FRENCH AND GERMAN. PROF. KEETELS’ NEW FRENCH SERIES. The Oral Method tvith the French. By Prof. Jean Gustave Iveetels, Author of “ Keetels’ New Method with the French.” In three parts, 12mo, cloth, [ The student is saved the expense of a large hook in commencing the study ] The Oral Method of Teaching living languages is superior to all others in many respects. It teaches the pupil to speak the language he is learning, and he begins to do so from the first lesson. He never becomes tired of the book, because he feels that, with moderate efforts, he is making constant and rapid progress. The lessons are arranged so as to bring in one difficulty at a time. They are adapted to class purposes, and suitable for large or small classes, and for scholars of all ages. The teacher, with this book in his hand, is never at a loss to profitably entertain his pupils, without rendering their task irksome. In fine, the Oral Method works charmingly in a class. Teachers and pupils are equally pleased with it; the latter all learn— the quick and the dull— each in proportion to his ability and application. It is our opinion that before long the Oral Method will find its way into every school where French is taught “I find that pupils understand and improve more rapidly under the Oral Method of Keetels’ instruction than any other heretofore used.” — A. Taylor, B.mwoocl Seminary , Glenn's Falls, N. Y. A New Method of Teaming the French \ Language. By Jean Gustave Keetels, Professor of French and German in the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute. 13mo. A Keg to the above. By J. G. Keetels. This work contains a clear and methodical expose of the principles of the language, on a plan entirely new. The arrangement is admirable. The les- sons are of a suitable length, and within the comprehension of all classes of students. The exercises are various, and well adapted to the purpose for which they are intended, of reading, writing, and speaking the language. The Grammar part is complete, and accompanied by questions and exercises on every subject. The book possesses many attractions for the teacher and stu- dent, and is destined to become a popular school-book. It has already been introduced into many of the principal schools and colleges in the country. A Comparative English-German Grammar, baled on the affinity of the two languages. By Prof. Elias Peissner, late of the University of Munich, and of Union College, Sche- nectady. New edition, revised. 316 pages. Sheldon & Company’s Text-ffooks. OLNEY’S HIGHER MATHEMATICS. Olney’s Introduction to Algebra Olney’s Complete School Algebra Olney’s Key to do. with extra examples. . . Olney’s Book of Test Examples in Algebra Olney’s University Algebra Olney’s Key to do. Olney’s Elements Geom. & Trigonom. (Sell. Ed.) Olney’s Elements of Geometry. Separate Olney’s Elements of Trigonometry. Separate. . Olney’s Elements of Geometry and Trigonom- etry. (Univ. Ed., witli Tables of Logarithms.) Olney’s Elements of Geometry and Trigonom- etry. (University Edition, without Tables.) Olney’s Tables of Logarithms. (Flexible covers.). Olney’s General Geometry and Calculus The universal favor with which these books have been received by educators in all parts of the country, leads the publishers to think that they have supplied a felt want in our educational ap- pliances. There is one feature which characterizes this series, so unique, and yet so eminently practical, that we feel desirous of ca llin g special attention to it. It is The facility with which the books can be used for ciasses of all grades, and in schools of the widest diversity of purpose. Each volume in the series is so constructed that it may be used w r itli equal ease by the youngest and least disciplined who should be pursuing its theme, and by those who in more mature years and with more ample preparation enter upon the study. Any of the above sent by mail , post-paid , on receipt of price. https://archive.org/details/elementsoflogic01 what_0 k ELEMENTS OE LOGIC: COMPRISING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARTICLE IN THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA METROPOLITANA, WITH ADDITIONS, Etc. By BICHARD WHATELY, D. D., ARCHBISHOP OP DUBLIN. NEW EDITION— REVISED BY THE AUTHOR. NEW YORK: SHELDON & COMPANY, No. 8 MURRAY STREET. ■ ADVERTISEMENT IUO VJSSSff THE NINTH EDITION In the present edition, a few insertions, and alterations of expression, in some places, have been introduced. In this and in the preceding edition, several passages "have been transferred from the places they formerly occupied, to others which appeared more suitable. And a brief, but, I trust, clear exposure has been added (in Introd. ^ 4, and b. iv. ch. i. ^ 1, 2) of the untenable char- acter of some objections which have been of late years revived, in a somewhat new form, against the utility of Science generally, — against the syllogistic theory, — and against the explanations given in this treatise, of reasoning from Induction. These answers (and also additional remarks on some of the same points, in ^ 4 of the Introduc- V ADVERTISEMENT. tion to the “ Elements of Rhetoric”) have been before the Public now some years , and as no at- tempt at a reply has been made, even in subse- quent editions of the very works Containing the objections, a strong presumption is thus afforded of the soundness of my views. The reader is to observe that tne angular [brackets] denote that the word so enclosed is equivalent in meaning to that which precedes it COlNTEJNTS. nai DEDICATION . is PREFACE • *ii> INTRODUCTION . 1 BOOK I. ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE . . .25 BOOK II. SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 60 CHAPTER I. OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND AND OF TERMS . 6C CHAPTER II. OF PROPOSITIONS 68 CHAPTER III. OF ARGUMENTS 86 CHAPTER IV. SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER III 107 CHAPTER V. SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER I. . . . .... 132 BOOK III. 199383 OF FALLACIES 168 CONTENTS. fit BOOK IV. DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OP REASONING . 251 CHAPTER I. OF NDUCTION 252 CHAPTER II. ON THE DISCOVERY OF TRUTH ... ... 262 CHAPTER III. OF INFERENCE AND PROOF 29C CHAPTER IV. OF VERBAL and REAL QUESTIONS . 297 CHAPTER V. OF REALISM 305 APPENDIX. No. I. ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY 319 No. II. MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR TnE EXERCISE OF LEABV ers 398 No III. EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS 417 INDEX 435 THE RIGHT REVEREND EDWARD COPLESTON, D. I). LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF, &c. &c. Ms Dear Lord, To enumerate the advantages I have derived from your instructions, both in regular lectures and m private conversation, would be needless to those acquainted with the parties, and to the Public, uninteresting. My object at present is simply to acknowledge how greatly I am indebted to you in respect of the present Work ; not merely as having originally imparted to me the principles of the Science, but also as having contributed remarks, explanations, and illustrations, relative to the most important points, o so great an amount that I can hardly consider myself as the Author of more than half of such portions of the treatise as are not boi* < DEDICATION. rowed from former publications. I could ha\>e wished indeed, to acknowledge this more explicitly, by mark* mg with some note of distinction those parts which are least my own. But I found it could not be done, in most instances there is something belonging to each of us ; and even in those parts where your share is the largest, it would not be fair that you should be made responsible for any thing that is not 611111-617 your own. Nor is it possible, in the case of a Sci* ence, to remember distinctly how far one has been, m each instance, indebted to the suggestions of another. Information, as to matters of fact, may easily be referred in the mind to the person from whom we have derived it : but scientific truths, when thoroughly embraced, become much more a part of the mind, as it were; since they rest, not on the uthority of the instructor, but on reasoning from data, which we ourselves furnish;* they are scions engrafted on the stems previously rooted in our own soil ; and we are apt to confound them with its indi- genous productions. You yourself also, I have reason to believe, have forgotten the greater part of the assistance you have afforded in the course of conversations on the sub< * See B. IV. Ch. ii. 4 1. DEDICATION. SI jeet ; as I have found, more than once, that ideas which I distinctly remembered to have received from you, have not been recognized by you when read or repeated. As far, however, as I can recollect, though there is no part of the following pages in which I have not, more or less, received valuable suggestions from you, I believe you have contributed less to the Analytical Outline, and to the Treatise on Fallacies, and more, to the subjoined Dissertation, than to the rest of the Work. I take this opportunity of publicly declaring, that as, on the one hand, you are not responsible for any thing contained in this Work, so, on the other hand, should you ever favor the world with a pub- lication of your own on the subject, the coincidence which will doubtless be found in it with many things here brought forward as my own, is not to be -egarded as any indication of plagiarism, at least on your side. Believe me to be, My dear Lord, Your obliged and affectionate Pupil and Friend, RICHARD WHATELY. PREFACE. The following treatise contains the substance of the Article Logic ” in the Encyclopaedia Metropob itana. It was suggested to me that a separate pub- lication of it might prove acceptable, not only to some who are not subscribers to that work, but also to several who are ; but who, for convenience of refer- ence, would prefer a more portable volume. In fact a number of individuals had actually formed a design (prevented only by this publication) of joining to- gether to have the Article printed for their own private use. I accordingly revised it, and made such additions, chiefly in the form of Notes, as I thought likely to increase its utility. When applied to to contribute the Article, I asked and obtained permission from Dr. Copleston (now Bishop of Llandaff) to make use of manuscripts com- piled in great measure from what I had heard from him in conversations on the subject, or which he had read to me from his common-place book, interspersed with observations of my own. These manuscripts I had drawn up and was in the habit of employing, foi the use of my own pupils, h XIV PREFACE. In throwing them into a form suit&ki for the Em cyclopoedia, and in subsequently enlarging the Article into the present volume, I have taken without scruple whatever appeared most valuable from the works ot former writers ; especially the concise, but in genera, accurate, treatise of Aldrich. But while I acknowledge my obligations to my predecessors, of whose labors I have largely availed myself, I do not profess to be altogether satisfied with any of the treatises that have yet appeared ; nor have I accordingly judged it any unreasonable presumption to point out what seem to me the errors they contain. Indeed, whatever defer- ence an Author may profess for the authority of those who have preceded him, the very circumstance of his publishing a work on the same subject, proves that he thinks theirs open to improvement. In censuring however, as I have had occasion to do, several of the doctrines and explanations of logical writers, and of Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be understood that this is not from my having formed a low estimate of the merits of the Compendium drawn up by the Author just mentioned, but, on the contrary, from its popularity, (it being the one commonly used at Oxford) — from the impossibility of noticing particularly all the points in which we agree, — and from the consid- eration that errors are the more carefully to be pointed out in proportion to the authority by which they are sanctioned. I have to acknowledge assistance received from several friends who have at various timos suggested remarks and alterations. But I cannot avoid parti- cularizing the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel Col PEERAGE. XV ege who actually composed a considerab e portion of the work as it now stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who is the original author of several pages. Some valuable illustrations of the importance of attending to the ambiguity of the terms used in Political Economy, were furnished by the kindness of my friend and former pupil, Mr. Senior, of Magdalen College, and now Master in Chancery, who preceded me in the office of Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, and afterwards was appointed to the same at King’s College, London. They are printed in the Appendix. But the friend to whom it is inscribed has contributed far more, and that, in the most important parts, than all others to- gether ; so much, indeed, that, though there- is in the treatise nothing of his which has not undergone such expansion or modification as leaves me solely responsi- ble for the whole, there is not a little of which I can- not fairly claim to be the Author. Each successive edition has been revised with the utmost care. But though the work has undergone not only the close examination of myself and several friends, but the severer scrutiny of determined oppo- nents, I am happy to find that no material errors have been detected, nor any considerable alterations found necessary. On the utility of Logic many writers have said much in which I cannot coincide, and which has tend- ad to bring the study into unmerited disrepute. By representing Logic as furnishing the sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teach* 2vi PREFACE. ing the use of the intellectual faculties in general they raised expectations which could not be realized and which naturally led to a reaction. The whols system, whose unfounded pretensions had been thus blazoned forth, came to be commonly regarded as utterly futile and empty: like several of our most valuable medicines, which, when first introduced, were proclaimed, each, as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite disorders ; and which consequently, in many instances, fell for a time into total disuse ; though, after a long interval, they were established in then just estimation, and employed conformably to then real properties. In one of Lord Dudley’s (lately published) letters to Bishop Copleston, of the date of 1814, he adduces a presumption against the study of Logic, that it was sedulously cultivated during the dark periods in which the intellectual powers of mankind seemed nearly paralyzed, — when no discoveries were made, and when various errors were wide-spread and deep-rooted: and that when the mental activity of the world re- vived, and philosophical inquiry flourished and bore its fruits, logical studies fell into decay and contempt. And this I have introduced in the “ Elements of Rhetoric,” (Part II. Ch. iii. <§> 2,) among other exam- ples of a presumption not in itself unreasonable, but capable of being rebutted by a counter-presumption. When any study has been unduly or unwisely culti- vated to the neglect of others, and has even been intruded into their province, there is a presumption that a reaction * will ensue, and an equally excessive See “ Charge, " 1843. PREFACE xvu contempt, or dread, or disgust, succeed. And in the present instance, the mistaken and absurd cultivation of Logic during Ages of great intellectual darkness might have been expected to produce, in a subsequent age of comparative light, an association in men’s minds, of Logic, with the idea of apathetic ignorance, prejudice, and adherence to error; so that the legiti- mate uses, and just value of the science (supposing it to have any) would be likely to be scornfully over- looked. Our ancestors having neglected to raise fresh crops of corn, and contented themselves with vainly threshing over and over the same straw and winnow- ing the same chaff, it might have been anticipated that their descendants would, for a time, regard the very operations of threshing and winnowing with con- tempt, and would attempt to grind corn, straw, and chaff all together. The revival of a study which had for a long time been regarded as an obsolete absurdity, would proba- bly have appeared to many persons, thirty years ago, as an undertaking far more difficult than the introduc- tion of some new study ; — as resembling rather the attempt to restore life to one of the antediluvian fossil- plants, than the rearing of a young seedling into a tree. It is a curious circumstance that the very person to whom the letter just alluded to was addressed should have lived to witness so great a change of public opinion brought about (in a great degree through hi s own instrumentality*) within the short interval — in- deed within a small portion of the interval — between * See Dedication. b* SVlii PREFACE. the writing of that letter and its publication, that the whole ground of the presumption alluded to has been completely cut away. During that interval, the trea- tise which was with his aid composed, and by his per- mission inserted in the Encyclopaedia, attracted so much attention as to occasion its separate publication, in a volume which has been frequently reprinted, not only in England, but in the United States of America; where it is in use, I believe, in every one of their Col- leges. Add to which, the frequent allusions (com- pared with what could have been met with twenty or thirty years ago) to the subject of Logic, by writers on various subjects. And moreover several other trea- tises on the subject, either original works 01 abridg- ments, have been making their appearance with con- tinually increased frequency of late years. Some indeed of these have little or nothing in common with the present work except the title. But even that very circumstance is so far encouraging, as indicating that the name of this science instead of exciting, as for- merly, an almost universal prejudice, is considered as likely to prove a recommendation. Certainly Lord Dudley, were he now living, would not speak of the general neglect and contempt of Logic ; though every branch of Science, Philosophy, and Literature, have flourished during the interval. To explain fully the utility of Logic is what can be done only in the course of an explanation of the sys- tem itself. One preliminary observation only (for the original suggestion of which I am indebted to the same friend to whom this work is inscribed) it may be worth while to offer in this place. If it were inquired PREFACE Xii what is to be legarded as the most api ropriate inteb iectual occupation of MAN, as man, what would be the answer? The Statesman is engaged with political affairs ; the Soldier with military ; the Mathematician, with the properties of numbers and magnitudes ; the Merchant, with commercial concerns, &c. ; but in what are all and each of these employed ? — employed, I mean, as men ; for there are many modes of exercise of the faculties, mental as well as bodily, which are in great measure common to us with the lower animals. Evidently, in Reasoning. They are all occupied in deducing, well or ill, Conclusions from Premisses ; each, concerning the subject of his own particular business. If, therefore, it be found that the process going on daily, in each of so many different minds, is, in any respect, the same , and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced from that system, for the bettei conducting of the process, then, it can hardly be denied that such a system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention, — not of the members of this or that profession merely, but — of everyone who is desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of Man in general, and to learn to do that well , which every one will and must do_ whether well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education. Even supposing that no practical improvement in argumentation resulted from the study of Logic, it would not by any means follow that it is unworthy of attention. The pursuit of knowledge on curious andi 2CX PREFACE. interesting subjects, for its own sake, is usually reckoned no misetnployment of time ; and is consid- ered as, incidentally, if not directly, useful to the individual, by the exercise thus afforded to the mental faculties. All who study Mathematics are not training themselves to become Surveyors or Mechanics; some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry is even expected in a man liberally educated, though without any view to his practising Surgery or Medicine. And the inves- tigation of a process which is peculiarly and univer- sally the occupation of Man, considered as Man, can hardly be reckoned a less philosophical pursuit than those just instanced. It has usually been assumed, however, in the case of the present subject, that a theory which does not tend to the improvement of practice is utterly unworthy of regard ; and then, it is contended that Logic has no such tendency, on the plea that men may and do reason correctly without it : an objection which would equally apply in the case of Grammar, Music, Chem- istry, Mechanics. &c.. in all of which systems the prac- tice must have existed previously to the theory. But many who allow the use of systematic principles in other things, are accustomed to cry up Common- Sense as the sufficient and only safe guide in Reason- ing. Now by Common-Sense is meant, I apprehend, (when the term is used with any distinct meaning,) an exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system of rules : such an exercise as we must necessarily em- ploy in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no established principles to guide us, — no line »f proc edure, as it were, distinctly chalked out, — »we PREFACE. II ' must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common- Sense. But that Common-Sense is only our second- best guide — that the rules of Art, if judiciously framed, are always desirable when they can be had, is an assertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to the testimony of mankind in general ; which is so much the more valuable, inasmuch as it may be accounted the testimony of adversaries. For the generality have a strong predilection in favor of Common-Sense, except in those points in which they, respectively, possess the knowledge of a system of rules ; but in these points they deride any one who trusts to unaided Common-Sense. A Sailor e. g. will, perhaps, despise the pretensions of medical men, and prefer treating a disease by Common-Sense: but he would ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship by Common-Sense, with- out regard to the maxims of nautical art. A Physician, again, will perhaps contemn Systems of Political- Economy,* of Logic, or Metaphysics, and insist on the superior wisdom of trusting to Common-Sense in such matters ; but he would never approve of trusting to Common-Sense in the treatment of diseases. Nei- ther, again, would the Architect recommend a reliance on Common-Sense alone, in building, nor the Musi- cian, in music, to the neglect of those systems of rules, which, in their respective arts, have been deduced from scientific reasoning aided by experience. And the in- duction might be extended to every department of prac- See Senior’s Introductory Lecture on Political Economy, p 28. XXII PREFACE. tice. Since, therefore, each give', .he preference to unassisted Common-Sense only in .those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he possesses th? knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though unconsciously and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of systematic know ledge to conjectural judgments. There is, however, abundant room for the employ- ment of Common-Sense in the application of thj system. To bring arguments, out of the form it? which they are expressed in conversation am At books into the regular logical shape, must be, of course, the business of Common-Sense, aided by practice ; for such arguments are, by supposition, not as yet within the province of Science ; else they would not br irregular, but would be already strict syllogisms. To exercise the learner in this operation, I have subjoined in the Appendix, some examples, both of insulated arguments, and (in the later editions) of the analysis of argumentative works. It should be added, however that a large portion of what is usually introduced into Logical treatises, relative to the finding of Arguments. — the different kinds of them, &c., I have referred to the head of Rhetoric, and treated of in a work on the Elements of that Art. It was doubtless from a strong and deliberate con- viction of the advantages, direct and indirect, accruing from an acquaintance with Logic, that the University af Oxford, when remodelling their system, not only retained that branch of study, regardless of the clamor* PREFACE XXlli ef many of the half-learned, but even assigned a prominent place to it, by making it an indispensable part of the Examination for the first Degree. This last circumstance, however, I am convinced, has, in a great degree, produced an effect opposite to what was designed. It has contributed to lower instead of ex- alting, the estimation of the study ; and to withhold from it the earnest attention of many who might have -applied to it with profit. I am not so weak as to imagine that any System can ensure great proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either in all students, or in a very large proportion of them : “ we sow many seeds to obtain a few flowers:” but it might have been expected (and doubtless was expected) that a majority at least of successful candidates would derive some benefit worm mentioning from their logical pursuits; and that a considerable proportion of the distinguished candidates would prove respectable, if not eminent logicians. Such expectations I do not censure as unreasonable, or such as I might not have formed myself, had I been called upon to judge at that period when our experience was all to come. Subsequently, however, experience has shown that those expectations have been very inadequately realized. The truth is, that a very small proportion, even of distinguished students, ever become proficients in Logic ; and that by far the greater part pass through the University without knowing any thing at all of the subject. 1 do not mean that they have not learned by rote a string of technical terms ; but that they understand atso- u hy nothing whatever of the principles of th« r, fence. XXIV PREFACE. I am aware that some injudicious friends :f Oxford will censure the frankness of this avowal. I have only to reply that such is the truth; and that I think too well of, and know far too well, the University in which I have been employed in various academical occupa- tions above a quarter of a century, to apprehend dan- ger to her reputation from declaring the exact truth, With all its defects, and no human institution is per- fect, the University would stand, I am convinced, higher in public estimation than it does, were the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in all points respecting it, more fully known. But the scanty and partial success of the measures employed to promote logical studies is the consequence, I apiprehend, of the universality of the requisition. That which must be done by every one, will, of course, often be done but indifferently ; and wheti the belief is once fully established, which it certainly has long been, that any thing which is indispensable to a testimonial, has little or nothing to do with the attainment of honors,* the lowest standard soon becomes the estab- lished one in the minds of the greater number ; and provided that standard be once reached, so as to secure the candidate from rejection, a greater or less proficiency in any such branch of study is regarded as a matter of indifference, as far as any views of aca- demical distinction are concerned. Divinity is one of these branches, and to this also * In the last-framed Examination- statute an express declaration, has been inserted, that proficiency in Logic is to have weight in th* assignment of honors. PREFACE. XXV most of what has been said concerning Logic might be considered as equally applicable ; but, in fact, there are several important differences between the two cases. In the first place, most of the students who are designed for the Church, and many who are not, have a value for theological knowledge, independently of the requisition of the schools ; and on that ground do not confine their views to the lowest admissible degree of proficiency : whereas this can be said of very few in the case of Logic. And moreover, such as design to become candidates for holy Orders, know that another examination in Theology awaits them. But a consideration, which is still more to the present purpose, is, that Theology, not being a Science, admits of infinite degrees of proficiency, from that which is within the reach of a child, up to the highest that is attainable by the most exalted genius ; every one of which degrees is inestimably valuable as far as it goes. If any one understands tolerably the Church- catechism, or even half of it, he knows something of divinity ; and that something is incalculably prefer- able * ^ nothing. But it is not so with a Science : one who does not understand the principles of Eu- clid’s demonstrations, whatever number of questions and answers he may have learnt by rote, knows abso- lutely nothing of Geometry: unless he attain this point, all his labor is utterly lost ; worse than lost, perhaps, if he is led to believe that he has learnt something of Mathematics, when, in truth, he has not. And the same is the case with Logic, or any other Science. It does not admit of such various degrees, as a knowledge of religion. Of course l an? c XXVI PREFACE far from supposing that all who understand any thing, much or little, of a certain Science, stand on the same level ; but I mean, what is surely undeniable, that one who does not embrace the fundamental principles, of a Science, whatever he may have taken on au- thority, and learned by rote, knows, properly speak- ing, nothing of that science. And such, I have no hesitation in saying, is the case with a considerable proportion even of chose candidates who obtain testi- monials, including many who gain distinction. There are some persons (probably not so many as one in ten, of such as have in other respects tolerable abil- ities,) who are physically incapable of the degree of steady abstraction requisite for really embmeing the principles of Logic or of any other Science, whatever oains may be taken by themselves or their teachers. But there is a much greater number to whom this is a great difficulty , though not an . impossibility ; and who having, of course, a strong disinclination to such a study, look naturally to the very lowest admissible standard. And the example of such examinations in Logic as must be expected in the case of men of these descriptions, tends, in combination with popular prejudice, to degrade the study altogether in the minds of the generality. It was from these considerations, perhaps, that it was proposed, a few years ago, to leave the study of Logic altogether to the option of the candidates ; but the suggestion was rejected ; the majority appearing to think (in which opinion I most fully coincide) that, so strongly as the tide of popular opinion set against the study the result would have been, withiii a fevif PREFACE. XXV 11 years an almost universal neglect of that science Matters were accordingly left, at that time, in respect of this point, on their former footing; which I am convinced was far preferable to the proposed altera- tion But a middle course between these two was sug- gested, which I was persuaded would be infinitely preferable to either ; a persuasion which I had long entertained, and which is confirmed by every day’s observations and reflections; of which, few persons, 1 believe, have bestowed more on this subject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged, be made optional to those who are merely candidates for a degree , but indispensable to the attainment of academical honors ; and the consequence would be, that it would speedily begin and progressively continue, to rise in estima- tion and to be studied with real profit. The ex- amination might then, it was urged, without any hardship, be made a strict one ; since no one could complain that a certain moderate degree of scientific ability, and a resolution to apply to a certain pre- scribed study, should be the conditions of obtaining distinction. The far greater part would still study Logic ; since there would be (as before) but few who would be willing to exclude themselves from the possibility of obtaining distinction ; but it would be studied with a very different mind, when ennobled, as it were, by being made part of the passport to Uni- versity honors, and when a proficiency in it came to be regarded generally as an honorable distinction. A.nd in proportion as the number increased of those who really understood the science, the number it waj -IXVlll PREFACE. contended, would increase of such as would value it ou higher and better grounds. It would in time coine to be better known and better appreciated by all the well-informed part of society : and lectures in Logic at the University would then, perhaps, no longer con- sist exclusively of an explanation of the mere ele- ments. This would be necessary indeed for begin- ners ; but to the more advanced students, the tutors would no more think of lecturing in the bare rudi- ments, than of lecturing in the Latin or Greek Gram- mar ; but, in the same manner as they exercise their pupils in Grammar, by reading with them Latin and Greek authors with continual reference to grammar- rules, so, they would exercise them in Logic by read- ing some argumentative work, requiring an analysis of it on logical principles. These effects could not indeed, it was acknowl- edged, be expected to show themselves fully till after a considerable lapse of time ; but that the change would begin to appear, (and that very decidedly) within three or four years, was confidently antici- pated. To this it was replied, that it was most desirable that no one should be allowed to obtain the Degree of B. A. without a knowledge of Logic. This an- swer carries a plausible appearance to - those unac- quainted with the actual state of the University; though in fact it is totally irrelevant. For it goes on the supposition, that hitherto this object has been ac- complished ; — that everyone who passes his exami- nation does possess a knowledge of Logic; which is notoriously not the fact, nor ever can be, without PREFACE xxix ome important change in some pa t of our system. The question therefore is, not, as the above objection would seem to imply, whether a real, profitable knowl- edge of Logic shall be strictly required of every can- didate for a Degree, (for this in fact never has been done) but whether, in the attempt to accomplish this by requiring the form of a logical examination from every candidate without exception, we shall continue -to degrade the science, and to let this part of the examination be regarded as a mere form, by many who might otherwise have studied Logic in earnest, and with advantage : — whether the great majority of candidates, and those too of a more promising descrip- tion, shall lose a real and important benefit through the attempt, (which, after all, experience has proved to be a vain attempt) to comprehend in this benefit a very small number, and of the least promising. Something of an approach to the proposed altera- tion, was introduced into the Examination-statute passed in 1830 ; in which, permission is granted to such as are candidates merely for a testimonial, to sub- stitute for Logic a portion of Euclid. I fear, however, that little or nothing will be gained by this; unless indeed the Examiners resolve to make the examina- tions in Logic far stricter than those in Euclid. For since every one who is capable of really understanding Euclid must be also capable of Logic, the alteration does not meet the case of those whose inaptitude for Science is invincible ; and these are the very descrip- tion of men whose (so called) logical-examinations tend ‘a depress the science. Those few who really are phys- ic ally incapable of scientific reasoning, and the far XXX PREFACE. greater number who fancy themselves so, or who at least will rather run a risk than surmount their aver- sion, and set themselves to study in earnest, — a., these will be likely, when the alternative is proposed, to prefer Logic to Euclid ; because in the latter, it is hardly possible, at least not near so easy as in Logic, to present the semblance of preparation by learning questions and answers by rote: — in the cant phrase of undergraduates, by getting crammed. Experience has proved this, in the case of the Responsion-exam- inations, where the alternative of Logic or Euclid has always been proposed to the candidates; of whom those most averse to Science, or incapable of it, are almost always found to prefer Logic. The determination may indeed be formed, and acted on from henceforth, that all who do in reality know nothing, properly speaking, of any Science, shall be rejected . all I know is, t! lat this has never been the case hitherto. Still, it is a satisfaction to me, that attention has been called to the evil in question, and an experimen- tal measure adopted for its abatement. A confident hope is thus afforded, that in the event (which I much fear) of the failure of the experiment, some other more effectual measure may be resorted to.* I am sensible that many may object, that this is nof the proper place for such remarks as the foregoing: what has the Public' at large, they may say, to do with * Since tliis was written, the experiment has been tried. In thi first Examination-list under the new Statute (Easter, 1831), of 12J candidates who did not aspire to the higher classes, twenty -Jive pre •ented Euclid for their examination, and one hundred, Logic i PHEFAUE. XXXI tue statutes of the University of Oxford? To tnis ij might fairly be replied, that not only all who think of sending their sons or other near relatives to Oxford, but all likewise who are placed under the ministry of such as have been educated there, are indirectly con- cerned, to a certain degree, in the system there pur- sued But the consideration which had the chief share in inducing me to say what I have, is, that the vindication of Logic from the prevailing disregard and contempt under which it labors, would have been altogether incomplete without it. For let it be remembered that the science is judged of by the Pub- lic in this country, in a very great degree, from the specimens displayed, and the reports made, by those whom Oxford sends forth. Every one, on looking into the University-Calendar or Statute-Book, feels himself justified in assuming, that whoever has gradu- ated at Oxford must be a Logician : not, indeed, necessarily, a first-rate Logician ; but such as to sat- isfy the public examiners that he has a competen knowledge of the science. Now, if a very large pro- portion of these persons neither are, nor think them- selves at all benefited by their (so called) logical education, and if many of them treat the study with contempt, and represent it as a mere tissue of obsolete and empty jargon, which it is a mere waste of time to attend to, let any one judge what conclusions respect- ing the utility of the study, and the wisdom of the University in upholding it, are likely to be the result. That prejudices so deeply rooted as those I tiavn tlluded to, and supported by the authority of suet XXX11 PREFACE eminent names, especially that of Locke, and (as ii commonly, though not very correctly supposed) Bacon should be overthrown at once by the present treatise, I am not so sanguine as to expect ; but if I have been successful in refuting some of the most popular objec- tions, and explaining some principles which are in general ill-understood, it may be hoped that just notions on the subject may continue (as they have begun) to gain ground more and more. It may be permitted me to mention, that as I have addressed myself to various classes of students, from the most uninstructed tyro, to the furthest-advanced Logician, and have touched accordingly both on the most elementary principles, and on some of the most remote deductions from them, it must be expected that readers of each class will find some parts not v/ell calculated for them. Some explanations will appear to the one too simple and puerile ; and for another class, some of the disquisitions will be at first too abstruse. If to each description some portions are found interesting, it is as much as I can expect. With regard to the style, I have considered perspi- cuity not only, as it always must be, the first point, but as one of such paramount importance in such a subject, as to justify the neglect of all others. Pro- lixity of explanation, — homeliness in illustration,— and baldness of expression, I have regarded as blem- ishes not worth thinking of, when any thing was to be gained in respect of clearness. To some of my readers a temporary difficulty may occasionally occui trom the use of some technical terms different, ot PREFACE. XXxiil aifferently applied, from what they have been accus- tomed to.* They must consider, however, that the attempt to conform in this point to the usage of every logical writer, would have been, on account of then variations from each other, utterly hopeless. I have endeavored, in the terms employed, to make no wan- ton innovations, but to conform generally to estab- ’shed usage, except when there is some very strong objection to it ; — where usage is divided, to prefer what may appear in each case the most convenient term ; — and, above all, to explain distinctly the sense in which each is employed in the present work. If any should complain of my not having given a history of all the senses in which each technical term has been used by each writer from its first introduc- tion, and a review of the works of each, I can only reply that my design was not to write a Logical Archaeology, or a Commentary on the works of for- mer Logicians, but an elementary introduction to the science. And few, I suppose, would consider a trea- tise, for instance, on Agriculture, as incomplete, which should leave untouched the questions of, who was the inventor of the plough, — what successive altera- tions that implement has undergone, — and from what legion wheat was first introduced. And if again any should complain of the omission of such metaphysical disquisitions on the laws of thought, and the constitution of the human mind generally, as they have been accustomed to include under the head of Logic, my answer must be, tlial See Book II. Chap. i. $ 1. XX XIV PREFACE. that term has been employed by me in a different sense ; for reasons which I have stated in several parts of this treatise, and especially in Book IV. Chap. iii. < and that I am therefore only to be censured, at the utmost, as not having undertaken a work of a differen 4 xind, and on a different subject. I would not, on the other hand, be understood as complaining of those who have used the word Logic in a more extended sense, or as underrating the value of their works. Only, the reader should be cautioned against the mistake — much commoner, I believe, than is generally thought — of confounding the exten- sion of the application of a name , with the enlarge- ment of the boundaries of a science. It is proper however to mention that the first Part of the “Elements of Rhetoric” contains a discussion of such points as many writers have treated of under the department of Logic. The technical language employed in this treatise, is, throughout, with the exception of a very few cases where some departure from ancient usage appeared indispensable, that of the older works on the subject. Some degree of prejudice perhaps might have been, in the outset, avoided, and a far greater appearance. of originality produced, by adopting novel forms of expression. There are also many writers who have found fault with the established technical language, as cumbrous and perplexing. I have always found how- ever that the phraseology they adopt in its stead consists of far more tedious circumlocution than that «vhich they censure ; while it is often less clear and ess correct. PREFACE. XXXV It should be observed however that all technical anguage (as well as all rules of art) must be expected to present, at first, a difficulty for the learner to sur- mount ; though in the end, it will greatly facilitate his procedure. But with this view it is necessary that such language and rules should be not only distinctly understood , but also learnt, and remembered as famil- iarly as the Alphabet, and employed constantly , and with scrupulous exactness. Otherwise technical lan- guage will prove an encumbrance instead of an advan- tage ; just as a suit of clothes would be, if instead of putting them on and wearing them, one should carry them about in his hands. Of the correctness of the fundamental doctrines maintained in the work, I may be allowed to feel some confidence ; not so much from the length of time that I have been more or less occupied with it, — enjoying at the same time the advantage of frequent suggestions and corrections from several judicious friends, — as from the nature of the subject. In works of taste, an author cannot be sure that the judgment of the Public will coincide with his own ; and if he fail to give pleasure, he fails of his sole or most appro- priate object. But in the case of truths which admit of scientific demonstration, it is possible to arrive by reasoning at as full an assurance of the justness of the conclusions established, as ihe imperfection of the human faculties will admit; and experience, accom- panied with attentive observation, and with repeated trials of various methods, may enable one long accus- omed to tuition, to ascertain with considerable cer- tainty what explanations are the best comprehended IXXV1 PREFACE Many parts cf the detail, however, may probabl] 1 j open to objections ; but if (as experience now aut, ar- izes me the more confidently to hope ) no errors are discovered, which materially affect the substantial utility of the work, but only such as detract from the credit of the author, the object will have been attained which I ought to have had principally in view. No credit, I am aware, is given to an author’s own disclaimer of personal motives, and profession of ex* elusive regard for public utility ; since even sincerity cannot, on this point, secure him from deceiving him- self ; but it may be allowable to observe, that one whose object was the increase of his reputation as a writer, could hardly have chosen a subject less suitable for his purpose than the present. At the time of the first publication, the study was neither popular, nor, apparently, likely soon to become so. Ignorance, fortified by prejudice, opposed its reception, even in the minds of those who are considered as both candid and well-informed. And as, on the one hand, a large class of modern philosophers might be expected to raise a clamor against “ obsolete prejudices ; ” “ bigoted devotion to the decrees of Aristotle ; ” “ confining the human mind in the trammels of the Schoolmen,” &c., so, on the other hand, all such as really are thus bigoted to every thing that has been long established, merely becausa it has been long established, were likely to exclaim against the presumption of an author, who presumes to depart in several points from the track of his pre- decessors. There is another circumstance, also, whi^h tend F REFACE. XXXVU naterially to diminish the credit of a writer on this and some other kindred subjects. We can make no discoveries of striking novelties : the senses of our readers are not struck, as with the return of a Comet which had been foretold, or the extinction of a taper in carbonic-acid gas : the materials we work upon are common and familiar to all, and, therefore, supposed to be well understood by all. And not only is any one’s deficiency in the use of these materials, such as is generally unfelt by himself, but when it is removed by satisfactory explanations — when the notions, which had been perplexed and entangled, are cleared up by the introduction of a few simple and apparently obvious principles, he will generally forget that any explanation at all was needed, and consider all that has been said as mere truisms, which even a child could supply to himself. Such is the nature of the fundamental principles of a science — they are so fully implied, in the most evident and well-known truths, that the moment they are fully embraced, it becomes a difficulty to conceive that we could ever have been not aware of them. And hence, the more simple, clear, and obvious any principle is rendered, the mere likely is its exposition to elicit those common remarks, “ of course ! of course ! ” “ no one could ever doubt that ; ” “ this is all very true, but there is nothing new brought to light; — nothing that was not familiar to every one,” “there needs no ghost to tell us that.” j am convinced that a verbose, mystical, and partially ! ccure way of writing on such a subject, is the most likely to catch the attention of the multitude. The generality verify the observation of Tacitus, “ omna d xxxvin PREFACE. ignotum pro mirifico ; ” and when any thing is mad® very plain to them, are apt to fancy that they knew it already; so that the explanations of scientific truths are likely, for a considerable time at least, to be, by most men, underrated the more, the more perfectly they accomplish their object. A very slow progress, therefore, towards popularity (far slower indeed than has in fact taken place) is the utmost that I expected for such a treatise as I have endeavored to make the present. I felt myselt bound, however, not only as a membei of Society, but more especially as a Minister of the Gospel, to use my* endeavors towards promoting an object which to me appears highly important, and (what is much more) whose importance was appreciated by very few besides. The cause of Truth universally, and not least, of religious Truth, is benefited by every thing that tends to promote sound reasoning, and facilitate the detection of fallacy. The adversaries of our Faith would, I am convinced, have been on many occasions more satisfactorily answered, and would have had fewer openings for cavil, had a thorough acquaintance with Logic been a more common qualification than it is. In lending my endeavors, therefore, whether with greater or less success, towards this object, I trust that I am neither uselessly nor unsuitably employed. Those who are engaged in, or designed for the Sacred Ministry, and all others who are sensible that the cause of true Religion is not a concern of the Ministry alone, should remember that this is no time to forego any of the advantages which that cause may derive from an active and judicious cultivation of the FKEFACE. XXXIX faculties. Among the enemies of Christianity in ths present day, are included, if I mistake not, a very Afferent description of persons from those who were /niefly to be met with a century, or even half a cen- tury ago : what were called “ men of wit and pleasure about town; ” — ignorant, shallow, flippant declaiiners, or dull and powerless pretenders to Philosophy. Among the enemies of the Gospel now, are to be found men not only of learning and ingenuity, but of cultivated, argximentative powers, and not unversed in the principles of Logic. If the advocates of our Re- ligion think proper to disregard this help, they will find, on careful inquiry, that their opponents do not. And let them not trust too carelessly to the strength of their tause. Truth will, indeed, prevail, where all other points are nearly equal ; but it may suffer a temporary discomfiture, if hasty assumptions, unsound arguments, and vague and empty declamation, occupy the place of a train of close, accurate, and luminous reasoning. It is not, however, solely, or chiefly, for polemical purposes, that the cultivation of the reasoning-faculty is desirable • in persuading, in investigating, in learn ing, or teaching, in all the multitude of cases in whiel; it is our object to arrive at just conclusions, or to lead others to them, it is most important. A knowledge: ot logical rules will not indeed supply the want of other knowledge ; nor was it «- ?r proposed, by any one who really understood this science, to substitute it for any other : but it is no less true that no other can be substituted for this ; that it is valuable ii* every branch of study ; and that it enables us to use o file greatest advantage the know’edge we possess, XI PREFACE It is to be hoped, therefore tnat tl jse Academical Bodies, who have been wise enough to retain this science, will, instead of being persuaded to abandon it, give their attention ra*her to its improvement and more effectual cultivation ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. INTRODUCTION. $ 1. Logic, in the most extensive sense in which it has been thought advisable to employ the name, may be considered as the Science, and also as the Art, of Reasoning. It investigates the prin- ciples on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes such rules as may be derived from those principles, for guard- ing against erroneous deductions. Its most appropriate office, however, is that of instituting an analysis of the process of the mind in Reasoning ; and in this point of view it is, as 1 have said, strictly a Science; while, considered in reference to the practical rules above mentioned, it may be called the Art of Reasoning. For it is to be remembered, that as t science is conversant about speculative knowledge only , ana art is the application of knowledge to practice , hence Logic (as well as any other system of knowledge) becomes, when applied to practice, an art; while confined to the theory of reasoning, it is strictly a science : and it is as such that it occupies the higher place in point of dignity, since it professes 1 Definition oj Logic. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [§ L to develop some of the most interesting and curjous inteh lectual phenomena.* Prevailing Considering how early Logic attracted the Mistalies attention of philosophers, it may appear sur* respecting prising that so little progress should have been Logic. mac |fi, as i s confessedly the case, in developing its principles, and perfecting the detail of the system ; and this circumstance has been brought forward as a proof of the barrenness and futility of the study. But a similar argument might have been urged with no less plausibility, at a period not very remote, against the study of Natural Philosophy ; and, very recently, against that of Chemistry. No science can be expected to make any considerable progress, which is not cultivated on right principles. Whatever may be the in* nerent vigor of the plant, it will neither be flourishing nor fruitful till it meet with a suitable soil and culture : and in no case is the remark more applicable than in the present ; the greatest mistakes having always prevailed respecting the nature of Logic ; and its province having in consequence been extended by many writers to subjects with which it nas no proper connection. Indeed, with the exception perhaps of Aristotle, (who is himself, however, not entirely exempt from the errors in question,) hardly a writer on Logic can be men- tioned who has clearly perceived, and steadily kept in view throughout, its real nature and object. Before his time, no distinction was drawn between the science of which we are Bpeaking, and that which is now usually called Metaphysics, a circumstance which alone shows how small was the progress • It is surely strange, therefore, to- find in a treatise on Logic, (Aldrich’s,) a distinct dissertation to prove that it is an Art, and not » Science ! INTRODUCTION. 3 j i.] History oj Logic distinct from the teaching of the science. made in earlier times. Indeed, those who first turned theii attention to the subject, hardly thought of inquiring into the process of Reasoning itself, but confined themselves almost entirely to certain preliminary points, the discussion of which is (if logically considered) subordinate to that of the main inquiry. To give even a very condensed account of the lives and works of all the principal writers on Logic, — of the technical terms introduced by each and the senses in which each employed them, — and of the improvements or corruptions that were from time to time introduced, — in short, to write the History and Antiquities of Logical Science, — would be foreign to my present design. Such a work, if undertaken by a competent writer, would be, though not of a popular char- acter, yet highly interesting and instructive to a limited class of students. But the extensive research which would form one indispensable qualification for such a task, would be only one out of many, even less common, qualifications, without which such a work would be worse than useless. The author should be one thoroughly on his guard against the common error of confounding together, or leading his readers to con- found, an intimate acquaintance with many books on a given subject, and a clear insight into the subject itself. With ability and industry for investigating a multitude of minute particulars, he should possess the power of rightly estimating each according to its intrinsic importance, and not (as is verj commonly done) according to the degree of laborious re- search it may have cost him, or the rarity of the knowledge le may in any case have acquired. And he should be care ful, while recording the opinions and expressions ol various authors on points of science, to guard both himself i nd his \ ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [} Z readers against the mistake of taking any thing on authority that ought to be evinced by scientific reasoning ; nr of regard- ing each technical term as having a sort of prescriptive right to retain forever the meaning attached to it by those who first introduced it. In no subject, in short, is it more impor- tant for an author to be free from all tinge of antiquarian pedantry. But if I felt myself as fully competent to the task of writing such a history of Logic as I have alluded to, as I am conscious of not being so, I should still decidedly prefer keeping such a work altogether distinct from a treatise on the science ; be- cause the combination of the two in a single volume would render it the more difficult to avoid the blending of them con- fusedly together ; and also because, on such a plan, the dis- tinction could not be so easily preserved between Logic, in the sense in which I am here using that title, and various met- aphysical disquisitions to which several writers have given the same name. For these reasons I have thought it best to take only a slight and rapid glance of the series of logical writers down to the present day, and of the general tendency of their labors. § 2. Zeno the Eleatic, whom most accounts Eat-ly writers represent as the earliest systematic writer on on Logic. . the subject of Logic, or, as it was then called, Dialectics, divided his work into three parts; the first of which (upon Consequences) is censured by Socrates [Plato, Parmen .] for obscurity and confusion. In his second part, however, he furnished that interrogatory method of disputa- tion which Socrates adopted, and which has since borne his name. The third part of his work was devoted to what may not be improperly termed the art of wrangling wh'ch supplied the disputant with a collection of { 2 .] INTRODUCTION. 5 sophistical questions, so contrived, that the concession of soma point, that seemed unavoidable, immediately involved soma glaring absurdity. This, if it is to be esteemed as at all fall- ing within the province of Logic, is certainly not to be re- garded (as some have ignorantly or heedlessly represented it) as its principal or proper business. The Greek philosophers generally have unfortunately devoted too much attention to it ; but we must beware of falling into the vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have regarded as a serious and in- trinsically important study, that which in fact they considered as an ingenious recreation. The disputants diverted them- selves in their leisure hours by making trial of their own and their adversary’s acuteness, in the endeavor mutually to per- plex each other with subtle fallacies ; much in the same way as men amuse themselves with propounding and guessing rid- dles, or with the game of chess ; to each of which diversions the sportive disputations of the ancients bore much resem- blance. They were closely anologous to the wrestling and other exercises of the Gymnasium ; these last being reckoned conducive to bodily vigor and activity, as the former were to habits of intellectual acuteness ; but the immediate object in each was a sportive, not a serious contest ; though doubtless fashion and emulation often occasioned an undue importance to be attached to success in each. Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as any further a logician than as to what respects his erotetic method of disputation ; a course of argument con stmcted on this principle being properly a hypothetical Sori- tes, which may easily be reduced into a series of syllogisms. To Zeao succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes , both pupils of Socrates. The Eiiclid ant r 1 Antistnenea. r ormer of these prosecuted the s bject of the l* Zeno. 6 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. I* » third part of his predecessor’s treatise, and is said to have been ■ the author of many of the fallacies attributed to the Stoical school. Of the writings of the latter nothing certain is known ; if, however, we suppose the above-mentioned sect to be his disciples in this study, and to have retained his prin- ciples, he certainly took a more correct view of the subject than Euclid. The Stoics divided all lexxu — every thing that could be said — into three classes; 1st, the Simple Term ; 2d, the Proposition ; 3d, the Syllogism ; viz. the hypo- thetical ; for they seem to have had little notion of a more rigorous analysis of argument than into that familiar form. We must not here omit to notice the merits of Archytas, to whom we are indebted (as he himself probably Archytas _ was, in a great degree, to older writers) for the doctrines of the Categories. He, however, (as well as the other writers on the subject,) appears to have had no distinct view of the proper object and just limits of the science of Logic ; but to have blended with it metaphysical discussions not strictly connected with it, and to have dwelt on the investi- gation of the nature of Terms and Propositions, without maintaining a constant reference to the principles of Reason- ing ; to which all the rest should be made subservient. The state, then, in which Aristotle found the Aristotle . science, (if, indeed, it can properly be said to have -listed at all before his time,) appears to have been nearly nis : the division into Simple Terms, Propositions, and Syllogisms, had been slightly sketched out ; the doctrine of the Categories, and perhaps that of the Opposition of propo- sitions- had been laid down ; and, as some believe, the analy> Bis of Species into Genus and Differentia had been introduced by Socrates. These, at best, were rather the materials of the Bystem, *ban the system itself ; the foundation of which indeed INTRODUCTION. 7 »*] he distinctly claims the merit of’ having laid, and which remains fundamentally the same as he left it. It has been remarked, that the logical system is one of those few theories which have been begun and completed by the same individual. The history of its discovery, as far as the main principles of the science are concerned, proper y commences and ends with Aristotle ; and this may perhaps in part account for the subsequent perversions of it. The brev- ity and simplicity of its fundamental truths (to which point indeed all real science is perpetually tending) has already led many to suppose that something much more complex, ab- struse, and mysterious remained tc be discovered. The van- ity, too, by which all men are prompted unduly to magnify their own pursuits, has led unphiloscphical minds, not in this case alone, but in many others, to extend the boundaries of their respective sciences, not by the patient development and just application of the principles of those sciences, but by wandering into irrelevant subjects. The mystical employment of numbers by Pythagoras, in matters utterly foreign to arith- metic, is perhaps the earliest instance of the kind. A more curious and important one is the degeneracy of Astronomy into judicial Astrology ; but none is more striking than the misapplication of Logic by those who have treated of it as “ the art of rightly employing the rational faculties,” or who have intruded it into the province of Natural Philosophy, and regarded the Syllogism as an engine for the investigation of nature ; while they overlooked the extensive aeld that was before them within the legitimate limits of the science, and perceived not the importance and difficulty of the task of completing and properly filling up the masterly sketch before hem. The writings of Aristotle were not only for the most pan 6 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. B* absolutely lost to the world for about two centuries, but seem to have been but little studied for a long time after their re* covery. An art, however, of Logic, derived from the princi- ples traditionally preserved by his disciples, seems to have been generally known, and to have been employed by Cicero n his philosophical works ; but the pursuit of the science seems to have been abandoned for a long time. As early in the Christian era as the second and third centuries, the Peri- Boethius. aatstic doctrines experienced a considerable revival ; and we Galen meet the names of Galen, Ammonius, Ammonius, (who seems to have taken the lead among the Alexander, commentators on Aristotle,) Alexander of Aph- Porphyry. roc |; s i aSj anc j Porphyry, as logicians; but it is not till the close of the fifth century, or the beginning of the sixth, that Aristotle’s logical works were translated into Latin by the celebrated Boethius.* Not one of these seems to have made any considerable advances in developing the theory of reasoning. Of the labors of Ga- len, (who added the insignificant fourth Figure to the three recognized by Aristotle,) little is known ; and Porphyry’s principal work is merely on the predicables. We have little of the science till the revival of learning among the Arabians, by whom Aristotle’s treatises on this, as well as on other sub- jects, were eagerly studied. § 3. Passing by the names of some Byzan- tine writers of no great importance, we come to the times of the Schoolmen ; whose waste of ingenuity, and frivolous subtilty of disputation, have been often made the subject of complaints, into the justice of which it is unne- cessary here fully to inquire. It may be sufficient to observe Schoolmen. * Born about A. D. 475, and died about A. D. 524. INTRODUCTION. s tnat their fault did not lie in their diligent study of 1 tgic, and the high value they set upon it, but in their utterly mistaking the true nature and object of the science ; and by the attempt to employ it for the purpose of physical discoveries, involving every subject in a mist of words, to the exclusion of sound philosophical investigation.* Their errors may serve to ac- count for the strong terms in which Bacon . . . Bacon. sometimes appears to censure logical pursuits ; hut that this censure was intended to bear against the extrav- agant perversions, not the legitimate cultivation, of the sci- ence, may be proved from his own observations on the sub- ject, in his Advancement of Learning. “ Had Bacon lived in the present day, I am inclined to think he would have made his chief complaint against unmethodized inquiry and illogical reasoning. Certainly he would not have complained of Dialectics as corrupting Philosophy. To guard uoic against the evils prevalent in his time, would be to fortify n town against battering-rams, instead of against cannon.” t His moderation, however, was not imitated Locke. in other quarters. Even Locke confounds in one sweeping censure the Aristotelic theory, with the ab- surd misapplications and perversions of it in later years. His objection to the science, as unserviceable in the discovery of truth, (which has of late been often repeated,) while : t holds good in reference to many (misnamed) logicians, indi- cates that, with regard to the true nature of the science itself, he had no clearer notions than they have, of the just limits of oghal science, as confined to the theory of Reasoning ; and • Of tiie character of the School-divinity, Dr. Hampden’s Hamp- ton Lectures furnish the best view that has, perhaps, ever appearci + Pol. Econ. Lect. Lx. p. 237. 10 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. l»» of the distinct character of that operation from the observa- tions and experiments which are essential to the study oi Nature. For instance, in chap. xvii. “ on Reason,” (which, by the way, he perpetually confounds with Reasoning ,) he says, in § 4, “ If syllogisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that before Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know any thing by reason ; and that, since the inven- tion of syllogisms, there is not one in ten thousand that doth. But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle tc make them rational, i. e. those few of them that he could get so to examine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above threescore ways that three propositions may be laid to- gether, there are but fourteen wherein one may be sure that tne conclusion is right,” &c. “ God has been more bounti- ful to mankind than so : He has given them a mind that can reason without being instructed in methods of syllogizing,” &c. All this is not at all less absurd than if any one, on being told of the discoveries of modern chemists respecting caloric, and on hearing described the process by which it is conducted through a boiler into the water, which it converts into a gas of sufficient elasticity to overcome the pressure of the atmosphere, &c., should reply, “ If all this were so, it would follow that before the time of these chemists no one ever did or could make any liquor boil.” He presently after inserts an encomium upon Aristotle, in which he is equally unfortunate ; he praises him for the invention of syllogisms ; ” to which he certainly had na more cuiim than Linnaeus to the creation of plants and ani- mals ; or Harvey, to the praise of hav'ng made the blow INTRODUCTION. II * 3 j circuit L£ Lavoisier, to that of having formed the atmos- phere we breathe. And the utility of this invention consists, according to him, in the great service done against “ those who were not ashamed to deny any thing ; ” a service which never could have been performed, had syllogisms been an in vention or discovery of Aristotle’s ; for what sophist coula ever have consented to restrict himself to one particular kind of arguments, dictated by his opponent ? In an ordinary, obscure, and trifling writer, all this confu- sion of thought and common-place declamation might as well have been left unnoticed ; but it is due to the general ability and to the celebrity of such an author as Locke, that errors of this kind should be exposed. An error apparently different, but substantially the same pervades the treatises of Watts, and seme other modern writers on the subject. Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic theory to the vast purposes to which others had attempted to apply it, he still craved aftei the attainment of some equally comprehensive and all-power- ful system ; which he accordingly attempted to construct un- der the title of The Right Use of Reason, — which was to be a method of invigorating and properly directing all the powers of the mind : — a most magnificent object indeed, but one which not only does not fall under the province of Logic, out cannot be accomplished by any one science or system that can even be conceived to exist. The attempt to comprehend so wide a field, is no extension of science, but a mere verbal gen*- eralization, which leads only to vague and barren declamation. It is not perhaps much to be wondered at, that in still later times several ingenious writers, forming their notions of the ecience itself from professed masters in it, such as have jus! been alluded to and judging of its value from their failures ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. j2 L j 3 should have treated the Aristotelic system with so much reprobation and scorn. The vague aspirations of some of these wri- Extravagant ters a p (er a .t true » — “ rational ” — “ philo- expectations of r some writers. S0 P hlcal system of Logic,” which, year after year, and generation after generation, is talked of, and hoped for, and almost promised, but which is acknowl- edged to have never yet existed,* may recall to one’s mind the gorgeous visions which floated before the imagination of the Alchemists, of the Philosopher’s Stone, and the Universal Medicine ; and which made them regard with impatience and with scorn the humble labors of existing Metallurgy and Phar- macy. I believe that in respect of the present subject, the views I am alluding to arise in great measure from men’s not perceiving tnat Language, i of some kind or other, is (as will be more fully shown hereafter) an indispensable instrument of all Reasoning that properly deserves the name. And hence it is that one may find such writers as I Tc ™ c!e ’ lc y t0 allude to speaking disdainfully of “ rules appli- cable merely to reasoning in words ; ” — rep- resenting Language as serviceable only “ in conveying argu- ments to another ; ” and even as “ limiting the play of our faculties ; ” and again as “ rendering the mental perception * I have even seen a complaint made, that the introduction of some such perfect system has been prevented, by the application of the k erm Logic to that which is commonly so called. We do not find, however, that the application of the names of Astronomy and Chem- istry to the studies formerly so called, prevented the origination of more philosophical systems. f Hobbes, who has very clearly pointed this out, has unhappily diminished the benefit that might have been derived from much that no has written, by the prejudice he has raised against himself through his exceptionable doctrines in Morals. Politics, and Religion. INTRODUCTION. 13 f 3 } of. all abstract truths obscure and confused, in so far as the rude symbol of each idea is taken in the stead of the idea itself ; ” with other such expressions, emanating from that which is in truth the ancient and still prevalent doctrine of ss Realism.” The Syllogistic theory has usually been con- incorrect sidered by these objectors as professing to fur- views of the nish a peculiar method of reasoning, instead of a nature of the method of analyzing that mental process which science - must invariably take place in all correct reasoning ; and ac- cordingly they have contrasted the ordinary mode of reason- ing with the syllogistic, and have brought forward with an air of triumph the argumentative skill of many who never learned the system ; a mistake no less gross than if any one should regard Grammar as a peculiar Language, and should contend against its utility, on the ground that many speak correctly who never studied the principles of grammar. For Logic, which is, as it were, the Grammar of Reasoning, dues not bring forward the regular Syllogism as a distinct mode of argumentation , designed to be substituted for any other mode ; * but as the form to which all correct reasoning may be ultimately reduced : and which, consequently, serves the * Strange as it may seem, there are some, (I suspect not a few,) who even go a step further, and consider Logic as something opposed .o right reasoning. I have seen a Review, of a work which the Re- viewer characterized as the production of an able Logician, and which he therefore concluded was likely to have influence with such as will not reason! The “not” might naturally have been regarded as a misprint, but that the context shows that such was the reviewer’s real meaning. On seeing such a passage written in the 19th century, who can won der that in the Middle Ages, Grammar (“ Gramarye ”) was regarded vs a kind of magical art ! 2 L4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC L$ * purpose (when we are employing Logic as an art) of a lest to try the validity of anj argument ; in the same manner aa by chemical analysis we develop and submit to a distinct ex- amination the elements of which any compound body is com- posed, and are thus enabled to detect any latent sophistication and impurity. § 4. Many misconceptions not very dissimilar to those of Locke, which continue to prevail, more or less, in the presen day, will be hereafter noticed, as far as is needful, in appropriate places. In this introduction it would be unsuitable to advert to them except very briefly, and that, only with a view to caution the learner, unused to these studies, against being dis- heartened in the outset, by hearing, generally, that objections have been raised against the leading principles of the science by writers of considerable repute ; objections which he wiH hardly suppose to be, in so great a degree as they really are either founded on mistake, or unimportant, and turning, im reality, on merely verbal questions. For instance, some, he may be told, have maintained tha men reason, — or that they may reason, — from a single premiss, without any other being either expressed or under- stood ; — that men may, and do, reason from one individua. case to another, without the intervention of any general [uni- versal] proposition, whether stated or implied ; — that the inferences from Induction are not drawn by any process that is, in substance, Syllogistic ; — that the conclusion of a Syllo- gism s not really inferred from the Premisses ; — that a Syllo- gism m nothing but a kind of trap for insnaring the incau- tious ; and that it necessarily involves the fallacy of “ begging the question , ” with other such formidably-sounding objec- tions • which, when simply spoken of as being afloat, and a* maintained by able men, are likely to be supposed far mor« INTRODUCTION. n } *1 Dowerful than the) will be found on a closer examina tion. Of those who speak of a single premiss being sufficient to warrant a conclusion some, it will be found, were confining their thoughts to such flat and puerile examples as Logical writers are too apt to employ exclusively ; as “ Socrates is a man ; therefore he is a living-creature, &c. ; ” in which the conclusion had been already stated in the one premiss, to any one who does but understand the meaning of the words ; “ living-creature ” being a part of what is signified in the very term “ Man.” But in such an instance as this : “ He has swallowed a cup of laurel-water, therefore he has taken poison,” the inference is one w’hich no one could draw who should be ignorant — as every body was, less than a century ago (though using the word in the same sense as now, to sig- nify a “ liquor distilled from laurel-leaves ”) that this liquor is poisonous. Others, again, when they speak of reasoning from one indi- vidual instance to another, without any universal premiss, mean, sometimes, that no such premiss is expressed , (which is the case oftener than not,) and that perhaps even the reasoner himself, if possessed of no great command of language, might ae at a loss to state it correctly.* And indeed it continually * It may be added, that in inward solitary reasoning, many, and perhaps most persons, but especially those not much accustomed to read or speak concerning the subjects that occupy their thoughts, make use, partly, of signs that are not arbitrary and conventional , but which consist of mental conceptions of individual objects ; taken, each, as a representative of a Class. E. g. a person practically conversant with mechanical operations, but not with discussions of them in words, may form a conception of — in colloquial phrase, “ figure to himself’ — a certain field or room, with whose shape he is familiar, and raaj tmploy this, in his inward trains of thought, as a Sign, to represent 16 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. nappens that even long trains of reasoning will flash Lirougti the mind with such rapidity that the process is performed unconsciously, or at least leaves no trace in the memory, any more than the motions of the muscles of the throat and mouth in speaking, or the judgments by which we decide as to the distances of visible objects : * so that a conclusion may be supposed to be seized by intuition, which in reality is the result of rapid inference. Some, again, appear to include under the title of “ reason- ing ” every case in which a person believes one thing in con- sequence of his believing another thing; however far he may be from having any good grounds to warrant the inference : and they accordingly include those processes which take place in the minds of infants and of brutes ; which are apt to asso- ciate with the appearance of an object before them the remem- bered impression of something that formerly accompanied it. Such a process is alluded to in the familiar proverbs that “A burnt child dreads the fire;” or as it is expressed in another form, “ The scalded cat fears cold water ; ” or again in the Hebrew proverb, “ He who has been bitten by a serpent for instance, “ parallelogram ” or “ trapezium,” &c. ; or he may “ fig- ure to himself” a man raising a weight by means of a pole, and may use this conception as a general sign, in place of the term “ lever ; ” and the terms themselves he may be unacquainted with ; in which •ase he will be at a loss to impart distinctly to others his own reason- ings ; and in the attempt, will often express himself (as one may fre- quently observe in practical men unused to reading and speaking) not only indistinctly, but even erroneously. See below, § 5. Hence, partly, may have arisen the belief in those supposed “ abstract ideas ” which will be hereafter alluded to, and in the possibility of reasoning with- out the use of any Signs at all. * The distance of an object having been, till a comparatively lat* period supposed to be directly perceived by the eve. INTR . iDUCTION 17 Ml is afraid of a rope.” Most logical writers however have con* fined the name of “ reasoning ” to valid argument; which cannot exist without a universal premiss, implied, if not ex- pressed. For whenever there are not two premisses which, taken jointly, do imply, and virtually assert, the conclusion, — the alleged premiss or premisses being such that a person may without inconsistency believe them true and yet not be- lieve the conclusion, — then, we have what Logicians have been accustomed to call an apparent, but not real argument. Some however have denied that the conclusion is inferred from the universal premiss. But then they acknowledge that the truth of that premiss is an indispensable condition of such inference : an admission which would satisfy most Logicians. For if any botanical physiologist, for instance, were to deny that the branches of a tree derive nourishment from the roots, saying that the- branches are nourished by the juices of the earth, but admitting that the roots are an indispensable con- dition, and that if they are destroyed, the branches will wither, this would not be reckoned as substantially any new doctrine. And so also if any one choose to maintain that the conclusion is drawn^/rowi the one premiss, by, or through the other prem iss, this would be accounted merely a needless and unim portant innovation in phraseology. So also when inferences from Induction are spoken of as not being — or not necessarily being — substantially Syllo- gistic, the learner might at first sight be startled and per- plexed, till he found it at the same time admitted that we have to decidt, in each case of Induction, the question, whether the instances adduced be “ sufficient ” to warrant the infer snce ; — whether it be “ allowable ” to draw the conclusion. And the decision of this question in the affirmative, — i. e. She decision that the procedure is not a mere random guess 2 * 18 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. u* — is, if expressed in words, the very premiss necessary to complete the Syllogism. (See B. iv. ch. i. § 1.) So also it will be seen that the alleged entrapping charactei of a Syllogism, merely amounts to this; that whoever per* ceives the validity of an argument, has no mode of escape from the “ snare ” (so called) except by the way he entered , viz. the premisses. He has only the alternative of allowing one of them to be false, or else, the conclusion to be true. And it is a matter of daily occurrence, that a man is unde- ceived as to some principle he had incautiously admitted, by perceiving what it would lead to. Complaints § 5. Complaints have also been made that against Logic. Logic leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the sources of the chief errors in reason- ing ; viz. the ambiguity or indistinctness of Terms, and the doubts respecting the degrees of evidence in various Proposi- tions : an objection which is not to be removed by any such attempt as that of Watts to lay dow’n “ rules for forming clear ideas,” and for “ guiding the judgment ; ” but by reply- ing that no art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and indeed more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system of universal knowl edge as should instruct us in the full meaning or meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity, — certainty or uncer tainty, — of every proposition, thus superseding all othef studies, it is most unphilosophical to expect, or even to im- agine. And to find fault with Logic for not performing this is as if one should object to the science of Optics for not giving sight to the blind ; or as if (like the man of whom Warburton tells a story in his Div. Leg.) one should com- plain of a reading-glass for being of no service to a person who had never learned :o read. In fact, the difficulties and S.j INTRODUCTION. 19 errors above alluded to are not in the process of Reasoning itself (which alone is the appropriate province of Logic,) but in the subject-matter about which it is employed. This pro- cess will have been correctly conducted if it have conformed to the logical rules, which preclude the possibility of any erroi creeping in between the principles assumed, and the conclu- sions we ieduce from them. But still that conclusion may be false, .f the principles we start from are so ; and the known falsity of a conclusion will often serve (as has been above remarked) to correct a mistake made in the outset. In like manner no arithmetical skill wiil secure a correct result to a calculation, unless the data are correct from which we calculate ; nor does any one on that account undervalue Arithmetic ; and yet the objection against Logic rests on no better foundation. There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect betweer the two sciences. All Numbers (which are the subject of Arithmetic) must be numbers of some things , whether coins persons, measures, or any thing else ; but to introduce into the science any notice of the things respecting which calcu- lations are made, would be evidently irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific character ; we proceed therefore with arbitrary signs representing numbers in the abstract. So also ioes Logic pronounce on the validity of a regularly-con structed argument, equally well, though arbitrary symbols may have bien substituted for the Terms; and, consequently, without any regard to the things signified by those Terms. And the possibility of doing this (though the employment of sucn arbitrary symbols has been absurdly objected to, even bv writers who understood not only Arithmetic but Algebra) >s a proof of the strictly scientific character of the system. But many professed logical writers, not attending to the cir- 20 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Jft cumstantes which have been just mentioned, i.ave wandered into disquisitions on various branches of knowledge ; disqui- sitions which must evidently be as boundless as human knowl- edge itself, since there is no subject on which reasoning k not employed, and to which, consequently, Logic may not be applied. The error lies in regarding every thing as the proper province of Logic to which it is applicable* Many however who do not fall altogether into that error, yet censure any logical treatise which, like the present, pro- fesses to be wholly conversant about Language ; and speak of the science as treating, properly, of the comparison of “ ab- stract Ideas," of which, Language, they say, merely supplies the names. It may be sufficient at present to reply, that supposing there really exist in the mind — or in some minds — certain “ abstract ideas,” by means of which a train of reasoning may be carried on independently of Common-terms [or Signs of any kind,] — for this is the real point at issue — and that a system of Logic may be devised, having refer- ence to such reasoning, — supposing this, — still, as I profess not to know any thing of these “ abstract ideas,” or of any *'• Universals ” except Signs, or to be conscious of any such reasoning-process, I at least must confine myself to the at- tempt to teach the only Logic I do pretend to understand. Many, again, who speak slightingly of Logic altogether, on the ground of its being “ conversant only about words f enter- tain fundamentally the same views as the above; that is, they take for granted that Reasoning may be carried on alto- gether independently of Language; which they regard fas • A similar error is complained of by Aristotle, as having taken place with respect to Rhetoric ; of which, indeed, we find specimen* in the arguments of several of the interlocutors in Cic. de Oratore. INTRC DU Cl ICXN . 21 M was above remarked) merely as a means of communicating it to others. And a Science or Art which they suppose to be confined 10 this office, they accordingly rank very low. Such a view I believe to be very prevalent. The majority of men would probably say, if asked, that the use of Lam guage is peculiar to Man ; and that its office is to express to one another our thoughts and feelings. But neither of jrese is strictly true. Brutes do possess in some degree the power of being taught to understand what is said to them, and some of them even to utter sounds expressive of what is passing within them. But they all seem to be incapable of another very important use of language, which does characterize Man ; viz. the employment of “ Common-terms ” (“ general- terms ”) formed by Abstraction, as instruments of thought ; by which alone a train of Reasoning may be carried on. And accordingly, a Deaf-mute, before he has been taught a Language, — either the Finger-language, or Reading, — cannot carry on a train of Reasoning, any more than a Brute. He differs indeed from a Brute in possessing the mental capa- bility of employing Language ; but he can no more make use of that capability, till he is in possession of some System of arbitrary general-signs , than a person born blind from Cata- ract can make use of his capacity of Seeing, till the Cataract is removed. Hence, it will be found by any one who will question a Deaf-mute who has been taught Language after having grown up, that no such thing as a train of Reasoning had ever passed through his mind before he was taught. If indeed we did reason by means of those “ Abstract- J Logic 28 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book. 1 fallacies, are so often at a loss to detect and expose them in a manner satisfactory to others, or even to themselves , it could not but appear desirable to lay down some general rules of reasoning applicable to all cases ; by which a person might Ve enabled the more readily and clearly to state the grounds of his own conviction, or of his objection to the arguments of an opponent ; instead of arguing at random, without any fixed and acknowledged principles to guide his procedure. Such rules would be analogous to those of Arithmetic, which ob- viate the tediousness and uncertainty of calculations in the head ; wherein, after much labor, different persons might arrive at different results, without any of them being able dis- tinctly to point out the error of the rest. A system of such rules, it is obvious, must, instead of deserving to be called the “ art of wrangling,” be more justly characterized as the “ art of cutting short wrangling,” by bringing the parties to issue at once, if not to agreement; and thus saving a waste of ingenuity. In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will Analysis of ^ found that every Conclusion is deduced, in argument. reality, from two other propositions ; (thence called Premisses ;) for though one of these may be, and com monly is, suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as admitted ; as may easily be made evident by supposing the denial of the suppressed premiss; which will at once invali date the argument ; e. g. if any one, from perceiving tha. “ the world exhibits marks of design,” infers that “ it must have had an intelligent author,” though he may not be aware his cwn mind of the existence of any other premiss, he wiL readily understand, if it be denied that “ whatever exhibits marks of design must have had an intelligent author,” tha die affirmative of that proposition is necessary to the validity ANALYTICAL OUTLINE 2d 2 ] ef the argument.* Or again, if' any one on meeting with • an animal which has horns on t.ie head ” infers that “ it is a ruminant,” he will easily perceive that this would be no argy ment to any one who should not be aware of the general fact that “ all horned animals ruminate.” An argument thus stated regularly and at full ^ ^ . .ength, is called a Syllogism ; which therefore is evidently not a peculiar kind of argument , but only a peculiar form of expression, in which every argument may be stated.f When one of the premisses is suppressed, (which for brev- ity’s sake it usually is) the argument is called an Enthymeme. And it may be worth while to remark, that when the argu ■ * Some choose to call this proposition not a premiss but merely a condition. This however is, substantially, (as has been formerly re- marked) just what Logicians mean. Whoever has any good ground for believing his inference to be a just one, must believe this condition to exist. t Some writers, and Locke among others, who profess to despise what they call “ syllogistic reasoning,” distinctly admit — as Locke does e. g. in ch. xvii. that “ all right reasoning may be reduced to the form of Syllogism ; ” (which is admitting the utmost that I conceive any Logician maintains) only, there are, he says, other and better “ ways of reasoning that is, as he proceeds to explain, people do not always, or usually, express their reasoning in a syllogistic form ; as if any one had ever doubted that ! Except indeed it be a writer in the Edinburgh Review, (in 1839) who in deprecating and deriding all attempts to adduce evidences of the truth of Christianity, as useless, and even dangerous, for the mass of mankind, (a discovery, by the way, which its first promulgators were not enlightened enough to make) gives as a reason, that “the Gospel has been the stay of I ountless millions who never framed a syllogism.” And very prob able it is, that Nicodemus for instance, and those who deputed him, when he said, “ we know that thou art a teacher sent from God ; for no man can do these miracles that thou doest except God be with him, ” though he spoke grammatically and reasoned conclusively may have never heard of syllogisms, or even of nouns and verba. 3 * ao ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I ment is in this state, the objections of an opponent are (oj father appear to be) of two kinds; viz. either objections to th. j ' jsertion itself, or objections to its force as an argument. E. G. In one of the above instances, an atheist may be corn ceived either denying * that the world does exhibit marks of design, or denying t that it follows from thence that it had an intelligent author. Now it is important to keep in mind that the only difference in the two cases is, that in the one, the expressed premiss is denied, in the other the suppressed ; for the force as an argument of either premiss depends on the other premiss: if both be admitted, the conclusion legiti- mately connected with them cannot be denied. It is evidently immaterial to the argument Reason . whether the Conclusion be placed first or last; but it may be proper to remark, that a Premiss placed after l s Conclusion is called the Reason f of it, and is introduced by one of those conjunctions which are called causal ; viz. “ since,” “ because,” fyc. which may indeed be employed to designate a Premiss, whether it came first or last. The illa- tive conjunctions, “ therefore,” fyc. designate the Conclusion. It is a circumstance which often occasions Proof and error and perplexity, that both these classes Cause. 0 f conjunctions have also another signification, being employed to denote, respectively, Cause and Eject , as well as Premiss and Conclusion : e. g. If I say, “ this ground is rich, because the trees on it are flourishing,” or “ the trees are flourishing, and therefore the soil must be rich,’ I employ these conjunctions to denote the connection * As the ancient atheists did. t As the modem atheists do, + 'Jfhe Major-premiss is often called the Principle ; and the word Reason is then confined to the Minor 3.1 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE 3 1 iif Premiss and Conclusion ; for it is plain that the luxuriance of the trees is not the cause of the soil’s fertility, but only the cause of my knowing it. If again I say, “ the trees flour* jsh, because the ground is rich,” or “the ground is rich, and therefore the trees flourish,” I am using the very same con- junctions to denote the connection of cause and effect ; for in this case, the luxuriance of the trees, being evident to the eye, would hardly need to be proved , but might need to be accounted for. There are, however, many cases, in which the Cause is employed to prove the existence of its Effect; especially in arguments relating to future events ; as e. g. when from favorable weather any one argues that the crops are likely to be abundant:* the cause , and the reason , in that case, coin- cide. And this contributes to their being so often confounded together in other cases. § 3 . In an argument, such as the examples above given, it is, as has been said, impossible for any one, who admits both Prem- isses, to avoid admitting the Conclusion. A man may perhaps deny, or doubt, and require proof, that all animals that are horned do ruminate. Nay, it is conceivable that he may even not clearly understand what “ ruminant ” means ; but still it will be not the less clear to him, that, supposing these Premisses granted, the Conclusion must be admitted. And even if you suppose a case where one or both of the Premisses shall be manifestly false and absurd, this will not * See Appendix No. I. art. Reason. Sse also Rhetoric, Part L cK 2, § iL 32 ELEMENTS 01’ LOGIC. |11ock 1 alter tlie conchisiveness of the Reasoning ; though the conclu- sion itself may perhaps be absurd also. For instance, “ All the Ape-tribe are originally descended from Reptiles oi Insects ; Mankind are of the Ape-tribe : therefore Mankind are originally descended from Reptiles or Insects : ” here, every one * would perceive the falsity of all three of these propositions. But it is not the less true that the conclusion follows from those premises, and that if they were true, it would be true also. But there will be frequently an apparent Apparent connection of Premisses with a Conclusion arguments. which does not in reality follow from them, though to the inattentive or unskilful, the argument may appear to be valid. And there are many other cases in which a doubt may exist, whether the argument be valid or not : i. e. whether it be possible or not to admit the Premisses, and yet deny the Conclusion. It is of the highest importance, therefore, to lay down some regular form to which every valid argument may be reduced, and to devise a rule which shall show ihe validity of every argument in that form, and consequently the unsoundness of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to it. E. G. If such an argument as this be proposed, “ every rational agent is accountable , brutes are not rational agents ; therefore they are not account- able : ” or again, “ all wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their nation ; Solon did this : therefore he was a wise legislator : ” there are some, perhaps, who would not perceive any fallacy in such arguments, especially if envel- >ped in a cloud of words ; and still more, when the conclu eion is true, or (which comes to the same pcint) if they ara Except certain French Naturalists. f »1 ANALYTICAL OUT LINK. 3fc disposed to believe it : and others might perceive indeed, bt. might be at a loss to explain, the fallacy. Now these (appa- rent) arguments exactly correspond, respectively, with the following, the absurdity of the conclusions from which is manifest : “ every horse is an animal ; sheep are not horses ; therefore they are not animals ; ” and “ all vegetables grow ; an animal grows ; therefore it is a vegetable.” Thesa last examples, I have said, correspond exactly (considered as ar- guments) with the former ; the question respecting the valid- ity of an Argument, being, not whether the conclusion be true, but whether it follows from the premisses adduced. This mode of exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward a similar one whose conclusion is obviously absurd, is often, and very advantageously, resorted to in addressing those who are ignorant of Logical rules ; * but to lay down such rules, and employ them as a test, is evidently a safer and more com- pendious, as well as a more philosophical mode of proceeding. To attain these, it would plainly be necessary to analyze some clear and valid arguments, and to observe in what their conclusiveness consists. Let us then examine and analyze such an Analysis of example as one of those first given : for in- an argument. * An exposure of some of Hume’s fallacies in his “ Essay on Mir- acles ” and elsewhere, was attempted, on this plan, a few years ago, in a pamphlet (published anonymously, as the nature of the argu- ment required, but which I see no reason against acknowledging) entitled Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte ; ” in which it was shown that the existence of that extraordinary person could not, on Hume’s principles, be received as a well-authenticated fact ; Binee it rests on evidence less strong than that which supports tha Scripture-histories. For a clear development of the mode in which this last evidence eperates on most minds, see “ Hinds on Inspiration,” p. 30- -46. J4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book V stance. “Every animal that has horns on the ht/id is rumP nant ; the Elk has horns on the head ; therefore the Elk ia ruminant.” It will easily be seen that the validity [or " con- clusiveness ; ” or “soundness”] of the Argument does not at all depend on our conviction of the truth of either of the Prem- isses or even on our understanding the meaning of them. For if we substitute for one of the things we are speaking about, some unmeaning Symbol, (such as a letter of the alpha- bet,) which may stand for any thing that may be s-greed on, the Reasoning remains the same. For instance, suppose we say, (instead of “ animal that has horns on the head,” ) “ Every X is ruminant ; the Elk is X ; therefore the Elk is ruminant ; ” the Argument is equally valid. And again, instead of the word “ ruminant,” let us put the letter “ Y :” then the argument “ Every X is Y ; the Elk is X ; therefore the Elk is Y ; ” would be a valid argument as before. And the same would be the case if you were to put “Z” for “ the Elk : ” for the syllogism “ Every X is Y ; Z is X ; therefore Z s Y,” is completely valid, whatever you suppose the Symbol;' X, Y, and Z to stand for. Any one may try the experiment, by substituting for X, Y, nnd Z, respec 'ively, any words he pleases; and he will find that, if he doe* but preserve the same form of expression, it will be impossible to admit the truth of the Premisses, without admitting also the truth of the Conclusion. And it is worth observing here, that rothing An Argument ; s so likely to lead to that — very common, ^ough seemingly strange — error, of supposing Terms are not ourselves to understand distinctly what in real ity we understand but very imperfectly, ot ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.. t 3-i 36 Dot at all, as the want of attention to what has beer, jtisl explained. A man reads — or even writes — many pages, perhaps, of an argumentative work, in which one or more of the terms employed convey nothing distinct to his mind : and yet he is liable to overlook this circumstance, from finding that he clearly understands the Arguments. He may be said, in one sense, to understand what he is reading ; because he can per- fectly follow the train of Reasoning , itself. But this , per- haps, he might equally well do, if he were to substitute for one of the words employed, X, or Z, or any other such un- known Symbol ; as in the examples above. But a man will often confound together the understanding of the Arguments in themselves, and the understanding of the words employed and of the nature of the things those words denote. It appears then, that valid Reasoning, when regularly ex pressed, has its validity [or conclusiveness] made evident from the mere form of the expression itself, independently of any regard to the sense of the words. In examining this form, in such an example as that jusi given, you will observe that in the first Premiss ( “ X is Y,” ) it is assumed universally of the Class of things (whatever it may be) which “ X ” denotes, that “ Y” may be affirmed of them ; and in the other Premiss, ( “ Z is X ” ) that “ Z ’ (whatever it may stand for) is referred to that Class, as com- prehended in it. Now it is evident that whatever is said of the whole of a Class, may be said of any thing that is com- prehended [or “included,” or “contained,”] in that Class: 10 that we are thus authorized to say (in the conclusion) that ‘ Z ” is “ Y.” Thus also, in the example first given, having assumed uti- versally, of the Class of “ Things which exhibit marks 0/ 36 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book i design,” that they “ had an intelligent maker,” and then, in the other Premiss, having referred “ The world ’ to that Class, we conclude that it may be asserted of “ The world ” that “ it had an intelligent maker.” And the process is the same when any thing is denied of a whole Class. We are equally authorized to deny the same, of whatever is comprehended under that Class. For instance, if I say, “ No liar is deserving of trust ; this man is a liar , therefore he is not deserving of trust ; ” I here deny “ deserv ing of trust,” of the whole Class denoted by the word “ liar ; ” and then I refer “ this man ” to that Class ; whence it follows that “ deserving of trust ” may be denied of him. This argument also will be as manifestly valid, if (as in the former case) you substitute for the words which have a known meaning, any undetermined Symbols, such as letters of the alphabet. “ No X is Y ; Z is X ; therefore Z is not Y,” is as perfect a syllogism as the other with the affirmative con- clusion. And here it is to be observed, that by “ Class ” Meaning of j g meant throughout this treatise, not merely a the xoord Class . . . “ Head ” or u general description to which several things are actually referred, but one to which an indefi- nite number of things might conceivably be referred ; viz. as many as (in the colloquial phrase) may “ answer to the de- scription." E. G. One may conceive that when the first- created man existed alone, some superhuman Beings may have contemplated him not merely as an individual bearing the ■proper-name of Adam but also, by Abstraction, simply, as possessing those attributes wnich we call collectively “ hu- manity” [“human-nature;”] ana may have applied to him a name, — such as “ Man,” — implying those attributes, [tha. description] and which would consequently ejit equally we anv of h>s descendants. S.j ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 37 When then any thing is said to be “ referred to such and such a Class," this is to be understood either of an actual, or what may be called a potential Class : i. e. the word Class is used whethei there actually exist, or not, several things to which the description will apply. For it is evident, that in any case, we refer something to a certain Class in consequenct of that thing’s possessing certain attributes, and not, rice versa. And this being kept in mind, there is a convenience in em- ploying the word “ Class,” instead of introducing circumlocu- tion by always speaking of “ description.” It will be found, then, on examination, that all valid argu- ments whatever may be easily reduced to such a form as that of the foregoing syllogisms : and that consequently the prin- ciple on which they are constructed is the UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning. So elliptical, indeed, is the ordi- nary mode of expression, even of those who are considered as prolix writers, — i. e. so much is implied and left to be understood in the course of argument, in comparison of what is actually stated, (most men being impatient, even to excess, of any appearance of unnecessary and tedious formality of statement,) that a single sentence will often be found, thougl perhaps considered as a single argument, to contain, com- pressed into a short compass, a chain of several distinct argu- ments. But if each of these be fully developed, and the whole of what the author intended to imply be stated ex- pressly, it will be found that all the steps even of the longest and most complex train of reasoning, may be reduced ic o the above form.* * One of ths ancients is reported to have con; pared Logic to tha closed fist, and Rhetoric to the open hand. To me it appears thattha "averse of this comparison would be more correct. 4 ELEMENTS OE LOGIC. [Book l It is a mistake (which migBt appear scarcely worthy of notice, had not so many, even es- teemed writers, fallen into it) to imagine that Aristotle and other logicians meant to propose that this prolix form of unfolding arguments should universally supersede, in argumentative discourses, the common forms of expression ; and that, “ to reason logically,” means, to state all arguments at full length in the syllogistic form ; and Aris- totle has even been charged with inconsistency for not doing so. It has been said that “ in his Treatises of Ethics, Poli- tics, -i referred to various different classes, according to the occasser. Not, of course, that we are allowed to refer any thing to & class to which it does not really belong ; which would be pre* .ending to abstract from it something that was no part of it • but that we arbitrarily fix on any part of it which we choose to abstract from the rest. It is important to notice this, because men are often dis- posed to consider each object as really and properly belong ing to some one class alone ; * from their having been accus- tomed, in the course of their own pursuits, to consider, in one point of view only, things which may with equal propriety be considered in other points of view also : i. e. referred to va- rious Classes, (or predicates.) And this is that which chieflji constitutes what is called narrowness-of-mind. E. G. a mere botanist might be astonished at Different . , , , T . modes of daa- hearing such plants as Clover and Lucerne in- eluded, in the language of a farmer, under the term “ grasses,” which he has been accustomed to limit to a tribe of plants widely different in all botanical characteristics; and the mere farmer might be no less surprised to find the troublesome “ weed,” (as he has been accustomed to call it,) known by the name of Couch-grass, and which he has been used to class with nettles and thistles, to which it has no bo- tanical affinity, ranked by the botanist as a species of Wheat, ( Triticum Repens.) And yet neither of these classifications is in itself erroneous or irrational ; though it would be absurd in a botanical treatise, to class plants according to th* r agri- cultural use ; or, in an agricultural treatise, according to the structure of their flowers. So also, a Diamond wo ’d be classed by a jewellfer along with the ruby, emerald, &c as a See the subjoined Dissertatior, Book IV Chap, v 58 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 1 precious stone ; while the chemist classes it, along with p’um bago and coal, as one of the forms of carbon. The utility of these considerations, with a view to the pres* ent subject, will be readily estimated, by recurring to the account which has been already given of the process of Rea Boning ", the analysis of which shows that it consists in refer ring the term we are speaking of to some class, viz. a middle term ; which term again is referred to, or excluded from (as the case may be) another class, viz. the term which we wish to affirm or deny of the Subject of the Conclusion. So that the quality of our reasoning in any case must depend on our being able correctly, clearly, and promptly, to abstract from the Subject in question that which may furnish a Middle-term suitable to the occasion. who are entirely strangers to the study) to point out the gen eral drift and purpose of the science, and to render the details of it both more interesting and more intelligible. The Ana- lytical form which has here been adopted, is, generally speak- ing, better suited for introducing any science in the plaines and most interesting form ; though the Synthetical, which will henceforth be employed, is the more regular, and the more compendious form for storing it up in the memory. It is to be observed, however, that technical terms ana rules will be rather an encumbrance than a help, unless we take care not only to understand them thoroughly, but also tc learn them so perfectly that they may be as readily and as correctly employed as the names of the most fami'ia*’ objects around us Utility of the analytical form. The imperfect and irregular sketch which has here been attempted, of the logical system, may suffice (even though some parts of it should not be at once fully understood by those ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 59 J6/J Bat if any one will take the trouble to do this once for all he will find that in the end, much trouble will have been saved. For, the explanations given of such technical-terms and general rules, when thoroughly learnt, once, will save the necessity of going through nearly the same explanation, over and over again on each separate occasion. In short, the advantage of technical-terms is just like what we derive from the use of any other Common-terms. When for instance, we have once accurately learnt the definition of a “ Circle,” or have had fully described to us what sort of creature an “ Elephant ” is, to say “ I drew a Circle,” or, ‘ I saw an Elephant,” would be sufficiently intelligible, without any need of giving the description or definition at full length over and over again on every separate occasion BOOK a SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM Chap. I. — Of the Operations of the Mind and oj Term » $ 1 - There are three operations [or states] of the mind which are immediately concerned in Ar» gument ; which are called by logical writers — 1st. Simple-apprehension; 2d. Judgment; 3d. Discourse oi Reasoning.* 1st. Simple-apprehension they define to be that act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object ; and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. It is eithe r Incom- Operattons of the Mind. Simple- apprehension. * Logical writers have in general begun by laying down that there are, in all, three operations of the mind : (in universum tres) an asser- tion by no means incontrovertible, and which, if admitted, is nothing to the present purpose. Our business is with argumentation, expressed in words, and the operations of the mind implied in that ; what others there may be, or whether any are irrelevant questions. The opening of a treatise with a statement respecting the operations of the mind universally, tends to foster the prevailing error (from which probably the minds of the writers were not exempt) of sup- posing that Logic professes to teach “ the use of the mental faculty in general; ” — the “ right use of reason,” according to Watts Chap. 1. v 2.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. bi plex or Complex : * Incomplex-apprehension is of oLe object, or of several without any relation being perceived between them as of “ a man,” “ a horse,” “ caids : ” Complex, is of several with such a relation, as of “ a man on horseback,” “ a pack of cards.” 2d. Judgment is the comparing together in Judgment . the mind two of the notions [or ideas] which are the objects of Apprehension, whether complex or incom plex, and pronouncing that they agree or disagree with each other ; [or that one of them belongs or does not belong to the other.] Judgment, therefore, is eithei affirmative or negative. 3d. Reasoning [or “ discourse ”] is the act of proceeding from certain Judgments to another founded upon them, [or the result of them.] § 2 . Language affords the signs by which these operations of the mind are not only expressed Lan 9 ua 9«- and communicated to others, but even, for the most part, car- ried on by ourselves. The notion obtained in an act of appre- hension, is called, when expressed in language, a term; an act of judgment is expressed by a proposition ; an act of reasoning, by an argument ; (which, when regularly ex pressed is a syllogism ;) as e. g. “ Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial ; Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, Therefore they are beneficial.” * With respect to the technical terms employed in this work. e*« the Preface. 6 elements of logic. [Book II w is a Syllogism ; the act of reasoning being indicated by the word “ therefore .” It consists of three propositions , each ol which has (necessarilv) two terms , as “ beneficial,” “ dispen- sations of Providence,” fyc. In introducing the mention of language previously to the definition of Logic, I have departed from established practice, in order that it may be clearly understood, that Logic is en- tirely conversant about language. If any process of reason- ing can take place in the mind, without any employment of language, orally or mentally, (a metaphysical question which I shall not here discuss) such a process does not come within the province of the science here treated of.* This truth, most writers on the subject, if indeed they were fully aware of it themselves, have certainly not taken due care to impress on their readers. Purposes for Language is employed for various purposes. which Lan- It is the province of the historian, for instance, guage is era- to convey information by means of language, ployed. — 0 f the Poet, to afford a certain kind of gratijb- tion, — of the orator, to persuade , &c. &c. ; while it belongs to the argumentative writer or speaker, as such, to convince the understanding. And as Grammar is conversant about lan- guage universally, for whatever purpose it is employed, so, it is only so far as it is employed for this last purpose, viz. that of reasoning , that it falls under the cognizance of Logic. And whereas, in reasoning, terms are liable Terms. to [, e indistinct, (i. e. without any clear, deter- Propositions ■ . , ... , . r 7 , Syllogisms minate meaning,) propositions to be false , and arguments inconclusive , Logic undertakes di- rectly and completely to guard against this last defect, and, * See Introduction, § 6. Chap. I. $ 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 03 incidentally, and in a certain degree, against the others, as as can be done by the proper use oj language. It is, there- fore, (when regarded as an art,) “ the Art of employing lan- guage properly for the purpose of Reasoning , and of distin- guishing what is properly and truly an Argument, from spuri- ous imitations of it.” The importance of such a study no one can rightly estimate who has not long and attentively consid- ered how much our thoughts are influenced by expressions and how much error, perplexity, and labor ate occasioned by a faulty use of language ; and many who are not unaware of that, have yet failed to observe that “ signs ” (such as Lan- guage supplies) are an indispensable instrument of all Reason- ing, strictly so called. In reference however to the above-mentioned Degree and defects, two important distinctions are to be ob- m anner in served. 1st. It is to be remembered that that scv eral defect s are which is, really , a Term, may be indistinctly t0 guarded apprehended by the person employing it, or by against. his hearer ; and so also, a Proposition which is false , is not the less a real Proposition : but on the other hand, any ex- pression or statement which does not really prove any thing is not , really , an Argument at all, though it may be brought for- ward and passed off as such. 2dly. It is to be remembered that (as it is evident from what has been formerly said) no rules can be devised that will equally guard against all three of the above-mentioned defects. To arrive at a distinct apprehension of every thing that ma v be expressed by any Term whatever, and again, to ascertain the truth or falsity of every conceivable Proposition, is mani- festly beyond the reach of any system of rules. But on the ether hand, it is possible to exhibit any pretended Argument b4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. iBook ii whatever in such a form as to be able to pronounce decisively on its validity or its fallaciousness. So that the last of the three defects alluded to (though not, .he two former) may be directly and completely obviated by the application of suitable rules. But the other two defects can be guarded against (as will presently be shown) only in- directly, and to a certain degree. In other words, rules may be framed that will enable us to decide, what is, or is not, really a “Term,” — really, a “ Proposition ” — or really, an “ Argument : ” and to do this, is to guard completely against the defect of inconclusiveness , since nothing that is inconclusive, is, really, an “ Argument ; ” though that may be really a “ Term ” of which you do not distinctly apprehend the meaning ; and that which is really a “ Proposition,' 1 ' 1 may be a false Proposition. A Syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable Analysis of j nto t h ree Propositions, and each Proposition syllogism and Proposition. containing two Terms; of these terms, that which is spoken of is called the subject ; that which is said of it, th e predicate; and these two are called the terms [or extremes] because, logically, the Subject is placed first, and the Predicate last ; * and, in the middle, the Copula, which indicates the act of Judgment, as by it the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Subject. The Copula must be either is or is not ; which expressions indicate sim- ply that you affirm or deny the Predicate, of the Subject. The substantive-verb is the only verb recognized by Logic ; inasmuch as all others are compound ; being resolvable, by * In Greek and in Latin, very often, and, not unfrequently, in Eng- lish, the predicate is, actually, put first : as “ great is Diana of thi Ephesians.” CHAP. I. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 65 means of the verb, “to he,” and a participle or uijective, e. g. “the .Romans oonqjered the word conquered is both copula and predicate, being equivalent to “ were (Cop.) victo rious ” (Pred.) It is proper to observe, that the Copula, as such, has no relation to time ; but expresses merely the agreement or dis- agreement of two given terms : hence, if any other tense of the substantive verb besides the present, is used, it is eithei uuderstood as the same in sense, (the difference of tense be- ing regarded as a matter of grammatical propriety only ;) or else, if the circumstance of time really do modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as to make the use of that tense an essential, then this circumstance is to be regarded as a part of one of the terms : “ at that timef or some such expres- sion, being understood : as “ this man was honest ; i. e. “ he is one formerly-honest.” In such cases, an emphasis, accom- panied with a peculiar tone, is usually laid on the substan- tive-verb.* Sometimes the substantive-verb is both Copula and Predi- cate ; i. e. where existence only is predicated : e. g. Deus est , “ there is a God.” “ One of Jacob’s sons is not.” And ob- serve, that the Copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence ; e. g. “ a faultless man is a Being feigned by the Stoics, and which one must not expect to meet with.” * Strange to say, there are persons who thus understand our Lord’* declaration to Pilate : “ my kingdom is not of this world ; ” viz. “now;" meaning (secretly) that it was to become so hekeafteb, when his followers should have attained greater strength ! 'What can be the moral sentiments of those who can believe such to have beeg the secret sense of the words of a divine messenger who is to be ouf model of truth and of all virtue ! 6 * 66 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 11 Categore- matic. Syncategore- matic. Mixed. $ 3 . It is evident that a Term may consist either of on.* Word or of several ; and that it is not every word that is categorematic, i. e. capable of being employed by itself as a Term. Adverbs, Prepositions, &.c. and also Nouns in any other case besides the nomina- tive, are syncategorematic , i. e. can only form part of a term. A nominative Noun may be by itself a term. A Verb (all except the sub- stantive-verb used as the copula) is a mixed word, being resolvable into the Copula and Predicate, to which it is equivalent : and, indeed, is often so resolved in the mere rendering out of one language into another ; as “ ipse adest ,” “ he is present.” ±71 TLllltlllPS It is to be observed, however, that under “ verb,” we do not include the Infinitive, which is prop- erly a Noun-substantive, not the Participle, which is a Noun-adjective. They are verbals ; being related to their respective verbs in respect of the things they signify ; but not verbs, inasmuch as they differ entirely in their mode of sig - nif cation. It is worth observing, that an Infinitive (though it often comes last in the sentence) is never the predicate , ex- cept when another Infinitive is the Subject : e. g. subj. pred. ^ r ' < r " ■' \ “ I hope to succeed : ” i. e. “ to succeed is what I hope.” * Not to advance is to fall back.” It is to be observed, also, that in English there are two in- finitives, one in “ ingf the same in sound and spelling as the Participle-present ; from which, however, it should be care- fully distinguishsd ; e. g. “ rising early is healthful.,” and “ tl 0 healthful to rise early,” are equivalent Chap. I. $ 3.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 6? Grammarians have produced much needless perplexity by speaking of the participle in “ mg ,” being employed so and so ; when it is manifest that that very employment of the word constitutes it, to all intents and purposes, an infinitive and not a participle. The advantage of the infinitive in ing , is, that it may be used either in the nominative or in any oblique case : not (as some suppose) that it necessarily implies a habit ; e. g. “ Seeing is believing : ” “ there is glory in dying for one’s country : ” “a habit of observing,” &c. If I say “ he is riding,” and again “ riding is pleasant,” in the former sentence “ riding ” is an Adjective, and is the Predicate ; in the latter it is a Substantive and is the Subject ; the sentence being equivalent to “ it is pleasant to ride.” In this, and in many other cases, the English word IT serves as a representative of the Subject when that is put last : e. g. pred. 6u bj. /— \ r~ ■ — n “It is to be hoped that we shall succeed.” An adjective (including participles) cannot, by itself, be made the Subject of a proposition ; but is often employed as a Predicate : as “ Crassus was rich ; ” though some choose to consider some substantive as understood in every such case, (e. g. rich man) and consequently do not reckon adjectives among Simple-terms ; [i. e. words which are capable, singly, of being employed as terms.] This, howevei, is a question of no practical consequence ; but I have thought it best to adhere to Aristotle’s mode of statement. (See his Categ.) Of Simple-teims, then, (which are wffiat the first part of Logic treats of) there are many Simpk-terms. divisions ; c e which, however, one will be suffi- cient for tha iresent purpose ; viz. into singular and com 68 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book n mon : because, though any term whatever may be a subject none but a common term can be affirmatively pred icated of several offiers. A Singular-term stands for out Singular and individual, as « Cmsar,” “ the Thames : ” common terms. these, it is plain, cannot be said [predicated] affirmatively , of any thing but those individuals respectively. A Common-term is one that may stand for any of an indefinite number of individuals, which are called its signijicates , i. e. can be applied to any of them, as comprehending them in its single signification ; as “ man,” “ river,” “ great.” The learner who has gone through the Analytical Outline, will now be enabled to proceed to the Second and Third Chapters either with or without the study of the remainder of what is usually placed in the First Chapter, but which I have subjoined as a Supplement. See Chap. V. Chap. II. — Ofi Propositions. § 1 . The second part of Logic treats of the Proposition ; which ’« “ Judgment expressed in words." A Proposition is defined logically “ a Sentence Definition of indicative," [or “asserting”] i. e. which “ af Proposition. L ... firms or denies." * It is this that dist.nguishei a Proposition from a Question , a Command , &c. Logical Writers are accustomed to add, in explanation of * “ Sentence ” being, in logical language, the Genus, and "indica five ” the 14 Differentia,” r or d stinguishing-quality.] See Ch V. j 6 Chai>. II. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 69 this definition that a “ Proposition” must not be ambiguous , inasmuch as .hat which has more than one meaning , is in reality not one, but several propositions. And they also add that it must not be imperfect or ungrammatical ; which is only saying that any combination of words that does not really form a “ Sentence ” cannot be a “ Proposition ; ” though one iray perhaps conjecture from it what it was that the speaker meant to assert. Propositions considered merely as Sentences , Categorical are distinguished into “ Categorical ” and “ Hy- and hypotheu pothetical.” ical propo- The Categorical asserts simply that the Pred- sltlons - icate does, or does not, apply to the Subject : as “ The world had an intelligent maker : ” “ Man is not capable of raising himself, unassisted, from the savage to the civilized state.” The Hypothetical [called by some writers, “ Compound ”j makes its assertion under a Condition , or with an Allerna tive ; as “ If the world is not the work of chance, it must have had an intelligent maker : ” “ Either mankind are ca- pable of rising into civilization unassisted, or the first begin- ning of civilization must have come from above.” The former of these two last examples is of that kind called “ Conditional-propositions ; ” * the “ condition ” being denoted by “ if,” or some such word. The latter example is of the kind called “ Disjunctive ; ” the alternative being denoted by “ either ” and “ or.” The division of Propositions into Categorical and Hypothet- ical, is, as has been said, a division of them considered merely as Sentences ; for a like distinction might be extended to othei kinds of Sentences also. Thus, “ Are men capable of r&is- * Or ' hypothetical,” according to those writers who use the word "compound” where we have used “ hypotheticaL’ ro ELEMENTS OF LOU1C. [Boos II ing themselves to civilization?” “Go and •tftudy books of travels,” are what might be called categorical sentences though not propositions. “If man is incapable of civilizing himself, whence came the first beginning of civilization ? ” might be considered as a conditional question : and “ Either admit the conclusion, or refute the argument,” as a disjunct tive command. Categorical propositions are subdivided into the pure, which asserts simphj [ purely ] that the subject does or does not agree with the predicate, and the modal, which expresses in what mode [or manner] it agrees ; e. g. “ An intemperate man will be sickly ; ” “ Brutus killed Caesar ; ” are pure. “ An intemperate man will probably be sickly;” “Brutus killed Caesar justly ; ” are modal. At presi nt we speak only of pure categorical propositions. The above division of Propositions (into Cat- Substance of a , TT , . . ,, . . . „ ... egorical and Hypothetical) is called in th6 Proposition. » J 1 ' phraseology of Logical writers, a “ division of them according to their substance ; ” i. e. considered simply as sentences. The “ characteristic-guza/zty ” [Differentia] of a Proposition being its “ asserting,"" — i. e. “ affirming or denying” some- thing, hence Propositions are divided, according to their “ Quality," into “ affirmative ” ano Quality- * negative.” The division of them again, into “ true ” and “ false,” is also called a division according to their “ quality ; ” namely, the “quality of the Matter:" (as it has relation to the subject-matter one is treating of) while the other kind of quality (a proposition’s being affirmative or negative) is “ tha quality of the expression." The “ quality of the matter ” is considered (in relation ta pur present inquiries) as accidental , and the “ quality of tha Chap. II. § 1 .J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 71 expression” as essetitial. For though the truth or falsity of a proposition — for instance, in Natural-history, is the most essential point in reference to Natural-history , and of a math- ematical proposition, in reference to Mathematics , and so in other cases, — this is merely accidental in reference to an inquiry (such as the present) only as to forms of expression. In reference .to that , the essential difference is that between affirmation and negation. And here it should be remarked by the way, that as, on the one hand, every Proposition must be either true or false, so, on the other hand, nothing else can be, strictly speaking, either true or false. In colloquial language however, “ true ” and false ” are often more loosely applied ; as when men speak of the “ true cause ” of any thing ; meaning, “ the real cause ; ” - - the “ true heir,” that is, the rightful heir ; — a '■'•false prophet,” — that is, a pretended prophet, or one who utters falsehoods; — a “ true ” or “false” argument; meaning a valid , [real] or an apparent- argument; — a man “true,” or false ” to his friend ; i. e. faithful or unfaithful, &c. A Proposition, it is to be observed, is Affirmative or Nega- tive, according to its Copula ; i. e. according as the Predicate ts affirmed or denied of the Subject. Thus, “ Not to ad- vance, is to fall back,” is affirmative: “No miser is truly rich ” [or “ a miser is not truly rich ”] is a negative. lL A few of the sailors were saved,” is an affirmative ; “ Few of the sailors were saved,” is properly a negative ; for it would be understood that you werS speaking of “ most of the sail ors,” and denying that they were saved. Another division * of propositions is accord- ing to their quantity [or extent.] If the Predi- Q uantlt y- See Chap. V. § 3. 72 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC TBuor li cate is said of the whole of the Subject, the proposition is Universal : if of part of it only, the proposition is Particular (or partial:) e. g. “Britain is an island;” “all tyrants are miserable;” “no miser is rich;” are Universal propositions, and their s lbjects are therefore said to be distributed ; being understood to stand, each, for the whole of its Significates : but, “ some islands are fertile ; ” “ all tyrants arp not assassi- nated ; ” are Particular , and their subjects, consequently, not distributed , being taken to stand for a part only of their Significates. As every proposition must be either Affirmative or Nega- tive , and must also be either universal or particular , we reckon, in all, four kinds of pure categorical propositions, (i,. e. considered as to their quantity and quality both ;) viz. Universal Affirmative, whose symbol (used for brevity) is A ; Universal Negative, E ; Particular Affirmative, I ; Par- ticular Negative, O. § 2 . When the subject of a proposition is a Common-term, the universal signs (“ all, no, every”) are used to indicate that it is distributed, (the proposition being consequently then uni- versal ;) the particular signs (“ some, 4*c.”) the contrary. Should there be no sign at all to the common term, the quan- tity of the proposition (which is called an Indefinite proposi- tion) is ascertained by the matter; i. e. the nature of the con nection between the extremes : which is either Necessary, Im- possible, or Contingent. In necessary and in impossible Matter an Indefinite is understood as a universal : e. g Indefinite. u birds have wings ; ” i. e. all: “ birds are not quadrupeds ; ” i. e. none : in contingent matter, (i. e. where Chap. II. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 73 ihe terms partly [sometimes] agree, and partly not) an Indef- inite is understood as a Particular; e. g. “ food is necessary to life ; ” i. e. some food ; “ birds sing ; ” i. e. some do ; “ birds are not carnivorous ; ” i. e. some are not, or, all are not. It is very perplexing to the learner, and needlessly so, to reckon indefinites as one class of propositions in respect of quantity.* They must he either universal or particular, though it is not declared which. The person, indeed, who utters the indefinite proposition, may be mistaken as to this point, and may mean to speak universally in a case where the proposition is not universally true. And the hearer may be in doubt which was meant, or ought to be meant ; but the speaker must mean either the one or the other. Of course the determination of a question relating to the “matter,” i. e. when we are authorized to use the universal, and when, the particular sign, — when, an affirmative, and when a negative, — is what cannot be determined by Logic. As for singular propositions, (viz. those whose Singular ubject is either a proper name , or a common proposiiions erm with a singular sign) they are reckoned as Universals, (see Book IV. Ch. IV. § 2.) because in them we speak of the whole of the subject ; e. g. when we say, “ Bru- tus was a Roman,” we mean the whole of Brutus. This is the general rule ; but some Singular-propositions may fairly be reckoned particular ; i. e. when some qualifying word is inserted, which indicates that you are not speaking of the whole of the subject ; e. g. “ Caesar was not wholly a tyrant ; ” “ this man is occasionally intemperate ; ” “ non omnis moriar.” It is not meant that these may not be, and that, the mosl * Such a mode of classification resembles that of some grammari- ans, who, among the Genders, enumerate the doubtful gender l 7 74 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I\ naturally, accounted Universals ; but it is only by viewing them in the other light, that we can regularly state the Con- tradictory to a Singular proposition. Strictly speaking, when we regard such propositions as admitting of a variation in Quantity, they are not properly considered as Singular ; the subject being, e. g. not Cccsar, but the parts of his character. tween universal and particular propositions :) but the distribu- tion or non-distribution of the predicate, depends (not on the quantity , but) on the quality, of the proposition ; for, if any part of the predicate agrees with the Subject, it must be af- firmed and not denied of the Subject ; therefore, for an Af- firmative-proposition to be true, it is sufficient that some part of the predicate .agrees with the Subject ; and (for the same reason) for a Negative to be true, it is necessary that the whole of the predicate should disagree with the Subject : e. g. it is true that “ learning is useful,” though the whole of the term “ useful ” does not agree with the term “ learning ” (for many things are useful besides learning ;) but “ no vice is useful,” would be false if any part of the term “useful” agreed with the term “ vice ; ” i. e. if you could find any one useful thing which was a vice. And this holds good equally whether the negative proposi- tion be “ universal ” or “ particular.” For to say that “ Some X is not Y ” (or — which is the same in sense — that “ All X is not Y”) is to imply that there is no part of the term “ Y* [no part of the class which “ Y ” stands_/or] that is ap dica- ble to the whole without exception, of the term “ X ; ” — in short, that there is some part of the term “ X ” to whici V is wholly inapp'icable. Distribution of terms . It is evident that the subject is distributed in every universal proposition, and never in a par- ticular : (that being the very difference be- Chap. II. § 2.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 75 Thus, if I say, “some of the men found on that island ara not sailors of the ship that was wrecked there,” or, in other words, “ the men found on that island are not , all of them , sailors of the ship, &c.,” I imply that the term “sailors, &c. is wholly inapplicable to some of the “ men on the island ; ” though it might perhaps be applicable to others of them. Again, if I say “ some coin is made of silver,” and “ some coin is not made of silver,” (or in other words, that “ all coin is not made of silver,”) in the former of these propositions I imply, that in some portion (at least) of the Class of “ things made of silver,” is found [or comprehended] “ some coin : ” in the latter proposition I imply that there is “ some coin ” which is contained in no portion of the Class of “ things made of silver ; ” or (in other words) which is excluded from the whole of that Class. So that the term “ made of silver ” is distributed in this latter proposition, and not, in the former. The two practical rules then to be observed respecting dis- tribution, are, 1st. All universal propositions (and no particular) distribute the subject. 2d. All negative (and no affirmative) the predicate.* * Hence, it is matter of common remark, that it is difficult to prove a Negative. At first sight this appears very obvious, from the cir- cumstance that a Negative has one more Term distributed than the corresponding Affirma.ive. But then, again, a difficulty may be l'clt in accounting for this, inasmuch as any Negative may be expressed (as we shall see presently) as an Affirmative, and vice versA. The proposition, e. g. that “ such a one is not in the To in ,” might be ex- pressed by the use of an equivalent term, “ he is absent from the Town.” The fact is, however, that in every case where the observation as to ihs difficulty of proving a Negative holds good, it will be found that the proposition in question is contrasted with one which has really s term the less, distributed ; or a term of less extensive sense. E. O ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book R rt L may happen indeed, that the whole of the predicate in an affirmative may agree with the subject; e. g. it is equulll true, that “ all men are rational animals ; ” and “ all rationa. animals are men ; ” but this is merely accidental , and is not at all implied in the form of expression , which alone is re garded in Logic.* * Of Opposition. § 3 . Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other when, having the same Subject and Predicate, they differ, in quantity, or quality , or both.f It is evident, that with any given subject and predicate, you may state four distinct prop- ositions, viz. A, E, I, and O ; any two of which are said to be opposed hence there are four different kinds of oppo- It is easier to prove that a man has proposed wise measures, than that he has never proposed an unwise measure. In fact, the one would be to prove that “ Some of his measures are wise ; ” the other, that “ All his measures are wise.” And numberless such examples are to be found. But it will very often happen that there shall be Negative proposi- tions much more easily established than certain Affirmative ones on the same subject. E. G. That “ The cause of animal heat is not res- piration," is said to have been established by experiments ; but t chat the cause is remains doubtful. See Note to Chap. III. § 5. * When, however, a Singular Term is the Predicate, it must, of course, be co-extensive with the Subject; as “Romulus was the founder of Rome.” In this and also in some other cases (see B. I. § 5.) we judge, not from the form of the expression, but from the significa- tion of the terms, that they are “equivalent” [“convertible"] terms. t For Opposition of Terms, see Chap. V. J In ordinary language however, and in some logical treatises, propositions which do not differ in Quality (viz. Subalterns ) are ns* (reckoned as “ opposed.” 17HA.P. II § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 77 sition, viz 1st. the two universals (A and E) are called con trarics to each other ; 2d. the two particular, (I ^ r ' Contraries. and O) subcontraries ; 3d. A and I, or E and O, Subcontraries . subalterns ; 4th. A and O, or E and I, contra - Subalterns, dietaries. Contradictories As it is evident, that the truth or falsity of any proposition (its quantity and quality being known) must depend on the matter of it, we must bear in mind, that, “ in necessary matter , all affirmatives are true , and negatives false ; in im- possible matter , vice versa ; in contingent matter , all uni versals, false , and particulars true ; ” e. g. “ all islands (or some islands) are surrounded by water,” must be true, be- cause the matter is necessary : to say, “ no islands, or some — not , SfC.f would have been false: again, “ some islands are fertile ; ” “ some are not fertile,” are both true, because it is Contingent Matter : put “ all ” or “ no ” instead of “ some," and the propositions will be false. Hence it will be evident, that Contraries will be both falsa in Contingent matter, but never both true : Subcontraries, both true in Contingent matter, but never both false : Contra- dictories, always one true and the other false , 8fc. with other observations, which will be immediately made on viewing the scheme ; in which the four propositions are denoted by their symbols, the different kinds of matter by the in- itials, n, i, c, and the truth or falsity of each proposition in each matter, by the letter v. for ( verum ) true, f. for ( falsum ) false. You may substitute for the unmeaning Symbols X, Y, I which stand for the Terms of the following Propositions! wnatover significant Terms you will ; and on their meaning of course, will depend the truth or falsity cf each propcsi tion 7 * 78 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book n For instance, Naturalists have observed that “ animals hav mg horns on the head are universally ruminant ; ” that, ol ‘ carnivorous animals ” none are ruminant ; and that, of “ ani- mals with hoofs,” some are ruminant, and some, not. Let us take then instead of “ X,” “ animals with horns on the head,” and for “ Y,” “ ruminant : ” here, the real connection of the Terms in respect of their meaning — which Connection is called the “ matter ” of a proposition — is such that the Pred- icate may be affirmed universally of the Subject ; and of course the affirmatives (whether Universal or Particular) will be true, and the “ negatives ” false. In this case the “ mat- ter” is technically called “necessary;” inasmuch as we Chap. II. i 3.1 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 7S cannot avoid believing the Predicate to be applicable to the Subject. “ Again, let “ X ” represent “ carnivorous-animal,” and “ Y ” “ ruminant : ” this is a case of what is called “ impossi- ble matter (i. e. where we cannot possibly conceive the Predicate to be applicable to the Subject) being just the re- verse of the foregoing ; and, of course, both the Affirmatives will here be false, and both Negatives true. And lastly, as an instance of what is called “ contingent matter,” — i. e. where the Predicate can neither be affirmed universally, nor denied universally, of the Subject, take “ hoofed-animal ” for “ X ” and “ ruminant ” for “ Y ; ” and of course the Universals will both be false, and the Particu- lars, true : that is, it is equally true that “ some hoofed ani- mals are ruminant, ” and that “ some are not.” By a careful study of the above Scheme, bearing in mind and applying the rule concerning matter , the learner will easi- ly solicit all the maxims relating to “ Opposition ; ” as that, in the Subalterns, the truth of the Particular (which is called the subalternate) follows from the truth of the Universal ( subalternans ), and the falsity of the Universal from the falsity of the Particular : that Subalterns differ in quan- tity alone ; Contraries, and also Subcontraries, in quality alone ; Contradictories, in both : and hence, that if any prop- osition is known to be true, we infer that its Contradictory is false ; if false, its Contradictory true, ents ; e. g. if A is the genus of B, B must be a species of A' if A is the cause of B, B must be the effect of A, fyc Ch^p. IV. $ 7.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 131 4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first Sj'Oogistni eight appear faulty, will often be found, on ex- apparently in- amination, to contain correct reasoning, and correct. consequently, to be reducible to a regular form ; e. g. when you have, apparently , negative Premisses, it may happen, that by considering one of them as affirmative , (see Chap. ii. §4 ) the Syllogism will be regular : e. g. “ no man is happy who is not secure ; no tyrant is secure ; therefore no tyrant is happy,” is a Syllogism in Celarent. If this experiment be tried on a Syllogism which has really negative Premisses, the only effect will be to change that fault into another : viz. an excess of Terms, or (which is substantially the same) an un- distributed Middle ; e. g. “ an enslaved people is not happy ; the English are not enslaved ; therefore they are happy : ” if “ enslaved” be regarded as one of the Terms, and “ not en- slaved ” as another, there will manifestly be four. Hence one may see how very little difference there is in reality between the different faults which are enumerated. Sometimes there will appear to be too many terms ; and yet there will be no fault in the Reasoning, only an irregularity in the expression : e. g. “ no irrational agent could produce a work which manifests design ; the universe is a work which manifests design ; therefore no irrational agent could have produced the universe.” Strictly speaking, this Syllogism has five terms ; but if you look to the meaning, you will see, that in the first Premiss (considering it as a part of this argument') it is not, propei’ly, “ an irrational agent” that you are speak- ing of, and of which you predicate that it could not produce a work manifesting design ; but rather it is this “ work,” fyc. of which you are speaking, and of which it is predicated that il could not be produced by an irrational agent ; if, then, yqu Btate the Propositions in that form, the Syllogism will be per fectly regular. (See above, § i.) 132 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. |Book II Thus, such a Syllogism as this, “ every true patriot is dis- interested ; few men are disinterested ; therefore few men are true patriots ; ” might appear at first sight to be in the second Figure, and faulty ; whereas it is Barbara , with the Premisses transposed : for you do not really predicate of “ few men,” that they are “ disinterested,” but of “ disinterested persons ,” that they are “ few.” Again, “ none but candid men arc good reasoners ; few infidels are candid ; few infidels are good reasoners.” In this it will be most convenient to considei the Major-premiss as being, “ all good reasoners are candid,’ (which of course is precisely equipollent to its illative con verse by negation;) and the Minor-premiss and Conclusior may in like manner be fairly expressed thus — “most infi dels are not candid ; therefore most infidels are not good rea- soners : ” which is a regular Syllogism in Catnestres* Or, if you would state it in the first Figure, thus: “those who ars not candid [or uncandid] are not good reasoners : most infi- dels are not candid ; most infidels are not good reasoners ” — Ciiap. V. • SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. This Supplement may be studied either before or after the preceding three Chapters .] § I- Univocal, The usua l divisions of nouns into univocal, Equivocal, equivocal , and analogous , and into nouns of the Analogous , fpst and second intention, are not, strictly * The reader is to observe that the term employed as the Subject of the Minor-premiss, and of the conclusion, is “ mcst-innde> : ” he te not to suppose that “ most” is a sign of distribution ; it i# merely a eomj endious expression for “ the greater part of.” tf^p. V 5 l.J SUPPLEMENT l'O CHAP. I. L33 speaking, divisions of words , but divisions of the manner of employing them ; the same word may be employed either univ- ocally, equivocally, or analogously ; either in the First-inten- tion, or in the Second. The ordinary logical treatises often oc- casion great perplexity to the learner, by not noticing this cir- cumstance, but rather leading him to suppose the contrary. (See Book III. § 8.) Some of those other divisions of nouns, which are the most commonly in use, though not appropriately and exclusively belonging to the Logical system, — i. e. to the theory of reasoning, — it maybe worth while briefly to notice in this place. Let it be observed, then, that a term expresses the view we take of an object. And its being viewed as an object, i. e. as one, or again as several, depends on our arbitrary choice ; e. g. we may consider a “ troop of cavalry ” as one object ; or we may make any single “ horse with its rider,” or any “ separate man ” or horse, or any limb of either, the subject of our thoughts. 1. When then any one object is considered singular according to its actual existence , as numerically and Common one , the name denoting it is called Singular ; terms • as “ this tree,” the “ city of London,” Sfc. When it is con- sidered as to its nature and character only, as being of such a description as might equally apply to other single objects, the inadequate or incomplete view (see B. I. § 3, and § 6.) thus taken of an individual, is expressed by a Common-term ; as ‘ tree,” “ city,” “ minister-of-state.” 2. When any object is considered as a part of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole Ahsolute and Relative. or to another part, of a more complex object of .hought, the name expressing this view is called Relative ■' nd to Relative-term is opposed Absolute; as denoting an 12 134 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boor P object considered as a whole, and without reference to anv thing of which it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it. Thus, “ Father,” and “ Son,” “ Rider,” “ Com munder,” fyc. are Relatives; being regarded, each as a par* & e the complex objects, Father-and-Son,” c^-e . ; the same ebject designated absolutely, would be termed a Man, Living' Being, fyc. Nouns are Correlative to each other, which Correlative. denote objects related to each other, and viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a King is a ruler of men, “ King” and “ Man ” are not correlative, but “ King ” and Subject , are. 3. When there are two views which cannot Compatible jj e ta | ten 0 p one s ; n gi e object at the same time, and opposite. the terms expressing these views are said to be Opposite , or Inconsistent [repugnantia ;] as, “ black,” and ‘ white ; ” when both may be taken of the same object at the same time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible (conve- nientia ;] as “ white,” and “ cold.” Relative terms are Oppo- site, only when applied with reference to the same Subject, ns, one may be both Master and Servant ; but not at the same time to the same person. 4. When the notion derived from the view Concrete and ta k en 0 f an y object, is expressed with a refer- abstract. . . . . ence to, or as in conjunction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a Concrete term ; as, " foolish,” or “ fool ; ” when without any such reference, by an Abstract * term ; as, “ folly.” 5. When a term applied to some object is such as to implj * It is unfortunate that some writers have introduced the fashios >f calling all Common-terms ” Abstract -terms Chap. V. } 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. ViZ in its signification some “ attribute ” belonging to that object, such a term is called by some of the early logi- , . cal writers “ Connotative ; ” but would perhaps 0 >- Connotative, be more conveniently called “ Attributive It and, Absolut “ connotes,” i. e. “ notes along with ” the object or non - ( ' onn6 ~ tative. [or implies ] something considered as inherent therein: as “The capital of France;” “The founder of Rome.” The founding of Rome, is, by that appellation, “ attributed ” to the person to whom it is applied. A term which merely denotes an object without implying any attribute of that object, is called “ Absolute ,” or “ Non connotative;” as “Paris;” “Romulus.” The last terms denote respectively the same objects as the two former ; bu‘ do not, like them, connote [ imply in their signification] any attribute of those individuals. Every Concrete-common-term is “ attributive,” [connota- tive] whether in the adjective* or substantive form ; as “ Man,” ‘human,” “triangle,” “triangular,” “ saint,” “ holy : ” for, ‘ man ” e. g. or “ human,” are appellations denoting, not the attribute itself which we call “ human-nature,” but a Be- ing to which such a term is applied in reference to, and by virtue of, its possessing that attribute. An Abstract-common- term, being the name of an Attribute-itself — as “human- nature,” “ triangularity,” “ holiness,” — is “ Absolute ” [non- connotative ] except where there is an attribute of an attribute implied in the term ; as the term “ fear” e. g. may be con- sidered as implying some hope of escape ; without which the apprehension of evil would be called “ despair.” * Some logical writers confine the word to adjectives ; but mere seems no essential difference in reference to the present subject. In- deed, in Greek and in Latin it often happens that a word may l>a reckoned either adjective or substantive; as “ stultus ; ’ “hospes." >36 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book ii It :s to he observed that many a term is employed — - au< to a certain degree, correctly employed, i. e. not msappliet — by persons who do not clearly and fully take in its signifi- cation ; — who do not know, or do not bring lefore theii minds, exactly what is implied [connoted] by it. E. G. a child learns to apply the term “ money ” to the bits of metal he sees pass from hand to hand, long before he has any clear notion (which some never fully attain) of what it is that constitutes “ money,” and is implied [connoted] by the term. So also it is conceivable that a person might, under certain ctr. umstances, know perfectly what individuals are Alder- men, Senators, &c. while he had but a very vague and im- perfect notion of the Office which such a term implies. And such a familiarity as this with any term, (together with one’s being able to comprehend processes of reasoning in which it occurs) tends to conceal from men their imperfect appre- hension of its signification, and thus often leads to con- fusion of thought, and error. (See B. iv. ch. iv. § 2.) 6. A term which denotes a certain view of Positive, an object as being actually taken of it, is called Privative, _ . . § Negative Positive: as “ speech , “a man speaking : a term denoting that this view might conceiv- ably be taken of the object, but is not, is Privative ; as dumbness ,” a “ man silent ,” fyc* That which denotes that * Many Privative epithets are such that by a little ingenuity the application of them may be represented as an absurdity. Thus, Wal- es’s remark (introduced in this treatise) that a jest is generally a mock fallacy, i. e. a fallacy not designed to deceive, but so palpable as only to furnish amusement, might be speciously condemned as involving a contradiction : for “ the design to deceive,” it might be said, “ is essen- tial to a fallacy.” In the same way it might be argued that it i» absa- d to speak of “ a dead man ; ” e. g. “ every man is a living crea> tore nothing dead is a living creature; therefore no man is dead 5 Chai*. V. $ 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I 137 such a notion is not and could not be formec of the object, is called Negative ; as,“ a dumb statue, a lifeless carcass,” tf-c, Many negative-terms which are such in sense only, have led to confusion of thought, from their real character being imperfectly perceived. E. G. “ Liberty,” which is a purely negative term, denoting merely “ absence of restraint,” is sometimes confounded with “ Power.” * It is to be observed that the same term may be regarded either as Positive, or as Privative or Negative, according to the quality or character which we are referring to in our minds : thus, of “ happy ” and “ miserable,” we may regard the for- mer as Positive, and the latter (unhappy) as Privative ; or trice versa ; according as we are thinking of enjoyment or of suffering. 7. A Privative or Negative term is also called . r - n ■ . Definite and Indefinite [infinitum] in respect of its not de- indefinite fining and marking out an object ; in contradis- tinction to this, the Positive term is called Definite [finitum] because it does thus define or mark out. Thus, “ organizeo Being,” or “ Cgesar,” are called Definite, as marking out, and limiting our view to, one particular class of Beings, or one single person ; “ unorganized,” or “ not-Caesar,” are called Indefinite, as not restricting our view to any class, or individ- ual, but only excluding one , and leaving it undetermined what other individual the thing so spoken of may be, or what other class it may belong to. * An extension of a man’s power (as Tucker has observed in his “ Light of Nature ”) may be tne means of diminishing his “ liberty ; ” as the liberty of a helpless paralytic is not abridged by locking the door of his room ; though it would be, if he were to recover the us« of his limbs. See a notice of the word “aperture’ in § 5. Essay i 1st Series. 12 * 138 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book IT It iu to be observed, that the most perfect opj jsiticn between terms exists between any two wnich differ only Contra. lictory j n respectively wanting and having the particle cpposilian of . termS ' not (either expressly, or in sense) attached to them ; as, “ organized,” and “ not-organized “corporeal,” and “ incorporeal.” For not only is it impossible for both these views to be taken at once of the same thing, but «lso, it is impossible but that one or other should be appli- cable to every object ; as there is nothing that can be both , so there is nothing that can be neither. Every thing that can be even conceived, must be either “ Caesar,” or “ not-Caesar ; ” — either “ corporeal,” or “ incorporeal.” And in this way a complete twofold division may be made of any subject, being certain (as the expression is) to exhaust it. And the repeti- tion of this process, so as to carry on a subdivision as far as there is occasion, is thence called by Logicians “ abscissio infiniti ; ” i. e. the repeated cutting off of that which the ob- ject to be examined is not ; e. g. “ 1. This disorder either is, or is not, a dropsy ; and for this or that reason, it is not ; 2. Any other disease either is, or is not, gout ; this is not : then, 3. It either is, or is not, consumption, fyc.” This procedure Is very common in Aristotle’s works. (See B. ii. ch. 3. § 4.) Such terms may be said to be in Contradictory-opposition to each other. On the other hand, Contrary terms, i. e. those Contrary , . , . , , , which, coming under some one class, are the terms. ° most different of all that belong to that class, as “ wise ” and “ foolish,” both denoting mental habits, are op- posed, but in a different manner : for though both cannot be applied to the same object, there may be other objec.s tc which neither can be applied : nothing can be at once noth 1 wise ’ and “ foolish ; ” but a stone cannot be e ther. SflAP. V. $ 2.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. 1. 139 § 2 . Generaliza- tion. The notions expressed by Common-terms, we are enabled (as has been remarked in the Analytical Outline) to form, by the faculty of abstraction: for by it, in contemplating any object (or objects,) we can attend exclusively to some partic ular circumstances belonging to it, [some certain parts of its nature as it were,] and quite withhold our attention from the rest. When, therefore, we are thus contem- plating several individuals which resemble each other in some part of their nature, we can (by attending to that part alone , and not to those points wherein they dilfer) assign them one common name , which will ex- press or stand for them merely as far as they all agree ; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them ; (which process is called generalization) and each of these names is called a common- term, from its belonging to them all alike ; or a predicable , because it may be pred- icated-affirmatively of them, or of any of them. (See B. i. § 3.) Generalization (as has been remarked) implies Abstrac- ion ; but it is not the same thing ; for there may be abstrac- tion without generalization. When we are speaking of an Individual, it is usually an abstract notion that we form ; e. g. suppose we are speaking of the present King of France; he must actually be either at Paris or elsewhere ; sitting, stand- ing, or in some other posture ; and in such and such a dress, fyc. Yet many of these circumstances, (which are separable Accidents,* and consequently) which are regarded as non • isscntial to the individual , are quite disregarded by us ; and we abstract from them what we consider as essential ; thus Predicables. * See § 6. I jMENTS of logic. [Book IV 1 40 'jrming an abstract notion of the Individuate Yet there is here no generalization. § 3 . The following is the account usually given in logical trea- tises of the different kinds [heads] of Predicable ; but it cannot be admitted without some considerable modifications, explanations and corrections, which will be subjoined. ' Whatever Term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their whole essence, which is called the Species ; or a part of their essence (viz. either the material part, which is called the Genus , or the formal and distinguishing part , which is called Differentia, or in common Differentia, discourse, characteristic ) or something joined to the essence; whether necessarily (i. e. to the whole spe- sies, or in other words, universally , to every individual of it), which is called a Property ; or contingently (i. e. to some individuals only of the species), Accident. which is an Accident. Genus. Property. Every predicable expresses either The whole essence of its subject : viz. : Species I aniversal but not peculiar or part of its essence Genus — Difference. Property I [peculiar but not universal] * universal and pe- culiar r i or something joined to its essence. I Accident inseparable — separable * See below, § 4. Chap. V. § 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP I. 14 Of these predicables, genus and species are commonly said, in the language of logicians, to be predicated in quid [tI) i. e. to answer to the question, “ what ? ” as, “ what i» Caesar ? ” Answer, “ a man ; ” “ what is a man ? ” Answer “ an animal ; ” Difference, in “ quale quid ; ” (noiov ti] Property and Accident in quale ( noiov .) It is evident from what has been said, that Genus ana the Genus and Difference put together make up Species, each, the Species. E. G. “ rational ” and “animal” a whole, in constitute “ man ; ” so that, in reality , the di ff erent Species contains the Genus [i. e. implies it ;] and when the Genus is called a whole , and is said to contain the Species, this is only a metaphorical expression, signifying that it comprehends the species, in its own more extensive sig- nification. If for instance I predicate the term “ animal ” of an individual man, as Alexander, I speak truth indeed, but only such a portion of the truth that I might equally predicate the same term of his horse Bucephalus. If I predicate the terms “ Man ” and “ Horse ” of Alexander and of Bucepha- lus respectively, I use a more full and complete expression for each than the term “ animal and this last is accordingly the more extensive , as it contains, [or, more properly speak- ing, comprehends] and may be applied to, several differen Species ; viz. : “ bird,” “ beast,” “ fish,” fyc. In the same manner the name of a species is a more exten- sive [i. e. comprehensive] but less full and complete term than that of an individual (viz. a Singular-term ;) since the Spec'es may be predicated of each of these. ‘ The impression produced on the mind by a Singular Term, may be compared to the distinct view taken in by the eye, of any object (suppose some particular rran) near a. hand, in a clear light, which enables us tc distinguish the 142 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II features of the individual: in a fainter light or rather far- ther off, we merely perceive that the object a a man: this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the narr. e of the Spe- cies : yet farther off, or in a still feebler light, we can distin- guish merely some living object ; and at length, merely some object; these views corresponding respectively with the terms denoting the Genera, less or more remote.” * Hence it is plain that when logicians speak of “ Species ” as “ expressing the whole essence of its subjects,” this is not strictly correct, unless we understand by the “ whole essence” the “ whole that any common - term can express : ” — the “ near- est approach to the whole essence of the individual that any term (not synonymous with the Subject) can denote.” No predicate can express, strictly, the whole essence of its Sub- ject, unless it be merely another name, of the very same im- port, and coextensive with it ; as “ Csesar was the conqueror of Pompey.” But when logicians speak of Species as a “ whole,” this is properly in reference to the Genus and the Difference ; each of which denotes a “ part ” of that Species which we consti- tute by joining those two together. But then, it should be re- membered that a Species is not a predicable in respect of its Genus and Difference (since it cannot be predicated of them) but only in respect of the Individuals, or lower Species, of which it can be predicated. § 4 . A Species then, it is plain, when predicated Subaltern i n( j; v j ( ] ua i S) stands in the same relation tc genus and species. them , as the Genus to the Species ; and when predicated of other (lower) Species, it is then * Iihet. Part III. Chap. ii. § 1. Chap. V. 9 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 143 n respect of these, a Genus, while it is a Species in respeci of a higher Genus ; as “ quadruped,” which is a species of “ animal,” is a Genus in respect of “ home ; ” which lat- er again may be predicated of Bucephalus and of other in- dividuals. Such a term is called a subaltern Species or Genus ; being each, in respect of different other terms respectively. A Genus that is not considered as a species of any thing, is called summum (the highest) Genus ; a Species that is net considered as a genus of any thing, — i. e. is regarded as con- taining under it only individuals , — is called infirna (the lowest) Species. When I say of a Magnet, that it is “ a kind of iron-ore ,” that is called its proximum-genus, because it is the closest [or 'owest] genus that is predicated of it : “ mineral ” is its more Highest Genus and lowest Species. Specific Difference § Property. When I say that the Differentia of a magnet is its “ attracting iron'' and that its Property is “ polarity ,” these are called respectively a Specific Difference and Property ; because magnet is (I have supposed) an injima species [i. e. only a species.] When I say that the Differentia of iron ore is its “ con- taining iron'' and its Property, “ being attracted by the magnet ,” these are called respectively, a gene- ric Difference and Property, because “ iron- ore ” is a subaltern Species or Genus ; being both the genus of magnet , and a species of mineral. It should be observed here, that when logicians sneak of Property and Accident as predicables expressing, not the Generic Difference <$ Property. ! 44 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II Essence, or part of the Essence of a subject, but something united to the Essence, this must be understood as having reference not to the nature of things as they are in themselves, but to our conceptions of them. “ Polarity ” for instance is as much a part of the real nature of the substance we call “ Magnet,” as its “ attraction of iron ; ” and again, a certain rhape, color, or specific gravity, as much belongs in reality to those magnets which are of that description, as either polarity, or attraction. But our modes of conceiving, and of express- ing our conceptions, have reference to the relations in which objects stand to our own minds ; and are influenced in each instance by the particular end we have in view. That, ac- cordingly, is accounted a part of the Essence of any thing, which is essential to the notion of it formed in our minds. Thus, if we have annexed such a notion to the term, Man, that “ rationality ” stands prominent in our minds, in distin- guishing Man from other Animals, we call this, the “ Differ- ence,” and a part of the “ Essence ” of the term Man ; though “ risibility” be an attribute which does not less really belong to Man. So, the primary and prominent distinction in our minds of a Triangle from other plane rectilineal Fig- ures, is its having three sides ; though the equality of its three angles to two right angles, be, in reality, no less essential to a triangle. But that this last is the fact, is demonstrated to the learner not till long after he is supposed to have become familiar with the notion of a Triangle. Hence, in different sciences or arts, different attributes are fixed on, as essentially characterizing each species, according as this or that is the most important in reference to the matter we are engaged in. In Navigation, for instance, the polarity of the Magnet is the essential quality ; since if there could be any other substance which could possess this, without attract Ohap. V. $ 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 145 ing iron, it would answer the same purpose : but to those man- ufacturers who employ Magnets for the purpose of more expeditiously picking up small bits of iron, and for shield- ing their faces from the noxious steel-dust, in the grinding of needles, the attracting power of the Magnet is the essen- tial point. Under the head of Property, logicians have enumerated, as may be seen in the preceding table, not only such as are strictly called Properties, as belonging each to the whole Spe- cies of which it is predicated, and to that alone, but also, such as belong to the whole Species, and to others besides ; in other words, Properties which are universal , but not peculiar ; as “ to breathe air ” belongs to every man ; but not to man alone ; and it is, therefore, strictly speaking, not so much a Property of the Species “ man,” as of the higher, (i. e. more comprehensive,) Species, which is the Genus of that, viz. of “ land-animal.” And it is this that logicians mean by generic - property. Other Properties, as some logicians call them, are peculiar to a species, but do not belong to P eculiar . Accident. the whole of it ; e. g. man alone can be a poet, but it is not every man that is so. These, however, are more commonly and more properly reckoned as accidents. Some have also added a fourth kind of Property ; viz. that which is peculiar to a Species, and belongs to every Individual of it, but not at every time. But this is, in fact, a contradic- tion ; since whatever does not always belong to a Species, does not belong to it universally. It is through the ambiguity of words that they have fallen into this confusion of thought ; c. g. the example commonly given is, “ homini canescere;” “to become gray” being, they say, (though it is not) peculiar to man, and belonging to every individual, though not always, 13 146 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boor II but or y in old age, &c. Now, if by “ canescere ” be mean the very state of becoming gray, this manifestly does not be long to every man : if again it be meant to signify the liabil* ity to become gray at some time or other, this does belong always to man. And the same in other instances. Indeed the very Proprium fixed on by Aldrich, “ risibility,” is nearly parallel to the above. Man is “ always capable of laughing ; ” bat he is not “ capable of laughing always .' 1 ' 1 Accidents That is most properly called an “ Accident,” separable and which may be absent or present, the essence inseparable. D f gp ec j es con’inuing the same ; as, for a man to be “ walking ,” or a “ native of Paris.’’'' Of these two examples, the former is what logicians call a separable Accident, because it may be separated from the individual: (e. g. he may sit down ;) the latter is an inseparable Accident, being not separable from the individual, ( i . e. he who is a na- tive of Paris can never be otherwise ;) “ from the individual,” I say, because every accident must be separable from the species , else it would be a property* This seems to me a clearer and more correct description of the two kinds of Accident than the one given by Aldrich ; viz. that a Separable-Accident may be actually separated, and an Inseparable, only in thought , “ ut Mantuanum esse, a Vir- gilio.” For surely “to be the author of the .ZEneid” was * In the Portuguese language there are two words, “ ser ” and ' estar,” both answering to the English “to be;” and foreigners, I aave been told, are often much perplexed about the proper use of each. I soon found, however, that the rule is a logical one, easily remembered : “ estar ” furnishes the copula when the predicate is a i sparable-accident, and “ ser,” in all other cases. E. G. ‘* Estar in In- ghilterra” is “to be in England ; ” “Ser Inglez” is “to be an Eng- lishman ; ” « Quern e ? ’ who is he ? ” “ Quern esta la ? ” “ who i» .here?” &c. Chap V. { 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 14 , anotnor Inseparable-Accident of the same individual ; “ to be a Roman citizen ” another ; and “ to live in the days of Augustus ” another ; now can we in thought separate all these things from the essence of that individual ? To do so would be to form the idea of a different individual. We can indeed conceive a man , and one who might chance to bear the name of Virgil, without any of these Accidents ; but then it would plainly not be the same man. But Virgil, whether sitting 01 standing, &c. we regard as the same man ; the abstract notion which we have formed of that individual being unaltered by the absence or presence of these separable accidents. (See above, § 2.) Let it here be observed, that both the general D ,. ,, ’ o Predicables name “ Predicable,” and each of the classes of relatively so Predicables, (viz. Genus, Species, c^*c.) are called - relative ; i. e. we cannot say what predicable any term is, or whether it is any at all, unless it be specified of what it is to be predicated : e. g. the term “ red ” would be considered a genus , in relation to the terms “ pink,” “ scarlet,” ty-c. : it might be regarded as the differentia , in relation to “ red rose ; ” — as a property of “ blood,” — as an accident of “ a house,” 4*c. And in all cases accordingly, the Differences or Proper- ties of any lower species will be Accidents in reference to the class they come under. E. G. “malleability” is an “acci- dent” in reference to the term “ metal ; ” but it is a “ prop- erty *’ of gold and most other metals ; as the absence of it, — ■ brittleness, — is of Antimony and Arsenic, and several others formerly called Semimetals. And unuersally, it is to be steadily kept ’.n tnind, that no “common-terms” have, as the names of Individuals [“ singular-terms ”] have, nny real thing existing in nature corresponding A common term not tilt name of on4 real thing. 148 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. | Book II to each of them,* but that each of them is merely a sign de- noting a certain inadequate notion which our minds have formed of an Individual, and which, consequently, not in eluding the notion of “ individuality ” [numerical- unity] nor any thing wherein that individual differs from certain others, is applicable equally well to all, or any of them. Thus “ man ” denotes no real thing (as the Sect of the Realists maintained) distinct from each individual, but merely any man, viewed inadequately , i. e. so as to omit, and alstract from, all that is peculiar to each individual ; by which means the term becomes applicable alike to any one of several indi- viduals, or (in the plural) to several together. The unity [ singleness 1 or sameness of what is Unity of a J common-term d enote ci by a common- term, does not, as in the belongs to the case of a singular- term, consist in the object term itself itself being (in the primary sense) one and the same,t but in the oneness of the Sign itself ; which is like a Stamp (for marking bales of goods, or cattle,) that impresses on each a similar mark ; called, thence, in the secondary sense, one and the same mark. And just such a stamp , to the mind, is a Common-term ; which being, itself one, conveys to each of an indefinite number of minds an impression precisely similar , and thence called, in the trans- ferred sense, one and the same Idea. A.nd we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we in each instance choose to abstract and consider separately, dis- regarding all the rest ; so that the same individual may thus be referred to any of several different Species, and the same • Tode T(, as Aristotle expresses it; though he has been, represented Its the champion of the opposite opinion : vide Catag. c. 3. t See Book IV. Chap. v. § 2. and Append. Art. “ Same.” Chap. V. § D .] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP I. 149 Species, to several Genera, as suits our purpose. Thus, it suits the Farmer’s purpose to class his oattle with his ploughs, carts, and other possessions, Different . nodes of cla-t" under the name of “ stock : ” the Naturalist, S ification. suitably to his purpose, classes them as “ quad- rupeds ,” which term would inc.ude wolves, deer, $*c., which to the farmer would be a most improper classification ; th< Commissary, again, would class them with corn, cheese, fish $*e.,as “provision ; ” that which is most essential in one view being subordinate in another. Division. § 5 . An individual is so called because it is inca- pable of logical Division ; which is a meta- phorical expression, to signify “ the distinct \i. e. separate] enumeration of several things signified by one common name.” This operation is directly opposite to generalization, (which is performed by means of “ Abstraction ; ”) for as, in that, you lay aside the differences by which several things are dis- tinguished, so as to call them all by one common name , so, in Division, you add on the Differences, so as to enumerate them by their several distinct names. Thus, “ mineral ” is said to be divided into “ stones, metals,” Sfc. ; and metals again into “ gold, iron,” fyc. ; and these are called the Parts [or mem- bers] of the division. “ Division,” in its primary sense, means sep- arating from each other (either actually, or in enumeration) the parts of which some really- existing single object consists : as when you divide “ an animal ” (that is, any single animal) 13 * Logical di- vision, meta- phorically *1 called. 150 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II into its several members; or again, into its“ bones, mnscles, nerves, blood-vessels,” &c. And so, with any single Vege table, &c. Now, each of the parts into which you thus “ physically ’ (as it is called) divide “an animal,” is strictly and properly a “part,” and is really less than the whole: for you could not say of a bone, for instance, or of a limb, that it is “ an Animal.” But when you “ divide ” — in the secondary sense of the word (or, as it is called, “ metaphysically ”) — “Animal,” that is, the Genus “ Animal,” into Beast, Bird, Fish, Reptile, Insect, &c., each of the parts [or “ members ”] is metaphor- ically called a “ part,” and is, in another sense, more than the whole [the Genus] that is thus divided. For you may say of a Beast or Bird that it is an “ Animal ; ” and the term “ Beast ” implies not only the term “ Animal,” but something more besides ; namely, whatever “ Difference ” characterizes “ Beast,” and separates it from “ Bird,” “ Fish,” &c. And so also any Singular-term [denoting one individual] implies not only the whole of what is understood by the Spe- cies it belongs to, but also more ; namely, whatever distin- guishes that single object from others of the same Species : as ' London ” implies all that is denoted by the term “ City,” and also all that distinguishes that individual-city. The “ parts ” [“ members ”] in that figurative sense with which we are now occupied, are each of them less than the whole , in another sense ; that is, of less comprehensive signifi- cation. Thus, the Singular-term “ Romulus ” embracing only an individual-king, is less extensive than the Species “ King ; ” and that, again, less extensive than the Genus “ Magis- trate,” Ac. An “ /^dividual ” then is so called from its being incapibU tf being (in this figurative sense) divided. Chap. V. $ 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I 151 And though the two senses of the word “ Division ” are easily distinguishable when explained, it is so commonly em- ployed in each sense, that through inattention, confusion often ensues. We speak as familiarly of tne “ division ” of Mankind intc the several races of “ Europeans, Tartars, Hindoos, Negroes,” &c. as of the “ division ” of the Earth into “ Europe, Asia Africa,” &c. though “ the Earth ” [or “ the World ”] is a Singular-term, and denotes what we call one Individual. And it is plain we could not say of Europe, for instance, or of Asia, that it is “ a World.” But we can predicate “ Man ’’ of every individual European, Hindoo, &c. And here observe that there is a common colloquial incor- rectness (increasing the liability to confusion) in the use of the word “ division,” in each of these eases, to denote one of the '■'•'parts ” into which the whole is divided. Thus you will sometimes hear a person speak of Europe as one “ division ” of the Earth ; or of such and such a “ division ” of an Army : meaning “ portion.’ 1 ' 1 And so again a person will sometimes speak of “.animals that belong to the feline division of the Carnivora” [flesh-eating animals] meaning, that portion of the Class “Carnivora.” It is usual when a long and complex course Schemes of of Division is to be stated, to draw it out, for Division the sake of clearness and brevity, in a form like that of a genealogical “ Treed' * And by carefully exam ining any specimen of such a “ Tree” (going over it repeat- edly, and comparing each portion of it with the explanations above given) you will be able perfectly to fix in your mind the technical terms we have been explaining. * See tne Division of Fallacies, Book III. § 4 152 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II Take for instance as a “ Summum-genus ” the mathemat ical-term “ Plane-superficial-figure ” ! Mixed Figure Rectilinear Curvilinear (of Rect. and Curv.) Figure Figure Triangle ; Quadrilateral, &c. Circle ; Ellipse, &c. Such a “Tree of division” the Student may easily fill up for himself. And the employment of such a form will be found exceedingly useful in obtaining clear views in any study you are engaged in. For instance, in the one we have been now occupied with, take for a Summum-Genus, “ Expression ; ” (i. c. “ expres- sion-in-language ” of any such mental-operation as those for- merly noticed) you may then exhibit, thus, the division and ruhdivision of — Cxpiemlon Chat. V. 5 5 I SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. Affirm- Nega- in in in Condi- Dia- athre. live 1st 2d .id tional, junc- Fig. Fig. Fig »!»• i54 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. FBoo* IL The rules ordinarily given foi Division are Ordinary ^gg . eac h Q f t ] le p ar t s or un y 0 f them r’llcsfor divis- i 0U ' short of all , must contain less, (i. e. have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. 2d. All the Parts together must be exactly equal to the thing divided ; therefore we must be careful to ascertain that tho summum genus may be predicated of every term placed under it, and of nothing else. 3d. The Parts or Members must be opposed [contradistinguished] i. e. must not be contained in one another ; e. g. if you were to divide “ book ” into “ poet- ical, historical, folio, quarto, french, latin,” <^c. the members would be contained in each other ; for a french book may be a quarto, or octavo, and a quarto, french, english, fyc. fyc. You must be careful, therefore, to keep in mind the principle of division with which you set out : e. g. whether you begin dividing books according to their matter , their language, or their size, Sj-c. all these being so many cross- >0SS divisions. And when any thing is capable (as in the above instance) of being divided in sev- ral different ways, we are not to reckon one of these as the true, or real, or right one, without specifying what the object is which we have in view : for one mode of dividing may be the most suitable for one purpose, and another for another ; as e. g. one of the above modes of dividing books would be the most suitable to a bookbinder ; another in a philosophical, and the other in a philological view. It is a useful practical rule, whenever you find a discussion of any subject very perplexing, and seemingly confused, to ex- amine whether some “ Cross-division ” has not crept in unob- served. For this is very apt to take place ; (though of course such a glaring instance as that in the above example could not occur in practice) and there is no more fruitful source of indistinctness and confusion of thought. Chap. Y. $ 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. ^ 155 When you have occasion to divide any thing in several dif ferent ways, — that is, “ on several principles-of-division ” — vou should take care to state distinctly how many divisions you are making, and on what principle each proceeds. For instance in the “ Tree ” above given, it is stated, that “ Propositions” are divided in different ways, “ accenting to ” this and that, &c. And thus the perplexity of Cross-division is avoided. Two other rules in addition to those above Additional given, are needful to be kept in mind : viz. Caution. 4thly, A Division should not be “ arbitrary ; ” that is, its Members should be distinguished from each other by “Differences” either expressed or readily understood - , instead of being set apart from each other at random, or with- out any sufficient ground. For instance, if any one should divide “ coins ” into “ gold-coins,” “ silver,” and “copper,” the ground of this distinction would be intelligible : but if he should, in proceeding to subdivide silver-coin, distinguish as two branches, on the one side, “ shillings,” and on the other “ all silver-coins except shillings,” this would be an arbitrary Division. 5thly, A Division should be clearly arranged as to its Members : that is, there should be as much subdivision as the occasion may require^ and not a mere catalogue of the “ low- est-Species,” omitting intermediate classes [“ subaltern ”] between these and the “ highest-genus : ” nor again an inter- mixture of the “ subaltern,” and “ lowest-species,” so as to have, in any two branches of the division, Species contradis languished and placed opposite, of which the one ought nat Orally to be placed higher up [nearer the “ Summum”] and he other, lower down in the Tree. For instance, to divide “ plane-figure” at once, into “ equi 156 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IT lateral-triangles, squares, circles, ellipses,” &c., or again ‘ vegetable,” into “ Elms, pear-trees, turnips, mushrooms,” &c., or again to divide “ Animal ” into “ Birds, Fishes, Rep- tiles, Horses, Lions,” &c. would be a transgression of this rule. And observe that, (as has been formerly remarked) although such glaring cases as are given by way of examples could not occur in practice, errors precisely corresponding to them, may, and often do occur ; and produce much confusion of thought and error. § 6 . Essential and acci- dental defi- nitions. Definition is another metaphorical word, Definition. w j 1 j c ] 1 literally signifies, “ laying down a boundary ; ” and is used in Logic to signify “ an expression which explains any term, so as to separate it from every thing else,” as a boundary separates fields. In reference to the several modes adopted for furnishing such explanation, Logicians dis- tinguish [divide] Definitions into essential and accidental. They call that an “ essential- definition ” which states what are regarded as the “ constituent parts of the essence ” of that which is to be defined ; and an “ accidental- definition ” [or Description'] one which lays down what are regarded as “ circumstances belonging to it ; ” viz. Properties or Accidents ; such as causes, effects, &c. Accidents in the narrowest sense, (as defined above, § 3) cannot, it is plain, be employed in a Description [accidental- definition] of any Species ; since no Accident (in that sense) can belong to the whole of a Species, nor consequently fui Dish an adequate Definition thereof. Chap. V. { 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 15 ' In the “ description ” of an individual, on the contrary, we employ, not Properties , (which ^ tfi^dion of individuals. as they do belong to the whole of a Species, cannot serve to distinguish one individual of that Species from another) but Accidents — generally, inseparable acci- dents — in conjunction with the Species : as “ Philip was a Sp. king of Macedon, who subdued Greece ; ” “ Britain is an Sp. Island, situated so ancPso,” &c. The Essential-definition again is divided into physical and physical [natural] and logical [metaphysical] logical defiiu- definition : the physical-definition being made tl0,ls - by an enumeration of such parts as are actually separable, — such as are the hull, masts, &c. of a “ Ship ; ” — the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c. of a “ Tree the Subject, Pred- icate, and Copula of a “ Proposition.” The “ ZogicaZ-definition ” consists of the “Genus” and “ Difference ; ” which are called by some writers the “ meta- physical ” [ideal] parts ; as being not two real parts into which an individual- object can (as in the former case) be actually divided, but only different views taken [notions formed] of a class of objects, by one mind. E. G. “ A Genus. t N Proposition ” would be defined, logically, “ a sentence Difference. G. f" - ' r ' f ~ " affirming-or-denying : ” A “ Magnet ” “ an Iron-ore having D. attraction for iron;” a “Square,” a “Rectangle” [right* D. angled parallelogram] having equal sides. Nominal and Definitions again have been divided by real defini - Logicians into the Nominal , which explains tl0,is ' 14 158 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II merely the meaning of the term defined ; * and Real , which explains the nature of the thing signified by that term. This division is evidently according to the object designed to he effected by each Definition : the former division, on tiw other nand — into Accidental, Physical, and Logical — being a division according to the means employed by each to effect its object. These therefore are evidently two “ cross-divis- ions ;”ta circumstance which has been generally overlooked by Logical writers, who have thus introduced confusion and perplexity. And here the question may naturally occur to the reader, whether there be properly any distinction between nominal and rea^-definition ; — whether the meaning of a Common- term, and the nature of the thing signified by it, are not one and the same ; since the object of our thoughts when we em- ploy a Common-term, is — not any such “abstract idea” as some talk of, but — the Term itself , regarded as a Sign, &c. as was formerly explained. And in truth there are many cases in which there does exist this exact coincidence between the meaning of the term and the nature of the thing ; so that the same definition which would be rightly styled “ nominal,” as explaining nothing be- yond the exact meaning of the term, might also be considered as entitled to be called a “ real definition,” as implying every * Aldrich, having given as an instance of a Nominal Definition the absuid one of “homo, qui ex humo,” has led some to conclude that the Nominal definition must be founded on the etymology ; or at leas’, that such was his meaning. But that it was not, is sufficiently plain from the circumstance that Wallis (from whose work his is almost entirely abridged) expressly says the contrary. Be this as it may, however, it is plain that the etymology of a term has nothing to d« with any logical consideration of it. See § 8, Book III- + See preceding {. Chap V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. 1. 159 attribute that can belong to the thing signified. Such are all definitions of mathematical and logical terms, and other technical terms of Science. There can- Technical terms. not e. g. be any property of a “ Circle,” or a “ Square,” that is not implied in the dtjinitio?is of those terms. Some of these properties may not indeed at once occur to a be- ginner in Mathematics ; and others, not even to one somewhat further advanced : but they must all be implied in the defi- nitions ; and it would be reckoned an impropriety to add e. g. to the definition of a Square that it is bisected by its diagonal: because though this might not at once occur to a beginner, and needs to be demonstrated, it is demonstrated from the defi- nition : to speak of “ a Square divided by its diagonal into unequal parts',” would be absurd, — unmeaning, — inconceiv- able. And the same, with other mathematical terms. But it is otherwise with terms of a different charactei, which are the names of actually existing substances. There may be attributes of the thing signified that are not at all im- plied in the signification of the term. E. G. The term “ lau- rel-water” is used by us in the same sense as by our ances- tors, to signify “ a liquor distilled from laurel-leaves ; ” though the poisonous quality of it was unknown a century ago. And so also many discoveries have been made, and others proba- bly will be made, respecting several metals, heavenly bodies, &c. though the words “ iron,” “ gold,” “star,” are employed in the same sense as formerly ; — a sense which does not imply the properties that have been discovered. And any Definition which goes beyond a “ nominal-defi- nition,” i. e. which explains any thing more of the nature of (he thing than is implied in the name, may be regarded, strictly speaking, as, so far, a “real-definition.” The very word “ Definition ” however is not usually era ployed in this sense ; but rather, “ Description .” ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 1L BO Logic is con- Logic is concerned with nominal- definition temed with alone ; with a view to guard against ambiguity Nominal defi- | n t| le use 0 f terms.* nitions alone. m P ,, ,, • I o ascertain fully the various properties ol animals and vegetables, belongs to Physiology; — of metals 1 earths, &c. to Chemistry ; and so, with other things. It is to be observed that the word “ Definition ” is some* times used to denote the whole sentence, in which the term defined is conjoined with the explanation given of it ; as when we say, “ a triangle is a three-sided figure : ” some- times it is used to signify merely that which gives the expla- nation ; as when we say “ three-sided figure ” is the definition of “ triangle.” In the former case, the sentence has the form of a Propo- sition : but what it is that such a proposition asserts, is no' always implied in the mere expression, but is left to be col- lected from the supposed intention of the speaker. Real existence is not necessarily implied : Real exist- ence not assert- e • S- “ A Phoenix is a bird fabled to live a thou- ed by a deji- sand years,” &c. implies merely that this is the meaning in which the word Phoenix has been used ; not that any such bird ever did or could exist. Sometimes again it is not implied even that the universal, or the ordinary, sense of the term is such as corresponds to the definition given ; but merely that such is the sense in which the author intends to employ it. * And for this purpose it will often happen that a definition will be sufficient in reference to the existing occasion, even though it may fall short of expressing all that is implied by the term See Book III. \ 10 . We should however carefully guard against the common mistake, of supposing that any one who applies a term correctly in several in- stances, must of course understand fully its signification. Chap. V. } 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 161 And in this case, the definition is sometimes stated in the imverative instead of the indicative form ; as is frequently done in the works of Aristotle, who Imperativ a . . . form of defi- is accustomed thus to waive, in some cases, all n iti ons . questions as to the ordinary employment of a term by others; saying “ Let so and so be taken to signify this or that.” In mathematical and other scientific definitions, whether expressed in the form of Propositions, or in the Imperative (or, as it might be called, Postulate ) form, it is understood to be implied that the definition involves no self-contradiction — no absurdity ; but that the thing denoted by the term de- fined — whether believed actually to exist or not — is con- ceivable, and may, not irrationally, be made a subject of thought. E. G. Though a “mathematical-line” cannot be conceived to be actually drawn on paper, — though noti ng could be exhibited to the senses as having length anc" no breadth, every one can make the distance e. g. between wo towns, a separate subject of his thoughts, having his i e “ Fallacia extra dictionem 172 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III But it is evident that vve may nevertheless remain liable to i>e deceived or perplexed in Argument by the assumption of false or doubtful Premisses , or by the employment of indis tinct or ambiguous Terms ; and, accordingly, many Logical writers, wishing to make their systems appear as perfect as Dossible, have undertaken to give rules “ for attaining deal ideas,” and for “ guiding the judgment ; ” and fancying or pro- fessing themselves successful in this, have consistently enough denominated Logic, the “ Art of using the Reason ; ” which in truth it would be, and would nearly supersede all other studies, if it could of itself ascertain the meaning of every Term , and the truth or falsity of every Proposition ; in the same manner as it actually can, the validity of every Argu- ment. And they have been led into this, partly by the con- sideration that Logic is concerned about the “ three Opera- tions ” of the mind — simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning ; not observing that it is not equally concerned about all : the last Operation being alone its appropriate province ; and the rest being treated of only in reference to that. The contempt justly due to such pretensions Discredit most un j us tly fallen on the Science itself ; brought upon Logic much in the same manner as Chemistry was brought into disrepute among the unthinking, by the extravagant pretensions of the Alchemists. And those Logical writers have been censured, not (as they should have been) for making such professions, but for not fulfilling them. It has been objected, especially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at a loss as to the most important and difficult point in reasoning ; viz. the ascertaining the sense of the terms cm ployed, an 1 removing their ambiguity: a complaint resem OF FALLACIES. 173 } ij blmg that made (according to a story told by Warburton * and before alluded to) by a man who found fault with all the reading-glasses presented to him by the shopkeeper ; the fact heing, that he had never learnt to read. In the present case, the complaint is the more unreasonable, inasmuch as there neither is, nor ever can possibly be , any such system devised as will effect the proposed object of clearing up the ambiguity of terms. It is, however, no small advantage, that the rules of Logic, though they cannot, alone, ascertain and clear up ambiguity in any Term, yet do point out in which Term of an argument it is to be sought for : directing our attention to the middle- Term, as the one on the ambiguity of which a Fallacy is likely to be built. It will be useful, however, to class and describe the differ- ent kinds of ambiguity which are to be met with , and also the various ways in which the insertion of false, or, at least, unduly assumed, Premisses, is most likely to elude observa- tion. And though the remarks which will be offered on these points may not be considered as strictly forming a part of Logic, they cannot be thought out of place, when it is con- sidered how essentially they are connected with the applied tion of it. § L The division of Fallacies into those in the words (IN DICTIONE,) and those in the matter (EXTRA DICTION EM) has not besn, by any writers hitherto, grounded on any distinct pnn Division of Fallacies. * In his Div. Leg. 15 * ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Eook III IT 4 ciple : at least, not on any that they have themselve f adherea to. The confounding together, however, of these two classes is highly detrimental to all clear notions concerning Logic ; being obviously allied to the prevailing erroneous views which make Logic the art of employing the intellectual faculties in general , having the discovery of truth for its object, and ail kinds of knowledge for its proper subject-matter ; with all that train of vague and groundless speculations which have led to such interminable confusion and mistakes, and afford- ed a pretext for such clamorous censures. It is important, therefore, that rules should be given for a division of Fallacies into Logical and Non-logical, on such a principle as shall keep clear of all this indistinctness and per- plexity. If any one should object, that the division about to be adopted is in some degree arbitrary, placing under the one head, Fallacies which many might be disposed to place under the other, let him consider not only the indistinctness of all former divisions, but the utter impossibility of framing any that shall be completely secure from the objection urged, in a case where men have formed such various and vague notions, from the very want of some clear principle of division. Nay, from the elliptical form in which all reasoning is usually ex- pressed, and the peculiarly involved and oblique form in which Fallacy is for the most part conveyed, it must of course be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary choice , not only to which genus each kind of fallacy should be referred, but even to which kind to refer any one indi - Tndetermi- ? ndual Fallacy. For, since, in any Argument, nate character J . of Fallacies. one Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently happens, in the case of a Fallacy, that tin nearers are left to the alternative of supplying either a Premiss 3 ] .hat there should be any method, science, or system, tha should emble one to know the full and exact meaning of every term in existence ? The utmost that can be done is ta give some general rules that may assist us in this work ; which is done in the first two chapters of Book II.* Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal from Familiarity men their imperfect conception of the meaning witfl a term of a term, than the circumstance of their being distinct f ro,u able fully to comprehend a process of reasoning hension of its in which it is involved, without attaching any meaning. distinct meaning at all to that term ; as is evident when X Y 25 are used to stand for Terms, in a regular Syllogism. Thus a man may be familiarized with a term, and never find him- self at a loss from not comprehending it ; from which he will be very likely to infer ■ ,*at he does comprehend it, when per- haps he does not, bur employs it vaguely and incorrectly; which leads to faiLci'.us Reasoning and confusion. It must be owned, howr ?er, that many Logical writers have, in great measure, brought on themselves the reproach in question, by calling Logic “ the right use of Reason,” laying down “ rules for gaining clear ideas,” and such-like dla^aveia, as Aristotle calls it ; ( Rhct . Book I. Chap, ii.) § 3 . The remaining class (viz. where the Conclu- Material sion does follow from the Premisses) may be Fallacies. * The very author of the objection says, “ This (the comprehension of the meaning of general Terms) is a study which every individual must carry on for himself ; and of which no rules of Logic (how use- ful soever they may he in directing our labors) can supersede thr necessity." D. Stewart, Phil. Yol II. chap. ii. s. 2. 178 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. Ill, called the Materia), or Non-logical Fallacies : of these there are two kinds ; * 1st. when the Premisses are such as ought not to have been assumed ; 2d. when the Con- clusion is not the one required, but irrelevant ; which Fallacy is commonly called “ ignoratio elenchi ,” because your Argu- ment is not the “ elenchus” (i. e. proof of the contradictory ) of your opponent’s assertion, which it should be ; but proves, instead of that, some other proposition resembling it. Hence, since Logic defines what Contradiction is, some may choose rather to range this with the Logical Fallacies, as it seems, so far, to come under the jurisdiction of that Art. Nevertheless it is perhaps better to adhere to the original division, both or account of its clearness, and also because few would be in dined to apply to the Fallacy in question the accusation of being inconclusive, and consequently “illogical” reasoning; besides which, it seems an artificial and circuitous way of speak- ing, to suppose in all cases an opponent and a contradiction ; the simple statement of the matter being this, — I am required, by the circumstances of the case, (no matter why) to prove a certain Conclusion ; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it ; — in this lies the Fallacy. It might be desirable therefore to lay aside Ignoratio ^ name 0 f u ignoratio elenchi ,” but that it is elenchi so generally adopted as to require some men- tion to be made of it. The other kind of Fallacies in the Matter will comprehend (as far as the vague and obscure lan- guage of Logical writers will allow us to con- Non causa j ecture ) t ] ie fallacy of “ non tausa pro causa ' 1 pro causa. . . , and that of “ petitio principle. Of these, the • For it is manifest that the fault, if there bn any, must be either lit, it the Premisses, or 2dly. in the Conclusion, or 3dly in the Cone xeaion between them. OF FALLACIES. 179 former is by them distinguished into “ a non vera pro vera and “ a non tali pro tali ; ” this last would appear to mean arguing from a case not parallel as if it were so ; which, in Logical language, is, having the suppressed Premiss false 5 for it is in that the parallelism is affirmed ; and the “ non vera pro vera ” will in like manner signify the expressed Premiss being false ; so that this Fallacy will turn out to be, in plain terms, nc'ther more nor less than falsity (or unfair assump- tion) of a Premiss. The remaining kind, “ petitio principii ,” [“ begging the question,”] takes place when ^question ? one of the Premisses (whether true or false) is either plainly equivalent to the conclusion, or depends on that for its own reception. 1 have said “ one of the Premisses,” because in all correct reasoning the two Premisses taken to- gether must imply and virtually assert the conclusion. It is not possible, however, to draw a precise line, generally, be- tween this Fallacy and fair argument; since, to one person, that might be fair reasoning, which would be, to another, “ begging the question ; ” inasmuch as, to the one, the Prem- iss might be more evident than the Conclusion ; while, by the other, it would not be admitted, except as a consequence of the admission of the Conclusion. The most plausible form of this Fallacy is arguing in a Arguing m There t s no Fallacy that may not properly be includes under some of the foregoing heads : those which in the Log- ical treatises are separately enumerated, and con‘radistiq- guished from these, being in reality instances of them, ana therefore more properly enumerated in the subdivision thereof as ip the scheme annexed : — circle ; and the greater the circle, the harder to detect. § 4 . [Boo* IU (« 17.) ($ 16.) (« 15.) (5 15.) Fallary of Fallacy of shifting ground. Fallacy of using com- Fallacy of appeals to the passions ; ad - bjections; &c. | Dlex and general terms. hmmncm ; ad veruundiam, $r. OF FALLACIES. 181 6j § 5. On each of the Fallacies which have been th'js enumerate! md distinguished, I propose to offer some more particulai remarks ; but before I proceed to this, it will be proper to premise two geneial observations, 1st. on the importance , and 2d. the difficulty, of detecting and describing Fallacies. Both have been already slightly alluded to ; but it is requisite that they should here be somewhat more fully and distinctly set forth. 1st. It seems by most persons to be taken for granted that a Fallacy is to be dreaded Importance of merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by lacies a skilful sophist ; or, if they allow that a man may with honest intentions slide into one unconsciously, in the heat of argument , still they seem to suppose that where there is no dispute , there is no cause to dread Fallacy ; whereas there is much danger, even in what may be called solitary reasoning , of sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived as even to act upon the conclusion thus obtained. By “solitary .reasoning” 1 mean the case in which one is not seeking for arguments to prove a given question , but laboring tc elicit from one’s pre vious stock of knowledge some useful inference* To select one from innumerable examples i n fl uence 0 f that might be cited, and of which some more words on will occur in the subsequent part of this essay; thoughts. it is not improbable that many indifferent sermons have been produced by the ambiguity of the word ’■'■plain.'" A young divine perceives the truth of the maxim, that “ for the lowel * See the chapter on “ inferring and proving,” (Bool [Y. cb j OF FALLACIES. 183 are figuratively called heavy, from the difficulty of ploughing or passing over them, which produces an effect like that of bearing or dragging a heavy weight ; yet still the terms “ light ” and “ heavy,” though used figuratively, have most undoubtedly introduced into men’s minds something of the ideas expressed by them in their primitive sense. The same words, when applied to articles of diet, have pncduced impor- tant errors ; many supposing some article of food to be light of digestion from its being specifically light. So true is the ingenious observation of Hobbes, that “ words are the coun- ters of wise men, and the money of fools.” “ Men imagine,” says Bacon, “ that their minds have the command of Language ; but it often happens that Language bears rule over their mind.” Some of the weak and absurd arguments which are often urged against Suicide may be traced to the influence of words on thoughts. When a Chris- tian moralist is called on for a direct Scriptural precept against suicide, instead of replying that the Bible is not meant for a complete code of laws , but for a system of motives and principles , the answer frequently given is “ thou shalt do no murder and it is assumed in the arguments drawn from Reason, as well as in those from Revelation, that Suicide is a species of Murder ; viz. because it is called self -murder , and thus, deluded by a name, many are led to rest on an un- sound argument; which, like all other fallacies, does more harm than good, in the end, to the cause of truth. Suicide, if any one considers the nature and not the name of it, evi« dently wants the most essential characteristic of murder, viz the hurt and injury done to one’s neighbor, in depriving hint of life, as well as to others by the insecurity they are in con lequence liable to feel. And since no one can, strictly speak tng, do injustice to himself, he cannot in the literal and prr 184 ELEMENTS UF LOGIC. [Book III mary act eptation of the words, be said either to rob or t« murder himself. He who deserts the post to which he is appointed by his great Master, and presumptuously cuts short the state of probation graciously allowed him for “ working out his salvation,” (whether by action or by patient endurance,) is guilty indeed of a grievous sin, but of one not the least analogous in its character to murder. It implies no inhuman- ity. It is much more closely allied to the sin of wasting life in indolence, or in trifling pursuits, — that life which is be- stowed as a seed-time for the harvest of immortality. What is called in familiar phrase “ killing time,” is, in truth, an approach, as far as it goes, to the destruction of one’s own life : for “ Time is the stuff life is made of.” “Time destroyed Is suicide, where more than blood is spilt.” — Young.* More especially deserving of attention is the Errors aris- j n fl uence 0 f Analogical Terms in leading men ing from the . , , , . , . into erroneous notions in theology; where the useoj analogi- ’ cal terms. most important terms are analogical; and yel they are continually employed in Reasoning, without due attention (oftener through want of caution than by unfair design) to their analogical nature ; and most of the * It is surely wiser and safer to confine ourselves to such argu ments as will bear the test of a close examination, than to resort tu such as may indeed at the first glance be more specious and appeal stronger, but which, when exposed, will too often leave a man a dupa to the fallacies on the opposite side. But it is especially the error of controversialists to urge every thing that can be urged; to snatch up 'he first weapon that comes to hand ; (“ furor arma ministrat ; ”) wit b »ut waiting to consider what is TRUE. OF FALLACIES 185 f&] errors into which theologians have fallen ma\ be traced, in pait, to this cause.* In speaking of the importance of refuting TwofoL. Fallacies, (under which name I include, as will danger from be seen, any false assumption employed as a any f alse 04 Premiss) this consideration ought not to be 1 overlooked ; that an unsound Principle, which has been em- ployed to establish some mischievously false Conclusion, does not at once become harmless, and too insignificant to be worth refuting, as soon as that Conclusion is given up, and the false Principle is no longer employed for that particular use. It may equally well lead to some other no less mischievous re- sult. “ A false premiss, according as it is combined with this, or with that, true one, will lead to two different false con- clusions. Thus, if the principle be admitted, that any im- portant religious errors ought to be forcibly suppressed, this may lead either to persecution on the one side, or to latitudi- narian indifference on the other. Some may be led to justify the suppression of heresies by the civil sword ; and others, whose feelings revolt at such a procedure, and who see per- secution reprobated and discountenanced by those around them, may be led by the same principle to regard religious errors as of little or no importance, and all religious persuasions as equally acceptable in the sight of God.”f It ought however to be observed on the other hand, that such effects are often attributed to O^er-esUmatt of the effect of some fallacy as it does not in fact produce. It some faiiad^, shall have been perhaps triumphantly urged, and repeated again and again, and referred to by many a* • See the notes to Ch. v. § 1 of the Dissertation subjoined, t See Essays, 3d Series, Ch. v. § 2. p. 228. 16 * 1815 ELEMENTS OF LOOIC. [Boo* HI irrefragable ; and yet shall have never convince< any one ; bu have been merely assented to by those alre; dy convinced To many perso is at y two well-sounding phrases, which have a few words th 3 same, and are in some manner connectec with the same subject, will serve for Premiss and Con elusion: and when we hear a man profess to derive convic- tion from such arguments, we are naturally disposed to re- gard his case as hopeless. But it will often happen that in reality his reasoning faculties shall have been totally dormant : and equally so perhaps in another case, where he gives his as- sent to a process of sound reasoning, leading to a conclusion which he has already admitted. “ The puerile fallacies which you may sometimes hear a man adduce on some sub- jects, are perhaps in reality no more his own than the sound arguments he employs on others ; he may have given an indo- lent unthinking acquiescence to each ; and if he can be ex- cited to exertion of thought, he may be very capable of dis- tinguishing the sound from the unsound.”* Thus much, as to the extensive practical influence of Fal- lacies, and the consequent high importance of detecting anl exposing them. § 6 . 2dly. The second remark is, that while sound reasoning is ever the more readily admit* ted, the more clearly it is perceived to be such, Fallacy, on the contrary, being lejected as soon rs perceived, will, of course, be the more .likely to obtain reception, the more it is obscured and disguised by obliquity Difficulty detecting Fallacies. * PoL Econ. Lect. I. p. 15. OF FALLACIES 187 *«] and complexity of expression. It is thus that it is the mos likely either to slip accidentally from the careless reasoner or to be brought forward deliberately by the Sophist. No. that he ever wishes this obscurity and complexity to be per ceived ; on the contrary, it is for his purpose that the expres- sion should appear as clear and simple as possible, while in reality it is the most tangled net he can contrive. Thus, whereas it is usual to express our rea- soning elliptically , so that a Premiss (or even two or three entire steps in a course of argument) which may be readily supplied, as being per- fectly obvious, shall be left to be understood, the Sophist in like manner suppresses what is not obvious, but is in reality the weakest part of the argument : and uses every other contrivance to withdraw our attention (his art closely resembling the juggler’s) from the quarter where the Fallacy lies. Hence the uncertainty before mentioned, to which class any individual Fallacy is to be referred : and hence it is that the difficulty of detecting- and exposing Fallacy, is so much greater than that of comprehending and developing a pro- cess of sound argument. It is like the detection and ap- prehension of a criminal in spite of all his arts of conceal- ment and disguise ; when this is accomplished , and he is brought to trial with all the evidence of his guilt produced, his conviction and punishment are easy ; and this is precisely the case with those Fallacies which are given as examples in Logical treatises ; they are in fact already detected, by being stated in a plain and regular form, and are, as it were, only brought up to receive sentence. Or again, fallacious reason- ing may be compared to a perplexed and entangled mass of accounts , which it requires much sagacity and close attention to clear up, and display in a regular and intelligible form Fallacies concealed by elliptical language. 188 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 111 though when this is once accomplished, the whole appears sc perfectly simple , that the unthinking are apt to undervalue the skill and pains which have been employed upon it. Moreover, it should be remembered, that a Fallacies very long discussion is one of the most effectua Tnply^di'f ve ^ s Fallac y- Sophistry, .ike poison, is at cussion. once detected, and nauseated, when presented to us in a concentrated form ; but a Fallacy which when stated barely, in a few sentences, would not de- ceive a child, may deceive half the world, if diluted in a quarto volume. For, as in a calculation, one single figure incorrectly stated will enable us to arrive at any result what- ever, though every other figure, and the whole of the opera- tions, be correct, so, a single false assumption in any process of reasoning, though every other be true, will enable us to draw what conclusion we please ; and the greater the number of true assumptions, the more likely it is that the false one will pass unnoticed. But when you single out one step in the course of the reasoning, and exhibit it as a Syllogism with one Premiss true and the other false, the sophistry is easily per- ceived. I have seen a long argument to prove that the potato is not a cheap article of food ; in which there was an elabo- rate, and perhaps correct, calculation of the produce per acre, of potatoes, and of wheat, — the quantity lost in bran — ex- pense of grinding, dressing, 4*c., and an assumption slipped in, as it were incidentally, that a given quantity of potatoes contains but one-tenth part of nutritive matter equal to bread: from all which (and there is probably but one groundless as- sertion in. the whole) a most triumphant result was deduced.® * This, however, gained the undoubting assent of a Review by n® means friendly to the author, and usually noted more for scepticism OF FALLACIES 189 ♦ «•] To use another illustration ; it js true in a course of argu- ment, as in Mechanics, that “ nothing is stronger than its weakest part ; ” and consequently a chain wmch has one faulty link will break : but though the number of tbe souna links adds nothing to the strength of the chain, it adds much to the chance of the faulty one’s escaping observation. In such cases as I have been alluding to, one may often hear it observed that “ there is a great deal of truth in what such a one has said : ” i. e. perhaps it is all true, except one essen- tial point. To speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies that , , , ... Error of sup • have ever been enumerated as too glaring and . „ r , & ° posing all Fal~ obvious to need even being mentioned, because lades to be the simple instances given in logical treatises, eas V °f detec- and there stated in the plainest and conse- quently most easily detected form, are such as would (in that form) deceive no one; — this, surely, shows extreme weak- ness, or else unfairness. It may readily be allowed, indeed, that to detect individual Fallacies, and bring them under the general rules, is a harder task than to lay down those general rules ; but this does not prove that the latter office is trifling or useless, or that it does not essentially conduce to the per- formance of the other. There may be more ingenuity shown in detecting and arresting' a malefactor, and con- victing him of the fact, than in laying down a law for the trial and punishment of such persons ; but the latter office, i. e that of a legislator, is surely neither unnecessary nor trifling. thar. for ready assent ! “ All things,” says an apocryphal writer, “ are double, one against another, and nothing is made in vain : ” un- blushing assertors of falsehood seem to have a race of easy believers provided on purpose for their use ; men who will not indeed believe the best established truths of religion, but are ready to believe arcf thing else. 190 ELEMENTS (. L< LOGIC. [Look III It sho.ild be added that a close observation and Logical analysis of Fallacious arguments, as it tends (according U what has been already said) to form a habit of mind well suited for the practical detection of Fallacies ; so, for that very reason, it will make us the more careful in making allou> ance for them : i. e. to bear in mind how much men in fen- © eral are liable to be influenced by them. E. G. a refuted argument ought to go hr nothing, (except where there is some ground for assuming that no stronger one could be adduced .) * but in fact it will generally prove detrimental to the cause, from the Fallacy which will be presently explained. Now, no one is more likely to be practically aware of this, and to take precautions accordingly, than he who is most versed in the whole theory of Fallacies ; for the best Logician is the least likely to calculate on men in general being such. § 7 . Of Fallacies in form, enough perhaps has already been said in the preceding Com- pendium : and it has been remarked above, that it is often left to our choice to refer an individual Fallacy to this head or to another. It may be worth observing, however, that to the present class we may the most conveniently refer those Fallacies, so common in practice, of supposing the Conclusion false, be- cause the Premiss is false, or because the Argument is unsound ; and of inferring the truth of the Premiss from that of the Conclusion. E. G. if any one argues for the exist- * See Essay II. on Kingdom of Christ, § 22, note. 17 .] OF FALLACIES. 191 ence of a God, from its being universally believed, a man might perhaps be able to refute the argument by producing a® instance of some nation destitute of such belief ; the argumenl wight then (as has been observed above) to go for nothing . but many would go further, and think that this refutation had disproved the existence of a God ; in which they would be guilty of an illicit process of the Major-term : viz. “ whatever is universally believed must be true ; the existence of a God is not universally believed ; therefore it is not true.” Other again, from being convinced of the truth of the Conclusion would infer that of the Premisses ; which would amount to the Fallacy of an undistributed Middle : viz. “ what is universally believed is true ; the existence of a God is true ; therefore it is universally believed.” Or, these Fallacies might be stated in the hypothetical form ; since the one evidently proceeds from the denial of the Antecedent to the denial of the Conse- quent ; and the other from the establishing of the Consequent to the inferring of the Antecedent : which two Fallacies will usually be found to correspond respectively with those of illicit process of the major, and Undistributed Middle. Fallacies of this class are very much kept T „ , J 1 Weak argu out of sight, being seldom perceived even by ments practi those who employ them; but of their practical cally detrimen importance there can be no doubt, since it is ta '“ notorious that a weak argument is always, in practice, detri- mental ; and that there is no absurdity so gross which men will not readily admit, if it appears to lead to a conclusion of which they are already convinced. Even a candid and sen- sible writer is not unlikely to be, by this means, misled, when ne is seeking for arguments to support a conclusion which he has long been fully convinced of himself ; i. e. he will often use such arguments as would never have convinced himself 192 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III tmd are not likely to convince others, but rather (by the operation of the converse Fallacy) to confirm in their dissent those who before disagreed with him. It is best therefore to endeavor to put yourself in the place of an opponent to your own arguments, and consider whether you could not find some objection to them. The applause of one s own party is a very unsafe ground tor judging of the real force of an argumentative work, and consequently of its teal utility. To satisfy those who were doubting, and to con- vince those who were opposed, are much better tests ; * but these persons are seldom very loud in their applause, or verv forward in bearing their testimony. Of Ambiguous Middle. § 8 . That case in which the Middle is undistributed belongs o! course to the preceding head ; the fault being perfectly man- ifest from the mere form of the expression : in that case the Extremes are compared with two parts of the same term ; but in the Fallacy which has been called semi-logical, (which we are now to speak of ) the Extremes are compared with tioo different terms, the Middle being used in two different senses in the two Premisses. t And here it may be remarked that when the argument is fraught into the form of a regular Syllogism , the contrast * The strongest, perhaps, of all external indications of the strength of an argument, is, the implied admission of those who nevertheless tesolve not to admit the conclusion. See Appendix; Art. Person , last clause. f For some instances of important ambiguities, see Appendix. OF FALLACIES. l93 I 8] between these two sense* will usually appear very sti iking from the two Premisses being placed together ; and hence the scorn with which many have treated the very mention of the Fallacy of Equivocation, deriving their only notion of it from the exposure of it in Logical treatises; whereas, in practice it is common for the two Premisses to be placed very fai apart, and discussed in different parts of the discourse ; by which means the inattentive hearer overlooks any ambiguity that may exist in the Middle-term. Hence the advantage of Logi- cal habits, in fixing our attention strongly and steadily on the important, terms of an argument. And here it should be observed, that when we mean to charge any argument with the fault of “ equivocal-middle,” it is not enough to say that the Middle-term is a word or phrase which admits of more than one meaning ; (for there are few that do not) but we must show, that in order for each premiss to be admitted, the Term in question must be under- stood in one sense (pointing out wliat that sense is) in one of the premisses, and in another sense, in the other. And if any one speaks contemptuously of T J 1 r j Importance “ over exactness ” in fixing the precise sense 0 f minute dis- in which some term is used, — of attending to Unctions. minute and subtle distinctions, &c. we may reply that these minute distinctions are exactly those which call for careful attention; since it is only through the neglect of these that Fallacies ever escape detection. For, a very glaring and palpable equivocation could never mislead any one. To argue that “ feathers dispel darkness because they are light," or that “ this man is agreeable, be cause he is riding , and riding is agreeable,” is an equivoca- tion which could never be employed but in jest. And yet however slight in any case may be the distinction betv/eea the 17 194 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IIa two senses of a Middle-term in the two premisses, the appar ent-argument will be equally inconclusive ; though its falla- ciousness will be more likely to escape notice. Even so, it is for want of attention to minute points, that bouses ar; robbed, or set on fire. Burglars do not in general come and batter down the front-door; but climb in at some window whose fastenings have been neglected. And an incendiary, or a careless servant, does not kindle a tar-barrel in the middle of a room, but leaves a lighted turf, or a candle snuff, in the thatch, or in a heap of shavings. In many cases, it is a good maxim, to “ take L.re of littlo things, and great ones will take care of themselves.” One case which may be regarded as coming Paronymous unc | er t [, e head of Ambiguous middle, is, (what words. _ I believe logical writers mean by “ Fallacia Figurce Dictionis ,”) the Fallacy built on the grammatical structure of language, from men’s usually taking for granted that paronymous [or conjugate] words — i. e. those belonging to each other, as the substantive, adjective, verb, fyc. of the same root, ha/e a precisely correspondent meaning; which is by no means universally the base. Such a fallacy could not indeed be even exhibited in strict Logical form, which would preclude even the attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in sound as well as sense. But nothing is more common in practice than to vary continually the terms employed, with a view to grammatical convenience ; nor is there any thing un- fair in such a practice, as long as the meaning is preserved unaltered: e. g. “murder should be punished with death, this man is a murae er; therefore he deserves to die,” SfC. ire. Here we proceed on the assumption (in this case just) that \ commit murder and to be a murderer, — to deserve death and to be one who ought to die, are, respectively, equ valen 5 8.1 OF FALLACIES. 11)5 expressions . and it would frequently prove a heavy incor.verj* ence to be debarred this kind of liberty ; out the abuse of it gives rise to the Fallacy in question : e. g. '•'■projectors ara unfit to be trusted ; this man has formed a project , therefore he is unfit to be trusted : ” * here the Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis that he who forms a project must be a projector : whereas the bad sense that commonly attaches to the latter word, is not at all implied in the former. This Fallacy may often be considered as lying not in the Middle, but in one of the terms of the Conclusion ; so that the Conclusion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all warranted by the Premisses, though it will appear to be so, by means of the grammatical affinity of the words : e. g. “ to be acquainted with the guilty is a presumption of guilt ; this man is so ac- quainted ; therefore we may presume that he is guilty : ” this argument proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspond- ence between '•'•presume' 1 '' and “ presumption f which, how- ever, does not really exist; for “ presumption ” is commonly used to express a kind of slight suspicion; whereas “ to pre- sume” amounts to actual belief . The above remark will apply to some other cases of ambi- guity of term ; viz. the Conclusion will often contain a term which (though not, as here, different in expression from the corresponding one in the Premiss, yet) is liable to be under- stood in a sense different from what it bears to the Premiss; though, of course, such a Fallacy is less common, because less likely to deceive, in those cases than in this ; where the term used in the Conclusion, though professing to correspond with one in the Premiss, is net the very same in expression * Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: Usury. % ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. Ul *nd therefore is more certain to convey a different sense ; which is what the Sophist wishes. There are innumerable instances of a non-correspondence in paronymous words, similar to that above instanced ; as between art and artful , design and designing, faith and faith- ful, $c. > a nd the more slight the variation of meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy to be successful; for when the words have become so widely icmoved in sense as “ pity ” and “ pitiful,” every one would perceive such a Fallacy, nor could it be employed but in jest. This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted, (except when you are addressing regular logicians,) by stating merely the impossibility of reducing such an argument to the strict logi- cal form. You must find some way of pointing out the non- correspondence of the terms in question ; e. g. with respect to the example above, it might be remarked, that we speak of strong or faint “ presumption,” but we use no such expres- sion in conjunction with the verb “ presume,” because the word itself implies strength. No fallacy is more common in controversy than the pres- ent ; since in this way the Sophist will often be able to mis- interpret the propositions which his opponent admits or main- tains, and so employ them against him. Thus in the examples just given, it is natural to conceive one of the Sophist’s Prem- isses to have been borrowed from his opponent.* The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or Etymology. rather perhaps may be regarded as a branch of that founded on etymology ; viz. when a term is used at one • Perhaps a dictionary of such paronymous [conjugate] words at lo net regularly correspond in meaning, would he nearly as useful sf one of synonymes ; i. e. properly speaking, of pseudo -synonymes. OF FALLACIES 197 } 9.1 time, in its customary, and at another, in itc etymological sense. Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of the word representative : assuming that its right meaning mu; correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb, “ represent,” the Sophist persuades the multitude that a member of the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents : and, in short, to be merely their spokesman: whereas law, and custom, which in this case may be considered as fixing the meaning of the Term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative to act according to the best of his own judgment, and on his awn responsibility. Horne Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such weapons for any Sophist who may need them ; and has fur- nished some specimens of the employment of them. He contends, that it is idle to speak of eternal or immutable ‘ Truth," because the word is derived from to “ trow,” i. e. believe. He might on as good grounds have censured the absurdity of speaking of sending a letter by the '■'■post" be- cause a post, in its primary sense, is a pillar ; or have insisted that “Sycophant” can never mean any thing but “Fig- shower.” § 9 . / It is to be observed, that to the head of Am- biguous middle should be referred what is called interrogations *' Fallacia plurium Interrogationum" which may be named simply, “ the Fallacy of Interrogation viz. the Fallacy of asking several questions which appear to be but one ; so that whatever one answer is given, being of course applicable to one only of the implied questions, may be inter* 17 * 198 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book ITt preted as applied to the other: the refutation is, of course, to reply separately to each question, i. e. to detect the ambiguity I have said, several “ questions which appear to be but one for else there is no Fallacy ; such an example, therefore, as ‘ estne homo animal et lapis 7" which Aldrich gives, is for- eign ;o the matter in hand ; for there is nothing unfair in ask- ing two distinct questions (any more than in asserting twc distinct propositions) distinctly and avowedly. This Fallacy may be referred, as has been said, to the head of Ambiguous middle. In all Reasoning it is very common to state one of the Premisses in form of a question, and when that is admitted, or supposed to be admitted, then to fill up the rest : if then one of the Terms of that question be ambigu- ous, whichever sense the opponent replies to, the Sopnist assumes the other sense of the Term in the remaining Prem- iss. It is therefore very common to state an equivocal argu- ment, in form of a question so worded, that there shall be little doubt which reply will be given ; but if there be such doubt, the Sophist must have two Fallacies of equivocation ready ; E. G. the question “ whether any thing vicious is ex- pedient,” discussed in Cic. Off. Book III. (where, by the bye, he seems not a little perplexed with it himself) is of the char- acter in question, from the ambiguity of the word, “ expe- dient," which means sometimes “ conducive to temporal prosperity,” sometimes “conducive to the greatest good:” whichever answer therefore was given, the Sophist might have a Fallacy of equivocation founded on this term ; viz. if the answer be in the negative, his argument, Logically developed, will stand thus, — “ what is vicious is not expedi- ent ; whatever conduces to the acquisition of wealth and aggrandizement is expedient ; therefore it cannot be vicious . ” if in the affirmative, then thus, — “ whatever is expedient if OF FALLACIES. 197 I 9] desirable ; something vicious is expedient, therefore de sirable.” * Again, a witness was; once asked hv a Parliamentary Com.' mittee (in 1832 ) whether he knew “how long the practice had ceased in Ireland of dividing the tithes into four portions, one for the poor,” 4' c - This resembles the hackneyed in- stance of asking a man “ whether he had left off beating his father.” [See Vol. of Charges and Tracts, p. 379 .] King Charles II.’s celebrated inquiry — of the Royal Society (no- ticed below, § 14 ) may be referred to this head. He asked the cause why a dead fish does not (though a live fish does) add to the weight of a vessel of water. This implies two questions ; the first of which many of the philosophers for a time overlooked : viz. 1st. is it a fact ? 2dly. if it be a fact, what can cause it ? t This kind of Fallacy is frequently employed in such a manner, that the uncertainty shall be, not about the meaning , but the extent of a Term, i. e. whether it is distributed or not : *. g. “ did A B in this case act from such and such a mo- tive ? ” which may imply either, “ was it his sole motive ? ” or “ was it one of his motives ? ” in the former case the term [“ that-which-actuated-A B ”] is distributed ; ir the latter, not: now if he acted from a mixture of motives, whichever answer you give, may be misrepresented, and your conclusion thus disproved. Distribution and non-dis- tribution. * Much of the declamation by which popular assemblies are . fieri misled, against what is called, without any distinct meaning, the “ doctrine of expediency,” (as if the “ right ” and the “ expedient were in opposition) might he silenced by asking the simple question, “Do you then admit that the course you recommrud is mexpe< dient ? ” "* See Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon. 200 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III Again, those who dispute the right ot a State to enforce the profession of a certain religion, have been met by the question, “ has a State a right to enforce Laws ?” If we an- swer in the negative, we may be interpreted as denying tha‘ any laws can rightfully be enforced ; which would of course go to destroy the very existence of a Political-community ; if, in the affirmative, we may be interpreted as sanctioning tho enforcement of any laws whatever that the Legislature may aee fit to enact : whether enjoining men to adore a Crucifix, or to trample on it ; — to reverence Christ or Mahomet, <^c. The ambiguity of the question lies in “Laws;” understood either as “ some laws,” or, as “ any laivs without exception . ” * § 10 . , . . In some cases of ambiguous Middle, the Intrinsic and hidden- Term in question may be considered as having tal equivoca- in itself , , from its own equivocal nature, two significations ; (which apparently constitutes the ‘ Fallacm equivocationis ” of Logical writers ;) others again lave a Middle-term which is ambiguous from the context, i. e. from what is understood in conjunction with it. This division will be found useful, though it is impossible to draw the line accurately in it. The elliptical character of ordinary discourse causes many Terms to become practically ambiguous, which yet are not themselves employed in different senses , but with different applications , which are understood. Thus, “ The Faith ” tvould be used by a Christian writer to denote the Christian faith, and by a Mussulman, the Mahometan ; yet the word • Dea “ Essays on the Kingdom of Christ.” N< te A. to Essay I OF FALLACIES. 201 1 10 .] Faith, lias not in these cases, of itself, two different signiflca tions. So ixlexxol, “ elect,” or “ chosen,” is sometimes ap- plied to such as are “chosen,” to certain, privileges and advantages ; (as the Israelites were, though “they were over- thrown in the wilderness” for their disobedience; and as a’C Christians are frequently called in the New Testament) sometimes again to those who are “ chosen,” as fit to re- ceive a final reward , having made a right use of those advantages ; as when our Lord says, “ many are called, but few chosen.” What Logicians have mentioned under the • i _ Amphibolia. title or “ ballacia ampmbouse is referable to this last class ; though in real practice it is not very likely to occur. An amphibolous sentence is one that is capable of two meanings, not from the double sense of any of the words, but from its admitting of a double construction: as in the instance Aldrich gives, which is untranslatable ; “ quod tan gitur a Socrate, illud sentit ; ” where “ illud ” may be taken either as the nominative or accusative. So also the celebrated response of the oracle ; “ Aio te, iEacida, Romanos vincere posse : ” “ Pyrrhus the Romans shall, I say, subdue : ” which closely resembles (as Shakspeare remarks) the witch-proph- ecy, “The Duke yet lives that Henry shall depose.” This effect is produced by what the French call “construction louche,” a squinting construction ; i. e. where some word or words may be referred either to the former or latter clause of the sentence ; of which an instance occurs in the rubric pre- fixel to the service for the 30th January. “If this day shall happen to be Sunday [this form of prayer shah be used] and the fast kept the next day following : ” the clause in brackets may belong either to the former or the latter part of the sen- tence. In the Nicene Creed, the words, “ by whom all things 202 ELEMENTS OE LOGIC. [Look ilL were made,” are grammatically referable either t the Fathet or the Son. And in the 2d Commandment, the clause “ of them that hate me,” is a genitive governed either by “ chib dren,” or by “ generation : ” the latter being indicated by the ordinary mode of punctuation and of reading; which totally changes the real sense.* The following clause of a sentence from a newspaper, is a curious specimen of Amphibolia : — ‘ For protecting and upholding such electors as refused, contrary to their desires and consciences, to vote for Messrs. A and B, regardless of threats, and unmindful of intimida- tion.” There are various ways in which words conn Accidental , to have two meanings : equivocation. ° 1st. By accident ; (i. e. when there is no per ceptible connection between the two meanings) as “ light ” sig nifies both the contrary to “heavy” and the contrary to ‘ dark.” Thus, such Proper-names as John or Thomas, fyc. which happen to belong to several different persons, are ambiguous, because they have a different signification in each case where they are applied. Words which fall under this first head are what are the most strictly called equivocal. First and 2dly. There are several terms in the use of second inten- which it is necessary to notice the distinction il0,u between first and second intention, t The * See Rhetoric, Appendix. t I am aware that there exists another opinion as tc the meaning of the phrase “ second intention ; ” and that Aldrich is understood by seme persons to mean (as indeed his expression may very well be un- derstood to imply) that every predicable must necessarily be employed in the Second-intention. I do not undertake to combat the doctrine alluded to, because I must confess that, after the most patient atten- tion devoted to the explanations given of it, I have never been able tl ♦ 10] OF FALLACIES. 203 “ first-intention ” of a T nun, (according to the usual accej ta- tion of this phrase) is a certain vague and general signification of it, as opposed to one more precise and limited , which it bears in some particular art, science, or system, and which is called its “ second-intention.” Thus, among farmers, in some parts, the word “ beast” is applied particularly and es- pecially to the ox kind ; and “ bird,” in the language of many sportsmen, is in like manner appropriated to the par- tridge : the common and general acceptation (which every one is well acquainted with) of each of those two words, is the First-intention of each ; the other its Second-intention. For some remarks on the Second-intention of the word “ Species,” when applied to organized beings (viz. as denot- ing those plants or animals, which it is conceived may have descended from a common stock), see the subjoined Disser- tation, Book IV. Chap. v. § 1. It is evident that a Term may have several Second-inten tions, according to the several systems into which it is intro- duced, and of which it is one of the technical Terms : thus “ line ” signifies, in the Art-military, a certain form of draw- ing up ships or troops: in Geography, a certain division of the earth ; to the fisherman, a string to catch fish, <^c. <^*c. , all which are so many distinct Second-intentions, in each of which there is a certain signification “ of extension in length ” which constitutes the First-intention, and which corresponds pretty nearly with the employment of the Term in Mathe- matics. comprehend what it is that is meant by it. It is one, however, which, whether sound or unsound, appears not to be connected with anj Logical processes, and therefore may be safely passed by on the pres' tat occasion. 204 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. Ill In a kw instances the Second-intention, or philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First-inten- tion, or popular use: thus “ affection ” is limited in popular use to 14 love ; ” “ charity,” to “ almsgiving ; ” “ flower,” to those flowers which have conspicuous petals ; and fruit, to such as are eatable. It will sometimes happen, that a Term shall be employed always in some one or other of its second intentions ; and never, strictly in the first, though that first intention is a part of its signification in each case. It is evident, that the utmost care is requisite to avoid confounding together, either the first and second intentions, or the different second intentions with each other. of grass,” and the contrivance in building called a “ dove-tail ,” are so called from their resemblance to the blade * of a sword, and the tail of a real dove. But two things may be con- nected by analogy , though they have in themselves no re - semblance: for analogy is -the resemblance of ratios (or rela- tions :) thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear ; and hence the same word u sweet ” is applied to both, though no flavor can resemble a sound in itself. So, the leg of a table does not resemble that of an animal ; nor the foot of a mountain that of an animal ; but the leg ansivers the same purpose to the table, as the leg * Unless, indeed, the primary application of the Term be to the leaf of grass, and the secondary to cutting instruments, which is per- haps more probable ; but the question is unimportant in the present sase. Resemblance and Analogy. 3dly. When two or more things are con- nected by resemblance or analogy , they will fre- quently have the same name. Thus a “ blade } 10 .] OF FALLACIES. 205 of an animal to .hat animal ; the foot of a mountain has ths> same situation relatively to the mountain, as the foot cf an animal to the animal. This analogy therefore may be ex> pressed like a mathematical analogy (or proportion) ; “ leg : animal : : supporting-stick : table.” The words pertaining to Mind may in general be traced jp, as borrowed (which no doubt they all were, originally) oy Analogy, from those pertaining to Matter : though in many cases the primary sense has become obsolete. Thus, “ edify ” # in its primary sense of “ build up” 1 is disused, and the origin of it often forgotten ; although the substantive “ edifice ” remains in common use in a corre- sponding sense. When ' however we speak of “ weighing ” the reasons on both sides, — of “ seeing,” or “ feeling” the force of an argument, — “imprinting” any thing on the memory, &c. wo are aware of these words being used analogically. In all these cases (of this 3d head) one of the meanings of the word is called by Logicians Primary ... . , , and secondary proper, i. e. original or primary ; the other an- r 1 J ° 1 J 7 senses, proper , secondary, or transferred ; thus, sweet is originally and properly applied to tastes; secondarily and improperly ( i . e. by analogy) to sounds ; thus also dove-tail is applied secondarily (though not by analogy, but by direct re semblance) to the contrivance in building so called. When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on sons fanciful analogy, and especially when it is introduced for ornament’s sake, we call this a metaphor , as when we speak nf “ a ship’s ploughing the deep ; ” the turning up of the • See l Peter ii. 5. 18 t See Johnson s Dictionary 806 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III surface being essential indeed to the plougn, but aceiden tal only to the ship. But if the analogy be a more important and essential one, and especially if we have no other word to express our meaning but this transferred one, we then call it merely an analogous word (though the metaphor is analo« gous also) e. g. one would hardly call it metaphorical or fig- urative language to speak of the “ leg of a table,” or “ mouth of a river.” * There are two kinds of error, each very common — which lead to confusion of thought in our use of analogical words : i. The error of supposing the things themselves to be simi- lar, from their having similar relations to other things. ii. The still commoner error of supposing the Analogy to extend further than it does ; [or, to be more complete than it really is ;] from not considering in what the Analogy in each case consists. For instance, the “ Servants ” that we read of in the Bible, and in other translations of ancient books, are so called by Analogy to servants among us : and that Analogy consists in the offices which a “ servant ” performs, in waiting on his master, and doing his bidding. It is in this respect that the one description of “ servant” “ corresponds ” [“ answers ”] to the other. And hence some persons have been led to apply all that is said in Scripture respecting Masters and Servants to these times, and this Country : forgetting that the Analogy is not complete, and extends no further than the point above- mentioned. For the ancient “ servants ” (except when ex- pressly spoken of as /tz'rerf-servants) were Slaves ; a part of the Master’s possessions. * See Bp. Copleston’s account of Analogy in the notos to hi* ‘ Four Discourses.” 10.1 OF FALLACIES. 20 ? 4thlv. Several things may be called by the same name (though they have no connection of Connection , , „ of time or resemblance or analogy) from being connected ^ by vicinity of time or place ; under which head will come the connection of cause and effect , or of part and whole, Sfc.; and the transference of words in this way from the primary to a secondary meaning, is what Grammarians cal Metonymy. Thus, a door signifies both an opening in the wall (more strictly called the door-way ) and a board which closes it ; which are things neither similar nor analogous When 1 say, “ the rose smells sweet ; ” and “ I smell the rose ; ” the word “ smell ” has two meanings : in the latter sentence, I am speaking of a certain sensation in my own mind ; in the former, of a certain quality in the flower, which produces that sensation, but which of course cannot in the least resemble it ; and here the word smell is applied with equal propriety to both. On this ambiguity have been founded the striking paradoxes of those who have maintained that there is no heat in fire, no cold in ice, fyc. The sensations of heat, cold, Sfc. can of course only belong to a Sentient Being. Thus again the word “ certainty,” denotes either, primarily, the state of our own mind when we are free from doubt, or secondarily, the character of the event about which we feel certain. [See Appendix, No. I.] Thus, we speak of Homer, for “ the works of Homer ; ” and this is a secondary or trans- ferred meaning : and so it is when we say, “ a good shot,” for a good marksman : but the word “ shot ” has two other meanings, which are both equally proper ; viz. the thing put into a gun in order to be discharged from it, and the act of discharging it. Thus “ learning ” signifies either the act of acquiring knowledge, or the knowledge itself ; e. g. “ he neglects his 208 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Boor III teaming;” “ Johnson was a man of learning.’' “ Posset* sion” is ambiguous in the same manner; and a mutfftude ot others. A remarkable and most important instance is tha ambiguity of such words as “ same ,” “ one,” &c. (See tha Articles on those words in Appendix, and also Book IV. Ch, v. § 1 & 2.) Much confusion often arises from ambiguity of this kind, when unperceived ; nor is there any point in which the copi- ousness and consequent precision o c the Greek language, is more to be admired than in its distinct terms for expressing an act, and the result of that act ; e. g. nyaS.iq, “ the doing of any thing;” nyaypa, the “thing done;” so, doacg and Sugar — L]tpig and h]ppu, fyc. It will very often happen, that two of the meanings of a word will have no connection with one another, but will each have some connection with the third. Thus, “ martyr” origi- nally signified a witness ; thence it was applied to those whe suffered in bearing testimony to Christianity ; and thence again it is often applied to “ sufferers” in general : the first and third significations are not the least connected. Thus '•'■post ” signifies originally a pillar, ( postum , from pono ) then, a distance marked out by posts ; and then, the carriages, messengers, &yc. that travelled over this distance. Thus “ Clerk,” originally one in Holy Orders, came to be used as it is at present, from the “Clergy” having been, during the dark Ages, almost the only persons who could read. It would puzzle any one, proceeding on mere conjecture, to make out how the word “ premises ” should have come to signify “ a building.” Ambiguities of this kind belong practically to the first head : there being no perceived connection between tha different senses. OF FALLACIES 20 $ 1 10 .] Another source of practical ambiguity (as has been just observed) “ is, that, in respect of any subject Elliptical concerning which the generality of men are ac- , c J language. custoined to speak much and familiarly, in their conversation relative to that, they usually introduce ellipticai expressions ; very clearly understood in the outset, but whose elliptical character comes, in time, to be so far lost sight of, that confusion of language, and thence, of thought, is some- times the result. Thus, the expression of a person’s possessing a fortune of 10,000Z. is an elliptical phrase : meaning, at full length, that all his property if sold would exchange for that sum of money. And in ninety-nine instances out of a hun dred, no error or confusion of thought arises from this lan- guage ; but there is no doubt that it mainly contributed tc introduce and foster the notion that Wealth consists especially of gold and silver (these being used to measure and express its amount ;) and that the sure way to enrich a country is ta promote the importation, and prevent the export, of the pre- cious metals ; with all the other absurdities of what is com monly called ‘ the mercantile System.’ So also we speak commonly of ‘ the example of such a one’s punishment serv- ing to deter others from crime.’ And usually, no misappre- hension results from this, which is, in truth, an elliptical expression. But sometimes sophistical reasoners take advan- tage of it, and men who are rot clear-headed are led into confusion of thought. Strictly speaking, what deters a man from crime in such cases as those alluded to, is, the appre- hension of himself suffering punishment. That apprehension may be excited by the example of another’s being punished ; or it may be excited without that example, if punishment be denounced, and there is good reason to expect that the threat will not be an empty one. And on tl ^ other hand, ;ha 210 ELEMENTS OE LOGIC. [Book 111 example of others’ suffering punishment does not deter any one, if it fail to excite this apprehension for himself; if for instance he consider himself as an exempt person, as is the case with a despot in barbarian countries, or with a mad man who expects to be acquitted on the plea of insanity. “ Again, when a man complains of being ‘ out of work' — is ‘ looking out for employment,’ — and hopes for subsistence by labor, this is elliptical language ; well enough understood in general. We know that what man lives on, is food ; and that he who is said to be looking out for work, is in want of food and other necessaries, which he hopes to procure in ex- change for his labor, and has no hope of obtaining without it. But there is no doubt that this elliptical language has contrib- uted to lead those who were not attentive to the character of the expression, to regard every thing as beneficial to the laboring classes which furnishes employment , i. e. gives trouble ; even though no consequent increase should take place in the Country, of the food and other commodities destined for their support.” * A snow-drift which obstructs a road, and a vein of valuable ore, may conceivably each furnish em- ployment for an equal number of laborers. The remedy for ambiguity is a Definition of the Term which is suspected of being used in two senses ; viz. a Nomi- nal !, not necessarily a Real Definition: as was remarked in Book II. Chap. v. ployed that are not familiarly introduced into ordinary dis Definition when most needed. It is important to observe that the very cir- cumstance which in any case “ makes a defini- tion the more necessary, is apt to lead to the omission of it : for when any terms are em< * Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. OF FALLACIES 211 10 j Bourse, such as ‘ parallelogram,’ or ‘ sphere,’ or ‘ tangent, pencil of rays,’ or ‘refraction,’ — ‘oxygen,’ or ‘alkali,’ — . the learner is ready to inquire, and the writer to anticipate the inquiry, what is meant by this or that term? And though in such cases it is undoubtedly a correct procedure to answer this inquiry by a definition, yet of the two cases, a definition is even more necessary in the other, where it is not so likely to be called for; — where the word, not being new to the student, but familiar to his ear, from its employment in every-day discourse, is liable to the ambiguity which is almost always the result. For in respect of words that sound something new and strange, though it is, as I have said, much better to define them in the outset, yet even without this, the student would gradually collect their meaning pretty correctly as he proceeded in his study of any treatise; from having nothing to mislead him, — • nothing from which to form his notions at all, except the manner in which the terms were employed in the work itself that is before him. And the very desire he had felt of a definition would lead him in this way to form one, and gen- erally a sufficiently correct one, for himself. . “ It is otherwise with terms to which we are familiarly accustomed Of these, the student does not usually crave definitions, from supposing, for that reason, that he understands them well enough: though perhaps (without suspecting it) he has in reality been accustomed to hear them employed in various senses, and to attach but a vague and inaccurate notion to them. If you speak to an uninstructed hearer, of anything that is spherical, or circular , or cylindrical , he will probably beg for an explanation of your meaning ; but if you tell him of any thing that is round , it will not strike him that any ex- Dlanatic. is needed : though he has been accustomed ‘a 212 uLEifiiiNTS OF I/'GIC. [Be * III employ the word, indiscriminately, in all the senses denoted by the otner three.” # Definitions, ^ ut here ma y be proper to remark, t thai how fxr to be for the avoiding of Fallacy or of Verbal-con- troversy, it is only requisite that the term should be employed uniformly in the same sense, as far as the existing question is concerned. Thus, two persons might, in discussing the question whether Augustus was a great man, have some such difference in their acceptation of the epithet “ great,” as would be non-essential to that question ; e. g. one of them might understand by it nothing more than eminent intellectual and moral qualities ; while the other might conceive it to im- ply the performance of splendid actions : this abstract differ- ence of meaning would not produce any disagreement in the existing question, because both those circumstances are united in the case of Augustus ; but if one (and not the other) of the parties understood the epithet “ great ” to imply pure pa- triotism, — generosity of character, fyc., then there would be a disagreement as to the application of the Term, even be- tween those who might think alike of Augustus’s character, as wanting in those qualities . \ Definition, the specific for ambiguity, is to be employed, and demanded, with a view to this principle ; it is sufficient on each occasion to define a Term as far as regards the question in hand. If, for example, we were remonstrating with any one far quitting the church of which he was a member, wantonly, and not from strong and deliberate conscientious conviction, bu« from motives of taste or fancy, and he were to reply by ask« mg, how do you define a Church ? the demand would be quite * Pol. Econ Lect. IX. t See Book II. Ch. v. j 6. X See Book iv. Ch. 4 $ 1. OF FALLACIES. 213 511.1 irrelevant, unless he meant to deny that the Community he quits is a Ch urch. But if we were to insist on designating any one religious-community on earth to which we might belong, as the universal or Catholic Church, — in demand- ing from all Christians submission to its ordinances and decisions, and denouncing all who should not belong to it, as being out of the pale of Christ’s Church, then indeed we might fairly be called on to give a definition, and one which should be consistent with facts.* § 11 - Of those cases where the ambiguity arises f rom the con- text, there are several species ; some of which Logicians have enumerated, but have neglected to refer them, in the first place, to one common class (viz. the one under which they are here placed ;) and have even arranged soma under the head of Fallacies “in dictione," and others under that of “ extra dictionem.” We may consider, as the first of these spe- cies, the Fallacy of “ Division” and that of Fallacy of . . , Division am “ Composition,” taken together; since in each Composition. of these the Middle-term is used in one Premiss. collectively, in the other, distributive ly : if the former of these is the major Premiss, and the latter, the minor, this ii called the “Fallacy of Division;” the Term which is first taken collectively being afterwards divided; and nice versd. The ordinary examples are such as these: “All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. A B C is an angle See Appendix, Article “Truth.’ 214 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boa III of a tiiungle ; therefore A B C is equal to two right angles.” “ Five is oue number ; three and two are five : therefore three and two are one number ; ” or, “ three and two are two numbers, five is three and two, therefore five is two num- bers : ” it is manifest that the Middle-term, three and two (in this last example) is ambiguous, signifying, in the lns-jor Premiss, “ taken distinctly ; ” in the minor, “ taken together : ” and so of the rest. To this head may be referred the common Fallacy of over-rating, where each premiss of an argument is only probable, the probability of the conclusion ; which, in that case, is less than that of the less probable of the premisses.* 6 For, suppose the probability of one of these to be — , and 7 of the other — (each more likely than not) the probability of 42 2 the conclusion will be only — - ora little more than - ; which luU o is less than an even chance. This Fallacy may be most easi- ly stated as a conditional ; a form in which any Fallacy of ambiguous middle may easily be exhibited. E. G. “ If it is * See below, § 14. Some persons profess contempt for all such calculations, on the ground that we cannot be quite sure of the exact degree of probability of each premiss. And this is true ; but this un- avoidable uncertainty is no reason why we shall not guard against an additional source of uncertainty which can be avoided. It is some advantage to have no more doubt as to the degree of probability of the Conclusion, than we have respecting that of the premisses. And in fact there are Offices, kept by persons whose trade it is, in which calculations of this nature are made, in the purchase o f con- tingent reversions, depending, sometimes, on a great variety of risks, which can only be conjecturally estimated ; and in Insurances, not only against ordinary risks (the calculations of which are to be drawn from Statistical-tables) but also against every variety and degree of p xttaordinarg risk ; the exact amount of which, no one can confidently oronounce upon. But the calculations are based on the best estimate chat can be formed. OF FALLACIES. 215 » 1*1 more likely than not, that these premisses are true: (i. e. thas they are both true) it is more likely than not, that the conclu- sion is true : but it is more likely than not that the premisses are true : (i. e. that each of them is so) therefore it is more likely than not that the conclusion is true.” Here, a term in the antecedent, viz. — “ that the premisses are more likely than not to be true ” — is taken jointly in the Major, and dividedly in the Minor. To the same class we may refer the Fallacy by wnich men have sometimes been led to admit, or pretend to admit, the doctrine of Necessity ; e. g. “ he who necessarily goes or stays ( i . e. in reality, 6 who necessarily goes , or who necessa- rily stays ’) is not a free agent ; you must necessarily go or stay (i. e. ‘ you must necessarily take the alternative ’), there- fore you are not a free agent.” Such also is the Fallacy which probably operates on most adventurers in lotteries ; e. g. “ the gaining of a high prize is no uncommon occurrence ; and what is no uncommon occurrence may reasonably be expected ; therefore the gaining of a high prize may reason- ably be expected ; ” the Conclusion, when applied to the in- dividual (as in practice it is), must be understood in the sense of “ reasonably expected by a certain individual ; ” therefore for the Major-Premiss to be true, the middle-Term must be understood to mean, “ no uncommon occurrence to some one •particular person ; ” whereas for the Minor (which has been placed first) to be true, you must understand it of “ no un- :ommon occurrence to some one or other ; ” and thus you will lave the Fallacy of Composition. There is no Fallacy more common, or more likely to deceive, than the one now before us. The form in which it s most usually employed, is to establish some truth, separate- y, concerning each single member of a certain class, and B16 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. Ill thence to infer the same of the whole collectively. Thus, some infidels have labored to prove concerning some one of our Lord’s miracles, that it might have been the result of an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances; next, they endeavor to prove the same concerning another; and so on ; and thence infer that all of them occurring as a series might have been so. They might argue in like manner, that because it is not very improbable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hundred times run- ning. disguised by a rapid and frequent transition from the one to the other alternately. E. G. You may prove that I00Z. would accomplish this object ; and then, that it would accomplish that: and then, you recur to the former; and back again: till at length a notion is generated of the possibility of accom- plishing hath by this 100/. “Two distinct objects may, by being dexterously presented, again and again in quick suc- cession, to the mind of a cursory reader, be so associated together in his thoughts , as to be conceived capable, when in fact they are not, of being actually combined in practice. The fallacious belief thus induced bears a striking resemolance (o the optical illusion effected by that ingenious and philosophi- cal toy called the Thaumatrope ; in which two objects painted cn opposite sides of a card, — for instance a man, and a horse, — a bird, and a cage, — are, by a quick rotatory motion, made to impress the eye in combination, so as to form one nicture, of the man on the horse’s back, the bird in the cage &■: As soon as the card is allowed to remain at rest, the Thaumatrope- fallacy. It will often happen that when two objects are incompatible , though either of them, sepa- rately , may be attained, the incompatibility is » H-l OF FALLACIES. 217 figures, of course, appear as they really are, separate and on opposite sides. A mental illusion closely analogous to this, is produced, when by a rapid and repeated transition from one subject to another alternately, the mind is deluded into an idea of the actual combination of things that are really incompati ble. The chief part of the defence which various writers nave advanced in favor of the system of Penal-Colonies , con- sists, in truth, of a sort of intellectual Thaumatrope. The prosperity of the Colony , and the repression of crime , are, by a sort of rapid whirl, presented to the mind as combined in one picture. A very moderate degree of calm and fixed attention soon shows that the two objects are painted on oppo- site sides of the card.” * The Fallacy of Division may often be consid- Ambiguity ered as turning on the ambiguity of the word of the word “all;” which may easily be dispelled by sub- “ AlL stituting for it the word “ each ” or “ every,” where that is its signification; e. g. “ all these trees make a thick shade,” is ambiguous ; meaning, either, “ every one of them,” or “ all together.” This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt to de- ceive themselves : for when a multitude of particulars are pre- sented to the mind, many are too weak or too indolent to take, a comprehensive view of them ; but confine their attention to each single point, by turns ; and then decide, infer, and act accordingly ; e. g. the imprudent spendthrift, finding that he is able to afford this, or that, or the other expense, forgets that all of them together will ruin him. To the same head maybe reduced that fallacious reasoning by which men vindicate themselves to their own conscience * Remarks on Transportation, pp. 25, 26. 1*1 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IT) fcl.8 and to ox\ttA, fur the neglect of those undefined duties, whicfi though indispensable, and therefore not left to our choica whether we will practise them or not, are left to our discretion as to the mode , and the particular occasions, of practising them ; e. g. “ I am not bound to contribute to this charitj in particular ; nor to that ; nor to the other : ” the practical conclusion which they draw, is, that all charity may be dis- pensed with. As men are apt to forget that any two circumstances (not naturally connected) are more rarely to be met with com- bined than separate, *hough they he not at all incompatible , so also they are apt to imagine, from finding that they are rarely combined, tha. there is an incompatibility ; e. g. if the chances are ten to one against a man’s possessing strong rea- soning powers, and ten to one against exquisite taste, the chances against the combination of the two (supposing them neither connected nor opposed) will be a hundred to one. Many, therefore, from finding them so rarely united, will infer that they are in some measure incompatible ; which Fallacy may easily be exposed in the form of Undistributed middle : “ qualities unfriendly to each other are rarely combined ; ex cellence in the reasoning powers, and in taste, are rarely combined ; therefore they are qualities unfriendly to each other.” § 12 . Fallacia accidentis, iccidentis ; ' The other kind of ambiguity arising from the context, and which is the last case of Aml igu* ous middle that I shall notice, is the '■'•fallacia together with its converse, '■'•fallacia a dicta tecundum quid ad dictum simpliciter ; ” in each of w hieh th« OF FALLACIES. 219 « 12.J Middle-Term is used, in one Premiss to signify something con- sidered simply, in itself, and as to its essence ; and in the other Premiss, so as to imply that its Accidents are taken into account with it : as in the well-known example, “ what » bought in the market is eaten ; raw meat is bought in the market ; therefore raw meat is eaten.” Here the Middle has understood in conjunction with it, in the Major-Premiss, “ as to its substance merely : ” in the Minor, “ as to its condition and circumstances .” To this head, perhaps, as well as to any, may be referred the Fallacies which are frequently founded on the occasional, partial, and temporary variations in the acceptation of some Term, arising from circumstances of person, time, and place, which will occasion something to be understood in conjunction with it beyond its strict literal signification. E. G. The word “loyalty,” which properly denotes attachment to. lawful gov- ernment, — whether of a king, president, senate, fyc., accord- ing to the respective institutions of each nation, — has often been used to signify exclusively, attachment to regal author- ity ; and that, even when carried beyond the boundaries of law. So, “reforrher” has sometimes been limited to the protestant reformers of religion ; sometimes, to the advocates of some particular parliamentary reform, Sj-c. And whenever any phrase of this kind has become a kind of watch-word or gathering-cry of a party, the employment of it would corn monly imply certain sentiments not literally expressed by the words. To assume therefore that one is friendly or unfriendly to “ Loyalty ” or to “ Reform ” in one sense, because he has declared himself friendly or unfriendly to it in another sense, when implying and connected with such and such other senti- ments, is a Fallacy, such as may fairly be referred to m* present head. 220 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book III. § 13 . On the non-logical (or material) Fallacies : and first, of k * begging the question ; 11 Petitio Principii. The indistinct and unphilosophical accounl Begging the bas been given by Logical writers of the question. Fallacy of '■'■non causa," and that of ‘•'■petitio prxncipii makes it very difficult to ascertain wherein they conceived them to differ, and what they understood to be the distinctive character of each. I shall not therefore undertake to conform exactly to their language, but merely to express myself distinctly, without departing more than is necessary for that purpose, from established usage. Let the name then of “ petitio principii ” ( begging the ques- tion) be confined to those cases in which one of the Premisses either is manifestly the same in sense with the Conclusion, or is actually proved from it, or is such as the persons you are addressing* are not likely to know, or to admit, except as an inference from the Conclusion : as, e. g. if any one should infer the authenticity of a certain history, from its recording such and such facts, the reality of which rests on the evidence of that history. All other cases in which a Premiss (whether the ex pressed or the suppressed one) has no sufficient claim to be admitted, I shall designate as the “ Fallacy of undue assump- tion of a Premiss.” Let it however be observed, that in such cases (apparently) as this, we must not too hasti y pronounce the argument falla- cious ; for it may be perfect' y fair at the commencement of an * For of two propositions, the one may be the more evident ta jome, and the ether, to others. »•] OF FALLACIES. 22 : argument to assume a Piemiss that is not more evident than the Conclusion, or is even ever so paradoxical, provided you proceed to prove fairly that Premiss ; and in like manner it is both usual and fair to begin by deducing your Conclusion from a Premiss exactly equivalent to it; which is merely throwing the proposition in question into the form in which it will b< most conveniently proved. Arguing in a circle, however, must necessa- rily be unfair ; though it frequently is practised undesignedly ; e. g. some Mechanicians attempt to prove, (what they ought to have laid down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis,) that every particle of matter gravi- tates equally ; “ why ? ” because those bodies which contain more particles ever gravitate more strongly, i. e. are heavier : “ but (it may be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more bulky ; ” “ no, but still they contain more parti- cles, though more closely condensed ; ” “ how do you know that ? ” “ because they are heavier ; ” “ how does that prove it ? ” ‘ because all particles of matter gravitating equally, that mass which is specifically the heavier must needs have the more of them in the same space.” Of course the narrower the Circle, the less likely it is to escape the detection, either of the reasoner himself, (for men often deceive themselves in this way) or of his hearers. When there is a long circuit of many intervening propositions before you come back to the original Conclusion, it will often not be perceived that the arguments really do proceed in a “ Circle : ” just as when any one is advancing in "a straight lint (as we are accustomed to call it) along a plain on this Earth’s sur- face, it escapes our notice that we are really moving along the circumference of a Circle , (since the earth is a globe) and that if we could go on without interruption in the same line, 19 * B22 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III we should at length arrive at the very spot we set out from. But this we readily perceive when we are walking round a small hill. For instance, if any one argues that you ought to submit to the guidance of himself, or his leader, or his party, &c. be- cause these maintain what is right ; and then argues that what is so maintained is right, because it is maintained by persons whom you ought to submit to ; and that these are, himself and his party ; or again, if any one maintains that so and so must be a thing morally wrong, because it is prohibited in the moral portion of the Mosaic-law, and then, that the prohibition of it does form a part of the moral (not the ceremonial, or the civil) portion of that Law, because it is a thing morally iorong , • — either of these would be too narrow a Circle to escape detection, unless several intermediate steps were interposed And if the form of expression of each proposition be varied every time it recurs, — the sense of it remaining the same, — ■ this will greatly aid the deception. Of course, the way to expose the Fallacy, is to reverse this procedure : to narrow the Circle, by cutting off the interme- diate steps; and to exhibit the same proposition, — when it comes round the second time, — in the same words. general either have recourse to the “ Circle,” or eise not ven- ture to state distinctly his assumption of the point in question but will rather assert some other proposition which implis » it;* thus keeping out of sight (as a dexterous thief does * Gibbon affords the most remarkable instances of this kind of ityle. That which he really means to speak of is hardly ever mada the Subject of his Proposition. His way of writing reminds one of those persons who never dare look you full in the face. Obliquity of expression. Obliquity and disguise being of course most important to the success of the pctitio principii as well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will in OF FALLACIES. 223 f 14. stolen goods) the point in question, at the very moment when he is taking it for granted. Hence the frequent union of this Fallacy with “ ignoratio elenchi : ” [vide § 15.] The Eng. lish language is perhaps the more suitable for the Fallacy of petitio principii , from its being formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous expressions, which have no resemblance in sound, and no connection in etymology ; so that a Sophist may bring forward a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin ; e. g. “ to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State ; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments.” § 14. The next head is, the falsity, or, at least, , . Undue as- undue assumption, of a Premiss that is not r sumption. equivalent to, or dependent on, the Conclusion; which, as has been before said, seems to correspond nearly with the meaning of Logicians, when they speak of “ non causa pro causa." This name indeed would seem to imply a much narrower class : there being one species of arguments which are from cause to effect ; in which, of course, two things are necessary ; 1st, the sufficiency of he cause ; 2d. its establishment ; these are the two Premisses ; if therefore the former be unduly assumed, we are arguing from that which is not a sufficient cause as if it were so : e. g. as if one should contend from such a man’s having been unjust or cruel, that he will certainly be visited with some leavy temporal judgment, and come to an untimely end. In this instanca 824 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II the Sophist, from having assumed, in the Premiss, the (granted; existence of a pretended cause, infers, in the Conclusion, the existence of the pretended effect, which we have supposed to be the Question. Or vice versa , the pretended effect may be employed to establish the cause; e. g. inferring sinfulness from temporal calamity. But when both the pretended cause and effect are granted, i. e. granted to exisi then the Sophist will infer something from their pretended connection ; i. e. he will assume as a Premiss, that “of these two admitted facts the one is the cause of the other : ” as Whitefield attributed his being overtaken by a hail-storm to his having not preached at the last town ; or as the opponents of the Reformation as- sumed that it was the cause of the troubles which took place at that period, and thence inferred that it was an evil. Many are the cases in which a Sign (see Sign put R] lc t. Part I.) from which one might fairly infet for Cause. ' J a certain phenomenon, is mistaken for the Cause of it: (as if one should suppose the falling of the mercury to be a cause of rain ; of which it certainly is an indication) whereas the fact will often be the very reverse. E. G. a great deal of money in a country is a pretty sure proof of its wealth ; and thence has been often regarded as the cause of it ; whereas in truth it is an effect. The same, with a numerous and increasing population. Again, The labor be- stowed on any commodity has often been represented as the cause of its value ; though every one would call a fine pearl an article of value, even though he should meet with it acci- dentally in eating an oyster. Pearls are indeed generally obtained by laborious diving : but they do not fetch a high price from that cause ; but on the contrary, men dive for them because they fetch a high price.* So also exposure te * Pol. Econ. Leot. IX. p. 253. 14 .] OF FALLACIES 225 want and hardship in youth, has been regarded as a cause of the hardy constitution of those men and brutes which have been brought up in barren countries of uncongenial climate. Yet the most experienced cattle-breeders know that animals are, cceteris paribus, the more hardy for having been well fed and sheltered in youth ; but early hardships, by destroying all the tender, insure the hardiness of the survivors; which is the cause, not the effect, of their having lived through such a training. So, loading a gun-barrel to the muzzle, an 1 firing k, does not give it strength ; though it proves , if it escape that it was strong. In like manner, nothing is more common than Appeal to to hear a person state confidently, as from his supposed ex - own experience, that such and such a patient P erienca - was cured, by this or that medicine : whereas all that he ab- solutely knows, is that he took the medicine, and that he recovered. Similar is the procedure of many who are no theorists for- sooth, but have found by experience that the diffusion of educa- tion disqualifies the lower classes for humble toil. They have perhaps experienced really a deterioration in this last respect , and having a dislike to education, they shut their eyes to the increase of pauperism ; i. e. of the mbit of depending on parish-pay, rather than on independer exertions ; which, to any unprejudiced eye would seem the most natural mode of explaining the relaxation of those exertions. But such men require us, on the ground that they are practical men, to adopt the results of their experience ; i. e. to acquiesce in their irude guesses as to cause and effect, (like that of the rustic who made Tenterden-steeple d e cause of Good- win Sands,) precisely because they r re not accustomed Ui reason 226 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III Hurtful 1 believe we may refer to the same head the changes attnb- apprehensions so often entertained, thai a change , vied to harm- however small, and however in itself harmless, less ones. . .. , , . , is necessarily a dangerous thing, as tending to produce extensive and hurtful innovations. Many instances may be found of small alterations being followed by great and mischievous ones ; * but I doubt whether all history can furnish an instance of the greater innovation having been, properly speaking, caused by the lesser. Of course the first change will always precede the second ; and many mischiev- ous innovations have taken place ; but these may all I think be referred to a mistaken effort to obtain some good, or get rid of some evil ; not to the love of innovation for its own sake The mass of mankind are, in the serious concerns of life wedded to what is established and customary ; and when the., make rash changes, this may often be explained by the too long postponement of the requisite changes ; which allows (as in the case of the Reformation) evils to reach an intolerable height, before any remedy is thought of. And even then, the remedy is often so violently resisted by many, as to drive others into dangerous extremes. And when this occurs, wo are triumphantly told that experience shows what mischievous excesses are caused by once beginning to innovate. “ I told you that if once you began to repair your house, you would have to pull it all down.” “Yes; but you told me wrong; for if I had begun sooner, the replacing of a few tiles might have sufficed. The mischief was, not in taking down the first itone, but in letting it stand too long.” Cause and Such an argument as any of these might reason con- str ; ct [y | 3e called “ non causa pro causa ; ” but founded to- t ! r it is not probable that the Logical writers in* * Post Ikw : ergo, propter hoc.” OF FALLACIES. 227 * 4 .] fended any such limitation (which indeed would bis wholly unnecessary and impertinent,) but rather that they were confounding together cause and reason; the sequence of Conclusion from Premisses being perpetually mistaken for that of effect from physical cause* It may be better, there- fore, to drop the name which tends to perpetuate this con- fusion, and simply to state (when such is the case) that the premiss is “ unduly assumed ; ” i. e. without being either self- evident, or satisfactorily proved. The contrivances by which men may deceive themselves or others, in assuming Premisses unduly, so that that undue assumption shall not he perceived , (for it is in this the Fallacy consists) are of course infinite. Sometimes (as was before observed) the doubtful Premiss is suppressed , as if it were too evident to need being proved, or even stated, and as if the whole question turned on the establishment of the other premiss. Thus Horne Tooke proves, by an immense induc- tion, that all particles were originally nouns or verbs ; and thence concludes, that in reality they are so still, and that the ordinary division of the parts of speech is absurd ; keep- ing out of sight, as self-evident, the other premiss, which is absolutely false ; viz. that the meaning and force of a word, now, and forever, must be that, which it, or its root, originally bore. Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an unfounded assertion, by being confidently told, n irec assumption. that it is so evident, that it would argue great weakness to doubt it. In general, however, the more skilful Sophist will avoid a direct assertion of what he means unduly o assume ; because that might direct the reader’s attention ta * See Appendix, No. I. article Reason. 228 ELEMENTS UF LOUIC. [Boor. in the consideration of the question whether it be true or not since that which is indisputable does not so often need to be asserted. It succeeds better, therefore, to allude to the prop- osition, as something curious and remarkable ; just as the Royal Society were imposed on by being asked to account for the fact that a vessel of water received no addition to its weight by a live fish put into it; while they were seeking for the cause , they forgot to ascertain the fact ; and thus admitted without suspicion a mere fiction. Thus an eminent Scotch writer,* instead of asserting that the “ advocates of Logic have been worsted and driven from the field in every contro- versy,” (an assertion which, if made, would have been tha more readily ascertained to be perfectly groundless,) mere y observes, that “ it is a circumstance not a little remarkable .” Again, any one who is decrying all appeal to evidence in jehalf of Christianity, (see Appendix iii. Note) will hardly venture to assert plainly that such was the practice of the Apostles, and that they called on men to believe what they preached, without any reason for believing. That would present too glaring a contrast to the truth. He will succeed better b_, merely dwelling on the earnest demand of “ faith ’ made by the Apostles; trusting that the inadvertent reader will forget that the basis on which this demand vas made to rest, was, the evidence of miracles and prophecies ; and will thus be led to infer that we are to imitate the Apostles by a procedure which is in fact the opposite of theirs. One of the many contrivances employed for Fallacy of p Ur p 0 se, is what may be called the “ Fal- References. ...... , , lacy of rejerences ; which is particularly common in popular theological works. It i? cf course a * Dugald Stewart. .. u OF FALLACIES. 229 f w] circumstance which adds great weight to any assertion, that it shall seem to be supported by many passages of Scripture or of the Fathers and other ancient writers, whose works are not in many people’s hands. Now when a writer can find few or none of these, .hat distinctly and decidedly favor his opinion, he may at least find many which may be conceived capable of being so understood, or which, in some way or other, remotely relate to the subject ; but if these texts were nserted at length, it would be at once perceived how little they bear on the question ; the usual artifice therefore is, to give merely references to them ; trusting that nineteen out of twenty readers will never take the trouble of turning to the passages, but, taking for granted that they afford, each, some degree of confirmation to what is maintained, will be overawed by seeing every assertion supported, as they suppose, by five or six Scripture-texts, — as many from the Fathers, 4*c. Great force is often added to the employment in a declam- atory work, of the fallacy now before us, by bitterly reproach - ing or deriding an opponent, as denying some sacred truth, or some evident axiom ; assuming, that is, that he denies the true premiss, and keeping out of sight the one on which the question really turns. E. G. a declaimer who is maintaining some doctrine as being taught in Scripture, may impute to his opnonents a contempt for the authority of Scripture, and reproach them for impiety ; when the question really is, whether *he doctrine be scriptural or not. Frequently the Fallacy of irrelevant conclu- sion [ignoraiio elenchi\ is called in to the aid of Combination lhi3 ' i. e. the Premiss is assumed on the ground ^ us * allac y with the fol- of another pnposition, somewhat like it, having ^ w i n g . been proved. Thus, in arguing by example, Sj-c. the varaVelism of two cases is often assumed from 20 830 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. flOOK III their being in so,ne respects aliite, though perhaps thej differ in the -very point which is essential to the argu- ment. E. G. From the circumstance that some men of humble station, who have been well educated, are apt to think themselves above low drudgery, it is argued, that universal education of the lower orders would beget general idleness: this argument rests, of course, on the assumption of parallel- ism in the two cases, viz. the past and the future ; whereas there is a circumstance that is absolutely essential, in which they differ; for when education is universal , it must cease to be a distinction : which is probably the very circumstance that renders men too proud for their work. Again, parallels have been drawn by Hume, (in his Essay on Miracles) and by Christian writers, between the mira- cles recorded in the New Testament, and those in the Le- gends of pretended Saints; which last were received just as counterfeit coin is, from its resemblance to genuine. This very same Fallacy is often resorted to on the opposite side : an attempt is made to invalidate some argument from Example, by pointing out a difference between the two cases , though they agree in every thing that is essential to the ques- tion. It should be added that we may often be de- Calculation ce ; vec i ? no t on jy by admitting a premiss which of probabili- .... , , , , ... ties is absolutely unsupported, but also, by attributing to one which really is probable, a greater de- gree of probability than rightly belongs to it. And this effecl will often be produced by our omitting to calculate the proba- bility in each successive step of a long chain of argument, and being in each, (see §11,) deceived by the fallacy of Division. Each premiss successively introduced, may have as was above explained, an excess of chances ; n its favor, anq OF FALLACIES. 231 \ HJ yet the ultimate conclusion may have a great preponderance against it; e. g. “All Y is (probably) X : all Z is (probably) Y : therefore Z is (probably) X : ” now suppose the truth of the major premiss to be more probable than not ; in othei 1 4 words, that the chances for it are more than - ; say - ; and foi Z I 2 ihe truth of the minor, let the chances be greater still ; say - 1 then by multiplying together the numerators, and also the 4 2 .8 denominators of these two fractions, =■ X ,, we obtain as indicating the degree of probability of the conclusion ; which is less than * ; i. e. the conclusion is less likely to be true than not. E. G. “ The reports this author heard are (probably) true ; this (something which he records) is a re- port which (probably) he heard; therefore it is true;” sup- pose, first, The majority of the reports he heard, — as 4 out of 7, (or 12 of 21,) — to be true; and, next, That he gener- ally , — as twice in three times, — (or 8 in 12,) — repeats faithfully what he heard ; it follows that of 21 of his reports, only 8 are true. Of course, the results are proportionably striking when there is a long series of arguments of this description. And yet weak and thoughtless reasoners are often influenced by hearing a great deal urged, — a great number of probabilities brought forward, — in support of some conclusion; i. e. a tong chain, of which each successive link is weaker than the foregoing ; instead of (what they mistake it for) a cumula tion of arguments, each, separately , proving the certainty oi probability, of the same conclusion.* * The converse fallacy is treated of below in § 18. When there really are several distinct and independent arguments 232 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III Lastly, it may be here remarked, conformably with wha has been formerly said, that it will often be left to your choice whether to refer this or that fallacious argument to the present not incompatible, and not connected, each separately proving the probability of the same conclusion, we compute, from our estimate of the degree of probability of each, the joint [ cumulative ] force of them, by the same sort of calculation as the above, only reversed : viz. as, in the case of two probable premisses, the conclusion is not established except on the supposition of their being both true, so in the case of two (and the like holds good with any number) distinct and independ- ent indications of the truth cf some proposition, unless both of then) fail, the proposition must be true : we therefore multiply together the fractions indicating the probability of failure of each, — the chances against it ; — and the result being the total chances against the establishment of the conclusion by these arguments, this fraction being deducted from unity, the remainder gives the probability for it. E. G. a certain book is conjectured to be by such and such an author, partly, 1st. from its resemblance in style to his know* works, partly (2dly) from its being attributed to him by some one likely to be pretty- well informed : let the probability of the Conclusion, as deduced 9 from one of these arguments by itself, be supposed -j, and, in the 3 . 3 other case - ; then the opposite probabilities will be, respectively, - and 4 12 y ; which multiplied together give as the probability against the Conclusion ; i. e. the chance that the work may not be his, notwith- standing those reasons for believing that it is' : and consequently the 23 2 probability in favor of that Conclusion will be ; or nearly Observe however that, in some cases, a perfectly distinct argument arises from the combination of certain circumstances, which have, each separately, no force at all, or very little, towards establishing a con- clusion which yet may be inferred, perhaps with a moral certainty, from that combination, when those circumstances are such that the chances are very great against their accidental concurrence. E. G. when two or more persons, undeserving of credit, coincide (where collusion would be impossible) in a full and circumstantial detail of some transaction. C3ee Rhet. Part I. Ch. ii. § 4.) . 3 ] OF FALLACIE? 233 nead, oi [hat of Ambiguous-Middle ; “ if the middle term ia here used in this sense, there is an ambiguity ; if in that sense, the proposition is false § 15 . The last kind of Fallacy to be noticed is that r , J Irrelevant of Irrelevant-Conclusion, commonly called igno- Conclusion ratio elenchi. Various kinds of propositions are, according to the occa- sion, substituted for the one of which proof is required. Sometimes, the Particular for the Universal ; sometimes a proposition with different Terms : and various are the contrivances employed to effect and to conceal this sub stitution, and to make the Conclusion which the Sophist has drawn, answer, practically, the same purpose as the ou« lie ought to have established. I say, “ practically the same purpose,” because it will very often happen that some emotion will be excited — some sentiment impressed on the mind — (by a dexterous employment of this Fallacy) such as shall bring men into the disposition requisite for your purpose, though they may not have assented to, or even stated distinct- ly in their own minds, the proposition which it was your business to establish.* Thus if a Sophist has to defend one tvho has been guilty of some serious offence, which he wishes to extenuate, though he is unable distinctly to prove that it is not such, yet if he can succeed in making the audience laugn at some casual matter, he has gained practically the same point * See Rhetoric, Part II. 20 * B34 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. Ill So also if any one has pointed out the extenuating circum- stances in some particular case of offence, so as to show that it differs widely from the generality of the same class, the Sophist, if he find himself unable to disprove these circum- stances, may do away the force of them, by simply referring the action to that very class , which no one can deny that it belongs to, and the very name of which will excite a feeling cf disgust sufficient to counteract the extenuation ; e. g. let it be a case of peculation ; and that many mitigating circum- stances have been brought forward which cannot be denied ; the sophistical opponent will reply, “ Well, but after all, the man is a rogue , and there is an end of it ; ” now in reality this was (by hypothesis) never the question ; and the mere asser- tion of what was never denied, ought not, in fairness, to be regarded as decisive ; but practically, the odiousness of the word, arising in great measure from the association of those very circumstances which belong to most of the class, but which we have supposed to be absent in this particular in- stance, excites precisely that feeling of disgust, which in effect destroys the force of the defence. In like manner we may refer to this head, all cases of improper appeals to the passions, and every thing else which is mentioned by Aristotle extraneous to the matter in hand ((?w tov nQ&yyaiog.) In all these cases, as has been before observed, if the fal- lacy we are now treating of be employed for the apparent establishment, not of the ultimate Conclusion, but (as it very commonly happens) of a Premiss, (i. e. if the Premiss re- quired be assumed on the ground that some proposition Resembling it has been proved) then there will be a combina- tion af this Fallacy with the last mentioned. For instance, instead of proving that “ this Prisoner has committed an atrocious fraud,” you prove that “the fra'id OF FALLACIES. 235 H5j he is accused of is atrocia s : ” instead of proving (as in the well-known tale of Cyrus and the two coats) „ J ' Combination that “ the taller boy had a right to force the other 0 j t ^ s y a \. boy to exchange coats with him,” you prove that lac y with tfle “the exchange would have been advantageous f 0,e 9 0in 9- to both : ” instead of proving that “ a man has not a right to educate his children or to dispose of his property, in the way he thinks best," you show that the way in which he educates his children, or disposes of his property is not really the best : instead of proving that “ the poor ought to be relieved in this way rather than in that,” you prove that “ the poor ought to be relieved:" instead of proving that “ an irrational-agent — whether a brute or a madman — can never be deterred from any act by apprehension of punishment,” (as for instance a dog from sheep-biting, by fear of being beaten) you prove that “ the beating of one dog does not operate as an example to other dogs,” &c. and then you proceed to assume as prem- isses, conclusions different from what have really been estab- lished. A good instance of the employment and exposure of this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus concerning the Mitylenaeans : the former (over and above his appeal to the angry passions of his audience) urges the justice of putting the revolters to death ; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to the purpose, since the Athe- nians were not sitting in judgment , but in deliberation ; of which the proper end is expediency. And to prove that they nad a right to put them to death, did not prove this to be an advisable step. It is evident, that ignoralio elenclii may be This fallacy employed as well for the apparent refutation of used, in refuua your opponent’s proposition, as for the apparent ilon ‘ 836 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. Ill establishment of your own ; for it is substantially tile same thing, to prove what was not denied, or to disproie what was not asserted. The latter practice is not less com m®n ; and it is more offensive, because it frequently amounts to a personal affront, in attributing to a person opinions, <^-c which he perhaps holds in abhorrence. Th«s when in a dis- cussion one party vindicates, on the ground of general expe- diency, a particular instance of resistance to Government in a case of intolerable oppression, the opponent may gravely maintain, that “ we ought not to do evil tha* good may come : ” a proposition which of course had never been denied ; the point in dispute being “ whether resistance in this particular case were doing evil or not.” Or again, by way of disprov- ing the assertion of the “ right of private-judgment in reli- gion,” one may hear a grave argument to prove that “ it is impossible every one can be right in his judgment." In these examples, it is to be remarked, (as well as in some given just above,) that the Fallacy of petilio principii is combined with that of ignoratio elenchi ; which is a very common and often successful practice ; viz. the Sophist proves, or disproves, not the proposition which is really in question, but one which is so dependent on it as to proceed on the supposition that it is already decided, and can admit of no doubt; by this means his “ assumption of the point in question” is so direct and oblique, that it may easily escape notice ; and he thus estab- lishes, practically, his Conclusion, at the very moment he is withdrawing your attention from it to another question. E. G. An advocate will prove, and dwell on the high criminality of a certain act, and the propriety of severely punishing it; as- suming (instead of proving) the commission. There are certain kinds of argument recounted and named by Logical writers, which we should by no means universally } 13. J OF FALLACIES. 237 call Fallacies ; but which when unfairly jsed, und so far a» then are fallacious, may very well be referred to the present head ; such as the “ argumentum ad hominem," [or “ personal argument,”] “ argumentum ad ^ verecundiam," “ argumentum ad populum ,” 8fC. nem ^ ^ all of them regarded as contradistinguished from “ argumentum ad rem ; ” or, according to others (mean, ing probably the very same thing) “ ad judicium." These have alt been described in the lax and popular language before alluded to, but not scientifically : the “ argumentum ad horn- incm ,” they say, “ is addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and does not bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the ‘ argumen- tum ad rem ' does : ” in like manner, the “ argumentum ad verecundiam ” is described as an appeal to our reverence for some respected authority, some venerable institution, Sf-c. and the “ argumentum ad populum," as an appeal to the prejudices, passions, fyc. of the multitude ; and so of the rest. Along with these is usually enumerated “ argumentum ad ignoran- tiam ,” which is here omitted, as being evidently nothing mere than the employment of some kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of that word, towards such as are likely to be de- ceived by it. It appears then (to speak rather more techni- cally) that in the “ argumentum ad hominem ” the conclusion which actually is established, is aot the absolute and general one in question, but relaive and particular ; viz. not that “such and such is the fact,” but that “ this man is bouno to admit iq in jonformity to his principles of Reasoring, or in .’.onsistenci Technical analysis of personal ar - §c. 238 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Look III with his own conduct, situation,” fyc* Such a conch sion 1 is often both allowable and necessary to establish, in order to silence those who will not yield to fair general argument ; 01 to convince t.iose whose weakness and prejudices would not allow them to assign o it its due weight. It is thus that out Lord on many occasions silences the cavils of the Jews as in the vindication of healing on the Sabbath, which is par alleled by the authorized practice of drawing out a beast that has fallen into a pit. All this, as we have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be done plainly, and avowedly ; but if you attempt to substitute this partial and relative Conclusion for a more general one — if you triumph as having established your proposition absolutely and universally, from having established * The “ argumentum ad hominem ” will often have the effect of shifting the burden of proof, not unjustly, to the adversary. (See Rhet. Part I chap. iii. § 2.) A common instance is the defence, certainly the readiest and most concise, frequently urged by the Sportsman, when accused of barbarity in sacrificing unoffending hares or trout to his amusement : he replies, as he may safely do, to most of his assail- ants, “ why do you feed on the flesh of the harmless sheep and ox ? ” and that this answer presses hard, is manifested by its being usually opposed by a palpable falsehood ; viz. that the animals which are killed for food are sacrificed to our necessities ; though not only men can , but a large proportion (probably a great majority) of the human race actually do, subsist in health and vigor without flesh-diet ; and the earth would support a much greater human population were such a practice universal. When shamed out of this argument they sometimes urge that the orute creation would overrun the earth, if we did not kill them for food; an argument, which, if it were valid at all, would not justify their feeding on fish ; though, if fairly followed up, it would justify Swift’s proposal for keeping down the excessive population of Ireland. The true reason, viz. that they eat flesh for the gratification of thfl palate, and have a tast 3 for the pleasures of the table, though net foi the sports of the field is one which they do not like to assign. OF FALLACIES. 239 t i&.j it, in reality, only as far as it relates to your opponent, then you are guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we are now treating of : your Conclusion is not in reality that which was, by your own account, proposed to be proved. The falla- ciousness depends upon the deceit , or attempt to deceive The same observations will apply to “ argumentum ad vcrecuvr diam ,” and the rest. It is very common to employ an ambiguous Ambvjuou » Term for the purpose of introducing the Fal- termsemphyed lacy of irrelevant conclusion : i. e. when you in this Fal- cannot prove your proposition in the sense in which it was maintained, to prove it in some other sense ; e. g. those who contend against the efficacy of faith , usually em- ploy that word in their arguments in the sense of mere belief, unaccompanied with any moral or practical result, but consid- ered as a mere intellectual process ; and when they have thus proved their conclusion, they oppose it to one in which the word is used in a widely different sense.* * “ When the occasion or object in question is not such as calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular readers or hearers, the emo- tions required, it is a common Rhetorical artifice to turn their atten- tion to some object which will call forth these feelings ; and when they are too much excited to be capable of judging calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their Passions, once roused, in the direction required, and to make them view the case before them in a very different light. When the metal is heated it may easily be moulded into the desired form. Thus vehement indignation against some crime, may be directed against a person who has not been proved guilty of it ; and vague leclamations against corruption, oppression, $c. or against the mis- chiefs of anarchy ; with high-flown panegyrics on liberty, rights of man, $e. or on social-order, justice, the constitution, law, religion, & -,c will gradually lead the hearers to take for granted, without proof, that the measure proposed will lead to these evils, or to these advantages ; and it will in consequence become the object of groundless abhor- rence or admiration. For the very utterance of such words is have a ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Boon in § 16. The Fallacy of “ irrelevant-conclusion” \ig- noratio elenchi] is nowhere more common than in protracted controversy, when one of the par ties, after having attempted in vain to maintain his position, shifts his ground as covertly as possible to another, instead of honestly giving up the point. An instance occurs in an attack made on the system pursued at one of our Universities. The objectors, finding themselves unable to maintain their charge of the present neglect {viz. in the year 1810) of Mathematics in that place, (to which neglect they attributed the “ late gen- eral decline ” in those studies) shifted their ground, and con- tended that that University “ was never famous for Mathema- ticians : ” which not only does not establish, but absolutely overthrows, their own original assertion ; for if it never suc- ceeded in those pursuits, it could not have caused their late decline. A practice of this nature is common in oral controversy especially ; viz. that of combating loth your opponent’s Prem- isses alternately , and shifting the attack from Fallacy of the one to the other, without waiting to have vmbating the e ; ther of them decided upon before you quit it. two Premisses alternately. “ Awa besides , is an expression one may often hear from a disputant who is proceeding to a 240 Shifting ground. multitude of what may be called stimulating ideas associated with them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially of the igno- rant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will effect- ually blind their judgment ; so that a string of vague abuse or pane- gyric will often have the effect of a train of sound Aigument.” Rhetoric , Part II. Chap. ii. § 6. i 17.] of fallacies. 241 fre«h argument, when he cannot establish, and yet will not abandon, his first. It has been remarked above, that one class of the propo- sitions that may be, in this Fallacy, substituted for the one required, is the particular for the universal : similar to this, is the substitution of a conditional with a universal antecedent, for one with a particular antecedent ; which will usually be the harder to orove : e. g. you are called on, suppose, to prove that if any yi. e. some) private interests are hurt by a pro- posed measure, it is inexpedient : ” and you pretend to have done so by showing that “ if all private interests are hurt by it, it must be inexpedient.” Nearly akin to this is the very common case of proving something to be possible when it ought to have been proved highly probable ; or probable, when it ought to have been proved necessary ; or, which comes to the very same, proving it to be not necessary , when it should have been proved not probable ; or improbable, when it should have been proved impossible. Aristotle {in Rhct. Book II.) complains of this last branch of the Fallacy, as giv- ing an undue advantage to the respondent; many a guilty person owes his acquittal to this ; the jury considering that the evidence brought does not demonstrate the complete impossi- bility of his being innocent; though perhaps the chances are innumerable against it. § 17 . Similar to this case is that which may be called the Fallacy of objections : i. e. showing °f f ° Objections. that there are objections against some plan, the- ory, or system, and thence inferring that it should be rejected • when that which ought to have been proved is, that there ai« 21 242 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II L more, oi stronger objections, against the receiving than tha i ejecting of it. Tins is the main, and almost universal Fal- lacy of anti-christians ; and is that of which a young Chris- tian should be first and principally warned.* They find nu- merous “ objections ” against various parts of Scripture ; to some of which no satisfactory answer can be given ; and the incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on these, to forget that there are infinitely more, and stronger objec- tions against the supposition that the Christian Religion is of human origin ; and that where we cannot answer all objec- tions, we are bound in reason and in candor to adopt the hy- pothesis which labors under the least. That the case is as I have stated, I am authorized to assume, from this circum- stance ; that 7io complete and consistent account has ever been given of the manner in which the Christian Religion, sup- posing it a human contrivance, could have arisen and pre- vailed as it did. And yet this may obviously be demanded with the utmost fairness, of those who deny its divine origin. The Religion exists : that is the phenomenon ; those who will not allow it to have come from God, are bound to solve the phenomenon on some other hypothesis less open to objections. They are not indeed called on to prove that it actually did arise in this or that way ; but to suggest (consistently with ac knowledged facts) some prfebable way in which it may have arisen, reconcilable with all the circumstances of the case. That infidels have never done this, though they have had 1800 years to try, amounts to a confession that no such hypothesis can be devised, which will not be open to greater objections than lie against Christianity.f * See note at the end of Appendix, No. III. T In an “ Essay on the Omissions of our Sacred Writers,” I have pointed out some circumstances which no one has ever attempted U OF FALLACIES. 24 ?. I 17 .] The Fallacy of Objections is also the strong- Reforms an hold of bigoted anti-innovators, who oppose ail °P en t0 ob J ec ' reforms and alterations indiscriminately ; for Uo,ls ' there never was, or will be, any plan executed or proposed, against which strong and even unanswerable objections may not be urged ; so that unless the opposite objections be set in the balance on the other side, we can never advance a step. E G. The defenders of the Transportation-system, — a sys- tem which, as an eminent writer has observed, was “ begun in defiance of all Reason, and persevered in, in defiance of all Experience ” — are accustomed to ask “ what kind of Second- ary-punishment would you substitute ? ” and if any one is suggested, they adduce the objections, and difficulties, real and apparent, to which it is exposed ; if another is proposed, they proceed in the same manner ; and so on, without end. For of all the other plans of Secondary-punishment that have ever been tried, or imagined, the best must be open to some objections, though the very worst is much less objectionable than Trans- portation.* * “ There are objections,” said Dr. Johnson, “ against a plenum , and objections against a vacuum ; but one of them must be true.” The very same Fallacy indeed is employed (as has been said) on the other side, by those who are for overthrowing whatever is established as soon as they can prove an objection against it; without considering whether more and weightier objections may not lie against their own schemes ; but their opponents have this decided advantage over them, that they can urge with great plausibility, “ we do not call upon you to reject at once whatever is objected to, but merely to suspend uccount for on any supposition of their being other thar not orJ y inn witnesses, but supernaturally inspired. * See Letters to Earl Grey on Transportation. 244 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book TIL your judgment, and not come to a decision as long as there are reasons on both sides : ” now since there always will It reasons on both sides, this won-decision is practically the very same thing as a decision in favor of the existing state cf things. “ Not to resolve, is to resolve.” * The delay of trial becomes equivalent to an acquittal .t § 18 . Fallacy of Another form of ignoratio clcnchi, which is proving a part also rather the more serviceable on the side of of the question. t jj e respondent^ is, to prove or disprove some part of that which is required, and dwell on that, suppressing all the rest. Thus, if a University is charged with cultivating only the mere elements of Mathematics, and in reply a list of the books studied there is produced, should even any one of those books be not elementary , the charge is in fairness refuted ; but the Sophist may then earnestly contend that some of those books are elementary ; and thus keep out of sight the real question, viz. whether they are all so.f So, also, one may maintain (with perfect truth) that mere intellectual ability — the reasoning powers alone — are insuf- ficient for the attainment of truth in religious questions ; (see Appendix III. note) and may thence proceed to assume * Bacon. t How happy it is for mankind that in many of the most moment- ous concerns of life their decision is generally formed for them by external circumstances : which thus saves them not only from the per- plexity of doubt and the danger of delay, but also from the pain of regret ; since we acquiesce much more cheerfully in that which is unavoidable. J “ Reply to calumnies of Edinb. Review against Oxford ' 1810 . 18.] OF FALLACIES. 245 ;usifitwere the same proposition) that all employment ot reasoning — all intellectual cultivation — are perfectly useless on such questions, and are to be discarded as foreign from the subject. This is the great art of the answerer of a nook; suppose the main positions in any work Art °f f’ am ~ . . . ln( J « Reply . to be irrefragable, it will be strange if some illustration of them, or some subordinate part, in short, will not admit of a plausible objection ; the opponent then joins issue on one of these incidental questions, and comes forward with “ a Reply ” to such and such a work. And such a “ Reply ” is still easier and more plausible, when it happens — • as it often will — that a real and satisfactory refutation can be found of some one, or more, of several arguments, each, singly, proving completely the same conclusion ; (as many a theorem of Euclid admits of several different demonstrations) or an answer to one or more of several objections, each, sepa- rately, decisive against a certain scheme or theory ; though it is evident on reflection, that if the rest, or any one of them, remain unrefuted and unanswerable, the conclusion is estab- lished, and stands as firm as if the answerer had urged nothing. He who thus replies to the arguments urged, is in the con- dition of a commander defending all the practicable breaches in a fortification except one. This kind of partial “ reply ” is properly available only in a case where each of the argu- ments does not go to establish the certainty , but only the probability of the conclusion. Then indeed, the conclusion resting not wholly on the force of any one of the arguments, but on the combination of them, is proportionably weakened by the refutation of any of them. The fallacy I am now sneaking of consists in the confounding ot the preceding case 21 * 246 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 111 either with this latter, or with the case formerly noticed [§ 14" of a chain of arguments, each proving, not, the same oonclu sion, but a premiss of the succeeding. Hence the danger of ever advancing more Damjn of ^y, an can [j e vve ][ maintained, since the refuta- maintammg too much. tion of that will often quash the whole. The Quakers would perhaps before now have sue ceeded in doing away our superfluous and irreverent oaths, if they had not, besides many valid and strong arguments, adduced so many that are weak and easily refuted. Thus, also, a guilty person may often escape by having too much laid to his charge ; so he may also, by having too much evidence against him, i. e. some that is not in itself sat- isfactory. Accordingly, a prisoner may sometimes obtain acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses against him is an infamous informer and spy ; though perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, the rest would have been sufficient for conviction. Cases of this nature might very well be referred also to the Fallacy formerly mentioned, of inferring the Falsity of the Conclusion from the Falsity of a Premiss ; which indeed is very closely allied to the present Fallacy : the real question is, “ whether or not this Conclusion ought to he admitted;'" the Sophist confines himself to the question, “ whether or not it is established by this particular argument ; ” leaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he has carried his point as to the latter question, that the former is thereby decided ; which is then, and then only, a correct inference, when there is good reason for believing that other and better arguments would have been adduced, if there had been any. (See above pt the end of § 6.) OF FALLACIES. 24 ? ( 19 ] § 19 . It will readily be perceived that nothing Is less conducive to the success of the Fallacy in ques- Suppressed Conclusion. tion, than to state clearly, in the outset, either the proposition you are about to prove, or that which you ought to prove. It answers best to begin with the Premisses, and to introduce a pretty long chain of argu- ment before you arrive at the Conclusion. The careless hearer takes for granted, at the beginning, that this chain will lead to the Conclusion required ; and by the time you are come to the end, he is ready to take for granted that the Conclusion which you draw is the one required ; his idea of the question having gradually become indistinct. This Fallacy is greatly aided by the common practice of sup- pressing the Conclusion and leaving it to be supplied by the hearer; who is of course less likely to perceive whether it be really that “ which was to be proved,” than if it were dis- tinctly stated. The practice therefore is at best suspicious ; and it is better in general to avoid it, and to give and require a distinct statement of the Conclusion intended. The Fallacy now before us is, perhaps, the most common form of that conclusion of thought to which those are liable who have been irregularly and unskilfully educated ; — who have collected perhaps a considerable amount of knowledge, without arrangement, and without cultivation of logical habits ; — who have learned (as I have heard it expressed) a good many answers without the questions. Most of the erroneous views in Morals, and in other subjects, which prevail among such persons, may be exhibited in the form of Fallacies of e48 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III Irrelevant-conclusion.” * E. G. The well-known wrong de- cision respecting the two boys and their coats, for which Cy- rus was punished by his preceptor, was a mistake of the real question , which was, not, “ which coat fitted each boy the best,’ but “ who had the right to dispose of them. ’ Anj! similar cases to this occur every day. An exact parallel is to be found in the questions relative to the imposition of restric- tions or other penalties on those of a different creed from our own. They are usually argued as if the point to be decided were “ which religion is the better,” or, “ whether the differ- ences between them are important ; ” instead of being, “ whether one man has a right to compel others to profess his religion,” or, “ whether the professors of the true Faith have a right to monopolize secular power and civil privileges.” Or attain (to put the same principles into another form) the ques- tions “ whether it be allowable for a Christian to fight in de- fending himself from oppression and outrage,” t and “ wheth- ♦ “ The fallacy consists in confounding together the unbroken Apostolical succession of a Christian Ministry, generally, and the same succession in an unbroken line, of this or that individual Minister. ****** If each man’s Christian hope is made to rest on his receiving the Christian Ordinances at the hands of a Minister to whom the sacramental virtue ” [of ordination] “ that gives efficacy to those ordinances, has been transmitted in unbroken succession from hand to hand, every thing must depend on that particular Ministei ; and his claim is by no means established from our merely establishing the uninterrupted existence of such a class of men as Christian Ministers. You teach me, — a man might say, — that my salvation depends on the possession by you — the particular Pastor under whom I am placed — of a certain qualification ; and when I ask for the proof that you possess it, you prove to me that it is possessed generally by a cer - vain class of persons of whom you are one. and probably by a large ma jority of them ! ” — On the Kingdom of Christ, Essay II. § 30. t See Essay 1st, on the Kingdom of Christ. 20 .] OF FALLACIES. 249 er a Christian magistrate may employ physical coercion and inflict secular punishment on evil-doers,” — these, are perpet- ually confounded with the questions “ whether Christians are allowed to fight as such; i. e. to fight for their Religion, against those who corrupt or reject the faith ; ” and, “ whether a Christian magistrate may employ coercion on behalf of Christianity, and inflict punishment on Heretics as evil- doers.” * Again, such propositions as the following, one may often hear, sophistically or negligently, confounded together : “ The Apostles held religious assemblies on the first day of the week,” with “ They transferred the Sabbath from the seventh day to the first : ” t “A Jew, Mahometan, or Roman Catholic, is not the most eligible person to hold Office in a Protestant- christian country,” with “ Such persons ought not to be legally eligible : ” “ The Apostles established such and such a form of government in the Churches they founded,” with “ They designed this form to be binding on all Christians as an Ordi- nance forever," &c. $ § 20 . Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, j it may not be improper to mention the just and ingenious remark, that Jests are mock- Fallacies ; i, e. Falla- cies so palpable as not to be likely to deceive any one, but yet bearing just that resemblance of Argument which is cal- * See Essays on the Dangers, &c. Notes E. and F ] See Thoughts on the Sabbath. See Kingdom of Christ, Essay II. § 9. 250 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IIL eu'.at&ti to amuse by tbc contrast ; in the same manner that a parody does, by the contrast of its levity with the serious pro- duction which it imitates. There is indeed something k ugh- able even in Fallacies which are intended for serious convic- tion, when they are thoroughly exposed.* There are several different kinds of joke and raillery, which will be found to correspond with the different kinds of Fallacy. The Pun (to take the simplest and most obvious case) is evidently, in most instances, a mock-argument founded on a palpable equivocation of the Middle-Term; and others in like manner will be found to correspond to the respective Fallacies, and to be imitations of serious argument. It is probable indeed that all jests, sports, or games ( naiSial ) properly so called, will be found, on examination, to be imi- tative of serious transactions ; as of War, or Commerce. t But to enter fully into this subject would be unsuitable to the present occasion. I shall subjoin some general remarks on the legitimate province of Reasoning, and on its connection with Inductive philosophy, and with Rhetoric ; on which points much misap- prehension has prevailed, tending to throw obscurity over the design and use of the Science under consideration. A treatise on what are called the “ laws of evidence ” the different kinds , strictly speaking, of arguments — and the occasions for which they are respectively suited, die., which i3 what some would expect in a Logical Work, will be found in the 1st part of the “ Elements of Rhetoric.” * See Wallis’s Logic, and also Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. iii. j> 7, p. 131 t See some excellent remarks on “ Imitation,” in I'r. A. Smith posthum ms Essays. BOOK IY. DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING, Logic being concerned with the theory of Reasoning, it is evidently necessary, in order to take a correct view of this Science, that all misapprehensions should be removed relative to the occasions on which the Reasoning-process is employed, — the purposes it has in view, — and the limits within which it is confined. Simple and obvious as such questions may appear to those who have not thought much on the subject, they will appear on further consideration to be involved in much perplexity and obscurity, from the vague and inaccurate language of many popular writers. To the confused and incorrect notions that prevail respecting the Reasoning-process may be traced most of the common mistakes respecting the Science of Logic, and much of the unsound and unphilosophical argumenta- tion which is so often to be met with in the works of ingenious writers. These errors have been incidentally adverted to in the fore- going part of this work ; but it may be desirable, before we dismiss the subject, to offer on these points some further re- marks, which could not have been there introduced withoul 100 great an interruption to the development of the systera *52 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV Little or nothing indeed remains to be said that is not implied in th: principles which have been already laid down ; but the results and applications of those principles are liable in many instances to be overlooked, if not distinctly pointed out These supplementary observations will neither require, noi admit of, so systematic an arrangement as has hitherto been aimed at : since they will be such as are suggested principally by the objections and mistakes of those who have misunder- stood, partially or entirely, the nature of the Logical system. Let it be observed, however, that as I am not writing a re- view or commentary on any logical works, but an introduc- tion to the science, I shall not deem it necessary to point out in all cases the agreement and disagreement between other writers and myself, in respect of the views maintained, or the terms employed, by each. Chap. I. — Of Induction. § 1 . Much has been said by some writers of the Mistake of SU p er i or ity 0 f the Inductive to the Syllogistic opposing In- auction to Syl- method of seeKing truth ; as if the two stood op- fogism. posed to each other ; and of the advantage of substituting the Organon of Bacon for that of Aristotle, 8pc. which indicates a total misconception of the na- ture of both. There is, however, the more excuse for the con- fusion of thought which prevails on this subject, because emi- nent Logical writers have treated, or at least have appeared to treat, of Induction as a kind of Argument distinci from the Chap. I. } l.J OF INDUCTION. 25 i Syllogism ; which if it were, it certainly might by contrasted with the Syllogism : or rather, the whole Syllogistic theory would fall to the ground, since one of the very first principles it establishes, is that all Reasoning, on whatever subject, is one and the same process, which may be clearly exhibited in the form of Syllogisms. It is hardly to be supposed theie- fore, that was the deliberate meaning of those writers ; though it must be admitted that they have countenanced the error in question, by their inaccurate expressions. This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have arisen from a vagueness in the use of the word Indue- Tlv ° sense> ' % of the word tion ; which is sometimes employed to designate induction. the process of investigation and of its collect- ing facts ; - sometimes, the deducing of an inference from those facts. The former of these processes (viz. that of ob- servation and experiment) is undoubtedly distinct from that which takes place in the Syllogism ; but then it is not a pro- cess of argumentation ; the latter again is an argumentative process ; but then it is, like all other arguments, capable of being Syllogistically expressed. And hence Induction has come to be regarded as a distinct kind of argument from the Syllogism. This Fallacy cannot be more concisely or clear- ly stated, than in the technical form with which we may now presume our readers to be familiar. “Induction is distinct from Syllogism : Induction is a process of Reasoning ; ” therefore “ There is a process of Reasoning distinct from SyllogisT 1 . ' Here “ Induction,” which is the Middle-Term, is used in different senses in the two Premisses. induction, so far forth as it is an argument , may, of course 22 254 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV be stated Syllogistically : but so far forth as it is a process oj inquiry with a view to obtain the Premisses of that argument, it is, of course, out of the province of Logic : and the latter is the original and strict sense of the word. Induction mean* properly, no‘. the inferring of the conclusion, but the bringing in, one by one, of instances, bearing on the point in question, till a sufficient number has been collected. The ambiguity therefore, above alluded to, and which has led to much con- fusion, would be best avoided by saying that we do not, strictly speaking, reason by Induction, but reason from r>opa sense j nc |uction . ^ e . from our observations on one of Induction. or on several individuals, {lx rcJr xuO' sxuvtoi') we draw a conclusion respecting the Class (r6 xti&olov) they come under : or, in like manner, from several Species, to the Genus which comprehends them : — in logical language, what we have predicated of certain singular- terms, we proceed to predicate of a common- term which comprehends them; — or proceed in the same manner from Species to Genus. E. G. “ The Earth moves round the Sun in an elliptical orbit ; so Ices Mercury; and Venus; and Mars, Sfc. : therefore a Planet (the common-term comprehending these singulars} moves round,” fyc. “ Philip was reckless of human life ; so was Alexander ; and J. Cajsar ; and Augustus, 8pc. .' there- fore this is the general character of a Conqueror.’’' 1 Now it appears as if the most obvious and simplest way of filling up such enthymemes as these, expressed as they are, would be in the third figure ; having of course a particulat Conclusion : Inductive Argument ex- pressed in a Syllogism. “ Earth, Mercury, Venus, fyc. move, fyc Mi. These are planets ; therefore Some planets move, fyc." JiiAJ*. I. $ l.j OF INDUCTION. 255 Jut when we argue from Induction we generally mean to nfer more than a particular conclusion ; and accordingly most iogical writers present to us the argument in the form of a syllogism in Barbara; inserting, of course, a different mino’ premiss from the foregoing, viz. : the simple converse of it. And if I am allowed to assume, the ^ rst figure. not merely that “ Mercury, Venus, and what- ever others I may have named, are Planets,” but also, that “ All Planets are these,” — that these are the whole of the individuals comprehended under the Term Planet, — I am ro doubt, authorized to draw a universal conclusion. But such an assumption would, in a very great majority of cases where Induction is employed, amount to a palpable falsehood, if un- derstood literally. For it is but seldom that we I* erfiect~ find an instance of what Logicians call a “ per- d uc n on fect-induction ; ” viz. where there is a complete enumeration of all the individuals, respecting which we assert collectively what we had before asserted separately ; as “ John is in England ; and so is Thomas ; and so is William ; and all the sons of such a one are John, Thomas, and Wil- liam ; therefore all his sons are in England.” Such cases, I say, seldom occur; and still more rarely can such an Induc- tion (which Bacon characterizes as “ res puerilis ” *) — since it does not lead the mind from what is better-known to what is less-known — serve any important purpose. But in such Inductions as are commonly employed, the assumption of such a minor-premiss as in the above-example * It may very well happen too, that (as in the example above) a certain circumstance may, in fact, belong to each individual of a cer- tain class, and yet may have no connection, except accidentally, with the Class itself, as such ; i. e. with the description of it, and that which wnsttiutes it a Hass. (See Appen. II. Ex 118.) 256 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV premiss sup pressed. would be, as I have said, strictly speaking, a false assumption And accordingly those logicians who state an argument from Induction in the above form, mean, I apprehend, that it is to be understood with a certain latitude ; i. e. that, in such prop- ositions as “ all planets are Mercury, Venus, or “ al' conquerors are Philip, Alexander, and Caesar,” they mean (by a kind of logical fiction) to denote that “all Conquerors are adequately represented by Philip, Alexander, c )-c.” — that these individual persons or cases are a sufficient sample , in respect of the matter in question, of the Class they belong to. I think it clearer, therefore, to state simply The Major an( j p rec j se ]y w hat it is that we do mean to assert. And in doing this, we shall find that the expressed premiss of the enthymeme, viz. : that which contains the statement respecting the individuals — ■ is the Minor ; and that it is the Major that is suppressed, as being in all cases substantially the same : viz. that what, be - lonprs to the individual or individuals we have examined, belongs (certainly, or probably, as the case may be) to the whole class under which they come. E. G. From finding on examination of several sheep, that they each ruminate, we conclude that the same is the case with the whole Species of sheep : and from finding on examination of the sheep, ox deer, and other animals deficient in upper cutting-teeth, that they each ruminate, we conclude (with more or less certainty) that quadrupeds thus deficient are ruminants: the hearer readily supplying, in sense, the suppressed major premiss • viz. tnat “ what belongs to the individual sheep we have ex- amined, is likely to belong to the whole species Spc. Whether that which is properly called Induction (viz. the inquiry respecting the sev«ral individuals or species) be suffi- c'ently ample, i. e. takes in a sufficient number of individual CHAP. I. $ 1.] OF INDUCTION. 257 or of specific cases, — whe her the character of those cases has been correctly ascertained — and how far the individuals we have examined are likely to resemble , in this or that cir- cumstance, the rest of the class, fyc. fyc., are points that require indeed great judgment and caution; but this judgment and caution are not to be aided by Logic ; because they are, in reality, employed in deciding whether or not it is fair and allowable to lay down your Premisses ; i. e. whether you are authorized or not, to assert, that “ what is true of the individ- uals you have examined, is true of the whole class : ” and that this or that is true of those individuals. Now, the rules of Logic have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the Premisses ; except, of course, when they are the conclusions of former arguments ; but merely teach us to decide, not, whether the Premisses are fairly laid down , but whether the Conclusion follows fairly from the Premisses or not. It has however been urged that what are de- scribed as the Major-premisses in drawing infer- Necessity oj T i .ill- i assuming a ences Irom Inductions, are resolvable ultimately „ r . J Major - Frem- into an assertion of the “ Uniformity of the laws ^ s . of Nature,” or some equivalent proposition ; and that this is, itself, obtained by Induction ; whence it is concluded that there must be at least one Induction — and that, the one on which all others depend — incapable of being exhibited in a Syllogistic form But it is evident, and is universally admitted, that in every case where an inference is drawn from Induction (unless that name is to be given to a mere random guess without any grounds at all) we must form a judgment that the instance ol instances adduced are “ sufficient to authorize the Conclu- sion ; ” — that it is “ allowable ” to take these instances as a sample warranting an inference respecting the whole Class 22 * 258 jN THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV Now tli? expression of this judgment in words, is the Major-premiss alluded to. To acknowledge this, therefore is to acknowledge that all reasoning from Induction without exception does admit of being exhibited in a syllogistic form and consequently that to speak of one Induction that does no admit of it, is a contradiction. Whether the belief in the constancy of Nature’s laws, — a belief of which no one can divest himself — be intuitive and a part of the constitution of the human mind, as some emi- nent metaphysicians hold, or acquired, and in what way ac- quired, is a question foreign to our present purpose. For that, it is sufficient to have pointed out that the necessity of assum- ing a universal Major-premiss, expressed or understood, in order to draw any legitimate inference from Induction, is vir- tually acknowledged even by those who endeavor to dispute it. § 2 . Whether then the Premiss may fairly be as- Assumption sume( i or no t 5 ; s a p 0 ; n t which cannot be de- of Premisses m Induction. cided without a competent knowledge of the nature of the subject. E. G. in most branches of Natural Philosophy, in which the circumstances that in any case affect the result, are usually far more clearly ascer- tained than in human affairs, a single instance is usually ac- counted a sufficient Induction ; e. g. having once ascertained that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorized to conclude that this property is universal. In Meteorology, how'ever, and some other branches of Natural-philosophy, in which less advancement has been made, a much more copious Induction would be required. And in respect of the affairs of human life, an inference from a single instance would hardly ever be deemed allowable. Cuap. I. § 2.] OF INDUCTION. 259 But it is worth remarking, that in all cases alike, of reason- ing from Induction, the greater or less degree of confidence we feel is always proportioned to the belief of our having more or less completely ascertained all the circumstances that bear upon the question. All men practically acknowledge this to hold good in all cases alike, physical or moral, by inva- riably attributing any failure in their anticipations in any cas', to some ignorance or miscalculation respecting some circum- stances connected with the case. (See Append. I. Art. “ Im- possible.”) In some subjects, however, there will usually be more of these circumstances difficult to be accurately ascertained, than in others ; and the degree of certainty belonging to the Major-premiss, will vary accordingly. But universally, the degree of evidence for any proposition we set out with as a Premiss (whether the expressed or the suppressed one) is not to be learned from mere Logic, nor indeed from any one distinct Science ; but is the province of whatever Science furnishes the subject-matter of your argument. None but a Politician can judge rightly of the degree of evidence of a proposition in Politics ; a Naturalist, in Natural His- tory, Sfc. E. G. from examination of many horned , , c , T , Investigation. animals, as sheep, cows, o& IV themselves ; and whose tnr.h is a conformity, not to the na- ture of things, but to our own hypothesis. Such arc all prop* ositions in pure Mathematics, and many in Ethics, viz. those which involve no assertion as to real matters of fact. It has been rightly remarked,* that Mathematical propositions are not properly true or false, in the same sense as any propo- sition respecting real fact is so called. And hence, the truth (such as it is) of such propositions is necessary and eternal : since it amounts only to a conformity with the hypothesis w: set out with. The proposition, that “the belief in a futire state, combined with a complete devotion to the present life, is not consistent with the character of prudence,” would be not at all the less true if a future state were a chimera, and prudence a quality which was nowhere met with ; nor would the truth of the Mathematician’s conclusion be shaken, that “ circles are to each other as the squares of their diameters,” should it be found that there never had been a circle, or a square, conformable to the definition, in rerum naturae. And accordingly an able man, may, by patient Reasoning, attain any amount of mathematical truths ; because these are all implied in the Definitions. But no degree of labor and ability, would give him the knowledge, by “ Reasoning ” alone , of what has taken place in some foreign country ; nor would enable him to know, if he had never seen, or heard of, the experiments, what would become of a spoonful of salt, or a spoonful of chalk, if put into water, or what would be the appearance of a ray of light when passed through a prism. Hence the futility of the attempt of Clarke, Fads, not anc | ot jj erSj to demonstrate (in the mathematical sense) the existence of a Deity. This can on^ Dugald Stewart’s Philosophy, Vol. H. Chap. II. § 1.] L ISCO VERY OF TRUTH. 271 be (apparently) done by covertly assuming in the Prem sses the very point to be proved. No matter of fact can be math- ematically demonstrated ; though it may be proved in such a manner as to leave no doubt on the mind. E. G. 1 have no more doubt that I met such and such a man, in this or that place, yesterday, than that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles : but the kind of certainty I have of these two truths is widely different ; to say, that I did not meet the man, would be false indeed, but it would not be any thing in- conceivable , self -contradictory , and absurd ; but it would be so, to deny the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right angles. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish these two kinds of Discovery of Truth. In re- Information and inslnic- lation to the former, as I have said, the word tion distinct “ information ” is most strictly applied ; the communication of the latter is more properly called “ instruc- tion. I speak of the usual practice ; for it would be going too far to pretend that writers are uniform and consistent in the use of these, or of any other term. We say that the His- torian gives us information respecting past times ; the Trav- eller, respecting foreign countries: on the other hand, the Mathematician gives instruction in the principles of his Sci- ence ; the Moralist instructs us in our duties, &c However, let the words be used as they may, the things are evidently different, and ought to be distinguished. It is a question com- paratively unimportant, whether the term “ Discovery” shall or shall not be extended to the eliciting of those Truths, which, being implied in our previous knowledge, may bo pstablished by mere strict Reasoning. Similar verbal questions, indeed, might be raised respecting many other cases : e. g. ..ne has forgotten ( i. e. cannot rened as in some respects resembling those of Mathematics, {viz. such as keep clear of all assertions respecting facts) they have this difference ; that not only men are not so completely agreed, respecting the maxims and principles of Ethics and Law, but the meaning also of each Term cannot be absolutely, and forever, fixed by an arbitrary definition ; on the contrary, a great part of our labor consists in distinguishing accurately the various senses in which men employ each Term, — ascertaining which is ths Chap. II. § 5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 26 ‘J Fallacious disparagement of reasoning. most proper, — and taking care to avoid confou lding them together.* It may be worth while to add in this place that as a candid disposition, — a hearty de- sire to judge fairly, and to attain truth, — are evidently necessary with a view to give fair play to the reasoning-powers, in subjects where we are lia- ble to a bias from interest or feelings, so, a fallacious per- version of this maxim finds a place in the minds of some persons: who accordingly speak disparagingly of all exercise of the reasoning-faculty in moral and religious subjects ; de- claiming on the insufficiency of mere intellectual power for the attainment of truth in such matters, — on the necessity of appealing to the heart rather than to the head, &c.t and then leading their readers or themselves to the Conclusion that the less we reason on such subjects the safer we are. But the proper office of candor is to pre- pare the mind not for the rejection of all evi- r,0 P er °ffi ce , of candor. dence, but for the right reception of evidence ; not, to be a substitute for reasons, but to enable us fairly to weigh the reasons on both sides. Such persons as I am alluding to are in fact saying that since just weights alone , without a just balance, will avail nothing, therefore we have only to take care of the scales, and let the weights take care of themselves. This hind of tone is of course most especially to te found m such writers as consider it expedient to inculcate on the mass of mankind what — there is reason to suspect — they do * See Appendix on Ambiguous Terms, t See Appendix III. 25 21)0 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV not themselves fully believe, and which they apprehend is the taore. likely to be rejected the more it is investigated.* Since it appears, from what has been said, that universally a man must possess something else besides the Reasoning- faculty, in order to apply that faculty properly to his own pur pose, whatever that purpose may be ; it may be inquired whether some theory could not be made out, respecting those “ other operations ” and “ intellectual processes, distinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary for us sometimes to employ in the investigation of truth ; ” t and whether rules could not be laid down for conducting them. the principles of Logic, properly so called ; but it would hardly be possible to build up any thing like a regular Science respecting these matters, such as Logic is with respect to the theory of Reasoning. It may be useful, however, to observe, that these “ other operations ” of which we have been speak- >ng, ana which are preparatory to the exercise of Reasoning Chap. 111. — Of Inference and Proof. $ 1 - Different applications of Reasoning. Something has, indeed, been done in this way by more than one writer ; and more might probably be accomplished by one who should fully comprehend and carefully bear in mind • See Powell’s “ Tradition unveil id. 1 t D. Stewart, Chap. Ill { 1.] INFERENCE ANU PROOF. 29 are of two kinds , according to t'ne nature of the end proposed for Reasoning comprehends Inferring and Proving ; which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in two different points of view : like the road from London to York, and the road from York to London. He who infers,* proves ; and he who proves, infers ; but the word “ infer ” fixes the mind first on the Premiss and then on the Conclusion ; the word “ prove,” on the contrary, leads the mind from the Conclusion to the Premiss. Plence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is last in the mind ; Inference being often used to signify the Conclusion (£. e. Proposition in- ferred,) and Proof , the Premiss. We say, also, “ How do you prove that ? ” and “ What do you infer from that ? ” which sentences would not be so properly expressed if we were to transpose those verbs. One might, therefore, define Proving, “ the assigning of a reason [or argument] for the support of a given proposition : ” and Inferring, “ the deduc- tion of a Conclusion from given Premisses.” In the one cas6 our Conclusion is given ( i . e. set before us as the Question) and we have to seek for arguments ; in the other, our Prem- isses are given , and we have to seek for a Conclusion : i. e. tc put together our own propositions, and try what will follow from them ; or, to speak more Logically, in the one case, we seek to refer the Subject of which we would predicate some ■ thing, to a class t to which that Predicate will (affirmativelj or negatively) apply ; in the other, we seek to find compr& * I mean, of course, when the word is understood to imply correct Inference. t Observe, that “ Class ” is used, here and elsewhere, for either al actual, or what may be called a potential Class : see Book i jj 3. 292 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV headed, in the Subject of which we have predicated something some other term to which that Predicate had not been befors applied.* Each of these is a definition of Reasoning. § 2 . To infer, then, is the business of the Phi Advocate ^ 0S0 P^ er >' to prove, o( the Advocate; the for* mer, from the great mass of known and ad- mitted truths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional truth whatever, that has been hitherto unperceived ; and per haps, without knowing, with certainty, what will be the terms of his Conclusion. Thus the Mathematician, e. g. seeks to ascertain what is the ratio of circles to each other, or what is the line whose square will be equal to a given circle. The Advocate, on the other hand, has a Proposition put before him, which he is to maintain as well as he can. His business, therefore, is to find middle-terms (which is the inventio of Cicero ;) the Philosopher’s to combine and select known facts or principles, suitably, for gaining from them Conclusions which, though implied in the Premisses, were before unper- ceived : in other words, for making “ Logical Discoveries.” It may be added that all questions may be considered as falling under two classes ; viz. “ What shall be predicated of a certain Sub- ject ; ” and, “ Which Copula, affirmative o? negative, shall connect a certain Subject and Predicate.” We inquire, in short, either Questions concerning Predicate, and concerning Copula. * “Proving” may be compared to the act of putting away any arti- cle into the proper receptacle of goods of that description ; “ infer' ring,' to that of bringing out the article when needed. Chap III. } 2.J INFERENCE AND PRUOF. 203 1st. “ What is A ? ” or, 2d, “ Is A, B, or is it not? ” The former class of questions belongs to the Philosopher ; the lat. ter to the Advocate. (See Rhet. Appendix G. p. 387.) The distinction between these two classes of questions is perhaps best illustrated by reference to some case in which our decision of each of the questions involved in some asser- tion, is controverted, by different parties. E. G. Paul says, that the apostles preached “ Christ crucified ; to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks, foolishness : ” that Jesus, who had suffered an ignominious death, was the Messiah, the Savior of the World, was a doctrine opposed both by Jews and Gentiles, though on different grounds, according to their respective prejudices : the Jews who “ required a sign ” ( i . e. the coming of the Messiah in the clouds to establish a splendid temporal kingdom) were “offended” — “scandalized” — at the doctrine of a suffering Messiah : the Greeks who “ sought after philosophical Wisdom ” ( i . e. the mode of themselves exalting their own nature, without any divine aid) ridiculed the idea of a Heavenly Savior altogether; which the Jews admitted. In logical language, the Gentiles could not com prehend the Predicate ; the Jews, denied the Copula. It may be added, that in modern phraseology, the operations of corresponding prejudices are Changes oj ‘ o j j paradox and denoted, respectively, by the words “ paradox ” nonsense. (a “ stumbling-block ”) and “ nonsense ; ” (“foolishness”) which are often used, the one, by him who has been accustomed to hold an opposite opinion to what is asserted, the other, by him who has formed no opinion on the subject. The writer who proves an unwelcome truth, is cen- sured as paradoxical ; he who brings to light truths unknown or unlhought-of, as nonsensical, 25 * 694 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Bock IV § 3 . Such are the respective preparatory processei Different j n these two branches of study, the philosophi- connected with cal ’ and the * to etoncal. They are widely differ- these processes, ent ; they arise from, and generate, very diffei* ent habits of mind ; and require a very different kind of training and precept. It is evident that the business of the Advocate and that of the Judge* are, in this point, op- posed ; the one being to find arguments for the support of his client’s cause ; the other, to ascertain the truth. And hence it is, that those who have excelled the most in the former de- partment, sometimes manifest a deficiency in the latter, though the subject-matter, in which they are conversant, re- mains the same. The Pleader, or Controversialist, or, in short, the Rhetorician in general, who is, in his own prov- ince, the most skilful, may be but ill-fitted for philosophical- investigation, even where there is no observation wanted : — when the facts are all ready ascertained for him. And again, the ablest Philosopher may make an indifferent disputant ; especially, since the arguments which have led him to the conclusion, and have, with him, the most weight, may not, perhaps, be the most powerful in controversy. The commoner fault, however, by far, is to forget the Philosopher or Theologian, and to assume the Advocate, im- properly. It is therefore of great use to dwell on the distinc- tion between these two branches. As for the bare process of Reasoning, that is the same in both cases ; but the prepar- atory processes which are requisite, in order to employ Rea- soning profitally, these, we see, branch off into two distinct channels. In each of these, undoubtedly, useful rules may Chap. HI. § 3.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 295 Rhetorical Inquiry. be laid down ; but they should not be confounded together Bacon has chosen the department of Philosophy ; , . , . _ , „ , Philosophical giving rules in his Urganon, not only for the inquiry conduct of experiments to ascertain new facts, but also for the selection and combination of known facts and principles, with a view of obtaining valuable Inferences ; and t is probable that a system of such rules is what some writers mean (if they have any distinct meaning) by their proposed “ Logic.” In the other department, precepts have been given by Aristotle and other Rhetorical writers as a part of their plan.* How far these precepts are to be considered as belonging to the present system, — whether “ Method ” is to be regarded as a part of Logic , — whether the Matter of Logic (i. e. general maxims, axioms, or common-places) is to be included in the system, — whether Bacon’s is properly to be reckoned a kind of Logic ; all these are merely verbal questions, relating to the extension, not of the Science , but of the name. The bare process of Reason- ing, i. e. deducing a Conclusion from Premisses, must ever remain a distinct operation from the assumption of Premisses ; however useful the rules may be that have been given, or may be given, for conducting this latter process, and others connected with it ; and however properly such rules may be subjoined to the precepts of that system to which the name of Logic is applied in the narrowest sense. Such rules as I * I have attempted the same in Part I. of Elements of Rhetoric ; although, (through some inadvertency) I have found mvself men- tioned along with some other writers, as having declared that the Jiing is impossible If I ever had made such an assertion, I should probably have been the first person that ever undertook to accomplish an acknowledged impossibility. 296 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV now allude to may be of eminent service ; but they must always be, as I have before observed, comparatively vague and general, and incapable of being built up into a regulat demonstrative theory like that of the Syllogism ; to which theory they bear much the same relation as the principles and rules of Poetical and Rhetorical criticism to those of Gram- mar ; or those of practical Mechanics, to strict Geometry. 1 find nc fault with the extension of a Term ; but I would sug- gest a caution against confounding together, by means of a common name, things essentially different ; and above all I svould deprecate the sophistry of striving to depreciate what is called “the school-Logic,” by perpetually contrasting it with systems with which it has nothing in common but the name, and whose object is essentially different. two different plans for attaining one and the same object,) have themselves complained of one of the effects of this confusion, viz. the introduction, early in the career of Academical Edu cation, of a course of Logic ; under which name they ob- serve, men now* universally comprehend the works of Locke, Bacon, which, (as is justly remarked) are unfit for beginners. Now this would not \iave happened, if rnen nad always kept in mind the meaning or meanings of each name they used. § 4 . Aristotle's Organon and Bacon s. It is remarkable that writers, whose expres- sions tend to confound together, by means of a common name, two branches of study which have nothing else in common (as if they were * ». e. In the Scotch universities Chap. IV. [ I.] VERBAL AN1) REAL QUESTIONS. 29? And it may be added, that however justly the word Logic may be thus extended, we have no ground for applying to the Aristotelian Logie the remarks above quoted respecting tha Baconian ; which the ambiguity of the word, if not carefully tcept in view, might lead us to do. Grant that Bacon’s work is a part of Logic ; it no more follows, from the unfitness of that for learners , that the Elements of the Theory of Reason- ing should be withheld from them, then it follows that the ele- ments of Euclid, and common Arithmetic, are unfit for boys, because Newton's Principia , which also bears the title of Mathematical, is above their grasp. Of two branches of study which bear the same name, or even of two parts of the same branch, the one may be suitable to the commencement, the other to the close of the Academical career. At whatever period of that career it may be proper to intro- duce the study of such as are usually called Metaphysical writers, it may be safely asserted, that those who have had the most experience in the business of giving instruction in Logic properly so called, as well as in other branches of knowledge, prefer and generally pursue the plan of lettinp their pupils enter on that study, next in order after the ele ments of Mathematics. Chap. IV. — Of Verbal and Real Questions. § 1 . The ingenious author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, and other writers, having maintained, or rather assumed, that Logic is applicable to Verbal controversy alone, there may be *n advantage (though it has been my aim throughout to show 29S ON THE f HO VINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV the application of it to all reasoning) in pointing out the dif ference between Verbal and Real Questions, and the probable origin of Campbell’s mistake. For to trace any error to its source, will often throw more light on the subject in hand than can be obtained if we rest satisfied with merely detecting and refuting it. Every Question that can arise, is in fact a Question whether a certain Predicate is or is not applicable to a certain Subject, or, what Predicate is applicable;* and whatever other account may be given by any writer, of the nature of any matter of doubt or debate, will be found ultimately to resolve itself into this. But sometimes the Question turns on the meaning and extent of the terms em- Difference be- p] 0 yed ; sometimes on the things signified by tween a verbal .. . and a real “ it be made to appear, therefore, that question. the opposite sides of a certain Question may be held by persons not differing in their opinion of the matter in hand, then, that Question may be pronounced Verbal ; as depending on the different senses in which they respectively employ the terms. If, on the contrary, i. appears that they employ the Terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the Question is Real ; — that they differ as to the opinions they hold of the things in Ques- tion. If, for instance, (to recur to an example formerly given, Book III. § 10.) two persons contend whether Augustus deserved to be called a “ great man,” then, if it appeared that the one included, under the term “ great,” disinterested patriotism and on that ground excluded Augustus from the • 8®s Chap. iii. § 2 Chap. IV. {2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 299 glass, as wanting in that quality ; and that the other also gave him' no credit for that quality, but understood no mere by the term “ great,” than high intellectual qualities, energy of char- acter, and brilliant actions, it would follow that the parties did not differ in opinion except as to the use of a Term, and that the Question was Verbal. If, again, it appeared that the one did give Augustus credit for such patriotism as the other denied him, both of them in- cluding that idea in the term great, then, the Question would be Real. Either kind of Question, it is plain, is to be argued according to Logical principles ; but the middle-terms employed would he different ; and for this reason, among others, it is important to distinguish Verbal from Real controversy. In the former case, e. g. it might be urged (with truth) that the common use of the expression “ great and good ” proves that the idea of good is not implied in the ordinary sense of the word great ; an argument which could have, of course, no place in deciding the other Question.* § 2 . Verbal Ques- tions mistaken It is by no means to be supposed that all Verbal Questions'are trifling and frivolous. It is often of the highest importance to settle cor- f or Real ' rectly the meaning of a word, either according to ordinal y jse, or according to the meaning of any particular writer o! class of men. But when Verbal Questions are mistaken foi Real, much confusion of thought and unprofitable wrangling — what is usually designated as Logomachy — will be generally the result. Nor is it always Logomachy. See Book III. the latter part of § 10- 300 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Bool IV so easj and simple a task, as might at first sight appear, ;a distinguish them from each other. For, several objects to which one common name is applied, will often have many poirts of difference ; and yet that name may perhaps be ap- plied to them all [univocaily] in the same sense, and may be fairly regarded as the Genus they come under, if it appear ‘•hat they all agree in what is designated by that name, and that the differences between them are in points not essential to the character of that genus. A cow and a horse differ in many respects, but agree in all that is implied by the term “ quadruped,” which is therefore applicable to both in the same sense.* So also the houses of the ancients differed I and so, and the other, something different : ” for they do not attach different senses to the word “true,” or to the word “believe;” they differ only in their persuasions of what is true, and ought to be believed. I have noticed some instances of the above kinds of mis- take in the Appendix to the third Series of Essays ; and also : n the Introduction to “ Political Economy,” from which I will .iere cite a passage. “ In speaking of exchanges, I did not mean to limit myself to voluntary exchanges ; — those in which the whole transac- tion takes place with the full consent of both parties to all the terms of it. Most exchanges, indeed, are of this character, Dut the case of taxation, — the revenue levied from the sub- let in return for the protection afforded by the sovereign eonstitutes a remarkable exception ; the payment being com 504 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV pulsory, and not adjusted by agreement with the payer. Stilt whether in any case it be fairly and reasonably adjusled, oi the contrary, it is not the less an exchange. And it is worth remarking, that it is just so far forth as it is an exchange, — so far forth as protection, whether adequate or not, is afforded in exchange for this payment, that the pay- ment itself comes under the cognizance of this science. There is nothing else that distinguishes taxation from avowed robbery. “ Though the generality of exchanges are voluntary, this circumstance is not essential to an exchange : since otherwise the very expression ‘ voluntary exchange, 1 would be tautologi- cal and improper. But it is a common logical error to sup- pose that what usually belongs to the thing , is implied by the usual sense of the word. Although most noblemen possess large estates, the word ‘nobleman 1 does not imply the pos- session of a large estate. Although most birds can fly, the ordinary use of the term ‘ bird 1 does not imply this ; since the penguin and the ostrich are always admitted to be birds. And though, in a great majority of cases, wealth is acquired jy labor, the ordinary use of the word ‘ wealth 1 does not in- clude this circumstance, since every one would call a pearl an article of wealth, even though a man should chance to meet with it in eating an oyster.” It is evidently of much importance to keep in mind the above distinctions, in order to avoid, on the one hand, stigma- tizing, as Verbal controversies, what in reality are not such merely because the Question turns (as every question mustj on the applicability of a certain Predicate to a certain Sub- ject ; or, on the other hand, falling into the opposite error of mistaking words for things, and judging of men’s agreernen Chap. Y. § l.J VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 303 or disagreement in opinion in every case, merely from theii agreement or disagreement in the terms employed. Chap. V. — Of Realism. § 1 . Nothing has a greater tendency to lead to the mistake jus, noticed, and thus to produce undetected Verbal Questions and fruitless Logomachy, than the prevalence of the notion of the Realists,* that Genus and Species are some real Things, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions ; and that, as in the case of Singular-terms there is some real individual corresponding to each, so, in Common-terms also, there is some Thing corresponding to each ; which is the object of our thoughts when we employ any such term.t * It is well known what a furious controversy long existed in all the universities of Europe between the sects of the Realists and the Nominalists ; the heat of which was allayed by the Reformation, which withdrew men’s attention to a more important question. t A doctrine commonly, but falsely attributed to Aristotle, who expressly contradicts it. He calls individuals “ primary substances ” {jiqortui o vcnai) ; Genus and Species “ secondary,” as not denoting (iuSt t i) a 'really-existing thing.” liana Si ova'ia Soxei -rode n iitii- veiv. 5 En l piv ovv Ton tiqujtiuv ovoiwr avafiipiofi/jTrjTov xai aXySig imiv, oti tuSe T l OTjuaivtr ogrofiov y'aQ xai ev ctQi&pno to SijXor^iEvov Imiv. ’Em Si r on Sivrinwv ovaiA INET A I u i I ofioiiug tu> a/i^iart n'g ;i qo - orjooiug Tods ri aijfiah eir , orav Any, av&Qumog, ij tmov O T MHN TH AAHPIE2 1 aXXu yaX.Xov TIOION TI arifiairti' x.T.X. Aristotle, Categ [ 3. See Appendix, Art. “ Same.” There is however a continual danger of sliding into Realism inadvertently, unless one is continually im the watch against it : of which Aristotle as -well as many otlia vriters not deliberately holding the doctrine, furnish instan ses. 26 * 306 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV There b one circumstance which ought to ba Technical . _ tense of Species no! ' cec ^ as having probably contributed not a token applied little to foster this error : I mean, the peculiar to organized technical sense of the word “Species” when applied to organized Beings. It has been laid down in the course of this work, that when several individuals are observed to resemble each other in some point, a common name may be assigned to them indi- cating [implying, or “connoting”*] that point, — applying to all or any of them so far forth as respects that common attribute, — and distinguishing them from all others; as, e. g. the several individual buildings, which, however different in other respects, agree in being constructed for men’s dwelling, are called by the common name of “House;” and it was added, that as we select at pleasure the circumstance that we choose to abstract, we may thus refer the same Individual to any one of several different Species, and again, the same Species, to one Genus or to another, according as it suits our purpose ; whence it seems plainly to follow that Genus ana Species are no real things existing independent of our thoughts, but are creatures of our own minds. Yet in the case of Species of organized Beings, it seems at first sight as if this rule did not hold good ; but that the Spe- cies to which each individual belongs, could not be in any degree arbitrarily fixed by us, but must be something real, unalterable, and independent of our thoughts. Caesar or Soc- rates, for instance, it may be said, must belong — different as they may be — to the Species Man, and can belong to no other; a ad the like, with any individual Brute, or Plant" e g • See Book II. Chap. v. $ 1. Chap. V. $ 1.] REALISM. 30? a horned and a hornless sheep every naturalist would regard as belonging to the same Species. On the other hand, if any one utters such a proposition as “this apple-tree isacodlin;” — “this dog is a spaniel,” — “ Argus was a mastiff,” to what head of Predicables would such a Predicate be referred ? Surely our logical principles would lead us to answer, that it is the Species ; since it could hardly be called an Accident, and is manifestly no other Pred- icable. And yet every Naturalist would at once pronounce that Mastiff is no distinct Species, but only a variety of the Species Dog. This however does not satisfy our inquiry as to the head of Predicables to which it is to be referred. It should seem at first sight as if one needed, in the case of organized Beings, an additional head of Predicables to be called “ Variety ” or “ Race.” The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the consid- sration of the peculiar technical sense [or “ second intention ”] of the word “ Species ” when applied to organ- ralists) to such individuals as are supposed to be from variety: descended from a common stock, or which might nave so descended ; viz. which resemble one another (to use M. Cuv.er’s expression) as much as those of the same stock do. Now this being a point on which all (not merely Natu- ralists) are agreed, and since it is a fact, (whether an oscer- tained fact or not) that certain individuals are, or are not, thus connected, it follows, that every Questions if question whether a certain individual Animal or f act and Plant belongs to a certain Species or not, is a ran gement. question not of mere arrangement, but of fact. But in the case of questions respecting Genus, i is otherwise ized Beings : in which case it is always ap^ plied (when we are speaking strictly, as natu- Species dis tinguished by Naturalists tions of ar < 308 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. l Boob. IV [f, e. g. two Naturalists differed, in t ie one placing (as Lin meus) all the Species of Bee under one Genus , which the other subdivided (as later writers have done) into several gen* era, it would be evident that there was no question of fact de« bated between them, and that it was only to be considered which was the more convenient arrangement. If, on the other hand, it were disputed whether the African and the Asiatic Elephant are distinct Species , or merely Varieties, it would be equally manifest that the question is one of fact ; since both w'ould allow that if they are descended (or might have de- scended) from the same stock, they are of the same Species; and if otherwise, of two : this is the fact, which they endeavor to ascertain, by such indications as are to be found. For it is to be further observed, that this fact being one which can seldom be directly known, the consequence is, that the marks by which any Species of Animal or Plant is known , are not the very Differentia which constitutes that Species. Now, in the case of unorganized Beings, these two coincide , the marks by which a Diamond, e. g. is dis- Mark by tinguished from other minerals, being the very which a Spe- J)iff eren tj a that constitutes the Species Diamond. ties is known not always the And the same is the case in the Genera even of Differentia. organized Beings : the Linnsean Genus “felis,” e. g. (when considered as a Species, i. e. as falling under some more comprehensive Class) is distinguished from others under the same Order, by those very marks which constitute its Differentia. But in the “ Infimse Species ’* (ac- cording to the view of a Naturalist) of plants and animals, this, as has been said, is not the case ; since here the Differ- entia which constitutes each Species includes in it a circum stance which cannot often be directly ascertained (viz. tne being sprung from the same stock), but which we conjecture Chap. Y. § 1.] REALISM. 399 from certain circumstances of resemblance ; so that the marks by which a Species is known, are not in truth the whole of the Differentia itself, but indications of the existence of that Differentia; viz. indications of descent from a common stock. There are a few, and but a few, other Species to which .he same observations will in a great degree apply : I mean in which the Differentia which constitutes the Species, and the mark by which the Species is known , are not the same : e. g. “Murder:” the Differentia of which is that it be committed “ with malice aforethought ; ” this cannot be directly ascer- tained ; and therefore we distinguish murder from any other homicide by circumstances of preparation, c^-c., which are not in reality the Differentia, but indications of the Differentia ; i. e. grounds for concluding that the malice did exist. Hence it is, that Species, in the case of organized Beings, and also in a few other cases, have the appearance of being some real things, independent of our thoughts and language. And heryce, naturally enough, the same notions have been often extended to the Genera also, and to Species of other things : so that men have a notion that each individual of every description truly belongs to some one Species and no other : and each Species, in like manner, to some onefrenus' whether we happen to be right or not in the ones to which we refer them. Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow and maintain this doctrine : but those who are not especially on their guard, are perpetually sliding into it unawares. Nothing so much conduces to the error of Ambiguity Realism as the transferred and secondary use of the words of the words “ same,” * “ one and the same,” “ same > w identical,” Sfc. when it is not clearly per- ° ne> See Appendix, Nd. I. Art. “ Same.' 310 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV ceived and carefully borne in mind, that they are employed in a secondary sense, and that , more frequently even than in the primary. Suppose e. g. a thousand persons are thinking of the Sun ' it is evident it is one and the same individual object on which all these minds are employed. So far all is clear. But = jp- pose all these persons are thinking of a Triangle ; — not any individual triangle, but Triangle in general; — and considet ing, perhaps, the equality of its angles to two right angles, it would seem as if, in this case also, their minds were all em- ployed on “ one and the same ” object : and this object of their thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere word Tri- angle, but that which is meant by it : nor again, can it be every thing that the word will apply to : for they are not thinking of triangles , but of one thing. Those who do not maintain that this “one thing” has an existence independent of the human mind, are in general content to tell us, by way of explanation, that the object of their thoughts is the abstract “ idea ” of a triangle ; * an explanation which satisfies, or at least silences many ; though it may be doubted whether they very clearly understand what sort of a thing an “idea” is; which may thus exist in a thousand different minds at once, and yet be “ one and the same.” The fact is, that “ unity ” ana 'sameness” are in such cases employed, not in the primary sense, but to denote per- fect similarity. When we say that ten thousand different persons have all “ one and the same ” Idea Id their minds or are all of “ one and the same ” Opinion, we mean no more than that they are all thinking exactly alike. When we sa> * Conceptualise is a name sometime* applied to those who ndop* this explanation ( if it can be called an -xplanation) ; to which claw Locke is referred. Chaf. V. j 1.1 REALISM. 3J t that they are all in the “ same ” posture, we mean that the) are all placed alike ; and so also they are said all to have the ‘ same ” disease, when they are all diseased alike. One instance of the confusion of thought and endless logomachy which may spring from Logomachy inattention to this ambiguity of the words re ™ ltm 9 f rom ° J this ambigu- same,” <^c., is afforded by the controversy ity, arising out of a sermon of Dr. King (Archbish- op of Dublin), published about a century ago. He remarked (without expressing himself perhaps with so much guarded precision as the vehemence of his opponents rendered need- ful) that “ the attributes of the Deity (viz. Wisdom, Justice, SfC.) are not to be regarded as the same with those human qualities which bear the same names, but are called so by re- semblance and analogy only.” For this he was decried by Bishop Berkeley and a host of other objectors, down to the present time, as an Atheist, or little better. “ If the divine attributes,” they urged, “ are not precisely the same in kind (though superior in degree) with the human qualities which bear the same name, we cannot imitate the Deity as the Scrip- tures require ; — we cannot know on what principles we shall be judged : — we cannot be sure that God exists at all ;” with a great deal more to the same purpose ; all of which would have been perceived to be perfectly idle, had the authors but recollected to ascertain the meaning of the principal word employed. For, 1st, when any two persons (or other objects) are said .0 have the “ same ” quality, accident, ssible,” “ Impossible,” and ‘ Necessary.” .ii. CASE. — Sometimes Grammarians use this word to lignify (which is its strict sense) a certain “ variation in tha * See Essa}- on the Dangers to Christian Faith, &e. Note A 2S 326 APPENDIX I. writing and utterance of a Noun, denoting the relation ia which it stands to some other part of the sentence some- times to denote that relation itself : whether indicated by the termination, or by a preposition, or by its collocation ; and there is hardly any writer on the subject who does not occa sionally employ the term in each sense, without explaining the. ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous debate has hence resulted. Whoever would see a specimen of this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek Grammar ; in which the Authors insist on giving the Greek language an Ablative case, with the same termination, however, as the Dative : (though, by the way, they had better have fixed on the Genitive ; which oftener answers to the Latin Ablative) urging, and with great truth, that if a distinct termination be necessary to constitute a case, many Latin Nouns will be without an Ablative, some without a Genitive or without a Dative, and all Neuters without aa Accusative. And they add, that since it is possible, in every instance, to render into Greek the Latin Ablative, consequent- ly there must be an Ablative in Greek.* If they had known and recollected that in the language of Lapland, there are, as we are told, thirteen Cases, they would have hesitated to use an argument which would prove that there must there- fore be thirteen Cases in Greek and Latin also ! All this confusion might have been avoided, if it had but been ob- served that the word “ Case ” is used in two senses. See Book III. § 10. $§ 4. CAUSE. — See “ Reason,” and “ Why.” iv. CERTAIN. — This is a word whose ambiguity, togetnei * It is in the same way ;hat some of the Latin-grammarians havs tniide on? of the Moods into three; Subjunctive, Potent' afi and Optative ambiguous terms. 32 ? with that of many others of kindred signification (as “ may ' “ can,” “ must,” “ possible,” fyc.) has occasioned infinite per- plexity in discussions on some of the most important subjects such as the freedom of human actions, the divine fore» knowledge, SfC. In its primary sense, it is applied (according to its etymol* ogy from cerno) to the state of a person’s mind ; denoting any one’s full and complete conviction ; and, generally, though not always, implying that there is sufficient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily transferred metonyrnically to the truths or events , respecting which this conviction is rationally entertained. And “ Uncertain ” (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjectives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, “ it is certain that a battle has been fought : ” “ it is certain that the moon will be full on such a day : ” “ it is uncertain whether such a one is alive or dead : ” “ it is uncertain whether it will rain to-morrow : ” meaning, in these and in all other cases, that we are certain or uncertain respectively ; not indicating any difference in the character of the events themselves, except in reference to our knowledge respecting them ; for the same thing may be, at the same time, both certain and uncertain, to different individ- uals ; e. g. the life or death at a particular time, of any one, is certain .0 his friends on the spot ; unceitain or contingent, to those at a distance. From not attending to this circumstance, the words “ uncer- tain” and “contingent” (which is employed nearly in the same sense as uncertain in its secondary meaning) have been considered by many writers* as denoting some quality in the * Among others, Archbishop King, in his Discourse on Predestina- tion, has fallen into this error; as is explained in the Notes and th« Appendix to my edition of that work. 328 APPENDIX 1 things themselves ; and have thus becom) involved in endless confusion. “Contingent” is indeed applied to events only not to persons : but it denotes no quality in the events them- selves ; only, as has been said, the relation in which they stand to a person who has no complete knowledge respecting them. It is from overlooking this principle, obvious as it is when once distinctly stated, that Chance or Fortune has come to be regarded as a real agent , and to have been, by the an- cients, personified as a Goddess, and represented by statues. ✓ v. CHURCH is sometimes employed to signify the Church, i. e. the Universal or Catholic Church, — comprehending in it all Christiana who are “ Members one of another,” and who compose the Body, of which Christ is the Head ; which, collectively taken, has no visible supreme Head or earthly governor, either individual, or council ; and which is one only in reference to its One invisible Governor and Paracltete the Spirit of Christ, dwelling in it, — to the one common faith and character, which ought to be found in all Christians, — and the common principles on which all Christian socie- ties should be constituted. See Hinds’s History of the Rise of Christianity , and Bernard’s Church and Synagogue , ar abridged translation from Vitringa. Sometimes again it is employed to signify a Church ; i. e It may be requisite to mention in this place, that I have been rep- resented as coinciding with him as to the point in question, in a note to Mr. Davison's work on Prophecy ; through a mistake, which the author candidly acknowledged, and promised to rectify. His mistaka arose from his having (as he himself informed me) spoken from con- jecture only, witn rut having read my publication. Unfortunately tha error was allowed to remain uncorrecf ed for several years after it had beer, pointed out in fact, till the wb >le of the edition containing the mis-statement had been sold off. AMBIGUODI TEEMS. 329 any one society, constituted on these general principles ; hav- ing governors on earth, and existing as a Community possess- ing a certain power over its own membeis ; in which sense we read of the “ Seven Churches in Asia ; ” — of Paul’s having “ the care of all the Churches,” SfC. To apply to some one of these communities, from its being confessedly a Church, all that is said, in Scripture or elsewhere, of the Church-universal_ [or Catholic ] is a fallacy, which, though very glaring, has misled many. (See the Art. Truth ; and also Essay ii. on the “ Kingdom of Christ .”) Moreover, the word “ Church” (like several others denot- ing Communities) sometimes denotes the Body itself, as such, and sometimes the individual members of it, as individuals. This distinction, which is an important one, has been noticed above, under the Art. Authority. The “ Church ” is also sometimes used to denote the Clergy , as distinguished from the Laity ; as, when we speak of any one’s being educated for the Church, meaning, “ for the min- istry.” Some would perhaps add that it is in this sense we speak of the endowments of the Church ; since the immediate emolument of these is received by clergymen. But if it be considered that they receive it in the capacity of ■public in- structors and spiritual Pastors, these endowments may fairly be regarded as belonging, in a certain sense, to the whole Body, for whose benefit they are, in this way, calculated ; in the same manner as we consider, e. g. the endowment of a professorship in a university, as a benefaction, not to the pro- fessors alone, but to the university at large. vi. ELECTION. — This is one of the terms which is often to all practical purposes ambiguous, when not employed, strictly speaking, in two differen. senses , but with different 28 * 330 APPENDIX I. applications, according to that which is understood in con- junction with it. — See Book III. § 10. See also Essays on some of the Difficulties, fyc. Essay III. “ On Election.” vii. EXPECT. — This we v d is liable to an ambigu : ty which may sometimes lead, in conjunction with other causes to a practical bad effect. It is sometimes used in the sense of “anticipate” — “calculate on,” SfC. [ibnllfn) in short “ consider as probable; ” sometimes for “ require or demand as reasonable,” — “ consider as right,” (d?ial.) Thus, I may fairly “expect” (u£mu) that one who has re- ceived kindness from me, should protect me in distress yet I may have reason to expect (llnCQeiv} that he wil not. “ England expects every man to do his duty;” but it would be chimerical to expect, i. e. anticipate, a universa' perform- ance of duty. Hence, when men of great revenues, whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendor and sensuality of Sardanapalus, they are apt to plead that this is expected of them ; which may be perhaps sometimes true, in the sense that such conduct is anticipated as probable ; not true, as im- plying that it is required or approved. Thus also, because it would be romantic to expect (i. e. calculate upon) in public men a primary attention to the public good, or in men in gen- eral an adherence to the rule of doing as you would be done by, many are apt to flatter themselves that they cannot rea- sonably be expected (i. e. fairly called upon) to act on such principles. What may reasonably be expected (in one sense of tne word) must be, precisely the practice of the majority; since it is the majority of instances that constitutes probabil- ity what may reasonably be expected (in the other sense) is something much beyond the practice of the generality ; as long at least as it shall be true that “ narrow is the way that ieadeth unto life, and few Inere be that find it.” AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 33 v viii. EXPERIENCE.* — This word, in its strict sense applies to what has occurred within a person’s own knowledge Experience, in this sense, of course, relates to the past alone. Thus it is that a man knows by Experience what sufferings he has undergone in some disease ; or, what height the tide reached at a certain time and place. More frequently the word is used to denote that Judgment which is derived from Experience in the primary sense , by reasoning from that, in combination with other data. Thus, a man may assert, on the ground of Experience, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medicine — that that medicine is, generally, beneficial in that disorder ; that the tide may always be expected, under such circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly speaking, none of these can be known by Experience, but are conclusions derived from Experience. It is in this sense only that Experience can be applied to the future , or, which comes to the same thing, to any general fact ; as e. g. when it is said that we know by Experience that water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze. “ Men are so formed as (often unconsciously) to reason, whether well or ill, on the phenomena they observe, and tc mix up their inferences with their statements of those phe- nomena, so as in fact to theorize (however scantily and crudely) without knowing it. If you will be at the pains carefully to analyze the simplest descriptions you hear of any transaction or state of things, you will find, that the process which almost invariably takes place is, in logical language, this; that each individual has in his mind certain major-prem- isses or principles, relative to the subject in question ; that observation of what actually presents itself to the senses suj>< * See Elements of Rhetoric, Book I. 332 APPENDIX 1. plies minor-premisses ; and that the statement given (and which is reported as a thing experienced) consists in fact of the conclusions drawn from the combinations of those premisses. “ Hence it is that several different men, who have all had equal, or even the very same, experience, i. e. have been witnesses or agents in the same transactions, will often be found to resemble so many different men looking at the same book : one perhaps, though he distinctly sees black marks on white paper, has never learned his letters ; another can read, but is a stranger to the language in which the book is written ; another has an acquaintance with the language, but under- stands it imperfectly ; another is familiar with the language , but is a stranger to the subject of the book, and wants power, or previous instruction to enable him fully to take in the au- thor’s drift ; while another again perfectly comprehends the whole. “ The object that strikes the eye is to all of those persona the same ; the difference of the impressions produced on the mind of each is referable to the differences in their minds. “ And this explains the fact, that we find so. much discre- pancy in the results of what are called Experience and Com. mon-sense, as contra-distinguished from theory. In former times men knew by experience, that the earth stands still, and the sun rises and sets. Common-sense taught them that there could be no antipodes, since men could not stand with their heads downwards, like flies on the ceiling. Experience taught the King of Bantam that water could not become solid. And (to come to the consideration of human affairs) the experience and common-sense of one of the most observant and intelligent of historians, Tacitus, convinced him, that for 4 mixed government to be so framed, as to combine the ele- AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 32 J merit? of Royalty, Aristocracy, and Democracy, must be next to impossible, and that if such a one could be framed, it must inevitably be very speedily dissolved.” * There are again two different applications of the word (set Book III. § 10), which, when not carefully distinguished, lead in practice to the same confusion as the employment of it in two senses ; viz. we sometimes understand our own personal Experience ; sometimes, general Experience. Hume nas availed himself of this (practical) ambiguity, in his Essay on Miracles ; in which he observes that we have Experience of the frequent falsity of Testimony, but that the occurrence of a Miracle is contrary to our Experience, and is consequently what no testimony ought to be allowed to establish. Now had he explained whose Experience he meant, the argument would have come to nothing: if he means, the Experience of man- kind universally, i. e. that a Miracle has never come under the Experience of any one , this is palpably begging the ques- tion : if he means the Experience of each individual who has never himself witnessed a Miracle, this would establish a rule (viz. that we are to believe nothing of which we have not ourselves experienced the like) which it would argue insanity to act upon. Not only was the King, of Bantam justified (as Hume himself admits) in listening to no evidence for the existence of Ice, but no one would he authorized on this prin- ciple to expect his own death His Experience informs him, directly, only that others have died. Every disease under which lie himself may have labored, his Experience must nave told him has not terminated fatally ; if he is to judge strictly ©f the future by the past, according to this rule, what should hinder him from expecting the like of all future diseases ? * Pol. Boon. Lect. in. 334 APPENDIX 1. Some have never been struck with this consequence o! Hume s principles ; and some have even failed to per- ceive it when pointed out : but if the reader thinks it worth his while to consult the author, he will see that his principles, according to his own account of them, are such as I hava stated. Perhaps however he meant, if indeed he had any distinct meaning, something intermediate between universal, and indi- vidual experience ; viz. the Experience of the generality , as to what is common and of ordinary occurrence ; in which sense the maxim will only amount to this, that false Testimony is a thing of common occurrence, and that Miracles are not. An obvious truth, indeed ; but too general to authorize, of itself, a conclusion in any particular case. In any other indi- vidual question, as to the admissibility of evidence, it would be reckoned absurd to consider merely the average chances for the truth of Tcstvnony in the abstract , without inquiring u dial the Testimony is, in the particular instance before us. As if, e. g. any one had maintained that no testimony co dd establish Columbus’s account of the discovery of America , because it is more common for travellers to lie, than for new Continer ts to be discovered.* Such a procedure involves a manifest ignoratio elenchi ; the two propositions brought forward a9 opposed, being by no means incompatible : Experience tells us that “a destructive hurricane is not a common occur- rence ; ” certain persons tell us that “ a destructive hurricane occurred in the West Indies, at such a time ; ” there is (as Dr. Campbell has pointed out) no opposition between these two assertions. It is to be observed by the way, that ther. is yet as See “Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte ' AMBIGUOUS terms. 335 additional ambiguity in the entire phrase “ contrary to experi ence ; ” in one sense, a miracle, or any other event, may be called contrary to the experience of any one who has nevet witnessed the like ; as the freezing of water was to that of the King of Bantam ; in another and stricter sense, that only is contrary to a man’s experience, which he knows by experi ence not to be true ; as if one should be told of an infallible remedy for some disorder, he having seen it administered without effect. No testimony can establish what is, in this latter sense , contrary to experience. We need not wonder that ordinary minds should be bewildered by a sophistical em- ployment of such a mass of ambiguities. Such reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and pro- found, on account of the subject on which they are employed , if applied to the ordinary affairs of life, they would be deemed unworthy of serious notice. The reader is not to suppose that the refutation of Hume’s Essay on Miracles was my object in this Article. That might have been sufficiently accomplished, in the way of a “ reductio ad absurdum,” by mere reference to the case of the King of Bantam adduced by the author himself. But this celebrate! Essay, though it has often perhaps contributed to the amuse- ment of an anti-christian sophist at the expense of those unable to expose its fallacy, never probably made one con- vert. The author himself seems plainly to have meant it as a specimen of his ingenuity in arguing on a given hypothesis ; Tor he disputes against miracles as contrary to the Course of Nature ; whereas, according to him, there is no such thing as a Course of Nature ; his scepticism extends to the whole external world ; — to every thing, except the ideas or impres- sions on the mind of the individual ; so that a miracle which is believed . has, in that circumstance alone, on his principle? as much reality as any thing can have. 336 APPENDIX 1. But my object has been to point out, by the use of this ex' ample, the fallacies and blunders which may result from inat- tention to the ambiguity of the word Experience : and this cannot be done by a mere indirect argument ; which refutes indeed, but does not explain , an error. FALSEHOOD and FALSITY. — See “Truth.” ix. GOD. — The Greek and Latin words which we trans- late “ God” having been applied by the Heathen to the high- est objects of their worship , were, naturally, employed by Jews and Christians to denote the object of their own wor- ship. But the Heathen were far from regarding any of these supposed Beings as eternal, or as the Maker and Governor of the Universe. They regarded them as the same kind of Beings with the Fairies, Demons, Nixes, Bogles, Genii, &c., which in various parts of the world are still feared, and in some places propitiated by offerings and other marks of rev- erence; and which in fact are the very Gods (though no longer called by that title) which our Pagan forefathers wor- shipped ; and a superstitious dread of which survived the introduction of the belief in a supreme Creator. But Chris- tians and also Mahometans (whose creed is a corrupted offset of Cnristianity) imply [connote] by the term “ God ” the supreme Author and Governor of the Universe : as is plain from this; that any one who should deny the existence of *n;y Bi.ch Being, would be universally considered as an Atheist , u c. as maintaining that there is no “ God.” And he would be not the less reckoned an Atheist, even though he should btdieve (which is conceivable) that there do exist Beings supe- rior in power o Man, such as Fairies, &c. The Heat'.en therefore, for the most part, come under thin AMBIGUOUS TERMS 337 description. They did not believe in any God ir. oui sense if the word. And accordingly the Apostle Paul expressly designates them as Atheists [“ without God ”] adeoi. The more any one studies the ancient Classical writers, the more in error he will be respecting their notions, if he is not attentive to the difference between the meanings they attached to certain terms and those which we, now, attach to corresponding terms. The present is one instance : and another is, “ immortality of the soul.” See Essay I. 1st Scries. x. GOSPEL. — This is instanced as one of the words which is practically ambiguous, from its different applications, even though not employed (as it sometimes is) in different senses. Conformably to its etymological meaning of “ Good-tidings,” it is used to signify (and that especially and exclusively) the welcome intelligence of Salvation to man, as preached by our Lord and his followers. But it was afterwards transitively applied to each of the four histories of our Lord’s life, pub lished by those who are called the Evangelists. And the term is often used to express collectively the Gospel -doctrines ; i. e. the instructions given men how to avail themselves of the offer of salvation ; and preaching the Gospel, is accord- ingly often used to include not only the proclaiming of the good tidings , but the teaching of what is to be believed and done, in consequence.* This ambiguity is one source of some important theological errors : many supposing that Gospel truth is to be found exclusively, or chiefly in the Gospels ; to the neglect of the other Sacred Writings. * See I iscourse L appended to “ Essays on the Dangers,” feo p. 204 . 29 38 APPENDIX I. Again, since Jesus is said to have preached the '‘Gospel," and the same is said of the Apostles, the conclusion is often hence drawn, that the discourses of our Lord and the Apos- tolic Epistles must exactly coincide ; and that in case of any apparent difference, the former must be the standard, and the latter must be taken to bear no other sense than what is im- plied by the other ; a notion which leads inevitably and imme- diately to the neglect of the Apostolic Epistles, when every thing they contain must be limited and modified into a complete coincidence with our Lord’s Discourses. Whereas it is very conceivable, that though both might be in a certain sense “ good tidings,” yet, one may contain a much more full de- velopment of the Christian scheme than the other. Which is confirmed by the consideration, that the principal events on which the Religion is founded (the atoning sacrifice and resur- rection of Christ) had not taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our Lord, when He preached, saying, “the King- dom of Heaven is at hand ; ” not that it was actually estab- lished ; as it was, when his Apostles were sent forth to preach to all nations. See Essays on the Difficulties , &c. Essay II. HENCE. — See “ Reason ” and “ Why.” IDENTICAL. — See “ One ” and “ Same.” xi. IMPOSSIBILITY. — According to the definition we may choose to give of this word, it may be said either that there are three Species of it, or that it may be used in three differ- ent senses. 1st. What may be called a mathematical impos- sibility, is that which involves an absurdity and self-contradic- tion ; e.g. that two straight lines should enclose a space, is not only impossible, but inconceivable, as it would b>e at variance AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 339 feith the definition of a straight line. And it should be observed that inability to accomplish any thing which ■s, in this sense, im possible, implies no limitation of power , and is compatible, even with omnipotence, in the fullest sense of the word. If it be pro- posed, e. g. to construct a triangle having one of its sides equal to the other two, or to find two numbers having the same ratio to each other as the side of a square and its diam- eter, it is not from a defect of power that we are precluded from solving such a problem as these ; since in fact the prob- lem is in itself unmeaning and absurd: it is, in reality, nothing, that is required to be done. It is important to observe respecting an Impossibility of this kind, that it is always susceptible of demonstrative proof. Not that every such Impossibility has actually been proved such : or that we can be certain it ever will be : but that it must be in itself capable of proof : — the materials of such proof — the data on which it may be founded, — being (whether discovered or not) within the range of our knowl- edge. This follows from the very character (as above described) * of such truths as the mathematical : mathemati- ca\-impossibilities being of course included under that term. For, every such truth must be implied — however tedious and difficult may be the task of eliciting it — in the Definitions we set out with, and consequently in the Terms, which are the exact representatives of those Definitions. E. G. That anj *wo sides of a Triangle are greater than the third — in other words that it is impossible to construct a triangle, one of whose sides shall be equal to the other two — "«* a matter of easy and early demonstration. The incommensurability of the Bide and the Diameter of a square, — in other words the Rook IY. Ch, ii. § 1. S40 APPENDIX I. impossibility of finding two numbers having o one another the ratio o' - the Side to the Diameter, — is a truth which was probably believed some time before a demonstration of it was found : but it is no less implied in the definitions of “ Straight line,” “ Square,” &c. In the case of the Circle again, the ratio of the Diameter to the Circumference has been long sought by mathematicians ; and no one has yet demonstrated, or perhaps ever will, either, what their ratio is, or, on the other hand, that they are incommensurable : but one or the other must be within the sphere of mathematical demonstra- tion. When therefore any one says that perhaps so and so may be an Impossibility in the mathematical sense, though we may never be able to prove it such,* he is to keep in mind that at least such proof is within the scope of inquiry, and that no increase of knowledge, in the sense of “ Information respect- ing facts,” f can be needed to furnish materials for the demon- stration. Every such Impossibility must be implied — though we may not perceive it, in the terms employed ; in short, it must be properly a “ contradiction in terms." 2dly. What may be called a Physical Impossibility is some- thing at variance with the existing Laws of Nature, and which consequently no Being, subject to those Laws, (as we are) can surmount ; but we can easily conceive a Being capable of bringing about what in the ordinary course of Nature is impossible. E. G. to multiply five loaves into food for a mul- titude, or to walk on the surface of the waves, are things physically impossible, but imply no contradiction ; on the contrary, we cannot but suppose that the Being, if there he such a one, who created the Universe, is able ta • See Bishop Copleston on Predestination, ■f See Book IV. Ch. ii. § 1. AMBIGUOUS TERM3. 34’ niter at will the properties of any of the substances it con- tains.* And an occurrence of this character, we call miraculous Not but that one person may perform without supernatural oower what is, to another, physically impossible ; as e. g a man may lift a great weight, which it would be phys- ically impossible for a child to raise; because it is con- trary to the Laws of Nature tha. a muscle of this degree of strength should overcome a resistance which one of that degree is equal to. But if any one perform what is beyond his own natural powers, or the natural powers of Man universally, he has performed a miracle. Much sophistry has been founded on the neglect of the dis- tinction between these two senses. It has even been contend- ed, that no evidence ought to induce a man of sense to admit that a miracle has taken place, on the ground that it is a thing impossible ; in other words, that it is a miracle ; for if it were not a thing impossible to man, there would be no miracle in the case : so that such an argument is palpably begging the ques- tion ; but it has often probably been admitted from an indistinct notion being suggested of Impossibility in the first sense; in which sense (viz. that of self-contradiction) it is admitted that no evidence would justify belief. 3dly. Moral Impossibility signifies only that high degree of improbability which leaves no room for doubt. In this sense we often call a thing impossible, which implies no con- tradiction, or any violation of the Laws of Nature, but which yet we are rationally convinced will never occiu merely from the multitude of chances against it ; as, e. g. that unloaded * See an able disquisition on Miracles, subjoined to the Li foot Apollonius Tyanaeus, in the Encyclopedia Metropolilana. 29 * 512 APPENDIX I. dice should turn up the same faces one hundred times succes sively.* And in this sense, we cannot accurately draw the line, so as to determine at what point the improbability amounts to an Impossibility; and hence we often have occa- sion to speak of this or that as almost impossible, though not quite, <^c. The other impossibilities do not admit of de- grees of approach. That a certain throw should recur two or three times successively, we should not call very improba- ble ; the improbability is increased at each successive step : but we cannot say exactly when it becomes impossible : though no one would scruple to call one hundred such recur- rences impossible. In the same sense we often call things impossible which are completely within the power of known agents to bring about, but which we are convinced they never will bring about. Thus, e. g. that all the civilized people in the world should with one accord forsake their habitations and wander about the world as savages, every one would call an impossibility ; though it is plain they have the power to do so, and that it depends on their choice which they will do ; and moreover that there even have been instances of some few persons doing so. In like manner, if we were told of a man’s having disgracefully fled from his post, whom we knew to be possessed of the most un- daunted courage, we should without scruple (and with good reason, supposing the idea formed of his character to be a just one) pronounce this an Impossibility ; meaning that there is Bufiicient ground for being fully convinced that the thing could never take p’ace ; not from any idea of his not having power nnd liberty to fly if he would ; for our certainty is built on the • And yet why should they not? since the chances are thi wry same against any given 100 throws. See Rhet Part I. Ch 1*4. AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 343 rery c rcumstance of his being free to act as he will, together with h s being of such a disposition as never to have the will to act disgracefully. If, again, a man were bound hand and foot, it would be, in the other sense, impossible for him to fly viz. out of his power. “ Capable ” has a corresponding amb’guity. E. G. We speak of this or that man being “ capable ” or '* incapable ’ of a cowardly act, in a different sense from that in which we speak of him as “ capable ” or “ incapable ” of writing a fine poem. The performance of any thing that is morally impossible to s. mere man, is to be reckoned a miracle , as much as if the .impossibility were physical. E. G. It is morally impossible fcff poor Jewish fishermen to have framed such a scheme of ethical and religious doctrine as the Gospel exhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretell distant and improbable future events with the exactitude of many of the prophecies in Scripture. Much of the confusion of thought which has pervaded, and has interminably protracted, the discussions respecting the long agitated question of human freedom, has arisen from inattention to the ambiguity which has been here noticed. If the Deity, it is said, “ foresees exactly what I shall do on any occasion, it must be impossible for me to act otherwise ; ” and thence it is inferred that man’s actions cannot be free. The middle-term employed in such an argument as this is “ impos- sible,” or “ impossibility ” employed in two senses. lie to whom it is, in one sense, impossible, (viz. physically) to act otherwise than he does, (i. e. who has it not in his poxer) is aoi a free agent ; correct foreknowledge implies impossibility in anothei sense, viz. moral impossibility ; — the absence o< 344 APPENDIX l ail room for doubt ;) and the perplexity is aggravated bj resorting, for the purpose of explanation, to such woids as “ may,” “ can,” “ possible,” “ must,” fyc., all of which are affected by a corresponding ambiguity.* It should be observed, that many things which are not usu ally termed “ mathematically ” necessary or impossible, wil at once appear such, when stated, not abstractedly , but with all their actual circumstances : e. g. that “ Brutus stabbed Caesar,” is a fact, the denial of which, though a falsehood, would not be regarded as self-contradictory (like the denial of the equality of two right angles ;) because, abstractedly we can conceive Brutus acting otherwise : but if we insert the circumstances (which of course really existed) of his hav- ing complete power, liberty, and also a predominant will tc do so, then the denial of the action amounts to a “ mathemat- ical ” impossibility, or self-contradiction ; for to act voluntarily against the dictates of a predominant will, implies an effect without a cause. Of Future events, that Being, and no other, can have the same knowledge as of the past, who is acquainted with all the causes, remote or immediate, internal and external, on which each depends. But every one is accustomed to anticipate future events, in human affairs, as well as in the material world, in proportion to his knowledge of the several circumstances connected with each ; however different in amount that knowledge may be, * See Tucker’s “Light of Nature,” in the Chapters on Providence, on Free-will, and some others. I have endeavored to condense and to simplify some of the most valuable parts of his reasonings in the Notes and Appendix to an edition of Archbishop King’s Discourse urt Predestination, published at the end of the Bampton Lectures. AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 315 in isference to different occurrences. Aid in both cases alike, we always attribute the failure of any anticipation to out ignorance or mistake respecting some of the circumstances. When e. g. we fully expect, from our supposed knowledge of some person’s character, and of the circumstances he is placed in, that he will do something which, eventually, he does not do, we at once and without hesitation conclude that we were mistaken either as to his character, or as to his situa- tion, or as to our acquaintance with human nature, generally ; and we are accustomed to adduce any such failure as a proof of such mistake ; saying “ it is plain you were mistaken in your estimate of that man’s character ; for he has done so and so : ” and this, as unhesitatingly as we should attribute the non-occurrence of an eclipse we had predicted, not, to any change in the Laws of Nature, but to some error in our cal- culations. xii. INDIFFERENCE, in its application in respect of the Will and of the Judgment , is subject to an ambiguity which some of my readers may perhaps think hardly worth noticing; the distinction between unbiassed candor and impartiality, on the one side, and carelessness , on the other, being so very ob- vious. But these two things nevertheless have been, from their bearing the same name, confounded together ; or at least represented as inseparably connected. I have known a per- son maintain, with some plausibility, the inexpediency, with a view to the attainment of truth, of educating people, or ap- pointing teachers to instruct them, in any particular systems or theories, of astronomy, medicine, religion, politics, <^c., on the ground, that a man must wish tc believe, and to find good reasons for believing, the system in which he has been trained, and which he has been engaged in teaching ; and this wish APPENDIX I. S46 must prejudice his understanding in favor of it, and const* quently render him an incompetent judge of truth.* Now let any one consider whether such a doctrine as this could have been even plausibly stated, but for the ambiguity of the word Indifference, and others connected with it. Fo it would follow, from such a principle, that no physician is to be trusted, who has been instructed in a certain mode of treating any disorder, because he must wish to think the the- ory correct which he has learned : nay, no physician should be trusted who is not utterly indifferent whether his patient recovers or dies ; since else, he must wish to find reasons for hoping favorably from the mode of treatment pursued. No plan for the benefit of the public, proposed by a philanthro- pist, should be listened to ; since such a man cannot but wish it may be successful ; fyc. No doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclinations; out it is possible, and it should be our endeavor, to guard against this bias. If a scheme be proposed to any one for embarking his capital in some speculation which promises great wealth, he will doubtless wish to find that the expecta- tions held out are well founded : but every one would call him very imprudent, if (as some do) he should suffer this, wish to bias his judgment, and should believe, on insufficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him. But we should not think such imprudence an inevitable consequence of his desire to increase his property. His wishes, we should say, were both natural and wise ; but since they could not render the event more probable, it was most unw'ise to allow them to influence his decision. In like manner a good man will indeed wish to find the evidence of the Christian religion satisfactory See Essay I. Second Series AMBIGUOUS l'ERMS. 347 But a wise man does not for that reason take for granted that it is satisfactory ; but weighs the evidence the more carefully on account of the importance of the question. It is curious to observe how fully aware of the operation of this bias, and how utterly blind to it, the same persons will be, :n opposite cases. Such writers, e. g. as I have just alluded to, disparage the judgment of those who have been accus tomed to study and to teach the Christian religion, and who derive hope and satisfaction from it, on the ground that they must wish to find it true. And let it be admitted that theil authority shall go for nothing ; and that the question shall be tried entirely by the reasons adduced. But then, on the same principle, how strong must be the testimony of the multitudes who admit the truth of Christianity, though it is to them a source of uneasiness or of dismay; — who have not adopted any antinomian system to quiet their conscience while leading an unchristian life ; but, when they hear of “ righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, tremble,” and try to dis- miss such thoughts till “ a more convenient season.” The case of these, who have every reason to wish Christianity un- true, is passed by, by the very same persons who are in- sisting on the influence of the opposite bias. According to the homely but expressive proverb, they are “ deaf on one ear.” And it may be added, that rt is utterly a mistake to suppose that the bias is always in favor of the conclusion wished for : it is often in the contrary direction. The proverbial expres- sion of “ too good news to be true,” bears witness to the ex- istence of this feeling. There is in some minds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases where their wishes are strong; «— ■ a morbid distrust of evidence which they are especially anxious to find conclusive ; e. g. groundless fears for the 348 APPENDIX I. health or safety of an xrdently-beloved jhild, will frequentlj distress anxious parents. Different temperaments (sometimes varying with the state of health of each individual) lead towards these opposite mis- ca'culations, — the over-estimate or under-estimate cf the reasons for a conclusion we earnestly wish to find true. Our aim should be to guard against both extremes, and to decide according to the evidence ; preserving the Indifference of fr.e Judgment , even where the Will neither can , nor should be indifferent. xiii. LAW is, etymologically, that which is “ laid ” down , and is used, in the most appropriate sense, to signify some general injunction, command, or regulation, addressed to cer- tain Persons, who are called upon to conform to it. It is irj this sense that we speak of “ the Law of Moses,” “ the Law of the Land,” fyc. It is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the state, ment of some general fact , the several individual instances of which exhibit a conformity to that statement, analogous to the conduct of persons in respect to a Law which they obey. It is in this sense that we speak of “ the Laws of Nature : ” when we say that “ a seed in vegetating directs the radicle down- wards and the plumule upwards, in compliance with a Law of Nature,” we only mean that such is universally the fact ; and so, in other cases. It is evident therefore that, in this sense, the conformity of individual cases to the general rule is that which constitutes a Law of Nature. If water should henceforth never become solid, at any temperature, then the freezing of water would no ionger be a Law of Nature : whereas in the other sense, a Law is not the more or the less a Law from the conformity AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 349 #r non-conformity of individuals to it : if an Act of cur Legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly disregarded by every one, it would not on that account be the less a Law. This distinction may appear so obvious when plainly stated as hardly to need mention : yet writers of great note and ability have confounded these two senses together : I need only mention Hooker (in the opening of his great work) and Montesquieu : the latter of whom declaims on the much stricter observance in the Universe of the Laws of Nature, than in mankind, of the divine and human Laws laid down for their conduct : not considering that, in the former case, it is the observance that constitutes the Law. xiv. MAY, and likewise MUST, and CAN, (as well as CANNOT) are each used in two senses, which are very often confounded together. They relate sometimes to Power , or Liberty , sometimes to Contingency. When we say of one who has obtained a certain sum of money, “ now he may purchase the field he was wishing for,” we mean that it is in his power ; it is plain that he may , in the Bame sense, hoard up the money, or spend it on something else ; though perhaps we are convinced, from our knowledge of his character and situation, that he will not. When again we say, “ it may .ain to-morrow,” or “ the vessel may have arrived in port,” the expression does not at all relate to power, but merely to contingency : i. e. we mean, that though we are not sure such an event will happen or has happened, we are not sure of the reverse. When, again, we say, ‘ this man, of so grateful a dispo sition, must have eagerly embraced such an opportunity of requiting his benefactor,” or “ one who approves of the slava 30 350 APPENDIX 1. trade ? nust be very hard-hearted,” we only mean to imply the absence of all doubt on these points. The very notions of gratitude and of hard-heartedness exclude the idea of compul* sion, and of yielding to irresistible power. But when we say that “ all men must die,” or that “ a man must go to prison who is dragged by force,” we mean “ whether they will o t not” — that there is no power to resist. So also, if we say that a Being of perfect goodness “ cannot ” act wrong, we do not mean that it is out of his power : since that would imply no goodness of character ; but that there is sufficient reason for feeling sure that He will not. It is in a very different sense that we say of a man fettered in a prison, that he “ cannot ” escape . meaning, that though he has the will, he wants the ability. These words are commonly introduced, in questions con- nected with Fatalism and the Freedom of human actions, to explain the meaning of “ necessary,” “ impossible,” fyc. ; and having themselves a corresponding ambiguity, they only tend to increase the perplexity. “ Chaos umpire sits, And by deciding worse embroils the fray.” MUST. — See « May.” xv. NECESSARY. — This word is used as the contrary to impossible ” in all its senses, and is of course liable to a corresponding ambiguity. Thus it is “ mathematically Neces* sary ” that two sides of a triangle should be greater than the third ; there is a “ physical Necessity” for the fall of a stone; and a “ moral Necessity ” that Beings of such and such a character should act, when left perfectly free, in such and such a manner i. e. we are sure they will act so ; though of AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 35 course it is in their power to act otherwise ; else there would be no moral agency.* This ambiguity is employed sophist!- cally to justify immoral conduct ; since no one is responsible for any thing done under “necessity,” — i. e. “ physica/ necessity;” as when a man is dragged any where by exter nal force, or falls down from being too weak to stand ; and then the same excuse is fallaciously extended to “ moral necessity ” also. There are likewise numberless different applications of the word “necessity” (as well as of those derived from it) in which there is a practical ambiguity, from the difference of the things understood in conjunction with it : e. g. food is “neces- sary ; ” viz. — to life ; great wealth is “ necessary ” — to the gratification of a man of luxurious habits ; the violation of moral duty is in many cases “ necessary ” — for the attain- ment of certain worldly objects ; the renunciation of such objects, and subjugation of the desires, is “necessary” — to the attainment of the Gospel-prornises, Spc. And thus it is that “ necessity ” has come to be “ the tyrant’s plea ; ” for as no one is at all responsible for what is a matter of physical necessity, — what he has no power to avoid, — so, a degree of allowance is made for a man’s doing what he has power to avoid, when it appears to be the less of two evils; as e. g. when a man who is famishing takes the first food he meets with, as “ necessary ” to support life, or throws over goods in a storm, when it is “ necessary ” in order to save the ship. But if the plea of necessity be admitted without inquiring for wliut the act in question is necessary, any thing whatever may be thus vindicated ; since no one commits any crime which is not, in his view, “ necessary ” to the attainment of some sup- posed advantage or gratification. * See the article “ Impossibility ; ” note. 352 APPENDIX I. The confusion of thought is further increased by the cm ployinent on improper occasions of the phrase “ absolutely necessary ; ” which, strictly speaking, denotes a case in which there is no possible alternative. It is necessary for a man’s safety that he should remain in a house which he cannot quit without incurring danger : it is absolutely ( or simply) neces sary that he should remain there, if he is closely imprisoned in it. I have treated more fully on this fruitful source of sophistry in the Appendix (No. I.) to King’s “ Discourse on Predestina- tion.” In the course of it, I suggested (in the first edition) an etymology of the word, which I have reason to think is not correct ; but it should be observed, that this makes no differ- ence in the reasoning, which is not in any degree founded on that etymology ; nor have I, as some have represented, at- tempted to introduce any new or unusual sense of the word, but have all along appealed to common use , — the only right standard, — and merely pointed out the senses in which each word has actually been employed. See the introduction to this Appendix. xvi. OLD. — This word, in its strict and primary sense, denotes the length of time that any object has existed ; and many are not aware that they are accustomed to use it in any other. It is, however, very frequently employed instead of “ Ancient,” to denote distance of time. The same transition seems to have taken place, in Latin. Horace says of Lucil- .us, who was one of the most ancient Roman authcrs hurt who did not live to be old — “ quo fit ut omnis Votiva pateat veluti desoripta tabe/la Vita Senis” AMBIU OUS TERMS. 353 The present is a remarkat e instance of the influence of air ambiguous word over the thoughts even of those who are not ignorant of the ambiguity, but are not carefully on the watcl against its effects ; the impressions and ideas associated by habit with the word when used in one sense, being always apt to obtrude themse.lves unawares when it is employed in another sense, and thus to affect our reasonings. E. G. “ Ola times,” — “the Old world,” fyc. are expressions in frequent use, and which, oftener than not, produce imperceptibly the associated impression of the superior wisdom resulting from experience, which, as a general rule, we attribute to Old men. Yet no one is really ignorant that the world is older now than ever it was ; and that the instruction to be derived from ob servations on the past (which is the advantage that Old per • sons possess) must be greater, supposing other things equal, to every successive generation ; and Bacon’s remark to this pur- pose appears, as soon as distinctly stated, a mere truism : yet few, perhaps, that he made, are more important. There is always a tendency to appeal with the same kind of deference to the authority of “ Old times,” as of aged men. It should be kept in mind, however, that ancient customs institutions , SfC. when they still exist , may be literally called Old ; and have this advantage attending them, that their effects may be estimated from long experience ; whereas we cannot be sure, respecting any recently-established Law or System, whether it may not produce in time some effects which were not originally contemplated.* xvii. ONE — is sometimes employed to denote strict and * See however the Article reprinted from the London Review, ia the first letter to Ear Grey on Secondary Punishments. 30 * 354 APPENDIX l. propet m.merica. Unity ; sometimes, c.ose Resemblance • correspondence with one single description. — See “ Same.” “ Facies non omnibus UNA, Nec diversa tamen ; qualem decet esse sororum.” — Ov. Met. b. :i. It is in the secondary or improper, not the primary tnd proper sense of this word, that men are exhorted to “ be of one mind ;” i. e. to agree in their faith, — pursuits, — mutual affections, 8f-c. “The Church” [viz. : die Universal or Cath- olic Church] “ is undoubtedly one, and so is the Human Race one ; but not as a Society. It was from the first composed of distinct Societies ; which were called one, because formed on common principles. It is One Society only when considered as to its future existence. The circumstance of its having one common Head, Christ, one Spirit, one Father, are points of unity, which no more make the Church One Society on earth, than the circumstance of all men having the same Creator, and being derived from the same Adam, renders the Human Race one Family.” * It is also in this sense that two guineas, e. g. struck from a wedge of uniform fineness, are said to be “ of one and the same form and weight,” and also “ of one and the same sub- stance.” In this secondary or improper sense also, a child is said to be “ of one and the same (bodily) substance with its mother:” or, simply “of the substance of its mother:” for these two pieces of money, and two human Beings, are ?iw- mericaUy distinct. It is evidently most important to keep steadily in view, aad to explain on proper occasions, these different uses of tka word, lest men should insensibly slide into error on the mosf Encyclop. Metrop. p. 774. AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 353 important of all subjects, by applying, in the secondary sense, expressions which ought to be understood in the primary and proper, — ( See “Person.”) Unity is, as might have been expected, liable to corresponding ambiguities. E. G. Some times what the Apostles say concerning “ Unity of Spirit ’ — * of Faith — Sec. is transferred to Unity of Church-Government xviii. PAL. — In the strict sense, a person is said to “ pay,’ 1 wno transfers to another what was once his own : in another sense “ pay ” is used to denote the mere act of handing over what perhaps never was one’s own. In this latter sense a gentleman’s steward or housekeeper is said to pay the trades- men their bills ; in the other sense, it is the master who pays them. It is in the secondary or improper sense that an executor is said to pay legacies, — a landowner or farmer to pay tithes, <^c., since the money these hand over to another never was theirs. See “ Evidence,” (in vol. of Tracts,) p. 339. xix. PERSON,* in its ordinary use at present, invariably implies a numerically distinct substance. Each man is one Person, and can be but one. It bas also a peculiar theological sense, in which we speak of the “ three Persons ” of the blessed Trinity. It was probably thus employed by our Di- vines as a literal, or perhaps etymological, rendering of the Latin word “ Persona.” I am inclined to think, however, from the language of Wallis (the Mathematician and Logi- cian) in the following extract, as well as from that of some other of our older writers, that the English word Person was * Most of the following observations will apply to the word “ Per lonality ” 356 APPENDIX 1. formerly not so strictly confined as now, to the sense it bei f in common conversation among us. “That which makes these expressions'” {viz. respecting the Trinity) “seem harsh to some of these men, is because they have used themselves to fancy that notion only of the word Person, according to which three men are accounted tc be three persons, and these three persons to be three men But he may consider that there is another notion of the wora Person, and in common use too, wherein the same man may be said to sustain divers persons, and those persons to be the same man : that is, the same man as sustaining divers capaci- ties. As was said but now of Tully, Tres Personas Unus sustineo ; meam , adversarii , judicis. And then it will seem no more harsh to say, The Three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, ire One God, than to say, God the Creator, God the Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, are one God it is much the same thing whether of the two forms we use.” — Letters on the Trinity , p. 63. “ The word Person ( persona ) is originally a Latin word, and does not properly signify a Man ; (so that another person must needs imply another man ) for then the word Homo would have served, and they needed not have taken in the word Persona • but rather, one so circumstantiated. And the same Man , if considered in other circumstances (considerably dif- ferent) is reputed another person. And that this is the true notion of the word Person, appears by those noted phrases, personam inducre , personam deponerc, personam agere , and many the like in approved Latin authors Thus the same man may at once sustain the Person, of a King and a Father , if he be invested both with regal and paternal authority. Now because the King and the Father are for the most part not onl; different persons but different men also, (and the AMBIGUOUS TERMS, 35 ? flke in other cases) hence it conies to pass that i fiother Person is sometimes supposed to imply another man ; lut not always, nor is that the proper sense of the word. It is Englished in our dictionaries by the state , quality or condition wherehy on < man differs from another ; and so, as the condition alters, tha Person alters, though the man be the same. “ The hinge of the controversy, is, that notion concerning the three somewhats , which the Fathers (who first used it) did intend co design by the name Person ; so that we are not from the word Person to determine what was that Notion ; but from that Notion which they would express, to determine in what sense the word Person is here used,” fyc. 4'C. — Letter V. in Answer to the-Arian’s Vindication.* What was precisely the notion which these Latin Fathers ‘intended to convey, and how far it approached the classical [.ignification of the word “ Persona,” it may not be easy to determine. But we must presume that they did not intend to employ it in what is, now, the ordinary sense of the word Person ; both because “ Persona ” never, I believe, bore that sense in pure Latinity, and also because it is evident that, in that sense, “ three divine Persons ” would have been exactly * Dr. Wallis’s theological works, considering his general celebrity, are wonderfully little known. He seems to have been, in his day, one of the ablest Defenders of the Church’s doctrine, against the Arians and Socinians of that period. Of course he incurred the censure, not only of them, but of all who, though not professedly Arian, gave such an exposition of their doctrine as amounts virtually to Tritheism. I beg to be understood however as not demanding an implicit defer- ence for his, or for any other human authority, however eminent. We are taught to “ call no man Master, on earth.” But the reference to Dr. Wallis may serve both to show the use of the word in his clays, and to correct the notion, should any have entertained it, that the yiewe of the subject here taken are, in our Church, any thir g n oval 358 APPENDIX I. equivalent to “ three Gods a meaning wliich the orlhodoj always disavowed. It is probable that they had nearly the same view with which the Greek theologians adopted the word Hypostasis which seems calculated to express “ that which stands undel (i. e. is the subject of) Attributes.” They meant, it may be presumed, to guard against the suspicion of teaching, on the one hand, that there are three Gods, or three Parts of the one God ; or, on the other hand, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are no more than three names* all, of the same signification ; and they employed, accordingly, a term which might serve to denote, that, (though divine Attributes belong to all and each of these, yet) there are attributes of each, respectively, which are not so strictly applicable to either of the others, as such ; as when, for instance, the Son is called especially the “ Re- deemer,” and the Holy Spirit, the “ Comforter or Paraclete,” t SfC. The notion thus conveyed is indeed very faint , and im- perfect ; but is perhaps for that very reason, (considering what Man is, and what God is,) the less likely to lead to error. One may convey to a blind man a notion of seeing, correct as far as it goes, and instructive to him, though very imperfect : f he form a more full and distinct notion of it, his ideas will * It is possible that some may have usgd this expression in the very sense attached by others to the word “ Person ; ” led, in a great degree, by the peculiar signification of “ Name ” in Scripture. For Borne very important remarks on that signification, see Hinds's His- tory, and also a Sermon on the Name Emmanuel in the vol. i lately published. f English readers are not usually aware that the title oi •* Para- clete” is ever distinctly applied to Christ in Scripture, as it is in 1 John ii. 1, because it is there translated “advocate” instead of * comforter.” AMBIGTJUuu ERMS. 359 inevitably be incorrect . — See Essay VII. § 5, Second Series.* It is perhaps to be regretted that our Divines, in rendering the Latin “ Persona,” used the word Person, whose ordinary sense, in the present day at least, differs in a most important point from the theological sense, and yet is not so remote from it as to preclude all mistake and perplexity. If “ Hypos* tasis,” or any other completely foreign term had been used instead, no idea at all would have been conveyed except that of the explanation given ; and thus the danger at least of be- ing misled by a word, would have been avoided.! Our Reformers however did not introduce the word into their Catechism ; though it has been (I must think, injudicious- ly) employed in some popular expositions of the Catechism, without any explanation, or even allusion to its being used in a peculiar sense. As it is, the danger of being not merely not understood, but misunderstood, should be guarded against most sedulously oy all who wish not only to keep clear of error, but to incul- cate important truth ; by seldom or never employing this am- biguous word without some explanation or caution. For if we employ, without any such care, terms which we must be sensible are likely to mislead, at least the unlearned and the unthinking, we cannot stand acquitted on the plea of not hav mg directly inculcated error. * It is worth observing, as a striking instance of the little reliance to be placed on etymology as a guide to the meaning of a word, that “ Hypostasis,” “ Substantia,” and “ Understanding,” so widely dif- ferent in their sense, correspond in their etymology. t I wish it to be observed, that it is the ambiguity of the word Per- son which renders it objectionable ; not, its being nowhere employed tn Scripture in the technical sense of theologians ; for t! is eircum stance is rather an advantage. — See Essoy VI. (Second Series) § 4, note. 360 APPENDIX 1. I am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, may be traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It is not won* derful that some should be led to renounce a doctrine, which, through the ambiguity in question, may be represented to them as involving a self-contradiction, or as leading to Tritheism ; — that others should insensibly slide into this very error; — or that many more (which I know to be no uncommon case) should, for fear of that error, deliberately, and on principle, keep the doctrine of the Trinity out of their thoughts, as a point of speculative belief, to which they have assented once for all, but which they find it dangerous to dwell on ; though it is in fact the very Faith into which,* by our Lord’s ap- pointment, we are baptized. Nor should those who do understand, or at least have once understood the ambiguity in question, rest satisfied that they are thenceforward safe from all danger in that quarter It should be remembered that the thoughts are habitually in fluenced, through the force of association, by the recurrence of the ordinary sense of any word to the mind of those who are not especially on their guard against it. See “ Fallacies,” $ 5 - The correctness of a formal and deliberate Confession of Faith, is not always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against error in the habitual impressions on the mind. The Roman- ists flatter themselves that they are safe from Idolatry, because they distinctly acknowledge the truth, that “ God only is to be served;' 1 '' viz. with “ Latria though they allow Adoration, (“ hyperdulia” and “ dulia ”) to the Virgin and other Saints, — to Images, — and to Relics: to which it has been justly re- * ct{ to iro/tct, “ into the Name ; ” not “ in the Name.” Matt xxviii. 19. AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 361 plied, that supposing this distinction correct in itself, It would be, in practice, nugatory ; since the mass of the people must soon (as experience proves) 'ose sight of it entirely in their habitual devotions. Nor again is the habitual acknowledgment of One God. of itself a sufficient safeguard ; since, from the additional ambi- guities of “ One” and “ Unity,” (noticed in a preceding Arti- cle) we may gradually fall into the notion of a me rely figura- tive Unity ; such as unity of substance merely, (see a preced- ing Article) — Unity of purpose, — concert of action, Sfc. such as is often denoted by the phrase “ one mind.” See “ Same,” in this Appendix, and “ Dissertation,” Book IV. Ch. v. When however I speak of the necessity of explanations , the reader is requested tc keep in mind, that I mean, not ex- planations of the nature oj the Deity, but of our own use of words. On the one hand we must net content ourselves with merely saying that the whole subject is mysterious and must not be too nicely pried into ; while we neglect to notice the distinction between divine revelations, and human explana- tions of them ; — between inquiries into the mysteries of the divine nature, and into the mysteries arising from the am- biguities of language, and of a language too, adopted by un- inspired men. For, whatever Scripture declares, the Chris- tian is bound to receive implicitly, however unable to under- stand it : but to claim an uninquiring assent to expressions of man’s framing, (however judiciously framed) without even an attempt to ascertain their meaning, is to fall into one of the worst errors of the Romanists. On the other hand, to require explanations of what God o in Himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach of the hu- man faculties and foreign from the apparent design of Scrip- 31 302 APPENDIX I. ture-revelation ; which seems to be, chiefly, if not wholly, to declare to us, (at least to insist on among the essential article* of faith ) with a view to our practical benefit, and to the influ- encing of our feelings and conduct, not so much the intrinsic nature of the Deity, as, what He is and does, relatively to us. Scripture teaches us (and our Church-Catechism directs out attention to these points) to “ believe in God, who, as the Father, hath made us and all the world, — as the Son, hath redeemed us and all mankind, — as the Holy Ghost, sanctfieth us, and all the elect people of God.” * And this distinction is, as I have said, pointed out in the very form of Baptism. Nothing indeed can be more decid- edly established by Scripture, — nothing more indistinctly ex ; plained (except as far as relates to us) than the doctrine of the Trinity ;t nor are we perhaps capable, with our present faculties, of comprehending it more fully. In these matters, our inquiry, — at least our first inquiry, — should always be, what is revealed : nor, if any one re- fuses to adopt as an article of faith, this or that exposition should he be understood as necessarily maintaining its falsity. For we are sure that there must be many truths relative to the Deity, which we have no means of ascertaining : nor does it follow that even every truth which can be ascertained, must be a part of the essential faith of a Christian. And as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such instruc- * Hawkins's Manual, p. 12. f Compare together, for instance, such passages as the following ; for it is by comparing Scripture with Scripture, not by dwelling on insulated texts, that the Word of God is to be rightly understood ! Luke i. 35, and John xiv. 9 ; John xiv. 16, 18, 26, Matt, xxviii. 19, 20 • John xvi. 7, Coloss. ii. 9 ; Philip, i. 19, 1 Cor. vi. 19 ; Matt, x 2tX and John xiv. 23. AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 363 tiona as are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, it seeins the part of a like wisdom, to abstain, during this our state of childhood, from curious speculations on subjects in which even the ablest of human minds can but “ see by means of a glass, darkly.” On these, the Learned can have no advantage ovet others ; though we are apt to forget that any mysterious point inscrutable to Man, as Man, — surpassing the utmost reach of human intellect, — must be such to the learned and to the ignorant, to the wise and to the simple, alike ; — that in utter darkness, the strongest sight, and the weakest, are on a level. “ Sir, in these matters,” (said one of the most eminent of our Reformers, respecting another mysterious point,) “ I am so fear- ful, that I dare speak no further, yea almost none otherwise, than as the Scripture doth as it were lead me by the hand And surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture, and take it for a guide , than to resort to it merely for confirma- tions, contained in detached texts, of the several parts of some System of Theology, which the student fixes on as reputed orthodox, and which is in fact made the guide which he per- mits to “ lead him by the hand ; ” while passages culled out from various parts of the Sacred Writings in subserviency to such system, are formed into what may be called an anagram of Scripture : and then, by reference to this system as « stand- ard, each doctrine or discourse is readily pronounced Ortho- dox, or Socinian, or Arian, or Sabellian, or Nestorian, fyc. , and all this, on the ground that the theological scheme whicl the student has adopted, is supported by Scripture. The ma- terials indeed are the stones of the Temple ; but the building constructed with them is a fabric of human contrivance. If instead of this, too common, procedure, students would fairly search the Scriptures with a view not merely to defend theii □pinions, but to form them, — not merely for arguments , but 364 APPENDIX I. for truth, — keeping human expositions to their tvvi. propel purposes [See Essay YI. First Series,] and not allowing these to become, practically, a standard, — if, in short, they were as honestly desirous to be on the side of Scripture, aa they naturally are to have Scripture, on their side, how much sounder, as well as more charitable, would their conclusions often be ! With presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded to, many theologians, even of those who lived near, and indeed during, the Apostolical times, seem to have been alike charge- able, widely as they differed in respect of the pellicular ex- planations adopted by each : “ Unus utrique Error ; sed variis illudit partibus.” And it is important to remember, — what we are very liable to lose sight of — the circumstance, that, not only there arose grievous errors during the time of the Apostles, and conse- quently such were likely to exist in the times immediately fol- lowing, but also that when these inspired guides were re- moved, there was no longer the same infallible authority to decide what was error. In the absence of such a guide, some errors might be received "as orthodox, and some sound doc- trines be condemned as heterodox. The Gnostics * introduced a theory of ACons, or succes- sive emanations from the divine “ Pleroma ” or Fulness ; one of whom was Christ, and became incarnate in the man Jesus.t • Of these, and several other ancient heretics, we have no accounts but those of their opponents ; which ho wever we may presume to con- tain more or less of approximation to what was usually maintained. t These heretics appear to have split into many different sect* teacning various modifications of the same absurdities. - - See Burton i Hampton Lectures AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 366 Yh« Sabeilians are reported to have described Christ as bear- ing the same relation to the Father, as the illuminating (qpwTiOT(x6r) quality does to the Sun while the Holy Ghost corresponded to the warming quality (i Oalnbv ) : or again, the Three as corresponding to the Body, Soul, and Spirit, of a man ; or again, to Substance, — Thought or Reason, — and Will or Action. The Arians again represented the Son and the Holy Spirit, as created Beings, but with a certain im- parted divinity. The Nestorians and Eutychians gave oppo- site, but equally fanciful and equally presumptuous explana- tions of the Incarnation, fyc. fyc. Nor were those who were accounted orthodox, altogcthel exempt from the same fault of presumptuous speculation. “ Who,” says Chrysostom, “ was he to whom God said, Let us make man ? who but he the Son of God ? ” And Epiphanius, on the same passage, says, “ This is the language of God to his Word.” Each of these writers, it may be ob- served, in representing God (under that title) as addressing Himself to the Son as to a distinct Being previously to the birth of Jesus on earth, approaches very closely to the Arian view. And Justin Martyr, in a similar tone, expressly speaks of God as “ One, not in number , but in judgment or de- signs.” * I will not say that such passages as these may not be so interpreted as to exclude every form of tritheism ; but it is a dangerous thing, to use (and that, not in the heat of declamation, but in a professed exposition) language of such a nature that it is a mere chance whether it may not lead into the most unscriptural errors. If the early writers had not been habitually very incautious in this point, that could hardly * oil Tog yeyQa fiftivog Osog, sreQog ton rov T a nurta 7Tot(f- tvvroQ ©toijf aQi&fiiS /Ltyw t ocXV av yvdifitj ; <§•93 3. Profit. The excess of value which the finished work possesses above the value of the material, implement?, and subsistence expended. The surplus remaining after the cost of production has been replaced. — Production of Wealth p 53 M‘Culloch. ( Principles , <^c. ) 1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which j paid by the farmer to the landlord for the use of the natural and inherent powers of the soil. — p. 265. 2. Wages. The compensation paid to laborers in return for their services. — Essay on Rate of Wages, p. 1. 3. Profit. The excess of the commodities produced by the expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that quantity of capital. — Principles, p. 366. Ricardo. ( Principles , fyc.) 3rd Ed. 1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and inde- structible powers of the soil. — p. 53. 2. Wages. The laborer’s proportion of the produce.— Chap. v. 3. Profit. The capitalist’s proportion of the produce. — Chap. vi. The first observation to be made on these definitions, is, that the Rent of land , which is only a species of an extensive genus, is used as a genus, and that its cognate species are either omitted, or included under genera to which they do not properly belong Wages and Profits are of h iman creatiov. : they imp'y a sacrifice of ease or immediate enjoyment, APPENDIX I. 39-1 bear a ratio to that sacrifice which is indicated by the com- mon expressions of “ the rate of wages,” and the “ rate of profits ; ” a ratio which has a strong tendency to uniformity. But there is another and a very large source of revenue which is not the creation of man, but of nature ; which owes its origin, not to the will of its possessor, but to accident ; which implies no sacrifice, has no tendency to uniformity, and to which the term “ rate ” is seldom applied. This revenue arises from the exclusive right to some instru- ment of production, enabling the employment of a given amount of labor or capital to be more than usually produc- tive. The principal of these instruments is land ; but all extraordinary powers of body or mind, — all processes in manufacture which are protected by secrecy or by law, — all peculiar advantages from situation or connection, — in short, every instrument of production which is not universally ac- cessible, affords a revenue distinct in its origin from Wages or Frofits, and of which the Rent of land is only a species. In the classification of revenues, either Rent ought to have been omitted as a genus, and considered only as an anomalous in- terruption of the general uniformity of wages and profits, or all the accidental sources of revenue ought to have been in- cluded in one genus, of which the Rent of land would have formed the principal species. Another remark is, that almost all these definitions of Profit include the wages of the labor of the Capitalist -The conti- nental Economists have in general been aware of this, and have pointed it out in their analyses of the component parts of Profit. The British Economists have seldom entered into this analysis, and the want of it has been a great cause of obscurity. On the other hand, much of what properly belongs to Profit AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 396 end F'i- . is geaerally included under Wages. Almost all Econ'/tr *ts consider the members of the liberal professions under t,/ class of laborers. The whole subsistence of such persons, observes Mr. M‘Culloch,* is derived from Wages ; and they are as evidently laborers as if they handled the spade or the plough. But it should be considered, that those whc are engaged in any occupation requiring more skill than that of a common husbandman, must have expended capital, more or less, on the acquisition of their skill ; their education must have cost something in every case, from that of the handi- craft-apprentice, to that of the legal or medical student ; and a Profit cn this outlay is of course lookeo for, as in other dis- bursements of capital ; and the higher profit in proportion to the risk ; viz. the uncertainty of a man’s success in his busi- ness. Part, therefore, and generally far the greater part, of what has been reckoned the wages of his labor ought more properly to be reckoned profits on the capital expended in fit- ting him for that particular kind of labor. And again, all the excess of gains acquired by one possessing extraordinary tal- ents, opportunities, or patronage (since these correspond to the possession of land, — of a patent-right, — or other mo- nopoly, — of a secret, fyc.) may be more properly regarded as Rent than as Wages. Another most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from the use of the word Wages, sometimes as expressing a quantity , sometimes as expressing a proportion. In ordinary language, Wages means the amount of % oml commodity , generally of silver, given to the laborer in return for a given exertion ; and they rise or fall, as that amount '% increased or diminished. * “ Principles,” &p, p. 228- 396 APPENDIX 1. *n the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the laborer’s proportion of what is produced , supposing that prod- uce to be divided between him and the Capitalist. In this sense they generally rise as the whole produce is diminished ; though if the word be used in the other sense, they generally fall. If Mr. Ricardo had constantly used the word “ Wages,” to express a proportion , the only inconvenience would have been the necessity of always translating this expression into common language. But he is not consistent. When he says,* that “ whatever raises the Wages of labor lowers the Profits of stock,” he considers wages as a proportion. When he says, t that “high Wages encourage population;” he con- siders wages as an amount. Even Mr. M‘Culloch, who has clearly explained the ambiguity, has not escaped it. He has even suffered it to affect his reasonings. In his valuable es say, “ on the Rate of Wages,” J he admits that “ when Wages are high, the Capitalist has to pay a larger share of the prod- uce of industry to his laborers.” An admission utterly in- consistent with his general use of the word, as expressing the amount of what the laborer receives, which, as he has himself observed,^ may increase while his proportion diminishes. A few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which attach to the seven terms that have been selected ; and these terms have been fixed on, not as the most ambiguous, but as the most important, in the political nomenclature “ Sup- ply and Demand,” “ Productive and Unproductive,” “ Over- trading” and very many others, both in political economy, and in other subjects, which are often used without any more explanation or any more suspicion of their requiring it, than * “Principles,” &c. p. 312. f Ibid p. 83. J P. 161. 4 P. 365 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 397 the words “ triangle ” or “ twenty,” are perhaps even more liable to ambiguities than those above treated of. But it is sufficient for the purpose of this Appen dix to have noticed, by way of specimens, a few of the most remarkable terms in several different branches of knowledge, in order to show both the frequency of an ambiguous use of language, and the importance of clearing up such ambiguity. 34 APPENDIX No. II. Mlbo'ELLANEVtJS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE 01 LEARNERS. N. B. In such of the following Examples as are not in a syl- logistic form, it is intended that the student should practise the reduction of them into that form ; those of them, that is, in which the reasoning is in itself sound : viz. where it is impossible to admit the Premisses and deny the Conclu- sion. Of such as are apparent Syllogisms, the validity must be tried by logical rules, which it may be advisable to apply in the following order : 1st. Observe whether the argument be Categorical or Hypothetical ; recollecting that a hypothetical Premiss does not necessarily imply a hy- pothetical Syllogism, unless the reasoning turns on the hy- pothesis. If this appear to be the case, the rules for hy- pothetical Syllogisms must be applied. 2dly. If the argu- ment be categorical, count the terms. 3dly. If only three, observe whether the Middle be distributed. 4thiy, Observe whether the Premisses are both negative ; ( i . e. really, and not in appearance only,) and if one is, whether the Con- clusion be negative also ; or affirmative, if both Premisses EXAMPLES 399 affirmative. 5thly. Observe what terms are Distributed in the conclusion, and whether the same are distributed in the Premisses. 6thly. If the Syllogism is not a Categorical in the first Figure, reduce it to that form. 1. No one is free who is enslaved by his appetites : a sen sualist is enslaved by his appetites : therefore a sensualist is not free. 2. None but Whites are civilized : the ancient Germans were Whites : therefore they were civilized. 3. None but Whites are civilized : the Hindoos are not Whites : therefore they are not civilized. 4. None but civilized people are Whites : the Gauls were Whites : therefore they were civilized. 5. No one is rich who has not enough : no miser has enough : therefore no miser is rich. 6. If penal laws against Papists were enforced, they would be aggrieved : but penal laws against them are not enforced : therefore the Papists are not aggrieved. 7. If all testimony to miracles is to be admitted, the popish legends are to be believed : but the popish legends are not to be believed : therefore no testimony to miracles is to be admitted. 8, If men are not likely to be influenced in the perform- ance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform it, the oaths commonly administered are superfluous ; if they are nkely to be so influenced, every one should be made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life ; but one or the other of tnese must be the case : therefore either the oaths commonly administered are superfluous, or every man should be made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life 400 APPENDIX II. 9 The Scliptures must be admitted to be agieeable to truth ; and the Church of England is conformable to the Scriptures: A. B. is a divine of the Church of England ; and this opinion is in accordance with his sentiments : therefore it must be presumed to be true. 10. Enoch (according to the testimony of Scripture.) pleased God ; but without faith it is impossible to please Him (for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that Ho is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him :) therefore, c^c. 11. “If Abraham were justified by works, then had ho whereof to glory [before God:] but not [anyone can have whereof to glory] before God : ” therefore Abraham was not justifieu by works. 12. “ He that is of God heareth my words : ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God.” 13. Few treatises of science convey important truths, with out any intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and interesting form : and therefore, though a treatise would deserve much attention which should possess such excellence, it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve much attention. 14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for reli- gious duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory on us : but we are bound to set apart one day in seven for religious duties; and hence it appears that the fourth commandment is obligatory on us. 15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference to the divine institution of sacrifices : one of the precepts deliw ered to Noah was abstinence from the eating of blood there- fore one of the precepts delivered to Noah contained the di- vine institution of sacrifices. 16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed befora .he Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not of cere- EXAMPLES. 40l monial sin (which could not then exist,) but of nsorJ sin : if so, the Levitical sacrifices must have had no less efficacy ; and in that case, the atonements under the Mosaic law would have “ made the comers thereunto perfect as pertaining to the conscience ; ” but this was not the case : therefore, fyt r Daviscn on Prophecy .] 17. The adoration of images is forbidden to Christians, if we suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israelite? alone, but for all men : it was designed, however, for the Is raelites alone, and not for all men : therefore the adoration ol images is not forbidden to Christians. 18. A desire to gain by another’s loss is a violation of the tenth commandment : all gaming, therefore, since it implies a desire to profit at the expense of another, involves a breach of the tenth commandment. 19. Ail the fish that the net enclosed were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds : those that were set aside and saved as valuable, were fish that the net enclosed : therefore those that were set aside and saved as valuable, were an indiscrim- inate mixture of various kinds. 20. All the elect are finally saved : such persons as are arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the divine decree are the elect : therefore such persons as are arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the divine decree, are finally saved. [The opponents of this Conclusion generally deny the Minor Premiss and admit the Major; the reverse would be the more sound and the more effectual objection.] 21. No one who lives with another on terms of confidence is justified, on any pretence, in killing him ; Brutus lived on terms of confidence with Csesar : therefore he was not justi- fied, on the pretence he pleaded, in killing him. J 22. He that destroys a man who usurps despotic power in 34 * 402 APPENDIX II. a free country deserves well of his countrymen : Brutus du strojed Caesar, who usurped despotic power in Rome : there fore he deserved well of the Romans. 23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary : virtue is vol- untary : therefore so is vice. [Arist. Eth. B. iii.] 24. A wise lawgiver must either recognize the rewards and punishments of a future state, or must be able to appeal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing them regularly in thin life ; Moses did not do the former : therefore he must have done the latter. [Warburton.] 25. Nothing which is of less frequent occurrence than the fa.jitv of testimony can be fairly established by testimony : any extraordinary and unusual fact is a thing of less frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony (that being very com- mon) : therefore no extraordinary and unusual fact can be fairly established by testimony. 26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very likely to be false : the evidence on which most men believe that there are pyramids in Egypt is testimony : therefore the evi- dence on which most men believe that there are pyramids in Egypt is very likely to be false. 27. The religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans was a tissue of extravagant fables and groundless superstitions, credited by the vulgar and the weak, and maintained by the more enlightened, from selfish or political views: the same was clearly the case with the religion of the Egyptians : the game may be said of the Brahminical worship of India, and the religion of Fo, professed by the Chinese ; the same, of the romantic mythological system of the Peruvians, of the stem and bloody rites of the Mexicans, and those of the Brit ons and of the Saxons : hence we may conclude that all sys- tems of religion, however varied in circumstances, agree EXAMPLES. 403 Li Deing superstitions kept up among the vulgar, from in- terested or political views in the more enlightened classes [See Dissertation, Chap. i. § 2.] J 28. No man can possess power to perform impossibilities , a miracle is an impossibility : therefore no man can possess power to perform a miracle. [See Appendix, Art. “ Impossible.”] 29. A. B. and C. D. are each of them equal to E. F. • therefore they are equal to each other. 30. Protection from punishment is plainly due to the inno cent •, therefore, as you maintain that this person ought no; to be punished, it appears that you are convinced of his inno- cence. 31. All the most bitter persecutions have been religious persecutions : among the most bitter persecutions were those which occurred in France during the revolution : therefore they must have been religious persecutions. 32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does, has neither merit nor demerit in his action : a liberal and benevo- lent man cannot possibly act otherwise than he does in reliev- ing the poor : therefore such a man has neither merit not demerit in his action. [See App. Art. “Impossible.”] 33. What happens every day is not improbable : some things against which the chances are many thousands to one, happen every day : therefore some things against which the chances are many thousands to one, are not improbable. 34. The early and general assignment of the Epistle to the (Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either from its professing to be his, and containing his name, or from its really being his ; since, therefore, the former of these is not (he fact, the Epistle must be Paul’s. 85. “ With some of them God was not well pleased ; fo> fcey were overthrown in the wilderness.” 404 APPENDIX II 36. A sensua ist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratifications without satiety : it is impossible to enjoy perpetual gratifica- tions without satiety : therefore it is impossible fora sensualist to obtain his wish. 37. If Paley’s system is to be received, one who has nd knowledge of a future state has no means of distinguishing virtue and vice : now one who has no means of distinguishing virtue and vice can commit no sin : therefore, if Paley’s sys- tem is to be received, one who has no knowledge of a future state can commit no sin. 38. The principles of justice are variable : the appoint ments of nature are invariable : therefore the principles of justice are no appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. v.] 39. Every one desires happiness : virtue is happiness • therefore every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. iii.] 40. A story is not to be believed, the reporters of which give contradictory accounts of it ; the story of the life and exploits of Buonaparte is of this description : therefore it is not to be believed. [See B. i. § 3.] 41. When the observance of the first day of the week as a religious festival in commemoration of Christ’s resurrection, was first introduced, it must have been a novelty : when it was a novelty, it must have attracted notice : when it attracted notice, it would lead to inquiry respecting the truth of the resurrection : when it led to this inquiry, it must have exposed the story as an imposture, supposing it not attested by living witnesses : therefore, when the observance of the first day of the week, <^-c. was first introduced, it must have exposed as an imposture the story of the resurrection, supposing it not attested by living witnesses. 42. All the miracles of Jesus would fill more books than die world could contain : the things related b/ the Evange' EXAMPLES. 405 iisls are the miracles of Jesus : therefore the thii gs related by the Evangelists would fill more bocks than the world eoula contain. 43. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been writ ten without knowledge of the events of the time of Christ they could not correspond with them exactly ; and if they had been forged by Christians, they would not be preserved and acknowledged by the Jews : they are preserved and acknowl- edged by the Jews, and they correspond exactly with the events of the time of Christ : therefore they were neither written without knowledge of those events, nor were forged by Christians. 44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred : occasional tur- bulence, therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism, is to be preferred to it. 45. According to theologians, a man must possess faith in order to be acceptable to the Deity : now he who believes all the fables of the Hindoo mythology must possess faith : there- fore such a one must, according to theologians, be acceptable to the Deity. 46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been either by faith or by works : now he was not justified by faith, (accord- ing to James,) nor by works, (according to Paul) : therefore Abraham was not justified. 47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it . all punishment : s an evil : therefore no punishment should be aLowed that good may come of it. 48. Repentance is a good thing : wicked men abound in jvepentance [Arist. Eth. B. ix.] : therefore wicked men abound in what is gord. 49. A person infected with the plague will (probably) dis Buppose three in five of the infected die] : this man is (probably) 106 APPENDIX II infected with '.ne plague [suppose it an even ehance' : theiefoia he will (probably) die. Query. What is the amount of this prob- ability ? Again, suppose the probability of the major to be (instead 2 4 12 of ~) -, and of the minor, (instead of -) to be jt, Query. What will be the probability of the conclusion ? 50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has been accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the condition of a slave : many of the negroes, however, may be happy in the condition of slaves, because they have never been accus- tomed to enjoy liberty. 51. Whatever is dictated by Nature is allowable : devoted- ness to the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that of gain in old age, are dictated by Nature [Arist. Rhet. B. ii.] : therefore they are allowable. 52. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that per- son’s greatest good : a virtuous man seeks the greatest good for himself : therefore a virtuous man is the greatest lover of himself. [Arist. Eth. B. ix.] 53. He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action, exercises no self-denial in the practice of that action : a good man has a confirmed habit of Virtue : therefore he who exer- cises self-denial in the practice of Virtue is not a good man. 'Arist. Eth. B. ii.] 54. That man is independent of the caprices of Fortune who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual ex- cellence : a ‘rue philosopher is independent of the caprices of Fortune : therefore a true philosopher is one who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excellence. 55. A system of government which extends to those ac- tions that are performed secretly, must be one which refers either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the rewards and punishments of another world : every perfect EXAMPLES 407 system of government must extend to those actions which are performed secretly : no system of government therefore can be perfect, which does not refer either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the rewards and punishments of another world. [Warburton’s Divine Legation.] 56. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds dj diligent study, the incitement of academical honors is unne> cessary ; and it is ineffectual, for the idle, and such as are indifferent to mental improvement : therefore the incitement of academical honors is either unnecessary or ineffectual. 57. He who is properly called an actor, does not endeavor to make his hearers believe that the sentiments he expresses and the feelings he exhibits, are really his own : a barrister does this : therefore he is not properly to be called an actor. 58. He who bears arms at the command of the magistrate does what is lawful for a Christian : the Swiss in the French service, and the British in the American service, bore arms at the command of the magistrate : therefore they did what was lawful for a Christian. 59. If Lord Bacon is right, it is improper to stock a new colony with the refuse of Jails : but this we must allow not to be improper, if our method of colonizing New South Wales be a wise one : if this be wise, therefore, Lord Bacon is noi right. 60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aristotle is to be regarded as infallible : but he is not : Logic therefore is not worthy of being cultivated. 61. All studies are useful which tend to advance a man in life, or to increase national and private wealth : but the course of studies pursued at Oxford has no such tendency : therefore it is not useful. 62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed, tend* 408 APPENDIX II. to heighten in others the dread of undergoing the same fate, it may be expected that those soldiers who have seen the most service, should have the most dread of death in battle; but the reverse of this is the case : therefore the former is not to be believed. 63. If the everlasting favor of God is not bestowed at ran- dom, and on no principle at all, it must be bestowed either with respect to men’s persons, or with respect to their con- duct : but “ God is no respecter of persons : ” therefore his favor must be bestowed with respect to men’s conduct. [Sumner’s Apostolical Preaching.] 64. If transportation is not felt as a severe punishment, it is in itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime : if it is so felt, much of its severity is wasted, from its taking place at too great a distance to affect the feelings, or even come to the knowledge, of most of those whom it is designed to deter; but one or other of these must be the case : therefore trans- portation is not calculated to answer the purpose of preventing crime. 65. War is productive of evil : therefore peace is likely to be productive of good. 66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other percepti- ble purpose but to gratify the sight : many flowers have great beauty ; and many of them accordingly answer no other pur- pose but to gratify the sight. 67. A man who deliberately devotes himself to a life of sensuality is deserving of strong reprobation : but those do not deliberately devote themselves to a life of sensuality who arc hurried into excess by the impulse of the passions : such therefore as are hurried into excess by the impulse of the pas- sions are not deserving of strong reprobation. [Arise. Eth. B. vii 68. It is a difficult task to restrain all 'nordinafe fesires : tc EXAMPLES. 409 conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a restraint of all inordinate desires : therefore it is a difficult task to conform to the precepts of Scripture. 69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemning a book without reading it : some Reviewers do not refrain from this : therefore some Reviewers are not candid. 70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a change of established laws, no laws could reasonably be maintained : but some laws can reasonably be maintained : therefore no objection that can be urged will justify a change of established laws. 71. If any complete theory could be framed, to explain the establishment of Christianity by human causes, such a theory would have been proposed before now ; but none such ever has been proposed : therefore no such theory can be framed. 72. He who is content with what he has, is truly rich : a covetous man is not content with what he has : no covetous man therefore is truly rich. 73. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the cir- cumstances of such an event as could not be conjectured by natural reason : his is the case with the prophecies of the Messiah contained in the Old Testament : therefore these are true prophecies. 74. The connection of soul and body cannot be compre. hended or explained ; but it must be believed : therefore something must be believed which cannot be comprehended or explained. 75. Lias lies above Red Sandstone ; Red Sandstone lies above Coal : therefore Lias lies above Coal. 76. Cloven feet being found universally in horned animals, we may conclude that this fossil animal, since it appear - have had cloven feet, was horned. 35 410 APPENDIX Ii 77. All that glitters is not gold : tinsel glitters : thereiore it is not gold. 78. A negro is a man : therefore he who murders a negro murders a man. 79. Meat and drink are necessaries of life : the revenues of Yitellius were spent on Meat and Drink : therefore the rev- enues of Vitellius were spent on the necessaries of life. 80. Nothing is heavier than Platina : feathers are heavier than nothing : therefore feathers are heavier than Platina. 81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother : she governed her husband ; he governed Athens ; Athens, Greece ; and Greece, the world : therefore the child of Themistocles governed the world. 82. He who calls you a man speaks truly: he who calls you a fool, calls you a man : therefore he who calls you a fool speaks truly. 83. Warm countries alone produce wines : Spain is a warm country ; therefore Spain produces wines. 84. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to freeze Quicksilver: the climate of Siberia is sufficient to freeze Quicksilver: therefore the climate of Siberia is intensely cold 85. Mistletoe of the oak is a vegetable excrescence which is not a plant; and every vegetable excrescence. which is not a plant, is possessed of magical virtues : therefore Mistletoe of the oak is possessed of magical virtues. 86. If the hour-hand of a clock be any distance (suppose a foot) before the minute-hand, this last, though moving twelve times faster, can never overtake the other; for while the min- ute-hand is moving over those twelve inches, the hour-hand will have moved over one inch : so that they will then be an .nch apart ; and while the minute-hand is moving over thal one inch, the hour-hand will have moved over i inch, so thal EXAMFLES. 411 it will still be a-head ; and again, while the minute-hand i* passing over that space of ^ inch which now divides them, the hour-hand will pass over rrr inch ? so that it will still be r 144 a-head, though the distance between the two is diminished ; 8fc. fyc. 4*c., and thus it is plain we may go on for ever : therefore the minute-hand can never overtake the hour-hand. [This is one of the sophistical puzzles noticed by Aldrich (the moving bodies being Achilles and a Tortoise ;) but he is not happy in his at- tempt at a solution. He proposes to remove the difficulty by dem( n- strating that, in a certain given time, Achilles would overtake the T( r- toise ; as if any one had ever doubted that. The very problem proposed is to surmount the difficulty of a seeming demonstration of a thing palpably impossible ; to show that it is palpably impossible, is no solution of the problem. I have heard the present example adduced as a proof that the pre- tensions of Logic are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect logical demonstration may lead from true premisses to an absurd conclusion The reverse is the truth ; the example before us furnishes a confirma- tion of the utility of an acquaintance with the syllogistic form : in which form the pretended demonstration in question cannot possibly be ex- hibited. An attempt to do so will evince the utter want of connection between the premisses and the conclusion.] 87. Theft is a crime : theft was encouraged by the laws of Sparta : therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged crime. 88. Every hen comes from an egg : every egg comes from n hen : therefore every egg comes from an egg. 89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn : therefore the son of Jupiter was the grandson of Saturn. 90. All cold is to be expelled by heat : this person’s disorder ,s a cold : therefore it is to be expelled by heat. 91. Wine is a stimulant: therefore in a case where stiinu- ants are hurtful, wine is hurtful. 9^. Opium is a poison : but physicians advise some of thfiil 412 APPENDIX II. Datients to take opium : therefore physicians advise some cf their patients to take poison. 93. What we eat grew in the fields : loaves of bread are what we eat : therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields. 94. A nimal-food may be entirely dispensed with : (as is shown by the practice of the Brahmins and of some monks ;) and vegetable-food may be entirely dispensed with (as is plain from the example of the Esquimaux and others ; but all food consists of animal-food and vegetable-food ; therefore all food may be dispensed with. 95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it : a mining speculation is no trifling business : therefore a mining speculation will enrich those engaged in it. 96. He who is most hungry eats most : he who eats least is most hungry : therefore he who eats least eats most. \ See Aldrich’s Compendium : Fallaciae : where this is rightly solved.] 97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in the place where it is, or in a place where it is not : neither of these is possible : therefore there is no such thing as motion. [In this instance, as well as in the one lately noticed, Aldrich mistakes the character of the difficulty ; which is, not to prove the truth of that which is self-evident, but to explain an apparent demonstration militat- ing against that which nevertheless no one ever doubted. He says in this case, “ solvitur ambulando ; ” but (pace tanti viri) this is no solution at all, but is the very thing which constitutes the difficulty in question ; for it is precisely because we know the possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of its impossibility produces perplexity. — See Introduction.] 98. All vegetables grow most in the increase of the moon : hair is a vegetable : therefore hair grows most in the increase of the moon. 99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to th« improvement of the mind ; all the works of ihe most cele EXAMPLES. 413 X x brated ancients are among the studies pursued a Oxford: therefore some of the works of the most celebratec ancient* conduce to the improvement of the mind. 100. Some poisons are vegetable : no poisons are useful drugs : therefore some usefu 1 drugs are not vegetaole. 101. A theory will speedily be exploded, if false, which appeals to the evidence of observation and experiment : Craniology appeals to this evidence : therefore, if Craniology be a false theory, it will speedily be exploded. [Let the prob- 7 4 ability of one of these premises be — ; and of the other Query. What is the probability of the conclusion, and which are the terms ?] 102. Wilkes was a favorite with the populace ; he who is a favorite with the populace must understand how to manage them : he who understands how to manage them, must be well acquainted with their character : he who is well acquaint ed with their character, must hold them in contempt : there- fore Wilkes must have held the populace in contempt. 103. To discover whether man has any moral sense, he should be viewed in that state in which all his faculties are most fully developed ; the civilized state is that in which all man’s faculties are most fully developed : therefore, to discover whether man has any moral sense, he should be viewed in a civilized state. 104. Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, fyc. have been countenanced by public opinion in several countries : all (he crimes we know of are Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, In- fanticide, Sfc. : therefore, all the crimes we knew of have been countenanced by public opinion in several countries. TPaley’s Moral Philosophy.] 105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who aro not well qualified to perform their part. None but veteran! 35* 414 APPENDIX II. are well qualified to perform their part. None but veteran? should he brought into the field. 106. A monopoly of the sugar-refining business is benefi- cial to sugar-refiners : and of the corn-trade to corn-growers : and of the silk-manufacture to silk-weavers, SfC. Sj-c. ; and thus each class of men are benefited by some restrictions. Now all these classes of men make up the whole community ; there- fore a system of restrictions is beneficial to the community. [ See Chap. iii. § 11.] 107. There are two kinds of things which we ought not to fret about : what we can help, and what we cannot. [To be stated as a Dilemma.] 108. He vvho believes himself to be always in the right in his opinion, lays claim to infallibility : you always believe yourself to be in the right in your opinion: therefore you lay claim to infallibility. 109. No part of mankind can ever have received divine in- struction in any of the arts of life : because the Israelites, who are said to have had a revelation made to them of religion, did not know, in the times of Solomon, that the circumference of a Circle differs from the treble of the Diameter. 110. The Epistle attributed to Barnabas is not to be reck- oned among the writings of the Apostolic Fathers ; because, if genuine, it is a part of Scripture, and if spurious, it is the work of some forger of a later age. 111. If the original civilization of Mankind was not the work of a divine Instructor, some instance may be found cf a nation of savages having civilized themselves. [Pol. Econ. Lect. V.] 112. The Law of Moses prohibited theft, murder, <£-c. Bui that Law is abolished : therefore theft, murder, fyc. ar? not arohibited. EXAMPLES. 415 1 Agriculture might have been invented by man, without a <3 u £ erhuman instructor ; and so might the working of met- als ; and so might medicine ; and so might navigation, fyc. and in short there is no art of civilized life that can be pointed out, which might not have been invented by the natu- ral faculties of man. Therefore the arts of civilized life might have been invented by man without any superhuman instructor.* ] 14. All those must disapprove of inflicting punishment on this woman who consider her as innocent : and as you disap- prove of inflicting punishment on her, it is to be presumed you think her innocent. 115. If a State has a right to enforce laws, (and without this it could not subsist,) it must have a right to prescribe what the religion of the People shall be. [See Book III. § 9.] 116. Every man is bound in duty to aim at promoting tha good — generally, and in all respects — of Mankind : a Civi; Magistrate (or Legislator) is a man : therefore a Civil Magis- trate is bound in duty to aim at promoting the good generally and in all respects — of Mankind. And hence it appears that, since true Religion is one of the greatest of goods, the Civil Magistrate is bound to enforce, by means of the power committed to him, the profession of a true Religion, and to suppress heresy. [See Essay I. on the “ Kingdom of Christ.”] 117. The month of May has no “R” in its name; nor has June, July, or August : all the hottest months are May, June, July and August : therefore all the hottest months are without an “ R ” in their names. [&e Book IY. Ch. i. ( 1.1 118. This man may possibly be right in his peculiaf * See Polit. Econ. Lect. V. p. 123. 416 APPENDIX II. religious Creed ; and the same may be said of that inan : and of a third, and a fourth, &c. : therefore it is possible they may be all right. 119. When the Disciples were first called Christians, they must have received the title either from Believers, or from Jewish unbelievers, or from Pagans : but one of these suppo- sitions is impossible ; and another is negatived by the New Testament records ; therefore the remaining supposition ia established. APPENDIX No. III. PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. Some have expressed much contempt for the mode iu which Logic is usually taught, and in which students are ex- amined in it, as comprising no more than a mere enumeration of technical rules, and perhaps an application of them to the simplest examples, exhibited in a form already syllogistic, or nearly so. That such a description, if intended to be univer' sal, is not correct, I am perfectly certain ; though, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition of Logic from all candidates for a degree, has confined both lectures and examinations, in a greater degree than is desirable, to this elementary character.* But the student who wishes to acquire, and to show that he has acquired, not only the elementary rules, but a facility of applying them in practice, should proceed from the study of such examples as the foregoing, to exercise himself in analyz- ing logically, according to the rules here given, and somewhat in the manner of the subjoined specimen, some of Euclid’s demonstrations, — various portions of Aristotle’s works, — the opening of Warburton’s “Divine Legation,” (which exhibits * See Preface. 4 IS APPENDIX III. the arguments in a form very nearly syllogistic) — several parts of Chillingworth’s Defence of Protestantism, — the corn eluding part of Paley’s Horse Paulinse, — Leslie’s Method with the Deists, — various portions of A. Smith’s Wealth of Na- tions, — and other argumentative Works on the most dissim- ilar subjects. The latter part of § 1. Chap. V. of the Disser- tation on the Province of Reasoning, will furnish a convenien subject of a short analysis. A student who should prepare himself, in this manner, in one or more such books, and present himself for this kind of examination in them, would furnish a good test for ascertain- ing his proficiency in practical Logic. As the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after tney have been exhibited at full length in the bare elementary form, it may be useful to subjoin some remarks on the mode of ana- lyzing and reducing to that form, any train of argument that may be presented to us : since this must in general be the first step taken in an attempt to apply logical rules.* First, then, of whatever length the reasoning may be, whether treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin with the con- cluding assertion; — not necessarily the last sentence ex- pressed, but the last point established; — and this, whether it be formally enunciated, or left to be understood. Then, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe on what ground that assertion is made. The assertion will be your Con- clusbn; the ground on which it rests, your Premisses. The * These directions are, in substance, and nearly, in words, extracted &Mn the Preface to Hinds’s abridged Introduction to Logic. FRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 419 whole Syllogism thus obtained may be tried by the rules of Logic. If no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed to take the premisses separately, and pursue with each the same plan as with the conclusion you first stated. A premiss must have been used as such, either because it required no proof, or because it had been proved. If it have not been proved consider whether it be so self-evident as to have needed nr proof. If it have been proved, you must regard it as a con- clusion derived from other assertions which are premisses to it : so that the process with which you set out will be repeated ; viz. to observe on what grounds the assertion rests, to state these as premisses, and to apply the proper rules to the syllo gism thus obtained. Having satisfied yourself of the correct- ness of this, proceed, as before, to state its premisses, if need- ful, as conclusions derived from other assertions. And thus the analysis will go on (if the whole chain of argument be correct) till you arrive at the premisses with which the whole commences ; which of course should be assertions requiring no proof; or, if the chain be any where faulty, the analysis will proceed till you come to some proposition, either assumed as self-evident, though requiring proof, or incorrectly deduced from other assertions.* It will often happen that the same assertion will have been proved by many different arguments ; and then, the inquiry into the truth of the premisses will branch out accordingly In mathematical or other demonstrative reasoning, this will of course never take pla* , since absolute certainty admits of no increase ; and if, as \t often the case, the same truth admits of several different de onstrations, we select the simplest and clearest, and discard he rest. But in probable reasoning • Many students proba > y will find it a very clear and convenient 42G APPENDIX III. there is often a Cumulation of arguments, each proving the sam« conclusion ; i. e. each proving it to be probable. In such eases therefore you will have first to try each argument separately ; and should each of them establish tne conclusion as in some degree probable, you will then have to calculate the aggregate probability. In this calculation Logic only so far assists as it enables us to place the several items of probability in the most convenient form. As the degree of probability of each proposition that is originally assumed , is a point to be determined by the rea- soner’s own sagacity and experience as to the matter in hand, so, the degree of probability of each conclusion , (given, that of each of its premises,) * * and also the collective probability resulting from several different arguments all tending to the same conclusion, is an arithmetical question. But the assist- ance afforded by logical rules in clearly stating the several mode of exhibiting the logical analysis of a course of argument, ta 4i»-v it out in the form of a Tree, or Logical Division ; thus, [Ultimate Conclusion.] Z is X, proved by Y is X, proved by Z is Y, proved by ~1 A is Y, Z is A, [suppose admitted.] proved bj &c. the argument that and by the ; argument that t \ B is X, Y is B, &c. & c. C is X, &c. • See Fal’acies, $ 14, near the end. PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 421 items so as to prepare the way for the other operations, wir not be thought lightly of by any who have observed the con fusion of thought and the fallacy, which have often been intro duced through the want of such a statement. Example of Analysis applied to the first part of Foley's Evidences. The ultimate Conclusion, that “ The Christian Religion came from God ” is made to rest (as far as “ the direct histor- '.cal evidence ” is concerned) on these two premisses ; Thai “ A Religion attested by Miracles is from God ; ” and thal “ The Christian Religion is so attested.” Of these two premisses it should be remarked, the Minoi seems to have been admitted, while the Major was denied, by the unbelievers of old : whereas at present the case is reversed.’* Paley’s argument therefore goes to establish the Minoi premiss, about which alone, in these days, there is likely to be any question. He states with this view, two propositions : viz. Prop. I. — “That there is satisfactory evidence, thal many, professing to be original witnesses of the Christian * It is clear from the fragments remaining of the ancient arguments against Christianity, and the allusions to them in Christian writers, and also from the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus which are still extant, (under the title of Toldoth Jeschii) that the original opponents of Christianity admitted that miracles were wrought, but denied that they proved the divine origin of the religion, and attributed them to Magic. This concession, in persons living so much nearer to the times assigned to the miracles, should be noticed as an important evidence ; for, credulous as men were in those days respecting magic, they would hardly have resorted to this explanation, unless some, at least plau- sible, evidence for the miracles had been adduced. And they could not but be sensible that to prove (had that been possible) the pre- tended miracles to be impostures, would have been the most decisive course ; since that would at once hare disproved the religion. 36 122 APPENDIX III. miracles, passed their lives in labors, dangers, ana sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of those accounts; and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to neiv rules of conduct.” Prop. II. — “ That there is not satisfactory evidence, that persons pretending to be original witnesses of any other simi- lar miracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth of those accounts.” Of these two propositions, the latter, it will easily be per- ceived, is the Major premiss, stated as the converse by Nega- tion (Book II. Chap. ii. § 4) of a universal affirmative : the former proposition is the Minor. As a Syllogism in Barbara , therefore, the whole wil stand thus : “ All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are wor- thy of credit : ” (by conversion, “ none which are not worthy of credit are so attested.”) “ The Christian miracles are attested by such and such evidence : ” Therefore “ they are worthy of credit.” The Minor premiss is first proved by being taken as several distinct ones, each of which is separately established. See Book II. Chap. iv. § 1. i. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity suf- fered ; by showing, 1st A priori , from the nature of the case, that they were likely to suffer : [because they were preachers of a re- ligion unexpected and unwelcome : 1. to the Jews ; and 2. to the Gentiles.*] * As Paul expresses it, “to the Jews, a stumbling-block ; and to th* Greeks, foolishness." • PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 423 2d. From profane testimony. 3d. From the testimony of Christian Writings [And here comes in the proof of one of the premisses of this last argument ; viz. the proof of the credibility, as ti this point at least, of the Christian Writings.] These arguments are cumulative ; i. e. each separately goes to establish the probability of the one common conclusion, tha ‘ the first propagators of Christianity suffered.' 1 ' 1 By similar arguments it is shown that their sufferings were such as they voluntarily exposed themselves to. II. It is proved that “ What they suffered for was a miracu- lous story : ” by 1st. The nature of the case ; They could have had nothins but miracles on which to rest the claims of the new re- ligion. 2d, By allusions to miracles, particularly to the Resurrec- tion, both in Christian and in Profane Writers, as the evidence on which the religion rested. The same course of argument goes to show that the mira- cles in attestation of which they suffered were such as they professed to have witnessed. These arguments again are cumulative. III. It is proved that “ The miracles thus attested are what we call the Christian miracles : ” in other words, that the story was, in the main, that which we have now in the Christian Scriptures ; by ^ 1st. The nature of the case; viz. that it is improbable the original story should have completely died away, and a substantially new one have occupied its place ; $ 2d. by The incidental al usions of ancient writers, both 124 APPENDIX III Christian and profane, to accounts agreeing with those of our Scriptures, as the ones then received ; ^ 3d. by The credibility of our Historical Scriptures : This is established by several distinct arguments, each sep- arately tending to show that these books were, from the earliest ages of Christianity, well known and carefully preserved among Christians : viz. § i. They were quoted by ancient Christian writers. § ii. with peculiar respect. ^ iii. Collected into a distinct volume , and § iv. distinguished by appropriate names and titles of respect. § v. Publicly read and expounded, and § vi. had commentaries , fyc. written on them : § vii. Were received by Christians of different sects ; 4*' 4-c* The latter part of the first main proposition, branches ofi into two ; viz. 1st., that the early Christians submitted to new rules of conduct ; 2d, that they did so, in consequence of their belief in miracles wrought before them. Each of these is established in various parts of the above course of argument, and by similar premisses ; viz. the nature of the case, — the accounts of heathen writers, — and the testimony of the Christian Scriptures, Sfc. The Major premiss, that “ Miracles thus attested rie wor- hy of credit,” (which must be combined with the former, .n order to establish the conclusion, that “ the Christian miracles are worthy of credit,”) is next to be established. * For some important remarks respecting the different ways in ivhich this part of the argument is presented to different persons, Set K Hinds on Inspiration,” pp. 30 — 4G. PBAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 425 Previously to his entering on the secc.nd main proposition, (which I have stated to be the Converse by negation of this Major premiss,) he draws his conclusion (Ch. x. Part I.) from the Minor premiss, in combination with the Major, resting that Major on § 1st. The a priori improbability that a false story should have been thus attested : viz. “ If it be so, the religion must be true.* These men could not be deceivers. By only not bearing testimony, they might have avoided all these sufferings, and have lived quietly. Would men in such circumstances pretend to have seen what they never saw ; assert facts which they had no knowledge of ; go about lying, to teach virtue ; and though not only con- vinced of Christ’s being an impostor, but having seen the suc- cess of his imposture in his crucifixion, yet persist in carrying it on ; and so persist, as to bring upon themselves, for nothing, and with a full knowledge of the consequence, enmity, and hatred, danger and death ? ” § 2d. That no false story of Miracles is likely to be so at tested, is again proved, from the premiss that “ no false story of miracles ever has been so attested ; ” and this premiss again is proved in the form of a proposition which includes it ; viz. that “ No other miraculous story what- ever is so attested.” § This assertion again, bifurcates ; viz. it is proved re- specting the several stories that are likely to be, or that * This is the ultimate conclusion deduced from the premiss, that rf it is attested by real Miracles ; which, in the present day, comes to the same thing : since those for whom he is writing are ready at one? to admit the truth of the religion, if convinced of the reality of th« Miracles. The ancient Jews were not. 36 * «2b APPENDIX III. have been adduced, as parallel to the Christian, that either 1 §. They ai 3 not so attested ; or 2 §. They are not propfcrly miraculous ; i. e. that admit- ting the veracity of the narrator, it does not follow tha any miracle took place ; as in cases that may be ex- plained by false perceptions , — accidents , SfC. In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest of the work, and to fill up the details of those parts of the argu- ment which I have but slightly touched upon.* It will be observed that, to avoid unnecessary prolixity, I have in most of the above syllogisms suppressed one premiss, which the learner will be able easily to supply for himself. E. G. In the early part of this analysis it will easily be seen, that the first of the series of cumulative arguments to provo that the propagators of Christianity did suffer, would at full 'ength stand thus : “ Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews and to the Gentiles, was likely to suffer ; The Apostles did this ; Therefore they were ’ikely to suffer,” <^*c. fyc. It is also to be observed, that the same proposition used in different syllogisms may require to be differently expressed by a substitution of some equivalent , in order to render the argu- ment, in each, formally correct. This of course is always allowable, provided great care is taken that the exact mean- ing be preserved : e. g. if the proposition be, “ The persons •vho attested the Christian miracles underwent sufferings in at * See note at the end of this Appendix. PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 427 testation of them,” I am authorized to state the same assertion in a different form, thus, “ The Christian miracles are attested by men who suffered in attestation of their reality,” <^*c. Great care however should be used to avoid being misled by the substitution of one proposition for another, when the two are not (though perhaps they sound so) really equivalent, so that the one warrants the assumption of the other. — See Book iii. § 3. Lastly, the learner is referred to the Supplement to Chap, iii. § 1, p. 107, where I have treated of the statement of a proposition as several distinct ones, each implying all the rest, but differing in the division of the Predicate from the Subject Of this procedure the above analysis affords an instance. Note referred to at page 426. When the Student considers that the foregoing is omy one out of many branches of evidence, all tending to the same point, and yet that there have been intelligent men who have held out against them all, he may be apt to suspect either that there must be some flaw in these arguments, which he is unable to detect, or else that there must be much stronge arguments on the other side than he has ever met with. To enter into a discussion of the various causes leading to Infidelity would be unsuitable to this occasion ; but 1 will notico one as being more especially connected with the subject of this work, and as being very generally overlooked. “ In no ither instance perhaps ,” (says Dr. Hawkins, in his valuable Essay on Tradition) “ besides that of Religion , do men com ■ nit the very illogical mistake , of first canvassing all the objec- tions agains* any particular system whose pretensions to truth they would examine , before they consider the direct argument t 128 APPENDIX Hi. m its favor.'" (P. 82.) But why, it may be asked, do they make such a mistake in this case ? An answer, which I think would apply to a large proportion of such persons, is this t because a man having been brought up in a Christian country has lived perhaps among such as have been accustomed from their infancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to regard an uninquiring assent as a mark of commendable faith ; and hence he has probably never even thought of proposing to himself the question, — Why should I receive Christianity as a divine revelation ? Christianity being nothing new to him, and the presumption being in favor of it, while the burden of proof lies on its opponents, he is not stimulated to seek reasons for believing it, till he finds it controverted. And when it is controverted, — when an op- ponent urges — How do you reconcile this, and that, and the other, with the idea of a divine revelation ? these objections strike by their novelty , by their being opposed to what is gen- erally received. He is thus excited to inquiry ; which he sets about, — naturally enough, but very unwisely, — by seeking for answers to all these objections : and fancies that unless they can all be satisfactorily solved, he ought not to receive the religion. “ As if,” (says the Author already cited) “ there could not be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable argu- ments, and yet at the same time obnoxious to objections, nu- merous, plausible, and by no means easy of solution. There are objections (said Dr. Johnson) against a plenum, and objec- tions against a vacuum ; but one of them must be true.” He adds, that “ sensible men, really desirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that reason directs them to examine first the argument in favor of that side of the question, where die first presumption of truth appears. And the presumption is manifestly m favor of that religious creed already adopted by the country. . . Their very earliest inqui-y iherefore must PRAXIS OF U 6ICAL ANALYSIS. 429 be into the direct arguments for the authority of that book on which their country rests its religion.” But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a strong temptation, and one which should be carefully guarded against, to adopt the opposite course ; to attend first to the objections which are brought against what is established, and which, for that very reason, rouse the mind from a state of apathy. When Christianity was first preached, the state of things was reversed. The presumption was against it, as being a novelty. “ Seeing that all these things cannot he spoken against , ye ought to be quiet'' was a sentiment which favored an indolent acquiescence in the old pagan worship. The stimulus of novelty was all on the side of those who came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The first inquiry of any one who at all attended to the subject, must have been, not, — “ What are the objections to Christianity ? ” — but, “ On what grounds do these men call on me to receive them as divine messengers ? " And the same appears to be the case with the Polynesians among whom our Missionaries are laboring : they begin by inquiring, “ Why should we receive this re- ligion ? ” and those of them accordingly who have embraced it, appear to be Christians on much more rational and deliber- ate conviction than many among us, even of those who, in general maturity of intellect and civilization, are advanced considerably beyond those Islanders. I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a re- ligious education ; but, pointing out the peculiar temptations which accompany it. The Jews and Pagans had, in theii early prejudices, greater difficulties to surmount, than ours but they were difficulties of a different kind. — See Essays on the Dangers , fyc. Disc. i. § 3 ; and also Rhet. Part I. Ch. iii § 1- I Dave subjoined, in parallel columns, extracts from Hume’s “ Essay on Miracles,” from two Ri ■ views, professedly Christian, but organs of two most opposite religious schools, and from Scripture. The coincidence between the first three, and the contrast they present to Scripture, being, I think, not 430 APPENDIX III. 2 g-e w OQ m A ,0J 'r* ts) Js £ •S-S §5. .5 3 6 .Sd 'S'? _ 0 r— < dj £ : 1 oT ° oJ ^ W-T3 ^ £ 0 ) o J3 oO 3 r^J .H +3 O O 3 D« _2r* £ oj 73 S 2 2 " 60 ® " g g S g c -e c3 . , c3 £3 Ha g s 2 ® ca -.a “ o St C33 33 CS ■> 0 ^ 0 . r/) ^ o i* ~ a S ?2 ^ S -a C3 i •« 2 g- H5 Sd g. cJ ~ , £ at o £ > f-< H O) fl) ^ » g e-c a, •3 a. Jft A ° e o $ s O « " o m a P.3 § ?i O 'o O 'He, 0 ) oj 0 t £i r £ CtJ O^CJ Hft, g ffl >' - >* + a b - OJ 7) ,c£ O) 73 cd £ ■) ^ ;£ £U **- O - ^■s i£ i i Ot _o •— O -fJ > oj £«**,'£' . O «3 J P. 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O _ (S W e5.rl e« • a> o " -M O > *d c «s s S"-* 2 t* ^2 m ■ ut; c 3 C ^ a; cs.; a> W) a» p 2 j =£0 S o .. o : •• o ' £4242 ; S * 5 3 u> a 3 : o o :3 , d oj : ?-» 3 43 : to p «> .Sio g? 13.H fi ^ 0 ) ci 43 ' 5 ^*+j m ’HI < 2 S s i ' 15 s S 3 3 D, £ C 43 42 «' •n ■> SJS 2 - tii i 04.2 S," > , i -*-* a) ^ ^ 4) ' £ 5 > -2 >» o £ t£ ° : r 44 ,.2 ^ £ s o «p tsn.2 & “ S 4 s » g> ; « £ J t?£$ 15 i m| 2 ^; _ a> " t; co - i ° r* ^ £ •- • b£-g~ S a.-® ; 3 «T* g i §5 5 3* -I- tJ 43 2 o _ , JO ii^') o : 43 3 t? CJD+S -i 2 «„.Sc 3 £ 0) eS 2 W tr ** 3 ^ 0 ^.® s s. . cr c | > *£ 43 2 O I o (D ^ o S - ! *» 45 43 • 2 £ r* 0 o„^ 3 S^ CJ £ P -r - 43 X! BO _ °'C 2 " .5-3 e®-- J S3 •£ rt 4: O - ■*•» w» 0 r**y a) o- c 3 2 0 ) 2 ^*5 o ^ 42 a> .tr - a Sd ■£ S j 3 2 r'S 2 _, « ^ ce r o j_ a .-i 2 •» 2 C G sfflU S5.2 3,3.- To these extracts might have been added an expiession, 3 JI the late Mr. Coleridge, of his contempt and disgust for the very name of Evidences of Christianity. He proposes, not as a con- firmation of other evidences, (which he might have done with much truth,) but as a complete substitute for them, a man’s feeling of the suitableness of the religion for his wants ; a suit- 432 APPENDIX III. ableness which doubtless many of the Mahometans perceiv* in their own religion, and of the Hindoos in theirs.* The coincidence between writers of such different schools is very striking, and affords matter for much reflection. They all agree in representing the “Faith” that is required of a Christian as wholly independent of evidence , and as necessa- rily, or most properly, based on feelings such as attach Pagans to their superstitions. And they all apparently calculate on the reader’s being totally ignorant of the New Testament, of which almost every chapter convicts Jesus and his followers of that '•'•timidity' 1 '' in appealing to the evidence of miracles and prophecies which is censured and derided. For, the pas- sages above cited from Scripture, even if multiplied many fold, as might easily be done, would give but a very inade- quate view of the case ; inasmuch as the general tenor of all the narrative, and all the teaching, of the New Testament, presupposes evidence as the original ground on which belief had been all along demanded : the unbelief which it “ de- nounces as sin ” being, not as those other writers represent, the requiring of evidence, but — on the contrary , — the rejec- tion of evidence. The fallacy of representing all appeal to reason as useless in cases where the “ argumentative faculty ” is not alone suffi- cient — which is like denying the utility of light, because it will not enable a man to see, whose eyes are not in a state to per- form their functions, — has been already noticed, Book IV Ch. ii. § 5. It may be a useful exercise for the learner to analyze some olhers of this collection of fallacies, referring to Book I. § 2, to Book II. Ch. ii. § 3, and to Appendix I. Art. “ Expeiience.” * I have treated of this point in the “ Lessons on Christian Evi- lences,” under the head of “ Internal Evidence.” See also Professoi Powell’s valuable work, “ Tradition Unveiled.” INDEX OP THE PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS. Absolute terms, b. ii. ch. v. j 1. Abstraction. — The act of “ drawing off” in thought, and attending t« separately, some portion of an object presented to the mind, b. ii ch. v. § 2. Abstract terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1 Accident. — In its widest technical sense, (equivalent to Attribute ,) any thing that is attrib ; ted to Rn o' / cr, md can only be conceived as belonging to some substance tqn which sense it is opposed to “ Substance ; ”) in its narrower and more properly logical sense, a Predicable which may be present or absent, the essence of the Species remaining the same, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. Accidental Definition. — A definition which assigns the Properties of a Species, or the Accidents of an Individual ; it is otherwise called a Description, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. A JJirmative — denotes the quality of a Proposition which asserts the agreement of the Predicate with the subject, b. ii. cn. ii. § 1. Amphibolia — a kind of ambiguity of sentence, b. iii. § 10. Analogous. — A term is so called whose single signification applies with unequal propriety to more than one object, b. ii. ch. v. § 1, and b. iii. § 10. Antecedent. — That part of a Conditional Proposition on which the other depends, b. ii. ch. iv. § 6. Apprehension {simple.') — The operation of the mind by which we men tally perceive or form a notion of some object, b. ii. ch. i. § 1 Argument. — An expression in which, from something laid down as granted, something else is deduced, b. ii. ch. iii. § 1. Arbitrary — division, faulty, b. ii. ch. v. § 5 ; definition, b. ii. ch. v. § ( 3 . Assertion— ar. affirmation or denial, b. ii. ch. ii. § i 436 INDEX. Attributive term, b. ii. eh. v. § 1. Bacon — erroneously supposed to have designed his Organon as rival system to that here treated of, Introd. § 3, and b. iv. eh. iii § 3. Categories, b. iv. eh. ii. § 1, Categorematic. — A word is so called which may by itself be employed as a Term, b. ii. eh. i. § 3. Categorical Proposition — is one which affirms or denies a Predicate of a Subject, absolutelv, and without any hypothesis, b. ii. eh. ii. § 4 - Circle — fallacy of, b. iii. § 13. Class — strictly speaking, a Class consists of several things coining under a common description, b. i. § 3. Contraposition, see Negation. Common term — is one which is applicable in the same sense to more than one individual object, b. i. § 6 ; b. ii. ch. i. § 3, and b. ii ch. iv. § 6. Compatible terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Composition — Fallacy of, b. iii. § 11. Conclusion. — That Proposition which is inferred from the Premisses of an Argument, b. ii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. iii. § 1. Concrete term, b. ii. ch. v § 1 Conditional Proposition — is one which asserts the dependence of one categorical Proposition on another. A conditional Syllogism is one hi which the reasoning depends on such a Proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. § 6. Connotative term, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Consequent. — That part of a conditional Proposition which depends on the other. (Consequens), b. ii. ch. iv. § 6, Note. Consequence. — The connection between the Antecedent and Conse- quent of a conditional Proposition. (Consequentia), b. ii. ch. iv § 6, Note. Constructive — conditional syllogism, b. ii. ch. iv. § 3. Contingent. — The matter of a Proposition is so called when the terms of it in part agree, and in part disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. § 2. Contradictory Propositions — are those which, having the same terms, differ both m Quantity and Quality, b. ii. ch. iii. § 5. Contrary Propositions — are two universals, affirmative and negative, with the same terms, b. ii. cll..ii. § 3. Contrary terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1 Converse, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. INDEX. 437 Conversion of a Proposition — is the transposition of the terms, s* that the Subject is made the Predicate, and vice versd, j. ii. ch. ii § 4 . Copula. — That part of a Proposition which affirms or denies the Predicate of the Subject: viz. is, or is not, -expressed or implied, b. ii. ch. i. § 2. Ooss-divisions, b. ii. ch. v. § § 5 and 6. Definite terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Definition. — An expression explanatory of that which is defined, *. a, separated, as by a boundary, from every thing else, b. ii. eh. v § 6 ; b. iii. § 10. Description. — An accidental Definition, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. Destructive — conditional Syllogism, b ii. ch. iv. § 3. Deaf-mutes — incapable of a train of reasoning, till they shall have learned some kind of general siyns. Introd. § 5. Dictum — “ de omni et nullo ; ” Aristotle’s : an abstract statement of an Argument, generally, b. i. § 4. Applicable to a Sorites, b. ii- cli. iv. § 7. Difference ( Differentia .) — The formal or distinguishing part of the essence of a Species, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. Dilemma. — A complex kind of conditional syllogism, having more than one Antecedent in the Major Premiss, and a disjunctive Minor, b. ii. ch. iv. § 5. Discovery of Truth — two kinds of, b. iv. ch. ii. § 1. Discourse. — The third operation of the mind, Reasoning, b. ii. ch. i. § 1- Disjunctive Proposition — is one which consists of two or more cate- goricals, so stated as to imply that some one of them must be true. A syllogism is called disjunctive, the reasoning of which turns on such a proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. § 4. Distributed — is cpplicd to a Term that is employed in its full extent, so as to comprehend all its significates, — every thing to which it is applicable, b. i. § 5, and b. ii. ch. iii. § 2. Division, logical — is the distinct enumeration of several things signi- fied by a common name ; and it is so called metaphorically, tiom its being analogous to*the (real and properly- called) division ■! t whole into its parts, b. ii. ch. v. § 5. Division. — Fallacy of, b. iii. § 11. Drift of a proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. § 1. DUiptical expressions — apt to lead to ambiguity, b. in. § 10. EnsiatU — Figure, the third Figure, so called b. ii. ch iii. § 4 . 27 * 438 INDEX. Erlhymeme. — An argument having one I remiss expressed and th« other understood, b. ii. ch. iv. § 7. Equivocal. — A Term is defined to be equivocal whose different signi- fications apply equally to several objects. Strictly speaking, there is hardly a word in any language which may not be regarded, as in this sense, equivocal ; but the title is usually applied only in any case where a word is employed equivocally ; c. g. where tha Middle-term is used in different senses in the two Premisses ; or where a proposition is liable to be understood in various senses, according to the various meanings of one of its terms, b. iii. § 10. Essential Definition — is one which assigns, not the Properties or Ac- cidents of the thing defined, but what are regarded as its essen- tial parts, whether physical or logical, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. Evidence — of Christianity, App. No. III. Example — use of, implies a universal premiss, b. iv. ch. i. § 2, — is not what, strictly speaking, deters, b. iii. § 10. Exception , proof of a rule, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. Exclusive — Figure, the second Figure, so called, b. ii. eh. iii. § 4 Extreme. — The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition are called its Extremes or Terms, being, as it were, the two boundaries, having the copula (in regular order) placed between them. In speaking of a syllogism, the word is often understood to imply the ex- tremes of the Conclusion, b. ii. ch. i. § 2. Fallacy. — Any argument, or apparent argument, which professes to be decisive of tire matter at issue, while in reality it is not, b. ri- ch. v. § 4. False — in its strict sense, denotes the quality of a Proposition which states something not as it is, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Figure of a Syllogism — denotes the situation of its Middle-term in reference to the Extremes of the Conclusion — The Major and Minor Terms, b. ii. ch. iii. § 4. Form — fallacies in, b. iii. § § 1 and 7. Generalization. — The act of comprehending under a common name several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract from each of them, and which that common name serves to indicate, b. ii. ch. v. § 2. ffmm. — A Predicable which is considered as the material part of the - Species of which it is affirmed, b. ii. ch. v. § 3. Ewne. — Essay on Miracles, b. i. § 3, note ; and Appendix I. Art Experience. Coincidence with some Christiar writers, Appen dixlil. INDEX. 4 Hypothetical Proposition — is one ■\vlnch asserts not absolutely, bu under an hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction. A hypothetic^ Syllogism is one of which the reasoning depends or such a prop- osition, b. ii. ch. iv. $ 2. Idea — “• abstract,” (supposed) Introd. § 5, and t it , ch. v. § § 1 and 2 Illative Conversion — is that in which the truth of the Converse fol- lows from the truth of the Exposita, or Proposition given, b. ii, ch. ii. § 4. impossible. — The Matter o a Proposition is so called when the ex- tremes altogether disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. — Ambiguity of, Ap- pendix II. Indefinite Proposition — is one which has for its Subject a Common- term without any sign to indicate distribution or non-distribution* b. ii. ch. ii. § 2. Indefinite Terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Indirect reduction — of Syllogisms in the last throe Figures, b. ii, ch. iii. § 6. Individual. — An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, one, and consequently cannot be logically divided; whence the name, b. ii. ch. v. § 5. Induction. — A kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more individ- uals of that class, b. iv. ch. i. § 1. Infer. — To draw a conclusion from granted premisses, b. iv. ch. iii. § 1. See Pkove. Lfima Species — is that which is not subdivided, except into individ- uals, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. information. — b. iv. ch. ii. § 1. Ignoratio-elenchi — fallacy of, b. iii. § 15 — 19. Inseparable Accident — is that which cannot be separated from th« individual it belongs to, though it may from the Species, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. Instruction. — b. iv. ch. ii. § 1. Interrogation — fallacy of, b. iii. § 9. Irrelevant-conclusion — fallacy of, b. iii. § 15 — 19. Judgment. — The second operation of the mind, wherein we pro- nounce mentally on the agreement and disagreement of two of the notions obtained by simple Apprehension, b. ii. tV. i. § 1. Knowledge. — b. iv. ch. ii. § 2. Note. Language — an indispensable instrument for reasoning, Inlrod. 5 b Logic, conversant about, b. ii. ch. i. § 2 INDEX 40 Limitation. — See “ Per Accidens .” Locke — notions of Syllogism, Introd. § 3. Logical definition — is that which assigns the Genus and Pilfersnc# of the Species defined, b. ii. ch. v. § 'l. logomachy. — b. iv. ch. iv. § 12. Major term of a Syllogism — is the Predicate of the Conclusion. The Major Premiss is the one which contains the Major term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Hypothetical Premiss is called the Major, b. ii. ch. iii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. iv. § 2. Matter of a proposition — the nature of the connection of its extreme, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3. Fallacies in, b. iii. § § 1 and 13. Metaphor. — b. iii. § 10. Metonymy. — b. iii. § 10. Middle term of a categorical Syllogism — is that with which the two extremes of the conclusion are separately compared, b. ii. ch. iii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. iii. § 4. Minor term of a categorical Syllogism — is the Subject of the con- clusion. The Minor Premiss is that which contains the Minor term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Categorical Premiss is called the Minor, b. ii. ch. iii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. iv. § 2. Modal categorical proposition — is one which asserts that the Predi- cate exists in the Subject in a certain mode or manner, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1, and b. ii. ch. iv. § 1. Mood of a categorical Syllogism — is the designation of its three propositions, in the order in which they stand, according to their quantity and quality, b. ii. ch. iii. § 4. Necessary matter of a proposition — is the essential or invariable agreement of its terms, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3. — Necessary , ambiguity of, Appendix, No. I. Negation — conversion by (otherwise called conversion by contraposi- tion), b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. Negative categorical proposition — is one which asserts the disagree- ment of its extremes, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Negative terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. New Truths — of two kinds, b. iv. ch. ii. § 1. Nominal Definition — is one which explains only the meaning of the term defined, and nothing more of the nature of the thing signi- fied by that Term than is implied by the Term itself to every on# who understands the meaning of it, b. ii. ch. v. § 6, and b iv, ch. ii. § 3. Nominalism. — b. iv. ch. v. Introd. j 5, and b. ii. ch. v. $ ■&. INDEX. 44 Objections — fallacy of, b. iii. § 17. Operations of the mind — three laid down by logical writers, b. ii eh. i. § 1. Opposed. — Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other, when, having the same Subject and Predicate, they differ eithei in quantity or quality, or both, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3. Opposition of terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Oatensive reduction — of Syllogisms in the last three figures, b. ii. ch. iii. § 5. Paronymous words, b. iii. § 8. Part — logically, Species are called Parts of the Genus they come under, and individuals, parts of the Species ; really, the Genus is a Part of the Species, and the Species, of the Individual, b. ii ch. v. § 5. Particular Proposition — is one in which the Predicate is affirmed oi denied of some part only of the subject, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Per Accidens. — Conversion of a proposition is so called when the Quantity is changed, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. Physical definition — is that which assigns the parts into which the thing defined can be actually divided, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. Positive terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Postulate — a form in which a Definition may be stated, b. ii» ch. v § 6. Predicaments, b. iv. ch. ii. § 1. Predicate of a Proposition — is that Term which is affirmed or denied of the other, b. ii. ch. i. § 2. Predicable. — A Term which can be affirmatively predicated of several others, b. ii. ch. v. § 2. Premiss. — A proposition employed to establish a certain conclusion, b. ii. ch. iii. § 1. Privative terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Probable arguments, b. iii. §§ 11 and 14. Proper-names — ambiguity of, b. iii. § 10. Property. — A Predicable which denotes something essentially con." joined to the essence of the Species, b. ii. ch. v. § 3. Proposition. — A sentence which asserts, t. e. affirms or denies, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Prove. ■ — To adduce Premisses which establish the truth of a certain conclusion, b. iv. ch. iii. § 1. proximum Genus of any Species -- is the nearest [least remote' t/3 which it can be referred, b. ii. ch. v. $ 4. 442 INDEX. Pure categorical proposition — is one which, asserts simply that tnj Predicate is, or is not, contained in the Subject, b. ii. ch ii. § 1 and b. ii. ch. iv. $ 1. Quality of a Proposition — is its affirming or denying. This is tha Quality of the expression , which is, in Logic, the essential circum- stance. The Quality of the matter is, its being true or false ; which is, in Logic, accidental, being essential only in respect of the subject-matter treated of, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Quantity of a Proposition — is the extent in which its subject ia taken ; viz. to stand for the whole, or for a part only of its Sig- niticatcs, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Question. — That which is to be established as a Conclusion, stated in an interrogative form, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. Real definition — is one which explains the nature of the thing defined beyond what is necessarily understood by the Term, b. ii. ch v. § G. Realism. — Introd. § 3. b. iv. ch. v. Reasoning — General Signs necessary for, Introd. § 5. Reduction — of syllogisms in the last three Figures, to the first, so as to fall under the Dictum, b. ii. ch. iii. §§ 5 and 6, — of hypothet- ical syllogisms to categorical, b. ii. ch. iv. § 6. References — fallacy of, b. iii. § 14. Refutation — of an argument, liablo to be fallaciously used, b. iii. §§ 6 and 7. Relative terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. Same. — Secondary use of the word, b. iv. ch. v. § 1, and Append. No. I. Second intention of a term, b. iii. § 10. Separable accident — is one which may be separated from the individ- ual, b. iii. Introd. Significate. — The s.everal things signified by a common Term ara its significates (Significata), b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Signs — general, indispensable for reasoning, Introd. § 5. Singular term is one which stands for one individual. A Singular proposition is one which has for its subject either a Singular term, or a common term limited to one Individual by a singular •iign, e. g. “This,” b. ii. ch. i. § 3 ; b. ii. ch. ii. $ 2, and b. ii. ch. v. $ 1. Sz? ites. — An abridged form of stating a series of Syllogisms, of whiefc the Conclusion of each is a Premiss of the succeeding, b. ii. ch 4 7 - INDEX.. facies. — A predicable which is considered as expressing the wholi essence of the individuals of which it is affirmed, b. li. eh. v. § 3, — peculiar sense of, in Natural History, b. iv. ch. v. § 1. Stewart, Professor Dugald, his mistake respecting Aristotle’s “ Dictum b. i 4 4 — instance of fallacy from, b. iii. § 14. Subaltern Species and Genus — is that which is both a Species of srmfi higher Genus, and a Genus in respect of the Species into which it is divided. Subaltern opposition, is between a Universal and a Particular of the same Quality. Of these, the Universal is the Subalternant, and the Particular the Subalternate , b. ii. ch. ii. § 3 f and b. ii. ch. v. § 4. Subcontrary opposition — is between two Particulars, the Affirmative and the Negative, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3. Subject of a proposition — is that term of which the other is affirmed or denied, b. ii. ch. ii. § 2. Summum Genus — is that which is not considered as a Species of any higher Genus, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. Syllogism. — An argument expressed in strict logical form ; viz. so that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of the ex- pression alone, without any regard to the meaning of the Terms, b. ii. ch. iii. § 1. Syncategoreinatic words — are such as cannot singly express a Term, but only a part of a Term, b. ii. ch. i. § 3. Term. — The Subject or Predicate of a Proposition, b. ii. ch. i. § 2. Tendency — ambiguity of, Appendix, No I. Thaumatrope, b. iii. § 11. True Proposition — is one which states what really is, b. ii. eh. ii. § 1. Truth new — two kinds of, b. iv. ch. ii. § 2, and Appendix, No. I. Tucker — his Light of N ature, Append. I. art. xi. Universal Proposition — is one whose Predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole of the Subject, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. Univocal. — A Common term is called Univocal in respect of thoafl things to which it is applicable in the same signification h ii ch, v. § 1. Wallis, Professor, his remark on jests, b. iii. § 20. Watts — his nc tion of Logic, Introd. § 3. SHE END OLNEY’S HIGHER MATHEMATICS. There is one feature which characterizes this series, so unique and yet so emi- nently practical, that we feel desirous of calling special attention to it. It is the facility with which the boohs can be used for Classes of all Grades, and in Schools of the widest diversity of purpose. Each volume in the series is so constructed that it may be used with equal ease by the youngest and least disciplined, and by those who in more mature years enter upon the study with more ample preparation. This will be seen most clearly by a reference to the separate volumes. Introduction to Algebra Complete School Algebra University Algebra Test Examples in Algebra Elements of Geometry. Separate Elements of Trigonometry. 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