Ouke University Libraries 
 Minority report 
 Conf Pam #288 
 
[House ok Representatives — Secret Session.] 
 
 HOUSE OFxREPfJES^NTATTVES, December 30th, 1863.— 
 Ordered to be printed.^ ' «- . 
 
 [By Mr. Bovce.] 
 
 MINORITY REPORT ON THE CURIIENCY. 
 
 As I am unable to concur with the majority of the committee, I am 
 compelled to submit ray own views. 
 
 It is admitted by all that the currency is in a deplorable Condition. 
 It is depreciated to suclf an extent that the Government can collect 
 nothing by taxation but its own paper, depreciated as compared with 
 specie to the extent of tMo thousand per cent. Its credit, measured, 
 as it must be by the depreciation ofthe currency, is almost exhausted. 
 Under this St:ite of affairs, the Government is in a condition of finan- 
 cial paralyf'is. It can ot pay its armies in the field, except in worth- 
 less paper. It cannot pay its employees It cannot purchase sub« 
 sistence for its armies, and is compelled, to prevent their disbanding 
 from starvation, to resort to the odious system of impressments, which 
 is filling the land ".ith execrations. It is evident, therefore, we arc 
 travelling a road, which is leading as fast ns possible to a precipice. 
 We must get out of this road as quick as possible. We cannot afford 
 delays. Present action is imperative. We must adopt a prompt and 
 elficacious remedy. We must gee rid of the 8Ui),0()i),(M)() of treasury 
 notes which block up our way. How is this to be done ? I propose 
 to do it, by a very simple process — by recurring to the truth — by 
 realizing that they are depreciated — that they only represent a value 
 of five cents on the dollar, 40, ')(»(>, UUO. I propose that they be 
 treated by the Government, in all its dealings, according to their value 
 m specie. I'hus the problem is solved and we are at once in posses- 
 sion of our resources. 
 
 There are only two sources by which the Government can obtain 
 values — one by credit, the other by taxation. What has destroyed our 
 credit? Setting aside the prejudicial influence of military disasters, 
 that which, in my opinion, has impaired our credit more than all other 
 causes combined, is the magnituile of our delt and the velocity with 
 which it is increasing. A debt already amounting to Sl,lUll,ii()i),UUO 
 and increasing as ours is, creates universal distrust as to the ability or 
 
the -willingness of the country to pay it. I hnow that the opinion is 
 generally expressed that our loss of credit is owing to the excessive 
 issues of the currency, more than is necessary as a circulating 
 medium. But that this opinion is erroneous!, is obvious, from this 
 fact, that the bond debt is of as little value as the notes in circula- 
 tion, which is evident from the fact that the currency is not. funded in 
 bonds, which the holders have had constantly the privilege of doing. 
 If the bonds were more valuable than the treasury notes in circula- 
 tion, the holders Avould have funded them in bonds. The bonds and 
 the currency are alike depreciated. To restore our credit, we must 
 reduce the amount of our debt^ and arrest its gigantic increase. The 
 plan which I propose accomplishes both of these purposes — reduction 
 of the debt and slowness of its future increase, more effectually than 
 any plan proposed. At the stroke of a pen, we find, by reverting to 
 i-eality, that we owe 41), 000, 000 outstanding notes, instead of 
 800,'JOO,000, and, as I shall explain in a subsequent part of this 
 report, I propose to place the Government in a position to buy 
 what it has to buy as cheaply as possible, thus arresting the velocity 
 with which we are running in debt. 
 
 But our great resource is our taxing power. The great desideratum 
 for us is to get the most efficient use of this power with the least 
 delay. My plan accomplishes this purpose more completely than any 
 other. We take full and perfect possession' of our taxing power at 
 once, with no incumbrance except the :*s40.()0(),00i| of specie value in 
 outstanding treasury notes, which we could rapidly absorb in taxes. 
 I propose that the taxes shall be payable in specie or outstanding 
 treasury notes at their specie value. But to avoid the difficulty in 
 [>aymeut of taxes from the scarcity of specie and to furnish the (lov- 
 ernnient with present means, 1 prepose that the Treasury Department 
 issue certificate receivable in payment of the taxes. "With these certifi- 
 cates the Government can meet its present wants. I propose to let the 
 Government anticipate the taxes for two years by issuing certificates 
 of taxes for that period. These certificates supplying tiie office of 
 .specie will be very nearly of the value of specie. At any rate no 
 paper obligation we can issue will approximate so nearly to the value 
 of specie as the tax certificates. We cease the indefinite issue of 
 paper and confine it to a limited amount for a specific purpose. We 
 concentrate in these tax certificates the total financial vitality of the 
 Government. When we have done this, Ave can do no more on this 
 
 line. 
 
 As taxation alone will not furnish sufficient means to carry oq the 
 Government, I propose to give the Secretary of the Treasury author- 
 ity to issue six per cent, bonds, strengthened by every possible appli- 
 ance to meet the deficiency. Such, in brief, are the outlines of ray 
 plan. 
 
 It may be objected that it is unjust to the holders of the existing 
 treasury notes. Undoubtedly it would be unjust to them if they had 
 received their treasury notes at par. But such is not the case. Very 
 few, if any, persons hold treasury notes which they received at par, 
 because persons do not hoard a paper currency, which is constantly 
 
depreciating. The present holders, as a general rule, have received 
 treasury notes at their depreciated rates. The injury is, therefore, 
 more apparent than real, Avhen we propose to treat the notes according 
 to their actual value. The holders have received them in a general 
 sense Avith reference to their real value. The loss incurred by the 
 dejjreciatiou of tlie.^e notes has already been experienced by those 
 through whose hands they have passed The present holders only fail 
 to make an enormous profit, but experience only * small loss. It is 
 very evident that th re is no way by which we can can get rid of the 
 outstanding treasury notes with so little individual hardship as by 
 taking the course 1 sujgost. 
 
 It may be further objected that such a measure as I propose would 
 jar seriously on the business machinery of society. But it does not 
 so occur to me, for I propose to make no change in the value of the 
 notes, but simply to recognize the fact and the extent of their depre- 
 ciation. Thus, business arrangements will not be disturbed. And 
 when we consider the fact that there are very few executory contracts 
 based on the existing currency, we see how little danger there is of 
 any derangement of affairs. 
 
 It may be further objected that what I propose is bankruptcy of the 
 State. If this be so, then I am not alarmed at even this borrible 
 word. I put it on the ground of State necessity. We cannot stagger 
 under a debt of §I.0()'.).O()ii,00(t and carry on the war. To attempt 
 to do this is to sink ourt-elves in a Serbonian bog, from which we can 
 never escape. I wish the Government to deal candidly with the peo- 
 ple, to make known our necessities, and to appeal to their intelligence 
 and patriotism to sustain us in a measure necessary for the public 
 safety. But I deny that, in a just sense, what I propose is bank- 
 ruptcy. We have issued :$8iHi,()!l*^,(|()0 of currency payable two years 
 after the war. This currency, depreciated to such an extent that it is 
 worth only live cents in specie on the dollar, is now a millstone around 
 our neck. We must get rid of it at once ; we propose to deal with it 
 according to its real value. (?an we, in the eminent danger in which 
 we find ourselves, in which our success depends in a large degree, on 
 our financial ability, can we. I say. be renuired to do more than this ? 
 I think not. 
 
 By the plan which I propose, we put ourselves at once in the best 
 financial position that is possible to us. 
 
 We vitalize our credit to the maximum extent, because we at once 
 diminish our debt to its maximum limit. 
 
 We attain instantly the fullest possible developement of our taxing 
 power. We get actual values. 
 
 We furnish the Government with the means of paying its employees, 
 and its army it; a valuable currency — an advantage which can scarce- 
 ly be over-rated; for a Government which does not pay its army or 
 its employees, has already the death-rattles in its throat. 
 
 Further, we give the Government a good currency with which it 
 Cfin buy cheap. We arrest the velocity with which our debt is in- 
 creasing. We put ourselves as nearly as possible on the specie basis. 
 To illustrate the advantages of this, suppose the Government carried 
 
on upon a specie basis, and that its annual expenses are $200,000,000, 
 and its taxation amounts to half this sum ; at the end of the year its 
 debt is ^l(lii,tM!tiji(Hi. Snppo'^e the same Government, carried on 
 upon acurren;-y inflated four hundred percent, by excessive issues 
 of paper money : its expenses would be $8O0,00,0l)0, its- receipts from 
 taxation $4'H),()(>n,0!»;i. ond its debt at the end of the year would be 
 $4l/0,()iH),000. By adopting my plan, we would put the (rovernment 
 as nearly as posKsbie on a specie basis, the .id vantages of which [ have 
 just illustrated. 
 
 I further propose to give the Secretary of the Treasury authority 
 to sell cotton, tobacco, and naval stores, to strengthen his financial 
 condition. By levying a tax in kind on these leading articles, very 
 considerable values might bo placed in the hands of the Secretary, by 
 which he might retire tax ceitificates, if ^hey exhibited a tendency T() 
 depieciation, or supply himself with tax certificiite^ ii rlu' Tic-^^sny 
 became pressed for means. 
 
 All of which is respectfully submitted. 
 
 WILLIAM W. BOYCE, Chavnncn. 
 
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