Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 https://archive.org/details/virginiacampaign01mili I The Military Historical Society of Mas- sachusetts proposes to publish the papers which have been read at its meetings in a series of volumes under the following titles : — 1. CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA, 1861-1862. A new and enlarged edition of " The Peninsular Campaign of General McClellan in 1862," issued by the Society in 1881. {PublisJied.) 2. THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1862 under Gen- eral Pope. A new edition of the volume issued in 1886. {Published. ) 3. ANTIETAM to GETTYSBURG. 4. THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA IN 1864. The Wilderness to Cold Harbor 5. PETERSBURG. 6. THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA IN 1864, 1865. Cedar Creek to Appomattox. 7. CAMPAIGNS IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE. April, 1862, to November, 1863. 8. THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. May to December, 1864. 9. OPERATIONS IN THE CAROLINAS, 1861-1863. 10. CRITICAL SKETCHES OF SOME OF THE FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE COMMANDERS. {Published June, i8Q5.) Each volume will be sold separately. Price per vol- ume (8vo), ^2.00. Published for the Society by HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, Boston and New York» PAPERS OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY MASSACHUSETTS VOLUME II. THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1862 UNDER GENERAL POPE A revised and enlarged edition of The Virginia Campaign of General Pope in 1862. Papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts in 1876, 1877, and 1880. Printed by the Society. Volume II. Boston : Ticknor and Company, 1886. The numbers of pages 1-385 of the first edition remain unchanged in this. THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1862 UNDER GENERAL POPE EDITED BY THEODORE F. DWIGHT A gift from The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. PUBLISHED FOR THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS BY HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY BOSTON AND NEW YORK Copyright, 1895, By the military HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS. All rights reserved. By transfer from 9 7 ^'t^ ^'^^ ^ K ^ PREFACE. All but one of the papers printed in this volume were, as has been stated elsewhere, first publi^ed by the Society in the year 1886, and have for some time been out of print. In this edition the foot-note references to authorities have been much increased, and those to official documents and cor- respondence have been changed from less readily accessible books to point to the authorized versions given in the War Records published by the Government. Since 1886, but one paper relative to the Pope Campaign has been presented to the Society, — General Andrews' ac- count of the Battle of Cedar Mountain, — and that has been added to complete the volume. THEODORE F. D WIGHT. ^ 0 1932 tXCH 238636 -d Williams j^L\p." A reproduction of a " Map of Battle-Grounds of Au^st 28tli, 29tli, and 30th, 1862, in the vicinity of Groveton, Prince William Co., Va. Made by the authority of the Hon. G. W. MeCrary, Secretary of War. Surveyed in June, 1878, by Bvt. Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren, Major of Engineers, U.S. A., assisted by Capt. J. A. Judson, C. E. (A. A. Gen. " King's Division"), and H. D. Gurden, C. E. (late Capt. and A. A. Gen., Confed. Army)," on vrhich the position of Long-street's forces, AugTist 29, has been indicated, in accordance with his statements and the statements of Charles W. Williams made to the Board convened to in- vestig-ate the ease of Fitz John Porter, 1878-1879 ; and published with the Report of the Proceeding's of that Board, 3. BoAED Map, No. 1." Showing the positions of the Union and Confed- erate forces at noon, August 29. 4. " BoAJRD Map, No. 2." Showing the "general situation" at 430, p. m., August 29. 5. " BoAED JtLAj', No. 3." Showing the " supposed situation " under which Pope's order to Porter of 4.30 p. m., August 29, was issued. Maps 3, 4, 5, are reproductions of the Warren Map described above, and from copies published with the same Report. THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY, September 1, 1862: — 6. The Neighborhood of Chantilly. 7. The Battlefield of Chajn'tillt. 8. THE BATTLEFIELD OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN, August 9, 1862, with a Sketch Map to illustrate the operations of the Union and Confederate armies prior to August 9. 9. EASTERN VHIGINIA. ) BOOKS CITED OR MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME, AND THE FOEMS OF REFERENCE. Army axd Navy Journal. See United States Army and Navy Journal. Arsty of Northern Virginia. See Confederate States. Bates : History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5 ; prepared in compliance with acts of the Legislature by Samuel P. Bates. 5 volumes, Harrisburg, 1869-1871. Bryant, E. E. History of the Third Regiment of Wisconsin veteran volun- teer infantry, 1861-1865. By Edwin E. Bryant, late Adjutant. Madison, Wisconsin : Published by the Veteran Association of the Regiment, 1891. Castlei-ian, a. The Army of the Potomac. Behind the Scenes. A diary of unwritten history of the army, by General George B. McClellan, to the close of the Campaign in Virginia, about the first day of January, 1863, by Alfred Castleman, Surgeon of the Fifth Regiment of Wisconsin Volunteers. Mil- waukee : Strickland & Co. 1863. Conduct of the War. See United States. Confederate States of Aiierica : Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, from June, 1862, to and including the battle at Fred- ericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862. 2 vols. Richmond : R. M. Smith, Public Printer. 1864. "A. N. V." Cooke, J. E. Stonewall J ackson : A Military Biography. By John Esten Cooke. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1866. " Cooke's Jackson." Gordon, G. H. Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain, in the War of the Great Rebellion, 1861-62. ... by George H. Gordon. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1883. " Gordon, Brook Farm." History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia under John Pope . . from Cedar Mountain to Alexandria, 1862. By George H. Gordon. Boston: Houghton, Osgood and Company, 1880. General Gordon's books are now published by Houghton, Mifflin & Company. " Gordon, A. of V." Gould, J. M. History of the First-Tenth-Twenty-ninth Regiment. In ser- vice of the United States from May 3, 1861, to June 21, 1866. By Maj. John M. Gould. With the History of the Tenth Me. Battalion. By Rev. Leonard G. Jordan. Portland : Stephen Berry, 1871. Greeley, H. The American Conflict : A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860-1865. ... By Horace Greeley. 2 vols. Hartford: Published by 0. D, Case & Company. 1864-1867. "Greeley."- xii BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME Harvard Memorial Biographies. [Compiled and edited by Thomas Went- worth Hig-ginson.] 2 volumes. Cambridge: Sever and Francis, 1866. " Harvard Mem. Biog." Jones, J. B. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital. By J. B. Jones, clerk in the War Department of the Confederate States Government. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1866. J. B. Lippincott & Co. " Jones, Diary." McClbllan, G. B. MeClellan's Own Story. The War for the Union ; the Soldiers who fought it ; the Civilians who directed it, and his relations to it and to them. By George B. McClellan, late Major-General commanding the Armies. New York, 1887. " O. S." ■ Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac: To which is added an account of the Campaign in Western Virginia, with plans of battle-fields. By George B. McClellan, Major-General United States [ Army. New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864. " MeClellan's Report." This version in some respects differs from the edition printed by the gov- ernment. Letter of the Secretary of War, transmitting report on the Organization of the Army of the Potomac, and of its Campaigns in Virginia and Mary- land, under the command of Ma j .-Gen. George B. McClellan, from July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862. Senate Ex. Doc. 38th Congress, 1st session. Washington : Govermnent Printing Office, 1864. [Reprinted in] The War of the Rebellion : A compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Prepared and published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Vols. 5, 12, 27. " First Period," July 27, 1861, to March 17, 1862. " 5 W. R., 5-66." " Second Period," March 17 to July 1, 1862. " 12 W. R., 5-71." " Third Period," July 1 to September 1, 1862. " 12 W. R., 71-104." " Fourth Period," September 1 to November 9, 1862. " 27 W. R., 36-94." All references to the statements in this version of the report, in the vol- umes of this series, have been made to the War Records, as above. Orleans, Louis Philippe, dug d', Comte de Paris. History of the Civil War in America. By the Comte de Paris. Translated, with the approval of the author, by Louis F. Tasistro. Edited by Henry Copp^e, LL.D. 4 vol- umes. Philadelphia : Jos. H. Coates & Co., and Porter & Coates, 1876-1888. " Comte de Paris." The Correspondence of the Comte de Paris with General Pope is referred to in this list under Porter, No. 32. Porter, Fitz-John, Major-General, U. S. V. The following is a list of the published or privately printed books, pamphlets and other pieces, relative to the case of General Porter, in the Library of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. Although all are not cited in this volume, it has been thought proper to include them, as an essay towards a bibliography of the subject. 1. Bayard, T. F. Speech of Hon. Thomas Francis Bayard, of Delaware, in the Senate of the United States, Monday, March 8, 1880, on bill (S. No. 1139) BOOKS CITED IX THIS VOLUME xiii for tiie reKef of Fitz-Jolin Porter, late major-general of tLe United States volunteers and colonel of tlie Army. CongTessional Record, Forty-Sixtli Congress, Second Session, !MareL. 11, ISSO. Xo. 64, Vol. 10. -ito. pages 1-8. 2. Biographical Sketch of Gex. Fitz-.Johi> Poetee. from Encyclopedia of Contemporary Biography. Xew York, Vol. Pv". Published by Atlantic Publishing and EngTaying Company, New York, 1SS5. 8to, 6 pages, -vrith portrait. 3. Bt.ate, M. Honorable ^Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-General during President Lincoln's administration, to ^flaj.-Gen. Fitz John Porter. Morris- town, N. J.: '"Banner" Steam Book and Job Printing I^tablishment. lST-4. Syo, 6 pages. [Of this there appear to hare been three other impres- sions. It is also to be found in Senate Ex. Doc. 87, Part 1 ; No. 56 of this list.] 4. Beewstee, B. H. Opinion of the Attorney-General. [Benjamin Harris Brewster, June 23, 18S4]. on the act entitled, " An Act for the relief of Fitz- John Porter." H. E. 1015, 48 th Congress, 1st Session. Imp, 8vo, n. p., n. d., 9 pages. 5. BuLEiTT. J. C. Argument of John G. Bullitt, counsel for the j)etitioner, Fitz John Porter, Before the Advisory Board of Officers at "West Point, Jan- uaiy 6, 1879. Philadelphia : Allen. Lane & Scott, Printers, n. d=, 8yo, 99 pages. 1 map. This argument will be found, also, in the Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers, No. 55, of this list, toL 2, pages 1369-1438 ; and in the Congressional reprint of the same, Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 3, pages 1276-1346 ; No. 56 of this list. 6. Choate, J. H. Closing argument for the Petitioner, Fitz-John Porter, by Joseph H. Choate, of counsel, before the Advisory Board of Officers at "West Point. January 11th. 1879. [Caption of page 1.] 8vo. n. p.. n. d., 241 pages. 1 map. 7. Case of General Fitz John Porter. Mr. Choate" s argument for petitioner. West Point, 1879. 8vo, 241 pages, 3 maps. This argument will be found, also, in No. 55 of this list. vol. 2, pages 167cl- 1782 ; and in No. 56, Part 3, pages 1573-1676. 8. Cobb. A, [Letter of Amasa Cobb to General Pope. Nov. 14, 1874, concern- ing the rejoicing over Pope's defeat at Franklin's headc[uarters.] 4to. n. p., n. d. 1 leaf, 1 page. 9. Cox, J. D. Letter from Hon. J. D. Cox to Gen'l J. A. Garfield, M. C. Cincirmati, 14th Feb'y, 1880. Reviewing RejDort of the Schofield Board. Fae-simile reproduction of manuscript. 4to, 7 leaves. 7 pages, 1 map. 10. The Second Battle of Bull Run. as connected with the Fitz-John Porter case. A pp.per read before the Society of Ex- Army and Navy Officers of Cincinnati, February 28, 1882. By Jacob D. Cox, Late Maj.-Gen. Com- manding 23d Army Corps. Cincinnati: Peter G. Thomson, 1882. 16mo, vi. -\- 124 pages. 11. CuTCHEOix", B. M. Fitz-John Porter. Speech of Hon. Byron M. Cutcheon, xiv BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME of Michigan, in the House of Representatives, Tuesday, February 16, 1886. Washington, 1886. 8vo, 59 pages. 12. Dawes, R. R. Speech of Hon. Rufus R. Dawes, of Ohio, in the House of Representatives, Thursday, February 15, 1883, on bill (S. 1844) for the relief of Fitz-John Porter. Congressional Record, Forty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, March 5, 1883. 4to, pages 1-7. 13. Extracts from Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia (Rebel army). Summer Campaign of 1862. Opera- tions on the 29th of August. Second Bull Run. 8vo, n. p., n. d., 4 pages. 14. FiTZ-JoHN Porter Inquest. Trenchant review by a soldier and a jurist, Q. E. D. [From Cincinnati Daily Gazette, April 18, 1879.] 8vo, n. p., n. d., 7 pages. 15. [Force, Manning F.] Synopsis of principal points made in Report of Schofield Board in Fitz-John Porter's ease, with answers thereto from the Official Records. 8vo, n. p., n. d., 10 pages. 16. Gardner, A. B. Opening Argument for the United States in rebuttal in the case of Fitz-John Porter, before the Advisory Board of Officers at Governor's Island, N. Y., October 2, 1878, by Asa Bird Gardner, " Counsel for the Government." 8vo, 83 pages, 1 map. This argument will be found, also, in No. 55, vol. 1, pages 464-547 ; and in No. 56, Part 2, pages 470-552. 17. Argument of Asa Bird Gardner, Counsel for Government, after conclusion of the evidence in the case of Fitz-John Porter, before the Board of Army Officers at West Point, January, 1879. Washington : Government Printing Office, 1879. , 8vo, 233 pages. This argument will be found, also, in No. 55, vol. 2, pages 1439-1672 ; and in No. 56, Part 3, pages 1347-1568. 18. Grant, U. S. An Undeserved Stigma. Extract from North American Review, No. 313, vol. 135, Dec, 1882, pages 536-546. 19. General Grant's Unpublished Correspondence in the case of Gen. Fitz-John Porter. 8vo, n. p., n. d., 20 pages. 20. Haynes, M. a. Fitz-John Porter. Speech of Hon. Martin A. Haynes, of New Hampshire, in the House of Representatives, Thursday, February 11, 1886. Washington, 1886. 8vo, 15 pages. 21. Johnson, R. A reply to the review of Judge Advocate General Holt, of the proceedings, findings and sentence, of the General Court Martial, in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and a vindication of that officer, by Reverdy Johnson. Baltimore : Printed by John Murphy & Co., 1863. 8vo, 88 pages. Printed in Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, No. 56 of this list. 22. LiPPiTT, F. J. Pope's Virginia Campaign, and Porter's part in it. Atlantic Monthly. Volume 42, No. 251. September, 1878, pages 349-366. 23. Logan, J. A. Speech of Hon. John A. Logan, of Illinois, in the Senate of the United States, March 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1880. Congressional Record, Forty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, March 26, 1880. No. 76, vol. 10. 4to, 46 pages, 1 map. BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME XV 24. Lord, T. A. A summary of the case of General Fitz-Joka Porter, by Theodore A. Lord. San Francisco : H. S. Crocker & Co., 1883. Svo, 114 pages, 10 maps. 25. Loud, TV. B. [Letters of "W. Blair Lord, stenographer to Joseph Holt, Jndge Advocate General, May 30, 1871 ; and, W. L. Ormshey to W. B. Lord, May 22, 1870. Concerning admissions of disloyalty to Pope made by Gen- eral Porter.] 4to, n. p., n. d. ; 1 leaf, 1 page. 26. McClelI;Ax's Dispatches feom Alexaxdeia during the 2d battle of Bull Run. From Eeport of Committee on the Conduct of the War. Part 2, (Supplement), 1865 ; 4to, n. p., n. d. ; 3 leaves, 5 pages. 27. McDonald, J. E. Speech of Hon. Joseph E. McDonald, of Indiana, in the Senate of the United States, March 0 and 10, 1880. Washington, 1880. 8to, 46 pages. 28. McDovTELL, I. [Letter to Colonel Franklin Haven, jr., Boston, Mass., from General McDovrell, written at San Francisco, California, May 7, 1879, relative to an attack on him (McDowell) in the investigation of Fitz-John Porter case, the subject of an article in the Nation of April 17, 1879.] Privately printed, folio, 4 leaves, 4 pages. 29. [Testimony by General McDowell before the Examining Board convened to consider Fitz-John Porter's case.] 4to, n. p., n. d., 2 pages. 30. Maltby, A. Argument of Anson Maltby, counsel for the petitioner, Fitz John Porter, before the Advisory Board of officers, at West Point, J anuary Sd and 4th, 1879. Svo, n. p., n. d. ; 102 pages, 2 maps. This argument will be found, also, in No. 55, vol. 2, pages 1241-1368 ; and in No. 56, Part 3 ; pages 1150-1276. SI. Mangold, F., Major, Westphalian Foot Artillery. The Campaign in Northern Yirginia in August, 1862. Fitz-John Porter's Case from a German Standpoint. Army and Navy Journal, Nov. 2, 1889 ; pages 178-181. 32. Mills, L. E. General Pope's Yirginia Campaign of 1862. Read before the Cincinnati Literary Club, February 5, 1870. By Lewis Este Mills. Cincinnati: Robert Clark & Co., 1870. Svo, 32 pages. 33. Novelty ik a Judicial Inquiry.- [From Cincinnati Daily Gazette.] Svo, n. p., n. d., 2 pages. 84. Gates, W. C. Fitz-John Porter. Speech of Hon. William C. Gates, of Alabama, in the House of Representatives, Wednesday, February 17, 1886. Washington, 1886 ; Svo, n. p., n. d., 12 pages. 35. Opixions ajstd Memorials in the ease of Gen. Fitz John Porter, Morris- town, N. J., "Banner" Steam Book and Job Printing Establishment, 1874. Svo, 90 pages ; 1 map. There appear to have been two editions of this pamphlet. Printed ^in Senate Ex. Doe. 37, Part 1. No. 56 of this Hst. 36. Patterson, W. C. Fitz-John Porter. Reprint from Penn Monthly for April, iSSO. By W. C. Patterson. Plailadelphia : Press of Edward Stem & Co. Svo, 49 pages. 87. Pope, J. Brief statement of the case of Fitz-John Porter, 4to, n. p., n. d., 3 lea,ves,, 5 pages. xvi BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME 38. Pope, J. Correspondence between General Pope and the Comte de Paris, concerning the second hattle of Bull Run. Pope to the Comte de Paris, May 29, Dec. 21, 1876, AprH 19, 1877. The Comte de Paris to Pope, Oct. 8, 1876, March 23, 1877. 4to, n. p., n. d., 10 leaves, 10 pages. These letters were first printed in the Army and Navy Journal, as stated on page 313, supra. 39. [Letters: John Pope to General Thomas, January 19, 1870. W. B. Franklin to General Roberts, April 6, 1868. George H. Thomas to Secretary of War, February 7, 1870, concerning charges against Pope, in a letter of General W. B. Franklin to General Grant.] 4to, n. p., n. d., 2 leaves, 2 pages. 40. [Letters : General Pope to Ed. Schriver, December 30, 1869 ; Colonel Ed. Schriver to General Pope, Jan. 7, 1870, embodied in a letter to General Sherman, October 23, 1878. Concerning Longstreet's report of sec- ond battle of Bull Run, relative to Porter Case.] 4to, n. p., n. d., 2 leaves, 2 pages. 41. [Letters concerning General Pope as a witness at the investigation of Fitz-John Porter, 1878 — submitted to Judge M. F. Force, in a letter, by General Pope, Nov. 2, 1878. Also a] Summary of further proceedings connected with the foregoing [by General Pope.] 4to, n. p., n. d. , 3 leaves, 3 pages. 42. Porter, F. J. Appeal to the President of the United States for a re- examination of the proceedings of the General Court Martial in his case, by Maj.-Gen'l Fitz John Porter, with accompanying documents. Morristown, N. J., 1869. 8vo, 66 pages. Printed in Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1. No. 56 of this list. 43. Brief Suggestions in the case of General Fitz John Porter. Morris- town, N. J. : " Banner " Steam Book and Job Printing Establishment, 1874. Svo, 44 pages, 1 map. Printed in Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1. No. 56 of this list. 44. [Letter of Fitz-John Porter to General J. D. Cox, August 29, 1880.] Svo, n. p., n. d. 26 pages. 45. General Fitz John Porter's Narrative of the services of the Fifth Army Corps, in 1862, in Northern Virginia. Morristown, N. J., Banner Steam Printing Establishment, 1878. Svo, 89 leaves, 89 pages. Another edition, same place, same printers, 1878. Svo, 89 pages. 46. ■ — Gen. Fitz John Porter's statement of the services of the Fifth Army Corps, in 1862, in Northern Virginia. New York: Evening Post Steam Presses, 1878. Svo, 122 pages, 1 map. This is virtually the same as the narrative. No. 38. [The Same]. Washington : Government Printing Office, 1879. Svo, 85 pages. f This statement is to be found, also, in Senate Ex. Doc, 37, Part 1, 309- 391. No. 56 of this list. 47. Randolph, T. F. Speech of Hon. Theodore F. Randolph, of New Jersey, in the Senate of the United States, Monday, March 1, 1880, on BOOKS CITED IX THIS VOLUME xni the bill for tlie Restoration of General Fitz-Jolin Porter to tlie United States Army. Washing ton. D. C. : R. 0. Pol king-horn, printer, 1880. Svo, 24 pag-es. 48. Ray, G. W. Fitz-John Porter. Speech of Hon. George VT. Ray. of Xew York, in the Honse of Representatives, Friday and Saturday, January 25 and 26, 1884 Washington, 1884. Svo, 40 pages. 49. Republican Press on the Fitz-John Porter case. Extracts from some of many Republican papers from all parts of the country. Washington : R. 0, Polkinghorn, Printer. 4to, 4pages. 50. Sewzll, W. J. Speeches of Hon. William J. Se"vrell. of Isew Jersey, delivered in the Senate of the United States, for the relief of Gen. Fitz-John Porter, December 2S. 1882, and January 3, 1883. Washington, 1882. 8vo, 48 pag-es. 51. Shkeqia2>. W. T. [Letters of General Sherman to General Pope, Decem- ber 13, 1869 ; February 24, 1870. Concerning a rehearing of Fitz-John Por- ter ease.] 4to, n. p., n. d., 1 leaf, 1 page. 52. SiA-TEK, J. S. An address, to the Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, and especially to the surviving members of the Fifth Corps, containing a brief revievr of the case of Gen. Fitz John Porter. By one who served xmder him. John S. Slater, 13th X. Y. V., 1st Brig.. 1st Div.. 5th Corps, Army of the Potomac. Washington. D. C, Thomas McGill cfc Co., printers, 1880. Svo, 30 pages. 63. Slocoi, H. W. Fitz-John Porter. Speech of Hon. H. W. Slocum. of Xew York, of the House of Representatives, Friday, January 18, 18-84. Washington, 18S4, Svo, 13 pages. 54. UxiTED States, Congress. Fitz-John Porter Court-MarMal. Letter from the Secretary of War, in answer to Resolution of the House of 3d instant, [February 8, 1863,] transmitting copy of proceeding's of the court- martial in the trial of General Fitz John Porter. February IS, 1863. House of Representatives Ex. Doc. No. 71. 37th Congress, 3d Session. Svo, 317 pages. This document has been reprinted in 17 W. R.. also in Senate Ex. Doc. 37. Part 1, No. 56 of this list. 55. Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Of6.cers, convened by Special Orders No. 78, Headquarters of the Army. Adjutant-General's office, Washington, April 12, 1878, in the case of Fitz-John Porter. Major- General John M. Sehofield, Brigadier-General Alfred H. Terry, Colonel George W. Getty, members. Asa Bird Gardner, Judge Advocate, United States Army, Recorder and Counsel for the Government. John C. Bullitt. Esq., Joseph H. Choate, Esq., Anson Maltby. Esq., Counsel for petitioner. Parts I. and H. 2 vols. 1 vol. maps. Washington : Government Printing Office. 1879. [Reprinted by Congress in the following, No. 56.] 56. Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers, convened by Special Orders No. 78, Headquarters of the Army. Adjutant-General's Office. Washington, April 12, 1878, in the case of Fitz-John Porter, together with the proceedings in the original trial and papers relating thereto. Senate xviii BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME Executive Document, 37, 46th Congress, 1st session. In three parts. Wash- ington : Government Printing office, 1879. 3 vols, text, 1 vol. maps. "Senate Ex. Doe. 37." The references to the Proceedings and Report in this volume have heen made to this edition. 57. Report of Board of Officers, convened at West Point, in June, 1878, [for investigation of Fitz-John Porter's case.] Imp. 8vo, n. p., n. d., 27 pages. 58. Report of the Board of Officers in the Case of Fitz-John Porter, late Major-General of Volunteers. Washington, D. C. : Army and Navy Gazette, 1879. 8vo, 18 pages. This Report has been printed distinctively, in several editions. It is to he found with the President's proclamation of May 4, 1882, remitting the penalties imposed on General Porter by Court- Martial, February, 1863, in 16 W. R., 513-536 ; also in No. 55 of this list, vol. 2, pages 1801-1825 ; and in No. 56, Part 3, pages 1695-1720. 59. Brief in the matter of the Report of the "Advisory Board," in the casQ of Fitz-John Porter. 4to, n. p., n. d., 11 leaves, 11 pages. 60. Fitz-John Porter. Message from the President of the United States, transmitting a communication from Fitz-John Porter, with copies o£ accompanying papers. [February 2, 1885.] 48th Congress, 2d Session House of Representatives. Ex. Doc. 175. 8vo, 137 pages. 61. Wheeler, J. Fitz-John Porter. Speech of Hon. Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama, in the House of Representatives, Thursday, February 15, 1883. Washington, 1883. 8vo, 114 pages. 62. — Fitz-John Porter. Speech of Hon. Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama, in the House of Representatives, Tuesday, February 16, 1886. Washington, 1886. 8vo, 82 j)ages, 8 maps. Quint, A. H. The Record of the Second Massachusetts Infantry. 1861-65. By Alonzo H. Quint, its Chaplain. Boston : John P. Walker. 1867. The Rebellion Recobd, a diary of American events. . . . edited by Frank Moore. 12 vols.. New York : G. P. Putnam, 1861-1868. " Rebellion Record." Robertson, J. Michigan in the War, compiled by Jno. Robertson, Adjutant- General. Revised edition. Lansing : W. S. George & Co., State Printers, 1882. Ropes, J. C. The Army under Pope, by John Codman Ropes. Campaigns of the Civil War. — IV. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1st edition, 1881 . Later edition, 1892. Ropes, Army under Pope." Southern Historical Society Papers. Volume 1, January to June, 1876. Volume 22, January to December, 1894. Richmond, Va. 1876-1894. "Southern Hist. Soc. Papers." SwiNTON, W. Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac : A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, from the commencement to the close of the War, 1861-1865. By William Swinton. New York, i866. "Swinton." — The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War : A History of the Eastern BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME xix and Western Campaigns, in Relation to the Actions that decided their Issue. By William Swiaton. New York, 1867. "S-wuiton, Decisive Battles."' Tatlok, W. H. Four Years \vith General Lee : being a summary of the more important events touching the career of General Robert E. Lee, in the war between the States ; together with an authoritative statement of the strength of the army which he commanded in the field. By Walter H. Taylor, of his staff, and late Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia. New York : D. Appleton and Company, 1877. " Taylor, Four Years." The Ukited States Anair akd Navy Journal, a gazette of the regular and volunteer forces. 33 vols. 1863-1895. New York : [a weekly publica- tion.] " Army and Navy Journal."'' United States Congbess. Conduct of the War : Report of the Joint Com- mittee on the Conduct of the War. Appointed under Joint Resolution of December, 1861. 8 vols. Washington : Government Printing Office, 1863- 1866. [First sei-ies.] Senate Reports [of Committees] : 37th Congress, 3d Session. 1862-1863, Report No. 71 (Battle of Fredericksburg), in vol. 1. Cited as "Sen. Rep. No. 71. 37 Cong. 3d Sess." Report No. 108. Army of the Potomac, vol. 2, part 1. 1 C. W." Bull Run, Ball's Bluff, vol. 3, part 2. " 2 C. W." Western Department, vol. 4, part 3. " 3 C. W." [Second series.] [The same.] 38th Congress, 2d Session. 1864-1865. Report No. 142. General Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, May 22, 1865, pp. iii.-v. Journal of Proceedings of that Committee, pp. vii.- SXXIX. Report on the Army of the Potomac : Under General Hooker, pp. xli.-lv. Under General Meade, pp. Iv.-Isxvii. Testimony taken by the committee : Concerning General Hooker, pp. 1-294. Concerning General Meade, pp. 295-524. Followed by a — Report on the Battle of Petersburg, July 30, 1864, pp. 1-249. All comprised in part 1 {L e., vol. 1). " 1 C. W., 1865." Report No. 142, continued. Report on the Red River Expedition, pp. iii.-xlis. Testimony on the Red River Expedition, pp. 1-401. Rejport on the Fort Fisher Expedition, pp. i.-viii. Testimony on the Fort Fisher Expedition, pp. 1-260. Report on Heavy Ordnance, pp. 1-179. AU comprised in part 2 {i. e. vol. 2.) " 2 C. W. 1865." Report No. 142 [continued. Each report has a distinctive paging.] Report on the Negotiations of General Sherman for the Surrender of General J. E. Johnston. 23 pp. XX BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME Report on Lig-lit-draug-lit Monitors, iv. -f 120 pp. Report on the Massacre of Cheyenne Indians, vi. + 108 pp. Report on lee Contracts. 100 pp. Report of General Rosecrans' Campaigns^ 119 pp. Miscellaneous : Operations against Charleston. Operations in the Gulf Depai'tment. Trade Regulations. Battle of Cedar Mountain. Treatment of Prisoners. 86 pp. " 3 C. W., 1865, Miscellaneous." Supplemental Report: 39th Congress, 1st Session. 1865-66. 2 vols. Washington, 1886. Vol. 1. Report of Major-General W. T. Sherman, 391 pp. Report of Major-General G. H. Thomas. 472 pp. " C. W., 1 Supplement/^ Vol. 2. Reports of — - Major-General John Pope. 217 pp. . " " J. G. Foster. 23 pp. " " A. Pleasanton. 13 pp. " " E.A.Hitchcock. 12 pp. " " P.H.Sheridan. 77 pp. Brigadier-General J. B. Ricketts. 7 pp. Comnaunication and Memorial of Norman Wiard. 32 + 4 pp, " aw., 2 Supplement." War Records. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Prepared under the direc- tion of the Secretary of War, by Bvt. Lieut.-Col. Robert N. Scott, Third U. S. Artillery, and published pursuant to Act of Congress, approved June 16, 1880. Series I. Vols. I.-XLVI., Part I. 95 vols. * Washington : Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1880-1894. " W. R." Volumes 1-49 were prepared and published under the direction of Lieut.- Col. Scott ; vols. 50-95, under the direction of Major George B. Davis, U. S. A., Mr. Leslie J. Perry, and Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley, a Board of Publi- cation. Until the publication of Vol. XXIV., Part I., the volumes bore only the particular series designations in Roman numerals. As the references to the earlier volumes have been made in this book by their serial numbers, a table harmonizing the same with their series designations is here given for the convenience of the student. Series Nos. Serial Nos. Series Nos. Serial Nos. L . 1 V. . 5 IL . 2 VI. . . 6 in. 3 VII. .......... 7 IV, . 4 VIIL .......... 8 BOOKS CITED IN THIS VOLUME xxi IX 9 ^vTTT ( Part 1 24 ^ (Parti 10 'iPart H 25 {Partn 11 XVm 26 ( Part 1 12 y-jy- { Part 1 27 XI J Part II 13 1 Part n 28 ( Part in 14 Part 1 29 Part 1 15 ( Part H 30 Partn , 16 XXI 31 XII- 1 Part II., part ii 17 ^^tt \ Part 1 32 t.i Part 11^ part ii 17 ^ J [Part in 18 ( Part n. Xm 19 ( Part 1 34 XIV 20 ^^^-jpartlL 35 XV 21 ( Part 1 36 XVI. Part 1 22 XXIV. Part H 37 Part II 23 (Part IIL ..... 38 Whitman aitd True. Maine in the War for tlie Union : A History of the part borne by Maine Troops in the Suppression of the American Rebellion. By William E. S. Whitman and Charles H. True. Lewiston : Nelson Ding- ley, jr., & Co., Publishers, 1865. Wilkes, Geokge. McCleHan : from Ball's Bluff to Antietam. New York : S. Tousey, 1863. I. THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL HALLECK'S mLI- TARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE SUMMER OF 1862, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RE- MOVAL BY HIS ORDERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE PENINSULA, AND TO THE SHARE WHICH BELONGS TO HBI IN THE CAIMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. By Bvt. Beig.-Gen. SAMUEL M. QUINCY, U.S. V. COMmTTEE. Bvt. Brig-.-Gen. Samuel M. Quincy, U. S. V. Colonel TnoiiAs L. LrvEEMORE, U. S. V. Read before the Society on Monday evening, Jan. S, 1S77. The following is the title of a contribution to the history of the Civil War by General Quincy : — HiSTOKY OF THE Second MASSACHUSETTS Regiment OF Infantry : A Pris- oner's Diary. A Paper read at the Officers' Reunion in Boston, May 11, 1877. By Samuel M. Quincy, Captain, Second Massachusetts Infantry, Brevet Brigadier-General Volunteers. Boston: George H. Ellis, Printer, 1882 Privately Printed for the Association. POPE'S YIPGIMA CAMPAIGN. GENERAL HALLECK'S ADMINISTRATION. IHAT up to tlie present time it has been too early to expect from any of our historians of the war a per- fectly nnhiased, dispassionate, and reliable judgment upon the Nvisdom of such an important move upon the military chessboard as the withdrawal of the Army of the Poto- mac from the Peninsula, together with an impartial and just distribution of the respective shares of responsibility attaching to commander and subordinates for the disas- ters of Gen. Pope's campaign, we tliink will be admitted. All that the chairman of your committee can present to the society this evening are simply the conclusions to which such study as he has been able to devote to the subject within a few weeks has brought his own mind. He claims no credit beyond that of an absence of partial- ity or bias, and offers his opinion, with all deference to those whom more intimate acquaintance with the facts has brought to a different conclusion. In whose mind first originated the idea of withdrawing Gen. Halle ck from the scene of his successful operations in the West, and investing him with supreme command, 3 4 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. we liave been unable to decide. Greeley credits Pope witb having undoubtedly suggested to tlie President tbe appointment of a common military superior," ^ and Pope, in his report,^ states that the appointment was made in ac- cordance with his views (after receiving Gen. McClellan's answer ^ to his letter) of the necessity of a military supe- rior to both, to ensure cooperation between the armies. By whom suggested is, however, immaterial ; the necessity was supposed to exist, and on July 11th the order was issued,^ although command was not, for some reason, as- sumed thereunder until the 23d. ^ For the situation in which Gen. Halleck then found the war in Virginia he, of course, was not responsible. Did he deal with that situa- tion wisely, in viev/ of the resources at his command, and what he could then be supposed to know of the character of his lieutenants, McClellan and Pope? And for the disasters which ensued until both armies were united with- in the fortifications of Washington, what share of respon- sibility ought he to assume ? These are the questions for our consideration, and which may hardly be considered as definitely settled and put to rest for many years to come. On the 26th of June, 1862, by an order of the Presi- dent, the forces under Gens, Banks, Fremont, and Mc- Dowell were consolidated into one army, to be styled the Army of Virginia, and to be commanded by Major-Gen. John Pope.^ It was doubtless the intention that, with this command, he should cover Washington, and threaten, if not advance upon Richmond. He himself declares the latter to have been his intention, until McClellan's re- verses, commencing on the day of Pope's appointment, ^2 Greeley, 173. ^ 14 ^^.U., 306. sib., 371, 16 W.R., 4. 2 16 W.R., 22. * Ib.j 314, e 15 W.R., 169. GEX. HALLECK'S ADMIXISTEATIOX. 5 put a foiTvard moYeinent out of tlie question. Gen. Hal- leck tlien, on assuming coniinancl, finds t^vo- armies sepa- rated bv Pdclimond and tlie enemy, — Pope before Wasli- ington, and McClellan at Harrison's Bar, — eacli on tlie defensive. If McClellan could be promptly put in a condition to vigorously resiune tlie offensive, and if sucli vigorous resumption could be expected of Mm, tlien, un- doubtedly, the plan for a double advance on Riclimond could be carried out. But if tlie cliance of being able to bring about sucli ^dgorous resumption appeared as small tlien to Gen. Halleck as it novr seems to tlie vaiter to liave been, tlien tlie question seems to be simplified into tlie manner of bringing tbe tvro armies togetlier — vrliicli should re enforce tlie otlier? It \vas tliougiit tliat tlie at- tempt to reenforce McClellan by Pope would give to tlie ever-Tvatcliftd enemy tlie opportunity of exclianging Ricli- mond for Wasliington, as Pope must be for that puipiose witlidraTvn from before tlie capital. If Pope, tlien, could not safely be vreakened, v-liere vrere tlie immediate reen- f or cements to be bad vritli vliicli McClellan promised tliat lie would again advance ? Even Svinton, vdiose prejudice against Gen. Halleck is expressed in no measured terms,^ admits that, if it was not designed to reenforce the Army of the Potomac to an effective that vrould enable it to im- mediately recommence active operations, then undoubt- edly the wisest course was to withdraw it from the Penin- sula, — assuming Gen. Halleck's ability, had he so chosen, to have not only enabled but induced Gen. McClellan to promptly resume the offensive, and this without endanger- ing Washington.- 1 Swinton, 170. 2 lb., 171. 6 POPE'S VIEGINIA CAMPAIGN. Let US look for a moment at Gen. McClellan's demands, and then allow Halleck to speak for himself in his reply to the former's protest against the order of withdrawal. Even before the battle of Malvern Hill McClellan had commenced to telegraph the President for fresh troops. On July 2d, in a reply to a demand for 50,000 more troops, the President, after stating the numbers and posi- tion of those available, concludes : *' Thus the idea of send- ing you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly is simply absurd. . . . Save the army, material and per- sonal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can." ^ But on the next day Gen. McClellan again asks for 100,000 to capture Eichmond and put an end to the rebellion.^ To this the President replies on July 4th : * ' To re-enforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. . . . Save the army, first, where you are, if you can ; and, secondly, by removal, if you must. ... — P.S. If at any time you feel able to take the offensive you are not restrained from doing so."^ On the 7th of July Gen. McClellan, abandoning the immediate subject of re-en- forcements, volunteered to the President, by letter, his views and advice ' ' upon a civil and military policy cover- ing; the whole s^round of our national trouble." ^ The Pres- ident, however, seemed to think that that portion of what might be called the ground of our national trouble," then held by the Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Bar, was sufficient for his immediate attention, and, conse- quently, visited the same personally on July 8th. The result of this visit seemed to give McClellan the idea that il4W,R., 286. 2 lb., 292, ^ i2 W.R., 72, 73. * lb., 73. GEN. HALLECK'S AD3IINISTRATI0K 7 the President favored a withdrawal, and by Gen. Pope's testimony, given on that very day, July 8th, to the Con- gressional Committee, it seems that he (Pope) had already advised the President in that direction.^ But, whatever may have been his opinions, the President did not take upon himself the responsibility of the move, but on July 11th issued the order calling Gen. Halleck to the supreme command. On the 25th Gen. Halleck visited the camp at Harrison's Landing, inspected the troops, and, it is said, called an informal council of officers high in command, the majority of whom, for various reasons, favored a withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. 2 In the interval between the President's visit on the 8th and General Halleck's on the 26th McClellan had been calling again for re-enforcements with which to resume the offensive, describing the spirit and condition of his troops as excellent, deprecating the effect of a retreat on their moral. ^ When, therefore, on the 30th he received Gen- eral Halleck's order to send away his sick,* in order to be in readiness for a move in any direction, he must have known that the withdrawal had been decided on, and that the utmost promptness and energy were called for in its execution. But, after a delay of two days, he replies that, while in ignorance of what the contemplated move is to be, he cannot decide what cases to send off, and, in fact, remonstrates at being kept in the dark.^ At last, on August 4th, he receives it in black and white, that his army is to be withdrawn to Acquia Creek, but that the move is, for the present, to be kept a secret, even from his ilC.W., 280. 2l6W.Il., 5. n2 W.R., 74, 75. ''lb., 76. ep^.^so. 8 POPE'S VIBGINIA CAMPAIGN. own officers.^ How much of a secret the intention then was in Richmond we shall soon see. To McClellan's almost indignant remonstrance and urgent request for a reconsideration of the decision, and withdrawal of the order, Gren. Halleck's reply appears to the writer so conclusive that it is here quoted at length : — Headquarters op the Armt, Washington, August 6, 1862. General : — Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed you a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview; and even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. . . But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no alternative. Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from the South. General Pope's army covering Washington is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are 30 miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly between you, 1 12 W.R., 80. GEN. HALLECK'S ADMINISTRATION. 9 ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack. If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Wash- ington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without expos- ing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present cir- cumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged. You say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, " which is now in excellent discipline and condition." I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court-House to your present condition was over 30 miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwith- standing the severe losses they sustained in elfecting it. A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about 60 miles of Richmond, and secures a re-enforce- ment of 40,000 or 50,000 fresh and disciplined troops. . . . But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I 10 POPE'S YIEGINIA CAMPAIGN. can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this you said at our interview that you required 30,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have " some chance" of success with 20,000. But you afterwards telegraphed me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely re-en- forced. If yoTlr estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable, but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River, and even after you received the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the meantime Gen. Pope's forces would be ex- posed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandon- ment. I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy between them. I GEN. HALLECK'S ADMINISTRATION; 11 must take things as I find them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better plan I should certainly have adopted it. But all of your plans requii-e re-enforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at 3'our command. I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at very different conclu- sions from your own. Ver}^ respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. ^ Major-Gen. G. B. McClellan, Commanding , eic, Berkeley, Virginia. The fiat having at length gone forth, protest and re- monstrance to the contrary notwithstanding, it became evident that everything depended on celerity of execu- tion. That a soldier like Gen. Lee would fail to strain every nerve to strike one army or the other the heaviest possible blow before their union could be effected, could hardly be supposed by those who had such reason to be- lieve him to be no laggard or bungler. And as to the length of time which elapsed before the decision at Washington, concealed carefully from McClellan's officers, became known at Richmond, and the energetic action which followed such knowledge, we need but call attention to the following extract from the most instructive pages 116 W.E., 9-11. 12 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. of the ''Diary of a Rebel War Clerk," published in 1866. It will be remembered that McClellan's first receipt of written orders for withdrawal was August 4. The author of the diary occupied the position of chief clerk to the rebel war secretary : — ''Auo^ust 3d. There is a rumor that McClellan is ' stealing away ' from his new base ! and Burnside has gone up the Rappahannock to co-operate with Pope in his * march to Richmond.' '* August 4th. Lee is makino- herculean efi'orts for an ' on to Washington,' while the enemy think he merely designs a defence of Richmond. Troops are on the move, all the way from Florida to Gordonsville. '' August 5th. ... I hope Lee will make the most of his time, and annihilate their drilled and seasoned troops. He can put more fighting men in Virginia than the enemy, during the next two months. ' Now's the day, and now's the hour ! ' " August 6th. Jackson is making preparations to fight. I know the symptoms. He has made Pope believe he's afraid of him. ''August 9th. Jackson and Ewell are waiting and watching. Pope will expose himself soon. "August 10th. Jackson struck Pope yesterday! It was a terrible blow, for the numbers engaged." ^ Leaving Gen. McClellan for the present with the work thus cut out for him, let us turn our attention to the army to be re-enforced, Gen. Pope's command then covering ^ 1 Jones' Diary, 147-148. GEN. EALLECK'S AmimiSTRATION'. 13 Wasliington. The latter had already, in his testimon}^ be- fore the Congressional Committee, developed, with some- what surprising confidence, his plans for the defence of Washington against the advance of a force superior to liis own. These seemed to consist in a prompt getting out of the way in front, and abandonment of all intrenched lines as useless : and a lying off on the enemy's flanks and so bothering him by unexpected attacks that he could go no farther, but must turn and follow his assailant to the mountains. What would there transpire the committee did not inquire. But this "lying off" strategy need not be adopted, if he could be re-enforced by the Army of the Potomac before Lee's advance in force could be made. And this he thought could be done.^ But, unfortunately, by his sneers, open and covert, at that army, its command- ers and its fighting, he had hardly taken the means which a student of human nature Avould recommend to bring it to his assistance at an enthusiastic double-quick when the pinch should arrive. Let his well-known bombastic farrago, issued on taking command, speak for itself : ^ Headquarters Army of Virginia, Washington, D.C., July U, 1862. To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia : By special assigmneut of the Presklent of the United States 1 have assumed command of this army. ... I have come to you from the West, where we have alwa^-s seen the backs of our enemies ; from au army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found ; whose policy has been attack and not defence. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our 1 1 C.W., 276, 277. = 18 AV.R., 473. 14 POPE'S YIBGINIA CAMPAIGN, Western armies in defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall en- deavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of ' ' taking strong positions and holding them," of "lines of retreat," and of "bases of supplies." Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever. Jno. Pope, Major- General, Commanding. And in his testimony, given a few days before to the committee, he agrees that with McClellan's army as it left Washington he (Pope) could have marched to New Orleans, and that the secret of the successes of the West- ern troops, who had nothing, not even trousers, and who went into action with musket-locks tied on with string, was harmony and an aggressive policy.^ 1 1 C.W., 282. GEX. HALLECK'S ADMIXISTRATIOX. 15 For not relishing the task of sending liis ovm army to reenforce tliis braggart, to save liim from disgrace, and assist liim to success and fame, Trho can blame George B. McClellan? But that it was a self-sacrifice, wliich true patriotism demanded, none will deny. The first reverse to Gen. Pope's army which seems to have opened Gen. Halleck's eyes to the fact that Lee did not propose to await either his or McClellan's leisure be- fore commencing the ^' on to Washington '' movement, which otu^ friend the rebel war clerk so gleefully chron- icles, was the battle of Cedar Mountain. As there has been an attempt to shift the responsibility for the fighting of this battle from the shoulders where it properly be- longs, and an utterly absurd charge of delay in going into action made against troops on whom the heaviest brunt of the fiO'htino; fell, and amono; whom the vniter had the honor of serving, he cannot refrain from a short digression fr^om the main subject, in order to show the manner in which the action in question was brought about, and in the consideration of wliich, and in refutation of the charge above-mentioned, some personal experiences must be given. On the morning of the 9th of August Gen. Pope knew that Jackson had crossed the Eapidan, and was moving in force, probably upon Culpeper. , The cavalry commands of Bayard and Biiford were both falling back from differ- ent directions. Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps had been thr^own forward the day before in the direction of Cedar Mountain to support and assist Bayard, while Banks and Sigel were ordered to march on Culpeper. 16 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, Banks did so, but Sigel sent back most unaccountably to ask by what road, when, according to Pope, there was but one, and that a broad pike. This delayed him so that he was not available for the* 9th, as Pope had expected he would be. Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was not pushed up to Crawford at the front, but was posted three miles in the rear at the intersection of the road from Madison Court-House, despatches from Buford having given rise to an uncertainty as to whether the enemy was not advancing from that direction. If Crawford was to be supported where he was, clearly Banks must do it, and the order was accordingly issued. And with a common sense, which those who should judge from his bombastic proclamation alone might not suspect him of possessing, in view of Sigel's delay and the heavy force of the enemy reported to him as moving, he ordered Gen. Banks, in so many words, to do the very thing the bare idea of which he had just exhorted the whole army to dismiss from their minds, viz., to take a strong position and hold it. My own experience in what followed, taken mainly from a diary, may be of interest to some, and throw some little light on the questions under discussion. The previous day's march had not been a severe one, though I find it noted as having "played out" some unfortunate recruits who had not yet got their sea- soning, and the regiment bivouacked at nearly mid- night under a full moon. One of the most sincerely mourned of the next day's fallen — Lieut. Stephen Perkins — came to my fire for some tea, our favorite drink after a march, and during our exchange of GEX. HALLECK'S ADJIIXISTEATIOX. 17 surmise and conjecture, expressed his strong conviction that we should see more fighting very soon : that, as he expressed it. there Tras a battle in the air." though we had had no cause, so far, to suspect the proximity of the enemy. The next morning, no orders having arrived, by about 9 o'clock a camp was marked out and tents just begin- ning to rise when enters an officer of Pope's staff at a gallop with orders which soon put us again in motion, under a blazing sun. but without knapsacks. This and the pace at which we were led caused me to suspect that perhaps Perkins was a prophet, and in effect desultory artillery firing a few miles in advance soon greeted our ears. The heat was tremendous, and my first sergeant fell with sunstroke just before we reached the front. "We passed through Ricketts's division, lying under the trees with their accoutrements off. and supposed that thev would not be lono; after us. if we o-ot into a fio-ht. We were nearly exhausted when we got into position at last, but the half hour of rest and shade which followed made men of us again. Our position was a strong one, and appreciated by the men. -If they come at us here, we shall have a cross-fire on them." was remarked. The right and left companies — Capt. Abbott's and mine — were then thrown well to the front as skirmishers, and there we lay for hours behind our jDlatoons in reserve with nothino^ to do but to watch the swavino-s of the ar- tillery fight, and time the explosion of the hea^w shells, until the sun was about half an hour high. Then, at last, comes an order to Gen. Gordon, delivered in the 18 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, writer's hearing, for our regiment to go somewhere im- mediately, followed, as it seems, by another for a general advance. Instantly on receipt of the first order the skirmishers were rallied on the battalion at the double, and hardly, panting and breathless, had we taken our places, before the general advance took place, at first by the right of companies to the front until some obstacles were cleared, then in line and at the double across the marsh, through the brook, and into the timber, whence proceeded the most terrific roar of musketry, and out of which wounded were staggering to the rear until we came to the edge of the fatal wheat-field, where we found the enemy in line. Banks has described his troops on that day as pant- ing for a fight.^ So much is certainly true that our men panted for breath from the speed with which they ran into it. Against the enemy, now in our front, we opened fire with the utmost confidence and with deadly effect, as the increasing gaps in his ranks testified, until, at last, there tore through our lines a tremendous and withering flank volley from the right, two bullets of which stretched me for twenty-four hours on the field, and caused me thereafter to commence a most painful "on to Richmond" on my own account. A most ex- cellent and exhaustive description of this battle is to be found in a paper read by Gen. Gordon before the 2d Mass. Regiment Association. For our purposes this evening it may be thus summarized. A most gallant and spirited, but, to quote a Confeder- ate opinion, rash and meaningless, assault had been 1 3 C.W., 1865, " Miscellaneous," 46. GEN. HALLECK'S ADMINISTRATION. 19 made, under Banks's orders, by our left. Its temporary success was converted by Jackson's reserves into a bloody rejDulse, and tlien it was that we of the right were thrown forward, to be in our turn flanked and over- whelmed. The absurd accusation of delay in going into action, and a failure to obey repeated orders, made by Banks against our brigade, may possibly have been at first made in good faith owing to his own ignorance of our position. But its falsity having been demonstrated, he has not had the manliness to make a public with- drawal. What orders he may think he sent to Gen. Gordon I do not knoAV. The first orders received were delivered in my hearing, and executed as I have de- scribed. But had the advance been simultaneous along the line instead of by piecemeal, first a regiment and then a bri- gade, the inevitable result Avould have been the same, except that we might have inflicted greater loss on the enemy. Jackson outnumbered us far too heavily, — Ms positions were far too strong to allow any hope of more than a temporary success against his first line. Banks's force actually present was only 6,289, and Jackson's 25,000, of all arms. Could we have held our own until nightfall had Jackson advanced on us ? Of this I think there can be no doubt, and such is the opinion of Gen. Roberts, given in the McDowell Court of Inquiry.^ Jackson's troops were fatigued from a long march, and the fury with which our troops charged across the open, against the enemy's selected position, shows with what desperate 1 15 W.R., 185. 20 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. tenacity tliey would have held their own until, to adapt Wellington's phrase, night or Ricketts were come, had positions been reversed. The satisfaction expressed by the men with our position on the right testified to their confidence in their ability to repulse any assault, and gave renewed assurance, if any were needed, that they never would retreat until ordered. Had any man, either by language or conduct, appeared to justify Banks's absurd description of "panting for a fight," I should have set him down for a recruit who had never smelt powder, and the most likely man to set an example of panic when he did smell it. Had Banks's military career commenced with a little of the experience of a line officer in a march- ing regiment, he would have realized that that thirst for combat which causes the political general, like the Script- ure war-horse, to snuff the battle afar off, is apt to get, in the words of the immortal Sawin, " kind o' lodged before it gets as low down as the ranks," and that good fighting by enlisted men is more likely to be the result of dis- cipline than of martial rage or the hope of glory. Indeed, private Sawin very well expresses their state of mind in the next lines to those just quoted : — '* "We git the licks, we're just the grist that's put into war's hoppers, Leftenants is the lowest grade that helps pick up the coppers." Let us here compare, very briefly, the conflicting testi- mony concerning the orders under which Banks was act- ing when he ordered the fatal advance on the left and abandoned the strong position selected for him by Pope's GEK. HALLECK'S ADMINISTRATION. 21 chief of staff. We have, first, Gen. Gordon's testimony that, on meeting Pope immediately after the battle, the latter, in Banks's presence, and in reply to a remark of Gordon's that the battle should not have been fought, replied, " I never ordered it fought, sir," and that Banks was silent. Four days after the battle Pope sends Halleck a long telegraphic report, published in all the papers, and in which, while complimenting Banks and his troops for their gallantry, he states that Banks departed from his order by leaving the position he was ordered to take up, and advancing to attack the enemy, ^ and Banks is silent. In Pope's official report, made in the following January, he repeats this statement very forcibly, that Banks was ordered to take a strong position and hold on until he could be re-enforced ; but that, against the urgent representations of Gen. Roberts, Banks left his strong position, believing that the enemy were not in force, and that he could crush their advance before their main body came up,^ — and Banks is still silent. But, at last, on December 14th, 1864, after testifying before the Congressional Committee in regard to the Red River campaign, he volunteers a statement, in contradic- tion of Pope, in regard to the battle of Cedar Mountain, and in which, from the words of an order, as transcribed by his Adjutant-General, he tries to make it appear that he was ordered to fight the battle of Cedar Mountain as he did fight it.^ That order, as written down in presence of the officer who verbally delivered it, is as follows : — 1 16 W.R., 133-134. 2 lb., 25-28. 3 3C.W., 1865, ''Miscellaneous," 44-46. 22 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. CuLPEPER, 9.45 A.M, August 9, 1862. From Col. Lewis Marshall : — Gen. Banks will move to the front immediately, assume command of all the forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediatelj' as soon as he approaches, and be re-enforced from here.* On his way to the front, under these orders. Banks calls at Pope's headquarters, and from his own lips receives the following: have sent an officer . . . who will desig- nate the ground you are to hold, and will give you any instructions he may deem necessary." Thus by the order received through the staff-officer he is directed what to do '*if the enemy approaches," and is promised re-enforce- ments, while from Pope's own lips he is told that the ground he is to hold will be shown him. The absurdity of supposing it to have been Pope's intention, that from the ground thus selected he should furiously advance por- tions of his command at a time against the selected ground of the enemy, seems self-evident. But this is exactly what he did as soon as it became clear that if he wanted a fight that afternoon he must force it. As late as 1865 no official report of the battle was made by Banks, though often called for by Pope. In his vol- unteered testimony before the committee he tries to make it out that the enemy advanced and commenced the attack, when he was encountered by our troops, who were obliged to fight or retreat. Nothing can be farther from the fact. Confederate testimony in abundance will show that by our furious and utterly unexpected charge their ^3 C.W., 1865, "Miscellaneous," 45. GEN. HALLECK'S ADMIXISTRATIOy. 23 troops were tliroTm into confusion, and for the time routed, and that it needed Jackson's utmost exertions and reserves to turn the tide of battle. As Gen. Gordon says in the paper alluded to : If there had been no reserve to the enemy, and no brigades on Cedar Mountain to rush in and take Prince in flank and rear, and if I had been ordered to move forward simultaneously with my bri- gade as a support, the chances are that we should have whipped Jackson.'' This volunteered testimony of Banks before the com- mittee soon elicited a most crushing reply from Pope, in which, by the evidence of both his staff-offlcers, that of Roberts having been taken before a previous court of in- quiry, he utterly demolishes Banks, and characterizes his attempt to shirk responsibility as it deserves.^ But the secret of Banks's state of mind and impatience for a fight that afternoon is furnished by himself. He was, he says, a little desperate because he thought that Pope thought that he (Banks) didn't want to fight, and this he gathered from the repeated remark of Gen. Roberts that there must be no backino^ out this daA'." - This lanoTiao^e, if used as Banks describes it, was mos": unfortunate, as it was like spurring a too willing horse. AVant of personal bravery, or " stomach for a fight,'' was never Banks's fault, and the backing out which Roberts, in igTLorance of the facts, alluded to, — the retreat to the Potomac, — was reprehen- sible only because too long delayed, because, in Banks's own words, "he feared the opinions of his friends more than the bayonets of his enemies.'' Had Roberts re- frained from stinging Banks with unmerited and, to a 1 3 C.W., 1865, " MisceUaneous," 47-51. 2 jb., 46. 24 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. superior officer, unmilitary, reproach, the latter might have been content to remain in position, and that after- noon's battle of Cedar Mountain would not have been fought. But it was fought, and the effect seems to have been, as we have stated, that of opening Halleck's eyes to the fact that Lee did not propose to wait for him, and he therefore commenced a shower of despatches and orders upon McClellan to hasten him, if possible, in bringing the Army of the Potomac to Pope's rescue. McClellan is told that the enemy is massing to crush Pope ^ — then that he is fighting him ^ — that Pope and Burnside were hard pushed, and required immediate aid^ — that his delay has been unsatisfactory, unexpected, in view of the amount of transportation at his disposal,* and that it must be ex- plained.^ It was not, however, until the 14th that McClel- lan commenced moving his effective troops by land to Fortress Monroe. Porter was in the advance, and is re- ported to have shown a most praiseworthy desire to bring his troops to Pope's rescue in time. He was under orders to halt the advance at Williamsburg until the crossing of the Chickahominy should be complete, but, intercepting there a letter which told him that the enemy were concentrating to crush Pope before he could be re-enforced, he took the responsibility of pressing on, marched sixty miles in three days, and on the 20th his corps had embarked at Newport News. Heintzelman em- barked at Yorktown on the 21st, Franklin at Fortress Monroe on the 22d. Keyes covered the embarkation at Yorktown, but there was no molestation whatever, the 1 12 W.R., 85. 2lb., 86. 3 ib., 92. * lb., 85. ^ lb., 87. GEN. HALLECK'S ADMINISTRATION. 25 enemy being after other game. McClellan himself arrived at Alexandria on the 26th, was put in command of all the forces in and about Washington, and intrusted with the duty of forwarding the much-needed re-enforcements to Pope. As to the manner in which this work was per- formed previous committees of the society have reached opposite conclusions, and the task of reviewing the evi- dence on wliich these contradictory verdicts have been based has been assigned to abler hands than those of your chairman. Without, therefore, anticipating the work of others by an examination of evidence in detail, the writer will simply state that the result of his study thereof has brought his mind to a concurrence in the verdict of con- demnation of Gen. McClellan, and this without having at the present time of writing read or heard either of the previous papers on the subject. That Gen. McClellan honestly believed at the time of making his report Hhat he had really done all in his power to forward re-enforce- ments to Pope without delay may be true, and at the same time such belief be widely divergent from actual fact. There is a state of mind in which a man will per- suade himself into the belief that a mole-hill is a moun- tain; that an obstacle really is insuperable, because he ardently wishes it to be so. Now what was McClellan's state of mind sufficiently appears ; first, by his accusation that Gen. Halle ck, his superior, had done his best to ruin or destroy the Army of the Potomac ; and secondly, while his immediate superior was showering upon him orders for haste, by what seems to the writer nothing less than an 1 August 4, 1863. 12 W.R., 5-105. 26 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. appeal against such orders to the President. "Which shall I do," he says to Lincoln, " devote all energies to opening communication with Pope " (as if he were not under orders to do that very thing), " or leaving Pope to get out of his scrape " (significant words), " turn all our attention to the safety of the capital ? " ^ There does not seem to the writer much room for doubt as to the answer which was desired. Instead of forwarding re-enforce- ments, had McClellan been ordered to march with them, supersede Pope, and take command, the writer cannot but think that he would have thrown away the convex spec- tacles through which he was regarding obstacles, and that the mountain would have quickly dwindled to a mole-hill- Franklin would have marched, ready or not ready, and the vexatious " marking time " been exchanged for a " for- ward double-quick." Had not Gen. Halle ck, on arriving from the West and taking command, every reason to suppose that the with- drawal of the army from the Peninsula would, when ordered, be accomplished in far less time, very far less, than that actually taken ? If so, the reasons for deciding upon the step appear, as he states them, cogent and unanswerable. On this point the opinion of a corps quarter-master, promoted to that position, according to Greeley, for eminent efficiency, — General Victor Le Due, ■ — may throw some light. In his private diary he thus sums up the results of his experience and observation : — " I am confident that there has been gross mismanage- ment in this whole affair. With all the resources that Government places in the hands of officers, the Army of 1 12 W.R., 98. GEN. HALLECK'S ADMINISTRATION. 27 the Potomac should have been transferred from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek or Alexandria, and landed, and in as good condition as when they embarked, all within two weeks. Each corps as a unit should have been embarked and landed by itself, and its transportation have accompanied it ; and with the two wharves at New- port News, inconvenient as they are, three days and nights was ample time in which to put the transportation on shipboard ; three days more would have been occupied in discharging it off and setting it up, and one day in transitu — seven days. Three corps could have shipped at the same time — one at Fortress Monroe, one at New- port News, and one at Yorktown. It has taken in fact nearly one month." ^ Our conclusion, therefore, is briefly this, — that Hal- leck's order of removal was, according to liis lights, a wise one, as he could not have been expected to foresee the manner in which it would be executed. Nor is it well seen how Halleck can be held responsible for the blunders and unfortunate issue of Pope's cam- paign. The latter moved his troops as he chose, the tenor of his instructions from Washington being simply to hold on and fight like the devil until the promised reen- f or cements should arrive. And he did hold on much beyond the time which Halleck assured him would be sufficient. There is a natural disposition to make no allowances for Pope, and to show liim no mercy, for obvious reasons. Had his entrance upon the scene been distinguished by that modesty which characterizes the true soldier, he would have received a lenient judgment, 1 2 Greeley, 171. 28 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. for at the last he was outnumbered, and the promised re- enforcements failed. But he showed none of the qualities of a great general, and had let slip priceless opportunities. Jackson was at one time so compromised that Pope could not fail to see his opportunity for, in his own words, " bag- ging his whole crowd." ^ And he is said to have planned the bagging operation well enough, but, before he could pull the string which was to close the bag's mouth, Jackson was out of it. Pope must also be credited with having acted much more wisely than he wrote or talked. When Lee did advance. Pope certainly did his best to block his way in front, instead of lying off on his flanks and endeavoring to draw him off to the mountains, according to the programme so confidently announced to the com- mittee. When he had reason to think that Jackson's forces before Culpeper greatly outnumbered his own at that point, he very sensibly recalls to Banks's mind the previously scouted idea of taking a strong position and holding it until a concentration could be made. And Banks's rash and meaningless assault was certainly in consonance with the spirit of Pope's general orders, if in violation of his special instructions. Again, after telling the committee how his brave Westerners marched to victory without trousers and with musket locks tied with string, when assigned to command in Virginia his first labors are, as he tells us in his report, directed to sup- plying his troops with much of the material absolutely necessary for troops in the field. And, so far as Halleck is concerned, it should be remembered that Pope had supreme command of the ^ 16 w. R., 72. GEN. EALLECK'S ADMINISTRATIOX. 29 Army of Yirginia for a montb. before the former assumed the command-irL-chief. Nothing is more strikingly in- structive than to note the contrast between the spirit of Pope's general orders on taking command, and that of his official report of the accomplished campaign. By the former, victory is announced as the sure result of a bold advance under his leadership. " Where breathes the foe but flies before us," he seems to say, if you vill only " charge where you see my white plume shine," etc. But Avhile sounding this gallant onset, he was yet, if we are to believe his report, taking the field, after an unsuc- cessful attempt to be relieved, with grave forebodings of the result. 1 How difficult and thankless was liis duty he says every military man will understand. " At no time," he says, could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the immensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was able at any time to outflank me and bear my small army to the dust."- He had learned by this time that his boasted view of the Western rebels' backs was not so much due to his own ao^oTessive policy as to the fact that he had never yet been confronted by the numbers or the generalship of a Lee or Stonewall Jackson. Pope has received generally that harsh judgment which a boaster who fails must expect. As time passes we are comfinced that that judgment will be modified. His abilities may not have been more than mediocre, and yet to ascribe his defeats simply and entirely to his own incapacity seems grossly unjust. I cannot persuade ^C.W., 1865-1866, 2 Supplement, 111. »Ib., 172. 30 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. myself that Porter obeyed him as he should,^ or that McClellan forwarded re-enforcements as he ought, and, this being so, the charge of utter incapacity, so confidently made by their partisans, deserves, in my opinion, the Scotch verdict of "not proven." The foregoing comprises, as stated in the outset, merely the general conclusions to which such study as I have been able to give to the subject of the withdrawal from the Peninsula and Pope's campaign has brought my own mind. It is hoped that nothing of historic value, as bear- ing upon disputed facts, was expected ; for, except in the matter of personal testimony as to the attack at Cedar Mountain, nothing of the sort has been attempted. It should be also kept in mind that the policy of appointing Gen. Halleck, or any General, to direct from Washington the movements of armies in the field has not been our subject, but simply whether, on being so appointed, his order of withdrawal from the Peninsula was a wise one, and whether for subsequent disasters he should be held responsible. On these points our verdict would be in his favor. ^ This was the writer's opinion when this article was written. II. THE CAIMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE IX ^^ROINIA, ITS OBJECTS AXD GEXERAL PLAN. First Paet : to the 19th of August, 1862. By Byt. Lieut.-Col. CHARLES P. HORTON, U.S.V. COMMITTEE. JoHif C. Ropes, Esq. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. Charles P. Hoeton, U.S.V. Bvt. Capt. HonvARD Stocktox, U.S.A. Read before the Society o?i Monday evening, Feb. 12, 1877. GENERAL POPE IN VIEGINIA. the 26tli of June, 1862, the head of Stonewall Jackson's columns reached Ashland, Ya., and he effected a junction with the army of Lee. On the same day the scattered commands, which had been withdrawn at the last moment from the Army of the Potomac, and to whose absence McClellan attributed the failure of his advance on Richmond, were united under one commander. During the preceding thirty days Jackson had had pretty much his own way. Banks had been driven out of the valley of Virginia, after a sharp engagement at Win- chester, with considerable loss of men and material. Fremont, endeavoring to bar the return of Jackson to Richmond, had been defeated at Cross Keys, and had retired again into the mountains whence he came. McDowell's advance having been very roughly handled at Port Republic, he had withdrawn to Fredericksburg, whilst Jackson proceeded to Richmond, having succeeded beyond his hopes. The authorities at Washington were thoroughly panic- stricken, and at last, apparently realized the fact that the 83 34 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. object of the war was not solely to provide popular politi- cal Generals with independent commands. The officer chosen for the command of the Army of Virginia, as the force in front of Washington was now termed, was Maj.-Gen. John Pope. He had served up to this time in the Western Army, where he had gained some reputation in the reduction of Island No. 10, and in the operations before Corinth. To the country he was principally known through an extraordinary despatch of Gen. Halleck, at the time of Beauregard's evacuation of Corinth, in which he was represented as the captor of ten thousand prisoners and of much material of war.^ It is true that the astonished Beauregard promptly denied this story ;2 but, as it was maintained with much force, that, rebellion being the sum of all villanies, the man who would fire on Fort Sumter would not stick at a lie, this denial had little effect, if indeed it ever reached those who were familiar with the original tale. To the President and to the Secretary of War, now greatly alarmed at the failure of their own operations in front of Washington and at the impending retreat of Mc- Clellan, he brought the prestige of success. Ascribing, as they did, the failure of McClellan's campaign to his insist- ance on its conduct on military principles, the advent of an officer of the regular army, who announced that, in his opinion, such talk was all bosh, and such principles suited only to the effete despotisms of Europe, was hailed as a dispensation for which they were inclined partly to credit themselves and partly to thank Providence. » 10 W.R., 774. 2 lb., 764. OBJECTS AXD GEXERAL FLAX. — PART I. 35 It was tlie opinion of Gen. Pope, freely communicated byliimto committees of Congress, and announced in orders of the day, tliat the time had come for the adoption of a tridy American system of warfare. Such traditions of the past as lines of retreat, bases of supplies, positions, maga- zines, etc., which had bothered, more or less, all com- manders from Agamemnon to Gen. Banks, were to be at once discarded. The commonly received trtiths of geometry and arith- metic met with no better acceptance from him. He was by no means disposed to concede that a straight line was the shortest distance between two fixed points : and main- tamed that, whilst two and two might sometimes make fiye, there was no reason why, in this coitntry, they should not on occasion make seven, or even fifteen. As, however, it was impossible for even the inventor of this system to grasp it wholly at once, we shall find Gen. Pope, during his brief command, sometimes apparently affected by his early education at ^Vest Point, and not always carrying out in practice what he preached at the department or in the committee-room. Personally, Gen. Pope was of quick temper, impatient of contradiction, rttde in manner, and gifted with a ^dvid imagination. With such a commander it was evident that the experi- ment of war on a large scale was to be tried in Virginia under new conditions indeed. The corps, to the command of which this officer was assigned, were, on the 26th of June, those of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, and the forces within the immedi- 36 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. ate defences of Washington, which consisted of only a few thousand men, principally heavy artillery and three months' troops.^ Gen. Fremont, disgusted at the appointment of a junior officer to a command which he considered properly his own, promptly resigned.^ To him succeeded Gen. Sigel, a German,3who stated that he had seen some service in the rebellion of '48, and had held a command west of the Mississi]Dpi since early in 1861, where he had acquired a certain newspaper reputation. It was thought that his appointment would conciliate the Germans and promote enlistments ; though why intel- ligent Germans should wish to " fight mit Sigel," when they could fight with any one else, remains a mystery. He was an officer of little capacity or experience, but of unbounded conceit, and extremely jealous of his supe- riors and equals in rank. During the cam2Daign he did his best, by neglect and disobedience of orders, to ruin such chances of success as there may have been. It is impossible, after the lapse of nearly fifteen years, to read without wonder and indignation the official reports of his conduct throughout the campaign, and to remember that at this time the fortunes of the country and the lives of its soldiers were intrusted to such a one without special remark or protest. His corps, originally formed on the nucleus of Blenker's division, was composed, at this time, principally of Ger- mans; its division and brigade commanders were almost all foreigners, with two noted exceptions, Schenck and Milroy. The troops were not remarkable for either drill > 15 W.R., 169. 2 18 W.R., 437. ^ lb., 444. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN— PART L 37 or discipline, and during tliis campaign were not very ser- viceable in tlie field against tlie enemy, tliougli terrible to the country through which they passed. They numbered about 10,500 infantry and 950 artillery.^ Gen. Banks, who commanded the Second Corps, had given evidence of such military ability as Governor of Massachusetts and as Speaker of the Xational House of Representatives, that, on the breaking out of hostilities, he was appointed a Major-General of volunteers, and, on the retirement of Patterson, was assigned to the command of the troops at and near Harper's Ferry. Although he had not received a military education, and had not acquired by service in lower grades the experience wliich might have supplied that want, he assumed this command, as he would have that of the Army of the United States, with perfect assurance. He had strong martial tastes ; that is, he was fond of music, of blue cloth and brass buttons, and delighted to appear well mounted at the head of his command; -Such was his ardor, that, at a species of sham-fight that took place shortly after Pope assumed command, he was with difficulty restrained by his staff from charg- ing one of his infantry squares at the head of his cav- alry escort. He was extremely ambitious, and the key to much that would otherwise be inexplicable in his conduct may be found in his remark to one of his general officers, when in the valley of Virginia he was preparing to attack Jackson who had about seven times his force : " The public are more remorseless than the rebels ; we have more to fear 1 18 W.R., 523; C.W., 2 Supplement, 118. 88 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. from the opinions of our friends than from the bayonets of the enemy." Had he entered the army as a line officer, nnder a strict colonel, he would, probably, eventually, have become a good regimental commander. As it was, his undoubted personal bravery, a certain military bearing, and a sonorous voice, with an owl-like appearance of wisdom, enabled him to impose himself on the country as a heaven-born General. At this time his military experience had been confined to the conduct of the campaign against Jackson in the valley of the Shenandoah, which had ended in disaster, only prevented from becoming disgrace by the steadiness of his troops and the ability of one of his subordinate commanders, whom he never forgave. His corps con- sisted of the divisions of Williams and Augur, and numbered on the 31st of July, according to his report,^ — Infantry. . . . . . 13,343 Artillery 1,224 Total 14,56T Pope, basing his ideas on the report of the force actually carried into action at Cedar Mountain by Banks, states that the real strength of the corps was only 8,000 men ;2and this statement, often repeated in his official report of his campaign, has misled even so careful a historian as the Comte de Paris, who ascribes the error to the inefficiency of the Adjutant-General's department at this time. The » C.W., 2 Supplement, 117, 118 ; cf. 16 W.R., 12 and 53. 2 2 Comte de Paris, 256. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN— PART L 39 figures were, however, probably about correct at the date when given, and Pope under-estimates the strength of this corps throughout. It is true that at Cedar Mountain Banks carried into action only about 6,300 infantry and artillery; but at this time more than one-half liis force was absent on various service. Of Greene's brigade of Augur's division, less than 500 men were present ; one regiment was at Sulphur Springs, one at Rappahannock Station, one with the trains of the army, and five com- panies on the Alexandria railroad. From Geary's brigade, of the same division, a detachment of about 1,000 men had been sent to Pony Mountain, wliilst a force of about 3,500 infantry and artillery was detached to Front Royal. If to these detachments are added the extra and daily duty men, and the sick between July 31 and August 9, it appears that the discrepancy that so puzzled Pope is accounted for, and that Banks's report was substantially correct. It is difficult to understand how Banks could have imagined liis force so much larger than it was, as the daily field returns, if he took the trouble to examine them, showed the exact number present with the colors for duty each day. Both Pope and Banks saw the corps, with the exception of Crawford's brigade, march out of Culpeper on the 9th of August, and ought to have been able to tell the difference between 6,000 and 12,000 men. The troops of this command had, for the most part, been in long service, and had had considerable experience in marching and fighting in the Shenandoah valley. They were in excellent state of efficiency, and were gen- erally well commanded. 40 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. The Third Corps was commanded by Gen. McDowell. Its two divisions were commanded by Gens. Ricketts and King, and were well drilled and disciplined. Its num- bers consisted on July 31 of 17,604 infantry and 971 artillery.-^ To it was later added a small force under Gen. Sturgis, brought from the defences of Washington. The total of Pope's command on the 31st of July was then as follows : — 2 First Corps 11,498 Second " 14,567 Third " 18,575 Infantry and artillery .... 44,640 There was also a considerable force of cavalry, not then united in one command, but attached to the different corps, and reporting a total of 8,738 ; of whom Pope says 3,000 were unfit for service,"^ probably dismounted. This gives the total of infantry, artillery, and cavalry at 53,378.* It was the intention of the Government that with this force Pope should cover Washington, assure the safety of the valley of the Shenandoah, and so operate upon the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gor- donsville and Charlottesville, as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations of the Army of the Potomac against that city.^ Pope's first object was the concentration of his scattered » 16 W.E., 53. 2 lb., and 18 W.R., 523; C.W., 2 Supplement, 118. 3 16 W.R., 53, and C.W., 2 Supplement, 118. ^ lb. ^ C.W., 2 Supplement, 110. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN— PART L 41 forces. Rightly conceiving that no considerable force of the enemy would enter the valley of the Shenandoah whilst his forces were so disposed as to be able to in- tercept its retreat and fall upon its rear, he ordered Banks and Sigel to cross the Blue Ridge, and to take post at and near Sperryville.^ Ricketts, who with one division of McDowell's corps had been stationed at Manassas Junction, was ordered up to Waterloo Bridge, where the road from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the upper Rappahannock. King's division of this corps was left at Fredericksburg to cover the raiboad to Acquia Creek and the Quarter- master's depot at that point. Pope's force was by no means large enough to divide in the face of the enemy, and this separation was entirely against his judgment. It was, however, insisted upon by the authorities at Washington, who desired to have a finger in every pie, and who had not yet been forced by a long series of disasters and an aroused public opinion to leave the command of troops in the field to the General they had themselves selected and who was responsible for the conduct of operations. The force detached was out of all proportion to the object in view. The depot at Acquia Creek might have been easily defended by a trifling force, with the aid of a couple of gun-boats, and the railroad to Fredericksburg abandoned ; if it should be at any time required for use, it could have been entirely rebuilt in about two days. However, at a time when imperative necessity demanded the immediate concentration of all Pope's forces, the strong- ^ Pope's official report of his military services, July, 1861, to Novem- ber, 1865, is to be found in Report on the Conduct of the War, Supple- ment, Yol. 2. The account of the Virginia Campaign of 1862 is comprised in pages 101-190. This contains the Report of -Tanuary 27, 1863, printed in 16 W.R., 20-87, Avith addition' 42 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. est division then in the army was needlessly separated from him by more than two days' march. Whilst this semi-concentration of forces was in progress, Major-Gen. Halle ck was called from the West to the com- mand of the armies of the United States, and a new ele- ment of confusion was introduced into the conduct of the campaign in Virginia. Since the arrival of Pope at Washington the state of a:ffairs in Virginia had materially changed. Gen. McClel- lan, having abandoned his attack on Richmond, had fallen back to the James River at Harrison's Landing, where, having now plenty of leisure, he was occupied in writing letters of advice to the President on the conduct of mili- tary and political affairs, and on such other matters as he considered of general interest.-"- It then became a question whether the Army of the Peninsula should be reinforced by the Army of Virginia, or whether both should be united in front of Washington. The President having finished the perusal of Gen. McClellan's first letter of instructions to him, was not long in making up his mind which course to pursue. It was decided to withdraw from the Peninsula, and to unite both armies under Pope. This decision was, how- ever, carefully concealed from McClellan, who was amused with promises of reinforcements with which he proposed to seize Petersburg and to commence operations on the line afterwards adopted by Grant. On the 10th of July, Pope ordered Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps forward from Little Washington to Cul- peper Court-House. » 12 W.R., 73. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN. — PART L 43 On the 14tli, having in his own words " spent two weeks in learning the whereabouts of his army," and finding where letters would reach them, he issued a general order assuming command, which for want of tact and judgment, and for bad taste, probably stands alone in military history. In it he announced his peculiar theory of warfare, to wliich allusion has already been made, bragged of what he had done and of what he would do, and sneered at the officers and men with whom he was to conduct the campaign.^ This was shortly followed by another, directing the troops under his command to sub- sist on the country, — as far as practicable, — probably is- sued in deference to the loud outcries of many patriots at "Washington who complained that the troops who should be employed in fighting the enemy were occupied in guarding the barns and hen-roosts of unrepentant rebels.^ It is true that Pope complains that this order has been misconstrued, 2 and that the pigs and chickens which were shot at sight should have waited imtil they were ^' called in in a regular way ; but, when considered in connec- tion with other orders directing that all male inhabitants should immediately take the oath of allegiance under pain of being sent across the lines ;^ that those witliin five miles of any interruption of military railroads or telegraphs, or of any house from wliich soldiers were fired on should be tried by coui*t-martial,^ with other orders of about the same date, and the known sentiments of the commander-in- chief, — it is not strange that the opinion should have pre- vailed in the army that a rebel had no property wliich a soldier was bound to respect. ^ 18 "W.R., 473. 2 W.R., 50. ^ jb., 23. 44 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, It has been maintained by some that these flaming orders should not be construed literally, as directions for the conduct of a campaign, but that they were intended simply to frighten the enemy, and to fill the place of the gongs, painted shields, and cannon crackers which have long been successfully employed in Chinese warfare. Others have regarded them as the lashings of the tail of the tiger with which he excites himself before springing on his prey ; but, unfortunately, neither of these interpreta- tions occurred to the soldiers of his army, by whom they were received with amazement, not unmixed with terror. As for the enemy, they didn't scare worth a cent, but retaliated by orders declaring Pope's officers not entitled to the treatment of prisoners of war; the execution of which caused for a time considerable suffering to those who were unfortunate enough to fall into the hands of the enemy. On the 14th of July Hatch, with Banks's cavalry, was ordered to proceed to Gordonsville and to break up the railroad. Pope complains bitterly that Hatch was too slow in his movements, and that his failure had important results ;^ but, as Jackson reached Gordonsville on the 16th, it is not probable that much could have been accom- plished. On the 16th, Hatch having failed to obey the orders of Pope to cross the Blue Ridge and cut the rail- road west of Gordonsville, he was at once relieved, and Brig.-Gen. John Buford assigned to command of Banks's cavalry force. ^ Shortly before this time some cavalry expeditions, 1 16 W.R., 24. 2 18 W.R., 514. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN — PART L 45 pushed out from Fredericksburg, had reached the railroad from Richmond to Gordonsyille, and effected some slight damage to it. Meantime, Lee, uncertain as yet from which side attack was to come, retained Hill and Longstreet at Richmond ; but, fearing a seizure of Gordonsville by Pope, despatched thither, on the 13th, ^ Jackson, with the divisions of Win- der and Ewell, the latter reaching that point on the 16th. Jackson did not feel himself strong enough to take the offensive, and asked for re-enforcements. On the 2Tth, Lee, inclining to think that the main moA^ement of the Union army would be against Gordons- ville, detached A. P. Hill to that point, ^ where he arrived on the 2d of August. On the 29th of July Pope, who states in liis report that he had for some time desired to follow the advice of Mr. Greeley and proceed to the West, at last left Washington, and, after reviewing the various divisions of his army, arrived on the 8th of August at Culpeper Court-House, where Crawford with his brigade of Banks's corps had been stationed for some time, and where Ricketts had arrived on the Tth.^ During this time his commanding officers first met him ; and while personal acquaintance did not increase their respect for his ability, or remove the unfavorable impres- sion created by his proclamations, the rouglmess of his manners — to say the least — produced an unfortunate effect. On the 7th of August Banks came up to Hazel River, from which on the 8th he was ordered forward to Cul- 1 18 W.R., 915. .. 2 ib^^ 913^ 919^ s iq y^.^., 24, 25. 46 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. peper.^ Sigel, still at Sperryville, was also ordered to Culpeper on the 8th f but, being unable to decide between the merits of two parallel roads, and equally attracted in either direction, remained like the ass between two bundles of hay, in a state of perfect rest. Crawford was ordered forward and took post at Cedar Mountain, about seven miles in front of Culpeper.^ Whilst these movements were in progress to the north of the Rapidan, Lee, having, on the 5th of August, learned from Col. Mosby, an exchanged prisoner who had casually remarked the fact when passing Fortress Monroe, that Burnside was proceeding up the Potomac, came to the conclusion that nothing more was to be feared from McClellan, and ordered Jackson to strike Pope before Burnside could join him.* Jackson moved at once with the divisions of Ewell, Winder, and A. P. Hill, and Rob- ertson's cavalry brigade, in all about 30,000 men, reaching the Rapidan on the night of the 7th and crossing on the 8th. On the morning of the 9th the position of the opposing forces was as follows ; — Jackson, having passed the Rapidan, was advancing on Culpeper, — the cavalry of Pope's command under Bu- ford and Bayard falling back before him. At Cedar Mountain was Crawford with one brigade ; about two and one-half miles in his rear was Ricketts with his division of McDowell. Banks was at Culpeper; and Sigel, reluctantly dragged from Sperryville, was at Hazel River. King was still at Fredericksburg. The forces present and available for action at and near > 16 W.R., 24, 25. 2 ib^^ 25. ^ ib, 4 13 y^,^,^ 926. OBJECTS AXD GEXERAL FLAX.— PART I. 47 Ciilpeper, on eitlier side, Tvere about equal in numbers, Pope ha^ung the advantage of position. About ten o'clock, on tlie morning of the 9th, Pope ordered Banks forvrard to Cedar Mountain, directing him. as he says in his official report, to take up a strong posi- tion ... to check the advance of the enemy, and to determine his forces and the character of his movements "as far as practicable."'^ It is possible that this may have been the order that Gen. Pope intended to give : but, if so, it vras strangely transmogrified when it reached Banks through Col. Marshall. Pope's Aide-de-camp. Delivered verbally by him, and taken dovn on the spot by Banks's Adjutant-General, it read as follows : — - CuLPEPEE. 9.45 A.M.. Ang-nst 9. 1862. General Banks to move to the front immediately, assume command of all the forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediately as soon as he approaches, and be re-enforced from here. Banks moved vrith promptness and celerity, though the day vas intensely hot and the road ankle-deep with dust, so that many of his men fell from exhaustion or sun- stroke. Arriving at the position held by Cravrford. he deployed into line, and found himself facing the advance of Jackson, who, ha^dng been skirmishing with the cavalry of Bayard all the morning, was then arriving at Cedar ^ 16 W.R., 25. - This version of the order varies from that, said to be the original submitted bv Banks to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, printed in 3 C. "VT.. ISGo. ^vliscellaneons. 45. 48 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Mountain. The position was a strong one against direct attack, and could doubtless have been held by Banks until all the forces under command of Pope were concentrated on the field, when the result of the action would not have been doubtful. Nothing, however, was further from the mind of the intrepid Banks. After an artillery duel which lasted for about two hours, and in which Winder was killed, he descended from the strong position he occupied and ad- vanced to the attack of an enemy already advancing to attack him. Banks attempts to justify this course by the order, already quoted, received from Pope before he left Cul- peper;! whilst Pope maintains that his staff-officer. Gen. B. S. Roberts, repeatedly explained his intentions to Banks and urged him to remain in position. ^ This assertion of Pope is denied by Banks, who repre- sents Roberts as " nagging " him, and rather urging him on f and this, indeed, was generally believed in Banks's corps at the tim_e of the battle. It is somewhat difficult to decide exactly the truth of these conflicting tales ; but the probabilty is that Banks, believing that he had only Jackson's advance in front, desired to gather for himself some of those laurels which had not fallen to his share in the valley of the Shenandoah. He felt himself on trial in his first field under a conmiander who " had come from the West where he had only seen the backs of his enemies ; " * he discarded all idea of a line of retreat, and remembered only what he had read and treasured up but a few days before, — that " the strongest position was that from » 3 C.W., 1865, Miscellaneous, 45-46. ^ lb., 46. 2 lb., 48. 18 W.R., 474. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN. — PART L 49 wMch tlie soldier could most easily advance upon the enemy." ^ It is to be feared tliat these sentiments were shared to some extent by Gen. Roberts, whose language at the time was probably not quite what he afterwards remembered it to have been, and that certain remarks of his, several times repeated, about no backing out here to-day," ^ and a certain expressive shrugging of the shoulders, were inter- preted by Banks as an encouragement in his course. So he cheerfully prepared to renew at Cedar Mountain the tactics of Winchester, when, with 4,000 men he had given battle to 25,000, and with less than 6,500 men advanced to attack 30,000. So impetuous was his attack that for a time he suc- ceeded in driving back the enemy and almost creating a panic in their ranks. Southern historians represent that on the narrow front of a mile and a half, the Federals brought up 30,000 men to attack Jackson. But the result could not long be doubtful. Hill, arriving on the field, took in flank and rear the right of Banks's command, whilst Ewell advanced against the left. Outnumbered five to one, these troops, whose conduct in action had extorted the admiration of the enemy, fell back to the ridge from which they had advanced, and then slowly retired across Cedar Run without molestation. One gun, mired at the recrossing of Cedar Run, and thrown from its carriage, remained in the enemy's hands, his sole trophy of the action. Passing through a narrow belt of woods to the rear of Cedar Run, the retreating forces came upon a plain crowded with masses of infantry » 18 W.R., 474. ' 3 C.W., 1865, 46. 50 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN: and artillery. Pope had arrived upon the field, bringing with him the division of Ricketts, which had lain inactive through the long summer afternoon, two miles or so from the field, in sight and hearing of every shot and shell. Sigel, reluctantly moving from Sperryville, had at last early in the afternoon reached Culpeper, but, reporting that his men were tired and had consequently eaten up the three days' rations they were supposed to have in their haversacks, a further delay took place whilst rations obtained from McDowell's train were cooked and distributed to his men. But at last he too was up, and, it now being quite dark, with no prospect of further fighting that evening, might be heard for a considerable distance swearing strange outlandish oaths at what was left on the field of the unfortunate corps of Banks. The battle was over, and, except for a few cannon-shots, the night passed in comparative quiet. The results of the first battle of the campaign had been most disastrous. Of a force of about 6,300 men carried into action. Banks had lost 1,661 killed and wounded, and 732 were reported missing ; but of these many lay dead on the field or mortally wounded in the hands of the enemy. The loss in officers was almost unprecedented. In the First Division one regiment — the Second Massachusetts — lost 13 officers killed and wounded, and one a prisoner, two- thirds of those engaged. In the Second Division, Gen- erals Augur and Geary were severely wounded, and Prince a prisoner. Brigades were commanded by lieutenant- colonels, regiments by lieutenants, and companies by corporals. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN. — PART L 51 The enemy admitted a loss of about 1,300 killed and wounded, and a few prisoners, mostly taken during the night of the 9th. The responsibility for this most unfortunate affair must rest principally with Gen. Banks. There is no probability that Pope ever contemplated the battle. It is unfortunate that so important an order as that sent to Banks by Pope on the morning of the 9th was not communicated in writ- ing, but intrusted to the rather hazy recollection of a staff- officer. At this time, considering the officer with whom he was dealing, a little of the exceedingly plain language he was accustomed to use when speaking to and of his officers would not have been misplaced. Gen. Banks was not an officer to whose discretion much could be left. It is probable that Pope supposed that the movement of Jackson was simply a reconnoissance in force, as ap- appears from his despatches of the 8th, and that Banks, with the 14,000 men he supposed him to have in his com- mand, would be able to resist its further advance until reenforcements could be brought up, even should it be supported by the whole force of the enemy. It is un- fortunate also, when so much depended on the successful opening of the campaign, that Gen. Pope did not go forward at least to the position of Ricketts's division. Had he done so, Jackson would probably either have been defeated that afternoon, or have withdrawn without a battle across the Rapidan. Banks's reports from the field, however, confirmed Pope in his idea that no very heavy force of the enemy was in his front, and it was not until late in the afternoon that 52 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. the roar of battle summoned him from Culpeper, too late to change the fate of the day. As for the tactical conduct of the action it is only nec- essary to say that Gen. Banks did not know what troops he had on the field, nor where they were, nor what they were doing. He ascribed his failure to every cause but the right one, — his own utter incapacity. The conduct of his troops was worthy of all praise, and this was freely bestowed upon them by Pope in an order in which he claimed the Yictory,Hhough in his official re- port he states that a considerable number of Banks's com- mand fled to such a distance that they never came back? This, like a good many other tilings in this report, is quite untrue ; the story is probably founded on the curious case of a regiment which during this campaign deserted, to a man, — colonel, colors, band and baggage, — and was after many months accidentally discovered, haj^pily re- united within the defences of Washington, where the colonel was provost marshal and the regiment his guard. Two days after the battle Pope, having been joined by King from Fredericksburg, moved forward to the Rapidan, behind which Jackson had already retired. On the 14th came Reno with 8,000 men of Burnside's corps. By this time, however, Lee, relieved of all anxiety on the side of the Peninsula, was pressing forward his whole army, with the exception of D. H. Hill's command, to Gordonsville, of which Pope was apprised on the 16th by an intercepted letter.^ Pope, on the 18th, therefore, fell back from the Rapidan to the Rappahannock, and on the 19th the whole of his army had repassed that stream, with » 16 W.R., 135. 2 lb., 28. ^ n,., 29. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN.— PART L 53 the exception of tlie cavalry, wlio were left to watch the movements of the enemy. Reno was on the left at Kelly's Ford, Banks and Mc- Dowell at Rappahannock Station, and Sigel on the right at Sulphur Springs. The new General had commenced liis campaign by a retreat, which, in the words of the Comte de Paris, " al- though a necessary manoeuvre in his situation, nevertheless promptly belied the promises contained in his general orders."^ 1 2 Comte de Paris, 266, III. THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE IN VIRGINIA: ITS OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN. Second Part: to the 28th of August, 1862. By JOHN C. ECPES, Esq. COMMITTEE, John C. Eopes, Esq. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. Charles P. Horton, U.S.V. Bvt. Capt. Howard Stockton, U.S.A. Read hefore the Society on Monday evening, Feh. 12, 1877. The following is a list of the published writings by Mr. Ropes, concerning; the Civil War : — Life of James Amory Perkins. In Harvard Memorial Biographies. 1866. Vol. 1, pp. 395 to 403. The Army under Pope. Campaigns of the Civil War. IV. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1881. A Few Words about Secession. Harvard Monthly, May, 1887. Memoir of Charles Devens. [In] General Devens' Orations and Ad- dresses. Boston : Little, Brown & Co. 1891. The Story of the Civil War: A Concise Account of the War in the United States of America between 1861 and 1865. Part I. To the Opening of the Campaign of 1862. New York : George P. Putnam's Sons. 1894. See List of Papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachu- setts at the end of this volume. GENERAL POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIEGINIA. ENERAL POPE, once behind the Rappahannock, was ordered to hold the line of that river as long as he possibly could. ^ It was already the 19th of August. McClellan had started on the 14th from Harrison's Land- ing, and it was confidently expected that in a very few days the bulk of the Army of the Potomac would be for- warded from Acquia Creek by the line of the Rappahan- nock, and from Alexandria on the railroad, to fight under the command of an officer who had a popular reputation for more ability and enterprise than McClellan was sup- posed to possess. On the 20th Lee brought up his main army, and occu- pied the next two days in vainly endeavoring to force the passage of the river at various points, but particularly near Rappahannock Station, where a successful battle would have deprived Pope's army of the railroad. Fail- ing in this, he naturally drew off towards his left, higher up the river, no doubt with the idea that Pope, who would feel himself compelled to hold the railroad, would not be able to detach to the northward sufficient force to prevent his crossing in the neighborhood of Sulphur » 16 W.R., 56, 57 ; 18 W.R., 591, 593. 58 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, Springs and Waterloo. His plan evidently was the same as that followed by him in the fall of 1863, when he crossed at Sulphur Springs, and, by a movement directed thence on the Warrenton pike, and also with a view of seizing the railroad between Warrenton Junction and Manassas Junction, forced Gen. Meade to retreat. And there was apparently for a time no reason why this attempt should not have been successful. Pope himself expected that the crossing would be made; but with characteristic boldness, for he certainly was not a timid General, he was prepared either to move rapidly to the northward and throw his whole army against the force which had crossed, or, if it sholild look more promising, to cross himself and attack the remainder of the enemy on the further side. And when, on the 22d, the advance of Jackson's corps actually did cross. Pope, getting from Halleck his approval of the latter course, gave the neces- sary orders for crossing at Rappahannock Station.^ We can only stop for a moment to speak of this project, and to say that, though it possessed the merit of being bold and unexpected, it can hardly be defended on sound prin- ciples. To cross a river liable to sudden freshets, with a powerful force moving on the line of communication, is, of course, a hazardous operation. It is true Pope might have gained a battle ; but, had Jackson gone straight on, leav- ing Lee to take care of himself, and seized the railroad in Pope's rear (as he unquestionably would have done). Pope must soon have retreated, and might have found himself in a very serious situation, without stores or muni- tions of war. 1 16 W.R., 59. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN — PART IL 59 But tlie sudden freshet on the night of the 22d put an end to the projects of both commanders for crossing the river ; and though Lee wasted some two or three days in waiting for the subsiding of the waters, he was glad enough, when Ewell was able, by re crossing at Sulphur Springs, to extricate himself from a perilous position. Tired of waiting, or, more probably, seeing the impor- tance of doing something before the Army of the Potomac should have come up to Pope's assistance, Lee now deter- mined on a project as rash as it was unprecedented. Jackson, with three divisions under Hill, Ewell, and Tali- aferro, was detached from the main army, and on the morning of the 25th he began his famous flank movement, by way of Orleans, Salem, White Plains, and Thorough- fare Gap, upon Gainesville and Manassas Junction ; the larger portion of Lee's army remaining on the Rappahan- nock, opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, to detain Pope until Jackson should have seized liis depot of sup- plies at the Junction, or at any rate should have advanced far enough on his mission to get a good start on his antagonist. Jackson's movement was known at once to our army; Col. Clark sent word of it to Banks early on the morn- ing of the 25th. ^ Its object could, of course, only be conjectured ; but it was perfectly manifest that the com- munications of the army might be cut by a force moving through Thoroughfare Gap ; and Pope himself, venture- some as he was, never intended to permit this. (See his despatch to McDowell, of August 27, 5,30 1 18 W.R., 654-655. 60 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. A.M., in which he proposes to occupy Gainesville, to secure his communications with Alexandria.) ^ He at once determined to cease guarding the lower fords of the Rappahannock River, thereby giving up the line of communications on which Porter and Heintzelman, who had joined him, had hitherto depended for their sup- plies ; and this was wise, as far as it went. But he did nothing to secure the threatened points, — the Gap, Gainesville, and the Junction, — save to write to Halle ck to push forward the troops arriving from the Army of the Potomac upon those places. 2 This, he persuaded himself, would be sufficient, for reports were reaching him con- stantly of arrivals and expected arrivals of troops, and he flattered himself that he could safely rely on a sufficient force being pushed forward to secure his communications. The fact was, he disliked the idea of retreating ; he had ostentatiously, at the outset of his campaign, cast odium on the idea of its ever being necessary to retreat for the purpose of covering one's base of supplies ; and, though he was altogether too able a man to believe in any such nonsense as this, and too good a soldier not to eat his own words and act on sound principles when it came to the point, he persuaded himself that things had not yet come to this pass. He ought to have known then, — and he afterwards learned the lesson by bitter experience, — how unmilitary a thing it is for a General to rely on the action of officers whom he does not at the moment command ; and he knew that Cox, and Franklin, and Sumner had not yet reported for duty. Sound common-sense should have brought him to Manassas Junction, Gainesville, and » 16 W.R., 35, 352. 2 X8 W.R., 684. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN.— PART IL 61 the Gap on the 26th. But he could not brmg himself to this so soon ; he thought, probably, that, if he should fall back so precipitately, he might find, on arriving at the points mentioned, that they were already occupied by troops from the Army of the Potomac, and then people would accuse him of unnecessary timidity. Besides, it was, perhaps, the most likely supposition that Jackson might be marching directly on Warrenton from Salem and White Plains, in wliich case his dispositions would be sufficient. Therefore he satisfied himself with concen- trating the bulk of his army near Warrenton, where, on the morning of the 26th, were McDowelhs two divisions, Eeynolds's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, Reno's division of the Xinth Corps, and Sigehs two divisions. Even now he was not certain of his plans. He was a man subject to sudden and violent changes of opinion. His orders were often perplexing, and even contradictory. For instance, Sigel, whose performances, under the clearest orders, were generally open to criticism, ha^dng spent the whole day of the 25th in the neighborhood of Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, trying to find out what he was expected to do, in the state of mind natural to a corps- commander who finds the corps supporting him moving away without a word of explanation, and having finally got a welcome order from Pope, directing him to march to Warrenton, and having marched all the evening and got there at 2 o'clock in the morning, received on his arrival an order from Pope directing him to cross Water- loo Bridge at daylight!^ These unexpected and appar- ently capricious changes of mind shook the confidence of 1 16 W.R., 67. 62 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, his officers in his comprehension of the situation, and this, as we shall see, exercised a most injurious effect on the results of the campaign. As for the rest of his army ; — Banks with two divis- ions was at Fayetteville, Porter at Bealton, also with two divisions, and Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearny, was at Warrenton Junction. From Manassas Junction to the Gap there was, so far as we know, not a regiment except the guard at the depot of supplies. In this position Pope's army lay all the 26th. But Jackson, passing the night of the 25th at Salem, marched through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gaines- ville, and reached Bristoe Station at 6 o'clock on the evening of the 26th, without opposition. There was no Cox, no Franklin, no Sumner in his way, and it was not his plan to disturb the security of the Army of Virginia, which was quietly passing this summer's day within fifteen miles of his line of march in total oblivion of him and his movements. And now comes the most interesting part of the cam- paign. Pope, on the morning of the 27th, having learned that the enemy had cut the railroad at Bristoe Station, but believing then that the main body of Jackson's corps could not have got through the Gap, or, at least, that it would be passing through Gainesville that day, ordered a general concentration of the army on Gainesville.^ McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds were to go straight to Gainesville, and Heintzelman and Reno to Greenwich, a village close by, and on the road leading from Catlett's » 16 W.R., 70. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN— PART IL 63 Station to Haymarket and the Gap. Banks was to look after the trains on the raiboad, and cover their moye- ment towards Manassas Junction. Porter, also, on the arrival of Banks at Warrenton Junction, was to move to Greenwich to support Heintzelman and Reno. These movements were mostly carried out ; McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds reached Buckland Mills, in the vicin- ity of Gainesville, on the evening of the 2Tth; it was owing to Sigel's slowness that no more progress was made. Kearny was at Greenwich ; so was Reno. Hooker's divis- ion of Heintzelman's corps had been directed to march along the railroad towards Manassas Junction, and had engaged Ewell and driven him, after a brisk action. Por- ter was at Warrenton Junction. Banks was still in the rear, near Bealton Station. After all, nothing could be much better than the posi- tion of Pope's army on that evening. He had six divis- ions pretty near the point on wliich Lee must march if he would connect with Jackson ; two more divisions were within supporting distance. Hooker and the two di^ds- ions of Porter could move on Manassas in the morning ; Banks could be up during the next day certainly. These dispositions, wliich Swinton calls " not only cor- rect," but brilliant,"^ and of which the Comte de Paris approves,^ were not, however, as we feel bound to state, made with the intention of interposing a force between Lee and Jackson, but simply with the object, as before stated, of attacking Jackson on his march from the Gap to Manassas ; for when, on the night of the 27th, Pope had become convinced " ^ that Jackson's whole force was south 1 SAvinton, 179. ^2 Comte de Paris, 279 et seq. 3 C.W. 2 Suppt., 144; 16 W.R., 36. 64 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. of the Warrenton pike, and in the neighborhood of the Junction, he made a totally different disposition of his army, showing, as it seems to me, that his previous dispo- sitions were mainly intended (as I have said) to prevent this movement of Jackson's towards the neighborhood of the Junction, and were ordered, when he supposed that it was only Jackson's advanced guard that had reached Manassas, and that, by concentrating at Gainesville, he (Pope) could still prevent Jackson's whole force from passing to the south of the Warrenton turnpike. When, however, he found he had been too late for this, and that Jackson's whole force was in the neighborhood of the Junction, and he bethought himself of what Jack- son's object really was, he conceived the idea that Jack- son would attempt to turn to the south and west, and, passing to the south of the railroad, would fall upon our trains under Banks. This opinion Gen. McDowell also shared ; ^ and although the Comte de Paris treats the idea as absurd,^ and though Swinton does not deign to mention it at all, — thereby leaving his readers very much in the dark as to Pope's real plans, — it must be confessed that such an idea, though at first sight extremely unlikely, was not by any means an impossible supposi- tion, when applied to the probable future conduct of an officer like Jackson. Pope, then, with his customary impetuosity, and his usual carelessness as to the possibility of his troops accom- plishing precisely what he had ordered, directed, on the night of the 27th, that McDowell with his whole force U-5 W.R., 316. 2 2 Comte de Paris, 281. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN. ^ PART IL 65 should marcli at daylight on the 28th from Gainesville to Manassas, "resting his right on the Manassas Gap Rail- road, and throwing his left well to the east." ^ He also ordered Kearny and Reno from Greenwich to Manassas, and Porter from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe. And he made not the least provision for the holding of Gaines- ville or of the Gap. What would have been the result of these movements had they all been strictly carried out, and had Jackson turned Pope's right and attacked his trains, we need not stop to inquire. Perhaps Porter and Banks would have defended themselves until the rest of the army had come up. But Jackson took the other horn of the dilemma. Having refreshed his army with our supplies, and destroyed the remainder, he marched off at mid- night, or soon after, of the 27th, A. P. Hill going at 1 A.M. to Centreville,^ Taliaferro to the north of the pike by the Sudley Springs road, halting, as he says, at day- light on the old battle-field of Bull Run ; ^ and Ewell, who brought up the rear, bivouacking between Manassas and Bull Run, but at dawn crossing at Blackburn's Ford, and thence, after recrossing at the Stone Bridge, moving north of the Warrenton pike to the same old battle-field.^ It is plain that Gen. Pope, when he says that, if the whole force of McDowell had moved forward as directed, — i.e., '* resting their right on the railroad, with their left thrown well to the east," and at the time specified, i.e., at daylight,"^ — they would have intercepted Jackson's UeW.E., 36. 2 lb., 670. ^ lb., 656. ^Ib.. 710. 5 lb., 37. 66 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. retreat towards Centreville by 8 o'clock in tlie morning, and that it would not have been possible for Jackson to have crossed Bull Run, is in error. The nearest place to Jackson's force occupied by McDowell's troops at daybreak on the 28th was Gainesville; and, had they remained there until Jackson's whereabouts was defi- nitely discovered, it would have been far better for them. Still, it must be remembered that Jackson's expedition in evacuating the neighborhood of Manassas Junction was, perhaps, extraordinary, and that had he not re- treated with so much promptness, and had Pope's orders been strictly carried out, a collision might have occurred that morning. We do not wish to judge Gen. Pope by knowledge obtained after the campaign has been fought. Thinking, as he and McDowell did, that it was likely that Jackson would move round to the south of the railroad, there was a reason for the concentration of the army at Manassas Junction, and the order of march directed by Pope was certainly more likely to intercept Jackson, if he should take the other course and move north, than any other order of march. But nothing, in our judgment, excuses leaving Gainesville and the Gap undefended. Two strong divisions, three even, might cer- tainly have been spared for this all-important duty of preventing, or delaying, a possible junction between Jackson and Lee. Lee was well known, as we should have before stated, to be on his march for Thoroughfare Gap, and, whatever might be the supposed necessity for following up Jackson in a raid round Manassas Junction to Catlett's or War- OBJECTS AXD GEXERAL PLAN.— PART IT. 67 renton Junction, there was certainly no earthly reason why Lee should be allowed, without opposition, to attack us unprepared in the rear while engaged with Jackson's column. The fact is, Pope never, from first to last, seems to have realized the need of holding the Gap and Gainesville. It was otherwise with McDowell; for he, having ordered reconnoissances early on the morning of the 28th in the direction of the Gap with artillery and cavalry, during the forenoon sent Ricketts's di^-ision to the Gap, which delayed the enemy certainly until sun- down. Yet Gen. Pope actually finds fault with McDow- ell for this, or, at any rate, he regrets, as he says, that any of his troops were sent in tliis direction.^ ^Tiatever, then, may be the result of our speculations as to the probable utility of Gen. Pope's dispositions for the morning of the 28th, in case Jackson shotild have exe- cuted the movement of going round our army to the south of the railroad and making for Banks and the trains, it is pretty clear that there was no reason for Pope's not leaving a sufficient force at the Gap, except that he did not realize the importance of this position. We have now to point out a further illustration of this singular inability to see what, to most critics on the campaign, seems so plain. The orders for the 28th were partially carried out. By noon Sigel, Be^Tiolds, and King had come down from Gaines^dlle to within three or four miles of the Junction. Hooker, Reno, and Kearny were at the Junction with Pope in person. Porter was at Bristoe Station. Banks was marcliing from Catlett's Station to Manassas Junc- U6 W.K., 37. 68 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. tion. And by noon Pope had found out where Jackson had gone, or, at least, where he had not gone. What did he then do? Did he instantly order everybody upon Gainesville ? Lee was coming through the Gap, held in check by Ricketts only. It is true that, so far as Pope knew, Jackson had retreated to Centreville ; but he must have known that Jackson was going to unite with Lee, if he could. He must have supposed that the Centreville movement was only to get out of the way for the time being. He knew, at any rate, that there was to be no turning of his own position to the southward ; and he had every reason to suppose that there would be a determined attempt to unite the two wings of Lee's army during the coming day. He knew that, by concentrating at Gaines- ville and Groveton, and keeping a competent force at the Gap, he could separate these two bodies of the enemy while he was attacking one of them. Yet in this crisis he divides his forces. It is true that he sent Sigel, Reynolds, and King to the Warrenton pike, a part moving by the Sudley Springs road ; but, fearing, as he says, lest Jackson should escape through Aldie Gap, he pushed to Centreville, — to the east of Jackson's force, be it remembered, — Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and Kearny, and Reno's division, and he went with these troops himself. The orders given to Sigel, Reynolds, and King were to march to Centreville; and, on attempting it that afternoon, a severe engagement took place between King's division and the enemy, with no decisive result. By an unfortunate accident Gen. Mc- Dowell, who had been searching for Pope without success OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN— PART IT. 69 that forenoon, was unable to find King's division, and that officer (King), finding himself on the left of the line, took it into his head that he was not in his proper place ; and, when Ricketts, at dusk, retreated from Thoroughfare Gap and passed through Gainesville, these two officers, in the absence of their corps-commander, abandoned their position, and fell back to Manassas Junction. The consequence was. that on the morning of the 29th there was no force whatever at the Gap, or at Gaines- ville ; there was nothing in the world to prevent the junction of Lee with Jackson, as soon as Lee should have got through the Gap : Jackson was confronted by Sigel and Reynolds only, and was actually pushed towards Lee by every attack which, under Pope"s own direction, was made tipon him from the direction of Centreville. Jack- son all this time was in a strong position on the north of the turnpike and to the west of Bull Run. Had Pope, when he learned definitely, at noon of the 28th. that Jackson had retreated northward, moved with all his forces upon Gainesville and Groveton, adequately supporting Ricketts, who was then fighting the van of Longstreet's corps emerging from Thoroughfare Gap, and then moved towards Centreville, he must have been able to have attacked Jackson, with all his forces, at daybreak on the 29th, if not before. And there was not the slightest reason why Porter, and, at least, one of Banks's divisions also, should not on the afternoon of the 28th have been sent in the same direction. Even if we con- cede that it was too late that afternoon to engage Jackson in a battle, yet it was possible to beat him before noon of TO POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. the next day. Pope might have had there, excluding Ricketts and Porter, who might well have been at Hay- market or thereabouts, King's, Reynolds's, Hooker's, Kearny's, and Reno's divisions, the three divisions of Sigel, and one, at least, of Banks's divisions, in all nine or ten divisions, against Jackson's three, and the contest ought not to have been doubtful. Instead of this, act- uated by an ill-founded fear that Jackson would make no stand, would not try his best to unite with Lee, who was just emerging from the Gap, Pope divides his own forces ; and, although it was, so far as he was concerned, an acci- dent that Ricketts and King fell back on the night of the 28th to Manassas, yet this would not have happened, had not all the general officers got it into their heads, from the extraordinary orders of the day before, that Gen. Pope attached no importance to the holding of Gainesville; for, had Pope, when, on the night of the 27th, he ordered a concentration of the whole army at Manassas, provided especially for a competent force to be left at Gainesville and at the Gap, it cannot be supposed that Ricketts and King would have abandoned without orders a post to which such importance had been attributed. Here, for the present, we close. The events of the 29th and 30th of August require careful consideration, which will occupy us at another meeting. ly. THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE IN VIRGINIA: ITS OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN. Third Paet : to the end of the Campaign. By JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. COMMITTEE, John C. Ropes, Esq. Bvt. Lieut. -Col. Chaeles P. Hortof, U.S.V. Bvt. Capt. Howard Stockton, U.S.A. Read before the Society on Monday evening, March 12, 2877. GENERAL POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. IHE report of your committee brought down the operations of the Army of Virginia to the morning of Friday, August 29, 1862. Let us, however, briefly review the progress of the campaign to that point. Lee, it will be remembered, lost no time, after the with- drawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, in reenforcing Jackson's corps on the banks of the Rapidan. Pope, thereupon, wisely retreated to the Rappahannock, which Lee for several days in vain attempted to cross. Finally, on the morning of the 25th of August, Jackson began his flank march to the north through Salem, White Plains, and Thoroughfare Gap to Manassas, which place he reached on the 26th, at evening, finding no oppo- sition in his path. Our forces were partly at and near Warrenton, and partly on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, between Bealton and Warrenton Junction. Pope here lost his great opportunity. Trusting that the troops, wliich he was assured were coming up from Alex- andria, would guard his depot at Manassas Junction, and that, at least, a strong corps of observation would be pushed forward to Gainesville and the Gap, he himself » 73 74 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, made no disposition to secure these all-important places. The troops under his command were uselessly allowed to remain at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, instead of being thrown back to protect his communications. Not that Pope was indifferent to the importance of these points, or lacked the decision of character to order a re- treat upon them. Had he positively known that Franklin and Cox could not be relied upon to defend his communi- cations, there is not the smallest reason to doubt that he would have had his army at Gainesville and the Gap by the morning of the 26th. But he did not relish the idea of retreating, and, having plenty of fair promises from Gen. Halle ck, he made the mistake of relying on them, instead of relying on his own troops under his own orders. When he first learned that the railroad in his rear was cut, on the night of the 26th, he, it will be remembered, supposed that this had been done by the advanced cav- alry of the enemy, and that Jackson's corps must be somewhere between the Gap and Manassas Junction ; and accordingly he ordered an immediate concentration of nearly all his troops on that line. By the evening of the next day, however, he found out his error ; he discov- ered that Jackson had been more rapid than he had sup- posed possible, and that he was, with his whole corps, in the neighborhood of the Junction. Then he conceived the idea that Jackson might intend to carry his corps round on the south side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and make for his trains under Banks. Under the influ- ence of this idea he ordered all the troops to move from Gainesville and Greenwich to Manassas Junction on the OBJECTS AKD GENERAL PEAK — PART TIL 75 morning of the 28tli, and, witli the exception of Ricketts's division, which McDowell, with better judgment, had ordered to Thoroughfare Gap on the forenoon of the 28th, — a step, by the way, which, as it seems to us, should have been taken twenty-four hours earlier, — nearly the whole army was in the neighborhood of Manassas at noon of the 28th. But at this moment, when Pope himself arrived at the Junction, he learned that he had guessed wrong, — that his antagonist, instead of turning to the south and west, had turned to the north and north-east, — that a part of his forces, at least, was in the neighborhood of Centreville, — and that, had he not given the orders of the evening pre^dous, his army would be betAveen Jackson and Thoroughfare Gap, with all the chances in their favor. It was not, however, yet too late to get between Jackson and Thoroughfare Gap ; on the contrary, nothing was easier. Had orders been issued to march to Gaines- "vdlle, reenforce Ricketts at the Gap, and then throw the bulk of the army upon Jackson, who would undoubtedly be somewhere on the Warrenton pike between Gaines- ville and CentreAulle, there can be but little doubt that Jackson might haA^e been scA'erely handled that eA^ening, and destroyed the next forenoon. But, Avhile Ave must accord to Gen. Pope the praise AA'hich belongs to courage, energy, and persistency, we cannot allow him to haA^e possessed great judgment. He seems utterly to haA'e for- gotten that the remainder of Lee's army was to be hourly looked for, emerging from Thoroughfare Gap. In fact, this singular forgetfulness of the approach of Lee's army is the key to Gen. Pope's conduct on this and the two 76 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN', subsequent days. He was, moreover, led away with the idea that Jackson meant to retreat to the north, towards Leesburg or Aldie Gap, forgetting how much more prob- able it was that he would remain on the Warrenton pike and unite with Lee if he could. Therefore, instead of concentrating his whole army at Gainesville, he, on the afternoon of the 28th, sent three excellent divisions, those of Hooker, Kearny, and Reno, from the Junction towards Centreville, and early the next morning actually went there himself. A part of the army, it is true, he sent back from Manassas to Gainesville and Groveton, the three divisions of Sigel, and those of King and Reynolds ; but these two parts of his army were separated by a distance of from six to ten miles ; and the balance of his army, the four fine divisions under Banks and Porter, he kept in reserve for the present, merely bringing them somewhat nearer to Manassas Junction. Such were Gen. Pope's dispositions for the day which was to prove, and which he ought to have known was to prove, the great and decisive day of his campaign. Had he adopted the other course, and, using all the roads to Gainesville and Groveton, concentrated his army there while he yet had the start of Lee, no one can say how suc- cessful he might have been. As it was. King's division eno^aged Jackson not far from Gainesville about sunset that afternoon of the 28th, and in the spirited action which took place Ewell and Taliaferro were both put Jiors- de-comhat. Who shall say what might have been the result had Hooker, Kearny, Reno, Porter, and Banks been there to help ? OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN — PART IIL 77 And now, fortune, which had hitherto accorded to him a fair share of her favors, turned against him. King aban- doned his position that night, bringing Ricketts along with him. Their corps-commander, McDowell, had, most unfortunately, got separated from Gen. King's division in an attempt to find the commanding General, with whom he wished to confer. Pope states that several times in the course of the night he sent orders to Gen. King to hold his ground ; but they were not received. And so it came to pass that these two officers, Ricketts and King, finding themselves on the extreme left of the line without definite orders, and with no plan of the campaign in their minds such as can generally be gathered from previous orders and movements, — knowing also, from Ricketts's ex- perience during the day, that Lee would be through the Gap early in the morning, — fell back to Manassas Junc- tion, leaving Sigel and Reynolds only in front of Jackson. Nothing that the Federal General could now do could prevent the junction of the two portions of the Confeder- ate army. It is not too much to say that this unneces- sary retreat of King and Ricketts affected the battle of the next day far more than the inaction of Fitz-John Porter, of which so much has been said. Ricketts's division was perfectly useless all the next day. It was marching from morning to night, as was also King's, and neither division was in presence of the enemy, or, unless their march up the Sudley Springs road was observed, had, or could have had, the smallest influence on the fortunes of the fight, until after 6 o'clock in the afternoon, when King's division, led by Hatch, engaged in 78 POPE'S VIRGINIA- CAMPAIGN. the action. On the other hand, Porter's two divisions were confronted, as we shall see, by at least as large a force of the enemy during the entire afternoon. But we are going too fast. Let us go back to Gen. Pope. That officer having, as we have said, on the afternoon of the 28th, sent Sigel's corps, and King's and Reynolds's divisions of McDowell's corps back to the Warrenton pike from the neighborhood of Manassas Junction, and ordered Kearny, Hooker, and Reno to proceed to Centreville, took up his head-quarters for the night near Bull Run, not far from Blackburn's Ford. Kearny reached Centreville that night ; Hooker was not able to cross Bull Run till the next morning. Reno was between the Ford and Centre- ville. That evening Pope learned that King's division of McDowell's corps had had the severe, though short, action with the enemy, of which we have just spoken, near Gaines- ville that afternoon at dusk. He at once communicated to Heintzelman, who commanded Kearny and Hooker, to Reno, and to Porter, the news that McDowell had inter- cepted the retreat of Jackson, and he ordered each of them to march with all speed to Centreville, there to turn to the west, and march on the Warrenton turnpike until they should encounter the enemy. Of Banks's two divisions, however, he did not propose to make any use, as he sent him no orders. The orders to Kearny and Heintzelman were dated about 10 in the evening of the 28th,i that to Porter at 3, and that to Reno at 5 in the morning of the 29th.2 remarkable, to say the least, that the order to Porter, who was several miles off, was not sent the evening before. 1 16 W.R., 74, 75. 2 lb., 75. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN — PART IIL 79 These orders were given in the belief that King and Ricketts still held their position on the Warrenton pike, on the extreme left of the line. It is impossible not to remark the singular detour pre- scribed to the troops in these orders of march. How much wiser to have ordered Porter to McDowell by the Sudley Springs road, instead of sending him round by Centre- ^dlle, at least a dozen miles out of his way ! As for the original error in sending Reno, Hooker, and Kearny to Centreville, we have before spoken of it. As Kearny was then at Centreville it was, perhaps, well enough to order Hooker and Reno to join him ; but Porter certainly should have been sent to the field of battle by the short- est road. If the retreat of King and Ricketts had not taken place that night, — and for this it must be recollected that Pope was in no way responsible, — it may ^rell be sup- posed that the action of the next day, the 29th, would have been certainly at the outset more favorable to our army than was actually the case. King and Ricketts could have attacked together with Sigel and Reynolds at daybreak, and Jackson's troops, who were pretty well exhausted, might have suffered severely. Kearny, as it was, arrived at Centreville before 10 o'clock. Hooker at 11, and Reno at 12, and it is possible that before Lee's army could have got into position, Jackson might have been defeated. Yet before 9 A.M. seventeen regiments, we know, joined Jackson, and Longstreet's corps was un- doubtedly in line about 11 o'clock. There would have been an opportunity for Lee to try the 80 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. manoeuvre, — which he tried the next day so successfully, but which he was deterred from attempting on Friday by the presence of Porter's corps on the railroad, — that of turning our left. But all we can affirm confidently is that, even if King and Ricketts had held on, Lee would have had as large a force on the ground at noon as Pope. But King and Ricketts did not hold on: they aban- doned their position. Pope learns this about 6 or 7 o'clock in the morning, and at once, with characteristic prompt- ness, and evidently under the impression that Jackson will retreat to the Gap, orders Porter to march direct to Gainesville, taking with him King's division (Ricketts's whereabouts Pope had not then learned) ; and to " be ex- peditious about it, or we will lose much,"^ as he puts it; telling him also that he himself was following the enemy, z.e., Jackson, down the Warrenton pike upon Gainesville. Nothing was said to Porter as to the course to be pur- sued in the event of Lee's reenforcing Jackson. Still, had Gen. Pope issued no other order than this, the spirit of which is thoroughly in keeping with the emergency, and the language of which is perfectly consistent and intelli- gible, there would probably have been no court-martial of Gen. Porter. With three fine divisions under his com- mand, with orders enjoining speed, defining the point to be reached, allowing of no alternative, and, above all, breathing the spirit of an impending battle, we do not doubt that Gen. Porter would have carried out the simple task set before him, and attacked whatever force came in his way. But, unfortunately for both Pope and Porter, something 1 17 W.R., 846; 18 W.K., 729. OBJECTS AND GENERAL FLAN— PART III 81 occurred wliicli induced the former to -^rite another order. Gen. McDo^vell had found his corps, T^'here he least expected it, at Manassas Junction, and naturally and properly conceived himself to be the proper person to lead it. He so wrote to Gen. Pope, who had put King's division under the orders of Porter, and Pope thereupon penned, about 9 o'clock in the morning, the celebrated Joint Order " to Generals McDowell and Porter. This order is as follows: — ^ ^ Head-quaetees AE:iiT of Viegixia, Centretille, Augnst 29, 1862. You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent Gen. Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel. and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communica- tion is estabhshed between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt, It may be necessary to fall back be- hind Bull Run, at Centreville. to-night. I presume it wiU be so on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any de- scription to Ricketts. and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the TVarrenton Pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's [Jackson's] flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out where Gen. McDowell was until a late hour this morning. Gen. McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with Gen. Ricketts, and insti'uct him to rejoin the other divis- ions of his corps as soon as practicable. ne W.R., 76; 17 VT.R., 825. 82 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by de- parting from this order, it will not be strictly carried ont. One thing must be had In view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy [Lee] is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here [Centreville] by to-morrow night or the next day. My own head-quarters will be, for the present with Heintzelman's corps or at this place [Centreville]. John Pope, Major-Qeneral Commanding. Generals McDowell and Portek. This order, of conrse, superseded all the previous orders. Its tone is plainly different from the tone of the two pre- ceding orders. There is nothing in it that looks as if it were written in expectation of a battle that day. The order of 3 o'clock in the morning ^ was written when Pope supposed that Jackson's retreat down the Pike was barred by McDowell's corps, and that a severe engage- ment was impending. The order of 7 in the morning^ was written in the first flush of indignation at the news that, by th-e unlucky retreat of King and Ricketts, there was no obstacle to Jackson's retreat, and in the heat of an angry resolution to pursue him at all costs. But by 9 o'clock Pope had had time to consider. While he sent orders to Sigel and Reynolds to attack at once, and pushed forward Kearny, Hooker, and Reno on the pike, he, nevertheless, did not really believe that Jackson would stay to be attacked. He was not a man given to over-estimating his adversary's courage or strength, and U6W.R., 75. MSW.R., 729. OBJECTS AND GEXERAL PLAN. — PART III 83 he could not suppose that Jackson tvouIcI voluntarily await an attack by our whole army. As for Lee, he erro- neously supposed him to be thirty-six hours' march dis- tant, as he says. All these three orders, it must be remem- bered, were issued on the su^Dposition that the affair was with Jackson only. Pope doubtless thought it not un- likely that his army would make a promenade to Gaines- ville, merely picking up stragglers and some of Jackson's recently captured stores. But beyond Gainesville he could not afford to pursue the retreating Jackson. He had had time to reflect on the scarcity of his stipplies, and on the absolute necessity of forming some new depot; and he had very wisely fixed upon Centreville as the proper place. He therefore mentions Centreville as the point to which the troops of McDowell and Porter were to fall back that night or the next morning. Besides, he did undoubtedly expect that within tliirty-six or forty- eight hours Lee would make his appearance with the rest of liis army to support Jackson, and he had, as we think the language of the Joint Order " shows by clear im- plication, made up his mind that Centreville would offer the greatest advantages for fighting the entire army of Lee. Here Pope could expect supplies and reenforce- ments, and there was here a strong defensive position. Xow, all this was doubtless clear enough in the mind of Gen. Pope when he wrote the order. But it must be admitted that this " Joint Order " wore rather an ambigu- ous look. There is nothing in it showing he expected a battle, yet, of course, it would not have been issued had not Pope thought it possible that Jackson would stand at 84 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. bay. There is nothing in it enjoining haste ; though Pope says there is. It is an order to march west, but to retreat at evening a dozen miles to the east. It is an order to cooperate in the pursuit of one corps of the enemy which is retreating west, and it finishes by saying that their whole army will be a dozen miles to the east of Gaines- ville by to-morrow night or the next day. Finally, it was an order which, by its terms, provided that it might be departed from. It is, in fact, an order requiring some previous knowledge of what was passing in Gen. Pope's mind. When we remember that he undoubtedly supposed that his march after Jackson would be unavailing, because Jackson, now that King and Ricketts had gone, would retreat to the Gap as fast as he could; that Lee was twenty-four hours' march away, and could not, of course, support him; that the question of supplies was assuming great importance, and that there was an evident necessity of getting to Centre ville, w^here the army could get them; when we also take into account that Pope ex2Dected that Lee would make his appearance with his whole army to assault the lines of Centreville the day after to-morrow, — the " Joint Order " becomes intelligible. There was certainly a good deal of delay in the move- ments of our army that morning. Pope, to be sure, sent orders, which were obeyed, to Sigel and Reynolds to attack Jackson, " as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring him to a stand if it were possible to do so."^ But Kearny, who came from Centreville, did not arrive till nearly 10, and Hooker and Reno, who had to cross 1 16 W.R., 38. OBJECTS AXD GENERAL PLAN.— PART IIL 85 Bull Run, march to Centreville. and thence to the field, did not get up till 11 and 12 res^^ectively. Pope himself did not arrive till noon.i Six or seven precious hours were thus lost owing to Pope's movement to Centre^ulle the day before. The troops of Gens. Sigel and Reynolds seem to have fought well that morning, unsupported as they were, and to have even gained ground, though naturally suffer- ing severely. Meanwhile Porter had, on the receipt of the first order, moved towards Centreville with his own corps and King's division of McDowell's corps, but on getting the second order he had faced about, and had passed the junc- tion of the Sudley Springs road with the Manassas Rail- road, proceeding towards Gainesville, when, towards noon, he was overtaken by McDowell, who had received the " Joint Order." The rear of Porter's column had passed the junction of these roads at this moment by a consider- able interval. McDowell's two divisions were in the rear of Porter's corps. The column had halted, and skirmish- ers of Morell's division had been sent out, who had reported the presence of the enemy directly in front.- The enemy cotdd also be seen marching from Gaines- ville to Groveton on the AVarrenton turnpike ; all these, of cotirse, belonged to Longstreet's corps, and had left the neighborhood of the Gap that morning. Gen. McDowell read to Gen. Porter a note he had received from Buford, written about 9 o'clock,^ in which he states that seventeen regiments of infantry, one bat- tery, and five hundred cavalry had been seen by him nt U6W.R.,39. nzW.R., 968. ^j^., 903. 86 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. a quarter before 9 that morning on the Warrenton pike marching from Gainesville towards Grove ton. These troops must have preceded those which could now be seen on the same road moving in the same direction. It was evidently too late to prevent the junction of Lee with Jackson. It was plain, also, that our advance moving from Centreville had been arrested, and that there had been some fighting, though how much was not very clear. The two Generals held a consultation together. What was best to be done ? Between them they had more than 20,000 men, excellent troops, well commanded. They could, doubtless, accomplish something, if they should act in concert. It was, however, plain, that by pursuing their present line of march they would strike the enemy, and not approach Pope's army, which had been brought to a stand on the Warrenton pike at a point north, or a little north-east, of where they were. It was evidently a case which the " Joint Order " did not contemplate, — a case where the discretion contained in the Joint Order" could be availed of. Should they, then, attack the enemy in their front, and drive him back on Gainesville ? Or should they endeavor to rejoin the main army? Or should they separate, the foremost corps (Porter's) remaining where it was, fighting or not, as occasion might require, and McDowell marching north by the Sudley Springs road to Groveton? Unfor- timately, as we think, they determined upon the latter course, and McDowell, whose troops were in the rear, marched up the Sudley Springs road, reaching the field of battle about 5 or 6 o'clock in the afternoon. He was OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN — PART IIL 87 too late to be of mucli service, though Kmg's division, then led by Hatch, King having been taken ill, was put in at a threatened point. Porter, meanwhile, remained where he Avas all the after- noon, occasionally reconnoitring somewhat to ascertain the position of the enemy. He was, he states, directed by McDowell to remain where he was without attacking ; but McDowell, on the contrary, states that he told Porter to attack the enemy, and he expected he would do so. It is not our province this evening to try again the case of Fitz-John Porter. All we need say here is, that we are satisfied that there was all that afternoon a large force in his front ; that any attack he could have made must have been made directly in front, and not on the enemy's flank ; that it is extremely doubtful whether anything of impor- tance would have been gained had he attacked, and that his presence on the railroad prevented, as we have before pointed out. Lee's turning the left of our army on the Warrenton Pike, as he did the next day with such crush- ing effect. We believe, also, that the reiterated statements in the " Joint Order " about the necessity of retreating to Centreville, combined with the mention of the probability of the enemy's reaching Centreville the next day, created a well-founded doubt in Gen. Porter's mind as to Gen. Pope's intention to hazard a general battle with the army of Lee anywhere beyond Centreville ; in fact, this seems to us to be a legitimate inference from the terms of the order. It must also be remembered that Porter had only two divisions ; that the country between him and Pope was difficult, and not traversable by an army corps ; and 88 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. that the only means of reaching the main army was by the Sudley Springs road in his rear, over which McDowell was marching all the afternoon. Moreover, he had no troops on his flanks, — unless we may call McDowell's column on the Sudley Springs road on his right flank, — and no reserves. The fact is he never should have been left alone there at all. Had the six divisions of Mc- Dowell, Porter, and Banks been united, and attacked the enemy together while taking up their positions in support of Jackson, the result of the day would have been wholly different. But to Porter, who was confronting alone the divisions of Longstreet, the question of attacking was certainly not a perfectly plain one. It was with him a question, it must be remembered, not of attacking a force already engaged with Pope, but of attacking another force in his own front, which might or might not be as strong or as strongly posted as his own, and which certainly could be reenforced sooner than he could possibly expect to be. We do not say that a less cautious officer would not have attacked boldly whatever was before him. By 2 or 3 in the afternoon, at the farthest, doubtless, and probably long before that time, he could have made his dispositions, and could have opened his battle with Jones's and Kemper's divisions of Long- street's corps. He might, of course, have had some very great success. On the ' other hand, he might have met with a severe repulse. But at any rate, whether defeated or successful, he would have drawn upon himself the whole of Longstreet's corps, or at least three out of his four divisions, — those of Jones, Kemper, and Wilcox, — OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN — PART IIL 89 and thus enabled Pope to contend with Jackson, sup- ported only by Hood and Evans. This would, however, have made no difference to Gen. Pope ; for, as it was. Hood and Evans were the only troops of Longstreet's corps that were actually engaged with him, as we know from the reports of the Army of Northern Virginia. But, whatever would have been the result, the operation would have been, as Porter maintained at the time, and as the subsequently published reports of the Army of Northern Virginia now show beyond a doubt, a very different opera- tion from what Gen. Pope believed at the time of the battle. He thought that there were no troops in front of Porter, and he expected him to attack tlm enemy with whom he, Pope, was fighting, in flank. This, as we now know, was out of the question. All that Porter could have done was to have engaged the enemy in his imme- diate front. This he did not think best to do. As for liis alleged disobedience of the order dated half-past 4 that afternoon, it arrived too late for any action to be taken in obedience to it. The battle of the 29th, then, as it turned out, was fought by Pope in person, commanding Sigel, Heintzelman, Eeno, and Reynolds. It was not skilfully fought, tacti- cally. Besides the error of beginning the battle by Sigel and Reynolds alone, and making no serious attack until afternoon, by which delay ample time was afforded to Lee to get his troops into line and well in hand, there was a great lack of ensemble in the assaults that were made. The troops seem all to have behaved well. Grover's brigade made a famous charge. Jackson's and Long- 90 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN-. street's veterans resisted with tlieir usual tenacity, and took the offensive from time to time. As a rule, in this, as in our other battles, the force which was attacked, if not outflanked, held its own. On the whole we gained ground, and the advantage was with us, though it was un- doubtedly a drawn battle. Gen. Pope, whose mind seems to have been unable from first to last of this campaign to comprehend that he had anybody but Jackson to deal with, states in his report that he is positive " that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th Gen. Porter had in his front no con- siderable body of the enemy." " I believed then," he goes on to say, " as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jack- son, and to have fallen upon his rear ; that, if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet." ^ This is now known to be an entire mistake ; and we can hardly pardon Gen. Pope for not having known it at the time he wrote his report. Gen. Buford saw 17 regiments of infantry, averaging 800 men each, with a battery and 500 cavalry, say 14,000 men, marching from Gainesville towards Groveton as early as 9 in the morning. ^ But Pope did not get on the field till noon, as he himself says. He had come from Centre ville, where, of course, he could know nothing personally. His head was full of Jackson, and only of Jackson. And he has chosen since to shut his eyes to the truth when he could have learned it. The report of Gen. Longstreet ' 16 W.R., 40. W.R., 903, 1010. OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN. — PART IIL 91 states that the division of Hood was on their left, sup- ported by Evans's brigade and by three brigades under Wilcox. Kemper's three brigades were on their right, and D. E. Jones's di^dsion " was placed upon the Manassas Gap Railroad, to the right and in echelon with regard to the three last brigades." ^ At half-past 4 or 5 in the afternoon Wilcox's brigades were withdrawn from the left and carried to the support of Jones, to the railroad, as Wilcox himself says,^ where they remained, however, only a short time. This was, probably, in response to a slight demonstration made by ]Moreirs division of Porter's corps towards dusk. AMiile, therefore, Lee was able to use Hood's and Evans's troops, the rest of his army hardly fired a shot. Jones, Kemper, and Wilcox — Anderson had not yet arrived — were contained by Porter's corps. The}' may also have supposed that the troops of McDowell, which they may possibly have seen marching on the Sudley Springs road, were probably about to deploy on Porter's right, thus connecting the wings of the Federal army. Pope, however, in a letter to the Comte de Paris, ^ actually quotes that portion of Longstreet's report relat- ing to the movement of Wilcox's divisio?i as showing the only movement of Longstreet's corps made in opposi- tion to the column of Porter, and omits what Longstreet had just stated about Jones's division, supported by Kemper's division, being sent down to the Manassas Gap Railroad as soon as they got through the Gap. We cannot help recurring again to our wish, before 1 16 564-565. 2 jb., 598. 3 Army and Navy Journal, Jan. 6, 1877, 346. 92 POPE* 8 VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. expressed, that the three corps of Banks, McDowell, and Porter had been put in together that morning. The right of the enemy could have then been turned with a ven- geance. These six fine divisions would have driven Lee back to the Gap, broken and badly defeated. It is, perhaps, safe to say that Pope would not have fought the battle of the 30th of August but for this ignor- ing of Lee's presence on his part, of which we have before spoken. Having, as we have before said, arrived on the field only at noon, and then having come from Centreville, and having found that Sigel and Reynolds, who were en- gaged early in the morning, had been engaged only with the troops of Jackson, having also been entirely ignorant that any troops from Longstreet's corps, save the division of Hood, which was engaged against him at Groveton, had been able to reach the field, — for the division of Wilcox and the brigade of Evans, although supporting Jackson during the greater part of the day, were not actually in conflict with our army, — Pope determined to call up Porter to Groveton, and fight the next day. He had, as has been stated, rather gained ground in Friday's battle, and with the exception of some aid rendered by King's division towards the close of the day he had not had the assistance of McDowell's or Porter's corps at all. He naturally argued that, with the reenforcement of these four divisions, he could beat the enemy with whom he had been fighting in his front. And so, perhaps, he could have done ; but, unfortunately for him, he had to reckon not only with Jackson and Hood, but with Wilcox, and Evans, and Kemper, and Jones, and also with Anderson, OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN, — PART IIL 93 wlio came up that morning. And for tliis battle, as for tlie one of the day before, he entirely neglected to sum- mon Banks's corps. Why this was so we shall never probably know. On this 30th day of August Gen. Pope was to learn by a severe experience the folly of obstinately closing one's eyes to facts. Had he been willing to believe Porter and his experienced officers in their statements that the enemy's right the day before extended across the Manas- sas Gap Railroad he would have known that Lee must have arrived with his whole army, or certainly with the bulk of it : and he would very probably have fallen back across Bull Run that morning and quietly taken up posi- tion on the Heights of Centreville, where he would have been reenforced by Franklin and Sumner, and might have defied Lee to do his worst. But he was angry, and would not see the facts, or hear the truth. He persisted in believing that he had had to deal in the battle which he had fought the day before with the whole of the reenforce- ments which had arrived from Lee's army, and that it was well worth while for him to fight another battle with this force now that his own army had been increased by Mc- Dowell's and Porter's corps. But, now that the absence of Porter's corps on our left flank was reported to Lee, that General occupied himself in getting his troops through the difficult country to the south of the turnpike ; and in the afternoon, just after our right had met with a sanguinary repulse in attacking Lee's left, in which Porter's corps suffered severely, Lee tkrew forward an overwhelming mass of troops, consisting 94 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. of Longstreet's whole command, 30,000 strong, upon our centre and left flank, driving it back in disorder, and, by threatening Stone Bridge over Bull Run, rendering our retreat imperative. Warren, Ricketts, Tower, Meade, Koltes, and Buchanan distinguished themselves by their firmness and gallant fighting, and the retreat of the army, which was at one time imperilled, was assured. The army fell back over Bull Run, and encamped on Centreville Heights on Sunday morning, August 31, in good order. There was no disorganization, no rout, though the con- trary has frequently been affirmed by partisan writers. Gen. Pope had, in the battle of the 30th, suffered a severe, though by no means a disastrous, defeat. He repaired, however, all his losses by the reenforcements of the Sixth and Second corps ; and the army under his command was, on the 1st of September, fully equal in strength to that of his adversary. It had, however, suffered greatly in confidence in its chief. The failure to inflict any severe blow upon the corps of Jackson, so audaciously exposed; the constant marching and counter- marching; the perpetual orders and counter-orders; the brave promises and the never-ending retreats ; finally, the severe handling which the army received on the second day, — all combined to render Pope's army far inferior to that of Lee for all practical purposes. But, whatever might have been Pope's intentions, Lee gave him no time to mature them. He realized, with that sagacity which he afterwards so brilliantly displayed at Chancellorsville, the moral advantage he had obtained, and, without pausing, he threw his left up to the great turnpike which runs OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN.— PART IIL 95 soutli-eastwarclly from Aldie Gap to Fairfax Court-House, and, passing about four or fiA'e miles to the north of Centreville, through Chantilly and Ox Hill, undertook to turn the right of the Federal army. In the action which followed, the gallant Kearny was killed, as was also the brave Gen. Stevens, who commanded a division of the Xinth Corps. This seemed to cap the climax of the misfortunes of this campaign, and even Pope made no strenuous remonstrance against the army being withdi^awn under the guns of the forts surrounding "Washington. In reviewing the campaign we ought freely to accord to Gen. Pope the merit of courage, energy, and decision of character. It is impossible, however, to credit him with strategic skill. It was his fault that Jackson was not utterly defeated, due entirely to his failure to seize Gainesville on the 28th of August. It was liis fault that the battle of the 30th was fought where it was, and in the way it was, and without the re enforcement that two or three days would have brought him ; for, had he un- derstood the battle of the 29th, — that it was fought by nearly the whole of Lee's army, only a part of whom, owing to the menacing position of Porter's corps on our extreme left, were employed by Gen. Lee against the troops commanded by Pope in person, — Pope would have fought his great battle with Lee at Centreville, in a strong defensive position, and with an army well fed, and stronger by 25,000 men at least. Those familiar with the Peninsular war will readily recall Talavera and Salamanca as instances where Napoleon found great fault 96 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. with Victor and Marmont for risking so mucli, when reenforcements were soon to arrive. Circumstances, how- ever, can, of course, be imagined where the peculiar self- confidence and the great persistence of Gen. Pope might have accomplished a great deal. Had he, for instance, commanded at Antietam, he would, unquestionably, have fought the next day, and would probably have been suc- cessful. Among other defects of Gen. Pope's military character was his exacting too much from his men. He tired his army out. And this was aggravated by his continual changes of mind. Countermarching followed marching with almost undeviating regularity. Of Jackson's operation against our depot at Manassas no one can speak too highly of the manner in which it was effected. The silence and secrecy and celerity of the march, — the thorough execution of the task, — the prompt retreat, — the wise direction given to the re- treat, — all show the hand of a master. But to imperil a corps of 25,000 men. by throwing them in rear of an army of 50,000 or 60,000, with supports two days' march or more distant, cannot be defended on any recognized principles of warfare. It was a rash and perilous ma- noeuvre, and the object was not worth the risk. Still, it was bravely carried out. A single word, in closing, on the alleged demoralization of the army at the close of the campaign. That the moral of the army was impaired was true enough. But its structure, its organization, had not been broken up or in any way affected. The troops had lost confidence in OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN— PART IIL 97 Gen. Pope undoubtedly, and tlie advent of McClellan was hailed with joy. That the partisans of McClellan made the most of the loss of moral in the troops may be easily belieyed. And South Mountain and Antietam furnish too sharp a contrast to Chantilly and Bull Run not to tempt the picturesque historian. Gen. Pope had lost at the outside 30 cannon, 9,000 prisoners, and perhaps 12,000 killed and wounded, — but these are the highest estimates. Of his army, however, Banks's corps was comparatively untouched. As for those divisions which had suf- fered the most, Gen. McClellan disposed of several of them in and about Washington. Sigel's and Heintzel- man's corps were left in garrison. He took with him McDowell's corps under Hooker, Banks's under Mansfield, Porter's corps and Reno's division, of the troops that had gone through the campaign of Bull Run, and, adding to these the fresh corps of Sumner and Franklin, and three fresh divisions, to fill up the Ninth Corps under Burnside, he was able to control a very effective army. It is inexcusable for a man like Swinton to say that **the structure of the army was completely dislocated; half the men had abandoned their colors, . . . and only these broken battalions lay between Lee and Wash- ington." ^ It is our duty to reprove severely all attempts to add to the interest of history by such unconscientious coloring of the facts ; and, therefore, I trust to be excused for having dwelt so long on this point. ^ Swinton, Decisive Battles, 149. Y. THE TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST, 1862 (BEING CHAPTER YII. OF THE HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, FROM CEDAR MOUNTAIN TO ALEXANDRIA). By Bvt. Maj.-Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON, U.S.V. Eead before the Society on Monday evening, April 8. 1878. The following is a list of the published writings by General Gordon, concern- ing the Civil War : — Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain in the War of the Great Eebellion 18G1-62. A revision and enlargement (from the latest and most authentic sources) of papers numbered I., II. and III., entitled " A History of the Second Massachusetts Regiment," and " The Second Massachusetts Regiment and Stonewall Jackson." Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1883 Later editions published by Houghton, Mifflin and Company. The " papers numbered I., II. and III." referred to above are : — The Organization and Early History of the Second Mass. Regiment OF Infantry : An Address delivered ... at the Annual Meeting of the Second Mass. Infantry Association, on the 11th May, 1873. Boston : Rock- well and Churchill, 1873. History of the Second Mass. Regiment of Infantry : Second Paper. De- livered ... at the Annual Meeting of the Second Mass. Infantry Association on May 11, 1874. Boston : Alfred Mudge & Son, Printers, 1874. History of the Second Mass. Regiment of Infantry : Third Paper. De- livered ... at the Annual Meeting of the Second Mass. Infantry Association, on May 11, 1875. Boston : Alfred Mudge & Son, Printers, 1875. This paper was also named "The Second Massachusetts and 'Stonewall Jackson." History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, under John Pope, Brigadier-General, U. S. A. ; late Major- General, U. S. Volunteers ; from Cedar Mountain to Alexandria, 18G2. Boston : Houghton, Osgood and Company. 1880. Later editions published by Houghton, Mifflin and Company. A War Diary of Events in the War of the Great Rebellion. 1863- 1865. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1882. Later editions pub- lished by Houghton, Mifflin and Company. See List of Papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachu- setts, at the end of this volume. ♦ GENERAL JACKSON AT MANASSAS JUNCTION.^ "pv AYLIGHT of the 27tli revealed to the Confederate Gen. Trimble a wealth of treasure. He had capt- ured military stores and equipments of great value and vast in amount. Indeed, he had no conception of the real magnitude of his prize until daylight revealed it. The night had been to him a season of great anxiety. At any moment the roar of an approaching train from Alexandria, filled with Federal troops, might be the signal of an open- ing conflict, in which the results of this gallant attack might be wrested from his grasp. Through the slow hours Gen. Trimble awaited with impatience the coming day. His men did not dare to close their eyes. In the morning it was found that the results of this midnight dash comprised about 300 prisoners and 200 slaves (recaptured), and that the loss to the Confederates was none killed and but 15 wounded. But in addition to the guns and equipments an amount of army supplies and valuable material was disclosed that was far in excess even of Jackson's wildest dreams. In the official state- ments, by the superior officers of Jackson's command, of ^ Gordon, History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia under John Pope, 143-173. 101 102 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. the incidents of that day's occupation of Manassas, they never tire in the repetition of the barrels of bacon, sugar, and pork, of the canned delicacies of sutler's stores, of the long trains of new cars heavily laden with supplies for Pope's army, that fell into their hands. Nor were they weary in gloating over the delivery to their emaciated troops of a full issue of " Yankee rations." According to reliable statements the captured storehouses contained 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1,000 barrels of corned beef, 2,000 barrels of salt pork, and 2,000 barrels of flour. Besides, there were two miles of burden cars, laden with clothing, oats, corn, and whiskey. The list further contains 175 draft-horses, 42 wagons and ambulances, 4 sutler's stores, with their contents, and from 200 to 300 new tents.* Well might Gen. Jackson, in the pride of his achievement, speak of these captures as " vast in quantity and of great value." 2 Before turning again to the oj)era- tions of the Federal army in its efforts to thwart the plans of the Confederates, we may, by first following the move- ments of the latter during the day of the 27th, receive a clearer impression of the campaign. Shortly after Trimble had arrived at Manassas, he became so much alarmed at his situation that he called for reenforcements. Jackson sent to him a brigade of infantry, which arrived after dispersing, with a few shots from a battery, a regiment of Federal cavalry that con- fronted it.^ 1 Official Reports of Generals Jackson and Trimble. 16W.R.,643- 644 ; 721, 723. cf. 2 Dabney's Life of Jackson, 266-269. 2 16 W.R., 644. 3 Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry. AUGUST 27TE, 1862. 103 At daylight Gen. Jackson marclied mth two of his divisions from Manassas. Gen. ETrell, with, his division, was left at Bristoe Station, where he encountered the Federal advance along the railroad from Warrenton Junc- tion, as will hereafter appear. In the concentration of the remainder of Jackson's corps at the Junction, the six brigades of Gen. A. P. HilFs division took the lead. Gen. Taliaferro's division followed. To the left of the depot at Manassas Station, Hill drew up his division in columns of brigades. The ground occupied by the Confederate troops was familiar to them. Here were the redoubts which they had thrown up in 1861. The hospital on the left, the ground around the railroad station, the path of the railway, and the run over which it crossed about three miles to the east, the roads, hills, and forests were the same that had known them daily for many weeks after their triumph on the bat- tle-field of Manassas. From here, in 1861, the Confederates had threatened the national capital, and from here had they withdrawn when their own capital at Richmond was in danger from the march of McClellan's army up the Peninsula. And now that the Federal army had been vanquished ; now that the Confederate capital was no longer tln-eatened by a hostile force, again had they returned to Manassas to strike the first blow in a series of strategetical movements whose boldness and whose vigor more than ever before or ever after threatened the very existence of our national life. When Jackson arrived at Manassas Station instant measures were taken to meet any force that might 104 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. threaten Mm from Washington. That Halleck would send along the railway all his available infantry, to recover the stores at Manassas, could not be doubtful. What that force was may have been known to Jackson through spies that swarmed at Alexandria ; for he did not move as if he were apprehensive of serious danger from the front, though he posted his troops to meet whatever might come. Muzzles of field-guns again looked over parapets of deserted earthworks, and again the plains of Manassas were dotted over with compact columns of infantry, while the wooded hill-tops, that look down upon the historic Bull Run at their feet, were filled with skirmishers of infantry and dismounted cavalry. The Confederates were soon apprised of the appearance of the enemy. At about 7 o'clock in the morning a long train of cars coming from the direction of Washington drew up on the eastern side of the railroad bridge. The troops disembarked at the stream, crossed the bridge, and formed in line of battle, facing towards Manassas. Their commander was Gen. Taylor, of New Jersey, and his troops were regiments of New Jersey volunteers. An order to move forward was given, and obeyed with a spirit and determination to which Gen. Jackson himself bore witness in his report. The Federal brigade had advanced without serious mo- lestation to a point near the hospital building, which is about 800 yards from Manassas Station, when Gen. Jack- son rode up to Gen. Archer, of Hill's division, with a battery, and ordered him to support it. For a brief period there were exchanges of shots from Federal and from Confederate artillery. From the redoubts and from the AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. 105 plain on the east and on the west of the raiboad, six different batteries of Hill's division concentrated their fire on this single brigade of raw levies. The result could not be doubtful; it was too uneven to last long. The Federal troops broke in confusion and turned towards the railroad bridge in flight. The Confederate batteries fol- lowed, firing upon the retreating column. The infantry of Hill's division took up the pursuit. The Federals reached the railroad bridge, crossed it, and attempted a stand upon the eastern bank of Bull Run. But they were soon driven away. The Confederates crossed the river, destroyed the train of cars which brought Gen. Taylor to the scene of action, burned the railroad bridge, and advanced for half a mile beyond the run. The gallant conduct of Gen. Taylor called forth from Jackson com- mendation for his character, and condemnation of his cause. Gen. Taylor was mortally wounded in this fight, and this was his eulogy. The Federal dead and wounded were left on the field; many prisoners were taken.' When the Confederate troops were recalled from the pursuit their attention was turned to the captured stores, which there had been some attempt to preserve from the hungry men that swarmed around them. Gen. Trimble had seen with impatience what he called an indiscriminate plunder of his Federal commissariat by the Confederate ^ Gen. A. P. Hill reports the number of Tederal prisoners as 200. 16 "W.R., 670. Gen. Archer, of Hill's division, reports the loss in his brigade as four killed and seventeen wounded. lb., 699. For accounts of Fed- eral attack on Manassas Junction, August 27, see lb., 401 et seq. Official Eeports of Generals Jackson, lb., 643; Hill, lb., 670; Archer, lb., 699; Pender, lb., 697; and Trimble, lb., 720-723. 106 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. cavalry ; but now he was called upon to bear a greater grievance. Gen. Hill's division had returned from its pursuit. His men were very hungry ; with longing eyes they looked upon the captured rations, over which Trimble's sentinels had been keeping guard. Gen. Hill would not restrain them. Weak and haggard from their diet of green corn and apples, one can well imagine with what surprise their eyes opened upon the contents of the sutler's stores, containing an amount and variety of property such as they had never before conceived of. Then came a storming charge of hungry men rushing in tumultuous mobs over each other's heads, under each other's feet, anywhere, everywhere, to satisfy a craving hunger stronger than a yearning for fame. There were no laggards in that charge, and there was abundant evidence of the fruits of victory. It is barely possible that the luckless purveyors of luxuries for Pope's army witnessed such amusing scenes without re- flecting upon an ensuing ruin. Men, ragged and famished, clutched tenaciously at whatever came in their way, whether of clothing or food, of luxury or necessity. Here a long yellow-haired, barefooted son of the South claimed as prizes a tooth-brush, a box of candles, a quantity of lobster salad, a barrel of coffee ; while there another, whose butternut-colored homespun hung around him in tatters, crammed himself with lobster salad, sardines, potted game, and sweetmeats, and washed them down with Rhenish wine. As there were no wagons at hand to transport these captured delicacies, every soldier ate what AUGUST 27TH, 1862. 107 he could, and carried away all the lighter articles that he could not eat. Nor was the outer man neglected. From piles of new clothing the soldiers of Jackson's corps arrayed themselves in the blue uniforms of the Federals. The naked were clad, the barefooted were shod, the sick and wounded were provided with comforts and luxuries to which they had long been strangers. Jackson's men found themselves in possession of all they most required, and they fell to in its distribution with a will to which Peter in his vision was a stranger. But though all was eaten that men could eat, and all was laden that men or means of transportation at hand could bear, there yet remained vast amounts to be destroyed. The first step in Lee's plan of operations against Pope had been taken. Jackson had met with a success that exceeded even the most sanguine hopes of his commander, as high as his hopes may have been raised when he let loose such an agent as Jackson to mar and destroy the plans of such commanders as Halle ck in his chair at Washington, and Pope as his subordinate in the field. Therefore Gen. Jackson made preparation for his second move in the game. And this was, to throw his corps northward upon the old battle-field of Bull Run, taking up a position be- tween Sudley Spring and Groveton, and thus, while con- trolling the Orange and Alexandria turnpike near Grove- ton, remain where he could over the shortest line effect the most rapid junction with Longstreet, who, in command of the remainder of Lee's army, was hastening to pour his veterans through Thoroughfare Gap. And there were other reasons why Gen. Jackson established himself there. 108 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. But now and here to discuss the advantages which this position secured to the Confederates, to meet such con- tingencies as Halleck and Pope might evolve, would be out of place. It will be referred to hereafter. During the afternoon of the 27th preparation was made to burn the doomed supplies at Manassas. This was to occur simultaneously with the evacuation of that place. At night two brigades of Hill's division were thrown south of Manassas Junction, and formed in line of battle, facing in the direction of Bristoe Station, to guard the rear of Jackson's army. As they stood there under arms the conflagration burst upon them. In their front was the re- tiring division of Ewell, the last of Jackson's corps, moving towards Manassas. Beyond them was that portion of Pope's army that was hurrying on eastward along- the line of the railway to Bristoe Station. To the north the divis- ion of Hill was in motion for Blackburn's Ford, thence to march on the direct road to Centreville. Taliaferro, too, was on the march. By the nearest road that led across the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike he pursued the old military road towards Sudley Mills, to halt on the old battle-field of Manassas. In his charge were all the Fed- eral spoils that the Confederates could transport. Ewell's pathway carried him across Bull Run, thence up its north bank, until the Centreville turnpike was reached, when he was ordered to move westward in the general plan of concen- tration. Stuart's cavalry covered the infantry columns. The Confederate cavalry had, on the 27th, pressed the good fortune of the Confederate infantry with wonderful activity. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, with a portion of his com- AUGUST 27TH, 1862, 109 mand, had. pursued the terror-stricken fugitives from the Federal brigade of Taylor, until he ca^Dtured stores and prisoners at Burke's Station, on the Orange and Alexan- dria Eailroad, within but about 12 miles of Alexandria. Nor had other detachments of the Confederate cavalry- been wanting in most zealous endeavor. It is true that their task was not attended with either danger or difficulty. To hang on the outskirts of Pope's army, to raid over all the highways and turnpikes, along which small fragments of Federal foot or Federal horse might be found foraging, was either the sportive effort which Stuart claimed to have found it, Avhenever the Federal cavalry commander, Buford, was not present to oppose, or the serious business wliich Buford always made it whenever he led his men into action. But now Buford was endeavor- ing to find Jackson to the west of Thoroughfare Gap, and Stuart's caA^alry raided with impunity. With their path illuminated by the red flames bursting out from the warehouses, the sutler's stores, and the cars, the rear guard of Hill's division witnessed the smoulder- ing ruins of almost CA'ery article necessary for the outfit of a great army.^ The emotions which such ruin created in Pope may be contrasted Avith the elation which it aroused in Jackson. That both armies should, under the circum- stances, be differently affected could not but follow. The despair of the Federals excited new hopes in the Con- federates. ^See official reports of Generals Jackson, 16W.R., 644; Hill, lb., 670; Stuart, lb., 739; Early, lb., 708; Capt. J. K. Boswell, lb., 651; chief engineer of Jackson's corps, Lieut. -Col. R. L. Walker, Hill's diyision, chief of artillery, lb., 673. 110 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. It has been charged that, but for grave omissions and negligences, Gen. Jackson would have met with disaster at Manassas ; and it has been a popular belief that if Gen. McClellan had forwarded troops from Alexandria as rapidly as he could, this disaster might have been averted. A brief reference to the facts of that campaign will not only show the falsity of this charge, but will give, it may be hoped, a clear insight into the motives that controlled the General-in-chief in Washington. There is no evidence that on the day Jackson cut Pope's line of communication at Bristoe, Halleck was much impressed with the necessity of strengthening Pope's army, or guarding Pope's communications, by troops from Alexandria. Although Pope in his official report bewails the heavy misfortune that happened to him on the night of the 26th of August, through faults and negligences not his own, it cannot be denied that his despatches to Halleck were the sole cause of Halleck's unconcern. That Pope believed the Confederates were marching for the valley of the Shenandoah on the 26th of August plainly appears from his despatches to McDowell; and that he communicated that belief to Halleck, as plainly appears from Halleck's despatch to McClellan as late as 11 o'clock in the morning of the 26th, in which he says ; There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving in large force into the Shenandoah valley," and that " reconnaissances will soon determine." ^ 1 12 W.R., 94. AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. Ill Further instructions given by the General-in-ehief in this despatch to McClellan, who was then at Acquia Creek, overlooking the arrival of troops from the Peninsula, and transferring them to Falmouth, — that he would draw no more troops down the Rappahannock at present, for all would be wanted in the direction of the Shenandoah valley, ^ — only strengthen the conviction that Pope had impressed his fatal blindness upon Halleck. We are not, therefore, surprised that, as one would speak upon matters of little concern, so Halleck, in his despatch of 11 o'clock in the morning of the 26th, informed McClellan that he * ' had better leave Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities were reported there ; " and that ' ' Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportation."^ No doubt there had been irregularities ; no doubt there had been confusion in Alexandria : officers clamoring for transpoi-tation ; managers in despair at the inadequacy of the means of transportation at hand ; new relays of men and material constantly arriving from the old Army of the Potomac ; and a single line of railway, crowded to its utmost capac- ity, and yet making little impression upon the troops, equipments, and stores that poured into Alexandria. Had Halleck known how near Jackson was to that single line of railway while he was sending this despatch, he might, perhaps, have overlooked the irregularities of railway officials, and censured his subordinate, whose false information and erroneous judgment had lulled him into a fatal security. Upon the receipt of Halleck's despatch McClellan U2W.Il., 94. 2 lb. 112 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. sailed for Alexandria. He arrived there at night. The railway was then in the possession of the Confed- erates. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 27th of August Gen. McClellan telegraphed, as his first despatch from Alexandria to Halle ck, that he had just heard that the enemy had burned the railway bridge over Bull Run! The city of Alexandria seemed to McClellan to be quite full of soldiers; but he was told that those remaining there were convalescents chiefly.^ The duties devolving upon the quartermaster were reported as well performed. Gen. McClellan saw nothing to criticise. The officers and agents of the government were hopeful ; their temper was serene. That the Bull Run bridge would be repaired by the morrow McClellan was assured.^ All this was communicated to Halle ck as early as twenty minutes before ten in the morning. It was therefore to be ex- pected that the movements of his old army, not yet com- pleted, should claim a part of McClellan's care. The line of the Rappahannock had been the point along which Pope was mustering his forces. To that point the corps commanded by Fitz-John Porter, and the division of Reynolds, had been despatched. Sumner's corps, en route for the same destination, was, on the 26th, landing at Acquia Creek.'* Burnside was at Falmouth. Two divis- ions of his corps, under Reno, had, as we have seen, moved up the Rappahannock ; and Burnside was charged •12W.R.,94. ''lb, 3 lb. ■* That the Rappahannock could be reached at an earlier period from Acquia Creek than from Alexandria, McClellan gave to Halleck as his reason for disembarking Sumner's corps at Aquia. lb., 94. AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. 113 with hurrying on the troops towards Rappahannock Sta- tion.^ A telegram from Fit z- John Porter to Burnside was next received by Halleck, and transmitted to McClellan. It gave information of Pope's army. Banks was at Fay- etteville ; McDowell, Sigel, Picketts, and Reno were near Warrenton. Reno was on the right. Porter was marching on Warrenton Junction to reenforce Pope. Nothing was said of Heintzelman. A battle was reported by Porter as imminent. Halleck was now aroused. Franklin's corps should march out by some other route than Centre ville, if McClellan preferred, carrying three or four days' provisions. He should move in forced marches and be supplied as fast as possible by railroad. The railway manager, Col. Haupt, should receive direc- tions from McClellan. He had asked them from Halleck.^ There must have been a serious neglect to guard the railroad. This should be immediately remedied. Gen. Casey was directed to furnish McClellan with about 5,000 of the new troops under his command, and Gen. McClellan was ordered to take entire direction of the sending out of the new troops from Alexandria, determin- ing questions of priority in transportation, and the places they should occupy. That Pope's head-quarters were near Warrenton Junction, Halleck knew ; but he could not ascertain the present position of his troops, nor could he get any satisfactory information from the front of the enemy. ^ There had been great neglect and carelessness ' 12 W.R., 94. 2 lb. 3 lb., 95. 114 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. about Manassas. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible, and a competent officer should be sent in that vicinity to take direction of affairs.' McClellan's reply was despatched immediately. Orders had been sent to Franklin to prepare to march at once with his corps, giving information of his means of transporta- tion. Kearny, of Heintzelman's corps, was yesterday at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford. Sumner, with his corps, would commence reaching Falmouth to-day. Couch's division had been sent for at once to come from the Peninsula. McClellan had lent Burnside his per- sonal escort (the first squadron of fourth regular cavalry) to scout down the Rappahannock. Although Halleck may have already received it, McClellan would forward to him all information he might secure, and as fast as received."* Now addressing himself to the task of finding out where Pope was, and where the enemy, McClellan sent a telegram both to Gen. Heintzelman and to Gen. Porter. " Where are you ? " he asked, and " What is the state of affairs ? " He inquired as to the troops in their front, and on their right and left. Where was Pope's left, and what of the enemy? These despatches, with the further information that the enemy had burned Bull Run bridge last night, with a cavalry force, were sent to Warrenton and to Bealeton, with directions to the nearest operator to those places to forward them to the officers designated.^ 1 12 W.R., 94-95. 2 lb., 95. 3 lb. AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. 115 Fears of impending disaster were now crowding fast upon McClellan. His despatclies from this time fortli bear evidence that he was filled with a sense of a heavy respon- sibility. An active quartermaster could have done all that Halleck had thus far required of him. But now steps should be taken to avert the dangers of a defeat of Pope's army. Therefore Halleck was advised that McClellan, in informing Burnside of all that had occurred at Alexandria, had cautioned him to look well to his right flank between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and to guard well his trains moving to Porter. McClellan had fears that the cavalry, who dashed at Bull Run last night, might trouble Burnside. So, the next cavalry that he got hold of he should land, and use to keep open communication between Pope and Porter, as well as to watch the vicinity of Ma- nassas. He had again endeavored to communicate with Porter and Heintzelman from Falmouth. He closed by asking for maps of the present field of operations.^ From this hour onward on the day of the 27th we have no further despatches from Halleck to McClellan. Tele- grams from McClellan to Halleck there are, however, from 8 o'clock in the morning, almost hourly, until 6 o'clock at night. Halleck's silence need not excite won- der. ]\IcClellan's cautions and suggestions, though wise and prudent, could not have failed to fill the soul of Hal- leck with wrath, perhaps with shame. Every word of every one of these messages was courteous, deferential, and patriotic, and yet every word was a reproach. With 1 12 W.R., 95. 116 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. all Halle ck's conceit lie could not but feel the sting. In the plan and in the performance of Pope's campaign, the possibility of a disaster which might open the city of Washington to Lee, Hallecl^ seemed not to have con- sidered. Of that reserved strength v^hich a skilful Gen- eral holds back to retrieve his failing fortunes, or v^^hich he opposes as a barrier behind which his broken ranks may form, and his feeble columns be restored, Halleck had not even spoken to McClellan. At the hazard of being charged with holding up Pope's campaign to de- rision and to contempt, and with the feeling that every suggestion he might make to avert a possible calamity would be used as evidence of his envy and hatred of those who had supplanted him in the field, — a treasonable envy and a malignant hate, damnable enough to lead him to withhold, under the guise of taking measures of precau- tion against Pope's defeat, all means that could enable Pope to win a victory, — McClellan nevertheless pressed upon Halleck telegram after telegram filled with most suggestive inquiries as to the course to be pursued should Pope be overtaken with disaster. Should not Sumner's corps, he asked, be moved here, and united with Frank- lin's ? "Would not a disaster to Pope if he should fight a battle at Warrenton be also a disaster to troops on the lower Rappahannock ? Cannot those troops render their best service in front of Washington ? ^ At five minutes past twelve, noon, it was reported to McClellan that heavy firing had been heard in the vicinity of Centre- ville ; but he could not report to Halleck what had occa- J 12 W.R., 96. AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. IIT sioned it, for he had no cavalry to send out. He could only inform Halleck of the fact, accompanying it with a question as to the works and garrisons for the defence of Washington.^ Franklin was now ordered by McClellan to get his corps in readiness to move at once. Twenty minutes after twelve found McClellan making more minute inquiries of Halleck. He was as anxious for the preservation of Pope's army as he had been for the defence of Washing- ton. His mind dwelt upon every detail that should aid. The bridges over Bull Run, were they sufficient to reen- force Pope, or to afford him means for a retreat ? Was Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success? And if not, should not Gen. Sumner's corps come to Alexandria ? Two gun-boats should be sent to Acquia Creek ; already the works near Alexandria and their gar- risons were being inspected ; and the railway should be seen to as soon as Gen. Casey or any other commanding officer could be found. Whatever he ordered, no time would be lost in carrying it out, was McClellan's conclud- ing assurance to Halleck.^ At fifteen minutes past one in the afternoon the condi- tion of Franklin's corps was made known to Halleck. There were horses enough in his corps for but four guns without their caissons, and no cavalry could be found; therefore, should not Sumner's corps be moved as rapidly as possible for the defence of works in front of Washing- ton? Could Franklin's corps without his artillery or 1 12 W.R., 96. 2 Ibid. 118 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. cavalry effect any useful purpose by moving to join Pope ? Should not Burnside at once evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, covering any of Pope's troops who might fall back in that direction ? Pope's exact position McClellan did not know, nor did he know the enemy's force between Pope and Washington. Did Halleck? Have we force enough in hand, asked McClellan, to form a connectipn with Pope, whose exact position we do not know ? Are we safe in the direction of the valley ? " * Thus, while rendering all possible assistance to Pope, McClellan revealed, in a tone not open to criticism, his fear that Halleck's General was doomed to defeat. In view of all that McClellan had been, in view of the exalted com- mand he had held for his country and before his country- men, of the issues involved in his campaign, and the great trusts that the people had reposed in him, it was not strange that his despatches were filled more with battles and strategic movements than with beef, clothing, and transportation of troops. Who will condemn him, if, perchance, he exposed to reproof the person, who, in elevating such a commander as Pope, had degraded such a commander as himself ; or, who will say that, if, in the performance of his duty, he expressed his own fears of an impending disaster, he was not somewhat justified in the belief that a disaster was inevitable, when incapacity and ignorance confronted an ability as marked as Marlbor- ough's, and a sagacity as unerring as Napoleon's? Within twenty minutes from the time his last message was despatched to Halleck, the disaster attending Taylor's > 12 W.R., 96. AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. 119 brigade in the morning in its contest with Jackson's corps was known at Alexandria.^ Five troopers of tlie Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry — illustrious remnants of a whole company — rode into the camp of the Fifth Wisconsin Regiment to tell the tale of their surprise in the morning, and to brag that they alone remained to reveal it. Then came straggling infantry and more cavalry, with wagons, and then hundreds of fleeing negroes, loaded with packs and babies, filling the roadway for miles as they crowded onward away from the fight at Manassas Junction,^ crowded onward to Alexandria, under the very dome of our own capital, before an enemy whose capital we believed it would require all their own power to defend. That the force opposed to Taylor had many guns, that it numbered 5,000 infantry and was receiving re enforce- ments every moment, and that Gen. Taylor's command was either cut to pieces or captured, McClellan, at thirty- five minutes past one o'clock in the afternoon, reported to Halleck.^ But the end of Federal misfortunes did not come with this disaster. Gainesville was in possession of the enemy. Again was Halleck implored to send cavalry in the direction of Dranesville and Lewinsville, to watch the Potomac. This last disaster confirmed McClellan that the true policy to be adopted in Wash- ington was to garrison the forts in front of Alexandria. * It -was brought b j some of those valiant members of the Twelfth Pennsyl- vania Cavalry who had been driven away so easily in the morning of the 27th, between Bristoe Station and Manassas. » Ai-my of the Potomac, Behind the Scenes, 207, 208. ^ 12 W.R., 96. 120 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. to send cavalry in the direction of the upper Potomac, to observe the movements of the enemy, and to mobilize a corps as soon as possible, but not to move it forward until supplied with artillery and with cavalry. These three expedients he pressed upon Halleck in his despatch of thirty-five minutes past one on the 27th of August, from Alexandria.^ In conformity with these suggestions McClellan ordered Sumner to send to Alexandria the whole of his corps, if he could reach it.^ Couch, with his division, was summoned to embark for the same destination from Yorktown.^ One squadron of cavalry that had now arrived McClellan caused to be at once landed and sent out towards Pope. More cavalry, if there was any at Washington, McClellan begged Halleck to send him. For the defence of Wash- ington, on both sides of the Potomac, McClellan again urged Halleck to provide.^ But while thus taking upon himself the whole catalogue of responsibilities that be- longed alone to the Commander-in-chief, McClellan was oppressed with the consciousness that he was powerless to do more than press forward troops and supplies to Pope. What Halleck had ordered him to do was not what McClellan, under the circumstances, would have advised ; and what he had advised he had no power to perform. It was not strange that then there came over him a feel- ing that interference with his plans for the Army of the Potomac before Richmond was the cause of the disaster then impending over Pope's army before Alexandria. Nor was it to be wondered at that such a feeling should U2 W.R., 96. 2 18 W.R., 692. ^2 W.R., 96-97, "lb., 97. AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. 121 find expression when McClellan fully appreciated that before the magnitude of the task he was absolutely powerless. "Please inform me at once," McClellan asked of Halleck, "what my position is." He did not wish to act in the dark. He was not responsible for the past, nor could he be for the future, unless he re- ceived authority to dispose of the ayailable troops ac- cording to his judgment.^ That the sweetness of Halleck's dreams was somewhat embittered by such despatches can- not be doubted. To be an ignoble factor in Halleck's movements, Halleck was willing to concede to McClellan. But now the sound of Jackson's guns, borne to the cap- ital, carried to the soul of the General-in-chief a feeling of dismay. Again might the salvation of the nation depend upon the skill of McClellan. Bitter, indeed, must have been Halleck's reflections. Should Pope fail, should Lee press forward to the Potomac, and carry his triumphant army into the Northern States, around whom would the old Army of the Potomac rally with such enthusiastic devotion as around McClellan? After all Halleck's plans for the defeat, for the downfall of his rival ; after all his hopes that he might, through Pope's efforts, though without sharing Pope's perils, achieve a success giving assurance that in a distant future he might grow strong enough to fill the chair from wliich he had displaced McClellan; after all his wiles and his ways, his deep schemes and his unwholesome influences, to find himself spoken of with contempt, as a general-in-chief, by his countrymen ; to find himself doomed to a deep, to a 1 12 W.R., 97. 122 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. bitter disappointment, — this was too severe, it was too ex- asperating. Therefore it is not to be wondered at that to all of McClellan's suggestions ranging above the level of a quartermaster's tasks Halleck returned no reply. Not yet had fear opened Halleck's mouth. Nevertheless, did Mc- Clellan continue to press forward despatches filled with information and with most fitting suggestions. It was not until 6 o'clock at night that a copy of Pope's de- spatch to Halleck of 10 o'clock in the morning was seen by McClellan. In this despatch Pope had requested that all forces sent to him should move to his right at Gaines- ville. Halleck had transmitted this copy to McClellan ; and McClellan hastened to avow his readiness to cooperate with Pope's desires. If Halleck wished him to order any part of the force at his disposal to the front it was in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point Halleck might indicate. That force now consisted of about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, of about 2,800 of Gen. Tyler's brigade, and of Col. Tyler's First Connecticut Artillery. The defence of Washington, in this despatch, as in others, appeared as a necessity constantly pressing itself upon McClellan's attention. He had for this purpose rec- ommended that Tyler's artillery regiment should be held in hand ; and he had ordered Gen. Casey not to move his men to Yorktown until further orders.* Notwithstanding, such was the activity and zeal with which McClellan labored on the 27th of August, men of the Halleck type in journalism labored with malignant feelings, that they 1 12 W.R., 97. AUGUST 27TH, 1862. 123 might arouse in the public mind contempt and ridicule for the course McClellan pursued. It was said in a sometime reputable journal that McClellan was ordered by Halleck on the 27th of August to place himself within easy sup- porting distance of Pope ; but that he sat idly at Alexan- dria, thus destroying Pope's justifiable reliances.' Nor was this censure confined to journalists alone. In both the armies of the Potomac and of Virginia there were men whose powers of fault-finding and of complain- ing absorbed their vitality. In the diaries of these days we find the first mutterings of discontent with McClellan, based upon accusations as false as they were malicious. Censorious officers thanked God that they had bidden farewell to the Peninsula, the land of blasted hopes, " the place of our disappointment," the " hot-bed of disgrace to the finest army of modern times." " There are men in the Army of the Potomac to whom Stonewall Jackson's offi- cial report of his splendid yictory at Cedar Mountain gives more joy than would the winning of a splendid suc- cess by McClellan." These are some of the grumblings of the times. They are in that tone and breathe that spirit of malicious feeling which the war department subse- quently imputed to McClellan and to his highest officers. They form the very groundwork upon which rested Pope's accusations of treachery, upon which he attempted to explain his defeat. It may, however, be positively affirmed that the bad hearts that could conceive, or the foul mouths that could utter, such tissues of baseless ^ McClellan from Ball's Bluff to Antietam, pamphlet by Wilkes, from Spirit of the Times, 20. 124 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. falsehoods were confined to but few, and these were of as little consequence as is the author of a book of the war from which I have quoted, who was a surgeon in a West- ern volunteer regiment, and whose book exceeds in false statement and falser inference the works of the most renowned grumblers of Christendom.' But we must turn from a research among the spiteful falsehoods of the day to follow the windings and courses to which Pope resorted to beat and destroy his pursuers. Before Buford's cavalry had confirmed the rumors and reports which McDowell had forwarded to Pope since 10 o'clock in the evening of the 26th, it became evident to Pope that heavy columns of the enemy were approaching the Federal line of communication with Alexandria, and that the whole of Lee's army was moving towards Wliite Plains and Thoroughfare Gap, rather than toward the valley of the Shenandoah. But Pope was not convinced that the reported interruption of his railway communica- tions was a part of the general Confederate plan. The most serious consequences resulting from this daring raid involved, in Pope's estimation, no more than a strong force to repair damages, to keep the road open, and a want of supplies for his army till the road was again made serviceable.'* At an early hour on the morning of the 27th the Fed- eral commander became painfully conscious that, while a movement of his army was a necessity, he was utterly unequal to the task of determining what that movement ' Army of the Potomac, Behind the Scenes, 202, 203. 2 16 W.R., 352. AUGUST 27TE, 1862. 125 slioiild be. He inclined to the abandonment of Warren- ton and the occupation of Gainesville ; but this he would not order until the counsel and guidance of McDowell had been invoked/ Pope must "act promptly in some way," but in what way he frankly confessed he knew not until McDowell gave him liis counsel. Before half-past 8 in the morning McDowell suggested a movement of troops, and at half-past 8 Pope approved McDowell's plans. These plans involved a movement of the Federal army upon Gainesville ; and they were no sooner deter- mined upon than Pope became masterly in his advice and energetic in his orders. Execute the movement you suggest, but you must be careful not to let the enemy know it until the last moment. Send the trains by this way, and call Banks to you. If the movement could be made by dark it would be better. . . , I do not know that it will be safe to wait, but you can tell better than I, as your scouts and lookouts can see the movements of the enemy. Order Banks to send his train off immediately, and also the trains you have. We must get to Gainesville to-night." Pope dis- closed his intention of moving to Manassas to open the road, and of joining McDowell when that was done.^ No time was lost by Gen. McDowell in Ms advance towards Gainesville. At forty-five minutes past 8 Pope was advised of the movements of Sigel's corps, and of the purposes for which they moved; and at the same time McDowell invited the General in command to place him- ^ 16 W.R., 352. 2 lb., 353. 126 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. self near the telegraph mstrument at Warrenton Junction and converse with him.^ Pope replied by averring his in- tention to be at the telegra2Dh office the greater part of the day. 2 Then, through numerous despatches,^ the transfer of all kinds of public property, by wagon or by rail, from Warrenton through Warrenton Junction and Catlett's Station towards Manassas was agreed upon. Then, too, the destination of Banks's corps was changed. To Mc- Dowell we owe it that our command, respectable in num- bers, undaunted by defeat at Cedar Mountain, active, willing, and courageous, was diverted from that pathway which would have thrown us with Hooker, Reno, Porter, Sigel, Reynolds, Ricketts, and King upon Jackson and Longstreet on the old battle-field of Manassas. To repair bridges and mend highways for the safe passage of horse equipments, salt pork, and hard bread is undoubtedly a military duty. But to send, under the circumstances in which Pope found himself, a whole corjDS along a road up- on which no enemy appeared, and where there seemed no reason to apprehend that he would ajDpear, to defend wagon-trains, instead of using it to oppose the enemy, was, as we now know, an error of judgment arising from Mc- Dowell's over-caution. " Had not Banks better retire by way of Warrenton Junction, preceded by his trains ? " * asked McDowell of Pope, at the telegraph office ; and thus the matter was settled. McDowell was directed to send Banks such an order from Warrenton, for, said Pope, he is nearer Warrenton than the Junction ; ^ and Banks was J 16 W.R., 353. 2 lb. 3 lb., 353-354. * lb., 354. ^ lb. AUGUST 27 TE, 1862. 127 ordered by McDoTrell to move upon Catlett's Station. Other matters relating to the marcli by Reno and Kearny on Greenwich were then discussed. Porter's corps, too, was considered, and McDowell was informed that it was on the road. That Sigel would supply Kearny's di^^sion with artillery was settled; for Kearny had none with him.' The condition in which at tliis time Pope found the troops that had joined him from the Army of the Potomac and from North Carolina could not but cause uneasiness. The corps of Fitz-John Porter had neither wagons nor proA'isions, and there were but forty rounds of ammunition to each man. The corps of Heintzelman and the divisions of the ninth corps under Reno were no better supplied. They had no wagons, and provisions with them were get- ting very scarce. So hurriedly had some of these troops been pushed forward that even their artillery had been left behind. This conference between ^McDowell and Pope resulted in a general order for the immediate movement of the Federal army.^ Sigel's corps and ^McDowell's, with Rey- nolds's division added, the whole under the command of McDowell, were ordered to move along the AVarrenton turnpike and reach Gainesville by night. Heintzelman, with Kearny's division of his corps and Reno's divisions of Burnside's, was ordered to move from Catlett's Station to Greenwich, and to be there by night or early dajdight.^ Gen. Fitz-John Porter was to remain at Warrenton ^ Telegraphic communications between Pope and McDowell, 16 "W.R., 350-355. 2 Warrenton Junction, August 27, lb., 70-71. ^ Greemvich is four or five miles from GainesTille. 128 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Junction until Gen. Banks relieved him, when he, too, would push forward for Greenwich. All the troops at Greenwich were to support Gen. McDowell in his opera- tions against the enemy. To Gen. Banks, with his corps, was assigned the duty of covering the movement of the army wagons, which, in immense numbers, and gener- ally from every threatened point, had concentrated around Warrenton Junction. Banks's instructions were minutely detailed. How the train of his own corps was to be guarded, and that it was to move on a road south of the railroad, was as carefully prescribed by Pope as were his instructions provided he encountered the enemy. Long trains of burden cars, heavily laden at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, were to be pushed forward as fast as bridges were replaced and the road was repaired. The defensive position for Banks's corps was to be on the eastern bank of Cedar Run, and this he was to hold as long as possible. If he could not defend the public property until Manassas was reached he should burn it. But Banks was to under- stand that Pope expected a tenacious defence. If he needed assistance. Gen. Fitz-John Porter would aid him. Banks was ordered to keep in constant communication with Porter, whom he would find on his right.^ Nor were the sick forgotten. Those that could be removed must be transported to Manassas in the wagon-train of Banks's corps, even if it necessitated the destruction of much bag- gage and regimental property. Pope deemed it prudent to close his order with an avowal of his belief that Banks 1 That is, in the direction of Greenwich, and easterly. AUGUST 27TH, 1862. 129 would discharge the very important duties which he had put upon him with " intelligence, courage, and fidelity." 1 Upon the receipt of this order McDowell moved to its instant execution. Of his whole command, Sigel, at Warrenton, was the nearest to Gainesville ; Sigel, there- fore, was directed to push a strong force immediately to Buckland Mills, where, on the road to Gainesville, a bridge crossed Broad Run. The remainder of Sigel's corps were, as quickly as possible, to be held in hand to follow his advance. None but ammunition-wagons were to accompany the corps on the road ; the baggage-trains were to proceed to Manassas via Catlett's Station, under charge of Banks. The divisions of Reynolds, King, and Ricketts, in the order named, were to follow Sigel.^ But Sigel had no cavalry ; his own had accompanied Buford, who, at daylight, had moved north-westerly towards White Plains, on that reconnaissance from which Pope had great expectations, about which McDowell made many promises, and of which Halleck made note to McClellan as the one reliable source in settling whether Lee had gone into the Shenandoah valley. So, Bayard, with three regiments, was lent to Sigel. Kearny's division was, as we have seen, coming up to Greenwich to aid Sigel. But Kearny had no artillery. Sigel, there- fore, was directed to hold three of his own batteries in readiness to be sent to him. From Buckland Mills Sigel was ordered to push on with his corps to Gainesville, but 1 16 W.R., 71. 2 15 ^.n., 175. 130 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. not until the divisions of Reynolds, King, and Ricketts closed up on him.' Thus was the first step to be taken by Pope's army in retiring from Warrenton towards Manassas. Gainesville was the objective point ; and in the way towards Gaines- ville lay the important bridge at Buckland Mills. Milroy was ordered to seize it. For this purpose he marched with his independent brigade. A small detachment of cavalry preceded him. In nearly eight miles the bridge was reached. The condition of Pope's cavalry was such that its arrival in advance of the infantry could not have been predicted. But it did arrive. Confederate cavalry, with one piece of artillery, were found on the eastern side of the Broad Run. The bridge was on fire. Milroy claims that Major Krepps charged twice with his cavalry upon the enemy before putting him to flight.^ The bridge was saved, but in a damaged condition. Now appeared the intrepid Milroy, leading his infantry. In fifteen minutes his pioneers had made the bridge safe for his artillery. But Milroy had not waited fifteen minutes. He pushed on with cavalry and infantry in the direction of Gaines- ville. But two of the three and one-half-miles to his goal had been passed, when the road to Haymarket opened before him. It was a dangerous point. If Lee were not travelling westward for the valley of the Shenandoah, it was to be feared he was marching east- ward toward Washington. A mixed force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was posted here, and Milroy sped ^ Official Report of General Irvin McDowell, 16 W.R., 334 et seq. 2 lb., 318. * AUGUST 27 TH, 1862. 131 on. Gainesville drew nigh. It was unoccupied, save by some 200 stragglers from Jackson's army corps. Claim- ing these as prisoners Milroy, without bloodshed or resistance, sat down in GainesAdlle, and halted his brigade for the night.^ With the remainder of his corps Sigel advanced rapidly on Gainesville, leaving Steinwehr's brigade at the bridge over Broad Run.^ Meanwhile the three divisions of McDowell's corps were withdrawn from their advanced positions on the Sulphur Springs and Waterloo roads, and pushed forward to the same place. ^ It was indeed apparent to McDowell that, wherever else he might meet the enemy, it would not be on the banks of the Rappahannock, at Sulphur Springs, nor at Waterloo. For, when the morning of the 27th dawned, the hill-sides and the forests were found silent and deserted. Suspicions of the night before were fully confirmed. Longstreet had followed Jackson in the direction of Salem and White Plains.' The march of McDowell's troops from their station near Warrenton and on the Rappahannock was both long and tedious ; no excitements cheered, no dangers relieved, its monotony. At Xew Baltimore, Reynolds's division of Penn- sylvania reserves came up. The men of this division had ^ Official Report of Brigadier-General R. H. Milroy, commanding brigade, First Corps, 16 W.R., 315-323. 2 Official Report of :\Iajor-General Sigel, lb., 265. 2 McDoAvell to Pope, -i.SO A.M., August 27th, in Avhich positions of his divisions are given, lb., 352. ^ Longstreet's, Hood's, D. R. Jones', and Wilcox's Official Reports, lb., 563-568; 60:1-606: 578-580; 595-597. 132 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. been old comrades with those of King's and Ricketts's two months before at Fredericksburg, while McDowell was awaiting a summons to strengthen McClellanat Richmond. But circumstances which " Stonewall " Jackson had done much to create had sent these divisions to different fields. In all their campaigns they had fought the same enemy under the same leader, although at different times and at different places. That leader was Gen. Jackson. Ricketts had pursued him through the Shenandoah valley after Banks had retreated before him. Reynolds had fought with the Army of the Potomac before Richmond against this untiring and indefatigable chief ; while McDowell, with King's and Ricketts's divisions united, confronted Jackson near the Rapidan and behind the Rappahannock. All these events had transpired since the preceding June. And now, on this 27th day of August, the three divisions of McDowell's corps were reunited in the pursuit of the same invincible Jackson. Reynolds's veterans from the Peninsula showed many traces of the severity of their campaign. Their faces were bronzed, their colors pierced and torn with bullets, and their ranks thinned. Hearty and enthusiastic sounded the welcome cheers, as, once more united with its old com- rades, this division took its place in line, and moved for- ward, to halt at 11 o'clock at night at the bridge across Broad Run. At the same hour Ricketts's division halted at Gainesville, while King bivouacked by the roadside somewhere between the two. By night, McDowell's en- tire command was at or near Gainesville, on the pike from Warrenton to Centreville and Alexandria. YI. THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY. By Btt. Brig.-Gen. CHARLES E. WALCOTT, U.S.V. Read before the Society, May 8, 1882. The following is the title of a eontrihution to the history of the Civil War by General Waleott. History of the Twenty-fibst Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers in THE War for the Preservation of the Union, 1861-1865 ; with Statistics of the war and of rebel prisons. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1882. THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY. IHE short, sjDirited, and bloody battle of Cliantilly (or Ox Hill, as called by the Confederates), which marked the end of Gen. Pojdc's campaigning in Virginia, was fought in the late afternoon and evening of Monday, Sep- tember 1, 1862. It is noted, in the history of the war, by the heroic death of Maj.-Gen. Isaac I. Stevens, commanding the First Division of the Xinth Corps, — a death strictly in the line of duty, and noble to the extreme of chivalrous devotion : and for the equally fearless, but rash self-sacri- fice of the life of Maj.-Gen. Philip Kearny, the brilliant and knightly leader of the First Division of the Third Corps. The Union troops engaged consisted of the First (Stevens's) Division, and the Second (Ferrero's) Brigade of the Second (Reno's) Division of the Ninth Army Corps, reenforced shortly before dark by the Second (Birney's) Brigade, of the First (Kearny's) Division of the Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Two guns of Benjamin's battery ^ (E, Second U.S. Artillery) were engaged in the early part of the fight, and were joined, * Benjamin had with him, also, two guns of Cook's (Eighth Mass.) batteiy. 135 136 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGK towards its close, by Randolph's battery (E, First R.I. Artillery). On the Confederate side the entire left wing of the Army of Northern Virginia (with the exception of the artillery) took part in the battle, under the immediate command of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson. The Con- federates used no artillery, as they had no opportunity to post any in an effective position. Chantilly, from which the Union name of the battle is taken, is a post-office in Fairfax County, situated some two miles north-westerly from the battle-field and about six miles north-west from Fairfax Court-House, on the Little-River turnpike, which enters the Warrenton turn- pike (the direct road between Fairfax Court-House and Centreville), near the hamlet of Germantown, two miles west of Fairfax Court-House. Chantilly is about five miles north of Centreville. The name Ox Hill, given to the battle by the Confeder- ates, is taken from a ridge running across the Little-River turnpike half a mile west of which the principal fighting occurred. The location of Ox Hill is given very exactly in Cooke's **Life of Jackson;"^ also in Gen. Early's report for E well's Division. ^ Mr. Ropes, in his very interesting book, '*The Army under Pope," has fallen into a serious error in placing Ox Hill about midway between the Warrenton and Little-River turnpikes. From the point of intersection of the two roads near Germantown the Little-River turnpike runs north-westerly and the Warrenton turnpike south-westerly ; they diverge ^ Cooke's Jackson, 305. ^ 16 W.K., 714. THE BATTLE OF CEANTILLY. rapidly, and at the point of the engagement are about two miles apart. The battle was brought on by an attempt on the part of Gen. Stevens to reach the Little-River turnpike, and hold at bay a flanking force of the enemy, of unknown strength, said to be advancing by that road, while the Union army was retreating from Centreville to a position near Fairfax Court-House, where Gen. Pope apparently persuaded himself, on the 1st of September, that he would dare to risk the o^eneral eno^agement which he wiselv shtmned near Centreville. T^Hiile Gen, StcA'ens was mov- ing on his desperate mission Gens. McDowell and Hooker were sent to Fairfax Court-House and Germantown : and, taking a strong position with Patrick's brigade and Pdck- etts's division in some old earthworks and along Difficult Run, in front of Germantown, in connection with Buford's cavahy. skirmished with and held their ground against Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery, who were moving on Fairfax Court-House a mile or two in advance of Jackson's infantry.^ The principal fighting, however (the battle of Chantilly proper), occurred about one and a half miles west of the Union position in front of Germantowm, a tliird of a mile south of the Little-River turnpike, and about a mile and a half north of the ^Varrenton turnpike. The official Confederate reports of the battle are full, and, on the whole, fair ; on the Union side there are no official reports throwing any light on the actual fighting except ^ Our cavalry do not seem to have been engaged. Gen. Hooker appears to have made no report. The reports of Gens. McDo-^vell and Eicketts are given here- after; they make no claim to any serious fighting. 138 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. the report of Gen. Birney, which relates to the latter pan of the engagement on the Union left. The Confederate reports (except Gen. Stuart's) may be found in '^Reports of the Army of Northern Ya.," for 1862, and also in **Eebellion Eecord."^ General Stuart's official report seems to have been published only in ** Southern Hist. Soc. Papers," and is exceedingly inter- esting in its detail.^ The Union reports may be found annexed to General Pope's corrected report of January 27, 1863, published in Exec. Docs., 3d Sess., 37th Cong., Vol. YIIL, 1862- '63.3 Qen^ Pope's first report (of September 3, 1862) is published in Vol 11.,^ Report of Officers in Porter's Case," p. 1115;^ but, as before stated, these reports are of little interest in connection with the battle of Chan- tilly, as, with the exception of Gen. Birney, the only Union Generals immediately concerned with the fighting were Kearny, Stevens, and Reno, of whom Kearny and Stevens were killed on the field, and Reno, having made no report, was killed, September 14, in the battle of South Mountain. In addition to the sources above indicated my knowl- edge of the battle is derived largely from my own obser- vation as an ofQcer of the Twenty-first Regiment Massa- chusetts Volunteers, which was on the field from nearly the commencement to the very last of the fighting. I am also much indebted to Gen. Hazard Stevens, then captain and A. A. G. on the staff of the General commanding the First Division of the Ninth Corps, for information relat- ^ 2 A. N. v., 9 Rebellion Record; 16 W.R., 551 tt seq. 23 Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, 281; 16 W.R., 744. 3 16 W.R., 20 d seq. ^ lb., 12 et seq. ^ lb., 513-535. TEE BATTLE OF CHAXTILLY. 189 ins^ to tlie movement of tliat division to the field and its attack upon the enemy. It was by no means the ordered battle which it is rep- resented to have been in the two Union classics on Gen. Pope's Campaign in Virginia, viz. : Gen. Gordon's " Army of Virginia," ^ and Mr. Ropes's " Army under Pope - neither did it occur in the immediate vicinity of the V^ar- renton turnpike, as represented in those books, but a short distance south of the Little-River turnpike, as before stated. The Confederate (as well as the Union) forces boxed the compass pretty well in their facings before the battle was over ; but, as a general description, faced south rather than east, as stated in the books above named ; and no fighting occurred south of the abandoned railroad line shown on the accompanying map and in Gen. Gordon's book. Before proceeding to a detailed account of the battle I will make a brief statement of the position and condition of the Union army at Centreiulle, the movements of Lee's army after the battle of the Second Manassas, and the orders and circumstances under which the action was brought on. At daylight of Sunday, August 31, the Lhiion army, under Gen. Pope, numbering in all about 50.000 men, was (with the exception of Gen. Stevens's First Division of the Xinth Corps, which had been left in an advanced position at Cub Run, about one and a haK miles in front, i.e., S.AV. of Centreville) anywhere and ever^-where in the earthworks tlmown up by the Confed- erates in the previous winter, and close about the village of Centreville, as they had halted during the early even- 1 Gordon, A. of V., 437-449. 24 Campaigns of the Civil War, 144-150. 140 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. ing and niglit previous on their retreat from the battle- field of the Second Manassas. Gen. Pope at once set vigorously to work to straighten things out ; positions were assigned, and before the middle of the afternoon the army was posted as fol- lows : Porter's corps and Franklin's division, on the right and front of the town ; Sigel's corps and Reno's and Stevens's divisions on the left and rear ; McDowell's and Heintzelman's corps (with the exception of Reynolds's division of McDowell's corps, which relieved Stevens at Cub Run) a mile or two to the rear, on the turnpike road leading to Fairfax Court-House.^ During the forenoon Sumner's (Second) corps came up and took position close on the right (north) ; and early in the afternoon Banks's corps, having marched up from Bris- toe Station, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, and took post a mile or two south of Centreville. Gen. Pope's army now numbered a round 60,000 men. Gen. Pope, in his report of January 27, 1863, having come to a realizing sense that his right was not suffi- ciently extended on the 31st of August, states that Sum- ner, as soon as he arrived, was ordered to take post between Centreville and Chantilly, and to occupy Chan- tilly in force ;^ but this statement, like many of Gen. Pope's corrections and explanations, is not in accordance with the best contemporary evidence. He shows no written order to that effect ; but, on the contrary, it appears by his orders to Gen. Sumner, of 3 A.M. and 5.45 A.M. of September 1, directing a reconnoissance by one or two brigades to be pushed not less than five miles due north ' 16 W.E., 16, 44. 2 lb., 45. TEE BATTLE OF CE Ay TILLY, 141 and as far as the Little-Riyer turnpike,^ that he kne^r that Sumner's corps ^as close upon Centreville, although just ^here he didn't know, as in the 3 A.M. order he complains that " the orderly whom you sent to me left me without permission, so that I find it very difficult to find your head-quarters."- At 3 A.M. of the 1st, Gen. Pope had just learned of the capture of a squadron of the Second Cavalry, who had started to accompany Gen. Sumner on his march to Centreville the day before, and, getting by mistake on to the Little-Pdver turnpike, had been surprised and captured, about 2 P.M. of the 31st, by Confederate cavalry a mile or two from Germantown. Added to tliis, m the early evening of the 31st, one of our wagon trains on the Centreville pike had been shelled by a Confederate force coming from the Little-River pike, about half way between Centreville and Fair^fax Court- House. But there is notliing to show that Gen. Pope looked upon these things as meaning anything more than a mere caA^alry raid. The bold and braggart tone of his despatches to Hal- leck, the commander-in-chief, ought to deceive nobody now. They were written in the hope that, somehow or other, he should escape further disgrace by the inaction of the Confederates, by his frightening Gen. Halleck into ordering the army back to ^Vasliington, or by some other special pro^i-dence ; and then the world might be 'For these orders see Gen. Pope's Second official report. 16 AV.R.. 81 et seq. Chantilly and the Little-River pike are about five miles north of Centreville. As a matter of fact no such reconnoissance seems to have been made on Sept. 1. -lb., 81. ; ..... , 142 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, persuaded, or, at least, his adherents might, with some show of reason, continue to claim that the enemy were " badly whipped " ^ at the Second Manassas ; that Gen. Po^De and his army were ready to " fight to the last " ^ at Centreville ; that if the enemy had only dared to attempt to turn his flank (as Pope " fully expected,'*' not ventur- ing, however, to say which flank) he would have had " his hands full." * Fortunately, however, for the truth of his- tory. Gen. Lee did not leave any such door of escape open to our presumptuous and braggart commander, whose general orders in his Virginia campaign will long be quoted as the best specimens of military blasphemy of the war, and whose campaign in the field .will always remain to the careful and accurate student a sad record of bloody miscarriages.^ It was, probably, fortunate for the country that Gen. 1 Pope's despatches to Halleck. 16 W.R., 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87. In the despatches annexed to his second official report he changed the phrase "badly whipped" to "badly crippled." lb., 79. 2 Gen. Pope evidently learned a good deal in this campaign, and his subsequent military career has been honorable, although it has offered no opportunity for brilliant service. One of the best illustrations of the callow and sophomoric swagger with which he entered on his command in Virginia may be found in his testimony of July 8, 1862, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (Part 1, p. 282), in which, after a little mock modesty, he is induced by the committee to admit that, if he had been in command of the army which McClellan had in front of Washington on the 1st of March, he could have marched to New Orleans with it. When he left Corinth the rebels in the West were " dejected, and dispirited, and without hope." While the Army of the Potomac had had everything and done nothing, his victorious troops in the West had gone into action "with the locks of their muskets tied on with strings." .... He also makes the following rather startling statement : "I have seen them" (his Western heroes) "wearing over- coats to hide their nakedness, as they had no pantaloons." THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY. 143 Lee did not force a battle on Sunday or Monday at Cen- treyille. The opj)osing armies were of equal numerical strength, and composed of equally gallant men; but in each — alas for the Union Army of Virginia I — the char- acter and conduct of the respective commanders had produced their legitimate fruit. The Confederate army, led by real masters in the art of war, who were trusted, respected, and loved by fellow-officers and men, was vic- torious, united, and fiercely enthusiastic. The Union army, jealousy-cursed and disunited, was split into two sections, — one, the Army of Virginia, battle-wearied and battle-disgusted, di^eading the leadership of the man under whose command their comrades had been slaughtered in detail ; the other, the Army of the Potomac, hating Gen. Pope as a matter of conscience and duty to their old commander , — a unit only in want of confidence and respect for Gen. Pope and his lieutenants. An illustration of this spirit in the Union army oc- curred in my own experience, and, if I may be pardoned, I will give it. Reno's old brigade (Twenty-first Massa- chusetts, Fifty-first New York, and Fifty-first Pennsyl- vania), about sundown of August 30, were transferred from the right centre to the extreme left of the battle- field of the Second Manassas ; and, most gallantly aided by Graham's battery of the First Artillery, under Gen. Reno in person, alone and unsupported, held the Henry House Hill to the bitter end. Leaving the field about 9 o'clock, as victors, the first troops that we met, about two miles from the battle-field, were some of Franklin's 144 POPE'S VIROmiA CAMPAIGN. division. Never believing in Gen. Pope, or considering ourselves a part of his army, and proud of having pre- served our discipline in the midst of the permitted de- moralizing rapine so general in the Army of Virginia, our hearts leaped with joy as we approached the long- hoped-for reenforcements from our Army of the Poto- mac. But to them we were only a part of Pope's beaten army, and as they lined the road they greeted us with mocking laughter, taunts, and jeers on the advan- tages of the new route to Richmond; while many of them, in plain English, expressed their joy at the down- fall of the braggart rival of the great soldier of the Penin- sula. Enough of this^ I have only digressed into it to show that, try to blind himself as he might. Gen. Pope, feeling in his heart how slight his hold was over the weary and discordant army nominally under his command, did not dare to risk another general engagement, either at Centre- ville or Fairfax Court-House, and that it was probably well for his country that he did not. Regiments, bri- gades, divisions, and corps in the Union army could still be relied upon for gallant and desperate work ; but, as an army, it was without cohesion, and substantially without a commander. Gen. Lee, finding on Sunday, the 31st of August, that the Union army was posted on the heights of Centreville, advanced a brigade across Bull Run in his front, and or- dered Jackson to move at once to turn our right, while Longstreet's men, remaining to clear up the battlefield, were to follow Jackson the next day. During the 31st TEE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY. 145 a cold, drizzling rain fell, but not enough to interfere with military operations. Jackson crossed Bull Run at Sudley Ford (only five or six miles west of Centreville in a straight line), on Sun- day morning, and marching north by obscure country roads struck the Little-River turnpike, down which he moved towards Fairfax Court-House, halting at night well on our right flank and about six miles west of Chantilly. A large portion of the Confederate cavalry, under Fitz- hugh Lee and Stuart in person, preceded Jackson along the turnpike, reaching the immediate vicinity of German- town that day. Longstreet, during the afternoon, drew his corps out to Sudley Ford, and followed Jackson the next day (Monday, September 1). Early on the morning of September 1, a beautiful morning, Jackson moved slowly forward on the Little- River turnpike, reaching Chantilly about noon, while Longstreet was pressing forward to join him. Owing, probably, both to the extreme weariness of his troops and a desire to have Longstreet within close supporting dis- tance, Jackson's three divisions moved from Chantilly up the turnpike slowly and well in hand. Jackson's division (under command of Gen. Starke) had the advance, fol- lowed by Ewell's division (then commanded by Gen. Law- ton), with A. P. Hill's division in the rear. The infantry moved in two columns, one on each side of the road, with the artillery in the road. The Union army, at a terrible disadvantage in the broken-down condition of its cavalry, was unaware of the strength of the Confederate movement until nearly noon 146 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, of Monday, September 1. No definite information is given by Gen. Pope as to bow or bow mucb be tben learned of it. In bis first official report of September 3, 1862, be says, " Neitber on Sunday or Monday did tbe enemy make any advance upon us ; " and " Tbe enemy during Monday again began to work slowly around to our rigbt for tbe purpose of possessing Fairfax Court-House, and tbus turn- ing our rear ; " ^ but be gives no information as to bow be obtained tbis knowledo:e. In bis elaborate report of January 27, 1863, be evi- dently intends to bave tbe reader draw tbe inference tbat tbe discovery was made by a reconnoissance sent out by Gen. Sumner by bis orders on Monday morning, Septem- ber 1.2 Gen. Sumner seems to bave made no report ; but, in testifjdng before tbe Committee on tbe Conduct of tbe War, after saying tbat be reacbed Centreville Sunday morning, tbe Slst of August, be states : I was ordered by Gen. Pope "to place my command in position on bis rigbt, wbicb I did immediately. He afterwards directed me to bave a reconnoissance in force made towards Cban- tilly, wbicb was done." He afterwards told me tbat be bad determined tbat I sbould make an attack on tbe flank of tbe enemy tbe next morning witb 25,000 men. . . . For some reason, bowever, wbicb was unknown to me, instead of making tbis attack, I was ordered that nigbt to retreat from Centreville down tbe turnpike, till I joined on to tbe corps tbat bad preceded me. But I did not find any of tbem until I got to Fairfax Court-House."^ Gen. Sumner says notbing more about tbe reconnoissance. Gen. Heintzelman (commanding Tbird Corps) says, in bis official report, tbat ^ 16 W.R., 16. 2 ib.^ 45. 3 1 C.W., 367. TEE BATTLE OF CEAXTILLY. 147 he and Gen. Sumner were ordered, on September 1, to march at daylight, on September 2, from Centreville in the direction of Chantilly, but that the order was soon countermanded . ^ ^Vhatever reconnoissance Gen. Sumner made it could not haAX been made to the vicinity of Chantilly on the 1st of September. In addition to his own statement, given above, that it was made the day before he was ordered to retreat from Centreville (which was on the evening of Monday, Sep- tember 1), Gen. Stuart says, in his official report, that Robertson's brigade capttired a company of Xew York cav- alry near Chantilly, on Sunday (August 31) ; - and that, joining Jackson near Chantilly on Monday, "I disposed paii: of Eobertson's brigade on his right flank between him and Centreville, and reconnoitred in person; but no force but a small one of cavalry was discernible nearer than Centreville.'"' ^ Col. Bradley T. Johnson, commanding the Second Brigade of Jackson's diAision, the head of Jackson's col- umn, says, in his official report, that his brigade on Monday covered the movement up the Little-River turnpike by holding the road leading from Chantilly to Centreville, and that he remained all day in position, about two and a half miles from Centreville, watching the Union force at Centreville and exchanging shots with Union cavalry. Xone of the Confederate reports make any allusion to any Union reconnoissance on Monday.^ It is probable that General Pope was informed of Jack- son's flanking movement by stragglers from the late battle-field, or by some fortunate accident, — a subject which will be further considered hereafter. His first ' 16 W.R., lU. 2 7^3. 3 xb., 741. 4 lb., 667. 148 POPE'S VIRGmiA CAMPAIGN-. knowledge of a decided movement on his right flank was about noon of September 1, as is shown by his de- spatch to Halle ck, stating that " the enemy is deploying his forces on the Little-River pike, and preparing to advance by that road on Fairfax Court-House," and that he should attack the rebel advance as soon as the move- ment was sufficiently developed ; but trying to frighten Halle ck into ordering him to retreat without a fight by alluding to the smallness of his force, the desperate nature of the impending battle, and the necessity for looking out for the entrenchments around Washington. This de- spatch is annexed to his second official report. It is dated 11 A.M. ^ It will be noticed that Gen. Pope knew very little of Jackson's whereabouts, as he supposed that he had just reached the Little-River pike ; whereas he had reached it the day before, and been moving up it all the morning of September 1. Although Gen. Pope promises an attack upon the Confederate advance, unless Gen. Halleck restrains his fighting ardor, it is interesting to note that all his orders to his army looked simply towards defence. The attach upon the enemy on Monday by Gen. Stevens with a handful of men (about 3,000 all told) was not anticipated by Gen. Pope, but made by Gen. Stevens, on his own judgment, in an unexpected emergency. At 12 o'clock Gen. Pope ordered McDowell (see Pope's and McDowell's official reports)^ to hasten with his corps to Fairfax Court-House, take command of the two brigades there, and occupy Germantown with his whole force, so as to cover the turnpike from Centreville to Alexandria^ (in other words, keep open his line of U6W.R., 84. =^ lb., 45, 344. 2,0,1. THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLT. 149 retreat), — a suggestive order, considering his pretence to Halleck,^ his order to Sumner, ^ and the statement in liis second official report that he then intended to fight near Chantilly.^ Hooker, also, early in the afternoon, was de- spatched to Germantown to take general command of the troops gathering there.* Of tlie same import, but showing more conclusively that, while talking fight near Centreville, he always meant to retreat if Lee really tried to force an engagement, is his despatch of 2 P.M., of September 1, to Col. Torbert, com- manding a brigade at Fairfax Court-House, telling him to send word to Alexandria to hurry up Couch's division and all other troojDS coming from Washington to German- town, and to take up a strong position there, concluding with the paragraph : " The whole army is on the move to join you^^ McDowell acted with great vigor; and, at once putting his troops in motion, hastened towards Fairfax Court-House. Fortunately meeting Gen. Patrick's brigade (Tliird Brigade, First Division, Third Corps, Army of Virginia), who had been sent to Fairfax Court- House early that morning to hold it against the rebel cavalry, and who, after observations from the hill-tops, seeing no signs of the enemy, were on the return march to Centreville, Gen. McDowell at once diverted them into the old intrenchments across the Little-River turnpike near Germantown, previously alluded to.^ This brigade was posted with two guns bearing upon the turnpike before 4 o'clock in the afternoon, just in time, in con- junction with some of Buford's cavalry and Gen. Ricketts's (Second) division of tlie Third Corps, to receive and 116 W.R., 81, 82. 2xb., 82. 3 lb., 45. nb., 84. 5 lb., 85-86. « lb., 344. 150 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. repulse Stuart's cavalry. This statement of the seryice rendered by Gen. Patrick's brigade was made to me, through Gen. Hazard Stevens, by Col. Chas. McClure, of Gen. Patrick's staff. Gen. Stuart's official report con- firms it fully. The only loss suffered by the Union troops in this skirmishing with Stuart in front of Germantown seems to have been by the Twentieth New York Infantry, which suffered a loss of about 20 in killed and wounded. To aid in securing time to get his army to the new position near Fairfax Court-House, Gen. Pope, early in the afternoon, sent Reno's command to gain and hold the Little-River turnpike at a point some two miles east of Chantilly. Gen. Pope has made no statement in his reports of the orders given by him to Reno's command, and no record of them appears to have been preserved. Gen. Hazard Stevens, then Captain and Adjutant-General of his father's division (First Division, Ninth Corps), in- forms me that two cavalry-men came from Gen. Pope soon after 1 P.M. with orders for the troops of the Ninth Corps (which was then under Gen. Stevens's command, as Gen. Reno, commander of the Second Division and the ranking officer, was sick and off active duty) to march at once across the fields to the Little-River turnpike, take a position across it, and hold in check a Confederate force said to be advancing by that road towards Fairfax Court- House. These men were under orders to accompany Gen. Stevens as guides on the march, and did so. As they rode with Capt. Stevens, in advance of the division, they in- formed him that, while foraging down the Little-River pike that morning, they had seen a large body of Con- THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLT. 151 federate infantry moving east, had ridden back at once and informed Gen. Pope, and liad then been directed by him to guide Gen. Stevens to a point on the turnpike some distance in advance of the place vliere they had noticed the head of the Confederate column. Getting his command under arms with all possible haste Gen. Stevens moved rapidly towards the indicated point, his division (the First) haAung the lead, followed shortly by the Second Brigade of the Second (Reno's) Division, the First Brigade of wliich had been so se- verely handled at Manassas, on the 29th of August, that it was called on for no subsequent duty during the campaign. Moving a third of a mile to the AVar- renton pike, which he followed a couple of miles toward Fairfax Court-House, Gen. Stevens left the pike, and, taking a cart-path leading off it to the left (north), struck out for the Little-River turnpike. After a march of a mile and a half from the Warrenton pike, when moving along elevated ground in open country, his hopes of being able to gain a position across the turnpike before the enemy came up were dashed by running on a skirmish line in his front, 150 yards away. The Confederate skirmishers were near the abandoned railroad line shown on the plan : behind them was open ground and a large cornfield, and beyond these fields, and quarter of a mile in Stevens's front, were thick woods, which also projected on his right nearly to the old railroad location. A strong skirmish line was thrown out to the front, under the direction of Capt. Stevens, and the enemy's 152 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN, skirmisliers driyen across the open land and cornfield into the woods beyond, from which the fire of an ex- tended line was opened, and Stevens's skirmishers fell back to the outer edge of the cornfield, the enemy not pursuing, although a single Confederate regiment ad- vanced from the woods in line of battle on the (Union) right of the cornfield, but immediately retired again to the woods. Meanwhile, Stevens's approach having been noticed, Jackson was hurrying Branch's and Brockenbrough's brigades into position to strike him. Gen, Stevens, who was watching the development of affairs from a wooded knoll near the old railroad, as his skirmishers began to come in set to work to throw his division of six regiments into a column of attack. The division numbered, all told, about 2,000 muskets, by actual count, just half the number with which it had left Fredericksburg to join Gen. Pope's army three weeks before ; and was formed in column with brigade front and three lines deep. The leading brigade, com- manded by Col. David Morrison, of the Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders), was composed of the Seventy- ninth New York and Twenty-eighth Massachusetts regi- ments ; the second line (Col. B.C. Christ's brigade) was composed of the Fiftieth Pennsylvania and Eighth Mich- igan; the third line (Col. Daniel Leasure's brigade) was composed of the One Hundredth Pennyslvania and Forty-sixth New York. This column of attack consisted of every Union soldier on the field at the time, except the artillerymen with the guns of Benjamin's battery THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLT. 153 which were placed in position on the knoll referred to. The only support then moving to the field was Reno's old brigade of three regiments (Twenty-first Massachu- setts, Fifty-first New York, and Fifty-first Pennsylvania), then half a mile in the rear. Nothing else was between Gen. Stevens and the Warrenton pike, by which he knew that the main army was in full retreat. The at- tack about to be made was Gen. Stevens's attack, for, although Gen. Reno accompanied his men to the field, and took some part in putting in the troops after Gen. Stevens's death, he considered himself off active duty, from sickness, as before stated, and let Gen. Stevens take the entire responsibility of what was to be done in the unexpected emergency which had arisen. Charged with this responsibility. Gen. Stevens, satis- fied that a strong Confederate force was in his front, which he believed was about to attack him, came to the quick conclusion that a sharp charge on his part was better policy than to receive an attack, or wait to allow his small force to be flanked in its position. Besides, he was under orders to gain the Little-River pike, and from the elevated ground on which he had just been moving he had seen the wagons on the Centreville pike hurrying towards Fairfax Court-House, and felt the greater need of showing a bold front. The time for action was short, as night was fast coming on, with a heavily clouded and threatening sky. General Stevens had formed his men for the attack with great rapidity, and his column was ready to move as soon as his skirmishers had come in. At about half-past 4 154 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. o'clock he gave the order to advance, first sending Capt. Belcher, provost-marshal on the division staff, back to the Warrenton pike, to report that his division was en- gaged with a heavy force of the enemy, and must have support, with orders to give the message to Gen. Pope, if he could find him at once, if not, to every corps and division commander that he could find until support was furnished. Dismounting from his horse the General had taken post in the centre of the charging column, and, to aid in holding the men to their work and driving the charge home with all possible vigor, had assigned a member of his staff to each of his regiments ; his Adjutant-General (his son, Capt. Hazard Stevens) being assigned to the Seventy-ninth New York, of which regiment the General had formerly been Colonel. The column moved forward across the open land, with the left skirting through the cornfield, some hundreds of yards, steadily and in silence, without a shot being fired, until they came to within 75 yards of a rail fence on the edge of the woods bordering the fields ; then, from Branch's brigade of five North Carolina and Brockenbrough's of three Virginia regiments, a terrific fire of musketry was opened from the cover of the fence, and the Seventy-nintJi and Twenty-eighth, suffering terribly, came to a halt. To be checked there in the open ground was to be lost; the colors of the Seventy- ninth were down, and the column wavered. Passing by his son, who had fallen wounded in the hip and arm, Gen. Stevens seized the flag of the Seventy-ninth, and ran in front of the column, shouting, " Follow me, my High- TEE BATTLE OF CEANTILLY. 155 landers ! " The Tvavering column moved on again with, resistless force ; surging up to the fence, they threw it over and gained the edge of the woods, breaking Branch's brigade, and forcing back Brockenbrough ; but Gen. Stevens, their devoted leader, was now lying dead upon the broken fence, a rebel bullet through liis brain, with the colors of his Highlanders still held firmly in liis grasp. These colors, presented to his widow on the muster-out of the regiment, are now a cherished heirloom in his family. For the next hour the battle on the Union side was a desultory fight of regiments, as the enemy hurried Gregg's brigade of six South Carolina regiments, Pender's of four North Carolina regiments, Thomas's of four Georgia, and Archer's of five Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama regi- ments, to cover and recapture the position gained by Stevens's diAision in its superb charge upon the Con- federate right : while, seriously threatened as they supposed on their front and left, Jackson's division (then com- manded by Starke) left the field in a causeless panic, and Ewell's division (then commanded by Lawton),in much confusion and uncertainty, was falling back or moving from right to left. In the midst of it a terrifi^c thunder- storm with a deluge of rain, which burst upon the field, brought on an early night, and added to the panicky state of the Confederates, rendering rapid or effective movements almost impossible. Just as Stevens's di^dsion gained the edge of the woods Reno's old brigade came to the front, commanded by Col. Edward Ferrero of the Fifty-first New York, under orders from Gen. Reno to cross the railroad 156 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, line and enter the woods at some distance on Gen. Stevens's right, while Benjamin's guns were shelling the interval. What the brigade was expected to do when it got into the woods is micertain. Gen. Reno stated soon afterwards that he ordered Col. Ferrero simply to take position to cover Stevens's right ; while the order, as communicated from Col. Ferrero to the Twenty-first Mas- sachusetts, was to move through the woods until we found the enemy. The Fifty-first New York, the leading regiment of the brigade, entered the woods half a mile from Stevens's right, and soon coming upon the enemy (by Gen. Early's official report for Ewell's division, probably Hayes's brigade of that division), became somewhat engaged, and suffered a small loss (8 wounded and 5 prisoners) ; the Twenty-first Massachusetts, crossing through a deep rail- road-cut, was then thrown into the woods in line of battle a little to the left of the Fifty-first New York, and moved rapidly forward from quarter to half a mile before they encountered the enemy ; the Fifty-first Pennsylvania entered the woods to the right of the Fifty-first New York, and were not engaged. Gen. Early's official report for Ewell's division shows conclusively that the movement by the Fifty-first New York, followed by the advance of the Twenty-first Mas- sachusetts, being mistaken in the fierce thunder-storm which had just broken for an attack in force, caused the panicky retreat of Hays's brigade, and shook Jackson's division so much as to cause Gen. Starke to withdraw it from tlie fie Id. ^ 1 10 W.R., 715. THE BATTLE OF CITAXTTLLY. 157 Tlie Twenty-first moved blindly on in the pouring rain until it ran upon a portion of Early's brigade (the Thir- teenth, Twenty-fifth, and Thirty-first Virginia regiments), and probably also upon a part of Trimble's brigade, with whom they had a terribly bloody engagement, and soon retired from the woods, the enemy not pursuing. There was no other fighting on the Union right during the battle. By this time the regiments of Stevens's division, hav- ing expended their ammunition, had been withdrawn (or retired) from their position along the edge of the woods to the A'icinity of a farm-house north of the old railroad line ; and Birney's brigade, which had come up most opportunely, was hotly engaged in a position a little to the left of the ground on which Stevens had fought, and close on the Confederate right, wliich was now held by Gregg's brigade, what there was left on the field of Branch's brigade, and two of Pender's regiments ; while Thomas's brigade, supported by two of Pender's regi- ments, was silently moving to attack Birney's exposed right ; Randolph's battery being in position on a knoll to the north of the old railroad line, and about an eighth of a mile from Birney's right. The rain had now ceased, and, although it could hardly have been later than half-past 6 o'clock in the evening, the atmosphere was thick, and the sky still so heavily overcast, that night coming on prematurely made it im- possible to distinguish any object clearly more than a few rods away. As the shattered Twenty-first Massachusetts regiment emerged from the woods, Gen. Kearny, who had 158 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, just arrived upon tlie field, and was searching for troops to cover Birney's right flank, rode full upon us, and in fierce haste ordered the regiment to move on the run to take post on Birney's right, the position of whose line was indicated only by the flashes of their muskets. When Gen. Kearny came upon us there was hardly a musket in our line that could be fired, as our disastrous fight in the woods had occurred in the midst of the terrific thunder-storm which had soon rendered the guns unserviceable. The officer in command of the regiment at the time begged the General to allow them a few moments to draw the wet charges from the guns, but was refused, with a hot sneer at our cowardice, and the threat that unless the regiment moved instantly, as ordered, he would turn a battery upon us,^ emphasizing his threat by riding from us directly towards Randolph's battery, posted a few rods in our rear, and which was then firing with solid shot (its only ammu- nition) into the woods across the cornfield. The General, fearful for Birney's right, and perhaps, also, somewhat un- duly excited by the reply provoked by his imputation upon the valor of the regiment, at once sent an officer from the battery to us, with his compliments, coupled with the assurance that it would play upon us unless the order given was instantly obeyed. Luckily two of our com- panies, which had been detached in the woods to cover our flanks, had escaped the ambuscade into which the others had fallen, and had now joined us with serviceable guns, and the regiment, about two hundred strong, moved across 1 Gen. Kearny's orders and remarks were addressed to the wi'iter, who happened to be in command of the regiment at the time of his first approach. THE BATTLE OF CHAN TILLY, 159 the open ground towards tlie cornfield and the front of Birney's right, deploying a thin skirmish line to cover our rio'ht and front as we advanced. As our skirmishers came up to the rail fence of the corn- field they were fired on by Thomas's skirmishers, whose brigade, with two of Pender's regiments, was in the corn- field and coming from the woods, well on Birney's right. Crossing the line of the fence we soon halted in the corn, under a dropping fire from the enemy. Gen. Kearny was following us up closely, and as we came to a halt fiercely tried to force us forward, saying that we were firing on our own men, and that there were no rebels near us. We had the proof in two prisoners — an ofiicer and private of a Georgia regiment — brought in by our skirmishers, beside the warning cries of " Surrender I " coming both from our right and front ; but, unfortunately, Kearny's judgment seemed unable to appreciate the existence of the peril which his military instinct had caused him to guard against. Lieut. Walcott, of the brigade staff, took our prisoners to him, saying, " General, if you don't believe there are rebels in the corn, here are two prisoners from the Forty-ninth Georgia, just taken in our front." Crying out fiercely, " you and your prisoners ! " the Gen- eral, entirely alone, apparently in uncontrollable rage at our disregard of his peremptory orders to advance, forced his horse through the deep, sticky mud of the cornfield past the left of the regiment, passing within a few feet of where I was standing. I watched him moving in the murky twilight through the corn, and, when less than twenty yards away, saw his horse suddenly rear and turn, 160 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, and lialf-a-dozen muskets flasli around him : so died the intrepid soldier, Gen. Philip Kearny ! Diverted by our movement from their designs upon Birney's brigade, the enemy surged up against our front and right flank, took what fire we could give them at a few paces' distance (which they returned with interest), and, in the dark, ignorant of our weakness, allowed us to withdraw from their front without pursuit, and in a few minutes also drew back themselves from the cornfield to the woods behind it. Except a few scattering shots on Birney's front, which soon ceased, the battle of Chantilly was now over, neither side having permanently gained a foot of ground in the engagement. During the night Gen. Sumner's command, which had remained at Centreville, fell back on Fairfax Court- House, and before daylight of September 2 the Union troops were withdrawn from the field of Chantilly and the Germantown front, and, halting for an hour or two near Fairfax Court-House, with the rest of the army completed the retreat to the defences of Washington and Alexandria. Gen. Birney, in his ofiicial report of the fight, says that, arriving on the field and going to the front, under orders from Gen. Reno, he found the division of Gen. Stevens retiring in some disorder before the enemy, the officers in command of regiments stating that their ammunition had been exhausted. He immediately ordered forward the Fourth Maine, which gallantly advanced, and was soon in active conflict ; the One Hundred and First New York, Third Maine, Fortieth and First New York, were succes- TEE BATTLE OF CEAXTILLY. 161 sivelT tlirown forward and held tlie enemy, snstainino- unflincliingly a very liea^y fire from a superior force. Gen. Kearnv, now arrhing on the field, went to ex- amine the gronnd on the right where Birney had asked to have a brigade posted to fill the gap caused by the withdrawal of Stevens's division. Kearnv not returning, Birnev assumed command of the division, and, ordering" forward Robinson's and Poe's brigades (the First and Third brigades of Kearny's division), relieved his tired regiments, and held the battle-gronnd without further fighting until 3 o'clock A.M., of September 2, when his di^fision followed Eeno's command to Fairfiix Couit-House ^ and the defences of "Washington. The A'ery incomplete returns indicate that the losses in the fight on the Union side were not less than 1.000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners ; while the enemy lost about 500 men in killed and wounded, besides a few prisoners. The Confederate loss is taken from official re- turns ; the Union loss is an estimate, based principally on returns wliich were furnished me by commanding officers of regiments, and through the Adjutant-Generals of Xew York, Pennsylvania, and Micliigan. Information as to Union losses has also been obtained from the following publications: "Bates's History Pennsylvania Volunteers," " Maine in the "War of the Rebellion, " and " Michigan in the W^ar." There had been, so far as I have been able to discover, no instance, except in the case of Poe's brigade (the only loss in which was four men on picket during the night), where the loss of any regiment on the Union side was officially reported. U6 W.R., 418. 162 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, The losses, thus ascertained, are as follows : — Confederate Loss. — Official. A. P. Hill's division : 39 killed, 267 wounded. Swell's division : 24 killed, 151 wounded, and a few missing (number not given). Uniois- Loss. In Ninth Corps, Army of the Potomac : — First (Stevens's) Division. Brig.-Gen. Isaac I. Stevens, commanding, killed, and Hazard Stevens, Captain and A.A.G., severely wounded. I have no report of other casualties on the division staff. First Brigade (commanded by Col. B.C. Christ) : — Eighth Michigan, 7 killed, and many wounded (num- ber not given). Fiftieth Pennsylvania, 7 killed, and many wounded (number not given). Second Brigade (commanded by Col. Daniel Leasure) : — One-hundredth Pennsylvania, 2 killed, and 34 wounded. Forty-sixth New York, suffered severely, but loss not reported. Third Brigade (commanded by Col. David Morrison) : — Seventy-ninth New York, 40 killed and wounded (no separate report as to each). Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, 15 killed, 79 wounded and 5 missing. TEE BATTLE OF CEANTILLY. 163 Second (Reno's) Division. Second Brigade (commanded by Col. Edward Ferrero) : — Twenty-first Massacliiisetts, 38 (including 6 commis- sioned officers) killed, 76 wounded, 26 prisoners. Fifty-first Xew York, 8 wounded, 5 prisoners. Fifty-first Pennsylvania ; if there was any loss none is reported. Third Corps, Army of the Potomac : — First (Kearny's) Division, Ma j .-Gen. Philip Kearny, commanding, killed. First Brigade (commanded by Brig.-Gen. J. C. Robin- son) : — Suffered no loss. Second Brigade (commanded by Brig.-Gen. D. B. Birney) : — Third Maine, 4 killed, 38 wounded, 8 missing. Fourth Maine, 8 killed, 54 wounded, 2 missing. Fortieth New York, 163 killed, wounded, and missing (no separate report as to each). First New York, loss not reported. Thirty-eighth New York, loss not reported. One-hundred and First New York, loss heavy, but not reported. Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania, loss, if any, not reported. Third Brigade (commanded by Col. O. M. Poe) : — Second Michigan, 1 killed, 1 wounded (official). Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania, 1 killed, 1 missing (official). 164 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. No other loss was suffered in the brigade. In front of Germantown, the Twentieth New York, of the Third (Gen. Patrick's) Brigade, of the First Divis- ion, Tliird Corps (Gen. McDowell's), of the Army of Virginia, seem to have been the only troops engaged, and suffered a loss of about 20 men in killed and wounded. The only official reports of any value relating to the skirmishing in front of Germantown are by Gens. Mc- Dowell and Ricketts. Gen. McDowell's report is as follows : On the 1st of September I received your order, herewith, to move immediately to Germantown to in- tercept the march of the enemy, then moving down the Little-River (or Aldie) turnpike to Fairfax Court-House. This was complied with within a few minutes after its receipt, and the corps was in position at Germantown in time to receive the enemy at the crossing of the Difficult. Here Ricketts' division was drawn up, under the direction of Maj.-Gen. Hooker, with a battalion thrown across the valley of the stream, and, opening on the enemy's advance, held it in check at the time Reno's corps attacked him in flank and repulsed him."^ Gen. Ricketts' report for his division (Second Division, Third Corps) says only: " On the 1st September we took up position on the Aldie road [Little-River pike] , acting in conjunction with Gen. Reno's division, and held this point until the 2d September, when, in compliance with orders, we fell back to Hall's Hill, near Washington." ^ » 16 W.R., 344. 2 lb., 385. THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY. 165 Gen. Stuart, in his official report of the part taken by his command in the battle of Chantilly, after stating his arrival at Ox Hill, says, " I first tried to force, with some skirmishers, our way down the turnpike [Little-River turnpike] toward Fairfax Court-House, but the wooded ridges were firmly held by infantry and artillery, and it was plainly indicated the enemy would here make a stand." The report then goes on to state that, Jack- son having halted for Longstreet to come up, Stuart, with Lee's brigade of cavalry, moved round toward Flint Hill, two miles north of Fairfax Court-House, in the thunder-storm which occurred shortly before dark; but, finding that the hill was occupied in force, returned at once to the vicinity of Germantown. He further says, referring to the time which elapsed while he was makino; this movement on Flint Hill, " Meanwhile a heavy engagement had taken place on Jackson's right, the enemy ha^dng penetrated to his flank by way of Milieu's house."! Gen. Jackson says, in his official report: "It being ascertained, next morning [Sunday, August 31], that the Federal Army had retreated in the direction of Centre- ville, I was ordered by the commanding general to turn that position, crossing Bull Eun at Sudley Ford ; thence pursuing a country road until we reached the Little- Eiver turnpike, which we followed in the direction of Fairfax Court-House until the troops halted for the night. Early next morning (September 1), we moved forward, and late in the evening, after reaching Ox 1 16 W.R., 744. See note, 192 supra. 166 POPE'S VTRGINIA CAMPAIGN: Hill,^ came in contact with tlie enemy, who were in position on our right and front, covering his line of retreat from Centre ville to Fairfax Court-House. Our line of battle was formed, General Hill's division on the right, Ewell's division. General Lawton command- ing, in the centre, and Jackson's division. General Starke commanding, on the left, all on the right of the turn- pike road. Artillery was posted on an eminence to the left of the road. The brigades of Branch and Field, Col. [J. M.] Brockenbrough commanding the latter, were sent forward to feel and engage the enemy. A cold and drenching thunder-shower swept over the field at this time, striking directly into the faces of our troops. These two brigades gallantly engaged the enemy, but so severe was the fire in front and flank of Branch's bri- gade as to produce in it some disorder and falling back. The brigades of Gregg, Thomas, and Pender were then thrown into the fight. Soon a portion of Ewell's divis- ion became engaged. The conflict now raged with great fury, the enemy obstinately and desjoerately contest- ing the ground until their Generals, Kearny and Stevens, fell in front of Thomas's brigade, after which they retired from the field." ^ A very mistaken idea of the battle has become prevalent, from widely circulated works which have been published on the campaign of which it was the closing engagement. These represent the battle to have occurred in the imme- ^ The distance from Pleasant Valley, which Jackson left in the morning, to Ox Hill is but nine miles ; an interesting fact, as sliowing the slowness and caution with which he was moving. ^ 16 W.R., 647. TEE BATTLE OF CHANT ILLY. 167 diate vicinity of, and in an attempt by Jackson to gain the Centreville pike, instead of being, as it really was, a battle forced npon Jackson to enable bim to maintain his own hold upon the Little-River pike until he was joined by Longstreet. A few further extracts from Confederate official reports bearing upon this matter are therefore given. It may be added that no report on the Union side by any officer, who was near enough to the fighting to have an opinion of any value on the subject, represents the fight to have been in the immediate vicinity of the Centreville pike. Gen. Lee's despatch to President Davis, dated Chantil- ly, September 3, 1862, gives the following concise account of the battle : — " The next morning [Aug. 31] the enemy was discov- ered in the strong position at Centreville, and the army was put in motion toward the Little-Eiver turnpike, to turn his right. L^pon reaching Ox Hill, on September 1, he was again discovered in our front on the heights of Germantown, and about 5 P.M., made a spirited attack upon the front and right of our column, with a view of apparently covering the withdrawal of his trains on the Centreville road and masking his retreat. Our position was maintained with but slight loss on both sides. Maj.-Gen. Kearny was left by the enemy dead on the field. During the night the enemy fell back to Fairfax Couit-House."! Branch's, Gregg's, and Pender's brigades, of A. P. Hill's division, bore the brunt of the fight, and their reports are of special value. n% W.R., 559. 168 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Gen. Branch was killed at Antietam ; Gen. Lane, suc- ceeding to the command of his brigade, made the follow- ing report of date Nov. 14, 1862 : — " On Monday afternoon, about 4 o'clock, we came up with the enemy again at Ox Hill, near Fairfax Court- House, on the Alexandria and Winchester turnpike " (Little-River pike), " when the engagement was immedi- ately opened. This brigade pressed eagerly forward through an open field and a piece of woods to the edge of another field where we were for a short time exposed to the enemy's infantry fire without being able to return it. An attempt was made to flank us on the right, and the Eighteenth regiment was immediately detached from the centre of the brigade and ordered to the right to pre- vent the movement, which it did, sustaining a deadly fire, unsupported. The enemy's direct advance was through a field of corn, in which he sustained great loss, notwithstanding most of our guns fired badly, on account of the heavy rain which fell during the engagement. On learning that our ammunition was nearly out Gen. Branch made known the fact, and was ordered to hold his position at the point of the bayonet. We remained where we were until dark, when the whole command fell back to the field in rear of the woods. The Twenty- eighth, cold, wet, and hungry, was then ordered back to the field of battle, to do picket duty for the night, without fires. This engagement is regarded by this bri- gade as one of our severest."^ 1 16 W.R., 677. TEE BATTLE OF CEANTILLY. 169 Branch's brigade lost 106 killed and wounded, and 2 missing. Gen. Gregg was killed at Fredericksburg. The report for his brigade was made by Gen. McGowan, of date Feb. 9, 1863. After describino^ the o-eneral flankino^ movement by Jackson's troops, after the second battle of Manassas, he goes on to say that they moved up the Little-River pike towards Fairfax Court-House, on September 1, '*and late in the evening, near Ox Hill, suddenly came in contact with the enemy, who was already in position on the right and front, covering his line of retreat from Centreville to Fairfax Court- House. While on the march the skirmishers suddenly commenced firing, and the brigade quickly formed in line of battle under a heavy fire. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth South Carolina Volunteers were posted in front, the Twelfth South Carolina Volunteers support- ing the Fourteenth, and Orr's rifles supporting the Thirteenth, and the First South Carolina Volunteers in reserve. In this order, with loaded muskets and fixed bayonets, they were immediately pushed upon the enemy south of the turnpike. They advanced rapidly to afgnce ; the Twelfth was thrown out on the left of the Fourteenth to lengthen the line, and the rifles were also thrown for- ward. After a short but very brisk and severe contest they drove the enemy back. A cold and drenching thun- der-shower swept over the field during the engagement, and rendered many of the guns unfit for use. The enemy withdrew, and we slept upon the field. The brigade went into action unexpectedly, but behaved extremely well. 170 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. For the time they were engaged and the small number present their loss was heavy, being in the aggregate 104 killed and wounded, including some valuable officers." ^ Gen. Pender, in his report of the operations of his brigade, made October 14, 1862, says: "In the after- noon, at Ox Hill, the head of the column coming in contact with the enemy, my brigade was for a few moments ordered under cover to be in support. Yery soon I received orders from Gen. Jackson to go to the support of Col. Brockenbrough, who reported he was hard pressed. I moved forward several hundred yards, when I came in rear of Col. Brockenbrough's brigade, which caused mine to be thrown slightly out of order, two re2fiments bearino^ to the rio-ht and thus o^ettins; separated from the others before I saw the trouble. The woods were quite thick. I, however, moved them on, bringing two to the support of Col. Thomas and the others to the assistance of Gen. Branch, who was some distance to the right. My brigade was thus placed between the two above-named brigades, with a short interval in my centre. Only the Sixteenth and Thirty- fourth North Carolina, on the right, were actively engaged. After reachinsr the edsre of the field in which the enemv were posted no, attempt was made to advance. My two regiments suffered very severely from direct and flank fire. This continued till about dark, I having previously caused my fire to cease. Col. Eiddick and Lieut.-Col. Miller, of the Thirty-fourth, both received wounds of which they died. Capt. Stowe, commanding Sixteenth North Carolina, was also wounded." ^ U6 W.R., 682. 2 lb., 698. THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY. 171 Col. Thomas, in the report for his brigade, made Octo- ber 26, 1862, says merely: " On Monday, September 1, near Germantown, the Third Brigade [Thomas's] was ordered to the support of General Gregg. After a sharp conflict with a hody of the enemy they were driven back, and the field was held by our troops that night." ^ I have not been able to find any report for Brocken- brousfh's brio-ade. Lieut. -Gen. Longstreet's report, made Oct. 10, 1862, contains the following mention of the battle of Chantilly : " Crossing the run [Bull Eun, at Sudley Ford] on the following day [Monday, Sept. 1], the command marched for Chantilly via the Little-River turnpike. The enemy was reported in position in our front as we reached Chantilly, and he made an attack upon General Jackson before my troops arrived. He was repulsed, however, before my re-enforcements got up and disappeared during the night." 2 Major-Gen. D. R. Jones's division of Longstreet's corps were the first troops to join Jackson at Chantilly, and I will conclude my extracts from the Confederate official reports, and my account of the battle, by quoting what he says of the position at Chantilly, in the report for his division, made Dec. 8, 1862: " On the morning of the 31st I took up line of march in the direction of Sudley Ford, crossing at it and marching to Chantilly the next day, whence, under orders from Gen. Longstreet, I sent Toombs' and Anderson's brigades to the support of 1 16 W.R., 703. 2 lb., 566. 172 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, General Jackson, who was engaged with the enemy at Ox Hill. These brigades took up line of battle on the right of the turnpike, and slowly advanced into the woods bordering it, supposed to contain the enemy. Night coming on and no enemy being visible, my troops were withdrawn to the road for bivouac." ^ 1 16 W.R., 580. CEANTILLY REVISITED, 173 A REVISIT TO THE FIELDS OF MANASSAS AND CHANTILLY. By Bvt. Beig.-Gen. CHARLES F. WALCOTT, U.S.V. SuhmiUed to the Society, Nov. 26, 1883. Accompanied by Gen. Hazard Stevens, I revisited the battle-grounds of tlie Second Manassas and Cliantilly on tlie ISth, 19th, and 20th of May, 1883. Taking horses at Manassas Junction early in the morn- ing of the 18th, by 10 o'clock we reached the Henry House, on the historic Henry-House hill, vhere Jackson and his men won the proud title " Stonewall," in the First Manassas, and where Reno's command repulsed the last surging Confederate charges in the second battle. From the commanding hill we saw again, after so man}^ years, to the north the woods from which the Union flank- ing column suddenly emerged in the first battle, only to fritter away their grand opportunity ; while up the War- renton pike to the west was Stony Ridge and the little hamlet of Groveton, central points in the second battle ; to the east was the line of Bull Run ; — all in full ^uew across the open fields, and each about a mile and a half distant. We found that twenty years had made wonder- 174 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. fully few changes in the battle-ground : the lines of fields and woods and general appearance of things were sub- stantially unchanged, and we soon felt that we stood on familiar ground. The venerable Mr. H. F. Henry, residing in the house, received us with the greatest kindness, and gave us all the information in his power. He was an eye- witness of both battles, and familiar with many of their details from personal observation, besides being an intelli- gent and careful student of the large collection of Union and Confederate maps, plans, and reports which he has in his house. The monument erected by the government in memory of the Union dead in the first battle (fought July 21, 1861), stands on the Henry-House hill, close to the house. It is a cheap, tumble-down affair, eight or ten feet high, built of red sandstone, with a plastered face bearing an in- scription to the patriot dead who fell in the battle. A similar monument has also been erected in memory of the Union dead in the series of bloody engagements consti- tuting the second battle (fought August 28-30, 1862), which stands on high land, a mile and a half westerly from the Henry House, near the old railroad-cut, the farthest point gained, or rather touched^ by the Union troops in the battle. The bodies of the Union dead have all been re- moved to Arlington, and the only soldiers remaining buried on the field are about 500 Confederates, closely packed in a neglected cemetery on a prominent knoll in front of Groveton. Gen. Bee and Col. Bartow, prominent Confederate offi- cers, were killed on the Henry-House hill in the first CHANT ILLY REVISITED. 175 battle, and tlie places where the}- fell — but a few yards aj^art — are now marked by piles of stones. The most pathetic monument on the hill is a marble headstone over the grave of the venerable Mrs. Henry, who was killed by a Union shell in the first battle. As I walked about the enclosure I stopped to read the inscription on the stone, when Mr. Henry, who stood close by, said, " It is my mother's grave." In answer to my inquiries he gave the following account of her death : " She was over eighty years of age, and, having been bedridden for some time, occupied the house with me and my brother, both of us invalids ; not expecting a battle on this ground we had not moved her, and were much shocked when we saw the Union troops coming from Sudley Ford. We wished to move her at once, but she was unwilling ; as the fight ad- vanced, shot after shot struck the house, and she at last consented to be moved. We took her upon a mattress, and carried her out of the house, intending to take her to Mr. Compton's ; but the fire grcAV hotter and hotter, and before we reached the woods she begged so hard to be taken back that we returned to the house, and had just replaced her in bed when she was instantly killed by a shell." Previously to this visit my whole interest in the field had been in connection with the second battle ; of the first battle I had but a very general and dim idea, consid- ering that its salient points were well enough described in the doggerel couplet, — "In eighteen hundred and sixty-one We all skedaddled from old Bull Run " — 176 POPE'S VIRGINIA campaign: and that the less any one knew about it the better for the reputation of the Union volunteers. On my recent visit I became satisfied that my former notions of the battle were somewhat erroneous, that there was some good fight- ing on the Union side, and that the honors of the field were not entirely with the Confederates.^ Selecting from Mr. Henry's collection of trophies a few Union bullets, which he had taken from the graves of Confederates who had originally been buried on the hill, we rode about a mile and a quarter down the Warrenton pike to Groveton, where we were made welcome to the hos- pitable house of Mr. William H. Dogan, and made it our head-quarters during the remainder of our stay upon the field. We spent a most interesting afternoon in looking up the places which we had occupied at different times in the second battle, and searching out Jackson's hiding-place in the railroad-cut in the woods, from which he hurled back Heintzelman, Hooker, Kearny, Reno, Stevens, and Sigel, in the bloody struggles of August 29. As we looked again on the old trees, still plainly showing count- less bullet-cuts, we realized again, as no words can indi- cate, the horrors of that day when thousands of handsome and gallant youths were lying cold in death, or writhing in agony beneath their shade. Having identified the Union and Confederate positions on that portion of the field we returned to the Dogan iVol. 2, Series 1, Official Records of Union and Confederate Armies, now being published by the government, contains the official reports for both armies of the First Manassas ; and, fortunately for the historian, no controversies of any great consequence exist amongst the respective commanding officers as to move- ments of troops, and what was done. CHANTILL Y RE VISITED. 177 house for supper. Mr. Dogan had always lived on the spot, being a lad fifteen years of age at the time of the second battle, and was possessed of much interesting infor- mation as to the movements of the troops and incidents of the battle. As Gen. Warren had stopped at his house while surveying the field, in 1878, for the map used before the board of officers in the Fitz-John Porter case, he was much interested in that question also, and sympathized more or less with Porter. It seemed to me, however, that liis sympathy for Porter was rather the ex- pression of the universal Virginian dislike for Gen. Pope, than because he thought that Porter had distinguished himself on the 29th of August. He looked up incredu- lously and changed the subject, when I remarked, to try him, that if Longstreet and Porter had changed positions Longstreet would have been knocked into a cocked-hat if he had attempted to force Porter ; evidently thinking that the Yankees were not to be expected to sail in with the customary rebel hardihood. He narrated an incident in connection with the second battle of Manassas, which interested me greatly, on ac- count of the coincidence of the local tradition with the story as told me at the time by a Union eye-witness. Dr. Calvin Cutter, the fighting surgeon of the Twenty- first Massachusetts Volunteers (in which regiment I then served), was slightly wounded and taken prisoner in the woods in front of Sudley Springs, in an assault by por- tions of Reno's and Heintzelman's corps, on the 29th of August. Soon after his capture as a combatant he was taken to Gen. A. P. Hill, by whom he was recognized as 178 POPE'S VIROINIA CAMPAIGN. entitled to the privileges of a non-combatant, and soon made himself so useful as a surgeon that he was welcomed as a guest in the General's quarters, and allowed to talk, go, and do about as he pleased within the Confederate lines ; and in a day or two after the battle was passed through the lines, and rejoined us at Alexandria. As he had been oyer almost the entire field we were much in- terested in his narration of what he had seen. He men- tioned, as the most terrible instance of destruction that he saw on the field, about a hundred of the Fifth New York (a regiment noted for its discipline and drill, belonging to Warren's brigade, of Porter's corps) lying near Groyeton, nearly all of whom had been shot through the head, and who had fallen as they had stood in line of battle. The doctor, in looking oyer the field the day after the fight, was adyised by one of Gen. Hood's officers to take a look at the handiwork of Texan rifles upon Warren's men at Groyeton, to tell the Yankees about on his return. On going to the place he found it a Mecca for the Confederate officers, who chuckled with delight at the unsuspecting Yankees haying been so carelessly brought up and left standing in regimental line in the oj)en ground, within a rod or two of the Texan rifle- men, who were lying concealed in the edge of the brush, and nearly destroyed Warren's little brigade in half a minute. Gen. Steyens and I had both been distant witnesses of the bushwhacking of the brigade, which was caused by an assumption on Warren's part that the woods were as they had been a short time previous, when occupied by CHANT ILLY REVISITED. 179 Keynolds's division. The place was about an eiglith of a mile in front of tlie Dogan house, and, after supper, we walked down to look at it. When we came back to the house Mr. Dogan said, " That little slope down there where you went looked just like a posy-garden the day after the fight : there were some Zouaves, mth blue jackets, red pants, and white leggins (the Fifth wore a showy Zouave uniform), marched, without any skirmishers out right on to Hood's Texans, and they laid 'em out in Kne." "Yes," said Mrs. Dogan, "I was living at Sudley then, and when the Texans came by a crowd of them stopped at our house for water, and I heard them laughing about it. I remember one of them said to mother, ' We popped 'em in the head every time ! "' As a matter of fact, by the official report, 79 of the Fifth Xew York were killed on the spot and 170 wounded in this ambuscade, out of a total of 490 men.^ In the evening, accompanied by Mr. Dogan, we walked along commanding Stony Ridge, wliich had bristled with belching rebel cannon in the fighting of the 30th, and over the ground made famous by the fierce and bloody conflict between King's and EavcU's divisions on the 28th, returning to the house well inclined by the labors of the day to do full justice to the comfortable beds which awaited us. Making an early start on the 19th, we devoted most of the morning to an examination of Porter's position on the 29th of August, making, during the trip, a call at tlie Compton House, where we had a pleasant chat with Mr. A. H. Compton, its present occu- pant, a manly, handsome Confederate, who charged with 1 16 W.R., 482, f/., Warren's Report, lb., 504; also, 260, 469, 470, 485, 609, 610, 617. 180 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Pickett at Gettysburg, and was left, severely wounded, a prisoner in Union hands. Returning to the Dogan house we were provided by kind Mrs. Dogan with a substantial lunch, which we ate in bivouac at the stone bridge over Bull Run, and, keeping on two or three miles, reached the heights of Centreville. After a hasty look at the old earthworks, many of which are still in a good state of preservation, we continued on up the Warrenton pike. After riding about two miles beyond Centreville both of us were satisfied that we were in the immediate vicinity of the cart-path by which Stevens's and Reno's troops had moved to the battle-field of Chantilly, but we could not find it. A new house was standing close by, and, on making inquiry at it, we found that the owner had recently come to the neighborhood, and knew nothing of the by-ways of tv/enty years ago. He, however, was much interested in our attempt to find the old way, and said that a colored man in his employ, who had always lived in the vicinity, claimed to have seen the Union troops, as they left the Warrenton pike, moving to the field. He imme- diately sent for the man and put him at our service. Somewhat aided by this man we soon found what there was left of the old cart-path, within a few rods of the place where we had been searching for it. It had not been used for several years, and was fenced off and con- siderably overgrown with bushes near the turnpike. Ordering our horses to be taken to the Little-River pike, we followed the old way on foot ; and, although crossed by several fences, and at times difficult to trace, we CHAXTILL Y REVISITED. 181 were botli satisfied beyond question tliat we were fol- lowing our old line of marcli for some two miles when we lost it liopelessly among cultivated fields. I had made up my own mind that the railroad-cut which my regiment (Twenty-first ^Massachusetts) had crossed before it first went into action was to be the key to the situation so far as I was concerned ; and, as our so-called guide, who, by the way, was of no assistance to us beyond his knowledge of the old cart-path, said that there was a railroad-cut in the immediate vicinity and only one, I at once went with him to the place ; but it recalled no associations, and I kncAV that I had never seen it before. Keeping on towards the Little-River pike we soon came upion the rear of an old but well-preserved farm-house, situated about quarter of a mile north of the unfinished railroad line, and found by the names on the stones of the appurtenant family graveyard that it was the old homestead of the Eeids. Seeing the proprietor sitting in the shade of the trees in front of the house we told him that we were looking for the battle-field of Chantilly, and asked him if he could aid us. "You are on the ground now,*' was his answer ; this house was used as a Union hospital in the fight, and the blood-stains can still be seen on its floors." Introducing ourselves we commenced an interesting and valued acquamtance with Lieut. Jolm N. Ballard, a gallant fighting Confederate from the bombardment of Fort Sumter to the end of the war, whose manly heart now beats for the Union, although a missing leg and bullet-riddled body attest his former devotion to the lost cause. 182 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, The liouse tract had belonged in Mrs. Ballard's family for more than a hundred years, and Mr. Ballard had resided there since the close of the war. We had actually reached the field, but had struck it at a point where the old associations did not aid us much. Mr. Ballard assured us that the lines of the fields and woods were not changed materially, if at all, and walked with us over the old cornfield now in grass, pointing out the place where Gen. Kearny was said to have fallen, a piece of old fence on the northern line of the field within 400 yards of the Little-River pike, full of bullet-holes, and near it the depressions of many old graves ; but I could not bring the field back to my recollection to feel sure of anything, although Gen. Stevens seemed to be more fortunate in his memory. Interested in aiding our investigations, Mr. Ballard, with warm Virginian hospitality, urged us so strongly to remain on the ground and spend the night at his house, to save the loss of time in going back to Cen- treville for the night, that we gladly consented. Learning from him of another railroad-cut, about quarter of a mile in an easterly direction from his house, I hastened to it, and, although it was the one part of the field which was somewhat overgrown with trees and brush, I recognized it at once as the place through which we had advanced into the woods, and the battle-field of Chantilly became in an instant an assured reality again. Meanwhile Gen. Stevens had been getting his initial point, and every moment until dark was full of interest to both of us as we walked over the lines of advance, which now we both felt sure of. Returning to the house CHANT ILL Y RE VISITED. 183 at dark, we found that Mrs. Ballard had returned from Fairfax Court-House, to which she had made the weekly drive for the mail, accompanied by three ladies on a visit over Sunday. We were ^lad to be assured by our kind host that the house was bigger than it looked, and that we still were welcome visitors. One of the visiting ladies (Mrs. Munroe) had passed along the Little-River pike, and over part of the battle-field, on the day after the fight, and gave us particular and valuable information of the places where she had seen the bodies of the dead. During the evening we got the names of residents in the vicinity at the time of the battle, whom we had not already seen, and further information about distances and localities. AYe had a bountiful supper ; the ladies were attractive and witty ; everybody recognized the fact that the war was over, and we passed a most enjoyable even- ing, and made a late night of it before retiring to our comfortable beds. Mr. Ballard liked to hear our war stories, and we were deeply interested in his vivid narratives of his army life. At the risk of being accused of serious digression I will give some of his narrated experiences. As a Confederate picket he had fired perhaps the first mortal shot on the field of the First Manassas. He and two or three other men of the Second South Carolina Volunteers were lying on and behind a stack of grain, close to Centreville, in the early morning of the 18th of July. Ballard, who was lying down, dozing, on top of the stack, with his gun in his hand, was suddenly brought to his senses by hearing one of the men cry, " He's a Yankee ! Shoot him ! " and fired 184 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. a mortal shot at a man running away. The victim, a Union officer named O'Brien, from Maine, belonged to the quartermaster's department ; he had lost his way, and, stumbling upon what he supposed were Union soldiers, betrayed himself by inquiring for Gen. McDowell's quarters. Ballard, as the shooter, claimed and received the money (some hundreds of dollars) on the unfortunate man's person ; but, when one of the party started to pull off the victim's boots, he found that he was too early in the war for that sort of thing, and was prevented, and roundly abused by all the rest for being willing to wear a dead man's boots.^ Most interesting, however, was the minute account which Mr. Ballard gave us of the organization of Mosby's command, of which he was for some time a member. Minute men, indeed, since they could start on a raid with- out rations, with full confidence in the hos|)itality and fidelity of the inhabitants of the nearest house ! In the night, when their scouts were lurking about in dangerous proximity to Union troops, they always selected a grave- yard to sleep in, if there was one in the vicinity, knowing that no negroes, the only Southerners they could not trust, would dare to come near it after dark. They did not carry sabres as a rule, but put their reliance on four revolvers (two in the belt and two in the holsters), preferring Colt's to other kinds requiring fixed ammunition, which was often very hard to get. In this connection his story of a sutler ^ On reading Col. Kershaw's oiScial report for the Second South Caro- lina Regiment, on my return, I found in it an interesting confirmation of Mr. Ballard's narrative. 2 W.R., 452. CHAN TILL Y RE VISITED. 185 seems worth repeating. This man came out several times from Alexandria, with a wagon well supplied with sutler's stores, as a Union spy ; was regularly captured by Mosby's men, and well paid for his stores. Mosby knew perfectly well that he was a spy, but there was nothing he could discover to do any harm ; and, besides, false to his trust, he gained the favor of his captors by filling their orders for the coveted ammunition. The sutler, however, made his last trip one day, when some of Mosby's men went through him in earnest and left his body in a ditch. One of the heroes of the band was Ames, a deserter from a Xew England regiment, and the betrayer of his late commander, Gen. Stoughton, who was captured by Mosby at Fairfax Court-House in his bed, on the night of the 8th of March, 1863. Ames, a sergeant, enraged at missing an expected promotion, deserted from Gen. Stoughton's command, and resoh'ed to gain Mosby's favor by his betrayal. Getting an audience with Mosby, after much difficulty, he explained the position of the pickets and the lay of things inside the Union lines, and how the capture might easily be made, offering himself as guide of the raiding party. Mosby, suspecting treachery, entered somewhat reluctantly into the scheme, and only on the condition that his guide should pay the penalty of any deceit or misinformation mth his life. Ames willingly consented, and, tied to his horse, and with a cocked pistol at his head, led Mosby and thirty of his men, with perfect success, five miles into and out from the centre of a strong- force of infantry and caA'alry. After this exploit Ames was one of Mosby's right-hand men, a general favorite. 186 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, and, till killed in action, noted as one of the most desperate and successful raiders in tlie command. I was much impressed by this account of Gen. Stoughton's capture, because Mr. Dogan, in whose house at Groveton we had spent the previous night, told me that he (a youth of sixteen years at the time) pitied the General that Mosby captured at Fairfax Court-House more than any man that he saw in the war. He was so handsome, and looked so sad as his jeering captors took him through Groveton at daylight, tied on to an old bare-backed horse led by a negro.^ Another Union deserter, a New-Yorker, who joined Mosby, did not stand so high in Mr. Ballard's estimation. He was " a mean and saucy little Yankee," and the men all hated him, but didn't dare to kill him, for fear of angering Mosby, his only friend. " Oh, how I did want to kill that little, saucy Yankee ! " came out with such earnestness that kind Mrs. Ballard gave a quick, reproving look, and her husband disposed of the case of Yankee deserter No. 2 by saying quietly that half a dozen of them finally resolved to kill him the first time Mosby was out of the way ; but, much to their regret, the little Yankee got wind of their plan and escaped from the command. From a soldier's point of view the service was demoral- izing in its tendency : as our friend pointedly expressed it, "They got so that they would ask prisoners for their pocket-books before they called for their pistols." I will close my long digression with one more thing bearing somewhat on the battle of Chantilly. Speaking 139 W.R., 43, 44, 1122. CHAXTILLY REVISITED. 187 of the watch kept upon the few men in the Ticinity sup- posed to have Union proclivities Mr. Balhircl said tliat a man near Chantilly was suspected of having; oiven infor- mation of Jackson's movement on Pope's rear, and he and others went to his house to hang him, but their intended victim got away from them. Simday, May 20, our host called us at an early hour to show us an old plan of his farm, wliich he had spoken of the night before ; and we found it a most interesting docu- ment, being an exact plan of almost the whole battle- ground, and nearly contemporaneous with the fight. It was made in 1858, and is connected with the will of Col. John Reid, and a deed dated January IT, 1859. It is marked Col. John Reid's House Tract," and is recorded T\dth Fairfax County Records, Liher A, Xo. 4, folio 322. "We made an accurate copy of it by tracing, and I give it here with no change except to mark the cornfield, the general position of troops, and the places where Kearny and Stevens fell. I have also indicated the locality sur- roimding the four lots shown on the plan. The descrip- tion in the deed (referring to the plan) is as follows : " Beginning at 'A' a large marked red oak, corner of the purchase from EUgey and in the line of Walker, thence ^ith said purchase from EUgey X. 9J° E. 29J poles to ' B ' a planted stone by a marked chestnut, then continuing with said purchase X. 53° 18J poles to ' C a stone in the line of Carter, now Stewart, then with said line S. 79° 161 poles 8 links to D. on the X.E. edge of the M.G. Railroad, thence along the X.E, edge of said Railroad S. 28f E. 110 poles S. 35J° E. 20 poles S. 411° e. 44 poles 188 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, S. 52 J°. E. 20 poles. S. 60° E. 28 poles 16 links to ' E.' — Several maples corner of Col. Millan on a branch. Thence N. 24° 45' E. 116 poles and 5 links to a small marked white oak, in the outline, thence with the outline N. 73j° W. 37 poles and 5 links to the beginning, containing 143J acres." ^ Immediately after breakfast we bade good-by to our kind and attentive host and his interesting household, and proceeded to Ox Hill and the Little-River turnpike. As we parted, our host followed us a little way, and, with many apologies for the question, flattered us by inquiring, in behalf of the young ladies, if we were married men ; in answer to which Stevens said that Lafayette, on liis revisit to this country, put that question to each of his old com- panions as he greeted them, and to the married ones said, " Happy man ! " and to the bachelors, " Lucky dog ! " after which preamble he requested our friend to inform the ladies that he was a lucky dog, while I sent my com- pliments, with the confession that I was a happy man. The long, high ridge, called Ox Hill, does not extend southerly more than a few rods, if at all, beyond the turn- pike. The turnpike is a broad, straight road, in com- parison with which the Centreville pike is like a cart- path. A matter of great interest to us was to get the distance * My only excuse for these minute details of the battle-ground of Chantilly is because the errors of previous narrators, in respect to the locality of the engage- ment, have tended to make it appear to have been an attack upon the Union aimy on its retreat up the Centreville pike, instead of being, as it really was, a Union check and attack upon the Confederates on their flanking movement up the Little- River pike. A reproduction of this map will be found at the end of this volume. CHANTILLY REVISITED. 189 from the Little-River pike of the point gained by Gen. Stevens in his charge. As we now knew the northerly lines of the cornfield beyond question, and a portion of the fence running along the edge of the woods, full of bullet-holes, was still standing, we had no difficulty in fix- ing the line on which Gen. Stevens fell : and, by pacing the distance to the Little-River pike, found it to be between 395 and 400 paces. Just at the point where Gen. Stevens's division made its charge, the line of woods lying between the narrow field bordering the turnpike and the fields through which the Union troops advanced has been some- what cut away ; but the portion of the bullet-riddled fence remaining, the stumps of the trees, the old graves, and the lines of the fields shown on the plan, left open no chance of mistaking the line beyond a yard or two at the farthest. We then went to the house of Mr. Charles Stewart, on the Little-River pike, about half a mile west of the line of Ox Hill, to whom Mr. Ballard and his neighbor, Mr. Millan, had both referred as being better acquainted with the details of the battle than any one else in the ^dcinity. He received us with great kindness, and, after pointing out the localities of interest in connection with the fight near his house, went with us along the lines of the battle. He was in his house at the time of the fight, an eye-witness of the movements of the Confederate troops, and went over the battle-field on the third day after the engagement. Jackson's artillery, when the advance of the Union troops was observed, was drawn out of the road and posted on a bare and commanding hill near the Stewart house, on the 190 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. left of the Confederate line of march, and about half a mile to the west of the ridge of Ox Hill. Mr. Stewart's knowledge of the field and acquaintance with the localities of interest in connection with the battle were very exact. One thing peculiarly interesting to me, as a member of the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment, was being enabled, through him, to fix the spot where we were en- gaged in our disastrous conflict in the woods with Early's Virginia regiments, which I found to be about 400 yards south of the Little-River pike, and 100 yards east of the road leading to the Ox Road. On the previous day I had made up my mind pretty well about the place, as, when I had spoken to Mr. Ballard of our passing some newly split rails just before we became engaged, he said a lot of rails had been " mauled " at the time in that locality, and he knew of no other place in the vicinity where any had been split out. This was con- firmed by Mr. Stewart, who saw the rails, after the fight, piled up for a breastwork ; done, doubtless, by the Con- federates after our retreat. He also pointed out the place of burial of our men killed in the woods ; the bodies had long since been removed, but the depressions of the graves were plainly visible. He also called our attention to the numerous bullet-scars on the trees, still, as in the woods near Groveton, plainly to be seen ; showing us one large dead tree, which he said had died from bullet- wounds. He, as Mr. Ballard had previously done, pointed out the place where, by local tradition. Gen. Kearny fell. It was very close to the spot where I had seen him fall ; and, although it differed but a few rods from my own esti- CEAKTILLY REVISITED. 191 mate, I was pleased to feel that on that single point my knowledge was the more accurate. When Kearny fell, my regiment, with a front of from 200 to 300 feet, was in line in the cornfield, with its right close to the woods. Gen. Kearny brushed our left as he dashed forward, and was shot a few yards in front of our left; and now, knowing our position at that time with substantial certainty, I could fix the spot where he fell very closely. In speaking of the discovery by our army of Jackson's flanking movement Mr. Stewart told me that the current story in the neighborhood was, that a man named Camp- bell, who lived below Chantilly, seeing Jackson's men moving up the turnpike, had ridden over to Gen. Pope with the information. Added to the pre^dous similar state- ment by Mr. Ballard, this story made a strong impression upon my mind, as showing that the local tradition accorded with my own well-assured belief that our discovery of Jackson's march was a matter of good fortune merely, and not owing to any reconnoissance by our troops. As Gen. Stuart states, in his official report of the battle of Chantilly, that the Union troops penetrated to Jackson's flank by way of MoUen's house, I was desirous of finding the house referred to by him, and made many inquiries about it. There is evidently an error in the name as printed, and "MoUen's house " must be the house then and now owned by Mr. Walker Millan, which is situated about three-quarters of a mile south of the Little-River pike, on the road in continuation of the Ox Road, leading from the Little River to the Centre ville pike. There were but two houses south of the Little-River pike any- 192 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. where in that vicinity, botli of which are still standing, -— the Reid House, in which we were so hospitably entertained by Mr. Ballard, its present proprietor, and the Millan House. Mr. Millan (being in the Confederate service) was absent from home at the time of the battle, and knew nothing, personally, as to its details.^ The Reid House at the time of the battle was occupied by a young man named Isaac Heath, who has removed from the vicinity. Riding on to Fairfax Court-House we got a very good dinner at the only restaurant in the place, kept by a colored man, who had been a body-servant and was still a wor- shipper of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, the great Confeder- ate leader. The colored man who had come with us from Manassas Junction had for some time been so restive and sulky at our prolonged examination of things that were of no in- terest to him that we were glad to send him home with the tired horses from this point; and, although rather heavily laden with a couple of rebel cannon-balls, bayo- nets, and other relics from interesting points of the fields which we had visited, made a leisurely and pleasant walk of four miles to Fairfax Station, where we took an evening train for Washington. We had beautiful weather on our trip, had enjoyed every hour of it, and received nothing but courtesy and kind attention from all the inhabitants of the region visited with whom we came in contact ; and if there was a house on or near the battle-fields which we did not call at, it was because we didn't happen to see the house. ' Correctly printed Millan, 16 W.R., 744. CHAJSTTILLY REVISITED. 193 The fact that we had been soldiers in the Union army, and were revisiting the fields on which we had fought, seemed to make the inhabitants feel that we had a right there, and even to justify us in walking through their growing wheat, which may, I think, be considered a pretty severe test to put a farmer to. Our experience with Mr. Henry, at the first spot visited, is a fair illustration of this spirit. As we rode up to his enclosure we saw a notice posted on the gate, stating that, in consequence of the ex- pense to which he had been put in rebuilding, an admis- sion fee of fifty cents must be paid to enter the grounds. As he saw us approaching he came out of the house, took our money, and said that he would be happy to give us any information in his power, — an offer of which we gladly took advantage. After a while he spoke of the plans and maps in his house, and on our expressing a desire to see them said that there would be a further charge of fifty cents each for entering the house, which we paid and entered. So far we had been principally questioners and listeners, but on sitting down in the house for a regular talk told him of our experiences on the field. Taking the money which we had paid him out of his pocket, he said that, poor and old as he was, he could not take money from us, as we had a right to go where we liked on that field; and it was only by an earnest and hona-fide re- sistance on our part that he was induced to keep the money. On the field of Chantilly nothing could exceed the kindness with wliich we were aided in our researches by Mr. J. N. Ballard and Mr. Charles Stewart. The old saying that the gods love a brave man struggling with 194 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. adversity is well exemplified in Mr. Ballard. With plenty of land, but little money, and sorely incapacitated by his wounds suffered for the lost cause, he has worked early and late to restore his fences and cultivate his farm ; and now, contented with his lot and happy in his good wife and healthy, promising children, is an example long to be remembered of success achieved by indomitable hope and courage. VII. STRENGTH OF THE FORCES UNDER POPE AND LEE. CONTEIBUTED BY LlEUT.-CoL. "WILLIAM ALLAN, LATE ChIEF OP Ordnance Second Corps Army of Northern Virginia, C.S.A. To WHICH IS APPENDED A NOTE BY JOHN C ROPES, ESQ. The following' is a list of the published writings of Lieutenant-Colonel William Allan, concerning the Civil War : — The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862. By William Allan, A. M. , LL. D. With an introduction by John C. Ropes. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1892. The Battle-fields of Virginia. Chancellorsville ; embracing the opera- tions of the Army of Northern Virginia, from the first battle of Fredericks- burg to the death of Lieutenant-General Jackson. By Jed. Hotchkiss and William Allan. New York : D. Van Nostrand, 1867. Historical Sketch of the Lee Memorial Association. By W. Allan, a member of the Executive Committee. Pages 3-19 of Ceremonies connected with the inauguration of the mausoleum and the un- veiling of the recumbent figure of General Robert Edward Lee. Richmond, Va. : West, Johnston and Company, 1883. History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. From November 4, 1861, to June 17, 1862. By William Allan, formerly Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Ordnance Officer, Second Corps, A. N. V. With full maps of the region and of the battle-fields by Jed. Hotchkiss, formerly Captain and Topographical Engineer, Second Corps, A. N. V. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1880. Jackson's Valley Campaign. Address before the Virginia division of the Army of Northern Virginia, at their annual meeting, Oct. 30, 1878. By William Allan. Richmond : G. W. Gary & Co., Printers, 1878. A Reply to General Longstreet. 3 Battles and Leaders, 355-356. [A criticism of General Longstreet's account of Gettysburg, in the same work and same volume.] Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign. In Annals of the War, 724-749. See List of Papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachu- setts, at the end of this volume. STRENGTH OF THE FORCES UNDER POPE AND LEE IN AUGUST, 1862. BOUT no part of tlie war in Virginia lias tliere been more confusion, uncertainty, and error than about tlie forces engaged in Pope's campaign, August, 1862. Much of this is due to the loss of returns, and no little to the loose and inaccurate reports and despatches of Gen. Pope. Though Gen. Pope's statements about other matters were known to be very careless and inaccurate, writers upon this campaign have not realized how much of this inexact- ness exists in his estimate of the number of his troops, especially when he desired to obtain reenforcements or to account for his rcYerses. Mr. Ropes, who has given us the best account so far published of this campaign, sees that Pope is evidently in error as to his numbers, when he puts them at 55,000 on August 27.^ Mr. Ropes finds that the troops composing the Federal army under Gen. Pope amounted, after the battle of Cedar Run, and before Manassas, to 77,500 men, and he finds it impossible to believe that 22,500 of these had been lost in the skirmishes on the Rappahannock and the retreat to Manassas before the battle at the latter place had occun^ed.- But even ^Kopes, Army under Pope, 195. *See 209, 217-218, supra. (197) 198 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Mr. Hopes makes an extravagant allowance for Pope's losses, and, apparently aiming at something like a mean between Pope's statement and the official reports, assigns him only 65,000 at Manassas. A careful examination of the returns on file in Wash- ington, which have recently been put in shape, shows that a reasonably correct knowledge of the Federal strength may be arrived at from the official figures. It is not necessary to begin with the return for June, as Mr. Ropes has done. There is on file a full return of all the troops under Pope's command for July 31, and this seems to be the latest full return in existence.^ From this return we take the following : — Present for Duty. Command. Officers. Men. Head-quarters, 35 164 First Corps, Sigel, 614 12,485 Second Corps, Banks's,* 698 14,087 Third Corps, McDov^ell, 1,161 22,756 Eeserve Corps, Sturgis, 471 7,939 White's Brigade (at Winchester), 131 2,621 Cox's forces (in Kanawha), 396 8,416 Artillery. Not reported. 52, part not reported. 554 15 Not reported. 3,506 68,468 It is the first three corps named in this return that con- stituted Pope's army on the Kappahannock. Only one brigade (Piatt's) of Sturgis's corps from the defences of Washington was able to join Pope before Jackson severed communication between him and his reserves, and but a 1 18 W.R., 523. ^Banks's report includes Hatch's cavalry of 158 officers and 3,101 men present for duty. STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 199 regiment or two of Cox's troops took part in defending the bridge over Bull Run in Pope's rear. It will be seen that Pope had, on July 31, in the three corps of Sigel^ Banks, and McDowell, including his head-quarters'' escort, just 52,000 men present for dutyT Pope, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, reports his forces, "some days" before Cedar Run, as follows : — 1st Corps. Infantry. Artillery. Cavalry. Total. 1st Corps (Sigel), 10,550 948 1,730 13,228 2d " (Banks), 13,343 1,224 4,104 18,671 3d " (McDowell), 17,604 971 2,904 21,479 Total, 41,497 3,143 8,738 53,378 Deduct infantry brigade at "Winchester . 2,500 Deduct regiment and battery at Pront Koyal . 1,000 Deduct cavalry unfit for service 3,000 6,500 Total 46,878 Note. — Instead of 14,500 infantry and artillery Banks had only about 8,000, from his report to me after the battle of Cedar Mountain.^ Comparing the two, it seems that the troops at Win- chester were included in Banks's command on the return used by Pope, while they are separated on the return for July 31. It seems also probable that some of the cavalry credited in the latter statement to Banks was, on the return for July 31, included in McDowell's corps. The deduction of 3,000 men as unfit for service " from the cavalry at the opening of the campaign seems hardly ^C.W. 2 Supplement, 118; in Avhich the ''total" as printed, ''47,878," manifestly innorrect. 200 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. authorized. After two months of rest in one of the finest grazing regions in the country the cavalry reported as ready for duty were no doubt so. That in a week or two all the cavalry force with tliis army was greatly run down and diminished in numbers was true ; but it is not proper to carry back these losses and charge them against the cavalry at the outset. On the return of July 31 the cavalry is not in all cases separated, and hence it is not possible to compare that return in this respect with Gen. Pope's statement. Nor does there seem to be any solid foundation for the statement that Banks had largely overstated his strength. The return of July 31 shows that Banks only reported 11,526 infantry and artillery as present for duty with the corps ; and Col. Horton has well shown in a paper quoted by Mr. Ropes, that the various detachments absent from Banks on August 9, together with the severe effects of marching in the excessive heat of that week, might readily have reduced his effective strength on the battle-field of Cedar Run to 8,000.^ (Mr. Ropes thinks that this 8,000 also included the cavalry Banks had that day ; but this is obviously not the meaning of Gen. Pope's language in the note on the return embodied in his testimony.) Mr. Ropes adopts figures about half-way between Gen. Pope's estimate and the return of July 31, and assigns Pope 49,500 men on August 1. The official return for July 31 shows that he really had 52,000, and this is the force he had available for field operations at the time of the battle of Cedar Run (August 9). At this date Sturgis held the defences of Washington ^Ante, 38-39. STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 201 with, over 8,000 men, and Burnsicle had arrh^ed at Fred- ericlvsbnrg Avith 12,000 effectives. Cox was at the same time ordered to bring the greater part of his forces from West Virginia to "Washington to reenforce Pope. Let ns come clown a little later. Reno, with 8,000 of Bimiside's troops, reenforcecl Pope on August 14. On August 20 Pope telegraphed Halleck that his strength was as follows : — ^ - McDowell . . • . . . . 18,000 Sigel 12,000 Banks 7,000 Reno . . . . . . 8,000 45,000 Let us see how this tallies witli the facts. ' McDowell's morning report for August 16, on file in Wash- ington, shows that he had then " present for duty " 22,618 men and present for duty equipped^ 22,117 men. Tins last number includes, however, 2,698 cavalry, and it is probable that Pope meant in the above despatch to leaA'e out all his cavalry. If so, he understated McDowell's effective equip2?ed infantrj' and artillery by nearly 1,500 men. There are no returns of Sigel or Banks for this date to be found. But Sigel's strength (as given in Pope's despatch) does not differ very widely from what it was on August 1, and is probably not far wrong. li\ regard to Banks, however, the number given is too small. Banks is said by Pope to have had only 5,000 men the day after Cedar Run,^ but us W.E., G03. ne W.R., 27. 202 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. as his losses in that battle did not probably exceed 2,500/ there must have been, if Pope is correct, a large number of stragglers, consequent upon the demoralization caused by his defeat. The mass of these stragglers soon returned to ranks. Banks's "return for the month of August" is on file. It was, of course, made out late in the month, about the time of the battle of Manassas, and it shows that he then had present for duty 8,800 men in infantry and artillery. Hence Banks's strength on August 20 must certainly have been 8,000 or more. There is no dispute about Reno's strength. He is everywhere credited with 8,000 men. Thus it appears that Pope's despatch of August 20 underestimated his infantry and artillery by at least 2,500, and left his cavalry out of the count. The Federal cav- alry had not suffered heavily up to this date, and Bayard's and Buford's brigades alone (including the First R.I. Cavalry) had numbered 5,000 men for duty on the first of the month. It is evident, therefore, that Pope had still not less than 52,000 men on August 20, when he had as yet received no reenforcements from McClellan, but had received 8,000 men from Burnside. In other words, it is plain that Pope had not sustained losses at Cedar Run, and in his subse- quent well-conducted retreat behind the Rappahannock, greater in amount than the reenforcements (8,000) brought hy Reno. But if Pope's statements about the numbers of his own troops are loose and inaccurate, they are not less so about the reenforcements he received from McClellan. ' Total loss, 2,216. Return of Casualties, 16 W.R., 138. STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 203 The following troops from McClellan's army joined Pope between August 20 and August 27 : — Reynolds's division, by way of Fredericksburg, August 23. Heintzelman's corps (Kearny's and Hooker's divisions) from Alexandria, August 24. Porter's corps (Morell's and Sykes's divisions) from Fredericksburg, August 26. Add also Piatt's brigade of Sturgis's forces, from Alexandria, August 26. Pope, in his report, puts Reynolds's division at 2,500 men.^ Assistant Secretary of AVar Tucker telegraphed Halleck, August 19, from Fort Monroe, that Gen. McCall's [Rey- nolds's] division left here thiis morning, consisting of about 8,000 men." ^ On August 21 Burnside telegraphed Halleck from Falmouth, that Gen. Reynolds' division of about 8,000 men are under orders and will start at once ; ought to reach him [Pope] early to-morrow ; " ^ and on the same day Col. T. C. H. Smith, of Gen. Pope's staff, telegraphed to Reno to the same effect.'* Now, Reynolds did reach Pope on the 23d, having marched up from Falmouth (opposite Fredericksburg) without collision or accident. Is it pos- sible that this body of men dwindled from 8,000 to 2,500 in two days without cause? But Pope's despatches, written at the time, do not agree with his report. On August 26, in a despatch to Porter, Pope puts Sigel, McDowell, and Reynolds together, at 34,000 men,^ which, supposing he intended to estimate Sigel and McDowell as high as he had done on the 20th (30,000 men), leaves 4,000 for Reynolds. But between the 20th and 26th Sigel and McDowell had suffered considerable losses U6W.R., 46. 2 18W.R., 600. ^b., 615. nb., 611. 6 lb., 675. 204 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. along the Rappahannock, beside the stragglers due to the marches and countermarches these corps had made in that interval. These commands were certainly smaller on the 26th than on the 20th ; and, if so, Reynolds must have had more than 4,000 in order to make up Pope's total of 34,000 for the three commands. The whole shows the looseness of Gen. Pope's statements about his numbers. Gen. G. H. Gordon, whose statements of the forces in this cam- paign are inaccurate, especially as to the Confederates, places Reynolds's strength at 4,500 ; ^ and this accords with an estimate found among the papers in the F. J. Porter trial. ^ There seems no good reason for doubting that Rey- nolds had from 7,000 to 8,000 when he first joined Pope. No returns for Heintzelman's corps for this period are found, and there are, therefore, no means of testing the accuracy of the estimate of from 10,000 to 10,500 assigned by Mr. Ropes ^ and others to this corps. There is a tele- gram from Gen. Kearny to Halleck, dated Acquia Creek, August 21, when Kearny was on his way to Alexandria, in wdiich he says, " My division is 7,000 marching men."^ Kearny and Hooker commanded the two divisions of Heintzelman's corps, and Mr. Ropes and Gen. Gordon both make Hooker the stronger; but, if these divisions were equal in size, Heintzelman must have reached Alex- andria with at least 14,000 men. It is possible, however, that some men were left there, and that only from 10,000 to 10,500 reached Pope ; and there is no evidence at pres- ent to disprove this supposition. In regard to Porter's corps we have his return for 1 Gordon, A. of V., 484. 2 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part I., 508, 46th Congress, 1st Session. 3 Ropes, Army under Pope, 194. " 18 W.R., 614. STREXGTH OF TEE OPPOSIXG AR^ITES. 205 August SI. Tvliicli makes liis strengtli - present for duty" 10.056. This return was of course made out before tlie battle of the SOtli, and it possibly includes Piatt's brigade of Sturgis's division. Trhicli bad been assigned to Porter's corps a few days before. It thus appears that Reynolds. Heintzelman, and Porter (including Piatt) brought to Pope's assistance, between August 22 and August 27. not less than 28.000 men. If these be added to the forces which Pope had on August 20 that General had about 80.000 troops in his twelve days' campaign from the Pvappahannock to Tv^ashington. As to the Confederate strength the nearest return ex- tant, before the opening of the campaign, is that for July 20, wliich is published by Col. Taylor, in his " Four Years with Gen. Lee." ^ The strength of Jackson's forces then at Gordonsville is not given in this return : but part of them, at least, can be obtained from other sources. Thus Gen. Early gives, fr^om the retui^ns of the di-\usion, now in his possession, the strength of Ewell's division on August 9, the day of the battle of Cedar Pvun: — In Ewell's division (three brigades) ofncers and men "present for duty" in infantry . . 4.780 Officers and men present for duty " in artillery , 237 Total 5,017 In Lawton's brigade, August 13. officers and men present for duty " in infantry and ar- tillery ^ 2,159 ■ Tavlor, Tout Years. 165. 2 cf.. IS VT.R.. 965. ^ cf.. Report. August 20. 1S62. lb.. 966. 206 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. The 16 regiments of Ewell's division, therefore, did not average quite 300 officers and men to a regiment on August 9. Jackson's old division, now under Winder, con- tained but 13^ regiments, including the Forty-seventh and Forty-eighth Alabama, recently added to Taliaferro's brigade. This division (except the two new regiments) had seen the severest service in the Shenandoah valley, and was most depleted thereby. The only two of its regiments whose strength at Cedar Run is given in the official reports did not average 150 each. If we estimate the regiments of this division at the average of Ewell's, the division would have numbered about 4,000 men, which is certainly above the truth. Adding proportionately for artillery, it is plain that the infantry and artillery that Jackson had at Gordonsville, in the commands of Winder, Ewell, and Lawton, did not reach 11,500 men on July 20. In addi- tion to this he had Robertson's brigade of cavalry, of 4J regiments, and numbering some 1,200 to 1,500 men. Near the end of July A. P. Hill's division and Staf- ford's brigade were sent to reenforce Jackson. By the return of July 20, A. P. Hill had 10,623 officers and men " present for duty." One of his regiments (Sixtieth Vir- ginia) was detached and sent to West Virginia, however, and the Third Louisiana battalion was incorporated into Stafford's brigade as the Fifteenth Louisiana regiment. Stafford's brigade was composed of 5 regiments and a battalion, and if we deduct from it the IJ regiments Hill had lost, we see that 4 regiments, or about 1,200 to 1,400 men, are to be added to the strength of Hill's division on July 20, in order to arrive at the entire STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 207 number that joined Jackson under Hill and Stafford. This makes the number about 12,000, and gives Jackson some 24,000 or 25,000 at Cedar Run. This number was not on that field, however, for Lawton's and Gregg's brigades were not present, and the same excessive heat that so greatly depleted Banks's forces seriously affected Jackson's also. Jackson's losses in battle at Cedar Run were 1,314. We may take his strength after the battle as certainly not beyond 23,000 men of all arms. Having determined Jackson's forces at the middle of August, the next question is, how many troops did Lee bring up from Richmond ? This can be determined pretty closely from the return of July 20.^ Gen. Lee brought with him the following commands : — Officers. Men. Total. Longstreet's division. Present for duty, July 20, 557 7,929 8,486 Whiting's or Hood's division. Present for duty, July 20, 2^2 3,600 3,852 Jones's " " " " 213 3,500 3,713 Anderson's " " " 357 5,760 6,117 Evans's and Drayton's brigades, estimated by Col. Taylor, 4,600 Fitz Lee's cavalry, " " " 2,500 Artillery, " " " 2,500 31,768 Col. Taylor's estimates are very liberal. For instance, Evans's brigade contained 2,200 aggregate for duty at the outset of the campaign, according to Gen. Evans's official report, which leaves 2,600 for Drayton's brigade, which was the smaller of the two. So, too, as to the cavalry and artillery. Stuart's two cavalry brigades (Fitz Lee's and Hampton's) contained but 4,035 on July 20, and Hamp- ^ Taylor, Four Years, 165. 208 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. ton's remained at Richmond. The total artillery on July 20 was 3,252, not more than half of which accompanied Gen. Lee to the Rapidan. Adding Jackson's 23,000, we find that Lee's entire strength could not have exceeded 54,000 to 55,000. It really never reached that amount. Gen. G. H. Gordon, in his " Army of Virginia," is greatly in error as to the Confederate forces,^ but Mr. Ropes has o^iven a fair statement of them. The three estimates aiven by Mr. Ropes vary from 47,000 to 54,268.^ The variation is mainly in Jackson's forces, the returns of which, as we have seen, are imperfect. It should be remembered that the figures we have given above include all officers and men " present for duty.^ These figures are too great for the " effective " strength, or for the " present for duty equipped." There is little doubt that the Confederate strength "present for duty" was somewhere between 50,000 and 55,000 men on August 20 ; or, in other words. Lee's forces were about equal to those which Pope had at that date, before any of McClellan's troops had joined him. The figures we have arrived at, 80,000 for the Federal army and 55,000 for the Confederate, apply only to the entire strength of the armies engaged in the campaign, without deducting any losses. Of course these numbers were lessened as the campaign progressed. Neither army mustered its full strength on the field of Manassas. Before that battle they had both been diminished by the fighting along the Rappahannock and by hard marching, and this diminution, up to the 27th of August, had taken 1 Gordon, A. of V., 489. ^ j>opes, Army under Pope, 197-199. STREXGTH OF THE OPPOSIXG ARMIES. 209 place in both armies in probably not widely different pro- portions. Mr. Ropes finds that Pope had 77,500 men in all, bnt assumes that he lost 12.500 in one way or another before Manassas, thus reducino- the Federal strength in the final struggle to 65,000 : ^ while, at the same time, he assumes that Gen. Lee had his n'lirAe original force (55,000, as Mr. Eopes puts it) in that battle.- Of course this is impossible. The losses along the Eappahannock were not very unequal, and surely, as to marching and short rations, Lee's troops were not better off than Pope's. Jackson's march of over 40 miles in two days, with green corn for food, was as severe a trial as anything done by the Federal army up to that time. Ill his report, written after the campaign was over, and when he was anxious to make out the best case he could, Pope states that on the morning of August 27 he esti- mated liis available forces at 55,000 men.° It is tliis state- ment that has misled so many writers. Xow, there is on file an order (already referred to) of Pope to Fitz-John Porter, dated at 7 P.M., August 26, in which he gives the disposition and strength of his various commands with reference to the battle he then thought at hand. In this paper he puts ^ McDowell. Sigel, Reynolds, at . . 34,000 Reno . . . . . . . 8,000 Banks 6,000 48,000 ^ Eopes. Armv under Pope, 1881. (first edition), 195; supra, 217-219. 2 10. edition of 1892. 32 ; 218, supra. ^ 16 W.E., 34. ns W.E., 675; ante, 203. 210 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, Next morning, according to Pope's report^ " McDowell, Sigel, Reynolds, Banks, and Reno had fallen from 48,000 to 36,500 ! ^ The above paper of Pope, written at the time, shows at what he then estimated the available strength of these commands. It is, doubtless, far nearer the truth than the report written some time after, and when a terrible disaster was to be accounted for. If we add Heintzelman's and Porter's forces, 20,000, to the 48,000 Pope assigned to the other commands, we have 68,000. This number does not include the Federal cavalry and, in one case at least^ it certainly is too small. Banks had, by the official return made out a day or two after, 8,800 men present for duty. It is plain, from Pope's statement at the time, combined with such official returns as exist of his army, that on August 27 he had considerably over 70,000 men present for duty. This day was that of the fight at Bristoe. Next day began the three days' battle of Manassas. This order to Porter has no doubt escaped Mr. Rope's attention. Our conclusions, then, are : — 1. That early in August (before Cedar Run) Pope had 52,000 men, when Jackson was opposing him with from 23,000 to 25,000. 2. That on August 20, when Lee confronted Pope along the Rappahannock, the latter, having been reen- forced by Reno with 8,000 men, had still 52,000 or more to oppose about the same number of Confederates. 3. That during the next ten days 28,000 men from McClellan were added to Pope, giving him 80,000 men in all with which to oppose a Confederate force that never exceeded 55,000. 1 16 W.R., 34. STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 211 4. That up to the 28th, though Pope had suffered from the fights on the Rappahannock, forced marches, and from the engagement at Bristoe, his losses were not so excessive or exceptional as to be entirely out of proportion to those incurred by the Confederate army from the same causes. 5. That, therefore, if 12 or 15 per cent, is to be de- ducted from Pope's numbers for losses before August 28, some 10 or 12 per cent., at least, should be subtracted from Lee's numbers for the same reason. 6. That Pope had fully 70,000 men on the 28th of August, and Lee about 49,000. In his statement of losses Mr. Ropes thinks no guns were captured by Lee on the 29th, and says, " The one gun which was taken on the evening of the 29th, was left on the ground." ^ He refers to the gun taken in Hood's charge, and which Longstreet says was cut down and left. As it fell into Confederate hands next day it was probably included in Gen. Lee's count. But Mr. Ropes has over- looked the fact that Gen. Bradley T. Johnson's brigade captured one three-inch rifle, and Starke's brigade another, in the repulse of Hooker's troops.^ These were brought off at that time. These three guns make up the count to twenty-nine ; and, were the reports all on file, we should no doubt be able to trace the one yet required to make the thirty, in all, claimed by Lee.^ Mr. Ropes, finding that Jackson's loss was 3,501, as reported at Manassas, while his total loss between the Rappahannock and the Potomac was 4,387,* supposes the first incomplete.^ The difference is due to Jackson's loss ^ Ropes, Army under Pope, 190; 218, supra. ^16 W.E., 666. 3 lb., 558. * 16 W.R., 648. ^ Ropes, Army under Pope, 191. 212 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. at other points than Manassas. Thus, the reports for Ewell's division, as published, show that it lost 45 at the Rappahannock, and 200 on the 26th and 27th of August, at Bristoe, and 200 on September 1 ; or 445 in other fights than those on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, to which the title of "Second Battle of Manassas" is usually re- stricted. ^ So A. P. Hill lost 38 before the 28th of August, and 306 on September 1. If the reports of the other divi- sion could be found no doubt the entire difference could be accounted for.^ So, too, perhaps, for Longstreet. His loss at Manassas was 3,743 (Mr. Ropes has accidentally transposed the figures belonging to Jackson and Longstreet), and in the whole campaign it was 4,725.^ The total Confederate loss in battle in the campaign was : — Jackson 4,387 Longstreet 4,725 Stuart (about) 100 9,212 This, of course, does not include the men worn out and broken down by the exertions and privations of the cam- paign. As to the Federal losses the reports are very imperfect. There are some indications, however, of their severity. Pope telegraphed to Halleck that he had lost 8,000, killed and wounded, on the 29th, ^ and in his report he adheres to the 1 16 W.R., 813. 2 i^oss^ Aug. 24-Sept. 1, 1864, lb., 673. 3 lb., 568 ; Ropes, Army under Pope, 191. ^ 18 741. STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSIXG ARMIES. 213 statement that his losses on that day were from 6,000 to 8,000.^ His losses next day Trere, of course, more severe. The Confederates captured and paroled 7,000 prisoners, the vast majority of whom were taken on the 30th. Mr. Eopes doubts about the number of these prisoners ; ^ but more on general principles, and because he does not clearly realize the severity of Pope's defeat, than for any good reason. King's division of McDowell's corps reported 9,500 men for duty (exclusive of cavalry) on August 16. It numbered on the monthly return for August, 6,700, while the field return for September 1 showed only 1,622 present for duty. Porter, on September 1, reported but 7,356 for duty. Of the losses in Heintzelman's and Sigel's corps, which were very heavy, there are no full returns. Pope, in a despatch to Halleck, dated September 2, says : " The whole force I had for duty yesterday morning was 57,000, exclusive of Couch's." ^ In his report he makes his strength on this day to have been 63,000.^ Of these, how- ever, 19,000^ are credited to Franklin and Sumner, who joined him the day after the battle. Thus, from 38,000 to 44,000 were all that remained, with their colors, of the army that had been defeated at Manassas. How near the truth these statements are it is impossible to tell. In the report Banks is credited with only 5,000, instead of 8,800 men : while, on the other hand, Porter is said to have 10,000, 1 16 W.R., 40. ' Ropes, Army under Pope, 190-191. 3 18 W.R., 797. C.W., 2 Sup. 163 ; stated as 62.000, 16 W.R., 44. ^Pope's inaccuracy is illustrated here. McClellan, in despatches from Alexandria, August 28 and 29, said^ " Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, \rithout cavalry or artillery, here." 18 "W.R., 710. " Pranklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 for duty." 12 AY.R.. 99. This Avouldmake the forces that joined Pope at Centreville 24,000 or 25,000, instead of 19,000. 214 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN-. while he really had only 7,356. McDowell's strength is put down at 10,000, which seems probable enough from King's return for September 1. The returns are too fragmentary for an accurate conclu- sion, but one thing seems pretty plain. It is, that Gen. Pope's available strength in the commands which had been engaged in the campaign was some 40,000 less on the second day after the battle of Manassas than it had been ten or twelve days before. His army had sunk from 80,000 to about 40,000. Of this loss probably more than one-third were stragglers or fugitives, who gradually rejoined their commands. It appears probable that, at a cost not exceeding 10,000 men, Gen. Lee had inflicted on the Federal army a loss of more than double that amount in killed, wounded, and prisoners. In addition to this the forces in his front were diminished for the time by a number of fugitives and stragglers greater than the entire Confederate loss. Pope's account of his army on September 2 makes its condition deplorable. He did not take as bright a view of it as does Mr. Kopes,^ when he telegraphed to Halleck : Unless something can be done to restore tone to this army it will melt away before you know it. . . . The enemy is in very heavy force and must be stopped in some way. These forces under my command are not able to do so in the open field, and if again checked I fear the force will be useless afterwards."^ ^ Eopes, Army under Pope, ITQ. ^ W.R., 797. STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 215 Abstract from consolidated morning report of the Third Army Corps, Army of Virginia, Maj.-Gen. Irvin McDowell commanding , for Aug. 16, 1862: — ! Present for Duty. 2 'o . Command. a f" ?! Officers. Men. Pieces Arti 24 8 24 24 24 14 22 24 Pontoniers (Third Maine Bat- 5 127 132 140 146 37 141 156 186 194 King's Division. 7 7 7 7 TAT 9 A7K Z,'± i O oo J yOOJ 130 2,44G 2,576 2,660 3,207 124 2,611 2,735 2,845 3,522 8 275 283 300 319 12 Second New York cavalry . . 39 691 451 757 870 541 9,804 10,066 10,820 13,365 12 EiCKETTs's Division. Staff a o a o n 0 107 2,125 2,232 2,371 D 3,131 lib O IfM ji, /U4 o r\c\Q o,uyo 111 2,661 2,772 2,926 3,487 94 1,488 1,582 1,739 2,793 9 182 191 202 833 Division artillery (Tillson's) . 15 384 399 421 487 22 24 468 492 531 701 482 9,652 10,134 10,900 14,036 22 ^ 18 W.K., 580. 216 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Command. Present for Duty. Present for Duty, Equipped. Aggregate Present. Aggregate Present and Absent. Officers. Men. Bayard's cavalry brigade First Ehode Island cavalry. 80 35 1,115 531 1,189 566 1,253 606 1,613 780 1,175 21,243 22,117 23,765 29,988 Abstract from return of the Second Army Corps, Army of Virginia, Maj.- Gen. N. P. Banks commanding , for the month of August, 18G2 : — Command. Staff FikstDivision (Williams's) Staff First brigade (Crawford's) . . Third brigade (Gordon's) . . . Total Second Division( Augur's). Staff First brigade (Geary's) Second brigade (Prince's) . . Third brigade (Greene's) • . . Total Artillery Cavalry Present for Duty Officers. Men 11 50 60 113 246 399 1,338 1,501 2,839 2,202 1,241 1,420 4,863 705 45 8,452 «2 11 s- S « 11 3 1,862 1,846 3,711 3 2,629 1,715 1,928 6,275 766 60 10,823 11 5 2,618 2,750 5,373 7 3,903 2,805 2,792 9,507 944 67 =)-i a) o s 40 15,902 40 STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 21T Abstract from Return of the Fifth Army Corps, 3Iaj.-Gen. Fitz-John Porter, U.S. Army, commanding, for Aug. 31, 1862: — Command. Corps, field, and staff. Morell's division Sykes's division Reynolds's division ^ . . Artillery reserve Total Present for Duty. Officers. 7 290 141 473 Men. 5,345 3,211 1,027 9,583 11,79G 7 G,613 3,985 1,191 c a o) !- S to 7 13,677 6,995 2,349 23,028 15 80 95 Detached pursuant to orders from head-quarters Army of the Potomac. NOTE BY MR. ROPES. The figures cited by Col. Allan, from my volume entitled The Army under Pope," in the Scribner Series of Campaigns of the Civil War," are taken from the first edition of that work, published in 1881. Subsequently to this date I became possessed, through the courtesy of Col. George Meade, of a copy of the Field Return of Gen. Reynolds's division, — the Penn- sylvania Reserves, — at Fairfax Court-House, on September 2, 1862, showing an aggregate of 4,047 officers and men. I also received, through the same channel, a copy of the report of the casualties in that division on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, 1862, showing an aggregate of 637 killed, wounded, and missing. Tliis proved that on the morning of the 28th the strength of the division was 4,684. Mr. Sypher, in his valuable " History of the Pennsylvania Reserves," states (p. 356) that the division went into the campaign with about 6,000 men, and the aggregate loss was 652. This statement of the losses is very close to the return for the three 218 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. days' battles at Manassas, and cannot, I think, include the casualties up to the 28th of August. Be that as it may, however, I did not hesitate to adopt Mr. Sypher's estimate in my second edition, which was published in 1882. By this change my statement of the strength of the Army of Virginia was increased by 3,500 men, which would raise its numbers to a total of 81,000 men; and for the losses up to the 2Sth of August, exclu- sive of those at Cedar Mountain, I considered 11,000 to be a fair estimate. This gives a force of 70,000 men on the morning of the 28th of August. (Army under Pope, p. 197, 2d ed.) I see Col. Allan has arrived at the same conclusion. I must confess that I accidentally omitted to make any deduction from Gen. Lee's total strength up to August 28, and I thank Col. Allan for having pointed out the omission. I quite agree with him that, making a deduction from the Army of Northern Virginia similar in amount to that wliich I have made above from Gen. Pope's army, Gen. Lee's force could not well have exceeded Col. Allan's estimate of it, viz., 49,000 men, on the morning of the 28th. In regard to the loss of guns on the 29th I must also admit that Gen. Bradley T. Johnson's statement of the two guns captured by his own and Starke's brigades escaped me. Whether the gun that was left on the field, after Hood had withdrawn on the evening of the 29th, was captured the next day or not, I do not know. No doubt Col. Allan is correct about this. I wish to add a word on a point that I should have called attention to in my history of the campaign. The advantage possessed by an army com- posed of troops who, for a year, have been organized as an army, who are under a General to whom they are accustomed and in whom they trust, in fighting an army that is a mere collection of three or four independent armies, or parts of armies, drawn together and organized as an army a very few weeks only before the first battle of the campaign, placed under the command of a General of whom they know absolutely nothing, and who knows nothing either of the troops or of their officers, is simply enormous. It outweighs disparity of numbers, at any rate, to a very great degree. The former army is a military machine, welded together, and a fit instrument of war, in the hands of a man who knows what it is, and how to use it. The latter is an aggregation of troops, and not an army at all. STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 219 Gen. Pope's army was ordered to be made up from the independent and widely separated armies of Sigel, Banks, and McDowell, on June 26. While the concentration was going on, and the organization of the Army of Virginia was being effected, Gen. Pope remained in "Washington. He joined liis new command on July 29. The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9, only twelve days later. As for the troops from the Army of the Potomac, coming up as they necessarily did in detachments, it was obviously out of the q^uestion to incorporate them, in any proper sense of the word, with the Army of Virginia ; in fact it was not even attempted. In my judgment far too little has been made of these disad- vantages under which the Federal commander and his troops labored. They account for a great part of the failure that attended the campaign. JOHN C. POPES. VIII, THE CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. By Brr. Beig.-Gen. STEPHEN M. WELD, U.S.Y. Read before the Society on Monday evening, April 16, 1877. THE CASE OF FITZ-JOHX PORTEE. "X revieTvino^ the case of Gen. Fitz-Jolin Porter I shall be obliged, from the short space of time allo^-ed me. to discuss as briefly as possible Ms conduct up to the 29th of August, reserving the main portion of my paper for the events of that day. His previous record was so honorable and so well knovm that even Ins accusers did not venture to attack it. Tlie extraordinary energy and zeal displayed by him in marching from Harrison's Land- ing to Xewport Xews. and in embarking and hastening his troops to Acc£uia Creek, and forwarding them from there to Pope, are admitted even by Judge-Advocate Holt. Xo complaint or fault is found with him until the day after joining Pope, which he did on the 27th of August. His marches had been rapid, his vigilance un- ceasing, his obedience to all orders uncjuestioned, and. in a word, his conduct in ad military matters had been that of a sldlfuh practised soldier and of one who deserved well of the Republic. Let us see what the charges were before the court-martial : — ^ Charge First, Violation of dth Article of War, or diso- U6 AY-E., 507-511: 17 W.R.. 82i-S27. 223 224 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. bedience of orders, under which were five specifica- tions : — 1. Failure to march at 1 o'clock A.M., August 28, when so ordered to do by Pope. 2. Disobedience of the so-called "joint order" of August 29. 3. Disobedience of order to attack at 4.30 P.M., August 29. 4 and 5. Disobedience of order to march to Groveton, A.M., August 30, by allowing two brigades of his com- mand to march to Centreville. He was acquitted on the last two. Charge Second, Violation of 52d Article of War^ or misbehavior before the enemy, under which were four specifications: — 1. Alleging disobedience of 4.30 P.M. order of 29th August, and shameful retreat. 2. That, knowing a severe action was pending on the 29th of August, he failed to bring his corjDS on to the field, and did shamefully retreat and fall back from the advance of the enemy, without knowing the force from which he retreated. 3. Practically same as 2. 4. That he made a weak and feeble attack on 30th August. I shall refer to this further on. As the events happening on August 27 and 28 are practically of no importance I shall pass directly to the affairs of the 29th August. Porter received an order at Bristoe Station, at 6 A.M. of this day, dated 3 A.M., ^ASB OF FITZ-JOHy PORTER. 225 to march to Centreville. and to be there at daylight. Like most of Pope's orders it was antedated, or much delayed in delivery. I vrill read the order: — ^ Head-quaeters. Army of Yirgixia, Xear Bull Rux, Aug. 29. 1862, 3 A.M. Gexeeal : — McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jack- son. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearny and Hooker march to attack the enemv's rear at early dawn. Major-Gen. Pope directs you to move upon Centrevihe at the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is A^ery important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary. I am, General, very respectfully, your obdt. serv't, Geo. D. ElXtGles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 2^Iajoe-Ge>-. Poetee. Porter vas much surprised at this order. It ordered him away from the field of battle. He started the corps at once, and rode on ahead to get. if possible, correct orders before the corps had marched too far out of the way. At the '\Veir house near Manassas Junction he met Gen. McDowell, vrho was as much stirprised at the order as himself. McDowell gave Porter some information as to the position of the various troops. Porter pushed on to- wards Bull Run, and met a messenger with an order to hast- en to Centreville, and to leave guards at Bull Run to pro- tect the trains, etc., showing that Pope still misunderstood the state of affairs. Further on he received still another ' IG W.R., 75. 226 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. message (verbal), to marcli to Gainesville, and to take King with him. Annoyed at these contradictory orders he sent a message to Pope, aclmowledging the receipt of this order, giving also the information he had received from McDowell, and asking in the future to have his orders in writing. This request gave much offence.^ The corps was at once faced about, and headed towards Gainesville. At Manassas Porter met Gen. Gibbon, with a written order, the same as the last verbal one, to march to Gaines- ville, to take King with him, and to " be expeditious, or we will lose much. J. Pope, M.-G." ^ Porter at once sought McDowell to obtain information of the roads, and also, if possible, what were the plans of the day. Gen. Porter has informed the writer that Gen. McDowell, speaking of the present and future, said that there was to be no general battle, at least until the Army of the Potomac came up ; that they would probably fall behind Bull Run, and form a new line ; that it was not the policy to fight any general battle until reenforcements, so near, could come up. He also stated that he did not think Porter would reach Gainesville ; that it would be impossible to prevent the junction of Longstreet and J ackson. King and Ricketts having fallen back. The former had had a successful contest with Jackson the night previous at Groveton, and, although ordered twice to hold on by Pope until he could be reenforced, had fallen back to Manassas, fearing he would be crushed between Longstreet and Jackson ; but the latter, Ricketts, after a feeble resistance, had fallen back, in violation of orders, towards Bristoe, and was then moving on Manassas. McDowell did not blame U7W.R., 885. M8 W.R., 729. CASE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 227 King, as lie did not consider Iiim in a condition to be responsible for anything, although he was excessively annoyed at his retreat. While at Manassas cannonading was heard at Groveton. McDowell characterized it as of no importance, only "one of Sigel's artillery duels, amounting to nothing ;" again saying there was to be no general battle. Porter, believing McDowell to be the ruling mind of the campaign, gave his suggestions all the consideration due to the highest authority, although McDowell did not then command him. The language of the "joint order "^received soon afterwards confirmed his belief, as it coincided with what McDowell had already told him. The object of the order to move upon Gainesville was of course evident. It was to recover, if possible, what had been lost by the retreat of King and Richetts ; and to accomplish it speed was necessary, and also an increase of force, which last Pope effected by assigning to Porter King's division of McDowell's corps. McDowell, how- ever, wanted Porter to wait until ha (McDowell) could receive orders from Pope, which were expected every moment, giving him back King, as he naturally did not want to lose him from his command. McDowell asked Porter to place King on his right, so as to have him join Sigel and Reynolds,^ where McDowell could reclaim him. Porter proceeded on the road to Gainesville, and found Morell, some mile and a half from Bethlehem Church, deploying, with his skirmishers out, having encountered and captured some of the enemy's videttes. U6 W.R., 76. 2 Gibbon's Letter. Army and Navy Journal, March 19, 1870. 228 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Morell was on a comparatively open hill-side sloping to the west, his men deploying about half way down the side. The country in front was open for about 1,000 to 1,200 yards, with bushes and thickets scattered here and there, traversed by a ravine, with a small creek at the foot about 200 yards to the front. Beyond this open space were woods, running out to a point some 700 yards distant and along the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad, the general direction of which was east to west. Our line of battle was at right angles to the railroad, with the right on or near it. The country road, on which we came up, was about parallel to the railroad. Our skirmishers were in the edge of these woods, which trended off to the south-west, making an acute angle with the raiload, and were engaged with the enemy. The woods were thick and heavy, screening from view the Warrenton pike, running ob- liquely across our front, at a distance of about two miles. Porter joined Morell about 11.30 A.M., and received soon afterwards the so-called "joint order," which I will now read, and under which McDowell, about 12 M., assumed command : — ^ Head-quarters Army of Va., Centreville, Aug. 29, 1862. You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent Gen. Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heiutzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that as soon as communi- cation is established between this force and your own the whole ' 16 W.R., 76. CASE OF FITZ-JOHX PORTER. 229 command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so, on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any descrip- tion to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the ^Yarrenton pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General Mc- Dowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day. My own head-quarters will for the present be with Heiutzel- man's corps, or at this place. John Pope, Jlojor- Genera^ Commanding. Gens. McDowell and Poetee. Gen. McDovi'ell rode up ^vhiile this deployment was going on. and said, ••Porter, yon are too far to tlie front; tMs is no place to figlit a battle." ^ The two Generals tlien went one side, and were engaged in conversation some twenty minutes, after which the deployment was stopped. I Trill here read a letter from General AVarren on tliis subject : — 1 17 TV.E., 956, 963. 230 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN-. Newport, Nov. 7, 1876. Gen. F. J. Porter, Morristown, Nf.J. : — Dear General, — . . . That " contradictory debate on McDowell's verbal orders to Porter," is about a matter there was never any doubt about in my mind. Our dispositions were going on rapidly for the attack as soon as we confronted the enemy, and skirmishing was begun, when McDowell's arrival and consultation with you, whatever may have been said, stopped it. Col. W. A. Roebling, on McDowell's staff as lieu- tenant, and not then known to me, has told me that was his impression too. It is only to be attributed to McDowell that the attack was not made then Yours truly, G. K. Warren. During this interview clouds of dust were seen moving down the Warrenton pike along the railroad and cross- roads between the two, and skirmishing was going on, the enemy's bullets frequently whizzing by. Some artillery was also opened on us, but was soon silenced. Artillery- firing was also heard to the right ; but McDowell again characterized it as of no consequence, — an artillery duel at long range. Shell bursting high in air seemed to con- firm this. Porter and McDowell now rode off to the right, cross- ing the railroad to see if connection could be made with Pope at Groveton. The country on the right was found to be impassable for infantry in any order, and absolutely so for artillery. It was rough, thickly wooded, and full of ravines. Porter and McDowell separated in these woods. As to what took place during this interview there is CASE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 231 much dispute. McDowell's version is that tliey dis- cussed the "joint order,'' and the necessity of falling back to Bull Run that night, etc. ; that Porter, pointing to the front, said, " We can't go in there anywhere without getting into a fight." ^ [This remark, if made at all, was with reference to McDowell's saying we were too far to the front, etc. Strong stress was laid on this remark by the JudoT-Advocate, as showino^ Porter's unwillino;ness to fight.] That he ordered Porter to put his troops in there, ^ meaning for him to attack, and that he would go round and join Sigel. Porter's side is, that he told McDowell that two scouts who had just been captured reported Lee and Longstreet in our front : that McDowell, to confirm this and the correctness of his remark about our being too far to the front, showed him a despatch from Buford, an- nouncing the passage of seventeen regiments of infantry and some artillery and cavalry through Gainesville at 8.45 that morning ; that McDowell ordered him to remain where he was, prepared to fall back to Bull Run that night; that, as he understood McDowell, and as it seems fair to infer in view of the facts, no connection could be made with Pope across this country ; that there was a large force in their front : that they were ordered not to go so far that they could not reach Bull Run that night or next morning ; that they were already far from the main forces ; that Longstreet and Jackson were united, and the object of uniting Porter and himself subverted, — the latter (McDowell) decided to go by the Sudley Springs road, behind the woods separating them from Sigel, tak- ing King and Ricketts with liim, and to connect on M_7W.R..905. 2ib..90j,. 232 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Sigel's left. The facts in the case seem to the writer to confirm Porter's understanding of the conversation. At all events, by McDowell's departure with his command, Porter, with some 9,300 men opposed by 18,000, or a much larger force than his, strongly posted, had forced upon him a policy wliich should hold this large force in his front and prevent its being thrown against Pope. On his way back to his command Porter saw the enemy marching up the railroad, and still going into position. Believing the time to strike Longstreet, if at all, was before his forces were all posted, and while King was present, Porter, McDowell having disappeared, sent back word suggesting King's remaining, and resumed his deployment. The messenger, Col. Locke, found Gen. McDowell near Bethlehem Church, with Gen. King„ After receiving the message, McDowell said, " Give my compliments to Gen. Porter, and say to him that I am going to the right, and will take Gen. King with me. I think he (Porter) had better remain where he is ; but if it is necessary for him to fall back he can do so upon my left."^ Col. Locke's recollection of this message, and of delivering it to Porter, was very strong indeed. Being called in rebuttal, he reiterated the fact, saying it made a strong impression on his mind, as it changed Porter's plans, who was relying upon King as his support in an attack which he (Locke) knew was to be made. This message fixed Porter's policy. He kept the greater por- tion of Longstreet's force in his front during the day, and caused one division to be brought from Longstreet's left to the right, where Porter was threatening him.^ ^ 17 W.R., 955, 1129. ^ kj W.R., 556, 564-565, 598. CASE OF F IT Z- JOHN PORTER. 233 McDowell remembered neither of these orders ; in fact, said he ordered Porter to attack. Is it prol)a])le he is right? Would he have abandoned the only chance of separating Longstreet and Jackson unless he knew it was useless to try it? Would he have ordered Porter to attack a large force in his front, and then have left him unsupported and isolated? Would he have marched off without any chance of getting into a fight for several hours, unless the policy was to have no general battle, but to wait and form a new line? Would he not rather have remained and crushed the force in his front, in conjunction with Porter ? He could have had a battle in half an hour by remaining there and attacking. As it was King did not get into a fight until Hood attacked him, five hours later, about 6 P.M, on his arrival near Groveton, and Ricketts did not reach the Warrenton pike till after dark. Porter now ceased his deployment, and moved his troops into the following position, from which practically no change was made until the next morning. Two of Morell's brigades were posted in front, and one in rear. Sykes's division was on the road in rear, V<^arren's brigade connecting Morell and the Regulars. Porter established his head-quarters near Bethlehem Church, with Sykes, where the Sudley Springs road joins the Manassas- Gainesville road. No portion of the command went any farther towards Manassas this day except Piatt's brigade of about 800 men, and these were recalled, and this movement was made before the despatch saying he should fall back. The objects of this disposition were as fol- 234 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. lows: Sykes's diyision was in supporting distance of Morell, in case lie were attacked ; he could move more rapidly to Pope, if called there, and at tke same time was in the proper place to fall back to Bull Run, if ordered. Porter was likewise in the most suitable place for reaching McDowell, with whom he was in constant communication, cavalry having been left for that purpose. About an hour or so after McDowell left a report came from Gen. Morell, that the enemy were advancing, and our forces retiring on the right where Pope was. Porter, thinking if our troops were falling back it might be necessary to retire, sent the following order to Morell, and at the same time a note to McDowell and King. I will read them both : — Gen. Morell : — Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach a road up which King is moving, and he has got ahead of you, let him pass ; but see if you cannot give help to Sigei. If you find him retiring, move back towards Manassas, and, should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find the direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return. F. J. Porter, Major- General } Gens. McDowell and King: — I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The enemy are in great force on this road, and, as they appear to have driven our forces back, the fire of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. 1 16 W.R., 523. CASE OF FITZ-.JOHN PORTER. 235 I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how affairs are going, and I will communicate with you. Had you not better send your train back? F. J. Porter, Major- GeneraW^ This note is incorrectly printed in some portions of record. Before acting on this note Porter went to the front, as lie said lie would do, and found tliat the report arose from the artillery-fire at Grove ton ceasing, and opening on our extreme right at Sudley Springs, showing that Reno and Kearny had arrived, and not that our troops were falling back. As there was no necessity for retiring, no retiring was done. This note, though, was the cause of Porter's being found guilty of disobeying the " joint order." No other evidence was offered against him on this point ; it was all in liis favor. To show Porter's activity and desire to do all he could to hold the enemy in his front, and his willingness and desire to fight, I will give here various orders and notes passing between him and Morell this afternoon. Most of them, like the preceding note to Morell, were not used on the court-martial, having come into Porter's possession since. Col. Marshall, referred to here, commanded the skirmishers. He was a regular army officer. 1 16 W.E., 524. 236 POPKS VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, No. 1. Gen. Porter : — Col. Marshall reports that two bat- teries have come down in the woods on our right, toward the railroad, and two regiments of infantry on the road. If this be so, it will be liot here in the morning. G. W. MORELL, Major 'General.^ Endorsed and returned to Morell : Move the infantry and everything behind the crest and con- ceal the guns. We must hold the place and make it too hot for them. Come the same game over them they do over us, and get your men out of sight. F. J. Porter.' No. 2. Gen. Porter: — I can move everything out of sight except Hazlett's battery. Griffin is supporting it, and is on its right, principally in the pine bushes. The other batteries and brigades are retired out of sight. Is this what you mean by everything ? Geo. W. Morell, Major- General, ^ Endorsed as follows : — - No. 3. Gen. Morell: — I think you can move Hazlett's battery, or the most of it, and post him in the bushes with the others, so as to deceive. I would get everything, if possible, in ambuscade. All goes well with the other troops. F. J. P.' To a verbal report that the enemy was being reen- forced^ from in front of Gen. Pope, and threatening attack, the following was sent : — 18 W.R., 734. ^ Showing Porter was informed of the approach of Wilcox's division from Longstreet. CASE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 237 Gen. Morell : — Tell me what is passing quickly. If the enemy is coming hold to him, and I will come up. Post your men to repulse him. F. J. POETER.' This was followed immediately by : — Gen. Morell : — Hold on, if you can, to your present place. What is passing ? F. J. Porter, Major-General.^ No. 4. Gen. Morell : — The enemy must be in much larger force than I can see; from the commands of the officers, I should judge a brigade. They are endeavoring to come in on our left, and have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on our left, as the movement of artillery. Their advance is quite close. E. G. Marshall, Colonel 13th N. Y.^ Eeceived and endorsed as follows : — Gen. Porter : — Col. Marshall reports a movement in front of his left. I think we had better retire. No infantry in sight, and I am continuing the movement. Stay where you are, to aid me if necessary. Morell.^ Returned with the following note : — Gen. Morell : — I have all within reach of you. I wish you to give the enemy a good shelling without wasting ammunition, 18 W.R., 734. ^ Probably relates to the injunction to get his men in ambuscade and come the same game over them they did over us and entice them to attack. See preceding page. = 18 W.Il., 734-735. 238 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. and push at the same time a party over to see what is going on. We cannot retire while McDowell holds his own. F. J. P.^ These despatches made Porter think he would soon be engaged. In pursuance of the course carried out during the afternoon of informing Pope and McDowell of every- thing that was going on, and to see if his course met with approval, Porter sent the writer to McDowell and King, and also to Pope, with a verbal and written message, the verbal message saying, " Morell will now be strongly engaged ; there were large clouds of dust in our front, and a large force " of the enemy. ^ The written message was to the same effect, going more into detail. Pope could not find this message at the court-martial. Porter has been severely criticised for not attacking during the afternoon of the 29th. There was nothing in the attitude of the opposing force to induce any attack on Por- ter's part. They were strongly posted and in large force, and continually threatening attack, which Porter desired and invited, as these preceding orders show. The true policy was to keep as large a force as possible in his front, to invite attack by concealing his strength, and at the same time to push small forces out to attract attention and to find out what was going on. This policy was carried out. After 5 P.M. Porter received a note from the writer, giving information from Hatch, now commanding King's division, that he had ''driven the enemy into the woods ; " ^ and from McDowell that All goes well on our right ; the enemy are retiring up the 1 18 W.R., 735. 2 17 w.R., 949. z^^,^ 950. CASF OF FIT Z- JO EN PORTER. 239 pike." Porter at once sent an order to Morell to attack with a force large enough to engage the enemy's atten- tion, and to find out what was going on in his front. The order was as follows : — Gen. Moeell : — I wish you to push up two regiments, sup- ported by two others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of 200 yards, and attack the party with a section of a battery opposed to you. The battle works well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy a good shelling when our troops advance. F. J. Porter, Ma]. -Gen. Commanding.'^ Morell protested strongly, saying the enemy were preparing to attack him. He thought the attack would bring on a disastrous repulse, followed by a strong pur- suit, and so called up his whole command.^ During the delay of this preparation Porter became satisfied that Morell w^as right, and, as the day was nearly ended, it being about sunset, suspended the attack by the following order : — Put your men in position to remain during the night, and have out your pickets. Put them so that they will be in line, and on rising will be in position to resist any attack. I am about a mile from you. McDowell says all goes well, and we are getting the best of the fight. I wish you would send me a dozen men from that cavalry. F. J. Porter, Major- General. Keep me informed. Troops are passing up to Gainesville, pushing the enemy. Ricketts has gone ; also King.^ 1 18 W.R., 735. 2 ij W.E., 968, 969. ^ ig ^jY.U., 735. 240 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. At about 6.30 the writer returned, having seen Pope and McDowell, but bringing no orders. Pope's only mes- sage was, " Tell Gen. Porter we are having a hard fight,"^ this at or near the junction of Sudley Springs road and Warrenton turnpike. Very soon after Capt. Douglas Pope arrived with this order : — Head-quarters in the Field, Aug. 29, 1862, 4.30 P.M. Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with Gen. Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as [you] engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communica- tion with the right wing. John Pope, Major- Gen . Commanding.'^ Major-Gen. Porter. Before proceeding any further I wish to call your attention to these maps.^ No. 2 shows the position of the contending forces, as understood by Pope at the time, and for three years afterwards. It is an official map, originally published in Pope's report to the Committee on the Con- duct of the War, and made official by the War Depart- ment. The original is here, and marked No. 2. No. 3 shows the actual position of the forces, mainly as Porter understood it at the time. Gen. R. E. Lee, Col. Marshall 1 17 W.R., 950. 2 iQ ^Y.Tl., 18. Copies of these maps will be found at the end of this volume. CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 241 (a direct descendant of Cliief-Justice Marshall, and confi- dential A.D.C. to Gen. Lee), Gen. Longstreet, and Gen. Wilcox, all testify to its correctness. Gen. Lee and Major Marshall saw the map marked 3 A, and Gens. Longstreet and Wilcox the same map, and also map marked 3 B, from both of y-liicli this is copied. The arrangements of the brigades, with reference to each other in the same division, may not be exact on the extreme right: but in the main they are correctly placed. Stripped of redundancy and repetition the order I haye just read is simply one to attack Jackson's right flank, and to keep close communication yitli Gen. Reynolds. It showed entire ignorance on Pope's part of Longstreet's separate force, then lying between Jackson and Porter, and also of the impenetrable country between Porter and the " right wing," with which he was " to keep close communication." Its execution inyolyed an attack upon this superior force, — an attack which Porter had been attempting in a smaller degree, and which in as large a degree he had regarded as leading to disaster, and had suspended. He, howeyer, immediately despatched Col. Locke to order Gen. Morell to prepare to attack with his whole force, and that he (Porter) would join him before he was ready. Porter at once acknowledged the receipt of the order and time (6.30 P.M.) by Gen. Pope's returning aid. He also wrote that, although hebelieyed the order had arrived too late to be executed, and would probably lead to dis- aster, he would do all that was possible to carry it into effect. He said he did not believe any impression could 242 POPE'S VIRGINIA campaign: be made on the strong force in Ms front, unless aided by the divisions taken away by McDowell.^ The aid, Capt. Pope, although ordered to make all speed possible on his return, did not reach Gen. Pope till 8 o'clock.^ The dis- tance is some five miles. The fair inference is that he did not leave Porter till 7 o'clock, about twenty minutes to half an hour after his arrival. Gen. Pope could not, or would not, produce this note at the court-martial, yet he acknowledged its receipt. It would have shown the time of receipt of the ''4.30 order," and the reasons for not attackino\ Porter's order to attack found Morell executing the previous order, to put his troops in line for the night. It hastened his movements ; but, when Porter joined him a few minutes after, darkness prevailed, and ended all aggres- sive movements. A few volleys of musketry heard on the right at this time and cheers were the only notice of an in- fantry contest heard during the day by Porter, or his Gener- als. In this position, Morell in line, and Sykes in rear, the corps rested for the night. At 4 the next morning, 30th, they started to join Pope by orders from him, dated 8.30 P.M., 29th, and received after 3 A.M., 30th.3 Porter's force during this day was 9,200 strong, consisting of Sykes's and Morell's divisions. Piatt, who had been assigned to him, ^ Porter supposed that McDowell had sent all his despatches to Pope, which he should have done, giving full information of the situation, and that Pope gave the order with these despatches in his possession ; and hence he, Porter, considered he was bound to obey the order as if Pope was pres- ent with him and undertook to execute it ; at the same time he protested against it. It appears McDowell did not send forward the despatches, and, worse still, did not even inform Pope of Buf ord's despatch, and of the fact that he had parted from Porter. 17 W.R., 879. 2 lb., 849, 879. ^ 16 W.E., 18. CASJE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 243 was left behind at Warrenton Junction to guard trains, and, although arriving at Manassas on the 29th, did not report to Porter till the 30th. Piatt had about 850 men. Let us now examine the record of the court-martial for this day. The charges are, stripped of all technicalities, that Porter disobeyed the " joint order " by retiring to Manassas. Practically no evidence is brought forward to proA^e this, except Porter's message to McDowell and King, announcing his intention of so doing, but saying " I will communicate with you," — meaning before retir- ing. This was given under the impression — and a natural one to have under the terms of the order itself — that Pope was retiring. As this impression was found to be incor- rect, no retiring was done ; yet he was found guilty. Second. I^isobedience of the order to attack, dated (or antedated) 4.30 P.M. The witnesses for the Gov- ernment were Gens. Pope, McDowell, and Roberts, Capt. Pope, Charles Duffee (his orderly), and Cols. B. F. and T. C. H. Smith. What they testified to, and what the Court believed they proved, and in consequence found Porter guilty of, is stated by Judge-Advocate Holt in his rcTOW of the case for President Lincoln, and was : — ^ 1. That there was no force in Porter's front that day, except possibly a squadron of cavalry, with a section of artillery, or a few skirmishers from Jackson's force. 2. That the country between Porter and Jackson was open and easily crossed by troops, and that the enemy crossed over it in their flank attack on Pope the next day, August 30. 3. That in consequence of the above state of affairs an attack as ordered, if obeyed by Porter, 1 17 W.R., 1112, et seq. 244 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. would have routed Jackson, and given us an overwhelm- ing victory. 4. That the order was received by 5 to 5.30 P.M., in plenty of time to have attacked. 5. That Porter failed to make this attack deliberately, and with design to injure Pope. 6. That the sounds of a general battle on his right ought to have made him attack or move to Pope's assistance. Almost all the officers above mentioned testified on these points, except as to the time of delivery of the " 4.30 order." Capt. Pope and his orderly were the only witnesses on this point. The evidence was almost entirely opinions or suppo- sitions made by men two or three miles away, and looking through thick, impenetrable woods, which no ordinary eye could see through. McDowell testified that he left Porter on the 29th, with the understanding that he was to attack ; that he did not remember saying to Porter that he was to attack; that he did not remember saying to Porter that he was " too far to the front ; " that " it was no place to fight a battle ; " that he did not remember sending any message to Porter about taking King, and that he (Porter) was to remain where he was. (This was said by Col. Locke to have been delivered in King's presence.) * King, a member of the Court trying Porter, was called, and testified that he did not see McDowell after 10 o'clock that morning. Allowing King to testify was, to say the least, a great piece of irregularity. Gen. McDowell knew that he (King) was in no condition to do or remember anything that day. ' 17 W.R., 956. Col. Locke was sustained by Leipold, his orderly, who stated in an affidavit made Feb., 18G3, that he was present at the interview between Locke and McDowell. CASE OF FITZ-JOHN FORT EE. 245 For the defence the following officers testified : Gens. Sykes, Morell, Griffin, Butterfield, Reynolds, and Buford ; Cols. Locke, Ruggles, and Marshall ; Maj. Hyland ; Capts. Monteith and Martin ; and Lients. Stevenson, Ingham, and Weld. Gens. Morell, Griffin, and Butterfield, and Col. Marshall, Maj. Hyland, and Lieut. Stevenson (the last three of the Thirteenth New York, on the skirmish line that day), testified to the large force in Porter's front, — from 10,000 to 15,000 ; Morell, that his division was at the front till the morning of the 30th, and hence could not have fallen back or retreated ; Reynolds, Morell, Griffin, and Stevenson, to the rough and impenetrable nature of the country on our right between Porter and Pope, making it impassable for infantry in any order, and abso- lutely so for artillery; Reynolds, that he could not move his force over it on the 28th, unopposed by any enemy; also that there was no battle this day till 5 P.M. Pope also admits that there was no battle till 5.30 P.M.^ Locke and Martin, both as honorable, gallant officers as there were in our service, testified to hearing McDowell say to Porter on riding up to him at noon of the 29th, " Porter, you are out too far ; this is no place to fight a battle." Locke also testified to McDowell's sending his compliments to Gen. Porter ; that he would take King with him, and he (Porter) was to remain where he was." This in answer to Porter's request for King to aid in his attack. Sykes, Locke, Monteith, Ingham, and Weld testified to the time of the receipt of the 4.30 order," giving the time as 6.30 P.M., — it will be remembered that Capt. Pope 1 17 W.R., 832, 833. 246 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. and his orderly were tlie only witnesses in contradiction, — Morell and GrifQn, that they heard no musketry-firing and no signs of a battle till nightfall. Lieut. Ingham also gave evidence, showing that Capt. Pope, the bearer of the " 4.30 order," came by way of Manassas Junction, and hence the delay in its receipt. He expected to find Porter there, — from his falling-back message. Porter's grounds of defence to these charges then were as fol- lows : — That he did not fall back that day one foot ; Morell's division being at the front, at the farthest point of its advance, the whole day, and until ordered away the next morning by Pope ; Sykes meanwhile being in rear, in support, or ready to move to Pope's assistance, as the case might be. This disposed of the charges of retreat- ing, etc.; That he ordered an attack, which he countermanded (and rightly, too), owing to the earnest remonstrances of Morell, whose reasons he found good and sufficient, viz. ; that the enemy were in large force, and were evidently on the point of attacking us; That he felt certain he was doing more good holding a large force in check, and so keeping them from attacking Pope ; That he received two distinct requests, or orders, from McDowell not to attack, but to remain where he was ; That, under McDowell's action in withdrawing Eang and directing Ricketts to follow, he was forced to take this policy ; That, under the " joint order," he had the right to do I CASE OF FITZ-JOEN PORTER. 247 T^'liat seemed to lilm best, discretion to do so being given in tlie order itself ; That lie kne^^' of no general battle tliat day, nor did any general officer under liis command ; That, as to tlie " order of 4.30 P.M.," it was an abso- lutely impossible order to obey, even if given earl}- in the afternoon, without any enemy in his front, on account of the nature of the ground : that, with an enemy in his front, it was doubly impossible, and an attempt to obey it sui- cidal and wicked, as it would result in extreme disaster, not only to himself, but to the whole army : that it was given under a total misapprehension of the true state of affairs : and that it reached him too late to obey ; That the only thing left to do was an attack in front ; wliich he attempted to make, but which darkness rendered impossible ; That his whole conduct this day was that of a soldier, and an honorable man, striving to do his best; That the record of his life was entitled to some weight, as showing him incapable of doing what he was accused of. The Court convicted him on all these charges. Porter now has new evidence,^ pro^dng : — That there was a large force in his front, — some 18,000 men of Longstreet's corps ; That an attack would have been hazardous, and one that no prudent military man would have made ; That the " order of 4.30 " was received at 6.30 ; That there was no general battle to the knowledge of the Confederate commanders till late in the day ; That the enemy did not march over this country in ^ Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, 551, et seq. 248 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. their flank attack next day, but drew in towards the pike, and then out, to avoid these " bad lands " ; That the enemy were anxious to have him attack ; That an attack by him would not have relieved Pope or weakened Jackson. This new evidence consists of reports of the Confeder- ate officers and letters from Gens. Lee, Longstreet, Early, Hood, and Robertson, and Col. Marshall (the latter, confidential aide to Lee). Let us see at what time of the day the Confederate Generals were first aware of 'Por- ter's movements. Gen. Early, of Jackson's corps, says: "Early next morning" (29th) "I received an order . to move . . . so as to prevent the enemy from flanking our forces on the right, a movement from the direction of Manassas indicating that purpose having been observed."^ In a letter he says that it was 8 A.M. when this was done, and that his forces were relieved by 12 M. by Longstreet's forces intervening between his force and the enemy. This shows that Lee must have known of Porter's movement on Gainesville early in the morning, or as soon as he arrived on the field. As to the time of the arrival of Lonostreet's forces on the field the accounts given in the reports and in letters from Confederate officers all agree (the fact, I believe, is not disputed) in saying that the}" were in supporting distance of Jackson by 9 to 10 A.M., 29th, and on the ground in position by 11.30 to 12 M.2 Longstreet says his line was formed as follows : Hood's division, supported by Evans's brigade, was drawn up at 1 16 W.R., 711. 2 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, 551 et seq. CASE OF FIT Z- JO EN PORTER. 249 right-angles to the Warrenton pike and crossing it, con- necting with Jackson's right ; Wilcox (3 brigades) sup- porting the left, and Kemper (3 brigades) supporting the right; D. K. Jones (3 brigades) on the right on Manassas Gap Railroad, in echelon with regard to Kemper.^ This would give the line as represented in this map, except as to Wilcox, who was, later on, moved round to the right to support Jones. Longstreet says in a letter that his line reached to and crossed the Manassas Gap Eailroad ; that they were ready and anxious. Gen. Lee particularly so, to bring on a battle at any time after 12 M. ; that his force was 25,000 to 30,000. Lee, Longstreet, and Wilcox, all speak of the nature of the ground in their front as difficult to handle infantry on, and especially artillery.^ Col. Marshall says : " The facts, as far as the movements of the Confederate forces were concerned, were not cor- rectly stated to the Coui-t." ^ Lee, Longstreet, and Wilcox say that an attack with 12,000 men before 12 M. ought to have been repulsed ; after 12 M. it would have been re- pulsed, and the force severely handled, and Pope over- whelmed, as he was the next day. Longstreet, Lee, Marshall, and Wilcox say that, owing to Porter's approach and threatening demonstrations, Wilcox was detached from the left, and moved over to support Jones in Porter's front. Wilcox says they were moved back again at dusk, but not in time to be in Hood's battle or reconnoissance. In other words Porter kept 1 cavalry division and 8 infantry brigades of Longstreet's 12 from firing a gun against Pope's forces that day. ^ 16 W.E., 564-565. 2 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, 551 et seq. 2 lb., 474; Porter's Statement, Morristown, 1878. 250 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Longstreet had from 25,000 to 30,000 men that day, divided into some 53 regiments, averaging, say, 500 men each. There were 36 regiments in Porter's front, and 17 in Pope's front. These figures are, of course, approx- imate. Pope, in his numerous letters opposing a reopen- ing of Porter's case,^ makes much importance of Stuart's report.^ The most probable explanation of this report seems to the writer to be as follows : Lee, as we have seen, must have known at an early hour of Porter's approach. When forming his line he made dispositions to meet him, and sent Jones's division to the Manassas Gap Railroad, which he reached by 12 M. Stuart's cavalry were scouting quite a distance in front of Jones, and, while he was forming, dragged bushes, etc., as he says. Lee, on receiving news from Stuart of the large force approaching, detached Wilcox's three brigades to aid Jones, by this time in position. Wilcox sets the time of his going to the right at 4 to 5 P.M. I think the weight of the evidence is against him. It was probably 3 P.M., at the latest. The only other explanations are, that Stuart dragged bushes on the direct road from Gainesville to Bristoe, or that he did not drag them at all, as Gen. Eobertson says in two letters, I am inclined to think Gen. Robertson is correct, and that no dragging of bushes was done. The force Stuart speaks of as retiring to Manassas was McDowell ; ^ and Pope knows it, yet still continues to assert it was Porter. 1 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, 478. ^ .U., 735-736. 3 lb., 565. CASE OF FITZ-JOny PORTER. 251 Galt House, Louistille, Kt., IMay 27, 1870. Major-Gex. F. J. Porter : — Sir. — Your letter with sketcli enclosed came to-day; and, as YOU request an early response, I sliall be as brief as pos- sible. On the afternoon of Thursday. August 28, 1862, I proceeded with my cavalry brigade ... to Haymarket. ... As soon as I could get feed for my horses the next morning, Friday, 29th (my men had no breakfast), I returned to Hay- market, expecting to renew the fight of the previous evening. It could not have been more than 8 or 8.30 o'clock when I reached Haymarket. Looking to my left and front I saw an immense body of troops, which I supposed to be Longstreet's, — having witnessed in the distance his fight with Eicketts the evening before. In a very short time a courier from General Lee, requesting to see me, proved the supposition correct. I joined Longstreet with my whole command, passed him on the left flank of his column, and when his line was formed took position on his right. . There was considerable artillery (Stephen Lee, I think) on Jackson's right. Longstreet formed his line to the right of this force, and perhaps as near on the prolongation of Jackson's line as the nature of the ground would permit. It was very broken, consisting of a number of small, high hills and ravines, skirted with timber and thick undergrowth. My recollection here is perfect, as I assisted in placing several batteries of artillery in position, and found it very difficult. Longstreet's right extended beyond your left flank, and my orders were to protect his right. L^pon making a recon- noissance a large body of Federal troops was discovered (after- wards known to have been yours) , and I was instructed to 252 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. watch their movements. This was about 12 o'clock (Friday, 29th) , and I am quite sure that most of Longstreet's forces were in line of battle by 11 A.M., or very shortly afterwards. There was no cavalry in that direction but mine, which was held there the remainder of the day to guard the right and watch you. A look at the map will at once show that troops moving from Manassas to Gainesville would have struck our line to the right of its centre. With the foregoing data you can easily locate Longstreet and myself. He was on Jackson's right, extending in an almost perpendicular direction across Warrenton turnpike and the Manassas Gap R.E. My brigade was on his right flank. Stuart was on the field, but was constantly moving about, chiefly that day among the artillery. I was with my com- mand nearly the whole time, and neither saw nor heard any- thing of "dragging bushes along the road."^ What was the object? Our forces were ready for action; and I think such an order would have come through me. So much for the 29th. Very respectfully, sir. Your obedient servant, B. H. Robertson. ^In another letter General Robertson says, I have no knowledge of bushes having been dragged by cavalry, to create the impression of large forces coming, or for any purpose. Had these directions been given the order would naturally have been transmitted through me. I heard no order on that subject. B. H. Robertson." There was no dragging of bushes, no such a project thought of, — although General Stuart so states in his report [16 W.R., 736], and Gen- eral Pope harps upon it. F. J. P. CASE OF FIT Z- JO EN PORTER. 253 17 Caeondelet St., New Orleans, Jan. 12, 1870. Dear Porter : — Your letter of the 6tli inst. and pamphlet have been received. You ask for criticisms from me, whether favorable or the reverse. I think the ground has been so thoroughly covered by yourself, McClellan, and Franklin, that there remains nothing more to be said. The disobedience of the order of the 27th was only partial, and that' literal, and not from any refractory or insubordinate spirit, but only from the conviction on your part that the spirit of the order could be better complied with by this slight departure from its literal readiug. There are but few cases where officers, even of the lowest grade, are not allowed some discretion in the execution of orders. As to the order of the 29th, to attack Jackson's, right and rear, Longstreet being beyond the Bull Run Mountains, according to my understanding of it you did not disobey this either in essence or literally. When Pope gave the order the situation was not such as he supposed, and had he known the true state of affairs the order would not have been given ; and had you attempted to execute the order you would have failed, and been truly worthy of all censure, and would have been ridiculed and denounced for this attempt of literal obedience of an order that any sensible man should have known ought not to have been obej'ed, it, as above stated, being given under a misconception of the true condition of things. The order late in the afternoon was to go into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, his rear, the enemy being Jackson alone, according to Pope ; when, in fact, all of Long- street's command was on Jackson's right, and all of these would have been in your way and first to be disposed of before you could have reached Jackson. Pope's letter of September 16 is truly characteristic of him. I never knew of any general and terrible conflict that raged on the 29th ; he is wrong when 254 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, referring to the difliculties of the ground over which you were required to move when he says "the enemy moved over this very ground.'^ We did not move over it, but only on a very small part of it, and that near the pike, where it was mostly open field. Frank- lin has the correct idea, — it was an after- thought with Pope, and after some one had put it in his head. The sentence of the Court is extraordinary, and its findings little less so. McDowell and yourself are at issue about an order he says he gave you. It seems to me that Pope's ignorance of our movements was inex- cusable, and gives proof conclusive of his unfitness for his posi- tion. His orders to you and McDowell, and his telegrams to Washington, all show great ignorance or want of truth, in fact both. Had Gen. Lee been like Pope, I could Ixave been tried by a court for disobeying his orders tome late the evening of the 29th ; but as I moved to the front I saw that matters were not what he believed them to be, and did not attempt what I was ordered to do. I think Dick Anderson failed to obey an order there also, though I am not certain. I have written with many interruptions, and after reading your pamphlet, w^liich is rather long for me to remember in de- tail ; but, as I said in the beginning, there was nothing left for me to say, so thoroughly had the case been handled by your- self, Franklin, and McClellan. The latter's letter expresses my own convictions in the case. I believe in " ante-bellum " da3's it was generally conceded that Pope acknowledged fealty to no one of the inculcations of the decalogue, and the war did not produce au}^ change. Had I known you would have published my letter given you in New York, in 1866, 1 would have written it with more care ; though I beheve the points are all clear, though the eighth line from bottom of 30th page should have read " Law's brigade, Hood's division," and that meant on the CASE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 255 left of the pike, all of Longstreet being on the (our) right of that road. Hood was not regarded as under Longstreet's com- mand. Truly, CM. Wilcox. Gen. R. E. Lee, commanding the enemy, Tvrites, 9th September, 1870: "As far as I can judge, the position assigned to the troops of the army of Ya., on the map sent me, or a little in advance, is that held l)y them on the 29th Aug., 1862."^ Again, 31st October, 1867, he writes : "Longstreet's command arrived within supporting distance of Jackson on the 29th August, 1862, between 9 and 10 A.M., and his line was formed by noon." "It was after 12 M. that Gen. Stuart reported the approach of a column of troops which threatened our right and Gen. Wilcox with his three Inigades was sent to reinforce it. . . .1 was with the portion of his [Longstreet's] troops south of the GainesAdlle turnpike." "Gen. Longstreet's command was formed by 12 M., on the 29th August, in two lines on Jackson's right, Gen. Hood's division crossing the Gainesville turnpike, and Gen. D. R. Jones's division the Manassas Gap R.R. ; artillery was massed between Jackson's right and Long- street's left, and cavalry under Gen. Stuart guarded the extreme right flank." " The probable result of an attack on Longstreet after 12 M., with less than 12,000 men, would have been a repulse." "The result of an attack before 12 M. with 25,000 men cannot be certainly pronounced, but it ought to ^ Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, 551. 256 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. have been repulsed if made after bis [Longstreet's] troops were formed. His wbole force except Anderson's divis- ion was up, and tbat arrived before next morning." ^ 18tb February, 1870, he says that the result of an attack upon Longstreet after 12 M., August 29, 1862, with about 12,000 men, would have been a repulse ; and if a repulse, especially at an early hour, or before 5 P.M., the effect would have been an attack on Gen. Pope's left and rear by Longstreet and Stuart, which, if successful, would have resulted in the relief of Jackson, and have probably rendered unnecessary the battle of the next day. If the attack had been made after 5 P.M. on Longstreet, he would have been able to have resisted it with his whole corps, which, if successful, would have equally secured Jackson's safety."^ And July, 1870: ''I had no anxiety for Jackson at Second Manassas. I knew he could hold on till we came, and that we should be in position in time." Porter could not take Jackson in flank, while he was attacked in front. He could do nothing of the sort. I was there then. I saw Porter approach, I went out and reconnoitred his corps, and made the proper dispositions to meet it. We flanked him. He could not flank Jackson." ' ' I suppose we should have cut Porter to pieces if he had attacked to get at Jackson's flank." ^ Gen. Longstreet says: '*My command was deployed in double line, for attack, between 10 A.M. and 12 M., on the 29th, extending from Jackson's right across turnpike and Manassas Gap Railroad." * 1 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, 551. ^ ji^. ^pQj^tgr's Statement, Morristown, 1878, 79. * Senate Ex. Doc. 37, Part 1, 552. CASE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 257 Col. Charles Marshall, aide-de-camp to General Lee. says : " Most of Longstreet's troops had reached or Trere reaching their position, Trhen Stuart, Trho was on our right, reported the approach of a force from the direction of Manassas." ... " Those troops, I understood after- wards, were Porter's, and I am positive that they ap- proached the field after Longstreet's arrival." " The map is just received, and, after a careful exami- nation of it, I have only to suggest one slight change in the position of the Confederate line on the 29th." . . " On the morning of August 29, when Longstreet came on the field, Jackson's whole command lay on the west side of the turnpike, his right reaching the road. The general direction of his line was as follows : His left, under A. P. Hill, was disposed along the line of the un- finished branch of the Manassas Gap Railroad, extend- ing towards Sudley Springs Ford. His centre (Ewell's diA-ision), under Lawton, followed the general direction of that railroad : and his right (Jackson's own division), under Starke, extended in the same general direction, but on the right, a little in advance of the railroad line." " Upon the arrival of Longstreet, Jackson's right was somewhat advanced, and occupied the line on which the battle was fought." "This advance of the right of Jackson threw still more of the railroad line in rear of Jackson." " On the arrival of Longstreet, Hood's two brigades, supported by one under Evans, was formed on Jackson's right. Hood's left lay some three hundred yards west of the turnpike, and his line extended across the road ob- 258 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. lique. On liis left he was supported by three brigades under Wilcox, and on his right by three more under Kemper. D. R. Jones extended from Hood's right to the old line of the M. G. R.R. ; and Stuart with the cavalry extended beyond that road." " About 11.30 A.M. or 12 M. (I am not sure of the time, but it was after Jones had nearly or quite gotten into position), Stuart reported Porter's approach. . . Inquiry was made at the time whether the approaching force came from Bristoe or from Manassas Junction. . . . I think Anderson came up before noon.^ I am sure that about the time he arrived, or shortly before, the three brigades, under Wilcox, were moving across from Hood's left to support D. R. Jones, in consequence of the report made by Stuart. Wilcox took some artillery with him." "D. R. Jones had, I think, six brigades, including Wilcox's three, and artillery also." Gen. B. H. Robertson says: "Longstreet was on Jack- son's right, extending in an almost perpendicular direction across Warrenton tu.rnpike and the Manassas Gap Rail- road. My brigade was on his right flank. Longstreet's right extended beyond Porter's left flank, and my orders were to protect his right. Upon making a reconnoissance a large body of Federal troops was discovered, — after- wards known to be Porter's. I was instructed to watch their movements. This was about 12 o'clock (Friday, 29th), and I am quite sure that most of Longstreet's forces were in line of battle at 11 A.M., or very shortly afterwards. Although Stuart was present I had imme- * Corrected in subsequent letter to " night." CASE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 259 diate command of all the Confederate cavalry at Second Manassas; and there was no cavalry in that direction but mine, which was held there the remainder of the day to guard the right and watch Porter." On the 30th Porter was ordered to report with his com- mand to Pope,^ which he did. Pope, laboring under the idea that the enemy were in full retreat, ordered Porter to pursue the retreating enemy, and that Gen. McDowell would take charge of the pursuit. Porter knew such was not the case, from the strong resistance made to his recon^ noissances, and endeavored to get Pope to the front to con- vince him. It was of no avail, and Porter attacked with his own corps and Hatch's (late King's) division on his right. After heavy and gallant fighting against Jackson's corps he was repulsed, and the repulse was followed by an attack on our left by Longstreet. Porter (at Mc- DowelFs earnest request) put in the Regulars, and with the aid of Reynolds repulsed this attack, when the enemy were witliin a very short distance of the pike, our only line of retreat. His losses this day were 2,200 killed, wounded, and missing, out of a total force of 7,000, Griffin being absent through his own mistake. Among the charges of the court-martial was one that Porter, being ordered to attack and take a rebel battery, did proceed to the attack so slowly as to give the enemy full notice of his plan, and did then attack so feebly as to make no impression on their lines, etc., referring to this attack on the 30th. This is the charge the Judge- Advo- cate said he would withdraw ; but would not mutilate the record by striking it out, simply saying that it was with- 1 16 W.R., 18; 339. 260 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. drawn. In the official order promulgating tire proceeding and findings of the court-martial this fact was not stated ; and to a casual observer it would appear as if he were tried on this also. Porter endeavored to offer proof as to his conduct this day, but was not allowed to do so. I quote from Jack- son's report to show the nature of Porter's attack : < ' After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the day the Federal infantry, about 4 o'clock in the even- ing, moved from under cover of the wood, and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extend- ing its attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary strug- gle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if determined by force of numbers and fury of assault to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and well-sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the commanding General for reenforcements ; but the timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet on the right relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, and gave to those brave men the chances of a more equal conflict."^ B. T. Johnson's (commanding Second Vir- ginia Brigade, Taliaferro's Division, Jackson's Corps) report says : ' ' Before the railroad-cut the fight was most obstinate. I saw a Federal flag hold its position for half an hour, within ten yards of a flag of one of the regi- ments in the cut, and go down six or eight times, and after the fight a hundred dead were lying twenty yards 1 16 W.R., 647. CASE OF FITZ-JOHX PORTER. 261 from the cut, some of them Tvithm twenty feet of it. The men fought until their ammunition was exhausted, and then threw stones. Lieut. Lewis Randolph, of the battalion, killed one with a stone, and I saw him after the fight with his skull fractured." ^ General Lee's report says: " About 3 P.M. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of General Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at close quarters hj Jack- son's troops, when its progress was checked and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line of great strength moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left."' ^ A. P. Hill's report says: " On the 30th, about 2 o'clock, the enemy again made an attack along our whole line. Tlie attack on my part of the line was gallantly resisted by Archer and Thomas, Gregg still holding the e^rtreme left. This onset was so fierce and in such force that at first some headway was made, but throwing in Pender and Brockenbrough, their advance was again checked and eventually repulsed with great loss." ° The army fell back to Centre ville that night, and remained there during the 31st. Most of the evidence which I have read to you to-night is capable of proof from official documents, ever}i:hing, in fact, except some unimportant facts of inter^'iew at Ma- nassas Junction. I have stated, as fairly as I know how to do, the evidence, and it seems to me a simple act of 1 16 W.E., 666. 2 lb., 557. 3 lb., 671. 262 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN. justice that Porter sliould have his case reopened, so as to allow this new evidence to be put in and weighed with the old evidence for what it is worth. Porter does not demand a new trial ; he does not raise any new issue by which to clear himself ; he simply asks a reopening of his case. He could not produce the most important part of this evidence at his trial, on account of the war. The remainder of it he could not produce in the hurried course of a trial by court-martial, where it was difficult to see his witnesses beforehand, or to know what eac^li one would testify to until the moment he went on to the stand. If Porter's evidence does not sustain what he claims it will his condemnation will be all the heavier. If it does sustain the grounds of his defence at the court-martial it is only fair and right that justice should be done him, and his sentence revoked. IX. THE CONDUCT OF GENERAL McCLELLAN DUUINO HIS STAY AT ALEXANDRIA IN AUGUST, 1862; THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HIS COMMAND, AND HIS ALLEGED NEGLECT TO SUPPORT THE ARMY OF GENERAL POPE. By Lieut.-Col. FRANIvLIN HAVEN, Jr. COMMITTEE. Lieut.-Col. Franklin Havkn, Jr., U.S.V. Bvt. Capt. Howard Stockton, U.S.A. Read before the Society on Monday evening^ Oct. 9, 1876. THE CONDUCT OF GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. rpHE subject submitted for our inquiry embraces a period of four days, — from the night of August 26, 1862, when Gen. McClellan arrived at Alexandria, to the night of August 30, when the army of Pope retired from the field of Second Bull Run. The 31st was a day of quiet and of little moment. The consideration of this subject may properly be pre- ceded by a brief summary of the events and circumstances therewith connected, and which occurred in the month of August. August 4, 1862, McClellan received orders to withdraw from the Peninsula. August 9 was fought the battle of Cedar Mountain. August 14 Gen. Reno, with 8,000 men of the forces which had arrived at Falmouth under Gen. Burnside, joined Gen. Pope, who then advanced towards the Rapidan. Information obtained through reconnoissances and the capture of a signal-station, and certain papers of the enemy (among which was an autograph letter of Gen. 265 266 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGK Robert E. Lee to Gen. Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 15), showed Pope, on the 18tli, that he had not only the corps of Ewell, A. P. Hill, Jackson, and Longstreet in his front, but Lee, in person, with the majority of Lee's forces. ^ On the night of the 18th, and during the 19th, Pope retired with his army behind the Rappahannock, closely pressed by the enemy, but without loss of men or material. August 18, Halleck, General-in-Chief, telegraphed to Pope: Stand firm on the line [of the Rappahannock], till I can help you. Fight hard, and aid will soon come."^ On the 20th, 21st, and 2 2d the enemy made repeated and unsuccessful efforts to cross the river at numerous fords. On the night of the 2 2d a heavy rain caused the river to rise six or eight feet, and temporarily destroyed all the fords. On the 23d and 24th the enemv maintained a strono: force in Pope's front, at Rappahannock Station, but con- tinued at the same time a steady movement of troops towards Pope's right. The army was beginning to suffer from scarcity of provisions. Even as early as the 20th Charles James Mills, of the Second Massachusetts, wrote in his diary : ' ' I begin to appreciate how little an officer has to eat on the march. It is rather ridiculous ! " On the 23d : ' ' We were aroused by the pleasant process of having our wood shelled by the rebels . . . could not raise anything to eat but a few unripe apples." On the 24th he wrote : ' ' Last nii^ht one of the officers said he wished he was dead, or a prisoner, or with the wagon train, he did not much care which. . . . ]^ow that we have feasted on ' 16 W.K., 6, 29. nh., 56. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 267 mutton, we feel better ; " and, further on, he said : " This starving takes a man's strength down awfully." ^ Capt. Mudge wrote to liis father, September 1 : " For the last ten days I have eaten what might pass for eleven meals. For three days our principal food was green apples and water, with occasionally a cracker. "We have marched somewhere every day, generally bringing up where we started from. ... I don't think there has been an hour since I have been here, when I was awake, that I haven't heard firing; . . . but we are in the best of spirits under it all ; in fact, joking more when we expected to starve, than if we were in some comfortable place enjoying ourselves." ^ There was throughout Pope's army a scarcity of food, and there was also all the extra hard work (the constant movement, marches by night, and sldrmishes by day) which a small army must go through to successfuU}' hold in check an enemy of double its numbers. On the 21st Halleck had telegraphed to Pope : " Gen. Cox's forces . . . will be here to-morrow and the next day. Dis- pute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil till we can reenforce you. Forty-eight hours more and we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it ; " ^ and twice forty-eight hours Pope held his ground. On the night of the 2 2d a small cavalry force of the enemy had crossed at Waterloo bridge, and made a raid on the baggage-wagons in rear of the army. On the 23d a force also crossed at Sulphur Springs, but was driven back on the following day, and our troops then destroyed the bridges at Sulphur Springs and at Waterloo. ^ 2 Harvard Mem. Biog., 143. ^ j^,^ 154^ 3 ^3 ^y.i>., 57. 268 FOrF'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. On the evening of the 26th — the evening that Gen. McClellan arrived at Alexandria — the advance of Jack- son's force passed through Thoroughfare Gap, and cut the railroad in the neighborhood of Kettle Run, about six miles east of Warrenton Station. On the afternoon of the 27th a severe engagement occurred between Ewell's division of Jackson's force and Hooker, about four miles west of Bristoe Sta- tion, in which Ewell was driven back along the rail- road. J ackson was now in a critical position : he had placed himself with 20,000 men between Alexandria and War- renton, between McClellan's forces at the former place and Pope's army at the latter. Longstreet and the rest of Lee's army were still on the other side of the river at Sulphur Springs, Waterloo, and above towards Salem. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 28th the enemy commenced evacuating Manassas Junction, retiring towards Centre ville. Pope in person, with Kearny's division and Reno's corps, reached Manassas Junction about 12 o'clock on the 28th, less than an hour after Jackson in person had retired. In the afternoon of the 28th Kearny drove the rear-guard out of Centre- ville, and Jackson, retiring on the Warrenton turnpike towards Thoroughfare Gap, met and had a severe fight with King's division, near Groveton. On the following days, 29th and 30th, was fought the battle of Second Bull Run. Of the Army of the Potomac Gen. Reynolds, with GEy. McCLELLAX AT ALEXAXDRIA. 269 2,500 men, and Gen. Kearny ^itli 4,500, had joined Pope prior to the 25th. On the 24th Haupt had telegraphed to Pope from Alexandria: "30,000 troops or more demand transpor- tation. . . . AVe can manage 12,000 troops per day, with supplies, if no accident occurs ; " ^ and on the fol- lowing day, 25th, Haupt telegraphed: "We expect to clean out all the troops now here, and all that are expected to-day."^ On the 26th Gen. Porter reported to Pope. His corps had been forwarded with a very small supply of provisions and with only forty rounds of ammunition to the man. On the 26th the corps of Pleintzelman had also arrived, but without wagons, without artillery, and, with only forty rounds of ammunition. On the evening of the 26th Gen. McClellan arrived at Alex- andria, and from that moment no additional troops reached Gen. Pope's army until after the battle of Second Bull Run. Reo^ardino' the nature and extent of Gen. McClellan's command, and his conduct during his stay at Alex- andria, we first look for information to his own report, ptiblished in 1864. He therein states, after quoting a part of the despatches which passed between him and the Department at Washington : " It will be seen from what has ceded . . . that, after my arrival at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to for- ward supplies and reenforcements to Gen. Pope. I sent with the troops that moved all the cavalry I could get hold of. Even my personal escort was sent out upon U6 W.E., 63. 2 1b. 270 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. the line of the railway as a guard, with the provost and camp guards at head-quarters, retaining less than one hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, inya- lids, members of bands, etc. All the head-quarters teams that arrived were sent out with supplies and ammuni- tion, none being retained, even to move the head-quarters camp. The squadron, that habitually served as my per- sonal escort, was left at Falmouth with Gen. Burnside, as he was deficient in cavalry." ^ Gen. McClellan omits from his report many important despatches, written by himself at Alexandria, and some of the orders of the General-in-Chief received by him. These omitted orders and despatches can be found in the first volume of the " Report on the Conduct of the War," printed the year before his report was published. ^ And, unfortunately, the orders and despatches relied upon by Gen. McClellan to substantiate his statement do not appear in any way to confirm it. To the inquiry of the Committee on the Conduct of the War : " What was the position of Gen. McClellan in regard to the troops of the Army of the Potomac, as they landed at Acquia Creek and Alexandria? Were they under his command ; and if so how long did they remain under his command ? " Gen. Halleck stated as follows : — " Answer. Gen. McClellan retained the command of the Army of the Potomac, as it landed at those two points, ex- cept such portions of it as were sent into the field under Gen. Pope. Those portions were considered as temporarily de- tached from his command, but still belonging to his army, and he was directed that all orders sent from him to the 1 McClellan's Keport, 342; O.S., 527; omitted from 12 W.R., 104. 2 Printed in 12 and 18 W.R. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 2T1 troops so detached, while under Gen. Pope's immediate command, must be sent through the head-quarters at "Wash- ington. He retained command of all the troops of his army as they landed at those places, until sent into the field, and reported to Gen. Pope ; and they continued to remain under his command, with the exception of the detach- ments, until Gen. Pope's army fell back on Washington, when all came under Gen. McClellan's command. On liis arrival at Alexandria he was told to take immediate com- mand of all the troops in and about Washington, in addi- tion to those which properl}- belonged to the Army of the Potomac. Some days after he had been A'erbally directed to take such command he asked for a formal order, Avhich was issued from the Adjutant-General's office. The order issued from the Adjutant-General's office was after Gen. Pope's army commenced falling back, and was dated Sep- tember 2 ; but Gen. McClellan had been in command ever since liis arrival in Alexandria. " Question. At what time did he arrive in Alexandria ? " Ansiver, He arriA^ed at Alexandria on the 26th of August. The formal order was issued that he might have no difficulty with Gen. Pope's forces ; that they might not question his authority. " Question, Who ordered the troops of the Army of the Potomac, as they landed, to join the army under Gen. Pope ? And were such orders given directly to the troops, or through Gen. McClellan ? Ayisiver. In regard to the first troops that landed at Acquia Creek the orders were given through Gen. Burn- side. Those troops that came to Alexandria before Gen. 272 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. McClellan's arrival received their orders direct from me to go out. After Gen. McClellan arrived they received their orders through him, with the exception of one or two orders that were issued while he was in Washington city or coming to or returning from Washington to Alexan- dria. " Question, Who ordered Gen. Franklin's corps to join Gen. Pope's command? When were such orders given, and what was the cause of the delay, if there was any delay, in obeying those orders? " Answer. The general instructions to Gen. McClellan were to send out the troops as fast as they landed. On the 27th of August I telegraphed to him that Franklin's corps should march in the direction of Manassas as soon as possible. I submit herewith the copies of the telegrams which passed between myself and Gen. McClellan in regard to the movements of Gen. Franklin. It will be seen that Gen. McClellan assumed the responsibility of stopping Gen. Franklin after he had started." ^ Gen. McClellan arrived at Acquia at daylight, August 24, and reported as follows : — ^ Head-quarters Army of the Potomac, AcQuiA Creek, August 24, 1862. I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders. On the 26th the General-in-Chief directed him to leave Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and to come to Alex- andria, as very great irregularities were reported there ; adding, Gen. Franklin's corps will march as soon as it ' C.W,, 452-453. 2 12 W.R., 93. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 273 receives transportation."^ McClellan immediately sailed for Alexandria, and the next day reported as follows : — Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 8 A.M. I arrived here last night, and have taken measures to ascer- tain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may be applied. Just received a rumor that railway bridge over Bull Run was burned last night. ^ August 27 Gen. Halleck instructed Gen. McClellan to direct Gen. Casey to furnisli liim about 5,000 of tbe new troops under his command, and " take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria.^' ^ On the same day, at 9 P.M., McClellan repoii;s : ''I find part of Cox's command under orders to take the cars. Will halt it with Franklin's until morning."* And Cox never went ! Two days afterwards, when Franklin did start, Gen. McClellan still held back Cox, and telegraphed : I propose moving Gen. Cox to Upton's Hill, to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry ^ Before the Committee of the Conduct of the War Gen. McClellan testified as follows : — Question, Did that portion [of the Army of the Peninsula] which landed at Alexandria receive their in- structions to march to the assistance of Gen. Pope from you, or from Gen. Halleck? Ansiver, All received the orders direct from Gen. Halleck, except the commands of Franklin and Sumner. n2W.R., 94. 2 lb. 3 lb., 95. n8W.R.,692. 5 12W.R., 97. 274 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. . . . The orders for Franklin and Sumner were given through me, but by direction of Gen. Halleck." ^ It is curious to read the repeated orders relative to movement of Franklin's corps, contained in the despatches of the General-in-Chief. We find ten successive orders issued in four days : — 1. August 26, 11 A.M. In despatch to Gen. McClellan at Acquia : " Gen. Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportation." ^ 2. August 27, 10 A.M. In despatch to McClellan at Alexandria : Franklin's corps should march in that direc- tion [Manassas] as soon as possible." ^ 3. August 27, 12 M. " Porter reports a general bat- tle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches." ^ 4. August 28. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Franklin directly: "On parting with Gen. McClellan, about 2 o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day toward Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the General has not yet returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order act on this." 5 5. August 28, 3.30 P.M. " Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible toward Ma- nassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reenforced." ^ The General-in-Chief, supposing that his orders have been obeyed, directs McClellan to maintain a telegraphic communication with Franklin, and receives reply : — 1 1 C.W., 439. 2 12 W.R., 94. ^ j^,^ 95. ^Ib., 94. .. .. nsW.K., 707. ^b., 709. GEX. McCLELLAX AT ALEXANDRIA. 275 ALEXANDRIA; August 28, 4.40. G-en. Franklin is with me here, etc.^ 6. August 28, 8.40 P.M. There must be no further dehiy in moAung Franklin's corps. They must go to- morrow morning, ready or not ready." ^ August 29, three days after receipt of first order, McClellan, at Alexandria, telegraphs that Franklin's corps is in motion : started about 6 A.I\L ; and adds, " I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last nidit.'-^! : 7. August 29, 3 P.M. " I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Annandale as to prevent his going farther : otherwise he will push on toward Fairfax. . . . Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.*' ^ 8. August 29, 7.50 P.M. " I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Annandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders ; investigate and report the facts of this disobedience." ^ 9. August 30, 9.40 A.M. ''I am by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of yesterda3\ Considering the circumstances of the case, he was very wrong in stop- ping at Annandale. Moreover I learned last night that the Quartermaster's Depaii:ment could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, anytime since his arrival at Alexandria." ^ 10. August 30, 2.10 P.M. ''Franklin's and all of 1 12 W.R., 97. 2 18 W.R., 710; cf. McClellan to Halleck. Aug. 28, 4.45 P.M.. lb.. 709. 3 12 W.E.. 97. 98. ^ 18 W-R., 722. = lb., 723. e xb., 744. 276 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible despatch. They must use their legs, and make forced marches."^ At 4 o'clock, August 30, Franklin was between one and two miles of the battle-field (so his Adjutant-General told one of your committee on the following day) , and he turned about, and marched back to Centre ville. About 5 o'clock the enemy made their last and great rush against Pope's left, and were repulsed. At quarter of 6 our troops were still masters of the field, but Pope gave the order to retire, because the army was without pro- visions. The movement of Sumner's corps is briefly told in his own language. Gen. Sumner says that, on reaching Acquia Creek, and before he was able to debark all of his command, he received orders to proceed directly to Alex- andria, which he did as speedily as possible. He marched through the town out on the Little-Eiver turnpike, about two miles beyond Alexandria, where he remained twenty- four hours ; was then ordered to retrace his steps through Alexandria and to march to the Aqueduct bridge at Georgetown ; after he had been there three hours re- ceived an order to move to Centreville. He says : ''If I had been ordered to advance right on from Alexandria by the Little-River turnpike I should have been in that Second Bull Run battle with my whole force. As it was, I lost some forty-eight hours by remaining in camp for a time near Alexandria, and then marching up to the Aqueduct bridge."^ ' 18 W.R., 747. 2 1 C.W., 366-367. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 211 And tliiis Cox Tvas detained when abont to take the cars ; and Franklin, after a dehav of two days, was x^er- mitted to start on the morning of the 29tli, and was then halted at Annandale, a distance of only seven miles from Alexandria ; and Sumner was put into camp on the turn- pike two miles from Alexandria, on the afternoon of the 28th, and there kept for twenty-four hours : and in the meantime Pope, only twenty-five miles from Alexandria, was fighting the enemy, and there were three or four broad, hard, excellent roads leading straight to his army, and after 12 o'clock on the 28th, a staff officer could have ridden alone and in safety to Pope's head-quarters. But may we not say that Gen. McClellan, after his ar- rival in Alexandria, was charged with the duty of defend- ing T\^ashington, as well as of re enforcing and supplying Pope's army ; that on the evening of the 2Tth he knew of Jackson's advance through Thoroughfare Gap : that on the 28th communication was interrupted between Pope's army and Alexandria, and that it had then become evident that a large body of the Confederate forces was in the neighbor- hood of Manassas (extravagant reports were brought in by stragglers, and rumors of the advance of Lee's whole army, 120,000 strong, on AVashington were current) ; that, under these circmnstances. Gen. McClellan might well feel the paramount necessity of providing for the protection of the capital, and of organizing a line of defences which might cover the retreat — perhaps the flight — of a broken and demoralized army ; that, sup- posing Lee had defeated Pope and was tln-eatening Washington, it was prudent to keep back Franklin from 278 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. an advance wliicli miglit liave resulted in his capture or destruction ? Unfortunately McClellan's was a twofold duty, and any promptness and zeal in providing for the defence of Washington cannot excuse his neglect of the army in the field. McClellan had no right to base his action on vague rumors and untrustworthy reports. He should have known, or at least attempted to know, something of the actual state of affairs. Besides, it^was only during a ]Dart of the 28th that the excuse of uncertainty can avail him. Early on the 29th Haupt had reported that Pope was at Centre ville and in good spirits, and Hooker driving the enemy ; ^ while Halleck, even on the evening of the 28th, having heard directly from Pope,^ reiterated his orders to move Franklin's corps to Manassas. On the 27th Haupt had sent out towards Bull Eun a number of railway employes and telegraph operators (who had volunteered for the service), ''with instruc- tions to conceal themselves in the bushes, send out scouts, make connection with the wire, and report all that they saw or heard." Haupt says, "Nearly all the information given to the department at "Washington for the remaining days of the fight was received through this channel."^ McClellan's desjiiatches show that he took no positive measures to ascertain the condition of afiairs in the direction of Pope's army. On the 27th he had telegraphed to Halleck : "If you will give me even one squadron of good cavalry here, I will ascertain » 18 W.E., 736. 2 ib,^ 720. ^ i Q,y^,^ 330. GEN. M^CLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 279 the state of the case." ^ And after he had received several squadrons, if he sends them out at all, it is in any direction except in the direction of Pope's army and of the enemy. At 12 o'clock, August 29, he says: *'Have ordered most of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry to report to Gen. Barnard for scouting duty toward Eockville, Poolesville, etc." (places in Maryland about sixteen and twenty miles N.N. W. of Washington) . Besides the two squadrons of cavalry halted with Franklin at Annan dale, besides Cox's two squadrons which he sends to scout towards Vienna and up along the Potomac towards Dranesville, and besides the Twelfth Pennsylvania, which he sends across the river to the other side of Washing- ton, he had at Alexandria on the morning of the 29th three squadrons of cavalry (so we understand his de- spatch dated 29th) And yet on the 29th, at quarter before 3 in the afternoon, more than twenty-four hours after Pope had driven Jackson from Manassas Junction, and nearly twenty hours after Kearny had driven Jackson's rear-guard out of Centre ville, and when there had not been a single enemy all that day between Pope's head-quarters and Alexandria, McClellan responded to President Lincoln's inquiry, " What news from direc- tion of Manassas Junction — what generally ? " ^ : ' ' The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted, — first, to concentrate all U2 W.R., 96. 2 xb., 99. 3xb., 98. 280 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. our available forces to open comrQunication with Pope ; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape," etc.^ Even after the most peremptory orders of Halleck (repeated during three days) to push his troops to the scene of action, and learn something of the enemy, he could only at 10 o'clock P.M., August 29, communicate a despatch from Franklin containing information picked up from sources passiiig along the road at Annandale. Frank- lin said, From all the evidence the inference is that we met with no disaster and that Stonewall is in a tight place. . . . All of the best witnesses and all of the citizens who have passed consider Jackson in a dangerous position. Pope's train is parked this side of Centreville. . Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the country will not support him." ^ The employment of his staff appears in McClellan's despatch, dated August 29, 1862 : *' I am having inspec- tions made of all the forts around the city by members of my staff, with instructions to give all requisite orders. I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening ; found them in good order." ^ This employment was very well ; but could he not have used one intelligent officer of his staff to ascertain the truth of some of the rumors which he reported? Prior to his departure from the Peninsula Gen. Halleck had instructed McClellan, under date of August 21 : By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammuni- tion. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover 112W.R., 98. nSW.R., 724. 3i2W.R., 100. GEN. M^CLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 281 they may have to fight as soon as they land." ^ To which McClellan replied : If you wish it, I can probably ship quite an amount of ammunition for other troops than this army."^ And three hours later, same day, August 21, he telegraphed from Fort Munroe : ' ^ I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery., and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficiency that may exist in Gen, Pope's army, , . . The forage is the only question for you to attend to." ^ August 30, at 1.45, Gen. Halleck telegraphed : Ammu- nition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward to Centre ville for Gen. Pope. It must be done with all possible despatch."* To which command, made while the battle of Second Bull Eun was being fought. Gen. McClellan replied : ''I know nothing of the calibre of Pope's artillery, etc." ^ On the 28th Pope says he telegraphed to the General- in-Chief the condition of his army, and asked that rations and forafi^e should be sent from Alexandria with all de- spatch.^ Early on the 30th Pope received the following- note : — August 29, 8 P.M. To Commanding Officer at Centreville : — I have been instructed by Gen. McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all the cars also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train. W. B. Franklin, Major-Gen. com'd'g jSixth Corps, 112W.R., 92. 2 lb. 3 lb. ^b., 101. ^i^. 6 16 W.R., 41 ; cf. 18 W,R., 721. ' lb., 17. 282 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, In his despatch to Gen. Halleck that morning, at 5 A.M., Pope said : " Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment."^ August 30 McClellan finds he must render some excuse for his conduct regarding movement of troops, and he writes to the Greneral-in-Chief : Ever since Gen. Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria he has been endeavoring to get transportation . . . but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition by unloading Banks's supply train. . The great difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons." ^ So it appears that Banks's wagons were coming into Alexandria from Manassas for supplies on the morning of the 29th, and yet Franklin's corps, so McClellan wrote, could not with safety pass over the same road beyond Annandale. And it also appears that the scarcity of transportation was owing to the fact that the greater part of it at Alexandria and Washington was needed for the current supplies of the garrisons, and that the garrisons must not be subjected to any incon- venience for the sake of sending reenforcements to the field, or of feeding hungry soldiers engaged in fighting the enemy. From the despatches contained in McClellan's Report, 1 18 W.R., 741. =^ 12 W.R., 100. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 283 and in the Congressional Eeport on the Conduct of the War, and from the testimony of Gens. McClellan, Halleck, and Sumner, and Col. Haupt, your committee find the following facts : — That Gen. McClellan was ordered from Acquia to Alex- andria to check irregularities at the latter place, and to push forward troops and supplies to Pope's army ; That he had command over all troops in front of Wash- ington until they had reported to Gen. Pope ; That after his arrival at Alexandria no troops reached Pope's army till after the battle of Second Bull Run ; That Gen. McClellan could and should have forwarded 80,000 troops; that 18,000 should have reached Pope's army by the 28th, and the remainder on the morning of the 29th ; That Gen. McClellan disobeyed the orders of the Gen- eral-in-Chief. That his despatches evince apathy regarding the fate of Pope's army, and especially the despatch containing the suggestion ''to leave Pope to get out of his scrape ".^ That his reply, that he " knew nothing of the calibre of Pope's artillery,"^ after he had assured the General-in- Chief from the Peninsula that he could furnish ammuni- tion for the whole of Pope's army, and at a moment when he could obtain, by telegraph, i-nformation from the ord- nance bureau at Washington (where a record of every gun is kept), and his statement to Pope through Frank- lin that he would load wagons with rations, etc., if Pope would send in cavalry to escort them, show that he » 12 W.R., 98. 2 lb,, 101. 284 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. evinced neither judgment nor zeal regarding the forward- ing of provisions and ammunition to Pope's army. That very little information was received by the Depart- ment at Washington in consequence of any action of Gen. McClellan, notwithstanding that he had more than 30,000 men and several squadrons of cavalry with which to obtain information, and was repeatedly directed to do so ; That he reported, without attempting to ascertain their truth, rumors, which, if the Department had not been otherwise and better informed, would have tended to create a panic in the capital. That his plea of want of transportation, as an excuse for not sending Franklin forward, was unjustifiable ; as shown by Halle ck's statement that the quartermaster's department asserted there was abundance of transporta- tion in Alexandria, and his own acknowledgment that he believed the difficulty to be that the trains were needed for supplies of the garrisons. " That the conduct of McClellan was an immediate cause of the escape of Jackson, when the latter was cut off from the rest of Lee's army, and a chief cause of the failure of our army on the 29th and 30th. It has been suggested that the conduct of McClellan was the result of some constitutional peculiarity of tem- perament, slowness of perception, timidity of action, sluggishness of judgment, or incapacity to come to a decision ! Certainly moderate intelligence, united with ordinary patriotism, in the commanding officer at Alex- andria, a simple obedience to the orders of the General-in- Chief, would then have saved the country from immense GEN. M^CLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 285 losses. McClellan showed no want of action, no hesitancy to assume responsibility, even to moving without orders, when such movement was in accordance with his personal preferment. McClellan stated to the Committee on the Conduct of the War that, before he started on the Antietam campaign, it had not been decided whether he was to go. He says, " I asked the question two or three times of Gren. Hal- leck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it had not been determined ; and / do not think it ever teas. I think that icas one of those things that grew into shai^e itself. When the time came I went outr^ Did not his conduct at Alexandria indicate his purpose to be that things should so shape themselves that he should again be General in command? 1 1 C.W., 438-439. X. THE CONDUCT OF GENERAL McCLELLAN DURING HIS STAY AT ALEXANDRIA IN AUGUST, 1862; THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HIS COMMAND, AND HIS ALLEGED NEGLECT TO SUPPORT THE ARMY OF GENERAL POPE. By Bvt. Brig.-Gen. STEPHEN M. WELD, U.S.V. C0M3IITTEE. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Stephen M. Weld, U.S.V. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Charles A. Whittier, U.S.V. Read before the Society on Monday evening ^ Oct. 9, 1876. THE CONDUCT OF GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. EN. McCLELLAN was in command at Alexandria from the evening of August 26, 1862, to September 1, — a period of five days. In considering the question of the nature and extent of his command while there, and the aid he furnished Gen. Pope, it is necessary to go back somewhat, and see what had been done for a few days previous to the 26th of August. Porter and Heintzelman had been moved forward to Gen. Pope with vigor and promptitude. Keyes had been left at Yorktown, appar- ently with the approval of Gen. Halleck. Sumner and Franklin alone remain to be accounted for. Franklin had been embarked from Fortress Monroe on the 23d, and Sumner reached Acquia Creek on the 26th. McClellan left Fortress Monroe on the 23d of August, immediately after the departure of Franklin's corps. He reached Acquia Creek on the morning of 24th of August, and im- mediately reported to Gen. Halleck for orders, and to ascertain his position and duties, and also the whereabouts of Gen. Pope.^ Halleck answers (the same date) that McClellan asks for information that he (Halleck) cannot ' 12 W.R., 93, 94. 289 290 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. give, and which he is most anxious to have himself. ^ On the 26th Halleck telegraphs McClellan that he had better come to Alexandria, as " great irregularities are reported " to exist " there." 2 He adds: "Franklin's corps will move as soon as it receives transportation." McClellan immediately sailed for Alexandria, reaching there the evening of the same day, and reported to Halleck by telegraph early in the morning of the 27th. ^ He reports Sumner as disembark- ing at Acquia Creek on the evening of the 26th. * On the morning of the 27th he received a despatch, which he had asked for three days before, defining his duties and position, as far as they were defined at all, as follows : Take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria. Determine questions of priority in transportation, and the places they shall oc- cupy." ^ From this time until the 30th of August Gen. McClellan seems to have had command of but few troops except Sumner and Franklin, although his advice and co- operation were constantly sought by Halleck and others. As to his power to give orders to Generals Casey or Barnard, or other Generals, except those going forward to Pope, he seems to have had none. On the 30th a War Department order was issued, de- fining his command as " that portion of the Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to Gen. Pope's command."^ This embraced a few men at Yorktown and Fortress Monroe, about 100 men at head-quarters, and his stafi\ On the 31st of August, at 10 P.M., Gen. Halleck ordered H2W.R., 94. 2 3 '^Ib. 5 lb., 95. ^b., 103. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 291 him to take command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington not acting under Gen. Pope ; ^ which order was further increased, or rather defined, on the morning of September 1, by an order (verbal) from Halleck to take charge of the defences of Washington, embracing, of course, the works and their garrisons. ^ As to the extent of aid furnished Pope it seems that there can be no question raised, except as to Franklin's corps. Generals Halleck and McClellan seem to have been in perfect accord as far as the movements of Sum- ner's corps were concerned. The whole question as to whether he furnished proper aid and support to Pope seems, therefore, to hinge on Franklin's corps. Let us examine the record here. Franklin's corps disembarked at Alexandria on the afternoon of the 26th. Halleck, in his despatch of 26th, ordering McClellan to Alexandria, says that " Frank- lin's corps will march as soon as it receives transporta- tion." ^ Ought not Gen. Halleck to have seen that trans- portation was ready for Franklin, if there was such press- ing need for his presence with Pope ? McClellan was at this time at Acquia Creek, and Franklin at Alexandria. On the 27th Halleck telegraphs McClellan, 10 A.M., that "there seems to have been great neglect and care- lessness at Manassas. Frankhn's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible." ^ Later, 12 M., on the same day : " Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and be supplied as far as possible by railroad." ^ McClellan, un- doubtedly supposing that transportation had been looked out for by Halleck, at once sends an aide to order Franklin 112W.R., 103. nsW.R., 807. n2W.R., 94. 4 lb., 95. nb., 94. 292 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. out in obedience to these orders. The aide finds Franklin, Smith, and Slocum at Washington, and leaves the order with the officer next in command. It is important now to bear in mind the state of affairs at and around Manassas. This place, with all its immense stores, had been captured by J ackson, early on the morn- ing of the 27th. Gen. Taylor's brigade, sent out to Bull Run bridge by train on the morning of the 27th, had been defeated and almost annihilated by Jackson. The extent of the enemy's force there no one at Washington could ascertain, as " Stuart's cavalry," according to the Comte de Paris, screened all Jackson's movements as with an impenetrable veil, and had even appeared in the neighborhood of Fairfax Court-House."^ McClellan had no cavalry to act as scouts, or to bring him any infor- mation of the movements of the enemy. Franklin re- ported that he had only horses for four guns, without caissons, and no means of transporting ammunition.^ These facts seem to justify McClellan in detaining Frank- lin as he did during the afternoon of the 27th, and during the 28th of August. With a strong force in his front, of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, no one knowing whether it was the whole of Lee's army or not, would it not have been folly or madness to send Franklin out with no cavalry, almost no artillery, and but forty rounds of ammunition per man, with no wagons for conveying reserve ammunition? When Heintzelman went to join Pope it was well enough to let him go forward unprovided with artillery and transportation. He was marching through a country free from the V2 Comte de Paris, 278. = ^2 W.R., 96. GEy. McCLELLAX AT ALEXAXDRIA. 293 eiieniv. vritli uninterruptecl railvray commuiiication with. Ms base of supplies. On the 28th Halleck sent tliree orders to move : one to Franklin direct ^ and two to McClellan,- the last one being a peremptory order for him to go on the morning of the 29th. wlietlier he was ready or not. This order was obeyed at once, as it admitted of no discretion. It seems to us that the other orders were, to a great extent, discretionary with McClellan. He felt that Halleck was misinformed as to the state of the transportation facilities (which his letter of Angust 30 shows to be so) ; ^ that he, McClellan, being on the spot, and personally cognizant of all the facts in the case, had a certain discretion allowed to him in the case. Most certainly Halleck's action in the whole matter shows that lie felt so himself. With his large staff at Washington why did he not personally attend to Frank- lin's starting? He must have known that his orders were not carried out. and it was liis duty to have them obeyed at once if they were not discretionary, even if he had to arrest McClellan and Franklin for disobe- dience. It was an easy thing to send an aide to Alexancbia, and ascertain the truth or falsity of McClellan's statements as to transportation. Perhaps it was easier to sit in kis office and telegrapk impos- sibilities or absurdities. Gen. Franklin started at 6 A.M., on the 29th. and pro- ceeded as far as Annandale, some nine miles, where he was halted by McClellan. His reasons for so doing are given in a despatch to Halleck. dated August 29, 8 P.M.. which I will now read in full : — ^ 18 W.E., 707. 2 lb., 709, 710. ^ 12 W.E., 100-101. 294 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. " On the same day I received a despatch from the General- in-Chief, in which he asked me why I halted Franklin in Annan- dale, to which I replied as follows : — Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 8 P.M. By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 A.M., 12 M., and 1 P.M., together with your reply of 2.48 P.M., jo\x will see why Franklin's corps halted at Annandale. His small cavalry force, all I had to give him, was ordered to push on as far as possible towards Manassas. It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Annandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 P.M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements to-morrow. I have sent to Col. Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as soon as possible ; Gen. Tyler to furnish the necessary guards. I have directed Gen. Banks' supply trains to start out to-night at least as far as Annandale, with an escort from. Gen. Tyler. In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders when I have simply exercised the discre- tion you committed to me. Geo. B. McClellan, Major- General} It would certainly seem from this that he had au- thority and power to do as he did, and, moreoyer, that he was wise in so doing. Franklin was ordered forward to Manassas on the evening of the 28th, and started on the 29th, at 6 A.M. In answer to a despatch of the 30th, from Halleck, which denies that there was any » 12 W.R., 99-100. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 295 want of transportation at Alexandria, Gen. McClellan sent the following : — Camp neae Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862, 11.30 A.M. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief: — Your telegram of 9 A.M. received. Ever since Gen. Frank- lin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria he has been endeavoring to get transportation from the quartermaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, he pro- cured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition by unloading Banks' supply train. Gen. Sumner endeavored, by application upon the quartermaster's department, to get wagons to carry his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march with what he could carr}^ in his car- tridge boxes. I have this morning directed that all my head- quarters wagons that are landed be at once loaded with ammu- nition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency. Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward at 1 A.M. with an escort via Annandale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The great difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. Such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you. Geo. B. McClellan, Maj or- General.'^ ^ 12 "W.E., 100, cf. -with another version, supposed to be the original. 18 W.R., 744-745. 2m POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, You will have to decide which was in the right, — McClellan and Franklin, who were on the spot, or Hal- leck, in his office at Washington. Despatch of August 30th, 9 A.M. : " I am by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of yesterday. Considering the circum- stances of the case, he was very wrong in stopping at Annandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the Quartermaster's Department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly." ^ It seems to us that McClellan did all that a man could do to aid Pope, and to give him a full and hearty support. Is he to be blamed for having greater foresight than those over him, and for endeavoring to bring order out of chaos, and to render the capitol safe ? It may be of some inter- est to this Society to hear the following letters, one from McClellan, and the other from an officer high in rank in our army : — Orange, New Jersey, June 20, 1876. My dear WmTTiER : — Your most welcome letter of the 13th reached me only yesterday, on my return from a week's absence, and it afforded me very great pleasure to hear from one so closely associated with Generals Sedgwick, McMahon, and my brother. Of all the charges made against me during the time I held command, that of not supporting Pope was perhaps the most unfounded, for I certainly left nothing in my power undone to aid him. You will find in my report a pretty complete history U8 W.R., 744. GEN. McGLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 297 of the case, — as complete as the data then in my possession pennitted. But in reading it you must go back to the com- mencement of the preparations for the withdrawal from Harri- son's Landing, on the James. The Washington authorities were entirely mistaken in regard to means of water transporta- tion available for the movement, and by following the various letters and telegrams contained in my report you will see that the transports furnished were not adequate to so prompt a movement as they thought practicable. Although I was always most strongly opposed to the withdrawal, and to the last moment did my best to have the order countermanded, I can conscientiously say that I did not lose a moment in carry- ing it into effect, and the movement was effected without an hour's unnecessary delay. You will see, from these despatches, that the means of transportation for horses, guns, and wagons, were especially deficient, and that the infantry, as a rule, reached Alexandria without artillery or wagons, and entirely out of condition to undertake a campaign and go into battle at any distance from thek supplies. Bear in mind, also, the en- tu'e ignorance, on Halleck's part (as shown in his despatches to me) , of Pope's position and condition ; the fact that the enemy was known to be between him and Washington (though in what force we did not know) , — and I am very sure you will see that Franklin could not move more readily or otherwise than he did. The same with regard to Sumner. So far as the statement is concerned that before my arrival at Alexandria the troops moved forward with no delays, etc., — it is a suf- ficient answer that these first troops exhausted the means of transportation, and that nothing was left for the others. You will see, from my report, that I held back nothing, but gave the last man, horse and wagon under my control. All this is most hurriedly written, and probably incoherent. After you have 298 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. carefully read that part of my report, if there are any points in regard to which you are in doubt, or need further explanation, I shall be very happy to give it you, and when I reach our summer destination, in Canada, I will look over the subject more carefully and write you again. In the meantime I would be glad to hear from you, and to receive any suggestions that may occur to you. I know so well that I honestly did all in my power to insure the good of the service that it may well be that important points might escape me. ■ mentioned to me incidentally a day or two ago that he intended writing to Weld or yourself on the subject, as Porter had written him about it. My address for the next two or three months (after the close of this month) will be Coburg, Canada. Again expressing the satisfaction with which I received your letter, I am, my dear Whittier, always your friend, Geo. B. McClellan. Gen. Chas. A. Whittier. Extract from Letter. McClellan's first action towards the support of Pope was in sending off the troops of the Army of the Potomac from Fortress Monroe and vicinity. He had them embarked with the greatest energy and speed, giving them such destinations (Acquia Creek some, others Alexandria) as would tend to reenforce Pope at the earliest moment. At this time no one supposed Pope to be in danger; but it was the wish of the War Department to make him strong beyond peradventure. It is my impression that Burnside's and Porter's corps were landed at Acquia Creek ; Heintzelman's, Franklin's, and Sum- ner's at Alexandria. On account of the enormous call for transports it was not possible to keep the men and material together in some of the corps. It was so with Porter the GElSr. McCLELlAX at ALEXANDRIA. 299 first to leave Fort Monroe and having every facility at his disposal, and in the case of Franklin the artillery horses and harnesses did not get to Alexandria for a considerable time after the arrival of the infantry and guns. Heintzelman's corps, I think, arrived at Alexandria first, and was imme- diately sent out to join Pope. Then arrived Franklin's, which was ordered to encamp near Alexandria by Gen. Halleck. Then arrived the head-quarters (Gen. McClellan), and then Gen. Sumner's corps. Gen. McClellan had, therefore, detached from his .own command the whole of the Army of the Potomac except these two corps. Pope had an army of enormous size, and the impression was in Washington that he was safe, and I do not think that any one in high position considered him in danger of defeat. There did not, therefore, appear to be any necessity for sending out either Sumner or Franklin. However, by Gen. Halleck' s order, Franklin's corps was sent out, 29th, with such horses and harnesses as could be ob- tained, without caissons for the artillery and without cavalry, with orders to guard the line of communication between Gen. Pope and Alexandria. It marched as far as Annandale, nine miles, when Gen. W. F. Smith, commanding the leading division, reported that he had learned from stragglers (one of whom was a colonel of a regiment), that the enemy was advancing in force from beyond Fairfax Court-House. Gen. Smith halted at Annandale, reported these facts to Gen. Franklin, who in turn reported them to Gen. McClellan, who directed that the corps should remain that night at Annan- dale. Gen. Smith also reported that his artillery was short of ammunition, having only what was in the limbers of the pieces. During the night Gen. Franklin received orders to await the 300 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. arrival of a train of provisions which was to leave Alexandria that morning. The train arrived about 8 A.M., 30th, when the march was immediately resumed, and continued until 1 P.M., when the corps arrived at a point some distance in front of Fairfax Court-House, towards Manassas. Gen. Franklin detached a brigade at Fairfax Court-House, under command of Brig.-Gen. Torbert, to take post at Ger- mantown, to prevent any approach of the enemy's cavalry from the rear, carrying out the instructions that he had received to guard the line of communication of Gen. Pope. While the remainder of the corps was resting, about 1 P.M., Gen. Frank- lin received an order from Gen. McClellan directing him to go forward and join Gen. Pope with his command. The march was immediately resumed, and continued without halt until the troops of Gen. Pope were met retreating from the battle- field, about dusk. The direction of the wind or the state of the atmosphere was such that no indication that a fight was in progress was apparent to any one in Gen. Franklin's command until the retreating troops were met. Gen. Franklin took the responsibility of leaving Gen. Tor- bert's brigade at Germantown, notwithstanding the order to join Gen. Pope with bis command. This brigade was attacked by the enemy on the next day, and the attack was repulsed. But, had it not been there, it is not assuming too much to say that Gen. Pope's trains, which were then filling the roads between Fairfax Court-House and Centre ville and Washington, would have been utterly destroyed, — a result prevented by Gen. McClellan's order t; ) Franklin to protect Gen. Pope's rear; an order given and executed when it was not supposed that Gen. Pope was in danger of defeat. This fact does not appear in any official reports, but Gen. Franklin has Gen. Torbert's official report to him.^ The effect of Gen. McClellan's foresight was, 1 16 W.R., 537. GEN. McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA. 301 in this instance, to save the demoralized forces of Pope from enormous disaster ; for, had the enemy's cavalry found the trains unguarded, the confusion caused by their destruction would have induced the belief that the bulk of Lee's forces had got between Centreville and Washington. It is hard to say now what would have been the result of that belief. In discussing this question (Did Gen. McClellan give to Gen. Pope proper support, etc. ?) it must be remembered that Gen. McClellan was acting as General Halleck's subordinate ; that he had reason to believe that Gen. Pope had as large an army as the best General could handle in a pitched battle ; that he had no information to induce the belief that Pope was in danger ; that, supposing Pope to be in danger, it was neces- sary to have a heavy force of fresh men in his line of retreat ; that, if Pope were routed, an energetic enemy would at once pursue ; and that Franklin's or Sumner's corps would have been the only troops immediately available to man the lines in front of Washington. General McClellan has often been blamed for the expres- sion in his despatch to Gen. Halleck as to leaving Pope to his fate, or words to that effect (they are, I know, not quoted cor- rectly) . These expressions were used in answer to a military question, and should not be considered as having any personal bearing. Gen. McClellan was asked what ought to be done in certain contingencies, and he ought to have given his honest opinion from the best lights in his possession. As has been stated before, there never was reason to believe from Pope's despatches, or from any other source, that Pope was in great danger until he was defeated. The best information on all these subjects can be obtained from Gen. McClellan's report, which gives the facts in detail. 302 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. In answer to an inquiry why McClellan did not send one of liis own staff to learn about Pope's situation Gen. Weld read the following letter from an intimate friend of Gen. McClellan (which had received the ap- proval of McClellan himself), showing that he had not only sent Col. Hammerstein, but had begged Gen. Halleck to send one of his own staff, for that very purpose : — Kelton's mission resulted directly from a report to McClellan by Col. Hammerstein, whom McClellan had sent to the front. This report accorded with Porter's and other information, and was directly contrary to the tenor of Pope's reports to Halleck. McClellan went to Halleck with it, and urged him to go out in person and obtain the state of affairs. He said that he had so much office-work that he could not go. McClellan told him the fate of the Army of the Potomac was vastly more impor- tant just then than any office-work ; that his post as General- in-Chief was with the army ; and urged him to go. He positively declined. Just then Gen. Cullum came in ; and McClellan asked him if he would go. He also had too much office- work of great importance. McClellan saw Kelton writing in the next room, and beckoned him in. McClellan asked him if he could go. He promptly assented, and said he could start on the instant. Before leaving McClellan lent him an aide, and cautioned him not to content himself with seeing Pope, but to see also as many of the corps and division commanders as possible, in private^ and to say to them that he, McClellan, wished him (Kelton) to have the exact state of affairs as far as they could give it. XI. REVIEW OF THE REPORTS OF COLONEL HAVEN AND GENERAL WELD ON THE CONDUCT OF GENERAL McCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA IN AUGUST, 1862; AND ON THE CASE OF FITZ- JOHN PORTER. By Col. THEODOEE LYMAN, U.S.V. COMMITTEE. Col. Theodore Lyman, U.S.V. Col. Thomas L. Livermore, U.S.V. Bvt. Brig. -Gen. Alfred P. Rockwell, U.S.V- Read before the Society on Monday evening, June 11 f 1877, EEYIEW OF REPORTS OF COL. HAYEN AND GEN. WELD. 1. A United States army, commanded in chief by tkree persons, de facto or de jure, viz. : the President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck. Of these, two were without military education and singularly want- ing in a soldier's instinct ; the third, a man of strong in- tellect and the best military training, had slender ability as a strategist, and none at all as a field-fighter. 2. Two beaten armies, — one of which was moving in all haste by water from the peninsula to Alexandria to re- enforce the other. 3. Two commanders in the field, — Pope and Mc- Clellan; the former an officer of courage and energy, and not devoid of capacity, but so bombastic and so desti- tute of savoir faire as to alienate his subordinates ; the latter conspicuous for the three talents of organization, strategy, and personal influence, yet lacking the qualities of a field-fighter. He had not the quick action of eye and will together that seizes the supreme moment of battle. There were, then, three incompetent commanders-in- 305 elements of the problem are these : — 306 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. chief at Washington, dealing out office strategy by tele- graph; two commanders in the field, distrustful each of the other ; and two beaten armies, not yet come together ; the whole in presence of an enemy active and united, and full of revolutionary ardor. This is one of those rare historical cases where it might be stated a priori that nothing but confusion, mismanage- ment, recrimination, and final disaster could result. And we can go farther, and aver that it was then, and has been since, impossible to determine accurately who are the officers responsible for such disaster. The best the historian can do is diligently to sift the evidence, dis- torted though it may be by prejudice, excitement, and faults of memory, and, taking into account the known natures of the chief witnesses, to make an approximation to the truth. In the present discussion Generals McClellan and Porter are really under trial, although the latter only was court-martialled. It is therefore needful to define what may be an officer's guilt. A soldier may commit two faults : — 1. He may err through want of capacity. 2. He may err through wilful disobedience of orders. The first is not punishable ; but the officer is removed from his command, and assigned to inferior duty fitted to his ability. The second renders him liable to such punish- ment as a court-martial may inflict. Your committee is of opinion that want of capacity should not be considered in this discussion, except as illustrating the real topic, to wit, wiliul disobedience of orders. These last ten days of REVIEW OF REPORTS. SOT August, 1862, are so fraught with confusion, passion, and suspicion that tlie historian can hope barely to determine who obeyed orders. A, Ca8e of Gren. Porter, This officer was tried and dismissed the service under substantially the following charges : — 1. Failure to obey the so-called "joint order" to Mc- Dowell and himself. ^ 2. Failure to attack under order from Pope, dated 4.30 P.M., August 29.2 3. Shameful retreat on August 29. 4. Feeble attack, August 30. After the able papers to which the Society has listened, an outline sketch of the military movements will suffice to make the deductions clear. On August 21 Lee presented himself on the south side of the Rappahannock, and made as if to force the fords. He had two corps : Jackson's, with the three divisions of Starke, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, in all say 35,000 men ; and Longstreet's, with the three divisions of Anderson, Walker, and McLaws, which composed it, and the added division of Hood, say about 35,000 men together. In- cluding cavalry and artillery Lee's army numbered from 70,000 to 75,000 men. On the north side Pope stood on the defensive, up and down the stream, from Rappahan- nock Station. He had about 50,000 men, including the commands of Sigel, Banks, McDowell, Sturgis, and Reno, and the cavalry. ^ 16 W.R., 76. 2Xb., 18. 308 POPE'S VIRGINIA campaign: The next four days were occupied by Pope in making and trying to execute as many plans of defensive attack. He kept his troops marcliing, countermarching, and cross- marching, often in mud and storm, until the officers lost all reckoning, and the men were exhausted by want of rest and rations. ^ On the 25th Jackson made a forced march north-east to Salem, then south-east through Thoroughfare Gap ; and on the night of the 26th he, with Stuart's cavalry, seized Manassas Junction, burned the enormous supplies there, and at one blow cut off Pope's communication and food. The latter hastened to reestablish his line by converging on Manassas Junction. On the night of the 27th one part of his army was near Gainesville, the other along the Alexandria Kailroad. Thus, Jackson was cut off from Longstreet, who was near Salem, following in the steps of his predecessor. The good work of this day Pope undid on the next. He or- dered a further closing in from the north-west and south- west on Manassas Junction, which Jackson, of course, evacuated on the 28th, and, marching without opposition to the north, settled down in line-of-battle with his left near Sudley Springs, and his right on the Gainesville pike, along which he stretched a friendly hand towards Long- street in Thoroughfare Gap. Before this Pope had received heavy reenforcements in the corps of Porter and Heintzelman, and the di- vision of Reynolds, so that on the eve of the 28th of August his force was about equal to that of Lee. But his troops were scattered and out of position, and REVIEW OF REPORTS. 309 he had opened the door wide to the right wing of the enemy. There is, perhaps, no instance in the war where a com- mander showed greater ignorance of the positions, not only of the enemy's troops, but of his own. On the 29th Gen. Pope, still confident that he would have only Jackson to deal with, made a series of yain attacks, chiefly with his right wing. Longstreet, coming along the Warrenton pike, joined Jackson before noon, and extended the line to the south, across the Manassas Railroad. Opposite him was Porter, forming the Union left ; and next, on Porter's right, but not connecting, came McDowell. In the afternoon of the 30th Pope, having drawn in his left, and strengthened his centre and right, attacked Jackson's right with Porter's corps, which was driven back with heavy loss. Lee saw the moment had come, and immediately charged, pivoting on Jackson and swinging to his own left. Pope's left wing was overwhelmed and forced back with the loss of 18 cannon and many prisoners ; and only the heroic resistance of the regulars and other choice troops, seconded by the falling night, saved the army from destruction, and enabled it to retreat on Centreville. It may be well to complete the sketch by adding that McClellan had arrived at Alexandria on the 27th under orders to command all the forces there and in the defences of Washington, — a command he administered for four or five days. There he found the corps of Sumner and Franklin, of which he sent the latter on the 29th as far as 310 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN. Annandale, and on the 30th to Centreville, where it reen- forced the retreating army. To come now to the case of Porter. Pope charges that Porter failed to attack, as ordered, on the 29th, and thus flank Jaclison (as he then supposed), or else paralyze Longstreet (as he subsequently maintained). It is no part of your committee's duty to determine the degree of vigor or intelligence exhibited by Porter. The only ques- tion is, whether Porter's dismissal for disobedience of orders was a justifiable sentence ? First to be considered is the " joint order." The points therein that touch this discussion are : — (a.) That Porter and McDowell should push their joint commands towards Gainesville, join Sigel, who was marching west on the Warrenton pike, and halt. (5.) That they should be prepared to fall back for rations to Centreville. ((?.) That the order could be departed from, if any great advantage were apparent. There is no word here of a general action or of a specific attack ; and the only idea twice repeated is the warning to be ready to fall back on Centreville. The clause (c'), permitting a modification of the order, is simply negative, and gives discretion without command. Nevertheless, if, under this clause, McDowell, as ranking ofQcer, had ordered Porter to attack, the latter would have been clearly liable under this "joint order." Mc- Dowell says he did so order ; Porter declares he did not. These assertions of honorable men neutralize each other, and we must look for outside evidence. It is admitted REVIEW OF REPORTS. 311 that there was, at any rate, no written order for attack. Gen. S. M. Weld and Gen. Y\"arren testify tliat McDowell exclaimed, Porter, tliis is no place for a battle. Yon are too far forward ; *' or words to that effect, and that his con- versation in general did not favor attack. Finally, an order to fight is so positive a thing for the recipient, that it is hardly possible Porter could have misunderstood, if he had received such a one. We can only guess that during their prolonged interview McDowell said that, under certain conditions, an attack would be advisable. Turn it as we may the charge is not proved. Second. There is the specific order to attack from Pope to Porter, dated 4.30 P.M., August 29. The testi- mony here seems conclusive (and especially the circum- stantial evidence of Gen, Weld) that this order was not delivered to Porter until 6.30 P.M. The sun on August 29 sets about 6.40 P.M. ; of course no such advance could then be made, and this charge of disobedience faUs. Third. The charge that Porter shamefully retreated seems based on his note to McDowell, which stated his intention to retreat for certain reasons which he soon discovered had no foundation. It seems now to be admitted that he remained in the place where early in the day he deployed his leading division, and essentially made no movement. The charge, therefore, has no basis. Fourth. The charge that Porter made a criminally weak attack on the 30th of August is controverted by the printed reports of Jackson, and other rebel officers, 312 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. and by the returns whicli showed a loss of 2,200 killed, wounded, and missing, out of 7,000 engaged. In thus summing up your committee have purposely avoided details, and questions of motive or judgment, and have carefully adhered to the single question of the strict justice of Porter's sentence. They are of the opinion that the charges were not proved, and that the sentence should be reversed. B, Case of MeClellan. It is plain, from the papers of Col. Haven and Gen. Weld, that MeClellan regarded the movements of Pope with profound distrust, and it is not improbable that he deemed it wise to hold a strong reserve near the capi- tal, in case of the defeat that seemed impending; but here, as in Porter's case, the question of his dislikes, his slowness, or his apathy, is not one that we can profitably discuss, since it would lead only to a series of barren hypotheses. What we can ask is : Did he obey his orders? Here the only doubt seems to con- cern Franklin's corps, because it does not appear that the movements of Sumner's troops were called in ques- tion. The orders sent by Halle ck for the movement towards Manassas of Franklin's corps were of two sorts. Those of August 26 and 27 were such as might allow dis- cretion to MeClellan ; but the order of the 28th was peremptory, yet it was not obeyed till the next day, when it had been seconded by a still more pressing telegram. REVIEW OF REPORTS. 313 Your committee is, therefore, of the opinion that McClellan disobeyed the orders of Halleck in retarding the advance of Franklin's corps from August 28 to August 29. Porter's Case. — Pope's letters to Comte de Paris : — 1. (Dated May 29, 1876) and published in Army and Navy Journal. 2. Published in Army and Navy Journal, January 6, 1877, p. 346. 3. Published in Army and Navy Journal, May 5, 1877, p. 626. Comte de Paris to Pope : — 1. Army and Nayy Journal, Noyember 4, 1876. 2. Army and Xayy Journal, April 14, 1877, p. 578. XII. THE CONDUCT OF GENERALS McCLELLAX AND HALLECK IX AUGUST. 1S62 : AXD THE CA-^E OF FITZ-JOHX PORTER. By Col. THQAIAS L. LIVEEMORE, U.S.Y. CO^nilTTEE. Col. Theodoee Ltman. U.S.V. Col. Thomas L. LrvEEMOEE. E.S.Y. Bvi. Brig. -Gen. Alfeed P. Eockwell, U.S.Y. Read hefore the Society on Mondo.y evening, June 11, 1877. THE CONDUCT OF McCLELLAN AND HAL- LECK IN AUGUST, 1862; AND THE CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. TULY 8, 1862, Gen. Pope, testifying before the Com- mittee on the Conduct of the War, at Washington, said that he was assembling his army of 43,000 men on the east side of the Blue Ridge, and at the outlets of the passes into the Shenandoah Valley, so that, if the enemy penetrated into that valley, he, by reason of being nearer Gordonsville than they, could cut off their retreat, and could defend Washington ' ' by laying off on his [the enemy's] flanks and attacking him night and day, from the moment he crosses the Rappahannock, until his forces are destroyed, or mine," ^ He also expressed himself as confident of preventing 80,000 of the enemy from reaching Washington,^ but said that he was apprehensive that he could not stop He recognized the possibility that the enemy might detach a large force from Richmond; and that if they did he should be flanked and forced back if he stood on the defensive. 100,000.= n C.W., 277. 3 lb., 278. 317 318 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. It was the wish of the government that he should draw a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond in order to facilitate McClellan's operations against that city ; ^ and this he did, for Lee says, in his report, that Jackson with his own and Ewell's divisions was sent north to meet Pope, July 13th. ^ McClellan did not avail himself of this diversion, and probably was ignorant of it, and Halleck (as appears by his memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated July 27, 1862 3) yisited McClellan July 25th to enforce upon him the necessity of either attacking Rich- mond, or withdrawing from the peninsula and joining Pope. McClellan asked for 30,000 more men before attacking ; but Halleck told him he could have only 20,- 000, and, after consultation with his officers, McClellan agreed to attack if the latter number were sent to him. On the next day McClellan sent a despatch to Halleck stating that the enemy in front of him was being largely reenforced, and beseeching the loan of an additional 15,000 or 20,000 men from the West.^ This was the last straw; — and Halleck testified that, as these troops could not be given him measures were then taken to withdraw his army from the peninsula.^ Blame has been thrown upon Halleck for not informing McClellan at once of the in- tended withdrawal of his army from the peninsula; but McClellan had persistently represented that a retreat would have an effect on the moral of his men which was to be dreaded, and which would be disastrous to his army.^ For this reason alone it would have been wise for Halleck to conceal his purpose from McClellan and his army until the moment it became necessary to order the march, if ^ 16 W.R., 21. nb., 552. ^ 14 y^,^,^ 337. 4 lb., 334. 5 1 C.W., 452. ^ 12 W.R., 75, 81, 83. CONDUCT OF McCLELLAN AND RALLECK. 319 McClellan had, in fact, had such an army as he feared; and of this Halleck could not be supposed to judge as well as McClellan. It was only after this despatch of July 26th from McClellan^ that Pope went to the front with the under- standing that McClellan was to be withdrawn from the peninsula; and yet it has been charged that McClellan's withdrawal had been determined on with Pope while the former was yet being urged to take the offensive. July 30th and 31st Halleck informed McClellan that Pope reported movements of the enemy from Richmond to the south of the J ames River and towards DamT.lle and Lynchburg, and that the force in Richmond was very small, and requested him to press the enemy and ascertain the facts. It was not until August 5th that McClellan reported any advance on his part, and then he had found out noth- ing.' These movements of the enemy, which were reported by Pope, were in fact the movement of A. P. Hill's division to join Jackson, July 27th, and the movement of D. H. Hill to Coggin's Point for a ruse to conceal the movement of Jackson to the Rapidan ; and the very troops of A. P. Hill whose movements were reported, were a part of those with whom Jackson fought Pope at Cedar Mountain ; and had McClellan pressed the enemy fronting him in earnest, it would not have been left to Pope to find out by the weight of Jackson's column that three divisions were in his front. July 30th McClellan was instructed to send away his ^ U W.R., 334. 2 12 W.R., 76, 77. 3 ib., 78. 320 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. sick. ^ August 3d lie was informed that his army was to be withdrawn and directed to take immediate measures to effect it.2 August 9th Halleck telegraphed to McClellan that, in his opinion, the enemy was massing in front of Pope and Burnside expecting to crush them and then move forward to the Potomac, and that he (McClellan) " must send re enforcements instantly to Acquia Creek." ^ August 10th Halleck informed him of the fighting then going on at Cedar Mountain, and of the crossing of the Rapidan by large forces of the enemy, and told him there must be no further delay in his movements.* August 12th Halleck again told him that not a moment was to be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington.^ On the same day McClellan replied that it was probably too late for his army to arrive in time to save Washington, and that it was in " much better posi- tion to do so from here than from Acquia."^ August 13th Lee ordered the rest of his army to reen- force Jackson, having delayed until then to meet any movement McClellan might make against Richmond.^ August 14th the Army of the Potomac began to move southward.^ Had McClellan been a commander of even ordinary energy and boldness, he would have so effectually stirred up the enemy, while waiting from August 3d to the 15th to get his sick away, that Lee could not have ventured to march northward at the time he did, and so the campaign against Pope might have been very different. It was the purpose of Lee to engage Pope in front on the Rapidan, while Jackson gained his rear. Pope dis- » 12 W.K., 76-77. nb., 80. ^b., 85. ^Ib., 86. 5 lb., 87. ^ lb., 88. 7 16 W.E., 552. ^ 12 W.R., 89. CONDUCT OF McCLELLAN AND HALLECK. 321 covered tliis August 15th, but delayed on tlie Rapidan until the 18th, to give time for the Army of the Potomac to arrive,^ and then skilfully withdrew to the left bank of the Rappahannock, reaching it on the 19th, — two days be- fore Lee was ready to begin his movement. Urged and commanded by Halle ck to stand on the Rappahannock until reenforced, Pope held his position on this river until the 24th, repeatedly encountering the enemy. ^ Whether Lee really intended to cross the Rappahan- nock in the vicinity of Waterloo, or whether he from the first intended to cross above and go through Thorough- fare Gap, as he finally did, has been doubted ; but it seems reasonable to suppose that, had not Pope extended his right to meet Lee as he appeared at each ford, the latter would have seized the first chance to cross and flank him ; and the reports of Lee,^ Jackson,* and Capt. Boswell (chief engineer of Jackson)^ all seem to leave no other conclusion. Considering the success of the same opera- tion by Lee in the fall of 1863, when Gen. Meade was obliged to retreat with all haste behind Bull Run, en- countering the enemy in his way twice in the retreat. Pope seemingly deserves great credit for his strategy and boldness down to the beginning of Jackson's movement to his right. On the night of the 2 2d, Stuart's raid on Catlett's sta- tion took place, ^ and although Pope's indifi'erence to it was creditable to his nerve, he perhaps was to blame in not recognizing it as the precursor of Jackson's coming. On the morning of the 25th Pope was informed of Jackson's movement towards Thoroughfare Gap which began that ^16W.E., 29. 2 lb., 29, 30. ^ jb., 552-554. * lb., 642-643. & i^., 649-650. ^ i^,^ 730-731, 322 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. morning ; and here, according to appearances, lie began to be greatly at fault, for, although the direction of this movement was apparent, it seems certain that Pope, not- withstanding what he says in his report, entertained the delusion that the enemy were bound for the Shenandoah Valley, until some time on the 26th. He so writes to McDowell on the evening of the 25th. ^ McDowell, in his despatch of the 26th, stating the possible movements of the enemy, does not foretell the movement through Thoroughfare Gap.^ Halleck at 11 A.M. on the 26th telegraphs McClellan (presumably on information from Pope) that there is reason to believe the enemy are mov- ing into the Shenandoah Valley, and that a reconnoissance will soon determine the fact.^ Pope complains that the cavalry he sent to Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 26th made no report;^ and the first order of Pope's looking to receiving the enemy on the Warrenton turn- pike was that to McDowell at 8 P.M. on the 26th, ^ and as late as 8.20 P.M. he directed Heintzelman to send a regi- ment to Manassas to see what had occurred, to repair the wires, and protect the railroad till further orders ;^ and at midnight of the 26th he sent word to McDowell that it was the enemy's cavalry that had cut his communication at Manassas, and that up to one hour before he had sup- posed it was only a column of ten or fifteen thousand that had come through the Gap, and that it must be ascertained whether his whole force had come. 7 Pope has been criticised because his movements had not been up to this time according to the plan laid out by him before the Committee on the Conduct of the War ; but this 67. Mb., 67-68. ^ 12 W.R., 94. n6 W.R., 34. 5 lb., 69. 6 113.^70. 7ii3^ CONDUCT OF McCLELLAN AND HALLECK. 323 is unjust, for he had been commanded to keep up com- munication with Fredericksburg, and re enforcements were coming from there and from Alexandria, so that he could not cut loose from that flank, and bj staying where he was, he had received Eeno, Eejnolds, Porter, and Heintzelman. But the error of not ascertaining Jackson's movements was a serious one, for at the moment when he was writing to McDowell, on the evening of the 26th, that he had requested Halleck to send Franklin up the Manassas Gap railroad to protect his right flank, ^Jackson's advance had stolen by that flank some hours and was then on Pope's railroad at Kettle Run. This was an enormous error. It will scarcely be contended that any General could be blamed for not predicting a movement so eccentric and so contrary to the recognized principles of strategy as Jack- son's was ; but certainly Pope was to blame for not dis- covering that during the whole of the 26th of August 25,000 men or more were marching from Salem to Bristoe so close to his position. Jackson began his march from Salem in the morning and arrived at Bristoe Station at sunset. Had Pope known of this march in season he might have fallen upon Jackson as he passed, brought him to a stand, and de- stroyed him, for he had with him then Eeno and Reynolds : and Porter was at Bealeton Station, and Heintzelman's corps was at Warrenton Junction, numbering in all, ac- cording to Pope's own estimate, 54,500 men. Gen. Pope says in his report that he expected Franklin to be at or near Gainesville by the afternoon of the 26th,^ ^ 16 W.R., 69. 2 xb., 33. 324 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. but we cannot discover that lie had any good ground for expecting this. At this period, when we find Pope cut off from Wash- ington by Jackson, it is due to him to say that Halle ck's repeated commands and entreaties to hold the Rappahan- nock until the Army of the Potomac arrived, had warranted him in so doing, even if he suspected, or ought to have suspected, that Halleck might fail him, and that, while it seems inexcusable for him to have remained ignorant of Jackson's movement, yet he had conducted the campaign with boldness, faithfulness, and strategic skill up to this time. It is true that he had made numerous marches and countermarches, and had provoked several days of fight- ing, and there seems to be no doubt that his men were weary and hungry, but these are the legitimate incidents of a defensive campaign against a larger force ; and when we consider that it was not over a day's march between the extremes of his field of operations, and remember the marches and hardships of the enemy opposed to him, and those of the Army of the Potomac in other cam- paigns, we cannot find good ground to greatly blame Pope for working his men hard up to August 25th. To return to Pope's situation on the night of the 26th. As appears from his message at midnight to Mc- Dowell, above referred to, he had only within an hour or so suspected that the force which had come through Thoroughfare Gap was a formidable one, and that, without information as to its destination or progress, he had not, at midnight, conjectured that it was this force which for some hours had possessed his railroad CONDUCT OF MgCLELLAN AND HALLECK. 325 in his rear, within ten miles of his headquarters at Warrenton Junction.^ TTe are left in ignorance of what Pope actually learned of the position of the enemy be- tween that time and the hour of issuing his order of the 27th for the movements of his command.^ This order directed McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds to march down the Warrenton turnpike to Gainesville, and Heintzelman and Porter to march to Greenwich. It does not seem that these dispositions were designed to cut off Jackson, nor does it seem that they were designed mainly to bring on a pitched battle with a force that Pope supposed was marching down from Thoroughfare Gap, but that they were designed to secure Pope's retreat behind Bull Run. The evidence of this is not negative merely. Porter, who met Pope on the morning of the 27th, and then, as we cannot doubt, was fully informed as to the latter's plans, in his despatch to Burnside of 4 P.M. of that day said that Pope was manoeuvring to get beliind Bull Run ; and Pope himself in his report says that it was his design on this day to place his army between Zee^s army and BuU Run^ and it is scarcely necessary to argue that, having taken this resolution, he must have determined to reach the left bank of Bull Run as soon as possible. The order to Banks to push the trains along the road to the south of Manassas, facing towards the Rappahannock for defence, the mention of Porter as being on his (Banks's) riglit^ and the terming of the force at Gainesville as the " right wing,"^ — all in- dicate that Pope regarded his army as still fronting the Rappahannock, and not as an army fronting an enemy be- tween it and Bull Run, and it seems as though the con- centration of his main force near Gainesville was to stop 1 16 W.E., 70. 2 lb., 70-71. 3 18 W.R., 699-700. ^ 16 W.R., 71. 326 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN. the way until his retreat by Manassas Junction was assured. He says in his report that these movements were also to crush that part of the enemy who had got through the Gap/ and doubtless he had determined to crush what- ever stood in the way of his retreat ; but it is not at all certain that, when he issued the order above referred to, he expected to meet any considerable force south of Gainesville, and it does seem certain that the whole movement was planned on the defensive, and not on the offensive. Perhaps future publications of the reports of all his subordinates, showing exactly what his information was on the morning of the 27th, will afford ground for different conclusions, which must rest on conjecture, if anything, now. What induced Pope to send Hooker down the railroad^ instead of towards Gainesville, is not plain, but it was for- tunate he did so, as it led to the discovery of Ewell four miles west of Bristoe, who was thereupon driven back in an engagement lasting until sunset. Pope says he then became convinced that Jackson was south of the turnpike near Manassas Junction, and he became apprehensive that the latter would try to turn his right at Bristoe.^ He has been much criticised for this, but as McDowell shared in the same apprehension, the grounds for it are worthy of examination. Pope's line of columns facing to the rear, ran substan- tially north and south, with its left at Gainesville and its right at Bristoe Station, and this line was substantially parallel to the east side of a triangle, one corner of which 1 16 w.R., 34. 2 He was going to reestablish his communication and get rations. — T. Lyman. ^ ^.j..^ 35. CONDUCT OF McCLELLAN AND HALLECK. 327 was at White Plains, another at Manassas Junction, and another on the west side of the Rappahannock. On the night of the 27th Jackson was at the south-east corner and Lee at the north corner ; from these corners a forced march of a day would bring them together at the south-west corner. To meet on the east side of the triangle would require nearly a day, if they were unop- posed ; but, in fact, McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds were on the road between them. Under these circumstances it does not seem to have been fatuous in Pope to suppose that, if his right flank remained weak, Jackson would take the road thus left open to liim, especially when the wagon- trains of Pope's army were a possible prize in such a movement; and even if this would not have been good strategy, was it unreasonable to suppose that this erratic commander contemplated it, when Pope had already found his advance four miles west of Bristoe Station, as if it were the very vanguard of the movement ? For the purpose of closing on Jackson and repelling his expected attack on the right flank, Pope ordered Porter, who was yet at Warrenton Junction,^ and Kearny (at Greenwich) to be at Bristoe by daybreak ; ^ also Reno (at Greenwich) to march at daylight on ]\Ianassas Junction,^ and ]\IcDowell (at Gainesville) to march at daylight on Manassas Junction, resting his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, and throwing his left " well to the east;"^ and Pope, in his despatches to Kearny and McDowell, expressed the hope that he should capture Jackson by these movements. It was disobedience of this order to Porter of which he . ^ 16 W.E., 71-72. 2 xb., 72. ^ ig 70I. " 16 W.R., 72. 328 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN was convicted on the first charge. Close study of it sus- tains the criticism of Mr. Charles O'Conor that it contains no intimation to Porter that Pope expected to be attacked at Bristoe. If Jackson had attempted to go round Pope's right, the dispositions of the latter would have brought their armies into pitched battle, with the odds greatly in Pope's favor ; or if Jackson had retreated to the north through Centreville, which Pope supposed was his only alternative, the latter would have been in favorable order for pursuit ; and even if McDowell and Jackson both had started at daybreak, and the former had moved down in line of battle (as his orders seemed to contemplate, and as in fact his orders to Sigel and Reynolds, intercepted by B. T. John- son, directed ^) , his 24,000 men would have stretched clear to the Sudley road, and Taliaferro's division, moving up on that road, would probably have been intercepted, which would have brought the other divisions to its rescue, and thus have precipitated a battle. But Sigel, who had the advance of McDowell's column, was several hours late in starting, and Jackson, moving through the night and early on the 28th in three columns, two east of Bull Pun, and one by the Sudley Spring road, west of Bull Pun, evaded a battle with Pope, and united his col- umns north of the Warrenton turnpike and west of Bull Run ; although, as appears by the report of Col. Johnson, commanding a brigade of Taliaferro's division, McDowell's column actually struck him on the Warrenton pike at Groveton.2 But the conclusion forces itself on us, that Pope over- looked the possibility of Jackson's moving early enough U6W.E., 664. 2ib.^665. CONDUCT OF McCLELLAN AND HALLECR. 329 and hugging Bull Run, and stealing round Ms left flank, as lie did. In passing we may say tliat we do not find reason to believe tliat Jackson moved A. P. Hill tkrougn Centre- ville as a ruse to deceive Pope. Jackson makes no men- tion of the movement of either diAusion except Tali- aferro's, which moved by the Sudley Springs road, across the Warrenton turnpike.^ A. P. Hill says he moved his division to Centreville at 1 A.M. of the 2Sth, and at 10 A.M. moved on the Warrenton pike towards the Stone Bridge, where he received a despatch from Jackson stating that the enemy were in full retreat, and to move down to the fords and intercept him ; but, having intercepted orders from Pope to McDowell, ordering the formation of his Kne of battle, he deemed it best to push on and join Jackson.- Early says that Ewelhs division moved towards Centreville on the night of the 27th, camped separately by brigades between Manassas and Bull Pun, and at dawn of the 2Sth crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford; that Early's brigade moved up its left bank through the fields to Stone Brido;e. followed bv Trimble's brio^ade : re- crossed at Stone Bridge, and waited with the other brigades on the old battle-field for Lawton's and Hayes's brigades, which, missing their way, had gone towards Centre^dlle, and which then came tip by the "Warrenton pike and joined the others.^ At noon of the 28th, Pope, arriving at Manassas Junc- tion, was led to believe that Jackson had retreated to Cen- treville on his way to the nortli. and he at once ordered McDowell to march to Gum Springs to intercept him : ^ l)ut immediately afterwards received a note from McDowell in which he suggested pushing a large force across the AVar- '16W.K., 644. 2i|3_^g-Q^ 3 113.^710. nsW.R., 717. 330 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. reiiton turnpike west of Bull Run ; and Pope replied, at 1.20 P.M., telling him not to go to Gum Springs if he thought it too hazardous, and directing him to call back his force to Gainesville, and promising to push Reno and Heintzelman to Gainesville that evening, unless he found a large force at Centreville, which he did not expect^ and agreeing to support McDowell in any way he suggested by pushing forward from Manassas Junction across the turnpike.! Pope says further, in his report, that he ordered McDowell to advance on Centreville.^ Why Pope did not at that moment, as suggested by McDowell, push Heintzelman and Reno, or Porter, or all of them, to Gainesville is not clearly explicable. He certainly was not then apprehensive that Jackson intended to go round his right flank. It is apjDarent that he feared Jackson would retreat to Aldie; but unless Mc- Dowell, in his note above referred to (which would be very interesting to read), had given him to understand that a movement towards Gum Springs was impracticable, it is difficult to comprehend why he did not see that the best route for him to take to intercept such a retreat by Jackson was through Gainesville towards Gum Springs. The key to all tliis seems to be that Pope, short of sup- plies, with his depot at Manassas destroyed, and depend- ent on Washington for further supplies, feared to incur ^ 16 W.n., 74, 337; C.W. 2 Sup. 149. There are two versions of this note as indicated: one printed in the War Eecords, 16 W.R., 74; the other in C.W. 2 Sup. 149. The former appears as having been written at 2 P.M., giving McDowell the privilege to disregard the order to proceed to Green Springs; the latter, as written at 1.20 P.M., and the name of the place as Gum Springs. The latter would seem to be the true version re- ceived by McDowell, being in agreement with the references to it in his report, 16 W.R., 337. 2 ib., 37. CONDUCT OF XcCLELLAN AXD EALLECK. 331 the risk of being cut olF from them by the adventurous Jackson, and chose to insure hhnself against this by throwing a heavy force between Jackson and Washing- ton ; and his message to McDowell, that Jackson's train ougiit to be captured at any rate, seems to indicate that he feared Jackson had escaped northwards even then. At night he was informed that McDowell had met and stopped the enemy at Gainesville.^ He then relied upon tlrrowing his right wing, under McDowell, across the road wliich Jackson would take to the north, and so, having: him hemmed in between McDowell, Sio^el. and Revnolds, with 25.000 men, on one side, and Kearny, Eeno, and Hooker, with 25,000 men. on the other side, to crush or capture liim. This seems to be the true explanation of his failure to send Heintzelman and Reno to Gainesville from Manassas Jtinction that night, as he promised ]\Ic- Dowell.^ But Pope lost tliis great opportunity, Avhich McDowell had indicated to him by his note of the 28th, and his own plan failed becatise he had miscalculated Lee's pace. Longstreet arrived at "Wlhte Plains on the evening of the 27th, having, as he says, been delayed an hour by a dash of several squadrons of Buford's cavalry ^ into Salem in front of him." (We should be glad to know whether Pope received a report of this reconnoissance on the 27th.) On the 28th, at 3 P.M., Longsti'eet arrived in fi'ont of Thoroughfare Gap, and here was delayed imtil after dark by Ricketts's division, which McDowell, with great foresight, had sent to hold the Gap on the 28th. Pope complains of this act of McDowell's as diverting a part of the force for operating against Jackson;^ but, if McDowell had not sent Rick- ^ 16 W.R., 7i-7o. = lb., 74. 3 gg^ 971, 277, 333. 335. lb., 564. =Ib., 37, 38, 332 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. etts up to the Gap, Longstreet would, in all probability, liave reached the field of battle on the night of the 28th. In that case McDowell would have been in a serious position, and what the result would have been it is diffi- cult to determine. That it was a position that Mc- Dowell's subordinates were not willing to occupy was made certain on that very night of the 28th, for Ricketts, retreating from Thoroughfare Gap, stayed not until he got safely beyond it, and King followed him. This destroyed Pope's combination against Jackson. Pope, by ordering McDowell to move down the Warren- ton pike towards Centreville, had in fact cut off Jackson from Lee. He undoubtedly was inexcusable for not knowing that Lee would not spare man or horse to aid Jackson, and for not foreseeing or discovering the near approach of Lee ; and the question occurs, whether, regardless of Lee's approach, he was warranted as a strategist in trusting to McDowell to stop the way be- tween Jackson and Lee. If an unhappy accident had not separated McDowell from his command that night it probably would have stayed at Gainesville until Lee came at least ; what would have followed, with the two armies sandwiched together in four parts, can scarcely be con- jectured. Towards daylight of the 29tli Pope learned that King had retreated to Manassas Junction and opened the way between Longstreet and Jackson.^ At this time a new phase came upon the campaign east of the Rappahannock. Up to the night of the 28th Jack- son, by the bold separation of his corps from Longstreet's, » 16 W.R., 38. CONDUCT OF McCLELLAN AND HALLECK. 333 had put himself within Pope's power, and the latter, with superior numbers and superior strategic position, had, as it seemed, only to bring on a pitched battle with all his force to realize a tremendous victory; but now, on the evening of the 28th, he had lost the advantage of position, and, although he did not know it, before he could recover it the enemy in liis front were to exceed him in force. This was the time when the whole Army of the Potomac and Cox's force were needed by him to secure victory, and in twenty-four hours more they were needed to avert dis- aster, and yet Franklin, Sumner, and Cox did not reach him; and the question comes. Who was to blame for it? The conclusion of a preceding committee, that McClellan was to blame for the detention of Franklin and Cox, can- not be avoided, although Halleck should share in the re- sponsibility for the detention of Cox from the evening of the 29th, when he assented to it. We think Halleck and McClellan were both to blame for the detention of Sumner. His corps was partially landed at Acquia Creek on the 26th. If he had continued he could have reached Pope on the 27th or 28th by land. At noon of the 27th McClellan suggested to Halleck to call Sumner to Alexandria by water, to move out to Centreville with Franklin. Halleck expressing his ap- prehension that the enemy were trying to turn Pope's right (which Jackson had done twenty-four hours before), assented to calling Sumner up by water. Sumner arrived at Alexandria on the 28th, and was detained in camp near Alexandria twenty-four hours, and that veteran, testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, said : 334 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. " I can say this, — had I, upon landing at Alexandria, been ordered forward immediately, I should have been in the second Bull Run battle with my corps''^ — a corps of about 10,000 men. At 8 A.M. on the 27th McClellan reported his arrival to Halleck.^ At 3.30 P.M. on the 28th Halleck ordered McClellan to push as large a force as pos- sible forward to communicate with Pope, " before the enemy is reenforcedy ^ It would seem that this was upon informa- tion from the front that Jackson was isolated by Pope. At 4.45 P.M. McClellan tells Halleck that neither Sumner nor Franklin is ready to move and fight a battle;^ at 10.30 A.M. of 29th he sends word to Halleck that, if Sumner follows Franklin, it will leave Washington too much alone ; and at noon, again, suggests the posting of Sumner in front of Washington ; ^ and in the afternoon Halleck assents to this.^ This resulted from a panic which had apparently over- taken Halleck and, perhaps, McClellan, resulting from their not hearing from Pope, which was most singular, because the enemy had retreated from the railroad early on the 28th, and left the way between Halleck and Pope open, although Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, with some cavalry, raided towards Alexandria on that day. It is difficult to find any justification for the belief of Halleck and McClellan, that Pope, with over 50,000 men, could give so little account of himself as to allow the enemy to march on Washington with such a force as to require Sumner, Cox, and Tyler to remain, with all the other troops that Pope had left behind, for the defence of Washington. » 1 C.W., 367. 2 12 W.R., 94 ; 18 W.R., 688-689. ^ 709. ^ lb. 5 12 W.R., 97-98. ^ lb., 98 ; 18 W.R., 722. COXDUCT OF McCLELLAN AXD EALLECK. 835 Sumner did not marcli for Pope until the oOtli, too late to take part in the battle. To return to Pope's moyements : Tve find that, upon learn- ing of King's retreat, he ordered Sigel, who was near Grove- ton supported by Reynolds, to attack the enemy as soon as it was light enough to see on the 29th, and to bring them to a stand ;^ he ordered Heintzelman and Reno at earliest dawn to follow and attack the enemy,- and he ordered Fitz- John Porter to march with King's division directly from Manassas Junction to Gaines^dlle with all speed, to turn the enemy's flank there. ^ Soon after this, on receiving a request from McDowell not to take King's division from him. he sent the joint order " to him and Porter.^ It has been contended that this order superseded all others, and that it was not made clear to Porter by it that Pope intended to fight a battle on this day ; that the command to assiu^e a retreat behind Bull Run that night was incon- sistent with such an intention ; and that Porter was so ignorant of the sitttation of affairs that, when he fotmd himself opposed by an itnexpected force, he cotild net divine that it was necessary for him to attack: and force has been lent to this last assertion by the statement that such had been the conftision of Pope's movements that he himself did not know the sitttation of his troops, and his commanders had no confidence in his knowledge of it. It is difficult to find sttpport for these propositions. It is true, as has been stated in this article, that Pope was cttlpably ignorant of the enemy's movements, bttt his own were exact, and they were commttnicated clearly and fully to his commanders by his despatches to them, which are 1 16 W.K., 38. 2 3 lb.. 513. 4 j^., 33, "6, 508, 520. 836 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. in print. And it does seem that lie and his commanders all knew on the night of the 26th that the enemy were in force behind him; on the morning of the 27th that the line of battle, facing the rear, was to be formed from Gainesville southward ; on the morning of the 28th that the different corps were to converge on the enemy at Manassas Junction ; in the afternoon that they were to pursue the enemy towards Centreville, and, on the morn- ing of the 29th, that Jackson, retreating towards Thor- oughfare Gap, was to be pursued by Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, and intercepted by Porter at Gainesville, if possible, and to be attacked, if he could be reached, and struck as hard a blow as possible before Lee reached him. The joint order seems in terms to confirm the previous order, which clearly contemplated an attack, and not to supersede it. It seems incredible that Porter could have supposed that the march to Gainesville of 50,000 men was intended to be merely an exercise in tactics, or to pick up strag- glers from Jackson's force ; or that he supposed he was to turn the enemy's flank only to get a convenient posi tion from which to retreat ; or that Sigel was to bring the enemy to a stand merely to afford them the spectacle of the Union army effecting a junction in their front, and then retiring over Bull Run. Porter reported to Pope in person on the morning of the 27th, and without doubt then learned the existing situation. At 4 o'clock on the same day he telegraphed to Burnside that Pope was working to get behind Bull Run ;^ again, at 2 P.M. on the 28th, that the talk about U8 W.R., 699-700. CASE OF FIT Z- JOHN PORTER. 337 bagging Jackson was bosh, that Manassas was left open, and the enemy jumped through ;^ and agam, at 6 A.M. of 29th, that Heintzelman and Reno were at Centreville, where they marched yesterday; that Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a body-guard, at the time not knowing where the enemy was, and when Sigel was fighting within eight miles of him and in sight. ^ These despatches show a knowledge of the general situation. The only theory consistent with Porter's intelligence is, that, both before and after reading the " joint order " of the 29th he knew that Pope intended both wings to fight the enemy he was pursuing as soon as they overtook them. Pope supposed that Longstreet would not reach J ackson that day, but McDowell informed Porter of Buford's re- port that seventeen regiments had passed through Gaines- ville that morning,^ and Porter, upon arriving at his most advanced position, doubtless found evidence that a considerable force was arriving in his front. McDowell and he rode to the front together and reconnoitred, and then McDowell determined to take his command round on the Sudley Springs road to the rear. There has been much question made as to whether, on the one hand McDowell advised Porter to attack there, or, on the other hand, ordered him not to. A civil court would be very likely to refuse to reopen an adjudicated question of a civil nature fifteen years after the event, where its solution depended on the recollection of witnesses of words spoken in a peaceful negotiation, and there is no greater safety in tliis case, where the words were uttered under the excitement aroused by the ^ 18 W.E., 732-733. 2 lb., 733. ' 16 W.R., 338. 338 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. presence of the enemy. The record of the Porter court- martial shows that Porter, marching on the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville, had arrived near where this road crossed the railroad at about noon. According to the testimony of Capt. Martin, when McDowell was with Porter at the front, the latter's troops were closing in mass preparatory to forming line of battle, and skirmishers were out,^ and a section of the enemy's artillery fired perhaps twenty minutes very slowly, and, perhaps an hour later, a battery further to the right opened, and was engaged by Hazlett's battery of Morell's division.^ Gen, Morell testified that when the enemy's skirmishers were reported. Porter ordered the column to be halted and position to be taken ; that, after McDowell left, Porter ordered him (Morell) to move over the rail- road to the right ; that he got a brigade and a battery over, and then received orders to return, and in so doing received a shot from the enemy's artillery directly in front ; that the only enemy he supposed to be in reach were directly in front ; and that the enemy in Pope's front were a considerable distance away, with woods between ; that he had out the Sixty-Second Penn- sylvania, and afterwards the Thirteenth New York, as skirmishers; that just before sunset he got an order from Porter to make dispositions to attack, which was then countermanded, and that soon after Porter came Gen. Griffin, commanding Morell's leading brigade, testified that his brigade moved over the railroad ^ 17 W,K., 963. 2 935^ 3 j^,^ 9(33, CASE OF FITZ-JOHX PORTER. and was tlien ordered back : and that lie then started back towards Manas.-as. and had gone from one and a half to two miles when an order reached him at about sunset to return to the front. ^ Col. B. F. Smith testified to the Second Division falling back.^^ Col. Marshall, of the Thirteenth Xew York, testified that he deployed skirmishers at about 1 o'clock, and was immediately tired on by dragoons, and soon after by a section of artillery, and that at abont 2 P.]\L the head of a large column came to his front and deployed skirmishers and drove his men in. and deployed in line of battle.-^ Major Hyland. of this regiment, testified that he was on the skirmish line, that the enemy opened fire between 2 and 3 o'clock, and that there was no enemy to the left that he conld see.* Col. Shepard and Capt. Bowers, of the Thirty-second Massachtisetts Voltinteers. who were in Griffin's command, have recently told one of yonr committee that they remember retreating a mile or two. and then coimter- marching to the front so late as to arrive at their previotis advanced position at dark. It is difficult to avoid the belief that this rearward movement of Morelhs was made late in the day. and in pursuance of the order of Porter to him to push over to the Sudley Springs road, on which King was moving to reach Sigel's rear and aid him,'^and the tone of the order is as if Porter himself were about cutting loose fi^om Morell to retreat with the Second Division, and one is led to connect tliis order with Porter's messao-e to Kino^ U7 9S3-9S4. ^Ib.. 932. 'lb.. 1011-1012. ■'lb- 996. =16W.R..523. 340 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN. and McDowell, that, having learned that Pope was being driven back, he was about to retreat. The explanation that this retrograde movement was sim- ply to conceal Morell's troops does not appeal strongly to an unsympathetic critic ; and as all the other despatches between Morell and Porter, published and unpublished (so far as disclosed), are consistent with the theory that Porter actually did retreat, unless the hours of send- ing them (which have not been disclosed) make this con- clusion inconsistent with them, there is no overwhelming reason apparent for disturbing the finding of the court on this point. It seems probable that it was Pope's order of 4.30 P.M. which arrested this movement, and the time that was occupied in countermarching to the front might go far towards explaining why there was not time to attack after the receipt of this order. For reasons before stated as to the other question, it seems utterly unwise to reopen the question of whether Porter received Pope's order of 4.30 at one time or an- other ; and Porter's claim for a rehearing does not neces- sarily depend on this, for this order was founded on Pope's belief that only Jackson was in his front, and that Porter could strike his flank ; and Porter was quite as much in the right to disregard this upon the ground that a differ- ent force than what Pope supposed was in his front, as he was to refrain from attacking on the order of the morning. He was tried for both these offences, and convicted of the charge of misbehavior in the face of the enemy against the 52d Article of War, on two specifications. Now, if this new force was in his front, it is folly to waste time in the CASE OF FITZ-JOHX PORTER. 341 discussion of the question whether he could have marched over the country, between liim and Jackson's right llanh, for he would hare had to march over a more serious ob- stacle, — a new enemy. And what conclusion must we arrive at as to the pres- ence of this new force, and whether Porter conducted himself well in its presence ? To begin with, we have now the published reports of the enemy which Porter's court did not have, and if thev afford us unambioaious evidence of the right kind, that should be enough to giA'e Porter a rehearing, because it is contemporaneous, disinterested, and preserved in print, -the memory of which," as a learned counsellor has said, is not impaired by the lapse of time.'' Porter encountered the enemy's skirmishers at about noon, perhaps an hour or so before noon, and we can gather from the testimony of the witnesses before the coiu't, that, at first, he encountered only skirmishers ; that after a while a section of artillery opened on him: and that during the afternoon infantry began to form in front of him, and a full battery opened on him. From the reports of Jackson and his subordinates it is made clear that all of his line of battle was north of the TTarrenton turnpike on this day, and therefore not in front of Porter. Reynolds testified before the Porter court : that up to 12 or 1 the enemy's right was not across the pike ; that he had made an attack on their right, and was obliged to change front to the rear to meet the enemy coming down the pike: that he thought they extended their right 342 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN. till dark/ and outflanked him by sunset too far to be engaged.^ Stuart says that at about 10 A.M. he was in Jackson's rear, and then went out towards Haymarket to open com- munication with Longstreet and Lee ; met them, with the head of the column, between Gainesville and Haymarket ; then passed through the column and went directly towards Manassas; selected a fine position for a battery which was sent to him, and fired a few shots at the enemy's supposed position, which induced the enemy to shift position.^ Major Frobel, chief of artillery, says that at 11 A.M. he reported with Bachman's battery to Stuart by order of Hood, and from a position selected by Stuart, near the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, opened on a column mov- ing to the right, which at once changed direction and moved to the left, — fired fifteen rounds and then ceased because the distance was so much increased, and then took the battery to the left of the turnpike at 1 P.M.^ Stuart says further, that Robertson, who had gone fur- ther towards Manassas, reported the enemy in his front, and that, repairing to that front, he (Stuart) found Rosser engaged with the enemy on the left of the road; that Robertson's videttes had found the enemy approaching from the direction of Bristoe towards Sudley, and that the prolongation of the line of march of the enemy would have passed through his (Stuart's) position " and struck Longstreet in flank ; " that he found this was at least an army corps; that he then dragged brush up and down the road, and so deceived Porter, and notified Longstreet that his flank was seriously menaced ; that J enkins's, U7 W.R., 993. 2ib.^ 994. ^ i6 W.R.., 735-736. * lb., 607. CASE OF F IT Z- JO EN PORTER. 343 Kemper's, and D. R. Jones's brigades and several pieces of artillery were ordered to Mni by Longstreet, and were placed fronting Bristoe ; and tliat, after exchanging a few shots, this corps of the enemy "withdrew toward llanassas, leaving artillery and supports to hold the posi- tion till night." 1 Hood had the advance of Longstreet's column, and kept on the Warrenton turnpike. The Orange & Alexandria Railroad, spoken of by jiajor Frobel, is the unfinished road which crosses or arrives at the turnpike between Gainesville and Groveton, and it is apparent that it was Reynolds or Sigel, manoeuvring near the turnpike, whom Stuart first encountered, and that this was at about noon, and before Longstreet had got into position. There also cannot be any doubt that the army corps discovered by Robertson was Porter's. If Stuart's account be correct, then Porter's demon- strations did not have much effect, and he diverted but three of Longstreet's brigades of infantry from their previous position, and those for a short time only. It is contended by Porter's friends that Stuart was accus- tomed to enlarge his exploits in the narration of them, and that in fact he had nothing to do with the force sent to meet Porter, and, moreover, that, in this instance, instead of three brigades sent over to him to meet Porter, there were three divisions posted by Lee him- self for that purpose. Longstreet in liis report says that after passing Gainesville Hood's division was placed on right and left of the turnpike at right angles with 116 W.R., 736. 844 . POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. it, and supported by Evans's brigade, and then goes on .to say : ' ' Before these [Hood's] batteries could open the enemy . , . withdrew his left. Another battery (Captain Stribling's) was placed upon a commanding position to my right, which played upon the rear of the enemy's left and drove him entirely from that part of the field. He changed his front rapidly, so as to meet the advance of Hood and Evans. Three brigades, under General Wilcox, were thrown forward to the support of the left, and three others, under General Kemper, to the support of the right, of these commands. General D. E. Jones' division was placed upon the Manassas Gap Eail- road to the right and en Echelon with regard to the last three brigades. , , , At a late hour in the day Major- General Stuart reported the approach of the enemy in heavy columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox, with his three brigades, from the left and placed his command in position to support Jones in case of an attack against my right. After some few shots the enemy ivithdi^eiv his forces, moving them around toward his front, and about 4 o'clock in the afternoon began to press forward against General Jackson's position. Wilcox's brigades were moved back to their former posi- tion, and Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, were quickly pressed forward to the attack. At the same time Wilcox's three brigades made a like advance, as also Hunton's brigade, of Kemper's command." ^ Lonfifstreet's field minutes also state that Lee was very anxious to attack the enemy in front when he arrived that afternoon, but that his subordinates per- suaded him to wait until the next day, and that after U6W.E., 565« CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 345 tliis the approach of the enemy on the right Tvas re- ported, and Wilcox yas sent over to meet them. Jackson, too, in liis report says that '-it Tras not desira- ble to bring on a general engagement on the evenmg of the 29th.i Wilcox says in his report that at 9.30 A.^^vl. on the morning of the 29th he joined the rest of the division at the junction of the roads from Thoroughfare and Hopewell Gaps, then marched past Gainesville three miles, formed line of battle on right and left of turn- pike, and at right angles with it. and then advanced thi'ee-Cjuaiters of a mile and halted, and then at 4.30 or 5 P.M. . . . moved across to the right of the turn- pike a mile or more to the Manassas Gap Railroad,"' and at sundown was ordered back to the turnpike and forward to the support of Hood.- Lee in his report says : D. R. Jones' division formed the exti'eme right of the line, resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The cavalry guarded our right and left flanks, that on the right being under General Stuaii; in person. After the arrival of Longstreet the enemy changed his position and l3egan to concentrate opposite Jackson's left, opening a brisk artillery lire, which was responded to with etiect by some of Gen- eral A. P. Hilhs batteries. Colonel "Walton placed a part of his artillery upon a commanding position between the lines of Generals Jackson and Long- sti'eet by order of the latter and engaged the enemy vigorously for several hours. Soon afterward General Stuart reported the approach of a large force from the direction of Bristoe Station, threatening Long- U6W.R.,6i6. 2 lb., 598. 346 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. street's right. Tlie brigades under General Wilcox were sent to reenforce General Jones, but no serious attack was made, and after firing a few shots the enemi/ withdrew.''^ D. R. Jones says in his report that he arrived at about noon, and was placed on the extreme right, and " during the balance of the day was subjected to shelling, resulting in but few casualties."^ It seems that Stuart was mistaken as to what brigades were sent to the right, for Wilcox had Pryor's, Feather- ston's, and his own brigades, and probably Stuart arro- gates too much to himself when he intimates that these brigades were put under his command, but in all other material particulars above mentioned Stuart, Longstreet, Wilcox, and Lee agree ; and the conclusion cannot be escaped that, while it is true that Longstreet, with all his corps, except R. H. Anderson's division, was arriving in front of Pope's army at aboi"'t noon of the 29th ; yet Lee on that day regarded Porter's demonstration as insignificant. Of all his army only the three brigades under Wilcox were diverted for the express purpose of meeting Porter, and Lee made all his dispositions except- ing this, and determined not to give battle on that day before Porter's demonstrations attracted his attention ; and, therefore, the claim that Porter, by his presence, re- lieved Pope in any material degree is not well founded. Further, the testimony of Stuart, Longstreet, and Lee is, that Porter's main force withdrew^ and this movement cannot be connected with anything but the march to the rear testified to by Griffin and Smith ; and as now related by Col. Shepard and Capt. Bowers. neW.R., 556. Mb., 579. CASE OF FIT Z- JO EN PORTER. 347 It is said by Porter's friends that Longstreet's troops to double liis number were in his front ; but this assertion is not warranted. Longstreet had with him twelve brigades, numbering from 25,000 to 30,000 men. Hood's two brigades, Evans's brigade, and Kemper's three brigades, six in all, are not suggested by any Confederate General as being in Porter's front, and four of them took part in the advance on Pope that afternoon. Col. Marshall, of Lee's staff, writing to Fitz-John Porter, in 1869, says : D. K. Jones was not in line when Porter's approach was reported, and was then disposed so as to meet it, and Porter's ap- proach caused nearly the whole of Longstreet's line to face from the north to the east ; ^ but this seems to be directly contrary to the reports above cited, made soon after the battle. It seems that Kemper, Hood, and Evans were not opposed to Porter. "Was D. R. Jones ? It is said, that, being formed on the Manassas Gap Railroad, he must have been ; but if liis right touched that railroad at first, yet, in advancing in line of battle three-quarters of a mile, as Wilcox did, his right would bear away from the railroad a long distance. Moreover, the witnesses on Porter's trial testified that the force in front of him was separate from that in Pope's front, while D. R. Jones's division was the prolongation in 6chelon of the force in front of Pope. It would be inter- esting to learn whose artillery fire it was that D. R. Jones was subjected to during the day. On the whole, it seems probable that D. R. Jones, even if not under Porter's fire, was in such position that he could have joined in repelling any attack of Porter's. * 1 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, P;irt 1, 474. 348 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA31PAIGN. This would make six brigades, numbering from 12,000 to 15,000 men, in front of Porter. The cavalry can hardly be counted as an effective force against Porter's infantry. It is not easy to understand why it has been supposed that Porter would have been destroyed if he had attacked this force with his 11,®00 veteran soldiers. The question now comes, whether Porter, with his knowledge of Pope's plans for the 29th, finding himself opposed by an unexpected force a little stronger than his own, was justified in refusing to attack ? It may be that he believed that no attack was being made by Pope ; but, if it comes to relying upon this, it must be admitted by Porter that he heard continued and severe artillery firing on his right, and that at one time he supposed Pope was being driven back in an infantry battle. Col. Marshall, of Griffin's brigade, testified on Porter's trial to seeing from Porter's front the encounter of infantry in Pope's front, ^ and Longstreet reported that his jaded men, approaching Gainesville, hurried forward at the sound of battle in their front,2and it is true beyond doubt that sev- eral hours before dark, and perhaps at the time Porter was withdrawing, Pope did attack the enemy in his front. However, upon newly discovered evidence of an unim- peachable character, it is now apparent that both Pope and Porter were confronted by a force which Pope had not expected. Whether the fact justified Porter's conduct is a question deserving the consideration of a tribunal of military experts of high rank, which we cannot begrudge Porter. » 17 W.R., 1012. H6 W.R.I 564. XIII. THE HEAKING IN THE CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. By JOHN C. EOPES, Esq. Read before the Society on Monday evening, Jan. 12, 1880. THE HEAEmG IN THE CASE OF FITZ- JOH^ POETER. Y an order of Gen. Sherman, dated March 9, 1878, a Board of Officers, consisting of Gens. Schofield and Terry and Col. Getty, with Major Asa Bird Gardner as Judge- Advocate, was convened " to examine in connec- tion with the record of the trial hy couit-martial of Major- General Fitz-John Porter, such new evidence relating to the merits of said case as is now on file in the War De- partment, together with such other evidence as may be presented to said Board, and to report, with the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in their opinion, justice requires should be taken " ^ by the President on the application of Gen. Porter for a review of his case. It is probable that it was Gen. Sherman's intention to limit the Board in receiving testimony to newly dis- covered evidence, whether from the files of the War Department or from other sources. His language, how- ever, was so broad as to justify the Board in admitting any evidence that might be presented, whether it had been presented to the coui-t-martial or not. The result of this latitudinarian construction was that *2 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, 63. 351 352 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. fifteen of the principal witnesses in the court-martial testified before the Board, and, though the effort was made in their examination in chief to confine them to matters to which they had not testified before, yet there was, of course, and unavoidably on the cross-examination, a good deal of ground gone over which had been occupied by them in their testimony before the court-martial. There were, as will be remembered, two charges pre- ferred against Gen. Porter at the court-martial ; the first being disobedience of orders, and the second, misbe- havior before the enemy. Under the first charge there were tliree specifications,^ as they are termed (for the 4th and 5th were dropped); that is, Porter was accused of disobeying orders on three occa- sions. He was accused of disobeying the order to start from Manassas Junction for Bristoe at 1 o'clock in the morn- ing of the 28th of August, the disobedience consisting in his starting at 3 instead of at 1 in the morning ; secondly, he was accused of disobeying the now celebrated " Joint Order to him and McDowell, received at noon of the 29th, the disobedience to which certainly did not consist in any plain act or omission to act ; and, thirdly, he was accused of disobeying the order ^ dated half-past 4 that afternoon, which undoubtedly was not obeyed. Gen. Porter alleging, in the first place, that it came too late to be obeyed ; and, secondly, that his situation was such that a literal compliance with it was impossible. I shall not take up the time of the society with dwell- ' 1 17 W.R., 824-826. ^ Appendix C, supra, 384. ^ Appendix D, supra^ 385. HEARING IN FIT Z- JOHN PORTER CASE. 353 ing oPx tliis cliarge of disobedience of orders. No person familiar with the case, it is safe to say, has had any great difficulty in disposing of this accusation. That a corps- commander cannot lawfully use discretion whether to start at 1 or at 3 o'clock in the morning on a road blocked by wagons is hardly to be maintained. In post- poning his march two hours, he exercised," to use the language of Gen. Schofield, " only the very ordinary dis- cretion of a corps-commander, which it w^as his plain duty to exercise." This is quite enough to dispose of this specification; but the Board go farther, and say that, in their opinion, this discretion w^as wisely used.^ Then as to disobeying the " Joint Order." That was an order directing Gens. McDowell and Porter to move forw^ard with their joint command towards Gainesville ; and it con- tained this sentence : " If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictl}^ carried out." It is not easy to see how this order could have been disobeyed. At any rate, the fact was that Gen. McDowell, who ranked Gen. Porter, thought that considerable advantages could be gained by depart- ing from the order, and, instead of moving towards Gainesville with the joint command, he marched up the Sudley Springs road towards Groveton with his own corps, leaving Porter alone. After this, it seems impos- sible to fasten on Porter the charge of disobedience to an order which had been departed from so essentially by his superior officer. It is plain that it was no longer ^Sopes, Army under Pope, 178-180; 3 Senate Ex. Doc, 1699. 2 Appendix C, supra., 384. 354 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. possible to obey it as it was written. Finally, as to tbe order' of 4.30 P.M. That order reads, "Your line of marcli brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear," etc. Gen. Porter maintained at the trial that this order was not received till nearly or quite half-past 6, and that then it was too late to obey it. The evidence he adduced in support of this was so strong that no student of the case probably has been surprised at its confirmation by a recently discovered despatch from Porter to McDowell, dated 6 P.M. And in regard to his main defence to this charge, namely, that his line of march did not bring him in on the " enemy's right flank," as the order said it did, but that, on the contrary, the enemy were confronting him in strong force, — while the evidence he brought forward of this state of facts w*as not so strong as could have been desired, still it was enough to show the extreme probability of the fact being as he maintained. It is needless to say that if the enemy were in the position in which Porter claimed that they were, a compliance with the order was impossible. To attack a force some miles off in flank is one thing, to attack another force directly in front is quite another ; and Gen. Porter's claim, that a large force of the enemy was in his front, while it lacked, at the court-martial, the evidence of the Confederate officers by which it was substantiated at the late hearing before the Board, was, nevertheless, sup- ported by so many facts that it is difficult to see how the ^ Appendix D, supra^ 385. HEARING m FIT Z- JOHN PORTER CASE. 355 court managed to find that there was no opposing force of any magnitude in liis front. Not one of tlie tliree specifications under the charge of disobedience of orders ever had a sufiicient probability in its favor to justify making it the foundation of a charge of violating one of the fundamental articles of war. The real difficulty in the case of Gen. Porter has always been connected with the second charge, that of misbehavior in face of the enemy ; and impartial students of the case have generally felt, not only that the other accusations were weak and unfounded, but that they showed an animus on the part of the Government quite inconsistent with the serious temper with which such a grave matter as trying a veteran officer of high rank should be undertaken. It has, however, as has just been said, not been found so easy to dispose of the second charge, that of misbe- havior in face of the enemy. The facts, as they were stated in evidence to the court-martial, were, on the whole, a good deal against Porter. Here was a battle going on a very few miles away, and Porter's corps lying idle all the afternoon. It is true that he claimed that he had a large body of the enemy in his front; but the evidence of this was weak. He was not attacked. He deployed only one brigade. His troops saw almost nothing of their opponents. His own instructions to his officers seemed hardly such as would have been given had he supposed himself seriously in danger. He liimself was, most of the afternoon, nearly three miles from the skirmish line. Above all, there was the parting word of 356 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Gen. McDowell, to wMcli that officer testified, telling him " to put his force in here." ^ Then there were the letters to Burnside, which seemed to supply the motive of this apparently unaccountable inactivity. Finally, there was no one on the court-martial, probably, who did not believe that the position of the two armies was such that Porter might have attacked Jackson in flank, and that thereby Pope would have gained a decisive victory. With such evidence as this before it, pressed home by arguments of a kind most calculated to affect soldiers in time of war, it was not, perhaps, greatly to be wondered at that the court condemned Fitz-John Porter. Since that decision much has been written upon the subject. Porter himself has made several appeals to the Government, and has adduced a great deal of evidence from the statements, and especially the official reports of Confederate officers. There have been rejoinders written or circulated by Gen. Pope and by Gen. McDowell. There have been pamphlets printed about the matter. The Comte de Paris was obliged to treat the subject in his History, and thereby became, naturally enough, perhaps, involved in a controversy with Pope, and in a correspondence with Porter. At last the Government took the matter up and ap- pointed this Board of Officers, as we have seen, to ex- amine the newly discovered evidence in connection with the record of the court-martial, and to report their opinion to the President. The hearing was, as we all know, very long and very full, and the evidence and arguments, contained in two bulky volumes of printed m W.R., 904. EEARIXG AY FIT Z- JO EX PORTER CASE. 357 matter, and a third of maps, vrill tell tlie future liistorian all tliat can be known abotit this celebrated case.^ Tliis hearing resulted in an almost unc[ualified approval by the "Boarcl of the conduct of Gen. Porter. He Tvas. it is true- criticised for the insubordinate language in which, in his letters to Burnside, he spoke of Gen. Pope : btit of his acts, and omissions to act. in the held, the Board had no words too emphatic in which to express their approval. I pui^pose this evening to examine, as briefly as may be, the evidence and arouiments at this hearino\ and the re- port of the Board of Officers, with reference to the second of the two charo;es against Gen. Porter, namelv. that of misbehavior in the face of the enemy. The first charge, that of disQbedience of orders, I have never considered worthy of much attention. There were three specifications to sttpport this second charge. (The fottrth. relating to the battle of the 30th, was abandoned.) The first adds to the accusation of dis- obeying the order to attack, of 4.30 P.M. by alleging that he shametuUy disobeyed it, and not only disobeyed it, but actually retreated from the enemy. This last, however, the court-martial found not to have been the fact. We need not particularly concern ourselves with this specification, for the gist of it lies in two mistaken sup- positions, namely, that the 4.30 P.M. order was received soon after 5 o'clock, and that it was possible for Porter to strike the flank of the force in front of Pope. T\'e shall recur to this later on. The second specification alleged that Porter, being in ^ Eeprinted in Senate ExeentiTe Document, Xo. 37. 4:6th Congress. 1st Session. See Porter, in List of Books cited, ante, ^Appendix D. siqrra. 385. 358 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. the face of the enemy, and within sound of the guns of a severe action, failed to bring his corps on to the field, and shamefully retreated from the enemy. On this he was found guilty. The tliird specification is an aggravation of the second, in this, that it accuses Pcrter of having shamefully re- treated to Manassas, when he was in the belief that Pope's army was being beaten. Of this he was found guilty; though the court said that he did not retreat so far as Manassas. These last two specifications are substantially the same. They are sufficiently precise for their purpose, and need not detain us farther, save to note that in them there is no allusion to the alleged verbal order of Gen. McDowell, of which so much was said in the course of the trial. The court-martial, in fine, found that Gen. Porter, being within hearing of a battle going on a few miles from where he was, and being, as they supposed he well knew, in a position where he could, by an aggressive movement on the enemy's flank, have decided the fate of the action, refused, from dishonorable motives, to fight his corps, and actually fell back a certain distance ; and it, therefore, found him guilty of this second charge, that of misbe- havior in presence of the enemy. This conclusion, that Porter's inaction was due to dis- honorable motives, was, however, not entirely based on the two supposed facts just recited, namely, that he was within hearing of a battle, and that he could have turned the flank of the enemy, had he chosen to do so. There was another supposed fact, and a very material HEARING IN FIT Z- JO UN PORTER CASE. 359 one in the opinion of the court, namely, that Gen. McDowell had, on leaving Gen. Porter, told him to put his force in at the place where he was then ; and, though the Judge Advocate did not probably consider this remark as sufficiently explicit for him to use it as the foundation of a specification under the charge of disobedience of orders, yet he did consider it as showing that the line of Porter's duty had been clearly pointed out to him, so that he was without excuse in his subsequent inactivity. In connection with this it must be remembered that the court-martial undoubtedly took the view of the situation of the two armies which Gens. Pope and McDowell believed at the time to be true, namely, that J ackson had not, during the 29th, been reenforced to any considerable extent, and that there was no large force of the enemy in front of Porter. Hence they held Porter to be bound to carry out Pope's expressed design of falling upon Jack- son before he should be joined by the rest of Lee's army, and that it was his plain duty to make his way through the country, whether rough or otherwise, which separated him from the Warrenton pike, while McDowell was marching up the Sudley Springs road, Porter thus strik- ing Jackson's right flank, while McDowell joined the main army under Pope. Now, the new evidence which Porter had to offer to the Board was almost entirely, so far as it was material and important, confined to one point ; but that was the key- point of the case. He was able to offer to the Board conclusive evidence from Confederate officers that nearly the whole of Lee's 360 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. army was confronting the Federal forces on the afternoon of the 29th, and, especially, that he (Porter) was con- fronted by a large part of Longstreet's corps, as he had maintained at his trial was the fact. He might, therefore, as it seems to me, have introduced this evidence, and then rested his case. He might have said substantially this : ^' Suppose that Gen. McDowell did at noon tell me to put my troops in where I was, and without reference to any cooperation with him. If he did, which I do not admit, it was under the supposition that I could go from where I was to the neighborhood of the turnpike without fighting a battle. The very fact of his marching away from me with both the divisions of his corps, shows that he did not expect that I should be con- fronted with the enemy just there. Had he known that the enemy were in front of me in large force he would, of course, have brought up his corps, so that we could have fought our battle together ; that is, he would, had it been his intention to fight there at all. At any rate it was clearly not my duty to undertake to carry out any order, based on what I very soon found was an entire miscon- ception of the true state of the case. I was convicted, not because the court thought I was to blame in not attacking Longstreet's corps in front of me, but because the court did not believe that Longstreet's corps was in front of me, and did believe that I could have attacked Jackson's force in flank, but deliberately refrained from so doing. Now, I show that Longstreet was in my front, as I maintained at the time, and that I could not possibly have attacked Jackson in flank. What is there f HEARING IN FITZ-JOHN PORTER CASE. 361 for the Board to do but to reverse the finding of the court ? Not because the finding of the court was unjust, but because it proceeded from an essentially mistaken view of the facts. I have no accusation to bring against any one. I do not care to inquire now how far passion and prejudice had to do with the formation of the mis- taken view of the facts in the minds of the witnesses who testified, or in the minds of the members of the court who decided, against me. I assume that they were all honorable, disinterested men ; and that, if I can convince them that they were mistaken, and that I was correct, in respect to the position of the enemy that afternoon, they, or those of them who are still living, will cheerfully join in a demand for my rehabilitation by this Board. In this temper and with this belief I submit my evidence and make my plea." Unfortunately, as I think, for the credit of the ser\dce, and for his own position in the controversy. Gen. Porter, or rather, perhaps, his counsel, did not take tliis ground. They took up from the first an attitude of hostility to every one who had testified before the court-martial against Porter. They tried their case exactly as if it had been an ordinary criminal case before the ordinary tribunals, tried for the first time. While they tried their case with great ability, they, however, dwelt upon every point of it with- out much discrimination, and with very little sense of per- spective. They had a case in which it was in their power absolutely to prove certain facts, a belief in which would overthrow, necessarily, the verdict of the court-martial. They proved these facts, indeed, but they proved a lot of 362 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. other things besides, of no earthly importance in any view of the subject. They proved, indeed, the presence of a large force in front of Porter, observing him all the afternoon; but they also proved that President Lincoln told Governor Newell, of New Jersey, " that he had not been able to give that personal attention to the case which its merits required ; . . . that he had had a high regard for General Porter personally and as a soldier."^ This piece of folly, however, brought its own punishment in the introduction by the Recorder of the evidence of Presi- dent Lincoln's son, who testified that his father said to him " that the case would have justified, in his opinion, a sentence of death." ^ As the real opinion of this eminent military expert was thus left in doubt, the Board, it is to be presumed, were obliged to fall back on their own unaided reason. This determination to go over every point of the case, and every bit of testimony minutely and slowly, was especially noticeable in their cross-examination of the Government witnesses. For instance, there was a man who testified that he heard Porter say, I warn't {sic) loyal to Pope; I was loyal to McClellan."^ It takes more than eight pages ^ to print his cross-examination ; and he stuck to it after all. A dozen instances might be cited as striking as this. So, also, their suspicion of, and hostility to, the Gov- ernment witnesses was a most marked and disagreeable feature in their method of trying the case. The great 1 2 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, 320. ^ i^., 855. ^ ib., 638. '* lb., 639-645 ; cf. Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Offi- cers, in the case of Fitz-John Porter, 652-660. HEARIXG IX FITZ-JOHX PORTER CASE. 363 instance of this is their treatment of Gen. McDowell, who was called by the Recorder. After some unim- portant questions, the Recorder asked him whether the asserrion made by the petitioner in his opening statement, that he had been told by McDowell that there was a plan to form behind Bull Run, and so forth, was true. Mr. Choate strenuously objected, and very unnecessarily said that Gen. McDowell was not there to argue the case.'' ^ And when the Board overruled the objection, and the Judge Advocate showed the General the passage in Porter's statement to vrliich he referred, the offensive suggestion was repeated. The Board, overruling the ob- jection again. Gen. McDowell said that he did not admit, in substance or in terms. haAuno; used the lanmiao^e at- tributed to liim. At once ]\Ir. Choate sprang upon him, savinor that he was not there to make admissions,'' and so forth. Under tins treatment a witness naturally be- comes suspicious, afraid of being taken up short,'' and of committing himself. And in this frame of mind he natu- rally does not do hunself justice. In fact, no lawyer begins by treating a witness in this way, unless with the deliberate intention of discreditino; him thi^ouodiout.- As the testimony of Gen. McDowell is, dotdotless, the most important testimony in the whole case on the gov- ernment side, I purpose to consider it with some care. I am somewhat at a loss to discover the object the Government had in callino- liim. unless it was to obtain from him the denial, to which I have just called attention, that he told Porter anything about there being a plan to form behind Bull Run, to get re enforcements from the ^2 Senate Ex. Doc. 37, 716. ^Ih., 717-718. 364 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Army of the Potomac, and then fight the main battle. The cross-examination was conducted by Mr. Choate. It began by calling the General's attention to the publica- tions he had made, or circulated, respecting the case, and especially to a misquotation in one of these publications from the report of Gen. Jackson as to the battle of the 29th of August. There could be but one purpose in this line of exami- nation, namely, to convict Gen. McDowell of such hos- tility to Gen. Porter that he was capable of falsifying the report of Gen. Jackson in order to sustain his accusa- tions. It is needless to say that his purpose was instantly perceived by the witness, and that the two men were thenceforth and throughout the examination in an atti- tude of mutual hostility. Nothing else could be expected, of course. Having exhausted this topic, to which I shall advert later on, and still anxious to pursue this plan of attempting to break down McDowell's character, chance threw another opportunity in his way. When this hearing before the Board was ordered. Gen. McDowell caused a new search to be made among his old papers, to see if anything could be found in any way bear- ing on the case. Such a search had been made at the time of the court-martial, and he expected nothing to result from his present inquiry. But it so happened that there were found among some old papers three little pieces of paper containing each a few lines written to him by Porter on the afternoon of the 29th. These he sent on at once to the Judge Advocate, as the HEARING IN FIT Z- JO EN PORTER CASE. 365 proper custodian of them. Of course, as it is liardly nec- essary to say, he might hare thrown them in the fire; but, as I have said, he did not, but furnished them without a second thought to the Revising Board. Now, it will hardly be believed, but it is, nevertheless, true, that Mr. Choate subjected the General to as severe a cross-examination about these despatches as if, for in- stance, they had been unearthed from the General's desk by a detective, after the General had told the Board that there was nothing in his desk. The grossest insinuations of intentional concealment were made, despite the fact, which stared everybody in the face, that it was McDowell himself, and none other, who had found and produced the despatches. If such treatment awaits a witness who puts all his evidence at the disposal of the proper officers, it is really not easy to see what worse fate would be liis who should in like cir- cumstances destroy newly discovered evidence. It is worth remarking, too, as a curious fact, that one of these despatches afforded Porter the means of showing that the order ^ of Pope, dated 4.30 P.M., had not reached him at 6 o'clock, — a fact very material to him on one branch of the case. The natural effect of this course of treatment upon Gen. McDowell was to render Mm extremely cautious, very careful in his answers to stick to the very terms of the question, and never to say a word more than he could help. Those of us who are familiar with courts, and who know with what readiness a clever lawyer will pass from ^Appendix D, supra, 385. 366 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. checking and snubbing a witness who may say a word too much, to the contemptuous insinuation, thrown out if a witness is precise, that the witness knew perfectly well what the question meant, and might answer at once if he were not disposed to prevaricate, — those of us, I say, who have seen this, can easily imagine the sort of time Gen. McDowell had with Mr. Choate. It is superfluous to say that the General's testimony is not agreeable reading ; that it does not give such a view of the facts of that day, and of that campaign, as lay in his mind. But then it was no part of Mr. Choate's intention that it should give such a view. On the contrary, he was determined to prevent anything of the kind being given in evidence ; and with the power he had as cross-examin- ing counsel, which he wielded most unhesitatingly, he naturally succeeded. To return to the misquotation from Jackson's report. It seems that McDowell found the Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia " in Gen. Halleck's library at San Francisco, and copied from them certain brief extracts from the reports of Stuart, Longstreet, and Jackson, and sent them to Pope, who prepared a paper, which was printed, though not published, and was entitled " Brief Statement of the Case of Fitz-John Porter," ^ in which these extracts appear with explanations and comments by Gen. Pope. Now, although these extracts show that Longstreet's corps was up on the afternoon of the 29th, which was denied by the Government in the court-mar- tial, still there are passages in them that look as if the irresolute attitude of Porter's corps on our extreme left ^ See List of Books cited, ante., HEARING m FITZ-JOHN PORTER CASE. 367 had enabled Lee to use the bulk of his force against Gen. Pope's immediate command. To this point the extracts from Stuart's and Longstreet's reports, in which there was no mistake whatever, are most appropriate. The extract from Jackson's report, which is to the same general purport, although very much fuller, was, however, taken from his report of the operations of the 30th. The mistake of citing it as applying to the 29th evidently arose, as any one will see from inspection of the book,^ from the writer not having commenced his account of the battle of the 30th by a new paragraph. There seems to a casual reader no break between the narrative of the opera- tions of the 29th and the narrative of the operations of the 30th. When Gen. Pope heard that some people had doubted whether the extract from Jackson's report re- ferred to the 29th, he sent it to the Adjutant-General's ofBce in Washington, and it was returned with only a few verbal corrections. As for McDowell, he never saw the book of Reports but once before it was shown to him at this hearing, and that was the time when he made the ex- tract from it. It was not difficult, in fact it was the easiest tiling in the world, for Mr. Choate to show Gen. McDowell his mistake, and to get him to acknowledge it. But Mr. Choate was not satisfied till this acknowl- edgment had been made seven or eight times, so as to give him the opportunity of charging the General with a wilful and fraudulent misquotation. Those of us who know Gen. McDowell need no defence of him from me against such an accusation as this. Carelessness there certainly was ; for the same ex- ^ 2 A. N. v., 96 ; the arrangement of paragraphs of Jackson's report as reprinted in 16 W.R., 646, probably corresponds with the original. 368 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. amination wliicli convinced him of liis error when the book was shown him on the witness-stand, ought, of conrse, to have been used by him in Gen. Halleck's library years before. But, besides the somewhat confus- ing way in which the operations of the two days are printed so as to make a continuous narrative, to which I have already referred, there was also this, which certainly assisted to mislead him, namely, that the extract from Jackson's report might have been written of the battle of the 29th almost as well as of the battle of the 30th. On the 29th, as on the 30th, the Federal infantry advanced in the latter part of the afternoon and pressed Jackson hard, and on both days he was saved from defeat by the assist- ance of Longstreet's corps. On the 29th he was aided by Hood and Evans, supported by Wilcox, and on the 30th the entire corps of Longstreet was put in on his right. And it cannot be said that this misquotation, of which so much has been made, added much, if it added anything, to the force of the citations from the reports of Stuart and Longstreet, in which there was no mistake at all. It did not, of course, escape the vigilant eye of Mr. Choate that this paper of Gen. Pope's, with the extracts made by Gen. McDowell from the rebel reports, admitted what neither Pope nor McDowell admitted at the court- martial having known at the time, namely, the presence on the field of the corps of Longstreet on the afternoon of the 29th. Of course there was nothing inconsistent in McDowell's having found out afterwards that Long- street's corps was up ; and, therefore, there was no reason HEAR IX G ly FIT Z- JOHN T OUTER CASE. 369 TvliY ^IcDoTvell should not have frankly stated that he had, subseqnently to the court-martial, ascertained this to be the fact. But, treated as McDoTvell had been, it Tras impossible to get from him any statement of this character in reply to any question of Mr. Choate. The same fate met Mr. Choate's queries based on ]Mc- DoTvell's order to Sigel, dated Buckland Mills, August 27, 11.30 P.M.,^ in which he tells that officer that a large division of the enemy, under Longstreet^ left Salem at 4 P3L for Manassas through Thoroughfare Gap. What with the reluctance of the witness to go into any exam- ination of matters prior to the 29th, and the objections raised by the Judge Advocate, there was a skirmishing of questions and answers running tln-ough eight printed pages before this order was brought out. Had Mr. Choate's treatment of his witness been respectful and conciliatorv. had he not beg^un bv accusmo' him of fraud and deceit, he would doubtless have got on faster. And I am compelled to say that had Gen. McDowell answered each c|uestion as frankly and promptly as was in his newer, without retortino- on the counsel bv wishino- to J- O V o know what was the object of this or of that question, and every now and then making a sort of stand in regard to certain questions which seemed to him directed by a hostile intent, his ^dews of the campaign would have appeared, so far as they were given in liis examination, to vastly better advantage. But the fact is, the witness, made thorouo-hlv hostile to Gen. Porter's counsel while he was yet in the hands of the Judge Advocate, gave his evidence in a piecemeal sort of way and with evident ^2 Senate Ex. Doc. 37. 753. 370 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. reluctance. But let it not be forgotten that for this state of feeling no one but Mr. Choate was to blame. Among other things which were out of the proper line of examination, and which tended greatly to intensify this unfortunate state of feeling, must be mentioned the questions put to Gen. McDowell, asking him why he did not do something else instead of the thing that he did do. Thus, he was asked whether there was anything to prevent his coming up on Porter's left, on the left of the Manassas and Gainesville road, instead of going up the Sudley Springs road.^ To all this sort of thing McDowell very properly objected, that what he did was plain enough, and that the question was open- ing a totally foreign subject of inquiry, namely, whether he might not have done something wiser than what he actually did. This annoyance was, by the way, repeated more than once in the course of the investigation. Leaving, now, further criticism on the conduct of the cross-examination of Gen. McDowell, I remark that his testimony shows very clearly that it was his intention to bring his troops round by the Sudley Springs road, and connect with Keynolds on the right and with Porter on the left. I do not know," he says, " that I had [the idea of a continuous line] , but, in general terms, the idea was to get the army together ; they were separated and in a critical position." ^ It also appears that Porter himself concurred in this proposed action, if he did not himself suggest it,^ as he himself thinks was the fact.* It is also very clear that McDowell, and, presumably, 1 2 Senate Ex. Doc, 759. ^ lb., 761. 3 lb., 779. " 1 Senate Ex. Doc, 330. HEARING m FIT Z- JOHN PORTER CASE. 871 Porter too, had no notion, when they separated at noon, that they were to be separated for the rest of that day. It is true that McDowell, on being asked if he had any idea how long the movement would take him, says he had not, but that, long or short, it was the movement he wanted to make ; that he does not recollect of his mind taking up the question of time, and so on.^ Yet he says later that he hoped at the end of an hour to get his force well around and connect with Eeynolds.^ And no doubt this was his expectation. It is true that Gen. McDowell will not admit that his intention was that the connection between his troops and those of Porter was to be made before Porter was to attack. He says, indeed, he expected that Porter would get engaged with the enemy at the end of an hour ; ^ and that by this time he hoped to have his force ' ' well around." But when asked whether, when he left Porter, his plan was one of cooperation, he makes the somewhat unsatisfactory answer, ^'We were all coop- erating to the same point." * And when asked whether it was his expectation that Porter would be in a general engagement with the enemy before he got around on the left of Eeynolds, he says, "You want to make me say what he would be doing at a certain time, and where I should be. I say no such calculation entered into my mind."^ "As to saying that I did not want him to do any fighting till I got around to a certain place, I made no such calculations." And there is much more to the same effect.^ But it is quite plain that Gen. Porter's understanding 1 2 Senate Ex. Doc, 37, 758-759. ^ lb., 778-779. ^ i^.,^ 779^ *Ib. 6Xb. 6 lb., 780. 872 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. of the matter was tliat he should establish some connec- tion with McDowell's corps before taking the offensive. And his three despatches to McDowell indicate nnmis- takably that his inability to effect this was unexpected, and a cause of great anxiety to him. It is plain that he felt his position to be critical, having the enemy in his front, and not being able, as he evidently expected he would in an hour or two be able, to connect Morell's division with King's. He says in his notes to Mc- Dowell that he cannot advance ; that he has failed to get messengers over to McDowell, save by the route taken by King, i.e.^ the Sudley Springs road ; that he has been wandering over the woods, and has failed to get a commu- nication to McDowell and King; that the enemy is in strong force in his front, getting towards his left ; that he wishes to know McDowell's designs for the night ; and more to the same effect, i These despatches show that Porter had one thing in his mind very clearly that after- noon, and that thing was connecting his right, or, at least, establishing some communication, with McDowell's corps. There is notliing in them of an apologetic character; nothing like an excuse for inaction ; on the contrary, they are simply the language of an officer unexpectedly left alone in presence of a large force of the enemy, and in a somewhat critical position, who has endeavored to carry out the understanding that he should connect, in some way, with the supporting corps, and who has not suc- ceeded in doing so, and who evidently does not imagine that anything of an aggressive character is expected of him until this connection shall be effected. The theory ^2 Senate Ex. Doc, 776; 16 W.R., 624, 525. BEARING IN FITZ-JOHN PORTER CASE. 373 of the Judge Advocate, that these despatches show that Porter felt himself to be bound by an order of McDowell's to attack the enemy from where he was/ seems to me wholly imsupported by their contents. Porter, in these despatches, says that he is trying to com- municate with McDowell, not to attack the enemy in his front ; and, with the exception of a statement in the first despatch, that he has attempted to send messengers to Sigel, there is no hint of any other intention in his mind than that of establishing communication with the corps of McDowell somewhere to the north of his own position. The only despatches of Gen. Porter's which look at all as if he intended at any time that afternoon to attack the enemy before ha^dng established some communica- tion with McDowell, are those sent to Gen. Morell, who commanded his advance division. The first order reads as follows : — General Morell, — Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach a road up which King is moving [i.e., the Sudley Springs road], and he has got ahead of you, let him pass; but see if you cannot give help to Sigel. If you find him rething, move back towards Manassas, and, should necessity requh-e it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find the direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return. F. J. Porter, Major- General, Look to the points of the compass for Manassas.^ 1 2 Senate Ex, Doc, 37, 492. ^ xb., 432 ; 16 W.R., 523. 374 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Gen. Porter says this was sent early in the after- noon ; ^ but Gen. Morell, with more probability, fixes the time from the reference to King moving up the Sudley Springs road, as the middle or latter part of the after- noon ; ^ and in this opinion the Board of Officers con- curred.^ This efi'ort was never made, however, owing, as Gen. Porter says, to the diflficulty of penetrating the in- tervening country even with iniantry, and the impossi- bility of carrying artillery through it, and owing to, also, as he wisely adds, the necessity of holding the enemy in our immediate front." ^ In fact, the order, which would seem to imply that Morell's division should cross from where it w^as posted over to the Sudley Springs road, up which King's division was marching, was, as Morell says, rescinded almost immediately, and before he had made any efforts to carry it out.^ Then, later in the afternoon, at 6 o'clock, favorable reports having, as Porter says, come in from the right wing. Porter ordered a reconnoissance in force with four regiments to be made by Morell ; but, on the urgent remonstrance of this officer, withdrew the order. ^ Both these orders were unquestionably given late in the afternoon, the one, five (as the Board of Officers fijid is probably the fact),''^ and the other six, hours after McDowell had left Porter. It is, therefore, impos- sible to find in them any admission on Porter's part of his feeling himself bound by an order of McDowell's to attack the enemy. Moreover, the first order is not an order to attack at all, but to communicate with Sigel by » 1 Senate Ex. Doc, 37, 333. 2 2 ib., 443. ^ 3 lb., 1705. 4 1 lb., 333. ^ 2 lb., 443. « i i^., 335. 7 3 i^.^ 1705. HEARING m FIT Z- JOHN PORTER CASE. 375 some road, wliicli the order indicates will probably be tlie Sudley Springs road. No one, it seems to me, can blame Porter for delaying his attack till he should have established his communica- tions mth McDowell. A battle is a serious thing under any circumstances, and for a corps-commander to under- / take, with both flanks in the air, an offensive operation against an enemy of unknown strength, when a large corps, to which he could look for help, but with which • he has as yet established no connection, was passing up a road a few miles in his rear, would have been about as unmihtary a thing as he could well have done. If met by superior numbers his defeat might have entailed that of McDowell. It is no sufficient answer to this to say, as McDowell does, that Porter might have made it a light or heavy attack, as circumstances dictated.^ Unless McDowell was actually prepared to support him, it would have been unwise for him to attack at all, at such a distance as he was from the main army. Por- ter and McDowell unquestionably expected that their two corps would be in communication in the middle of the afternoon, but they were disappointed, owing to McDowell's corps taking a longer time than he expected to make the march, and owing, doubtless, also to McDow- ell's being obliged to obey new orders from Pope wliich carried him away from Porter towards the main army. And this left Porter waiting for orders, and waiting also for the establishment of some sort of communication with McDowell, all the afternoon ; observing the enemy with one division; keeping the other in column to be '2 Senate Ex. Doc, 37, 781. 376 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. ready to move at a moment's notice ; and, judging from the tone of Ms despatches, as well as from the facts of the case, not having the least foreboding of the cruel interpretation so soon to be put upon his inactivity. Still, while we may admit that Porter was under no obligation either to attempt to force his way through the broken country to Groveton with a powerful enemy on his flank, or to fall furiously on that enemy in his front before having established some sort of communication with McDowell's corps, we need not, as it seems to me, rush to the conclusion that the dispositions made of his troops that afternoon were the wisest in the world. In two points, perhaps, they may be open to criticism. Firsts as to the ascertainment by Porter of the strength and composition of the enemy's forces in his front. This was called for, not only from a regard for his own safety, but to insure an intelligent and successful cooperative movement, in case an attack should be ordered after communication with McDowell had been established. But his dispositions to this end seem to me to have been quite inadequate. How he managed, with the very slight reconnoissance that he ordered, or rather that he could prevail upon Morell to undertake, — how he managed, I say, to find out as much as he did, is rather a mystery t( me. He deployed but one brigade. It would be tedious to recapitulate the evidence of his officers ; but, though it is now established by the Confederate testimony that a large force was directly in front of him, say ten thousand men, during the whole of the afternoon, and more than that number at one period, yet it is not easy to see how HEARING IN FIT Z- JO EN PORTER CASE. 37T the reports of his subordinates to him in regard to the strength and dispositions of tliis force could have enabled him to cooperate very intelligently or very efficiently with McDowell, had that officer's corps managed to get around and connect with Porter's troops in the middle, or toward the close, of the afternoon, and had a forward movement been then ordered. For how much of this ignorance of the enemy's position and strength Gen. Morell was responsible we can hardly tell. Morell says of himself that he was very ill, and scarcely fit for duty.i Secondly^ while Porter ought, under the circumstances, to have ascertained all about the enemy, he might also have made such demonstrations with his corps as would have drawn to that portion of the field a considerable part of the enemy's force. But he did, as has been said, notliing of the kind. He concealed his forces from the enemy's observation, and abstained from all demonstra- tions whatever. It is clear to my mind that, had his attitude been more pronounced, General Lee would have sent a much larger force to observe his corps. I am not speaking now of making attacks, or of anything except such menacing demonstrations as can always be made by as large a force as that which Porter commanded, and can always be made by experienced officers with entire safety to their commands. I think such demonstrations as these were plainly demanded by the circumstances of the case. I think the orders to Morell, to which I have referred, show that Porter himself recognized tliis. But, whether it was due to Mor ell's sickness, or to Porter's belief that ^2 Senate Ex. Doc, 37, 446. 378 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. he might at any moment be called upon to fall back to Bull Run, as indicated in the " J oint Order," * or to what- ever cause, certain it is that no demonstrations of any serious kind were made. I believe myself entirely in Porter's good faith and generally sound military judg- ment ; but he certainly did not, in my opinion, make so much of an impression on the enemy that afternoon as might have been made. It seems probable to me that Porter was under the impression all the afternoon that his stay in this exposed position was merely temporary,^ and that he therefore dis- posed his corps so as to fall back to Bull Run with the greatest possible convenience and celerity, having been convinced by the terms of the " Joint Order " and by the appearance on the" field of Longstreet's corps, that this would be Gen. Pope's plan. And for this belief he had, as I have before said, very strong reasons. Still, I think that the dispositions he made of his force while he was waiting for the orders he expected, are open to the above criticisms. If, now, we ask the not unnatural question, how it happened that two such able and zealous officers as McDowell and Porter, being apparently in perfect accord at noon, so far as either of them knew or believed, could, during the afternoon, have become the subjects of this most unhappy misunderstanding, — for such it appears to me to have been, — I must reply that, like most misunder- standings, this one arose from a want of explicitness. * Appendix C, supra, 384. ^ j^^f^^ 85-89. EEARIXG m FIT Z- JO EN PORTER CASE. 379 Had tliev perfectly understood each other during the half hour they were together, this unfortunate and deplorable affair could not have happened. If Gen. McDowell, instead of giving Porter what he admits was a very vague " ^ order, " put your troops in here " or "there," accompanied by a motion of the hand in some direction not remembered,- and without indi- cating when the order was to be executed, had given him, mstead, an explicit order, not, of course, precise as to tactical details, but such an order as would be given to a corps-commander who was to make a serious attack without any support that could be counted upon (which was the case here), the whole trouble would probably have been avoided. Had he remained till he was certain that Porter clearly understood him, it would have saved a world of trouble. Had they discussed, even in the most general way, the route by wliich, and the time in which the communication between their respective corps was to be estabhshecl, after McDowelhs moA^ement up the Sudley Springs road should have placed his corps on the left of Reynolds's division, they could not have failed to arrive at some sort of a mutual understanding. But, vague as were Gen. McDowell's orders, his calculations were no less vague. What he intended to do himself was clear, and was supported by cogent military reasons ; but truth compels me to say that he does not seem to have devoted sufficient consideration to the situation of his associate after he should have separated from him, to justify him in giving that associate an order, even a very vague one. It does not, in fact, seem as if McDowell assumed any such ^ 2 Senate Ex. Doc, 37, 769. ^ lb., 777. 880 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGm responsibility for the success of tlie movement lie pre- scribed to Porter as an officer who gives an important order must assume. For, it must be remembered, this order, on McDowell's own showing, was not a common order to attack, given by a general-in-chief to a corps-commander in the course of a battle. It was not, for example, like the order given to Porter the next day by Pope, that he should assault the enemy's position in a particular part of the field. It was an order to make an independent movement with his corps, so as to get engaged with an enemy with whom they were not then, as McDowell supposed, in immediate contact, and in regard to whose strength they had very general information. Such an order, though necessarily vague as to some points, such as tactical details, should have been, one would suppose, tolerably explicit as to other points, such as communications, connections, Hnes of advance and retreat. Such an independent operation as that which McDowell says he prescribed to Porter was inevitably hazardous, and contingencies and emergencies should have been foreseen and provided for, so far as pos- sible, in his instructions. It is perfectly plain that Porter never understood that he had received an order of this nature. McDowell, indeed, admitted that any kind, almost, of an attack would have been a compliance with his order ; ^ but this only shows that he was far from being clear in his own mind as to what the situation demanded, except, as has been said, as to his own course. As to that, McDowell was perfectly clear ; but as to Porter, whether he should attack in force or merely with ^2 Senate Ex. Doc, 37, 781-782. HEARINO m FIT Z- JOHN PORTER CASE. 381 a skirmish-line,^ whether he was or was not to get en- gaged before McDowell's corps could support him ; ^ when, if at all, he could calculate on the head of Mc- Dowell's column reaching some available point, ^ — on none of these points, all of which, it is needless to say, were of vital importance to Gen. Porter, in view of the supposed movement, does Gen. McDowell seem to have thouo-ht at all. It was not to be wondered at, that a combined operation, so loosely conceived and defined, should have failed. It is greatly to be deplored that the failure, so very natural in itself, should have led to such distressing results. I have hardly thought it necessary to express my opinion of the ability with which Gen. Porter's case was conducted. I have, in the former part of tliis paper, criti- cised certain features in the management of the case by the able counsel he employed, w^hich seemed to me de- serving of reprehension. But I desire to bear my testi- mony to the great acumen and marvellous industry with which every point of the case was cleared up. Not a stone was left unturned. Nor must I omit to mention the gallant and able de- fence of Major Gardner. With an unpopular cause to maintain, with three experienced and able practising lawyers all exercising their combined wit upon his posi- tions and arguments, he held his own, like a good soldier, and like a good lawyer. And a pretty strong case he made of it too. Whenever the other side overshot the mark, they had to pay for it. Whenever the facts, seemed 1 2 Senate Ex. Doc, 37, 769, 781-782. ^ j^., 779. 3 j^^^ 758-759. 382 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. to bear out the Government theory, they were ably mar- shalled for that end. The report is characteristic of Gen. Schofield, who un- doubtedly drew it up. It is very clear and very strong in what is called " power of statement." In general, it is, to my mind, convincing, so far certainly as its conclusions are concerned ; but there are several passages in it where the views of the petitioner are, perhaps, adopted rather too fully. Believing, as we certainly may, and as I certainly do, that Gen. Porter was entirely innocent of any intentional disregard of duty, that none of his acts or omissions to act that afternoon sprang from any unwillingness to render to Gen. Pope all the service in his power, we are yet, I sup- pose, quite free to regard him as a fallible man like other men. In the vindication of his character by the Board, I entirely concur. Still, in reviewing the whole case, I may frankly say that I think he might have done more than he did during that afternoon to ascertain the strength of the enemy, and also to attract their attention, and thus relieve the main army. But I cordially concur, as I have said more than once, in the verdict of the Revising Board, and I trust that such action will speedily be taken by Govern- ment as will at last remove the stain of dishonor from a faithful and gallant soldier. HEARING IN FIT Z- JO EN PORTER CASE. 383 APPEXDIX. A. Headquarters of the Army of Yirgixia, Near Bull Eun, August 29, 1862, 3 A.M. G-EXERAL : — McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearny and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Centre- ville at the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early houi' in the morning. A severe engage- ment is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, G-EO. D. EUGGLES, Colonel and Chief of Staff.' Major-General Porter. Bristoe. — Received August 29, 1862, 5.30 A.M. B. Headquarters Army of Yirgls-ia, Cextretille, August 28, 1862. Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Wan'enton tuimpike. Be expeditious or we will lose much. Jyo. Pope, Ma jor- General, Commanding.^ Major-Gex. Fitz-John Porter. 1 16 75, 518 ; 17 TV.R.. 846, 923, 1061, 1070 : 18 W.R., 733. 2 15 W.R., 245 ; 16 W.R., 518 ; 17 TT.R., 846, 1061 ; 18 TV.R., 729. 384 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, C. Headquarters Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 1862. Generals McDowell and Porter : — You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the War- renton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desu'e that as soon as communication is established between this force and your own the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to- night. I presume it will be so, on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to com- municate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to join the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indica- tions are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this dkection at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps or at this place. John Pope, Major-General^ Commanding.^ » 15 W.E,., 196; 16 W.R., 76, 508, 520; 17 W.R., 825, 903, 1121. HEARING IN FIT Z- JO EN PORTER CASE. 385 Headquarters Army of Virginia, In the Eield, August 29, 1862, 4.30 P.M. Major-General Porter : — Your line of inarch brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desu-e you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Rey- nolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as [you] engage then- flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close com- munication with the right wing. Jno. Pope, Major-General ^ Commanding ^ » 16 W.E., 18, 509, 510, 525 ; 17 W.R., 826, 1085. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN, August 9, 1862. By GEOEGE LEOXARD ANDREWS, Brevet Major- General, U.S.V. Read hefore the Society on Tuesday Evening, March 26, 1895. CEDAE MOU^^TAm. undertaking to give an account of the battle of Cedar Mountain, I am well aware that even with the best intentions and much painstaking I cannot reasonably expect to state accurately the trath, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, concerning anything so complicated. An eye-witness sees at most only a part of the action, and, in regard to what he does see, his memory, especially after the lapse of many years, is somewhat defective. Like other writers on events of the War of the Eebellion, I have had to depend largely upon the statements of others, found in official reports and correspondence, or in accounts written for the most part long after the events ; and, as was to be expected, these statements are more or less conflicting. Besides official reports and letters contained in the Record of the War of the Rebellion, I have consulted the published works of General Gordon, Mr, John C. Ropes, Major Gould of the 10th Maine, Adjutant Bryant of the 3d Wisconsin, Chaplain Quint of the 2d Massachusetts, and Esten Cooke of the Confederate Army.^ I have also had oral or written statements from several of the officers and men who took part in the battle, of whom I ought to mention ^ See List of Books cited, ante. 389 390 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Major Gould, and Mr. H. A. Tripp of the 10th Maine. From these sources of information, and from my recol- lection of what I saw, I have endeavored to make a plain, straightforward, unpretending statement of the pertinent facts, avoiding in the narrative expressions of opinion which might interfere with a clear and distinct presenta- tion of the facts. For the better understanding and appreciation of the battle, its causes and results, I have thought it best to begin with some account of the organization of the Army of Virginia, and of the movements that preceded and led to the first serious action in which any considerable part of that army was engaged. On the 26th of June, 1862, the President issued an order by which the forces under Fremont, Banks and McDowell, and the troops at Washington, were consoli- dated to form one army to be called the Army of Virginia, to the command of which was specially assigned Major-General John Pope. The troops of the Mountain Department under Fremont were to constitute the First Army Corps ; the troops of the Department of the Shenandoah under Banks, the Second Army Corps ; the troops of the Department of the Eappahannock, except those within the city of Washington, the Third Army Corps ; and the three corps were to be commanded re- spectively by Fremont, Banks and McDowell.^ Pope was junior in rank to every one of these three generals, of whom Fremont, unwilling to serve under his 1 15 W. R., 169 ; 18 W. R., 435. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 391 junior, was, at his own request,^ relieved from the com- mand : ^ he was replaced by Sigel.^ The order of the President was in the direction of a reversal of the policy previously pursued by the Govern- ment, of constituting commands independent of one another, which received orders only from the President or the War Department. Under that policy, McClellan had been relieved of all command except that of the Army and Department of the Potomac, and several departments entirely independent of his department, and of one another, had been constituted and had been placed under the command of several generals, who naturally were not always in harmony. The disadvantages of many separate commands, and the inability of the War Department to combine and direct their movements so as to secure united and effi- cient action, had been plainly shown by the events in the Shenandoah Valley in the latter part of May, 1862. Here Jackson had inflicted on Banks's small army heavy losses in men and materiel^ had caused great alarm at the North and to the authorities at Washing-ton, and had prevented the co-operation of McDowell with McClellan ; afterward, he had with little scathe escaped the forces of Fremont, Banks and McDowell, sent to intercept him, and had returned to the ^dcinity of Eichmond in time to take part in the battle of Gaines's Mill. Pope assumed command of the Army of Virginia on the 27th of June.'' He announced his headquarters as U8W. E., 437. nb., 444. 2 lb., 438. 4 lb., 436. 392 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. at "Washington, where he remained and whence he issued orders until the 29th of July. He was, he says in his report, to cover the city of Washington from any attacks from the direction of Rich- mond, to make dispositions necessary for the safety of the valley of the Shenandoah, and at the same time to operate upon the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville so as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Eichmond, and thus relieve the operations of the Army of the Potomac against that city.^ The assignment of Pope to his command was just at the beginning of the Seven Days' battles on the peninsula, which ended in the transfer of the Army of the Potomac from the Chickahominy to the James. This movement Pope had strongly opposed ; and he had urged upon the President that McClellan should be ordered not to move with his army farther south than the White House or York River. ^ However, soon after the movement was completed. Pope wrote to McClellan proposing to co- operate with him, but plainly indicated that his move- ments must be governed by the necessity of protecting Washington.^ Of this kind of co-operation McClellan had had experience, and his reply,* though courteous, was not satisfactory to Pope. According to the latter, it became apparent that, to secure harmonious and prompt co-operation between the two armies, some military supe- rior of both McClellan and himself should be placed in 1 16 W. E., 23. 2 lb., 21-22. 3 14 W. R., 295. 4 lb., 306. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUXTAIX. 893 command of all the operations in Virginia.^ In accord- ance with these views, Major-General Halleck was placed in general command. He was appointed General-in-Chief on the 11th of July: -but, having been detained by affairs at the West, did not assume command until the 23d.3 Here something seems to have made Pope dissatisfied : for he says that many circumstances induced him to ex- press to the President, to the Secretary of War, and to General Halleck, his desire to be relieved from the com- mand of the Army of Virginia, and to be returned to the TTestern country.^ His wishes were not complied with, and he says he took the field in Virginia with grave fore- bodings of the result, but with a determination to carry out the plans of the Government with all the energy and with all the ability of which he was master.^ Pope found his army disposed as follows : Fremont's corps was in the Shenandoah Valley on Cedar Creek, to the right of Banks"s corps, with detachments at other points : Banks's corps was guarding the Shenandoah from Strasburg Turnpike eastward to Front Royal : Eicketts's division of ]\IcDo well's corps was near Manas- sas, and King's division was at Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg : Cox's command was in the District of the Kanawha, the main body being at Flat-top Mountain ; Sturgis was at or near AVashington. According to Pope's ofiicial report, the strength of these component parts of his army was as follows : ^ 16 TT. R., 22. 3 ^T. R.. ^-b ' lb.. 22-23, 46. n^TV. R., 371. ^Ib.,22. 394 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Sigel's (formerly Fremont's) corps, 11,500; Banks's corps reported 14,500, but in reality only about 8,000; McDowell's corpa, 18,500; making of the three corps a total of 38,000. The cavalry numbered about 5,000 men for duty, " most of it badly mounted and armed, and in poor condition for service."^ The force under Sturgis at Washington numbered about 17,000 men, says Pope in his letter to McClellan, "mostly raw recruits and fragments of broken regiments, in no con- dition for ser^dce."^ The force in the District of the Kanawha was about 12,000 men. In the same letter Pope says that the troops of the First and Second Corps " are much demoralized and broken down, and unfit for active service for the present."^ He also says that McDowell's corps is the best, and in fact the only reliable portion of his command.^ Sigel, on assuming command of the First Corps, made a very unfavorable report of its condition.^ Having ascertained the strength, condition and posi- tion of the several parts of his command, and having at- tended to the re-organization of the divisions and of some of the brigades of the First Corps, and to furnishing his whole force with needed supplies. Pope began to concentrate his movable forces, and to establish them in the positions which he judged best for the purpose of effecting the objects set forth in his instructions. In the first week in July, Eicketts's division was ordered to Warrenton ; ^ Sigel's corps (temporarily under Schenck) 1 16 W. K., 20. 3 ib.^ 295. * lb., 20, 54. 2 14 W. R., 296. " lb., 296. « 18 W. R., 451. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUXTAIX. 395 was directed to proceed along the west side of the Blue Eida'e through Luray Valley to Sperryville ; ^ Banks's corps moved to a point near ^Varrenton.- All these movements were effected hy the 11th. But Banks having moved as he did under a mistake due to an error in a telegraphic despatch received by him on the 9th, again moved on the 16th, and on the 17th arrived at Little AVashington, a few miles from Sperryville. These movements brought the active army upon a line extend- ing from Luray Gap eastward through Spenyville and Little TTashinglon to Warrenton. King's division of McDowell's corps was left at Falmouth, " to cover the crossing of the Eappahannock at that point and to pro- tect the railroad thence to Acquia Creek and the public buildings that had been erected at the latter place." ^ Pope says that this wide separation of one di^-ision from the rest of the army was in compliance with the wish of the War Department, and gave him very serious uneasiness.^ The cavalry of Banks's corps under Hatch covered the front : the cavalry under Bayard was with ^McDowell. On the 12th Hatch was directed to take up his head- quarters at Culpeper, throwing out strong cavalry pickets for at least twenty miles in the direction of Gordonsville and Eichmond.^ On the llrtli he was ordered to seize Gordonsville, and if possible Charlottes- ville; he was promised promotion in case of success. He was to destroy the railroad east and west from Gor- ^ 18 TV. R.. 453. ni3 R.. 21. ns TT. R., 467. « lb., 450. ^Ib, 396 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. donsville ; and, if he met no considerable resistance, was to push a force to the James and destroy the canal. ^ On the 15th Bayard with his cavalry was ordered from Warrenton Junction to Culpeper to join Hatch. ^ On the 17th, Pope learned that instead of moving with cavalry only. Hatch had taken with him infantry, artil- lery and wagons ; and that in consequence of bad roads he had at that date advanced only as far as Madison Court-House.^ Meantime, on the 16th (the Confeder- ate accounts say the 19th), Ewell had reached Gordons- ville, and the proposed movement had become impracti- cable.* Hatch was then ordered to make another movement, one against the railroad west of Gordons- ville, by proceeding with a cavalry force from Madison Court-House round the west side of the Blue Eidge. In this also he failed, and after the two failures, was re- lieved from his command and replaced by Buford.^ About this time a cavalry expedition which King had been ordered to send afirainst the Yiro^inia Central Kail- road was reported successful.^ On the 21st Ricketts's division was ordered from War- renton to Waterloo Bridge, at the crossing of Hedge- man's River, on the road to Sperryville ; this brought him nearer to Banks. Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps was sent forward to Culpeper, where it arrived on the 24th. Kins^'s division was still at Falmouth. On the 29th, Pope left Washington and joined his army. He was not enthusiastically received. He had, 1 18 W. R., 473. 16 W. R., 24. ^ lb., 24, 514. Ub., 496. 2 lb., 474. "lb. nSW. R .,484, 485, 487, 490, 499. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 397 on the 14th of July, sent to his conmiancl the following communication : To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia : By special assignment of the President of the United States I have assumed the command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning yom- whereabouts, your condition, and yom' wants, in pre- jDaring you for active operations, and in placing you in jDositions from which you can act promptly and to the purpose. These labors are nearly completed, and I am about to join you in the field. Let us understand each other. I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies ; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found ; whose policy has been attack and not defence. In but one instance has the enemy been able to p)lace our AVestern armies in defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of "taking strong positions and holding them," of " lines of retreat," and of " bases of supplies." Let us discard such ideas. The sti'ongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of reti'eat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and gloiy are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on tliis understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed and that your names will be dear to your country- men forever.^ 1 18 K., i73-i74. 398 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. This communication gave great offence to his army, and was regarded as indicating on his part a lack of judgment and good sense. It was felt that neither in his career nor in the events of the war up to that time had there been anything to justify his taking such a tone. His insinuations against the courage of the Eastern armies doubtless had an effect on Banks at Cedar Mountain. Pope also spoke in conversation openly and freely in bitter censure of McClellan ; and this, while very pleasing to certain persons at Washington, was equally displeasing to many of Pope's command. More- over, a habit of open censure was thereby fostered, from which Pope himself suffered. His pretensions were greatly ridiculed in his army and elsewhere ; the newspapers especially made him an object of attack. The unfavorable impression upon his command made by General Pope at the beginning, only grew worse; so that, after the disasters of the last of August, when, according to an eye-witness, his wounded "laid upon the ground waiting for transportation to come, covered acres," the same witness adds, "How they cursed one man ! " Yet, notwithstanding ill-feeling and lack of confidence in Pope, there was on the part of his oflScers and men no want of determination to do their duty manfully, as their heavy losses in killed and wounded attest, and as the behavior of Banks's corps was so soon to demon- strate. Pope's orders holding citizens responsible for injuries done to tracks, lines or roads, and for attacks upon THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 399 trains or stragglers, by guerillas in their neighborhood; directing that disloyal male citizens should be arrested, and, in case of refusal to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, be conducted southward beyond our lines, and be treated as spies if they returned ; and prescribing other acts of severity greatly exasperated the Confederates, and rendered the contest more bitter, with little utility to the Union cause. ^ " It was determined before I left Washington to take the field in Virginia," says Pope, "that the union of the Armies of Virginia and of the Potomac was al:)so- lutely essential both to the safety of the national capital and to the further successful prosecution of the opera- tions against Eichmond.""^ This modified Pope's plans, in that his operations against the enemy's lines of com- munication to the west and north-west, thereby forcing him to make heavy detachments from his main force at Richmond, were thereafter to be with the object of enabling the Army of the Potomac to withdraw from Harrison's Landing on the James and take shipping for Acquia Creek or for Alexandria ; and further, in that if the enemy should, as was feared, throw his whole force in the direction of Washington, his advance was to be resisted at all hazards, his movements were to be embarrassed and delayed, so as to give all the time pos- sible for the arrival of the Army of the Potomac behind the Eappahannock.^ The order to withdraw from the James and transfer his troops to Acquia Creek ^ was received by McClellan 1 16 W. R., 51, 52. 2 lb., 23. 3 16 W. R., 23. * 12 W. R., 80-81. 400 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. only on the 4th of August.^ Lee's letters to Jackson show that, so long as McClellan remained on the James, Lee did not think it prudent to re-enforce Jackson heavily;^ however, on the 27th of July he sent him A. P. Hill's division.^ By the plan determined upon at Washington, the two Union armies were left widely separated, and were for a time to be even farther apart ; the enemy had the inte- rior line, and it was to be expected that Lee, as soon as he was satisfied of the withdrawal of McClellan, would not confine himself to making heavy detachments from his force at Richmond, as Pope seems to have imagined, but would throw nearly the whole of it upon Pope. However, Lee did not learn, for some days after the order was given, that the withdrawal of McClellan had begun ; and he did not commence his own movement against Pope until the 13th of August,^ but left to deal with the latter, Jackson re-enforced by Hill. Soon after Pope joined his army. Banks moved from Little Washington to Hazel River where it crosses the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper ; Ricketts moved to Culpeper. Thus, on the 7th of August the infantry and artillery, except King's division, were at points on the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper, a dis- tance of about twenty-two miles. They numbered according to Pope's report about 28,500 men ; ^ but the return of his army of July 31 shows a larger number.^ The cavalry on the 7th of August was 112W. E., 81. 3 lb., 919. 5 16W. R.,24. 8 18 W. R., 916-917. * lb., 928-929. ^ lb., 53. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 401 disposed as follows : Buford with five regiments was posted at Madison Court-House, having his pickets along the Eapidan from Barnett's Ford as far west as the Blue Eidge ; Bayard with four regiments was posted near Eapidan Station, ha\dng his pickets extending from Barnett's Ford eastward to Eaccoon Ford. As a support to Buford's cavalry, Sigel had been directed to send a brigade and a battery to Eobertson's Eiver, where it crosses the road from Sperryville to Madison Court- House ; as a support for Bayard's cavalry, Crawford's brigade with artillery was posted at Culpeper.^ The weather at this time was intensely hot ; owing to this, to imprudence in eating unripe fruit, and to neglect of sanitary precautions, many of the men were ill, and many died. I now turn to the movements of the enemy. Jack- son, after having escaped the forces sent to intercept him, encamped on the 12th of June near Weyer's Cave. Aided by a false movement of a part of Lee's forces, he sought, apparently with success, to give the Union com- manders the impression that a strong advance was to be made in the Shenandoah Valley. But, instead of mov- ing down the valley, he proceeded to Eichmond to take part in the attack on McClellan begun on the 26th of June. As I have stated, it was regarded by the Con- federate authorities, even after McClellan's withdrawal to the James, as necessary to retain at Eichmond a force sufficient to repulse any advance of his army. How- ever, it was known or believed that Pope was threaten- ing Gordonsville, and it was deemed important that he U6 W. R., 24. 402 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. should be checked. Therefore, on the 13th of July Jackson with his own division and that of Ewell was ordered to "proceed to Louisa Court-House, and if prac- ticable to Gordonsville, there to oppose the reported ad- vance of the enemy from the direction of Orange Court- House." ^ The two divisions moved as ordered, and on the 19th Ewell reached Gordonsville. Jackson, having received information that the Union forces greatly out- numbered his own, repeatedly asked Lee for re-enforce- ments ; Lee hesitated, but as above stated, sent him on the 27th, A. P. Hill's division.^ Early in August, Lee was informed by Colonel Mosby that Burnside was embarking troops at Fort Monroe, and that they were intended for the Kappahan- nock. This was promptly communicated to Jackson, who, learning that only a part of Pope's army was at Culpeper, determined to attack it before it should be re-enforced. Accordingly, the three divisions, Ewell's, Hill's and Jackson's moved on the 7th of August from their camps near Gordonsville, in the direction of Cul- peper.^ The divisions were to move in the order above given ; but Hill, mistaking Jackson's division for that of Ewell, which he was to follow, fell in rear of the former, and thus caused delay.'* On the morning of the 8th, the Confederate cavalry under Kobertson attacked and drove back the Union cavalry under Bayard, and Jackson continued his advance.^ The day was spent in skirmishing with the U8 W. R., 915. new. R., 182. ^ i^.^ i82. 2 lb., 919. 4 lb., 214-215. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN, 403 Union cavalry, which displayed such activity and enter- prise that Jackson, to guard the trains of his division, sent back Lawton's brigade, which was thus prevented from taking part in the battle of the next day.^ Jack- son had intended to arrive at Culpeper in the forenoon of the ninth, but his troops like those of Pope had greatly suffered from the oppressively hot weather, and his progress had been much slower than he had expected. I now return to the movements of Pope's army, which was left extending along the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper. On the 7th Pope was at Sperr}wille, where he inspected Sigel's corps, and remained until four o'clock in the afternoon. During the day he received reports that the enemy was crossing the Rapidan at sev- eral points between the railroad crossing and Liberty Mills. Pope returned to Culpeper, where he arrived on the mornins: of the 8th. Here were Crawford's brio;- ade of Banks's corps and Ricketts's division of McDow- ell's corps. During the morning, reports were received from Bayard, who was slowly falling back in the direc- tion of Culpeper, and from Buford, who reported the enemy advancing in force in the direction of Madison Court-House.^ From these reports it was uncertain in which direction the real movement of the enemy was being made ; yet Pope, in view of his instructions to keep interposed between the enemy and the lower Rap- pahannock, decided to concentrate at or near Culpeper. Shortly after noon on the 8th, he sent forward toward UGW. R., 182. 2 lb., 25. 404 POPE'S VIRGINIA CA3IPAIGN. Cedar Mountain, Crawford's brigade with artillery to support Bayard and assist him in determining the move- ments and the forces of the enemy. Orders were sent to Banks to move promptly to Culpeper, and to Sigel to march at once to the same place. Banks arrived at Culpeper at eleven o'clock that night ; but Sigel, at half- past six o'clock that afternoon, sent to ask Pope by what road he should march, although the only direct road was the turnpike.^ Consequently, he arrived at Culpeper only in the afternoon of the 9th. His troops were much fatigued, and, in spite of express orders to the contrary, had come unprovided with rations. ^ They required time to repose and to obtain rations. On the 8th also, Ricketts's division was sent to the junction of the road from Madison Court-House with the road from Cedar Mountain to Culpeper ; ^ Buford was di- rected to try to make a dash upon the flank and rear of the enemy and King's division was ordered to join Pope.^ King arrived only on the 11th ;^ he had left at Falmouth, Burnside with about 12,000 men."'' On the morning of the 9th, Banks was directed to move forward with his corps toward Cedar Mountain and join Crawford's brigade.^ The corps began its march at about ten o'clock, under a burning sun, over a road without shade or water, soon passed Ricketts's division reposing near the road, and at about noon, or soon after, arrived at the ground held by Crawford near Cedar Run. 1 16 AV. R., 25. 3 lb., 170. ^ lb. ' 18 W. R., 554. 2 lb., 26. 18 W. R., 548. « 16 W. R., 27. ^ iq R., 25. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUXTAIX. 405 There has been a controversy as to what Banks was ordered to do : he asserting that he was ordered to attack,^ and Pope denying that he gave an order to that effect.2 An order orally given to Banks, brought Ijy Colonel Lewis Marshall," of Pope's staff, was by Banks's direc- tion put in writing by Major L. H. Pelouze, of Banks's stalf, and according to Pelouze's retained copy was worded as follows : CuLPEPER, 9.45 A.M., Aug. 9, *62. From Col. Leicis 2Iarsho.ll : Genl. Banks to move to the front immediately, assume com- mand of all forces in the front, deplov his skirmishers if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediately as soon as he approaches, and be re- enforced from her e.^ I find no reason to doubt that the order sriven to Banks was so worded : in fact, Pope in one of his state- ments admits that he gave Banks substantially the same directions/ It is plain that Banks did his part to have the order coiTectly expressed in writing : and that, for any mi sunder standins" due to an error in the wording of the order, he was not responsiljle. The answer to the question whether Banks was ordered to do as he did, seems to turn upon the proper interpretation of the order as above expressed, and upon 1 3 C. TV.. 1665, •■ Zvliscellaneous," 46. 2 16 W. R.. 26; 3 C W.. 1865. •• ^liscellaneous," 47. ^ Louis H. ^rarshall. * cf. 3 C. TT.. 1S65, •■^liscellaneous," 45. * 16 W. R., 26. 406 POPE'S VIRGINIA campaign: whether such oral instructions as Pope says he gave Banks were really given. The order, while giving directions concerning the employment of skirmishers, — a matter that might well be left to the discretion of the commander of the corps, — is silent upon really important matters. If it was intended, as Pope alleges, that Banks should merely check the advance of the enemy so as to give time for the concentration of Pope's forces, nothing to that effect is found in the order ; moreover, the point where the concentration was to be made is not distinctly indicated. Pope's statements vary considerably, but he has asserted that he gave, in an interview at his head- quarters in Culpeper, oral instructions to Banks, ^ and that he sent him his chief of cavalry. General Robei-ts, with full and precise orders that Banks should take up a position near that held by Crawford's brigade, and if the enemy advanced upon him (Banks) he should push his skirmishers well to the front and attack the enemy with them.^ Roberts says that he understood Pope's object was to hold the enemy in check at Cedar Mountain, and not to attack until the other troops should arrive and join Banks ; ^ that at about three o'clock he expressed to Banks the opinion that Jackson had arrived and his forces were very large ; that Banks expressed a different opinion, saying he thought he should attack the batteries before night ; that he gave Banks his reasons for believ- ^ 15 W. E., 201 ; 16 W. R., 26 ; cf. 3 C. W., 1865, " Miscellaneous," 45. 2 16 W. R., 26 ; 3 C. W., 1865, " Miscellaneous," 46. 3 15 W. R., 184. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 407 ing such an attack would be dangerous, and stated his conviction that the batteries were supported by heayy masses of infantry massed in the wood, that Banks was of a different opinion, and thought he could carry the field ; that he (Eoberts) then (he thinks the despatch was dated at. about half-past four) sent word to Pope that a general battle would be fought before night, and urged that Eicketts's di^dsion should be at once sent to the field. In regard to all this, it is to be said that Pope's statements^ are unreliable, and that Roberts is not an unbiassed or an accurate witness ; moreover, there is incongruity between the statements made by the two, and the course taken by Eoberts. Pope says he sent Eoberts with full and precise orders as to what Banks was to do, and Eoberts says he understood Pope's object was to hold the enemy in check at Cedar Mountain, and not to attack until other troops should arrive and join Banks ; yet, according to Eoberts's first statement, the objections to the proposed attack which he made to Banks were based only on his belief that the enemy was in great force, not upon the ground that such an attack would be inconsistent with Pope's orders or with his object. However, in his testimony on the next day, Eoberts said : " I . . . showed General Banks the posi- tions where his own corps could take position to advan- tage and hold those positions, as I thought, if attacked. I then told him that General Pope wanted him to hold the enemy in check there until Sigel's forces could be ^ 15 TV. R., 185. 408 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. brought Up, which were expected that day, and all his other forces united to fight Jackson's forces." ^ Why was a matter so important omitted in Roberts's first statement ? Was Banks to hold the enemy in check until even King's division should arrive ? Roberts adds in the same para- graph, "I mean to be understood to say that it is my impression that General Banks fought that battle entirely upon his own responsibility and against the expectations of General Pope, and those expectations had been expressed to General Banks, as I have already stated, per- haps more strongly." ^ If Roberts distinctly recollected having said to Banks what he asserts that he said, why does he weaken the force of his statement by explaining it as his "impression"? Again, Roberts says that Pope authorized him to give any orders in Pope's name to any of the officers that might be in the field senior to him (Roberts).^ That Pope was empowered so to authorize Roberts, and thus virtually to place him in command over Banks, is, at least, very doubtful ; for it seems to have required a special law to empower even the President to place a junior in command over his senior. However, Roberts appears not to have doubted the validity of the authority given him, yet it was not used to prevent Banks from doing what Roberts understood to be not what Pope intended. U5 W. E., 186. "^Ih. 3 lb., 184 ; cf., 3 C W., 1865, " Miscellaneous," 48. This statement was modified the next day to : "I was authorized to give any orders, so far as to carry out General Pope's views as they had been expressed to me (General Roberts), in relation to holding the enemy there until his forces (General Pope's forces) could come up." 15 W. R., 185. TEE BATTLE OE CEDAR MOUyTAIX. 409 It is true that the order does not in terms direct sitck an attack as Banks made : and in anv case, some dis- cretion must be aUowed to tke comm.ander of an army corps acting at a distance from kis superior. Banks said to tke Committee on tke Conduct of tke ^Var. "'I ^as a little desperate, because I supposed General Pope tkougkt we did not want to figkt.'"' ^ Banks doubtless remembered tke language of Pope's address to kis army on tke 14tk of July. Besides, on tkat same date. Pope wi-ote to Banks, "I again beg of you to dismiss any idea tkat tkere is any purpose whatever to reti^eat from the positions which you are in- stinct ed to take up. or tkat tkere is any design wkatever to await any attack of tke enemy.'" - And Banks states tkat Eob^erts said to kim repeatedly on tke day of tke b>aule, "Tkere must be no backing out to-day." ^ In view of all tkis. it is ceitain tkat "taking a strong position and kolding it." "not "to seek tke adversary and beat kim wken foimd,"^ or "to await any attack of tke enemy." was not in accordance witk tke expressed views of General Pope ; and to kave any " backing out was regarded as especially objectionable. Union commanders kad often been accused of over- estimatino" tke numbers of tke enemy, and at Cedar ]\Iountain kis infantry force, mostly concealed in tke wood or by tke nature of tke groimd, could only be con- ^ 3 C. 1S65. "mscenaneoii5."46. - IS VT. E.. 472. 3.3 C. W.. 1S65. " AlisceEaneoiLS.'" i6. ' IS TV. E.. i7i. = lb. 410 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. jectured. Besides, Banks had received at about nine o'clock on tlie morning of tlie 9tli a despatcli from Buford stating that all his (Buford's) force was in re- treat toward Sperryville, that the enemy was in force on his right, left and rear, and that he might be cut off.^ The force of the enemy thus referred to, appears to have been cavalry. This despatch tended to mislead Banks as to the force in his front ; and, having been forwarded to Pope, was probably the cause of the retention of Ricketts's division at the junction of the road from Madi- son Court-House with the road from Culpeper to Cedar Mountain. As late as twenty-five minutes past two o'clock in the afternoon. Banks reported the enemy as showing ostentatiously a strong force of cavalry, no in- fantry seen and not much artillery.^ Going back to the movements on the 8th, Crawford marched soon after noon, with four regiments of infantry, Roemer's battery (L, 2d New York) of six three-inch rifled guns and two sections of Knap's battery (E, Penn- sylvania) of ten-pounder Parrotts. By four o'clock he came up with Bayard's cavalry near Cedar Run. Passing to the front, he saw the enemy's pickets, and beyond them on the road a portion of his cavalry. Crawford selected a position, drew up his infantry in the low ground of the run, concealed from the view of the enemy, and within close supporting distance from his artillery, which he posted on his right and left. The cavalry moved to the front, strong pickets were thrown out, and the command bivouacked for the night. ^ 1 16 W. R., 55. 2 nh., U9-150. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUXTAm. 411 In the morning of the 9th, the enemy established near the foot of Cedar Momitain, and to Crawford's left, a battery of three pieces, from T^'hich at eleven o'clock he opened fire, and soon afterward opened from another battery a short distance in the rear. This fire was sharply replied to by Knap's battery, and soon ceased. A little later Battery F, 4th U.S. Artillery, arrived and was placed on the right and left. There was for some time an occasional fire of artillery at long range. At about twelve o'clock, Gordon's brigade of ^Villiams's division came up ; and between one and two o'clock, Banks arrived with Augur's division, which took posi- tion on Crawford's left. Gordon moved to the right. ^ My remembrance of the topography of the l^attlefield is imperfect. I have not seen it since the time of the battle, and the maps which I have been able to consult are incomplete and do not agree : hence, my description must be defective. About six miles from Culpeper on the road to Orange Court-House there is for half a mile a gentle descent to the ground through which winds, with several branches, a small stream called Cedar Eun. For about four hundred yards from the beginning of the descent, the road is skirted on both sides by a wood, then passes through open ground, for about nine hundred yards, to a short distance beyond the junction of the road to ^Mitchell's Station. Here, on the right of the road, and on a ridge crossing it, a strip of wood of varying width, narrow on the road, soon becomes some three or four hundred yards 1 16 W. R., 150. 412 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. wide. On the hither side of this strip of wood is the low ground of the run (the latter being then nearly or quite dry) ; thence, northward, the ground rises consider- ably to a wood nearly parallel to the other, near the edge of which, and about twelve hundred yards to the right of the road from Culpeper, is a house (Mrs. Brown's). On the farther side of the strip of wood was a stubble field, of which the wheat had been reaped and left in stacks. This field, of irregular, four-sided outline, ex- tended about eight hundred yards to the right of the Culpeper road, was some six hundred yards across along the road, and about three hundred yards at the opposite end. Here it adjoined an old, worn-out field, nearly trapezoidal in shape, overgrown with bushes and briars ; alonof the line between the two fields ran a low ridj^e fringed with bushes. On the side next the Culpeper road, the wheatfield was open ; on both the hither and the farther side of the two fields, and along the end of the bushy field farthest from the road, extended a thick wood. On the left of the road, opposite the wheatfield, were cornfields with the corn still standing. The road, from a point not far from the crossing of the run, curves to the right, and leaves Cedar (Slaughter's, or Cedar Run) Mountain a considerable distance to the left, nearly due south from the crossing. From several hundred yards on the hither side of the run, the ground on our left of the road was open, undulating, dotted here and there with clumps of brushwood, crossed by several fences, and gradually rose for a mile or more from the run to TSE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 413 the base of the mountain, of which the sides were par- tially wooded. A little beyond the crossing, a road to the left leads to Mitchell's Station on the Orange and Alexandria Eailroad. About a mile and a half farther on the road from Culpeper to Orange Court-House, a road branches to the right and leads to Madison Court-House. There were also, running in various directions, several farm roads and dirt roads. Soon after his arrival on the field, Gordon suggested to Eoberts that the crest of the hill near Brown's house should be held, and said, Shall I take it? " — "Do so," replied Roberts, and the brigade moved at once to the designated place and took position -} the 27th Indiana on the right, having two companies out beyond and to the front of its right flank, both with skirmishers de- ployed; near these companies the 16th Indiana battery; the 2d Massachusetts and the Collis company of Zouaves (temporarily attached) a little in rear of Brown's house, with two companies at the house ; the 3d AVisconsin on the left ; Cothran's battery (M, 1st Xew York) in front and to the left of the house. Six companies of the 3d Wisconsin deployed as skirmishers were soon sent for- ward into the strip of wood in front. The line held by Gordon on the crest of the hill, extending to and across the road, appears to have been the line indicated by Eoberts to Banks as the strongest position for the whole command,^ from which, however, Banks moved forward. It seems that Banks did not 1 Gordon, Brook Earm, 282. 2 15 R., 186 ; 3 C. W., 1865, " Miscellaneous," 45. 414 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. know the position assigned to Gordon, but supposed him to be just this side of the strip of wood and to the right of Crawford,^ after the latter had moved forward into the wood, as will now be related. Soon after the arrival of Augur's division, Crawford's brigade, then posted across the road, was moved wholly, to the right of it. Some time afterward, the 5th Con- necticut, 28th New York and 46th Pennsylvania of this brigade were ordered into the strip of wood in front; they moved off with alacrity, and soon disappeared from view. Immediately after this, the 10th Maine of the same brigade was ordered forward to the hither side of the same strip of 'wood, its left resting near the road. The three other reo'iments had inclined to the risfht so that they were in front of Gordon's position, distant therefrom full 1,200 yards, and were also widely sepa- rated from the 10th Mame.^ Augur's division, which had taken position on the left of Crawford's brigade, was, after this brigade had gone to the right of the road, moved forward and formed in two lines, the right resting near the Culpeper road, the lines extending therefrom in a direction a little to the east of the mountain.^ Williams's line beino' in a direc- tion nearly east and west, the lines of the two divisions formed an obtuse angle, with the re-entering toward the enemy. Augur's brigades were in the following order from right to left : Geary's, Prince's, Greene's. Of ^ Gordon, Brook Farm, 286, note. 2 16 W. R., 150-151. 3 lb., 157-158. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUXTAIX. 415 Geary's brigade, the Ttli Ohio on the right and the 66th Ohio on the left formed the first line : the 29th Ohio on the right and the 5th Ohio on the left formed the second line. Of Prince's brigade, the 11th Pennsylvania on the right and the 3d ^Maryland on the left, formed the first line ; the 109th Pennsylvania on the right and the 102d Xe^v York on the left, the second line ; while the bat- talion of the 8th and the 12th U.S. Infantry mider Cap- tain Pitcher was detached, and l^y General Augar's order was deployed as skiiTnishers " to cover the front of the whole division, to advance continuously, discover the enemy's position, and annoy him as much as possi- ble."'" This was so well done as to excite the admiration of the enemy, some of whom asked a captured officer whether these skirmishers were not regulars, as they had never seen such skirmishing. These regulars were out during the whole liattle, penetrated to the enemy's posi- tion, and annoyed him so much as to cause him to turn artillery and waste canister upon them. Greene's small brigade was on the left of the whole line, somewhat re- fused, and supported ]\IcGilvery's battery.^ The artillery was in front, placed from right to left nearly as follows : The 16th Indiana battery on the right, near the two companies of the 27th Indiana : Cotliran's battery (M, 1st Xew York) near Brown's house ; Muh- lenberg with four guns of Best's battery (F, 4th U.S.) on our right of, and near, the Culpeper road : next, on our left of that road, four gims of Koemer's battery (L, 2d Xew York) ; then, on higher ground, four guns of 1 16 W^ E.. 157-158. 416 POPWS VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Knap's battery (E, Pennsylvania) ; next, two guns of Roemer's battery under Lieutenant Howard ; next, two guns of Best's battery under Lieutenant Harry Cushing ; next, two guns of Knap's battery under Lieutenant Geary ; next, six guns of Robinson's battery (4th Maine) ; next, on our extreme left, six guns of McGil- very's battery (Gth Maine) ; forty-two guns in all. The discrepancies in the different accounts of the position of the artillery are probably due to changes made in the position of portions of it during the action. According to Augur's official report, his total number of men in action was 3,013 : Geary's brigade and Knap's battery, 1,121 ; Prince's brigade and Robinson's battery, 1,435; Greene's brigade and McGilvery's battery, 457. There were absent detached, from Geary's brigade, the 28th Pennsylvania at Thoroughfare Mountain to protect the signal station ; from Greene's brigade, the 3d Dela- ware at Front Royal, the Purnell Legion Maryland Volunteers at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, the 60th New York at Warrenton Springs, leaving in this brigade only the 78th New York and a battalion of the 1st district besides the battery.^ Estimating the number of officers of infantry and artillery at 235, the total of officers and men in the division was 3,248. Williams's division had, in Crawford's brigade, 1,767 ^ officers and men; in Gordon's brigade, about 1,500;^ in the artillery, including batteries serving on the 9th in front of Augur's division, about 300 (estimated) ; total 3,567. Of Gordon's brigade, the 29th Pennsylvania ^ 16 W. R., 157. 2 lb., 153. 3 ib.^ 808. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 41T was, and had been for weeks, on detached semce. Some shigie companies were also detached. The cavahy was estimated at not more than 1,200. The grand total of Banks's forces present in action was about 8,000^ or, exclusive of cavalry, which took little part in the action, about 6,800. It will be noticed that the detachments were numer- ous and heavy ; and these, together with losses by sick- ness and straggling, both aggravated by the oppressive weather, will go far to account for the discrepancy be- tween the reported strength of the corps and its effective strenglh in action. Turning attention now to the Confederates, who were left just arriving at Cedar Mountain, Jackson's intention had been, as he states in a despatch dated the 9th, at Locust Dale, twelve miles from Culpeper, to be in Cul- peper before noon on that day. But Ewell's division marched only eight miles on the 8th, the weather being oppressively hot and several men having suffered from sunstroke. Hill's division made that day only two miles, and at night was only one mile north of Orange Court-House. ^Mien writing the despatch, Jackson did not expect a battle that day, and feared that in con- sequence of his tardy movements his expedition would be productive of little good.^ The cavalry of the Confederates had made their appear- ance on the 8th : but Jackson's leadins: division under Ewell arrived near the battlefield only at about one o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, and began to move ^16W. R.,2o. 2 ^181. 418 • POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. into position at about two o'clock.^ Early with his brigade of this division moved by the Culpeper road, and formed his line on his right of the road, just behind the crest of a hill some distance to the left of Mrs. Critten- den's house ; ^ while Ewell with the brigades of Hays and Trimble, on reaching the point where a road to Rapi- dan Station leaves the Culpeper road, turned off to his right, proceeded to the mountain and along its side, and at about three o'clock reached a position on the north- east slope, about two hundred feet above the valley below, where his forces were concealed from view. Hays's bri- gade (under Colonel Forno) was held in reserve ; neither of the two brigades was actively engaged, although both were under fire.^ Jackson's division (commanded by Winder) came near the battlefield at about three o'clock, and was an hour or more in getting into position.^ Campbell's brigade (under Lieutenant-Colonel Garnett) was placed with the 21st and the 48th Virginia facing Augur's front ;^ the 42d Virginia and the 1st Virginia (Irish) battalion at an angle with the two other regiments and facins: the wheatfield. The left of this bris^ade was soon strengthened by the 10th Virginia from Taliaferro's brigade, Jackson having directed Garnett to look well to his left flank and to call upon Taliaferro's brigade for re-enforcements.^ Taliaferro's brigade was placed be- tween that of Early on its right and that of Garnett on • Swell's Report. 16 W. R., 226-228. Early's Report. lb., 228-233. 3 16 W. R., 237. 4 lb., 182, 188, 192. s lb., 182, 200. « lb., 200. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 419 its left.i The Stonewall brii?acle under Colonel Ronald was placed in reserve, considerably in rear of Garnett, and formed in column of regiments. These resfiments were all from Virginia, and when later they moved for- ward in line of battle were in order from rioiit to left as follows : 27th, 33d, 5th, 2d, 4th.2 Lawton's brigade was far in the rear guarding trains and was not in action.'"^ The brigades of Hill's division marched in the follow- ing order from front to rear : Thomas's, Branch's, Archer's, Pender's, Stalford's, Field's.^ Thomas's bri- gade, as it came up, w^as ordered to support Early, and took position on the right of the latter.^ The brigades of Branch, Archer and Pender, arrived in time to take part in the struggle with Williams's division ; ^ those of Stafford and Field did not arrive until after the battle was ended."' The Confederate artillery was placed opposite to Augur's front, on a line concave toward the Union artillery, and on higher ground. The batteries of Poague, Carpenter and Caskie were in front of Talia- ferro and Garnett ; ^ those of Brown, Dement and D'Aquin, in front of Early ; ^ to them were added as they came up, Pegram's and Fleet's batteries from Hill's division ; Latimer's battery and a section of Johnson's ' 16 W. R., 182-183, 188. 2 lb., 183, 188, 191. 3 lb., 178, 182. *Ib., 215. » lb., 183, 215, 219, 231. 6 lb., 178, 183, 215, 218, 225. ' lb., 216, 217, 224. 8 lb., 183, 190, 192, 213. 9 lb., 182, 227. 10 lb., 184, 226. 420 POPE'S VIRGINIA 0A3IPAIGN. were on tlie Confederate right with the brigades of Trimble and Hays.^ The total number of pieces I do not know ; the number reported as belonging to Ewell's division was sixteen. The batteries seem to have been incomplete in number of pieces. I find no mention of any important part taken by the Confederate cavalry in the action, nor did I see anything of the kind. The positions of the two armies at about five o'clock in the afternoon, when infantry began to be seriously engaged, may be briefly summed up as follows : BANKS'S ARMY. Williams's division, on our right of Culpeper road; three regiments of Crawford's brigade and six companies of the 3d Wisconsin in the strip of wood on the hither side of the wheatfield, and not in sight of the enemy ; the 10th Maine near the Culpeper road, on this side of the strip of wood, and considerably separated from the rest of the brigade. Gordon's brigade (except the six companies of the 3d Wisconsin) on the crest of the hill near Brown's house, full twelve hundred yards in rear of Crawford.^ Augur's division, on our left of Culpeper road, the line forming an obtuse angle with Williams's line, the re-entering toward the enemy ; Geary's brigade on the right. Prince's next ; Greene's small brigade on the left somewhat refused, supporting McGilvery's battery. The division was in two lines, and extended from a point 1 16 W. R., 227. 2 lb., 146, 807-808. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 421 near the Culpeper road in a direction somewhat to the eastward of the mountain.^ The artillery, one battery on our right near the 27th Indiana, one near Brown's house, one near the 10th Maine, four along the front of Augur's division, mostly on a low ridge. The cavalry, the 1st Maine, Colonel Allen, on our extreme left : ^ the remainder mostly at the centre near the Culpeper road. JACKSOX'S AROT. E well's division, the brigades of Hays and Trimble on the extreme Confederate right ; next, at a consider- able distance to the left, leaving a gap soon partly filled by Thomas's brigade of Hill's division, Early's brigade.^ Jackson's di^dsion, Taliaferro's brigade on the left of Early; next, on Taliaferro's left, Campbell's brigade with two regiments in line with Taliaferro, and two regiments facing the wheatfield strengthened by an additional regiment from Taliaferro's brigade ; Eonald's Stonewall brigade in resen^e in the rear of Campbell's left. Thomas's, Taliaferro's, and part of Campbell's brigades, facing Prince and Greary.^ Hill's division, except Thomas's brigade already in line or about to enter, coming up on the Confederate left by the road from Orange Court-House to Cul- peper.^ The artillery, in line along the front, opposite to the 1 16 W. R., 157. ^ lb., 182-183, 188, 191, 200, 215, 219, 231. 2 lb., UO. ^Ib., 215. 3 lb., 182. 422 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Union artillery in front of Augur's division and the 10th Maine. Winder commanded Jackson's division, but was mortally wounded early in the action, as he was directing the movements of batteries in front of his command, and was succeeded in command by General Taliaferro.^ At about three o'clock, the fire of artillery began in earnest. From Brown's house, looking toward the left of the mountain, I could see some of our batteries, all actively engaged, changing position occasionally as the enemy appeared to get their range. I could also see a part of our infantry in two lines a short distance apart lying down on the lower ground in rear of our artillery. From where I stood, none of the enemy's infantry was then in sight, and of his batteries only the one on his extreme right was visible, from which some shots struck near Cothran's battery. I thought we had the greater number of pieces and the better service ; but the enemy replied vigorously, and some of his pieces had a heavier sound as if of larger calibre. The fire of artillery continued two hours or more. I cannot recall having heard in all that time any fire of musketry; there may have been, as the reports state, some skirmishing,^ but I certainly heard nothing to indicate that infantry was seriously engaged. Near me and in Gordon's front, all was quiet except Cothran's battery. About five o'clock Banks ordered our artillery to cease firing, in order that the infantry might advance ; ' 16 W. R., 178, 183, 206. ' lb., 158. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 423 but it was soon found that the enemy's infantry also was advancing, that the ground was such as to permit firing over the heads of our men without endangering them, and the cannonade was renewed and continued until the close of the action. I recollect that the fire of artillery ceased or at least slackened at about five o'clock. Evening was approaching, and I began to think the rest of the battle would be deferred until the next day. Nothing was yet heard from Crawford ; there was no movement on the part of Gordon. It seems that Banks was still quite unaware of the strength of the enemy. In a despatch to Pope dated at fifty minutes past four o'clock, he reported that one regi- ment of rebel infantry deployed as skirmishers was ad- vancing, and that he had ordered " a regiment from the right, Williams's division, and one from the left [Augur's] ; Augur to advance on the left and in front." He added, " 5 P.M. They are now approaching each other." ^ To what movement this despatch referred, I am unable to say. However, shortly after five o'clock, Geary's brigade was ordered forward to support the skirmishers of the U.S. Infantry, who were falling back before the advancing enemy, and was soon hotly engaged.^ Prince's brigade also advanced and took part in the combat.^ Suddenly, at about forty minutes after five o'clock, there burst forth in the direction of the w^heatfield the heaviest and most continuous sound of musketry that I ever heard. It was not preceded by scattering shots, » 16 W. E., 55. 2xb., 160. ^ n^,^ iq^^ 424 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. but at once became a steady roar. What was there takmg place was out of sight from Grordon's po- sition. It will be remembered that Crawford with three reo-i- ments of his brigade had some time before been ordered into the strip of wood on our side of the wheatfield. Colonel Euger with his six companies of the 3d Wis- consin deployed as skirmishers had been sent into the same wood, had swept through it on Crawford's right ; but, not having crossed the field beyond the wood, had not encountered the enemy. Some time after five o'clock Crawford was ordered to advance against the left flank of the enemy, and was informed that the move- ment would be supported by Gordon's brigade.^ He ordered Euger with his six companies to join him, but Euger objecting to obey without an order from his own superior, such an order was obtained from Banks. ^ The advance was hastened in consequence of urgent directions from Banks ; and without waiting to see that Euger's command was properly joined to his own, or to see whether Gordon's brigade was in a position promptly to support him, Crawford formed his regiments in line (the order from right to left being, 46th Pennsylvania, 28th New York, 5th Connecticut) , gave the order to advance to the edge of the wood, to fix bayonets, and to charge upon the enemy's position.^ This was at about forty minutes after five o'clock. I do not find that Crawford himself advanced into the wheatfield, or that he gave any directions to his command after the order to ad- ^ 16 W. E., 151. 2 s lb. 4 lb. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 425 vance ; the leader in the combat was Colonel Donnelly of the 28th New York. The three regiments, numbering 1,306 officers and men, moved to the edge of the wood, passed over a fence near it, with a cheer rushed across the field, passed over another fence on the farther side of it, and fell upon the Confederates, who, being engaged with Geary, seem to have been surprised by this sudden attack from an unex- pected direction. I have not space to give in detail all that was so gallantly done by the three regiments. Under a heavy fire from the moment they entered the wheatfield, they unshrinkingly pressed forward, crossed the field, drove back in great disorder Campbell's brigade under Grarnett,^ of which the 1st Virginia (Irish) bat- talion could not be rallied, and of which the 21st Vir- ginia engaged in front with Geary suddenly received a fire in the rear and fell back in disorder,^ as did also the 48th Virginia taken in rear and almost surrounded,^ By this time all regular order in the three regiments was lost ; but they pushed on and poured a fire into the rear of Taliaferro's brigade, causing it, as well as the left of Early's brigade, to fall back.^ The artillery of Jackson's division became exposed in the rear and was withdrawn.^ While the men were still firing upon the disordered brig- ade of Taliaferro, the Stonewall brigade under Konald was seen advancing in line of battle. Leaving Taliafer- ro's men, the now scattered groups turned upon these fresh enemies, threw the right regiment into disorder, 1 16 W. R., 183, 200-201. ^ i^., £01, 204. ^ i^. 2 lb., 202. 4 ^183. 426 ■ POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, and checked the next regiment. The Confederate Gen- eral Branch says in his journal, "I had not gone one hundred yards through the woods before we met the celebrated Stonewall brigade, utterly routed and fleeing as fast as they could run." ^ This seems to be an ex- aggeration ; for according to other accounts only a part of the Stonewall brigade was thrown into dis- order. Turning our attention for a moment to the six com- panies of the 3d Wisconsin, Ruger obeyed the order given him, assembled his skirmishers, formed the bat- talion in the edge of the wood on Crawford's right, and found himself opposite to the old bushy field, with a considerable gap between his battalion and the right of the three regiments. Owing to the ridge between the two fields, to the bushes and the stacks of wheat, the right of the three regiments was not in sight of the bat- talion. Climbing over the fence near the edge of the wood, it advanced into the bushy field. Its movement, on account of the rough and broken ground over which it had advanced, had been slower than that of the three regiments, and it came into action somewhat later. As it entered the field, the battalion became fully exposed and speedily found itself confronted by the Stonewall brigade, which had been thrown forward as soon as the three regiments struck Campbell's brigade. Imme- diately the battalion was receiving the fire of the three regiments of the left of the Stonewall brigade ; the 2d new. E., 223. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 427 Virginia in front, the 4th Virginia on its left, and the 5th Virginia on its right ; the line of the three regiments being somewhat concave toward the battalion. To re- main under such a fire was annihilation, and the com- mand fell back to the wood in some disorder, having lost in about two minutes 80 out of 267 in action. The lieutenant-colonel was killed, the major badly wounded, two captains were wounded. Accounts differ as to whether Euger ordered his command to fall back ; how- ever, in any case the intimations from the enemy were not such as to be disregarded. The 5th Virginia, after having fired upon Kuger's command, wheeled to its right and helped to close round Crawford's broken regiments ; but there is significance in the fact that Ronald found it prudent to recall the 5th Virginia back into the wood. Crawford's three regiments had sustained great losses, had become exhausted by their extraordinary efforts, were assailed by parts of broken regiments rallied by the personal exertions of Jackson himself, by the un- broken regiments of the Stonewall brigade, and by the fresh brigade of Branch which had just come up. The remnants of the three regiments fell back under a hot fire to the wood whence they had started. Their loss had been 29 officers and 296 men killed and wounded, 19 officers and 350 men captured ; a total of 694 out of 1,306 in action. Their brave leader. Colonel Donnelly, was mortally wounded; in fact, nearly all their field officers were killed or wounded.^ U6 W. R., 137, 151, 152-153. 428 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, The 10th Maine of Crawford's brigade we left in rear of the strip of wood and near the Culpeper road, sup- porting Muhlenberg's battery. There was no occasion for active support from infantry ; but the battery received from Latimer's battery, aided by guns in front of Early, more compliments than it could well return. On a hill near the battery General Banks was seen calmly watch- ing the combat, undisturbed by the shots that fell about him. Some time after Crawford's advance, the 10th Maine was ordered to move forward through the wood and attack the enemy. The order was promptly obeyed, and at the farther edge of the wood the regiment got its first view of the scene of actual combat. In front was the wheatfield, there about six hundred yards across. For about five hundred yards the ground descended with some undulation to a marshy run; thence rose to the opposite wood at the edge of which was a rail fence. Some two hundred and fifty yards to the left 'was the Culpeper road, and on the left of it Greary's troops were seen hotly engaged. The edge of the opposite wood was alive with men. From it were coming out remnants of the three regiments, which passed diagonally across the field toward the right. As the 10th Maine appeared in the wheatfield, it came under a heavy fire which became murderous when the regiment reached the summit of a low ridge. Colonel Beal, seeing that his men having no shelter were suffering severely and use- lessly, began to move the regiment back to the shelter of the wood he had left, when Major Pelouze of Banks's staff came up, forbade the movement, and gave Banks's THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 429 order to advance. An altercation between the major and Colonel Beal ensued, which ended in the colonel's halting the regiment behind a low ridge, ordering the men to Ke down and fire. It was a little after six o'clock when this fire was opened, the men taking advan- tage of such slight shelter as was at hand. A]30ut this time the skirmishers of the 2d Massachusetts were seen entering the wheatfield at some distance to the right : the rest of Grordon's brigade was not in sight. Under the fire of a greatly superior force, the regiment suffered so much that the colonel ordered a retreat.^ The loss was 173 out of 461 present. At about this time a charge across the wheatfield was made by two squadrons (less than 200 strong) of the 1st Pennsylvania reserve cavalry under IMajor Falls, with the object of favoring the withdrawal of a battery left without support. The charge was gallantly made, but was speedily repulsed by the fire of the enemy. It is time to relate what took place in front of Augnir's division. That Jackson did not attack seems to have encouraged Banks in attacking. Some time after five o'clock, Geary's brigade was ordered forward to support the skirmishers, who were fallino' back under a o-allino- fire. They had been near capturing in front of Early's left several pieces of artillery, which had, without see- ing the skirmishers, dashed forward to within short range of the cornfield in which they were. The pieces were saved only by a prompt and rapid advance of Early's brigade. Geary's first line (7th and 66th Ohio) 1 Gould. 173-178. 430 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN-. advanced, and under a destructive fire did not give way. However, Geary, seeing the need of aid, ordered for- ward the second line, the 29th Ohio, to the support of the 7th, the 5th to the left of the 66th. But after a most brave and determined but ineffectual stmo:£:le with the superior force of the enemy (Taliaferro^s brigade and parts of Early's and Campbell's), the brigade retreated.^ Its loss was 464 (mostly killed or wounded) out of about 1,160 engaged, including officers. The 5th Ohio lost 122 out of about 275, and the 7th lost 182 out of 307.^ Prince, seeing Geary's forward movement, began a cautious advance of his first line (111th Pennsylvania and 3d Maryland) . He soon received an order to go forward, and advanced across a ridge, a ditch, several fences, and a road, into a field of very high corn. In this movement, the obstacles being more in the way of the 3d Maryland, it fell somewhat in the rear of the lllth*Pennsylvania ; and in the cornfield where the two regiments could not see each other, the 111th Pennsyl- vania came to lap over the 3d Maryland. When the line reached the outer edge of the cornfield, the fire of the enemy converged from full thirty degrees to Prince's left. While the first line was movins: throuorh the corn- field. Prince received an order to move forward his whole force. He brought up the second line (109th Pennsylvania and 102d New York), and formed it en Echelon about 100 paces to the left and rear of the first line. The direction of the fire of the second line was carefully indicated so as to avoid firing into the 3d 1 16 W. R., 160-165- 2 lb., 137, TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR JIOUXTAIX. ^Maryland. But at the first volley this regiment thought it Tvas receiving a fii'e from the rear, and fell back in dis- order, folloved by the 111th Pennsylvania. Both regi- ments, however, were rallied in the road that had been crossed in the advance, and later did good seiwice. The second line steadily held its ground. The ti'oops op- posed to this brigade were Thomas's brigade and part of Earlrs.i Prince, on going toward his right, perceived that the firing in Geary's brigade on his right had ceased. Xo staff officer or mounted person was near him, and he pro- ceeded toward division headquarters to ascertain the state of affairs on his right. At this time Augur and Geary had both been wounded, and Prince was, without knowing the fact, left in command of the division. AThile walking his horse in the cornfield, his bridle was seized and he found himself a prisoner. His second line had been turned by troops that were noiselessly occupying the cornfield, where, however, they were for a time held in check by the fii'st line rallied in the road. But soon, the first line having withdrawn to cover aitillery also withdrawn, the second line found itself turned on its right, and retired along our left of the field.- The loss in the brigade was 152 out of about 1,500 officers and men engaged.^ I have seen no report of the part taken by Greene's fragment of a brigade. It seems to have supported a battery near it, and to have assisted in holding in check the right of the enemy. It retired when the troops on U6 W. E., 16S-169. "lb. ^ ji^^, 137^ 432 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. its right fell back. The loss was 26 out of about 475 officers and men.^ Allen's cavalry (1st Maine) was employed in watching the enemy on our extreme left. The fire of the Con- federate artillery obliged him more than once to change position. In the evening, having had a slight afiair with the Confederate cavalry, and a battery at point- blank range having opened fire upon him, he withdrew to the cover of the woods in the rear.^ Ewell's two brigades opposite to our left seem to have remained inactive until the close of the action. A mill- pond in front was in the way of their movements, and the only other ground over which they could advance was swept by the fire of Latimer's battery.^ The only movement remaining to be described is that of Grordon's brigade, which, it will be remembered, had been posted near Brown's house. Attempts have been made to throw upon Gordon the blame of Crawford's not having received timely support : a few words on this point. When Crawford's three regiments moved forward to attack, Gordon's brigade was at least twelve hundred yards in rear of them, and Gordon did not receive the order to advance until after the three regiments had been for some time engaged; they were not engaged more than thirty minutes. Under these circumstances timely support was impossible. Williams says in his report, " General Gordon put his brigade in movement at double-quick as soon as the order was communis 1 16 W. R., 138. 2 ib,^ 140. 3 lb., 227. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR 3I0rXTAIX. 433 cated.'"' ^ In vain : his brigade could not have arrived in time if it could have flown. To have given timely and efficient suppoii:. Gordon's brigade should have been placed not more than one himdred and fifty yards in rear or to the right of Crawford's command, and should have advanced at the same time. The relative positions to be occupied by the brigades of a division are determined, not by the commander of a brigade, but by the com- mander of the division, or by higher authority. If, then, G-ordon's brigade was not in proper position with respect to Crawford's command, the fault was not Gordon's. According to T\^illiams's report, Gordon's brigade (ex- cept the six companies) "was held in the oiiginal position to observe the right flank, and especially some woods half a mile or so on the right (which^ it was thought was a cover for rebel cavalry), as well as to be in readiness to re-enforce Crawford's brigade in case of necessity."- AVhether Gordon's small brigade could have changed the fortune of the day is very doubtful : but if it was intended that Gordon should support Craw- ford's attack, he certainly ought to have been ordered forward much earlier. That there might be no delay, a signal to advance had been arranged ^vith Gordon by TTilliams, the two being in plain sight of each other : but it was not used, nor could its use have remedied what was amiss. At last, about six o'clock, a messenger brought an order from Banks to send the 2d Massachusetts " down the pike *' to him. The regiment immediately moved 1 16 ^. Pv.. U7. 2 Ri.. U6. 434 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. forward, but had gone only a short distance, when an aide of General Williams brought an order to Grordon to move his whole command to the support of Crawford. The direction of the 2d Massachusetts was changed toward the right, and the command moved forward at double-quick, the 27th Indiana on the right, the remain- ing companies of the 3d Wisconsin next, the 2d Massa- chusetts considerably to the left, owing to its first direction. As we approached the wood, the scattered men of Crawford's regiments were coming out of it without any order, mostly opposite to the two regiments, whose movements were thereby somewhat hindered. Some of the men of the six companies of the 3d Wiscon- sin were here rallied, joined the fresh companies of the regiment, and went into action the second time that after- noon. Just as I was entering the wood, I met Major Perkins, chief of Banks's staff, coming out of it, and asked him for some information as to what was in the wood, and where. " Oh ! the enemy is there ; go in and you will find him," was the reply. Thinking I might find him too suddenly, I caused Company A to be deployed as skirmishers, and precede the rest of the regiment. However, the enemy was not in that wood, if he had been there at all. It was after sunset, and the obscurity of evening was gathering in the wheatfield, when the regiment reached the edge of the wood on this side of the field. Of Crawford's three regiments, nothing whatever was to be seen. The enemy was concealed by the opposite wood, and his presence was shown only by the incessant flashes THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 435 of his fire of musketry. There was nothing left to sup- port. Xo attack on my part seemed practicable ; I thought firing at a concealed enemy at a distance of four or five hundred yards worse than useless, and I ordered the men to lie down behind the low wall crowned by a fence which ran along the edge of the wood. The skirmishers, however, had advanced quite far into the field, and were firing lying down. They had run into Confederate skirmishers, with whom they had some close encounters. Soon afcer the regiment came into this position. Major Perkins rode up and gave me an order from General Banks to charge across the field. In utter astonishment I exclaimed, Why, it will be the destruction of the regiment and will do no good." The major shrugged his shoulders with a deprecating look and made no reply. To charge with a single unsuppoi'ted regiment across an open field in face of the long line of the enemy extending far to right and left ! A very similar blundering order' was, on the field of Gettysburg, carried to the gallant Mudge then in command of the regiment, and under the circumstances he obeyed ; we know with what result. If I had obeyed the order given to me at Cedar Mountain, nothing useful would have been accomplished, and I doubt whether the regiment as such would have appeared at Gettysburg. Determined to avoid such wanton destruction if I could, I sought and found Gordon, and informed him that I had received such an order. " I know you have," he replied, " what do you think of it? " I told him what I thought of it ; he agreed with me and 436 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. said, "You need not do it." Gordon is mistaken in saying that I could not have made the movement with- out his order ; ^ but his taking the responsibility of directing the order given to be disobeyed, was, under the circumstances, wise and commendable. He himself, while having enough to do to hold his position, had brought to him by an officer the message, " General Banks wishes you to charge across the field." — "What field ? " — "I do not know ; I suppose this field." Gordon sent the messenger back for explicit instructions ; but before the latter had had time to return, the enemy had effectually countermanded the order. It was afterward stated to me by Major Perkins, that the order given me was given by mistake, under the impression that I had gone, as at first directed, " down the pike " to General Banks. It was denied that the order brought to Gordon was sent him.^ Soon after I received the order brought by Major Perkins, Gordon rode up to me and asked why I was not firing, I replied, " I don't see anything to fire at." He then directed me to move to the right and join the rest of the brigade ; this was immediately done.^ The two other regiments, which we left just entering the wood, had advanced to the edge of it next the wheat- field. Owing to the nature of the ground, the 27th Indiana had had some difficulty in getting into position, so that its right wing came into action before the left wing got into line. As soon as they appeared in sight of the enemy, both regiments were under a heavy fire, ' Gordon, Brook Farm, 317. ^ ^^.^ 3 ^f. ib., 305-306. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUXTAIX. 437 the 27tli Indiana being so placed as to receive both a direct and a slant fire. A report that we were filing on our own men caused the fii'e of a portion of the 27th temporarily to cease ; but Gordon riding forward in the direction of the supposed friends, drew such a fire as removed all doubt as to their real character. The fire of the enemy became heavier, the crash of musketry was continuous. Soon, in spite of ail that Colonel Colgrove could do, the regiment gave way and fell back to the rear of the wood. Here it was rallied and ao'ain moved foi'ward to the field. But it had fired only one or two rounds when the enemy was discovered advancing against its right ; Pender's brigade was on its flank. Colonel ColgTOve attempted to change front to meet this new attack ; but it was too late, no skirmishers were out on the right, and the advancing enemy had not been dis- covered in time.^ This, however, considering the over- whelming force of the enemy, doubtless made no difference in the result. The regiment again fell back to the rear of the wood, whence it retreated to its original position. TTith it fell back the 3d Wisconsin, which, however, rallied in the wood and attempted to make a stand, but was soon forced to continue its retreat. Owing to the thick wood and underbrash, all this had been out of sight from the 2d Massachusetts, and no notice reached me that the two regiments had fallen back and that mv rio-ht flank was left uncovered. The loss of the 27th Indiana was officially reported as 50 ; that of the od TVisconsin, including the loss in the bushy field, as 1 16 W. R., 156. 438 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. 108.^ However, I think these losses are somewhat understated. Of Williams's division, and perhaps of Banks's whole corps, the 2d Massachusetts was now the only regiment left holding its ground. Soon after the regiment moved to the right and joined the rest of the brigade, the enemy's line appeared coming up from a hollow and advancing obliquely, his left inclined toward my right. The fire of the regiment was immediately opened, and was so effectual as to stop for a time the advance in front. The force opposed was Archer's brigade, and it was here that he was, as he says in his report, " exposed to a heavy fire,"^ losing in killed and wounded 135. The contest with the enemy in front had continued but a few minutes when suddenly there came from my right and right front a withering fire, before which Captain Goodwin of the right company and (it seemed to me) half his men went down. Some men on the right fell back. I was then a few paces directly in rear of the company, and impulsively started forward to restore the line, when my horse re- ceived two bullet wounds, which sent him plunging about amidst the trees and underbrush. I soon quieted him, and turning again toward the regiment, saw at once that the enemy was on its right flank, and the sooner we departed from that place the better. I accordingly ordered the companies to fall back. The order was immediately obeyed by the companies on the right that could hear it in the uproar ; but riding toward the left, I found companies steadily holding their positions, wait- 1 16 W. R., 137. 2 lb., 219. TEE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 439 ing to be sure that the order to retreat had been given. I particularly remember Captain Charles F. Morse com- ing back to me from where his company still stood in line, and asking whether I had ordered a retreat. The order finally reached the left, and the companies fell back to the original position, where the regiment was re-formed. The loss was 173 out of 497 engaged; out of twenty-two officers, only eight came back unhurt. The major was mortally wounded, four captains were killed, another captain was wounded and taken prisoner, still another captain, H. S. Eussell (now General), was taken prisoner while binding up the wounds of Major Savage.^ The Collis Company of Zouaves on the left of the regiment did its duty honorably and creditably. Its loss was thirteen including its commander. Lieutenant Heimack, taken prisoner.^ The pursuit by the enemy was very feeble. Gordon's position near Brown's house was not attacked or even ap- proached. On our left of the Culpeper road, the brigades of Stafford and Field of Hill's division advanced as far as through the wood opposite to Brown's house. Here Pegram's battery was placed and opened fire on Eick- etts's division then coming up, but was soon silenced with heavy loss by Hall's (2d Maine) and Thompson's (2d Maryland) batteries. Eicketts's division arrived at about seven o'clock, and took position on our right of the road, one brigade relieving at Brown's house Gor- don's brigade, which was sent to the rear. There was 1 cf. Gordon Brook Earm, 312. ^ ^37^ 440 POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. some exchange of musketry with the enemy in the wood on our left of the road, and it was nearly midnight be- fore all was quiet. General Pope arrived at' about the same time as Kicketts's division. Sigel's corps came up considerably later. The battle was over. The next morning the enemy withdrew from his advanced position on our left (his right) to nearly his original position of five o'clock P.M. on the 9th. The two armies remained in presence of each other — both leaders ready to receive but not to make an attack — until the night of the 11th, when Jackson, who had learned that Pope had received or was to receive re-enforcements, retreated to the vicinity of Gordonsville. A few days afterward, Pope retired across the Eappahannock. Though General Pope did not approve of Banks's attack, he spoke in the highest terms of Banks's intrepid- ity and coolness during the engagement, and expressed himself as " delighted and astonished at the gallant and intrepid conduct " of his corps. A Southern writer asserts that the action was brought on by General EaHy in obedience to an order from General Jackson. But whatever may be said, or may seem to be, in favor of this view, the fact is that at Cedar Mountain he who was aggressive, who persistently attacked, who " forced the fighting," was no other than General Banks. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTARY SOUECES OF DATA FOR THE HIS- TORY OF THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. The Reports of the Union and Confederate officers engaged in this battle are to be found ia the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol- ume XH., Part n., i. e., 16 W. R. ; and their Correspondence in the same, Part m., {. e., 18 W. R. Banks. — General Banks appears never to have made a report of this battle. His only official statement concerning' the event was volunteered on the con- clusion of his testimony on the Red River Expedition of 1863, to the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, December 14, 1864. This statement was not printed with the papers of the Red River investigation, but with a series of " Miscellaneous " papers of the Reports of that Commit- tee, in Volume 3 of the Second Series of Reports, see List of Books cited, ante, xx. References to this statement are made in this volume to 3 C. W., 1865, "MisceUaneous," 44-46. His correspondence with Pope and other officers, of that period, will be found in 16 and IS W. R. Makshali., Louis H. , Colonel, U. S. V. The order from Pope of August 9 1862, alleged by Banks to have been communicated verbally by Colonel Lewis [sic] Marshall, and to have been taken down by Colonel Pelouze in his pre- sence and approved as correct by him, is printed with Banks's testimony on, page 45 of 3 C. W., 1865, " LliseeUaneous." Marshall's letter containing a statement from memory of the order sent by him from Pope to Banks, AugTist 9, 1862, and his understanding of its inten- tion, is printed with Pope's Letter to Wade of January 12, 1865, in the same volume, i. e., 3 C. W., 1865, " Miscellaneous," page 54. Pope. — Major-General John Pope, U. S. V., was appointed to command the Army of Virginia, June 26, 1862, [15 W. R., 169 ; 18 W. R., 435 ;] and assumed command, June 27, [18 W. R., 436.] He appeared before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Jidy 8, 1862, and stated his plans of campaign, [1 C. W., 276-282.] His Report concerning the Virginia Campaign, accompanied by his official Correspondence, forms Part III. of his general report addressed to B. F. Wade, Chairman of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, and was first piiblished in 1866, in the second volume of a document of the 1st Session, 39th Congress. " Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the War, in two volumes. Supplemental to Senate Report, No. 142, 38th Congress, 2d Session. The general report is comprised in pages 3-217, covering a period of May 17, 1861, to November 15, 1865. The part relative to the Virginia Campaign 442 BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN of 1862, is comprised in pages 104-190, (cited as C. W., 2 Supp't). This spe- cial part has been largely reprinted in 16 W. R., 20-87 ; some preliminary and concluding statements have been omitted and the correspondence printed dis- tinctively. Other correspondence of the period between him and the Government, and the officers of the Army of Virginia, is printed in 16^and 18 W. R. General Pope's testimony before the McDowell Court of Inquiry, held at Washington, Nov. 17, 1862-Feb. 23, 1863, is printed in 15 W. R., 200-207. The statements particularly relative to Cedar Mountain on pages 200-202. His testimony before the Military Commission convened as a general Court- martial for the trial of Fitz-John Porter is printed with the Record of that trial, in 17 W. R., 829-860, 1045-1046. This testimony does not relate to Cedar Mountain or to a period prior to August 27, 1862. His Letter of January 12, 1865, to B. F. Wade, Chairman of the Joint Com- mittee on the Conduct of the War, with accompanying papers and testimony concerning the battle of Cedar Mountain, August 9, 1862, is printed in Part 3 of the Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, submit- ted at the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Senate Report, No. 142, 1865, in section " Miscellaneous," pages 47-53, (cited as 3 C. W., 1865, "Mis- cellaneous." This letter was intended as a rebuttal of the statements made by General Banks in his volunteered testimony before that Committee, on his action at Cedar Mountain. RoBEKTS. — Brigadier-General Benjamin S. Roberts, M. S. V., gave his testi- mony concerning Cedar Mountain at the McDowell Court of Inquiry. This is printed in 15 W. R., 184-190 ; also, with Pope's Letter to Wade of Jan° uary 12, 1865, in 3 C. W., 1865, " MisceUaneous," 51-53. INDEX. Abbott, E. G., Capt., 2d Mass., at bat- tle of Cedar MountaiB, 17. Acqnia Creek, Ya.. tlie railroad from Fredericksburg to, g-narded by King-, Jtdy, 1862, 41, 895; tbis provision criticized, 41 ; tbe transfer to, of the Army of tbe Potomac from tbe Peninsula, ordered Aug. 4, 1862, 7, 399 ; unnecessary delay of transfer, 27; expectation of Government as to time required for tbe transfer, 57; McClellan urged to basten re- enforcements to, Aug. 9, 320 ; bis opinion tbat troops at Harrison's Landing would be more useful tban at, ib. ; bis belief tbat communica- tion to tbe Eappabannock from, sborter tban from Alexandria, 112 note ; Kearny's strengtb at, Aug. 21, 204 ; Porter's transfer from Harri- son's Landing to, 223 ; McClellan ar- rived at, Aug. 24, 272, 289 ; ordered to Alexandria from, 111, 272, 283 ; engaged, Aug. 26, in superintending debarkation of army at, 111 ; bis posi- tion at, 270 et seq. ; Burnside in cbarge of forwarding troops from, after Aug. 26, 271, 272 ; McClellan's proposi- tion, Aug. 27, to send gunboats to, 117 ; also that Burnside sbould evac- uate, 118; part of Sumner's corps landed at, Aug. 26, 112, 289, 299, 333 ; bis movement to Alexandria from, 276 ; mentioned, 274, 298. Alabama Yolimteers, C. S. A., 5tb bat- talion in Arcber's brigade. A. P. Hill's division, Jackson's corps, at battle of CbantiUy, Sept. I,"'l862, • 155 ; 47tb and 48tb reg-ts. in TaH- j aferro's brigade, "Winder's division, Jackson's corps, 206. I Aldie, Ya., Pope believed tbat Jack- ! son's retreat would be made by way | of, Aug. 28. 68. 76, 330 ; Lee's move- ment by. in attempt to turn Union rigbt, Aug. 31, 95. I Aldie Turnpike. See Little River Tiirnpike. Jexandria, Ya., Confederate spies at, 104 ; Army of tbe Potomac ordered to withdraw from tbe Peninsula to, 399-400 ; unnecessary delay in trans- fer, 27 ; expectation of Government as to time required for transfer, 57 ; McClellan summoned to correct ir- regularities at. 111 ; tbe irregulari- ties, 111, 272, 283. 290; McCleUan arrived at, Aug. 26, 112, 265, 268, 269, 271, 273, 277, 290, 309; be found notbing to criticize at, 112 ; its works of defence inspected, 117 ; proposition to garrison forts at, 119 ; McCiellan's conduct at, examined, 269 et . seq. ; McClellan reported as idle at, 123 ; communication between Pope and, interrupted by Jackson, Aug. 28, 268, 277 ; Pope's efforts to secure bis communications witb, at Gainesville, 59-60 ; Pope knew of Confederate advance on bis commu- nications witb, 124 ; peril of Con- federates at Manassas from Union troops at, 101 ; tbe return of tbe re- mains of Taylor's brigade from Man- assas to, 118-119 ; Union forces pur- sued by Confederate cavalry rear to, Aug. 27, 109 ; Pope's confidence in tbe coming of re-enforcements from, 73 ; re-enforcements sent by Haupt from, Aug. 24, 25, 269 ; tbe commu- nication free. Aug. 29, between Pope •and, 279 ; Pope informed tbat be could get supplies for bis army, Aug. 29, by sending to, 281 ; tbe condition of tbe Army of tbe Potomac on reacbing, 297 ; McClellan's strengtb at, 2S4 ; tbe cavalry force at, Aug. 29, 279 ; McClellan given cbarge, Aug. 27, of forwarding troops to Pope from, 113 ; Couch's division ordered to Fairfax C. H., from. 149 ; Franklin disembarked at. Aug. 26, 291, 298, 299 ; Franklin's corps en- camped near, Aug. 26. 299 ; the lack of transportation at, for Franklin discussed, 291 et seq. ; an abundant 444 INDEX means of transportation at, Aug-. 26- 30, 282, 283, 284; Kearny's state- ment, Aug. 21, of his strength at, 204 ; Kearny and Hooker moved to join Pope from, 203 ; also Piatt, ih. ; proposition that Sumner should be brought to, 117 ; Sumner ordered to, Aug. 27, 120 ; his movement to, and detention at, 333-334 ; in his move- ment to Georgetown, 276, 277 ; Pope's provision for protecting road for retreat to, 148 ; the retreat of Union forces to, Sept. 2, 160 ; men- tioned, 132, 178, 213 note, 274, 298, 299, 305. Alexandria and Orange Railroad. See Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Alexandria and Winchester Turnpike. See Little River Turnpike. Allan, W., Lt.-Col., C. S. A., his esti- mates of numbers of Union and Con- federate Armies, Aug., 1862, 197- 217 ; Ropes' reply to, 217-219. AUen, S. H., Col., _U. S. V., in com- mand of 1st Maine Cavalry regt., 2d division (Ricketts), 3d Corps, A. of v., 421 ; his position. Cedar Mountain, ih. ; his service in the battle, 432 ; his strength, Aug. 16, 2] 5. Ames, the deserter from New England regiment, and betrayer of General Stoughton to capture by Mosby, 185. Anderson, G. T., CoL, C. S. A., in com- mand of brigade, D. R. Jones' di- vision, Longstreet's corps, at Chan- tilly, 171. Anderson, R. H., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., his strength, July 20, 207 ; under Longstreet, Aug. 21, 307 ; time of his arrival, second battle of Bull Rim, 91, 92-93, 256, 258 note, 346 ; his failure at Manassas to obey an order of Lee's, 254. Andrews, G. L., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (March 26, 1865), Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 10, 1862), Col. 2d Massachu- setts (June 13, 1862), at Cedar Moun- tain, his advance in support of Craw- ford, 434 ; ordered into the wood by Perkins, ih. ; his position on the edge of the wheat-field, 434-435 ; ordered by Perkins to charge across the wheat-field, 435 ; the order counter- manded by Gordon, 436 ; the order was given by mistake, ih. Annandale, Va., 282 ; Franklin's move- ment to, Aug. 29, 309-310 ; detained at, by McCleUan, Aug. 29, 275, 277, 293 ; reasons for detention cited, 294, 299; Halleek's displeasure, 296; the incorrect information sent by Frank- lin from, 280. Antietam Creek, Maryland, Pope would probably have been successful in battle of, 96 ; a contrast to bat- tle of ChantiUy, 97; McClellan's anxiety for command of campaign, 285. Aqueduct Bridge, Georgetown, D. C, Sumner ordered to position at, Aug. 30, 276 ; ordered to Centreville from, ih. Archer, J. J., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his brigade in A. P. Hill's division at Cedar Mountain, 419 ; his loss at close of day from fire of 2d Mass., 438 ; in engagement, Aug. 27, at Manassas Junction, 104 ; his report of Union prisoners taken, 105 note ; his share in battle of Aug. 30, 261 ; at battle of ChantiUy, Sept. 1, 155. Arlington, Va., National cemetery at, 174. Army and Navy Journal, the corre- spondence between Pope and the Comte de Paris published in, 313. Army Corps. See United States Army Corps. Army of Northern Virginia, Confed- erate. See Confederate States, Army of Northern Virginia. Army of the Potomac, Union. See United States, Army of the Po- tomac. Army of Virginia, Union. See United States, Army of Virginia. "Army under Pope," by J. C. Ropes, cited, 136, 217 et seq. Army, United States, Regular. See United States, Army, Regular. Artillery, United States Army. See United States, Army, Regular, Ar- tillery. Ashland, Va., Jackson's advance to, June 26, 1862, 33. Augur, C. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Major, U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 9, 1862) ; as Brig.-Gen., U. S. v., in command of 2d division, 5th Corps, 38 ; Greene in his division, 39; his position at battle of Cedar Mountain, 414, 420-421 ; the dispo- sition of his forces, 414-416 ; his estimate of Union strength, 416 ; position of Confederate artillery in front of, 419 ; one of his regiments ordered to advance, 4.50 P. M., 423 ; INDEX 445 his part in tlie battle, 429-432 ; his [ brigade uuder Geary repulsed, 429- 430 ; wounded severely, 50, 431 ; return of his division for AugTist, 216. Baehman, W. K., Capt., C._ S. A., de- monstration made by his battery, Aug-. 29, 342. Ballard, J. N., Lieut., C. S. A., pro- prietor of the Reid House, on Chan- tiUy battlefield, ISO; Walcott and Stevens in 1SS3, entertained by, 181 ei seq. ; his reminiscences of the var, 183 et seq. ; fired the first shot at first Bull Run, ib. ; mentioned, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193. 194. Banks, N. P., ]\Iaj.-Gen., U._ S. Y. (May 16, 1861), little injury inflicted on Jackson by. May, 1862, 391 ; his i engagement "vrith Jackson at Win- chester, Jime, 1862, 33 ; driven from the Shenandoah Valley, 33 ; his po- sition in the Shenandoah Valley, June 30, 393 ; his forces included in Army of Virginia, June 26, 1862, 4, 35, 390 ; given command of the 2d Corps, June 26, 1862, 37, 390 ; the strength of his command, July- September, 1862 : Pope's report, July 8, 199 ; his ovra report for July 31, 38, 198 ; his estimate sustained, 39, 200; Pope's statement of his strength, after Cedar Mountain, 201 ; Pope's statement of, Aug. 20, ib. ; the statement discussed, 201-202 ; strength understated, ib. ; as stated in return for August. 202, 210, 216 ; Pope's statement of September 2, 213 ; Pope's statement in his report, 209, 210 ; the question discussed. 39, 394 ; conjecture as to cause of dis- crepancy between the several re- ports, 199, 202 ; desertions from his corps, 52 ; his cavalry under com- mand of Hatch, 44, 395 ; afterwards of Buford, 44 ; Crawford's brigade of his corps, 15 ; Crawford ordered to Culpeper, 42. 45 ; Eieketts' prox- j imity to, after July 21, 396 ; his movements under Pope's i orders : ordered to position at Sperry- ville, July 5, 41, 395 ; at Hazel River, | Aug. 7, 45 ; ordered to Culpeper. Aug. 8, 15, 45, 400, 404; at Cul- 1 peper, Aug. 8, 16, 46. 403, 404; ordered to Cedar Mountain, Aug. 9, 404 ; his prompt movement, 47 ; suf- j fering of his troops on the march. ib., 207; his interview with Pope early morning. Aug. 9. at CulpeiDer. 22, 48, 406 ; Cedar Mountain : controversy as to Pope's orders to, 405 et seq. ; Pope's order of 10 A. m., sent by Marshall, cited, 21-22, 47, 405; transcribed by Pelouze, 21, 47, 405 ; credibility of Pelouze's version, 405 ; the purport of it admitted by Pope, ib. ; question as to the interpretation of the order, 405-406 ; Pope's error in sending verbal order, 51 ; directed by Pope to take strong position, 47, 48 ; Roberts given authoiity to as- sign the forces of, to position, 406 et seq. ; Roberts' imputations as to his unwillingness to fight. 23, 48, 409 ; his restiveness under Roberts, 23 ; his claim that Roberts urged fighting, 48 ; Roberts' testimony con- tradicted, ib. ; attack made by, con- trary to the wishes of Roberts. 406 et seq. ; Roberts' statement that he was authorized to give orders to, in Pope's name, 408 ; the statement qualified, 408 note ; Pope not pos- sessed of authority to place any one in command over, 408 ; his belief that Pope thought him unwilling to fight. 409 ; his strength at Cedar Mountain, 19, 38, 50, 416-417 ; the strength of his cavalry, 417; his position, 47, 420-421 ; its strength, 48 : probable result had he held it, ib. ; position on Brown House bill indicated to him by Roberts, 413 ; the disposition of his forces, 414- 416 ; his ignorance of Gordon's posi- tion, 52, 414 ; his ignorance of the strength of the enemy, 48, 51. 423 ; his position for survey of battlefield, 428 ; informed by Buford of the enemy's advance, Aug. 9, 410 ; mis- led by Buford's despatch, ib. ; his despatch to Pope at 4.50 p. in., ib., 423 ; his statement incorrect that the battle began by attack of Confed- erates. 22 ; the failure of attack by Jackson encouragement for an at- tack by, 429 ; attack begun by, about 4.50 p. m., 48, 423 ; his force "panting for a fight," 18, 20; the cause of his attack, 23, 48 ; in con- sonance with Pope's general orders, 28, 49, 398, 409 ; affected by the terms of Pope's letter of July 14 to, 409 ; his desire to retaliate for re- verses inflicted by Jackson in the Shenandoah, 48, 49 ; foolhardiness of his attack, 28, 49 ; its impetu- 446 INDEX osity, 49 ; repetition of bad taeties of battle of Winebester, ib. ; the ar- tillery silenced by command of, 5 p. M., 422 ; tlie fire renewed, 423 ; his order for Ruger's advance, con- firming' Crawford's, 424 ; his order to 3d brigade to charge, criticized, 18, 19 ; the question discussed, 20 ; his incorrect accusation of delay of 3d brigade, 19 ; his order for charge by the 10th Maine, 428; his order to the 2d Mass. to join him, 433 ; immediately obeyed, ih. ; order given by his chief of staff to 2d Mass., to ad- vance into the wood, 434 ; order given by the same to the same to make a hopeless charge across the wheat- field, 435 ; the order not obeyed, 435- 436 ; the order a mistake, 436 ; 2d Mass. the only part of his forces which held their ground at night-fall, Aug. 9, 438 ; their retreat, ih. ; feebly pursued by the enemy, 439 ; the bravery and sacrifice of his corps at Cedar Mountain, 49, 398; their retreat, 49 ; his loss, 50 ; compli- mented by Pope, 21, 440 ; his intre- pidity praised by Pope, 440 ; his attack not approved by Pope, ih. ; Pope's statement that he had not ordered the battle, in his presence, not denied by him, 21 ; Pope's state- ment in his report, as to orders given to, not denied by, until 1864, 21 ; his statement to Conduct of War Committee, Dec, 1864, 18, 21, 22, 23 ; his testimony answered by Pope, 23 ; his responsibility for tlie dis- aster, 51, 440 ; his attempt to jus- tify himself, 23, 48 ; no official re- port of the battle made by, 22 ; Pope's statement of the strength of, Aug, 10, 201. Period subsequent to Aug. 9 : with Pope on the Rappahannock, Aug. 21, 307 ; Jackson's movement, Aug. 25, reported to, 59 ; at Fayetteville, Aug. 26, 62, 113 ; Pope's communications with McDowell concerning his move- ment|from Warrenton, Aug. 27, 126 ; given charge of trains, in movement to Manassas, Aug. 27, 63, 126, 128, 325 ; Pope's conjecture of Jackson's project against the trains, 64, 67, 74, 126 ; question as to the result of an attack on, 65 ; ordered to Catlett's Station, Aug. 27, 126-127 ; precision of orders given to, 128 ; at Bealeton Station, evening of Aug. 27, 63, 128 ; marching from Catlett's to Manassas, Aug. 28, 67 : the position to which he should have been assigned, Aug. 28, 69, 76 ; conjecture as to the ad- vantage which might have resulted had his forces been united with Por- ter's and McDoweU's, Aug. 29, 88 ; not employed by Pope in operations, Aug. 29, 78 ; his supply wagons em- ployed for Franklin's transportation, 282, 294, 295 ; rejoined Pope, Aug. 31, 140 ; his position, ih. ; his slight loss in Pope's campaign, 97. His characteristics : his ignorance of the soldier, 20 ; his inexperience in war, 35, 37 ; his political career, 37 ; his appointment as Maj.-Gen., May 16, 1861, ih.; his martial predilec- tions, ih. ; his ambition, ih. ; pos- sessed good military capacity for subordinate service, 38 ; his bravery, 23, 38 ; mentioned, 132, 219. Barnard, J. G., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Colonel of Engi- neers, U. S. A. (Dec. 28, 1865) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Sept. 23, 1861) ; 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry ordered to report to, Aug. 29, 279 ; MeClellan possessed no authority to give orders to, untU Aug. 30, 290. Barnett's Ford, Rapidan River, one limit of Bayard's picket line, 401 ; Buford's pickets at, ih. Bartow, F. S., Col., C. S. A., place where he was killed on Henry House hill, marked by a monument, 174- 175. Bates, S. P., History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, by, mentioned, 161. Bayard, G. D., Capt., 4th Cavalry, U. S. A. (Aug. 20, 1861), Brig.- Gen., U. S. V. (April 28, 1862), in command of cavalry brigade, 3d Corps, A. of v., 215 ; his strength, with Buford's, Aug. 1, 202 ; his po- sition at Rapidan Station, Aug. 7, 401 ; his picket line, ih. ; supported by Crawford, ih. ; repulsed by Robertson, Aug. 8, 46, 402; Con- federate advance retarded by, 402- 403 ; his reports to Pope of Confed- erate advance, 403 ; his retreat to Culpeper, ih. ; his position at 4 p. M. Aug. 8, on Cedar Run, 410 ; Craw- ford ordered to his support, at Ce- dar Mountain, Aug. 8, 403-404 ; his skirmishes with Jackson, morning of Aug. 9, 47 ; his movement, Aug. 9, 15 ; with McDowell's command, 395 ; ordered, Aug, 15, to join Hatch at Culpeper, 396; strength, Aug. 16, INDEX 447 215 ; attached to Sigel's commaiid, Aug. 27, 129. Beal, G. L., Col., U. S. V., in com- mand of 10th Maine, 428 ; his at- tempt to shelter his troops under a murderous fire, Cedar Moimtain, ib. ; censured by Pelouze, ib. ; the position taken by, 429. Bealeton Station, Va., Porter in posi- tion at, Aug-. 26, 1882, 62, 73^323 ; Banks at, evening of Aug. 27, 68 ; McCleUan's telegram for information to, Aug. 27, 114. Beauregard, G. T., Capt. of Engineers, U. S. A. (March 3, 1853 - Feb. 20, 1861) ; General, C. S. A. ; Cormth evacuated by. May 30, 1862, 34; HaUeck's despatch discredited by, ib. ; his refutation not believed at the North, ib. Bee, B. E., Capt., 10th Infy., U. S. A. (March 3, 1855 — March 3, 1861); Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., killed on Henry House hill, first battle of Bull Run, 174 ; monument to mark the place, 175. Belcher, Capt., A. D. C, U. S. V., sent by Stevens from Chantilly to Pope for re-enforcements, 154. Benjamin, S. N., Bvt. Lt.-CoL, U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. A. (June 13, 1864) ; as 1st Lieut., U. S. A., in command of battery E, 2d U. S. Artillery at Chantilly, 135, 152 ; his position, 153 ; his service, 156. Best, C. L., Major, U. S. A. (Feb. 5, 1867) ; Capt., U. S. A. (April 29, 1861) ; Chief of ArtiUery, 1st divi- sion, 2d Corps, A. of V., his battery F, under Miihlenberg, its position at Cedar Mountain, 415 ; in returns for August, 216. Bethlehem Church, Va., interview of Locke and McDowell at, 232 ; Por- ter's headquarters at, 233. Bhney, D. D., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Feb. 3, 1861), his report of battle of ChantiUy, 138 ; cited, 160 ; his divi- sion hotly engaged, 157-158 ; his position, ib. ; his opponents, 157 ; Kearny killed in seeking to cover right flank of, 158-159 ; in contact with Thomas' command, 159 ; the enemy diverted from attack on, 160 ; his forces in the action, 160-161, 163- 164 ; assumed command of division, in Kearny's absence, 161 ; held posi- tion at ChantiUy, tiU 3 A. M., Sept. 2, 161 ; his retreat, ib. Blackburn's Ford, Bull Run, in the route of Hill's division, night of Aug. 27, 108 ; crossed by Ewell, Aug. 28, 65 ; Pope's headquarters near, night of Aug. 28, 78 ; Banks' retreat from Bristoe, Aug. 31, by way of, 140. Blenker, L., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 9, 1861), his division the nucleus of Sigel's corps, 36. Blue Ridge Mts., Va., Sigel ordered by Pope to cross, 41, 395 ; failure of Hatch's expedition by way of, 44, 396 ; Buford's line of pickets ex- tended to, Aug. 7, 401 ; 317. Boswell, J. K., Capt., C. S. A., Chief Engineer, A. N. V., his report cited in evidence of Lee's j)lan against Pope, 321. Bowers, Capt., 32d Mass., his state- ment as to movement, Aug. 29, 339, 346. Branch, L. O'B., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in command of brigade, A. P. Hill's division, Jackson's corps, at Cedar Mountain, 419 ; his report of the rout of the Stonewall brigade ex- aggerated, 426 ; brigade sent by, to re-enforce the Stonewall brigade, 427 ; hurried by Jackson to oppose Stevens at Chantilly, Sept. 1, 152 ; his brigade in the engagement, 154, 167 ; his position, 166 ; broken in Stevens' charge, 155, 166 ; position of remnants of his brigade, 157 ; his ammunition exhausted, he held posi- tion by bayonet, 168 ; his loss, 169 ; support given by Pender to, 170 ; report for his division at Chantilly made by Lane, 168 ; killed at Antietam, ib. Bristoe Station, Va., on Orange and Alexandria RaOxoad, Jackson's march to, Aug. 26, 328 ; Jackson arrived at, 6 p. m., Aug. 26, 62 ; rail- road at, cut by Jackson, ib. ; Pope informed, Aug. 27, 62, 74 ; no evi- dence that Jackson cut Pope's com- munications at, 110 ; encounter^ be- tween Hooker and Ewell at Kettle Run, Aug. 27, near, 108, 326 ; Ewell repulsed, 63, 210, 211, 268; his losses, 212 ; Jackson's position at, night of Aug. 27, 108 ; Pope in- formed of Jackson's advance beyond, 327 ; Kearny ordered to, Aug. 28, 327 ; Porter ordered to, Aug. 28, 65, 327 ; disobedience of order, a charge against Porter at court-martial, 352 ; Ricketts' withdrawal towards, from 448 INDEX ThoroTigMare Gap, Aug. 28, 226; the movement of Union troops from, seen by Confederates, morning' of Aug. 29, 342, 345; Pope's order, Aug-. 29, 3 A. M., received Tby Porter at, 224, 383 ; no intimation made by Pope to Porter of expected attack at, 328 ; conjecture that Stuart dragged bushes from Gainesville to, 250 ; Banks' retreat from, Aug. 31, 140. Broad Run, Va., seizure by Union force of bridge at Buckland Mills on, ordered, 129 ; saved from burn- ing, 130 ; guarded by Steinwehr, 131 ; place of Eeynolds' encampment, night of Aug. 27, 132. Brockenbrough, J. M., Col., C. S. A., his share in battle of Aug. 30, 261 ; in command of Field's Virginia brigade, A. P. Hill's division, Jack- son's corps, Sept. 1, 166 ; brought up to oppose Stevens at Chantilly, Sept. 1, 152 ; engaged, 154 ; his position, 166, 170; forced back by Stevens' charge, 155 ; Pender ordered to his support, 170; no report of his brigade for Chantilly, 171. Brown, Mrs., position of her house in Cedar Mountain battle, 412 ; Gor- don's position by, Aug. 9, 413, 420 ; the strongest position for the Union forces, 413 ; indicated by Roberts to Banks for his position, ih. ; Banks' ignorance of Gordon's position on, 413-414 ; position of Union artillery before, 421 ; aspect of the battle from, 422 ; Gordon's first position on, not approached by the enemy, 439 ; the advance of the enemy to- wards, ih. Brown, W. D., Capt., C. S. A., in com- mand of Chesapeake (Maryland) battery, position of his gun. Cedar Mountain, 419. Bryant, E. E., his history of the 3d Wisconsin, 389. Buchanan, R. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Brig- Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862) ; Col., U. S. A. (Feb. 8, 1864) ; Lt.-Col., U. S. A. (Sept. 9, 1861) ; his ser- vices in battle of Aug. 30, 94. Buckland Mills, Va., Union forces at, Aug. 27, 63; Sigel ordered to Gainesville, Aug. 27, by way of, 129, 369 ; the bridge at, seized by Union forces, 130 ; saved from burn- ing, ih. Buford, J., Maj., U. S. A. (Nov. 12, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Dec. 16, 1863) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (July 27, 1862) ; superseded Hatch in command of cavalry, 2d Corps, A. of v., 44, 396 ; his probable strength, Aug. 1, 202 ; in return for Aug., 216 ; his position and strength, Aug: 7, at Madison Court House, 401 ; position of his pickets, ih. ; sup- ported by Sigel, ih. ; ordered to op- erate upon the flank and rear of enemy, Aug. 8, 404 ; his movement, Aug. 9, 1862, 15; his reports of Jackson's advance, 16, 403, 410 ; his retreat towards Sperryville, 46, 410 ; Banks misled by his despatch, 410 ; his report to McDowell of 9 a. m., Aug. 29, of Confederate advance, 85, 90, 124, 231, 242, 337 ; read to Por- ter, 85, 231 ; not communicated to Pope, 242 ; Sigel's cavalry attached to his command, Aug. 27, 129; oc- cupied va. reconnaissance to White Plains, Aug. 27, looking for Jack- son, 109, 129 ; Longstreet's advance to Thoroughfare Gap delayed by, 331 ; his skirmishing operations, Sept. 1, in the retreat from Centre- ville, 137 ; with Patrick and Riek- etts, repulsed Stuart on Little River Turnpike, Sept. 1, 149-150 ; his testi- mony for Porter at court-martial, 245. Bull Run, Va., railway bridge over, burned, Aug. 27, by Jackson, 112, 273 ; Lee free from apprehension on account of Jackson at, 256 ; McClel- lan's apprehensions from Confederate cavalry at, Aug. 26, 115 ; his appre- hension that the bridges over, would not afford Pope sufficient means for retreat, 117 ; Haupt's re- connaissance towards, Aug. 27, 278 ; fight between Taylor and Jackson at the bridge over, 105, 292 ; crossed by Ewell, night of Aug. 27, 108 ; Pope's dispositions, Aug. 27, intended to secure his retreat beyond, 325; in Jackson's movement from Manassas, Aug. 28, 328, 329; Porter's move- ment to, early Aug. 29, 225 ; ordered by Pope to post guard at, ih. ; pro- vision in Pope's joint order to Porter and McDowell to return to, night of Aug. 29, 81, 82, 226, 229 ; Porter's misconstruction of that order, 231, 335 ; his disposition of forces in eon- sequence, 234 ; the effect upon his action, 377-378; McDowell's state- ment at Porter investigation board INDEX 449 concerning- the plan to reform be- j liind, 363; tlie delay caused to ! Hooker and Reno in crossing-, Aug. 29, 85 ; Pope should have withdrawn behind, Aug. 30, 93; his retreat across, 94; crossed by Banks in j retreat from Bristoe, Aug. 31, 140 ; \ defence of bridge over, by Cox, 199 ; \ advance by Lee across, Aug. 31, 144 ; crossed by Jackson, Aug. 31, 144- 145, 165 ; by Longstreet, 145, 171, 173; Meade's retreat behind, 1863, 321. BuU Eun, battle of 1861, the field agaia occupied by Jackson's forces Aug. 28, 1862, 65-66; his strong position there, 69; souvenirs of, found by Confederates, Aug. 27, 103 ; Jackson's movement to, 107, 108 ; j Henry House Hill on, visited by j Walcott, 173 et seq. ; reminiscences j of, related by Ballard, 183 et seq. j BuU Run, second battle, Aug. 29-30, ! 1862, 73-97, 169, 265, 268 ; no re-en- \ f orcements sent to Pope from Aug. | 26 until after, 269, 283 ; McClellan's \ indifference to Pope's demands for | ammunition and rations during, 281, 283, 284 ; estimates o£ strength \ of Union and Confederate armies at, j 197 et seq. ; Union and Confederate I armies not in full strength at, 208 ; j Ewell's losses in, 212 ; kSumner pre- j vented from j)articipating in, 276 ; but for error of orders Sumner might have particix^ated in, 333-334 ; the survivors of Pope's arrny, Sept. 2, 213 ; position of Union Army after, 139-140 ; victory claimed by Pope, 142 ; contrast with South Mountain and Antietam, 97 ; McClel- lan's responsibility for the loss of, 284 ; scene of, revisited by Walcott and Stevens, 173. Bull Run Mountains, Va., Longstreet's position beyond, Aug. 28, 253. Burke's Station, Va.. on Alexandria and Orange Railroad, Taylor's forces pursued by Confederate cavalry to, Aug. 27, 109 ; captures made at, ih. Bumside, A. K, Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 6, 1861) ; his transfer to co- operate with Pope, known at Rich- mond, Aug. 3, 1862, 12, 46, 402 ; Lee's purpose to strike Pope before he cordd be joined bv, 46 ; in com- mand at Falmouth, 112, 265, 404; his strength, 201, 404; deficient in cavalry, 270 ; Reno's division, of his corps, 127 ; Reno sent to Pope, Aug. 14, 52, 201, 202 ; HaUeck informed by, Aug. 21, of Reynold's movement to join Pope, 203 ; the danger of his command made known to McClel- lan, 24, 320 ; Halleck's i)roposition, Aug. 26, that he should superintend debarkation of troops at Acquia Creek, 111, 112-113; Porter's de- spatches to, Aug. 27 and 28, 113, 325, 336, 337, 357 ; Porter's insubor- dinate language in the desxDatches to, 357 ; cautioned to protect his right flank by McGlellan, 115 ; McClellan's personal escort lent to, Aug. 27, 114 ; his testimony for Porter at court- martial, 245, 298. "Campaigns of the Civil War," the Scribner Series, 217. Campbell, a resident of Chantilly, carried news of Jackson's move- ment, Aug. 31, to Pope, 191. Campbell, J. A., Col., C. S. A., his bri- gade under command of Garnett, Aiig. 9, 418, 425 ; its position at Cedar Mt., 418, 421 ; repulsed by Donnelly's charge, 425 ; its aid to Taliaferro in the repulse of Geary, 430. Carpenter, J. C., Lieut., C. S. A., posi- tion of his Virginia battery, Cedar Mt. 419. CarroU, S.'S., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865); Col., U. S. A. (Oct. 9, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 31, 1862) ; as Colonel, in com- mand of 4th brigade, 2d division (Ricketts'), 3d Corps, A. of V., strength^ Aug. 16, 215. Carter, in the bounds of Reid-farm survey, 187. Casey, S., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Col., U. S. A. (Oct. 9, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 31, 1862) ; a part of his troops assigned to MeClellan at Alexandria, 113, 273 ; McClellan's proposition that the Alexandria railway should be put in order by, 117 ; ordered not to move his force to Yorktown, Aug. 27, 122 ; MeClellan possessed no authority to give orders to, imtil Aug. 30, 290. Caskie, W. H,, the position of his battery. Cedar Mountain, 419. Castleman, A., his book condemned by Gen. Gordon, 124. Catlett's Station, Va., on Orange and Alexandiia Railroad, Stuart's raid 450 INDEX on, Aug". 22, 321 ; TJnion forces dis- posed on road to Haymarket from, Aug-. 27, 62, 126-127, 66; Banks, Aug. 28, moved to Manassas Junc- tion from, 67 ; public property moved to, Aug. 27, 126, 129. Cavalry, United States Army, Regular. See United States Army, Regular, Cavalry. Cedar Creek, Shenandoah Co., Va., Fremont's forces on, July, 1862, 893.- Cedar Mountain, Va., distance from Culpeper, 46 ; account of battle of, Aug. 9, 1862, 15 et seq., 389-440 ; Crawford concerned in, 15, 16, 45, 46, 47, 396, 401. 403-404, 406, 410, 411, 414, 416, 420, 424, 432, 433 ; Gordon concerned in, 17-23, 389, 411, 413-414, 416, 420, 422, 424, 432-436, 439; Ricketts' movement to, 439 ; on guard over road from Madison Court House to, 404, 410 ; brought to battlefield too late, 50, 407, 439 ; Banks ordered to move towards, Aug. 9, 47, 404 ; celerity of Ms movement to, 47 ; suffering of the troops on the march to, ib., 207 ; Banks' strength at, 38, 39, 48, 49, 50, 201, 416-417 ; about equal to the Confederates, 47 ; position of the Union forces at, 47, 48, 420-421; position of 2d Mass. at, 17, 413, 414 ; Banks' position selected by Roberts, 20-21, 406 et seq. ; his removal from that position, 21, 22 ; probable re- sult, had he kept it, 48 ; Jackson, his advance towards, 46, 402, 403 ; suffer- ings of his army on the march, 403 ; his delay, 417 ; Confederate forces at, 207, 418-420, 421-422; their strength, 46, 48, 49, 50, 207 ; about equal to Union strength, 47, Ewell's move- ment towards, 46 ; in the battle, 49 ; his strength, 205 ; A. P. Hill, his advance, 46, 402, 421, 439; his troops employed against Pope at, 319 ; position of Confederate forces at, 411, 418-420, 421-422 ; the enemy's force concealed at, 409 ; the battle- field described, 411-413 ; the artillery duel, 48, 423-424, 425 ; Banks ex- pected by Pope to hold the enemy in check at, 406, 407 ; controversy as to the instructions given by Pope verbally and through Marshall and Roberts, 21-22, 47-48, 405-406 ; Pope's denial of order to fight, 21, 410 ; the order cited by Banks, 21-22, 47-48, 405-406 ; Banks' action at. influenced by Pope, 898, 409 ; the battle caused by Banks' attack, 22- 23, 48, 423, 429 ; Southern claim that the battle was forced in obedience to Jackson's order, 22, 440 ; Banks' action criticized, 22 ; his desire to fight, ib., 23, 48, 49, 398, 406, 409 ; Banks' attack, 48 ; its impetuosity, 49, 425, 427; its effect, ib. ; 3d brigade ordered to charge, 17 ; the charge, 18, 19 ; outnumbered and forced to retire, 49 ; a gun lost, ib. ; Union loss, 50 ; Confederate loss, 51 ; McClellan informed, Aug. 10, of the battle at, 320 ; mentioned by Rebel War Clerk, 12; victory claimed by Pope, 52, 123, 126; Gordon's opinion as to the conditions for victory, 23 ; the effect of the battle to show Halleck the aggressive designs of Lee, 24 ; Pope's losses on the Rap- pahannock and at, 202 ; Mr. Ropes' estimate of strength of Pope's army after the battle discussed, 197 et seq. ; no report of battle made by Banks, 22 ; his attempt to evade responsi- bility for defeat, 23 ; documentary sources of data for history of the battle, 441-442 ; mentioned, 30, 218, 219, 265. Cedar Run, Fauquier County, Va., Banks' position on, Aug. 27, 128. Cedar Run, Madison County, Va., in the Cedar Mountain battlefield, 411; Bayard's meeting with Crawford on, Aug. 8, 410 ; Crawford's position at, Aug. 9, 404; Banks' retreat from Cedar Mt. across, 49 ; a Union gun lost in, lb. ; Confederate name for battle of Cedar Mountain, 197. Cedar Run Mountain, another name for Cedar Mountain, 412. Centreville, Va., Franklin's route to the Rappahannock, not to be by way of, Aug. 27, 113 ; Ewell's move- ment to, 329; A. P. Hill's movement through, 65, 75 ; not intended to de- ceive Pope, 329 ; Jackson's move- ment towards, night of Aug. 27, 108, 268 ; known to Pope, Aug. 28, 68, 329 ; mistaken movement of Lawton and Hayes towards, Aug. 28, 329 ; Pope at, Aug. 28, 329, 337 ; Heint- zelman and Reno at, 337 ; Pope's at- tempt to catch Jackson at, 68 ; his position favorable for pursuit of Jackson to, 328 ; the theory erroneous that Jackson might have been inter- cepted at, 65-66 ; his plan to pui*- sue Jackson to, should have been INDEX 451 understood by his commanders, 336 ; McDowell said by Pope to have been ordered to advance on, Ang-, 28, 330 ; the forces ordered to, 6S ; Confederate rearguard driven by Kearny from, 2(38, 2 79 ; delay of Hooker and Reno in reaching-, 84- 85 ; times of their arrival, 79 ; delay of Kearny's movement from, 84; Porter ordered to move upon, at dawn, Ang. 29, 225, 383 ; his move- ment towards, 85, 225 ; time lost by moving forces by way of, 85 ; the advance from, arrested, 86 ; Pope's provision in joint order for -with- drawal to, night of Aug. 29, 81, 83, 229, 310, 384 ; his purpose, 83, 87 ; supplies expected at, S3 ; Porter's misconstruction of the order, 231, 234 ; Moreil ordered to push to, fail- ing to communicate with Sigel. 234, 373 ; Pope's movement to battlefield from, 92 ; noise of heavy firing at, reported to Halleck, 116-117 ; the enemv reported as evacuating, Aug, 29, by McCleHan, 279; Pope re- ported at, by Haupt, Aug. 29, 278 ; his trains reported by Franklin as parked near, 280 ; Franklin's move- ment towards, Aug. 30, 310 ; Pope should have withdrawn to, morning of Aug. 30, 93 ; Porter's theory that Pope intended to fight the battle, Aug. 30, at, 87 ; his battle should Lave been fought there, 93, 95 ; permitting two brigades to march to, Aug. 30, a charge against Porter, 224 ; Halleck's effort to cause Sumner's advance to, 333 ; Sumner ordered to, from Georgetown, too late for action, 276 ; Franklin's with- drawal to, Aug. 30, instead of ad- vanciag to battlefield, 276 ; retreat of Union Army to. Aug. 30, 94, 261, 309 ; position of Union Army at. Aug. 31, 139, 140 ; position of Confeder- ates aronnd, Aug. 31-Sept. 1, 147 ; attack by Lee expected, Aug. 31, at, 84; his movement by, Aug. 31, 95; no battle at, Aug. 31, 143 ; the be- lief at Washington, Aug. 31, that Lee's forces were between "Washing- ton and, 301 ; Sumner at, Aug. 31, 146, 147 ; his retreat from, Sept. 1, 160 ; Union forces withdrawn from, 137, 141, 142, 153, 160, 166, 167, 169, 180; the retreat from, known to Jack- son, 165 ; Pope did not intend to fight near, 149 ; number of MeClellan's forces who joined Pope at, 213 note ; j McClellan directed to send ammuni- tion to Pope at, 281 ; his evasion of j order, ib. ; Pope informed at, that he \ could g'et rations by sending to Alex- I andxia, ib. ; distance of Sudley Ford from, 145 ; distance of Chantilly from, 136 ; mentioned. 69, 70, 76, 78, : 132. Centreville Turnpike, the battle of Chantilly not fought to obstruct Jackson's advance to. 166-167, 188, ! 191. I Chancellorsville, Ya., battle of. May j 2—4, 1863, Lee's sagacity displayed at, 94. 1 ChantiUy,Ya., battle of, Sept. 1, 1862, i 135-194 ; the Lnion forces engaged, i 135, 152-153 ; its situation, 136 ; site I of battlefield, 137, 139 ; not fought j according- to plan, 139 ; the opera- I tions preceding the battle, 139 et seq. ; j no reconnaissance made by Sumner towards, 147 ; Union cavalry cap- tured near, Aug. 31, ib. ; Stevens' movement towards, 151 ; his position and strength at, 152 ; his disposition of forces, 153-154 ; his charge, 154- 155 ; Stevens killed, 155 ; the Con- i federates demoralized by the charge, j ih. ; Jackson's movement towards, 145-147 ; battlefield reached by him I at noon, 145 ; the Confederate forces of Jackson's corps engaged, 155; thunder-storm, 155, 156 ; its effect ! on Confederates, 156 ; Union forces j reenforced, 155-156 ; disposition of new troops, 155-156 ; Kearny's I death, 159-160 ; the indecisive termi- I nation of the conflict, 160 ; L^nion forces withdrawn from, night of j Sept. 1, 160 ; called one of the sever- ' est eng-agements by Lane, 168 ; the I losses on both sides, 161-164 ; pau- city of data for the history of the battle, 138, 164 et seq. ; citations con- cerning the battle from Birney's , report, 160-161 ; citations from Con- federate reports : Jackson's, 165-166; I D, R. Jones', 171-172 ; Lane's, : for Branch's brigade, 168 ; Lee's, i 167 ; Longstreet's, 171 ; Mc-Gow- an's, for Gregg's brigade, 169 ; Pen- I der's, 170 ; Stuart's, 165 ; Thom- as', 171 ; erroneous statements con- cerning, 167 ; the real object of the battle, 168 ; caused by Lee's effort to turn the Union right wing, 95 ; contrast with Antietam, 97 ; called j by Confederates battle of Ox Hill ; revisited, 1883, by Waicott and Ste- 452 INDEX yens, 173 et seq. ; tlie battlefield ex- amined, 180 et seq. ; the Reid house, a Union hospital, 1862, 180 ; the ap- proach to, identified, 182 ; its site, the Reid farm, description of survey, 187-188 ; bullet scars in the trees on, 190. Charlottesville, Va., Pope expected to operate on communications of Rich- mond with, 40, 392 ; Hatch ordered, July 14, to seize, 395 ; his failure, 396. Chickahominy River, Va., 24 ; the transfer of the Army of the Poto- mac to the James from, 392. Choate, J. H., of counsel for appellant, Porter investigating board, 363 ; his treatment of Gen. McDowell dis- cussed, 363 et seq. ; his attitude to- wards McDowell in the matter of Porter's despatches, 365-366 ; also in the matter of the misquotations from Jackson's report, 367-370. Christ, B. C, Col., U. S. v., in command of 1st brigade, 1st division, 9th Corps, at Chantilly, 152 ; its compo- sition, ih. ; his losses, 162. Clark, J. S., Col., A. D. C, U. S. V., reported Jackson's movement, Aug. 25, 1862, 59. Coggin's Point, Va., the purpose of D. H. Hill's movement to, 319. Colgrove, S., Col., U. S. V., in com- mand of 27th Indiana, at Cedar Mt., 437; unable to force his regiment against terrific fire of the enemy, ib. ; his attempted manoeuvre, ib. ; his retreat, ib. ; his loss, ib. CoUis, C. H. T., Capt. of Penna. Com- pany Zouaves d'Afrique, under Gor- don, in position, Aug. 9, on Brown House hill, 413 ; the creditable ser- vice of his Zouves, 439 ; his loss, ib. Compton, A. H., 175 ; visited by Wal- eott and Stevens, 1883, 179. Conduct of the War, Joint Committee of Congress on. See United States Congress. Confederate States, Army of Northern Virginia, McClellan's estimate of the strength of, Jime 25, 8, 10 ; efforts to re-enforce it, Aug. 3, 12 ; its strength at Cedar Mt., 207 ; its strength, Aug. 20, 207-208, 218 ; its losses on Rappahannock, 107, 208, 209 ; its advance against Pope, Aug. 18, 266 ; prevented from crossing the Rappahannock, Aug. 20-22, ib. ; Pope confronted by, at Rappahannock Station, ib. ; cavalry raid, Aug. 22, by way of Waterloo Bridge, 267 ; re- pulsed at Sulphur Springs Aug. 23, ib. ; position of the main part, Aug. 25, 1862, 59 ; no provision made by Pope to intercept it, at Thoroughfare Gap, 65,^66, 67, _70, 74, 77, 84; Pope's miscalculation of time of ap- proach of, 83, 84; its advance dis- covered by Porter's skirmishers, Aug. 29, 85 ; its position, Aug. 29, 248, 251, 252, 255 ; its left wing under Jackson at Chantilly, Sept. 1, 1862, 136 ; data for that battle in the reports of, 138 ; its movement at that battle, 139 ; its condition not better than Pope's army, 209; its losses, 212 ; its loyalty to its commanders, 143 ; the reports of commanders of, as evidence, in a new hearing of the Porter case, 341 et seq., 354, 356, 357-358; the evidence ambiguous, 341. Artillery: strength of, July 20, estimated, 207, 208; half accompa- nied Lee in campaign against Pope, 208 ; none used at battle of Chan- tilly, 136. Cavalry : its service in Jackson's Manassas raid, 108, 109 ; estimates of its strength, Aug., 1862, 205-208 ; commanded by Robertson, Aug. 29, 258-259. Confederate States Government, in- formed of project at Washington to terminate the Peninsular Campaign, 12. Connecticut Volunteers, Artillery, 1st regt., at Alexandria, Aug. 27, 122: Infantry, 5th regt., in battle of Cedar Mountain, 414 ; in Crawford's charge, 424. Cook, in command of 8th Mass. bat- tery, his guns at Chantilly, 135 note. Cooke, J. E., his biography of Stone- wall Jackson mentioned, 136, 389. Corinth, Miss., Pope's operations at, 1862, 34; evacuated by Beauregard, May 30, 1862, 34. Cothran, G. W., Capt., U. S. V., in command of Battery M, 1st New York Light Artillery, his position, Aug. 9, on Brown House hill, 413, 415, 422. Couch, D. N., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (July 4, 1862), called from the Peninsula, Aug. 27, 114, 120; his division ordered to Fairfax C. H., from Alex- andria, Sept. 1, 149, 213. IXDEX 453 Court of Inquirv in ease of Gen. Me- Do^vell. See ' McDowell, Conrt of Inquirv. Cox.. J. b.. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Dec. 7, 1864) ; Brig. -Gen., U. S. V. (May IT, 1861) ; Ms command in. tlie Dis- trict of the Kanawha, 198, 393 ; strengtli of Ms forces, by return of July 31. 1862, 198 ; ordered from West Virginia to re-enforce Pope, 201 ; Pope promised the supxDort of. by Halleck, Aug. 21, 267; had not reported for duty, Aug. 27, 60, 62, 74; withheld from Pope by Mc- Clellan, 273, 277; sent to Upton's Hill instead, 273 ; the cavalry imder his command, ih. ; his force not available when required by Pope, 333 ; the responsibility for his de- tention discussed, ih. ; slight aid given to Pope bv. 199. Crawford. S. W.V B^. Maj.-Gen., U. S. Y. (Aug. 1. 1864) ; Asst. Surgeon. U. S. A. (March 10, 1851) ; Maj., U. S. A. (Mav 14, 1861); Brig'.-Gen., U. S. V. (April 25. 1862 ; in command of 1st brigade, 1st division, 2d Corps. A. of V. ; ordered to Culpeper. July 10, 42- ; at Culpeper July 24-Aug. 8, 39, 45, 396, 401, 403 ; Bayard supported by, Aug. 7, 401 ; ordered to Cedar Mt., Aug. 8, to support Bayard, 45, 403- 404 ; Ms movement. Aug. 8, 15, 410 ; the character of his force, 410 ; his strength, 216, 416 ; Banks ordered to join, Aug". 9, 16, 404 : Banks' junc- tion with, 47 ; at Cedar Mt., 46 ; in position on Cedar Run, Aug. 9, 404 ; his position at Cedar Mountain de- scribed. 410. 420 ; the enemy's po- sition in relation to, 411 ; Banks placed in position by Roberts near, 406,411; Gordon supposed by Banks to be in position on the right of, 414 ; his movement to new position after Augnr's arrival, ih. ; Augur's position in relation to. 420 ; his movement into the wood, after 5 o'clock. 414, 424 ; promised support of Gordon's brigade. 424; his disposition of forces in his advance, ih. ; did not accom- pany his brigade into the wood, ih. ; Ruger ordered to charge by, ih. ; order required confirmation by Banks, ih. ; Gordon censured for his failure to give timely support to, 432 ; the question of the order dis- cussed, 432-433 ; mentioned. 39. Crittenden House, Cedar Mountain j battlefield, Earlv's position near, i 418. I Cross Keys, Va.. Frdmont defeated by I Jackson at, June 8. 1862, 33. I Cub Run, Va. , General Stevens' posi- I tion on, Aug. 31, 139 ; Reynolds in I position on. 140. CuUum. G. W.. Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Major, Engi- neers, U. S. A. (Aug. 6, 1861) ; Brig.- j Gen._, U. S. V. (Nov. 1, 1861) ; Col., Engineers (March 7, 1867) ; de- clined to make an effort to get in- formation concerning Pope, 302. I Culpeper Court House, Va., Crawford ordered to. July 10, 42 ; in position I at until Aug. 8, 39, 45, 396, 401, 403 ; I Hatch ordered to position at, July ' 12. 395 ; Bayard ordered to join i Hatch at. July 15, 396 ; Pope ar- I rived at, Aug. 8, 45 ; his headquarters I at; 403 ; Jackson's movement to- j wards, begun Aug. 7, 15, 46, 402 ; I expected to arrive at, morning of Aug. 9. 403 ; Pope informed, Aug. 7, of enemy's advance towards, 403 ; orders for concentration of army at, Aug. S. 400, 403 ; Ricketts ordered to position near, 404 ; his arrival at, 45 ; Crawford ordered to Cedar Mt. from, Aug. 8, 46 ; Pope's disposi- tions of Banks and Sigel to block Jackson at, 15, 16 : Banks ordered to, Aug. 8, 46 ; arrived that night, ; 15, 16. 404 ; ordered to Cedar Mt. I from, Aug. 9, 47 ; Sigel ordered to, I 46, 404 ; unable to find the only road j to, ih. ; arrived at. afternoon of Aug. I 9, 50, 404 ; Bayard's retreat to, 403 ; j Pope's interview with Banks at, I morning of Aug. 9, 48 ; Pope's or- ! der sent by Marshall to Banks from, I Aug. 9. 405 ; sound of battle of I Cedar Mt. heard at. by Pope, 52 ; } Pope outnumbered by Jackson at, 28 ; distance from Cedar Mountain, I 46 ; distance of Cedar Run from, 411 ; road to Madison Court House 1 and Cedar Mountain gxiarded by I Ricketts, Aug. 8, 404; roads from, to Orange Court House and Mad- ison Court House, 413. Culpeper Road, Mrs. Brown's house on. 412 ; description of the battle- field on, ih. ; Augnr's position on, Aug. 9. 414, 420 ; WiLliams' position on, 420 ; Geary's engagement on, 428 ; position of the 10th Maine on, 428 ; Confederate position on. 418. Gushing, H. C, Bvt. Major, U. S. A, 454 INDEX (Aug. 28, 1864); Capt., U. S. A. (Aug. 22, 1871) ; 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (Sept. 17, 1862) ; 2d Lieut., U. S. A., 4th ArtiUery (Oct. 24, 1861) ; his po- sition at Cedar Mountain, 416. Cutter, C, Surgeon, 21st Mass., taken prisoner, Aug. 29, 1862, 177 ; his re- lation of the handiwork of Texan riflemen at hattle of Groveton, 178. D'Aquin, L. E., Capt., C. S. A., posi- tion of his battery of Louisiana Guard Artillery, Cedar Mountain, 419. Danville, Va,, the enemy's movement from Richmond towards, July 30-31, 319. Darling, Fort, on James River, a de- fence of Richmond, 10. Davis, Jeff., Lee's report of hattle of Chantilly to, 167. Delaware Volunteers, 3d regt., stationed at Front Royal, Aug. 9, 416. Dement, W. F., Capt., C. S. A., position of his 1st Maryland battery, Cedar Mountain, 419. Department of the Potomac, under command of McClellan, 391. Department of the Rappahannock, under command of McDowell, 390 ; constituted the 3d Corps, Army of Virginia, ih. Department of the Shenandoah, under command of Banks, 390 ; consti- tuted the 2d Corps, Army of Vir- ginia, ih. Diary of a Rebel War Clerk (J. B. Jones), cited, 12. Difficult Run, Va., Union forces in po- sition on, Sept. 1, 1862, 137, 164. District of Kanawha, Cox in command in, July, 1862, 393 ; the strength of Union force in, 198, 394 ; the force ordered to Washington, 201. Dogan, W. H., visited by Walcott and Stevens, 1883, 176 et seq. ; his remi- niscences of 2d Bull Run, 177 et seq. ; the destruction of a file of the 5th New York, 177-178; the cap- ture of General Stoughton, 186. Donnelly, D., Col., U. S. V., in com- mand of 28th New York, the leader of Crawford's charge at Cedar Moun- tain, 425 ; his loss in the charge, ib. ; mortally wounded, 427. Doubleday, A., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Maj., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (iFeb. 3, 1862) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. Y. (Nov. 29, 1862 ; Col., U. S. A. (Sept. 15, 1867) ; in command of 2d brigade, 1st division (King's and Hatch's), 3d Corps, A. of V., his strength, Aug. 16, 215. DranesviUe, Va., McClellan's propo- sition that cavalry be sent to, Aug. 27, 119 ; scouting force sent towards, Aug. 29, 279. Drayton, T. F., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., the estimated strength of his brigade, July 20, 1862, 207. Duffee, C, Orderly, 1st Ohio, a witness for Government at Porter Court Mar- tial, 243. Duffi^, A. N., Col., U. S. v., in com- mand of 1st R. I. cavalry, under Bayard, 3d Corps, A. of V., strength, Aug. 16, 216. Duryea, A., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 31, 1861), in command 1st brigade, 2d division (Ricketts'), 3d Corps, A. of v., strength, Aug. 16, 215. Early, J. A., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in command of a brigade, Ewell's di- vision, Jackson's corps, his position in Cedar Mountain battlefield, 418, 421 ; supported by Thomas' brigade, 419 ; part of his brigade forced back by Donnelly's charge, 425 ; his guns engaged in attack on Muhlenberg, 428 ; his artillery endangered by Union skirmishers, 429 ; saved from capture, ib. ; his aid to Taliaferro in repulsing Geary, 430, 431 ; part of his brigade attacked by Prince, 431 ; the battle attributed to, 440 ; his re- port of the movement from Manas- sas, Aug. 27-28, 329 ; cited in de- fence by Porter, 248 ; his definition of position of Ox Hill, 136 ; his re- port for Ewell's division cited as to the panic at Chantilly, 156 ; severe engagement of 21st Mass. with, 157 ; site of encounter identified by Wal- cott, 1883, 190; his statement of strength of Ewell's division, Aug. 9, 205. Ellgey, in the bounds of Reid-farm survey, 187. Evans, N. G., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in command of independent brigade, his strength, July 20, 207; in co- operation with Jackson against Pope, Aug. 29, 89, 91, 92 ; his position, 91 ; not engaged, 92 ; his position under Longstreet, Aug. 29, 248 ; not in Porter's front, Aug. 29, 347 ; formed to support Hood, Axig. 29, 257, 344. Ewell, R. S., Lieut.-Gen., C. S. A.; INDEX 455 Capt., 1st Dragoons, U. S. A. (Aug. 4, 1849-May 7, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., C. S. A. (July-Sept., 1862), in com- mand of 3d division, Jackson's corps, the strength and composition of his division discussed, 205-206 ; his losses, 212 ; sent with Jackson, July 13, to protect Gordonsville, 45, 206, 318, 402 ; at Gordonsville, July 16, 396, 402 ; in movement on Pope, reached the Rapidan, Aug. 7, 46, 402 ; crossed the river Aug. 8, 46 ; advancing against Pope, Aug. 9, 12 ; in the battle of Cedar Mountain, Aug. 9, 49 ; his arrival at Cedar Mountain battlefield, 417 ; his posi- tion, 418, 421 ; his strength, 205 ; the composition of his division, Aug. 9, 421 ; the number of his guns, 420 ; his inactivity during the battle, 432 ; with Jackson, Aug. 21, 307 ; in the advance on Pope, 59, 266; Lee extricated from perilous position by his reerossing of Rappahannock, Aug. 25, 59 ; repulsed by Hooker, Aug. 27, at Kettle Run, 63, 103, 268, 326 ; the movement of his division from Manassas Aug. 27-28, 65, 329 ; repulsed by King in engagement of Aug. 28, 76 ; the scene of the action on Stony Ridge, 179 ; his division under Lawton's command Aug. 29, 257 ; also, Aug. 31, 145, 155; in Jackson's centre, 257; his position, Sept. 1, at Cha^ntilly, 166 ; demoral- ized in that battle, 155 ; his losses, 162 ; report of his division at Chan- tiUy made by Early, 136, 156. Fairfax County, Va., situation of Chantilly in, 136. Fairfax Court House, Va., Stuart's cavalry seen in neighborhood of, Aug. 27, 292 ; an alternative in Franklin's movement, 275 ; the enemy reported advancing against Franklin from, Aug. 29, 299 ; Franklin's ad- vance, Aug. 30, to position near, 300 ; Confederate movement towards, Aug. 31, 95, 145, 148, 168, 169 ; Stuart's movement towards, Sept. 1, 137, 165 ; Jackson's report of his movement towards, 165-166 ; the roads between Centreville, Washing- ton and, filled by Pope's trains, Aug. 81, 300 ; Pope's retreat to, Sept. 1, 137, 148, 149 seq., 164, 167; with- drawal of Union forces for defence of Washington from, Sept. 1, 160; re- treat of Sumner's forces to, Sept. 1, 146, 160 ; Torbert in position at, Sept. j I, 149 ; Stevens' movement towards, 151 ; Pope's expectation of a battle at, Sept. 1, 137; Birney's retreat to, Sept. 2, 161 ; Reynolds' strength at, Sept. 2, 217 ; distance of Chan- tUly from, 136 ; General Stoughton's capture by Mosby at, March 8, 1863, 185-186; visited by Walcott and Stevens, 1883, 192 ; mentioned, 140, 141, 144, 146, 153, 168, 169, 184. Fairfax Station, Va., 192. FaUs, R. I., Maj., U. S. V., in com- mand of 1st Pennsylvania reserve cavalry, 429 ; his charge across the wheat-field at Cedar Mountain re- pulsed, ih. Falmouth, Va., King's division sta- tioned at, July, 1862, 41, 133, 152, 393, 395 ; his movement from, Aug. II, to join Pope, 52; the army of the Potomac transferred to, on its arrival from the Peninsula, 111 ; Reynolds' movement from, Aug. 21, 203 ; Porter's movement from, to join Pope,z&. ; Burnside at, 112, 265, 404 ; his strength, 201, 204 ; his de- ficiency in cavalry at, 270 ; Sum- ner to be hurried to, Aug. 27, 114 ; McClellan's attempt to communi- cate with Porter and Heintzelman through, Aug. 27, 114, 115. See Fredericksburg. Fayetteville, Va., Banks in position at, Aug. 26, 62, 113. Featherston, W. S., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., at 2d battle of BuU Run, with WH- eox, Aug. 29 346. Ferrero, E., Col.,U. S. V., in command of 2d brigade, 2d division, 9th corps, 135 ; at Chantilly, 135, 155-156 ; sent into the woods, 156 ; mistake in de- livery of order, ih. ; but slightly en- gaged, ih. Field, C. W., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his brigade in A. P. Hill's division at Cedar Mountain, 419 ; his brigade arrived too late for the battle, ih. ; his advance towards Brown's house, 439 ; his division of Jackson's corps commanded by Brockenbrough, Sept. 1, at Chantilly, 166. Flat Top Moimtain, West Va., the main body of Cox's command at, July, 1862, 393. Fleet, W. C, Capt., C. S. A., posi- tion of his battery, Cedar Mountain, 419. Flint Hill, Va., its distance from Fair- fax C. H., 165 ; Stuart's movement, Sept. 1, towards, ih. 456 INDEX Florida, Confederate troops called from, to re-enforce Lee, Aug-. 3, 1862, 12. Forno, H., Col., Sth Louisiana In- fantry, C. S. A., in command of Hays' brigade, Aug. 9, 418. Fort Darling- on James River, its cap- ture necessary to an advance on Richmond, 10. Fort Monroe, Va., MeClellan's transfer of army from Harrison's Landing to, begun July 14, 24 ; Franklin em- barked for Alexandria at, July 22, ih. ; Burnside's embarkation at, re- ported to Lee, Aug. 5, 1862, 46, 402 ; McCall's, or Reynolds', division em- barked at, Aug. 19, 203 ; further embarkation of troops at, Aug. 23, 289, 298, 299; left by MeClellan Aug. 23, 289; within MeClellan's military command, Aug. 30, 290 ; mentioned, 281, 298. Fort Sumter, S. C., mentioned, 34. Fort Ward, inspected by MeClellan, Aug. 29, 280. Fort Worth, inspected by MeClellan, Aug. 29, 280. ^ "Four Years vt^ith General Lee," by W. H. Taylor, cited, 205. Franklin, W. B., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865); Col., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (July 4, 1862) ; returning from the Peninsula embarked at Fort Monroe, Aug. 22, 1862, 24, 289 ; disembarked at Alexandria, Aug. 26, 291 ; the delay of his artil- lery horses, 299 ; his strength, 122, 213, 213 note ; MeClellan's proposi- tion to unite Sumner's corps with, 116 ; expected by Pope to be at Gainesville, Aug. 26, 323 ; his corps called for by Pope, Aug. 26, to protect his right flank, ih. ; ordered to join Pope, Aug. 26, 272 ; ordered by Mc- CleUan to march, Aug. 27, 113, 114 ; ordered again to make ready to march, 117 ; his corps detained at Alexandi^ia for transportation. 111, 117-118, 275, 282, 290, 291-293 ; Halleck's statement of abundance of transportation, 284 ; MeClellan's de- nial, 295 ; transportation required for garrison purposes, 282, 284 ; at Wash- ington, Aug. 27, 292 ; his delay in moving to join Pope, 26, 60, 62, 74 ; the question of his delay examined, 272 et seq., 333 ; the questions in- volved in the charge against Me- Clellan for delaying him, 291 ; Me- Clellan's attempt to explain the de- lay, 282, 297 ; his detention for the defence of Washington justified, 301; MeClellan held responsible, 312- 313, 333 ; the responsibility shared by Halleck, 333 et seq.; Halleck's im- patience because of delay of, 273, 274, 275, 291 ; orders disobeyed by MeClellan, 312-313; Halleck cen- sured for not attending personally to the details of forwarding him, 293 ; correspondence between Halleck and McCleUan cited, 272-276 ; his road to Pope not obstructed, Aug. 29, 279, 282 ; his despatch to Pope, Aug. 29, concerning rations, cited, 281, 283 ; Pope's conmient thereon, 282 ; com- pelled by Halleck to set out, Aug. 29, illy provided with transporta- tion for his artillery, 299 ; his march begun Aug. 29, 273, 293 ; his move- ment to Annaudale, Aug. 29, 309- 310; halted there by order of Me- Clellan, 273, 277, 293 ; McCleUan's statement of reasons for his deten- tion there, 294 ; his halt caused by report of the advance of enemy, 299 ; the incorrect information picked up there by, 280; Pope should have waited for, after battle of Aug. 29, 93 ; his advance to position near Fairfax Court House, Aitg. 30, 300; again ordered at 1 P. M. to join Pope, ih. ; his ignorance of the battle of Aug. 30, ih. ; 21st Mass. taunted by his division, Aug. 30, 143-144; liis failure to support Pope, Aug. 30, 276; re-enforced Pope's retreating army, Aug. 30, 300, 310 ; Torbert ordered to position at Germantown by, 300 ; his position, Aug. 31, 140 ; in Antietam campaign, 97 ; men- tioned, 253, 254, 298. Fredericksburg, Va,, McDowell's re- turn to, from the Shenandoah, 33; considered as a j^laee of junction for armies under MeClellan and Pope, 9; Pope commanded to keep com- munication with, 322-323 ; King's division stationed at, 1862, 41, 46, 152, 393; moved to the Rapidan from, Aug. 11, 52 ; Reynolds and Porter moved by way of, to join Pope, 203 ; Burnside's strength at, 201 ; cavalry expeditions to damage the Virginia Central R. R. sent from, 45. See Falmouth. Freedom Hill, Va., 273. Fremont, J. C, Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. INDEX 457 (May 14, 1861), Httle damag-e in- \ flieted to Jackson by, May, 1S62, , 391 ; defeated, June 8, 1S62, by i Jackson at Cross Keys, 33 ; ids corps, Jnne 27, in the Slienandoali I Valley, 393 ; its streng-tb, 394 ; bis command made part of tbs Army of Virginia, Jnne 26, 1862, 4, 35, 390 ; given command of tbe 1st corps. 35, 390 ; relieved of com- mand. 36, 390-391; rei^laced bv I Sigel.'36. 391. " I Frobel, B. W.. Maj., C. S. A., Chief of j Artillery, Army of Northern Va., j his demonstrarion Aug. 29, 342. 343, ' 344. ' I Front Eoyal, Va., Banks' jjosition at, { Julv, 1862, 393 ; strength of force at, July 31, 1862, 199 ; detachment of \ Geary's forces at. Aug'. 9, 1862, 39 ; | 3d Delavrare stationed at, Aug. 9, I 416. I Gaines" Mill, Va.. Jaeksofi participated ill the battle of, 391. Gainesville, Va., one of the objects of Jackson's flank movement, Aug-. 1862, 59; Jackson passed through, ; Aug. 25, 62 ; believed by Pope to be protected by Army of Potomac, 73, j 74; Frankliu expected by PojDe to have reached, Aug. 26, 323 ; the | concentration of Pope's army at, j ordered, Aug. 27, 62, 132, 325 ; its j object, 63-64, 83, 325-326 ;' the route to, as ordered, 127 ; the details of the movement, 129-132 ; execution of plan delayed by Sigel, 63 ; the reason for not sending Hooker to, 326 ; iliiroy's movement to. 130- 131 ; taken' by MiLroy, 131 ; Pope's position at, Aug. 27. 308, 325, 326 ; : the army at, Aug. 27, considered by ' Pope as his right "wing, 325 ; Pope's call for re-enforcement at, Aug. 27, 122 : his project of sending force to support McDoTvell at. not executed, ' 60, 330 ; Pope's order withdrawing troops from. Aug. 28, 1.20 p. m.. dis- cussed. 330-331 ; no provision made for holding, 65, 68j. 74, 75, 76, 95 ; ' this neglect inexcusable, 66 ; the , cause of Pope's failure to defeat \ Jackson, 95 ; McDowell ordered to | Manassas from. Aug. 28, 65, 74; a j better position for him, 66 ; Sigel, ■ Reynolds, and King at. noon. Aug. | 2S, 67 ; ordered from, to Warrentou ; tnmpike, ih. ; engagement between ^ King and Jackson's forces near, 28, 68. 76. 78 ; the retreat of Ricketts and King through, night of Aug. 28, 69 ; without protection. Aug. 29, ih. ', forces sent to, 76; conjecture as to the result had McDowell been with his command at. night of Aug. 28, 332 ; Pope's belief that Jackson's movement was directed to Aldie rather than to. 330 ; also, night of Aug. 28. that McDowell had in- tercepted Jackson at. 331 ; at 9 A. jM., Aug. 29, Pope believed Heint- zelman's corps to be not far from, 81 ; Porter ordered to advance with King towards, Aug\ 29, 6-7 A. 80, 226, 335, 383; Porter's move- ment, morning of Aug. 29, on road from Manassas to, 226, 338 ; his movement knovm early by Lee, 248 ; the joint order contemplated an ad- vance to by Porter and McDowell, Aug. 29, 310, 384; Porter not ex- pected by McDowell to reach, 226 ; a Union movement towards, would have struck Long-street's centre. 252 ; Porter's and McDoweK's problem as to diiving enemy back to. 86 ; Mc- Dowell's departure from Pope's order to march to, 353 ; Porter's misap- prehension of the purj^ose of his march to, 336 ; occupied by strag- glers from Jackson's corps, 131 ; Buf ord's report of the enemy's force at, morning of Aug. 29, 85, 86, 90, 231, 337 ; enemy discovered by Por- ter's skirmishers advancing from, noon, Aug. 29, 85 ; Longstreet en- countered by Stuart between Hay- market and, Aug. 29, 342 ; his men worn out in their march to, 348 ; the movement of Wilcox past. 345 ; con- jecture that Stuart dragged bushes to Biistoe from, 250 ; Union forces reported to Porter at sunset as mov- ing towards, 239. ainesville Turnpike,' Jackson's right wing on, Aug'. 28, 308 ; Longstreet's position south of, Aug. 29, 255 ; Hood's position across, 255, 343 ; position of Confederate artillery on, 343. 344; Porter's position near, 233; 370. ardner, A. B., Major and Judge Ad- vocate. U. S. A. (Aug. 18, 1873-Dec. 8, 1888), in charge of the Gov- ernment case before the Fitz-John Porter Investigation Board, 351 ; Gen. McDowell called as a witness for Government by, 363 ; his skir- mishes with Choate, 369 ; his theory 458 INDEX tliat Porter's despatches to Morell indicated a conTiction that he was to attack from the position in which he was left by McDowell, 373 ; this theory not sustained, 374 ; his management of the ease commended, 381-382. Garnett, T. S., Lt.-Col., C. S. A., in command of Campbell's brig-ade, Aug-. 9, 418 ; Taliaferro's brigade ordered to support, ih, ; StoneAvall brigade in reserve, in rear of, 419 ; his forces repulsed by Donnelly, 425. Geary, E. K., Lieut., U. S. V., in com- mand of two guns, battle of Cedar Mountain, 416. Geary, J. W., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in command of 1st brigade, 2d division, 2d Corps, A. of v., its composition, 415 ; its strength, Aug. 9, 1862, 39, 416 ; his brigade under Augur, bat- tle of Cedar Mountain, 414; his po- sition, 414-415, 420 ; Confederate force opposed to, 421 ; his advance after 5 o'clock to support skirmish- ers, 423, 429 ; the Confederates en- gaged by, at the time of Crawford's charge, 425, 428 ; repulsed, 430 ; se- verely wounded at Cedar Mountain, 50, 431 ; his losses, 430 ; in return for August, 216. Georgetown, D. C, Sumner ordered to position at, 276. Georgia Volunteers, C. S. A., 14th regt. in Thomas' brigade, A. P. Hill's division, Jackson s corps, at Chan- tilly, 155 ; 19th regt. in Archer's brigade, A. P. Hill's division, Jack- son's corps, at Chantilly, ih. ; 35th and 45th regt. in Thomas' brigade, at Chantilly, ih. ; 49th regt. in Thomas' brigade, at Chantilly, ih. ; prisoners taken from, by Union skir- mishers, 159. Germans in the Civil War, appoint- ment of Sigel intended to conciliate, 36. Germantown, Ya., its distance from Fairfax C. H., 136 ; Torbert stationed at, Aug. 30-31, 300 ; squadron of 2d U. S. cavalry captured at, Aug. 31, 141 ; Union forces in retreat to, Sept. 1, 1862, 137, 148 ; MeDoweU's move- ment to, Sept. 1, 164 ; command of Union troops at, given to Hooker, Sept. 1, 149 ; Couch's and other forces intended for, ordered to Fair- fax C. H., 149 ; Stuart repulsed by Patrick's brigade o\\ Little River Turnpike before, 149-150 ; Union losses, 164; data for history of en- gagement, ih. ; in Lee's report, 167 ; in Thomas' report, 171. Getty, G. W., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S, V. (Sept. 2, 1862) ; Col., U. S. A. (July 28, 1866), a member of the board to investigate the Fitz-John Porter ease, 351. Gettysburg, Pa., Pickett's charge men- tioned, 180 ; the disastrous charge made by Mudge at, 435. Gibbon, J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. A. (Nov. 2, 1859) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 2, 1862) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (June 7, 1864) ; Col., U. S. A. (July 28, 1866) ; in command of 4th brig- ade, 1st division (King's and Hatch's), 3d Corps, A. of v., his strength, Aug. 16, 215 ; bearer of Pope's order of 6-7 A. M., Aug. 29, to Porter, 226. Goodwin, R. C, Capt., U. S. V., his com- pany of the 2d Mass. attacked at close of Aug, 9, Cedar Mountain, 438. Gordon, G. H., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (April 9, 1865) ; Col., 2d Mass. (May 24, 1861-June 9, 1862) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. y. (June 9, 1862- Aug. 24, 1865) ; in command of 3d brigade, 1st division, 2d Corps ; his brigade, of Williams' division, arrived at Cedar Mountain, noon, Aug. 9, 411 : his position, 411, 420 ; moved to po- sition by Roberts' order, on Brown's house hill, 413, 420, 432 ; his position the strongest, 413 ; Banks' ignorance of Gordon's position, 413-414 ; his disposition of his forces, 413 ; his strength, 416 ; Perkins' order for a charge across the wheat-field to An- drews countermanded by, 435-436 ; his action without authority, 436 ; Andrews ordered to join the brigade by, ih. ; ordered to charge across a field by Banks, 436 ; more explicit instructions called for, ih. ; period of quiet in his front, 422 ; the action begun about 5 o'clock not visible from his position, 424 ; his whole command ordered by Williams to support Crawford, 17-18, 434 ; his prompt movement, 432 ; his charge, 18, 19 ; its effect, 19, 22, 23 ; the order discussed and criticised, 19-20 ; repulsed by Jackson's reserves, 19, 22-23 ; his statement as to error of tactics, 23 ; Crawford expected the sjipport of, 424 ; censured for failure INDEX 459 to support CraTvford, 432 ; expla- nation of Ms delay in obeying- order, ih. ; his brigade could not ba,ve ar- rived in time, 433 ; liis position not suited for prompt support, ih. ; ques- tion as to his influence on the fate of the day, 433 ; his position on Brown's hill not approached by the enemy, 489 ; relieved by Ricketts, 439 ; Pope's statement that he had not ordered battle of Cedar Mountain in the presence of, 21 ; his opinion as to conditio us for success in the battle. 28 ; an authority on the battle of Cedar Mountain, 18, 889 ; his state- ment of Reynolds' strength, 204 ; his statements concerning' battle of Chantilly corrected, 189 ; his esti- mates of strength of Union and Con- federate armies in Pope campaign inaccurate, 204, 208 ; in return for August, 216. Gordonsville, Ya., Pope expected by Government to operate on enemy's commimieations at, 40 ; his proposed operations at, 317, 392 ; Pope be- lieved by the Confederates to be threatening-, July, 45, 401 ; Jackson and Ewell despatched to, July 13, 45, 206, 318, 402 ; Jackson at. July 16. 44. 206 ; EweU at. July 16, 396. 402 ; A. P. Hill sent to. Jidy 27, 45, 402 ; railroad damaged by Union cavalry between Richmond and, J uly, 1862, 45 ; Confederate forces called to, from Florida, Aug. 3, 1862, 12 ; Jackson's movement from, against Pope, Aug-. 7, 402 ; his withdrav.'al to, Aug-. 11, 440 ; Hatch ordered to seize, Aug-. 14, 395 ; his failure, 44, 396 ; Lee's advance to, Aug-., 52, 266. Gould, J. M., Maj., U. S. v., his history of the 10th Maine as to the battle of Cedar Momitain, 389 ; further infor- mation provided by. 390. Graham, W. M., Pvt. Biig.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13. 1865) ; Capt., U. S. A. (Oct. 26, 1861) ; Col., U. S. V. (April 7, 1865); CoL, U. S.^A. (July 1, 1891), 1st artillery ; his battery on Henry house hill, Aug. 80, 1862, 14.3. Grant, U. S., General, U. S. A., his operations against Petersburg con- formed to McClellau's propositions, 42. Greeley. H., cited as to Pope's sugg-es- tion that a General-in-Chief be ap- pointed, 4 ; Pope advised by, to give I up the command of the Army of Virginia. July, 1862, 45 ; cited as to Gen. Le Due, 26. # Green Springs, erroneously given in I one version of Pope's order to Mc- Dowell, Aug-. 28, 1.20 p. ir., instead of Gum Spring-s, 380 note. Greene, G. S., Pvt. Maj.-Gen.,U. S. A. j (March 18, 1865) ; Brig-.-Gen., U. S. V. (April 28, 1862) ; in command of \ 3d brigade. 2d division (Augur), 2d ; Corps (Banks), A. of V., 39, 414; I at Cedar Mountain. 39, 414; his [ strength, 39, 416 ; his position, 414, I 415, 420 ; his service at Cedar Moun- j tain, 431-482 ; his losses, 432 ; in re- i turn for Aug-ust, 216. I Greenwich, Ya., Union forces ordered to support McDowell at. Aug-. 27, 62, 63, 127, 128, 325 ; Kearny and Reno ordered to Bristoe and Ma- j nassas from, Aug-. 28, 65, 74, 827. Gregg. M., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in com- I mand of brigade, A. P. Hill's di-vi- ! sion, Jackson's corps, not at Cedar I Momitain, 207 ; his share in battle of ! Aug-. 30,' 1862, 261 ; in battle of ; Chantilly, Sept. 1, 1862, 155, 157, 166, 167 ; the report of his brig-ade made by McGowan, 169 ; his losses, 170 ; Thomas ordered to support of, 171 ; killed at Fredericksburg. 169. Griffin, C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865); Capt., U. S. A. I (April 25, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. Y. I (June 9, 1862) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. Y. I (April 2, 1865) ; Col.. U. S. A. (July I 28, 1866) ; the 82d Mass. in his com- j mand, 839 ; 848 ; his testimony at j Porter court-martial as to his move- j ment Aug-. 29, 245, 338-339, 346; heard no soimd of battle till nigiit- I fall , 246 ; by h's ov>'n blunder not eng-aged, Aug. 80, 259. Grover, C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. A. (Sept. 17, 1858) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. Y. (April 14, 1862) ; Lieut.-Col., U. S. A. (July 28, 1866), his famous charge, battie of Aug. 29, 1862, 89. Groveton, Ya., forces withdrawn from, by Pope, Aug. 28, 76 ; no effort made by Pone to interpose between Lee and Jackson at, Aug. 28, 68, 69, 70, 76 ; severe engagement, Aug. 28, between King and Jackson near, 226, 268 ; Jackson's position, Aug. 28, between Sudley Springs and, 107 ; Sigel ordered to attack Jaek- j son near, morning of Aug. 29, 835 ; 460 INDEX McDowell's advance towards, Aug. 29, a departure from Pope's order, 86, 353 ; Taliaferro's division struck by McDowell at, Aug. 28, 328 ; en- emy's forces discovered by Porter's skirmishers advancing- towards, noon, Aug. 29, 85 ; Buford's confirmatory despatch, 85-86, 90 ; cannonading at, Aug. 29, heard by Porter and McDowell at Manassas, 227 ; the effect of its cessation on Porter's plans, 235 ; a route from Porter's position to, thought to be impracti- cable, 230, 234 ; Porter considered to be under no obligation to force a movement to, Aug. 29, 376 ; position of Confederate artillery on turnpike between Gainesville and, 343 ; King- attacked by Hood, 6 p. M., Aug. 29, at, 92, 233 ; Porter called to, for battle of Aug. 30, 92 ; disobedience of order of Aug. 30, to march to, a charge against Porter, 224 ; incident of destruction of men of the 5th New York at battle of, Sept. 30, 178; visited by Walcott and Stevens, 1883, 176 ; Confederate cemetery at, 174 ; mentioned, 173, 190. Gum Springs, Va., McDowell ordered to intercept Jackson, Aiig. 28, at, 329 ; order countermanded, 330 ; Pope's reasons for abandoning the movement to, ih. ; erroneously given as Green Springs in one version of the order, 330 note. Hall, J. A., Capt., U. S. V., in com- mand of 2d Maine battery, his ap- proach with Eicketts to Cedar Mountain battlefield, 439 ; Pegram's battery silenced by, ih. Hall's Hill, near Washington, Rickett's retreat to, Sept. 2, 164. Halleck, H. W., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (Aug. 19, 1861), appointed General- in-Chief July 11, 1862, 4, 7, 42, 393 ; the caiise of his appointment as General-in-Chief, 3-4 ; suggested by Pope, 4, 393 ; assumed command, July 23, 4; the character of his ad- ministration discussed, 3-30 ; his ap- pointment to command a cause of confusion of Virginia campaign, 42 ; position of Union armies in Vir- ginia on his assumption of command, 5 ; the difficulties involved by their separation, ih. ; the reorganization of forces in Virginia, order of June 26, 1862, 4 ; his visit to McClellan, July 25, to arrange for an attack on Rich- mond, or a withdrawal from the Pe- ninsula, 7, 318; offered McClellan 20,000 men, 318 ; unable to meet greater demands, ih. ; the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula de- termined by, ih. ; McClellan ordered to send his sick away by, 7 ; with- drawal of the army ordered, Aug. 4, ih. ; charged by McClellan with an attempt to ruin the army of the Potomac, 25 ; his letter of Aug. 6, giving reasons for withdraAval, 8-11 ; cogency of his reasons, 26, 27 ; cen- sured for his delay to inform Mc- Clellan of the intended withdrawal, 318 ; his delay justified, ih. ; his efforts for an expeditious with- drawal, 24, 320; Tucker's de- spatches to, announcing the move- ment of the forces, Aug. 19, 203 ; declined to relieve Pope from com- mand in Virginia, 393 ; the Union line ordered to be held on the Rappahannock, 110, 266, 267, 321, 324 ; McClellan informed by, of the movement of the enemy from Rich- mond, 319 ; surprised by advance of Jackson at Cedar Mountain, 15 ; an intimation of Lee's aggressive policy, ih., 24; McClellan iiiformed by, of the battle at Cedar Mountain, Aug. 10, 320 ; his despatch to Pope, Aug. 18, promising re-enforcements, 266 ; his like despatch of Aug. 21,267; informed of Reynolds' movement to join Pope, Aug. 21, 203 ; Pope's un- wise dependence on the promises of re-enforcements of, 60, 62, 74, 324; Pope's plan to cross Rappahannock approved by, Aug. 22, 58 ; Pope's request for Franklin to protect his right flank, Aug. 26, 323 ; McClel- lan's announcement to, of his arrival at Aequia Creek, 289 ; McClellan ordered to Alexandria by, Aug. 26, 111, 290 ; incorrect information given by Pope to, 110; McClellan informed by, Aug. 26, that the enemy were in the Shenandoah, 100, 111, 129, 322 ; ignorant of Jackson's proximity, 1] 1 ; informed of burning by Jackson of railway bridge over Bull Run, 112; expected by Jackson to send force, Aug. 27, to Manassas, 104 ; Taylor sent to oppose Jackson by, 104;' his defeat, 104-105, 107, 108, 119 ; aroused to the danger imminent, 113 ; his undue alarm for the safety of Washington, 334 ; Me- Clellan's aid invoked, 113, 290; theu- INDEX 461 constant correspondence, 115-116 ; its character, McClellan courteous but reproachful, 115-116 ; expedients offered by McCleUan to, 115-118, 119, 120 ; discussion of the effects of the propositions on, 121-122; his failure to reply to McClellan's de- spatches attributed to mortification, 122 ; at a dead-lock with McCleUan, 120 ; McClellan's call for cavalry from, 120, 278 ; informed of heavy firing' at Centreville, 116-117 ; called on by Pope to hurry Army of the Potomac to his support, Aug-. 27, 60 ; his attempt to hasten re-enforcements to Pope, 25 ; McClellan's appeal to Lincoln ag-ainst orders of, 25-26 ; his projects for hurrying- the re-enforce- ments, 113 ; his reiterated orders for moving- Franklin, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276. 278, 293 ; his orders disobeyed by McClellan, 283, 281, 312-313 ; his correspondence with 3icClellan con- cerning' Franklin, 271-276, 291 ; the difficulty of moving- Franklin made known to, 117-118; the transporta- tion question with respect to Frank- lin, 291-293 ; his statement concern- ing- the abundance of transportation, 284 ; McClellan's denial of, Aug-. 30, cited, 295 ; McClellan's despatch of Aug. 29 to, concerning- the deten- tion of Franklin at Annandale, 294 ; his displeasure, 296 ; his statement to Conduct of War Committee as to McClellan's position at Alexandria and liis efforts in forwarding- troops, 270-272 ; censured for leaving- the duty of forwarding- Franklin to Mc- Clellan, 293 ; his share of responsi- bility of delay, 333-334 ; his orders concerning' Sumner executed by Mc- Clellan, 291 ; his correspondence concerning Sumner, 333-334 ; his share of the responsibility in the detention of Cox and Sumner discussed, 333-334 ; McCleUan's demand for a definition of his pow- ers, of, 121, 285, 302; unable to de- fine his position prior to Aug. 30, 289-290 ; his order defining his po- sition Aug. 31, 290-291 ; his order of Sept. 1, increasing McClellan's powers, 291 ; his instructions to Mc- Clellan as to provisions and ammuni- tion Aiig. 21, 280-281, 283, 284 ; Mc- Clellan's report of his ample supply, 281 ; McClellan's evasion of a requi- sition for ammunition Aug. 30, made by, 281, 283, 284 ; Pope's despatch to, Aug. 30, in comment on Frank- lin's message concerning rations, 282 ; unable to get satisfactory in- formation, 113 ; ignorant of Pope's whereabouts, 114 ; his refusal to get information, 302 ; Kearny's state- ment of his strength, Aug. 21, 204 ; Porter's telegram to Burnside sent to McClellan by, Aug. 27, 113; Pope's report, Aug. 20, of his strength to, 201 ; Pope's report of losses to, Aug. 29, 212 ; Pope's de- spatches to, Aug. 31, not trust- worthy, 141 ; Pope's rejDort of Jack- son's flank movement to, Sept. 1, 148 ; Pope's report of Sept. 2 to, 213, 214 ; Pope's diplomacy in put- ting the responsibility of his retreat on, 141, 142^ 148, 149 ; charged with the responsibility of failure to re- enforce Pope, 301 ; not responsible for misfortunes of Pope campaign, 27, 28-29 ; his extravagant despatch concerning Pope's captures at Corinth, 34 ; refuted by Beauregard, ih. ; his abilities and defects as a military commander. 305 ; his jeal- ousy of McClellan, 121 ; McClellan's intelligence superior to that of, as to state of affairs, 293 ; McClellan's statement of his ignorance, 297 ; Swinton's prejudice against, 5 ; ex- tracts made from the Confederate reports in the possession of, 366, 368 ; mentioned, 5, 6. Hammerstein, PI. von, Maj.. U. S. V., sent by McClellan to get information concerning Pope, 302. Hampton, W., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., strength of his cavalry brigade, July 20, 207 ; stationed at Kichmond, Aug. 13, and did not accompanv Lee, 208. Hanover Court House, Va., Army of Potomac not demoralized by trans- fer from. 9. Harper's Ferry, Va., Banks in com- mand of forces at, 37. Harrison's Landing, or Bar, Va., Army of the Potomac at, 5, 6, 42 ; Lincoln's visit at. 6 ; Halleck's visit, 7 ; army • ordered to withdraw from, ih. ; with- drawal begun Aug. 14, 24, 57, 297, 899-400 ; Porter's transfer from, to Acquia Creek, 223. Hartsuff, G. L., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. A. (Aiig. 3, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (April 15, 1862) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862); Lieut.-CoL, U. 462 INDEX S, A. (June 1, 1864) ; in command of 3d brigade, 2d division (Ricketts), 3d Corps, A. of v., strength, Aug. 16, 215. Hatch, J. P., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. K. (Oct. 13, 1860) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Sept. 28, 1861) ; Maj., U. S. A. (Oct. 27, 1863) ; in command of cavalry 2d Corps, A. of V., 44, 395 ; ordered to position at Culpeper, July 12, 395 ; ordered, July 14, to seize Gordons- viile and Charlottesville, ih. ; and to destroy railroad, 395-396 ; and to push towards the James River and destroy canal, 396 ; promotion to he his reward for success, 395 ; his fail- ure to execute the orders, 44, 396 ; Bayard ordered to join, July 15, ib. ; superseded by Buford, 44, 396 ; his strength, July 31, 198 note ; on Aug. 16, 215 ; in command of brigade. King's division, ib. ; in command of King's division engaged in the battle of Aug. 29, 77, 87, 238, 259 ; reported by Porter as moving on Gainesville at sunset, 239 ; his report of his re- pulse of enemy, 238 ; with Porter until the meeting with McDowell, 85 ; rendered little service, Aug. 29, 87, 92. Haupt, H., Col., A. D. C, U. S. A. (April 27-Sept. 5, 1862), 283 ; his despatches to Pope, Aug. 24, 25, as to forwarding re-enforceraents, 269 ; placed under McClellan's direction, Aug. 27, 113; his encouraging re- port of Pope, Aug. 29, 278 ; his system of obtaining intelligence in- efficient, ib. ; ordered by McClellan to provide supply trains for Frank- lin, Aug. %), 294. Haven, F., Lieut.-Col., A. D. C, U. S. v., his argument concerning McClel- lan's conduct at Alexandria, 265- 285 ; reviewed by Col. Lyman, 305- 313 ; his indications of McClellan's distrust of Pope, 312. Haymarket, Va., in Pope's plans, Aug. 27, 1862, to guard Thoroughfare Gap, 63 ; in Milroy's movement, Aug.^ 27, 130 ; a good position for Porter, Aug. 28, 70 ; Robertson's movement to, Aug. 28, 251; Stuart's movement towards, 342. Hays, H. T., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in com- mand of brigade in Ewell's division, Jackson's corps, at Cedar Moimtain, 418 ; his brigade under Forno's com- mand, Aug. 9, ih. ; his position, 421 ; missed his way in his retreat from Manassas, Aug. 28, 329 ; withdrawn panic-stricken from battle of Chau- tilly, 156. Hazel River, Va., Banks' movement to, 400 ; Bank| at, Aug. 7, 45 ; advanced to Culpeper from, Aug. 8, ib. ; Sigel at, Aug. 9, 46. Hazlett, C. E., 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861), Battery B, 5th U. S. Artillery, engaged under Morell, morning of Aug. 29, 338 ; his posi- tion, 236. Heath, Isaac, occupant of Reid's house, Chantniy, 1862, 192. Hedgeman's River, Va., Rieketts' order to position on, July 21, 396. Heimack, G., Lieut., Zouaves d'Af- rique, U. S. V.. taken prisoner, 439. Heintzelman, S. P., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Col., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 5, 1862) ; Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (May 31, 1862) ; embarked at Yorktown, Aug. 21, 1862, return- ing from the Peninsula, 24 ; in com- mand of 3d Corps, Army of Poto- mac, 146 ; his lack of transportation in going to join Pope, 127, 269, 292- 293 ; joined Pope, Aug. 24, 203, 205, 269, 289, 308, 323; in position at Warrenton Junction, Aug. 26, 62, 323 ; his division under Kearny re- ported as at Rappahannock Station, Aug. 26, 114; directed to protect railroad at Manassas, Aug. 26, 322 ; his supply line broken, Aug. 27, 60 ; ordered to Greenwich, Aug. 27, 62, 127, 325 ; Porter ordered to his sup- port, 63 ; McClellan's attempts to communicate with, Aug. 27, 114, 115 ; not mentioned in Porter's tel- egram to Burnside, Aug. 27, 113 ; removed, Aug. 28, from Manassas Junction to Centreville, 68 ; Pope's project to send him to Gainesville to support McDowell evening of Aug. 28, 330 ; this project not executed, ib. ; his reason for not sending him, 331 ; at Centreville, Aug. 28, 337 ; ordered to Warrenton Turnpike, 78 ; informed by Pope that Jackson's re- treat had been intercepted, ib. ; his movement reported by Pope to Mc- Dowell and Porter, 81, 384 ; Pope's headquarters with, Aug. 29, 82, 384 ; ordered to join in Sigel's attack, Aug. 29, 335, 336; engaged under Pope in battle of Aug. 29, 89 j his INDEX 463 repulse by Jackson, Aug-. 29, 1862, 176 ; his position, Aug. 31, 140 ; his estimated strength, 204, 210 ; no report of his losses, 213 ; his report concerning the order to move to Chantilly, Sept. 2, which was counter- manded, 146-147 ; his corps assigned to garrison duty at Washington by McClellan,Sept., 97 ; mentioned, 177, 298, 299. Henry, H. F., visited by Walcott and Stevens, 1883, 174, 193 ; his mother killed during first battle of Manas- sas, 175. Henry house hill, action on, Aug. 30, 1802, 143; visited by Walcott and Stevens, 1883, 173 et seq. ; the sobri- quet "Stonewall" earned by Jack- son in first Bull Run, at, 173 ; bodies of Union dead removed to Arlington from, 174; the poor Union monument on, ib. Hill, A. P., Lieut.-Gen., C. S. A. ; 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (Sept. 4, 185i-March 1, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862) ; detained at Richmond in fear of at- tack, July 13, 45 ; composition of his division, July 20, 206 ; Aug. 9, 419 ; Thomas' brigade of his division, 421 ; his strength, July 20, 206, 207 ; sent to Gordonsville, July 27, to re-en- force Jackson, 45, 206, 319, 400, 402 ; arrived, Aug. 2, 45 ; Ms advance against Pope, 46, 400 ; by mistake he lost his proper position, 402 ; reached the Rapidan, Aug. 7, 46 ; crossed, Aug. 8, ib. ; his advance to Cedar Mountain battlefield, Aug. 9, 421 ; his position at Cedar Mountain, 49, 439 ; with Jackson in movement against Pope, begun Aug. 25, 59, 266, 307 ; in movement to Manassas, 103 ; artillery duel between his and Union battery, 104, 105 ; unable to restrain his force from plundering at Manassas Junction, 105-106; his re- port of Union prisoners taken, 105 note ; position of his forces night of Aug. 27, 108 ; after raid at Manas- sas, at 1 A. M., Aug. 27, he marched to Centreville, ih. ; this movement not intended as a ruse to deceive Pope, 329 ; his statement concerning this movement, ib. ; his artillery de- monstration, Aug. 29, 345 ; his posi- tion on Jackson's left, 257 ; his con- sideration for Dr. Cutter of 21st Mass., 177-178 ; his report of vio- lence of battle of Aug. 30, 261 ; his division in movement, Aug. 31, to Chantilly, 145 ; his position on the right at Chantilly, 166 ; his brigades bore the brunt of the fight, 167 ; his losses, 162 ; his losses in the cam- paign, 212. Hill, b. H., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A. (1864) ; Brig.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862) ; the pur- pose of his movement to Coggin's Point, late in July, 319 ; left at Rich- mond by Lee, in advance on Pope, 52. Holt, J., Judge Advocate General, U. S. A., his review of the Porter case cited, as to the findings of the court- martial in 2d specification of 1st charge, 243-244 ; 4th specification of 2d charge withdravv'u by, 259-260 ; his admission of Porter's good ser- vice, 223 ; his construction of the in- activity of Porter subsequent to his interview with McDowell, 231, 359. Hood, J. B., General, C. S. A. (1864) ; 1st Lieut., U. S. A., Aiig, 18, 1858 (April 16, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862) ; Ms strength, July 20, 207 ; in command of a division under Longstreet on the Rappahannock, Aug. 21, 307 ; in command of Long- street's advance, 343 ; his position on Jackson's right, Aug. 29, 91, 248- 249, 257-258, 343-344 ; in co-opera- tion with Jackson, Aug. 29, against Pope, 89, 91, 92 ; Wilcox detached from, to support Jones, 249, 344, 345; Law's brigade of Ms division, 254 ; his two brigades not in Porter's front, Aug. 29, 347 ; artillery de- monstration made morning of Aug. 29, by order of, 342, 344 ; movement of Union troops in consequence, 344 ; his the only force of Longstreet's command engaged in the battle, 92 ; the good fighting of his veterans, 89- 90 ; King attacked by, at 6 p. m., 233 ; gun captured by, 211, 218; incident of destruction of men of 5tli New York by his Texas riflemen, Aug. 30, 178; engaged at Groveton, 92; evidence from his report and letters cited, in defence by Porter, 248. Hooker, J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 5, 1862) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (Sept. 20, 1862) ; joined Pope, Aug. 24, 203 ; his estimated strength, 204 ; at Warrenton Junction, Aug. 26, 1862, 62 ; the reason for sending him to the railroad, instead of to- wards Gainesville, Aug. 27, 326 note ; 464 INDEX in advance on Manassas Junction, Aug". 27, repulsed by Ewell at Kettle Run or Bristoe Station, 63, 103, 268, 326 ; at Manassas Junction, Aug. 28, 67 ; tlie result conjectured had lie joined attack on Jackson, Aug. 28, 76 ; believed by Pope, night of Aug. 28, as obstructing Jackson's retreat, 331 ; ordered to attack Jackson, early morning, Aug. 29, 78, 82, 225, 383; did not cross Bull Run till Aug. 29, 78 ; his movement on Cen- treville, 68, 76, 78 ; reached Centre- ville at 11 A. M., 79, 84; reported by Haupt as driving the enemy, Aug. 29, 278 ; his repulse by Jackson, Aug. 29, 1862, 176 ; a gun lost by, 211 ; in retreat from Centreville, Sept. 1, 137 ; command of Union forces at Germantown given to, Sept. 1, 149 ; his position, 164 ; given com- mand of McDowell's corps by Mc- Clellan, 97 ; mentioned, 126. Hopewell Gap, Va., 345. Horton, C. P., Bvt. Lieut.-Col., U. S. V. ; Capt. and A. D. C, U. S. V., his estimates of Eanks' strength, 38-39 ; cited, 200. Howard, H. B., Lieut., U. S, A. ; 4th Artillery, his position battle of Cedar Mountain, 415. Hunter's Lane, Va., 273. Hunton, E., Col., C. S. A., his move- ment, Aug. 29, 344. Hyland, G., Jr., Maj., 13th New York Volunteers, his testimony before Porter court-martial, 245, 339. Indiana Volunteers, Artillery, 16th Battery, in position at Cedar Moun- tain, Aug. 9, 413, 415 ; Infantry, 27tb regt., its position under Gordon on Brown's House hill, 413, 415; in movement to support Crawford, 434 ; its unfortunate position, 436-437 ; its losses in that position, 437. Ingham, G. T., Lieut., U. S. V., his tes- timony for Porter at court-martial, 245, 246. Island No. 10, Mississippi River, cap- tured by Pope, April 8, 1862, 34. Jackson, T. J., " Stonewall," Lieut.- Gen., C. S. A. (1863) ; Maj.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862); the strength of his forces, July-Sept., 1862, considered, 10,^46, 48, 49, 50, 206, 207, 208; variations in Ropes' estimates, 208 ; his strength not fully stated in re- turn of July 30, 205 ; his strength Aug. 9, 207, 210; on Aug. 21, 307; Aug. 26, 323 ; his losses, 211-212 ; his successful operations in the Shen- andoah, 33 ; Banks driven from the Valley by, ih. ; the injury inflicted upon Banks, May, 1862, 391 ; Banks' first military experience, the campaign of 1862 against, 38 ; the escape from serious injury in the Valley of, 391 ; the Union command- ers in the Shenandoah deceived by, 401 ; Fremont defeated at Cross Keys by, 33 ; the success at Port Republic of, ih. ; at Weyer's Cave June 12, 401 ; his advance at Ash- land, June 26, 33 ; his movement to Richmond, 401 ; engaged in Seven Days' Battles, ih. ; participated in the battle of Gaines' Mill, 391 ; sent to guard Gordonsville July 13, 45, 318, 402 ; at GordonsviUe, July 16, 44 ; asked for re-enforcements, 45 ; A. P. Hill's division sent to, July 27, 319, 400, 402 ; Hill joined him Aug. 2, 45 ; ordered to attack, before Pope should be re-enforced, 46, 402 ; his movement against Pope begun Aug. 7, 46, 402 ; his dispositions of forces for the march, 402 ; ruse to conceal his movements to the Rapidan, 319 ; his belief that he had deluded Pope, 12 ; the Rapidan crossed by, Aug. 7, 46, 403 ; his skirmishes with Bayard, 47 ; Union cavalry repulsed by, Aug. 8, 402 ; his advance retarded by Bay- ard, 403 ; his movement towards Cul- peper known to Pope, Aug. 9, 15 ; his intention to reach Culpeper at noon, Aug. 9, 417 ; the suffering of his army on the march, 403; his forces seriously affected by the heat, 207, 417; fed on green corn, 209; fatigued by the march, 19 ; probable effect of a defeat of, conjectured, 5L Cedar Mountain : his arrival, 47 ; confronted by Banks, 47 ; Banks not expected to make an attack on, until re-enforced by Sigel, 407-408 ; Banks' wish to attack, about 3 o'clock, Aug. 9, 406 ; Banks' desire to retaliate for reverses in the Shen- andoah, 48 ; the failure of, to attack, encouragement for attack by Banks, 429 ; Banks' reckless attack on, 37, 48 ; his resources strained to repel attack, 23 ; composition of his forces, 421-422 ; his strength, 207, 210 ; his strength miscalculated by Banks, 48, 51, 407 ; the position of his INDEX 465 forces, 418-420, 421-422 ; position \ of Hs artillery, 419 ; Ms diyisiorL \ Tinder Winder's command, Aug. 9, 206, 422 ; position of his division, I 421 ; Hs cavalry not engag-ed, 420 ; : his leading' division nnder EvreU ar- \ rived near battlefield at 1 P. ii., 417 ; , engag-ed in artillery dnel, 4S ; ids ! artillery attack about 5 o'clock, 423- ] 424 ; liis artillery compelled to re- ! tire by Donnelly's cbarg-e, 425 ; cliarg'e of the 3d brig'ade repulsed by Ms reserves. 19, 23 ; Ms personal exertions in rallying Ms forces after \ Crawford's, 427 ; Banks forced to ; retire by, 49 ; Ms loss. 51, 207 ; tbe i battie noted by Rebel War Clerk, I Jones, 11 ; tbe battle said to bave been precipitated by, 440 ; Pope's chance to capture the army of, 2S ; Gror don's opimon as to conditions for , defeating", 23 ; Ms defeat probable ■ had Banks held position and vraited for re-enforcements. 5 1 ; Union forces outnumbered by, 28, 29, 48, 49, 50 ; ' Pope outgeneralled by, 29; Ms at- ' tack not renevred. Aug. 10, 440 ; his ■withdrawal to Gordonsville. Aug. 11, 52, 440. _ ' j Second advance against Pope : i Lee's order further to re-enforce, . Aug. 13, 320 ; reason for not largely ■ re-enforcLog'. prior to Aug. 13, 400; joined by Lee, Aug. 16. on the Eap- , idan. 73 ; crossed the Rappahannock, Aug. 22, 58 ; conjecture as to the result had Pope attacked Lee ujider , plan of Aug\ 22, ih. ; Lee's strategy ; to permit Pope's rear to be gained by, 320 ; Lee's intention to flank ; Pope, 321 ; his flank movement be- \ gun Aug. 25, 59, 73, 2ut3 ; forces ' employed. 59 ; conjecture as to its ; object, ih. ; 61 ; the scheme discov- ; ered by Pope, Aug. 15. 59, 321 ; the i destination of. believed by Pope to \ be the Shenandoah Yalley, Aug. -26, j 110,111,322. Manassas raid : Pope's failure to i foresee the raid on Manassas of. 321- j 322 ; the serious consequences of j Pope's neglect to ascertain the des- | tination of. 323 ; his ignorance of the ' movements of. inexcusable. 324 ; be- lieved by Pope. Aug. 27. Thorough- fare Gar) had not been passed by, : 62 ; Buford employed. Aug. 27, in looking for. west of tiie Gap, 109 ; 1 his progress to Bristoe Station un- ' molested, Aug. 25-26, 62, 73, 323 ; an opportrmity for his destruction, 323 ; engagement. Aug. 27. with Hooker, 103, 104-105, 268 ; Pope's commmiications interrupted by, 62, 277, 324; no evidence that he cut Pope's communications at Bristoe, 111) ; his raid at Manassas Junction, 101 et seq. ; 292, 308 ; Trimble re- enforced by, 102 ; the disposition of his forces, Aug. 27, 103 ; his strength, 119 ; L^mon forces defeated by, 104- 105, 292 ; his praise of L'mon Gen. Taylor, 105 ; Stuart's service to, Aug. 27, 292 ; supplies captured bv, 65, 96, 101-102, 105-108 ; prisoners and slaves recaptured, 101 ; the gains not commensurate with risk, 96 ; the condition of Ms army, 107 ; cut o£P from Longstteet. Aug. 27, 308; the peril of his position prior to Aug. 29, 101, 102, 268, 280, 332-333 ; Lee's confidence in his safety, 256 ; the unexpected success of his raid, 107 ; his elation, 109 ; Umon dis- aster reported to Halleck, 119, 121, 123. 126, 131 ; his advance known to McClellan, Aug. 27, 277 ; McClel- lau's failure to repel Mm at Ma- nassas Junction, 274 ; tiiat his raid might have been prevented by Mc- Clellan demed, 110 ; his position with respect to Pope night of Aug. 27, 327 ; Pope informed of his posi- tion mght of Aug. 27. 63. 74, 326 ; Pope's conjectiu'e of the plan of, to capture the trains tmder Banks, 64, 327, 331 ; Pope's change of plans with respect to, 64, 65 ; expected by Pope to retreat to the Gap, 80, 82 ; and not wait to be attacked, 82, 83, 84 ; the expectation of capture of, 327. Retreat from Manassas : his eva- sion of Pope, 65, 268, 308 ; skilful- ness of tMs operation, 66, 96 ; his disposition of forces in withdrawing from Manassas. 329 ; Ms movement to BuU Run battlefield, Aug. 27, 107 ; the cotrrse of his army. 107- 108 ; his position, Aug. 2S. 65, 69, 107 ; no evidence that A. P. Hill's movement was intended as a rose, 329 ; Pope's plans frustrated by Jackson's night movement. 328 ; Mc- Dowell ordered, noon. Aug-. 28, to intercept him at Gum Springs, 329 ; the order intercepted by, ih. ; order countermanded. 330. Aug. 23 :. Pope ignorant of the position of , 68 ; Pope's dispositions 466 INDEX for pursuit in a movement of, to Centre ville, Aug. 28, 62, 63, 80, 328 ; his rear-g-uard driven from Centre- viile by Kearny, 278, 279 ; Pope's belief that his destination was Aldie Gap, 330 ; driven towards Gaines- ville, Aug". 28, 279 ; only confronted by Sigel and Reynolds, 69 ; his severe fight with King- near Grove- ton, Aug. 28, 68, 76, 78, 268 ; be- lieved by Pope to have been inter- cepted by McDowell, 78, 225, 331 ; Pope's orders to King to hold front against, not received, 77 ; withdrawal of King and Rieketts from Gaines- ville, Aug. 28, 69, 77 ; Pope's chances to give battle missed, 69, 70, 75, 76 ; probable result of a battle, 69, 70 ; outnumbered by Pope, 70 ; the prob- able result of a movement by, round Pope's right, 328 ; Pope's plan for closing on, 327 ; Pope's expectations from forces sent in pursuit of, 83 ; that his plans for the attack and pursuit of, should have been under- stood by his commanders, reason- able, 336 ; Porter's incredulity as to his capture by Pope, 337 ; his dis- positions with a view to junction with Lee, 327. Aug. 29 : his junction with Lee effected, 33, 79, 86 ; Pope's mistaken calculation as to time of coming of Lee, 83, 84, 337 ; Pope's disposition apparently not intended to intercept Lee, Aug. 27, 325 ; the junction not prevented, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 77, 82, 95 ; McDowell believed Porter could not prevent the junction, 226 ; his union with Longstreet believed to have been effected by Porter and McDowell, 231, 233 ; McClellan's re- sponsibility, 284 ; Longstreet in po- sition to support, by 10 A. M., 248, 255 ; Longstreet's position on the right of, 248-249 ; the character of the ground held by his artillery, 251 ; Ms order to Early, morning of Aug. 29, 248 ; the disposition of his forces according to Marshall, 257 ; his di- vision imder command of Starke, 257 ; his place of concealment in railroad cut near Groveton, 176 ; re- enforced by Longstreet, 29, 344 ; Wilcox sent by, to, 236 note ; in bat- tle he had the co-operation of Hood's and Evans' divisions, 89; the good fighting of his command, 89-90 ; Stuart's movement in relation to, 342 ; attack on, by Kearny and Hooker, ordered at dawn, 225 ; con- jecture as to result of attack on, by King, Rieketts, Sigel, and Reynolds, 79 ; Confederate testimony as to the Union movements in relation to, 345- 346 ; Porter ordered to attack his right flank, 241, 359; Pope's belief that Porter could have succeeded, 89, 90 ; Pope ignorant that he was engaged with a force other than that of, 90, 241, 309, 340 ; court-martial found only a few skirmishers of army of, before Porter, 243, 359 ; his suc- cesses, 309 ; his statement that the Confederates avoided a general en- gagement, 345 ; Porter charged with the failure to flank, 310 ; an attack by Porter on Longstreet would not have weakened, 248 ; such an attack would have been to the advantage of, 256 ; free from danger of attack, 256 ; Porter not confronted by, 341 ; the misquotation of his report in a publication against Porter, 364, 366- 370 ; extract sent to Pope by Mc- Dowell, 366 ; the purport of the ex- tract as used by Pope, 367 ; the cause of misquotation explained, ib., 368. Aug. 30 : supposed by Po^je to be retreating, 259 ; his severe battle with Porter, ib. ; his report cited as to violence of Porter's attack, 260 ; B. T. Johnson's report of the en- gagement, 260-261 ; his rej)ort ap- pealed to, to controvert the charge of a weak attack, 311 ; the attack criticised by Wilcox, 253 ; Porter defeated by, 309 ; saved from defeat, Aug. 29 and 30, by Longstreet's aid, 368. Aug. 31-Sept. 1 : ordered by Lee to turn Union right flank, 144, 165, 167 ; the discovery of his movement, Aug. 31, an accident, 191 ; informa- tion of, carried by a resident at Chan- tilly to Pope, ib. ; his route to Chan- tilly, 137, 145, 165 ; followed by Longstreet, 145 ; his forces in the movement, 145, 147, 148 ; Longstreet not engaged with, Sept. 1, 171. Chantilly : in command of Con- federate left wing at battle of Chan- tilly, Sept. 1, 136; his arrangements for the battle, 152, 166 ; his forces, 153 et seq. ; his division commanded by Starke, 145, 155, 166 ; panic- stricken, 155, 156, 166; the cause of panic, 156 ; the battle forced on, 167 ; his own report of battle, 165- 166 ; Pender ordered to support INDEX 467 Broekenbrongli by, 170; his move- ment to^vards Fairfax C. H., in Stuart's report, 165 ; Pope's failure to do liim serious injury, 94 ; the operations against, in which the Pennsylvania Reserves shared, 133 ; his sobriquet "Stonewall," earned at fii-st battle of Bull Run, 173 ; his rashness, 96 ; his plans inscrutable, 64, 323 ; Cooke's biography of, 3S9 ; mentioned, 198. James River, Ta., its summer climate dangerous, 10 ; transfer of the Army of the Potomac to, 392 ; McClellan's position at Harrison's Landing on, 42 ; Hatch ordered to push a force to, July 14, 396; his faHure, 396; the enemy's movement from Rich- mond to the south of, 319 ; McClel- lan a menace to Lee, 400 ; the Army of the Potomac withdrawn from, 297, 399-400; the force employed for the defence of Richmond after the withdrawal of McClellan, 401. Jenkins, M., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., de- monstration by, in front of Bristoe, Aug. 29. 342-343. Johnson, B. T., Col., C. S. A. (1862), in command of 2d brigade, Jack- son's division, 147 ; in command of Second Virginia Brigade, Talia- ferro's division, Jackson's corps, at second Bull Run, 260 ; his encounter •with McDowell's column at Grove- ton, Aug. 28, 328 ; Pope's orders to Sigel and Reynolds intercepted by, ih.\ gun ca2>tured by, 211, 218; his report cited as to the violence of Porter's attack, Aug. 30, 260-261 ; his report of movement towards ChantiUy, Sept. 1, 147. Johnson. J. R., Capt_, C. S. A., a sec- tion of his Virginia battery at Cedar Mountain, 419-420. Johnston. J. E., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (June 28, 1860-April 22, 1861); _ General, C. S. A., 192. Jones, D. R.. 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (May 7, 1849 -Feb. 15, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862-1863) ; his strength, July 20, 207 ; his streng-th, Aug. 29, 258 ; Pope ignorant of his proximity, 92 ; question if he was in position before Porter, Aug. 29, 347 ; Porter confronted bv, Aug. 29, 88 ; his position, 91, 249^ 255, 258, 344 ; "Wilcox detached to his support. 249, 250, 255, 258, 344, 346 ; demonstra- tion by, in front of Bristoe, 342-34:3 ; kept inactive by Porter, 91, 92 ; his report as to Aug. 29, cited, 346 ; his forces the first to join Jackson at Chantilly, 171 ; his report cited, l7l- 172. j Jones, J. B., his Diary of a Rebel War I Clerk cited, 12-15. ! i Kanawha, District of. See District of Kanawha. Kane, T. L., Lieut.-CoL, U. S. V., in command of rifle battalion, 2d divi- sion (Ricketts'), od corps, A. of V., strength, Aug. 16, 215. Kearny, P., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861), in command of 1st divi- sion, 3d corps, composition of his division, 135, 163 ; his strength, Aug. 21, 204, 269 ; joined Pope, Aug. 24, 203, 269; at Warrentou Junction, under Heintzelman. Ang. 26, 1862, 62 ; at Rappahanuoek Station, Aug. 26, 114 ; without artillery, Aug. 27, 129 ; to be supplied with artillery by Sigel, 127 ; ordered, by way of Cat- lett's Station, to Greenwich, Aug. 27, 127 ; at Greenwich, Aug. 27, 63 ; the hope of capturing Jackson ex- pressed to, by Pope, Aug. 28, 327 ; ordered from Greenwich to Bristoe, Aug. 28, ih. ; ordered to Manassas, Aug. 27, 65 ; his division at Manas- sas Junction, noon Aug. 28, 268 ; in position there, Aug. 28, 67 ; removed to Centreville. 68, 76, 78 ; at Centre- ville, night of Aug. 28, 78 ; beheved by Pope, night of Aug. 28, to be ob- structing Jackson's retreat, 331; or- dered to Warrenton turnpike, 78 ; might have been profitably em- ployed, Aug. 28, in an attack on Jackson, 70, 76 ; reached Centreville before 10 A. M., Aug. 29, 79, 84 ; Confederate rear-guard driven from Centreville by, 268, 279 ; pressed for- ward in pui'suit, 82 ; his arrival at Sudley Springs, Aug. 29, 235 ; ordered to attack early morning Aug. 29, 225. 383 ; his repulse, Aug. 29, 1862, by Jackson, 176 ; the 21st Mass. taunted and threatened by, 158 ; his effort to protect Bimey's right flank at Chantilly, 158 ; men- tioned in Birney's report, 161 ; his indifference to danger, 159 ; his con- tempt of Lieut. Walcott's warning, ih. : killed at Chantilly, 95, 135, 138, 160, 163, 166, 167 ; killed by Georgia men, of Thomas' brigade, 160, 166 ; the scene of his death, 159-160, ISO, 190, 191 J indicated on maps, 187. 468 INDEX Kelly's Ford, Va., Heno's position at, Aug-. 20, 1862, 53 ; Kearny reported by Porter as at, Axig. 26, 184. Kelton, J. C, Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865); CoL, U. S. V. (Sept. 19, 1861-May 12, 1862) ; Maj., U. S. A. (July 17, 1862) ; Lieut.-CoL, A. D. C, U. S. A. (March 23, 1866) ; Capt., U. S. A. (Aug-. 3, 1861-July 17, 1862) ; sent by McClellan to get information concerning Pope, 302. Kemper, J. L., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A. (1865) ; Brig.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862) ; in command of division Longstreet's corps, 2d battle of Bull Run, Pope ignorant of his proximity, 91 ; his position, 91 ; not engaged, ih. , 92 ; kept inactive by Porter, 91 ; his three brigades not in front of Porter, Aug. 29, 347 ; had Porter attacked, he vv^ould have been confronted by, 88 ; his movement to support Confed- erate left, 258, 344 ; D. R. Jones' position with regard to, Aug. 29, 249 ; demonstration by, in front of Bristoe, 342-343. Kershaw, J. B., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862) ; his report, as Colonel 2d South Carolina regt., of first battle of Bull Run, mentioned, 184 note. Kettle Run, Va., near Bristoe Station, Jackson in position near, Aug. 26, 268 ; Jackson in possession of the railroad at, 323 ; Ewell repulsed by Hooker, Aug. 27, in engagement at, 63, 103, 268, 326. Keyes, E. D., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (May 31, 1862) ; Col., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; Maj. -Gen., U. S. V. (May 5, 1862) ; covered embarkation of Union forces at Yorktown, returning from Peninsula, 24 ; left in command at Yorktown, Aug. 23, 289. King, R., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861-Oct. 20, 1863) ; in command of 1st division, 3d Corps, Army of Va., July 33, 1862, 40; his strength, Aug., 213, 214, 215; his division at Falmouth, Aug. 7, 41, 46, 133, 393, 395, 396, 400 ; ordered to join Pope, 404 ; moved, Aug. 11, to the Rapi- dan, 52 ; arrived, Aug. 11, 404; his successful cavalry expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, 396 ; position night of Aug. 27, 132 ; com- pelled by illness to leave his com- mand, 77, 87, 244 ; his division under command of Hatch, 77, 87, 238, 259 ; ordered to Centreville, 68 ; sent to Warrenton turnpike, iL ; to follow Sigel to Gainesville, 129 ; his engagement vnth Ewell, on Stony Ridge, near Groveton, Aug. 28, 68, 76, 78, 179, 226, 268 ; sent back to Gainesville, 76 ; his division reported at sunset as moving on Gainesville, 239 ; at Gainesville, Aug. 28, 67 ; his withdrawal from Gainesville night of Aug. 28, 69, 77, 79, 80, 84, 226, 246, 332 ; his removal left Thoroughfare Gap unprotected, 69, 70, 77 ; McDow- ell's action in withdrawing, criticized, 246 ; Pope's orders to him to hold position at Gainesville not received by, 77 ; not blamed by McDowell for withdrawing from Groveton, 226- 227 ; separated from McDowell, 69, 77 ; Pope informed early morning Aug. 29 of the retreat of, 332 ; the effort to regain, Aug. 29, the advan- tage lost by his retreat, 227 ; detached from McDowell's command and as- signed to Porter for advance on Gainesville, 80, 81, 85, 86, 226, 245, 335, 383 ; McDowell's remonstrance, 81, 335 ; rejoined McDowell, 86, 231 ; Porter's projected attack frustrated by the detachment from his com- mand, of, 232 ; Porter's request that his division should be returned to his command, 245 ; informed by Porter of the advance of enemy, 234-235, 238 ; Porter's despatch to, a proof of disobedience to court-martial, 243 ; effort of Morell to join, Aug. 29, 339, 372, 373, 374 ; the movement to, failed, 372 ; conjecture as to the result of an attack on Jackson, Aug. 29, con- jointly with Ricketts, Sigel, and Rey- nolds, 79; his division useless and not engaged until after 6 P. M. , Aug. 29, 77, 233 ; attacked by Hood at 6 p. M., ib. ; rendered no important ser- vice thereafter, 87 ; member of the court martial, 244 ; his appearance as a witness criticized, 244. Knap, J. M., Capt., U. S. V., in com- mand of Battery E., Pennsylvania Volunteers, at Cedar Mountain, 410 ; engaged in artillery duel, 411 ; his position, 416. Kol!/-s, J. A., Col., U. S. v., in com- mand of 1st brigade, 2d division, 1st Corps, A. of v., till he was killed, Aug. 30, his services in battle of Aug. 30, 94. Krepps, J. S., Maj., U. S. V., his re- pulse of Confederates at Buckland Mills, Aug. 27, 130. INDEX 469 Lafayette, anecdote of, ISS. i Lane, J. H., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his : report of Braneli's "brig-ade in battle of Cliantilly cited, 16S. Latimer. J. W.. C. S. A., posirion of his battery, Cedar Mountain, 419 ; ids ■ atta-ck on Muidenberg-'s battery, 428 ; E^ell's division protected bv. 4:32. Lav, E. X.. Col., C. S. A. , 4tb Alabama, in co mm and of 3d brigade. Hood's division, 254. Lavrton. A. R., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his brigade at Gordonsville, 206 ; not ; eng'aged at Cedar Motmtain, 207 ; j employed to guard trains, 403, 419 : j his strengtb, Aug. 13, 205 ; missed his -^ay in retreat from Manassas. Ang. 28, 329 ; in co mm and of i Evrell's division, Aug. 29, 145, 155. 257 ; his position at Chantilly, 166. Leasnre, D., Col., U. S. Y., in command of 2d brigade, 1st division. 9th Corps, at Chantillv, 152 ; his losses. 162. \ Le Duc; v.. Gen., U. S. V., cited as to unnecessary delay of transfer of Army of Potomac from the Penin- snla. 26-27. Lee, Fitzhngh, 1st Lient.. U. S. A. (March 31-May 21. 1861) ; Brig.- Gen., C. S. A. (1862) ; Maj.-Gen., . C. S. A. (1865) ; his estimated strength. July 20, 207 ; his opera- tions in Manassas raid. lOS-109, oS4; in command of Confederate cavalry, in movement to turn Union right. Aug. 31-Sept. 1. 145. 165. Lee. R. E., General.- C. S. A.. CoL. U. S. A. (March 16-April 25, (1861) : his strength, 307 ; his strengiih Aug. 20. 207. 208 ; strength of his forces. ' August-September. 1862, 197 et seq.. 207, 20S, 210, 211 : Ropes" error in estimate of strength of. 209, 218 ; the extravagant reports of his strength. 277 ; his strength unknown at Wash- i ington. Aug. 27-28, 292 : his army no stronger in numbers but more efficient ' than Pope's. 94 ; condition of his army not better than Pope's, 209 ; Col. | Marshall his aide-de-camp, 241, 24S, ! 255 ; his advantage from interior lines, 400 ; Jackson's junction vrith. ' June 26, 1862, 33 ; Jackson's and i Ewell's divisions sent from Rich- j mond to Gordonsville. oppose Pope, i July 13, 45, 318 ; importuned by Jackson for re-enforcements. 402 ; in ■ fear of attack. Hill and Longstreet ; kept at Richmond by, 45 ; A. P. Hill sent to Jackson by, July 27, 45, 402 ; the purpose of his ruse in de- taching forces from Richmond late in July, 319 ; his movement against Pope affected by McClellan's pres- ence near Richmond. 4U0 ; informed of Eumside's embarkation at Fort Monroe, 46, 402 ; informed of the intention to terminate Peninsular campaign, 11-12 ; his delay in learn- ing of McClellan's -svithdravral from the James. 400 ; having' no fears from McClellan he removed his army to re-enforce Jackson, Aug. 13, 46, 320 J his orders to attack, be- fore Pope should be re-enforced, 402 ; the energy of attack to be expected from. 11 ; his project of an advance on TTashing-ton. noted by Jones, 12 ; his aggTessive policy made known to Halleck by battle of Cedar Motm- taia, 15, 24 : his advance to Gordons- ville. Aug. 13. 52 ; his advance made known to Pope by intercepted letter, 52, 266 ; Jackson re-enforced on the Rapidan by, 73 ; his position on the Rappahannock. Aug. 21, 307 ; an in- tention to flank Pope on the Rappa- hannock indicated, 321 ; his plans to cross the river. 57-58 ; Pope's efforts to block the advance of, 28 ; his un- successful effort to force a passage over Rappahannock; Aug. 20. 57, 73 ; his correct estimate of Pope's exigencies, 57 ; conjecture as to re- sult of an attack by Pope, Aug. 22, 58 : his perilous position caused by freshet. Aug. 22, 59 ; extricated. Aug. 23. ih. ; his movement to Sulphur Springs expected by Pope, 58 ; Pope's statement of his intention to take position between Btdl Run and the army of, Aug. 27, questioned, 325 ; his movement against Pope be- gun. Aug. 25, 59, 73 ; Jackson's raid at Manassas. 107 ; believed by Pope and Halleck to be in the Shenandoah VaUey, Aug. 26. 110, 111 : his posi- tion, Aug. 27, 268 ; Pope's movement of Aug. 27, not intended to inter- pose between Jackson and. 63, 75 ; known to be approaching Thorough- fare Gap. Aug. 28, 66, 68 ; Pope's miscalculations as to the proximity of, 83, 84, 331 ; his appearance ex- pected, Aug. 31. 84 ; Pope inexcus- able for miscalculating the time of his approach. 332 ; McClellan's alarm, Aug. 27, of a descent on Washington 470 INDEX by, 116 ; Jackson's commmiieation with, cut by McDowell, Aug-. 28, 832 ; his force about equal to Pope's, 808 ; Jackson's junction with, not preyented by Pope, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 75, 332 ; Ricketts sent to protect the Gap, Aug-. 28, 67, 68 ; his advance to Thoroughfare Gap, 107, 124; with Longstreet encountered Stuart, morn- ing' of Aug-. 29, 342 ; his forces seen advancing by Buford, 9 A. M., 85, 90 ; his advance reported by Porter, 93 ; Jackson's position with a view to junction with, 327 ; his advance con- jectured, 9 A. M., Aug. 29, by Pope, 82 ; Pope's error of delaying battle of Aug. 29, 79, 89 ; the junction ef- fected, 86 ; his statement as to the time of Long'street's arrival, 255 ; with Longstreet's division, ih. ; Por- ter court-martial ignorant of the presence of his army, 359, 366-367 ; Porter's evidence of the presence of, submitted to the investigating board, 859-360 ; his knowledge of Porter's movement early Aug. 29, 248, 250, 256, 257, 258 ; his wish to attack, 249, 844 ; dissuaded by his officers, 344-345 ; Porter's doubt as to Pope's intention to engage in general battle with, 87 ,* Porter received no orders in alternative in ease Jackson should be re-enforced by, 80 ; Porter's de- monstration regarded as insignificant by, 316 ; the probable effect on, of a more serious demonstration, 377 ; his opinion that an attack would have been repulsed, 249, 255, 256 ; Rob- ertson ordered to support Longstreet by, 251 ; Longstreet re-enforced by Wilcox by order of, 249, 250 ; his opinion that Longstreet was held in- active by Porter, 91, 92, 249; de- terred from attempt to turn Union left by Porter, 79-80, 87 ; his evi- dence as to the withdrawal of Porter, 846 ; and as to the difficult character of the coimtry, 249 ; his report cited as to position and movement of Con- federates, 345-346 ; his statements in accord with Stuart's, 346 ; Pope's ignorance of his presence, 92, 95 ; Pope would not credit, Aug. 30, the report of the presence of, 93, 95 ; his report of the violence of battle of Aug. 30, 261 ; Pope's left wing overwhelmed by, 93-94, 309 ; the advantage gained, followed up by, 94 ; the possibility of his defeat by a different disposition of the Union forces, 92 ; his tactics, Aug. 81, in attempt to turn the Union right, 94-95, 144-145 ; caused no battle, Aug. 31, 143 ; his report of battle of Chantilly, 167 ; his estimate of his chances at 2d Bull Run, 256 ; the av/ful consequences conjectured of the destruction of Pope's supply trains by, 30 1 ; the destruction pre- vented by Torbert, 300-301 ; his orders disobeyed by Anderson and Wilcox, 254 ; Pope out-generalled and out-numbered by, 29 ; captures of guns by, 211 ; prisoners captured by, 213 ; his ability like Marlbor- ough's, his sagacity like Napoleon's, 118 ; his sagacity at Chancellors- ville, 94 ; his successful strategy against Mead in 1863, 58, 321 ; his letters to Porter, 255-256 ; his re- ports and letters cited in defence by Porter, 248; the "Board Maps" verified by, 240-241 ; his verification of Porter's map, 255. Lee, S. D., 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (Oct. 81, 1856-Feb. 20, 1861) ; Col., C. S. A. (1862) ; in command of Light Ar- tillery battalion, 2d Bull Run, his position on Jackson's right, 251. Leesburg, Va., Pope's apprehensions for, after Manassas raid, 76. Leipold, R. H. G., U. S. V., Locke's statement as to interview with Mc- Dowell sustained by, 244 note. Lewinsville, Va,, McClellan's propo- sition to send cavalry to, Aug. 27, 119. Liberty Mills, Va., the Rapidan crossed Aug. 7, by Jackson near, 403. Lincoln, President, his alarm in June, 1862, 34 ; Army of Virginia created by, June 26, 4, 890 ; Pope given command by, 4; his hopes from Pope, 84 ; Pope's suggestion to, that a General-in-Chief be appointed, 4 ; Halleck appointed by, July 11, 1862, ih.^ 7 ; importuned by Mc- Clellan for re-enforcements, 6, 7 ; his reply, July 2, 6 ; his letter to MeClellan, July 4, ih. ; McClellan's letter of advice to, July 7, 6, 42 ; MeClellan visited by, July 8, 6, 7 ; Pope's suggestions to, as to the move- ment on the Peninsula, 892 ; the withdrawal of MeClellan from the Peninsula favored by, 7 ; his purpose to vv^ithdraAv, 42 ; McClellan's appeal to, for orders as to executing Hal- leck's. 26 ; McClellan's incorrect re- port of affairs at Manassas to, 279 ; INDEX 471 MeClellaii's proposition to leave Pope j to " g-et out of Ms scrape " to, 26, j 280, 283, 301 ; Porter's case revieTi-ed ' by Holt for, 243 ; his reg'ard for Por- ; ter submitted in eyideuce to tlie in- j yestigating board, 362 ; Lis opinion i tbat Porter deserved a death sen- tence, ih. ; nnfitted for command in military affairs, 305 ; his creations of independent commands, 391 ; the disadvantages of his policy, ih. Lincoln, R. T., his evidence that the President considered Porter to de- serve a sentence of death, 362. Little River Turnpike, Va., position of Chantilly on, 136, 139 ; in Jackson's movement, Aug\ 31, 145, 147, 148; Stevens' movement on, Sept. 1, 137, 151 : McDowell ordered to protect, for Union retreat, 148 ; comraand given to Hooker of Union forces on, 149 ; Reno charged "with holding position on, 150, 153 ; Sumner's po- sition on, 276 ; Patrick posted on, 149 ; Stuart repidsed on, 149-150 ; Union losses in the action, 150, 164 ; Jackson's report of movement on, ; 165 ; in Lane's report, 168 : in Lee's report, 167 ; in McDowell's report, 164 ; in McGowan's report, 169 ; in Riekett's report, 164 ; in Stuart's re- port, 165 ; visited by TValcott and Stevens, 1883, 180. et seq. : also called Alexandria and "Winchester Turn- pike, 168 ; mentioned, 141. 181, 191. Little Washing-ion, Va., Crawford's brigade removed from, 42 ; Banks' movement to, July 17, 395 ; in Banks' movement to Culpeper, 400. Locke, F. T., Lieut.-CoL, A. D. C. U. S. v., bearer of message to McDow- ell from Porter, 232 ; the message and answer, ib. ; his testimony as to his interview with McDowell, 244, 245 ; his evidence sustained by Lei- pold, 244 note ; Porter's order to Morell to attack. Aug. 29, carried by, 241, Longstreet, J., Major, A. D. C U. S. A': ( Julv 19, 185vS-June 1, 1861) ; Lieut.-Gen., C. S. A. (1862-1865) ; his streng-th, 232, 249, 250, 307 ; on July 20, 207 ; on Aug. 29, 245, 247, | 347, 348 ; detained at Richmond in I fear of an attack, 45 ; with Lee on I the Rappahannock, Aug. 21, 307 ; in { the advance on Pope, 266 ; his posi- ! tion, Aug. 27, 268 ; at White Plains that evening, 331 ; cut off from Jack- : son by Pope, 308 ; delayed at Thor- oughfare Gap by Ricketts night of Aug. 28, 69, 331. 332 ; by the retreat of King and Ricketts his junction with Jackson made possible, 332 ; his advance reported by Porter and McDowell, 231 ; McDowell ques- tioned that Porter could prevent the jimction of Jackson and, 226, 233 ; his forces discovered in advance on Groveton. Aug. 29, 85, 86 ; his junc- tion with Jackson, 231, 309 ; his flank seriously menaced, 342, 345-346 ; en- countered by Stuart, 342 ; warned by Stuart of L^nion advance, ib., 345- 346 ; the jaded condition of his men, 348 ; demonstration before Bristoe, 342-345 ; his position, 89, 248, 251, 252, 255, 309, 343, 344 : the time his forces were placed in position, 343, et seq. ; only part of his forces be- fore Pope, 347 ; the disposition of his forces, 248-249, 256 ; Marshall's statement of the disposition of his forces. 357 ; on Jackson's right, 251, 252, 255 ; Jackson's position in re- lation to him, 257-258 ; Jackson re- enforced by, Aug. 29, 79, 171, 236 ; the good fighting of his divisions under Hood and Evans, 89-90 ; Jack- son saved from defeat, Aug-. 29-30, by aid from, 368 ; Porter confronted by. 88, 309 ; Pope's ignorance of his presence. 89, 90, 92, 241; Pope's miscalculation as to time of arrival of, 337 ; his presence not admitted at Porter court-martial, 368 ; no comment made by McDowell on his ignorance of the presence of, 369 ; Porter's evidence submitted to the board that he was confronted by, 359-360 ; his forces held inactive by Porter, 232 ; prevented by Porter from further advance, 249 ; his field minutes cited as to Lee's wish to attack, 344-345 ; Porter's attack on, frustrated, 232 ; probable result of attack, 88 ; Porter was expected to paralyze, 310 ; Porter's irresolute at- titude, 366, 367 ; Porter's withdrawal, 345 ; Porter's neglect to attack, questioned, 348 ; Porter not con- victed for failure to attack, 360 ; his report of battle of Aug. 29, cited, 90-91 ; hLs aid to Jackson in repuls- ing Porter's attack, Aug. 30, 259, 260 ; the Union left and centre broken by, 94 ; his losses at Ma- nassas, 212 ; care of Confederate dead and wounded on battlefield commit- ted to, Aug. 31, 144 ; his movement 472 INDEX towards Chantilly, 145, 165 ; not en- gaged at Chantilly, 171 ; Ms report cited, 248-249 ; extract sent to Pope by McDowell, 366; not cited fully Tby Pope to Comte de Paris, 91 ; the Porter " Board Maps " veri- fied by, 241 ; mentioned, 126, 131, 378. Louisa Court House, Va., Ewell ordered to, July 13, 402; removed to Gor- donsville from, ib. Louisiana Volunteers, 15tli regt., for- merly 3d battalion, in Stafford's brigade, Jackson's division, Jack- son's corps, 206. Lowell, J. R., Biglow Papers cited, 20. Luray Gap, Va. (i. e. Milam's Gap), in the Union line, July, 1862, 395. Luray Valley, movement of Sigel's corps through, July, 395. Lyman, T., Col., A. D. C, U. S. V„ his review of arguments concerning McClellan's conduct at Alexandria, 305-313 ; his explanation of Hook- er's movement, Aug. 27, 326 note. Lynchburg, A^a., the enemy's move- ment from Richmond towards, July 30-31, 319. McCall, G. A., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861-March 31, 1863) ; Reynolds succeeded to the command of his division, 203. McClellan, G. B., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861-Nov. 8, 1864), with- drawal of Confederates from Ma- nassas, spring of 1862, on his advance towards Richmond, 103 ; McDowell's co-operation with, prevented, 391 ; Jackson's forces engaged against, in Seven Days' Battles, 401 ; his move- ment to the James opposed by Pope, 392 ; Pope's suggestion as to the limit of the southern movement of, ih. ; his position on Harrison's Land- ing, 5, 42; his distance from Rich- mond, after July 1, 8; project for the co-operation of Pope and, 4, 5 ; correspondence respecting co-opera- tion, 4, 392 ; his reluctance to co- operate, 15 ; Pope's open censure of, 398 ; his letter of advice to Lin- coln, July 7, 6, 42 ; visited by Lincoln, July 8, 7 ; Halleck appointed his military superior, 392-393 ; his de- mands for re-enforcements, 6, 7, 318 ; compliance dependent on his vigor in operations, 5 ; his demands not complied with, 318 ; his demands reviewed by Halleck, 9-10 ; Hal- leck's change of plan, after the re- verses of, 4 ; the plan of govern- ment, Jidy 8, to facilitate his opera- tions by a demonstration by Pope, 318 ; informed July 30-31, of move- ment of the enemy from Richmond, 319; directed to ascertain the facts of the enemy's condition, ih. ; he took no advantage of the opportu- nity, 318 ; his failure to get infor- mation, Aug. 5, 319 ; his chance to attack a weak enemy disregarded, ih. ; visited by Halleck, July 25, 7, 318 ; his attack on Richmond aban- doned, 42 ; encouraged with a hope to attack Petersburg, ih. ; his failure in Peninsular Campaign attributed by him to the denial of re-enforce- ments, 33 ; ascribed by government to his conduct of it on military prin- ciples, 34 ; alarm at Washington be- cause of his failure, ih. ; his fears for the morale of his army in case of a withdrawal, 318 ; instructed to send away his sick, July 30, 7, 319- 320 ; the determination to withdraw his army from the Peninsula, 3, 4, 5, 7, 399 ; the decision concealed from, 42 ; not informed of intention to terminate the campaign, 48, 318 ; the order issued, Aug. 3, 7, 320 ; the order received by, Aug. 4, 7, 265, 320, 399-400 ; his remonstrance, Aug. 1, 7 ; HaUeck's letter, Aug. 6, to, giving reasons for terminating the campaign, 8-11 ; the effect of the withdrawal of, on Pope's plans, 319 ; his belief that the interference with his plans was the cause of dis- aster to Pope, 120 ; the projected withdrawal known at Richmond be- fore it was known by the officers of, 11-12 ; Lee's delay in learning of the withdrawal of, 400 ; his presence on the James the cause of the de- tention of Lee's forces at Richmond, ih. ; the Confederate force detained at Richmond after the withdrawal of, 401 ; informed, Aug. 10, of the battle at Cedar Mountain, 320 ; his assumption that his army could not be transferred in time to save Wash- ington, ih. ; and to re-enforce Pope, ih. ; believed its position better on the James, ih. ; his removal to Fort Monroe begun, Aug. 14, 24, 57 ; his belief that the route to the Rappa- hannock was shorter from Aequia Creek than Alexandria, 112 note; the dates at which his command was INDEX 473 forwarded from tlie Peninsula, 2S9 ; details of the transportation of his army from Fortress Monroe, 298, 299 ; expectation of government of a quick transfer, 57 ; liis expedi- tion in sending Porter and Heintzel- man to Pope, 289 ; his lack of en- ergy in obeying orders, 320 ; Hal- leck's eifort to hasten, 24, 320 ; Le Due's opinion as to his delay, 27 ; Lee's apprehension of an attack from, relieved, Aug-. 5, 46 ; he left Fort Monroe, Aug. 23, 289 ; arrived at Acquia Creek, Aug. 24, 272, 283, 289 : ordered to Alexandria to correct irregularities, 111, 272, 283 ; arrived at Alexandria, Aug. 26, 25, 112, 265, 268, 269, 271, 273, 290, 309; con- tented with condition of affairs there, 112 ; in command at Alexandria, Aug. 26 to Sept. 1, 289, 290: his lack of authority, 290 : his command restricted to the Department of the Potomac, 391 ; given command of troops in and about Washington after Aug. 26, 25, 271, 283 ; given charge of forwarding' troops to Pope, 25, 113 ; in command of the de- fences of Washiagton, 309 ; his strength at Alexandria, 122, 284 ; informed that the enemy was in the Shenandoah, Aug. 26, 110, 111, 129; Halleck's call for aid from, 113 ; his activity in consequence, 114 ; in- formed of Lee's advance against Pope, Aug. 27, 277 ; reported the destruction of Bull Run railway bridge, 112 ; Union disaster at Ma- nassas reported to Halleck, 119 ; his incorrect report of affairs at Manas- sas to Lincoln, 279 ; the charge that he could have prevented Jackson's raid, denied, 110, 111 ; his telegrams to Heiatzelman and Porter asking information, 114 ; Porter's telegram, Aug. 27, to Burnside announcitig battle imminent, sent to, 113 ; Burn- side cautioned by, 115 ; his personal escort lent to Burnside, 114 ; his dis- tribution of the cavalry, 279 ; his lack of cavalry, Aug. 27, 292 ; his demands of Pope for cavalry, 278 ; the reports received from cavalry un- trustworthy, 279 ; Halleck's reiter- ated orders to send Franklin to Pope, 117, 293 ; his delay in forwarding Franklin, 272, et seq. ; his corre- spondence with Halleck concern- ing Franklin, ib. ; Franklin detained at Annandale by order of, Aug. 29, 298 ; his reasons for detention, 294 ; responsible for the detention, 274, et seq. ; 277, 333, 334 ; his dis- obedience of Halleck's orders, 283, 312-313 ; the detention of Franklin justified, 292 ; his statement of lack of transportation, 117-118, 282 ; his superior knowledge as to transporta- tion, 293 ; the abimdance of trans- portation denied by, 295 ; the futil- ity of his plea of lack of transpor- tation, 282, 284 ; Halleck censured for leaving the business of forward- ing Franklin to, 293 ; Cox withheld from Pope by, 273, 277, 333 ; Sum- ner prevented from joining Pope by, 276, 334 ; the resiDonsibility for their detention shared by Halleck, 333 ; the defence of Washington of more concern than the safety of Pope's army to, 116, 277-278, 334 ; as anxious for safety of Pope's army as for Washington, 117 ; his provision for defence, 279 ; his distrust of Pope. 312 ; his appeal to Lincoln for direction as to executing Halleck's orders, 26 ; his proposition " to leave Pope to get out of his scrape," 26, 280, 283 ; the intention of this prop- osition explained, 301 ; his solicitude for Pope's defeat, 115, 116, 118 ; his confidence that Pope would be equal to the emergency, 301 ; his exag- gerated estimate of Pope's strength, ib. ; ignorant of Pope's position and strength, 118 ; his fears of disaster, 115 ; his dependence upon imtrust- worthy reports, 278 ; informed of Pope's call for re-enforcements to Gainesville, 122 ; reported firing at CentrevUle, 116, 117 ; his staff em- ployed in the inspection of forts, Aug. 29, 280 ; his effort to ascer- tain Pope's situation, 302 ; Halleck's refusal to co-operate with, ib. ; his indifference as to the condition of Pope's army, 278-279, 283 ; his statement concerning ammunition, 280-281 ; his evasion of providing supplies for Pope's army, 281, 283, 284 ; Pope informed, Aug. 29, that by sending to Alexandria rations would be furnished, 281 ; Pope's comment on this proposition, 282 ; his conduct at Alexandria, Aug-. 26- 30, examined, 265-285, 305-313 ; the number of men sent to Pope by, Aug. 20-27, 203, 210, 213 note ; Pope's statement as to re-enforce- ments inaccurate, 202 ; the number 474 INDEX of his men available for Pope, 283 ; no troops forwarded after his arrival at Alexandria, 202, 269, 283 ; the re- sult of his efforts, the protection of the retreating" supply trains, 300- 801 ; his testimony concerning re- enforcements, 273-274 ; Halleek's statement to the Conduct of War Committee as to the position at Al- exandria of, 270-272 ; the move- ments of troops chiefly under orders of, 272 ; his attempted justification in his report cited, 269-270 ; his omission of orders and despatches from report which would not sus- tain his position, 270 ; his defence in letter of June 20, 1876, to Gen. Whit- tier cited, 296-298 ; censurable for failure to re-enforce Pope, 25, 26, 80, 312-313 ; defended against the charges, 298-302 ; as Halleek's sub- ordinate not responsible for the fail- ure to strengthen Pope, 301 ; the question of liis responsibility for Pope's disaster summed up, 283-285 ; Porter's admissions of disloyalty to Pope, and loyalty to, 362 ; Pope be- lieved to be more enterprising than, 57 ; the army rejoiced by restoration to command of, 97 ; the logic of his partisans, ih. ; reorganization of the army by, ih. ; his disposition of Sigel's and Heintzelman's corps, ih. ; forces taken for his Antietam cam- paign, ih. ; South Mountain and An- tietam in contrast to 2d Bull Run and Chantilly, ih. ; his abilities and defects as a military commander, 305 ; his constitutional peculiarities, 284 ; his unfortunate state of mind and peculiarities exhibited, 25-26 ; probable effect on, had he been ordered to supersede Pope, 26 ; his relations to Halleck discussed, 121- 122 ; Halleek's ignorance of the character of, 4 ; his accusation of Halleck, 25 ; their dead-lock, 120 ; his right to immunity from criticism, in criticizing Halleck and Pope, 118 ; his correspondence with Halleck, Aug. 27, 115 ; courteous but re- proachful, ih. ; his numberless prop- ositions, 115-118, 122 ; his anxiety as to his authority and position, 121 ; his conduct actuated by a desire for restoration to command, 285 ; mis- represented in newspapers, 122-123 ; generally censured, 123 ; mentioned, 208, 253, 254. McClure, C, Maj., U. S. V., his state- ments concerning Patrick's services, Sept. 1, 150. McDoweU, I., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (March 14, 1862) ; his operations against Jackson, 132 ; little injury done to Jackson by, May, 1862, 391 ; his co-operation with McClellan be- fore Richmond, prevented, ih. ; his forces unsuccessful at Port Republic, June 9, 1862, 33 ; his command made the 3d Corps, Army of Virginia, 4, 35, 40, 390 ; Pope's statement of the strength of, July 8, 199 ; his strength, July 31, 40, 198 ; his own report, Aug. 16, 201, 215 ; as reported by Pope, Aug. 20, 201 ; in Pope's state- ment, Aug. 26, 203 ; in Pope's final report, 209, 210, 214, 394 ; his losses along the Rappahannock, Aug. 20- 26, 203 ; the distribution of his corps, July, 393 ; the cavalry under Bayard attached to his command, 395 ; his troops in good condition, 394 ; Rick- etts' division of his corps, 16 ; Rick- etts ordered, July 22, to Waterloo Bridge, 41 ; Ricketts at Culpeper, Aug. 8, 403 ; his position, Aug. 9, 46 ; rations supplied to Sigel by, 50 ; his position at Rappahannock Station, Aug. 20, 53, 307 ; informed by Pope that Jackson's destination was the Shenandoah Valley, Aug. 25, 110, 322 ; his forces near Warrenton, Aug. 26, 61, 113 ; Pope's order to, Aug. 26, to protect the railroad to Manassas, 322 ; Pope's despatch to, evening of Aug. 26, 323, 324; his advice soli- cited by Pope, Aug. 27, 125 ; advice given by, ih. ; his telegraphic com- munications, Aug. 27, with Pope, 125-127; the results, 127-128; the great importance of his services, 126 ; in accord with Pope as to disposi- tions, 326 ; in agreement with Pope's conjecture as to Jackson's plans, 64, 126 ; Pope's intention to occupy Gainesville communicated to, 60 ; ordered to Gainesville, Aug. 27, 62, 125, 127, 325 ; his movement to Gainesville, 65, 66, 125, 129, 131; Banks ordered to Catlett's Station by, 126-127 ; the forces at Green- wich ordered to his support, 128 ; his expectations from Buford's re- connaissance, 129 ; reached Buekland Mills, evening of Aug. 27, 63; in position to intercept communication between Jackson and Lee, 132, 327 ; Sigel's corps and Reynolds' division placed under command of, 127 ; his INDEX 475 order to Sigel from BncMand Mills, S69 ; Pope's hope to capture Jackson expressed to, 327 ; Pope in error in belief tiiat Jackson might have been intercepted by, 65 ; Jackson's plans tnisapprehended by, 66 ; Jackson's communica,tions with Lee cut by, Ang\ 28, 332 ; ordered to Manassas Junction, 65, 327, 330 ; the position better at Gainesville, 66 ; expected by Pope, to encounter Jackson early, 328 ; ordered in the afternoon to intercept Jackson at Gum Springs, 329 ; the order countermanded, 330 ; Pope's orders to, intercepted by Jackson, 329 ; Pope ad^'ised by, to place a large force across Warrenton Turnpike, 329-330 ; the reason for failure to adopt his suggestion, 330 : Kicketts sent by, to check Lee's advance, 67, 68, 75, 331 ; censured by Pope for this, 67, 331 ; King and Keynolds sent to Warrenton Turn- pike, 78 ; the engagement \nt\\ Jack- son, Aug. 28, 226 ; the withdrawal of his forces from Gainesville, 226 ; King's withdrawal approved by, 226-227 ; his forces reported by Pope to have intercepted Jackson, 78, 82, 225, 331, 383 ; his unsuccess- ful effort to find Pope, 68, 69, 77 ; by a<5cident separated from his com- mand, 77, 332 ; conjecture as to the ! result had he remained with his I corps, 332 ; his corps found at Ma- nassas, morning of Aug. 29, 81 ; Pope's ignorance of his position, 81, 884; in command of Union centre, 309 ; his early meeting with Porter, ! 225 ; Pope's plan for the employment I of, in the capture of Jackson, 331 ; | King's division nnder Hatch, de- I tached from, 85, 383 ; his remon- strance, 81, 335 ; the division re- stored to his command, 85, 227, 232, 245 ; the division needed by Porter, 242 ; Pope's joint order to Porter and, 81, 231, 310, 335, 353, 384; the order received, 227, 228 ; ordered to communicate with Ricketts, 384 ; provision made for his withdrawal to Centreville, 81, 82 ; reasons for the same, 83-84 ; authorized to de- part from instructions for the sake of advantage, 81 ; his violation of Pope's joint order, 243, 353 ; with Porter in conference over the order, 85-86 ; his meeting with Porter, 226- 227 ; his recollection of the meeting, 231, 244 ] controversy eonceruing the interview, 230-231, 254; the data discussed, 337, 338 ; the probable po- sition of the enemy at the time of meeting, ih. ; Biiford's report of the enemy's advance communicated to Porter by, 85, 231, 337 ; the report sent to Pope by, 85, 90, 124 ; in- formed by Porter of Confederate ad- vance, 231, 234-235 ; problem caused by Lee's advance, 85-86 ; his igno- rance of the presence of Longstreet's forces, 359 ; discouraged Porter's hope of reaching Gainesville, 226 ; a route to Groveton thought to be impracticable for Porter by, 230 ; his claim that he ordered an attack, 87, 229, 233, 244, 356; his claim questioned, 233, 311, 337 ; his dis- pute with Porter, 310 ; Wilcox's comment on the orders given by, 254 ; Porter believed himself ordered to remain in position by, 231, 245 ; Porter attributed his inaction to the orders of, 87 ; Porter s statement de- nied by, ih. ; his tenacity to state- ment that he expected Porter to at- tack, 371 ; the vagueness of his order, 379, 380-381 ; his forgetful- ness of his ordei-s, 233 ; the want of clear understanding between Porter and, 378-381 ; the effect of his order to Porter as to the place at wliich to put his troops in, on the opinion of the court, 358-359 ; not considered suf- ficiently explicit by the Judge-Ad- vocate, 359 ; Porter exonerated for his failure to attack without the sup- port of, 375-376 ; suggestion as to a proper statement by Porter to the Board of the consequences of follow- ing • the order of, 360 ; his parting from Porter, 86, 230; his route by Sudley Springs Road to Warrenton Turnpike, 85, 88 ; not seen by King after 10 a. m. , 244 ; King known by him to be incapacitated, ib. ; his en- counter with Bradley T. Johnson at Groveton, 328 ; Sigel's position on his right. 383 ; rendered little service, 87, 92 ; informed by Porter of affairs, 238 ; Porter reassured by, ib., 239 ; his message to Porter carried by Locke, 232, 245 ; the result of Por- ter's message to, 232 ; Porter's de- spatch to, considered as evidence of disobedience of joint order," 243 ; did not forward Porter's despatches to Pope, 242 note ; Porter's dispo- sition of forces with a view to aid, 234, 338 ; expected Porter to connect 476 INDEX with Mm, 871, 372 ; Porter criticized for liis failure to establish commu- nication with, 376, 377 ; Porter's in- ability to join, 372 ; believed there would be no general battle, 226 ; Porter's confidence in the opinions of, 227 ; Warren's opinion that he was responsible for Porter's failure to attack, 229-230 ; conjecture that the Confederates refrained from at- tacking Porter because of the prox- imity of, 91 ; advantage which might have followed had his forces and Banks' been united with Porter's, 88, 92 ; ordered by Pope to super- intend pursuit of an enemy not re- treating, Aug. 30, 259 ; his position, Aug. 31, 140 ; ordered to prepare the way for retreat, Sept. 1, 148 ; his prompt action, 149, 164 ; Patrick posted by, to repel Stuart, 149 ; Stuart repulsed, 149-150 ; Union losses in that action, 150, 164 ; his report of engagement, 164 ; in re- treat to Fairfax C. H., 137 ; his corps put under Hooker's command by MeClellan, 97 ; his testimony at Por- ter court-martial, 243 ; treated with indignity by Porter's counsel, before the investigating board, 363, et seq. ; the object of his employment as a witness by government discussed, 363-364 ; his discovery of Porter's note of Aug. 29, 364 ; accused of a disposition to suppress the note, 365 ; the note employed in evidence, 364- 365 ; attempt to prove him guilty of falsifying Jackson's report, 364, 368- 370 ; the caution of his statements, 365-366 ; his silence as to Long- street's presence, 369, 370 ; men- tioned, 93, 184, 213, 219. McDowell, Court of Inquiry, Roberts' testimony at, 19, 23. McGilvery, F., Capt., U. S. V., in com- mand of 6th Maine Battery, 415, 416 ; Greene's brigade supported by, Cedar Mountain, 415, 420 ; strength of, 416. McGowan, S., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his report for Gregg's brigade at Chan- tilly, 169 ; loss of the brigade, 170. McLaws, mider Longstreet, Aug. 21, 307. McMahon, mentioned by MeClellan, 296. Madison Court House, Va., Hatch or- dered to make a cavalry demonstra- tion from, 396 ; his slow movement to, lb. ; road to Sperryville from, guarded by Sigel, Aug. 7, 401 ; Bu- ford's report from, of Confederate advance, Aug. 8, 403 ; road to Cedar Mountain from, guarded by Rick- etts, 16, 404, 410; road from Cul- peper to, 413. Maine Volunteers, Artillery, 3d Bat- tery, strength, Aug. 16, 215 ; 4th Battery under Robinson at Cedar Mountain, 416 ; its strength, ib. ; 6th Battery under McGilvery at Cedar Mountain, 415, 416, 420. , Cavalry, 1st regt. under Allen, in 2d division (Ricketts'), 3d Corps, A. of v., at Cedar Mountain, 421, 432 ; strength, Aug. 16, 215 : 3d regt. in 2d brigade (Birney's), 1st division (Kearny's), 3d Corps (Heintzei- man's), a.t Chantilly, 160-161 ; its losses, 163 : 4th regt. in 2d brigade at Chantilly, 160 ; its losses, 163 : 10th regt. in Crawford's brigade, Cedar Mountain, 414, 420 ; Muhlen- berg's battery supported by, 428 ; its advance under heavy fire, ib. ; removed to shelter, ib. ; its colonel censured by one of Banks' aides, ib. ; Gould's history of, 389. , Infantry, 2d regt. under Hall, 439 ; Pegram's battery silenced by, Cedar Mountain, ib. ; Whitman and True's "Maine in the War," men- tioned, xxi., 161. Malvern Hill, Va., McClellan's call for re-enforcements before the battle of, 6. Manassas Gap Railway, Rieketts or- dered to Waterloo Bridge from, July 22, 41 ; railroad from Warren- ton Junction to, seized by Lee, 1863, 58 ; his arrival at, Aug. 26, 73 ; not protected by Pope, 60, 62 ; an object in Jackson's flank movement, 59 ; believed by Pope to be i^roteeted by Army of Potomac, Aug. 26, 73 ; Pope's movement to, Aug. 27, 63 ; Hooker repulsed Ewell in advancing towards, ib. ; in possession of Jack- son, Aug. 27, 323, 324, 325 ; Mc- Dowell's right wing ordered to, Aug. 28, 65, 327 ; Porter and McDowell's interview, near its junction with Sud- ley Springs Road, 86 ; the Confed- erate position on, Aug. 29, 91, 93, 249, 252, 255, 256, 258, 344 ; Long- street's position on, 309 ; A. P. Hill's position on the unfinished branch of, 257 ; D. R. Jones' position on, 345, 347 ; Wilcox's movement to, 345 ; mentionedj 187, 323. INDEX 477 Manassas Junction, Va., Ricketts in po- sition near, in July, 393 ; Jackson's raid at, Aug. 26-27, 268,^292, 308 ; Union stores captured, 65, 96, 101- 102 ; skUiuliiess of the operation, 66, 96 ; measures taken by Jackson for defence at, 103-104 ; plunder of stores by Confederate soldiers at, 105-106 ; supplies burned at, 108, 109 ; description of tbe scene of op- erations at, 103 ; perilous position of Confederates at, 101-102 ; Pope's orders looking' to tbe protection of, Aug. 26, 322 ; the object of move- ment of, Aug. 27, to attack Jackson between Thoroughfare Gap and, 63 ; in his disposition of forces, 327 ; Kearny ordered from Greemvich to, 65 ; Reno ordered to, 65, 327 ; Mc- Dowell ordered to, 64, 65, 327 ; Union forces sent to Warrenton Turnpike from, 78 ; McClellan's failure to send forces to, to repel Jackson, 274 ; en- gagement at, Aug. 27, 104-105 ; Taylor's attempt to drive the rebels from, 292 ; almost annihilated by Jackson at, ib. ; the return of the remnants of Union forces to Alex- andria from, 119 ; Jackson's with- drawal from, Aug. 27-28, 65, 268, 308, 328-329 ; charge that McClellan could have prevented the disaster at, denied, 110 ; his proposition to employ cavalry in watching. 115 ; Jackson's raid reported by Porter to Bumside, 337 ; disobedience of Pope's order to Porter to move to Bristoe from, 352 ; Pope informed of Jackson's position at, Aug. 27, 326 ; his consequent change of plan, 65, 75 ; public x^roperty transferred from Warrenton towards, 126 ; Pope's fear for his supplies coming from "Warren- ton, 330-331 ; Banks assigned to protection of trains to, 129 ; Banks ordered to push trains to the south of, 325 ; Pope's arrival at, about noon, Aug. 28, 67, 268, 329 ; Hooker, Reno, and Kearny at, 67 ; all re- moved to Centre ville, 68 ; unfor- tunate removal of King and Rick- etts to, night of Aug. 28, 69, 70, 332 ; Pope's plan for movement to, should have been understood by his com- manders, 336 ; exaggerated reports of Confederate strength at, brought to McClellan, 277 ; Banks removed, Aug. 28, from Catlett's to, 67 ; King and Porter directed to advance to Gainesville from, morning of Aug. 29, 335 ; Porter's movement on the road to Gainesville from, 338 ; the Union movement from, early known by Jackson, 248 ; Robertson's move- ment towards, 342 ; Stuart's move- ment towards, ih. ; McDowell's force seen by Stuart retiring to, 250 ; Por- ter's meeting with Gibbon at, 226 ; McDowell's corps foimd by him_ at, 81 ; meeting of Porter and McDowell near, 225 ; Pope's dispositions to se- cure a means of retreat to, 325-326 ; cannonading at Groveton heard at, 227 ; movement to, permitted as an alternative for King, 234, 373 ; Por- ter's intention to withdraw to, 234 ; Gri:^n's movement towards, and re- turn from, 338-339 ; Union troops seen by Confederates retiring to- wards, 343, 344 ; Porter's retreat to, discussed, 338, et seq. ; Porter found guilty of shamefully retreating to- wards, 358 ; in Captain Pope's route with 4.30 p. M. order to Porter, 246 ; neither Union nor Confederate armies in full strength at, Aug. 1^9-30, 208 ; a movement at Gainesville from, would have struck Longstreet's centre, 252 ; McClellan's meagre re- ports of affairs at, Aug. 29, 279 ; Franklin's advance towards, Aug. 30, 300 ; the reiterated orders to Frank- lin to move towards, 272, 274, 278 ; Franklin detained by McClellan in march to, Aug. 29, 293 ; Halleck's impatience that Franldin was not sent to, 291 ; Piatt's arrival at, 243 ; the survivors of Pope's army at, Sept. 2, 213 ; battlefield revisited, 18S3, by Walcott and Stevens, 173, et seq.; mentioned, 211, 212, 261, 369, 370. Manassas. Second Battle of. See Bull Run, 2d battle. I Manassas-Gainesville Turnpike, Por- i ter's position, Aug. 29, near, 233. I Mansfield, given command of 2d Corps, I A. of v., Sept., 1S62, 97. 1 Marlborough, Lee compared with, 118. i Marmont, A. F. L.V. de, due de Raguse, I his rashness at Salamanca, 95-96. Maryland, its defence considered. 9. I MarshaU, C, Col. and A. D. C, C S. A., confidential aid to Lee, 248; his I statement as to the Confederate i movements, Aug. 29, cited in de- I fence by Porter, 248, 249, 257 ; not correctly stated to the Porter court- ! martial, 249 ; his belief that Porter 1 reached the field after Longstreet, 478 INDEX 257 ; Ms statement of tlie disposi- tion of Longstreet's forces, 257-258 ; tliat D. R. Jones was not in line on Porter's approach, 347 ; his opinion that an attack by Porter would have been repulsed, 249 ; his statements not in accord with reports of Con- federate g-enerals, 347 ; the Porter Board Maps verified by, 240-241. Marshall, E. G. (?), Col., U. S. A., his report of movement of enemy, Aug-. 29, 236 ; and of advance of enemy, 237 ; his testimony for Porter at court-martial, 245, 339, 348 ; men- tioned, 235. Marshall, J., Chief Justice, U. S. A,, Col. C. Marshall, his descendant, 241. ' Marshall, L. H., Col., U. S. V., Aide- de-Camp to Pope, carried order to Banks respecting Cedar Mountain, 22, 47, 405. Martin, A. P., Capt., U. S. V., his tes- timony for Porter at court-martial, 245 ; readiness of Porter's forces for attack, morning of Aug. 29, 338. Maryland Volunteers, 2d regt., Thomp- son's battery silenced Pegram, Cedar Mountain, 439; 3d regt., in Prince's brigade, Augur's division, its po- sition at Cedar Mountain, 415, 430 ; its advance into the corn-field, 430 ; its retreat into the road, 431 ; Pur- nell Legion, stationed at Warrenton, Aug. 9, 416. Massachusetts, Banks. Governor of, 1858-1861, 37. , Volunteers, 2d regt., in 1st division, 2d Corps, A. of V., 50 ; at Cedar Mountain, 16, et seq. ; its po- sition on Brown House hill, 413 ; ordered to the svipport of Crawford, 434 ; its attempted charge across the wheat-field, 429, 438; attacked on the right flank, 438 ; compelled to retreat, 429 ; its loss, 50, 429, 439 ; the enemy's loss, 438 ; a futile charge ordered by Banks, 435 ; the order cancelled by Gordon, 436 ; the order given by mistake, ib. ; ordered to re- join the brigade, ib. ; ordered to join Banks at 6 o'clock, 433 ; saved by McDowell from participating in second Bull Run, 126 ; C. J. Mills an officer in, 266 ; Quint's record of, 389 : 8th regt., its guns of Cook's battery, at Chantilly, 135 note ; 21st regt., in Reno's brigade, 143, 153, 156 ; its position and service, Aug. 30, on Henry House hill, 143 ; its want of confidence in Pope, 144 ; taunted by Franklin's division, ib. ; its participation in the battle of Chan- tilly, 138 ; its position in the woods, 156 ; its shattered condition on with- drawal from the woods, 157 ; its severe engagement with Early's bri- gade, ib. ; its delay in supporting Birney, 158 ; its guns unserviceable, ib. ; taunted by Kearny, ib. ; its losses, 163 ; Dr. Cutter, its fighting surgeon, 178 ; its route to Chantilly traced by Walcott and Stevens, 1883, 180, et seq. ; the site of its encounter with Early's forces identified, 190 ; its po- sition when Kearny was killed, 191 : 28th regt., at Chantilly, 152, 154 ; its losses, 162 : 32d regt., its movement, Aug. 29, 339. Meade, G., Col.,U. S. V., data supplied by, 217. Meade, G. G., his services in battle of Aug. 30, 94 ; forced by Lee, in 1863, to retreat behind Bull Run, 58, 321. Michigan, Adjutant-General, data of losses at Chantilly supplied by, 161. — — , Volunteers, 2d regt., in 3d bri- gade (Poe's), 1st division, 3d Corps, its losses at Chantilly, 163 ; 8th regt., in 1st brigade (Christ's), 1st division, 9th Corps, at Chantilly, 152; its losses, 162 ; Robertson's " Michigan in the War " mentioned, 161. Millan, Walker, an authority on battle of Chantilly, 189 ; his name incor- rectly printed MoUen in Stuart's re- port, 191, 192 note. Millan's House, Chantilly, in the battle of Sept. 1, 165 ; in the bounds of Reid farm survey, 188. Miller, E. H., Lieut.-Col., C. S. A., of 34th North Carolina regt., mortally wounded at Chantilly, 170. Mills, C. J., citation from his diary as to the condition of the army, Aug. 20-24, 266-267. Milroy, R. H., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in command of brigade, 1st Corps, 36 ; the bridge at Buckland Mills saved and secured by, Aug. 27, 130 ; his movement to Gainesville, 130-131. Mitchell's Station, Va., road to, 413 ; its proximity to Cedar Mountain, 411. MoUen House. See Millan. Monroe, Fort. See Fort Monroe. Monteith, his testimony for Porter at court-martial, 245. MoreU, G. W., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., in command of 1st division, 5th Corps (Porter), in return for August, 217; INDEX 479 joined Pope, Aug'. 26, &03 ; Hs readi- ness for attack, morning- of Aug. 29, SoS ; liis position, 233 ; approach, of the enemy discovered by, 85 ; Porter's order to, on adyance of enemy, 23J: ; informed of movement of enemy by Marshall, 237 ; an attack on, ex- pected, 238 ; Porter's order to, vnth. a view to an attack, 239, 241, 242, 373-374 ; the time of issue of order discussed, 374 ; order carried by Locke, 241 ; ordered by Porter to support Sigel. 234, 235, 372, 373 ; o-\ving to the difficulties of the case no effort made by, 374 ; as an alter- native directed to push, towards Centre-sTlle, 373 ; his demonstration, 91, 376—377 ; Porter dissuaded by, countermanded the order, 229, 246 ; the time of his movement, 339, 340 ; ordered into position for the night, 239, 242 ; his correspondence Mith Porter, 235-238 ; his position at the front until Aug-. 30, 246 ; his testi- mony for Porter at court-martial, 245 ; his correspondence vrith Porter, evidence that Porter retreated. Aug. 29, 340 ; his testimony as to Pope's orders, 338. Morrison, D., Col., 79th New York, at Chantillv, 152 ; his losses, 162. Morse, C. P., U. S. V., 439. Mosby, J. S., Col., C. S. A., account of the organization of his guerrilla force, 184 et seq. ; story of the Union spy, 185 ; Gen. Stoug-hton captured by, 185 et seq. ; the deserter from a Kew York regiment in his command, 186 ; the demoralization caused by his service, 186 ; Lee informed by, of withdrawal of Burnside from the Peninsula, 46, 402. Motmtain Department, West Va., under command of Fremont, 390 ; its forces constituted the 1st Corps, Army of Virginia, ib. Mudge, C. P., Lieut.-CoL, 2d Mass. (Jime 6. 1863) ; Ist Lieut. (May 25, 1861) ; Capt. (July 8. 1861) ; citation from his diary as to the condition of the army, 267 ; bis disastrous charge at Gettvsburg', 435. MuHenberg. E. D., Lieut., U. S. A., in command of battery F, 4th artillery, at Cedar Motmtain, 415 ; his posi- tion, 411, 415 ; supported by 10th Maine, 428 ; attacked by Latimer's battery, ib. Munroe, Mrs., her reminiscences of battle of ChantiUy, 183. j Napoleon I., his eensnre of Victor and I Mannont for rashness at Talavera I and Salamanca, 95-96 ; Lee com- I pared with, 118. j New Baltimore, Va., McDowell joined ! by Reynolds, Aug. 27, at, 131. j New Jersey Volunteers, in engagement, Aug". 27, at Manassas Jimctiou, 104. j New Orleans, La., mentioned, 14. ; Newport News, Va., Porter embarked at, Aug. 20, 24, 223 ; estimate of time necessary for shipping transpor- tation material at, 27. j New York, Adjutant-General, infor- mation supplied bv, of losses at I Chantilly, 161. New York Highlanders. See New I York Volunteers, 79th regi;. : New York Volunteers, Artillery, bat- 1 tery L, under Poemer at Cedar I Mountain. 410 ; position of, 415 ; j battery M, under Cothran, position, I Aug. 9, on Brown Hotise hill, 413; I 415. i Cavalry, capture of a company of, j by Eobertson, Aug. 31, 1802, near Chantilly, 147 ; 2d regt. (Harris Light, Kilpatiiek), with 1st division, 3d Corps, A. of v., its streng'th, Aug. 16, 215. Infantry, 1st regt. in 2d brigade, (Birney), 1st division (Kearny), 3d Corps (Heintzelman), at battle of Chantilly, 160-161 ; its loss not re- ported, 163 : 5th. regt., in 3d brigade (Warren), 2d division (Sykes), 5th Corps (Porter), in the battle of Groveton, Aug. 30, 1862, destruction of men of, by Texan riflemen, 178, 179 : 13th regi;., its officers, Aug. 29, 245 ; employed in skirmishing- by Morell, 338, '339: 20th regt., iu. 3d brigade (Patrick), 1st division, 3d Corps of Army of Virginia (McDow- ell), 164; losses in engagement be- fore Germantown, Sept. 1, 150. 164 : 28th regt., in battle of Cedar Moun- tain, 414 ; in Crawford's charge, 424 ; the charge led by its colonel, 425 ; its colonel killed, 427 : 40th regt., in 2d brigade (Birnev), 1st division, 3d Corps, at Chantilly, 160-161 ; its losses, 163 : 46th regt., in 2d brigade, 1st division, 9th Corps, at Chantilly, I 152 ; its losses, 162 : 51st regt., ia Reno's brigade, 143, 153, 155 ; its position and service, Aug. 30, on Henry House hill, 143 ; its move- ment on Chantilly battlefield, 155 ; under mistake in order sent to 480 INDEX the woods, 156 ; its losses, 163 : 60t}i rsg-t., stationed at Warrenton Spring's, Aug-. 9, 411) : 79th reg-t., in Greene's brig'ade, Augnr's division, at battle of Cedar Mountain, 416 : 79th regt., Highlanders, under Col. Morrison, at Chantilly, 152; Capt. Stevens assigned to, in the charge, 154 ; its colors carried hy Gen. Ste- vens, ih. ; its losses, 162 : 101st regt., in 2d brigade (Birney), 1st division (Kearny), 3d Corps (Heintzelman), at Chantilly, 160, 161 ; its losses heavy, but not reported, 163 : 102d regt., in Prince's brigade. Augur's division, its position at battle of Cedar Mountain, 415, 430 ; its ad- vance into the corn-field, 430 ; its retreat to the road, 431. Ninth Army Corps. See U. S. Army Corps. North Carolina, Union forces from, which joined Pope, poorly fitted for the campaign, 127. , Volunteers, C. S. A., 7th regt., in Branch's brigade, at Chantilly, 154 : 16th regt., in Pender's brigade, A. P. Hill's division, Jackson's corps, at battle of Chantilly, 155, 170 ; its commanding officer, Captain Stowe, wounded, 170 : 18th regt. in Branch's brigade, at Chantilly, 154, 168 : 22d regt., in Pender's brigade, at Chan- tilly, 155 : 28th regt., in Branch's brigade, at Chantilly, 154 ; per- formed picket duty night of Sept. 1, 168 : 33d regt., in Branch's brigade, at ChantUly, 154: 34th regt., in Pender's brigade, at Chantilly, 155, 170 ; its colonel, Riddick, and Lieut.- Col. Miller, mortally wounded, 170 : 37th regt., in Branch's brigade, at ChantiUy, 154: 38th regt., in Pen- der's brigade, at Chantilly, 165. O'Brien, IJ. S. V., first man shot at Bull Run, 1861, the story of the inci- dent, 183-184, 184 note. O'Conor, C, his examination of Pope's order to Porter, Aug. 28, 328. Ohio Volunteers, 5th regt., in Geary's brigade, Augur's division, its po- sition battle of Cedar Mountain, 415, 430 ; severely engaged, 430 ; its losses, ih. : 7th regt., in Geary's bri- gade, its position at battle Cedar Mountain, 415 ; its steady advance under destructive fire, 429-430 ; compelled to retreat, 430 ; its losses, ib.\ 29th regt., in Geary's brigade. 430 ; its severe engagement at Cedar Mountain, ih. : 66th regt., of Geary's brigade, at Cedar Mountain, 415, 429 ; its position, 415 ; its steady ad- vance under destructive fire, 430 ; compelled to retreat, ih. Orange and Alexandria Railroad, Mit- chell's Station on, 413 ; five com- panies of Greene's brigade at, Aug. 9, 39 ; Lee's plans against, Aug. 20, 58 ; cut at Bristoe Station by Jack- son, Aug. 25, 62, 74 ; Union forces at Bealton on, Aug. 26, 73 ; in the possession of Jackson, Aug. 27, 112; Pope's erroneous conjecture that Jackson's objective was his supply trains on, 64, 67, 74, 109 ; Pope's po- sition on, Aug. 27, 308 ; under Jack- son's control, Aug. 28, 107; unfinished division, demonstration made by Confederate artillery, Aug. 29, from position on, 342, 343 ; seized by Lee, 1863, 58. Orange Court House, Va., Union ad- vance expected by Confederates from, July 13, 402 ; road to, from Culpeper, proximity of Cedar Run to, 411, 413. Orleans, L. P., due d', Comte de Paris, misled as to Banks' streng th, 38 ; Pope's movement of Aug. 27, ap- proved by, 63 ; considered Pope's estimate of Jackson's plan absurd, 64 ; cited as to Stuart's service at Manassas, Aug. 27, 292; Pope's partial extract from Longstreet's report in letter to, 91 ; his treatment of the Porter case, 356 ; his corre- spondence with Pope, its publication, 313 ; his controversy with Pope, 356. Orleans, Va., in Jackson's flank move- ment, Aug., 1862, 59. Orr's Rifles, at Chantilly, 169. Ox Hill, Va., battle of, Sept. 1, 1862, 135-194 ; its position, 136 ; its dis- tance from Pleasant Valley, 161 note ; in Lee's route, Aug. 31, 95 ; in Jackson's report, 165-166 ; in D. R. Jones' report, 170 ; in Lane's re- port, 168 ; in Lee's report, 167 ; in McGowan's report, 169 ; in Pender's report, 170 ; Stuart's report of oper- ations at, Sept. 1, 165 ; visited by Walcott and Stevens, 1883, 188 ei seq. ; the Confederate name for battle of Chantilly. Ox Road, 191. Paris, Comte de. See Orleans, L. P., due d'. INDEX 481 Patrick. M. E.. Bvt. Maj.-Gen.. U. S. \ V. (Marcli 13, 1S65) ; Brig-.-Gen. U. | S. V. (March. IT, 1862) ; in command of 3d brigade, 1st division, 3d Corps. I A. of v., 149, 16-1 ; his strength. Aug. ' 16, 215 ; his position, Sept. 1, in Union ' retreat from CentreviUe, 137 ; Me- . Dowell's meeting with, 1-49 ; Stuart repulsed by, on Little River Turn- pike, 149-150 ; his losses, 164 ; source of information as to his services, Sept. 1, 150. Patterson, R., Maj.-Gen.. U. S. V., suc- ceeded by Banks in command at Harper's Ferry, 37, PegTam. W. J., Capt., C. S. A., position of his battery, Cedar Mountain, 419, 439 ; his fire upon Ricketts, 419 ; silenced with heaw loss. ih. Pelouze. L. H.. Bvt.^ BrigvGen.. U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt..U. S. A. j ■ (May 14. 1861) ; Maj., A. D. C, U. S. A. (July 8, 1862) ; on Pope's staff. | July 3-Aug. 20, 1862 ; Pope's order '; to Banks of Aug-. 9 transcribed by. ! 21, 47, 405 ; copy of his retained ' copv, 405 ; liis altercation with j colonel of the 10th Maine. 428-429. I Pender, W. D., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A.. ! in command of a brigade, A. P. ' Hill's division, Jackson's corps, at Cedar Mountain, 419 ; his position on ColgTove's flank. 437 ; his share in battle of Aug. 30, 261 ; at Chan- tilly, Sept. 1. 155, 166 ; his position in the late afternoon, 157, 159 : with Branch and Gregg bore the brunt of fight, 167 ; bis position, 170 ; his losses, ih. ; his report of the battle, ih. Peninsular Campaign in V irginia. See Virginia. i Peninsular War. See Spain. Pennsylvania, the defence of, consid- ered. 9. , Adjutant - General, data sup- i plied by. 161. j , Volunteers. Bates' History of, \ xi. 161. ' ~ I — , Artillery, battery E, un- 1 der Knap, at Cedar Mountain. 410, | 416. , Cavalry, 1st regi:., of re- serves, repulsed in a charge. Cedar Moimtain, 429 : 12th regt.. five sur- : vivors of engagement at Manassas. ' Aug. 27. 119 ; ordered to Barnard for , scouting duty, Aug. 29, 279. I , Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves, under Reynolds, at War- renton, Aug. 26, 61 ; ordered to Gainesville, Aug. 27, 62 ; joined Mc- Dowell at Xew Baltimore, 131 ; theii- operations against Jackson, 132 ; their strength, Sei^t. 2. 217 ; history of. by Sypher, cited, ih. : 11th regt., in Prince's brigade. Augur's division, its position, battle of Cedar Moun- tain, 415 : 2Sth regt., detached from Geary's brigade, Aug-. 9, at Thor- oughfare, 416 : 29th regt., not en- gaged at Cedar Mountain, 416-417 : 46th regt., in Cra-v\'ford's brigade at Cedar Mountain, 414 ; in Crawford's charge, 424 : 50th regt., in 1st bri- gade, 1st division, 9th Corps, at Chantilly, 152 ; its losses, 162 : 51st regi;., in Reno's brigade, 143, 153 ; its position and serrice in second battle of Bull Run. Aug. 30, 143 ; its position at Chantilly. not engaged, 156; its losses, not reported, 163: 57th regi:., in 2d brigade (Birney), 1st division (Kearny), 3d Corps, at Chantilly, its losses not reported, 163 : 62 d regi:., employed as skir- mishers by Morell, morning of Aug. 29, 338 : 99tli regi:., iu 3d brigade (Poe), 1st division. 3d Corps, its losses at Chantilly. 163 : 100th regi:., in 2d brigade, 1st division. 9th Corps, at Chantilly, 152 ; its losses, 162 : 109th regt., in Prince's brigade, Augnr's division. 415, 430 ; its po- sition at Cedar Mountain, 415 ; its advance into the corn-field, 430 ; its retreat to the road, 431 : 111th regt., in Prince's brigade, at Cedar Moun- tain, 430 ; its advance into the corn- field, ih. ; its retreat to the road, 431. Perkins. S., 2d Lieut., 2d Mass. Tegi:., his progTiostication, Aug. 8. of a battle, 15-16 ; chief of Banks' staff, 434; 2d Massachusetts ordered into tke wood by, ib. ; his order for a liopeless charge, 435 ; not obeyed, 436 ; his acknowledgment of a mis- take, ih. ; killed at Cedar Mountain, 16. Petersburg, Va.. McClellan encouraged in his plans against, 42. Piatt, A. S., Brig.-Gen.. U. S. V., in command of brigade, Reserve Corps (Sturgis), re-enforced Pope. AiTg. 26, 198, 203; assigned to Porters corps, 205 ; at Warrenton J unction, 2-12-243 ; at Manassas. Aug. 29, 243 ; bis movement, 233 ; joined Pope, Aug. 30, 243 ; his strength, ih. Pickett. G. E., Capt., U. S. A. (March 3, 1855-June 25, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., 482 INDEX C. S. A., his charge at Getty shu|g mentioned, 180. Pitcher, T. G., Bvt. Brig-.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 12, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. A. (Oct. 19, 1858) ; Brig-.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862) ; Col., U. S. A. (July 28, 1866) ; in command of bat- talion, 8th and 12th U. S. Infantry, his extraordinary service in skirmish- ing- at Cedar Mountain, 415. Pleasant Valley, Va., distance from Ox Hill, 166; in Jackson's movement, 166 note. Poague, W. T., Capt., C. S. A., posi- tion of his battery, Cedar Mountain, 419. Poe, O. M., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (July 1, 1860); Col., 2d Mich. (Sept. 16, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862-March 4, 1863) ; Capt., U. S. A. (March 3, 1863) ; Major, U. S. A. (March 7, 1867) ; Lieut.-Col., U. S. A. ; Col., U. S. A. (April 7, 1888) ; in command of 3d brigade, 1st division (Kearny), 3d Corps, at Chantilly, 161 ; his losses, 163-164. Pony Mountain, Va., detachment of Geary's forces at, Aug. 9, 1862, 39. Poolesville, Va., scouting force sent to, Aug. 29, 279. Pope, D., Bvt. Maj., U. S. A. (March 2, 1867) ; Capt., U. S. V. (June 30, 1862) ; 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (July 28, 1866-Oct. 10, 1871) ; bearer of Pope's 4.30 p. M. order to Porter, 240; car- ried back Porter's acknowledgment, 241, 242 ; his testimony for govern- ment at Porter court-martial, 243, 245, 246. Pope, J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. A. (July 1, 1856) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (March 21, 1862) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (July 14, 1862) ; his services in capture of Island No. 10 and of Corinth, 34 ; given command of the Army of Virginia, June 26, 1862, 4, 34, 42, 390 ; assumed command, June 27, 391 ; the composition of his command, 4, 35-36, 390; the junior of his corps commanders, 390 ; Fremont refused to serve under, 390, 391 ; project of government for his employment, 40, 318, 392 ; position of his forces before Washington, 5, 12-13 ; his headquarters at Wash- ington, 392 ; his expectation of the union of the two armies in Virginia under his command, 399 ; the cav- alry reported as in a bad condition by, 40, 394 ; the position of his army corps in July, 393 ; his orders for the concentration of his army, 40-41, 394-396 ; his testimony, July 8, be- fore the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 8, 35, 317 ; his descrip- tion of the Western troops, 14, 28 ; his project for defence of Washing- ton, 13, 317 ; the changes in affairs in Virginia after his arrival at Wash- ington, 42 ; McClellan's movement to the James opposed by, 392 ; prob- lem of government as to his coop- eration with McClellan, 5 ; his claims as to the possible service of McClel- lan's forces under his command, 14 ; withdrawal of McClellan from the Peninsula, advised by, July 8, 7; his plans consequent upon the Avith- drawal, 5, 319 ; Crawford ordered to Culpeper, July 10, by, 42 ; his ad- dress, July 14, 1862, to the Army of Virginia, 13-14, 43 ; cited, 397 ; his general orders as to foraging and rebellious Virginians, 43, 398-399 ; exasperation caused by, 399 ; con- trast between the spirit of his ad- dress and of his report, 29 ; its in- sinuations and want of tact, 398 ; the offence given by, ih. ; the dislike in the army for, ih. ; his reluctance to continue in command of the Army of Virginia, 29, 45, 393 ; advised by Greeley to resign, 45 ; his request to be relieved not granted, 393 ; an attack on Gordonsville by, appre- hended by Lee, 12, 45, 401 ; informed of Hatch's slow movements, July 17, 396 ; Hatch replaced by Buford, 44 ; his good provisions for safety of Shenandoah Valley, 41 ; his opening operations criticized by Comte de Paris, 53 ; left Washington to join the array, July 29, 45, 392, 396 ; un- favorable impression made by him on his officers, 45 ; not enthusiasti- cally received by his army, 396 ; de- termination of his army to support him, 398 ; the movements of his army after July 29, 400-401; Banks' intrepidity in sham-fight be- fore, 37 ; McClellan informed, Aug. 6, that he would be expected to aid, 10. Cedar Mountain : the Confederate forces sent from Richmond to op- pose, 318 ; Jackson ordered to at- INDEX 483 tack, 46 ; Jackson's advance towards 400, 401, 402, 403; at Sperryville, Aug-. 7, 403 ; position of Ms army, Aug-. 7, ih. ; arrived, Ang'. 8, at Cul- peper, 45, 403; informed of Jack- son's advance, 15 ; his uncertainty of Jackson's destination, 403 ; the effect of Buford's despatch on, 410 ; his disj)ositions to block Jackson, 15, 16 ; his army ordered for concen- tration at Culpeper, 403-404 ; Banks and Sigel ordered to Culpeper, 45, 404 ; joined by Banks, 140 ; disap- pointed by Sigel, 16 ; Crawford's brigade sent towards Cedar Moun- tain, 403-404 ; Banks ordered, Aug. 9, to move towards Cedar Mountain, 404; position of the Union forces, 46 ; his intention that Banks should hold the enemy in cheek, 406 ; the controversy as to the order given to Banks, 48, 405 ; his statement as to the orders, in his report, 21 ; his in- terview with Banks, 22, 48 ; his order to fight cited by Banks, 21, 22 ; the oral order delivered by Marshall, 47 ; cited, 57, 405 ; denied by, 405 ; the form in v\^hich it was recorded by Banks, 47 ; his error in sending a verbal order, 51 ; his dis- approval of Banks' attack, 440 ; the wisdom of his instructions, 28 ; Banks' assault in consonance with the spirit of the general orders of, ib. ; Roberts sent by, to place Banlis in position, 406 ; authority given to Roberts to issue orders, 408 ; Roberts' statement as to this author- ization qualified, 408 note ; not pos- sessed of authority to supersede Banks in command, 408 ; Banks' impression that he was thought to be unwilling to fight by, 23, 409 ; Banks affected by the terms of the July 14 letter of, 409 ; Banks' des- patch to, at 4.50 p. M., 423 ; informed by Roberts of the probability of a general battle, 407 ; the sound of the battle heard at Culpeper by, 52 ; arrived at Cedar Mountain about 7 P. M.. 50, 440 ; his orders to 2d Mass., 17 ; Banks praised for his intrepidity by, 21, 440; his praise of the 2d Corps, 52, 440 ; the reverse at Cedar Mountain, 15 ; victory claimed by, 52 ; Jackson's attack noted by Jones, 12 ; supposed to have been deluded by Jackson, ih. ; his position the supe- rior, 47 ; his lost chance to capture Jackson's army, 28 ; his statement of Banks' strength at Cedar Mountain, 38 ; his strength and Jackson's about equal, 47 ; his error in estimating Jackson's strength, 51; his demand for a report of battle not heeded by Banks, 22 ; his statement that he did not order the battle, 21 ; not denied by Banks until 1864, 21 ; his rejoinder to Banks' testimony before Conduct of Vfar Committee, 23; Roberts his Chief of Cavalry, 20, 21. Augvist 18-25, delayed on the Rapidan until Aug. 18, 321 ; Lee's plan of campaign against, 320 ; Lee's intention to flank him on the Rap- pahannock, 321 ; advised of Lee's advance, Aug. 18, by intercepted let- ter, 52, 265, 266; Lee's movement anticipated by, 321 ; his successful withdrawal to the Rappahannock, Aug. 18-19, 52, 266, 321, 440 ; his movement praised, 63, 321 ; directed to hold his line on the Rappahan- nock, Aug. 18, 57, 266,267,322-323, 324, 403 ; his operations affected thereby, 403 ; his forces divided, 41 ; his apprehensions on account of the division, 395 ; required to keep com- munication with Fredericksburg, 323 ; his obedience to order, 27 ; crossed the Rappahannock, Aug. 19, 52, 73 ; position of his forces, 53, 307 ; believed to be in no danger prior to Aug. 20, 298 ; his attempt to block Lee's advance, 28 ; jire- vented the crossing of the river by the enemy, Aug. 20-22, 57, 266, 321 ; Lee's crossing of the river expected by, 58 ; his plans to attack Lee, ih. ; the dangers involved in the attack as planned, ih. ; conjecture as to the result of an attack, ib. ; crossing the Rappahannock prevented by a freshet, Aug. 22, 59 ; his concentra- tion at Warrenton. 61, 113 ; his con- flicting orders to Sigel, 61 ; his army exhausted in movements, Aug. 21- 25, 308 ; scarcity of food in his army, 266-267 ; Confederate cavalry raid, Aug. 22, round his supply trains, 267 ; confronted by the en- emy at Rappahannock Station, Aug. 23-24, 266 ; Confederates re- pulsed, Aug. 23, at Sulphur Springs, 267: Aixgust 25-26 : Jackson's flank movement begun Aug. 25, 59 ; in- formed of Jackson's advance, z6., 403 ; ignorant of his destination, 324-325; believed Jackson's move- 484 INDEX. ment directed towards tlie Shenan- doah Valley, 110, 322; deceived by Lee, 124 ; his indifference to the signs of Jackson's advance, 321-322 ; the serious consequences, 75, 76, 323 ; the position of his army, Aug". 26, 62 ; his situation night of Aug. 26, 324 ; the importance of the con- trol of railway to, 57 : August 27 : his reason for send- ing Hooker to the railroad, 326, 326 note ; informed of Jackson's move- ment through Thoroughfare Gap, 324 ; Buf ord sent to reconnoitre, 109, 120 ; cut off from Washington by Jackson, 308, 324 ; his supplies de- stroyed at Manassas by Jackson, 65, 268, 308 ; the plunder described, 105-108 ; informed of Jackson's de- struction of railroad at Bristoe Sta- tion, 62, 73, 124 ; his vacillation in the adoption of a plan, 124-125 ; conscious of his inability to deter- mine the projier movement to be made, 124; his telegraphic com- munications with McDov/ell, 125- 126 ; Jackson's intentions misappre- hended by, 61, 65-66, 75, 126; his reasonable fear of an attack on his trains, 327 ; shared by McDowell, 64, 326; his order to McDowell cited, 125 ; precision of his order to Banks, 128 ; McDowell's important service to, 125-126 ; the results, 127- 128 ; his proposition to occupy Gainesville, 59-60 ; concentration of army at Gainesville ordered, 62, 325 ; the intention of his orders dis- cussed, 325 ; not designed to cut ofi! Jackson, ih. ; his dispositions criti- cized, 60, 73, 74, 75, 76 ; his orders not strictly obeyed, 66, 67 ; his divi- sion of his forces, 68 ; his interview with Porter, morning of Aug. 27, 325, 336 ; probably stated his plans, 325 ; the direction of his line, 326 ; criticized for his apprehensions for his right at Bristoe. ih. ; position of his army, evening of Aug. 27, 63 ; favorable in a movement by Jackson roimd his right, 328 ; his change of dispositions, night of Aug. 27, 63-64, 65 ; his order to Porter, 6.30 P. M,, 352 ; his error in concentrating at Manassas, 64-65, 75 ; his conjecture as to Jackson's plans, having learned his position, 64, 74 : August 28 his blunder in move- ment, 308 ; his order of 1 A. m. to Porter, 224 ; ordered to Manassas early, Aug. 28, 64-65, 74 ; his theory as to the chance of intercepting Jack- son by McDowell erroneous, 65-66 ; his dispositions to capture Jackson, 327 ; Kearny and Reno ordered to Manassas, 65 ; Porter to Bristoe, 65, 74; at Manassas Junction, 67, 268, 329 ; ordered forces to Centreville, and thence to Warrenton Turnpike, 78 ; McDowell's movement cut Jack- son's communications with Lee, 332 ; at Centreville, 68, 337 ; his order to McDowell to intercept Jackson at Gum Springs, 329 ; the orders inter- cepted by Jackson, ib. ; his effort to hasten pursuit of Jackson, 82 ; him- self engaged in following Jackson to Gainesville, 80 ; the position of his army, 67 ; his movement of Aug. 28, 68 et seq. ; his forces scattered and out of position, 308, 309 ; his object, not to interpose between Lee and Jackson, but to attack the latter, 63 ; no provision made for holding Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap, 65, 67, 68, 95 ; this neglect inex- cusable, 66, 95 ; made no effort to prevent Jackson from rejoining Lee, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 ; McDowell cen- sured by, for sending Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap, 67 ; his lost op- portunity to block Thoroughfare Gap and defeat Jackson, 69-70, 75- 76 ; his combination against Jackson destroyed by the retreat of King and Ricketts, 332 ; probable effect of their retreat on action of Aug. 29, 79 ; his opportunity to intercept and destroy Jackson, 323 ; conjecture as to the result had a force been main- tained at the Gap, 332 ; learned of King's engagement, 78 ; predicated too much on the report, ib., 79 ; his headquarters at night near Black- burn's Ford, 78 ; his force about equal to Lee's, 308 ; the facilities of communication between Alexan- dria and his position, after Aug. 28, 277: August 29 : Jackson within his power prior to Aug. 29, 332-333 ; his plans made in ignorance of the retreat of Ricketts and King, 79 ; reported that Jackson's retreat had been intercepted, 78, 225 ; informed early morning, of the retreat of King and Ricketts, 332 ; his indignation, 82 ; his orders in consequence, 335 ; ignorant of Ricketts' position, 80 ; his plans frustrated by Jackson's INDEX 485 Tonforeseen nig-ht movement, 65, 328- 329 ; no evidence that A. P, HilFs movement was intended to deceive, 329 ; Sig-el directed to attack Jack- son at Groveton, 335 ; Heintzelman and Reno ordered to join in the at- tack, ih. ; unsuccessful effort of Mc- Dowell to fiud, 68 ; his order to Por- ter delayed until Aug-. 29, 78; his orders to Porter, 3 A. M., 78, 79, 80, 224-225, 383 ; Porter sent to Centre- ville, 225 ; Porter's misapprehension of the puriDose of, 336 ; believed Jackson to be hurrying" his retreat by way of Thoroughfare Gap, 80, 82, 83 ; his 6-7 a. m. order to Porter for movement to Gainesville, 80, 226, 335, 383 ; Porter ordered to take Kiiag's division, 335 ; remonstrance of McDowell, because of the assig'n- ment of King^'s division to Porter, 81 ; his joint order to Porter and Mc- DoweU, 9 A. M., 81, 224, 229, 241, 242, 243, 352, 353, 384; McDoweU and Porter in conference over, 85-86 ; its provisions discussed, 83-84, 310; the spirit in which it was given, 82 ; its provision for withdrawal to Cen- treville at nig'ht, 81, 82 ; his ]Durpose in this provision, 83, 325-326 ; rea- sons why it could not be obeyed, 311 ; the joint order superseded all others of prior date, 82 ; its effect upon Porter's action, 378 ; his head- quarters with Heintzelman, 82 ; Lee's advance conjectured by, 9 A. M., 82, 124 ; the position of enemy not im- derstood by, 225 ; time lost throug'h his movement by way of Centrevllle, 85 ; did not reach field of battle until noon, 90, 92 ; his imsuccessful attack -ndth his rig'ht wing", 309 ; his order to Porter at 4.30 P. M., 89, 224, 240, 241-242, 311, 354, 357 ; the or- der cited, 385 ; Porter ordered there- in to attack, 311 ; the order given under misapprehension of the op- posing' force, 340-341 ; the order aeknowledg-ed by Porter, 241 ; it reached Porter too late to be acted on, 89 ; the time of receipt, 365 ; an attack on Long-street by Porter would have been no advantag-e to, 89, 249, 256 ; would have resulted in disaster, 249. 256, 259 ; the order criticized by Wilcox, 253 ; its effect on Porter's movement, 340 ; Porter's disposition of Sykes with a view to aiding, 234 ; the country impassable between Porter and, 87, 88, 245 ; Porter's demonstrations had little effect in relieving the pressure on, 346 ; his message to Porter, 240 ; informed of all events by Porter, 238 ; Porter's despatches not for- warded by McDowell to, 242 note ; his miscalculation as to the time of Lee and Longstreet's arrival, 83, 84, 337 ; inexcusable, 254, 332 ; his ignorance of the enemy's position, 337 ; the Confederate strength in front of, 250 ; his belief that Jack- son only was his ojDponent, 83, 90, 92, 309; opposed also by Hood's and Evans' divisions, 89, 90, 309, 346, 347, 348 ; his ignorance of Longstreet's presence, 89, 90, 93, 95, 241,253; the Confederate strength held inactive by Porter, 246, 249 ; Porter informed that Jackson had been reenf orced, 236 ; Longstreet's presence not admitted at Porter court-martial bv, 359, 368 ; the bat- tle of Aug. 29, fought by Pope, 89 ; not skilfully fought, ib. ; the pos- sibility of defeating Lee, had the forces of Banks, Porter, and Mc- Dowell been employed, 88, 92 ; he neglected to call for Banks, 93 ; his errors, 89 ; little help given him by McDowell, 92 ; Porter's movement in retreat caused by report of the re- pulse of, 243, 340 ; his misapprehen- sion that the enemy were retreating, 259 ; intended no pursuit beyond Gainesville, 83 ; the orders of, dis- obeyed by Porter, stated, 352 et seq. ; his orders to Porter, Aug\ 29 : 3 a. m., 78, 79, 80, 224, 225, 226, 383 ; 6-7 A. M., 80, 226, 335," 383 ; 9 a. m., joint order to Porter and Mc- Dowell, 81, 82. 83. 84, 86. 224, 229, 241, 242, 243, 310, 311,325, 326, 352, 378, 384 ; 4.30 p.' m., 89, 224, 240, 241, 242, 249, 253, 256, 259, 311, 340, 341, 354, 357, 365, 385; 8.50 p. M., 242 ; complications caused by his orders, 80-81 : his verbal orders, 225-226 ; offence taken by Porter's request for written orders, 226 ; de- lays in execution of his orders, 85 ; his orders criticized, 79 ; his orders antedated, 225 ; his belief that Jack- son's right flank could have been turned by Porter, 89, 90 ; Porter's means of knowledge of the battle of Aug. 29, considered, 348 ; Porter's doubt as to the intention of, to en- gage in a general battle, 87 ; the justice of the assertion questioned, 486 INDEX 335 ; a construction of Porter's tlieory as to the plans of, 337 : Aug-ust 30 : Porter summoned to Groveton by, for battle of Aug". 30, 92, 224, 259 ; his order of 8.50 p. m. obeyed by Porter, 242 ; repulsed by Jackson, 309; his left and centre broken by Lee, 93-94, 309 ; his de- feat not disastrous, 94 ; his army not demoralized, 96-97 ; the confidence of the army in him impaired, 94, 96- 97 ; his great error in not falling back to Centre ville, 93, 95 ; he would not have fought, Aug. 30, had he known of Lee's presence, 92 ; his claim of victory at second Bull Run, 142 ; his retreat to Centrevilie well conducted, 94, 309: August 31 : his position and strength at Centrevilie, 139, 140 ; Lee's effort to turn the right of, 94- 95 ; his correction of Union lines, 140 ; informed of Jackson's move- ment on his right flank, 147, 191 ; his ignorance of Jackson's position, 148 ; and of Sumner's, 141 ; his statements open to correction, as to alleged order to Sumner, 140-141 ; Sumner's testimony concerning the orders of, 146 ; his promise to at- tack, 148 : September 1 : order for attack given, 148 ; informed of Confederate advance on Little River Turnpike, 150-151 ; his report relative to Con- federate flank movement cited, 146 ; McDowell's report to, concerning action before Germantown, cited, 164 ; his orders to Stevens, 151 ; called on for reenfoi-cements by Stevens, 154 ; no statement made by, of his orders to Reno, 150 ; the battle of Chantilly, 95; his cam- paign terminated at Chantilly, 135 ; his statement that he intended to fight near Chantilly, questioned, 149 ; his attempt to cause Halleck to order a retreat, 141, 142, 148 ; his retreat to Fairfax C. H., 137 et seq. ; his expectation of battle there, 137 ; his army withdrawn to Washington, 95 ; his trains protected by Torbert, 300 ; his fears for his army, Sept. 2, 213, 214. His strength : his testimony to Conduct of War Committee, July 8, as to his strength, 199 ; his total strength, July 31, 1862, 40, 198; Allan's estimate, 199; as reported by iiim, Aug. 7, 400 ; prior to Aug. 9, 210 ; his report of, Aug. 20, 201 ; during operations on the Rappahan- nock, 210, 307 ; according to his estimate, Aug. 26, 323 ; his estimate, Aug. 27, 205 ; his army as strong, Sept. 1, as Lee's, 94 ; his report of, Sept. 2, 213, 214; his statement in his report, 209, 394; McDowell's force understated by, 201 ; the num- ber provided by Army of the Poto- mac, 203, 205, 210, 269 ; his state- ment, Aug. 26, of forces of Sigel, McDowell and Reynolds, 203; the number of men brought to him by Reno, Aug. 14, 201, 202, 265; his estimate of Reynolds' strength, 203 ; the estimate questioned, 203, 204 ; his statements of numbers careless, 202, 204, 209, 213, 213 note; his underestimate of the corps dis- cussed, 39 ; Allan's discussion of his strength, 197 et seq. ; Ropes' esti- mate, 209; Ropes' estimates re- viewed, 197 et seq. ; his report of deserters from Banks' corps, 52 ; his losses prior to Aug. 29, 209, 212 ; his Josses in the campaign, 97 ; his statement of losses in his report, 213 ; the number of prisoners cap- tured by Confederates, ih. ; Lee's capture of guns discussed, 211. Re-enforcements : promised re- enforcements by Halleck, 266, 267 ; the object of the government in re- enforcing him, 298 ; his confidence in support of Army of the Potomac, 60, 61, 73, 74; attempt to hasten McClellan's junction with, 24, 57, 113 ; McClellan's statement of his effort to re-enforce, 25, 296-298; troops from Army of Potomac illy supplied, Aug. 27, 127 ; re-enforce- ments ceased on McClellan's arri- val at Alexandria, Aug. 26, 269 ; McClellan's responsibility in with- holding re - enforcements, 277 ; a cause of his failure, 219 ; Halleck's statement concerning McClellan's efforts to re-enforce, 270 et seq. ; Hal- leck charged with the responsibility of the failure, 301 ; Haupt's de- spatches as to forwarding troops, Aug. 24, 25, 269 ; Cox ordered from West Virginia to, 201 ; aid given by Cox to, 199 ; joined by King, Aug. 11, 52 ; joined by Reno, Aug. 14, 52, 201, 202, 265, 323; by Reynolds, 203, 308, 323 ; by Porter, Aug. 26, 203, 205, 223, 269, 289, 308, 323; by Herntzelman, Aug. 26, 269, 289, 308, INDEX 487 323; by Piatt, Aug. 26, 198; by Franklin, Aug. 30, 300; by Sum- ner, Aug. 31, 140 ; Porter's effort to come to aid of, 24; Frankliu expected by, to be at Gainesville, Aug. 26, 323-324 ; Halleck's orders concerning Franklin disobeyed by McClellan, 312-313 ; Halleck's dis- pleasure because of tbe detention of Franklin, 296 ; Franklin's junction ■witb, as the army -was retreating, Aug. 30, 300 ; Sumner delayed in his advance towards, until Aug. 30, 335 ; re-enforcements called for, 60 ; his call for re-enforcements at Gainesville, 122 ; his mistaken esti- mate of the force of the enemy di- rected towards Manassas, Aug. 26, 322. His relations with Halleck : Hal- leck's extravagant report of the captures made by, at Corinth, 34 ; his suggestion as to the appointment of a military superior, 4, 392-393 ; in command of Army of Virginia for a month prior to Halleck's assumption of command, 28-29 ; Halleck ignorant of the character of, 4 ; Halleck aroused to a sense of the peril of, Aug. 27, 113 ; respon- sible for Halleck's unconcern as to danger at Manassas, 110 ; his posi- tion unknown to Halleck, Aug. 27, 113, 114, 297; his despatch to" Hal- leck, Aug. 30, concerning the ration question, 282 ; conjecture as to Hal- leck's apj)rehensions in the event of failure of, 121, 122 ; apparent want of confidence of Halleck in, 334; Halleck not responsible for the mis- fortunes of the campaign of, 27. His relations with McClellan : his overtures to McClellan as to co-op- eration, 4, 392 ; his letter, July 4, cited, 4; McClellau's reply, July 7, ib. ; the reply not satisfactory to, 392 ; his free censure of McClellan, 398 ; the effect of McClellan"s delay in withdrawing from the Peninsula on the campaign of, 320 ; McClel- lan's aid invoked by Halleck, 113 ; McClellan charged with forwarding troops to, 290 ; McClellan informed of Lee's advance against, 277 ; his report of the enemy's movement communicated to McClellan, 319 ; McClellan's propositions looking to the aid of, 116-118; apprehensions that the bridges over Bull Rim would not afford means of retreat to, 117; McClellan's inquiry as to the position of, Aug. 24, 289 ; McClellan's proposition to let him "get out of his scrape," 26, 280; McClellan's exaggeration of the strength of, 301 ; McCleUan's confi- dence in the ability of, ih. ; McClel- lan's distrust of, 312; McCleUan's neglect to learn the condition of, 278, 284; McClellan's efforts, not seconded by Halleck, to get accurate information concerning, 302 ; in- formed by McClellan that he could get supplies by sending to Alexan- dria, Aug. 29, 281, 283-284; Mc- Clellan's offer to supply ammuni- tion to, 281 ; on demand for ammu- nition, Aug. 30, McClellan's evasion of compliance, ih. ; the defence of Washingi:on of more importance to McClellan than the safety of the army of, 277-278 ; McClellan's soli- citude for defeat of, 115-116, 117- 118 ; McClellan represented as hav- ing done nothing to aid, 123 ; probable effect on ]\IcClellan had he been ordered to supersede, 26 ; his defeat attributed to McClellan by, 123 ; energy on the part of McClel- lan would have saved the enemy from massing against, 319 ; the aid rendered bv McClellan to. discussed, 289, 302 ; " McClellan believed to have done all he could to aid. 296 ; his disaster attributed by McClellan to interference with plans against Kiclimond, 120. His relations with the Comte de Paris : the controversy, 356 ; his partial extract from Longstreefs re- port in letter to Comte de Paris, 91 ; reference to the publication of their correspondence, 313. His relations with Porter : his tes- timony at Porter court-martial, 243 ; Porter's intention to injure, 244; Porter's insubordinate lan- guage, criticizing the operations of, 357 ; his charge that Porter retreated from the enemy not sustained by court-martial, ib. ; failed to submit Porter's announcement of expecta- tion of attack, 238, 242; Porter found guilty of second specification, first charge, 357-358 ; also of third specification, 358 ; the court held that Porter had no discretion in fail- ing to execute the order of, 359 ; his opposition to the re-opening of the case, 356; his citation of Stuart's 488 INDEX report in opposing a rehearing-, 250, 252 note ; extracts from Confederate reports sent by McDowell to, 366 ; cited in his pamphlet, ih. ; the pur- port of the extracts, 366, 367 ; his extract of Jackson's report collated with the original, 367 ; the use made by Porter's counsel of his misquota- tions from Jackson's report, 367 et seq. ; Porter's admission of disloyalty to, 362 ; the versions of his report, 41 note ; map in his report, 240. His personal characteristics, 35 : his veracity questioned, 254, 407; his despatches to Halleck not trust- worthy, 141, 142 ; his braggadocio, 141-142 ; he acted more wisely than he wrote or spoke, 28 ; his abilities and defects as a military comman- der, 305 ; his campaign discussed and criticized, 95-96 ; his campaign conducted admirably prior to Aug. 26, 321, 324 ; criticized because his plans of July 8 were not carried out, 322-323 ; the criticism unjust, 323 ; the criticisms of Wilcox of, 253- 254 ; his ignorance of his enemy's troops and his own, 309 ; his cul- pable ignorance of the enemy's movements, 335 ; his efforts to fit his army for the campaign considered to be at variance with his opinions as to needs of forces for war, 28 ; want of confidence of Army of Vir- ginia in, 94, 96-97, 143-144; his probable expectation from his arm^y, 83 ; his army not homogeneous, 219 ; less effective than Lee's, 94 ; the precise character of his orders, 335-336 ; the constant movement of the army, 266 ; the army fatigued by, 96, 324 ; his lack of qualities of a great general, 27-28 ; his reputa- tion based upon his capture of Island No. 10, 34 ; not a timid general, 58 ; not disposed to intimidation by esti- mates of his opponent's strength, 82; believed to have more enter- prise than McClellan, 57 ; his belief in an aggressive policy, 14 ; his con- tempt for old systems of warfare, 35 ; possessed of energy, persistency and courage, but not great judg- ment, 75, 96 ; his sudden changes of opinion, 61 ; not fitted to cope with Jackson and Lee, 29 ; his ignorance and incapacity in contrast with Ijee's ability and sagacity, 1 18 ; his self- confidence, 96 ; the dislike of Vir- ginians for, 177; the charge of his incapacity not proven, 30 ; would probably have been successful at Antietam, 96 ; a want of charitable disposition in critics towards, 27 ; the judgment of censure given him to be modified in history, 29 ; men- tioned, 3, 108. Port Republic, Va., Jackson successful in engagement at, June 9, 1862, 33. Porter, F. J., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (July 4, 1862) ; Col., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861); Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (June 27, 1862) ; cashiered (Jan. 21, 1863) ; in command of 5th Corps, Aug.-Sept., 1862 ; his prompt trans- fer of his corps from the Peninsula, 223 ; his forces sent to the Rappa- hannock from Acquia Creek, 112 ; his movement to join PojDe, 24, 223 ; Aug. 26, his junction with Pope effected, 203, 269, 289, 308, 323; his lack of transijortation and sup- plies, 127 ; 269 ; at Bealeton Station, 62, 323 ; Aug. 27, ordered to Green- wich, 63, 127-128, 325 ; his line of supply abandoned, 60 ; ordered to aid Banks at Warrenton, 128; at Warrenton Station, 63 ; his meet- ing with Pope, 325, 336 ; probably informed of Pope's plans, 325 ; his position on Banks' right, ib. ; Mc- Clellan's attempts to communicate with, 114, 115 ; McClellan's propo- sition to open communications be- tween Pope and, 115 ; his telegram to Burnside reporting battle immi- nent, 113; sent to McClellan, 274; his despatch to Burnside 4 p. M., 336 ; Pope's order to, 6.30 p. m., 241, 352 ; Aug. 28, the order of 1 a. m., to move to Bristoe, 65, 224, 327 ; the object of the order, 327 ; his despatch to Burnside, 2 p. M., 336-337; his contemptuous comment on Pope's plans therein, ib. ; at Bristoe, 67 ; convicted of disobedience of this order, 327-328 ; no intimation of an attack at Bristoe given him, 328 ; the better positions to which he should have been assigTied, 69, 70, 76 ; but for Pope's misapprehension of Jackson's movement he would have been ordered to Gainesville, 330; Aug. 29, in command of left wing, 309 ; Pope's order of 3 A. m., 78, 79, 85, 224-225, 226, 229, 393 ; order cited, 383 ; its object to meet enemy on Warrenton Turnpike, 78, 229 ; the order criticized, 79 ; not INDEX 489 sent by shortest road, ih. ; his move- ment toTvards Centreville, 85 ; re- moYing- him from field of battle, 225 ; received verbal order to hasten, ih. ; asked for vrritten orders, 22fi ; his meeting" vdth McDowell, 225 ; the order of 6-7 a. m., 80, 226, 383 ; ordered to march vrith King to Gainesville, 80, 335 ; order repeated verbally. 226 ; no alternative given to, SO ; his change of movement in conseqtience, 85 ; his position at | noon, ih. ; 338 ; preparation made j for action by, 85 ; " joint order," 9 A. ii., to McDowell and, 81-82, 384 ; | time of receipt by, 85 ; discussed \ and criticized, So-S-i ; its provision for rettrrn at night to Centreville, 81-82 ; his constrtiction of this pro- vision, 87 ; his movements possibly affected thereby, 377-378 ; question as to the effect of joint order in > superseding prior orders, 335 ; his '. action negatived by complication of orders. 80, 81 ; his second meeting ' •with McDowell, 226 ; their confer- ; ence, 85-86, 337; the controversy i as to their interview, 230-231 ; McDowell's recollections of it. 244 ; i his disposition of troops to attack at ! the time of the meeting, 338 ; in- j formed by McDowell of Bnford's i report of the enemy's advance, 337 ; ' their problem cattsed by evidence of . Lee's advance, 85-86 ; the ronte to j Groveton thought to be impracti- I cable by McDoweH and, 230, 231 ; j McDov.-ell's parting from. 86, 230 ; ' not aware that this sejoaration was for the day, 870-371 ; McDowell's movement on Sudley Spring Road stiggested by, 370 ; his failure to in- : stire the co-operation of McDowell, | 376 ; their want of a clear under- | standing', 378-381 ; McDowell's al- leged orders to, 229, 231 ; expected by McDowell to attack, 244, 371 ; and to make connection with him, 371 ; his dispute with McDowell as to order to attack, 310; his claim i that he was ordered not to attack, 87 ; that he was directed by McDowell to "'remain where he ; was," 231, 245, 246 ; that he was j told by McDowell that he was not in a suitable position for a battle,^ \ 245, 246; that he was opposed by ' a large force, 245 ; King's division taken by McDowell from, 85. 227, 232, 245 ; his apparent disobedience of McDowell's order, 355-356 ; his doubts as to Pope's intention to en- gage in a general battle, 87 ; con- firmed by McDowell, Aug. 29, 226 ; informed by Morell of advance of enemy, 237; his expectation of attack by enemy, 238 ; attack by Morell ordered and countermand- ed, 234, 239, 241, 242; his order countermanded for good reasons, 246 ; his project of attack frustrated by the detaclunent of King, 232, 242, 245, 246 ; Warren's opinion that McDowell was responsible for the failure of, to attack, 229-230; his small force and difficult position, 87 ; the impropriety of his position, 88 ; the Confederate advance re- ported to McDowell by, 231, 238; Pope and McDowell informed of all events by, 238 ; Morell ordered to join Sigel by, 234, 372, 373 ; the order rescinded, 374; his personal reconnaissance, 235 ; its inefficient character, 376-377 ; demonstradon by MoreU ordered, 236-239; this demonstration not effective, 343, 344 ; its inefficient character, 377 ; regarded by Lee as insignificant, 346 ; his correspondence, as to op- erations, with Morell, 236-238 ; the construction given to these de- spatches, 372 ; evidence of an inten- tion to attack of, 373 ; his purpose in Morell's movement discussed, 338- 340 ; Morell's testimony as to orders given him by, 338 ; his correspon- dence with Morell in evidence, 340 ; his dispositions of troops in the afternoon criticized, 376, 3S2 ; Morell ordered by, at 6 P. M., on a recon- naissance, 374 ; Pope's 4.30 p. m. order to, 22-*, 240, 241, 242, 243, 385 ; acknowledged, 241 ; the order was received too late to be acted upon, 89, 245, 246, 247, 311 ; time of receipt, 365 ; the order was given under a misapprehension of the con- ditions of the case, 247 ; and of the opposing force, 340 ; Pope's message sent by TTeld to, 240; evidence of his efforts to be of service, 235 et seq. ; his inaction, Aug. 29, 77, 87, 246, 355 ; the wisdom of his neglect to attack questioned, 88, 348 ; the probable effect of an attack by, 88 ; an attack would not have relieved Pope or weakened Jackson, 89, 24*^ ; would have been too hazardous, 247 ; the enemy wished him to attack, 490 INDEX 248; an attack by Long-street on Pope prevented by, 246 ; an attack on Jackson by, would have caused disaster, 256 ; bis only road to main army occupied by McDowell, 88; that the country between Pope and himself was impassable, 245 ; in- formed that the enemy before Pope was re-enforced, 286 ; reassured by McDowell, 238, 239; informed of repulse of enemy by Hatch, 238 ; his despatch announcing" his plans to McDowell at 6 p, m., 234-235, 354 ; deceived by Stuart's ruse of brush dragging", 342 ; his want of confi- dence in Stuart's statement, 343 ; his note to McDowell the cause of his condemnation by court-martial, 235 ; the movement made under the impression that Pope was withdraw- ing", 243 ; his claim that he held his position all day, 246 ; the question whether he retreated discussed, 339- 340 ; the Confederate evidence as to his retreat, 346 ; his disposition of forces for the night, 233 ; his head- quarters at Bethlehem Church, ih. ; his troops believed to have reached the field after Longstreet's, 257 ; seen by Lee in his advance from Manassas, 248, 250, 256, 257, 258; watched by Robertson, 258, 259, 343 ; his movements as observed by enemy through the day, 344 ; con- fronted by Longstreet at noon, 309 ; strength of opposing force, 232, 247, 341 et seq. ; the claims made as to Longstreet's strength exaggerated, 347 ; his estimate of the Confederate force not in accord with Stuart's statement, 343 ; his neglect to as- certain the composition of the ene- my's force, 376 ; Longstreet's force divided, 347 ; Pope's ignorance of forces opposed to, 89, 90, 341 et seq. ; new evidence to prove the presence of Lee's army, 359-360 ; Long- street's forces held inactive by, 232 ; the claim that he relieved the press- ure on Pope not well founded, 346 ; Lee deterred from turning Union left by, Aug. 29, 80, 87; Long- street's right extended beyond his left fiank, 258 ; his risk conjectured had he and Longstreet changed places, 177 ; believed by Pope that Jackson's right flank might have been turned by, 89, 90 ; conjecture as to resnlt of an attack on, by Jackson, 65 ; incredulity as to his apparent misapprehension of Pope's intentions, 336 ; a construction of his theory in this regard, 337 ; the pro- bable advantage which would have been gained by the union of his force with McDowell and Banks, 88 ; no general battle until 5 p. m., 245, 246, 247 ; his position examined by Walcott and Stevens in 1883, 179 ; Pope's order to, at 8.30 P. M., to move to Groveton, 92, 224, 242 ; obeyed Aug. 30, 242 note. Aug. 30, joined Pope, 259 ; his withdrawal to Groveton permitted Lee to turn Union flank, 93 ; ordered to pursue the enemy not retreating, 259 ; in an attack on Jackson, re- pulsed, ih., 309 ; his losses Aug, 30, 259, 312 ; the charge of a feeble attack controverted by Confederate officers, 260-261, 311-312 ; Aug. 31, his position, 140. Estimates of his strength, 204-205, 210, 232, 242 ; in return for August, 217 ; his strength, Sept. 1, 213 ; the estimate of Reynolds' strength in his possession, 204 ; accompanied McClellan in Antietam campaign, 97 ; mentioned, 298. Porter Court-Martial, Nov. 27, 1862- Jan. 10, 1863, the charges preferred, 30, 223-224 ; Pope's charges against, discussed, 310-312 ; conclusions that they were not justified, 311-312 ; his defence, 352, 353, 354 ; his defence in second specification, first charge, 245-248 ; convicted on all charges of this specification, 247 ; Holt's opin- ion cited as to findings of, under this specification, 243-244; the pro- ceedings relative to Aug. 29 con- sidered, 243 et seq. ; evidence in its records of Porter's position at noon, Aug. 29, 338 ; judge-advocate's the- ory as to the indications that he was expected to attack the enemy from the position in wliich he had been left by McDowell, 373; the effect on the opinion of the court of his inactivity after McDowell's direc- tion as to the place to advance, 358- 359 ; considered by the judge-advo- cate as an indication of the line of duty of, 359 ; the charge of misbe- havior in the face of enemy, 355 ; convicted of disobedience of order, 4.30 P. M., 340 : his despatch to Mc- Dowell announcing advance of enemy not submitted to, 238 ; his note ac- knowledging 4.30 p. M. order with- INDEX 491 held from, 242; Ms retirement to Manassas a disobedience o£ "joint order,"' 243 ; the correspondence be- tween Porter and Morell s:ibmitted in evidence, 2o5 ; Holt's construction of his nmvilling-ness to fig'ht, 23 i ; the note to McDowell cited in proof, 235 ; his defence against the charge, 231 ; held by the court as having no discretion under Pope's orders, 359 ; the coiirt's ignorance of the presence of Lee's army, 243, 359, 368 ; his statements concerning' the enemy's force not credited by Pojoe, 93 ; charged at court-martial with mak- ing a feeble attack, Aug. 30, 259 ; the charge withdrawn, 259-260 ; not permitted to offer proof in defence of this charge, 260 ; tlie conclusions of court-martial summed tip, 358 ; the points on which he was con- demned, 307 ; the damaging char- acter of the e-s-idence submitted, 355 ; his condemnation on the evidence not siu-prising, 356 ; prosecuted with ill-temper by the government, 355 ; not convicted of failure to attack Longstreet, but of failure to attack Jackson, 360; the coxxrt held that his failure was intentional, 244 : that his action was due to dishonorable motives, 358 ; that he was respon- sible for Pope's defeat, 243-244 ; his case re-^-iewed, 305-313 ; found g'uilty on insufficient evidence, 243 : Confederate reports of battle not considered by the court, 341 ; the proposition to reopen the case dis- cussed, 261-262, 337 ; his good rec- ord prior to Aug. 28 unimpeached, 223 ; the plea that his conduct was that of a soldier and an honorable man, 247 ; that his past record should have weight, ih. ; the evidence in sup- port of his defence discovered after the court-martial, 247-250 ; the sym- pathy of W. H. Dogan for, 177 ; his appeals for a nev/ trial, 356 ; his ap- peals granted by g'overnment, ih. Board of Investigation convened by order of General Sherman, 1878, 351 ; members of, ib. ; the findings of court-martial re-examined, ih. ; the charges considered, 352 ; the free construction of the order as to evi- dence, 351, 352 ; the question of the employment as evidence of Confed- erate reports, discussed, 341 et seq. ; the source of the new evidence, 248, 356 ; Lee's letter to, Sept. 9, 1870, 255-256 ; Robertson's letter to, May 27, 1870, 251-252; Wilcox's letter to, Jan. 12, 1870, 253-255 ; the evi- dence that Longstreet's force was not wholly in Porter's front, 347 ; criticized for insubordinate language, 557 ; e\'idence of Porter's confession of disloyalty to Pope, 362 ; the tes- timony of B. F. Smith, E. G. Mar- shall, and Hyland, as to their move- ments, 339 ; testimony of Martin, Morell, and Griffin, as to the ar- rangements for attack, 338-339 ; its opinion as to the time of issue of Porter's order to Morell, 374 ; con- tradictory evidence as to Lincoln's oijinions, 362 ; testimony as to his good faith and military judgment, 378 ; its conclusions as to Porter's good judgment in not following Pope's orders, 353-354 ; relieved from blame for not attacking with- out McDowell's support, 375 ; its approval of the defendant, 357 ; the vindication of his character con- curred in. 382 ; his innocence of an intentional disregard of duty, ih. ; its publication of records, 356-357 ; the maps concerning his case de- scribed, 240 ; the character of the presentation of the case criticized, 361 : suggestion as to a proper state- ment to the board, 360-361 ; gov- ernment witnesses before, treated %\ith indignity by the apx^ellant's counsel. 3o2 et seq. ; the discovery by McDowell of Porter's 6 p. M. note written by, 364, 365, 366 ; the at- tempt of his counsel to asperse the character of McDowell, 365-366 ; the ability with which his case was conducted, 381. Potomac, Army of. See Army of the Potomac. Potomac. Department of. See Depart- ment of the Potomac. Potomac River. 211 ; Burnside's move- ment from Fort. Monroe on, 46 ; cau- tioned to protect his right flank between Rappahannock and, Aug. 27. 115 ; MeCleUan's proposition that it be watched, 119, 120 ; the Con- federate plan of movement to, an- ticipated by government, 320 ; scouting party in reconnaissance on, Aug. 29, 279'; mentioned, 23, 211. Prince. H., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13. 1865) ; Maj., A. D. C, U. S. A. (May 23, 1855) ; Brig-.-Gen., U. S. y. (April 28, 1862) ; his bri- 492 INDEX gade in Augnr's division at Cedar Mountain, 414 ; its composition, 415 ; his position, 414, 415, 420 ; his strength, 416 ; Confederates opposed to, 42 i ; sent into action about 5 o'clock, 428 ; his advance into the corn-field, 430 ; the forces employed, ih. ; his retreat, 431 ; his losses, ih. ; captured by the enemy, 50, ib. Pry or, R. A., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., with Wilcox, Aug. 29, 34(3. Purnell Legion, Maryland Volunteers, stationed at Warrenton, Aug. 9. 416. Quincy, S. M., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. v., as Captain 2d Massachusetts, at Cedar Mountain, 15, 30 ; citations from his diary, 16-18 ; wounded, 18 Quint, A. H., Rev.; chaplain 2d Mass.; his history of the 2d Massachusetts, 389. Randolph, G. E., Capt., U. S. V., in com- mand of battery E, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, at Chantiily, 136 ; position of his battery, 157. Randolph, L., Lieut., C. S. A., his re- port of fighting with stones, battle of Aug. 30, 261. Rapidan River, Va., movements of Union forces north of, Aug. 7-9, 46 ; Confederate ruse to conceal Jack- son's movement to, 319, 320 ; crossed by Jackson in advance on Culpeper, Aug. 8, 1862, 15, 46 ; McClellan in- formed of the crosring, 320 ; bxit for attack at Cedar Mountain, Jackson would probably have withdrawn to, 51 ; King's movement to, Aug. 11, 52 ; Pope detained on, waiting re- enforcements from McClellan, 321 ; Pope re-enforced by Reno on, Aug. 14, 265 ; Jackson re-enforeed by Lee, Aug. 16, on, 73 ; Pope's re- treat from, Aug. 18, 52. Rapidan Station, Va., Bayard stationed at, Aug. 7, 401 ; Buford's pickets on, lb. Raccoon Ford, Va., a limit of Bayard's picket line, Aug. 7, 401 ; crossed by Jackson, Aug. 7, 403 ; Confederate position on road to, 418. Rappahannock, Department of. See Department of Rappahannock. Rappahannock River, Va., in Pope's plan of campaign, July 8, 317 ; Union forces on, July 31, 198 ; Burn- side's removal to, known at Rich- mond, Aug. 3, 1862, 12, 402 ; the crossing at Falmouth guarded by King, 395 ; the Army of the Poto- mac expected seasonably to reach the Union lines on, 57, 399 ; effort by Haileck to hurry troops from Alexandria to, 113, 114; McClellan believed the communication froni Acquia Creek shorter to, than from Alexandria, 112 note; the transfer of troops to, superintended by Mc- Clellan, Aug. 26, 111 ; transfer sus- pended by Haileck, 111 ; Pope's forces distributed on, 112 ; Pope's skilful retreat to, Aug. 18, 52, 73, 266, 321, 440; crossed by Army of Virginia, Aug. 19, 52, 59 ; Pope's position on the north side of, 53, 307, 325 ; Pope ordered to hold his lines on, Aug. 18-20, 57, 266, 324 ; Pope's operations affected thereby, 403 ; Lee's position on south side of, Aug. 21, 307 ; his intention to flank Pope on, 321 ; the Confederate efforts to cross, unsuccessful, Aug. 20-22, 57- 73, 266 ; the hazard of crossing, 58 ; swollen by heavy rains, 266 ; Pope's strength in operations on, 210 ; Riek- etts stationed at Waterloo Bridge on, 41 ; crossed by Jackson, Aug. 22, 58 ; Lee's perilous position on, Aug. 22-25, 59; Pope authorized, Aug. 22, to cross to attack Lee, 57 ; pre- vented by freshet, 59 ; the fords abandoned by Pope, 60 : estimate of Union losses in skirmishes on, 197 et seq., 202, 208, 211 ; losses by Sigel and McDowell considerable, 203, 204 ; Union and Confederate losses not unequal, 209 ; recrossed by Ewell, Aug 25, 59 ; Ewell's loss on, 212 ; in Pope's disposition of forces, Aug. 27, 327 ; Lee's successful strat- egy, on, 1863, 58, 321 ; mentioned, 9, 10, 115, 131, 205, 211,332. Rappahannock Station, Va., one of Greene's regiments at, Aug. 9, 39 ; McDowell in position at, Aug. 20, 53 ; Lee's unsuccessful effort to cross the river at, Aug. 20-22, 57 ; Pope authorized to cross at, Aug. 22, 58 ; strong force of enemy at, Aug. 23- 24, 266; Kearnv reported at, Aug. 26. by Porter, 114. Rebel War Clerk. See Jones. Rebellion Record, 138. Red River Campaign, mentioned, 21. Reid Farm, scene of battle of Chan- tiily, 187 ; the survey of, 1858, de- scribed, 187-188 ; reproduction of the map, 188 note. Reid House, Cliantilly battlefield, INDEX 493 visited "by Walcott and Stevens, 1SS3, 180 et seq., 191 ; a Union hospital, 1862, 18U ; occupied by Isaac Heatli, 1862, 192. Eeid, Joiin, tlie survey of Hs farm, 1858, described. 187-188. Reno. J. L., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Jiilv 18,' 1862) ; Capt., U. S. A. (Julv 1, 1860) ; Brig-.-Gen., U. S. V. (Xov."'l2! 1861) ; joined Pope. Aug-. 14, 1862, 52, 201, 265, 323,- bis strength, 201, 202, 209, 210, 265; composition of his brigade, 143, 153 ; his corps poorly supplied for campaign, 127 ; recrossed the Rapidan and Rappa- hannock. 52 ; in position, on Pope's left, at Kelly's Ford, Aug. 20, 1862, 58, 307; informed of Reynolds' moyement from Falmouth. Aug. 21, 203 ; on the Rappahannock, Aug. 26, 112 ; his position on the right, 113 ; his division of the Ninth Corps at Warrenton, Aug. 26, 61, 114, 323 ; ordered to Greenwich, Aug. 27. 62, 127 : at Greenwich, evening of Aug. 27, 63 ; Porter ordered to his sup- port, ib. ; ordered to Manassas. Aug. 28,65, 327; at Manassas Junction, noon. Aug. 28, 67, 268 ; moved to Centreville, 6S, 70, 76, 78, 337; Pope's project to send him to Gaines- ville to support McDovrell, evening of Aug. 28, 330 ; this project not executed, 26. ; the reason for not sending him, 331 ; believed by Pope, night of Aug. 28, as obstructing Jackson's retreat, ib. ; place of en- campment, night of Aug. 28, 78 ; ordered to Warrenton Tunpike, 78 ; reached Centreville at noon, Aug. 29. 79, 84-85 : ordered to attack and pursuit of Jackson, 335, 336 ; in pur- suit of enemy, 82, 384 ; mentioned in joint order to McDowell and Porter, 81 ; at Sudley Springs, 235 ; engaged under Pope in battle of Aug, 29, 89 ; Confederates repulsed by, Aug. 30, on Henry House hill, 143, 173 ; his position. Aug. 31, 140 : charged with folding position, Sept. 1, on Little River Turnpike, 150 ; his attack on Stuart, before Germantown, 164; Bimey ordered to Chantilly by, 160 ; his force at battle of Chantilly, 135 ; Ms division under Stevens' com- mand. Sept. 1, 150. 158 ; accompanied his forces to battlefield, but took no part in the conflict, 153 ; his services at Chantilly, ib. ; mistake in deliv- ery of his orders to Ferrero, 156 ; no report of battle made by, 13S ; no statement made by Pope of his orders, to, 150 ; route of his forces under Stevens to Cliantilly battle- field traced, 18^3, by Walcott and Stevens, 180 et seq. ; accompanied MeClellan in Antietam campaign. 97 ; killed at South Mountain, Sept. 14, 138 ; mentioned, 126, 177. Revnolds, J. F., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862) ; Lieut.-CuL, U.S. A. (Mav 14. 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 26, 1861) ; CoL. U. S. A. ( Jtme 1, 1863) ; in command of division, 3d Corps, A. of V., transferred from Fort Monroe, Aug. 19, 203 ; his forces sent to the Rappahannock from Ac-quia Creek, 112 ; moved from Fahnouth to join Pope, Aug. 21, 203. 205 ; joined Pope. Aug. 23, 203, 268-269 ; 308. 323 : his strength, 203, 204, 216. 269 ; Sept. 2, 217 ; at War- renton Junction, Aug. 26, 61, 323 ; his division placed under McDow- ell's command. Aug. 27. 127 ; joined McDoweR at Xew Baltimore, 131 ; ordered to Gainesville, Aug. 27, 62, 325 ; to follow Sigel, 129 ; reached Buckland MUIs evening of Aug. 27, 63 ; his place of encampment, 133 ; in position to intercept communica- tion between Jackson and Lee, 327 : Pope's order to. Aug. 28, intercepted, 828 ; reached Gainesville, noon. Aug. 28, 67 ; sent to TTarrenton Turnpike, 68, 78 ; sent back to Gainesville, 76 ; with Sigel, Jackson's only opponent. 69, 70, 77 ; believed by Pope, night of Aug. 28, as obstructing Jackson's retreat, 331 ; enconntered by Stuart, morning' Aug. 29, 343 ; ordered to attack Jackson. 82. 84; engaged under Pope in battle of Aug. 29, 89 ; ignorant, though fighting from early morning", of other than Jackson's forces. ii2 ; the scheme for junction of McDowell and. suggested by Porter, 370-371, 379; Porter ordered, at 4.30 P. M., to keep in communica- tion with, 240, 385 ; his good fight- ing. Aug. 29. 85 ; conjecture as to result of attack on^ Jackson, con- jointly with Sigel. King, and Rick- etts. 79 ; aid given to Porter by, in repulse of Jackson. Aug. 30, 259 ; his position. Aug. 31, 140 ; the con- dition of his command. 132 ; his former operations against Jackson. lb. ; his testimony for Porter at court-martial, 245 ; that the coun. 494 INDEX try between Porter and Pope was impassable, ih. ; testimony as to bis movement Aug. 29, 341-842 ; that there was no battle until 5 p. M., 245; mentioned, 126, 129, 179. Rhode Island Volunteers, Artillery, 1st reg't., Battery E, under Randolph at ChantiUy, Sept. 1,1862, 136; Cav- alry, 1st regt. (Duffi^), with i]d Corps, Army of Virginia, Aug. 1, 1862, 202 ; strength, Aug. 16, 216. Riddiek, R. H., Col., C. S. A., of 34th North Carolina regiment, mortally v>^ounded at ChantiUy, 170. Richmond, Va., withdrawal, spring of 1862, of Confederate force from Manassas Jimetion to, 103 ; Jack- son's return to, after his Shenandoah Valley campaign, June, 1862, 33, 391 ; the project for the army under Pope against, prior to July 1, 1862, 4 ; in the plan of government, 318 ; McClellan on the James a menace to, July, 400 ; the effect of opposi- tion by strong force from, considered by Pope, July 8, 317 ; scheme to draw Confederate force from, 392 ; attacks from, apprehended at Wash- ington, ih. ; Poise's operations in- tended to interrupt communications with, 40 ; and relieve Army of Poto- mac, ih. ; McClellan's estimate of Confederate army at, July 25, 8 ; his distance from, ib. ; distance of Pope from, ih. ; the two Union armies in Virginia separated by, July, 1862, 5 ; advance of both against, depend- ent on McClellan, ih. ; the successful operation against, expected from the Union of the Armies of Virginia and the Potomac, 399 ; scheme of ad- vance on, by McClellan reviewed by Halleck, 9-10; Hatch ordered to make a cavalry demonstration, July 12, towards, 395 ; railroad damaged, July, 1862, by Union cavalry be- tween Gordonsville and, 45 ; Pope believed at, to be preparing to ad- vance on, Aug. 3, 12 ; the enemy's movement from, to the south of the James, 319; McClellan's neglected opportunity to attack a reduced force at, 319 ; attack on, abandoned by McClellan, 42 ; the intention of gov- ernment to withdraw Union army from, known at, 8, 11-12 ; the Army of the Potomac withdrawn from be- fore, 399 ; Hill and Longstreet, for protection, detained at, 45, 400 ; re- leased by the withdrawal of McClel- lan, 400 ; the force remaining for defence thereafter, 401 ; strength of Lee's army in advance from, 207- 208 ; the interference with his plans before, believed by McClellan to be the cause of Pope's disaster, 120 ; distance from Fredericksburg, 9 ; mentioned, 133. Ricketts, J. B., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Capt., U. S. V. (Aug. 3, 1852) ; Brig. -Gen., U. S. V. (July 21, 1861) ; Maj., U. S. A. (June 1, 1863) ; Bvt. Col., U. S. A. (June 3, 1864) ; Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 1, 1864); in com- mand of 2d division, 3d Corps, A. of v., July, 1862, 16, 40, 149 ; his division ordered to Warrenton, July, 394 ; ordered to Waterloo Bridge, July 21, 41, 396; his movement to Culpeper, 400 ; at Culpeper C. H., Aug. 7, 16, 17, 45, 46, 403 ; ordered, Aug. 8, to position on road near Cedar Mountain, 404 ; position of his division at noon, ib. ; his reten- tion on Madison Court House Road, 410; Roberts' advice that Banks should send for, 407 ; his inactivity, 50 ; Pope's error in not going early in the day, 51 ; reached tbe battle- field too late, 50, 439 ; time of his arrival, 439 ; his position, ih. ; Pe- gram's fire on, silenced, ih. ; reported by Porter as near Warrenton, Aug. 27, 113, 126; ordered to follow Sig^el to Gainesville, 129 ; encamped at Gainesville, Aug. 27, 133 ; sent to Thoroughfare Gap, Aug. 28, 67, 75, 331 ; to cheek Lee's advance, 68 ; the value of his position at the Gap not appreciated by Pope, 331 ; his engagement with the van of Long- street's forces, Aug. 28, 69 ; seen by Robertson, 251 ; Longstreet's ad- vance delayed by, 331, 332 ; his re- treat from the Gap, 226, 332 ; left the Gap unguarded, 69, 70, 77, 84 ; should have been retained and re- enforced ther-e, 75 ; Pope's combina- tion against Jackson destroyed by, 332 ; effect of his withdrawal on battle of Aug. 29, 77, 79, 80 ; Pope's ignorance of his position, morning of Aug. 29, 81, 384 ; McDoweU directed to comnmnieate orders to, ih. ; ac- companied McDowell in movement towards Groveton, 231 ; the effect on Porter's plans, 246 ; his delay in reac]iing scene of action, 233 ; re- ported to Porter as moving towards INDEX 495 Gainesville, 239 ; Lis division use- ) less. Aug-. 29, 77 ; conjeetiire as to ' result of an attack on Jackson by. conjointly -vrith >ig'el. Reynolds, and King-, 79 ; his services in battle of : Aug-. 30, 94; his position on Difficult j Kun, Sept. 1, 137 ; his position be- I fore Germanto-^. 164 ; vi-ith Buf ord and Patrick engaged in repulse of ; Stuart on Little River Turupike. | 149-150 ; his report of action, 164— | 165 ; his former operations ag-ainst j Jackson. 133; mentioned. 131. I Roberts. B. S., Bvt. Brig-.-Gen.. U. S. i A. and Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. \. \ (March 13, 1865); Maj.. U. S. A. (Mav 13, 1861); Brig-.-Gen.. U. S. V. (July 16, 1862) ; A. D. C. (Jnlv 28-Sept. 3, 1862) ; Lient.-CoL. U. S. A. (Jtily 28, 1866) ; Pope's chief of cavalry, 406 ; sent to place Banks in position, ib. ; Banks only expected ' to hold the enemy in check. /6. ; ' authorized by Pope to give orders in his name, 408 ; the propriety of . this authorization questioned, ih. ; : his statement qualified by him, 408 ; note ; his failure to use his author- j ity to prevent the battle, 408 ; i strong' position selected by, 20-21 ; I the position abandoned by Banks . contrary to advice of, 21, 48 ; Gor- don ordered to position by, 413 ; his opinion of ability of 2d Corps to hold its position, Aug\ 9. 19 ; his imputa- tions as to Banks" tm-willingiiess to fig-ht. 23. 48, 49, 409 ; the explana- tion of the charg-e, 23 ; his statement as to Banks' action. 406 ; opposed to an attack by Banks. 406 et seq. ; , his statement that Banks foug:ht on '> his ovrn responsibility. 408 ; not un- ' biased in his statements concerniug- Banks, 407 ; his memory at fault. 49 ; his evidence as to Banks" eifort ' to evade responsibility for defeat. 23. 4S ; his testimony concerning Cedar Mountain at ^IcDowell Court of Inquiry. 19. 23 ; a ^vitness for government at Porter court-martial. 243. Robertson, B. H., Capt., U. S. A. , (March 3-Aug. 8, 1861) : Brig.- ' Gen.. C. S. A. (1862) ; his cavalry brigade at Gordonsville. its strength. 206 ; -with Jackson's command in advance against Pope, reached the Rapidan, Aug. 7, 1862, 46; repulsed Bayard, Aug. 8, 402 ; crossed the j river, Aug. 8, 46 ; his movement, i Aug. 28, to Hayroarket, 251; in command of Confederate cavalry at. Aug\ 29, 258-259 ; assigned to support Longstreet, in advance to Gainesville, 251 ; Porter's corps dis- covered by, 343 ; assigTied to -watch Porter, 258. 259 ; position of his own brigade, 258 ; his statement as to Jackson"s posi-tion, ib. ; his move- ment to-wards Manassas, 342 ; e\'i- dence from his report and lettei's cited in defence by Porter, 248 ; his letter to Porter of May 27, 1870. cited, 251-252 : his denial that bushes -were dragged by Stuart, 250, 252, 252 note ; Union cavalry cap- tured by. Aug. 31, 147 ; his position near Chantilly, Sept. 1. ib. Robertson. J., Michigan in the -war, by, mentioned, 161. Robertson"s River. Va., Sigel's force at. Aug. 7, 401. ' Robinson. J. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. Y. (June 27. 1864) ; Capt.. U. S. A. (Aug. 12, 1850) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. T. (April 28. 1862) ; Maj.. U. S. A. (Feb. 20, 1862^ ; in command of 1st brigade, 1st division (Kearny's), 3d Corps, at Chantilly, 161 ; suffered no loss, 163. Robinson. 0"X. W.. Capt.. U. S. V., in conmiand of battery. 4th Maine, at Cedar Moimtain, 416. Rockville. Md.. scouting force sent to, Aug. 29. 279. RoebHng, TT. A.. Col., A. D. C. U. S. A., his opinion that McDo-well -was responsible for Porter's failure to attack. Aug. 29, 230. Roemer. J.. Capt., U. S. Y.. in com- mand of battery L. 2d Xe-w York, his position at Cedar Mountain. 410, 415. Ronald. C. A., Col., C. S. A., in com- mand of the Stone-wall brigade. Cedar Moimtain, 419 ; his position in reserve, ib., 421 ; his advance against Donnelly, 425 ; thrown into disorder by Donnelly, 425-426 ; re- ported by Branch as routed. 426. Ropes. J. C.. his Army imder Pope " cited, 136, 197, 389; his estimates of strength of Union and Confeder- ate Armies, in Yirginia. Aug. 1862, reviewed. 197 et seq. ; his explana- tion of discrepancy of statements of Banks" force, 200 ; his estimate of Heintzelman's strength. 204; of Pope's strength. 209 ; of Pope's losses prior to Aug. 29, ib. ; of Confederate 496 INDEX strength, 208 ; his statement of Jack- son's loss corrected, 211 ; the Con- federate claim of the prisoners cap- tured questioned by, 213 ; concern- ing- guns captured by Confederates, 211, 218 ; his note in reply to Allan, 217-219 ; his statements as to place of battle of Chantilly corrected, 136, 139 ; his opinion of good condition of Pope's army after defeat, 214. Rosser, T. L., CoL, C. S. A., his engage- ment morning of Aug. 29, 342. Ruger, T. H., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 2, 1867); Col., U. S. V. (Aug. 20, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862) ; Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 30, 1864) ; Col., U. S. A. (July 28, 1866) ; in command of 3d Wisconsin, 424 ; ordered to ad- vance into the woods by Crawford, ih. ; would not go without an order from Banks, ih. ; his charge, 426 ; its disastrous consequences, 426-427. Ruggles, G. D., Bvt. Brig-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Col., A. D. C, U. S. A. (June 28, 1862-May 31, 1866) ; ordered to Porter, Aug. 29, 8 A. M., issued by, 225, 383 ; his testimony for Porter at court-mar- tial, 245. Russell, H. S., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. v.. Col., 5th Mass. Cavalry, captured by the enemy at Cedar Mountain, 439. Salamanaca, Spain, battle of July 22, 1812, 95. Salem, Va., in Jackson's flank move- ment, Aug. 1862, 59, 73, 308, 323 ; Jackson conjectured to be marching to Warrenton from, 61 ; Confederate forces near, Aug. 27, 268 ; Long- street at, Aug. 27, 308 ; mentioned, 131, 369. San Francisco, Cal., the residence of Gen. Halleck at, 306. Savage, J., Jr, Maj., 2d Mass., mortally wounded Cedar Mountain, 439. Sehenck, R. C, Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 30, 1862) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; in command of brigade, 1st Corps, 36 ; temporarily in command of 1st Corps, 394 ; or- dered to Sperryville, 395. Schofield, J. M., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 4, 1869) ; Capt., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 21, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862) ; Brig.-Gon., U. S. A. (Nov. 30, 1864) ; a member of the board to investigate the Por- ter case, 351 ; his comment on the charge of disobedience of Pope's or- der of Aug. 27, 6.30 p. M., 353 ; his leanings towards the petitioner's point of view, 382 ; his report for the board in the Porter case com- mended, ih. Scribner's Sons, publishers of " Cam- paigns of the Civil War," 217. Second Army Corps. See U. S. Army Corps. Second Corps, Army of Virginia. See U. S. Army Corps, Army of Vir- ginia. Second Massachusetts Regiment Asso- ciation, account of Battle of Cedar Mountain by Gordon, read to, 18. Sedgwick, J., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (July 4, 1862) ; Col., U. S. A. (April 25, 1861); Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Aug. 31, 1861) ; mentioned by Mc- Clellan, 296. Seven Days' Battles, the beginning of, coincident with Pope's assignment to command, 392. Shenandoah Valley, Va., the May, 1862, operations in, favorable only to Jackson, 391 ; attempt to deceive Union commanders in, June, 401 ; Jackson's successful operations in, 33 ; severe service of his division in, 206 ; his movement to Richmond from, 401 ; Banks' reckless attack on Jackson in, 37 ; Banks driven from, 33 ; the scene of all of his actions prior to 1862, 38 ; experience of his forces in, 39 ; the position of Union forces in, July, 393; Banks' wish to retaliate at Cedar Mountain for reverses inflicted by Jackson in, 48 ; the projected employment of Pope for safety of, 40 ; his good disposi- tions to that end, 41; his plan to guard the outlets of, 317, 392 ; Jack- son's August movement believed by Pope to be directed to, 110, 111, 129, 322 ; mentioned, 133. Shenandoah, Department of. See De- partment of the Shenandoah. Shepard, Col., 32d Massachusetts Vol- unteers, his statement as to move- ment, Aug. 29, 339, 346. Sherman, W. T., Gen., U. S. A. (March 4, 1869); CoL, U. S. A. (May 14, 1861); Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; Maj-Gen., U. S. V. (Mav 1, 1862- Aug. 12, 1864) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (July 4, 1863) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (Aug. 12, 1864) ; Lieut.- IXDEX 497 Gen,. U. S. A. (J^v_25, 1S66); Ms order of March. 9. 1S7S, eonvermig a board to re-lieaT tlie Porter case, 351 : the constraetion of the hoard of his proTision a,s to eTidenee. ii. Sigel. F.. Ma j. -Gen,. U. S. A'. (March 21, 1S62) : Brig.-Gen.. U. S. V. ^May 17. 1861) ; his service in Germany. 184S, 36 ; his command in Alissis- sij)pi. ib. ; his forces of little service. 36-37; his inefficiency. 36 ; rei^laced Fremont in command of 1st Corps. A. of v., 36. 391 ; his opp ointment intended to conciliate Germans. 36 ; composition of his corps, ib. : his strengTh, 37. 19S. 19'9. 201.' 203,' 394; his unfavorable report of tie condi- tion of his command. 394; ordered. July 5. to position at Sperryville. 41 ; tem^Dorarily replaced by Schenck. 3'94; his corps inspected by Pope. Aug. 7. 4tj3 ; dii'ected to support Buford. Aug-. 7, 4ul ; ordered to move to Culpeper. Aug. S. 15, 46. 404 ; tinable to find the only direct road. 16, 46. 404; at Hazel Pdver. Aug. 9, 46; arrived at Culpeper afternoon of Aug. 9. 50. 404 ; Pope's orders as to rations violated by. 4iJ4 : his forces tired and huugry. oO. 404; delayed for rest and food rill too late for action. 50 ; Banks expected not to precipitate a fight before the arrival of. 4ij7 ; Ms arrival, evening, at Cedar Mountain. 440 : in position at Sulphur Springs. Aug. 20-26, 53. 61, 307 : his losses in skirmishes on the Ptappaliannock, 203 ; Pope's capricious orders to. 61 ; ordered to Warrenton. 61, 113 ; his tvro divi- sions at TTarrenton, Aug. 26. 1^62. 61. 129 ; his corps placed under Mc- Dowell's command; Aug. 27, 127 : artillery supplied to Kearny by, ih. : his corps vrithout cavalry, 129 ; Mc- Dovr ell's order to, Aug. 27. 369 ; or- dered to Gainesville. Aug. 27. 62. 129, 325 ; by his slo^ess delayed th.e movement of the army to GainesTille. 63, 130-131 : reached BuckLand Mills, evening. Aug-. 27. 63 ; in position night of Aug'. 27. to intercept co m munication between Jackson and Lee. 327 ; Pope's order to. intercepted; 32S ; sent to Gaines- ville. Aug. 2S. 76 ; at Gainesville at noon. 67 ; sent to "VTarrenton Turn- pike, 6S, 7S : ordered to Centre ville. 6S: vtith.Peynolds confronted Jack- son. 69 ', his engagement with J ack- son, 337 ; believed by Pope, night of Aug. 2S. as obstructing Jackson's retreat. 331 ; Pope's project to em- ploy him in pursuit of Jackson. 336 ; his position, morning. Aug. 29, 225, 3S3 ; ordered. Aug-. 29, to attack Jackson near Grovetou. 7S, Si, S2, S4. 335 ; encountered by Stuart, 343 ; his movement in pursuit of enemy. 3S4; Porter and McDowell ordered to join. 310 ; McDowell held to have ordered Porter to join. 231 ; Mc- Dowell's movement by Sudley road caused a separation from. 231. 232 ; effort made by Porter to send Morell to aid. 234. 235 ; Porter's unsuccess- ful effort to communicate with., 373, 374 ; King's movement to aid. 339 ; engaged under Pope in battie of Aug. 29. 89 ; his good fighting. 85 ; repulsed by Jackson. 176 ; his igno- rance of other forces engaged than Jackson's. 92; conjecture as to re- sult of attack, conjointiy with Rey- nolds. King and Ricketts, 79 ; his position. Aug. 31. 140 ; no report of his losses. 213 : his corps assigned to garrison duty at Washington, by Me- Clellan. 97 ; mentioned, 70. 77, 126, 219. Slaughter's Moimtain. another name for Cedar Moimtain. Slaus'hter's Run. See Cedar Run. Slocum. H. W.. Maj.-Gen.. U. S. V- { Julv 4. lS62-Sept. 2S. 1865) : Col.. U. S. V. (Mar 21. 1861) ; Brig.- Gen.. U. S. T. (Aug. 9, 1861) ; at Washington. Aug. 27. 292. Smith. B. F,. Bvt. Brio-.-Gen.. U. S. V. (March 26. 1865) ; Capt. U. S. A. (^lav 14. 1861) : Col.. 126tli Ohio (Sept. 10, 1862); Maj.. U. S. A. (July 25, 1866) ; a witness for gov- ernment. Porter court-martial, '24^-j, 339. :346, Smith.. T. C. H., Lieut.-Col.. A. D. C, U. S. v.. announced Reynold's move- ment from Falmouth to Reno. Aug. 21. 203; a witness for government, Porter court-martial. 24^^. Smitb. W. F.. Bvt. Mai-Gen.. U. S. A. (March 13. 1865) ; Capt.. U. S. A. (Julv 1. 1859) : Col., U. S. Y. (Julv I'x '1861); Brig.-C^n.. U. S. V. (Aus-. 13. 1861) ; :SIai.-Gen., U. S. T. (July '4. 1862); Maj., U. S. A. (May 3'. 1863-]VIarcli 7, 1867) ; at TTashington. Aug. 27, 292 ; in ad- vance under Franklin. Aug. 29. 299 : owing to his report of the advance 498 INDEX of enemy, Franklin's division was halted at Aunandale, ih. ; his want of artillery ammunition, 299-300. South Carolina Volunteers, C. S. A., 1st, or Orr's Rifles, in Gregg-'s bri- gade, A. P. Hill's division, Jackson's corps, at battle of Cliantilly, Sept. 1, 1802, 155, 169: 2d regt. at first battle of Bull Run, 183 : 12th regt., in Gregg-'s brig-ade, A. P. Plili's divi- sion, Jackson's corps, at battle of Chantilly, Sept. 1, 1862, 155, 169: 13th regt. in Gregg's brigade, A. P. Hill's division, Jackson's corps, at Chantilly, 155 ; its position and service, 169: 14th regt. in Gregg-'s brig-ade, A. P. Hill's division, Jack- son's corps, at Chantilly, 155 ; its position and service, 169. South Mountain, battle of, Sept. 14, 1862, a contrast to second Bull Run, 97 ; Reno killed at, 138. Southern Historical Society Papers, 138. Spain, Peninsular War, 95. Sperryville, Va., Banks ordered to position at, July 5, 1862, 41 ; Sigel also, 26., 395 ; Ricketts ordered to position on the road to, July 21, 41, 396 ; road from, to Madison Court House, guarded by Sigel, 401 ; Sigel's corps inspected by Pope at, Aug. 7, 403 ; Sigel ordered to Cul- peper from, Aug. 8, 46 ; Sigel's difficulty in selecting a road for his movement from, ib. ; his reluctant and tardy movement from, 50 ; Buford's retreat towards, morning of Aug. 9, 410 ; Banks' position in relation to, 400. Stafford, L. A., Col., C. S. A., in com- mand of 4th brigade, Jackson's divi- sion, Jackson's corps, 206 ; its com- position and strength, 206-207 ; his brigade in A. P. Hill's division at Cedar Mountain, 419 ; arrived too late for the battle, ih. ', his advance towards Brown's house, 439. Stanton, E. M., Secretary of War, his hopes from Pope, 34 ; unfitted for command in military affairs, 305 ; Halleek's statement of July 27, concerning his visit to MeClel- lan, 318. Starf^e, W. E., Brig.-Gen., C S. A., with Jackson, Aug. 21, 307 ; in com- mand of Jackson's division, 145, 155, 166, 257 ; his position, 257 ; his divi- sion fled from the field of Cliantilly, 155, 166 ; Hays' brigade withdrawn panic stricken by, 156 ; a gun cap- tured by, 211. Steinwehr, A. von, Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Oct. 12, 1861) ; in command of 2d division, 1st Corps, A. of V., bridge at Buekland Mills, guarded by, Aug. 27, 131. Stevens, H., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (April 2, 1865) ; Capt., A. D. C, U. 5. V. (Oct. 21, 1861) ; Col., U. S. V. (July, 1863) ; ^Maj., U. S. V. (Nov. 6, 1864) ; Adjutant- General on his father's staff, 154 ; his participation as Captain and Aide-de-Canip in battle of Chantilly, 138 ; assigned to the 79th New York, in the charge, 154 ; wounded, ib., 162 ; information provided by, 150 ; revisited Ma- nasses and Chantilly, 1883, 173, 178, 182 ; his anecdote of Lafayette, 188. Stevens, I. I., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Jidy 4, 1862) ; Col., 79th New York regt., (July 30, 1861) ; Brig.- Gen., U. S. V. (Sept. 28, 1868) ; his repulse, Aug. 29, by Jackson, at Groveton, 176 ; his position, Aug. 31, at Cub Run, 139 ; relieved by Reynolds in that position, 140 ; ordered to check advance of enemy on Little River Turnpike, 136, 150, 151, 153 ; in command, during Reno's absence, of 1st division, 9th Corps, 139, 150; accompanied by Reno to the battlefield of Chantilly, 153 ; the composition of his force, 151-152 ; his strength, 148, 152 ; his position, 152 ; his movement against the enemy, 151 ; the battle caused by. 136 ; the responsibility of the action taken by, 153 ; his prepara- tions to receive attack, ib. ; called for re-enforcements, 154 ; time of his advance, 153-154 ; his attack, 148 ; led the charging column, 154 ; bore the flag of the 79th New York, ih ; the effect of the charge, 155 : killed, 95, 135, 138, 155, 162, 166; he fell in front of Thomas' Georgia brigade, 16<> ; the spot where he was killed indicated on map, 187, 189 ; his division being Avithout am- munition was withdrawn from battle, 157; Birney's account of the with- drawal of division of, 160 ; his route of approach to Chantilly battlefield traced by Waleott and Stevens, 1883, 180-181, 189-191. Stevenson, J., Lieut., 13th New York, his testimony for Porter at court- martial, 245, INDEX 499 Stewart, C, visited by TValeott and I fetevens, ISSo, 169 et seq.. lUo ; his i reminiscences of battle of Chantilly, 189 et seq. " ' Stewart, in the bounds of Reid farm survey, 187. Stone Bridge, Bull Run, in Ewell's movement, Aug. 28, 65 ; in Early's movement. 329 ; HilFs movement towards, ib. ; threatened by Long- street, Aug. .30, 94; visited, 1883, by Walcott and Stevens, 180. "Stonewall" sobriquet given to Jack- son, after first Bull Run, ITo. Stonewall Brigade. C. S. A., its com- j)osition, 419 ; thrown into disorder by forces under Donnelly. 420 ; re- ported by Branch as routed, ib. ; its reception of Ruger's attack, ib. ; Ru- ger forced back by, 427. ! Stony Ridge, or Sudley Mountain, Va., ! in the second battle of Manassas, i 173 ; visited by Walcott and Stevens, 179 ; the scene of engagement be- tween King and Ewell. Aug. 28, 179, 226. Stoughton, E. H., Brig.-Gen., U. S. Y. (Nov. 0, 1862) ; 2d Lieut., U. S. A. (Sept. 5, 1859-March 4, 1861) ; Col., 4th Vermont (Sept. 21, 1861) ; cap- tured by Mosbv. Mar. 8, 1863, at Fairfax C. H., 185-186. Stowe. L. W., Capt.. C. S. A., in com- mand of 16th Xorth Carolina, se- verely wounded at Chantilly, 170. Strasburg Turnpike, Ya.. Banks' po- sition, on. Julv. 1862. 393. Stribling, R. M., Capt., C. S. A., his artillerv demonstration under Hood, Aug. 29. 344. Stuart. J. E. B.. Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., Capt., U. S. A. (April 22-May 14, \ 1861) ; his partiality for raiding, ! 109 ; his encounters with Buford, j 137 ; his loss, estimated, 212 ; his j strength, July 20, 207 ; Lee's letter i to, of Aug. 15. intercepted by Pope, | 265-266 ; his raid to Catlett Station, j Aug. 22, not heeded by Pope, 321 ; j in the movement from Manassas Junction, night of Aug. 27, 108; wdth Jackson in the raid to Manas- sas, 308 ; his service, 292 ; not in command of Confederate cavalry, Aug. 29, 258-259 ; the cavalry on the Confederate right under com- mand of, 345 ; his report to Lee of Union advance from Manassas, 250, 255, 257, 344, 345-346 ; his move- ment, 342 ; his position, 255, 258 ; \ his attempt by dragging brush to ■ deceive Porter, 342 ; his statement questioned, 250 ; denied by Robert- son, 250, 252, 252 note ; his state- ments distrusted by Porter's defend- ers, 343 ; his statement of Confed- erate force before Porter morning- of Aug'. 29, not in accord with Porter's estimate, ib. ; his statements incor- rect as to the brigade sent to sup- port the Confederate right, 346 ; his evidence of Porter's withdrawal, ib. ; his capture of Union cavalry, Aug;. 31. 147 ; engaged in flank movement during Union retreat. Sept. 1, 137 ; his report. 138 : repulsed on Little River Turnpike, 149-150, 164, 165 ; joined Jackson near Chantilly, 147 ; his report, of operations at Chantilly, cited, 165, 191 ; extract from his re- port sent Pope by McDowell, 366, 367 ; his report employed in support of his attack on Porter by Pope. 250, 252 note ; its construction by Weld, 250. Sturgis, S. D., Brig.-Gen.. U. S. Y. (Aug. 10, 1861) ; Maj., U.'S. A. (Mav 3, 1861) ; Lieut.-CoL, U. S. A. (Oct. 27, 1863) ; in command of the de- fences of Washington (May 25-Aug. 24, 1862) ; in position at Washing- ton. Julv, 1862. 393 ; his strength, 198'. 200-201, 394 ; with Pope on the Rappahannock, Aug. 21, 307; Pope re-enforced bv his brigade under Piatt, Aug. 26^ 40, 198, 203, 205. Sudley Ford, Bull Run, crossed by Jackson, Aug. 31, 1862, 145, 165 ; also by D, R. Jones, 171 ; also by Longstreet. 145, 171 ; the left of A. P. Hill's division in position near, 257 ; mentioned, 175. Sudley Mills, Ya., Taliaferro's move- ment, Aug. 28. on road to. 1' S. Sudley Springs, Ya.. position of Jack- son's left wing near, Aug. 28. 107, 308 ; effect of the attack on L^uiou right at, Aug. 29, on Porter's plans, 235 ; the Union movement from Bristoe towards, observed by Con- federates, 342 ; mentioned, 177. Sudley Springs Road. Taliaferro's route of march from Manassas. Aug. 27, 65 ; Jackson's movement by, Aug. 28, 328, 329 ; route of Union forces from Gainesville to Warrenton turnpike, 68 ; movement of Ricketts and King on, 77 ; Porter's position near, noon, Aug, 29, 85. 233 ; McDowell's move- ment on, Aug. 29, 86, 231, 337, 353, 500 INDEX 359, 370, 379 ; McDowell's presence on, probably known to the Confed- erates, 92 ; Morell's movement to, 339, 372, 373, 374, 375 ; Pope's %ht near, reported to Porter, 240 ; only avail- able for McDowell's forces, 88 ; mentioned, 328. Sulphur Springs, Va., one of Greene's regiments at, Aug. 9, 39 ; Sigel's po- sition at, Aug. 20, 53 ; Lee's plan to cross the Rappahannock at, 57-58 ; recrossed, Aug. 22, 1862, by Ewell, 69 ; Confederates repixlsed at, Aug. 23, 267 ; bridge at, destroyed by Uxiion force, ib. ; Lee's army in po- sition opposite, Aug. 25, 59 ; Sigel at, Aug. 25, 61 ; McDowell's move- ment to Gainesville, Aug. 27, by way of, 131 ; Confederate forces at, Aug. 27, 268 ; in Lee's movement, 1863, 58. Sumner, E. V., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 31, 1862) ; Col., U. S. A. (March 3, 1855) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 16, 1861) ; his corps at Acquia Creek, Aug. 26, 112, 289, 290, 299, 333 ; had not reported for duty, Aug. 27, 60, 62 ; intention to forward his forces to Falmouth, Aug. 27, 114 ; MeClellan's proposition to unite Franklin's corps with, 116 ; his movement to Alexandria 117, 120, 309, 333 ; his attempt to find trans- portation for Franklin, 295 ; corre- spondence between McClellan and Halleck concerning, 333-334 ; his detention at Alexandria, 333 ; the responsibility for his detention dis- cussed, ib. ; his detention defended by McClellan, 297 ; his detention for the defence of Washington justified, 117, 301 ; not required for the de- fence of Washington, 334 ; orders to join Pope given by McClellan, 273, 274; delayed until Aug. 30, 275, 276, 335 ; his report of his devious movement, 276 ; might have reached battlefield in time, but for his move- ment to Georgetown, 276, 277 ; his force not available when required by Pope, 333 ; Pope should have waited for, after battle of Aug. 29, 93; joined Pope, Aug. 31, 140; discus- sion of Pope's alleged order as to position of, Aug. 31, 140-141 ; and as to a reconnaissance by, 146-147, 149 ; Confederate flank movement discovered by, Sept. 1, 146; ordered to retreat from Centre ville, Sept. 1, 147; his retreat to Fairfax C. H,, 160 ; no report made by, 146 ; his strength, 213, 213 note ; with Mc- Clellan in Antietam campaign, 97 ; his testimony to the Conduct of War Committee concerning his detention, 146, 333-334 ; his statements em- ployed in the discussion of MeClel- lan's conduct at Alexandria, 283 ; mentioned, 298. Sumter, Fort. See Fort Sumter. Swinton, W., his prejudice against Halleck, 5 ; cited as to military problem in Virginia, July, 1862, ib. ; his commendation of Pope's move- ment to Manassas, Aug. 27, cited, 63 ; his silence as to Pope's conjec- ture of Jackson's plans, 64 ; his state- ment as to demoralization of Army of Virginia, cited, and its truth de- nied, 97. Sykes, G., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Maj., U. S. A. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Sept. 28, 1861) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862) ; Lieut.-Col., U. S. A. (Oct. 16, 1863) ; in command of 2d division, 5th Corps (Porter), in re- turn for August, 217 ; joined Pope, Aug. 26, 203 ; his position, Aug. 29, 233, 246 ; its object, 234 ; his position at night, 242 ; his service, Aug. 30, ib. ; his testimony for Porter at court- martial, 245. Sypher, J. R., his History of the Penn- sylvania Reserves cited, 217. Talavera, Spain, battle of July 27, 1809, 95. Taliaferro, W. B., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., 47th and 48th Alabama regts. in his brigade, at Cedar Mountain, 206 ; his position, 418-419, 421 ; expected to re-enforce Garnett, 418 ; took com- mand of Jackson's division on the death of Winder, 422; his brigade forced back by Crawford's forces, 425 ; Geary's brigade repulsed by, 430; with Jackson in movement against Pope, begun Aug. 25, 1862, 59 ; in movement, Aug. 27, to Ma- nassas, 103; his retreat from Ma- nassas, night of Aug. 27, 65, 108 ; the spoils of the raid in his custody, 108 ; the 2d Virginia brigade in his division, 260, 328 ; his movement by Sudley Springs Road, Aug. 28, 329 ; his encounter with McDowell at Groveton, 328 ; repulsed by King, 76. Taylor, G. W., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. INDEX 501 (May 9, 1862) ; in command of forces ' sent, Aug. 27, ag-ainst Jackson at | Manassas Junction, 104 ; his eug-age- ment and repulse on Cub Run, 104, | 105 ; almost annihilated, 292 ; his g'aUant conduct, 105 ; mortally wounded, ih. ; pursuit of his forces i by Fitzhug'h Lee, 109; his disaster | known at Alexandria, 119 ; the re- j turn of the remnants of his brig-ade | to Alexandria, ih. ; McClellan"s re- port of disaster to Halleek, ih. \ Taylor. W. H., Capt., A. D. C, C. S. A., I his "Four Years with Lee" cited j as to strength of Confederate armv, ' 205. ' I Tennessee Volunteers, C. S. A., 1st j reg't. (Provisional Army), in Arch- j er"s brigade, A. P. Hill's division, | Jackson's corps, at Chantilly, Sept. 1, 18(32, 155 : 7th regl. also. ih. ; 14th regt. also, ih. Terrv, A. H., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; Col., 7th Conn. (Sept. 17, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Apiil 25, 1862) ; Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (April 20, 1865) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. (Jan. 15, 1865) ; a member of the board to investigate the Porter case, 351. Texas Volunteers, 1st, 4th, 5th regts., in Hood's brigade. Hood's division, Long-street's corps, their disastrous attack on 5th JSTew York at battle of Groveton. 178, 179. Third Army Corps. See L^'nited States Armv Corps. ] Thomas, E. L., Brig.-Gen.. C. S. A., in command of brigade, A. P. Hill's division. Jackson's corps, at Cedar Mountain. 419 ; his position, 421 ; attacked by Prince, 43 1 ; his share in battle of Aug. 30, 261 ; at Chan- tiUy, Sept. 1, 1862, 155, 166; his movement against Birney, 157, 159 ; prisoners from his command taken by Laiion skirmishers, 159 ; Stevens and Kearny killed by his men, 159- 160, 166 ; support given to. by Pen- der. 170; his report of the battle, cited, 171. Thompson, J., Capt., U. S. V., in com- * mand of 2d Jilaryland battery en- gaged in silencing Pegram, 7 P- M., Cedar Momitain, 439. ThorougMare Gap, Va., in Jack- son's flank movement, Aug., 1862. 59. I 62, 73 ; Lee's intention to advance to, discussed, 321 ; Poise's effort to block, 59-60; want of report of cavalry reconnaissance to, com- plained of by Pope, 322 ; Jackson's movement towards, not anticipated by Pope, 321, 322, 323 ; passed by Jackson's force, Aug. 26, 2o8, 3o8, 324 ; Jackson's advance known to MeClellan, Aug. 27, 277 ; Buford employed, Aug. 27, in looking for Jackson west of, 109; not protected by Pope, 62, 325 ; Pope's plans for protecting, 63 ; believed by Pope to be protected by Army of Potomac, 73 ; Pope's intention to attack Jack- son between Manassas and, 63 ; Jackson expected by Pope to retreat to, 80, 82 ; Jackson's retreat towards, Aug'. 28, 268 ; Lee's advance to- wards, 66, 107, 124 ; no provision made for holding, Aug. 28, 65, 66, 67, 70, 74, 75, 95 ; this neglect inex- cusable, 66 ; Pope's lost opportunity for driving Lee back to, 92 ; Ricketts sent. Aug. 28, by McDowell to, 67, 68, 75 ; Longstreet arrived at, Aug. 28, 3 p. 31., 331 ; engagement be- tween Ricketts and Longstreet at, 69, 331; the retreat of Ricketts and King from, 332 ; their removal left Lee's passage xmchecked, 69, 70, 77 , Long-street's advance from, morniag of Aug-. 29, 85 ; the enemy reported by MeClellan, Aug. 29, as retiring towards, 279 ; mentioned, 336, 345, 369. Thoroughfare Mountain, Va., 28th Peimsvlvauia stationed at, Aug. 9, 416. TilLson, D., Maj., U. S. V. Chief of Artillery, 2d division (Ricketts). 3d Corps. A. of v., liis strength, Aug. Id, 215. Toombs, R.. Brig -Gen., C. S. A., in command of brigade, D. R. Jones' division, Longstreet's coi-ps, at ChantlLLy, 171. Torbert. A. T. A., Bvt. Maj.-Gen.. U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (Feb. 25. 1861) ; Col., U. S. V. (Sept. 16, 1861); Brig.-Gen. . U. S. V. (Xov. 29, 1862) ; saved Gen. Pope's traias from destruction, 300 ; Pope's orders to, 149 ; in position, Sept. 1, at Fairfax C. H., 149. Tower. Z. B., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (June 12, 1865) ; Maj., U. S. A. (Auo-. 6, 1861); Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 23, 1861) ; Lieut.-Col., U- S^ A. (Xov. 11, 1865) ; Col., U. S A. (Jan. 13, 1874) ; in command of 2d brigade, 2d division (^Rieketts), 3d 502 INDEX Corps, A. o£ v., strength, Aug-. 16, 215 ; ordered to post at German- town, Aug-. 30, by Franklin, 300 ; his services, 94 ; his snccessful en- gagement, Aug. 31, ib. Trimble, I. R., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in command of brigade, Ewell's divi- sion, Jackson's corps, Aug.-Sept., 1862, his position, Cedar Mountain battlefield, 418, 421 ; his captures of Union stores at Manassas Junction, Aug. 26-27, 101-102; his perilous position, ih. ; re-enforced by Jack- son, 102 ; unable to restrain Confed- erates from plundering stores, 105- 106 ; his movement in retreat from Manassas, Aug. 28, 329 ; severe en- gagement of 21st Mass. with his force at Chantiliy, Sept. 1, 157. Tripp, information concerning Cedar Mountain provided by, 390. Tucker, J., Assistant Sec'y of War, his statement of the strength of Reynold's division, Aug. 19, 203. Tyler, E. B., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 14, 1862) ; strength of his force at Alexandria, Aug. 27, 122 ; concerned in the defence of Wash- ington, 334 ; assigned by McClellan as escort to Franklin, Aug. 29, 294. Tyler, R. O., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. ^March 13, 1865) ; Capt., A. D. C, U. S. A. (May 17, 1861) ; Col., U. S. V. (Aug. 29, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Nov. 29, 1862) ; Lieut.-CoL, U. S. A. (July 29, 1866) ; at Alexan- dria, Aug. 27, 122. Union Mills, Va., Morell ordered to Centreville by v/ay of, Aug. 29, 234, 373. United States Army, under command of Lincoln, Stanton and lialleek, 305. Adjutant-General, Pope's ex- tract from Jackson's report collated with the original in the^office of, 367. Regular. Artiller}^, 2d regt. bat- tery E, under Benjamin at Chantiliy, Sept. 1, 1862, 135 : 4th regt., battery F, its service at Cedar Mountain, Aug, 9, 411, 415. Cavalry, 2d regt., a squadron of, captured, Aug. 31, at Gerraantown, 141 : 4th regt., 1st squadron, McClel- lan's escort, 114. lufantry, 8th regt., battalion of, under Pitcher in Prince's brigade, Augur's division, in skirmish line, Cedar Mountain, 415 ; its extraor- dinary service, ih. ; 12th regt. also, 415. United States Army Corps, 2d Corps, under Sumner, joined Pope, Aug. 31, 140 ; its position, 140-141 ; with McClellan in Antietam campaign, 97 ; 3d Corps, under Heintzelman, given garrison duty at Washington, Sept. 9, by McClellan, 97 ; 1st divi- sion under Kearny, 135 ; 1st brigade, under Robinson, at Chantiliy, 161 ; suffered no loss, 163 ; 2d brigade, under Birney, at Chantiliy, 157-158 ; its opponents, 157, 159 ; its composi- tion, 160-161 ; its losses, 163 ; its re- treat, 161 ; 3d brigade under Poe, at Chantiliy, 161 ; its losses, 163-164 ; 5th Corps, under Porter, with McClellan in Antietam campaign, 97 ; in return for August, 217 ; 1st division (Morell), in return for Au- gust, 217 ; 2d division (Sykes), in return for August, 217 ; 2d division, its withdrawal from line of battle, Aug. 29, 339; Artillery (Weed), in return for August, 217 : 6th Corps, under Franklin, re-enforeed Pope after Aug. 30, 94 ; with McClellan in Antietam campaign, 97 : 8th Corps, strength of brigade at Win- chester under J. White's command, July 31, 198; 9th Corps, under Burnside, 97 ; its position, Atig. 31, on Cub Run, 139; 1st division under Stevens at battle of Chantiliy, 135, 138 ; its movement against the enemy, 151 ; its losses at Chantiliy, 162-164 ; 1st brigade under Col, Christ, at Chantiliy, 152 ; its com- position, ih. ; its losses, 162 ; 2d brigade under Leasure at Chantiliy, 152 ; its composition, ih. ; its losses, 1()2 ; 3d brigade, under Morrison, at Chantiliy, 152 ; its losses, 162 ; 2d division, under Reno, at Warrenton, Axig. 26, 1862, (U ; ordered to Greenwich, Aug. 27, 62; its compo- sition, 135, 151-152 ; under com- mand of Stevens, 139, 150 ; position on Cub Run, Aug. 31, 139; relieved by Reynolds, 140 ; ordered to Little River "Turnpike, 150, 151, 153; at Chantiliy, 135, 136, 148 ; its strength, 148, 152; its position, 152, 153; its charge, 154, 155 ; without ammuni- tion, withdrawn, 157, 160 ; 1st bri- gade, under Col. Nagle, its severe action, Aug. 29, 151 ; 2d brigade, under Ferrero, at Chantiliy, 135, 151, 155-156; its composition, 156, INDEX 503 163 ; its position, 153 ; sent into ■woods, 156 ; mistake iu delivery of order, ih. ; slig'Iitly engag-ed, ih. ; its losses, 163 ; Kanawha division, un- der Cox, its streng'th, July 31, 198 : Reserve Corps, under Stiirg-is. in de- fence of Wasliiug'ton (May 25-Ang-. 24, 1S62) ; its strengi^h, July 31, 198 ; McDovrell re-enforced by, 40. 198. United States Army Corps, Army of Virginia. 1st Corps, formed of forces under Fremont in Mountain Depart- ment, June 26, 1862, 4, 35, 390; command given to Fremont, 390 ; command resigned by Fremont, ih. ; command given to Sigel, 36, 391 ; its position, July, 1882, in tbe Sben- andoali Valley, 393 ; its streng'tli, 198, 394; unfavorable report of its condition made by Sigel, 394 ; placed on garrison duty at Washington, bv McCleUan, Sept., 1862, 198; reor- ganized, ih. ; 2d Corps, formed from the troops of the Department of the Shenandoah, June 26, 1862, 390; command given to Banks, 37, 390 ; its service in the Shenandoah Valley, May, 39, 391 ; demoralized in June, 394 ; its position in the Shenandoah Valley, Julv, 393 ; its strengi;h, 38, 48, 49, '50, 198, 216, 394 ; discrepancy of statements as to its strength. 38, 394 ; its streng-th miscalculated by Confederates, 49 ; Pope re-enforced by. after Aug. 1, 94; its intrepidity at Cedar Mountain, 49 ; Confederates panic-stricken by attack of, ih. ; praised by Pope, 52, 440 ; desertion of one of its regiments, 52 ; its movement to position near Warren- ton affected, Aug. 11, 395; com- mand of. given to Mansfield, Sept. 10, by McCleUan. 97. Cavalry under command of Hatch, 895 ; its failures imder his command, 395-396 ; command given to Buford. 396; its strength. 216 ; Bayard or- dered to join. July 11. 396 ; Bayard"s streugi:li,216; Ist division (Williams), loss at Cedar Mountain, 50 ; strength, Aug., 216. 1st brigade (Crawford), loss at Cedar Mountain, 15, 16 ; strength. Aug. 216 ; 3d brigade (Gordon), in return for August, 216 : loss at Ce- dar ZMountain. 16 et seq. ; 2d division (Augiir), loss at Cedar ]S[ountain, 50 : in return for August, 216 ; Artil- lery under Best, in return for Au- j gust, ih. ; 1st brigade (Geary), in re- i turn for August, 216 ; 2d brigade j (Prince), in retm-n for August, z6. ; I 3d brigade (Greene), in return for 1 August, ih. ; 3d Corps, formed from 1 the Department of the Rappahan- j nock and the troops defending j Washington, June 26, 1862, 390 ; ! McDowell given command of, 40, 390 ; inflicted but little injury on j Jackson, May, 391 ; the positions of the several divisions of, 393 ; strength and comj)osition of, 40. 198, 215, 394 ; command of, given by McCleUan to Hooker, 97 ; 1st divi- sion (King's and Hatch's), its com- position and strength, Aug. 16, 215 ; 1st brigade (Hatch and SuUivan), its strength, Aug. 16, ih. ; 2d bri- I gade (Doubleday), its strength. I Aug. 16, ih. ; 3d brigade, commanded j by Patrick, 149, 164 ; its strength, i Aug. 16, 215 ; its position, Sept. 1, on Little River Turnpike, 137, 149 ; j Stuart's attack repulsed by, 149— 150 ; its losses, Sept. 1, before Ger- j mantown, 150, 164 ; 4th brigade j (Gibbon), its strength, Aug. 16. 215 ; ! ArtiUery, strength of, Aug. 16, ih. ; Cavalry, 2d N. Y., strength of, Aug. 16, ih. ; 2d division commanded by Ricketts, 149 ; its strength, Aug. 16, 215 ; his report of engagement be- fore Germantov-m, Sept. 1, 164 ; 1st I brigade (Duryea), its strength, Aug. 16, 215 ; 2d brigade (Tower), its i strength, Aug. 16, ih. ; 3d brigade I (Hartsuff). strength, Aug. 16, ih. ; I 4th brigade (CarroU), strength, Aug. I 16, ib. : Rifle battalion (Kane), its ; strength, Aug. 16, ib. ; ArtiUery ' (TiUson), strength, Aug. 16. ib. ; Cavalry, 1st Maine regt. (Allen), I strength. Aug. 16, ih. \ United States, Army of the Potomac, the plan of government for the em- ployment of, in July, 400 ; Pope to divert force from Richmond to the advantage of, 40, 392 ; its transfer to the James, 392 ; the movement , opposed by Pope, ih. ; at Harrison's Landing, " July 23, 1862, 5, 6 : ' strength of, July 25, 8 ; on the j James a menace to Lee. 400 ; ques- ! tions as to its disposition at close of Peninsular campaign. 42 ; danger to the health of. in summer on the James. 1" ; McClellan's opinion of i demoralization to ensue by with- drawal from the Peninsula, 7 ; Hal- 504 INDEX leek's answer to that proposition, 9- 11 ; order for its withdrawal from the Peninsula received by MeClellan, Aug". 4, 899-400; Halleck charged by MeClellan with an effort to ruin it, 25 ; McClellaii's resentment of governmental interference with, 120 ; withdrawal from the Peninsula of, 3, 7, 8, 73 ; the cause of the with- drawal of, from the Peninsula, 318 ; its movement to Fortress Monroe begun, Aug. 14, 24, 57, 320 ; the pro- cess of transfer from the Peninsula, 298-299 ; widely separated from the Army of Virginia, 400 ; project of union with Army of Virginia, 5, 9, 399; the union not effected, 219; the co-operation of, with the Army of Virginia expected by Pope, 392 ; Lee's delay in learning the with- drawal of, 400 ; his effort to defeat Pope before he could be re-enforced by, 59 ; expectation of government of quick transfer of, to the Rappa- hannock, 57 ; attempt of Halleck to hasten the transfer of, 24 ; and its junction with Pope, 25 ; its delay in joining Pope discussed, 333 et seq. ; Le Due's opinion as to its unneces- sary delay, 26-27 ; Pope's confidence in its coming to his support, 13, 60, 61 ; Pope delayed on the Pappahan- nock waiting the arrival of, 321, 324 ; the number of men from, who joined Pope prior to Aug. 25, 268-269 ; Halleck's statement concerning troops sent to Pope from, 270 et seq. ; not available to Pope at the crucial moment, 333 ; illy supplied with transportation, provisions, and ammunition, 127 ; its scattered forces organized under Pope, 4, 33 ; MeClellan censured in, 123 ; its hatred of Pope,. 143 ; insinuations of Pope against, 398 ; its situation, Aug. 26, 305 ; McDowell believed, Aug. 29, that Pope would not en- gage in battle till re-enforced by, 226 ; McClellan's authority over, de- fined, Aug. 30, 290, 391 ; two corps retained under his command by Me- Clellan, 299 ; mentioned, 133, 364. United States, Army of Virginia, con- solidated under order of June 26, 1862, 4, 33, 390 ; its composition, 4, 35- 36 ; its organization described, 390 et seq. ; its corps commanders, 36- 38 ; made of independent com- mands, not homogeneous, 219 ; Pope assigned to command of, June 26, 1862, 4, 33, 34, &90 ; command as- sumed by Pope, June 27, 391 ; the return of, July 31, 1862, 40, 198; estimates of its strength, Aug., 1862, 197 et seq., 217-219 ; its strength, Aug. 31, and its position, 139, 140 ; as strong as Lee's, Sept. 1, but not so effective, 94 ; its losses in the campaign, 97. Cavalry, the poor condition of, July, 1862, 40, 145, 199, 200, 394 ; ctrength of, 394 ; Pope's efforts to fit it for the campaign, 28 ; its bad condition under poor sanitary reg- ulations, 401 ; questions as to its employment, 42 ; its duty, the de- fence of Washington, 4, 5 ; widely separated from the Army of the Potomac in July, 5, 400 ; union of Army of Potomac with, projected by government, 5, 399 ; under Pope for a month prior to Halleck's as- sumption of command, 28-29 ; Pope's address to, July 14, 13-14, 397 ; the address criticized, 29 ; offended by the address, 398 ; Pope not received enthusiastically by, 396 : his orders as to foraging, 44 ; Pope's effort to be relieved from command of, 393 ; Pope's dispositions of, 40-41 ; move- ments of, after July 29, 400-401 ; the concentration of, near Culpeper, Aug. 7, 400; the dispositions of, Aug. 8, 45 ; Jackson's movement against, 400, 401, 402, 403 ; at Cedar Mountain, Aug. 9, 47-52; its posi- tion superior to Confederate's, 47 ; moved to the Rappahannock, Aug. 18, 52 ; crossed the river, Aug. 19, ih. ; its position, Aug. 19, 53, 57 ; divided by order of government, 41 ; its want of provisions, 266, 267 ; its position, Aug. 26, 61, 62, 73 ; its situation, 305 ; flanked by Jackson, 62 ; the movement of, determined on by Pope and McDowell, Aug. 27, 127-128 ; ordered to Gainesville, Aug. 27, 62, 127-130; the move- ment delayed by Sigel, 63 ; its posi- tion, evening of Aug. 27, ib. ; at Warrenton, Aug. 27, 268 ; Pope's change of dispositions of, night of Aug. 27, 64-65 ; movements of, Aug. 28, 67-68 ; its position, Aug. 29, on Porter map verified by Lee, 255 ; lines corrected, Aug. 31, 140 ; Con- federate attempt to fiank, in the re- treat to Fairfax C. H., Sept. 1, 137; the position tliere, 139 ; its forces in the battle of Chantiiiy, 135-136 ; not INDEX 505 disorgauized after Aug. 80, 94, 96, 97 ; its well conducted retreat, 94 ; its confidence in Pope destroyed, 94, 96-97 ; its constant employment, 267 ; fatigued by Pope. 324 ; de- moralization of. under Pope, 143- 144 ; McClellan's evasion of order to provide ammunition and rations for, 281, 282, 2S3, 284 ; MeClellan cen- sured in, 123 ; partisans of MeClellan in, 398 ; merged in Army of Potomac, Sept., 1862,4, 34; rejoiced in Mc- Clellan's restoration to command, 97 ; McClellan's changes of corps commanders, ih. ; its distrust of its commanders, 143. See United States, Army Corps, Army of Vir- ginia. United States, Congress, Joint Com- mittee on tlie Conduct of the War, informed by Pope that he had ad- vised the withdi-awal of MeClellan from before Eichmond, July 8, 7 ; also of his plans for defence at Washington, 13 : PojDe's expressed contempt of old systems of warfare to, 35 ; Pope's statement of strength to, 199 ; his statement of plan of camx)aign made to, 317 ; Pope's plans stated to, not carried out, 322 ; Pope's report to, 240 ; Banks' testimony to, concerning Cedar Mountain, 21-22, 409 ; McClellan's testimony concern- ing effort to re-enf oree Pope to, 273- 274; Halleck's statement concerning MeClellan to, 270, et seq. ; Sumner's testimony to, concerning his move- ment of Aug. 31, 146 ; and his de- tention at Alexandria, 333-334, U. S. Congress. House of Representa- tives. Banks speaker of, Feb. 2, 1856- March 3, 1857, 37. United States, Government, pa^nie- strieken by condition of affairs in Virginia, June, 1862, 33-34 ; the policy of indej)endent commands, 34 ; its plans for the employment of the army in July, 400 ; the plan of, to aid MeClellan by the vrithdrawal of Confederate force to oppose Pope, 318 ; the termination of Peninsular campaign by, discussed, 3-12 ; Mc- Clellan's failure ascribed to his em- ployment of military principles. 34 ; Pope appointed to command of Army of Virginia, 34 ; his forces di^ided by orders of, 41 ; Pope directed by, to wait on Rappahannock for re- enforcements, 27 ; ignorant of means of water transx^ortation for Army of Potomac in withdrawal from Pen- insula, 297 ; Porter's appeal to, for a rehearing of his case, 356 ; his ap- peals granted, ib. ; board of of&cers to investigate the case appointed, ib. ; its Avitnesses before the investigating board treated with indignity by Por- I ter's counsel, 362. i Department of War, its author- ity over the several independent commands in Virginia, 391 ; its in- ability to conduct the movements in A^irginia, ib. ; its purpose to strengthen Pope, 298 ; its orders re- quiring the division of Pope's army, 395 ; correspondence with MeClellan as to re-enforcing Pope, 269-270 ; its order defining McClellan's com- mands issued Aug. 30, 290 ; records and papers from, employed in the investigation of the Porter case, 351 ; maps authenticated by, 240. Adjutant-General, errors as to Banks' strength, July, 1862, 38. — ■■ — Quartermaster - General, could have sujoplied Franklin with means of transportation, 275, 296. ! U. S. Military Academy, West Point, N. Y., Pope a cadet at, 1838-1842, 35. Upton's Hill, Va., Cox sent by Me- Clellan, Aug. 27, to, 273. Victor, General, censured by Napoleon for rashness at Talavera, 95-96. Vienna, Va., reconnaissance ordered to, Aug, 27,273 ; scouting force sent to- wards, Aug. 29, 279. Virginia, the position of the two Union armies in, 5 ; the Union operations in, placed under Halleck's commands, 392-393 ; exasperation in, caused by Pope's orders, 399. Peninsular Campaign, 1862, the termination of, favored by Lincoln, 7 ; advised by Pope, ib. ; ordered by Halleck, ib. ; the order received by MeClellan, Aug. 4, 265, 399-400 ; Ms remonstrance, 8 ; the reasons for, given by HaHeck, 8-11 ; the subject discussed, 3, et seq.. 42, 318 ; Mc- Clellan's delay in withdrawing the army, 26-27 ; Halleck's orders as to ammunition, 280 ; debarkation of troops, 112 ; purpose to call Couch from the Peninsula. Aug, 27, 114. Virginia Volunteers, 2d brigade under command of B, T. Johnson at 2d Bull Run, 260 ; 22d battalion, in Brockenbrough's brigade, at Chan- 506 INDEX tilly, 154: 1st regi;. (Irisli), its po- sition, battle of Cedar Mountain, 418 ; demoralized by Donnelly's ebarg-e, 425 ; almost captured by Donnelly, ih. : 2d regt., in Stonewall brigade, 419; in tbe repulse of Ruger's attack, 427 : 4th. regt., in Stonewall brigade, 419 ; in the repulse of Ruger's at- tack, 427 : 5th regt., in Stonewall brigade, 419 ; in the repulse of Ru- ger's attack, 427 : 10th regt., its po- sition, Cedar Mountain, 418 : loth regt., in Early's brigade, Ewell's di- vision, Jackson's corps, at Chantilly, Sept. 1, 1862, 157: 21st regt., its position. Cedar Mountain, 418 ; de- moralized by Donnelly's charge, 425 : 25th regt., in Early's brigade, Ewell's division, Jackson's corps, at Chan- tilly, Sept. 1, 157: 27th regt., in Stonewall brigade, 419 : 31st regt., in Early's brigade, Ewell's division, Jackson's corps, at Chantilly, Sept. 1, 157 : 33d regt., in Stonewall bri- gade, 419 : 40th regt., in Brocken- brough's brigade, at Chantilly, 154 : 47th regt., also, ih. : 48th regt., its position, Cedar Mountain, 418 : 55th regt., in Brockenbrough's brigade at Chantilly, 154 : 60th regt., of A. P. Hill's division, sent to West Virginia, 206. _ Virginia, Army of. See Army of Vir- ginia. Virginia Central Railway, damaged between Gordonsville and Richmond by Union cavalry, July, 1862, 45 ; successful cavalry expedition sent by King to, 396. Volunteers, U. S. Armies, the Western, described by Pope, 14 ; the German, in Army of Virginia, 36. Walcott, C. F., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (April 9, 1865) ; Capt., 21st Mass. (Aug. 21, 1861) ; Lieut. -Col., 61st Mass. (Sept. 22, 1864) ; Col. (Nov. 9, 1864) ; his participation in battle of Chantilly, 138 ; his encounter with Kearny, 158 ; Kearny warned by, 159 ; his visit to Manassas and Chan- tilly, 1883, 173 et seq. Walker, J. G., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in command of a division, under Long- street, Aug. 21, 307. Walker , in the bounds of Reid farm survey, 187. Walton, J. B., Col., Washington (Lou- isiana) Artillery, C. S. A., position of his artillery, Aug. 29, 345. Ward, Fort. See Fort Ward. Warren, G. K., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A. (March 13, 1865) ; 1st Lieut., U. S. A. (July 1, 1856) ; Lieut.-Col., 5th N. Y. (May 14, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (Sept. 26, 1862); Maj.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 3, 1863) ; Maj., U. S. A. (June 25, 1864); Lieut.-Col., U. S. .A. (March 4, 1879) ; position of his brigade, Aug. 29, 233; his opinion that McDowell was respon- sible for Porter's failure to attack, 230; and that McDowell did not favor an attack by Porter, 311 ; his services in battle of Aug. 30, in command of 3d brigade, 2d division, 5th Corps, 94 ; the destruction of his men of the 5th New York, 178 ; his survey for map used in the Porter case, 177 ; his letter of Nov. 7, 1876, to Porter, cited, 230. Warrenton, Va., Ricketts' division ordered to, July, 1862, 394 ; in po- sition at, 113 ; and from thence to Waterloo Bridge, July 21, 41, 396 ; Banks' movement to, 395 ; his po- sition near, ih. ; Purnell Legion sta- tioned at, Aug. 9, 416 ; Jackson conjectm'ed to be marching on, Aug. 25-26, 61 ; Union army concentrated at, ih., 113 ; Sigel ordered to, Aug. 25, 61 ; Reno in position at, Aug. 26, ih., 113 ; Pope's forces at, use- less, 74 ; abandoned by Pope, Aug. 27, 125 ; Sigel ordered to Gaines- ville, from, 129 ; McDowell's move- ment from, 131 ; public property re- moved from, 126, 128; mentioned, 132. Warrenton Junction, Va., Bayard ordered to Culpeper from, July 15, 396 ; Pm'nell Legion stationed at, Aug. 9, 416; Lee's plans against railroad at, Aug. 20, 58 ; Jackson in position near, Aug. 26, 268 ; Pope's headquarters at, Aug. 26, 325 ; be- lieved by Halleck to be at, Aug. 27, 113 ; Heintzelman at, Aug. 26, 62, 73 ; Pope's forces at, 323 ; the forces useless at, Aug. 26, 74; Pope's com- munications with McDowell by tele- graph from, 125-126 ; proposition for Banks' movement by way of, 126 ; public property transferred through, 126, 129 ; supply trains at, put under Banks' direction, Aug. 27, 63. 126, 128, 325; Porter at, Aug. 27, 63, 127, 327 ; Porter ordered to remain at, until relieved by Banks, 127 ; Ewell's encounter with Hooker INDEX 507 coming' from, 103 ; McClellan's tele- grams to, 114 ; McClellan's appre- hensions as to disaster at, 116 ; Porter ordered to Bristoe from, Aug-. 28, 65, 66-67 ; Sykes g-uarding- trains at, prior to Aug. 39, 243 ; Lee's more- ment on, 1S63, against Meade, 58. Warrenton Springs, Va., 60th New York stationed at, Aug. 9, 416. Warrenton Turnpike, in Lee's plans, Aug. 20, 1862, against Pope, 58 ; in the route for the concentration of the Union army at Gainesville, 127, 325 ; details of the Union movement on, 129-132; Ricketts' delay in reaching, 233 ; in Taliaferro's route, night of Aug. 27, 108 ; the route of Jackson's retreat from Centreville, 268 ; in Ewell's movement, Aug. 28, 65 ; Pope convinced, Aug. 27, that Jackson's force was south of, 63-64 ; McDowell's suggestion to Pope, Aug. 28, to intercept Jackson on, 329-330; not heeded, 331; Sigel, Reynolds, and King sent to, Aug, 28, 68, 75, 78 ; encounter on, of McDowell with Taliaferro's division, Aug. 28, 328 ; movement of the enemy on, dis- covered morning' of Aug. 29, 85, 86 ; Longstreet's junction -ndth Jackson on, 309 ; Longstreet's position across, 248-249, 252, 258 ; Pope in pursuit of Jackson on, 80, 384 ; Pope's move- ment announced by Porter, 383 ; and in joint order to McDowell and Porter, 81 ; Sigel's movement on, 310 ; evidences of skirmishing on, seen by Porter and McDowell, morn- ing of, 230 ; Jackson's luie of battle north of, 341 ; Pope's message to Porter concerning the fight on, 240 ; the rough character of the country between Porter's position and, 359 ; Porter prevented the turning of Union left flank by Lee on, 87 ; Stevens' movement, Sept. 1, towards Chantilly, on, 151 ; re-enforcements called for by Stevens from, 154 ; the direct road irom Fairfax Court House to Centreville. 136 ; mentioned, 153, 173, 176, 180, 329. Washington, D. C, alarm at, June 1862, 34; the forces stationed at, under command of Sturgis, 36, 393 ; the strength of troops at, 36, 394 ; assigned to McDowell's command, June 26, 40, 390 ; Pope in charge of the defence of, 392 ; disposition of his army to that end, 4, 5, 9, 12-13 ; Pope expected to ensure safety of, 40 ; McClellan's theories as to the true means of defence of, 119-120 ; Pope's plan for defence of, 317 ; commimicated to Committee on the Conduct of the War, 13; the necessity of protecting, of the first importance in Pope's movements, 392 ; the dan- ger to, involved in a transfer of Pope to the James, 9 ; Cox ordered to, from West Virginia, 201 ; Pope's headquarters at, untH July 29, 391- 392; bis departure from, to join the army, 45 ; Lee's project of an ad- vance on, noted by Jones, 12 ; the Army of the Potomac ordered from the Peninsula to the neighborhood of, 399-400; McClellan's assump- tion, Aug. 12, that his army could not be transferred in time to save, 320 ; McClellan in command of the forces in and about, after Aug. 26, 271, 272 ; persons inimical to Mc- Clellan at, 398 ; McClellan's respon- sibility for the defence of, 277, 278 ; Pope's communication with, inter- cepted by Jackson, Aug. 26, 323, 324; Jackson's measures for defence at Manassas, Aug. 27, against force expected from, 103 ; liis engagement with Union forces from, 104-105 ; McClellan's provision for theldef enee of, 279 ; his exaggerated estimate of force under Lee in advance on, 277 ; McClellan's solicitude for safety of, 116, 117, 118, 122, 334 ; Halleck's im- due apprehensions, 334 ; Pope's de- pendence on supplies from, 330, 331 ; three commanders-in-chief at, 305- S06 ; Union generals found at, Aug. 27, 292 ; ignorance concerning Jack- son's force at, ib. ; the extravagant reports concerning Lee's advance on. Aug'. 28, 277 ; forces ordered to Fairfax C. H., from, 149; Lee's forces believed, Aug. 31, to be be- tween Centreville and, 301 ; Pope's scheme to alarm Halleck as to safety of, Aug. 31, Sept. 1, 141, 142, 148 ; Pope's retreat to, 271 ; Birney's re- treat to 161 ; Ricketts' retreat to, 164 ; McClellan given command of the defence of, Sept. 1, 291, 301 ; Union forces withdrawn, Sept. 2, to the defence of, 160 ; the two Union armies of Virginia, united before, 4, 34 ; the regiment deserted from Banks' corps in service at, 52 ; Si- gel's and Heintzelma-n's corps given garrison dutv at. by McClellan, 97 ; mentioned, 107, 130, 192, 202,205, 508 INDEX 219, 254, 367 ; U. S. Government at. See U. Government. Waterloo, Va., Lee's plan, Aug-. 20, 1862, to cross Rappahannock at, 58 \ his army in position, Aug-. 25, oppo- site, 59 ; his intention to cross the Rappahannock at, discussed, 321 ; Confederate forces at, Aug-. 27, 268 ; mentioned, 131. Waterloo Bridge, Va., over Rappahan- nock, Ricketts ordered, Jtily 21, to, 41, 396 ; in raid of Confederate cavalry, Aug-. 22, 277 ; destroyed by Union forces, Aug-. 23, ih. ; Sigel at, Aug-. 25, 61 ; ordered to Warrenton from ih. ; ordered to cross at, Aug-. 26, ib. Waterloo Road, McDowell's move- ment, Aug. 27, by, 131. Weir House, Manassas Junction, place of meeting- of Porter and McDowell, Aug. 29, 225. Weld, S. M., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., GoL, 56th Mass., bearer of despatches from Porter to Pope and McDowell, Aug. 29, 238 : his communications to Porter, 238', 240 ; his defence of MeClellan's conduct at Alexandria, 289-302 ; reviewed by Coi. Lyman, 305-313 ; letter read by, concerning MeClellan's efforts to get informa- tion about Pope, 302 ; his indi- cations of MeClellan's distrust of Pope, 312 ; his testimony for Porter at court-martial, 245 ; that Mc- Dowell did not favor an attack by Porter, 311 ; as to time of receipt by Porter of Pope's 4.30 P. M. order, ib. Wellington, Field Marshal, the Duke of, mentioned, 20. West Virginia, Cox's forces stationed in, July, 1862, 393 ; ordered to join Pope from, 201 ; 60th Virginia sent to, 206. West Point, N. Y., U. S. Military Academy at. See U. S. Military Academy. Western Soldiers, Pope's account of, 14. Weyer's Cave, Va., Jackson encamped at, June 12, 401. White, J., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (June 9, 1862) ; in command of a brigade, 8tli Corps, at Winchester, his strength, July 31, 1862, 198, 199. White House, Va., Pope's opinion that MeClellan's southern movement should stop at, 392. White Plains, Va., in Jackson's flank movement, Aug., 1862, 59, 62, 73; supposed to be marching on Warren- ton from, 61 ; Lee's movement by, 124 ; Longstreet at, evening of Aug. 27, 331 ; Buford's reconnaissance to, Aug. 27, 109, 129 ; in Pope's dispo- sition of forces, Aug. 27, 327 ; men- tioned, 131. Whiting, W, H. C, Capt., U. S. A. (Dec. 13, 1858-Feb. 20, 1861) ; Maj.- Gen., C. S. A., his division imder Hood's command, 207. Whitman, W. E. S., and C. H. True, " Maine in the War," by, mentioned, xxi, 161. Whittier, C. A., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. . V. ; 2d Lieut., 20th Mass. (June, 1861) ; Lieut.-Col., A. D. C, U. S. v., Capt., U. S. A. (July 28, 1866- Aug. 8, 1870); MeClellan's letter to, June 20, 1876, 296-298. Wilcox, C. M., Capt., U. S. A. (Dec. 20, 1860-June 8, 1861) ; Brig.-Gem, C. S. A., 1862, Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., the composition of his force, Aug. 29, 346 ; his strength, 258 ; his posi- tion, 91, 249, 258 ; Porter confronted by, 88 ; Pope ignorant of his prox- imity, 92 ; not engaged, 91, 92 ; kept inactive by Porter, 91 ; his movement to support Jones, 236, 249, 250, 255, 258, 344, 345, 346; restored to his former position, 250 ; no other forces than his diverted from Longstreet, 346 ; his report cited as to his movement, 345 ; in accord with Stuart's statement, 346 ; his disobedience of Lee, 254 ; his criticisms of Pope, 253-254 ; his let- ter to Porter, Jan. 12, 1870, cited, 253-255 ; his opinion as to Porter's immunity because of disobedience of orders, 253 ; the Porter " Board Maps " verified by, 241. Williams, A. S , Brig.-Gen., U. S. V. (May 17, 1861) ; in command of di- vision under Banks, 38 ; the strength of his division, Aug. 9, 416; the form of his line, Cedar Mountain, 414-416 ; his position, 420 ; one of his regiments ordered to advance, 5.40 p. M., 423 ; his report as to the position of Gordon's brigade, 433 ; his order to Gordon to support Craw- ford, 434 ; his statement as to the promptness of Gordon's movement, 432-433 ; at close of day his divi- sion still held its ground, 438. Williamsburg, Va., Porter's advance to join Pope from, 24. Winchester, Va., engagement between Banks and Jackson at, June, 1862, 33 ; the foolhardy tactics of Banks at, 49 ; strength of White's brigade at, by return of July 31, 198, 199. Winchester and Alexandria Turnpike. See Little River Turnpike. Winder, C. S., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his division sent under Jackson to pro- tect Gordonsville, July 13, 1862, 45, 206 ; crossed the Rajjidan, Aug. 8, in advance against Pope, 46 ; in command of Jackson's division, bat- tle of Cedar Mountain, 206, 418,' 422 ; the composition of his division, 206 ; mortally wounded, 48, 422 ; suc- ceeded by Taliaferro, 422. Wisconsin Volunteers, 3d regt., six comi^anies of, employed in skirmish- ing in front of Brown House hill, Aug. 9, 413, 420, 424 ; in movement to support Crawford, 434 ; its losses, 437-4o8 ; 3d regt., Bryant's history of, 389 ; 5th regt., at Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862, 119. Worth, Fort. See Fort Worth. York River, Pope's opinion that Me. Clellan's southern movement should stop at, 392. Yorktown, Va., the reduction of de- fences before Richmond conjectured as difficult as those of, 10 ; Frank- lin embarked at. Aug. 21, 1862, re- turning from the Peninsula, 24 ; es- timate of time for shipping troops at, 27 ; Keyes given command at, 289 ; Couch called to Alexandria from, Aug. 27, 1862, 114, 120 ; Casey ordered, Aug. 27, not to move to, 122. THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS. OFFICERS, MEMBERS, AND PAPERS READ AT ITS MEETINGS. THE ROOMS OF THE SOCIETY, In the Armory of the First Corps of Cadets, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, corner of Columbus Avenue and Ferdinand Street, Boston, Massachusetts. \ OFFICERS OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF 3USSACHTJSETT8. 1876. PEESIDEXT. Brevet Major-Gexekal GEORGE H. GORDON. SECRETARY AXD TREASURER. Brevet Captain EDWARD B. ROBIXS. EXECUTIVE CO^nilTTEE. JOHX C. ROPES, Esq. Brevet Major-Gexeeal CHARLES DEYEXS. CoLOXEL THO:iIAS L. LIVERMORE. 1895. PRESIDENT. Brevet Brigadiee-Gexeral FRAXCIS A. WALKER. SECRETARY. Lieutexant CHARLES H. PORTEE. TREASURER. Brevet Captain EDTTARD B. ROBINS. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. JOHX C. ROPES, Esq. CoLO-VEL THOMAS L. LIYERMORE. Brevet Captaix HOWARD STOCKTON. TRUSTEES. Brevet Brigadier-General FRAXCIS A. WALKER. Lieutenant CHARLES H. PORTER. Brevet Captain EDWARD B. ROBIXS. JOHX C. ROPES, Esq. Colonel THOMAS L. LIYERMORE. Brevet Captain HOWARD STOCKTON. Brevet Colonel THOMAS F. EDMANDS. RESIDENT MEMBERS. The names of Members who have died are indicated by an asterisk. CHAKLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry. ADELBERT AMES, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fourth Infantry, U. S. A., 1866-1870. Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. CHARLES BEAN AMORY, Brevet Major, U. S. V. Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. CHARLES WALTER AMORY, First Lieutenant, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. V. Resigned member- ship. GEORGE LEONARD ANDREWS, Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Professor, U. S. Millitary Academy, 1871-1892. Second Lieutenant Corps of Engineers, U. S. A, 1854-1855. NATHAN APPLETON, Brevet Captain, U. S. V. Second Lieutenant, Fifth Massachusetts Battery. * JOHN BADGER BACHELDER, Government Historian of the Battle of Gettysburg. Died December 22, 1894. * GEORGE PEMBERTON BANGS, Captain, Second Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. V. Died June 28, 1893. GEORGE MIDDLETON BARNARD, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Captain, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry. MEMBEES. 515 * WILLIAM FRANCIS BARTLETT, Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. Died December 17, 1876. EDWARD TRACY BOUV^:, Major, Twenty-sixth New York Cavalry, U. S. V. HENRY PICKERING BOWDITCH, M. D., Major, Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. V. Professor of Physiolog}^ Harvard University. Resigned membership, EDWARD HICKLING BRADFORD, M. D. EDWIN HOWARD BRIGHAM, M. D. EVERETT CEPHAS BUMPUS, First Lieutenant, Third Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, U. S. V. ARTHUR TRACY CABOT, M.D. EDWARD CLARKE CABOT, Lieutenant-Colonel, Forty-fourth Massachusetts Infantr}", U. S. V. BENJAMIN SHREVE CALEF, Captain and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. V. * WILLIAM LATHAM CANDLER, Brevet Colonel, Captain, Aide-de-Camp, U. S. V. Died December 20, 1892- EDWARD CHANNING, Ph. D., Assistant Professor of History, Harvard College^ ROBERT FARLEY CLARK, Captain and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. V. * JOHN MURRAY CORSE, Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Died April 27, 1893, * BENJAMIN WILLIAM CROWNINSHIELD, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Major, First Massachusetts Cavalry. Died January 17, 1892. CASPAR CROWNINSHIELD, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, Second Massachusetts Cavalry. 516 MEMBERS. GREELY STEVENSON CURTIS, Brevet Brigadier-General, IT. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, First Massachusetts Cavalry. HENRY ROGERS DALTON, Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. LORIN FULLER DELAND, Esq. * CHARLES DEVENS, LL. D. Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Attorney-General of the United States ; Justice, Supreme Court of Massa- chusetts. Died January 7, 1891. THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A. Captain, U. S. A. Retired. HENRY GUSTAYUS DORR, First Lieutenant, Fourth Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. V. WILLIAM FRANKLIN DRAPER, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-sixth Massachusetts Infantry. WILLIAM RAYMOND DRIVER, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V. Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Y. THEODORE FRELINGHUYSEN DWIGHT, Esq. THOMAS FRANKLIN EDMANDS, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry; EDWARD WALDO EMERSON, M. D. CHARLES FAIRCHILD, Assistant Paymaster, U. S. N., 1864. EDWARD NICOLL FENNO, Esq. JOHN FISKE, LiTT. D., LL. D. WILLIAM HATHAWAY FORBES, Lieutenant-Colonel, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. V. MEMBERS. 517 EEGIXALD FOSTES, Esq. JAMES FRAXCIS, Brevet Lieutenaut-Colonel, U. S. V. Major, Second Massachusetts Infantry. * GEORGE HEXRY GORDOX, Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. Brigadier-General, U. S. Y, Died August 30, 188S. JOHX CHIPMAX GRAY, LL. D. Major and Judge Advocate, U. S. V. Royall Professor of La'v\', Harvard University. XORY^OOD PEXROSE HALLOWELL, Colonel, Fifty-fifth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. ALPHEUS HOLMES HARDY, First Lieutenant Forty-fifth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. ALBERT BUSHXELL HART, Ph. D. Assistant Professor of History, Harvard College. FRAXKLES" HAYEX, Lieutenant-Colonel, Second California Cavalry, and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. V- JOHX THEODORE HEARD, M. D. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, M. S. Y. Jiledical Director, Fourth Army Corps. FRAXCIS LEE HIGGIXSOX, Captain Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. Y. EEXRY LEE HIGGIXSOX, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Y. Major, First Massachusetts Cavalry. THOMAS WEXTTTORTH HIGGIXSOX, Colonel, Thirty-third U. S. Colored Troops. JOHX HOMAXS, M. D., First Lieutenant, and Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A. JOHX HOMAXS, 2d. M. D. 518 MEMBERS, CHARLES PAINE HORTOiT, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V. Captain and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. V. CHARLES HUNT, Captain Forty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. V, JAMES FREEMAN HUNTINGTON, Brevet Major, U. S. V. Captain, First Ohio Light Artillery. WILLIAM JONES LADD, Brevet Captain, U. S. V. First Lieutenant, Thirteenth New Hampshire Infantry. JOHN LATHROP, Captain, Thirty-fifth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. Justice Supreme Court of Massachusetts. THOMAS LEONARD LIVERMORE, Major and Brevet Colonel, Fifth New Hampshire Infantry, U. S. Y„ Colonel, Eighteenth New Hampshire Volunteers. ABBOTT LAWRENCE LOWELL, Esq. * EDWARD JACKSON LOWELL, Esq. Died May 11, 1894. * GEORGE HINCKLEY LYMAN, M. D., Lieutenant-Colonel and Medical Inspector, U. S. A. Died August 19, 1891. THEODORE LYMAN, S. B., Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, Volunteer Aide-de-Camp to Major-General George G. Meade. SILAS MARCUS MACVANE, McLean Professor of History, Harvard College. AUGUSTUS PEARL MARTIN. Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Captain, Third Massachusetts Battery, « HERBERT COWPLAND MASON, Brevet Major, U. S. V. Captain, Twentieth Blassachusetts Infantry. Died September 24, 1884 MEMBERS. WILUXM POWELL MASOX, Captain and Additional Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Y. EICHARD STTEET MILTON", Captain, Xinth Massachusetts Battery, U. S. Y. HENRY STEDMAX XOURSE, Captain, Fifty-fifth Ilhnois Infantry, U. S. Y. WILLIAM MILO OLIX, Private, Thirty-sixth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. Secretary of State of Massachusetts. FRAXCIS AUGUSTUS OSBORX, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. Colonel, Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry. WILLIAM HEXRY OSBORXE, Private, T^venty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. * FRAXCIS WDsTHEOP PALFREY, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. Colonel, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry. Died December 6, 1889c JOHX CARYER PALFREY, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. A. Captain Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., 1863-1866. Chief Engineer, Thirteenth Army Corps. FRAXCIS EYERETT PEABODl^ Esq. FRAXCIS HOWARD PEABODY, Esq. CHARLES LAAYREXCE PEIRSOX, Brevet Brigadier-General L'. S. Y. Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry. * WILLIAM EDWARD PERKIXS, Captain, Second Massachusetts Infantr.-, U. S. Y. Died January 28, 18 HEXRY GODDARD PICKERING, Esq. CHARLES HUXT PORTER, First Lieutenant. Thirty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. * SAMUEL ALFRED PORTER, Brevet Brigadier-General, S. Y. Brevet Major and Captaui, U. S. A. Retired. Died April 21, 1880. 520 MEMBERS. * WILLIAM PRATT, Captain and Assistant Adjutant-Gentralj U. S. V. Died March 2-9, 1893. GEORGE PUTNAM, Esq. * SAMUEL BIILLER QUINCY, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel Eighty-first U. S. Colored Troops. Died March 24, 1887e ARNOLD AUGUSTUS RAND, Colonel, Fourth Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. V. JAMES FORD RHODES, Esq. MAURICE HOWE RICHARDSON, M. D. ANDREW ROBESON, Brevet Major, U. S. V. Captain, First New York Engineers. EDWARD BLAKE ROBINS, Brevet Captain, U. S. V. ■ First Lieutenant, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry. ALFRED PERKINS ROCKWELL, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S V. Colonel, Sixth Connecticut Infantry. HENRY MUNROE ROGERS, Acting Assistant Paymaster, U. S. N., 1862-1865. JOHN CODMAN ROPES, Esq. HENRY STURGIS RUSSELL, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry. * WILLIAM GURDON SALTONSTALL, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N. Died July 21, 1889. CHARLES SPRAGUE SARGENT, Brevet Major, U. S. V. Captain and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. V. Arnold Professor of Arboriculture, and Director of the Arnold Arboretum, Harvard University. MEMBERS. 521 TVIORRIS SCHAFF, Captain of Ordnance, U. S. A. NATHANIEL SOUTHGATE SEALER, Captain, Independent Kentucky Battery, Field Artillery, U. S. V. Professor of Geology and Dean of tlie Lawrence Scientific School, Harvard University. THOMAS SHERWIN, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry. WILLIAM PRICE SHREVE, Brevet Major, U. S. V. First Lieutenant, Second U. S. Sharpshooters. * HIRAM SMITH SHURTLEFF, Captain, Fifty-sixth Massachusetts Infantr}", U. S. V. Died December 11, 1893. « JACOB HENRY SLEEPER, Brevet Major, U. S. V. Captain, Tenth Massachusetts Battery. Died August 19, 1891. JOHN CODMAN SOLEY, Lieutenant, U. S. N. Retired. Resigned membership. JOSEPH LEWIS STACKPOLE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V. Major and Judge Advocate. HAZARD STEVENS, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Major and Assistant Adjutant-GeneraL ROBERT HOOPER STEVENSON, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry. HOWARD STOCKTON, Brevet Captain, U. S. A. First Lieutenant, Ordnance Corps, U. S. A. Captain and Additional Aide-de-Camp, U. S. V. 522 MEMBERS, HENRY STOXE, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, One Hundredth U. S. Colored Troops. WILLIAM WILLARD SWAN, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A. Captain, Seventeeth Infantry, U. S. A. FRANK WILLIAM TAUSSIG, LL. B., Ph. D., Professor of Political Economy, Harvard College. Resigned membership. SAMUEL LOTHROP THORNDIKE, Esq. WILLIAM HENRY TURNER, Major, First Rhode Island Cavalry, U. S. V. * ADIN BALLOU UNDERWOOD, Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Died January 14, 1888. * CHARLES FOLSOM WALCOTT, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, Sixty-first Massachusetts Infantry. Died June 11, 1887. FRANCIS AMASA WALKER, Ph. D., LL. D., Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. STEPHEN MINOT WELD, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, Fifty-sixth Massachusetts Infantry. CHARLES ALBERT WHITTIER, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. Captain, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Infantry, U. S. A., 1866-1870. EDWARD NEWTON WHITTIER, M. D., Brevet Captain, U. S. V. First Lieutenant, Fifth Maine Battery. Acting Inspector-General of Artillery. * HENRY WINSOR, Jr., Captain Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Acting Assistant Inspector-General Died August 28, 1894. CORRESPONDING MEMBERS, » WILLIAM ALLAN, Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery, C. S. A. Chief of Ordnance, Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. Died September 17, 1889. ARCHER ANDERSON, Colonel and Adjutant-General, C. S. A. ELISHA BENJAMIN ANDREWS, D. D., LL. D. Second Lieutenant, First Connecticut Artillery, U. S- V. President of Brown University. FRANCIS CHANNING BARLOW, Major-General, U. S. V. JOHN BIGELOW, Jr., Captain of Cavalry, U. S. A. TASKER HOWARD BLISS, Lieutenant-Colonel, Subsistence Department, U. S. A. Aide-de-Camp to the Major-General commanding the Army. HENRY VAN NESS BOYNTON, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirtj'-fifth Ohio Infantry. JOHN RUTTER BROOKE, Brigadier-General, U. S. A. Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U S. V. * HENRY ARMITT BROWN, Died August 21, 1878. CORNELIUS CADLE, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, Seventeenth Army Corps. 524 MEMBERS. JOSHUA LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIIT, LL. D., Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V,l Governor of the State of Maine. Formerly President of Bowdoin College. WINFIELD SCOTT CHAPLm, Second Lieutenant, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A., 1870-1882. SELDEN CONN^OR, Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, Nineteenth Maine Infantry. JACOB DOLSON COX, Major-General, U. S. V. Commandant, Twenty-third Army Corps. HARRY COOKE GUSHING, Brevet Major, U. S. A. Captain, Fomth Artillery, U. S. A. GEORGE BRECKENRIDGE DAVIS, Major and Judge Advocate, U. S. A. In charge of publication of the War Records. *EPHRAIM CUTLER DAWES, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V. Major, Fifty-third Ohio Infantry. Died April 23, 1895. GEORGE DEWEY, Captain, U. S. N. HENRY KYD DOUGLAS, Colonel, Thirteenth and Forty -ninth Virginia Infantry, C. S. A* GEORGE BERNARD DRAKE, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. V. First Lieutenant, Sixth Infantry, U. S. A., 1864-1865. HENRY ALGERNON Du PONT, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A. Captain, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A., 1864-1875. JOSEPH GILES EATON, Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N. MEMBERS. 525 OSWALD HERBERT ERXST, Colonel, Corps of Engineer?, U. S. A. Superintendent of the U. S. Militan,- AcadernVj "West Point, X. Y. LUCIUS FAIRCHILD, Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Captain, Sixteenth Infantry, U. S. A., 1861-1863. Governor of the State of Wisconsin, E. E. and M. of the United States to Spain, 1880-1882. DAXIEL WEBSTER FLAGLER, Brigadier-General, U. S. A^ Chief of Ordnance Department, U. S. A. CHARLES WILLIAM FOLSOII, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. Y, MAXXIXG FERGUSOX FORCE, Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. * GUSTAYUS YASA FOX, Captain. U. S. X. Assistant Secretary, Xavv Department, 1861-1886. Died October 29, 1SS3. WILLIAM BULL FRAXKLIX, Major-General, U. S. Y. * JAMES BARXET FRY, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. A. Died Julv 11, 1894. JOSEPH SCOTT FULLERTOX, Brevet Brigadier-General, LT. S. Y. Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Y. GEORGE RIGGS GAITHER, Captain, First Yirginia Cavairv, C. S. A. GEORGE LEWIS GILLESPIE, Lieutenant-Colonel, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. ROBERT HALE lYES GODDARD, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Y. Caprain and Aide-de-Camp. JOHX :*IEAD GOULD, Major, Twentj-uinth Maine Infantry, U. S. Y, 526 MEMBERS. FRANCIS MATHEWS GREEN, Commander, U. S. N. GEORGE SEARS GREENE, Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V, EUGENE GRIFFIN, Captain, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., 1886-1889. SIMON GOODELL GRIFFIN, Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. * WINFIELD SCOTT HANCOCK, Major-General, U. S. A. Died February 9, 1886. ALFRED STEDMAN HARTWELL, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel Fifty-fifth Massachusetts Infantry, HARRY LEROY HAWTHORNE, First Lieutenant, First Artillery, U. S. HENRY HETH, Major-General, C S. A. JAMES JACKSON HIGGINSON, Brevet Major, U. S. V. Captain, First Massachusetts Cavalry. HENRY CLAY HODGES, Jr., First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, U. S. A. JEDEDIAH HOTCHKISS, Captain, Engineer Corps, C S. A. McHENRY HOWARD, First Lieutenant, Aide-de-Camp and Assistant Inspector-General, C S. A. HENRY WILSON HUBBELL, Captain, First Artillery, U. S. A. Second Lieutenant Fortieth New York Infantry, U. S. ¥» MEMBERS. 527 * AXDREW ATKINSON HUMPHREYS, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Chief of Engineers, U. S. A. Died December 27, 1883. * HENRY JACKSON HUNT, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac. Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. Died February 11, 1889. * ROBERT HUNTER, Captain, Seventy-fomlh Ohio Yolunteers. Died December 2, 1894. TPIOMAS Y'ORCESTER HYDE, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, First Maine Yeteran Yolunteers. JOHN WILLIAM JONES, D. D. Chaplain, Army of Northern Yirginia, C. S. A. Chaplain of the University of Yirginia. JOSEPH TTILLIAM KIRKLEY, War Department, Washington, D. C. GILBERT CRAWFORD KNIFFIN", Brevet Major, U. S. Y. Captain and Commissary of Subsistence. ROBERT EDWARD LEE, Captain of Cavalry and Aide-de-Camp, Army of Northern Yirginia, C. S. A, WILLIAM ROSCOE LFTERMORE, Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General, C. S. A. STEPHEN BLEECKER LUCE, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. Retired. WILLIAM GORDON McCABE, Captain of Artillery, 3d Corps, Army of Northern Yirginia, C S. A. ALEXANDER CALDWELL McCLURG, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Army Corps. 528 MEMBERS. « iRviN Mcdowell, Major-General, U. S. A. Died May 4, 1885. ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, Captain, U. S. N. WILLIAM MAHONE, Major-General, C. S. A. CHARLES MARSHALL, Lieutenant-Colonel, C. S. A., Aide-de-Camp to General Robert E. Lee. GEORGE MEADE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V., Captain, U. S. V. Captain, U. S. A,, 1866-3874. Aide-de-Camp to Major-General George G. Meade. * MONTGOMERY CUNNINGHAM MEIGS, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Quartermaster-General, U. S. A. Died January 2, 1892, I^ELSON APPLETON MILES, , Major-General, U. S. A, , FREDERIC CUSHMAN NEWHALL, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V. Major and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. A. Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Y. JOHN PAGE NICHOLSON, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V. First Lieutenant, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry. * EMERSON OPDYCKE, Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Died April 25, 1884. EPHRAIM ALLEN OTIS, Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. Chief of Staff of Major-General Rousseau. CARL POLLEN PALFREY, Captain, Cgrps of Engineers, U. S. A. * LE COMTE DE PARIS, Died September 8, 1894. MEMBERS, 529 JOHN GRUBB PARKE, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Colonel, Co7-ps of Engineers, U. S. A. * FOXHALL ALEXANDER PARKER, Commodore, U. S. N. Died June 10, 1879. * LOUIS HENRY PELOUZE, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. A. Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. A. Died June 2, 1878. WILLIAM BROOKE RAVVLE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V. Captain, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. RICHARD ROBINS, Captain, Thirty-ninth Infantry, U. S. A. ANDREW HOWL AND RUSSELL, Captain, Ordnance Corps, U. S. A. DAVID WARD SANDERS, Blajor and Assistant Adjutant-General, French's Division, Stewart's Corps, Army of the Tennessee, C. S. A, * ROBERT NICHOLSON SCOTT, - - . Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A. Major, Third Artillery, U. S. A. In charge of publication of the War Rec- ords. Died March 5, 1887. WILLIAM FORSE SCOTT, Lieutenant, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, U. S. V. THOMAS OLIVER SELFRIDGE, Captain, U. S. N. JAMES SHAW, Jr., Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Colonel, Seventh U. S. Colored Troops. * WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, General, U. S. A. Died February 14, 1891. 530 MEMBERS, WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Major-General U. S. V. Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. Retired. JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1890-1893. GEORGE AUGUSTIN THAYER, Captain, Second Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. V. * EDWARD DAVIS TOWNSEND, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Adjutant-General, U.S.A. Died May 10, 1893. CHARLES SCOTT VENABLE, Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. A. JOHN GRIMES WALKER, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. * GOUVERNEUR KEMBLE WARREN, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Died August 8, 1882. ALEXANDER STEWART WEBB, LL. D. Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. and U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U. S. V. President of the College of the City of New York. SKIPWITH WILMER, Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp, C. S. A. CHARLES URQUHART WILLIAMS, Captain and Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. A. Aide-de-Camp to General D. R. Jones and General M. D. Corse. JAMES HARRISON WILSON, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Major-General, U. S. V. Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-fifth Infantry, U. S. A. EDMUND LOUIS ZALINSKI, Captain, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A. Retired. Second Lieutenant, Second New York Heavy Artillery, U. S. V. EEPORTS AND PAPEES. Since its organization, reports and papers have been read before th.e Society on the follo^ring subjects : — OPERATIOXS IX TEE SHEXAXDOAH VALLEY, 1861 AXD 1862. 1. PaitePlSON^'s Cajipaigx, 1S61. CoLO>-EL THOilAS L. LIVEPvMOEE. 2. Ca?ipaigx a&aixst Jacksox. tt.osi Winchester to Poet Republic, 1832. By Majoe JAilES F. HTXTIXGTOX. THE PEXIXSULAR CAMPAIGX OF McCLELLAX IX 1862. 1. General AIcClellan's Plans for the Campaign of 1562, and the Alleged Interference of the Government vv-ith them. J0H3 C. ROPES, Esq. 2. The Siege of Yoektovtn. Ge>-esal JOHX C. PALTRET. 3. The Period tthich elapsed betv^'een the Fall of Yorkiown and the Seven-Days' Battles. Ge>-i:h^ FRAXCIS PALTREY. ■i. The Seven-Days' Battles: — Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, "Wliite Oak SAvamp, Glendale. GE>-z?.Ai FRANCIS TT. PALFREY. 5. The Seven-Days' Battles: — Malvern Hill. Ge>-eeal FRAXCI5 TT. PALFREY. 6. Comments on the Peninsular Ca:\tpaign. Grxkrat. CHARLES A. TTEITTTEIR. The foregoing form Yolume 1 of tie Society's Publications. 532 REPORTS AND PAPERS. GENERAL POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA IN 1862. 1. The Character of General Halleck's Military Administration in THE Summer of 1862; with Special Eeference to the Removal, SY his Order, of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, and to the Share which belongs to him in the Campaign of General Pope. General SAMUEL M. QUINCY. THE OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 2. First Part, to the Nineteenth of August. Lieutenant-Colonel CHARLES P. HORTON. 3. Second Part, to the Twenty-eighth of August. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. 4. Third Part, to the End of the Campaign. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. 5. The Twenty-seventh Day of August. General GEORGE H. GORDON. 6. The Battle of Ciiantilly, First of September. General CHARLES F. WALCOTT. 7. The Numbers of the Two Armies. Colonel WILLIAM ALLAN. 8. The Case of Fitz-John Porter. General STEPHEN M. WELD. 9. The Conduct of General McClellan at Alexandria in August, 1862; the Nature and Extent of his Command; and his Alleged Neg- lect TO Support the Army of General Pope. Lieutenant-Colonel FRANKLIN HAVEN, Jun. 10. The Same Subject. General STEPHEN M. WELD. 11. Review of the Reports of Colonel Haven and General Weld. Colonel THEODORE LYMAN. BEPOETS AND PAPERS. 533 12. The Conduct of Generates McClellan and Halleck r.i August, 1862, AND the Case of Fitz-John Porter. Colonel TH02IAS L. LIVERMORE. 13. The Hearing in the Case of Fitz-John Porter. cO'SN C. ROPES, Esq. 1-i. The Battle of Cedar Mountain, August Ninth, 1862. General GEORGE L. ANDREWS. , The foregoing form Volume 2 of the Society's publications. THE ARMY OF TEE PQT03fAC UNDER McCLELLAN AND BURNS IDE, SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1862. 1. The Battle of Antietam. General FRANCIS W. PALFREY. 2. The Alleged Delay in the Concentration of the Army of the Potomac, and the Reasons why the Second Corps did not enter INTO THE Action earlier on the Day of the Battle. Major JOHN C. GRAY. 3. Strategy of the Campaign of Sharpsburg, or Antietam. Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM ALLAN. 4. The Military Situation in ISTorthern Virginia, from the First to Fourteenth Days of November. General WILLIAM F. SMITH. 5. Fredericksburg, December Eleventh to Fifteenth. Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM ALLAN. 6. The Left Grand Division at Fredericksburg, December Thirteenth, 1862. General WILLIAM F. SMITH. THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE UNDER HOOKER, 1863. 1. The Disaster to the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville. Colonel THEODORE A. DODGE. 2. The Fight of Sunday, May Third, at Chancellorsville. Colonel THEODORE A. DODGE. 534 BEPOBTS AND PAPEBS. 3. Sedgwick at Chanoellorsville. Colonel THEODORE A. DODGE. 4. The Battle of Chancellorsville. Colonel THEODORE A. DODGE. These papers, by Colonel Dodge, have been embodied in his book " The Campaign of Chancel lorsville." 5. Meade at Chancellorsville. General ALEXANDER S, WEBB. 6. The Battle of Chancellors ville. (Contributed, but not read by) Majoe JAMES F. HUNTINGTON. THE OPERATIONS UNDER MEADE IN 1863. 1. The Numbers of the Two Armies at the Battle of Gettysburg. General GREELY S. CURTIS. 2. The Causes of the Confederate Failure at Gettysburg. General GREELY S. CURTIS. 3. The Strategy of the Gettysburg Campaign. Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM ALLAN. 4. The Left Attack (Swell's) at Gettysburg. Captain EDWARD N. WHITTIER. 5. Pickett's Charge. Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM R. DRIVER. 6. The Regulars at Gettysburg. Captain RICHARD ROBINS. 7. The Battle of Bristoe Station. General FRANCIS A. WALKER. This paper has been printed in General Walker's " History of the Second Army Corps." THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA UNDER GRANT IN 1864, 1. Grant's Campaign in Virginia, 1864. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. BEPOBTS AXD PAPERS. 535 2. The TJselessxess of the Maps fur>'ished to the Staff of the Army OF the Potomac previous to the Campaign of Mat, 1864. CoLO>-EL THEODORE LYilAX. 3. XoTES A>'D Recollections of the opexixg of the Campaign' of 1864^ Liet:texa>-t ilcHEXRT HOTTARD. 4. The Battle of the Wilderness. LlEUTENAOT-COLOlvEL "^LLIAil "W. SVTAN. 5. The Same Subject. CoLO>-EL THEODORE LYilAIf. 6. The Sixth Corps in the "Wilderness. Gexeeal hazard STETEXS. 7. The Operations of the Army of the Potomac from the Seventh TO THE Eleventh Days of May. Gesteeal CHARLES L. PEIR50X. 8. The Capture of the Salient at Spottsylvania, May Twelfth. Genebal FRAXCIS C. BARLOW. 9. Review of General Barlow's Paper. Geneeal lewis a. GR-AN'T. 10. The Capture of the Salient. lie^te^-a^-t-colo^-el william r. driver. 11 The Operations of the Army of the Potomac from SIay Thir- teenth to June Second, inclusive. Majob WILLIAM P. SHRETE. 12. The Battle of Cold Harbor, June First to Third. Captain CHARLES H. PORTER. 1.3. Same Subject. JOKN' C. ROPES, Esq. 14. The Operations of the Army of the Potomac, from the Fifth to Fifteenth of June. CoLO^-EX THEODORE LT:VIAy. 15. The Failure to take Petersburg on the Fifteenth Day of June. CoLO^-EL THEODORE LYMAN. 536 heports and papers. 16. The Same Subject. Colonel THOMAS L. LIVERMORE, 17. The Failure to take Petersburg on the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, AND Eighteenth Days of June. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. 18. The Operations at Bermuda Hundred on the Sixteenth, Seven- teenth, AND Eighteenth Days of June. General FRANCIS A. OSBORN. 19. The Petersburg Mine, July Twenty-Ninth. General STEPHEN M. WEED. 20. The Same Subject. Captain CHARLES H. PORTER. 21. The Movement against Petersburg. General WILLIAM F. SMITH. 22. The Operations against the Weldon Railroad in August. Captain CHARLES H. PORTER. 23. The Siege of Petersburg after the Capture of the "Weldon RAiii- road. Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM R. DRIVER. 24. The Battle of Ream's Station, August Twenty-First-Twenty-Sixth. General FRANCIS A. WALKER. 25. The Expedition to the Boydton Plank Road in October. General FRANCIS A. WALKER. 26. The Operations of the Cavalry of the Army of the Potomac in 1864. General JAMES H. WILSON. 27. The Valley (Sheridan's) Campaign of 1864. Lieutenant L. W, V. KENNON. 28. The BattLe of Cedar Creek, October Nineteenth. General HAZARD STEVENS. 29. The Same Subject. Colonel BENJAMIN W. CROWNINSHIELD. REPORTS AND PAPERS. 537 TEE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA UNDER GRANT IN 1865. 1. The Xu.'mbers of General Lee's Ar:.iy at the Openia'g of the Cam- paign, March Twenty-Fifth. Colonel THEODORE LYMAN. 2. Operations of the Fifth Corps, March Twenty-Seventh to Thirty- First : Gravelly Run. Captain CHARLES H. PORTER. 3. The Battle of Five Forks, April First. Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM W. SWAN. 4. The Same Subject. Captain CHARLES H. PORTER. -5. The Storming of the Lines of Petersburg, by the Sixth Corps, April Second. Geneeal HAZARD STEVENS. 6. The Battle of Sailor's Creek, April Sixth. General HAZARD STEVENS. 7. A Narrative of the Appomattox Cajipaign. Colonel THOMAS L. LIVERMORK 8. Grant's Campaigns against Lee. Colonel THOMAS L. LIVERMORE. CRITICAL SKETCHES OF SOME OF THE FEDERA.L AND CONFEDERATE COMMANDERS. General Grant as a Soldier, Colonel THEODORE A. DODGE. The Military Character and Services of Major-General "Winfield Scott Hancock. Geneeal FRANCIS A. WALKER. Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys. Gentiral JAMES H. WILSON. General Rawlins. Vi. I General JAMES H. WILSON. 638 BE PORTS AND PAPERS. General George H. Thomas. Colonel HENRY STONE. General Thomas in the Record. Colonel THOMAS L. LIVERMORE. W jth tho exception of General Wilson's paper on General Rawlins, these Sketches of Com. manders have been printed in Volume 10 of the Society's publications. THE CAMPAIGNS IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE, 1862-1863. The Battle of Shiloh, April Sixth-Seventh, 1862. Colonel HENRY STONE. The Same Subject. Lieutenant-Colonel EPHRAIM C. DAWES. The Kentucky Campaign of 1862. Captain N. S. SHALER. The Operations of General Buell in Tennessee and Kentucky in 1862. Colonel HENRY STONE. The Chickamauga Campaign, September Nineteenth-Twentieth, 1863. Genekal henry V. BOYNTON. The Last Battles before Chattanooga, October-November, 1863. Genekal HENRY V. BOYNTON. An Historical Sketch of the Military Operations round Chat- tanooga, Tennessee, September Twenty-Second to November Twenty-Seventh, 1863. General WILLIAM F. SMITH. THE CAMPAIGNS UNDER SHERMAN AND THOMAS IN 1864. The Opening of the Atlanta Campaign, May Sixth, 1864. Colonel HENRY STONE. From the Oostenaula to the Chattahoochee. Colonel HENRY STONE. REPORTS AND PAPERS, 539 The Siege and Capture of Atlanta, July Xixth, September Eighth, 1864. Colored HEXRY STONE. A Review op the Atlanta Campaign, Mat Fourth to Septembee Eighth, 1864. Battle of Feanklin, ISTovember Thirtieth, 1864. CoLOUEL HEXRT STONE. Battle of Kashville, December Fifteenth-Sixteenth, 1864. Colonel HENRY STONE. General Sherman's plans after the Fall of Savannah. Geneeal JOHN C. PALFREY. OPERATIONS IN THE CAROLINAS. Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, 1861. General GEORGE H. GORDON. Military Operations against Charleston, 1862- GEifERAL HAZARD STEVENS- OPERATIONS against Charleston, 1863. General ALFRED P. ROCKWELL. Operations in Xorth Carolina, 1861-1862. Colonel THOilAS F. EDMANDS- The Department of Xorth Carolina under General Foster, 1862-63, Lieutenant-Colonel J. LEWIS STACKPOLE. PAPERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. The Home Squadron in the Winter of 1860-1861. Rear Admiral GEORGE K BELKNAP, U. S. N. The Cumberland. Captain THOMAS 0. SELFRIDGE, U. S. N. The Assault on Port Hudson, May, 1863, General JOHN C. PALFREY. The Red River Expedition, M\rch-May, 1864. JOHN -HOMANS, M. D. 540 EEPORTS AND PAPERS. The Battle of Mobile Bay, August Fourth, 1864, Commodore FOXHALL A. PARKER, U. S. N. The Capture of Mobile, March Twenty-Seventh to April Nikth, 1865. General JOHN C. PALFREY. Modern Battles. Major WILLIAM R. LIVERMORE. Artillery. General HENRY J. HUNT. Cayalky in Virginia during the War of the Rebellion. Colonel BENJAMIN W. CROWNINSHIELD. Aspects of the Medical Service in the Armies of the U» 8= DURING the Rebellion. GEORGE H. LYMAN, M. D. The Northern Volunteer. CoLOKEi.' THOMAS L. LIVERMORE. The Negro as a Soldier in the War of the EEBELLiom Colonel NORWOOD P. HALLO WELL. The Naval Brigade. t Lieutenant JOHN C. SOLEY, U. S. K PERSONAL NARRATIVES. BIy Captivity. General SAMUEL M. QUINCY. Personal Reminiscences of the War, 1861-1865. Commander W. G. SALTONSTALL, U. S. N. Recollections of Staff and Regimental Life. General STEPHEN M. WELD. THE WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1812-1814. The Fight between the Java and the Constitutiok. Lieutenant JOHN C. SOLEY, U. S. K. BEFOBTS AXD FAPEBS. 0 The Chesapkake a>'d the 5HA^-^-c^^ IjECTES-AiTC-COiESIAJfDEE J. G. EAT OX, U. S. TEE TTAE BET WE EX THE UXITED STATES AND MEXICO. The Battle of Buexa Tista. Gi-^EEAi, WTLLIAil B. FEAXEXIX. The Battles of Co^^treras a^cd Cheruecsco. GzyFF.AT, GEORGE H. GOEDOX. The Battles of 3Iolixo del Ret axd Chapultepec. GE^-EEAL GEORGE H. GORDON. CAMPAIGXS OF XAPOLEOX. The First Campaign of Bo^-APARTE ix Italy, 1796. llAJOB -VrrLLIAAl E. UTERMOEE. The CA3IPAIGX OF Waterloo: The Grouchy Co>-teoveesy. iiOWS C. ROPES. Esq. BATTLEFIELD OF MANASSAS,VA. CLOSE OF THE ACTION AUGUST 29™ 1802. Bcport of My. Gon. John Pope to tho ConiTnittecon. tJie Conduct of the War. ( Not a fac-simile. copy Papers of the Militarj/ Historical Society of Massachusetts, Vol. 2 Lon^street