^'>^f«^»'i.«,l^^,^f 
 
 *^^^^^^, 
 
 !J55?5' 
 
 Ifil: 
 
 
 
 ■<.;'!!:^»5.*se^,M*, 
 
 SnWflfcKsm 
 
 g^i^^^^s^i^M^v^:: 
 
 ;fti«/Mi«f 
 
 ,*y<^^;;ArN^^'^ 
 
 
 jun.ij.TA. 
 
 
 «:'-":.^"r.' 
 
 ^^R^M^^^^;ii^J^.;,j,j,,i^^' 
 
 f^^,l^h;^^^Kl%' 
 
 .k^Akkihh?<hkhhy 
 
DUKE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 Treasure %oom 
 
^ 
 
 A N 
 
 ADDRESS 
 
 T O 
 
 Dr. PRIESTLY. 
 
JL N 
 
 ADDRESS 
 
 T O 
 
 Dr. PRIESTLY, 
 
 UPON HIS 
 
 Doilrine of Philofophical NeceJJity 
 Illujlrated. 
 
 By JACOB BRYANT, EsQ^ 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand. 
 Al.DCC.LXXX. 
 
': A 
 
 ERRATUM. 
 
 P. 127, 1. 18. for antients read ancients. 
 
391 
 
 A N 
 
 ADDRESS 
 
 T O 
 
 Dr. PRIESTLY, ^c. 
 
 S I R, 
 
 IT was but lately, on account of fome avoca- 
 tions, that an opportunity was afforded me 
 of reading over your Treatife, upon Neceffity ; 
 which however I had for fome time longed 
 to accomplifh : as it was a fubjefl, which I 
 had much confidered; and had indeed long 
 fince, for my private fatisfaflion, written down 
 my thoughts upon it. When I did at laft 
 take your treatife in hand, I formed a re- 
 lolution not to be coo hafty in my conclufions: 
 but to read it over with that attention and care, 
 which every thing deferves, that proceeds froni 
 B a perfoQ 
 
 ' 183240 
 
[ 2 ] 
 
 a perfon fo juftiy celebrated, as Dr. PrteMf , 
 It will be unneceflary, and idle, to detain you 
 with any further prefatory difcourfe : on 
 which account I fhall only take the liberty of 
 giving you this fhort information at fetting 
 out, that I cannot by any means accede to the 
 principles, which you lay down ; nor abide by 
 your conclufions. Upon the mod diligent in- 
 quiry I am perfuaded, that mankind have a 
 felf-determining power. That upon mature 
 deliberation, and juft reafoning, they can make 
 a free and proper election : and can not only 
 choofe, but rejefl, as ihall feem bed to their 
 judgment. In fhort they are not tied down by 
 that abfolute Neceffity, under which you lay 
 them : nor are affected by that overbearing 
 influence, and chain of caufes, which accord- 
 ing to your opinion have been irrefiftibly 
 operating from the very commencement of time* 
 You fay in the courfe of your treatife^ that the 
 'Neceflity, of which you treat, is not the Pre- 
 deflination of the Calvinijlsy nor the Fate of the 
 Ancients : (Preface, p. xxiii.) a circumftance, 
 which I fhall not take upon me at prefent to 
 controvert. This is certain upon your own 
 evidence, through the whole courfe of your 
 writing, however you may fometimes foften 
 7 and 
 
t 3 ] 
 
 and qualify it, that the Neceflity, of which 
 you treat, is no other than fixed Fate, and un- 
 avoidable * Predeftination. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 YOU may perhaps in fome degree anfwer 
 me, by faying, that at your very beginning, 
 when you take in hand to treat of Liberty and 
 Neceflity ; you give full fcope to the pov/ers 
 of man : and allow him all the freedom that 
 can be wifhed, in refpedl both to thinking and 
 a6ling. It mufl be confefTed, that you do : 
 but how this correfponds with your aflertions 
 afterwards, will be our future confideration. 
 It may be want of difcernment on my fide, 
 which prevents my uniformly perceiving the 
 force of your arguments : but to the befl of 
 my judgment, the conceflions, which you make 
 at the beginning, are inconfiflent with what 
 you fay afterwards. They feem to be contra- 
 didled through the whole courfe of your trea- 
 tife. However, as you aflure us, that philofo- 
 phical neceflfity may be m.ade to agree very well 
 with human freedom, let us apply to your own 
 %vords, where you firit fpeak upon the fubjed. 
 
 ♦ Sec p. 162. 
 
 B 2 /// 
 
 183 
 
[ 4 ] 
 
 In the firft place y I would ohferve^ that I allow 
 to man all the liberty or power , that is pofTible 
 in itfelf, and to which the ideas of mankind in 
 general ever go 3 which is the power of doing 
 whatever they will or pleafe, both with rejpe6l 
 to the operations of their minds, and the motions 
 of their bodies, uncontrolled by any foreign prin- 
 ciple or caufe, 'Thus every man is at liberty to 
 turn his thoughts to whatever fubje^i he pleafes, 
 to confider the reafons for or againfl any fcheme or 
 propofition, and to refle5l upon them as long as he 
 fhall think proper ; as well as to walk wherever 
 he pleafes, and to do whatever his hands and 
 other limbs are capable of doing, p. 2. I pafs 
 over the pafTage, which you quote from Mr. 
 Hobbes, as well as that from Mr. Wollafton. 
 The latter gentleman, a perfon of great learn- 
 ing, was a ftrong advocate for human liberty, 
 and has brought the cleared arguments in de- 
 fence of it : and you tell us that you allow 
 them, p. 3. Now, if I am not under an illu- 
 fion, the whole feems to me a paradox : 
 nor can I account for your making thefe con- 
 cefTions ; as they feem fo inconfiftent with the 
 principles, which you elfewhere maintain. And 
 though you may with great ingenuity attenuate 
 and foften, what you fay, and make ufe of 
 
 many 
 
f 5 ] 
 
 many reftridlions -, yet I do not fee, how you 
 can abide by what you have allowed ; and 
 make any compromife between freedom and 
 necefTity. You acknowledge in your preface, 
 that you have given up the dodlrine of liberty, 
 Pref. p. xxj^i. And in another place you tell us, 
 that the two fch ernes of liberty and necejftty ad- 
 mit of no medium between them, p- 84. How, 
 can thefe jarring principles be made to agree? 
 
 A5 you have however in the paflage above 
 given your fandlion to human liberty i and al- 
 lowed it its full force in refpeab both to thought 
 and a6lion, uncontrolled by any foreign power ; 
 let us fee by what means it is, that you bring 
 it afterwards under the thraldom of neceflity : 
 and how can you reconcile what you have faid 
 in one place with that, which you maintain in 
 another ? It may pofTibly be want of percep- 
 tion in me ; but after the concefTions made 
 about human liberty, I do not fee what there 
 is, of which you can poflibly abridge it. Let 
 us then, without any referve, have in the moft 
 clear and precife manner your opinion upon 
 this fubje6l. Your words are thefe. — All the 
 liberty i or rather power ^ that I fay a man has 
 noty is that of doing feveral tilings, when all 
 B 3 the 
 
[61 
 
 the previous circumflances (including the liatc 
 of his mind, and his views of things) are pre^ 
 cifely the fame. p. 7. It may be, as I have be- 
 fore faid, a want of apprehenfion in me: but I 
 cannot after repeatedly confidering the pre^ 
 mifes, fee the force of this argument. However 
 let us follow you, as you proceed— " /F/6tf^ / 
 contend fer is, that, with the fame ft ate of mind,, 
 the fame ftrength of any particular pajfion, for ex- 
 ample, and the fame views of things, as any obje5i 
 appearing equally defirahle, he would always, vo- 
 luntarily, make the fame choice, and come to the 
 fame determination. For inflame, if I make any 
 particular choice to-day, I fhould have done the. 
 fame y eft er day, and fh all do the fame to-morrow ^ 
 provided there be no change in the ft ate of my mini 
 refpe5fing the obje5f of my choice. Permit me for 
 to flop here for a minute, in order to remark, 
 that I think it impoiTible for a perfon to be fa 
 precifely in the fame ftate of m.ind and body, 
 «s i^ above • defcribed, . after any interval of 
 ^ime. Befides the mind is often fo fickle, 'and 
 circumflances fo indifferent, that we choofe, as 
 we fay, at hazard, and with little or no confir 
 deration. So. that it is hai*dly credible, that 
 the fame thing fhould be uniformly at different 
 times the fame obje6l of our dedion. If aa 
 
 hundred 
 
[ 7 ] 
 hundred -lottery tickets in a feries of numbers 
 were laid before a perfon, void of all whim and 
 prejudice, whp was to choofe one ; he would 
 with great indifference lay his hand upon that 
 which might feem mpft readily to prefent itfelf. 
 If the fan^e were to be poilponed for a day or' 
 IWQ, it would be juft an hundred to one, whether 
 h[?.iroade the fame option. But in reality np 
 ^nd is fo conftant, nor body fp uniform, as 
 to be at diffi^rent intervals frecifely the fame, 
 p. 7. But Ihould we; grant your premifes, ftill, 
 if Ja the fame circumftances repeated a man 
 would aH^ay^i as you allow, vcluntarily make, the 
 fame choice : it is plain, that he would not dp 
 it necefTarily ; and muil theretbre be at all times 
 in a ftate of liberty. Ppr though a perfon 
 were to repeat the fame adion ever fo often : 
 yet if he does it voluntarily, he mufl be in re- 
 fpect to choice free. You can never from a 
 voluntary z6t infer necelTity. 
 
 I am fprry for this interruption, and will 
 now give the reader your farther elucidation of 
 the premifes.—- /«. other wordsy I maintc^n that 
 there is fome fixed law of nature refpe(5ling the 
 will as well as the other powers of the mind, and 
 ivery thing elfe in the confiitution of nature i and 
 B 4 that 
 
[ 8 ] 
 
 that confequently it is never determined without 
 fome real and apparent caufe, foreign to it f elf, 1. c. 
 without fome motive of choice, or that motives iji- 
 fiuence us in fome definite y and invariable manner : 
 fo that every volition, or choice, is conflantly re- 
 gulated, and determined, by what precedes it. 
 Permit -me here to make a fhort paufe, and 
 confider what has been faid ; for being rathett 
 fhort-fighted I am apt to overlook the clue, 
 which Ihould lead me, and am foon 16ft in a 
 maze. As to nature and the law of nature I 
 know not what to fay about them. They feem 
 to be terms, to which we have often recourfe 
 by way of fubterfuge, when we are treating of 
 properties, for which we cannot account. But 
 upon this I (hall not dwell; as "that which fol- 
 lows demands our immediate attention. For 
 you aflert, if I miftake not, that the mind with 
 all its powers, and particularly the will, is ne- 
 ver determiyicd without fome real or apparent 
 caiife, foreign to it f elf, p. 8. Now I am as 
 much at a lofs as I was before. For it feems im- 
 pofilble to make, what you fay here, Confiftent 
 with that, v/hich you maintained above. In 
 this place the will, and the "mind in general, 
 muft be determined by a foreign caufe : if we 
 look but fix pages backward we find juft the 
 
 contrary 
 
[ 9 ] 
 
 contrary afibrted — viz. that men are quite free 
 to do, whatever they will or pleafey both with 
 refpe5f to the operations of their own minds, and 
 the motions of their bodies, uncontroUed by any 
 foreign principle or caufe, p. 2, This feems to 
 be an abfolute contradi6lion : but pofTibly as 
 we go on we may have it cleared up. To 
 proceed then. — And this conftant determination 
 'ef mind according to the motives prefented to us^ 
 is ally that I mean by its neceffary determination. 
 *This being adr,iittedy there will be a neceffary con^ 
 ne5lion between all things paft, prefent, and to 
 come, in the way of proper caufe and efFedt, as 
 much in the infelk^ual as in the natural world ; 
 fo that how Utile faever the bulk of mankind may 
 be apprehe'iifive of it, or fiaggered by it, accord- 
 ing to the eftablifloed laws of- nature, no event 
 Qould have been otherwife, than it has been, 
 is,' or is to be, and therefore all things, pafi, pre- 
 fent, and to come, are precifely, what the Author 
 of nature really intended them to be, and has made 
 provifton for. p. 8. I take the liberty to make 
 anfwer, that in refpedt to the Author of na- 
 ture, I think that we often introduce him with 
 too little reverence, and determine about his 
 purpofes too boldly. And it feems to me in- 
 explicable, that this all -wife Being (bould give 
 
 to 
 
r lo 3 
 
 to man a full power of choice, which you al^ 
 Ipw, that he did : and that he fhould at the 
 ^n^e time lay him und^r an irrefiftible infl:u- 
 cnccy ^nd render the gift ufeiefs and abortive, 
 
 WE. come now to your fecoiid chapter, ir\^ 
 which you try to enforce iJb^ fame doc- 
 triiias fr^m the cbnJtderatiGn of caufe and effe5i. 
 We have perceiyed above, xh"^ the mind of man, 
 1^/JiipJh w^s faid to be quite at Jiberty either t^ 
 ^hoofe Of reject"* g-nd in all its operations free, 
 frpH> any foreign power and impulfe, is at laft 
 tied down by a blind neceflity, and is obliged to 
 detem^ine by an external overbearing influence ; 
 fo that whatever has happened, could not have 
 been otherwife, according to the fixed laws of 
 nature. You go. on to explain farther what 
 you have before faid. You inform us, that 
 there is a ferie$ of parts, which are connected 
 like the links of a chain : and that they n^*- 
 ceflarily follow one after another 5 and ar^ 
 dependent upon a firft mover, whofe original 
 energy pafTes through the whole ; — fo that un^ 
 lefs the fundamental lews of the fyftem wer-e 
 changed^ it would h impffihU^ that any event 
 
 fhould 
 
t " ] 
 
 jheuU have been Qther-isyife^ than it was i jujt as 
 fbe precife place where a billiard-ball reft 5 is ne- 
 cejfari/y determined by the impulfe given at fir ft ^ 
 notwithftanding its impinging againft ever fo manj^, 
 other balls y or the fides of the table, p. 9, 10. 
 I hope, I have not mifquoted your words, nor 
 mifreprefented your meaning. You go on to 
 tell us, that this chain of causes and efi^e5fs cannot 
 be broken J but by-fiich apravifiM in the conftitution 
 cf nature y as thM the fame event fhall not cer- 
 tainly follow, the preceding circumftances. In this, 
 cafe indeed it might be truly faid, that any par- 
 ticular event might have been otherwife than it 
 wasy there having been no certain provifion in the 
 laws of nature, for determining it to he this rather 
 than that. But then this event y net being pre^ 
 ceded by any circurnftancesy that determined it ta 
 be what it was, would be an effe^ without a 
 caufe. For a caufe cannot be defined to be any 
 thiyig but fuch previous circumftances as are 
 conftantly followed by a certain efFed; the 
 conflancy of the refult making us concludey that 
 there muft be a. fufficient reafon in the nature of 
 the things why it fbould be produced in thofe cir- 
 cumftances. So that in all cafes, if the refult be 
 differenty either the circumftances muft have been 
 differenty or there were m circumftances whatever 
 
 correfponding 
 
[ 12 J 
 
 tdrrefp ending to the difference of the refult -, and 
 confequently the effe5l was without any caufe at alL 
 --'Thefe maxims are univerjal^ being equally ap- 
 plicahle to all things, that belong to the conjlitu- 
 tion of nature corporeal or mental , &c. p. lo, \\, 
 I mult confefs, that I do not perfeftly under- 
 fland this procefs of your argument : however 
 I quote at large ; as it may meet with others, 
 who are blefTed with a better apprehenfion. 
 The fame manner of reafoning is purfued, 
 p. 13. A particular determination of mind could 
 not have been otherwife than it was, if the laws 
 cf nature rtfpe5ling the mind be fuch, as that the 
 fame determination fhall conflantly follow the fame 
 flate of mindy and the fame views of things » And 
 it could not be pojfible for any determination to 
 have been otherwife than it has been, is, or is to 
 be, unlefs the laws of nature had been fuch, as 
 that though both the flate of mind, and the views 
 of things y were the fame, the determination might 
 or might not have taken place. But in this cafe 
 the determination mufi have been an effect with- 
 sut a caufe, be caufe in this cafe^ as in that of the 
 ialance, there would have been a change of fitua- 
 tion without any previous change of circum- 
 ftances : and there camiot be any other definition 
 $f an effeff wis bout a caufe, The application of 
 
 the 
 
[ 13 ] 
 
 the term voluntary to mental determinations can- 
 not pojfibly make the leaft difference in this cafe. 
 
 If the laws of nature be fuch as that in given 
 circumfiancesj I conflantly make a definite choice j 
 my conduct through life is determined by the Being 
 who made me^ and -placed me in the circumflames 
 in which I fir H found myfelf For the confequence 
 of the fir ft given circumftances was a definite 
 voluntary determination, which bringing mt 
 into other circtimfiances was followed by another 
 definite determination. Upon no fcheme whatever 
 can this chain of Jituations of mindy and confequent 
 mental det er ruinations ^ or of caufes and effects 
 be broken*, Befides if one effe^f might take place 
 without a fufficient caufe^ another ^ and all effects y 
 might have been without a caufe : which entirely 
 takes away the only argument for the being of a 
 God, p. 14, 15. I would not willingly cavil: 
 and I Ihould be forry to do any injullice to 
 your arguments. I can perceive in them much 
 labour and fubtiltyj but they confound rather 
 than convince : fo that, believe me good firi 
 I fcarcely know, where I am ; or upon what 
 ground I ftand. I have been one Vyliile told, 
 
 • See p 17. concerning this indiiToluble chiln of cir- 
 cumftances and cffcds. 
 
 tha; 
 
that man has a power of doing, whatever hd 
 pkafes, uncontrolled by any foreign principle 
 or power, p. 2. You in a few pages after 
 afllire nne, p. 8. that the mind and will is al- 
 ways determined by a caufe foreign to itfeK 
 And you go on to prove this by various argu- 
 ments, fhewing in this very page, that no deter- 
 mination could have been otherwife than it has 
 heen^ or is : for we are under pofitive decrees : 
 and, though the term itfelf is kept out of 
 fight, in a flate of abfolute * predeftina- 
 tion. Hence our will is fubje6b to an un- 
 avoidable influence : and every thought ante- 
 cedently determined. But when this has been 
 thus fettled> you feem fomehow to compro- 
 rriile matters, and after all to allow to the 
 mind fome power of judging for itfelf; the 
 refult of which you term a definite choice -, and 
 a definite voluntary determination. By this, if 
 I apprehend you right, is meant, that a man 
 has a partial and limited power of eledlion. 
 But in another part of your work you afTert^ 
 that in the- fcheme of liberty and necejjity there is 
 no medium, p. 84. How then can we admit of 
 
 * This towards the end is more evidently acknowledged. 
 See the Doftrineof Philofophical Neceffity, p. 162. 
 
 this 
 
[ «s ] 
 
 tills compromife ? and by what means can thefe 
 different aflfertions be rendered confiftent ? 
 After all that you have been fo good as to 
 explain, I an:i ftill left to afk, whether I art! 
 free or not free : for as to this qualifying me^ 
 dium I know not what to make of it j as you 
 do not lufficiently either define, or prove it : 
 and at the fame time it feems to militate 
 againft your own avowed principles. I there- 
 fore again requefc to know in refpedl to my 
 thoughts and a6lions, whether I am volun'ta- 
 rily or necejfnrily determined. To this you 
 have in a manner antecedently replied : and 
 feem to think, that there is an impropriety in 
 the very flaring of fuch a queflion. It may 
 perhaps help to dear up this matter to feme pei'- 
 fonSy to conftdery that voluntary is not oppofed to 
 neceffary, hut only to involuntary^ and that no- 
 thing can he oppofed to neceffary hut contifigent, 
 p. 15. 
 
 Excufe me, good fir, for I would not with- 
 out caufe prefume to diffent from you : but 
 your diflinftion, unlefs my logic fails me, can- 
 not be true. F^^r what are we to underfVand 
 by the word contingent^ but fomething cafual 
 and foftuitous-: fomething, which proceeds 
 
 from 
 
[ i6 ] 
 from cli^nce. But chance daes not in reality 
 exift, and the terni Ihould be banifhed from 
 all philofophical inquiries. Chance and con- 
 tingency are quite oppofite to your princi- 
 ples, who reduce all things, even our mofl 
 airy thoughts, the wild flights of imagina- 
 tion, to the rigid rule of caufe and effed. 
 This contrafl therefore with fubmiflion cannot 
 be admitted. And in refped to what you have 
 faid, that voluntary is not oppofed to necef- 
 fary^ but only to involuntary -, what is involun- 
 tary but another word for neceflary ? They feem 
 to me to be in a manner fynonymous. What- 
 ever we do involuntarily we do by neceflity : and 
 on the other hand, when we a6l voluntarily-. 
 We a(5t freely : fo that when we bring invo- 
 luntary in oppofition to voluntary, it is the 
 iame thing as oppofing neceflity to freedom. 
 As the premifes do not feem to be good, I 
 pafs over the inferences, which are made from 
 them : as well as your anfwer to fome of yout 
 opponents, who have differed from you in 
 opinion. Towards the conclufion you repeats 
 that there are motives, to which man is obliged 
 to fubmit j and if in fa5i he never do a^ con- 
 trary to their influence^ it can only he becaufe he 
 has no power fo to da : and therefore he fs fubje5f 
 
 to 
 
[ J7 ] 
 
 io an ahfolute neceffity^ &c. p. i8. I mention 
 this to fhew after all your conceflions the ulti- 
 mate to which you bring us. 
 
 As the whole of your fyftem is founded upon 
 the dodtrine of caufe and effe6lj it may be 
 worth our while to confider what .you have 
 been pleafed to fay further upon this fubjeft. 
 You maintain, that there is a necejjary connexion 
 between all things;^ paft, frefent^ and to come, in 
 the way of proper caufe and effe5f, as much in the 
 intelle^ualy as in the natural world: fo that how 
 little foever the bulk of mankind may be apprehen- 
 five of it, or ftaggered by it i according to the efta- 
 blifhed laws of nature y no event could have been 
 otherwife than it has been, is, or is to be » p. 8. 
 The like is again enforced p. 13 — ■// could not be 
 pojfible for any determination to have been other- 
 wife than it has, is, or is to be. And further 
 you fay, that as a man adts at one time, fo he 
 would a6l at all times in the fame circum- 
 ftances : For inftance, if I make any particular 
 choice to-day, I fhould have done the fame yejler- 
 day and fhall do ■ the fame to-morrow, provided 
 there be no change in my mind refpe5iing the obje^l 
 of the choice, p. 7. The limitation at the clofe 
 feems unnecefTaryi becaufe there can be no 
 
 C change 
 
[ i8 ] 
 
 change in a mind, which is uniformly a6led upon^ 
 by the fame foreign power. For you maintain 
 that there is a fixed law of nature refpe5fing the 
 will, p. 7. The fame influence muft produce 
 like effefls : And you further intimate, p. 9. 
 as well as in other places, that there v/as an. 
 original fyftem eftablilhed, and a primary im- 
 pulfe given, upon which every thing depends ; 
 and unlefs the fundamental laws of the fyflem were 
 changed^ it would he impoffible^ that any event 
 Jhould have been otherwife than it was : jufl as 
 the precife place^ where a billiard-ball refls^ is ne- 
 ceffarily determined by the impulfe given to it at 
 firfty notwithjianding its impinging againft ever fo 
 many balls ^ or the fides of the table, p. 10. You 
 elfcwhere take notice of a vafl feries of events, 
 which you term an indiffoluble chain of circum- 
 flances and effects y fo that nothing could have been 
 otherwife than it is, p. 17. All thefe events 
 took their rife from an original impulfe, which 
 has been carried on for ages through the whole 
 fyftem : and is termed a law of nature. What- 
 ever therefore a perfon does at one time, he 
 would in the fame fituation do at another : and 
 as both fituation and difpofition are determined 
 by the fame influence and law, which you at 
 other times comprehend under the term necef- 
 
 fity ; 
 
[ 19 3 
 City; a man, if in the fanie fituation, would 
 after the greateft interval of time afl precifely 
 in the fame manner. This, Sir, is your opi- 
 nion: by which you endeavour to fhew that the 
 will is not free : and, as you prefume, that when 
 the fame objedls are prefented, it would at all 
 times make the fame choice, you from hence 
 conclude that' it is under an unavoidable ne- 
 celTity. . Thefe laws, and this neceflltyi* ex- 
 tend to the phyfical as well as the moral and 
 intelledlual world. From thefe principles, 
 which you lay down, that all in the fame fitu- 
 ation would after any interval adl precifely as 
 they have done, it follows, that if the world were 
 renewed, all the fame occurrences would necef- 
 farily happen again. If after ever fo many my- 
 riads of ages a man were formed in the fame 
 manner, and in the fame circumftances, as the 
 perfon from whom we are all defcended ; he 
 would ad exadlly as Adam is prefumed to 
 have adled : he would have the fame pofterity: 
 they would travel over the fame ground ; find 
 out the fame arts at the fame periods ; and 
 perform without the ieaft deviation all and 
 every of thofe things, which have been already 
 performed. Every flep, they fhould take, 
 would be found the fame : every look, every 
 C 2 turn 
 
[ 20 ] 
 
 turn, every involuntary gefture, would be re- 
 peated. The winds would blow with the fame 
 variation; the rain muft fall to a drop, and 
 even the thoufandth part of a drop, as it 
 had done before. The very duft, and the 
 fmallefL motes, which float in any niedium, 
 would be in number and quality the fame. 
 For according to your principles the fame ori- 
 ginal impulfe muft be attended with the like 
 confequences. And if we allow a failure in the 
 fmalleft degree, there muft be ultimately an 
 unavoidable difference through the whole ar- 
 rangement. But fuch difference is inconfiftent 
 with that primary influence, and that neceffity 
 which you maintain. There muft therefore 
 be a perfedt fimilarity throughout. Thefe are 
 the neceffary confequences from your princi- 
 ples : but, I believe, nobody will be per- 
 fuaded, that this would ever obtain. Let any 
 perfon, after he has figned his name, try to 
 write it three or four times precifely in the 
 fame manner ; and fee whether it perfedly ac- 
 cords. If he cannot do it, when he undertakes 
 it with premeditation, he will hardly bring it 
 to perfedion, when he ads without defign. 
 Or let him walk an hundred yards, and then 
 try to pace die fame ground at the like 
 
 intervals, 
 
[ 21 ] 
 
 intervals, and in the fame time. If he could 
 not perform it immediately j he would not ef- 
 fect it at the diftance of three days, or thirty 
 days : much lefs after an interval of ages. 
 
 But granting that people in the fame cir- 
 cumftances would always a6l uniformly in the 
 fame manner : yet in refpedl to the mind and 
 the freedom of choice, I do not fee how they 
 are at all affefled. If I had full liberty to 
 choofe in one inflance, I Ihould have the fame 
 in another ; and even if I were to repeat it an 
 hundred times. You infift, that the repetition 
 of the fame ad: muft be the efFed; of neceflity. 
 But if that, which I do, be the refult of fore- 
 caft and reafon, it will at all times be an 
 inftance of my freedom in refpeft to eledbion. 
 We fhould, in all the cafes fuppofed, be led 
 by inducements; and thofe inducements would 
 arife from confideration, and judgment : by 
 which we Ihould be inclined to make our op- 
 tion. But you throughout make no diflinc- 
 tion between inducement, and neceflity: be- 
 tween inclination and force. Whenever wc 
 hefitate, deliberate, and choofe, you think, 
 we are im.pelled paft all refiftance : and from 
 
 C 3 this 
 
[ 22 ] 
 
 this freedom of eledion would infer a total 
 want of liberty. 
 
 Let 14s ftill farther confider this feries of 
 events, this indiflbluble chain of caufes, upon 
 which your fyfiem is founded. Thefe accord- 
 ing to your principles are derived from a pri- 
 mary influence, which operates univerfally. 
 This influence you think is never impeded ; 
 and the chain of caufes never interrupted : fo 
 that the operations of our minds are by thefe 
 means neceflTarily determined. Motive arifes 
 from motive: and one idea produces another i 
 and this inevitably : fo that the mind, as you 
 afflrm, has no determining power. But may I 
 afk, Sir, if you have- ever confidered the ftate 
 of fleep ? What connexion has the laft idea 
 of a man, when he finks at night into oblivion, 
 with the firfl: thought, which occurs to him 
 upon his awaking in the morning ? We have 
 reafon to think, that there is fcarcely a revolu- 
 tion of four and twenty hours, but this indif- 
 foluble chain is interrupted. At the fame fea- 
 fon the original impulfe muft ceafe, and can 
 no longer operate upon the mental faculties. 
 You will perhaps fay, that men think in their 
 fleep, as is evident from their dreams. But 
 
 do 
 
[ 23 ] 
 
 do all men dream ? or if they do, what enfues, 
 but a train of irregular and incoherent ideas, 
 which are unconnefted with one another, and 
 quite independent of all foreign and remote in- 
 fluence. But fetting thefe things afide, have 
 you confidered the ftate of perfons, who fufFer 
 a deliquium P during which there feems to be 
 a total lofs of fenfation. There have been in- 
 ftances of people drowned ; who, before they 
 have been recovered, have lain for hours in a 
 ftate of death, deprived of every vital faculty. 
 Have you ever refle61:ed upon perfons in fuch 
 a fituation ? In thefe inftanccs the connexion 
 fpoken of muft have been entirely broken off. 
 If then the mind has no internal power of its 
 own, by what means does it renew its train of 
 thoughts 3 and how is it able to think again at 
 all? The laft idea, when it funk into forget- 
 fulnefs, and the firft, which occurred, when 
 it languifhed into day, cannot polTibly have 
 had any relation to each other. There has 
 been a manifefl breach in the chain : and the 
 primary influence, if it exifted, muft have been 
 in like manner interrupted. From whence then 
 does the mind recover itfelf : and what impref- 
 fion is it, which fets the train of ideas in mo- 
 jtion X and oftentimes brings the mind into the 
 
 C 4 fame 
 
[ 24 ] 
 
 fame track of thinking ? Is the influence from 
 within or from without ? It cannot be any ex- 
 ternal impulfe : for in thefe circumftances no 
 immediate operation of the fenfes can make a 
 perfon recur to events long pafl -, and to prior 
 affedlionS, which the mind may pofllbly at fuch 
 feafon recolledl. The immediate impulfe of 
 the fenfes, and the furrounding objeds, cannot 
 bring this about. And as to original influence, 
 of which you treat, and the chain of caufes : 
 there has been a flop put to the whole ; and 
 the connexion no longer fubfifls. This power 
 of recolledlion muft therefore be from within, 
 and is undoubtedly owing to a peculiar energy 
 of the mind -, a power of felf-exertion : by 
 which it is enabled to call up and arrange its 
 ideas at pleafure : and to determine upon them, 
 as fhall feem beft. And in confequence of this 
 we may conclude, that the will is not under 
 any arbitrary and blind influence i nor diredled 
 by nep efiity : . but on the contrary there is a 
 freedom of choice -, which is oftentimes the re- 
 fuit of long deliberation, and judgment. 
 
 But why need we go fo far to find out, that 
 in the feries of events fo often mentioned, and 
 in this lengthened chain of caufes, there is no- 
 thing. 
 
[ 25 ] 
 
 thing, which is neceffarily coercive ? You in* 
 deed tell me. Sir, that every thought is pre- 
 determined :' and in every a6t of volition I am 
 forcibly impelled : fo that I could not in any 
 inftance have made my ele6tion otherwife than 
 I have done. Every movement of the mind, 
 you fay, arifes from 2ipre£ing uneMftnefs. This 
 theory may appear fpecious : but it feems to 
 run counter to all experience : and the con- 
 trary, if I miflake not, is felf-evident. I fit 
 at this inftant at my eafe, in a calm and dif- 
 pafTionate Hate of mind '-, as you are pleafed 
 Sir, to recommend *. I perceive myfelf at full 
 liberty : and know not of any external impulfe 
 to determine me either in my thoughts or 
 actions. I purpofe to move : but antecedently 
 examine, whether I am under any bias, or ne- 
 ceffity : or dire<5led by any foreign power. I 
 find none. In the vail feries of caufcs, fo often 
 mentioned, I do not perceive one, that will 
 have any fliare in the effed:, which I am about 
 to produce. The whole originates in myfelf, 
 whether I move my body ; or my arm : or am 
 content with extending a finger. The like ap- 
 pears in refped to my thoughts. I am here 
 equally free 3 and among the various objedls, 
 
 * 5ee C. ix, p. 106. 
 
 which 
 
[ ^6 ] 
 
 which are ready at my call, I arbitrarily choofe 
 thofe, to which my fancy leads me. You tell 
 me, that every thought is an efFedl ; and that 
 it is connefted with a prior idea, by which it 
 was produced. 1 cannot fee any fuch uniform 
 affinity or correfpondence : and to give a proof 
 of my liberty and independence, I will for once 
 expatiate freely, and produce a feries of un- 
 connefted ideas from my own imagination. 
 I accordingly, without any prefling uneafinefs, 
 think of a tree; of time -, of the ocean; of 
 darknefs ; of a cone ; of truth -, of a tower i 
 of probability ; of Therfites , of love -, of 
 Epidaurus ; of Socrates ; of a mite ; of cafuif- 
 try ; of the Iliad ; of Otaheite -, of Tenterden 
 fleeplc ; of a mole ; of a moufe-trap. In doing 
 this I did not find, that I was reftrained by 
 any law of nature : or impelled by any foreign 
 power. Nor can I at laft perceive that thefe 
 defultory thoughts have the leafl connexion 
 with one another: much lefs with any prior 
 ideas. You aflure me, that they muft una- 
 voidably have a reference; and that they are 
 dependent upon others, which have preceded. 
 In Ihort according to your principles they 
 arofe fo necelTarily in my mind, that five days 
 h^nce, or five years hence, in the fame cir- 
 
 cumftances. 
 
C 27 ] 
 
 cumftances, and with^ the fame difpofitionj, L 
 fhould infallibly make the. very fame choice. . 
 But this feems contrary to experieace ; for 
 though I am as precifely in the fame circum- 
 ftances, as we can fuppofe any man to be 5 
 and likewife in the fame difpofitipn of mind, 
 yet, after an interval of "a very few minutes^, I 
 am not able to go over the fourth part of this 
 feries. And however cogent the neceflity may 
 be, I can r€colle61: very little more than the 
 mole and the moufe-trap. 
 
 I fhould think, nothing could more plainly 
 Ihew, that your fyflem is not well grounded, 
 than the power, which we fo intimately ex- 
 perience of recolledlion, and reflexionr In- 
 ftead of proceeding in a regular feries of 
 ideas, I can at any time paufe for a feafon : 
 and then revert abruptly to what has pafledj 
 and recapitulate my thoughts and a6lions, as 
 far back, as memory will carry me. You will 
 fay, as ufual, th^ thet'e mufi he a motive for 
 this. We will grant that there may be : for in- 
 ftance a profpedl of future good, or immediate 
 fatisfa<5tion. Bift this motive often arifes at my 
 will, and proceeds from my own bofom : 
 where that faculty, that energy, is lodged; 
 by which thefe cfFefts are produced. What I 
 
 in 
 
[ *8 ] 
 
 in this manner perform is my own a6t intirely; 
 unconnefled with any feries, for which you 
 contend ; and uninfluenced by any foreign 
 power. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 YOUR third fe6lion contains — An argument 
 for Necefftty from the Divine Prefcience. In 
 this among other things you affert, that upon 
 the doctrine of Philofophical Liberty, the Divine 
 Being could not poffibly fore fee what would happen 
 in his own creation : and therefore could not pro- 
 vide for it. p. 1 9. In another place you fpeak 
 to the fame purpofe. 'To all minds the pre- 
 ' telling of a contingent event is equally a matter of 
 conjecture : confequently ev€n infinite knowledge 
 makes no difference in this cafe. For knowledge 
 fuppofes an objedb, which in this cafe does not 
 exift ; and therefore cannot he known to exift. 
 If man he poffeffed of a power of proper felf- 
 determination, the Deity himfelf cannot controll 
 it (as far as he interferes^ it is no f elf -determina- 
 tion of the man) and if he does not controll 
 it, he cannot forefee it. p. 21. Surely, Sir, 
 this is very bold, even to a degree of rafh- 
 nefs : and at the fame time your mode of rea- 
 
 foning 
 
[ 29 ] 
 
 foning feems to my judgment totally inconclu- 
 five. It may, I think, be obviated by a thou- 
 fand circumftances in common life. A child 
 may determine to take a walk in a garden : 
 and I may have a power of controlling his 
 purpofe. But how does my tacit, and quief- 
 cent, power at all influence, or prevent, his 
 felf-determination. But you intimate, that if 
 I do not controU it (the child's purpofe) I 
 cannot forefee it. This too is very ftrange : 
 for I cannot conceive how my not exerting 
 one power takes away another. I fow a field 
 with wheat : and, if I pleafed, I could make 
 an alteration by ploughing it up and fowing 
 it with rye, or barley. But I cannot fee how 
 the mere power of varying my purpofe can 
 ruin that purpofe, and hinder my hope and 
 profped of a good harveft. In (hort you 
 make no diftinftion between what the Deity 
 can do, and what he really does : and you 
 argue, as if power and performance were the 
 fame. You moreover in a parenthefis obferve, 
 that as far as he (the Deity) interferes, it is no 
 felf-determination of the man, Moft undoubt- 
 edly : If any perfon determines for him, it 
 is not his own determination. This is a felf^ 
 evident truth, to which I readily fubfcribe ; 
 
 but 
 
C 30 ] 
 
 but I do not fee how it makes for your pur- 
 pofe. 
 
 You however proceed to enforce your argu- 
 ment by the authority of Mr. Hobbes, by 
 whom you think the affair has been fatis- 
 fadorily flated. Denying Neceffityy fays this 
 writer (Works, p. 485) deftroys both the decrees 
 and prefcience of Almighty God. For whatever 
 God has purpofed to bring to pafs by many as an 
 inftrumenty or forefees Jhall come to pafsy a man 
 if he has liberty y might frufir ate y and make not 
 come to pafs 'y and God fhotdd either not foreknow 
 ity and not decree it -, or he Jhall foreknow fuch 
 things fh all be, as fro all never bcy and decree what 
 Jhall never come to pafs. What a rafh, con- 
 temptible and Ihort-fighted reptile is man 1 
 Who would think that this infe(5l of a day 
 would prefume to limit omnifcience, and con- 
 trol the powers of the Almighty ? Bold and 
 inconfiderate ! to form a judgment of the di- 
 vine energy by his owa fcanty faculties y and 
 endeavour to reduce his Creator to the ftandard 
 of man. Befides, what a round of abfurdity 
 is there in this weak and impious fuppofition ? 
 One would imagine, that none but an idiot 
 could have ftated fuch a cafe, wherein things 
 
 are 
 
t 31 ] 
 
 arc fuppofcd to be foreknown, v/hich Jhall 
 never he -, and things decreed in confequence of 
 fore-knowledge which y^^r// never come to pafs : 
 is fhort where it is faid, that what God fore- 
 fees is not for efeen : for it may be frujlrated 
 by man, and rendered inefFe6i:uaL This, Sir> 
 is the argument, which you think is clearly 
 ftated. 
 
 The experience, which we gain from our 
 fenfes comes to us by different inlets, and 
 through a neutral medium; fo that we arc 
 never intimately acquainted with the objedls, 
 from which our notices proceed. In the ope- 
 rations of the mind, and the procefs of rea- 
 foning, we are obliged to collate and com- 
 pare our feveral ideas ; and go through a train 
 of inferences and dedu6tions : and oftentimes 
 it is not till after a long' and painful invefli- 
 eation that we at laft arrive at the truth. But, 
 
 CD ' 
 
 my good Sir, can you pofTibly think, that the 
 knowledge of the Almighty is obtained in 
 this fervile and precarious manner ? and that 
 his wifdom proceeds after the human mode 
 of reafoning? You may as well, like the 
 Anthropomorphites, afcribe to him the eyes 
 of a man to get intelligence, and human 
 3 limbs 
 
t 3a ] 
 
 limbs to perform his high operations. You 
 tell us, that there has been from the begin- 
 ning an indifToluble chain of connedled events: 
 a feries of caufes and efFeds : and thefe pro- 
 duced by an unavoidable necefllty, and an ir- 
 refiftible influence : fo that nothing could have 
 been otherwife than it is, p. 17. And if this 
 be not, as you afTert ; there can be no pre- 
 fcience in God : for by thefe means and thefe 
 only, he is enabled to forefec. There cannot 
 polTibly be any other way, by which this at- 
 tribute can be exerted. Now, Sir, I fhould 
 be very unwilling to be guilty of any difrefpedt 
 towards you ; and to make ufe of any harfh 
 expreflion. But furely you are highly pre- 
 fumptuous : not to fay felf-fuflicient. How 
 can you limited as you are in your faculties, 
 and every way finite and imperfedt, pretend to 
 determine about divine intelligence ? to afTert, 
 that if the Deity does not forefee things by 
 the means, which you prefcribe -, that he can- 
 not have any forefight at all ? You tell me, 
 that you believe in the fcriptures ; and I pre- 
 fume, that you are fincere. Do not you then 
 know, that the wifdom of man is foolijhnefs with 
 God, I Cor. iii. 19. that his ways are higher 
 than our ways \ aiid his thoughts, than our 
 
 thoughts ? 
 
i 33 1 
 
 thoughts? Ifaiah Iv. 9. To whom then will y^ 
 liken mey and Jh all I he equals faith the Holy ore ? 
 Ifaiah xl. 25. Haft thou not known^ haft thou 
 not heardy that the everlafting Lordy the Creator 
 of the ends of the earthy faint eth noty neither is 
 weary ? there is no fearching of his underftanding^ 
 Ifaiah xl. 28. Thy right eoufnefsy fays the 
 Pfalmifl, ftandeth like the great mountains : thy 
 judgments are like the great deep, Pfalm xxxvi. 6. 
 Who hath directed the fpirit of the Lord? — Who 
 inftru5fedy and taught him in the path of judg- 
 menty — and fhewed him the way of under ft anding ? 
 Ifaiah xl. 13. 14. This laft. Sir, I am forry 
 to fay, is the part, which you have taken by 
 pretending to prefcribe to the Deity. You 
 have joined yourfelf with thofe, who fay, — How 
 doth God knoWy and is there wifdom in the Moft^ 
 High? Pfalm Ixxiii. 11. And thou fay eft y 
 How doth God know ? Can he judge through the 
 dark cloud? Job xxii. 13. In what manner 
 does the fame facred writer finally determine 
 this point ? Attend, Sir, for he fettles the whole 
 in thefe few, but important, words. He he- 
 holdeth all high things. He is a king over all the 
 children of pride. Jobxli. 34. From the quota- 
 tions above given, we may learn to humble 
 ourfelves, when we fpeak of ouc Creator ; and 
 
 D " to 
 
[ J4 J 
 
 to mention his divine attributes with reverence* 
 If his judgments and counfels be like the great 
 deepy they are paft our ability to fathom. Be- 
 fides. Sir, if I may be permitted to fpeak to 
 you with freedom, there feems to be a funda- 
 mental mifbake, that runs through your long 
 courfe of arguing ; by which your whole fyflem 
 is affefted. We have heard you fpeak of caufe 
 and efFed; of motive and influence ; alfo of a 
 chain of caufes, and a long train of connexions, 
 which have reached downwards frorn the com- 
 mencement of things. Now we will grant, 
 that in the tide of time there has been a long 
 feries of events ; that they have followed; one 
 another in an uniform fuccefTion, and after an 
 interval of many ages they are at lad come 
 down to us. Let all this be in fome degree 
 * allowed : yet when once we become engaged 
 in the feries ; we are not totally palTive, and 
 impotently driven on like the waves in a 
 ftream : velut toida fupervenit undd : nor are we 
 blindly impelled like a hall at a hilliard'tahU, 
 We take a fliare in this train of events i and as 
 
 * We may allow, but with fome limitation, that every 
 caufe has been efFeft and every effedl a caufe. This in 
 general may be granted in refpeft to the common occur- 
 rences in life. But connexion does not prove neceflity. 
 
 far 
 
[ 35 ] 
 
 far as our influence reaches, they are carried on 
 in great meafure according to our own pur- 
 pofes i and in confequence of our will and 
 judgment. And in refped to motives and in- 
 citements, we can often either fubmit to them, 
 or oppofe them j according as it may appear to 
 us beft upon due confideration. This power 
 we manifeflly experience : we feel it intimately. 
 You too are obliged to own it, though you 
 deny it afterwards : and endeavour to make it 
 void. But all the theory in the world is no- 
 thing, when oppofed to experimental know- 
 ledge. You err in this : you make no diflinc- 
 tion between a caufe, and an irrefiflible influ- 
 ence ; between a fimple motive, and a cogent 
 force i between connexion and necelTity. You 
 do not confider, that in the feries, of which 
 you treat, many things may have been confe- 
 quential, and by no means neceflary. They 
 might have been varied at the will of man ; 
 however you may difallow it : and a different 
 train of things might have been propagated, 
 without any impeachment of the prefcience of 
 God. 
 
 You proceed to tell us, thai many of the moft 
 
 zealous advocates for the do^rine of philofophical 
 
 D 2 liberty. 
 
[ 36 ] 
 
 liberty i aware of its inconfiftency with the do5irine- 
 tf the di'Vin'e prefciencey have not fcrupkd to givt 
 up the latter altogether. They muft then give 
 up the fcriptures at the fame time : and with 
 the fcriptures their religion and faith. For in 
 the facred writings the foreknowledge of the 
 Deity is not only inculcated as a doftrine, but 
 proved by a variety of events. With refpe^f to 
 fuch perfonsy you fay, / can only repeat what I 
 have faid upon this fuhje5l in my examination of 
 the writings of Br, Beat tie : p. 173. And here 
 i muft obferve, that you yourfelf deny this 
 great attribute except upon your own princi- 
 ples : and thofe, who do not admit your prin- 
 ciples, you fuppofe equally to deny it. But 
 furely this is injurious, and not agreeable to 
 truth. Let us however fee, what you fay upon 
 this head to Dr. Beattie. Thus our Author^ in 
 the blind rage of difputation hejitates not to de- 
 prive the ever-bleffed God of that very attribute y 
 by which in the books of Scripture he exprefsly 
 dijiinguifhes him f elf from all falfe gods : and than 
 which nothijtg can be more ejfentially necejfary te 
 the government of the univerfcy rather than re- 
 linquiflo his fond claim to the fancied privilege of 
 f elf -determination : a claimy which appears to me^ 
 to be juji as abfurdy as that of felf-exijlenct^ 
 
 and 
 
[ 37 ] 
 
 and which could not pojftbly do him any goody if 
 he had it. 
 
 What is more extraordinary y this power he ar- 
 rogates to himfelf without pretendiitg to advance a 
 ftngle rational argument in favour of his claim ; 
 but e^peEls it will he admitted on the authority of 
 his infiintiive common fenfe only. And yet if a 
 man exprefs the leaji indignation at fuch new and 
 unheard of arrogance, and in an argument of 
 fuch importance as this, what exclamation and 
 ahufe muft he not expeM ? 
 
 As to Dr. Beattie*s argument, I muft leave 
 k to his own management and flcill to be de- 
 fended. In refpedi: to the gentleman himfelf I 
 can only fay, that I am not totally unac- 
 quainted with him : and he appears to be a 
 perfon of confummate goodnefs and candour : 
 and of great elegance and erudition, and he is 
 fo defcribed by all, who have the happinels 
 more intimately to know him. I cannot there- 
 fore conceive^ how he could deferve fo fevere 
 a cenfure. For in truth thefe are cruel alle- 
 gations : and upon the faireft computation 
 amount to little lefs than igmrancey arrogance y 
 and impiety. And after all I do not fin.d> that 
 
 D 3 he 
 
C 38 ] 
 
 he has denied any thing but your premifes ; 
 which has brought upon him this heavy charge. 
 You might upon the fame principles llile him 
 an atheift, and make him deny his Creator. 
 But let us flop here ; and it were well, if we 
 could draw a veil over what has preceded, 
 that it might be had no more in remem- 
 brance. 
 
 You may perhaps afk me, // the divine pre- 
 fcience does not depend upon the caufes which you 
 have allot ted^ from whence does it arife ? \n truth 
 I do not prefume to judge. It is a wonderful 
 attribute ; far, very far, above my comprehen- 
 fion. I cannot account for the primary affec- 
 tions of niy own mind : I cannot tell why I 
 ftretch out my arm ; and believe me, Sir, with 
 fubmiffion, you are equally in the dark. Yet 
 you, who do not know the fecret workings of 
 your own bofom, pretend to dired Omni- 
 fcience. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 YOUR fourth fedlion is concerning the 
 caufe of volition, and the nature of the 
 will. In this, Sir, you labour to fhew in a 
 
 very 
 
E 39 ] 
 
 very ample manner, that there is an analogy 
 in all operations -, and that as a ftone tends to 
 the ground by the force of gravity, and as the 
 planets are all retained in their orbits by powers 
 that draw them towards the centers of their re- 
 ffeciive motions^ p. 25, fo the will is under its 
 particular influences; and is determined ac- 
 cordingly : and you proceed for fome pages in 
 a courfe of illuflration to this purpofe : and at 
 laft tell us, that // cannot but be allowed by the 
 moft ftrenuous advocates for rnetaphyfical liberty^ 
 that * motives have fome real influence upon the 
 mind. p. 31. I fhould think, Sir, that you 
 have expended more labour, than was requi- 
 fite. Who ever aflerted, that the mind was 
 never under an influence \ and, that the will 
 was not determined by motives. The great 
 point in quefliion you keep out of fight \ and 
 yet in the concluiion you make your inferences, 
 as if it had been fatisfadlorily proved. You in 
 this place, as in many others, fpeak of influ- 
 
 • So again, p. 33. Let a man ufe ijohat 'words he fleafes^ 
 he can hwve no more conception hoHU ^we can fometimes be de- 
 termined by motives, and fometimes ^without any moti'uet than 
 he can of a fc ale being fometimes ^weighed do<wn by ixj eights, 
 £ind fometimes by a kind offubfiance, ivhich has no 'weight at 
 all, 'which <w hat ever it be in itfelf mufi in refpe^i to the fcale 
 be nothing* 
 
 D 4 ence 
 
[ 40 3 
 
 cncc and motives indefinitely : but the great 
 queftion is, whether thefe motives are coer- 
 cive : whether this influence be irrefiftible 5 fo 
 that the mind has no power of eledlion, and 
 cannot by any means reject. You add. It 
 would be too manifefi a contradiction to all expe- 
 rience^ to ajfert that all ohje5is are indifferent t9 
 m, that there is nothing in any of them, that can 
 excite deftre or aver/ton, or that defire or averfion 
 have no influence upon the will, and do not incline 
 us to decide on what is propofed to us. Here 
 again the chief point to be difcufTed is kept 
 from us. The queftion is not, whether mo- 
 tives may not incline us : but whether they do 
 not always force us. You have all along con- 
 tended, that the mind is under an abfolute ne- 
 cefiity : that the will is always predetermined, 
 and has been fo from the beginning ; being in- 
 flexibly direded to one point : and now you 
 feem to fay, that it is only inclined. The 
 thing, which you here afk, is univerfally 
 granted. We all know and allow that the 
 mind may be inclined : but we think that wc 
 are at liberty to refift the inclination. We 
 contend, that we have a power of choice : and 
 however prefling the motive, that we can adt 
 againft the grain : and that judgment will 
 
 often 
 
[ 41 ] 
 
 often get the better of external influence. Thus, 
 though eagerly prefTed, I can refufe food, 
 which would prove my bane and ruin. I can 
 refift illicit pleafure by a painful felf-denial. 
 You will tell me, that this is owing to a ftronger 
 motive j which overcomes the weaker. This 
 I fhall not controvert. All I know is, that 
 whatever influences there may be, we are blef- 
 fed with reafon, to confider and to judge : and 
 with a power to rejedl or to choofe. It is en- 
 joined us in Scripture to keep judgment, to do 
 jufl:ice, and to determine according to right : 
 alfo to prove all things^ and bold faft that which 
 is good, I. TheflT. v. 21. But injundtions of 
 this fort would be quite unneceflary, if our 
 v/ill were predetermined. We therefore claim, 
 not a metaphyflcal liberty, but a real power ; 
 by which we are enabled to judge and to 
 diftinguifli ; and to employ all the faculties, 
 with which we are blefl!ed. This power is un- 
 der no blind and necefl^ary controll, but at- 
 tended with an energy of its own, which we 
 intimately feel : and of which we are experi- 
 mentally certain. What is once pafl:, is fixed, 
 and not to be recalled. But before any thing 
 is determined, we have it often in our power 
 to alter our fchemes, and to vary pur purpofes 
 
 a thoufand 
 
[ 42 ] 
 
 a thoufand ways. There may be influences and 
 motives to incline us : but inilead of merely 
 looking back upon the paft, let us look for- 
 ward i and amid the numberlefs invitations to 
 thought and to adlion, confider, whether there 
 be any irrefiftible influence, that overpowers 
 our reafon, and abridges us of a free choice. 
 Where things are rather indifferent, the li- 
 berty for which I contend, will more plainly 
 appear. When a fair profpe6t difclofes itfelf 
 to any perfon, let him afk himfelf, whether 
 he be under any abfolute controll, when he 
 direds his eyes to any objed: and whether 
 any law of nature, or law of fate -, or laftly 
 any abfolute neceflity, diredls him folely to 
 one point; and prevents his expatiating freely. 
 Let him inquire of his own heart, v/hen he did 
 one thing, whether he could not have done 
 another ? And if he could with the fame fa- 
 cility have turned to another objedl of opera- 
 tion ; then there was no abfolute neceflity 
 for things being as they are. There was a 
 poflibility of their being otherwife. Thefe 
 truths come immediately under our cogni- 
 zance ; they are proved from repeated expe- 
 rience. Therefore, as I before have urged, 
 all the fine-fpun theory in the world, amounts 
 
[ 43 ] 
 
 td nothing, when oppofed to experimental 
 certainty. You will therefore excufe me, if I 
 fay nothing about things automatic and feconda^ 
 rily automatic, of things fecondarily automatic 
 Jhortenedy and fecondarily automatic extended. 
 p. 41. 42. I may perhaps be greatly to be 
 blamed for not underftanding your arguments : 
 but indeed they are too abftrufe for me: I 
 confefs, that I do not comprehend them. I 
 therefore with your permiflion will leave them 
 to perfons of greater fagacity: and conclude 
 with this theorem — that though things are^ as 
 they are^ yet they might have been otherwife, 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 THE fifth Seftion is concerning the flip- 
 pofed confcioufnefs of Liberty, and the 
 ufe of the term Agent. 
 
 This part of your Treatife is for the moft 
 part calculated to anfwer the obje6tions of Dr. 
 Price : in which I do not think myfelf necefTa- 
 rily concerned : and therefore Ihall not meddle 
 with this feries of altercation : efpecially as I 
 have fo lately given my opinion upon this head; 
 t^hich needs not be here recapitulated. And 
 
 as 
 
[ 44 ] 
 as to the difpute, Sir, between Dr. Price and 
 yourfelf, whether it be motive or man, which is 
 the agents I rnuft leave it as I find it. You 
 feem to proceed upon your old principle of a 
 chain of caufes, influencing from the beginning 
 of time : concerning which we have already 
 explained ourfelves fufficiently, In Ihort you 
 think, that we are always impelled by fome- 
 thing from behind i and never led by any thing 
 before us. But believe me, we are more in- 
 fluenced by the prefcnt, than by the pad : 
 and what is to come is not without its confi- 
 deration. 
 
 ft 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 THIS part of your difcourfe, like the for- 
 mer, contains an altercation between 
 you and your antagonifl Dr. Price: but is 
 of greater confideration than the foregoing. 
 Yet what you urge here, relates not always to 
 the point in general, but to the particular opi- 
 nion of your opponent. This gentleman infills 
 with good reafon, that Liberty is ejfential to 
 f radical virtue: and that a Being, which is 
 under a foreign and neceflary influences is not 
 accountable for his adtions, or thoughts ; nor 
 
 can 
 
[ 45 ] 
 
 can he be faid to a6t virtuoufly or vicioufly. 
 He muft be a free agent, and a6t for hinnfelf 
 in order to be anfwerable for what he does. 
 And in this, Dr. Price fays, there is no me- 
 dium ; nor compromife : and you have faid fo 
 yourfelf. Hence the Do<5tor's inference — Who 
 muft not feel the ahfurdity of faying — I determine 
 voluntarily, and yet neceffarily? Your anfwer, 
 Sir, to this, is, I think, by no means fatisfac- 
 tory. It is as follows, p. 57. Here we have 
 the fame arbitrary account of agency, that has 
 been conjidered before. For this is the very fame 
 whether the object of choice be of a moral nature^ 
 cr not, whether it relates to different kinds of 
 fruit, or to virtuous or vicious actions. In faEf^ 
 if a virtuous refolution be formed, the Jterfon by 
 whom it is formed, is the object of my complacence 
 and regard : and if a vicious choice be made, the 
 ferfon is the obje5f of my abhorrence, and there is 
 the greatefi ufe and propriety in punifhing him. 
 Believe me. Sir, you would in doing fo a6b 
 with the greatefi injudice. For if this perfon 
 is under an abfolute neceility, directed and 
 forced by a foreign impulfe, as you have 
 abundantly inlifled, he cannot be accountable 
 for what he does. You may difpute about 
 ggent and agency ; and ftrive to evade the ar- 
 
 gujnent : 
 
[ 46 ] 
 
 gument: but the pofition is plain, that we 
 cannot determine voluntarily and yet neceffarily. 
 If our will and determination be, as you infift, 
 under a foreign irrefij3:ible influence, the con- 
 fequences, which refult from them, be they 
 good, or be they bad, cannot be placed to our 
 account. You fpeak of a virtuous refolution 
 heing formed^ and of the perfon, who formed 
 it, being entitled to your regards But, pardon 
 me. Sir, you beg the queflion. The very 
 thing in difpute is, whether a perfon under an 
 overpowering influence does form his own re- 
 folutions, and whether he is any more anfwer- 
 able for what is done, than the fword of juftice 
 diredled by the executioner; or the dagger by 
 the hand of the ruffian. 
 
 In p. 60. Dr, Price makes mention of a mo- 
 ral neceflity in oppofition to the natural necef- 
 fity maintained by you: which he feems to 
 make arife from a confcience and convidion 
 within, and not from any external force, nor 
 lengthened chain of caufes. How true this 
 may be, I fhall not contend. He adds, the 
 more efficacious and unconqueraUe the influence of 
 confcience is within a 'perfon, the more amiable 
 -di;e muft think him, p, 61. Upon this you 
 o make 
 
[ 47 ] 
 make a comment. But it were to be wifhed, 
 that you had endeavoured to elucidate the 
 great truths, in which we are all concerned, 
 from fome more general principles, and not 
 from the particular opinion of a fingle perfon. 
 The world may not perhaps agree with Dr. 
 Priccj any more than with Dr. Prieftly ; though 
 they may both in many refpedls be entitled to 
 its jufl elleem and regard. However you urge 
 in confequence of this the certainty of your own 
 pofitions. Is is plain therefore y that when, Dr. 
 Price does not ufe the language of a fyjleniy a full 
 confent of the will, though produced by the effica- 
 cious and imconquerahle influence of confcience, that 
 is of motives, is fufficient to conjiitute virtue. 
 Here therefore we fee the mofl perfefl virtue 
 arifing from the moft ah folate neceffity, that isy if 
 there he any meaning in words, virtue, without a 
 poffihility of man's aEling otherwife than he does^^ 
 p. ^2' How is it pofTible, good Sir, in this 
 inftance thus to deceive yourfelf ? Or are you 
 in reality deceived : and not rather carried on 
 by prejudice in a cafe fo plain ? Where is it 
 faid, that the dictates of confcience are irre- 
 liftible : and that whoever liftens to them, is 
 tiadei: an unconquerable influence^ and an ahfolute 
 
 necejfity ? 
 
[ 48 1 
 
 necejjity ? Do we not know, that people often- 
 times exclude the light, and ad contrary to 
 reafon ? And do not the facred writers fpeak 
 of the confciences of men bearing witnefs 
 againft them j fometimes accufing, and at 
 other times excufing tliem, accordingly as they 
 ad more or lefs in conformity to the truth ? 
 See Romans, c. ii. v. 15. Dr. Price, fpeaking 
 in the comparative degree, makes ufe of this 
 mode of exprefling himfelf — ^he more efficacious 
 and UNCONQUERABLE the influence of confcience is 
 within him (i.e. any perfon) the more amiable we 
 muft think him. If in this inftance he has made 
 ufe of a term too ftrong ; the world fhould 
 not be amufed with inferences drawn from 
 thence -, efpecially if they are contrary to his 
 exprefs meaning ; as at firil fight will plainly 
 appear. It is by no means fair to fet afide the 
 context, and to argue from a fingle word: 
 which after all you in a great degree pervert ; 
 and apply in a different, and even in an oppo- 
 fite, fignification. By an influence more effica- 
 cious, and more unconquerable y he only means, 
 the more irrefiftihle the influence is, and the more 
 determinately a man gives himfelf up to it, the 
 greater is his merit : plainly intimating, that 
 confcience, fo far from being abfolutely coercive, 
 
 may 
 
[ 49 ] 
 
 may be more or lefs efficacious : and likcwife 
 may oftentimes be refifted and even conquered. 
 That this is the fenfe of the words may be 
 fcen from all that precedes ; as you have quoted 
 from him. And though this is too manifeft 
 to be miftaken 5 yet you take an unfair advan- 
 tage of this flrong expreffion ; and infill that 
 he makes virtue depend upon an unconquerable 
 influence * : and that according to him the mod 
 perfect virtue may arife from the moft abfolute 
 necejfity. Whereas he tells you t\\t exprefs con- 
 trary ', and uniformly afferts, that our adlions 
 are free^ and that liberty is eflential to pradtical 
 virtue. See p. 56. I Ihould therefore be afraid, 
 that you have in this inftance forgot yourfelf ; 
 and not adled with that fincerity, which the 
 world may have expeded from you. Yet you 
 boldly conclude. If this he not a juft inference, 
 J do not know what is. I fear this declaration 
 will not be to your advantage in the opinion 
 of your adverfary. He will think, it afFeds 
 either your head, or your heart. 
 
 In the courfe of your Treatife we are brought 
 to fome very critical ^hd interefting argunnents, 
 
 • By the more unconquerable he plainly means fht lift 
 lialh to ht cozi^uend, 
 
 E gf 
 
[ s<^ ] 
 
 of Dr. Price, upon which the whole feems to 
 turn. To thefe we have reafon to exped a 
 very precife and determinate anfwer. I have 
 not feen, what this gentleman has written -, fo 
 I both here, and elfewhere, copy his words, as 
 I find them quoted by you. If has always been 
 the general, and it has evidently he en the natural j 
 fenfe of mankind, that they cannot be accountable 
 for what they have no power to avoid. Nothing 
 can he more glaringly abfurd than applauding, or 
 reproaching ourfelves, for what we were no 
 more the cdufe of, than of our own beings, and 
 what it was no more pojftble for us to prevent, 
 than the return of the feafons, or the revolutions 
 cf the planets, p. 64. In fhort the Author 
 would fain know, what room there is for merit 
 or blame ; if all our anions proceed from ne- 
 ceflity and force ? His arguments are ftated 
 very fairly and concifely : let us fee> how yow 
 reconcile thefe things upon your principles: 
 how do you make virtue confident with neccf- 
 fity ? How can man be accountable, if he is 
 under a conftant and irrefifiiible influence ? 
 Your whole fyftem depends upon your anfwer; 
 which is in. the following words. ^Us is fo ex- 
 preffed, as if the difpofition of mind, which is one 
 Hec'effary caufe of men's refoliitions and alliens , was 
 : ; 9 . . not 
 
[ 51 ] 
 
 7iot at all concerned. But taking in this circum^ 
 ftancCy to which Dr. Price allows a certain and 
 7iecejjary operation, that which he calls a glaring 
 ahfurdity is precifely his own principle ; tinlefs he 
 will /ay, &c. Surely^ my good Sir^ this mud 
 iappear very evafive. The world does not want 
 to be engaged in your cavils with the Author, 
 but expeds a precife anfwer^ and to have thefe 
 difficulties reconciled. How can you with 
 any juftice avail yourfelf of the fuppofitioa 
 that -the mind*s difpofition is not included, or 
 corrcerned in Dr. Price*s argument ? Befides 
 what are we to underfland by the terms difpoji- 
 tion of mind, but a mind difpofed ? And if the 
 miad of a man is at all difpofed, there muft 
 have been fomething which difpofed it. And 
 as you uniformly through your whole treatife 
 infift, that every thing is produced by fome 
 motive from without : that every thought, 
 woi:d, and adion is determined by necefHty.: 
 the mind according to your principles muft be 
 • under the fame influence, and directed by the 
 fame power. For according to your repeated 
 opinion^ no events neither thought, word, nor 
 deed, could ha^ve been otherwife than it was, is, 
 cr is to he. p. 8. If then the mind, as you 
 fay, be difpofed by necefTity, afcribe what you 
 E 2 pleafe 
 
t 52 ] 
 
 plcafc to the difpofition of it, flill our thoughts 
 and our will are no longer our own ; no more, 
 than any of the confequences, which refult from 
 them. This you have tried to inculcate con- 
 tinually. Hehce then arifes Dr. Price's infe- 
 rence in confequence of your principles, — that 
 men cannot be accountable for what they have no 
 power to avoid: and that according to your 
 fyftemi we can neither applaud nor reproach our^ 
 felves for any thing we do : as we are no more 
 the caufe of our own anions than of our own 
 being, p. 64. Here then is the great point, 
 which demands an immediate anfwer : all which 
 you feem to evade : and only tell us that Dr. 
 Price has not confidered, or does not feem to 
 have confidered — difpofition of mind. But what 
 the leaft authority have you for fuch an arbitrary 
 fuppofition ? Befides is not the mind, accord- 
 ing to your own dodrlne, difpofed and impelled 
 by the fame unavoidable influence, by which 
 all other things are driven ? Do not you aiTert 
 that the will, and confequently every thing re- 
 lating to it, is under a foreign power ? Tell 
 us then in a Word, how are we upon your 
 principles accountable for any thing, which 
 • we do ? Do not feduce me from the matter in 
 hand by an account of any perfon's abfurdity 
 
 and 
 
[ 53 ] 
 
 and contradidions: but anfwcr to the purpofe: 
 how can we upon the principle of neceflity be 
 entitled to either reward or punilhment ? You 
 anfwer not : but enter into difpute with Dr. 
 Price ; giving up the point in quellion ; and 
 at the fame time giving up your whole fyflem. 
 What follows confifts for the mofl part of the 
 difpute with the fame perfon carried on through 
 feveral pages. Towards the clofe, though you 
 have not afforded any proof for the truth of your 
 principles, yet you flill perfifl in them: and 
 aflert again, that the will is determined by the 
 difpofition of the mind: which you. fay is a necejfary 
 determination, p. 72. You mention, that man^ 
 kind in general do not refine fo much as Dr. Price: 
 and Br. Price prays like other Chrifiians and with 
 the humility of a Necefjarian. You add, 1 wifh 
 J)r, Price would confider — and 1 alfo wifh Dr, 
 Price would conjider^ &c. p. 69. 70. 71. But 
 as I know not what this gentleman has written, 
 nor what occafion there may be for this recon- 
 fideration, I mull pafs by what is faid upon 
 the occafion -, for I am treated with what I do 
 not want ; and am difappointcd of that, which 
 I expeded. 
 
 E J S E C^ 
 
C 54 3 
 
 SECTION VIL 
 
 YOU here treat of the propriety of rewards 
 and puniJhtnentSy and the foundation of 
 praife and blarney on the fcheme of Necefftty. 
 This has before been the fubje6b of debate; 
 but nothing fatisfadbory was afforded by you 
 to fhew the propriety here fpoken of. What 
 we have hitherto been deprived of, we hope. 
 Sir, will now be in an ample manner explained. 
 You begin in the following manner. The oh- 
 jeElion to the do5frine of necejfity that has weighed 
 the mofi with thofe^ who have conjldered thefuhje^f^ 
 is that, if men's determinations and anions flow ne- 
 ceffarily from the 'previous fiat e of their mnds, and 
 the motives or influences, to which they are expofedy 
 the idea of refponfihility, or accountahlenefs, va- 
 nifbesy ayid there can he no propriety, or ufe, of 
 rewards or punifhments, p, 73. You will be fo 
 good as to excufe me, if I think, that this is by 
 ho means fairly flated. You foften and exter 
 nuate the fuppofed objedion by means of am- 
 biguous terms 5 of which you afterwards take 
 an undue advantage. You are apt to fpeak ii). 
 general where you fhould be particular : and 
 ip particular, where you fhould be general. 
 
 Thofe, 
 
[ ss ] 
 
 Thofe, to whom you allude, do not found 
 their objedlions upon any difpofition of man*s 
 mind, nor upon the influence and motives, to 
 which it is liable, as you are pkafed to fur- 
 mife. They allow that virtue may arife from 
 influence, and morality from motives : and 
 praife and reward may in confequence of it be 
 juftly affbrded. But they obje(5l to abfolute 
 necefllty ; by which every thing, according to 
 your principles, mujl have been as it is : and 
 could not poflibly have been otherwife. They 
 objedt to that overbearing influence, to thofe 
 irrefiftible motives, which you maintain : fuch 
 as operate fo ftrongly, that the mind through 
 its whole progrefs is blindly driven on in all 
 its various directions, like a ball upon a billiard- 
 table. This is the principle, to which they 
 objefl : It is no other than abfolute necefllty 5 
 p. 18. in other words, fixed fate: which you 
 now keep out of fight, and in the room of it 
 fubfl:itute difpofition^ and ftate of mind. What 
 your opponents infifl: upon is this ; that where 
 a perfon is not his own mafl:cr, he is not re- 
 fponfible for his a6lions : and where a man is 
 not accountable for his actions, he cannot 
 jufl:ly be liable either to reward or punifl:iment. 
 This is the point, upon which they found their 
 E 4 objection. 
 
[ S6 ] 
 
 objedion. To my judgment you feem, Sii^ 
 often to fpeak with too great a latitude -, as in 
 the pafiage above, when you mention indeter- 
 minately — motives. Now there are two forts 
 of motives; by which the will is difpofed: the 
 one aflumed by you, which is fuppofed to be 
 entirely from without, and to originate in a 
 cogent neceflity : The other fort is internal, 
 and though it may arife from different objedls, 
 yet it is not compulfatory, nor does it neceffa- 
 rily oblige us, there being always room left 
 for reafoning and judgment ; and confequently 
 for determination and choice. Man is en- 
 dowed with a rational faculty, by which he is 
 taught, when premifes are laid before him, to 
 compare, and to diftinguifh; and to make his 
 ele6lion accordingly. If he choofes well, and 
 acls up to the truth, he cjeferves praifc. But 
 if he either makes a wrong eledion through 
 prejudice and wilful blindnefs ; or if he fees 
 the truth plainly and will not a(^ up to the 
 knowledge afforded him ; he then is culpable: 
 becaufe he refufes the light offered, and abufes 
 the befl of gifts. This power of the mind, 
 which we experimentally know to exift; and 
 its confequences, with which we are intimately 
 acquainted, feem by you to be fet afide -, or at 
 
 leaft 
 
t 57 3 
 
 leaft to be kept out of fight. It is true, at 
 your firft fetting put you make large concef- 
 fions, and allow to men a liberty of thinking 
 and of ailing, as they pleafe. p. 2, But you 
 afterwards overturn the whole ; and tell us, 
 that every thing has been eftablifhed by abfo- 
 lute decrees from the beginning ; that we are 
 all neceffarily dire6led : and confequently that 
 there is no room for eledion y as all, that we 
 do, is unalterably determined: and nothing 
 could be otherwise than it has heen^ or is. How 
 the power above granted is confiilent with thefe 
 principles, you never have, nor can, make out. 
 In fhort you give liberty, and take it away. 
 You allow it in five or fix lines; and deny it 
 for an hundred pages. The whole of your 
 treatife is contrary to your firft determination. 
 And as you proceed uniformly upon this no- 
 tion of an inevitable necefiity, and thpfe, who 
 differ from you do not allow any fuch influ- 
 ence 3 you often fuppofe them to fet afide all 
 influence whatever : and that they do not allow 
 any motive to either thought or adlion. Hence 
 p. 85. you mention the abfurdity of imagin- 
 ing a will a6ling independently of any motive: 
 that virtue without any motive would not he vir- 
 tue. You have likewife many quotations from 
 
 Mr. 
 
[ 58 1 
 
 Mr. Hume and others to this purpofe. As if 
 thofe who do not allow the influence, upon 
 which you infift, fet afide all influence what- 
 ever. This afliimptlon is not fair : and your 
 inferences in confequence pf it by no naeans 
 true, 
 
 ' You however proceed. Sir, to enforce your 
 do6i:rine by other means : and aflTurc us, that 
 fbere can be no ufe or propriety of rewards or pu- 
 mjhments on any other Jcheme s hut the greatefi 
 pojfihle upon this of neceflity. p. 74. In order 
 to make this clearly apprehended^ let us fuppofe 
 two minds conftrucfedy as I may fay, upon the prin-r 
 dples of the two oppojitefchemes of liberty andnecef-^ 
 Jity : all the determinations of the one being inva- 
 riably dire^ed by its previous difpofitionsy and th$ 
 motives prefenied to it-, while the other Jh all have a 
 •power of deter minings in all cafes y in a manner inde^ 
 pendent of any fuch previous difpofition or motives : 
 which is precifely the difference between the fyf- 
 terns of necejftty and liberty y philofophically ani 
 firiSlly defined. Here we find, what I have fo 
 often taken notice of, things foftened to pre- 
 vent difgufl: and previous difpofition, and 
 motives (indefinitely taken) fubflituted in the 
 room of abfolute decrees, and predeftination. 
 
 However 
 
[ S9 3 
 
 However let us fee, how you farther illuftratc 
 this, point. To avoid circumlocution let us call 
 the former (/. e, the neceflary fcheme) A : and 
 the latter (the fcheme of liberty) B, I will 
 farther fuppofe my f elf to he a father y and thefe 
 two my children y and knowing their inward make 
 and conftitutiony let us confidery how I fhall treat 
 them. My ohje5f is to make them virtuous and 
 
 happy, Now fince motives have a certain and 
 
 neceffary influence on the mind of Ay I knowy that 
 the profpeU of good will certainly incline him to do^ 
 what I recommend to him : and the fear of evil 
 will deter him from any thing, that Iwifh to dif- 
 fuade him from. p. 76. Here, Sir, your laft 
 fentence begins with the words — Now fines 
 motives — indeterminately. What are the mo- 
 tives here mentioned, and the influence of 
 which you treat ? Not any thing prefent and 
 immediate certainly : for what influence can 
 you bring to any purpofe upon, what you call, 
 a previous difpofition : upon a mind already 
 determined and under abfolute control ? You 
 talk indeed of your perfuafive powers, and 
 their efficacy: but you manifeflly beg the 
 queftion. You take for granted, what is the 
 very thing to be explained. You add — that 
 9ther influences indeedy to which he may he expofedy 
 
 and 
 
[60] 
 
 end that I am not aware of, may counter a5i my 
 *f!iewSy and thereby my ohje5l may be fruftrated, — 
 ^ut notwithjlanding this, my difcipUne will likewife 
 have its certain and necejfary effe5ly counteracting 
 in part, at leajl, all foreign and unfavourable 
 influence, l^tYi^v^ me. Sir, you have carried 
 me in a Ihort fpace through fo great a maze \ 
 that I am quite confounded. I cannot con- 
 ceive how your difcipline, and influence, can 
 have a certain and neceflary efFed, when other 
 influences may counter a^ your views, and when 
 your ohje^ may be fruftrated. Or how your 
 g.dvice can countera(5l in any degree all foreign 
 influence; when there is according to your own 
 account a law of nature, and an unavoidable 
 foreign power, by which the mind and all its 
 operations have been originally determined. 
 See p. 7. Yet you farther t:ell us, that every 
 promife, and every threatning, every reward and 
 every punifhment, judicioufly adminiftered, works to 
 my ?nd — &:c. But as there is a feeming in- 
 confiflency in all this, it is a pity that you had 
 not reconciled the difficulties, which here oc- 
 cur; before you had laid down the principles, 
 upon which you fo determinately argue. Let 
 Vis now turn our eyes to the other of the two 
 charadters, by which you a.re to illuftrate your 
 
 hypothefis, 
 
[ 6. ] 
 
 hypothefis. — But in my fon B, I have to do with 
 a creature of quite another make. Motives have 
 no necejfaryy or certain influence upon his defer- 
 minationSy and in all cafes where the principle of 
 freedom from the certain influence of motives takes 
 place^ it is exa5ily an equal chance^ whether my 
 rewards orpunifhments determine his aBions or not. 
 The f elf determining power is not at all of the na- 
 ture of any mechanical influence y that may be count cr- 
 adled by influences equally mechanicaly but is a thing 
 with refpe5i to which I can make no fort of calcu^ 
 lationy and agaiitft which I can make no provijion. 
 Even the longeft continued feries of proper anions ^ 
 will form no habit that can be depended upon, and 
 therefore after all my labour and anxiety y my objeEi 
 is quite precarious and uncertain, p. 76. You 
 have here. Sir, drefled up a charafler, agreea- 
 bly to the fentiments of thofe, who maintain 
 liberty, and the freedom of the will. And 
 you fay, that motives have no neceffaiy or cer. 
 tain influence upon fuch a perfon. You men- 
 tion many truths, to which your opponents 
 will, I believe, readily fubfcribe. For what is 
 extraordinary, that which you bring as an ob- 
 je6bion to their fyflem, is a manifefl demon- 
 ftration of it's truth. You fay, that a perfon 
 in this ilate of liberty, can never be certainly 
 
 depended 
 
i 62 ] 
 
 depended on. You know not whether yoitf 
 praifes or your rebukes will have &ny falutary 
 effedls. His future refolutions can never be 
 abfolutely known : even the longefi feries ofpro^ 
 J)er actions will form no bahit^ that can he de- 
 pended upon. In fhort your labour is quite pre^ 
 carious, as a father ji and your views uncertain^ 
 for the fon, upon whom thefe labours are ex-r 
 pended, may pofiibly a(5l in oppofition to your 
 beft wifhes. All this. Sir, is precifely true j 
 and the real hiftory of man. No one breathes^ 
 who is not in this uncertain flate. There are 
 many inducements to virtue.; many motives to 
 incline us to the truth ; and though it is to be 
 hoped, that they very often prevail : yet they 
 have no certain, no neceflary, influence upon 
 our minds. There is nothing overbearing and 
 irrefiflible : we are after all left to choofe free- 
 ly : and it is pofTible for us to make a bad op- 
 tion. In fhort we tread in flippery paths, and 
 it would be prefumptuous in the beft man, that 
 ever lived, to fay, that he ihall not fall. Hence 
 it is, that we are counfelled in the Holy Scrip- 
 tures to know our imbecillity, and to call for 
 Divine afilftance, in order that our weakneiTes 
 'may be remedied, and that we may be efta- 
 blifhed in the way, in which we fhould go. O, 
 
 Mi 
 
[ 63 ] 
 
 hold up thou my goings in thy paths ^ that my foot* 
 Jlepsjlipnot. Pfalmxvii. 5. St. Paul mentions, 
 how neceflary it was for him, even an Apoftie, 
 to be upon his guard, left after all he Ihould 
 he caft away. The account therefore, which 
 you have given of the ftate of liberty, is the 
 genuine hiftory of man. It is the fame which 
 is defcribed to us in the Scriptures : the fame 
 likewife, which our daily experience affords us. 
 It is alfo authenticated by the authority of va- 
 rious philofophers : and you intimate, that you 
 are one of that denomination: whence it is won- 
 derful, that this truth fhould have efcaped you; 
 As this is the real hiftory of man, the fyftem 
 of liberty is confirmed by it ; and you have 
 undefignedly given your atteftation to the 
 truth. 
 
 But thefe confequences, which have been 
 deduced from your words, are very different 
 from your original intention. In the charac- 
 ters drawn of the two perfons, your fuppofed 
 fons, you endeavour to fhew that the former, 
 in a ftate of abfolute necefTity, is liable to pro- 
 per influences ; can be led by paternal advice ; 
 and condudVed any way at pleafure : and fhU 
 with a degree of certainty. But the other, 
 
 in 
 
[ 64 ] 
 
 in a flate of freedom, is fuppofed in this place 
 to i3e partially affedled by motives : in other 
 places to be liable to no * motives at all. Now 
 all this is pail my comprehenfion. I cannot 
 conceive, how a perfon in a ftate of neceflity, 
 whofe thoughts and a6lions have been for ages 
 unalterably determined, can be led away by 
 any new impulfe, and dire6bed with fo much 
 eafe. And that the perfon in a flate of liberty 
 (hould be fo limited, that advice fhould be 
 cither totally, or in a great degree, lofl upon 
 him. You fay afterwards, that he can never 
 be wholly a proper obje6l of difcipline, that is 
 of teaching, exhorting, and advice, //// his felf- 
 determining power he entirely difcharged. Nov/ 
 as all advice mufl be fubmitted to his option ; 
 according to your opinion he can never* choofe, 
 till he has loft the power of choice. In fhort. 
 Sir, I fhould be forry to give a falfe turn to 
 your argument ; but you feem to lYie to con- 
 tend, that a perfon determined in his princi- 
 ples is the moft ready to be perfuaded, and 
 that none are fo inflexible, as thofe who are 
 open to convi6tion. The very nature of things 
 
 * See p. 82. and p. g^. of a perfon afting wrong, and 
 Halving a bad choice without any motive. 
 
 A mere will adling without any motive, p. 85. 
 
 appears 
 
[ 65 1 
 appears to my apprehenfion inverted. YoU 
 deny freedcnn, where there is the greateft li- 
 berty : and admit it only under an abfolute ne- 
 ceflity. 
 
 There are many of your aflumptions after- 
 wards, for which I cannot account, and to 
 which I know not how to accede. That which 
 follows is of this nature. We have fuppofed 
 that A has done a virtuous a5lion^ and has been 
 commended^ becaufe it proceeded from the bent of 
 his mind to virtue^ fo that whenever proper cir-^ 
 eumftances occurred^ he neceffarily did what wc 
 wifhed him to have done. Let us now fuppofe^ 
 that B does the very fame thing ; but let it be 
 fully underftood^ that the caufe of his right deter- 
 mination was not any bias or difpofition of mind 
 in favour of virtue \ or becaufe a good motive in^ 
 fluenced him to do it : but that his determination 
 was produced by fomething within him (call it by 
 what name you pleafe) of a quite different nature^ 
 with refpe5f to which motives of any kind have no 
 fort of influence or effe^i^ a mere arbitrary plea* 
 furCy without any reafon whatever (for a reafon 
 is a motive) and I apprehend he would no more be 
 thought a proper fubje5f of praifcy notwithjianding 
 he fhould do what is right in itfelf^ than the dice 
 
 F whiih 
 
E ^6 J 
 
 which by a fortunate throw Jhould give a man cm 
 eflate. It is true the aBion was right, hut there 
 was not the proper principle and motive, which 
 are the only juji foundation ofpraife, p. 8i. You 
 fay afterwards, at the conclufion of fome other 
 of your proofs,, If this he not a jufi, impartial^ 
 md philofophical Jlate of this cafe, I do not know ^. 
 what is fo — p. 86. This is fpoken very em- 
 phatically, and I accordingly leave it at large 
 for the world to confider^ and to determine, 
 as Ihall feem beft. To me the whole appears 
 to have been a very plain matter confounded v 
 wherein right and wrong have changed places i 
 and the one has been fubflitu ted for the other,, 
 
 In another place, where you objed to the 
 fcheme of liberty, you have the following 
 words. / will venture to fay that let the cafe he 
 fiated with ever fo much addrefs, and refinement y 
 it will he ftill found, that there cannot he any jufi 
 foundation for praife, hut upon a fcheme, which 
 fuppofes the mind to he fo difpofed^ as that juj}' 
 views of things will neceffarily determine the will 
 to right a^ion, 'The two fchemes of liherty and 
 neceffity admit of no medium hetween them, p. 84.. 
 There is nobody, I ihould think, but muft al- 
 low, that a mind well iifpofed^ upon which a 
 
[ 67 3 
 
 juft view of things properly operates, is entitled 
 to praife. But how this can be confiftent with 
 your fcheme, is not eafy to be conceived. You 
 indeed fpeak of a juft view of things, which is 
 necejfarily to determine the will. But how is 
 praife confiftent with neceflity ? And how in- 
 deed can any prefent view of things at all af- 
 fedt the will, which is antecedently deter- 
 niined ? If the mind has a propenfity to any 
 virtuous adtion, it was unavoidably imprelTed 
 upon it, according to your principles. Whence 
 then the claim to merit, and to praife ? 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 IN this you confider. How far man's general 
 condufb will be influenced by the belief of 
 the dodtrine of necefllty. It is imagined, you 
 fay, by fome^ that the apprehenjion of all the ac^ 
 tions of men depending upon motives, which necefr 
 farily influence their determinations, fo that no ai^ 
 tion or event could poJfiUy be otherwife, than it 
 has been, is, or is to be, would make men indif^ 
 ferent in refpeEi to their condulf, or to what hi^ 
 fals them in life, lanfwer fo it would y if their 
 cwn anions and determinations were not neceffary 
 links in this chain of cmfes and events ; and if their 
 F a ^ooi 
 
[ 68 ] 
 
 good or bad fuccefs did not, in the Jlri^eft fenfe of 
 the ' wordy depend upon themfelves^ p. 96. We 
 have here the fame fubjed of debate brought 
 over again : and the fame detail of caufes and 
 efFe(5ts renewed under the figure of a chain and 
 its links. The misfortune. Sir, is, that in 
 your anfwcr to the difficulty propofed the quef- 
 tion is begged here, as in other places j and 
 what wants moft to be proved is taken for 
 granted. Such is your arbitrary pofition, that 
 perfons tinder an abfolute neeeflity, all whofe 
 thoughts and adlions are decreed, muft for 
 their good and evil in life in the ftriSleft manner 
 depeyid upon themfelves. What dependance can 
 people have upon themfelves, who are fubje6t- 
 cd to a prior and invincible obligation j and 
 whofe thoughts and anions have been previ- 
 oufly decreed ? You try afterwards to give 
 fome folution to this difficulty : and at lafl af- 
 ford us an example by way of illuflration. 
 How fatisfadory this may appear, can only be 
 known from your own words, which I Ihall 
 accordingly lay before the reader. — All this may 
 perhaps be more intelligible by example : I Jhall 
 therefore endeavour to give one. No man enter-- 
 tains a doubt , but that every thing relating to ve- 
 get at ion is fubje^t to the ejiablijhed laws of nature i 
 
 and 
 
{ 69 J 
 
 andfuppoftng this to he the cafe^ with refpe^ to the 
 human mind, and its operations^ a beings of per-, 
 ftEl intelligence and forefight^ will know how we 
 Jhall be provided for the next or , any future year v 
 fo that in fa of our provifton forihe next year, and 
 all the events of it,, are ahfolutely fixed, and no- 
 thing can interfere, to make it otherwife than it is 
 to he, p. III. Here for a moment I will flop 
 fliort : as we are now come to the very pointy 
 which will ferve for a criterion between the 
 man of liberty and the rigid predeftinarian. 
 You, Sir, with thofe of your fyflem, maintain, 
 that as God foreknows every event to come, 
 therefore all things are abfolutely fixed, having 
 of old been predetermined : and that nothing 
 happens but by ao abfolute unalterable decree.. 
 Now the perfon, who proceeds upon the fyf- 
 tem of liberty and freewill, acknowledges, as 
 you do, that all things are forefeen by the 
 Deity : but his forefight and antecedent know- 
 ledge had no more influence upon the things 
 in the womb of time, than our immediate 
 knowledge and intuition have upon things pre- 
 fent and before our eyes. Things would pro- 
 ceed, as they do, whether we faw them or not. 
 This perfon thinks the dodrine of NecefTity or 
 Fate, contrary to experience ; and inconfiflent 
 F 3 with 
 
t 70 ] 
 
 with the gift of reafon; notwithftanding all 
 that has been faid in its favour. But you will 
 fay with Mr. Hobbes : if we fet afide abfolute 
 decrees, and neceflity, we deftroy the prefcience 
 of the Deity. For whatever God forefees Jhall 
 come to pafs ; a man, if he has liberty ^ might fruf- 
 trate, I anfwer, not in the leaft. This notion 
 arifes from our prefumption in circumfcribing 
 God's power, and not knowing the extent of 
 Omnifcience. You boldly confine this great 
 attribute, and limit it to caufe and efFeft: and 
 if it has not its origin from thofe means, you 
 rafhly infill, that God cannot have any fore- 
 knowledge. But on my part, though I am 
 fcnfible, that it exifts, yet I do not prefume to 
 determine in what manner: nor do I make its 
 reality depend upon the powers of the human 
 mind, nor the depth of my own knowledge. 
 I am well affured, that it exifls in a mofl abfo- 
 lute manner, and can never be made void. 
 Indeed the very notion of God's foreknowledge 
 being fruflrated is a cohtradidtion : an abfolute. 
 inconfiflency. As man is gifted with freedom 
 in his thoughts and adions 5 he may hefitate, 
 he may doubt, and delay the execution of his 
 purpofes. But after all there is an ultimate, 
 to which he mufl come : he muft one way or 
 3 other 
 
t 7t i 
 
 other determine : and that ultimate and' deter- 
 mination was certainly forefeen by the Deity: 
 You may yourfelf fluduate and be uncertain ; 
 •but this uncertainty was forefeen by God ; and 
 though you may not know your own refolution^' 
 yet it was known to him. In fhort — Vertc 
 omnes tete in facies, et contrahe quicquid, five 
 animis, five arte vales ; be defignedly indeter- 
 minate, yet it will amount to nothing : your 
 laft refolves are afTuredly known, and were fo 
 from the beginning. You fay, that this muft 
 proceed from a feries of caufes and effedls: ancf 
 if it does not originate from them, that it cannot 
 -exift at alL You appear to me much too raili 
 and confident in limiting Omnipotence j and 
 determining the ways of the Moft High. By 
 many pious and learned men the foreknow- 
 ledge of the Deity has been thought to confift 
 in a vaft comprehenfive power of the Divine 
 mind: in a wonderful and boundlefs intuition j 
 through which all things, pafl, prefent, and 
 to come, have been intimately and immedi- 
 ately known from the beginning. But you 
 fondly think, that if man is gifted with free- 
 dom of thought and adiori, that he can dif- 
 appoirit the Almighty, and render his fore- 
 knowledge abortive. What an abfurd furmifc 
 F 4 is 
 
[ 7« ] 
 
 is this ? No real foreknowledge ran be made 
 void : therefore do not call things by wrong 
 names : For be afTured, that the prefcience of 
 the Deity cannot be either controlled ; or ren- 
 dered inefFedual. It would not be foreknow* 
 ledge, were fuch a thing pofTible. His vjays 
 are higher than our ways \ and his thoughts^ than 
 our thoughts. His underflandmg cannot be fa- 
 thomed by mortals. In fhort let us ad or 
 think as we pleafe, flill we muft come to a 
 conclufion : and the whole was ever open to 
 Him from whom nothing is hid j both the de- 
 termination, at whatever time it may be brought 
 about, and the fecret workings by which it was 
 effeded. 
 
 But I raay be wrong in deferring fo long the 
 example, by which you purpofed to illuflratc 
 your fcheme. You had intimated that there 
 was- an analogy between the human mind, and 
 vegetation : and that they were both fubjed to 
 the fame laws of nature, p. 98. And in refped 
 to the former the produce of each year was de- 
 termined of oldi and nothing can interfere to 
 make it otherwife than it is to be. But, fay you, 
 will any Farmer, believing this ever fo firmly, neg- 
 leU on this account to fow his fields and content 
 
 himfe^f 
 
[ 73- I. 
 
 h/mfilf ^^'^^ f^yi^gi ^^^ knows how I Jhall he 
 provided for the next year ? I cannot change bis 
 decree^ and let his will be done. We fee in faEl^ 
 that fuch a perfuafjon never operates in this man^ 
 ner : becaufe though the chain of events is necef- 
 fary, our own deterifninations and actions are ne^ 
 cejfary links of that chain. This gives the Far^ 
 mer the fullefl affurance, that if it be decreed for 
 him to ftarvcy it is likewife decreed for him to 
 negle5f to fow his fields-, but if he do fow his fields, 
 which depends entirely upon himfelf that then, 
 fince the la'UQS of nature are invariable^ it will he 
 evident y that no fuch unfavourable decree had gone 
 forth, p. 99. ■ This in truth, Sir, is a very 
 elaborate illuftration : which I am forry to fay, 
 after all your trouble, I- am not able to com- 
 prehend. I cannot conceive, how it fhould 
 come to pafs, that, if a Farmer llarves, it is 
 by an abfolute decree : if he grows rich and in 
 good plight, it depends entirely upon hipifelf : 
 You feem in the latter cafe to give up the ne- 
 cefTity for which you have been contending: 
 and to admit the liberty, which you before de- 
 nied. In refpedl to the Farmer's foliloquy I 
 fee nothing fo improper in Jt upon your prin- 
 ciples : were they in reality, in full force. . But 
 I am confident, that though a perfon may be 
 
 a Pre- 
 
[ 74 ] 
 
 a Predcftinarian in theory ; he will never be fo 
 in^ pradice. You fay well of the countrymen's 
 perfuafion, that // never operates in this manner. 
 You are undoubtedly in the right. We may 
 be affured, that the honeft ruflic had never any 
 conception of this nature. When he was to 
 plough and to fow, he never in the leaft^ 
 thought of a long chain of neceffary events : 
 iior that his own determinations and aElions were 
 neceffary links of that chain. Whatever decrees 
 you may frame for him, he is of a firm opi- 
 nion, that his fowing and his reaping depend 
 entirely upon himfelf: and he ads in conformity 
 to thisr perfuafion. He knows fo much of the 
 invariable laws of nature that com will not: 
 grow of itfelf : and that without culture he 
 Ifeall have nothing but dock and darnel. la 
 Ihort, as I have before faid, I believe you will' 
 never find a thorough-paced pradical Predefti- 
 harian. 
 
 SECTION IX, 
 
 THE purport of this Sedion is the Moral 
 Influence of the Dodrine of Necefllty : 
 and the happy confequences, which refult from 
 it. It is faid, that mankind in general cannot 
 
 arrive 
 
[ 75 1 
 
 arrive at the great truths^ which are contained 
 in this fyftem. ney have, we are told, no ap- 
 p-ebenjion of the real and unavoidable confeq^uenrei 
 cf the -principle Sy they every day a^ upon, Thay 
 would even be alarmed^ and ftaggered^ if thofs 
 confequences were pointed out to them, p. 104. 
 When they are toldy that in confequence of thefe 
 {onceffionSy they mufl admit, that nothing could 
 have been otherwife than it has been ; that every 
 thing comes to pafs in confequence of an eflablifnti 
 conftitution of things, &c, — that God is to be con- 
 Jidered as the proper and fole caufe of all things^ 
 good and evil, natural and moral, they are flag- 
 gered, and withheld their ajfent. 
 
 From this place, therefore, the Philofopher mufh 
 h content to proceed by himfelf. But we Jhall 
 fijs, that his more comprehenfive views of the fyfiem 
 of nature are not lefs, but much more favour ahh 
 to his improvement in virtue and happinefs, than 
 the more limited views of the bulk of mankind,—* 
 p. 105. 
 
 Bat previous to this I would obferve, that tht 
 f^AUical ufe of thefe philofophical views is confined 
 tt) a man's cooler moments, when the mind is not- 
 under the influence of any violent emotion orpajfton* 
 
 For 
 
[ 76 ] 
 
 / 
 
 porjtnce the mind of a Philofopher is formed , and 
 the ajfociationsy hy which it is infiuenced^ are fixed 
 €xa5fly like thofe of other men^ he will not be able 
 in the general tumult and hurry of life, to feely 
 thinky or ^61^ in a manner different from other 
 men, A "provo cation will fix his refentment — and 
 a grateful or kind a£lion willy in like manner^ di- 
 re5l his love — &c. p. ic6. — We are now there^ 
 fore to confider what are the feeliyigs of the Philo-: 
 fopher retired from the world y under the influence 
 of no violent emotion, and therefore contemplating 
 nothing very recent, p. io6. — Now in my opinion, 
 his philofophical views will give an elevation and 
 force to his piety, and to virtue in all its branches, 
 that could have been acquired any other way^ 
 And this may be perceived in thofe perfonSy whofe 
 general views of things have approached the near eft 
 to thofe y that are truly philofophical. — I'he fpirit 
 of devotion in general muft be greatly promoted^^ 
 It will not be poffible to bear ill will to any of our 
 brethren : — In fhort this one leading principle of 
 devotion cannot fail to regulate the whole temper and 
 conduct, p. ic8. 109. No other than aNeceffarian 
 can poffibly attain to the full per fuafion of this great 
 and invaluable truth, — With fuch fublime views of 
 the fyftem and the author of it, as thefcy vice 
 is abfolutely incompatible : and more efpecially, 
 
 hatred, 
 
[ 77 ] 
 
 hatred^ envy^ and malice^ are totally excluded, J 
 cannot as a Necejfarian hate any man. p. 1 1 1 . — 
 If as a Necejfarian^ I ceafe to blame men for their 
 vices in the ultimate fenfe of the ivord ; though in 
 the common and proper fenfe of it I continue to do 
 foy &c. — / on my fyftem cannot help viewing them 
 with a tendernefs, and compajfton, that will have 
 an infinitely finer and happier effe^f^ &c. p. 112. 
 You have, Sir, placed your fyftem in fo fair a 
 light, and fo affedingly defcribed its happy 
 confequences, that I am nearly induced to 
 adopt in fome degree the words of Agrippa to 
 Paul, and fay — Almoft thou perfuadeft me to be a 
 Neceffarian. The love, the charity, and the 
 univerfal benevolence, which you hold forth, 
 would, one would think, be inducements to 
 any perfon of a rational turn of mind, and en- 
 gage him to your party. And I do not fee 
 any thing to impede my immediate conver- 
 fion, but one or two fcruples, which I know 
 not how to overcome. You intimate, good 
 Sir, in more places than one, that you are a 
 philofopher : and you have good reafon to take 
 that title to yourfelf. Your deep refearches, 
 in nature, and your experimental knowledge, 
 are well known : and your difcoveries have 
 been efteemed of great confequence : on which 
 
 account 
 
[ 78 ] 
 
 account the world looks up to you very jufcly 
 with high efleem and honour. Scarcely any 
 in this department can rank before yon. And 
 ill refped to the prefent fyllem, which you 
 have been prefenting to us, you intimate, that 
 you have arrived at an infight in thefe matters, 
 to which none but a Philofopher can attain. 
 You may therefore be looked upon as the 
 chief pillar of your caufe : and if the virtues 
 above mentioned do naturally arife from your 
 fyftem, we may fuppofe them to be eminently in 
 you. But herein I think, that I perceive fome 
 little failure. If anger and refentment are in- 
 compatible with necelTity : if, when devoted 
 to that fyftem you cannet hate a man ; and are 
 really gifted with that infinitely refined tendernefs 
 and compajfion for others, which you have men- 
 tioned ; how comes it, that there is not a 
 greater Ihew of it ? For you are fenfible, that 
 the tree is known by its fruits. In fliort how 
 comes it, that you fometimes forget your ne- 
 cefTarian charity, and fo cruelly fall foul of Dr. 
 Beattie ? And not only of Dn Beattie and his 
 infiin^ive common fenfe^ but of fome others, 
 who differ from you in opinion s and whom 
 you treat with not a little roughnefs. Perhaps, 
 as a Neceffc^rian you do not abufe them for 
 
 their 
 
C 19 3 
 
 their failings in the ultimate fenfi of .the wordy 
 but in the common fenfe of it : which may afford 
 them fome confolation, if they underftand your 
 meaning. In fhort, if thofe falutary effe6b, 
 which you mention, were the real confequences 
 of the dodbrines, which you have embraced 
 and recommend, they would be particularly 
 confpicuous in yourfelf, as you are more emi- 
 nent than any of your brethren. But, believe 
 me, I do not perceive any more candour, 
 benevolence, and charity, from your words^ 
 than is to be found among^ other people: 
 which makes me doubt much of the fuppofed 
 excellency of your fyflem. Nor is it only 
 from you, that we have a right to expedb thefe 
 marks of fuperiority, but from all thofe, 
 who in any degree adhere to the do6trines of 
 Neceffity and Predeftination. If thefe Chrif- 
 tian virtues are the particular refult of thofe 
 opinions, as you fay ; they muft be very con- 
 fpicuous among the perfons, who have em- 
 braced them. Now thefe we know to be 
 chiefly the Calvinifts ; a portion of people, o( 
 whofe community you once werej and con- 
 fequently muft be well acquainted with their 
 tenets, as well as their manners. They are 
 many of them rigid Prcdeftinarians, and Ihould 
 
 on 
 
Oft that account, furpafs all other people iri 
 meeknefs, charity, and virtue in general. But 
 we have your evidence, that it is not fo. You 
 fpeak in p. 16 1. of the Calviniftic fcheme^ as 
 a gloomy one : and you fay, — where a difpojition 
 to vice has preoccupied the mind, I am well fatis- 
 fiedy and hut too many fa£ls might he alledged to 
 prove ity that the do^rines of Calvinifm have heen 
 actually fatal to the remains of virtue : and have 
 driven men into the moft defperate and abandoned 
 courfe of wickednefs, p. 162. You likewife con- 
 fefs, p. 164. that though there be undoubtedly 
 among them men, whofe hearts and lives are 
 truly Chriflian, yet there is often found in others 
 of this perfuafion — great malignity of hearty con- 
 cealed under all the external forms of devotion, I 
 mull confefs on my part, that I never was wit- 
 nefs to any fuch malignity : but we have your 
 word for it ; and will therefore acquiefce in 
 what you affirm. You likewife mention fome 
 cruel treatment, which you have experienced 
 from the Calvinifts ; and that you was exafpe- 
 r^/^^ again ft them. p. 164. But if your fyf- 
 tem, as you fay, is fuperiour to all others -, and 
 IS produdive of nothing but peace, charity," 
 and benevolence -, attended with all the gentle 
 affcdions of tendernefs and compaflioni whence 
 
 proceed* 
 
[ 8i ] 
 
 proceeds fuch malignity and ill-will, with all 
 this bitternefs of gall ? How come the elect, 
 whom we fliould have thought exempt from 
 thele infernal qualities, to abound with them 
 more than others ? I by no means affirm that 
 they do : but I only argue from what you have 
 faid of them, as well as of yourfelf. For I 
 am unwilling to think fo ill of a community, 
 which has produced fome excellent men -, par- 
 ticularly a Leland and Fofler. 
 
 Moreover as the Calvinifts are fuppofed to 
 have a large portion of the divine influence, and 
 to feel intimately the grace of God operating 
 within them, one mud neceflarily be led to ex- 
 pe6V, that they would enjoy a particular gleam 
 of comfort; a heavenly ferenity, in confe- 
 quence of this bleffing. The divine truths alfo 
 fhould be more open to them than to others ; 
 and their principles, one would think, Ihould 
 be the befl founded. Yet, though they are as 
 much Neceflarians as yourfelf, you difapprove 
 of their principles, and fcem to intimate from 
 them, that the Calvinifts are under an illufion. 
 Upon the whole however y the acquaintance I have 
 had with Calvinifts convinces me, that their princi- 
 ples y in the minds of calm foher- thinking perfons, will 
 always leave fome room for doubt and uncertainty 
 G with 
 
[ S2 ] 
 
 with refpe5f to the evidence of their converfion ; and 
 what is called the work of grace in the hearty in 
 which much mufl neceffarily be left to the imagina- 
 tion \ and therefore that at times a gloom will be- 
 fpread over the fouL — Unlefs this effe5l be count er - 
 a5ledj their -principles do not admit of that perfe^i 
 ferenity and chearfulnefs^ with which it is to be 
 wijhed that a life of real piety and virtue might 
 ever be attended, p. 165. At this rate I do not 
 fee any the leaft advantage, that a Neceffarian 
 has in proof of his orthodoxy : There is no- 
 thing, that can perfuade us of the fuperiour 
 excellence of his fyflem. He is defcribed, as 
 in a flate of uncertainty, if not of infatuation : 
 and his principles are faid to lead to gloom 
 and melancholy ; and, if we may truft to what 
 has been faid before, to abfolute defpair. 
 Thefe things, if true, do not feem to be the 
 fruits of the Spirit : nor can they recommend 
 the fyflem, in which they are found. 
 
 You may perhaps fay, that your notions 
 about neceffity are very different from thofe of 
 the Calvinifts. They may be fo : but it is a 
 point, in which I am not concerned. In rea- 
 lity I believe, it will be found a diftindlion 
 without a difference. There may be fome 
 10 things. 
 
[ 8j 3 
 
 things, in which you fancy that you do not 
 agree with them : but your firft principles are 
 the fame. You both believe in abfolute de- 
 crees, and unavoidable deftiny : arid the fame 
 confequences mud follow, however on your 
 part you may try to evade them. 
 
 SECTION X. 
 
 WE are here informed. In what fenfe God 
 may be conftdered as the author of fin : 
 and of the ohjediion to the do5lrine of neccffity on 
 that account. You are pleafed to tell us more 
 than once, that when people have confidercd 
 the confequences which naturally refult from 
 your principles, they zx^ fi agger ed zud frighten- 
 ed : and have not the courage to proceed. Be- 
 lieve me, good Sir, I do not wonder at it : 
 for the path feems to lead to a precipice, and 
 every ftep is over burning emibers. There are 
 few of fuch courage as not to be appalled, when 
 they hear the God of all goodnefs made the 
 author of all evil. You indeed put your quef- 
 tion. In what fenfe God may be fo confidered : 
 but there is only an alternative, that he either 
 is, or is not: and however you may foften 
 things at fetting out, you at lad determine, 
 G 2 that 
 
[ 84 ] 
 
 that he is fo in every fenfe, hy making him the 
 f roper caufe of all eviL p. 125. In this place 
 you go fo far as to fay, that as all evils are fub- 
 fervient to greater good, — every thing without 
 diftin^ion may he fafely afcribed to God. p. 115. 
 Surely, Sir, this is as rafh as it is fliockingj How 
 can a perfon of the leaft reverence towards his 
 Creator^ fuppofe that the God of all goodnefs 
 and juftice, as well as of all purity and hoii- 
 nefs, fhould have decreed, theft, murder, par- 
 ricide, and every fpecies of cruelty ? that he 
 fhould have ordained and appointed pollution, 
 filth, incefl, and every unnatural defire -, di- 
 rected every evil affection of the mind ; and 
 with a high hand carried every crime into exe- 
 cution? Do not. Sir, think it want of fortitude 
 in me, if I tremble at the bare recital : for it is 
 pall expreflion (hocking to conceive the horrid 
 confcquences, which necefTarily follow from 
 your principles. You give a reafon for what 
 you fo boldly aflert : that whatever terminates 
 in good, philofophically fpeaking, is good. This, 
 Sir, is an aphorifm as falfe as it is dangerous. 
 It was an article of the Jefuits creed: by 
 which they thought they were authorized to 
 wade through a fea of blood in order to arrive 
 at a remote advantage. As for your qualify- 
 
 ing 
 
[ 85 ] 
 
 ing it by the ttrm% philofophically /peaking : I 
 know not the meaning of the limitation. 
 You afterwards confefs, that the whole is a 
 mere theory j and not to be reduced to prac- 
 tice : which is very flrange. But this is a view 
 of moral evil, which though innocent^ and even 
 tifeful in /peculation, no wi/e man can, or would 
 choo/e to a5f upon him/el/, becau/e our under/land- 
 ings are too limited /or the application 0/ /uch a 
 means 0/ good : though a Being 0/ in/inite know- 
 ledge may introduce it with the great eft advantage 
 — JVhile our natures are, what they are, — we 
 muft /hun vice as any other evil, and indeed the 
 greateft 0/ all evils, and choo/e virtue as the 
 greateft good, p. 115. But have you not. Sir, 
 faid, that God is the author of evil : that it 
 proceeds from his original decrees : what room 
 then is there for man either to choofe or to 
 fhun ? In truth I try, but am at a lofs, to find 
 your meaning. I am overpowered by words 
 and bewildered, I am obliged again and again 
 to recur to what you have faid : that the two 
 /ch ernes 0/ liberty and nece/fity admit 0/ no medium, 
 p. 84. That all things have been i^rr^^^: and 
 that our will is under the direction of an ab/o- 
 lute and /oreign power, p. 8. You here feem 
 to forget thefe things : and to allow to man a 
 G 3 free 
 
[ 86 ] 
 
 free wilL by giving him a power of choofing 
 and rejedlirig. For thefe concefTionSj as I have 
 repeatedly faid, I know not how to account. 
 You proceed to illuitrate your fyflem : and to 
 palliate, what you have afierted, by telling us, 
 that fuppcftng God to he the author of Jin, it by 
 7to means implies, that he is afinful being. — If his 
 difpojition and defign be good, what he does is mo- 
 rally good. This, 1 imagine, will hardly be 
 granted : that luft, murder, inceft, parricide^ 
 can at any rate be morally good j whatever 
 may be the confequences. However you try 
 to illufcrate and prove your tenets by example, 
 // was wicked y you fay, in JofepFs brethren to 
 fell him into Egypt : becaufe they a^ed from envy^ 
 hatred^ and covetoufnefs : but it was not wicked 
 in Gody becaufe in appointing it, he was not ac- 
 tuated by any fuch principle. In him it was gra- 
 cious and good, &c. p. 117. This is furely a 
 weak argument. How would a Voltaire, a Di- 
 derot, and even your friend Hume, fmile at 
 thefe feeble expedients ; by which you try to 
 free your felf from the difficulties, into which 
 you have been rafhly involved ? You tell us, 
 that it was wicked in Jofeph's brethren to be- 
 have as they did, becaufe they a5ied from envy^ 
 hatred, and covetoufnefs. But was not this ha- 
 tred. 
 
c 87 r 
 
 tred, and this envy, decreed ? Do not you fay, 
 that all things, good and evil, may be afcribed 
 to the Deity, p. 115. Do not you in fo many 
 words, p. 127. 1. 24. make God the caufe of 
 all evil? How then were the perfons concerned 
 in the fale of their brother accountable for 
 their paflions, any more than for the confe- 
 quences, which enfued from them. They were 
 according to your principles under an abfolute 
 neceflity \ and a6led in obedience to an irre- 
 fiflible power. Why then do you flile them 
 wicked ? You yourfelf have been trying 
 through" 100 pages to prove that all things 
 proceed from the Deity. A Voltaire would 
 therefore afk. How comes it. Sir, if thepurpofe 
 and end be good, that the means are not 
 equally excellent : for though you may allot 
 in this place only the good purpofe to God, 
 and the evil to Jofeph's brethren, yet in other 
 places you afcribe to him the whole : you in- 
 fift that all things are ordained by his counfels : 
 and as you admit him to be the author of all 
 good ; fo (fhocking to conceive!) you make him 
 the contriver of all evil. Therefore upon your 
 fyflem, the good and the evil mull defcend 
 from r^ ^ fame fountain. 
 
 G 4 You 
 
[ 88 ] 
 
 You tell usj that Mr, Hume^ who in general 
 difcujfes the queftion concerning liberty and necejfity 
 with great clearnefs, intirely abandons the do5irine 
 of necejfity to the mojl immoral and Jhocking con- 
 Jequences, — He fays (Philofoph. ElTays, p. 157.) 
 that upon the fcheme of necefiltyj human anions. 
 can either have no turpitude at ally as proceeding 
 from fo good a caufe, as the Deity ; or if they 
 have any moral turpitude^ they mufi involve our 
 Creator in the fame guilt, p, 119. A fearful al- 
 ternative truly : and, whatever you may think, 
 not to be folved upon the principles of necef- 
 fity. You accufe Mr. Hume in this cafe : but 
 he a6ls confidently : you yourfelf have faid 
 the fame thing in other words ; and then try 
 to loften the harfhnefs of the dodlrine, but 
 to little purpofe. Thefe fatal confequences 
 follow naturally and mufl be admitted upon 
 your fyftem. You aflc indeed, Did not this 
 'writer know, what is known to all the worlds 
 that the motive or intention^ with which a thing 
 is donCy is the circumfiancey that principally confli^ 
 tutes it* s morality? With what contempt would 
 Mr. Hume treat this palliating circumfiance? He 
 would in his turn afk, whether it were pojfibley 
 when the Deity decreed evily that hefhould never in- 
 tend it F I'eSy you will fay, he did indeed intend ity 
 
 hut 
 
<s 
 
 [ 89 ] 
 
 hut it was with a purpofe to bring forth good. 
 But it will be faid, — If theivhole comes from Gody 
 why could not an All-powerful Being produce the 
 20od without the evil? And tliat which was 
 afked before may be again required — If the 
 purpofe was good, why were not the means equally 
 excellent? You fay, the difpofition is that, 
 which conftitutes morality. But in reality- 
 good and evil, virtue and vice, are irreconcile- 
 ably different : and no purpofe, nor difpofi- 
 tion, can make them other, than they are. 
 You have. Sir, brought yourfelf into difficul- 
 ties, from which you cannot with all your art and 
 fubtilty difengage yourfelf. Mr. Hume was a 
 man of a dark turn : devoted to doubt and 
 uncertainty. If we may not fay, that he did 
 not believe in a Providence, yet it cannot 
 be affirmed that he did. He feems to have 
 been, if I may be allowed the expreflion, an 
 undetermined Atheiji, All therefore, that he has 
 faid upon this occafion, is confident with his 
 principles. But you. Sir, who own, that you 
 believe in a Deity, are guilty of great incon- 
 Tiftency : from which you cannot free yourfelf. 
 Every fatal confequence, which Mr. Hume de- 
 duces from the dodrine of neceflity, follows in 
 ;he fame manner from your fyftem. But you 
 
 try 
 
C 90 ] 
 
 try to extenuate what you fay; being unwilling 
 to fright people with the fatal tendency of 
 thefe principles. You feem yourfelf to flart 
 back, as if in fonae degree Ihocked : and in 
 good truth, you have reafon. In confequence 
 of this you would fain alter the eiTence of vice, 
 and impiety. By the help of a talifmanic 
 word, BifpofJion 3 criaies change their nature : 
 Theft, robbery, murder, ebriety, luft, envy, 
 revenge, become innocent : Sin and guilt are 
 by you reconciled with juftice*: and the moft 
 foul and deformed vices with the Beauty of 
 HoUnefs. You believe. Sir, in the fcriptures -, 
 and you muft furely remember, how very ex- 
 prefs the Prophet is upon this head. JVoe 
 unto them^ that call evil goody and good evil; 
 that put darknefs for lights and light for dark- 
 Tiefs : that put bitter for fweety and fweet for 
 hitter, Ifaiah c. 5. v. 20. 
 
 You endeavour to excufe the introdu6lion 
 of moral evil into the world, which you fup- 
 pofe to be the work of the Deity, by faying, 
 *That the Divine Being may adopt fome thingSy 
 which be would not have chofen on their own ac- 
 count : hut for the fake of other things y with 
 which they were conne^ed. p. 1 24. But in this 
 
 you 
 
[ 91 ] 
 
 you greatly leflen the majefiy of the Deity, and 
 bring down the Creator to a level with his 
 creatures : attributing to him the fame impo- 
 tence in his counfelsi and laying him under 
 the fame neceflity and refhraint. And to ex- 
 cufe it ftill farther, you maintain, that accord- 
 ing to the fundamental laws of nature morality 
 could not Gxia without * vice. p. 125. They 
 are to be fure in human life contrafted as much 
 as light and darknefs. But to aver, that the 
 one depends upon the other, and cannot fubfift 
 without it, is a moll unwarrantable affertion. 
 You may as well fay, that there could not be 
 funlhine without Ihade: whereas the fun would 
 be in full luflre, though there were not a fingle 
 opaque body within the fphere of his rays. 
 At this rate the kingdom of righteoufnefs, pro- 
 mifed by our Saviour, can never come, in the 
 manner we expedl it : for upon your principles 
 there mull be a proper Ihare of folly and wick- 
 ednefs in the other world to conllitute fuch a 
 
 • According to the moji fundamental laius of Nature, and 
 indeed the nature of things, great ^virtues in fame could not 
 be generated, nor exijf, but in conjunilion ivith great 'vices 
 in others. For it is this oppojition, that not only exhibits 
 them to ad<vantage, hut even properly fpeaking creates them, 
 
 kingdom. 
 
[ 9^ ] 
 
 kingdom. But be affured, that things arc 
 very different from what you imagine. A 
 kingdom will undoubtedly be eflablifhed, 
 where there will be purity without fpot, and 
 holinefs without foil or blemilh. And the 
 fame might have been in this, were it not for 
 the perverfenefs of man ; and his abufe of the 
 liberty, with which he was from the beginning 
 endowed. You infill the whole tribe of vir- 
 tues are created by their oppofite failings. 
 That without a proportional quantity of moral 
 evil J there could be no fortitude^ no elevation 
 of foul y nor reftgnation to the will of God. p. 125. 
 But this is a great miflake. The envy, hatred, 
 and malice of the world may call forth thefe 
 happy qualities ; and render them confpicuous : 
 but the moral excellence, from whence they 
 proceed, the original parent virtue, would 
 exifl, though they were not difplayed. We 
 may imagine a rich treafure to be in a coffer, 
 though there may not be any demand for it*s 
 being immediately produced; and as I faid 
 before, a light may fhine though there be no 
 contraft. Suppofe the world were univerfally 
 good. Would it not be a ftrange aphorifm to 
 maintain, that virtue would ceafe to he virtuey 
 when it came to be uniformly pra^fifed : and that^ 
 
 if 
 
 1 
 
[ 93 ] 
 
 if lovCy dutyy and allegiance, were pun5fually kept 
 upi we Jhould be 'void of all morality? Nothing, 
 I ihould think, could be more unwarrantable : 
 and yet thefe are the natural confequences of 
 the principles, which you have laid down. 
 
 When among other objects of creation it 
 pleafed God to make man; He formed him in 
 his own image : and endowed him with a rea- 
 fonable foul. And he placed before him good 
 and evil, that he might have opportunities of 
 cxercifing the noble faculty, with which he was 
 blefled; and thereby fhew a proper fenfe of 
 duty to the hand, which had formed him. When 
 man was thus gifted v/ith reafon, there feems 
 to have been this alternative only, in refpe6b 
 to his future condu6l : either he was to have 
 liberty to employ the powers beflowed upon 
 him; to feparate, diflinguifh, and make his 
 option accordingly : or he was to be under the 
 abfolute influence of a fuperior power ; and to 
 be diredted in all his ways. U then we may 
 take the liberty to judge from the fmall lio-ht 
 afforded us concerning the operations of the 
 Mod High, which may we prefume to think 
 moft confonant to Divine wifdom? whether to 
 grant man the liberty of reafoning, and em- 
 ploying 
 
C 94 3 
 
 ploying the faculties, with which he was in- 
 veiled : or to overrule his will by a foreign in- 
 fluence : and though he retained the gift, 
 yet to abridge him of the ufe of it ? You, Sir, 
 leem to acknowledge, that this muil: have been 
 the alternative; by faying, that there can be 
 no medium between neceffity and freedom. And 
 in confequence of it, I hope, it will not be 
 prefumptuous to fuppofe, that as it has pleafed 
 God to beftow the gift of reafon, it was his 
 intention to indulge man in the ufe of it, and 
 not to counteract his own purpofes. For a 
 power of reafoning without the liberty to rea- 
 fon were a vain gift. From hence we may be 
 able to anfwer the queflion of old about evil ; 
 which has been with fome triumph repeated by 
 Mr. Hume. '^V/hy is there any mifery at all in 
 the world ? Not by chance furely. From fome 
 caufe then. Is it from the intention of the Deity ? 
 But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his 
 intention ? But he is Almighty, Nothing can fhake 
 the folidity of this reafoning^ fo fhort, fo clear y 
 and fo decifive : except we affert, that thefe fub^ 
 jeEls exceed all human capacity. The queflion, 
 which he puts partially about pain and mifery, 
 has been often afked about evil in general : and 
 
 • Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, p. 194- 
 
 he 
 
C 95 ] 
 
 he afterwards refers to it himfelf, infifling, that 
 it is inexplicable. If we preferve human analogy y 
 we muji ever find it impojjihle to reconcile any mix- 
 ture of evil in the univerfe with infinite attributes, 
 p. 198. He may after all be too felf-fufficient; 
 efpecially as he thinks the fubjecl may poflibly 
 exceed human capacity. What we cannot ob- 
 tain by our own natural light, may be in fome 
 degree afforded by revelation. In confequence 
 of which permit me to afk fome queltions. Is 
 it inconfiftent with the wifdom of the Creator 
 to produce different degrees of fubordinate be- 
 ings : and inflead of one fpecies enrich the 
 world with many ? I trufl^ that no body can 
 except to this procedure : nor think it an im- 
 peachment either of his wifdom or his juftice. 
 Is there in the next place any impropriety, 
 among other objedts of creation, to produce 
 man : and to endow him with reafon, that he 
 may diftinguilh between good and evil ? Surely 
 'nobody can have the prefumption or the ingra- 
 titude to arraign the Deity on this head. Who 
 can repine at his being made a rational crea- 
 ture rather than a brute bead; or being reduced 
 to a flock or a flone ? But if the Deity en- 
 riched man with the faculty of reafon, to dif-r 
 tinguilh and to choofe i can we fuppofe that 
 
 he 
 
[ 9^ ] 
 
 he would overrule that power by an abfolute 
 neceffity ; and not fufFer man, to whom it is 
 given, to employ it after the manner intended ? 
 Would it not appear ftrange, that a gift jQiould 
 be beftowed, and the liberty of exercifmg 
 it be taken away? That a man fhould be 
 bleffed with the means of conduc^ino- him- 
 felf, and yet be ever under the diredtion of 
 another? Is it polTible to conceive, that the 
 Deity fhould run counter to his own purpofes; 
 and make his beft gifts unnecelTary and ufe- 
 lefs ? For there is no occafion for reafon to 
 diftinguifli, if we are never allowed the liberty 
 of determination. Does it not feem vain to 
 give a power of choofing, and at the fame time 
 to abridge us of all choice ? To allow us a 
 will, but take away the power of volition : 
 which, according to you. Sir, is ever to be di- 
 rected by a foreign influence : an influence not 
 arifjng from our own judgment : but from an 
 abfolute decree, an irrefiflible motive, which 
 takes away all mental determination ? 
 
 As far as we can learn from the fcriptures 
 we may be afTured, that man from the begin- 
 ning was bleffed with the high prerogative of 
 reafon ; and at the fame time with full liberty 
 
 to 
 
t 5^ 1 
 
 to ufe it. If any evil has ariftn from tke abufc 
 of this noble gift, it is in rny opinion blafpiie- 
 my to place it to the aecqiint of the all-juft 
 God i as it proceeds inimediately from man. 
 How can we fuppofe hinri> who is faid to be of 
 purer eyes than even to bchvld iniqnityy to be' 
 the author of all wickednefs ? Yet you fay that 
 he permits .evil : that isj he permits man to adt 
 in conformity to the; ftatipn, in which he is 
 placed i and to the powers allotted hinx. What- 
 ever is created, if not equal to the Creat;orj 
 iXiuft be infinitely fliort of his excellence. But 
 what creature can be fuppofed to be equal, to 
 the omnipotent and all -wife God ? Whatever 
 then is created mufl be comparatively imperr 
 fed : and from imperfedion evil will necefla- 
 .rily arife. ,There is a natural imbeGillity. to 
 which eyery thing is liable. Why do you not 
 arraign divine wifdem, as well as divine jullice, 
 -for fufFering the grafs to wither^ the flower to 
 fade, a^d the tree tO; die? :.Why do you not 
 adjudge it ^ defed and impropriety in the pro- 
 qefil q/ creation, that the oyfler fhould want 
 jpcomQtivity 5 that the tortoife (hould be ever 
 •IpurtJ^ned with its houfe j that the eagle can- 
 not fwinii nor the fliark run, nor the mule fly ? 
 ,^S?5f:kr.-n()t jour pride aggrieved thaj:-;5very 
 rilLoJf H thing 
 
[ 9« I 
 
 thing created is 'not - at once imnnortal ? 
 Man like blether ahimals is limited :■ and 
 this, both in refp^dl t6'*'!h^^ powers ' of his 
 body and the faculties of the mind. Though 
 nobly ^h^owed, yet hg-'is -h^ithe-r omnipotent 
 hbr^mhifcient : but infinitely below any fucE 
 exiraordltiary pret^nfioris. 'He is - therefore 
 liable to err i and, through the irnbecillky oif 
 his mind, to inifapply the talents with which 
 he^is giftedv He is enriched with reafonj and 
 it is his' duty to confider, to diftinguifh ; and to 
 judge 'without pr^jiidiee^.-' His powers were 
 given for thi^ purpofe; and if he falls ofi^ and 
 abuies thefe powers^, it is his own fault, and to 
 be imputed to him' folely. But you repeatedly 
 aflCj Has not the Deity a fuperior power ; and 
 'Ciahnot 'he prevent this abufe ? That is, as God 
 has been pleafed to beftow upon man the fa* 
 culty of reafon, in order that he may judge 
 between^right and wr^ngrahd determine ac- 
 cordingly V cannot he overrule this power, 
 co&rtefal^ Wis -owfi: purpofe's, and render the 
 gfff ufelefil' In t(^pe6t t6'power he undoubt- 
 ecdy caitrbiit every- thing, which can be dond, 
 m^y riot be 'confident with divine 'wifdoni. It 
 feemsi as far as man- can judge, Indifpehfably 
 iiideflary', that every thing in its department, 
 >.'•-•- '-* fhould 
 
f 99 ] 
 
 flipuld fulfil the purpofe, for which it was de* 
 figned : .and if man is gifted with a power o( 
 judging and determining, that he (hould judge 
 for himfelf, whatever may be the confequence, 
 and not be always determined by a foreign in^ 
 fluence. You, Sir, infift, that to permit evil 
 is as bad as to caufe it. But give me leave to 
 ftate our two opinions and fee if things can 
 poflibly be, as you afTert : for, as far as I can 
 jiidgCi -the whole of your argument and fyflem^ 
 fe^ms to lead to a great impiety. According 
 to my beft judgment all moral evil originates 
 in man, from an abufe of his reafon, and of the 
 liberty given him both to judge and to det.er- 
 mine. All this was forefeen by the Deity; 
 and in refpedl to power could have been pre- 
 vented. But then man could not have been 
 man : his liberty of judging and adling mufl 
 have been overruled: and a rational being mud 
 not have been permitted to reafon ; which is 
 the fame thing as if the gift had never been 
 granted. Man therefore was left to make ufc 
 of his' faculties, and to enjoy that liberty, with 
 which he had been endowed : and if he has 
 mifemployed his talents, and any evil has re*- 
 fuked froiti the liberty beftowed upon him, that 
 evil muft be imputed to him only. The 
 H 2 Deity 
 
t ICO ] 
 
 Deity permits it ; as it cannot be totally rc- 
 (trained in man> without defeating the very 
 purpofe of his creation. It can be remedied, 
 and will be remedied by him, who out of evil 
 brings forth good, and can reinflate the falleri 
 crfeature. All this will be in the fuUnefs of 
 time accompliihed, when his gracious purpofes 
 will effeclually take place. 
 
 If then we prefume to obje6l to the evil,. 
 which originates in man : we muft retradt our 
 afTent to the propriety both of his being created, 
 and of his being endowed, as we find him to 
 be. We muft infift, that he ihould have been 
 otherwife framed and gifted : for as he is, thele 
 tronfequenccs muft neceflarily follow. To bq 
 -fure the fceptic may fo infift : but then man 
 tvould no longer be man j the fuppofition refers 
 to another creature : and the argument is as ab- 
 furd, as it is impious. Mr. Hume in his enquiry 
 about evil afks, whether it is from the intention 
 ef the Deity ? and adds, hut he is perfe5lly bene- 
 volent. Is it contrary to his intention ? but he is 
 Almighty, Nothing can Jhake the folidity of this 
 * reafoning. Yet the whole of this formidable 
 queftion amounts only to. this, whether the all- 
 
 " ^ * Difcourfes concerning Nat. Relig. p. 194. 
 
 ferfeff 
 
r loi ] 
 
 ferfeSl God can produce any thing mperfe^f ? In . 
 other words, whether he muji necejfarily produce 
 aU things equal to himfelf? But the quef- 
 tion is as abfurd, as the thing itfelf is*im- 
 pofTible : for perfedion is to be found in him 
 -only: and all created things mud fall infinitely 
 fhort of his excellence. They may be faid to 
 be fo far perfe6l, as that they anfwer to the 
 wife purpofes, for which they were defigned. 
 Thus as an infedt is fitted to it's proper fphere: 
 fp is man adapted to the department which he 
 is to fill. The whole is done with great juftice 
 and propriety; and whatever may be the con- 
 fequences, we cannot without the utmofl im- 
 piety arraign the difpofition. 
 
 Above, Sir, you have my opinion, that the 
 moral evil, with which we are converfant, ori* 
 ginates in man ; and that the Deity fuffers it : 
 as it is the neceflary confequence of the liberty, 
 with which we are gifted. You fay, that to 
 fuffer it, is the fame as willing and directly caujing 
 
 ♦ Dr. prieftly has this copcefllon : from which, I think, 
 he might have made many proper inferences, — That God 
 might h(Wi made all men finleff and happy y might ^ for any 
 thing that lue knenv, have been as impojjihle, as his making 
 tbem not fiiite, hut infinite beings , in all refpeSls equal tA 
 hin^elf. p. ii8. 
 
 H 3 /V, 
 
it. pt ra'^v'^and you go farther and maintain; 
 that all evil proceeds from the Deity : he de- 
 creed and ordained it from the beginning. The • 
 neceflary inferences from hence are Ihocking be- ^ 
 yond conception. According to your fyfl^m 
 every foul and polluted thought muft proceed 
 from the God of all purity. All perfidy and 
 falfhood was decreed by the God of juftice and 
 triith. In fhort there is no inilance of wick- 
 ednefs, but mud have been (horrid to imagina- 
 tion) of his contrivance, and inforced by his 
 * commands : and thefe commands attended 
 with an abfolute neceflity j which nothing cai^ 
 refift. At the fame time we are told, if any 
 faith may be placed in the holy fcriptures, that 
 God detefts vice, and that fin is his abomina- 
 tlbn. The whole tendency of the facred writ- 
 ifigs is to recommend virtue •, and to difcoun-' 
 tenance wickednefs. fhe Lordy fays the Pfalmifl:, 
 will abhor the bloody and deceitful man, v. 6. 
 Lying lipr are an abomination to the Lord, Pro v.' 
 xii. 22. Kee'p thy tongue from evily and thy 
 lipSy that they fpeak no guile.. Pfalm xxxiv, 13, 
 
 * As the fame arguments are renewed continually, I 
 am obliged both here and in other places to repeat my 
 anfwers. This may appear in feme degree tirefome ; but 
 ic could not well be avoided, 
 
[ 102 ] 
 
 S^k goody and not evil, that yemayR^e, . Amos 
 v;;* '.'i;}; ;':: '; Follow ■ not ''tifat^ ' which:' 'is'-'imljpliut 
 that, which is good,- 3 John, veh^k n- E^horta^ 
 tions of this -for^.'aeei in ^ great* number :^and 
 thefd Ire aifo backed with ^pofitive^l^wsi in or- 
 def'to^keep people in a flate of virtue and. god- 
 lilies ' And when a -better difpenfation took 
 place, the wiH 'of 4:lie "a-lt- righteous- God -was 
 more fully madfe known ; and the reafonable 
 ferviee, the facrifice of th^ will, enjoined: and 
 not only outward fahclity, but the inward pu- 
 rity of the mind recomnntnded and enforced. 
 But to what purpofe were thefe different dif* 
 penfations, if there wxre prior decrees of a 
 contrary tendency? by v/hich mankind was ir- 
 refiftibly tied down? And hov/ inconfillent 
 muftit appear, and even impoffible for the 
 fame benevolent God;, who enjoins hoHnefs, 
 to be, as you would perfuade us, the author of 
 all evil ! And what a paradox it is to have thofe 
 falutary lefTons for our cond'udt adminiflered, if 
 after all we are under a prior'influerice and de- 
 prived of: all choice!^ You may fay, that you 
 have -in fo many words allowed rricn' the liberty 
 of chbofing. You'^fiaveTo in one: page :*" and, 
 as I have befdreobferved, you Have laboured 
 to^make^it void in every other part of your 
 H 4 treatife. 
 
C 104 ] 
 
 tsreatife. And yau have unluckily taken awa^ 
 all opportunity of any fubterfuge, by afferting, 
 that between liberty and neceffity there i^ na 
 medium. You therefore fet afnie all liberty, and 
 reduce n^cn to an abfolute and unavoidably ne- 
 ceffity. And thisi neceffity according to your 
 fyftem i$ derived from the Deity : who by his 
 unalterable decrees has ordained every thing 
 which is bad and corrupt : every fpecies of 
 abomination and fin. This you infift on, 
 though you are told by the Prophet and Evan- 
 gelifts, that he is a God of righteoufnefs and 
 holinefs : that he is alfo eminently good ; fo 
 that, there is none good hut oney that is God, Matt, 
 Piix. 17. The fame Deity from whom you 
 fuppofe all difcord and violence to have pro- 
 ceeded, is c^led the God of love and peace^ 
 2 Cor. xiii. n. and the very God of peace, 
 -Heb. xiii. 20. We may therefore be affijred, 
 that none of thefe horrid qualities could be dc- 
 -rivecj fropi him, God is light, and in him is n$ 
 darknefs, 1 John i. 5. Thefe things. Sir, | 
 ,have thought poper to lay before you; that 
 you tnay judge,* whether the fufferance of .eyiJl 
 be as h^id :2iS caujing It : and whether a permit 
 Ibe the fame as a performance. I fhall add nq 
 ipo^^eji but only conclude wi^h^^he words q(,tk^ 
 .•^ /:t i ' ^ r- Apoftle, 
 
C 105 ] 
 
 Apoftle, tet God be truCy and every man a liari 
 Of it is wrhten^ That thou might eft he juftified in 
 thy fayings 5 and mighteft overcome^ when thou ar^ 
 judged. Rom^s iii. 4. 
 
 S E C T I O N XI. 
 
 HAVING hitherto profecuted your fyftem 
 in theory, you try at laft to confirm it 
 by divine authority j and accordingly you at- 
 tempt to fhew us — How far the Scriptures are 
 favourable tQ the do^rine of Neceffity. p. 129. 
 Should there poflibly be found one or two 
 texts, which might feem to favour your no- 
 tion 5 yet they would amount to little, when 
 oppofed to the whole tenour of the facred 
 writings ; which cpntain a very different doc- 
 trine. So far from being determined from the 
 beginning by any foreign influence, we arc 
 commanded to make ufe of our reafon, and to 
 look up to God for his afTiftance and direftion* 
 And if we will not make a good ufe of the fa- 
 culties beflowed upon usj nor Teek that hea-^ 
 venly influence, by which we may be led to 
 the truth ; we are given up to our own depra- 
 ved will, and the iniquity of our hearts. All 
 "this plainly proves^j when good and eyil arc 
 
 laid 
 
hLTd'btfof'G- mv'tlktvjt are 'Sit-faW 4ib6^y i^ 
 diob'ife the one and, to efchew the other': nor^ 
 c€ff we have been under any previous^ heceffity-V 
 nor have had our purpofes determined befd^^*^ 
 hand by any abfolute decrees : for then we 
 Ibould be paft amendment ; and all change im- 
 podible : wKereas we pray for a renewal of 
 l|>k(ty'and fOf,j the grace of GcidTto effe^lfiff 
 which, grace is a fubfequeat gift j . and depends, 
 uppn our wilhes and prayers. .Supplications^ 
 and pious wifhes, of this kind are enjoined tot 
 ^l-*.! but they would be urineceflary and prc- 
 pofterpusj if eViery' thing antecedently were de^ 
 termined concerning us. The freewill-offering, 
 fojagceptable to the Deity, is rendered void by. 
 the; foppofing, ofj , ^ny prior, a^id^ irre/iftible re^ 
 ftraint upon the mjnd and undjerftanding. At 
 the fame time we wellknoWj^ and acknowledge, 
 that God does not leavf:, the world to itfelf : 
 but continually interferes with a paternal care 5 
 and occafionally direds,; enforces,- alters, and 
 reilrains, as feemeth beft tOr hIS; Divine Wif^ 
 dom. - His Providence is over all his work^-j 
 and by this fuperintendan5:e.the w;hole is ulti- 
 mately carried on, to the completi^on of thofe 
 great purpofes, for wjiichJt, was. intended,- You, 
 Sir, infift, upon p rev i 014s abfolute de,crees : aruj 
 
 thac 
 
[ I07 X 
 
 that the world is direded by an 'uncontrolled 
 neceflity : In confequence of which you quote 
 many paiTages frorrt the facred writings, as if 
 they confirmed thofe doflrines. But they ma- 
 nifeftly relate to the Providence of God: and 
 to the fubfequent blefiings of Grace to thofe, 
 who try by juft means to obtain them. Alfo 
 to the judicial blindnefs and infatuation, which 
 is threatened to the rebellious ; and to all, who 
 wilfully mifapply the gifts, with which they 
 have been favoured. For to every one^ that 
 hatby Jhall he given-, and he Jhall have ahun- 
 dance : lut from him that hath not, Jhall hi 
 taken away, even that which he hath. Matt. xxv. 
 29. But let us fee the quotations, of which 
 you are pleafed to avail- yourfelf: that we may 
 judge how far they are ferviceable to your- 
 fyftem. 
 
 Peut., XXX. 6. And the Lord thy God will 
 
 circumcife thy heart, and the heart of thy fad, to 
 
 love the Lord thy God with all thy hearty and 
 
 with all thy foul, that thou mayefi live. 
 
 - *-« 
 Jerem. xxiv. 7. And I will give them a heart 
 
 to know me, that I fm the Lord : and they Jhall 
 
 he my people^ and Twill he their God, and they 
 
 ^all turn unto me with their whole heart. 
 
 Jercra, 
 
[ io8 ]i 
 
 ; Jssrem. xxxii. 39. And I will giv$ them mi 
 hearii arid one wayy that thiy may fear me for 
 evfr^ for the good of them and of their children 
 after them, I will put my fear in their hearty 
 they fhall not depart from me. 
 
 r-Ezek. xi. ig. And I will give them one heart, 
 aftd Iwillptft a new fpirit within ydu 3 and I mill 
 t^e.the fiony heart out of your flefh. 
 
 Ezek. xxxvi. 26, And I will put my fpirit in 
 ymt^^ and caufe you to walk in my ftatutes ; and. 
 ye fhall keep my fiatutes and do them, 
 
 , It ijS faid of Lydia (Adks x^^i. : 14,) whofe 
 heart tja^ Lord opened^ that fhe attended to the 
 things that were fpoken of PauU 
 
 With refpe^ to the reception of the Gofpely our 
 Saviour fays (John v;. 37. dec) All that the 
 Father giveth me, fhall come to me. No man can 
 come to mey except the Father, who hath fent me, 
 draw him,- -And again, — No man can come unto 
 r^ey except it he given to htm of the Father. 
 
 '^0 the fame purpofe the Apoflle St. Paul fays 
 (1. Cor. iii. 6. ice). I^hc^ve planted and Apollos 
 
 watered. 
 
[ losf I 
 
 ^ateredy hut God gave the increafe : fi that neU 
 ther is he, that planted^ any thing; neither he, 
 that water edy hut Cod that gave the increafi. 
 He alfo fays (Phil. i. 6.) Being confident of this 
 one thingy that he^ who hath begun a good work 
 in youy wrll perform ^t unto the day ofjefus Chrifi. 
 ii. 12. 13. Work out your own ^ falvation with 
 fear and trembling ; for it is Gody that workesb 
 in you both to -will and to doy of his own pleafure. 
 Wefindthefamefentimentinjudey ver. i\. Now 
 unto hinty that is able to keep you from falling and 
 to prefent^ you faultlefs before the coming of his 
 glory with exceeding joyy to the only wife God^ 
 and our Saviour y be glory and majefty, &c. To 
 thefe you add the following obfervations, viz. 
 All prayers for gojod difpofitions go upon the fame 
 principles y and thefe are frequeyit in the Scriptures, 
 nus Solomony at the folemn dedication of the tern- 
 pie, prays in the following wanner (i Chron. 
 xxix. 18.) Lord God of Abraham, of Ifaac^ 
 and Jacoby keep this for ever in imagination of 
 the thoughts of the hearts of thy people y and pre- 
 pare their hearts unto thse, David faySy (Pf. 
 li. 10.) Create in me a clean hearty O God, and 
 'renew a right Spirit within me, Tloe Apoftle Paul 
 pr-^ys to -the fame ptirpofe, (Rom. xv. 13.) 
 Now the God of hope fill you with all hope and 
 
[ 11^ 3 
 
 joy in helievingy that ye may .akound, in hgpe^ 
 through the power of the Holy Ghoji, Ephcf. iii. 
 1 6. That he may grant you according to the 
 riches of his glory to he ftrengthened with might 
 ly his fpirit in the inner man ; that, Chrift may 
 dwell in your hearts by faith y. that, you being 
 rooted and grounded in love^ &:c, i ThefT. v. 23. 
 And the very Qod of peace fan5lify you wholly, 
 Heb. xii. 20. Now the God of all peace make you 
 perfect in every good, work to do his. will: work-- 
 ing in you^ that which is well pledfing in his 
 Jighty through Jefus Chrift, Such are the texts 
 of Scripture, which you have brought in fup- 
 port of your fyftem : but all, that can be 
 learned froni them, is, that God fuperintends 
 all things, like a wife governour : and, as we 
 are through the imbecillity of our nature inca- 
 pable of afting up to the dignity of our call- 
 ing, that he is ever gracioufly ready to aflift 
 thofe, that call upon him, with his faving 
 grace : and that if we will but exert ourfelves, 
 and try to merit his afliftance, what we can- 
 not of ourfelves perform fhall be compleated 
 in us by the influence of his Holy Spirit. All 
 this is promifed upon certain terms : and all 
 that was promifed to the children of Ifrael 
 through Mofes was conditional; in confe- 
 
 quence 
 
[ III ] 
 
 quencc of.ajcovenant eflablifhedi and of itheif 
 faithfoUy perfarming their part. • But in tliefe 
 prbmifes,. and'in thefe coinmunications of di- 
 vine favour, there isr not the l^aft hint bf any 
 abfolute neceffity^ nor eternal decrees : There; 
 is no la\v of; nature .nor irrdiftible influence 
 mentioned as operating fronn the beginning of 
 time : but quite: the contrary.: :. An in fiife nee 
 is promifedi but conditional. 'It is fubfequerit 
 to the promife. rtia'des and' liable • to be for- 
 feited ;'i if rthofeyto^whonr .it; is tendered, do 
 not labottr^to.fdeferve it. And thefe perfons, 
 fo'f^ from being: fixed in their principkg, and 
 deti^rmined by any foreign power, are left to 
 their free Option> to accept, or to j-efufe, the 
 overture's made ^ unto them. And as God in 
 the^bunda-nce^pf his mercy and goodnefs pro- 
 ffiiftd to further all thofe ,who looked up to 
 hirpj and .ufed their beft; endeavours to pleafe 
 hinnf/jifahfi t^hreatened all; tliofe, who were dif- 
 obedieht and apoftates, with the lofs of his fa- 
 vouf, and the, withholding of his F3oly Spirit, 
 And he fai;^her ^(Tured all fuch, that he would 
 not only .withdraw his kind influence; but if 
 they perfifted to be foolifh, he would add. to 
 their foUy : if they were wilfully blind, he 
 .would pncreafe their darknefsj and bring a ju- 
 ,--tmHOv.: dicial 
 
t I" ] 
 
 dicial blindncfs upon them. Were any of ail 
 obdurate, cruel, and relentlefs heart, proof 
 againft all convidkionj he woiild harden that 
 heart farther, and urge themon to theruin, which* 
 they were feeking. In fhort it is the purpofc 
 of the Almighty, as there is €vil in the world, 
 to continually counteract the mifchief, and by 
 his divine wifdom to bring good out of evil. 
 And if any perfons are fo unhappily depraved, 
 as to render themfelves ufelefs members in the 
 world, wherein they are converfknt ;. . it often 
 feems good to the Deity to add to their infa- 
 tuation, and render them ultimately ufefui, by 
 making them objedls of divine vengeance. Fof 
 this is a lelTon continually intimated in the fa- 
 cred writings, that from him, that hath not, 
 Jhall be taken, even that which he hath. And as 
 every thing was from the beginning known 
 to the all-wife God, he with his infinite wif- 
 dom fuperintends the whole, and manages it, 
 not by any neceflity, nor by abfolute decrees, 
 but by fuffering perfons to employ their facul- 
 ties, and by remedying that evil, which muft 
 be the refult of freedom. For evil muft arife 
 among beings, which are in their nature frai-l 
 and imperfedl. None of which evil will be 
 laid to their cliarge, if they labour for im- 
 provement. 
 
[ U3 ] 
 
 provement, and look up to heaveti for aflift- 
 ancc : and above all if they confefs their imbe- 
 cillity : and fue for pardon through the merits 
 of their Redeenier. Whatever therefore occurs 
 in fcripture concerning judicial blindnefs, and 
 God*s appointment of things in the world, re- 
 lates not to any arbitrary and original decree, 
 but to the occafional interpofition of the Deity, 
 Thus Jofeph fays to his brethren. (Gen. xiv. 5.) 
 Now therefore he not grieved^ nor angry with 
 yourfelves ; that ye fold me hither ; for God did 
 fend me before you to preferve life. And again 
 (ver. 8.) It was not you that fent me hither hut 
 God, 
 
 (Exod. vi, 21.) The Deity fays of Pharaoh, 
 / will harden his hearty that he fhall not let the 
 people go. 
 
 (Jof. xi. 20.5 It is faid of the Canaanite^." 
 // was of the Lord to harden their hearts y that they 
 Jhoutd come againfi Ifrael to hat tie ^ that he might 
 dejiroy them utterly, 
 
 (Judges ix. 23.) And God fent an evil fpirit 
 betwixt Ahimelech and the men of Sbechem : and 
 
 I tht 
 
C "4 ] 
 
 the men of Shechem dwelt treacheroiijly with Ahjy 
 inelecb. 
 
 (i Sam. ii. 25.) ney (the Tons of Eli) heark- 
 ened not to the voice of their father^ hecaufe the 
 Lord would flay them, 
 
 (2 Chron. xviii. ao. 21.) God perjnitted a 
 lying fpirit into the mouth of his. (Ahab's) prophets 
 in order to deceive him, 
 
 (Matt. xl. 25.) At that time Jefus anfwered^ 
 and f aid y I thank thee^ O Fathery Lord of heaven 
 and earthy that thou haft hid thefe things from the 
 wife a fid prudent y and haft revealed them unto babes. 
 Evenfoy Father yf or fo it feemed good in thy fight. 
 
 In all thefe pafTages, and others, which 
 you quote, we may perceive that there was 
 a portion of light, to which particular peo- 
 ple were not entitled i tliat the fons of folly 
 and rebellion were condemned to be doubly 
 infatuated : and that God continually inter- 
 pofed to preferve his church -, and to con- 
 firm in their faith all fuch, as were devoted to 
 his fervice. He made all evil fubfervient to 
 thisgreat purpofe; turning it continually to 
 'advantage. This was effeded by.expofing the 
 ■ ' " weakncfs 
 
C "5 3 
 
 %veaknefs of worldly wifidom : by bringing upon 
 his enemies illufions ; and by enhancing their 
 infatuation, by way of example to others. You 
 take notice of the death of our Saviour being 
 decreed : and very truly. (A6ls ii. 23.) Him 
 being delivered by the determined counfel and fore- 
 knowledge of Gody ye have taken ; and with 
 wicked hands have crucified and flain. When 
 God by his wonderful prefcience forefaw the 
 falling off of mankind, he determined to coun- 
 tera(5l the evil by fending his Son into the 
 world. So that every thing, which the Saviour 
 of mankind fuffered, was both foreknown, and 
 determined by the Deity. But this was parti- 
 cular : and we mufl not argue from this in- 
 fiance of wifdom and goodnefs, that all man- 
 kind is under a blind necefTity : nor conclude^ 
 becaufe the Deity had determined to remedy 
 the evil of the world 3 that therefore he was 
 the Author of all evil. In refped to mankind 
 we know how they have been at ail times in- 
 vited to happinefs. We read continually of 
 prophets and holy men being fent to them, to 
 remonftrate, to teach, and to perfuade them, 
 that they might change their' way of life, and 
 turn from iniquity. How can we fuppofe per- 
 fons to be under an abfoiute neceflity, who are 
 I 2 liable 
 
[ "6 ] 
 
 liable to be perfuaded : or from a pofTibility of 
 change infer that they are already determined ? 
 You, Sir, in one place make mention of the 
 Providence of God : and you fay, that a per- 
 forty who fees in a ftrong light the dcElrine of di- 
 vine providence y cannot avoid fpeaking like a Ne- 
 ceffarian upon the fuhje5f. p. 130. The provi- 
 dence of the Deity appears to me not only 
 plainly to be difcovered through the whole 
 procefs of the fcriptures : but to be experi- 
 mentally known. So far however from leading 
 me to be a NecefTarian, it feems to be in every 
 refpe(5l repugnant to that do6trine. For what 
 are we to underfland by the term providence of 
 God, but his wifdom continually exerted, and 
 his power employed, for the confervation of 
 the world, which he has created. By his di- 
 vine interpofition all things are upheld : and 
 the purpofes of man are furthered, fuf- 
 pended, or altered, according to his plea- 
 fure. But this interfering of the Deity is quite 
 oppofite to the dodtrine of abfolute decrees: 
 and to your notion of an original impulfe, and 
 that nothing could have been otherwife, than it 
 has been, is, or is to be. In ancient times we 
 find, as has been before mentioned, that God 
 was pleafed to fend prophets and holy men to 
 
 perfuade 
 
[ 117 ] 
 
 perfuade his people to turn from their evil 
 ways : which fhews, that they were at liberty 
 to choofe: and that there was a pofTibility for 
 thofe, who rejeded the truth, to have accepted 
 the offers made. Hence it is impoflible for 
 them to have been predetermined by any fo- 
 reign influence, fuch as you have fuppofed. 
 You are too fagacious. Sir, not to fee, that 
 this quite ruins your fyflem. When therefore 
 you have mentioned the providence of God in 
 on€ page, you feem to Cct it afide in the next, 
 p. 131. In this you go great lengths. The in- 
 t-erpofition of the Deity mentioned in the Old 
 and New Teftament is not by you uniformly al- 
 lowed. You aver boldly, that many particular 
 events — /aid exprefsly to have been appointed by 
 Gody were not appointed by him : and even 
 the pcrfons, who have been reprefented as in^ 
 fpired by God, were not under any divine in- 
 fluence, p. 151. And you add in confirmation 
 of what you have faid, that in the inflances, 
 whatever they may be, to which you allude, 
 there appears from the circumftances of the 
 hiftory to have been no proper interpcfitton of the 
 Divine Being : no real miracle : but every thing 
 took place according to the common ejlablijhed courfe 
 cf nature, p. 131. As this is fomewhat ex- 
 
 I 3 traordinary. 
 
[ n8 ] 
 
 traordinary, it is a pity that you did not illuf- 
 trate what jou maintain by fome examples. 
 What you may mean by there being no proper 
 interpofition, I kno^y not. We have before 
 us an alternative, which admits of no medium. 
 The Deity either does interpofe or he does not. 
 Therefore if you are true to your principles yoi^ 
 ftiould fpeak out, and maintain without equivo- 
 cation, that God does not at all interfere in the 
 world : in other words, that there is no Pro- 
 vidence. You proceed farther to intimate, 
 that there is no fecret influence of God's Holy 
 Spirit j though it be a gift continually fpoken 
 of in the fcriptiires , and promifed to the faith- 
 ful as one of the greateft bleffings. You ac- 
 cordingly tell us that the good defigns and anions 
 ^f men are in the fcriptures frequently afcribed ta 
 God J though there be no reafon from the circum- 
 fiances of the fa£fs to fuppofe^ that there was 
 any fupernatural influence upon their minds ; hut 
 that they aBed as well- difpo fed perfons would na- 
 turally do in their Jituation. p. 132. Though 
 you fpeak with limitation, yet I think it is too 
 plain, that you would fet afide all occafional in- 
 terpofition of the Deity; all influence of the 
 Holy Spirit in confequcnce of humiliation, re- 
 pentance, and earncft prayer: and refolve 
 
 every 
 
[ "9 ] 
 
 every thing into an antecedent neceflity, which' 
 renders the interfering of the Deity after- 
 wards urineceflary and inconfiftent. You af- 
 cribe indeed all things to God : but fuppofe 
 them to be determined, and, if I underftand 
 you right, irrevocably fixed from all eternity. 
 You are pleafed to fay farther, that good jiien in 
 the [criptures frequently af cribe their good 'voorki 
 to God as the proper author of them ; the giver of 
 every good and perfe^ gift : and are the furthefi in 
 the world from having th€ leafl idea of their having 
 any merit j or claim upon God in confequence of it: 
 which upon the do5lrine of philofophical free-willy 
 they really have* p. 133. You write. Sir, with 
 fo much referve: and your words are fo 
 guarded, that I am not always fure, that I 
 arrive at your true meaning. When you 
 fpeak q( philofophical free-willy I prefume you 
 iijean free-will abfolute : for I know not of any 
 different forts of free-will ; nor of any limita- 
 tions or degrees. And in refpedl to what you 
 urge, that men would from hence be entitled 
 to merit y and that they would have a claim 
 upon the Deity, I cannot fee any fuch confe- 
 quence, that can be derived from it. The 
 cafe has always appeared to me to be this. 
 We have good and evil, life and death, placed 
 I 4 before 
 
[ 120 ] 
 
 before us : and we are at full liberty to make 
 our option. Thofe, who make a right ufe 
 of their reafon, and who have the fear of God 
 before their eyes, will not fail to make a 
 proper choice. But when this option is made, 
 fuch is the imbecillity of their nature, that 
 they cannot adl up to their wifhes : they are 
 continually liable to fall away ; and ruin their 
 own good purpofes. On this account, they 
 are told to look up to heaven, and implore the 
 divine afliflance: that if they will but exert 
 themfelves and fhew themfelves zealous of good 
 works, they fhall be furthered in all that is good : 
 and what they cannot of themfelves effed, 
 fhall be brought to perfection through the in- 
 fluence of the Holy Spirit. This is the whole: 
 and when this is done, they have the fame 
 claim upon the Deity, as a beggar has upon 
 a Prince, who has given him leave to afk ; 
 and afterwards granted him his charity. 
 
 You are pleafed however to perfift in your 
 opinion, that our wills and inclinations were 
 from the beginning determined : and you have 
 been at great pains to produce inflances from 
 the facred writers to countenance this do(5lrine. 
 ^ome of thefe are frorn the Apoflles and Evan- 
 
 gelifts; 
 
[ lil ] 
 
 gelifls : which however appear to me, as I 
 have fhewn, to have nothing to your purpofe. 
 And indeed you feem in reality to acknowledge 
 it : and though you fpeak with your ufual cau- 
 tion and referve 5 yet you afford us too plainly 
 an indication of your real opinion of thofe wri- 
 ters, to whom you pretended that you had 
 been fo much beholden. Your words are very 
 remarkable. Not that I think the [acred writers 
 wercy Jlri£tly fpeakingy Necejfarians ; for they 
 were not Philofophers : hut their habitual devo^ 
 tion naturally led them to refer all things to God 
 without refle5ling on the rigorous meaning of their 
 language-, and very probably y had they been in- 
 terrogated upon the fuhje5fy they would have ap^ 
 peared not to be apprized of the proper extent of 
 the Neceffarian fcheme ; and would have anfwered 
 in a manner unfavourable to it, p. 133. Who 
 muit not after this pity the fate of the poor 
 Apoftles and Evangelifts ? Alas, Sir, how very 
 low mud they be in your eftimation ! They, 
 who for ages were thought to have been in- 
 fpired, and to have been peculiarly direded 
 by the Spirit of truth,' are at laft fuppofed not 
 to underftand their own meaning. They were 
 not, you fay, ftridUy fpeaking, Necejfarians. 
 No, in good truth. Sir, nor were they in any 
 
 refpedl 
 
C 122 ] 
 
 rcTpect of that denomination. They were not, 
 you fay, Philofophers, It is true. Sir, they 
 might not underftand the dodtrine of fixed 
 air : nor had they ever made any difcoveries in 
 eledlrieity. To the fquaring of the circle they 
 w^re probably utterly ftrangers. Yet believe 
 me. Sir, they were great Philofophers. And 
 however you may rate yourfelf above them, they 
 were far your fuperiprs in true knowledge. 
 They were bleft above others with rational 
 philofophy, and Jikewife with a philofophy, 
 to which reafon could not pofTibly arrive: 
 and v^hich could only be obtained from the 
 fountain of all wifdom. This they had in full 
 plenitude : and the whole of our religion^ and 
 of our happinefs in confequence of it, depend? 
 vpon the teflimony of thefe Apoftjes, whom 
 you thus vilify and debafe. Such were thefe 
 lights of the world, thefe preachers of divine 
 truth : who, it feems, if they had been interro- 
 gated by Dr. Prieflly, would not have been 
 able to have given him a proper anfwer. 
 
 S E O 
 
C 123 ] 
 
 SECTION xir, 
 
 As yon have mentlpned the philofophical 
 doftrine of FFee-will, &> you here intro- 
 duce the philofophical dodrinc of NecelTity, 
 And this chapter contains an account of the 
 Calviniflic do6trine of Predeftination connparcd 
 with the philofophical dodtrine of Neceility. 
 Of the former you give an unfavourable repre- 
 fentation : and fhew the fatal confequcnces, 
 which refult from this opinion. But after all, 
 your principles are the fame : though you 
 form different conclufions. You are both ab« 
 folute Predeftinarians; however you may differ 
 in inference and dedudtion. It is your opi- 
 nion, that of mankind all will be faved : Mr, 
 Toplady afferts that many will be faved : the 
 rigid Calvinifts, that there will be very few. 
 But this is all furmife; and arifes from the 
 pride of human reafon, which will determine, 
 though there may be no grounds for deter- 
 rnination. Thefe notions do not affedb the 
 article of Predeftination, which you all main- 
 tain alike ; though you on your part would fain 
 make a diftindlion. The Calvinifts, you tell 
 ^Sj differ from you in this : their fyftem intirely 
 
 excludes 
 
[" "4 ] 
 
 excludes the popular notion of free- will, viz. the 
 liberty or power af doirpgy what we pleafe, vir^ 
 tuousy or vicious, as belonging to every perfon in 
 every Jit uat ion : which is perfeEily conjiftent with 
 the do^rine of philofophical Necejftty ; and indeed 
 refults from it. p. 158. If, as you here fay, 
 liberty be confiftent with your fyflem, how 
 came you at any time to give it up, and to 
 make void in one place, what you maintain in 
 another ? Be pleafed. Sir, to attend to your 
 own words, which I have been obliged more 
 than once to allude to. / was not, however , a 
 ready convert to the do5lrine of Necejftty, — 1 gave 
 up my liberty with great reluctance ; and in a long 
 correfpondence, which I once had upon the fubjeCly 
 I n^aintained very Jirenuoufly the do^rine of Li^ 
 herty — (Preface p. xxxi.) but it feems you 
 finally renounced it : and all through your 
 treatife have been arguing for an abfolute Ne- 
 cefTity. How this is confiftent with what you 
 maintain here, I know not : or with that, 
 which you elfewhere infift upon through an 
 hundred and thirty pages. You, like all 
 other Prcdcftinarians, hold that every thing 
 has been ordained from the beginning 3 and is 
 enforced by an irrefiftible influence, fo that no- 
 thing could have been otherwife^ than it has 
 -•»••• been. 
 
[ 125 ] 
 
 been. You afterwards fpeak of the difpofition of 
 man, and the tendency of his mind: upon which 
 you make your fuppofed liberty to depend, (p. 
 64.) But hew comes it, when all things were 
 antecedently determined, that the difpofition of 
 man Ihould have been left free ? When all our 
 adlions, and all our thoughts, were under a pre- 
 vious irrefiflible influence : when neither our 
 good works, nor our evil, originate in ourfelves; 
 when all our inclinations are biafled and even 
 forced 5 how is it pofTible for the difpofition to 
 enjoy this freedom? The world, I fear. Sir, will 
 hardly think you fincere in thefe your opinions. 
 For it is certain, that what you grant in one 
 place, you make void in another. 
 
 You fuppofe throughout, that there has been 
 anuninterupted chain of caufes and efFe(5ls : and 
 that the foreknowledge of the Deity arifes from 
 hence, and from hence only. And, as all events 
 are open to his view, that he judges from hence 
 concerning things to come j and has no other 
 means of judging. You proceed farther upon 
 thefe premifes, and infer, that as the Deity 
 forefees things, which happen, they therefore 
 could not be otherwife, than they always are, 
 and upon this you found your dodrine of 
 
 Neceflitjf : 
 
{ 1*6 ] 
 
 is^ccefTity : as if, had things happened othefwlft?^ 
 they would not have, been equally forefeen by 
 the Deity. Hence it is, that like other Pre- 
 deflinarians, you are led to fuppofe an una- 
 voidable and Uncontrollable influence over all 
 our thoughts and adtions. But as I have re- 
 peatedly faid, Foreknowledge has no more in- 
 fluence over what is to come, than retrofped 
 has upon what is paft ; or immediate intuition 
 on that, which is before us. Yet upon this 
 you found your Neceflity, and think it a new 
 difcovery. But it is the fame as the Fate of the 
 Stoics ; which has been canvafied for ages. 
 They maintained the fame chain of caufes and 
 effedts : from whence they deduced their doc- 
 trine both of Necefllty and Fate. In this they 
 were not uniform : but each explained his no- 
 tions according to his own fancy, and as argu- 
 ments arofe, which feemed to accord to his 
 favourite fyfl:em. The Philofopher Heraclitus 
 held, that all things were ordered by an inevi- 
 table impulfe j which he termed ocvKym and 
 si^ciffAiviiy Neceffity and Fate. Others feparated 
 thefe two, and diflinguifhed between them: 
 maintaining, that the will and the anions of 
 men, were determined only by £»^aap,u«i/7j. Fate. 
 Avayxn, Neceffity^ was at blind, inevitable, and 
 
 overbearing 
 
[ 1^7 ] 
 
 overbearing power, not always admitted ; but 
 nfAcxpiA.zvYt, Fate, confifted of a feries and combi^ 
 nation of caufes by appointment: (ru/xTrXextrv atriwy 
 riT»y{xtv7\v ; and by this all human affairs were 
 fuppofed to be determined. Plutarch de Plac. 
 Philof. 1. i. c. xxix. p. 885. Cicero fpeaks 
 to the fame purpofe. Fatum autem id appello, 
 quod GriEci H/Aa^|tx£v>iv : id efl, ordinem feriem- 
 que caufarum 5 cum caufas caufa ncxa rem ex 
 fe gignat. Ea eft ex omni asternitate fluens 
 Veritas fempiterna. De Divinatione. The 
 fame was the opinion of Chryfippus the Stoic. 
 Fatum eft, inquit, fempiterna quaedam et in- 
 declinabilis feries rerum, et catena volvens fe- 
 metipfa fefe, et implicans per setcrnas confc- 
 quentise ordines, &c. A. Gcll. 1. vi. c. 2. 
 
 But the antients were not unanimous fn 
 their opinions upon this head. They not only 
 doubted from whence the necelTity fpoken of 
 proceeded ; but they alfo varied about the ex- 
 tent and influence of fate. It was apparent 
 that fo much evil as Well as inconfiftency 
 arofe from it, that they were, many of them, 
 at laft obliged to compromife matters, and to 
 allow, that though fome things were dirccfled 
 5 by 
 
t »28' ] 
 
 by a fuperiour influence i yet that others wefc 
 left to the free will of man. — cor£ roc i^iy ufAup^ou, 
 rxh «vn,aap6a{. Plut. ibid. So that fome things 
 were fubje^i to Fate; but others not fo. You, 
 Sir, are pleafed to go beyond thefe Philo- 
 fophers upon their own principles : and inftfl 
 upon an univerfal and abfalute necefTity. Had 
 the fages above partaken of the falutary light, 
 which we now enjoy, their Fate would probably 
 have amounted to no morcy than the order and 
 inftitution of things, and the general interpofi- 
 tion of Providence, by which the world is fu- 
 perintended : and by which we are occafionally 
 diredled. The Stoic Boethus acknowledged> 
 like others, a feries of caufes, which he termed 
 Fate : yet he feems to have meant little more 
 hy it, than the common courfe and order of na- 
 
 turc* Er* ^i ii\f.oi.p\hiyy\ a»Ti« twv cktwv lipofAtvriy jcaS* 
 ov Mtr^Aoq htj^xytrai. Fate is a ferus of caufesy 
 conne5fed as it were hy a chain > in other wordsy 
 that reafon and influence, by which the world is 
 carried on, Diog. Laert. Zeno. p. 459, This 
 is the purport of the words, when explained, 
 Chryfippus feems to have been of the fame 
 opinion : for he was againft Necejfity, though 
 he argued for Fate. He maintained — Et/Aap- 
 ^fv?)v n}iok% (pwcTixijk cvvTo^J^iy Tuv QKm: that Fate was 
 
 nothing 
 
[ ^29 ] 
 
 nDihing hut the natural connexion of things in the 
 univerfe, A. Gellius fupra. Stobjeus, fpeak- 
 ing of the Stoical tenets, feems to define it ex- 
 prefsly to be the fuperintendence of God. 
 
 Aoyov Twj* ly tw xo<r[xu irfovoia, $iOiyiiSfji.iv(joy» 7%e ef- 
 tahlijhed reafon and order ^ by which through PrO'- 
 vidence the things of the world are governed* 
 Stobaei Phyfic. 
 
 You are therefore in fome degree miflaken, 
 when you affirm, that what the ancients have 
 faid oh the fuhje5f is altogether foreign to the pur- 
 pofe : their Fate being quite a different thing from 
 the NeceJJity of the moderns. For though they had 
 an idea of the certainty of the final events of fome 
 things^ they had no idea of the neceffaiy connection 
 cf all the preceding means to bring [about the de- 
 figned end', and leaji of all, had they any jufi 
 idea, of the mechanifm of the mind, depending 
 upon the certain influence of motives to determijie 
 the will ; by means of which the whole feries of 
 events, from the beginning of the world to thi 
 confummation of all things, makes one connected 
 ihain of caufes and effects ^ &c. &c. Preface. 
 p. XXV. It is feen from the quotations above, 
 that their Fate was deduced from the fame 
 principles, on which you found your doctrine 
 
 K of 
 
[ 130 ] 
 
 of Necejfity, Both depend upon a long chain 
 of caufes exprefsly lb mentioned : fo that your 
 fyftem is far from having in it any thing new. 
 Only thus much is to be obferved, that the 
 more moderate of the Philofophers of old, and 
 among the reft Chryfippus, did not carry their 
 opinions to the fame length, as you have done. 
 For however you may extenuate in fome places, 
 what you have faid i yet you infift upon ahfo- 
 lute necejfity, p. i8: and that no event could 
 have been otherwife^ than it has been, iSy or is to 
 he, p. 8. Some of the wifeft among the an- 
 cients thought the arguments, drawn from a 
 fuppofed chain of events, to be equivocal .and 
 dangerous, as they deprived people of free 
 will, and led many to defperation. Among 
 thefe was Cicero, ^i introducunt caufarum 
 feriem fempiternam, ii mentem hominum neceffitate 
 devinciunt. Cicero de Fato. p. 1283. He far- 
 ther mentions that Chryfippus had fo embar- 
 raffed himfelf by his fyftem of caufes and ef- 
 fects, that he could not well clear himfelf of 
 the dangerous confequences, which followed; 
 and which he difavowed. Chryfippus aut em cum 
 et neceffitatem improharet^ et nihil vellet fine pra- 
 pofitis caufis evenire^ caufarum genera difiinguity 
 tit et necejfitatm ^fftigiat^ et re tinea t Fatum. Ibid. 
 
 Thii 
 
[ 131 ] 
 
 This very learned and acute Philofopher makes 
 the following conclufion ; wherein he deter- 
 nnines the controverfy between Chryfippus, and 
 thofe, who oppofed him. Omninoquey cum hac 
 Jit diftin^ioy ut ift qiiibufdam rebus vere did 
 pojjity cum ha caufce antegrejja fint^ non effe in 
 7icftrd poteftatCy qtiin ilU eveniant, quorum caufa 
 fuerint : quihufdam autem in rebuSy caufis ante^ 
 greJfiSy in noftrd tamen effe poteftatCy ut aliud aliter 
 eveniat: banc diftin£lionem utrique approbant. Ibid, 
 p. 1284. From hence, I think, we may have 
 the opinion of Cicero, who allows, that there 
 are fome caufes, which in the courfe of things 
 muft inevitably take place. But there are 
 other caufes, whofe influence and tendency 
 may be oppofed and furmounted, fo that con- 
 trary to your notion, a thing, which at any 
 time happened, might have happened otherwifcy 
 if we had chofen it. By thefe means the will 
 is left free ; and the mind quite at liberty in 
 refped to Neceffity and Fate. 
 
 From the above you will fee. Sir, that your 
 opinion is by no means new : but has been 
 long ago. canvafled, and confuted. You fay, 
 that in the profecution of your fyftem, you 
 have been led chiefly by Collins, Hume, and 
 K - Hobbes. 
 
[ 1^2 I 
 
 Hobbes. What chain of caufes was it, wftiu 
 fatal neceflity^ that linked you with this inglor 
 rious triumvirate ? For however high you, and 
 foine others, may rate thefe writers : yet, who- 
 ever abufes his talents, and writes with an ill 
 defign, is in my eye inglorious. And I am 
 forry to fay, that there was no neceflity in the 
 cafe, nor any abfolute decree, which forced 
 yt>u into this alTociation. It was quite a volun- 
 tary a6t: and we may too plainly perceive, that 
 a confonnity of opinion, and an approbatiort 
 of their dodrines, led you to a union with thefe 
 perfons. This has been a great misfortune i 
 for the world would have been glad to have 
 found Dn Priefbly in better company. 
 
 There is a pafTage, Sir, as far back^ as your 
 dedication, which I fhould be unwilling to 
 pafs by unnoticed. It is v/here you are fpeak- 
 ing of your principles, and have the following 
 words. In thefe principles alone do we find a 
 ferfe5i coincidence between true religion and phi- 
 lofophy ; and ly the help of the latter, we are able 
 to demonflrate the excellence of the moral precepts 
 of the former, p. xv. This is paying a poor 
 compliment to the facred writings, and to the 
 precepts contained in them, to think, they 
 a ftand 
 
 I 
 
 j 
 
[ ^33 ] 
 
 ftand in need of any fuch feeble fuppbrt. Be- 
 fides it is inverting the order of things : for 
 the philofophy of the world fhould be tried by 
 the Scriptures : and not the Scriptures by the 
 opinions of men: unlefs you give up a mate- 
 rial article ; and will not allow the Scriptures 
 to be the word of God. Ill has it always 
 fared with religion, when the morality and 
 dodtrines of the facred writings have been mo- 
 delled and interpreted according to the fafhion 
 of the world, and the, opinions of conceited 
 men> fallly called philofophy. I am fenfible, 
 that genuine philofophy cannot bq repugnant 
 to the Scriptures : but where is it to be found ? 
 Oftentimes what is ftiled philofophy to-day, is-, 
 abfurdity to-morrow : yet we would fain warp 
 the Scriptures, and level them to our own ca- 
 pacity : and call this demonjiration. This mode 
 of illuflration began very early y and was car- 
 ried on by Juftin and Clemens, and fo on by 
 other of the Fathers to the time of Origen. It 
 has at intervals been revived, and brought down 
 to the prefent times. But though there have: 
 been advantages of much confequence accruing; 
 from the-ftore of learning introduced, by thefe^, 
 rrieans, yet religion itfelf has often been.huxt: 
 by. it. Many have engaged themfelves ii> thi^ 
 
 purfuit 
 
[ '34 1 
 
 purfuit with a good intent : but we have reafon 
 to fear, that others have made ufe of thefe fo- 
 reign helps with an evil defign; that they 
 might corrupt by a feeming improvement ; and 
 ruin by afFefting to eftablifh. This, Sir, I 
 truft, is not the cafe with you : though I ad- 
 mire, that you did not fee the fatal confe- 
 quences of your fyftem. You take notice of 
 feveral perfons of note, who have written more 
 or lefs on the fame fubjeft -, yet they have none 
 of them in your opinion been "J^recifely in the 
 right. Mr. Locke is greatly miftaken : Pref. 
 p. xxix. Mr. Edwards is not always to the 
 purpofe : p. 122. Mr. Hobbes fails /« his folu- 
 tion of the difficulty : p. 118. And laftly Mr. 
 Hume, p. 118. intirely abandons the do5frine of 
 Neceffity to the moft immoral and fhocking confe- 
 que?ices. I fhoul^ have thought, that the lapfcs 
 of thefe perfons might fortunately have led 
 you to have fufpe6ted your own ftrength ; and 
 rendered you lefs fanguine and determinate. 
 As to the confequences from Mr. Hume's 
 Hating of the cafe, which appear fo immoral 
 and fhocking i the very fame arife from your 
 own principles, however you may try to evade 
 them. You may fhift your ground, and 
 endeavour to fhake them off; but they 
 
 flick 
 
[ 135 ] 
 
 ftick like the fhirt of Hercules : and attend 
 you, wherever you go. You mention the dif- 
 pofition of nnan, as an expedient to qualify 
 matters : and fpeak of the ultimate and in- 
 tention, when a train of evils are introduced. 
 But this will not prove a fatisfadory anfwer to 
 the Sceptic and Atheift. They will hardly 
 think, that by this fubterfuge you get rid of 
 the difficulty, when the old demand is made— 
 IloOfv TO Kxxov. You will not perfuade them, 
 nor indeed any reafonable perfon, that good 
 and evil depend upon intention -, and that any 
 purpofe of the agent can make them change 
 their nature. You will have many objedions 
 ftill made: and many perplexing queflions 
 afked. Of fome I have already taken notice : 
 particularly of thofe introduced by Mr, Hume ; 
 as you quote him. To thefe you have given 
 no fatisfaclory anfwer ; nor can you upon your 
 principles : though the difficulty may be, and 
 I trufl, has been fatisfa^lorily folved. The 
 fame fhocking confequences, which he draws 
 from the dodlrine of Neceffity, mud necefTarily 
 follow from your fyilem : which indeed is the 
 very fame, which he has embraced, and which 
 he boldly defends. It is in vain to talk of the 
 difpofition of mans and the intention, when 
 
 evil 
 
C 136 J 
 
 evil is created. Thefe expedients are of little 
 weight. According to your fyftrem, evil is 
 fuppofed to be neceflary and unavoidable. Is 
 it not then more rational to refer what is called 
 moral evil to the abufe of liberty in man; 
 than to the all-wife and all-powerful Deity, the 
 Father of all purity and goodnefs ? That there 
 is a falling off we both allow : but we differ in 
 the caufe. By me it is imputed to man, and 
 to the abufe of his powers : By you, to that 
 God, who is all perfedbion, who fpeaks of it 
 as an abomination : and denounces his ven- 
 geance againft it. 
 
 THE END. 
 
6-ZS--3 
 
 3. 
 

 :m§Mm)^f^R^ 
 
 
 ''^'^s^ssmmmm 
 
 'Mm^^^^^k 
 
 ,;^»BB"-"'«»J#|*Sj;?RgR'i»ftS.RS 
 
 
 M^'^^wm^^zy^ 
 
 ■"^^;^ 
 
 P<ii^t^f*if:it:i^^-^f<r: 
 
 ■-?^««« 
 
 
 ,«r9»A«,R522' 
 
 ,«;RX'M»S?^!