\ THE PROCEDURE, &c. O F Human Underftanding. f THE PROCEDURE, EXTENT, AND LIMITS O F Human Underftanding. The Second Edition with Corre&ions and Amendments ISAIAHlv.ci. /is the Heavens are higher than the Earth, fo are my Ways higher than your Ways ; and my Thoughts than your Thoughrs. LONDON: Printed for William Innys, at the Weft End of St. Paurs. MDCCXXIX. CONTENTS. ,53P INtrodaffion to the whole Dejrgn. Page i BOOK I. CHAP. I. Introduction to this Treatife. p. 35 CHAP. II. Of Senfe, and the Ideas of Senfation. p. 55 CHAP. III. Of our Idea of Spirit y and of God in {articular, P- 73 CHAP. IV. tfhe Jeveral Properties of Ideas of Senfation, p. 87 CHAP. V. A fecond Property of Ideas of Senfation^ that they are Simple, p. py CHAP. VI. A third Property that they are Immediate, p. 1 03 CHAP. VII. T'hat they are Diretf. p. 108 chap. vni. A fifth Property^ that they are Clear andDiftincJ. p. 119 A CHAP. CONTENTS. CHAP. IX. 7%e Difference between Divine Metaphor ', and P'tvine Analogy. Page 132 BOOK II. CHAP. L Of the pure Intellect. P- * 47 CHAP. II. Of Injtintf in Brutes. p. 158 CHAP. III. rfhe Jecond Operation of the pure Intellect, 7*hat of Judgment, p. 175 chap, rv r Of Jbjir 'atfion. p. 186 CHAP. V. Of Relation. p. 204 CHAP. VI. Of the different Kinds of Knowledge , and Evidence. p. 214 CHAP. VII. Of the farther Improvement of Knowledge by Re- lations reveqled. p. 2^9 chap. vra. Of Revealed Relations intirely new. p. 302 CHAP. CONTENTS. CHAP. IX. Of the Improvement of Morality by Revelation. p. 330 CHAP. X. Of Spirit , andSotd, and Body ; and the great Ufe- fulnefs of this Dijlinftion in Religion, p. 353 BOOK HI. A Summary of the Natural Order, and whole Procedure of the Intellect. CHAP. I. 7h Mmdatfrjl a Tabula Rafa. p. 382 CHAP. II. Ideas of Sen/at ion. p* 385 CHAP. m. The fimple Apprehenjion of the Intellect, or iu View of thofe Ideas. p. 3^2 CHAP. IV. Compound Ideas of Sen/at ion. p. 403 CHAP. V. $%e Intellect's Confcioufnefs of its own Operations. Its complex Notions and Conceptions. p. 41 1 CHAP. CONTENTS. CHAP. VI. Illation or Inference, or Reafon Jlritfly Jo calld. p. 420 CHAP. VII. We have Knowledge of things, whereof we havs no Ideas. p. 440 CHAP. VIII. From the Exijlence of Things material and human, is infer' d the neceffary Exigence of God. p. 447 C H A P. IX. From the Exiftence of God and the fever al Relati- ons he bears to Mankind, the Jpeculative Know- ledge of natural Religion is infer' d. p. 457 CHAP. X. The 'Tragical Duties of Natural Religion, infer* d from the Speculative Knowledge. p. 463 CHAP. XI. 7%i NeceJJity, and Marnier of Revelation, p. 46% THE C « 3 INTRODUCTION T O T H E WHOLE DESIGN. SOME years paft a fmall Treatife was publifh'd with this Title, A Letter in anfwer to a Book, enti- tled) Cbriftianity not myjler'iom 3 as alfo to all thofe who fet up for Reafon and Evidence, in oppofition to Revelation and Myfleries. It plainly appears to have been written in hafte, and with the in- correctnefs of a youthful and as yet un- formed ftile ; but the Foundation the Author all along proceeds upon, for the confutation of his Adverfary ; and for laying open the fallacy of mens Argu- ments againft Divine Revelation and our Chriftian Myfteries, drawn from the To- pics of Ariel: Reafon, Certainty, and Evidence feems to be folid and juft ; B and 2 INTRODUCTION. and indeed the only one upon which fuch a firm and unfhaken Superftrufiiure can be rais'd, as may be Proof againft all the Arguments and Objections of Un- believers. That Letter proceeds intirely upon a Diftinction at firft laid down between a Proper and Immediate Idea or Con- ception of a Thing ; fuch as we have of the things of this world, which are the proper and immediate Objects of our Senfes and our Reafon : and that Idea or Conception which is Mediate only and Improper, fuch as we neceflarily form of the things of another world. It is there afferted as a fure and inconteftable Truth, that we have no immediate proper Idea at all of God, or any of his Attributes as they are in themfelves ; or of any thing elfe in another world : And confequent- ly, that we are under a neceflity of con- ceiving all things fupernatural by Ana- log ; that is, by the Mediation and Sub- ftitution of thofe Ideas we have of our felves, and of all other things of Na- ture. 4 This INTRODUCTION. 3 This Distinction is there affirmed to be absolutely neceflary for the afcertain- ing and fettling the Bounds and Meafure of our Knowledge ; for Shewing the true Limits, and utmoft Extent of human Underftanding, that we may clearly and diftinctly apprehend where mere Know* ledge ends, and Faith begins : Where it is they meet again, and inseparably combine together for the inlargement of our Un- derftanding vaftly beyond its native Sphere ; for opening to the Mind a new and immenfe Scene of things other- wife imperceptible ; and for a rational well-grounded Affent to fuch Truths concerning them, as are a folid Founda- tion for all Religion Natural and Re- vealed. The nature of this Analogy the Au- thor explains by a Similitude in this fol- lowing Paragraph. "And thus it is plain, that tho' we " may be faid to have Ideas of God and " Divine things, yet they are not imme- " diate or proper ones, but a fort of Com- j " pofition we make up from our Ideas of B z " worldly 4 INTRODUCTION. " worldly Objects ; which at the utmoft " amounts to no more than a Type or " Figure, by which fomething in ano- " ther world is fignified, of which we " have no more notion than a blind man " hath of Light. And now that I am " fallen into this Similitude, which feems " well to explain the nature of the thing, " let us purfue it a little ; and fuppofe, u that to a Man who had never feen or " heard any thing of it, it were to be re- " veal'd that there was fuch a thing as " Light. This Man as yet hath neither " a Name nor a Notion for it, nor any " Capacity of conceiving what it is in " it felf. 'Tis plain therefore God would Whimfies, Improprieties, calculated for peoples Fancies ; mere FiBions, Chime- rasy and chimerical Conceits, and Com* pliances with falfe Images in the heads of the Vulgar. That his Grace hath out- done the Rehearfer, who in effeft impi- oajlyfays, St. Paul and the other Apo- files confound all with their improper way of talking - y that his Sermon hath done a great deal of Hurt and Dijfer- vice to the Church of Chrijl ; That a man might as well have per formed what his Grace hath done by the fubterrane- ous World-, by the Philofophers Stone, by Magic, and occult Qualities ; and that upon his Principle Mmijlers are not to trouble them/elves, whether the Doc- trine they preach be true or falfe. C z Out 20 INTRODUCTION. Out of a Pamphlet, the Author of which fliles himfelf a Profelyte to plain Dealings I have collected thefe few from many fuch like exprefllons of a feverifh burning Zeal, and not according to know- ledge for the Doctrines of the Gofpel ; which are all however fafe upon his Grace's main Principle rightly under- ftood and candidly interpreted. Another anonymous and much clofer Antaspnift, who writes with lefs fhew of Zeal indeed for the Caufe of Chriftianity, but with better colour of Reafon ; is no lefs fevere and injurious in his Cenfures of the main Principle upon which his Grace proceeds. He aflerts with an air of great Pofitivenefs, that upon his Principle, God is a Being without Wifdom> Goodnefs, Jufiice, and Mercy, Knowledge and Holm efs. That all the moral and natural Attributes of God are indefenfible. That all the Ar- guments for God's Government of the World i and for rewarding and punifh- mg Men in a juture State, which are drawn from the Divine Attributes taken in INTRODUCTION, zi in a flriB and literal Senfe, are given up ^ and that we can never from thence infer any Obligation to Duty. That thus it is a Matter of no great confequence, what Notions Men have of God. That by confequence from his Principles God mufl be without Diftinblion of Perfons, as well as without Parts and PaJJions - and that his Grace hath given up the Caufe to the Unitarians. That his Grace owns y that God is neither Good nor Wife ; and that according to him^ the Scripture Text, Be ye holy as I am holy, is as unintelligible , as Be ye holy as I am Rabba. That if his Grace meant to make all our Notions of God pafs for Riddles in Divinity not to be underfioody little Credit will be gaind by it to Religion. That thus the Unity of God would be on- ly fomething as good as but one God. The Author asks, How can Men know God's Will, when he hath no Will ? And, How can we imitate the Holinefs of God unlefs it be of the fame nature with that Quality in us ? And again, Whither will Matters run ? Whither in- C 2 deed! 2i INTRODUCTION. deed ! when one may not fo much as fay , God knows whither. And he makes this Remark upon the whole, That the World had been as wife and as quiet ^ if their ordinary Notions of God's Attri- butes had never been diflurbed. I have troubled the Reader with thefe empty Outcries and Sarcafms here, in order to prevent this loofe and un- reafoning way of fpeaking upon this Sub- ject for the future ; and that I may pre- vail upon thofe Authors to think the Matter over again in cool Blood : And to consider, that they are the very Men who are juftly liable and obnoxious to all thofe hard Speeches and frightful Im- putations of fappingand fubverting Chri- ftianity, which they fo wrongfully charge upon the great and learned Prelate. Be- caufe they all along fo ftrenuoufly main- tain, That if the DoBrines of the Go- /pel, Gody and his Attributes^ are by us conceived Analogical there can be no- thing of Truth and Reality in them. An4 that upon the Suppofition of fuch Analo- gy ', we coud have no Knowledge at alt INTRODUCTION. 23 of them)) but what is purely Figurative and Metaphorical. Two of the moft defperate and univerfaly pernicious Po- sitions, that were ever openly and pub- lickly maintain'd ; being by direct and immediate confequence utterly deftruc- tive of all Religion Natural and Reveal- ed : And which, if they were true, wou'd fupport and confirm all the Ar- guments of Arians, Socinians, and De- ifts againft the Chriftian Revelation and Myfteries. To convince them effectu- aly that they are fundamentaly wrong, let them but fingle out any one Idea or Conception, together with the Word by which we exprefs it ; and revolve it in their mind, and try whether they can transfer it to the Divine Being and the Things of another World, in the fame ftricl: and literal Propriety with which they apply it to Man : And if they find this in fact not practicable, then let them fufpend all further Op- position to the Doctrine of Analogy, till the Nature of it is more fully and rightly explained, and the true Ufe of C 4 it %4 INTRODUCTION. it in Religion fhewn ; together with the application of it to the Defence of the Truths and Myfteries of the Gofpel ; and to the Confutation of Herefy and Infidelity. Such Objections as have any weight or colour of Reafon in them may, God willing, be throughly confidered here- after. But by the way, it is conveni- ent to obviate and remove one popular Prejudice againft the enlarging upon this Subject: of Analogy. What occafion or neceffity is there for it at this time, more than ever ? Wou'd not the world have been as wife, and as good, and as holy, if Men's ordinary Notions of God and his Attributes , and of all things elfe fupernatural had never been difturb- ed ? Yes it wou'd ; and it cannot be fufficiently lamented, that they have been fo difturbed. But who are the Difturb- ers ? The Arians, Socinians, and Deifts ; who, by turning all the Words and Lan- guage of the Gofpel either into mere Figure and Metaphor on one hand, have argued away the whole Subftance of our Faith; INTRODUCTION, ij Faith ; and refolved all Chriftian Myfte- ries into nothing : Or by wrefting all the Terms and Expreffions we have for them to ftridly literal and proper Acceptati- ons on the other hand, have from thence charged our Faith of the Gofpel and its Myfteries with Inconfiftencies, Abfur- dities, and Contradictions ? Or are they the Difturbers, who undertake to mew, that thofe Gofpel Terms are to be un- derftood neither in a fence purely Figu- rative and Metaphorical, nor yet in their ftricl: and literal Propriety ; and who by that means lay open the Fallacy of all thofe men's Reafonings from the Na- ture of Things known, to the real in- ternal Nature of Things unknown ? The defign of the Scriptures indeed is, that we mould take both the moral and natural Attributes of God, and all things fpoke in them of another World fo far literary, as to give our Affent to them all as to things true and real, upon the Teftimony of God; without med- dling with their Nature as they are in themfelves, which is incomprehenfible. But 16 INTROD UCTION. But when Men will deviate from that Defign, and pervert this common, and familiar, and literal Acceptation, which would fully have anfwered all the Ends of Religion; and will raife their Obje- ctions from thence againfl the Scriptures themfelves, and the Myfteries revealed in them : Then, when the Enemies of Revelation and Myftery make a bad ufe of it, by mifreprefenting and mifapply- ing this Analogy ; it becomes abfolute- ly neceflary for the Orthodox to make a good ufe of it ; to explain it truly, and apply it rightly ; to diftinguifh the Nature of it with greater nicety, and mew how it differs from Figure and bare Allufion. The fundamental Doctrine revealed in Scripture, and ever maintained by the Church, but denied by the Arians is , that God is Truly a Father ; that Chrift is his True and Genuine Son, and Affualy begotten of the Father in his own Divine Nature and Perfections. The Ground of the Arian Scheme is, that the words Father^ and Son, and Begotten INTRODUCTION. 27 Begotten cannot be underftood literaly and properly of God ; therefore they are to be taken Improperly and figura- tively ; namely, that Chrift was Made or Created^ or fome way Produced by the Will and Power of God ; and con- fequently cou'd not be equal in Nature and Perfections, nor co-eternal with him. From hence they branch out into a large Hypothefis full of Blafphemy againft God as a True Father ; and againft Chrift as Truly a Son, in the received fence of the words as they are commonly applied to God and to Chrift. For us to under- take to prove in the other extreme, that thofe terms are to be underftood literaly and in their ftridl Propriety of God and Chrift, is an impoflible task; and thus they will be furely too hard for us in every point of Controversy. But if we take the middle way, and (hew thofe Terms not to be taken in their Firfl, and StriB, and literal Propriety ; nor in a mere and empty Figure ', but Analo- gicaly thus : That Chrift, in his Divine pre-exiftent Nature, is as Truly, and/te- aly. *8 INTRODUCTION. aly, and ABualy the Son of God in a fupernatural incomprehensible manner, begotten in his own Nature and full Per- fections, as if he were literaly fo ; and as Truly as a human Child is the Son of his Father in the way of Nature ; then we bring the Controverfy upon the right foot; and they muft ftumble at every ftep they take to confute us. The Dilemma the Socinians reduce us to, and pufh us with at every turn is this. All the words of Scripture, in which the Myfteries of Chriftianity are revealed, are to be underftood either li- teraly or metaphoricaly. But you muft grant, fay they to us, that they cannot be taken properly and literaly ; there- fore they are to be taken Metaphori- caly ; and confequently they are all no- thing more than mere Figure and bare Allufion : And accordingly they are fo full of this, that Socinus himfelf, fpeak- ing of the Gofpel, hath this faying, Tot& Redemptionis nofirte per Chrijlum Me- taphora. The true anfwer to them is, that thofe words are to be underftood neither INTRODUCTION. 29 neither in a ftricUy proper fence, nor in a fence purely Metaphorical, but Analo- gicaly ; in which acceptation they con- tain and exhibit to us as much Truth and Reality y as they do when taken in their moll Uriel: and literal Proprie- ty- The whole lum and fubftance of the Deift's and Freethinker's reafoning may be refolved into this. You muft grant, fay they, that we can neither know nor believe any thing but what we havefome kind of Idea or Conception of; And you muft grant likewife, that the Chriftian Myfteries are incomprehenfible, that is, that we have no Idea at all of them ; therefore we can neither know nor be- lieve them. And purfuant to this, they every where oppofe the Certainty and E- vidence of Senfe and Reafon, and the clear and diftincl: knowledge we have of Their proper Objecls ; to the Uncer- tainty, and Obfcurity, and Unconceiv- ablenefs of Revelation and Myftery, Now we are under a neceffity of making them both thofe Conceflions thus Se- parated 3 o INTRODUCTION. parated by them, and yet their con- fequence is abfolutely falfe : For tho' we have no Idea at all of the Chriftian Myfteries as they are in their Real Na- ture \ yet we can both Know and Believe them under Analogical Reprefentations and Conceptions. So that thofe two Aflertions of theirs will infer one Pofi- tion abfolutely true ; namely, That the Scripture terms expreflive of thofe Myf- teries, firft understood and apprehend- ed literary, and then transfer'd by Ana- logy to things Divine and Incompre- henfible, do contain as much folid and fubftantial Truth and Reality for an Ob- ject of our Knowledge and Faith, as when they are applied to things Natural and Human. Nay, the Atheifts themfelves find their account in laying afide and con- founding this Analogy ; for thus they argue. If God is Infinite, no finite hu- man Underftanding can have any Know- ledge at all of him. It can't know him in the Whole, becaufe nothing finite can comprehend Infinity \ nor can it know any INTRODUCTION. 31 any Part of him, there being no part of Infinity. To which I return the A- poftle's Anfwer, that tho' we can't be laid to know any Part of him ; yet we are truly faid to know him in part, as we fee the reflection of a fubftance in a looking-glafs , that is, by Analogy with thofe Perfections we obferve in our felves, and in the things of Nature; the brighteft Mirrour in which we now behold him. But they urge, there can be no Proportion or Similitude between Finite and Infinite, and confequently there can be no Analogy. That there can be no fuch Proportion or Similitude as there is between finite created Beings is granted ; or as there is between any material fubftance and its Refemblance in the glafs : and therefore wherein the Real Ground of this Analogy conilfts, and what the Degrees of it are, is as in- comprehenfible as the real Nature of God. But it is fuch an Analogy as he himfelf hath adapted to our Intellect, and made ufe of in his Revelations ; and therefore we are lure it hath fuch a foun- dation 3 i INTRODUCTION. elation in the Nature both of God and Man, as renders our Moral Reafonings concerning him and his Attributes fo- lid, and juft, and true. I must not now ftay to enlarge up- on thefe things, and fhall here only give fome account of my Defign and Me- thod in the further profecution of this Subject. The great Genius of the laft Century, under the head of Revelation and the Myfteries of Religion, obferves how God hath vouchfafed to let himfelf down to our Capacities >- fo unfolding his Myfieries as that they may be bejl or mofl aptly perceived by us $ andy as it were y graft- ing or inoculating his Revelations into thofe Notions and Conceptions of Re a f on which are already in us. After which, he reckons a Treatife of Logic calcula- ted for this very purpofe, among hisZte- fiderata. Itaque nobis res falubris vide- tur & imprimis utilis, fi Tratlatus infli- tuatur fobrius &f diligens y quide ufu Ra~ tionis humane in Theologicis utiliter pra- cipiaty tanquam Divina qua dam Diale- x ilka* INTRODUCTION. 33 Bica. Utpote qua futura fit inftar opi- ate cujufdam medicina 5 qua non modo fpeculationurnj quibusfchola interdym la- bor at y mama confopiat ; verum etiam controverfiarum Furor es^ qua in Ecclejia tumultus cienty nonnihil mitiget. Ejuf modi TraBatum inter Defiderata poni- mus; & Sophronem, five de legitimo uju Rationis human* in Divinis nominamus. Now this is the very thing I aim at, &nd what I endeavour by this firftTrea- tife to perform in fome degree. In which I propofe rightly to ftate the whole Extent and Limits of human Understand- ing; to trace out the feveral fteps and degrees of its Procedure from our firft and fimple Perception of fenfible Ob- jects, thro' the feveral operations of the pure Intellect upon them, till it grows up to its full Proportion of Nature : And to fhew, how all our Conceptions of things fupernatural are then grafted on it by A- nalogy ; and how from thenct it extends it felf immenfely into all the Branches of Divine and Heavenly Knowledge. D Some 34 INTRODUCTION. Some Treat ife of this kind I forefaw was necefTary to be premifed, before I cou'd proceed to the application of this Analogy to any of our Controverfies in Religion ; becaufe of that ftrong Preju- dice againft it, from an opinion that it ultimately refolves all Religion into mere Figure and Allufion, and confequently brings it to nothing ; and becaufe of the many Errors and Prepoffeflions in the generality of young Students, taken up from falfe and pernicious Principles in fome of our modern Writers of Logic and Metaphyfics. In order to obviate and remove thefe, I was to begin with the firft Rudiments of our Knowledge ; to explain the feveral Properties of thofe Ideas of Senfation, which are the only Materials the Mind of Man hath to work upon ; to lay open the true nature of Divine Analogy, how it differs from hu- man Analogy, and how both differ from pure Metaphor : To fhew, how we ne- ceflarily apply it to the conceiving the Divine Being and his Attributes ; of what univerfal advantage it is in direct- i ing INTRODUCTION. 35 ing us to the right ufe of Reafon in Re- ligion ; in enabling us to ftate the true manner of apprehending the Myfteries of Chriftianity ; and to judge, when it is that our Reafonings upon them are juft, and folid, and clear $ and when they are confined, precarious, and falfe. I hope the ingenuous Reader will fufpend any Indignation and Cenfure, which may arife from his Zeal for the Truth and Safety of Religion, till he can lee the whole Defign together in one view. For my Intention is (if God per- mit) in fome of the following Tracts to proceed to our Controversy with fuch as are declared and profejfed Arians, whe- ther ancient or modern. When the way is thus far prepared, I purpofe to lay open the deep Diffimulation of all thofe who have no other colour or pretence to renounce that name and Character, unlefs it be becaufe they rigoroufly main- tain the ranked of their Heretical Opi- nions not exprefsly ; but by dire& y im- mediate ^ and necejfary confequence. The confideration of the SoclmanPoJluIa- D % ta, l6 INTRODUCTION. ta,and that grofs and complicated Scheme of Herefy deduced from them with much Subtilty and Artifice, I leave to the kit. The Sabellians began early in the Church to deftroy the very Subftance of Chriftianity, and give an intire turn to the whole Tenor of the Gofpel, and the Reality of our Salvation by the Me- rits and Mediation of a Saviour : And that, by arguing the words Father and Son to be purely figurative, and con- fequently to denote only one and the fame Divine Perfon ; and thus they form- ed their Herefy upon the foot of Meta- phor. The Arians afterwards, tho' they ran into the quite contrary Extreme, yet ar- gued from the very fame Topic of Fi- gure and Metaphor; concluding juft as the Sabellians did, that Father and Son were Terms altogether improper , and utterly unworthy the Divine Nature in their literal and proper acceptation. But they made a quite contrary ufe of this; not only to prove them two diftincl: and different Perions ; but to prove the Son to INTRODUCTION. 37 to be of a different and fubordinate Na- ture, neither coeternal nor coequal with the Father : and it was by this Artifice, they endeavoured to obviate and inva- lidate all the Arguments of the Ortho- dox, drawn from the real import and true acceptation of thofe words in the Gofpel. The Socinians agree with the Arians in allowing Chrift to be God in the moft elevated fence, and to all intents and pur- pofes that a made or created Perfon can be fuch; but that it is ftill in a figu- rative only, and not in the lame ftriclly proper acceptation in which it is attri- buted to the Father. And they differ from them in thefe two material Points, That whereas the Arians allow Chrift a pre-exiftent, tho' a made or created Na* ture ; the Socinians will have him ori- ginaly a mere Man, and not in being till born of the Virgin Mary, And fe- condly, Whereas the Arians, by holding Chrift to be God in a Figure only, do intirely take away all the real and truly divine virtue and efficacy of his Merits D 3 and 38 INTRODUCTION. and whole Mediation for us ; yet they do this by direct and immediate confe- quence only ; and leave the Myfteries of Chriftianity in their full force and effi- cacy with fuch as do not difcern this ne- ceflary confequence. But the Socinians do exprefsly and profeffedly turn them all into pure Metaphor, and bare Allu- fion only to what was enjoined and prac- tifed under the legal Difpenfation. So that they hold Chrift to be a Figurative Saviour, a figurative Prieft, a figurative Mediator ; they refolve his Merits and Sa- tisfaction, with the words Price^Purchctfe, Redemption, Wafhing and Cleanfwg of his Blood, all into mere empty Figure ; and in fhort, turn our whole Chriftiani- ty into a Metaphorical Religion. The Deifts and Freethinkers of all ranks and degrees, who build upon theiv Principles, have but one ftep farther to go, and do make this Inference, which is obvious and rational upon the Soci- nian Hypothefis ; That if all thofe things are to be underftood in Figure and Me- taphor only, then they can have nothing of INTRODUCTION. 3? ofFealityand folid Truth at the bottom. By the f.ime fatal Delufion with the So- cinians, they utterly reject all Analogy in Religion as well as Metaphor ; and there- fore fet up for the belief of one only Divine Perfon ; and for fuch Principles of Morality as are deduceable only from the Light of Reafon, as they imagine, without the help of that Revelation, to which even they themfelves owe their beft and moft exalted Notions of it. They rigoroufly confine the Underftanding within the narrow bounds of direB and Immediate objects of Senfe and Reafon ; and will not fuffer the Mind of Man in any one Inftance to reach above the ftriclily literal and immediate acceptation of Words ; fo as to transfer them and their Ideas Analogicaly with the leaft Truth and Reality to things incorporeal, and otherwife inconceivable and ineffable. The Progrefs from thence into fpe- culative Atheifm is fhort and eafy. For if all Revealed Religion is to be reject- ed as merely figurative, and metaphori- cal y then all Natural Religion is to be D 4 like- 40 INTRODUCTION. likewife reje&ed ; becaufe all the Ideas and Conceptions we can have of God and his Attributes from the light of Reafon muft be equaly figurative and metapho- rical ; and therefore we have no Real true Knowledge at all of them ; and confe- quently can never prove the Exiftence of a Being whereof we have no true Conception or Knowledge. I look upon Socintamfrn> together with the modern Clandefl'ine Artantfm which is moftly built upon it, to be in all probability the laft great Effort of the Devil againft Chriftianity ; which will then fhine out to the world in its full Luftre and Glory, whenever this thick Cloud is fully removed and diffipated, which he hath interpofed to obfeure and darken its Rays. X)ur modern Deifts, and Freethinkers, and Atheifts of all forts and fizes are likewife the natural Growth and Offspring of Socinianifm : They are as fo many Heads daily fprout- ing up from that figurative Metaphori- cal Monfler ; each of which multiplies by being cut off, and they increafe their i number. INTRODUCTION, 41 number by being as daily confuted. Nor can they ever be totaly deftroyed, till they are all ftruck off together at one Blow, skilfully levelled at the common Neck from whence they rife; which I am perfuaded can never be otherwife per- formed, than by a dexterous application of that true Analogy (which hath a fo- lid Foundation in the Nature of things, and ever carries in it a fure, and certain, and confiftent Parity of Reafon) to all thofe Arguments and Objections raifed againft Revelation, from men's blending and confounding it with pure Metaphor, a Creature only of the Imagination. The abfolute neceffity ofanfwering the Enemies of Revelation and Myfte- ry upon fome other than the common footing, is apparent ; not only from the daily increasing number of their Profe- lytes, but from their boafted Triumphs over the Orthodox; whom they pre- tend to have greatly diftrefled and ftreightened, by reducing them to a ne- ceffity of proving all the Scripture Terms, wherein our Chriftian Myfteries are re- vealed, 4i INTRODUCTION. vealed, to be taken in their ftridtly lite- ral and proper acceptation. This they plainly difcern to be an impoffible task to us ; and therefore whilft the Cham- pions for the Caufe of God and Reli- gion are labouring and toiling up this Precipice ; and ever bend all their force and ftrength to attack them in that part of their Hypothefis, in which alone they are impregnable ; they, from the oppo- fite fide, never fail to ply them at every turn with all their artillery of Figure, and Metaphor, and Allufion. From hence it is, that their greater!: Advan- tages are gained ; and tho' they can never hope to obtain any intire Victo- ry from thence, yet this ferves to raife a Mift before men's eyes ; to perplex and darken the whole controverfy ; and to render every material point of it confufed and indiftincl:, fo that it cannot be brought to a certain and determinate Conclufion. All this difficulty and ob- fcurity, *as I conceive, may be effectually removed by rightly ftating the true na- ture of that Analogy which runs thro' our INTRODUCTION. 4* our Conceptions of Things divine. For then the only Objection left to the Ad- verfaries of Revelation will be ; that Granting all we contend for, yet Ana- logy at beft is ftill but Figure^ and therefore that by this method of pro- ceeding, we make that very Conceilion which gives up the Subftance and Rea- lity of Myftery. To which the Anfwer is obvious, That if they will take the word Figure in General, and in a great latitude, as it is oppofed to the fiddly Li- teral Propriety ofthofe Scripture Terms, in which our Chriftian Myfteries are de- livered ; and mull: and will call them fiich ; there is no danger in a Word, fo they allow the Thing : And will after- wards fairly diftinguifh between that which is Purely Figure, and ferves only for a mere Elegance and Ornament of Speech ; and that which hath as folid a Meaning and as fubftantial a Ground in the very Nature of things, as if it cou'd be exprefs'd in Terms ftriclly literal and proper. This I apprehend is to be no other- wife 44 INTRODUCTION. wife performed, than by rightly explain- ing the Nature of that true and Neceffa- ry Analogy, which runs thro' all our Conceptions and Language of Things di- vine. And furely there cannot be a bet- ter Teft, that this is the true Meafure and certain Rule in thinking and fpeak- ing of things otherwife imperceptible and ineffable, than its being univerfaly ap- plicable to fo many different Subjects and Controversies ; and yet never once giving juft Occarion for a Sufpicion of its failing in the Trial : efpecialy if it is all along found confiftent with it felf under fo many various ufes ; beginning in our moft natural Conceptions of the Attri- butes of God) and ending in the moft fublime Myfteries of Christianity. My Delign in each of the following Tracts is, not to calculate them for an Anfwer to any particular Book or Au- thor, but to the whole Caufe in contro- verfy with Arians and Socinians ; and other Unbelievers who build upon them, and do from their Hypothefes argue a- gainft all Revealed Religion, with bet- ter INTRODUCTION. 47 ter colour of Reafon, than thofe Here- tics do againft the Truth and Reality of our Chriftian Myfteries. My Purpofe is to lay a Foundation for anfwering, not only what hath been already offered by them ; but what may be advanced upon the like erroneous Principles for the fu- ture. In order to which, I am not to expatiate into any great variety of Mat- ters fubordinate, and of lefs moment; or to apply Arguments or Solutions to each man's peculiar way of Reafoning: But to make a juft and impartial Re- prefentation of their Doclxine and Prin- ciples ; to ftate rightly the fundamental Queftions in debate; that the whole Controvexfy may be brought upon the right foot, and the material Branches of it reduced to the utmoft point of De- cifion. To fingle out fuch of their Ar- guments as are the main Pillars and Sup- port of their whole Scheme of Religion; none of which I think to pafs over or conceal ; but to propofe them in their full Strength and Force, and in the {hort- eft and cleareft Light, as I have collected them 4 <$ INTRODUCTION; them out of their bed: and mod valua- ble Authors. And laftly, fo to adapt my Anfwers to them, that in reading any of their Works, with a continual eye to the diftindlion between Metaphor and the true Divine Analogy, the main > lufion and Fallacy which runs thro' t hern all, may lie open to every difcerning and unprejudiced Perfon. I h a v e endeavoured to be very exacl and juft in my Quotations, tho' I name none but the Antients ; and even out of thefe I decline, as much as may be, ci- ting either the Place or Page from whence the Quotations are taken. The few Paffages cited for their Authority only, are to be met with in moft Books upon the Subject ; and as for the reft, whether from the Antients or Moderns, I leave them to pafs according to their own intriniic worth and value, without the additional weight of great Names. The world is already rilled v/ith that kind of Learning, which confifts in tedious Diflertations concerning what fuch and fuch men's thoughts and opinions were, in INTRODUCTION. 47 in Matters plainly to be decided by Rea- fon and Scripture ; when the main Que- ftion is, what Opinions they Ought to be of; and who gives the beft and moft convincing Reafons for what he fays? Truth will ever ftand upright alone ; but Error is tottering, and falls to the ground when its Props are removed ; and every thing merely human is to be efteemed, not according to the Perfon who faid it, but according to the in trinfic weight of what is faid. Tho' I may commit many miftakes and overfights in the courfe of my Per- formance ; (and who is intirely free from them ? ) yet that ought to be no Prejudice againft the main Foundation I have laid, and do all along proceed upon. If it is falfe and imaginary, and a groundlefs In- vention of Man, it will come to nought ; and I pray God it may do fo lpeedily, that the Fallacy may be laid open to his Glory, and to my own Shame ; who have been fo deeply engaged in dangerous Er- ror and Miftake: But if the Foundation is good, and agreeable to the Light both of 48 INTRODUCTION. of Nature and Revelation, as I truft it will be found, then it is of God^ it will ftand fure ; and all Contradiction and Oppofition given to it, will tend only to its farther Eftablifhment ; and to the Strength and Confirmation of that whole Superftru&ure which is raifed upon it. AN THE PROCEDURE, EXTENT AND LIMITS O F Human Underftanding. ' iiiim ■ r — BOOK I. CHAP. I NO AfTertion whatlbever feems more agreeable to Reafon, than that Things Human and Divine, Natural and Supernatural , are not perceived by the Mind of Man after the fame manner. Every one at firft Hearing will be apt to think this a true Propofition ; and on lecond Thoughts will look upon it as Matter of greater! Con- fequence in Religion, that it be throughly weighed and confidered : And yet by fbme E ftrange 50 Procedure of ftrange unaccountable Unhappinefs, it hath lb fallen out, that nothing hath been more over- looked than this lignal and important Diffe- rence ; and lels attended to in molt of thole Controverfies, which have all along difturbed the quiet and peaceable Courfe of the Golpel. This Overfight hath been equaly the Caule of all the Errors of Enthujiafts on the one hand ; and of the pretended Votaries to ftricteft Reajbn and Evidence on the other. For tho* thefe two feem to be in contrary Extremes, and to run as far from one another as they can ; yet they both let out at firft with the fame fa- tal Delufion ; they meet again at length in one common Error > and proceed in all their Notions and Arguments upon the fame grols Suppofition , That Human and Divine Things are alike the Direct and Immediate Objects of our Uhderftanding. Upon this very Miftake it is, that on one fide Men will not ftoop ib Low as Realbn ; and that on the other, they will not venture to rife Above it. While Enthufiafis afpire to a more direct and immediate View of Things, which are not in fiich a Degree dilcernible either by Senfe or Realbn, their Notions mull of Necel- fity be all lenfelels and irrational : And while the Boafters of Reajbn and Evidence acquiefce Entirely in the immediate Objects of our under- ftanding Faculties, and will not fuffer the Mind the Understanding. 51 Mind to launch out beyond them, they by di- rect Confequence deilroy. all Religion, as well Natural as Revealed. M y Defign being to lay a Foundation for the clear and effedual Confutation of moft Errors of both kinds, but elpecially thole of the Brians, and Socinians, and DeiJIs, and Free- thinkers of all Sorts ; againft whom the follow- ing Difcourfes are more directly levelled ; I forefee it neceiTary , that the Fir ft of them mould be taken up in tracing out the Bounds and Limits of Human Understanding. The exad Defcription of thefe, with luch Plainnels and Perlpicuity, that Men may know how to Stop when they come to the full Extent and Natural Compafs of it ; and then to Qauje a while, 'till they are lenfible how the Mind mulb Begin a-new for the Apprehenfion of Things Supernatural, and intirely immate- rial ; feems to me the greateft Service which can be done to all Religion in general, in this notional and fceptical Age. For as the mifta- king of thefe Bounds hath been the Caule and Occafion of moft Delufton and Error ; fo the having a proper Recourfe to them, is become the only effectual Way of forming diftincl: and fatisfa&ory Anfwers, to moft of thole Difficul- ties and Objections which have been railed a- gainft the Truths of Religion. E 2 The 51 Procedure of The Bounds fet out to our Underftand- ing by nature, are not very extenfive ; for the Mind hath originaly no larger a Sphere of its Activity than this vifible Frame of material Objects, that feems to be fhut in by the fix'd Stars ; which intire Space we may conceive to be but as anoint to the Univerle; and yet all Things beyond them, with refpect. to any Direct or Immediate Perception of our Faculties, are as if they had no Being : Infomuch, that if Men were refolved never to concern themfelves with any Exerciie and Application of their Knowledge and Affent, farther than the direct and immediate Objects of their Senles and their Realbn, they mult neceflarily "cut off all Inter- courfe and Commerce with Heaven ; and there could be no fuch Thing as any true Religion in. the World. And therefore now we are to confider after what manner it is, that the Mind of Man di- lates and extends itfelf beyond its native Bounds; . how it lupplies the want of DireB and Proper Ideas of the things of another World ; railing up Within it felf Secondary Images of them, where it receives no Immediate Impreilion or Idea from Without. How the vaft and bound- lels extent of the Univerje^ with the great and glorious Variety of heavenly things , the World of Spirit s> and even GWhimlelf and his Attributes \ together with all the Sacred My- fitfw of Chriftianity become the Obje&s of our 4 Reafon the Understanding. jj Reafbn and Underftanding : Inibmuch, that Things Otherwife imperceptible grow Familiar and Eajy ; and how we are able to meditate and difcourle, to debate and argue, to infer and conclude concerning the nature of thole things, whereof we have not the leaft dired Perception or Idea. Before I proceed to this, I mall premifc it as a lure and uncontefted Truth ; That we have no other Faculties of perceiving or know- ing any thing divine or human but our Five Senfes, and our Reafon. The Contexture of our Frame is lb various and complicated, that it i» no eafy matter nicely to diitinguilh our under* Handing Faculties from one another ; and Men who would appear more fharp-ilghted than others, and pry farther into this matter than there is occafion, may increafe the number of thofe Faculties : But they will be all compre- hended under Senfe, by which the Ideas of ex- ternal fenlible Objects are firft conveyed into the Imagination ; and Reafon or the pure Intel- led:, which operates upon thole Ideas, and up- on them, Only after they are lb lodged in that common Receptacle. A s this firft Volume relates to Knowledge in general, and is chiefly Logical, and prepa- ratory only to what is intended mould follow - y fb I have been more large and particular in. thole parts of it which elpecially regard my E 3 main 74 Procedure of main Dcfign. But the touching upon fbme collateral Points that fell in my way, was al- moft unavoidable ; the placing of which in a true Light might prove of confiderable Service to thofe who have been milled by fome late Authors of Vogue and Authority, Whether thefe incidental Subjects are truly determined here, or not ; I defire it may be obferved, that this will not any way affect the main Doctrine, nor alter the principal Foundation laid, in re- lation to our manner of conceiving the things of another World. I lay no greater a ftrefs upon any of thole Points, than as being matter of highly probable Conjecture only, and as what appears to me to be Truth ; and do accordingly leave them to Hand or fall, as they fhall be found more or lefs agreeable to the natural Sentiments of any Reader who is yet free to judge for himfelf, and unbiafifed from the Weight of great Names. This previous Caution I would have extended particularly to what is faid concerning the Souls of Brutes ; the degree of our Knowledge in natural Caufes and Effects ; the Nature and Ufefulnefs of Syllogifm ; to my conjectural Obfervations, at the latter End of the fecond Book, upon that Scripture Diftinction of Spi- rit ^ and Soul, and Body ; as well as to all other matters which have not a direct tendency to eftabliih the main Doctrine of Divine Analogy. CHAP. THE UNDERSTANDIMG. 5J CHAR II. Of Senfe, and the Ideas of Senfation. OU R five Senfes , tho' common to us with Brutes, are however the only Source and Inlets of thofe Ideas, which are the intire Groundwork of all our Knowledge both Human and Divine. Without Ideas of fome fort or other, we could have no Knowledge at all ; for to know a thing, is to have fome Repre- fentat'ion of it in the Mind ; but we cannot think, or be confcious of thinking, 'till we have fome Idea or Semblance of an Object to think upon ; and without our Senfes, we could not have one internal Idea or Semblance of any- thing without us. Inlbmuch that in our very Entrance into the large and capacious Field of Argument which is before us, we mult lay down that Maxim of the Schools as univerfaly true without any Reftriction or Limitation, Nihil eji in IntelleBu quod non prius fuit in Sen/it ; or, as a certain Philofopher expreffeth it with more Softnefs, Nefcio an quicquam Intelkcfus mo~ liri poffity nifi rib Imagmatione lacejjitus. The Imagination is the common Store- houfe and Receptacle of all thole Images, which are tranfmkted thro' the Senfes • and till this is furniftied in fome degree, the Soul, while it is in the Body, is a ftill, una&ive Prin- E 4 ciple i $6 PROCEDURE OP ciple ; and then only begins to operate and jfirft exert itielf, when it is iupplied by Senia- tion with Materials to work upon : So that the moft abftr acted fpi ritual Knowledge we have, as will hereafter abundantly appear, takes its firft Rife from thole Seniations ; and hath all along a necelTary dependence upon them. I am not unaware, how much this pofitive AfTertion will at fir 11 ftartle and furprize all thole, who have hitherto fancied they could abitract intirely from all Ideas of Senfation } and that by the help of iuch a? are '■Purely In- tellectual they could think altogether indepen- dently of them. And the thought which na- turaly ariies in their Mind on this occafion is this ; That if this kind of Abstraction is utter^ ly impracticable, what then will become of all oar Knowledge of the Things of another World ? Of all Revealed Religion , and the Truths of Morality, and the My/kries of Chri- stianity ? They are all, I truft in God, very fafe ; and will become the more fo when this AfTertion is fully laid open, rightly explain'd ? and univerfaly acknowledged to be true. The Queition is not, what the Conjeqaences may be of enlarging upon this (pritKiple, and purliiing that Analogy, by which alone our nar tural Ideas and Conceptions become iubfervient to the conceiving and apprehending things liir pernatural ? But whether the Principle is tnae ? For the Understanding. 57 For there is a mutual Sympathy and faft Con- nection between the Truths of Nature , and thofe of Religion ; they fall in together, and clofe whenever they meet, fo as to communi- cate Light and Strength to each other. This Opinion, as every thing elfe which is agreeable to Reafon, will I hope be of no fmall Advan- tage to true Religion ; for I doubt not but the Effect of putting it in a right Light will be, that Enthufiafm, in all the great Variety of Shape in which it fliews itfelf, will fall to the Ground at once ; and all thofe Objections a- gainft Revelation and Myftery will be re- moved, which proceed upon their being Ab- ftrufe\ Unintelligible, and Contradiffory ; and thole who expole our Chriftian Myfteries, or explain them away under Pretence and Colour of ad- hering to ftrid Realbn and Evidence, will be under a neceflity of finding out new Topics. So that, tho' we thus ftoop as Low as the Earth y yet it is that from thence we may with more Vigour take our Flight even to Heaven itfelf, for the Contemplation of all the glorious Ob- jects of another World. Before I fpealc of the particular Pro- perties of thefe Ideas of Senfation, it will be convenient to obferve thefe three things in ge- neral concerning them. 1. That it is no way to the Purpofe of the following Difcourfe to decide here, whether ail j8 Procedure of all fenfitive Perception be performed by any ^fe/Impreflion of the Thing itfelf upon our Senies ? Or by any Operation of the fenfe upon the Object ? Whatever the Quality in fenfible Objects is, which enables them to imprint fome Reprejentat'wn or Charatfer of themfelves upon us ; or whatever that Frame and Contexture of the Organs is, which difpofeth them either to receive that Impreflion, or to take the Like- nefs of thofe external Objects by any intrinfic Virtue and Power of their own ; it is certain that all liich Perception neceffarily requires the tyrefence of the Object ; with an immediate actual Operation either of the Object upon our Organs, or of our Organs upon the Object. The Effect and Confequence is the lame, as when we apply the Wax to the Seal, or the Seal to the Wax ; there follows fome fort of Reprefentation of the Object and its Qualities. This is the Cafe of all thofe material external Objects, which by their Prefence have left any Footftep or Character of themfelves upon our Senfes ; and this Reprefentation or Likenefs of the Object being tranfmitted from thence to the Imagination, and lodged there for the View and Obfervation of the pure Intellect, is aptly and properly called its Idea. I f any one, not yet fatisfied, fhall ask far- ther what an Idea is ? I fhall defire him to look upon a tfree, and then immediately to fhut his Eyes, and try whether he retains any Simili- tude the Understanding. jp tude or Refemblance of what he law ; and if he finds any fuch within him, let him call that an Idea, till a better Word can be found ; and thus he will have a more exact Knowledge of what an Idea is, than he could attain to by any Defcription or Definition of it. Thus it is that all the great Variety of Objects in the vifible Creation is let in upon the Mind thro' the Senfes ; as all the Parts of a delightful and lpa- cious Landfchape are contracted, and conveyed into a dark Chamber by a little artificial Eye in the Wall ; and fo become conlpicuous and diflinguifhable in Miniature. I know there are ibme who will allow no- thing to be called an Idea but what we have from our Senfe of Seeing ; tho' at the lame time they give us no other Word for the Sen- fations of the other four Senfes : But the Per- ceptions of the other four are truly and pro- perly Ideas j for otherwife a blind Man, tho* he was born with all his other Senfes, could have nolmprefiion of any Object conveyed to his Imagination which might be an Idea orRe- preientation of it ; and confequently he could have no Knowledge, no not fo much as any irrational Animal. It is eafily owned that the Ideas of Sight are more numerous, and more vivid, and diftinct than thofe of the other Senfes ; and more clear and lading Reprefentations of external Objects : And therefore becaufe the Sight is the nobleft and moft extenfive of them, I gene- 60 Procedure of I generaly take my Inflances and Similitudes from thence ; not but that I comprehend all other Senfations under it. 2. Nor Secondly, doth it make any altera- tion in the Foundation upon which I build, whether the Ideas of fenfible Obje£b exhibit to us a true Image of their Real Nature, as they are in themfelves ; or whether the Objects be only the Occajtons of producing them ; or whe- ther we perceive them only by their Effetfs, or 4djun$s£>x Circttmjiances^ox Qualities: As Heat may be no true Image of Fire ; nor Light of the Sun ; nor Colour of the Superficies ; nor Sweetnefs of Sugar. For whatever Impreflion external fenfible Objects make upon us, this we call their Idea ; becaufe it is the only Per- ception of them we are capable of, and the only way we have of knowing them. Which Idea, tho' it fhould be iuppoied to exhibit to us no more of the true and intrinfic Nature of the Object, than the Impreifion on the Wax doth of the real true Nature of the Stone or the Steel which made it : Yet the Objed leaves behind it fuch a Similitude and Relemblance of itlelf upon the Senles , as anfwers all the Ends of Knowledge in this Life; and lays a Groundwork Jurficient to build all that Know- ledge upon, which is necefTary in order to an- other, whether in rcfpe& of natural or revealed Religion, That the Understanding. 61 That our Ideas or Perceptions of fenfible Objects do not exhibit to us their whole intrin- fic Nature, fb as to afford us a complete and Adequate Knowledge of their intire Effence ; together with the inward Configuration and Difpofition of all their Parts, is eafily granted : But that they are agreeable to the true Na- ture of the Things perceived, as far as they go j that there is fuch an exact Correlpondence be- tween thefe and their Ideas, that what Know- ledge we have of the Objects is vrue and Real, and not feign'd of Imaginary , is more than pro- bable : Our Knowledge falls fhort indeed, but it fails in Degree only ; and tho* it is Imgerfetf, yet it is not Falje or delufive. Now that the Nature, and Attributes, and intrinsic Qualities of fenfible Objects are thus far intirely agreeable to that external Appear- ance they make to us by the Mediation of our Ideas, is fufficiently evident from this plain Reafbn : Becaufe it was as eafy to the Qower and Wifdom of God, to have contrived all our Organs of Senfation for a juft and exad Per- ception of their real true Nature ; as for what is Feign'd only and Delufive^ which is in truth no real Perception of them at all. He could as well have adapted all our Faculties to the real Nature of Things as they Are in them- felves, as to what they are Not ; and we may realbnably conclude, that this is more agree- able 6i Procedure of able to the T'ruth and Veracity of the Divine Nature, than to have made us altogether for Delufion ; and put fuch an invincible Deceit upon all the Powers and Faculties of Percep- tion which he gave us, that we mould have no Real true Knowledge of any of their proper Objects, but be deceived in every thing about us. Nothing can be more ablurd than this Opinion, according to which external Objects are only the Occafional Caufes of fuch Affections in us as the Objects themfelves have no Simi- litude of, nor any natural Relation to. For no Thought is more obvious than that every thing • mould act according to its refpective Nature ; and if fb, then they muft operate upon our Senfes according to their own intrin- fic Qualities ; and our Senfations of them, as far as they reach, muft be juft, and agreeable to what the Objects are in themfelves. But this Opinion muft fuppofe that God Sujpends the real Nature and intrinfic Powers of every Agent, and miraculouily interpofes in every act of theirs, to alter thofe Effects which they are naturaly diipofed to produce, into lome others quite different from them, or above their Power of acting. Thus all Objects without us muft operate upon us by Qualities and At- tributes quite different from what they are xealy endued with ; they muft affect us in a manner beyond or befide any Power of Act- ing the Understanding. 6$ ing that is in them ; and we may as well iiip- pofe that nothing may ad upon fbmething. However Perfbns may for Argument fake, or out of any Affectation of Singularity, abet this Error ; yet they can't forbear fiifpect ing it to be fuch when they confider, that all external lenfible Objects have univerfaly the lame uniform Effects upon all Men's Senfes, and at all times, when they are equaly dif- pofed : This muft incline them to believe, that as far as external Objects do affect us, they do it truly according to their own intrinfic Na- ture and our's ; and that if our Organs were more nicely difpofed, and our Faculties more curious and perfect, all farther Impreflions of external Objects upon us, would be juft and real ; and ftill more exact and complete Re- prefentations of their true Nature and ErTence. 3. A third thing neceffary to be premifed, and of no fmall Confequence towards remov- ing infinite Confufion out of our way of Think- ing ; and towards a clear and diftinct Proce- dure of our Underftanding in the attainment of true Knowledge is ; that the Word Idea, ac- cording to its genuine and proper Signification, fhould be limited and confined to our fimple Senfations only, and to the various Alterations and Combinations of them by the pure Intel- lect. Whenever the Word is apply'd to the Operations of our Mind ; or to tbeie confidered 4 in 6\ Procedure of in Conjun&ion with any of thole Ideas of Serv fation on which they operate, it is ufcd in a very Loo/e and Improper Manner ; and the cal- ling them all Ideas indifferently, and in the lame propriety and ftri&nels of Speech with- out diftin&ion, hath evidently tended to the amuftng and perplexing the Underftanding ; and no way contributed to the improvement and enlargement of our Knowledge. Thus the laying down the Ideas of Senja- tton and Reflection to be Mike the Original Sources and Foundation of all our Knowledge, is one great and fundamental Error which runs thio' molt of the Difcourles and EfTays of our modern Writers of Logic and Metaphyfics. Nothing is more true in Fad, than that we have no Ideas but of fenfible Objecls ; upon thefe it is that the Mind begins to exert all its Opera- tions ; of which we have a Confcioufnefs indeed • but cannot frame to our felves the leaft Idea or Relemblance of them, abftra&edly from thofe Obje&s upon which they operate. We are Confcioiis to our felves of the two chief Opera- tions of the Mind, Thinking and Willing , as alio of the leveral Modes of them, Remembrance, Dijcerning, Reafoning, yudging, Knowledge, Faith, tXc. But let any Man look into himlelf, and try whether he can find there any Idea of yhiuking or Willing intirely leparate and ab- ftraded from any thing to be thought of or willed y or luch as he doth of a Tree or an Horje ; and the Understanding. 6$ and he will foon be convinced of the miftake of exprefling all thefe Operations by the Word Idea. I t is plain that Thinking and Willing, with all the various Modes of them, are not Ideas ; but the Atfions and Workings of the Intellect upon Ideas, firft lodged in the Imagination for that purpole • and neceflarily to be confidered as antecedent to any iuch Operations. When thefe are firft laid down as the only Ground- work and Materials of all our Knowledge, then the various Operations of the Mind upon them come naturaly to be confidered ; but not as a new Set of Ideas, as if the Operations of the Mind were to be their own Ideas, and exercifed up- on T'hemjelves : And that likewife not imme- diately, but by the Mediation of Ideas, as if is in fenfible Objects, which is grofly ablurd. Nothing is properly an Idea but what Hands in the Mind for an Image or Reprefentation of fbmething which is not in it ; the thing rnuft be without us; and becaufe it cannot itlelf enter, the Ltkenefs of it only is conveyed thro' the Senles into the Imagination ; which is by Nature dilpofed for receiving and retaining the Impreflion. But it is not fo with the Ope- rations of the Mind, which are themfelves within us originaly ; and are not known merely by any Similitude or Reprefentation of them in the Imagination. F This 66 Procedure of This is inftead of many Arguments to Shew the great miftake and abiurdity of that Exprefllon Ideas of Rejieftion , fince we neither have nor can have Ideas, pertinently (peaking, of any thing but what is external to the Mind ; and which can enter into it no other way than by Similitude only, or Reprefentation of itielf. So that nothing is plainer than that we do not conceive the Operations of our Minds by the Help or Mediation of any Ideas which are fubftituted in their Head ; but that we have an immediate Confcioufnefs of the Operations themfelves; as being already within us, and effentialy belonging to our very Make and Frame. But if Men muft have all the Operations of our Minds to be Ideas, and will right or wrong call them by that Name ; yet 'tis plain they would be neither Direft, nor Simple, nor Immediate, nor Original. The very Word Reflexi- on would even thus ipeak them to be only Secon- dary Ideas ; for the Truth is this : Firlt there is a direcl: and immediate View of the Intellect up- on the Ideas of Senfation • from thence, by an immediate Confciouihels, it obferves its own Motions and Actions and Manner of operating upon thole Ideas ; then forms to itielf the beft Conceptions it can of thole Operations; not Abjlrafledly, but in Conjuntfion with thole Objects, the Understanding. 67 Objeds, or rather Ideas of them, which its O- perations were exercifed upon. S o that all the Operations of the Mind ne- cefTarily prefuppofe Ideas of Senfation as prior Materials for them to work upon -, and with- out which the Mind could not have operated at all ; no, nor have had even a Confcioufnefs of itsfelf, or of its own Being : Infomuch that it never could have exerted one Ad of Think- ing, if it had not been firft provided with lome of thefe to think upon -, and this the compound Word Confcioufnefs plainly imports. As we could have had no Notion of Sight, without lome outward Object to exercife the Eye up- on j lb the pure Intelled could have no No- tion or Confcioufnefs of any one of its Ope- rations, without lbme precedent Idea in the Imagination for it to work upon. And again, as the Eye can fiirvey the whole beautiful Range of viflble Beings, but hath no Power to caft one dired Glance upon itfelf ; fo the Soul of Man can take a View of all the inex- hauftible Store of Ideas treafiired up in the Imagination, by a Direff Ad ; but cannot have the leaft dired or reflex Idea of itfelf , or any of its Operations. I might add to this, that we are fb far from having any Immediate, Simple, or Original Ideas of the Operations of our Mind, that all the Ideas we attempt to form of the Manner of its Ading, and the Expreffions we ufe for it are borrowed from F a Senfation - 7 68 Procedure of Senfation ; as will more fully appear here- after. A s the Mind can have no Direti and imme- diate View of its own Operations, ib neither can it have any True and Proper Ideas of them ; and the Affe&ation of calling thefe by the name Ideas y and holding them to be equaly fimple and original with thofe of Senfation, is the rlrft fatal Step which is ulualy made out of the way, to miilead the Understanding in its fearch after Truth ; and from that time ibrward Men wan-* der up and down in a Labyrinth of Ideas with- out the leaft Progrefs towards the Attainment of any folid and iubftantial Knowledge. When the Ideas of Senfation and Reflec- tion are firft laid down indifferently for the Groundwork, then Men run endleis Divifions upon them; then come on Compound Ideas of both together ; Ideas of Simple Modes ; Ideas of Mixd Modes ; Ideas of Primary and Secondary Qualities, Ideas of Relations ; Ideas of Pajfions, Ideas of Power ; Ideas of Caujes and Effects ; Ideas of Virtues and Vices ; in fhort every thing mutt be ranged under ibme Head or other of Ideas : Tho' it be a Scheme as precarious and as void of any Foundation in Nature as Jriftotle's Predicaments, but much more perplexed and confounding; and thus they go on till their Heads are ib fuTd and impregnated with them, that they turn every thing into Ideas that comes the Understanding. 6y comes in their way, inlbmuch that they can neither think nor fpeak without them. T a k e a Sample of this profound Ideal Wif- dom out of one of the moil: celebrated Au- thors of this Strain ; Would you know what Power is ? The Anfwer is, Uhat it is a com- pound Idea in the Mind which it hath received both from Sen/at ion and Reflection ; that is to fay in plain Language, it is lbmething we know by our Senjes and our Reafon. But how comes any thing like it into the Mind at all ? Thus ; uhe Mind being every Day informed, by the Senfes y of the Alterations of thojejjmple Ideas it obferves in things without ; and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceafes to be, and another be- gins to exijl, which was not before ; reflecting aljb on what pajjes within itfelj, and obferving a conjlant Change of its Ideas, Jo?neti?nes by the Im- preffion of outward Objects on the Senjes, andfome- times by the Determination of its own Choice ; and concluding from what it hath fo conjiant ly obferved to have been, that the like Changes will jor the future be made, in the Jame things, by like A- gents, and by the like Ways ', conjiders in one thing the PoJJibility of having any of its flmple Ideas changed, and in another the Pqfftbility of mak- ing that Change ; and fo comes by that Idea we call (Power. W h a t a Treafure of Wifdom is here un- locked, and laid open to the View of ignorant F 3 Novices I yo Procedure of Novices ! After reading that long Deicription, let any Man look into his own Mind and ob- ferve whether he doth not know as little of the true Nature of Power as he did before; befides that it all along grofly fiippofes Ideas to be in the Things Without us, which are only in our felves, and not in the Objects. There is no more in it all than this in plain Language ; becaule we obferve the things without us change, and we find the Mind changes ; therefore we infer, there muft be fbme* thing able to make and to fuffer that Change ; and thus, lays he, we conceive Wower, which is an Idea of Senfation and Reflexion. Whereas realy nothing can carry the Mind farther from a true Notion of Power, and particularly from the infinite Power of God, with whom there is no Var'iablenefs or Shadow of Change, If it be replied, that we form an Idea even of the Power of God, as is above deicribed ; then I ask, what becomes of the greateft In- ftance of his Power, that of Creation, which is no Change but a Production out of Nothing ? Upon that refined and abftrafted Notion of Power we muft ridiculoufly fuppofe, that there was a QaJJive Power in the Creature to be made before it had a Being ; and an Atfive Power in the Creator to make it : And in fhort that God hath no Power at all of Creation, and can only change all which Before had a Being, and a paifive the Understanding. 71 paflive Power in them to be changed. It is not ftrange that young Students fhould be amufed and dazzled with fuch paint and glit- tering outfide of Knowledge • but it may juftly be wondered at, that Men of Progrefs in Years and Learning mould be fo pleas'd and delighted with this empty Noife and gingling of Ideas ; that they cannot be too lavifh in their Admi- ration, and Praifes, and Recommendation of iiich Syftems as draw them out into great lengths, without any real and iblid Improve- ment of human Under ftanding at the bottom. Nor laftly have we, properly ipeaking, any Idea of Pain as our moft celebrated Idea- lifts aflert we have ; for if we had, we fhould not difcern the Pain It/elf either of Body or Mind, but the Idea of it : It is enough and too much that we have an immediate inter- nal Senfation or Feeling of bodily Pain, and a Confcioujhefs of Anguifh or Pain in the Mind ; and conlequently the moft apt way of expre£- fing it is that by which we find it affect us. The very fame may be faid of Qleafure both of Body and Mind ; for if we had the Idea only of Pleafure within us, we could not have the Subftance or Reality of it ; becaufe Both could not be within us at the lame time (as I have before obferved concerning the O- perations of the Mind) and thus our Happi- nels would not be true and real, but falfe and delufive. Therefore it is better to lay afide F 4 that 7i Procedure of that affected way of exprefling thefe by the Word Idea, and Ipeak of them as of internal Seniations or Affections of the Body or Mind, which we perceive and are Confcwus of with- out the Mediation of any Ideas. I might thus run thro' all thofe things which Men affect to expreis by Ideas, beyond thole of Senfation, and fhew how very unaptly and improperly the Word is apply 'd to them ; not without great Confufion and Detriment to the Progrefs of our Understanding inthePur- fuit of Knowledge. After all, we have no Idea of any thing but of external ienfible Ob- jects ; and when once we pafs the Ideas of Sen- lation, the Word is ever after Equivocal, and of an uncertain Meaning. And therefore it were well that we could fix it here once for all - y and never apply it to other things, but rather expreis them by thofe Words which ob- tained in the World, before the Word Idea ulurped upon them, and thruft them out of ufe ; liich as Notion, or Conception, or Jppre- henjion, or Confcloufnefs, or by lbme other Term of this Sort, which may diftinguifh this Kind of Knowledge from that which we have of external Objects by their internal Ideas, CHAP. the Understanding. 7$ CHAP. III. Of our Idea of Spirit, and of God in particular. I A M now come to what is a yet greater Refinement of this Ideal Knowledge ; namely , That we have the cleareft Idea of active Power from our Idea of Sprit, and not from Matter j becaufe Matter hath only a Paf- fve Power , that is a Power not of Acting itfelf, but of fuffering the active Power. This Spirit, according to the Standard and Oracle of Ideas in our Age, is a thinking Sub fiance ; which he labours to mew may be Matter for ought we know ; ib that according to him we have our Idea of active Power from fpiritual Mat- ter, or from a Material Spirit : Thus hath he confounded the life of Words and the received Way of Thinking and Speaking } fince by Spi- rit is ever underftood ibmething that is not Matter. A s fhameful an Abfurdity , and palpable Contradiction as this appears at firlt Sight, yet it is plain to be feen in that Author, and open to every confidering Reader. It is impoflible for us to have an Idea of Active Power in any Degree, if we muft have it only from an Im- material Subftance, of which we have no Idea 1 at 74 Procedure of at all ; nor indeed a Conception of any one Operation of it independent of Matter or ma- terial Organs ; in Conjunction with which the Spirit of Man exerts all its Operations. The truth is thus ; we obferve fuch Effects with regard to things material and lenfible, as we conclude cannot proceed from any inherent Power in themielves ; and therefore we rightly infer there mult be fbme other Beings Not ma- terial 'which have the Power of producing iiich Effects ; tho' fuch Beings are utterly im- perceptible to us, and we have no Idea of them properly ipeaking. So that we come to our Knowledge of Power , not from any Direff Knowledge or Idea we have of Spirit ; but jntirely from our Reafoning upon lenfible Ob- jects. I N purfuance of a long Chain of Ideas , Men have prefumed in the Face of common Senie and Reaibn, to lay down this monftrous Pofition magifterialy and with great Pofitive- nels. T'hat we have as clear and dijlintf an Idea of Spirit, as we have of Body. The fhorteft way to confute this Abliirdity is, what the Philo- fopher took, with him who denied there was any fuch thing as Motion ; by riling up and walking before him. So I would place a hu- man Body before the Eyes of any one who maintains this Affertion, and then require him to place a Spirit before my Eyes. But the Understanding. 75 But inftead of this, by the magical Vir- tue of Ideas, he will call a Mift before you, and lay, That you can conceive Thinking and Willing as eafily as you do Extenfjon and the Cohtjion of the lolid Parts in Matter. Suppofe this true , which is absolutely falfe , That we have as clear and diR'mck Ideas of Thinking or Willing (which are each of them in Man, one and the fame united A£t of a material and immaterial Subftance in Conjunction ) as we have of Extenfion and Cohefion : Yet how doth this give us any Idea of the Operations of a Qure Spirit , acting intirely independent of and feparate from Matter ? No doubt a pure Spirit hath Perfections anfwerable to that think- ing and Willing in us, which are performed by the Help of material Organs ; but we can no way difcern of what kind they are in them- felves. Grant it to be true, tfhat we perceive not the Nature of Extension clearer than we do that o/Thinking; yet we do not per- ceive the Knowledge of a Spirit lb clearly as we do that of thinking, which is Our way of Knowledge : Nay we do not Perceive it at all, and that is the Reafbn why we Conceive it and fpeak of it by that Thinking and Willing we find in our felves, The y6 Procedure of The Ground of the Fallacy which deceives in all this rcalbning is, that Thinkings which ex- preffes what we know by a conicioulhefs of it in our fclves, is every where confounded with the Knowledge of a pure Spirit, of which we have no direct immediate Idea or confcioufneis at all : And the Inference made is this ; Bc- caule we perceive Thinking as clearly as we do Exten/ion y therefore we conceive what Know- ledge is in a pure Spirit, as clearly as we do Extenfion. Whereas, we are fiire that what- ever the manner of knowing is in pure Spirits, it is no more performed by Thinking, than their Motion is by Walking, or Running, or Flying. Their way of Knowledge cannot be of the fame kind with our Thinking, which is fucceffive, and by the concurrence of material Organs ; and is accordingly ever performed to more or lefs Advantage, as thele Organs are better or worfe difpoled : They are foon relaxed and tired by the labour of Thought and Atten- tion, and mull be conftantly wound up a-new by Reft or Sleep; a Diftemper puts the whole Machine out of Frame, and fb ruffles, and even overturns it, as to ipoil all our ibber Thinking, and change it into Raving and Madncfs ; and if the fibres and veffels of the Brain are intirely obftru&ed, as in an apoplectick Fit, we can- not think at all. What an extravagant Thought is it then to imagine that a pure Spirit Th'inks ? It Knows ) the Understanding. yy Knows indeed, but we know not How ; to be lure net by playing upon a fet of material Strings, exquifitely contrived and wrought up into a curious Contexture of bodily Parts for that purpofe ; according to the prevailing mi- ftaken conception of the manner of our Spirit's Thinking within us ; that is, only In the Body, and not by a necelTary Co-operation with it ; as if Matter were not as Effential to our manner of Knowledge by Thinking, as Spirit. The fame Argument for the proof of that ridiculous Pofition, tfhat we have as clear and dift'm$ an Idea of Spirit as we have of Body, is varied thus ; A foil d extended Sub fiance is as hard to be conceived, as a thinking immaterial Sub fiance^ lay the Afferters of it. How great a Solecifm and Contradiction a T'hinkinz Immaterial Sub- (lance is, we have already leen ; but letting that 'pals, fure we know more of bodiiy Subirance, than we do of fpiritual. For we know by a DireB and proper Idea, that Extenilon is a Quality elTential to Body • but we are fo far from knowing whether a pure Spirit be Ex- tended or no , that there is no one elTential Quality of it which we do know by any Direff and Proper Idea at all , or by any Conception whatlbever, as it is In its own Nature. There is an ambiguity in the Word Sub fiance , which they overlook ; the Word is applied to a pure Spirit Indirectly only ; and if we would exprefs ourfelves in ftrid propriety when we lpeak of Spirit, y% Procedure of Spirit, we muft lay afide that Word, and lub- ilitute the Word Being inftead of it. I t is granted that we have no clear Idea of bodily Subftance ; but furely there is a great difference between having no Clear Idea of a thing, and having no direct proper Idea Jt all of it, in any degree. We have no clear Idea of Spirit, lay they ; but have they any Idea at all of it but what is borrow'd, and what we are compell'd to place Injlead of it ? When we attempt to frame to our ielves any tyofitive Idea of Spirit, we do it from matter refin'd and ex- alted to the greateft degree that falls within the compafs of our Obfervation ; which yet hath no more in it of the Real Nature of a pure Spi- rit, than a lump of Lead, or than Thinking hath of its way and manner of Knowing. Common Senle and Reafon , to thole who will ufe them in a plain way, make it evident, that we have no Immediate or D'treft Idea or Perception of Spirit, or any of its Ope- rations, as we have of Body and its Qualities. And becaule we are lure we can have no fuch Idea of it in this Life ; therefore we are natu- raly led to exprefs it by a Negative ', and call it an Immaterial Subftance ; that is, lbmething which hath a Being, but is not Matter ; lbme- thing that If, but is not any thing we direcily know ; and for want of any dired and pofitive Idea of it, we conceive and exprefs it after the bell the Understanding. 79 beft manner we can ; faying it is Something which Thinks and Wills , becaufe we obferve thefe to be the Operations of an united Body and Spirit in our felves, and the greateft Per- fections of our realbnable Nature ; and confe- quently , the fitteft to reprefent the inconcei- vable Operations of a Being which is all Spirit : Tho' nothing is plainer, than that it neither thinks or wills as we do \ and that thefe are in themfelves as unapt to exhibit to us the Real Manner of Knowledge in a pure Spirit, as an human Body is to reprefent its Subftance. Could any one have imagined, that by a dextrous jumble of Ideas, Men mould go about to make us believe, that We have as clear and diftintf an Idea of God, as we have of Man ; and that We are as ignorant of the EJpnce of a Pebble or a Fly, as we are of the EJpnce of God? Do we not know by direct and proper Ideas, that it is of the EfTence of a Pebble, to be Extended, Hard, and Heavy ? And of a Fly, to have a lbrt of animal Life and Motion by the fluttering of its Wings ? And do we know fo much of the Effence of God by any direct Idea or Know- ledge whatever ? And will any Man affert we are as ignorant of the Effence of a Thing, of which we know many elfential Properties by Direct Ideas ; as we are of the Effence of a Being, none of whole effential Properties we are able to obtain any Idea of, as they are in their own Nature j and of which we can form Jnak- 2o Procedure of Analogical Conceptions only ? Again, Do we not know it to be of the EJJence of a Man to be compoied of Soul and Body, and to Think by the operation of theie two effential Parts in conjunction ? And have we any dired Notion or Idea of the ElTence of God, how it differs from Matter ; and after what manner his Knowledge is performed ? Do we not know that it is elTential to a Man , a Fly , and a Pebble to be Finite ; and have we not a direct, and immediate, and clear Idea of this Finite- nefs ? But have we any Actual Idea of Infinity at all ? We have no pofitive Idea of Infinity, and therefore weexprels it by a negative, With* out End j tho' what it is to be without Begin- ning and End we know not : We never can enlarge our Thoughts fo far, but we may ca-ry them farther ; and therefore can never reach Infinity, which hath no bounds ; when we have enlarged our Thoughts to the utmoft of our Capacity, we are as far from any Actual '^Pofitive Idea of Infinity, as when we firft began. If it is here objected, That in the above Af- fertion by EJJence is not meant the EJpntial^ro- pertiesy but the Intima Subjtantta or Subjlratum of thole Properties ; I anfwer, that as far as we directly know the effential Properties of any Subftance, fo far we have a direct knowledge of the Subftance J//£^V And if we had a direct knowledge of All the effential Properties of any Subftance, we ihould have an Adequate know- ledge the Understanding. Si ledge of that Subftance ; for furely if there be any meaning in Words, the knowing any of the elTential Properties of a Thing, is knowing So much of its very Subftance or Effence. All that I obferved of Spirit in general, muft be true of the Divine Nature in a more eminent degree. Thofe Attributes and Perfec- tions in God which we are now under a neceflity of conceiving by that Thinking and Willing in us, and by the various modes of them, which are all performed by help of material Organs, do vaftly more tranfcend the greateft Perfections in the higheft Order of created Beings ; than theirs do thofe that are in Man. And if we do but confider how far even thoie Angelic Per- fections are probably removed from all com- munication with Matter, or dependence upon it ; we fhall then perceive that our Thinking and Willing, performed in effential Conjunction with Matter, are but a very feint and diftant Analogy, for conceiving the Otherwije utterly inconceivable and Correfpondent Perfections of God. Properly fpeaking, we have no Idea of God ' y infomuch that we come to the know- ledge of his very Exigence, not from any Idea we have of him, or from any direct Intuition of the Intellect ; but from the obfervation and reafbning of the Mind upon the Ideas of Senfation j that is, from our reafoning upon G the 8 ± Procedure of the works of this vifiblc Creation ; and for want of any Simple and Direct Idea of him, we from thence form to our felves an indirccT, Analogous^ and very complex Notion of hyn. God is in himielf Simple and Uncompound- ed, and if we had any direct and pofitive Idea of him, this would be ib likewiie ; and there- fore when Men Attempt to form any Simple Idea of him, they do it by a figurative one of tranlcendent Light, or vifible Glory of the Sun: But becaufe we have no Idea of him, as he is in his own uncompounded EfTence, we con- ceive him the belt we can by a very complex Notion y by removing from him all the Imper- fections of the Creatures ; and attributing to him all their Perfections, and more elpecialy thofe of our own Minds. Not by adding /;;- finlty to each of them, as ibme afTert, which is itfeif a Negative, and therefore can make up no L To/ttwe Idea of the fupreme incompre- henfible Being ; and if it could , yet would be far from exhibiting to us any thing of his true Nature and EfTence, as he is In Himfelf For the greater!: Perfections of thole Creatures which fill within our obfervation, and thofe we find in our felves particularly, are realybut ib many Imperfections when referr'd or attributed to the divine Nature as it is in itfeif ; even with the moft exalted meaning we can annex to them in their Literal and proper Acceptation. As the Understanding, 8$ A s for inftance , the knowledge or con- fcioufneis we have of our own Exigence may convince us, that it is a manner of Exiltence al- together unworthy of an Immaterial Subftance, and much more of the Divine Being : Let the nature and manner of his Exiltence be what it will, to be lure he doth not exift according to any fuch grois Idea at all as we have of Exi- stence ; fo that when we attribute to God !>/- jimte Exiflence, we fpeafc without Ideas ; for we have no a&ual Idea of exifting infinitely. So when we attribute Duration to God, which in our notion of it neceflarily includes Succef- Jton , we attribute another Imperfection of the Creature to him ; and when we Enlarge that Duration in our Thoughts as far as we are able, by Infinity added to it, we are in truth but multiplying and increafing lb many Mi* nutesy and Hours, and Months, and Tears for the Divine Being to lair. Again, All the Diretf Idea ot Conception we have of Ipect to all the Subftances that are compounded out of them ; namely, that they run thro' an infinite the Understanding. 89 infinite variety of Changes from the Operations of the Mind upon them ; but do in themfelves remain the fame and unchangeable. As all our Compounded Ideas are made out of Thefe a- lone, and as even our moft abftrad Complex Notions take their flrft Rife from them ; lb is our Knowledge of all Things, whereof we have complex Notions or Conceptions, Ultimately refolvable into thefe Ideas only ; and not indif- ferently and promifcuoufly into limple Ideas of Senfation and Reflexion as Equaly original. By this Property they are diftinguifhed, ifl. From fiich Ideas as are fiippofed to be Innate^ fiich as we are by fome imagined to be born with, and are fb interwoven with our frame, that they necelfarily grow up within us j and would be in our Mind, if there were no impreffion from outward Objects upon the Senfes. That which gave Rife to this Opinion of Innate Ideas was, the lofs Men found them- felves at in Iblving the Manner of our con- ceiving Immaterial and heavenly Things ; they would not give way to fiich a Thought, as that we mould conceive them by the help and In- tervention of any things in vhis World, there appearing no Congruity or Proportion between them ; and therefore they had recourfe to innate Ideas for that purpofe, which mould be the Objects of the (Pure Intelleft independent of all Senfation. But let any Man, if he is able, abftrad from all Senfation or Impreffion of ma- terial 90 Procedure of terial Objects, and look inward, and try whe- ther he can find one Simple Idea independent of it for the Mind to exercife any of its Ope- rations upon ; and if any iiich inftance is pre- tended to be offer'd, it will be eafy to fhew the neceffary connexion it hath with Senfat'wn y and the Dependence it hath upon it. That we have no Innate Ideas is fufEciently evident from hence (which is the Common Ar- gument againft that Opinion) that there is no Occafion at all for them ; and that they are al- together luperfluous and unneceffary. There is no occafion for innate Ideas of Senfibk Ob- jects, becaufe there is an eafy obvious way of attaining them by the Senles ; and if Some Ideas of them are innate, it is hard to give a realon why they mould not All be lb. So that if there be any Ideas innate, it muft be of Immaterial ObjeBs ; but with regard to the Knowledge we have of Ipiritual Things, as it cannot be accounted for from any innate Ideas of them, fo our Conceptions of them are eafily explain'd by the mediation of Ideas of Senfa- tion , confider'd together with the Operations of the Mind upon them. The Rife and whole extent of all our Knowledge of them is plainly accounted for from the Ideas of Senftble Objeth j the neceffary Confequence we draw from T'heir Exiftence to the Exiftence of things Not Senjlbk^ and from that Manner of conceiving theie, which we afterwards naturaly fall into, by the i help the Understanding. pi help and Mediation of fuch Things as are with- in the compafs of our preient Sphere. Thus for inftance, we conceive the Know-' ledge of a Spirit by the mediation of our 'thinking, and the various modes of it exer-* cifed on Ideas of Senfation ; its Moral Perfect tions by our Willing , and Qajfions y and Jffec- tions. So we make up the bell Conception we can of the Divine Nature and Attributes, by putting together the greateft Perfections we find in our own, to Hand for and reprefent them. If we had any Innate Ideas of thofe fp?^ ritual Things, they would be as Direct and Im- mediate as the Ideas of fenfible Objects are ; they would be True and Proper Repre/entations of thole Things as they are In 'Themfelves, and no way Analogical as they now are : We mould think of them as dire&ly, and fpeak of them as properly as we do of the moft familiar Ob- jects of Senfe ; and not by any Words or Ideas or Conceptions Firfi apply 'd to the Things of This World, and then transferred by Analogy to the Things of Another \ as it is evident we always do, whenever we think or fpeak of them. idly. That property of Ideas of Senfation that they are Original, diftinguifheth them from fuch Ideas as, tho* they may not be Innate and born with us like the former ; yet, according to a very common and moft erroneous Opinion, are Perhaps this Power of raifing up to itfelf Ideasy without the prefence or impreflion of Any Object whatibever, is a Privilege of the Di- vine Intellect alone ; and anfwerable to the Almighty Power of Creation, or producing a Thing out of Nothing. But the power of the Mind in our little World, is much the lame with that of the whole Man in the greater ; it is as impoffible for it to raile up to itfelf any fimple Idea intirely New and independent of all Senlation, as it is for a Man to add one Parti- cle to the common Mafs of Matter ; tho' it muft be confeffed to have a wonderful Sagacity in working upon what it finds already ftored up in the Imagination. So that the five Senfes are as fo many Windows thro* which the Mind takes in a profpecfc of the whole vifible Crea- tion y and if thefe were from the firft Hopped up and doled, it would be always involved in thick Darkne/s : And even now, with all our Senfes, we have no more DireB Perception of any thing beyond the fix'd Stars by the Eye of the Intellect, than by that of the Body. Mens endeavouring to abftract the Intel- lect, from all Objects of Senfe, fo as to take a Diretf View of Ipiritual things ; and working up their Minds to an opinion and belief that they have fome degree of Intuitive Diretf know- $6 Procedure of knowledge of them tho' Imperfect and obicure, hath proved a fatal Delufion, and never ferved any real and fubftantial End of Religion. I believe I may lafely appeal to the Experience of the belt of Men, whether they ever found any the leaft Glimmerings of fuch celeftial Light in their molt exalted Contemplations ? Many who never afpired to this Immediate and fami- liar Intercourfe with heavenly Objects, have arrived to great degrees of habitual Virtue and Holineis ; whereas the contrary Opinion doth but puff Men up with fpiritual Pride ; and too often ends in rank Enthufafra. 3. Thirdly, by that property of Ideas of Senfation, their being Original, they are di- ftinguifhed from fiich as are called Ideas of Reflection, or fuch as we are luppofed to have of the Operations of our own Minds. But thefe Operations cannot be difcerned by the means and Intervention of any Ideas ; for then we mould have no Perception or even Confcioufhefs of the Operations Them/elves ; but of thofe Characters only and Reprefenta- tions of them, which would ftand in the Mind inftead of the Operations ; as the Idea of a 'Tree Hands in the Mind for the Tree itfelf, and is the immediate Object of Thought. And fince there neither is nor can be an Idea of what is Itfelf a&ualy in the Mind already, thofe Ope- rations can be perceived no other way than by a Self-confcioufnefsi The Eye of the Mind , 1 as the Understanding. 97 as I laid before, cannot take a view either of its own Subftance or EfTence, or of its own Properties or Qualities by any Reflex Act : It doth not come to the knowledge of its own Faculties by any iuch unnatural Squint, or diftorted Turn upon itfelf ; but by an imme- diate Confcioufnefs of the feveral different ways of its own working upon thole Ideas of Senia- tion lodged in the Imagination. W e have not even the leaft Direff Idea or Perception of the purely fpiritual Part of us ; nor do we difcern any more of its Real Sub- Jiance than we do that of an Angel. We are fo far from an exact view or intuitive know- ledge of it, that we are forced to argue and infer its very Exigence from our Oblervation only of luch Operations as we conclude could not proceed from mere Matter ; and becaufe we have no direct Idea of it, we exprefs the Nature of it, as we do that of Spirit in ge- neral, by the negative Word Immaterial. And as we cannot form one Thought of our Spirit, otherwiie than as it is in conjunction with the Body ; fb neither can we conceive any of its Operations but as performed together with bo- dily Organs : And therefore it is that we are under a neceffity of expreffing the Modus of them all in Words borrowed from Senfation and bodily Actions. Thus we fay the Mind Di/cernSy Apprehends, Dijlinguijheth, or Sepa- fates, one thing from another j it Draws one H thipg 98 Procedure of thing out of another, which is a Conference or one thing Following from another. Nay, when we would Attempt to form Ideas of thinking and all the various Modes of it, they are imagin'd to be fo many Motions or Agita- tions of the Soul, in conjunction with the moil refin'd and fpirituous Parts of the Body, about the Ideas of fenfible Objects, and the Notions formed partly out of them : And when from the Exiflence of thefe fenfible things it infers the Being or Exiftence of things Ipiritual and im- perceptible, and exercifes thole Motions or O- perations upon them, as Reprefented by their Subftitutes : that is properly meditating upon the things of another World. And thus it is with all the Paflions of the Mind, Love, Defire, Joy, Sorrow, Hope, Fear, An- ger -, when we attempt to form Ideas of them, we do it by conceiving them as fo many Motions or Agitations of the fineft and moft curious Parts in the frame of an Human Body, in con- junction with the purely Ipiritual Part of us, a- bout Objects of Senfation or their Ideas, or about our complex Conceptions : And when thofe Mo- tions are, by the Mediation of thefe Ideas and Conceptions exercifed upon Objects out of the reach of all our Perception, fuch as God an&Hea- venly things, and upon iiich Things of this World as have a more immediate relation to them,that is Religion, This is drawing the Mind off from the things of this World, and letting our Affec- tions ti4e Understanding. 99 tions on things above ; and the more habitualy all thofe Motions of the Soul are imployed that way, to the greater degrees of true Devotion, and Piety, and Holineis do Men arrive. CHAP. V. A fee on d Property of Ideas of Senjatiort, that they are Simple. AS e c o n d Property of an Idea of Sen- fation is that it is Simple -, that is, an Uniform Uncompou.ndedAip-pcaYa.ncc, which can- not be refblved into more Ideas than one of the Same Kind', and is the Effect and Cbn- lequence of one (ingle individual Senfation. So that this Property is applicable only to our Firjl Seniations or Perceptions of Things, con- fider'd antecedently to any Act or Opera- tion of the Intellect; excepting only that of a bare View and merely intuitive Knowledge of them, in the fame Order and Figure they lie ranged in the Imagination ; before it makes any Compofition, or Alteration, or Compari- fon \ and before it forms any 'Judgment upon them ; or draws any Conferences whatfbever in relation to them. The Notion of Simple Ideas I think ought not to be reduced to iuch a narrow compafs as they generaly are by Logicians ; as if the Ideas of Sounds, and Tafles, and Smells, and Colours, and tangible Qualities only wcrc'Simple ; and as if the Ideas of fingle feparate Bodies were all Compound- Id 2 ed. ioo Procedure of ed. Surely we fhould include into our Notion of Simple Ideas all that ftrikes the Senle at once ; as when we lee the Sun or Moon, an human ' Body or an Horje; theie and all iuch like are properly Simple Ideas; for it is the lntelktf y and not the Senjes, which fub-divides them in- to more Ideas than one, by directing the Senle or Imagination to furvey the Parts, or Quali- ties, or Accidents mcceffively : The Seniation is One only at firft ; it is but one Single Jcf of Perception ; for you cannot divide the Idea cf an human Body into the Ideas oiMore Bodies, nor that of an Houfe into Ideas of more Houles. And therefore once for all, by a Simple Idea I mean, all tha.t Refemblance or Similitude of the external Object, which the Organ of Seniation is capable of receiving in one diftinft Percep- tion ; as the Idea of an Human Body : Tho* it may be fubdivided into many other Ideas ; as into the Ideas of all the different -Tarts of that Body; and tho' thefe again may be divided into Ideas of ftill lelfer Parts; lb that fimple Ideas may be thus multiplied, as far as it is within the Power of Senle to diftinguifh. i. By this Property, Ideas of Seniation arc diftinguifhed, Firft from the various Alterations and Combinations made of them by the Mind. As thefe fimple Ideas came into the Imagina- tion without the Concurrence of the Intel- lect, fo neither can it deftroy any one of them ; but ail beyond theic are the Creatures of the Understanding, ioi of the Intellect, which hath a Ibvereign Sway and arbitrary Power over thole Idem: It alters, and Enlargeth, or Diminifbeth them in any Propor- tion ; it Separates and T'ranfpofes ; it turns and winds them at pleafure ; and thus raileth up to itlelf a new Set of Compounded Ideas with which the Imagination is furniihed by it from Within, as thofe which were Simple and Origi- nal enter thither from Without. Thus the Ideas of many Men may be put together into one Idea of an Army ; many Sheep to make the Idea of a Flock ; many Houfes into one Idea of a City ; and thus alfb the Idea of One Man is by the Intellect made to Hand for all Mankind, which is then called an Univer- fal Idea. 2. The Ideas of Senfation are by this Pro- perty diftinguifhed from all thofe Notions or Conceptions which are Compofitions only of the Intellect out of our fimple and compound Ideas of Senfation, confider'd together with the va- rious Operations of the Mind upon them. Such is the Notion we form of 'Charity r , which is made up of the Ideas of a Man in Mifery, of the Money or other Relief that is given him ; and alio by adjoining the leveral Operations of the Mind upon them, fuch as c Vain of Mind for his Mifery, a Sence of Duty to God, and Com- pajjion for a fellow Creature. And thus it is with all Virtues and Vices, of which properly fpeaking we have no Ideas Simple or Compound- H 3 edi ior Procedure of ed\ but each of them is apprehended by Ideas of Senfation, and the Motions or Operations of the Intellect upon them, put together in- to one complex 'Notion or Conception; and comprehended under one Name or T'erm^ which is of a Signification fb complex or gene- ral, that it always imports a Combination of feveral different Conceptions and Ideas. After the fame manner the Intellect raifes up to itfelf a Conception of Spirit \ be- caufe it finds neither a fimple nor a compound Idea thereof within itfelf, it makes up a fort of complex notion or Conception of it, by firft adding together the Operations of our Mind, fuch as Thinking and Willing and the feveral Modes of them ; and then Subftitut'wg them fb combined, to reprefent the Perfections of a Being or Sub fiance of which we have no Proper Idea ; and of which we form the beft Idea we Can from that of the moft fpirituous part of mate- rial Subftance. And this is the way the Mind fupplies the intire want of Simple Ideas for the Things of another World, whereof it hath not any, everr~m the moft obfcure and imperfect degree ; lb that it may be truly laid , our Simple and Compound Ideas of Senfation, to-» gether with the various complex Notions which arife from the Operations of the Mind upon them, do comprehend the full extent of all our Knowledge : But to lay down Ideas of Reflexion together with thofe of Senfation as Equaly the Understanding. 103 Equaly the Ground-work of our Knowledge, is confounding the Workman with his Materials ; and the Skill and Manner of exercifing his Art, with the Stuff he works upon. CHAP. VI. A Third Property that they are Immediate. ANother thing peculiar to Ideas of Senfation is that they are Immediate. The original and iimple Ideas of Senfation when they are Fir/i obtained, neceffarily pre- fuppole the Prefence of the Object, and lomc real actual Impreffion of it upon the Organs of Senfe ; there is an Immediate and di- rect Reprefentation of the Object, and it is per- ceived without the mediation or Intervention of any other Object or Idea whatfbever. Thus the Ideas of a Man, and a Tree, could never have come into the Mind, if they had never been prefent to the Senle, and the Eye had not actualy feen them. Nor was it poflible for us to have had an Idea of a Trumpet's Sound, unlefs the Collifion of the Air had been once fb near that fome of the Undulations of it could ftrike upon the Senfe of Hearing. So that by this Property they are diftinguifhed, 1. From the Ideas we have of abfent Ob- jects of the fame kind, but fuch as were never H 4 Jtfuafy 164 Procedure of Jtfualy perceived ; thus the Idea of a Man we Have feen, ftands for the Idea of any other Man we Never faw. The Mind hath no other way of conceiving a Man or an Horie which was never preient to the Senies nor actualy perceived, but by fubftituting the Idea of a Man or an Horfe which was fo. If the Intellect could dilate itfelf no farther than the very particular or individual Objects which have been Qrefent to the Senfes and actualy perceived, its Sphere of Activity would be very fcanty, and all our Knowledge confin'd within a very narrow Compafs : And yet this muft be fb, if Men relblved neither to Know or Believe the Exiftence of any thing but what is or hath been prefent to lbme of their Facul- ties, and thus actualy perceived by them ; they muft not believe that there is a Man, or a City, or a Country in the World they never faw. We readily yield our firm aflent to the Being even of fenfible Things which we never perceived, and do reafon and difcourfe of them under borrowed and Subjlituted Ideas ; and we efteem our Knowledge of them to be Real, and True, and So/id, tho' we never had any actual Perception of them. And yet that Knowledge muft be owned to be in fome Mea- fure imperfect, becaufe no two Individuals of a like kind are intirely and Exaflly the fame in all particular Refpects ; and therefore the Idea of one muft reprefent the other but im- perfectly, the Understanding. 105 perfe&ly. All the Men and all the Cities we have not feen, fomewhat differ from any we have feen ; the Men have different Features, and Shapes, and Colours perhaps, and the Ci- ties differently-difpos'd Streets and Houfes \ and yet notwithstanding their many Unlike-* nejps to that Idea by which we conceive them, we cannot fay they are altogether Unknown, to us. idly. Ideas of Senfation are by this Pro-? perty diftinguifhed from all Ideas or Conceptions of things which are purely Figurative andikfc- taphoricaL Of thefe there are two Sorts ; one of which may be diftinguifhed by the Name of Human, and the other of Divine Metaphor ' But the latter being chiefly to my purpofe, I mail take more particular Notice of that only here. Divine Metaphor is the fubftituting our Ideas of Senfation (which are Direct and Im- mediate) as well as the Words belonging to them, to exprefs the invifible and immaterial Things of Heaven, of which we can have no dired Ideas , nor any Immediate Knowledge or Conception ; as when God's Knowledge is expref^d by his Eyes being in Every Qlace ; his Goodnefs in granting our Petitions, by his Ear not being Heavy ; his -Tower by a Strong Hand-, and many others of this kind ufed in Scripture to ex- prefs his Attributes, and other heavenly Things with jo6 Procedure of with an Emphafis, and in a Figure and AUu- fion only, Without any correfpondent Reality or Refemblance between the Things compared. Both Human and Divine Metaphor agree in this, That the figurative Words, and Ideas, and Conceptions, are us'd without any Real Similitude or Proportion, or Correfpondent Rejem- blance in the things compared. The Compan- ion is not founded in the Real Nature of the Things, but is a pure Invention of the Mind and intirely Arbitrary. There is for Inftance no Similitude or real Correfpondence in the Nature of Things between the Verdure of a Field and Smileing ; between a Faculty of our Soul in diftinguifhing Beauties and Defects in Writing, and Painting, and Mufick, and the T'afte of the Palate ; between the Roughnefs of the Sea, and the Jnger of a Man ; and fo likcwife be- tween Hands, and Eyes, and Ears, and God's in- conceivable, tho' Real Supernatural Perfections. 2. They agree in this likewife, That nei- ther of them are absolutely NeceJJary to a True and Real Knowledge of the Things defigned to be exprelfed or conceived by the fubftituted Ideas. They would both be intirely ufelefs, were not thofe Things known otherwife more Immediately and Direcfly, or at leaft more Ex- actly Before y after another manner. And they differ in this, That in Human Metaphor, the Ideas or Conceptions Defgned to the Understanding. 107 to be exprefs'd , are or may be as Dlreffly known and zslmmedlate, as the Ideas and Con- ceptions placed in their Stead. But in Divine Metaphor the Subftituted Ideas are Immediate- ly and Directly known, but what is defigned to be exprefs'd and convey'd to us thus, is no way conceivable by any Dlreff and Immediate Idea, Conception, or Notion. %dly. The Ideas of Senfation are by this Property diftinguifh'd from all Ideas or rather Conceptions and Notions which are purely A- naloglcal That is, when the Conceptions and Complex Notions we already have of Things Directly or Immediately known, are made ufe^ of and lubftituted to reprefent, With feme Re- Je mb lance y or correfpondent Reality and Proportion, Divine things whereof we can have no Direff and Proper Idea , or Immediate Conception or Notion at all. As when our Conception of Human Wifdom , wb ; ch confifts in Thinking and Realbn, is fubftituted to reprefent an hi" conceivable but Correfpondent Perfection of the Divine Nature. This I call Divine Analogy ', to diftinguifh it from that Human Analogy which is ufed to conceive things in this World ; as when we conceive the various Operations of Inftintf in Brutes, by Analogy with thofe of Reafon in Men. This Divine Analogy is univerfaly us'd with refpecl; to all Immaterial or purely ipirw 4 mat 108 Procedure of tual Things of another World, when we wou'd apprehend them with any degree of Real, or True , or Ufeful Knowledge. For fince there can be no actual Idea or immediate Conception or Confcioufnefs of what is purely fpiritual, by any of our Faculties of Body or Mind, or of both together ; confequently there is a neceffi- ty for thus making other Conceptions and No- tions which are familiar to us, and direct, and immediate , to Stand for them in the Mind ; that by their Mediation we may think and ipeak of what is otherwile inconceivable and unut- terable with any Degree of correipondent Ex- a&nefs and Proportion. Thus we conceive the Knowledge of purely ipiritual Beings by our ¥hinking> and apply the various Modes of it to them ; nay, we thus conceive God himfelf and all his Attributes, and Ipeak of them by the mediation of the Operations of our own Mind, and of the more commendable Paffions and Affections of an Human Soul. CHAP. VII. That they are DireS. AFourth Property of Ideas of Senfa- tion, which I fhall ailign, is that they are Direct ; by which they are not oppofed to iuch as arife from any Keflex KQi of the Mind upon itfelf. The Mind or Ipiritual Part of us cannot look upon or into itfelf, by either a di r reft the Understanding. 109 rect or reflex Act, any more than it can difcern a Soul in its State of Separation from the Bo- dy : We have no Knowledge of our own Spi- rit, or of any of its Faculties, but from a con- scious Experience of its feveral Ways of Act- ing upon the Ideas of Senfation, or the Objects of the vifible Creation ; which tho* it be nei- ther a direct nor reflex View, yet is a Know- ledge of the Operations of our Mind, as Imme- diate as the View it hath of thofe Ideas of ex- ternal Objects upon which it operates. But they are by this Property oppos'd not only to all Indirect Ideas, but to our indirect Concep- tions and Notions alio ; which Oppofition may be illuftrated in general by this Similitude. When we look ftrait in a Man's Face, this gives us a D/r^Idea of it ; but if we had ne- ver leen that Face but in a Glafs, it would have given us an Indirect Idea y or bare Refemblance of it : So that an indirect Idea or Concep- tion is when we have never difcerned the thing Itfelj\ but either a mere Shadow \ or elfe a more perfect Similitude or Rejemblance of it in lbmething elfe. 1. Thus then they are by this Property op- poled Firft , to thofe Metaphorical Ideas , or mere Shadows only and Allufions, made ufe of to conceive the Objects of another World. For inftance, the Idea of the Sun or a relplendent material Light is DireB ; I do not difcern it by the Intervention of any other Idea ; But when 1 this iio Procedure of this Idea is put for the Glory of God or of Heaven, it becomes Indirect. I can have no Direct Intuition or Idea of the Glory of Hea- ven in any degree, and therefore I view it as well as 1 can Indirectly in that of Light. And thus I conceive God's Power by a Mighty Arm ' 7 and the Motion of Angels by Flying, What Idea I have of Material Subjiance is in every Relped a Direct one. My Senles have a direct Perception of its Bulk, Extenfion, Fi- gure , and Solidity. But when this Idea of Subftance is applied to conceive the Subftance or Effence of Matter and Spirit in ftrid Con- junction, it is Indirect ; and much more fo when 'tis uled for purely immaterial Subftance ; for then it can import nothing but Being in general. idly. They are by this Property oppos'd to thofe Types only, or bare Kefemblances of God and the Things of another W orld, which for want of any Direct View or Knowledge of them, are in a good Meafure rendered intelli- gible, and become conlpicuous by a kind of Reflection only from our direct Conceptions of Things in this World ; as the Likenefs of a Body is from a Mirrour or Looking-Glals. For our Conceptions and Notions may be Diretf or Indirect, as well as our Ideas. When they Hand in the Mind for their proper and Original Objects, and when the Words that expreis them the Understanding, hi them are taken Llteraly for fuch Objects, they are Direct ) we have a direct Knowledge of the things they Hand for. But when they are Sab- flituted to conceive, and do Stand for Divine Im- material Things, then they become IndireB and Analogical. Thus the Conception I have of thinking in its molt perfect Degree, is from an Immediate Confcioufhefs within me \ and may be called fo far a Direct Conception, be- caufe it needs not the Intervention of any other Conception by which to know it. But when I place this to Keprefent and Stand for the Knowledge of a pure Spirit, it becomes an In- direct and Analogical Conception. And thus it is with God and his Attributes; I can have no Direff View or Intuition by the Eye either of Body or Mind, of any thing in the divine Nature ; therefore there is no other way of beholding him but in the Mirrour of the vi- fible Creation, and particularly in our felves : So we behold his Wifdom in our thinking and Reafbning ; his Power in our worldly Do- minion and Power ; his Goodnefs in the Recti- tude of our molt commendable Paflions and Affections. Not by adding Infinity to each of thele, as lome have grofly miitaken, fb as to ftretch our Imagination as far as we can to In- finite thinking ; Infinite Strength ; Infinite Kec- titudeoityajjions and Jffetf ions : But by adding Infinity to thole Incomprehenfible Perfections' in the divine Nature of which we have not the leail in Procedure of leaft Direff Glimpfe or Knowledge ; and there- fore do conceive them Indirectly in thoie Re- femblances of them which are difcernible in the moft perfect Works of the vifible Creation. Thus, as in a Mirrour, we See him who is invi- Jible \ and inftead of Seeing all things in God, as ibme have Enthufiaflicaly fancied, we lee God in his Creatures ; and the Invijible things of him are known, by the things that are made. The true Nature and Manner of the Pre- fent Knowledge we have of the things of ano- ther World , is , by the Apoftle , very aptly defcribed by our Seeing thro*, or rather //; a Glafs darkly ; and our Future Knowledge of them by our feeing Face to Face ; that is Direct- ly, and not by any Reflection either of mere Sha- dows only, or Refemblances y as it is now with us. The Word 'bao-nrpx in the Original of that PafTage is not a ^Perfpefiive, but a Mirrour or Looking-Glafs ; and the true rendering of it is In a Mirrour or Looking-Glafs, as the Words join'd with it are 'Ev dmy/uutri, In an obfcure Repre- ientation ; this is evident from the Oppofiti- on in the following Words, Then Face to Face, To fhew the great Aptitude and Significancy of that Similitude of our Seeing in a Glafs darkly, I fhall obferve thefe two things. i. That a Glafs or Mirrour exhibits to us nothing of the Reality and Subfiance of the thing reprefented in it j the Similitude form'd by the Reflection the Understanding. 113 Refle&ion of the Object, hath no more of the true Ejfince and Properties of the thing itfelf, which it exhibits, than a mere Shadow ; and is nothing more than an Appearance which pe- rifheth with the Removal of the Object. And yet we cannot fay but that there is a Repre- sentation, and a true one j but that there is a Real Likenefs of the Subftance in that airy Form ; and that there is however (lick a Pro- portion between them, that the Idea of a Face we never faw but in a Glafs is a juft one, and may be well Sub/iituted in the Mind for the Face itfelf, and that it gives us lome Real and true Knowledge of it. Thus it is with thofe Conceptions which ftand in our Minds to reprelent God and Spi- ritual Things. Tho' the things they are fub- ftituted for, are of a quite different Kind, and tho' thefe Subflltutes are no more in reipect. of them , than a fleeting tranfient Appearance only in the Glals, is to the Man himfelf whom we lee in it ; yet there may be fuch a Like- nefs or Proportion and Analogy between them, as may render our natural and familiar Con- ceptions of worldly Things apt and juft Repre- fentations of things Super -natural^ and particu- larly of the Divine Nature : Infbmuch that the Knowledge we have of them by that Analogy, tho* Imperfeft, fhall be however tfrue and Real\ and all our juft Thoughts and Reafbnings upon Jhem JhalJ be folid and fubftantial ; that is 9 I while ii4 Procedu re of while they are kept within the due Compafs of thofe Similitudes and Reprefentations of them. For then it is that Men run into Sole- cifm and Abiiirdity, into Error and Confufion concerning God and spiritual Things ; when they, not contented with this imperfect degree of Knowledge by Reprefentation only and A- nalogy, will argue from Things merely Natural, to the Real Intrinfic Nature of thole Things which now we can know no other way but by that Similitude, or Correfpondency, oxQroportion they bear to our natural Ideas and Conceptions : And when they proceed upon this falle Sup- pofition , that what can be affirmed of thefe Reprelentations only, mull: be ilricHy and lite- raly true with reiped to the Real Nature and Subftance of the Things they reprelent. Upon this very miftake it is that our modern clandeftine Arians argue Chrift to be a Separate, Inferior Divine Perlbn ; Subjetf and Sent, and doing the Will of another, in as Uriel: and Literal a Sence as one Man can be laid to be the Melfenger of another, and to perform his Will, and to be feparate from him : Tho' this be as abiurd as to argue that the Reflection and Image of a Man in the Glals, is a true and Real human Body and Perlbn, in all refpe&s like one of our felves. Again, Thele very Men at another time run into a quite Contrary Extreme and Abfurdity ; and, like the Socinians , turn this Analogy into mere the Understanding. ny mere Metaphor and Alhfion only. Thus they argue that Son and Begotten when ipoke of Chrift, are only a Figure for a more tranicen- dent Acl: of Creation \ which is as groundlefs as afTerting the Image in the Glais to be no more than a metaphorical Allufion only, without any correipondent Refemblance or Analogy at all to the Man reflected from it. And thus the So- cinians will have the Blood of Chrift to be no Price, Pur chafe or Redemption, becaufe there can be no proper and literal Price, Purchafe or Redemption in the Cafe. I n fhort, moft of the Arguments by which the Socinians bring all the Myfteries of Chri- ftianity to Nothing ; as well as thole of all the Deifts and Freethinkers of this unbelieving Age who owe all their Infidelity to the Socinian Hypothefis, are built upon this fandy Founda- tion. Accordingly when we come to confider them more particularly, we fhall find that their Reafonings and Inferences are as abfurd, as thole would be which we ftiould make from the Likenefs of a Man in the Glafs, to his Real Nature : As if we mould from thence argue with great acutenefs, that a Man himlelf could have neither a Body nor Solidity, nor Spirit, nor Life, nor Reafon \ that he had neither Senfation nor Speech ', nay, that he was nothing but a mere Shadow or Appearance, and had no Be* ing but in our Imagination alone. I 2 2. The 1 1(5 Procedure 6f i. The fccond thing I mall obferve concern- ing that Similitude of theApoftle'sis, that ia all Instances univerfaly we ufe the Same Words and ExprelTions ibr the Similitudes and Jp- fearances of Things in the Glafs, by which we exprels the Things Uhemfehes ; and indeed this is the moft juft and proper way we have of ipeaking of them : For tho* there is nothing of the Reat Nature of the Objects reprefented, in thofe Appearances ; yet there is fuch a Cor- refpondency and Proportion between them, that the lame Words aptly ferve for both. Thus we fay we See a Man in a Glals , when we lee no fuch thing ; for the Appearance hath nothing of the real Nature of Man in it : And thus we lay we lee the Sun, Moon, and Stars in the Water, when there is no fuch thing there. And yet it would be abfolutely falle to fay we do Not fee any thing at all of them in the Glals, or in the Water ; becaufe there is fuch a Similitude and Proportion between the Objects and thofe Reprefcntations of them, as would give us fome imperfect Idea or Notion of the Things themfelves, tho' we had never feen them but in a Gla/s, or in the Hater. Accordingly then if we could but make the Suppofition that there were a Perlbn wiio never law the Face of any other Man but in a Glais, nor-,SV.'//, Moon, or Stars but in the Water \ how imperfectly would he think and ipeak the Understanding. 117 fpeak of the Things themfelves reprefentcd to him by thole Adumbrations and faint Appear- ances ? I fhall only obferve in fhort that he would not be able from thence to know ex- actly any one particular with refpecr. to their Real Nature y and every Inference he made from thole Images to the Intrinftc Sub/lance or Ef- lence and True^P roper ties of the things fignified, would be full of Abfurdity and Solecifm. One of the laft things he could infer would be, that any of them had Solidity and a Body ; or that the human Appearance could have Senfe, and Reafony and Under /landing, and Will : And in fuch a Cafe as this, all the Names, and Words y and Exprejjions he ufed for thole Similitudes only, he would fubftitute for fpeaking of the Things themfelves ; and would not invent New Terms and a New Language, for Things whereof he had no Idea or Conception as they were in their own Nature. I t is this kind of Analogy which runs thro' all our Exprejjions of ipiritual and immaterial Objects. As we have no Idea or Conception of their real and true Nature, lb neither can we invent any Words or Expre (lions which fhall be peculiar and proper to them ; nor in- deed can any Words Exprejs what is Inexpref- jzble : Therefore we are under a neceflity "to Speak of them after the fame manner we Con- ceive them y and apply thofe Words and Phrafes to them by which, in their firft Propriety, we I 3 exprels i 18 Procedure of exprefs the Ideas or Conceptions which ftand for them in our Minds. Thus the Word Spi- rit in its firft Propriety is ufed to fignify the moft volatile and exalted Parts of Matter , and is from thence taken to exprefs an human Soul in Conjunction with Matter ; and from thence again transferr'd to reprefent a purely Immaterial Subftance by Analogy. The Word Wifdom fignifies primarily the moft advanta- geous and dextrous management of our Think- ing or Reafon, to obtain a commendable end \ and is from thence apply'd to an Inconceivable Perfection in the Divine Nature : So Goodnefs which is firft apply'd to the regulating our Pallions and Affections with regard to other' rational Creatures, is attributed to God ; and ferves to exprefs fome incomprehensible Per- fection in him, for which we have neither a Proper Word, Idea, or Conception ; and fb it is in all other Inftances. Thus the fame Words and Phrafes ferve to exprefs the things whereof we have Direct and Immediate Ideas and Concep- tions, and thofe things whereof we have None fuch ; they equaly fignify fomething Real and fiibftantial, whether they are apply'd to one or the other : Only when they are apply'd to the latter, they are always taken in a more Ele- vated and Exalted Sence ; to denote Things which lb far tranfcend all our Capacities, that we have no other way of thinking or {peaking of them, but by fuch Words and Conceptions as are common and familiar to us. i CHAR the Understanding, up CHAP. VIII. A fifth Property, that they are Clear and Difl'wB. TH E laft Property of Ideas of Senfation is, That of their being Clear and Dijlinft ; which is meant only of thoie that are Simple and Original ; the Impreffions made by parti- cular fenfible Objects upon any of our Organs of Senfation ; which have ever a greater or lefs Degree of Perfpicuity in Proportion to that .Strength, and Firmnefs, and Frequency with which the Object ftrikes upon the Senfe • and to the Vigour of the Imagination in receiv- ing and retaining them. Then an Idea is at the Height of Perfpicuity when it is fb evi- dently and plainly difcerned by the Mind, that it can be diftinguiihed from all other Ideas at one View of the Intellect ; without farther Ob- lervation or Reaibning, to feparate it from o- thers that have any Likenefs or Refemblance of it 'j and then it is that it removes all Doubt, and compels our Affent to the Truth and Ex- iftence of the Object it reprelents. Now by this Property thefe Ideas are diftinguiihed, i. From all Delufions of the Senles. There is ever more or lefs Obfcurity and Confufion in our Ideas according to the prefent Temper I 4 of no Procedure of of the Organ of Senfation, the Diftance of the Object, and the Quality of the Medium which interpofes : Thefe being rightly and duly dif- poicd, every original Idea which is made by one and the fame Object, and at the fame time is not only Diflintt, and Clear, and Ade- quate, but Simple too \ as the Impreffion of a Seal is but one Figure and Similitude, tho* it confiits of feveral different Parts. Thus the Idea caufed in the Mind by our looking on a Man, or an Horfe, or a Tree is a fimple Idea ; and is diftinct, and clear, and adequate \ and the Realbn is plain, becaufe liich an Idea contains all that the Object is naturaly difpofed to imprint upon the Senfe At once, and all that the Senfe is framed and contrived by the Author of Nature to take in or receive at One MX of Senfation. O f this Kind are all our Ideas of every fingle and particular Subftance ; for tho* when I look upon it, I do not fee into the inward EJJence and Configuration of all its Parts ; nor dilcern all its primary and fecondary Qualities ; nor How they fubfift in it ; nor can view it fb as to take in all its Powers active and pafllve : Yet the Idea comprehends all that the Object is naturaly difpofed to Imprefs upon the Senfe at once ; and all that either the Senfe or the Imagination is capable of receiving from one fingle View. Whatfoever is beyond this is the Object of more Particular Senfations, or rather of Reafon and Obfervation • and not of one l fingl^ the Understanding. izi fingle A£t of Senfation. And lure it muft be abfurd to fay, that an Idea of Senfation is either Objcure and bidiftintf, or Inadequate, be- caufe it doth not contain what the Object, can- not communicate to the Senfe, nor the Senie is any way capable of perceiving. From hence we lee how fanciful and pre- carious that Opinion is, which aflerts our Ideas of all, even iingle and particular Subftances, to be Complex, and Indijiintf, and obfcure, or Inadequate ', becaufe we do not dilcern the in- ward Configuration of all their Parts, together with all their elfential Qualities and Powers by any Ad of Senfation ; whereas for the fame Rea- fon there could be no fuch thing as a clear and di- ftin&Idea of-^/zyObjecT: whatfbever. Thus you ihall have no clear and diftind Idea of Sound, be- caufe in one and the lame Senlation we do not perceive that Commotion or Concuflion of the Air which caufes it; and thole Undulations which gradualy flowing from thence do at length llrike upon the Organ of Hearing : Nor can the Ideas of 7*afte be Simple or Clear, becaufe we have no Guft or Senfation of the exact Figure and Conformation of thofe minute Particles of Matter which affect the Tongue or Palate ; neither thus are our Ideas of Colours Simple, or Clear, or Dijlinti, or Adequate ; becaufe the Eye doth not difcern that peculiar Texture of thole Particles in the Superficies of Bodies , which Refle&s the Light fo as to give it that Appear- ance, H2, Procedure of ance, rather than any other. This abfurd O- pinion was invented and tedioufly purfued, only for the Support of that bold and irratio- nal Pofition, Tiat we have ds clear dnddijlinft an Idea of the Sub fiance of a Sprit, as we have of bodily Subfiance : Whereas, were this true, we fhould from thence have as Direft y and Clear and diftinct, and Adequate 2l Knowledge of all created Spirits, and as clear and direct Evidence of their Exijience and true Proper- ties, as we have of Body. i. B y this Property the Simple , original Ideas of Senfation are diftinguiihed from all the Alterations made in them afterwards by enlarging or diminifhing ; and by the various Combinations they undergo at the Will and Plealiire of the pure Intellect. Thus the Mind may alter the whole Face of Nature, and fome way or other change every Object from what it realy appears to the Senfes ; and raiie up to itfelf fiich new Ideas out of thofe which are ftmple and original, as have no Being but in the Intellect alone ; fuch as thofe of Pigmies, Fdi- riesy and Centaurs. Thefe do all go under the Denomination of Ideas of Senfation, tho' not occasioned by the Prefence or Impreflion of any external Object : Becaufe as they are formed by the Intellect in the Imagination out of our iimple Ideas, lb they remain there and become new and further Materials for the Mind to ex- ercife its Operations upon j and they have greater the Understanding. 115 greater or lefs Degrees of Diftinctnefs and Per- ipicuity, as they are more or lefs alter'd and compounded. I would oblerve here that when any parr ticular fimple Idea is rendered Specific, then from being Char and diftincl it becomes more Obfcure and confus'd. In order to underftand which it muft be confider'd, that we do not form lpecific or univerfal Ideas, or Notions, by collecting all the Powers and Qualities obferved in the Particulars of every kind 5 and then put- ting them together to make up one Idea or Notion to ftand for them all, and which is fup- pofed to be formed by Abjiratting from all the Individuals. But what is quite the reverie, all our lpecific or univerlal Ideas and Con- ceptions are formed thus ; the Mind fubftitutes the Idea or Conception it has already obtain- ed of lome one Individual, to ftand for and reprefent all the Individuals of the fame Kind. As for inftance, when I would form an {/«/- verfal Notion of Mankind, I do not firft col- lect all the Powers and Qualities I obferve com- mon to all particular Men, and then put them together into one abftract Notion of Mankind, to include all the Individuals : But on the quite contrary, having obtained the cleareft Complex Notion I can of one individual Man, the In- tellect makes that a Representative of all the Men in the World ; and thus renders it Ge- neral in its Signification , and coniequently ©lore i 24 Procedure of - more obfcure. Whereas were all the Indivi- duals of each 'Kind exactly the lame in all re- ipe£ts, as they differ in many ; the Idea or Notion when it became thus Specific or Ge- neral, would be as clear and diftincr as when it flood for one Individual. 3, But laftly, the flmple Ideas of Senfa- tion, together with thole compounded out of them, are by this Property diltinguifhed, as I may ib fay, even from Themjehes in a Secondary Acceptation and Application of them y that is when they are taken in Con- junction with the Operations of the Intellect, and thus are Subflituted for the Reprefentation of things of the R^/Tr^ Nature of which we can have no Notion or Idea at all, that is for the things of another World ; which for greater Clearnefs and Brevity it will be convenient hereafter to denote by the Name of the Anti- types, and thofe Ideas or Notions which re- prefent them by that of the Types, As when Begetting is put for the Supernatural Generation of the Son from the Father ; Father and Son, for the Relation between the two firft Perfons in the Trinity ; our human Spirit, or rather Soul, for a Being purely Immaterial, and par- ticularly for the yhird Perlbn in the divine Nature ; ^Price, tyurcbaje, Ranfom, for the Me- rits of Chrift/s Death, and the Value and Corner of his Sacrifice with God ; Mediation and Inter- c^fion among Men, for the Inconceivable Man- ner the Understanding, h^ ner of his Reconciling us to God. I might thus run thro' all our Conceptions and Words for the things of another World, which in their firft and iiriQUy Proper Signification arediitinct and Clear j but then are commonly fuppo- fed to become more confufed and Ob/cure, ■when they are transferred from their natural Import and Signification to things Supernatu- ral, and therefore otherwife utterly inconceiv- able. And thus it is likewife with all thofe Com- plex Notions and Conceptions which are made up of our Simple and Compounded Ideas of Sen- fation, in Conjunction with the Operations of our Mind upon them. The more of thefe are accumulated to make up one Conception or Reprefentation, the more confufed and indi- ftinct it is. As when we put together the Ideas of a Man, of Want or Mijery, of an Alms, the Notion in general of our Duty to God, of Hu- manity towards our fellow Creatures, and of the Reward of another World to make up a com- plex Notion of Charity. And thus it is alio in the complex Notions we form to our felves of Immaterial Being?, and of all things Relating to them ; as when to the Word Subjlance and our Idea of it we add thinking and Willing, toge- ther with the various Mode s of them, to make up an Analogical complex Notion of Spiritual Being in general : And when again we carry o.n that very Conception and render it yet more com r iz6 Procedure of complex by adding to it all other the greater! Perfections natural or Moral we are capable of obferving in rational Agents ; which Con- ception becomes yet lefs clear* and diftinfr by removing from it all the Imperfections of the Creatures within our view, for a Reprefentation of the divine Nature. All thofe Ideas and No- tions which go to make up thefe Compofiti-* ons, are, when confidered fingly and fepa- rately, plain and obvious, clear and diftincl:, both in their Firjf and Analogical Acceptation ; but when they are united into One Complex Con- ception which Hands in the Mind to lupply the Place of one Simple uncompounded Idea i which we mould have of that Thing if we had Capacities or Faculties for a Direct or immedi* ate Perception of it ; then they become more confus'd and obfcure. But then it ought to be well confidered, that whatever there is of fuppofed Obfcurity and Confufion in thofe Analogical complex Notions fo form'd, and then fubftituted for the Reprefen- tation of heavenly Things ; it does not proceed merely from their being So Complicated, (in which inftance they are only on an equal Foot with all other very complex Notions) nor does it proceed from the nature of the Things thus Reprejentedy they being in their Own Nature very clearly intelligible had we Capacities fo to apprehend them : But from a prevailing er- roneous Opinion, that we have Direct and c Pro* the Understanding. 127 fer, tho* indiftinft and confufed Ideas of thole things, whereof in Reality we have no other than Indirect and Analogical Conceptions ; and from a miftaken Imagination that thefe Ana- logical Conceptions give us lbme imperfect De- grees of DireB Perception where we have none at all. In order to the right apprehending of which I fhall propofe thefe two things to be confidered. 1, That in Refped of Immaterial Beings, and of all things relating to the Real 7*rue Na- ture of them as they are in themfelves, we are as a Man born Blind in Relpect of Light or Colours ; and not as a Man who hath a very Dim Sight, or who can difcern Diretf, tho' Faint Glimmerings of Light ; and hath lbme Imme- diat€y tho' no more than Conjufed and imper- fect Views of vifible Objects. We can have no Ideas of immaterial Beings from our Senfes ; nor have we any Ideas of them that are purely Intellectual and intirely independent of Ideas of Senfation ; we have not the leaft Spark of Light, or fmalleft Glimpfe, whereby to dif- cern their Real Nature or EfTence, or any Part of it; fo that thus far it is not an indiftinct or Ob/rure Perception, but No Perception at all. When Men are fully apprifed of this they will find, 2. T h a t all thofe Conceptions which Stand in the mind for fpiritual Things, and thofe Words i 18 Procedure of Words and Expreflions which we ufe for therrtj arc in themfelves, at leaft As clear and diftind when they are apply'd to this fecondary and Analogical Sence, as when they are apply'd to what they import in their firft and Proper Signification \ that is, As far as we can have any Knowledge at all of thofe Things of another H Grid, or are obliged to give any Affent to them. As for Inftance,The Conceptions of Father, Son, and Spirit are clear and diftincl: enough in their firft and proper Acceptation ; the Relation between Father and Son among us is clear and diftincl y and fo are thole Properties of a Human Spirit , which we have from SelfConfcioufnefs. Now when thefe are Transferred from their firft and proper Signification to the Perfons in the Blef> led Trinity, they are no leis diftincl: and Clear than before, as far as we are Obliged to Under- Jiand that Diftinclion in the Divine Nature, or to Believe it. For the True and Real Nature of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit is no Object either of our Under/landing or Faith , any far- ther than to underftand and believe that the Diftinction is Real, as it is Incomprehen/ible. How and after what exact manner the firft is a Father, How the fecond a Son, and How the third a Spirit differing from either, is likewife no Object of our Chriftian Faith, becar fe it is no Object of our Underjianding, and rcaufe we can Believe nothing but What we firft Un- derfand diftin&ly and clearly, and as Far only as we underftand it. If the Understanding. 129 If we underftood the real manner of Di- ftin&ion in the Divine Nature Confufedly and lndijllntfly, our Jffent would be ib likewife: No, what we are to believe is, that we con- ceive nothing of the Real Nature of Father, Son, and Spirit, nor of the Manner of that Diftin&ion. But we are bound to believe what we Do underftand, namely that there Is a Real and true DiftincHon, and a Perjbnal one like- wife in the Divine Nature ; as there is a real and perlbnal DiftincHon between the Father and the Son among Men, and as there is a real and perlbnal DiftincHon between one Human Spirit and another ; but What they are in Them- felves, and How they are One or how they are 'Three, we have not fo much as a Confufe'd and Obfcure Perception of. So again, the Idea and Word Begotten, when apply'd to the Communication of the Divine Nature to the Son, is as clear and di- ftin£t as when apply'd to Human Generation* As for the true and Real Manner and Nature of the Divine Generation, it is true we can- not have the leaft Idea or Conception of it ; and accordingly we cannot give our Jffent to what we do Not at all apprehend. But we know clearly and diftin&ly that the Son is faid to have been begotten of the Father ; and whatfoever Incomp-ehenfible Manner of Produc- tion is meant by the Word, we are to un- K derftand 130 Procedure of derftand and believe what is clearly and di- ftinctly expreffed by that Term ; that Chrift is the Son of God by a iupernatural Generation in as "True and Real a Sence, as one Man is the Son of another in the way of Nature : And that the Divine Generation differs as EJpntialy from all manner of Creation, as a Man's be- getting a Son differs from his making a Sta- tue • and the not giving our Affent to what Is fo clearly and diftinctly revealed is Infidelity. T H u s it is with the Conceptions and Terms, ^Pricey and Qurchaje, and Ran/dm. As far as we are obliged either to know or believe that the Blood of Chrift is fuch, we have as clear and diftinct Ideas of them when apply'd to it, as when they are ufed in the common Affairs of Life ; inibmuch that we can know clearly and diftinctly, and give a firm unfhaken Al- fent to this Propofition, That the Blood of Chrift was a Real and T'rue ^Price, Qur- chaje, or Ranfom for us ; tho' we are utter- ly ignorant of the 'Nature and Degrees, of the Virtue and Merit of his Sacrifice with God, which are no Objects either of our Underftand- ing or Affent : As we might know and be- lieve that a Price and Ranlbm w r as paid for the Redemption of a Captive, tho* we know nei- ther the Kind nor the Value of the Price by Nvhich he was redeemed, And the Understanding. 131 And laftly, thus it is with the Conception and the Word Interceffion. How and after what real Manner Chrift- intercedes for us, fo as to pre- vail with God in our behalf; and how he pleads the Virtue and Merit of his Sacrifice, can't be laid to be Obfcurely and Indijlinctly known, but totaly and intirely Unknown ; as it is not at all revealed, fo it is no Article or Part of our Chriftian Faith : But that he doth make a Real and true Interceffion for us, is revealed - 7 and this is clear and diftinct, and accordingly the proper Object: of our Knowledge and Ai- fent ; and all that we are to believe of the Real Nature of that Interceffion is, that we neither Have nor Can have any Knowledge of it in this World, and therefore ought to acquiefce there- in till we come to another. In the mean time we are to Believe as Far as we can Know clearly and perfectly j that Chrift intercedes for us ; as we might believe that the Son of a Prince in- tercedes to his Father in behalf of a Captive ; tho* we may be utterly ignorant after what manner he performs it, and what Motives or Arguments he makes ufe of to obtain that Pardon and Redemption. I might here run thro' all the Attributes of God, and Myfferies of the Gofpel, and fhew how the Ideas and Conceptions which are lub- ftituted for them in the Mind, and the Terms by which we exprels them, are as Clear and Di- K % Jwci 132 Procedure of ftinff when attributed or apply'd to thofe Hea- venly things (as far as we are obliged to be- lieve them) as when they are taken in their Fir (I and ftrictly proper Signification ; and how what is Unkwwn of them is no direct or im- mediate Object either of Reafon or Faith. As alio how all our Moral Reatbnings upon the Types hold true in reflect of the Antitypes ; and then only arc dubious or falfe when we attempt to reafon from the Real Nature and Subftance of the Types, to the real true Nature of the Antitypes whereof we are utter- ly ignorant. But all this will be fully confi- der'd when I come to lay open the Nature of Analogy in a following Treatife, together with the manifold UTe of it in Religion. CHAP. IX. The Difference between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy, FR o m what I have already faid in Chapter the Sixth, Metaphor in General may be eafily and widely diftinguiihed from all Ana- logy : But becauie the Diftin&ion is of great and important Moment, I {hall more particu- larly place the difference between Divine Me- taphor and Divine Analogy in a clear and oppo- fite Light here \ thefe two being moft liable to be confounded and miftaken. But before I en- the Understanding. 133 I enter upon the Explication of this material Difference, I mult defire the Reader to recoi- led what I have already faid of the proper Ufe of the Word Idea, and that I think it ought to be confined intirely to our fimple and com- pound Ideas of SenJation y in Diftinction from all the Operations and Affections of the Mind y of which we have an immediate Confc'ioufntjs without the Intervention of any Idea ; and from all thofe complex Notions or Concep- tions form'd by the Mind out of its own Ope- rations and the Ideas of Senfation. Thus we have an Idea of an Houfe, a Confcioufnefs of Thinking or Grief, and a Complex Notion of Juftice, Mercy, and Charity. If this be ob- ierved, the following Diftin&ions will be clear- ly and fully apprehended. 1. First then, Divine Metaphor is intire- ly Arbitrary ; and no way ablblutely NeceJJary towards our conceiving or expreiling the Na- ture of purely fpiritual Things or their Proper- ties. But Divine Analogy is, in our prelent Circumftances, ablblutely neceffary both to our conceiving and fpeaking of immaterial Things ; when we would think of them with any degree of Exatf Knowledge at all, or ex- preis any Correfpondent Reality in thole Things: Becaule, as I laid, we can neither know them by immediate Ideas, or by Con- fcioufnefsy or by any Diretf Perception or No- tion. In fhort, we can neither conceive them K 3 Of 134 Procedure of Of our Selves ; nor can any thing intirely New concerning them be Reveal'd to us, as our Fa- culties now are, without the Mediation of this Analogy. But 'tis quite otherwife with Di- vine Metaphor • This is never us'd but to ex- preis fomething Already known and conceived by the Light of Nature, or revealed by God with more Exa&nefs thro' the Mediation of Analogy. Were we capable of forming no other than Merely Metaphorical Ideas or Conceptions of God and heavenly Things ; and were no o- ther alfo made uie of in a Revelation of Doctrines intirely new concerning them - y fiich merely figurative Ideas or Conceptions could never have aniwered the neceflary Ends either of natural or revealed Religion. For as they would then be mere Figure and Alhjion only, without conveying a Notion or Conception of any thing Cor refpov dent or An- fwerable in the very intrinfic Nature of the Divine Things ; we never cou'd have Argued from them with Ju/lne/j and Certainty, or without perpetual Miftake and fatal Error : All our Reaibnings upon them would be precari- ous, and without any folid Foundation in the Nature of the Things ; and in fhort we fhould have nothing more than a Merely Figurative^ that is, no Real, and 7m?, and Ex a 3 Know- ledge of them at all. Now the Understanding, i 3 y Now this Obfervation can no way depre- ciate the Excellency of Scripture Metaphor ; becaule this always fuppofes us iurnilhed before- hand with more exact, and complete, and Cor- refpondent Notions of God, and other hea- venly Things from natural Reafon or Revela- tion, by Analogy. And therefore 'tis that the Holy Spirit has given us, not merely figura- tive and Metaphorical Ideas Only : But Analogi- cal Conceptions and Terms for all the things of another World which were neceiTary for us to have any true and undoubted Knowledge of; particularly of God and his Attributes, the Myfteries of Chriftianity, and the future State of Rewards and Punifhments. And tho' we read of the Hand, and Eye y and Fare, and Arm of God, yet we are iuppoied to have had Notions of his 'Power y and W'tjdom, and Goodnejs before ; or this Metaphorical Manner Alone could never have given us any uleful Notice or real Know- ledge of thofe his inconceivable Perfections. It no way debates Scripture Metaphor to lay, that it anfwers not an End for which com- mon Senfe will tell us it was never Intended by the Holy Spirit. When it is ufed in Scrip- ture to exprefs heavenly Beings, it is not de- figned to delcribe any thing realy Correfpon- dent and 'Truly Anjwerabk in thole Beings, as Analogy is : But rather to Exprefs more Emphatic aly , what we Knuzv already more K 4 Exactly i $6 Procedure of lixarlly by Analogy. Then indeed the Meta- phorical Images in Scripture ferve to excellent Purpoles : namely to illuftrate what was Other- wife known and conceived ; to awaken and exalt the Mind ; to ftrike it with greater Awe and Surprife j and to move all our religious Paffions and Affections ; which is the proper uie of all Figure. Even Human Metaphor, were it ufed to exprels or conceive any thing which we never could have had any Idea, or Conlcioufnefs, or Notion of, but merely from that Metaphor Alone y would convey to us no Real ox true Knowledge; and much more would this be true of Divine Metaphor, if it was the only Method we had of conceiving and ex- prefling the imperceptible things of God and another World : For what real or True Know- ledge could we poffibly have of the Infinite Power of God for inftance, by the merely fi- gurative Idea and Expreffion of a Strong Hand^ or Mighty Arm, if we could never have known it more exactly lome other way ? For thefe Reafons it is, as I obferv'd, that wherever God is plea fed to reveal any thing intirely new concerning heavenly Things, he always does it by Analogy with the things of this World, and not by Metaphor only ; in iiich Inftances we always find Analogy us'd to In- form the Under/landings as Metaphor and other Figures are, to Affeti the Imagination. And there is fo little danger of miftaking one for the the Understanding. 137 the other in Scripture, that no Perfon who will ufe his common Senfe without prejudice, can ever confound them. For who could, o- therwife than wilfuly, miftake the Analogy in the Words Son and Begotten when applied to Chrift, for pure Metaphor and Figure only ; or the Words Door, and Way, and Vine, and Light of the World, when lpoke of 'him, for an Analogy as compleat and perfect as the former • without the utmoft Violence to his Underftand- ing ? And yet as plain and obvious as this is, the not duly confidering this material Difference between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy has been the Occafion of numberlefs and Fatal Errors in Religion. 1. T h e fecond Difference is this. In Di- vine Metaphor the Refemblance, or Propor- tion, or Correfpondency is Imaginary ; 'tis pure Invention and mere Allufion alone, and no way founded in the Real Nature of the things compared. But in Divine Analogy the Refem- blance, or at leaft the Co rrefpondency and Pro- portion is Real, and built on the very Nature of Things on both fides of the Comparilon. There is fomething realy correlpondent and anfwerable and proportionable in heavenly and ipiritual Beings , to thole Conceptions which are juftly fiibftituted to reprefent them. As for inftance, there is certainly lomc inconcei- vable (perfetfion in God anfwerable to Hu- man Knowledge ; which is obtained by the Labour 138 Procedure of Labour of Thinking, and the Operation of Matter and Spirit in effential Conjunction : Goodnefs in God is an inconceivable Excellency of his Nature correfpondent to what we con- ceive and exprefs by the fame Word in human Nature - y And the Si milts Ratio or ^Proportion runs thus, What Knowledge and Goodnefs are in the Nature of Man, 7*hat fome inconceiva- ble but correfpondent Perfections are in the Nature of God. And ib 'tis in all the other Attributes, which tho* totaly different in Kind from thole Properties in us bearing the fame Name, yet are thus very ufefully and truly repreiented to our Mind, fb as to anfwer all the purpofes of fubftantial Knowledge and Re- ligion. $dly. What yet more widens the diffe- rence between Divine Metaphor and Divine A- nalogy is this. Divine Metaphor expreffes im- material Things by our Ideas of Sen/ation only. But Divine Analogy furnifhes us with a Know- ledge of the fame Objects by iubltituting the Conceptions or Complex Notions of our Mind to reprefent them. Thus when the Glory of God is expreffed by the refplendent Light of the Sun, even this is nothing more than mere Metaphor ; tho' indeed it muft be confefs'd that a more noble and exalted one cannot en- ter into the Mind of Man. But when we re- prefent the Knowledge of God by Our Know- ledge, and the Goodnefs of God by the Good- nek the Understanding. 139 nefs of a Man (which are the only Direct Notions we can have of either Knowledge or Goodnefs) this is true Analogy. When the Joys of Hea- ven are called a Crown of Righteoulheis, and Heaven itlelf defcribed as a New ferufalem, thefe are mere Metaphors borrow'd from Ideas of Senfation ; but when 'tis faid that the Righteous fhall obtain Joy and Gladnejs, and tpkafure for evermore, this is an Analogical Conception ; and reprelents an Inconceivable future Blifs Correfpondent and Anfwerable to the beft Conception we are able to form of Joy and Pleafure here, in the Gratification of all our reafonable Affections. The Ground and Realbn of this laft Di- m'n&ion between Divine Metaphor and Di- vine Analogy will appear very obvious if we confider, that there can be no Real Refemblance or true Correfpondency, between mere Objects of Senje or their Ideas , and Immaterial hea- venly Beings. But there may be a real Rejem- blance, or at leaft a true Correfpondency and Proportion, between the Operations of our ^Aind (as well as our Complex Notions formed partly out of them) on one Side of the Com~ parifbn ; and the immaterial Things they are fubftituted to reprefent on the other. For as we are made in fbme Meafiire after the Image of God, efpecialy in our fpiritual Part , this |erves to render all the Analogy rationaly built on inch Conceptions and Notions, Real and Jufl with* 140 Procedure of with refpect. to him and his Attributes ; as well as to other purely lpiritual Beings who are created in a yet Nearer Likenefs to him. And therefore his Natural 01 rather Supernatural ? At- tributes we conceive by Analogy with the Ope- rations and Properties of our own Minds ; and what we call his Moral Attributes, we conceive by Analogy with our complex Notions of hu- man Virtues and moral Excellencies. Now therefore to prevent any Miftake hereafter in relation to thole Inftances which may be given of Analogy, I mull obferve that tho' Light, in its greateft Relplendency is Ma- ferial^ and an Object of Senfation ; and there- fore cannot be transferred to God otherwife than Metaphoricaly \ there being nothing in his purely lpiritual Nature correfpondent or anfwerable to Matter : Yet as Intellectual Light is ufed for Knowledge, and becomes expreflive of the moft noble Faculty or Perfection of the human Mind, it carries in it fo much of the Nature of the true Analogy ; and therefore whenever I ufe it as an inllance of luch, I take it in that Sence, and as it excludes all Mate- riality. Again, The Idea of Sub fiance is an Idea altogether of Senfation, as it includes Length, Breadth, and Thickneis \ and therefore can- not be transferr'd to God in this Sence, other- wife than by pure Metaphor ; and this preca- riouily the Understanding. 141 lioufly too, lince it is no Scripture Metaphor. And therefore whenever I mention our con- ceiving the Subftance of God by Analogy with material Subftance, I ever mean as it imports the Notion of Being in general only. S o again, Wind or Breath are Ideas of Sen- fation, and cannot be transferred to the Holy Ghoft otherwife than Metaphoricaly : But as Wind or Breath from its firft Propriety comes to fignify Animal Life both in Man and Beaft, and from thence is ufed to exprels the im- material Spirit of a Man y which is a Notion complex enough to take in all the Operations of an human Mind ; then 'tis pure Analogy, us'd to conceive the Incomprehenfible and Holy Spirit, T o fiim up the Difference then between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy in full. Metaphor exprefles only an Imaginary Refem- blance or Correlpondency 7 Analogy conveys the Conception of a Correfpondent Reality or Re- femblance. Metaphor is rather an Mlufion^ than a real Subftitution of Ideas ; Analogy a pro- per Subftitution of Notions and Conceptions. Metaphor at belt is but the ufing a very re- mote and foreign Idea to exprels lbmething Already uppofed to be more exactly known ; Analogy conveys fomething correfpondent and aniwerable, which could be now No otherwife ufefuliy and realy known without it, Meta- 2 phor 143 Procedure of phor is moftly in Words, and is a Figure of Speech ; Analogy a Shnilis Ratio or Proporti- on of ^ThingSy and an excellent and neceffary Method or Means of Reajbn and Knowledge. Metaphor ufes Ideas of Sen/at ion to expreis immaterial and heavenly Objects, to which they can bear No Real Refemblance or Propor- tion ; Analogy fiibftitutes the Operations of our Souly and Notions moftly formed out of them, to reprefent Divine Things to which they bear a Real tho' Unknown Correipondency and Proportion. In fhort, Metaphor has No real Foundation in the Nature of the Things com- pared ; Analogy is founded in the Very Nature of the Things on both Sides of the Companion : And the Correipondency or Refemblance is cer- tainly Real, tho' we don't know the exact Na- ture, or Manner 9 or Degree of it ; at leaft we may fafely prefume this from the Truth and Veracity of God, who has thus made his Reve- lations to Mankind under the Analogical Con- ceptions and Language of this World. Tho' nothing is more plain and evident than this Analogy y which runs thro' all our Conceptions and Reafonings upon the Things of another World, when we come to reflect and confider the Matter clofely ; yet we fall into it lb naturaly, and are lb ufed to it from the firft, that we are generaly infenfible of it ; and apt to take it for granted that thole Con- ceptions are as Direct and Immediate } and our 4 Lan- the Understanding. 141 Language for them as ftrictly proper, as when they are applied to the Things of this World. And indeed there would have been no harm in leaving the World to continue in that Opinion j there would have been no Occafion for unde- ceiving Men, nor for putting them upon di- ftinguifhing lb nicely the nature of Metaphor and Analogy, if there had been any other ef- fectual way of clearly and fatisfactorily obvia- ting the many dangerous Miftakes, and even fatal Errors prevailing in this Age , which ftrike at the very root of Chriftianity. It is now become abfolutely neceifary to put this matter into a Glaring Light, fince the whole Socinian Syftem, and all that Infidelity which is the Effect and Confequence of it \ as well as fome more Modern Syftems which are in no lmall degree built upon its general Principles, turn upon refolving all Revelation and the Myfte- ries of Chriftianity into mere Metaphor and Mlajion only : And upon their ever confound- ing this with the true Analogy, which is of a quite different kind ; which is founded in the very Nature of Things, and is abfolutely ne- celTary even to our 'Thinking of heavenly Ob- jects, tho' we mould never expreisour Thoughts by Words. Having thus ftated the wide Diftinction be- tween Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy, as far as was necelTary here ; I fhall only take notice of one Objection againft this Diftin&ion which 144 Procedure of which may be made by thofe who always find their Account in Confounding them. Perhaps they will fay, that by their refol- ving feveral Things in the Goipel Myfteries into Metaphor, they do not intend to reduce them to Mere Figure only, and lb bring them to No- thing as I infinuate : But on the contrary they will affirm, that they intend to underftand by thole Metaphors lbmething as Real, and Solid, and True with regard to fpiritual Things, as I wou'd make this Analogical Sence of them to fignify. N o w to this I anfwer, That tho' the Go£ pel Terms, when applied to Things of ano- ther World, fhould be Intended by them to mean Something true, and real, and lblid (as indeed all Metaphor is intended to do) yet if they be taken as Mere Metaphor, they cannot exprefs or convey any thing of a Correfpondent Reality in thole Divine Things ; or any thing which has a Real and True Proportion or Refem- blance in the Very Nature of thofe fpiritual Ob- jects. And therefore, however they may In-* tend it, it cannot thus fignify as much Real kind Solid T^ruth with regard to the Myfteries of the Gofpel and heavenly Things, as Analogy docs; becaufe this not only exprefTes Somewhat Real y and Solid, and True ; but Correfpondent alfo, and Proportionable, and Anfwerabh in the Very Natures of the Things compared. Eve m the Understanding. 14J Even in thofe Expreffions of Scripture which are allowed on all hands to be pure Me- taphor, tho' Some Truth and Reality be certain- ly meant by them, yet are they widely diffe- rent from Analogy. As for inftance ; when God is laid to have a Mighty Jrm y it means lbmething as real and true, as when it is faid God is Powerful: And yet there can be nothing Correspondent and Jnjwerable to a great Arm of Flefh, in God. Whereas when God is faid to be powerful, and wife, and good, we don't only mean fomething true, and folid, and real ; but alio inconceivable Perfections in his real Nature Correfpondent and anfwerable to Power, and Wifdom, and Goodnefs in us. And again, to make this yet plainer ; when Generation is made a mere Metaphor for a tranfcendent A el of Cre- ation, it may indeed be Intended to fignify fbme- what real, and lblid, and true ; but can mean nothing in the Divine Nature fb correfpondent and proportionable to human Generation, as that Chrift fhould be in as much Truth and Reality the Son of God by fupernatural Gene- ration, as one Man is the Son of another in the ordinary way of Nature ; which is the true and analogical Acceptation of the Term Be- gotten. And for thefe Reafbns it is, and in this Sence, that we jufdy charge our modern Arians with bringing the Myfteries of the Gos- pel to Nothing by their unwarrantable and me- taphorical Interpretations. L But 146 Procedure of But if, after all this, they mould allow the Terms in which the Goipel Myfteries are ex- preiTed, to fignify not only ibmething Real in Spiritual Things, but alio lbmewhat Correfpon- dent and Proportionable to the Things of this World liibftituted for them ; and yet will ftill call this Metaphor : They are then grofly guilty of confounding two Things totaly dif- ferent, by perverfely giving them the fame Name to ferve a vile Turn ; and alio make a Conceflion which at once renders them fhame- fully inconfiftent with themielves , and over- turns all their Schemes of Divinity. BOOK the Understanding. 147 BOOK II. CHAP. I. Of the Pure IntelkB. HA v 1 N g in the firft Book confider'd the Ideas of Senfation as the only Materials which the active and bufie Mind of Man hath to work upon ; and as the ible Groundwork or Foundation for the whole Superftructure of human Knowledge ; I come in this iecond to treat of the Pure Intellect. By which I would have it obferved here, once for all, that by this I do not mean that immortal immate- rial Part of us, denoted in Scripture by the Word tUnvjjCa or Spirit , nor do I mean any the moft refined and exquifite parts of the Body, or animal Spirits, which are more im- mediately fubfervient to the intellectual Ope- rations of that Spirit ; but by the Pure Intel- left I always underftand Both thele operating together in eifential Union and Conjunction ^ fo that all thinking or Reafbning is a mix'd and compound Aft of both Matter and Spirit. Thinking is by a general Miftake attributed to the Pure Spirit, exclufively of thole material Organs without which it cannot exert one thought ; and in a neceflary Conjunction with which, it performs all its Operations. L 2 This 148 Procedure of This will be yet clearer, if we diftinguifh theie following Words of a near Signification - y and which have therefore been uled promi£- cuoufly. The Sprit is the purely immaterial Part of our Compofition, which is capable of Sepa- ration from the Body, and can then exift and operate independently of Matter .* This is of- ten by miftake call'd the Soul, in a vulgar and more indiftin& way of ipeaking ', but is di- ftinguilh'd in the Scripture by the Wordn^- fjLx Spritus. The Soul, or rather inferior Soul, as it is ufed to be called in Diftin&ion from that which is pure Spirit ; is fomething in us refulting from an effential Union of the pure Spirit with our material Frame ; and it is in Scripture denoted by the Word turf Anima, or Soul. The Mind, in a common and more indi- ftincl: Acceptation, is Synonimous with Soulj but is in truth a more general and complex Term, and includes the pure Sprit, together with the hit die ft, the Will, and Memory, and all the Pajjions and Jfieffions of the inferi- or Soul • and is properly NSs Jn'mus, or Mind, The the Understanding. 149 The Pure Intellect taken in Diftin&iorv from thofe three, is properly the pure Spirit or immaterial Part of us, as acting in effential Union and Conjunction particularly with thole animal Spirits and remote imperceptible Fibres of the Brain, which are more immediately fub- fervient to 'Thinking or Knowledge, and all the Operations of the Underftanding. This is eall'd Nona-/? Intellefius, or the but of fomething Within him. I cannot forbear again remarking here the ftiameful Inconfiftency of thole Men, who maintain that we have as clear and diftinft an Idea of Sprit as we have of Body ; for this rea- % ion, the Understanding. 151 fon, beeaufe we have as clear and diflincl an Idea of Thinkings as we have of Extenfion or Solidity : And who at the lame time argue the Soul may be material, becaule God can luperadd to Matter the Power of Thinking. For is not Thinking and Willing even in their Hypothefis, oppos'd to Extenfion and Solidity ', as Effential Properties utterly incompatible in the fame Being ; fo that Body and Spirit are by thefe Properties effentialy diftinguifhed from one another, as well as in our Ideas or Concep- tions of them ? And how then can Thinking be iiiperadded to Matter, without making it a Spirit ? If we have a clear Idea of Spirit from Thinkings and of Body from Extenfion and Solidity ; then, whenever Matter is made to think of itfelf, without the Concurrence of Ipiritual Subftance, all our Ideas are changed and confounded ; then it might be faid we have a clear Idea of Matter from Thinking ; and we mull look out for lome other effential Property to give us a clear Idea of Spirit, To which I lhall add, that one and the fame Pro- perty of Thinking cannot be Effential to one fort of Being, and Superadded only and merely Ac- cidental to another ; wherever it is, it mull: be an original effential Property ; ib that the Re- moval of it will make a Thing ceale to be what it is ; as the fiiperadding it will make a Thing what it was not in its own Nature be- fore. It is even ridiculous to fay, that tho* Thinking is not originaly effential to Matter, L 4 yet ijr Procedure of yet it may be made to Think by accident, ib as that Thinking may be a new and adventi- tious Quality of it. For it muft be granted, that whenever "Thinking goes together with Ex- tenfion or Solidity in the fame Body even by Accident, they will each of them ceaie to be any Marks of Diftin&ion between Body and Spirit. Besides, if the Soul may be material, and Thinking is fuperadded to it ; fure this can give no Idea of the manner of Knowledge in a Being altogether immaterial, and which hath Knowledge not fuperadded^ but originaly in its own Nature and ElTence. If they fay that a material and immaterial Subftance may both of them 7%hk 9 tho' after a different Manner ; this is playing upon the Word fhinh- ingy and taking it for Knowledge which is a ge- neral Word, and includes the Knowledge of God and Angels ; whereas the proper Accep- tation of it, is for the particular way of Know- ledge in Man. But call the Knowledge of God and Angels by what Name you will, nay call it ^kinking it will end in the fame thing ; for the Manner of it in God, and Angels, and Man muft be allow'd as effentialy different as their Nature ; fb that thinking in Man can give us no Direct Conception of Thinking in a pure Spirit. B y the but not to the Matter of it. I am aware of the laft great Objection which lies againft this whole way of arguing ; that from thence it will be inferr'd, that all Senfitive Perception in Brutes muft intirely dif- fer from that which is Human, and be quite of another Kind ; 16 as to be a refemblance on- ly, or a lbrt of Imitation of our Seniations. I fhall make no other reply to this, than to leave the Objection as I find it. For I don't know why we may not allow Senfitive Perception in Brutes, to be ibmethmg correfpondent only and Analogous to Senlation in Man, as natural InfrinB is to Reajcn. Their Seniations may be all as Real as ours, and yet be of a very different the Understanding. 171 different Kind ; and that they are fo, is more than probable, fince it is plain they can have no fuch Confcioufnefs of their own Senfations as we have of ours ; nor have they any Know- ledge of them properly fo call'd, as we have ; nor have their Senfations any immediate ef- fential Concurrence of Sprit as thole which are human : So that fince this feems to be the Cafe, all the Impreflions made upon the Or- gans of Senfation in Brutes, and the Ideas con- iequent to thofe Impreflions are realy to be confidered as abftra&edly and as much fepara- ted from any Concurrence or Obfervation of a true Principle of Rea/dn and Understanding, as the Sound and Motions of a Clock. And for this reaibn I would have it remarked here, that whenever I ufe the Words Knowledge, or Irifcerning, or Di/linguifhing, or Jtfion, as ap- plied to Brutes ; I don't mean that they have any fiich Powers properly fpeaking as thofe which are called by the fame Names in Man- kind : But only that thefe are the belt Analo- gous Notions and Words we have, to reprelent thole Movements of theirs which feem to Mimick the Anions and Faculties of Men. But however this may be, yet the Ob- fervation arifing from thence is very natural ; that thofe Men run into an unreafonable Ex- treme on the other hand, who to avoid the Souls of Brutes being immaterial, will have them to be no other than a more refin'd and complicated 172- Procedure of complicated fort of Engines or Injlruments ; and call them mere Machines, or ^Puppets, or Clockwork ; as if the Wifdom and Power of the great Creator in the Difpofition of Matter and Motion, were to be directed by the Rules of our Mechanics ; and confined to obierve the Meafures of human Artifice and Contrivance. As if God could not, after an Inconceivable manner, work up a Syitem of mere Matter into a Brute ; and by a curious Difpofition and Contexture of all its Parts, vaftly out of the reach of our Comprehenfion, could not render it in a peculiar manner iufceptible of iuch Motions and Impreffions from external mate- rial Objects, as may be the impulfive Caule of all that variety of Actions we fee in them ; and particularly of thofe which have lb near and lively a Relemblance of our human Sen- fations. So that all the Arguments to prove Brutes mere Machines and Engines, in the com- mon Acceptation of thofe Terms, are preca- rious and imaginary ; and the Words carry with them an odious tho' tacit Comparilbn between the Art and Contrivance of Man, and the infinite Power and Wifdom of God, when- ever they are ufed otherwile than as bare //- lu ft rations only of the Actions of Brutes ; after which manner alone I would have them un- derftood wherever they occur in this part of my Difcourfe. They the Understanding. *71 They who hold Sen fit we Perception in Brutes to be an Argument of the Immateriality of their Souls, find themfelves under a Neeemty of al- lowing thofe Souls to be Natural/ Immortal like- wile ; and they are fo embaraffed in thinking how to difpofe of thole Irrational Immortal Souls after the DifTolution of their Bodies, and what lbrt of Immortality to contrive for them, that they imagine them all to return into the great Soul or Spirit of the World ; or by a Metemp- Jychojts to pafs into the Bodies of fucceeding Animals ; and then when they have done their Work, at the End of the World they are to be difcharged out of Being, and again reduced to their primitive Nothing. B u t if thofe Souls are once granted to be Immaterial^ it is utterly inconceivable that they mould not Naturaly have the fame Immortality with thofe which are Human ; fince we can- not with any Sence or Confiftency diftinguifh two Different Kinds of Immortality for created Spirits. If the Soul of Brutes is Immortal, That cannot, when feparated, be thought to remain altogether in a State of utter Inactivity and Infenfibility, which communicated Senle and Activity to Matter while in Conjunction with it. And if ib, they mull be lenlible of Happinefs or Mifery ; and in fome Degree liable to Rewards and Punifhments, as eternal as their Souls. % What 174 Procedure of What heightens the Abfurdity of this Way of Thinking is, that in imagining the Souls of Brutes to be Immaterial, Men muft necef- farily diftinguifh a great Variety of them both in Nature and Degree ; one fort for Birds, an- other for Beajls, and another for Fifties. And thefe muft be all fubdivided again into very different Species of immaterial Souls, accord- ing to the different Sorts there are under each of thole general Heads. Nay every Fly and Infecf muft on this Suppofition have fbme fort of immaterial Soul, even down to the Cheefe Mite ; and what is yet more abfurd is, that there muft be an infinite Variety of Immorta- lities imagin'd to fuit the Rank and Condition of every individual, living, fenflble Creature. I shall conclude this Head of the Simple Apprehenpon or intellectual View of the Mind which follows upon Senfation, when I oblerve that the Realbn why the Intellect, which takes a clear and diftinct View of fuch numberlefs Objects of Senle in their Ideas ; hath not how- ever the leaft obfcure or indiftinct direct Appre- henfion or iimple Intuition of a Pure Spirit ; is, becaufe we neither have an immediate Confci- oufnefs, nor a Diretf fenfible Perception of any thing relating to the Nature of fuch a Being ; nor can there be any Idea of it, to be view'd in the Imagination ; which is however Capa- cious enough to take in all vifible Nature, and to the Understanding. 17 j to ftore up an immenfe Number of Ideas of all Objects which occur to the Senles. What an amazing Variety of them are daily conveyed in by that one Senfe of Seeing P to which if wc add thole of the other Senles, we fhall render the Number mexhauftible ; and yet nothing of all thefe is properly Knowledge, confider'd in themfelves, and abftractedly from that Intui- tion or View taken of them by the pure Intel- lect : They are only the rude and unwrought Materials, heaped together for that Superftruc- ture which every Man is to raife according to the peculiar Dilpofition of his natural Genius, the different Methods he purliies, and the De- grees of that Application of the Intellect which he ufes. CHAP. III. The fecond Operation of the pure IntelleH^ That of Judgment. TH E fecond Operation of the pure Intel- lect: upon the Ideas of Seniation is com- monly called the Judgment it paffes upon them. Becaufe my Purpofe is not to go thro* the Art of Logic in general, but to trace the Rife, and Progrels, and Extent of our Know- ledge, more efpecialy as it relates to Religion and the things of another World ; I mall not enlarge upon this Operation as far as the Nature \y6 Procedure of Nature of it requires, nor am I willing wholy to pafs it by. The great Variety of Ideas of Senfation which is conveyed to the Imagination and lodged there, is not for the fole guidance and direction of us, by any inward Inftinci, or Im- fulje of theirs ; and in order to remain there always unviewed and unobierved by any higher Principle ; which is the Condition of Brutes. Nor are they there only for the naked View and Simple Intuition of the Mind which is its firft Operation upon them } but as Subjects for the Farther Employment of our Underftand- ing and Will ; for Obfervation and Judgment ; for all our Inferences, Difcourles, and Realbn- ings ; for the Exercife of all the Faculties of an human Soul ; and for Ingredients which go into the Compofition of all thofe Complex No- tions and Conceptions which the Mind railes up to itfelf for its own ufe, and to fupply the Want of Simple and Original Ideas : Inlbmuch that it hath an arbitrary Sway and lovereign Power over them ; and they are fubjeel: to the Exercife of all its Operations at pleafiire. Con- cerning thefe Ideas and the leveral Operations of the Mind upon them, thefe Miftakes are common among Logicians, and lome Writers of Metaphyfics. Tho' they rightly lay down Ideas as the only Original Materials for the Mind to work upon ; yet the Understanding. 177 yet they do it in the General, without limiting them to thole of Senfation only ; and without exploding and rejecting fuch as are falily lup- pofed to be Purely Intellectual, and equaly 0- riginal ; and which are imagined by lome to come into the Mind another way than by Sen- la tion or Reflection ; all which are accordingly thought to be (in common with thofe of Senfe) the firjl Ground-work and Materials of our Knowledge. As thefe laft are not mentioned in their Introductions to the Art of Realbning, which they mull and ought to be, if they be- lieved there were any fuch Ideas ; ib neither is there any Qrovi/jon made for the real want of thele purely intellectual Ideas, thro' their whole Syftems. This lure is an inexcufableOmillion, and a fundamental Defect, both in the old and new Logic ; that they make no Provilion for explaining the true Manner of coming to the moft excellent Part of our Knowledge, that of things Divine and Immaterial. This rnuft be either by Ideas of them Purely IntelleBual; or by Ideas of Reflection ; or by the help of thofe of Senfation formed into Complex Notions, by confidering them together with the Opera- tions of the Mind -, and then fubltituting thele Notions Analogtcaly to reprefent things Imma- terial. Now the two firft of thefe Methods are merely Imaginary, and have no Founda- tion in Nature or Realbn ; and the laft is in- tirely omitted by the Writers of Logic ; who not knowing where to fix the Rife and true N Manner \y% Procedure of Manner of our fpiritual Knowledge and Con- ceptions, have made it over to be treated of in Metaphy/tcs, under the firft mention'd Head of Ideas Purely Spiritual and Intellectual, with much Obfcurity and Confufion, and with very- little, or no real Improvement of human Un- derftanding. Others confound thofe original Ideas of Senfation, with the Operations of the Mind upon them, ib far, that they fancifully lay down thole Operations as a new let of original Ideas for the Mind to work upon. What an aukward Abiiirdity is this ? The fame thing fhall be an Idea, and the Operation of the Mind upon an Idea at the lame time ; and thus we muft have a new Idea for another fecond O- peration, and ib on In Infinitum. And this new Set of Ideas is expreiTed by a Term as ab- iiird , an Idea of Reflection ; a hard Word without any real or determinate Meaning. If they had diitinguhried them in plain Lan- guage, into Ideas of Senfe, and Ideas of Reafon, (which they might with equal good Sence have done) all the Amuiement would ceafe ; be- caufe every Body could then fee that Reafbn is the Operating of the Mind upon our Ideas ; and lbme Ideas muft therefore necefTarily be (Rrefuppofed, for an Object of thofe Operations. And laftly, whereas this of Judgment is a very Complicated 'Operation, and confifts of ma- i ny the Understanding. 179 ny Particulars, which if enlarged upon and treated of with Diftin&nefs and Perfpicuity, would contribute much to the Direction of our Understanding in the purfiiit of Knowledge : Yet thefe are flightly paffed over and refolved immediately into Qropo/ttion and Enuntiatlon * y whereas thefe latter fhould be treated of fepa- rately from Judgment, and under a diftincl: Head. For the Operations of the Mind com- prifed under that of its Judgments, may be without any Actual Affirmation or Negation. If it is laid that Propositions are the Judg- ments of the Mind reduced to Sentences ; I grant it, but thefe are as Accidental to the In- ward Judgments of the Intellect, as Words or Terms are to the Ideas in the Imagination, and mould be treated of with the fame Distinc- tion ; befides that fome of the Operations com- prehended under that general Name, do not admit of any Affirmation or Negation. I mall mftance in fbme of the chief of thofe O- perations of the pure Intellect upon our Ideas, which I include under this Head of Judg- ment. 1 . That of Separating them from one an- other, and Ranging them into any order at Will. Our Ideas lie originaly in the Imagination, in the fame confufed and diforderly Manner, in which outward Objects from our Infancy hap- pen to ftrike upon our Senfes ; and would al- ways continue in the very fame fituation, if N 2 they 180 Procedure of they were not in the Power of the Intellect to dilpole and manage at pleaiure : By Singling out one or more from the reft, for a more Di- fiinfl and Particular View and Confideration ; by Sorting and franfpojing them for any Pur- pofes of the Mind ; and particularly Ranging them under feveral diftincl Heads or Kinds for the forming Univerjal Ideas ; as when the Ideas of all Men we have, and have not leen, are reprefented by the Idea of One Man, which Hands for all Mankind. The Ideas of Senfation in Brutes lie with- in them unremoved, and their fituation is un- changeable ; they cannot put them out of the order wherein they were tranfmitted. thro* the Senfes ; becaufe they are purely paflive, not only in the Reception of all their Ideas, as we are ; but in that Inftigation and bnpulfe of thoic Ideas which excites and prompts them to all their Operations. Their Ideas being the Impreflions only of one Part of Matter upon another ; and there being no active immaterial Principle within them to change their Pofition, they mull neceflarily remain thus fix'd and Unalterable while they laft ; as fb many Figures of a Seal imprelfed upon Wax. 2. Another inftance is that of Compa- ring our Ideas one with another, to mark and oblerve their Agreements and Difagreements in every the Understanding. i8t every particular, whether efTential or accident tal to them ; as when the Idea of a Tra? and that of an Horfe are compared in refpecl: of their Vegetative and Animal Life ; in relpecl: of the Circulation of the Sap in one, and of the Blood and Spirits in the other. This Opera- tion ought to be diftinguifhed from that of confidering the Relations they bear to one ano- ther, which is but one particular way of com- paring them ; the Likenefs and Unlikenejs of Ideas (as well as of outward Objecls) their Agreements and Difigree merit s y are things dif- ferent from their mutual Relations in all other Inftances, and their Dependences upon one ano- ther ; and therefore thele are of a diftincT and ieparate Confideration. Brutes do not Compare in any degree ; for as they have a bare Senfation only of the Object, and not even a fimple Jpprehenjion of its Idea within them, diftincT: from that Sen- fation ; fo they can never attend to more than One Idea at once ; they muft neceflarily advert to their Ideas fucceffively one after an- other, and feparately ; but can never put two or more Ideas together to make a Compart" Jon. If they had any Power for fuch a Per- formance within them, we fhould fee them a&ualy put two or more outward Objefts to- gether ; as We do, for their more convenient and eafy diftinguilhing. Brutes may indeed be Said to Difcern the difference between two N 3 oi i8i Procedure of or more Objects which are prefent to their Senles ; and to diftinguifh them in fome fenfi- ble Circumftances which immediately ftrike upon them : But this is not Comparing Ideas, no nor their Objetfs, even when they are der'd leparately by the Mind. This is utterly out of the Power of Brutes; a Dog which lirft hath had one view of his Mailer may, while he is prefent, look at his Face, and after- wards at his Feet, or at any other part of him lucceffively ; but this is not Subdividing the Idea of an human Body into the Ideas of its Parts : For when the Dog's Eyes are fhut, or the Man difappears, he is utterly inca- pable of this Subdivifion in the Jbfence of the Object The Power of the Intellect is no lefs in Compounding its Ideas either in the Whole^ as when it compounds the Ideas of many Trees to make up a Wood ; or of many Houfes to make up that of a City : Or in tyart, when it Separates the Parts of cJirTerent Ideas to frame anew the Understanding. i 8 y a new Compojjtion out of them. And this is done either According to Nature, as when the Ideas of the Stem and many Branches are put together to make up that of a Tree -, or A- ga'mji Nature, as when part of an Horfe and part of an human Body are united into a Cen- taur ; which latter fort have been well called Chimerical. Brutes can no more Compound than they can Divide ; for all Senfation is of Particulars, and therefore fb muft the Ideas be which are confequent to it. What is there in tfhem which fhould unite any of thole Particulars in- to one Compound Idea ? Not the external 0#- jetis, which can each of them make but one fingle Impreflion of themlelves ; nor the Or- gan of Senle, which receives the Impreffions Ungly, and tranfmits them fo to the Imagina- tion, which alfo being material retains them juft as they are tranfmitted from the Senfes. So that nothing can put two or more of them together into one compound Idea but lbme Principle fuperior to Matter, and to all that the Objed hath any Aptitude or Power to work ei- ther upon the Organ of Senfation, or upon the Imagination. It hath been urged that a Dog compounds the Shape, and Smell, and Voice, to make up a Compound Idea of its Mafler ', and that it knows him by all three at Once, which, as I have obierved, is not true : How- ever were it fb, this would be a compounding 4 of i86 Procedure of of inward Ideas only in the Qrefence of the outward Objects of them ; ib that unlefs the Dog could unite thole three Ideas in the Ab- fence of his Malter to make up One Idea of him, it is not properly that compounding which is the Privilege and Power of an human Intellect. CHAP. IV. Of AbfiraB'ton. ANother Act of the pure Intellect in relation to the Ideas of Senfation com- monly reduced to this head of Judgment is laid to be Abjlratfion, which is ufualy diftin- guifhed into two Sorts, and both of them e- qualy groundless. I. T h e firffc is a Logical Abftraction in or- der to form General Ideas ; which is thought to be performed by withdrawing the Mind in- tirely from all the Individuals, and then form- ing one (ingle Idea which mail reprefent the Whole Kind or Species at once ; as when we remove our Thoughts intirely from all the In- dividuals of Men, and frame to our lelves one general Idea diftinct from them all to reprefent the whole Race. And thefe General abjlraft Ideas fhall, in the modern refined Method of forming them, prove the mangeft and moft in- confiftent the Understanding. 187 confiftent Monfters in the World. Thus the General abftraft Idea of Man, fhall not be of a black or white, fliort or tall, thick or flen- der Man ; but fhall be All thele and None of them at the Same time : The general ab- flrad Idea of a Triangle fhall be neither of an Equilateral, nor Equicrural, nor Scalenum ', nei- ther Oblique nor Retf angle, but all and none of thefe at once. N o w this is utterly impracticable, and therefore Abftra&ion in this Sence is a hard Word and without any determinate Meaning ; for if the In tell ed abftracls from all the Ideas of every Individual, it can have no Idea at all left to operate upon. When we fay Mankind, it exprefleth no one DiJlinB, Abjlraft, General Idea which Hands in the Mind for all the In- dividuals at once ; but it fignifies the Idea of One Individual, which is no otherwife made general, than by our conceiving all the reft of the fame Kind By that one ; fo that in truth it is the lingle Idea of any one Individual which is made to ftand for and reprefent the whole Species. There is no iuch thing in Nature as any Vniverfal realy Exijling, either to ftrike upon our Senfes, or to be an Object of our Reafon ; and confequently there can be no luch general abftract Idea in the Mind. If there were any luch, it would be equaly Simple and Original with that of one Individual ; and, which is yet more ablurd, whether luch an Idea i 88 Procedure of Idea were fuppos'd to be from Nature, or from AbflraElion, or Creation of the Intellect, it would neceffarily imply this plain Abfurdity, That it would not only be both a Particular and Vniverfal Idea, as you differently Conjider'd it, which is very allowable and may be true ; but it would be actualy and In itfelf both a Simple and Compounded Idea at the Same time, which is downright Contradiction ; Simple, as it reprefented the whole Kind at once, in one fimple Idea abftratfed from all the In- dividuals j and Compounded as it Included them all And now we may have leave to wonder at thofe Perfons, who fingle out this fort of Imaginary Abfir action for the only perfect Di- ftin&ion between Men and Brutes ; and chuie to place the only Difference between them in that fort of Abftraction which one would think could never enter into the Head of Man or Beafl. Nay we may with good realbn lay, that of all the Operations of the pure Intellect they are leaft diftinguifhable in this of making the Idea of one Individual ftand for all of the fame Kind, which is the 'True Abftraction. When we have an Idea of one particular Man, this ferves us to diftinguifh the whole Species from any other : And thus far even Brutes feem to approach to this Power, namely, that the Idea of a Particular Man whom a Dog for inftance hath feen, lerves in his Imagination whereby the Understanding. 189 whereby to diftinguifh any Individual of the Same Species, (as often as it is excited again by the Qrefence of any other Man) from the I#- dividuals of any Other Species. I f Men had faid that tho' Brutes diftin- guiih every Individual as it is an Outward Ob- jetiy and as it a&ualy prefents itfelf to the Senfe ; yet this is not diftinguiftiing Ideas in The Abfence of all the Individuals, or making one Idea or Conception Hand for the Ideas or Conceptions of them All. That they can't any way diftinguifh one whole Species from an- other ; much lels difcern any determinate e£- iential Property, wherein All the Individuals agree ; as Rationality in Man. And laflly, that they cannot diftinguiih even between the Individuals, but in fuch Qualities as depend upon actual outward Senfation ; whereas Men can diftinguiih between both the Species and Individuals in things intirely independent of all outward Seniation. If thele things, I lay, had been urged, they would indeed have made a perfect Diftinction in this reipect between Men and Brutes. But for Men to allow Brutes Reafon in common with Mankind, that is, allow them to be reafbnable Creatures ; and yet afterwards to place the Diftinction between them and us in a fort of Abftra&ion which is altogether Irrational , is no other than fir ft R ai- Jjng Brutes up to the Dignity of human Na- ture, and then Degrading Mankind below it. I hope ipo Procedure of I h o p e from what I have faid it is rea- ibnably plain how falle and groundlels that Opinion is, which afferts, that Brutes do fome of them reafon in certain Inflames^ as J'urely as they have Senje. Jnd y that if they have any Ideas at all, we cannot deny them to have fome Reafon. But if Some Brutes reafon, why not All Brutes ? Or which are thole Brutes which do reafon, and which do not ? Which are the rational Brutes, and which are irration- al ? Again, which are the certain Inftances in which they do reafon, and which are to be referr'd to pure Inflincl: ? Surely if fome of them have realbn, they all have more or lefs of it ; it is lure they are all directed in their Operations by one common Principle, whether that be Reajon or Injiintf ; which laft is no other than the prompting and Im- pulfe of Ideas from the Imprefiion of outward Objects. I F you grant they have Some degree of Reafon, it will be hard to tell why they have not a Greater degree of it ; for they have as many Senfes as Men , and generaly more acute ; and confequently have all their Ideas more diftincl than we have. Ideas of Senfa- tion are the only original Groundwork of all Our Knowledge } and if Brutes have all the Original Materials which we have, and can Reajon upon them, what fhould hinder them from the Understanding. 191 from attaining to the fame degrees of Know- ledge which we have ? What trifling is it to fay they reafon but a Little ? They compare their Ideas but a Little ? They compound them but a Little? For fince material Objects can cauie Ideas by making Impreffions of thcmfelves, but no mere Matter can operate upon thofe Ideas after they are once form'd ; then the caufe that we reafon more, and Brutes leis, muft be, either becaufe their Organs are not 16 well dilpofed to act in Conjunction with an immaterial Principle ; or becaufe the immate- rial Principle in them is of a very Diminutive Kind ; or not §}uite fo immaterial perhaps as ours. They who itretch their Zeal fb fir for making Men of Brutes, are the very Perfons who labour to make Brutes of Men ; and will have the Soul of Man to be nothing but Matter with a Faculty of Thinking Superadded to it : And if fo, the Soul of a Brute, according to them, muft be Matter with Reafon fuper- added to it ; for Thinking and Reafon fignify the fame thing. I t is confefTed then by thefe Men, that thinking is a Faculty that is not original y in the Nature of Matter, but Superadded ; and if fb then it is a Faculty Above the Nature of it, and therefore Contrary to the Nature of it. But it implies no Contradiction, fay they ; no more, fay we, than that God fhould make the fame thing to be Matter^ and No Matter at the ioi Procedure of the fame time ; no more than in fuppoflng that Almighty Power mould take away Know- ledge from a pure Spirit, and fuperad Gravity or Solidity to it ; that is mould make it ibme- thing elfe, and not Spirit. To which I may add this Contradiction farther, That the fame Faculty of Reafbn mail be Ejpntial to a Syftem of Matter, and yet only Accidental and Super- added to that fame Syftem by almighty Power ; for that thinking is EJJential to Man I hope will be allowed by thofe, who contend for the Pofllbility of its being Superadded to Brutes. Wh a t Extremes thefe Advocates for Brutes run into ? They attribute thinking to Beings purely Immaterial , to Angels, and to God himfelf ; whereas it is properly the joint Ad or Operation of pure Spirit and Matter in ef- iential Conjunction ; and on the other hand they attribute Thinking or Reafon both to Men and Brutes as Mere Matter^ without any Union with an immaterial Subftance ; and both with equal Abfurdity. That which de- ceives Men in this latter Opinion is, that in all their Realbnings in favour of Brutes, they ever confound the a&ual Senjftive Perception thefe have of outward Qb'jeffs, with the Knowledge we have of the Ideas of thole Objects after they are lodged in the Imagination : Whereas the fimple Apprehenfion of the Mind \ "Judging in all its Inftances ; Reafoning, and all the Ope- rations of the Intellect are moftly imploy'd and the Understanding. 193 and exercifed immediately upon Ideas, and not upon their external Obje&s. This it is which evidently mews the Ne- ceffity of an immaterial Principle in Man ; for the Action or Impremon of Matter upon Mat- ter, may occafion many, and very diftinct Ideas ; but thefe are as yet nothing more than fo many immediate lenfitive Perceptions of the outward Object conveyed to the Imagination ; which may from within prompt and excite Animals to many Operations : But being only confequent to the fimple Perceptions of the Objects, and not being any New Perception or Apprehenfion of the Ideas themfelves, it is a Degree of Knowledge which can receive no other Increafe than what proceeds from a Re- newal or Repetition of the fame or like Im- preffions ; unlefs there were a Principle above Matter to apprehend the Ideas themfelves, to judge of them, and to realbn upon them. Without this there can be nothing beyond a bare Perception or Idea of the Object, which is lboner or later worn out as there are new Impreffions of different Objects ; or according to the Difpofition of thofe refined and ipiritu- ous Parts of the Frame which are more im- mediately fubfervient to the Imagination, the Seat of thofe Ideas. All hitherto is but a naked Perception of the outwarcflObject } but when thefe Ideas are O once 194 Procedure of once ftamp'd, what fhould begin Jnew to ope- rate upon them ? To take a View of them ; to alter and tranfpofe them at pleamre \ to enlarge and diminiih \ to divide, compare, and compound ; to draw Inferences from them ; and weigh and confider all their mutual Re- lations and Dependencies ? Surely not Mere Matter, which could do no more than either heave lmprefilons of itfelf, or Retain thofelm- preflions when they are made ; and by that means caufe a fimple bare Perception of the external Object ; but could not proceed one Step farther towards any Higher Operation Upon that Impreilion or Idea. T o clear up what hath been faid, and en- force this Argument, I fhall reduce the diffe- rence between that Knowledge and Perfection which is in us, and that merely Senfitive Percep- tion which is in Brutes, to thefe lew fhort Ob- servations. I. All Perception in Brutes is immediately of the external Objeth themiel ves ; but the Ideas of them arc the immediate Obje&s of the In- tellect in Man. They have a bare naked Per- ception of the fenfible Object only ; we have a farther Perception or Apprehenfion of the Idea itfelf in Diftindlion from the Object and Sepa- rate from it. By the Idea they have a Percep- tion of the Obje£t\ by the In f llj rf we appre- hend the Idea. * 2. The the Understanding. ipj 2. The Knowledge of Brutes terminates in Ideas ; ours only Begins there. 3. Their fimple Ideas of Senfation are the whole Extent of all their Knowledge ; whereas they are only the Groundwork and firft Materials of ours. 4. I f their Ideas are ever fb little defaced or decayed, they can never be repaired but by a New Imprefiion of the Object : Ours can be renewed and revived again, when faded, by voluntary Recollection Without the Object, which is truly and properly Memory. 5. They NeceJ/arify follow the Inftinct and Prompting of their fenfitive Ideas in all their Operations ; we can regulate all our Operati- ons even in Oppofition and contrariety to them. 6". They cannot Alter the Nature, or Pro- portion, or Diipofition of any of their Ideas ; we can Tranfpofe, and Alter, and Compound them even Againfl Nature. II. The other fort of Abftraction is called Metaphyseal, and is faid to be performed by taking the Mind intirely off from all the Ob- jects, or rather Ideas of Senfation, and all its Compositions out of them ; and from all thole Complex Notions and Conceptions of things in O a this i Cf6 Procedure of this World, which are made up of Ideas of Senfe confidered together with the Mind's ope- rations upon them ; in order to form Abjlraft Ideas of Heavenly Things and Incorporeal Be- ings. But this is utterly impracticable in this l^ife, as any one may find upon a Trial ; af- ter the utmoft Efforts of the pureft Intellect, to conceive or frame luch an Abjlratf Idea, he will find his Attempt vain and trifling. If any one fuch Idea could be aiTigned, and a pro- per Name found out for it, we might the lefs wonder how Men could puriue this Notion lb far as they do, to the great Obftruclion of true Knowledge, and perplexity of human Underftanding. I f we Abjlrati intirely from Material Sub- itance and its Properties, we mould have no Idea nor indeed Conlcioulhels of Being at all ; for that could never enter into the Mind with- out the Idea of ibmething actualy Exifting up- on which to exercife our Thoughts ; and fince the Mind can Directly perceive nothing actualy exifting but what is Material, our very Idea of Exiftence mull: take its Yirjl Rife from thence. If we abftracr, totaly and intirely from winking, we can have no Conception at all of the Know- ledge of any Incorporeal Being ; therefore Yhink- ing, which is the joint Operation of pure Spi- rit and Body united, is the beft Notion and Re- frejentation we can have of that Knowledge, which is performed without any Concurrence i or the Understanding. 197 or Communication with Matter. If we ab- ftracl, I lay, intirely from our linking, which includes the Labour of the Brain ; we could form no Notion or Conception of the Wlfdom of Spirits in general, muchlefsof theWifdom of God ; and therefore for Want of any luch abftracl Notion or Idea, which Men are pleas'd to lpeak fo much of, we are forced to lubftitute that of our thinking, to reprefent an inconceiv- able Correfpondent Perfection which is in God. So if we totaly abftracl: from the Notion of Qower in Man, we fhall have neither a Word, Idea, or Notion left for that incomprehenfible Perfection in God called by the lame Name ; and thus it is with his Goodne/s, and with all other Perfections which we attribute to him. The Cafe is the very fame in the Myfte- ries of Chriftianity. If we totaly and intirely abftracl: from the Ideas or Notions we have of Father ', Son, and Spirit in the ftriclly literal and proper Signification of the Words, when lpoke of Men j we can have no Notion or Concep- tion at all of any perlbnal Diftinclion in the Divine Nature : And therefore it is that God, in Condeicention to our only way of Knowledge by the Operations of the Intellect upon Ideas of Senlation, hath thus revealed that Myftery to us for which we could have had no luch Jb- Jlrafl; Notion or Idea ; and conlequently no Idea or Conception At all, if it were not to be con- ceived by the Mediation and Subjiitution of O 3 fuch i?8 Procedure of fuch as were plain and familiar to us. If we abftrad intirely from a (Price, (purchaje, or Redemption among Men ; we could have no (Purely IntelleBtial or Jbjlratf Notion or Idea of the real worth and value of the Blood of Chrift to obtain Salvation for us ; and confe- quently no Notion or Idea at all of it : There- fore this Myftery is reveal'd to us under that Analogical or borrowed Conception among Us y which is moft liiitable and anfwerable to the Nature of that Divine Price or Purchafe ; to that Value and Merit which, as it is in its own Nature , is utterly incomprehenfible to us. And laftly, fhould we abftrad intirely from the Notion we have of a Man's interceding to a Prince, in behalf of a Criminal ; we fhould have no Notion or Idea left in the Mind to reprefent that Intercejjion, which Chrift makes in our behalf to God. Thus I might run thro* all other Inftances of Divine Things, and iriew how we can form no Ideas or Conceptions of them intirely Ab- Jlraffied from thofe of Senjation, and the Opera- tions of our Minds upon them \ and that when we Attempt to do fo y we can neither think nor fpeak at all of them. The true Ab fir ac- tion (if Men Will call it by that Name) con- lifts, not in thus afpiring above the Power and Reach of all human Underftanding, and hunt- ing after Ideas or Conceptions of Divine Things and incorporeal Beings intirely abftracted from all the Understanding. 199 all Senfation, and totaly independent of it : But in altogether laying afide that vain and fruitlefs Attempt, and in fubftituting the only Notions we have, and which are Natural^ and Eafy, and Familiar ', to Repre/ent and Stand For thofe immaterial heavenly Things, of whole real Nature and Properties we can otherwiie obtain no Notion or Idea ; and in raifing and transferring our Thoughts thus, from the Lite-' ralStritf Propriety of thofe Words and Phrafes, in which we exprels them ; to that Analogical Import and Signification of them, by which they are as it were fanctified and fpiritualized. That is, by confidering each of the Concep- tions we thus fubftitute, as repreienting a real and Correfpondent ', but Inconceivable Nature or Perfection, of which we cannot in our prefent State form any Abftraffi Idea or Notion • or in- deed any other Conception at all, than by Me- diation of the Ideas and Notions of this World. This is the True and only Ah ft ration we are capable of with regard to Things fpiritual ; which, we lee, is ib far from being intirely in- dependent of all Ideas of Senfation^ and the im- mediate Operations of the Intellect upon Them (as lome would have it) that we can no other- wile think and fpeak of fuch Objects than in thefe worldly and human Symbols ; and that if we abftracl: from Thefe^ we mull: at the fame time abftracl from All thought of heavenly and fupernatural Beings, and can have neither Names nor Ideas for them. O 4 Thus 200 Procedure of Thus might we reaffume all the forego- ing Inftances, and fhevv how we are capable of no other abftraft Notions of the Exiftence and Attributes of God and pure Spirit, than filch analogical Repreientations as I have defcribed; unlefs Men will ftill call thefe Abjirafl and purely Intellectual Ideas, becaufe they ftand in the Mind for what is Incomprehenfible, and of which we can have no proper abftracl: Ideas or Notions at all. When we employ our Thoughts on the Myftery of the trinity for inftance, it is not to be done by aiming at any db ft raff in- tellectual Ideas of that incomprehenfible Unity and Diftinclion in the Divine Nature ; which can never be obtained : But by exercifing our Mind on thofe Subftituted Conceptions in which that Myftery is revealed to us ; by confidering the familiar Notions of a Father and Son by Nature, together with the belt Conception we can form of our own Spirit which is united to Matter, as the only Correfpondent Reprefenta^ tions we can have of that Divine Diftin&ion ; and by taking thole Terms in the Analogical Sence, as being expreffive of what is Anfwer- able, tho' Still inconceivable in the Divine Na- ture, Now in proceeding thus we mull: necefla- rily infer, that if this Myftery is revealed to us under fuch Analogical Refemblances as evi- dently imply a Real and cventperJdnalDiftmc- tion ; the Understanding. 201 tion ; we are to think and fpeak of it as fiicb, or not think or fpeak of it at all. I here leave the Reader to run over all the other Myfteries of Chriftianity in his own Mind ; as well as every thing in Natural Religion relating to the Nature of God, and the things of another World ; and fee whether this is not the True Abstraction ? And whether any thing hath been of more fatal Conlequence to Religion, than mhtaking it for an airy fanciful Purfuit of Abjlratt Notions, and Purely Intellectual 'Ideas of things altogether imperceptible and incon- ceivable as they are In themfehes, by the help of even the molt exalted Notions we can form? I mail only give the Hint here, that this true Abftraction, or rather transferring of the Mind from our Ideas and Notions of things tempo- ral, to thole fpiritual Things which are thus re- prefented by them ; holds not only with re- iped to the Under (landing, but alio the Will and Affections of an human Soul : Which are never by any Diretf and Immediate Operation em- ployed on Abjlratf intellectual Ideas of heavenly Things ; but are then lifted up from Earth to Heaven when they are exercifed on our com- mon and natural Ideas or Notions considered as Types, which reprefent anfwerable incon- ceivable Antitypes. Thus are our Lave, Joy, Fear, Hope, Dejjre, Gratitude employed, not Immediately upon any dired Ideas of the real Perfections of God or Heavenly Bli/s, which are Jncomprehenfible j but upon the Analogous Conceptions 2.02 Procedure of Conceptions we form of the Goodnefs and 240 Procedure of This is ftri&ly Knowledge or Science^ and necefTarily ex- cludes all Belief in ge- neral, and Faith pro- perly $0 calFd, and all AfTent of the Mind upon the Testimony of others. This Proportion contains Matter of pure Speculation or theory only ; and it re- quires no Concurrence bringing Men to fix and ascertain their mo- ral Notions and Con- ceptions by the rfrue Meafure or Standard. Here we may be faid both to Know and to Believe the lame Proportion, in natural or reveal'd Religion. To Know it upon the utmoft moral Proof and Evidence ; and to Believe it in general, becaufe the voluntary Concurrence of thcWill is requifite to that An- ient of the Mind, and it is not extorted. And it is alio ^Religious Faith when there is a lull Concurrence of the Will and Heart to it, Subjequent to that AC- fent of the Intellect. As there is a Con- currence of the Will requifite in order to influence the AfTent of the Intellect to the Truth the Understanding. 241 of the ^///either rfo or truth of this Propofi- after the AfTent of the tion ; fo muft it af- IntellecT:; fo that the terwards continue to Practical Ufes of it are Clofe with that AfTent merely accidental. in order to regulate our Pratfice, and to lway and influence the Manners of Men , which is then a truly tyrafiical Faith* t. From the very different and even op- pofite Nature of Mural Certainty , and that which is ftricHy Demonflrative and Mathematical 'put in- to this Light ; it muft appear Firft, that there is as little room for the latter in Morality and Natural Religion, as in Revelation. To make this Point the more evident, I have taken for my inftance the fundamental Truth of all Na- tural and Revealed Religion, and which of all others is prefumed to be the moft ftrictly de- monftrable. The Proportion is undoubtedly and unqueftionably true ; it hath the higheft /and of Evidence the nature of the thing will admit of: It is founded upon the plaineft .R&z- Jun and the utmoft Moral Certainty ; fo as to Demand and Claim the AfTent of the Intellect ; and render itsDiflentinexcufable Partiality and Wickednefs. But that it is not ftricrly Demon ft ra- hle is plain from the very Exijlence of a Deity being revealed in Scripture by the name i" am, which is in other Words, I exijl ; and from R that 242, Procedure of that faying, T'he Fool hath fa) din his Heart there is no God: For if there were any One demon- strative Argument, or a Mathematical Cer- tainty for it, this would render all Other Ar- guments either from Scripture or Reajbn in- tirely needlels ; and there could not be fuch a thing as a fpeculative Atheift in the World • whereas the Experience of all Ages hath fhewn, that there are many fuch Fools, otherwile of great Learning and natural Sagacity, who have argued that there is no God. They have indeed varied much in their Manner of doing this j fbme who denied the Exiftence of a Deity, have however allowed a Firft Caufe ; others who allow'd a Firjl Caufe, have deny'd it to be an Intelligent Agent ; others who allow him to be an Intelligent Agent, yet deny his (Provi- dence j and lbme who allow his Providence , have however corrupt Notions of his Attributes, and fuch as by immediate Conlequence deftroy his very Exiftence. And we are not without a lamentable Inftance, even in our own times, of a Qerfon of great natural Sagacity and dole Application ; who hath firft undertaken to Demonjlrate the Exiftence Of One God Only, by a Chain of Metaphyfical Deductions : And yet afterwards hath publifh'd another Book of no fmall Bulk to demonftrate, by the fame dint of Metaphyfics, the Exiftence of More Gods than One -, tho' if you ftrip both thefe Under- takings out of their Metaphyfical Drefs, the irreconcileable Inconfiftency and Contradiction between the Understanding. 243 between them will be evident to common Sence and Reafon ; and nothing will appear plainer, than that there can be no Demonjira- tion for the Exiftence of One God, but what muft conclude as neceflariiy againft the Exi- ftence of any Other God whatlbever, Co-ordi- nate or Inferiour. When the Reader's Aftonilhment is over, how this Palpable Monjircus InconhTiency ftiould pafs with fuch Currency and Smooth- neis as it hath done, and without a general Ob- fervation and Abhorrence ; I fhall go on to re- mark, that if there were any one clear de- monftrative Argument of apparent Mathema- tical Certainty for the Exiftence of a Deity and his Attributes, then all that Variety of Opinions would fall of Courfe ; nor would there be any fuch thing as Idolatry, or worfhip- ping more Gods than one : And what is yet more ftrange, wholbever was capable of un- derftanding that Form of Demonftration might be faid indeed to Know there is a God ; and yet not Believe in him, according to the proper Acceptation of a Religious Faith. Alas ! no- thing is farther from the Nature of Mathema- tical Certainty, than Metaphyseal Abjlraciions \ and Mankind would be in a delperate Con- dition indeed, if they were to depend upon fuch Abftra&ions for the fundamental Point of all Religion natural and reveal'd ; and were to be conducted by a Spider's Clue thro' an R 1 intricate 244 Procedure of intricate Maze of nice and thinipun notional Abftractions, before they could arrive at this Conclufion, therefore there is a God\ or which is in Effect or Coniequence the very fame, therefore there is but One God. That Mathematical Certainty is not to be had but in things Mathematical, and that Demonftration properly ib call'd can have no Plate in Morality or 'Natural Religion, hath been the general Opinion of the Wife and Learned ; accordingly it is a faying of Jamblicus, T'hat Demonjlrations are not to be expected in Matters concerning God and things Divine. And in an excellent Treatife of natural Religion (which went thro' the Hands of two great and Learn- ed Prelates of our own ; and which hath more Force of Argument and Uriel: Realbning in it, than all the Abftra&ed and Metaphyfical Tracts which have fince appeared upon that Subject) there is another faying full to the fame Pur pole. Do Men expect Mathematical Proof and Certainty in moral 'Things r JVhy y they may as well expert to fee with their Ears, and hear with their Eyes. The endeavouring to gratify Men in that unreafonable Expectation is not only Abjhrd, as being altogether impracticable ; but hath been of Pernicious Coniequence in theie two Refpects. Fir/l, As the Writers in this way have furnilhed the World with an handle for think- the Understanding. 245 thinking that nothing in natural Religion is to be regarded as ftrictly Obligatory, farther than it is capable of liich demonftrative Proof: And fince the Nature of it will not admit this, the unavoidable Mifcarriage of all who attempt it is of no fmall Prejudice to the Caufe they would thus maintain by A Zeal without Knowledge, For I appeal to any obferving Perfon, whether the Effect and Confequence of it hath not al- ready been, the fupporting and encouraging Libertines and Unbelievers in their Demands for Demonftrative Certainty and Evidence in every Point both of Faith and c Praffice ? And whe* ther every Thing now publifhed in Religion is not too generaly look'd upon with Contempt, which hath not fome Air and Appearance at leaft of demonftrative Certainty and Evidence? The diicerning Men among Infidels, Free- thinkers, and Libertines do well know that fuch Evidence is never to be obtained either for Natural or Reveal 'd Religion ; and that no- thing can contribute more to the Advantage of their Caufe, than thus drawing off their Antago- nists from a truly rational and lolid way of Ar^ gument, and putting them upon an impoflible Task ; wherein they mull: necefTarily wafte and confume all their Strength and Vigour in empty Noife\ and Flourijh, and Beating of the Air. Secondly, As it is a direct Injinuation againft all Reveal d Religion ; for if mere Morality is (tri&ly Demonftrabky and Revelation is capable R 3 of ij[6 Procedure of of no more than Moral Evidence y then this kit can never be upon an equal Foot of Certainty and Evidence with natural Religion. This Con- iequence is lb obvious that all who are evily inclin'd to Revelation mult plainly fee it; and they accordingly infill: upon Mathematical Certainty and Evidence in Religion, and relifh nothing but what hath a Colour at leait of De- monftration : And from thence it is that all our new-fangled Metaphyseal Morality is grown into Mode and Fafhion ; and that our Modern Writers upon that Subject have unwarily formed their Dilcourfes to the prevailing Tafte and Genius of an Unbelieving Age. i. Another thing which appears from the above Oppofition is, that notwithstanding the greateffc Evidence we have for natural Religion, it however includes a Religious Faith ; and that this Faith, as it ought to be, is Founded on the utmoft Moral Certainty. When from a full Proof and Evidence to their Realbn, Men have given their AlTent to the Exiftence of a Deity ; and from thence have inferr'd that he muft have all incomprehenfible Perfection, and infinitely greater than we can imagine ; and have accordingly fubftituted the high- eft Perfections difcemible in the Creature, and in our human Nature in particular, to ftand for his inconceivable Perfections : Then the hearty Concurrence of the Will to that great and fundamental Truth improves and Completes it t the Understanding. 247 it into a Religious Faith in God, and in all his Attributes ; and Inclines the Mind to the Dis- charge and Performance of all thole Duties which are deduced from them by the Light of Nature; ib that without Faith it is Impojjible to pleaje God in any Religion. Faith, in the ftrid Propriety of the Word, is as necelTary in Natural Religion, as in Reveal'd ; for tho* we have the Utmo/l (Proof and Moral Evidence for the Exiftence of a Deity, which is ib far Knowledge only : Yet ftill becaule the Intrinfc Nature of God and his Effential Attributes are utterly Incomprehenfible and ineffable, and can be no Immediate Objects of our Understanding; Men mult Indirectly, and by the- mediation of their Subftitutes, give the JJpnt of the Intellect here, as well as the Confent of the Will, to the truth of things as Myflerious as any in all re- veal'd Religion ; and which they are obliged to conceive and apprehend by the lame Analogy we do all the Myfteries of Chriltianity. 3. The laft thing I mall obferve from the different Nature of Moral and Mathematical 'Cer-r taint y is, that Evangelical Faith (which as we fee adds no more to that which is neceflary in natural Religion than the believing the Word of God, whole Exiftence and Attributes we were obliged to believe before) is no Precarious or Implicit Aflent of the Mind. The cafe here is the very lame as it is in Natural Religion ; we have the utmoft moral Certainty and Evi- R 4 dence 248 Procedure of dence for the Scriptures being the Word of God, or a Supernatural Revelation from Heaven -, we neither give our Affent to this great Truth our felvcs, nor defire that others fhould do fo, but upon the utmoft moral Certainty and Evidence Men are capable of receiving for a Truth or Fad of that Nature. Now whether they Are fuch or Not ? is no immediate Point of Faith, but of Knowledge -, and if Men, lway'd and in- fluenced by Prejudice or Prepollefiion againft plain and full realbnable Evidence, with-hold the Affent of the Intelkft here ; there can be no iiibfequent Concurrence of the Will, and confe- quently no Evangelical Faith. But if the Aj- 'fent of the Intellect is given to that great Truth, and there is moreover a Concurrence of the Heart and Will ; then Men act juft in the fame Manner they did before in natural Re- ligion: They give the Affent of the Mind to Truths in the Word of God, no more Incom- frehenjible nor otherwife Myfterious than his Na- ture and Attributes 5 to things as Eajjly con- ceiv'd and expreffed by the very lame Analogy ; things whofe real Nature admits of as little In- trinfick Immediate Proof or Evidence ; and ac- cordingly do afterwards fuffer thefe myfterious Truths to Infmence their Lives and Practice ; •and that is a complete Evangelical Faith. These two things therefore in refpect of Evangelical Faith, are of no imall Confequence to be rightly diftinguifhed in all our Contro- vexfies with the Adverlaries of Revelation. i B The the Understanding. 249 I. The firft is, the Jffent of the Under- ■(landing to the Truth of any Proportion upon Sufficient Undoubted Evidence or a Moral Certain- ty j which is thus far merely Knowledge, and of a very different and feparate Confideration in itfelf. Here then we are to fix our Foot, and join Iflue with all Ranks of Unbelievers upon the Point of Knowledge only. For as in Natural Religion the firft and great Queftion is not, Whether we Believe the Exiftence of a God ? But whether there Is a God ? So the firft and main Point to be decided with Regard to Re- velation is not, Whether we Believe the Scrip- tures to be the Word of God ? But whether they realy Are fo ? And whether we have fuf- ficient Realbn to Know they are fo ? Whe- ther we will yield the AfTent of the Intellect to that great Point of Knowledge, as to a Truth founded upon the utmoft Moral Proof and E- vidence the Nature of the Thing will bear, and that we are now Capable of receiving ? Nay, fuch Proof and Evidence as would be not only a full Conviction to the Underftanding in any Matters of the fame kind merely temporal and Human ; but much greater than 'They can ad- mit of. This Point of Knowledge in general is firft to be decided ; and when there is zxl Jf- fent of the Under/landing to it, then the Con- currence of the Witt and its clofing with it, which is Subfequent to that Knowledge, com- pletes an Evangelical Faith, And the Procedure 250 Procedure of is thus, As, when the Exigence of a Deity is af- fented to, in natural Religion, upon full Moral (Proof and Evidence, Men Believe in the incom- prehensible Nature and Attributes of God : So upon the JJfent of the Under/landing in general to the Scriptures being a divine Revelation ', the Jf- Cent of the Intellect, and Confent of the Will is yielded to all the particular Doctrines contained in them ; tho' Jome of them relate likewi/e to things as incomprehenjrble, as the real intrinfic Nature of God and his Divine Jttributes. Thus we fee that Men muft Know, before they can rightly Believe -, and have a full Con- viction of their "Judgment upon fufficient Evi- dence, before there is any clofing of the Will to Complete the Nature of Evangelical Faith -, which is literaly as the Apoftle defines it, The Evidence of things not feen, or the AfTent of the Understanding to the truth and Exiftence of things Inconceivable, upon certain and evi- dent Proof of their Reality in their Symbols and Reprefentatives. This fhews the ftrange Incon- flitency of thole Men who reject the Faith of Chriftian Myfteries, under Colour of want- ing Strict Reafon and Evidence ; for as it is their preient Guilt, ib the Ground of their Condem- nation hereafter will be their Want of Know- ledge, when they had all the proper Means of attaining it ; and that they did not yield the jj/pnt of the Under/landing upon the fame or greater Moral Certainty and Evidence, than would the Understanding. 2ji would be a full Conviction to them in Matters merely Human of the fame Sort. That they withheld that Affent either thro' tyajjion or (Prejudice ; or for want of application to weigh and confider the Force of that Evidence ; and that they infilled upon a Sort of Proof and E- vidence, which is proper only to a quite diffe- rent Kind of Knowledge, and fiich as would render all Religious Faith impracticable. The Influence of the Will upon the Affent of the Intellect to Truths capable of Moral £- vidence only, is lb great, that if Men were once well enough inclined to Morality and Natural Religion, to wifh the Gofpel and all the Doc* trines and (precepts in it were true ; they would loon difcern the prevailing Strength of that Moral Evidence which Claims and Demands the Affent of the Underftanding ; as Chrift himfelf obferves, John vii. 1 7. idv ns MXy If any Man is willing, or difpofed, to Db the Will of God whatever it appears to be, He Jhall Know 0/ the Doflrine, whether it be of Godj Or whether I fpeak of my felf But when Men are byaffed and blinded by their Immoralities and Violations of Natural Religion ; then the plainelt Evidence even of Senfation for the Truth of any Doctrine, may be Evaded', as the Jews the fenfitive Evidence of Miracles for our Saviour's Divine Million ; nay tho' they called them Miracles, yet they attributed the Power by which they were wrought to Beel-r Zebufc ijl Procedure of 2ebub the Prince of the Devils : Arid the Ro- manifts at this Day obftinately elude the cleareft Evidence of their Senfes in the Point of Tran- fubftantiation, by refolving an Heap of Con- tradictions both to Senfe and Reafon, into the Almighty Power of God. The cleareft Evi- dence and Conviction of Self-Confcioufnefs may be ftitled and loft for want of a due Attention and Regard to it ; and thus Multitudes have overturned the glaring irrefragable Evidence of their own Minds for a Freedom of Will, by Ar- guments drawn from God's c Prefcience and De- crees , which is oppofing the Evidence of Rea- Jbfiy to that of Self-Confcioufnefs ; a Knowledge of equal, if not greater Truth and Certainty than that of Realbn, and which ought not therefore to be confronted with it. So again, may the utmoft Degree of Moral Certainty al- ways admit of fome Evafion or other ; as the Jews evaded all the Arguments of Chrift ibr his Divine Miflion, drawn from Types and ^Prophecies ; they were realy Blind to the Force of them from inveterate Prepoffellion and Pre- judice ; and the Perverfenefs of their Wills quite obftructed all Affent of the Intellect to the Truth of his Doctrine. This is the very De- scription given of them by our Saviour him- ielf. 'They Seeing, fee not ; and Hearing, they hear not, neither do they Under ft and: which was not from any Natural Defect in their Intellec- tuals, nor for want of the Utmoft Moral Evi- dence , but as he obierves, Becaufe their Heart 4 was the Understanding. 253 was grofs, and Lejl they Jbould Understand with their Heart. Thus neceffary to the Aflent of the In- tellect, even where there is the utmoft Moral Certainty and Evidence, is the Concurrence of the Heart and Will, and an intire freedom from all Prejudice and PrepofTeflion \ and therefore the Guilt and Hypocrify of the Jews coniifted in this, that they were not as ready to give their Affent upon a Moral Certainty and Evi- dence in Matters of Religion, as in things in- different and Merely Human, They could ob- lerve that when the Skie was Red in the Even-' ing, it was a Sign of Fair Weather the Day fol- lowing ; and if Red and Lowring in the Morn- ing, it was a Sign of Foul Weather that Day : But they Could not difcern the Signs of the 'times, and of that 7)me in particular wherein there was a Completion of all the antient Prophecies from the Beginning of the World, relating to the perfonal Appearance of the Meffiah ; and for this Reafon it is that we findChrift upbraid- ing them not fo much for want of Faith, as for their ftupid and wilful Ignorance ; calling them Fools and Blind, as being deftitute of that Know- ledge which ought to have been the Foundation of their Faith in the promiled Meffiah. 2. T h e other thing neceffary to be obferved in relation to Evangelical Faith is, that Con- fent of the Will and Concurrence of the Heart which 2j4 Procedure of which is Sub/eqaent to the AfTent of the Intel- led, and founded upon it ; and is to be well diftinguifhed from any Influence of the Will which is Qrwr to that AiTent. Every AfTent of the Mind to the Truth of any Propofition capable of Moral Evidence only, hath been promifcuoufly and indifferently call'd a Believ- ing it, to the great Confufion of our way of Thinking and Speaking. Every AiTent of the Mind to any Truth in Religion is not Faith, tho' all Faith is an AiTent of the Mind. This general Word Belief muft. therefore be well di- ftinguifhed, into that AfTent of the Mind which is properly Knowledge ; and the Concurrence of the Heart and Will which Completes and im- proves it into a Religious Faith, Confequent to that Knowledge and Founded upon it. The AiTent of the Intellect, or 'Judgment of the Mind, mult be Firjl fixed or determined, in relation to any Propofition whatfbever in Re- ligion ; the Propofition mull: be perfectly In- telligible, and the Truth of it muft appear from a Moral Evidence, fufficient for a Full Con- viction of the ftri&eft Reafbn : So that it muft be a Point of Knowledge, Before that full Con- lent of the Will and clofing of the Heart with that Point of Knowledge, which renders it both Faith and Knowledge at the fame time ; nor Can there be an Immediate AfTent of the In- tellect, or Concurrence of the Will to any Pro- pofition containing what is Unconceivable or In- comprehenjible } whatibever is fo } cannot be a i Direft the Understanding. 2jy Direff and Immediate Object either of Know- ledge or Faith. I fhall explain this by a few Inftances, as particularly in this Proposition. 'Then is a God. This mull be firft well [/>/- derjlood ; for tho' the whole Nature of God, and of all his Real intrinfic Attributes is utterly incomprehenfible ; yet we apprehend them all clearly, and they become very obvious and in- telligible in their types or Analogical Reprelen- tations ; particularly the Operations and Per- fections of an human Mind. The Propofition is then ^Proved from the Light of Nature or Revelation, or from both ; and the unpreju- diced Mind yields an AfTent to it upon the apparent reafonable and Moral Evidence there is for it; and this Ajfent, or Belief in General, as 'tis fometimes named, or Speculative Faith (as lome call it) is realy fo far properly Knowledge. But when the Will doles intirely with that Affent, and there is a Concurrence of the Hearty as well as of the Head to this great Truth ; which doth ever more or leis influence the Life and Manners of Men, in Proportion to the Attention and Application of their Minds to it ; then it becomes a Religious Faith found- ed upon the utmoft Moral Proof and Certainty : And as what is Intelligible in that Propofition, is the Immediate Object both of our Knowledge and Faith ; fo the Remote and Mediate Object of them both, is the Incotnprehenftble Nature and real Intrinjtc Attributes of the Divinity. Thus i$6 Procedure of Thus again, tfhe Scriptures are the Word of God, or A Divine Revelation. If from the Mi- racles of our Saviour ; the exaft and full Com- pletion of Scripture Prophecies, from the Be- ginning of the World, centering in him only, and in no other Perfon whatioever ; together with that Improvement and Exaltation of Na* tural Religion and Morality which is apparent thro' the whole Tenor of the Scriptures ; If, I lay, by Arguments drawn from thefe and iuch like Topics Men void of Prejudice yield an AlTent to the Truth of this Propofition, it is ftill but Knowledge founded upon the utmoft Moral Certainty : And then it becomes pro- perly Evangelical Faith, when there is a full Content of the Will and a Concurrence of the Heart, together with an intire Refolution of yielding an AfTent to the Truth of every Pro- pofition contained in them \ and when this pro- ceeds on to a ready Obedience, and to an actu- al Performance of the Precepts of the Gofpel, it may then properly be called a ^PraBical Faith, Again, Chrift Shall change our vile Body, that it may be like unto his glorious Body. This Propofition is as Intelligible as any other where- in we affert one thing, or one Man to be Like another. When from the Proofs of the Scrip- tures in general being the Word of God, a Per- ion unprejudiced yields the AlTent of the In- teUed the Understanding. l$? telleft to the Truth of this Propofition, he in ftrict Propriety may be faid to Know it : But the Chrijlian Faith founded upon this Inftance of Knowledge, is a clofing of the Heart and Will with what appears to be true from full Proof and Evidence ; the Confequence of which is a lively Hope and Expectation of that great Change, tho' we know nothing of the true Real Nature and Manner of it, and do therefore reverence and regard it as a Myjlerious incomprehenfible Truth. Once more, Chriji ever Viveth to make In- tercejffion for us. This Proportion is as intel- ligible as that wherein one Man is faid to in- tercede for another j and the Truth of it de- pends upon the lame Moral Proof and Evi- dence with that foregoing. If a Perfon obfti- nately with-holds his Affent to the Truth of this Propofition it is wilful Ignorance properly, and Blindnels in the midft of the cleareft Means of Knowledge. If he yields the AfTent of the- Intellecl:, this may be call'd Believing it in the general and confuted Sence of that Term, as we are faid to Believe any thing we Know upon Moral Evidence. And then this Knowledge is improved to Evangelical Faith, when the full Confent and Concurrence of the Will falls in with it ; which is followed by a Reliance upon this Interceffion, tho' the tfrue Nature and Man- ner of this Divine Performance are ib incompre- henfible ? that we can know nothing more of S it 158 Procedure of it, than that it cannot be after the fame Man- ner with any Human Interceffion, by which it is, however, reprefented \ or even Angelic^ if it were poflible for us to have any Notion of fuch Interceffion. If it is here objected, that I place the diftin- guifhing Character of Evangelical Faith in the Ad of the Will, Subfequent to that Aflent of the Intellect which is properly Knowledge ; and not in the Aflent of the Mind to things Incom- frehenjible, w r hich leems to be the very thing that makes it ^Properly Faith. I anfwer, that the Aflent of the Mind to the Reality and £*- ifience of things Incomprehenjible, is not to be Excluded Trom the Nature of Evangelical Faith, for it mult Mediately and Ultimately refer to what is Incomprehenjibk. But then this is of an After and Secondary Confideration ; and the true Nature of a Religious Faith is to be clearly ftated and relblved in refpecl of what is Direcily and Immediately underftood and comprehended, before any thing which is neither underftood nor comprehended can come into the Account, or be efteemed a neceflary Ingredient of it either in Natural or Reveal'd Religion. To explain this let us inftance in the fundamental Propofition of all Reveal'd Religion - y and the rather becaufe it was delivered by an audible Voice from Heaven. s». IS the Understanding. 259 l'his is my beloved Son* That which makes this a Point of Know- ledge, is the Jffent of the Intellect to the Truth of it, as a Proposition Intelligible and perfectly Under flood as any thing in human Language ; and upon the utmoft Moral Qroof and Evi- dence of its being fpoken from Heaven : This is Believing it in the General Acceptation of that Term, as you may be faid to Believe any Pro- pofition even in Civil Matters, which is fb proved and underftood. That therefore which makes it a Religious Faith muft be fome Far- ther Concurrence of the Will than what was neceffary to make it Knowledge ; and that is a doling of the Heart with it as a Proportion in Religion ; and a full Perfuaiion of the Mind that Chrift (not in any Unintelligible Manner, but) according to what the Words at firft Hear- ing Plainly import, is the Son of Ged in as T^rue and Real a Sence, as one Man is the Son of another. He who believes thus far, and efleems and reverenceth Chrift as luch ; without any Far- ther refped to what is Incomprehenjible in that Propofition, namely the Supernatural Generation, and the divine ineffable Manner of it ; hath an Orthodox Evangelical Faith. What then, you will lay, becomes of the fo much controverted 1 1 Myftmes of the Gofpel, and our Faith in them ? S a They 160 Procedure of They arc all very fecure, and what is Myfte- rwus in the Propofitions of the Goipel is all laid up out of our reach, to be the Direct and iw- mediate Objects of our Knowledge when we come to fee Face to Face ; and we are Now only to know and believe that they are Incomprehen- fible. But you will ask again, What then be- comes of Divine Jnalogy, and of our Conceptions of things Spiritual by Symbol and Repreienta- tion ; and of what ufe is this, if the AfTent to what is IncomPrehenJible in them, is not the fole Dijlingmjmng Mark of Evangelical Faith ? I anlwer, that there was true Evangelical Faith in the World long before that Analogy was ever thought of; or the true Manner of our con- ceiving things Divine and Spiritual by Symbol and Reprefentation only, came to be confi- dered and rightly adjufted. Men truly Or- thodox Believed as far as they Vnderjlood ; and did not perplex or embarrais either their own Heads or the Chriftian Faith, with any nice and intricate Notions and Conceptions of what was utterly incomprehenfible ; it being no matter of Duty or Obligation in refpe£t either of their Knowledge or Faith ; and it being on the contrary matter of Duty to know and believe what they Under 'flood, and not to con- cern themfelves with thole fecret things which belong to God alone. They took every Pro- portion in the mod plain and Obvious Signifi- cation the Understanding. i6i cation of the Words, and yielded the Jffent of the Intellect, and the Confent of the Will and Concurrence of the Heart to it as Such ; they believed it as Far as it was Intelligible, and ne- ver did exprefly take what was Incomprehenji- ble into the Account of either their Knowledge or Faith ; and it had been happy for the Chri- ftian World if it had continued fo to this Day. But fince Infidels and Heretics began, on the quite Contrary, in all their Controversies with the Orthodox, intirely to overlook or lay afjde whatever was plain and Obvious and In- telligible in the Doctrines and Myfteries of the Golpel ; and to raiie many Doubts and Diffi- culties about what is altogether Unintelligible or Incomprehenfible ; fince they now oppole what we can have no Direct Conception or Idea of, to what is plain and obvious and eafily un- derftood ; and charge what is Intelligible with Abfurdity and Contradiction, by arguing from an intrinfic Incomprehenjjbk Nature ; wherein they cannot judge or diicern what is, or is not Conjiftent with it. And fince they labour to render the Chriftian Faith, plain and obvious in itfelf, dark and obfcure by judging of the Antitypes in all reipects as they do of the Types ; forming all their Arguments upon this grofs Suppofition, That they muft Both be of the lame Nature and Kind in all refpects ; anj that things Human and Divine are alike to be S 3 perceived 161 Procedure of perceived by Direct and Immediate Conceptions and Ideas. Then, I fay, it became neceflary to diitinguifh rightly in every Proportion re- lating to our Chriftian Myfteries, what is the Direfi and Immediate Object of our Knowledge and Faith, which only is Matter of Duty and Obligation, and binding upon our Conferences j and what is the Mediate only and Ultimate Ob- jed of them. Then we are compel'd to ex- plain the Nature of that Divine Analogy by which we apprehend things otherwiie incom- prehenfible ; and to place it in liich a full and glaring Light, that there may be a juft and right Application of it, in all the chief Points of Contioverfy with the Adverfaries of Reve- lation : In order to make it appear that the A£- fent of the Mind may, and muft be fo far given to the Reality and Exigence of things Incompre- henfible and ineffable ; as that thele cannot be Excluded from being the Mediate and Ultimate Objects both of our Knowledge and Faith. Now tho' it was neceflary to diftinguifh, the JJJent of the Intellect to what is perfectly underftood, upon full Proof and the utmoft Moral Certainty ; the Influence of the Will frior to the yielding that AfTent ; the Confent of the Will Subjequent to that AfTent, and full Concurrence of the Heart to the Truth of the Proportion afTented to ; and to the Reality and Exigence of what is Ultimately fignified and in- tended in that Proportion : Yet I would ob- fervc the Understanding. i6\ ferve here, that all thefe together are ufualy and not unaptly call'd by the Name of Faith both in Natural and ReveaPd Religion. A s Faith is founded upon Knowledge, fo wc can ftridly and properly be faid to Believe only as far as we Know ; but this Faith at the fame time neceflTarily includes an AfTent of the Mind to the Reality and Exigence of things, the true Nature and Manner of which we can have no Knowledge of by any Direfi or Immediate Idea or Conception. For tho' we can neither Know nor Believe in God M he is Incomprehenfible, or What is incomprehenfible in him ; yet we both know and believe that he If, and that he Is Incomprehenfible : So, tho* we neither Know nor Believe the Myfterious Revelations of the Gos- pel As they are incomprehenfible, or What is Incomprehenfible in them ; yet we both know and believe them to Be real, and Incomprehenfible, From hence it appears that the Faith of the Gospel is no liich Implicit and Precarious AlTent (as the Enemies of Revelation reprefent it) to things altogether Unintelligible and Incon- ceivable ; fince, as we have feen, nothing in Religion that is Incomprehenfible and above Senie and Realbn can properly come at all into any Quefiion between us: All this mull: be intirely laid afide, in thofeGontefts andDifputes which have been raifcd concerning the Evangelical Faith of any Proportion ; we can have no Contro- S 4 verfy 2^4 Procedure of verfy but about what is perfectly well Under-* flood, and Js far as it is lb ; and concerning that Moral Certainty and Evidence upon which Proportions as clear as any in human Lan- guage are founded. Our Controverfies muft turn altogether upon the Point of Knowledge y and when that is decided, the Appeal muft be from thence to the Heart and Will, whether this ought not to dole with that Point of Knowledge ib as to render it Evangelical Faith ; for as to what is utterly Incomprehenjible in any Propofition whatlbever, it can be no direct and immediate Object: either of Knowledge, or of that Faith which is built upon it. III. The third Kind of Knowledge which we have from Deduction of Reafon, is that of Opinion ; the fhorteft and moft apt Delcription of which, that I have met with, is that of Qlato's, who defines it A Medium between Know*- ledge and Ignorance ; it is fituated between both ; and every Opinion is more or lefs well grounded and evident, as it approaches to one or the other of thofe two Extremes. So that there can be no Mere Opinion of any thing known from external Senjation, or Self- Confcioufnefs, or Demon fir ation, or Moral Cer- tainty ; or even from Sufficient tfejlimony either Human or Divine : Tho' it may be Founded upon Topics drawn from any, or all of thele Kinds of Knowledge , not excluding even Science ; if they are firffc taken for Granted, 4 and the Understanding. i6j and each of them eftablilhed upon that Cer- tainty and Evidence which is peculiar to them. This is a Kind of Knowledge Inferior to any of the aforementioned, and approaches neareft to that which is founded on Moral Evidence ; but differs from it in this, that whereas in the utmoft Moral Certainty the Conclufion admits but of a, bare Natural ^PoJJibility of the things being otherwife than we apprehend it,and leaves no Reajbmble Caufe of Doubt or Error : Here the Conclufion ever follows from the Premiies Indeterminately and Uncertainly ; and according- ly leaves room more or lefs for Doubt , and for fbme Likelihood, or Fear, or Dijlruft of the things being otherwife than we apprehend it ; ib that in refpect of all the Degrees between the utmoft Moral Certainty in the One Extreme, and the Lowe ft ^Probability in the Other ; thefe two Kinds of Knowledge run into each other, and are not eafily to be diftinguifhed. Now for the rightly adjufting thofe Ex- tremes, as well as the feveral Intermediate De- grees of this Mix'd Kind of Knowledge, as we may now call it -, the beft way I can think of is, by a Parallel drawn from common Mecha- nifm. Since all Kinds and Degrees of Moral tProof, and Probability, are no other than our confidering and offering the Realbns For and Jgainjl the 7*ruth of any Propofition ; you may imagine your felf throwing the Realbns gnd Arguments on )x>th fides into the Scales, and t66 Procedure of and weighing them in a Balance. If there is an ^Equilibrium without any Inclination of the Ba- lance to one fide or the other, it is then no Degree of Knowledge, nor even of Doubting ; but downright Ignorance: The Realbns on both Sides deftroy each other, lb that the Intellect can form no Judgment, nor can it yield any jljjent \ and if there is any Decifion of the Point in Scrutiny, it muft be from the Arbitrary Impofition and precarious Act only of the Will. If from any Natural Weaknefs or Defect, or want of Improvement of the Intellect, it cannot find out the T'rue Reafons ; nor determine upon the intrinfic Weight of them, fo that the Judg- ment Varies, and that each Scale preponde- rates Alternately and Equaly -, then nothing can be concluded, and it is a ftate of Hejitation and Sulpence, of Doubtfulnefs and Uncertainty. If one fide 'of the Queftion preponderates, tho' but a Little, and continues in one Stay ; ib as that the Inclination or Difference is but fcarcely dil- cernible ; it is then only a bare Appearance of Truth, and nothing more than a ConjeBure. But if the Preponderancy is diftindly Whin and Vifible, and yet there is Weight enough of Reaion on the Contrary fide of the Queftion, to continue the Scales ftill Pendent and in Mo- tion-, then indeed it is properly Opinion and Probability t And the matter of Opinion is better or worie founded, according as it ap- proaches nearer, either to mere Conjecture on the one hand ; or to Moral Certainty on the other the Understanding. 167 other. But then the Nature of it is changed, and it lofes the very Name of Opinion and Pro- bability, and is reiblved into a Moral Certainty ; when the Realbns and Arguments are fo ftrong and cogent, that one of the Scales weighs to the Ground. For then the Balance is deftroy- ed, and there is no realbnable Caufe left for a farther Oppofttion or Scrutiny ; the Propofition Claims the full Affent of every unprejudiced Mind, and ought to conclude and Determine the Judgment as Surely, tho' not as Necejfarily as Demonftration ; the nature of which is to admit of no Weight whatlbever to be thrown into the Qppojite Scale. Now concerning this kind of Knowledge, which is diftinguifhed by the name oi^Probabi- lity or Opinion \ whether it is founded Inter- naly upon our own Realbn, or Externaly upon the < teJltmony and Experience of others, I fhall obferve thele three Things. 1 . That there are two latent Caules of the Worft fort of Fraud and Deceit in this Scrutiny forjudging and determining upon the Truth of Propofitions, in Religion eipecialy, becaufe it is being deceived in Matters ofutmoftConfe- quence. The one is in the Intellect itfelf, which holds the Balance ; for if a Man is Ignorant and Weak in his Judgment, fo as not to dilcern what Realbns are proper to be confider'd, and what are foreign to the Queftion, he may be groily impoftd 268 Procedure of impofed upon by Falje Weights : And if his Ignorance proceeds from want of Induftry in the Improvement of his Underftanding ; and of Application in the Ufe of thole Means of Know- ledge which are plainly in his Power, his en- tertaining even Wrong Opinions is Inexcufable. The other too common Method of deceiving a Man's lelf is, when inftead of plain and Ge- nuine Reafon, he throws his Humour, or ^Pride, or Qajffion, or ^Prejudice, or Vanity into the Scales; fb that thefe, by an invifible Difpofition or Turn of a Falje Balance (which is here no lefs jln Abomination to the Lord, than in Merchan- dize) lhall Outweigh the plaineft and moil co- gent Moral Arguments, which can be offered for the Truth of any Propofition. i. That tho* mere Probability or Opinion is a kind of Knowledge Inferior to that of Mo- ral Certainty, yet in Matters of Religion it De- ferves and even Requires the Affent of the In- tellect and Concurrence of the Will. In the com- mon Affairs of This World, wheiein Men are not fb fubjecl: to Prejudice and PrepoffelTion, the Higher Probability always determines the Judgment ; fb that in cafes wherein the Dif- ference or Inequality between the two oppolite Sides of the Queftion is not very Diftinguijhable, Men ever dole intirely with the grcatefl Ap- pearance and Likelihood of Truth, even in Matters of the greater! Confequence ; wherein the Health of their Bodies ? and their whole worldly the Understanding. 269 worldly Fortune is concerned ; nay, and when their very Lives are at flake : And this is fb remarkably true, that the main Conduct of human Life, thro* the whole Courle of Temporal Affairs is influenced and governed by the High- eft (probability ; infomuch that in many Inftan- ces it would be efteemed downright Folly and Madnefs not to be determined and directed by it. This Opinion or (Probability ought to have its proper Weight in matters of Religion likewife; the belt Proof that can be thought of, or offered in every Inftance of any Importance here, Ought to determine the Affent of the Intellect - y and this mould be followed with a Conlent of the Will. Religious Matters of Opinion only, and founded upon a Rea/onable Probability are of no fmall Conlequence to the promoting Virtue and Holinefs in every Man in Particu- lar , and contribute not a little to Peace and Unanimity in the Church in General, fb that tho* the Things themfelves, which are founded on (Probability, may be in their ow r n Nature Indifferent ; yet the Determination of the Judg- ment concerning them, as far as Men are able, may become no Matter of ' Indifferency ', but of Duty and Obligation ; becaufe all Chriftians ought, as far as it is practicable, to arrive at a perfect Harmony and Agreement even in re- ligious Opinions. ^Prove or try All things, fays the Apoftle, hold f aft or adhere firmly to That 270 Procedure of T'hat which is good. We are for Peace fake 0$- lig'd to ule the beft Means of informing the Judgment in thefe religious Matters even of Opinion *, which tho' they cannot Claim or De- mand the Affent of the Mind, as in Moral Cer- tainty ; may yet render the vvith-holding it, fo as to keep the Mind ever Fluctuating and in Sufpence, utterly Inexcufable : And this is the Cafe of thole who, in one Extreme, will give no firm Affent to anything in Religion, with- out Demonftration and Mathematical Certainty ; and of thole, in the other Extreme, who take up their Opinions without a juft Regard to any impartial Reafoning of their Own, or to the De- cifions and Determinations either of the Church in general, or of fuch as ought to be prefumed the moft Wife and Knowing in it ', which have been always reckoned the fundamental Rules of (probability, with regard to religious Opinions, The danger of Deceit and Fallacy here is, when Men put any degree of Mere (Probability upon the Foot of Moral Certainty and Evidence, and lay as great a Strefs upon it ; or on the Contra- ry, what is moraly Certain and Evident upon the Foot only of a Bare ^Probability. 3. The laft thing I fhall obferve is, that no Point of Mere Opinion and Probability, can be a fufficient Foundation for a religious Faith y in the true and Proper Acceptation of that Word. This Faith muft be built upon Know- ledge - y and if that is Not Clear and Certain, the 1 AfTent the Understanding. 271 Affent of the Intellect and Concurrence of the Will muft be Dubious and Wavering, and of Coniequence not abiblutely Obligatory upon the Conlciences of Men, as every Article of the Chriftiau Faith is. We may indeed be faid in General to Eelieve things for which we have No moral Certainty; but then that Belief muft have the fame degrees of Wavering and Uncer- tainty ', with that ^Probable Knowledge only upon which it is founded. Opinion hath been ufed promifcuoufly, in the large and Vulgar Sence of the Word, to exprefs indifferently Any Judgment of the Mind form'd either upon Moral Certainty, or Bare Probability only , 16 that nothing is more common than to lay, a Man is offuch or luch Opinions, in relation even to the plain Fundamentals of Chriftianity ; and the Equivocation or Fallacy latent in that rferm hath too often given a fpecious Colour to the fatal and deadly Errors of lome Men ; and hath a tendency to deceive fuch as are truly Orthodox into a mild and favourable Judgment of luch Principles as are abiblutely Heretical: Whereas in the tfrue and Proper Sig- nification of that Term, it is to be reftrained to that Allent of the Mind which is founded upon any Proof or Evidence Short of a Moral Certainty. Hence therefore we have this peculiar Mark and Character of Here/y, as it is diftinguifhed from all erroneous Opinions in the general ; that it is a Denial of a Qlain and exprefs Religious Dofirine or Proportion, in the moft obvious and 270 Procedure of and intelligible Sence of the Words, which is founded upon a Moral Certainty and Evidence : And whether fuch a Propofition is denied Ex- prejly, or by Immediate necefTary Conjequence, it makes no alteration in the nature ol the thing ; there is only this Circumftantial Difference, that the one is more Covert and clandeftine, the o- ther hath an Air of Opennefs and Ingenuity. For inftance, as if a Perfbn fhould afTert, That Chrifl is not the only begotten Son of God, in as 'True and Real a Sence and full Import of thoje 'Terms, tho' not in the lame Literal ^Propriety of them, as when they are ujed for an human Son; but in mere Metaphor only. That the Holy Spirit of God is not God; nor ought to be call' d Jo. That the Son is not Originaly andlnt'irely of the fame real Nature and EJpnce with his true Father. That the Son and Holy Ghojl are not Divine Perlbns in the plain, and obvious, and moft intelligible Sence of the Term Divine ; but in lome Abftraft Me- taphyseal Acceptation of it, Jo unintelligible that it will not admit of any Explanation. That we mujl worfhip the Son as an Omnipresent Invisible Being ; and yet muft not pay him Supreme and Ultimate Worfhip. And ihould be pofitive that Chrijt is not the true God; and aggravate this by adding, That they are wor- thy of Cenjurewhojay he was made out oj nothing ; tho* this can mean no more than, Let Men ima- gine him to be what elje they pleaje,yet he is not the true God. And fhould likewiie hold firmly That the Understanding. 273 tfhat Chrift is not Co-eternal with the Father ; and fhould add, that They are jufily cenfured zvho fay there was a 'Time when he was not ; tho' this cannot poffibly have any other intelligible Sence or Meaning, but that Tho' he is not eternal as the Father is, yet they dejerve Cenfure who pre- fume to fiy he is not Eternal: Or at belt, Let Men think what they will elfe of him, yet they maji not think him truly' Eternal. Tho' Men are indilpenfably bound in Duty to agree in all Points of Religion which are 'Plain and perfe&ty Intelligible, and for which there is a Moral Certainty, as being the E/Jentials of it; yet they may often be of different Opi- nions in other Points of it which are not fb, without any juft blame or Cenfure : For the Weaknefs of human Under (landing is fuch ; there are iuch different Turns in Mens Minds 5 they have lb many various ways of Thinking \ and there is luch a want of Education and Refine- ment in the Generality of Mankind -, that af- ter the moft Sincere and Diligent Endeavours they cannot always exactly agree in religious Matters of mere ^Probability ', tho' indeed it is their Duty, as I before obferv'd, to do it as far as they are able. The unavoidable Necefi- Jity of this variety of Opinions often renders it Excufable \ and it is attended with this acci- dental Advantage, that it affords a large Scope for the Exercife of Humanity, and Meeknefs, and Qondefcention in Men, and for their Bearing with T one 274 Procedure of one another. But then it ought well to be con- fider'd, that tho' this Difference in religious Matters of Opinion may be very allowable and Innocent in itlelf ; yet it may become highly Criminal when Men confound things for which there is no other than a bare ^Probability, with fuch as have a plain Undeniable Certainty and Evidence : And when with matter of Opinion only they intermix 'Pride and Vanity, ^Pre/iimp- tion^ L PoJjtiveneJs, or '-Prejudice-, Breach oj ( Com- muni on, and Refiftance of Lawful Authority ', or Dijobedience to fpiritual Governors; who for that very realbn, becaufe Men cannot be fup- pos'd to agree intirely in religious Matters of mere Opinion and Probability, and becauie thefe are not Fundamental ox EJpntial to Religion, have undoubted Power of Judging and Determining finaly in Such Matters ; tho' they have no far- ther Power in Matters Effential, and founded upon plain Moral Certainty and Evidence than that of Explanation and lllujlration only. IV. The fourth and laftHead of Knowledge obtained by Deduction of Rea/on is that which is derived from the Experience and Information of others, and is founded upen tfefiimony. This is a kind of Knowledge very different in its Nature from any of the former, and built on a very different kind of Evidence ; and it hath been very imperfectly defin'd, Jn JJfent of the Mind given to the Truth of any tfhing upon the Teflimony of another ; to which fhould have been added, the Understanding. 277 added, upon a fall Conviction of the Reafonable- nefs of yielding that JJfent : For every Propofi- tion to which we yield an AiTent, either Is or Ought to be a Point of Knowledge, before it can regularly be either a Belief in general, or a re- ligious Faith in particular. The nrft Part of that Definition hath blended together thefe lever al things very Different in themlelves, and which ought to be well diitinguifhed ; namely Know- ledge ; Belief in general^ a true religious Faith ; and a blind Implicit Jfjent of the Mind, that is, where there is not firfl liich a Conviction ofReafon as is a juft and lolid Ground lor that Allen t. All the kinds of Knowledge we have hi- therto treated of arole from Our Jelves, and re- liilted from the Immediate Uie and Exercife of our own Natural Faculties ; but this is in a great meafure from Without us, and is owing to the Realbn and Underftanding of 'Others : Which then becomes truly Our own, when we give no hafty and precarious AiTent to any Information or Teftimony ; but ule our Reafcn ftriclly and impartialy in Searching and Trying every In- itance of this Knowledge, ib as to approve or Rejetf it as it appears to us to be true or falie, realbnable or abfurd ; or in Proportion to thole Degrees of -Probability wherewith it comes re- commended. N o w, there mult be fuch a Concurrence of our Own Reafon in thefe following Particulars, T 2 with iy6 Procedure of with regard to every Point of Information or tfeftimony, as fhall render it truly Knowledge, as well as Belief or Faith. i. Cur own Reafon mull: be imploy'd in judging of the Subject Matter of the Information ; and whether the Words and Language in which o o the Information is made are perfectly Intelli- gible ? If they are not to be Under flood, the In- formation is to be rejected, not as Abfurd or Contrad'ittcry ; but as being Sencelefs and with- out any Meaning at all. No Man can be in- form'd of what he is not Capable of underftand- ing ; and there can be no Information or Re- velation to Mankind concerning the Real In- fringe Nature of any thing in itfelf Incompre- hensible to us ; the Information muft be of fbmcthing ib Plain and Intelligible that Reafon can clearly apprehend it, and judge of it. So that no divine Revelation concerning God and his Attributes, the Myfteries of Chriftianity, and all things Supernatural 'and Spiritual, reaches any farther than as to their Exiflence only, and that lively Symbol and Analogy under which they are reprefented to the Mind of Man ; which is as Plain and obvious, and Intelligible as any thing in Nature and common Life. 2. Secondly, Realon mull: be convinced that the fubjedt Matter of the Information is Poffible, and that it implies no Abiurdity or Contradic- tion. And if the Information is concerning any thing the Understanding. 277 thing Supernatural and Spiritual, this is a fun- damental Rule for the Procedure of the Intel- led ; that it muft deduce no Ablurdiry or Con- tradiction but from what is plain and Intelligi- ble in every Propofition : And it mult conclude that fiich Abfurdities and Contradictions as ariie from a Comparifon between what is plain andlntelligible, and that which is Incomprehenfble, in relpect of their real Intrinfic Natures, are all groundlels and imaginary : as for inftance in this Propofition, Chrift is the only begotten Son of God. Now that one Perfon ihould be the only begotten Son of another, is plain and in- telligible ; and a Man who believes the Scrip- tures to be the Word of God, concludes, with- out any farther Examination of what is Unin- telligible and Incomprehenfbk, that this is as true and as void of Abfurdity and Contradiction in reipect of the Divine Nature, as it is in com- mon Speech among Men ; which is the Sub- ftance of this Propofition as far as we are ob- liged to Under (land and Believe it : And he will look upon it as impious Trifling with the plain Word of God to raile any Abfurdities and Con- tradictions, from iuch a Comparifon between Human and Divine Generation, as infers that the Son cannot be intirely of the Same Nature and EJpntial Perfections with the Father. As it is the Office and Privilege oiReafon to reject every Information, which carries any ma- nifeft Abfurdity or Contradiction In \tfelf\ ib T 3 it 17 8 Procedure of it mull obferve narrowly whether it is contra- dictory to any of the Preceding Articles of Knowledge ; that of Scnjation or Self-Confciouf- nefs, or Demon ft rat ion, or Moral Certainty, or even to any Great Degree of Probability : For tho' theie may Combine together for the Con- firmation of the Same Truth ; yet fince they are all Natural means of Knowledge, and when they are truly genuine can never Deceive, they are every one of them to be duly regarded in their Kind, and are never to be let in Ojfo- Jition to one another. 3. Thirdly, our Reajbn muft judge and determine concerning the Jbility and Sincerity of the tyerfen from whom the Information comes. In order to this Judgment, Informa- tion together with the lejlimony or Evidence upon which it is founded, muft be divided into that which is merely Human, and that which is Divine. As to Human Information, we yield the AiTent of the Intellect to it in Proportion only to what appears agreeable to Truth from our Own Faculties of Underffcanding ; and by the ufe of our Reafon we make what was the Knowledge of Others properly our Own. This is very extenfive, and makes up the greateft Part of that Knowledge with which the Mind of Man is furnifhed; it takes in all that we have frdm the Hiftory of Mankind and of Na- ture ; the Accounts we have of all the Parts of the World which we have not leen ; and in fhort the Understanding, zyp fhort all that we have from the Knowledge and Experience of Other Men : And we acquiefce in all this as lb much i^j/Knowledge, and not as any Precarious implicite Belief •, but as an Affent of the Mind founded upon luch human Tefti- mony, as often amounts to & Moral Certainty. A s to Divine Information or Revelation, no Search or Inquiry of this Nature can be made - y fince Reaibn hath Already a full Conviction that it muft exceed all human Certainty ; for God can neither be deceived himlelf, nor deceive others. So that in refpecc of Divine Revela- tion in particular, the laft thing our Reaibn is to have a full Conviction of is 4. Fourthly, that the Information or Reve- lation comes from God\ or that the Scriptures wherein thefe Revelations are made are of Di- vine Authority', for a right Apprehenfion of which I fhall obicrve theie two Things. 1 . That as God hath made Man the im- mediate Inflrurmnt of all Thole Revelations, ib muft Evangelical Faith be partly founded up- on Human Teftimony or Evidence. Men were the Authors of all the Books in the Old and New Teftament ; and if we confider them ab- ftra&edly from any Confideration of their Di- vine Authority, they muft be allow'd of equal Credibility at leaft with all Other Antient Writings ; that is if we examine them im- T 4 parrialy 280 Procedure of partialy by the fame Rules of Criticifm, by which we make a Judgment of other Authors. If we confider the Characters of the facred Pen- Men ; their Antiquity, Style, and Manner of Writing; the Opportunities they had of being Them/elves well hi j or me d of the Truth of what they tranfmitted down to Pcflerity; the great Weight and Importance of the Sub- jedts they treated of; the Accounts given of them by their Cotemporaries, and by thofe who lived in the Near eft Ages to them ; their in- tire Conftftency with the mielves ; together with the perfect Harmony there is between all thofe who in feveral Di'ftant Ages have purfued the fame deilgn : Tho' we fhould iuppofe the Scriptures to be upon the foot of mere Human Teftimony and Evidence ; yet in thefe, as well as in all Other reipecls, our Knowledge of them, and the Belief that is built upon that Know- ledge, muft be of equal Truth and Certainty with that which is founded upon any Profane Hiftory. We may as truly and properly be faid to Know all the Facts and Tranlactions re- lated in Scripture, and to be as Sure and as well informed of the Qualifications, and Cha- racters, and Ccndutf, and Performances of all the Perfons mentioned in it, and of Chrijt and his Apo files in particular. And we have the fame Moral Certainty even upon the Foot of Human Teftimony, that there Were fuch Per- fons, and that they fpoke and acted fuch things as are related of them ; as we have that there 2 were the Understanding. 281 were fiich Perfbns as 1 y tlate, and Herod, and jiuguftusy and Tiberius Ccefar \ and of all thole A&ions and Exploits of theirs whereof we have a particular Account in Profane Hiftory. Now if to this Teftimony merely Human y and founded upon the Credibility and Faith of antient Hi/lory in general, we add that which is D'wtney and which cannot be (Pretended for any other Writings in the World ; luch as the Miracles of Chrift and his Apoftles, to which they always appeal'd for the Truth of their Doctrine and Million ; the concurrent Comple- tion of all the (Prophecies relating to the M$f- fiah from the Beginning of the World, in the Perlbn of Chrift Jhne ; the Scriptures being the only Book in the World which gives us any Account of the whole Series of God's DiJ- penfations towards Mankind, from the firffc Creation for about four thouland Years toge- ther ; the great Improvement of Natural Reli- gion, and Exaltation of Morality lb vifible thro* the whole Tenor of Scripture. And laltly, the (Providential Care and Caution lb fignal and manifeft in every Age, for tranfmitting down Books written at fuch great diftances of time from One another, and Jll of them from Us ; their being at this Day fb Confiflent among themfelves, and fo void of any Material Error, that in the immenfe Number of Various Read- ings, which have been with great Labour col- letted, there cannot any one Inftance be found of 282. Procedure of of a Contrariety or Oppofition in relpeft of any Fundamental Point of Ftf/7Z> or Qratfice. If thefe things, I fay, are iuperadded and thorough- ly confidered, they give the Scriptures the ut- moft Moral Certainty, fiich as no merely Human Writings can admit of ; arid are the greateft Proof and Evidence for the Truth of them which we are Capable of receiving, without a continued daily Repetition of Miracles thro* every Generation. It is an Evidence founded upon the 'Teflimony of God and Man ; fuch as Claims and Demands the AfTent of the Intellect, and that Concurrence of the Heart and Will which renders it an Evangelical Faith built up- on the ftricleft Operation of Reafbn, and the utmoft Effort of human Underftanding. So that "Revelation is a Solid Ground of Terfuajion ; and our Faith is founded upon the Teflimony of God : But Reajdn firft provides that the Foundation is Sure and rightly laid ; that we do not miftake that Teltimony for what is merely Human, and build our Faith upon the Sand ; and that the ipecious Superftructure be not Ignorance or Super Jiition y a blind Credulity or Enthufiajm. But there is one thing more which clears up this Moral Certainty or Evidence beyond all Evafion ; and that is, that the Authors of the Books in Scripture ^ProfeJ/ed to have wrote them by an immediate divine Commiflion and In/pi rati on j and moft of them proved the Truth of the Understanding. 183 of this by Miracles, which were allowed by all to be Such at the time they were wrought : And in thole miraculous Operations they were lb far from gratifying any Vanity or Interejl of their own, that they fuffered the utmoft Con- tempt, and bodily Vain, and even Death for the Doctrines they confirmed by them. Now, had they penned down the Scriptures as dicta- ted Verbatim by an Audible articulate Voice from Heaven as loud as Thunder, this would not have amounted to a greater Moral Certainty for the Truth of them, than what we now have : For the Authors would ftill have been Men ; we now mult have rcly'd upon the Teftimony of Men and the lame fecret Providence of God for their being tranfmitted Qure and uncorrup- ted down to Pofterity ; and we might as well have been deceived in T'his, as in the QrofeJJion made by the original Authors, of their having wrote by an immediate Divine Infpiration. 2. The other thing well worth Obfervati- on here is, that as God hath made Men the immediate Inftruments of all his Revelations ; fo in merciful Condefcention to the Weaknefs of our Under Handing he hath made ule of human Language, as well as of our Natural and moft Familiar Conceptions and Ideas for the clear and eafy Reprelentation and Disco- very of things fupernatural, and otherwile altogether incomprehenfible. Since Men were jfie Inftruments of thele Revelations, they could 284 Procedure of could not have been made in the Language of Angels \ or in any fuch c Proper Terms as would literaly have expreffed the Real intrinfic Na- ture of heavenly Things ; there being no Capa- city in Man for any Ideas or Conceptions of their Real Nature, nor any Words in human Language to exprefs th^m. And if we mould fiippofe that by a ^Miraculous Operation a Man had any fuch Vijions and Revelations of their real Nature vouchlafed to him either In the Body or Out of the Body, they would be Unjpeakable, and it would not be poiTible for him to utter tbem ; fo that he could not be the Inftrument of Con- veying them to the reft of Mankind. This made it necelfary to have all the divine Reve- lations adapted to our natural Way of Thinking and Speaking ; and accordingly the Wifdom of God hath lo ordered it, that we are not oblig- ed to yield either the JJftnt of the Intellect, or Confent of the Heart and Will, to any Doctrine which is not as plain or Intelligible as any thing in common Life : All therefore Beyond this, all that is Unconceivable or Jncomprehenfible in any Scripture Propofition, is no Immediate and Pro- per Object either of Chriftian Knowledge or Faith ; it belongs to Another World ; and we are at prefent to know and believe no more of it, than that it is Incomprehen/ible, and therefore refer ved intirely for the Beatific Vifion. Thus we fee no JJJent of the Mind can be given to any thing Intirely unintelligible, or in- compre- the Understanding. 285 comprehenfible, upon the tfeftimony either of God or Man ; and if the Divine Revelations had not been very plain and intelligible, they never could have been Conveyed down to Us by thole who received them firft ; for Men could never have tranimitted to Qojlerity what they had no Knowledge of Tkem/ehes. So that nothing can be more unreafbnable and ground- less, than the Objections of Unbelievers and Freethinkers againft our Chriitian Myfteries, as Unintelligible and Incomprehenjtble \ fince they are Obliged to know and believe nothing more in them, than what is Plain and eaiy, and very Intelligible. The lame Objections will lie as Itrongly againft all that the Heathen Moralifts have wrote concerning God and his Attributes ; nor for the lame Reafon could any Intelligible- Sence or Meaning of their Writings upon thole Subjects have been ever handed down to us ; for nothing can be as to its own intrinfic Nature more Myfterious and Incomprehensible to us than God and his Attributes } and therefore by that way of arguing Men muft reject, all the- fundamental Articles of Natural Religion* Since it is thus evident that Evangelical Faith requires the Alfent of the Mind to no- thing but what is plain and Intelligible in every Proportion, in the moft clear and obvious Signification of the Words *, let every Man firft have a full Conviction of the Truth of each Proposition in the Gofpel, as far only as it is Plain 28(5 Procedure of Plain and Intelligible ; and then let him firmly Believe as far as he Vnderjlands. Let him be- lieve firmly, and without any bafe Equivoca- tion or Fallacy , that there is but One God, the fble and only invifible Object of Any Di- vine Worjhip whatlbever : And 'Think and Speak of him, and Worjhip him under that plain and perlbnal Diftin&ion of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which molt exprefly runs thro' the whole Style of the New Teftament -, and leaves the Incomprehenftble Nature of that Unity and Dijlinc- tion (as common Sence would direct him) to the great Author of our Faith himfelf. Let him be- lieve Chrift to be The only begotten Son of God, in the moftF#//and moft Obvious Import of thole Words ; that is, in as much T'ruth and Reality as one Man is the Son of Another: And leave the Real manner of that Divine Incomprehenfible Ge- neration to the Veracity of God ; who propoled his Revelations to be Under flood and Believed, by Way of Accommodation to the Method of Thinking and Speaking amongft Men. l^et him believe that Chrift, by his Death, did as tfruly and Acfaaly make an Atonement to God for our Sins -, as one Man works an Atonement and Reconciliation to Another for the Offences of a Third Perfbn : And leave the Unintelligible Reality, and ineffable Manner of that Divine Operation for the Subject of eternal Contem- plation and Praife in another World. And ib likevvife in every Other Inftance of what goes under the Name of Myftery in the Golpel : Let him the Understanding. 287 him believe the Blood of Chrift hath the fame intrinfic Virtue and Efficacy, for the Real and Actual cleanfing of the Soul from the Guilt and Pollution of Sin , that Water hath for the wafhing any Filth or Dirt off from the Body. That the Intercejjion made in our behalf by Chrift is as Truly ^ and Realy, and Ac~iualy fuch ; as if it were a ftri&ly Proper and Literal Inter- ceffion. That Men fhall undergo a great and glorious Change at the Reliirredion of the Juft y as T'raly as a Man is here changed from the Point of Death, to a Hate of Perfect Health ; or from the Condition of a Slave, to the Glory of a Kingdom. Let Men I fay Believe as far as they thus perfectly and clearly Underjiand y without perplexing and confounding themielves or others with what is Incomprehensible, and then they anlwer all the Ends of an Evangeli- cal Faith ; and do fulfil the whole Purpofe of God in all his divine Revelations. I f Men would come about to this Primi- tive Temper and Spirit of Believing , and leave off darkning and difturbing the Faith of Chri- ftians, which is plain in itlelf, by blending what is obvious and Intelligible with what is Un- telligibk and Incomprehensible : Then we fhall^ relinquiih all Analogy , and there will be no occafion for obviating all their pretended Ab- furdities and Contradictions, by ihewing how we are under a Neceffity of apprehending things ipiritual and divine in Types only and Sym- 4 bolical 288 Procedure of bolical Re premutations. But fince the profefs'd and open Arians y and Socinians, and Deifls, and Freethinkers have utterly declin'd the Natural and Eajy way of Believing ; laying afide all that is obvious and Intelligible in the Doctrines of the Gofpel, on account of what is altogether Unconceivable and ineffable. And fince our mo- dern Clandejline Avians have, from their grcfs I- deas of three Human Perjons, or rather even three Bodily Sub/lances, argued the Son and Holy Ghofl to be actualy and intirely Separate from the Father, as we conceive 'Three Men to be &- far ate from one another ; and confequently Subordinate and Inferior to him. And fince theie Enemies of Revelation have gained lb great a Point, as to draw off the Learned and worthy Defenders of Chriftianity from the Plain and open Field of Battle, into Unknown Ground full of inextricable Mazes and Windings : Where they are obliged to Engage them by underta- king Solutions of what is never to be fblved - y by Explaining what is Inexplicable 7 and by ela- borate Illuftrations of things altogether in the Dark. Since, I fay, this is evidently the pre- ient State and Condition of Chriftianity among •us ; the Doctrine of Divine Analogy is now be- come abfolutely neceffary ; and is like to con- tinue fb as long as this Strain of Infidelity fo prevailing in our Age fhall laft ; which it is to be fear'd may, in a greater or leis Degree, be traaimitted down to the lateft Pofterity. The the Understanding. 28p The Reafon why I have, in this Prelimi- nary Treatiie, began with the iirft Rudiments of Knowledge ; and traced the Procedure of the Underftanding thro' every Step y from Ideas of Senfatkn up to our Conceptions of things Su- pernatural and Spiritual, may not perhaps be foon difcerned : Yet I doubt not but the Necefi- jity of it will evidently appear hereafter, when Men come to lee the great Ufefulnefs and Ad- vantage of applying this Doctrine to our pre- fent Cent rover fies with all Sorts of Unbelievers j together with the Difficulty of that Application, fo as to run neither into the ftrictly Literal and Proper Acceptation of Scripture Terms, on the one hand ; nor into mere Metaphor and jiflujion only, on the other. I hope I need not apologize for diftinguifh- ing the feveral Kinds of Knowledge with fome Exaclnefs ; together with that Kind of Evi- dence which is proper to each of them. The Mind of every judicious Reader muft iuggeft to him, what Light and Direction it administers for the Procedure of the Underftanding in ge- neral, as well as in Matters of Natural and Reveal'd Religion in particular ; and what cndlefs Conjufton and Uncertainty may hereby be prevented in all our Religious Ccntvoverfies and Difputes : Eipecialy if he hath cbferved, how thefe have all arifen from abfurdly fup- pofing the ieveral Heads of Knowledge above- U mentioned 290 Procedure of mentioned to differ only in Degree, and not in Kind \ from blending and confounding the different Kinds of Proof and Evidence peculiar to each of them ; from Mens infilling upon a Proof and Evidence peculiar to One Kind of Knowledge for that of Another, which is of a quite different Nature, and will not admit of it ; from Oppo/jng the different Kinds of Know- ledge and Evidence to one another, which are each of them per feci: in their Kind, and mull never be liippoied to interfere or clafh with one another ; and laftly from not diftinguifh- ing between a blind Implicit Jffent of the Mind upon the bare Word or Teftimony of another, and that Faith which remits from a full Con- viffion to Keafon of the Truth of what is be- lieved. CHAP. VII. Of the farther Improvement of Know- ledge by Relations revealed. WE have now by feveral Steps brought the Mind of Man to the utmoft Bounds of that Knowledge, which it can poffibly arrive at by the Strength of its own unaffifted Fa- culties ; and where all the declared Enemies of Revelation and Myftery take up their Reft. Whatever Knowledge it obtains beyond that 4 included the Understanding. 291 included under the foregoing Heads, is com- municated to it from Heaven. Accordingly, When the Mind comes to learn and con- fider firu, the more Particular and Full Dis- coveries which are made to us of thofe Rela- tions we had already fome Knowledge of by the Light of Nature ; and fecondly thofe Re- lations we bear to God, and he to us, which are intirely New and Ind'ifcoverable by Reafon ; this Knowledge includes the Subftance and Foundation of all Reveal'd Religion. 1. As to the Firft, when to that general Knowledge we have by the Light of Nature of God as the Creator of all things, it is revealed that he Spoke them into Being, and created them by the Word ; that he made Man in par- ticular of the Earth, to which he added a Di- vme Principle of another Kind, breathed into it immediately from himfelf ; and that the Living Soul was the relult of that Union of Matter and Spirit ; that he was created in In- nocence, and in the Likenefs and Image of God ; that Adam and Eve were the fir It created Pair, and that all Mankind defcended from them. Again, when to the general Relation of his Providence over us, it is more particularly reveal'd, that he Vpholdeth all things by the Word of his Power -, that In him we live, move, and have our Being ; that a Single Sparrow doth U 2 not zo2 Procedure of not fall to the Ground without him ; and tfhat the very Hairs of our Head are all numbered. And laftly, when that Relation he bears to us /? as a Judge, is rendered more full and exprels by thefe farther Particulars ; That the Eyes of the Lord are in every Place beholding the Evil and the Good ; that God fhall bring every Work into Judgment^ with every fee ret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil ; that he hath appointed a Day in the which he will judge the World in Righteoufnefs ; that in Order to this univerjal Judgment there fhall be a Re/ur region of the Dead, both of the jufl and of the unjufl \ and that thofe who are alive at the laft Day Shall be changed in a Moment, in the twinkling of an Eye. Again, when it is revealed that there is but One God -, for tho' the neceffary Exiftence of one Fir ft Caufe of all things, could be inferred by the Light of Nature ; yet this was a De- gree of Knowledge ib General and Imperfect, and ib little weighed and conflder'd, that Deities were multiplied in the Heathen World accord- ing to all the Wants and Neceffities of human Life: Infomuch that Revelation became ablo- lutely neceffary to fix Mankind in the belief of One only true God, and that there is No other God but one. Of this one only God feveral Par- ticulars are more exprcily revealed in Scripture ; as That he is a Spirit -, That there is None good hut he - ? That he Only is wife, and that his Wif- dom the Understanding. 293 dom is infinite ; That he is Almighty , hath all Power 7 and is the Only (Potentate, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords ', That he is Above all. That he is Juft, and Righteous, and Merciful, and Holy ; That he is Loving, and Gracious, and Long-fuffering ; That he lees the Secrets of all Hearts, and will reward every Man According to his Works', That he only hath Immortality, and Life In him/elf; That he is the Moll High God and Lord of Hofts, incorruptible, invijible. Thefe and filch like more Full and Exprefs Characters we meet with in Scripture of the One only true God, and which are applied to him only, and can be attributed to none but him. And thefe, with many iuch other Inftances, are Improvements in that Knowledge we al- ready have by the Light of Nature, of thofe Relations which God and the things of another World bear to us ; and have a direct tendency to the Refinement of genuine Morality, and the exaltation of it into Chriftianity. These Exprefilons are all plain and intel- ligible; fo that when we fpeakof the One God in this Language of Scripture, we know what we fay ; and tho* thefe Points are in fbrne Meafure agreeable to the Light of Nature, yet this Full and exprefs and Clear Revelation of them is become Matter of Faith, in which all Chriftians mult now agree. But as to fuch Words and Exprefiions as thefe concerning the only true God ; That he is but One Per/on; U 3 God 294 Procedure of God Of hlmftlj ; Caufe, Principle, Root, Foun- tain, Original, Archetype ; That he is a c Pure jld, Simple, UncompounJed, Undivided, Self-Ex- iflent, Underived, Unoriginated, Independent, Ab- Julutely Supreme ; and Perfect In bimjelf • toge- ther with the Words Supremacy, Subordinate, Co-ordinate, Subftflence, Incommunicable -, and above all his Metaphyseal Subftance and El- fence ; together with a Metaphyseal and (poten- tial Eternity, and fuch like: They are not the Language of Revelation, eipecialy when us'd to explain the Unity of the Divine Nature ; but ib many notional JffeBed Terms which fome great and learned Men have invented to ex- prefs their Peculiar Sentiments, and their ieve- ral ways of Thinking of that Unity. Some of thofe Terms are altogether Unin- telligible, and without any meaning when ap- plied to the Unity of God • feveral of them are purely Negative, and give no pofitive de- terminate Notion or Conception at all ; and all of them fail in thefe two material Points. Firft that none of them have an Authority or Foun- dation in Scripture for any Divine Analogy which will be fully explained hereafter , and Secondly that tho' the meaning of them may be con- ceived and undeiirood when they are applied to the one true God, in refpecl of his Creatures, and in Comparifon with them : Yet when they are Ipoke of him confider'd Inhimfelf, and lb applied to the Divine Js r atifre • riot as he is in his, the Understanding. 295 Metaphyseal (as fbme Men fpeak) or imaginary Subftance and EfTence, but in his Phyjical, that is in his rfrue and Real Subftance and EfTence ; their meaning is altogether unintelligible. As for inftance, take any of thole Words, iuppofe Unoriginated ; when this Word is apply'd by way of Companion between God and his Crea- tures, as between Him and the greateft Angel in Heaven ; it hath a very obvious and deter- minate Meaning, and we eafily apprehend how the Angel is Originated, and God Unoriginated : But when the Word is applied to the real Na- ture of God as he is in himfelf, intirely -jib- Jlratfed from all Refpecl: to the Creature ; it hath no meaning at all. We can form fbme Notion of what it is for a Being to be Created or not Created : but what the Word Unorki- nated Means when ipoke of the True cPhyfical Nature of God, as when the Father is faid to be unoriginated in refpecT: of the Son and Holy Ghoft, we are utterly ignorant ; and can fix no Idea or Conception at all to k. Again, we know no more of Qure J$, but that they are two Monofyllables put toge- ther without any Signification ; and fo the Words Simple, Uncompounded, Undivided, when applied to the Divine Nature without any Com- parifon with the Creature, can at the utmoft have no other intelligible Meaning but that he cannot be divided into More Gods than One. As to the Words Canfe, Principle, Root, Founr* U 4 tain } iy6 Procedure of tain, Original, Jlrchetye, Prototype ; it is plain that God is all thefe in refped of his Creatures ; and in this Sence they have a very obvious Meaning, and are very good and pertinent Terms : But when you intirely lay afide all relpecl to the Creatures, and Companion with them ; and apply thole Terms to the Father only, in refpect, of the Son and the Holy Ghofl, as they are Related to the Father ; the Words are mere empty Sound without any Significa- tion. S o likewile the Words Jbjolutely Supreme, and Independent ; when thev are lpoke of the one true God in refpecr, of the whole Creation, or any part of it ; they are very good Words : But when you apply them to the Divine Na- ture, as it is in itielf , or by way of diitin- guifhing the Father from the Son and the Holy Ghoft, they have no more conceivable or de- terminate Meaning, than if you repeated their Syllables backward. As for The Metaphxfical Effence and Sub fiance of God ; Barbara, Ce la rent, Dar'u are as good Sence ; and it is impoflible to fix any intelligible Meaning at all to them; unlefs they mean quite the contrary, his Phy- sical, that is his real True Nature, and Effeyce as he is in himfelf, which is utterly incompre- henfible. So that when Men argue thole At- tributes to be Incommunicable ; if they mean to any Mere Creature, the meaning of them is plain and ealy to be underitood ; Bat when they the Understanding. 297 they apply thole Attributes directly to God or the Father, without any Companion with a Created Being, they fpeak of what they have not the leaft Idea or Conception ; and they know as little what is Communicable or Incom- municable in him, in refpect of the Son and Holy Ghojl j as they do of his real true Phy- fical Subftance and ElTence. And now, can we fufficiently lament and bewail all that irreparable Mifchief, which hath been of late done by the Rumbling of thefe and iuch like Sounding Words and Phrafes thro* whole Volumes, in that grois and miftaken Application of them which I have noted ? To the diftrac"ting Mens Minds ; to the confound- ing themfelves and thole Readers who do not lee thro' this Fallacy \ and to the perplexing and obfcuring the great and fundamental Ar- ticle of our Chriftian Faith, that of the Holy Trinity \ which as it lies before us in Scripture and the Language of Revelation is (as far as we are obliged to underftand or believe it) the Plainefi Thing in the World. All this pom- pous Affectation of being wiler and more Knowing in the real Pbyjrcal Nature of God and the Myfteries of Chriftianity, than the Scriptures can make Men ; hath no other main Scope or Tendency but to propagate abfurd and inconliltcnt Notions, which a plain rational Man would be alham'd of; iuch as thele fol- lowing. That ip8 Procedure of That the Son of God was Produced by an External Act of the Father's Almighty- Power and Will ', and yet was not made or Created. T h a t a Perlbn mould be by Nature Truly God, and yet not the True God, and that he fhould not have one Attribute Orlginaly and properly His Own, to render him even Truly God. That there are two Divine Perlbns who had not any Divine Nature or EfTence Orlgi- naly in them , that one of them Became Di- vine by a Communication of Divine Attributes ; and the other by No Communication at all. That there are Three Degrees of true and genuine Divinity, one above another; the loweft of which doth not give the Perfon who hath it, even the Name God. That one of thofe Divinities is Subject to the firft ; and that the Third is Subject to Two Divinities above him. That there are three Perlbns Truly Divine, one of them the True God, the other Truly God, the third No God at all. That there are two Intelligent Agents in the Univerle, which originaly were neither effentialy God, nor elfentialy Creatures , who now the Understanding. 299 now have ibmething of Both in them, but are realy and truly Neither, That the Work of Creation was effected by a Delegated Power only ; that a Finite Per- fon exerciied Infinite Power j and T'hat likewife purely by CommiJJion. That the Father communicated his own EJftntial Attributes to the Son, without any Communication of his Real Intrinjtc Nature and ElTence : And yet that he communicated to him tfrue Divinity ', which of all things feems to the Mind of Man utterly Incommunicable. That divine Worfhip^ as well as Divinity itfelf, may and muft be varied in Degrees^ fo as to be More or Lefs Divine. That we may and muft pay divine Wor- Jhip to Two Gods ; and divine Honour to a third Perfon who is No God, without Idolatry. That there are three different Degrees or Kinds of Creation; and that there are two in- termediate Natures between the LoweJ} of thofe Degrees, and the (Per/on of the molt high God, in the modern Arian Style. That tho' we ftiould grant the Son to be in- tirely of the fame Nature and Effence with the Father j yet he hath not the fame Jdnd of £#- ijlence^ 300 Procedure of ijlence, nor Independency , nor Supremacy , nor Do- minion or Authority ; tho* thefe are NeceJ/a- rily inherent in that Nature, and Infeparable from it even by the moft exquifite Abftra&ion of the Mind. That tho' the

Now thefe Words and Expreflions of Son, and Born, and Image as a Man is the Image of his Father who begat him ; as alio the Word Begot- ten, being applied to Chrift in refpecl: of his^P/v- exijlent State, NeceJJarily leads us into a Con- ception of his Equality with the Father in all effential Perfections. For that thofe Words are not to be underftood in their ftvidly Proper and Literal Seace muft be allowed ; it were the height of Impiety to imagine it ; nor are they X a^merc $06 Procedure of a mere Figure and nothing more, without any farther real Correfpondent Import or Significa- tion : But they are to be underftcod Analogi- cal? , That as a Perfon among Men is the Son of his Father by Natural Generation; fo Chrift is the Son of God (not by any tranlcendent Act of Creation, or by Adoption, in each of which there may be mere Metaphor but no Analogy ; but) by a Supernatural Generation, or ineffable Derivation of him from the very Subjlance and Effence of the Father. There can be no other Scope or Purpole, in revealing all things relating to Chrift under the Characters and Semblances of a Son, an Only Son, and Begotten of the Father, and Born before the Creation of any thing, but to im- print in us this Conception of him ; that he hath all the natural and Effential Perfections of the Father, who begat him • and that as an Human Son poffeffes the complete Intire hu- man Nature, lb doth Chrift poffefs the intire Divine Nature. It can import nothing fhort of fuch a Complete Samenefs of EJJence ; and we could neither think nor fpeak of him with any Truth as the Only Begotten Son of God, if he wanted any effential Perfection of the Di- vinity. So that they who oppofe the Son's partaking of the divine Nature with the Fa- ther, of whom he was begotten, and his Equa- lity with him ; mull find out fbme other Ana- logy for reprefenting the Peribn of the Son, i than the Understanding. 307 than what the Wifdom of God hath made choice of: Unlefs they will allow him to be a Son by Nature, and Begotten of God ; and then lay that this leads us into a Notion that he is intirely Different from the Father who begat him ; and lure nothing is fo monftrous and con- tradictory to our common Sentiments and man- ner of lpeaking, than that the Divine Nature lhould thus Beget a mere Creature or Man* That the Son was thus fupernaturaly Derived from the Father, doth not in the leaft hinder the neceflary Conception we have of his Equa- lity with him, in all the Effential Perfections of the Divinity j for it is no more than wc fee every Day among Men ; the Son is derived from his Father and begotten by him, and yet is as truly Man ; and equal to his Father in aU the EfTentials of human Nature. That we muft underftand thole Terms Son, Begotten, Born in this very Acceptation is evident : becaule the Mind of Man cannot pol- fibly without Force affix any other real Idea or Conception to them. They cannot, as I obferved before, be underftood in a ftri&ly tyro- per and Literal Sence, as they are nrft apply'd to human Nature ; for this is altogether un- worthy of God. Nor can they be taken in a purely Metaphorical Acceptation; for that is turning them into mere Allujion and Figure, without any real or lblid Correfpondent Import in refped of the Father or the Son ; and is an X % Opinion 3c8 Procedure of Opinion full of Imputation on the Goodnefs and Veracity of God, and the Juftnefs of thofe Terms he makes uie of in this Revelation ; which ne- ceffarily convey a Meaning totaly different from that of other Terms us'd to exprefs Crea- tion^ or any Other Operation of the Father. So that there is no other reasonable Way left of underftanding thofe Scripture Terms, but by Analogy with what they Signify in common Speech among Men : That is, with the Deriva- tion of a Son from his Father in the way of Nature ; lb as by means of that Derivation, originaly to partake of all the Effential Attri- butes of a Man, and to be upon an intire Eqzia- lity with his Father in all the Perfections of human Nature. This is the only Method re- maining to the Intellect, of forming a Judg- ment upon the Sence and Acceptation of thole Terms ; it muft either underitand them thus, or affix no Correfpondent determin'd Meaning at all to them : And it is plain we reduce the Faith of Chriftians to Nothings unlels we con- ceive the Divine Generation of the Son to dif- fer as Effentialy from Making or Creation ; as a Man's Begetting a Son, differs from his Making a Statue or Building an Houfe. That the Holy Spirit which we find in Scripture diftinguifhed from the Father and the Son, is a Diflintf and different Perlbn from them both, is plain from the Commifliori gi- ven the Apoftles which runs in the Name of the the Understanding. 305? the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghofl ; and from that folemn Form of Blei- fing, which is pronounced in the Name of Chrift, and of God, and of the Holy Ghofl. For if the Spirit be not a Dijlintf Peribn, as well as the Father and the Son ; it muft be own'd, that thefe Forms fufficiently tend to puzzle and confound Mankind ; by leading them nc- ceiTarily into the Opinion of a ^r/0/^/Diftinc- tion where there is realy None: And then the Sence would be thus, Go teach and baptize in the Name of the Father and of the Son who are DlftlnB Perfbns, and of the Holy Ghofl who is No diftincT: Perfon ; and it will amount to this, Baptize in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Father again. Therefore to ar- gue the third Perfon mentioned to be a mere Name, and nothing more -, and to import only the (power or Energy of the Father, is not only charging God with laying a Snare for deceiv- ing us ; but it is perverting the received Ule of Words and Language • and abufing the common Sence and Underftanding of Men: Who are naturaly led into the Interpretation of this Comm'ijfion, and of that Form of Bkf- flng, by a Companion and Analogy with Com- miflions from Princes for lifting Men into their Service, or for conferring their Grace and Fa- vours upon them. If one of their Commiffions ran in the Names of T'hree Men jointly and le- veraly, it would be playing upon our Reafbn and even ridiculous to argue, that the T'hird Name X 3 was 310 Procedure of was only a Word for the Power and Authority* of the Prince ; fo that if we will make even common Sence of that divine Commiflion and Form of Blefling, we muft underftand the Holy Ghoft to be a fpiritual intelligent Being, Per- fonaly diftincr. from the Father and the Son. That this Spirit is God or partaker of the Divine Nature, is- evident from Revelation } becaufe he is every where diftinguifhed by the peculiar Character of Holy. Abfolute confum- mate Holinefs is the peculiar infeparable Attri- bute of the Self Exi pent, Unoriginated, ■ Inde- pendent, absolutely Supreme God. Of him it is faid, Thou only art Holy ; and upon the High Prieft's Mitre was written Holinefs to 'Jehovah, that is to hirn Only. Now the Spirit being every where called Holy, as his peculiar dii- tinguifhing Character ; and accordingly the Words not capable of being rendered Jn Holy Spirit, but 7*he. Holy Spirit, by way of Excel- lency and Diftinftion from all Created Spirits (the greateft of which cannot without Blafphe- ming be called The Holy Spirit abfolutely ) that Epithet muft mean an Intrinjtc original 'and Efjential Holinefs in him , and not barely the Spirit which fanctifies or Makes Holy ; elpeci- aly fince even This could not be fuppofed of him, unlefs he had eifential Holinefs in hina- felf. This way of Thinking of the Spirit is unavoidable, if we obferve that Holinefs is his conflant diftinguiihingChara&eiyiot only where h§ the Understanding. 311 he is mentioned in the Relation he hath to Us ; but that he is called Holy even where he is named together with, and in relpeft to the Fa- ther and to the Son : As In the Name of the Fa- ther , andofthe Son, andofthe Holy Ghofl. And in the Form of BleJJing \ and where it is laid, The Holy Ghojl, whom the Father will Jena \ in my Name ; and in many other Places : So that he is characterized as Holy, not only in refpecl: of Us who are fan&ified by him ; but in refpect of the Father and the Son ; inlomuch that he Alone is ltiled Holy wherever the three Peribns are exprefly named together in Scripture. The Word Holy in thofe Places cannot be added in Oppojttion to the Father and the Son ; nor as Exclupve of the Father and the Son ; becaufe They are both abfblutely Holy as well as the Spirit ; nor is it the Lefs but the Greater Holinels for his being exprefly mentioned in Conjunction with them : So that the Words of thole Places naturaly lead us into an Opinion that His muft be the fame Holinefs with that of the Father and of the Son, who are both called The mo ft Holy ; that is, the very intrinfic Ef- fential Holinels of Jehovah the moll; high iii- preme God. To which if we add, that he is cal- led The Spirit of Holinefs, the Spirit of Glory, the eternal Spirit, and very often The Spirit of Godj and particularly at the Baptifm of Chrift, where he was tperfonaly diftinguifhed from the Father, even in a Vifible Appearance 3 we muft have X 4 our 3 H Procedure of our Reafbn amufed by Subtilty and Criticifm, and be quite turned out of the plain and com- mon Way of Thinking ; before we can under- Hand the Revelations made of the Holy Ghoft ia any other Sence, than as of God Equal with the Father. But that which puts this Matter out of all doubt is, that the Term Spirit is taken origi- naly for the Breath of Man ; from thence it came afterwards to be uled for the Immaterial Principle of our Composition, which in com- mon Speech is call'd the Soul: And from thence again it came to be transfer'd to the Divine "Nature ; and accordingly hath been apply'd by the Wifdom of God in Scripture, to exprefs the third Divine Perfbn, or Holy Spirit of God. Hence it is plain, that we mull; not underftand that Term Literaly and in its ftrict Propriety, as it is uled to exprefs an human Spirit ;. let this be far from us : Nor can it mean a purely Figurative and Metaphorical Spirit only ; for that is no Spirit at all. Nor can it be a mere Figure for God the Father, for that would be a.DeluJtveT'autology running thro" the whole Style and Language of Revelation, lufficient to con- found the Reafon and Underftanding of Men ; who are under a Neceflity from thence to luppole them (perfonaly Diftinci', and efpecialy where they are named Together as exprefly diftinguilh- ed from each other. So that there is no way left to the Mind of Man to affix any Juft, Real, and the Understanding. 313 and Solid Meaning to that Scripture Term, but by jlncdogy with the Spirit of Man that is in him ; which is an Ejpntial Part of his Com- pofition, and yet in Truth and Reality ca- pable of being a£tualy Dijlinguijhed and fe- parately confidered from the other Part of the Compound. This perfbnal Diftin&ion hath very aptly in the Church been termed the trinity ; as the neceflary conceiving of it to be in one and the lame Divine Nature, is called the Unity : And tho* neither of thefe Terms are found in Scrip- ture applied to the Divine Nature -, yet all the Scoffs and Sarcafms by which Men ridicule and expofe them, are no other than Blalpheming that Diftinflion, and that Samenefs and Identity of the Divine Nature, whereof the Revelations of God are full and expreflive ; and exploding the whole Chrijlian Faith, which is founded up- on the Reality of them ; and which mull all fall to the Ground upon the denying or reject- ing the true Meaning of either. Now lince both Realbn and Revelation fhew us there can be but One God, we can own and worfhip but one ; that one God alone who Only hath Immortality, and Life in him/elf-, who is the Mojl High, above all Incorruptible, Invi- Jible ', or to fpeak in Words of Human Inven- tion, who is Unoriginated, Independent, Jlbjb- futely Supreme. And lince the Books of Scrip- ture 3 14 Procedure of ture are full of a Perfonal Diftin&ion in the Divine Nature, beyond our Difcovery any where but in them -, and fince we find that One God let forth to us under three diftincl and different Relations , which the three Peribns bear both to One another, and to Us ; and ac- cordingly diftinguifhed by different perfonal Names, and Charatfers, and Operations, and Offices ', therefore we worfhip that one God with this Diftin&ion of his Own making, and not of Oars, A s we cannot conceive any Intermediate Be- ing between that abfblutely Supreme God, and a mere Creature ; fb neither is there, nor can there be any Medium- between Worfhip abfb- lutely Divine, and Civil Worjlnp, or rather Ho- nour to be paid to a Creature as fuch. And therefore if the Son and Holy Ghoft are to be properly and realy worfhiped at all, as all Chri- ilians allow -, the Same Worfhip muft be paid tfhem which we pay the moll High or abfolute- ly Supreme God; that Worfhip which confifts in addrefllng our felves in any Religious Act. of the Mind, or Pofture of the Body, to an Invifibh Being : Which is that very Supreme and Ultimate Worfhip due to ' the Supreme, the abfblutely Supreme Deity alone ; and therefore can admit of no Degrees, fb as to be paid to any other Inferior Invifible Being whatfoever ; That Wor^ fhip which is Truly Divine, which is Abfolutely fo, and which without Idolatry cannot be paid to the Understanding. 315 to any Creature whatfbever. All our Prayers and Praifes muft be firfl and laft, Primarily and JJltimately directed to the Honour and Glory of that One absolutely Supreme God ; and no de- gree of Divine Worfhip, if it Could admit of iiich, ought to be directed to the Honour or Glory of any other invifible Being whatfbever, but of him alone. The Holy Scriptures leave no room for us to imagine any fuch degrees in Divine Worfhip ; or for any Medium between that Worfhip which is abfblutely Divine, and to be paid to the abfblutely fupreme God ; and that which is a purely Civil RefpecT: or Honour, and to be paid to a mere Creature. I T is laid, rfhou (halt worfhip the Lord thy Gody and him only /halt thou ferve j the one only independent Abfolutely fupreme God ; fb that all Divine Worfhip is, by that Precept, ab- fblutely Excluded from the Son and Holy Ghof y and they muft have no other Kind of Honour than we might pay an invifible Angel or de- parted Saint, unlefs they are incomprehenfibly One in Nature and all Perfections with that ab- folutely fupreme invifible God. Again, rfhc Lord our God is one Lord, whom we are to Love with All our Heart, with All our Soul, with All our Mind, and with All our Strength ; and if fb, there is no room left for the Divine Love of Son or Holy Ghofl, unlefs we fuppofe them that One Lord our God ; who is reprefented as a Jealous God, and will not in the leaft Ihare $i6 Procedure of fhare with any other in Divine Worftiip, which is altogether to be paid to him alone : And if the Son and Holy Ghoft are not feme way or other Truly and not in Mere Figure only that One God and Lord, it would be as far from Idolatry to addreis our Prayers and Praifes to an Jngel, as to Them ; fo that thofe Prayers and Praifes b&rima- r'tly and Ultimately directed ftill to that One God. According to this plain and natural Way of Thinking, as we are iirrl: jointly and facramentaly Baptized, by one and the fame iblemn Act. of Worlhip, In the Name of the Fa- ther \ and of the Son, and oj the Holy Ghofl\ fo we ever after unite them in our Worlhip, and adore them without any Degrees or Inequality in that Worlhip ; which being truly Divine •can admit of no Degrees or Inequality. Where- as they who argue for an Inequality in the Di- vine tper/ons ; and for an Inferiority of Nature, and a Subjeffiion in the Son and Holy Ghoft to the Father ; neceflarily involve themfelves, and all who adhere to their Principles, in end- lels Uncertainty and Confufion. Becaufe they can never fix and fettle the different Kinds and Degrees of that Lower Divine Worflfip (a Contradiction in the very Terms) which is to be paid to the Son and to the Holy Ghoft ; nor diftinguifh it with liich Exa&nels and Nicety, that it fhall neither be the Worlhip due to the Unoriginated absolutely Supreme God - y nor that mere Honour and Relpect only which is the Understanding. 317 is to be paid to Creatures, and varied accord- ing to their feveral Ranks and Dignities. B u t to make it yet more clear, that the Mind of Man cannot without Abiurdity have any other Notion or Conception of the Son and Holy Ghoft, than as their being incom- prehenfibly One abfohitely Supreme Deity with the Father, without a Figure ; and One joint and ultimate Objetf of all Chriftian Worfhip ; let us colled the two feemingly inconiiftent Dodrines into oppofite Propofitions thus. 'There is no other God Let all the Angels of but one. God worfhip him. T'hou /halt worfhip Go baptize all the Lord thy God, and Nations in the Name of* him only jhalt thou ferve. the Father, and of the Son, a?id of the Holy Ghojl. O n this Side the The Precepts on Precepts are expreis this Side in Scripture, and pofitive for the are no lefs plain and believing in One God pofitive and peremp- alone ; and for paying tory ; that the whole DivineWorfhiptohim intelligent Creation is Only. They are fall to pay Divine Worfhip and peremptory a- to the Son ; and Man- gainft addreffing our kind in particular, by felves religioufly in expreis Precept and 1 Exam* 5 1 8 Procedure of Body or Mind to any Example. The Son other invilible Deity, is call'd God abfblute- than to that one only ly ; and the conftant and absolutely Supreme Style for the Holy Deity ; who is a jea- Ghoft is the Spirit of lous God, and will not God himfelf, and not luffer any Kind or De- One of God's Spirits, gree of Divine Honour or Worfhip, to be di- rected to any other Deity whatlbever, £- qual or Inferior to him. The Mind of Man can underftand thefe Pre- cepts no otherwife ; nor can it frame any other Notion of Idola- try, than the addref- fing our felves either The Precept is ex- prefs for performing one of ommoft. Solemn Sacramental Ads of Di- vine Worihip Jointly to the Father, Son and Holy Ghoft. As we are firft initiated into the Chriftian Religion by one Ad of Wor- fhip paid to them joint- in Body or Mind, by ly ; fo are we ever af- way of ReligiousWor- ter blelfed jointly in fhip, to any other Be- the Name of all the ing, efpecialy Invlftble, than to the Moft High and abfblutely Su- preme Deity alone. Three : And all this without the leaft direct or indired Mention or Intimation of any I#- equality ; or of any Dif- ference of Nature or Degree ; or of any Z)/- fllnftion of Worfhip. And the Understanding. 319 And what is yet more fully decifive to the plaineft Realbn is, that thro 5 the whole Tenor of Revelation fuch EJpntlaly Divine Attributes are given to the Son and Holy Ghoft; as cannot,with- out Blafphemwg , be ipoke of any Being J»- ferlor to theMoft High Supreme Deity. Now both thefe Precepts here oppos'd, are expreis Scripture ; they are both from God, and both true ; both are therefore equaly the Ob- jects of our Knowledge and Faith ; and both of them to be obferved and obeyed. Since it is evident that there is no Contradiction in Terms here, and no more can be pretended than an appearing Oppofition and Inconfiiten- cy ; and that too in Relation to an Unity and Diftinction, for the direct: Apprehenfion of which there is no Capacity in the Mind of Man ; therefore the Wiidom of God hath left it to us, to believe them Both true, and to recon- cile them according to the beft of our Under- Handing. Not by taking upon us to fhew How the Divine Nature is One^ and how it is 7*hree ; by labouring after abftracted Metaphyseal So- lutions 320 Procedure of lutions of the Real true Nature and Manner of that Unity, or Diftinclion ; or by any auk- ward and unfeemly llluft rations of them, and mean unworthy Comparifons of our Own with any Unity or Diitin&ion whereof we can pot- fibly have Proper Direct Notion or Idea. But by lolving the feeming Oppofition in a way molt, eafy and obvious to the plainer!: Under- ftanding ; that is, by concluding, that fince there is but One God who alone is to be JVor- Jhiped and lerved ; and fince the Son and Holy Spirit are each of them Called God ; and are exprefly commanded to be worfhiped likewife with Sacramental, and confequently with Su- preme and. Ultimate Worfhip : Therefore they muft certainly be incomprehenfibly One with the Moft High God in. Reality y and not in Fi- gure alone ; and for that Realbn only are de- clar'd to be, together with the Father, the "Joint and Supreme Object of all truly divine and ultimate Worfhip. Thus all Abfiirdity and Contradiction, which can poflibly be urged againft the Doctrine of the tfhree Divine Perlbns, and One only Moft High Supreme Deity, are relblved into this ; that we know not How to reconcile this to the intrinfic Nature and EJJence of God \ which we freely acknowledge, as we do every thing in the Real Nature of God to be Inconceiv- able and .ineffable. The Mind of Man can Rejl in this 7 and acquiefce intirely in believ- ing the Understanding. 311 ing the Diftinction between Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft to be as Real and True as if it were Literaly Perlbnal ; and their Unity to be fo Str'ili that it renders them One Joint and Su- preme Objeff of all truly Divine and Chriftian Worftiip : Thus we receive and embrace the glorious Revelation as we find it in the Scrip- tures ; and leave the real Incomprehensible Ground and Foundation of it in the Nature of God, to his own Veracity ; with this full Per- fuafion, that he would never lead us by any invincible Temptation into grofs and inevita- ble Idolatry. All this is obvious and eafy, falling in with common Sence and Realbn ; and hath a tPlainefe worthy of God, as it is a Doctrine calculated for the Knowledge and Faith of all Mankind both learned and unlearned : But ac- cording to the Modern Scheme of Religion in the aforementioned fifty five Proportions, the Cafe will ftand thus. rfhere is no other There are More God but one. Gods than One. T'hou Jbalt morjhip Thou fhalt Wor- ths Lord thy God, and flrip and ferve Another him only Jbalt thou ferve. God, Be/ides the Lord thy God. And thou fhalt pay Divine Ho- nour to a third Divine Y Per- jZ2 Procedure of Perlbn, who is not e- ven to be Called 'God. O N this Side, in Here you muft Purfuance of" that believe Another fepa- ' Scheme, you mull un- rate Qerfon of a God. derftand theie Precepts You muft ferve and thus. There is no o- Worfhip that diftind ther but one Qerfon of and feparate Perlbn. God. Thou fhalt Wor- And you muft Honour Jhip that one Perfon of a third ieparate Perlbn, God, and that one Per- not expreily own'd for lbn Only fhalt thou either God or a Crea- ferve. tare. Here there is no Seeming Oppofition only and Inconfiftency, but downright Flat Contra- diction in exprels ferms:, rendred ftill more flagrant, by fuppofing the Moft High God or Supreme Deity to be but One Qerfon. The Method that Author prefcribes to Mankind for evading this monftrous Contra- diction is, an Advice to add Caufe, Origin, Au- thor, ^Principle, Monarchy, Self-Exijlence, Inde- pendency, Abjolute Supremacy to the Perlbn on One Side : And to the Perlbns on the other ; Effect or Efficiency, Separate Exigence, Inferio- rity, Dependency, and Subjection, Now if you ule thele Terms of human Language either in their firft Propriety and ftrictly Literal Ac- ceptation, (as he all along doth) or even Ano- 4 logkaly, the Understanding. 6i$ logkaly, but to no other Purpofe than that Au- thor ufes them, namely to diftinguifh the Di- vine Perfons from Each other , and not from the Creatures only ; both the Terms themlelves, and all the Coniequences deduced from them, are fb far from helping Chriftians to any wa^r of Reconciling the palpable Contradiction either to their Under {landing or Conferences ' y that they ferve only to eftablifh and confirm it, and if poffible to render it more glaring and infuperable than it firft appeared itv the contradictory Propofitions themfelves. The Ufe and Application of all thole £/);- fcriptural Terms is to argue the Perfons on both Sides to be not only Di/lin£? y but in- tirely disjoin'd and Separate from each other, as human Perlbns are ; nay more,' to be of a quite Different Nature and Degree : So that the whole Scope and Tendency of the fifty five Propo- fitions muft center at laft in the utter Exclu- fion of the Son and Holy Ghofi from all Divine Worfoip and Honour ; the Understanding is here quite baffled and Confounded ; and no eva- five Subtilty can ever reconcile this Contra- diction to the Mind of Man ; you fhall Wor- jbip and ferve the Qerfbn of the Mofl High God alone ; and yet you lhall Worfhip two other 'Perfons befides him. T o do the Author juftice, he doth not At- tempt, any Reconciliation of it- ; he contends Y 2 only 324 Procedure of* only for the Dlfunion and Separation of the Di- vine Perlbns thro* all his Proportions ; and in- tirely deftroys all Real Unity, allowing only that of the Qerfon of God In him/elf, a Figu- rative Unity of 'Tower with the Son ; and no Unity At all with the Holy Ghoft. The Foun- dation of the whole is laid in this Criticifm ; ^Per/on or Intelligent J gent is always in Latin and Greek expreffed by the Mafculine Jdjeffiive \ therefore when God is in Scripture faid to be Jl£, it means, not only that he is one God, but likewife that he is one Per/on : From whence the Concluiion is, that he cannot be diftinguifhed into rfhree ^Perjons ; fo that the Son and Holy Ghoft cannot be, even in any In- comprehenftbk Real Manner, One and the lame Supreme Deity with the Father. But the Ar- gument rightly formed mould ftand thus. I f the Word E% is always ufed to fignify one individual Man ; then it muft likewife fig- nify one God , when apply'd to the Divine Nature. But the Word F% is always ufed to fig- nify one individual Man. Ergo. This is a fair way of Arguing, and the Confequence intirely true ; for this is the very Purport of the Mafculine Adjective, and of JE% in particular, when it is apply'd to exprefs the Unity of God in Scripture* But this will not the Understanding. 3 2 y not ferve the Author's turn ; his Confcquence is, Therefore Efs muft fignify one ^Per/on of God ; it muft exprefs juft llich another Numeri- cal individual Unity, as we conceive in one lingle Man ; but not as he is made up of Spirit and Soul and Body, which is a faint and diftant Emblem of the trinity \ and therefore fuch an Unity is no way agreeable to this Author's grand Principle : Who every where argues the Father to be a feparate Sub fiance from the Son and Holy Ghoft ; which direclly leads Men into a Notion, that we muft conceive the U- nity of the Father by that of one human Sy- ftem of Matter. According to hirn, at beft you muft imagine God to be One, as a Man is One ; which cannot be, unlels you conceive him to be fiich another ^Per/on or Intelligent Agent, as one of us. I f to obviate this grofs Notion, we obferve that the Terms c PerJun and Intelligent Agent cannot be liippoied applicable to the Divine Nature in that Literal and ftri6t Propriety, but in a Divine Sence and by Analogy only • then by Chfing with the Analogy, that Author's Ar- gument will be carried to the utmoft thus. A s the mafculine Adjective E I allow not ; for what I would y that do I not ; but what I hate y that do J. The pure Intellect and Will are rarely or never fo brought over to the Enemies Side, as to fall in with them intirely, or to abet and main- tain their Caufe with Qleafure and Approbation ; B b 3 tho* 374 Procedure of tho' they may be carried mto Captivity by our own Default; and into luch a State of Eondage and Subjection as to be pall all Hope or Proipecl: of any Releaie. But ftill in the midft of Chains and Fetters, the Spirit, like a royal Captive awful even in Diftrefs, will a£- fert its native right of Dominion, and upbraid its Betrayer with unjuft and treacherous Ulur- pation. From thence come Remorfe of Con- Science, and boding Expectation of inconceiv- able Mifery in a future State, occafioned by going out of the World with our whole Frame voluntarily Inverted, and by the Qure Spirit's being probably configned over by Death to the endlefs Tyranny of the Inferior Soul, upon the Re-union of Body and Spirit at the Refur? reclion. II. The Word ufed in Scripture to denote the fecond Principle in Man is \[y^w which hath various Acceptations. In i Qet. ii. If, it is taken for wcdux or the pure Spirit of Man, Beware of flefhly Lufls which war agamjl the Soul -, and thus it is to be interpreted where-? ever it is apply'd to a pure Spirit in a State of Separation. Sometimes it is taken for both thefe, Spirit and Soul together, as 'Thou Fool, this Night Jball thy Soul be required of thee, as likewile in all Places where mention is made of Saying the Soul, or of loving God with Ml the Soul Very often it is taken for the whole Man, let Every Soul be fibjetf to the higher (Power So the Understanding. 37J ^Powers. And laftly, it is ever included in the Word Flejh when it is let in Oppofition to Wftopa, or the pure Spirit ; as where it is faid, tfhe Spirit indeed is willing, but the Flejb is weak* T'he Flejh lufteth againji the Spirit, and the Spi- rit again ft the Flejh. I know that in me, that is In my Flejh ^ dwelleth no good thing. This Part of us is Mortal, fubjecT: both to Moral and Natural Corruption ; and as it owes its Being to the Conjunction of the pure Spi- rit with the Body ; lo it ceaieth and is difTolved again immediately upon their Separation : This is the Seat of all our irregular Inclinations and Defires ; and as it is Nearer ally'd to the Body than the Spirit, lb it is greatly taken up in the Conlervation of its being, and providing for the full Gratification of all its Appetites. For which Reafon it is by the Heathen Phi- lolbphers branded with fuch Names of Con- tempt as thele ; the Horje, becaufe it is head- flrong and runs away with the Man, or rather with the Spirit which ought to have the go- verning of the Reins. The Beaft in us, be- caule the animal or lenfitive Soul is tuppofed common to us with Brutes. The Woman or Child in us, becaule the Paffions and Affections of Women and Children are commonly ftronger, and their Reafon weaker than in Men. So that, as I have met it well oblerved, Man is an am- phibious Creature, of a middle Order and Nature between Angels and Brutes: With theje he par- B b 4 take* l?6 Procedure of takes of a corporeal Soul, vital Blood, and a Mafs of animal Spirits ; with the former he partakes of an Intelligent, Immaterial, immortal Spirit, Now whether we fuppofe this inferior Soul an Original, Dlfilntf, Confiltuent Part of our Frame, anfwerable to the feniitive Soul in Brutes ; or fome third Principle of Action ne- ceflarily arifing from the elfential Union of an immaterial Subftance with Matter ; yet if con- fidered abftra&edly from that pure Spirit, it is beft conceived and Ipoke of in this Ab/lratfed Sence, by the Soul of a Brute ; which of itfelf could give no more than Life, and Motion, and bodily Appetites ; and perhaps lbme fuperior Degree of natural Inflinti, as is moft obferved in thofe Beafts which approach neareft to hu- $nan Shape : And were the Body of a Man to grow up with that Alone, without the addition of an Immaterial Subftance, he would be no more than a Beaft in human Shape. When the gure Spirit was breathed into the Body, Man became a Reajbnable, as well as a Living Soul ; and thence, what would otherwife have rifen no higher than Bodily Appetite, Senfe, and In~ Jllntf ; is improved, not only into Under/land- ing and Will, but into all the Qajfions and Af- feBlons of a reafonable human Nature. These Affections were all regular in our firft Creation ; but by the Fall our bodily Ap^ 4 petite? the Understanding. 377 pctites got the upper hand of our Reafon, and became lb headftrong and violent as to draw off all the PaJJions and .Affections of the Mind from God, and Goodnefs, and the things of an- other Life ; and engage them too much on the prefent Objects of Sen/e, which were adapted to the more immediate Pleafure and Gratifi- cation of thole Appetites common to us with Brutes. Thefe i in a State of corrupt Nature being craving and impetuous, do with Clamour and Fury in a tumultuous manner, hurry a- way all thofe Jffeftions of the Mind ; in Con- tradiction to the . ftill Voice, and calm tho' conftant Advice and Tendency of the pure Underitanding and Will ; and bring them over to the Flefh. Thus it is that thefe Affections, from being the Inftruments of all Virtue and Holinefs ; become corrupt and degenerate, and are iubfervient to all manner of Vice and Wickednefs : And thus at laft is the pure Spi- rit itfelf importun'd into a Confent to their fin- ful Motions, tho' not to an intire Approbation of them. And now we fee what a fpacious Scene of Knowledge the clearing up this Diftinction of Spirit, and Soul y and Body in Man, hath opened to the Mind with relpect to the whole Syltem of Moral and Practical Religion ; by pointing out to us wherein our Strength lies, and where our Weaknefs } and difcovering to us the true Seat of all our Corruption, and the means and method of oiir Cure, Q V R 378 Procedure op Our Strength lies in the Immaterial 'part of Us aflifted by the Grace of God, which is the iecret and ineffable Communication of the holy- Spirit to the Spirit of a Man which is in him ; to enable it to refill and overcome all the Al- lurements and Temptations of the lenlitive Soul ' 7 and recover its native right of Domit nion over all the Faculties of the inferior Man, This purely ipiritual Part of us may be enti- ced and Allured^ but never overcome by Force ; for it is a noble Principle, whole Ruin muft proceed from itfelf ; it can lie under noCom- pulfion or Abfolute Constraint from any thing without it, but from that only which is Al- mighty. As there is nothing more Feeble than the Mind of Man, when it refigns itfelf up to irregular Paffion and Appetite ; fo there is no- thing in Nature fo Strong and invincible, when- ever it is truly and fteadily refolved to be ib : When by divine Affiftance it exerts itfelf to the utmoft, the World and the Flefh are not able to Cope with it, nor the Devil to ftand before it. I n a mere ftate of corrupt Nature indeed, this Godlike Part of us is without a mfficient Power of Direction and Government ; it is fo overcome and obftru&ed, that of itielf it is ut- terly unable to reftrain any one irregular Incli- nation or Appetite in the fenfitive Soul, or Body : To which tho' it be efFentialy United, yet the Understanding. 379 yet it cannot diffule its own native Inclinations and Defires thro' the unweildy Mais ; which fets up a great Variety of Lufts and Appetites of its own in direct Oppofition to it ; fo that it cannot when Unajfifled, commendably and e£- fectualy exert itfclf to the Performance of any Virtue or Goodneis in Thought, Word, or Deed. This made the fecret Influence of the Sprit of God upon our Spirit neceffary for us ; that the fame Breath of God which firft gave it Being, might fupply it with new Life and Vigour: Stirring up its original Inclinations and Tendencies } awakening and reviving thole native Defires of Virtue and Holinefs, which lay dormant and unaclive under the Ruins of human Nature ; and this is the Beginning of a Chriftian Life. When by God's Preventing Grace the Spirit is rouzed out of its Lethargy, then comes on the Struggle ; the Principles of Rea/on and Grace, againft the corrupt Appetites and Propenfions of Nature. If it cherifhes and encourages thefe Firjl Motions of the Ho- ly Spirit, and holds out relblutely and with firm Perfeverance, it gains Ground every Day ; and goes on gradualy from Strength to Strength : Till at laft, like a glorious Monarch reftored and confirmed, it rules the rebel Affections and Paffions of the lenfitive Soul, and the Appe- tites of the Body, with a Rod of Iron, and fways them all with its Nod. It may then approve or reject ; fupprels or excite ; check or encourage all our Inclinations at will ; it may St/9 380 Procedure of Still the raging and fwelling of our Paffions, and fay to each of them, Hitherto (halt thou come and no further ; and in Ihort nothing fhall be tranfacted in the little World without its Permiffion or Command. Our. Weaknefs lies in the Senjltive Soul, the immediate Seat of all our Pajjiom and Affec- tions ; which as it relults from the Conjunction of the Pure Sprit and Body, is lbllicited on both fides, and mull incline to one or the o- ther : If it join with the Spirit, it will itlelf become fpiritualized in all its Tendencies ; but as it more or lefs inclines to the Fle/h, fo far it becomes carnal and degenerate. Now becaule all the Motions and Affections of this inferior Soul are more immediately converfant with the Objects of our bodily Appetites ; and more ftrongly importuned by their conitant and in- timate tyre/ence ; they are in their own Nature apt to clofe with thefe, and Dwell upon them : And it is not without great Difficulty and Re- fblution that they can be weaned and drawn off from them ; fo as to be chiefly imployed upon the invifible Things of another World, and fuch Things here as have a more immedi- ate Relation to them. For this Reafon both the Inferior Soul and Body go under the Deno- mination of Flefh ; and accordingly of this it is faid, that the Flefh lufteth againjl the ffirit y and the fpirit againjl the flefh ; and thefe arei contrary the one to the other. These the Understanding. 381 These are the two Enemies which muft engage ; Implacable irreconcilable Enemies, ever fince the Fall ; and the fhort fierce Combat is for Eternity. The fecret Influences of the Holy Spirit of God come into the Affiftance of the purely Spiritual Part of us ; the Devil on the other fide is a conftant Auxiliary to the Flejb ; the flruggle is for no lels than Life or Death everlafting ; and the one or the other muft obtain a compleat Vi&ory. BOOK 3« z Procedure of BOOK III. ASUMMARY • of The NATURAL ORDER, and WHOLE PROCEDURE of The INTELLECT. CHAP. I. The Mind at Firji a Tabula Rafa. THAT Maxim of the Logicians is to be taken for a fure and fundamental Truth, Nihil efl in Intellefiu quod nonfat prius infenfu ; the true Meaning of which is, that the Ideas of Senje are the Firft Foundation on which we raile our whole Superftru&ure of Knowledge ; and that all the Difcoveries we can make in things temporal and Spiritual, together with the moft Refined and Abftratfed Notions of them in the Mind of Man, take their Rife originaly from Senfation. A t our Birth the Imagination is intirely 3 Tabu fa Raja or perfed Blank, without any Ma- terials either for a Simple View or any Other O- peratior* the Understanding. 383 peration of the Intellect. We are not furnifhcd wit!) any Innate Ideas of things material or im- material ; nor are we endued with a Faculty or Diipofition of forming '■Purely Intellectual Ideas or Conceptions independent of all Senla- tion : Much lels has the human Soul a Power of railing up to itfelf Ideas out of Nothing, which is a kind of Creation ; or of attaining any Fir ft Principles exclufive of all Illation or confequential Dedudion from Ideas of Material Objects ; without which the Mind of Man, during its Union with the Body, could never have arrived even to a Confcioufnels of its own Operations or Exijlence. Daily Experience fhews us that as far as Peribns are from their firft Infancy deprived of any of their Senjes, they are fb far imperfect in their Intellectuals. What a vaft degree of Knowledge do we find cut off together with that one Senfe of Hearing ? Take away the Sight likewile, and then confider how limited and confin'd the Operations of the Intellect muft be ? If after this you remove from a Man all tfafte and Smelling, and if he hath no Ideas left for the Mind to work upon but thofe of his Feeling ; how far would he differ from the fenfitive Plant ? The Mind in fuch cafe would not be able to infer the bare Exiftence of any thing external to it but what was Felt ; and if it were poffible for the Man to haVe Animal Life without Feeling, he would be as utterly 1 Void 384 Procedure of void of Knowledge as one in a Swoon or Apo- pleftick Fit. Now this is lb far from being a juft realbn to think the Soul of Man Material, that it is an Argument of the quite Contrary. For let us reftore that Man to all his Senfes again, in the greateft degree of Acutenefs he is capable of, inlbmuch that he fhall have his Imaginati- on furnilhed with the Ideas of all Senfble Ob- jects ; yet you have not reftored him to any ule of his Reafon and Under/landing j not even to that of a Simple View or Apprehenfion of thole Ideas. With relped to the fimple Perception of Mere Senje he is Hill upon the lame Level with Brutes ; he is altogether Pafftve ; he retains all the Signatures and Impreffions of outward Objects, but in the very Order only in which they are ftamped ; without tfranfpojing or Al- tering, Dividing or Compounding, or even Com- paring them one with another : And they would always continue lb in the Imagination, if there were not a Principle Above Matter, firft to contemplate or view them ; and then to work up thofe rude and grols Materials into a great Variety of curious Arts and Sciences. G H A P the Understanding. 3 8 j CHAP. II. Ideas of Senfation. THE Firft ftep therefore made towards Knowledge is Antecedent to any Opera- tion of the Qure Mind, and without any Con- currence of the Intellect ; and that is, the At- tainment of Ideas, or lome Likenels and Re- prefentation of external Objects which may re- main in their Abfence , and (fince all Senfati- on is of (Particulars only, and Succejjively of one Object, after another) which may bring them all together, as it were into one Place, for the more convenient View and Obfervation of the Mind. Whether this is performed by any actual ImpreflSon of the Object upon the Organ of Senlation; or by lome Operation of the Senfe upon the Object ? And whether the Idea is always an Emblem of the Real tfrue Nature of the Object. \ or of its external Appearance alone ; or only Occajion'd by it ? are Queftions perhaps never to be thoroughly decided ; and therefore we leave them to be for ever debated by the Curious. Thefe feveral Remarks fol- lowing, which are within the Compais of our Knowledge, are more material to be obferved. 1. That thefe Ideas of Senfation are all Sim" fU Perceptions, and of Particulars only j which C c is 386 Procedure of is evident enough with refpect to Four of eur Senfes ; and will appear to be fo likewife of the Sight, if it is confidered that tho' the Eye can take in a Confujed Profpect of a great Va- riety of Objects at Once, yet it can take a Di- ftinff View of them no otherwife than Succef- fively one after another : And tho' the fame ex- ternal Object may make Impreilions upon More of our Senfes than one at the fame time, yet Each of thofe Impreffions are of a Different kind, and each a Simple Idea in itfelf ; tho* the Mind may afterwards put them together to make up one Compound Idea of that Object. 2. That this fimple Perception of Objects by their Ideas, which is common to us with Brutes, is to be well diftinguifhed from the fimple Apprehenjion of thofe Ideas by the Intellect after they are lodged in the Imagination ; which is an Operation never to be performed by mere Matter, without the Concurrence of an imma- terial Principle. .3. That thefe fimple Ideas of Senfation only are, in the ftrict and truly proper Sence of the Word, to be called Ideas ; and that tho* this Term may improperly be extended to fig- nify any of tfhefe confider'd in Conjunction with the Operations of the Mind upon them, yet it then ferves only to darken the Subject and con- found the Underltanding. 4. That the Understanding. 387 4. That thefe are the Original Materials and Ground-work of all our Knowledge. And if any one hath a Doubt whether they are fo, let him infta'nce in fome one Simple original Idea, which we are not beholden to the Senfes for ; one that the Intellect, can call altogether its own ; and which it acquired intirely Independent of them. The very Idea oiExijlence, which is the moll direct and immediate one we have with refpect to Immaterial Beings, is from the Senfes ; in the Knowledge of which the Intel- led proceeds thus : As from the Exiftence of one thing Material actualy perceived, I infer the poilible and even probable Exiftence of other things Material which were never the Obje&s of any of my Senfes ; fb from the known Ex- iftence of things Material I draw this Conle- quence, That other things may and muft exift which are Not Matter. Were it not for our d final ienfible Perception of Bodily Subftance, we fhould not know what it was to have a Be- ing, nor could we be conlcious of even our Own Exiftence. S o likewife all the Idea or Notion we have oiQower, is from the Operations we obferve in things purely Material one upon another ; or from the Operation of the Mind upon its Ideas^ and its voluntary moving of the Body : And therefore becaufe we can have no ^Proper No- tion or Direfi Idea of the Power of Creation, Q c 1 ©r 388 Procedure of or of producing a Thing into Being no Part of which exifted before ; we Endeavour to conceive it after the beft manner we can, by the Power of a Man in making fbmething out of Qre-ex- ifient Materials. Thus we form a Conception even of Eternity itfelf from Time, which is meafured by the Motion of the Heavenly Bo- dies; and from the Duration of things material. So likewife by enlarging the Idea we have of Space and Extenfion, the Mind forms to itfelf the beft pofitive Conception of Infinity it is capable of; and all the Notion of it we have beyond this, is only a Negation of any Stop or Boundary. Nay when we attempt to form any Simple Idea of God himfelf, it is by no other than that of Light , or the Glory of the Sun, For this Reaibn we naturaly fall into that way of Ipeaking of things immaterial, and where- of we can have no dired Perception or proper Idea, in the very lame Style and Language we ipeak of Ourfelves and other things of this World ; or elle exprels them in Terms purely Negative, fiich as Infinite, Immaterial, Immortal, Incomprehen/ibk, and iiich like. For the lame Reaibn it is, as I have met it well oblerved, that we exprels the pureft Operations of the Intellect by Terms borrowed from Senlation, Animi ipfius Funtfiones vocibus quae a rebus corporeis funt tranjlatx dejignamus ; quod nimirum res apprehendat, quod dijcurrat, cXc. As we fay in Englifti, that the Mind Appre- hends the Understanding. 386 hends or fakes a thing, that it Runs over it, and iiich like : Bccaufe we have no Ideas of thofe Operations ; and therefore when we form the moft Abftrafled Conceptions we can of them, it is not to be done exclufively of thofe Objetfs which are "Thought of or Willed '; in the molt re- fined Compofition of which Objects, there will always be found a Mixture of fenfitive Ideas or a Dependence upon them. And thus like- wile all the Conceptions we have of the par- ticular Affections and ^PaJJions of the Soul of Man, are in fome Mealiire made up out of Ideas of Sen/ation. We cannot form any Notions of them exclufive of the Objects which occafion them, and of their different Manner of affect- ing the Body, by which they become Vifible in the Lineaments of the Face, or the outward De- portment of the Perlbn : And by joining fuch Ideas to a Confcioufnefs of'-TIea/ure and ^Pain in the Mind, we form a Complex Notion of each Paflion. Thus we partly conceive "Joy and Gladnels by the Iparkling of the Eyes and di- lating of the Countenance ; Sorrow by a down Look and a Contraction of all our Features ; and Anger by the Diftortion of them. There is a peculiar Look of Envy, another of Shame, and another of Defpair. Let any Man try to form an Idea or Conception of any particular Pajjion abftractedly from all External Things which are its Objects, and from all Effects of it on the Body \ and he will loon perceive what a Dependence it has on Ideas oiSenfe, and what C c 3 a Portion 390 Procedure of a Portion of them muft be taken into the Ac- count. In fhort whilft the Spirit is in Con- junction with the Body, if you remove from it all Ideas of Senfation, the whole Superftruc- ture of Knowledge Human and Divine falls to the Ground ; the Intellect could then have no thought, having nothing left to think of: Nay tho' at the fame time we fhould fuppofe the Exiftence of Myriads of Immaterial Beings ; fince nothing is plainer, than that it could have no direct and proper Idea of them. When thefe Impreilions which we are by God and Nature difpoled to receive from out- ward Objects, are imperceptibly conveyed thro* the Organs of Senfation inwardly to the Ima- gination j to be there repofited and ftored up as the flrft Groundwork and grols unwrought Materials of all Knowledge, whether of things Material or Immaterial ; then it is that they obtain the Name of Ideas: Whkh are ever more clear, and diftinct, and permanent accord- ing to the prefent Difpolition of the Organ of Senfation ; the juit Diitance of the Objetf ; the Strength of the Impreffion made upon the Senle \ the frequent Repetition of that Impreffion ; and the Difpolition of the Medium. It is called the Imagination from the Images of external Objects lodged in it, in the fame confufed and dilbr- 'derly manner they are tranlmitted from the Senfes ; and Sen/its Communis, becaufe it is the Inward common Receptacle of all the outward Impreffion? the Understanding. 391 Impreflions made upon them. This is a Fa- culty in Man, as well as Brutes, purely Paf- five y and differs from Memory in that it is, 'more diftincHy fpeaking, the Storehoufe or Re- fofetory \ but Memory regards rather the Furni- ture or vaft Variety of Ideas themlelves, lodged there for the ufe of the pure Intellect ; and is not a Dijlinft Faculty from the Intellect, as the Imagination realy is ; but an Ability in it to Revive again and bring into View any Ideas or Notions wherewith the Imagination has been once impregnated, without the repeated Prefence of the Obje&s or Occafions which firft excited them. When we lay a Man hath a lively or working Imagination, it is but a mis- taken and vulgar way of exprefling the more dextrous and iprightly Operations of the In- tellect upon the Ideas T'hat is ftored with : And confifts particularly in a quick and ready Com- farifon of them with one another; and placing them together in iiich a Light, as that they fhall mutualy reflect, a Beauty and Lultre from one to the other, and by that means produce a Surprife and Plealure in the Mind. Tho' all hitherto is not properly Know- ledge, but only what is common to us with Brutes ; yet it is an immenfe Fund of Mate- rials laid in for the Imployment of the Mind. The Ideas which the Imagination is capable of containing are not within the Power of Number ; eipecialy fincc the great increafe of C c 4 them 39* Procedure of them by Telelcopes and magnifying Glafles : It is a Faculty wide and extenfive as that Sys- tem including the fix'd Stars y and is of Ca- pacity enough to take in Ideas from all the Objects of the whole vifible Creation. CHAP. III. The Jimple Apprehenfion of the InteU left) or its View of thofe Ideas, TH E next Advance in the Order of Na- ture is to what is truly and properly Knowledge ; and that is a bare Contemplation or Simple View by the pure Intellect of thofe Ideas lodged in the Storehoufe of the Imagination ; in the very lame Order and Condition they were tranfmitted from the Senfes: Without any Tranipofition or Difturbance of their Situation, and without any Comparifon, Compqfition or Z)/- vifion, Enlargement or Diminution ; without any Change or Alteration of them whatlbever ; and without any Judgment, or Remark, or Objerva- tion y which may be formed into an affirmative or negative Propofition. By the Pure Intellect I do not mean the Pure Spirit or immaterial Principle in our Compofition, in Diflintfion from all that is Material in us : But the Spirit in e£- lential Union with the Body ; and particularly with thole animal Spirits, and imperceptible exquifite Fibres of the Brain, which are the more the Understanding. $93 more immediate Inftruments of Reafbn and Underftanding. This nrft Operation of the Intellect: is by the Logicians very aptly called Jpprenfio Stem* plex. But then it hath been conibunded with Senfation or the fimple Perception of the Senfes, to which it is lublequent ; whereas This pre-fuppofes all Simple Ideas of Senfation Al- ready formed and lodged in the Imagination, and actuary prepared for the Operations of the Intellect : I do not fay of the Mind, becaufe this is a more complex Term, and includes not only the Intellect, but the Will ; together with the Memory, and all the Qajjions and Jffefttons of that inferior Soul which reiiilts from the Union of the pure Spirit with the Body. This is the only Intuitive Knowledge we have, pro- perly fpeaking; and is the firft Degree of Knowledge, as it is rightly diftinguifhed from that fimple Perception of outward Objects which is common to us with Brutes : And it is a peculiar Privilege of Man to be capable of this Contemplation or View of his own Ideas, by having an Immaterial Principle in his Com- pofition. That Brutes cannot have even this Sim- ple View or Contemplation of their own Ideas, not having an immaterial Principle in their Nature, is evident ; for all external fenfible Objects, and the Organs of Senfation which are dilpofed 394 Procedure of difpoled to receive their Signatures orlmpref^ fions , and the Imagination likewife in Brutes which receives and retains thofe Impreflions, are all purely Material: So that what a Figure in the Wax is, to the Seal ; that an Idea is, in refpect of the Object of which it is a Similitude' and Reprefentation. It is no more than the Impreffion of one thing material upon another; and let this be ever fo Strong, or ever lb often Repeated ; and let the Number of Ideas be ever fo Many, ftill the Imagination is in this cafe but purely Qajfftve : And therefore thefe Ideas cannot exert any Operation upon Each other ; nor can any One of them take a View of the Reft, or exercife any Power whatibever beyond that of a material Impulfe. The fimple Perception of Brutes is pro- perly Ipeaking a Perception of the Object by the Idea ; and not of the Idea itlelf, or any View or Contemplation of it in Di/lbicfiou from the Object. Which fimple Perception of Senfe they have, from their all-wile Creator, often to a greater Perfection than Man ; bc- caufe the Ideas of Senfe in the Imagination of Brutes are the whole Sum and Subftance of their Knowledge (to fpeak by way of Analogy) which in Man are but. a Foundation for it, and Materials only for a great and glorious Super- ftruclure : And becaufe thefe are their lble ^Principle of Action ; inibmuch that they are wholy and tPafjively conducted in all their Pur- lb ft» the Understanding. 395 iiiits by the Force and Impulfe of thofe Ideas of Senfation alone (which is Natural Injlinfl) and not by any ieparate View or Contemplation of them ; which is the Beginning of Realbn or Knowledge. Brutes are under a natural NeceJJity of always following the Force and Impulle of thole fenfible Impreffions, which alone let them a going ; they continue to operate as long as there are any Remains of that Impulle, and in Proportion to the Strength or Weakneis of it : And are ever dilpoled to take a different Turn and Propenfion from every Renewal or Change of thofe fenfible Impreffions ; which they can never Revive or renew when impaired, by any Power in Themfelves^ without the repeated tyre* fence of the Objects. It may give us a tolera- ble Image of their Proceeding in all their O- perations, as they are prompted and urged on by Impreffions of outward Objects upon their Senfes ; to obferve how one Globe or Ball link- ing upon another, gives a very Different Deter- mination to its Motion according to the Force which is communicated, and the Point which it happens to touch upon : That which receives the Stroke hath no Power Within it either to divert its Courfe, or to abate or flop the Mo- tion, which is neceflarily continued whilft there are any Remains of the firft Impreflion ; but fails gradualy, and wears away till it ends in Rejl j and fo it continues till the lame Stroke 4 is 396 Procedure of is Repeated^ or that it happen to receive lome New and different Determination of its Mo- tion. How great the Number of our Simple Ideas is, will not eafily be conceived, otherwife than by confidering that our Imagination, from be- ing at firft a perfect Blank, doth in our Infan- cy receive lome Ob/cure and Confufed Delinea- tions of external Objects of Senfation ; toge- ther with a Dead and Lifelefs Colouring only : All which are cleared up gradualy by frequent Impreffions, as with the repeated touches of a -Pencil^ and grow every Day more Conipicuous and Diftintf , till at length they become a de- lightful Reprefentation and Lively Picture of all Nature. This comprehenfive Intellectual View o univerfal Nature in Miniature, mull give no imall Pleafure to the Mind of Man ; when it thus fees the vaft extent of human Understand- ing, and that it hath no Limits on this Side the fix'd Stars. It muft be transported to find it can look Inward for a Profpect of all things Without it, as far as the Eye, the moft exten- five Organ of Senfation can reach, or Optic GlafTes can cairy it : And in fhort that the Man can behold a Little World within his own Brain, in its Ideas ; which are all his own proper Goods, and which he is intire Matter of, fb as to ma- nage and difpofe them at his arbitrary Will and the Understanding. 397 and Pleafbrc. Whereas Brutes carry their Ideas about with them, as Pajjively as they do their Burdens ; at leaft for no other Purpoic properly of their own, except for a Necejfary Direction and Guidance in all their Motions. However, thefe original Simple Ideas are ft ill in Reality but a numberlefs Variety of choice and excellent Materials of all Kinds for the Intellect to work upon ; and for the Ex- ercife of all its Operations in refpect of human and Divine, Speculative and Practical Know- ledge. Thefe are the only original Foundati- on of it ail, laid by God and Nature ; but the Workmanjhip out of them is various, ac- cording to the different Temper, and Difpofi- tion, and Application of Men's Minds : And the Superstructure railed upon this Foundation is either Gold, Silver, and Precious Stones which will abide the Trial ; or on the contrary Wood, Hay, and Stubble which are fit only to be burnt. But to be a little more Particular. The generality of Men are fb indolently Incurious and unobferving, as to make little farther Im- provement of Knowledge from thefe fimple Ideas, than what they are daily prompted to by their lower Appetites and (PaJJions \ and ib of courfe make the neareft Appraches to thofe irrational Animals, which are altogether under the Power and Conduct pf Stnjibk Impreffions. Others 398 Procedure of Others there are who may be faid only to Qhy with thefe Ideas, as Children do with their Trifles. Who by arriving, with long Practice, to a great Dexterity in Rattling them one againft another by Strained and unnatural Comparijbns, which are moftly exprefTed in a Style Inverted and perplex'd, together with .a Gingh of Words ; do tickle the Ears of the Superficial and Lazy. Thus under the plau- lible Titles of Wit, and Fancy, and Humour, they Strike out of their Ideas a falfe and flaftiy Light, to Amufi and furpriie ; but not Injlrucr or improve the Underftanding. The Perfor- mances of this ibrt either in Writing or Con- vention, for the moft part pleafe by their Odr nefs only ; by their Author's ilraying not only out of the Common, but out of the Natural and Ufeful way of Thinking : They are calculated chiefly for the ufe of fuch as conliilt nothing but Eafe and Pleafure of Body and Mind ; and who have not Capacity or Relblution for the Attainment of any Knowledge that is Solid and Ufeful ; they ferve only for filling up that Time which is not employ 'd in other Diver- fions; and then grow flat and infipid, when they have for Once gratified an Itch of the Mind. As the former fupine Carelefnefs of the Vulgar is properly to be ranged under the De- nomination of Folly ; fo this is no other than a fort of voluntary Frenzy, as the Men of this Strain themfelves are pleas'd to defcribe it ; Great Wit* to Madnefs jure are near all fd. A the Understanding. 399 Avery different or rather oppollte fort of Men there is, who having a Solid natural Genius, cultivated by a fober and happy Edu- cation, do work up thole fimple and grofs Materials into La/ling and Stately Superstruc- tures, for the real Ule and Ornament of Human Life. This is performed by a nice and curious Oblervation of all their mutual Relations and Connexions .; by finding out the real Likeneffes of thole that are different, and the real Diffe- rences of thofe that are like ; by Sorting and ranging them all into proper ClafTes, under pe- culiar and diftind Heads and Denominations ; by refolving them into a Series of Caujes and Effects ; and by purfuing them thro' many Con- fequences and Deductions, and Complex Notions, till they are at laft form'd into regular Schemes of Arts and Sciences, and into rational Syjlems of natural Religion and Morality. And here I mud obferve, that Men of the moft Solid Judgment never decline what is T'rufy Wit, but cultivate and intermix it in their moft ferious Performances. I mean that kind of Wit which animates the Works of the celebrated ancient Authors, like the agreeable Lije and Spirit proper to fine Gentlemen ; with- out any mixture of the Antick Quickneis and Unnatural Agility of Dancers, and Buffoons^ and Pojlure-men ; not to fay even of Apes, and Reptiles, It is this which makes them outlive all 400 Procedure of all their Dependents ; which renders them very hardly imitable, and the Standards of good Sence and Expreflion thro* all Ages and Lan- guages j becauie they never lofe fight of Nature, but ever keep clofe to her in all her Windings and Labyrinths. This is a Felicity and Ex- cellence lo peculiar to them, and fome few o- thers, that it is as difficult in the Defcription as in the Imitation ; but thus much we may ven- ture to fay, that their Wit is ever Free, and Eajy, and iuch as flows of itlelf. It is truly an Imitation of Nature, and not a miferable wreft- ing and Dlflortlon of it ; by either reprclenting her Swoln and Bloated, and Larger than the Life, which is Monjirous : Or Left than her own juft Size and Stature ; cramping and diminiihing her Features in low and Homely Companions j which is to make her appear Dwarfijb and de- Ipicable. Wit is ever truly valuable whilft it is an Handmaid to Realbn ; and not a proud r and freakifh, and domineering Mijlrejs. When it ferves to all the Purpofes of Brightening and Polijhing, without Defacing our Images ; and of giving Light, and Illujl ration, and even Splendor to things in themfelves Dark, and Obfcure, and Difficult to be apprehended ; inftead of Glaring, and lb Dazling the Eye of the Mind, that it cannot have a Dijlinft ufeful Perception even of the plaineft Objeft. In ftiort, when it is fiich a Defcription and Picture of Nature, as keeps ilri&ly to all her juft Proportions and Lineaments j in which lhe may be fcen and admired by the i Beholder* the Understanding. 401 Beholders in her own Genuine Simplicity and Native Modefiy : And which doth not deck her out in a rfinj'el and Gawdy Drels j or expoie her to publick View in Looje and Wanton Apparel. This great and commendable Progrels, in railing iuch lofty Superftru&ures out of original Materials fo mean in Appearance, is often at- tended with no Imall Danger and Hazard ; as the lad Experience of too many hath iriewn us. For when they have carried them on to the greateft Height of Knowledge attainable in things merely Natural and human ; and do find that from thence they cannot look Strati into Heaven for the difcovery of KevealedTi\xths' y nor have luch a Proipecl: of things Spiritual and Immaterial as they have of the Objects of Senfe \ and that their Minds cannot be furnifh- ed with luch Clear and DiJiinB Ideas of them, as are alio Direct and Immediate : Then they intirely acquielce and leek no farther ; letting up here their Mirks of the utmoft Boundaries to human Underftanding, engraven and diftin- guifhed with this celebrated Motto, Qua? fupra nosy nihil ad nos. From thefe imaginary Al- titudes of theirs they look down, with a con- temptuous Air, upon all the Advocates of Re- velation and Myjlery ; perpetualy calling upon them for Ideas, nay even Simple Origiiial Ideas of things altogether imperceptible and incon- ceivable by any Proper and Direct Ideas ; and ever upbraiding them with their haying Faith D d with- 402. Procedure of without Reafin ; with Believing without Know- ledge j and with having Knowledge without Ideas. Thus thefe Men continue to live and die in a polite and learned Infidelity, for want of this plain and obvious Confederation ; that up- on their grand Principle of allowing no Know- ledge farther than they have Direfi and Proper Ideas, there could be no fuch thing even as Natural Religion : Nay they muft not acknow- ledge the Exiftence of an Angel or Spirit ; or of God himfelf, fince it is plain that they can have no Dirett Perception or Proper Idea of him j and that for want of any luch Idea, we are obliged to form to our felves a very Com- plex and Analogous Notion or Conception of him, out of the beft Ideas the Mind is lupplied with from the vifible Creation, confider'd together with its own Operations upon thole Ideas. And this Notion or Conception of him (for it is no Idea) is ib very Complicated, that perhaps it is not exactly the fame in any two Men what- loever : Yet however Complex it is, and col- lected from all the Excellencies we can difco- Ver in the vifibie Creation (but more efpeci- aly from the greater!: Perfections obfervable in Man) and however Analogous only ; yet it is a Solid Ground and Foundation for all the Pre- cepts of natural Religion, and the practical Duties of Morality. CHAP. the Understanding. 403 C H A P. IV. Compound Ideas of Senfation. FROM this fimple Apprehenfion or Intui- tive Contemplation of Ideas in the Imagi- nation, the Intellect proceeds not only to make its own manifold Remarks and Obfervations up- on them, in the fame Situation and Condition they appear there ; But intirely to Invert their whole Order and Difpolition at Will : and to fit and prepare them by numberlefs Changes or Alterations in whole or in part, for any life or Purpofes of its own. For tho' the pure Intellect cannot Jdd one Simple original Idea to the Number already in the Imagination, yet it hath an arbitrary and defpotick Power over all that it finds there • and exerts itfelf to the utmoft in a great Variety of Operations upon them. It Enlarges or Diminijheth them at Pleafiire in any Proportion ; as for inflance, the Idea of a Mite may be increafed to the bigneis of an Elephant , and that of the Sun may dwindle into the Size of a. Spark of Fire. It Compounds or Divides them ; as the Idea of a Mm and Horfe maybe put together into one; and when the Compofitions are thus Again ft Nature, they are ftiled Chimeras: So again the Idea of a Man's Body may be divided into its integral Parts, or bodily Members. It Unites or Separates them ; as it can bring a multitude of particular Ideas of Men together to make up the compound D d a Idea 404 Procedure of Idea of an Army , lb it can Separately confide r things not a&ualy feparated in Nature, as the Pure Intellect from the Will and AffeBwns, for the more Diftintf View and Reasoning of the Mind, and this is truly Abftratfion. It Improves or Debajes any of its Ideas 5 as the Idea of Light may be carried on beyond that of the brighter!: Sun Beams, which Men do when they attempt to form any Simple Idea of God's Glory ; fb again a Shadow may be aggravated till it ends in thick and palpable Darknefs. It Compares them infinitely to find out their Relations, and Similitudes, and Oppofitions ; and then by Port- ing, and tranlpofing, and bringing them to- gether, it forms to itfelf an endlefs Variety of Compound Ideas. It places one Idea to Stand for many or all others of the fame kind, and thus renders it Univer/al in its Signification. It con- joins them with the Operations of our Mind known by Confciouinefs, in order to make up Complex Notions. It fubftitutes the Idea or Conception of one thing for another whereof it has even an Imaginary Refemblance, as in Metaphor ; or of which it has a Real and Known Similitude, which is Human Analogy. And laftly it fubftitutes our Conceptions of Things human and Diretfly known, for the Repre- fentation of Immaterial Objects whereof we have no Diretf Idea or Conception ; and this, not on account of any Known, but an Un- known tho' Real Similitude, or Proportion, or Correlpondency which is Divine Analogy. t Here the Understanding. 40 j Here again is a New Enlargement of the Mind of Man, and an Advance towards Know- ledge which Brutes are not capable of : For as they have not even that fimple Apprehenfion of the Intel/eft, which is diftind from the Per- ception of Senje ; id are they much lels capa- ble of any of thefe Operations that are all Sub- sequent to this fimple Apprehenfion. They have not the leaft Power over their Ideas, ei- ther to Enlarge or Dim'uiifi them ; to Compound or Divide them ; to Unite or Separate them ; to Improve or Debaje them ; but above all to Compare them with one another, to Subftitute Ideas or Notions for the Reprefentation of others, on account of any Real or Imaginary ^ Known or Unknown Proportion or Similitude. In fhort Brutes can neither rfranfpofe nor Alter any one Idea in their Imagination ; but are on the contrary altogether under the Power of their Ideas or fenfible Impreflions, as to their whole Direction and Conduct. How great a Privilege of a rational and human Mind this is, and what a vaft Scope it gives to the Underftanding, will immediate- ly appear when it is confidered ; that the very fame Power the Intellect hath over its Simple Ideas, it hath alfb over all its own various Al- terations of them, and endlels Compofitions out of them. The very Same Operations of the Intellect are renewed and exerted to the utmoft D d 3 Over 406 Procedure of Over again upon thele likewile ; lo as to tranfpofe, and alter, and combine them with the lame defpotic Power : And as thole O- perations are all thus repeated upon this New Sett of compounded Ideas ; ib it may proceed to operate after the fame Manner upon thole that are Doubly compounded, as we may fay -, and fo on according to the working or dexte- rity of the Mind. If our ftore of Simple Ideas only are Innumerable, as we have leen they arc ; furely the Alter at torn and Combinations of them by the Intellect, together with its own Qbjer~ vaticns upon their feveral Qualities and Rela- tions muft be more fo : And if the Intellect can exerciie the fame Operations over again up- on its own Further voluntary Compolitions out of them ; then our Compounded Ideas can hardly- come within the Power of Arithmetic to number. As I have met it expieifed with Hy- perbole enough, The Truths and Rejblutions of the Intellect from thence, muft be prodigiou/ly more than have yet been difcover'd by the Sons of Men : And perhaps they contain more than would ever be difcovered, were the prefent Frame of things to continue as it is for Millions of Jucceeding Ages. And again, If a few Letters are capable of in- finite Combinations and Alterations, what endlefs Variety mujl the Combinations and Alterations of the Ideas we are fumijhed with from all the Ob- jects of the viftble Creation, afford f It is of no fmall Conlequence to our Pro- gress the Understanding. 407 grefs in Knowledge to obferve here, that the Term Idea is attributed to thole Alterations and Combinations of the Intellect in a Lejs proper Sence ; and not in the lame Strict Pro- priety in which it is attributed to the Simple and Original Perceptions of the Senfes, when conveyed to the Imagination. However as thefe are the Primary, fo the other are a" Secon- dary Set of Ideas : But then we muft intirely drop the Term here, and carry it with us no farther ; for all Beyond thefe are either Notion, or Conception^ or Jpprehenjion ; or what you may more properly call by any other Denomi- nation, than that of Idea. The want of diftinguifhing rightly between the Simple Perceptions of Senj'e, and the Simple Jpprehenjbn of the Intellect ; between the Pri- mary and Si?nple Ideas of Senfition which are Independent of the pure Intellect, and thole Se- condary compound Ideas which are its Creatures ; between all thole, and the Cotnpkx Notions and Conceptions of the Mind : But above all, the want of diftinguifhing between the Conceptions of things human, when they are Direct and Im- mediate * and when they are transferr'd to things fpiritual and immaterial by Semblance only and yJnalogy. For want, I fay, of obferving thefe fundamental Diftin&ions thro* our modern Sy- ftems of Logic and Metaphyflcs : their Authors, inftead of Helping the Unde; landing and ena- bling it to clear up things obfcure and difficult ; D d 4 have 408 Procedure of have on the contrary rendered the plaineft Truths Myfier'wus and Unintelligible : To luch I mean who will ftri&ly keep within their Me- thod and Rules of reiblving even all that Knowledge which confifts in Complex Notions and Conceptions, indifferently and promifcuout- ly into Ideas of Senfation and Reflections as e- qualy Simple and Original. T a K e an Inftance of this truth in one Point of Knowledge : ' God is to be wor/biped by Man. In this Proportion there are three Complex No- tions or Conceptions exprefs'd ; that of God, which is a Conception or Notion not only very Complex, but made up of the utmoft Perfec- tions of our own Nature Analogicdly attributed to an infinite Being who is Incomprehenjible, that is, of whom we have no Proper or Dire ft Idea ; and this is a Conception the plaineft Man is capable of forming to himielf, according to the Meafure of his Underftanding. Divine Worjloip is a complex Notion, formed by put- ting together the outward Qojlure of the Body, the Intention of the Mind, all thole ^afjions and Affections which are the Ingredients of Devoti- on in the Soul; together with the Invijible Ob- je$ to which all thefe are directed. Man is likewife a very complex Notion or Conception, including the outward Figure of the Body, the immaterial Spirit with the pure Intellect and Will, and all the tPaJfions and Affections of the inferior Soul \ and every one puts as many 1 of • • ' - . • thefc the Understanding. 409 thefe together as he can to make up his No- tion of a Man. Thus that Propofition is c Plain and Intelligible to every Capacity ; and if this Point of Knowledge mould come to be Rejbl- ved Jnalyticaly, it would be found to have ta- ken its firft Rife from our fimple original Ideas oiSenfation: From whence the Intellect, pro- ceeding gradualy thro' all its own Obfervati- ons and Deductions, came at length to form that Propofition which is of fo much Confe- quence in Religion. So that it evidently ap- pears this Aflertion may very well be granted to our Freethinkers as true, tfhat we can have no Knowledge without Ideas, nay even without Ideas of Senfation) and yet be very falfe in tfheir Sence of it, which is • tfhat we can have no Knowledge of things, whereof we have no Ideas. But according to the modern Affectation of refolving all our Knowledge into Ideas, nay Original Simple Ideas, tho* Not of Senfation ; lee what a long Chain of Ideas mull be Drawn out before you can arrive at a true Knowledge of this Propofition. You mull have an Idea of God, of whom you can have no Idea ; and of all his Attributes, every one of which are In- comprehenjible. You mull have an Idea of Worjhip, whereof you can have no Idea farther than of the bodily Qoflure, or of the Elements and outward Materials \ifed in Worfhip ', all the other main Ingredients of Divine Worih>p added 410 Procedure of added to thefe make up a Complex Notion, not an Idea of it. Nay you muft have diftinft and feparate Ideas of all the Operations of the Intel- lect and of all thole c Rajfions and Jffetlions which are the Ingredients of Devotion in the Mind, by Refleft "wn: And by joining all thole Ideas ' of Reflection, to the Ideas of Senfation which you have from the bodily Pofture and' outward Materials, you make up, in their way, a very Clear and D'iflintf Idea of Divine Wor- fhip. You muft have the Idea of an human and Rational Creature or intelligent Agent, of whom you can have no other Idea but that of his outward Bodily Figure and Motion. Nay before you can lay down that Propoilti- on for a fundamental Principle of Religion, you muft have an Idea of thinking, of Reafon- ing, and Deduction ; the Idea of a Law \ the Idea of Sanction j the Idea of Obedience and of Tran fgrejjion ; the Idea of\Pleafre and Reward; the Idea of c VuniJhment and Qain ; the Idea of Power to give Reward, and to inflict Punifh- ment ; and all thele muft be Simple Original Ideas either of Senfation or Reflexion. And thus if you go about to reiblve any other In- ftance of plain and obvious Knowledge into its firft Originals according to this New Method, it will be intirely loft in a confufed Jumble 2ccA Rout oi Ideas. Thus far are our tedious modern Syftems, which run altogether upon the Doctrine of Ideasy the Understanding. 411 Ideas , from contributing any Real Help and Im- provement to the Understanding ; infomuch that when you have read them over with the greater!: Attention, your Head only Chimes and Thighs with a continued inceffant Repeti- tion of the Word Idea : And you are fo far from any true advancement of Knowledge, that you have been lb long wandering out of your way; and can make no Progrels till you come into the plain and open Road again. But what is yet worle, you are, by that confuted and indiftind Method of proceeding, infenfibly drawn into an Opinion, That you can have no Knowledge of any thing but what you have a direct and immediate Idea of which is a Proposition fataly falfe, and the great fundamental Prin- ciple of all thofe, who let up for Reajbn and Evidence in Oppolition to Revelation and Myftery. CHAP. V. The Intellects Confcioufnefs of its. own 0- peratzons. Its complex Notions and Conceptions, WHEN the Imagination is ftored with fuch an immenle Fund of Simple Ideas, and with its own manifold Compojitions out of them j the Intellect naturaly proceeds to a Con- fideration of thole leveral Operations of its own which it exerts and exercifes upon them ; but not to a View of any Ideas we have of them 1 either 41 i Procedure of either DireCt, or by Reflection : And therefore I would choole to lay, it begins to mark and ob- lerve its own Operations from an inward and immediate Confcioufnefs it hath of them ; and not by the Mediation of any Ideas, A n Idea of Refleflion is an empty Sound, without any intelligible and determinate Mean- ing. It hath been ufed in Oppofition to our DireCt Perception of fenfible Objects, from whence we have Ideas of Senfation • and the Mind is prepofteroufly luppofed to come by Ideas pf its own Operations, from a Reflex Ad: or looking back upon itfelf. But as the Eye is incapable of furveying its Internal Frame by any Direct or Reflex Acl; lb is the Mind utterly unable to know its own Operations by any Direct, or Reflex Ideas: Or to have any other Knowledge of them than an immediate Seff- ConfcioufnefS) obtained while it is employed on the Ideas of External Objects. It is by thole Operations upon fuch Ideas, that the Intellect at firft comes to the Knowledge even of a Pozver within itfelf of exerting fuch a Variety of Operations. It would not perceive that it had even an Exigence, or a Faculty of thinking or Willing^ were it not for fome Idea, or Notion of the ObjeCt which it a&ualy thinks upon, or defires and chooles. The Intellect firft ope- rates either upon fome original Ideas of Senja- tion) or upon fome Compofitions and Combina? lions made out of them j or upon fome Cora- ■ flex the Understanding. 413 flex Notions and Conceptions of its own form- ing (which three take in all the Objects of human Undei Handing) and then it obferves as exactly as it can the Nature and Marnier of thofe Operations ; and lb forms to itfelf the belt Complex Conceptions of them it is able. That there can be no fuch thing as Ideas of the Operations of the Mind by Reflection, is molt evident; for granting (what we have feen is evidently falfe) that the Mind could take a View of its Operations by Turning in upon itfelf, then there would be no want of Ideas to diicern them by. An Idea is lbme Reprefentation of an External Object in the Mind ; it Hands For the Object, and fupplies its ablence ; and there would be no Need of any Reprefentation, if the Object itfelf were there :' But the Operations of the Mind are all Within itfelf; and in order to prove Ideas of Reflection, you mull fuppofe either that thefe Operations are • their Own Ideas : or that the Objects themfelves are overlooked, and their Ideas only made the Objects of the Intellect. T o fay that the Operations tfhemfelves, and the Ideas of thoie Operations are in the Mind together at the lame time, is moll: abiurd \ as being Superfluous, and altogether without any Neceflity in Nature, which doth nothing in vain. Upon this Suppolition it would be utterly impoflible for the moft acute Logician to 414 Procedure of to determine which of the two were the Ohjett of our Under/landing ; and the belt Relblution of the Cafe would be, that either one or the other may be fo Indifferently ; for that it would be impoftible to diftinguilh between them. But if any one yet thinks that he hath a Simple, Original, and purely Intellectual Idea of any Operation of the Intellect, or of the Willy or of any Pajjion or Jffetfion of the Mind , let him fhut his Eyes, and abltracl: intirely from the Idea of the Objetf known or defired, or up- on which the Paftion is bent ; from all Com- motions in the Body ; and from all the Effeffis and Confequences of the Paflion which are Ex- ternal to the Mind, and then he will find no- thing left to be equaly the Original Founda- tion of his Knowledge with Ideas of Sen/at ion 5 as fome would have Ideas of Rejletfion to be. Having as I hope intirely removed that ftumbling Block out of the way, upon which thole who have had the misfortune to fall, have Halted ever -after; and having left the Term Idea behind us, we may now go on to oblerve how the Mind proceeds to raife up to itfelf, out of thofe Ideas of Senfation conlider'd toge- ther with its own Operations upon them, an endlels Variety of Complex Notions or Concept tions of all thole things, for which it can have no Ideas fimple or compounded. How we come to have no other than complex Notions or Con- ceptions of God, and of Man as a rational Ani- mal, the Understanding. 4. : j mal, of the Mind, and of Divine Worjhip we have already feen. We have no other of the Intellect, and of all its Operations^ or of any c PcifJion or Affection of the Soul, or of things Immaterial and ipiritual; or in fhort of Any thing, excepting only of Senjible Material Ob- jects. The Notion we have even of the Intel- led is, that it is made up of Spirit and Matter acting in eflential Union ; and exerting itielf in all thole Operations we obierve it exerciie upon external Objects or their Ideas, and upon complex Notions of its own forming. Thus likewife it is in all our Conceptions of the Pa£- fions and Affections, as we obierv'd before: And lb we form a Complex Conception of an Angel, ' by iubftituting all the Operations of an human Mind to Stand for its Perfections ; which we conclude muft iubiift in a Subftance or Being whereof we can have No Idea, unlels that which we attempt to form from the moft refined and fpirituous Parts of 'Matter. The complex Notions or Conceptions of the Operations of the Mind are wrought up Co gradualy, and obtain'd fb Infenflbly from one act of the Intellect to another upon the fimple Ideas of Senlation, that we are at length apt to miftake them for Originals', which hath been the Occafion of that pernicious Error of calling them, and thole of Senlation, promif- cuoufly by the common Name of Ideas, and treating both as Eaualy the Fir ft Ground of Knowledge. 4i<$ Procedure of Knowledge. Whereas not only thefe, but All the moll abftra&ed of our complex Notions and Conceptions are, at beft but a carious Piece of intellectual Workmanfhip ; and the Materials are no other than the Ideas of Senfation for the firft Groundwork^ confidered together with all the Subfequent Operations of the Intellect upon them. Inlbmuch that the moil refined and ex- alted Knowledge, when we come to refolve it analyticaly into Simple Ideas, will be found to end ultimately in that Sen/at ion from whence it took its Rife : So true is that Saying of a modern Philofopher, Nulla funt in Cerebro Vef- tigia, nullte in ipfa mente Species infculptce, qute res ab omni fenju remotas exhibeant ; at que adeo femper hue ejl redeundum. Had we Simple Original Ideas of other Ob- jects beyond thole of Senfation, we fhould all indifferently and readily acquiefce in our Opi- nions about them ; a Peafant would have as Clear and Diftinff Ideas of them, of the Intellect for Inftance and of all its Operations j of all the cPajfions and Affections of the Mind ; and of all things Immaterial and fpiritual, as themofi acute and learned Head. Our Knowledge of all thefe things would then be as Intuitive, as our preient fimple View of Senjitive Ideas in the Imagination is ; there would be as rare a Dif- ference of Sentiments, as little Far iety of Judg- ments, and we mould as feldom Di/pute about them, as we do now about the common Ob- jects of Senfe. This •the Understanding. 41? This opens to the View of the Underftand- ing a new, and immenle Field of what goes pro- perly under the Name of 'Knowledge and Learn-* trig in the World : For the Intellect is under a Neceflity of Supplying the Want of original fimple Ideas of all things beyond fcnfible Ob- jects, by the beft Compojjtions it can, which arc its Notions or Conceptions of them. Thefe No- tions or Conceptions are infinitely varied ac- cording to the different Natural Sagacity, and Acquired Improvement of the Intellect, and the Diligence and Sincerity of Men's Minds in the Purluit of Knowledge ; and they are ever more or lels 7r#£, as they approach the Real Na-* ture and T'ruth of things. Some Men's Notions come Short of this ; and others go too far Be* yond it; lome have their Notions of things More complex, fbme Lefs ; fome have all the Ingredients of thefe complex Notions ranged more Ctofely and firmly and Methodic aly toge- ther, lb that they become clear, and eafy, and diftincl: ; others by leaving them Loofe and ill compacted, and not rightly Ranged, have all their Notions confuted and perplex'd, dubious and uncertain. There is no end of thefe Com" plex Notions or Conceptions of things, nor of their Differences and Agreements in the Mind j befides that it is not eafy to find two Men who have made up to themfelves Exactly the fame complex Notion of any thing ; And from hence moftly arileth that infinite Variety ofOpi~< £ e nions 418 Procedure of mons and Sentiments which occafions fb many Debates and Controverfies, and fills the World with Strife and Contention. It fhould be obferved here, that all com- prehended under this Head, may be aptly e- nough called by the Name of Judicium or Judgment ; and when the Mind pronounces upon any of thofe Ideas fimple or compound- ed, or upon any of thefe complex Notions or Conceptions by exprefs Affirmation or Negation, then it becomes a Qropojition ; the Nature of which is varied according to the different Quan- tity or Quality of it, as the Schools term it. We are to obferve likewife that the Imagina- tion, being the Storehoufe where all the origi- nal Materials are Reported for the Exercife and Employment of the Intellect , may be con- ceived as if it were the Vlace of Acting, and the Scene of all its Operations : And it is from the clofe and intimate Union of the Imaginati- on with the Spiritual Part of Man, that it is fb impregnated with thefe Complex Notions, as to retain them there in that common Repofi- tory, together with the Ideas of external Ob- jects obtained at the firft. When this is done, the Intellect hath the fame abfblute defpotic Power over 7"ke?n, which it had over the Ideas of Senfation \ it can rfranfpofe and Separate, or Combine and Alter them at Will ; It can call for them When and in What order it pleafes, which is Memory : If any of thefe complex No- tions the Understanding. 419 tions are miflay'd or hid among Heaps, it can fearch it out ; when any one of them is Defaced and even in appearance obliterated, it can Re- vive it again; after it has become dark and Confufed by time, it can Brighten it up anew, render it clear and diftinct, and lay it up again at hand for more ready Ufe on future Occa- fions. Now tho* what I have defcribed here will to an attentive and unprejudiced Mind appear to be true, and the Real Progrefs of the Un- derftanding in its Attainment of Knowledge ; yet perhaps by way of Anjwer to all this I may be ask'd ; But may not a Man of Name and Character in the World elpecialy for a Vo- luminous Syftem of Logic and Metaphyfics, juftly call all thefe Complex Notions and Con- ceptions by the Denomination of Ideas, if he pleafes? I aniwer, No; becaule a Man is in- excusable who always uies One and the lame Term, to expreis indifferently Two things the moft different in Nature that poflibly can be ; and who confounds two things which ought to be moft carefully and exactly diftinguifhed ; the Ideas of Sen/at ion, and thofe Complex Notions or Conceptions which arife from them conlider'd with the Operations of the Intellect upon them : Elpecialy when the laying down Ideas of Sen- fation and Reflection as Equaly original, and e- qualy the Ground of all our Knowledge, doth fhamefuly miflead and Confound 'the Underftand- E e 2 ing; 4io Procedure of ing; under a Pretence and Iblemn Profeffion of Helping it forward, of fetting out its true Bounds and Limits, and defcribing its Progreis. No Man fhould take a Liberty fo evidently- injurious not only to Knowledge in General, but to that of Religion in particular ; and which leads Men dire&ly into Scepticifm and Infidelity ', by tending to fix them in this Opinion, That they can have no Knowledge of things whereof ttiey have no Direct Ideas. When a Man fets out with an Error lb Fundamental, as the blend- ing together into One, two things fo totaly and intirely Oppofite in Nature ; his Treatife muft neceflarily carry along with it many Infinuati- ons againft the divine revealed Truths and My- Iteries of Chriftianity ; of which it is fiire we have, properly fpeaking, no Ideas-, tbo* we have diftincl: Notions and Conceptions of them in their Symbols and Representatives, CHAP. VI. Illation or Inference, or Reafon Jlriffly fo caWd. THERE being fuch a wonderful In-* creafe of Knowledge in the Mind from the Addition of our complex Notions and Conceptions, the Intellect naturaly proceeds from thence to the higheft Operation of it, which is Illation or Inference, This in the more 4 ftricT: the Understanding. 421 ftrict and limited Sence of the Word is called Reafon ; which is not ib much employed upon our Simple Ideas, or even thoie which are Com- founded out of them ; as upon our Complex No- tions and Conceptions. For as the Perception of Senlation, With the after-View of our fimple original Ideas is a kind of 'Intuitive Knowledge ; lb is that of the Agreement or Dijagreement of them likewiie for the molt Part intuitive ; it is moftly difcerned at One View by a Juxta- Pofition ; and they feldom require the Appli- cation of any Common Meajure, to find out their Differences or Agreements. So fundamentaly falfe is that celebrated Maxim, that Reafon fails us where there are no I d e a s ; and that all our Knowledge conjifls in a Perception of the Agree- ment or Dijagreement of our Ideas. Which Maxim evidently excludes, i. First, all Knowledge beyond that of Ideas of Senfation> and their Compounds. There could, according to this, be no Reafoning or Argu- mentation upon any of our Complex Notions or Conceptions of things ; tho' upon them Chiefly our reafoning Faculty is moft truly and pro- perly employed : For the Objcurity, and Con- fuJion y and Imperfection , together with the endlefs Variety and Oppo/ition of Men's Complex Notions and Conceptions, is the very Caufe and true Occafion of almoft all our Reafoning and Argumentation, whereas the Simple Apprehen- Jron of Ideas is much the fame in all Men, and Ee 3 this 421 Procedure of this occafions almoft a general Content and Acquiefcence in their Agreements and Difa- greements. 2. Secondly, it utterly excludes all De- grees of Knowledge in things Spiritual and Im- material^ of which we have No Ideas ; and which are therefore conceived by Subflitution only and Analogy, and by making up the bell: Com- plex Notions we can out of things Material and Human to Reprejent them : Nor is it poflible for us to have any Intermediate Idea or a com- mon Mealure between things utterly Imper- ceptible^ and Inconceivable to us as they are in their Own Nature ; that is in other Words, for which we have No Ideas. We cannot difcern the Agreement or Difigreement of Ideas where there are None ; and confequently according to that Maxim we could have no Knowledge of fuch things. 3. Thirdly, It intirely excludes all true Illation, or the Jttual inferring one thing from another ; and in. effect all Knowledge whatlbe- ver that is not Intuitive. Inftead ofSyllogi/m the Author of that Maxim lays down a mere na- ked Juxta-^ojition of Ideas, ranged in this Or- der for the more ready and convenient View of the Intellect. You muft in your Mind place the two Extremes on each fide; and the common Meafure, or intermediate Idea or Ideas Between them ? all in a Row: And then the Intellect at the Understanding. 42.J at one Glance will difcern, firft how far the Ex- tremes agree with the Intermediate Ideas ', arid then how they agree or difagree with Each 0- ther, without any Exprefs, or even Mental De- duction or Illation. For fays he, Every Man hath a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of his Ideas. And Thefe are to befeen by the Eye and perceptive Faculty of the Mind. B u t if every Man hath a Native, that is a Natural Faculty of perceiving the Coherence or Incoherence of his Ideas, he would with that native Eye equaly difcern the Coherence or In- coherence of All, or of Any of his Ideas Alike ; and there would be no Occafion for any Inter- mediate Ideas : For perceiving the Coherence or Incoherence between the Extremes, would be as Natural to him ; as perceiving thole be- tween 'Them, and any Intermediate Ideas. However, to give this intellectual Form of Seeing without Argumentation, allthe and Combinations of them without Number. From obferving the Manner of exerting its own Operations upon thofe Ideas, it is come to a very diftinft Confcionfnefs of all thole Opera- tions. Out of Thefe, in Conjunction with thole Ideas upon which they operate, it has railed up to itfelf Complex Notions and Conceptions with- out End j and laid them all up in the com- mon Store-houfe the Imagination ; either to re- main there as they are, or to undergo any Far- ther Alterations or Combinations, at the ar- F f 3 bitrary 438 Procedure of bitrary Will and Pleafure of the Intclled. And laftly, it hath increafed all this into an immenfe Fund of Knowledge, by that noble Operation of Deduction and Confequencc ; which in our Condition of Infirmity fupplies the place of Intuition, by fathoming with a Line thole Depths where the Naked Eye of the Mind can- not fee to the Bottom ; and by the Application of a common Meafure to fiich Heights and Du Jlances, as it cannot bring together for a fingle View by any Immediate and near Companion. The Mind having thus proceeded to the utmoft Bounds of things merely Natural, let us Hop a while here, to behold it at this Stage of its Progrefs ; and to obferve all our Idea- Mongers daily loading it with Fetters and Shackles, left it fhould make any Attempt to move one Step Farther. And yet nothing is plainer than that all hitherto is no more than Secular Knowledge ; and that tho' within this Compafs men may arrive to the greateft In- light attainable into all things on 'This Side Heaven \ nay tho' they could fee thro' the whole Series and Ghain of fecond Caufes and their £/- feffs, fo that one Link of it did not efcape their •Obfervation : And could calculate all the Mo- tions of the heavenly Bodies to an Inftant, yet all this is but Secular Knowledge ftill ; and if the Mind of Man could exert itfelf no Far- ther, there would not be the leaft room left for any Knowledge of Religion natural or revealed, * Accor^ the Understanding. 439 Accoring to their fundamental Principle, That if our Words do not ft and for Ideas, they are Sounds and nothing elje ; that the Mind neither doth nor can extend itfelf farther than They^o; and that where we have no Ideas our Reafoning Stops, and we are at an end of our Reckoning ' y it is plain that the Mind is tied down altogether to Objecls of Senfation ; of which only, as we have feen, it can properly ipeaking have Direct and Immediate Ideas } and that it can never carry one Thought beyond the fix'd Stars, any more than if all without them were an empty Void, Nay this laft Confequence from thole Principles would be neverthelefs true, tho' we mould al- low ourfelves to have Simple original Ideas of the Operations of our own Minds \ and tho' we Ihoujd molt ablurdly call our Complex Notions and Conceptions of things here below, by the Name of Ideas : For all thefe are ftill within our fcanty limited Syftem ; and will not give us the leaft Direct View over its Bounds ; from whence we might form any one fuch Idea, or even Complex Notion or Conception, not only of the real True Nature, but even of the Ex- iftence of any thing in another World, as we have of things Here which are within the Im- mediate Reach and Compais of Senfe and Rea- lbn. But much lels can they help us to any Direct Idea or Notion either of the Exiflence of God, or of his real True Nature and Jttri- butes ; which is the Foundation of all Religion natural and revealed. FT4 Tho' 44° Procedure of Tho' the Men, who lay down thefe Por- tions, do not Exprejly or in Profeflion renounce all Natural Religion at leaft ; yet they plainly deftroy even rfhts by immediate necefiary Con- fequence ; whilft under Colour of adhering to the itrict-eft Sence, and Reafon, and Evidence they lay an Injurious and Unnatural Reftraint upon the Underftanding, and tye it down to the Objects or Ideas of Senfation only ; or at moft to thofe Things of which we have Diretf and Immediate Ideas or Conceptions. Inlbmuch that the unavoidable Effect of that Do&rine in which they would be thought to excel, is plainly the precluding us from all Knowledge of any thing beyond this vifible Frame, which mull: therefore be to us the Univerje : And up- on tfheir Principles, our Cafe muft be much the fame with that of thole homebred ignorant PeaJantSy who cannot be perfuaded to Know or Believe there is any Earth or Sky beyoncj the Tops of the neighbouring Mountains, CHAP, VII. We have Knowledge of things, whereof we have no Ideas. TH O* thefe Men make an open and rain Profeflion of their Progrefs even to the Vtmojl Limits of human Underftanding; we •'•'.* * • : "" ' ' "' -■■ ' ••■ muft the Understanding. 441 muft however leave them far behind us, and proceed to fhew how the Mind comes by the Knowledge of things whereof it neither hath, nor *an have any Ideas, The Intellect by the foregoing Operation of DeduBion or Inference, doth from the Ex- jftence of things Material and lenfible, infer not only the Pojftble, but the Probable Exis- tence of things Immaterial and imperceptible in General r ; that is, of things whofe very Exigence would have been utterly unknown to the Mind Otherwife than by this Conjequence ; and which will always remain unknown otherwife than by Analogy whilit we are in this World, both as to their whole Nature, and Manner of Exiftence. Wherefore as we neither have, nor can have any iuch Perception or Idea of them in any de- gree as we have of things Material and Human ^ (b neither is it poffible to exprefs them in any Language fo peculiar to them, that it fhali not be Firfl more applicable to things whereof we have a Direct Perception #nd Idea, or an Imme- diate Confcioufnefs. We can find out no Proper Therms for diftinguifhing, and exprefling things utterly Inconceivable to us by any Proper Ideas or Direct Conceptions, as all Spiritual Beings are: So that we are under an abfblute NeceJJity of Conceiving them by fuch Ideas and Notions as are Already in the Mind ; and of ExpreJJing all our Knowledge of them in luch Words and language, as- were Familiar to us before any Infe- 44*- Procedure of Inference at all was made in relation to their Exiftence. Jf we had as Clear and Dijlintf an Idea ^f the Subftance or Properties of Spirit , as we have of Bodily Subftance or its Properties ; the Exiftence of Spirits wOuld be known to us by their Ideas , as the Exiftence of Matter is known ; and not by any Reafoning or Deduction only from the Exiftence of things Material : But this is fb far from being true, that we have no Idea at all of the Subftance or Propeities of Spirit. tVe can difcern one and the fame Bo- dily Subftance with all our five Senfes ; but we cannot difcern a pure Spirit by any one of them, or by all of them together. But why have we as Clear and Dijlintf an Idea of Spiritual Subftance, as we have of Cor- poreal Subftance ? Becaufe we are equaly Igno- rant of Both y and can have no Idea at all of Either ; this is a new Method indeed of Ar- guing. But fays the celebrated Author of that grand Solcecifm, We have equaly clear and diftincl: Ideas of their Qualities. Suppofe this were true, how doth it prove that we have Equaly clear and Dijiin0 Ideas-of their Subjlances\ or that we are Equaly ignorant of them ? But this happens to be as falfe as the other, nay jdoubly falfe ; for we have not as clear and di- ftincl: Ideas of the Operatians of the Mind, as we, have of the fenfible Qualities of Corporeal Sub- ftance. the Understanding. 443 fiance, We have Immediate, jimple, original Xdeas of the Qualities of corporeal Subftance, by Impreffion from outward Objects -, but there are No Ideas within us of the Operations of the Mind ; lb that the Operations Uhemfehes are discerned, and not any Ideas inftead of them : And that too no otherwile than by a Confcioujhefs of the Mind's operating from the firft upon Ideas of Senfation ; and afterwards upon thole Compound Ideas and Complex Notions which it raifes up to itlelf out of them. But what is yet more abfurd, granting that we had As clear and Dijlintf Ideas of the Qua- lities or Operations of our Mind, fuch as think- ing, Knowing, Doubting, and Power of Moving, as of Corporeal Qualities ; yet this would give us no Idea either of the Qualities or Sub- ftance of a Spirit: For in Man thefe are all the joint Operations of Spirit and Matter in efTential Union and Conjunction ; which can give us no Ideas of the Qualities and Ope- rations of a Subftance Purely immaterial, and in- tirely Independent of Matter. And what is yet worfl of all is, that if mere Matter is capable of having the Powers of thinking, Willing, Knowing, Doubting, as the aforefaid Author contends; then T'heje Properties can give us no Ideas or diftinguifhing Marks of things which are Not Master ; and which muft confequently be endued with Knowledge without that T'hink- pg, whicfi (upon this Suppofition of his) mull either 444 Procedure of either be a Quality Effential to Matter, or elfc Change the yery EJ/ence of Matter, whenever it is Superinduced. I shall take this Opportunity of remark- ing here, that I fuppofe what led the Author abovementioned into this profound Error of a Qojjibility that Thinking may be fuper added to Matter ; was his not rightly diftinguifhing be- tween our being capable of Jbftratfedly conji- dering the Properties of a Subftance, without confidering or regarding at the lame time the Subftance It/elf in which they are, which is very poflible : And the having an Jtfual Per- ception or Idea of any Effential Properties fepa- rately and Jbjlrafodly from the Subftance itielf^ which is impoflible; becaufe they cannot in 'Their Nature exift feparately from it. We cannot dilcern, or form an Jtfual Idea of the elTential Properties Without the Subftance ; but according to common Sence we are faid to dis- cern thole Properties In the Subftance, or a Subftance With liich Properties : This is lb evi- dent that a plain Man would laugh at you, if you fhould tell him that he did neither tafte nor feel the Subftance of the Morfel of Bread he was eating ; and that for ought he knew he was chewing only a parcel of (Properties, or Qualities. This abliird Notion, I lay, of an jlbftraftfon utterly Impofjible (of which this Au- thor is every where full) led him into an Opi- nion of the Poffibility of an ABual Separation of the Understanding. 44^ of an EJpntial (Property , from the ElTence of Subftance it/elf, and into a Belief that Think- ing could become a Superadded Property of Matter, without fuperadding at the fame time the ipiritual or thinking Subjlance, I t is for want of any Clear and Diftinti, or even Obfcure and Conjufed Idea of Spirit, that we are forced to conceive it by framing to our lelves the b& Complex Notion we can of an hu- man Mind, and then transferring it by Ana- logy to an unknown Being. We do not, as the aforefaid Author defcribes it, form an Idea of Spirit by putting together many Simple Ideas of the Operations of our Mind, fuch as Think- ing, Willing, Knowing, and Power of beginning Motion, and then by joining theie in their Firji and Original Acceptation, and as differ- ing in Degrees of Perfection only, to a Sub- ftance of which we have as Clear and Dijiinffi an Idea as we have of Body : But we firft frame to our ielves the beft and moft perfect. Complex Notion we can have of an human Mind, from a Confcioufiefs of its various Operations upon material Objects and their Ideas, or its own Conceptions -, and then we Subjlitute this No- tion to reprefent Analogicaly a Being whole Subjlance and Properties are of a quite Different Kind from ours \ and utterly imperceptible and inconceivable, as they are in their Own Nature. The very Reafon of which proceeding of the Underftanding is^ becaufe it is Necejfary ; for wc 44^ Procedure of we can have no Idea either of the Real Proper- ties or True Subftance of Angel or Spirit; and if it were not for this way of Procefs we could neither rfhink nor Speak of them. For this lame Realbn it is, that when Men Attempt to conceive an Angel by any Simple Idea, they do it by that of the mOft Spi* rituous Parts of Matter, or more vulgarly by that of a Flying Boy, or a. iVinged Head $ to which they add the beft Conception they have of the Properties of an human Mind : And this they do for want of any Idea either of its Subjiance, or of its inconceivable Manner of Knowledge, without any neceflary Concurrence of material Organs -, which is therefore no more performed by Thinking, than it is exprelfed or commu- nicated by Speaking. And accordingly the Language of Revelation often falls in with this more Vulgar way of conceiving Angels and Spirits ; and lpeaks figuratively of the tongue, and Voice, and Food, and Mouth, and Face, and Hand of an Angel ; and the very Denomination itfelf is taken from the manner of one Man's Sending another about Bufinefs, and originaly denotes a Mejpnger. C H A E the Understanding. 447 CHAP. VIII. From the Exijience of Things material and human, is infer d the necej/ary Exijience of God, FROM thus inferring the Probable Exift- ence of immaterial Beings in General y which we call Subjiances from our grofs Idea of Matter ; the Intellect by a natural Gradation proceeds to infer the Neceffary Exiftence of one immaterial Supreme Being, the Firfl Caufe of all things. Becaufe the Mind perceives it to be a flat Contradiction that the Beings which have been (produced, taken all together or fingly, mould produce tfhemfehes , or that they mould poffibly be produc'd or preferv'd as they are, otherwife than by the infinite Power and Wis- dom of an Intelligent Agent : Which firft Caufe muft be Without Beginning ; fince it is likewifc flat Contradiction that he ftiould have made himfelf With this plain, and neceflary, and obvious Inference it is, that after the utmoft Reach of the Underftanding in the Knowledge of things Natural and merely Human, the Mind enters upon a glorious Scene of Action intirely New y and upon a very Different manner of exerting and exercifing all its Operations over again. Not 44? Procedure of Not by employing itfelf Here as it did Before^ upon any Direct and Immediate Ideas y iiich as it had of things Natural and Senjtble ; nor up- on any Obfcure Glimmering and Imperfect Idea J of things Supernatural and Imperceptible ; or then railing up to itfelf Complex Notions and Conceptions from obferving its own various ways of Operating upon Such Ideas $ or laftly by making any Inferences and Deductions, in relation to Such Notions and Conceptions* No, but by choofmg out the Clearejl and moft diftincl: Notions and Conceptions we have Al- ready formed, Originaly for the Operations and Perfections of our own Mind ; and when they are put together into one complex Notion or Conception, properly and Immediately for the Mind of Man ; then by Subjlitut'mg that very Notion or Conception fo formed for the Su- preme Being ; and what was a Direff and Immediate Conception before, becomes thus af- terwards a Mediate^ Indirect : , and Analogical Re- prelentation of that incomprehenfible Being, for whom we can have no Direct Conception or Idea. Thus it is that, as the fimple Ideas of Senfation only are the whole Foundation and firft Materials of all Knowledge merely Na- tural and Human ; fo ibme of thole Complex Notions and Conceptions railed up from the immediate Operations of the Mind confidered jointly with 173 bem y do become a New Founda- tion, and Secondary Set of Materials for the whole Superftru&ure of all Religion 7 as well Natural as Reveal'd. Thb the Understanding. 449 The Method by which the aforementioned Author lays we frame a Complex Idea of God, is by putting together the Simple Ideas we have from Reflection, of thofe Qualities and Powers which we find it better to Have than to be Without, luch as the Idea we have of Knowledge (which is pcrform'd by thinking) together with the Ideas of all the other moft per feci: Operations and Properties of an human Intelleft and Will \ as alio the Ideas of all the commendable Jf- fetfions of the Mind ; and then Enlarging all theie without Bounds, in their Original Accep- tation, and in Degree only, by adding the Idea of Infinity to each of them : And likewife by adding Ideas even of Senfation, luch as thole of Exiflence, Duration, and Exten/ion \ and En* Urging them alio to that Vaftneis to which In* jinity can extend them. I n which Doctrine, befides the falle and groundlefs Suppofition of our having Ideas of , Reflexion, as Simple and Originates thole of Sen* fation ; and the Abfurdity of calling it one Complex, inftead of one Compounded Idea of many fimple Ideas put together, which is a confufed and indiitincT: way of fpeaking : And alio his fuppofing us here to have an Idea of Infinity, which we exprels by a Negative became we have No Idea of it ; to pais theie over I lay, which ought not to be paiTed over ; there are £wo fundamental Errors in that Doctrine. G g The 450 Procedure of The firft confifts in furnifhing out this Idea of God as he calls it, by Enlarging thole Ope- rations and Affections of our Mind, in Conjunc- tion with the Ideas of Senfation beforemention- ed, even to Infinity : Which is in truth and re- ality no other than extending and aggravating fo many Infirmities (even at the bell) of our human Nature, and carrying them on to a boundlefs Degree, till they are Monjlrous be- yond all Imagination. The Beji and moft per- fect, and indeed the Only Proper Conception we have of Knowledge, is that which is per- formed by thinking and the various Modes of it ; which is the Action of Matter as well as Spirit operating together in elfential Union : It is a Gradual and Succeffive Operation, and all the Modes of it exprels their own Effential Im- perfection, fuch as Re afoning, Inferring, Doubt- ing, Deliberating, "Judging. So that when we apply to God Infinite Knowledge, we ought to be lb far from attributing it to him as improved in Degree only, that to render it worthy of him, we mult neceffarily feparate from it the whole Kind, and Nature, and Manner of our Knowing -, and remove from him all Thinking with the various Modes of it, as an elTential Im- perfection of our compounded Humanity : And this we do by underftanding the Term analo- gicaly when we attribute it to Him. When we apply the Word Knowledge to God, it im- ports an infinite Inconceivable Perfection \ An- 4 Jwerabk TriE Understanding. 4^1 fwerable to our imperfect manner of Knowledge by thinking : And yet when we fay God knows ? we lpeak as much Solid tfruth, as when we fay Man knows ; only with this Difference, that by the Former we mean an infinite inconceivable' Perfection of the Divinity ; by the Latter we exprefs the infirm State and Condition of our Humanity. And thus it is for want of Any Idea of that divine Perfection, and of any more Proper 7"erm to exprefs it, that we ufe the Words Knowledge and thinking in common both for God and Man. Again, the beft Idea or Conception we have of (Power, is from Strength of Body y or a 1 Mighty Arm ; from a Multitude of Men dif- ciplined for War j or the moving our Body by Willing it. The beft Conception we have of Goodnejs, is that which con fills in the Informing our Under/landings in Matters of Duty ; recti- fying our Wills ; reftraining and regulating our Qajjions and Affetfions \ and in Benevolence from one Man towards Another. The only Idea- ox Conception we have of Exigence, is of that of Corporeal Subftance, as of a Pebble or of a Fly j or at beft of Matter and Spirit in effential Union. Nor can this any way be Enlarged or improved, but by enlarging the Obje0 which exifts to an immenfe and boundlefs Size ; or by Multiplying the Beings of the fame Kind which do exift. If it is faid, that the Idea of Exiftence may be enlarged by our Idea of Da-* G g a ration f 452 Procedure of ration, or by the Continuance of that Exiftencc; this itfelf neceflarily implying Succefjion^ is an- other Imperfection of the Creature altogether un- worthy of God. Our Idea of Extenjion, which we have from Space or Body ; and our Only Per- ception of Pleafure and Happinejs, which wc have from a Confcioafnefs of the Gratification of our Appetites, and-PaJfions, and Dejires> are likewile altogether Unworthy of God. Thus we lee what an Unnatural hideous Compofition is made up for our Notion of God, by enlarging or improving even our Be ft Ideas and Choiceji Conceptions, in Degree alone, as far as we can extend them towards Infinity ; and how it is highly Injurious to his Majefty and Excellency to apply any of thole Words, with their Proper and Original Ideas or Conceptions, to his Incomprehenjibk Perfections. This is plainly no other than putting together lb ma- ny Infinite Imperfections of the Creature, to make up our complex Notion of the infinitely Per- fect Creator. Nay tho* we could liippole all thofe preceding Inftances to be real Perfections in us, and So far not unworthy of God ; yet the very Addition of Infinity to each of them, would intirely alter their Nature, and render them Perfections of quite another Kind ; for nothing that is Finite, can be of the lame Kind with that which is Infinite. The lecond Error yet more grols, and i more the Understanding. 473 more Pernicious in its Confequences, confifts in his fuppofing, that by putting together the Simple Ideas, we are faid to have, of the Ope- rations and Affections of our own Mind -, and thole Ideas of Senfatlon beforementioned, we come by as Direct and Immediate a Conception, or Idea as he calls it, of God, as we have of the Mind itfelf ; nay by as clear and diftincl: an Idea of his very Subftance, as we have of the Subftance of a Fly or a Pebble. This is in Purfuance of that deteftably falfe Maxim, That we have no Know- ledge beyond our Jimple Ideas: But the truth is per- fectly the Reverfe : for by that means we come by a Mediate only and Indirect Notion or Concep- tion of God ; and fuch as exhibits to us nothing of the Reality of his True Nature, Subftance, or Attributes as they are In them/elves ; in the At- tainment of which Conception, the Intellect proceeds thus. It firft frames to itfelf as clear and diftinct a Complex Notion as it can of the Mind of Man, by uniting and combining all its own moft perfect Operations into one : This Notion or Conception, already formed, and Orlglnaly apply'd to Our/elves, is attributed in the whole, as well as in every part of it, to a Being or Subftance Incomprehensible ; and then becomes an Analogical Reprefentatlon only, of the Real, internal and infinite Perfections of the divine Nature ; of which we have not the leaft Imperfect, Ob/cure, or glimmering Percep- tion or Idea, G g 3 Wi 4J4 Procedure of W e are i© far from having any DirecJ and Immediate Ideas of the Exiftence, and Properties or Attributes of God ; or any Clear and Dijiintf Idea of his Subjlance, that we have no Idea at all of them : For His manner of Exiftence we conceive as well as we can by our Own ; and we come to the Knowledge of it, not by any fiich immediate Confcioujmfs as we have of our own ; but by Conlequence and Deduction firft, and afterwards by Revelation. His Attributes we conceive by the Operations, and Properties, and Affe&ions of our Mind ; and the only Simple Idea we can form of his Immaterial Sub* Jlance, is from that of the moft lpirituous Cor* poreal Subftance, tho* thefe two are directly Oppojpte and incompatible. Thus we fee, as I obferved before, that our immediate conlcious Conceptions of the Mind, and all its Operations ; together with all Ideas of Senfation ; and the Terms exprefling them, in their Firfl and Proper Acceptation, muft be Removed from the divine Nature as fo many Imperfections, not only of the Crea* ture, but of a Creature of a very low and In* ferior Degree : And whenever they are trank fer'd to the Divinity, it muft be by Analogy only. Infomuch that the fame Operations which being put together in the Strict and ^Proper Acceptation of the Terms exprefling fhem ? make up the complex Notion of Our }&ind \ the Understanding. 455 Mind ; when transfer'd to the divine Nature, do denote fb many infinite Unknown Wer fac- tions j and are the very Ingredients which make up our Complex Notion of God. Now becaule the Intellect fo Naturaly and inlenfibly falls in- to this way of conceiving him, we may rea- fbnably from thence conclude, that there mult be fuch a fecret Parity of Reafon, and Cor re- fpondent Analogy between the Operations of our Mind, and the infinite Perfections of God ; that it renders all our Conceptions and Moral Realbnings concerning him, as Solid and tfrue^ as if they did Directly and Immediately exhibit to us the Reality of his internal Nature. Thus it is that the Intellect infers and concludes that this fupreme Being, whom it calls by the Name God, the firft Caufe of all things, muft have all Abfolute and Confummate Perfections in himfelf ; but fuch as are altoge- ther Incomprehenjjble , and infinitely beyond any Conception of ours : Which it therefore defcribes moftly by Negative Terms ; and thole of them which are exprefs'd in tyojitive Terms, being no other than the natural Per- fections of the Creature, it concludes mult be Imperfections when attributed in their Literal and Proper Acceptation to him who is altoge- ther Supernatural, and the Creator of them all. So that none of thole Perfections, even the Greatefl of an human Mind, can be lpoken of him, ib as to exprefs his infinitely perfect Na- G g 4 tare 45 6 Procedure of ture and Attributes : Nor indeed any otherwiie than as they are transfer'd to him by way of Reprefentation only, and Analogy ; and as they denote and Symbolize fome real Correfpondent Perfections of the Divinity, whereof ours are but lb many diftant, imperfect, and tranfient Images. A s God is realy and intirely of another Kind, in EJfence and Subjlante, from all his Crea- tures \ fo likewife the Intellect concludes that his manner of Exifience, together with his At- tributes, muft be not only different in Degree of Perfection, but neceffarily of quite another Kind from thofe of the moft glorious Beings of the Creation ; and much more from thoie of our human Nature, who are perhaps in ths loweft Rank of intelligent Agents. But fince there can be no tyerfetfion in the Creature, any otherwife than as it bears Some Refemblance or Similitude of him, who is the Fountain of it all ; then all Intelligent Creatures efpecialy muft be more or left perfect, as they bear a greater or lefs Semblance and Analogy with his infinite incomprehenfible Perfections : And confequent- ly all their Notions and Conceptions of the Di- vine Being muft be more or lefs iublime, ex- alted, and exact ; in Proportion to that Refem- blance which their Own eflential Perfections bear to his, who is the Standard of all Perfec- tion. Ci xi A. i?i the Understanding. 457 CHAP. IX. From the Rxifteme of God, and thefeve- ral Relations he hears to Mankind^ the fpe culative Knowledge of natural Religion is infer d. FROM thus inferring the necefTary Exis- tence, and infinite Perfection of God, as he is Abfolutely in himfelf ; the Intellect natu- raly proceeds to the more particular Confide- ration of the feveral Relations he bears to us, and we to him : And as we think and fpeak of all his effential Perfections when more Abfo- lutely confider'd, by Correfpondence and Ana- logy with thofe Perfections, which are natural or acquired in Our/elves ; fb we conceive all thole Relations likewife under the Semblance and Analogy of fuch as we bear to One another* First we conceive him as our Maker ; and becauie we have no Idea of producing a thing into Being no part of which exifted before ; therefore we conceive it by that of a Man's making a Statue, or any other Work of Art : And to this Inconceivable Operation of infinite Power we affix the peculiar Name Creation, to diftinguifh it from the Literal Sence of the Word Making, which is forming any Work of Art out of Pre-exiftent Materials, of which we have 45 8 Procedure of have a clear and diftincl: Idea, It is in this Ge- neral Sence only that God was ftiled Father y both by Jews and Heathen. Again we conceive him as our Governor- In which Conception both the Idea and the Word by which it is exprefTed, are borrowed from thofe of an earthly Monarch : As our No- tion of the Manner of his governing the Uni- verfe is, from the Conceptions we have formed to ourfelves of the beft Human Polity, and the manner of ruling a temporal Kingdom, of which we have a clear and diftinct Conception y but how God governs the Univerfe we know not. Histyrovidence is originaly conceived, from the previous Notion we have of that commen- dablrGare, and Forecaft, and Contrivance we obferve among Men for providing all things convenient, and good, and necelfary for the c Publuk. Thus again we conceive God as our Defender, and call him fo, from the Notion we have firft formed of one Man's defending ano- ther from any AlTault or impending Danger, by his W]fdom y or Strength of Body, or military Force. We ftile and conceive Him our Deli- verer from the fecret Malice of evil Men, and the invifible Power of the Spirits of Darkneis ; from that Vtjtble Help, and Affiftance, and Kindnels whereby one Man refcues another out of the Hands of his inveterate Enemy. And we conceive him the invifible D'ifpojer of all things, from the Viftble Diftribution of 'Worldly HappU the Understanding. 4jp Happinefs, or Riches, and Honours, and Pre- ferments in the State. So likewife it is by the lame Analogy that he is ftiled our King and Lord, from that Conception we have in the Mind of a temporal Prince, iurrounded with all the Infigns of Power, and Majefty, and royal Grandeur. The laft Relation of the Supreme Deity to Mankind I mall mention is, that of our 'Judge. This Term, together with the Notion annexed to it, is taken originaly from that we have of a Man's fitting upon a Bench for the Tryal of Criminals, and pronouncing an Im- partial Sentence of Abfolution or Condemna- tion according to the Forms in our Courts of Judicature : Or from a juft ^Prince's Examina- tion and Inquiry into the Inclinations and Be- haviour of his Subjects, and his Equal Diftri- bution of Rewards and (Punijbments according to their Merits or Demerits. From this laft mentioned Relation of the Supreme Caufe to us, as his Creatures endued with that Freedom of Will, and Liberty of Act- ing in every inftance of Duty, this way or di- rectly the contrary, and thdX^ower of Difobey- ing which we experience in ourlelves ; the In- tellect infers the Neceflity of a future State pf Rewards and ^unijhments in another World. This it doth by a plain and natural Confe- quence from the unequal Diftribution of Pro- vidence 460 Procedure of vidence fo vifible in tfhis Life ; even to that Degree that the moll immoral Men are often the moft Profperous ; perhaps that they may- have all the Reward of a partial Obedience, and of a Mix'd and Imperfect Virtue here : And that the ftricleft Oblervers of the Light of Nature are Sufferers by it in their Fortune efpecialy, and too often in Reputation and Character ; that they may have a more full Compenlation and Reward of a Sincere Virtue and Obedience hereafter. Nay and from ob- ferving that temporal Qrofperity hath an Apt- nefs and 'Tendency to make Men Tranlgreifors ; and that Adverfity on the contrary is apt to make corrupt and wicked Men reflect and Re- form ; which cannot be fuppofed of any true and Genuine Rewards and Punifhments for Vir- tue or Vice from the Supreme Being. From the Confideration of thole feveral Relations of God to Mankind, naturaly follow the feveral mutual and correlpondent Relati- ons of Us towards Him ; as being his peculiar Property , and Creatures, and SubjeBs, and Chil- dren, in the lame wide and extenfive Accepta- tion of that Term, in which God is ftiled Fa- ther by the Light of Nature only. Hence again immediately arile all the Duties of Na- tural or Moral Religion , for a Foundation of which we are to polfefs our Minds with the higheft Opinion, and Veneration, and Love of God we are capable of doing from the Opera- tions the Understanding. 461 tions of our own Minds, and from all the Per-> fe&ions in the vifible Part of the Creation. Wc are to conceive him as a Being altogether fo Incomprehenjible, that we come by the Know* ledge of his very Exigence by Deduction only and Confequence ; and not from any Direft Conception or Idea we can have of his real Nature itielf ; and are therefore obliged, for want of better, to think and lpeak of him in the moft exalted Conceptions and Expreflions, whereby we think and fpeak of ourfelves, or of the moft glorious Obje&s in Nature. As we necefTarily infer in General that he muft have all confummate and infinite Perfection ; and yet find we can have no direct. Conception or Idea of any ^Particular Perfections as they iub- iift in his Real Nature ; fb we necefTarily alcribe to him all the particular Perfections of our own rational Nature : Thefe we call his Attributes, becaufe they are only Attributed to him ; that is transfer'd from Man to God, and from Earth to Heaven ; and do by Semblance and Jnalogy only reprefent and exprefs the inconceivable, but Real however, and Correfpondent Perfecti- ons of the Divinity. Here it is worth while to flop a little, and oblerve how great an Ingredient Faith is, even in a merely Moral Religion ; I mean that Faith which necefTarily includes an Aflent of the Mind to the rfruth and Reality of things utterly Incomprehensible ^ and of the Nature whereof 46i Procedure of whereof we can have no Conception or Idea, otherwife than by Semblance and Analogy with the things of this World \ whether we come to the Knowledge of their Exigence by Reafon or Revelation. It is of this Faith the Apoftle fays, that without it It is impojjible to pleafe God\ and he inftances in a Point of Natural Religion, For he that cometh to God mufl believe that he is ' y and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently feek him. Which Character of a Rewarder is founded upon his Power, and Wifdom, and Goodnefs ; and upon the reft of his Divine At- tributes that are Themfelves all Obje&s of Faith according to the Apoftle's Definition of it, Faith is the Subftance. of things hoped for : Which Subftance is in this Life reprelented in Types and Images ; fo that we Hope for things in another World whereof we have here no £)/'- reef Perception or Idea. T'he Evidence of things not feen, that is either by the Direct Eye of Body or Mind ; but Clearly and Diftintfly con- ceived and underftood in their Types and Re- prefentatives : In which we have a foil Proof and Evidence of the true Subftance and Real Exigence of the Antitypes, tho', as they are in themfelves, they be now utterly inconceivable. Thus the Sum and Import of this Definition of the Apofile's is, that the things of another World are now the Immediate Obje&s of our Knowledge and Faith, only in their Types and Reprefentatives ; and the Mediate Obje&s of Both, as to their True Nature and Subftance and Reality* the Understanding. 465 Reality. So far is Faith from being confined to the Myfterles of the Go/pel, that it was of the very EfTence of Religion from the Days of Abel ; and the moft noble A&s of Faith were exerted by Kim, and by Enoch », and Noah, and Abraham, and the fucceeding Patriarchs, and Mofes before any of the inipired Writings ap- peared in the World. CHAP. X. The Practical Duties of Natural Reli- gion , infer } d from that Speculative Knowledge. FROM Matters of Faith, the Intellect pro- ceeds to infer all thole Practical Duties of Natural Religion founded on the inconcei- able (Perfections of the Divine Nature, and the ieveral Relations it bears to Mankind ; all which require from us fuitable Returns of Fear and hove, of Honour and Gratitude ; and of Obedience to all the Dictates of Right Reafon : Which are the Laws of Nature, that is of God who hath endued us with that Rea/on, and with Freedom of Willy and Power for the Obfervance of thole Laws. Thele Laws of Nature are unavoidably divided firft, into Religious Worjlnp both of Body and Mind to be paid to God alone, as to the only Object of Worlhip among Invijtbk Beings. Secondly, into a becoming and equi- table 4^4 Procedure of table Treatment of our Fellow Creatures, in all Inftances of Behaviour ; which Branch of Duty, from the manifold Corruption and Obfcurity in which it was involved under uninlightned Reafon among Jews and Heathens, is now re- duced with Clearnefs and Certainty to one uni- Verfal Rule of Action, Whatfoever ye would that Menjhould do unto you, do ye aljb unto them : So that upon an Imaginary Change of Condition and Circumftances with any other Perlbn, it is almoft impoflible to err in Judgment unlefs thro* (Perverjhe/s and Partiality. And laftly into the feveral Duties owing to Our/ebes, with regard to our Private Happinefs and Perfec- tion ; the Sum of which confifts in the Re- training our Appetites, and the Regulation of our Pajfions according to Reafon. The Intellect having, in the Series and Order before defcribed, attain'd at length to a commendable Knowledge of the Exiftence of God, and of his Attributes , and of the feveral Relations which he bears to Mankind ; which are the Foundations of Faith in him, and of Divine Worjhip ; together with that of all other Qratilcal Duties in Religion merely Moral, has gone the whole length of its Chain, and can* not by its own Natural Powers take one Step farther. Here then we are arrived at the Ut* mojl Limits of human Underftanding, fet out by God and Nature ; fuch as are utterly Im* paiTable, and never to be furmounted by the utmoft the Understanding. 46'j utmoft Efforts, and higheft Flights of Unin- lightened Sence and Realbn. Accordingly here it is, that all the Oppofers of Revelation fet up their Standard * where they labour with all their Force and Artifice, to guard and defend thefe Frontiers of theirs ; by hindering all Attempts of the Mind to obtain any Degree of Supernatural Know- ledge, which might be Conveyed from Heaven over thole fcanty Bounds, to the Side of Nature. They will not fuppofe any Knowledge nece£- fary to Religion, beyond the Immediate Reach of thofe Faculties interwoven with our Frame ; or which cannot be attained by the fame Un- ajjijled and uninterrupted Method of Proceed- ing, and continued Chain of Conlequences, by which the Mind of Man attains to any Other kind of Knowledge merely temporal and Hu- man. Their Permafion is, that neither the Mind nor Conscience has any thing to do with things, whereof Men, without any immediate Light from Heaven, cannot form to themfelves lome Direct Idea or Conception : Such reveaPd Truths they call a Knowledge without any Kind of Ideas ; and a Faith without Know/edge ; both which they efteem Unreajonable in God to re- quire, and altogether Impracticable and unne- ceflary in refpecr, of Man* This would have been a very juft way of Arguing, if Man had continued in that Frame H h and j^.66 Procedure of and Temper of Body and Mind wherein he was firft made : But we are now, not as the Hypo thefts of thofe Men molt abliirdly liip- pofes, in an original Healthy State of Nature ; but in one which is new and fuperinduc'd, and altogether Preternatural We find by lad Ex- perience that we labour under a broken and crazy Conftitution, with great Dimneis of Sight in our Under /landing ; Crookednefs in our Will ^ Diilortion in all the Pajjions and Affections of the inferior Soul ; together with Corruption and Pollution in all the Appetites of the Body. In this Condition our mere Moralifts would have the Purblind fickly Mind of Man judge for itlelf ; and work out a Cure intirely upon the Strength of its Own Judgment, without the leaft Advice or Help from Heaven. Their fatal Error is, that they infift wholly on the Light of Nature alone, in this Unnatural State of Mind ; and will choofe to fee with no other than this obfeure, uncertain, expiring Light ; which was fo near being Ex- tinguifh'dy that it could never have recovered without being Kindled anew from Above. So that all their Boafts of Natural Religion only, exclufive of Revelation^ is but glorying in their Shame: And vainly magnifying that Weaknefs of the Underftanding, by which it is in the very Condition of the Man in the Gofpel, Who Jaw Men as frees walking when his Eyes were but half open'd ; and which render'd it utterly un- 2 able the Understanding, 467 able of itielf to contribute any thing to its own Cure -, and therefore neceifarily required Diicipline, and Regimen, and a Phyfician of Souls. We were fo far from being able of Our felves to form any true Judgment upon the iufc- ficient Means and Method of our Recovery, by the Light of Nature ; that it could not have helped us even to any account of the true Caufe .of our Dijiemper ', and of that fatal Step by which we were plunged into this deplorable State of Blindnefs and Corruption : Which all Men have ever bewail'd, but could never ac- count for without Revelation; from whence alone we learn that it was not our Original Frame, as we flrft came out of the Hands of God. Here therefore we are to fix our Foot, for evincing the abfolute NeceJJity of fome imme- diate exprefs Revelation from Heaven ; and muft lay this down as a certain Truth, in Oppofition to what is Suppos'd and Infinuated by the Mag- nifiers of Mere Reajbn. That Mankind, in its fyrefent State of Degeneracy, is to be confider'd; not in Pofleflion of the Divine Laws Fair and Legible, as they were originaly written on the tables of our Heart by the Finger of God -, and Hill remaining Whole and Intire: But as they are Broken to Pieces, and Shatter d -, like thofe lively Emblems of them which Mofes, fuTd with juft Indignation, daihed againft the Stones. So that the whole Sum of all our Knowledge in Religion merely Natural, is nothing more Now, than the Poor Remains of the Firjl Tran- H h a fcript* 4^8 Procedure of Icript ; and only fome Few, Imperfect, and Vn- certain Hints recovcr'd by the laborious Ga- thering up, and Piecing of the Fragments, CHAP. XL The NeceJJity, and Manner of Revelation. HE R E we are come at length to the Ut- mofi Advancement of human Underftand- ing, and the higheft Elevation of the Mind of Man by Divine Revelation ', whereby it is railed above itfelf, and above all things in this World, to take a Clear and Delightful Prolped of an- other ; whereof it had but a very Faint and Uncertain Notion before. This opens to the Mind, all at once, a New and immenle Scope, and Ipacious Scene of lblid and lubftantial Knowledge : From which all the Adverfaries of Reveafd Religion unhappily preclude them- lelves, as from a kind of Utopia ox Fairy Land, wherein all is mere Dream and Vifion ; where Men muft leave their Reafon behind them at their firft Entrance ; and give a Loofe to the groundlefs and extravagant Amuiements of a warm Imagination. In this they are fb fix'd and pofitive, that they ever infinuate the Term Revelation to import nothing more than Ignorance and Superjiition. But their not dis- cerning the abfblute Neceflity of Revelation, is a lad Effect and Confequence of that Blindne/s of their Underftanding, which it was intended to the Understanding. 469 to Heal and inlighten : And Men are never in a more Deplorable Condition, than when they remain altogether hifenfible in a MortalDittem- per ; and cannot be periuaded they Hand in need of any Cure or Remedy. That the native Powers and Faculties of the whole Man were all out of Order and mi- ierably broken and corrupted, the wifeft of the Heathens were thoroughly fenfible, and fadly lamented : And that all this proceeded from a Voluntary Aft of his own, and not from any Fatal NeceJJity, or Qojitive Decree and immedi- ate Interposition of Almighty Power, we are fully informed by Scripture. Now, after Man had funk into iuch a Condition of Infirmity and Corruption, as to be utterly unable to ex- tricate himfelf ; or to make any Effectual At- tempt towards the Recovery of his original Frame and Temper of true Wifdom and Inno- cence : That unnatural Change and Degene- racy muft necelfarily have either always Con* tinned, and have been unavoidably hicreafed by Cuftom and Habit thro' every Generation ; or there muft have been lbme Help or Remedy from Without. There could be no Alteration for the better of this daily declining State, and languifhing Condition of the Soul, from Within^ Nature had no Strength left to Work, off the Diftemper, which proceeded from a mortal and deadly tyo'ifon, greedily lwallowed by our firfl: Parents thro' a fatal Difobedience and In- Hh 3 advertency j 470 Procedure of advertency ; being treaeheroufly handed out to them for the higheft Cordial, by the com- mon Enemy of their whole Race. The Anti- dote or Remedy was paft all Human Art or Pre- fcription ; and that it could be adminiftred by Infinite Wifdom alone is plain, fince the Opera- tion moft have been according to the Nature and Difpofition of a Free Agent : The Healing, as well as the Corruption muft have been in- tirely Voluntary ; and the Means of our Reco- very muft have been altogether adapted to that perfect Freedom of Will with which we were created, and without which we could not be either truly Virtuous or Holy ; and conlequently without our Own voluntary Concurrence, we could never be Refiofd in any Degree to our primitive Frame and Conftitution. Since therefore the Freedom of our Will was to be continued whole and Inviolable, thro* all the Difpeniations of God towards Mankind for our Recovery ; there was no reafbnable or Conceivable Way of effecting this, but by Ap- plication of proper Help and Afliftance to the Natural lowers and Faculties of the Mind : And particularly to the Under /landing, before there could be any room for the fecret Opera- tion of the Spirit of God upon that of Man, for influencing the Will. This was to be per- formed, not by any Sudden actual Illumination of it All at once ; as Blindnels is cur'd in the Body, when it is the immediate Refult of Al- mighty the Understanding. 471 mighty Power (for we might as well fuppofe God, after the Fall, to have firft reduced Man to Nothing, and then to have made him over again a New Creature in a Literal Sence) But by Information or Revelation from Without , of luch Inftances of Knowledge as were neceifary to enable us to become New Creatures in a truly Evangelical Sence ; and which it was impoffible for us to attain by any Inward Light or Strength of Reafbn. And accordingly this Divine In- formation was begun in the firft Promife of the Seed of the Woman which was to Break the Serpent's Head ; and this was continualy En- larged and clear'd up farther in fucceeding Ages by New Revelations, as the Gradual Corrup- tion and Exigencies of Mankind required. Thus our Underftanding is affifted, and in- lightned with the Knowledge of things Super- natural and Spiritual ; after the fame Manner it is with that of things Temporal and Human. The Knowledge and Experience of Other Men conveyed to us by Information, makes up the greateft Part of our Secular Knowledge ; which we do not take up Implicitly ', but render it properly Our own by the Exercile of our Rea- fdn, in judging and determining upon the Cre- dibility of every thing we give our AfTent to upon the Teftimony of others. And we have the lame Full and Free Ufe of our Reafbn, in judging and determining concerning the Cre- dibility of every thing which comes to us by H h 4 Divine 47 * Procedure of Divine Information ; which goes by the Name of Revelation, to diitinguifh it from that which is Human. So that nothing can be more ground- lefs and abfurd, than the general and firm Per T fuafion of all our modern Infidels and Freethink- ers ', That no Information nath or can come to us from God, as well as from Man , and that fuch as we hold to come from Him, requires, a blind and Implicit Affent of the Mind, with- out a thorough Examination and Conviction of Reafon. As it is thus evident that the Underftanding may be, and is enlightened by External Infor- mation in Matters of Religion ; fo it appears to the plaineft Realbn, that all fach Informa- tions or Revelations mult be convey'd in the Lan- guage of Men, who are made the Injlruments of them all -, and by the Mediation and Subftitu- tion of fuch natural and Human Ideas and Con- ceptions, for the expreffing of which the Words and Terms of that Language were Originaly accommodated. It is not realbnable to ima- gine that this mould be performed by giving us any Faculties intirely New -, or by any to- tal Alteration of thofe we Already have ; for this would be a kind of Second Creation, ancj not any Information or Revelation. And it is as unreafonable to think, that this fhould be performed by exhibiting Internaly to the Mind of Man any Obfcure, or Faint, or Glimmering Ideas of things Supernatural, as they are In 2 ' themfelvts j the Understanding. 47$ them/elves ; for we are by Nature as unquali- fy'd for any, even the leaft Degree of Such a Perception of them, as we are for Clear and Di- Jlinti Ideas of their RealEJfence : Befides that up- on Such a Suppofition, all that Knowledge and Faith which is founded on Revelation, mull of Necefiity be Eaualy confufed, and Dubious, ancj Ob/cure. No; Divine Information gives us no New Faculties of Perception, but is adapted to thofe we Already have ; nor doth it exhibit to the Immediate View of the Intellect Any, the Leajl glimmeringldea. of things purely ipiritual, intirely abftra&ed from all Senjation or any De- pendence upon it : But it is altogether per- formed by the Intervention and Ufe of thofe Ideas which are Already in the Mind ; firft con- veyed to the Imagination from the Impreflion of external Objeds upon the Organs of Senja- tion ; then varioufly Alter 'd and diverfify'd by the Intellect -, and afterwards by its Operations of Judgment and Illation, wrought up into an endlels Variety of Complex Notions and Concep- tions -, which takes in the whole Compais of our merely temporal and Secular Knowledge. Now, all thefe are transfer'd from Earth to Hea- ven, by way of Semblance and Analogy : So that the Ideas fimple and compound -, the Complex Notions and Conceptions ; the 'Thoughts and Rea- fonings ; the Sentiments and Apprehen/jo?is ; the Imaginations, anoj Vf/pons, and dffeffions of an Human 474 Procedure of Human Mind ; together with the Language and tferms by which we expreis them, become Sub- fervient to all the real Ends and Purpofes of Revelation. The farms together with the Con- ceptlons apply'd to things Supernatural and Spi- ritual, are the Same which are in common Ule for things temporal and Human ; but the Ap- plication is New and Holy ; they are only con- iecrated to a Divine Vfe and Signification : They are fb far fanclified and to be reverenced as they are thus appropriated to Religion ; to the Reprefentatlon of the intrinfic Nature and Attributes of God ; and to the glorious, and Otherwlje ineffable Myfierles of the Gofpel. This Operation of Subjlltutlng thole Ideas and complex Notions which are Natural and Familiar to us, for the Reprefentation of things Supernatural and in themfelves Incomprehensible (which we fall into fb infenfibly, that we do not eafily diftinguilh between the Literal^ and Analogical Acceptation of thofe Terms by which we expreis them) is the higheft and moft valu- able Privilege of the Intellect. It is this which gives it full Scope for the Contemplation of heavenly Objects ; which extends its Dimen- iions; and fo dilates all the Powers and Facul- ties of the Mind, that it takes in the immenfe Creation with all its glorious Inhabitants ; and even God himfelf, and all his Attributes. By this it comes to a fblid and Real Knowledge of things, whereof it can have no £Mf Con- ception thte Understanding. 475 ception or Idea ; and is enabled to judge and determine, to diicuis and argue, to make fure and certain Deductions and Conclufions ; and form to itfelf Axioms, and Rules, and Precepts concerning things far removed out of the Imme~ diate Reach of all its natural Capacities ; and by this they become the Objects of Our Fear and Love, Faith and Hope, and of all the Paffions and Affections of a human Soul. In fhort this is the very way by which all Inter- courfe is kept up between God and Man ; and whereby he lets himlelf Down to our prefent Condition of Infirmity, in all his Revelations. Thus we contemplate things Supernatural and Spiritual^ not by looking directly Upward for any Immediate View of them ; but as we behold the heavenly Bodies, by calling our Eyes Downward to the Water. Which tho' it exhi- bits to us nothing of the Real Nature and Turtle Sub/lance of the Firmament, with all its Fur- niture of radiant and delightful Objects ; yet affords us fuch a Goodly appearance and Lively Reprejentation of them, that a Perfbn (fiippo- fed never to have feen thofe celeftial Lumina- ries tfhemfehes ; but convinced that there May be a true Similitude, and Proportion, and Cor- refpondtncy between the Refemblances and the Reality) would have Notions and Conceptions of the things unleen, not only Juft and 7*rue : But fo Clear likewife and Diflinti, that he wou'd from thence infer their Necejpiry Exijlence ; ad- mire 47 6 Procedure of mire their Splendor, and Beauty, and Ufa ; and realbn upon them, to all Moral Intents and Purpofes, with as much lblid 'Truth and Reality as he could upon thole things whereof he had either Direct Ideas , or an Immediate Con- fcioufnefs ; and nothing would be more ridicu- lous in him, than to draw any Exa& Parallel between the Real Nature and effential Proper- ties of the Types and Antitypes. Tho' our Knowledge of Reveal' d Truths and Myfteries is thus by Semblance only and Analogy ; yet, fince God has formed us to his own Image and Likenefs, we have a firm De- pendence upon his Wifdom and Veracity (of which we had before obtain'd Conceptions from mere Realbn) for fuch a juft Rejemblance, and Proportion, and Correfpondency between thole Scripture Types which are Natural, and the Supernatural Antitypes, as renders that kind of Knowledge Solid and Real ; the Faith that is built upon it, Certain and Firm ; and our Hope well grounded and Sure. And then only we are in danger of running into Error and Delufion, and may be Fataly deceived, when we either turn it into mere Metaphor and Al- lufton only ; or when we Strain that Analogy, by which we conceive things fpiritual, to an Undue and Literal Companion with things na- tural and human, and in fuch Initances as ne- ver were Intended by the Wifdorn of God ; or Jaftly, when we begin to imagine, that we havQ the Understanding. 477 have in any degree a Diretf or Immediate Per- ception of things Supernatural. The Mind of Man, while it keeps within its own proper Sphere, acls with Freedom and Security ; but when it ftrives to exert itfelf beyond its Native Powers and Faculties, then it finks into Weaknels and Infirmity ; and is ever liable to endleis Miftake and Error. It hath no Direff Perception, or Immediate Con- icioufnefs beyond things fcnfible and human. So that in all its nobleft Efforts and moft lofty Flights, it mull ever have a fteady Eye to the Earth from whence it took its Rile \ and al- ways confider that it mounts upward with Bor- rowed 'Wings : For when once it prelumes upon their being of its own Natural growth, and at- tempts a Direft Flight to the heavenly Regi- ons -, then it falls Headlong to the Ground, where it lies Groveling in Superitition, or Infidelity. FINIS. Printed by James Bettenham^ Books Printed for William Innys. I. *" ■"* HE Neceffity of Divine Revelation, and the Truth of M . Jtfre Chriftian Revelation afferted, in Eight Sermons. To which is prefixed, a Preface with fome Remarks on a late Book iiutitled, The Scheme of Literal Prophecy confidered, £sfr. By John Rogers, D. D. &c. 8vo. II. A Vindication of the Civil Eftabliftiment of Religion : Wherein fome Pofitions of Mr. Chandler, the Author of Literal Scheme, &c and an Anonymous Leter on that Subject are oc- casionally confidered. With an Appendix, containing a Letter ftom the Reverend Dr. Marihal, and an Anfwer to the fame. By J. Rogers, D. D. HI. Sixty Sermons, preached on feveral Occafions. By the Right Reverend Father in God -George Smalridge, D- D. late Lord Biihop of Briftol, and Dean of Chrift Church, Oxford. The ■Second Edition, Folio. IV. A Defence of the Differtation on the Validity of the Eng- lish Ordinations, againft the feveral A.nfwers made to it, with pro- per Vouchers for the Facts advanced in that Work. By the Re- verend Father P. F. le Courayer, In two Vol. 8vo. V. F. Courayer's Diflertation, the 2d Edition 8vo. VI. The Divine Right of Epifcopacy, and the neceffity of an Epifcopal Commiffion for preaching God's Word, and for the Va~ lid Miniftration of the Chriftian Sacraments, proved from the Holy Scriptures, and the Doctrine and Practice of the Primitive Church. Together with an impartial Account of the. falfe Prin- ciples of Papifts, Lutherans, and Calvinifts, concerning the Iden- tity of Bifnops and Presbyters. Alfo the valid Succeflion of our Englilh Bifhops vindicated, againft the Objections of Presbyterians and Romanifts. And the Popifh Fable of the Nag's -Head Confecra- tion of Archbilhop Parker fully refuted. By Thomas Bret, LL. D. VII. Lay Baptifm invalid ; or, pretended Baptifm by ufurping Adminiftrators, who never were ordain'd or commiluon'd to Bap- tife, proved to be no Chriftian Baptifm ; and that the pure Pri- mitive Church did not allow of any Validity in fuch Sacrilegious Wafhings: All made evident from the Holy Scriptures of the Old and BOOKS Printed for W. Innys. and New Teftament, the Writings of the ancient Chriftian Fathers, and the Articles, Canons, and Rubricks of the Church of England. With Anfwers to all the Objections of fome learned Oppofers ; particularly, thofe of the late Dr. Burnet, Bifhop of Salisbury ; the late Dr. Fleetwood, Bifhop of Ely ; the prefent Bifhop of Dur- ham ; and the late Reverend Mr. Bingham, &c. Containing all the Trafts which have been written upon that Subject. By R. Lawrence, M. A. To which are added, Letters to the Author by the late Dr. Hickes, and other Divines of the Church of Eng- land. In 8 Parts, in z Vols. 8vo. VIII. Remarks upon a late Book entitled, The Fable of the Bees ; or Private Vices Publick Benefits. In a Letter to the Author. To which is added, a Poflfcript, containing an Obfer- vation or two upon Mr. Bayle. By William Law, M. A. 8vo. ] IX. The Religious Philofopher : Or, The right Ufe of Con- templating the Works of the Creator, i. In the wonderful Structure of Animal Bodies, and in Particular Man. 2. In the no lefs wonderful and wife Formation of the Elements, and their various Effefts upon Animal and Vegetable Bodies. And, 3. In the moft amazing Structure of the Heavens, with all its Furni- ture. Defigned for the Conviction of Atheiits and Infidels. In 2 Vols. Throughout which, all the late Dilcoveries in Anatomy, Philofophy, and Aflronomy ; together with the various Experi- ments made ufe of to illuftrate the fame, are moft curioufly handled by that learned Mathematician Dr. Nieuwentyt. Tran- ilated from the Low-Dutch. To which is prefixed, A Letter to the Tranflator, by the Reverend J. T. Defaguliers, LL. D. F. R. S. The 3d Edition, adorn'd with Cuts. K. 5. ine 3a naition, aaorn a witn v^uts. X. Reflections upon Reafon. By Phileleutherus Britanni 2d Edition 8vo. 1CUS. XI. A compleat Collection of the Works of the Reverend and Learned John Kettlewell, B. D. formerly Vicar of Coles-Hill in Warwicklhire, in 2 Volumes ; the feveral Treadles printed from Copies revifed and improved by the Author, a little before his Death. To which is prefixed the Life of the Author, by George Hickes, D. D. and Robert Nelfon, Efqr; 2 Vols. 1724. XII. The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker, in eight Books of the Laws of Ecclefiaftical Polity, compleated out of his own Manufcripts, dedicated to the King's moft excellent Majefly Charles II. by whofe Royai Father (near his Martyrdom) the former five Books (then only- extant V BOOKS ^Printed for W. Innys- extant) Were commended to his dear Children, as an excellent Means tQ fatisfy private Scruples, and fettle the publick Peace of this Church and Kingdom : To which are added feveral other Treatifes, by the fame Author, all revifed and corrected in num- berlefs Places of the former Editions, by a diligent Hand. There is alfo prefixed before the Book the Life of the Author, written by Ifaac Walton. To this Edition is added a large Alphabetical Index. XIII. Origines Sacra : Or a Rational Account of the Grounds of natural and revealed Religion, the eight Edition. To which is now added, part of another Book upon the fame Subjeft ; written A. D. 1 697, publilhed from the Author's own Manu- fcript. By the Reverend Father in God Edward Stillingfleef, D. D. late Lord Biihop of Worceftef, 1724. XIV. The Pofthumous Works of Robert Hooke, M. D. F. R. S. Geom. Prof. Grefli. &c. containing his Cutlerian Lectures; and other Difcourfes, read at the Meetings of the illuftrious Roy- al Society, for the Advancement of natural Knowledge. With Cuts, and the Author's Life, by Richard Waller. R. S. Seer. XV. Fafti Eceleji Verf-o Vert-o Voc-o Vol-o Volv-o Perf. adiv-i eg-i audiv-j cetid-i cecin-i cep-i colu-i condid-i consumpf-i dux-i excep-i expedtav-i tul-i finx-i fov-i freg-i fug-i gemu-i habu-i impul-i intul-i infpirav-i infu-i laudav-i memorav-i metu-i migrav-i mif-i narrav-i occupav-i ornav-i pafl-us permif-i petiv-i prelT-i putav-i quaesiv-i rccitav-i rex-i reliqu-i rog-av-i rup-i fciv-i fervav-i fiv-i fprev-i fu-i fumps-i tex-i tetend-i tenu-i fuftul-i tradid-i trax-i vex-i ven-i versav-i vert-i ■vncav-i volu-i volv-i Suf>i». adit-um aft-um audit-um caf-um cant-um capt-um cult-um condit-um consumpt-um dudl-um except-um expe£tit-um Jat-um fid-urn fot-um fra£r.-um fugit-um £emit-um habit-urn impulf-um illat-um inipirat-um laudat-um memorat-um migrat-um miff-um narrat-um occupat-um ornat-um permiff-um petit-um preff-um purit-um quaesit-um recitat-um reft-um relift-um rogat-um rupt-um fcit-um fervat-um fit-um fpret-um fumpt-um teft-um tenf-um tent-um fublat-um tradit-um tra£t-um veft-um vent-um versat-um verf-um vocat-um volut-um fafir.-.t. ad-ire ag-ere aud-ire cad-ere can -ere cap-ere cbl-ere tond-ere consum-ere diic-ere excip-ere expedl-are ferre fing-ere fov-ere frang-ere fug-ere gem-ere hab-ere impeil-ere inferre infpir-are in-effe laud-are memor-are metu-ere migr-are mitt-ere narr-are occup-are orn-are pat-i permitt-ere pet-ere prem-ere put-are quzer-ere recit-are reg-ere relinqu-ere rog-are rump-ere fc-ire ferv-are fin -ere fpern-ere efle fum-ere teg-ere tend-ere ten-ere toll-ere trad-ere trah-ere veh-ere ven-ire verf-are vert-ere voc-are velle volr-ere Regimen. a. ab, 3 a. * ab, 4 a. ab, 3 d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, X a. d, ab. a. d, ab. 3 a. d, ab, 2 a. d* ab, 3 a. d, ab. 3 a. ab. 3 a. d, ab, 2 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, a. d, ab, j a. d, ab, d, ab, i a. d, ab, i a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, i d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, i a. % ab, i a. ab, i a. d, ab, 3 a. ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 4t. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, i a. ab, 3 a. d, ab, i a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, i a. «, ab, 3 a. * ab, 4 a. ab, i a. d, ab, 3 a. ab, 3 a. ab, g- d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 2 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, 3 a. d. ab, 3 a. d, ab, 4 d, ab, i a. d, ab, 3 a. d, ab, i a. d, ab, a. d, ab, 3 1 " d, "b* BOOKS printed for T. 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