DUKE UNIVERSITY WOMAN’S COLLEGE LIBRARY GIFT OF Duke University Press. IVe take pleasure in presenting this book for your editorial use. May we request two copies of your notice, which should not appear be¬ fore the date of publication: J(Jt « 20 19S3 Price: c 4 5 q 1-i Duke University PrMs College Station, Box 6697 Durham, North Carolina SN- BN SN- »*■ »*• BN- Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/economicsofwartiOOolso The Economics of the Wartime Shortage To my parents The Economics of the n Wartime Shortage A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II Mancur Olson, Jr. Duke University Press Durham, North Carolina 1963 (C) 1963, Duke University Press Library of Congress Catalogue Card number 63-17328 Cambridge University Press, London N.W.i, England Printed in the United States of America by the Seeman Printery, Inc., Durham, N. C. Acknowledgments The author is indebted not only to the many individuals who have helped him with this study, but also to several institutions. First, to University College, Oxford, where he first acquired an interest in the economic history of Great Britain. Second, to Harvard University, where this study began, and where Professors Alexander Gerschenkron and J. K. Galbraith gave him exceptional amounts of help and criticism. Third, to Princeton University, where the study was continued with the aid of the Princeton University faculty research fund. Last, but most notably, the author thanks the United States Air Force Academy and the Air Force Academy Foun¬ dation, the two institutions that have given his research on this topic by far the most generous support. The author has completed this study during his two-year tenure on the faculty of the Air Force Academy, where he has received con¬ tinuous assistance and encouragement. He is especially thankful to General Robert F. McDermott, Dean of the Faculty, to Colonel Wayne A. Yeoman, Head of the De¬ partment of Economics and Geography, and to Mr. William Kim of the Air Force Academy Foundation. vi Acknowledgments This study has also benefitted from several helpful critics, especially Professor Thomas Wilson and Dr. Alan Holmans of Glasgow University, Mr. Walter Minchinton of the Uni¬ versity College of Swansea, Mr. R. J. Hammond of the Stanford Food Research Institute, and Dr. Sterie T. Beza, a former colleague in the Department of Economics at Princeton University. The author is also deeply grateful to his wife, Alison G. Olson, for her unfailing encouragement and her help in improving the exposition. None of these critics is, however, in any way responsible for the faults that remain. Contents 1. Introduction: A Theory of Wartime Shortages 2. Food and Fear of War 33 3. The Wars with France, 1793-1814 49 4. World War I 73 5. World War II 117 6. Summary and Conclusion 132 Index 148 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage I. Introduction: A Theory of Wartime Shortages There has been a significant similarity in all three of the major wars Great Britain has fought since the advent of the Industrial Revolution. In the Napoleonic War, as in World Wars I and II, Britain’s enemies tried to defeat her through economic strangulation. In the Napoleonic War the Continental System and in the two world wars the submarine campaigns were used in attempts to choke the strength and life out of the British nation. This similarity in the histories of these three major wars deserves careful attention for two reasons. First, Great Brit¬ ain is of all major nations the most heavily dependent on foreign trade, or the furthest from self-sufficiency, so its ex¬ perience in these wars should reveal most clearly the eco¬ nomic effects of a disruption of international trade. Britain has been dependent on imports not only for much of the raw material needed for its industry, but also for most of the food needed by its people. It is of all major nations the most industrialized in the sense that it has the smallest proportion of its resources devoted to agriculture. A high degree of dependence on imports is often a source of anxiety. Prob¬ ably no argument for tariffs has been accepted by economists for as long as that which pleads against dependence on im- 4 The Economics o£ the Wartime Shortage ports on grounds of defense. 1 Even Adam Smith conceded that “Defence ... is of much more importance than opu¬ lence. . . .” 2 Many nations have taken measures in peace¬ time to reduce their dependence on imports in any future war. Some nations, especially Germany, in the past have protected their agricultural sectors to insure an adequate supply of food in wartime. 3 Great Britain and the United States more recently have maintained stockpiles of food or raw materials to prepare for such contingencies. 4 The United States has limited oil imports partly out of strategic consider¬ ations. 5 British experience with losses of vital imports in the last three great world conflicts should be useful in any assessment of the policies that a nation uses to prepare against wartime shortages and blockades. Second, this similarity in British experiences during those three wars deserves study because it is an important and neglected aspect of British economic history. The similarity in the problem Great Britain faced in each of these wars gives unity to an historical study. It is not merely that Brit¬ ain faced the same problem in each war; it is also that she used some of the same methods in attempts to overcome the problem in each case, and that she was able to overcome it each and every time. It is more than that Britain was in each war on the winning side. The British economy has not only endured these interruptions of its trade: it has pre¬ vailed over them. In each of these wars the capacity of the 1. Edmund Silberner, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Eco¬ nomic Thought (Princeton, 1946); Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1943), pp. 1 1 7 * 54 - 2. Wealth of Nations (6th Cannan ed., 2 vols.; London, 1950), I, 429. 3. See below, pp. 74-75 and pp. 114-16. 4. U.S., Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Planning, Stockpile Report to the Congress, January-June, 1961 (Washington, D.C., 1961); Great Britain, “Statement on Defence, February, 1956" (London, 1956), Cmd. 9691, pp. 27-28; Great Britain, House of Commons, Select Com¬ mittee on Estimates, Second Report, Session 1959-60 (London, i960), esp. pp. 120-23. 5. James Terry Duce, “The Changing Oil Industry,” Foreign Affairs, XL (July, 1962), 628-29. See also General Lucius Clay’s comments, reported in New York Times (Western Edition), March 27, 1963. Introduction 5 British economy to survive and to counter the shortages it suffered has surpassed the expectations of those concerned. The authors of scores of books, pamphlets, and articles, both scholarly and polemical, have considered this aspect of one or the other of these three wars, but no one has summarized this literature, much less made any systematic study of the common problem which Britain encountered in all three. The historical problem is, moreover, one which should in¬ terest the economist as well as the historian, for as this book should make clear, the insights of economic theory provide a key to an understanding of the problem. The unity of the topic is especially evident in the case of food. Britain first became dependent upon foreign food supplies before the struggle against Revolutionary and Na¬ poleonic France. 6 During part of this long struggle, and again during both the world wars, Britain was deprived of most of its normal imports of food. In each of these wars Great Britain undertook many of the same adjustments in its system of agricultural production and in its pattern of food consumption in the successful attempts to counter the shortages it suffered. The wartime losses of food supplies, which will receive most of the attention in this study, also have attracted the most attention and concern in the past. The British main¬ tain a “Strategic Food Stockpile,’’ but keep its size and com¬ position secret. 7 In Britain the possibility of a loss of food 6. Although Britain became a net importer of wheat in the 1760’s, im¬ ports were not generally a significant part of total consumption until just before the French Revolution (Great Britain, Customs Tariffs of the United Kingdom, C. 8706, pp. 256-58). 7. “Information about the administration and composition of the Food Stockpile is withheld on security grounds in the national interest.... The Strategic Food Stockpile is held by the Government in a number of suitable stores spread over the United Kingdom; it consists largely of basic food¬ stuffs in ready-to-eat condition, or as near as possible to that condition. These stocks are in addition to any . . . commercial stocks . . .” (letter to the author from Brigadier J. R. Reynolds, Emergency Services Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, of July 27, 1962; see also Great Britain, “Statement on Defence, February, 1956,” Cmd. 9691). 6 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage imports often has provoked intense anxiety. This is perhaps partly because food imports have made up the largest single part of British cargo imports in the aggregate, and some¬ times accounted for almost half of the total weight. 8 This anxiety about food supplies may also be due in part to the fact that the primary purpose of Germany’s submarine at¬ tacks, particularly in World War I, was to defeat England by starvation. 9 Food often has been regarded, both by Brit¬ ain and by her enemies, as the weakest link in Britain’s chain of defense. The possibilities of famine have attracted more concern than other types of shortages because food obviously is in¬ dispensable to life. 10 Thus it usually is assumed that a na¬ tion can spare manufactured goods and services more easily than it can spare food. If a good part of a nation’s supplies of manufactured goods is lost it is unfortunate, but if a good part of its food supplies is lost it is fatal. In the Napoleonic and world wars alike the shortages of food have been Brit¬ ain’s major complaint. And as later parts of this study will show, each of these wars brought insistent demands that Britain permanently expand its agriculture, or acquire a reserve of food, to guard against future wartime food short¬ ages. But there have not been many corresponding demands that Britain should attempt to protect itself against future shortages of other things. Almost certainly Great Britain and most of the nations of the Continent produce much more food at home than their strictly economic interests would 8. See below, pp. no-11 and pp. 128-29. 9. Letter of Transmittal and Memorial of the Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy, Admiral von Holtzendorff, to Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, of December 22, 1916, on Necessity of an Unre¬ stricted U-boat War, published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Official German Documents Relating to the World War (2 vols.; New York, 1923), II, 1214-77. 10. General Erich Ludendorff gave considerable emphasis to the par¬ ticular importance of food supplies to a nation at war. See his The Nation at War (London, 1936), pp. 66-70; his The General Staff and Its Problems (2 vols.; London, 1920), I, 195-99; and his My War Memories (2 vols.; Lon¬ don, 1919), I, 349-55. Introduction 7 dictate; they could get many types of food from countries such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States at less cost than by producing them domestic¬ ally. These European nations passed many of the tariffs and other measures that have stimulated their domestic food output partly (though probably not mainly) because they did not like to be dependent on imports of foreign food. 11 In short, food is regarded as an absolutely essential prod¬ uct. Some types of goods are necessities, others are luxuries, and still others fall between these two poles. But food is always assumed to be the clearest example of a necessity. If the total loss of all kinds of food were in question, this belief no doubt would be correct. But in practice a nation never need fear that it would be completely without all kinds of food. It might be confronted with serious short¬ ages, but not with a situation such that it had no sources of food whatever. Every nation—even Britain, the most depend¬ ent on foreign food—grows some of its food at home. It is shortages—losses of part of the customary supply—that are the practical problem. These shortages could be so severe that they would lead to widespread starvation, and to the defeat of a nation. But no doubt they still would involve only a portion of a nation’s normal food supplies. Actually, therefore, when partial losses of food supplies are at issue, the idea that food is more essential than most other types of goods is false. The classification of products as essential or non-essential is not only misleading: it is wrong as well. Statements such as these will not be believed unless convincing arguments and supporting evidence are offered. The supporting historical evidence must wait for later chapters, but the logic of the argument can be given here. Assume a hypothetical consumer who is interested in getting as much satisfaction out of his income as he can. 11. See below, pp. 74-75 and pp. 114-16. 8 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage Ordinarily, he will buy many types of goods. And it should generally be true that after a point a consumer will feel that as he consumes more of a given type of product, ad¬ ditional units of that product will come to have a decreasing utility to him; they will bring progressively smaller incre¬ ments of satisfaction. If a person were to spend 95 per cent of his income on travel, and 5 per cent of his income on food, he would find, unless he were very rich, that he had to eat plain and unsatisfactory food. His fancy for travel on the other hand might very nearly be satiated. The last few pennies he spent on travel might bring him, say, perhaps one tenth as much satisfaction as the last few pennies he spent on food. If this were true, he could make himself better off by spending a few pennies more on food and a few pen¬ nies less on travel. If he did this he would get, we assume, ten times as much satisfaction out of those last few pennies. But why stop there? If he wants the maximum benefit from his income, he will continue spending less on travel and more on food until the last penny he spends on travel brings the same amount of satisfaction as the last penny he spends on food. The reader will recognize the foregoing argument as a simplified illustration of the economist’s elementary theory of consumer choice. This tendency for the last unit of money spent on each type of good to bring the same subjective benefit to the consumer as the last unit of money spent on any other, while subject to many qualifications, is very im¬ portant to an understanding of shortages. It suggests the presumption that the consumer would feel more or less equal¬ ly deprived whichever type of good he lost, so long as he did not lose something like his entire supply. It leads also to the conclusion that it is wrong to say one type of good is essential and another is not. There are some low priority, or inessential, uses of every type of good. There is no necessary relation between the tragedy caused by the total lack of a Introduction 9 particular kind of goods and the difficulty involved in getting along without part of the normal supply. This point can best be illustrated by considering water, an absolute necessity of life. If a country were deprived of part of its supplies of water, it would need to restrict its irrigation, its watering of lawns, its washing of automobiles, and it might have to build more dams, viaducts, reservoirs, wells, and so on. It might be costly and inconvenient for a country to get along without part of its water supply, but a partial shortage of water is not necessarily fatal. Compare a partial loss of water supplies with the effects of a country’s losing part of its supply of automobiles or television sets. Plainly life can exist without automobiles or airplanes or television sets; equally plainly it cannot exist without water. Yet if a nation lost a small proportion of its automobiles and television sets, and an equally small pro¬ portion of its water supply, it is not clear that it would suffer more from the latter than the former. In the average modem society, automobiles and television sets are very costly. The average person in the United States or Great Britain, for example, must devote a larger proportion of his income to automobiles and television sets than to water. Accordingly, it might well be that he would “suffer” more from a partial deprivation of luxuries like automobiles and television sets than he would from a partial deprivation of a necessity of life like water. At least one cannot be certain that the opposite would always be true. This rather curious illustration proves at least how wrong it is to speak of goods as necessities or luxuries. Water is thought a necessity, but sometimes it is used for swimming pools or decorative foun¬ tains; automobiles are thought to be something of a luxury, yet they perform many essential functions in a modern econ¬ omy. It is not the type of good, but the type of use that distinguishes a necessity from a luxury. The theory of consumer behavior illustrated above shows io The Economics of the Wartime Shortage that the loss of part of the customary supply of water need be no worse than the loss of part of the customary supply of goods of a luxury type. Since there is a tendency for a con¬ sumer to get the same degree of satisfaction or benefit out of his marginal expenditure on all types of goods, it follows that generally the importance of a unit of a “necessity” like water will bear the same relation to the importance of a unit of a “luxury” good that the price of the “necessity” bears to the price of the “luxury.” The difficulty of getting along without part of the usual supply of a good should vary roughly with the importance of that good in a person’s budget. That a nation may lose part of its supply of food and suffer no more than if it had lost part of its supply of other things can be illustrated much more directly. Wheat and grains generally are thought the most elementary necessities of life. But these products have their luxury uses too. Grain may be used whole to make a dark, economical, and nu¬ tritious bread. Or the hull and the other parts of the kernel often thought to be less tasty may be removed, and the re¬ mainder used to make a more expensive, luxurious, white bread. Or the grain may be fed to livestock, to produce delectable steaks. These steaks will be in some sense wasteful of the grain and will be much more expensive, since it takes five to ten pounds of grain to produce a pound of meat. Or the grain may be used to make whiskey, which is still more expensive and still more a luxury. The upshot is that con¬ sumers can consume a necessity like grain with more or less luxury. Naturally if grain is not especially expensive, peo¬ ple can afford to use it for non-essential purposes, or to con¬ sume it in luxurious or expensive ways. Again, it is not particular goods that are luxuries, but particular uses of goods that are luxurious. The idea that some types of products are especially es¬ sential also has been applied to industrial raw materials. Introduction 11 Raw materials provide the food that is vital to the life of modern industry. While perhaps less essential than food, raw materials are regarded as more nearly essential than manufactured products or services. 12 Food and raw mate¬ rials—the products of the earth—are called “primary prod¬ ucts” and are distinguished from manufactured or “second¬ ary” products and services or “tertiary” production. 13 The word “primary” itself suggests the special importance or indispensability of the products of the earth. Though no one now agrees with the physiocrats that primary products are the only source of value, many seem to view possible losses of primary products with special anxiety. This must be true of those who are concerned about the conservation of natural resources; other types of conservation are not often considered. That industrial raw materials at least are some¬ times thought particularly indispensable is evident from the stockpiling policies of the United States and (to a lesser extent) Britain since World War II. The United States has spent 8.6 billion dollars on its stockpile of critical raw ma¬ terials, 14 and has not done anything on even a remotely com¬ parable scale to protect against future shortages of secondary or tertiary production. Britain for a time at least main¬ tained a considerable stockpile of industrial raw materials (as well as food), but any present holdings are hidden be¬ hind a mask of official secrecy. 15 The concern of the British 12. On this subject see these interesting studies: Major John Dunn, "American Dependence on Materials Imports,” Journal of Conflict Resolu¬ tion, IV (March, i960), 106-22; E. S. Mason, "American Security and Access to Raw Materials,”. World Politics, I (Jan., 1949), 147-60; Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton, 1956); Walter Voskuil, Minerals in World Industry (New York, 1955); T. S. Lovering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York, 1943); C. K. Keith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C., 1943). 13. Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress (3rd ed.; London, > 957 )- 14. U.S. Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Stockpile Report to the Congress, January-June, i<)6o (since 1961 these reports have been issued by the Office of Emergency Planning, which succeeded the OCDM); U.S. News and World Report, LII (Feb. 12, 1962), 71. 15. “In 1947, the Government decided to build up strategic reserves of is The Economics of the Wartime Shortage government for oil supplies however was openly revealed when it engaged in its expensive expedition to capture the Suez Canal. 16 The United States also limits imports of oil partly out of strategic motives. 17 At least two reasons might be used to justify the conten¬ tion that a loss of raw materials would be more damaging than a loss of secondary or tertiary production. First, raw materials are seemingly not replaceable. When a nation is short of a manufactured product it can manufacture more of that product, if it has the needed raw materials, but when it is short of a raw material it cannot make more, however much manufacturing capacity it might have. Secondly, the loss of a raw material presumably would reverberate through an entire economy, stopping production all along the line, while this would not be so likely to happen because of the shortage of a manufactured product. If a nation is short of materials that would be essential and difficult to obtain in an emergency.... The commodities were chosen and the target quantities fixed on the basis of the strategic assumptions at the time; the intention was to provide, after taking into account commercial stocks, for defence production and essential civilian uses. “In the Government’s Statement on Defence of February, 1956, it was stated: ‘The strategic holdings of industrial raw materials are large and, in the light of the new priorities, can be run down to some extent without risk. The Government have decided to make a start on this in 1956-57_’ Substantial disposals were made in 1956 and the following year. The com¬ position and size of the stocks to be retained was reconsidered from time to time, and responsibility for the ‘retained’ stocks was transferred on 1st April, 1959, from the Board of Trade to the Ministry of Supply." No infor¬ mation on the number or amounts of commodities “retained" was given, but some idea of the magnitude of the stockpile at least at one time is evident from the fact that some 74 materials weighing more than 2,000,000 tons and stored in 1,236 depots have been released from the strategic stock¬ pile for sale, and it is expected that the sale of these amounts and items no longer considered strategic will be completed by 1964. (Memorandum submitted by the Board of Trade to the Select Committee on Estimates, and published in the Second Report of that committee, Session 1959-60, pp. 120- 23 ) 16. See William F. Longwood, Suez Story (New York, 1957), pp. 142-68; and Europe’s Need for Oil, published by the Organization for European Eco¬ nomic Cooperation, Paris, 1958. 17. Woodford Heflin, "The Factor of Oil in the Military Problem," (Maxwell Field, Ala.: Air University Documentary Research Study No. 7, mimeographed, 1947), and Duce, "Changing Oil Industry.” On the general concern about oil supplies, see Pierre l’Espagnol de la Tramerye, The World Struggle for Oil (New York, 1924). Introduction 13 petroleum, it will not only have to suffer the loss of this one thing; it will also suffer shortages of the many things that are produced with the help of petroleum . 18 So intricate and in¬ terdependent is the modern economy that a shortage of even a minor raw material may cause profound dislocations. Some Allied planners in World War II, for example, believed that if the Nazis could be deprived of their supplies of molybde¬ num, a minor metal, they could be driven to defeat . 19 Per¬ haps reasons such as these explain the special concern to protect nations against future shortages of raw materials. The weakness in policies that assume industrial raw ma¬ terials are, like food, more nearly indispensable than most other things can be shown by looking at a producer inter¬ ested in maximizing his profits. The producer is in a posi¬ tion logically very much like that of the hypothetical con¬ sumer considered earlier. He uses several different factors of production, just as a consumer purchases several different consumption goods. The producer finds that because of the law of diminishing returns after a point additional incre¬ ments of any one factor of production will bring only dimin¬ ishing additions to his production; if the producer adds more labor, say, to a given amount of machinery he will find in time that additional laborers add less to production than the first laborers did. Just as the consumer could in¬ crease his satisfaction from a given income by making certain that the last penny he spent on each type of goods brought the same amount of satisfaction, so the producer finds that he will get the maximum production from a given amount of resources, if he uses different raw materials, machinery, and labor—all different factors of production—in such a way that the last penny spent on each factor of production adds as much to total output as the last penny spent on any other 18. On this subject see U. S. Air Force Historical Division, Air Uni¬ versity, The Development of Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-41, USAF Historical Studies, No. 89 (Sept., 1955), pp. 57-58. 19. Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (New York, 1947), pp. 220-21. 14 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage factor of production. From this it would seem that in gen¬ eral one factor of production would be no more essential than any other, or perhaps that the degree of essentiality of a factor of production could roughly be measured by the amount the producer spent for it. The economist’s expectation that the marginal value product of a factor of production will tend to equal its price also means that it should often take about the same amount of productive resources to replace any good, whether it be a raw material or some other good used in production, or food or some other good for final consumption. Thus, not only is it generally as easy to substitute directly for pri¬ mary products, by using other things, as it is to substitute for non-primary products, but it is also generally as easy to substitute indirectly for primary products, by using more resources to produce more of what is missing, as it is to substitute for non-primary products. The extent to which an economy can substitute for short¬ ages of raw materials or food, or for that matter anything else, is quite remarkable. Any modern economy faces chang¬ ing supplies of different commodities or products quite fre¬ quently, whenever there is a strike, a bad crop, a new tariff, or any other such change, but most of these “shortages” are never recognized because the economy adjusts to them with such facility. The reason is that, both in consumption and in production, there are so many different ways in which it is possible to substitute for something in short supply. This can be illustrated by taking almost any product and thinking of the many things that could be done to alleviate the problems that would result if it were in short supply. A shortage of oil might be worth considering . 20 Sup¬ pose that a highly industrialized country like the United States imported half of its supply of crude oil, and all of the 20. See M. W. J. Broekmeyer, “The Threat of Red Oil," NATO’s Fifteen Nations, VII (June-July, 1962), 102-8. Introduction *5 imports of crude oil suddenly were cut off. The first result presumably would be a rise in the price of crude oil and petroleum products. Even apart from any government ac¬ tion, a number of steps to conserve petroleum would no doubt be taken because of the higher price. Coal no doubt would tend to replace oil as a source of power for trains, ships, factories, and so on. It presumably would replace oil in the heating of homes. But consumers of oil would not be limited to an obvious substitute like coal. By spending less of their extra money on automobiles and pleasure driv¬ ing, and more on other types of luxuries, they could get along with still less petroleum. They could use smaller auto¬ mobiles with more efficient diesel engines; they could travel more by train and less by plane and car. They could replace internal combustion engines used for industrial purposes with electricity. And there are many other ways in which a nation could conserve its consumption of petroleum. The higher price for crude oil also would stimulate more pros¬ pecting for domestic supplies and more effort to extract additional supplies from the less accessible reserves already known. 21 This is not merely speculation: that an industrial system can function with widely varying quantities of crude oil is indicated by the experience of several nations. The Soviet Union uses about one-fourth as much oil per capita as the United States. 22 Statistics dealing with the period just before the Suez expedition show that oil supplied 32 per cent of the total energy in Italy, but only 9 per cent of the total energy consumption in Germany; 40 per cent of the total energy consumption in Sweden, but only 13 per cent in the United Kingdom; 82 per cent in Greece, but only 24 per cent in Norway. 23 Clearly nothing in the modern economic 21. Duce, ‘‘Changing Oil Industry,” pp. 628-29. 22. Ibid,., p. 634. 23. George Lenezowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), p. 34. 16 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage order demands that oil provide a fixed proportion of the industrial ingredients. Moreover, though Germany imported virtually all of its crude oil in the years before World War II and the wartime British naval blockade cut off almost all of these imports, Germany nonetheless managed to put up a very good fight for several years. It made synthetic oil out of coal (some other countries could also use shale). Only when the Allied armies were beating down the gates of Germany and Allied bombing had destroyed the factories making synthetic oil was Germany halted for lack of petrol¬ eum products. 24 Because of the possibilities for substitution, advanced in¬ dustrial economies are not as inflexible in the face of short¬ ages as might be supposed. They have a considerable capacity to substitute for anything in short supply, whether it be a primary, secondary, or tertiary good. 25 This substitution is not only—not even mainly—of the obvious kind, where something ersatz, something that is obviously a “substitute,” takes the place of what is in short supply. People may often readjust their patterns of production and consumption in ways such that no one thing, but rather many different things, take the place of what is scarce. The competition any given product faces from a whole range of other prod¬ ucts is a very important force in a modern, monopolistically competitive economy. 26 This means that there are usually many goods that can substitute to a degree for all or part of the supply of a good that is missing. Moreover, since many types of goods are normally used or consumed in several different ways or forms, some less economical than others, 24. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War) and Oil Industry, Final Report. 25. On a modern economy’s capacity to substitute for a manufactured good see my article on "The Economics of Strategic Bombing in World War II,” Airpower Historian, IX (April, 1962), 121-27. 26. Edward H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (6th ed.; Cambridge, 1948); Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (London, 1933). Introduction *7 it is possible that when there is a shortage of a certain type of good, the more economical form of that good may substi¬ tute for the less economical form, and thereby alleviate the shortage. But these are only direct ways in which substitution can take the place of missing goods that consumers or producers normally would regard as essential; these are only the ways in which individuals attempting to maximize their satisfac¬ tion from consumption or their income from production can adjust to a shortage. There are also the indirect ways in which substitution can ameliorate a shortage of something essential; 27 the ways in which an economy as a whole can substitute for something that is missing by sacrificing in its place something that may be completely different. A nation can ameliorate a shortage by transferring labor, capital, and productive resources generally from the production of things that are plentiful or inessential to the production of some¬ thing that is scarce and essential. A nation can by reallocating its productive resources substitute almost anything it would be willing to sacrifice for almost anything it lacks. It matters not whether the product it would sacrifice has anything in common with the product that is missing. And this indirect type of substitution, too, applies as much to shortages of primary products as to shortages of other things. The physiocratic theory of shortages is thus as fallacious as the physiocratic theory of wealth. The view that a short¬ age of food or industrial raw materials is particularly dis¬ abling to a nation is as clear an example of the “physiocratic fallacy” as the view that all wealth comes from the earth and that only the products of the earth should be taxed. The seriousness of a shortage of a particular good will depend upon many factors, but it will be affected more by the total 27. Strictly speaking, it is not that a product of a certain type is alto¬ gether essential, but rather that a particular product has certain essential uses, as was explained earlier. 18 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage monetary value of that good than by the fact that this good is or is not a product of the earth, or a “necessity.” There are, to be sure, a number of qualifications and ob¬ jections to the hypothesis that a loss of food (or other pri¬ mary products) is no worse for a nation than a loss of some other products. First of all, agriculture (as is mining to a smaller degree) is characterized by large numbers of rela¬ tively small firms and something approaching pure competi¬ tion, while most lines of manufacturing industry are char¬ acterized by fewer and larger firms and by monopoly or oligopoly. Price in a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry probably will have some tendency to be higher in relation to (marginal) costs than price in a purely competitive in¬ dustry. It would therefore seem that the loss of a certain market value of products of a purely competitive industry would cost more to replace than the loss of an equal market value of the products of a monopolistic or oligopolistic in¬ dustry. While this qualification may not be especially im¬ portant quantitatively, it is a factor that should be taken into account. A more important qualification to the view that short¬ ages of agricultural products are not necessarily much more difficult to survive than shortages of other things involves the question of the income elasticity of demand for different products. In any nation with at least reasonably high in¬ comes, expenditures on food tend to increase more slowly than expenditures on other things as per capita income in¬ creases; food consumption seems to fluctuate less than the consumption of most other things when income changes. 28 This might well indicate that consumers would find a short¬ age of food more of a trial than a shortage of most other things. For if, when incomes fall, people curtail their con¬ sumption of food less than they curtail their consumption of 28. Willard Cochrane and Carolyn Bell, The Economics of Consumption (New York, 1956), esp. comments on "Engel’s Law,” pp. 188-89, 196-98. Introduction »9 other things, it may indicate that they find a reduction in their food consumption more trying than a reduction in their consumption of most other things. This might mean that while a consumer could no doubt spare his marginal unit of food as easily as he could spend his marginal unit of anything else, he would find it harder to give up a large proportion of his consumption of food than to give up a similarly large proportion of anything else; the intra-mar¬ ginal units of food would be especially difficult to spare. There is undoubtedly something in this argument, and it is surprising that it has not been widely used to justify meas¬ ures to protect nations against wartime shortages. 29 It cer¬ tainly must be accepted as an objection or qualification to the view put forth earlier in this chapter. The two foregoing arguments against the theory that a loss of imports of food and other “essential” items need be no worse than an interruption of trade in other things are however offset by some other considerations. The extent to which a stoppage of imports of a particular type of product into a country will be harmful depends in large part on how quickly the domestic production of that commodity can be increased. And there are several reasons why the agri¬ cultural industry in a modern economy should be capable of increasing output more quickly than many other indus¬ tries, despite the tendency toward diminishing returns as more labor and capital are applied to a given amount of land. To a certain extent it is also true of other extractive or primary producing industries that they are well suited to compensating for a loss of imports because of their capacity to increase output quickly. One reason why agriculture, and to a degree other pri¬ mary producing industries, should be able to respond ef¬ fectively to a cessation of imports is that agriculture, and to 29. For the sorts of arguments that have been used to appeal for agri¬ cultural protection or reserves of grain in anticipation of war, see chap. ii. 20 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage a degree other extractive industries, are in normal peacetime conditions plagued with excess resources. The primary pro¬ ducing industries in advanced countries tend to be “declin¬ ing industries,” partly because of the fact that the demand for their output rises less quickly than the demand for other things when real incomes increase, and partly because these industries in recent years have tended to increase productivity per worker faster than many other industries. 30 These in¬ dustries therefore need a smaller and smaller proportion of a nation’s labor and other productive resources as time goes on and are in this sense “declining industries.” Primary product industries may contain more excess resources than other declining industries, since workers often can leave primary industries only with special difficulty. 31 The primary producing industries are located next to the relevant natural resources, not in the great urban centers of trade and in¬ dustry. Agriculture is, needless to say, confined to rural areas, areas which for the most part support no other industry. Mining sites similarly are often located some distances from other sources of employment. Thus when these industries decline the workers in them are in a particularly unenviable position. They may have no nearby alternative source of employment and therefore may stay in the declining in¬ dustry notwithstanding the low incomes in that industry. 32 This is especially clear in the case of agriculture, where de¬ spite many devices to limit production there are persistent surpluses, and where despite subsidies incomes are dispro¬ portionately low. 33 Agriculture in the nations of Europe 30. See Willard Cochrane, Farm Prices, Myth and Reality (Minneapolis. 1958); Theodore Schultz, The Economic Organization of Agriculture (New York, 1953); John W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton, 1961); John R. Bellerby, Agriculture and Industry, Relative Income (London, 1956). 31.I have developed and supported this argument in more detail in my testimony on “Declining Industries and Depressed Areas,” before a sub¬ committee of the House Banking and Currency Committee; see its Hearings on Area Redevelopment, March 13, 1961. 32. Ibid. 33. Bellerby, Agriculture and Industry, Relative Income, esp. pp. 269-74: Cochrane, Farm Prices. Introduction 21 may display its propensity to surplus production less con¬ spicuously than agriculture in the United States, because in most of the nations of Europe, and especially in Britain, tariffs conceal the extent of the subsidies and the magnitude of the “surplus” (uneconomic) production. 34 The significance of all this is that the unnecessary labor and other resources in agriculture in peacetime provide an unplanned buffer against wartime shortages. Because of the redundant resources in agriculture that persist despite the low incomes, agriculture would be capable of combating a wartime food shortage more quickly than many other in¬ dustries. To a degree this is also true of mining. The truth of this is especially obvious in the United States. If the United States suddenly were confronted with a food shortage it could simply plow and plant the land in its “soil bank”; if it faced a shortage of coal it could simply put the unem¬ ployed miners in the depressed areas of West Virginia and Pennsylvania to work. Another reason why agriculture and other extractive in¬ dustries should be able to increase output quickly is that in really advanced countries they are industries which tend to increase their productivity rapidly over time. The ad¬ vance of science seems to have a greater impact on methods of production in farming and mining than in many other industries, especially service industries. Primary industries seem especially well suited to mechanization. In agriculture scientific advances have brought about remarkable improve¬ ments, particularly in plant breeding. The returns to ex- 34. E. F. Nash, "The Competitive Position of British Agriculture,” Journal of Agriculture Economics, XI (June, 1955), 222-37. See also Gavin McCrone, The Economics of Subsidizing Agriculture (Toronto, 1962). Mr. McCrone finds no strictly economic justification for the vast British subsidies to agriculture, but argues that “there is nonetheless a strong case for pre¬ venting the nation’s self-sufficiency from falling below a certain level. The maintenance of adequate food supplies is essential to the very existence of the nation. Food is more important in this respect than any other com¬ modity. There is therefore bound to be some element of risk if a substantial portion of these supplies are produced in an area over which the United Kingdom does not have political control” (pp. 174-75). 22 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage penditures on the development of varieties of hybrid com have been at least 700 per cent. 35 The idea that agriculture is a “backward” industry is most misleading. The secular improvements in productivity in agriculture and other pri¬ mary industries mean that if a modem nation is confronted with a continuing shortage it will in time get some relief from secular increases in productivity alone, even if it does nothing else. Moreover, in agriculture shortages of capital normally seem to keep many smaller and less prosperous farmers from taking as much advantage of new technology as they would like to. This means that when a shortage of food increases food prices and farm incomes, there may be a sudden increase in productivity. Some writers credit the “astonishing” increase in agricultural output in the United States in World War II, and other periods of exceptionally high farm income, partly to this fact. 36 Something of the same sort also happened in Great Britain in World War II. The applicability of scientific advance to agriculture and several other primary industries also means that it is possible to compensate for a shortage of primary products by devot¬ ing more scientific resources to these industries. * * # There are other reasons why agricultural output can be greatly increased in an emergency. Certain technical pecu¬ liarities of the agricultural industry enable it to increase output easily to combat a loss of food imports, and certain facts about human nutrition further ease the strain of such a loss. These peculiarities of agricultural production and these facts of human nutrition have been revealed very clear¬ ly by Britain’s experiences in the Napoleonic and First and Second World Wars. Britain’s efforts to counter the short- 35. Zvi Griliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovations,” Journal of Political Economy, LXVI (Oct., 1958), 419-31; Cochrane, Farm Prices, pp. 46-50. 36. Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, p. 271; Cochrane, Farm Prices, pp. 48-52. Introduction 23 ages in these wars show the many effective steps a nation can take to compensate for a loss of food imports. British experience shows that the most important and helpful single fact relating to a nation’s vulnerability to a loss of foreign food supplies is the waste of human nutrients involved in normal peacetime livestock production. Far more people can be supported by consuming grain directly than by feeding it to livestock. This means that agriculture’s output of human nutrients can be increased vastly simply by switching from livestock to crop production. This was true, and known to be true, even in Napoleon’s time. Arthur Young told a parliamentary committee that various estimates put the nutrients obtained by consuming plant food directly at from three to nine times the food obtained from the same land by feeding livestock; he thought the superiority of crop culture was about five or six to one. 37 Modern research shows that these estimates are quite conservative. 38 In every one of their last three great wars the British moved toward a crop-oriented agriculture and (as later chap¬ ters of this study will show) in this way greatly increased food output. They also took the different efficiencies of the various livestock enterprises into account. For example, in World War II the United Kingdom restricted the produc¬ tion of meat but encouraged milk production, partly be¬ cause the dairy cow was a more efficient producer of both protein and energy. 30 In both world wars the government encouraged the use of whole milk and discouraged the production of butter on the ground that butter did not 37. Report and Evidence of the Select Committee on Petitions respecting the Corn Laws, Parliamentary Reports, 1813-14, III, minutes of evidence, 85: see also W. T. Comber, An Inquiry into the State of National Subsistence (London, 1809), p. 93. 38. K. A. H. Murray, Agriculture, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1955), p. 44; Great Britain, The Food Supply of the United Kingdom, Cd. 8421 (1916), p. 27; F. B. Morrison, Feeds and Feeding (20th ed.; Ithaca, N.Y., 1945). 39. Murray, Agriculture, pp. 239-40. 24 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage utilize all of the nutrients in the milk. 40 It is also possible to increase the efficiency of war food production by marketing calves as veal or baby beef, rather than fattening steers. 41 Table i Energy produced as Protein produced as percentage of energy percentage of energy in feedstuffs in feedstuffs Beef cattle 7 10 Dairy cows 23 Sheep 8 >3 Pigs 18 12 Fowls 10 32 The various crops similarly produce different amounts of food nutrients per acre (Table 2). For example, an acre of potatoes produces twice as many calories as an acre of wheat. 42 Crop Sugar beets Potatoes Wheat Oats Table 2 Used for food as: sugar potatoes flour oatmeal Calories per acre 4,836,000 4,100,000 1,980,000 1,650,000 In all three wars the British gave special encouragement to the planting of potatoes. 43 Clearly Britain’s ability to adjust to a loss of food imports is greatly enhanced by the possi- 40 . Food Supply of the United Kingdom, p. 28; Murray, Agriculture, p. 240. 41. Food Supply of the United Kingdom, pp. 26-27; 866 a ' so T. B. Wood's Food Economy in Wartime (Cambridge, 1915), and his National Food Supply in Peace and War (Cambridge, 1917). 42. F. Yates and D. A. Boyd, ‘‘The Relative Y'ields of Different Crops in Terms of Food and Their Responses to Fertilizers,” Agricultural Progress, XXIV, Pt. I (1949), 14-24. 43. Second Report of the Select Committee on the High Price of Provisions, 1801, Parliamentary Reports, First Series, Vol. IX; Patrick Colquhoun, Useful Suggestions Favourable to the Comfort of the Labouring People (London, 1 795 )l Sir William Beveridge, British Food Control, p. 155; Murray, Agricul¬ ture, passim. Of course the extreme example of a type of production that can be increased without extra land is fishing. The supply of fish can be in¬ creased indefinitely if sufficient men and boats are available. See reports of the Committee on the High Price of Provisions, 1800, Parliamentary Reports, Vol. IX, and the Report of the Herring Industries Committee, Parliamentary Reports, 1943-44, Vol. Ill, Cmd. 6503. Introduction 25 bility of choosing those types of agricultural production which bring the greatest amount of nutrients per acre. 44 But it would be wrong to consider only the output per acre. This is tantamount to assuming that land is the only scarce re¬ source during a war and represents the opposite of the labor theory of value. The amount of food energy that can be obtained from each unit of labor applied also varies from one commodity to another. Thus it is possible to get more food from a given labor force by changing from one agricultural output to an¬ other. Grain production is twice blessed in that it is econom¬ ical both of labor and of land. It is possible therefore that output per acre and per man can be increased at the same time by a movement of resources from livestock to grain farming. Potatoes and other root crops, however, are less economical of labor than cereal crops. As the manpower shortage became more acute toward the end of World War II, the British gave more attention to the labor factor. 45 The efficiency of a particular crop also depends on the time that the labor is needed; if the heavy demand for labor comes during an off-season when labor is easily available, its advantages for a wartime food program are increased. Likewise, if the additional labor required can be provided by women, children, or physically defective men, the labor cost becomes less crucial. Thus potatoes are less expensive of labor than it would first appear. Many other factors affect the choice among the different types of crop and livestock. Some crops require more fer¬ tilizer or more expensive types of machinery. Cattle, par¬ ticularly dairy cattle, have an advantage because they can 44. The output of proteins will increase sufficiently as a by-product of the increase in caloric production. See Ernest Starling, The Feeding of Nations (London, 1919), p. 64. 45. J. H. Kirk, “The Output of British Agriculture During the War,” Journal of Proceedings of the Agricultural Economics Society (June, 1946), P- 34 - 26 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage utilize forage growing on untillable acreage and do not consume grains that could be used for human consumption, as hogs do. Thus in World War II the British cut the num¬ ber of hogs raised by more than one-half and the number of chickens by one-third, while they actually added to the num¬ ber of their dairy cattle. 46 When the food problem arises because of a shortage of shipping space still further substitutions can be used to ad¬ vantage. Some products are much bulkier and more difficult to transport per unit of food value, as Table 3 shows. 47 Table 3 Item Shipping space per ton ( cu. ft.) Wheat in bulk 50 Sugar 45 Fat and tallow 80 Dried fruits 50 Butter 55 Cheese 60 Bacon 110 Frozen beef 95 Eggs in shell 120 Energy value per cubic foot of shipping space ( ooo’s of calories) 5 6 83 118 55 M3 56 39 26 12 Evidently if eggs or bacon have been imported before the war, a sizable cargo space can be saved simply by raising these products at home or curtailing their consumption, and im¬ porting instead butter, fats, sugar, or grain. When, as was the case before the two world wars, Britain imported vast tonnages of animal feedstuffs, an impressive food saving could be brought about by abandoning the cattle-feeding operations and using the shipping space to import concen¬ trated products for human consumption. Savings of this sort were obtained in both world wars. By substituting one 46. Murray, Agriculture, Table 16, p. 237. 47. Sir John Boyd Orr, “The Effects of War on Agriculture," Transactions of the Highland Agricultural Society of Scotland, LII (1940), 1-15. Introduction 27 type of agricultural production for another, then, Britain could increase its output of food nutrients per acre, and per man, and sometimes obtain still further gains by co-ordinat¬ ing the use of its shipping space with its agricultural pro¬ gram. Over the long run this adaptability is of course much less remarkable. A continued emphasis on crops rather than livestock could after some years—probably only a few years— diminish fertility to such an extent that productivity would fall off. The potency of a policy of substituting crops for livestock is further curtailed by the law of diminishing re¬ turns: as more land is plowed, the additional acres are less well suited to tillage. There are also many opportunities for substitution and economy in consumption. For one thing, there is always some non-essential consumption in peacetime. The grain used for brewing and distilling, for example, can be diverted to more vital uses to replace some of the lost imports. In all three of the wars studied in this paper, brewing was moderately, and distilling was drastically, curtailed by the government, and on occasion the production of spirits was stopped altogether. 48 Whenever the flour is milled for white wheaten bread, only about 70 per cent of the kernel is used; the remainder is diverted to lower uses. In a period of food scarcity a larger proportion of the kernel can be used in the bread while also augmenting the nutritive value. Accordingly, during the Napoleonic wars, as well as the world wars, the manufacture of ordinary white bread was prohibited: only brown bread, or “war bread,” containing a larger percentage of the kernel, legally could be made. 49 The savings affected by this means 48. See, for example, 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 8 and 9 (Oct. 12, 1799): Statistics on the Sale of Intoxicating Liquor, 1917, Cd. 8769; Orders of the Food Controller (London, 1918), pp. 99-100; and Murray, Agriculture, pp. 70-179. 49. Committee on the Assize and Making of Bread, 1800, Parliamentary 28 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage can be very considerable; it was estimated that in 1917-18 alone over five weeks’ consumption of grain was spared by lengthening the extraction. 50 But in the Napoleonic wars popular resistance brought most of the efforts to change the bread to naught. 51 In all three wars the British have substituted relatively plentiful foods for those in shortest supply. This was done not only through the rationing schemes, but also by many other means. The government often has required that wheat flour be diluted with flour from other commodities, such as po¬ tatoes, barley, and rice. Dilution in 1917-18 was supposed to have saved more than a seven weeks’ supply of wheat. 52 In the Napoleonic wars substitution of more plentiful for scarcer foods was accomplished to a degree, in spite of the lack of a rationing system, by changes in the distribution of relief and by changes in relative prices. Parish officials were urged to give relief in vegetables, fish, rice, or soup, rather than in grain or cash (though this met with some resistance from the poor). 53 Further economies were achieved in all three wartime shortages through restrictions on the use of grain for industrial purposes, or for the feeding of horses. 54 Moreover, in any normal peacetime situation there is some outright waste. Many people are too fat for their own health; many cooks waste food. Rationing or high prices can curtail this unnecessary consumption. Propaganda for econ- Reports, First Series, Vol. IX; 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 18 (Feb. 20, 1800); Food Supply of the United Kingdom, 1916, Cd. 8421; Report of the Conference on the Post U'ar Loaf, Cmd. 6701, pp. 4-8. 50. Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies, 1921, pp. 7-9. 51. See below, p. 56. 52. Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies, 1921, pp. 6-9. 53. Committee on the Assize and Making of Bread, 1800, Parliamentary Reports, Vol. IX; Colquhoun, Useful Suggestions; William F. Galpin, The Grain Supply of England during the Napoleonic Period (New York, 1925), p. 15 n. For World War II, see Fenelon, Britain’s Food Supplies, esp. p. 62. 54. P. C. Reg., 155 (Dec. 3, 1800); Commons Journal, 55; 882, 890; 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 29 (April 4, 1800); 52 Geo. Ill, (July 8, 1812); The Diaries and Correspondence of the Right Hon. George Rose, I (London, i860), 283-85; Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies, pp. 10-11; Murray, Agriculture, esp. pp. 134 and 171; Horses Rationing Order, Cd. 8580. Introduction 29 omy in food consumption can perhaps be of some assistance; it had to be used with special gusto in World War I because the popular faith in laissez faire doctrine dictated that ration¬ ing should be put off as long as possible. 55 In both world wars extravagent pastries and other luxury foods have been curtailed or prohibited. 56 At times during the Napoleonic wars and World War I the sale of fresh bread was pro¬ hibited. 57 Bakers testified in 1800 that usually one-eighth to one-third less bread was consumed if people ate old bread. But some thought there was “more of taste than reason” in these regulations. 58 Even when the total amount of food available to a coun¬ try declines, the average level of health and well-being may improve because the redistribution brought about by ra¬ tioning may give the poor more than they had before. This may well have happened during World War II. 59 Another type of substitution that can meliorate a food shortage is the transfer of factors of production from less essential employments into food production. Food output therefore can be increased even if there is no change in the type of product raised: e.g., more livestock products can be grown by using extra labor and capital to turn pastures into fields for growing feed and fodder, since there is often much waste involved in grazing. 60 Food production of all kinds 55. National Food Journal, Vol. I, Oct. 24, 1917; Beveridge, Food Control, pp. 37-39. Note esp. Lord Buckmaster's comment about the government’s food propaganda: “It is unfortunate that the government has adopted means of recommending their measures to the public which have hitherto only been used extensively by the vendors of ‘quack’ medicines.” House of Lords, May 8, 1917. 56. See, for example, the National Food Journal, Vol. I, Aug. 14, 1918, and the Cake and Pastry Order, Cd. 8852. 57.39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 18 (Feb. 20, 1800); and Orders of the Food Controller (London, 1918), p. 30. 58. First Report of Committee on the Assize and Making of Bread, 1800; Parliamentary Reports, First Series, Vol. IX; Annals of Agriculture, XXXV, 238-39. Such regulations were unhelpful in World War I when the gov¬ ernment tried to make people consume bread instead of other foods. 59. R. J. Hammond, Food, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1951), I, 368-71. 60. Morrison, Feeds and Feeding, p. 206 and elsewhere. For an earlier 30 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage always should increase with more intensive husbandry, though not normally in proportion to the extra labor and capital applied. And shipping shortages similarly can be lessened by applying more effort to the shipping and ship¬ building industries. During the Napoleonic wars the British offered subsidies to food importers, which brought the coun¬ try a larger proportion of whatever food was available in foreign lands. This subsidy to the food-importing industries meant that more of the national resources were used to ac¬ quire food. Extra resources also were devoted to shipping during the world wars. The military demands for labor usually handicap a war¬ time food program, but the use of labor not indispensable elsewhere—women, children, physically handicapped men, and prisoners of war—has been remarkably successful in in¬ creasing Britain’s wartime food output. 61 As the experience of World War II shows, it is possible to obtain so much casual and otherwise unemployed labor that there is a sizable net gain in the size of the labor force, notwithstanding the demands of the armed forces. 62 * * * The theories and facts brought out in this chapter show that there is no basis for any assumption that a loss of food imports is necessarily worse than a loss of other things, simply because food is a “necessity.” This chapter has however recognition of this point see William Mitford, Considerations on the Opinion of the Committee of the Council Upon the Corn Laws (London, 1791), pp. 22-23. 61. See below, pp. 127-28. Lord Ernie, “The Women’s Land Army,” The Nineteenth Century and After, LXXXVII, (Jan., 1920), 1-16; Thomas Middleton, Food Production in War (Oxford, 1923), pp. 109-110; H. T. Williams, “Changes in the Productivity of British Agriculture,” Journal of the Agricultural Economics Society, X, No. 4 (March, 1954), 332-56. 62. A war also will increase food requirements somewhat. People who are working harder will eat more and men will tend to consume more in the armed forces than in civilian life. For interesting discussions of the extra demand for food in the Napoleonic wars see Sir Gilbert Blane, In¬ quiry into the Causes and Remedies of the Scarcity (London, 1800), pp. 40-42, and Thomas Tooke, A History of Prices (London, 1838), I, 90-113. Introduction 31 neglected one factor that could perhaps make it especially costly to increase the production of food and other primary products in short supply. This factor is the law of diminish¬ ing returns—the tendency for additional amounts of labor and capital applied to a given amount of land or other resources ultimately to bring smaller and smaller increases in production. Conceivably this tendency toward diminish¬ ing returns could make it practically impossible for a nation to adjust to a really large loss of food imports. There is no deductive or theoretical way to find out; the question can only be answered through an historical investigation. Only an historical investigation, moreover, can establish the ex¬ tent to which in the confused conditions of war a nation of any given level of political and administrative competence will be able in practice to make the adjustments that are physically and economically possible. Hopefully, these latter questions will be answered in the chapters that follow. Chapter II shows the general historical context of Britain’s war food problems, and emphasizes the arguments used in the debates about what Britain should do in peacetime in anticipation of a wartime food shortage. These arguments have attracted some of the leading figures in British political and intellectual history and some of the greatest names in the history of economic thought. Chapter III deals with Britain’s wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and particularly with the effects of the Continental System. It attempts to settle the disagree¬ ments among historians about whether Napoleon would have defeated England if at a crucial moment he had not relaxed his prohibition of exports of grain to her. Chapter IV considers the position of the United Kingdom in World War I, and compares the different fortunes of that country and Germany so far as war food supplies were concerned. Britain had followed a laissez faire agricultural policy before World War I, while Germany had imposed high tariffs to 32 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage protect agriculture, and this difference in preparation had a surprising effect on the food shortages of the two nations. The unrestricted submarine campaign, which brought the United States into the war, was supposed to starve Britain into submission if Germany could sink the expected tonnage of shipping. In fact, German submarines sank more tonnage than they had expected. The defeat of the submarines was due, not to the convoy and the Allied naval achievements to which it is usually ascribed, but to certain economic ad¬ justments to the shipping shortage. Chapter V explains the especially severe loss of food imports Britain suffered in World War II and the elaborate measures it undertook to deal with that loss. Finally, Chapter VI pulls together all the factual evidence from these three major wars and relates it to the theoretical speculations in this beginning chapter. The theories and facts presented in this study have, if correct, a number of wider implications for other problems and other countries. 2. Food and Fear of War In the peacetime periods before the three great outbreaks of violence, some Britons pleaded that the country perma¬ nently increase its agricultural output, or form a stockpile of grain, in order to lessen the dependence on foreign food supplies and insure that hunger would not be coupled with the other evils of war. They contended “that it is during plenty that it is most fit and safe to provide against the probable recurrence of scarcity... by every practical and rational mode of encouraging and improving agriculture.” 1 The majority, however, must not have shared this concern for there were no important programs to provide for the safety of the food supply in anticipation of any of these wars. Before the war against Revolutionary France, some people in Britain were apprehensive about the newly recognized dependence on foreign food supplies. As Sir John Sinclair wrote in 1791, “If we cannot supply ourselves with bread, we are not an independent nation.” 2 But nothing significant was done about the problem; a new Corn Law was passed in 1791, but the committee which proposed it expected that 1. Seventh Report of the Select Committee on the High Price of Provisions, Parliamentary Reports, First Series, Vol. IX. 2. Sir John Sinclair, Address to the Landed Interest on Corn (London, '79')- 34 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage before long Britain would in any event have to depend on the distant harvests of America for part of its food. 3 Most people were not intensely enough concerned to give this question first priority. Spokesmen for the landed interest, like Lord Sheffield and William Mitford, who at¬ tacked the 1791 corn bill on the grounds the tariff would not be high enough to bring self-sufficiency, 4 also opposed the clause in that bill which would have provided for pub¬ licly financed granaries to be used as an insurance against an emergency. 5 They argued that a reserve of corn would spoil the farmers’ reasonable hopes of advantage during a dearth, and that anyway no one could want anything nearer than the magazines in the great cities of Holland! 8 Edmund Burke, in his “Thoughts and Details on Scar¬ city,” 7 a memorial to Pitt written late in 1795, caustically attacked another grain storage proposal, which he had heard the government was considering at that time. The construction of such granaries throughout the Kingdom would be an expense beyond all calculation .. . the rick yard of the farmer ... and the barn ... have been the sole granaries of England from the foundation of its agriculture to this day.. .. The moment that government appears at market, all the prin¬ ciples of market will be subverted. The periods of scarcity during the wars with France momentarily strengthened those who wanted a permanent 3. Committees in Council on Laws Regulating the Importation and Exportation of Com, 1790, p. 4. 4. John Baker Holyrod, Lord Sheffield, Observations on the Com Bill, Now Depending in Parliament (London, 1791), and Considerations on the Opinion of the Committee of Council (London, 1791). Also see Lord Sheffield’s comments in Parliament on Feb. 22, 1791. For different views of the law of 1791 see Edgar Corrie, Considerations on the Corn Laws (Lon¬ don, 1791), the Report of the Town Council of Glasgow [071] the Corn Bill (Glasgow, 1791), and Observations by the Chamber of Commerce and Manu¬ facturers (Glasgow, 1791). 5. Committees in Council... on Corn, p. 18. 6. See the abstract of Lord Sheffield's speech in Parliament on March 11, 1791, in Parliamentary Debates, XXVIII, 1379-81, and his Observations, pp. 50-51; see also Mitford's Considerations on the Opinion, p. 14, and for a different opinion, Corrie, Corn Laws, pp. 60-61. 7. Works (London, 1852), V, 189-211, see esp. 201-2. Food and Fear of War 35 policy intended to guard against deficiencies. Several years of poor crops, the disturbances in Europe, and Napoleon’s prohibitions on trade with England, had brought about seri¬ ous food shortages in 1795-96, 1800-01, and 1812-13. The Committee on the Com Trade of the United Kingdom recommended in 1813 that Britain should raise its tariffs on corn far beyond anything that had been known in the past. 8 Sir Henry Parnell, chairman of the committee, told the House of Commons that they had “been influenced by no other motive than that of a strong sense of danger of contin¬ uing to depend upon our enemies for a sufficient supply of food.” 9 In the following year, a parliamentary committee appointed to study petitions on the corn laws claimed “that many of the sacrifices and privations to which the people have been obliged to submit, during the late long and arduous contest, would have been materially alleviated if their means of subsistence had been less dependent on foreign growth.” 10 Malthus was driven to support a high tariff at least partly as an insurance against future wars. He recognized that a duty on corn would obstruct economic progress and even reduce the population; he was, moreover, appalled at the idea that a tariff should be enacted to secure a “fair living profit” for the farmers. “This is not a province of govern¬ ment,” he said. But, like Adam Smith, he conceded that de¬ fense was more important than opulence, and concluded that Britain should enact tariffs gigantic enough to make it ordinarily independent of foreign supplies. 11 8. Parliamentary Reports, sess. 1812-13, III. 9. Abstract from Parliamentary Debates, XXVI, 645; for an attack on this view, see The Speech of the Rt. Hon. George Rose (London, 1814), which also argues for a warehousing program. 10. Select Committee on Petitions respecting the Corn Laws, Parliamentary Reports, sess. 1813-14, III; Rev. George Skene Keith wrote, “nothing . . . can be more absurd than to trust to the importation of foreign corn,” in a pamphlet General Observations on the Corn Trade (Edinburgh, 1814). 11. Observations of the Effects of the Corn Laws (2nd ed.; London, 1814), and Grounds of an Opinion on Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn (London, 1815). In the first pamphlet Malthus could not 36 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage This went too far for his friend Ricardo, who contended, in that great pamphlet in which he first enunciated his famous theory of rent, that only in the strangest of cases would nations act, as Malthus had expected, “from passion rather than interest” and cut off Britain’s food supplies. 12 “I am fully persuaded,” he wrote, “that notwithstanding the war, we should be freely supplied with corn, expressly grown in foreign countries for our consumption. Buona¬ parte, when he was most hostile to us, permitted the ex¬ portation of corn to England by licenses, when our prices were high from a bad harvest.” 13 In the House of Commons Mr. Baring showed the begin¬ nings of the popular tendency to make economics more nearly a religious creed than a system of analysis, by saying that any attempt to insure Britain against a wartime food shortage was in direct opposition to the “wise provision by which nature, in varying the produce of different countries, had made them all dependent on one another.” 14 Yet the arguments for self-sufficiency triumphed, largely because they were so congenial to the politically potent landed interest. Parliament passed an unprecedentedly high grain tariff in 1815. In the long peace that followed the Congress of Vienna, bring himself to sanction anything more uneconomic than a moderate tariff, but in the second he opted decisively for an independent supply in years of average crops. See also Edmund Silberner, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought (Princeton, 1946). 12 . An Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Com on the Profits of Stocks, with Remarks on Mr. Malthus’ Two Last Publications (London, 1815) pp. 29-31. For the likely importance of the war scarcities in prompt¬ ing Ricardo’s theory of rent, see below p. 67. 13. Ibid., p. 32. Napoleon allowed the export of significant quantities of corn in 1809-10 but not during the rest of the war. See below, p. 65. See also Ricardo’s letter to Malthus on February 13, 1815, in Piero Sraffa, ed., Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, VI (Cambridge, 1952), 176-78. Ricardo supported his argument by contending that, if Britain through free trade imported vast quantities of grain from abroad, the agricultural in¬ terests in the exporting countries would rebel at the vast economic loss they would suffer from a blockade of England. 14. Abstract from Parliamentary Debates, Feb. 22, 1815, XXIX, 965-79. esp. 972. Food and Fear of War 37 the concern about an independent supply slowly faded away. Laissez faire sentiments achieved a remarkable ascendancy as time passed, and some ardent free traders doubted that even the exigencies of war could restrain “natural” market forces or nullify the law of comparative advantage. In 1846 the Corn Laws were repealed. The problem of a wartime food supply received scant attention in the debates. 16 The possibility that during the American Civil War Britain would have suffered a severe famine, had it not been able to continue importing wheat from the United States, has received some attention. The presumption is that if Britain needed United States wheat as much as, or more than, it needed Confederate cotton this fact must have affected her attitude toward the North in the Civil War. There is, however, no basis in fact for the contention that Britain could not have managed without wheat from the United States, since she had adequate alternative sources of supply. 16 Wheat prices remained strong for more than a quarter century after the repeal of the Corn Laws, mainly because the settlement of the frontier countries and the improve¬ ment of transportation had not proceeded far enough to end the British farmers’ domination of the growing domestic market. But from 1873 on Britain was deluged with an altogether unprecedented flood of grain imports which forced prices down relentlessly until 1896, by which time British wheat acreage had been cut to about one-third of its 15. G. R. Porter in his book on The Progress of the Nation (London, 1836) assured his readers that it was physically impossible to import enough food to feed a populous country like Britain, so it followed that domestic agriculture would always increase pari-passu with population (pp. 143-44). 16. For information on this subject see Eli Ginzberg, “The Economics of British Neutrality during the American Civil War,” Agricultural History, X (1936), 147-56; Ephraim Douglass Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (2 vols.; New York, 1925), II, 13-18; Thomas Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People (6th ed.; New York, 1958), pp. 333-38; Frank Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago, 1931); Louis Bernard Schmidt, "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American Rela¬ tions During the Civil War,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XVI (July, 1918), 400-439. 38 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage level in the sixties. 17 Meanwhile, the population had virtually tripled during the century, and Britain was import¬ ing about four-fifths of its wheat. 18 This extreme degree of dependence on foreign food supplies began to bother a few vocal Englishmen. A book entitled. War, Famine and our Food Supply pointed fran¬ tically to the nation’s precarious food position. 19 A number of proposals for storing reserves of food or protecting agri¬ culture were put forward. The scholarly authority of A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy often was invoked by those who argued for preparedness in food for he had written of Britain’s vulnerable food position and suggested that she might in war go the way Holland had gone in the seven¬ teenth century. 20 In January, 1902, this agitation reached a head when in the House of Commons, Mr. Seton-Karr moved that the government appoint a committee to investigate the dangers in wartime of the nation’s dependence on foreign food. This provoked an animated, if by no means prophetic, debate. Mr. Seton-Karr seemed to think the greatest danger was that the grain merchants of Minneapolis would get a comer on wheat and force up the price beyond Britain’s capacity to pay; his opponents argued that grain could always reach England unmolested in neutral bottoms, and contended that 17. Mancur Olson, Jr., and Curtis Harris, Jr., "Free Trade in Corn," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIII (Feb., 1959), 145-68. Some scholars argue that there was not in fact an agricultural depression from 1873 to 1896, because livestock production remained a satisfactory source of income. That the production of wheat decreased remarkably, and Britain’s de¬ pendence on foreign food increased greatly, is not however open to dispute. 18 . Royal Commission on Supply of Food and Raw Materials in Time of War, Cd. 2643, 1905, Appendix No. 1, pp. 86-87. 19. By R. B. Marston, published in London, 1897. See also his “Com Stores in Wartime,” Nineteenth Century, XXXVIII (Feb., 1896), 236-39: and also W. E. Bear, “Our Food Supply in the Event of War,” The National Review, XXVII (April, 1896), 197-207; Ernest E. Williams, The Foreigner in the Farmyard (London, 1897); John T. Danson, Our Commerce in War and How to Protect It (London, 1897); H. Rider Haggard, Rural England (London, igo2), II, 560. 20. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, (11th ed.; Boston, 1896), PP- 37-38- Food and Fear of War 39 any government war food program whatever was contrary to the commandments of laissez faire economics and there¬ fore unthinkable. 21 Sir William Harcourt said that any pro¬ posal for government storage of grain was “insane.” The president of the Board of Trade, Mr. Gerald Balfour, at¬ tacked a suggestion that the country draw up plans for a possible food rationing scheme for use in a wartime food shortage, saying: . . . the idea of the Government’s rationing the entire population of this country was . . . one of the most absurd and extrava¬ gant ideas that ever entered the mind of man. ... It is sufficient for the country if it has a navy adequate for its needs, and if we have not such a navy, it is not an inquiry that is needed, but rather an impeachment of a government that has neglected an obvious and essential duty. 22 Mr. Gibson Bowles was equally confident: I maintain that the geographical position of the British Islands is such that you cannot blockade all our ports.... The water¬ ways to the British Islands are so enormously wide and large that it would be absolutely impossible for all the fleets in the world, with the fleet of England included, to blockade Great Britain. ... if the admiralty [cannot] keep this country supplied with corn in time of war, they ought to be taken out and be¬ headed on Tower Hill. 23 After the debate, Mr. Seton-Kerr withdrew his request for an inquiry. But a few isolated voices kept breathing life into the argument. J. Holland Rose, the Napoleonic ex¬ pert, published a polemical article in the Monthly Review 24 which argued that the history of the Napoleonic War revealed the urgent need for a war food inquiry, because Britain sup¬ posedly would have lost that conflict had Napoleon not temporarily allowed food exports to Britain in 1810. In time the government decided to appoint a Royal ■21 .Parliamentary Debates: Commons, Jan., 1902, LXI, 1077-1163. 22. Ibid., 1142-44. 23. Ibid., 1153-60. 24. “Our Food Supply in the Napoleonic War,” Monthly Review, VI (March, 1902), 63-76. 40 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War. This commission concluded in 1905 that “Not only is there no risk of a total cessation of food sup¬ plies, but no reasonable probability of a serious interference with them.” 25 This report was accepted as gospel by most of those in influential circles before the war. 26 The lack of concern about imported food supplies was general, but not by any means unanimous. Some of the most articulate and communicative people in the country were very concerned about the dependence on foreign food, but they could do nothing to change the dominant mood. Rudyard Kipling was obviously uneasy about the extent of Britain’s reliance on imports of food, as is evident from his poem “Big Steamer.” 27 “Oh, where are you going to, all you Big Steamers, With England’s own coal, up and down the salt seas?” “We are going to fetch you your bread and your butter. Your beef, pork, and mutton, eggs, apples, and cheese.” “But if anything happened to all you Big Steamers, And suppose you were wrecked up and down the salt sea?” “Then you’d have no coffee or bacon for breakfast, And you’d have no muffins or toast for your tea.” “Then what can I do for you, all you Big Steamers, Oh, what can I do for your comfort and good?” “Send out your big warships to watch your big waters. That no one may stop us from bringing you food. “For the bread that you eat and the biscuits you nibble, The sweets that you suck and the joints that you carve, They are brought to you daily by all us Big Steamers— And if any one hinders our comming you’ll starve!’’ (Italics are Kipling’s) 25. Cd. 2643 (1905), p. 59. 26. Great Britain, Agricultural Tribunal of Investigation, Report, Cmd. 2145 (1924) VII, Supplementary Memorandum on Defence by Sir William Ashley, 209. 27. Rudyard Kipling’s Verse, Inclusive Edition, 1885-1918 (New York, 1920), pp. 765-66. Food and Fear of War 4 1 Another well-known literary figure, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, was even more anxious. He wrote an article for the Fort¬ nightly Review in 1913 which was filled with foreboding about Britain’s future food supplies. 28 In this and in other writings Conan Doyle prophetically predicted that the sub¬ marine was the most likely source of danger. “What effect a swarm of submarines, lying off the mouth of the Channel and the Irish Sea, would produce upon these islands is a problem which is beyond my conjecture,” he wrote. “Other ships besides British would likely be destroyed, and inter¬ national complications would probably follow.” 29 The prob¬ lem was not however beyond his conjecture. To alert his countrymen to the danger he proceeded to write a short story called “Danger!” about how a fictional nation normally of little military or naval strength managed to defeat Eng¬ land with a handful of submarines. The story assumed that the submarines left the British Navy alone and concentrated on shipping, of whatever nationality, in the approaches to Great Britain. Within weeks after the submarine campaign began the price of corn rose to unprecedented heights, and civil strife tore the social fabric of England to shreds. “There was serious rioting in the Lanarkshire coalfields and in the Midlands, together with a Socialistic upheaval in the East of London, which has assumed the proportions of a civil war.” But presently the food blockade was to leave England in still more agony. In the great towns starving crowds clamored for bread before the municipal offices, and public officials everywhere were at¬ tacked and often murdered by frantic mobs, composed largely of desperate women who had seen their infants perish before their eyes. In the country, roots, bark and weeds of every sort were used as food. In London the private mansions of Ministers were 28. "Great Britain and the Next War,” The Fortnightly Review, DLIV, N. S. (Feb., 1913), 219-36. 29. "The Next Year,” p. 231; see also John Dickson Carr, The Life of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (London, 1949), pp. 273-75; Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Memories and Adventures (London, 1924), pp. 316-25. 42 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage guarded by strong pickets of soldiers, while a battalion of Guards camped permanently round the houses of Parliament. 30 Doyle felt that there were three ways to keep his prophecy from coming true. First, British agriculture must be pro¬ tected and expanded, whatever the Liberal politicians might think. Secondly, a railroad tunnel should be built under the channel, so that continental food supplies would be within reach. Thirdly, submarine freighters, which could carry food to England while remaining immune from attack, should be built. 31 The Prime Minister had nothing good to say for Doyle’s proposals, and The Times wrote derisively about his “fancy picture of twenty-five submarines off the Kent coast and twen¬ ty-five in the Irish Channel.” 32 While Doyle’s dire predic¬ tions attracted some attention, they aroused not a bit of action. The general faith in the Royal Navy and in laissez faire left little room for doubts about Britain’s food sup¬ plies. This complacent optimism was general until well into World War I. So complete was this confidence that even during the first two years of World War I there was no large-scale program to increase domestic food output or ration consumption. 33 This sense of security sank with the merchant ships that went down when the unrestricted submarine campaign began in February, 1917. The Germans attacked neutral as well as British vessels. “One day in 1917 no less than 34 ships sank to the bottom. More than once our reserves of sugar were only a few hours.... The line which separated the 30. Arthur Conan Doyle, Danger! and Other Stories (London, 1918), pp. 1-49, esp. pp. 40 and 41. This story was first published in The Strand Magazine. 31. Doyle, Danger! and Memories; "The Next War,” p. 233; Carr, Life of Doyle, pp. 273-75. 32. Carr, Life of Doyle, p. 275; Doyle, Memories, pp. 316-25. 33. There was an attempt to acquire a reserve of wheat shortly after the war began, and a sugar commission was established, but these tardy and fainthearted actions did not accomplish much. Food and Fear of War 43 nation from starvation was perilously thin.” 34 This (albeit somewhat exaggerated) account by an erstwhile Minister of Agriculture demonstrates the shock of the recognition that the country’s daily bread depended on the vagaries of war. 35 The anxiety was heightened by the example of Germany, which suffered a virtual famine during the later years of World War I. 36 In 1917 the country was driven to adopt a crash program to increase domestic food production; grass¬ lands were plowed all over the Kingdom and seeded to grain. Food had to be rationed. The frightening experience of World War I led some to suggest that the British agricultural sector should be ex¬ panded lest the country should again be under siege. 37 Novelist John Galsworthy wrote that “Britain’s position is absurdly weak ... due to the fact that we do not grow our own food,” and advocated that the country endeavor always to grow most of the provisions it needed. 38 Governmental committees to study agriculture found that peacetime crop production had to be expanded in the interests of national security. 39 The drift toward war again in the mid-thirties kept this concern alive. Many felt that it was “useless to be armed to 34. Lord Addison, A Policy for British Agriculture (London, 1939), p. 205. 35. This concern about food supplies did not become at all intense among the rank and file until somewhat later, when rationing became widespread, according to Lord Ernie. When, as president of the Board of Agriculture, he made speeches about the need for more domestic food production, he was greeted by the question, “Why don’t you get it from abroad?” The public did not have a full knowledge of the losses to the submarine and the size of the reserves. ( Whippingham to Westminster, The Reminiscences of Lord Ernie (London, 1938), pp. 290-91 and 299. 36. Ernest H. Starling, "The Food Supply of Germany During the War,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, LXXXXII, Pt. II (March, 1929), 225-55- 37. Sir Daniel Hall, Agriculture After the War (London, 1916), esp. chaps, i and viii; Christopher Tumor, Our Food Supply (New York, 1916); F. D. Green, A New Agricultural Policy (London, 1921). 38. The Land (London, 1918), esp. p. 2. 39. See esp. the Agricultural Policy Sub-committee of the Reconstruction Committee, 1918, Cd. 9079, and the Agricultural Tribunal of Investiga¬ tion, 1923, Cmd. 1842. The latter committee, however, was concerned with the need for more employment in agriculture as well as with national se¬ curity. 44 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage the teeth if your molars have nothing to chew.” 40 Viscount Lymington wrote Famine in England , 41 and Lord Addison said, “remember, we cannot accelerate the processes of na¬ ture in the growth of food. A bold program of increase in the arable cultivation is urgently required.” 42 In a full scale debate in the House of Lords in July, 1936, peer after peer attacked the government for failing to take action to in¬ sure against a war food shortage. Sir Arthur Salter in the House of Commons also led a tireless campaign for food reserves. 43 Shortly before the war John Maynard Keynes recom¬ mended that the government provide free warehouses where traders could keep reserves of grain (and other storable war materials) and offer interest-free loans to carry the reserves. Other economists, like Roy Harrod, offered similar sugges¬ tions. 44 Nonetheless, it appears that many more people were apathetic or opposed to any program for preparedness in food; the government took no decisive action to guard against a wartime food shortage. It certainly did not stimulate Brit¬ ish agriculture to prepare for war food problems. 45 Neville Chamberlain, while he was Prime Minister, said, “The idea that we can be starved out in wartime seems to me entirely fallacious. We can depend upon the Royal Navy and Mer- 40. Rural Reconstruction Association, The Revival of Agriculture (Lon¬ don, 1936), p. 42. 41. London, 1938. 42. Addison, A Policy, pp. 20-21. 43. Parliamentary Debates: Lords, Cl, 595-669, Commons, CCCXXVI, 2930-40; R. J. Hammond, Food, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1951), I, 13-30. Viscount Astor and B. Seebohm Rowntree, The Agricultural Dilemma (London, 1935). 44. See L. St. Clare Grondona, Food Reserves (London, 1939), for Keynes's proposal, as well as Grondona’s own plan for a storage scheme which, like Keynes’s, was designed to bring a measure of price stability as well as in¬ surance against wartime scarcities. Harrod advocated a storage scheme in a commendatory introduction to Grondona’s book. 45. There were some measures to protect domestic agriculture, but they did little more than compensate for the dumping policies of food export¬ ing nations. See K. A. H. Murray and Ruth L. Cohen, The Planning of Britain’s Food Imports (Oxford, 1934), p. 89. Food and Fear of War 45 candle Marine to keep open our trade routes and to enable us to import our food and raw materials indefinitely.” 46 On the eve of war Parliament passed an Essential Commodities Reserve Act, and the government acquired small amounts of food. But this was altogether too little and too late to be of any real help. 47 Then World War II, the submarines, and the danger of famine again. The government once more had to limit consumption and hurriedly expand domestic food output. Just as the problem in World War II was the same as in the two great preceding conflicts, so the programs used to meet it, and the final outcome, were surprisingly similar. As this study will attempt to show, history tended to repeat itself to an unusual extent, even in details. Now new voices strengthened the plea for a permanently larger agricultural sector. 48 In the 1943 speech in which he promised “death, dust, and ashes” to Nazism, Winston Churchill stated that peacetime agricultural production would have to be maintained at a higher level than before the war. 49 According to a scholarly observer, “In 1943 and 1944 almost every institution connected with agriculture pro¬ duced a plan for it in the post-war world. These proposals 46. H. T. Williams, ed., Principles for British Agricultural Policy (Lon¬ don, i960), p. 244. 47. “As eventually carried out . . . the purchases of sugar, wheat, and whale oil that were undertaken were (except for the whale oil) more significant as a breach with tradition than as an important contribution to national security. . . . they were so small in total amount as to be readily offset by a fall in trade stocks. For both wheat and sugar this seems to have taken place between 1938 and the outbreak of war” (R. J. Hammond, Food and Agriculture in Britain, 1939-45 [Stanford, Calif.: Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1954], p. 14). However, see also Karl Brandt, Whaling and Whale Oil During and After World War II (Stanford, Calif.: Food Research Institute War-Peace Pamphlet 11, 1948). There was on the other hand a certain amount of planning and think¬ ing about war food problems. (See Hammond, Food and Agriculture, pp. 9-18, and Murray, Agriculture, pp. 50-67.) 48. George P. Pollitt, Britain Can Feed Herself (London, 1942); Arthur Smith, Agriculture’s Challenge to the Nation (London, 1942). For a some¬ what different approach see D. A. E. Harkness, A Tract on Agricultural Policy (London, 1945), and War and British Agriculture (London, 1941). 49. The Times, March 22, 1943. 46 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage disagreed on many things, but... they all agreed post-war farming should be based more on arable crops and less on pasture.” 50 In 1945 Winston Churchill declared again that it would be madness to cast away the increased food produc¬ tion that had been achieved during the war. 51 In 1947 the Labour government began a four-year program to expand the already much augmented agricultural sector, hoping that by 1951-52 it would produce an output about 50 per cent above the prewar level, and 20 per cent above the 1946-47 production. 52 There was more to this measure than the hope of reduc¬ ing Britain’s reliance on overseas food supplies in time of war. The balance of payments crises, and the beliefs that a larger farm economy would improve the country’s terms of trade, were important. But the attempt to achieve complete self-sufficiency in animal feedstuffs suggests that the fear of war was a factor. The people, still on an austere diet, had not forgotten the severe rations of the war. British agriculture continues to receive extraordinarily high sub¬ sidies: the total net income of British farmers may well have been roughly equal to the amount of the government’s direct and indirect subsidies to them! 53 Though the concern about future food shortages is no doubt becoming steadily less as the memories of the short¬ ages of the last war fade from memory, there are still many who protest by invoking the specter of wartime shortages any attempt to prune British agriculture down to a more eco- 50. Edith Whetham, British Farming, 19)9-49 (London, 1952). p. 134. 51. Victory, War Speeches, by the Right Hon. \V. S. Churchill (London, 1945), p. 82. 52. D. K. Britton, “Agriculture,” in G. D. N. Worswick and P. H. Ady, eds.. The British Economy (Oxford, 1952), chap. xxi. p. 465. For a contrary opinion, see F. W. Bateson, Towards a Socialist Agriculture (London, 1946). 53. E. F. Nash, "The Competitive Position of British Agriculture,” Jour¬ nal of Agricultural Economics, XI (June, 1955), 222-34; note Colin Clark's agreement with this conclusion, pp. 235-37. See also Graham Hallett, “The Economic Position of British Agriculture,” The Economic Journal, LXIX (Sept., 1959), 522-40; and Sir Ralph Enfield, “How Much Agriculture," Lloyd’s Bank Review, XXXII (April, 1954), 19-32. Food and Fear of War 47 nomic size. A significant and responsible study, apparently based on many years of work by several eminent men, was published by the Nuffield Foundation in i960, and it devoted several chapters to “strategic considerations.” It argued that “a strategically sound agriculture requires the maintenance of the tillage area at about the current level. . . .” B4 It also recommended a stockpile of sugar and wheat, and in addition a strategic reserve of fertilizers. 55 Such a policy obviously pre¬ sumes something other than a short nuclear war. A much less common, but by no means eccentric, view has been ex¬ pressed by Robert Trow-Smith: The war came in 1939 as the convulsive end of an epoch. His¬ tory may see the months of 1939-40 as the moments when British agriculture emerged out of the ancient system of farming for profit and passed into an era of farming for national subsistence which stretches out in front of us as far as the mind can reach. 60 Whether “farming for national subsistence” stretches that far out into the future is doubtful. Still some measure of con¬ cern about wartime food shortages must remain, for the British government presently maintains a stockpile of food in addition to a vastly expanded agriculture. Most of the facts about the stockpile are hidden beneath a cloud of official secrecy, but it is definitely kept for reasons of national se¬ curity. 57 After suffering shortages in three wars, and after a cen¬ tury and a half of debate, Britain has followed the ad¬ vice of those who wanted a larger agricultural sector. It ap¬ pears at first glance that the British have learned a lesson from their experiences: they have been trying to insure 54. Williams, Principles for British Agricultural Policy, p. 270; see also pp. 43 - 44 - 55 - Ibid., pp. 274-77. 56. Society and the Land (London, 1953), p. 208. See also Rural Re¬ construction Association, Feeding the Fifty Million (London, [1955])- On the political support for an expanded agriculture see Peter Self and H. Storing, The State and the Farmer (London, 1962). 57. See above, p. 5. 48 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage that hunger would not, for a fourth time, be added to the other horrors of war. This raises the question of whether a larger peacetime agriculture would in fact have furthered the country’s defense and well-being in the three great wars that have been fought since Britain became dependent on foreign food supplies. Would a policy of the type used now or some other (like a granary-reserve scheme) have been helpful? Or did British food output expand so rapidly (or consumption adjust so easily) during these wars, that a larger peacetime agriculture would have been unnecessary? Or was it impossible, as Lord Addison put it, to “accelerate the processes of nature in the production of food”? 58 58.^ Policy, pp. 20-21. 3. The Wars with France, 1793-1814 i. 1793-1802 When the war between Britain and France began in 1793, both nations were quick to declare restrictions on the trade of the other. The British blockaded the coasts of France, and the Revolutionary government forbade all com¬ merce with England in regulations which foreshadowed Napoleon’s Continental System. 1 In the first year of war, Britain’s food situation was com¬ fortable. The crop was satisfactory and the French, lacking control of the sea, were unable to prevent the British from getting grain imports from the Baltic countries and Ameri¬ ca, the usual sources of supply. In the summer of 1794, however, the country suffered a drought and the harvest in the autumn of that year was below average by nearly a fourth. 2 The next year was to bring no relief. The winter of 1794- 95 was punctuated by rigorous frosts; Edmund Burke said it was “more than unusually unfavorable. . .. Much 1. Eli F. Heckscher, The Continental System (Oxford, 1922), pp. 25-50; Thomas Tooke, A History of Prices (London, 1838), I, 181-82. 2. See testimony of Arthur Young, Claude Scott, and others before The Committee of Council on Trade and Foreign Plantations, 1795; and Ed¬ mund Burke, “Thoughts and Details on Scarcity,” Works (8 vols.; London, 1852), V, 179-211; see also Thoughts on the Most Safe and Effectual Mode of Relieving the Poor, During the Present Scarcity (London, 1795). 50 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage wheat was utterly destroyed.” 3 The wheat harvest of 1795 produced, according to the Parliamentary Committee on the High Price of Com, one-fifth to one-fourth less than normal. 4 Meanwhile, imports were also reduced, as the harvests of 1795 in northern Europe were below average and the ravages of the Hessian fly diminished the American crop. 5 Prices, which had been averaging 50 shillings before the bad harvests, about doubled, setting a record for dear¬ ness that surpassed anything since at least the sixteenth cen¬ tury. 6 Many of the people blamed the high food prices on the war; a London mob attacked the King on October 29, 1795, demanding peace. 7 That same day in the House of Com¬ mons, Fox bitterly attacked the government for continuing a war which aggravated so grievous a scarcity. 8 Pitt denied that the war had any significant effect on the price of grain, but even so stalwart a supporter of the war as Burke con¬ tended that his argument was “not worth powder and shot.” 9 In fact, the war was not the principal cause of the scarcity: the French had not been able seriously to obstruct British imports. During these two years of scarcity, British grain imports were greater than ever before. 10 Still, the extra de¬ mands of the expanded armies and the disturbed state of the whole continent must have aggravated the scarcity, and the alarm and uncertainty of war must have caused speculative price rises. While the scarcity does not appear to have made national 3. "Thoughts and Details on Scarcity,” esp. p. 204. 4. Parliamentary Reports, First Series, IX, 53; Tooke, Prices, I, 181-84. 5. Tooke, Prices, I, 182; Sir Gilbert Blane, Inquiry into the Causes and Remedies of the Scarcity (London, 1800), pp. 38-39. 6. C. R. Fay, The Corn Laws and Social England (Cambridge, 1932), p. 37. 7. Parliamentary Debates, XXXII, 144-55: William Frend, A Letter to William Devaynes on the Scarcity of Bread (2nd ed.; London, 1795), p. 2. 8 . Parliamentary Debates, XXXII, 165: see also XXXIII, 239. 9. “Thoughts and Details on Scarcity," p. 209; Tooke, Prices, I, 219-20. 10. Lord Sheffield, Remarks on the Deficiency of Grain (London, 1800), appendixes 4, 5, and 6. Wars with France, 1793-1814 51 survival doubtful or seriously interfered with the prosecu¬ tion of the war, it left a deep impression in the minds of many people. 11 Within two years after this period of scar¬ city, Malthus produced his celebrated Essay on Population. In an attempt to mitigate the distress, the government passed several statutes to prevent wasteful or unnecessary consumption. 12 It also sent agents to buy grain in the Baltic countries, but this was unhelpful, as it was badly handled and removed the incentive for imports on private account. The famous Speenhamland system of relief also was adopted during this dearth. 13 In these years the British had even more than the usual justification for complaints about the weather. The winter of 1798-99 was harsh, the following summer uncommonly wet. Accordingly, the harvest of 1799 was, as Malthus wrote, “bad, both in quality and quantity.’’ 14 Sir Gilbert Blane said the harvest had never, in his time, been so scanty. 15 The leaders of the anxious nation looked hopefully toward the next harvest. In the spring of 1800, the fields bloomed with promise, but an unusual heat wave in the summer and bad harvest weather caused another defective crop. 16 The defective harvest of 1800 was followed by a serious crisis between Britain and the nations on the Baltic, from which she obtained most of her grain imports. In Novem¬ ber, 1800, Tsar Paul I closed all Russian ports to the Brit¬ ish. 17 He had been enraged when the British, having cap¬ tured Malta from the French, failed to turn that island over 31. See below, pp. 53-67. 12. See below, p. 55. 13 .A Proposal for a Perpetual Equalization of Pay (London, 1795); T. Malthus, An Investigation of the Cause of the Present High Price of Pro¬ visions (2nd ed.; London, 1800); Donald Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws, 1660-1846 (London, 1930), pp. 75-77; C. R. Fay, ‘‘Corn Prices and the Corn Laws,” Economic Journal, XXXI (March, 1921), 17-27; Transac¬ tions in Parliament in Session of 1795 on the Apprehension of Famine (Lon¬ don, 1798), esp. debates of Nov. 3, 1795, pp. 32-36. 14 -An Investigation ..., p. 8; see also Lord Sheffield, pp. 5 and 11. 15 .An Inquiry..., p. 12. 16. Tooke, Prices, I, 216-17. 17. J. B. Scott, ed.. The Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800 (New York, 1918), pp. 513 and 516 for the Russian documents. 52 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage to him, for he felt that his election as head of the Knights Templar of that island gave him rightful control over its destiny. 18 The Russian embargo, and the confiscation of British property that went with it, led to a virtual state of war. The Swedes, the Danes, and the Prussians meanwhile had been offended by Britain’s ungracious treatment of neutral shipping. Thus when the Tsar proposed to them that the nations bordering on the Baltic associate in an Armed Neu¬ trality, under which they would agree to sail their mer¬ chant ships in convoys with naval protection, they were quite receptive. In December, 1800, Russia signed Armed Neu¬ trality agreements with each of these nations. 19 Britain looked on this development with a jaundiced eye. She assumed that these agreements created a confed¬ eracy against her, and so declared an embargo on trade with Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. Britain exempted Prussia from the embargo, perhaps partly because of its need for that country’s food supplies, but also because she thought that the Prussians could more easily be drawn away from the Armed Neutrality. But Prussia was not in any mood to let the British have their way, and threatened to close off many of the German states to British shipping by taking control of Hanover, while the Danes occupied Hamburg. At this point, when the shortcomings of the harvest of 1800 were most severely felt, Britain was unable to trade on a regular basis with any of the nations in the area from which she got most of her food supplies. 20 The average price before the two meager harvests had been not far from 505. per quarter; by December, 1799, it 18. W. A. Phillips and A. H. Reede, The Napoleonic Period, II, too, in Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law (New York, 1935-36). 19. For the texts of the agreements, see Scott, Armed Neutralities, pp. 531-49; see also G. F. Martens, Recueil des Principaux Traites d'Alliance, de Paix, de Treve (Gottingue, 1817-41), Vol. VII. 20. Britain in 1800 imported more than three-fourths of her corn from Russia, Prussia and Poland, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries (Gal- pin, Grain Supply, Appendix 8). Wars with France, 1793-1814 53 had risen to 935. 10 d. But the worst was still a long way off, for in May, 1800, the price reached 1205., and in 1801 it rose higher still, setting a new record at 1405. in January, and reaching an awesome 1565. in the week of March 21, 1801. 21 Malthus wrote that the “severe distress exemplified his Principle of Population.” 22 The government was quite aware of the gravity of the situation. The King’s speech in Novem¬ ber, 1800, dealt almost entirely with the food shortage. The poor were even more concerned; riots broke out in many parts of England. At Bath a poster announced: “Peace and a Large Bread or a King without a Head.” 23 Another claimed: "Bread or blood.... Have not Frenchmen shewn you a pattern to fight for liberty?” 24 Most people denied the gov¬ ernment’s claim that the war had nothing to do with the scarcity. The cause of the distress and famine, said Sir Fran¬ cis Burdett, looking at Pitt, “was seated on the treasury bench.” 25 People were quick to find a scapegoat. In 1800 and 1801, as in 1795, they laid the blame on middlemen. 26 As Malthus described it: Many people of sense have joined in the universal cry of the common people, that there must be roguery somewhere, and the general indignation has fallen upon ... all middlemen what¬ ever. 27 Even Lord Kenyon, the Lord Chief Justice, joined in the clamor. 21. London Gazette; see also Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, First Series, IX, 185-86. 22. Present High Price of Provisions, p. 27. 23. Home Office, 42:49, George to Portland, March 16, 1800, quoted in Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 19. 24. Home Office 42:51, Combe to Portland, Sept. 14, 17, 18, 22, 1800. See this and other references, in Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 19. 25. Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 31. 26. Thomas Wright, The Crying Frauds of the London Markets (Lon¬ don, 1795, and A Short Address to the Public on the Monopoly of Small Farms (London, 1795): Philanthropus, Reflections on Monopolies and the Comers of Provisions (L e ' cester > 1795)- 27. Present High Price of Provisions, p. 3: see also George Chalmers, Estimate of Comparative Strength of Great Britain, (new ed.; London, 1804); and Sir Gilbert Blane, An Inquiry ..., pp. 25-35. 54 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage Private individuals are plundering at the expense of public happiness... when the sword of justice is drawn, it shall not be sheathed until the full vengeance of the law is inflicted on them; neither purse nor person shall prevent it. 28 The larger minds were not susceptible: Edmund Burke attacked proposals to abolish speculation in grain as “sense¬ less, barbarous, and, in fact, wicked.” Malthus pointed out that the wheat supply was in so many hands and the amount of capital needed to control the supply so enormous that monopoly could not be the cause of the dearness, and Pitt and Fox agreed that the charges against the middlemen were unrealistic. 20 By late spring, 1801, it seemed that prices had reached their peak and were beginning to decline slightly. The mod¬ erate fall in prices must have been due, not to any prosecu¬ tion of middlemen, but rather to the settlement of Britain’s difficulties with the Baltic countries. The British had taken decisive action against the nations of the Armed Neutrality by sending a naval squadron to attack Copenhagen, forcing the Danes to come to terms on April 2. The fearful Swedes opened negotiations later in the month. 30 At about the same time Tsar Paul I was strangled to death, and succeeded as autocrat of Russia by his son Alexander I, who was willing to appease the British. Thus the barriers to British food imports from the Baltic were removed only a short while after they had been erected. It appears from the statistics, and from the moderate degree of the price decline in the late spring of 1801, that the diplomatic controversy, the resulting embargoes, and the Battle of the Baltic had a significant but not an overwhelm¬ ing influence on the level of British food imports from the Baltic area. Britain’s total grain imports were actually greater 28 . Annals of Agriculture, 1795, XXV, 111. 29. Burke’s letter to Arthur Young, May 23, 1797, in Works, II, 398; Malthus, Present High Price of Provisions, passim.; Galpin; Grain Supply, pp. 23 - 25 - 30. Phillips and Reede, Neutrality, II, 106. Wars with France, 1793-1814 55 in 1801 than ever before. Larger imports from the United States account for the increase, but imports from Prussia, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden were not vastly reduced. The short duration of the diplomatic crises, and the British guarantee of protection, even on the return voyage, to Prus¬ sian and Scandanavian ships bringing food to them, 31 must have limited the loss of British food imports from the Baltic. The dearth was completely over by autumn, 1801. The new crop was gathered in, and on October 1 the British signed a preliminary peace agreement which was to pave the way for the Treaty of Amiens. The country had withstood the food shortages and had continued to wage war. Its at least partial success in the face of the unfortunate harvests was due to consider¬ able part to the several types of policies it used to solve the food supply problem. It took many steps to economize con¬ sumption, stimulate imports, and encourage production. To curb non-essential consumption the government for¬ bade distillation from wheat (or from any grain in Scotland, where many people lived on other cereals), prohibited the manufacture of starch from wheat, forbade the sale of bread until 24 hours after it was baked (because people were as¬ sumed to eat less old bread), and passed a Brown Bread Act (to reduce waste of the bran). 32 There were also several attempts to bring about voluntary restrictions of consumption by the well-to-do. The Archbishop of Canterbury said that compulsory controls were not necessary, and introduced a series of self-denying resolutions which passed the House of Lords. The Crown issued a proclamation urging frugality in the consumption of grain and a reduction in the use of oats for government horses. 33 Many trivial economy meas- ji.Galpin, Grain Supply, Appendix 8. and F.O., 64:60, Carysfort to Gren¬ ville, Feb. 18, 1801, F.O. 64:60 Grenville to Carysfort, March 3, 1801, quoted on pp. 128-129. 32. See 2g and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 8; 20 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 25; 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 18; 41 Geo. Ill, c. 16. 33. Galpin, Grain Supply, pp. 12 and 26. 56 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage ures were proposed, and some were passed. One clergyman devoted a pamphlet to the need to reduce the number of dogs in the kingdom, and the government prohibited the use of hair powder. 34 In general, the economy measures must have had a sensible effect. The Committee on the High Price of Pro¬ visions reported in December, 1800, that, before the next harvest, they expected the stoppage of the distilleries would save 360,000 quarters of grain, 35 and the prohibition against making starch from wheat 40,000 quarters. Since the commit¬ tee had estimated that the crop was less than one-fourth below average, and that the average home production of wheat was 6,700,000 quarters, 36 we can infer that these two economy measures might have filled about a quarter of the gap between the actual and the average supply. The commit¬ tee assumed, perhaps too sanguinely, that voluntary retrench¬ ment would save another 300,000 quarters. The prohibition against fine white wheaten bread, how¬ ever, was unsuccessful. While experiments then (and since) have shown that bread made of flour that includes part of the bran and pollards is quite wholesome and nutritious, most of the common people would not eat it. Proposals of this sort came from “the rich,” wrote one observer, 37 and did not take account of the fact that dark bread was a symbol of an earlier, more wretched, standard of living. Bakers said, "we are obliged to make bread for the eye.” The poor in many areas also were loath to switch to bread made from rye or 34. Barnes, Corn Laws, p. 73; John Donaldson, A Letter to the Hon. Wil¬ liam Pitt on the use of Hair Powder (2nd ed.; London, 1795). 35. Burke, on the other hand, thought that it was pointless to stop the distilleries. See his Works, V, 207. 36. Parliamentary Reports, IX, Sixth Report of the Committee; for a contrary view see [John Coakley Lettsom], Hints Respecting the Distresses of the Poor (London, 1795). 37. Gov. Thomas Pownall, The Considerations on Security and High Prices of Bread Corn and Bread (Cambridge, 1795); J. L. and Barbara Ham¬ mond, The Village Laborer, quoted in Sir W. Ashley’s ‘‘Place of Rye in the History of English Food,” Economic Journal, XXXI (Sept., 1921), 285-309. Wars with France, 1793-1814 57 any other “inferior” grain: “they have lost their rye teeth, as they express it,” says Eden, in his State of the Poor? 8 The government encouraged them in vain to use bread made partly of rice or potato flour. “The poor obstinately turned a deaf ear to Pitt’s appeal that they shake off their ‘ground¬ less prejudices’ and try bread of mixed flour.” 39 The government also offered bounties and other incen¬ tives to stimulate food imports. Import bounties were offered on all types of corn, and also maize (American corn), and rice. Swedish herring was allowed into England duty free. 40 Since the British were never cut off from all sources of foreign food, their problem was the uncommonly high price in those areas left open to them. In a situation of this sort the bounties must have greatly stimulated imports. The exportation of many types of grain, and at times all kinds of food, was forbidden. 41 In 1800 and 1801 imports reached all-time highs, despite the international situation, surpassing the record set in 1795-96, and exceeding the normal prewar import by several times. 42 In the long run, however, the most important measures must have been those which encouraged greater production. For example, farmers were offered premiums for the cultiva¬ tion of potatoes, which tend to produce more nutrients per acre even than grain, and parish officers were asked to allot plots in the common pastures to cottagers in order that they might grow potatoes or other vegetables on them. 43 The Board of Agriculture gave farmers premiums for planting 38. See Fay, Corn Laws , p. 4, and Blane, An Inquiry . . .; Sir Frederick Eden, The State of the Poor (London, 1797). 39. Ashley, “Place of Rye.’’ 40. See 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 29; 39 and 40 Geo III, c. 35; 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 53; 41 Geo. Ill, c. 19; 41 Geo. Ill, c. 2. 41. See, for example, 41 Geo. Ill, c. 2 (Nov. 24, 1800); 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, c. 91 (July 28, 1800). 42. Barnes, Corn Laws, Appendix C, p. 300. See also W. T. Comber, An Inquiry into the State of National Subsistence (London, 1808). 43. “Second Report of Select Committee on High Price of Provisions,” Par¬ liamentary Reports, First Series, IX, 27; Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 27. 58 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage spring wheat, to bring a quick crop in times of scarcity. 44 Fi¬ nally, at the recommendation of the Board of Agriculture and a Commons Committee on Wastes and Common Lands, Parliament passed a bill in 1801 which facilitated the process of enclosure of common lands. 45 This act led to a great in¬ crease the amount of tillage. 46 The most potent stimulus to greater production, and economy in consumption, came from high prices. 47 The government did not establish a price ceiling on any kind of com. Malthus claimed that “the effects of the high price have been to enforce a strict economy in all routes of life; to encourage an extraordinary importation, and to animate the farmer by the powerful motive of self-interest.” This was “more calculated to answer the purpose intended, than the hanging of any number of farmers and corn factors that could be named.” 48 ii. 1804-1814 From March, 1801, until March, 1804, prices fell stead¬ ily, despite the renewal of the war in 1803. Wheat dropped to an average price of about 60 shillings a quarter in 1803 and 1804. This level, while still slightly above the prewar average, was such that with the new level of costs many felt the landed interest deserved better. 1 Accordingly a new com law was passed in 1804, under which imports were to be restricted by a sizable duty unless 44. Arthur Young, On the Advantages Which Have Resulted from the Establishment of the Board of Agriculture (London, 1809). 45. Ibid.-, Committee on the Cultivation and Improvement of Wastes, Parliamentary Reports, First Series, Vol. IX; 41 Geo. Ill (U. K.), c. 109. 46. See below, p. 69. 47. See below, p. 68. 48. Present High Price of Provisions, p. 20. 1. Commons Journal, 59:83-84, 124, 187, 192. Wars with France, 1793-1814 59 prices were above 63 shillings a quarter; it was a moderate step in the direction of greater protection for agriculture. 2 The passage of the new tariff act, combined with a below average crop, brought a rise in price. Many urban groups then began to attack the newly enacted com tariff. But prices did not rise enough to bring about any serious diffi¬ culty. 3 The more ominous portents came from the Continent, where Napoleon was winning hegemony over the lands on which Britain depended for most of her food imports. On December 2, 1805, Napoleon won the Battle of Austerlitz, which led to the Peace of Pressburg with Austria; in the following year he overwhelmed the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt. This put the Corsican in a position to promul¬ gate his famous Continental System, which he announced at Berlin in November, 1806. Napoleon’s defeat of the Tsar’s army at Friedland on June 14 of the next year led to the Treaty of Tilsit, in which both Prussia and Russia agreed to comply with the Conti¬ nental System. 4 To make the Continental System reach even farther, Napoleon ordered Denmark and Portugal, the two neutral states in Europe, to comply with it; Denmark, out¬ raged by the British bombardment of Copenhagen, willingly joined in the System, and Napoleon attacked Portugal to force its adherence. Thus the whole coast of Europe from St. Petersburg to Trieste was to be closed to British com¬ merce. Sweden was the only European state not participat¬ ing in the embargo on British trade, and Napoleon got the Tsar to attack that country. At the same time, the Americans were indignant at the highhanded treatment they received from the combatants. 2.44 Geo. Ill, c. 109 (July 20, 1804). 3. Tooke, A History of Prices, I, 258-64; Galpin, Grain Supply, pp. 38-42 and 141; Comber, An Inquiry into the State of National Subsistence. 4. The Tsar actually agreed to join the Continental System only if he failed to make peace between England and France; but of course he failed. The month after Tilsit, Russia, Prussia, and Austria declared war on England. 60 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage The British had declared the whole of the territories under Napoleon in a state of blockade, and forbade neutral as well as belligerent vessels access to the continental ports. Similar¬ ly, Napoleon declared all ships that had touched the British isles fair game for privateers and ordered confiscation should they enter a French port. These British and French meas¬ ures led in December, 1807, to the American Embargo Act, which prohibited all American ships from leaving their ports. Thus another major source of Britain’s food supplies was declared out of bounds. Napoleon controlled most of the Continent, and the American government prohibited trade with England dur¬ ing much of the rest of the war. But British (and Irish) grain production had expanded so much since the first war¬ time shortage in 1795, that England got along quite well in the early years of Napoleon’s Continental System. In 1806 and 1807 grain prices in Britain were moderate, despite the fact that little wheat could be obtained from the traditional sources of supply in the Baltic; imports from the United States and Ireland supplemented a sizable home production. By 1808 imports from the United States were only a trickle and the Continent was largely off limits to Britain. Yet so much had wheat production been expanded that Britain satisfied her own needs and had a slight surplus for export as well. 5 Things went well until the autumn of 1809 when Brit¬ ain suffered another deficient crop. 6 By contrast, the harvest in France that year was good; France had gathered abundant crops since 1806, but the 1809 harvest was so bountiful “as to be almost a calamity.” 7 The French feared that this crib- busting crop would bring about a collapse of their price structure and with it agrarian discontent. Napoleon accord- 5. Barnes, Corn Laws, Appendix C, p. 300. 6. Tooke, Prices, I, 291-96. 7. A letter from the House of Dubois Violette of Nantes to the French government, quoted in Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 170. Wars with France, 1793-1814 61 ingly decided to allow the export of grain to Britain under special licenses. 8 At first glance it seems strange that Napoleon, who put such emphasis on the continental blockade, should sell the British a prime necessity like grain in a year when they especially needed it. The development was not an oversight: Napoleon gave the com crop (and the Continental System) his closest attention. He wrote that “The com question is for sovereigns the most important and delicate of all. ..,” and once exclaimed to Chaptal: “I fear these disturbances based on lack of bread: I should have less fear of a battle against 200,000 men.” 9 The emperor’s decision to export corn to Britain, mani¬ festly inconsistent with our idea of a siege or blockade, did not seem paradoxical in his day. Napoleon, like many practical men, outwardly rejected all theory as “the chatter of political economists” or the “ravings of ideologues,” but unknowingly he was a captive to the mercantilistic theory of trade. He once wrote to his brother, King Louis of Hol¬ land, about exports of gin, saying “They must pay with money, never with goods, never, do you understand?” 10 His Continental System was designed primarily to prevent British exports , rather than cut off her imports. This would burden Britain with an unfavorable balance of payments, subject her to a loss of gold, leave her unable to subsidize her allies on the Continent, and finally bring on a collapse of internal credit ending in a commercial crisis. In this way “the isle of shopkeepers,” “the modern Carthage,” would be ruined. 11 8. F. E. Melvin, Napoleon’s Navigation System (Philadelphia, 1919) pp. 78-87. Melvin states that Napoleon actually inaugurated the license for grain exports in the spring of 1809. See also Tooke, Prices, I, 295, and Galpin, Grain Supply, chap. x. 9. Letter to Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, Aug. 6, 1810, as quoted in Heck- scher, Continental System, pp. 74 and 341. 10. The letter is printed in the Correspondence from the Memoires de Ste.-Helene and quoted in Heckscher, Continental System, p. 71. 11. J. Holland Rose, "Our Food Supply in the Napoleonic War,” Monthly Review, VI (March, 1902), 63-76, and his chapter on “The Continental System” in the Cambridge Modern History, IX, 371; also Heckscher, Continental Sys- 62 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage Napoleon had other reasons for exporting com. The British were trading with the Continent despite all the emperor’s energy; some of his own troops wore uniforms of British cloth. King Louis said that they could just as well try to “prevent the skin from sweating” as stop trade. 12 By allowing food exports from France under license, Napoleon was able to obtain revenue for his treasury from the trade, some of which would have gone on in any event by illegiti¬ mate means. Finally, Napoleon must have realized that if necessary, England could have managed without Napoleon’s grain exports. 13 France exported 225,710 quarters of wheat to Britain in 1810, and more was sent from the other states it con¬ trolled. But in the summer of 1810, Napoleon heard rumors (which turned out to be well-founded) that the coming harvest in France was doomed to failure. Napoleon, much distressed, stopped the grain exports. 14 The subsequent food shortage in France kept Britain from importing much corn until it had Napoleon at bay in 1813, though the venality of customs inspectors insured that Britain was always able to have some trade with the Continent. In the next few years Britain was to feel the lack of European and American grain supplies most acutely. Her harvest in the autumn of 1811 was perhaps only five-eighths of a normal crop. 15 Nor was that the last of the country’s food problems. The arduous winter of 1812, which caused so much hardship to the Grand Army in Russia, was similarly unkind to Brit¬ ish agriculture. It helped make the harvest of 1812 especial- tem, pp. 25-28, 71, 335, 340-45; Melvin; Napoleon’s Navigation System, chap, iii. 12. Heckscher, Continental System, pp. 38, 367. 13. See below, p. 65; Heckscher, Continental System, p. 346; Melvin, Navigation System, chap, iii; C. R. Fay wrongly claims in "Com Prices and the Corn Laws,” op. cit., p. 21, that Napoleon first tried to starve England, and then switched to the policy of trying to drain England of bullion. See also Francois Crouzet, L’Economie Britannique et le Blocus Continental (Paris, 1958), II, 564-72. 14. Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 171. 15-Tooke, Prices, I, 319-22. Wars with France, 1793-1814 63 ly meager. The weather had been bad for Britain throughout the war period: fourteen of the twenty-two harvests between 1793 and 1814 were deficient, while only two were really abundant. 16 To add to the nation’s troubles, a commercial crisis raged in the midst of the food shortage. Beginning late in 1810 be¬ fore the corn prices started to rise, the crisis afflicted the Con¬ tinent as well as England, so it would be wrong to look to the food situation as its cause. 17 Prices exceeded 100 shil¬ lings a quarter every week from October, 1811, until the dearth ended in 1813. In August, 1812, wheat sold for the extraordinary price of 155 shillings a quarter. 18 Most of the emergency measures that had been passed between 1795 and 1800 to bring about economies in consumption were now re-enacted. The country was oppressed by unemployment, high taxes, and unprecedentedly high food prices all at the same time. Rioting began late in 1810 and continued throughout the crisis. A notice near Manchester read: “The poor cry aloud for bread Prince Regent shall lose his head And all the rich who oppress the poor In a little time shall be no more.’’ 19 The riots were not due primarily to the food prices, however. They were generally directed against the new machinery, which was blamed for the unemployment. 20 The nature of most of the riots is illustrated in Charlotte Bronte’s novel, Shirley. The violence described in that work is directed against Robert Moore’s installation of new machinery in his 16. Lord Ernie, English Farming (6th ed.; London, 1961), p. 210; Tooke, Prices, I, 82 and 84-85; George Chalmers, An Estimate of Comparative Strength of Great Britain (new ed.; London, 1804), p. 331. 17. N. J. Silberling, “Financial and Monetary Policy in Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIII (Feb., 1924), 145-68. 18. See the London Gazette for regular reports on wheat prices. 19. Home Office, 40:1, Letter from W. R. Hay, police officer at Man¬ chester, referred to in Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 79. 20. Parliamentary Papers, 1812, no. 210; Parliamentary Debates, XXIII, 496. 64 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage factory, while the high price of food is scarcely mentioned. The high yielding harvest of 1813, and the Napoleonic losses that year in Northern Europe, finally brought the return of plenty. The British had survived another food shortage, the third during the wars against France. The 1812- 13 shortage was probably less burdensome than the short¬ ages of 1795-96 or 1800-1801, though in the last period the obstacles to import were the greatest. Domestic output had grown so greatly that Britain was closer to self-sufficiency, in spite of the growth of her population. 21 But the most important thing is that, despite the loss of most of its foreign food supplies and an uncommonly large number of inclement seasons, the British did not have to falter for lack of food in their struggle against the mighty Napoleon. It would be stupid to deny the seriousness of the food shortages and callous to ignore the hardships they brought upon the poor. Yet the food problem was never serious enough to prevent population growth, 22 or threaten national collapse. The riots while serious should not be overemphasized. In those days food riots were by no means unprecedented. Samuel Johnson described another period of dearth, in the peacetime year of 1766, in the following terms: The miseries of the poor are such as cannot easily be borne: such as have already incited them in many parts of the kingdom to an open defiance of Government, and produced one of the greatest of political evils—the necessity of ruling by immediate force. Caesar declared after the battle of Mundo, that he had often fought for victory, but he had that day fought for life. We have often deliberated how we should prosper, we are now to inquire how we shall subsist. 23 In those days many found life a struggle for nourishment. And it is in this context—one in which hunger is desperately 21. See below, pp. 68-71. 22. See below, p. 71. 23. “Considerations on Corn," printed in an appendix to W. G. Ham¬ ilton’s Parliamentary Logick (London, 1808). Wars with France, 1793-1814 65 feared because it is vividly remembered—that the wartime food scarcities must be considered. 24 The famous Napoleonic scholar, J. Holland Rose, greatly exaggerated the gravity of Britain’s war food prob¬ lems when he claimed that, by enforcing his continental blockade in 1810, Napoleon would have starved England into submission: .. an imperial decree forbidding the export of com from France and her allied states to the United Kingdom could hardly have failed to reduce us to starvation and surrender.” With this mistake Napoleon lost “the utmost favorable opportunity of his life.” 25 Agricultural output had increased to such an extent that Britain surely would have survived, even without Na¬ poleon’s com in 1810 (or the modest imports she acquired in 1811 and 18x2). During 1810 the British imported 1,306,441 quarters from France and its allied states. 26 While this was a significant quantity, it was not a decisive proportion of the British consumption. The population of England and Wales in 1810 was about ten million, and average consumption was a quarter per person (or its equiva¬ lent in other grain). 27 Imports from Napoleon’s territories were about 13 per cent of total consumption, and the loss of this would have involved a small cut in consumption com¬ pared with what was tolerated in Sweden in World War I: that country’s supply of cereal in 1917-18 is estimated at less than half of normal. 28 Britain in both of the world wars sustained far larger reductions in its food imports. More¬ over, many of the devices for preventing the waste of corn 24. Consider also Fox’s statement on the regularity of famine in Par¬ liamentary Debates, Nov. 23, 1795. XXXII, 241, and Sir Gilbert Blane, In¬ quiry into Scarcity. 2$.The Life of Napoleon I (London, 1904), II, 208-30, esp. 221, and “Our Food Supply in the Napoleonic War.” 26. Galpin, Grain Supply, Appendix 8. 27. See below, p. 70, n. 44. 28. Galpin, Grain Supply, p. 196 or Appendix 8. Note that because of smuggling Britain would have obtained some of this grain even had Na¬ poleon prohibited exports (Heckscher, Continental System, p. 338). 66 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage were not in effect in 1810, the only year Napoleon permitted significant exports, as they had been in 1800-1801, for ex¬ ample. As was shown in Chapter I, the flexibility open to a country deprived of part of its food supply can be consider¬ able. C. R. Fay puts it rightly when he relates that “the response of British farming to the emergency was so superb that the country could have survived without the importation of a single quarter of foreign wheat.” 29 Francois Crouzet, in a thorough two-volume study, L’Economie Britannique et Le Blocus Continental, also argues that Napoleon did not have it in his power to starve Britain into submission (though Crouzet’s reasons for this assertion are somewhat different from those offered in this work). 30 The most important factor accounting for Britain’s reasonably secure position in the later years of the war was the remarkable growth in the domestic (and Irish) produc¬ tion of food. This is indeed the crux of the story. Unfortunately there are no statistics on British food pro¬ duction during the war, but it is possible by considering various types of evidence to show that the nation’s food output must have increased greatly. Let us consider in turn the increased investment in British agriculture, the extent to which enclosure brought about more tillage, and the estimates of those who commented upon British food out¬ put at the time. Students of the history of economic thought will not be surprised to learn of the vast investment in British agricul- 29. Com Laws, p. 38. 30. Crouzet contends that Napoleon could not have prevented all of Britain’s grain imports in 1810, for he had no control over any imports from Ireland or the United States, and only a very limited degree of control over imports from the Baltic area. Accordingly: “Si Napoldon l’avait voulu, il aurait certainement pu rendre plus s^rieuse la p^nurie dont souffrit la Grand-Bretagne, provoquer une hausse des prix encore plus forte, mais il n’est pas raisonable de penser qu’il £tait en son pouvoir de rdduire son ennemie ‘a la famine et d la capitulation' ...” ( 11 , 571 ). Wars with France, 1793-1814 67 ture during the Napoleonic wars. The wartime investment in agriculture seems to have helped to inspire one of the most important advances in the history of economic analysis —the Ricardian theory of rent—just as the wartime shortages encouraged Malthus in his theory of population. 31 Just after the war Ricardo published his “Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock,” in which he con¬ tended that the growing demand for com stimulated farmers to cultivate poorer land, on which the expenses of cultiva¬ tion were greater. The expenses of cultivation on the poor¬ est, or marginal, land set the prices of corn, and raised rents; the high price of corn, according to the principle of popula¬ tion, forced up the wages of labor, and reduced profits. The lack of profits would halt investment in industry, and bring a static society. A tariff on corn would raise the price and bring this stagnant state all the sooner. The scarcity, high prices, and expanding agriculture dur¬ ing the wars against France must have stimulated Ricardo’s original analysis and dismal prophecy, for his adult life began in 1793, and he acquired his interest in political economy (from stumbling on a copy of Wealth of Nations) in the dearth year of 1799. 32 Ricardo was not alone among economists in noticing the increased investment in British agriculture and the resulting increase in rents; T. R. Malthus, Edward West, and Robert Torrens emphasized the same phenomenon (actually they preceded Ricardo by a few days in publishing the “Ricardi¬ an” theory of rent). 33 The Parliamentary Committee on Peti¬ tions Respecting the Corn Laws also emphasized that “great 31. See above, pp. 35-36. 32. Piero Sraffa, ed., The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (Cambridge, 1955), X, 29, 35-36. 33. See Malthus’ Inquiry into Rent and Grounds of an Opinion, West’s Essay on Application of Capital to Land, and Torrens’ Essay on the Ex¬ ternal Corn Trade. All of these works, like Ricardo’s were published in February, 1815, partly to influence the parliamentary debate on the Corn Laws. For the exact dates of publication, see Sraffa, Works, IV, 4-5. 68 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage additional capitals” had been applied to agriculture, though it differed from most of the economists in wanting a higher corn tariff. 34 The singular enthusiasm for farming which marked the period provides further evidence of the atten¬ tion and capital devoted to agriculture. Good farming was so fashionable that even many of the busiest and best known men, like Fox, Burke, and the Duke of Bedford, devoted much attention to farming. Agricultural experiments were favorite topics of polite discussion. 35 This interest and investment in farming should not surprise us, in view of the high prices. As Samuel Johnson said, when talking about the same landed interest some years before, “Whatever is done for gain, will be done more as more gain is to be obtained. ... While men are desirous to be rich, where there is profit there will be diligence.” 36 Many businessmen were tempted to put capital into agri¬ culture. 37 The elasticity of supply—the extent to which an increase in price will stimulate output—was probably quite high; at least it was later in the century. 38 The great extent of enclosure during the wars also points to the likelihood of an increase in food output. From 1776 to 1790 an average of twenty-five enclosure bills were passed each year, but with the war the number of bills rose rapidly, so that by the most rapid period of enclosure, from 1802 (the first year after the bill which facilitated enclosure stat¬ utes) through 1813, there were ninty-nine enclosure bills per year. 39 While it is logically possible that the enclosure could 3 Parliamentary Reports, Sess. 1813-14, III; see also George Skene Keith, "General Observations on the Corn Trade and Corn Laws,” Farmer’s Maga¬ zine (1814). See also Crouzet, L’Economie Britanniqae et le Blocvs Conti¬ nental, II, 868. 35. Ernie, English Farming, pp. 207-23. 36. “Considerations on Corn,” pp. 244-46. 37. W. H. R. Curtler, A Short History of English Agriculture (Oxford, 1909), p. 243. 38. Mancur Olson, Jr., and Curtis C. Harris, Jr., “Free Trade in Corn,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIII (Feb., 1959), pp. 160-64. 39. G. R. Porter, Progress of the Nation (London. 1836), pp. 155-56. V Wars with France, 1793-1814 69 have reduced the amount of land in cultivation—open fields could be enclosed and turned into pasture—it is quite clear that this did not generally happen. The Lord’s Committee on Distilleries and the Corn Trade of 1810 asked many of those who gave testimony whether or not enclosure had added to the production of grain: thirteen stated that it had, two gave ambiguous answers. Gilbert Slater has estimated the amount of waste and common land enclosed: from 1761 to 1792 an average of 14,946 acres per year was enclosed; from 1793 to 1801 the figure rose to 30,432 acres each year, and from 1801 to 1815, 52,839 acres were enclosed in the average year. Within a short while after the war the enclosure move¬ ment had slowed to a crawl. 40 In 1800, the Committee on the High Price of Provisions estimated that the usual consumption of wheat did not exceed seven million quarters. Since the average import of wheat had been about 325,000 quarters, they concluded that the average crop was about 6,700,000 quarters (apparently neg¬ lecting the amount that would have to be raised to provide the seed). 41 Arthur Young estimated in 1814 that the average annual production was 8,412,838 quarters. 42 Thus production seems to have risen more than 1.7 mil¬ lion quarters, or more than one-fourth, in just over a decade. The whole of the increase in output during the wars against France must have been even considerably greater because output must have been larger in the years just before 1800 than it had been before the war, especially in view of the high prices in 1795 and 1796; 43 the rate of enclosure in- 40. The English Peasantry and the Enclosure of Common Fields (Lon¬ don, 1907), Appendix A, p. 267. 41. Sixth report of the Committee, Parliamentary Reports, IX. 42. Evidence before Select Committee on Petitions respecting the Corn Laws, Sess. 1813-14, III, 145. 43. There were ambitious governmental inquiries into the acreage and production of grain in 1794, 1795, and 1801, but the results are of little value for the purpose here. These inquiries involved estimates at the local level, generally by the Lords Lieutenant of the counties or by the local clergy, but the estimates were based on such diverse principles that 70 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage creased greatly in this period, as we have just seen. More¬ over, the 1800 estimate probably tends to overstate produc¬ tion of that time, so the calculated increase in output is too small. 44 the results are generally not comparable. There are comparable figures for the Guthlaxton Hundred of Leicestershire, however, which reveal that wheat acreage increased about a third between 1793 and 1801. Figures for fifteen parishes in Gloucestershire, on the other hand, show no definite increase. (See \V. E. Minchinton, “Agricultural Returns and the Govern¬ ment during the Napoleonic Wars,” The Agricultural History Review, 1 (1953), 41-42. Minchinton in turn got the information on Leicestershire from Mrs. joan Thirsk.) 44. Arthur Young based his estimates on the assumption that 78.7 per cent (8,500,000) of the 10,791,115 people in England and Wales ate wheat (or rarely rye) bread rather than oat or barley bread. He assumed further that the average consumption of wheat among those who used it was a quarter a year. All contemporary observers agreed on this figure. While this was almost a third greater than the average British consumption at the beginning of the twentieth century, by that time the majority of the people could afford much more of other types of food. (See Report of the Royal Commission on Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War, Cd. 2643, 1905, opp. p. 100; Tooke, Prices, I, 214; Sheffield, Deficiency of Grain, p. 21.) The average excess of imports over exports, for 1811 and 1812, Young put at 187,162 quarters. (This figure seems a little too small, as imports were unusually low in 1811 and 1812, and even for these two years he seems to make the import surplus somewhat too slight; but in any event, these qualifications would not affect his over-all estimate of British production significantly.) Thus Young deduced that the wheat pro¬ duction of England and Wales was 8,412,838, (or if one-ninth is added to account for the production needed to supply seed, 9,347,597.) The weakness of this approach is that it depends on the doubtlessly very crude estimates of the proportion of the population that ate wheat bread. But it seems that the 1800 estimate of the Committee on the High Price of Provisions was more likely the one which overstated the proportion of the population which ate bread made of wheat flour. The committee did not show its calculations, but on the basis of the census returns of 1801, giving a population of 8,892,536, their assumption of 7,000,000 con¬ sumers of wheat implies that 78.4 per cent of the people ate wheaten bread. This was virtually the same proportion which Arthur Young as¬ sumed in 1814, but there is every likelihood that the proportion of the population eating wheaten bread was measurably less at the turn of the century than it was at the end of the Napoleonic wars. Lord Sheffield con¬ tended that only two-thirds ate wheaten bread in 1799 (see Deficiency of Grain, p. 21). It had not been long since the majority of the people, in England as on the Continent, ate bread made from cereals other than wheat, as Sir William Ashley has shown (see "The Place of Rye in the History of English Food,” Economic Journal, XXXI, Sept., 1921, 285-309). Charles Smith had stated decades before, in his Three Tracts on the Corn Trade and the Corn Laws (London, 1766), that his careful investigations had shown that only 6214 per cent of the people ate wheat bread, while 8 per cent ate rye bread, and the remainder ate bread or meal made of oats or barley. Wars with France, 1793-1814 71 During the Napoleonic wars the population of England and Wales grew at what was probably one of the highest rates in its history. Between 1801 and 1811 the population in¬ creased from 8,892,536 to 10,164,256, or 14.3 per cent, ac¬ cording to the census figures. 45 Clearly, in an epoch when population was limited by food supplies, this rate of popula¬ tion growth indicates that the food shortage, however dis¬ tressing, was never near the point of bringing mass starvation. This growing population was fed, moreover, with smaller imports. In 1801, about 1.4 million quarters were imported; in 1812 only .3 million. Taking an average of several years, it appears that imports from 1795 through 1801 were 5.2 million quarters, but from 1806 through 1812, they were only 3.5 million quarters. 46 And of the smaller imports which Britain did receive toward the end of the war, an increasing proportion came from Ireland, where output had been much increased because of the high prices throughout the United Kingdom. The increased Irish exports could not unreason¬ ably have been counted as an increase in the domestic out¬ put. 47 Many were confident that British agriculture could have done much more had it been necessary. The Board of Agri¬ culture stated that, in spite of the vast increase in tillage during the war, there were still “considerable tracts of grass¬ land fit to be converted into tillage, without any great preparatory expense; and in many cases at no other expense than that of setting the plough to work.” 48 The Select Committee on the Corn Trade felt that this fact showed the wisdom and practicability of subsidizing British agricultural output in peacetime to the point where the country was independent of foreign supplies. It might 45. R. Price Williams, “On the Increase of Population in England and Wales,” Journal of the Statistical Society, XLIII (Sept., 1880), 462-96. 46. Customs Tariffs of the United Kingdom, C. 8706, pp. 256-58. 47. Select Committee on the Corn Trade, Parliamentary Reports, Sess. 1812-13, Vol. III. 48. Ibid., Appendixes 2 and 3. 72 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage have been quite as reasonable to conclude that this potential —the capacity to increase food output, even beyond the levels of 1812, without much difficulty or expense—meant that the country could increase its agricultural output after wartime needs became apparent, even if it had not expanded its agricultural sector in peacetime. The most significant fact about the British food situation in the Napoleonic War, then, is that, while difficult, it was never disastrous, and that by preventing wasteful consump¬ tion, encouraging agriculture and subsidizing importation, the British adjusted fairly successfully to the challenge of an abnormally large number of years with bad weather, coincid¬ ing with diplomatic and military predicaments that drastical¬ ly limited food imports. Napoleon witlessly aided the British by exporting surplus grain from France in 1810; but even without this help, the story would have been much the same. 4. World War I In the years between the Napoleonic wars and World War I British agriculture became only a fraction of its former self. Before the Napoleonic wars Britain, though by no means self-sufficient in food, was at least within sight of that goal, but by the eve of World War I British agriculture provided only a small fraction of the nation’s food. Four out of every five slices of the bread the British ate before World War I were made from wheat grown abroad, and three out of every five of these slices were spread with imported but¬ ter. In addition, the British imported four-fifths of their lard, two-thirds of their ham and bacon, and three-fourths of their cheese. 1 The decline in British agriculture that accounted for this unprecedented dependence on imported food had been proceeding for a long while, but was especially rapid during the agricultural depression between 1873 and 1896. There have been attempts recently to minimize the severity of the agricultural depression, but there can be no denying the results: British farmers, partly for lack of incentive, pro¬ duced less and less of their nation’s food. 2 l.Sir William Beveridge, British Food Control (London, 1928), p. 359; Great Britain, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics, XLVIII (1913), Pt. IV. For bibliographical reference see M. E. Bulkley, Bibliographic Survey of Contemporary References for the Economic and Social History of War (Oxford, 1922). 2. Mancur Olson, Jr., and Curtis Harris, Jr., “Free Trade in Corn,” 74 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage Just as there can be little doubt that the relatively lower return in agriculture than in industry was a factor in bring¬ ing about the unprecedented dependence of the growing Brit¬ ish population on foreign food, neither can there be much question that Britain did nothing to halt the agricultural recession. The decline of British agriculture and Britain’s unexampled dependence on foreign food was indeed encour¬ aged by the unalloyed free-trade policy which Britain, and Britain alone, followed. British trade and agricultural policy provided a sharp contrast to the policies of the major continental countries, which built formidable tariff walls to keep out the flood of cheap food from the New World. These differences in farm and trade policy had in turn many causes, but they were due in part to different reactions toward the possibility of war. While the British generally felt that their imports would always be secure behind the might of the Royal Navy, some continental countries, especially Ger¬ many, did not dare to depend on foreigners for most of their food. Military arguments were often heard in German tariff debates, and some argued that she should let her “grain grow and her cattle graze beneath the shelter of her guns.”* * Accordingly, while the British raised only 35 per cent of the calories they consumed, the Germans produced over 80 per cent of their caloric requirements. With soils no doubt innately as good as those of Germany, the British fed only 45 to 50 people on an average hundred acres of their Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIII (Feb., 1959), 145-68; Great Britain, Ministry of Reconstruction, Report of the Agricultural Policy Sub-committee, Cd. 9079, pp. 7-11; Sir Daniel Hall, Agriculture After the War (London, 1916), pp. 1-29; T. W. Fletcher, "The Great Depression of British Agriculture, 1873- 96,” The Economic History Review, 2nd Series, XIII (April, 1961), 417-32. 3. Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1943), passim, but esp. pp. 54, 87, and 88; J. H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914 (Cambridge, * 955 )’ PP- 178-83 and 209-14; Count von Schwerin-Lowitz, "German Agri¬ culture,” in The Recent Development of German Agriculture, published by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries of Great Britain, Cd. 8305, pp. 49. 50, 56, 62. World War I 75 farmland, while the Germans fed 70 to 75 people from the same amount of their comparable land. 4 Moreover, the Brit¬ ish planted only 43 acres of wheat per 1,000 population, while the Germans planted 308 acres (and the French 468 acres) for every 1,000. 6 Though Britain and Germany had sharply contrasting agricultural policies and vastly different levels of peacetime agricultural production, both nations were destined to face the same food problems in World War I. In that war the British tried by a surface blockade to starve the Germans, and the Germans tried by a submarine blockade to starve the British, so that both the British, who were so little prepared, and the Germans, who had so long prepared, had to adjust their agricultural production to meet the exigencies of block¬ ade. 6 As Sir Arthur (later Lord) Salter pointed out: It was as much a war of competing blockades, the surface and the submarine, as of competing armies. Behind these two block¬ ades the economic systems of the two opposing groups of coun¬ tries were engaged in a deadly struggle for existence, and at several periods of the war the pressure of starvation seemed likely to achieve an issue beyond the settlement of the en¬ trenched armies or the immobilized navies. 7 Germany’s submarine blockade of England started slow¬ ly. It was not until February, 1915, that the Germans de¬ clared the waters around Britain a “War Zone” which both enemy and neutral vessels would enter at their peril. But the threats and protests of neutrals, especially the United States, kept the Germans from continuing the unrestricted attacks on merchant vessels which were necessary to a suc¬ cessful submarine campaign. For at least eighteen months the British were, thanks mainly to the neutrals, spared the 4. Board of Agriculture, German Agriculture, p. 6. 5. Benjamin Hibbard, Effects of the Great War upon Agriculture in the United States and Great Britain (New York, 1919), p. 173. 6. W. Arnold-Forster, The Blockade, 1914-19, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 17 (Oxford, 1939). 7. James Arthur Salter, Allied Shipping Control (Oxford, 1921), p. 1. 76 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage rigors of unrestricted U-boat warfare. The Germans more¬ over had only a small number of submarines in the earlier part of the war, and probably could not have maintained an effective blockade until they augmented their undersea fleet. 8 Winston Churchill has written that for most of the first two years of the war the enemy submarines were “no appreciable inconvenience.” 9 Because the enemy submarine campaign was not carried on effectively until later in the war, the British in the earlier part of the war had no difficulty in importing a sufficient supply of food. Food imports were apparently so easy to come by that, despite the obvious potential problem posed by Germany’s growing submarine fleet, the British did virtually nothing in the first two years of the war to guard against a future food shortage. 10 The government was so complacent about the food situation that it told the House of Commons in September, 1914, that it “would not be justi¬ fied in holding out a financial inducement to farmers to increase their acreage of cereals.” 11 Moreover, British farmers, still wary of the risks of arable farming as a result of the collapse of grain prices from 1873 to 1896, were opposed to any policy that would make them plow grassland. In 1915 there were even fewer acres devoted to cultivated crops than there had been on the average in the prewar years from 1904 to 1913. 12 Neither did the government prepare any blue- 8. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (4 vols.; London, 1923-29), II, 227-98; Earl Jellicoe, The Submarine Peril (London, 1934); C. R. Crutt- well, A History of the Great War (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1936), pp. 187-203, 376- 89. 9. Churchill, World Crisis, II, 293. 10. Sir Stephan Tallents, Man and Boy (London, 1943), 230-51; for an example of the relatively confident mood about food supplies in England early in the war, see Henry Rew, Food Supplies in War Time, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 45 (Oxford, 1914). There was a halfhearted attempt to acquire a reserve of wheat early in the war, but no large increase in the nation’s stock of cereals was in fact obtained. Beveridge, Food Control, pp. 13-15, 348-49; E. M. H. Lloyd, Experiments in State Con¬ trol (Oxford, 1924), pp. 311-12. 11. Thomas Middleton, Food Production in War (Oxford, 1923), p. 107. 12. Ibid., p. 111. World War I 77 prints for rationing or other controls on food consumption, partly because this was inimical to the prevailing British enthusiasm for laissez faire doctrine, and partly because of an excessive confidence in the Royal Navy’s ability to protect food imports. 13 Accordingly, when later in the war the sub¬ marine campaign began, the Germans faced a nation that not only had steadfastly refused to prepare in peacetime for a possible wartime food shortage, but had also refused to prepare even after two years of a desperate war in which the Germans were working feverishly to build more submarines. There were, to be sure, some in England who advocated decisive action to guard against a food shortage. They be¬ came more numerous in 1916 when a poor harvest, rising food prices, and the example of a hungry Germany made many uneasy about their food supplies. In the latter part of 1916, too, the Germans, despite the restrictions on their sub¬ marine offensive, were beginning to destroy more British shipping, since their submarine fleet was increasing rapidly, and this stirred more anxiety in the British Isles. In any event, a number of Britons began to attack the food and agricultural policy of the somewhat hesitant Asquith govern¬ ment. Winston Churchill was one of the more vigorous proponents of a policy to guard against a food shortage. He attacked the government’s emphasis on voluntary, free mar¬ ket action and advocated that food policy be put “boldly on to a war basis.” 14 The president of the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, admitted in November, 1916, that “we have been driven bit by bit against our will... to suspend the easy flow of purely voluntary action,” 15 only to be bitterly attacked for doing too little too late. Churchill argued that: ... it was always a question of driving the government bit by bit to suspend the easy flow of private and voluntary action. 13. Beveridge, Food Control, pp. 5-19; Lloyd, Experiments in State Con¬ trol, passim. 14. Parliamentary Debates: Commons, LXXXV, 2508; see also 2505-22. 15. Ibid., LXXXVII, 862; see also Tallents, Man and Boy, pp. 230-51. 78 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage And so it has been in regard to the regulation and supply of food and in regard to the regulation of shipping. No doubt in the end everything that is asked for, or nearly everything that is thought too extreme now, will be forced upon us by the cruel circumstances into which we shall gradually descend during the hard months that are before us... expedients will be put off as long as possible by the government... until when they are adopted, much of the usefulness which could be derived from them is gone. In war what is obvious is nearly always obsolete... . But why not do these now? .. . Each month that goes past will make the difficulty greater and will make the relief which you will gain from these measures less. 18 Churchill was right: before the war was over Britain was to establish a Food Production Department with far-reaching powers over its agricultural economy, to ration and distribute a wide variety of foods, to control its entire merchant ship¬ ping industry in the interests of saving tonnage, and to dictate food prices on a grand scale. 17 The enormity of such depar¬ tures from the prevailing British standards of economic pol¬ icy, and the intensity of the opposition to them, can best be appreciated by recalling the attitude of Gerald Balfour, presi¬ dent of the Board of Trade in 1902, when he greeted a pro¬ posal that blueprints of a food rationing scheme be drawn up as a precaution against the possibility of a war food short¬ age by calling it “one of the most absurd and extravagant ideas that ever entered the mind of man.” 18 Such a ration¬ ing scheme was put into practice before the end of World War I, as were many other drastic measures, but the doctrinal character of the British adherence to laissez faire and the unquestioning faith in the Royal Navy meant there was to be no preparation for the crisis, no action until action no longer could be avoided. In the Napoleonic War and in World War II, Great Britain faced in Napoleon and Hitler enemies that controlled 16. Parliamentary Debates: Commons, LXXXVII, 1106-7; see also 827-1167. 17. Samuel J. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain (New York, * 9 - 19 )- passim. 18. Parliamentary Debates: Commons, LXI, 1142-43. World War I 79 or captured agricultural areas more than sufficient to meet their food needs, but in World War I it fortunately faced an adversary that was, like itself, vulnerable to a loss of food imports. The British took every advantage of this opportun¬ ity and from the onset of the war subjected the Germans to a merciless blockade which became steadily more effective as the war progressed. In the face of the complaints of neu¬ trals and what many thought were the rules of international law, Britain blockaded not only munitions for the enemy armies, but also food for German civilians. In time it ra¬ tioned the imports of neutral nations in Europe to insure that they did not re-export food to Germany. The United States after its entry into the war participated in the block¬ ade to which as a neutral it had objected and thus helped to draw the noose around the German neck ever tighter. 19 The Germans suffered grievously from this blockade. Much of their population was on a near starvation diet. By the autumn of 1916 the ration distributed contained only 1,344 calories. Then the potato crop failed. When the last notch of the belt seemingly had been used, the authorities discovered that the 1916 crop had been overestimated, and yet another cut in rations was necessary. The official sta¬ tistics of the German Empire suggest that there may have been about 769,000 more civilian deaths in the four years from 1915 through 1918 than would have been expected from the prewar figures. The civilian death rate rose gi / 2 per cent in 1915, 14 per cent the following year, 32 per cent in 1917, and 37 per cent in the last year of the war. 20 Accord¬ ing to the German General, Erich von Ludendorff: 19. Arnold-Forster, Blockade; Cruttwell, Great War, pp. 187-203; Sir William Beveridge, Blockade and the Civilian Population, Oxford Pam¬ phlets on World Affairs, No. 24 (Oxford, 1939); Archibald Hurd, Germany Besieged: Memories of 1870-ji (London, n.d.), also in The Fortnightly Review of August, 1916. 20. Ernest H. Starling, “The Food Supply of Germany During the War," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, LXXXXII (March, 1920), 225-55; Beveridge, Blockade; L. P. Thompson, Can Germany Stand the Strain ? Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 19 (Oxford, 1939); George Bruntz, Allied 8 o The Economics of the Wartime Shortage The waning morale at home was intimately connected with the food situation.... In wide quarters a certain decay of bodily and mental powers of resistance was noticeable, resulting in an unmanly and hysterical state of mind which under the spell of enemy propaganda encouraged the pacifist leanings of many Germans.... This state of mind was a tremendous element of weakness.... It could be eliminated to some extent by strong patriotic feeling, but in the long run could only be overcome by better nourishment. Our enemies’ starvation blockade triumphed, and caused us both physical and spiritual distress. 21 Germany’s Admiral Scheer said that the continuing British blockade “meant the ruin of Germany as surely as the ap¬ proach of winter meant the fall of the leaves from the trees.” 22 Some British authorities have agreed that without the block¬ ade the Allies would not have won the war. 23 It seems remarkable that a nation which had striven to free itself from dependence on foreign food supplies for so long, and which in peacetime provided 80 per cent of the calories it consumed, should have suffered so acutely from the blockade. Perhaps the major reason was that German agri¬ culture somehow could not expand its food output during the war. The production of cereals for human food actually declined from 13.1 million tons in 1912-13 to 8.6 million tons in 1917-18, though this was partly because of bad weather. 24 But there also were other reasons for the unhappy food shortages. The German farmers maintained their num¬ bers of livestock even though this prevented an increase in the nutrients available for human consumption. 25 Another factor aggravating the food problem was the inequitable Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918 (Stanford, Calif.. ' 9 S 8 )> PP- 161-69. 21 .My War Memories, I, 349-55. 22. Admiral Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet in the World War (New York, 1934), p. 217. 23. Cruttwell, Great War, p. 187. 24. Starling, “Food Supply,” p. 233. 25. On Jan. 1, 1913, there were 20,994,000 head of cattle in Germany; in 1916 there were 20,874,000; in 1917, 20,095,000. Out of 25 million pigs before the war, 17 million remained on Jan. 1, 1916. Starling, “Food Supply,” pp. 225-55. World War I 81 distribution of food. Apparently the farmers ate as much as ever. 26 Black markets also developed, and the government made these illicit markets quasi-legal by encouraging muni¬ tions factories to buy food in them to prevent malnutri¬ tion among crucial workers. The food left for those with¬ out much money provided a bare subsistence diet. 27 Not surprisingly the Germans, while enduring this food blockade, wanted to put the same stranglehold on their enemy. And the extent of their own shortages, despite their long prepared and much expanded agriculture, may have led them to think that England, totally unprepared to deal with a loss of imported food, would be a vulnerable victim. In any event, the German navy was certain that if the cramp¬ ing restrictions on its submarine campaign were removed, it could bring England to starvation and certain defeat. It had long felt confident that it could force England to surrender in less than six months merely through an unrestricted U-boat campaign. 28 The German government under Chan¬ cellor Bethmann-Hollweg felt that any such campaign would drive the United States into war on the side of the Allies and had accordingly restrained the navy through 1916. In January, 1917, however, the military situation on land seemed to offer no hope of a German victory (Russia was still in the war) and the military leaders began to push with increasing zeal for a completely uninhibited submarine offensive. The fateful decision was taken at a meeting at Pless on January 9, 1917, at which Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorf pressed Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser to agree to an all- out submarine blockade. They recognized that this would probably mean war with the United States. 29 The Kaiser’s military leaders were willing to bite off such a sizable enemy 26. “Producers kept all they needed themselves, and more_” Luden- dorft. My War Memories, I, 351. 27. Starling, “Food Supply,” pp. 235-36. 28. Admiral Scheer, Germany’s Fleet, p. 236; Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (2 vols.; New York, 1919). 29. Churchill, World Crisis, III, 219-23. 82 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage for the sake of a submarine campaign because they thought their submarines would isolate America from the war, and because they were certain such a campaign would bring the defeat of England. This belief stemmed from a German naval memorandum which seemed to prove that the defeat of England by August 1 was statistically certain. The naval memorandum pointed out that Britain had available about twenty million gross tons of shipping. After subtracting military needs, the requirements of other Allied nations, coastal tonnage, and ships under repair, there were only eight million tons left for supplying England’s domestic needs for imports. At the same time the poor harvests in Britain and in America apparently meant that an unusual amount of wheat would have to be imported from distant Argentina and still more remote Australia, with a resulting require¬ ment for three-fourths of a million tons of extra shipping. The Germans estimated that they could destroy 600,000 tons of shipping per month with an unrestricted submarine cam¬ paign. In five months they would destroy three million tons and, in addition, would terrorize and thereby prevent some neutral vessels from making voyages to England, with the result that British imports would be cut by nearly two-fifths. This would force England to make peace. 30 “Such favorable conditions,” wrote Germany’s Chief of the Admiralty Staff in a letter summarizing the naval memorandum, “promise certain success. ... I have therefore come to the conclusion that we must have recourse to unrestricted U-boat warfare, even at the risk of war with America, so long as the U-boat campaign is begun early enough to insure peace before the next harvest, that is, before August 1 .” 31 The Kaiser ranged 30. Letter of Transmittal and Memorial of the Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy, Admiral von Holtzendorf, to Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, of December 22, 1916, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Official German Documents Relating to the World War (2 vols.; New York, 1923), II, 1214-77; see also I, 216-684, and II, 685-1213. 31. Quoted from the translation in Scheer, Germany’s Fleet, 249-52; World War I 83 himself on the side of the military, and Bethmann-Hollweg, albeit reluctantly, conceded that the portentous step be taken. Thus the deadly submarine campaign, freed of all restric¬ tions, began according to plan on February 1, 1917. 32 The rate of destruction of merchant shipping immediately increased; by March the submarine campaign was proceed¬ ing in full fury, and by April it had far exceeded the expec¬ tations of the German navy. The estimates in the German naval memorandum were proving if anything too conserva¬ tive. The sinkings in the six months from February 1 through August 1 exceeded the estimated 600,000 tons per month 33 (see Table 4). The necessary amount of tonnage Table 4. Gross Tonnage of Shipping Lost Through Enemy Action:* I 9 I 1 Total tonnage i February 540,006 March 593.841 April 881,027 May 596,629 June 687,507 July 557 . 9 88 Total six month tonnage loss. . 3.856.998 Average loss per month. . 642,833 • Based on Charles Ernest Fayle, Seaborne Trade (3 vols.; London, 1921- 1924), III, 465. These figures exclude commissioned auxiliaries, but include fishing vessels. The figures include not only British-owned tonnage, which absorbed about three-fifths of the losses, but also all non-British ships destroyed by enemy action. was being destroyed before the next harvest, in accordance with the German navy’s well-laid plan. Nor had their see also the full Letter of Transmittal and Memorial in Carnegie Endow¬ ment, Official German Documents, II, 1214-77. 32. Churchill, World Crisis, III, 219-23; Cruttwell, Great War, 376-81; Ernest May, The World War and American Isolation, 79/4-79/7 (Cambridge, * 959 ). PP- 404-15- 33. Great Britain, Merchant Tonnage and the Submarine, Supplementary Statement, Cd. 9221 (London, 1918). 84 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage memorandum misjudged the availability of British ship¬ ping at the start of the campaign: their statistics on this point were generally correct. And in estimating their U-boat losses the German navy had been if anything too pessimistic; in fact, they were building three U-boats for every one they lost. 34 In April the rate of destruction of merchant tonnage was almost half again larger than the naval memorandum had predicted: over 880,000 tons went to the bottom (see Table 4). In the last fortnight of April the British lost 73 ocean-going ships to submarines. At this rate of loss an out¬ ward-bound ship had only a three-to-one chance of return¬ ing unharmed. 35 Meanwhile, the French were in need of more food imports, further exacerbating the shortage of ship¬ ping; French wheat production, very nearly adequate to the country’s needs in peacetime, was now less than half the pre¬ war level. 36 In April the situation seemed bleak indeed to those Allied leaders who knew, as the general public did not, the magnitude of the submarine’s success. Many British leaders expected that, unless the situation changed quickly, they would be defeated in a few months. 37 During this gloomy month Admiral Sims of the American navy arrived in England to consult with the British Admiralty. Sims was appalled to learn from Britain’s Admiral Jellicoe of the desperate character of the Allied shipping situation, and has recorded the ominous dialogue that took place between Jellicoe and himself. Jellicoe told Sims that “it is impossible for us to go on with the war if losses like this continue.’’ “What,” Sims asked, “are you doing about it?” 34. Carnegie Endowment's Official German Documents, I, 512; see also Cruttwell, Great War, pp. 378, 381. 35. Lord Ernie, “The Food Campaign of 1916-18,” Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England, LXXXII (1921), 2. 36. Michel Auge-Larib£ and Pierre Pinot, Agriculture and Food Supply in France During the War (New Haven, 1927). 37. William S. Sims, The Victory at Sea (Garden City, N. Y., 1920), pp. 12-14: Lord Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant (London, 1961), pp. 99-101: Carnegie Endowment, Official German Documents, I, 511-20. World War I 85 “Everything we can. We are increasing our anti-sub¬ marine forces in every possible way....” “It looks as though the Germans were winning the war,” Sims remarked. “They will win,” said Jellicoe, “unless we can stop these losses—and stop them soon.” “Is there no solution to the problem?” Sims inquired. “Absolutely none that we can see now,” Jellicoe replied. 38 The Allies were in fact soon able to develop one counter¬ weapon which was to alleviate the situation somewhat and reduce the losses below the level they reached in April. This was the convoy. While the convoy was much more helpful than British naval opinion had expected—the Admiralty had doubted its value and were pressed into experimenting with it by Lloyd George—it was not effective enough to give the lie to the estimates in the German naval memorandum. 39 Indeed, the convoy merely kept these estimates from being far too conservative. While the convoys kept the shipping losses from ever again reaching the level they reached in April, 1917, the fact remains that by August 1, the date by which the German naval memorandum expected “certain success,” the Germans had destroyed fully as much shipping as they had expected to destroy. Their estimates had in a sense been proved correct by the convoy, without which they would have understated the destructiveness of their submarines in what they regarded as the critical months for their “certain suc¬ cess.” As Admiral Koch of the German navy said after the war, “It was not the U-boats that left us in the lurch. On the contrary, the expectation of those conducting naval opera¬ tions was more than reached in this respect.” 40 38. Sims, Victory at Sea, p. 9. 39. Cruttwell, Great War, pp. 385-89; Sims, Victory at Sea, pp. 88-117; Jellicoe, Submarine Peril, pp. 121-74; Herbert Hoover, The Years of Ad¬ venture, 1874-1920 (New York, 1951), p. 225. 40. Testimony of Admiral Reinhard Koch on Nov. 6, 1919, before the Second Subcommittee of the Committee of Inquiry appointed by the German National Constituent Assembly, recorded in the Carnegie Endow- 86 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage But August 1 came and went and the British were still very much in the war, still expecting the victory that was eventually to be theirs. They had not starved, but were in¬ deed eating considerably better than the Germans. Why? Why had the submarine campaign gone according to plan, and yet failed to force the English to sue for peace? Why were the Germans winning the battle and losing the war? The answer, briefly, is that the British, sometimes in con¬ junction with their American allies and sometimes alone, undertook a series of economic countermeasures that enabled them to get along very well without the merchant tonnage lost to the German submarines. By making a series of substi¬ tutions or adjustments in shipping and import policies, in food consumption patterns, and in agricultural production it was possible to compensate for the destructiveness of the sub¬ marines. The shipping shortage could be overcome only at very great expense, but there was no question, because of the economic countermeasures, that it could be overcome. These economic countermeasures depended for the most part upon the replacement in December, 1916, of the “wait and see” government of Asquith with the “push and go” government of Lloyd George. The new government estab¬ lished in short order a Ministry of Shipping, a Food Produc¬ tion Department, and appointed a “Food Controller,” and before long had endowed these new institutions with sweep¬ ing powers. 41 The institutions created by Lloyd George, along with other organs of the government, soon came to control 90 per cent of the nation’s imports. 42 The com¬ ment’s Official German Documents, I, 512; see also Cruttwell, Great War, pp. 378, 381. 41. The Asquith coalition government had agreed to appoint a “Food Controller” in November, 1916, but the government fell before the posi¬ tion had been filled. See Beveridge, Food Control, pp. 1, 2; Salter, Allied Shipping Control, p. 70; Ernie, “Food Campaign,” p. 5; Tallents, Man and Boy, pp. 230-51. 42. William Beveridge, The Public Service in War and Peace (London, 1920), p. 4, and Power and Influence (New York, 1955), p. 141. World War I 8 ? mercial and ideological considerations which had been stand¬ ing in the way of a vigorous war food policy were swept aside and producers, middlemen, and consumers alike were forced to fit into a program geared to defend the nation against the German food blockade. Some of the economic countermeasures depended also on closer co-ordination with the United States, the new ally that the unrestricted submarine campaign had brought to Britain’s aid. The countermeasures that depended upon the co-operation and assistance of the United States for the most part involved Britain’s shipping and import policies. Britain requisitioned all of its ocean shipping and the allocation of shippings and cargoes was geared to the single end of count¬ ering the submarine menace. Britain soon joined with other Allies, and with the United States, to form the suc¬ cessful Allied Maritime Transport Council, which was to co¬ ordinate the shipping policies of the member nations. 43 There were several ways in which the British, in conjunction particularly with the United States, were able to alleviate the shortage of shipping to a remarkable extent. This is best illustrated by the example of the “Atlantic Concentration,” which involved allocating a far greater pro¬ portion of the ships that survived the submarine attacks to the North Atlantic routes. This meant taking a much larger share of Britain’s imports from the United States and Canada and a much smaller share from more distant sources of supply. As a result a given number of ships could carry more imports to Britain than before. This diversion of ship¬ ping to the Atlantic took place on a large scale. In 1914 North America supplied 24 per cent by value of Britain’s imports; in 1917 this rose to 43 per cent, and in 1918 to 49 per cent. Meanwhile, the percentage of British imports that came from Australasia, East Asia, and South America de- 43. Fayle, Seaborne Trade; Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant, pp. 105- 28; Salter, Allied Shipping Control, passim. 88 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage dined. 44 This applied not only to imports in general but also to food in particular. Before the war the United States had exported on the average about 6.4 million tons of food and feed per year, but in 1917-18 it exported 15.1 million tons of food and feed, which went in considerable part to Great Britain. 45 That this was no accident, but a natural method for countering the submarine attacks, is shown by a speech Herbert Hoover, the United States Food Admin¬ istrator, made in 1917 to a group involved in the food con¬ servation campaign in the United States: I take it that you are all possessed of the fact that there is a shortage of food in the world; but you probably don’t know that the shortage is the result of a shortage of shipping, that there are in the world today three great food pools—one of them Australasia and Malaysia, the East Indies, China and Japan; another, South America; and the third, North America. Now, with the gradual shortening of shipping, what you might call the Eastern Pool has been almost totally isolated from the Allied World. There lie in Australia at the present moment probably 250,000,000 bushels of wheat; there are in Java a million tons of sugar; there are in the East Indies probably 500,000 tons of beans and a million tons of rice, and there are four or five thou¬ sand tons of vegetable oils. If we had that supply in the Allied countries at this moment... there would be no need for any exertion on our part. But the world simply hasn’t the shipping to spend on that long voyage.... The consequence is that at the present moment we have to take the place of an enormous food supply that is isolated ... we have to take a larger and larger proportion of the load as time goes on, because we are standing against a constant diminution in the world’s shipping. We are confronted at the present moment with the necessity to take the place of those world supplies, and we have already exported from the United States practically our normal surplus. ... We normally consume somewhere around eighty percent more protein... than we need. We consume probably a hun¬ dred percent more fats than we require, and consume probably 44. Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, 480-81. 45. Hoover, Years of Adventure, p. 270; Frank M. Surface and Raymond Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period (Stan¬ ford, Calif., 1931), pp. 22, 266, 932; Beveridge, Food Control, p. 134. World War I 89 twenty five or thirty percent more carbohydrates—that is cereals —than we absolutely need.... After conservation—which is our main problem from now until the next harvest—comes the question of increased produc¬ tion. A stimulant to the production of the country is absolutely vital. 46 The United States after entering the war undertook a wide range of measures to limit the consumption and in¬ crease the production of food. For example, many temper¬ ance measures, finally including outright prohibition, were put into effect partly as a result of arguments that this was necessary to save food. And farmers were promised high prices for increased production. 47 The average American knew nothing of the extent of losses to enemy submarines and supposed that there indeed was a food shortage. But in fact there was no food shortage, only a shortage of shipping. What actually happened was that the increase of production and the savings from con¬ sumption in America were being used to substitute for the merchant ships sunk by German submarines. This concentration on North American supplies brought losses as well as gains. The British lost important mercantile and marine connections in other parts of the world and Americans had to limit their standards of consumption. 48 Moreover, products which could, but for the shipping short¬ age, have been produced and procured more efficiently in more distant parts of the world were instead gotten at greater cost in the United States and Canada. But for these costs the Atlantic Concentration would have existed even in peace- 46. Quoted in Edith Guerrier, We Pledged Allegiance (Stanford, Calif., 1941), pp. 69-72. 47. William Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administra¬ tion (Stanford, Calif., 1941); Guerrier, We Pledged Allegiance; Thomas Nixon Carter, Government Control of the Liquor Business in Great Britain and the United States (New York, 1919). 48. Francis Hirst, The Consequences of the War to Great Britain (New Haven, 1934); John Maurice Clark, The Costs of the World War to the American People (New Haven, 1931). 90 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage time. But whatever these costs, it would not have paid to lose the war, so the European Allies, the United States, and Canada naturally reorganized their pattern of trade in the interest of saving the shipping capacity that was essential to victory. The British also were able to alleviate the shortage of shipping space by limiting the amount of their exports. 49 Admittedly, exports were shipped on outgoing ships and did not compete directly with imports, except to the extent that they slowed down ships in port and the like. But British exports were to a considerable degree made from raw mater¬ ials that had been imported from abroad and then processed or manufactured in Britain. It follows that when exports were cut the need for imports was reduced. This again in¬ volved long-run economic disadvantages. 50 The British also had to borrow more abroad to compensate for the loss of export earnings. Their exports to the United States were greatly reduced in 1917 and 1918, while their imports from the United States were reaching remarkable new heights. 51 The result was a huge indebtedness to the United States. Much of the cost of this distortion of trade was also borne by the United States, since this indebtedness was for the most part ignored in the chaotic economic conditions after the war. The American economy was of course able to help com¬ bat the submarines not only by bearing some of these costs, but also in a more obvious way as well, by allocating its re¬ sources to a then unprecedented degree to the building of cargo ships. 52 The new ships however generally could not 49. Charles Ernest Fayle, The War and the Shipping Industry (London, 1927), pp. 99-101; Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, passim; Hurwitz, State In¬ tervention, pp. 196-204. 50. Hirst, Consequences of the War; see also J. Russell Smith, Influence of the Great War Upon Shipping (New York, 1919). 51. Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, 480-83. 52. Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant, pp. 97-100; W. C. Mattox, Building the Emergency Fleet (Cleveland, 1920). World War I 9 1 be finished by August 1, 1917, the date by which the Ger¬ man naval memorandum expected “certain success” for the submarine blockade. Nonetheless, whether or not the Brit¬ ish would sue for peace by August 1 depended not only on what had happened before that date, but also on the future prospects. In this respect the forthcoming increase in the output of merchant ships was relevant. In this sense, too, the convoy was significant, for though it did not prevent the Germans from sinking all the ships they expected to sink by the time they expected victory, it did by that time offer a basis for British optimism about their capacity to survive the submarine blockade. It was May, 1918, before the con¬ voy system and the increased rate of shipbuilding brought about a situation where the additions to available tonnage equaled the losses; but the trends of the rates of loss and construction changed early enough to affect the situation even before August, 1917. 53 The increases in British and American agricultural production also contributed to the Allied victory. The Kaiser’s naval authorities thought that their subma¬ rine campaign would largely isolate the New World from Eu¬ rope, so that the United States, for all its wealth and power, could not even by declaring war affect the outcome of the struggle in Europe. 54 But America was in fact able to affect the outcome of this struggle very decidedly. It was able to do so in large part because its wealth made a decisive contribu¬ tion to the defeat of the submarines. The submarines which the German military leaders thought would isolate their new enemy were in fact frustrated in their purposes by the eco¬ nomic strength they were trying to isolate. The American economy in a sense was able to substitute part of its strength for the ships sunk by the submarines. It did this partly by 53. Salter, Allied Shipping Control, pp. 366-67. 54. “American money... can never take the place of transportation and shipping space.” Carnegie Endowment, Official German Documents, II, 1218. g2 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage replacing more distant sources of supply for the British Isles, thereby releasing extra shipping tonnage; partly by sacrificing or supplanting British exports, in order that still more ship¬ ping might be saved; and partly by building more merchant ships, thereby replacing some of those sunk by the subma¬ rines. As a result, Britain was helped to remain in the war despite the loss of merchant tonnage, and in addition enough extra tonnage was released to support a considerable Ameri¬ can army in France. By sacrificing part of its considerable consumption of non-essential items, and by readjusting its patterns of production, the United States, along with Britain and the other Allies, was able to substitute what could easily be spared for the extra shipping space that was urgently needed. The war debts of the Allies to the United States repre¬ sented to a great degree the cost of the economic counter¬ measures taken against the submarine. The concentration of Allied purchases in North America and the decrease in British exports to North America certainly accounted for a good part of the war debts. These debts, like the claims for reparations, stimulated a great deal of unfruitful division and discussion in the years after the war, but this explanation of the origin of the debt did not receive proper attention. 55 The United States could, of course, well afford to forego some of its consumption, divert part of its production, and make the necessary loans and grants to its Allies. But ap¬ parently Hindenberg, Ludendorf, and the German naval authorities did not sufficiently appreciate this important fact when they advocated the unrestricted submarine campaign. The German authorities apparently did not realize that, by taking advantage of the possibilities for substitution, the economically powerful nations allied against them could get 55. See Harold Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, World War Debt Settlements (New York, 1929) and War Debts and World Prosperity (New York, 1932). World War I 93 along without much of the shipping that, before these sub¬ stitutions took place, had been absolutely essential. Many of the economic countermeasures did not, to be sure, involve the United States and Britain together, but only Great Britain. The possibilities for substitution could also be exploited in some ways that did not depend upon the co-operation or support of the United States. The British could, for example, use more labor in loading or unloading ships to reduce the time the ships spent in port; the loss of carrying power through port delays had at times shut out four or five million tons of imports a year. 66 Therefore, the British created the “Transport Workers’ Battalions” to speed the handling of ship and railway cargoes, and in 1917 despite the congestion caused by convoys the average time in port de¬ creased. 67 The Ministry of Shipping said, “there is no work upon which the return per man has so high a value in in¬ creasing supplies.” 68 The British also could save shipping space by producing more of the relatively bulky things they needed at home, or sacrificing them, and devoting the ton¬ nage released to more compact and valuable cargo. 59 During the wartime shipping shortage the weight of cargo carried per gross ton of shipping capacity increased. The British not only could compensate partially for the losses to enemy submarines by managing to bring in more imports per gross ton of merchant shipping; they also could fully maintain their health and strength with a far smaller level of imports. For example, the British were able to cut down on their investment and for a time rely mainly on their old capital stock. By failing to make the usual peacetime addition to their stock of capital, and by failing even to re¬ place some of the capital that was depreciated during the war, Britain could reduce its need for imports in the short run. Consider buildings. A large amount of residential, 56. Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, 70. rfl.lbid., Ill, 156-72. 58. Ibid., Ill, 89. 59. Ibid., Ill, 58. 94 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage factory, and office shelter is absolutely indispensable to the health and productivity of any advanced nation. But it is quite possible for a few years to avoid adding to the stock of buildings, and even perhaps to avoid some of that new building that would only compensate for the deterioration of old buildings. The result will be that the future standard of living will be limited somewhat, for there will eventually have to be a sacrifice of consumption to allow more saving and investment in buildings. But that is a price a nation at war is happy to pay if it can thereby survive a blockade. In certain lines of industry some such process must have taken place in Britain during World War I. By 1917 the imports of wood and timber had fallen from the prewar level of 11.6 million tons to 3.0 mil¬ lion tons, and were to fall still further in 1918. During the war the imports of iron and steel manufactures fell from 2.2 million tons to .3 million tons. 60 Despite the increased pro¬ duction of the (mainly metal) instruments of war the im¬ ports of iron ore and scrap also decreased slightly over the course of the war. 61 In view of this evidence it would seem likely that the investment in some types of plant and equip¬ ment must have been reduced in Britain during the war, with the result that the nation could devote more of the shipping space it had left to immediately essential purposes. Even the “investment” in new clothing was curtailed, and imports of raw cotton were substantially reduced. 62 The most obvious way in which the British government could limit imports yet maintain the nation’s strength was through government controls to prevent the importation of non-essential items and the excessive consumption of essential imports. Government restrictions on the import of paper and papermaking materials provide a quantitatively im- 60. Ibid., Ill, 478; see also Salter, Allied Shipping Control, esp. p. 96. 6 1. Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, 59-65, 478. 62. Ibid., Ill, 270-71; Hurwitz, State Intervention, pp. 196-204. World War I 95 portant example: imports of paper and papermaking ma¬ terials fell from 1.8 million tons in 1913 to .5 million tons in 1918. 63 To a degree the importation of less essential products and the wasteful consumption of essential imports also had been limited more or less automatically through the opera¬ tion of the price system. When shipping became scarcer, imports became more expensive, resulting in an incentive for import-saving changes in the pattern of consumption and production. Such price changes, as the Napoleonic War in¬ dicated, can make a large contribution. An effective price system can in many respects do the same things an effective system of governmental controls does. The contribution of the price system however was greatly limited by the extreme¬ ly unequal incomes in Britain at this time. Some of the very rich could and would pay almost any price for luxuries. The price system would not, moreover, insure that the available food supply was distributed in a way that would make the maximum contribution to the nation’s health and energy. This was particularly important in World War I be¬ cause the working class was threatening to strike, even in war industries, over the high price of food. 64 Accordingly, an extensive system of controls was imposed on the distri¬ bution of food. The government toward the end of the war took such a large share in the control of the distribution of food that it bought and sold 85 per cent of the food con¬ sumed in the country. Overseas purchases of food were in time controlled by an inter-allied commission. Some com¬ modities were rationed. 65 There were no doubt some losses as well as gains because of the controls, as hastily constructed ad- 63. Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, 59, 478. 64. Great Britain, Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, Sum¬ mary of the Reports of the Commission, Cd. 8696 (London, 1917), pp. 2, 3, 65. Sir William Beveridge, Some Experiences of Economic Control in War Time, Barnett House Papers, No. 23 (London, 1940), pp. 17-38; Bev¬ eridge, Food Control, 56-57; Frank H. Coller, A State Trading Adventure (London, 1925); Lloyd, Experiments in State Control. 96 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage ministrative machinery attempted to supplement the price mechanism. But the British controls on the whole were ad¬ ministered with fairness and efficiency, and were no doubt far superior to the food controls in Germany. The controls were, moreover, designed explicitly for the survival of the nation and in the interests of the health of all classes of the population. They appear to have saved a considerable quan¬ tity of food. Bread was subsidized in order that this most “efficient” wartime food should not become too expensive for the work¬ ing class. 66 The sale of “fresh” bread, which was thought to lead to nutritionally wasteful consumption, was restricted. The extraction rate of wheat flour was lengthened and other types of flour were mixed with wheat flour until “war bread” finally consisted of only one-half of the normal constituents. The government also restricted the distilling of alcoholic bev¬ erages, and to a lesser extent also limited brewing. In 1917-18 such measures saved an amount that was estimated to be equal to about thirteen weeks’ consumption of wheat flour. 67 In addition, the government discouraged the consumption of certain fancy, nutritionally wasteful food products, and the use of essential foods for the feeding of dogs and horses. 68 All of these measures no doubt caused some unpleasantness, but they unquestionably helped counter the submarine cam¬ paign. The Lloyd George government sought to stimulate the production of food as well as to economize in the consump¬ tion of food. Lloyd George made Edmund Prothero, a noted writer on agricultural topics who was later to become Lord Ernie, the new president of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, and created a new Food Production Department 66. Beveridge, Food Control, pp. 108-12, 299-302. 67. Great Britain, Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies, First Report, Cmd. 1544 (London, 1921), pp. 6-9. 68. John R. Clynes, Memoirs, 1869-1924 (London, 1937), pp. 212-66; Bever¬ idge, British Food Control, pp. 34-35, 81, 256-60. World War I 97 headed first by Mr. (later Sir Thomas) Middleton, and sub¬ sequently by Sir Arthur (later Lord) Lee. The department was to direct a vigorous campaign to increase food output. 69 The Food Production Department decided that grasslands throughout the Kingdom were to be plowed and planted to crop with all possible speed; the acreage of wheat, oats, and potatoes was to be increased, however much this reduced the pasture available for meat production. The department’s policy was inspired by facts brought out in a scientific report published by the Food (War) Committee of the Royal Society in igi6. 70 Most farmers still wanted to “keep off the grass,” but public and parliamentary opinion was swinging in favor of a more intensive, crop-oriented agriculture. 71 Parliament de¬ bated the question in February, 1917, just after the unre¬ stricted submarine campaign had begun, and it was quite evi¬ dent by then that the Conservatives would plow their pas¬ tures, and that the Liberals would bury their economic doc¬ trines, to satisfy the urgent demand for food. 72 In the British Isles spring wheat usually gives far lower yields than winter wheat and is not generally used. Thus the Food Production Department was formed too late to augment the 1917 wheat harvest. It therefore decided to achieve as large an increase as practicable in the 1917 harvest of potatoes and oats, and to concentrate much of its efforts on getting permanent grass plowed during the summer and fall of 1917 to make a larger 1918 wheat crop possible. The 69. Ernie, “Food Campaign,” p. 8. 70. Great Britain, The Food Supply of the United Kingdom, Cd. 8421 (London, 1916); see also Great Britain, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Final Report of the Committee to Consider the Production of Food, Cd. 8095 (London, 1915); T. B. Wood and F. G. Hopkins, Food Economy in War Time (Cambridge, 1915); T. B. Wood, The National Food Supply in Peace and War (Cambridge, 1917); and, particularly, Ernest Starling, The Feeding of Nations (London, 1919). 71. See John Wrightson, The Extension of Agricultural Food Supplies, "Rural Problems Series,” Christopher Turnor, ed. (London, 1919). 72. Parliamentary Debates: Commons, XC, 109-233 and 1591-1649. 98 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage plan for 1918 called for an increase of nearly a fifth in the acreage planted to crop: about two-thirds of the land which had reverted to grass in the previous half century would have to be plowed. The goal was an increase of 2.6 million acres in the area under com and 170 thousand acres more of po¬ tatoes. 73 To insure that farmer resistance would not prevent the realization of these goals, the government assumed the power to require that pasture and meadows be plowed through a Cultivation of Lands Order, under which the County Agri¬ cultural Executive committees were given the authority to specify what land should be plowed by the farmer, and if necessary to undertake cultivation themselves or transfer the control of land from one farmer to another. The orders were rigorously enforced, though the majority of farmers co-operated patriotically. 74 But the carrot was used sparingly, if at all. In February, 1917, Lloyd George announced the government’s intention to guarantee the prices of wheat, oats, and potatoes, but the guaranteed price for wheat was only 60 shillings a quarter, 75 considerably below the prevailing price. These proposals were passed as the Com Production Act of 1917; this act also restricted rents and allowed for the fixing of minimum agri¬ cultural wages. 76 It was more than a question of convincing farmers to do their best. Eventually farmers in the United Kingdom lost one-third of their regular workers to the military or to other industries, 77 and there were shortages of fertilizers and 73. Middleton, Food Production, pp. 207-11. 74. Ernie, “Food Campaign,” p. 32. The committees issued about a hundred thousand plowing orders; there were 254 prosecutions for default and 236 convictions; 317 tenancies were forcibly terminated. 75 . Parliamentary Debates: Commons, XC, 1598-1607. 76 .Ibid., XC, 1591-1649; Hibbard, Effects of War, pp. 188-89. 77. K. A. H. Murray, Agriculture, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1955), p. 15; Parliamentary De¬ bates: Commons, XC, 109-233. World War I 99 machinery. The Food Production Department partially com¬ pensated for the lack of regular laborers by providing women, boys, physically handicapped men, and prisoners of war. A limited number of agricultural deferments were granted. For the harvest of 1918 the Food Production Department was able to provide a force of 350,000 men, women, and boys. It also obtained more fertilizer and machinery. The depart¬ ment itself did some of the farm work. It acquired horses, tractors, and steam traction units, and operated training schools for plowmen. In fact, the greater part of the per¬ manent grass broken up was plowed by the Food Production Department. 78 The plowing goals were met. Even in 1917 there was an increase of nearly a million acres in the area under the plow compared with the previous year. Potato production was in¬ creased by more than a third and oats production by nearly a fifth over the previous year. 79 Plowing for the 1918 crop went on slowly through the summer of 1917, and only a fraction of the needed acreage was covered. But in the late autumn the weather was ideal for plowing, so most of the breaking was done then or in the early winter. The lateness of the plowing did not prevent the increase in the wheat acreage; farmers planted most of their old land and that part of the grassland which had by then been plowed into wheat, hoping that additional newly plowed land would be available for the spring crops. It was, so oats and potato plantings also were increased. The total amount of land under tillage increased by a fifth. 80 78. Ernie, “Food Campaign,” pp. 30 and 37-41. 79. Great Britain, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Sta¬ tistics, LII (1917), Pt. II, Cd. 9089, 56-57; Middleton, Food Production, pp. 190-92. Since only the spring-sown part of the 1917 crop could have been affected by the government’s food production policy, it is not possible to learn much about that policy by studying the 1917 crop. For that reason most of the attention here will be focused on the 1 g 18 crop. The govern¬ ment had not pushed the planting of spring-sown wheat; for an argument that they should have, see Country Life, XLI (Jan. 6, 1917), 2-5. 80. Middleton, Food Production, pp. 235-40. ioo The Economics of the Wartime Shortage When the time came to harvest this vast acreage the weather turned against the food production program: it was the most inclement harvest season in years, and some of the crop was ruined by the rains. 81 Despite the wartime shortages of labor and farm supplies, the yield was quite satisfactory (see Table 5). More im- Table 5 * Crop Yields in bushels per acre Average i()oy-i6 1916 I 9 1 7 1918 Wheat $'■7 29.1 30.6 33-3 Barley 33-8 32.0 32.0 33-8 Oats 42-3 41.2 43-7 44-5 Potatoes (in tons) 5-7 4.8 6.3 6.1 * Prepared from Great Britain, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics, LII, Pt. II (1917), Cd. 9089, 56-57, and LIII, Pt. Ill (1918), Cmd. 298, 54-55. portant, the yield was satisfactory in spite of the law of diminishing returns: though the increased acreage was gained by extending the margin of cultivation to poorer lands, the newly broken land yielded as much as the rest. 82 The reserve of fertility of the freshly plowed grasslands compensated for their innate inferiority. Sample inquiries of the Food Pro¬ duction Department indicated that the yield of wheat, on the newly broken land, was over 31 bushels to the acre, and thus equal to the ten-year average yield for wheat in the United Kingdom. The potato yield on new land was 12 per cent in excess of the decennial average. The barley yield on newly 81. Lord Ernie estimated that 5 per cent of the crop was a total loss, that 7 per cent of the wheat that was harvested was unmillable, and that over 15 per cent of the barley was unfit for brewing (“Food Campaign,” P- 33 )- 82. Agricultural experts assumed an increase in acreage would bring a decrease in yield. See Wrightson’s, Extension of Agricultural Food Supplies, P- 9 - World War I 101 broken land was below par, but oats ran slightly above av¬ erage. 83 The author of a technical article on the crops on the newly plowed land stated that the results of the plow-up had in general been satisfactory. These results might have in¬ volved still higher yields if the seedbed had been better pre¬ pared. If on heavy land the plowing had been done earlier, even four to six months before planting, he felt that yields would have been much better. Potatoes were best suited to the freshly broken land. Extra cultivation could in part compensate for late plowing. 84 It is not surprising, in view of the good yields, that the food production campaign often should have been called a success. 86 If the exceptional plow-up campaign brought greater than average yields of badly needed grain on land that would otherwise have been left in grass, it must indeed have been successful. That it was is shown by the fact that both the total number of tons of food produced and the total num¬ ber of calories produced increased significantly. 86 The policy of plowing pastures and planting them to grain, however, was a controversial one, and in view of the price relationships that prevailed, one that must have been contrary to the economic interests of many farmers and landowners. 87 The pasture and meadow land that was plowed and cropped for human food moreover must have reduced the grass and hay available for livestock and the output of livestock production to some degree, however slight. There was one opponent of the plowing policy at least who argued after the war that the loss of forage for livestock was so great that it more than outweighed the admitted increase in crop 83. Middleton, Food Production, pp. 250-53. 84. C. Bryner Jones, “The Breaking Up of Permanent Grass in 1918,” Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society, LXXIX (1919), 24-44. 85. See below, pp. 108-9. 86. See below, pp. 107-8. 87. Great Britain, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Journal of the Board of Agriculture, XXIV (Feb., 1918), 1304-7; Ernie, “Food Cam¬ paign,” pp. 29-33; Middleton, Food Production, pp. 237-38, 284-85. 102 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage production, so that the plowing policy on balance failed to increase food production. This was the view of Sir Henry Rew, whose views on this subject cannot be taken lightly; he was a noted writer on agricultural topics who had twice been president of the Royal Statistical Society, and who usually had submitted and summarized the official agricultural sta¬ tistics for the Board of Agriculture during the war. Sir Henry argued that “there was no doubt a set-back to food production during the war. By a special effort, the amount of cereal food and potatoes was increased, but there was a marked reduction of other kinds of food, meat and milk par¬ ticularly. .. .” 88 He did not support his judgment with any evidence whatever and there seems to be no reason now for anyone to accept it. But why did Sir Henry come to this con¬ clusion? Why, when the number of tons and calories pro¬ duced was greater, did he say that food production decreased? It could have been his apparent dislike for the unprecedented degree of government intervention involved in the food pro¬ duction program. Or conceivably it stemmed from a sense of embarrassment because he had belittled the danger of an effective naval blockade at the beginning of the war. 89 Per¬ haps a more plausible explanation is that Sir Henry con¬ fused the money value of the food produced in wartime with its real value to the nation. The changing money value of agricultural production in wartime will be a satisfactory measure of output only when the prices of the different types of food reflect their true value to the nation at war. The 1918 British food prices were controlled to insure 88. “The Progress of British Agriculture,” Journal of the Royal Sta¬ tistical Society, LXXXV, Pt. 1 (Jan., 1922), 1-19; see also his Food Supplies in Peace and War (London, 1920). 89. "However carefully prices may be fixed . . . the simple fact that the state assumes the power of settling the market value of any commodity, must inevitably tend to check the enterprise of the producers of that commodity” (Rew, Food Supplies, p. 49). On his optimism on continued food imports at the beginning of the war, see his Food Supplies in War Time, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 45 (London, 1914). World War I 103 that they would not become too high for the restive working class, and controlled in such a way that they did not reflect the true relative values of the different types of food to the be¬ leaguered nation. Nor would uncontrolled peacetime prices necessarily give an accurate measure of the proper relative values during a war blockade; a pound of meat might sell for, say, five times as much as a pound of grain in peacetime be¬ cause of its greater cost and palatability, yet during a siege the two would have more or less the same real value per pound, since their food values would not be greatly different. Sir Henry’s conclusion that wartime agricultural production decreased—that the reduction in the output of meat and milk caused by the plowing of pastures outweighed the in¬ crease in crop production despite the good yields—can be explained, then, in terms of his thinking of the relative money values, rather than the relative food values, of the plant and animal products involved. Indexes showing the money value of the agricultural output in Britain before World War I, and again in 1918, have been prepared for this study. Because of the lack of statistics these indexes are of doubtful reliability. For what they are worth, they show that the value of output in money terms was less in 1918 than in 1913. 90 There was a severe 90. The rough compilations made for this study show that output on the eve of war of products on which data were easily available, was worth £677,171,500 at 1918 piices. The 1918 production at the same (its own) prices was worth only £564498400 (p 2 q 0 /Po^i equals .83). At p,, or ante helium, prices, the prewar output was worth £306,944,250. At these prices, too, the 1918 output was less: £257,102,500 (p 1 q 9 /p.|q 1 equals .84). Thus using either prewar or 1918 prices, output in terms of value must have decreased about 16 or 17 per cent. These are the figures for gross output: as a comment in the text indicates, they do not take into account the fact that feed imports in 1918 were only a small fraction of the prewar feed imports. This makes the drop in output appear much too great. An index of net output would have been more meaningful, but the necessary figures on the value of British feed imports were not available. Also, the home-produced feed grains have been “double counted.” The value of all the oats and barley produced at home and the value of live¬ stock production were both included in the figures of total agricultural production. There were no available data on the amount of the oats and 104 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage inflation in Britain during World War I, so of course the 1918 output valued at 1918 prices was greater than the 1913 output valued at the (much lower) 1913 prices. But if the output in both years is valued at the same set of prices (whether it be those of 1913 or 1918) the value of output is less in 1918 than in 1913. This (admittedly imperfect) index seems to indicate that the value of production in money terms declined in spite of the fact that production measured in terms both of tons and calories increased. One reason for the apparent decline in the money value of agricultural output during the war was the lack of im¬ ported animal feedstuffs. 91 This caused a considerable reduc¬ tion in the output of animal products. In getting along with¬ out their customary feedstuffs, British farmers spared a con- barley that was used for feeding cattle. However, this double counting brings error only to the extent that different proportions of the grain crop were used for livestock feed in the prewar years and in 1918. Since more livestock were fed in 1913, the figure for that year may be relatively too high. The lack of official statistics of the weight of livestock marketed posed another problem. There were official statistics on the number of each of the different classes of livestock slaughtered, some sample statistics on the average carcass weight of the different types of animals, and scattered fig¬ ures on "dressing percentages” (carcass weight as a percentage of live weight). The dressing percentage (d) divided into the carcass weight (c) gives the live weight (w): c/d — w. This gave an estimate of the weight of livestock sold which was used for the index. Finally, the paucity of data required that the minor agricultural products be excluded, as were two not-so-minor products, poultry and eggs. Clearly an index with lacunae as notable as these leaves much to be desired. There is still a likelihood that it is correct in showing that output by value declined in 1918. This result is at any rate consistent with the price statistics, which seem to show that the government’s price policy was not suited to its food production goals. Most of the data for this index came from various issues of Agricultural Statistics; and from J. B. Guild’s "Variations in the Numbers of Livestock and the Production of Meat in the United Kingdom during the War,” Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society, LXXXI (July, 1920); tables in Beveridge’s Food Control and Middleton’s Food Production; the Committee on the Production and Distribution of Milk, Cmd. 483 (1919); and the Journal of the Royal Agriculture Society, LXXIX (1918), p. 168. 91. Great Britain, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Journal of the Board of Agriculture, XXIV (Oct., 1917), 736-44, (Jan., 1918), 1177-84. (March, 1918), 1420-23; Salter, Allied Shipping Control, p. 32; Beveridge, Food Control, p. 358. World War I 105 siderable amount of shipping for more useful imports of human food, and thereby made an additional contribution to the struggle against the submarine blockade. This important contribution would no doubt be reflected in the figures of the value added or net output of British agriculture, if there were data enough to calculate these figures. But it is obvi¬ ously not reflected in the rough estimates of gross output made for this study. Another reason for the apparent de¬ cline in the money value of agricultural output in 1918 is that livestock that would normally have been marketed in 1918 were marketed instead in the autumn of 1917, be¬ cause a mistake by the price control authorities (see p. 107) made it unprofitable for farmers to market livestock at the usual times. 92 Even if these complications could be taken into account quantitatively (and this is not feasible because of the lack of suitable data), the value of output in money terms might nonetheless have declined from 1913 to 1918. This apparent decline in the value of output in money terms could explain Sir Henry’s surprising and misleading assertion that the food production campaign brought an over-all decrease in pro¬ duction. The clear increase in food output in terms of total weight and caloric content in 1918, and the contrasting decline in the value of production in money terms, suggests that the relative prices paid to producers were indeed inappropriate, as an earlier part of this chapter suggested. Even if the indexes prepared for this study should be totally inaccurate, there would be no reason to doubt that the war price policy was inappropriate. A glance at the price statistics shows that the price of pigs and the price of wheat rose roughly the same amounts during the war, even though farmers were being encouraged to raise more wheat at the expense 92. Arthur Bowley, Prices and Wages in the United Kingdom, 1914-1920 (Oxford, 1921), pp. 82-84; Beveridge, Food Control, pp. 139-53. io6 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage of pigs. Generally speaking, the prices of the major types of meat and grain had about doubled by 1918. 93 There was no large change in relative prices to stimulate the de¬ sired changes in production. Generally the food controller had sole authority to set the prices of most farm products, needing only to consult with the president of the Board of Agriculture. Price control had been put into effect to prevent further rises in the cost of living that would lead to industrial unrest. Bread was most important in the diet of the working classes, and it was moreover an efficient food to use during a submarine blockade. Accordingly, the government wanted as low a price as possible. It even put a subsidy on flour, but this subsidy was apparently not large enough to allow the government to raise the price the farmers were paid for wheat significant¬ ly above its old relationship with other agricultural prices. The price of wheat to the British farmer was sometimes two-fifths less than the cost of imported wheat. 94 Sir William Beveridge claimed that: Those parts of the [food production] policy that lay in con¬ trol of the government were substantially achieved. Those that involved a change of farming habits—such as the killing off of cattle or the substitution of veal and baby beef for steer beef— were not achieved. On this flank the breadstuffs policy shattered against the immovable conservatism of farmers. . . .” 95 Perhaps the perverse price policy deserves some of the blame. Elsewhere Beveridge shows that the government made many 93. Great Britain, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Sta¬ tistics, XLVIII (1913), Pt. Ill, Cd. 7487, 188-249, and Lln (> 9 > 8 ). Pt - HI. Cmd. 375, 58-86; Bowley, Prices and Wages, pp. 18-24. It is quite possible for production in physical terms to increase, while the index of output by value declines, even when price relationships are roughly constant. The absolute physical increase of the less expensive goods could be greater than the absolute decrease in output of the more expensive goods. 94. ‘‘There was, unless the patriotic incentive was plain and urgent, little temptation to farmers to spread themselves in cereal production’’ (Lord Ernie, “Food Campaign,” p. 46 and passim); see also Beveridge, Food Control, esp. pp. 107 and 331. 95. Food Control, p. 84. World War I 107 serious mistakes in its pricing policy. 96 In one case a con¬ flict between the Food Controller and Board of Agriculture was referred to Lord Milner of the War Cabinet. He decided to compromise and set the high price asked by one department for the early months of the period in ques¬ tion and the low price set by the other department for the later months of this period. Lord Milner thought he had found the “golden mean”; but the result was naturally a glut in the early months (the autumn of 1917) and a serious shortage in the later months (the winter of 1918). This was one of the most serious blunders of the war food pro¬ gram. 97 The inauspicious pricing policies put more pressure on the system of compulsory controls set up to direct farm pro¬ duction and perhaps also increased the amount of plowing and other farm work that the Food Production Department had to undertake itself; these pricing policies may also have been partly responsible for the farmer opposition to the de¬ partment’s campaign. But this relatively minor pricing problem should not be overemphasized: whatever Sir Henry Rew may have thought, the Food Production Department’s campaign was a definite success. The necessary production adjustments were brought about through the voluntary co-operation of patriotic farmers and by more direct means. Notwithstand¬ ing the shortage of skilled labor and the multitudinous difficulties of the wartime situation, British agriculture must have considerably augmented its output of food nutrients. This is especially clear as far as the production of the major crops is concerned. As Table 6 reveals, the production of wheat, barley, oats, and potatoes in the United Kingdom qG.Ibid., pp. 138-61. 97. Lloyd, Experiments in State Control, pp. 155-200; see also Lord Mil¬ ner's comments in the House of Lords on Feb. 28, 1918, quoted in Bev¬ eridge, Food Control, pp. 146-47. 108 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage rose from an annual average of 12.7 million tons a year from 1904-13 to 17.8 million tons in 1918; an increase of 5.1 mil¬ lion tons or about 40 per cent. Table 6. Food Production in the United Kingdom, 1918 and Prewar* Crop Wheat Barley Oats Potatoes Totals: Tons produced annually, 1904-13 Tons produced Excess of 1918 (average) in 1918 over 1904-13 1,564,000 1,516,000 3,040,000 6,592,000 12,712,000 2,579,000 1,540,000 4,461,000 9,223,000 17,803,000 1,015,000 24,000 1,421,000 2,631,000 5,091,000 * Based on data in Agricultural Statistics as arranged in Tables XIV and XVIII of Middleton’s Food Production. This increase in the production of cereals must of course be adjusted somewhat to allow for the decreased output of certain animal products. Sir Thomas Middleton argued that the 40 per cent increase in the production of grain and pota¬ toes was offset to only a modest degree by the losses in the production of animal products because of the plow policy, and that the net increase in production of calories, after subtracting these losses, was about 24 per cent. 98 The presi¬ dent of the Board of Agriculture during the food production program, Lord Ernie, states that an official calculation showed the farmers of England and Wales alone increased net food output by 2.3 million tons. Lord Ernie, in a different calcu¬ lation of his own, finds that the food production campaign in England and Wales saved 3.3 million tons, or considerably more. 99 To these figures the considerable net increases in food output in the rest of the United Kingdom must be added. Similarly, the produce of the spade must be added to that of the plow; the number of garden “allotments” 98. Food Production, esp. p. 322. 99. "Food Campaign,” pp. 34-37. World War I 109 increased by 830,000 after 1916, and these produced an addi¬ tional million tons of human food, bringing the total net increase to at least 4 million tons. 100 The estimates of well- informed contemporary observers like Middleton and Ernie cannot be definitely confirmed, since the data needed to calculate accurately the change in the weight or caloric value of production are not available. It is not now possible to say exactly how much of the 5.1-million-ton increase in the output of field crops was offset by losses of meat and milk. But none of the data examined or the calculations made for this study are in any way inconsistent with the usual con¬ clusion of those who have studied the question. 101 This conclusion, as a recent scholar stated it, is that “the achieve¬ ments of British farming in 1918 were undoubtedly very considerable.’’ 102 In the winter and spring of 1918 the Food Production Department had to consider what to do about the 1919 wheat crop, for they would have to plow and plant still more land in the summer and fall of 1918 if they were to bring about a further increase in the 1919 wheat harvest. At this time the fears of a further food shortage were still very intense—so intense that on January 31, 1918, the Allied prime min¬ isters sent a telegram to the President of the United States saying: “It is our deliberate conviction that the food short¬ age with its effect on the morale of the population, which has been one of the principal causes of the breakdown of Rus¬ sia, is the greatest danger at present threatening each of the European Allies.” 103 These fears had prompted the Food Pro¬ duction Department to consider plowing yet another million acres of grass so that the 1919 crop might be increased. It 100. Ibid., p. 37. 101. See Christopher Tumor's judgment of the 1918 achievement in Wrightson’s The Extension of Agricultural Food Supplies, pp. 21-22, and Samuel Hurwitz's conclusion in State Intervention, p. 221, that “the policy of the ‘plough maniacs’ had proven successful.” 102. Murray, Agriculture, pp. 14-15. 103. Beveridge, Food Control, p. 94. no The Economics of the Wartime Shortage was estimated that this would save a further 876,000 tons of shipping. 104 In March the Allies suffered serious setbacks in France, notably the German advance on Amiens. Lord Haig issued his famous appeal: troops were to hold their ground at all hazards. In April the military age was raised to 51 and there was a call for more recruits from the agricultural labor force. Accordingly, the plans to plow more land for a larger 1919 harvest were abandoned. Some members of the Board of Agriculture wanted to see the program continued, but the decision was never brought to the Cabinet. Most mem¬ bers thought the Germans were shooting their last bolt. And so they were. Between March 21 and July 17, 1918, the Germans launched five desperate offensives. The last of these failed. The Allies began the counteroffensive that was to bring triumph. Thence the Armistice, before even most of the 1918 crop was consumed. Viewed ex post facto the Food Production Department’s 1918 campaign was only un¬ necessary insurance against a continuation of the war (though the extra food produced in 1918 was extremely useful in the serious world food shortage after the war). 105 The fact that the war ended before most of the increased 1918 production could be consumed, however, should not obscure the main point: that in World War I Great Britain demonstrated a creditable capacity to adjust to a food blockade. In 1913 Great Britain imported 18.1 million tons of food; in 1918 she imported only 11.4 million tons, or about 63 per cent as much. 106 The difference—about 6.7 million tons—represents the amount of shipping saved by the adjustment in production and consumption in Britain. It was then accepted that it took four or five thousand tons 104. Middleton, Food Production, pp. 261-64: Ernie, “Food Campaign,” P- 43 - iO". Frnle, “Food Campaign,” pn. 41-4". 106. This includes drink and tobacco as well as food; Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, 478. World War I 111 of shipping to bring 1,000 American troops with their sup¬ plies to France, 107 so it would appear that the British saved enough shipping through their attempts to reduce food im¬ ports to bring some 1.3 million American troops to France. Though Britain’s achievement on the food front was less re¬ markable in World War I than it was to be in World War II, this was certainly a respectable achievement. A signifi¬ cant part of this achievement was due to increases in agri¬ cultural production. The proportion of wheat supplies that Britain provided for herself increased by more than three- fifths. 108 Great Britain reduced her non-food imports by very near¬ ly as large a percentage as she reduced her food imports. In absolute terms the saving in non-food imports was even greater. All imports together, food and non-food, amounted to 56 million tons in 1913, and to 35.6 million tons in 1918. 109 The loss of shipping capacity available for imports into Great Britain was even larger than this 20.4-million-ton reduction in imports would indicate; had it not been for the Atlantic Concentration and other measures to increase the amount of cargo that could be carried per gross ton of avail¬ able merchant fleet, the loss in imports would have been still greater. These figures on imports therefore understate the contribution made by all of the economic countermeasures in the struggle against the submarine blockade. Even if the submarine blockade had been much more effective tactically and had lasted much longer, Britain still could have survived and the Allies still could have won the war. Had the unrestricted submarine campaign started sooner, the substitutions undertaken to combat it probably 107. See the German naval memorandum in Carnegie Endowment. Offi¬ cial German Documents, II, 1261; Ernie, "Food Campaign,” p. 5; Clynes, Memoirs, p. 255. 108. Beveridge, Food Control, p. 359. 109. Fayle, Seaborne Trade, III, 478; other sources sometimes give dif¬ ferent figures for British imports, but the differences are so small they do not affect the conclusions drawn here. 112 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage also would have begun earlier. The United States even might have declared war on Germany at an earlier date. Moreover, if pressed harder the British could have consumed considerably less and produced considerably more. The Ger¬ mans themselves showed that it was possible, for a consider¬ able period at least, to eat a great deal less, for their per capita food consumption during the war was much less than that in Britain. That the British could also have produced much more was suggested when many, if not most, of the food production authorities, including the head of the Food Production Department, Lord Lee, felt that, in addition to the grassland that had already been plowed for the 1918 crop, a further million acres should be plowed to make pos¬ sible a further increase in the 1919 output. Such an addi¬ tional plow-up program was expected to save an additional 876,000 tons of shipping. So confident was Lord Lee of the feasibility of this program that he resigned when, because of the (correct) expectation that the war would end before the 1919 crop could be consumed and because of the mili¬ tary demands for further conscription of farm workers, there was a decision against continuing the Food Production De¬ partment’s program into 1919. 110 There is no reason to sup¬ pose that these plans for the 1919 crop could not have been carried out had it been necessary or useful to do so. There were vast amounts of land in Britain that had been cropped before the agricultural depression beginning in 1873, but which remained in grass even after the plow policy of 1917-18. The yield of newly plowed grassland in 1918 was quite im¬ pressive, and this suggests that additional land put to the plow would have given at least a tolerable yield. 111 There is accordingly no justification for the claim that the unrestricted submarine campaign would have been success¬ ful if it had started sooner. Some of the Kaiser’s admirals, 110. Ernie, ‘‘Food Campaign,” pp. 42-48; Middleton, Food Production, pp. 259-80. 111. See above, pp. 100-101. World War I 14 3 who had promised “certain success” by August i, 1917, if their program for unrestricted submarine warfare were adopted, were equally certain, after their program had been adopted and the war had been lost, that if the unrestricted submarine campaign had started sooner it would have brought victory. 112 The limitations and restrictions on the earlier submarine campaigns, said Admiral Tirpitz, had “robbed us of final victory.” 113 This view is contradicted by the fact that the Germans did not have nearly as many subma¬ rines in the earlier part of the war as they had by 1917. But even if the submarine campaign would have done much more damage had it started earlier, it still might have failed. There is no merit either in the common claim that “the war on commerce in 1917 brought Great Britain within measur¬ able distance of defeat.” 114 Nor is there any reason why the convoy system should so often be given all of the credit for the defeat of the submarine. 115 For, as earlier parts of this chapter pointed out, the submarine campaign was a tactical success. The German submarines sank, despite the convoy system, fully as much shipping as they expected to sink before their supposedly certain victory on August 1. The convoy system did affect the prospects of the belligerents by August 1 and therefore may deserve part of the credit for the defeat of the submarine, but only part, and perhaps the smaller part. It is the capacity for substitution that the German naval authorities must have failed to take into account when they advocated an unrestricted submarine campaign. It was the principle of substitution that accounted for the unexpected flexibility of the British economic system, and that deserves much of the credit for the campaign’s failure. 112. Scheer, Germany’s Fleet, pp. 257-58; Carnegie Endowment, Official German Documents, I, 500-505. 113. Tirpitz, Memoirs, II, 203; also 180-86. 114. Cruttwell, Great War, p. 187; Hurwitz, State Intervention, p. 194; Carnegie Endowment, Official German Documents, I, 516. II, 833. 115. Hurwitz, State Intervention, p. 1 g 1. U4 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage The contrast between the British economy’s surprising flexibility in the face of the attempt to starve the country into submission, and the German economy’s relative lack of flexibility, is full of irony. For Britain had not prepared for a wartime food shortage in the peacetime years before the war, or even in the first two years of the war, while Germany had gone to great expense for many years to prepare its agri¬ cultural economy for just such a possibility. 116 Britain, mis¬ takenly confident that the Royal Navy would always be able to protect its imports, had let its ancient cornfields grow up to grass. Germany, correctly recognizing the possibility that it might sometime have to depend on domestic food supplies, had used tariff subsidies to expand its agricultural produc¬ tion. But while Germany had the better foresight, Britain had the better fortune. When the wartime shortages came, Great Britain was able to increase its agricultural production and control its food consumption with surprising success, while Germany was unable to increase its food production or effectively control its food consumption. The British had only to plow their grassland to tap a reserve of fertility that had accumulated over many years, while German agriculture had been fully extended, in some sense even overextended, before the war, and could not increase output in the face of wartime shortages and adversities. Britain, with its relatively unified electorate and generally efficient civil service was able to choose a set of vigorous policies to counter the war¬ time shortages, and to execute these policies effectively. Germany, with its urban and rural voters badly divided, and 116. On Germany’s prewar food production and consumption, see Paul Eltzbacher, ed., Germany’s Food, Can it Last? (London, 1915). This book was the result of studies by leading German scientists on the war food problems posed for Germany by the British naval blockade. The book did not anticipate the gravity of the food problem that was eventually to con¬ front Germany, though it was a carefully prepared study by excellent scholars. The book was translated and published in England shortly after its publication in Germany, and stimulated many Britons to think about their own food supply problems. World War I i»5 with probably a less modern civil service, was unable to distribute its food supplies fairly or efficiently. 117 Britain’s agriculture and her political-administrative machinery had a flexibility which the corresponding German systems did not have. 118 To some degree, at least in agriculture, British society had this flexibility because it had not tried to make its economy independent of foreign trade and because it had not reduced its over-all economic strength by pursuing un¬ economic policies out of strategic motives. This argument must not be carried too far, however. It does not follow that the country that least prepares its econ¬ omy for war will necessarily suffer the least from equal war¬ time shortages. It is not even clear that Britain would have been worse off if she had subsidized her agriculture, or that Germany would have been better off if she had not. The situations are so complicated and the number of con¬ tingencies so numerous that it is not possible to say definitely what would have happened had either Britain or Germany followed a different policy. What can be said is that the usual assumption that a nation will strengthen itself in any future war by reducing its dependence on foreign supplies is com¬ pletely unproven. The experience of World War I points if anything to the opposite conclusion. Had Britain tried to become independent of foreign sources of food before the war, its munitions output in World War I would have been much smaller than it was, and its valuable investments in foreign countries would have been less. Had Germany re- 117. Admiral Holtzendorff, in the German naval memorandum advo¬ cating unrestricted submarine warfare, had argued that the opposite would be true. ‘‘The conclusion which I reach, without underestimating the talent of the English for organization, is that a rationing system capable of bringing about the husbanding of requisite supplies to an extent ap¬ proximating that which was accomplished in Germany is not possible in England, or at least is no longer possible.” Carnegie Endowment, Official German Documents, II, 1241. 118. It is interesting to note that Dr. Helfferich, German Secretary of State of the Interior, had said in September, 1916: "For God’s sake, do not underestimate British tenacity and the possibilities of food control” [Ibid., II, 834). 116 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage jected tariffs on its agriculture, it would have had more in¬ dustrial output in World War I. To show that either Ger¬ many or England would have been better off in World War I for having subsidized their agricultural sectors, it is necessary to show not only that the subsidy left the agricultural indus¬ try better able to cope with the war (and the experience of World War I does not prove this), but also that any gain that may have resulted exceeded the peacetime and wartime costs in terms of the output of other industries that was sacrificed (and this is still harder to prove from the experience of World War I). In the midst of a lament about the inadequate food sup¬ plies in wartime Germany, General Erich von Ludendorf wrote: The country has been able to see that, just as the army is the basis of order, so our agriculture is the basis of our economic, indeed, even of our political life. If we had only borne this in mind before the war things would have been much easier for us. 119 Apparently Ludendorf thought even the high tariffs in pre¬ war Germany were not enough: the wartime food shortages showed the need for a still larger peacetime agricultural sec¬ tor. When Britain’s impressive response to the unrestricted submarine campaign is considered, and compared with Ger¬ many’s hungry experience, General Ludendorf’s analysis seems a bit too simple. 119. My War Memories, I, 352. 5. World War II In the two decades of peace before World War II the British agricultural sector shrunk, just as it had in the half century before World War I. In the years of peace between the two world wars the number of persons employed on farms fell about 30 per cent, and the area under the plow was re¬ duced about 25 per cent. About seven-eighths of Britain’s wheat and flour and over two-thirds of her total calories came from across the seas. In addition, the inexorable growth of the cities had reduced the amount of land available for farming. 1 The atrophy of British agriculture had been slowed somewhat by a number of tariffs and other subsidies, but these were largely anti-depression measures and were not sufficient to compensate for the extra foreign food sold on the British market during the depression. 2 These measures by no means constituted a systematic program to build up Brit- 1. K. G. Fenelon, Britain’s Food Supplies (London, 1952), p. 48; Edith Whetham, British Farming, 1939-49 (London, 1952), p. 10; K. A. H. Mur¬ ray, Agriculture, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1955), pp. 38-39. 2. K. A. H. Murray and Ruth L. Cohen, The Planning of Britain’s Food Imports (Oxford, 1934), p. 89; see also Ada F. Wyman and J. S. Davis, “Britain’s New Wheat Policy in Perspective,” Wheat Studies, IX (July, 1933), 305-60. For material on the world wheat situation before World War II see M. K. Bennett, “Wheat and War, 1918 and Now,” Wheat Studies, XVI (Nov., 1939), 67-112. u8 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage ish agriculture in anticipation of war. There was a hesitant attempt to acquire a small food reserve shortly before the war, but the meager government stocks were offset by declines in private inventories. 3 The attitude of the farmers was an¬ other negative factor; the Com Production Act of 1917 had guaranteed prices for six years, but in 1921 the government decided to repeal the guarantee. This “betrayal” came at a time of collapsing farm prices and left a bitterness that ex¬ acerbated farmers’ anxieties about government policy in World War II. 4 Accordingly, no one would suggest that British agricul¬ ture had been intentionally prepared for the war it was to face. But neither, perhaps, had the Royal Navy been pre¬ pared for the war it was to fight. In the years immediately preceding the war the admiralty assumed that the submarine would not be its major problem. It had developed “Asdic,” a device which could by the use of sound waves detect sub¬ merged submarines near a ship, and was more impressed with this device, and the convoy, than the weapon against which they were means of defense. 5 The submarine campaign in the earlier part of the war did not in fact cause especially seri¬ ous damage, though airplanes, mines, and surface raiders were then a significant problem. In the first year and a half of war g.R. J. Hammond describes the watered-down plan for a storage re¬ serve that was finally accepted in the following terms: “There could be no pretence that the revised plan constituted an adequate insurance; officials supporting storage in principle regarded it rather as a lever to secure Ministerial agreement to the establishment of any Government reserve at all.” See his Food, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1951), I, 20. The government also appointed an inter-departmental committee before the war, which was to study plans for combating any war food problems that might arise. See also Ham¬ mond’s Food and Agriculture in Britain, 1939-45, “Food Research Insti¬ tute’s Series on Food and Agriculture in World War II" (Stanford, Calif., • 954 ). P- ' 4 - 4. 11 & 12 George V, c. 48, as cited and discussed in Murray, Agriculture, p. 18. 5. Captain S. W. Roskill, White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, Md., i960), p. 35; C. B. A. Behrens, Merchant Ship¬ ping and the Demands of War, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1955), p. 35. World War II 119 the Germans had only a few submarines—usually less than fifteen—at work in the Atlantic, and therefore they could not cause decisive destruction. In the last half of 1940 particular¬ ly, however, the relative lack and inefficiency of defensive measures enabled the Germans to obtain a high rate of kill per submarine, but still the over-all impact could not be decisive. 6 But as the war went on the Germans produced ever larger numbers of submarines, and in 1941, and still more in 1942 and 1943, the Battle of the Atlantic intensified. It was in the spring of 1943 that the battle reached its apogee. The Ger¬ mans had greatly increased and improved their submarine fleet and the Allies had developed their defensive capability. 7 The advantage was finally with the Allies, but for a very long while this was in doubt, and for much of the war the Nazis had the upper hand. During World War II Britain lost 11.4 million tons of merchant shipping, or an amount equal to 54 per cent of her merchant tonnage just before the war. 8 The shipping shortage for a long while limited the entire Allied war effort. It was, said Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, imposing “a stranglehold on all offensive operations.” 9 Perhaps in no other area was the Nazi effort successful in such a large degree, and for such a long time. “The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war,” said Winston Churchill, “was the U-boat peril.” 10 While the British government’s prewar agricultural poli¬ cies often were attacked as shortsighted, its wartime food pro¬ grams were generally praised as intelligent and efficient. 6. Admiral Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, trans. R. H. Stevens (London, 1959); Roskill, White Ensign, pp. 43-48. 7. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September J939- May 1943, Vol. I, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, 1947). 8. Roskill, White Ensign, pp. 117-48, 193-240, 262-79, and esp. p. 447. 9. A comment at Casablanca, Jan. 14, 1943, quoted in Behrens, Merchant Shipping, p. 328. 10. Their Finest Hour, II, The Second World War (Boston, 1947), 598; see also Samuel Eliot Morison, The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943-May 1943, Vol. X, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, 1956). and Doenitz, Memoirs. 120 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage This praise was well deserved. British war food pro¬ grams were based on a thorough knowledge of the funda¬ mental possibilities of substitution in production and con¬ sumption. While British food and agricultural planners probably did not set out all of the logical possibilities for substitution in the schematic and systematic fashion of Chap¬ ter I of this book, they still seem to have taken account of almost all of the possible types of substitution in production and consumption. 11 All types of economic activity that affected the food short¬ age were tightly controlled, and this facilitated the integra¬ tion of consumption policy, shipping policy, and agricultural policy in the interest of a coherent food program. Food con¬ sumption was controlled by a comprehensive system of ra¬ tioning, regulations, subsidies, and price controls. Non-es¬ sential and inefficient types of food consumption were limited or prohibited, much as they had been in the two preceding major wars. There were restrictions on brewing, while flour had to be made with a higher extraction rate and diluted as well. The distribution of food consumption among rich and poor also was altered so that a given amount of food could make the largest contribution to the health of the popu¬ lation as a whole. 12 This policy too was consistent with the pattern of the Napoleonic War and World War I, though the previous attempts to bring about a more nearly equitable distribution of food were quite modest by comparison with those in World War II. The merchant shipping policy was similarly controlled so that the space available for food im¬ ports would be restricted to the food products that were most economical of transportation. The agricultural industry, in n.J. H. Kirk, "The Output of British Agriculture During the War,” Journal of Proceedings of the Agricultural Economics Society, V'll (June, 1946), 30-45; "Notes on Agricultural Policy for Those Directing the Food Pro¬ duction Campaign,” issued by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1942, and lo¬ cated in the Appendix of Murray’s Agriculture; see also Hammond, Food. 12. Hammond, Food, Vols. 1 and III; Great Britain, Report of the Con¬ ference on the Post-War Loaf, Cmd. 6701, pp. 4-8. World War II 121 turn, concentrated mainly on the production of commodities that were, on the one hand, economical sources of vital nutri¬ ents, and, on the other, so bulky or perishable that they were wasteful of shipping space. Thus land was diverted from per¬ manent grass fed to beef cattle, which yielded little nutritive value per acre, to cereals and potatoes, which were efficient sources of human food. 13 Farmers could keep beef cattle only if there were feedstuffs left after other needs were met. Similarly, hogs, chickens, and feeder cattle required vast amounts of imported feed for every unit of human nutrients they produced, so their numbers were reduced. The num¬ bers of hogs fell by more than half. 14 The numbers of chickens and feeder cattle were also considerably diminished, with the result that imports of feedstuffs could be cut from 8.75 million tons to 1.25 million tons. 16 The most important feature of the agricultural side of the war food program—indeed, perhaps the most important fea¬ ture of the entire program—was the plowing of permanent grass to increase the acreage of cereals and potatoes. During the war the acreage planted to wheat doubled and the total area under tillage rose from 8.4 million acres in 1936-38 to 13.7 million acres in 1944. 16 Both compulsion and enticements were used to bring about this drastic change in the pattern of British agricul¬ ture. County agricultural committees, composed mainly of the better farmers, were set up, and they discussed cropping 13. Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, "History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (London, 1951), pp. 57 and 65. See also Kirk, "Output During the War”; Murray, Agriculture; Hammond, Food; Behrens, Merchant Shipping. 14. Statistical Digest, p. 61; see also James Wyllie, Land Requirements for the Production of Human Food (Wye College, Kent, 1954), Appendix. From 1936-39, 18 per cent of the caloric output of the United Kingdom came from cereals and 24 per cent from meat. In 1943-44, 43 P er cent came from cereals and 9 per cent from meat. One person was being fed on each 1.15 acres, where 1.85 acres had been needed before (Wyllie, Land Requirements, pp. 12-15). 15. Kirk, “Output During the War.” 16. Statistical Digest, p. 57. x 22 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage plans for each year (at least after 1942) with every farmer to emphasize the government’s production goals. Typically the county agriculture committee and the farmer would easily agree on cropping plans, partly because farmers felt they should co-operate out of patriotic motives. Farmers who did not have the cash to buy the fertilizers or equipment the com¬ mittee thought essential were forced to accept credit. All farmers were classified as “A,” “B,” or “C” farmers according to their estimated efficiency and productivity. Class “C” farmers were either forced to turn over their farms to more progressive management or were subjected to detailed super¬ vision by the committee. Class “B” farmers had to undergo occasional inspection or supei-vision. (This system of control does not seem to have offended most farmers, for to a large extent the system has been retained in peacetime with farmer support.) 17 Monetary incentives were used more effectively than in World War I. Farm income probably rose more rapidly than other incomes, trebling during the war. Each year the gov¬ ernment attempted to set agricultural prices and the wages of farm labor at a level which would call forth the needed production and be consistent with the broad requirements of the nation. In the early years of the war, however, a tendency to base prices on the average costs of production of the different commodities, rather than on the varying urgency of the need for them, made the price structure less effec¬ tive. In 1940 the government promised to guarantee prices until at least one year after the end of the war; the promise was soon extended to two years, and in 1944 to four years. 18 Direct subsidies also were used with success; the most im¬ portant of these was the payment of £2 for every acre of 17. “Notes for Those Directing the Food Production Campaign,” Ministry of Agriculture, in Murray, Agriculture, Appendix; Kirk, “Output During the War,” pp. 36-37. 18. Whetham, British Farming, pp. 35-38, 42-46, and 120; Murray, Agri¬ culture, pp. 309-10. World War II 123 grass plowed. The government wanted to use special sub¬ sidies for marginal production, which would increase output without having the inflationary effects of higher prices and greater economic rents. But for administrative reasons this was difficult: it would not be entirely appropriate simply to subsidize production on marginal land, for marginal produc¬ tion resulting from more intensive production on good land and the production of marginal farms equally deserved en¬ couragement. The government finally turned to per-acre payments for wheat, rye, and potatoes, ad hoc payments for marginal farms, and special payments for sheep and cattle raised on land too hilly to be cropped. 19 Amateur gardening also received every encouragement. A “Dig for Victory” campaign brought perhaps 2.5 to 3 mil¬ lion tons of food. Unused land was requisitioned for gardens, and pigs and chickens were kept to utilize home garbage. 20 The 1940 harvest was the first that could have been affected by the wartime policy. The target for 1940 was the plowing of two million acres of permanent grass, and the seeding of this land to wheat, potatoes, and feed crops. These goals were achieved. The shipping problem was not yet considered serious enough to force the liquidation of meat animals. For the 1941 harvest, a further 2.2 million acres in crop was desired; the increased acreage was to be planted to potatoes, sugar beet, and flax. Again the targets were sub¬ stantially realized. The 1942 harvest goal was 1.98 million acres more under the plow, with increased plantings of wheat and other crops. The wheat output exceeded the target, but only 1.4 million extra acres were plowed. With reduced im¬ ports of feedstuffs the number of pigs was reduced so much that the output of pork was only 38 per cent of the prewar level. Total meat output also was lower than in peacetime. 19. Whetham, British Farming, pp. 124-28; Murray, Agriculture, pp. 292-99. 20. Murray, Agriculture, pp. 245-48. 124 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage The difference between the plowing goal and the accomplish¬ ment of the 1942 harvest was compensated for the next year, when the target of nearly a million more acres under the plow was substantially exceeded, as were the other goals for crop production. The 1943 output of wheat was 200 per cent over the 1940 output. Total meat production tvas but 69 per cent of the prewar level, while milk output was 93 per cent of the peacetime supply. The total number of milk cows had been rising steadily because of the dietary im¬ portance of milk, but the average yield per cow had de¬ creased. In 1944 the government asked that 700,000 more acres be plowed and planted to crops. The area of permanent grass was reduced by another 595,000 acres, but a further 506,000 acres of arable land was sown to temporary grass, so that the area under crops other than grass was about the same as in 1943. This was accomplished in spite of inauspi¬ cious weather. 21 These sparkling results were tarnished slightly in 1945 when neither the target for tillage area nor the desired wheat acreage was achieved. There was an absolute decrease in wheat output: the 1944 production was 3.1 million tons, but in 1945 it was only 2.2 million tons. 22 This seems to be due in part to a continuing increase in the amount of temporary grass. It will be argued below (page 146) that this steady in¬ crease in the area seeded to temporary grass, reaching its peak in 1945, the year of an absolute decline in output, dam¬ ages the argument that a large peacetime acreage of grain and potatoes can be justified as a measure of war prepared¬ ness; a larger crop acreage in peace may force a smaller crop 21. All of the figures in the foregoing discussion of the planting goals and accomplishments are from Murray, Agriculture, esp. pp. 175, 220, and 235 - 37 - 22. Ibid., pp. 235-38, and Statistical Digest, pp. 57-59. World War II 125 acreage in war, because it draws on fertility and requires that some of the land be put temporarily into grass. 23 Yet, taking the war as a whole, it is perfectly clear that the desired substitutions in the uses of British agricultural resources were almost invariably achieved. In short, the acreages of the vital crops were increased in close conformance with the wishes of the government and the needs of the na¬ tion. But there was not merely an increase in the acreage of vital crops: there was also an increase in production. Despite the use of innately inferior land, as the acreage in crop increased, yields increased; 24 total production rose more than acreage. Moreover, even considering the fact that the production of some food products fell greatly because of the diversion of resources to the production of the commodities that were emphasized, total production—the total output of food nutrients—increased considerably. The calory output of the United Kingdom’s agriculture rose from 18.7 billion calories in the average prewar year to 29.0 billion calories in 1943-44, an increase of 55 per cent. But while four bil¬ lions of the prewar output were dependent on the imports of feeds and seeds, only about one billion of the calories produced in 1943-44 were due to the imports of foreign agri¬ culture. Thus the prewar net output was only 14.7 billion calories, so during the war caloric output actually increased by 91 per cent. The increase in the output of proteins was 106 per cent, even greater, 25 indicating that a war food campaign can bring not only more calories, but also more of other nutrients needed for a balanced diet. Of course the net worth of this great increase in British agriculture’s output of food nutrients will not have been demonstrated until the extent of any transfer of productive 23. No doubt if the costs were completely ignored, this need not be true, for if there were no economic limit whatever to the amount of fer¬ tilizer and the like that could be used, productive capacity could be main¬ tained at the highest level despite heavy peacetime cropping. 24. Statistical Digest, p. 60. 25. Murray, Agriculture, p. 242. 126 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage resources to the agricultural sector is considered. The in¬ creased food output would not have brought much advantage on balance had it been due solely to greater purchases of machinery and other farm supplies, and thus detracted great¬ ly from other parts of the war effort. But even when the extra resources devoted to agriculture during the war are consid¬ ered, the results are imposing. If we value the output and all of the non-farm inputs (purchases of farm supplies, machin¬ ery, and feedstuffs from other countries or other British industries) of British agriculture at their 1945-46 prices, we find that in 1943-44 the agriculture of the United Kingdom had achieved a net output 15 per cent greater than the pre¬ war level. 26 Of course the relevance of this index of net output depends on the extent to which the prices at the end of the war measured the true wartime worth of the inputs and outputs of British farming. Since prices were controlled and subsidized to prevent any serious rise in the cost of living, they surely did not perfectly reflect the true values of goods. But if anything they must understate the net contribution of British agriculture to the war effort, for the food produced was vitally important, and probably worth far more to the country than its controlled price would suggest. 27 26. The index of “net” output prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture shows a 25 per cent increase in 1913-44. But this index overstates the ac¬ complishments of Britain’s farmers, as it does not take account of the larger purchases of farm equipment and supplies during the war; it only subtracts the cost of imported feedstuffs. Net output, according to the index used for this study, fell from 115 in 1943-44 to 108 in 1944-45, 50 the net output in the last year of the war was only 8 per cent over the prewar level. For the source of these indexes see H. T. Williams, "Changes in the Productivity of British Agriculture,” Journal of Proceedings of the Agricultural Economics Society, X (March, 1954), 332-56. 27. Admittedly the number of tractors and the use of fertilizers grew greatly during the war. Some of the tractors and fertilizers came from abroad and thus used scarce shipping space. But the tonnage required for these inputs was surely very small in relation to the increase in agri¬ cultural output. For instance, on the generous assumption that each tractor weighed three tons, all of the tractors bought by British agri¬ culture between May, 1942, and June, 1946, weighed only 258,000 tons. And in fact many of them were manufactured at home. The tonnage of fer¬ tilizer imported was also very small in relation to the agricultural output. World War II 127 British farmers also may have used more labor during World War II. While more than 5 per cent of the regular male farm workers were lost 28 (despite limited exemptions), the greater use of women, children, and prisoners of war may have more than compensated for this. According to some estimates of the relative worth of the substitute war¬ time labor, the working force in agriculture had increased 3 per cent by 1942-43, and 9 per cent by 1944-45, oyer pre¬ war levels. 29 But this extra labor consisted mainly of workers who in normal times were not employed anywhere and who could not have produced much in other industries. Thus it is not possible to argue that the labor used in any significant way negated the value of the increased agricultural output. Indeed the quickness and ease of substitution in British agri¬ culture is suggested by the fact that, even with the use of inexperienced and marginal labor, the productivity per man¬ hour increased during the war. The calory production per man-equivalent rose 49 per cent over the prewar norm. 30 Even when output is measured by value, the output per unit of labor seemed to rise slightly. 31 Thus, all things considered, British agriculture made a notable contribution to the war effort. Despite wartime shortages and particularly the loss of some skilled men to the armed forces, it almost doubled its output of food nutrients. While more temporary labor was used and some other inputs also were employed in greater quantity, these extra inputs certainly did not have anything like the wartime value of the extra food produced. Moreover, See Statistical Digest, pp. 63 and 120; see also Williams, “Productivity of Agriculture,” p. 336. 28. Statistical Digest, p. 16. 29. Williams, “Productivity of Labor,” p. 334; A. W. Ashby, “The Future of British Agriculture,” Westminster Dank Review (May, 1947), pp. 3-12. In the United States agricultural output increased by 25 per cent during the war, despite a 7 per cent decrease in farm employment. But it must be remembered that government policies had restricted agricultural output in the States before the war. 3a Wyllie, Land Requirements, p. 20. 31. Ashby, “Future of British Agriculture,” pp. 3-12. 128 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage the efficiency of British agriculture increased: output per man rose and yields improved. There were, however, not only substitutions within Brit¬ ish agriculture, but also substitutions in food consumption and in merchant shipping. The measures to alter the pat¬ tern of consumption and the use of available shipping space were co-ordinated with agricultural policy, and the combined effect of the three types of policy greatly exceeded that due to the agricultural adjustments alone. The contribution the British war food programs made to the Allied cause is best measured by the amount of precious shipping space they made available for carrying the men and material needed to fight the war, though there are, to be sure, difficulties in measuring the amount of shipping saved. 32 In the prewar years the food and feed imports of the United Kingdom averaged about 22.5 million tons per year; in the years from 1940-41 through 1944-45 food and feed imports averaged only about 12 million tons annually. The average annual wartime saving was accordingly about 10 million tons, and the total saving for the entire war ex¬ ceeded 50 million tons. 33 The magnitude of these savings is shown by comparing them to the yearly total tonnage of British imports of supplies. In 1942-43, for example, when the submarine campaign reached its climax, total British non-tanker imports were 23.4 million tons, and total food and feed imports were 10.3 million tons. The level of food 32. See p. 129, n. 35. On the contribution British economic policies gen¬ erally made to the war effort see the many volumes in the "History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series.” The following works in this series are especially useful to anyone studying the British war economy and war supply problems generally: M. M. Postan, British War Production (London, 1952), W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy (London, 1949), H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London, 1955), H. Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley, Studies of Overseas Supply (London, 1955). For the British and Allied attempt to blockade Nazi Germany, see W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade (2 vols.; London, 1952 and 1959). 33. See Table 7. World War II 129 Table 7 . Total Non-Tanker Imports and Food and Feed Im¬ ports into the United Kingdom by War Years, 1939-40 to 1944 - 45 * Total non-tanker Ministry of food Year imports imports 1 939 * 4 ° 44,169,000 20,689,000 1940-41 31,545,000 14,423,000 1941-42 26,872,000 12,687,000 1942-43 23,447,000 10,288,000 4 943-44 26,759,000 11,514,000 1 944-45 25,954,000 11,607,000 • This table is based upon more detailed figures in Table 161 of the Statistical Digest, pp. 184-85, and follows the summary arrangement of Murray in Agriculture, p. 152. The total imports include all those under departmental programs, and the Ministry of Food imports include animal feed stuffs. and feed imports in this year was 12 million tons less than the prewar average of 22.5 million tons. 34 In other words, the British war food policies in a crucial year saved the equivalent of half the total British import tonnage. The sav¬ ings in other years, when the situation was on the whole less stringent, were a little less, but still remarkable. It also ap¬ pears that the tonnage saved by the war food policies is siz¬ able in relation to the total loss of import capacity resulting from the Nazi U-boat campaign, though no detailed statistical comparison is possible in this instance. 35 By other standards, too, the British food programs were remarkably successful. Though food and feed imports were for a long while reduced by 55 per cent, and at the nadir, in January, 1943, by 75 per cent, the people were never without adequate nourishment. Indeed, the diet of the average Briton actually became more healthful during World War II. While the regimen of the war was no doubt unpleasant and monotonous, its nutritional adequacy is beyond question. 34. See Table 7, above, and Murray, Agriculture, p. 241. 35. Between September 3, 1939, and August 15, 1945, the British mer- 130 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage The death rate declined more rapidly than it had in pre¬ war years. As in World War I, bread was not rationed (though it w r as rationed after the war, when the severe short¬ ages in Europe and some miscalculations by the government caused a tightening of the British rations). The better distri¬ bution of the food supply, brought about by rationing, sub¬ sidies, and other controls, apparently more than compensated for the reduced variety of food available. 36 No doubt the dietary restrictions lowered the morale: but still the spirit of chant fleet lost through enemy action 2,714 ships with a total of 11.5 million gross tons. It does not, to be sure, follow that the savings due to the war food programs of over 50 million tons exceeded the British loss of shipping to enemy action by four or five times. The gross tonnage sunk is not directly comparable to the tonnage of imports saved. First, the sinking of a British merchant ship deprived Britain of the tonnage that ship could have carried on subsequent voyages had it not been sunk as well as the tonnage carried at the time of sinking. The tonnage a ship carries, moreover, is generally not the same as the gross tonnage figure given in the statistics. The gross tonnage is determined from the cubic feet of enclosed space in the ship; some merchant ships could carry a tonnage, that is have a “deadweight” tonnage, greater than their gross tonnage. In British-controlled ships during the war the deadweight tonnage was on the average about a third greater than the gross tonnage. But the number of tons a given ship will carry on a given voyage may in fact be limited, not by either its deadweight or gross tonnage, but rather by the bulky character of the cargo, or how well this cargo is prepared for shipping. The cargo-carrying capacity of a given number of ships also will change with the length of the haul: a given fleet of ships can of course carry more tonnage per year over a short haul than a long one. A merchant fleet will carry more if ships can travel independently ac¬ cording to their own convenience than if they have to go in convoy, and more if they are handled quickly in port than if they face port con¬ gestion. For these and other reasons, it is not possible directly to compare the tonnage saved by the war food programs with the reduction of British imports brought about by the enemy’s efforts at blockade. Still, it is difficult to avoid the impression that British war food policies to a con¬ siderable degree compensated for the merchant shipping capacity lost be¬ cause of the submarine and other enemy weapons. (On the extent of the merchant shipping losses to enemy action see Roskill, White Ensign, Ap¬ pendix, p. 447; on the problem of measuring the cargo-carrying capacity of a fleet of merchant ships see Behrens, Merchant Shipping, esp. Appendix 2, pp. 18-20 and 466.) 36. Hammond, Food, I, 368-71. Hammond states that “Generally speaking... the diet theoretically available to the British civilian was not only maintained but actually improved during the war” (p. 369). See also Food Consumption Levels in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, reports of a committee of the Combined Food Board, and The Impact of the War on Civilian Consumption, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1945; Whetham, British Farming, pp. 74 and 138-39. World War II 131 the British people remained strong throughout the war, and the food rationing system won widespread public acceptance. There were even public demands that rationing be extended to more commodities. 37 The essence of the British food situation in World War II, then, is that, though before the war British agriculture had declined to the point where the nation imported most of its food, and though the German submarine blockade during the war was to a considerable extent effective, Britain still was able completely to maintain the health and efficiency of its people while at the same time releasing a large amount of shipping for military purposes. This was due partly to a number of adjustments and substitutions in agricultural pro¬ duction, which led to a greatly increased output of food nutrients, and to a series of limitations and substitutions in import and consumption patterns, which led to important additional economies in cargo space, and brought complete success in counteracting the submarine campaign to blockade Britain into starvation and submission. 37. Hammond, Food, II, 753 writes: “The success of food rationing was something that the British people came to take for granted. Their satisfaction with control, speaking generally, varied directly with its com¬ pleteness.” Also see Whetham, British Farming, p. 74. 6. Summary and Conclusion The preceding chapters have shown that Great Britain did in¬ deed face similar supply problems in each of the three major wars it has fought since it first became dependent on foreign food supplies, and that each time it was successful in over¬ coming these problems. In the Napoleonic wars the Conti¬ nental System deprived Great Britain of most of its normal food imports, yet it successfully survived this long struggle. In both world wars, German submarines deprived Britain of a large part of its normal imports of food and other sup¬ plies, yet twice more it victoriously survived. But while the food problems British faced in all three wars were of the same kind, they were not always of the same degree. Britain endured the greatest loss of food sup¬ plies in World War II, the next greatest loss in World War I, and the smallest loss in the Napoleonic wars. In Napoleonic times Great Britain was dependent on imports for only a minor fraction of her supplies, while before each of the two world wars she was dependent on imports for the greater part of her food and for about four-fifths of her bread grains. Consequently, a curtailment of imports in the first conflict should not have presented as serious a problem as it did in the latter two. The Continental System, moreover, was de¬ signed mainly to limit British export trade rather than to Summary and Conclusion 133 starve the British into surrender, and it was accordingly less effective in stopping British food imports. Nevertheless, the amount of suffering for want of food in the Napoleonic period was probably much greater than in either of the world wars, since Britain at that time did not have the sophistication to deal as effectively with a food shortage as it did later. In the Napoleonic period rationing was never attempted, for the obvious reason that the admin¬ istrative ability necessary to make it work did not exist. Therefore, there was more inequality of consumption, and less national strength derived from a given quantity of food, than in the two world wars. In the time of Napoleon, more¬ over, the coercive weapons of the government were so blunt, and the ignorance of the people so great, that it was not pos¬ sible to bring about a general switch from the less economical and less nutritious white bread to the more efficient and healthful dark bread. The quick increases in agricultural production of which Britain was capable in World Wars I and II were also beyond her reach in the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. In the Napoleonic period Britain had to rely on a primi¬ tive price system to stimulate agricultural production and limit wasteful consumption. The price system worked and brought about generally the same kind of changes that gov¬ ernment control helped impose in the latter two wars. For example, it greatly increased both arable cultivation and food production. But this increase was not as rapid as it might have been; the achievement might not have seemed as im¬ pressive had the war been shorter. Probably farmers were at that time less alert to changes in relative prices than they have been in recent times, and it took longer for them to take advantage of the opportunities posed by the high prices brought about by the scarcity. While a free price system will eventually stimulate the agricultural adjustments a nation at 134 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage war needs, it may not do so quickly enough, for farmers will not know in the first year of high prices whether prices will remain favorable long enough to justify the costs of chang¬ ing the normal pattern of production. A long-term guaran¬ tee of high prices of the kind used in World War II, com¬ bined with an effective control system which forces farmers to make the desired changes in production, may bring action more quickly. The fact that Britain suffered more severely from food shortages in 1795-96 and 1800-1801 than in 1812- 13, though the loss of imports was greatest in the latter period, supports this interpretation. So does the fact that the rate of enclosure increased more rapidly in the latter part of the struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. 1 The price system also tended to limit wasteful consump¬ tion, just as an effective rationing system would have done. But the inequality of income at that time was so great that at any level of grain prices the rich would still have had no need to watch their consumption very closely. It therefore is not likely that the increasing grain prices brought about as much economy in consumption as rationing did in World War II. Nor was the food distributed in a way that would maximize the nation’s strength. The working of the price system itself was hindered by the prevalent ignorance and prejudice about economic questions. The persecution of middlemen, who performed useful functions and were in no way responsible for the high prices, no doubt made the price system far less effective than it could have been. The de¬ struction by mobs of the facilities of millers, bakers, and grain dealers could only be harmful. The same was true of the legal punishment promised to those who sold grain for a higher price than they paid for it, for it was these people who had an interest in seeing that grain was stored until most needed, or moved to the areas of greatest dearth. Attempts to l.See above, pp. 68-69. Summary and Conclusion 135 keep the price of bread down discouraged farmers from growing more and also limited imports. When the British government tried to alleviate the shortage by buying grain for importation from abroad, it often merely reduced the in¬ centive for imports by private traders. Thus, it is not only that Britain did not have the competence to develop an effec¬ tive system of control: the government and the people did not have the economic knowledge needed to make the price system function as well as it might have done. However, the primitive character of the attempt to over¬ come the food shortage in Napoleonic times should not ob¬ scure the main point—the attempt was clearly successful. The precise magnitude of the achievement cannot be known because of the lack of accurate data on food production and food consumption. But the estimates made for this study, 2 and the figures on the rapidly growing population, suggest that the loss of food imports by no means threatened the sur¬ vival or war-making capacity of the nation. In an age that accepted the idea that food supply limited population, an unusually large increase in population was not consistent with a famine severe enough to call into question the strength or survival of an entire people. The popular discontent dur¬ ing these years was directed more toward new machinery and industrial problems than toward the high price of food. Though the amount of land in cultivation increased greatly during the long struggle, there was more satisfactory land that could have been plowed even when the acreage had reached its highest point. Accordingly, there is no basis for the claim made by J. Holland Rose, the noted Napoleonic scholar, that had Napoleon stuck rigorously to his prohibition on trade with England he would have won the war. Britain, in addition, was successful in the Napoleonic struggle because in a general way it used techniques similar 2. See above, pp. 69-70. 136 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage to those in later wars. It switched from an animal agricul¬ ture to crop production, moved more resources into agricul¬ tural production and into shipping, and discouraged uneco¬ nomic forms of consumption. The difference between the Napoleonic period and the two world wars was neither in the type of problem facing the country or the type of changes made to deal with the problem. Rather it was that in physical terms the problem in the Napoleonic period was smaller, the necessary measures were handled less well, and the degree of success was less startling. While Napoleon’s Continental System was sometimes administered in a haphazard way, the German submarine campaign in World War I was used with a single-minded efficiency and thoroughness to starve Great Britain into sub¬ mission. The German naval and military leaders were cer¬ tain that, if the unrestricted submarine campaign sank as much tonnage as expected, England would be forced to sue for peace within five months, and Germany would end the war to her advantage despite America’s probable entry. With the assistance of experts in several fields, the German naval staff had carefully prepared a long and thorough memo¬ randum which showed the amount of shipping that Britain had available, the amount that was needed for military and allied purposes, and the level of imports which Britain had needed in the past. On the basis of these figures the memo¬ randum showed that it was “certain” that Britain would be forced to sue for peace if Germany could sink 600,000 tons of shipping per month. British data made available after the war bear out the general correctness of the information on which the German memorandum was based. With re¬ spect to the number of submarines they expected to lose the German naval authorities were proven too pessimistic. They were similarly pessimistic about the rate at which the U-boats would destroy shipping around the British Isles. Between Summary and Conclusion 137 February 1, 1917, when the unrestricted submarine campaign began, and August 1, the date by which the German ad¬ mirals expected “certain victory,” the Germans sank an aver¬ age of well over the predicted 600,000 tons per month. Yet despite these losses the British continued to eat enough to maintain their health, productivity, and morale, and not for a moment were they near the defeat the German memo¬ randum had anticipated. The British regimen at its worst was a great deal better than that which Germany endured for almost the entire war. The defeat of the submarine cannot be explained by the convoy system, for despite the convoy the rate of destruction in the period in which Germany expected to win was more than equal to German expectations. The most important element was the capacity of Britain and the United States to give up things that were inessential in order to ob¬ tain more of the shipping that they found essential. By such sacrifices the United States was able to provide England with the things she normally would have obtained from more distant countries; shorter voyages resulted, so that a given amount of shipping could carry more cargo. Similarly, the British allocated formerly inessential labor to the docks, in order that ships might be loaded more rapidly and efficiently, with the result that inessential consumption was sacrificed so that Britain might get a larger tonnage of imports. The British, by limiting the import of investment goods, also gave up postwar consumption in return for more immediately essential imports. The Germans, in short, overlooked the “indirect” type of substitution explained in the Introduc¬ tion. Even if the German submarine campaign had been still more destructive, or had lasted much longer, there is no rea¬ son to assume it would have been successful. For British 138 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage food output in World War I, though it had risen consider¬ ably, had not increased by nearly as much as was possible. The unrestricted submarine campaign began only in 19x7, and the British government in the earlier part of the war had taken no decisive measures to increase food output. Only in 1918, the last year of the war, did their food production campaign harvest its main results. Those in charge of the food production campaign believed that a much larger out¬ put of food could be achieved in 1919. Because of the prog¬ ress of Allied arms and the end of the war, however, this belief was never put to the test. Its probable truth is never¬ theless suggested by the fact that a great deal of land that had been cultivated regularly in the x86o’s was still left to plow. Nor had Britain moved as much labor and machinery into agricultural production as it could have done had the need arisen, nor had it imposed all of those controls on food con¬ sumption that later experiences would show to be feasible. A further movement from an animal agriculture based on graz¬ ing to crop production directly for human food, and a cor¬ responding change in the British diet, would have been pos¬ sible. While British agriculture had declined for nearly half a century before the war, German agriculture for a long while had been expanded partly in anticipation of war. Yet, ironically, when war came it was British agriculture that in¬ creased its output, while German agriculture could not main¬ tain its earlier pace. Before the war Britain produced little more than a third of its calory requirements, while Germany produced four-fifths of the calories it needed. During the war Britain enjoyed a perfectly adequate and healthful diet, while Germany lost perhaps three-quarters of a million civilians because of its severe food shortages. A major reason for the superior performance of British agriculture was the reserve of fertility stored up in the grasslands of peacetime Summary and Conclusion igg Britain. Only the plow was needed to tap them. In contrast, at the outbreak of war German agriculture was almost fully extended, and could not maintain output in the face of war¬ time difficulties. In the control of food consumption during World War I the British also had the advantage over their enemy. The distribution of food in Germany was very ineffective, with farmers, soldiers, and rich getting considerably more than they needed, while the poorer people suffered from inade¬ quate diets. Black markets flourished, and munitions firms sometimes were told to buy food for their workers from these illicit sources. Farmers were not prevented from maintain¬ ing their herds of livestock even when these herds competed for food desperately needed for human beings. In Britain, by contrast, such rationing as was necessary was generally well handled. This again indicates the importance of skilful leadership and administration. While the management of Britain’s food, shipping, and agricultural programs was rather awk¬ ward by the standards of World War II, it was outstanding by the standards of World War I (or any earlier period). While in the earlier part of the war the doctrinaire adher¬ ence to laissez faire policies held Britain back (it even for a long while refused on something like laissez faire grounds to make military service compulsory), in the later part of the war the pragmatic leadership of Lloyd George, the quality of the British civil service, and the fundamental political unity of the British people led to well-managed economic counter¬ measures against the submarine (though the price policy for agricultural products kept the price system from working in harness with the mechanism for government control of agri¬ culture). The maladministration that plagued Germany was generally avoided. British shipping management was espe¬ cially praiseworthy. If Britain had had the governmental un- 140 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage derstanding and administrative capacity to do even half as much in the Napoleonic period, there would have been no problem worth mentioning. The British administrative system, however, had its finest hour in World War II. British food and feed imports in 1939-40 were 20.7 million tons; by 1942-43 they had been cut to 10.3 million tons, or by half. 3 Non-food cargo imports were cut by only a slightly smaller proportion. Yet the health of the British people actually improved during World War II. So effective was the redistribution of food in wartime Britain that the improvement in the distribution of certain protective foods more than compensated for the smaller supply. Much of the credit goes to British agriculture; the net increase in the output of calories was for a time more than 90 per cent, and the net increase in protein production more than 106 per cent. 4 This was achieved without any large increase in the resources allocated to agriculture. Those who willingly accepted irksome diets also deserve part of the credit, as do those involved in the system of shipping control. But no sector of the British economy or society could have played its part in this performance if the food programs had not been well designed and well administered. This extraordinary achievement in World War II, and the less striking but still remarkable achievements of World War I and the Napoleonic period, cannot be credited to any prewar preparation, or to any peacetime expansion of the agricultural sector. For there had been virtually no prepara¬ tion for any of these wars, and before each of the two world wars British agriculture had been in serious decline. The lesson that Britain has drawn from these experiences, and especially the last of them, is that it should in peacetime grow more of its food, and keep a stockpile on hand. This, at least, is the policy that has been generally followed since World War II. 3. See above, p. 129. 4. See above, p. 125. Summary and Conclusion 141 Whether British experience in the Napoleonic and two world wars really justifies such a policy is open to doubt. But there can be little doubt that this experience supports the argument outlined at the start of this study—a loss of food imports is not necessarily worse than a loss of imports of other kinds. All three wars show that consumption patterns can be changed to bring sizable savings of food without damaging the health of the people. All three wars also show that agricultural production, in terms of any nutritional measure, can be increased considerably without making ex¬ cessive demands for resources upon the rest of the economy. Further savings can be gained by integrating the shipping program with the food program. The clearest indication that a loss of food imports is not uniquely tragic comes from a comparison of the reductions in imports of different kinds. In World Wars I and II the im¬ ports of food were cut by as much or more than non-food cargo imports. 6 The British logically could have reduced their non-food imports almost to zero, if these imports were generally inessential, and at the same time maintained their food imports at nearly the prewar level, if all of these im¬ ports were generally essential. Instead they reduced each about equally. This is precisely what the theoretical specu¬ lations in this study would have led one to expect. Of course the non-food sector of the British economy also showed great flexibility—much more flexibility than is gen¬ erally understood. The point is that modern economies, especially if they are intelligently administered, are more adaptable in the face of shortages than is often assumed. 6 5. See above, pp. in and 129. Tanker imports are not included. 6. This would suggest that Professor Leontief’s justly famous Input- Output system, which would collapse if a nation were deprived of the input needed by, or the output of, any one “cell,” is not very well suited to the study of a wartime economy. The assumption of rigid coefficients may be appropriate in peacetime conditions, but not in a nation ready to bear any cost to wage war. On the flexibility of the industrial sector of a modem economy see my articles on “The Economics of Strategic Bombing in World 142 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage But this adaptability applies fully as much to a loss of food, or raw materials, or other “necessary” types of imports as it does to secondary or tertiary production. The experience of Great Britain in the Napoleonic wars and in World Wars I and II shows not only that a loss of food imports was less disastrous than was normally supposed, but also that advanced techniques in administration, in science, and in government are very useful when there is a shortage of a primary good (or for that matter anything else). The food problem that Britain faced was least serious in the Na¬ poleonic period, more serious in World War I, and most serious in World War II. But the British perform¬ ance was least remarkable in the Napoleonic period, more re¬ markable in World War I, and most remarkable in World War II. The explanation is surely that as time went on Britain became a nation much better able to understand the scientific, economic, and administrative problems involved in a food shortage. As more information about the wartime efficiency of different types of agricultural production and about the nutritive worth of different types of food became available, Britain was better able to cope with food shortages. Thus, the progress of the physical, biological, medical, and agricultural sciences made a contribution. Likewise, more knowledge about the functions of a price system became avail¬ able, and as the wartime possibilities of governmental con¬ trol came to be understood, Britain’s capacity to deal with shortages increased. In the Napoleonic period the British nation devoted part of its energies to absurd and harmful at¬ tempts to persecute middlemen for high food prices, which were due in fact to the loss of imports and poor crops. In World War I the British did not commit such obvious folly as this. However, they did have a mystical, unanalytical, War II.” Airpower Historian. IX (April, 1962), 121-27, and on “The Eco¬ nomics of Target Selection for the Combined Bomber Offensive,” Royal United Service Institution Journal, CVII (Nov., 1962), 308-14. Summary and Conclusion 143 laissez faire belief which for a time kept them from taking advantage of the assistance that conscription, rationing, and other forms of control might have made to their war effort. In World War II Britain possessed a firm knowledge both of the function of a price system and the uses of governmental power. Agricultural production, for example, was stimulated alike by price incentives and by government directives. Thus, the advance of economic understanding left Britain stronger. Finally, as more administrative sophistication be¬ came available, Britain was better able to administer the pro¬ grams needed to counter a loss of food imports; the improve¬ ment of the civil service left her in a more secure position. Therefore, the development of the scientific, economic, and administrative capabilities of a nation is helpful even in overcoming a shortage of food. History also offers other examples which support the con¬ tention that a nation with advanced scientific, economic, and administrative capabilities can handle shortages of primary or other types of products better than less advanced nations. Before the American Civil War it was fearfully expected in Britain, and confidently believed in the Southern states, that the loss of American cotton would paralyze the British indus¬ trial system and force Britain to intervene against the North. Britain before the war got almost all of its cotton from the Southern states. Yet when the war came, England suffered surprisingly little from the loss of American cotton. It was possible to make do by using previously unacceptable Indian cotton or other fibers. The more limited economy of the Con¬ federacy found that it had much more difficulty in getting along without the products of Europe and the North than these areas had in getting along without “King Cotton.” Some scholars, apparently assuming to the end that raw ma¬ terials are decisive for the destiny of an economy, went on to state that it was fear of a loss of wheat from the Northern 144 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage states that kept England from intervening on the side of the South. But this was absurd; for Britain could easily have imported all of the wheat it needed at that time from nations other than the United States. 7 While in World War I Germany failed to handle its shortages in the way that England did, in World War II Ger¬ many’s performance was excellent. It is partly that Germany was by then a more advanced nation, and partly that Speer, Hitler’s most able assistant, had charge of industrial affairs during Germany’s crucial period in World War II. That Germany got along without its normal oil imports in World War II, though it had in peacetime produced almost no oil at home, was explained earlier. The Germans also were de¬ prived by the British naval blockade of many important in¬ dustrial raw materials. 8 Both in Germany and in England no one expected that Germany would be able to fight a long war of attrition with her insignificant holdings of vital war ma¬ terials. 9 Germany had expected the war to be short. Yet, though the war was appallingly long, Germany was able to get by very well on its slender supplies of raw materials. Copper was in very short supply, so the Germans saved copper by replacing copper radiators with iron radiators in all motor vehicles. They reduced the amount of copper needed in U-boats from 56 to 26 tons on the average. At the beginning of 1942 German locomotives required 2.3 tons of copper; by 7. See Frank. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago, 1931); Ephraim Douglass Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil IVar (2 vols., New York, 1925); Eli Ginzberg, “The Economics of British Neutrality during the American Civil War,” Agricultural History, X (1936), 147-56; Thomas Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People (6th ed.; New York, 1958), pp. 333-38; Louis Bernard Schmidt, “The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American Relations During the Civil War,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XVI (July, 1918), 400-439. 8. See W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, “History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series” (2 vols.; London, 1952-59). 9. See Burton H. Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cam¬ bridge, 1959); L. P. Thompson, Can Germany Stand the Strain? Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 19 (Oxford, 1939); A. G. B. Fisher, Economic Self Sufficiency, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 4 (Oxford. ' 939 )- Summary and Conclusion 145 the middle of 1943 these requirements had been reduced to 237 kilograms, a reduction of about 90 per cent. The Ger¬ mans also saved by changing from one alloy using scarce metal to others, using more plentiful metals. 10 For example, vanadium replaced nickel and molybdenum in gun barrels. Substitutions of this kind may sometimes reduce quality, but there is no doubt that German military equipment compared favorably with that of other nations. 11 Despite these severe shortages, and despite the massive Allied strategic bombing of supposedly indispensable industries and targets, German war production increased by a multiple in the latter part of World War II. 12 Though Japan was bombarded much less heavily and blockaded much less effectively than Germany, it could not stand the strain of the shortages the bombing and the block¬ ade imposed upon it. Before Japan surrendered, her economy was crawling to a standstill, though all of her homeland was still in her hands. 13 The explanation for this remarkable disparity in the industrial achievements of Japan and Ger¬ many may very well be the different degrees of scientific, economic, and administrative development in the two coun¬ tries. While its rate of scientific, economic, and administra¬ tive advance in the last half century probably had been far faster than that of Germany (or perhaps any other country), Japan had by no means reached the absolute level of de¬ velopment of Germany, Britain, or the United States. Ac¬ cordingly, its skilled people had to be spread too thinly. It 10. E. S. Mason, “American Security and Access to Raw Materials,” World Politics, I (Jan., 1949), 152. Professor Mason in turn got this infor¬ mation from reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 11. Hanson W. Baldwin, Readers’ Digest (Oct., 1950), quoted in Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (New York, 1954), p. 113. is. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War) (Washington, D. C., 1945). On the effects of wartime shortages on raw ma¬ terials, see my article on “American Materials Policy and the ‘Physiocratic fallacy,’ ” Orbis, VI (Winter, 1963), 670-88. 13. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Japanese War) (Washington, D. C., 1946). 146 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage had the skill needed for most types of modem production, but it did not have the virtuosity needed to improvise at the same time. If the foregoing interpretation is correct, then it may be that if any one kind of production is to be singled out as most critical, it should not be the production of food or raw materials but the production of a skilled and versatile peo¬ ple. Perhaps tertiary industries, like the educational “in¬ dustry,” ought to be expanded, rather than the primary in¬ dustries. If the primary producing industries are expanded beyond the prevailing economic level in peacetime there will be fewer resources left for other industries, unless there is widespread unemployment. A nation that expands its primary producing industries will sacrifice not only the useful peacetime and wartime output of other industries but also the adaptability that a larger tertiary sector would give it. Moreover, the sacrifice of other types of goods and serv¬ ices that must result from an uneconomic expansion of pri¬ mary production is made larger by the fact that the primary producing industries are (because of the law of diminishing returns) increasing cost industries. The primary producing industries also are industries that tend to deplete their pro¬ ductive capacity as they increase output. The more oil the United States pumps up in peacetime, the less it has left for war. The more lead and zinc the United States digs to aug¬ ment its vast stockpile, the less it has left in the ground. That this is true to a degree even of agriculture is shown by the great expansion of output Britain got from land that had fallen to grass, and from the fact that toward the end of the Napoleonic War and World War II the effects of the de¬ pletion of fertility began to be noticed. As World War II drew to a close, Britain had to put some of the plowed land back into temporary grass. 14 14. See above, pp. 124-25. Summary and Conclusion 147 The protection by tariff of domestic primary industry, and to a lesser degree stockpiling, also tend to hurt a nation’s strength by damaging its relations with others. If the Com¬ mon Market countries decide to maintain high tariffs on their domestic production of agricultural and other pri¬ mary products, they will earn the resentment of the under¬ developed countries, and even of the United States and the old Dominions of the British Commonwealth. Had Great Britain raised more of its own food before the two world wars, it might not have had the same amount of help in wartime from the Commonwealth, or even from the United States. Thus, barriers against international trade can de¬ prive a nation of that “dependence” on foreign nations which makes neutrals out of enemies and allies out of neu¬ trals. Just because British history has thrice repeated itself, it does not follow that it will do so again. If the tragedy of a fourth great war should occur, it probably will be much different from the three great wars of economic attrition that preceded it. It may well be a short, quick, and devastating nuclear exchange that could reduce a nation’s population by a third, or a half, or more, in a matter of days. Though no one can be certain of the future, it seems quite likely that the least of a nation’s worries after such a war would be the amount of its food and raw materials, for population and production would be much less. But a nation’s need for a resourceful, disciplined, and well-managed people would reach unprecedented heights. For whatever else the sur¬ vivors of a nuclear war may have to do, they will certainly have to create a new system of production, and a new order, on the radioactive ruins of the old. Index Adams, Ephraim Douglass, 37 n., 144 n. Addison, Lord, 42-44, 48 Agricultural depression; see Depression of British agriculture Alcoholic beverages, 10, 27, 89; brewing, 27, 96, 120; distilling, 27, 55, 57, 96 Alexander I, Tsar, 54 Allied Maritime Transport Council, 87 Animal agriculture; see Crops, advan¬ tage over livestock Argentina, 7, 82, 87, 88 Arnold-Forster, W., 75 n., 79 n. Aron, Raymond, 145 Ashby, A. W., 127 n. Ashby, Sir William, 40 n., 56 n., 57 n., 70 n. Asquith, Herbert, 77, 86 n. Astor, Viscount, 44 n. “Atlantic Concentration, The,” 87-90, 111 Aug^-LariW, Michel, 84 n. Australia, 7, 82, 87, 88, 147 Bailey, Thomas, 37 n., 144 n. Baldwin, Hanson W., 145 n. Balfour, Gerald, 39, 78 Baltic area, nations of, 49-55, 60, 64 Barnes, Donald, 56 n., 57 n., 60 n. Bateson, F. W., 46 n. Bear, W. E., 38 n. Bedford, Duke of, 68 Behrens, C. B. A., 118 n., ng n., 121 n., 130 n. Bell, Carolyn, 18 n. Bellerby, John R., 20 n. Bennett, M. K., 117 n. Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, 81, 83 Beveridge, Sir William, 24 n., 29 n., 73 n„ 76 n., 79 n., 86 n., 88 n., 95 n„ 96 n., 104 n., 105 n., 106, 107 n., 109 n., 111 n. Bland, Raymond, 88 n. Blane, Sir Gilbert, 30 n., 50 n„ 51, 53 n -> 57 n - 65 n - Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 57, 58, 71, 96, 107-10 Bowles, Gibson, 39 Bowley, Arthur, 105 n. Boyd, D. A., 24 n. Brandt, Karl, 45 n. Bread, 10, 55, 57, 61, 73, 96, 106, 117, 130, 135; “Brown Bread Act,” 55; dark bread favored, 10, 27, 28, 55-57, 96, 120, 133; dilution of flour, 28, 57, 96; fresh bread prohibited, 29. 55, 96; rye bread, 57, 120; "War bread,” 27, 96 Brewing: see alcoholic beverages Britton, D. K., 46 n. Broekmeyer, M. W. J., 14 n. Bronte, Charlotte, 63 Bruntz, George, 79 n. Bulkley, M. E., 73 n. Burdett, Sir Francis, 53 Burke, Edmund, 34, 49, 50, 54, 56 n., 68 Canada, 7, 87, 89, 147 Cargo space, 26, 30, 86-96, 110, 111, 120- 123, 128, 129, 131, 137, 139, 140 Index H9 Carr, John Dickson, 41 n., 42 n. Carter, Thomas Nixon, 89 n. Chalmers, George, 53 n., 63 n. Chamberlain, Neville, 44 Chamberlin, Edward H., 16 n. Churchill, Winston S., 45, 46, 76 n., 77, 78, 81 n„ 83 n. Civil service, 114, 115, 133, 139-43 Clapham, J. H„ 74 n. Clark, Colin, 11 n., 22 n„ 46 n. Clark, John Maurice, 89 n. Clay, General Lucius, 4 n. Clynes, John R., 96 n., 111 n. Cochrane, Willard, 18 n., 20 n., 22 n. Cohen, Ruth L., 44 n., 117 n. Coller, Frank H., 95 n. Colquhoun, Patrick, 24 n., 28 n. Comber, W. T„ 23 n., 57 n„ 59 n. Common Market, 147 Confederacy, 37, 143 Conservatives, 97 Continental System, 3, 31, 49, 59-72, 132, 136 Controls; see Rationing Convoy, 32, 85, 91, 113, 118, 137; see also Royal Navy Com Laws; see Tariffs Com Production Act, 98, 118 Corrie, Edgar, 34 n. Cotton, 37, 143 County Agricultural Executive commit¬ tees, 98, 121 Crops, advantage over livestock, 23-28, 76, 80, 97, 101-12, 114, 121-29, »33. 136, 138-41 Crouzet, Francois, 62 n., 66, 66 n., 68 n. Cruttwell, C. R., 76 n„ 79 n., 80 n„ 83 n., 84 n., 85 n., 113 n. Cultivation of Lands Order, 98 Curtler, W. H. R„ 68 n. Danson, John T., 38 n. Davis, J. S., 117 n. Denmark, 52, 55, 59 Depression of British agriculture, 37, 73 > 74 . 7 6 > 9 8 - ”2. 117 Distilling; see Alcoholic beverages Doenitz, Admiral Karl, ng n. Donaldson, John, 56 n Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, 41, 42 Duce, James Terry, 4 n„ 12 n., 15 n. Dunn, Major John, 11 n. Eden, Sir Frederick M., 57 Elasticity of demand; see “Engel’s law’’ Eltzbacher, Paul, 114 n. Embargo Act, U. S., 60 Enclosure, 58, 68-70, 134 Enfield, Sir Ralph, 46 n. "Engel’s Law,” 18, 20, Ernie, Lord (Edmund Prothero), 30 n., 43 n., 63 n., 68 n., 84 n., 86 n., 96, 97 n., 99 n., 100 n., 101 n., 108, 109, 110 n., 111 n., 112 n. Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, 6i n. Fay, C. R., 50 n., 51 n., 57 n., 62 n., 66 Fayle, Charles Ernest, 83, 87 n., 88 n., 90 n„ 93 n., 94 n„ 95 n., uon.,111 n. Fenelon, K. G., 28 n., 117 n. Fertility of soil, 25, 27, 98, 100, 101, 114, 124, 125, 138, 139, 146 Fertilizer; see Fertility of soil Fisher, A. G. B., 144 n. Fletcher, T. W., 74 n. Flour; see Bread “Food Controller,” 106, 107 Food Production Department, 76, 86, 96-100, 109, 112 Food (War) Committee of Royal So¬ ciety, 97 Fox, Charles James, 50, 54, 65, 68 France, 5, 49-72, 75, 84, 110, 134 Frend, William, 50 n. Furness, J. W„ 11 n. Galpin, William F., 28 n., 52 n., 53 n., 54 n., 55 n„ 57 n„ 60 n„ 61 n., 62 n„ 63 n., 65 n. Galsworthy, John 43 Gardens, 57, 108, 109, 123 German Naval Memorandum, 82-85, 91, 92, 136, 137 Gerschenkron, Alexander, 74 n. Ginzberg, Eli, 37 n., 144 n. Gowing, M. M., 128 n. Great Depression of British agriculture; see Depression of British agriculture Greece, 15 Green, F. D., 43 n. Griliches, Zvi, 22 n. Grondona, L. St. Clare, 44 n. Guerrier, Edith, 89 n. Guild, J. B., 104 n. Haggard, H. Rider, 38 n. Haig, Lord, 110 Hall, Sir Daniel, 43 n., 74 n. Hall, H. Duncan, 128 n. Hallett, Graham, 46 n. Hamilton, W. G., 64 n. Hammond, J. L., and Barbara, 56 n. The Economics of the Wartime Shortage 1 5 ° Hammond, R. J., 29 n., 44 n., 45 n„ 118 n., 120 n., 121 n., 130 n., 131 n. Hancock, W. K., 128 n. Harcourt, Sir William, 39 Harkness, D. A. E., 45 n. Harris, Sir Arthur, 13 n. Harris, Curtis C., Jr., 38 n., 68 n., 73 n. Harrod, Roy, 44 Heckscher, Eli F., 49 n., 61 n., 62 n., 65 n. Heflin, Woodford, 12 n. Hibbard, Benjamin, 75 n., 98 n. Hindenburg, Field Marshal von, 6 n., 81, 82 n., 92 Hirst, Francis, 89 n., 90 n. Hitler, Adolph, 78 Holland, 38, 61 Holtzendorff, Admiral von, 6 n., 82 n., 115 n. Hoover, Herbert, 85 n., 88 n. Hopkins, F. G., 97 n. House of Commons; see Parliament House of Lords; see Parliament Hurd, Archibald, 79 n. Hurwitz, Samuel J., 78 n., 90 n., 94 n., 109 n., 113 n. Interdependence of modern economy, * 3 » 1 4 1 *43 Ireland, 60, 66, 71 Italy, 15 Japan, 145 Jellicoe, Admiral, 76 n., 84, 85 Johnson, Samuel, 64, 68 Jones, C. Bryner, 101 n. Keith, C. K., 11 n. Keith, Rev. George Skene, 35 n„ 68 n. Kendrick, John W., 20 n. Kenyon, Lord, 53 Keynes, John Maynard, 44 Kipling, Rudyard, 40 Kirk, J. H., 25 n., 120 n., 121 n., 122 n. Klein, Burton H., 144 n. Knorr, Klaus, 11 n. Koch, Admiral Reinhard, 85 Labour government, 46 Laissez faire, 29, 37, 42, 77, 78, 87, 97, 139 . *43 Law of diminishing returns, 13, 19, 27, 30, 31, 100, 146; see also Theory Lee, Lord (Sir Arthur), 97, 112 Lenezowski, George, 15 n. Leontief, Wassily, 141 n. Lettsom, John Coakley, 56 n. Lewis, Cleona, 11 n. Liberal party, 42, 97 Liberalism; see Laissez faire Livestock; see Crops, advantage over livestock Lloyd, E. M. H., 76 n., 95 n., 107 n. Lloyd George, David, 85, 96, 98, 139 Longwood, William F., 12 n. Louis, King of Holland, 61, 62 Lovering, T. S., 11 n. Ludendorff, General Erich von, 79, 81, 92, 116 Lymington, Viscount, 44 McCrone, Gavin, 21 n. Mahan, Admiral A. T., 38 Malta, 51 Malthus, Rev. T. R., 35, 36, 51-54, 57, 67 Marston, R. B., 38 n. Martens, G. F., 52 n. Mason, E. S., 11 n., 145 n. Mattox, W. C., 90 in. May, Ernest, 83 n. Medlicott, W. N., 128 n., 144 n. Melvin, F. E., 61 n., 62 n. Mercantilism, 61; see also Theory of mercantilism Merchant shipping; see Cargo space Middlemen, 53, 54, 58, 134, 142 Middleton, Sir Thomas, 30 n., 76 n., 97, 98 n., 99 n., 101 n., 104 n., 108, 109, 110 n. Milner, Lord, 107 Minchinton, W. E., 70 n. Mining industry, 18-21, 146; see also Raw materials Ministry of Shipping, 86, 93 Mitford, William, 20 n., 34 Morison, Samuel Eliot, 119 n. Morrison, F. B., 23 n., 29 n. Moulton, Harold, 92 n. Mullendore, William, 89 n. Murray, K. A. H., 23 n., 24 n., 26 n., 27 n., 28 n., 44 n., 45 n., 98 n., 109 n., 117 n., 118 n., 120 n., 121 n., 122 n., 123 n„ 124 n., 125 n„ 129 Napoleon, 23, 35. 39, 59-66, 72, 78. 135, 136 Nash, E. F., 21 n., 46 n. Naval memorandum; see German naval memorandum Navy; see Royal Navy Neutral nations, 38, 60, 75, 79 Index New Zealand, 7, 147 Norway, 15 Nuclear war, 47, 147 Nuffield Foundation, 47 Oil, 4, 12-16, 144-46; synthetic oil, 16 Olson, Mancur, Jr., 38 n., 68 n., 73 n., 141 n., 142 n., 145 n. Orr, Sir John Boyd, 26 n. Owsley, Frank, 37 n., 144 n. Parliament, 35-38, 44, 50, 55-58, 67, 69, 71, 76, 97 Parnell, Sir Henry, 35 Pasvalsky, Leo, 92 n. Paul I, Tsar, 51, 54 Petroleum; see Oil Philanthropus, 53 n. Phillips, W. A., 52 n., 54 n. Physiocratic theory, 11; of shortages, 17; of wealth, 17 "Physiocratic Fallacy," 17 Pinot, Pierre, 84 n. Pitt, William, 34, 50, 53, 54 Pollitt, George P., 45 n. Population, 35, 38, 51, 53, 64, 67, 71, 79, 135, 147; see also Malthus Porter, G. R„ 37 n„ 68 n. Portugal, 59 Postan, M. M., 128 n. Potatoes, 24, 25, 57, 79, 97, 99-101, 107, i2i, 123 Pownall, Governor Thomas, 56 n. Price; causes of high prices, 50, 53, 54, 59; controls over, 102, 103, 120, 121, 126; as an incentive, 28, 58, 76, 95, 101-7, 122, 133-35, '39. *42-431 as in¬ dication of value, 10, 15, 18, 37, 41, 50-54, 58, 63, 102-7, *26, 127 Primary products, distinguished from others, 11, 16, 18-22, 46-47, 142 Prussia, 52, 55, 59 Rationing. 28, 29, 39, 46, 77, 78, 81, 95, 96, 120, 130, 131-34, 139, 143 Raw materials, 3, 10, 11, 44, 45, 90, 144-47; see a ^ so Stockpile Reede, A. H., 52 n., 54 n. Rent; see Theory of rent Reserves; see Stockpile Rew, Sir Henry, 76 n., 102-4, *°7 Reynolds, Brigadier J. R., 5 n. Ricardo, David, 36, 67 Robinson, Joan, 16 n. Rose, John Holland, 39, 61 n., 65, 135 *5* Roskill, Captain S. W., 118 n., 119 n., 130 n. Rowntree, G. Seebohm, 44 n. Royal Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Materials in Time of War, 40 Royal Navy, 39-42, 44, 54, 74, 75, 77, 78, 84, 85, 102, 113, 114, 118, 144 Russia, 15, 51-54, 59, 62, 81 Salter, Sir Arthur (Lord), 44, 75, 84 n., 86 n., 90 n., 91 n., 94 n., 104 n. Scheer, Admiral, 80, 81 n., 82 n., 113 n. Schmidt, Louis Bernard, 37 n., 144 n. Schultz, Theodore, 20 n. Schwerin-Lowitz, Count von, 74 n. Scotland, 55 Scott, Claude, 49 n. Scott, J. B., 51 n., 52 n. Self, Peter, 47 n. Seton-Karr, H., 38, 39 Sheffield, Lord (John Baker Holyrod), 34, 50 n., 51 n., 70 n. Silberling, N. J., 63 n. Silberner, Edmund, 4 n., 36 Sims, Admiral William, 85, 86 Sinclair, Sir John, 33 Slater, Gilbert, 69 Smith, Adam, 4, 35 Smith, Arthur, 45 n. Smith, Charles, 70 n. Smith, J. Russell, 90 n. Soviet Union; see Russia Speer, Albert, 144 Sraffa, Piero, 36 n., 67 n. Starling, Ernest, 25 n., 43 n., 79 n., 80 n., 81 n., 97 n. Stockpiles, 4, 5, 11, 33, 38, 47, 48, 118, 140, 146, 147; “Essential Com¬ modities Reserve Act,” 45; of ferti¬ lizers, 47, 146; of food, 34, 44, 47, 48, 118; of raw materials, 44, 45; in United States, 11 Storing, H., 47 n. Substitution; see Theory of substitu¬ tion Suez Canal, 12, 15 Surface, Frank M., 88 n. Sweden, 15, 51, 55, 57, 59, 65 Tallents, Sir Stephan, 76 n., 77 n., 86 n. Tariffs, 3, 4, 21, 31-37, 58, 59, 67, 68, 74, 114-17, 120, 147 Theory: of consumer choice, 8; of di¬ minishing returns, see Law of dimin- 152 The Economics of the Wartime Shortage ishing returns; of free markets, see Laissez faire; of physiocracy, see Physiocratic theory; of profit max¬ imization in production, 13, 14; of rent, 36, 67, 123; of substitution, 14, 16, 17, 67, 113, 120, 125,128,131,141, 145—“direct substitution,” 14, 16, 17— “indirect substitution,” 14, 16, 17, " 3 - *37 Thirsk, Joan, 70 n. Thompson, L. P., 79 n., 144 n. Tirpitz, Grand Admiral von, 81 n., 113 Tooke, Thomas, 30 n., 49 n., 50 n., 51 n., 59 n., 60 n., 61 n., 62 n., 63 n., 70 n. Torrens, Robert, 67 Tramerye, Pierre l'Espagnol de la, 12 n. Transport Workers' Battalions, 93 Treaty of Amiens, 55 Trow-Smith, Robert, 47 Tunnel, railroad, under channel, 42 United States, 4, 11, 15, 34, 37, 49, 50, 57-62, 75, 82-84, 87-93, •»«. >$6, >45* •47 Voskuil, Walter, 11 n. War debts, 90, 92 West, Edward, 67 Whetham, Edith, 46 n., 117 n., 122 n„ 123 n., 130 n., 131 n. Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 81, 91, 113 Williams, Ernest E., 38 n. Williams, H. T., 30 n., 45 n., 47 n., 126 n., 127 n. Williams, R. Price, 71 n. Wood, T. B., 24 n., 97 n. Wright, Thomas, 53 n. Wrightson, John, 97 n., 100 n„ 109 n. Wrigley, C. C., 128 n. Wyllie, James, 121 n. ( 127 n. Wyman, Ada F., 117 n. Yates, F., 24 n. Young, Arthur, 23, 49 n., 54 n. ( 58 n., 69, 70 n. /■