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 ^VliT r>K y^J^U; 
 
 OUTPORT SERVICE : 
 
 IHIAI, IXSTIUi 
 
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 i;f,\ikws. 
 
George Washington Flowers 
 Memorial Collection 
 
 DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 ESTABLISHED BY THE 
 FAMILY OF 
 
 COLONEL FLOWERS 
 
PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 OUTPOST SERVICE; ' 
 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BATTLE; 
 REVIEWS. 
 
 CHARLESTON : 
 
 S T K A M - 1' (> W K R P R K S S OF K V A N S & COGSWELL, 
 No. S Brond an^ 103 Kast Bay streets. 
 
 1863. 
 
Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive 
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 PRIE1PLES A^D MAXIIIS OF WAR, ETf. 
 
 EXTRACTED, ARRANGED, AXD PUIiLISHED BY GENERAL G. T. BEAU- 
 REGARD, C. S. A.. FOR THE USE OF GENERAL OFFICERS IN THE 
 DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA. 
 
 Charleston, S. C, May, 1863. 
 
 PRINCIPLES. 
 
 The vvliole science of AVar may be briefly defined at; the 
 art of pUicing in the right position, at the right time, a 
 mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose 
 to you. 
 
 Principle No. 1. — To i:>lace masses of your ariwj in contact 
 with fractions of i/our enemy. 
 
 Principle Xo. 2. — To operate as much as possible on the 
 rommunications of yovr enemy vithout exposing your own. 
 
 Principle Xo. 3. — To opei-ate always on interior lines {or 
 shorter ones in point of time). 
 
 Every true maxim in war can be deduced from the above 
 given principles, it being of conr.se understood that they 
 are to be reversed in speaking of the operations of the 
 enemy — i. e., care must l)e taken, first, to prevent your 
 enemy from bringing tlie mass of his forces in contact with 
 fractions of 3'our own, or large fractions against small 
 ones ; second, to prevent him from operating on your com- 
 munications Anthout exposing his own ; third, to prevent 
 his moving on interior or .shorter lines. 
 
These three [)riiiciples supply an infallible test by which 
 to judge of every niilitaiy plan : for no combination can 
 be well conceived, no maxim founded in truth, which is at 
 variance with them. 
 
 By operating- ou the interior lines which the distribution 
 of your adversary atibrds you, you may march against one 
 of his separated fractions with your whole force, aud after 
 destro3'ing it proceed to the next, aud so on ; you will thus 
 defeat them in detail by bringing the mass of your army 
 in contact with successive fractions of your enemy. Prin- 
 ciple 3 indicates that the hostile fraction which you should 
 tirst attack is one of the flanks, since it will take the enemy 
 double the time to concentrate his whole force on either 
 flank that would be required to eifect his concentration on 
 the centre. 
 
 In war it is an axiom that everj possible chance of success 
 must be enlisted on your side. 
 
 MAXIMS. 
 
 Maxim 1. — Kecer abandon your lira: of corn.niunicati.on from 
 over-confidence. 
 
 Maxim 2. — Although it is a maxim never to abaiulon your 
 line of communication, yet to change that line is one of tlie ynost 
 skilful manoeuvres of the art of loar, where circumstances au- 
 thorize it. 
 
 Maxim 3. — If you march to the conquest of a coimtry vjiih 
 two or three armies ivhich have each its line of ojyeration toward, 
 a fixed point where they are to unite, it is a niaxiin that the union 
 of these diff'ererd corps d'armee must never take place near the 
 enemy, because not only may the enemy, by concent?'ating his 
 forces, prevent their junction, but he ynay moreover beat them in 
 detail. 
 
 The route by which an army marches toward its object 
 
must be sheltered bv its own frontiers, or by some natural 
 obstacle throuffhout as great an extent as is possible. 
 
 That part of the base of operations is the most advan- 
 tageous to break out from into the tlieatre of war which 
 conducts the most directly upon the enemy's flank or rear. 
 
 Maxim 4. — An army ought to have but one line of operation, 
 which it must ca.refulbj guard and never abandon, except from an 
 overriding necessity. 
 
 Maxim 5. — When tiro armies are ranged in battle, and one of 
 them has but one point to retreat upon, lohile the other can retreat 
 on all the points of the coinpass, all the advantage is with the last. 
 It is in such a case that a commander should be bold to strike 
 great blows, and manoeuvre on his enemy's flank. Victory is in 
 his hands. 
 
 Maxim 6. — It is one of the most imjjortant jyrincij^les of war 
 to unite the scattered bodies of an army at the point which is the 
 most distant and the best protected, from the attempts of an eiiemy. 
 
 Maxim 7. — To operate by lines distant from each other, and 
 without intercommunication, is a fault which generally leads to 
 another. The advancing columns of an army must be in con- 
 stant communication with each other, so that an enemy can not 
 pei\etrate between them. 
 
 Maxim 8. — The communication between the different fractions 
 of an army, whether in jyosition or in movement, must always be 
 perfectly open and easy. 
 
 MaxixM 9. — To besiege a fortified place ivhose possession v'oidd 
 be useless to yourself, and which gives the enemy no power of 
 annoyance, is to ivaste time and means. 
 
 The places which an invading army is justified in besieg- 
 ing are such as come Avithin the meaning of the definitions 
 of strategetical points and decisive points. 
 
 Every point on the theatre of war, whatever be its uat- 
 
6 
 
 nre, which conduces in any manner to strengthen your line 
 of operation or of communication is a strategetical point 
 
 Decisive strategetical points are those only which are deci- 
 sive in insuring the success of any operations of strategy, 
 either for oflence or defence. 
 
 Maxim 10. — The excellence of a position is alwa>/s relative: 
 1st. To that occupied hy the enemy. 
 2d. To the number of troops intended to line i^ 
 3flf. To the comp>osition of those troojos. 
 
 Maxim 11. — A position must not he commanded by heights in 
 the direction of the enemy within artillery range, 
 
 Maxim 12. — Every position must cover the line of communi- 
 mtion of the army with its base. 
 
 Maxim 13. — The lines by wldclt the army must retreat from 
 its position, if defeated, must be as numerous and easy as p)Ossible. 
 
 In forming a line of battle, special respect must be had 
 to the line or lines by which the army may be obliged to 
 retire. The more directly these lead toward the base of 
 operation the better. The more of these lines available, 
 the greater the security in which the army will fight, and 
 the greater the probability that, if defeated, it will be able 
 to effect its retreat without an}- overwhelming disaster. 
 
 Maxim 14. — The part or parts of a line of battle which are 
 in front of any line or lines of retreat must be made the strongest 
 (if not so already from natural causes), either by entrenchments or 
 by posting the greatest force at such parts of your line. 
 
 If the enemy attack and break that part of your line 
 which is in front of your line of retreat j^our army, divided 
 into two parts, may be forced back toward the flanks, and 
 the enemy may gain possession of your line of retreat. 
 
 Maxim 15.— Every position must afford easy communicationy 
 in rear of the linCy between the different parts of your line of 
 battle. 
 
Maxim .16. — The ground infiwii of your position should be 
 f'uch as to impede the movements of an enemy adrancing to attack 
 you, and should be so completely commanded by your position as 
 to insure its being swept by your artillery to thefidl extent of its 
 range. 
 
 Siu'li ground will be more slowly traversed by the enemy ; 
 lie will be exposed for a longer time to the lire of your 
 gnus, which \\\\\ luive the effect of disordering his march, 
 and damping his ardor in a degree proportioned to the- 
 difficulty of the ground lie has to pass over. 
 
 ■ Maxim 17. — JErery position must afford secure protection to 
 the flanks of your army. 
 
 This is a deduction from Principles 1 and 2, since its 
 observance will prevent the enemy from applying them at 
 3'our expense — 
 
 Principle 1, by placing himself in such a position as will 
 enable him to attack the flank of your line, the nature of 
 'which manoeuvre is to bring masses of the attacking force 
 in contact with successive fractions of the line attacked. 
 
 Principle 2, by turning your flank and acting on your 
 line of retreat. 
 
 Strong natural obstacles afford the best protection, such 
 as mountains, large rivers, impenetrable woods, marshes, 
 etc. AVhere these do not exist the flanks must be strength- 
 ened b}' artificial means. 
 
 Maxim 18, — A position cannot be too strong; lose no oppor- 
 tunity of strengthening it by means of field-works. 
 
 The natural positions w'hicli are generally met with can 
 not itrotect an army from the attacks of a superior force 
 witliout the aid of art. 
 
 Maxim 19. — Orcupy your position in such a manner that you 
 can defend a part of it with a snmller force than that which the 
 enemy can bring against it, so that the greater part of your force 
 may he available to assad the weaker of the enemy. 
 
 If, two armies, A and B, of 20,000 men each, occupy 
 
lines of equal, length ; but A, by reason of tlie ground 
 being naturally stronger on the right half of his line, rtr 
 by reason of entrenchments, is able to occupy that half 
 effectively with only 5,000 men, while the force of B is 
 equally disseminated, then (to use a technical term) the 
 5.000 of A eontam 10,000 of B ; while A has 15,000 where- 
 with to overwhelm the opposing 10,000 of B. 
 
 If your force is superior to that of the enemy, j-ou should 
 r.ot therefore occupy a greater front than that of the enemy, 
 l>ut hold your surplus troops in hand ready to take advan- 
 tage of any opening that may be afforded. You will thus 
 be able to insure the superiority at the decisive point an-d 
 time. 
 
 If A and B consist respectively of 20,000 and 10.000 
 men, and A occupies a front twice as extended as that of 
 B, then A loses the advantage of numbers, for B can bring- 
 to bear on an o[5posite part of A's line a force equal to 
 that which can oppose it, and that part may be broken 
 before succor from the distant portions of A's line can 
 arrive. 
 
 It must never be forgotten that it is not the number of 
 troops ranged in order of battle which decides the victory, hut the 
 number which is actually put in vigorous action hg a commander. 
 
 Maxim 20. — When on the eve of a battle recall all your 
 d.etaclmients ; do not neglect one, however small : one battalion the 
 more sometimes decides the day. 
 
 In the same manner as no part of a position can be too 
 strong, a master of the art of war will never consider that 
 he has too many troops, no matter how small may be his 
 enemy's force. 
 
 Maxim 11.— Never detach a force, either on the eve or on the j 
 day of a battle, for the purpose of co-operating tvith your mail). 
 body in attacJdng the enemy, unless your commurdcations with the 
 detachment can be constantly maintained. 
 
 Unless communication is maintained, there can be no 
 
concert. Xotliing should be ]oft to accident. If a force 
 be detached to such a distance that its communication with 
 the main body is not constant and rapid^ however well a 
 combination may be conceived, a thousand accidents may 
 disconcert it. 
 
 If a bod}' of troops be detached to a distance from the 
 main army round a flank of the enemy, for the purpose of 
 attacking the enemy in rear in an approaching battle, a 
 watchful enemy will learn the movement and overwhelm 
 the detachment. 
 
 Maxim 22. — Never leave intervals hetivecn the different divis- 
 ions of your line of battle ivhere the enemy might penetrate^ 
 unless to draw him into a snare. 
 
 It results as a corollary from the last maxim, that you 
 must never weaken any part of your line to such an extent 
 that a vigorous attack upon it by the enem}^ will probably 
 succeed, and enable him to act as has been above de- 
 scribed ; also that, unless you have a great superiority of 
 force, it is dangerous to attack an enemy's line by both 
 extremities at once; for, as both attacks must be reinforced 
 at the expense of your centre, your centre becomes weak- 
 en(Kl, and a counter-attack upon it by the enemy may suc- 
 ceed. 
 
 ^Iaxim '1'^. — Never attack with a fraction of your force when 
 a short delay will enable you to attack with masses. 
 
 The temptation or supposed necessity may sometimes be 
 great, but yielding to it will almost invariably increase the 
 evil it is intended to remedy. 
 
 Maxim 24. — Nothing can be more rash or contrary to the 
 principles of war than to make a flank march before an enemy in 
 posUio7i. 
 
 Maxim 25. — There are two icays of obliging an enemy to 
 abandon a position, viz : by attacking and driving him from it, 
 and by manceuvring so as to make it impossible for him to hold it. 
 
10 
 
 The first luethod should onl\' be adopted when, in con- 
 sequence of your liaving a superior force, or of the enem3''s 
 position being faulty, it is your object to bring on a decisive 
 engagement. 
 
 The mode of applying the second is in general to threaten 
 the enemy's line of communication. 
 
 Maxim 26. — An attack on the enemy's centre, if successful, is 
 in general the most decisive. That on a flank is the most 
 sec\ire. 
 
 The centre of a line is not only the strongest naturally, 
 from its position enabling it to be doubly reinforced from 
 each wing in half the time required to reinforce one wing 
 from the other, but, in addition, its strength is artificially 
 increased by every possible means; the fire of the guns of a 
 position likewise, all converging on the ground over which 
 the enemy must advance to attack the centre, renders th6 
 attack on that point more doubtful than one upon a flank. 
 As a general rule the attack of a position should.be made 
 on the weakest points, or on points which are so decisive 
 that an attack upon any other is impossible or dangerous, 
 so long as they remain in the enemy's possession. 
 
 The weakest points are the flanks when not supported, 
 or any salient points of the enemy's line which are not 
 w^ell defended by his artillery in position, or any point 
 of his line where he has left an interval, or which he has 
 not occupied in sufficient force. 
 
 In choosing a point of attack, one should be preferred 
 from which the assailants, if repulsed, may with safety 
 retreat, rather than another which may ofter greater temp- 
 tations to attack, but the line of retreat from which would 
 be exposed. 
 
 Maxim 27. — If your enemy is entrenching and it is your 
 intention to attack his position, do not delay a moment. Every 
 hour's delay may cost the loss of 1,000 inen in an assault. 
 
 Maxim 28. — Aii army on the inarch and an army in position 
 
ii 
 
 in an eneyiufs countri/, sJtoidd never be for one moment without 
 its advanced guard and its advanced posts. 
 
 There are two descriptions of advanced posts, viz: those 
 which are to be maintained against attack to the hist, and 
 those which are onlv to be defended sufficiently long to 
 enable the army they cover to form in order of battle 
 before an enemy can attack it. 
 
 iSTo precaution, therefore, which will strengthen such 
 posts and enable the defenders to keep the enemy at bay, 
 if only for five minutes, should be neglected. An officer 
 is not worthy of the name who, in command of an outpost, 
 does not feel that the safety of the whole army jnay de- 
 pend on his individual vigilance, who neglects anj' possible 
 expedient to strengthen his post, and who does not make 
 himself thoroughly acquainted with the ground to a con- 
 siderable distance around it, asking .himself frequentlv 
 what he should do if attacked. 
 
 MaxIxM 29, — 7o defend a defile, never take post in front, hat 
 ahcays in rear of the defile. 
 
 This will enable the defenders to attack with their whole 
 force any fraction of the enemy they may think proper to 
 allow to emerge from the defile. 
 
 Xo position, however good otherwise, should be occupied 
 b\' an arm}- which has a defile in its rear through which 
 the arm}' must retreat if defeated. A retreat through a 
 defile before an enemy is always disastrous. 
 
 The case of an army defending the head of a bridge is 
 an exception to this. 
 
 It follows that you should never lose an opportunity of 
 attacking an enemy in retreat, while in the act of passing 
 a defile, allowing any portion of his army you think proper 
 to enter it, and then attacking with your whole force the 
 remaining fraction. 
 
 All passes over mountains are of the nature of defiles. 
 
 A bridge is essentially a defile; and, in the same way as 
 important passes are defended by forts, a bridge over a 
 great river is defended by fortifications of more or less 
 strength. 
 
Maxim oO. — Every disadvantage may he removed by skill or 
 fortune, except time. If a General has time against him, he 
 must fail. And conversely, time is the best ally. 
 
 Maxim 31. — As a general rule the column of divi^sions is the 
 most convenient order of march; the line is the best formation for 
 collision. 
 
 Every rule in war may, if true, be traced to one of the 
 three principles. The present is derived from ITo. 1, as by 
 attacking lines with columns, the greater number of the 
 men composing the column are unable either to fire or act 
 offensively in any manner, while every man in the line can 
 be brought into play, thus bringing the greater number of 
 the line in contact with the smaller of the column. 
 
 It must be borne in mind that no rule can be absolute in 
 war; every one is subject to modification from actual cir- 
 cumstances. Although the column is the most convenient 
 order of march general]}', and the only ,safe order when 
 exposed to cavalry attack, it is not always the safest. 
 
 Maxim 32. — All movements of troops must he made in such a 
 manner as will expose them to the least possible amount of injury 
 from an enemy. 
 
 Therefore, in the case where troops advancing to attack 
 an enemy's position are exposed to the fire of a powerful 
 artillery, the advance should be made in line. 
 
 Maxim 33. — All movements in presence of an enemy must hi' 
 made in that order which will admit of the formation of the H/k 
 of battle in the sJiortest possible time. 
 
 This maxim is peculiarly applicable to a flank march 
 within reach of an enemy, or to a movement whose object 
 is to prolong one flank. In moving to the front when 
 threatened by cavalry, the march is executed in column at 
 quarter-distance, because from that formation the order of 
 battle is assumed in the shortest' possible time (viz: that of 
 the square). 
 
 In moving to a flank within reach of an enemy, where 
 
13 
 
 cavalry attack is not imminent, or where sufficient protec- 
 tion is afforded by the cavahy of the army so moving, the 
 marcli sliouh.l be executed in column at full distance, be- 
 cause (the line liaving been established as the proper order 
 for collision — see Maxim 31), from that formation, line is 
 formed with the least possible delay by a simple wheel of 
 divisions into line. 
 
 When it is desired to prolong a line to one flank to a 
 comparativel}' small extent, it may be done by the march 
 of successive battalions or brigades from the other flank in 
 rear of the line. The flank march is in this case protected 
 and concealed by the general lino. 
 
 When time presses, the same object may be accomplished 
 by moving up to the flank of the first line the nearest bat- 
 talions or l)rigades of the second line, making a simulta- 
 neous flank movement of the second line to a suflicient 
 extent to cover the prolongation of the first, and supplying 
 its deficiency on the other fiank by battalions or brigades 
 drawn from the first line. 
 
 ^Iaxim 34. — Of all the attacks to which a body of troops can 
 be exposed, that upon a fiank is the most dangerous. 
 
 This is deduced from Principle 1. For, suppose a battal- 
 ion in line, which we may call A, to be attacked by another 
 line, B. which has succeeded in establishing itself perpen- 
 dicularly to the direction of A, on one of its flanks. The 
 commander of A will endeavor to change his front so as 
 to form a line parallel to B, in order to meet its attack. 
 Should B be at a suflicient distance to enable A to com- 
 plete its change of front, no inconvenience:. will ensue ; but 
 if notj only a part of A will have been able to assume the 
 required parallel formation at the time when it is attacked 
 by B's whole force, and driven back on the remaining 
 divisions of the battalion, which will be attacked and over- 
 thrown by B in succession. 
 
 The most advantageous direction which a line can as- 
 sume for the purpose of attacking another line in flank is 
 perpendicular to that of the line to be attacked; and the 
 more nearly perpendicular the greater is the advantage. 
 
u 
 
 The attack on the head of a column is analogous to that 
 on the ilank of a line; but it is more ruinous in its eftects. 
 
 The echelon formation combines to a certain extent the 
 advantages of the line and column. For mere changes of 
 position, the movement in oblique echelon saves much 
 time. For an advance against an enemy in position, the 
 direct echelon formation presents advantages attbrded by 
 no other. It combines the greater correctness of the march 
 in column with the superior force, for collision, of the line. 
 
 The head of the echelon is the only part the enemy can 
 attack without exposing his own flank. The retired flank 
 can only be turned by a long march on the part of the 
 eneni}-; it may therefore be considered safe, and the ad- 
 vanced wing, with which you first attack, may be reinforced 
 at the expense of that which is retired. Thus, in less than 
 the time Avhich would be required by the enemy to turn 
 the retired flank, you may gain some decided advantage 
 with the other. 
 
 In general terms, the adv^antages of the echelon forma- 
 tion are that one flank is therebj- secure from attack — 
 each division of the echelon covers the flank of that which 
 precedes it, and the exposed flank may be reinforced at the 
 expense of the other; thereby observing Maxim 19, since, 
 by reason of the distance Avhich separates them, one wing 
 of the enemy is held in check by the retired wing of the 
 echelon, which has been weakened in order to reinforce 
 the head of the echelon which is the point of collision. 
 
 The retired flank being safe, it remains only to secure 
 the head of the echelon from flank attack. 
 
 In case of there being no flank support for the head of 
 the echelon, the greater part of the artillery and cavalry 
 must support that flank. 
 
 If two armies of equal strength are opposed to each 
 other, and one of them has its flanks strongly posted, while 
 one or both of the flanks of the other are unsupported, the 
 general line of the last may be parallel to that of the flrst, 
 and the exposed flank or flanks may be protected by several 
 bodies of troops being posted in echelon to their rear; the 
 
15 
 
 enemy dare not attack the exposed flank, because his own 
 flank would be in danger from the troops in echelon, and 
 he could not make a long flank march to turn the flank of 
 those troops Avithout exposing his line of retreat. 
 
 Frederick's system was to attack one wing of his enemy's 
 army with one of his own wings, reinforced for that pur- 
 pose at the expense of the other, remedying the weakness 
 of his other wing by removing it beyond the reach of at- 
 tack. He formed his line obliquely to that of the enemy, 
 and then marched in the prolongation of his own line until 
 he outflanked the wing he designed to attack. 
 
 When an army from the parallel order assumes tlie 
 oblique order with respect to an enemy, the flrst consid- 
 eration must be the line of retreat. The usual means of 
 efl:ecting the change is by keeping one flank in its original 
 position and throwing back the other. 
 
 The general of an army which has eftected such a 
 change of front should, as a general rule, post the greater 
 strength of his second line in rear of his advanced wing, 
 and hold his reserve somewhere behind the centre of tliat 
 wing. 
 
 Such a change of position, however, in presence of a 
 watchful and able enemy ought to be impossible; and it is 
 only by surprise that a general can hope to place his army 
 en 7nassc in a position to attack one of his enemy's flanks. 
 
 In order to attempt successfully the oblique order by a 
 flank march in the neighborhood of an enemy, the march 
 of the army must be concealed from the eneni}-. 
 
 The line of retreat of the army which takes the oblique 
 order must always be in rear of the advanced wing. 
 
 The greater the obliquity of the army to the enemy's 
 line the greater the security of the refused flank from 
 counter-attack, and the greater the probability of success. 
 And this only brings us to the perfection of flank attack, 
 which is when the direction of the army is perpendicular 
 to that of the enemy. 
 
 If an enemy endeavQrs to turn one of your flanks by 
 moving his whole army to that flank there are several 
 modes of defeating his intention. 
 
1st. If he marches in such an order that he can not read- 
 ily resume his line of battle facing your army, make a 
 visrorous attack on tlie flank of his march alono- his whole 
 line. 
 
 2d. If he marches as above in loose order, so as to leave 
 any large interval between the different divisions of his 
 army, attack one of the separated portions — suppose the 
 rear portion — by interposing a body of troops between it 
 and the rest of the army, to stop the head of its march 
 while you direct other troops against the flank of its 
 march. 
 
 3d. If, he marches compactly, and in such an order as 
 will enable him to' reform his line in a moment, 3'ou must 
 choose the head or the rear of his line of march for attack; 
 but the attack must be made with method and supported 
 by cavalry, or tlie enemy's cavalry (which Avill be found at 
 both those points) will take your infantry in flank. 
 
 4th. You may prolong your line to the threatened flank 
 by either of the methods already given, and turn the tables 
 on the enemy by outflanking him. 
 
 The eftective force of an army in battle depends chiefly 
 on the rapidity and precision with which it can manoeuvre ; 
 and the basis of its excellence in this particular is found in 
 the proficiency of each battalion and squadron in field 
 movements. The effective force of an army in a campaign 
 depends mainly on the i-egularity and rapidity with which 
 its marches are conducted; and as the success of an action 
 may often be influenced b}' the order of march in which 
 an army approaches an enem_y in position, it is impossible 
 that the troops can be too much practised in every possible 
 order of march. 
 
 In all armies, ancient and modern, the line of battle has 
 been divided into units, whose magnitude has been deter- 
 mined by the average range of the human voice. The 
 unit should be as large as is consistent with the possibility 
 of the men composing it, when formed in line, being di- 
 rected by the voice of their commjmder. 
 
 The battalion is taken as the unit of the infantry line. 
 
IT 
 
 The squadron and the batteiy as that of the cavahy and 
 artillery respective!}-. 
 
 Ill our army 500 men in two ranks form a line of about 
 150 yards, as many as are usually found in the field, 
 supernumeraries and non-effectives being taken into ac- 
 count: i. e., 3-J men to one yard,'or 5,867 to one mile; or 
 5,000 men to one mile, allowing for space between regi- 
 ments, etc. ; a greater extent of line might be inconvenient, 
 although it is certain that in an attack the larger the mass 
 to which unity of impulse can be communicated without 
 confusion the greater will be the chances of success. 
 
 The art of directing troops in battle consists in the just 
 employment of the three arms in such a manner that they 
 shall mutually support and defend each other to as great 
 an extent as possible. No fixed rule can be laid down as 
 to their relative proportion in the composition of an army. 
 That must depend very much on the nature of the country 
 in which an army operates. 
 
 But where such country is favorable to tlie march and 
 action of those arms, a good proportion is — 
 
 Cavalry, one-fifth of the infantry ; artillery, three guns 
 for every thousand men of infantry and cavahy united. 
 
 Nothing can be more opposed to the rules of war than 
 for infantry alone to attack an enemy's infantry in position 
 which is defended by artillery. The fire of the latter will 
 throw the attacking force into confusion, and will expose 
 it to an easy overthrow if it should succeed in reaching the 
 position to be assaulted. 
 
 When an officer is on active service in the field, every- 
 thing connected with the daily life of his men" should be 
 an object of constant attention ; no detail is beneath him. 
 He must not think the arms and ammunition his most 
 important chaj'ge, and that if they be in fighting order he 
 need not trouble himself much about the rest. 
 
 The arms are the fighting weapons, but the soldier is the 
 
 machine which wields them ; and it is to him — to clothino: 
 
 his back, and feeding his belly, and looking after his health 
 
 and comfort — that the great attention is due. The arms 
 
 2 
 
18 
 
 and ammunition must of course be alwa3"S in perfect order, 
 but tbey are onh' required when in contact with an enemy. 
 The natural condition of a soldier on service is the line of 
 march., He will have at least twenty da3's marching to 
 one of fighting; and he has to be preserved in health and 
 comfort during those twcnt}- days, otherwise his musket 
 and pouch Avould do small service on the twenty-first day. 
 
 An ofiieer should go among his men and himse|f look 
 after their comfort. jN'o fear of their losing respect for 
 him because he does so. At the end of a march, he should 
 never feel at libert}' to attend to his own wants until he 
 has seen his men engaged in cooking their meals. The 
 rapidity with which a regiment has its fires lighted after a 
 march, and meals cooked, may be regarded as a test of the 
 attention paid by the officers to the. comfort of their men. 
 
 Similarly before a march, an officer should take care that 
 none of his men leave their encampment or bivouac with- 
 out as good a meal as circumstances permit. 
 
 As regards equipment for the field, an officer must have 
 as few wants as possible ; and he should carefully study 
 the art of putting up the articles it is necessary he should 
 possess in the smallest possible compass. The line of 
 march must be considered as the natural condition of a 
 soldier, and everything regulated with that view. 
 
 An officer charged with the arrangement of any military 
 movement or operation should on no account trust to the 
 intelligence of subordinates who are to execute it. He 
 should anticipate and provide against, every misconception 
 or stupidity it is possible to foresee, and give all the mi- 
 nute directions he would think necessary if he knew the 
 officer charged with the execution of the operation to be 
 the most stupid of mankind. 
 
 No amount of disapprobation of his geng^al's plans can 
 justify an officer in canvassing those plans with others, and 
 openly finding fault with them. A great many young 
 gentlemen (and old gentlemen too, for that matter) set 
 up for generals, and habitually ridicule the dispositions of 
 their superiors. Such a practice is insubordinate and mis- 
 
19 
 
 chievous in the highest degree ; the soldiers ^acquire the 
 habit from those whose duty it is to set an example ; they 
 lose that confidence in their general which is one of the 
 principal elements of success in .military operations, and 
 infinite mischief results. 
 
.«",' 
 
 OUTPOST SERVICE. 
 
 1. The commanders of all detached army corps, divis- 
 ions, brigades, or regiments of this army, on arriving at a 
 position to be occupied, will carefully reconnoitre, person- 
 ally and by staft" officers, the ground in the vicinity, and 
 all roads and approaches thereto, for a distance of several 
 miles, especially in the known direction of the enemy. 
 The best positions for holding all such approaches under 
 vigilant observation, and for the prevention of surprise, 
 will be carefully selected for the advanced line of picket 
 sentries, which shall not be less than one mile distant froiii 
 the main body of the command, nor more than three miles. 
 The force to be employed in this outpost, service shall 
 habitually be not less than one-lifth of the command from 
 which it may be detached, and the tour of duty will be for 
 three days. 
 
 2. The post of the regiment, battalion, or detachment 
 on outpost service, will be selected at a convenient central 
 point, about half a mile in rear of the front line to be 
 occupied by sentinels; and there will be the reserve, and 
 place for baggage and cooking. One-third of the com- 
 mand or detachment will be thrown forward in three equal 
 parties, equidistant from each other, to within two hun- 
 dred yards of the extreme picket front; and from these 
 detachments smaller detachments, each of from three to 
 six privates, with a commissioned or non-commissioned 
 officer in charge, from which a continuous line of sentries 
 will be established along the entire front to be held and 
 observed, connecting at all times with the sentinels on the 
 right and left, thrown forward either by the pickets, posts 
 
21 
 
 of tlie same regiment, battalion, or detacliment, or estab- 
 lished from other regiments, battalions, or detachments on 
 outpost service. At night the number of sentinels will be 
 doubled. 
 
 3. Sentinels on picket should be so established as to 
 observe as much, and as far, as possible, while themselves 
 concealed from observation by the enemy. Loud talking, 
 singing, whistling, and fires, except at the reserve — and, in 
 very cold weather, on the line of company or detacliment 
 reserves — is strictly prohibited. Citizens must not be 
 allowed to stay or lounge about the picket posts, or con- 
 verse with pickets; this is particularly enjoined: for, under 
 the pretence. of hospitality, and the simulation of the sim~ 
 pie countryman, an insidious spy may be lurking to dis- 
 cover our signals of recognition, countersigns, passwords, 
 or other information, to be betrayed to our injury. 
 
 4. Officers, and non-commissioned officers and soldiers, 
 on picket service, are at all times dressed and equipped. 
 The commander of each outpost command will make fre- 
 quent visits and inspections of his advanced detachments, 
 picket posts, and front line of sentinels; and he will be 
 responsible for any surprise of his lines, or lax, negligent 
 performance of picket service by his officers and men 
 during the tour, lie will give proper instructions to all 
 under his command, touching their several duties, and 
 should satisfy himself that those instructions are well un- 
 derstood and rigidly executed. His adjutant, or some 
 other officer selected for the duty, will also visit each picket 
 post and sentry once each night, between twelve o'clock 
 and daylight. 
 
 5. When a day signal of recognition has been arranged 
 for any picket line, it will be demanded as soon as the 
 parties see each other. At night parties approaching will 
 be halted at a distance of sixty yards, if practicable, in a 
 loud,. distinct tone, and the signal demanded. The party 
 challenged will then require a response from the challeng- 
 ing party; this made, the latter will order the former to 
 advance and give the countersign. Commanders of out- 
 
22 
 
 posts will be careful not to prevent nor clela}^ tlie passin'g of 
 cavalry pickets, or couriers with despatches; but when 
 reasonable doubts arise as to the character of the party, ho 
 must be sent, under charge of guard, at once to the head- 
 quarters of the nearest general officer. A mounted man 
 will not be required to dismount to give the countersign, 
 after having made the proper signal, nor will the counter- 
 sign be required in the daytime. Great circumspection 
 must be exercised in the use of signals, to prevent their 
 observation by lurking spies of the enemy. 
 
 6. An approach of the enemy must be resisted by the 
 pickets as obstinately as practicable; the ground must only 
 be yielded before an overwhelming force ; they will then 
 retire, fighting, on the reserve, where a stand will be made 
 as long as practicable. If forced to retire, they will take 
 up successive positions behind all advantageous shelter, 
 
 ,and resolutely check and retard the advance of the enemy 
 as long as possible. The best marksmen will be selected 
 to cover the rear, while thus falling back, who will fire 
 with deliberation as they retire. If pressed closely by the 
 enemy, the command must be brought, if possible, to 
 charge jvith the bayonet. The utmost care must be taken 
 to prevent the men from crowding m masse, in falling back, 
 as they will offer a target for artillery ; and the men must 
 be cautioned against, and prevented from making, a precip- 
 itate retreat from an outpost, under any circumstances. 
 
 7. While on outpost duty, no officer or soldier will be 
 permitted to leave the outpost, without express authority 
 from the commander, except upon a surgeon's certificate. 
 Commanders of outposts must remain constantly during 
 the tour with their reserve, except when visiting the picket 
 posts and sentries, in which case, they will leave these 
 instructions with the officer next in command. 
 
 8. In marching to and from outposts, the utmost order 
 and discipline will be preserved. No siraggliiif/ must be 
 permitted. 
 
 ■ . 9. As soon as the pickets may become seriously engaged 
 with' the enemy, any baggage at the post of the reserve 
 
23 
 
 will be immecliatelj sent to the rear, to the baggage of the 
 brigade to which the detachment belongs. Troops on out- 
 post service are expected to bivouac. 
 
 10. As soon as the^ enemy shall have developed with cer- 
 tainty a design to advance, the commanders of outpost> 
 will at once despatch couriers to the general commanding 
 the corps or division to which the outpost belongs, giving 
 information of the movements of the enemy, his probable 
 strength, kind of force, and wliether moving rapidly or 
 not, route or routes taken, and such other information as 
 may be of service. The report of mere rumored move- 
 ments must always be avoided, or at least distinguished 
 from what may be ascertained by the military. 
 
 11. The comnuindcr of each outpost will publish these 
 orders every tour, before establishing his picket post or 
 posting his picket sentries; they will likewise be read to 
 each companj' or detachment of the line ofiidvanced picket 
 parties. They will be carefully preserved, and transferred 
 to the next commanders of the outpost. 
 
 12. Any person found in the act of eluding the outposts, 
 and failing to halt when directed to do so, will be fired 
 upon by the sentinels; and any person, if suspected of 
 eluding the outposts, will be at once arrested and sent to 
 the nearest provost marshal. 
 
 13. Cavalry pickets will be required, by sentries and 
 picket posts, to show authority of their colonel or other 
 commander for the service before being allowed to pass ; 
 and couriers, with despatches, must be furnished with 
 passes properly signed. 
 
 14. The roll of troops at outposts must be called fre- 
 quently during the day, and at retreat there shall be an 
 inspection of arms and ammunition. 
 
 15. Staft' officers may be sent b}' the general, or other 
 officer in command, to inspect the outposts of his com- 
 mand. 
 
 16. Sentries must alwa3-s be ready to iire, but will be 
 sure of the presence of the enemy before firing, and will 
 carefully avoid false alarms. Once satisfied that the enemy 
 
24 
 
 is at hand, the sentinel, though all defence on his part 
 may be useless, must fire, as the safet}' of the army may 
 depend on the alarm he will then give. Picket sentries 
 should be relieved every hour at night, and, as a precaution 
 against surprise, should be instructed in some signal for 
 the night before giving the countersign to others of the 
 same outpost detachment. 
 
 17. In the immediate or near presence xDf the eneni}^ the 
 main and company' reserves must stand to their arms for 
 an hour immediately before daybreak. Patrols will be 
 made slowly, silently, and with the utmost precaution, to 
 insure against surprise or being mistaken for the enemy 
 by our own men. When patrols are sent out information 
 of the fact must be spread throughout the picket posts and 
 sentries. 
 
 CAVALRY PICKETS AND VEDETTES. 
 
 18. In addition to infantry outposts, the wdiole front of 
 any force in position or camp must be completely observed 
 and covered by cavalry ; all commanding points of obser- 
 vation will be occupied ; and all possible avenues of ap- 
 proach will be watched, as near to the enemy's lines as 
 the nature of the country will admit, or he will permit 
 without substantial resistance. Positions must be avoided 
 which the enemy can approach under cover or turn. There 
 must be an unbroken line of conmiunication on the right 
 and left, between all the posts and vedettes. The horse 
 should be relieved by his rider as much as possible, but 
 when near the eneyny the vedette must never quit his^rcin or 
 take off bridle or saddle. 
 
 19. Cavalry picket detachments, when practicable, will 
 consist of entire companies, and each companj- will cover 
 its proportion of the front to be occupied. The picket 
 posts, detached in advance, will not be of less than one 
 non-commissioned officer and three troopers each. The 
 captain of each company will serve as officer of the guard 
 for his company on picket service, and a field officer, or 
 
lio 
 
 senior captain, will be officer of the day fov the whole line 
 of the regiment, battalion, or squadron on outpost duty. 
 
 20. The company commander ^vill be habitually with 
 the reserve, established at a central point in rear of the 
 picket posts. 
 
GEiNERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BATTLE. 
 
 1. Field and company officers arc specially enjoined to 
 instrnct their men, under all circumstances, to fire with 
 deliberation at the feet of the enemy; they will thus avoid 
 overshooting, and, besides, wounded men give more trouble 
 to our adversary than his dead, as they have to be taken 
 from the field. 
 
 2. Officers in command must be cool and collected in 
 action, hold their men in hand, and caution them against 
 useless, aimless firing. The men must be instructed and 
 required each one to single out his mark. It was the delib- 
 erate sharp-shooting of our forefathers in the Revolution 
 of 1776, and at I^ew Orleans, in 1815, which made them 
 so formidable against the odds with which they were 
 engaged. 
 
 3. In the beginning of a battle, except by troops de- 
 ployed as skirmishers, the fire by file will be avoided; it 
 excites the men, and renders their subsequent control diffi- 
 cult; fire by wing or company should be resorted to instead. 
 During the battle, the officers and non-commissioned offi- 
 cers must keep the men in ranks, enforce obedience, and 
 encourage and stimulate them if necessary. 
 
 4. Soldiers must not be permitted to quit the ranks to 
 strip or rob the dead, nor even to assist in removing our 
 own dead, unless by special permission, which shall only 
 be given when the action has been decided. The surest 
 way to protect our wounded is to drive the enemy from 
 the field ; the most pressing, highest duty is to win the 
 victory. 
 
 5. Before the battle, the quartermaster of the division 
 will make all the necessary arrangements for the imme- 
 
27 
 
 diate transportation of the wounded from the field. After 
 consulting with the medical otfieers, he will establish the 
 ambulance depot in the rear, and give his assistants the 
 necessary instructions for the efficient service of tlie ambu- 
 lance wagons and other means of transportation. 
 
 6. The anibulancc depot, to wliich the wounded are to 
 be conveyed or directed for immediate treatment, should 
 be established at the most convenient building nearest the 
 field of battle. A red flag marks the place and way to it. 
 
 7. Before aTid immediately atter battle the roll of each 
 company will be called, and absentees must strictly account 
 for their absence from the ranks. To quit their standard 
 on the battle-lield, under fire, under the pretence of remov- 
 ing or aiding the wounded, will not be permitted. Any 
 one persisting in it will be shot on the spot; and whoever 
 shall be found to have quit the field, or his regiment, or 
 company without authority will be i-egarded and pro- 
 claimed as a coward, and dealt with accordingly. 
 
 8. The active ambulances will follow the troops to succor 
 the wounded, and to remove them to the depots. Before ' 
 the engagement Infirmary detachments will also be de- 
 tailed and organized, of three (the least efl:ective under 
 arms) from each compan\', whose duties will be hereinafter 
 prescribed. These men vui.st not loiter about the depots^ but icUl 
 return prompth/ to the field as 800\i as j)f>ssible. 
 
 9. The Infirmary detachments will be under the imme- 
 diate orders of the medical officers on the field. This 
 corps is to go upon the field unarmed, except the non-com- 
 missioned officers, who are to protect the corps against 
 stragglers and marauders. The mend)ers will be provided 
 with one litter to every two men, and each with a badge 
 by which he can be easily distinguished from the rest of 
 the command; also with leather shoulder-straps, a canteen 
 of water, a tin ciip, a haversack, containing an eighth- 
 pound of lint, four bandages, two long and two short 
 sphnts of wood, sponges and tourniquets, and a pint bottle 
 of alcoholic stimulants. 
 
 10. It shall be the duty of this corps, under the imme- 
 
28 
 
 diate' direction of the assistant snrgeon of the regiment, 
 accompanied hj' the ambulances or wagons, to follow up 
 promptly the action, administering .to the immediate wants 
 of the wounded, by giving stimulus, checking hemorrhage, 
 and the temporary splinting of fractures. 
 
 11. Those Avho are too much disabled to walk will be 
 removed to some ambulance depot, previously agreed upon, 
 where they will be left in charge of the surgeon of the 
 regiment. The removal of the wounded from the field 
 will devolve upon the Infirmary corps, and till men strag- 
 gling from the ranks uilder pretext of aiding this corps 
 will be summarily dealt with, to which end the medical 
 ofiicers in charge and the non-commissioned officers are 
 specially required to report to the regimental commanders 
 of the stragglers their names, and the companies to which' 
 they may belong. 
 
 12. The assistant surgeon in charge of the Infirmary 
 corps should provide himself with a pocket-case, ligatures, 
 needles, pins, chloroform, napkins, brand}- or whiskey, 
 tourniquets, bandages, lint, and spirits. To obviate the 
 shock of the nervous system, to suppress hemorrhage, to 
 put fractures in some temporary apparatus, so as to facili- 
 tate the removal of the wounded, should be his first care. 
 This last is best accomplished by placing under the frac- 
 tured limb a piece of old linen or cotton of the form of a 
 pocket-handkerchief; on the opposite and outer edges of 
 this are placed the splints, which are rolled up in it, toward 
 the lint, on eadh side, until the fracture is snugly sup- 
 ported in the intervening space; the whole to be secured 
 by two or three bands of tape or bandage. 
 
 13. The regimental surs^eon should, before an action, 
 satisfy himself by personal inspection that all the means 
 and appliances for carr3'ing the wounded are at hand; give 
 instructions to the Infirmary corps as to Ihe application of a 
 tourniquet to restrain dangerous hemorrhage; establish de- 
 pots for the wounded, under the supervision of the medical 
 director; and render to the men of his regiment all neces- 
 sary surgical aid ; performing there all operations that are 
 
29 
 
 required; and lie will be held responsible that he has at his 
 disposition all the means, supplies, and appliances for the 
 proper performance of the service enjoined, or has taken 
 all propernieasnres t() secure them. He will instruct all 
 detailed to assist him not to allow ambulances to be mo- 
 nopolized by wounded officers to the exclusion of others, 
 lie will forbid any of the Infirmary corps to hold officers' 
 horses on the field, or to do anything- but what strictly ap- 
 portains to^ their duty. The surgeon should not devote 
 liimself exclusively to a wounded officer, nor leave his post 
 to accompany him to the rear. 
 
 14. Wounds will be dressed and operations performed as 
 far as practicable on the field, and patients made as comfort- 
 able as circumstances will admit for transportation to hos- 
 pitals in the interior. 
 
 15. Surgeons will supply themselves with hospital flags, 
 and will have them attached to the ambulances and placed 
 conspicuously over the field infirmaries and hospitals. 
 
 16. As soon as possible after an action, surgeons will 
 transmit to the medical director a return of casualties ac- 
 cordinir to the foUowiuir form: 
 
 Heiurn of Killed and Wounded in the 
 Action of 
 
 liegimenf in the 
 
 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 > 
 C 
 
 Si 
 c 
 
 b' 
 
 
 
 C 
 
 a 
 
 2 
 o 
 s 
 — 
 
 < 
 i 
 
 : 
 
 2 
 
 11km ARKS. 
 
 Officers 
 
 N. C. Officers. . 
 Privates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Names of Officers killed and 
 wounded to be inserted here. 
 
 17. The material for the badges and for the ambulance 
 fla,gs prescribed in paragraph Yl will be provided by the 
 quartermaster's department. 
 
REVIEWS. 
 
 1. The reviewing officer, upon his arrival on the ground, 
 will receive an artillery salute when entitled to it, unless 
 otherwise specially ordered. ISTine guns will be fired for a 
 General of the Confederate army, eight for a Lieuteuant- 
 General, seven for a ]\Iajor-General, and six for a Brigadier- 
 General. 
 
 2. The reviewing officer having taken his position near 
 the camp color, placed beforehand at a suitable distance in 
 front of the line, the district or other commander of the 
 forces, part of which are about to be reviewed, Avill, if pres- 
 ent, and of an inferior rank to the reviewing officer, take 
 place one step to the left, the head of his horse on a line 
 with the haunches of the reviewing officer's horse. 
 
 An}' invited guest will take his position on the left of the 
 district or other commander of the forces. 
 
 3. The chief of staff, when on the ground, w^ill be three 
 steps to the rear and one to the left of the general. The 
 other members of the staff of the reviewing officer will 
 form in one rank if their number does not exceed eight, 
 and in two ranks if more than eight, at a distance of at 
 least eight paces to the rear and left, the officers of the 
 personal staff on the right of the line, according to rank, 
 and the right of the line directly behind the reviewing 
 officer. 
 
 4. The staff of the district or other commander of the 
 forces to be reviewed, or of any general officer takiifg 
 position near the reviewing officer, will form in rear of 
 staff of latter, in accordance with the third clause of these 
 orders. 
 
31 
 
 5. When the reviewing officer advances to review the 
 line, the district or other commander of the forces, any 
 invited guest, and the cliief of staff present will move 
 with him, and the otlicj* members of the staff (breaking by 
 fours right in front) will follow at the respective distances 
 mentioned above, the left of each rank of fours being 
 directly behind the reviewing officer. 
 
 6. After reviewing the front and rear of the line the 
 reviewing officer will resume his position in front of it, 
 and the staff is again formed as before indicated. 
 
 7. "When general officers dismount in front of their 
 commands, before being passed in review by their supe- 
 riors in rank, their staff officers must occupy the position 
 required by paragraph 354, Arm}' Regnhitions, to wit: 
 
 "AVhen two or more battalions arc to be reviewed, they 
 will be formed in parade order with the proper intervals, 
 and will also perform the same movements that are laid 
 down for a single battalion, observing the additional direc- 
 tions that are given for such movements when applied to 
 the line. The brigadier-general and his staff, on foot, will 
 place themselves opposite the centre of the brigade; the 
 l)rigadier-general two paces in front of the rank of colonels, 
 his aid two paces on his right, and one retired; and the 
 other brigade staff officers, those having the rank of iield 
 officers in the rank of lieutenants-colonel and majors, and 
 those below that rank in the line of company officers." 
 
 8. In all reviews, the commander only of the division, 
 brigade, or regiment, as the case may be, having put the 
 column in motion, and arriving at the proper distance 
 (after saluting the reviewing officer) will take his position 
 one pace on the right, the head of liis horse on a line with 
 the haunches of the latter's horse. lie will remain near 
 the reviewing officer during the defile, after which he will 
 rejoin liis command. ' 
 
 9. The following paragraphs of Army Regulations will, 
 in all cases required, be strictl}' observed, to wit: para- 
 graphs 336, 337, 340, 342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 354, 355, 358,. 
 360. 
 
32 
 
 10. Staff officers will not draw their swords unless placed 
 ill actual command of troops. 
 
 11. Staff officers are expected to familiarize themselves 
 with the general principles of cavalry tactics, and to adhere 
 strictly to the rules prescribed for the dressings, the break- 
 ings by fours, the formations into line, etc., etc. 
 
 12. Officers on duty at reviews or elsewhere, when walk- 
 ing or riding together, will occupy positions according to 
 rank : the senior on the right. 
 
 13. All staff officers will wear the badges prescribed in 
 General Orders, 'No. 76, series 1862, from these head- 
 quarters, when on duty with their side arms.