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EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 DELIVERED BY THE 
 
 RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P., 
 
 IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 ox 
 
 The Vote of Censure moved by Sir Stafford Northeote, M.P., 
 On Tuesday, 12th February, 1884 
 
 Printed for the Liberal Central Association, Jf.1 and J$, 
 Parliament Street, Westminster, S.W. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 THE NATIONAL PRESS AGENCY, LIMITED, 
 
 13, Whitefriars Street, E.C. 
 
 PRICE ONE PENNY. 
 
Pamphlet Collection 
 Duke University Library 
 
EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. 
 
 Sir Stafford Northcote moved his Resolution : — " That this 
 House, having read and considered the correspondence relating 
 to Egypt, laid upon the table by Her Majesty's command, is of 
 opinion that the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are 
 due, in great measure, to the vacillating and inconsistent policy 
 pursued by Her Majesty's Government." 
 
 On the conclusion of Sir S. Northcote's speech, Mr. Gladstone 
 said — Mr. Speaker, we have lost, but we have also gained, by the 
 unfortunate collapse of the debate last week. The Government lost an 
 opportunity — when a contention had been made of the failure of its 
 efforts in Lower Egypt — of showing that they had not failed. But 
 the House have had this advantage, that the right hon. gentleman 
 [Sir S. Xorthcote] has been able to make his motion on the basis of 
 authentic papers instead of on newspaper reports. Moreover, they 
 have had this greater advantage, that, after the calamities which 
 have recently happened in Egypt, he has felt that those calamities 
 warrant him doing what last week he did not venture to do — 
 namely, to submit a direct issue to the House. Why, what did he 
 submit last week? He submitted.' that we could not adequately 
 perform our part in Egypt unless we acknowledged our obligations. 
 We have been doing nothing but acknowledging our obligations in 
 the most solemn form. They have been denned and described three 
 times over in the Speeches from the Throne. There was not a word 
 in the debate of last week to tell us what these Obligations were, 
 Everything positive, everything binding was carefully avoided, and 
 
4 Speech of the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 the House was invited in the name of a vote of censure to discuss a 
 truism and a platitude. But the right hon. gentleman has now, as I 
 say, plucked up his courage and has submitted to us a direct issue of 
 adequate force, for in the terms of his motion he calls on us to allege 
 that " the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due, in 
 great measure, to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued 
 by Her Majesty's Government." (Cheers from the Opposition.) Yes, 
 you are ready to cheer those words or any words, it matters not 
 what, provided only they are sufficiently condemnatory of Her 
 Majesty's Ministry. (Renewed Opposition cheers.) I am delighted 
 with the frank and truly English response which that affirming 
 cheer gives to the sentiment I have indicated. I was not sanguine 
 enough to hope for it. I admit that it was in the nature of a decoy 
 offered to hon. gentlemen, and they took it and cheered it to 
 the echo when 1 said it did not matter whether the proposal was 
 this or that, provided it was condemnatory. Now, Sir, I put it to 
 the House that there is but one mode in which Her Majesty's 
 Government can meet the motion. I move no amendment ; I meet 
 it with a direct negative. I say, in the first place, there has been no 
 vacillation ; there has been no inconsistency in the policy of Her 
 Majesty's Government ; and, Sir, I say more, that no part of the 
 ingenious argument of the right hon. gentleman has for a moment 
 gone to show that there was either vacillation or inconsistency. I 
 admit that he has condemned our conduct; but he has not attempted 
 to show that one part of our conduct was inconsistent with another 
 part. He has not shown that we hesitated in the adoption of reso- 
 lutions when the circumstances were laid before us ; and the proposi- 
 tions in his motion do not derive the smallest support from any argu- 
 ment in his speech. The right hon. gentleman has used arguments in 
 his speech, I admit, but his argument is this, not that we vacillated or 
 flinched — I mean from our own view of the case — not that we were 
 different at one time from what we were at another, but that we 
 adopted a wrong policy ; that we refused to strengthen the Egyptian 
 army for the conquest of the Soudan, that we refused to counsel 
 the Egyptian General in the Soudan, and that we refused to 
 over-ride the Egyptian Government with respect to the Soudan. 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 5 
 
 Sir, these are very serious charges, with which I shall 
 deal, but they have nothing to do with vacillation or inconsistency. 
 
 What the right hon. gentleman calls upon the House to vote 
 is, not that we have had a false policy, but that we have been 
 vacillating and inconsistent in the pursuance of our policy ; and, 
 Sir, do you suppose for one moment that these strange inconsis- 
 tencies between the speech and the motion of the right hon. 
 gentleman are due to some accident — that they are due to a want 
 of perception or want of acuteness on the part of the right hon. 
 gentleman 1 Xo, Sir, nothing of the kind ; they are due to this 
 —that if the right hon. gentleman, instead of charging us with 
 vacillation and inconsistency, had plucked up his courage to a : 
 higher point, and called upon the House to condemn any particular 
 portion of our policy by a motion, he would himself have been 
 obliged to declare a policy. But while he, forsooth, charges us 
 with flinching from responsibility, he does not dare to put his 
 objections in a form in which they could receive the judgment of 
 the House, because he knows that, if he did, he might bind 
 himself to something, whereas the essence of the whole affair is^ 
 that he shall bind himself to nothing. I must say that the 
 right hon. gentleman, considering the nature of the case that he 
 had to lay before us, has been very far from extravagant. I 
 have risen somewhat in contravention of my own statement of 
 Parliamentary usage in a case which is a very broad one, at a 
 time, when I am afraid I shall be a loser in a competition which 
 will presently arise in this House between continuing in this 
 House to hear my argument and the fulfilment of a very much 
 more necessary, if not more legitimate purpose. Whether I am 
 justified in the charge I have just made (and I have made a very 
 distinct charge) that the speech of the right hon. gentleman had 
 nothing whatever to do with his motion, and that he did not 
 venture to put the upshot of his speech into a motion because it would 
 have bound him to a policy, and he was determined not to bind him- 
 self to any policy — whether this be so or not, I say that this debate 
 has a wider interest than the mere issue raised between the 
 two parties. I shall not scruple, as far as my strength permits me, 
 
6 
 
 Speech of the Bt. Ron. W. E. .Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 to say to the House all that appears to me of vital importance, in 
 order to redeem the pledges I have given, to practise no reserve,, 
 and to state minutely and particularly those facts that are material 
 to enable the House to judge of our conduct. But I must gc? 
 beyond that, and say that this debate will have the character of a 
 historical debate. Now for the first time is raised a great issue 
 between parties in this House, but that great issue involves in it 
 something much more important than the victories of Oppositions 
 or the continuance of Ministries ; it involves the development of 
 great and useful lessons with regard to rash and unwise interven- 
 tions. I will at least take care that I shall be sufficiently explicit 
 in what I have got to say. It is absolutely necessary to go further 
 back than the right hon. gentleman has done, and to present, in what 
 I conceive to be its completeness,, the case of the Government. 
 
 Sir, the situation in Egypt, with or without the aggravation of 
 the Soudan and the increase of the responsibilities which it has 
 brought, is one of the utmost degree of anomaly and inconvenience, 
 and, in some points of view, perhaps even of political danger. How 
 has this situation come about 1 Where is the root of the mischief 1 
 It is the business of the House to censure the Government if 
 they have gone wrong ; but it is the business of the House, as the 
 Guardians of the public weal, to search to the very bottom into the 
 causes and origins of great public disaster or of great and serious 
 public inconvenience. Sir, I affirm, and I will show, that the 
 situation in Egypt was not one which we made but one that 
 we found. I shall show that we have never had an option. 
 (Cries of "Oh ! Oh ! ") I am not prematurely claiming your assent, 
 I am stating what I will show, not what I have shown. I 
 will show that we do not claim those laudations for vigorous 
 initiatives, and the like which have been sweet perhaps to the- 
 ears of others. 
 
 We are content to administer the affairs of an empire of 30G 
 millions, and as far as we can to keep the enormous interests of that 
 fifth or fourth part of the population of this globe within the limits, 
 already wide enough, which history, Providence, and the genius of 
 the country have assigned to them. But, Sir, it would not have 
 
On Eijypt and the Soudan. 7 
 
 (been in keeping with the propriety of things to reverse the attitude 
 which we found occupied by the British Government in Egypt. 
 We inherited from our predecessors certain engagements (" Oh ! 
 Oh ! " from the Opposition) — see whether I make good my words 
 or not • from those engagements it has never been in our power 
 Jionourably to escape. Sir, what the country knows is perhaps 
 not much of this case. They know that there was established 
 in Egypt what was termed the Dual Control. But what was 
 the Dual Control ? It was the establishment in the heart and 
 centre of Egyptian Government of two great functionaries, the 
 representatives of two of the greatest nations in the world, who 
 held their office in Egypt, and for Egypt, by a tenure independent 
 of the will of Egypt, and dependent altogether upon the will of the 
 two Governments they represented. For what did these two nations 
 go there ? The right hon. gentleman can contradict me if I am 
 inaccurate. I say they went there pledged to each other for certain 
 purposes. It was not merely to manage the revenues in the 
 interests of the bondholders ; it was general control, general advice, 
 general support to the Government of Egypt. The late ruler of 
 Egypt had been displaced, a new ruler had been put upon the 
 throne, by the agency mainly of the British Government — at any 
 rate, with an essential and at least equal share in the operation. 
 The two Governments had undertaken obligations towards that 
 ruler, and in my opinion those obligations were, when they had once 
 established this extraordinary system, matters strictly and essentially 
 consequential. They could not possibly have put Tewfik on the 
 throne and have declined to support him; and they bound themselves 
 to one another to support him, and to support him earnestly. They 
 bound themselves, likewise, to one another, while those were their 
 obligations to him, to maintain the peculiar and, in a certain sense, 
 exclusive political influence that these two Powers, and these alone, 
 were to exercise in Egypt, Under these circumstances, it was 
 obvious that we were bound to counsel the Khedive to the best of 
 our ability. I do not speak now of the action of the lion, member 
 for Bipon. The right hon. gentleman knows that my remarks have 
 nothing to do with his proceedings in Egypt. They have nothing to 
 
8 Speech of the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 do with any of the proceedings of the late Government in the earlier 
 part of its existence. They have to do with the Dual Control 
 established under Lord Salisbury, and my contention is that when 
 we placed independent officers representative of England and France 
 to hold office in Egypt by a tenure in no way dependent on Egypt, 
 we were bound — indeed, Lord Salisbury has always admitted this — 
 to counsel the Khsdive to the best of our ability 
 
 The next contention is, that if we counselled the Khedive to the 
 best of our ability, we were bound by every sentiment of honour to 
 support our counsels by our acts. (Cheers and counter-cheers.) It is a 
 singular pleasure to me when I find myself in concurrence, as has 
 happened already once or twice, with hon. gentlemen opposite. It has 
 been admitted that, when difficulties arose in the country — such as the 
 difficulties of the year before last — we were bound to give, by the posi- 
 tion we occupied, our advice to the Khedive upon all those difficulties ; 
 and having given that advice, we were bound to support it by con- 
 sequent action to such an extent as circumstances might appear to 
 demand, subject, of course, to the judgment of Parliament. I am not 
 in the habit of going back upon statements of my own, but I must say 
 .that all these obligations and all the difficulties they involved ought 
 to have been foreseen. I must say that the late Government, when 
 they built up this curious system, did it with their eyes open. They 
 xwere not unwarned of what would happen. They were not unwarned 
 that the establishment of financial control by a Government 
 must mean political control, and must involve political 
 responsibilities. I hope it will not be an unpardonable breach of 
 manners if, happening to recollect what I myself said upon the 
 subject, I read an extract reported in " Hansard " on the 6th of 
 March, 1876, not corrected by me, but expressing with substantial 
 accuracy what I said. This was at the very first beginning of this 
 intervention; and no control such as I now speak of was established 
 for some considerable time, I think three years afterwards. This 
 was the warning I ventured to give : — 
 
 " I should, therefore, wish to know whether, if the proposition 
 for the appointment of such a Commissioner be entertained, the 
 right hon. gentleman \ (that was, Lord Beaconsfield) "means the 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 9 
 
 appointment of a Commissioner who would really have such an 
 effective control over all arrangements and the mode of accounting 
 for these revenues that he could guarantee to us the receipt of the 
 whole, that it might be applied to the purpose in view 1 If this is 
 what it does mean, it appears to me that we are only shifting the 
 difficulty one step further ; because in that case our Commissioner 
 is to take into his hands the administration of a very important 
 portion of the government of Egypt : so that the measures which 
 we may think necessary as a matter of prudence to cover the 
 proposal which we are to consider may entail upon us still greater 
 difficulties and mix us up still further with a heavier responsibility 
 for a portion of the internal government of Egypt. When we have 
 begun with one portion of the internal government of Egypt, we may 
 pass on to another. We may come to occupy the entire ground by a 
 series of degrees not difficult to contemplate ; and possibly this may 
 have been in the mind of the right hon. gentleman the other night, 
 when he said that, while the people of this country would view the 
 diminution of the Empire with horror, they would see it increased 
 without dissatisfaction." 
 
 Thus, I ventured to point out what I do not think I deserve 
 the smallest credit for pointing out — namely, that these arrange- 
 ments, then in partial contemplation, afterwards greatly developed 
 and rigidly enforced, did advance from financial to political, and 
 from political to probably territorial responsibilities. I have no 
 charge of ill -motives to make against the late Government. Tn my 
 opinion they committed a great error, of which we are now from day 
 to day bearing the burden. I give them every credit for honourable 
 and upright motives. Though I then disapproved of the means, and 
 now, I do not need to say, still more deeply lament these means were 
 resorted to ; yet I am fully persuaded that the object which the late 
 Government had in view was to secure a better Government for 
 Egypt. Further, I admit that very considerable practical and 
 administrative advantages were secured for the fellaheen by the 
 administration of the revenue; although I am afraid those advantages 
 were far more than counterbalanced in their political importance by 
 our having imported into the country that fatal and most dangerous 
 
10 Speech of the fit. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 idea that it was doomed to be placed under foreign domination, 
 and that Egypt was to be governed and maintained for the benefit 
 of persons beyond its borders. (" Hear, hear," from Lord 
 R. Churchill.) The noble lord cheers me, and there is 
 very great truth in what I take to be the meaning 
 of that cheer. He probably thinks that Arabi was one who 
 fought against that foreign domination. That is not my view. I 
 think I could give conclusive proof to the contrary ; but of this I do 
 not entertain a doubt, that Arabi was able to give vigour and 
 extension to his motives by appealing to that hatred of foreign 
 domination; and so long as foreign domination continues in Egypt, 
 the danger will recur from time to time. So far, I have said some- 
 thing to show that 1 do not use idle words, when I allege that the 
 situation which we have now in Egypt was, in its root and origin, 
 far beyond the power of such prosaic people as the present Ministers 
 to conceive. It was due to higher and more venturesome geniuses, 
 such as those who preceded us. There has been no moment at which 
 it was possible for us, consistently with our honour, to retrace our 
 course. And we must look back as well as forward if we want to 
 place before the English people — the people of the three Kingdoms — 
 all the lessons of this great question, which is far greater than the 
 hon. gentleman would lead us to believe. 
 
 I have spoken thus far of the situation in Egypt down to the 
 close of the military operations, and I will adopt divisions of time 
 in what I have to say, for the purpose of being more intelligible to* 
 the House, and depriving myself of the power of using subterfuge, 
 even if 1 were, (which I trust is not the case,) inclined to resort to it. 
 The close of the military operations was, I think, on the 21st of Sep- 
 tember, 1882 — the time of the surrender of Damietta, the battle ®i 
 Tel-el-Kebir having been eight days or something like that before. 
 The right hon. gentleman has placed the pith of his charge during 
 the thirteen months between the surrender of Damietta and the 
 defeat of Hicks Pacha in November, 1883. He is extremely angry 
 with us because in our cowardice — our timidity about responsibility 
 — we did not take enough of responsibility for the Soudan. Well, 
 we had to begin with taking a good deal of responsibility upon us/ 
 
Oil Egypt and the Soudan. 11 
 
 We had taken the responsibility of military operations. The army 
 was entirely broken up. The institutions of the country were gone. 
 We had before us the work of reconstitution. Our obligation in 
 honour to support the Khedive bound us in our opinion to supply 
 him with the means of defence, and with some primary means of 
 good government. In those thirteen months what was the course 
 we took 1 We sent to Egypt the very best men of every class and 
 stamp that we could J find From DufFerin to Gordon — from the 
 first to the last, though I might go back to Sir E. Malet, but 
 it would be too long to enumerate the list of able, upright, 
 patriotic men who have been serving the interests of Egypt with our 
 concurrence and authority — but from DufFerin to Gordon, they were 
 men as remarkable for their ability and fitness for their work as any 
 men that have ever been in the political service of the British 
 Crown. I am not going to say, because they were able men they 
 were responsible for what was done, but I am going to say that, at 
 least, by choosing men of that vigour and masculine force of cha- 
 racter, and that consummate skill in affairs, we did not take the 
 course which might be taken by those who were undoubtedly anxious 
 to shirk their proper responsibility. We endeavoured to go to the 
 root of the matter, and to put into action all those reforms which it 
 was clearly necessary we should endeavour to make. If we were 
 bound to support the Khedive, we were bound to support him 
 earnestly — and I am sorry to say that the right hon. gentleman has 
 been extremely reticent on that subject — and, if we were bound to 
 support the Khedive earnestly, we were bound to have some regard 
 also for his people ; and, if we endeavoured to give security to his 
 throne by the constitution of something like an adequate military 
 force, we were bound also to do what we could in seconding what 
 we not only believed, but what we knew, to be his own good, upright, 
 and patriotic intentions for the government of Egypt and the good 
 of his people. Was nothing done in that period 1 New 
 tribunals for natives were organised and I believe I may say- 
 that they are at work — at any rate the codes have been 
 for some time completed, and the judges have been appointed. 
 Legislative institutions, hardly, I admit, worthy of that name — they 
 
12 Speech of the RL Eon, W. E. Gladstone, M,P., 
 
 would perhaps be more accurately called consultative institutions — 
 l»ut intended to give some moderate expression to the national life, 
 have been framed, and the scheme has been carried into execution. 
 Elections have taken place, and the Legislative Council met last 
 November at the very epoch of the disaster to General Hicks' force. 
 Jt will be remembered what grievances there were with regard to 
 the undue employment of foreigners and the non-taxation of 
 foreigners. With respect to the undue employment of foreigners } 
 great efforts have been made, which it may be possible to exhibit 
 more fully in the shape of numerical results at a future stage, largely 
 to cut them down. The non-taxation of foreigners is no easy matter 
 to deal with. It is liable to be met by jealousies in every quarter. 
 However, the actual state of the case is this, that that exceptional 
 and odious practice has been given up of course by us, and not by us 
 alone, but by France, Italy, Germany, and Austria ; in truth, I 
 believe I may say by nearly every Power in any way concerned. 
 The land survey, which the right hon. gentleman I think referred to 
 the other night, has been economised, and what is thought a new 
 and better system for conducting it has been introduced. I do not 
 know whether the right lion, gentleman thinks that in our thirteen 
 months of occupation we ought to have completed our land survey ; 
 but when I reflect that in the half-century during which I have 
 been a member of this House, I have been accustomed to hear of 
 successive votes for the completion of our national cadastral survey, 
 it does not seem tome that an excessive term has been occupied in 
 this matter in Egypt. A valuable report has been made upon 
 irrigation by Mr. Moncrieff, and I trust great benefit is to be 
 •expected from it. With regard to the constabulary and police, the 
 •constabulary was organised in what appeared to be an effective 
 form for its purposes under Baker Pacha. The police is certainly 
 under the most efficient handling we could give it, being in the hands 
 of Mr. Clifford Lloyd. I believe, and have been informed, that 
 the prisons have undergone considerable, at all events initial, 
 reforms. I will not refer to sanitary departments and other matters. 
 But there are several very important matters, such as the debts of 
 the fellaheen, which have not escaped attention, and a Commission 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 has been appointed for the consideration of that question. The 
 slave traffic to which the right hon. gentleman refers has not been 
 forgotten, and the charge of all measures relating to it has been 
 transferred to what I believe to be the best and most efficient 
 department — namely, the department of the Inspector-General of 
 Constabulary, with an increase of means, and a better system for 
 including the principal routes now under reformation. The only 
 other point I will mention, that is vital to the whole, is, that the 
 army has been organised under the able auspices of Sir Evelyn 
 Wood. All the reports of officers show that its discipline is as high 
 as, indeed higher than, it was possible or reasonable for us to expect. 
 I have only now to say that instead of having failed in carrying 
 forward these institutions, we were justified in advising Her Majesty 
 to declare in the Speech from the Throne that, down to the month 
 of November last, in the execution of this exceedingly heavy and 
 responsible work, she had ample reason to be satisfied with the 
 progress which had been made. 
 
 I wish to say two or three words, however, upon the exact 
 position which we hold in Egypt, for it is material that it should be 
 accurately understood. At one moment the right hon. gentleman 
 cast upon us great responsibility for having shattered the Govern- 
 ment of Egypt, which he said it may be impossible to replace with 
 dignity and credit before the people ; but not many sentences before 
 in his speech, he had reproached us with at least equal vigour for not 
 shattering that Government long before. It will be in the recol- 
 lection of the House, when I affirm that, again and again, he stated 
 how it was our business to have forced upon the Egyptian Govern- 
 ment,much earlier than we did,the adoption of principles and methods 
 of action, to which we have been unhappily compelled to resort. In 
 my opinion, this shattering of the Egyptian Government is a very 
 serious matter indeed. It is an essential portion of our policy 
 to uphold the Egyptian Government with all the credit and dignity 
 we can. We bound ourselves to that, and therefore we do not 
 wish to make any demand upon the Egyptian Government except 
 that which necessity requires. But, Sir, as the Power in military 
 occupation of the country, we are after all primarily responsible in 
 
14 Speech of the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 those matters which we deem vital to the purpose for which we went 
 there. It is a great mistake to suppose that we have taken out of 
 the hands of the Egyptian Government the whole important 
 administration of the country. We have done nothing of the sort. 
 We have only conveyed to the Egyptian Government at a serious 
 crisis the clear knowledge of this fact, that our military occupation 
 entails upon us the obligation and duty, (where we have no doubt 
 as to the right and propriety of the thing to be done or as to its 
 importance) of seeing that, if we are to remain in the country, the 
 course which we recommend shall be adopted. It is true that upon 
 all these vital points we have taken and shall continue to take all 
 the power necessary for our purpose. We do not seek more ; we 
 should think it wrong to take it. We are under engagements 
 earnestly to support the Khedive. We think it would be a most 
 unfortunate policy, were we to show indifference in the matter. We 
 cannot concur with those gentlemen who say we should sweep the 
 Egyptian Government away, and govern the country by English 
 functionaries. I am not willing to undertake a thing which would 
 result in setting up any sentiment adverse to foreign domination ; 
 and, though we will firmly and resolutely go up to the point when 
 necessity calls us, we will not willingly go beyond that point. I 
 must remind the House that the difficult, onerous, and inconvenient 
 — some may think it the almost hopeless — task which we have 
 undertaken, is that, first, of putting down disorder in Egypt, and 
 then of establishing at least some beginnings of tolerable govern- 
 ment. That task is also one of considerable delicacy. It is one 
 which we are executing not alone on our own behalf, but on behalf, 
 I may say, of civilised mankind. We undertook it with the 
 approval of the Powers of Europe, the highest and most authentic 
 organ of modern Christian civilisation ; but having undertaken it 
 at their invitation or with their concurrence, we must fulfil it as we 
 received it from them. I know sometimes the word protectorate is 
 spoken of ; if it is not spoken of in its technical sense, and it is only 
 meant by that that we must have full and plenary power to do what 
 our purpose requires in Egypt, I agree with it. But it is a dangerous 
 word, because it has a technical and a legal meaning. I may remind 
 
6 
 
 On Egypt and the Soudan. 15 
 
 the House that we have ourselves held a protectorate. We had a 
 protectorate over the Ionian Islands, but that protectorate was im- 
 posed upon us by the united voice of the Powers of Europe ; and 
 even now Austria in Bosnia, having taken over the administration of 
 that province and Herzegovina, has done so by the united voice and 
 invitation of the Powers of Europe. The point is a sufficiency of 
 control, and it is to that, therefore, that we shall look. We conclude 
 it to be absolutely included in the purpose of our mission, and we 
 should go beyond what the purpose required were we to insist on more 
 than that. I may remind the House of an analogy I think worthy 
 of their notice — I mean the analogy of the Indian Protected States. 
 Now, Sir, in the case of these States, our power is, I may say,absolute. 
 We are under no restraint of European law. Those States are 
 endavis within our own dominions. Our intervention becomes a matter 
 of absolute practical necessity, but what do we do 1 We send an 
 agent there and take care that he shall have all the power necessary 
 for efficiency. But we take care also that he shall have no more. 
 We leave in its native vigour and its dignity before the people of 
 those countries the native Administration, which, depend upon it, 
 they love far more than foreign domination. Few, indeed, are the 
 peoples so degraded and so lost to every noble sentiment that it shall 
 be a matter of indifference to them whether they are governed by 
 persons who belong to the same political constitution with themselves, 
 or whether they are governed by those who come from a remote 
 quarter, with foreign instincts, foreign sympathies, and foreign 
 objects. Such was our case in Egypt until we came to the month 
 of November last year. 
 
 Now I pass to the Soudan. And there I will take three periods 
 — first, the period before the defeat of Hicks ; next the period 
 between the defeat of Hicks and the defeat of Baker ; and then the 
 period which I admit the House has the right to scrutinise most 
 narrowly, namely, that between the 5th of February last week and the 
 12 th of February, on which I have the honour of addressing the 
 House. Now I directly traverse the assertion of the right hon. gentle- 
 man with regard to the period before the defeat of Hicks Pacha. 
 I have already observed there was not a word of his accusations that 
 
16 Speech of the Rt. Ron. W. E. Gladstone, if. P., 
 
 bore upon the question of vacillation or inconsistency at all, and I 
 am not now going to discuss his motion at all. I hope, Sir, I shall 
 not be called to order, because if I am discussing a matter not con- 
 tained in the motion before the House, I am bound to say the same 
 objection may be taken to every word of the speech of the right 
 hon. gentleman. Sir, what the right hon. gentleman charged upon 
 us was false policy. I told you why he does not venture to put it 
 into his motion. If he did, he would be bound to show a true policy. 
 What true policy has he shown to-night 1 What approach to it ? — 
 what sketch, what shadow, what outline, what shred or patch to one? 
 It is all very well to say that what we have done is wrong. But 
 notwithstanding the ingenious efforts of the right hon. gentleman to 
 shirk pointing out to us anything like a policy, there are certain 
 indications which it is difficult for him to efface from critical remark. 
 He says we are greatly responsible for these disasters, that we 
 cannot (and in this I quite concur) escape responsibility by saying 
 we are not responsible, and then came in his simile of the pistol. 
 He never pointed out to us what the pistol was. He did not 
 explain his own parallel, and I suspect it would rather puzzle him 
 to do so. What the right hon. gentleman contended was virtually 
 this — that we ought to have taken into our own hands the business 
 of advising Egypt upon the war. He began with saying that we 
 ought to have seen that Egypt was supplied with such an 
 army of her own as would have carried on the war with 
 effect. 
 
 Sir S. Northcote — I did not say that we ought to have supplied 
 an army. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone — I am speaking now, not of a British army, but 
 that in our reformatory operations in Egypt we ought to have in- 
 cluded the provision of such an army — of such Egyptian army. Now, 
 I affirm most distinctly that we ought not, and that if we had done 
 so we should have undertaken what was impossible, what 
 was unreasonable, what was beyond our position of com- 
 petency, and what was probably unjust. It is all very well for 
 the right hon. gentleman to point to the smallness of Sir E. Wood's 
 army and to say that a larger army would have been 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 17 
 
 requisite in order to send to General Hicks the supplies 
 which, when unhappily he got into difficulties, he came to want. How 
 were these men to be supplied, Sir ? Where were the funds to 
 supply them ? Is Egypt so rich a country 1 Egypt is in financial 
 difficulties. (Sir S. Northcote : Now.) Egypt was long ago — when 
 the right hon. gentleman had to do with it himself — in financial 
 difficulties. The financial difficulties were then the excuse for our 
 most unfortunate intervention. But I say that this was impossible, 
 for Egypt had no means to constitute such an army. 
 
 Mr. Bourke — They were obliged. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone — They found the means of constituting Hicks' 
 army, but that is not the charge, and I hope when the right hon. 
 gentleman interrupts me he will not do so for a purpose of forcing 
 me to circumlocution. The charge is, that it ought to have been a 
 better and more considerable army, able to meet the wants of Hicks 
 when he had undertaken this charge. That is the charge which I 
 traverse by a direct denial, and by saying, in the first place, it was 
 impossible to constitute such an army. Even had it been possible 
 to constitute such an army, when we received from the Powers of 
 Europe our commission with regard to Egypt, we received no such 
 commission with regard to the Soudan. 
 
 Sir S. Northcote — -Where is the commission 1 
 
 Mr. Gladstone — The commission is in the records of the Con- 
 ference at Constantinople, immediately before the operations in 
 Egypt ; and I may also say that it was quite sufficiently recited in 
 the speech of the right hon. gentleman to-night, when he spoke of 
 the relations which the Powers of Europe had assumed towards the 
 work we had in Egypt. In that work, in their view, there was no 
 question of conducting the conquest or re-conquest of the Soudan. 
 But has the right hon. gentleman made up his mind with regard to 
 the relations between Egypt and the Soudan 1 Has he ever con- 
 sidered what the Egyptian people think of the Soudan ? Is he aware 
 that, if there is one thing that the Egyptian has in horror more than 
 another, it is being called upon to carry on the war in the Soudan 1 
 Is he aware that the army of Sir E. Wood was organised expressly 
 
18 Speech oftheRt. Eon, W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 without the obligation to serve in the Soudan 1 And if he is aware 
 of these things, what does he mean by saying that it was our 
 business to constitute a sufficient Egyptian army to supply the 
 demands of Hicks Pacha as these might grow under the necessities of 
 the time, and to enable Egypt to re-conquer the Soudan ? But what is 
 the case of the Soudan 1 The other night, when T was referring to 
 a paragraph in which something had been said about the Mahdi, I 
 entirely declined to give any opinion about the Mahdi. I know this, 
 and now I am speaking in conformity with the opinions of the man 
 whom I look upon as by far the highest authority on the subject — 
 I mean the opinions of General Gordon — the Soudan is a vast country 
 equal in size to France, Germany, and Spain, a desert country, as he 
 states, with a deadly climate, inhabited thinly by sparse and warlike 
 tribes, but still it is the country of those tribes. They love it as 
 their country. The right hon. gentleman seems to me to have made 
 up his mind — his whole speech shows it — that Egypt is in the right 
 in subjecting that country, and in sending Turks, Circassians, and 
 Anatolians to govern it. Sir, I have not made up my mind to any 
 such thing. I decline to enter into that controversy. We have 
 refused — and I believe the House will approve our refusing — to have 
 anything to do with the re-conquest of the Soudan. During all my 
 political life, I am thankful to say that I have never opened my lips 
 in favour of a domination such as that which has been exercised by 
 certain countries upon certain other countries, and I am not going 
 now to begin. I look upon the possession of the Soudan — I won't 
 say as a crime — that would be going a great deal too far — but I 
 look upon it as the calamity of Egypt. It has been a drain on her 
 treasury, it has been a drain on her men. I believe it is estimated 
 that a hundred thousand Egyptians have laid down their lives in 
 endeavouring to maintain that barren conquest, and at this moment, 
 when your sympathies have been justly excited on behalf of 500 
 men in Tokar and in behalf of 500 men who were in Sincat, there 
 are nine and twenty thousand Egyptian soldiers, or soldiers in the 
 service of the Khedive, scattered over that enormous region. In those 
 circumstances I utterly repudiate and repel the doctrine of the right hon. 
 gentleman that it was our duty to construct a military system for Egypt 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 19 
 
 by which — I am supposing now that she had the means which she had 
 not — she would have been able to re-establish in its fulness the re" 
 conquest of the Soudan. The right hon. gentleman has challenged 
 me to-night. I challenge him. He asks us to pronounce on vacilla- 
 tion and inconsistency, and we are ready to pronounce upon it. I 
 ask him to put into a motion that which was the pith and essence of 
 his speech to-night — namely, that the Egyptian military system 
 ought to have been constituted for the full support of Hicks and the 
 re-conquest of the Soudan — and to take the judgment of the House 
 upon it. 
 
 Sir S. Northcote — I never said anything of the sort. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone — The right hon. gentleman does not seem very 
 fond of responsibility as to the meaning of what he says. What 
 were his touching pictures of the inhuman conduct of Sir E. Malet, 
 who would not give a little advice to General Hicks ? Does the 
 right hon. gentleman think that it was in our power to advise 
 General Hicks as to the conduct of the war without 
 becoming responsible for the war ? I say that responsibility 
 for the war directly followed upon our undertaking to 
 advise as to the conduct of it. (Sir S. Northcote : Oh no.) The 
 right hon gentleman thinks not. That is the very dignified course 
 he would take. To say, "Hicks, you should march here and, Hicks, 
 you should march there." Yes ; to say here to go and there to 
 advance, and if he advanced and succeeded we should have the 
 credit ; if he advanced and failed — oh "Xo ( no," says the noble lord 
 [Lord R. Churchill] opposite — we are not at all responsible. We 
 could not advise without becoming responsible. Well, I do not 
 stand alone upon that, because the House will recollect that in the 
 most distinct manner the right hon. gentleman constructed the first 
 division of his speech upon the insufficiency of the Egyptian army, 
 which we had created, or which it was our duty to create, in order to 
 enable this war to be carried on. 
 
 Sir S. Northcote — Or to limit the purpose to which it was to 
 be applied. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone — I will follow the right hon. gentleman — " or 
 
20 Speech of the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., . 
 
 to limit the purpose to which it was to be applied." I examine his 
 words. What do they mean 1 ? They mean the shattering of the 
 Egyptian Government. The Egyptian Government was determined 
 to adhere to the whole of the Soudan, and I cannot much blame 
 them. They had been for sixty years in possession of it. They 
 had struggled to hold it. The success of Hicks was remarkable. 
 On almost every occasion he had defeated the Mahdi, and 1 believe 
 the Egyptian Government would have laughed in our faces if we 
 had attempted to force upon them the abandonment of the Soudan. 
 We had no business to enforce our counsels upon the Egyptian 
 Government, except in cases which we knew to be essential for our 
 purposes in Egypt. How did the right hon. gentleman know, or 
 how did we know, when the Mahdi was driven back at every point, 
 that the Egyptian Government would not be able to hold its own 1 He 
 says we ought to have restricted the limits of the shattered Egyptian 
 Government, because it did not conform to our views in giving 
 up what was no essential part of the Egypt in which we interfered. 
 Well, we should have again become responsible for the retention of 
 that part, as we should have given Egypt her charter to that part„ 
 and that part would have been just as liable to the fear of foreign 
 domination as the rest. I decline — and let the right hon. gentleman 
 get the House to censure us for it if he likes — to become a party to 
 maintain that foreign domination. Well, I think I have shown that 
 it was not our mission to deal with the Soudan at all, and, if we had 
 advised upon the conduct of the war, we should have inevitably 
 become responsible for a war, when Egypt was perfectly impotent to 
 do more than she did, which was to create the army which Hicks 
 Pacha thought sufficient. ("No" from Mr. Bourke.) But the 
 right hon. gentleman read it out, and now a right hon. gentleman, 
 sitting by his side contradicts him. We have every reason to 
 believe that the people of Egypt — not the ruling classes, but the 
 people — detest this war, while we have very great reason to doubt 
 whether this war is based on those considerations of honour and 
 interest, and just necessity and regard for the welfare of the 
 governed, which alone can render any war tolerable or endurable for 
 a moment in the sight of a Christian. 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 I think I have pretty well gone through what the right hon. 
 gentleman has said upon the subject. He referred to Lord Dufferin's 
 opinion about the limits to which the Soudan ought to be restricted, 
 and I refer to that opinion because it is a matter of great weight. I 
 fxm sorry it did not weigh with the Egyptian Government. It was 
 the opinion of an intelligent friend, though not of a responsible 
 Government, for Lord Dufferin did not speak on our behalf. But 
 the rejection of that opinion, combined with the high estimation in 
 which the Egyptian Government held Lord Dufferin, is a clear proof 
 of the importance which they attached to the holding of the Soudan 
 and that it was not possible for us to interfere with them, until it 
 had been irresistibly shown that for them to attempt to hold 
 the Soudan would be an insane sacrifice of the best interests of 
 Egypt. 
 
 Sir, I am very much obliged to the House for the patience with 
 which they have heard me thus far, and I am glad to say that I 
 am making progress. After the defeat of Hicks — this is the 
 second period — our position was entirely changed. We deemed 
 that that defeat — especially when it was followed up by a 
 second defeat — the knowledge of which reached us about three 
 weeks later — was a distinct proof that it was impossible to hold 
 the Soudan in any manner tolerably satisfactory ; and that con- 
 sequently it was our duty to speak frankly and boldly upon the 
 matter, because the Soudan had assumed a question not of £100,000 
 a year, as was the old story, but it had assumed a character such as 
 to make it evident that, if the struggle were to be continued, it 
 would suck the life-blood from the heart of Egypt. 
 
 I will now give the House very rapidly and succinctly the course 
 of events simply by dates. On the 19th of November came the first 
 report of the defeat of Hicks. On the 20th of November we thought 
 that, supposing that news to be true, we were at once justified in 
 saying to our agent " If consulted, recommend the abandonment of 
 the Soudan within certain limits." On the 21st we came to know the 
 defeat of Hicks. There were subsequently rumours casting doubt 
 upon it, but we believed it on the 21st. The Government then had 
 to consider it, and consider the very grave measure of interrupting 
 
22 Speech of the Bf. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 the course of the withdrawal of our troops, which had down to that 
 time in all its stages proceeded with perfect satisfaction. On the 25th 
 we suspended the evacuation of Cairo. On the 26th we found we were 
 unfortunately at issue with the Egyptian Government. They were, 
 in the first place, not so certain of the news as we were. In the 
 second place, they were contemplating assistance from the Turkish 
 Government, and that also was a very serious question. It was very 
 difficult to deny their right to contemplate assistance from Turkey, 
 and very difficult under certain circumstances to deny the right of 
 Turkey to give that assistance. But those were the reasons why we 
 could not proceed peremptorily in the matter. We found they were 
 disposed, if they could, to hold the Soudan, and at any rate to wait a 
 while for fuller ascertainment of the facts before they took a positive 
 course. That was on the 26th of November. They determined to wait, 
 and take in hand in some manner this communication with Turkey 
 of which I am not sure that we are directly cognisant with the 
 particulars. On the 8th of December came the second defeat. That 
 was a heavy blow succeeding a frightful blow ; and on the 1 2th of 
 December the Egyptian Government at length stated that they 
 were ready to be guided by us in respect to the Soudan. Did we 
 vacillate or hesitate ? On the 13th of December, the very next day, 
 we telegraphed our deliberate decision that the Egyptian Govern- 
 ment should withdraw from the Soudan, and should confine its 
 efforts to maintaining the valley of the Nile as far as Assouan, 
 which is the limit, I think, of Egypt proper, or at all events, if 
 there were strong military reasons for their going further, as far as 
 Wadi Hafit, which is farther up the valley. "Well, I am not 
 going to censure Oherif Pacha and his colleagues. Their 
 difficulties were enormous. We know the self-love of a 
 class holding dominions of this kind. But while making every 
 allowance, we found with deep regret that on the 22nd of December 
 the Egyptian Government were again hesitating. That created a 
 very serious state of affairs. This shattering of the Egyptian 
 Government was the only alternative left. Naturally, we desired 
 to turn to every other alternative rather than resort to it, but we 
 found it impossible to avoid something that an unfriendly critic 
 
6 
 
 On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 would describe by that term. On the 4th of January our demand 
 was made peremptorily ; on the 7th Cherif Pacha resigned, and on 
 the 8th Nubar Pacha was appointed. He was in complete accord 
 with us, and on that day it was perfectly competent to the 
 garrison of Khartoum to retire in safety, and, so far as we know 
 it is the case now. 
 
 Here I have the pleasure of contradicting the statement made 
 by the right hon. gentleman the member for King's Lynn, that 
 the abandonment of the Soudan was contrary to the deliberate 
 judgment of the Khedive, If he has read the papers on the table 
 of the House, he would have found that, on the contrary, whatever 
 prior leanings the Khedive might have had, (and of course the prior 
 leaning of a sovereign is to keep his territory,) the deliberate judg- 
 ment of the Khedive was in complete accord with the policy of 
 Her Majesty's Government. ISow, my contention is, that we 
 interfered to require the abandonment of the Soudan, as soon as we 
 were justified in carrying up to that point what must be considered 
 as a high-handed proceeding with regard to the interior administra- 
 tion of Egypt. But it may have occurred to many that a long- 
 time had elapsed after we had heard of the defeat of Hicks, an-1 
 the time I am now speaking of ; and that all this time was lost. 
 That would be an entire and absolute misconception as I will point 
 out. It was perfectly true, that in the region of political right 
 principle, we were separated during that interval from the Egyptian 
 Government. We at once adopted the policy of withdrawal. 
 "We had pressed it first as friendly advice, we pressed it at last as 
 an imperative injunction • but during the whole interval between the 
 first and last stage there were practical measures in progress upon 
 which we are perfectly agreed, and which must have gone on 
 precisely in the same manner, had Kubar Pacha been in office from 
 the first day, instead of Cherif Pacha. We were all agreed that 
 measures should be taken for the extrication of the garrisons. The 
 force of Baker Pacha, which has unfortunately been defeated, 
 was organised for that purpose. (Mr. Asiimead-Bartlett : Oh !) 
 The hon. member, with his supreme authority, scoffs at that state- 
 ment ; and an impression has gone forth that Baker Pacha was sent 
 
24 Speech of the Rt. Hon, W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 as a sort of forlorn hope. (Mr. Bourke : Hear, hear.) The right 
 hon. gentleman is not aware that my hon. friend, the Under- 
 Secretary for India, happened to be in Egypt during the organi- 
 sation of this force. (Mr. Bourke : So was I.) Well, I will back 
 my hon. friend, with some confidence in the match if it comes off. I 
 am not going to make an extravagant assertion, but what I am going 
 to say is this : that, when Baker Pacha set out, it will be obvious he 
 was under no military obligation to undertake that business. He 
 was not enlisted for that purpose, and was under no obligation or 
 military service at all, unless he thought it a profitable and hopeful 
 expedition. He was the head of the constabulary, and a con- 
 stabulary is not organised — though the right hon. gentleman [Mr. 
 Bourke] seems to think it is — for marching into foreign countries. 
 I have no doubt he was entreated to go ; I have no doubt the 
 Egyptian Government greatly desired it ; but what I say is, that he 
 was under no military obligation to go, and I say, with the authority 
 of my hon. friend, that Baker Pacha went with the belief, that the 
 means at his command were adequate means for the immediate 
 purpose he had in view. I am going to produce something else ; 
 but I produce in the first instance my hon. friend, who is not 
 deficient in the faculty of expressing himself when he has occasion to 
 address the House. Baker Pacha had very great doubts, as I under- 
 stand, citing my hon. friend, whether it would be in his power to effect 
 the whole operation of relief from Souakim to Berber, and from Berber 
 to Khartoum ; but he was very confident that his means were suffi- 
 cient for the smaller operation of reaching Sincat. Here is a 
 telegram of Sir Evelyn Baring's dated February 2nd, 1884, three 
 clays only before the calamity which overtook Baker Pacha : " Baker 
 telegraphs that he will advance to the relief of Tokar to-morrow," 
 3rd, with 3,200 men, and that there is every chance of success." 
 Perhaps the right hon. gentleman [Mr. Bourke] will likewise over- 
 throw the authentic official information received from Sir E. Baring. 
 I have shown, then, that, during the whole of this time, the expedi. 
 tion of Baker Pacha was in preparation and in progress, and that 
 there was a reasonable expectation that that expedition would 
 suffice, if not to get to Khartoum, at any rate to deal with cases 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 like the case of Sincat and the case of Tokar. Well, that organi- 
 sation removed a practical difficulty for the moment, and prevented 
 its becoming necessary for us to shatter the Egyptian Government 
 at the earlier period, which the right hon. gentleman [Sir S. North- 
 cote] seems at once emphatically to desire, and resolutely and 
 positively to condemn. That brings me to the 5th of February, and 
 the failure of Baker's efforts. 
 
 I have gone through now, I think, all that relates to the speech 
 of the right hon. gentleman ; but I must say a few words on the 
 remaining period of five days, on which I admit we are 
 justly open to a careful scrutiny. And here I arrive at 
 the case of General Gordon. General Gordon, in our estimation, 
 is a very great feature in the case. What is General Gordon 1 He 
 is no common man. I thank the right hon. gentleman for the manner 
 in which he referred to him. I may also say that General Gordon 
 is not alone. Other very able men are with him — one in particular, 
 Colonel Stewart, his seconder and coadjutor — and, in fact, we have 
 acted all along on the principle of obtaining for this difficult Egyptian 
 problem the very best services we could possibly get. It is no 
 exaggeration, in speaking of General Gordon, to say that he is a 
 hero. It is no exaggeration to say that he is a Christian hero. It 
 is no exaggeration to say that in his dealings with Oriental people 
 he is also a genius — that he has a faculty of influence, or command, 
 brought about by moral means, for no man in this House hates the 
 unnecessary resort to blood more than General Gordon. He has 
 that faculty which produces effects among those wild Eastern races 
 almost unintelligible to us Western people. Perhaps it may be 
 said : " If General Gordon has all these gifts, why did you not 
 employ him sooner 1 " (Opposition cheers.) Again you have fallen 
 into the decoy. You have not taken the least pains to 
 ascertain whether it was possible or not. Now, the suggestion 
 to employ General Gordon in the Soudan was made at a 
 time so early, that it really is not within the limits of 
 the direct responsibility of the present Government. As early 
 as in the month of November, 1882, Sir Charles Wilson 
 recommended the employment of General Gordon. But there were 
 
26 Speech of the Rt Eon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 difficulties on both sides. It is very difficult to marry two people 
 when one is averse, but it is still more difficult to marry them when, 
 unfortunately, there is an aversion on both sides — and that, I believe, 
 was found to be the case at that period between the Khedive and 
 General Gordon. However, when it came to the grave period and to 
 the increased responsibility upon us for the affairs of the Soudan 
 that followed Hicks' defeat, then it was again our duty to have 
 regard to the possibility of what might be got through General 
 Gordon. 
 
 Sir Stafford Northcote : Was there anything between these 
 periods 1 
 
 •Mr. Gladstone : No, but the right hon. gentleman will see that 
 I have been contending all along, that, down to the time of Hicks' 
 defeat, we should not have been justified in interfering, to take into 
 our own hands the management of the Soudan ; and it was already 
 known to us that the Egyptian Government objected to General 
 Gordon. On the 1st of December Lord Granville had reason to 
 believe he was in a condition to offer the services of General 
 Gordon to the Egyptian Government. Unfortunately they were 
 refused, but not entirely without reason. The reason given was one 
 that did not satisfy us, but still it went far to silence us, as is often 
 the case ; and I think the right hon. gentleman will find that to 
 be the case too. The objection made to us was this : — " The Soudan 
 is a country of strong Mohammedan fanaticism. For us to send a 
 Christian as our agent, with a view to govern it, might be 
 a dangerous course, which might cause a still more serious 
 outbreak." We were not satisfied with the reason, but 
 it was difficult to thrust that objection rudely aside, 
 and it caused further delay. That was the offer of Lord 
 Granville on December 1st. But we became acquainted with the 
 sentiments of General Gordon ; and, as time went on, the aversion of 
 the Egyptian Government became mitigated, and at last entirely 
 removed. However, it was not till the 16th of January — that is 
 to say, eight days after Nubar Pacha came into office — that they 
 sent to us a request for a qualified officer to undertake the conduct 
 of the evacuation of the Soudan. That was sent to us on the 1 6th of 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 27 
 
 January, and on the 18th General Gordon was on his way to Egypt. 
 At Cairo General Gordon formed his plan. A paper will be laid 
 on the table, I believe. We received General Gordon's plan 
 first, in the shape of a valuable memorandum of his own, but we 
 have had some doubts whether it was our duty to produce his plan. 
 If we could have produced it to this House, or even to this country 
 alone, it would have been another matter, but the promulgation of 
 that plan through the telegraph in Egypt might have caused its 
 failure. All I will say of it on this occasion — for I would rather 
 not go into particulars about it — is that it was evidently a 
 well-reasoned and considered plan ; that it was entirely pacific in 
 its basis; that it proceeded on the belief, — a belief, which would have 
 been fanatical or presumptuous in my case, or in the case of most of 
 those in this House, but which in the case of General Gordon, with his 
 experience and gifts, was, I believe, neither the one nor the other — 
 not that he certainly must, but that he fairly might hope to, exercise 
 a strong pacific influence by going to the right persons in the 
 Soudan ; and it was his desire quite as much as ours that this should 
 be done without any resort whatever to violent means. As 
 I have said, General Gordon went not for the purpose of 
 re-conquering the Soudan or of persuading the chiefs of the 
 Soudan again to submit themselves to the Egyptian Government. He 
 went for the double purpose of evacuating the country by the ex- 
 trication of the Egyptian garrisons and reconstituting it by giving 
 back to those chiefs their ancestral powers, which had been with- 
 drawn or suspended during the period of the Egyptian Government. 
 I have told the House already that General Gordon had in view the 
 withdrawal from the country of no less than 29,000 persons paying the 
 military service to Egypt. The House will see how vast was the trust 
 placed in the hands of this remarkable person. We cannot exaggerate 
 the importance we attach to it. We were resolved to do nothing which 
 should interfere with this great pacific scheme, the only scheme 
 which promised a satisfactory solution of the Soudanese difficulty by 
 at once extricating the garrisons and reconstituting the country 
 upon its own basis and its local privileges. It was our duty, what- 
 ever we might feel as to a particular portion of the garrisons, to 
 
28 Speech of the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., 
 
 beware of interfering with Gordon's plans generally, and, before 
 we adopted any scheme that should bear that aspect, to ask 
 whether in his judgment there would or would not be such an 
 
 interference. 
 
 I will now explain to the House what we have been doing 
 during the last seven days. February 5th, when the disaster 
 happened to Baker Pacha, unfortunately found us cut off for a 
 moment from communication with Gordon. He had considered it 
 his duty to take the shortest and swiftest means to convey himself 
 to Khartoum, and that severed him from the telegraph, which runs 
 up the course of the river. "We resumed the telegraph on the 11th 
 — on the morning of yesterday. We used our utmost endeavours to 
 communicate with him at the earliest moment. We did not wait 
 till we were coming near the time of his possibly reaching Berber, 
 but we sent our messages from the very first moment when we 
 thought there was a chance, being determined to anticipate the 
 possibility of his arrival. We did that on Thursday or Friday of last 
 week, and inquired from him what were his views after Baker Pacha's 
 defeat. We had already taken certain measures. Our first duty was 
 to recollect that the defeat of Baker Pacha altered the position of 
 Sualum, and therefore we took measures, as rapidly as. was in our 
 power, to make Suakim safe. We further issued preliminary orders 
 to the British ships that were going up and down the Red Sea, in 
 order to have them in readiness if any action should be found pos- 
 sible and advisable. When Baker Pacha was defeated, the case 
 of Sincat was hopeless as to military help. It was known 
 for a long time that the garrison had been in extremity. 
 I have read a telegram which acquaints us that Baker Pacha was on 
 the way to its relief, and that he had every hope of succeeding in 
 that relief. No means that we could possibly use could have 
 availed in the slightest degree to bring aid to Sincat, before the time 
 when unhappily it fell. That was not a question of difficulty, but 
 of absolute impossibility. There was another mode, as to which I 
 believe Admiral Hewett and Sir E. Baring have been in communica- 
 tion. Admiral Hewett has endeavoured to see what could be done 
 by negotiations for the extrication of the garrison. He failed, 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 29 
 
 but this failure only became known to us about ten o'clock 
 last night. I think it was reasonable and right that 
 he should make the effort in the impossibility of any other effort 
 that could be made. But we were bound to take into view this — 
 would an attempt of relief in that quarter have the effect of endan- 
 gering first of all the precious life of. General Gordon, on which 
 the whole hope of the solution of this question was depending! 
 would it also have the effect of endangering the measures for 
 the extrication of the 29,000 men, who, after all, must be re- 
 garded of more weight than the 500 in Sincat 1 We have at last 
 heard by telegraph from General Gordon on that subject. Having 
 reached Berber, he has received our messages, and we are satisfied 
 from his replies that, although he does not like the use of military 
 means, yet such an effort as might be made for the relief of Tokar 
 would not in his view interfere with his safety or the likelihood of 
 his success. He does not speak with enthusiasm of anything 
 of that kind, but he leaves upon us the entire responsibility of such 
 a proceeding. In these circumstances we have not hesitated for a 
 moment. Having been put in possession partly by evidence that 
 reached us through Colonel Stewart, and now again since the House 
 met by telegraph from General Gordon, we have come to the reso- 
 lution to gather immediately, with absolutely the utmost promptitude, 
 a force — a British force — at Suakim, with the view if possible to 
 the relief of Tokar, with the computation of its being sufficient for 
 that purpose, if the garrison should be able to hold out. 
 
 We have acted, therefore, without the smallest hesitation upon 
 our own undivided responsibility for a purpose, which implies no 
 departure whatever from our policy in regard to the re-conquest 
 of the Soudan, but with the view of performing what I hope may 
 be regarded as a simple service to humanity, which I am quite sure 
 that this House and the country will not grudge. When I said yester- 
 day that it was not a question of hours, my meaning was this : that 
 our communications with ships would not have been in the slightest 
 degree accelerated by having been made yesterday, and to-day, on 
 the contrary, the position of the ships would enable us to do so. 
 The House will therefore understand that our injunctions and 
 
30 Speech of the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P , 
 
 directions have, as I trust, by this time reached the authorities in 
 Egypt, and that their first efforts to give effect to them have probably 
 been by this time taken. 
 
 I think I have now stated distinctly what we have been about 
 during the last week, and why we thought it wrong, without any 
 reference to General Gordon, in his great and comprehensive plan, 
 to pursue a purpose, which, although one of humanity, and one 
 strongly appealing to the feeling of this country, yet concerned, 
 after all, but a very limited portion of a very difficult and formidable 
 undertaking. I stated that we took preliminary measures with a 
 Tiew to the increase of the force at Suakim. We have moved up 
 troops from Malta in order to be in a condition to put them forward 
 for any purpose of this kind. 
 
 Sir M. H. Beach — How many ? 
 
 Mr. Gladstone — I think it would be very much better that I 
 should not enter upon that. We have had from Admiral Hewett, 
 the best authority on the spot — no doubt he had consulted with 
 others — a very distinct account of what he considered necessary for 
 the relief of Tokar. 
 
 Sir M. H. Beach — I should not have put the question had it not 
 "been told that the number was stated in another place. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone — I do not know whether the right hon. gentle- 
 man means the final or the initial number. I have been speaking of 
 initial measures. If he means the final number, it will be a number 
 somewhat in excess of the number considered by Admiral Hewett 
 to be sufficient for the purpose. I believe it will be 4,000 men. 
 I do not enter into the constituent parts, but I believe that will 
 not be inexact in round numbers. 
 
 Now, I have endeavoured to give the reasons why we have 
 acted and why we did not act before. I revert to the motion of 
 the right hon. gentleman. I hope it will be thought that I have 
 not shrunk from grappling with it. If the House will vote for it 
 — which I own I do not expect — it would be a singular case of 
 voting for a motion, on behalf of which not a single word has been 
 said by the mover. The right hon. gentleman made imputations. 
 
On Egypt and the Soudan. 
 
 31 
 
 These imputations, if they imply anything at all — and the right 
 hon. gentleman seems to say that they do not imply anything at all 
 — imply that he desires and recommends a policy which we think 
 alike opposed to prudence, to humanity, and to justice. I have thus 
 stated the case of the Government. I make in few words my final 
 appeal to the House of Commons, and I ask, from your indulgence 
 it may be, but also from your justice, that acquittal which we feel 
 we are entitled to claim. 
 
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