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I 
 
 THREE 
 
 DIALOGUES 
 
 CON CEP NING 
 
 LIBERTY. 
 
DUKE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 Treasure %oom 
 
THREE 
 
 DIALOGUES 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 LIBERTY. 
 
 |L,ibcrtatem, quam in me requiris, quam ego 
 neque dimifi unquam, neque dimittam, non 
 in pertinacia, fed in quadani moderatione 
 pofitam putabo. 
 
 Cicero, Oratio pro Cn. Pancio. 
 
 LONDON: 
 Printed for J. D O D S L E Y, in Pall-Mall. 
 
 M.DCC.LXXVI. 
 
« 
 
 THREE 
 
 DIALOGUES 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 .LIBERTY. 
 
 ' — . — ». 
 
 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 / g ^ W O winters have pafTed, fince 
 -"- a friend, of a ftudious turn of 
 mind, and fond of retirement, was 
 prevailed on, reiu(5i:antly, to pafs a 
 few of the winter weeks with me in 
 
 town. As, with a very good un- 
 
 derftanding, he hath acquired a calm- 
 nefs of mind, which enables him to 
 judge of things with great accuracy 
 and difmtereftednefs, I was frequently 
 deliglited, by hearing his opuiions of 
 B thofe 
 
 TK,K 
 3xU 
 
2 DIALOGUE L 
 
 thofe political difputes, whith take up 
 fo much of the time and thoughts of 
 the good people of this great city. 
 
 He would fay, it was furprizing to 
 fee fo great a number of people as he 
 met with every where, fo warm and 
 fo agitated about a fubjeft, of which 
 .if they were not intirely ignorant, 
 they had certainly given themfelves 
 very little trouble to examine into 
 
 the nature of, He meant the fub^. 
 
 je£l of Liberty. 
 
 I thought it but fair, that he who> 
 laughed at the abfurdity and ignorance 
 of others, fhould produce his own opi- 
 nions on the fame fubje6l. I there- 
 fore drew him, one evening when we 
 were left together without other com- 
 pany, infenfibly to the point I intend- 
 ed, and urged him to give me his 
 thoughts on the fubje6l of Liberty, 
 
 the 
 
DIALOGUE I. ^3 
 
 tile nature of which, I faid, I had ne- 
 ver very nicely confidered. He 
 
 hefitated a moment, and faid, he knew 
 I was not one of thofe, who enquire 
 through an impertinent curiofity, or 
 who argue to. gain a vi6i:ory ; he would 
 therefore freely give his opinion on 
 the fubjecl, provided, I would not fail 
 to interrogate him, when he fliould 
 not fufficiently explain himfelf j and 
 would not let any thing pafs unexa- 
 mined, which I might think wrong or 
 
 not fufficiently clear. 1 promifed, 
 
 and he began as follows. 
 
 Liberty is a word, taken as it is 
 vulgarly ufcd, of a very indeterminate 
 fignification, and, like many others of 
 the moral kind, very few people have, 
 ^ve7z nearly i the fame ideas affixed to it. 
 
 ; But it doth not from thence fol- 
 
 B 2 ' h:)w. 
 
4 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 low, that it, as well as others of the 
 lame kind, is incapable of definition; 
 but that more care is required to trace 
 out and place it in its true point of 
 
 view. Here he flopped. 
 
 I begged he would proceed -, for that 
 I knew of none more likely than 
 himfelf to place it in its true point of 
 
 view. The doubt of that, he faid, 
 
 was the thing which made him paufe ; 
 for the refearch muft be deep into the 
 natural conflitution of man. Yet he 
 thought the fubje6l much more fimple 
 than was commonly imagined ; and 
 that the intricacies and uncertainties, 
 which fome could fancy themfelves 
 able to difcover in fuch fubjefts, arofe 
 more from prejudice and perverfity, 
 than from the nature of the things. 
 He faid, it appeared to him, that 
 
 the 
 
DIALOGUE I. 5 
 
 the liberty or freedom of man, in an 
 abflra6led fenfe, confifted in a power 
 of doing, or of forbearing to do, any 
 
 a6lion, at his pleafure. If there 
 
 were any impediment, either to his 
 doing, or not doing any action, he 
 was in fuch cafe not free ; he was 
 confined on the' one fide, or on the 
 
 other.- 1 afientcd. It may fcem 
 
 trifling, continued he, to fiy, that 
 man hath not a freedom of choice in 
 things fuperior to his nature ; and 
 that God hath fet bounds to the 
 powers of human nature which can- 
 not be exceeded : yet it appears re- 
 quifite to fay fo much, becaufe, you 
 know, there have not been wantincr 
 many inftances of men, whofe memo- 
 ries have failed them in that parti- 
 
 cular. True, faid I, as Alexander 
 
 B 3 when 
 
6 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 when he fancied himfelf a God,- 
 
 Aye, faid he, and as evei*y one who 
 fancies himfelf endued with faculties 
 or powers, which are either above or 
 below human nature; and they doubt- 
 lefs have been, and are numerous. 
 
 But, added he, the all-wife Creator 
 hath thought fit to circumfcribe the; 
 powers of Man, and he can a6l only 
 within a certain fphere : within that 
 fphere the utmoft freedom of human 
 a6lions is neccflarily confined: beyond 
 
 it man can do nothing. He looked 
 
 at me. — — True, faid I ; But may a 
 man, then, do all that he hath power 
 to do, within the circumfcribed line ? 
 May every capricious fancy be in- 
 dulged ? or are there reafons, why 
 Liberty fo extenfive fliould fuffer re- 
 straint ? There are, anfwered he, 
 
 very 
 
DIALOGUE I. 7 
 
 very fubftantial reafons to be giveii% 
 why the L«ibeity of man fiiould bw re- 
 
 ftrained within narrower bounds.-: 
 
 But how narrow are thofe bounds ? 
 interrogated I, fomewhat fliarply ; 
 and what fhould move him to contain 
 himfelf within them ? It was dif- 
 ficult, he faid, to draw precifely the 
 line which ought not to be pafled, in 
 all cafes, perhaps almoft impofTible : 
 vet he thou2;ht he could do it well 
 enough to fatisfy the mind of any ra- 
 tional man. 1 fmiled, begged he 
 
 would go on, and leave the minds of 
 
 irrational men* difiatisfied. He 
 
 proceeded thus. 
 
 All creatures, every one according 
 
 to his kind or fpecies, are created 
 
 fubje6l to laws, proper and peculiar 
 
 to their feveral natures, and fuitable 
 
 B 4 to 
 
8 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 to the ends of the Supreme Bemg. 
 
 • True, faid I. The creature 
 
 man too, continued he, is created fub- 
 je6l to laws equally proper and pecu- 
 liar to his nature : and the Deity hath 
 not only made him fenfibly to feel 
 them, but hath enabled him to un- 
 derftand their reafonablenefs, and to 
 perceive their beauty and excellence : 
 and in this underftanding and percep- 
 tion confifts the great difference be- 
 tween man and other creatures. 'Theyy 
 while left to themfelves, feem to be 
 guided by an unerring inftin6f ; but 
 ^joe are allowed a larger field, and are 
 capable of a certain degree of refiftance 
 to the true and natural impulfes or laws 
 of our nature •, wliich God appears to 
 have allowed to man, that he might 
 2iot be incapable of merit -, the merit 
 ^ of 
 
¥ 
 
 DIALOGUE I. 9 
 
 of freely choofing to obey thofe true 
 and natural impulfes, by which God 
 doth point out his will in the foul of 
 
 man.- 1 think, faid I, I perfe6lly 
 
 agree with you 3 only I do not well 
 underftand what you mean, when you 
 fay, ** we are capable of a certain degree 
 ** of refiftance to the true and natural 
 *' impulfes or laws of our nature." 
 
 1 mean, anfwered he, that we can 
 
 refifl and a61: contrary to thofe im- 
 pulfes, which would move us to con- 
 duct ourfelves agreeably to our own 
 true happinefs, and to the general 
 2:ood of our kind : but that we can 
 only refifl: to a certain degree-, fufFicient 
 indeed to torment ourfelves and others, 
 and one would think, therefore, fuffi- 
 cient to convince us of our errors : yet 
 ^he utmoft force of human difobe- 
 
 dience 
 
% 
 
 10 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 dience arid perveiTity is, doubtlefs, too. 
 weSk* and too much circumfcribed, 
 to be able to bring about a general 
 deftrudlion of our kind ; and furely 
 much too infignificant, to difturb the 
 general order and harmony of the 
 univerfal fyftem. — — It Ihould feem 
 then, replied I, (fmce our power of 
 refiftance extends only to the torment- 
 ing of ourfelves and others) agreeable 
 to the true happinefs of individuals, 
 and to the good of all, not to refift, 
 but to obey, thofe true and natural 
 
 impulfes or laws you fpeak of. 
 
 Doubtlefs, rejoined he ; and becaufe 
 the true happinefs, and the true good 
 of all, and of every individual, require 
 obedience to thofe laws ; therefore the 
 greateft liberty of man ought to be 
 reflrained within narrower bounds : 
 
 within 
 
DIALOGUE r. II 
 
 within bounds which thofe laws would 
 prefcribe. 
 
 I am convinced, faid I, that our 
 greatcft liberty, or freedom of aftion, 
 ought not to be cxercifed in its fuUefl 
 extent ; and it mufl be acknowledged, 
 that reftraints are neceflary : but what 
 thofe rcftraints ought to be, and how 
 far they ought to extend, are points 
 about which mankind feem to be very 
 far from entertaining the fame fenti- 
 
 mciits. 'Tis true, anfwered he, 
 
 men do feem to differ widely about 
 thofe things ; but their differences do 
 not arife io much from any natural 
 difiiculty in the fubje6l, as from the 
 prepofTcdion of eftablillied prejudices : 
 fuch iSs falfe religions, unnatural cuf- 
 toms, mifguided palTions, and merce- 
 naiy contentions. — —Surrounded by 
 
 fuch 
 
12 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 fuch dark clouds, ignes fatui for their 
 guides, leading various and contrary 
 ways ', it is not very furprizing that 
 the minds of men do not agree con- 
 cerning a matter, which can only be 
 underftood by looking clofely into 
 themfelves, and obfei*ving there thofe 
 laws which God hath imprefled on the 
 
 foul of man. But, to the truth of 
 
 a proportion, or the exiflence of a 
 thing, the univerfal confent of man- 
 kind is not a/wajs neceflary. How- 
 ever,. I do not find that men differ 
 much in material points, when they 
 can fo far conquer their prejudices as 
 to compare notes with a moderate 
 fhare of patience : nor, indeed, is it 
 pofTible they fhould, fmce God hath 
 given the fame laws to all human 
 nature. — ■ — It feems, replied I, you 
 
 think 
 
DIALOGUE I. 13 
 
 think thofe prejudices you fpeak of 
 (and which, doubtlefs, do very ftrong- 
 ly influence the minds of many) have 
 caft obfcuritics around nature, through 
 which flie is not eafily difcerned ; but 
 could we diveft ourfelves of thofe pre- 
 judices, we fliould difcovcr much more 
 fimplicity in the laws impcfed on hu- 
 man nature than is commonly ima- 
 gined ? It is jufc what I think, 
 
 anfwered he. 1 believe you were 
 
 going to explain fome of thofe laws 
 
 when I interrupted you ? faid I. 
 
 I was endeavouring to colleft my 
 thoughts for that purpofe, anfwered 
 he : and I think we had agreed that 
 our greatefl liberty ought to be re- 
 ftrained within bounds,, which the 
 true laws of our nature would pre- 
 fcribe ; becaufe the true happinefs 
 M. and 
 
14 D I A L O G U E I. 
 
 and good of all required fuch reflraint f 
 
 . 1 anfwered, we had : and now I 
 
 want to know what thofe laws are> 
 which may be deemed jufi: reftraints 
 on our more extenfive liberty 5 and 
 which it is the true happinefs of all 
 
 to fubmit to. 1 will. endeavour to 
 
 fatisfy you, faid he, as well as I can : 
 to do which it will be neceflary to 
 take the matter fomcwhat deeply, as 
 I faid before, and to carry our re- 
 fearches to the fundamental principles 
 of human nature : yet I do not mean 
 to enter into all the minute dilHnc- 
 tions of fome refined moral writers, 
 not only becaufe they would be unne- 
 cefiary to our prefent purpofe, but 
 becaufe I know you are not unac- 
 quainted with them. -I looked 
 
 confent, and he went on as follows. 
 
 5 K 
 
wff 
 
 DIALOdUE I. 
 
 It having been ordained by the 
 Great Creator, that the continuation 
 of the human kind fliould be pre- 
 ferved by generation ; and that we 
 fliould afcend from the loweft degrees 
 of weaknefs and ignorance, by a very 
 flow and gradual progreflion, to cor- 
 poreal ftrength and a reafonable mind j 
 he hath accordingly endued us with 
 affe6lions and paffions (or laws) fuit- 
 able and fubfei*vient to thefe ends, 
 Certainly. The paffion be- 
 tween the fexes, and the confequent 
 afFe6lion toward the offspring, and 
 all the other affe6lions which take 
 their rife from family, have their 
 foundations in human nature, and 
 are evidently intended to continue 
 tlie being of the kind, and to fecure 
 the nurture and fupport of thofe, 
 
 who 
 
i6 D I A L O G U E I. "♦ 
 
 who would be unable to nourifh and 
 
 fupport themfelves. True, faid I. 
 
 And do not thefe laws, interro- 
 gated he, a6l upon us with an almoft 
 invincible force; as, indeed, the impor- 
 tance of their end, and the great diffi- 
 culties in the progrefs to that end, 
 
 require they fhould ? They do 
 
 indeed, anfwered I; for nothing feems 
 fo much to agitate the human frame, 
 as the fenfe we have of thefe laws : 
 nothing throws us into fo great irre- 
 gularities as the violation of them. 
 They are the great fources, from 
 whence we derive all that is pathetic, 
 all that is moft aife6ling and moft 
 interefling to human nature. 
 Then, faid he, I may infer, that you 
 will not difpute the authority, which 
 all thofe tender affinities of hufband 
 
 and 
 
DIALOGUE I. 17 
 
 Sind wife, of parent and child, of bro- 
 ther and filler, and other more diflant 
 relatives, ought to have over our con- 
 
 cluft ? By all means, replied I. 
 
 So that all the moral obligations, 
 
 continued he, w^hich muft naturally 
 arife from thofe tender affinities, we 
 may juftly call laws ; which the being 
 of our kind, and the concord and {la- 
 bility of families, require that men 
 
 fhould fubmit to ? 1 think fo, an- 
 
 fwered I. May we not conclude 
 
 then, demanded he, that the liberty 
 of man ought to fufFer fuch reflraints 
 as f^efe laws would put on it 5 and 
 that he can have no jufl pretence to 
 exercife any liberty contrary to thefe 
 
 laws ? Doubtlefs, anfwered I.~ — - 
 
 Here then, faid he, we fee arife many 
 
 reflraints on liberty, which moralifls 
 
 C have 
 
i8 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 have particularized, and which are fo 
 eafy to underftand, that few can be 
 ignorant of them. But thefe are not 
 all ; there are many more, which, in 
 a general way, I will endeavour to 
 
 point out. 1 defned him to go on. 
 
 All thofe kind propenfities, con- 
 tinued he, which are commonly un- 
 derftood by the words, humanity, ge- 
 nerofity, benevolence, &c. why may 
 we not call them true and natural laws 
 
 of our nature ? 1 fee no objection, 
 
 faid I. In contradifliinftion, con- 
 tinued he, to inhumanity, felfifhnefs, 
 and malevolence, which are rightly 
 called unnaturaly as having tenden- 
 cies contrary and inimical to human 
 nature ? 
 
 The Deity hath fo ftrongly impreffed 
 them on the foul of man, and fo clearly 
 
 diftinguilhed 
 
DIALOGUE L 19 
 
 diflinguiflied them as the true guides 
 of human a6lions, by the pleafure 
 they yield to the pra6lifer, the love 
 and admiration they draw from men, 
 and the great utility of fuch virtues 
 to the world, that the man's mind 
 mull be ftrangely perverted from its 
 natural bent, who is not fenfible of 
 fuch laws in his foul. For though 
 bad cuftoms, bad education, and un- 
 natural manners, may very much de- 
 face the original impreflions which 
 God hath flamped on the human foul ; 
 yet thofe impreflions can never be in- 
 tirely deftroyed> as long as man con- 
 tinues fubje6l to the prefent ftate of 
 
 humanity. Indeed, I think fo, faid 
 
 I. We can indeed, continued he, 
 
 render ourfelves infenfible of a thou- 
 
 fand moae refined and pleafmg emo- 
 
 C 2 tio;is 
 
20 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 tlons of the foul ; but not without 
 exchanghig them for painful ones. 
 For nature feems conflant in this 
 precept -, Obey my laws, they lead to 
 pleafure, or fuffer the pains of difobe" 
 dience. It is impofliblc to extirpate 
 them ; it is impoflible to oppofe them 
 without pain -, it is impoflible to be 
 indifferent. They are a principal part 
 of our nature, and nothing can deflroy 
 
 their force, but death. 1 cannot 
 
 dilfent from you, faid L It will 
 
 then, faid he, be unnecefl^ary to our 
 prefent purpofe, to moralize more par- 
 ticularly. And we may be permitted 
 to make this inference,' — That, as 
 obedience to thefe laws conduces to 
 the good and felicity of every indivi- 
 dual, and of mankind in general -, and 
 as difobedience has a contrary effe(5l ; 
 
 5 it 
 
DIALOGUE I. 21 
 
 it is but jiift and reafonable, that the 
 liberty of man fliould fuffer fuch re- 
 ftraints as may be necefTary to prevent 
 
 him from offending againft them. . 
 
 I am of the fame opinion, faid I. 
 Thus then, faid he, we have, in a ge- 
 neral v^ay, drawn the outlines of thofe 
 laws of the human nature, which it 
 hath pleafed the Creator to impofe on 
 it, for ends, which, we have agreed, 
 are intirely for the advantage and fe- 
 licity of the creature. Nor do we 
 deem it unjuft to retrain the Uberty 
 of man, when he would tranfirrcfs 
 
 thcfe laws, ■ True, faid I : But 
 
 who fliall reftrain his liberty ? who 
 fliall enforce obedience ? Why may 
 he not trample on the laws of his 
 nature, and fuffer the pains of difobe- 
 4iencey without being compelled to 
 C 3 obey ; 
 
22 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 obey ; fmce nature, it feems, only 
 points out felicity in obedience, and 
 mifery in difobedience, but leaves man 
 
 to choofe ? Your queftion, replied 
 
 he, would be unanfwerable, if there 
 were but one man on the earth at a 
 time ; or if men were fo fituated, 
 that they had not the leaft neceflary 
 connection or commerce with each 
 other. But the fa6l being quite con- 
 trary, as we have feen in the preced- 
 ing part of our difcourfe, and men 
 being, by the very nature of their ex- 
 iftence, necefTarily interefted in, and 
 connected with one another, they 
 thereby acquire a juft right to con- 
 troul the a6lions of each other -, fo 
 far, at leaft, as to prevent injury to 
 themfelves. But the principal foun- 
 dation of right in men to efiforce 
 
 obedience 
 
DIALOGUE I. 23 
 
 obedience on each other, to the true 
 laws of their nature, is derived from 
 their natural equality, How ! in- 
 terrogated I, do you, then, maintain 
 that levelling principle, that men are 
 naturally equal, when there are natu- 
 ral inequalities among them fo very 
 
 manifeft ? 1 do, anfwered he : but 
 
 I fancy the ideas, which you and I 
 have affixed to the word equality , in 
 this inftance, are very different. What 
 mine are, with your permifTion, I will 
 endeavour to explain* in as few words 
 
 as poffible. 1 begged he would; 
 
 and he proceeded thus. 
 
 All creatures of the fame kind are 
 created under laws peculiar to their 
 kind. All men are of the fame kind, 
 and are doubtlefs created under laws 
 peculiar to their kind : and in this 
 C 4 refpe6t 
 
24 DIALOGUE I, 
 
 refpe(5l it is that all men are certainly 
 
 equal. So it appears to me, faid I, 
 
 But are the great differences in the 
 faculties and abilities of men no ob-. 
 
 je6lion againft this equality ? Not 
 
 at all, anfwered he. The pofTeilion 
 of great bodily ftrength, for inflance, 
 gives a man no juft title to ufe that 
 flrength mifchievoufly, and againft the 
 laws of humanity : he may polTefs fome 
 of, or all, the faculties of the body iin 
 greater perfe6lion than other men ; 
 but thefe faculties are given him fub- 
 je(5led to the fame natural laws which 
 are common to all men : nor can he 
 by fuperior force tranfgrefs the laws 
 common to his kind by nature, with-, 
 out injuftice. He may bear greater 
 burdens, run fwifter, ftiew more agi- 
 lity in adtion, &c, and all the fuperior 
 
 advantage^ 
 
DIALOGUE I. 25 
 
 advantages refulting from thefe facul- 
 ties jiijlly iifed, he hath a right to, but 
 
 no other. Your reafoning feems 
 
 juft, faid I : But what fay you to fu- 
 perior mental powers ? Have they no 
 better claim than thofe of the body ? 
 In this cafe, anfwered he, they ap- 
 pear to me to have lefs. Superior un- 
 derftanding, far from allowing a man 
 to difpenfe with the laws of human na- 
 ture, more ilri6lly binds him to a nice 
 obfervance of them. He is unpar- 
 donable, if he do no more than com- 
 mon men in praclifmg and promoting 
 a due obedience to them. Great ge- 
 nius enables him to be more tho- 
 roughly convinced of the truth and 
 juftice of thefe laws. He perceives 
 more, underftands more, than inferior 
 piinds : Can we, from thence, infer, 
 
 he 
 
26 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 he hath a right to tranfgrefs thefe laws, 
 which the inferior hath not ? or, if the 
 inferior tranfgrefs, is he not more par- 
 donable than the fuperior genius, for 
 that very reafon, becaufe he is inferior ? 
 
 1 cannot but confefs it, faid I ? 
 
 No man, then, continued he, pofielling 
 any quality or property of the human 
 nature in a fuperior degree, can from 
 thence, with the leaft fhew" of reafon,^ 
 fuppofe himfelf not juftly bound by 
 the fame laws of his nature, by which 
 all men are bound : for all degrees of 
 human qualities or properties, from 
 the leaft to the greateft without ex- 
 ception, are inconteftably given by 
 God, under the very fame natural 
 laws, which are common to the hu- 
 man kind. And until a man demon- 
 ftrate, that he is created under laws 
 
 peculiar 
 
DIALOGUE I. 27 
 
 peculiar to himfelf, and not thofe 
 known and felt by other men, (which, 
 by the way, would be to prove him- 
 felf not a man, but fome other crea- 
 ture) there cannot be the leaft reafon 
 to fuppofe him exempted from fub- 
 jeclion to thofe laws, which are com- 
 mon to the human nature. By 
 
 no means, faid I. -We have, then, 
 
 faid he, not only difcovered, that the 
 liberty of man ought to be reftrained 
 by the laws peculiar to his nature j 
 but that all men are by nature equally 
 
 fubjefled to thefe laws. So it 
 
 feems, returned I. 
 
 I Vvdll, continued he, with your 
 leave, fay fomewhat more of the na- 
 ture and efFe6ls of this equality. 
 
 I am all attention, faid I. 
 
 He 
 
28 DIALOGUE L 
 
 He proceeded thus. If a man offend, 
 in fuch a manner, againft the laws of 
 human nature, that the ill effects be 
 abfolutely confined to his own perfon, 
 (which is, llri6lly fpeaking, hardly 
 pofiible) and be no way detrimental 
 to others j he does not feem to be ac- 
 countable to any, but to God and 
 himfelf. But, for the leafl tranf- 
 greflion, which injures, or tends to 
 injure, his equals and fellow-crea- 
 tures, he is accountable to them, as. 
 well as to his Maker. Men, being- 
 injured, or having y«/? caufe to fear in- 
 jury, and being equal, have therefore an 
 indifputable right to ufe all reafonable 
 means of prevention and corre6lion ; 
 regulating their condu6l by the laws 
 of their nature 3 lince, otherwife, that 
 
 juft 
 
DIALOGUE I. 25 
 
 juft equality of the human kind could 
 never be, in any tolerable degree, pre- 
 ferved. 
 
 Nor can it be conceived, by what 
 right, any man, or number of men, 
 could corre6l the wrong or unjuft ac- 
 tions of another, if this natural equa- 
 lity had no exiftence : Every one would 
 have reafon to think he might do any 
 thing he could do, without regard to 
 others ; as containing in himfelf fpe- 
 cific qualities, which made the laws 
 of his nature peculiar to himfelf, and 
 not the fame as thofe which are com- 
 mon to all men. But as no man is a 
 fpecies of himfelf, but only a part of 
 a fpecies, he cannot have laws pecu- 
 liar to himfelf; but muft be fubje6led 
 to thofe, which are common to all of 
 his fpecies. It will not be under- 
 
 flood. 
 
5o DIALOGUE L 
 
 flood, continued he, that equality iri 
 point of property is intended ; for 
 that is not only impoffible in the 
 natural courfe of things, but neither 
 reafonable or juil. The laws of our 
 nature are not at all infringed, by a 
 jujl ufe of the advantages, which fu- 
 perior wdfdom, or fuperior induftry, 
 gives one man over another : On the 
 contrary, it would be great injuftice, 
 and great difcouragement to all merit, 
 to take from them thofe advantages 
 and emoluments, which they may na- 
 turally acquire without breach of the 
 
 laws of the human nature, Here he 
 
 paufed, feeming to expe6l fome reply. 
 — — I am glad, faid I, to find myfelf, 
 by your lafl obfei*vations, relieved from 
 the dread I had of the levelling prin- 
 ciples, which at firfl I thought would 
 
 have 
 
DIALOGUE I. 3I 
 
 have been the confequence of this na- 
 tural equality. But now I think I 
 clearly underftand you ; nor do I know 
 of any rational objection to equality 
 thus explained. Yet I do not quite 
 comprehend, how^ the right which 
 men exercife over each other, of pu- 
 nifliing and corre6ling tranfgreflions 
 againft the laws of their nature, is de- 
 rived from their natural equality. I 
 thought juflice gave them that right ? 
 — 'Tis true, anfwered he, juflice does 
 give them that right. But be pleafed 
 to obferve, that, from equality, under- 
 ftood as we have explained it, the no^ 
 tion of jujlice takes its rife among 
 men j and the laws of their nature, 
 which equally bind all men, are the 
 principles, by which the adminiftra- 
 tion of it fliould be regulated. An 
 
 appeal 
 
32 DIALOGUE t. 
 
 appeal to juftice, is nothing but dil 
 appeal to thofe natural laws, by which 
 the juft equality of mankind is to be 
 preferved ; and the felf-partiahty of 
 parties concerned requires, that the 
 determination fliould be left to unin-» 
 
 terefted judges. The notion of juf-* 
 
 tice hath no exiftence, where an equa- 
 lity in nature is not underftood 
 
 Take away that equality in nature (as 
 among creatures of different fpecies) 
 and juftice is no more feen, nor the 
 claim of jviftice heard. The fuperior 
 fpecies (if capable of reafon) may ex^ 
 hibit benevolence, but juftice is quite 
 out of the queftion. Nor can a 
 creature of one fpecies, adminifter 
 juflice to creatures of a different fpe- 
 cies J becaufe he cannot be fuffici- 
 ently fenfible of the laws of a different 
 
 fpecies. 
 
DIALOGUE I. 33 
 
 fpecies, by which his judgments fhould 
 be regulated. So that every fpecies of 
 creatures, a6ling conformably to the 
 laws of its nature, although it may 
 be injurious to other fpecies, is not 
 deemed unjufl on that account. No 
 man, for inftance, complains of in- 
 juftice on account of any injurious 
 a6tions done againft himfclf by beings 
 which he does not believe to be fub- 
 jefted to thofe natural laws, which 
 men are fubjc6led to. If a lion de- 
 vour a man, lie is not underflood to 
 be unjufl ; we fuppofe the creature to 
 a6l only in conformity to the laws of 
 his nature. If inundations deftroy, 
 the fun burn, the froft chill, or the 
 winds carry away, no injuftice is at- 
 tributed to thefe elements ; nor could 
 be, fuppofmg them to be intelligent 
 9 D beings. 
 
34 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 beings, aEliiated by the true laws of 
 their natures, any more than to the 
 lion, who was a6luated by the laws 
 of his nature. Nor do we conceive, 
 that, in the ufes we make of other 
 creatures, fo far at leaft as our nature 
 feems to require, we do them any in- 
 juftice. Juftice or injuftice, then, do 
 not appear to be concerned in the 
 actions of fuperior natures, a6ling ac- 
 cording to their true laws, on inferior 
 
 natures, or vice verfa. 1 think, I 
 
 am convinced, faid I ; only I fear the 
 attribute of juftice, which we give to 
 the Deity, may be called in queflion, 
 by what you fay of the incapacity of 
 a fuperior fpecies to exercife juftice 
 over an inferior : may it not ? — • 
 Not at all, anfwered he ; for the Deity 
 bears no fimilitude to created beings, 
 
 ill 
 
DIALOGUE I. 35 
 
 iti that refpet^l. He is the Creator of 
 all beings, and of the laws of all be- 
 ings ; and mull therefore be, without 
 controverfy, a moft perfe6l judge of 
 the lawSj and of the nature, of all the 
 creatures in theuniverfe^ which can- 
 not be faid of any created beings. 
 
 Your anfwer, faid I, feems fatis- 
 
 fa^lory; yet now another doubt arifes. 
 You have faid, ** The notion of juftice 
 ** hath no exiilence, where an equality 
 ** in nature is not underftood." Now, 
 what equality in nature is there be- 
 tween God and man ? or doth not the 
 notion of juftice exift between them ? 
 
 This difficulty, anfwered he, is 
 
 not fo great as at firft it may appear. 
 The equality, which is the foundation 
 of juftice between God and man, is 
 hot to be fought for in the nature of 
 D ^ God 
 
 
36 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 God and the nature of man; for ther6 
 the difference is infinite, and beyond 
 all comprehenfion : but it is to be 
 fought for, and will be found, in the 
 laws which God has given to human 
 it nature, and the powers and faculties 
 
 of man ; which he has fo nicely and 
 juflly proportioned to each other, that 
 perhaps there cannot in nature be 
 found a more exa6l equality. Nor 
 will it, I think, be difputed, that the 
 Deity is fo jufl in the laws he has given 
 to every fpecies of creatures, as to pro- 
 portion the faculties of the creatures 
 to their laws : and that more is not 
 expedled, than is adequate to the fa- 
 culties any creature may pofTefs. Thus 
 we fee, that the laws of human na- 
 ture, which are equally binding on all 
 men, are not only the rule or meafure 
 
 of 
 
DIALOGUE I. 37 
 
 of juflice between man and man; but 
 thefe fame laws are alfo the rule, 
 which the God of all wifdom hath 
 been pleafed to ordain between man 
 and Himfelf. — Your reafoning feems 
 juft, faid I. But what do you fay to a 
 
 flate of future retribution ? I lav, 
 
 anfwered he, (in few words) that, if it 
 fliall be found, that men be not fuffi- 
 ciently rewarded by the pleafures of 
 obedience, nor enough puniflied by 
 the pains of difobedience, in this life i 
 there can be no doubt, but that in 
 fome future cxiftence, perfect juflice 
 will take place : for the Supreme Judge 
 is almighty, and of unerring wifdom, 
 
 and infinite goodnefs. You mufl 
 
 be right, faid I. We will therefore 
 
 conclude, if you pleafe, continued he, 
 
 ihat from the equality of mankind, 
 
 D 3 that 
 
 l» 
 
38 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 that is, from the equal fubje(5lion of all 
 men to the fame laws of their nature^ 
 they derive a right equally to exa6l 
 obedience of one another : and that in 
 the practice of a perfeBly equal obe- 
 diencCj the idea of perfeB jujiice con- 
 lifts ; and in the enforcing of equal 
 obedience, the exercife of juftice con- 
 fifts. I will only add one obfervation 
 more on this head, which is, that had 
 the human fpecies, like other animals, 
 been governed by an inftin6l, which 
 would have kept them true to their 
 natural laws, juftice had never been 
 
 heard of among men. Well then, 
 
 faid I, fuppofnig us to be agreed in 
 
 this point ? Why then, anfwered 
 
 he, we have agreed in all points thus 
 
 far.- And, I think, from what has 
 
 been faid, we may be able to draw, 
 
 with 
 
DIALOGUE I. 39 
 
 with fome degree of precifion, the Hue 
 
 by which the liberty of human actions • 
 
 ought to be circumfcribed. 
 
 Firil, No man can jufily violate or 
 tranfgrefs thofe laws, which are necef- 
 fary to the propagation, continuation, 
 and fupport of our fpecies, with the 
 greatejl advantage poj/ible. 
 
 Secondly, No man csxvjujlly violate 
 the lavv^s of humanity, or all thofe 
 propenfities, which would prompt us 
 to a benevolent, humane, and reafon- 
 able treatment of each other. 
 
 Thirdly, No man can jufily tranf- ^}t 
 
 grefs thofe bounds, which juftice, re- 4 * . 
 
 gulated by the laws of human nature, 
 doth determine to be the true mea- 
 fures of the rights of mankind, to 
 the pofTeflion of property of any fort 
 whatfocver, 
 
 D 4 Fourthly, 
 
40 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 Fourthly, and laflly. That the nearer 
 men approach to a perfe6l obedience 
 of all, to all thofe laws, the nearer 
 they will approach to ihcLtJuJl 7iatural 
 equality, and that jujl liberty, which 
 would refult from the equal fubje6lion 
 of all men to the fame natural laws : 
 and that the idea of perfe6l human 
 liberty is a perfe6l and exaft obedience 
 of all, to all thofe laws. -So it ap- 
 pears to me, faid I. And fo, replied 
 
 he, (rifmg to go to reft) we find nature 
 is no lefs an enemy to licentioiifnefs, 
 
 than fhe is to tyranny, And 
 
 thus ended our firft converfation. 
 
 DIALOGUE 
 
[ 41 ] 
 
 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 ^ H ^ H E next evening, being left ra- 
 ■^ ther early by fome company 
 who had fpent the day with us, we 
 drew our chairs toward the fire-fide. 
 After fome light converfation, I took 
 an opportunity, on the mention of 
 fomething political, to introduce a few 
 obfervations on the fubje6l of the pre- 
 ceding evening; which produced nearly 
 what follows. 
 
 Some things, faid I, which all writers 
 on political fubje6ls, fpeak very much 
 of, were by us unnoticed yefterday 
 evening : Such as, the fiat e of nature, 
 the rife of civil government , a compadl, 
 
 religion. 
 
42 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 religion, &c. in all which things, the 
 liberty of mankind is thought to be 
 very much concerned, and, doubtlefs, 
 with abundant reafon. May I de- 
 mand fome explanation concerning 
 
 thefe things ? By all means, an- 
 
 fwered he ; I fliall be very glad to oblige 
 you, with any thing in my power. 
 
 After a fhort paufe, he faid, you 
 
 well know, how much has been faid 
 and written on thefe fubje6ls by very 
 able men j for which reafon you will 
 not expe6l me to fay a great deal. And 
 I fhali efleem myfelf fortunate, if, by 
 purfuing the fimplicity of my former 
 reafoning, I may happily flrike out 
 fomething new in thefe matters -, or 
 render, what in them has been made 
 difficult and tedious, more obvious and 
 lefs tirefome. 1 think then, conti- 
 nued 
 
DIALOGUE II. 43 
 
 iiued he, a tolerable notion of the Jiate 
 of nature may be formed, from what 
 has already been faid in our firft con- 
 verfation ; for in that was contained a 
 defcription of the jiate of ?iature in its 
 earlieft period : And you know, that 
 writers ufually chufe to diftinguifli the 
 earlieft period, as that, in which they 
 conceive man to be in the Jiate of na^ 
 turc. 
 
 As for thofe, who are fo veiy curious 
 in their refearchcs, concerning the Jiate 
 of nature, as to confidcr man as a be- 
 ing abftrafted from fociety, and natu- 
 rally unfociable ; as an individual to- 
 tally unconnedled with his fellow-crea- 
 tures, vv^c may leave them to the en- 
 joyment of their own fpeculations ; 
 which, notwithftanding the difcovery 
 pf a * wild boy or tivo, are entirely 
 * Peter. vain 
 
 .f 
 
44 D I A L O G U E 11. 
 
 vain and chimerical ; becaufe men ne- 
 ver have, naturally, exifted in fiich a 
 
 ftate at any time whatever. I 
 
 nodded aflent. 
 
 When, ' continued he, we difcourfe 
 of men, as being in the Jiate of nature, 
 to diftinguifh their manner of exift- 
 ence, before their entering into any 
 formal government -, it is a phrafe, 
 which may ferve very well for that 
 purpofe : But if we conceive, (and it 
 is generally fo conceived) that as foon 
 as men fubmit themfelves to govern- 
 ment, they are no longer in their natu- 
 ral Jiate, it is a very great miftake. — 
 It is true, they have varied the ilate 
 they were in, before their fubmiffion 
 to government, but that variation does 
 not induce an annihilation of the laws 
 of nature -, or, in other words, it does 
 
 not 
 
D I A L O G U E II. 45 
 
 not make void the Jlate of ?iature, con- 
 fidered as a flate, in which men lived 
 obedient to the true laws of nature, 
 not enforced by poHtical government : 
 It is the injurious part of the Jlate of 
 natwe, (which arifes from the want of 
 fome certain and fufficient power, to 
 enforce an equal and due obedience to 
 the laws of nature) that men mean to 
 get rid of, by fubmiOion to political 
 government. — All the other parts of 
 the ftatc of nature ^ they mean to pre- 
 
 ferve by that very fubmiffion. So 
 
 that when men enter into political go- 
 vernment (if upon right principles) 
 they are as much in the fate of Jiature, 
 as tlicy were before they entered, with 
 this difference only ; that by the force 
 of a good go'vernmenty the laws of their 
 nature will be preferved in much 
 
 greater 
 
46 D I A L O G U E It. 
 
 greater purity, than they coulclJ^c irf 
 the (late of nature for the want of that 
 force. — So much for the fiat e of nature y 
 confidered in this particular Hght. 
 
 But for my part, I cannot but think 
 it a very unphilofophical diJlin6lion> 
 to fuppofe m.en to be out of a fiat e of 
 nature, when they fubmit themfelves 
 to government ; or indeed ever to fup- 
 pofe them to be out of their natural 
 flate at all, iinlefs ivhen they violate the 
 true laws of their nature -, and that we 
 know they frequently do, under go- 
 vernment, as well as before their fub- 
 miflion to government. 
 
 Now if the violation of the true 
 laws of human nature, do (as being 
 an anti-natural thing) put men into an 
 unnatural fiat e -, and if to correcl and 
 reform fuch violations, be to reduce 
 ij men 
 
D I A L O G U E IL 47 
 
 men to their natural fiat e again ; and 
 if that can only be effe6lually done by 
 the help of good government, muft we 
 not conclude, that the true end of 
 government is to keep men in their 
 natural flate r And that men, under 
 fuch government, are really much 
 more in a natural Hate than they 
 were, when under no government at 
 
 all ? Your reafoning feems juft, 
 
 anfwered I. * 
 
 It has ever appeared ftrange to me, 
 continued he, to hear men talk of man, 
 as being in the fiate of Jiature, or not 
 hi the fiate of nature ^ in the fenfe ufu- 
 ally affixed to thefe phrafes. Much 
 ambiguit}^ would have been avoided, 
 if the words, *' Man in his natural 
 ** fiate, or Jiot in his ?iaturalfiate," had 
 been employed.- — *-When any other 
 
 fpecies 
 
48 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 Ipecies of animals is made a fubjecl of* 
 enquiry, we always treat of it, as be- 
 ing in its natural Jiate. And we very 
 juftly determine that to be the iiatural 
 Jiate of any fpecies of creatures, which 
 is found to be confonant to the true 
 laws of its nature : and as far as the 
 motives or a6lions of any creature, 
 be difTonant to the fame laws (by what- 
 ever means fuch difTonance arife) fo 
 far mufl they be deemed unnatural, 
 and the creature out of his natural 
 
 flate, Now v/ere wx to make man 
 
 a fubje61: of enquiry on the fame 
 ground, I apprehend much perplexity 
 would be avoided ; and we fliould be 
 much more likely to underltand his 
 true natural Jiate. But, interro- 
 gated I, would you have us to treat 
 of man, as we do of other animals^ 
 
 whofe 
 
13 I A L O G U E IL 49 
 
 ■whofe nature and faculties are fo 
 widely different ? ^ -Why not ? an- 
 fwered he : Are not the nature and 
 faculties of every fpecies of creatures 
 widely different ? Yet we find an 
 analogy in their natures, and treat of 
 them all in nearly the fame method. 
 But what I have to fay, continued he, 
 will be fhort and general -, nothing to 
 the difadvantage of man, and perhaps 
 fomething fatisfaflory to you. 
 
 Suppofe, then, we lay it down as a 
 maxim, that man, like other animalsy 
 is always in his natural Jlatc, when hia 
 motives and a6lions are confonant to 
 the true laws of his nature ; and vice 
 
 verfa. 1 fee no obje6lion, faid I. 
 
 If that be allowed, replied he, 
 
 then, whether we confider him in the 
 
 moft favagc and uncultivated flate, or 
 
 E in 
 
so D I A L O G U E II. 
 
 in the mofk refined and poliflied, or in 
 any ftatc between the two, we fhall 
 always find him in Iiis natural ft ate y 
 when his condu6l is conformable to 
 
 the true laws of his nature. It 
 
 feems {o^ faid I. And his condu6l, 
 
 I prefume, faid he, will be fo found, 
 more generally under good govern- 
 ment, than in any other period of 
 
 his prcgrefs. It is probable, faid I. 
 
 • But w^e are fo ufed, added he, to 
 
 confider the rudeft ftate of our exift- 
 ence, as more truly our natural iliate, 
 that, I fear, I fliall with fome diffi- 
 culty find credit for a different opi- 
 nion. But let us endeavour at a far- 
 ther explanation, faid he. Man in 
 his rudeft flate bears a nearer refem- 
 blance to other animals ; other ani- 
 mals, we allow, are kept in their 
 
 natural 
 
DIALOGUE II. 51 
 
 natural ftate by laws whicli acl ///- 
 
 jiinBively upon them, and partake 
 
 but veiy little, if at all, of the rational 
 
 faculty : fo that we think ourielves 
 
 certain, that they are true to the laws 
 
 of their nature : and thus making 
 
 them a meafure for man, we fuppofe 
 
 him to be more truly in his natural 
 
 ftate, the nearer he approaches to the 
 
 condition of other animals : and that 
 
 may be true, as far as concerns his 
 
 animal fun6lions merely. But it ought 
 
 to be confidered, that the peculiar and 
 
 diftinguifhing faculties of the human 
 
 mind, which fcem to infer a power of 
 
 judging of the propriety of human 
 
 actions, and a power of chufing or 
 
 refufmg to obey the diftates of nature, 
 
 make a vei-y confiderable difference 
 
 between the nature of man and of 
 
 E 2 other 
 
52 D I A L O G U E II. 
 
 other creatures, and prove him to be 
 intended for another and a much 
 higher fphcre of a6lion. I fee no 
 caufc therefore to conclude, that the 
 rudefl and leafl cultivated is more 
 properly the natural ftate of man, on 
 account of its approximation to the 
 condition of brutes ; but rather the 
 contrary. There is no doubt indeed, 
 as I faid before, that man, in the- 
 animal or inftin6live part of his na- 
 ture, hath a great fimilarity to other 
 creatures : but to pafs away a life in 
 the exercife of the animal faculties 
 only, would hardly be deemed natural 
 in a human creature : yet fuch nearly 
 is the favage ftate. Now what other 
 conclufion can be juftly drawn from 
 all this, but that man in a favage or 
 uncultivated itate is i?i the lowefi and 
 
 leafi 
 
DIALOGUE II. 53 
 
 leajl impro'ved Jiate of human nature ; 
 and in that which approaches the ncarejl 
 
 to the brute creation ? No other, I 
 
 think, anfwered I It is, no doubt, 
 
 continued he, the proper place to 
 commence at, in the hiitory of human 
 nature ; and that is the only ufc that 
 ought to have been made of it. But 
 to fuppofe men to be out of their na- 
 tural Jiate, as foon as they begin to 
 form plans of government, and to in- 
 vent the ufeful and ornamental arts of 
 life, is as irrational as to fuppofe ants 
 out of their natural ftate, when they 
 ftore up their hoards againft winter -, 
 or bees, when they conilrudl combs 
 for their honey. 
 
 A creature formed as man is, with 
 fuch faculties, fenfes, and mej:tal pow- 
 ers, is by nature moved, according as 
 E 3 particular 
 
54 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 particular circumftances arife, to form 
 and to fubmit himfelf to political in- 
 jftitutions j and to invent and cultivate 
 arts ufeful and ornamental to life, and 
 necefTary to his vi^ell-being. This in- 
 deed is done in a progreflive way, 
 from a flate of barbarity to a ftate of 
 refinement and elegancy. He feldom 
 continues long in any certain ftate. 
 Sometim.es his progrefs in improve- 
 ment is quick, fometimes very flow, 
 becaufe it mud: depends on favourable 
 circumftances, and on the.aufpicious 
 fituation of things. In tlie leaft cul- 
 tivated, or favage period of his exifl- 
 ence, he is a very neceflitous creature, 
 and his time and faculties mufl be 
 aimofl intirely engrofTed in providing 
 for fuch wants as are too prelTmg to 
 be nedecled. In fuch a flate he can 
 
 have 
 
D I A L O G U E II. ^^ 
 
 have but little Iclfure for contempla- 
 tion and refleiStion ; aiid £• om the 
 rudenefs of things about ium, his 
 ideas muft be few, and his views fliort 
 and confined. In his progrefs tow;ird 
 a more improved ftate, his urgent 
 wants becoming more eafily provided 
 for, and finding more time for the 
 exercife of his mind, he proceeds on, 
 ftep by ftep, to the difcovery of all 
 the arts and fciences fubfervient either 
 to the utility or the ornament of life, 
 until at length he arrive at the moft 
 refined and poliihed Hate ; from which 
 it has been the ufual courfe of things 
 to decline again into barbarity. Now, 
 were we inclined to determine upon 
 any one period in this progrefs, as 
 being more properly the iiatural fiatc 
 of man than any other, where muft 
 E 4 we 
 
50 DIALOGUE IL 
 
 we fix ? To fay particularly feems 
 
 difficult, anfwered I. Muft it not 
 
 be jufl at that period, interrogated he, 
 when his condu6l is moft conform- 
 able to the true laws of his nature ? 
 
 > It muft, anfwered I. Perhaps, 
 
 continued he, that may not be in 
 the moft refined ftate ; and I think 
 we are fure it is not in the moft rude : 
 but at whatever intermediate period 
 it may be judged to exift, in all ft ages 
 ^bove or below that period, man will 
 be more or lefs in his natural Ji ate, 
 according as he approaches to, or re- 
 cedes from, this conformity to the 
 Jaws of his nature. And this is what 
 I think, concerning the natural Jlate of 
 
 man. Remove one difficulty for 
 
 me, faid I, and we perfectly agree. 
 Gpvernrnent, you know, is efteeme4 
 
 a work 
 
DIALOGUE II. 57 
 
 a work of art : now can men be faid 
 to live in their naturjil JlatCy when 
 their condu^^l is regulated by a work 
 
 of art ? They may, anfwered he : 
 
 for if we enquire into the juft princi- 
 ples of that work of arty we fhall find 
 them to be the true laws of human 
 nature, which ought to regulate, not 
 only the a6lions of men, but the con- 
 flru6lion and condu6l of that work 
 of art itfclf . But you will be pleafed 
 to obferve, added he, that it would 
 be but of little moment here, to mark 
 out precifely the line which feparates 
 the operations of inflinctive nature 
 from the works of human Ikill : be- 
 caufe, in the cafe before us, the in- 
 quiry is concerning the natural Jl ate 
 of man J which confifting, as we have 
 agreed, in his obedience to the laws of 
 
 his 
 
58 D I A L O G U E II. 
 
 his nature, it matters not whether 
 this obedience be efFe6luated by /;z- 
 jltn6iive natwe fimply, (though we 
 are pretty fure it is not) or by the 
 force of that and art united. And 
 here I muft beg leave to take notice, 
 continued he, that when the word 
 art is ufed to fignify fomething not 
 founded in the nature of man, or as 
 fomething that is not the natural re- 
 fult of the nature, conftitution, and 
 faculties of man, it certainly is mif- 
 
 ufed. Do you mean, demanded I, 
 
 to fay that art is natural to man ? 
 
 I do, anfwered he. But is "not 
 
 that a contradi6lion in terms ? inter- 
 rogated I. — —It may appear fo, ac- 
 cording to the vulgar fenfe of thofe 
 terms, replied he -, but I believe it is 
 no contradiction in the nature of 
 A things ; 
 
DIALOGUE II. 59 
 
 things ; for if it were, it certainly had 
 never exifted. It may be very proper 
 on fome occafions, continued he, to 
 diflingiiifh the operations of general 
 or inftin6live nature from the w^orks 
 of human fkill : which, you know, 
 has been done by Mr. Harris, as he 
 does every thing, with admirable per- 
 fpicuity, in his Treatife on Art. But, 
 neverthelefs, it is impoflible to con- 
 fider the wants and defires of man, 
 ai>d the nature, extent, and capacity 
 of the human mind, and not to per- 
 ceive that the natural refult muft be 
 
 art. So indeed it feems, faid I. 
 
 .— — Art mufl therefore, in this fenfe, 
 be natural X.O man, concluded he.- 
 
 On this head I am fatisfied, replied I. 
 Well then, faid he, I hope we fliall 
 not find fo much difficulty in ac- 
 counting 
 
6o D I A L O G U E 11. 
 
 counting for the origin of civil go- 
 vernment : And he continued thus. 
 
 Opinions, you know, have been ad- 
 vanced concerning the firft formation 
 of pohtical focieties, no lefs extrava- 
 gant than unnatural and contrary to 
 probability : As if the rife of govern- 
 ment, in the courfe of things, were not 
 as naturaU as the exigence of the pri- 
 mary principles of human nature. 
 Nay fome * would make us believe, 
 that fuch principles had no exiftence 
 at all, till human laws were invented 
 to give them one. And they find 
 it very difficult to conceive, how men 
 could aflbciate, and form political fo- 
 cieties, without a great deal of pre- 
 vious formahty. But, if the prin- 
 ciples of human nature have exifled 
 
 * Locke. 
 
 at 
 
DIALOGUE II. 6i 
 
 at all times, in all men, (and to believe 
 otherwife mufl furely be veiy unphi- 
 lofophical,) is it not eafy to perceive, 
 that the paflion which impels us to 
 the propagation of our fpecies, toge- 
 ther with its confequent afFc6lions ; 
 that the neceffitous ftate of men with- 
 out reciprocal afliftance ; that the mu- 
 tual ftrength and fecurity, which the 
 union of numbers gives to a body of 
 men, and the attracting pleafures of 
 converfation and fociability ; do all 
 feverally and unitedly draw men, ne- 
 
 ceflarily, into fociety? 1 looked af- 
 
 fent. Why may we not believe 
 
 then, continued he, that a fmall num- 
 ber of men, in a ftate of pure fimpli- 
 city, might live amicably together, 
 under the fole influence of the laws of 
 their nature, at leaft for fome time ; 
 
 and 
 
62 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 and that fmall irregularities might be 
 corre6led by fname, by fear, and by 
 
 reproof? 1 fee no obje6lion, faid 
 
 I.^ Greater crimes, added he, from 
 
 the dread all men would have of their 
 extending to themfelves, would na- 
 turally excite them to think of the 
 means of prevention : They would, 
 doubtlefs, congregate, and confult for 
 the general fafety ; and, in their de- 
 fence, would form rules, inftitutes, 
 or civil laws, by the energy of which 
 they might hope to fecure themfelves 
 from fuch enormities in future. As 
 crimes increafed, fo would civil infti- 
 tutes ', and fo a body politic would be 
 as naturally produced, as any other 
 efFe6l in nature. This I take to 
 be a true, though but a fhort account 
 of the rife of civil government. 
 
 Though 
 
D I A L O G U E II. 63 
 
 Though fliort, faid I, it comprehends 
 much, and feems very probable. But 
 is it not hard to conceive, how, from 
 fo fimple an origin, fo great a diverfity 
 
 of governments could arife ? The 
 
 difficulty of accounting for fo great a 
 diverfity, with precifion, may be very 
 great, replied he. The impenetrable 
 obfcurity in which the origin and ear- 
 lier times of nations are clouded, are 
 
 the caufes of this difficulty. But 
 
 were the hiftories of nations exa6l 
 accounts of the progrefs of a people 
 from their earlieft ftate, upward ; and 
 were they written in a circumftantial 
 and philofophical manner; I think, 
 from what we know by our own ex- 
 perience, when we thoroughly under- 
 ftand the motives of mens a6lions, 
 there is but little reafon to doubt, that 
 
 a chain 
 
64 DIALOGUE IL 
 
 a chain of caufes and events would 
 be difcovered, which would fuffici-^ 
 ently account for all the varieties 
 which have appeared in political go- 
 vernments. 
 
 But great and ilriking adlions and 
 events alone are generally the fubje6V 
 of hiftory ; and all the intermediate 
 links, which fliould chain thofe great 
 events together, are llightly palled 
 over, or entirely unnoticed. Nay 
 even the motives and caufes, which 
 produced the great events themfelves, 
 are generally far from being thoroughly 
 underftood. And indeed it happens 
 unfortunately for hiftory, that a na- 
 tion is fo complex a body, and every 
 public a6lion is the product of fo 
 many and various motives, views, and 
 interefts, that the hiilorian mufl be 
 
 very 
 
DIALOGUE II. 65 
 
 very happy in his conjectures, who 
 doth not frequently err in his endea- 
 vours to explain them. And for this 
 caufe it is, that we find but few hif- 
 tories worth the reading, except thofe, 
 in which the writers themfelves have 
 
 been confiderable a6lors. 1 believe 
 
 your obfervations are jufl, faid I, and 
 I am thus far fatisfied. But what do 
 you fay to an origma/ company fo much 
 
 talked of by political writers ? I 
 
 fay, anfwered he, after a fhort paufe, 
 by continuing our enquiries on the 
 fame principles, on which we have 
 hitherto proceeded, we fliall probvibly 
 find that fubje6l much lefs difficult, 
 and more clear, than it is generally 
 found in the ufual way of treating 
 
 it. 1 begged he would proceed in 
 
 his own way ; and he began thus. 
 
 F Granting 
 
66 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 Granting the exiflcnce of a formal 
 or an implied compr.cl (for the exig- 
 ence of both have been denied) in 
 every ftate, what may one naturally 
 fuppofe to be the foundation and ob- 
 ject of fuch a compact ? 1 cannot 
 
 readily fay, anfwered I. 1 fhould 
 
 think, faid he, the object muft be ge~ 
 neral good or happinefs ; and, if fo, 
 
 ^Q foundation muft be on juftice. 
 
 It feems fo, faid I. It cannot other- 
 wife, replied he, be a fair compact : for 
 if theintereft and advantage of one, or 
 a few only, be aimed at and obtained, to 
 the oppreffion of the reft, it is nothing 
 lefs than deceiving and over-reaching 
 the opprefTed party ; and therefore 
 fuch a compa6l muft be, in its nature, 
 
 void. True, faid I. There can 
 
 -then, continued he, be no juji political 
 
 compa6t 
 
DIALOGUE II. 6f 
 
 compa6l made contrary to the true 
 principles of human nature ; becaufe^ 
 if the foundation of fuch compact 
 muft be on jujiice^ the determinations 
 oi jujiice muft be regulated by thefe 
 principles ; as was fliewn in our firfl 
 converfation. Men, from a fenfe of 
 the excellence of thefe principles, being 
 moved with a defire of preferving 
 them as pure as polTible, firfl formed 
 civil polities ; not to thwart and con- 
 tradi6l, but to confirm and flrengtheri 
 them. No compa6l can, therefore^ 
 be fuppofed of any force or validity, 
 which would oblige men, in any man- 
 ner, not confonant to thefe principles. 
 And thus we find the juft meafure of 
 every formal or implied political com- 
 pa6l to be the true principles or laws 
 
 of human nature. It muft be fo;^ 
 
 F 2 faid 
 
68 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 faid I. To aflert then, faid he, the 
 
 validity of any political compaft, either 
 formal or implied, to oblige men to 
 fubmit to laws enacted by any autho- 
 rity whatfoever, any longer than fuch 
 laws be conformable to, or corrobora- 
 tive of, the true principles of human 
 nature, muft be a falfe afTertion, and 
 inimical to the juft liberties of man- 
 kind. Your conclufion feems juft, 
 
 faid I. Yet, in common life, we do 
 not think a contra6t void and of no 
 force, on account of its being, on one 
 fide, a foolifh, or even an injurious 
 
 bargain. The generality do not, 
 
 replied he 3 yet that they do not think 
 fo, does not arife from any convi6lion 
 that fuch a contra6l can pollibly be 
 juft ; but becaufe it is found necefTary, 
 to prevent eternal litigations, and end- 
 6 lefs 
 
DIALOGUE II. 69 
 
 lefs uncertainty, to draw a line fome- 
 where, that there may be fome rule, 
 fome {landing meafure in thefe mat- 
 ters. Neverthelefs, when cafes of ex- 
 traordinary folly or iniquity occur, the 
 obligation of a contra6t is frequently 
 made void. But the cafe of a political 
 compa6l, which comprehends the in- 
 terefts of whole nations ; and in which 
 the natural enjoyments and profperity 
 of a people and their pofterity are con- 
 cerned i mufl be underftood in the 
 mofl liberal fenfe, utterly devoid of 
 all thofe mean artifices which are 
 ufually employed in what is called 
 making a good bargain. For there is 
 a wide difference between private con- 
 trails, and this great public one. 
 
 But it has been ufual, continued 
 
 he, to view this matter in another 
 
 F 3 light. 
 
7P DIALOGUE II, 
 
 light, in which it is prefumed, that a 
 people can ftipulate away the rights 
 and privileges of their nature, in fa-? 
 vour of their prince, or rulers. In 
 this view of an original compa6l, the 
 wifdom of the prince, or of the rulers, 
 will be thought great, in proportion 
 as the cQmpa6l Ihall be explained in 
 favour of the eilablifhment of their 
 pwn power and authority, as a kind 
 of rightful property, which they hold 
 
 independent of the people. It is 
 
 frequently fo underflood, faid I. 
 
 So that having ufurped an authority, 
 continued he, or acquired it by any 
 other mpre artful means, the ufe they 
 would make of a compact feems to be 
 pnly that of confirming, augmenting, 
 pr peradventure of regulating that au- 
 thority fo acquired 3 but which the 
 
 people 
 
DIALOGUE II. 71 
 
 people are never luppofcd to have any 
 rignt t J aboliih, even if it fhould be 
 judged abJolutely neceflary for the ge- 
 neral welfare of the community. 
 
 Such dod:rines have been advanced, 
 
 faid I. But furely, faid he, to talk 
 
 of a compaiSt on fuch a foundation as 
 this, mull be efteemed an impudent 
 mockery of the common fenfe of man- 
 kind. We will therefore endeavour 
 farther to explain the nature of this 
 political compa6l, and to fix it in its 
 
 true point of view. 1 begged he 
 
 would, and he proceeded thus. 
 
 When men firfl began to difregard 
 the impulfes or laws of their nature, 
 and their irregularities and vices point- 
 ed out the necefiity of political infti- 
 tutions; at the commencement of thofe 
 inftitutions, the firfl probable appcar- 
 F 4 ances 
 
72 D I A L O G U E II. 
 
 ances of a compa6l are difcovered. 
 But here we do not perceive any ap- 
 pearance of a compa6l between par- 
 ties, whofe rights, interefts, or views 
 are diflincl or oppofite : it is rather a 
 general union or agreement of a fo- 
 ciety of men, in defence of the rights 
 of human nature. It is an agreement 
 to fubmit to fuch inftitutes, laws, 
 and regulations, as may be deemed 
 adequate to the purpofes of reducing 
 men to, and of retaining them in, a 
 proper fubjeclion to the laws of their 
 nature : and the obligations of this 
 agreement, to be^juft, muft be equal 
 on every member of the fociety. Will 
 the advocates for unjuft authority, 
 interrogated he, be able to derive much 
 advantage from a compa6l of this fort ? 
 
 • Not much, anfwered I. 
 
 But, 
 
D I A L O G U E II. 73 
 
 But, continued he, it has been 
 affirmed, that when men enter into 
 a political fociety, they make a formal, 
 or a tacit, furrender of their natural 
 rights to that fociety ; and, as it were, 
 compa6t or agree fo to do. The drift 
 and tendency of this affirmation is to 
 eftablifh the authority of all ruling 
 powers, juft or unjuft, and to debafe 
 and enflave mankind. But no maxim 
 was ever more falfe, or lefs founded 
 in nature. Men neither do, nor 
 can mean, by entering into govern- 
 ment, to give up any of their efTential 
 natural rights : they mean, by the aid 
 of government, to maintain and fecure 
 them. They do not mean to fubju- 
 gate themfelves to the will of tyran- 
 nical mafters, nor even to political 
 Liws, when diflbnant and repugnant 
 
 to 
 
74 D I A L O G U E II. 
 
 to the principles of their nature. 
 Their intention, as well as the true end 
 of government, is quite the contrary. 
 For, if men had paid a pundlual obe- 
 dience to the laws of their nature, 
 the inftituting of civil laws, and con- 
 fequently of civil magiftrates, would 
 have been quite unnecefTary. Civil 
 laws were inftituted to enforce obe- 
 dience to the true laws of human na- 
 ture. Therefore civil laws, which 
 contradict or are repugnant to the 
 true laws of human nature, are not 
 in confciejice binding. And all civil 
 laws, and ail civil magiftracies, ought 
 to be formed, altered and corre6led, 
 confirmed or aboliflied, according as 
 they agree with, or are repugnant to, 
 the true laws of human nature. 
 But were we to grant, that under 
 
 government 
 
DIALOGUE II. 75 
 
 government (tlirough the defe6live- 
 nefs of human policy) fome of our 
 natural rights mud neceiTarily be 
 waved, in compliance v^ith a general 
 opinion of its being advantageous to 
 the community at large ; it mufl alfo 
 be allowed, at the fame time, that, in 
 juftice, no part of the rights of na- 
 ture iliould be given up by any one, 
 which ought not to be given up by 
 every member of the fame commu- 
 nity. The juji equality of mankind 
 demands fo much. But what are 
 the principal natural rights, fuppofed 
 to be given up in civil fociety ? Are 
 they not the rights oi judging in our 
 own caufe, and of avenging our ow?z 
 
 injuries? They are, faid I. And 
 
 thefe, continued he, we furrender to 
 the flate, to be placed in the hands of 
 
 proper 
 
76 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 proper magiilrates. But if we con- 
 lider the tendencies of thefe rights, 
 as they are called, they will be found 
 fo very injurious and unjuft, and fo 
 inimical to humanity, that it will be 
 hard to allow them the appellation of 
 natural rights at all. They are powers 
 neceflarily afTumed and exercifed, when 
 the condition of mankind proves fo 
 miferable, as to have no better way of 
 admin illering juftice. But they are 
 fo evidently wrong, fo clearly fubver- 
 five of juftice, that no man in his 
 fenfes would attempt to juftify the ufe 
 of them, as rights, but in cafes of 
 
 irrefiftible neceffity. Here he 
 
 paufed. 1 afTented.- Well then, 
 
 faid he, fhould it be ftill infifted on, 
 that men, on entering into govern- 
 ment, do agree to furrender up part 
 
 (or 
 
D I A L O G UE II. 77 
 
 (or the whole, as fome bUndly con- 
 tend) of their natural rights ; let it 
 never be forgotten, that fuch agree- 
 ment cannot be obligatory on any one, 
 unlefs it extend to every one, under 
 the fame government. But let us, 
 faid he, digrefs no farther, but purfue 
 our fubjecl a little more clofely. 
 
 I think v^^e had found the firfl ap- 
 pearance of a compa6l to be at the 
 commencement of civil fociety -, and 
 that the compa6l then v^as, not be- 
 tween parties, whofe interefls were 
 oppofite or eflentially different, but 
 were one and the fame, and united 
 and centered in one point, which was, 
 
 t/je defence of their natural rights.- 
 
 We had, faid I. To proceed then, 
 
 faid he. 
 
 When fuch civil laws, as may be 
 judged adequate to fuch defence, are 
 
 agreed 
 
78 D I A L O G U E 11. 
 
 agreed on -, the manner of putting 
 them into execution becomes the next 
 obje6l of confideration, and produces 
 another fort of compaB, which is in* 
 tirely relative to the execution. And 
 hence originate all the various powers 
 and authorities of magiflracy* Let 
 us examine the true nature of the com- 
 pa6l in this place, which does indeed 
 not only contain what has generally 
 been underilood by a political com- 
 pa6t, but it comprehends all that is 
 
 moft important to civil liberty*^ 1 
 
 delired him to go on. 
 
 The laws then, continued he, being 
 agreed on, a mode of executing thent 
 mufl necefTarily be determined on > 
 and the various powers of magiftracy 
 are found requifite for that purpofe.- 
 We will therefore fuppofe them to' 
 be ordained and eilablifhed, and their 
 
 feveral- 
 
DIALOGUE II. 79 
 
 feveral powers exercifed and enforced. 
 
 Very well, faid I. Now what, 
 
 demanded he, muft we underiland the 
 compact to have been, between the 
 people and the magiftrates, in this 
 cafe ? Could it be, that the peo- 
 ple furrendered themfclvcs to be go- 
 verned at the difcretion of the magif- 
 trates ; or were the magiflrates chofen 
 fimply lO execute the determinations 
 
 of the people ? Undoubtedly the 
 
 latter, anfwered I. It muft be fo, 
 
 replied he, for the power of magif- 
 tracy in itfelf is nothing ; that force, 
 which ariles from the general concur- 
 rence and confent of the people, is 
 abfolutely necefTary to give it ftability. 
 The people, therefore, compa6l or 
 agree to exert that force (which is al- 
 ways ultimately fupreme) in fupport 
 2 of 
 
So D I A L O G U E II. 
 
 of the power of their magiftrates : And 
 the magiftrates agree to exercife their 
 power, in the modes prefcribed, and 
 for the ends propofed by the people. 
 And this feems to me to be the only 
 juft and natural purpofe of fuch a 
 
 compa6l. So it appears to me, 
 
 faid I. 
 
 But, continued he, (humanum eft 
 errare) magiftrates long habituated to 
 power not fufficiently controuled, are 
 apt to claim fuch power as their right : 
 And a people long habituated to obe- 
 dience, without frequent exertions of 
 their fupremacy, by new delegations of 
 power, are apt to forget their own 
 rights. Thefe bad habits, however, 
 cannot annihilate the juft rights of 
 mankind. They only difcover to us, 
 that frequent affertions of them are 
 
 very 
 
DI AL O G UE II. 8i 
 
 very neceffary; and that the memories 
 of both magiftrates and people want 
 perpetual refreftiing on thofe impor- 
 tant points. 
 
 The compa6l then, as explained 
 above, does not give the magiftrates 
 any power independent of the people, 
 or independent of the ends propofed 
 by the people to be accompUfhed by 
 that power. It does not fix them as 
 lords and mafters of the people ; it 
 only conftitutes them executors of the 
 laws or determinations of the people, 
 to which they, with the whole com- 
 munity, are equally fubje6l. Pecu- 
 liar privileges often claimed by, and 
 fometimes thought neceflary to magif- 
 tracy, are hardly ever juftifiable, and 
 never at all but temporarily. 
 
 The people, therefore, always retain 
 G in 
 
82 DIALOGUE 11. 
 
 in themfelves, as an inherent and un-^ 
 alienable property, the right of dele- 
 gating power to their magiftrates, and 
 confequently the right of prefcribing 
 the particular modes of exercifing fuch 
 power, and alfo of recalling that power 
 whenever it may be found necefiary fo 
 to do ; that is, whenever it fhall be 
 exercifed contrary to the ends pro- 
 pofed, or even when it fliall have been 
 exercifed flri6lly according to the ends 
 propofed, and proves not adequate, or 
 not fatisfa6lory. For every political 
 inftitution ought to be confidered only 
 as making an experiment ; and its per- 
 manency ought to depend intirely on 
 its efficiency or non-efficiency for the 
 purpofes intended, and not at all on 
 the meritorious condu6l of the execu- 
 tive inftrument, the magiflrate. So 
 
 that 
 
D I A L O G U E n. 2^ 
 
 that in this view of a compaft, we do 
 not fee the Icafl appearance of a fur- 
 render of their natural rights by the 
 people, nor any jufl foundation for a 
 retention of their authority by the ma- 
 giftrates, againft the confent of the 
 people. The compa(5l, flri6lly fpeak- 
 ing, on the part of the people extends 
 only to the intrufting of the magif- 
 trates with certain portions of power, 
 which are to be exercifed in certain 
 modes, with a view to attain ends 
 which may be deemed beneficial to the 
 community at large, and to fupport 
 the magiftrates in the execution : and 
 the magiftrates, on their part, are 
 bound to obferve the modes, and to 
 purfue the ends, truly and faithfully. 
 But, interrogated I, fuppofe they do 
 not obferve the modes and purfue the 
 G 2 ends 
 
84 DIALOGUE 11. 
 
 ends truly ? If they do not, an- 
 
 fvvered he, they break the compaft^ 
 and confcquently forfeit their autho- 
 rity; may be juflly difplaced by the 
 people, and their power fo difpofed of 
 as may be thought moft advantageous 
 
 to the community. But what if 
 
 they do obferve the compa6t j/?r/^/}/ f 
 
 demanded L If they do, replied he, 
 
 although they will then do no more 
 than was agreed on, nor than they 
 ought as a duty ; yet flridi integrity 
 being a very eftimable quality, they 
 will deferve all the rewards and all the 
 honours due to fo meritorious a con- 
 
 du6l. Perhaps, faid I, fmiling, you 
 
 may think it enough to have deferved 
 well of the republic. But I hope you 
 will acknowledge, that, as long as the 
 magiflrates fliall JiriBly obferve the 
 
 compacSi, 
 
DIALOGUE II. 85 
 
 compa6l, they will have fonie right to 
 retain and exercife the powers dele- 
 gated to them, efpecially if the powers 
 be fuch as are deemed permanent in the 
 
 ilate ? By no means, replied he. 
 
 As long as they obferve the compact, 
 (altlioLigh the powers they exercife be 
 deemed permanent in the ftatc) the 
 only jufb conclufion we can draw is, 
 that they exercife their power legally, 
 / and according to the intent for which 
 it was delegated to them : but that 
 cannot give them the leaft claim to a 
 right to a perpetual exercife cf that 
 power, independent of the people, 
 from whom it was received ^ and from 
 whom alone all juil power is derived. 
 In fhort, continued he, fomewhat en- 
 thufiaftically, the jufl rights of human 
 mature, founded on the divine princi- 
 G 3 pies, 
 
S6 D I A L O G U E II. 
 
 pies, which the all-wife Creator hath 
 originally imprejfTed on the human 
 fpecies, are utterly unalienable by any 
 means ivhatfoever ! No rights of 
 princes, no powers of magiftracy, no 
 force of laws, no delufive compacts, 
 grants, or charters, can ever entitle any 
 part of mankind to deprive their fel- 
 low-creatures of thefe natural rights ! 
 All the nations upon earth (thofe in 
 the moft flavifh, as well as thofe in 
 the moft free ftate) pofTefs an innate, 
 inherent, and indifputable right, to 
 afTert their liberty at all times ' Nor 
 can any thing be more glorious than 
 the attempt, founded on juft princi- 
 ples, even if it fail : for then we 
 fhall feel the fubiime fatisfa6lion of 
 being actuated by thofe divine prin- 
 ciples, which, from their native truth 
 
 and 
 
DIALOGUE 11. 87 
 
 and beauty, as well as from our in- 
 ward fenfe of them, we know to be 
 the laws of God ! ■ ■■■■■Thus ended 
 our fecond dialogue. 
 
 G4 DIALOGUE 
 
[ 88 ] 
 
 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 T^ H E fucceeding evening, we 
 renewed our fubje6l -, and after 
 making fome curfory obfei*vations on 
 what had been faid before. May I 
 now requeft your opinion on a very 
 grave fubje6l, faid I, the fubjefl of 
 religion -, I mean, fo far, at leaft, as 
 liberty may appear to be concerned in 
 it ? I know very well, you think on 
 that, as well as on other fubjecls of lefs 
 ferious import, with great freedom: but 
 I defire nothing fo much, as that you 
 will exprefs yourfelf with your ufual 
 franknefs and fmcerity ; becaufe we 
 can by no other means come to a true 
 
 under- 
 
DIALOGUE III. 89 
 
 underflanding of any fubjeft. 1 
 
 will, replied he, endeavour to fatisfy 
 you in the way you defire, but gene- 
 rally, and without entering into too 
 many particulars, on a fubjedl ^o deli- 
 cate. What, then, continued he, 
 
 muft we call that general apprehen- 
 fion of fuperior beings, or of 0?2e Su- 
 preme, which feems fo naturally, and 
 fo univerfally, to poflefs the minds of 
 all men ? Muft we not, in a general 
 fenfe, call it religion ? interrogated he. 
 To be fure, faid I. And, re- 
 plied he, it appears fo like an innate 
 principle, that it will be found hard 
 to imagine it to be any thing lefs. 
 However, it being unnecefiary to our 
 prefent purpofe to endeavour to prove 
 it to be fo, we will, at this time, pafs 
 it by 5 only we may obferve from it, 
 
 with 
 
90 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 with what prodigious facility and eafe 
 men receive rehgious impreflions of 
 various and even oppofite kinds : with 
 fo much faciUty, and fo neceffary does 
 religion feem to the mind of man, that 
 if cannot reft without poflefTing itfelf 
 of fuch notions of the religious kind 
 (whether juftly and rationally founded 
 or not) as may happily prove, in fome 
 degree, fatisfaclory to itfelf. Neither 
 do I think it neceffary here to enter 
 into any difpute concerning what re- 
 ligion may be fortunate enough to be 
 the only true one ; our prefent bufmefs 
 being only to difcover, if we can, in 
 what manner religion may be ren- 
 dered moft favourable to the juft li- 
 berties of mankind. Were I in- 
 clined to libertine-wit, faid I, I might 
 ^nfwer you, Not in any manner at all. 
 
 But 
 
DIALOGUE III, 91 
 
 But I only impertinently interrupt 
 
 you. Not at all, replied he; for I 
 
 am not quite certain that there may 
 not be fome truth in the obfervation ; 
 at leaft, if wc were to be governed by 
 our paft experience of all religions, 
 when not properly controuled by the 
 civil power. 
 
 There is in religions (or perhaps 
 more properly, in religionifts) of every 
 denomination, fomething naturally in- 
 tolerant and tyrannical, whenever there 
 is any great degree of fmcerity and 
 zeal in the worfliipper : And perhaps 
 it may be an inconteflable truth, that 
 the more erroneous and falfe his no- 
 tions be, the ftronger will thefe difpo- 
 fitions be, in him. And there is no- 
 thing in all this but what is very na- 
 tural, and even in fome cafes almofl 
 
 meritorious. 
 
92 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 meritorious, when v/e confider the m^ 
 tention, and not the confequences. 
 For, there is fuch a natural charm an4 
 beauty in truth, that even falfe images 
 of it, when beUeved to be the true, 
 warmly engage the aiFe6lions : and even 
 in very uninterefting and infignificant 
 things, where the mind finds itfelf 
 thoroughly, though perhaps falfely, 
 convinced, (and men a(5l freely and 
 devoid of that caution, which polite 
 or crafty men pofTefs) it cannot refill 
 its propenfity to zeal ^ which is gene- 
 rally accompanied with an obflinate 
 and pofitive humour, which carries the 
 fame marks of tyranny and intoler- 
 ance. Now rehgious truths, or what 
 are believed to be religious truths, being 
 of a much more im.portant nature 
 than any other 3 the zeal, the intoler- 
 ance. 
 
DIALOGUE III. 93 
 
 ance, and the tyranny in their behalf, 
 muft naturally be flronger, and confe- 
 quently much more troublefome and 
 dangerous to the juft liberty of man- 
 kind. 
 
 It proves indeed unfortunate for 
 mankind, that what are generally 
 thought the moft important truths of 
 religion, are either hidden in impene- 
 trable myfleries, or are abfolutely be- 
 yond the reach of the human under- 
 ftanding and nature -, fo that it is im- 
 poflible for men to be convinced of 
 their truth, by any found philofophi- 
 cal reafoning. And doubtlcfs on this 
 account it is, among others, thaty^/V/6 
 hath ever been efteemed fo veiy meri- 
 torious in all religions ; for it faves a 
 world of pains to the worthy tribe of 
 
 zealous profelyte-makers. And 
 
 I o here 
 
94 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 here you perceive, continued he, tjiat 
 . the fublimer truths of religion, are of 
 a kind very different from all other 
 ti*uths. For in other truths, the rea- 
 fonings and evidences are founded in 
 nature, and lie level to the fenfes, un- 
 derftanding, and capacity of man ; fo 
 that it is generally not veiy difficult to 
 prove, or difprove any interejiing truth 
 or falfehood. And if it fliould happen, 
 that fome good men (which has, very 
 frequently, been the cafe) iliould be 
 troubled v^ith chimerical and unphilo- 
 fophical whimfies ; v/hich they may 
 zealoufly endeavour to propagate for 
 truths, there cannot well arife much 
 harm from it -, becaufe, as no opinions 
 are deemed facred but religious ones, 
 fuch whimfies will either fall into the 
 negle6l or contempt they may ill- 
 
 fatedly 
 
DIALOGUE III. 95 
 
 fatedly deferve ; or every one will be 
 at liberty to ridicule or refute them.— 
 But the myitcrious truths of religion 
 are not to be treated in this ordinaiy 
 and familiar manner. Their de- 
 fenders have, by faith, vvdiich is al- 
 vi^ays much fuperior to argument, fb 
 Rrong 3. ft'fife of their fublimity; and 
 they attach fuch very important and 
 interefting confequences, to a right, or 
 a wrong conception and belief of 
 them ; that, when in earnefl, they can- 
 not chufe but feel themfelves extra- 
 ordinarily zealous and ftrenuous in 
 their propagation and defence. 
 
 It were undoubtedly vain, and per- 
 haps foolifh, to think of treating men 
 thus enlightened, in the ordinary way 
 of argumentation. The juft and ne- 
 cefTary cautions, which prudent men 
 
90 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 are c:pt to ufe on other fubjefts, are' 
 branded with opprobrious names, and 
 perhaps themfelves too ; and wit and 
 ridicule, thofe cruel enemies to grave 
 impoflure, are held in utter deteftatiort 
 and abhorrence. And perhaps indeed 
 we ought to treat with fome degree of 
 refpeft and tendernefs, fo great and fe- 
 rious, and fo univerfal an infirmity of 
 human nature, even when the falfity 
 and abfurdity of their notions are 
 indifputable. 
 
 . Now, if this account of religion and 
 its efFe6ls, when ferioufly and zealoufly 
 embraced, be true ; (and I truft, paft 
 experience, and the very nature of the 
 thing when impartially confidered, will 
 abundantly evince the truth of it) can 
 we reafonably conclude, that religion, 
 in the general fenfe of the word, is na- 
 turally 
 
DIALOGUE III. 97 
 
 turally favourable to the juft liberties 
 
 of mankind ? 1 fhould think not, 
 
 anfwered I. Is it not flrongly ini- 
 mical, interrogated he again ? Why, 
 
 it feems fo, replied I, And you may 
 be right with regard to religion in ge- 
 neral ; but I hope you make a differ- 
 ence in religions, in that refpe6l ; for 
 they certainly are not all equally fo. 
 
 The thing, anfwered he, is too 
 
 evident to be difputed ; there are 
 doubtlefs great differences in their 
 natures and tendencies. But if fome 
 be much more moderate than others, 
 we mufl not forget to attribute a 
 great deal of that moderation to the 
 degree of their fubordination to the 
 civil authority. And here I cannot 
 but obferve, that, without that fubor- 
 dination, experience hath taught us, 
 H that 
 
98 DIALOGUE lit. 
 
 that there would be no truflnig td 
 the moderation of any fct of reh- 
 gionills, how mild foever the religion 
 
 they might profefs. But, faid I, 
 
 the fault would not then be in the 
 
 religion, but in its profeflbrs. 
 
 It might be fo, he replied ; but that, 
 in a political view, makes no diffe- 
 rence. Politically, our bufmefs is 
 with men and their a6lions ; and if, 
 profefling a religion the moft pure 
 and innocent, they either fo mifcon- 
 ceive or mifapply its precepts and 
 do6lrines, as to become turbulent -and 
 refra6lory intruders on the jufc liber- 
 ties of mankind, it muft furely be 
 as reafonable and neceffary to keep 
 them in a due fubordination, as any 
 other difturbers of the public peace> 
 and invaders of the public liberty. 
 
 Do 
 
Dialogue hi. 99 
 
 —Do you then, demanded I, allow 
 nothing to the divine authority by 
 which they a6l, at leaft in the true 
 
 religion P A well-governed ftate, 
 
 anfvvered he, will allow of no autho^ 
 rity, among men within its own ju- 
 .rifdi6tion, fuperior to itfclf. Indeed, 
 a government founded on the juft 
 principles we have dcfcribed in our 
 preceding difcourfes, will a6l by a di- 
 vine authority, to which nothing can 
 be fuperior on earth. But men may 
 be allowed the liberty of pretending 
 to what they pleafe, fo long as they 
 reftrain themfelves from encroaching 
 on the natural freedom of mankind. 
 But when they will not do that, where 
 is the fault of making them under- 
 
 ftand that they muft ? Why truly, 
 
 faid I, I cannot very readily tell you : 
 H 2 but 
 
loo DIALOGUE III. 
 
 but yet methinks your do6lrine makes 
 fomewhat too free with fo ferious a 
 
 fubjecl. What, when the obje6l is 
 
 liberty ? interrogated he. To be 
 
 fure, anfwered I -, for have not you 
 (in our firfl convcrfation) taught me, 
 that liberty fliould be reflrained within 
 
 certain bounds ? True, true, re- 
 
 pHed he : and within thofe bounds I 
 am contented to be reflrained. But I 
 cannot allow our religionifts more li- 
 berty than I do rnyfelf, notwithfland-* 
 ing their divine pretenfions. 
 
 But this reftraint cannot naturally 
 extend to the thoughts : and fpeech 
 may be exercifed very freely, without 
 any dangerous confequences to li- 
 berty : and I fhould think it ]could 
 never be deemed injurious to the juft 
 pretenfions of any fet of religionifts -, 
 
 if 
 
DIALOGUE III. loi 
 
 if they were kind enough to allow 
 the fame freedom of thought and of 
 fpeech to others, which they are gene- 
 rally difpofed to exercife fo liberally 
 themfelves. Freedom of thought, in 
 refpe6l of the rights of humanity, is 
 perfedlly innocent : and freedom of 
 fpeech, when employed in the fearch 
 of truth, is not only beneficial, but it 
 is abfolutely neceffary, and equally the 
 right of all men. What advantage 
 the free exercife of this right hath 
 been of, towards the difeovery of many 
 truths in polite literature, is pretty 
 well known ; nor has it indeed thrown 
 a little light on religious fubjefts, al- 
 though under much reftraint, even in 
 the freed countries. 
 
 But would you then, faid I, take off 
 
 all reftraint in matters of religion ? I 
 
 H 3 afk 
 
102 DIALOGUE IIL 
 
 alk this queflion, becaufe that free-t 
 dom of fpeech for which you con^ 
 tend, if cxercifed on rehgious fubjecls, 
 would evidently have fuch a tendency. 
 
 Undoubtedly, anfwered he ; for 
 
 I know of no juft reflraint which can 
 be laid on that freedom, but that 
 which ought to reflrain men (as we 
 have agreed) in all other cafes ; I 
 mean refpcB for the juji rights of hu- 
 man nature. And befides, men have 
 not a clearer right in nature, than 
 that of paying their devotions to their 
 God in their own manner. 
 
 Such freedom, continued he, might 
 be productive of ftill greater diverfity 
 in the modes of worfhip than are 
 now praclifed. But how very favor- 
 able that diverfity has ever been to 
 liberty, by blunting the edge of that 
 
 cruel 
 
DIALOGUE III. 103 
 
 cruel zeal which admits of but one 
 true mode, is known from dear- 
 bought experience : and the caufes 
 liot being very difficult to underftand, 
 it is furprizing how men could ever 
 be fo wrought on, as to think other- 
 wife. 
 
 Do w^e not fee the infinite diverfity 
 of men's thoughts and opinions on 
 fubjed:s which are generally thought 
 by no means difficult to underftand ? 
 And whence doth this arife, but from 
 caufes which can never be intirely re- 
 moved ? The different degrees of the 
 underflandings of men, of the flrength 
 or weaknefs of their affi^clions and 
 paffions, of their application to the 
 proper means of information and cor- 
 reftion, their jarring interefls, and a 
 thoufand other various and oppofite 
 H 4 circum- 
 
104 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 circumftances, as in other things, fo 
 in religion, create differences in the 
 ideas of human minds, as utterly irre^ 
 concileable to each other as the moft 
 contrary things in nature. This be- 
 ing the cafe, what can be expe6led 
 from the endeavours of thofe who 
 blindly ftrive to reduce men to an 
 uniformity of opinions and modes in 
 religion ? Can there be any thing 
 more tyrannical than the latter, or 
 more impofTible in nature than the 
 
 former ? He paufed, 1 looked 
 
 aflent. Commend me, rather than 
 
 to fuch vile tyranny, continued he, 
 to the generous and liberal Pagans, 
 under whofe free conftitutions every 
 man might choofe a religion for him- 
 felf, and among whom the gods of all 
 countries were admitted, and even 
 
 courted 
 
DIALOGUE III. 105 
 
 courted to come : for fucli a free tole- 
 rance is certainly much more favour- 
 able to our juft liberties, than ahy 
 forced uniformity of worfliip, even of 
 the moft true religion, can be. Be- 
 fides, I do not conceive, that wctq 
 uniformity cftabliflied, and that in a 
 mode which may be thought the mofl 
 pure imaginable, that mental idolatry, 
 which is the moil faulty part of idola- 
 try, would be at all cured by fuch uni- 
 formity. It never can be cured, for 
 thofe very caufes of the diverlity of 
 men's ideas, which have been enu- 
 merated above. 
 
 It has been thought no mean ftretch 
 of the human underflanding, to form 
 tolerably juft ideas of the fublime per- 
 feftions of the Deity : and it falls not 
 to the lot of many men, to be nearly 
 
 conjijlent 
 
io6 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 confifient on a fubjecl fo dazzling, fb» 
 immenfe ! Perfeft clearnefs is, doubt-, 
 lefs, much beyond the utmoil capacity 
 of the moft enlarged human mind. 
 If the wifeft and ableit then be in- 
 capable of attaining notions truly 
 worthy of the Supreme Being ^ what 
 muft we fay of that rude and incon- 
 gruous mixture, which polTelTes and 
 agitates the minds of the mafs of man- 
 kind, clouded as they are with all the 
 various and numerous obflruftions to. 
 
 a juft apprehenfion ? Indeed I 
 
 know not, faid I -, unlefs that their 
 ideas muft be very unworthy of the 
 Supreme Being. But what do you 
 
 conclude from that ? 1 conclude, 
 
 anfwered he, that, be the modes of 
 worfhip what they may, the ideas of 
 the Deity, in the minds of vulgar wor- 
 
 fhippers 
 
DIALOGUE III. J07 
 
 (liippers in general, are, and ever will 
 be, falfe, erroneous, and idolatrous ; 
 and that the cafe can never be other- 
 wife, as long as men form their ideas 
 of the attributes and perfe6tions of the 
 Deity, from unjuft and ill-founded 
 fears, and fenfelefs hopes -, and from 
 all the variable and fluctuating paf- 
 fions and afFe6lions with which they 
 
 feel themfelves agitated. That is, 
 
 in fliort, faid I, as long as men fliall 
 
 be men. True, it is fo, replied he; 
 
 and for that very reafon, I alfo con- 
 clude, that it is tyranny to attempt to 
 force men to pra6life any particular 
 modes of worfliip, though perfectly 
 right and true ; and that they ought 
 to be left free to exercife themfelves in 
 the reUgious way, fo as may be mofl 
 fuitable to their own capacities and 
 
 will; 
 
io8 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 will ; provided only, that they offend 
 not againfl the juft laws of human 
 nature. 
 
 Suppofing, faid I, all you have faid 
 to be true 5 yet you feem to me to 
 carry your love of religious liberty, 
 much farther than would be found 
 
 advantageous to civil liberty. If fo^ 
 
 replied he, I muft be wrong. For I 
 
 have always underftood, continued I, 
 that religion, under the direction of a 
 wife government, might be employed 
 very ufefully, as well to flrengthen the 
 bonds of civil fociety, as to confirm 
 the morals of men. And certainly its 
 influence would be much more flrong 
 and equal, where uniformity prevailed, 
 than where there was an unbounded 
 diverfity ; or it would be flrong or 
 weak in proportion to the uniformity, 
 or diverfity, of the modes of worfhip. 
 
Dialogue hi. 109 
 
 ♦^ 1 think, replied lie, I have no 
 
 where faid any thing contrary to your 
 firfl obfervation ; if I have, I here re- 
 tra6l it. But as to your laft, expe- 
 rience has demonftrated your miftake. 
 Not but that w^hat you advance might 
 be true, if an uniformity could be ob- 
 tained freely, and founded on a tho- 
 rough convi6lion of the minds of men. 
 But as that can never be, for the caufes 
 which have been already afligned above, 
 I think your obfervation cannot be 
 fupported. 
 
 A conviction of the mind is abfo- 
 lutely neceflary in all cafes, in which 
 we would engage the heart. Were 
 men, on fuch a convi6lion, without 
 force, to run into an ufeful unifor- 
 mity ; perhaps it would be a very 
 defirable thing. Yet I cannot but doubt 
 of it, becaufe God (certainly for wife 
 
 ends) 
 
no DIALOGUE lit. 
 
 ends) feems to have conftituted ttid 
 
 nature of man in oppofition to it. 
 
 However they are much more likely to 
 be fo difpofed, after having had time 
 to canvas and examine things in their 
 own v^ay freely, than by any effort of 
 power whatfoever. And I muft again 
 repeat, that it is a cruel tyranny to at- 
 tempt to force men in matters of reli- 
 gion, as long as their condu6l remain 
 incfenfive to the rights of huma- 
 nity. 
 
 But we do not find, by experience^ 
 that diverfity in religion hath any na- 
 tural tendency to weaken the force of 
 ftates ; even although that diverfity be 
 extravagant and monflrous, as it is re- 
 prefented to have been among the Pa-» 
 gans. We do not find any material 
 divifions among the Greeks or Ro- 
 mans, on religious accounts i nor that 
 
 flate 
 
DIALOGUE III. in 
 
 ftate affairs were carried en lefs fuc- 
 cefsfally, on account of the great num- 
 ber of their gods and goddeffes. Nor 
 do we find in our own country, that 
 toleration, as far as it extends, has at 
 all weakened our flrength as a nation » 
 
 Nay wfe are fure of the contrary.- 1 
 
 know of but one reafon therefore, for 
 refufnig toleration to any religion, and 
 that is, when we are certain its piin^ 
 ciples and profeflbrs are intolerant 
 themfelves. Such was, formerly, the 
 temper of the Jews, and fuch flill is 
 the tempet* of fome religionifls, even in 
 thefe enlightened days. 
 
 I will only add, in favour of reli- 
 gious liberty, that an extenfive diver- 
 fity has fome great and undeniable ad- 
 vantages over a forced uniformit}^ or 
 
 ^ very limited toleration. In a great 
 
 diverfity, men find v^ry little difficulty 
 5 ' of 
 
ri2 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 of unloading their minds of their bur- 
 thens of fuperflition in their own 
 way ; and this facility muft naturally 
 prove a great cooler of religious zeal, 
 which is always more heated by diffi- 
 culty and oppofition. And where a 
 man finds a thoufand different modes of 
 worlhip already formed and eftablifhed, 
 and a thoufand different arguments in 
 favour of each mode ; his eagernefs to 
 embrace any one, muft be very much 
 retarded, and a proper moderation and 
 coolnefs will, moft probably, be the 
 refult of his delay : an effe6l the mofl 
 favourable imaginable to religious li- 
 berty, and a preparation indifpenfably 
 neceffary to the clear comprehenfion of 
 
 abflrufe and difficult truths. Here 
 
 he paufed, feeming to expe6l a reply. 
 
 I do not find myfelf, faid I, much 
 difpofed to controvert the general ten- 
 dency 
 
DIALOGUE III. 113 
 
 dency of your reafoning ; yet I cannot 
 allow myfelf fo much freedom of 
 thought on this fubje6l, as to believe 
 it would be beneficial to mankind, to 
 allow fo extenfive a liberty in religious 
 matters, as you contend for. You 
 feem defirous of regulating the opera- 
 tions and modes of religion (as well as 
 thofe of civil Laws) by the principles or 
 laws of human nature j which appears 
 to me an inverfion of the natural order 
 of things : for certainly religion mufl 
 be prior in dignity, and given unto 
 mankind to regulate and fupply the 
 defe6ls of the laws of nature, and not 
 to be controuled and regulated by thofe 
 laws. i fliall not difpute the prio- 
 rity in dignity with you, replied he ; it 
 has been too long affumed by pricflly 
 modefty. But if I miftake not, a very 
 eflential part of the duties of religion 
 I confills 
 
114 DIALOGUE IIL 
 
 confifts in a due obedience to the laws 
 of nature : for they are, indubitably, 
 revelations, which God hath made of 
 his will in the foul of man. Do we 
 not then, as far as we obey the laws of 
 our nature, obey the will of the Deity, 
 who hath made thofe laws ? And are 
 they not marks of a truly religious 
 and v/ell-difpofed mind -, to be inclined 
 ourfelves to obey, and to endeavour, 
 by all reafonable means, to promote 
 obedience in others ? Obedience to 
 thofe laws, or thofc revelations, call them 
 which you will, continued he, is the 
 true and natural felicity of human 
 creatures : the true and only jufl end 
 of all civil inftitutions is to enforce the 
 obedience of mankind to thofe laws, 
 as indifpenfably neceffary to the gene- 
 ral happinefs of the fpecies : and 
 religion, when juftly employed, af- 
 j fumes 
 
DIALOGUE III. 115 
 
 fomes no airs of fuperiority over the 
 laws of our nature : flie finds her- 
 felf never fo well or fo ufefuUy em- 
 ployed, as when all her influence is 
 exerted in inculcating the true prin- 
 ciples of nature, and in confirming and 
 eftablifhing men in obedience to them. 
 This I take to be a found practical 
 employment of religion, and that part 
 of it which comes within the compre- 
 henfion of every man -, and therefore 
 more immediately relative to the li- 
 berty of mankind Here he paufed 
 
 agani. As far as your do6lrine ex- 
 tends, replied I, I believe it may be 
 true ; for true religion is not inimical 
 to the laws of nature, as you have de- 
 fcribed them. But, I obferve, you 
 decline fpeaking of the fubliiner part 
 of religion, the contemplative, as not 
 fo immediately relative to the fubjed ; 
 
 fome 
 
ii6 DIALOGUE IIL 
 
 fome reafon for that, if you plealcj 
 
 and I have done. Becaufe, an- 
 
 fwered he, the contemplative part^ 
 confidered as merely contemplative, 
 evei7 man may freely enjoy, without 
 any inconvenience to others : nor can 
 it juftly come under the regulation of 
 
 any huitlan inllitutions. But fup-- 
 
 pofe, interrogated I, there fliould be 
 too much fociability in the nature of 
 men, to allow them to enjoy their 
 contemplations in filence, and they 
 -# will communicate, for the good of 
 
 fociety ? Why then, anfwered he, 
 
 they muft expect to meet with that 
 free fort of examination, which eveiy 
 man may ufe, who has as good a 
 right to communicate as they have. 
 
 1 could not but agree. And 
 
 thus ended our dialogue on this 
 fubjedt. 
 
 FINIS. 
 


 9^