ClRXVVH Bk.tCuE^ 
 
 
 
 THE ETHEL CARR PEACOCK 
 
 
 
 MEMORIAL COLLECTION 
 
 
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 Matris amori monumentum 
 
 
 
 
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 TRINITY COLLEGE LIBRARY 
 
 DURHAM, N. C. 
 
 
 
 1903 
 
 
 
 Gift of Dr. and Mrs. Dred Peacock 
 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/jamesmadison01gays_0 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
American Statesmen 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 
 
*L S’ to *40 
 
 American J>tate£mm 
 
 JAMES MADISON 
 
 SYDNEY HOWARD GAY 
 
 2 5 6 4-3 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 
 
 New York: 11 East Seventeenth Street 
 (C6e Ritasibe Dress, <Tam6nbse 
 1894 
 
Copyright, 1884, 
 
 By SYDNEY HOWARD GAY. 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 
 The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A. 
 Electrotyped and Printed by H. 0. Houghton & Company. 
 
923,173 
 
 M / g ^ Q 
 
 P 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Page 
 
 The Virginia Madisons 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Young Statesman 16 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 In Congress 29 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 In the State Assembly 47 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 In the Virginia Legislature 64 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Public Disturbances and Anxieties .... 76 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Constitutional Convention 88 
 
 CHAPTER VIH, 
 
 “ The Compromises ” 93 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Adoption of the Constitution 115 
 
 2 - f 6 * 0 
 
VI 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER. X. 
 
 The First Congress 128 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 National Finances. — Slavery 151 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Federalists and Republicans 172 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 French Politics 193 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 His Latest Years in Congress 216 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 At Home. — “ Resolutions of ’98 and ’99 ” . . . 234 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Secretary of State 252 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 The Embargo 264 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 Madison as President 283 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 War with England 301 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 Conclusion 321 
 
 INDEX 
 
 339 
 
JAMES MADISON. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE VIRGINIA MADISONS. 
 
 James Madison was born on March 16, 1751, 
 at Port Conway, Virginia ; he died at Montpellier, 
 in that State, on June 28, 1836. Mr. John 
 Quincy Adams, recalling, perhaps, the death of 
 his own father and of Jefferson on the same 
 Fourth of July, and that of Monroe on a subse- 
 quent anniversary of that day, may possibly have 
 seen a generous propriety in finding some equally 
 appropriate commemoration for the death of an- 
 other Virginian President. For it was quite pos- 
 sible that Virginia might think him capable of an 
 attempt to conceal, what to her mind would seem 
 to be an obvious intention of Providence : that all 
 the children of the “ Mother of Presidents ” should 
 be no less distinguished in their deaths than in 
 their lives — that the “ other dynasty,” which 
 John Randolph was wont to talk about, should 
 no longer pretend to an equality with them, not 
 
2 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 merely in this world, but in the manner of going 
 out of it. At any rate, he notes the date of Mad- 
 ison’s death, the twenty-eighth day of June, as 
 “the anniversary of the day on which the ratifi- 
 cation of the Convention of Virginia in 1788 had 
 affixed the seal of James Madison as the father 
 of the Constitution of the United States, when 
 his earthly part sank without a struggle into the 
 grave, and a spirit, bright as the seraphim that 
 surround the throne of Omnipotence, ascended to 
 the bosom of his God.” There can be no doubt of 
 the deep sincerity of this tribute, whatever ques- 
 tion there may be of its grammatical construction 
 and its I’hetoric, and although the date is errone- 
 ous. The ratification of the Constitution of the 
 United States by the Virginia Convention was on 
 June 25, not on June 28. It is the misfortune of 
 our time that we have no living great men held in 
 such universal veneration that their dying on com- 
 mon days like common mortals seems quite impos- 
 sible. Half a century ago, however, the propriety 
 of such providential arrangements appears to have 
 been recognized almost as one of the “ institu- 
 tions.” It was the newspaper gossip of that time 
 that a “ distinguished physician ” declared that he 
 would have kept a fourth ex-President alive to 
 die on a Fourth of July, had the illustrious sick 
 man been under his treatment. The patient him- 
 self, had he been consulted, might, in that case, 
 possibly have declined to have a fatal illness pro- 
 
THE VIRGINIA MADISONS,. 
 
 3 
 
 longed a week to gratify the public fondness for 
 patriotic coincidence. But Mr. Adams’s appropri- 
 ation of another anniversary answered all the pur- 
 pose, for that he made a mistake as to the date 
 does not seem to have been discovered. 
 
 It was accidental that Port Conway was the 
 birthplace of Madison. His maternal grandfather, 
 whose name was Conway, had a plantation at 
 that place, and young Mrs. Madison happened to 
 be there on a visit to her mother when her first 
 child, James, was born. In the stately — not to 
 say, stilted — biography of him by William C. 
 Rives, the christened name of this lady is given as 
 Eleanor. Mr. Rives may have thought it not in 
 accordance with ancestral dignity that the mother 
 of so distinguished a son should have been bur- 
 dened with so commonplace and homely a name 
 as Nelly. But we are afraid it is true that Nelly 
 was her name. No other biographer than Mr. 
 Rives, that we know of, calls her Eleanor. Even 
 Madison himself permits “ Nelly ” to pass under 
 his eyes and from his hands as his mother’s name. 
 
 In 1833-34 there was some correspondence be- 
 tween him and Lyman C. Draper, the historian, 
 which includes some notes upon the Madison 
 genealogy. These, the ex-President writes, were 
 ‘•made out by a member of the family,” and they 
 may be considered, therefore, as having his sanc- 
 tion. The first record is that “ James Madison 
 was the son of James Madison and Nelly Con- 
 
4 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 way.” On such authority Nelly, and not Eleanor, 
 must be accepted as the mother’s name. This, of 
 course, is to be regretted from the Rives point of 
 view ; but perhaps the name had a less familiar 
 sound a century and a half ago ; and no doubt 
 it was chosen by her parents without a thought 
 that their daughter might go into history as the 
 mother of a President, or that any higher fortune 
 could befall her than to be the respectable head 
 of a tobacco-planter’s family on the banks of the 
 Rappahannock. 
 
 This genealogical record further says that “ his 
 [Madison’s] ancestors, on both sides, were not 
 among the most wealthy of the country, but in 
 independent and comfortable circumstances.” If 
 this comment was added at the ex-President’s own 
 dictation it was quite in accordance with his un- 
 pretentious character . 1 One might venture to say 
 
 1 Dr. Draper has kindly put into our hands the correspondence 
 between himself and Mr. Madison, and we copy these genealog- 
 ical notes in full, with the letter in which they were sent, as all 
 that the ex-President had to say about his ancestry : — 
 
 “ Montpellier, February 1, 1834. 
 
 “Dear Sir, — I have received your letter of December 31st, 
 and inclose a sketch on the subject of it, made out by a member 
 of the family. With friendly respects, 
 
 “James Madison.” 
 
 “ James Madison was the son of James Madison and Nelly 
 Conway. He was born on the 5th of March, 1751 (O. S.), at 
 Port Conway, on the Rappahannock River, where she was at the 
 time on a visit to her mother residing there. 
 
 “ His father was the son of Ambrose Madison and Frances 
 
THE VIRGINIA MADISONS. 
 
 5 
 
 as much of a Northern or a Western farmer. But 
 they did not farm in Virginia ; they planted. Mr. 
 Rives says that the elder James was “ a large 
 landed proprietor ; ” and he adds, “ a large landed 
 estate in Virginia . . . was a mimic common- 
 wealth, with its foreign and domestic relations, 
 and its regular administrative hierarchy.” The 
 “foreign relations” were the shipping, once a 
 year, a few hogsheads of tobacco to a London fac- 
 tor ; the “ mimic commonwealths ” were clusters 
 of negro-huts, and the “ administrative hierarchy ” 
 was the priest who was more at home at the tav- 
 ern or a horse-race than in the discharge of his 
 clerical duties. 
 
 As Mr. Madison had only to say of his immedi- 
 ate ancestors, — which seems to be all he knew 
 about them, — that they were in “ independent 
 and comfortable circumstances,” so he was, ap- 
 
 Taylor. His mother was the daughter of Francis Conway and 
 Rebecca Catlett. 
 
 “ His paternal grandfather was the son of John Madison and 
 Isabella Minor Todd. His paternal grandmother, the daughter 
 of James Taylor and Martha Thompson. 
 
 “ His maternal grandfather was the son of Edwin Conway and 
 Elizabeth Thornton. His maternal grandmother, the daughter 
 of John Catlett and Gaines. 
 
 “ His father was a planter, and dwelt on the estate now called 
 Montpellier where he died February 27, 1801, in the 78th year of 
 his age. His mother died at the same place in 1829, February 
 11th, in the 9Sth year of her age. 
 
 “ His grandfathers were also planters. It appears that his an- 
 cestors, on both sides, were not among the most wealthy of the 
 country, but in independent and comfortable circumstances.” 
 
6 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 parently, as little inclined to talk about bimself ; 
 even at that age when it is supposed that men who 
 have enjoyed celebrity find their own lives the 
 most agreeable of subjects. In answer to Dr. 
 Draper’s inquiries he wrote this modest letter, 
 now for the first time published: — 
 
 “Montpellier, August 9, 1833.' 
 
 “Dear Sir, — Since your letter of the 3d of June 
 came to hand, my increasing age and continued mala- 
 dies, with the many attentions due from me, had caused 
 a delay in acknowledging it, for which these circum- 
 stances must be an apology, in your case, as I have 
 been obliged to make them in others. 
 
 “ You wish me to refer you to sources of printed in- 
 formation on my career in life, and it would afford me 
 pleasure to do so ; hut my recollection on the subject is 
 very defective. It occurs [to me] that there was a bio- 
 graphical volume in an enlarged edition compiled by 
 General or Judge Rodgers, of Pennsylvania, and which 
 may perhaps have included my name, among others. 
 When or where it was published I cannot say. To this 
 reference I can only add generally the newspapers at 
 the seat of government and elsewhere during the elec- 
 tioneering periods, when I was one of the objects under 
 review. I need scarcely remark that a life, which has 
 been so much a public life, must of course be traced in 
 the public transactions in which it was involved, and 
 that the most important of them are to be found in doc- 
 uments already in print, or soon to be so. 
 
 “ With friendly respects, James Madison. 
 
 “ Lyman C. Draper, Lockport, N. Y.” 
 
THE VIRGINIA MADISONS. 
 
 1 
 
 The genealogical statement, it will be observed, 
 does not go farther back than Mr. Madison’s 
 great-grandfather, John. Mr. Rives supposes that 
 this John was the son of another John who, as “the 
 pious researches of kindred have ascertained,” 
 took out a patent for land about 1653, between the 
 North and York rivers on the shores of Chesa- 
 peake Bay. The same writer further assumes 
 that this John was descended from Captain Isaac 
 Madison, whose name appears “ in a document 
 in the State Paper Office at London containing 
 a list of the Colonists in 1623.” From Sains- 
 bury’s Calendar 1 we learn something more of this 
 Captain Isaac than this mere mention. Under 
 date of January 24, 1623, there is this record : 
 “ Captain Powell, gunner, of James City, is dead ; 
 Capt. Nuce (?), Capt. Maddison, Lieut. Craddock’s 
 brother, and divers more of the chief men re- 
 ported dead.” But either the report was not alto- 
 gether true, or there was another Isaac Maddison ; 
 for the name appears among the signatures to a 
 letter dated about a month later — February 20 — 
 from the Governor, Council, and Assembly of 
 Virginia to the King. It is of record, also, that 
 four months later still, on June 4, “Capt. Isaac 
 and Mary Maddison ” were before the Governor 
 
 1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, 1574-1660, Pre- 
 served in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty’s Public 
 Record Office, edited by W. Noel Sainsbury, Esq., etc. London, 
 1860. 
 
8 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 and Council as witnesses in the case of Greville 
 Pooley and Cicely Jordan, between whom there 
 was a “ supposed contract of marriage,” made 
 “ three or four days after her husband’s death.” 
 But the lively widow, it seems, afterward “ con- 
 tracted herself to Will Ferrar before the Governor 
 and Council, and disavowed the former contract,” 
 and the case therefore became so complicated that 
 the court was “not able to decide so nice a differ- 
 ence.” What Captain Isaac and Mary Maddison 
 knew about the matter the record does not tell 
 us ; but the evidence is conclusive that if there 
 was but one Isaac Maddison in Virginia in 1623 
 he did not die in January of that year. Probably 
 there was but one, and he, as Rives assumes, was 
 the Captain Madyson of whose “achievement,” 
 as Rives calls it, there is a brief narrative in John 
 Smith’s “ General History of Virginia.” 
 
 Besides the record in Sainsbury’s Calendar of 
 the rumor of the death of this Isaac in Virginia, 
 in January, 1623 ; his signature to a letter to the 
 King in February ; and his appearance as a wit- 
 ness before the Council in the case of the widow 
 Jordan, in June, it appears by Hotten’s Lists of 
 colonists, taken from the Records in the English 
 State Paper Department, that Captain Isacke 
 Maddeson and Mai'y Maddeson were living in 1624 
 at West and Sherlow Hundred Island. The next 
 year, at the same place, he is on the list of dead ; 
 and there is given under the same date “ The 
 
THE VIRGINIA MADISONS. 
 
 9 
 
 muster of Mrs. Mary Maddison, widow, aged 30 
 years.” Her family consisted of “ Katherin Lay- 
 den, child, aged 7 years,” and two servants. 
 Katherine, it may be assumed, was the daughter 
 of the widow Mary and Captain Isaac, and their 
 only child. These “ musters,” it should be said, 
 appear always to have been made with great care, 
 and there is therefore hardly a possibility that a 
 son, if there were one, was omitted in the numer- 
 ation of the widow’s family, while the name and 
 age of the little girl, and the names and ages of 
 the two servants, the date of their arrival in Vir- 
 ginia, and the name of the ship that each came 
 in, are all carefully given. The conclusion is in- 
 evitable ; Isaac Maddison left no male descend- 
 ants, and President Madison’s earliest ancestor in 
 Virginia, if it was not his great-grandfather John, 
 must be looked for somewhere else. 
 
 Mr. Rives knew nothing of these Records. His 
 first volume was published before either Sains- 
 bury’s Calendar or Hotten’s Lists ; and the re- 
 searches, on which he relied, “ conducted by a 
 distinguished member of the Historical Society of 
 Virginia ” in the English State Paper Office, 
 were, so far as they related to the Madisons, in- 
 complete and worthless. The family was not, 
 apparently, “coeval with the foundation of the 
 Colony,” and did not arrive “ among the earliest 
 of the emigrants in the new world.” That dis. 
 tinction cannot be claimed for James Madison, 
 
10 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 nor is there any reason for supposing that he be- 
 lieved it could be. He seemed quite content with 
 the knowledge that so far back as his great-grand- 
 father his ancestors had been respectable people, 
 “ in independent and comfortable circumstances.” 
 
 Of his own generation there were seven chil- 
 dren, of whom James was the eldest, and alone 
 became of any note, except that the rest were 
 reputable and contented people in their stations of 
 life. A hundred years ago the Arcadian Vir- 
 ginia, for which Governor Berkeley had thanked 
 God so devoutly, — when there was not a free 
 school nor a press in the province, — had passed 
 away. The elder Madison resolved, so Mr. Rives 
 tells us, that his children should have advantages 
 of education which had not been within his own 
 reach, and that they should all enjoy them equally. 
 James was sent to a school where he could at 
 least begin the studies which should fit him to 
 enter college. Of the master of that school we 
 know nothing except that he was a Scotchman, 
 of the name of Donald Robertson, and that many 
 years afterward, when his son was an applicant 
 for office to Madison, then Secretary of State, the 
 pupil gratefully remembered his old master, and 
 indorsed upon the application that “ the writer is 
 son of Donald Robertson, the learned Teacher in 
 King and Queen County, Virginia.” 
 
 The preparatory studies for college were fin- 
 ished at home under the clergyman of the parish, 
 
THE VIRGINIA MADISONS. 
 
 11 
 
 the Rev. Thomas Martin, who was a member of 
 Mr. Madison’s family, perhaps as a private tutor, 
 perhaps as a boarder. It is quite likely that it 
 was by the advice of this gentleman — who was 
 from New Jersey — that the lad was sent to 
 Princeton, instead of to William and Mary Col- 
 lege in Virginia. At Princeton, at any rate, he 
 entered at the age of eighteen, in 1769; or, to 
 borrow Mr. Rives’s eloquent statement of the 
 fact, “ the young Virginian, invested with the 
 toga virilis of anticipated manhood, we now see 
 launched on that disciplinary career which is to 
 form him for the future struggles of life.” 
 
 One of his biographers says that he shortened 
 his collegiate term by taking in one year the 
 studies of the junior and senior years: but that 
 he remained another twelve-month at Princeton 
 for the sake of acquiring Hebrew. On his return 
 home he undertook the instruction of his younger 
 brothers and sisters, while pursuing his own stud- 
 ies. Still another biographer asserts that he be- 
 gan immediately to read law; but Rives gives 
 some evidence that he devoted himself to theol- 
 ogy. This and his giving himself to Hebrew for 
 a year point to the ministry as his chosen profes- 
 sion. But if we rightly interpret his own words, 
 he had little strength or spirit for a pursuit of any 
 sort. His first “ struggle of life” was apparently 
 with ill health, and the career he looked forward 
 to was a speedy journey to another world. In a 
 
12 
 
 JAMES MADISON. . 
 
 letter to a friend (November, 1772) he writes, “I 
 am too dull and infirm now to look out for ex- 
 traordinary things in this world, for I think my 
 sensations for many months have intimated to 
 me not to expect a long or healthy life ; though 
 it may be better with me after some time ; but I 
 hardly dare expect it, and therefore have little 
 spirit or elasticity to set about anything that is 
 difficult in acquiring, and useless in possessing 
 after one has exchanged time for eternity.” In 
 the same letter he assures his friend that he ap- 
 proves of his choice of history and morals as the 
 subjects of his winter studies ; but, he adds, “ I 
 doubt not but you design to season them with a 
 little divinity now and then, which, like the phi- 
 losopher’s stone in the hands of a good man, will 
 turn them and every lawful acquirement into the 
 nature of itself, and make them more precious 
 than fine gold.” 
 
 The bent of his mind at this time seems to 
 have been decidedly religious. He was a diligent 
 student of the Bible, and, Mr. Rives says, “ he 
 explored the whole history and evidences of 
 Christianity on every side, through clouds of wit- 
 nesses and champions for and against, from the 
 fathers and schoolmen down to the infidel philos- 
 ophers of the eighteenth century.” So wide a 
 range of theological study is remarkable in a 
 youth of only two or three and twenty years of 
 age ; but, remembering that he was at this time 
 
THE VIRGINIA MADISONS. 
 
 13 
 
 living at home, it is even more remai’kable that 
 in the bouse of an ordinary planter in Virginia 
 a hundred and twenty years ago could be found a 
 library so rich in theology as to admit of study so 
 exhaustive. But in Virginia history nothing is 
 impossible. 
 
 His studies on this subject, however, whether 
 wide or limited, bore good fruit. Religious intol- 
 erance was at that time common in his immediate 
 neighborhood, and it aroused him to earnest and 
 open opposition ; nor did that opposition cease till 
 years afterward, when freedom of conscience was 
 established by law in Virginia, largely by his la- 
 bors and influence. Even in 1774, when all the 
 colonies were girding themselves for the coming 
 revolutionary conflict, he turned aside from a dis- 
 cussion of the momentous question of the hour, in 
 a letter to his friend 1 in Philadelphia, and ex- 
 claimed with unwonted heat : — 
 
 “ But away with politics ! . . . That diabolical, hell- 
 conceived principle of persecution rages among some ; 
 and, to their eternal infamy, the clergy can furnish 
 their quota of imps for such purposes. There are at 
 this time in the adjacent country not less than five or 
 six well-meaning men in close jail for publishing their 
 religious sentiments, which in the main are very ortho- 
 dox. I have neither patience to hear, talk, or think of 
 
 1 The letters to a friend, from which we have quoted, were 
 written to William Bradford, Jr., of Philadelphia, afterward At- 
 torney-General in Washington’s administration. They are given 
 in full in The Writings of James Madison, vol. i. 
 
14 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 anything relative to this matter ; for I have squabbled 
 and scolded, abused and ridiculed so long about it to lit- 
 tle purpose that I am without common patience.” 
 
 These are stronger terms than the mild-tem- 
 pered Madison often indulged in. But he felt 
 strongly. Probably he, no more than many 
 other wiser and older men, understood what was 
 to be the end of the political struggle which was 
 getting so earnest ; but evidently in his mind it 
 was religious rather than civil liberty which was 
 to be guarded. “ If the Church of England,” he 
 says in the same letter, “ had been the established 
 and general religion in all the Northern colonies, 
 as it has been among us here, and uninterrupted 
 harmony had prevailed throughout the continent, 
 it is clear to me that slavery and subjection might 
 and would have been gradually insinuated among 
 us.” 
 
 He congratulated his friend that they had not 
 permitted the tea-ships to break cargo in Philadel- 
 phia ; and Boston, he hoped, would “ conduct 
 matters with as much discretion as they seem to 
 do with boldness.” These things were interest- 
 ing and important; but “away with politics! 
 Let me address you as a student and philosopher, 
 and not as a patriot.” Shut off from any contact 
 with the stirring incidents of that year in the 
 towns of the coast, he lost something of the sense 
 of proportion. To a young student, solitary, ill 
 in body, perhaps a trifle morbid, in mind, a lit- 
 
THE VIRGINIA MADISONS. 
 
 15 
 
 tie discontented that all the learning gained at 
 Princeton could find no better use than to save 
 schooling for the six youngsters at home, — to him 
 it may have seemed that liberty was more seri- 
 ously threatened by that outrage, under his own 
 eyes, of “ five or six well-meaning men in close 
 jail for publishing their religious sentiments,” 
 than by any tax which Parliament could contrive. 
 Not that he overestimated the importance of this 
 wrong, but that he underestimated the importance 
 of that. He was not long, however, in getting 
 the true perspective. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE YOUNG STATESMAN. 
 
 Madison’s place, both from temperament and 
 from want of physical vigor, was in the council, 
 not in the field. One of his early biographers 
 says that he joined a military company, raised in 
 his own county, in preparation for war; but this, 
 there can hardly be a doubt, is an error. He 
 speaks with enthusiasm of the “high-spirited” 
 volunteei’s, who came forward to defend “ the honor 
 and safety of their country ; ” but there is no in- 
 timation that he chose for himself that way of 
 showing his patriotism. But of the Committee of 
 Safety, appointed in his county in 1774, he was 
 made a member — perhaps the youngest, for he 
 was then only twenty-three years old. 
 
 Eighteen months afterward he was elected a 
 delegate to the Virginia Convention of 1776, and 
 this he calls “ my first entrance into public life.” 
 It gave him also an opportunity for some distinc- 
 tion, which, whatever may have been his earlier 
 plans, opened public life to him as a career. The 
 first work of the convention was to consider and 
 adopt a series of resolutions instructing the Vir- 
 
THE YOUNG STATESMAN. 
 
 17 
 
 ginian delegates in the Continental Congress, then 
 in session at Philadelphia, to urge an immediate 
 declaration of independence. The next matter 
 was to frame a Bill of Rights and a Constitution of 
 government for the province. Madison was made a 
 member of the committee to which this latter sub- 
 ject was referred. One question necessarily came 
 up for consideration which had for him a peculiar 
 interest, and in any discussion of which he, no 
 doubt, felt quite at ease. This was concerning re- 
 ligious freedom. An article in the proposed Dec- 
 laration of Rights provided that “ all men should 
 enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of re- 
 ligion, according to the dictates of conscience, 
 unpunished and unrestrained by the magistrate, 
 unless, under color of religion, any man disturb 
 the peace, happiness, or safety of society.” It 
 does not appear that Mr. Madison offered any 
 objection to the article in the committee ; but 
 when the report was made to the convention he 
 moved an amendment. He pointed out the dis- 
 tinction between the recognition of an absolute 
 right and the toleration of its exercise ; for toler- 
 ation implies the power of jurisdiction. He pro- 
 posed, therefore, instead of providing that “all 
 men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the ex- 
 ercise of religion,” to declare that “ all men are 
 equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it 
 according to the dictates of conscience ; ” and that 
 kt no man or class of men ought, on account of re- 
 
18 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 ligion, to be invested with peculiar emoluments or 
 privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disa- 
 bilities, unless, under color of religion, the preser- 
 vation of equal liberty and the existence of the 
 State be manifestly endangered.” This distinction 
 between the assertion of a right and the promise 
 to grant a privilege only needed to be pointed out. 
 But Mr. Madison evidently meant more ; he meant 
 not only that religious freedom should be assured, 
 but that an Established Church, which, as we have 
 already seen, he believed to be dangerous to lib- 
 erty, should be prohibited. Possibly the conven- 
 tion was not quite ready for this latter step ; or 
 possibly its members thought that, as the greater 
 includes the less, should freedom of conscience be 
 established a state church would be impossible, 
 and the article might therefore be stripped of super- 
 erogation and verbiage. At any rate it was re- 
 duced one half, and finally adopted in this simpler 
 form : “ That religion, or the duty we owe to our 
 Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be 
 directed only by reason and conviction, not by force 
 or violence ; and, therefore, all men are equally 
 entitled to the free exercise of religion according 
 to the dictates of conscience.” Thus it stands to 
 this day in the Bill of Rights of Virginia, and of 
 other States which subsequently made it their own, 
 possessing for us the personal interest of being the 
 first public work of the coming statesman. 
 
 Madison was thenceforth for the next forty 
 
THE YOUNG STATESMAN. 
 
 19 
 
 years a public man. Of tlie first Assembly under 
 the new Constitution, he was elected a member. 
 For the next session also he was a candidate, but 
 failed to be returned for a reason as creditable to 
 him as it was uncommon then, whatever it may 
 be now, in Virginia. “ The sentiments and man- 
 ners of the parent nation,” Mr. Rives says, still 
 prevailed in Virginia, “ and the modes of canvass- 
 ing for popular votes in that country were gener- 
 ally practiced. The people not only tolerated, 
 but expected and even required, to be courted and 
 treated. No candidate who neglected those atten- 
 tions could be elected.” But the times, Mr. Mad- 
 ison thought, seemed “ to favor a more chaste 
 mode of conducting elections,” and he “deter- 
 mined to attempt, by an example, to introduce it.” 
 He failed signally ; “ the sentiments and manners 
 of the parent nation” were too much for him. He 
 solicited no votes ; nobody got drunk at his ex- 
 pense; and he lost the election. An attempt was 
 made to contest the return of his opponent on the 
 ground of corrupt influence, but, adds Mr. Rives, 
 in his sesquipedalian measure, “for the want of 
 adequate proof to sustain the allegations of the 
 petition, which in such cases it is extremely diffi- 
 cult to obtain with the requisite precision, the pro- 
 ceeding was unavailing except as a perpetual pro- 
 test upon the legislative records of the country, 
 against a dangerous abuse, of which one of her 
 sons, so qualified to serve her, and destined to be 
 
20 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 one of her chief ornaments, was the early though 
 temporary victim.” Mr. Rives does not mean that 
 Mr. Madison was for a little while in early life 
 the victim of a vicious habit ; but that he lost 
 votes because he would do nothing to encourage it 
 in others. 
 
 The country lost a good representative, but 
 their loss was his gain. The Assembly immedi- 
 ately elected him a member of the governor’s 
 council, and in this position he so grew in public 
 favor that, two years afterward (1780), he was 
 chosen as a delegate to the Continental Congress. 
 He was still under thirty, and had he been even 
 a more brilliant young man than he really was, it 
 would not have been to his discredit had he only 
 been seen for the next year or two, if seen at all, 
 in the background. He had taken his seat among 
 men, every one of whom, probably, was his senior, 
 and among whom were many of the wisest men in 
 the country, not “ older ” merely, but “ better sol- 
 diers.” 
 
 If not the darkest, at least there was no darker 
 year in the Revolution than that of 1780. Within 
 a few days of his arrival at Philadelphia, Madison 
 wrote to Jefferson, — then governor of Virginia, — 
 his opinion of the state of the country. It was 
 gloomy but not exaggerated. The only bright 
 spot he could see was the chance that Clinton’s 
 expedition to South Carolina might be a failure ; 
 but within little more than a month from the date 
 
THE YOUNG STATESMAN. 
 
 21 
 
 of his letter, Lincoln was compelled to surrender 
 Charleston, and the whole country south of Vir- 
 ginia seemed about to fall into the hands of the 
 enemy. Could he have foreseen that calamity, 
 his apprehensions might have been changed to 
 despair ; for he writes : — 
 
 “ Our army threatened with an immediate alternative 
 of disbanding or living on free quarter ; the public treas- 
 ury empty ; public credit exhausted, nay, the private 
 credit of purchasing agents employed, I am told, as far 
 as it will bear ; Congress complaining of the extortion 
 of the people ; the people of the improvidence of Con- 
 gress ; and the army of both ; our affairs requiring the 
 most mature and systematic measures, and the urgency 
 of occasions admitting only of temporary expedients, 
 and these expedients generating new difficulties; Con- 
 gress recommending plans to the several States for 
 execution, and the States separately rejudging the expe- 
 diency of such plans, whereby the same distrust of con- 
 current exertions that had damped the ardor of patri- 
 otic individuals must produce the same effect among the 
 States themselves ; an old system of finance discarded as 
 incompetent to our necessities, an untried and precarious 
 one substituted, and a total stagnation in prospect be- 
 tween the end of the former and the operation of the 
 latter. These are the outlines of the picture of our 
 public situation. I leave it to your own imagination to 
 fill them up.” 
 
 He saw more clearly, perhaps, after the ex- 
 perience of one session of Congress, the true cause 
 of all these troubles ; at any rate he was able, in 
 
22 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 a letter written in November of that year (1780), 
 to state it tersely and explicitly. The want of 
 money, he wrote to a friend, “ is the source of all 
 our public difficulties and misfortunes. One or 
 two millions of guineas properly applied would 
 diffuse vigor and satisfaction throughout the whole 
 military department, and would expel the enemy 
 from every part of the United States.” 
 
 But nobody knew better than he the difficulty 
 of raising funds except by borrowing abroad, and 
 that this was a precarious reliance. There must 
 be some sort of substitute for money. In specific 
 taxation he had no faith. Such taxes, if paid at 
 all, would be paid, virtually, in the paper currency 
 or certificates of the States, and these had already 
 fallen to the ratio of one hundred to one ; they 
 kept on falling till they reached the rate of a 
 thousand to one, and then soon became alto- 
 gether worthless. When the estimate for the 
 coming year was under consideration, he proposed 
 to Congress that the States should be advised to 
 abandon the issue of this paper currency. “ It 
 met,” he says, “ with so cool a reception that I 
 did not much urge it.” The sufficient answer to 
 the proposition was, that “ the practice was man- 
 ifestly repugnant to the Acts of Congress,” and as 
 these were disregarded and could not be enforced, 
 a mere remonstrance would be quite useless. The 
 Union was little more than a name under the 
 feeble bonds of the Confederation, and each 
 
THE YOUNG STATESMAN. 
 
 23 
 
 State was a law unto itself. Not that in this 
 case there was much reasonable ground for com- 
 plaint ; for what else could the States do ? Where 
 there was no money there must be something 
 to take its place ; a promise to pay must be ac- 
 cepted instead of payment. The paper answered 
 a temporary purpose, though it was plain that in 
 the end it would be good for nothing. 
 
 The evil, however, was manifestly so gi’eat that 
 there was only the more reason for trying to mit- 
 igate it, if it could not be cured. Madison, like 
 the rest, had his remedy. He proposed, in a let- 
 ter to one of his colleagues, that the demand for 
 army supplies should be duly apportioned among 
 the people, their collection rigorously enforced, 
 and payment made in interest-bearing certificates, 
 not transferable, but to be redeemed at a specified 
 time after the war was over. The plan would un- 
 doubtedly have put a stop to the circulation of a 
 vast volume of paper money if the producers 
 would have exchanged the products of their labor 
 for certificates, useless at the time of exchange, 
 and having only a possible prospective value in 
 case of the successful termination of an uncertain 
 war. Patriotic as the people were, they neither 
 would nor could have submitted to such a law, 
 nor had Congress the power to enforce it. But 
 Mr. Madison did not venture apparently to urge 
 his plan beyond its suggestion tG his colleague. 
 
 Why the Assembly of Virginia should have 
 
24 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 proposed to elect an extra delegate to Congress, 
 early in 1781, is not clear, unless it be that one 
 of the number, Joseph Jones, being also a mem- 
 ber of the Assembly, passed much of his time 
 in Richmond. It does not appear, however, that 
 the delegate extraordinary was ever sent, per- 
 haps because it was known to Mr. Madison’s 
 friends that it would be a mortification to him- 
 There was certainly no good reason for any dis- 
 trust of either his ability or his industry. One 
 could hardly be otherwise than industrious who 
 had it in him — if the story be true — to take but 
 three hours out of the twenty-four for sleep during 
 the last year of his college course, that he might 
 crowd the studies of two years into one. He 
 seemed to love work for its own sake, and he was 
 a striking example of how much virtue there is in 
 steadiness of pursuit. Not that he had at this 
 time any special goal for his ambition. His aim 
 seemed to be simply to do the best he could where- 
 ever he might be placed ; to discharge faithfully, 
 and to the best of such ability as he had, whatever 
 duty was intrusted to him. His report of the 
 proceedings in the Congressional session of 1782- 
 83, and the letters written during those years and 
 the year before, show that he was not merely dil- 
 igent but absorbed in the duties of his office. 
 
 He was more faithful to his constituents than 
 his constituents sometimes were to him. Any- 
 thing that might happen at that period for want 
 
THE YOUNG STATESMAN. 
 
 25 
 
 of money can hardly be a matter of sui'prise ; but 
 Virginia, even then, should have been able, it 
 would seem, to find enough to enable its members 
 of Congress to pay their board-bills. He com- 
 plains gently in his Addisonian way of the incon- 
 venience to which he was put for want of funds. 
 “ I cannot,” he writes to Edmund Randolph, “ in 
 anyway make you more sensible of the importance 
 of your kind attention to pecuniary remittances for 
 me, than by informing you that I have for some 
 time past been a pensioner on the favor of Hayne 
 Solomon, a Jew broker.” A month later he 
 writes, that to draw bills on Virginia has been 
 tried, “ but in vain ; ” nobody would buy them ; 
 and he adds, “ I am relapsing fast into distress. 
 The case of my brethren is equally alarming.” 
 Within a week he again writes : “ I am almost 
 ashamed to reiterate my wants so incessantly to 
 you, but they begin to be so urgent that it is im- 
 possible to suppress them.” But the Good Sa- 
 maritan, Solomon, is still an unfailing reliance. 
 “ The kindness of our little friend in Front Street, 
 near the coffee house, is a fund which will pre- 
 serve me from extremities ; but I never resort to 
 it without great mortification, as he obstinately 
 rejects all recompense. The price of money is so 
 usurious, that he thinks it ought to be extorted 
 from none but those who aim at profitable specu- 
 lations. To a necessitous delegate he gratuitously 
 spares a supply out of his private stock.” It is a 
 
26 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 pretty picture of the simplicity of the early days 
 of the Republic. Between the average modern 
 member and the money-broker, under such cir- 
 cumstances, there would lurk, probably, a contract 
 for carrying the mails or for Indian supplies. 
 
 Relief, however, came at last. An appeal was 
 made in a letter to the Governor of Virginia, 
 which was so far public that anybody about the 
 executive office might read it. The answer to 
 this letter, says Mr. Madison, “ seems to chide our 
 urgency.” But there soon came a bill for two 
 hundred dollars, which, he adds, “ very seasonably 
 enabled me to replace a loan by which I had an- 
 ticipated it. About three hundred and fifty more 
 (not less) would redeem me completely from the 
 class of debtors.” It is to be hoped it came with- 
 out further chiding . 1 
 
 The young member was not less attentive to 
 his congressional duties because of these little 
 difficulties in the personal ways and means. Mil- 
 itary movements seem, without altogether escap- 
 ing his attention, to have interested him the 
 least. In his letters to the public men at home, 
 which were meant in some degree to give such 
 
 1 The members of Congress were paid, at that time, by the 
 States they represented. Virginia allowed her delegates their 
 family expenses, including three servants and four horses, house 
 rent and fuel, two dollars a mile for travel, and twenty dollars a 
 day when in attendance on Congress. The members were re- 
 quired to render an account, quarterly, of their household ex- 
 penses, and the State paid them when she had any money. 
 
THE YOUNG STATESMAN. 
 
 27 
 
 information as, in later times, the newspapers sup- 
 plied, questions relating to army affairs, even news 
 directly from the army, occupy the least space. 
 They are not always, for that reason, altogether 
 entertaining reading. One would be glad, occa- 
 sionally, to exchange their sonorous and rounded 
 periods for any expression of quick, impulsive 
 feeling. “ I return you,” he writes to Pendleton, 
 “ my fervent congratulations on the glorious suc- 
 cess of the combined armies at York and Glouces- 
 ter. We have had from the Commander-in-Chief 
 an official report of the fact,” — and so forth and 
 so forth ; and then for a page or more is a discus- 
 sion of the condition of British possessions in the 
 East Indies, that “ rich source of their commerce 
 and credit, severed from them, perhaps forever ; ” 
 of “ the predatory conquest of Eustatia,” and of 
 the “ relief of Gibraltar, which was merely a neg- 
 ative advantage ; ” — all to show that “ it seems 
 scarcely possible for them much longer to shut 
 their ears against the voice of peace.” There is 
 not a word in all this that is not quite true, perti- 
 nent, reflective, and becoming a statesman ; but 
 neither is there a woi’d of sympathetic warmth 
 and patriotic fervor which at that moment made 
 the heart of a whole people beat quicker at the 
 news of a great victory, and in the hope that the 
 cause was gained at last. 
 
 All the letters have this preternatural solem- 
 nity, as if each was a study in style after the 
 
28 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 favorite Addisonian model. One wonders if he 
 did not, in the privacy of his own room, and with 
 the door locked, venture to throw his hat to the 
 ceiling and give one hurrah under his breath, at 
 the discomfiture of the vain and self-sufficient 
 Cornwallis. But he seems never to have been 
 a young man. At one and twenty he gravely 
 warned his friend Bradford not “ to suffer those 
 impertinent fops that abound in every city to 
 divert you from your business and philosophical 
 amusements. ... You will make them respect 
 and admire you more by showing your indigna- 
 tion at their follies, and by keeping them at a 
 becoming distance.” It was his loss, however, 
 and our gain. He was one of the men the times 
 demanded, and without whom they would have 
 been quite different times and followed by quite 
 different results. The sombre hue of his life was 
 due partly, no doubt, to natural temperament ; 
 partly to the want of health in his earlier man- 
 hood, which led him to believe that his days were 
 numbered ; but quite as much, if not more than 
 either, to a keen sense of the responsibility resting 
 upon those to whom had fallen the conduct of 
 public affairs. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 IN CONGKESS. 
 
 Madison had grown steadily in the estimation 
 of his colleagues, as is shown, especially in 1783, 
 by the frequency of his appointment upon impor- 
 tant committees. He was a member of that one 
 to which was intrusted the question of national 
 finances, and it is plain, even in his own modest 
 report of the debates of that session, that he took 
 an important part in the long discussions of the 
 subject, and exei’cised a marked influence upon 
 the result. The position of the government was 
 one of extreme difficulty. To tide over an imme- 
 diate necessity, a further loan had been asked of 
 France in 1782, and bills were drawn against it 
 without waiting for acceptance. It was not vei’y 
 likely, but it was not impossible, that the bills 
 might go to protest ; but even should they be hon- 
 ored, so irregular a proceeding was a humiliat- 
 ing acknowledgment of poverty and weakness, to 
 which some of the delegates, Mr. Madison among 
 them, were extremely sensitive. 
 
 The national debt altogether was not less than 
 forty million dollars. To provide for the interest 
 
30 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 on this debt, and a fund for expenses, it was nec- 
 essary to raise about three million dollars annu- 
 ally. But the sum actually contributed for the 
 support of the confederate government in 1782 was 
 only half a million dollars. This was not from 
 any absolute inability on the part of the people to 
 pay more ; for the taxes before the war were more 
 than double that sum, and for the first three or 
 four years of the war it was computed that, with 
 the depreciation of paper money, the people sub- 
 mitted to an annual tax of about twenty million 
 dollars. The real difficulty lay in the character of 
 the Confederation. Congress might contrive but 
 it could not command. The States might agree, or 
 they might disagree, or any two or more of them 
 might only agree to disagree ; and they were more 
 likely to do either of the last two than the first. 
 There was no power of coercion anywhere. All 
 that Congress could do was to try to frame laws 
 that would reconcile differences, and bring thir- 
 teen supreme governments upon some common 
 ground of agreement. To distract and perplex it 
 still more, it stood face to face with a well-disci- 
 plined and veteran army which might at any mo- 
 ment, could it find a leader to its mind, march 
 upon Philadelphia and deal with Congress as 
 Cromwell dealt with the Long Parliament. There 
 were some men, probably, in that body, who would 
 not have been sorry to see that precedent fol- 
 lowed. Washington might have done it if he 
 
IN CONGRESS. 31 
 
 would. Gates probably would have done it if he 
 could. 
 
 To avert this threatened danger ; to contrive 
 taxation that should so far please the taxed that 
 they would refrain from using the power in their 
 hands to escape altogether any taxation for general 
 purposes, was the knottj 7 problem this Congress 
 had to solve in order to save the Confederacy from 
 dissolution. There was no want of plans and ex- 
 pedients ; neither were there wanting men in that 
 body who clearly understood the conditions of the 
 problem, and how it might be solved, and whose 
 aim was direct and unfaltering. Chief among 
 them were Hamilton, Wilson, Ellsworth, and 
 Madison. However wrong-headed, or weak, or in- 
 temperate others may have been, these men were 
 usually found together on important questions ; 
 differing sometimes in details, but unmoved by 
 passion or prejudice, and strong from reserved 
 force, they overwhelmed their opponents at the 
 right moment with irresistible argument and by 
 weight of character. 
 
 In the discussion of the more important ques- 
 tions Mr. Madison is conspicuous — conspicuous 
 without being obtrusive. A reader of the debates 
 can hardly fail to be struck with his familiarity 
 with English constitutional law, and its applica- 
 tion to the necessities of this off-shoot of the Eng- 
 lish people in setting up a government for them- 
 selves. The stores of knowledge he drew upon 
 
32 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 must needs have been laid up in the years of quiet 
 study at home before he entered upon public life. 
 For there was no congressional library then where 
 a member could “ cram ” for debate ; and — though 
 Philadelphia already had a fair public library — 
 the member who was armed at all points must 
 have equipped himself before entering Congress. 
 In this respect Madison probably had no equal, 
 except Hamilton, and possibly Ellsworth. To 
 the need of such a library, however, he and others 
 were not insensible. As chairman of a commit- 
 tee he reported a list of books “ proper for the 
 use of Congress,” and advised their purchase. 
 The report declared that certain authorities upon 
 international law, treaties, negotiations, and other 
 questions of legislation, were absolutely indispen- 
 sable, and that the want of them “ was manifest 
 in several Acts of Congress.” But the Congress 
 was not to be moved by a little thing of that sort. 
 
 The attitude of his own State sometimes em- 
 barrassed him in the satisfactory discharge of his 
 duty as a legislator. The earliest distinction he 
 won after entering Congress was as chairman of a 
 committee to enforce upon Mr. Jay, then minister 
 to Spain, the instructions to adhere tenaciously to 
 the right of navigation on the Mississippi, in his 
 negotiations for an alliance with that power. Mr. 
 Madison, in his dispatch, maintained the American 
 side of the question with a force and clearness to 
 which no subsequent discussion of the subject ever 
 
IN CONGRESS. 
 
 33 
 
 added anything. He left nothing unsaid that could 
 be said to sustain the right either on the ground of 
 expediency, of national comity, or of international 
 law ; and his arguments were not only in accord- 
 ance with his own convictions, but with the in- 
 structions of the Assembly of his own State. It 
 was a question of deep interest to Virginia, whose 
 western boundary at that time was the Mississippi. 
 But Virginia soon afterward shifted her position. 
 The course of the war in the Southern States in 
 the winter of 1780-81 aroused in Georgia and 
 the Carolinas renewed anxiety for an alliance with 
 Spain. The fear of their people was, that, in case 
 of the necessity for a sudden peace while the 
 British troops were in possession of those States 
 or parts of them, they might be compelled to re- 
 main as British territory under the application of 
 the rule of uti possidetis. It was urged, therefore, 
 that the right to the Mississippi should be surren- 
 dered to Spain, if it were made the condition of 
 an alliance. In deference to her neighbors Vir- 
 ginia proposed that Mr. Jay should be reinstructed 
 accordingly. 
 
 Mr. Madison was not in the least shaken in his 
 conviction. With him, the question was one of 
 right rather than of expediency. But not many 
 at that time ventured to doubt that representa- 
 tives must implicitly obey the instructions of their 
 constituents. He yielded; but not till he had ap- 
 pealed to the Assembly to reconsider their dec! 
 
 3 
 
34 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Bion. The scale was turned ; in deference to the 
 wishes of the Southern States new orders were 
 sent to Mr. Jay. Mr. Madison, however, had not 
 long to wait for his justification. When the im- 
 mediate dangei’, which had so alarmed the South, 
 had passed away, Virginia returned to her original 
 position. New instructions were again sent to 
 her representatives, and Mr. Jay was once more 
 advised by Congress, that on the Mississippi ques- 
 tion his government would yield nothing. 
 
 On another question, two years afterward, Mr. 
 Madison refused to accept a position of inconsist- 
 ency in obedience to instructions which his State 
 attempted to force upon him. No one saw moi'e 
 clearly than he how absolutely necessary to the 
 preservation of the Confederacy was the settle- 
 ment of its financial affairs on some sound and 
 just basis ; and no one labored more earnestly and 
 more intelligently than he to bring about such a 
 settlement. Congress had proposed in 1781 a tax 
 upon imports, each State to appoint its own col- 
 lectors but the revenue to be paid over to the 
 federal government to meet the expenses of the 
 war. Rhode Island alone, at first, refused her 
 assent to this scheme. An impost law of five per 
 cent, upon certain imports and a specific duty 
 upon others for tweiity-five years were an essential 
 part of the plan of 1783, to provide a revenue to 
 meet the interest on the public debt and for other 
 general purposes. That Rhode Island would con- 
 
IN CONGRESS. 
 
 35 
 
 tinue obstinate on this point was more than prob- 
 able ; and the only hope of moving her was that 
 she should be shamed or persuaded into compli- 
 ance by the combined influence of all the other 
 States. 
 
 Mr. Madison was as bitter as he could ever be 
 in his reflections upon that State, whose course, 
 he thought, showed a want of any sense of honor 
 or of patriotism. Virginia, he argued, should re- 
 buke her by making her own compliance with the 
 law the more emphatic, as an example for all the 
 rest. But Virginia did exactly the other thing. 
 At the moment when debate upon the revenue 
 law was the most earnest, and the prospect of 
 carrying it the most hopeful ; when a committee 
 appointed by Congress had already started on 
 their journey northward to expostulate with, and, 
 if possible, conciliate Rhode Island ; — at that 
 critical moment came news from Virginia that she 
 had revoked her assent of a previous session to 
 the impost law. This was equivalent to instruct- 
 ing her delegates in Congress to oppose any such 
 measure. The situation was an awkward one for 
 a representative who had put himself among the 
 foremost of those who were pushing this policy, 
 and who had been making invidious reflections 
 upon a State which opposed it. The rule that the 
 will of the constituents should govern the repre- 
 sentative, he now declared, had its exceptions, and 
 here was a case in point. He continued to en- 
 
36 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 force the necessity of a general law to provide a 
 revenue, though his arguments were no longer 
 pointed with the selfishness and want of patriot- 
 ism shown by the people of Rhode Island. In the 
 end his firmness was justified by Virginia, who 
 again shifted her position when the new act was 
 submitted to her. 
 
 The operation of the law Avas limited to five 
 and twenty years. This Hamilton opposed, and 
 Madison supported ; and in this difference some 
 of the biogi’aphers of both see the foreshadowing 
 of future parties. But it is more likely that 
 neither of those statesmen thought of their differ- 
 ence of opinion as difference of principle. The 
 question was, whether anything could be gained 
 by a deference to that party which, both felt at 
 that time, threatened to throw away, in adhering 
 to the state-rights doctrine, all that was gained 
 by the Revolution. They were agreed upon the 
 necessity of a general law, supreme in all the 
 States, to meet the obligation of a debt contracted 
 for the general good. Unless — wrote Madison in 
 February — “ unless some amicable and adequate 
 arrangements be speedily taken for adjusting all 
 the subsisting accounts and discharging the public 
 engagements, a dissolution of the Union will be 
 inevitable.” He was willing, therefore, to tem- 
 porize, that the necessary assent of the State to 
 such a law might be gained. Nobody hoped that 
 the public debt would be paid off in twenty-five 
 
IN CONGRESS. 
 
 37 
 
 years ; but to assume to levy a federal tax in the 
 States for a longer period, or till the debt should 
 be discharged, might so arouse state jealousy that 
 it would be impossible to get an assent to the law 
 anywhere. If the law for twenty-five years should 
 be accepted, the threatened destruction of the 
 government would be escaped for the present, and 
 it might, at the end of a quarter of a century, 
 be easj" to reenact the law. At any rate the evil 
 day would be put off. This was Madison’s rea- 
 soning. 
 
 But Hamilton did not believe in putting off a 
 crisis. He had no faith in the permanency of the 
 government as then organized. If he were right, 
 what was the use or the wisdom of postponing 
 a catastrophe till to-morrow ? A possible escape 
 from it might be even more difficult to-morrow 
 than to-day. The essential difference between 
 the two men was, that Madison only feared what 
 Hamilton positively knew, or thought he knew. 
 It was a difference of faith. Madison hoped some- 
 thing would turn up in the course of twenty-five 
 years. Hamilton did not believe that anything 
 good could turn up under the feeble rule of the 
 Confederation. He would have presented to the 
 States, then and there, the question — would they 
 surrender to the Confederate Government the right 
 of taxation sb long as that goverment thought it 
 necessary ? If not, then the Confederation was a 
 rope of sand, and the States had resolved them- 
 
88 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 selves into thirteen separate and independent gov- 
 ernments. Therefore he opposed the condition of 
 twenty-five years, and voted against the bill. 
 
 Nevertheless, when it became the law, he gave it 
 his heartiest support, and was appointed one of a 
 committee of three to prepare an address, which 
 Madison wrote, to commend it to the acceptance 
 of the States. Indeed, the last serious effort made 
 on behalf of the measure was made by Hamilton, 
 who used all his eloquence and influence to in- 
 duce the legislature of his own State to ratify it. 
 It was the law against his better judgment ; but 
 being the law he did his best to secure its recogni- 
 tion. But it failed of hearty support in most of 
 the States, while in New York and Pennsylvania 
 compliance with it was absolutely refused. Noth- 
 ing, therefore, would have been lost had Hamil- 
 ton’s firmness prevailed in Congress ; and nothing 
 was gained by Madison’s deference to the doc- 
 trine of state-rights, unless it was that the ques- 
 tion of a “more perfect Union” was put off to 
 a more propitious time, when a reconstruction of 
 the government under a new Federal Constitution 
 was possible. Meanwhile Congress borrowed the 
 money to pay the interest on money already bor- 
 rowed ; the Confederate Government floundered 
 deeper and deeper into inextricable difficulties ; 
 the thirteen ships of state drifted farther and far- 
 ther apart, with a fair promise of a general wreck. 
 
 But the bill contained another compromise 
 
IN CONGRESS. 
 
 39 
 
 ■which was not temporary, and once made could 
 not be easily unmade. Agreed to now, it became 
 a condition of the adoption of the Federal Con- 
 stitution four years later ; and there, as nobody 
 now is so blind as not to see, it was the source of 
 infinite mischief for nearly a century, till a third 
 reconstruction of the Union was brought about by 
 the war of 1861-65. The Articles of Confedera- 
 tion required that “ all charges of war and all 
 other expenses that shall be incurred for the com- 
 mon defense or general welfare ” should be borne 
 by the States in proportion to the value of their 
 lands. It was proposed to amend this provision 
 of the Constitution, and for lands substitute popu- 
 lation, exclusive of Indians not taxed, as the basis 
 for taxation. But here arose at once a new and 
 perplexing question. There were, chiefly in one 
 portion of the country, about 750,000 “persons 
 held to service or labor ” — the euphuism for ne- 
 gro slaves which, evolved from some tender and 
 sentimental conscience, came into use at this pe- 
 riod. Should these, recognized only as property 
 by state law, be counted as 750,000 persons by 
 the laws of the United States? 1 Or should they, 
 in the enumeration of population, be reckoned, in 
 accordance with the civil law, as pro nullis, pro 
 mortuis , pro quadrupedibus ; and therefore not to 
 be counted at all ? Or should they, as those who 
 
 1 In some of the States slaves were reckoned as “ chattels per- 
 sonal ; ” in others as “ real estate.” 
 
40 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 owned them insisted, be counted, if included in 
 the basis of taxation, as fractions of persons only? 
 
 The South contended that black slaves were 
 not equal to white men as producers of wealth, 
 and that, by counting them as such, taxation 
 would be unequal and unjust. But whether 
 counted as units, or as fractions of units, the 
 slaveholders insisted that representation should 
 be according to that enumeration. The Northern 
 reply was that, if representation was to be accord- 
 ing to population, the slaves being included, then 
 the slave States would have a representation of 
 property, for which there would be no equivalent 
 in States where there were no slaves ; but, if 
 slaves were enumerated as a basis of representa- 
 tion, then that enumeration should also be taken 
 to fix the rate of taxation. 
 
 Here, at any rate, was a basis for an interesting 
 dead-lock. One simple way out of it would have 
 been to insist upon the doctrine of the civil law; 
 to count the slaves only as pro quadrupedibus , to 
 be left out of the enumeration of population as 
 being no part of the State, as horses and cattle 
 were left out. But the bonds of union hung 
 loosely upon the sisters a hundred years ago ; 
 there was not one of them who did not think she 
 was able to set up for herself and take her place 
 among the nations as an independent sovereign ; 
 and it is more than likely that half of them would 
 have refused to wear those bonds any longer on 
 
IN CONGRESS. 
 
 41 
 
 such a condition. There was no apprehension 
 then that slavery was to become a power for evil 
 in the State ; but there was intense anxiety lest 
 the States should fly asunder, form partial and 
 local unions among neighbors, or become entan- 
 gled in alliances with foreign nations, at the sacri- 
 fice of all, or much, that was gained by the Revo- 
 lution. To make any concession, therefore, to 
 slavery for the sake of the Union was hardly held 
 to be a concession. 
 
 The curious student of history, however, who 
 loves to study those problems of what might have 
 happened, if events that did not happen had come 
 to pass, will find ample room for speculation in 
 the possibilities of this one. Had there been no 
 compromise, it is as easy to see now, as it was 
 easy to foresee then, how quickly the feeble bond 
 of union would have snapped asunder. But never- 
 theless, if the North had insisted that the slaves 
 should neither be counted nor represented at all, 
 or else should be reckoned in full and taxes levied 
 accordingly, the consequent dissolution of the Con- 
 federacy might have had consequences which then 
 nobody dreamed of. For it is not impossible, it 
 is not even improbable, that, in that event, the 
 year 1800 would have seen slavery in the process 
 of rapid extinction everywhere except in South 
 Carolina and Georgia. Had the event been post- 
 poned in those States to a later period, it would 
 only have been because they had already found in 
 
42 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 the cultivation of indigo and rice a profitable use 
 for slave-labor, which did not exist in the other 
 slave States, where the supply of slaves was rap- 
 idly exceeding the demand. There can hardly be 
 a doubt that in case of the dissolution of the Con- 
 federacy, the Northern free-labor States would 
 soon have consolidated into a strong union of their 
 own. There was every reason for hastening it, 
 and none so strong for hindering it as those which 
 were overborne in the union which was actually 
 formed soon afterward between the free-labor and 
 slave-labor States. To such a Northern union 
 the border States, as they sloughed off the old 
 system, would have been naturally attracted ; nor 
 can there be a doubt that a federal union so 
 formed would ultimately have proved quite as 
 strong, quite as prosperous, quite as happy, and 
 quite as respectable among the nations, as one 
 purchased by compromises with slavery, followed, 
 as those compi’omises were, by three quarters of a 
 century of bitter political strife ending in a civil 
 war. 
 
 But the Northern members were no less ready to 
 make compromises than Southern members were 
 to insist upon them, these no more understanding 
 what they conceded than those understood what 
 they gained; for the future was equally concealed 
 from both. A committee reported that two blacks 
 should be rated as one free man. This was un- 
 satisfactory. To some it seemed too large, to 
 
IN CONGRESS. 
 
 43 
 
 others too small. Other ratios, therefore, were 
 proposed — three to one, three to two, four to 
 one, and four to three. Mr. Madison at last, “ in 
 order,” as he said, “ to give a proof of the sincer- 
 ity of his professions of liberality,” — and doubt- 
 less he meant to be liberal, — proposed “that 
 slaves should be rated as five to three.” His mo- 
 tion was adopted, but afterward reconsidered. 
 Four days later — April 1st — Mr. Hamilton re- 
 newed the proposition, and it was carried, Mad- 
 ison says, “ without opposition.” 1 The law on 
 this point was the precedent for the mischievous 
 three fifths rule of the Constitution adopted four 
 years later. 
 
 Youth finally overtook the young man during 
 the last winter of his term in Congress, for he fell 
 in love. But it was an unfortunate experience, 
 and the outcome of it doubtless gave a more sombre 
 hue than ever to his life. His choice was not a 
 wise one. Probably Mr. Madison seemed a much 
 older man than he really was at that period of his 
 life, and to a young girl may have appeared really 
 advanced in years. At any rate it was his un- 
 happy fate to be attached to a young lady of more 
 than usual beauty and of irrepressible vivacity, 
 
 1 J. C. Hamilton says, in his History of the Republic, that “ the 
 motion prevailed by a vote of all the States excepting Massachu- 
 setts and Rhode Island.” But his understanding of the question 
 is in other respects incorrect — misunderstood, one may hope, 
 rather than misstated lest hs should give credit, for what he con- 
 sidered a meritorious action, to Madison. 
 
44 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 — Miss Catherine Floyd, a daughter of General 
 William Floyd of Long Island, N. Y., who was one 
 of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, 
 and who was a delegate to Congress from 1774 to 
 1783. Miss Catherine’s sixteenth birthday was in 
 April of the latter year ; Madison was double her 
 age, as his thirty-second birthday was a month 
 earlier. His suit, however, was accepted, and they 
 became engaged. But it was the father rather 
 than the daughter who admired the suitor ; for 
 the older statesman better under-stood the char- 
 acter, and better appreciated the abilities, of his 
 young colleague, and predicted a brilliant career 
 for him. The girl’s wisdom was of another kind. 
 The future career which she foresaw and wanted 
 to share belonged to a young clergyman, who — 
 according to the reminiscences of an aged relative 
 of hers — “ hung round her at the harpsichord,” 
 and made love in quite another fashion than that 
 of the solemn statesman, whom the old general 
 so approved of. It is altogether a pretty love 
 story, and one’s sympathy goes out to the lively 
 young beauty, who was thinking of love and not 
 of ambition, as she turned from the old young 
 gentleman, discussing, with her wise father, the 
 public debt and the necessity of an impost, to that 
 really young young gentleman who knew how to 
 hang over the harpsichord, and talked more to 
 the purpose with his eyes than ever the other 
 could with his lips. There is a tradition that she 
 
IN CONGRESS. 
 
 45 
 
 was encouraged to be thus on with the new love 
 before she was off with the old, by a friend some- 
 what older than herself ; and possibly this ma- 
 turer lady may have thought that Madison would 
 be better mated with one nearer his own age. At 
 any rate the engagement was broken off before 
 long by the dismissal of the older lover, much to 
 the father’s disappointment, and in due time the 
 young lady married the other suitor. There is no 
 reason that I know of for supposing that she ever 
 regretted that her more humble home was in a 
 rectory, when it might have been, in due time, 
 had she chosen differently, in the White House at 
 Washington, and that afterward she might have 
 lived, the remaining sixteen years of her life, the 
 honored wife of a revered ex-President. Perhaps, 
 however, she smiled in those later years at the 
 recollection of having laughed in her gay and 
 thoughtless youth at her solemn lover, and that 
 when at last she dismissed him, she sealed her 
 letter — conveying to him alone, it may be, some 
 merry but mischievous meaning — with a bit of 
 rye-dough . 1 
 
 Mr. Rives gives a letter from Jefferson to Mad- 
 ison at this time, which shows that he stood in 
 need of consolation from his friends. “I sincerely 
 
 1 For the details, so far as they can now be recalled, of this 
 single romantic incident in Mr. Madison’s life, I am indebted 
 to Nicoll Floyd, Esq., of Moriches, Long Island, a great-grandson 
 of General William Floyd. 
 
46 
 
 JAMES MADISON, 
 
 lament,” Mr. Jefferson wrote in his philosophical 
 way, “ the misadventure which has happened, from 
 whatever cause it may have happened. Should it 
 be final, however, the world presents the same and 
 many other resources of happiness, and you pos- 
 sess many within yourself. Firmness of mind and 
 unintermitting occupation will not long leave you 
 in pain. No event has been more contrary to my 
 expectations, and these were founded on what I 
 thought a good knowledge of the ground. But of 
 all machines ours is the most complicated and 
 inexplicable.” It was Solomon who said, “ there 
 be three things which are too wonderful for me, 
 yea four which I know not.” This fourth was, 
 “ the way of a man with a maid.” . He might 
 have added a fifth — the way of a maid with a 
 man — which, evidently, is what Jefferson meant. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 As the election of the same delegate to Con- 
 gress for consecutive sessions was then forbidden 
 by the law of Virginia, Mr. Madison was not re- 
 turned to that body in 1784. For a brief inter- 
 val of three months he made good use of his time, 
 we are told, by continuing his law studies, till in 
 the spring of that year he was chosen to repre- 
 sent his county in the Virginia Assembly. It may 
 be that “ the sentiments and manners of the pa- 
 rent nation,” which he lamented seven years be- 
 fore, had passed away, and nobody now insisted 
 upon the privilege of getting drunk at the candi- 
 date’s expense before voting for him. But it is 
 more likely that the electors had not changed. 
 The difference was in the candidate ; they did not 
 need to be allured to give their votes to a man 
 whom they were proud to call upon to represent 
 the county. Mr. Madison’s reputation was already 
 made by his three years in Congress, and he now 
 easily took a place among the political leaders of 
 his own State. 
 
 The position was hardly less conspicuous or less 
 
48 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 influential than that which he had held in the na- 
 tional Congress. What each State might do was of 
 quite as much importance as anything the Federal 
 Government might or could do. Congress could 
 neither open nor close a single port in Virginia to 
 commerce, whether domestic or foreign, without 
 the consent of the State ; it could not levy a tax 
 of a penny on anything, whether goods coming in 
 or products going out, if the State objected. As 
 a member of Congress, Mr. Madison might pro- 
 pose or oppose any of these things ; as a member 
 of the Vii-ginia House of Delegates, he might, if 
 his influence was strong enough, carry or forbid 
 any or all of them, whatever might be the wishes 
 of Congress. It was in the power of Virginia to 
 influence largely the welfare of her neighbors, so 
 far as it depended upon commerce, and indirectly 
 that of every State in the Union. 
 
 In the Assembly, as in Congress, Mr. Madison’s 
 aim was to increase the powers of the Federal 
 Government, for want of which it was rapidly sink- 
 ing into imbecility and contempt. “ I acceded,” 
 he says, “ to the desire of my fellow-citizens of 
 the county that I should be one of its representa- 
 tives in the legislature,” to bring about “ a rescue 
 of Jhe Union and the blessings of liberty staked 
 on it from an impending catastrophe.” Early in 
 the session the Assembly assented to the amend- 
 ment to the Articles of Confederation proposed at 
 the late session of Congress, which substituted 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 49 
 
 population for a land-valuation as the basis of rep- 
 resentation and of taxation. The Assembly also 
 asserted that all requisitions upon the States for 
 the support of the general government and to pro- 
 vide for the public debt should be complied with, 
 and payment of balances on old accounts should 
 be enforced ; and it assented to the recommenda- 
 tion of Congress that that body should have power 
 for a limited period to control the trade with for- 
 eign nations having no treaty with the United 
 States, in order that it might retaliate upon Great 
 Britain for excluding American ships from her 
 West India colonies. All these measures were de- 
 signed for “the rescue of the Union,” and they 
 had, of course, Madison’s hearty support. For it 
 was absolutely essential, as he believed, that some- 
 thing should be done if the Union was to be saved, 
 or to be made worth saving. But there were ob- 
 stacles on all sides. The commercial States were 
 reluctant to surrender the control over trade to Con- 
 gress ; in the planting States there was hardly any 
 trade that could be surrendered. In Virginia the 
 tobacco planter still clung to the old ways. He 
 liked to have the English ship take his tobacco 
 from the river bank of his own plantation, and to 
 receive from the same vessel such coarse goods as 
 were needed to clothe his slaves, with the more ex- 
 pensive luxuries for his own family, — drygoods 
 for his wife and daughter ; the pipe of madeira, the 
 coats and breeches, the hats, boots, and saddles for 
 
50 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 himself and his sons. He knew that this year’s 
 crop went to pay — if it did pay — for last year’s 
 goods, and that lie was always in debt. But the 
 debt was on running account, and did not matter. 
 The London factor was skillful in charges for in- 
 terest and commissions, and the account for this 
 year was always a lien on next year’s crop. He 
 knew, and the planter knew, that the tobacco could 
 be sold at a higher price in New York or Phila- 
 delphia than the factor got, or seemed to get, for 
 it in London ; that the goods sent out in exchange 
 were charged at a higher price than they could be 
 bought for in the Northern towns. Nevertheless, 
 the planter liked to see his own hogsheads rolled 
 on board ship by his own negroes at bis own 
 wharf, and receive in return his own boxes and 
 bales shipped direct from London at his own order, 
 let it cost what it might. It was a shiftless and 
 ruinous system ; but the average Virginia planter 
 was not over-quick at figures, nor even at reading 
 and writing. He was proud of being lord of a 
 thousand or two acres, and one or two hundred 
 negroes, and fancied that this was to rule over, as 
 Mr. Rives called it, “ a mimic commonwealth, 
 with its foreign and domestic relations, and its reg- 
 ular administrative hierarchy.” He did not com- 
 prehend that the isolated life of a slave plantation 
 was ordinarily only a kind of perpetual barbecue, 
 with its rough sports and vacuous leisure, where 
 the roasted ox was largely wasted and not always 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 51 
 
 pleasant to look at. There was a rude hospitality, 
 where food, provided by unpaid labor, was cheap 
 and abundant, and where the host was always glad 
 to welcome any guest who would relieve him of his 
 own tediousness ; but there was little luxury and 
 no refinement where there was almost no culture. 
 Of course there were a few homes and families of 
 another order, where the women were refined and 
 the men educated ; but these were the exceptions. 
 Society generally, with its bluff, loud, self-con- 
 fident but ignorant planters, its numerous poor 
 whites, destitute of lands and of slaves, and its 
 mass of slaves whose aim in life was to avoid work 
 and escape the whip, was necessarily only one re- 
 move from semi-civilization. 
 
 It was not easy to indoctrinate such a people, 
 more arrogant than intelligent, with new ideas. 
 By the same token it might be possible to lead 
 them into new ways before they would find out 
 whither they were going. Mr. Madison hoped to 
 change the wretched system of plantation-com- 
 merce by a port bill, which he brought into the 
 Assembly. Imposts require custom-houses, and 
 obviously there could not be custom-houses nor 
 even custom-officers on every plantation in the 
 State. The bill proposed to leave open two ports 
 of entry for all foreign ships. It would greatly 
 simplify matters if all the foreign trade of the 
 State could be limited to these two ports only. It 
 would then be easy enough to enforce imposts, 
 
52 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 and the State would have something to surrender 
 to the Federal Government to help it to a revenue, 
 if, happily, the time should ever come when all 
 the States should assent to that measure of salva- 
 tion for the Union. Not that this was the pri- 
 mary object of those who favored this port law ; 
 but the question of commerce was the question on 
 which everything hinged, and its regulation in 
 each State must needs have an influence, one way 
 or the other, upon the possibility of strengthening, 
 even of preserving, the Union. Everything de- 
 pended upon reconciling these state interests by 
 mutual concessions. The South was jealous of 
 the North, because trade flourished at the North 
 and did not flourish at the South. It seemed as 
 if this was at the expense of the South, and so, 
 in a certain sense, it was. The problem was to 
 find where the difficulty lay, and to apply the 
 remedy. 
 
 If commerce flourished at the North where each 
 of the States had one or two ports of entry only, 
 why should it not flourish in Virginia, if regulated 
 in the same way? If those centres of trade bred 
 a race of merchants, who built their own ships, 
 bought and sold, did their own carrying, competed 
 with and stimulated each other, and encroached 
 upon the trade of the South, why should not 
 similar results follow in Virginia if she should 
 confine her trade to two or three ports ? If the 
 buyer and the seller, the importer and the con' 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 53 
 
 suraer, went to a common place of exchange in 
 Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, and pros- 
 perity followed as a consequence, why should they 
 not do the same thing at Norfolk? This was 
 what Madison aimed to bring about by the port 
 bill. But it was impossible to get it through the 
 legislature till three more ports were added to 
 the two which the bill at first proposed. When 
 the planters came to understand that such a law 
 would take away their cherished privilege of trade 
 along the banks of the rivers, wherever anybody 
 chose to run out a little jetty, the opposition was 
 persistent. At every succeeding session, till the 
 new Federal Constitution was adopted, an attempt 
 was made to repeal the act ; and though that was 
 not successful, each year new ports of entry were 
 added. It did not, indeed, matter much whether 
 the open ports of Virginia were two or whether 
 they were twenty. There was a factor in the 
 problem which neither Mr. Madison nor anybody 
 else would take into the account. It was possible, 
 of course, if force enough were used, to break up 
 the traffic with English ships on the banks of the 
 rivers ; but when that was done, commerce would 
 follow its own laws, in spite of the acts of the 
 legislature, and flow into channels of its own choos- 
 ing. It was not possible to transmute a planting 
 State, where labor was enslaved, into a commercial 
 State, where labor must be free. 
 
 However desirous Mr. Madison might be to 
 
54 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 transfer the power over commerce to the Federal 
 Government, he was compelled, as a member of 
 the Virginia legislature, to care first for the trade 
 of his own State. No State could afford to neglect 
 its own commercial interests so long as the thirteen 
 States remained thirteen commercial rivals. It 
 was becoming plainer and plainer every day, that 
 while that relation continued, the less chance there 
 was that thirteen petty, independent States could 
 unite into one great nation. No foreign power 
 would make a treaty with a government which 
 could not enforce that treaty among its own peo- 
 ple. Neither could any separate portion of that 
 people make a treaty, as any other portion, the 
 other side of an imaginary line, need not hold it 
 in respect. What good was there in revenue laws, 
 or, indeed, in any other laws in Massachusetts 
 which Connecticut and Rhode Island disregarded ? 
 or in New York, if New Jersey and Pennsyl- 
 vania laughed at them ? or in Virginia, if Mary- 
 land held them in contempt ? 
 
 But Mr. Madison felt that, if he could bi’ing 
 about a healthful state of things in the trade of 
 his own State, there was at least so much done 
 towards bringing about a healthful state of things 
 in the commerce of the whole country. There 
 came up a practical, local question which, when 
 the time came, he was quick to see had a logical 
 bearing upon the general question. The Poto- 
 mac was the boundary line between Virginia and 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 55 
 
 Maryland ; but Lord Baltimore’s charter gave to 
 Maryland jurisdiction over the river to the Vir- 
 ginia bank ; and this right Virginia had recog- 
 nized, claiming only for herself the free navigation 
 of the Potomac and the Pocomoke. Of course 
 the laws of neither State were regarded when it 
 was worth while to evade them : and nothing was 
 easier than to evade them, since to the average 
 human mind there is no privilege so precious as 
 a facility for smuggling. Nobody, at any rate, 
 seems to have thought anything about the matter 
 till it came under Madison’s observation after his 
 return home from Congress. To him it meant 
 something more than mere evasion of state laws 
 and frauds on the state revenue. The subject fell 
 into line with his reflections upon the looseness of 
 the bonds that held the States together, and how 
 unlikely it w r as that they would ever grow into a 
 respectable or prosperous nation while their pres- 
 ent relations continued. Virtually there was no 
 maritime law on the Potomac, and hardly even 
 the pretense of any. What could be more absurd 
 than to provide ports of entry on one bank of a 
 river, while on the other bank, from the source to 
 the sea, the whole counti’y was free to all comers ? 
 If the laws of either State were to be regarded 
 on the opposite bank, a treaty was as necessary 
 between them as between any two contiguous 
 States in Emope. 
 
 Madison wrote to Jefferson, who was now a del- 
 
56 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 egate in Congress, pointing out this anomalous 
 condition of tilings on the Potomac, and suggest- 
 ing that he should confer with the Maryland del- 
 egates upon the subject. The proposal met with 
 Jefferson’s approbation ; he sought an interview 
 with Mr. Stone, a delegate from Maryland, and, 
 as he wrote to Madison, “ finding him of the same 
 opinion, [I] have told him I would, by letters, 
 bring the subject forward on our part. They will 
 consider it, therefore, as originated by this con- 
 versation.” Why “ they ” should not have been 
 permitted to “consider it as originated” from 
 Madison’s suggestion that Jefferson should have 
 such a conversation is not quite plain ; for it was 
 Madison, not Jefferson, who had discovered that 
 here was a wrong that ought to be righted, and 
 who had proposed that each State should appoint 
 commissioners to look into the matter and apply a 
 remedy. So, also, so far as subsequent negotia- 
 tion on this subject had any influence in bringing 
 about the Constitutional Convention of 1787, it 
 was only because Mr. Madison, having suggested 
 the first practical step in the one case, seized an 
 opportune moment in that negotiation to suggest 
 a similar practical step in the other case. As it is 
 so often said that the Annapolis Convention of 
 1786 was the direct result of the discussion of the 
 Potomac question, it is worth while to explain 
 what they really had to do with each other. 
 
 The Virginia commissioners were appointed 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 57 
 
 early in the session on Mr. Madison’s motion. 
 Maryland moved more slowly, and it was not till 
 the spring of 1785 that the commissionei’s met. 
 They soon found that any efficient jurisdiction 
 over the Potomac involved more interests than 
 they, or those who appointed them, had consid- 
 ered. Existing difficulties might be disposed of by 
 agreeing upon uniform duties in the two States, 
 and this the commissioners recommended. But 
 when the subject came before the Maryland leg- 
 islature it took a wider range. 
 
 The Potomac Company, of which Washington 
 was president, had been chartered only a few 
 mouths before. The work it proposed to do was 
 to make the upper Potomac navigable, and to con- 
 nect it by a good road with the Ohio River. This 
 was to encourage the settlement of Western lands. 
 Another company was chartered about the same 
 time to connect the Potomac and Delaware by a 
 canal, where inter-state traffic would be more im- 
 mediate. Pennsylvania and Delaware must nec- 
 essarily have a deep interest in both these proj- 
 ects, and the Maryland legislature proposed that 
 those States be invited to appoint commissioners 
 to act with those whom Maryland and Virginia 
 had already appointed to settle the conflict be- 
 tween them upon the question of jurisdiction on 
 the Potomac. Then it occurred to somebody : if 
 four States can confer, why should not thirteen ? 
 The Maryland legislature thereupon suggested 
 
58 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 that all the States be invited to send delegates to 
 a convention to take up the whole question of 
 American commerce. 
 
 While this was going on in Maryland, the Vir- 
 ginia legislature was considering petitions from 
 the principal ports of the State praying that some 
 remedy might be devised for the commercial evils 
 from which they were all suffering. The port 
 bill had manifestly proved a failure. It was only 
 a few weeks before that Madison had complained, 
 in a letter to a friend, that “ the trade of the coun- 
 try is in a most deplorable condition ; ” that the 
 most “shameful frauds” wete committed by the 
 English merchants upon those in Virginia, as well 
 as upon the planters who shipped their own to- 
 bacco ; that the difference in the price of tobacco 
 at Philadelphia and in Virginia was from eleven 
 shillings to fourteen shillings in favor of the 
 Northern ports ; and that “ the price of merchan- 
 dise here is, at least, as much above, as that of to- 
 bacco is below, the Northern standard.” He was 
 only the more confirmed in his opinion that there 
 was no cure for these radical evils except to sur- 
 render to the Confederate Government complete 
 control over commerce. The debate upon these 
 petitions was hot and long. It brought out the 
 strongest men on both sides, Madison leading 
 those who wished to give to Congress the power 
 to regulate trade with foreign counh'ies when no 
 treaty existed ; to make uniform commercial laws 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 59 
 
 for all the States; and to levy an impost of five 
 per cent, on imported merchandise, as a provision 
 for the public debt and for the support of the 
 Federal Government generally. A committee, of 
 which he was a member, at length reported in- 
 structions to the delegates of the State in Con- 
 gress to labor for the consent of all the States to 
 these propositions. But in Committee of the 
 Whole the resolutions were so changed and quali- 
 fied — especially in limiting to thirteen years the 
 period for which Congress was to be intrusted 
 with a power so essential to the existence of the 
 government — that the measure was given up by 
 its friends as hopeless. 
 
 But before the report was disposed of Mr. Mad- 
 ison prepared a resolution, to be offered as a sub- 
 stitute, with the hope of reaching the same end in 
 another way. This resolution provided for the 
 appointment of five commissioners, — Madison to 
 be one of them, — “ who, or any three of whom, 
 shall meet such commissioners as may be ap- 
 pointed in the other States of the Union, at a 
 time and place to be agreed on, to take into con- 
 sideration the trade of the United States ; to ex- 
 amine the relative situations and trade of said 
 States ; to consider how far a uniform system in 
 their commercial regulations may be necessary to 
 their common interest and their permanent har- 
 mony ; and to report to the several States such an 
 act, relative to this great object, as, when unani- 
 
60 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 mously ratified by them, will enable the United 
 States, in Congress, effectually to provide for the 
 same.” This he was careful not to offer himself, 
 but, as he says, it was “ introduced by Mr. Tyler, 
 an influential member, — who, having never served 
 in Congress, had more the ear of the House than 
 those whose services there exposed them to an im- 
 putable bias.” He adds that “it was so little ac- 
 ceptable, that it was not then persisted in.” 
 
 About the same time the action of the Mary- 
 land legislature on the Potomac question, and 
 the report of the Potomac commissioners, came 
 up for consideration. Mr. Madison said afterward 
 that, as Maryland thought the concurrence of 
 Pennsylvania and Delaware were necessary to the 
 regulation of trade on that river, so those States 
 would, probably, wish to ask for the concurrence 
 of their neighbors in any proposed arrangement. 
 “ So apt and forcible an illustration,” he adds, 
 “ of the necessity of an uniformity throughout all 
 the States could not but favor the passage of a 
 resolution which proposed a convention having 
 that for its object.” 
 
 As one of the Potomac commissioners, he knew, 
 of course, what was coming from Maryland, and 
 “ how apt and forcible an illustration ” it would 
 seem, when it did come, of that resolution which 
 he had written and had induced Mr. Tyler to 
 offer. It did not matter that the resolution had 
 been at the moment “so little acceptable,” and 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 61 
 
 therefore “ not then persisted in.” It was where 
 it was sure, in the political slang of our day, to 
 do the most good. And so it came about. All 
 that Maryland had proposed, growing out of the 
 consideration of the Potomac question, the Vir- 
 ginia legislature acceded to. Then, on the last 
 day of the session, the Madison-Tyler resolution 
 was taken from the table, where it had lain quietly 
 for nearly two months, and passed. If some, who 
 had been contending all winter against any action 
 which should lead to a possibility of strengthening 
 the Federal Government, failed to see how impor- 
 tant a step they had taken to that very end ; if 
 any, who were fearful of Federal usurpation and 
 tenacious of state-rights, were blind to the fact 
 that the resolution had pushed aside the Potomac 
 question and put the Union question in its place, 
 Mr. Madison, we may be sure, was not one of that 
 number. He had gained that for which he had 
 been striving for years. 
 
 The commissioners appointed by the resolution 
 soon came together. They appointed Annapolis 
 as the place, and the second Monday of the fol- 
 lowing September (1786) as the time of the pro- 
 posed national convention ; and they sent to all 
 the other States an invitation to send delegates to 
 that convention. 
 
 On September 11 commissioners from Virginia, 
 Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New 
 York assembled at Annapolis, Others had been 
 
62 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 appointed by North Carolina, Rhode Island, Mas- 
 sachusetts, and New Hampshire, but they were 
 not present. Georgia, South Carolina, Maryland, 
 and Connecticut had taken no action upon the 
 subject. As five States only were represented, 
 the commissioners “ did not conceive it advisable 
 to proceed on the business of their mission,” but 
 they adopted an address, written by Alexander 
 Hamilton, to be sent to all the States. 
 
 All the represented States, the address said, had 
 authorized their commissioners “ to take into con- 
 sideration the trade and commerce of the United 
 States ; to consider how far an uniform system 
 in their commercial intercourse and regulations 
 might be necessaiy to their common interest and 
 permanent harmony.” But New Jersey had gone 
 farther than this ; her delegates were instructed 
 “ to consider how far an uniform system in their 
 commercial regulations and other important mat- 
 ters , might be necessary to the common interest 
 and permanent harmony of the several States.” 
 This, the commissioner’s present thought, “ was an 
 improvement on the original plan, and will de- 
 serve to be incorporated into that of a future con- 
 vention.” They gave their reasons at length for 
 this opinion, and, in conclusion, urged that com- 
 missioners fi’om all the States be appointed to 
 meet in convention at Philadelphia on the second 
 Monday of the following May (1787), “to devise 
 such further provisions as shall appear to them 
 
IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 63 
 
 necessai'y to render tlie Constitution of the Fed- 
 eral Government adequate to the exigencies of the 
 Union.” 
 
 In the coiu’se of the winter delegates to this 
 convention were chosen by the several States. 
 Virginia was the first to choose her delegates ; 
 Madison was among them, and at their head was 
 George Washington. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. 
 
 That the Annapolis Convention ever met to 
 make smooth the way for the more important one 
 which came together eight months afterward and 
 framed a permanent Constitution for the United 
 States, was unquestionably due to the persistence 
 and the political adroitness of Mr. Madison. But 
 it was not exceptional work. The same diligence 
 and devotion to public duty mark the whole of 
 this period of three years through which he con- 
 tinued a member of the state legislature. As 
 chairman of the judiciary committee he reduced 
 with much labor the old colonial statutes to a 
 body of laws befitting the condition of free citi- 
 zens in an independent State. From his first to 
 his last session he contended, though without suc- 
 cess, for the faith of treaties and the honest pay- 
 ment of debts. The treaty with England pro- 
 vided that there should be “no lawful impediment 
 on either side to the recovery of debts heretofore 
 contracted.” The legislature notified Congress 
 that it should disregard this provision, on the plea 
 that in relation to “slaves and other property ” it 
 
IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE . 65 
 
 had not been observed by Great Britain. Mr. 
 Madison did not then know that — as he said 
 three years later — “the infractions [of the 
 treaty] on the part of the United States preceded 
 even the violation on the other side in the in- 
 stance of the negroes.” He maintained, neverthe- 
 less, that the settlement of the difficulty, if it had 
 any real foundation, belonged to Congress, the 
 party to the treaty, and not to a State which had 
 surrendered the treaty-making power ; and that 
 in common honesty one planter was not relieved 
 from his obligation to pay a London merchant for 
 goods and merchandise received before the war, 
 because other planters had not been paid for the 
 negroes and horses they had lost when the British 
 troops invaded Virginia. At each of the three 
 sessions of the legislature, while he was a member, 
 he tried to bring that body to adopt some line of 
 conduct which should not — to use his own words 
 — “extremely dishonor us and embarrass Con- 
 gress.” It was useless ; the repudiators were 
 quite deaf to any appeals either to their honor or 
 their patriotism. 
 
 On another question both he and his State were 
 more fortunate. Religious freedom had to be 
 once more fought for, and he was quick to come 
 to the defense of a right which had first called 
 forth his youthful enthusiasm. Two measures 
 were brought forward from session to session to 
 secure for the church the support of the state. 
 
 5 
 
66 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 The first was a bill for the incorporation of relig- 
 ious societies ; but when it was pushed to its final 
 passage it provided for the incorporation of Epis- 
 copal churches only. For this Mr. Madison con- 
 sented to vote, though with reluctance, in the 
 hope that the church party would be so far satis- 
 fied with this measure as to abstain from pushing 
 another which was still more objectionable. 
 
 He was disappointed. Naturally those who 
 had carried their first point were the moi’e, not 
 the less, anxious for further success. Now it was 
 insisted that there should be a universal tax “ for 
 the support of teachers of the Christian religion.” 
 The tax-payer was to be permitted to name the 
 religious society for the support of which he pre- 
 ferred to contribute. If he declined this volun- 
 tary acquiescence in the law, the money would be 
 used in aid of a school ; but from the tax itself 
 none were to be exempt on any pretext. Madi- 
 son was quick to see in such a law the possibility 
 of religious intolerance, of compulsory uniformity 
 enforced by the civil power, and of the suppres- 
 sion of any freedom of conscience or opinion. 
 The act did not define who were and who were 
 not “ teachers of the Christian religion,” and that 
 necessarily would be left to the courts to decide. 
 A state church would be the inevitable conse- 
 quence ; for it was not to be supposed that any 
 dominant sect would rest till it secured the recog- 
 nition by law of its own denomination as the sole 
 
IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. 
 
 67 
 
 representative of the Christian religion. To ex- 
 pect anything else was to ignore the teachings of 
 all history. 
 
 The burden of opposition and debate fell, at 
 first, almost solely upon Madison. Some of the 
 wisest and best men of the State were slow to see, 
 as he saw, that religious freedom was in danger 
 from such legislation. There was, it was said, a 
 sad falling-off in public morality as indifference to 
 religion increased. There was no cure, it was de- 
 clared, for prevalent and growing corruption ex- 
 cept in the culture of the religious sentiment, and 
 the teachers of religion, therefore, must be upheld 
 and supported. But granting all this, Madison 
 saw that the proposed remedy would be to give 
 not bread but a stone, and a stone that would be 
 used in return as a weapon. It was impossible to 
 regulate religious belief by act of the Assembly, 
 and therefore it was worse than foolish to try. 
 
 It was due to him that the question was post- 
 poned from one session to the next. A copy of 
 the bill was sent, meanwhile, into every county of 
 the State for the consideration of the people, and 
 that was aided by a “ Memorial and Remon- 
 strance,” written by Madison, which was circu- 
 lated everywhere for signature, in readiness for 
 presentation to the next legislature. The bill, 
 the memorial said, would be “ a dangerous abuse 
 of power,” and the signers protested against it 
 with unanswerable arguments, taking for a start- 
 
68 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 ing-point the assertion of the Bill of Rights, “that 
 religion, or the duty we owe to our Creator, and 
 the manner of discharging it, can be directed only 
 by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.” 
 It is not at all improbable that many signed this 
 remonstrance, not so much because they believed 
 it to be true, as because it was a protest against a 
 tax; that others were more moved by jealousy of 
 the power of the Episcopal Church than they were 
 by anxiety to protect religious liberty outside of 
 their own sects. But whatever the motives, the 
 movement was too formidable to be disregarded. 
 It was made a test question in the election of 
 members for the legislature of 1785-86 ; at that 
 session the bill for the support of religious teach- 
 ers was rejected, and in place of it was passed “an 
 act for establishing religious freedom,” written by 
 Jefferson seven years before. This provided “ that 
 no man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
 any religious worship, place, or ministry whatso- 
 ever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, 
 or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall other- 
 wise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
 belief ; but that all men shall be free to profess, 
 and by argument maintain, their opinions in mat- 
 ters of religion, and that the same shall in no 
 wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capac- 
 ities.” 1 
 
 1 With how much interest Jefferson watched the progress of this 
 controversy he showed in his letters from Paris. In February, 
 
IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. 
 
 69 
 
 In the memorial and remonstrance Madison 
 had said : “ If this freedom be abused, it is an 
 offense against God, not against man. To God, 
 therefore, not to man, must an account of it be ren- 
 dered.” If the people of Virginia did not clearly 
 comprehend this doctrine in all its length and 
 breadth a hundred years ago, it is not quite easy 
 to say who were then, or who are now at liberty 
 to throw stones at them. The assertion of the 
 broadest religious freedom was no more new then 
 than it is true that persecution for opinion’s sake 
 is now only an ancient evil. It was not till fifty 
 
 1786, he wrote to Madison, “I thank you for the communication 
 of the remonstrance against the assessmeut. Mazzei, who is now 
 in Holland, promised me to have it published in the Leyden Ga- 
 zette. It will do us great honor. I wish it may be as much ap- 
 proved by our Assembly, as by the wisest part of Europe.” 
 Again, in December of the same year, he says, “ The Virginia Act 
 for religious freedom has been received with infinite approbation in 
 Europe, and propagated with enthusiasm. I do not mean by the 
 governments, but by the individuals who compose them. It has 
 been translated into French and Italian, has been sent to- most of 
 the courts of Europe, and has been the best evidence of the false- 
 hood of those reports, which stated us to be in anarchy. It is in- 
 serted in the Encyclope'die, and is appearing in most of the publica- 
 tions respecting America. In fact, it is comfortable to see the stand- 
 ard of reason at length erected, after so manj’’ ages, during which 
 the human mind had been held in vassalage by kings, priests, and 
 nobles ; and it is honorable for us to have produced the first legis- 
 lature who had the courage to declare, that the reason of man 
 may be trusted with the formation of his own opinions ! ” This 
 latter passage is characteristic, and many who do not like. Jeffer- 
 son will read between the lines the exultation of a man who was 
 not always careful to draw the line between religious liberty and 
 irreligious license. 
 
70 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 years after Virginia bad refused to tax her citi- 
 zens for the support of religious teachers, that 
 Massachusetts repealed the law that had long im- 
 posed a similar burden upon her people. 
 
 It was in 1786, the last year of Madison’s ser- 
 vice in the Virginia Assembly before he returned 
 to Congress, that the craze of paper money broke 
 out again through all the States. The measure 
 was carried in most of them, followed in the end 
 by the usual disastrous consequences. Madison’s 
 anxiety was great lest his own State should be 
 carried away by this delusion, and he led the op- 
 position against some petitions sent to the Assem- 
 bly praying for an issue of currency. The vote 
 against it was too large to be due altogether to 
 his influence ; but he gave great strength and 
 concentration to the opposition. In Virginia to- 
 bacco certificates supplied in some measure the 
 want of a circulating medium, and it was, there- 
 fore, easier there than in some of the other States 
 to resist the clamor for a paper substitute for real 
 money. A tobacco certificate at least represented 
 something worth money. Madison assented to 
 a bill which authorized the use of such certifi- 
 cates. But his “acquiescence,” he wrote to Wash- 
 ington, “ was extorted by a fear that some greater 
 evil, under the name of relief to the people, would 
 be substituted.” He was “ far from being sure,” 
 he added, that he “ did right.” But no evils with 
 which he had to reproach himself followed that 
 
 measure. 
 
IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. 71 
 
 These three years of Iris life were probably 
 among the happiest, if they were not altogether 
 the happiest, in his long public career. There 
 was little disappointment or anxiety, and evi- 
 dently much genuine satisfaction as he saw how 
 certainly he was gaining a high place in the esti- 
 mation of his fellow-citizens for his devotion to the 
 best interests of his native State. In the recesses 
 of the legislature he had leisure for studies in 
 which he evidently found great contentment. He 
 traveled a good deal at intervals, especially at the 
 North ; learned much of the resources and char- 
 acter of the people outside of Virginia, and be- 
 came acquainted with the leading men among 
 them. Jefferson urged him to pass a summer 
 with him in Paris ; and some foreign diplomatic 
 service was open to him, had he expressed a will- 
 ingness to accept it. But he preferred to know 
 something more of his own country while he had 
 the leisure ; and if his life was to be passed in 
 public service, as now seemed probable to him, he 
 chose, at least for the present, to serve his country 
 at home, where he thought be was more needed, 
 rather than abroad. In his orders for books sent 
 to Jefferson the direction of his studies is evident. 
 He sought largely for those which treated of the 
 science of government ; but they were not con- 
 fined to that subject. Natural histoi’y had great 
 charms for him. He was a diligent student of 
 Buffon, and was anxious to find, if possible, the 
 
72 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 plates of his thirty-one volumes, in colors, that he 
 might adorn the walls of his room with them. He 
 made careful comparisons between the animals of 
 other continents, as described and portrayed by 
 the naturalist, and similar orders in America. All 
 new inventions interested him. “I am so pleased,” 
 he writes, “ with the new invented lamp that I 
 shall not grudge two guineas for one of them.” 
 He had seen “ a pocket compass of somewhat 
 larger diameter than a watch, and which may be 
 carried in the same way. It has a spring for 
 stopping the vibration of the needle when not in 
 use. One of these would be very convenient in 
 case of a ramble into the western country.” A 
 small telescope, he suggests, might be fitted on as 
 a handle to a cane, which might “ be a source of 
 many little gratifications,” when “ in walks for ex- 
 ercise or amusement objects present themselves 
 which it might be matter of curiosity to inspect, 
 but which it was difficult or impossible to ap- 
 proach.” Jefferson writes him of a new invention, 
 a pedometer ; and he wants one for his own 
 pocket. Trifles like these show the bent of his 
 mind ; and they show a contented mind as well. 
 
 While writing of important acts of the legis- 
 lature of 1785, he is careful to give other infor- 
 mation in a letter to Jefferson, which is not unin- 
 teresting as written ninety-eight years ago, and 
 written by him. 
 
 “I. Rumsey,” he says, “by a memorial to the last 
 
IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. 73 
 
 session, represented that he had invented a mechanism 
 by which a boat might be worked with little labor, at the 
 rate of from twenty-five to forty miles a day, against 
 a stream running at the rate of ten miles an hour, and 
 prayed that the disclosure of his invention might be pur- 
 chased by the public. The apparent extravagance of his 
 pretensions brought a ridicule upon them, and nothing 
 was done. In the recess of the Assembly he exemplified 
 his machinery to General Washington and a few other 
 gentlemen, who gave a certificate of the reality and im- 
 portance of the invention, which opened the ears of this 
 Assembly to a second memorial. The act gives a mo- 
 nopoly for ten years, reserving a right to abolish it at 
 any time by paying £10,000. The inventor is soliciting 
 similar acts from other States, and will not, I suppose, 
 publish the secret till he either obtains or despairs of 
 them.” 
 
 This intelligence was evidently not unheeded 
 by Jefferson. In writing, some months after he 
 received it, to a friend on the application of steam- 
 power to grist-mills, then lately introduced in 
 England, he adds : “ I hear you are applying the 
 same agent in America to navigate boats, and I 
 have little doubt but that it will be applied gen- 
 erally to machines, so as to supersede the use of 
 water-ponds, and of course to lay open all the 
 streams for navigation.” Nor does Madison seem 
 to have been one of those who doubted if anything 
 was to come of Rumsey’s invention. All this was 
 less than a hundred years ago, and now there is a 
 steam-ferry between New York and Europe run- 
 ning about twice a day. 
 
74 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 In a similar letter, a year later, he is careful, 
 among grave political matters, to remember and 
 report to the same friend that in the sinking of a 
 well in Richmond, on the declivity of a hill, there 
 had been found, “about seventy feet below the 
 surface, several large bones, apparently belonging 
 to a fish not less than the shark ; and, what is more 
 singular, several fragments of potter’s ware in the 
 style of the Indians. Befoi-e he [the digger] 
 reached these curiosities he passed through about 
 fifty feet of soft blue clay.” Mr. Madison had 
 only just heard of this discovery, and he had not 
 seen the unearthed fragments. But he evidently 
 accepts the story as true in coming from “ unex- 
 ceptionable witnesses.” He adds, as a corrobora- 
 tion, that he is told by a friend from Washington 
 County of the finding there, in the sinking of a 
 salt-well, “of the hip-bone of the incognitum, the 
 socket of which was about eight inches in diam- 
 eter.” Such things were peculiarly interesting to 
 Jefferson, and Madison was too devoted a friend 
 to him to leave them unnoticed. But they were 
 hardly less interesting to himself, though he had 
 not much of Jefferson’s habit of scientific investi- 
 gation. That “the potter’s ware in the style of 
 the Indians” should be found so deeply buried 
 only seems to him “ singular ; ” nor, indeed, is there 
 any record, so far as we know, that this particular 
 fact was any more suggestive to Jefferson, though 
 apparently so likely to arouse his inquiring mind 
 
IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. 
 
 75 
 
 to seek for some satisfactory explanation. But 
 his geological notions were too positive to admit 
 even of a doubt as to the age of man. Supposing 
 a Creator, he assumed that “ he created the earth 
 at once, nearly in the state in which we see it, fit 
 for the preservation of the beings he placed on 
 it.” Theorist as he was himself, he had little pa- 
 tience with the other theorists who were already 
 beginning to discover in the structure of the earth 
 the evidence of successive geological eras. The 
 different strata of rocks and their inclination gave 
 him no trouble. He explained them all by the as- 
 sumption that “ rock grows, and it seems that it 
 grows in layers in every direction, as the branches 
 of trees grow in all directions.” That evidences 
 of the existence of man should be found with a 
 super-imposed weight of earth seventy feet in 
 thickness would present to him no difficulty. If 
 the fact had specially aroused his attention he 
 would have explained it in some ingenious way as 
 the result of accident. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AND ANXIETIES. 
 
 In February, 1787, Madison again took a seat 
 in Congress. It was an anxious period. Sbays’s 
 rebellion in Massachusetts had assumed rather 
 formidable possibilities, and seemed not unlikely 
 to spread to other States. Till this storm should 
 blow over, the important business of Congress was 
 to raise money and troops ; in reality, to go to the 
 help of Massachusetts, if need should be, though 
 the object ostensibly was to protect a handful of 
 people on the frontier against the Indians. It was 
 a striking instance of the imbecility of the gov- 
 ernment under the Articles of Confederation, that 
 it could only undertake to suppress rebellion in a 
 State under the pretense of doing something else 
 which came within the law. Massachusetts, it is 
 true, was quite able to deal with her insurgents ; 
 but when Congress convened it was not known in 
 New York that Lincoln had dispersed the main 
 body of them at Petersham. Nevertheless, a like 
 difficulty might arise at any moment in any other 
 of the States, where the strength to meet it might 
 be quite inadequate. 
 
PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AND ANXIETIES. 77 
 
 Madison’s ideal still was, the Union before the 
 States, and for the sake of the States ; the whole 
 before the parts, to save the parts ; the binding 
 the fagot together that the sticks might not be 
 lost. “ Our situation,” he wrote to Edmund Ran- 
 dolph, in February, “ is becoming every day more 
 and more critical. No money comes into the fed- 
 eral treasury ; no respect is paid to the federal au- 
 thority ; and people of reflection unanimously 
 agree that the existing Confederacy is tottering to 
 its foundation. Many individuals of weight, par- 
 ticularly in the eastern district, are suspected of 
 leaning toward monarchy. Other individuals pre- 
 dict a partition of the States into two or more 
 confederacies. It is pretty certain that if some 
 radical amendment of the single one cannot be 
 devised and introduced, one or the other of these 
 revolutions, the latter no doubt, will take place.” 
 
 It is not impossible that Madison himself may 
 have had some faith in this suspicion that “ indi- 
 viduals of weight in the eastern district ” were 
 inclined to a monarchy. For such suspicion, how- 
 ever, there could be little real foundation. There 
 were, doubtless, men of weight who thought and 
 said that monarchy was better than anarchy. 
 There were, doubtless, impatient men then who 
 thought and said, as there are impatient men now 
 who think and say, that the rule of a king is better 
 than the rule of the people. But there was no dis- 
 loyalty to government by the people among those 
 
78 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 who only maintained that the English in America 
 must draw from the common heritage of English 
 institutions and English law the material where- 
 with to build up the foundations of a new nation. 
 No intelligent and candid man doubts now that 
 they were wise ; nor would it have been long 
 doubted then, had it not so speedily become mani- 
 fest that, if the stigma of “ British ” was once af- 
 fixed to a political party, any appeal from popular 
 prejudice to reason and common sense was hope- 
 less. 
 
 There were a few persons who would have done 
 away with the divisions of States and establish 
 in their place a central government. Those most 
 earnest in maintaining the autonomy of States de- 
 clared that such a government was, as Luther 
 Martin of Maryland called it, of “ a monarchical 
 nature.” What else could that be but a mon- 
 archy? An insinuation took on the form of a 
 logical deduction and became a popular fallacy. 
 Yet those most earnest for a central government 
 only sought to establish a stable rule in place of 
 no rule at all ; or, worse still, of the tyranny of 
 an ignorant and vicious mob under the outraged 
 name of democracy, into which there was danger 
 of drifting. Whether their plan was wise or fool- 
 ish, it did not mean a monarchy. Even of Shays’s 
 misguided followers Jefferson said : “I believe you 
 may be assured that an idea or desire of return- 
 ing to anything like their ancient government 
 
PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AND ANXIETIES. 79 
 
 never entered into their heads.” As Madison 
 knew and said, the real danger was that the States 
 would divide into two confederacies, and only by 
 a new and wiser and stronger union could that ca- 
 lamity be averted. 
 
 To gain the assent of most of the States to a 
 convention was surmounting only the least of the 
 difficulties. Three weeks before the time of meet- 
 ing Madison wrote : “ The nearer the crisis ap- 
 proaches, the more I tremble for the issue. The 
 necessity of gaining the concui’rence of the con- 
 vention in some system that will answer the pur- 
 pose, the subsequent approbation of Congress, and 
 the final sanction of the States, present a series of 
 chances which would inspire despair in any case 
 where the alternative was less formidable.” He 
 said, in the first month of the session of that body, 
 that “ the States were divided into different inter- 
 ests, not by their difference of size, but by other 
 circumstances ; the most material of which re- 
 sulted partly from climate, but principally from 
 the effects of their having or not having slaves. 
 These two causes concurred in forming the great 
 division of interests in the United States. It did 
 not lie between the large and small States. It 
 lay between the Northern and Southern.” 
 
 During the earlier weeks of this session of Con- 
 gress, and, indeed, for some months before, events 
 had made so manifest this difference of interest, 
 coincident with the difference in latitude, that 
 
80 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 there seemed little ground for hope that any good 
 would come out of a constitutional convention. 
 The old question of the navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi was again agitated. The South held her 
 right to that river to be of much more value than 
 anything she could gain by a closer union with 
 the North, and she was quite ready to go to war 
 with Spain in defense of it. On the other hand, 
 the Northern States were quite indifferent to the 
 navigation of the Mississippi, and not disposed ap- 
 parently to make any exertion or sacrifice to secure 
 it. Just now they were anxious to secure a com- 
 mercial treaty with Spain ; but Spain insisted, as 
 a preliminary condition, that the United States 
 should relinquish all claim to navigation upon a 
 river whose mouths were within Spanish terri- 
 tory. In the Northern mind there was no doubt 
 of the value of trade with Spain ; and there was 
 a good deal of doubt whether there was any- 
 thing worth contending for in the right to sail 
 upon a river running through a wilderness where, 
 as yet, there were few inhabitants, and hardty any 
 trade worth talking about. More than that : there 
 was unquestionably a not uncommon belief at the 
 North and East, that the settlement and prosper- 
 ity of the West would be at the expense of the 
 Atlantic States. Perhaps that view of the matter 
 was not loudly insisted upon ; but many were none 
 the less persuaded that, if population was attracted 
 westward by the hope of acquiring rich and cheap 
 
PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AND ANXIETIES. 81 
 
 lands, prosperity and power would go with it. At 
 any rate, those of this way of thinking were not 
 inclined to forego a certain good for that which 
 would profit them nothing, and might do them 
 lasting harm. 
 
 For these reasons, spoken and unspoken, the 
 Northern members of Congress were at first quite 
 willing, for the sake of a commercial treaty, to 
 concede to Spain the exclusive control of the Mis- 
 sissippi. But to pacify the South it was proposed 
 that the concession to Spain should be for only 
 five and twenty years. If at the end of that period 
 the navigation of the Mississippi should be worth 
 contending for, the question could be reopened. 
 The South was, of course, rather exasperated than 
 pacified by such a proposition. The navigation of 
 the river had not only a certain value to them 
 now, but it was theirs by right, and that was rea- 
 son enough for not parting with it even for a 
 limited period. Concessions now would make the 
 reassertion of the right the more difficult by and 
 by. If it must be fought for, it would lessen the 
 chance of success to put off the fighting five and 
 twenty years. Indeed, it could not be put off, for 
 war was already begun in a small way. The 
 Spaniards bad seized American boats on trading 
 voyages down the river, and the Americans had 
 retaliated upon some petty Spanish settlements. 
 Spain, moreover, seemed at first no more inclined 
 to listen to compromise than the South was. 
 
82 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 England watched this controversy with interest. 
 She had no expectation of X’ecovering for herself 
 the Floridas, which she had lost in the war of the 
 Revolution, and had finally ceded to Spain by the 
 treaty of 1783; but -she was quite willing to see 
 that Power get into trouble on the Mississippi 
 question ; and more than willing that it should 
 threaten the peace and union of the States. Her 
 own boundary line west of the Alleghanies might 
 possibly be extended far south of the Great Lakes, 
 if the Northern and Southern States should divide 
 into two confederacies ; but, apart from any lust 
 of territory, she rejoiced at anything that threat- 
 ened to check the growth of her late colonies. 
 
 Fortunately, however, the question was disposed 
 of, before the Constitutional Convention met at 
 Philadelphia, by the failure to secure a treaty. 
 The Spanish minister, Guardoqui, consented, at 
 length, after long resistance, to accept as a com- 
 promise the navigation of the river for five and 
 twenty years ; but Mr. Jay, who was willing, 
 could he have had his way, to concede anything, 
 found at that stage of the negotiations Le could 
 not command votes enough in Congress to secure 
 a treaty even in that modified form. Hitherto he 
 had relied upon a resolution, passed by Congress 
 in August, 1786, by the vote of seven Northern 
 States against five Southern. This, it was assumed, 
 repealed a resolution of the year before, and au- 
 thorized the Secretary to make a treaty. The 
 
PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AND ANXIETIES. 83 
 
 resolution of the year before, August, 1785, bad 
 been passed by the votes of nine States, and was in 
 confirmation of a provision of the Articles of Con- 
 federation declaring that “ no treaties with foreign 
 powers should be entered into but by the assent 
 of nine States.” The minority contended that 
 such a resolution could not be repealed by the 
 vote of only seven States, for that would be to 
 violate a fundamental condition of the Articles of 
 Confederation. It is easy to see now that there 
 ought not to have been a difference among honor- 
 able men on such a point as that. Nevertheless 
 Mr. Jay, supported by some of the strongest North- 
 ern men, held that the votes of seven States could 
 be made, in a roundabout way, to authorize an act 
 which the Constitution declared should never be 
 lawful except with the assent of nine States. So 
 the Secretary went on with his negotiations and 
 came to terms with the Spanish minister. 
 
 In April the Secretary was called upon to report 
 to Congress what was the position of these nego- 
 tiations. Then it first publicly appeared that a 
 treaty was actually agreed upon which gave up 
 the right to the Mississippi for a quarter of a cen- 
 tury. But it was also speedily made plain by 
 various parliamentary motions, that the seven 
 votes which the friends of such a treaty had re- 
 lied upon, had fallen from seven — even could 
 that number in the end have been of use — to, at 
 best, four. The New Jersey delegates had been 
 
84 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 instructed not to consent to the surrender of the 
 American right to the use of the Mississippi ; a 
 new delegate from Pennsylvania had changed the 
 vote of that State ; and Rhode Island had also 
 gone over to the other side. “ It was considered, 
 on the whole,” wrote Madison, “ that the project 
 for shutting the Mississippi was at an end.” 
 
 These details are not unimportant. Forty-five 
 years afterward Madison wrote, that “ his main ob- 
 ject, in returning to Congress at this time, was to 
 bring about, if possible, the canceling of Mr. Jay’s 
 project for shutting the Mississippi.” Probably 
 it had occurred to nobody then that within less 
 than twenty years the Province of Louisiana 
 would belong to the United States, when their 
 right to the navigation of the river could be no 
 longer disputed. But, so long as both its banks 
 fi’om the thirty-first degree of latitude southward 
 to the Gulf remained foreign territory, it was of 
 the last importance to the Southern States, whose 
 territory extended to the Mississippi, that the 
 right of way should not be surrendered. If a 
 treaty with Spain could be carried that gave up 
 this right, and the Southern States should be com- 
 pelled to choose between the loss of the Mississippi 
 and the loss of the Union, there could be little 
 doubt as to what their choice would be. It was 
 not a question to be postponed till after the Phil- 
 adelphia convention had convened ; if not dis- 
 posed of before, the convention might as well not 
 meet. 
 
PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AND ANXIETIES. 85 
 
 Madison’s letters, while the question was pend- 
 ing, show great anxiety. He was glad to know 
 that the South was of one mind on this subject 
 and would not yield an inch. He was quite con- 
 fident that his own State would take the lead, as 
 she soon did, in the firm avowal of Southern 
 opinion. But he rejoiced that the question did 
 not come up in the Virginia legislature till after 
 the act was passed to send delegates to the Phila- 
 delphia Convention. That he looked upon as a 
 point gained, and the delegates were presently 
 appointed ; hut he still despaired of any good 
 coming of the convention, unless “Mr. Jay’s proj- 
 ect for shutting the Mississippi ” could be first 
 got rid of. 
 
 In a recent work 1 Mr. Madison is represented 
 as having “ struck a bargain ” with the Kentucky 
 delegates to the Virginia Assembly, agreeing to 
 speak on behalf of a petition relating to the Mis- 
 sissippi question, provided the delegates from Ken- 
 tucky — then a part of Virginia — would vote 
 for the representation of Virginia at Philadel- 
 phia. A “ bargain ” implies an exchange of one 
 thing for another, and Madison had no convic- 
 tions in favor of closing the Mississippi to ex- 
 change for a service rendered on behalf of a 
 measure for which he wished to secure votes. 
 Moreover, no bargain was necessary. It was not 
 
 1 A History of the People of the United States. Vol. I. By 
 John Bach McMaster. 
 
86 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 easy to find any body in Virginia who needed to 
 be persuaded that the right to the Mississippi must 
 not be surrendered. Madison wrote to Monroe in 
 October, 1786, that it would “be defended by the 
 legislature with as much zeal as could be wished. 
 Indeed, the only danger is that too much resent- 
 ment may be indulged by many against the fed- 
 eral councils.” His only apprehension was lest 
 the Mississippi question should come up in the As- 
 sembly before the report from the Annapolis Con- 
 vention should be disposed of, for if that were 
 accepted the appointment of delegates to Phila- 
 delphia was assured. “ I hope,” he wrote to 
 Washington in November, “the report will be 
 called for before the business of the Mississippi 
 begins to ferment.” It happened as he wished. 
 “ The recommendation from Annapolis,” he wrote 
 again a week later, “ in favour of a general re- 
 vision of the federal system was unanimously 
 agreed to ; ” — (the emphasis is his own.) He 
 afterward reported to Jefferson that “ the pro- 
 ject for bartering the Mississippi to Spain was 
 brought before the Assembly after the preceding 
 measure had been adopted.” There was neither 
 delay nor difficulty in securing the unanimous con- 
 sent of the Assembly to resolutions instructing 
 the members of Congress to oppose any conces- 
 sion to Spain. But Madison’s anxiety was not in 
 the least relieved by the speedy appointment of 
 delegates to the Philadelphia Convention ; for, he 
 
PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AND ANXIETIES. 87 
 
 wrote presently to Washington, “I am entirely 
 convinced, from what I observe here (at Rich- 
 mond), that, unless the project of Congress can 
 be reversed, the hopes of carrying this State into 
 a proper federal system will be demolished.” He 
 had already said, in the same letter, that the res- 
 olutions on the Mississippi question had been 
 “agreed to unanimously in the House of Dele- 
 gates,” and three days before the letter was writ- 
 ten the delegates to Philadelphia had been ap- 
 pointed. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Mr. Madison is called “ the Father of the Con- 
 stitution.” A paper written by him was laid before 
 his colleagues of Virginia, before the meeting of 
 the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia, and 
 was made the basis of the “Virginia plan,” as it 
 was called, out of which the Constitution was 
 evolved. In another way his name is so identified 
 with it that one cannot be forgotten so long as the 
 other is remembered. From that full and faithful 
 report of the proceedings of the convention, in 
 which his own part was so active and conspicuous, 
 we know most that we do, or ever can, know of 
 the perplexities and trials, the concessions and 
 triumphs, the acts of wisdom, and the acts of 
 weakness of that body of men whose coming to- 
 gether time has shown to have been one of the 
 important events in the history of mankind. 
 
 Then it is also true that no man had worked 
 harder, perhaps none had worked so hard, to 
 bring the public mind to a serious consideration 
 of affairs and a recognition of the necessity of re- 
 organizing the government, if the States were to 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 89 
 
 be held together. Never, it seemed, had men bet- 
 ter reason to be satisfied with the result of their 
 labors when, a few months later, the new Consti- 
 tution was accepted by all the States. Yet the 
 time was not far distant when even Madison would 
 be in doubt as to the character of this new bond 
 of union, and as to what sort of government had 
 been secured by it. Nor till he had been dead 
 near thirty years was it to be determined what 
 union under the Constitution really meant ; nor 
 till three quarters of a century after the adoption 
 of that instrument was the more perfect union 
 formed, justice established, domestic tranquillity 
 insured, the general welfare promoted, and the 
 blessings of liberty secured to all the people, 
 which by that great charter it was intended, in 
 1787, to ordain and establish. All the difficulties, 
 which they who framed it escaped by their work, 
 were as nothing to those which it entailed upon 
 their descendants. 
 
 Two parties went into the convention. On one 
 point, of course, they were agreed, else they would 
 never have come together at all : that a united 
 government under the Articles of Confederation 
 was a failure, and, unless some remedy should be 
 speedily devised, States with common local inter- 
 ests would gravitate into separate and, perhaps, 
 antagonistic nationalities. But the differences be- 
 tween these two parties were radical, and for a 
 time seemed insurmountable. One proposed sim- 
 
90 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 ply to repair tlie Articles of Confederation as tliey 
 might overhaul a machine that was out of gear ; 
 the other proposed to form an altogether new Con- 
 stitution. One wanted a merely federal govern- 
 ment ; not, however, meaning by that term what 
 the other party — soon, nevertheless, to be known 
 as Federalists — were striving for; but a confed- 
 eration of States, each independent of all the rest 
 and supreme in its own right, while consenting to 
 unite with the rest in a limited government for 
 the administration of certain common interests . 1 
 
 This idea of the independence of the States was 
 a survival of the old colonial system, when each 
 colony under its distinct relation to the crown had 
 attained a growth of its own with its separate in- 
 terests. Each of these colonies had become a 
 
 1 Those who were zealous for state-rights, and opposed to a 
 central government, called the system they wished to reestablish 
 a Federal System — a confederacy of States. It was too conven- 
 ient, and probably too popular a term to be lost, and the other 
 party adopted it when the new Constitution was formed. The 
 Federalist was the name chosen for the volume in which were 
 collected the papers, written first under the signature of “ A Cit- 
 izen of New York,” but afterward changed to “ Publius,” in sup- 
 port cf the new Constitution, by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. In 
 one of the earlier papers, Mr. Hamilton refers to the Articles of 
 Confederation, which were to be superseded, as the Federal Con- 
 stitution ; but in the later papers Madison is careful to refer to 
 the proposed form of government as the Federal Constitution, 
 and Federal soon came to be the distinguishing name of the party 
 which first came into power under the new Constitution. What- 
 ever may be said of Madison’s other title, his right to that of fa- 
 ther of the Federal party can hardly be disputed. 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 91 
 
 State. The Revolution had secured to each, it was 
 maintained, a separate independence, achieved, it 
 was true, by united efforts, but not therefore bind- 
 ing them together as a single nation. It was held 
 as a legitimate result of that doctrine that each 
 State, not the people of the State whether many 
 or few, should be represented by the same number 
 of votes in a federal government as they were un- 
 der the Articles of Confederation, because such a 
 government was a union of States not of a people. 
 
 All men, it was argued, — going back to a state 
 of nature, — are equally free and independent; 
 and when a government is formed every man has 
 an equal share by natural right in its formation 
 and in its subsequent conduct. While numbers 
 are few every member of the State exercises his 
 individual right in person, and none can rightfully 
 do more than this, however wise, or powerful, or 
 rich he may be. But when government by the 
 whole body of the people becomes cumbersome 
 and inconvenient through increase of numbers, the 
 individual citizen loses none of his rights by in- 
 trusting their exercise to representatives, in choos- 
 ing and instructing whom all have an equal voice. 
 So when States are united in a confederacy each 
 State has the same relation to that government 
 that individuals have to each other in a single 
 State. They are free and equal, and none has a 
 larger share of rights in the confederacy because 
 its people are more numerous, or because it is 
 
92 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 richer or more powerful, th;in the rest. In such a 
 confederacy it is not the individual citizen who is 
 to be represented, but the individual State. In 
 such a confederacy there would be the same rep- 
 resentation for a State, say of ten thousand inhab- 
 itants, as for one of fifty thousand. This, it was 
 maintained, preserved equality of suffrage in the 
 equality of States ; while the representation of the 
 individual citizens of the States would be in real- 
 ity inequality of suffrage because the autonomy of 
 the State would be lost sight of. If in such a case 
 it were asked, what had become of the- rights 
 which the majority of forty thousand had inher- 
 ited from nature ; the answer was that those 
 rights were preserved and represented in the 
 state government. The difficulty, nevertheless, 
 remained : how to reconcile in practice this doc- 
 trine of the equal rights of States, where there 
 might be a minority of persons, with the actual 
 rights of the whole people where, according to the 
 underlying democratic doctrine, the good of the 
 whole must be decided by the larger number. 
 
 Those who proposed only to amend the old 
 Articles of Confederation and opposed a new Con- 
 stitution, objected that a government formed un- 
 der such a Constitution would be not a federal, 
 but a national, government. Luther Martin said, 
 when he returned to Maryland, that the delegates 
 “ appeared totally to have ^forgot the business for 
 which we were sent. ... We had not been sent 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 93 
 
 to form a government over the inhabitants of 
 America considered as individuals. . . . That the 
 system of government we were intrusted to pre- 
 pare was a government over these thirteen States ; 
 but that in our proceedings we adopted principles 
 which would be right and proper only on the sup- 
 position that there were no state governments at 
 all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive 
 continent were in their individual capacity, with- 
 out government, and in a state of nature.” He 
 added that, “ in the whole system there was but 
 one federal feature, the appointment of the sena- 
 tors by the States in their sovereign capacity, that 
 is by their legislatures, and the equality of suf- 
 frage in that branch ; but it was said that this 
 feature was only federal in appearance.” 
 
 The Senate, the second house as it was called 
 in the convention, was in part created, it is need- 
 less to say, to meet, or rather in obedience to, rea- 
 soning like this. There was almost nobody who 
 would have been willing to abandon the state 
 governments, as there was next to nobody who 
 wanted a monarchy. “ We were eternally trou- 
 bled,” Martin said, “with arguments and prece- 
 dents from the British government.” He could 
 not get beyond the fixed notion that those whom 
 he opposed were determined to establish “ one gen- 
 eral government over this extensive continent, ot 
 a monarchical nature.” If he, and those who 
 agreed with him, sincerely believed this to be 
 
94 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 true, it was natural enough that the frequent al- 
 lusions to British precedents, as wise rules for 
 American guidance in constructing a government, 
 should be looked upon as an unmistakable hanker- 
 ing after lost flesh-pots. Should the state govern- 
 ments be swept away it might be that, in time of 
 danger from without or of peril from internal dis- 
 sensions, the country, under “a government of a 
 monarchical nature,” might drift back to its old 
 allegiance. If those who feared, or said they 
 feared, this were not quite sincere, the temptation 
 was almost irresistible to use such ai-guments to 
 arouse popular prejudice against political oppo- 
 nents. It is curious that Madison seemed quite 
 unconscious of how much the frequent allusions 
 in his articles in “ The Federalist” to the British 
 Constitution might strengthen these accusations 
 of the opposition ; while he half believed that the 
 same thing in others showed in them a leaning to- 
 ward England, from which he knew that he him- 
 self was quite free. 
 
 The Luther Martin protestants were too radical 
 to remain in the convention to the end, when they 
 saw that such a confederacy as they wanted was 
 impossible. But there were not many who went 
 the length they did in believing that a strong cen- 
 tral government was necessarily the destruction 
 of the state governments. Still fewer were those 
 who would have brought this about if they could. 
 That the rights of the States must be preserved 
 
TEE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 95 
 
 was tlie general opinion and determination, and it 
 was not difficult to do this by limiting the powers 
 of the higher government, or federal as it soon 
 came to be called, and by the organization of the 
 second house, the Senate, in which all the States 
 had an equal representation. The smaller States 
 were satisfied with this concession, and the larger 
 were willing to make it, not only for the sake of 
 the Union, but because of the just estimate in 
 which they held the rights belonging to all the 
 States alike. The real difficulty, as Madison said 
 in the debate on that question, and as he repeated 
 again and again after that question was settled, 
 was not between the larger and smaller States, 
 but between the North and the South; between 
 those States that held slaves and those that had 
 none. 
 
 Slavery in the Constitution, which has given so 
 much trouble to the Abolitionists of this century, 
 and, indeed, to everybody else, gave quite as much 
 in the last century to those who put it there. Many 
 of the wisest and best men of the time, Southern- 
 ers as well as Northerners, and among them Mad- 
 ison, were opposed to slavery. They could see 
 little good in it, hardly even any compensation for 
 the existence of a system so full of evil. There 
 was hardly a State in the Union at that time that 
 had not its emancipation society ; and there was 
 hardly a man of any eminence in the country who 
 was not an officer, or at least a member, of such 
 
96 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 a society. Everywhere north of South Carolina, 
 slavery was looked upon as a misfortune which it 
 was exceedingly desirable to be free from at the 
 earliest possible moment; everywhere north of 
 Mason and Dixon’s Line, measures had already 
 been taken, or were certain soon to be taken, to 
 put an end to it ; and by the Ordinance for the 
 government of all the territory north of the Ohio 
 River, it was absolutely prohibited by Congress, in 
 the same year in which the Constitutional Con- 
 gress met. 
 
 But it was, nevertheless, a thing to the con- 
 tinued existence of which the anti-slavery people 
 of that time could consent without any violation 
 of conscience. Bad as it was, unwise, wasteful, 
 cruel, a mockery of every pretense of respect for 
 the rights of man, they did not believe it to be 
 absolutely wicked. If they had so believed, let us 
 hope they would have washed their hands of it. 
 As it was, it was only a question of expediency 
 whether, for the sake of the Union, they should 
 protect the system of slavery, and give to the 
 slave-holders, as slave-holders, a certain degree of 
 political power. To refuse to admit a slave-hold- 
 ing State into the Union did not occur, probably, 
 to the most earnest opponent of the system ; for 
 that would have been simply to say that there 
 should be no Union. That was what Madison 
 meant in saying so repeatedly that the real dif- 
 ficulty in the way was, not the difference between 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 97 
 
 the large and the small States, but the difference 
 between the slave-holding and the non slave-hold- 
 ing States. If there could be no conciliation on 
 that point there could be no Union. 
 
 Some hoped, perhaps, rather than believed, that 
 slavery was likely to disappear ere long at the 
 South as it was disappearing at the North. It is 
 an impeachment of their intelligence, however, 
 to suppose that they relied much upon any such 
 hope. The simple truth is that slavery was then, 
 as it continued to be for three quarters of a cen- 
 tury longer, the paramount interest of the South. 
 To withstand or disregard it was not merely diffi- 
 cult, but was to brave immediate possible dangers 
 and sufferings, which are never voluntarily en- 
 countered except in obedience to the highest sense 
 of duty ; or to meet a necessity, from which there 
 was no manly way of escape. The sense of abso- 
 lute duty was wanting ; the necessity, it was hoped, 
 might be avoided by concessions. It can only be 
 said for those who made them that they did not 
 see what fruitful seeds of future trouble they were 
 sowing in the Constitution. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 “THE COMPROMISES.” 
 
 The question with the North was, how far could 
 it yield ; with the South, how far could it en- 
 croach. It turned mainly on representation ; on 
 “the unimportant anomaly,” as Mr. George Tick- 
 nor Curtis calls it in his “ History of the Consti- 
 tution,” “ of a representation of men without po- 
 litical rights or social privileges.” However much 
 they differed upon the subject in the convention, 
 there was nobody then and there who regarded 
 the question as “unimportant;” nor was there a 
 political event to happen for the coming eighty 
 years that it did not influence and generally gov- 
 ern. There were some who maintained at first 
 that the slave population should not be repre- 
 sented at all. Hamilton proposed in the first days 
 of the convention “ that the rights of suffrage in 
 the national legislature ought to be proportioned 
 to the number of free inhabitants.” Madison was 
 willing to concede this in one branch of the legis- 
 lature, provided that in the representation in the 
 other House the slaves were counted as free in- 
 habitants. The constitution of the Senate subse. 
 quently disposed of that proposition. 
 
“ THE COMPROMISES .” 
 
 99 
 
 But why should slaves be represented at all ? 
 “ They are not free agents,” said Patterson, a del- 
 egate to tlie convention from New Jersey; they 
 “ have no personal liberty, no faculty of acquiring 
 property ; but, on the contrary, are themselves 
 property, and, like other property, entirely at the 
 will of the master. Has a man in Virginia a 
 number of votes in proportion to the number of 
 his slaves ? And if negroes are not represented 
 in the States to which they belong, why should 
 they be represented in the general government? 
 . . . If a meeting of the people was actually to 
 take place in a slave State, would the slaves vote ? 
 They would not. Why, then, should they be rep- 
 resented in a federal government ? ” There could 
 be but one reply ; but that was one which it 
 would not have been wise to make. It was slave 
 property that was to be represented, and this 
 would not be submitted to among slave-holders as 
 against each other, while yet they were a unit in 
 insisting upon it in a union with those who were 
 not slave-holders. Among themselves slavery 
 needed no protection; their safety was in equal- 
 ity. But to their great interest every non-slave- 
 holder was, in the nature of things, an enemy ; and 
 prudence required that the power either to vote 
 him down or to buy him up should never be want- 
 ing. It was as much a matter of instinct as of 
 deliberation, for love of life is the first law. The 
 truth was covered up in Madison’s specious asser- 
 
100 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 tion that “every peculiar interest, whether in 
 any class of citizens or any description of States, 
 ought to be secured as far as possible.” The only 
 “ peculiar ” interest, however, belonging either to 
 citizens or States, that was imbedded in the Con- 
 stitution, was slavery. 
 
 So Wilson of Pennsylvania asked : “ Are they 
 [the slaves] admitted as citizens — then why are 
 they not admitted on an equality with white citi- 
 zens ? Are they admitted as property — then 
 why is not other property admitted into the com- 
 putation ? ” He was willing, howevei’, to concede 
 that it was a difficulty to be “ overcome by the 
 necessity of compromise.” 
 
 Never, probably, in the history of legislation, 
 was there a more serious question debated. Com- 
 promise is ordinarily understood to mean an ad- 
 justment by mutual concessions, where there are 
 rights on both sides. Here it meant whether the 
 side, which had no shadow of right whatever to 
 that which it demanded, would consent to take a 
 little less than the whole. It was the kind of 
 compromise made between the bandit and his vic- 
 tim when the former decides that he will not put 
 himself to the trouble of shooting the othei’, and 
 will even leave him his shirt. It was not diffi- 
 cult to understand that horses and cattle could be 
 justly counted only where property was to be the 
 basis of representation. Yet the slaves, who were 
 counted, were, in the eye of the law, either per- 
 
THE COMPROMISES.” 
 
 101 
 
 sonal property or real estate ; and were no more 
 represented as citizens than if they also had gone 
 upon all fours. Their enumeration, nevertheless, 
 was carried, and it so increased the representative 
 power of their masters that inequality of citizen- 
 ship became the fundamental principle of the 
 government. This, of course, was to form an oli- 
 garchy, not a democracy. Practically the govern- 
 ment was put in the hands of a class ; and there 
 it remained from the moment of the adoption of 
 the Constitution to the Rebellion of 1860 ; while 
 that class, including those of so little consequence 
 as to own only a slave or two, in its best estate, 
 probably never exceeded ten per centum of the 
 whole people. 
 
 There was, if one may venture to say so, a sin- 
 gular confusion in the minds of the venerable 
 fathers of the republic on this subject. They 
 could not quite get rid of the notion that the 
 slaves, being human, ought to be included in the 
 enumeration of population, notwithstanding that 
 their enumeration as citizens must necessarily dis- 
 appear in their representation as chattels. Slaves, 
 as slaves, were the wealth of the South, as ships, 
 for example, were the wealth of the North ; but, 
 being human, the mind was not shocked at hav- 
 ing the slaves reckoned as population in fixing the 
 basis of representation, though in reality they 
 only represented the masters’ ownership. But 
 nobody would have been at a loss to see the ab- 
 
102 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 surdity of counting three fifths of the Northern 
 ships as population. Even a Webster Whig of 
 sixty-five years later could, perhaps, have under- 
 stood that that was something more than an 
 “ unimportant anomaly.” There was no clearer- 
 headed man in the convention than Gouverneur 
 Morris ; yet he said that he was “ compelled to 
 declare himself reduced to the dilemma of doing 
 
 O 
 
 injustice to the Southern States or to human na- 
 ture ; and he must do it to the former.” C. C. 
 Pinckney of South Carolina declared that he was 
 “alarmed” at such an avowal as that. Yet had 
 the question been one of counting three fifths of 
 the Northern ships in the enumeration of popu- 
 lation, Morris would have discovered no “ di- 
 lemma,” and Pinckney nothing to be “ alarmed ” 
 at. So palpable an outrage on common sense 
 would have been merely laughed at by both. 
 
 In reply to Pinckney, however, Morris grew 
 bolder. “ It was high time,” he said, “ to speak 
 out.” He came there “ to form a compact for the 
 good of America. He hoped and believed that all 
 would enter into such compact. If they would 
 not, he was ready to join with any States that 
 would. But as the compact was to be voluntary, 
 it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on 
 what the Southern States will never agree to. It 
 is equally vain for the latter to require what the 
 other States can never admit : and he verily be- 
 lieved the people of Pennsylvania will never 
 
‘ ‘ THE C OMPR OMISES. ’ ’ 
 
 108 
 
 agree to a representation of negroes : ” of negroes, 
 he meant, counted as human beings, not for their 
 own representation, but, as ships might be counted, 
 for the increased representation of those who held 
 them as property. The next day he “ spoke out ” 
 still more plainly. “ If negroes,” he said, “ were 
 to be viewed as inhabitants, . . . they ought to 
 be added in their entire number, and not in the 
 proportion of three fifths. If as property, the 
 word wealth was right,” — as the basis, that is, 
 of representation. The distinction that had been 
 set up by Madison and others between the North- 
 ern and Southern States he considered as heret- 
 ical and groundless. But it was persisted in, and 
 “he saw that the Southern gentlemen will not be 
 satisfied, unless they see the way open to their 
 gaining a majority in the public councils. . . . 
 Either this distinction [between the North and 
 the South] is fictitious or real ; if fictitious, let it 
 be dismissed, and let us proceed with due confi- 
 dence. If it be real, instead of attempting to 
 blend incompatible things, let us at once take a 
 friendly leave of each other.” 
 
 But could they take “ a friendly leave of each 
 other ? ” Should a union be secured on the terms 
 the South offered ? or should it be declined, as 
 Morris proposed, if it could not be a union of 
 equality ? The next day Madison again set forth 
 the real issue, quietly but unmistakably. “ It 
 seemed now,” he said, “ to be pretty well under- 
 
104 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 stood, that the real difference of interests lay, not 
 between the large and small, but between the 
 Northern and Southern States. The institution 
 of slavery and its consequences formed the line of 
 discrimination.” There is sometimes great power, 
 as he well knew, in firm reiteration. So long as 
 slavery lasted the lesson he then inculcated was 
 never forgotten. Thenceforward, as then, “the 
 line of discrimination,” in Southern politics, lay 
 with “ slavery and its consequences.” One side 
 would abate nothing of its demands ; there could 
 be no “friendly leave” unless the determination, 
 on the other side, to overcome the desire for union 
 and take the consequences was equally firm. 
 
 When the question again came up, however, 
 Morris had not lost heart. His talk was the talk 
 of a modern abolitionist : — 
 
 “ He never would concur in upholding domestio 
 slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It was the 
 curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed. 
 Compare the free regions of the Middle States, where 
 a rich and noble cultivation marks the prosperity and 
 happiness of the people, with the misery and poverty 
 which overspread the barren wastes of Virginia, Mary- 
 land, and the other States having slaves. Travel 
 through the whole continent, and you behold the pros- 
 pect continually varying with the appearance and dis- 
 appearance of slavery. . . . Proceed southwardly, and 
 every step you take through the great regions of 
 slavery presents a desert increasing with the increasing 
 
THE COMPROMISES 
 
 105 
 
 proportion of these wretched beings. Upon what prin- 
 ciple is it that the slaves shall be computed in the rep- 
 resentation ? Are they men ? Then make them citizens, 
 and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is 
 no other property included ? The houses in this city 
 [Philadelphia] are worth more than all the wretched 
 slaves who cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. 
 . . . And what is the proposed compensation to the 
 Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of 
 right, of every impulse of humanity ? They are to bind 
 themselves to march their militia for the defense of the 
 Southern States, for their defense against those very 
 slaves of whom they complain ? They must supply 
 vessels and seamen in case of foreign attack. The leg- 
 islature will have indefinite power to tax them by ex- 
 cises and duties on imports, both of which will fall 
 heavier on them than on the Southern inhabitants ; for 
 the Bohea tea used by a Northern freeman will pay 
 more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable 
 slave, which consists of nothing more than his physical 
 subsistence and the rags that cover his nakedness. . . . 
 Let it not be said that direct taxation is to be propor- 
 tioned to representation. It is idle to suppose that the 
 general government can stretch its hand directly into 
 the pockets of the people scattered over so vast a coun- 
 try. . . . He would sooner submit himself to a tax for 
 paying for all the negroes in the United States, than 
 saddle posterity with such a Constitution.” 
 
 So much of this as was not already fact was 
 prophecy. Yet not many weeks later this impas- 
 sioned orator put his name to the Constitution, 
 
106 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 though it had grown meanwhile into larger pro- 
 slavery proportions. There was undoubtedly some 
 sympathy with him among a few of the members ; 
 but the general feeling was more truly expressed a 
 few days later by Rutledge of South Carolina, in 
 the debate on the continuance of the African slave- 
 trade. “Religion and humanity,” he said, “had 
 nothing to do with this question. Interest alone 
 is the governing principle with nations. The 
 true question at present is, whether the Southern 
 States shall or shall not be parties to the Union. 
 If the Northern States consult their interest, they 
 will not oppose the increase of slaves, which will 
 increase the commodities of which they will be- 
 come the carriers.” The response came from 
 Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth saying : “ Let every 
 State import what it pleases. The moi’ality or 
 wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to 
 the States themselves. What enriches a part en- 
 riches the whole,” — especially Newport and its 
 adjacent coasts, he might have added, with its 
 trade to the African coast. 
 
 But a Virginian, George Mason, had another 
 tone. He called the traffic “ infernal.” “ Slavery,” 
 he went on, “discourages arts and manufactures. 
 The poor despise labor when performed by slaves. 
 They prevent the emigration of whites, who 
 really enrich and strengthen a country. They 
 produce the most pernicious effect on manners. 
 Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. 
 
THE COMPROMISES: 
 
 107 
 
 They bring the judgment of heaven on a coun- 
 try. As nations cannot be rewarded or punished 
 in the next world, they must be in this. By an 
 inevitable chain of causes and effects Providence 
 punishes national sins by national calamities.” 
 
 These were warnings worth heeding. But Ells- 
 worth retorted with a sneer : “ As he had never 
 owned a slave, he could not judge of the effect of 
 slavery on character.” He said, however, that, 
 “ if it was to be considered in a moral light, we 
 ought to go farther, and free those already in the 
 country.” But, so far from that, he thought it 
 would be “ unjust toward South Carolina and 
 Georgia,” in whose “ sickly rice swamps ” negroes 
 died so fast, should there be any intermeddling to 
 prevent the importation of fresh Africans to labor, 
 and, of course, to perish there. Perhaps it was 
 this shrewd argument of the Connecticut delegate 
 that suggested, half a century afterward, to a Mis- 
 sissippi agricultural society the economical cal- 
 culation that it was cheaper to use up a gang of 
 negroes every few years, and supply its place by a 
 fresh gang from Virginia, than rely upon the 
 natural increase that would follow their humane 
 treatment as men and women. His colleague, 
 Roger Sherman, came to Ellsworth’s aid. It 
 would be, he thought, the duty of the general 
 government to prohibit the foreign trade in slaves, 
 and should this be left in its power, it would prob- 
 ably be done. But he would not, if the Southern 
 
108 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 States made it the condition of consenting to the 
 Constitution that the trade should be protected, 
 leave it in the power of the general government 
 to do that which he acknowledged that it should, 
 and probably would, do. 
 
 Delegates from Georgia and the Carolinas de- 
 clared that to be the condition — among them C. 
 C. Pinckney of South Carolina. “ He should con- 
 sider,” he said, “a rejection of the clause as an 
 exclusion of South Carolina from the Union.” 
 Nevertheless he said to the people at home, when 
 they came together to consider the Constitution : 
 “We are so weak that by ourselves we could not 
 form a union strong enough for the purpose of 
 effectually protecting each other. Without union 
 with the other States, South Carolina must soon 
 fall.” On the part of that State it had been a 
 game of brag all along. The first lesson in the 
 South Carolinian policy was given in the Consti- 
 tutional Convention. Of the result, this was 
 Pinckney’s summing up to his constituents : — 
 
 “ By this settlement we have secured an unlimited im- 
 portation of negroes for twenty years ; nor is it declared 
 that the importation shall be then stopped ; it may be 
 continued. We have a security that the general gov- 
 ernment can never emancipate them, for no such author- 
 ity is granted. . . . We have obtained a right to re- 
 cover our slaves, in whatever part of America they may 
 take refuge, which is a right we had not before. In 
 short, considering all circumstances, we have made the 
 
“ THE COMPROMISES." 
 
 109 
 
 best terms, for the security of this species of property, it 
 was in our power to make. We would have made better 
 if we could, but on the whole 1 do not think them bad.” 
 
 A more moderate and a more significant state- 
 ment could hardly have been made. 
 
 On the foreign slave-trade Madison had little 
 to say, but, like most of the Southern delegates 
 north of the Carolinas, he was opposed to it. 
 
 “ Twenty years,” he said, “ will produce all the^ 
 mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty 
 to import slaves. So long a term will be more 
 dishonorable to the American character than to 
 say nothing about it in the Constitution. ” The/ 
 words are a little ambiguous, though he is his own 
 reporter. But what he meant evidently was, that 
 any protection of the trade would dishonor the na- 
 tion ; for at another point of the debate, on the 
 same day, he said that “ he thought it wrong to 
 admit in the Constitution the idea that there could 
 be property in men.” Such property he was 
 anxious to protect as the great Southern inter- 
 est, so long as it lasted ; but he was not willing 
 to strengthen it by permitting the continuance of 
 the African slave-trade for twenty years longer 
 under the sanction of the Constitution. But he 
 held it to be, as he wrote in “ The Federalist,” 
 
 “ a great point gained in favor of humanity, that 
 a period of twenty years may terminate forever 
 within these States a traffic which has so long and 
 so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern pol- 
 
110 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 icy.” He added, “ the attempt that had been 
 made to pervert this clause into an objection 
 against the Constitution, by representing it as a 
 criminal toleration of an illicit practice,” was a 
 misconstruction which he did not think deserving 
 of an answer. 
 
 It was, in fact, a bargain which he had not ap- 
 proved of, and did not now probably care to talk 
 about. It was made at the suggestion of Gouver- 
 neur Morris, who moved that the foreign slave- 
 trade, a navigation act, and a duty on exports be 
 referred for consideration to a committee. “ These 
 things,” he said, “may form a bargain among the 
 Northern and Southern States.” When the com- 
 mittee reported in favor of the slave-trade, C. C. 
 Pinckney proposed that its limitation should be 
 extended from 1800 to 1808. Gorham of Massa- 
 chusetts seconded the motion, and it was carried 
 by the addition of the votes of New Hampshire, 
 Massachusetts, and Connecticut to those of Mary- 
 land, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. 
 
 The committee also reported the substitution of 
 a majority vote for that of two thirds in legisla- 
 tion relating to commerce. The concession was 
 made without much difficulty, a Georgia delegate, 
 and three of the four South Carolina delegates 
 favoring it, two of the latter frankly saying they 
 did so to gratify New England. It was, C. C. 
 Pinckney said, “the true interest of the Southern 
 States to have no regulation of commerce ; ” but 
 
THE COMPROMISES. 
 
 Ill 
 
 he assented to this proposition, and his constitu- 
 ents “ would be reconciled to this liberality,” be- 
 cause, among other considerations, of “ the liberal 
 conduct [of the New England States] towards 
 the views of South Carolina.” There was no 
 question of the meaning of this sudden avowal of 
 friendly feeling. Jefferson relates in his “ Ana,” 
 on the authority of George Mason, a member of 
 the convention, that Georgia and South Carolina 
 had “ struck up a bargain with the three New 
 England States, that if they would admit slaves 
 for twenty years, the two Southernmost States 
 would join in changing the clause which required 
 two thirds of the legislature in any vote.” 
 
 The settlement of these questions was an oppor- 
 tune moment for the introduction of that relating 
 to fugitive slaves. Butler of South Carolina im- 
 mediately proposed a section which should secure 
 their return to their masters, and it was passed 
 without a word. As Pinckney said in the passage 
 already quoted, when he went back to report to 
 his constituents, “ it is a right to recover our slaves 
 in whatever part of America they may take ref- 
 uge, which is a right we had not before.” 
 
 It is notable how complete and final a settle- 
 ment of the slavery question “ these compromises,” 
 as they were called, seemed to be to those who 
 made them. They were meant to be, as Mr. Mad- 
 ison called them, “ adjustments of the different 
 interests of different parts of the country,” and 
 
112 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 being once agreed upon they were considered as 
 having the binding force and stability of a con- 
 tract. The evils of slavery were set forth as an 
 element in the negotiation, but no question of es- 
 sential morality was raised that brought the system 
 within the category of forbidden wrong. What- 
 ever results might follow would be limited, it was 
 thought, by the terms of the contract ; whereas, in 
 fact, the actual results were not foreseen, and could 
 not be guarded against, except by the refusal to 
 enter into any contract whatever. 
 
 On all other questions involving political prin- 
 ciples, — the just relations of the Federal Govern- 
 ment and the governments of the States ; the re- 
 lations between the larger and the smaller States ; 
 the regulation of the functions of the executive, 
 the legislative, and the judicial departments of 
 government, — on all these the framers of the 
 Constitution brought to bear the profoundest wis- 
 dom. When one reflects upon the magnitude and 
 character of the work, Madison’s conclusion seems 
 hardly extravagant, that “ adding to these consid- 
 erations the natural diversity of human opinions 
 on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossi- 
 ble to consider the degree of concord which ulti- 
 mately prevailed as less than a miracle.” There 
 were, nevertheless, the gravest and most anxious 
 doubts how far the Constitution would stand the 
 test of time ; yet as a system of government for a 
 nation of freemen it remains to this day practically 
 
THE COMPROMISES 
 
 113 
 
 unchanged. But where its architects thought 
 themselves wisest they were weakest. That which, 
 they thought they had settled forever was the one 
 thing which they did not settle. Of all the “ ad- 
 justments ” of. the Constitution, slavery was pre- 
 cisely that one which was not adjusted. 
 
 Madison’s responsibility for this result was that 
 of evei’y other delegate, — no more and no less. 
 Neither he nor they, whether more or less opposed 
 to slavery, saw in it a system so subversive of the 
 rights of man that no just government should tol- 
 erate it. That was reserved for a later genera- 
 tion, and even that was slow to learn. To the 
 fathers it was, at worst, only an unfortunate and 
 unhappy social condition, which it would be well 
 to be rid of if this could be done without too much 
 sacrifice ; but otherwise, to be submitted to, like 
 any other misfortune. 
 
 While it did exist, however, Madison believed 
 it should be protected, though not encouraged, as 
 a Southern interest. The question resolved itself 
 into one of expediency, — of union or disunion. 
 What disunion would be, he knew, or thought he 
 knew. Perhaps he was mistaken. Disunion, had 
 it come then, might have been the way to a true 
 union. “ We are so weak,” said C. C. Pinckney, 
 “ that by ourselves we could not form a union 
 strong enough for the purpose of effectually pro- 
 tecting each other. Without union with the other 
 States, South Carolina must soon fall.” But he 
 8 
 
114 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 was careful to say this at home, not in Philadel- 
 phia. In the convention, Madison wrote a month 
 after it adjourned, “ South Carolina and Georgia 
 were inflexible on the point of the slaves.” What 
 was to be the union which that inflexibility car- 
 ried, was not foreseen. It was the children’s 
 teeth that were to be set on edge. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Madison’s labors for the Constitution did not' 
 cease when the convention adjourned, although 
 he was not at that moment in a hopeful frame of 
 mind in regard to it. Within a week of the ad- ; 
 journment he wrote to Jefferson: “I hazard an 
 opinion, that the plan, should it he adopted, will 
 neither effectually answer its national object, nor 
 prevent the local mischiefs which excite disgusts 
 against the state governments.” 
 
 But this feeling seems to have soon passed 
 away. Perhaps, when he devoted himself to a 
 careful study of what had been done, he saw, in 
 looking at it as a whole, how just and true it was 
 in its fair proportions. He now diligently sought 
 to prove how certainly the Constitution would an- 
 swer its purpose ; how wisely all its parts were 
 adjusted ; how successfully the obstacles to a per- 
 fect union of the States had been, as he thought, 
 overcome ; how carefully the rights of the sepa- 
 rate States had been guarded, while the needed 
 general government would be secured. Whether 
 there should be an American nation or not de- 
 
116 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 pended, as he had believed for yeai’s, upon 
 whether a national Constitution could be agreed 
 upon. Now that it was framed he believed that 
 upon its adoption depended whether there should 
 be, or should not be, a nation. In September, as 
 he wrote to Jefferson, he was in doubt; in Febru- 
 ary he wrote to Pendleton : “ I have for some 
 time been persuaded that the question on which 
 the proposed Constitution must turn is the simple 
 one, whether the Union shall or shall not be 
 continued. There is, in my opinion, no middle 
 ground to be taken.” 
 
 Those who would have called a second conven- 
 tion to revise the labors of the first had no sympa- 
 thy from him. He not only doubted if the work 
 could be done so well again ; he doubted if it 
 could be done at all. With him, it was this Con- 
 stitution or none. “ Every man,” he said in “The 
 Federalist,” referring to a picture he had just 
 drawn of the perils of disunion, — “ every man 
 who loves peace, every man who loves his country, 
 every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever 
 before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart 
 a due attachment to the Union of America, and 
 be able to set a due value on the means of preserv- 
 ing it.” This “means” was the Constitution. . 
 
 Of the eighty papers of “ The Federalist” he 
 wrote twenty-nine ; Hamilton writing forty-six, 
 and Jay only five. These famous essays, of wider 
 repute than any other American book, are yet 
 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 117 
 
 more generally accepted upon faith than upon 
 knowledge. But at that time, when the new Con- 
 stitution was in the mind and on the tongue of 
 every thoughtful man, they were eagerly read as 
 they followed each other rapidly in the columns 
 of a New York newspaper. They were an ar- 
 mory, wherein all who entered into the contro- 
 versy could find such weapons as they could best 
 handle. What governments had been, what gov- 
 ernments ought to be, and what the political 
 union of these American States would be under 
 their new Constitution, were questions on which 
 the writers of these papers undertook to answer 
 all reasonable inquiries, and to silence all cavils. 
 Madison would undoubtedly have written more 
 than his two fifths of them, had he not been called 
 upon early in March to return to Virginia ; for the 
 work was of the deepest interest to him, and the 
 popularity of the papers would have stimulated to 
 exertion one as indolent as he was industrious. 
 
 But the canvass for the election of delegates to 
 the Constitutional Convention of Virginia called 
 him home. He had been nominated as the repre- 
 sentative of his county, and his friends had urged 
 him to return before the election, for there was 
 reason to fear that the majority was on the wrong 
 side. 1 " : Henry, Mason, Randolph, Lee, and others 
 among the most influential men of Virginia, were 
 opposed to the Constitution. There must be 
 somebody in the convention to meet strong men 
 
118 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 like these, and Madison was urged to take the 
 stump and canvass for his own election. Even 
 this he was willing to do at this crisis, if need be, 
 though he said it would be at the sacrifice of every 
 private inclination, and of the rule which hitherto 
 from the beginning of his public career he had 
 strictly adhere d to, — never to ask, directly or in- 
 directly, for votes for himself. 
 
 It is quite possible, even quite probable, that 
 Mr. Madison had little of that gift which has al- 
 ways passed for eloquence, and is, indeed, elo- 
 quence of a certain kind. If we may trust the 
 reports of his contemporaries, though he wanted 
 some of the graces of oratory, he was not wanting 
 in the power of winning and convincing. His ar- 
 guments were often, if not always, prepared with 
 care. If there was no play of fancy, there was no 
 forgetfulness of facts. If there was lack of imag- 
 ination, there was none of historical illustration, 
 when the subject admitted it. If manner was for- 
 gotten, method was not. His aim was to prove 
 and to hold fast ; to make the wrong clear, and to 
 put the right in its place ; to appeal to reason, not 
 to passion, nor to prejudice ; to try his cause by 
 the light of clear logic, hard facts, and sound 
 learning; to convince his hearers of the truth, as 
 he believed in it, not to take their judgment cap- 
 tive by surprise with harmonious modulation and 
 grace of movement. Not his neighbors only, but 
 the most zealous of the Fedei’alists of the State, 
 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 119 
 
 sent him to the convention. It was there that 
 such eloquence as he possessed was peculiarly 
 needed. The ground was to be fought over inch 
 by inch, and with antagonists whom it would be 
 difficult, if not impossible, to beat. There was to 
 be contest over every word of the Constitution 
 from its first to its last. “ Give me leave,” cried 
 Patrick Henry in his opening speech, “ to demand 
 what right had they to say ‘We the people’ in- 
 stead of ‘We the States ? ’ ” He began at the be- 
 ginning. It was the gage of the coming battle ; 
 the defenders were challenged to show that any 
 better union than that already in existence was 
 needed, and that in this new Constitution a better 
 union was furnished. 
 
 As month after month passed away while the 
 Constitution was befoi’e the people for adoption, 
 the anxiety of the Federalists grew, lest the requi- 
 site nine States should not give their assent. But 
 when eight were secured there was room to hope 
 even for unanimity, if Virginia should come in as 
 the ninth. Should she say Yes, the Union might 
 be perfect ; for the remaining States would be al- 
 most sure to follow her lead. But should she say 
 No, the final result would be doubtful, even if the 
 requisite nine should be secured by the acquies- 
 cence of one of the smaller States. This-answer 
 could not, of course, depend altogether upon one 
 man, but it did depend more upon Madison than 
 upon anybody else. 
 
120 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 The convention was in session nearly a month. 
 At the end of a fortnight he was not hopeful. 
 “The business,” he wrote to Washington, “is in 
 the most ticklish state that can be imagined. 
 The majority will certainly be very small, on 
 whatever side it may finally lie ; and I dare not 
 encourage much expectation that it will be on the 
 favorable side.” But his fears stimulated rather 
 than discouraged him. He was always on his 
 feet ; always ready to meet argument with ax’gu- 
 ment ; always prompt to appeal from passion to 
 reason; quick to brush aside mere declamation, 
 and to bring the minds of his hearers back to a 
 calm consideration of how much was at stake, and 
 of the weight of the responsibility resting on that 
 convention. Others were no less earnest and dili- 
 gent than he ; but he was easily chief, and the 
 burden and heat of the day fell mainly upon him. 
 Probably when the convention assembled the ma- 
 jority were opposed to the Constitution ; but its 
 adoption was carried at last by a vote of eiglity- 
 nine to seventy-nine. Thenceforth opposition in 
 the remaining States was hopeless. 
 
 New Hampshire — though the fact was not 
 known in Virginia — preceded that State by a 
 few days in accepting the Constitution, so that 
 the requisite nine were secured befox-e the conven- 
 tion at Richmond came to a decision. But it was 
 her decision, nevertheless, that l'eally settled, so 
 far as can be seen now, the question of a perma- 
 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 121 
 
 nent Union. Had the vote of Virginia been the 
 other way it is not likely that Hamilton would 
 have carried New York, or that North Carolina 
 and Rhode Island would have finally decided not 
 to be left in solitude outside. What the history 
 of the nine united States only, with four disunited 
 States among them, might have been, it is impos- 
 sible to know, and quite useless to conjecture. 
 The conditions which some of the States attached 
 to the act of adoption ; the addition of a Bill of 
 Rights ; proposed amendments to the Constitu- 
 tion ; and the suggestion of submitting it to a sec- 
 ond convention, were matters of comparatively 
 little moment, when the majority of ten delegates 
 was secured at Richmond. These were questions 
 that could be postponed. “ The delay of a few 
 years,” Madison wrote to Jefferson, “will assuage 
 the jealousies which have been artificially created 
 by designing men, and will at the same time point 
 out the faults which call for amendment.” 
 
 Immediately after the adjournment of the Rich- 
 mond Convention he returned to New York, where 
 the Confederate Congress was still in session. 
 That body had little to do now but decide upon 
 the time and place of the inauguration of the 
 new government. Madison had entered upon his 
 thirty-eighth year, and we get an interesting 
 glimpse of him as he appeared at this time of his 
 life to an intelligent foreigner. “ Mr.' Warville 
 Brissot has just arrived here,’ he wrote to Jetfer- 
 
122 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 son in August, 1788. This was Brissot de War- 
 ville, a Frenchman of the new philosophy, — . 
 whose head, nevertheless, his compatriots cut off, 
 a few years later, — then traveling in America to 
 observe the condition and progress of the new Re- 
 public. His tour extended to nearly all the 
 States ; he met with most of the distinguished 
 men of the country ; and he made a careful and 
 intelligent use of his many opportunities for ob- 
 servation. On his return to France he wrote an 
 entertaining volume, — “ New Travels in the 
 United States of America,” — still to be found in 
 some old libraries. What he says of Madison is 
 worth, repeating, not only for the impression he 
 made upon an observant stranger, but as the evi- 
 dence of the contemporary estimate of his charac- 
 ter and reputation, which De Warville must have 
 gathered from others. 
 
 “ The name of Madison,” he writes, “ celebrated in 
 America, is well known in Europe by the merited eulo- 
 gium made of him by his countryman and friend, Mr. 
 Jefferson. 
 
 “ Though still young, he has rendered the greatest 
 services to Virginia, to the American Confederation, 
 and to liberty and humanity in general. He contrib- 
 uted much, with Mr. White, in reforming the civil and 
 criminal codes of his country. He distinguished him- 
 self particularly in the convention for the acceptation of 
 the new federal system. Virginia balanced a long time 
 in adhering to it. Mr. Madison determined to it the 
 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 123 
 
 members of the convention, by his eloquence and logic. 
 This Republican appears to be about thirty-eight years 
 of age. He had, when I saw him, an air of fatigue ; 
 perhaps it was the effect of the immense labors to which 
 he has devoted himself for some time past. His look 
 announces a censor, his conversation discovers the man 
 of learning, and his reserve was that of a man con- 
 scious of his talents and of his duties. 
 
 “ During the dinner, to which he invited me, they 
 spoke of the refusal of North Carolina to accede to the 
 new Constitution. The majority against it was one 
 hundred. Mr. Madison believed that this refusal would 
 have no weight on the minds of the Americans, and 
 that it would not impede the operations of Congress. I 
 told him that though this refusal might be regarded as a 
 trifle in America, it would have great weight in Eu- 
 rope ; that they would never inquire there into the mo- 
 tives which dictated it ; nor consider the small conse- 
 quence of this State in the confederation ; that it would 
 be regarded as a germ of division, calculated to retard 
 the operations of Congress ; and that certainly this idea 
 would prevent the resurrection of American credit. 
 
 “ Mr. Madison attributed this refusal to the attach- 
 ment of a great part of the inhabitants of that State to 
 their paper money and their tender act. He was much 
 inclined to believe that this disposition would not remain 
 a long time.” 
 
 In October the Virginia Assembly met. Two 
 thirds of its members were opposed to the new 
 Constitution, and at their head was Patrick 
 Henry, his zeal against it not in the least abated 
 
124 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 because he had been defeated in the late con- 
 vention. The acceptance of the Constitution by 
 that representative body could not be recalled. 
 But the Assembly could, at least, protest against 
 it, and was led by Henry to call upon Congress to 
 convene a second national convention to do over 
 again the work of the first. The legislature was 
 to elect senators for the first Senate under the 
 new government ; and it was also to divide the 
 State into districts for its representation in the 
 lower House of Congress. In ordinary fairness, 
 as the State had, in a popular convention, so re- 
 cently accepted the Constitution, the party then 
 in the majority was entitled to at least one of the 
 representatives in the Senate. But Henry nom- 
 inated both, and could command votes enough to 
 elect them. In modern party usage this would 
 seem quite unobjectionable ; indeed, a modern pol- 
 itician who should not use such an advantage for 
 his party would be considered as unfit for practi- 
 cal politics. But a hundred years ago it was 
 thought sharp practice, and a fair proportion of 
 Henry’s partisans refused to be bound by it. One 
 of Henry’s nominees was elected by a majority of 
 twenty over Madison ; but in the case of the other 
 that majority was reduced more than half, and a 
 change of five more votes would have elected 
 Madison. 
 
 He had, however, neither expected nor wished 
 to be sent to the Senate, while he did hope to be 
 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 125 
 
 elected to the House of Representatives. The 
 Senate was intended to he the more dignified 
 body, requiring in its members a certain style of 
 living for which wealth was indispensable. Mad- 
 ison had not the means to give that kind of social 
 support to official position ; but he could afford to 
 belong to that body where a member was not the 
 less l’espectable because his whole domestic estab- 
 lishment might be a bachelor’s room in a board- 
 ing-house. 
 
 Virginia was, as he wrote to Washington, “ the 
 only instance among the ratifying States in which 
 the politics of the legislature are at variance with 
 the sense of the people, expressed by their repre- 
 sentatives in convention.” This had enabled 
 Henry and a majority of his friends to elect sen- 
 ators who, representing “ the politics of the legis- 
 lature,” did not represent “ the sense of the peo- 
 ple ” in regard to the national Constitution. But 
 in the election of members of the House of Rep- 
 resentatives, the sense of the people was to be 
 again appealed to, and a new way must be de- 
 vised for asserting the supremacy of legislative 
 power. The cleverness of Elbridge Gerry of 
 Massachusetts, many years later, under similar 
 circumstances, introduced a new word into the 
 language of the country, and, it was supposed 
 at the time, a new device in American politics. 
 But what has since been known as “ Gerryman- 
 dering ” was really the invention of Pati’ick 
 
126 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Henry. Th is method of arranging counties into 
 congressional districts in accordance with their 
 political affinities, without regard to their geo- 
 graphical lines, Henry attempted to do with Mr. 
 Madison’s own county. By joining it to distant 
 counties it was expected that an anti-Federal ma- 
 jority would be secured large enough to insure his 
 defeat. The attempt to elect him to the Senate 
 was, Madison wrote to Jefferson, “defeated by 
 Mr. Henry, who is omnipotent in the present leg- 
 islature.” He adds that Henry “ has taken equal 
 pains, in forming the counties into districts for 
 the election of representatives, to associate with 
 Orange such as are most devoted to his politics 
 and most likely to be swayed by the prejudices 
 excited against me.” The scheme, however, was 
 unsuccessful, perhaps partly because of the indig- 
 nation which so dishonorable a measure to defeat 
 a political opponent excited throughout the State. 
 Madison entered upon an active canvass of his 
 district against James Monroe, who had been 
 nominated as a moderate anti-Federalist, and de- 
 feated him. It was winter-time, and in the ex- 
 posure of some of his long rides his ears were 
 frozen. In later life he sometimes laughingly 
 pointed to the scars of these wounds received, he 
 said, in the service of his country. 
 
 Thus Henry’s “ Gerrymander,” like many an- 
 other useful and curious device, brought neither 
 profit nor credit to the original inventor. Had 
 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 1 ^ 
 
 Henry acted in the broader spirit of the modern 
 politician, who sees that he serves himself best 
 who serves his party best, he would have disposed 
 of every Federal county in the State as he dis- 
 posed of Orange. As it was, he only aroused a 
 good deal of indignation and defeated himself by 
 openly aiming to gratify his personal resentments. 
 Had he scattered his shot for the general good of 
 the party he would, perhaps, have brought down 
 his particular bird. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 The Confederate Congress, at its final session 
 in 1788, had fixed the time for the election of 
 President and Vice-President under the Constitu- 
 tion, and the time and place for the meeting of 
 the first Congress of the new government. The 
 day appointed was the first Wednesday of the fol- 
 lowing March, and as that date fell on the fourth 
 of the month, a precedent was established which 
 has ever since been observed in the installation of 
 a new President. The place was not so easily 
 determined. The choice lay between New York 
 and Philadelphia, and the struggle was prolonged, 
 not because the question of the temporary seat of 
 government was of much moment, but because of 
 the influence the decision might have upon the 
 future settlement of the permanent place for the 
 capital. 
 
 No quorum of the new Congress was present at 
 New York on March 4, 1789, and neither House 
 was organized until early in April. On the 28d, 
 Washington arrived ; and on the 30th he took the 
 oath of office as first President of the United 
 
THE FIRST COR GEE SS. 
 
 129 
 
 States, standing on the balcony of Federal Hall, 
 at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets, a site 
 now occupied by another building used as the sub- 
 treasury. A week before, when tbe ceremonies 
 proper for such an occasion were a subject of dis- 
 cussion in Congress, the question of fitting titles 
 for the President and Vice-President came up for 
 consideration. It was decided that when the Pres- 
 ident arrived the Vice-President should meet him 
 at the door of the Senate Chamber, lead him to 
 the chair, and then, in a formal address, inform 
 him that the two Houses were ready to witness 
 the administration of tbe oath of office. “Upon 
 this,” says John Adams, in a letter written three 
 years afterward, “ I arose in my place and asked 
 the advice of tbe Senate, in what form I should 
 address him, whether I should say, 4 Mr. Wash- 
 ington,’ ‘ Mr. President,’ ‘ Sir,’ ‘ May it please 
 your Excellency,’ or what else? I observed that 
 it had been common while he commanded the 
 army to call him ‘His Excellency,’ but I was free 
 to own it would appear to me better to give him 
 no title but ‘ Sir,’ or £ Mr. President,’ than to put 
 him on a level with a governor of Bermuda, or 
 one of bis own ambassadors, or a governor of any 
 one of our States.” 
 
 Thereupon the question went to a conference 
 committee of both Houses, who reported that no 
 other title would be proper for either President 
 or Vice-President, at any time, than these which 
 9 
 
130 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 were given by the Constitution. To this report 
 the Senate disagreed and appointed a new com- 
 mittee. This proposed that the President should 
 be called, “ His Highness, the President of the 
 United States, and Protector of their Liberties.” 
 When wise men are absurd they presume on their 
 prerogative. The Senate accepted the report, but 
 the House had the good sense to reject it, consent- 
 ing, however, to leave the question in abeyance. 
 On these proceedings Mr. Madison thus com- 
 mented in a letter to Jefferson : — 
 
 “ My last inclosed copies of the President’s inaugural 
 speech, and the answer of the House of Representa- 
 tives. I now add the answer of the Senate. It will 
 not have escaped you that the former was addressed 
 with a truly republican simplicity to George Washing- 
 ton, President of the United States. The latter follows 
 the example, with the omission of the personal name, 
 but without any other than the constitutional title. The 
 proceeding on this point was, in the House of Represen- 
 tatives, spontaneous. The imitation by the Senate was 
 extorted. The question became a serious one between 
 the two Houses. J. Adams espoused the cause of titles 
 with great earnestness. His friend, R. II. Lee, al- 
 though elected as a republican enemy to an aristocratic 
 Constitution, was a most zealous second. The projected 
 title was, His Highness the President of the United 
 States and the Protector of their Liberties. Had the 
 project succeeded, it would have subjected the President 
 to a severe dilemma, and given a deep wound to our in- 
 fant government.” 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 131 
 
 Washington has sometimes been accused of 
 wishing for the title of “ His Highness,” and of 
 having suggested it. Had this been true, Madi- 
 son would have been certain to know it, and he 
 was quite incapable of asserting in that case that 
 such a title would have been to the President “ a 
 severe dilemma.” About Mr. Adams he was per- 
 haps mistaken, as he might easily have been, since 
 he was not a member of the Senate and probably 
 heard only a confused report of how the question 
 was brought before that body. As Mr. Adams’s 
 letter, quoted just now, shows, he regarded the 
 charge as a calumny and resented it. He gave 
 them, according to his own statement, no other 
 opinion than that he preferred “ Sir,” or “ Mr. 
 President,” as a more proper address than “ Ex- 
 cellency,” a title then, as now, pertaining to gov- 
 ernors of States. He probably took no further 
 part in the debate, but it is not impossible that he 
 may in private have avowed a preference for some 
 other and higher title than either “ Mr. Presi- 
 dent ” or “Your Excellency.” “ For,” he said in 
 the explanatory letter to his friend, “ I freely own 
 that I think decent and moderate titles, as distinc- 
 tions of offices, are not only harmless, but useful 
 in society ; and that in this country, where I know 
 them to be prized by the people as well as their 
 magistrates as highly as by any people or any 
 magistrates in the world, I should think some dis- 
 tinction between the magistrates of the national 
 
132 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 government and those of the state governments 
 proper.” A distinction might be proper enough 
 if there were to be any titles whatever ; but cer- 
 tainly they were the wiser who preferred good 
 home-spun to threadbare old clothes. Had rags 
 of that sort been made a legal uniform it is almost 
 appalling to reflect upon the absurdities to which 
 the national fondness for titles would have carried 
 us. 
 
 From March 4 to April 1, though the House of 
 Representatives met daily, there were not mem- 
 bers enough present to make a quorum. The first 
 real business brought before the House, except 
 that relating to its organization, was introduced 
 by Madison, two days after the inauguration. It 
 was a proposition to raise a revenue by duties on 
 imports, and by a tonnage duty on all vessels, 
 American and foreign, bringing goods, wares, or 
 merchandise into the United States. The essen- 
 tial weakness of the late Confederacy was, first of 
 all, to be remedied by uniform rules for the regu- 
 lation of trade. Revenue must be provided for 
 the support of government, and that in a way 
 which should not be oppressive to the people. 
 Commerce, Mr. Madison said, “ought to be as 
 free as the policy of nations will admit;” but 
 government must be supported, and taxes, the 
 least burdensome and most easily collected, are 
 those derived from duties on imports. He agreed, 
 however, as he said on the second day of the de- 
 
TEE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 133 
 
 bate, with those who would so adjust the duties 
 on foreign goods as to protect the “infant manu- 
 factories ” of the country. With little interrup- 
 tion this subject was debated for the first six 
 weeks of the opening session of the First Congress. 
 No other could have been hit upon to test so thor- 
 oughly the strength of the new bond of union. 
 It was to brush aside all those trade regulations in 
 the several States which each had hitherto thought 
 essential to its prosperity. Every interest in the 
 country was to be considered, and their different, 
 sometimes opposing, claims to be reconciled. 
 
 New England was sure that, should the tax on 
 molasses be too high, the distilleries would be shut 
 up, and a great New England industry destroyed. 
 Nor would the injury stop there. The fisheries, 
 as well as the distilleries, would be ruined. For 
 three fifths of the fish put up for the West Indies 
 could find no market anywhere else; and a market 
 existed there only because molasses was taken in 
 exchange. A prohibitory duty on that article, 
 or a duty that should seriously interfere with its 
 importation, would well-nigh destroy the fisheries. 
 What then would become of the nursery of Amer- 
 ican seamen ? With no seamen there would be 
 no ship-building. What sadder picture than this 
 of a New England without rum, without codfish, 
 without seamen, and without ships. One can 
 easily conceive that even in that restrained and dig- 
 nified First Congress there was no want of serious 
 
134 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 and alarmed expostulation, and even some threat- 
 ening talk from such men as the tranquil Good- 
 hue, the thoughtful and scholarly Ames, and the 
 impulsive Gerry. 
 
 Then the South, for her part, was alarmed lest, 
 among other things, too high a tonnage duty 
 should leave her tobacco, her rice, and indigo rot- 
 ting in the fields and warehouses for want of ships 
 to take them to market. She had no ships of her 
 own and could have none, and she invited the 
 ships of the rest of the world to come for her 
 products and bring in return all she needed for 
 her own consumption. The picture of the possi- 
 ble ruin of New England was as nothing to that 
 of the Southern planter scanning the horizon with 
 weary eyes, in vain, for the sight of a sail, while 
 behind him was a dangerous crowd of hungry 
 blacks with nothing to do. That desolation seemed 
 complete to the southernmost States when it was 
 also proposed to levy a tax of ten dollars upon 
 every slave imported. In short, the whole sub- 
 ject bristled with difficulties. The problem was 
 nothing more nor less than how to tax everything, 
 and at the same time convince everybody that the 
 scheme was for the general good, while nobody’s 
 special interests were sacrificed. The “ infant 
 industries,” to which Mr. Madison alluded, really 
 received no special consideration in the final ad- 
 justment, and they were too feeble then even to 
 cry for nursing. They have grown sti’onger since 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 135 
 
 though they are “ infants ” still ; and they should 
 never cease to be grateful to him who, however 
 unwittingly, gave them a name to live by for a 
 hundred years. 
 
 But the most remarkable part of the debate was 
 that upon the proposition of Mr. Parker of Vir- 
 ginia, to impose a duty upon the importation of 
 slaves. Could the progress of events have been 
 foreseen, that proposal might have been regarded 
 as meant to protect an “ infant industry ” of the 
 northernmost slave States. But the wildest imag- 
 ination then could not conceive of the domestic 
 slave-trade of a few years later, when a chief 
 source of the prosperity of Virginia would be her 
 virgintial crop of young men and women to be 
 shipped for New Orleans and a market. But Mr. 
 Parker had no ulterior motive when he avowed 
 his regret that the Constitution had failed to pro- 
 hibit the importation of slaves from Africa, and 
 hoped that the duty he proposed would prevent, 
 in some degree, a traffic which he pronounced “ir- 
 rational and inhuman.” It would have been dif- 
 ficult to have found a Virginian of that day who 
 would not have taken down his shot-gun on hear- 
 ing that there were miscreants prowling about his 
 kitchen doors in the hope of buying up the strong- 
 est young people of his household for export to 
 the Southwest. 
 
 Judging from the imperfect report of the debate 
 upon the subject, it would seem that the bargain 
 
136 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 relative to tlie slave-trade, made in the Constitu- 
 tional Convention of two years before between 
 New England and the two southernmost States, 
 might still hold good. Or there may have been a 
 new bargain ; or, perhaps, both sides trusted to a 
 tacit recognition of the eternal fitness of things, 
 and made common cause where legislation threat- 
 ened at the same time the distillery and the slave- 
 ship . 1 At any rate the extreme Southerners 
 expressed surprise at the audacity which would 
 disturb a compromise of the Constitution ; the 
 extreme Northerners deprecated it as quite un- 
 called for in any consideration of the subject of 
 revenue. The principle of Mr. Parker’s motion, 
 Mr. Sherman of Connecticut thought, was to cor- 
 
 1 Eleven years afterward, when the question of prohibiting the 
 carrying on the slave-trade from American ports came up, one 
 John Brown of Rhode Island said in Congress, “ Our distilleries 
 and manufactories were all lying idle for want of an extended com- 
 merce. lie had been well informed that on those coasts [African] 
 New England rum was much preferred to the best Jamaica spir- 
 its, and would fetch a better price. Why should it not be sent 
 there, and a profitable return be made 1 Why should a heavy 
 fine and imprisonment [of slave-traders] be made the penalty for 
 carrying on a trade so advantageous 1 ” Sixty years later still, 
 there was another Brown in Providence, Rhode Island, who was 
 a member of the Committee of the Kansas Aid Society of New 
 England. He was about to withdraw from it for want of time to 
 attend to its duties, — had, indeed, actually sent in his resignation, 
 — when news came of the doings of another John Brown at 
 Harper’s Ferry. The resignation was instantly recalled, with the 
 remark that it was not a time for Browns to seem to be backward 
 on the question of slavery. Such is the irony of coincidence in 
 names. 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 137 
 
 rect a moral evil ; the principle of the bill before 
 the House was to raise a revenue. At some other 
 time he would be willing to consider the question 
 of taxing the importation of negroes on the ground 
 of humanity and policy ; but it was a sufficient 
 reason with him for not admitting it as an object 
 of revenue that the burden would fall upon two 
 States only. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts could 
 only take counsel of his conscience. From his 
 soul, he said, he detested slavery ; and — forget- 
 ting, apparently, that this tax was provided for by 
 the Constitution — he doubted whether imposing 
 it “ would not have the appearance of authorizing 
 the practice ” of trading in slaves. This was his 
 reason for wishing to postpone the subject. But 
 Mr. Livermore of New Hampshire was more in- 
 genious still. If the imported negroes were goods, 
 wares, or merchandise, they would come within the 
 title of the bill, and be taxed under the general 
 rule of five per centum, which would be about the 
 same rate as ten dollars a head ; but if they were 
 not goods, wares, or merchandise, then such im- 
 portation could not properly be included in the 
 consideration of the question of a revenue from 
 duties on such articles of trade. 
 
 Mr. Madison came to the help of his colleague, 
 and brushed aside the sophistries of the New Eng- 
 land allies of the slave-traders. If there were 
 anything wanting in the title of the bill to cover 
 this particular duty, it was easy to add it. If the 
 
138 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 question was not one of taxation because it was 
 one of humanity, it would be quite as difficult to 
 deal with it under any other bill for levying a 
 duty as under this. If the tax seemed unjust be- 
 cause it bore heavily upon a single class, that 
 would be a good reason for remitting many taxes 
 which there was no hesitation in imposing. If 
 ten dollars seemed a heavy duty, a little calcula- 
 tion would show that it was only about the pro- 
 posed ad valorem duty of five per centum on most 
 other importations. “ It is to be hoped,” he added, 
 “ that by expressing a national disapprobation 
 of this trade we may destroy it, and save our- 
 selves from reproaches, and our posterity the im- 
 becility ever attendant on a country fdled with 
 slaves.” “ If there is any one point,” he contin- 
 ued, “ in which it is clearly the policy of this na- 
 tion, so far as we constitutionally can, to vary the 
 practice obtaining under some of the state gov- 
 ernments, it is this. ... It is as much the inter- 
 est of Georgia and South Carolina as of any in the 
 Union. Every addition they receive to their num- 
 ber of slaves tends to weaken and render them less 
 capable of self-defense. ... It is a necessary 
 duty of the general government to protect every 
 part of the empire against danger, as well internal 
 as external. Everything, therefore, which tends 
 to increase this danger, though it may be a local 
 affair, yet, if it involves national expense or safety, 
 becomes of concern to every part of the Union, and 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 139 
 
 is a proper subject for the consideration of those 
 charged with the general administration of the 
 government.” No Northern man, except Elbridge 
 Gerry of Massachusetts, supported this measure ; 
 and none from the Southern States, except three 
 of the Virginia members, with Madison leading. 
 As the foreign slave-trade was protected in the 
 Constitution for twenty years by a bargain be- 
 tween the two southernmost States and New Eng- 
 land ; so now the same influence staved off the 
 imposition of the tax which was a part of the con- 
 sideration to be given for that constitutional pro- 
 tection of the trade. It is not a creditable fact ; 
 but it is, nevertheless, a fact and a representative 
 one in the history of the United States. And it 
 is to Madison's great honor that he had neither 
 part nor lot in it. 
 
 After six weeks of earnest debate, an amicable 
 and satisfactory agreement was made to impose a 
 moderate duty upon pretty much everything im- 
 ported, except slaves from Africa. It was liter- 
 ally a tariff for revenue; but it was a settlement 
 that settled nothing definitely, except that the 
 provision of the Constitution for a tax of ten dol- 
 lars on imported slaves should be a dead letter. 
 Thenceforth the policy of free trade was estab- 
 lished, so far as African slaves were concerned, till 
 the traffic was supposed to cease by constitutional 
 limitation and Act of Congress in 1808. 1 
 
 1 The subsequent legislation on this subject is a curious exem- 
 
140 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 The determination to protect the commercial 
 interests of the country, beyond the point of mere 
 revenue, was more manifest in fixing the rate of 
 duty upon tonnage than in duties upon importa- 
 tions. It was generally agreed, after much debate, 
 that American commerce had better be in Amer- 
 ican hands, and a difference of twenty cents a ton 
 was made between the tax upon domestic and that 
 upon foreign ships, as a measure of protection to 
 American shipping. Mr. Madison proposed to 
 make it still larger, but the House would only 
 agree to increase it to forty cents on ships belong- 
 ing to powers with which the United States had 
 
 plification of the ingenuity with which any law obnoxious to the 
 owners of slaves was got rid of, when it was clear that it could 
 not be defeated by force of numbers. In 1806 a final attempt was 
 made to impose the duty of ten dollars upon slaves imported, and 
 a resolution passed in favor of it. This was referred to a com- 
 mittee, with instructions to bring in a bill. A bill was reported 
 and pushed so far as a third reading, when it was recommitted, 
 which put it off for a year. When it next appeared it was a bill 
 for the prohibition of the importation of slaves, in accordance 
 with the constitutional provision that the traffic should cease in 
 1808. The new question, after some debate, in which there was 
 no allusion to the tax, was postponed for further consideration. 
 But it never again came before the House. A month later, Febru- 
 ary 13, 1807, a bill from the Senate, providing that the foreign 
 slave-trade should cease on the first day of the following January, 
 was received and immediately concurred in, and that seems to 
 have been silently accepted as disposing of the whole subject. No 
 tax was ever paid ; but the importation of slaves, notwithstand- 
 ing the law to put an end to importation in 1808., continued at the 
 rate, it was estimated, of about fifteen thousand a year. Proba- 
 bly it never ceased altogether till the beginning of the Rebellion 
 of 1860. 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 141 
 
 no treaties. The Senate, however, refused to ad- 
 mit this distinction, and insisted that all foreign 
 ships should be subject to the same tonnage duty 
 without regard to existing treaties. The House 
 assented, lest the bill should be lost altogether. 
 This proposed differential duty on foreign vessels 
 was as clearly aimed at Great Britain as if that 
 power had been named in the bill. Nor, indeed, 
 was there an} r attempt at concealment ; for it was 
 openly avowed that America had no formidable 
 rival except the English, who already largely con- 
 trolled the commerce of the United States. In 
 the debates and in the final decision of the ques- 
 tion is shown clearly enough the difference of 
 opinion and of feeling, which soon made the divid- 
 ing line between the two great parties of the first 
 quarter of a century under the Constitution. No- 
 body then foresaw how bitter that difference of 
 party was to be, nor what disastrous consequences 
 would follow it. 
 
 Mr. Madison was among the most zealous of 
 those who insisted upon a discrimination against 
 Great Britain. He thought it should be made 
 for the dignity no less than for the interest of the 
 United States. He had no fear, he said, “of en- 
 tering into a commercial warfare with that na- 
 tion.” England, he believed, could do this coun- 
 try no harm by any peaceful reprisals she could 
 devise. She supplied the United States with no 
 article either of necessity or of luxury that the 
 
142 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 people of the United States could not manufacture 
 for themselves. He called those “ Anglicists ” 
 who did not agree with him, and who believed 
 that it was in the power of Great Britain to hinder 
 or to help immensely the prosperity of the United 
 States. It was not of so much moment' what 
 America bought of England, as it was that Eng- 
 land should consent to free trade with her colo- 
 nies ; and on every account it was wiser to concili- 
 ate than to defy Great Britain ; wiser to induce 
 her to enter into a friendly commercial alliance, 
 than to provoke her to retaliate upon the feeble 
 commerce of this country, upon which she had so 
 strong a grip. Madison had shown himself, before 
 this time, half credulous of the charges of a lean- 
 ing toward England and toward monarchy, made 
 by those who wanted a congress of petty States, 
 against those who wanted a strong national gov- 
 ernment. If, however, there were Anglicism on 
 one side, so there was quite as much Gallicism, if 
 not a good deal more, on the other. In writing 
 to Jefferson of the probability that the Senate 
 would make no discrimination in the tonnage du- 
 ties, he said that in that case “ Great Britain will 
 be quieted in the enjoyment of our trade, as she 
 may please to regulate it, and France discouraged 
 from her efforts at a competition, which it is not 
 less our interest than hers to promote.” What- 
 ever may be thought of this first concession of 
 the new government to England, it is quite as 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 143 
 
 much the coming party leader as the statesman 
 who speaks here. It may not be doubted that he 
 sincerely thought it to be, as he said, “ impolitic, 
 in every view that can be taken of the subject, to 
 put Great Britain at once on the footing of the 
 most favored nation.” But the relation of Amer- 
 ican interests to English intei’ests was evidently 
 already associated in his mind with the relations 
 of France and England, so soon to be the absoi'b- 
 ing question in American politics. 
 
 The impost act was followed by others hardly 
 less important in putting the new Constitution 
 into operation under its first Congress. The di- 
 rection of business seems, by common consent, 
 to have been intrusted to Mr. Madison among 
 the many able men of that body ; doubtless, be- 
 cause of his thorough familiarity with the Consti- 
 tution, and of his methodical ways. He was sure 
 to bring things forward in their due order, to pro- 
 vide judiciously for the more immediate needs. 
 The impost bill secured the means to work with ; 
 the next necessity was to organize the machinery 
 to do the work. Resolutions to create the execu- 
 tive departments of Foreign Affairs, of the Treas- 
 ury, and of War, were offered by Mr. Madison. 
 These were required in general terms by the Con- 
 stitution, with a single officer at the head of each, 
 to be appointed by the President “by and with 
 the advice and consent of the Senate.” The man- 
 ner of the appointment of subordinate officers was 
 
144 
 
 JAMES MADISUK. 
 
 provided for by the Constitution, but the manner 
 of their removal from office was not. Was the 
 tenure of office to be good behavior? Were the 
 incumbents removable, with or without cause ? 
 If the power of removal existed, did it vest in 
 the power that appointed, that is, in the President 
 and Senate conjointly, or in the President alone? 
 
 As the Constitution was silent, the question had 
 to be settled on its own merits. With all the ar- 
 guments that could be urged, either on one side or 
 the other, we are familiar enough in our time, 
 coming up as the question so often does in changes 
 in state constitutions and municipal charters, and 
 in the discussion of the necessity for civil service 
 reform. There is this essential difference, how- 
 ever, between now and then ; we know the mis- 
 chiefs that come from the power of official re- 
 moval, which were then only dimly apprehended. 
 The power of removal from office belonged, Mr. 
 Madison believed, rightfully to the Chief Magis- 
 trate, and if, by some unhappy chance the wrong 
 man should find his way to that position and abuse 
 the power intrusted to him, “the wanton removal 
 of meritorious officers would,” he said, “ subject 
 the President to impeachment and removal from 
 his own high trust.” 
 
 Lofty political principles like these may still be 
 found in the platforms of modern political par- 
 ties, — 
 
 “ The souls of them fumed-forth, the hearts of them torn-out.” 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 145 
 
 But Mr. Madison believed, at least, that he be- 
 lieved in them. There is in politics as in religion 
 an accepted doctrine of justification by faith ; and 
 this, perhaps, sustained him when, twelve years 
 later, as Jefferson's Secretary of State, he learned 
 from his chief that, as “ Federalists seldom died 
 and never resigned,” party necessities must find a 
 way of supplementing the law of nature. Jeffer- 
 son was a little timid in applying the remedy, but 
 Madison lived long enough to see Jackson boldly 
 remove, in the course of his administration, about 
 two thousand office-holders, whose places he wanted 
 as rewards for his own political followers. From 
 that time to this there has not been a President 
 who might not, if Madison’s doctrine was sound, 
 have been impeached for a “ wanton ” abuse of 
 power. 
 
 Though the Constitution had been adopted by 
 the States, it was not without objections by some 
 of them. To meet these objections Mr. Madison 
 proposed twelve amendments declaratory of cer- 
 tain fundamental popular rights, which, it was 
 thought by many persons, were not sufficiently 
 guarded by the original articles. This, also, was 
 left to him to do, no doubt because of his thor- 
 ough knowledge of the Constitution and of the 
 points wherein it was still imperfect, as well as 
 those wherein it had better not be meddled with. 
 The amendments, as finally agreed to after long 
 debate, were essentially those which he proposed, 
 10 
 
146 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 and in clue time ten of them were ratified by the 
 States. The two that were not accepted referred 
 only to the number of representatives in the 
 House, and to the pay of members of Congress. 
 
 It was hoped that the selection of a place for 
 the permanent seat of government would be made 
 by this Congress. There was much talk of the 
 centres of wealth, of territory, and of population 
 then, and of where such centres might be in the 
 future. But the question was really a sectional 
 one. The Northern members were accused of 
 having made a bargain out of doors with the 
 members of the Middle States. The bargain, 
 however, was only this : that inasmuch as it was 
 hopeless that the actual centre should be chosen 
 as the site for a capital city, a place as near as 
 possible to it should be insisted upon. The 
 South, on the other hand, determined that the 
 seat of government should be within the boun- 
 daries of the Southern States. That was a fore- 
 gone conclusion with them, that needed no bargain. 
 The nearest navigable river to the centre of pop- 
 ulation was the Delaware ; but the jealousy of 
 New York stood in the way of any selection that 
 favored Philadelphia. The Susquehanna was pro- 
 posed. It empties into Chesapeake Bay. North 
 of it was, as Mr. Sherman showed, a population 
 of 1,400,000 ; and south of it 1,200,000. The 
 South wanted the capital on the Potomac, not be- 
 cause it was the centre of population then, but 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 147 
 
 because it might be at some future time, from the 
 growth of the West. On the other hand, it was 
 insisted that the population south of the Potomac 
 was then only 960,000, while north of it there 
 were 1,680,000 people, and that it was no more 
 accessible from the West than the Susquehanna 
 was. To many members, moreover, this talk 
 of the great future of the West seemed hardly 
 worthy of consideration. It was “ an unmeasur- 
 able wilderness,” and “when it would be settled 
 was past calculation,” Fisher Ames said. “ It 
 was,” he added, “ perfectly romantic to make this 
 decision depend upon that circumstance. Proba- 
 bly it will be near a century before these people 
 will be considerable.” He was nearer right when 
 he said in the same speech “that trade and manu- 
 factures will accumulate people in the Eastern 
 States in proportion of five to three, compared 
 with the Southern. The disproportion will, doubt- 
 less, continue to be much greater than I have cal- 
 culated. It is actually greater at present, for the 
 climate and negro slavery are acknowledged to be 
 unfavorable to population, so that husbandry as 
 well as commerce and manufactures will give more 
 people in the Eastern than in the Southern States.” 
 It was, however, finally resolved by the House 
 “ that the permanent seat of the government of 
 the United States ought to be at some convenient 
 place on the banks of the river Susquehanna in 
 the State of Pennsylvania;” and a bill accordingly 
 was sent to the Senate, 
 
148 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Had the Senate agreed to this bill, there are 
 some luminous pages of American history that 
 would never have been written ; for the progress 
 of events would have taken quite another direc- 
 tion had the influences surrounding the national 
 capital for the first half of this century been 
 Northern instead of Southern. But the Senate 
 did not agree. For “ the convenient place on the 
 banks of the Susquehanna” it substituted ten 
 miles square on the river Delaware, beginning 
 one mile from Philadelphia and including the vil- 
 lage of Germantown. To this amendment the 
 House agreed, and there, but for Madison, the 
 matter would have ended. He had labored earn- 
 estly for the site on the Potomac ; but failing in 
 that, he hoped to postpone the question till the 
 next session of Congress, when the representatives 
 from North Carolina would be present. He moved 
 a proviso that the laws of Pennsylvania should 
 remain in force within the district ceded by the 
 State till Congress should otherwise provide by 
 law. It seems to have been accepted without con- 
 sideration, a single member only saying that he 
 saw no necessity for it. At any rate, whether 
 that was Mr. Madison’s motive or not, time was 
 gained, for it compelled the return of the bill to 
 the Senate. This was on September 28, and the 
 next day the session was closed by adjournment 
 till the following January. 
 
 When in that next session the bill came back 
 
THE FIRST CONGRESS. 
 
 149 
 
 from the Senate to the House, a member from 
 South Carolina said, in the course of debate, that 
 “a Quaker State was a bad neighborhood for the 
 South Carolinians.” The Senate had also come 
 to that conclusion, for the bill now proposed that 
 the capital should be at Philadelphia for ten 
 years only, and should then be removed to the 
 banks of the Potomac. It was done, Madison 
 wrote to Monroe, by a single vote, for two South- 
 ern senators voted against it. But the two sena- 
 tors from North Carolina were now present, and 
 the majority of one was made sure of somehow. 
 
 So much was gained by gaining time, and Mad- 
 ison thought the passage of the bill through the 
 House was possible, “ but attended with great 
 difficulties.” Did he know how these difficulties 
 were to be overcome? “If the Potomac suc- 
 ceeds,” he adds, “ it will have resulted from a for- 
 tuitous coincidence of circumstances which might 
 never happen again.” What the “fortuitous co- 
 incidence ” was he does not explain ; but the term 
 was a felicitous euphuism to cover up what in the 
 blunter political language of our time is called 
 “ log-rolling.” 
 
 The reader of this series of biographies is al- 
 ready familiar with Hamilton’s skillful barter of 
 votes for the Potomac site of the capital in ex- 
 change for votes in favor of his scheme for the as- 
 sumption of the state debts. Madison seems not 
 to have been ignorant of the progress of that bar- 
 
150 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 gain, with which Jefferson was afterward so anx- 
 ious to prove that he had nothing to do. Madison 
 earnestly opposed the assumption of the state debts 
 from first to last ; but, when he saw that the meas- 
 ure was sure to pass the House, he wrote to Mon- 
 roe : “ I cannot deny that the crisis demands a 
 spirit of accommodation to a certain extent. If 
 the measure should be adopted, I shall wish it to 
 be considered as an unavoidable evil, and possibly 
 not the worst side of the dilemma.” In other 
 words, he was willing to assent silently to what 
 he believed to be a great injustice to several of 
 the States, provided that the bargain should be a 
 gain to his own State. If Hamilton and Jeffer- 
 son were sinners in this business, Madison will 
 hardly pass for a saint. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 NATIONAL FINANCES. — SLAVERY. 
 
 Hamilton’s famous report to the First Con- 
 gress, as Secretary of the Treasury, was made at 
 the second session in January, 1790. Near the 
 close of the previous session a petition asking for 
 seme settlement of the public debt was received 
 and referred to a committee of which Madison 
 was chairman. The committee reported in favor 
 of the petition, and the House accordingly called 
 upon the Secretary to prepare a plan “for the 
 support of the public credit.” 
 
 So far as Hamilton’s funding scheme provided 
 for that portion of the debt due to foreigners it 
 was accepted without demur. There could be no 
 doubt that there the ostensible creditor was the 
 real creditor, who should be paid in full. The re- 
 port assumed that this was equally true of the 
 domestic debt. A citizen holding a certificate of 
 the indebtedness of the government, no matter 
 how he came by it, nor at what price, was entitled 
 to payment at its face value. But here the ques- 
 tion was raised, Was this ostensible creditor the 
 sole creditor? Was he, whose necessities had 
 
152 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 compelled him to part with the government's 
 note of hand at a large discount when full pay- 
 ment was impossible, to receive nothing now when 
 at last government was able to pay in full ? Was 
 it equity to let all the loss fall upon the original 
 creditor, and all the gain go to him who had lost 
 nothing originally, and had only assumed at small 
 cost the risk of a profitable speculation? More- 
 over it was charged, and not denied, that in some 
 of these speculations there had been no risk what- 
 ever ; and that so soon as the tenor of the report 
 was known fast-sailing vessels were dispatched 
 from New York to the Carolinas and Georgia to 
 buy up public securities held by persons ignorant 
 of their recent rapid rise in value. As hitherto 
 they had been worth only about fifteen cents on 
 the dollar ; as upon the publication of the Secre- 
 tary’s report they had risen to fifty cents on the 
 dollar ; and as, if the Secretary’s advice should be 
 taken, they would rise to a hundred cents on the 
 dollar ; it would be securing, what in the slang of 
 the modern stock -exchange is called “a good 
 thing,” to send agents into the rural districts in 
 advance of the news to buy up government paper. 
 “ My soul rises indignant,” exclaimed a member, 
 “ at the avaricious and moral turpitude which so 
 vile a conduct displays.” Nor on that point did 
 anybody venture then to disagree with him 
 openly. 
 
 But besides the question as to who were in real- 
 
NATIONAL FINANCES.— SLAVERY. 153 
 
 ity the public creditors, a doubt was also raised 
 whether the debt ought to be paid in full to any- 
 body. Every dollar of the foreign debt was for 
 an actual dollar borrowed. But the domestic debt 
 was not incurred to any large amount for money 
 borrowed, but in payment for services, or for pro- 
 visions and goods purchased, for which double, or 
 moi'e than double, prices had been exacted by 
 those who exchanged them for government paper. 
 If the exigencies of war had compelled the govern- 
 ment to promise to pay for fifty bushels of wheat 
 the price of a hundred bushels, the creditor, now 
 that the government was in a condition to redeem 
 its promise, was not entitled in equity to receive 
 more than the actual value of the fifty bushels at 
 the time of the purchase. Moreover, it was con- 
 tended, there was no injustice in such a settle- 
 ment of the debt, for the war had been carried 
 on and brought to a successful end, for the ben- 
 efit of the creditor as well as of everybody else. 
 The argument was analogous in a measure to that 
 used by a certain class of politicians in our time, 
 who maintained that the bonds of the United 
 States, bought at a discount for “greenbacks,” 
 during the late rebellion, should not be redeemed 
 in gold when the war was over. 
 
 The answer to all this was obvious. The na- 
 tion must first be just by paying its debts to those 
 who could present the evidence that they were its 
 creditors. If, when that was done, it could afford 
 
154 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 to be generous, it might, if so disposed, reimburse 
 those who had lost by parting with the certificates 
 of debt at a discount. The government could not 
 in honor go behind its own contracts. The Con- 
 stitution provided that “ all debts and engage- 
 ments, entered into before the adoption of this 
 Constitution, shall be as valid against the United 
 States under this Constitution as under the Con- 
 federation.” Here was a debt which the Confed- 
 eration had contracted, and the Federal Govern- 
 ment had no more right “ to impair the obligation 
 of contracts ” for its own benefit, than the sepa- 
 rate States had ; and that they were expressly 
 forbidden by the Constitution to do. 
 
 Madison listened quietly day after day to the 
 long and earnest debates upon the subject, and 
 then advanced an entirely new proposition. He 
 agreed with one party in maintaining the inviola- 
 bility of contracts. The Confederacy had incurred 
 a debt to its own citizens, which the new govern- 
 ment had agreed to assume. But he also agreed 
 with the other party that there was a question as 
 to whom that debt was due. W ere those who now 
 held the certificates entitled to the payment of 
 their face value, dollar for dollar, although the 
 cost to them was only somewhere from fifteen to 
 fifty cents on the dollar? It was true that the 
 original contract was transferable, and these 
 present creditors held the evidence of the trans- 
 fer. But did that transfer entitle the holder to 
 
NATIONAL FINANCES. — SLA VERY. 155 
 
 the full value without regard to the price paid for 
 it? Was there not in equity a reserved right in 
 the original holder, who, having given a full 
 equivalent for the debt, had only parted with the 
 evidences of it, under the compulsion of his own 
 poverty, and the inability of the government at 
 that time to meet its obligations? Was not this 
 specially true in the case of the soldiers of the 
 late war, to whose devotion and sacrifices the na- 
 tion owed its existence ? 
 
 Mr. Madison thought that an affirmative reply 
 to the last two queries would present the true view 
 of the case, and he proposed, therefore, to pay both 
 classes of creditors — those who now held the evi- 
 dence of indebtedness, acquired by purchase at 
 no matter what price ; and those who had parted 
 with that evidence without receiving the amount 
 which the government had promised to pay for 
 services rendered. It was not, however, to be ex- 
 pected that the entire debt should be paid in full 
 to both classes. That was beyond the ability of 
 the government. But it would be an equitable 
 settlement, he contended, to pay the present hold- 
 ers the highest price the certificates had ever 
 reached, and to award the remainder to those who 
 were the original creditors. 
 
 This proposition received only thirteen votes out 
 of forty-nine. Many of those opposed to it were 
 quite ready to grant that it was hard upon the vet- 
 erans of the war that they, who had received so 
 
156 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 little and who had borne so much, should not now 
 be recognized as creditors when at last the govern- 
 ment was able to pay its debts. But the House 
 could not indulge in sentimental legislation. That 
 would be to launch the ship of state upon another 
 sea of bankruptcy. There were in the hands of 
 the people tens of millions of paper money not 
 worth at the current rate a cent on the dollar. If 
 everybody who had lost was to be paid, the point 
 would soon be reached where nobody would be 
 paid at all. A limit must be fixed somewhere ; 
 let it be at these certificates of debt which were 
 the evidence of a contract made between the gov- 
 ernment and its creditors. These could be paid, 
 and they should be paid to those who were in law- 
 ful possession of them. The law, if not the equity, 
 of the case was clearly against Madison. That 
 the government should be absolutely just to 
 everybody who had ever trusted to it, and lost by 
 it, was impossible. It was a bankrupt compelled 
 to name its preferred creditors, and it named those 
 whom it was in honor and law bound to take care 
 of, and over whose claims there was, on the whole, 
 the least shadow of doubt. That the loss should 
 remain chiefly with the soldiers of the Revolution, 
 and the gain fall chiefly to those who were shrewd 
 enough, or had the means to speculate in the pub- 
 lic funds, was a lamentable fact ; but to discrim- 
 inate between them was not within the right of 
 the government. That he would have had it dis- 
 
NATIONAL FINANCES. — SLAVERY. 157 
 
 criminate was creditable to Madison’s heart ; it 
 was rather less creditable to his head. 
 
 Of course, underneath all this debate there lay 
 other considerations than those merely of debtor 
 and creditor, of moral and legal obligation, of pity 
 for the soldiers, and of strict regard for the letter 
 of a contract. Mr. Hamilton and his friends, 
 it was said, were anxious to establish the public 
 credit, not so much because they wished to keep 
 faith with creditors, as because they wished to 
 strengthen the government and build up their 
 own party. The reply to these accusations was, 
 that the other side, under pretense of considei’ation 
 for the soldiers and others on whom the burden of 
 the war had borne most heavity, concealed hostil- 
 ity to the Constitution and a consolidated govern- 
 ment. These were not reflections to be spoken of 
 in debate, but they were not the less cherished, 
 and gave to it piquancy and spirit. There was 
 truth on both sides, without doubt. 
 
 Though defeated in this measure Madison was 
 not less determined in his opposition to the as- 
 sumption of the debts of the States. Of these 
 debts some States had discharged more than 
 others ; and he complained, not without reason, of 
 the injustice of compelling those which had borne 
 their own burdens unaided to share in the obliga- 
 tions which others had neglected. He was un- 
 fortunate, however, in assuming a superiority for 
 Virginia over some of the Eastern States, and 
 
158 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 especially over Massachusetts, in services rendered 
 in the struggle for independence. The compai'i- 
 son provoked a call for official inquiry ; and that 
 proved that Massachusetts alone had sent more 
 men into the field during the war than all the 
 Southern States together. It was not much to be 
 wondered at, when this fact was considered, that 
 the debt of Massachusetts should be larger than 
 that of Virginia by $800,000. The difference be- 
 tween Virginia and South Carolina was the same, 
 the truth being that the war had cost Massachu- 
 setts more money to pay her soldiers for the gen- 
 eral service, and South Carolina more to repel the 
 enemy upon her own soil, than it had cost Virginia 
 for either purpose. Massachusetts and South Car- 
 olina were again found acting together, simply be- 
 cause each of them had a debt — $4,000,000 — 
 larger than that of any other State. The total 
 debt of all the States was about $21,000,000 ; and 
 as that of North Carolina, Pennsylvania, or Con- 
 necticut, when added to the $8,000,000 of Mas- 
 sachusetts and South Carolina, amounted to half, 
 or more, of the whole sum, there was no difficulty 
 in forming a strong combination in favor of as- 
 sumption. No combination, however, was strong 
 enough to carry the measure on its own merits, 
 notwithstanding its advocates attempted to defeat 
 the funding of the domestic debt of the Federal 
 Union unless the debts of the several States were 
 assumed at the same time. 
 
NATIONAL FINANCES. — SLAVERY. 159 
 
 The domestic debt, however, was at length pro- 
 vided for, and the assumption of the debts of the 
 States was rejected till that bargain, referred to 
 in the preceding chapter, which gave to the South- 
 ern States the permanent seat of government, was 
 concluded. It would not have been difficult, prob- 
 ably, to defeat that piece of political jobbery by 
 a public exposure of its terms. Why Madison 
 did not resort to it, if, as seems certain, he knew 
 that such a bargain had been privately made, can 
 only be conjectured. Perhaps he saw that Ham- 
 ilton, who was applauded by his friends and de- 
 nounced by his enemies for his clever manage- 
 ment, had, after all, only made a temporary gain ; 
 and that Jefferson, whose defense was that Ham- 
 ilton had taken advantage of his ignorance and 
 innocence, would not, had he not been short- 
 sighted, have made any defense at all. For the 
 assumption of the state debts by the general gov- 
 ernment was only a distribution of a single local 
 burden ; and this was a small price for Virginia 
 and the other Southern States to pay for the per- 
 manent possession of the federal capital. 
 
 While these questions were pending another was 
 thrown into the House, which was not disposed 
 of for nearly two months. The debates upon it, 
 Madison said in one of his letters, “ were shame- 
 fully indecent,” though he thought the introduc- 
 tion of the subject into Congress injudicious. The 
 Yearly Meeting of Friends in New York and in 
 
160 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Pennsylvania sent a memorial against the com 
 tinned toleration of the slave-trade; and this was 
 followed the next day by a petition from the Penn- 
 sylvania Society for the Promotion of the Aboli- 
 tion of Slavery, signed by Benjamin Franklin as 
 president, asking for a more radical measure. 
 
 “ They earnestly entreat,” they said, “ your serious 
 attention to the subject of slavery ; that you will be 
 pleased to countenance the restoration of liberty to these 
 unhappy men, who alone in this land of freedom are de- 
 graded into perpetual bondage, and who, amidst the gen- 
 eral joy of surrounding freemen, are groaning in servile 
 subjection ; that you will devise means for removing 
 this inconsistencj" from the character of the American 
 people ; that you will promote mercy and justice to- 
 wards this distressed race ; and that you will step to the 
 very verge of the power vested in you for discouraging 
 every species of traffic in the persons of our fellow-men.” 
 
 The words were probably Franklin’s own, and 
 as he died a few weeks after they were written, 
 they may be considered as his dying words to his 
 countrymen, — counsel wise and merciful as his 
 always was. 
 
 A memorable debate followed the presentation 
 of these memorials. Even in the imperfect re- 
 port of it that has come down to us, the “ shame- 
 ful indecency ” of which Madison speaks is visible 
 enough. Franklin, venerable in years, exalted 
 in character, and eminent above almost all the 
 men of the time for services to his country, was 
 
NATIONAL FINANCES. — SLAVERY. 161 
 
 sneered at for senility and denounced as disre- 
 garding the obligations of the Constitution. But 
 the wrath of the pro-slavery extremists was spe- 
 cially aroused against the Society of Friends, and 
 was unrestrained by any considerations of either 
 decency or truth. In this respect the debate was 
 the precursor of every contest in Congress upon 
 the subject that was to follow for the coming 
 seventy years. The Quakers were the represen- 
 tative abolitionists of that day, and the measure 
 of bitter and angry denunciation that was meted 
 out to them was the same measure which, heaped 
 up and overflowing, was poured out upon those 
 who, in later times, took upon themselves the bur- 
 den of the cause of the slave. The line of argu- 
 ment, the appeals to prejudice, the disregard of 
 facts and the false conclusions, the misrepresenta- 
 tion of past history and the misapprehension of 
 the future, the contempt of reason, of common 
 sense, and common humanity, then laboriously and 
 unscrupulously arrayed in defense of slavery, left 
 nothing for the exercise of the ingenuity of mod- 
 ern orators. A single difference only between 
 the earlier and the later time is conspicuous ; the 
 “ plantation manners,” as they were called five 
 and twenty years ago, which the Wises, the 
 Brookses, the Barksdales, and the Priors of the 
 modern South relied upon as potent weapons of 
 defense and assault, were unknown in the earlier 
 Congresses. 
 
 n 
 
162 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Mr. Madison and some other members from the 
 South, particularly those from Virginia, opposed 
 the majority of their colleagues, who were unwill- 
 ing that these memorials should be referred to a 
 committee. “ The true policy of the Southern 
 members,” Madison wrote to a friend, “ was to 
 have let the affair proceed with as little noise as 
 possible, and to have made use of the occasion to 
 obtain, along with an assertion of the powers of 
 Congress, a recognition of the restraints imposed 
 by the Constitution.” This in effect was done in 
 the end, but not till near two months had passed, 
 within which time the more violent of the South- 
 ern members had ample opportunity to free their 
 minds and exhaust the subject. The more these 
 people talked the worse it was, of course, for their 
 cause. Had Madison’s moderate advice been ac- 
 cepted then, and had that example been followed 
 for the next sixty or seventy years, it is quite 
 likely that the colored race would still be in bond- 
 age in at least one half of the States. But there 
 was never a more notable example of manifest 
 destiny than the gradual but certain progress of 
 the opposition to slavery ; for there never was a 
 system, any attempt to defend which showed how 
 utterly indefensible such a system must needs be. 
 Every argument advanced in its favor was so 
 manifestly absurd, or so shocking to the ordinary 
 sense of mankind, that the more it was discussed 
 the more widespread and earnest became the op 
 
NA TIONAL FINANCES. — S LA VER Y. 
 
 163 
 
 position. Had the slave-holders been wise they 
 would never have opened their mouths upon the 
 subject. But like the man possessed of the devil, 
 they never ceased to cry, “ Let me alone ! ” And 
 the more they cried the more there were who un- 
 derstood where that cry came from. 
 
 In one respect Mr. Madison declared that the 
 memorial of the Friends demanded attention. If 
 the American flag was used to protect foreigners 
 in carrying on the slave-trade in other countries, 
 that was a proper subject for the consideration of 
 Congress. “ If this is the case,” he said, “ is 
 there any person of humanity that would not 
 wish to prevent them ? ” 1 But he recognized the 
 limitations of the Constitution in relation to the 
 importation of slaves into the United States, and 
 the want of any authority in the letter of the 
 Constitution, or of any wish on the part of Con- 
 gress, to interfere with slavery in the States. On 
 these points he would have a decisive declaration, 
 without agitation, and with as little discussion as 
 
 1 The most serious difficulty in the way of the final suppres- 
 sion of the African slave-trade in the present century was, that 
 it could be carried on without molestation in American bottoms, 
 under the American flag. The ruling power in the United States, 
 from 1787 to 1860, was never willing that their own cruisers 
 should meddle with the slavers, and resented as an insult to the 
 flag the search, by the cruisers of other powers, of any vessel 
 under the American flag, though if might be absolutely certain 
 that she had come straight from the coast of Africa, and that her 
 “ between-decks ” was crowded full of negroes to be sold as slaves 
 in Cuba. 
 
164 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 possible, and there would have dropped the sub- 
 ject. It only needed, he evidently thought, that 
 everybody, North and South, should understand 
 the Constitution to be a mutual agreement to let 
 slavery altogether alone, when the bargain would 
 be on both sides faithfully adhered to. 
 
 This was all very well with the numerous per- 
 sons who were quite indifferent to the subject, or 
 who thought it very unreasonable in the blacks 
 not to be quite willing to remain slaves a few 
 hundred years longer. But there were two other 
 classes to reckon with, and Mr. Madison was not 
 much inclined to be patient with either of them. 
 To let the subject alone was precisely what the 
 hot-headed members from the South were incapa- 
 ble of doing then, as they proved to be incapable 
 of doing for the next seventy years. On the 
 other hand, all the petitioners could really hope 
 for was that there should be discussion. The gal- 
 leries were crowded at those earliest debates, as 
 they continued to be crowded on all such occa- 
 sions in subsequent years. Many went to learn 
 what could be said on behalf of slavery, who 
 came away convinced that the least said the bet- 
 ter. Agitation might disturb the harmony of the 
 Union, which was Madison’s dread ; it might lead 
 to the death of an abolitionist, as it sometimes did 
 in later times ; but it was sure in the end to be 
 the death of slavery, though its short-sighted de- 
 fenders could never understand why. They could 
 
NATIONAL FINANCES. — SLA VER Y. 165 
 
 never be made to see that its most dangerous foes 
 were the friends of its own household, who could 
 not hold their tongues ; that for their case all 
 wisdom was epitomized in the vulgar caution u to 
 lie low and keep dark ; ” that the exposure of the 
 true character of slavery must needs be its de- 
 struction, and that nothing so exposed it as any 
 attempt to defend it. Slavery was quite safe 
 under the Constitution, as Mr. Madison intimated, 
 if its friends would only leave it there and claim 
 no other protection. 
 
 Advocates are never wanting in any court who 
 believe that the most effective line of defense is to 
 abuse the plaintiff. The Quakers, it was said, 
 “ notwithstanding their outward pretenses,” had 
 no “ more virtue or religion than other people, 
 nor perhaps so much.” They had not made the 
 Constitution, nor risked their lives and fortunes 
 by fighting for their country. Why should they 
 “ set themselves up in such a particular manner 
 against slavery ? ” Did they not know that the 
 Bible, not only allowed but commended it, “ from 
 Genesis to Revelation ” ? That the Saviour had 
 permitted it? That the Apostles, in spreading 
 Christianity, had never preached against it ? That 
 it had been — the illustration was not altogether a 
 happy one — “ no novel doctrine since the days of 
 Cain ? ” The condition of these American slaves 
 was said to be one of great happiness and com- 
 fort ; yet almost in the same breath it was asserted 
 
166 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 that to excite in their minds any hope of change 
 would lead to the most disastrous consequences, 
 and possibly to massacre. The memorialists were 
 bidden to remember that, even if slavery “ were 
 an evil, it was one for which there was no rem- 
 edy ; ” for that reason the North had acquiesced 
 in it ; “a compromise was made on both sides — 
 we took each other with our mutual bad habits 
 and respective evils, for better, for worse ; the 
 Northern States adopted us with our slaves, and 
 we adopted them with their Quakers.” With- 
 out such a compromise there could have been no 
 Union, and any interference now with slavery by 
 the government would end in a civil war. These 
 people were meddling with what was none of their 
 business, and exciting the slaves to insurrection. 
 Yet how forbearing were the people of the South- 
 ern States who, notwithstanding all this, “ had 
 not required the assistance of Congress to exter- 
 minate the Quakers ! ” 
 
 This was not conciliatory. Those who had been 
 disposed at the beginning to meet the petitions 
 with a quiet reply that the subject was out of 
 the jurisdiction of Congress, were now provoked 
 to give them a much warmer reception. They 
 could not listen patiently to the abuse of the 
 Quakers, and, though they might acquiesce in 
 the toleration of slavery, they were not inclined 
 to have it crammed down their throats as a wise, 
 beneficent, and consistent condition of society 
 
NATIONAL FINANCES.— SLAVERY. 167 
 
 tinder a republican government. Even Madison, 
 who at first was most anxious that nothing should 
 be said or done to arouse agitation, while acknowl- 
 edging that all citizens might rightfully appeal to 
 Congress for a redress of what they considered 
 grievances, was moved at last to say that the me- 
 morial of the Friends was “ well worthy of con- 
 sideration.” While admitting that under the Con- 
 stitution the slave-trade could not be prohibited 
 for twenty years, “ yet,” he declared, “ there are 
 a variety of w r ays by which it [Congress] could 
 countenance the abolition, and regulations might 
 be made in relation to the introduction of [slav- 
 ery] into the new States to be formed out of the 
 western territory.” 
 
 Gerry was still more emphatic in the assertion 
 of the right of interference. He boldly asserted 
 that “ flagrant acts of cruelty ” were committed 
 in carrying on the African slave-trade ; and, while 
 nobody proposed to violate the Constitution, 
 “that we have a right to regulate this business is 
 as clear as that we have any right whatever ; nor 
 has the contrary been shown by anybody who has 
 spoken on the occasion.” Nor did he stop there. 
 He told the slave-holders that the value of their 
 slaves in money was only about ten million dol- 
 lars, and that Congress had the right to propose 
 “ to purchase the whole of them ; and their re- 
 sources in the western territory might furnish 
 them with the means.” The Southern members 
 
168 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 would, perhaps, have been startled by such a 
 proposition as this, had he not immediately added 
 that “ he did not intend to suggest a measure of 
 this kind ; he only instanced these particulars to 
 show that Congress certainly had a right to inter- 
 meddle in the “ business.” It is quite likely, had 
 he pushed such a measure with his well-known 
 zeal and determination, that it would have been 
 at least received with a good deal of favor ; and, 
 as the admirers of Jefferson are tenacious of his 
 fame as the author of the original Northwest Or- 
 dinance, so Gerry, had he seriously and earnestly 
 urged the policy of using the proceeds of the sales 
 of territorial lands to remunerate the owners of 
 slaves for their liberation, would have left behind 
 him a more fragrant memory than that which 
 clings to him as a minister to France, and as 
 the “ Gerrymandering ” governor of Massachu- 
 setts. The debate, however, came to an end at 
 last with no other result than that which would 
 have been reached at the beginning without de- 
 bate, except, perhaps, that the vote in favor of 
 the reports upon the memorials was smaller than 
 it might have been had there been no discussion. 
 
 Within less than two years, however, Warner 
 Mifflin of Delaware, an eminent member of the 
 Society of Friends, who was one of the first, if 
 not the first, of that society to manumit his own 
 slaves, petitioned Congress to take some measure 
 for general emancipation. The petition was en 
 
NA TIONAL FINANCES. — SLA VER Y. 169 
 
 tered upon the journal ; but on a subsequent day 
 a North Carolina member, Mr. Steele, said that 
 “after what had passed at New York on this sub- 
 ject, he had hoped the House would have heard 
 no more of it ; ” and he moved that the petition 
 be returned to Mifflin and be expunged from the 
 journal. Fisher Ames explained in a rather apol- 
 ogetic tone that he had presented the petition at 
 Mr. Mifflin’s request, because the member from 
 Delaware was absent, and because he believed in 
 the right of petition, though “ he considered it as 
 totally inexpedient to interfere with the subject.” 
 The House agreed that the petition should be re- 
 turned, and Steele then withdrew the motion to 
 expunge it from the journal. 
 
 In the next Congress, eighteen months after- 
 ward, the House took up the subject of the slave- 
 trade, apparently of its own motion, and a bill 
 was passed prohibiting the carrying on of that 
 traffic from the ports of the United States in for- 
 eign vessels. The question was as inexorable as 
 death, and the difference in regard to it then was 
 precisely what it was in the final discussion of the 
 next century which settled it forever. One set of 
 men was given over to perdition if they dared so 
 much as talk ; the other set talked all the more, 
 and went to the vei'y verge of the Constitution in 
 act all the more, because they were bidden nei- 
 ther to speak nor to move. Courage was not 
 one of Madison’s marked characteristics, but he 
 
170 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 never showed more of it than in his hostility to 
 slavery. 
 
 At the third session of the First Congress, 
 which had adjourned from New York to Philadel- 
 phia, where it met in December, 1790, Madison led 
 his party in opposition to the establishment of a 
 national bank, which Hamilton had recommended ; 
 and again, as in the adjustment of the domestic 
 debt, he and his party were defeated. He com- 
 pared the advantages and the disadvantages of 
 banks, and possibly he did not satisfy himself, as 
 he certainly did not the other side, that the weight 
 of the argument was against their utility. At any 
 rate, he fell back upon the Constitution as his 
 strongest position. To incorporate a bank was 
 not, he maintained, among the powers conferred 
 upon Congress. The Federalists, who were be- 
 ginning to recognize him as the leader of the op- 
 position, were quite ready to accept that challenge. 
 “Little doubt remains,” said Fisher Ames, in 
 rising to reply, “ with respect to the utility of 
 banks.” Assuming that to be settled, — whether 
 he meant, or not, that such was the conclusion to 
 be drawn from Madison’s argument on that point, 
 . — he addressed himself to the constitutional ques- 
 tion. If the incorporation of a bank was forbid- 
 den by the Constitution there was an end of the 
 matter. If it was not forbidden, but if Congress 
 may exercise powers not expressly bestowed upon 
 it, and if by a bank some of the things which the 
 
N A T ION AL FINANCES. — SLA VER 7. 171 
 
 Federal Government bad to do could be best done, 
 it would be not only right but wise to establish 
 such an agency. This was the burden of the ar- 
 gument of the Federalists, and Madison and his 
 friends had no sufficient answer. The bill was at 
 length passed by a vote of thirty-nine to twenty. 
 
 But it had still to pass the ordeal of the cabi- 
 net. The President was not disposed to rely upon 
 his own judgment either one way or the other. 
 He asked, therefore, for the written opinions of 
 the Secretaries of the Treasury and of State, Ham- 
 ilton and Jefferson, and the Attorney General, 
 Randolph. The same request was made to Madi- 
 son, probably more because Washington held his 
 ability and knowledge of constitutional law in 
 high esteem, than because of the prominent part 
 he had taken in the debate. Hamilton’s argu- 
 ment in favor of the bill was an answer to the 
 papers of the three other gentlemen, and was ac- 
 cepted as conclusive by the President. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 FEDERALISTS AKD REPUBLICANS. 
 
 Madison was a Federalist until, unfortunately, 
 he drifted into the opposition. He was swept 
 away partly, perhaps, by the influence of personal 
 friends, particularly of Jefferson, and partly by the 
 influence of locality — that “ go-with-the-State ” 
 doctrine, which is a harmless kind of patriotism 
 when kept within proper limits, but dangerous in 
 a mixed government like ours when unrestrained. 
 Had he been born in a free State it seems more 
 than probable that he would never have been 
 President ; but it is quite possible that his place 
 in the history of his country would have been 
 higher. The better part of his life was before he 
 became a party leader. As his career is followed 
 the presence of the statesman grows gradually 
 dimmer in the shadow of the successful politician. 
 
 In the course of the three sessions of the First 
 Congress the line was distinctly drawn between 
 the Federal and Republican (or Democratic) par- 
 ties. The Federalists, it was evident, had suc- 
 ceeded in firmly uniting thirteen separate States 
 into one great nation, or into what, in due time, 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 173 
 
 was sure to become a great nation. It was no 
 longer a loose assemblage of thirteen independent 
 bodies, revolving, indeed, around a central power, 
 but with a centrifugal motion that might at any 
 time send them flying off into space, or destroy 
 them by collisions at various tangents. Those 
 who opposed the Federalists, however, had no fear 
 of a tendency to tangents ; the danger was, as 
 they believed, of too much centripetal force, and 
 that the circling planets might fall into the central 
 sun and disappear altogether. Even if there were 
 no flying off into space, and no falling into the 
 sun, they had no faith in this sort of political as- 
 tronomy. They were unwilling to float in fixed 
 orbits obedient to a supreme law other than their 
 own. 
 
 There is no need to doubt the honesty of either 
 party then, whatever came to pass in later years. 
 Nor, however, is there any more doubt now which 
 was the wiser. Before the end of the century the 
 administration of government was wrested from 
 the hands of those who had created the Union ; 
 and within fifteen years more the Federal party, 
 under that name, had disappeared. It would not 
 be quite just to say that they were opposed for no 
 better reason than because they were in power. 
 But it is quite true that the principles and the 
 policy of the Federalists survived the party organ- 
 ization ,• and they not only survived, but, so far 
 as the opposite party was ever of service to the 
 
174 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 country, it was when that party adopted the Fed- 
 eral measures. It was in accordance with the 
 early principles of Federalism that the Republic 
 was defended and saved in the war of 1860-65 ; 
 as it was the principles of the Democratic state- 
 rights party, administered by a slave-holding oli- 
 garchy, that made that war inevitable. 
 
 Hamilton said, in the well-known Carrington 
 letter in the spring of 1792, that he was thor- 
 oughly convinced by Madison’s course in the late 
 Congress that he, “ cooperating with Mr. Jeffer- 
 son, is at the head of a faction decidedly hostile to 
 me and my administration, and actuated by views, 
 in my judgment, subversive of the principles of 
 good government, and dangerous to the union, 
 peace, and happiness of the country.” At first he 
 was disposed to believe, because of his “ previous 
 impressions of the fairness of Mr. Madison’s char- 
 acter,” that there was nothing personal or factious 
 in this hostility. But he soon changed his mind. 
 Up to the time of the meeting of the First Con- 
 gress there had always been perfect accord be- 
 tween them, and Hamilton accepted his seat in 
 the cabinet “ under the full persuasion,” he said, 
 “ that from similarity of thinking, conspiring with 
 personal good-will, I should have the firm support 
 of Mr. Madison in the general course of my ad- 
 minstration.” But when he found in Madison his 
 most determined opponent, either open or covert, 
 in the most important measures he urged upon 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 175 
 
 Congress, — the settlement of the domestic debt, 
 the assumption of the debts of the States, and the 
 establishment of a national bank, — he was com- 
 pelled to seek for other than public motives for 
 this opposition. “ It had been,” he declared, 
 “ more uniform and persevering than I have been 
 able to resolve into a sincere difference of opinion. 
 I cannot persuade myself that Mr. Madison and I, 
 whose politics had formerly so much the same 
 point of departure, should now diverge so widely 
 in our opinions of the measures which are proper 
 to be pursued.” 
 
 In the letter from which these extracts are 
 made Jefferson and Madison are painted as almost 
 equally black, though the color was laid the 
 thicker on Jefferson, if there was any difference. 
 Hamilton seemed to think that, if Jefferson was 
 the more malicious, Madison was the more artful. 
 He is accused of an attempt to get the better of 
 the Secretary of the Treasury by a trick which 
 was dishonorable in itself, and at the same time 
 an abuse of the confidence reposed in him by 
 Washington. Before sending in his message at 
 the opening of the Second Congress the President 
 submitted it to Madison, who, Hamilton declares, 
 so altered it, by transposing a passage and by the 
 addition of a few words, that the President was 
 made to seem, unconsciously to himself, to ap- 
 prove of Jefferson’s proposal to establish the same 
 unit for coins as for weights. This would have 
 
176 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 been to disapprove of the proposal of the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury that the dollar should re- 
 main the unit of coinage. The statement rests 
 on Hamilton’s assertion ; and as he had forgotten 
 the words which made the change he complained 
 of ; and as the message was restored to its original 
 form by the President when its possible interpre- 
 tation was pointed out to him, it is impossible now 
 to judge whether Madison may not have been 
 quite innocent of the intention imputed to him. 
 It is plain enough, however, that Hamilton was 
 sore and disappointed at Madison’s conduct, and 
 that he was quick to seize upon any incident that 
 justified him in saying, “ The opinion I once en- 
 tertained of the candor and simplicity and fair- 
 ness of Mr. Madison’s character has, I acknowl- 
 edge, given way to a decided opinion that it is one 
 of a peculiarly artificial and complicated kind.” 
 To justify this opinion, and as an evidence of how 
 bitter Madison's political and personal enmity to- 
 ward him had become, he refers in the same let- 
 ter to Madison’s relation to Freneau and his 
 paper, “The National Gazette.” “As the coad- 
 jutor of Jefferson,” he wrote, “in the establish- 
 ment of this paper, I include Mr. Madison in the 
 consequences imputable to it.” 
 
 The story of Freneau need not be repeated 
 here at length, having been already told in an- 
 other volume of this series of biographies. If 
 there were anything in that affair, however, for 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 177 
 
 which Jefferson could be fairly called to account, 
 Madison may be held as not less responsible. 
 When the charge was made that he had a sinister 
 motive in procuring for Freneau a clerkship in the 
 State Department, and in aiding him to establish 
 a newspaper, Madison frankly related the facts in 
 a letter to Edmund Randolph. He had nothing 
 to deny except to repel with some indignation the 
 charge that he had helped to establish the jour- 
 nal in order that it might “ sap the Constitution,” 
 or that there was the slightest expectation or in- 
 tention on his part of any relation between the 
 State Department and the newspaper. Freneau 
 was one of his college friends, a deserving man, to 
 whom he was attached, and whom he was glad to 
 help. There was nothing improper in commend- 
 ing one well qualified to discharge its duties for 
 the post of translator in a government office, and 
 as those duties, for which the yearly salary was 
 only two hundred and fifty dollars, were light, 
 there was no good reason why the clerk should not 
 find other employment for leisure hours. 
 
 If Mr. Madison, having said this, had stopped 
 there, his critics would have been silenced. But 
 when he added that he advised his friend with 
 another motive besides that of helping him to 
 start a newspaper, then, as the expressive modern 
 phrase is, he “ gave himself away.” There is a 
 feeling, common even in those early and innocent 
 days when such things were rare, that the editor, 
 12 
 
178 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 whose daily bi’ead, whether it be cake or crust, 
 comes from the bounty of the man in office or 
 other place of power — that an editor so fed, and 
 perhaps fattened, is only a servant bought at a 
 price. Madison said that to help a needy man 
 whom he held in high esteem was his “ primary 
 and governing motive.” But he adds : “ That, as a 
 consequential one, I entertained hopes that a free 
 paper . . . would be an antidote to the doctrines 
 and discourses circulated in favor of monarchy and 
 aristocracy; would be an acceptable vehicle of pub- 
 lic information in many places not sufficiently 
 supplied with it — this also is a certain truth.” 
 What was this but an acknowledgment of the 
 essential truth of the charge brought against Jef- 
 ferson and himself ? Not that he might not de- 
 voutly hope for an antidote to the poisonous 
 doctrines of monarchy and aristocracy, though in 
 very truth the existence of any such poison was 
 only one of the maggots which, bred in the muck 
 of party strife, had found a lodgment in his brain ; 
 not that it was not a commendable public spirit to 
 wish for a good newspaper to circulate where it 
 was most needed ; not that it was not a most excel- 
 lent thing in him to hold out a helping hand to the 
 friend who had been less fortunate than himself ; 
 but that in helping his friend to a clerkship in a 
 department of the government, his motive was in 
 part that the possession of a public office would 
 enable the man to establish a party organ. That 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 179 
 
 was pi'ecisely the point of the charge which he 
 seems to have failed to apprehend — that public 
 patronage was used at his suggestion to further 
 party ends. 
 
 Freneau had intended to start a newspaper 
 somewhere in New Jersey. Whether or not that 
 known intention suggested that the project could 
 be better carried out in Philadelphia, and a clerk- 
 ship in the State Department would be an aid to 
 it, the change of plan was adopted and the clerk- 
 ship bestowed upon him. The paper — the first 
 number of which appeared five days after his ap- 
 pointment — was, as it was known that it would 
 be, an earnest defender of Jefferson and liis friends, 
 and a formidable opponent of Hamilton and liis 
 party. The logical conclusion was that the man, 
 being put in place for a purpose, was diligent in 
 using the opportunities the place afforded him to 
 fulfill the hopes of those to whom he was indebted. 
 Madison and Jefferson both denied, with much 
 heat and indignation, that they had anything to 
 do with the editorial conduct of the paper. No 
 doubt they spoke the truth. They had to draw 
 the line somewhere ; they drew it there ; and an 
 exceedingly sharp and fine line it was. For it is 
 plain that Freneau knew very well what he was 
 about and what was expected of him, and his 
 powerful friends knew very well that he knew it. 
 They could feel in him the most implicit con- 
 fidence as an untamed and untamable democi'at, 
 
180 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 and one, perhaps, whose gratitude would be kept 
 alive by the remembrance of poverty and the 
 hope of future favors. There was clearly no need 
 of a board of directors for the editorial super- 
 vision of “ The National Gazette,” and it was 
 quite safe to deny that any existed. The fact, 
 nevertheless, remained, that a seat had been given 
 the editor at Mr. Jefferson’s elbow. 
 
 Three months before Madison heard that his 
 relation to Freneau was bringing him under pub- 
 lic censure, he showed an evident interest in the 
 “ Gazette ” hardly consistent with his subsequent 
 avowal of having nothing to do with its manage- 
 ment. In a letter to Jefferson he refers to the 
 postage on newspapers, established by the bill for 
 the regulation of post-offices, and fears that it will 
 prove a grievance in the loss of subscribers. He 
 suggests that a notice be given that the papers 
 “ will not be put into the mail, but sent as hereto- 
 fore ,” meaning by that, probably, that they would 
 be sent under the franks of members of Congress, 
 or by any other chance that might offer. “ Will 
 you,” he adds, “hint this to Freneau ? His sub- 
 scribers in this quarter seem pretty well satisfied 
 with the degree of regularity and safety with 
 which they get the papers, and highly pleased 
 with the paper itself.” This was careful dry- 
 nursing for the bantling which had been pro- 
 vided with so comfortable a cradle in the State 
 Department. 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 181 
 
 The political casuist of our time may wonder at 
 the importance which attached to this Freneau 
 affair. We are taught that “there were giants 
 in those days ; ” but we may also remember that 
 in the modern science of “ practical politics ” they 
 were as babes and sucklings. Madison was making 
 good his place as a leader of the opposition hardly 
 second to Jefferson himself. As with Hamilton, 
 so with the Federalists generally, he fell more 
 even than Jefferson fell in their esteem. He fell 
 more, because he had farther to fall. No man 
 had been more earnest than he for a consolidated 
 government ; no one had shown more activity to 
 bring about a convention to frame a Federal Con- 
 stitution ; and when at last that work was done, 
 no one, not even Hamilton himself, was more 
 zealous to convince his countrymen that national 
 salvation depended upon union, and that union 
 was hopeless unless the Constitution should be 
 adopted. The disappointment and the sliock were 
 all the greater wlien he gradually drew off from 
 those who had hitherto counted him as on their 
 side. They could not understand how he could 
 find so much to oppose in the legitimate adminis- 
 tration — as they believed it to be — of a Consti- 
 tution he had done so much to create, and the 
 beneficent results of which he had foreseen and 
 foretold. Or, if they understood him, it was on 
 the supposition that he had thrown his convic- 
 tions and his principles to the winds, abandoned 
 
182 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 his old friends and attached himself to new ones, 
 from motives of personal ambition. This, of 
 course, may not have been absolutely just. It is 
 quite possible that he did not deliberately sur- 
 render his principles, but persuaded himself that 
 he was as true as ever to the Constitution. It is, 
 nevertheless, certainly true that the men with 
 whom he was now acting were the men who, hav- 
 ing failed to prevent the adoption of the Consti- 
 tution, now aimed by zealous endeavors for an as- 
 sumed strict construction to defeat the purpose 
 for which it was framed . 1 
 
 Naturally his motives were suspected, and his 
 conduct narrowly watched. Jefferson’s influence 
 over him was known to be great, and Jefferson had 
 had nothing to do with the framing of the Consti- 
 tution, had been doubtful at first of its wisdom, 
 and gave his assent to it at last with many doubts. 
 The Anti-Federal party was growing gradually 
 stronger in Virginia as in all the Southern States ; 
 most of Madison’s warmest personal friends, as 
 well as Jefferson, were of that party. What 
 chance would he have in the public career he had 
 
 1 “ I reverence the Constitution,” said Fisher Ames, in debate, 
 “ and I readily admit that the frequent appeal to that as a stand- 
 ard proceeds from a respectful attachment to it. So far it is a 
 source of agreeable reflection. But I feel very different emotions, 
 when I find it almost daily resorted to in questions of little im- 
 portance. When by strained and fanciful constructions it is made 
 an instrument of casuistry, it is to be feared it may lose something 
 in our minds in point of certainty, and more in point of dig- 
 nity.” 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 183 
 
 marked out for himself if his path and theirs led 
 in opposite directions ? How much he was influ- 
 enced by these considerations it is impossible to 
 tell ; perhaps he himself could not have told. 
 Perhaps they were not even considerations, but 
 only unconscious influences, which he would have 
 thrown behind him had he recognized them as pos- 
 sible motives. To others, however, whether justly 
 or not, they were quite sufficient to explain his 
 course, and, once accepted, no other explanation 
 was sought for. The appointment of Freneau to 
 office at Madison’s request, followed by the almost 
 immediate appearance of a violent party organ, 
 edited by this clerk in Mr. Jefferson’s department, 
 was quite enough to raise an outcry among the 
 Federalists ; and Madison’s explanation, when it 
 came to be known, of his share in that business, 
 did not add to his reputation either for frankness 
 or political rectitude. Perhaps it was at first more 
 the seeming want of frankness that disgusted his 
 old friends. They could have more readily for- 
 given him had he openly declared that he had 
 gone over to the enemy, instead of professing to 
 find in the Constitution sufficient ground for hos- 
 tility to their measures. These constitutional 
 scruples they sometimes thought so thin a disguise 
 of other motives as to be better deserving of ridi- 
 cule than of argument. 
 
 All he said and did was watched with suspicion. 
 In the interval between the First and Second 
 
184 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Congresses, lie and Jefferson made a tour through 
 some of the Eastern States, as they said, for relax- 
 ation and pleasure. But it was looked upon as a 
 strategic movement. Interviews between them 
 and Livingston and Burr in New York were re- 
 ported to Hamilton as “a passionate courtship.” 
 They visited Albany, it was said, “ under the pre- 
 text of a botanical excursion,” but in reality to 
 meet with Clinton. Botany naturally suggests 
 agriculture, and as they continued on their jour- 
 ney into New England they were accused of “ sow- 
 ing tares,” as they traveled. Such treachery 
 would have been considered as aggravated by 
 hypocrisy had it been known then that on his re- 
 turn Mr. Madison wrote to his father from New 
 York : “ The tour I lately made with Mr. Jeffer- 
 son, of which I have given the outlines to my 
 brother, was a very agreeable one, and carried 
 us through interesting country, new to us both.” 
 This was cool, if the journey really was a political 
 reconnoissance. 
 
 Though Mr. Madison may have been for a time 
 a special target for this kind of partisan rancor, 
 it was by no means confined to him. Jefferson 
 had a very pretty talent for exasperating his 
 enemies, and nobody could long divide with him 
 the distinction of being the best hated man in 
 the country. A curious instance of it was given 
 when the question was discussed, both in the 
 First and Second Congresses, as to the successor 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 185 
 
 to tlie presidency in case the office should become 
 vacant by the deaths of both President and Vice- 
 President. A bill was sent down from the Sen- 
 ate to the House, providing, in case such a thing 
 should ever happen, that the President pro tem- 
 pore of the Senate, or, should the Senate have no 
 temporary President, the Speaker of the House 
 of Representatives should succeed to the vacant 
 office. The House sent back the bill with an 
 amendment substituting the Secretary of State 
 for the succession in the possible vacancy instead 
 of the presiding officers of the two Houses of Con- 
 gress. Madison was very earnest for this amend- 
 ment, but the Senate injected it and the House 
 finally assented to the original bill, which is the 
 law to-day. It was shown in the course of the 
 debate, that according to the doctrine of chances 
 the office of president would not devolve, through 
 the accident of death, upon a third person oftener 
 than once in about eight hundred and forty years. 
 The rejection of the amendment naming the Sec- 
 retary of State as the proper person to succeed to 
 the presidency, in the improbable event supposed, 
 was nevertheless resented by the Republicans as a 
 direct reflection upon Mr. Jefferson. Nor did the 
 Federalists deny it. With grim humor they seized 
 upon the opportunity, apparently, to announce, 
 that not with their consent should he ever be 
 president even by accident, though he should 
 wait literally eight hundred and forty years. It 
 
186 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 was a long range shot, but there could not have 
 been one better aimed. 
 
 If before there had been some room for hope, 
 Madison’s course in the Second Congress left no 
 doubt as to which party he had cast his lot with. 
 His hostility to the establishment of a bank was, 
 he thought, justified by what he saw at the open- 
 ing of the subscription books in New York. The 
 anxiety to get possession of the stock was not to 
 him an evidence of public confidence, and an argu- 
 ment, therefore, in favor of such an institution ; 
 but “ a mere scramble for so much public plun- 
 der.” He could only see that “ stock-jobbing 
 drowns every other subject. The coffee-house is 
 in an eternal buzz with the gamblers.” “ It pretty 
 clearly appears also,” he said, “ in what propor- 
 tions the public debt lies in the country ; what 
 sort of hands holding it ; and by whom the people 
 of the United States are to be governed.” Here, 
 perhaps, was one cause of his hostility to Hamil- 
 ton’s financial policy. Its immediate benefit was 
 for that class whose pecuniary stake in the stabil- 
 ity of the government was the largest. This class 
 was chiefly in the Northern States where capital 
 was in money and was always on the lookout for 
 safe and profitable investment. At the South, 
 capital was in slaves and land, and could not be 
 easily changed. If the Bank and the bond-hold- 
 ers were to exercise — as he feared they would, 
 and as he believed that the Federalists meant they 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 187 
 
 should — a controlling influence over tlie govern- 
 ment, it was certainly pretty apparent “ by whom 
 the people of the United States were to be gov- 
 erned.” It would be the North, not the South ; 
 and he was a Virginian before he was a Unionist. 
 
 Perhaps he was influenced by this consideration 
 when he proposed that the payment of the domes- 
 tic debt should be divided between those who had 
 originally held, and those who had acquired by 
 purchase, the certificates of indebtedness. The 
 public creditors would, in that case have been 
 more widely distributed in different sections of 
 the country and among different classes. The 
 thought, at any rate, does not seem to have been 
 a new one when he saw and reported the eager- 
 ness with which the bank stock was sought for, 
 denounced it as stock-jobbing and gambling, and 
 indignantly reflected that in these men he saw the 
 future governors of the country, and particularly 
 of his own people. No doubt there was a good 
 deal of speculation ; and, as at all such times, 
 there were a few who made fortunes, while many 
 who had, at first, much money and no stock, next 
 much stock and no money, had at last neither 
 stock nor money. But Mr. Madison’s indignation 
 was quite wasted, and his fears quite unfounded. 
 Neither the stock-jobbers, the Bank, nor the bond- 
 holders ever usurped the government, whatever 
 may have been Hamilton’s hopes or schemes, if he 
 had. any other than to serve his country. The 
 
188 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 inoney-power of the North built cities and ships, 
 factories and towns, and stretched out its hands 
 to the great lakes and over the broad prairies, to 
 add to its dominion, to extend its civilization, and 
 to give to labor and industry their due reward. It 
 was the South that devoted itself to the business 
 of politics, and, united by stronger bonds than can 
 ever be forged of gold alone, soon entered into 
 possession of the government, which it retained 
 and used for its own interests, without regard to 
 the interests or the rights of the North, for nearly 
 three quarters of a century. Mr. Madison had no 
 prescience of any such future in the history of the 
 country, nor, indeed, then had anybody else. He 
 may have really believed that the holders of a 
 large public debt and the owners of a great na- 
 tional bank, through which the monetary affairs 
 of the country could be controlled, were aiming 
 to lay hold of the government. If all this were 
 true, imminent peril was impending over repub- 
 lican institutions. The inconsistency of which 
 Hamilton accused Madison was therefore not nec- 
 essarily a crime. It might even be a virtue, and 
 Madison be applauded for his courage in avowing 
 a change of opinion, if he saw in the practical 
 application of Hamilton’s principles dangers that 
 had not occurred to him when looking at them 
 only as abstract theories. But the Federalists be- 
 lieved that Madison, governed by these purely 
 selfish motives, sacrificed his convictions of what 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 189 
 
 was best for the country that he might secure for 
 himself a position on what he foresaw was the 
 winning side. It is quite likely that the more 
 pronounced enmity he showed towards Hamilton 
 during the second session of Congress was due, in 
 some measure, to his knowledge of this feeling to- 
 wards himself among the Federalists. He seemed, 
 at any rate, to be animated by something more 
 than the proverbial zeal of the new convert. If 
 it was not always shown in debate, it lurked in 
 his letters. Anything that came from the Sec- 
 retary, or anything that favored the Secretary’s 
 measures, was sure to be opposed by him. He 
 was not, of course, always in the wrong, and some- 
 times he was very right. There was a manifest 
 disposition on the part of the Federalists in the 
 House to defer to the Secretary in a way to pro- 
 voke opposition from those who did not share in 
 their estimate of his great ability. There was 
 some resentment, for example, when it was pro- 
 posed that Congress should submit to the Secre- 
 tary the question of ways and means to carry on 
 the Indian war at the West, after St. Clair’s dis- 
 astrous defeat ; and when, a few days later, it was 
 suggested that lie should be called upon to report 
 a plan for the reduction of the public debt. Mem- 
 bers, chief among them Madison, thought that 
 they were quite capable of discharging the duties 
 belonging to their branch of the government with- 
 out instructions from a head of department whom 
 
190 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 many of them looked upon as only an official sub- 
 ordinate of Congress. For the same reason they 
 refused with prompt decision to permit the Secre- 
 tary to appear upon the floor of the House to ex- 
 plain some proposed measure. In the Carrington 
 letter Hamilton said that he had “ openly de- 
 clared” a “determination to treat him [Madison] 
 as a political enemy.” He probably took care 
 that Madison should hear of it, for he was not a 
 man who made idle threats. He was sometimes 
 arrogant and overbearing in manner', was always 
 ready for a fight, which he rather preferred to 
 quietude, and had little disposition to spare an en- 
 emy. These were not conciliating qualities likely 
 to temper the asperities of political warfare, and 
 they may have provoked even Madison, mild-man- 
 nered and almost timid as he was, to unusual heat. 
 
 All this, of course, is aside from the question 
 whether the party, to which Mr. Madison had 
 given his allegiance, was right or wrong. On that 
 point there may be an honest difference of opin- 
 ion. It is apart also from the question whether 
 a man may not honestly change sides in politics, 
 notwithstanding the suspicion that always follows 
 him who runs from one side to the other, when in 
 neither has there been any change in principles 
 or measures. It is cpiite possible that he may be 
 governed by the most sincere convictions ; and if 
 he obeys them and abandons old friends for new 
 ones, or consents to be friendless, it is the strong- 
 
FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS. 191 
 
 est proof the statesman or politician can give of a 
 moral courage which ought to gain for him all 
 the more respect. But whether that respect must 
 be denied to Mr. Madison, because he was gov- 
 erned by other and lower motives, is the question. 
 There had been no change of political principles 
 either in the party he had left or the party he 
 had joined; but each was striving with all its 
 might to adapt the old doctrines to the altered 
 condition of affairs under the new Union. The 
 change was wholly in Mr. Madison. That which 
 had been white to him was now black ; that 
 which had been black was now as the driven 
 snow. Why was this ? Had he come to see that 
 in all those years he had been wrong ? Or had 
 he suddenly learned, not that he was wrong, but 
 that he had mistaken a straight and narrow path 
 for the broad road which would lead to the goal 
 he was seeking? These are not pleasant ques- 
 tions. He had served his country well ; one does 
 not like to doubt whether it was with a selfish 
 rather than a noble purpose. But of any public 
 man who changed front as he changed, the ques- 
 tion always will be — what moved him? Not to 
 ask it in regard to Madison is to drop out of sight 
 the turning-point of his career ; not to consider it 
 is to leave unheeded essential light upon one side 
 of his character. For his own fortunes the choice 
 he made was judicious, if to “gain the whole 
 world ” is always the wisest and best thing to do. 
 
192 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 He gained his world, and was wise and virtuous 
 in his generation according to the vote of a large 
 majority. Whether that decision still holds good 
 it is not so easy to say ; probably it does, however; 
 for the popular estimate of men often remains un- 
 changed long after the judgment upon the events 
 which gave them celebrity is completely reversed. 
 But history, in the long run, weighs with even 
 scales ; and the verdict on Madison’s character 
 usually comes with that pitiful recommendation to 
 mercy from a jury loath to condemn. Admiration 
 for his great services in the Constitutional Con- 
 vention and after it, when its work was presented 
 to the people for their approval, has never been 
 withheld ; upon his official integrity and his high 
 sense of honor in all his personal relations, except 
 when obligation to party may have overshadowed 
 it, there rests no cloud; and his intellectual power 
 is never questioned. One having these recognized 
 qualities, and who for five and twenty yeai’s was 
 genei’ally high in office, must needs be held in 
 high estimation especially in a new country where 
 fame, like everything else, is cheap. Nevertheless, 
 impartial historians, who venture to believe that 
 nature admits of imperfections in a native of Vir- 
 ginia, declare their conviction that Mr. Madison 
 either wanted the strength and courage to resist 
 the influence of those about him, or that the am- 
 bition of the politician was strong enough to over- 
 come any consideration of principles that might 
 stand in his way. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 If any proof were wanting of how completely 
 Madison had gone over to the opposition, he gave 
 it in the memorable attack upon the Secretary of 
 the Treasury in the spring of 1793, within four 
 days of the close of the second session of the Sec- 
 ond Congress. It was hoped by that proceeding 
 to overwhelm Hamilton with disgrace, and that 
 the President would feel himself obliged to expel 
 him from the cabinet. When the resolutions 
 with this aim were offered, a member said that 
 delicacy, decency, and every rule of justice had. 
 been violated ; “ a more unhandsome proceeding 
 he had never seen in Congress;” he might have 
 remained a member to this day, and, save for the 
 attempts in our time to expel John Quincy Ad- 
 ams and Joshua R. Giddings, not have changed 
 his opinion. 
 
 In the course of the preceding year Hamilton, 
 under various signatures, had met his opponents 
 in the newspapers. But it was a veil, not a visor, 
 behind which he fought ; for everybody knew 
 
 from whom came the vigorous blows that he dealt 
 13 
 
194 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 about him right and left. It was a boast always 
 of Jefferson that he never condescended to news- 
 paper controversy; but it was pretty well under- 
 stood that he himself did not enter upon that 
 rather unsatisfactory mode of warfare, because he 
 preferred the safer method of fighting by proxy. 
 Hamilton never was in doubt as to who was his 
 real antagonist, and he aimed his blows over the 
 heads of his petty assailants to where he knew 
 they would hit home. They left bad bruises 
 upon his colleague in the cabinet. Among other 
 papers of the time, though not a newspaper arti- 
 cle, was an official letter to the President, in 
 which Hamilton defended his principles and his 
 measures. Early in 1792, the President, longing 
 to escape the toils of public life and to spend 
 the rest of his days in tranquillity, had consulted 
 Madison and his two Secretaries, Jefferson and 
 Hamilton, upon the propriety of his declining a 
 reelection. He soon changed his mind, influenced, 
 perhaps, as much by the dissensions, so evident in 
 the expostulations of his friends, as by the expos- 
 tulations themselves. He deprecated this open 
 feud between his Secretaries as a public misfor- 
 tune, and sought, if he could not reconcile them, 
 to silence it. That the Federalists were monarch- 
 ists, as Jefferson and Madison never ceased assert- 
 ing, he knew was not true, without the emphatic 
 and indignant declarations of Hamilton, Adams, 
 and other leading men of that party, when they con 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 195 
 
 descended to notice a charge which they deemed 
 so absurd that it was difficult to believe that any- 
 body could make it in earnest. But, while he 
 knew there was no real danger from that quarter, 
 he could not fail to see that the reverence and love 
 in which he was held constituted a bond of unity, 
 so long as he remained chief magistrate; and he 
 may have felt that, should he retire, there was no 
 other common tie strong enough at that moment 
 to hold together a Union, the possible dissolution 
 of which was, both at the North and at the South, 
 considered with calmness, sometimes with compla- 
 cency, and, when party passion was at a red heat, 
 even as a thing to be prayed for. At any rate 
 the President consented to take the advice of the 
 counselors whom he had consulted ; but in ask- 
 ing that advice he unwittingly aggravated the 
 quarrel among them which caused him so much 
 uneasiness. 
 
 Jefferson, in the arguments he set forth both in 
 conversation and by letter to influence Washing- 
 ton’s decision, dwelt upon the unhappy condition 
 of public affairs. It was a storm which he himself 
 meant to get out of by retiring to Monticello, 
 though he thought it was Washington’s duty to 
 remain at the helm and keep an eye to windward. 
 This unhappy condition of affairs, he said, had all 
 come from the course pursued by the Secretary of 
 the Treasury, and was the natural consequence of 
 the acts of Congress in relation to the public debt, 
 
196 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 the Bank, excise, currency, and other important 
 measures passed in accordance with the Secre- 
 tary’s policy. Whether this policy was meant to 
 destroy the Union, subvert the Republic, and es- 
 tablish a monarchy upon its ruins ; at any rate 
 such must be the inevitable result of those mis- 
 chievous measures. He urged this view of the 
 subject with such pertinacity, that Washington, 
 either because he was impressed by so much ear- 
 nestness, or because he was curious to know how 
 the assertions could best be answered, sent them 
 to Hamilton, with other objections of a similar 
 character from other persons, and asked for a re- 
 ply. No names were given ; but it is not likely 
 that Hamilton was at any loss in guessing where 
 such strictures upon his administration of affairs 
 came from. “ I have not fortitude enough,” he 
 said in his answer, “ always to hear with calmness 
 calumnies which necessarily include me as a prin- 
 cipal object in the measures censured, of the false- 
 hood of which I have the most unqualified con- 
 sciousness. ... I acknowledge that I cannot be 
 entirely patient under charges which impeach the 
 integrity of my public motives or conduct. I feel 
 that I merit them in no degree, and expressions of 
 indignation sometimes escape me in spite of every 
 effort to suppress them.” There were only two 
 men in the country whom he could have had in 
 mind when he wrote such words as these. In all 
 Washington’s career there is nowhere a stronger 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 197 
 
 proof of his strong will, self-reliance, and passion- 
 less impartiality, than that he could stand be- 
 tween two such furnaces as Hamilton on one side, 
 and Jefferson and Madison on the other, both 
 glowing at the intensest white heat, while he re- 
 mained usually as calm and as unmoved as if 
 breathing the softest, balmiest, and gentlest airs 
 of a day in June. But all this personal contro- 
 versy in the public prints, and in the official in- 
 tercourse of the cabinet, left on both sides an in- 
 tense exasperation, which could not fail to have 
 a controlling influence in the conduct of political 
 parties. Whether Jefferson was conscious or not 
 • — and whatever his feeling was, Madison shared 
 it with him — that in this paper warfare he was 
 signally defeated, the attempt to ruin Hamilton 
 by an attack upon him in Congress followed, if it 
 was not the consequence of, the mortification of 
 defeat. 
 
 In February, 1793, Mr. Giles, a representative 
 from Virginia, offered a series of resolutions call- 
 ing upon the President for certain information re- 
 lating to the finances. They were a bold attack 
 upon the Secretary of the Treasury, and, should 
 it prove that they could not be satisfactorily an- 
 swered, would convict him of mismanagement of 
 the financial affairs of the government, of a disre- 
 gard of law, of usurpation of power, and even of 
 embezzlement of the public funds. Any reasona- 
 ble ground for believing such charges to be well- 
 
198 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 founded would be quite sufficient to bring the 
 Secretary to trial by impeachment. There was 
 probably little doubt at the moment as to whence 
 this blow came ; for, though the hand might seem 
 the hand of Esau, the voice was the voice of Jacob. 
 Behind Giles was Madison ; and behind Madison, 
 of course, was Jefferson. Mr. John C. Hamilton, 
 in his “ History of the Republic,” asserts that the 
 resolutions were still — when he wrote, twenty- 
 five years ago — in the archives of the State De- 
 partment at Washington, in Madison’s handwrit- 
 ing ; and he further declares that Giles assured 
 Rufus King that Madison was their author. 
 
 Hamilton’s reply, so far as any intentional 
 wrong-doing was imputed to him, was conclusive. 
 There had been technical violations of acts of 
 Congress in one instance, but it was only to carry 
 out the acts themselves. Congress had, three 
 years before, passed two acts authorizing the ne- 
 gotiation of two loans, one for twelve million dol- 
 lars for the discharge of the foreign debt, and 
 another for two million dollars to be used at home. 
 It had been convenient, and had conduced to the 
 success of the negotiation, to offer in Holland to 
 contract a loan for fourteen million dollars, with- 
 out the unnecessary, and to foreigners probably 
 the confusing, statement that the authority for 
 borrowing that amount was derived from two sep- 
 arate acts of Congress. It was only in this bor- 
 rowing of the money that there was any seeming 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 199 
 
 disregard of the letter of the law. The loans and 
 their purposes were kept entirely distinct in the 
 accounts *of the department. Other questions 
 touching the management of these loans were so 
 clearly and frankly explained that nothing but 
 the captiousness of party could refuse to be satis- 
 fied. On one point — the charge of an alleged 
 deficit — the opposition was absolutely silenced. 
 The Secretary indignantly explained, that the sum 
 — as anybody could have known for the asking 
 from any officer in the Treasury Department — 
 which was made to appear as missing was in 
 credits for customs bonds not yet due, and bills 
 of exchange on Europe, sold but not yet paid for. 
 
 Though there was enough of decency, or of 
 prudence which took the place of decency, to drop 
 the insinuation that the Secretary had stolen what 
 had never been in his possession, it was not so 
 with the rest of the accusations. Only four days 
 before Congress was to adjourn, Giles offered an- 
 other set of resolutions. These assumed that the 
 defiance of law and unwarranted assumption of 
 power, which, at first, were only suggested by the 
 inquiries, were now proved to be true by the ex- 
 planations that had been given. The indictment, 
 therefore, was made to include the verdict and the 
 sentence ; the criminal was accused, was to be 
 found guilty, and condemned to capital punish- 
 ment in one proceeding, without the privilege of 
 trial, or a recognition of the right to be heard. 
 
200 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 The argument of the resolutions was, that certain 
 acts were a violation of law ; that the Secretary 
 had committed all those acts ; and therefore it 
 was the will of the House that the facts be re- 
 ported to the President. The presumption ob- 
 viously was that the President would immediately 
 dismiss from office a disgraced and faithless public 
 servant. But the prosecution was an utter fail- 
 ure. The largest vote received for any of the res- 
 olutions was only fifteen ; that on the others was 
 from seven to twelve, in a quorum of from fifty to 
 sixty members. In the course of the debate Mr. 
 Madison had said that “ his colleague [Giles] had 
 rendered a service highly valuable to the legisla- 
 ture, and no less important and acceptable to the 
 public.” The House showed by its votes how 
 very far it was from agreeing with him. But 
 Fisher Ames wrote, about that time, — “ Madison 
 is become a desperate party leader, and I am not 
 sure of his stopping at any ordinary point of ex- 
 tremity.” If it be really true that he instigated 
 this attack upon Hamilton, and was the author 
 of the resolutions, using Giles as his tool to get 
 them before the House, Ames’s reflection was not 
 uncharitable. 
 
 It would not be just, however, to leave the im- 
 pression that the hostility shown in this affair was 
 purely personal. Both Jefferson and Madison had 
 a hearty hatred for Hamilton which would have 
 been greatly gratified could they have made it the 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 201 
 
 plain duty of the President to put him out of the 
 Treasury Department, a dishonored and ruined 
 man. But this particular outbreak of their en- 
 mity was intensified by their sincere and earnest 
 enthusiasm for France. They were quite willing 
 to bring Hamilton to grief at any time, because 
 he was Hamilton ; they were more than ordina- 
 rily exasperated against him just now because in 
 recent newspaper and other controversies he had 
 altogether got the better of them ; but in this par- 
 ticular instance they wanted to punish him be- 
 cause of delay of payments in discharge of the in- 
 debtedness of the United States to France. This 
 was the essential delinquency at which the Giles 
 resolutions were pointed. The difficulty was, not 
 that the Secretary of the Treasury was not care- 
 ful enough of the public money, but that he was 
 too careful. He insisted upon being quite certain, 
 when paying off a public debt, that he was paying 
 it to the right persons, and that no risk should be 
 incurred of its being demanded a second time. 
 He felt there was no such certainty about pa}'- 
 ments to France. The King was dethroned ; but 
 it was not wise, the Secretary thought, to be hasty 
 in recognizing I’evolutionary governments. It was 
 a republic to-day ; it might be a regency to-moi’- 
 row ; a monarchy again the third day. It was 
 more prudent to await a reasonable period for the 
 evidence of permanency on one side or the other. 
 Those old enough to remember the late war of the 
 
202 
 
 JAMES MADISOE. 
 
 rebellion know how important the maintenance of 
 this doctrine was in regard to the recognition of 
 the rebel confederacy by England and France. 
 
 But to all this Jefferson did not in the least 
 agree ; neither did Madison. They were in full, 
 even passionate, sympathy with the men who 
 brought Louis XVI. to the guillotine. Money, 
 they knew, was needed, and it was a crime 
 against liberty to delay payment, when payment 
 was due to the French government. With Ham- 
 ilton the question was, not whether the revolu- 
 tionists ought to be, but whether they were, 
 France. With Jefferson and Madison they were 
 France, because they ought to be. Hesitation to 
 acknowledge that the revolution was the nation, 
 they thought, could only come from an “Anglican 
 party,” the “ enemies of France and of Liberty,” 
 who would lead the American people “ into the 
 arms, and ultimately into the government of 
 Great Britain ” — to use the terms in which Mad- 
 ison spoke, a little later, of the Federalists. 
 Which of these men, in this regard at least, were 
 the thoughtful and prudent statesmen, and which 
 were doctrinaires , nobody now, probably, ques- 
 tions. The larger proportion of the people, how- 
 ever, were then carried away by the enthusiasm 
 for the French revolutionists. It was so, no 
 doubt, at first without much distinction of party ; 
 but it was inevitable, when the government should 
 be called upon to take some decisive stand in rela^ 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 203 
 
 Lion to European politics, that the country should 
 divide into two hostile camps ; or, rather, that the 
 two camps already existing should become more 
 hostile to each other than ever. It is not neces- 
 sary to assume that the mass of the people gave 
 themselves up to any very hard thinking about 
 the matter. For the most part they followed, as 
 the way is with parties, the political leaders to 
 whom they were already accustomed, never doubt- 
 ing that not to do so would be treacherous to the 
 gratitude America owed to France, and to the 
 cause of liberty and democracy, which, in the 
 hands of the Frenchmen, was hurling monarchs 
 from their thrones — at least one monarch from 
 his, and more, it was hoped, would follow. But 
 when the revolution ran into the terrible excesses 
 of a later stage, if any Federalists had wavered in 
 their allegiance to their chiefs they soon returned, 
 persuaded that the wild and bloody anarchy of 
 Paris was not the road that led to the establish- 
 ment of a wise and safe popular government. 
 
 There was no need now of pretexts for quarrel- 
 ing ; real causes came fast enough. France de- 
 clared war against England, and the United 
 States had its part to play in this strife of giants. 
 Its real interest was to keep out of trouble ; and, 
 if all were agreed on that point, it does not seem 
 that there should have been much difficulty in 
 saying so. “ It behooves the government of this 
 country,” wrote Washington to Hamilton, “to 
 
204 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 use every means in its power to prevent the cit- 
 izens thereof from embroiling us with either of 
 those powers, by endeavoring to maintain a strict 
 neutrality.” It is difficult to conceive of a man 
 being sincerely desirous of helping neither one 
 side nor the other ; of injuring neither one side 
 nor the other ; of maintaining, so far as help or 
 harm could go, an attitude of absolute impar- 
 tiality towards both — it is difficult to conceive of 
 such a man quarreling with the word “ neutral- 
 ity ” as applied to his position. But Jefferson, 
 nevertheless, quarreled with it ; not frankly and 
 directly as a thing he did not want, but captiously 
 and hypercritically objecting to the word to cover 
 his dislike to the thing itself. “A declaration of 
 neutrality,” he said, “ was a declaration that there 
 should be no war, to which the Executive was not 
 competent.” 
 
 It was true that the Executive was not compe- 
 tent to declare that there should be no war ; it 
 was not true that the use of the word “ neutral- 
 ity ” could have any such application to the future 
 as to prevent Congress, when it should assemble, 
 from declaring war should it see fit to do so. But 
 meanwhile, Congress not being in session, and no 
 exigency having arisen that made it desirable in 
 the President’s judgment to call an extra session, 
 he, with the assent of the cabinet, — for Jefferson 
 did not venture upon direct opposition, — issued a 
 proclamation “ to exhort and warn the citizens of 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 205 
 
 the United States cai'efully to avoid all acts and 
 proceedings whatsoever ” that might interfere with 
 “ the dut } 7 and interest of the United States ” to 
 “ adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and im- 
 partial towards the belligerent powers.” The ob- 
 jectionable word was left out in deference to Mr. 
 Jefferson, who, really preferring that there should 
 be no proclamation at all, hoped to take the sting 
 out of it by the omission of a phrase. It was the 
 thing said, not the way of saying it, that the Pres- 
 ident insisted upon, as it was his duty to preserve 
 the peace till the legislature should declare for 
 war, and his inclination to preserve it altogether. 
 
 It can hardly be doubted that Jefferson and his 
 friends saw as plainly as the other party saw how 
 perilous to the interests of the United States a 
 foreign war would probably be. But while pro- 
 fessing a desire to avoid it, they were far more 
 anxious, apparently, to give aid, moral as well as 
 material, to France, with whose revolutionary 
 struggles they sympathized so deeply, than they 
 were to avoid offense to England, whom they 
 hated and would gladly see crippled. Not to be an 
 enemy of England they held was to be an enemy 
 of France; and not of France merely, but of the 
 “rights of man.” They could not or would not 
 comprehend any wisdom in moderation, any pru- 
 dence in delay. It is curious to see how party ani- 
 mosity blinded even the best of them. The objec- 
 tion to the word “neutrality” was a mere quib- 
 
206 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 ble ; for tlie proclamation called upon all good cit- 
 izens to maintain at their peril that state which, in 
 all dictionaries, neutrality is defined to be. Mr. 
 Jefferson, in instructing as Secretary of State the 
 American ministers abroad as to the attitude as- 
 sumed by the government, could find no better 
 term than “ a fair neutrality.” The fact was, the 
 Republican leaders wished to avoid taking any 
 positive stand, partly because delay might be a 
 help to France, and partly in obedience to the law 
 of party politics, in opposition to the other side. 
 They were not at first quite sure of their ground, 
 and wanted to gain time. Mr. Madison seems to 
 have waited about six weeks before he could ven- 
 ture upon a positive opinion as to the proclama- 
 tion. The newspapers helped him to a knowledge 
 of party opinion, and party opinion helped him to 
 make up his own. “ Every ‘ Gazette ’ I see,” — 
 he wrote in June, about eight weeks after the 
 proclamation was published, — “ every ‘ Gazette ’ 
 I see (except that of the United States [Federal- 
 ist]), exhibits a spirit of cr-iticism on the Anglified 
 complexion charged on the Executive politics. . . . 
 The proclamation was, in truth, a most unfortu- 
 nate error.” A week before he had been seem- 
 ingly cautious even in writing to Jefferson. Then 
 he had observed that newspaper criticisms aroused 
 attention, and he had heard expressions of surprise 
 “ that the President should have declared the 
 United States to be neutral in the unqualified 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 207 
 
 terms used, when we were so notoriously and un- 
 equivocally under eventual engagements to de- 
 fend the American possessions of France. I have 
 heard it remarked, also, that the impartiality en- 
 joined on the people was as little reconcilable with 
 their moral obligations as the unconditional neu- 
 trality proclaimed by the government is with the 
 express articles of the treaty.” He adds, “ I have 
 been mortified that on these points I could offer 
 no bond fide explanations that might be satisfac- 
 tory.” He was not in doubt long, however. Mr. 
 Jefferson sent him within two or three weeks a 
 series of papers by Hamilton, under the signature 
 of “ Pacificus,” in defense of the proclamation, 
 and urged him to reply. This Madison undertook 
 to do at once, and in five papers, under the signa- 
 ture of “ Helvidius,” he took up all the points in 
 dispute. 
 
 The question relating to treaty obligations was 
 the more serious. By the treaty of 1778 the 
 United States had guarantied “ to his Most Chris- 
 tian Majesty, the present possessions of the Ci'own 
 of France in America.” An attempt on the part 
 of Great Britain to take any of the French West 
 India Islands would involve the United States in 
 the war. How, then, Mr. Madison’s friends might 
 well ask, as, in the letter just quoted he said they 
 did, could “ the President declare the United 
 States to be neutral in the unqualified terms used, 
 when we were so notoriously and unequivocally 
 
208 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 under eventual engagements to defend the Amer- 
 ican possessions of France ” ? Hamilton’s ground 
 was that the treaty, by its terms, was “ a defen- 
 sive alliance,” and therefore not binding in this 
 case, inasmuch as the present war against England 
 was offensive ; and that, besides, the treaty was 
 in suspension, as France herself was, in a sense, in 
 suspension, having only a provisional government, 
 the permanent and legitimate successor to which 
 was uncertain. But an important point was 
 gained, it was thought, in the decision to receive 
 Genet as the French minister. Hamilton, still 
 acting in accordance with that cautious policy 
 which he thought to be, in such a crisis, the most 
 judicious, questioned whether a minister from the 
 provisional government in Paris should be recog- 
 nized without reservations. Such an ambassador 
 might be followed presently by another accredited 
 by a new power in the revolutionary progress. 
 This would, at the least, be an awkward dilemma 
 not to be recovered from without the loss of some 
 dignity by the government of the United States. 
 But this point also was yielded in deference to 
 Jefferson, and much to his mortification the con- 
 cession turned out to be before he was many weeks 
 older. 
 
 “ I anxiously wish,” Madison wrote to Jeffer- 
 son, “ that the reception of Genet may testify 
 what I believe to be the real affections of the peo- 
 ple.” He was amply gratified. From Charles- 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 209 
 
 ton, where he landed, to Philadelphia, Genet was 
 received with the warmest enthusiasm by all who 
 sympathized with France, and by that larger 
 number among Americans who are always ready 
 to hurrah for anything or anybody that has 
 caught the popular fancy. Madison watched his 
 progress with great interest, and apparently with 
 some misgivings. Writing again a few days later, 
 to Jefferson, he says that “ the fiscal party in 
 Alexandria was an overmatch for those who 
 wished to testify the American sentiment.” In- 
 deed, he thinks it certain, he says in the same let- 
 ter, “ that Genet will be misled if he takes either 
 the fashionable cant of the cities or the cold cau- 
 tion of the government for the sense of the pub- 
 lic ” — falling himself, before he reaches the end 
 of the sentence, into the cant of assuming neutral- 
 ity in the government to be only a “ mask ” be- 
 hind which to hide its “secret Anglomany.” But 
 he was quite mistaken in supposing that Genet 
 was likely to be misled, or led at all, by anybody. 
 He was almost capable, as General Knox said, of 
 declaring the United States a department of 
 France and of levying troops here to reduce the 
 Americans to obedience. The man’s conduct, if 
 it had not been so outrageous, would have been 
 ludicrous in its assumption of power, its disregard 
 of the laws of the country, and its defiance of the 
 government. Within thi'ee months of his arrival 
 Jefferson himself was constrained to acknowledge 
 14 
 
210 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 that he had developed “ a character and conduct 
 so unexpected and so extraordinary, as to place us 
 in the most distressing dilemma, between our re- 
 gard for his nation, which is constant and sincere, 
 and a regard for our laws, the authority of which 
 must be maintained ; for the peace of our country, 
 which the executive magistrate is charged to pre- 
 serve ; for its honor, offended in the person of 
 that magistrate ; and for its character, grossly 
 traduced in the conversations and letters of this 
 gentleman.” Though this was in an official letter 
 it gave, no doubt, Jefferson’s real opinion; for no 
 man had more reason than he for resenting the 
 conduct of the irrepressible Frenchman. Jeffer- 
 son has been accused of too much familiarity with 
 the French minister in private, and of tardiness 
 in the discharge of his own duty as Secretary 
 where it was likely to clash with the other’s 
 schemes. Genet himself complained that he was 
 thrown over by Jefferson after receiving from him 
 every encouragement. This is, of course, true, 
 but not in the least discreditable to Jefferson. 
 When Genet arrived in Philadelphia, he was, al- 
 though he had already committed some illegal 
 acts in Charleston, profuse in his promises of good 
 behavior. The Secretary of State had welcomed 
 him as the representative of France and the Rev- 
 olution, and naturally he meant to make the most 
 he could out of him, for the sake of the Republi- 
 can party, as well as for the sake of the sacred 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 211 
 
 cause of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” But 
 be soon saw that be was dealing with one wbo 
 was a cross between a mountebank and a mad- 
 man, as we learn from a letter of Madison to Jef- 
 ferson, written witbin two months of Jefferson’s 
 first interview with Genet. . “ Your account of 
 Genet,” says tbe letter, “ is dreadful. He must 
 be brought right if possible. His folly will other- 
 wise do mischief which no wisdom can repair.” 
 
 The mischief dreaded was, that the administra- 
 tion party would take advantage of the insolent 
 and outrageous conduct of the French minister to 
 show the folly of precipitancy, and to gain popu- 
 larity and strength for itself. Madison soon 
 writes to Jefferson to acquaint him with the re- 
 action taking place in Virginia, “ in the surprise 
 and disgust of those who are attached to the 
 French cause, and who viewed this minister as 
 the instrument for cementing, instead of alien- 
 ating the two Republics.” He asserts that “ the 
 Anglican party is busy, as you may suppose, in 
 making the worst of everything, and in turning 
 the public feelings against France and thence in 
 favor of England.” In a sense this must have 
 been true. The “fiscals,” the “ Anglomanys,” 
 the “ Anglican party,” the “ monarchists ” — 
 which were Mr. Madison’s pet names for his old 
 friends — were good enough politicians to take 
 great satisfaction in keeping well stirred and in 
 lively use the muddy waters into which their op- 
 
212 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 ponents had floundered. They were not, proba- 
 bly, careful always to remember that France was 
 neither the better nor worse, neither the wiser nor 
 the less wise, because one of the mad fanatics, 
 bred of the Revolution, had found his way, unfor- 
 tunately, to the United States as a minister plen- 
 ipotentiary. But, on the other hand, it was not 
 true that there was any “ Anglican party,” in the 
 sense in which Madison used the term ; — a party 
 led by men who were “ the enemies of France 
 and of liberty, at work to lead the well-meaning 
 from their honorable connection with those [the 
 French people] into the arms and ultimately into 
 the government of Great Britain.” Washington 
 said that he did not believe there were ten men 
 in the United States, whose opinions deserved any 
 respect, who would change the form of govern- 
 ment to a monarchy. But if there were only ten 
 men in the country whose opinions, in the esti- 
 mate of Jefferson and Madison, were not worth 
 much, Washington was among them. The affec- 
 tion and reverence, with which he was regarded 
 by the people, they would have been glad to ap- 
 peal to on behalf of their own party ; but it is 
 easy to read between the lines in Jefferson’s 
 “Ana,” and in his and Madison’s correspondence, 
 that they looked upon the President as the dupe 
 of his Secretary of the Treasury. Not that they 
 were ever wanting in terms of respect and even 
 of veneration for the President, but the tone was 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 213 
 
 often one of pitiful regret almost akin to con- 
 tempt. 
 
 “ I am extremely afraid,” Madison wrote to 
 Jefferson, “ that the President may not be suffi- 
 ciently aware of the snares that may be laid for 
 his good intentions by men whose politics at bot- 
 tom are very different from his own.” Again he 
 says, a few days later, “ I regret extremely the 
 position into which tlie President has been thrown. 
 The unpopular cause of Anglomany is openly lay- 
 ing claim to him. His enemies, masking them- 
 selves under the popular cause of France, are play- 
 ing off the most tremendous batteries on him. . . . 
 It is mortifying to the real friends of the Presi- 
 dent that his fame and his influence should have 
 anything to apprehend from the success of liberty 
 in another country, since he owes his preeminence 
 to the success of it in his own. If France tri- 
 umphs, the ill-fated proclamation will be a mill- 
 stone, which would sink any other character and 
 will force a struggle even on his.” Yet it is cer- 
 tain that Washington was not in the least doubt as 
 to his own political principles ; that he was never 
 in danger of being inveigled into the betrayal of 
 those principles, whatever they might be, and that 
 he was quite capable of due care for his own rep- 
 utation. 
 
 If Madison did not know that these tears over 
 Washington, if sincere, were quite uncalled for, 
 Jefferson was not in the least deceived. He re- 
 
214 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 cords in his “ Ana ” that the President, referring 
 to certain articles that had recently appeared in 
 Freneau’s “Gazette,” said that “he considered 
 those papers as attacking him [Washington] di- 
 rectly ; for he must be a fool indeed to swallow 
 the little sugar-plums here and there thrown out 
 to him. That in condemning the administration 
 of the government they condemned him, for if they 
 thought there were measures pursued contrary 
 to his sentiments, they must conceive him too 
 careless to attend to them, or too stupid to under- 
 stand them.” Again, some months later, the Pres- 
 ident, alluding to another article in Freneau’s pa- 
 per, — that “ rascal Freneau,” as he called him, — 
 said, “ that he despised all their attacks on him 
 personally, but there never had been an act of the 
 government — not meaning in the executive line 
 only, but in any line — which that paper had not 
 abused. He was evidently sore and warm,” con- 
 tinues the candid Secretary, “ and I took his in- 
 tention to be, that I should interpose in some way 
 with Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appointment 
 of translating clerk in my office. But I will not 
 do it.” 
 
 These frank and indignant avowals of feeling 
 and opinion were not, if we may believe Jeffer- 
 son, unusual with Washington, even in cabinet 
 meetings ; and it seems hardly likely that Madi- 
 son, who was on the most friendly and intimate 
 terms with the President, could have been so ignoe 
 
FRENCH POLITICS. 
 
 215 
 
 rant of how lie felt and thought, as to suppose him 
 the mere dupe of designing men. The truth is, 
 probably, that Madison did not, any more than 
 Jefferson, believe this. It was only a bit of party 
 tactics to assume, lest the President should have 
 too much influence over the minds of the people, 
 that, in the hands of the wicked “ Anglicists,” he 
 was as clay in the hands of the potter. The two 
 friends, whether in writing or by speech they la- 
 mented and excused the unhappy position, as they 
 were pleased to call it, of the President, must 
 have appeared to each other like the Roman au- 
 gurs in G^rome’s picture. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 HIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 
 
 Genet was at last got rid of, but the evil that 
 he did lived after him. His presence had pro- 
 voked an outbreak, to some degree, of the phe- 
 nomena of the French Revolution, which, however 
 significant they might be in the upheaval of an 
 old monarchical despotism, were an unwholesome 
 growth among a simple people, where one man 
 was as good as another before the law ; where, 
 from the first settlement of the country, all had 
 largely possessed the advantages of a popular gov- 
 ernment ; and where any other than a republican 
 government for the future was well-nigh impos- 
 sible. For men to address each other as “citi- 
 zen,” as if the word had the new significance in 
 America that it had just gained in France ; to 
 swear eternal fidelity to liberty, equality, and fra- 
 ternity, as if these were lately discovered rights, 
 which had been denied the common people for 
 centuries by kings and nobles, who had always 
 lived in the next street in inconceivable luxury 
 wrung from the blood and sweat of the poor ; to 
 form Jacobin Clubs pledged to the suppression of 
 
EIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 217 
 
 the tyranny of aristocrats in a country where, as 
 Samuel Dexter said of New England, there was 
 hardly a man rich enough to own a carriage, and 
 few so poor as not to own a horse ; for men thus 
 to ape those revolutionary ways, which meant so 
 much in Paris, may have seemed at the moment, 
 to sober-minded people, more fantastic than harm- 
 ful. It was harmful, however, insomuch as it sub- 
 stituted sentiment for common sense, and made 
 enthusiasm, not reason, the guide of conduct. A 
 character was given to political conflict which ob- 
 tained for years to come. There was, it is true, a 
 certain manliness about it in remarkable contrast 
 with that maudlin sentimentality of our time, 
 which is rather inclined to ask pardon of the reb- 
 els of the late civil war for having put them to 
 the trouble of getting up a rebellion. It was a 
 conflict, nevertheless, more of party passion than 
 of principle, whei’ein it is impossible to see that 
 either party was absolutely right, or either abso- 
 lutely wrong. The Fran comania phase of it dis- 
 appeared for a time in John Adams’s administra- 
 tion ; but it revived again, and gave intensity and 
 virulence to the political struggles, in the first de- 
 cade of this century. Then it was that men went 
 about their daily affairs with cockades on their 
 hats as distinctive party badges. In their social 
 as well as in their business relations they were 
 governed by party affinities. Neighbors differing 
 in politics would hardly speak to each other, and 
 
218 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 each was always ready to accept the other’s polit- 
 ical crookedness as the measure of his possible de- 
 pravity in everything else. They would hardly 
 walk on the same side of the street ; or sail in the 
 same packet ; or ride in the same stage-coach ; or 
 buy their groceries at the same shop ; or listen to 
 the preaching of the gospel from the same pulpit ; 
 indeed, if the preacher was known to have pro- 
 nounced political opinions, he was held, by those 
 who did not agree with him, as one from whose 
 shoulders the clerical gown should be torn. 
 
 Gratitude to France had not yet even become 
 traditional, and it was intensified by the deepest 
 sympathy for a people struggling for what, by 
 their aid, Americans had so recently gained. 
 Added to this was the old hatred to England, which 
 England as carefully nursed as if it were her set- 
 tled policy, by exciting Indian hostilities on the 
 borders, by outrages on the high seas, and by an 
 interference with American commerce, exercised 
 with as little consideration of the rights of an inde- 
 pendent nation as if the States were still colonies 
 in revolt. Never did a party find, ready-made and 
 close at hand, so many elements of popularity ; and 
 these being appealed to as Genet appealed to them, 
 it was easy to set the country in a blaze. When 
 the Administration was determined that he should 
 be recalled, and the Republican leaders were anx- 
 ious to get rid of him, as they could not restrain 
 him, Jefferson opposed, in a meeting of the cabinet, 
 
HIS LATEST TEARS IN CONGRESS. 219 
 
 the proposition to ask for his recall, lest such pop- 
 ular indignation should be aroused as would en- 
 able the French minister to defy the Govei’nment 
 itself. The seed sowed by such a man, on such a 
 soil, bore fruit a thousand-fold for almost a gener- 
 ation. It is not to be wondered at that the Fed- 
 eralists could not long hold their own against a 
 party that did not ask the people to think, but 
 bade them only to remember, — much, indeed, 
 that ought to be remembered, — and to feel. 
 That is always so much easier to do than the other, 
 and it is always so much easier to appeal effectu- 
 ally to sentiment than to reflection, that the won- 
 der rather is that the Federalists could hold their 
 own so long as they did. All things were against 
 them but one. Washington, though altogether 
 above any partisan bias, as he believed to be the 
 imperative duty of the chief magistrate of the na- 
 tion, conducted his administration by the princi- 
 ples which distinguished the Federalists. He was 
 neither, as he intimated to Jefferson, so careless 
 as not to know what was done, nor such a fool 
 as not to understand why it was done ; and so 
 greatly was he revered for his exalted character, 
 so universal was the confidence in his integrity, 
 sagacity, and sound judgment, that, so long as he 
 remained President, the party that surrounded him 
 was immovable as a mountain. His policy was 
 to stave off a rupture with England, and, if pos- 
 sible, to bring that power into pacific and rational 
 
220 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 relations with the United States. The govern- 
 ment aimed to keep itself clear of entanglement 
 with all foreign politics ; to maintain that perfect 
 neutrality which should violate no treaties, offend 
 no national friendships, provoke no jealousies, and 
 leave England and France to fight their own bat- 
 tles, content that the United States should be an 
 impartial spectator. Thirty years afterward, when 
 the Federal party had ceased to exist under that 
 title, this was announced as the true American 
 policy, and was thenceforth known as “ The Mon- 
 roe Doctrine,” though the merit, even of re-dis- 
 covery, did not belong to President Monroe. 
 
 In nine cases out of ten, perhaps in ninety-nine 
 out of a hundred, the wisest statesmanship is the 
 knowledge when and how to compromise. Cer- 
 tainly that was all John Jay, whom the President 
 sent to England to make a treaty, could do. The 
 treaty was a bad one ; that is, it was not such an 
 one as any President and Senate would have dared 
 to consent to for the last sixty years ; it was not 
 so good an one as that which Monroe and Pinkney 
 negotiated ten years later, and which President 
 Jefferson, lest it should help England and hurt 
 France, then quietly locked up in his desk with- 
 out permitting the Senate even to know of its ex- 
 istence ; nor was it so bad as the treaty of peace 
 made with England in 1814. But it was undoubt- 
 edly the best that could be done at the time. The 
 question was between it and nothing ; and the 
 
HIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS 221 
 
 best its warmest defenders could say was, that it 
 was better than nothing. No treaty meant war ; 
 and war at that moment with England meant 
 ruin. At least so the Federalists thought, and, so 
 far as human foresight could go, they were prob- 
 ably right. 
 
 But never was a treaty more unpopular than 
 this, when its provisions came to be understood. 
 The government, in delaying to make it public, 
 seemed to fear for its reception, and by that hesi- 
 tation helped to raise the very doubts it was afraid 
 of. But when it was published the whole South 
 was aroused, as one man, on finding that the pay- 
 ment for fugitive slaves, who during the war of 
 the Revolution had sought refuge with the Brit- 
 ish army, was not provided for. Other concessions 
 made to England were, in other parts of the coun- 
 try, deemed not less humiliating and injurious to 
 the national honor than this refusal to pay for 
 runaway negroes. Also, there was a one-sided 
 stipulation relating to commerce in the West In- 
 dies, so injurious to American interests that the 
 President and Senate, rather than ratify it, de- 
 termined to reject the whole treaty and take the 
 consequences. There was hardly a town of any 
 note that did not hold its indignation meeting. 
 Jay was burned in effigy, or the attempt was made 
 so to express the public disapprobation, in more 
 than one of the larger towns. Hamilton, when 
 at a public meeting in New York he tried to 
 
222 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 explain and defend the treaty, was stoned and 
 compelled to retire. If the more violent oppo- 
 nents of the Administratkm were to be believed, its 
 members, from the President down, and all the 
 leading men of the party supporting it, were 
 bought by “ British gold,” or were ready without 
 being bought, but from pure original depravity, 
 to betray their own country and help to destroy 
 France. The name of the ingenious inventor of 
 the argument of “British gold,” then used for the 
 first time, has unfortunately been lost ; but it 
 has stood the test of a hundred years’ usage, and 
 is as startling and conclusive to-day as it was a 
 century ago. 
 
 There soon came, however, the sober second 
 thought which took into consideration the circum- 
 stances under which the treaty was made, the pos- 
 sible, and even probable, consequences of its rejec- 
 tion, as well as the objections to the treaty itself. 
 After the first excitement had passed away, many 
 thought it worth while to read for themselves 
 what hitherto they had only reviled at the sugges- 
 tion of others, or from sympathy with the popular 
 clamor. The commercial community, the New 
 York Chamber of Commerce leading the way, 
 came to the conclusion that their rights and in- 
 terests were reasonably protected; that to be rec- 
 ognized as a neutral between two such belligerent 
 powers as England and France was a great point 
 gained ; that partial indemnity was better than 
 
HIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 228 
 
 total loss ; and that the chance of a fairly profita- 
 ble trade in the future was preferable to the ruin 
 of all foreign commerce. It was universally 
 agreed that peace was better than war ; but there 
 was this difference between the two parties : 
 while one maintained that war was not a neces- 
 sary consequence of the rejection of the treaty, the 
 other declared it must be inevitable, where there 
 were so many points of collision which could only 
 be escaped by mutual agreement. This was espe- 
 cially true on the frontier, where Indian hostilities 
 were sure to follow, and lead to general war, if the 
 military posts, which should have been given up at 
 the close of the Revolution, should remain longer 
 in the hands of the English. 
 
 But, after all, the real question with the Repub- 
 licans was the influence which a treaty with Eng- 
 land might have upon the relations of France and 
 the United States. They detested England for her 
 own sake ; they detested her still more for the 
 sake of France. If there had been no question of 
 France in the way they would, perhaps, have been 
 willing, like the Federalists, to consider the rela- 
 tions of England and the United States on their 
 merits ; — to remember that the commerce be- 
 tween them was greater than that which the 
 United States had with any other country, the 
 loss of which might be a disastrous check to her 
 prosperity ; that the peoples of the two countries 
 were, after all, of one blood, and that theirs was 
 
224 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 a common heritage in the institutions, laws, lan- 
 guage, and character that distinguished the race ; 
 that the quarrel between them was — though it 
 might be the more bitter on that account — a 
 family quarrel, and ought, for that reason, to he 
 the more speedily settled. But, if England would 
 not remember these things — as she never has to 
 this day — if, on the contrary, she chose to be 
 overbearing, contemptuous, insolent, quite regard- 
 less of American rights — as she always has been 
 when she could be so safely — then it behooved 
 the United States, inasmuch as she was a young 
 and as yet a feeble nation, to conciliate this pow- 
 erful enemy whenever she could do so consist- 
 ently with her self-respect, to avoid giving un- 
 necessary offense or pi’ovoking fresh injuries, and, 
 in the meanwhile, to nurture and husband her 
 strength, to keep an accurate account of all the 
 wrongs that in her weakness she should be com- 
 pelled to submit to, and to bide her time. These 
 were the principles of the Federalists. Their aim 
 was not the good of England, but the good of the 
 United States. They were an American pai'ty ; 
 to them foreign relations were of importance 
 mainly for the influence these might have upon 
 the prosperity, happiness, and power of their own 
 country. They did not forget the gratitude due 
 to France for the aid she had given to the strug- 
 gling colonies, though that aid was given not so 
 much for love of America as for hatred of Eng- 
 
EIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 225 
 
 land. The pacific and friendly relations already 
 established with France they held in due esti- 
 mation ; and their sympathies went out to her 
 people in full measure in their struggle for a pop- 
 ular government, so long as that struggle was 
 kept within the bounds of reason and humanity. 
 But sympathy with, and gratitude to France did 
 not blind them to the wisdom and expediency of 
 pacific and friendly relations with England, pro- 
 vided such could be established without the sacri- 
 fice of their own prosperity, independence, and 
 national pride. It was only to add to that pros- 
 perity, to gain new security for that independence, 
 and to build up a nation of which they and their 
 children, to the latest generation, might well be 
 proud, that they ought to be on good terms with 
 that powerful state with whom they were co-heirs 
 in all the ideas and institutions constituting the 
 civilization that made her great. They hoped to 
 build up, west of the Alantic Ocean, “ an Inglishe 
 Nation” in its broadest sense, of which Walter 
 Raleigh had hoped that he might live to see the 
 beginning, and which the latest historical writers 
 in England are just now recognizing as the most 
 important part of the modern empire of the Eng- 
 lish race. 
 
 The House of Representatives was not in ses- 
 sion when the Jay treaty was ratified by the 
 President and Senate ; but Mr. Madison’s letters 
 show that he could see in it nothing but evil. In 
 15 
 
226 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 February, 1796, the ratification by both govern- 
 ments was announced to both Houses of Congress, 
 and measures were at once taken by the Repub- 
 licans in the lower House to render the treaty, if 
 possible, null and void. A resolution, warmly 
 supported by Mr. Madison, was offered, calling 
 upon the President for copies of the instructions 
 under which Mr. Jay acted, with the correspond- 
 ence and any other papers, proper to be made 
 public, relating to the negotiation. The resolution 
 was subjected to a debate of three weeks, but was 
 finally passed. The request was refused by the 
 President on the ground that the treaty -making 
 power was, by the Constitution, confided to the 
 President and Senate. It was on this point 
 mainly that the debate had turned ; and the Pres- 
 ident in support of his opinion, as well as that of 
 the Federalists generally, referred to his recollec- 
 tion of the plain intention of the Constitutional 
 Convention ; and to the fact that a proposition, 
 “ that no treaty should be binding on the United 
 States which was not ratified by law,” was “ ex- 
 plicitly rejected.” Mr. Madison said, a day or 
 two after, that, while he did not doubt “ the case 
 to be as stated, he had no recollection of it.” Of 
 the message itself he said, that it was “ as unex- 
 pected as its tone and tenor are improper and in- 
 delicate.” But Hamilton, he thought, wrote it, 
 and the President was, as usual, lamented over for 
 having been taken in. A resolution, however, was 
 
HIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 
 
 227 
 
 finally passed in favor of the treaty, though by a 
 majority of three only. The debate upon it was 
 earnest and long, Mr. Madison leading the oppo- 
 sition. His disappointment was bitter. “ The 
 progress of this business throughout,” he wrote to 
 Jefferson, “ has been to me the most worrying 
 and vexatious that I ever encountered ; and the 
 more so, as the causes lay in the unsteadiness, the 
 follies, the perverseness, and the defections among 
 our friends, more than in the strength, or dexter- 
 ity, or malice of our opponents.” 
 
 Though the Jay treaty was not — as was said 
 on a previous page — such an one as the United 
 States would nave acceded to in latter times, the 
 result proved it to be a wise and timely measure. 
 Notwithstanding the disturbed condition of affairs 
 in Europe, its influence upon the United States, 
 and the increasing violence of faction here, the in- 
 crease for the next ten or twelve years of the com- 
 merce, and the consequent growth and prosperity 
 of the country, were greater than the most sanguine 
 supporters of the treaty had dared to hope for. 
 Their immediate expectations that it might be 
 possible to establish better relations with England, 
 without disturbing essentially those existing with 
 France, were, however, signally disappointed. 
 Their opponents were wiser ; for they not only 
 measured accurately the indignation of the French 
 by their own, but they took good care that it 
 should not languish for want of encouragement. 
 
228 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 The French Directory might have Been reconciled 
 to the situation had it been plain to them that 
 there was neither an “ Anglicized ” party nor a 
 French party in the United States, but that the 
 people were united in the determination to main- 
 tain, for their own protection, whatever their per- 
 sonal sympathies might be, an absolute neutrality 
 between the belligerent powers. But as they 
 were assured that their friends in America meant 
 also to be their effectual allies, so they believed 
 that those who professed neutrality used it only 
 as a mask for friendship to England. 
 
 James Monroe had been received in Paris as 
 American minister, literally as well as morally, 
 with open arms, in that memorable scene when, in 
 the presence and amid the cheers of the National 
 Convention, the President, Merlin de Douai, im- 
 printed upon his cheeks, in the name of France, 
 the kiss of fraternity. Till he was recalled in the 
 latter days of Washington’s administration, Mon- 
 roe was the representative, not so much of the gov- 
 ernment to which he owed allegiance, as of the 
 faction to which he belonged at home. He was 
 not, it is true, unmindful of the hundreds of out- 
 rages perpetrated by French naval vessels and pri- 
 vateers upon American merchantmen ; that their 
 crews were thrown into French prisons, and that 
 the detention of their cargoes had brought ruin 
 upon many American citizens ; nor did he neglect 
 to demand redress. But he seemed absolutely in- 
 
HIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 229 
 
 capable of understanding that if there were any- 
 thing to choose between the insults and wrongs 
 which America was compelled to submit to from 
 England and France, it was only in the greater 
 ability of England to inflict them. English ships 
 swept the ocean, and pretexts were never wanting 
 for overhauling American vessels, stripping them 
 of some of their men, or confiscating both ships and 
 cargoes. France had as many pretexts and quite 
 as good a will to enforce them ; but she had fewer 
 ships, and for that reason, and that only, did rather 
 less damage. 
 
 But however earnest Monroe was in insisting 
 upon the rights of neutrals, in urging upon the 
 French ministry the strict observance of treaty 
 obligations, and in complaining of the constant 
 injuries done in their despite, there was another 
 thing about which he was far more earnest. He 
 was as anxious to aid the French to baffle, if pos- 
 sible, Jay’s negotiations in London as if he were 
 uncovering a plot against his own government. 
 When the ratification of the treaty was made 
 known in Paris, the indignation of the Directoi'y 
 was hardly kept within bounds. The Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs notified Monroe that the Directory 
 considered the stipulations of the treaty of 1778 
 as altered and suspended in their most essential 
 parts by this treaty with England. Under any 
 circumstances the French would, no doubt, have 
 resented the establishment of friendly relations be- 
 
230 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 tween the United States and the old enemy of 
 France, with whom she, at that moment, was en- 
 gaged in a war arousing more than the bitter in- 
 herited enmity of the two peoples. But the course 
 Monroe had seen fit to pursue had done much to 
 assure the French that the strong party in the 
 United States, which he represented, would never 
 permit the virgin Republic to be delivered, as it 
 was assumed the treaty did deliver her, bound and 
 gagged into the hands of the power which Jeffer- 
 son loved to call “ the harlot England.” The first 
 enthusiasm of the Revolution was fast growing 
 into cant in both countries, and the language of 
 devotion to liberty, equality, and fraternity was 
 beginning to lose all meaning. But it was easy 
 to be deceived by the assurances, more significant 
 in actions than in words, of an official representa- 
 tive, that the American people, save an Anglicized 
 and decreasing minority, were the friends, and 
 meant to be the allies, of France. Of course the 
 French were all the more exasperated because 
 they had permitted themselves to be deluded. 
 Monroe was first rebuked by his own government 
 for neglecting to do all that might have been done 
 to reconcile the Directory to a treaty between the 
 United States and Great Britain ; and soon after, 
 his conduct continuing unsatisfactory, he was re- 
 called. 
 
 It is, of course, possible that the French Direc- 
 tory were not misled ; that nothing would have 
 
HIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 231 
 
 reconciled them to the British treaty; and that 
 their subsequent course would have been the 
 same, had they believed the American people 
 were desirous to be on good terms with England 
 solely for their own tranquillity and interest, and 
 not at all because any large portion of them were 
 at enmity with France. This, however, would not 
 be a valid excuse for Monroe’s course as a repre- 
 sentative of his government. The only defense 
 for him is, that he was deceived by his friends at 
 home ; they must share, therefore, the responsibil- 
 ity for his conduct, inasmuch as they encouraged 
 a man, not over strong in mind or character and 
 more likely to be governed by impulse than by 
 good judgment, to abuse the confidence placed in 
 him by the Administration. 
 
 From any share in this responsibility, however, 
 Madison must be relieved. He was in very con- 
 stant correspondence with Monroe, and kept him 
 carefully advised as to the progress of the treaty. 
 No man desired its defeat more earnestly than he, 
 and he believed that a majority of the people 
 were opposed to it. But he evidently doubted its 
 rejection from the first, and his discussion of pos- 
 sibilities in his letters to Monroe was always frank 
 and discriminating. In the end he accounted for 
 the vote in its favor in the House of Representa- 
 tives by the activity and influence of its friends, 
 which its opponents wanted the ability or the 
 time to overcome. It is probable that his col- 
 
232 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 leagues of his own party in the House did not 
 agree with him that public opinion was against 
 the treaty, as it was by votes from their side that 
 its acceptance was carried. 
 
 With the ensuing session of Congress, at the 
 close of Washington's administration, Madison’s 
 congressional service ended. The leadership of 
 the opposition, whatever may be thought of its 
 influence upon the welfare of the country, or of 
 the personal motives by which he may have been 
 governed, had devolved upon him, almost from the 
 beginning, by natural selection of the fittest for 
 that position. It was not an easy place to take, 
 either by one's own choice or by the suffrages of 
 others ; for at the head of the administration to 
 be opposed stood the man most revered by a 
 grateful country, surrounded by men among those, 
 at least, who were best known for their past ser- 
 vices and most esteemed for their ability and char- 
 acter. It was the more difficult for one whose 
 personal relation to the President was that of the 
 warmest friendship ; to whom the President was 
 accustomed to turn for counsel and even for guid- 
 ance ; and who, being among those eminent men 
 to whom the people owed their new Constitution, 
 was counted upon to strengthen the union of the 
 States and build up a strong and stable govern- 
 ment. He played his difficult part, nevertheless, 
 with dignity; if not brilliant, he was always 
 ready with the best reasons that could be given 
 
EIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS. 233 
 
 for the measures he supported ; and his zeal was 
 invariably tempered with a wise moderation and 
 a courtesy toward opponents, which made him al- 
 ways respected, and sometimes feared for reserved 
 force, in debate. 
 
 Somewhat more than a year before his retire- 
 ment from Congress Mr. Madison had married, 
 and it is quite possible that this may in part have 
 moved him to seek rest in the tranquillity of a 
 country life. Tradition says that Mrs. Madison 
 was a beautiful woman. She has in our time been 
 a marked figure in the society of Washington, and 
 many remember her for her fine presence, her 
 powers of conversation, and that beauty which 
 sometimes belongs to the aged, though it may not 
 have been preceded by youthful comeliness. Her 
 maiden name was Dolly Payne, and her parents 
 were members of the Society of Friends. When 
 Madison married her she was Mrs. Todd, the 
 widow of John Todd, a lawyer of Philadelphia. 
 Her age at this time was twenty-six years, Mr. 
 Madison being forty-three, and she survived him 
 thirteen ) r ears, dying in 1849. On her tombstone 
 she is called “ Dolley;” but Mr. Rives, in his life 
 of her husband, ever mindful of the proprieties, 
 calls her “ Dorothea,” or rather, Mrs. Dorothea 
 Payne Madison ; for, like the Vicar of Wakefield, 
 he loved to give the whole name. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 AT HOME. — “RESOLUTIONS OF ’98 AND ’99.” 
 
 Mr. Madison, in retiring for a time from pub- 
 lic office, did not lose his interest in public affairs. 
 Of few Americans can it be said* with more truth, 
 that he had a genius for politics, and the sub- 
 ject, wherever he might be, was never out of his 
 mind. There is not much else in the volumes 
 of his published letters, while there is just enough 
 else to show that in these he said all he had to 
 say about anything. His more ambitious writ- 
 ings, the papers in “The Federalist,” the essay 
 on The British Doctrine of Neutral Trade, his con- 
 troversial articles in the newspapers under various 
 pseudonyms, are all political, all able, and all of 
 great value as a part of the history of the times. 
 Those which are controversial, however, must be 
 taken, like his letters, as aids to knowledge rather 
 than as definite conclusions to be accejMed with- 
 out question. It does not detract from the value 
 of these letters, however, that they are written 
 from the point of view of a party leader. Affairs 
 of only tempoi-ary importance sometimes loom up 
 before him merely because of their influence upon 
 
AT HOME. 
 
 235 
 
 some immediate party movement ; and others of 
 far-reaching consequences, which have no such 
 bearing, escape his notice altogether ; but the 
 reader soon learns that he may, at any rate, con- 
 fide in the sincerity of the writer, and accept as 
 freely the reasons given for his course as they are 
 frankly stated. 
 
 Of the literary value of his writings, aside from 
 their historical interest, there is not much to be 
 said, though Mr. Madison always wrote, even in 
 his letters, as if writing for posterity. He was 
 not felicitous in the use of language ; the style is 
 turgid, heavy with resounding words of many syl- 
 lables, unillumined by any ray of imagination, 
 any flash of wit or of humor ; and the sentences 
 are often involved and badly put together. But 
 there is a genuineness, an evident sincerity of pur- 
 pose, in all he wrote, and occasionally an expres- 
 sion of deep feeling, which are always impressive. 
 We search for glimpses of his private life and 
 character in such letters, for they are not easily 
 apparent. In one sense he had no private life, or, 
 at least, none that was not so subordinate to his 
 public career that there was little in it either sig- 
 nificant or attractive. There is, in this respect, 
 a marked contrast between his correspondence 
 and that of Jefferson. There was, possibly, a lit- 
 tle affectation in Jefferson’s frequent assertions of 
 his intense desire for the quiet of the country and 
 the tranquillity of home, and of his distaste for the 
 
236 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 turmoils and anxieties of public office. But he 
 ■was certainly fond of country-life with the leisure 
 to potter about among his sheep and his trees ; to 
 watch the growth of his wheat and his clover ; to 
 contrive new coulters for his plows ; to talk of phi- 
 losophy, of the Social Contract, of mechanics, and 
 of natural history ; if he was averse to public 
 life it was not because political power and distinc- 
 tion were a burden to him, except as they brought 
 with them strife and unpopularity which truly his 
 soul loathed for himself, though he rather liked 
 to set other people by the ears. His private life 
 was unquestionably as full of interest to himself 
 as it is entertaining to look upon in the uncon- 
 scious revelation of his own letters. 
 
 But with Madison it was apparently quite 
 otherwise. He unbent with difficulty. Always 
 solemn and dignified, it was rather painful than 
 pleasant to him to stoop to the petty matters of 
 every-day existence. He had no small affecta- 
 tions, and was not forever asserting that he was 
 without ambition ; as if that, without which no- 
 body is of much use in the world either to him- 
 self or to others, were a weakness akin to deprav- 
 ity. With brief intervals, covering only a few 
 months altogether, he was where he best liked to 
 be, from his entrance upon public life in 1775 till 
 he stepped down in 1817 from that political ele- 
 vation beyond which there are no ascending steps. 
 During these forty-two years he found a certain 
 
AT HOME. 
 
 237 
 
 enjoyment m a country home for a little while at 
 a time, but it was chiefly the enjoyment of needed 
 rest from, official labor. The price of tobacco and 
 the promise of the wheat crop interested him 
 then, but only as they interested him always as a 
 source of his own income, and as the index to the 
 general prosperity. At the end of a letter upon 
 political matters, he announces with satisfaction 
 that his Merino ewe has dropped a lamb and both 
 mother and offspi’ing are as well as could be ex- 
 pected ; but it was probably Mr. Jefferson’s grati- 
 fication rather than his own that he had in mind, 
 for it was Mr. Jefferson who had imported the 
 sheep. Again, in a similar letter, he takes a lit- 
 tle remaining space to express a hope that Mr. 
 Jefferson may permit the use of the rams of that 
 flock to improve the breed of the native stock ; 
 not, apparently, that he cared so much about 
 wool, as that he wished to show a courteous and 
 friendly interest in one of Mr. Jefferson’s many 
 projects for the improvement of things generally. 
 
 It was during the year of comparative leisure 
 after he left Congress that Mr. Madison probably 
 built his house at Montpellier, about which some 
 question has been started recently. A house at 
 that time he certainly was building, and it is not 
 likely that he ever employed himself in that way 
 more than once. Scattered among discussions of 
 Alien and Sedition Laws, the war in Europe, free 
 goods in neutral ships, and other public topics, are 
 
238 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 brief allusions to lathing nails which he depended 
 upon Mr. Jefferson to supply; that gentleman 
 haying recently set up a machine for their manu- 
 facture, which, however, like a good many other 
 of his contrivances, seems to have had a hitch in 
 it. So also he asks the Vice-President to see to 
 it, that, when the window-glass and. the pullies 
 are forwarded, the “ chord ” for the latter shall 
 not be forgotten ; and orders for other articles, 
 only to be found in Philadelphia, are sent to his 
 obliging friend. Mr. Jefferson, it is easy to be- 
 lieve, found them rather the most interesting part 
 of the political letters to which they were ap- 
 pended ; and he was quite willing, no doubt, to 
 relieve the tedium of presiding over the Senate by 
 searching through the Market Street shops for the 
 latest improvements in builders’ hardware. To 
 Mr. Monroe, Madison wrote that, as he is sending 
 off a wagon to fetch nails for his carpenters, “ it 
 will receive the few articles which you have been 
 so good as to offer from the superfluities of your 
 stock, and which circumstances will permit me 
 now to lay in.” Evidently he was getting ready 
 to go to housekeeping with his young wife. Mon- 
 roe’s stock of household goods had been replen- 
 ished, perhaps by importations from France on 
 his recent return, and he was disposing of his old 
 supplies, by gift or sale, among his neighbors. 
 Madison, at any rate, sends this modest list of 
 what he would like to have : “ To wit, two table* 
 
AT HOME. 
 
 239 
 
 cloths for a dining-room of about eighteen feet ; 
 two, three, or four, as may be convenient, for a 
 more limited scale ; four dozen napkins, which 
 will not in the least be objectionable for having 
 been used ; and two mattresses.” It was not an 
 extravagant outfit, even though it had not been 
 meant for one of those lordly Virginia homes of 
 which some modern historians give us such 
 charming pictures. “ We are so little acquaint- 
 ed,” — Mr. Madison continues in that stately way, 
 which nothing ever surprised him into forgetting, 
 — “ we are so little acquainted with the culinary 
 utensils in detail that it is difficult to refer to such 
 by name or description as would be within our 
 wants.” 
 
 But pots and kettles, — though that may not be 
 the name they were known by in Virginia, — ta- 
 ble-cloths and mattresses, however moderate in 
 number, are sure indications that the house, which 
 was to be his residence when he should be content 
 to retire from public service, was finished early in 
 1798. He had rested long enough, and was busy 
 that year in attendance upon the State Assembly 
 at Richmond, to which he consented the next year 
 to be returned as a member. Perhaps it was be- 
 cause he could not keep longer out of the fray. 
 Perhaps he felt called to a special duty. Affairs, 
 foreign and domestic, were in a critical condition. 
 France, in her resentment at the Jay treaty, had 
 committed so many fresh outrages upon American 
 
240 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 commerce ; had so exasperated the American peo- 
 ple by these outrages ; and by refusing to receive 
 the ministers from the United States, had so in- 
 sulted them and the government they represented 
 in the proposed arrangements, — disclosed in the 
 X. Y. Z. correspondence, — that all friendly rela- 
 tions between the two countries had ceased, and it 
 had seemed impossible that war could be avoided. 
 
 For a while the popular sympathy was entirely 
 with Mr. Adams’s administration, and the prom- 
 ise could hardly be fairer that the Federalists, if 
 they managed wisely, might remain in power and 
 be sustained by the whole country. But in some 
 respects they were as unwise as in others they 
 were unfortunate. President Adams, though pos- 
 sessing many great qualities, was of too irascible 
 and jealous a temper to be a successful leader or 
 a good ruler. But there were other men of dis- 
 tinction among the Federalists who were hardly 
 less fond of having their own way than the Presi- 
 dent was of having his. The incompatibility of 
 temper was- not altogether on one side in that 
 family quarrel. But all were equally responsible 
 for such a blunder as the enactment of the Alien 
 and Sedition Laws. The provocation, it is true, 
 was unquestionably great. Refugees from abroad 
 had crowded to the United States, many of whom 
 were professional agitators, and some were very 
 sorry vagabonds. Whatever reason they might 
 have had for fomenting discontent with govern 
 
“ RESOLUTIONS OF '98 AND ’99.” 241 
 
 ment in England or in France, there was nothing 
 to justify any such violent measures in this coun- 
 try. But from their conduct as political partisans, 
 particularly as newspaper editors, they soon came 
 to be looked upon by the Federalists — for they 
 all joined the other party — as a dangerous class. 
 There grew up a feeling that it would be wiser 
 for civil affairs to remain, in city, state, and na- 
 tion, in the hands of those who were born and ed- 
 ucated under republican institutions, and not to fall 
 altogether under control of those who were alien 
 in blood and religion, and who were inclined to 
 look upon politics, not in the light of the citizen’s 
 duty to the common weal, but as an easy and 
 profitable calling where the least scrupulous scoun- 
 drel could gather the largest share of spoils. It 
 may be that the authors of those laws were so de- 
 termined to forestall the apprehended evils of such 
 a dispensation because use had not accustomed 
 them, as it has later generations of American citi- 
 zens, to live under it in humility if not content. 
 Or, perhaps, they wanted that profound, faith of 
 our time that the longer this subversion of gov- 
 ernment is submitted to, the easier it will be to 
 get back to the rule of the honest and wise. 
 
 But, at any rate, whatever their reasons, they 
 meant by these laws relating to aliens to put the 
 acquirement of citizenship under more stringent 
 regulations and to check the growth and promul- 
 gation of seditious doctrines. If it be true, as is 
 16 
 
242 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 sometimes maintained with some plausibility, that 
 citizens, to be intrusted with self - government, 
 should be endowed with a certain degree of intelli- 
 gence and virtue, then the aim of the framers of 
 the laws, in the first case, was a good one ; and in 
 the second case, the country has had some experi- 
 ence in later times which tends to show that they 
 were not altogether wrong in believing that doc- 
 trines and practices which may lead to insurrection 
 and civil war might best be met, so far as is pos- 
 sible, at the outset. Nevertheless, the laws, under 
 the circumstances of the time, were ill-considered 
 and injudicious. For one reason, they put an effi- 
 cient weapon into the hands of the opposition at a 
 moment when it was at a loss where to turn for 
 one. “Anglicism” and “British Gold” were blun- 
 derbusses which, in the present popular irritation 
 against France, had, for a time, lost their useful- 
 ness, and were apt to miss fire. But an appeal to 
 a generous and impulsive people on behalf of the 
 unfortunate refugees, who had fled from the tyr- 
 anny of the old world to find liberty and a home 
 in the new, was sure to be listened to. A good 
 many, besides those who assumed that republi- 
 canism and the rights of man were in their spe- 
 cial keeping, believed that an unfortunate class 
 had been dealt with hastily, and even cruelly. 
 The clamor, once begun, told heavily against the 
 Federalists. They could be denounced now, not 
 only as the enemies of liberty in France, but as 
 
“ RESOLUTIONS OF '98 AND '99." 243 
 
 refusing it to men of any nation or any race who 
 should seek it in the United States, — it being, of 
 course, understood that races of black or yellow 
 complexion need not apply. It was, indeed, ad- 
 vanced as an argument against one of the acts, — 
 which gave the President power to order out of 
 the country all aliens whose presence he thought 
 dangerous, — that it might be used to prevent the 
 importation of persons from Africa. On this 
 point Mr. Gallatin, a native of Switzerland, was 
 exceedingly anxious lest there be a violation of 
 the Constitution. But the outrage upon the 
 rights of man here apprehended was the right of 
 white men to make black men slaves. 
 
 Against the enactment of these laws Mr. Jeffer- 
 son did nothing as Vice-President. But whatever 
 was his motive for official inaction, it was not be- 
 cause he approved them. He wrote the Kentucky 
 “ Resolutions of ’98,” — the strongest protest that 
 could be made against them, and to be thence- 
 forth held by nullifiers and secessionists as their 
 covenant of faith. But he acted secretly, taking 
 counsel only with George Nicholas of Kentucky 
 and William C. Nicholas of Virginia (brothers), 
 and, Hildreth says, “ probably with Madison.” 
 The resolutions were to be offered in the Ken- 
 tucky legislature by George Nicholas, and, with 
 some modifications, were passed by that body in 
 Novembei’. A year afterward other resolutions 
 were passed to reassert the opinions of the pre- 
 
244 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 vious session and to record against the laws the 
 “solemn protest” of the legislature; and further 
 declaring “ that a nullification by those sovereign- 
 ties [the States] of all unauthorized acts done un- 
 der color of that instrument [the Constitution] is 
 the rightful remedy.” In the resolutions which 
 Mr. Jefferson had prepared for Nicholas the year 
 before this essential doctrine is found in that por- 
 tion which Nicholas had omitted, in these words — 
 “ where powers are assumed which have not been 
 delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful 
 remedy.” As originally prepared the resolutions 
 were found in Jefferson’s handwriting after his 
 death. HikKeth’s conjecture that Madison, as 
 well as the brothers Nicholas, was consulted in 
 the preparation of these resolutions, rests only on 
 circumstantial evidence. The Kentucky Resolu- 
 tions were passed in November; those of Virginia 
 in December; the former were written by Jeffer- 
 son, the latter by Madison ; and the doctrines in 
 each are essentially the same. It would have 
 been a perfectly natural thing for the two friends 
 to consult together upon a measure of so much 
 importance ; there is no reason why they should 
 not have done so ; and these coincidences suggest 
 that they probably did. Jefferson clearly shirked 
 the responsibility of an act which he knew would 
 endanger the Union ; but Madison made no se- 
 cret, so far as can be seen now, of his going to 
 Richmond, though not a member of the Assern 
 
“ RESOLUTIONS OF ’98 AND ’99." 
 
 245 
 
 bly, apparently for the express purpose of writing 
 these resolutions and urging their adoption. But 
 Jefferson was not a man of courage even in doing 
 that wdiieh he believed to be wise. In Madison, 
 it was only the conscience that was timid ; and 
 having once convinced himself that the thing he 
 proposed to do was right he was always ready to 
 face the consequences. It may be that neither of 
 them foresaw that the real importance of this par- 
 ticular act was rather prospective than imme- 
 diate ; and if so their conduct is to be measured 
 by its instant purpose. If Jefferson meant then 
 and there to dissolve the Union, or even to weaken 
 the constitutional bond that held it together, he 
 was not over-cautious in keeping out of sight. 
 But if Madison’s intention was to strengthen the 
 Union by withstanding what he believed to be a 
 perilous violation of the Constitution, then his 
 courage, though it is to be commended, is not to 
 be wondered at. That, he said, was his motive, 
 and to defend the resolutions and his own part in 
 regard to them was the chief interest and serious 
 labor of the latter years of his life. He was 
 elected a member of the Assembly for the session 
 of 1799-1800, probably because he and his friends 
 thought his official presence desirable when the 
 subject should again come up for consideration at 
 the reading of the replies from other States, to all 
 which the resolutions had been sent. The report 
 on those replies was also written by him, and the 
 
245 
 
 JAM£S MADISON. 
 
 position taken the year before was therein reaf- 
 firmed. explained, and elaborated at length. 
 
 In 1527-25 the doctrines of nullification and of 
 secession were assumed to be the legitimate co- 
 rollary of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
 of 179S and 1799. Jefferson was dead: but 
 Madison felt called upon to deny, in his own de- 
 fense and in defense of the memory of his friend, 
 that there was any similarity between them. 
 From 1830 to 1836 his mind seems to have been 
 chiefly occupied with this subject, upon which he 
 wrote many letters, and a paper of thirty pages, 
 entitled " On Nullification." which bears the date 
 of 1835-36, the latter year being the last of his 
 life. He resents the charge of any political in- 
 consistency in the course of his long career, and 
 most of all such an inconsistency as would im- 
 pugn his attachment to the Constitution and the 
 Union. The Resolutions of 1798, he maintains, 
 do not and were not meant to assert a right in 
 any one State to arrest or annul an act of the 
 General Government, as that is a right that can 
 only belong to them collectively. Nullification 
 and Secession he denounces as “ twin heresies,” 
 that “ought to be buried in the same grave.” 
 “ A political system,” he declares, “ which does 
 not contain an effective provision for a peaceable 
 decision of all controversies arising within itself, 
 would be a government in name only. He as- 
 serts that “ the essential difference between a free 
 
“ RESOLUTIONS OF ’93 AND ’99.” 247 
 
 government and governments not free, is that the 
 former is founded in compact, the parties to which 
 are mutnallv and equally bound by it. Xeither of 
 them, therefore, can have a greater right to break 
 off from the bargain, than, the other or others 
 have to hold them to it. . . . It is high time that 
 the claim to secede at will should be put down by 
 the public opinion.” What. — he writes to another 
 friend, — what can be more preposterous than to 
 say that the States, as united, are in no respect or 
 degree a nation, which implies sovereignty ; . . . 
 and on the other hand, and at the same time, to 
 say that the States separately are completely na- 
 tions and sovereigns? . . . The words of the Con- 
 stitution are explicit, that the Constitution and 
 laws of the United States shall be supreme over 
 the Constitution and laws of the several States ; 
 supreme in their exposition and execution, as well 
 as in their authority. Without a supremacy in 
 these respects, it would be like a scabbard, in the 
 hand of a soldier, without a sword in it.” Abra- 
 ham Lincoln micrht have said this twentv-eieht 
 years later when he determined that his first duty 
 as President was to suppress insurrection. 
 
 Such is the drift of the many pages Mr. Madi- 
 son wrote upon the subject during the last five or 
 six years of his life. He looked then, whatever 
 he mav have thought in the closing; years of the 
 preceding century, upon the United States as a 
 nation, and not as a confederacy having its parts 
 
248 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 held together only by “ a treaty or league ” called 
 a constitution. But his object is to show that 
 there is nothing inconsistent in the resolutions of 
 1798 with these opinions upon the sovereignty 
 of the United States; that he held them just as 
 strongly then as he held them now ; and that 
 they, and he as their author, looked to the States 
 as a whole, not to a single State, to find and ap- 
 ply a remedy in a constitutional way, for an un- 
 constitutional measure of which an administra- 
 tion of the government might be guilty. His 
 position is maintained with all the acuteness, in- 
 genuity, and logical skill which mark his earlier 
 writings. There is no sign of failure of mental 
 power, of which those accused him who could not 
 answer him. Such an imputation he resented 
 with as much indignation as he did a charge of 
 inconsistency, which here could only mean false- 
 hood. There is no possibility, then, of misunder- 
 standing his opinions during the last six years of 
 his life ; and the world has no right to doubt his 
 repeated and earnest assurances that these were 
 his opinions when he wrote the resolutions of 
 1798. It can only be said that the construction 
 he gave them, thirty years afterward, is opposed 
 to the universal understanding of them at the 
 time they were written. 
 
 But if his defense of himself be considered com- 
 plete, it is not even specious when presented on 
 behalf of Jefferson. Mr. Madison wrote in 1830 : 
 
“ RESOLUTIONS OF '98 AND '99'- 249 
 
 “ That the term ‘ nullification ’ in the Kentucky 
 Resolutions belongs to those of 1799, with which 
 Mr. Jefferson had nothing to do. . . . The resolu- 
 tions of 1798, drawn by him, contain neither that 
 nor any equivalent term.” It was not then gen- 
 erally known, whether Mr. Madison knew it or 
 not, that one of the resolutions and part of an- 
 other which Jefferson wrote to be offei’ed in the 
 Kentucky legislature in 1798 were omitted by 
 Mr. Nicholas, and that therein was the assertion 
 already quoted — “ where powers are assumed 
 which have not been delegated, a nullification of 
 the act is the rightful remedy.” The next year, 
 when additional resolutions were offered by Mr. 
 Breckenridge, this idea in similar, though not in 
 precisely the same language, was presented in the 
 words — “ that a nullification by those sovereign- 
 ties [the States] of all unauthorized acts, done 
 under color of that instrument, is the rightful 
 remedy.” In 1832, this fact, on the authority of 
 Jefferson’s grandson and executor, was made pub- 
 lic ; and further, that another declaration of Mr. 
 Jefferson's in the resolution not used was an ex- 
 hortation to the co-States, “ that each will take 
 measures of its own for providing that neither 
 these acts nor any others of the general govern- 
 ment, not plainly and intentionally authorized by 
 the Constitution, shall be exercised within their 
 respective territories.” All this must have been 
 known to Mr. Madison then, if not before. Yet 
 
250 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 three years later, in his paper “ On Nullification,” 
 under the date of 1835-36, he wrote : “ The amount 
 of this modified right of nullification is, that a 
 single State may arrest the operation of a law 
 of the United States. . . . And this new-fangled 
 theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jeffer- 
 son, the apostle of republicanism.” It would be 
 charitable here to believe that there was some 
 lapse of memory in these latter days, and that he 
 had forgotten that Jefferson was, above all things, 
 his own words being witness, the apostle of nul- 
 lification. 
 
 The Alien and Sedition Laws — of which the 
 more obnoxious of the former was never enforced, 
 and the latter expired by limitation in two years 
 — had their influence in the presidential election 
 of 1800. But it was due more to differences be- 
 tween the President and some of the leaders of 
 the Federal party that that party lost its hold upon 
 power, never to be l’egained. With the election 
 of Jefferson, Madison entered upon another sphere 
 of duty, which was politically a promotion, but 
 where his influence, if it was so large, was not so 
 evident as when an active leader of his party. It 
 was at Mr. Jefferson’s “pressing desire,” Mr. 
 Madison himself says, in a letter written many 
 years afterward, that he took the office of Secre- 
 tary of State. In the same letter he explains 
 that he had declined an executive appointment 
 under Washington, because, in taking a seat in 
 
“RESOLUTIONS OF '98 AND '99V 251 
 
 the House of Repi-esentatives, he would be less ex- 
 posed to the imputation of selfish views in the 
 part he had taken in “ the origin and adoption 
 of the Constitution ; ” because there, if anywhere, 
 he could be of service in sustaining it against its 
 adversaries, especially as it was, “ in its progress, 
 encountering trials of a new sort in the formation 
 of new parties attaching advei’se constructions to 
 it.” The latter reason seems to be one of those 
 happy after-thoughts which public men not un- 
 frequently flatter themselves will anticipate a 
 question they would prefer should not be asked. 
 Mr. Madison was a member of the First Congress 
 from the first day it met, before the new Constitu- 
 tion had encountered new trials from new parties 
 by any constructions either one way or the other. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE. 
 
 On the morning of March 4, 1801, Mr. Jeffer- 
 son tied his horse to the fence and walked alone 
 into the Capitol to take the oath of office as Presi- 
 dent. Mr. Madison was not present at that per- 
 functory ceremony, the death of his aged father 
 detaining him at home. He soon after, however, 
 assumed the duties of the station to which Mr. 
 Jefferson had called him, and there he remained 
 till he took the presidential office, in his turn, eight 
 years afterward. 
 
 The new dynasty entered upon its course under 
 happy circumstances. There was, of course, much 
 to fear from the condition of affairs in Europe; 
 for the United States must needs be in a perilous 
 position so long as the struggle for supremacy 
 continued between France and England, and that 
 would be while Napoleon could command an 
 army. But the danger of war with France was no 
 longer imminent, since Mr. Adams had wisely re- 
 established friendly relations, though many of the 
 leading Federalists believed it was at the cost of 
 ruin to his own party. English aggressions upon 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE. 
 
 253 
 
 American commerce had for the moment ceased; 
 as fourteen years afterward they ceased altogether, 
 when the provocation disappeared with the per- 
 manent establishment of peace in Europe. In the 
 temporary lull of the tempest the sun shone out 
 of a serene sky, and the land was blessed with 
 quiet and prosperity. “Peace, commerce and 
 honest friendship with all nations, entangling alli- 
 ances with none,” the President said in his inaugu- 
 ral address, were among “ the essential principles 
 of our government, and consequently those which 
 ought to shape its administration.” The condi- 
 tion of the country was in accord with the thought 
 and may even have suggested it. “ We are all 
 Republicans; we are all Federalists,” said Jeffer- 
 son in his inaugural ; it was meant, however, as 
 an avowal of a tolerant belief in the patriotism of 
 both parties, rather than, as has sometimes been 
 supposed, an assertion that party lines, so clearly 
 drawn in the election, were at length obliterated. 
 But hardly a year had passed before this seemed 
 to be almost literally true. One after another 
 States hitherto Federal, both at the North and at 
 the South, went over in their state elections to the 
 Republican or Democratic party ; till, with the 
 exception of Delaware, there was not a single 
 Federal State outside of New England ; and even 
 in that stronghold one State, Rhode Island, had 
 marched off with the majority. “Everywhere,” 
 wrote Madison in October, “ the progress of the 
 
254 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 public sentiment mocks the cavils and clamors of 
 the malignant adversaries of the Administration.” 
 
 If it may not be asserted that this overthrow of 
 the Federal rule was fortunate at that juncture, — 
 as nothing is more idle in history than speculation 
 upon what might have been, — it may at least 
 be said that Jefferson’s administration for his 
 first four years was a happy one for his country 
 and acceptable to. his countrymen. None since 
 Washington’s has ever been so popular ; and no 
 other, except Lincoln’s, has ever been so success- 
 ful. Nor can it be said of it that it was a happy 
 period because it is without a history ; for it in- 
 cluded acts of moment, accepted then with an ap- 
 probation and enthusiasm which time has justified. 
 Not less shallow is that view of his character 
 and of those years of his administration, taken 
 by many of his contemporaries, who neither loved 
 nor respected him, and who attributed his suc- 
 cess and his popularity to his good fortune. This 
 was a favorite and easy way, among his political 
 opponents, of explaining a disagreeable fact. Par- 
 ton notes in his Life, that C. C. Pinckney could 
 only understand Jefferson’s hold upon public con- 
 fidence as “ the infatuation of the people.” John 
 Quincy Adams said : “ Fortune has taken a pleas- 
 ure in making Jefferson’s greatest weaknesses and 
 follies issue more successfully than if he had been 
 inspired with the profoundest wisdom.” “ When 
 the people,” said Gouverneur Morris, “ have been 
 
SECRETARY OF ST A TE. 
 
 255 
 
 long enough drunk, they will get sober, but while 
 the frolic lasts, to reason with them is useless.” 
 There has been more than one occasion of late 
 years, and in more than one place, where this may 
 be truly said of popular political enthusiasm ; but 
 it was not true of that which prevailed for the 
 first four years of this century ; and Mr. Adams’s 
 sarcasm can hardly fail to recall the fact, that 
 when Mr. Jefferson, in his second term, was really 
 guilty of a great folly in adhering to a prolonged 
 embargo, it was Mr. Adams who committed one of 
 the few follies of his own life in abandoning his 
 party to give his support to the President’s blun- 
 der. 
 
 Though there were many changes in Mr. Jeffer- 
 son's cabinet in the course of eight years, they 
 were not the result of dissensions. Yet he was, 
 perhaps, more an absolute President than any 
 other man who has ever held that position. He 
 sought and listened to counsel, no doubt ; but 
 taking it was another matter. He certainly did 
 not take it if it did not suit him ; and if it was 
 not likely to suit him, he was in no hurry to ask 
 for it. It was in his own fertile brain, not in the 
 suggestions of others, that important measures 
 had their birth. That trait in his character, which 
 phrenologists have named secretiveness, largely 
 governed his actions. Ic was natural for him to 
 bring things about quietly and skillfully by set- 
 ting others to do what he wanted done, without 
 
256 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 himself being seen ; though sometimes there was 
 no other motive than the mere gratification of se- 
 cretiveness. He preferred often to suggest meas- 
 ures quietly to congressmen rather than to Con- 
 gress, though the result in either case might be 
 the same. At other times, where the end to be 
 attained was of great importance and he was ab- 
 solutely sure only of himself, he boldly took the 
 responsibility, as he did in the purchase of Louisi- 
 ana, and in the suppression of the Monroe-Pinck- 
 ney treaty with England in his second term. It 
 is not surprising, therefore, that Madison’s part, 
 during the eight years of Jefferson’s presidency, 
 is found to be more a secondary one than is usual 
 with a Secretary of State, or than was usual with 
 him. He was in perfect accord with his chief, 
 who held always in the highest esteem his knowl- 
 edge and judgment, and sought, no doubt, his 
 sound and moderate advice when he thought he 
 needed advice from anybody. But Madison’s in- 
 fluence is less visible in Jefferson’s administration 
 than in Washington’s, when he was in the oppo- 
 sition. Washington, where he doubted his own 
 ability to decide a question and felt the need of 
 enlightenment, was accustomed to call in Madi- 
 son, though he did not always accept his friend’s 
 conclusions. It was rarely that Jefferson was 
 troubled with any doubt of his own judgment in 
 the discussion or decision of any question that 
 might come before him. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE. 257 
 
 The most important measure of his administra- 
 tion was peculiarly his own, and when once de- 
 termined upon it was pushed to a conclusion with 
 vigor and courage. Nobody doubts now, or has 
 doubted since the abolition of slavery, that the 
 purchase of Louisiana was an act of sound states- 
 manship. Jefferson did not foresee that the ac- 
 quisition of that fertile territory would stimulate 
 a domestic trade in slaves, as profitable to the 
 slave-breeding as to the slave-consuming States ; 
 or that, as slavery increased and brought prosper- 
 ity and power to a class, there would grow up an 
 oligarchy, resting on ownership in negroes, which, 
 within sixty years, would have to be uprooted at 
 an enormous cost. But his aim was to secure the 
 peaceful possession of the Mississippi territory on 
 both its banks, as a permanent settlement of a 
 question which, so long as it remained open, was 
 a perpetual menace of war with one or another 
 European power. That danger would always in- 
 volve the possibility of the Appalachian range 
 becoming the western boundary of the United 
 States ; in which case the valley of the Missis- 
 sippi, and the vast region west of it, would fall 
 into the power of an alien people. So far was 
 plain to Mr. Jefferson; but the result of the re- 
 bellion of 1861 proves that he was wiser than he 
 knew when he acquired the territory stretching 
 to the Sabine and the foot of the Rocky Moun- 
 tains, for the occupation of a free people. 
 
 17 
 
258 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 It is not necessary to repeat here the story of 
 the purchase. The news of it reached Washing- 
 ton in July and was received with enthusiasm. 
 That there was no warrant in the Constitution 
 for an acquisition of territory by purchase was 
 manifest ; and Mr. Jefferson’s opponents were not 
 ^ in the least backward in heaping reproaches and 
 ridicule upon the great champion of strict con- 
 struction, who had no hesitation in violating the 
 Constitution when it seemed to him wise to do 
 so. Both the President and his Seci’etary frankly 
 met the accusation by acknowledging its entire 
 justice ; but at the same time they put in, as a 
 sufficient defense, the plea of the genei-al welfare. 
 This did not abate the ridicule, though the argu- 
 ment was a hard one for the Federalists to with- 
 stand ; for it could not be forgotten that it was 
 on this ground that Hamilton, as Secretary of the 
 Treasury, had justified the imposition of certain 
 taxes, and the Republicans had maintained that 
 the plain limitations of the Constitution could not 
 be overstepped on such a plea, even for the gen- 
 eral good. Jefferson was so sensitive to this con- 
 stitutional objection that he proposed to meet it 
 by an amendment to the Constitution ; but it was 
 soon evident that the unwritten law of manifest 
 destiny did not need the appeal to the ballot-box. 
 “ The grumblers,” Jefferson wrote to a friend 
 soon after the news of the treaty was received, 
 “ gave all the credit of the acquisition to the ao 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE. 
 
 259 
 
 cident of war.” “ They would see,” he added, in 
 records on file “ that though we could not say 
 when war would arise, yet we said with energy 
 what would take place when it should arise.” 
 He only meant by this, probably, that from the 
 beginning of his administration he had been pre- 
 pared to take advantage of circumstances when 
 war should break out again between England and 
 France, as it was evident enough to the whole 
 world that it must break out sooner or later. 
 That the particular conjunction of circumstances, 
 however, would occur that did occur, could not 
 have been foreseen. Jefferson could have had no 
 prescience that Spain would reconvey Louisiana 
 to France; that Napoleon would enter at once 
 upon extensive preparations for colonization on 
 the banks of the Mississippi ; and that he would 
 be willing to relincpiish this important step in his 
 great scheme of a universal Latin Empire, that 
 he might devote himself to the necessary prelimi- 
 nary work of subduing his most formidable enemy 
 of the rival race. But it is Jefferson’s best title 
 to fame that he was ready to take advantage of 
 this conjunction of incidents at exactly the right 
 moment. Doubtless, the progress of civilization 
 would have been essentially the same had he 
 never been born. But having been bom it fell to 
 him to contribute largely to the events that have 
 distributed the race speaking the English tongue 
 the most widely over the globe, and to exercise a 
 
260 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 powerful influence upon the age. It does not de- 
 tract from the merit of his act, however, that he 
 by no means saw all its importance nor even 
 dreamed of its consequences. The region beyond 
 the Mississippi, he thought, might be made useful 
 as a refuge for Indian tribes of the East ; but he 
 neither saw, nor could see, then that the purchase 
 of Louisiana was the essential, though only the 
 preliminary, step toward the occupation of the 
 continent to the Pacific by the English race. 
 The expedition of Lewis and Clarke, which he 
 sent out the next year, was in the interest of sci- 
 ence, and especially of geograph}', rather than of 
 any possible settlement of that distant region. 
 Indeed, he said that if the new acquisition of ter- 
 ritory were wisely managed, so as to induce the 
 eastern Indians to cross the great river, the result 
 would be the “ condensing, instead of scattering, 
 our population.” But “ man proposes and God 
 disposes.” 
 
 The immediate consequences, however, of the 
 acquisition of Louisiana were enough to bring al- 
 most universal popularity to the President, es- 
 pecially at the South and West, without any rev- 
 elation of the future. Nor was the act the less 
 popular because it was an immediate stimulus to 
 the foreign slave-trade, partly because at the 
 North that excited but little interest, and partly 
 because at the South it excited a great deal. The 
 abolition societies, it is true, asked that the impor- 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE. 
 
 261 
 
 tation of slaves from Africa into the annexed ter- 
 ritory should be forbidden ; and an act was passed 
 prohibiting their introduction, except by those 
 persons from other parts of the United States who 
 intended to be actual settlers, and were, therefore, 
 permitted to bring slaves imported previous to 
 1798. But the law might properly have been 
 entitled an Act for the Encouragement of the 
 Trade in Negroes ; and so it seems to have been 
 regarded by the older slave States. South Caro- 
 lina reopened the trade to Africa, and as Con- 
 gress failed to levy the constitutional tax of ten 
 dollars a head, the raw material, so to speak, 
 came in free. The rest could be safely left to the 
 law of supply and demand. Neither South Caro- 
 lina, nor any other State, had imported slaves 
 since 1798. The whole slave population, there- 
 fore, could be legally taken into Louisiana by act- 
 ual settlers, and its place supplied in the old 
 States by new importations. The demand regu- 
 lated the supply, and the supply came from Af- 
 rica as truly as if the importation had been direct 
 to New Orleans. This was the legal course of 
 trade till 1808 ; thenceforward it flourished with- 
 out the protection of law but in spite of it, so long 
 as it was profitable — so long, that is, as the nat- 
 ural increase of the eastern negro was insufficient 
 to answer the demand of the southwestern mar- 
 ket. 
 
 But besides the peaceful extension of the na- 
 
262 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 tional domain there was much else in the first foui 
 or five years of Jefferson’s administration to com- 
 mend it to his countrymen. His party had noth- 
 ing to complain of, despite that genial and gener- 
 ous assurance of the inaugural which could not be 
 forgotten — “ we are all Republicans ; we are all 
 Federalists;” and the other party had reason to 
 be thankful that, considering, as he said, “ a Fed- 
 eralist seldom died, and never resigned,” the num- 
 ber was not large who were reminded, by their 
 removal from office, of their unreasonable delay 
 in doing either the one thing or the other. It 
 was only the politicians, however, a class much 
 smaller then than it is now, who were concerned 
 in such matters ; the people at large were influ- 
 enced by other considerations. Credit was given 
 to the President for things that he did not do as 
 well as for things that he did. It was due to him 
 that the administration was an economical one ; 
 but it was through Mr. Gallatin’s skillful manage- 
 ment of the finances that the old public debt was 
 in process of speedy extinction. Occasional im- 
 peachments enlivened the proceedings of Con- 
 gress, which otherwise were as harmless as they 
 were dull. Jefferson was never so much out of 
 his proper element as in war, yet a successful one 
 was carried on, during his first term, with the 
 Barbary States which put an end for many years 
 to the exactions and outrages which had long been 
 needlessly submitted to. It was a war, however, 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE. 
 
 263 
 
 of only a few naval vessels in the hands of such 
 energetic and brave men, destined to become fa- 
 mous in later years, as Bainbridge, Decatui’, 
 Preble, and Barron ; and to send off the expedi- 
 tion was about all the government had to do with 
 it. It was easy to keep clear of “ entangling alli- 
 ances,” or entanglements of any sort with Eu- 
 ropean powers, so long as they left the commerce 
 of the United States to pursue its peaceful and 
 profitable course without molestation. This both 
 England and France did for several years, and 
 there fell, in consequence, an immense carrying 
 trade into the hands of American merchants 
 which brought prosperity to the whole country, 
 such as was never known before, and was not 
 known again, after it was lost, for near a quarter 
 of a century. All these things made Mr. Jeffer- 
 son acceptable to the people as almost a heaven- 
 appointed President. If, as John Quincy Adams 
 thought, fortune delighted to beam upon him 
 with her sunniest smiles, he knew, at least, how 
 best to take advantage of them. While they 
 lasted his Secretary of State sat in their light and 
 warmth, quietly and contentedly busy and in the 
 diligent and faithful discharge of official duty, 
 which could not in those years of prosperous tran- 
 quillity be over-burdensome. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 THE EMBARGO. 
 
 Almost at tlie beginning of his second term, 
 Jefferson found himself in troubled waters, as the 
 United States was drawn slowly but surely into 
 the vortex of European war. The carrying trade 
 at home and abroad had fallen very much into 
 the hands of Americans, and this became the root 
 of bitterness. The tonnage of their vessels em- 
 ployed in foreign trade and entered at the custom- 
 houses of the United States was equal to nearly 
 four fifths of the tonnage of British vessels en- 
 gaged in the same traffic and entered at home. 
 But there was this difference : the foreign com- 
 merce of Great Britain was almost all carried on 
 from her own ports, and the returns, therefore, 
 showed its full volume. On the other hand, the 
 American ships were largely the carriers between 
 the ports of the belligerents and of other powers 
 in Europe, and there were no entries at the Amer- 
 ican custom-houses of their employment, or that 
 they were employed at all. As early as 1804-05, 
 the aggregate value of this foreign trade in the 
 hands of Americans was probably much larger 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 265 
 
 than that controlled by English merchants ; and 
 the former increased to the time of the promul- 
 gation of the Berlin decree of 1806, and the Brit- 
 ish orders in council of the next year. Nor was 
 it only that wealth flowed into' the country as the 
 immediate return from this trade abroad. It stim- 
 ulated enterprise and industry at home by the in- 
 crease of capital ; and there was not only more 
 money to work with, but more to spend. Conse- 
 quently the increase in exports and in imports grew 
 steadily. In 1805, 1806, and 1807, about one half 
 the average total exports, something over the value 
 of twenty million of dollars, went to Great Britain 
 alone ; and the value of the imports from that 
 country for the same period was about sixty mil- 
 lion dollars a year. Nor did this disproportion, 
 though increasing with the growing prosperity, 
 represent a general balance of trade against the 
 United States, as one school of political econo- 
 mists would insist it must have done. For the 
 imports were small from other European countries 
 in exchange for American products ; and the dif- 
 ference, together with the profits of the carrying 
 trade abroad, was remitted in English manufac- 
 tures. In other words, the imports from England 
 represented the returns for all exports to Europe, 
 and the returns also — available in the first in- 
 stance through bills of exchange — of the trade 
 which had been gained by Americans and lost by 
 those nations whose ships the war had driven from 
 the ocean. 
 
266 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 The British manufacturer had no reason for 
 discontent with this state of things. The best 
 market for his goods was constantly improving, 
 and he did not much care who took them to Amer- 
 ica. But the English government, and the Eng- 
 lish merchants who owned ships, looked on with 
 neither pleasure nor patience. It was impossible 
 not to see that the United States was fast becom- 
 ing a great commercial rival. This in itself was 
 bad enough ; but it was the harder to bear when it 
 was remembered — and it could not be forgotten 
 — that the rivalry came from States so lately in 
 revolt against England, and that their President at 
 that moment was one of the most obnoxious of 
 the rebels. Then what did it avail that England 
 was mistress of the seas, if her formidable enemy 
 could laugh at any effort of hers to destroy the 
 commerce of France, so long as that commerce 
 could be carried on in safety under a neutral flag? 
 If that flag must be respected, English naval ves- 
 sels and privateers would cruise in vain for prizes, 
 for the merchant ships of any belligerent, not 
 strong enough to protect them, stayed in port. It 
 had not yet come to be the acknowledged law of 
 nations that free ships make free goods. But 
 nearly the same purpose was answered, if the 
 property of belligerents could be safely carried in 
 neutral ships under the pretense of being owned 
 by neutrals. The products of the French colonies, 
 for example, could be loaded on board of Ameri- 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 267 
 
 can vessels, taken to the United States and re- 
 shipped there for France as American property. 
 England looked upon this as an evasion of the 
 recognized public law that property of belligerents 
 was good prize. Accordingly when she saw that 
 French commerce was thus put out of her reach, 
 and that the rival she most dreaded was growing 
 rich and powerful in the possession of it, she sought 
 a remedy and was not long in finding one. 
 
 It was denied that neutrals could take advan- 
 tage of a state of war to enter upon a trade which 
 had not existed in time of peace ; and American 
 ships were seized on the high seas, taken into port, 
 and condemned in the Admiralty Courts for car- 
 rying enemy’s goods in such a trade. The exer- 
 cise of that right, if it were one by the recog- 
 nized law of nations, would be of great injury to 
 American commerce, unless it could be success- 
 fully resisted. To show that it was not good 
 law, Mr. Madison wrote his “ Examination of 
 the British Doctrine which Subjects to Capture a 
 Neutral Trade not open in the Time of Peace.” 
 The essay was a careful and thorough discussion 
 of the whole question, and showed by citations 
 from the most eminent writers on international 
 law, by the terms of treaties, and by the conduct 
 of nations in the past, that the British doctrine 
 was erroneous and would lead to other infringe- 
 ments of the rights of neutrals. But argument, 
 however unanswerable, has never yet brought the 
 
268 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 British government to reason, unless there was 
 something behind it not so easy to disregard. The 
 appropriation for Mr. Jefferson's gunboats could 
 not get that naval arm ready for effective service 
 much before the year 1815, even if it could then 
 be of use ; and there was, moi-eover, this further 
 difficulty in the way of its efficiency at the time, 
 — that as it could not go to the enemy, it must 
 wait for the enemy to come to it ; the conflagra- 
 tion would have to be brought to the fire-engines. 
 A war with England must be a naval war ; and 
 the United States not only had no navy of any 
 consequence, but it was a part of Mr. Jefferson’s 
 policy, in contrast with the policy of the preceding 
 administrations, that there should be none, except 
 these gunboats kept on wheels and under cover in 
 readiness to repel an invasion. But there was no 
 fear of invasion, for by that England could gain 
 nothing. “ She is renewing,” Madison wrote in 
 the autumn of 1805, “ her depredations on our 
 commerce in the most ruinous shapes, and has 
 kindled a more general indignation among our 
 merchants than was ever before expressed.” 
 
 These depredations were not confined to the 
 seizing and confiscating American ships under 
 the pretense that their cargoes were contraband. 
 Seamen were taken out of them on the charge of 
 being British subjects and deserters, not only on 
 the high seas in larger numbers than ever before, 
 but within the waters of the United States. No 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 269 
 
 doubt these seamen were often British subjects 
 and their seizure was justifiable, provided Eng- 
 land could rightfully extend to all parts of the 
 globe and to the ships of all nations the merciless 
 system of impressment to which her own people 
 were compelled to submit at home. Monroe, in a 
 note to Madison, said that the British minister 
 had informed him that great abuses were com- 
 mitted in granting protections ” in America, and 
 acknowledged that “ he gave me some examples 
 which were most shameful.” But even if it could 
 be granted that English naval officers might seize 
 such men without recourse to law, wherever they 
 should be found and without respect for the flag 
 of another nation, it was a national insult and out- 
 rage, calling for resentment and resistance, to im- 
 press American citizens under the pretense that 
 they were British subjects. But what was the 
 remedy ? As a last resort in such cases, nations 
 have but one. Diplomacy and legislation may be 
 first tried, but if these fail, war must be the final 
 ordeal. For this the Administration made no prep- 
 aration, and the more evident the unreadiness the 
 less was the chance of redress in any other way. 
 Immediate war would, of course, have been un- 
 wise ; for what could a nation almost without a 
 ship, hope from a contest with a power having the 
 largest and most efficient navy in the world ? If 
 this, however, was true from 1805 to 1807, it was 
 not less true in 1812. But it need not have been 
 
270 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 true when war was actually resorted to, had the 
 intervening years been years of preparation. The 
 fact was, however, that the party which supported 
 the Administration was no more in favor of war 
 at the earlier period than the Administration 
 itself was ; and meanwhile, till a war-party had 
 come into existence and gained the ascendency, 
 the country had been growing every year less and 
 less in a condition to appeal to war. 
 
 The first measure adopted to meet the aggres- 
 sions of the English was an act prohibiting the 
 importation of certain British products.. This had 
 always been a favorite policy with Madison. He 
 had advanced and upheld it in former years, when 
 a member of Congress, and when Great Britain 
 had first violated the rights and dignity of the 
 United States by interference with her foreign 
 trade and by impressing her citizens. Non-inter- 
 course had been an effective measure thirty years 
 before, and had a kind of prestige as an American 
 policy. It was not seen, perhaps could not be 
 seen without experience, that a measure suited to 
 the colonial condition was not sufficient for an 
 independent nation. But the President and Sec- 
 retary were in perfect accord ; for Jefferson pre- 
 ferred anything to war, and Madison was per- 
 suaded that England would be brought to terms 
 by the loss of the best market for her manufac- 
 tures. Others, and notably John Randolph, saw 
 in the measure only the first step, which, if per- 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 271 
 
 sisted in, must lead to war ; while, in the mean- 
 time, to interfere with importations would he quite 
 as great an injury to the United States as to Great 
 Britain. Randolph was apt to blurt out a good 
 deal of truth when it happened to suit him. Im- 
 pressment, he said, was an old grievance which 
 had not been thought a sufficient provocation for 
 war when the nation was not prepared ; and it 
 was no more ready to resort to that desperate 
 remedy now than it had been in the past. With- 
 out a navy it would be impossible to prevent the 
 blockading of all the principal American ports 
 by English squadrons. The United States would 
 need an ally, and he was not willing she should 
 throw herself into the arms of that power which 
 was seeking universal conquest. France, he said, 
 would be the tyrant of the ocean, if the British 
 navy should be driven from it. The commerce, 
 moreover, which it was proposed to protect, was 
 not the “ honest trade of America ; ” but “ a 
 mushroom, a fungus of war — a trade which so 
 soon as the nations of Europe are at peace, will 
 no longer exist.” It was only “a carrying trade 
 which covers enemy’s property ; ” and he did not 
 believe in plunging a great agricultural country 
 into war for the benefit of the shipping merchants 
 of a few seaports. There were many who agreed 
 with him ; for it was one of the cardinal principles 
 of the Jeffersonian school of politics, that be- 
 tween commerce and agriculture there was a nat- 
 ural antagonism. 
 
272 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 But the Administration did not rely upon legis- 
 lation alone in this emergency. The President 
 followed up the act prohibiting the introduction 
 of British goods by sending William Pinkney to 
 England in the spring of 1806, to join Monroe, 
 the resident minister, in an attempt at negotiation. 
 These commissioners soon wrote that there was 
 good reason for hoping that a treaty would be con- 
 cluded, and thereupon the non-importation act was 
 for a time suspended. In December came the 
 news that a treaty was agreed upon, and soon after 
 it was received by the President. The most seri- 
 ous difficulty in the way of negotiation had been 
 the question of impressment. The British gov- 
 ernment claimed the right to arrest deserters from 
 its service anywhere outside the jurisdiction of 
 other nations, and that jurisdiction, it was main- 
 tained, could not extend beyond the coast limit 
 over the open sea, the highway of all nations. 
 There was an evident disposition, however, to come 
 to some compromise. The English commission- 
 ers proposed that their government should pro- 
 hibit, under penalty, the seizure of American cit- 
 izens anywhere, and that the United States should 
 forbid, on her part, the granting of certificates of 
 citizenship to British subjects of which deserters 
 took advantage. But as this would be an acknowl- 
 edgment virtually of the right of search on board 
 American ships, and the denial of citizenship in 
 the United States to foreigners, the American 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 273 
 
 commissioners could not entertain that proposi- 
 tion. They were willing, however, if the assumed 
 right to board American ships were given up, to 
 agree, on behalf of their government, to aid in the 
 arrest and return of British deserters when seek- 
 ing: a refuge in the United States. But to this 
 the British commissioners would not accede. 
 
 Monroe and Pinkney were enjoined, in the in- 
 structions written by the Secretary of State, to 
 make the abandonment of impressment the first 
 condition of a treatj^. A treaty, nevertheless, was 
 agi’eed upon, without this provision. But when 
 it was sent to the President, the ministers ex- 
 plained : — 
 
 “That, although this government [the British] did 
 not feel at liberty to relinquish, formally, by treaty, its 
 claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen, 
 its practice would nevertheless be essentially, if not com- 
 pletely, abandoned. That opinion has since been con- 
 firmed by frequent conferences on the subject with the 
 British commissioners, who have repeatedly assured us 
 that, in their judgment, we were made as sure against 
 the exercise of their pretension by the policy which their 
 government had adopted in regard to that very delicate 
 and important question, as we could have been made by 
 treaty.” 
 
 These assurances did not satisfy the President. 
 Without consulting the Senate, though Congress 
 was in session when the treaty was received, and 
 although the Senate had been previously informed 
 18 
 
274 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 that one had been agreed upon, the President re- 
 jected it. On several other points it was not ac- 
 ceptable ; but, as Mr. Madison wrote to a friend, 
 “ the case of impressments particularly having 
 been brought to a formal issue, and having been 
 the primary object of an extraordinary mission, a 
 treaty could not be closed which was silent on that 
 subject.” The commissioners, therefore, were or- 
 dered to renew negotiations. This they faithfully 
 tried to do for a year, but were finally told by the 
 British minister that a treaty, once concluded and 
 signed, but afterward rejected in part by one of 
 the contracting powers, could not again be taken up 
 for consideration. The opponents of the Admin- 
 istration made the most of this action of Mr. Jef- 
 ferson. The country was not permitted to forget, 
 even were forgetfulness possible, that thousands 
 of seamen had been taken from American vessels, 
 and that the larger proportion of these were na- 
 tive-born citizens of the United States. Not that 
 these opponents wanted war ; that, they believed, 
 would be ruinous without a navy, and therefore 
 some reasonable compromise was all that could be 
 hoped for. But what was to be thought of an ad- 
 ministration that would not go to war because it 
 was not prepared ; would not prepare in the hope 
 that some future conjunction of circumstances 
 would stave off that last resort ; and, meanwhile, 
 would accept no terms which might at least miti- 
 gate the injuries visited upon the sea-faring peo- 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 275 
 
 pie of the United States, and possibly relieve the 
 nation from an insolent exercise of power which 
 it was not strong enough to resent? 
 
 As England’s need of seamen increased, the 
 captains of her cruisers, encouraged by the failure 
 of negotiation, grew bolder in overhauling Amer- 
 ican ships and taking out as many men as they be- 
 lieved, or pretended to believe, were deserters. In 
 the summer of 1807 an outrage was perpetrated 
 on the frigate Chesapeake, as if to emphasize the 
 contempt with which a nation must be looked 
 upon which only screamed like a woman at wrongs 
 which it wanted the courage and strength to re- 
 sent, or the wisdom to compound for. The Ches- 
 apeake was followed out of the harbor of Norfolk 
 by the British man-of-war Leopard, and when a 
 few miles at sea, the Chesapeake being brought to 
 under the pretense that the English captain wished 
 to put some dispatches on board for Europe, a de- 
 mand was made for certain deserters supposed to 
 be on the American frigate. Commodore Barron 
 replied that he knew of no deserters on his ship, 
 and that he could permit no search to be made, 
 even if there were. After some further alterca- 
 tion the Englishman fired a broadside, killing and 
 wounding a number of the Chesapeake’s crew. 
 Commodore Barron could do nothing else but sur- 
 render, for he had only a single gun in readiness 
 for use, and that was fired only once and then with 
 a coal from the cook’s galley. The ship was then 
 
276 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 boarded, the crew mustered, and four men arrested 
 as deserters. Three of them were negroes, — two 
 natives of the United States, the other of South 
 America. The fourth man, probably, was an Eng- 
 lishman. They were all deserters from English 
 men-of-war lying off Norfolk ; but the three ne- 
 groes declared that they had been kidnapped, and 
 their right to escape could not be justly ques- 
 tioned ; indeed, the English afterward took this 
 view of it apparently, for the men were released 
 on the arrival of the Leopard at Halifax. But 
 the fourth man was hanged. 
 
 For this direct national insult, explanation, 
 apology, and reparation were demanded, and at 
 the same time the President put forth a procla- 
 mation forbidding all British ships of war to re- 
 main in American waters. Of how much use the 
 latter was we learn from a letter of Madison to 
 Monroe: “ They continue to defy it,” he wrote, 
 “not only by remaining within our waters, but by 
 chasing merchant vessels arriving and departing.” 
 Some preparation was made for war, but it was 
 only to call upon the militia to be in readiness, 
 and to order Mr. Jefferson’s gunboats to the most 
 exposed ports. Great Britain was not alarmed. 
 The captain of the Leopard, indeed, was removed 
 from his command, as having exceeded his duty ; 
 but a proclamation on that side was also issued, 
 requiring all ships of war to seize British seamen 
 on board foreign merchantmen, to demand them 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 277 
 
 from foreign ships of war, and if the demand was 
 refused to report the fact to the admiral of the 
 fleet. It was not till after four years of irritating 
 controversy that any settlement was reached in 
 regard to the affair of the Chesapeake. 
 
 New perils all the while were besetting Amer- 
 ican commerce. In November, 1806, Napoleon’s 
 Berlin decree was promulgated, forbidding the in- 
 troduction into France of the products of Great 
 Britain and her colonies, whether in her own 
 ships or those of other nations. This was in vio- 
 lation of the convention between France and the 
 United States, if it was meant that American 
 vessels should come under the prohibition ; but for 
 a time there was some hope that they might be 
 excepted. In the course of the year, however, it 
 was officially declared in Paris that the treaty 
 would not be allowed to weaken the force of a war 
 measure aimed at Great Britain. Under this de- 
 cision cargoes already seized were confiscated and 
 the trade of the United States faced a new calam- 
 ity. The decree, it was declared, was a rightful 
 retaliation of a British order in council of six 
 months before, which had established a partial 
 blockade of a portion of the French coast. In the 
 kidnapping business, France could not, of course, 
 compete with England ; for there were few of her 
 citizens to be found on board of American vessels, 
 and to seize a Yankee sailor, under the pretense 
 that he was a Frenchman, was an absurdity never 
 
278 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 thought of. But hundreds of Americans, the 
 crews of ships seized for violation of the terms of 
 the Berlin decree, were thrown into French pris- 
 ons. So far, therefore, as the United States had 
 good ground of complaint on any score against 
 either power, there was little to choose between 
 them. Mr. Jefferson’s repugnance to war was suf- 
 ficient to hold him back from one with England, 
 though he might have had France for an ally ; still 
 more unwilling was he, by a war with France, to 
 make a friend of England, whom he still looked 
 upon as the natural enemy of the United States ; 
 for, notwithstanding all that had come and gone, 
 he still regarded France with something of the 
 old affection. In the autumn of 1807 he called 
 a special session of Congress in consideration of 
 the increasing aggressions of Great Britain, espe- 
 cially in the attack upon the Chesapeake, and the 
 injury done by the interdiction of neutral trade 
 with any country with which that power was at 
 war. But he had no recommendations to offer 
 of resistance nor even of defense, except that some 
 additions be made to the gunboats, and that sailors 
 on shore be enrolled as a sort of gunboat militia. 
 The probable real purpose of calling the extra 
 session, however, appeared in about two weeks, 
 when he sent a special message to the Senate, rec- 
 ommending an embargo. 
 
 An act was almost immediately passed, which, 
 if anything more was needed to complete the ruin 
 
THE EMBARGO. 
 
 279 
 
 of American commerce, supplied that deficiency. 
 A month before this time the English ministry 
 had issued a new order in council — the news of 
 which reached Jefferson as he was about to send 
 in his message — proclaiming a blockade of pretty 
 much all Europe, and forbidding any trade in neu- 
 tral vessels, unless they had first gone into some 
 British port and paid duties on their cargoes ; and 
 within twenty-four hours of the President’s mes- 
 sage, recommending the embargo, Napoleon pro- 
 claimed a new decree from Milan, by which it was 
 declared that any ship was lawful prize that had 
 anything whatever to do with Great Britain — 
 that should pay it tribute, that should carry its 
 merchandise, that should be bound either to or 
 from any of its ports. All that these powers could 
 do to shut every trading vessel out of all European 
 ports was now done ; and at this opportune mo- 
 ment Mr. Jefferson came to their aid by compelling 
 all American vessels to stay at home. It is not 
 easy in our time to conceive of a President propos- 
 ing, or of a party accepting, or of the people sub- 
 mitting to such a measure as this. But Mr. Jeffer- 
 son's followers were very obedient, and there was, 
 undoubtedly, a very general belief that trade with 
 the United States was so important to the nations 
 at war, that for the sake of its renewal the obnox- 
 ious decrees and orders in council would soon be 
 repealed. But, except upon certain manufacturers 
 in England, little influence was visible. General 
 
280 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Armstrong, the American minister in France, 
 wrote : “ Here it is not felt ; and in England, 
 amid the more recent and interesting events of the 
 daj 7 , it is forgotten.” When, however, the effect 
 was evident at home of a law forbidding any 
 American vessels from going to sea, even to catch 
 fish, and prohibiting the export of any of the prod- 
 ucts of the United States either in their own ships 
 or those of any other country, then there arose 
 a popular clamor for the abandonment of a policy 
 so ruinous. Within four months of its enactment, 
 Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts declared, in a de- 
 bate in Congress, that “ an experiment, such as is 
 now making, was never before — I will not say 
 tried — it never before entered into the human 
 imagination. There is nothing like it in the nar- 
 rations of history or in the tales of fiction. All 
 the habits of a mighty nation are at once counter- 
 acted. All their property depreciated. All their 
 external connections violated. Five millions of 
 people are engaged. They cannot go beyond the 
 limits of that once free country ; now they are 
 not even permitted to thrust their own property 
 through the grates.” While American ships at 
 home were kept there, those which had remained 
 abroad to escape the embargo were met by a new 
 peril. Some of them were in French ports await- 
 ing a turn in affaii’s ; others ventured to load with 
 English goods in English ports, to be landed in 
 France under the pretense, supported by fraudu* 
 
TEE EMBARGO. 
 
 281 
 
 lent papers, that they were direct from the United 
 States or other neutral country. The fraud was 
 too transparent to escape detection long, and Na- 
 poleon thereupon issued, in the spring of 1808, the 
 Bayonne decree authorizing the seizure and con- 
 fiscation of all American vessels. They were either 
 English or American, he said ; if the former they 
 were enemy’s ships and liable to capture ; but if 
 the latter, they should be at home, and he was 
 only enforcing the embargo law of the United 
 States, which she ought to thank him for. 
 
 The prosperity and tranquillity which marked 
 the earlier years of Jefferson’s administration dis- 
 appeared in its last year. Congress, both in its 
 spring and winter sessions, could talk of little else 
 but the disastrous embargo ; proposing, on the one 
 hand, to make it the more stringent by an enforce- 
 ment act, and, on the other, to substitute for it 
 non-intercourse with England and France, restor- 
 ing trade with the rest of the world, and leaving 
 the question of decrees and orders in council open 
 for future consideration. The President no longer 
 held his party under pei’fect control. The mis- 
 chievous results of the embargo policy were evi- 
 dent enough to a sufficient number of Republi- 
 cans to secure ; in February, 1809, the repeal of 
 that measure, to take effect the next month as to 
 all countries except England and France, and 
 with regard to them at the adjournment of the 
 
282 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 next Congress. But the prohibition of importa- 
 tion from both these latter countries was contin- 
 ued till the obnoxious orders in council and the 
 decrees should be repealed. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 Mr. Jefferson named bis own successor. Of 
 the three Democratic candidates, Madison, Mon- 
 roe, and George Clinton, he preferred Madison 
 now, and urged Monroe to wait patiently as next 
 in succession. Beyond two lives he did not, per- 
 haps, think proper to dictate ; and, besides, Clin- 
 ton was not a Virginian. What little opposition 
 there was to Madison in his own party came from 
 those who feared that he was too thoroughly iden- 
 tified with Jefferson's policy to untie the knot in 
 which the foreign relations of the country had be- 
 come entangled. Of the 175 electoral votes, how- 
 ever, he received 122 ; but that was fewer by 89 
 than had been cast for Jefferson four years before. 
 Of the New England States, Vermont alone gave 
 him its votes, changing places with Rhode Island, 
 which had wheeled into line again with the Fed- 
 eralists. 
 
 During the winter of 1808-09, after Madison’s 
 election but before his inauguration, he had qui- 
 etly conferred with Erskine, the British minister 
 at Washington, upon the condition of affairs. 
 
284 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Much was hoped from these conferences ; but the 
 end which they helped to bring about was the re- 
 verse of what was hoped for. Could Madison 
 have had his way, he would probably have pre- 
 ferred that Congress should have left untouched 
 at that session the questions of embargo and non- 
 intercourse ; for the tone of the debates and the 
 tendency of legislation naturally led the English 
 ministry to doubt tbe assurances which Erskine 
 gave, that these proceedings did not truly rep- 
 resent the friendly disposition of the incoming 
 President. In answer to those representations, 
 however, there came in April from Canning, the 
 Foreign Secretary, certain propositions which were 
 so presented by Erskine, and so received by the 
 Administration, as to promise a settlement of all 
 differences between the two governments. Er- 
 skine was a young man, anxious very likely for 
 distinction ; but a laudable ambition to be of ser- 
 vice in a good cause made him over-zealous. He 
 exceeded the letter of his instructions, while keep- 
 ing, as he thought, to their spirit. Probably he 
 mistook their spirit in assuming that his govern- 
 ment cared more to secure a settlement of existing 
 difficulties than for the precise terms and minor 
 details by which it should be reached. At any 
 rate he agreed that Great Britain would withdraw 
 her orders in council provided the United States 
 would maintain the non-intercourse acts against 
 France so long as the Berlin and Milan decrees 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 285 
 
 remained in force. This being secured, lie did not 
 insist upon two other conditions — partly because 
 it was represented to him that they would need 
 some action by Congress, and partly because he 
 believed that the essential point was gained by an 
 agreement on the part of the United States to en- 
 force non-intercourse against France while her 
 decrees were unrepealed. These other conditions 
 were, first, that the United States should cease to 
 insist upon the right to carry on in time of war 
 the colonial trade of a belligerent which had not 
 been open in time of peace to neutrals ; and sec- 
 ond, the acknowledgment that British men-of- 
 war might rightfully seize American merchant 
 vessels when transgressing the non-intercourse 
 laws against France. He also proposed a settle- 
 ment of the Chesapeake question, but omitted to 
 say, as Canning had instructed him to say, that 
 some provision would be made, as an act of gener- 
 osity and not of right, for the wives and children 
 of the men who were killed on board that ship. 
 But when that settlement was accepted by the 
 Administration, he failed to resent some reflections 
 from Robert Smith, the Secretary of State, on the 
 conduct of Great Britain in that affair, which 
 Canning, when he heard of them, thought should 
 have been resented and their recall demanded, or 
 the negotiation stopped. 
 
 On the terms, however, as Erskine chose to 
 present them, an agreement was reached, and the 
 
286 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 President issued a proclamation repealing the acts 
 of embargo and non-intercourse as against Great 
 Britain and her colonies after June 10. On that 
 day more than a thousand ships, loaded and riding 
 at anchor in all the principal ports in anxious 
 readiness for the signal for flight, spread their 
 wings, like a flock of long-imprisoned birds, and 
 flew out to sea. There was an almost universal 
 shout of gratitude to the new President, who, in 
 the first three months of his administration, had 
 banished the fear of war abroad, and at home was 
 sweeping away involuntary idleness, want, and 
 ominous discontent. Madison had known some- 
 thing of popularity during his long career ; but 
 never before had he felt the exultation of riding 
 upon the very crest of a mighty wave of popular 
 applause. But it was one of those waves that 
 collapse suddenly into a surprising flatness. Can- 
 ning repudiated all that Erskine had done and 
 immediately recalled him. The ships that had 
 gone to sea, under the sanction of the President’s 
 proclamation, were permitted by an order in 
 council to complete their voyages unmolested ; but 
 otherwise all commerce was once more brought to 
 a stand-still. It would have been easier to bear 
 some fresh misfortune than to be compelled to 
 struggle again with calamities so well understood 
 and which it was hoped had been left behind for- 
 ever. Madison and Gallatin, who had been re- 
 tained in the Treasury Department and was the 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 287 
 
 President’s chief adviser, were accused of having 
 been either imbecile or treacherous. It was 
 openly said that they had led the young minister 
 to agree to an arrangement which they knew his 
 government would not sanction. But they could 
 hardly have been so foolish as to make a bargain 
 with the certainty that it would stand only so 
 long as a ship could go and come across the At- 
 lantic. Nobody understood better than Madison 
 how grateful a reconciliation with England would 
 be to a large proportion of the people, and nobody 
 was more disappointed that the negotiations came 
 to worse than nothing, inasmuch as their failure 
 led to new embarrassments. 
 
 He said with some bitterness, in a letter to Jef- 
 ferson, early in August : “You will see by the in- 
 structions to Erskine, as published by Canning, 
 that the latter was as much determined that there 
 should be no adjustment as the former was that 
 there should be one.” He was unjust to Can- 
 ning ; the real fault was with Erskine, and with 
 him only because his zeal outran his judgment. 
 In another letter to Jefferson, the President says: 
 “ Erskine is in a ticklish situation with his gov- 
 ernment. I suspect he will not be able to defend 
 himself against the charges of exceeding his in- 
 structions, notwithstanding the appeal he makes 
 to sundry others not published. But he will 
 make out a strong case against Canning, and be 
 able to avail himself much of the absurdity and 
 
288 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 evident inadmissibility of tlie articles disregarded 
 by him.” Possibly Mr. Erskine considered that 
 his government would approve of bis not urging 
 these points too earnestly, inasmuch as the other 
 side refrained from insisting upon the abandon- 
 ment of impressment of seamen on board Ameri- 
 can ships. But Mr. Madison’s indignation must 
 have covered up a good deal of mortification. He 
 could hardly have been without the sensation of 
 one hoisted by his own petard. It was only two 
 years since Mr. Jefferson, with his approval, had 
 rejected the Monroe- Pinkney treaty because in- 
 structions had not been literally complied with. 
 Mr. Canning, in following that example, could 
 have pleaded, had he chosen, much the stronger 
 justification, under the circumstances of the two 
 cases ; and Mr. Madison could not fail to remem- 
 ber, without being reminded of it, when this 
 agreement was thrown back in his face, that he 
 had been willing to accept it without any protec- 
 tion of the rights of American seamen, the want 
 of which was the ostensible reason for rejecting 
 the Monroe-Pinkney treaty. 
 
 However, the Administration was now com- 
 pelled to meet anew the old difficulties which the 
 Erskine agreement had failed to dispose of. The 
 President’s first duty was to issue a second procla- 
 mation, recalling the previous one which had sent 
 to sea every American ship in port. They could 
 all come back, if they would, to be made fast 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 289 
 
 again at their wharves, till the recurrent tides at 
 last should ripple in and out of their open seams, 
 and their yards and masts drop piecemeal upon 
 the rotting decks. But many never came back, 
 preferring rather the risk of being sunk or burned 
 at sea, which happened to not a few, or of cap- 
 ture and confiscation by the belligerents whose 
 laws they defied. Erskine was followed by a new 
 ambassador from England, Mr. Jackson. His mis- 
 sion, however, had no other result than to widen 
 the breach between the two nations. A contro- 
 versy almost immediately arose between the min- 
 ister and Mr. Smith, the Secretary of State, — or 
 rather Mr. Madison himself, who, as he com- 
 plained at a later period, did most of Smith’s 
 work as well as his own, — touching the arrange- 
 ment with Erskine. Jackson intimated, or was 
 understood as intimating, that the Administration 
 must have known the precise terms on which Er- 
 skine was empowered to treat with the govern- 
 ment of the United States ; and when a denial 
 was made with a good deal of emphasis on the 
 part of the Administration, the insinuation was re- 
 peated almost as a direct charge. Of course there 
 could be but one conclusion to correspondence of 
 this sort; further communication with Jackson 
 was declined and his recall asked for. 
 
 It was plain enough in the latter months of Jef- 
 ferson’s administration, to himself as well as to 
 everybody else, that the embargo had not only 
 19 
 
290 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 failed to bring the belligerents to terms abroad, 
 but that it bad added greatly to the distress at 
 home. That the measure was a failure, Madison 
 himself acknowledged in one of his retrospective 
 letters written in the retirement of Montpellier, 
 sixteen years afterward. It was meant, he said 
 in that letter, as an experimental measure, prefer- 
 able to naked submission or to war at a time when 
 war was inexpedient. It failed, he added, “ be- 
 cause the government did not sufficiently distrust 
 those in a certain quarter whose successful viola- 
 tion of the law led to the general discontent, which 
 called for its repeal.” That is to say, the govern- 
 ment relied too confidently upon the submission of 
 New England; was too ready to believe that her 
 merchants would not let their ships slip quietly out 
 to sea whenever they could evade the officers of the 
 customs, nor slip in to land a cargo at some unfre- 
 quented place where there was no custom-house. 
 “ The patriotic fishermen of Marblehead,” he says, 
 “atone time offered their services ; ” and he re- 
 grets they were not sent out as privateers to seize 
 these contraband ships as prizes, and to “ carry 
 them into ports where the tribunals would en- 
 force the law.” Apparently there was not a rea- 
 sonable doubt in his mind whether such tribunals 
 could be found in any port along the coast of New 
 England. It is also rather more than doubtful — 
 even assuming that there was much of the kind 
 of patriotism which he says existed in Marblehead 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 291 
 
 — how long, had the government offered commis- 
 sions to private citizens to prey upon their neigh- 
 bors, the embargo would have been respected at 
 all east of Long Island Sound. But this was the 
 afterthought of 1826. Madison’s policy in 1809- 
 10 was rather to conciliate than provoke “ those 
 in a certain quarter.” He could not command 
 entire unanimity even in his own party. Con- 
 gress passed the winter in vain efforts to find 
 some common ground, not merely for Democrats 
 and Federalists, but for the Democrats alone. 
 Various measures were proposed to meet the crit- 
 ical condition of the country. Some were too rad- 
 ical ; some not radical enough ; and none were so 
 acceptable that it was not easy to form combina- 
 tions for their defeat. All were agreed that the 
 non-importation act must be got rid of ; but the 
 difficulty was to find a way to be rid of it so that 
 the nation should at once maintain its dignity, as- 
 sert its rights, and escape a war. The President 
 would have preferred that all British and French 
 ships be excluded from American ports, and that 
 importations from both countries should be pro- 
 hibited except in American vessels ; and a bill to 
 this effect was one of several that was defeated in 
 the course of the session. But at last, in May 
 (1810), an act was passed excluding only the men- 
 of-war of both nations, but suspending the non- 
 importation act for three months after the ad- 
 journment of Congress. The President was then 
 
292 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 authorized, when the three months were passed, 
 to declare the act again in force against either 
 Great Britain or France, should the commercial 
 orders or decrees of either nation he continued in 
 force while those of the other were repealed. 
 
 If the aim of the dominant party had been to 
 devise a scheme sure to lead to fresh complications 
 more difficult to manage than any that had gone 
 before, it could not have hit upon a better one 
 than this. Hitherto, in all the perplexities and 
 anxieties of the situation, the government had, at 
 least, kept its relations to other powers in its own 
 hands, to conduct them, whether wisely or un- 
 wisely, in its own way. It could resent or sub- 
 mit to encroachments upon the commerce of the 
 country as seemed most prudent ; it could close 
 or open the ports, as seemed most judicious ; or it 
 could join forces with that one of its two enemies 
 whose alliance promised to secure respect on the 
 one hand, and compel it on the other. But now 
 it had tied itself up in a knot of provisos. It 
 would do something if England would do some- 
 thing else, or if France would do something else. 
 If the proposition was accepted by England and 
 was not accepted by France, then the United 
 States would remain in friendly relations with 
 England, and assume by comparison an unfriendly 
 attitude toward France; and if France accepted 
 the condition and England declined it, then the 
 situation would be reversed. Nothing would be 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 293 
 
 gained in either case that might not have been 
 gained by direct negotiation, and, no doubt, on 
 better terms. But if the proposition now offered 
 should be disregarded by botli powers, the situa- 
 tion would be worse than before. This evidently 
 was Madison’s view of the question. He wrote to 
 Pinkney, the minister at the Court of St. James, 
 a month after the act was passed : “ At the next 
 meeting of Congress, it will be found, according 
 to present appearances, that instead of an adjust- 
 ment with either of the belligerents there is an 
 increasing obstinacy in both ; and that the incon- 
 veniences of embargo and non-intercourse have 
 been exchanged for the greater sacrifices, as well 
 as disgrace, resulting from a submission to the 
 predatory system in force.” Not that he wanted 
 war; his faith in passive resistance was still un- 
 shaken ; embargo and non-intercourse he was still 
 confident would, if persisted in long enough, 
 surely bring the belligerents to terms. But as to 
 this act, he weighs the chances as in a balance. 
 In England some impression may be made by the 
 prices of cotton and tobacco — “ cotton down at 
 ten or eleven cents in Georgia; and the great 
 mass of tobacco in the same situation.” Pie has, 
 however, no “ very favorable expectations.” But 
 as to France he evidently is not without hope that 
 she will be wise enough to see that “ she ought 
 at once to embrace the arrangement held out by 
 Congress, the renewal of a non-intercourse with 
 
294 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Great Britain being the very species of resistance 
 most analogous to her professed views.” But he 
 was clearly not sanguine. 
 
 If that was his wish, however, it was gratified. 
 Napoleon did take advantage of the act; but 
 in such a way as to reverse the relative positions 
 of the two nations by seizing for France and tak- 
 ing from the United States the power or the will 
 to dictate terms. The French minister, Cham- 
 pagny, announced in a letter merely, in August, 
 the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, 
 from the 1st of the following November; and, a 
 day or two after, such new restrictions wei'e im- 
 posed upon American trade, by prohibitory duties 
 and a navigation act, as pretty much to ruin what 
 little there was left of it. The revocation of the 
 edicts, moreover, was coupled with the conditions 
 that Great Britain should not only recall her order 
 in council, but renounce her “new principles of 
 blockade,” or that the United States should 
 “cause their rights to be respected by the Eng- 
 lish.” Napoleon had in this three ends to gain, 
 and he gained them all: First, to secure France 
 against a I’enewal of the non-importation act of 
 the United States, if the President should accept 
 this conditional recall of the decrees as satisfac- 
 tory ; second, to leave those decrees virtually un- 
 repealed, by making their recall depend upon the 
 action of England, who, he well knew, would not 
 listen to the proposed conditions ; and, third, to 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 295 
 
 involve the United States and England in new 
 disputes, which might lead to war. Everything 
 turned out as the Emperor wished. The Presi- 
 dent accepted the conditional withdrawal of the 
 French, decrees, as in accordance with the act of 
 Congress ; England refused to recognize a contin- 
 gent withdrawal as a withdrawal at all ; and the 
 result at length was war between England and 
 the United States. 
 
 The acquiescence of the President in the decis- 
 ion of Napoleon was the more significant inasmuch 
 as Mr. Smith, the Secretary of State, had assured 
 the French government, when a copy of the act 
 of May was sent to it, that there could be no ne- 
 gotiation under the act until another matter was 
 disposed of. A decree, issued at Rambouillet in 
 March, 1810, and enforced in May, ordered the 
 confiscation of all American ships then detained in 
 the ports of France, and in Spanish, Dutch, and 
 Neapolitan ports under the control of France. 
 The loss to American merchants, including ships 
 and cargoes, was estimated to be about forty mil- 
 lion dollars. This decree was ostensibly in retal- 
 iation of that act of non-intercourse passed by 
 Congress more than a year before, and was, there- 
 fore, a retrospective law. The non - intercourse 
 act, moreover, had expired by its own limitation 
 months before many of these ships were seized ; 
 , but all, nevertheless, were confiscated, though some 
 of them had entered the ports merely for shelter. 
 
296 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 By order of the President, Smith wrote to Arm- 
 strong, the American minister at Paris, that “ a 
 satisfactory provision for restoring the property 
 lately surprised and seized by the order, or at the 
 instance of the French government, must be com- 
 bined with a repeal of the French edicts, with a 
 view to a non-intercourse with Great Britain ; 
 such a provision being an indispensable evidence 
 of the just purpose of France toward the United 
 States.” The injunction was repeated a few weeks 
 later ; but when the Emperor’s decision upon the 
 decrees was announced, in August, the “ indis- 
 pensable” was dispensed with, and a few months 
 later an absolute refusal of any compensation for 
 the spoliation under the Rambouillet decree was 
 quietly submitted to. 
 
 But meanwhile the President, in November, is- 
 sued a proclamation announcing that France had 
 complied with the act of the previous May, and 
 revoked the decrees, while the English orders in 
 council remained unrepealed. But England still 
 had three months, according to the act, in which 
 to make her choice between a recall of her orders 
 in council or the alternative of seeing the Amer- 
 ican non-intercourse act revived against her. 
 But, it is to be observed, the French minister’s 
 announcement of the acceptance of the act of 
 May was not made till August, and then the revo- 
 cation of the decrees was not to take effect till 
 
 * 
 
 November. November came bringing with it the 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 297 
 
 President’s proclamation, when it soon appeared 
 that there was still to be “ tarrying in the eating 
 of the cake.” The decrees were to remain in 
 force at least three months longer, till it should be 
 known whether Great Britain would comply with 
 those terms which France — not the United States 
 — made the condition of revoking the orders in 
 council ; and if Great Britain did not comply, then 
 the French decrees were not revoked. The legal- 
 ity of the President’s proclamation, of course, was 
 questioned. There was, as Josiah Quincy said 
 in debate in the House, the following February 
 (1811), “a continued seizure of all the vessels 
 which came within the grasp of the French cus- 
 tom-house, from the 1st of November down to the 
 date of our last accounts.” Other members, not 
 more earnest, were less temperate in the expres- 
 sion of their indignation at what, one of them said, 
 would be called swindling in the conduct of pri- 
 vate affairs ; while another declared that the Pres- 
 ident was throwing the people “ into the embrace 
 of that monster at whose perfidy Lucifer blushed 
 and hell stands astonished.” France knew all this 
 while what England's decision would be. She was 
 ready to rescind the orders in council when the 
 French edicts were revoked, but she did not recog- 
 nize a mere letter from the French minister, 
 Champagny, to the American ambassador as such 
 revocation. The second French condition, that 
 England should abandon her “ new principles of 
 
298 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 blockade ” and accept in tbeir place a new French 
 principle, was peremptorily rejected by the Eng- 
 lish ministry. That proposition opened a question 
 not properly belonging to an agreement touching 
 the decrees and orders — a question of what was 
 a blockade, and what could properly be subject to 
 it. Napoleon’s doctrine was, not only that a pa- 
 per blockade was not permissible by the law of 
 nations, but that there could be no right of block- 
 ade “ to ports not fortified, to harbors and mouths 
 of rivers, which, according to reason and the usage 
 of civilized nations, is applicable only to strong or 
 fortified places.” Mr. Emott, a member of the 
 House from New York, said in debate that the 
 United States might well be grateful to both Eng- 
 land and France, if they would agree upon this 
 doctrine as good international law ; since, in that 
 case, as there were no fortified places in the United 
 States, she would never be in peril of a blockade. 
 But it was precisely what England would not ad- 
 mit nor even discuss as relevant to an agreement 
 to revoke the orders and decrees. 
 
 To “ this curious gallamatry,” as Quincy called 
 it, “ of time present and time future, of doing and 
 refraining to do, of declaration and understand- 
 ing of English duties and American duties,” was 
 added another ingredient of Madison’s own devis- 
 ing. The American ministers in England and 
 France were instructed that Great Britain would 
 be expected to include in the revocation of her 
 
MADISON AS PRESIDENT. 
 
 299 
 
 orders in council the blockade of a portion of 
 the coast of France, declared in May, 1806 ; and 
 the President offered, unasked, a pledge to the 
 French Emperor, that this should be insisted upon. 
 Whether he meant to make it easier for Napo- 
 leon and harder for Great Britain to respond to 
 the act of May, is a question impossible to answer ; 
 but the opponents of the policy he was pursuing 
 were careful to point out that the act of May 
 said nothing whatever, either of this or any other 
 blockade ; that when, the year befoi’e, the agree- 
 ment was made with Erskine, the President did 
 not pretend that the orders in council included 
 blockades ; and that it was remarkable that he 
 should forget his own declaration regarding the 
 monstrous spoliation of a few months before by 
 the French, under the Rambouillet decree, and yet 
 remember this British order of blockade of four 
 years before, which everybody else had forgotten. 
 Indeed, so completely had it passed out of mind, 
 that the American minister in London, Mr. Pink- 
 ney, was obliged to ask the British Foreign Secre- 
 tary whether that order had been revoked or was 
 still considered as in force. It had never been for- 
 mally withdrawn, was the answer, though it had 
 been comprehended in the subsequent order in 
 council of January, 1807. England refused, how- 
 ever, to recall specifically this blockade of 1806, 
 for that would have been construed as* a recogni- 
 tion of Napoleon’s right to demand an abandon- 
 
300 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 ment of her “ new principles of blockade ; ” but 
 in fact — as the British minister in Washington 
 afterward acknowledged — the recall of the order 
 in council of 1807 would have annulled the order 
 of blockade of 1806, which it had absorbed. 
 
 The truth is, the whole negotiation was a trial 
 of skill at diplomatic fence, in which England 
 would not yield an inch to the United States or 
 to France. Madison and his party were more than 
 willing to aid Napoleon ; and Napoleon hoped to 
 defeat both his antagonists by turning their swords 
 against each other. A quite different result would 
 have followed had France been as willing as Eng- 
 land apparently was that the commercial edicts 
 should be considered without regard to other 
 questions ; or if the American Executive had in- 
 sisted that it would accept their unconditional rev- 
 ocation, pure and simple and not otherwise^ from 
 either power, as was contemplated in the act of 
 May, 1810. But instead, when Congress rose in 
 March, 1811, it left behind it an act renewing 
 non-intercourse with England, in accordance with 
 Napoleon’s demand that the United States should 
 “ cause their rights to be respected by the Eng- 
 lish.” This meant war. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 In May, 1811, there occurred one of those acci- 
 dents which happen on purpose, and often serve 
 as a relief when the public temper is in an exas- 
 perated and almost dangerous condition. This 
 was the fight between the American frigate Pres- 
 ident, of forty-four guns, and the English sloop- 
 of-war, Little Belt, of eighteen guns. This ves- 
 sel belonged to the British squadron, which was 
 ordered to the American coast to break up the 
 trade from the United States to France ; and the 
 President was one of the few ships the Govern- 
 ment had for the protection of her commerce. 
 The ships met a few miles south of Sandy Hook, 
 chased each other in turn, then fired into each 
 other without any reasonable pretext for the first 
 shot, which each accused the other of having fired. 
 The loss on board the English ship, in an en- 
 counter which lasted only a few minutes, was over 
 thirty in killed and wounded, while only a single 
 man was slightly wounded on board the President. 
 It was, as Mr. Madison said, an “ occurrence not 
 unlikely to bring on repetitions,” and that these 
 
302 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 would “ probably end in an open rupture or a 
 better understanding, as the calculations of the 
 British government may prompt or dissuade from 
 war.” This certainly was obvious enough ; though 
 it would be a great deal easier for England to 
 bring on a war than to avert it, in the angry mood 
 in which the majority of the Democratic party 
 then was. But Mr. Madison preserved his equa- 
 nimity. Considering his old proclivity for France, 
 and his old dislike of England, his impartiality 
 between them is rather remarkable. But his aim 
 was still to keep the peace while he abated noth- 
 ing of the well-founded complaints he had against 
 both powers. When a new Congress assembled 
 in the autumn he was careful to point out in his 
 message the delinquencies of France as well as the 
 offenses of England. He insisted that, while Eng- 
 land should have acknowledged the Berlin and 
 Milan decrees to be revoked and have acted ac- 
 cordingly, France showed no disposition to repair 
 the many wrongs she had inflicted upon American 
 merchants, and had lately imposed such “ rigorous 
 and unexpected restrictions ” upon commerce that 
 it would be necessary, unless they were speedily 
 discontinued, to meet them by “ corresponding re- 
 strictions on importations from France.” 
 
 This tone is even more pronounced in his let- 
 ters for some following months. If anything, it 
 is France rather than England that seems to be 
 looked upon as the chief offender, with whom there 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 303 
 
 was the greater danger of armed collision. A fort- 
 night after Congress had assembled he wrote to 
 Barlow, the new minister to France, that though 
 justified in assuming the French decrees to be so 
 far withdrawn that a withdrawal of the British 
 orders might be looked for, “yet the manner in 
 which the French government has managed the 
 repeal of the decrees and evaded a correction of 
 other outrages, has mingled with the conciliatory 
 tendency of the repeal as much of irritation and 
 disgust as possible.” “ In fact,” he adds, “ with- 
 out a S} T stematic change from an appearance of 
 crafty contrivance and insatiate cupidity, for an 
 open, manly, and upright dealing with a nation 
 whose example demands it, it is impossible that 
 good-will can exist ; and that the ill-will which 
 her policy aims at directing against her enemy 
 should not, by her folly and iniquity, be drawn 
 off against herself.” French depredations upon 
 American commerce in the Baltic were “ kindling 
 a fresh flame here,” and, if they were not stopped, 
 “ hostile collisions will as readily take place with 
 one nation as the other ; ” nor would there be any 
 hesitation in sending American frigates to that 
 sea, “with orders to suppress by force the French 
 and Danish depredations,” were it not for the 
 “ danger of rencounters with British ships of supe- 
 rior force in that quarter.” 
 
 By this time, however, Congress, under the lead 
 of younger, vigorous men — chief among them 
 
304 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 Clay and Calhoun — panting for leadership and 
 distinction, was beginning its clamor for war 
 with England. How much respect had Madison 
 for this movement, and how much faith in it ? 
 A letter to Jefferson of February 7 answers both 
 questions. Were he not evidently amused he 
 would seem to be contemptuous. “ To enable the 
 Executive to step at once into Canada,” he says, 
 “they have provided, after two months’ delay, 
 for a regular force requiring twelve to raise it, and 
 after three months for a volunteer force, on terms 
 not likely to raise it at all for that object. The 
 mixture of good and bad, avowed and disguised 
 motives, accounting for these things, is curious 
 enough but not to be explained in the compass of 
 a letter.” This is not the tone of either hope or 
 fear. If war was in his mind at that time, it was 
 not war with England. Three weeks later, he 
 writes to Barlow at Paris. On various points of 
 negotiation between that minister and the French 
 government, be observes much that “ suggests dis- 
 trust rather than expectation.” He complains of 
 delay, of vagueness, of neglect, of discourtesy, of 
 a disregard of past obligations as to the liberation 
 of ships and cargoes seized, and of late condemna- 
 tions of ships captured in the Baltic ; and con- 
 cerning all these and other grievances he says, 
 “ we find so little of explicit dealing or substantial 
 redress mingled with the compliments and en- 
 couragements which cost nothing because they 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 305 
 
 mean nothing, that suspicions are unavoidable ; 
 and, if they be erroneous, the fault does not lie 
 with those who entertain them.” France, he be- 
 lieves, in asking for a new treaty, which he thinks 
 quite unnecessary, is only seeking to gain time 
 that it may take advantage of future events. 
 The commercial relations between the two coun- 
 tries are so intolerable, that trade “ will be pro- 
 hibited if no essential change take place.” Unless 
 there be indemnity for the great wrongs committed 
 under the Rambouillet decree, and for other spo- 
 liations, he declares that “ there can be neither 
 cordiality nor confidence here ; nor any restraint 
 from self-redress in any justifiable mode of effect- 
 ing it.” The letter concludes with the emphatic 
 assertion that, if dispatches soon looked for “ do not 
 exhibit the French government in better colours 
 than it has yet assumed, there will be but one 
 sentiment in this country ; and I need not say 
 what that will be.” 
 
 Congress all this while was lashing itself into 
 fury against England. The ambitious young lead- 
 ers of the Democratic party in the House wex - e, so 
 to speak, “ spoiling for a fight,” and they chose 
 to have it out with England rather than with 
 France. Not that there was not quite as much 
 reason for resentment against France as against 
 England. Some, indeed, of the more hot-headed 
 were anxious for war with both ; but these were 
 of the more impulsive kind, like Henry Clay, who 
 20 
 
306 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 laughed in scorn at the doubt that he could not at 
 a blow subdue the Canadas with a few regiments 
 of Kentucky militia. But war with England was 
 determined upon, partly because the old enmity 
 toward her made that intolerable which, to the 
 old affection for France was a burden lightly 
 borne ; and partly because the instinctive jealousy 
 of the commercial interest, on the part of the 
 planter-interest, preferred that policy which would 
 do the most harm to the North. On April 1, 
 1812, just five weeks after the writing of this 
 letter to Barlow, Mr. Madison sent to Congress a 
 message of five lines, recommending the immedi- 
 ate passage of an act to impose “ a general em- 
 bargo on all vessels now in port or hereafter arriv- 
 ing for the period of sixty days.” It was meant 
 to be a secret measure ; but the intention leaked 
 out in two or three places, and the news was hur- 
 ried North by several of the Federalist members 
 in time to enable some of their constituents to 
 send their ships to sea before the act was passed. 
 Nor, probably, was it a surprise to anybody ; for 
 war with England had been the topic of debate in 
 one aspect or another all winter, and the purpose 
 of the party in power was plain to everybody. 
 That the embargo was intended as a preparation 
 for war was frankly acknowledged. An act was 
 speedily passed, though the period was extended 
 from sixty to ninety days. Within less than sixty 
 days, however, another message from the Pres- 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 307 
 
 ident recommended a declaration of war. On 
 June 3, the Committee on Foreign Relations, of 
 which Calhoun was chairman, reported in favor of 
 “ an immediate appeal to arms,” and the next day 
 a declaratory act was passed. Of the seventy-nine 
 affirmative votes in the House, forty-eight were 
 from the South and West, and of the other thirty- 
 one votes from the Northern States, fourteen were 
 from Pennsylvania alone. Of the forty-nine votes 
 against it, thirty-four were from the Northern 
 States, including two from Pennsylvania. On the 
 17th, a fortnight later, the bill was got through 
 the Senate by a majority of six. 
 
 Mr. Madison for years had opposed a war with 
 England as unwise and useless ; unwise, because 
 the United States was not in a condition to go to 
 war with the greatest naval power in the world ; 
 and useless, because the end to be reached by war 
 could be gained more certainly, and at infinitely 
 less cost by peaceful measures. The situation had 
 not changed. Indeed, up to within a month of 
 the message recommending an embargo as a pre- 
 cursor of war, his letters show that, if he thought 
 war was inevitable, it must be with France, not 
 England. But the faction determined upon war 
 must have at their command an administration to 
 carry out that policy. Their choice was not lim- 
 ited to Madison for an available candidate. Who- 
 ever was nominated by the Democrats was sure to 
 be chosen, and Madison had two formidable rivals 
 
308 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 in James Monroe, Secretary of State, and De Witt 
 Clinton, Mayor of New York, both eager for war. 
 The choice depended on that question, and be- 
 tween the embargo message of April 1, and the 
 war message of June 1, the nomination was given 
 to Madison by the congressional caucus. It was 
 understood and openly asserted at the time by the 
 opponents of the Administration, that the nomina- 
 tion was the price of a change of policy. At the 
 next session of Congress, before a year had passed 
 away, Mr. Quincy said in the House : “ The great 
 mistake of all those who reasoned concerning the 
 war and the invasion of Canada, and concluded 
 that it was impossible that either should be seri- 
 ously intended, resulted from this, that they never 
 took into consideration the connection of both 
 those events with the great election for the chief 
 magistracy which was then pending. It was never 
 sufficiently considered by them that plunging into 
 a war with Great Britain was among the condi- 
 tions on which the support for the presidency was 
 made dependent.” The assertion, so plainly aimed 
 at Madison, passed unchallenged, though the 
 charge of any distinct bargain was vehemently de- 
 nied. 
 
 If Mr. Madison’s conscience was not always 
 vigorous enough to enable him to resist tempta- 
 tion, it was so sensitive as to prompt him to look 
 for excuses for yielding. In a sense this was to 
 his credit as one of the better sort of politicians, 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 309 
 
 without assuming it to be akin to that hypocrisy 
 which is the homage vice pays to virtue. Per- 
 haps it was this sentiment which led him to ac- 
 cept so readily the pretended disclosui’es of John 
 Henry, and to make the use of them he did. 
 These were contained in twenty-four letters for 
 which the President, apparently without hesita- 
 tion, paid fifty thousand dollars. On March 9 
 he sent them to Congress with a message, and on 
 the same day, in a letter to Jefferson, alludes to 
 them as “ this discovery, or rather formal proof 
 of the cooperation between the Eastern Junto and 
 the British cabinet.” In the message he inti- 
 mates that this secret agent was sent directly by 
 the British government to Massachusetts to fo- 
 ment disaffection, to intrigue “ with the disaf- 
 fected for the purpose of bringing about resistance 
 to the laws and eventually, in concert with a Brit- 
 ish force, of destroying the Union,” and reannex- 
 ing the Eastern States to England. In the war- 
 message of June 1, these charges are repeated as 
 among the reasons for an appeal to arms. Mr. 
 Calhoun’s committee followed this lead and im- 
 proved upon it in the report recommending an 
 immediate declaration of war. The Henry affair 
 was declared an “ act of still greater malignity ” 
 than any of the other outrages against the United 
 States of which Great Britain had been guilty, 
 and that which “ excited the greatest horror.” 
 The incident was seized upon, apparently, to an- 
 
310 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 swer a temporary purpose, and then, so far as Mr. 
 Madison was concerned, was permitted to sink 
 into oblivion. In the hundreds of pages of his 
 published letters, written in later life, in which 
 he reviews and explains so many of the events of 
 his public career, there is no allusion whatever to 
 the Henry disclosures, which, in 1812, were held, 
 with the ruin of American commerce and the im- 
 pressment of thousands of American citizens, as 
 an equally just cause for war. In truth there was 
 nothing whatever in these disclosures, for which 
 was paid an amount equal to the salary of half a 
 presidential term, to warrant the assumptions of 
 either Mr. Madison’s messages or Mr. Calhoun’s 
 report. The man had been sent, at his own sug- 
 gestion, early in 1809 by the Governor of Canada 
 to Massachusetts to learn the state of affairs there 
 and observe the drift of public opinion. His na- 
 tional proclivity — he was an Irishman — to con- 
 spiracy and revolution, had led him to see in the 
 dissatisfaction with the embargo a determination 
 in the New England people to destroy the Union, 
 reannex themselves to England, and return to the 
 flesh-pots of the colonial period. To learn how 
 far gone they were in these designs, to put him- 
 self in intimate relations with the leading conspir- 
 ators and to bring them into communication with 
 Sir James Craig, the Governor General of Can- 
 ada, that sufficient aid should come through him 
 at the proper moment from the British govern- 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 311 
 
 ment, was Henry’s mission. Of this truly Irish 
 plot Henry was the villain and Craig the fool ; 
 but it is hardly possible that three years after- 
 ward Madison and his friends, with all the letters 
 spread before them, could really have been the 
 dupes. 
 
 Henry went to Boston and remained there 
 about three months, living at a tavern. He found 
 out nothing because there was nothing to be found 
 out. He knew nobody, and nobody of any note 
 knew him, and all the information he sent to 
 Craig might have been, and doubtless was, picked 
 up in the ordinary political gossip of the tavern 
 bar-room, or culled from the columns of the news- 
 papers of both parties. He compromised nobody, 
 for — as Mr. Monroe as Secretary of State, tes- 
 tified, in a report to the Senate — he named no 
 person or persons in the United States, who had, 
 “ in any way or manner whatever, entered into 
 or countenanced the project or views ” of himself 
 and Craig ; and all he had to say was pointless 
 and unimportant, except so far as his opinions 
 might have some interest as those of a shrewd ob- 
 server of public events. Indeed, his own conclu- 
 sion was that there was no conspiracy in the East- 
 ern States; that the Federal party was strong 
 enough to keep the peace with England ; and 
 that there was no talk of disunion nor any likeli- 
 hood of it unless it should be brought about by 
 war. The correspondence itself showed, in a let- 
 
312 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 ter from Robert Peel, then secretary to Lord 
 Liverpool, that the letters of Henry were found, 
 as a matter of course, among Canadian official pa- 
 pers as they related to public affairs; but they 
 had either never attracted any attention or had 
 been entirely forgotten, and Lord Liverpool was 
 quite ignorant of any “ arrangement or agree- 
 ment ” that had been made between the Governor 
 of Canada and his emissary to New England. 
 It was only because of his failure to get any re- 
 ward from the British government or from Craig’s 
 successor in Canada, for what he was pleased to 
 call his services, that the adventurer came to 
 Washington in search of a market for himself and 
 his papers. He came at an opportune moment. 
 Notwithstanding the Secretary of State frankly 
 declared that, neither by writing nor by word of 
 mouth, did the man implicate by name anybody 
 in the United States ; notwithstanding one of the 
 letters was evidence, the more conclusive because 
 incidental, that the British Secretary of State had 
 known nothing of this mission contrived between 
 Henry and Craig ; yet Mr. Madison pronounced 
 the letters to be the “ formal proof of the coopera- 
 tion between the Eastern Junto and the British 
 cabinet.” The charge was monstrous, for this 
 pretended proof had no existence. If the Presi- 
 dent, however, could persuade himself that the 
 story was true it would help him to justify him- 
 self to himself for a change of policy, the result of 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 313 
 
 which would be the coveted renomination for the 
 presidency. 
 
 Not that there had never been talk of disunion 
 in New England. There had been in years past, 
 as there was to be in years to come. But talk of 
 that kind did not belong exclusively to that par- 
 ticular period, nor was it confined to that particu- 
 lar region of country. Ever since the adoption of 
 the Constitution the one thing that orators, North 
 and South, inside the halls of Congress and out- 
 side them, were agreed upon was, that in all de- 
 bate there was one argument, equally good on 
 both sides, to which there could be no reply ; that 
 in all legislation there was one possible supreme 
 move that would bring all the wheels of govern- 
 ment to a dead stop. The solemn warning or the 
 angry threat was always in readiness for instant 
 use, that the bonds of the Union, in one or an- 
 other contingency, were to be rent asunder. But 
 so frequent had been these warning cries of the 
 coming wolf that they were listened to with in- 
 difference, except when some positive act indi- 
 cated real danger, as in the Jefferson- Madison 
 “ Resolutions of ’98.” It was easy, therefore, to 
 alarm the public with confessions of a secret emis- 
 sary, as he pretended, who had turned traitor to 
 the government which had employed him and to 
 the conspirators to whom he had been sent ; and 
 the more reprehensible was it, therefore, in a 
 President of the United States, to make the use 
 
314 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 that was made of this story, which an impartial 
 examination would have shown was essentially ab- 
 surd and infamously false. Mr. Madison’s intelli- 
 gence is not to be impugned. He was too saga- 
 cious, as well as too unimpassioned a man, to be 
 taken in by the ingenious tale of such an adven- 
 turer as Henry. In a letter to Colonel David 
 Humphreys, written the next spring, in defense of 
 the policy of commercial restrictions, he says : “ I 
 have never allowed myself to believe that the 
 Union was in danger, or that a dissolution of it 
 could be desired, unless by a few individuals, if 
 such there be, in desperate situations or of un- 
 bridled passions.” New England, he continues, 
 “ would be the greatest loser by such an event, 
 and not likely, therefore, deliberately to rush into 
 it.” “On what basis,” he asks, “could New Eng- 
 land and Old England form commercial stipula- 
 tions?” Their commercial jealousy, he contends, 
 forbade an alliance between them, for that was 
 “ the real soux-ce of our revolution.” He closes 
 with the significant assertion that, “ if there be 
 links of common interest between the two coun- 
 tries, they would connect the Southern and not 
 the Northern States with that part of Europe.” 
 How, then, could he seiuously accept Henry’s pre- 
 tended disclosures as “formal proof,” as he wrote 
 to Jefferson at that time, “ of the cooperation 
 between the Eastern Junto and the British cabi- 
 net?” By the Eastern Junto is meant the Fed* 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 315 
 
 eral party, or, at least, the influential and able 
 leaders of that party ; and he could not consider, 
 nor would he have spoken of them as “ a few in- 
 dividuals, if such there be, in desperate situations 
 or of unbridled passions.” He accepted, then, the 
 Henry story in spite of his deliberate opinions, as 
 a help to involve the country in a party war. 
 
 Even at the risk of some prolixity it is need- 
 ful to follow the course of events that led to this 
 war a little farther ; for here was the culmina- 
 tion of Mr. Madison’s career, and from his course 
 in shaping and directing these events we best 
 learn what manner of man he was, and where his 
 true place is among the public men of our ear- 
 lier history. For a year and a half the United 
 States had acted on the assumption that France 
 had recalled her decrees, and that England had 
 not revoked her orders. The extracts from Mr. 
 Madison’s letters, given on previous pages, show 
 his conviction that the revocation of either de- 
 crees or orders was practically no more true of one 
 power than it was of the other. The government 
 of the United States, nevertheless, submitted to 
 the one, and against the other it first reenacted the 
 non-intercourse act, then proclaimed an embargo 
 preparatory to war, and finally declared war. Yet 
 the whole world knew, and nobody so surely as 
 the Emperor of France, that the Berlin and Milan 
 decrees had never been formally repealed at all ; 
 meanwhile French outrages upon American com- 
 
316 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 merce had continued, and all redress so persist- 
 ently refused, that so late as the last week in Feb- 
 ruary, 1812, the President intimated that war — 
 war with France, not England — might prove the 
 only remedy. But he suddenly yielded to the 
 clamors of the war party at home, whatever may 
 have been his motive. Then, and not till then, 
 were the decrees actually revoked by Napoleon. 
 In May, 1812, more than a month after the Presi- 
 dent had recommended an embargo, the hostile 
 purport of which was so well understood, a de- 
 cree was proclaimed by the Emperor which for 
 the first time really revoked those of Berlin and 
 Milan. True, it was dated — “ purported to be 
 dated,” it was said in an official English docu- 
 ment — April, 1811. But that was of no mo- 
 ment ; the essential point was, that it had never 
 seen the light ; that any hint of its existence had 
 never been given to the American government or 
 its representatives abroad, till the United States 
 had taken measures to “ cause their rights to be 
 respected by the English,” which was the original 
 condition of a revocation of the decrees. Its os- 
 tensible date was when the news reached France 
 that non-intercourse had been again enforced 
 against England in March, 1811 ; but its promul- 
 gation was to all intents and purposes the real 
 date, when news reached France, in April or 
 May, 1812, that war against England was finally 
 determined upon. 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 317 
 
 The Duke of Bassano, the French minister, had 
 not, moreover, brought out this year-old decree 
 without pressure from the American minister, 
 Barlow. The President had written Barlow in 
 that February letter, already quoted, that if his 
 expected dispatches did not “ exhibit the con- 
 duct of the French government in better colours 
 than it has yet assumed, there will be but one 
 sentiment in this country, and I need not say 
 what that will be.” When the dispatches came 
 Mr. Madison received no assurances of redress for 
 past wrongs and no promises for the future ; but 
 he learned, on the contrary, that Bassano, in a 
 recent report to the Emperor, had referred to the 
 decrees of Berlin and Milan as still in full force 
 against all neutral nations which submitted to the 
 seizure of their ships by the British, when con- 
 taining contraband goods or enemy’s property. 
 Naturally the British ministry was not slow in 
 presenting this precious acknowledgment to the 
 United States as a proof that she had all along 
 been in the wrong, and that in common justice to 
 England the non-importation act should now be 
 repealed. The assurance was at the same time 
 repeated, possibly in a tone of considerable satis- 
 faction, that when Napoleon really should revoke 
 his decrees Great Britain was ready, as she al- 
 ways had been, to follow his example with her 
 orders. It was an awkward dilemma for the 
 President and his minister to France. But by 
 
318 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 this time, the Presidential nomination impending, 
 Mr. Madison had made up his mind what to do. He 
 was not exactly a wolf ; neither was Great Britain 
 a lamb ; but the argument he used was the argu- 
 ment of the fable. Instead of advising — Bassano 
 having declared the decrees still in force — a re- 
 peal of the non-importation act, as Great Britain 
 claimed was in justice and comity her due, he rec- 
 ommended a war measure. But Barlow evidently 
 felt himself to be under some decent restraint of 
 logic and consistency. He urged upon the French 
 minister the necessity now of a positive and impe- 
 rial declaration that the decrees, so far as regarded 
 the United States, were absolutely revoked ; for 
 this recent assertion of Bassano that they were still 
 in force, put the United States in an attitude both 
 towards France and England utterly and absurdly 
 in the wrong. Barlow represented that, should the 
 revocation be extended only to the United States, 
 Great Britain would not for that alone repeal her 
 orders. In that case France would lose nothing 
 of the advantage of her present position, while 
 everything would be lost should the United States 
 be compelled to repeal her non-importation laws 
 against England. Bassano was quick to see the 
 necessity of jumping into the bramble-bush and 
 scratching his eyes in again, and he then produced 
 his year-old edict. Being a year old, it, of course, 
 covered all questions. But was it a year old ? 
 Who knew? It had never been published? No, 
 
WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 319 
 
 the Duke said; but it had been shown to Mr. 
 Jonathan Russell, who, at that time, was Charge 
 (V Affaires at Paris. Mr. Russell denied it, though 
 a denial was hardly needed. He would not have 
 ventured to withhold information so important 
 from his government ; and it was evident, from the 
 tone of his dispatches of a subsequent date, that 
 he had no suspicion of its existence. For he had 
 maintained it, as a point of “national honor,” that 
 the revocation of the French decrees must have 
 preceded the President’s proclamation of Novem- 
 ber 1, 1810 ; and this he would not have dared to 
 do had he known that the actual revocation by the 
 French minister was not made till six months 
 after the date of the President's proclamation, and 
 was then made secretly. 
 
 However, as if to defeat all these machinations 
 of France and the United States, Great Britain 
 immediately recalled her orders in council, when, 
 in May, 1812, the Duke of Bassano announced the 
 edict of April, 1811, revoking the Bei’lin and Mi- 
 lan decrees, though so far only as they concerned 
 American vessels. The declaration of war of June 
 18 had not reached England, and there was still 
 a chance for peace. Foster, the late English min- 
 ister to the United States, learned at Halifax — 
 where he had stopped on his way home — that the 
 orders in council were repealed, and he took im- 
 mediate steps to bring about an armistice between 
 the naval commanders on the coast of Nova Scotia, 
 
320 
 
 JAMES MAD IS ON. 
 
 and between the Governor of Canada and the 
 American general, Dearborn, in command of the 
 frontier. The government at Washington, how- 
 ever, refused to ratify any suspension of hostilities. 
 Some negotiations followed, but, decrees and or- 
 ders being out of the way, there was nothing left 
 to negotiate about except the question of impress- 
 ment. Upon that question the two governments 
 were as wide apart as ever and not in the least 
 likely to come together. Mr. Madison determined 
 that on that ground alone the war should go on. 
 It had been as good and sufficient ground for such 
 a war any time for the past dozen years ; but 
 whether it could be settled by an appeal to arms, 
 was a question of possibilities and probabilities by 
 which both Jefferson and Madison had hitherto 
 been ruled. Was that still the essential question? 
 With the result came the answer. Two years 
 later the Administration was glad to accept a 
 treaty of peace in which impressment was not 
 even alluded to. Great Britain did not relin- 
 quish by a syllable her assumed right to board 
 American ships in search of British seamen ; and 
 the Administration instructed its Peace Commis- 
 sioners not even to ask that she should. 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Early in the war Mr. Madison said to a friend, 
 in a letter “ altogether private and written in con- 
 fidence,” that the way to make the conflict both 
 “ short and successful, would be to convince the 
 enemy that he was to contend with the whole and 
 not part of the nation.” That it was a war of a 
 party and not of the people, was a discouragement 
 to himself, however the enemy may have regarded 
 it, which he could never see any way of overcom- 
 ing. He could not listen to an opponent nor learn 
 anything from disaster. “ If the war must con- 
 tinue,” said Webster within a year of its end, 
 “ go to the ocean. Let it no longer be said that 
 not one ship of force, built by your hands since 
 the war, yet floats. If you are seriously contend- 
 ing for maritime rights go to the theatre where 
 those rights can be defended. . . . There the 
 united wishes and exertions of the nation will go 
 with you. Even our party divisions, acrimonious 
 as they are, cease at the water’s edge. ... In 
 protecting naval interests by naval means, you 
 will arm yourself with the whole power of na- 
 21 
 
322 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 tional sentiment, and may command the whole 
 abundance of national forces.” Taking now in 
 one view the events of those years, it is easy to 
 see in our generation how mad were Madison and 
 his party to turn deaf ears to such considerations 
 as these. Their force and wisdom had already 
 been proved by eighteen months of disaster on 
 land, which had made the war daily more and 
 more unpopular ; and by brilliant success for a 
 time at sea, when each fresh victory was hailed 
 with universal enthusiasm. “ Our little naval tri- 
 umphs,” was the President’s way of speaking of 
 the latter ; and the only importance he seems to 
 have seen in them was, that they excited some 
 “rage and jealousy” in England and moved her 
 to increase her naval force. How could Mr. Mad- 
 ison expect that the whole and not a part only of 
 the nation could uphold an administration which, 
 after eighteen months of fighting, could be re- 
 proached on the floor of Congress with not having 
 launched a ship since the war was begun? Or 
 did he only choose to remember that the navy, 
 which alone so far had brought either success or 
 honor to the national arms, was the creation of 
 the Federalists in spite of the Jeffersonian policy? 
 It surely would have been wiser to try to propi- 
 tiate New England, with which he was in perpet- 
 ual worry and conflict, by enlisting it in a naval 
 war in which it had some faith. A large propor- 
 tion of her people would have been glad to escape 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 328 
 
 idleness and poverty at home for service at sea, 
 though they were reluctant to aid in a vain at- 
 tempt to conquer Canada. 
 
 Even to that purpose, however, Massachusetts 
 contributed, in the second campaign of 1814, more 
 recruits than any other single State ; and New 
 England more than all the Southern States to- 
 
 O 
 
 gether. New England could have given no 
 stronger proof of her loyalty, if only Mr. Madison 
 had known how to turn it to advantage. He was 
 absolutely deaf and blind to it ; but his ears were 
 quick to hear and his eyes to see, when he learned 
 presently that the New Englanders were seriously 
 calculating the value of the Union under such 
 rule as they had had of late. It was not often 
 that he relieved himself by intemperate language, 
 but he could not help saying now, in writing to 
 Governor Nicholas of Virginia, that “ the greater 
 part of the people in that quarter have been 
 brought by their leaders, aided by their priests, 
 under a delusion scarcely exceeded by that re- 
 corded in the period of witchcraft ; and the lead- 
 ers themselves are becoming daily more desperate 
 in the use they make of it.” The “ delusion ” 
 was taking a practical direction. Mr. Madison 
 had learned before the letter was written that a 
 convention was about to meet at Hartford, the 
 object of which was to weigh in a balance, upon 
 the one side, the continuation of such government 
 as that of the last two or three years, and, upon 
 
324 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 the other side, the value of the Union. He ar- 
 dently hoped that the commissioners, then assem- 
 bled at Ghent, would agree upon a treaty ; and 
 there seemed to be no good reason why there 
 should not be peace when nothing was to be said 
 of the cause of the war, no apology demanded for 
 the past, and no stipulation for the future. But 
 if by any chance the commissioners should fail, 
 Mr. Madison saw in the Hartford Convention the 
 huge shadow of a coming conflict more difficult 
 to deal with than a foreign war. It was the first 
 step in dead earnest for the formation of a North- 
 ern Confederacy, and it is quite possible he may 
 have felt that he was not the man for such a 
 crisis. Every line of the letter pulsates with anx- 
 iety. The only consoling thought in it is, that 
 without “ foreign cooperation revolt and separa- 
 tion will hardly be risked,” and to such coopera- 
 tion he hoped a majority of the New England 
 people would not consent. A treaty of peace, 
 however, came to save him and the Union. Within 
 a few weeks the administration papers were laugh- 
 ing at Harrison Gray Otis of Boston, who had 
 started for Washington as the representative of 
 the Hartford Convention, but turned back at the 
 news of peace; and were advertising him as miss- 
 ing under the name of Titus Oates. It was, how- 
 ever, the hysterical laugh of recovery from a ter- 
 rible fright. 
 
 If ambition to be a second time President led 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 325 
 
 Mr. Madison to consent against his own better 
 judgment to a war with England, he paid a heavy- 
 penalty. It was the act of a party politician and 
 not of a statesman ; for the country was no more 
 prepared for a war in 1812 , when as a politician 
 he assented to it, than it had been for the pre- 
 vious half dozen years when as a statesman he 
 had opposed it. He gave the influence of the 
 United States in support of a despotism that 
 aimed at the subjugation of all Europe; he threw 
 a fresh obstacle in the way of that power to which 
 Europe could chiefly look to resist a common 
 enemy ; and he did both under the pretense that 
 the just complaints of the United States were 
 greater against one of these powers than against 
 the other. He declared war mainly to redress a 
 wrong which ceased to exist before a blow was 
 struck ; he then rejected an offer of peace because 
 another wrong was still persisted in ; but finally, 
 of his own motion, he accepted a treaty in which 
 the assumed cause of war was not even alluded to. 
 
 That Mr. Madison was not a good war-Presi- 
 dent, either by training or by temperament, was, if 
 it may be said of any man, his misfortune rather 
 than his fault. But it was his fault rather than 
 his misfortune that he permitted himself to be 
 dragged in a day into a line of conduct which the 
 sober judgment of years had disapproved. He is 
 usually and most justly regarded as a man of 
 great amiability of character; of unquestionable 
 
326 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 integrity in all the purely personal relations of 
 life ; of more than ordinary intellectual ability of 
 a solid, though not brilliant, quality ; and a dili- 
 gent student of the science of government, the 
 practice of which he made a profession. But he 
 was better fitted by nature for a legislator than 
 for executive office, and his fame would have been 
 more spotless, though his position would have 
 been less exalted, had his life been exclusively de- 
 voted to that branch of government for which he 
 was best fitted. It was not merely tlmt for the 
 sake of the Presidency he plunged the country 
 into an unnecessary war ; but when it was on his 
 hands he neither knew what to do with it himself 
 nor how to choose the right men who did know. 
 
 It is our amiable weakness — if one may ven- 
 ture to say so of the American people — that all 
 our geese are swans, or rather eagles ; that we are 
 apt to mistake notoriety for reputation ; that it is 
 the popular belief of the larger number that he 
 who, no matter how, has reached a distinguished 
 position, is by virtue of that fact a great and good 
 man. This is not less true, in a measure, of Mr. 
 Madison than of some other men who have been 
 Presidents, and of still more who have thought 
 that they deserved to be. But, if that false esti- 
 mate surrounds his name, there is a strong under- 
 current of opinion, common among those whose 
 business or whose pleasure it is to look beneath 
 the surface of things historical, that he was want- 
 
CONCL US ION. 
 
 327 
 
 ing in strength of character and in courage. He 
 did not lack discernment as to what was wisest 
 and best ; but he was too easily influenced by 
 others or led by the hope of gaining some glitter- 
 ing prize which ambition coveted, to turn his back 
 upon his own convictions. It was this weakness 
 which swept him beyond his depth into troubled 
 waters where his struggles were hopeless. Had 
 he refused to assume the responsibility of a war 
 which his judgment condemned, and which he 
 should have known that he wanted the peculiar 
 ability to bring to a successful and honorable con- 
 clusion, he might never have been President, but 
 his fame would have been of a higher order. 
 History might have overlooked the act of politi- 
 cal fickleness in his earlier career, which was so 
 warmly resented by many of his contemporaries. 
 Abandonment of party is too common and often 
 too justifiable to be accounted as necessarily a 
 crime ; and it can rarely be said with positiveness, 
 whatever the probabilities, that a political de- 
 serter is certainly moved by base motives. It is 
 rather from ex post facto than from immediate ev- 
 idence, as in Madison’s case, that a just verdict is 
 likely to be reached. But there can be neither 
 doubt nor mistake as to the President’s manage- 
 ment of foreign affairs during the two years pre- 
 ceding the declaration of war against England ; 
 nor of the remarkable incompetence which he 
 showed in rallying the moral and material forces 
 
328 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 of the nation to meet an emergency of his own 
 creation. 
 
 Opposition to war generally and, therefore, op- 
 position to an army and navy were sound cardinal 
 principles in the Jeffersonian school of politics. 
 Mr. Madison was curiously blind to the logical 
 consequences of this doctrine ; he could not see, 
 or he would not consider, that, when war seemed 
 advisable to an administration, the result must de- 
 pend mainly upon the success of the appeal to the 
 people for their countenance and help. But he 
 unwisely sought to raise and employ an army for 
 the invasion and conquest of the territory of the 
 enemy in spite of the opposition of a large propor- 
 tion of the wealthiest and most intelligent people 
 in the country ; while at the same time he refused 
 to see any promise or any presage in a naval war- 
 fare which had opened with unexpected brilliancy 
 and would, had it been followed up, have been 
 sure of popular support. His title to fame rests, 
 with the multitude, upon the fact that he was one 
 of the earlier Presidents of the Republic. But it 
 is that period of his career which least entitles 
 him to be remembered with gratitude and respect 
 by his countrymen. 
 
 Its crowning humiliation came with the capture 
 of Washington in August, 1814, when the British 
 admiral, Cockburn, entered the Hall of Represen- 
 tatives, at the head of a band of followers, and 
 springing into the speaker’s chair shouted : “ Shall 
 
CON CL USION. 
 
 329 
 
 this harbor of Yankee Democracy be burned ? 
 All for it will say, Aye ! ” Early in the war 
 Madison had written to Jefferson, “ we do not 
 apprehend invasion by land ” — the one thing, it 
 would seem, that a commander-in-chief should 
 have apprehended, whose single aim was the in- 
 vasion and conquest of the enemy’s territory. 
 His devotion to this one purpose, to the exclusion 
 of any other idea of either offense or defense and 
 in spite of continued failure, was almost an in- 
 fatuation. Within a year of that expression of 
 confidence to Mr. Jefferson the whole coast was 
 blockaded from the eastern end of Long Island 
 Sound to the mouth of the Mississippi. For a 
 year before Washington was taken, the shores of 
 Chesapeake Bay were harassed and raided and 
 devastated by a blockading force, till the people 
 were reduced almost to the condition of a con- 
 quered country. Two months before the British 
 commanders, Ross and Cockburn, went up the Po- 
 tomac, Mr. Gallatin, who was then in London, 
 had informed the President that the fleet was to 
 be reinforced for that very purpose ; but neither 
 he nor Congress took any effective measures to 
 meet a danger so imminent. Their eyes were 
 fixed with a far-off gaze across the Northern bor- 
 der, while only five hundred regular troops, a 
 body of untrained militia who had never heard 
 the whistle of a bullet, and a few gunboats on the 
 Potomac, guarded the national capital against a 
 
330 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 British fleet, a thousand marines, and thirty-five 
 hundred men from Wellington’s best regiments. 
 The President fleeing in one direction with the 
 Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the 
 general in command ; Mrs. Madison fleeing in 
 another, with her reticule filled with silver spoons 
 snatched up in haste as she left the White House ; 1 
 behind them all as they fled, the horizon red with 
 the blaze of the largest navy yard in the country 
 and of all the public buildings, but one, of the 
 capital ; — these incidents are an amazing com- 
 mentary on the early assertion that invasion was 
 not to be apprehended. 
 
 The end of this wretched war, which has been 
 foolishly called the second war of independence, 
 
 1 Paul Jennings, who was a slave and the body-servant of Mr. 
 Madison, says in his Reminiscences : “ It has often been stated 
 in print, that when Mrs. Madison escaped from the White 
 House, she cut out from the frame the large portrait of Washing- 
 ton (now in one of the parlors there) and carried it off. This is 
 totally false. She had no time for doing it. It would have re- 
 quired a ladder to get it down. All she carried off was the silver 
 in her reticule, as the British were thought to be but a few 
 squares off, and were expected every moment. John Suse (a 
 Prenchman, then doorkeeper, and still [1865] living), and Ma- 
 graw, the President’s gardener, took it down and sent it off on a 
 wagon, with some large silver urns and such other valuables as 
 could hastily be got hold of. When the British did arrive, they 
 ate up the very dinner, and drank the wines, etc., that I had pre- 
 pared for the President’s party.” On a previous page he had re- 
 lated that: “Mrs. Madison ordered dinner to be ready at three 
 as usual ; I set the table myself, and brought up the ale, cider, 
 and wine, and placed them in the coolers, as all the cabinet and 
 several military gentlemen and strangers were expected.” 
 
CON CL USION. 
 
 331 
 
 came four months afterward. Never was a peace 
 so welcome as this was on all sides. England 
 was exhausted with the long contest w r ith Napo- 
 leon ; and now, that being over, as there was no 
 practical question to differ about with the United 
 States, the ministry were not unwilling to listen 
 to the demands of the commercial and manufac- 
 turing classes. In America so great was the uni- 
 versal joy that the Federalists and the Democrats 
 forgot their differences and their hates, and wept 
 and laughed by turns in each other’s arms and 
 kissed each other like women. One party was 
 delivered from calamities for which, if continued 
 much longer, there seemed only one desperate and 
 dreaded remedy ; the other was overjoyed to back 
 out of a blunder which was the straight and broad 
 road to national ruin. Of all men, Mr. Madison 
 had the most reason to be glad for a safe deliver- 
 ance from the consequences of his own want of 
 foresight and want of firmness. Less than two 
 years remained to him of his public career. In 
 that brief period much was forgotten and more 
 forgiven — as our national way is — in the prom- 
 ise of a great prosperity to be speedily achieved 
 in the released energies of a vigorous and indus- 
 trious people. He had not again to choose be- 
 tween differing factions of his own party, nor to 
 carry out a policy against the will of a formidable 
 opposition. To the Federalists hardly a name 
 was left in the progress of events at home and 
 
332 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 abroad ; while all immediate vital questions of dif- 
 ference vanished, the party in power remained 
 in almost undisputed ascendency. The most im- 
 portant Democratic measures it then insisted upon 
 were a national bank and a protective tariff. To 
 the establishment of a bank Mr. Madison assented 
 against his own conviction that any provision 
 could be found for it in the Constitution ; and a 
 tariff, both for revenue and for the protection and 
 encouragement of American industry, he agreed 
 with his party was the true policy. 
 
 For nearly twenty years after his retirement to 
 Montpellier — a name which, with rare exceptions, 
 he always spelled correctly, and not in the Amer- 
 ican way — it was his privilege to live a watchful 
 observer of the prosperity of his country. If it 
 ever occurred to him in his secret soul that at the 
 period of his preeminence he had done anything 
 to arrest that prosperity, he gave no sign. He 
 loved rather to remember and sometimes to recall 
 to others the part he had taken in the nurture of 
 the young Republic in the feeble days of its in- 
 fancy.' Of his own administration and the events 
 of that time he had much less to say than of the 
 true interpretation of the Constitution, of the 
 intent of its framers, and the circumstances that 
 influenced their deliberations. His voluminous 
 correspondence shows the bent of his mind as a 
 legislator and a student of fundamental law ; and 
 on that, rather than on his ability and success as 
 
CON CL US /ON. 
 
 333 
 
 the chief magistrate of the nation, rests his true 
 fame. 
 
 These twenty years, though passed in retirement, 
 were not years of leisure. “ I have rarely,” he 
 wrote in 1827, “ during the period of my public 
 life, found my time less at my disposal than since I 
 took my leave of it ; nor have I the consolation of 
 finding, that as my powers of application necessa- 
 rily decline, the demands on them proportionally 
 decrease.” Much as he wrote upon questions of 
 an earlier period, there were no topics of the cur- 
 rent time that did not arouse his interest. Upon 
 the subject of slavery he thought much and wrote 
 much and always earnestly and humanely. How 
 to get rid of it was a problem which he never 
 solved to his own satisfaction. Though it was one 
 he always longed to see through, it never occurred 
 to him that the way to abolish slavery was — to 
 abolish it. How kind he was as a master, Paul 
 Jennings bears witness. “ I never,” he says, “ saw 
 him in a passion, and never knew him to strike 
 a slave, though he had over a hundred; neither 
 would he allow an overseer to do it.” If they 
 were in fault he rebuked them ; but, adds Jen- 
 nings, he would “ never mortify them by doing it 
 before others.” It will be remembered that on 
 the first occasion of his being a candidate for 
 public office he refused to follow the universal Vir- 
 ginian habit of “treating” the electors. To the 
 principle which governed him then he adhered 
 
334 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 through life, and bis letters show the warm inter- 
 est he always took in every phase of the temper- 
 ance movement. “ I don’t think he drank a quart 
 of brandy in his whole life,” says Jennings. A 
 single glass of wine was all he ever took at din- 
 ner, and this he diluted with water, when, says 
 the same witness, “ he had hard drinkers at his 
 table who had put away his choice madeira pretty 
 freely.” This will go for something, considering 
 the times, with even the most zealous of the mod- 
 ern supporters of that cause ; but they must be 
 quite satisfied to know that “ for the last fifteen 
 years of his life he drank no wine at all.” Consid- 
 eration for his own health, always feeble, may 
 have led him to this abstinence ; but it is rather 
 remarkable that a man of his position should have 
 held, fifty years ago, the advanced notions which 
 he certainly did upon this question ; and that the 
 doubt only of the possibility of enforcing laws for 
 prohibiting the manufacture and sale of spirits 
 seems to have withheld him from proposing them. 
 
 Social as well as moral questions he discussed 
 with evident interest and without passion or prej- 
 udice. Aside from the party meaning of the term, 
 he belonged to that school of democracy, now ex- 
 tinct, which believed that the highest object of 
 human exertion is to improve man’s condition and 
 to secure to each the rights which belong to all. 
 He did not agree with Robert Owen as to meth- 
 ods ; but neither did he reject his schemes as in- 
 
CON CL US ION. 
 
 335 
 
 evitably absurd because they were new and untried. 
 One would not gather from bis correspondence 
 with Frances W right that this was the notorious 
 Fanny Wright whom the world chose to consider, 
 as its way is, a disreputable and probably wicked 
 woman, inasmuch as she proposed some radical 
 changes in its social relations, which she thought 
 would be a gain. He gave much attention to 
 popular education, and all the influence he could 
 command was devoted, through all the later years 
 of his life, to the establishment and well-being of 
 the University of Virginia. Education, he main- 
 tained, was the true foundation of civil liberty, and 
 on it, therefore, rested the welfare and stability of 
 the Republic. It is probable that he would have 
 drawn a line at difference of color then, simply 
 because of the difference of condition implied by 
 color. But he made no such distinction in sex. 
 Sixty-three years ago he saw his way quite clearly 
 on a question which is a sore trial now to many 
 timid souls. The capacity of “ the female mind ” 
 for the highest education cannot, he said, “be 
 doubted, having been sufficiently illustrated by its 
 works of genius, of erudition, and of science.” The 
 capacity, he assumed, carried with it the right. 
 In short, he was ready always to consider fairly 
 questions relating to the well-being of society 
 which since his time have deeply agitated the 
 country ; and he approached them all much in the 
 spirit of the reformer who hopes to leave the world 
 
336 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 a little better and happier because be has lived 
 in it. 
 
 “ Mr. Madison, I think,” says Paul Jennings, 
 “ was one of the best men that ever lived.” This 
 is the testimony of an intelligent man whose op- 
 portunities of knowing the personal qualities of 
 him of whom he was speaking were more intimate 
 than those of anj^ other person could be except 
 Mrs. Madison. “ He was guilty,” says Hildreth, 
 “of the greatest political wrong and crime which 
 it is possible for the head of a nation to com- 
 mit.” One saw the private gentleman, always 
 conscientious and considerate in his personal rela- 
 tions to other men ; the other judged the public 
 man, moved by ambition, entangled in party ties 
 and supposed party obligations, his moral sense 
 blinded by the necessities of political compromises 
 to reach party ends. It is not impossible to strike 
 a just balance between these opposing estimates, 
 though one is that of a servant, the other that of 
 a learned and judicious historian. 
 
 Mr. Madison left a legacy of “ Advice to My 
 Country,” to be read after his death and to “ be 
 considered as issuing from the tomb, where truth 
 alone can be respected, and the happiness of man 
 alone consulted.” It is the lesson of his life, as 
 he wished his countrymen to understand it. “The 
 advice,” he said, “ nearest to my heart and deepest 
 in my convictions is, that the Union of the States 
 be cherished and pei’petuated. Let the open enemy 
 
CON CL USION. 
 
 337 
 
 to it be regarded as a Pandora with her box 
 opened, and the disguised one as the serpent creep- 
 ing with his deadly wiles into Paradise.” The 
 thoughtful reader, as he turns to the first page of 
 this volume to recall the date of Mr. Madison’s 
 death, will hardly fail to note how few the years 
 were before these open and disguised enemies, 
 against whom he warned his countrymen, were 
 found only in that party which he had done so 
 much, from the time of the adoption of the Consti- 
 tution, to keep in power. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adams, j'ohn, on presidential titles, 
 129, 131 ; his administration, 240. 
 
 Adams, J. Q., memoir of Madison, 1, 
 2 ; opinion of Jefferson, 254. 
 
 Alien and Sedition Laws, 240, 250. 
 
 Ames, Fisher, on the slave-trade, 137 ; 
 on site of Federal capital, 147 ; on 
 a United States bank, 170; the ap- 
 peals to the Constitution, 182, note ; 
 opinion of Madison, 200. 
 
 Annapolis, first convention at, 61 ; 
 second convention at, 64, 88. 
 
 Bank. United States, 170 ; speculation 
 in stock of, 186. 
 
 Barbary States, war with, 262. 
 
 Barlow, Joel, minister to France, ap- 
 peal to Duke of Bassano, 318. 
 
 Barron, Commodore, of frigate Chesa- 
 peake, 275. 
 
 Bassano, Duke of, announces repeal 
 of decrees, 317. 
 
 Bayonne, decree issued at, 281. 
 
 Berlin decree issued, 277 ; informal 
 repeal of, 316 ; final repeal of, 316. 
 
 Breckenridge, offers resolutions in 
 Kentucky legislature in 1799, 249. 
 
 Bonaparte. See Napoleon. 
 
 Butler, Peirce, proposes fugitive slave 
 clause in Federal Constitution, 111. 
 
 Calhoun, John C., in Congress, 304. 
 
 Canning, George, repudiates Erskine’s 
 treaty, 284. 
 
 Capital, site of the, discussed, 128, 
 146 ; the bargain for, 149, 159. 
 
 Champagny, French minister, infor- 
 mal revocation of Berlin and Milan 
 decrees, 294. 
 
 Chesapeake, frigate, attacked by the 
 Leopard, man-of-war, 275; proposed 
 settlement of the case of, by Er- 
 skine, 385. 
 
 Clay, Henry, in Congress, 304 ; his 
 proposal to take Canada, 305. 
 
 Clinton, De Witt, a candidate for 
 presidential nomination, 308. 
 
 Cockbum, Admiral, in Washington, 
 328. 
 
 Commerce of the United States, 264 
 et seq. 
 
 Compromises of the Constitution, 98, 
 
 110 . 
 
 Congress, meeting of the First, under 
 the Federal Constitution, 128. 
 
 Constitution, the, 112 ; adoption of, 
 115 et seq. ; in New Hampshire 
 and Virginia, 120. 
 
 Constitutional Convention, 88 ; de- 
 bates in the, 115 et seq. ; character 
 of the, 112. 
 
 Craig, Sir John, and John Henry, 310 
 et seq. 
 
 Curtis, George T., History of the Con- 
 stitution, 98. 
 
 Debt, public, the, 22, 29, 152 et seq. 
 
 Dexter, Samuel, estimate of New Eng- 
 land people, 217. 
 
 Disunion, frequent threats of, 31, 313. 
 
 Draper, Lyman C., correspondence 
 with Madison, 4, 5, 6. 
 
 Duties. See Tariff. 
 
 Ellsworth, Oliver, Member of Con- 
 gress, 31 ; on slavery, 106, 107. 
 
 Embargo, the, 264 ; repealed, 286. 
 
 Essex Junto, 312, 314. 
 
 Federal Government, organization of 
 the, under the Constitution, 128, 
 143. 
 
 Federalists, origin of the name of the, 
 90. 
 
 Federalist, The, writers of, 116. 
 
 Floyd, Catherine, affianced to Madi- 
 son, 43. 
 
 France, payments to, 201 ; Revolu- 
 tion in, 202 ; declares war against 
 England, 203 ; influence of revolu 
 
340 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 tionary ideas of, in the United 
 States, 216. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, on slavery, 160. 
 
 Freneau, Philip, 176 et seq. ; Wash- 
 ington’s opinion of, 214. 
 
 Friends, petitions of the Society of, 
 for abolition of slavery, 160 ; de- 
 nounced in Congress, 166. 
 
 Gallatin, Albert, fears of effect of laws 
 against aliens, 243 ; Secretary of 
 the Treasury, 286. 
 
 Genet, G. C., received as minister 
 from France, 208 ; his recall pro- 
 posed, 218. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge, on slavery, 167. 
 
 Giles, W. B., attack on Hamilton, 
 197. 
 
 Great Britain, non-observance of 
 treaty of 1783, 64 : tonnage duties 
 of ships of, 141 ; war with France, 
 203; Jay’s treaty with, 220 ; trade 
 with, 264 ; Monroe-Pin kney treaty 
 with, 273 ; orders in council, 277 ; 
 war declared against, by United 
 States. 307 ; repeals orders in coun- 
 cil, 319 ; peace, 1814, 331. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, in Congress, 31; 
 on right of taxation, 37 ; on basis 
 of representation, 98 ; report of, as 
 Secretary of State in 1790. 151 ; dif- 
 ference with Madison, 170, 190 ; at- 
 tacked by the Republicans, 193 ; 
 letter to Washington, 196. 
 
 Hartford Convention, 323. 
 
 Henry, John, 309 et seq. 
 
 Henry, Patrick, opposes the adoption 
 of the Constitution, 117 ; opposed 
 to Madison and “ Gerrymanders ” 
 the State, 126. 
 
 Impressment of seamen, 229, 268, 272, 
 274, 275, 288. 
 
 Jackson, F. J., British minister, 289. 
 
 Jay, John, minister to Spain, 32, 34 ; 
 negotiations on the Mississippi ques- 
 tion, 82 ; negotiates treaty with 
 Great Britain, 220. 
 
 Jefferson. Thomas, on religious free- 
 dom, 68, note ; on use of steam, 74 ; 
 his geological theory, 75 ; on Shays’s 
 Rebellion, 78 ; letter to Washing- 
 ton on condition of affairs, 195 ; re- 
 lations with Washington, 214 ; Ken- 
 tucky resolutions of 1798-99, 246; 
 inauguration of, 252 ; inaugural 
 speech, 253 ; purchase of Louisiana, 
 258 ; rejects Monroe-Pinkney treaty, 
 274 ; names his successor to the 
 presidency, 283. 
 
 Jennings, Paul, on the capture of 
 Washington, 336. 
 
 Kentucky resolutions of 1798-99, 243 
 et seq. 
 
 Leopard, man-of-war, fight with the 
 Chesapeake, 275. 
 
 Lewis and Clarke Expedition, 260. 
 
 Library, Congressional, proposed by 
 Madison, 32. 
 
 Little Belt, sloop-of-war, fight with 
 the President, 301. 
 
 Livermore, Samuel, on slave-trade, 
 137. 
 
 Liverpool, Lord, ignorance of Henry, 
 312. 
 
 Louisiana, purchase of, 257. 
 
 Madison, James, birth and death, 1 ; 
 ancestry, 3 et seq.; education, 10; 
 on religious liberty, 13, 17, 66 ; 
 member of Committee of Safety, 16 ; 
 of Virginia Constitutional Conven- 
 tion, 16 ; of Assembly, 20 ; delegate 
 to Congress, 20 ; letter on public 
 affairs, 1789, 21 ; his faithfulness 
 and industry, 24; his pay, 25: in- 
 structed on the right to navigation 
 of the Mississippi, and on imposts, 
 34 ; position on public debt, 36, 
 154 ; and on taxation, 38 ; and on 
 basis of representation, 39 ; engaged 
 to be married, 43; elected to State 
 Assembly, 47 ; on national and state 
 commerce, 53 ; navigation of the 
 Potomac, 55 ; proposition to Mary- 
 land, 56 ; on state of commerce in 
 Virginia, 58 ; proposes a national 
 convention, 59 ; position on treaty 
 obligations, 65 ; his tastes and stud- 
 ies, 71 ; on steam-power, 73 : pre- 
 historic relics in Virginia, 74 ; on 
 necessity of union of the States, 77, 
 79, 314, 336 ; course on the Missis- 
 sippi question and National'Conven- 
 tion in Virginia Assembly, 85 ; 
 “father of the Constitution,” 88; 
 on slave representation, 98 ; differ- 
 ence between the North and the 
 South, 104 ; on slavery, 109, 162, 
 333 ; in the Constitutional Conven- 
 tion, 113 ; author of papers in “ The 
 Federalist,” 116 ; delegate to Con- 
 stitutional Convention of Virginia, 
 117 : de Warville's sketch of him, 
 122 ; candidate for First Congress, 
 124 ; opposed by Patrick Henry, 
 126 ; on presidential title, 130 ; on 
 free trade, 132 ; on the slave-trade, 
 137; difference with Hamilton, 174; 
 
 I changes his party, 181 et seq. ; jour* 
 
INDEX. 341 
 
 ney northward, 184 ; Hamilton's 
 opinion of, 190 ; leads attack on 
 Hamilton, 193 ; on neutrality, 206 ; ! 
 interest in Genet, 208 ; his pity 
 for Washington, 212 ; disapproves 
 Jay’s treaty, 226; as leader in Con- 
 gress, 232 ; marries Mrs. Todd, 233 ; 
 value of his writings, 235, 333 ; his 
 private life and habits, 236, 334 ; 
 resolutions of ’98, 244 et seq. ; Sec- 
 retary of State, 252 ; elected Presi- 
 dent, 283; proclamation repealing 
 embargo, 286 ; proclamation re- 
 called, 288 ; letter to Pinkney, 293 ; 
 pledge to Napoleon on blockade, 
 299 ; attitude toward France and 
 Great Britain, 302 ; letter to Jeffer- 
 son on preparations for war, 304 ; 
 to Barlow, 302, 317 ; complains of 
 France, 305 ; proposes general em- 
 bargo and war with England, 306 ; 
 r< nominated for President, 308 ; 
 purchases Henry's papers, 309 : re- 
 turns to Montpellier, 332 : his char- 
 acter, 324, 333 ; legacy to his coun- 
 try, 336. 
 
 Marblehead, patriotic fishermen of, 
 290. 
 
 Martin, Luther, fears of a monarchy, 
 78 ; on the Constitutional Conven- 
 tion, 92, 93; in the Virginia Con- 
 vention, 119 ; opposes Madison, 126. 
 
 Maryland, proposes meeting of com- 
 missioners, 57, 60. 
 
 Mason, George, on slavery, 106. 
 
 Massachusetts, revolutionary services 
 and public debt of, 158 ; in war of 
 1812, 324. 
 
 Merino sheep, 277. 
 
 Mifflin, Warner, petitions Congress, 
 169. 
 
 Mississippi, navigation of, 32, 80. 
 
 Monroe, James, Minister to France, 
 228 et seq. ; candidate for presiden- 
 tial nomination, 308 ; testimony 
 against Henry, 311. 
 
 Monroe-Pinkney treaty rejected, 288. 
 
 Morris, Gouvemeur, on Jefferson, 
 254, 300. 
 
 Morris, Robert, on slavery, 102, 104. 
 
 Napoleon Bonaparte, his policy, defi- 
 nition of blockade, 298. 
 
 Nicholas, George, offers Kentucky 
 Resolutions of ‘98, 243. 
 
 Non-importation Act of 1810, 291 ; of 
 1811, 300. 
 
 Nullification, Madison’s opinion of, 
 246 ; Jefferson the father of, 249. 
 
 Otis, Harrison Gray, advertised as 
 missing, 324. 
 
 Owen, Robert, corresponds with Mad- 
 ison, 334. 
 
 Paper money, 70. 
 
 Parker, Jonathan, proposes duty on 
 importation of slaves, 135. 
 
 Patterson, William, on slavery, 99. 
 
 Peel, Robert, on the Henry letters, 
 312. 
 
 Pinckney, C. C., on slavery, 102, 148 ; 
 on the Union, 113 ; on Jefferson, 
 254. 
 
 Pinkney, William, minister to Eng- 
 land, *272. 
 
 Potomac Company, plan of, 57. 
 
 Potomac, navigation of, 55. 
 
 Pre-historic remains in Virginia. 74. 
 
 Presidency, succession in the, 184 
 
 President, title of the, 129. 
 
 President, the frigate, battle of, with 
 the Little Belt, 301. 
 
 Quakers. See Friends. 
 
 Quincy, Josiah, on the embargo, 280; 
 on French outrages, 297 ; on foreign 
 relations, 298 ; on Madison’s nomi- 
 nation and the war, 308. 
 
 Rambouillet decree, 295. 
 
 Randolph, John, on the embargo, 
 270. 
 
 Religious freedom, 13, 17, 66, 68. 
 
 Representation in Congress, basis of, 
 39,42. 
 
 Rhode Island, rejects impost law, 34 ; 
 joins the Republican party, 253 ; 
 returns to the Federalist party, 283. 
 
 Rives, William C., biography of Mad- 
 ison, 3, 9, 19 ; on Virginia planta- 
 tion life, 50. 
 
 Rumsey, J., application of steam- 
 power, 73. 
 
 Rutledge, John, on the slave-trade, 
 106. 
 
 Shays’s Rebellion, 76. 
 
 Sherman, Roger, on slavery, 107. 
 
 Slavery, possible extinction of, in the 
 eighteenth century, 41 ; influence 
 of, in Virginia, 49 et seq.; in the 
 Constitution, 95 ; debate on, in the 
 Constitutional Convention 99 et seq.; 
 petitions on, to Congress, 160. 
 
 Slave-trade, domestic, 135 ; in Louis' 
 iana, 261. 
 
 Slave-trade, foreign, debate on duty 
 upon, 136 et seq.; abolition of, 140: 
 policy of the government on, 153, 
 note. 
 
 Smith, Robert, Secretary of State, 
 285 ; demands satisfaction of France 
 295. 
 
842 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Solomon, Hayne, a Jew, befriends 
 Madison, 25. 
 
 South Carolina, revolutionary debt of, 
 158. 
 
 Steam-power first used, 73. 
 
 Tariff, proposed in First Congress, 
 132 ; dreaded effect of, in New Eng- 
 land, 133 ; and at the South, 134 ; 
 on importation of slaves, 135 ; on 
 foreign ships, 142. 
 
 Taxation, 31, 34. 
 
 Todd, Dolly, marries Madison, 233. 
 
 Virginia, ratifies the Constitution of 
 the United States, 120; religious 
 freedom in, 13, 17, 66 ; on the Missis- 
 sippi question, 33, 85 ; on imposts, 
 34 ; public debt, 49 ; planters of, 49 : 
 port bill passed, 53 ; proposed in- 
 structions to her delegates in Con- 
 gress, 59 ; delegates to Convention at 
 Annapolis, 63; refuses compliance 
 
 with treaty with Great Britain, 64*, 
 “ Gerrymandering ” in, 125 ; reso- 
 lutions of ’98, 246. 
 
 Warville de Brissot, sketch of Madi- 
 ison, 122. 
 
 Washington, city, proposed site of cap- 
 ital, 146, 159 ; taken by the British, 
 328. 
 
 Washington, George, delegate to Con- 
 stitutional Convention, 63 ; inaug- 
 uration as first President, 128 ; the 
 official title, 129 ; proclamation of 
 neutrality, 206 ; Jefferson's and 
 Madison's attitude toward, 212 ; 
 principles of his administration, 
 216; portrait of, saved, 330. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, on the war with 
 Great Britain, 321. 
 
 Wilson, James, member of Congress, 
 31 ; on slavery, 100. 
 
 Wright, Frances, corresponds with 
 Madison, 325. 
 
/ 
 
American Statesmen. 
 
 A Series of Biographies of Men famous in the 
 Political History of the United States. Edited by 
 John T. Morse, Jr. Each volume, i6mo, 
 gilt top, $1.25; half morocco, $2.50. 
 
 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. By John T. Morse, Jr. 
 ALEXANDER HAMILTON. By Henry Cabot Lodge. 
 JOHN C. CALHOUN. By Dr. H. Von Holst. 
 
 A NDR E W JACKSON. By IV. G. Sumner. 
 
 JOHN RANDOLPH. By Henry Adams. 
 
 JAMES MONROE. By D. C. Gilman. 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON. By John T. Morse, Jr. 
 DANIEL WEBSTER. By Henry Cabot Lodge. 
 ALBERT GALL A TIN. By John Austin Stevens. 
 JAMES MADISON. By Sydney Howard Gay. 
 JOHN ADAMS. By John T. Morse , Jr. 
 
 JOHN MARSHALL. By Allan B. Magruder. 
 SAMUEL ADAMS. By James K. Hosmer. 
 THOMAS H. BENTON. By Theodore Roosevelt. 
 HENRY CL A Y. By Carl Schurz. 2 vols. 
 
 PATRICK HENRY. By Moses Coit Tyler. 
 GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. By Theodore Roosevelt. 
 MARTIN VAN BUREN. By Edward M. Shepard. 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON. By H. C. Lodge. 2 vols. 
 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN. By John T. Morse, Jr. 
 JOHN JA Y. By George Pellew. 
 
 LEWIS CASS. By Andrew C. McLaughlin. 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN. By J. T. Morse, Jr. 2 vols. 
 Others to be announced hereafter. 
 
CRITICAL NOTICES. 
 
 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. ^^'.aTtaThe S 
 
 be those of posterity we have very little doubt, and he has set an 
 admirable example to his coadjutors in respect of interesting 
 narrative, just proportion, and judicial candor. — New York 
 Evening Post. 
 
 TT n MTT TT) AT TIle biography of Mr. Lodge is calm and 
 
 Ul . dignified throughout. He has the virtue — 
 rare indeed among biographers — of impartiality. He has done 
 his work with conscientious care, and the biography of Ham- 
 ilton is a book which cannot have too many readers. It is more 
 than a biography; it is a study in the science of government.— 
 St. Paul Pioneer Press. 
 
 p a r tern tt at Nothing can exceed the skill with which the 
 c/IL/Jt/t . political career of the great South Carolinian 
 is portraved in these pages. The work is superior to any other 
 number of the series thus far, and we do not think it can be sur- 
 passed by any of those that are to come. The whole discussion 
 in relation to Calhoun’s position is eminently philosophical and 
 just. — The Dial (Chicago). 
 
 ‘yjryfM/k Professor Sumner has ... all in all, made 
 /dl/Aowv. the j us test long estimate of Jackson that has 
 had itself put between the covers of a book. — New York 
 Times. 
 
 P , NrpfgiT pur The book has been to me intensely inter- 
 
 E'U P • esting. ... It is rich in new facts and side 
 
 fights, and is worthy of its place in the already brilliant series 
 of monographs on American Statesmen. — Prof. Moses Coit 
 Tyler. 
 
 AT n ATP DR -*- n Nearness of style, and in all points of liter- 
 Hl U1VJX. UJd. a ry W orkmanship, from cover to cover, the 
 volume is well-nigh perfect. There are also a calmness of judg- 
 ment, a correctness of taste, and an absence of partisanship 
 which are too frequently wanting in biographies, and especially 
 in political biographies. — American Literary Churchman (Bal- 
 timore). 
 
 TfTT T7TTP P SO AT The book is exceedingly interesting and 
 j-jnst u . readable. The attention of the reader is 
 strongly seized at once, and he is carried along in spite of him- 
 self, sometimes protesting, sometimes doubting, yet unable to lay 
 the book down. — Chicago Standard. 
 
 Vf/77 R C TJ7 P It read by students of history ; it will 
 
 IV LLnEl LLK. k e i nva ] ua p,le as a work of reference; it 
 will be an authority as regards matters of fact and criticism ; it 
 hits the keynote of Webster’s durable and evergrowing fame; 
 it is adequate, calm, impartial ; it is admirable. — Philadelphia 
 Press. 
 
T J T T A TTJV ' s one most carefully prepared of 
 
 Lr/lEPri ■- . ^ese ver y valuable volumes, . . . abound- 
 ing in information not so readily accessible as is that pertaining 
 to men more often treated by the biographer. . . . The whole 
 work covers a ground which the political student cannot afford 
 to neglect. — Boston Correspondent Hartford Courant. 
 
 M A 71 T’sDJV Tim execution of the work deserves the high- 
 IVlsiui . est p ra i se- jt i s ver y readable, in a bright 
 
 and vigorous style, and is marked by unity and consecutiveness 
 of plan. — 7 he Nation (New York). 
 
 <vrt IP AT A n J T/N A g°°d P iece of literary work. ... It 
 ' covers the ground thoroughly, and 
 gives just the sort of simple and succinct account that is wanted. 
 — Evening Post (New York). 
 
 T,r < n o tta t t Well done, with simplicity, clearness, pre- 
 1 * ' cision, and judgment, and in a spirit of 
 
 moderation and equity. A valuable addition to the series. — 
 New York Tribune. 
 
 SAMUEL ADAMS. 
 
 Thoroughly appreciative and sym- 
 pathetic, yet fair and critical. . . . 
 This biography is a piece of good work — a clear and simple 
 presentation of a noble man and pure patriot ; it is written in a 
 spirit of candor and humanity. — Worcester Spy. 
 
 BENTON An intetesting addition to our political liter- 
 ature, and will be of great service if it spread 
 an admiration for that austere public morality which was one of 
 the marked characteristics of its chief figure. — The Epoch 
 (New York). 
 
 (JNA Y. M r e l' ave ' n this life of Henry Clay a biography of 
 one of the most distinguished of American states- 
 men, and a political history of the United States for the first 
 half of the nineteenth century. In each of these important and 
 difficult undertakings, Mr. Schurzhas been eminently successful. 
 Indeed, it is not too much to say that, for the period covered, 
 we have no other book which equals or begins to equal this life 
 of Henry Clay as an introduction to the study of American pol- 
 itics. — Political Science Quarterly (New York). 
 
 JTENRY. P r °f essor Tyler has not only made one of the 
 best and most readable of American biographies ; 
 he may fairly be said to have reconstructed the life of Patrick 
 Henry, and to have vindicated the memory of that great man 
 from the unappreciative and injurious estimate which has been 
 placed upon it. — New York Evening Post. 
 
 MORRIS Mr. Roosevelt has produced an animated and 
 intensely interesting biographical volume. . . . 
 Mr. Roosevelt never loses sight of the picturesque background 
 of politics, war -governments, and diplomacy. — Magazine oj 
 American History (New York). 
 
VAN B UREN more generous, appreciative, or just 
 biograph}', and no more interesting or 
 philosophical piece of political history has appeared in this valu- 
 able series . . . than this absorbing book. . . . To give any ad- 
 equate idea of the personal interest of the book, or its intimate 
 bearing on nearly the whole course of our political history would 
 be equivalent to quoting the larger part of it. — Brooklyn Eagle. 
 
 l/VA ’sFTTNCTO N Mr. Lodge has written an admirable 
 biography, and one which cannot but 
 confirm the American people in the prevailing estimate concern- 
 ing the Father of his Country ; but its deepest and most impor- 
 tant significance appears to us to consist in its testimony to the 
 exaltation and the uniqueness of a character whose like comes 
 seldom to the world, and only in periods of great stress and cri- 
 sis. — New York Tribune. 
 
 ERAAR'L IA T H e ^ as n ' ana g e( I to condense the whole 
 
 mass of matter gleaned from all sources 
 into his volume without losing in a single sentence the freedom 
 or lightness of his style or giving his book in any part the 
 crowded look of an epitome. He has plenty of time and plenty 
 of room for all he wishes to say, and says it in the very best and 
 most interesting manner. — The Independent (New York). 
 
 JAY. In his long career — as member of the Continental 
 Congress, President of Congress, member of the Con- 
 stitutional Convention, Foreign Secretary, Chief Justice of the 
 United States, governor of New York, Minister to Spain, spe- 
 cial envoy to England — no breath of suspicion or doubt attached 
 to his fame. ... It is an important addition to the admirable 
 series of “ American Statesmen,” and elevates yet higher the 
 character of a man whom all American patriots must delight to 
 honor. — New York Tribune. 
 
 CASS. Professor McLaughlin has given us one of the most 
 satisfactory volumes in this able and important series. 
 It ought to be read in the East as well as the West, but in the 
 Northwest it ought to be read in every hamlet from Detroit 
 to Puget Sound. The early life of Cass was devoted to the 
 Northwest, and in the transformation which overtook it the 
 work of Cass was the work of a national statesman. — New York 
 Times. 
 
 LINCOLN. Asa Life of Lincoln it has no competitors ; as 
 a political history of the Union side during the 
 Civil War, it is the most comprehensive, and, in proportion to 
 its range, the most compact. — Harvard Graduates’ Magazine. 
 
 For Sale by all Booksellers. Sent, post-paid, on receipt of 
 price by the Publishers, 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, 
 
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