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II E r 11 T 
 
 ROANOKE ISLAND 
 
 INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE. 
 
 RICHMOND: 
 
 ENQUIRER BOOK AN' I) JOB PRESS 
 TYLKR, WISE, ALLEORE &. SMITH. 
 1S62, 
 
« 
 

 EErORT OF THE COMMITTEE. 
 
 The Committee, to whom was referred a resolution of the 
 House of Representatives, instructing them " to enquire 
 and report the causes and circumstances of the capituhxtion 
 of Roanoke Ishmd,-' have had tlic same under consideration ; 
 and have given all the facts and circumstances connected 
 -with the defences of the said Island and its adjacent waters, 
 and of the capitulation on the 8th of February, a most 
 elaborate investigation. 
 
 The Committee find, that on the 21st day of August, 
 1861, Brig. General Gatlin Avas ordered to the command of 
 the Department of Kortli Carolina, and the coast defences 
 of that State. On tlie 29th of September, Brig. General 
 D, II. Hill was assigned to duty in North Carolina, and 
 charged with the defences of that portion of said State, ly- 
 ing between Albemarle Sound and the Ncuse river and Pam- 
 lico Sound, including those waters, and was directed to re- 
 port to Brig. Gen, Gatlin. 
 
 On the 16th of November, Brig. GenT L. 0. Branch was 
 directed to relieve Brig. General Hill, in command of his 
 district in North Carolina. On the 21st of Deccmbu', that 
 part of North Carolina east of the Chowan river, together 
 ■with the counties of Washington and Tyrrell, was, at the 
 request of the proper authorities of North Carolina, sepa- 
 rated from the remainder, and constituted into a Military 
 District, under Brig. Gen'l II. A. Wise, and attached to 
 the command of Major Gen'l Huger, commanding the De- 
 partment of Norfolk. At the time, therefore, of the sur- 
 render of Roanoke Island, on the 8th of February, 1862, it 
 was within the Military District of Brig. General Wise, and 
 attached to the command of Mnjor Gcnl Huger. 
 
 The military defences of Roanoke Island and its adjacent 
 \Tatcrs, on the said Sth of February, 1862, consisted of 
 Fort Bartow, the most Southern of the defences on the west 
 side of the Island — a sand fort, well covered with turf, hav- 
 
ing six long 32-pountIer guns in emln-asure, and three 32- 
 pounders en barbette. The next is Fort Bl.anchard, on the 
 same side of the Island, about two and one-half miles from 
 Fort Bartow — a semi-circular sand fort, turfed, and mount- 
 ing four 3i-ponnders en barbette. Next, on the same side, 
 and about twelve hundred yards from Fort Blanchard, is 
 Fort Iluger. This is a turfed sand fort, running along the 
 line of the beach, and closed in the rear by a low breast- 
 work, with a barquette for infantry. It contained eight 32- 
 pounder guns in embrasure, two rifled 32-pounders en bar- 
 bette, and two small 32-pounders en barbette on the right. 
 
 About three miles below Fort Bartow, on the east side 
 of the Island, was a battery of two 32-pounder guns en 
 barbette, at a point known as Midgctt's Hammock. In the 
 centre of the Island, about two miles from Fort Bartow, 
 and a mile from Midgett's Hammock, was a redoubt or 
 breast-work, thrown across the road, about 70 or 80 feet 
 long, with embrasures for three guns, on the right of which 
 was a swamp, on the left a marsh — the redoubt reaching 
 nearly between them and facing to the South. On the Tyr- 
 rell side, on the main land, nearly opposite to Fort Iluger, 
 was Fort Forrest, mounting seven 32-pounders. 
 
 In addition to these defences on the shore and on the Is- 
 land, there was a barrier of piles, extending from the east 
 side of Fulker shoals, towards the Island. Its object was 
 to compel vessels passing on the west of the Island to ap- 
 proach Avithin reach of the shore batteries; but up to the 
 8th of February, there was a span of 1,700 yards open op- 
 posite to Fort Bartow. Some vessels had been sunk, and 
 piles driven on the west side of Fulker shoals, to obstruct 
 the channel between that shoal and the main land — which 
 comprise all the defences, either upon the land or in the 
 waters adjacent. 
 
 The entire military force stationed upon the Island prior 
 to, and at the time of, the late engagement, consisted of the 
 8th Regiment of N. C. State Troops, under the command of 
 Col. H'. M. Shaw, the 31st Regiment of N. C. Volunteers, 
 under the command of Col. J. V. Jordan, and three compa- 
 nies of the 17th N. C. Troops, under the command of Maj. 
 G. H. Hill. After manning the several Forts, en the 7th 
 of February, there were but one thousand and twenty-four 
 men left, and two hundred of them were upon the sick list. 
 On the evening of the 7th of February, Brig. Gcn'l Wise 
 sent from Nagg's Head, under the command of Lt, Colonel 
 
Anderson, a reinforcement, numbering some 450 men. This 
 does not include the commands of Lt. Col. Green and Major 
 Fry, both of Avhora marched to the scene of action after the 
 battle was closed. The committee do not think there was 
 any intentional delay in the landing of the commands of 
 Col. Green and Major Fry. The former. Col, Green, ex- 
 hibited great anxiety to get into the fight, vdien lie did land, 
 and acted with great gallantry in the skirmish he did have 
 with the enemy in the vicinty of the camp. 
 
 The whole under the command of Brig. Gen. Wise, who, 
 upon the 7th and 8th February, was at Nagg's Head, four 
 miles distant from the Island, confined to a sick bed, and 
 entirely disabled from participating in the action in person. 
 The immediate command, therefore, devolved upon Col. II. 
 M. Shaw, the senior officer present. 
 
 On the Gth of February, it was discovered by the compa- 
 nies on picket duty on the south end of the Island, that the 
 enemy's fleet was in Pamlico Sound, south of Roanoke Is- 
 land, and, apparently, intending to attack the forces upon 
 the Island. Col. Shaw immediately communicated the f\ict 
 to Brig. Gen'l Wise, and issued orders for the disposition of 
 his troops preparatory to an engagement. The points at 
 which it was supposed the enemy would attempt to land 
 troops were Ashby's and Pugh's landings. Ashhy's is sit- 
 uate on the west side of the Island, about two miles south 
 of Fort Bartow ; andPugh's on the same side, about two 
 miles south of Ashby's. 
 
 On the night of the Gth, or early in the morning of the 
 7th, -a detachment, with one piece of artillery, was sent to 
 Pugh's landing, and one, with two pieces of artillery, was 
 sent to Ashby's, and the remainder of the forces was sta- 
 tioned in the immediate vicinity of Ashby's. On the morn- 
 ing of the 7th, the enemy's fleet passed by both of the land- 
 ings, and proceeded towards Fort Bartow ; and the detach- 
 ment of infantry, stationed at Pugh's, immediately fell back 
 to the vicinity of Ashby's landing, and joined the detach- 
 ments there — all under command of Col. J. V. Jordan. 
 
 In the sound, between Roanoke Island and the main land, 
 upon the Tyrrell side. Commodore Lynch Avith his scjuadron 
 of seven vessels had taken position, and at 1 1 o'clock the 
 enemy's fleet, consisting of about 30 gunboats and schoon- 
 ers, advanced in ten divisions — the rear one having the 
 schooners and transports in tow. The advance and attack- 
 ing division again subdivided — one assailing the squadron 
 
and the other firing upon the fort, witli nine inch, ten inch 
 and eleven inch shell, spherical case, a few round shot and 
 every variety of riHed projectiles. The fort replied with 
 but four guns (which were all that could be brought to bear) 
 and after striking the foremost vessel several times, the fleet 
 fell back, so as to mask one of the guns of the fort, leaving 
 but three to reply to the fire of the whole fleet. The bom- 
 bardment was continued through the day, and the enemy re- 
 tired at dark. The squadron under the command of Com- 
 modore Lynch, sustained their position most gallantly, and 
 only retired, after exhausting all their amniunilion, and 
 having lost the steamer Curlew and- the Forrest disabled. 
 Fort Bartow sustained considerable damage from the fire of 
 the day, but the injuries were partially repaired by the next 
 morning and the fort put in a state of defence. 
 
 About 3 1-2 o'clock on the morning of the 7th, the ene- 
 my sent off from his transports about twenty-five men in a 
 launch, apparently to take soundings, who were fired upon 
 and retreated; whereupon two large steamers having in tow, 
 each thirty boats, filled with troops, approached the Island, 
 under the protection of their gunboats, at a point north of 
 Ashby's landing, known as llayiuon's, and did ellect a land- 
 ing. The point selected was out of the reach of the field 
 pieces at Ashby's, and defended by a swamp from the ad- 
 vance of our infantry, and protected by the shot and shell 
 from their gunboats. Our whole force therefore withdrew 
 from Ashby's and took position at the redoubt or breast- 
 work, and placed in battery, their field pieces with necessa- 
 ry artillerymen, under the respective commands of Captain 
 Schemerhorn, Lieutenants Kinney and Seldon. Two com- 
 panies of the Sth and two of the 31st were placed at the 
 redoubt to su})port the artillery. Three companies of the 
 Wise Legion, deployed to the right and left as skirmishers. 
 The remainder of the infantry, in position 3(J() yards in the 
 rear of the redoubt as a reserve. 
 
 The enemy landed some fifteen thousand men, with artil- 
 lery, and at 7 o'clock, A. M., of the Sth opened fire upon 
 the redoubt, which was replied to imme<liately with great 
 spirit, and the action soon became general, and was contin- 
 ued without intermission for more than five hours, when the 
 enemy succeeded in deploying a large force on either side of 
 our line, flanking each wing. The order was then given by 
 Col. Shaw to spike the guns in the battery and to retreat to 
 the northern eu<l of the Island. The guns were spiked and 
 the whole force fell back to the camps. 
 
During tlie engagement at tlie redoubt, the enemy's fleet 
 attempted to advance up Croatan Sound, -which brought on a 
 desultory engagement between Fort Bartow and the fleet, 
 which continued up to half-after-twelve o'clock, when the 
 commanding officer was informed that the land defences had 
 been forced, and the position of the fort turned. He there- 
 fore ordered the guns to be disabled and the ammunition des- 
 troyed, which was done and the fort abandoned. The same 
 thing was done at Forts Blanchard and Hugcr ; and the 
 forces from all the forts were marched in good order to the 
 camps. Tlie enemy took possession of the redoubt and 
 forts, immediately, and proceeded in pursuit with great cau- 
 tion towards the northern end of the Island in force, deploy- 
 ing so as to surround our forces at the camps. Col. Shaw 
 having arrived with his whole force at his camp in time to 
 have saved his whole command, if transports had have been 
 furnished, but none being there, and finding himself sur- 
 rounded by a greatly superior force upon the open Island, 
 with no field Avorks to protect him and having lost his only 
 three field pieces at the redoubt had either to make an idle 
 display of courage in fighting the foe at such immense dis- 
 advantage, to the sacrifice of his command or to capitulate 
 and surrender as prisoners of war. lie wisely determined 
 upon the latter alternative. 
 
 The loss on our side in killed and wounded and missing is 
 as follows : Killed 23; wounded 58 ; missing G2. The loss 
 of the 4Gth and 59th Virginia Volunteers is killed G ; 
 wounded 28; missing 19 — that of the 8th and 3 1st and 2nd 
 North Carolina State Troops is 16 killed; 30 wounded; 43 
 missing — of the engineers department, Lieut. Seldon, kill- 
 ed, who had patriotically volunteered his services in the line, 
 was assigned to the command of the six-pounder, which he 
 handled with so much skill as to produce immense havoc in 
 the enemy's ranks, and to elicit the unbounded admiration of 
 all who witnessed it. Unhappily, however, that gallant of- 
 ficer received a rifle ball in the head, and he fell without a 
 groan. 
 
 The loss of the enemy, was in killed and wounded at least 
 900, and the probability is, a much larger number. 
 
 The foregoing is a brief and concise view of the defences 
 of Roanoke Island and of the adjacent waters ; the number 
 of our troops engaged on the 7th and Sth of February and 
 the circumstances of the capitulation thereof on the 8tli of 
 February. The committee are satisfied that Col. Shaw held 
 
8 
 
 the possession of that post as long as he could have done 
 ■without a useless sacrifice of huraiin life. That on the 7th 
 and Sth, the officers and men in Fort Bartow displayed great 
 coolness and courage and persevering effort to sustain their 
 position and drive back the enemy's fleet. 
 
 In the battle of the 8th of February, at the redoubt the 
 officers and men exhibited a cool and deliberate courage, 
 worthy of veterans in the service, and sustained their posi- 
 tion under an uninterrupted and deadly fire for more than 
 five hours, repulsing the enemy in three separate and 
 distinct charges and only -withdrew from the deadly con- 
 flict after exhausting their ammunition for their artillery, 
 and being surrounded and flanked by more than ten times 
 their number. Instead of the result being ^'deeply humilia- 
 ting,^^ it was one of the most brilliant and gallant actions of 
 the war, and in the language of their absent Commanding 
 General "both officers and men fought firmly, coolly, effi- 
 ciently and as long as humanity would allow." 
 
 The committee are satisfied that the whole command did 
 their duty, and they do not feel at liberty to designate any 
 particular acts of companies or individuals. But in simple 
 justice to Col. Shaw (upon whom devolved the command by 
 reason of the extreme illness of his superior. General Wise, 
 and who has been censured for the result) the committee 
 take pleasure in stating that there is no foundation for any 
 just reflection upon him. lie, upon the 7th of February, 
 after disposing of his infantry force, and finding that the 
 enemy did not intend landing, repaired immediately, in per- 
 son, to Fort Bartow, where the bombardment was progress- 
 ing, and made his way into tlie fort amidst the most immi- 
 nent danger from shot and shell ; and there remained, en- 
 couraging the men and assisting as far as he was able, until 
 he discovered the enemy intended to effect a landing below, 
 when he left the fort, under the same dangerous circum- 
 stances of the morning, to take command of the infantry in 
 person : and upon tlie 8th at the redoul)t, he commanded in 
 person, sharing the dangers of his men for more than five 
 hours, with a firmness, coolness and bravery worthy of the 
 position he occupied. 
 
 Immediately upon the secession of the State of North 
 Carolina from the Government of the United States, and 
 the adoption of the Constitution of the Confederate States 
 of America, the authorities of that State commenced the 
 construction of fortifications at Ilatteras and. Oregon Inlet, 
 
and other points upon her coast, which were not completed 
 when the State transferred her forts, arsenals, army, navy 
 and coast defences to the Confederate Government. Shortly 
 thereafter the attack was made upon Forts Ilattcras and 
 Clark, and tlicy Avere taken, and the fortifications at Oregon 
 Inlet were abandoned, and the armament, stores and ammu- 
 nition were removed to Roanoke Island. The enemy imme- 
 diately appeared in force in Pamlico Sound, the waters of 
 which are connected with Albemarle and Currituck Sounds 
 by means of the two smaller sounds of Croatan and Roa- 
 noke. The island of Roanoke being situated between these 
 two latter souiuls, commanding the channels of either, be- 
 came, upon the fall of Ilatteras and the abandonment of 
 Oregon Inlet, only second in importance to Fortress INlon- 
 roe. That island, then, became the key which unlocked all 
 Northeastern North Carolina to the enemy, and exposed 
 Portsmouth and Norfolk to a rear approach of the most im- 
 minent danger. In the language of Brigadier- General 
 Wise, " That such is the importance and value, in a mili- 
 tary point of view, of Roanoke Island that it ought to have 
 been defended by all the means in the power of the Govern- 
 ment. It was the key to all the rear defences of Norfolk. 
 It unlocked two sounds, Albemarle and Currituck ; eight 
 rivers, the North, West, Pasquotank, the Pcrquimmons, the 
 Little, the Chowan, the Roanoke, and the Alligator ; four 
 canals, the Albemarle and Chesapeake, the Dismal, Swamp, 
 the Northwest Canal and the Sufiblk; two railroads, the 
 Petersburg and Norfolk, and the Seaboard and Roanoke. It 
 guarded more than four-fifths of all Norfolk's supplies of 
 corn, pork and forage, and it cut the command of General 
 linger oif from all of its most eificiont transportation. It 
 endangers the subsistence of his whole army, threatens the 
 navy-yard at Gosport, and to cut off Norfolk from Rich- 
 mond, and both from railroad communication with the South. 
 It lodges the enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of 
 Ilatteras, gives them a rendezvous and large rich range of 
 supplies, and the command of the seaboard from Oregon 
 Inlet to Cape Henry. It should have been defended at the 
 expense of twenty thousand men, and of many millions of 
 dollars." 
 
 The committee are of the opinion that the island of Roa- 
 noke was a military post of great importance ; that it might 
 have been placed in a state of defence against any reasona- 
 ble force, with the expenditure of mouey and labor, sup^ 
 
10 
 
 posed to be within the means of the Government; that the 
 same was not done, and the defences constructed were 
 wholly inadequate for its protection from an attack either 
 by land or water. And the committee have no difficulty in 
 assigning, as the cause of our disaster and defeat on the 8th 
 of February, the want of the necessary defences upon the 
 island and the adjacent waters, and upon the mainland upon 
 the Tyrrell side; the want of the necessary field artillery, 
 armament and ammunition, and the great and unjiardonable 
 deficiency of men, together with the entire want of trans- 
 portation, by which the whole command might have been 
 conveyed from the island after the defeat at the battery. 
 
 But the couimittee have had much difficulty in locating 
 the responsibility for the neglect of this exceedingly impor- 
 tant point, owing to the fact that the command of that island 
 has been transferred so frequently from one military com- 
 mander to another, between the time that the Confederate 
 Government became responsible for the coast defences of 
 North Carolina, and the attack upon the island upon the 
 7th of February, 1862. That Island, upon the fall of Ilat- 
 teras, was taken possession of by Colonel Wright, under 
 the instruction from Gen. Huger, and the principal defences 
 constructed under the authority and directions of General 
 linger, who assumed jurisdiction over the island, although 
 itwasAvithin tlie military command of General Gatlin. Af- 
 terwards Brigadier-General D. II. Ilill was assigned for 
 a short time to the immediate command of that post, who 
 immediately entered upon his duty, made an examination of 
 the defences in person, and was making active preparations 
 for putting the island in a state of defence, wlien he was 
 suddenly superseded, and Brigadier-General Branch given 
 the command. It does not appear in evidence that General 
 Branch ever visited the island or made any move towards its 
 defence, lie, however, was superseded by Brigadier-General 
 Wise about the 1st of January, 18G2, who immediately pro- 
 ceeded to the island in person, aliout the Gth of January, 
 spent several days in a reconnoissance of the island and its 
 defences, and in examining the adjacent waters, Avith a view 
 of constructing obstructions in Croatan Sound, and to pre- 
 vent the passage of a hostile fleet, and from that moment up 
 to the 7th of February, the committee are satisfied that 
 General Wise has devoted his whole time in a zealous, ener- 
 getic and indefatiga])lo efibrt to place that island in a state 
 of defence, and has done all and every thing in his power, 
 
11 
 
 witli tlie means lie hail at liis commauil, to effect tliis impor- 
 tant object. At Norfolk, on the 2d of Januar}'-, upon his 
 way to Roanoke Island, he met an express from Colonel 
 Shaw (who was then in the immediate temporary command 
 of the island) to General linger, informing him of the de- 
 fenceless state of the island, and urging the necessity of 
 strengthening Fort Bartow by mounting other guns, ob- 
 structing Croatan Sound and making requisitions for am- 
 munition, pile driver and other things necessary. General 
 Wise endorsed and approved of tlie requisition and seconded 
 the demands of Colonel Shaw. General Wise arrived at 
 Roanoke Island upon the Gth and assumed the command at 
 that post upon the 7th of January, 1862. After making a 
 reconuoisauce of the island and its defences, General Wise, 
 on the loth January, informed General Huger '* that Roa- 
 noke Island was in a defenceless condition and in presence 
 of a very formidable enemy's force. The Burnside expedi- 
 tion is reported to have sailed. Independent of that, the 
 force now at Hatteras Inlet can pass or take Roanoke Island, 
 and pardon me for saying that I respectfully differ from ths 
 opinion you expressed in your orders to-day, that to pre- 
 vent the enemy's gun-boats from passing the marshes at the 
 south end will also prevent any landing. Batteries at the 
 marshes are vitally essential to prevent the gun-boats from 
 passiiig into Croatan Sound, but they will not prevent the 
 landing on the south or east end of the island. At least 
 3iU)0 infantry are needed on the island, and a consiilerablc 
 force, say loJl) men, are needed on the beaches, and if the 
 enemy pass Roanoke, oUJiO at least are necessary to fight 
 them on the tongue of land on the north side of Albemarle 
 Sound. We neeil on the beach and on the island at least 
 8 field pieces and the carriages and caissons necessary. We 
 require 32 horses for the artillery. Wo need at least six 
 heavy pieces at the south end marshes, and two at least at 
 Fleetwood Point." 
 
 On the same day General Wise addressed the Secretary 
 of War, in which he says that " It is very important that 
 my Legion shoiihl be forwarded as speedily as possible. 
 The defence of Roanoke Island, (which is the key of all the 
 rear defences of Norfolk, and its canals and railroads) is 
 committeil to mv charsre, and I have just returned from a 
 reeonnoisince of that point. It is now utterly defenceless. 
 No preparations have been mule there at all adequate. 
 General linger has given me a large authority, to do whu- 
 
12 
 
 over is necessary, and has advised ^vllat lie deems proper in 
 iny command; but we have very limited means, and not half 
 time enough to prepare to meet an enemy, who is now al- 
 most in immediate presence, in very formidable force. 
 Twice the number of my Legion is necessary, and I beg 
 that the place of my 3d Regiment may speedily be filled, or 
 tliat it may be restored." 
 
 On the loth January, 1SG2, General Wise writes to the 
 Tccretary of War, " I am sure you will not adjudge me im- 
 portunate, when I inform you that I returned from Roanoke 
 Island to. Norfolk last Saturday. I hasten back, after a 
 short reconnoisance, to apprize Headquarters and the De- 
 partment, that there are no defences there ; no adeiiuate pre- 
 paration whatever to meet the enemy, and to forward all the 
 means in my reach as speedily as possible, to make the key 
 of all the rear of Norfolk, with its canals and railroads, 
 safe. Inside of Ilatteras Inlet I found 24 vessels of light 
 draft, eight of which are steamers, said to carry four guns 
 each. They are at farthest but 3' I miles from Roanoke Is- 
 land, and can reach there any four hours or less, to attack 
 five small gun-boats, under Captain Lynch, and four small 
 laud batteries, wholly inefficient. Any boat drawing seven 
 feet water or less, can pass the Croatan Sound as far off as 
 one and a quarter miles from any battery, and the enemy's 
 guns can silence our batteries there in a very short time. 
 Neither battery is casemated, and our men now there are 
 untrained to heavy pieces mounted on navy carriages. The 
 moment the enemy passes Croatan channel, the North Land- 
 ing river. North river, Pasquotank, Chowan, Roanoke, Al- 
 ligator and Scuppernong rivers, and the Dismal Swamp, and 
 Albemarle and Chjcsapeakc canals will be blockaded effec- 
 tually, and Norfolk and Portsmouth will be cut off from 
 su])plies of corn, pork and forage. The force at Ilatteras 
 is indejocndent of the Burnside expedition. No matter 
 where the latter is, the former is amply sufficient to capture 
 or pass Roanoke Island in any twelve hours. Let me say 
 then, sir, that if we are to wait for powder from Richmond, 
 until we are attacked at that Island, that attack will be cap- 
 ture, and our defeat will precede our supply of ammunition. 
 The case is too urgent for me to delay speaking this out 
 plainly at once." And in another part of the same letter 
 he says: "We want ammunition and men. In a word, al- 
 most every preparation has to be made. Delay is defeat 
 now, at Roanoke Island, and with present means Captain 
 
13 
 
 Lynch and I combined can't guarantee successful defence 
 for a day. I beg, sir, that you will urge this upon the Navy 
 Department, and believe that I am not superserviceable in 
 this urgency." 
 
 General Wise finding that his written appeals for aid in 
 the defences of the Island, to Headquarters at Norfolk and 
 to the Department at Richmond, were neglected, and treated 
 with indifTerence, repaired in person to Richmond, and 
 called upon the Secretary of War and urged, in the most 
 importunate manner, the absolute necessity of strengthen- 
 ing the defences upon that Island with additional men, ar- 
 mament and ammunition. The Secretary of War replied 
 verbally to his appeals for reinforcements, that he had not 
 the men to spare for liis command. General Wise urged 
 upon the Secretary that General linger had about 15,0011 
 men in front of Norfolk, lying idle in campfor eight months, 
 and that a considerable portion of them could be spared for 
 the defence of the rear of Norfolk, and especially as his 
 (General Wise's) District supplied Norfolk and his army 
 Avith nearly or quite all of his corn, pork and forage. That 
 reinforcements at Roanoke Island were as absolutely neces- 
 sary to the defence of Norfolk, as forces in its front, and 
 that particular or special posts should not be allowed to mo- 
 nopolize nearly all the men, powder and supplies." In re- 
 ply to all his urgent appeals for the means of defence. Gen- 
 eral Wise on the 22d January received the following mili- 
 tary order, No. 17 : 
 
 " Brigadier General Henry A. Wise, Provisional Army, 
 will immediately proceed to Roanoke Island, North Caroli- 
 na, and assume command of the Confederate States troops 
 at that place. 
 
 " By command of the Secretary of War. 
 
 "(Signed.) John Withers, 
 
 "= A. A. General."' 
 
 It is apparent to the Committee, from the correspondence 
 on file of General Wise, Avith the Secretary of War, Gene- 
 ral Iluger, his superior officer, the Governor of North Car- 
 olina, and others, proves that he was fully alive to the im- 
 portance of Roanoke Island, and has devoted his whole time 
 and energies and means to the defence of that position, and 
 that he is in no way responsible for the unfortunate disas- 
 ter which befcd our forc:s upon that Island on the 7th and 
 Sth of February. 
 
 But the Committee cannot sav the same in reference to 
 
14 
 
 the efforts of the Secretary of "War and the commanding 
 officer at Norfolk, General linger. It is apparent that the 
 I&hmJ of Roanoke was important for the defence of Nor- 
 folk, and that General linger had under his command at that 
 point upwards of 15,(i()0 men, a large supply of armament 
 and ammunition, and could have thrown in a fe^Y hours a 
 large reinforcement upon Koanoke Island, and that himself 
 and the Secretary of War had timely notice of the entire 
 inadequacy of the defences, the want of men and munitions 
 of war, and the threatening attitude ol the enemy. But 
 General linger and the Secretary of War paid no practical 
 attention to those urgent appeals of General Wise, sent for- 
 ward none of his important requisitions, and permitted 
 General Wise and his inconsiderable force to remain to meet 
 at least fifteen thousand men, well armed and equipped. If 
 the Secretary of War and the Commanding General at Nor- 
 folk had not the means to reinforce General Wise, why was 
 lie not ordered to abandon his position and save his com- 
 mand ? But, upon the contrary, he was required to remain 
 and sacrifice his command, with no means in his insulated 
 position to make his escape, in case of defeat. 
 
 The Committee, from the testimony, are therefore con- 
 strained to report, that whatever of blame and responsibility 
 is justly attributable to any one, for the defeat of our troops 
 r,t lloanoke Island on the Sth of February, 1862, should 
 attach to Major General B. linger, and the late Secretary 
 of War, J. P. Benjamin. 
 
 All of which is respectfully submitted. 
 
 B. S. GAITIIER, 
 
 Chainnan. 
 

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