LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK - BOSTON - CHICAGO - DALLAS ATLANTA : SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., LimrtED LONDON - BOMBAY = CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Lt». TORONTO LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER BY Sir GEORGE ARTHUR IN THREE VOLUMES VOL. II on G6IGY jew Pork THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1920 All rights reserved ai il 0% Eee ‘ Ay s . =} i Ni pune a xo MV 3 Oa <<“ 1g) mit Ones 1 CONTENTS CHAPTER XLII Commander-in-Chief—Blockhouse and Drive—Rlockhouse tien The first Drive . ; 1 CHAPTER XLIII Concentration Camps—De La Rey and De Wet—De Wet headed eC Keanna aa aie mee Hier) eeoen hall ahs ya dueheiis) savy) @hMristr ae CHAPTER XLIV Interview with Botha—Botha’s Terms—British Terms—Negotia- tions broken off RANE ooh awn eats: Vie CHAPTER XLV Acting High Commissioner—State of Cape Colony. . .. . CHAPTER XLVI Boer Depression—Vlakfontein—Another Year of War. . . CHAPTER XLVII Free Staters obstinate—J. C. Smuts—Elliot’s Drive—The Seven- teenth Lancers . SOI ee Mis wee eae te pO st ees CHAPTER XLVIII Blockhouses extended—Botha’s Campaign—Death of Benson—A Chief of the Staff—Groen Kop . v Gol 64 ll 18 27 32 38 46 Vi LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAPTER XLIX PAGE Foretelling the End—Botha and the Viljoens—The Boers jaded . 56 CHAPTER L A moving Wall of Troop—At the ne River—Tweebosch— Carelessness of Officers . . . MPM SG LE CHAPTER LI Peace Proposals—Local Unity of Command. . .... . 70 CHAPTER LII Kitchener’s Methods—Treatment of Officers. . .. . . . 9 CHAPTER LIII Financial Adviser—Roberts and Brodrick . . ... . . 81 CHAPTER LIV The six Points—Armistice refused—Boer Differences—British Differences =. 6) 6 0 ww a CHAPTER LV Botha’s Arguments—Peace Terms drafted—Policy of Reconcilia- tion eee eh Seley e eee a) rrr CHAPTER LVI The Boer Submission—Peace signed—Fusing Briton and Boer . 102 CHAPTER LVII Arrival in London—To Khartum and India. . . . . . .« 109 CONTENTS vii CHAPTER LVIII PAGE The Indian Command—tThe Call to the War Office—The Attrac- PIDTMOL PETES ooo, og. ee fe re ee cae Be eo CORON ee BES CHAPTER LIX Arrival in India—Re-numbering Regiments—Regimental Titles . 122 CHAPTER LX Tour of the Frontier—Hospitalities at Simla . . . . . . 128 CHAPTER LXI Redistribution Scheme—Internal Defence—Reorganisation ap- TRICE Mig uC TaN SSRMET BaP oR NIST OOS iy Sora er Ciaoameram F - CHAPTER LXIT A serious Accident—Grouping of Divisions—System at Work . 138 CHAPTER LXIII Frontier Railways—Rival Routes . . . . . . . . «. 145 CHAPTER LXIV Relations with the Amir—A Frontier eevee and Mah- suds—The Mahsuds . ... . oe Alene OhegS, ns ae eee CHAPTER LXV Frontier Militia—Samana—aA Militia Reserve. . . . . . 160 vill LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAPTER LXVI Mixed Brigades—The Division as War Unit—Training of TYOOpS ee a ae AGE CHAPTER LXVII A Staff College 06. 65 i rr CHAPTER LXVIII Native Commissions—A delicate Question—Courtesy to Natives 177 CHAPTER LXIX British Officers’ Pay—The young Officer. . . ... . . 184 CHAPTER LXX Army Institutes—The British Soldier’s Well- eae le Well-being—Native Soldiers’ Pay . .. . . 189 CHAPTER LXXI The Dual Control—Waste of Money . . . . .. . . . 198 CHAPTER LXXII “Divide et impera’”—The Military ae and Trans- port—The Civil Supremacy ... . . 203 CHAPTER LXXIII The Viceroy’s Opinion—Sir Edmond Elles—Lord Curzon’s Min- ute—The Viceroy’s Council—Decision of the Cabinet—The Viceroy resigns) 23) )0 0) teeta sy a CONTENTS ix CHAPTER LXXIV Mr. Morley—The Army Secretary—The Supply Department . . 284 CHAPTER LXXV Morley’s Hconomies—Infantry Reductions—The Capitation Rate 231 CHAPTER LXXVI Japan’s Example—Dangers to India—No Reduction of the Army 238 CHAPTER LXXVII Economy at all costs—Military Works ci aie Anir— ~— Habibullah’s Friendship . . . Le ae Cea. Pa Dey ee CHAPTER LXXVIII Sedition in India—Treasonable Journals—Loyalty of Indian EECOPS MEAG een OL eas CUR ie emt ied 1S ae he LOS CHAPTER LXXIxX Sanatorium for Aden—Extension of Command—Application for Leave—Application withdrawn—A new Decoration . . . 260 CHAPTER LXxxX Venereal Diseases—An Appeal to ete for Self-con- GEOL Ta huey Geer era vel areata MICENMAIN eta MN WNW anAaS Mite 4¢ (8) CHAPTER LXXXI Farewell to the Army—The German Menace—The Indian Army . 277 ~~ x LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAPTER LXXXII To China and Japan—Arrival in Australia—Sidney and Mel- Dourme ea ee ear rr CHAPTER LXXXIII ~ The Australian Report—Military Areas—New Zealand—Visit to America 2003. 6 ee ce ee 2 CHAPTER LXXXIV The Indian Viceroyalty—Imperial Defence. . . . . . . 301 CHAPTER LXXXV In British East Africa—King George’s Coronation—British Agent in Hgypt® 2.0020. oe ss CHAPTER LXXXVI Egypt and ad sen ark Fellahin—The Five Feddan 2 culture. . . F aT aaa ena ap ccta ee PM) gic CHAPTER LXXXVII Cotton—The Cotton Area—The Sudanese Loan. . .. . . 322 CHAPTER LXXXVIII The Public Health—A Legislative Assembly—The King at Port Sudan—Kitchener’s life threatened . . . . . . . . 828 CHAPTER LXXXIX Mediterranean Fleet—Germany and a a Khedive—The Wakfs—Leaves Egypt. . . : oso) Re ILLUSTRATIONS General Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief in India, and his Staff. From a Photograph by Bourne & Shepherd. (From right to left, Lord Kitchener; Captain Basset, Rifle Brigade; Major-General Birdwood; Captain FitzGerald, 18th Bengal Lancers; Captain Nigel L. Learmonth, 15th Hussars; Lieu- tenant Wylly, V.C., The Guides) . . . . . . Frontispiece 3 FACE PAGE Map showing the Northern and Southern Armies and the Nine Divisions as established 1907. . . . . . . . . . 140 Proposed strategic Railways, India . . ..... =. =. 148 NO NN Pea Whe. SHEN hae hubs ug ' REN UMOA eat BAH Is. te AARON SL iy Oe Ye ; yi te 2 - bay t | " eS ® ' ; ‘ ; + i rt ; / ' ; CHAPTER XLIT KitcHENER, on taking over the command in December 1900, could approximately estimate the number of Boers actually fighting at 20,000. The precise figure could not be ascertained at the time, but at the end of the war it became known that, though the greatest number ever mobilised at one time was not more than 25,000, the total then at the disposal of the Boer Commanders, all armed and most of them mounted, was close upon 60,000. Against these the British were able to range a force that, on paper, was over- whelming. The appeal made for reinforcements in December 1900 was followed in the first four months of 1901 by a steady stream of troops flowing into South Africa, strengthened by local levies. In May 1901 the new Mounted Army was com- plete. It included 14,000 Cavalry, about 12,000 Mounted Infantry, 7500 South African Constabulary, and a second contingent of Imperial Yeomanry 17,000 strong. Besides these, there were 5000 fresh Australasian troops and 24,000 irregular troops raised locally, and also some Militia. The total strength of the Mounted Force—more than half of them from overseas—was about 80,000 officers and men, who in riding and marksmanship, as well as in the tactics which the nature of the country imposed, VOL. II 1 B 2 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. had something to learn from the enemy. In addition to the Mounted Riflemen there were in South Africa about 85,000 Regular Infantry, 20,000 Militia, 13,000 Gunners, 4000 Engineers, and 11,500 of the Auxiliary Corps, bringing the grand total nearly to 240,000, with 100 heavy guns, 420 horse and field- guns, and 60 ‘‘pom-poms.’’ But these figures were nominal only; the net fighting strength,, which fiuc- tuated a good deal, stood on June 19, 1901, at under 164,000 men, of whom, however, nearly 100,000 were scattered along the lines of rail, and were almost wholly upon the defensive. Thousands were em- ployed on detached duties, such as escorts and guards, as well as at the coast towns and depots. Wastage from casualties and sickness, as well as from the straggling caused by long and rapid marches, was a constant drain upon man-power. The question of the future leadership of the vari- ous columns was an anxious one. Jan Hamilton had gone home with Roberts; Lyttelton! was to have leave in view of future command; Blood had not arrived from India; French, Methuen, Bruce Hamil- ton, Rawlinson, Clements, Rundle, Plumer, Byng,? Broadwood, were still in the field and at the top of their form. But some of the senior regimental officers, on whom independent command might de- volve, were a little stale? prone to over-caution, and probably unequal to the pace likely to be set. On the other hand, many of the younger leaders who 1 Later Lieut.-General Sir N. Lyttelton. 2 Lieut.-General Sir Bindon Blood; Sir Leslie Rundle; Major-General Plumer; General Sir Henry Rawlinson; Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Sir Julian Byng. The three last were raised to the peerage in 1919. 3 “Kitchener is almost the only G.O. in whom some staleness is not apparent.” (Letter from a Regimental Officer at the end of 1900.) XLII COMMANDER-IN-CHIBF 3 later distinguished themselves had yet to be dis- covered.! The Artillery and Infantry were still in full vig- our; but under the new conditions the functions of the former were largely in abeyance, while the latter had become, in a sense, ancillary to the insufficient Cavalry. And even if horsemen had sufficed, horses were lacking, although the country was swept for remounts.? The wastage in horses had been large—larger indeed than it need have been; and shortly before the outgoing Commander-in-Chief left for England orders were given to the Remount Department to suspend further purchases, with the unhappy conse- quence that his successor’s earlier requisitions for horses and mules could only be met with a blank non possumus. Nor was the Mounted Branch quite happily equipped or well adapted for its functions. The Regular Cavalry had not yet been armed with the long-range magazine rifle, and were thus on uneven terms with an enemy whose marksmanship with a Mauser was almost faultless. The Mounted Infan- try, drawn from infantry regiments, with a sprin- kling of Colonial Irregulars and Yeomanry, were, if a makeshift, a most valuable adjunct to the regular horsemen, their infantry training giving them a con- siderable start both in proficiency with the rifle and in ground skirmishing. But in point of strength they 1“I hope you will remove some incompetent C.O.’s. I could then use regiments that are comparatively fresh, but have now to be kept on garrison duty, owing to the impossibility of trusting their C.O.’s in the field.”” (Kitchener to Roberts, 14.12.00.) 2“T recently raided the racing stables at Johannesburg in order to fit out our mobile columns with the best horses. The result has been that they have caught up Boers galloping.” (Kitchener to Roberts.) + LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. were strictly limited. Reserves were not available, and commanding officers of infantry regiments were naturally shy of parting with their best men. The position of the Yeomanry and Colonials was even worse. Not only had they no reserves, but for the most part they were nearly time-expired. Kitchener persistently pleaded for fresh and further mounted troops, to which he pinned his faith. Almost his first telegram was a prayer for Yeomanry drafts to replenish the very weak battalions. He then reminded Mr. Brodrick that many of the Yeo- men—whom he commended as a most useful body of men—had important business at home, and could not be held to indefinitely prolonged engagements, and he suggested that their cup might be sweet- ened by raising their pay to the level of Colonial rates. In December Colonel Alderson was put in com- mand of the Mounted Infantry, with a depot and training base at Pretoria, and all infantry regiments were asked to send him every man they could spare. The answer was immediate and generous, though most of the new troops could not be ready before April. Roberts, on his arrival in England, had spoken no fair words to the Cabinet,! and under his earnest advice two cavalry regiments and 1000 trained mounted infantry were promptly shipped to South Africa, arrangements being also made to despatch 3000 more mounted infantry during the ensuing two months. Finally it was decided to raise a new force 1“Almost the first thing I did was to submit a memorandum pointing out the necessity of sending you more mounted troops. This was accepted by the Cabinet; indeed I feel sure they will let me send as many as can be collected.”” (Roberts to Kitchener, 18.1.01.) xLI BLOCKHOUSE AND DRIVE 5 of Yeomanry; by the end of March! 1901 a total of 506 officers and 16,431 men had been enrolled, and, as soon as ready, were sent to the theatre of war, there to be equipped and trained. But efficiency had often to yield to emergency, and captures of ‘‘green’’ Yeo- manry, with a valuable haul of rifles and ammunition, were not rare occurrences. Somehow the War Office did not take the lesson to heart, or was unwilling to institute a cut-and-dried programme of reinforce- ments, and so late as the end of 1901 a brand new force of Yeomanry had to be raised and sent over sea. The twin military measures which Kitchener instituted for the confusion of the enemy are remem- bered as ‘‘the Blockhouse’’ and ‘‘the Drive.’’ The structurally weak point in the blockhouses was vul- nerability to shell-fire. But even before they began to take shape in January 1901 there was little need to reckon with, and no cause to fear, the Boer artillery. The blockhouses were intended in the first instance to defend the railways against Boer raids—of late increasingly audacious and mischievous—and inci- dentally to release some of the vast number of men ineffectively employed in patrolling the lines. A few of the earlier specimens were substantial stone forts; the majority were loop-holed structures made of two skins of corrugated iron nailed on to wooden frames, and filled in with gravel and earth. The design was modified by successive alterations making for simplicity and cheapness; the iron skins were brought nearer together, so that both could be nailed 1In January Roberts had written: “The Yeomanry are coming on well. I hope we shall be able to despatch the first lot ere long. I am forwarding them in companies, instead of sending them out as drafts.” 6 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP, to a single wooden frame; the filling was less bulky but of hard shingle, and the octagonal form was abandoned for a cylindrical one. As defensive works the blockhouses were of first- rate value, and combined admirably with the ar- moured patrol trains in protecting the railway. Such protection had become imperative; wrecking trains, destroying bridges, and damaging lines had been for many months a highly favoured method of Boer warfare. But in December 1900 the ever-swell- ing audacity of the burghers reached its high-water mark. This brought about an important enlarge- ment of the protective plan. The well-guarded and fortified railway lines were themselves to be utilised as barriers against the Boer commandos—an exten- sion of purpose which reacted on the blockhouse sys- tem. Originally few in number and planted only at vulnerable points, the blockhouses were multiplied liberally and placed at regular intervals—first of one and a half miles, and ultimately of 400 yards, and even in certain cases of 200 yards—along the entire line of railway. The barrier was strengthened by a continuous fence of barbed wire, with entanglements round each blockhouse; and telephonic communica- tion was laid throughout. Kitchener was at first fairly well pleased: By fortifying and increasing our posts on the railway lines, they form barriers which the Boers cannot cross without being engaged. I am getting blockhouses at every 2500 yards, and at night parties from each meet and sleep out between, waiting for any attempt to cross. This has proved successful. The expedient was not to be confined to the railway xi BLOCKHOUSE LINES 7 but was to reinforce other protective arrangements. Six months earlier a line of small posts had been established on the Bloemfontein—Thaba ’Nchu— Ladybrand road; but the entrenched posts were far apart and their garrisons numbered forty or fifty. As a protection to the line of communication the posts had their value, but as a cordon for barring the passage of Boers they were void of effect. Kitch- ener, for all that, would not abandon the cordon sys- tem, but rather decided to extend it from Bloemfon- tein westwards—only in a greatly improved shape, more elaborate in plan and wider in scope. His first care was to fence in a protected area round each of the capitals, so as to secure their civil life. Asa police measure this work was entrusted to the South African Constabulary. Bloemfontein was at once secured by an impenetrable screen of posts defended by Boer farmers who had surrendered to the British Government, and enclosing an area of 25-mile radius. The line of police posts sometimes served, not merely as a defence against attacks and a barrier to Boer movements, but as a base for of- fensive operations to clear the country. In July Kitchener explains to Brodrick that “‘there is no doubt these flying columns, on extended operations in this vast country, only in great measure beat the air, as the mobile Boers clear off the mo- ment they hear of the column being sometimes 20 miles away. My project has been, with a number of troops economised off the lines, to divide the country up into paddocks by lines of blockhouses, and so re- strict the area in which the Boers could operate.’’ A month later he was able to pronounce a definite © verdict on the merits of the new system: 8 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. The lines of blockhouses have been successful. The dis- trict west of this—as far as the line of blockhouses which extend from the railway along the Mooi River north to Naauwpoort, and thence to Breeds Nek, and along the Magaliesberg to Commando Nek—is now quite clear; the proof is that the few Boers who have got through our lines into the area enclosed have been obliged to come in and surrender, or are at once caught. I should like to extend this system by running a line of posts from Potchefstroom to Vredefort Road Station, and thus clear the Losberg area, which is always infested by small parties. Two battalions would be necessary for this, but I am not quite sure where I can find them. We are now doing all we can to prevent Kritzinger and Malan and a party of Transvaalers under Smuts, the late Attorney-General, from getting back into Cape Colony. Our blockhouse lines are almost complete, and I have moved down a considerable number of troops to guard the frontier. I hope we shall frustrate them and drive them north again. The area between the Orange River and the Ladybrand— Modder River line has been so thoroughly cleared of supplies that I doubt the enemy’s being able to exist there for any length of time. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 23.8.01.) Four months later Ian Hamilton, on returning to South Africa, telegraphed to Lord Roberts: Although I had read much of blockhouses, I never could have imagined such a gigantic system of fortifications, bar- ‘iers, traps, and garrisons as actually exists. This forms the principal characteristic of the present operations, supplying them with a solid backbone and involving permanent loss of territory to the enemy, which former operations did not. Drives, though embodying no new principle, were a novelty in modern tactics. They suggested them- selves as a natural expedient for dealing with an XLII THE FIRST DRIVE 9 enemy few in number but almost superhumanly alert and scattered over a vast stretch of country. Our scheme was not so much to catch and crush in detail an agile and ubiquitous adversary, as to denude the entire country of all combatant Boers, herding them more and more closely towards an enclosure formed either by natural features or by artificial barriers— corralling and rounding them up into an angle or pocket—forcing them, as it were, through a closed funnel into its blind end. Kitchener perceived that some such thorough and exact measure, which might be slow but would be sure, was necessary for anything like finality. The more the Boer forces were disintegrated the more must his own be consolidated. To fight scattered commandos with scattered columns would have been a tactical error. Granted that to sweep up a huge expanse of territory with long and continuous lines of troops might seem a primitive and prodigal de- vice ; yet it presented fewer difficulties than the alter- native course which had been tried and found want- ing. The principle of the drive was believed to be sound; for its successful application a compound of skill and luck was required. The first of the drives, which served afterwards as a rough model, was put through by French in the Eastern Transvaal in February 1901. His general idea was to push forward his centre as the apex of a wedge, then gradually to extend his wings till the whole force was aligned, and with a sweep eastwards to compress the Boer commandos towards and against the Zululand frontier. French had all the skill but lacked the luck. Jan Hamilton had both when in the Western Transvaal he carried out the 10 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER car. x0 last drive of the war, and scored so heavily as to turn the scale in favour of peace. The drives vindicated themselves in time, though only after patient perse- verance against initial failure. It had been easy to gibe at the numerous instances in which the Boers laughed at locksmiths, but experience was witness that, for a rather leisurely force pitted against a very lively foe, the Drive-cum-Blockhouse expedient was a military happy thought. CHAPTER XLIII To make these methods of fighting even workable, it was necessary to blend them with some adminis- trative measures of a drastic character. The prime necessity of striking at enemy sources of supply was the clear justification—as it was the compelling motive—of our treatment of the civil population. British public opinion has always been sensitive as to the rights of non-combatants. Kitchener shared the sentiment, but had to reconcile it with the dire requirements of war. The question was acute; the farmstead and its belongings had become the Boer base of supply, and every farm was both an intelligence agency and a stores department. Already in September Roberts had adopted in prin- ciple the policy of destroying the Boer resources; it fell to Kitchener to carry this out on a large scale by depopulating the country and stripping it. Thousands of flocks and herds were appropriated, huge loads of grain seized or destroyed, standing crops burnt, mills and farm-buildings gutted. The farms, however, being inhabited by women and chil- dren, humanity dictated the wholesale removal of families to a place of safety where they could be fed, sheltered, and cared for at our expense. There was an additional reason for this precaution. ‘‘The 11 12 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cur. women question,’’ Kitchener noted in his first letter to Roberts, ‘‘is always cropping up, and is most difficult ; there is no doubt the women are keeping up the war, and are far more bitter than the men.’’? Camps were established for the Boer families and were located near the railway to facilitate their proper supply and supervision. A distinction was drawn between the merely destitute women, who were to be fed and looked after, and the actively hostile women, who had to be removed for inciting the men to continue the war; and orders were given that the two classes should be kept apart. In May 1901 the number of those roped in was 77,000 white people and 21,000 coloured—the figures rising in October to 118,000 and 43,000 respectively. So far from proving efficacious in coercing the Boers into submission, the plan was something more than a failure, for it acted as an encouragement to them to fight on. The burghers chuckled at being relieved of the trouble of maintaining their families —the more so as the embarrassing charge was trans- ferred to us. Unhappily, too, the sickness and mortality in the Concentration Camps soon afforded good cause for uneasiness. The unhealthiness of the Camps was attributed—for the most part unjustly—to neglect of sanitation, the fact being that the inmates were not very refined in their habits and refused medical advice, so that they fell an easy prey to the visitation of measles and pneumonia which at this time spread all over the Boer territories. No remedial measure 1 This was more generally true of the women of the Free State than of those of the Transvaal. Milner, writing to Kitchener (3.10.01), cites one of the latter as having said to him that they knew better than the men can “the state of affairs all round, and see that it is no use going on.” xLUI CONCENTRATION CAMPS 13 was neglected, and it is beyond doubt that a far greater amount of misery and a far higher rate of mortality would have been the lot of these unfor- tunates if they had been left unprotected and unpro- vided for on the veldt. In England, while the earlier condition of the interned people attracted much legit- imate sympathy, the woeful tales of the Concentra- tion Camps, enriched with much imaginative detail, afforded delectable material for sensation-mongers and were fully exploited in anti-British propaganda. Brodrick, when telling Kitchener that even some of the Ministerialist Members of Parliament were ‘hot on the humanitarian tack,’’ added: ‘‘It is a mystery to me how, with so many people on a single line, and with your own troops to feed, you have managed to cope with the difficulty as you have.”’ Botha asked that greater care might be taken in bringing in the women. ‘‘I told him,’’ Kitchener informed Roberts, ‘‘I had issued special instructions that, when sufficient transport was not available, they were to be left on their farms until transport could be provided. He made no complaint about burning farms’’ (28.2.01). Eventually a Commission of ladies * was eaaniieed by the War Office to investigate the facts. After a four months’ tour they made a number of useful criticisms and suggestions, they reported that some of the causes of the high death-rate were unavoid- able, and warmly praised the efforts made by a scanty staff of overworked officials to cope with an impossible task. 1A lady named Hobhouse, whose — a her sense of propriety. was forbidden to land at Cape Town. “‘I see,” wrote Kitchener to Mr. Ralli, “Miss Hobhouse has taken action against me, and I shall probably be put in prison on my arrival in England.” 14 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. As a result of reforms and remedial measures the death-rate was steadily lessened, and early in 1902 had fallen nearly to vanishing point. Kitchener wrote to Lady Cranborne: What a hard time Brodrick has had in Parliament with these refugee camps. I wish you would come out and see them; the inmates are far better looked after in every way than they are in their homes, ov than the British refugees are, for whom no one now seems to care. The doctors’ re- ports of the dirt and filth in which the Boer ladies from the wilds revel are very unpleasant reading, and I am consid- ering whether some of the worst cases should not be tried for manslaughter. (2.8.01.) The best and truest witness to what was done was that borne by Botha himself: ‘‘ We are only too glad to know that our women and children are under British protection.’’ The early days of Kitchener’s command were harassed by an outbreak of activities of which De Wet, Beyers, and De la Rey were the chief pro- moters, and on December 19 he had to mention his first reverse: Yesterday I had bad news from Clements. He was at- tacked at dawn by De la Rey !—reinforced by Beyers with the Waterberg commando—making up a total of 2500 men, with 4 to 8 guns. Broadwood was on the north side of the Magaliesberg looking out for Beyers’s commanda, but he let them slip by. (Kitchener to Roberts, 19.12.00.) On December 28 Kitchener, anxious that Roberts should have the latest report before embarking, sent a message from Pretoria: 1Ten days earlier De la Rey had grabbed a fairly large convoy near Rustenburg. XLUI DE LA REY AND DE WET 15 I have put off writing to the last moment in the hopes of receiving good news from the Colony. The operations there drag on, and it seems as if our troops cannot catch the very mobile party of Boers now out there. I greatly fear De Wet will give us the slip and dash south. I went down to Naauwpoort and De Aar and arranged all I could. I had to hurry back, as my absence might have given cause for exag- gerated reports here of how affairs were going in Cape Col- ony. Very few people knew I had been away. A week later: A most astounding blow came on us last Sunday when we heard that Viljoen’s men had surprised and rushed Helvetia at 2.30 a.M. on Saturday, and captured the 4.7 gun without a shot being fired. The sentries must have been all fast asleep, and as there have been many cases lately of men sleeping at their posts I issued a warning that I will confirm death-sentences in such cases. The attack on Vrieheid is of precisely similar nature, though there, fortunately, it was driven off. I had reiterated the orders for barbed wire entanglements everywhere, particularly round positions of guns; there seems to be contradictory evidence about a wire entangle- ment at Helvetia, but this shall be cleared up. Cape Colony continues to be unsatisfactory. I have sent down Douglas Haig?* with local rank of Colonel to see what can be done and take charge of the field. Though our efforts have not been decisively successful, we have prevented the raiders from doing any harm. These have been cleared everywhere, and have not obtained recruits or support in the Colony. Milner has been quite calm, and I have had to wake up Chowder with some rather strong telegrams. Of course, having 4000 mounted men in the Colony hampers my action considerably both in the Orange River and here; at the same 1 Later Field-Marshal Earl Haig. 16 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cHaP. time I am acting as vigorously as possible against the enemy everywhere, and am trying, by working up Peace Commit- tees and giving good terms, to induce burghers to leave the commandos and surrender. If only the Cape Colony dis- turbance would end I could do more. Louis Botha is some- where near Bethel, and there are reports that he talks of peace, but I do not put much eredit in it. In December De Wet, by diverting to himself the attention of the British columns, had enabled Kritz- inger and Hertzog to cross the Orange River. The former moved towards the middle districts of Cape Colony; the latter made for the west, and, hunted for 400 miles, succeeded in reaching Lambart’s Bay on the Atlantic coast, where he hoped to find a ship bearing munitions and European mercenaries. To many of his men this was their first sight of the sea; to all of them it was a novel experience, for they were immediately shelled by a British eruiser lying at anchor. Meanwhile Kritzinger, heading south, had reached Willowmore, almost within sight of the Indian Ocean; and the two adventurers, having in the course of their sprint to the sea escaped pun- ishment, returned to the south of the Orange River to await orders. The Boer Governments for the moment were sati- ated with fighting in the Republics, and resolved to make their next démarche in Natal and Cape Colony —Botha to move on Pietermaritzburg from the Transvaal, and De Wet to pick up Hertzog and Kritzinger and advance boldly on Cape Town. On January 25 De Wet and Steyn assembled over 2000 men at the Dornberg and, eluding Knox and Hamil- ton, made for the Orange River. Kitchener wrote to Roberts: XLII DE WET HEADED BACK 17 De Wet has got through our Thaba ’Nchu line at night without damage. I still hope to head him by training Knox and Hamilton’s men to Bethulie. French’s move to sweep up the high veldt is going on well. The Boers are flying in front of him and centring about Ermelo. If we could only catch De Wet about the time we get to Ermelo I believe it might finish the war. I am sending Lyttelton to Naauwpoort to direct operations there with Chowder. I am glad to say that at last the Col- ony is showing a little more energy; I have been impressing the necessity of preparation for De Wet’s invasion for a long time without much effect; now they are waking up, but I fear too late to do all that should have been done. I have seen your speech on landing; it was very kind of you to use such terms about me, and I can assure you it gave me the keenest pleasure to know that you are satisfied with what I did in the campaign. (1.2.01.) To catch De Wet, who crossed into the Colony on February 10 by Zand Rift, troops were hurried from the Transvaal, Kimberley, and Cape Town, Kitch- ener himself going to De Aar to direct the hunt. Mainly through the energy of Plumer, De Wet, who soon saw he could play no pranks in the Colony, was headed back. His disappointed burghers had to turn and twist in every direction to shake off their pur- suers and follow their leader who, re-crossing the Orange at Botha’s Drift on February 28, succeeded by the skin of his teeth in regaining his own country and reached the Dornberg just six weeks after he had left it. VOL. II 9 CHAPTER XLIV In a proclamation of December 20, 1900, Kitchener promised that all burghers who surrendered should be allowed to live with their families in Government laagers, and to return to their homes as soon as the guerilla warfare was at an end, their stock and other property being meanwhile respected. A meeting of surrendered Boers was at once held at Pretoria, Kitchener addressing them in a candid but kindly speech, which was afterwards translated into Dutch and circulated with copies of the proclamation among the various commandos. But the burghers were not to be wooed; they regarded the emissaries, not only as cowardly shirkers, but as traitors to their coun- try; and those who did not show a clean pair of heels were treated to fines, imprisonment, and flogging, and in at least one case to summary execution. The failure of the proclamation was discouraging, but not without its object-lesson; Kitchener turned him- self wholly to military considerations and awaited overtures from his opponents. These within a couple of months took form in a peace tentative from Botha! himself, to which the British General was ready to respond. Mrs. Botha [he told Brodrick] has just brought in a letter from her husband ? stating that he desires to meet me with 1He had caused a verbal intimation to be conveyed to Botha that he was willing to meet him on the understanding that the question of Boer independence must be ruled out of discussion. 2To Roberts he wrote: “Mrs. L. Botha has just come in with a letter from ‘\er husband to say he wishes to meet me. It may mean a great deal, cnar.xtiv INTERVIEW WITH BOTHA 19 a view to bringing the war to an end. I think a personal meeting may end the war if we are prepared not to be too hard on the Boers. It will no doubt be settled one way or the other before you get this letter. I expect our move sweeping the high veldt has changed the idea of the Boers, and made them far more peacefully in- clined than they were a few days ago. It will be good policy for the future of this country to treat them fairly well; and I hope I may be allowed to do away with anything humiliat- ing to them in the surrender, if it comes off. I believe Botha can make complete peace, and that De Wet and De la Rey and others will all give in if matters are settled at our meeting. (22.2.01.) The interview, which took place at Middelburg on the last day of February 1901, was quite of a friendly nature, Kitchener entertaining Botha and his four staff officers at luncheon. The same evening he wrote to Brodrick: MippELzBurG, February 28, 1901. I have had a long day with Louis Botha; he came in at 10 a.m. and left at about 3 p.m. He brought four staff offi- cers with him, and they lunched with us. Botha has a nice unassuming manner, and seemed desirous of finishing the war, but somewhat doubtful of being able to induce his men to accept peace without independence in some form or other. I told him that independence in any form was impossible, and that any modified independence would be extremely dangerous, considering the mixed population, the effects of the war, and previous experience. This he agreed in, with evidently some regret. He came prepared with a list of points which he consid- ered should be answered before he could lay the matter of and at any rate it can do no harm.” To a private friend: “At last there looks some chance of finishing the war. I have just had a letter from Louis Botha asking me to meet him, to consider any means of bringing the war to a close. I shall of course meet him, and I hope the result may be satisfactory.” 20 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cmap. peace before his Government and the people. I have tele- graphed the ten points to you, and will only now add my impressions during the conversation. He seemed to think that representative government might be granted at once on cessation of hostilities, but did not press the matter. He spoke very strongly as to the feeling of his burghers about Milner’s appointment, and at one time seemed to think it would entirely prevent any chance of their giving in. I assured him that Milner was a first-rate man, and that, in a short time, they would all agree, and that I thought there was no chance of a change... . When the Kaffir question was brought up, it at once turned on the question of franchise for Kaffirs, to which they are greatly opposed. He stated it would be most dangerous for the burghers on their distant farms. I suggested it should be left open for a representative Government to decide upon later; this he thought satisfactory. He was anxious that legal debts of the Republic should be paid out of revenue; he says that under the law they were allowed to issue notes for a million—these have not all been issued, but if they are repudiated it will entail great loss on farmers. In conversation it was suggested that such claims might be equitably considered by a judge, but I gave no opinion on the point. He, however, considered it one of great importance, and said he felt personally responsible, and hoped that the admission of these debts as valid against the Transvaal would not be refused. The next important point which he spoke strongly about was amnesty to all for bona fide acts in the war; he men- tioned Cape and Natal rebels, and said they could not desert them to be severely punished; he did not see much objection to their being disfranchised. The minor points he referred to were: Church property to remain untouched; Public trusts and orphans’ funds to remain untouched ; Languages, English and Dutch, to be equal in schools; War tax on farms; XLIV BOTHA’S TERMS On Government assistance to rebuild and restock farms; Date of return of prisoners of war. He had notes on the above points, and evidently came prepared. I asked him, if he agreed in the settlement of the points raised, whether he could be certain that all commandos or bands would submit and lay down their arms. He said he was more or less bound to the Free State, but he felt sure he could influence De Wet (if terms were the same for the Orange River Colony), and in that case he could guarantee complete cessation of hostilities and a gen- eral laying down of arms, and Briton and Burgher would then be friends again, and he and his officers would give the best assistance to the Government. We talked about the conduct of the war without any bit- terness. He promised not to take our ambulances again, and I agreed to let him have some medicines. He repeated that he and his people felt bitterly losing their independ- ence, but he evidently did not think it impossible for them to agree to do so. He said, incidentally, that he could carry on for some time. I pointed out the hopelessness of the struggle on their part, and that they had no right to ruin the country further. He was very bitter about those that had surrendered, and did not like the peace committees, but he eould not justify De Wet’s murder of the peace envoy with- out trial—he said he feared it was the result of demoralisa- tion caused by the war. L. Botha is a quiet, capable man, and I have no doubt carries considerable weight with the burghers; he will be, I should think, a valuable assistance to the future good of the country in an official capacity. It seems a pity that the war should go on for the points raised by Botha, which appear to me all capable of adjust- ment ; and, supposing it cost two millions—that is to say, one million for notes issued by the Transvaal Government, and one million for rebuilding and restocking farms, which is the 22 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. most possible—it would only represent one month’s expen- diture out here on the war. I promised to write to Botha when I received the reply of the Government on the points raised, and he will then at once take steps in the matter. By the same mail went a letter to Roberts: I have written to Brodrick about my meeting with Botha and hope you will see my letter. If the Government wish to end the war, I do not see any difficulty in doing so, but I think it will go on for some time if the points raised by Botha cannot be answered. I do not think Botha is likely to be unreasonable; there is a good deal of sentiment about it— particularly as regards giving up their independence, which they feel very much. Kitchener believed, and said, that all the points raised by Botha were capable of adjustment; that the amount of money involved could not exceed the two millions; and that a continuance of the war could not be other than a matter for regret. After Botha’s departure the proposed terms of settlement were em- bodied in a draft letter from the British to the Boer General, which was submitted to Milner and by him forwarded to the Home Government.: The condi- tions were for the most part approved, but modifica- tions were introduced on several important points— an amnesty for bona fide belligerents and Colonial rebels; the future form of government; the debts of the Transvaal Republic; pecuniary aid to farmers; and the status of Kaffirs.. On March 7 Kitchener conveyed to Botha the decision of the British Gov- ernment: 1On the same day Roberts was writing to Kitchener: “The posters all over London to-day announce the surrender of Louis Botha to you at 9 A.M. at Middelburg. I sincerely hope it may be true, but no telegram has been received from you, and the F.O. and C.O. know nothing.” XLIV BRITISH TERMS 23 With reference to our conversation at Middelburg on February 28, I have the honour to inform you that, in the event of a general and complete cessation of hostilities, and the surrender of all rifles, ammunition, cannon, and other munitions of war in the hands of the burghers, or in Govern- ment depots, or elsewhere, His Majesty’s government is prepared to adopt the following measures :— His Majesty’s Government will at once grant an amnesty in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for all bona fide acts of war committed during the recent hostilities. British subjects belonging to Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be compelled to return to these colonies, will, if they do so, be liable to be dealt with by the laws of those colonies specially passed to meet the circumstances arising out of the present war. As you are doubtless aware, the special law in the Cape Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary penal- ties for High Treason in the present case. All prisoners of war, now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere, being burghers or colonists, will, on the completion of the surrender, be brought back to their country as quickly as arrangements can be made for their transport. At the earliest practicable date military administration will cease, and will be replaced by civil administration in the form of Crown Colony government. There will therefore be, in the first instance, in each of the new colonies, a Gover- nor and an Executive Council, composed of the principal of- ficials, with a Legislative Council, consisting of a certain number of official members to whom a nominated unofficial element will be added. But it is the desire of His Majesty’s Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to introduce a representative element, and ultimately to concede to the new Colonies the privilege of self-government. Moreover, on the cessation of hostilities a High Court will be established in each of the new Colonies to administer the laws of the land, and this Court will be independent of the Executive. Church property, public trusts, and orphan funds will be respected. Both the English and Dutch languages will be 24 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. used and taught in public schools when the parents of the children desire it, and allowed in Courts of Law. As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, His Majesty’s Government cannot undertake any liability. It is, however, proposed, as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not exceeding one million pounds sterling to repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for goods requisitioned from them by the late Republican Gov- ernments, or subsequent to annexation, by Commandants in the field, being in a position to enforce such requisitions. But such claims will have to be established to the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial Commission appointed by the Govern- ment to investigate and assess them; and, if exceeding in the aggregate one million pounds, they will be liable to reduction pro rata. I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Govern- ment will take into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting by loan the occupants of farms, who will take the oath of allegiance, to repair any injuries sustained by de- struction of buildings or loss of stock during the war; and that no special war tax will be imposed upon farms to defray the expense of the war. When burghers require the protection of fire-arms, such will be allowed to them by licence, and, on due registration, provided they take the oath of allegiance. Licences will also be issued for sporting rifles, guns, ete., but military fire- arms will only be allowed for purposes of protection. As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to give such franchise before representative government is granted to those Colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as to secure the just predominance of the white race. The legal position of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold in the Cape Colony. In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that, if the terms now offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for consideration, they must be regarded as cancelled. XLIV NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF 25 Kitchener was doubtful whether the amendments made at the Colonial Office—particularly those refer- ring to assistance to be given only in the shape of loans, and the question of the enfranchisement of natives—would be accepted by the Boers, and warned Brodrick that Botha might fail to win over the rep- resentatives of the Orange Colony. His misgivings were justified, for De Wet and Steyn remained deaf to all arguments, and ten days later Botha abruptly, and without giving any reason, broke off the negotiations. Kitchener was avowedly disappointed, and was at no pains either to conceal his chagrin or to mask his efforts towards a just peace. I was afraid [he wrote to Brodrick on March 22] Botha could hardly accept the terms offered. The Boers have a good deal of sentiment of honour amongst them—particu- larly the leaders—and leaving those that had helped them to go to prison for six years, as has been done in Natal, would, I felt sure, make it almost impossible for them to accept. I, therefore, insisted on my views being sent home in Milner’s telegram to the Colonial Secretary. I hardly expected, however, after Milner’s strongly worded objec- tion to my proposition, that the Government would de- cide differently to what they did. TI did all in my power to urge Milner to change his views, which on this subject seem to me very narrow. I feel cer- tain, and have good grounds for knowing, that an amnesty or King’s pardon for the two or three hundred rebels in question (carrying with it disfranchisement, which Botha willingly accepted) would be extremely popular amongst the majority of the British and all the Dutch in South Africa; but there no doubt exists a small section in both Colonies who are opposed to any conciliatory measures being taken to end the war, and I fear their influence is paramount ; they want extermination, and I suppose will get it. My views were that once the Boers gave up their inde- 26 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cmap. x11v pendence and laid down their arms, the main object of the Government was attained, and that the future Civil Admin- istration would soon heal old sores and bring the people together again. After the lesson they have had, they are not likely to break out again. Milner’s views may be strictly just, but they are to my mind vindictive, and I do not know of a case in history when, under similar cireum- stances, an amnesty has not been granted. We are now carrying the war on to put two or three hundred Dutchmen in prison at the end of it. It seems to me absurd and wrong, and I wonder the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not have a fit. Mrs. Botha has written to ask her husband if the amnesty question is the only one they are now fighting for; if he replies in the affirmative, could anything be done if Botha were induced to ask for better terms for the rebels, and for a reconsideration of their case? Should this be possible please wire me. On the very day that Kitchener was making this appeal for judicious clemency towards an opponent with his back to the wall, Brodrick was writing: We are all very much opposed to a complete amnesty to Cape and Natal rebels. The feeling is that it will be a sur- viving reproach on us. The loyalists at least have surely a right to see the very moderate Cape punishments inflicted on rebels. . . . Is it not likely that with one more turn of the military screw, they will be ready for submission? We | shall be glad in any case when the time arrives. (22.3.01.) But the screw was to be turned ad nauseam before that time came—if, indeed, it ever fully came at all. Meanwhile the Man on the Spot had justifiable mis- givings as to whether the war—with all its misery and all its waste—was being continued merely ‘‘to put two or three hundred Dutchmen in prison at the end of it.’’ CHAPTER XLV It was not until May 1901 that Kitchener, though his hands were as ready to strike as his head was to treat, could assume any initiative. The whole position, ranging over a vast area, bristled with diffi- culty. The policy of concentration had not produced the intended effect. De Wet, hunted up and down, and in and out of, the Orange Colony, was still at large. French’s drive had depressed but had not subdued Eastern Transvaal, and Blood’s operations in Northern Transvaal had just fallen short of their expected success. The Cape Colony rebellion had been stifled, but was not extinct.1 Meanwhile military exigencies had not been al- lowed to over-ride the need of an early revival of civil industries. I am sure [Kitchener told Roberts early in March] you will be glad to hear I am making a start at opening the Johannesburg Mines. I am allowing 350 stamps to start under the supervision of the Chamber of Mines and safe- guarding our interests as regards the men on service with our troops. I have no doubt it will have a good effect, and I 1In a private letter Kitchener alluded to the efforts, happily unsuccessful, of a notorious journalist to make further bad blood in the Colony: ‘“‘S "3 lieg were distributed all through Cape Colony. Our troops found them in almost every house. The result has been the reverse of what was antici- pated. Instead of the Dutch being excited to take up arms against us the exactly contrary effect has been produced, as they do not want the same ‘horrors’ near them! Out of evil sometimes good comes, and the Dutch have remained very quietly at home, showing plenty of sympathy, but giving no help” (25.1.01). 27 28 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. am now well off for supplies here and can afford the extra railway accommodation they will want for this project. It has not definitely started yet, but will I expect in a few days. I am also arranging to move the troops out of the town of Johannesburg, leaving interior defence to the vol- unteers, Rand Rifles, and Mine Guards. And a month later: The mines at Johannesburg are now starting work, and we shall soon be turning out a certain amount of gold. I expect this will have a depressing effect on the Boers. Moreover, a nominated Town Council had now taken over the municipal business of Johannesburg, while in both the new Colonies civil departments were organised, and military officials were by degrees giving place to civilians. Sir Alfred Milner, after four years’ continuous strain, felt that the framework of reconstruction was sufficiently strong to permit of his going on leave, and wrote to Kitchener: H.M.’s Government is willing I should clear for three months at an early date, but rather puzzled how to provide for my work in my absence. The simplest thing is to let matters take their course under the existing Commission. By the terms of my commission as H.C. in case of my absence all my powers pass if no special provision is made to the sen- ior Military Officer in South Africa, and these powers include at present the Administratorship of the two new Colonies. Therefore if nothing is done you would, on my leaving, wpso facto, succeed to all my powers while I was away. H.M.’s Government would, I know, be agreeable to this, if you were, and I ne demande pas mieux. The only difficulty is that the mass of work is enormous, and you have your hands more than full already. The only way in which you could live would be to tell all the principal men under you to earry on XLV ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER 29 as quietly as possible, shelve all questions which required long consideration, and only come to you in matters of quite first-rate importance and requiring immediate decision. In that case you might get on without demands on your time which, with your existing heavy responsibilities, you could not possibly submit to. But I would not suggest even this if you objected. (9.4.01.) Kitchener was quite willing to ‘‘double’’ for a while the duties of Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner, and a little later on told Brodrick, ‘‘Milner’s work, as left for me, is not excessive. I can manage it all right, and I think his affairs are going on smoothly. He has a very good legal ad- viser in Solomon. I am of course sending all civil matters to Mr. Chamberlain.’’ The arrival of the South African winter gave rise at home to a sanguine expectation that its hardships for man and beast on the veldt would effectually damp the Boers’ ardour, and might effectively dam- age their cause. Animated by this bright idea, the Government suggested a reduction of the troops in the field, and this just when it might have seemed desirable to strengthen the Commander-in-Chief’s hands for pressing his own rigours with those of the season. Kitchener did not immediately turn down the pro- posal. On July 5 he wrote to Brodrick: Considering the enormous expenditure going on, Lord Roberts’s telegram on the subject of reduction of the forces in South Africa was not a surprise. I have been for some time fortifying the railway lines with blockhouses, so as to reduce the numbers employed in defending the lines, which duty takes up by far the greater number of the troops in South Africa, and I am glad to say these works are now so 30 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. far forward that, to my mind (though in this some of my generals do not willingly agree), a reduction of the forces can be safely carried out. . . . Out of the 140,000 men pro- posed by Lord Roberts, I think I may calculate on having 100,000 Infantry and Mounted troops, leaving 40,000 for Artillery, Engineers, Departmental Corps, and sick. But a fortnight later he plainly intimated that, whereas any reduction of his forces must depend entirely on Cape Colony being clear and quiet, a doleful letter just received pictured its present condi- tion as confused and turbulent: According to the intelligence and other reports which have been communicated to me [wrote the Governor] more than five-sixths of that portion of Cape Colony which is south of the Orange River is now more or less harassed by the guerilla operations of the enemy. We hold the towns and most of the villages and the railways; but, except within a strip varying from about 50 to 100 miles along the coast, travel- ling without an escort is unsafe. Even the railways are oc- casionally broken and trains derailed. . . . Murraysburg is altogether unguarded, and has lately been made use of by the Boers as a kind of base. To-day news comes that the Boers have burnt down the public buildings and the houses of the loyalists there. . Speaking generally, the state of affairs is considerably worse than it was when I arrived in the Colony four months ago, and it is now more than six months since this second in- vasion of the Colony commenced. . . . There seems no doubt that something like 50 per cent of the white inhabitants of Cape Colony are more or less in sympathy with the Boers. . . . I venture to press very earnestly on your Lordship the desirability of making a determined effort to clear the Colony of the guerilla bands as soon as possible. Kitchener replied that the Government of Cape Colony might in several ways do more to cope with XLY STATE OF CAPE COLONY 31 the situation: (1) by rendering assistance in collect- ing horses; (2) by extending martial law—as the General Officer Commanding had, so far in vain, requested; (3) by insisting on more energetic action on the part of the local authorities throughout the Colony; (4) by taking better precautions against the leakage to the enemy of arms and ammunition now in the hands of local defence forces. Evidently the condition expressly laid down as an essential preliminary to any reduction in the strength of his Army was at present far from fulfil- ment. At the end of July Kitchener stated that in the present temper of Cape Colony he could not see his way to meet the wishes of the Government; and on September 8 he wrote bluntly: ‘‘I enclose corre- spondence about martial law in Cape Ports, which shows the attitude taken up by the Cape Govern- ment. It is nothing less than one of actual hostility to His Majesty’s forces, and the same is going on throughout the Colony.”’ The difficulties of the whole situation, exacerbated as they were by the internal condition of the Colony, seemed for a moment to have had effect even on Kitchener’s iron nerves. For once, a confession of the weakness of the flesh was wrung from him. ‘‘I am not well,’’ he wrote to a friend, ‘‘and feel terribly disheartened.’’ But his physical resilience quickly asserted itself. ‘‘I was very seedy last mail,’’ he wrote to the same correspondent, ‘‘but I am all right again, and feel there is still hope of ending this miserable business before very long.’’ CHAPTER XLVI Tue Boers, on their side, had not been without their share of trouble. A council of war, held early in May near Ermelo, was attended by the members of the late Transvaal Government, together with Botha, J. C. Smuts, Ben Viljoen, and Chris Botha. It was but dismal fare which they met to discuss. Viljoen with his account of the devastation in the north-east, and Smuts with his story of the defeats of Wild- fontein and Goldwoorintzicht, did little to cheer up a gloomy gathering. Even the imperturbable Botha was a little worried by the prospect of the high veldt, where he had so long disported himself, being over- run by British columns. The growing record of surrenders, the failing sup- ply of ammunition, the improbability of foreign in- terference, the already waning authority of the lead- ers, had a depressing effect on the meeting. With- out consulting the Free Staters, the Council resolved that Kitchener should be asked to let the Trans- vaalers send a representative to Europe to confer with Kruger as to the prosecution of the war; Presi- dent Steyn was to be informed of this decision, and in the event of Kitchener’s refusal, an armistice was to be asked for so that the Governments of the two Republics might take counsel as to their future course. 32 CHAP. XLVI BOER DEPRESSION 33 A letter was accordingly sent to Steyn, broadly hinting that the time for further resistance had passed; to this he dashed off a furious reply de- nouncing both the application to Kitchener and the bare idea of an armistice. Steyn, however, could only speak for himself, and a general council of war —very difficult to convene—would be required to register anything like a binding decision. By this time the winter campaign had opened and Kitchener, on May 9, 1901, could write to Brodrick: Last month we took 2000 Boers out of the field, a good many rifles, and over half a million rounds of ammunition. Clearing up the north has done a great deal of good and, as far as I can make out, the enemy have no plans. There is a large and, I hope, growing party amongst them who think the terms offered should have been accepted, and that their leaders are betraying the people, possibly for personal rea- sons. The number of surrenders has greatly increased in the Transvaal, which does not look as if the burgher camps were so very bad. Things are not quite so satisfactory in the Orange River Colony. De Wet, Brand, and Hertzog seem to be able to keep up the irreconcilable feeling and suppress all moderate counsels. Steyn’s influence seems to have decreased. I cannot make out what they intend to do beyond keeping up a hostile attitude, and taking advantage of any slips we may make. ... I started the mines working at Johannesburg last Satur- day, and I hope this will have a depressing effect on the Boer enthusiasts. Our being able to do it shows that the country is getting slowly settled. Attacks on railway lines have greatly decreased owing to our improved blockhouses, and the lines are now gradually forming barriers through the country which hostile forces cannot cross; this breaks them up into areas which we will gradually clear. Having cleared the Roos-Senekal district a good many columns will now be avail- VOL. II D 34 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. able to clear the country east of Carolina, which has not been touched and is a Boer stronghold. Vigorous operations are also going against De la Rey in the west, and an expedition has started for Louis Trichardt in the north. In the Orange River Colony Elliot is sweeping the country along the Vaal, moving east until he reaches the Natal fron- tier. Rundle is in Fouriesburg and operating from there. C. Knox will in a day or two move west of the line on Botha- ville, and Bruce Hamilton is clearing up the southern por- tion along the Orange River. In the Colony small bands are being cleared up everywhere, and the Colonial Defence Force is now taking a greater part and is useful... . I have had no further communication with Botha. I send you some letters caught on the enemy’s despatch riders. You will see the absurd lies spread by the leaders to keep their men in the field. It seems impossible to believe the credulity of the Boers. A large party were coming in yes- terday to surrender, when they were told from Johannes- burg that war had broken out between Russia and England, and so they all went back. On the same date he confides to Roberts his fear that a lost opportunity may mean a long bill: I wish I could tell you when the end of the war would come. . . . I much dread its degenerating into uncontrolla- ble brigandage, which might take a very long time to sup- press, and cause incalculable damage to the country and enormous expense. Hence my desire for terms with Botha, who could control the enemy’s force. However, that is probably all over now, and how it will end I cannot see. That they are being visibly weakened there is no doubt, but the end is khadu jaunta [‘‘very uncertain’’]. The prospect for the ensuing months presented little that was roseate to either side. The saner and more moderate Boers could no longer hug themselves with hopes of ultimate success. The British troops XLVI VLAKFONTEIN 30 had no doubt on this point, but saw nothing as yet to indicate finality, and were well aware that ‘‘hide- and-seek’’ played in the winter is bound to be a grim war game. . In addition to the columns quoted by Kitchener, Haig was operating in Cape Colony, and Colonel Harold Grenfell and Colenbrander were in the north of the Transvaal; while Plumer and Bindon Blood, after a breather in the north-east, were on the move in the south-east against Botha and Viljoen. Methuen, having toiled hard and caught little in Western Transvaal, had retired with Rawlinson to the Kimberley-Mafeking railway; Babington and Ingouville-Williams had repaired to Klerksdorp; Dixon‘ had gone to his camp at Naauwpoort, south of the Magaliesberg. The redoubtable De la Rey was thought to have stowed himself away in the south near Wolmaranstadt, and Methuen was de- tailed to look him up. Dixon, all unaware that his was the path in which the real danger lurked, left his camp on May 26, proposing to clear farms and search for hidden guns and ammunition? among the hills west of Naauwpoort. On May 29, near Vlakfontein, his rearguard was attacked and broken up by Kemp under cover of a veldt fire. Dixon at once retorted, and at some cost retrieved the position, but was forced by sheer weakness to retire to his base. Every available man was rushed up to the rescue, but only to find that the Boers had performed the usual vanishing trick. 1 Major-General James Babington; Major-General Edward Ingouville- Williams; Col. Sir Henry Dixon. 2The Boers sometimes over-reached themselves in burying ammunition. On one occasion they confided the job to two men, so that the place should be kept secret; but these trusted agents being killed directly after, the secret died with them. 36 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. Kitchener, remembering the disabilities of untried troops, was content to say, ‘‘As far as I can see, our troops behaved well and no blame attaches to any one. I am afraid some of the new Yeomanry were somewhat wild, but that must be expected at first.’’ Early in June the Free Staters held a conclave, De la Rey, De Wet, and Steyn conferring at Reitz as to the Transvaalers’ proposal of overtures for peace. Steyn was particularly anxious to be backed by De la Rey in negativing the proposal, and it was ar- ranged that the trio should go north and meet Botha at Ermelo. Kitchener could only report in very qualified terms an improvement in the outlook: There is no doubt the Boers are thoroughly tired of fight- ing, but are still kept at it by their officers, in hopes that something will turn up. We have heard the same story so often that it has to be taken with misgiving; still everything seems to point to an end coming before very long. De Wet’s influence is the doubtful point; he is greatly against giving in, and is now trying to join Botha. De la Rey is also going to join Botha; his influence, although better than De Wet’s, would not be for general surrender. I therefore fear that De Wet and De la Rey combined will induce Botha to go on through the winter. (Kitchener to Roberts, 7.6.01.) Unfortunately, events conspired to hearten the Boers. Vlakfontein, which they magnified into a signal success, had for its sequel on June 12 Muller’s attack at Wilmansrust on the Victorian Mounted Rifles. The Colonial horsemen failed alike in vigi- lance and discipline, and Muller was able to rush their camp at dusk. The Regular officers in vain attempted to rally their men, and the Boers, though inferior in numbers, trekked defiantly off with their XLVI ANOTHER YEAR OF WAR 37 prize of pom-poms, rifles, ammunition, and stores. This untoward incident, in itself petty enough, was highly inopportune and had an effect wholly dispro- portionate to its military importance. A week later the two Boer Governments held their long-deferred meeting on June 20, at Waterval, near Standerton. Their reply to the main question—to fight or not to fight—was now hardly in doubt. Steyn and De Wet plumped for war; Kruger! had cabled a vehement exhortation ‘to hold out; and any inclination which the other leaders might have had toward a settlement was dispelled by the success snatched at Wilmansrust. They knew well enough that they were hopelessly outnumbered and must surely be out-manceuvred; but this last ‘‘scrap’’ had enhanced their reliance on their almost uncanny mo- bility, and encouraged the hope that they might either wear down their opponents or that foreign in- tervention would somehow and from somewhere be forthcoming. Both surmises were doomed to disap- pointment, but they sufficed to beguile desperate men into a desperate decision, which was to entail another twelve months’ devastation of their own land, with, as a set-off, an increase of a hundred millions sterling to the British National Debt. 1 Kitchener had granted special permission for Kruger to be consulted by telegraph. CHAPTER XLVII THE condition of Cape Colony at the moment acted on the Transvaal leaders as an exhilarating, but un- sustaining, stimulant. To the brilliant young Cam- bridge graduate, J. C. Smuts,! late Attorney-General at Pretoria, was allotted the task of cultivating and spreading the germ of disaffection in the Colony, where operations promised well, inasmuch as the land had not been molested and the inhabitants were largely, if latently, in sympathy with the Boers. Smuts repaired with De la Rey to the Western Transvaal to mature plans, while Viljoen and Muller betook themselves to the Middelburg district. In a manifesto just then published, Kruger ex- pressed the comfortable belief that all would be well in the end, adding a complacent assurance that proper division should be made for the women and children in the Concentration Camps, and for the prisoners of war. Asa corollary, a stubborn decla- ration, inspired by the venerable refugee in Holland, was signed by Steyn and Schalk Burger: No peace will be made, and no peace conditions accepted, by which our independence and national existence, or the 1 Smuts’s maiden effort had been to immolate a British detachment at Modderfontein Nek in January, and a few weeks later in a brush with Cunningham at Krugersdorp he had startled and worsted the British General. 38 cnar.xtvn FREE STATERS OBSTINATE 39 interests of our Colonial brothers, shall be the price paid; ~ and the war will be vigorously prosecuted by taking all measures necessary for the maintenance of our independence and interests. Kitchener’s lingering hopes of an early peace were sadly dashed, but Brodrick tactfully wrote to him: I would only beg you to understand that the telegraphing to and fro does not indicate the slightest want of confidence of the Government in your administration and conduct of the very difficult task you have resting upon you. We are prepared to back you to the full, and shall believe in your efforts, however long drawn out the war may be; and the public here have complete confidence in you. (13.7.01.) Steyn, at this juncture, had to reconstitute his Government, for on his return with his colleagues to the Free State they fell across Elliot,! whose sub- ordinate, Broadwood, dropped on the confederates at Reitz, and took the whole party prisoners except Steyn, the President making a somewhat undignified exit as he galloped off in his night-shirt. Broadwood had secured, besides the persons of the notables, some valuable information, and the letters found in Steyn’s baggage showed afresh that to the obstinacy of the Free Staters was chargeable the continuance of hostilities. Among the papers seized was a letter written by Smuts to Steyn stating that, if they had to give up now, it would be with the intention of fighting again when England might be in difficulties. But just as the Sikhs, whom we fought and whose territory we annexed in 1849, were amongst our staunchest supporters in arms in the Indian Mutiny in 1857, so the Transvaal patriots were a dozen years 1 Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Locke Elliot, 40 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cHaP. later to be our doughty comrades in the war which convulsed the world. For his audacious adventure into the Colony Smuts was endued with the heart of a dare-devil sol- dier and the head of a shrewd lawyer. Asa start, he had to collect an adequate force under the very nose of several British columns, and then to thread his way through the whole length of the Orange River Colony, evading the attentions of four British Com- manders. What he contrived to do would fill a spicy chapter in any story of guerilla warfare. By the middle of July he had assembled 340 reso- lute spirits divided into four parties—under Van der Venter, Kirster, Bouwer, and Dreyer—whose ren- dezvous was fixed at a spot on the Vet River, near Hoopstadt. Kitchener ordered two columns to make for the Hoopstadt district, while three others converged on different points of the Vaal. Elliot was moving on the Modder River, by way of Vrede- fort and Klerksdorp, to join hands with Bruce Ham- ilton; and Smuts, wriggling round to Elliot’s rear, just saved his neck from the noose set for him by the drive which was to clear South-Western Trans- vaal and the Orange River Colony. But some nasty surprises awaited him. Besides seven columns . rapidly approaching him from the north, another bevy seemed to bar his road in every direction. Smuts was in fact up against a drive which was to eclipse its predecessor, and for which Kitchener had impressed most of the columns in the Transvaal and the Orange Colony. Much as in the Indian kheddahs elephants are driven up rapidly narrowing jungle lanes and com- pelled into a stockade, Kitchener’s far-stretching xiv J. C. SMUTS 41 columns were set to sweep in all the outlying Boer commandos, and chase them right up to the north- western portion of the Orange Colony, bounded by the Vaal River on the north, the Modder on the south, and the two main railways with their forbidding line of blockhouses on the east and west. Here was, so fo speak, the stockade into which the quarry was to be rushed and then demolished by the inner circle of columns. The final impetus was to be given from the north. In the south, besides the Modder River, a barrier was presented by the line of posts manned by the South African Constabulary, which ran from Bloemfontein to Petrusberg, and thence on to Jacobsdal. In the second week of July Bruce Hamilton had moved his force to the west of the line, and stationed half of them under Rochfort,’ Williams, and Byng behind the Constabulary cordon, with their flanks on the Wegdraai Drift of the Riet River to Emmaus. This line was prolonged eastward to the railway by Knox, who lined the Fauresmith—EHEdenburg road. The rest of Hamilton’s men guarded the Orange River from Norval’s Point to Ramah, thus forming a third line of beaters. Elliot meanwhile was sweep- ing on from the east, and, coasting along the Vaal, reached Klerksdorp, just north of the culminating point of the drive. Towards the end of July the troops which had been on Smuts’s immediate track were poised for a fresh swoop. Elhot now commanded the seven columns which were to form the main line of beaters, and be- hind this a column under Garratt? was detailed to 12 Majer-General Sir A. Hochfort. 2 Brigadier-General Frameis Garrait. 42 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. worry any of the enemy who might break back. In addition to these, ‘‘stops’’ were provided on both flanks, and Plumer, summoned from a distant part of the Transvaal, was posted at the south-western angle of the Boer fastness. In the middle of July Plumer was on the Delagoa railway, far from the scene of operations, but Kitchener rushed him south by rail, refitted him at Bloemfontein on July 18, and landed him on the 30th at Modder River Station. The moves of the various columns were co- ordinated from the Commander-in-Chief’s office, like those of trains in a time-table. The beaters were now ready, the ‘‘stops’’ were posted, and—in sports- man’s parlance—everything turned on what game would be brought up to the guns. It was known that a number of local commandos were inside the cordon, and that there were many hitherto untouched laagers and farms, as well as countless hordes of cattle and sheep. On July 29 the drive proper commenced, Elliot’s columns moving southwards in parallel lines, the others falling in and conforming to the movement as the line reached them. On August 10 Elliot reached the Modder River and the drive was over. The bag as regards men was meagre; only seventeen Boers were killed or wounded, and the 259 prisoners were generally of a poor type. In the south Bruce Hamil- ton, Knox, and the Constabulary had taken during the month about 300 prisoners, and had given to the country between the Modder and Orange Rivers the complexion of a wilderness. Many wagons, 186,000 sheep, and 21,000 cattle had been seized; but the principal quarry still roamed at large, as Hlliot’s lines had been perforated at night. XLII ELLIOT’S DRIVE 43 The leaders of the local commandos had been able to choose between eluding their pursuers and engag- ing them: Smuts had his own offensive to carry out, and had enjoyed the personal experience of being ringed in by 15,000 British troops, and headed off by lines of railway blockhouses manned by a formidable force of Constabulary. On August 3, having slipped behind the British line, he sent Van der Venter with a part of his force to the Cape Colony border, where his heutenant pierced the Bloemfontein—Thaba ’Nchu line of Constabulary. Smuts himself, hang- ing on Elliot’s rear, crossed the Modder and went through the Constabulary posts—only to find a clus- ter of little columns around him. He tiptoed south to Springfontein, but then had to turn about and sprint seventy miles towards Bloemfontein. Then he made another dash southwards and worked his way over the railroad. At Reddersburg he lost a handful of prisoners to Rawlinson; he was then bit- ten at by Major Damant, but on August 27 he man- aged, with his jaded residue of 250 men, to join Van der Venter at Zastron. Here he also met Kritzinger —fresh from his fifteen weeks’ incursion into Cape Colony and exulting over his successful evasion of the constant and pressing attentions of French. The presence of the three fiery spirits so near the Cape Colony frontier was not to be tolerated: to eatch them at all costs was the order of the day. Plumer, Rawlinson, Thorneycroft, and Pilcher * were hurried up; the Orange River from Bethulie to the Basuto border was held by Fitzroy Hart *; and a new line of blockhouses between Bethulie and the Her- 1 Major-General A. Thorneycroft; Major-General T. Pilcher. 2 Major-General Sir Fitzroy Hart. 44 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. schel border was occupied by the Highland Light In- fantry, with a reserve of Connaught Rangers at Lemoenfontein. To all appearances Smuts and Kritzinger were once more engirdled. Kitchener wrote to Brodrick: We are now doing all we can to prevent Kritzinger and Malan and a party of Transvaalers under Smuts, the late Attorney-General, from getting back into Cape Colony. Our blockhouse lines are almost complete, and I have moved down a considerable number of troops to guard the frontier. I hope we shall frustrate them and drive them north again. The area between the Orange River and the Ladybrand— Modder River line has been so thoroughly cleared of sup- plies that I doubt the enemy’s being able to exist there for. any length of time. (23.8.01.) The position of the Boer leaders seemed sufficiently parlous; but this kind of crisis had by now become second nature to them, and they carried on in happy ignorance, and complete defiance, of all recognised military tactics. Kritzinger and Brand joined hands for a time and then separated. While the former snapped up some of Hart’s force near the Orange River, the latter near Saunalisport accounted for a party of Mounted Infantry with a couple of guns. Smuts, with French thundering at his heels, started southwards, and on September 17 actually ambushed and got the better of a detachment of Regular Cav- alry. Kitchener telegraphed: The squadron 17th Lancers in Cape Colony, severely mauled by Smuts’s commando, fought well. The Boers were surrounded and determined to get through at all costs, which they did with severe loss. The only mistake avr THE SEVENTEENTH LANCERS 45 was that the Boers, being dressed in khaki, were allowed to get to close quarters before they were fired on. Smuts then turned aside to join Schupers, who had been active for some time in the south-western dis- tricts near the sea. Finding, however, that Schupers had just been ‘‘scuppered,’’ he boldly proceeded to invade the Ceres district—less than a hundred miles from Cape Town—where he arrived at the beginning of November. Since June he had trekked 1100 miles, kept clear of the far-flung net, and ridden the coun- try from the Transvaal to the far end of the Colony. CHAPTER XLVIII On August 7 was issued a not very succulent proc- lamation penned in London. Opening with a legal preamble descriptive of the situation, it assured the Boers that their numbers were insignificant, their guns and munitions all but exhausted, and their pros- pects hopeless. In minatory terms their uncondi- tional surrender was demanded before September 15, the penalty for non-compliance being—for Govern- ment officials, commandants, field cornets, and lead- ers—perpetual banishment; while recalcitrant bur- ghers were warned that the cost of maintaining their families in the Concentration Camps was to be recov- erable by a levy on their property, real or personal. The Downing Street composition read much like a lawyer’s writ,! and was about as popular. Botha, Steyn, and De Wet replied with curled lip; the bur- ghers generally treated it with contemptuous silence. Kitchener, while willing to give the civilian pre- scription for ending the war every chance, was put- ting into effect a more practical plan. Hitherto the blockhouses had been confined to the railway. But the beginning of the end may perhaps be traced to their more extensive and more vigorous use. The blockhouses were now to stretch themselves relent- 1 Kitchener wished that there were ‘‘not so many preliminary ‘paras’ beginning ‘whereas,’ which only puzzle the Boers.” ‘If,’ he said, “they can argue over any one of them, they do so, and think they can upset the proclamation in consequence’”’ (Kitchener to Brodrick, 2.8.01). 46 cx.xitvr BLOCKHOUSES EXTENDED 47 lessly across the country and to create fenced areas within which the Boers could be accounted for in detail. The blockhouse lines, following those of the roads, would themselves be immune from danger, and would handsomely contribute fresh means of communication and facilities for dealing powerful offensive strokes. It was also recognised that the posts had attempted to combine dual functions; they had been useful for active clearing work and for pro- tecting lines of communication, but, when called upon, offered a very flabby barrier. It was decided that the posts should be limited to their proper sphere; the Constabulary were to be employed in manning interior sets of posts within areas enclosed by blockhouses; the duty of sweeping clean enclosed areas was to devolve on really mobile columns. These preparations were not allowed to slacken work in the field. Elliot’s drive in August and September through the eastern part of the Orange River Colony effected little. Kritzinger could not be lured out of his retreat between the Orange and Caledon Rivers, and De Wet was still on the war- path. In Eastern Transvaal the Boers were quies- cent, but in Western Transvaal De la Rey and Kemp were brisk as ever. The latter, after nonplussing several endeavours to encircle him in the Zwart- ruggens, gave a hand to his friend in attacking Methuen near the Marico River on September 5, but Methuen’s spirit had fired his Yeomanry, who put up a capital and wholly successful fight. No serious attempt had yet been made to deal with Botha in the Ermelo district. Early in Sep- tember the Boer General made a dash for Piet Retief with a commando a thousand strong. 48 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. Lyttelton, who directed the pursuit against him, was badly misinformed as to his real objective, which was Dundee, about forty miles due north of Ladysmith. On September 17 a mounted column under Gough, which had been sent out from Dundee to escort an incoming convoy, stumbled on Botha at Blood River Poort. Seeing a number-of horses turned out to graze, Gough congratulated himself on the rare chance of surprising dismounted Boers. But he reckoned without Botha’s main body, which galloped up and rolled over the British line from right to left in ten minutes. Six officers and 38 men of the Mounted Infantry were killed or wounded, and 6 officers and 235 men taken prisoners. After searching inquiry, the Commander-in-Chief exoner- ated Gough: ‘‘Gough’s affair might happen to any one. He fell into a carefully-prepared trap in very difficult ground. The bait was 200 men of the enemy off-saddled, and the whole force of the enemy carefully concealed’’ (Kitchener to Brodrick, 20.9.01). But the Blood River Poort surprise was taken very seriously. Troops were bustled up from every quarter, and a force of 16,000 British with 40 guns was pitted against a raiding commando of 2000 men. Botha must anyhow be headed back and every door shut against him, especially that by which he had entered the southern corner of the Transvaal. Curiously enough, the Boer General, who might well have been flushed by his success, failed to play it up, and as he was hesitating the Buffalo River rose in flood in front of him, and denied him Dundee. He then made up his mind to enter Natal through 1 Colonel Hubert Gough. XLVI BOTHA’S CAMPAIGN 49 Zululand at a point just below the confluence of the Tugela and Buffalo Rivers, and on September 24 arrived at Babanago Mountain, close to the Zulu frontier, with 2000 men. Before him lay the Itala Mountain, at the base of which stood a fortified British post, and ten miles to the west a smaller post at Prospect. Botha determined to rush both these posts. He had begun to realise that his dash on Natal had no chance of success, and that if he hung about there too long he would certainly be caught. He understood that the posts were weakly held, and thought by bringing off a cheap coup to create a diversion which would cover his retreat. Emmett and Grobler were told off to take Pros- pect, and Chris Botha was thrown against Itala, where Major Chapman against heavy odds put up a fine fight that lasted for 23 hours. Both sides lost heavily, but the Boers were the first beaten, and Chapman took his battered but undaunted little force to Nkandhle. At Prospect, the position being entirely tenable, the assailants received much and inflicted little punishment. The two assaults having failed, Botha renounced all further idea of a campaign on the Tugela, sent off a rather stiff letter to the Transvaal Government, and turned his mind, and his men, to retreat. Lyttelton was not made aware of this till four days later, and Bruce Hamilton, after a fine march of 48 miles in 23 hours, reached Itala on the 28th, to find he had been trudging along parallel to Botha, but in the opposite direction. Walter Kitchener was ordered by his brother to block Botha’s retreat in the north by occupying the VOL. II 50 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. passes in the Pondwana Mountains. Bruce Hamil- ton was to move up from the south towards Walter Kitchener, and Clements was directed to operate from the west. But Botha secured a start of three days, and with the British columns ponderously plodding on in step with their ox-transport, Hamil- ton could only on October 5 reach the Inklayatic Mountain, Botha having fetched up in the neighbour- hood six days earlier. Unable to force the pass at Vaalkranz Nek, he shed his transport and sat astride the road to Pivaen Bridge, where Walter Kitchener found him. He then fought a clever rearguard ac- tion, forded the Pivaen, and, dismissing his local ad- herents, passed with the relict of his commando through Piet Retief, the gate by which he had orig- inally entered. The story of the pursuit of Botha is that of the hare and the tortoise, with the difference that the hare won the race. Kitchener was sorely disappointed, but, loyal to a subordinate who had honestly, if heavily, done his best, he wrote home on October 18: Botha has escaped from Natal by passing through Swazi- land. I am sorry we were not able to stop him, but I think he has lost considerably both in prestige as a leader, and materially in the numbers of wounded and loss of transport. Lyttelton did all he could, I think, but bad weather made the movement of troops very slow, and enabled the Boers to get away by abandoning their transport. (Kitchener to Brodrick. ) Botha had enjoined Viljoen to carry on in his absence, but the deputy was cowed by the assiduous attentions of Benson,’ whose raids on the high veldt had provoked terror and resentment. Moreover, 1 Colonel Benson, R.A. XLVI DEATH OF BENSON dl the steady contraction of Kitchener’s great ring- fence had sensibly diminished Botha’s practicable area of operations. The return of the Boer General put new life into the commandos, and a ery of wrath went up from his stalwarts, the men of Ermelo and Carolina, who found that during their absence their homes had been ruined or raided. Their hot desire for revenge was voiced in a fierce demand for re- prisals on Benson. The latter had found it necessary to return to the Delagoa Bay railway to refit, and set out on October 30. The weather was bad, and Grobler continually pressed the rearguard, which in the afternoon was halted on Gun Hill with two field-guns. Grobler with his main force overwhelmed the infantry detachment between the hill and an adjacent ridge on which Botha was perched, silenced the guns, charged Gun Hill, and in half-an-hour the troops on the hill were cut to pieces, the officers all billed or wounded, and Benson himself mortally hurt. The British main body, encamped a short distance off, was itself awkwardly attacked, and could offer little help. The Boers failed, as usual, to follow up their success, and Colonel Wools-Sampson,' who took over Benson’s command, was able to form an inner circle of entrenchments and maintain himself until relieved on November 1. Benson’s death was a genuine grief to Kitchener: I am very much upset at this most sad affair of Benson’s column. I have just heard that he has died of his wounds. What can be done to prevent this sort of occurrence? I have not got full details yet, but it is the usual thing. The Boers observe the movements of a column from a long 1 Colonel Sir Aubrey Wools-Sampson. 52 “LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. way off, only showing a very few men; then having chosen some advantage—in this case it was the weather—they charge in with great boldness, and the result is a serious cas- ualty list. Benson’s was one of my best columns, and had a most excellent and efficient intelligence run by - Wools- Sampson. He knew every inch of the ground, having been constantly in that part of the country, and my last telegram from him on the 29th was to the effect that the country was clear, and that he thought the time had come to move the line of posts forward from the Wilge River. This is only to show you how difficult it is to prevent these occurrences. I have tried all I can to keep columns safe, and yet vigorously to push the war; but some risks must be run, and if a column like Benson’s, operating 20 miles outside our lines, is not fairly safe, it is a very serious mat- ter, and will require a large addition to our forces to carry on the war. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 1.11.01.) Just at this time a proposal was rather gingerly made by Roberts, who asked Kitchener whether a Chief of the Staff in the person of Sir Jan Hamilton would be welcome. The offer was accepted with un- expected alacrity: Nov. 5, 1901.—I am extremely grateful; there is nothing I should like better. He is just the man I want. Hamilton will be a great help to me. You will no doubt let him bring me your latest views; but is there anything you could tele- graph that you think I could do to bring the war to a more rapid conclusion? Sometimes those at a distance can see things that those on the spot miss. I can make fairly steady progress, and I try continually for something more; but I can never make a certainty of the latter, the Boers being always able to evade us, as in the recent Natal operations. The Blockhouse system does a great deal, but it takes up a large number of infantry. I should like to extend the line considerably ; also to deal effectually with the most difficult | XLVI A CHIEF OF THE STAFF 53 question, how to make troops more mobile. I have tried pack-saddles and have to an extent succeeded; but it is not enough to catch the Boers, who go with nothing, and trust to pick up a few mealies in a native hut. The revival of Boer activity in the South African spring of 1901 was extended to Western Transvaal, where, for the moment, Kitchener could only spare Kekewich to face Kemp and De la Rey. Kekewich on September 13 left Naauwpoort for the Magalies- berg, and with 800 infantry, 560 mounted men, 3 guns and a pom-pom moved into the Zwartruggens, a rugged forest district peculiarly suited to Boer tac- tics. On the 29th he bivouacked at Moedwil, on the Selous River, and before reveillé next dav De la Rey’s men, 1000 strong, having rushed the picket, went straight for the camp. But they met more than their match in quality, and half-an-hour sufficed to send them to the right-about. Kekewich was badly wounded and lost a quarter of his fighting strength; he, however, quickly patched himself up, and a fort- night later was on the track of De la Rey, but a proposed attack concerted with Methuen—who had just driven De la Rey back from Kleinfontein— missed fire. There was beginning to be an uncomfortable con- viction that the end of 1901 would find the Boer chieftains still unaccounted for. Botha was just outside the protected area in the Hastern Transvaal, De Wet in the north-east of the Orange River Colony, and De la Rey in his favourite quarters, the Zwartruggens. Against De Wet, who had been located near Reitz, Kitchener now directed a drive of fourteen columns; on their arrival at that dreary place on November 54 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 12 the troops were perhaps more vexed than sur- prised to find the bird had flown, though it was chir- ruping only twenty miles away. Steyn and De Wet just then indignantly turned down Botha’s new suggestion that the British Gen- eral should be approached on the subject of peace. Both leaders scouted the bare idea, and by the end of November De Wet had scraped together at Blijds- chap 1000 burghers who, after giving the go-by to three of Elliot’s columns, tucked themselves in the folds of the hills beyond Bethlehem. Kitchener was not to have a happy Christmas. A British force of less than 1000 men between Harrismith and Bethlehem, covering the construc- tion of the blockhouse line to Kroonstad, was split up into three detachments, too far apart to afford each other effective support. One of these, consisting entirely of Yeomanry, was on Groen Kop, three miles from Rundle’s Headquarters. De Wet chose Christmas Eve, a moonlight but cloudy night, to at- tack them, and by two o’clock next morning had placed himself at the foot of the precipitous side of the Kop. Not until the heads of the storming party actually appeared above the crest was the alarm given. Within an hour the struggle was over, the camp cut up, and De Wet was on his way to the hills with prisoners, guns, and wagons. Kitchener tele- graphed on December 26: Before the men in camp could get clear of their tents the Boers rushed through, shooting them down as they came out. The officers were shot trying to stem the tide. . . . There was no panic and all did their best; but the Boers were too strong and, once the pickets were overwhelmed, they had all the advantage. Including dead and wounded, about half XLVI GROEN KOP 9) the column are now at Eland’s River bridge; the remainder are prisoners. The disaster was the more disturbing as a few days earlier Damant’s force had met with misfor- tune, his advance guard having been outwitted and overborne by a number of Boers dressed in British uniforms. Kitchener was well aware that these episodes would loom large in the public eye at home, and that —without any striking British success—the gradual grinding down of the enemy was liable to be overlooked. ‘‘Oh, for a little luck! but I never get any,’’ he confided to Brodrick. ‘‘It is no longer real war out here, but police operations of considerable magnitude to catch various bands of men who resist and do all they can to avoid arrest. The Boers cordially dislike the blockhouse lines.’’ To Roberts he wrote: Who would have thought, when you left Johannesburg, that I should be a year in command with the war still going? History repeats itself, and to bring a people under evidently must take time and patience; they evidently are not gov- erned by any common sense, and simply continue a hopeless struggle until they are individually caught. It is through a mistaken idea of patriotism, which results in the ruin of their country. The only good thing about it is that it makes the future more secure. There is no doubt a large number of the Boers have the feeling, ‘‘Perish everything, rather than I should be called a traitor!’’ Many are disgusted at being deceived by their leaders, and fully know that there is only one end possible to the war; and yet they go on, for fear of being branded hereafter as ‘‘hands-uppers.”’ CHAPTER XLIX Mranwute the successes scored by Botha had de- manded instant counter-action. On November 16 Bruce Hamilton started a sweeping movement with 15,000 men in twelve columns to drive the com- mandos against the Swaziland border. His imme- diate aim was to tackle Botha on the high veldt. The Constabulary lines had been pushed forward fifteen miles to a line between Brugspruit and Waterval. With columns supporting his flanks, based on the Delagoa and Natal railways, Hamilton advanced towards Ermelo. Botha, however, knew to a nicety the movements of his adversary, and having disposed the Transvaal Government in a place of safety, doubled back arm- in-arm with Piet Viljoen to Oshoek, twenty miles west of Ermelo. Hamilton then set himself to se- cure Botha’s laager by one of the new-fashioned and very fruitful night raids. The modus operandi was that a party of native scouts were sent out to collect information. Three picked men would visit the Kaffir kraals and learn the latest news. Then the place to attack would be carefully selected. As a rule, the force employed numbered from 1500 to 2000 men, usually without transport, with a couple of guns and ambulance, and with mounted Kaffirs scout- ing on either flank. Distances up to forty miles were 56 cur.xux FORETELLING THE END 57 thus often covered; the desired point was to be reached before dawn. The troops were then rapidly deployed on an extended front, and with the first streak of day rushed the laager. Taken by surprise, and unable to get at their horses, the Boers usually put up their hands, and the affair was quickly over. These successful nocturnal raids were much enjoyed by the British and much resented by the Boers, who never felt sure of a night’s rest. While Benson in this part of the country was undermanned and without a proper base, Hamilton had the call of fresh troops; and the blockhouse line | which now connected Ermelo with Standerton and the Natal railway served him well. He took a large handful of prisoners and a quantity of material, but Botha himself got away and, pushing past Pulteney * and Plumer, crossed the upper Vaal. Hamilton had no better luck with Viljoen, whom he twice raided; some 200 Boers were accounted for, but Viljoen him- self escaped each time and was able to post a trouble- some body of 300 men inside the protected area. On December 13 Kitchener, committing himself for the first time to an approximate date, correctly foretold finality: I think about April we shall have pretty well exhausted the Boers and so enclosed them in areas that they will find it very hard to keep up much form of resistance. Of course for some time there may, and probably will, bea few bands of irreconcilables in difficult country, but these will be easily confined to districts. (Kitchener to Roberts, 13.12.01.) The following week he added: There is no doubt the Boers are much depressed in the 1 Later Lieut.-General Sir William Pulteney. 58 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. Transvaal and consider the game is up. The leaders still make them stick to it, telling them they have nothing to lose. Formerly they thought we should never be able to catch them all, but now they have changed considerably, and see that the day is not so very far off when there will be prac- tically no Boers in the field. Small matters show the change. The prisoners we took used to refuse to speak to the surren- dered burghers and treated them with great disdain; now it is quite the contrary, and they try to curry favour with the ““hands-uppers.’’ (Kitchener to Roberts, 20.12.01.) In the same letter he deprecated the rash attempts to start new farms before the firing had ceased: t I am sorry to see by Reuter that men are being sent out from home to commence cultivation in the Orange River Colony. As I said in a telegram to Brodrick, I consider this premature; already the Boers have swept away Goold- Adams’s! stock and cultivation more than once. It is merely a gift to the Boers [for us] to go too fast, and noth- ing I can say will check the civil element in thinking that, because they do not hear guns firing round them, the war is over.and everything is safe. When the Boers knock over their projects, they only ask why were they not protected. We clear the country, and they then put out cattle and cultivation because there are no Boers in sight. Of course the enemy come back and make great capital out of their success. I try and implore people to wait until I can say with moderate safety ‘‘Go on,’’ but it is of no use. Botha was, however, to carry out his bat. Plumer and others not only failed to propel him and his 800 Boers into Hamilton’s expectant arms, but in the attempt lost eighty men—taken prisoners. A fur- ther drive by Hamilton late in January did force him to take refuge in the Vryheid hills, where for a month 1 Sir H. Goold-Adams. XLIX BOTHA AND THE VILJOENS 59 he was kept on the move; after this he disappeared, and was no more seen until he turned up at the Peace Conference at Pretoria. His authority had of late only just sufficed to keep his men in the field, and he was constantly told either to end the war, or to give some good reason for continuing it. This was an awkward demand, as his chief reason for going on was the forlorn hope either of a weakening of British purpose, or of an eleventh-hour foreign intervention. But Europe stood aloof and Britain stood firm; more- over, the blockhouse line from Standerton to Won- derfontein was now complete and bisected the high veldt, and the three principal centres of the Kastern Transvaal were irrecoverably in British hands. , Piet Viljoen, in the west, was out of immediate reach at Vaal Kop near Bethel, and had succeeded in introducing a party of 200 men into the protected area behind the Constabulary posts. His circum-' stances, however, were precarious, for the devastated Bethel district was incapable of supporting a force of any importance. He had the choice of three courses —to follow Michael Prinsloo into the protected area, to join Ben Viljoen in the north-east, or to unite with De Wet in the Free State. . These alternatives were discussed among the Boer leaders on January 7, and, after some squabbling, a body of about 400 men threw in their lot with Piet Viljoen and joined Prinsloo on January 24, mate- rially strengthening his position, from which succes- sive attempts to oust him had failed. In the North-Eastern Transvaal Ben Viljoen and Muller, between whom no love was lost, kept them- selves to themselves; the former had his headquar- ters at Pilgrim’s Rest, twenty-five miles north-east 60 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. of Lydenburg, with a body of about 900 men, while Muller haunted the hills in the west and south-west of Lydenburg. Neither leader could boil up any of- fensive spirit in their war-weary contingents. The Transvaal Government, which had been forced across the Delagoa Bay railway by Bruce Hamilton in December, narrowly escaped capture by Colonel Park, and were then persuaded by Ben Viljoen to take refuge with him. They set out to join him at Pilgrim’s Rest, but at first sight of the - barbed wire and blockhouses their courage oozed out and they turned back. Their discretion was justi- fied, as Ben Viljoen early on December 26 was caught by a company of the Royal Irish Regiment, and con- signed to St. Helena. The official personages evaded further pursuit and crossed to the west of Olifant’s River, whence, on March 12, by Kitchener’s permis- sion, they joined a conference with Steyn at Kroonstad: Ben Viljoen’s capture (he did not give himself up) may do some good in the north, but I doubt it having any very great effect, as he has been for some time working for peace, and it will be said he gave himself up. Our party was lying out for Schalk Burger and the Government, who, we thought, were going to see B. Viljoen, instead of which Viljoen went to see them and was caught. I would much sooner have got the Government. (Kitchener to Roberts, 31.1.02.) The third drive in the Orange River Colony ab- sorbed all available troops, and Piet Viljoen was left undisturbed in the protected area until the end of March, when, during a night raid, Lawley trod on him twenty miles east of Springs, and a ding-dong fight of little consequence and less result ensued. xLIX THE BOERS JADED 61 Bruce Hamilton then took a hand, but Viljoen himself kept clear, while his lieutenant, Alberts, at the head of 500 men, bolted into the Orange River Colony with the British General in panting pursuit. Notwithstanding the Boers’ run of luck, there were signs that their cause was languishing. The men were very jaded, a little out of hand, and increas- ingly, if stealthily, pacifist. Kitchener in writing home could point to rifts in his opponent’s lute: There have been constant reports from secret agents that the great majority of the Boers do not intend to go on much beyond the end of the year, owing to want of food and am- munition. We have had such reports before, so I only men- tion them for what they are worth, which may be very little. From one of De Wet’s letters we know Botha wants to ar- range to meet De Wet, probably to discuss the future, as Botha’s men are very discontented with the way things are going, and at being led by the Orange Free Staters. Ben Viljoen is doing all he can to bring about peace, and his men are anxiously waiting to give up. De Wet’s own men are much more discontented and insubordinate than they used to be. At a meeting the other day De Wet had to sjambok one of his men for openly saying ‘‘they were being deceived,”’ and asking ‘‘how long they were to be kept at this hopeless struggle.’’ There have been several quarrels amongst the Free Staters lately. No one now cares to go down to the Colony, and De Wet has to exert all his influence to get men to attempt it. Kritzinger, after refusing for a long time, has at last been induced to make another attempt, but he has only started with 60 men, though he may gather some more en route. It was a good moment to deliver a shrewd blow. CHAPTER L Tue meshes of the widespread military net were strong, but the Boers were finding them wide enough to permit of parties slipping through by night. Kitchener improved his system, and so approved it that he suggested an analogy for Parliament then assembling. ‘‘Your campaign,’’ he wrote to Brod- rick, ‘‘has now started again, and I hope you will have every success. Let me recommend the block- house system; I have no doubt it would have an excellent effect in Parliament; you pin your adver- sary down to certain areas’’ (17.1.02). He now was substituting for the net a thin but continuous wall of mounted troops, fifty or more miles in length; this solid wall, with no gaps through which the enemy could escape, was to move forward by day, and at night every officer and man would be on duty to form a continuous line of pickets. The ends of the wall would rest on blockhouse lines, especially reinforced by fresh battalions of infantry ; and it moved towards a similar line, the railways being patrolled by armoured trains. The whole area of the drive was therefore to be fenced in by a living hedge. The physical disadvantage of the system was that it admitted of no substantial reserves; a really de- termined force could break through. But the moral 62 coar.t A MOVING WALL OF TROOPS 63 effect was most satisfactory, as the weaker spirits who, in the old-fashioned drives, knew that they could generally escape without being hurt, now found they had to fight for their lives to get out. The new device of course made a searching demand on the discipline and staying powers of the British troops, who had to cover great distances at sustained speed, while preserving the dressing of a fifty or sixty mile line over rough country. In the first week of February Kitchener directed four columns respectively under Rimington,! Elliot, Byng, and Rawlinson against De Wet at Hlandskop —9000 men being distributed overnight on a front of fifty-four miles from Frankfurt: in the north to Kaffirkop in the south—an allowance of one man to every ten yards. The distance to the railway, about fifty miles, was to be covered in three days and two nights. Writing to Roberts on February 7 Kitch- ener said: ‘‘ You can imagine how anxious I am, as, if De Wet is still in to-night, his chances will be small. As far as I can see, the troops are working excel- lently, keeping touch along the whole line, and we may have a great coup.”’ But De Wet was not to be among the 300 burghers accounted for that night. Hampered as he was by a herd of cattle from which his people refused to be parted, he succeeded in cutting the wire fence be- tween Kroonstad and Lindley and made good his way to the Doornberg. This drive, if devoid of much ma- terial result, accounted for some fine fighting burgh- ers, and De Wet’s disciples were beginning to shake 1 Brigadier-General Michael Frederic Rimington. One of his orders Tran: “Every man from the Brigadier to the last native to be on duty and to act as sentry for one third of the night.’”’ This in addition to a full day’s work! 64 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. their heads. The experiment was to be renewed on a major scale. A portion of the north-east of the Orange Colony having now been cleared, the new idea was to drive the remainder of the Colony, in addi- tion to a portion of the Transvaal between the Natal railway and the Drakensberg, and the Winburg— Harrismith line. The drive was to be carried out by two distinct movements. Elliot, starting east- wards from Kroonstad and the Doornberg, was to advance with the right of his line resting first on Lindley and next on Harrismith, near which place he was timed to meet the other three columns under Rawlinson, Byng, and Rimington. This phase was to occupy four days, from the 13th to the 16th. The other three commanders, concentrating in the angle formed by the main railway and the Natal railway, were to drive along both banks of the Vaal, and when abreast of Tapel Kop would wheel to the right until they faced south, Elliot then joining in and keeping in line with them. The drive was to end on the southern blockhouse line between Eland’s River . bridge and Van Riemen’s pass. The programme was especially heavy for the northern columns, who would have to face eleven successive nights of out- post duty. Elliot started on February 13, and, after swinging an abortive blow at De Wet, reached the Wilge River on the 22nd, where he awaited the other columns. The Wilge was now held by the 2nd Leinster Regi- ment, Elliot’s column, and mounted troops from Harrismith. This was too wide a front for the numbers employed, and the northern blockhouse line was also too weak to stem the rush of fugitives from Rawlinson and Byng. A number of Boers had been L AT THE WILGE RIVER 65 driven into the angle before the Wilge River, where, mixed up with De Wet and Steyn and their fighting followers, was a mass of women, children, cattle, and transport. De Wet saw that his best chance was to break through Rawlinson’s attenuated line at the point where it was supposed to touch Byng’s column. Shortly after sundown a mob of mounted Boers, wagons, and cattle started from Brakfontein on its desperate errand. The 900 combatants led the van; then marched De Wet and Steyn; then came the wagons, followed by an enormous herd of cattle covering several miles of the veldt. The fortunes of De Wet and Steyn were waning, but did not on this occasion forsake them; and at midnight the re- doubtable couple poked their way through the Brit- ish line, leaving women, children, cattle, and a heterogeneous mass of material—hbesides notabilities such as De Wet’s son and secretary—to swell the Harrismith commando and form a bulky prize for their pursuers. Kitchener, not displeased with this haul, allowed only three days to elapse before beginning his third drive. Two sets of converging columns met just where De Wet and Steyn were in hiding, but al- though some lurking commandos were broken up, the elusive pair made good their escape and took refuge with De la Rey at Wolmaranstad in the Transvaal. Two more drives, less ambitious because the troops had to be sent to the Transvaal, failed to put salt on De Wet’s tail,! but unrelenting pressure was evi- dently telling on the burghers’ nerves. De la Rey’s last, most successful, and to him most 1“I wonder whether they will catch De Wet,” said Kitchener thirteen years later, when that duty lay with the Transvaal General. VOL. II F 66 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. creditable, coup was now to be brought off. Methuen was bent on retrieving the valuable convoy captured by De la Rey on February 25, and tried to lick into some sort of shape the miscellaneous human material he was at pains to collect for the purpose. The so-called ‘‘column’’ was indeed a mixed crew; the 1300 men who composed it were drawn from four- teen different units, varying in quality, calibre, moral, and colour. This job lot was further handi- capped by a prodigious train of ox and mule wagons. De la Rey was reported to be making for the Marice River; Methuen thought to intercept him, and told Kekewich to lend a hand from Klerksdorp. Grenfell was accordingly despatched to join Methuen at Roirantjesfontein, seventeen miles south of Lich- tenburg, where he arrived on March 7. Methuen, delayed by scarcity of water, only reached Tweebosch on the 6th; at 3 a.m. on the 7th his ox convoy, escorted by half his force, started, fol- lowed by the mule convoy at an interval of an hour. At dawn De la Rey made a sudden pounce from the rear. A panic was started by a native boy with led horses, who galloped through the mule convoy just as it was attempting to close up on the ox convoy in advance. The mounted troops forming the rear screen behaved, and bolted, badly. Some of the Yeomanry honestly tried to stem a rout, but were sucked into the current of it, and there followed the shameful spectacle of a mob of horsemen and mule wagons bumping along at top speed away from their comrades. Major Paris strove in vain to recall the mounted men to their sense and scene of duty. The valour of the British gunners and infantry, and Methuen’s own skill and superb personal courage, L TWEEBOSCH 67 were unavailing. The camp was overcome, and of the British surrenders in the war the last and sad- dest had to be recorded. The bright spots in the sorry picture were the persistent no-surrender of the Northumberland Fusiliers and Loyal North Lancashires, and the chivalrous courtesy of De la Rey to his wounded opponents. Kitchener wrote to Roberts on March 9: Our dark days are on us again: first, the convoy from Wolmaranstad, and now this disaster to Methuen. It is dreadfully sad and will, of course, put off the end of the war. We had got De la Rey’s men well down, short of ammunition, and very anxious forthe end ofthe war. Nowthey areall up again, and we have to begin afresh. . . . I felt a little anxious about Methuen’s suggestion that he should march to Lichten- burg with Paris’s column, reinforced by mounted men and infantry ; but Paris has always done so well, and Methuen was quite confident, that I thought it was all right. I ar- ranged, however, that Grenfell, with a portion of Kekewich’s and Von Donop’s men, should meet him before he reached Lichtenburg, and co-operate against any Boers in the neighbourhood. So serious a set-back might well dispel any near prospect of peace. Brodrick rightly warned the country that the struggle might be prolonged and the last stages of its dreary progress be the most difficult. Kitchener had to set his teeth and keep his eyes open to the possibility of another cold-weather campaign. The British public was, not unreason- ably, inclined to regard Tweebosch as a discreditable, as well as deplorable, disaster. No one without ac- tual experience of veldt fighting was able to realise that our enormous numerical superiority could not of itself score successes, or even avert defeat, when 68 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. against it were ranged the countless advantages en- joyed by adversaries who knew every hole and cor- - ner in the country and would traverse it without bag or baggage. On March 15 Brodrick wrote: It is, I think, inevitable we should take it very seriously. An utter rout of two columns in ten days, the loss of mate- rial and re-arming and equipment of the Boers, the loss of prestige by Methuen’s capture, and the misconduct of the mounted troops, seem to us to make it the worst business since Colenso. Moreover, it comes at a very bad time, and shows what a fine fighting spirit still exists in the remain- ing Boers. (15.3.02.) He proceeded to impress on Kitchener that the public were insistent on the punishment of those whose carelessness or incompetence was: responsible for these mishaps: ‘‘People here will stand any- thing now in the way of men or money, but they will not readily overlook carelessness in a small section of the force, when you and all your officers and ninety-nine out of every hundred men are undergo- ing immense exertions.”’ But Kitchener, a strict disciplinarian, was not to be hurried by popular clamour into acts of possible injustice : I am much obliged [he writes on April 6] for your letter of March 15. I quite agree with you as regards the strict punishment of those officers and men who, by their careless- ness, or through other causes, do so much harm; and I con- sider that this is most necessary for the good of the Army asa whole. One of the great faults in British officers is that they do not look upon their work sufficiently seriously at all times. They are in many cases spasmodic, and do not realise the 2 CARELESSNESS OF OFFICERS 69 serious nature of their responsibilities, and if they do so at one time they easily forget them. Though this is due to some extent to training, it seems to be a national defect, based a good deal on over-confidence. In my opinion, strict punish- ment is very necessary to impress on officers their very serious duties, but at the same time it does no good to act without the fullest inquiry, and strictly on legal lines. A hasty judgement creates a martyr, and unless Military Law is strictly followed, a sense of injustice having been done is the result. Military Law requires, in my opinion, considerable altera- tion to be effective, and to meet cases which have occurred during this war... . It should be solely for the benefit of the Army that examples are made of offenders—not for the gratification of a public opinion demanding a scape- goat: I am having one officer tried for the loss of the convoy, and six officers tried for Methuen’s disaster. These trials probably will result in other trials, as we get at the truth. You may be quite sure I will not let the matter drop, if I have anything to go upon. CHAPTER LI On the day Tweebosch was being fought Kitchener was communicating to the Transvaal Government correspondence regarding proposals for peace nego- tiations. Six weeks earlier Holland had formally offered to mediate between the contending parties. The Netherlands Minister suggested to Lord Lans- downe that the Boer representatives in Holland should repair to South Africa, consult with the lead- ers, and return with authority in their pockets to de- termine the conditions of peace. The British Gov- ernment flatly declined any outside intervention, but agreed to grant a safe-conduct, if required, to the proposed envoys. As, however, these gentlemen would have no influence over their compatriots in the field, and as the last word would certainly lie with Steyn and Schalk Burger, direct communication be- tween Kitchener and the Boer authorities seemed the more expeditious method. Brodrick anyhow had written: Our feeling is that any overtures should be made by the Boers in the first instance, and decided here after your con- sideration and Lord Milner’s. (1.2.02.) An incidental difficulty in the way of negotiations was that the Boers were as wide apart on the veldt as they were in their opinions. The Acting President of the Transvaal, Schalk Burger, under safe-conduct for himself and his 70 CHAP. LI PEACE PROPOSALS (is Government to pass the British lines at Balmoral, arrived at Kroonstad on March 22 to confer with the Free State Government as to drafting peace pro- posals—to find, as the British troops had so often found, that the Boer leaders were not easy to come by. De Wet was running up and down; Steyn was with De la Rey in the Western Transvaal; Botha was several hundred miles away to the east; Smuts was 600 miles to the west. But Schalk Burger meant business and was willing to wait. Kitchener was just then telling his Government that everything might turn on laying down a definite period for the grant of self-government in the new Colonies: I believe, if two or three years could be fixed, on the un- derstanding that the Boers behave thoroughly well, that it would help greatly. If they come to us and say, ‘‘We are beaten—be generous,’’ then I think we should treat them with consideration. None of them like the idea of being handed down to posterity as traitors who gave their country away. (30.3.02.) But if sympathetic with the policy of reconcilia- tion, he was neither supine nor over-sanguine: Of course they have not seen De la Rey, whose attitude, after his recent successes, would not be conducive to peace. I am going all in my power to hit De la Rey hard as soon as possible, and hope soon to succeed. While, therefore, the Transvaal Government were locating the leaders, Kitchener was inquiring for them in quite another spirit. The recent disasters were the more galling because they threatened to disappoint his hopes of peace, just when he was be- ginning to feel he had it within his grasp. Dela Rey 72 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. could not be left triumphant in the Western Trans- vaal, and to quell him a big effort was to be made. Four picked and powerful columns, making up a force of some 14,000 men, were concentrated in the Western Transvaal based on Klerksdorp. They were, how- ever, badly handicapped for their work, as the only blockhouse lines to help them were those which ran along the Schoom Spruit, thence to Lichtenburg and Mafeking, and along the Vaal. The object was to drive the Boers against these lines: the trouble was that, for the moment, the British, and not De la Rey, were the meat in the sandwich, and the position was only adjusted by a sporting dash of 11,000 mounted men through the commandos on the night of March 23. This force—after a forty-mile ride—deployed at dawn on an arc of ninety miles. But the darkness had produced some disruption of the line, and—be- wildered though the Boers were by the scamper of British columns through their midst—De la Rey and Steyn rode out unnoticed; their companion Lieben- berg made a sensational escape a few hours later, and three guns and some groups of prisoners were the net return of the nocturnal raid. Kitchener up to now had directed all movements in the Transvaal and the Orange Colony from Pre- toria, corresponding directly and daily with his column leaders, but for the final fighting he contem- plated a change. It so happened that General Cook- son, one of Walter Kitchener’s subordinate com- manders, was making a reconnaissance in charge of a fine foree—on which Kitchener set special store— made up of Royal Horse Artillery and Mounted In- fantry, Canadian Mounted Infantry, and some picked Colonial troops. On March 31 Cookson was sur- LI LOCAL UNITY OF COMMAND 73 prised, and by a concatenation of misadventures Headquarters was notified that his party had been cut to pieces. The perverse ‘‘news,’’ emanating from his brother, dealt Kitchener a heavy blow.* For two days the telegraph lines were inoperative, but on the morning of the third day a message was to hand that Cookson had beaten off his assailants and was in touch with his immediate commander. The relief was great, but Kitchener made up his mind that the situation called for unity of command on the spot, and Ian Hamilton was at once despatched to Middelburg to take control of the four columns, to which was added a fifth under Thorneycroft. The Boers, contrary to their usual practice of dispers- ing before the storm, concentrated their force of 3000 somewhere on the line of the Hart’s River. Ian Hamilton ordered Kekewich, Walter Kitchener, and Rawlinson to sweep the country along the Hart’s River; then along the Vaal, and finally to Klerks- dorp. The movement began on April 10, and was timed to occupy four days, the distance covered to average forty miles a day. De la Rey having left to take part in Peace negotiations, Kemp took over the 2500 Boers who were to make the last stand for independence. Kekewich, who had reached Roodeval early on April 11, pushed on to the Hart’s River. His ad- vance guard at once located a large party of mounted men on the left front, which, until fire was opened, they mistook for a part of Rawlinson’s column. In ilan Hamilton wrote of Kitchener that though he was “impassive as a rock in appearance, he was really a bundle of sensitive and highly- strung nerves kept under control 999 hours out of 1000 by an iron will.” Somehow this particular blow at this particular moment hit him below the belt. For nearly two days and two nights he scarcely tasted food and would speak to no one except to give actual orders. 74 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER ca. reality it was a force of over 1000 Boers under Pot- gieter, who drove in our advance guard and then made a fine charge across the open. The main body of the British at first made the same mistake. ‘‘It must be Rawlinson,’’ every one said, for who would start to gallop across a mile and a half of coverless ground against a force in position? But Boers they were, and with such dash did they come on that they were within 500 yards of their objective before a hur- ried British deployment could be effected. Even then our 1500 rifles and six guns only emptied saddles without checking the onrush. At 300 yards the line itself faltered, but a brave band, bravely led by Pot- gieter, still pressed on, and, fighting to a finish, fell behind their leader within 70 yards of the British bayonets. Kekewich and Rawlinson were quickly in pursuit of Kemp, who made good his escape, but left in their hands the much-prized guns which Methuen had lost at Tweebosch. The encounter, albeit only an episode, was per- haps the most critical of the war, for a Boer success at this moment, however ephemeral, might have spelt the indefinite prolongation of a dreary and desolat- ing struggle. For two years and a half both sides had stood up manfully to give and take some pretty hard blows, but the direct sequel to Roodeval was the final shaking of hands between Boers and Britons, as Ian Hamilton’s subsequent westward drive and some rather desultory movements in the Colony did nothing to harm or hinder the approaching consum- mation of peace. CHAPTER LILI Suc# in brief were some of the activities which for seventeen months Kitchener had from his office at Pretoria directed in person. From the very nature of the campaign it might seem as if our own signal successes in the field had been few in number and never sensational in character, whereas reverses to our arms had been salient features in the operations. But the secret of the ultimate British success lay in the folds of a steadfast continuity of logical purpose, while the ‘‘set-backs’’—frequent, and fraught with disappointment and disaster as they may have been —were for the most part unavoidable incidents in a long and wearing, but coolly calculated, process, from which there could be no turning aside, and to which there could be but one end. Kitchener’s mode of conducting the war was not exempt from unfavour- able comment. They were depreciated in some quar- ters as comparable rather to the working of a ma- © chine than to the action of an organism instinct with life—as depending too exclusively on symmetry of plan and punctuality of execution, and as relying too little on spontaneous dash and individualeunning. It was not unusual, while applauding his achievements asa great organiser, to find fault with his tendency to control everything in person—‘‘Qui trop embrasse 75 . 76 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. mal étreint.’’ Granted the ability with which he re- placed obsolete methods by an effectively organised system, it was objected that everything was abso- lutely centralised in himself. Was not his naturally imperious and self-reliant temper given too free play? While his driving power owed much to an iron will, an unflagging industry, an exact memory, a faculty of concentration, was not his position as absolute head of a great military organisation one of exaggerated isolation? The argument was fortified by the fact that up to November 1901 no one had been appointed to succeed to the part which he him- self had played to Lord Roberts’s lead. Yet his shrewdest critics have owned that his environment, even more than his temperament, was responsible for what was the only workable system. Self-contained by habit, and perhaps a little contemptuous of convention, he was not the ideal Staff director. He inclined either to trust a man entirely to carry out a special duty with- out supervision and interference, or else to do it himself. Thus, at least in two theatres of operations, ab- solute discretion was given to the leaders. In Cape Colony French was allowed a perfectly free hand, and was enjoined not to ask Pretoria for directions, but only for support when required. The same lib- erty was accorded to Ian Hamilton, who was tied by no instructions when in charge of the final drive through the Western Transvaal,’ the only messages 1 He paid a flying visit to French in February 1902, and wrote to Brod- rick: ‘“‘He is quite cheerful about the future of Cape Colony, but no doubt I feel with regard to him very much as you do as regards myself—‘With all the troops you have, why in Heaven's name can you not finish it more quickly?’ The difficulties only really appear stronger when you are dealing with the troops on the spot yourself: then one realises.” LII KITCHENER’S METHODS 77 sent him being either congratulatory on his suc- cesses, or approbatory of his plans, or mandatory— to go full steam ahead. Except in one or two special cases the Commander- in-Chief’s custom was to see the column commanders whenever he could, and give them minute instruc- tions. Nor was his paternal interest relaxed when they were in the field. Daily they had to cable to him direct; and daily he used to send them direct wires individually, for in concerted, or rather con- verging, movements of columns there was no rec- ognised rule under which the senior officer took command. The habit of intervening in current operations— of sending orders, sometimes directly, to a subordi- nate officer; the occasional descent upon a troubled scene, with as its possible sequel the suppression of a local commander—were methods likely to be frowned on by the old school. But in the field itself there was little protest against them, and there was much to be urged on their behalf. In his silent office, linked up to every post and garrison in the country, and with immediate and intimate knowledge of every turn of events, of every possibility and difficulty, the Com- mander-in-Chief was perforce a better judge of each situation than his lieutenants on the spot, who, ab- sorbed in the work assigned to him, would be often unaware of conditions which had supervened, and out of touch with the general strategy of the hour. 1 Kitchener’s confidence in the Chief of the Staff who had been accredited to him was not confined to work in the field. Ian Hamilton was asked by the Government to write and cable home separately in order that the fullest light might be thrown on the situation. He, however, feeling it impossible to have private communications with the Home Government behind his chief’s back, laid before him copies of his cables and also of letters he had written to public personages. Kitchener thanked him for his loyalty, but refused to look at any of the missives. 78 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. Strategy, safety, supplies, were all matters so closely and so variably affected by the stream of informa- tion, which with a thousand springs had its mouth in Pretoria, that the true direction could be given from nowhere than the central and supreme control. The mobility of the Boers had its counterpart in their quick-wittedness in gathering the intelligence which dictated their mercurial methods. But Kitchener’s efforts to improve the machinery for the collection and assimilation of his own intelligence had been entirely successful, and on that intelligence as sup- plied to him by Colonel Henderson ‘ he relied largely, and never in vain, for his own devisings. His choice of commanders was governed by intui- tion and personal observation, rather than by written report or reference to the Army List: I think it is a good thing to change [commanders] at times without having any serious cause for doing so against the individuals concerned. I judge principally by results, and some commanders, though good in many respects, are not quite sufficiently enterprising to catch the wily Boer at this particular stage ofthe war. (Kitchener to Roberts, 26.7.01.) His instinct for detecting merit was unerring; a brief conversation or passing incident would often suffice to reveal to him some valuable qualification or special adaptability, and he seldom failed to in- spire officers on whom his eye lighted with his own energy and willingness to accept responsibility. When he required an officer for a special purpose he was, perhaps unduly, indifferent to the branch of the Army from which he drew him, and was thus at times not unreasonably accused of robbing Peter to 1 Later General Sir David Henderson. Lu TREATMENT OF OFFICERS 79 pay Paul. But the active, discreet, and often com- paratively young men whom he marked out for special employment seldom fell short of his expecta- tion. If they knew that distinction was difficult to win in a school where service was hard and their master’s praise scanty, they knew also that they would neither be denied recognition as a reward for success, nor be made scapegoats in the event of failure. His treatment of officers was the reverse of that sometimes ascribed to him. Slackness and care- lessness and ‘‘letting things slide’’ were anathema always, but he was slow to wrath over an error of judgement. So far from being a hard taskmaster, intolerant of failure, his fault—if any—lay in the opposite direction. He himself admitted that he was not fiuent in praise, but he was prone to approve, and senior officers and his Staff have even been known to lament his reluctance to ‘‘tell off’’ an offender, and the infrequency with which he did so. Moreover, he was always anxious to find and record a man’s best side,t and even when failure necessitated removal he was at pains to report on previous good work or explain that ill-luck had at- tended well-meant efforts: 24.5.01—‘‘ A’’ would be better in some other employ- ment; he has lost his nerve. “*B”’ is not well, but he is not ill—only tired, and should go home for a bit. “*C”’ does not appear to have done much. I cannot help 1 “It would, I think, be a very good thing if a few brevets and distinguished service medals could be allowed to be given at once for service rendered of a particularly excellent nature. As you know, officers and men are tired, and they do not much believe that good services will be remembered. I asked for some by wire, but have had no answer.” (Kitchener to Roberts, March ’01.) 80 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER caar.io thinking he needs a change, and will give it him if I ean find some one to replace him. : I am worried about ‘‘D.’’ I do not think it will do to leave him in command of a column; yet he has made no seri- ous error, though I have had to criticise his operations. He has not the confidence of officers or men of his column. He is very strict about his horses, which is to his credit, but he does it as a sergeant-major would, and makes himself unnee- essarily disagreeable. But if he were a really successful leader in the field, the officers and men would put up with this. His prejudice, if any, was against officers whose service had been in smooth places—who had always been able to lean up against their seniors. If you think advisable, pray send ‘‘E’’ out. I personally know nothing of him. His reputation does not seem to point to his being a great success, but I do not put much trust in reputations which have been gained in the street or elub, and not in the field. CHAPTER LIT KitcHENER’s conduct of the campaign involved a strenuous working day. He was in his office at 6 a.M., before which ‘‘operations’’ and many other telegrams had been opened and filed for his inspec- tion. After a close study of the messages his Staff shifted all the little flags on the map which covered the whole floor, when Chief and Staff on hands and knees would set the positions of 30 or 40 columns on the maps. Kitchener then, telegrams in hand, dic- tated answers and fresh orders. His immediate grasp of situations which were continually shifting would surprise even those accustomed to be with him. The circumstances of each column were al- ways clear in his mind, the names of their com- manders fixed in his memory, and his messages were admittedly models of brevity and clearness. After breakfast the heads of the Supply, Trans- port, Railway, and Ordnance Departments filed in, and with the detailed points of the night’s cables and of the exact position of the columns in his head, the ‘*Chief’’ issued orders with unfailing accuracy as to despatch of stores, reinforcements, or other neces- saries to whatever place the columns were destined to trek that night. Remounts, Press Censor, Adju- tant-General followed in rapid succession, any legal Vol, II 81 G 82 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. details of the latter department being a dry morsel for him. A very modest luncheon preceded further interviews with officers from the front, civilian offi- cials, and occasionally press representatives. At 4 o’clock the Commander-in-Chief usually al- lowed himself to be taken for a ride, which was sup- posed to last an hour, but before he had been twenty minutes in the saddle he would fret as to whether some message had come through, and on returning his foot was scarcely out of the stirrup before the intelligence news was demanded. Work went on until dinner, after which his own correspondence, private and official, had to be dealt with. The arrival of a Chief of the Staff enabled Kitch- ener to detach himself from his office for visits’ of inspection, which greatly benefited both him and his men: ‘‘I am sure it is a good thing for me, as well as for the troops, that I should personally see them as often as possible; and now that I have Ian Hamil- ton I can get away without trouble and without stop- ping continuity of work’’ (Kitchener to Roberts, 13.12.01). The control of operations in the field was only a part of Kitchener’s cares. Administration claimed his attention unsparingly. During the early phases of the war neglected necessities had to be made good, regardless of cost, and calls for economy were cor- nered. Kitchener, who always maintained that econ- omy should attend on, and not conflict with, efficiency, determined on reaching Pretoria that expenditure should no longer run riot. His overhauling of local contracts, and later of all purchases for his Army, was drastic, and brought to light much that was unsatisfactory and not a little that was unsavoury. LI FINANCIAL ADVISER 83 He thought it well to vest financial control in one individual and secured the services of the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the War Office, Mr. Fleetwood Wilson, who arrived in South Africa in March 1901. The trained knowledge of the official enabled him to move easily among such diversities as commandeering and the damages done by the troops, the military railway administration in the new Colonies, the extravagance of the Ordnance Department at Cape Town,! and the charges for pro- viding specie; to advise competently as to reforms and economies, and to assist in setting up a general control of expenditure—a salutary restriction being that no large purchases or contracts should be made without reference to Headquarters. After the Army’s arrival at Bloemfontein the rail- way traffic question became acute, and the organisa- tion had been entrusted to the then Chief of the Staff, to whom the building and direction of railways was entirely congenial. The 1310 miles of Boer line which he eventually accomplished stand as an effec- tive pendant to his creation in the Sudan. When he took over command, he did what he could to adapt his transport to the tactics of the Boers. The first step was to separate the Director- ship of Transport from that of Supplies. He then attached to all the larger Commands, Deputy Assist- ant Adjutant-Generals for transport, with staff offi- cers serving with the columns and in the various dis- tricts; and twenty-five workshops and repair depots were formed at different centres. The formation of the Army into a number of columns to meet the new enemy tactics involved the allotment to each column 1 Evidence given before the War Stores Commission. 84 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. of its fixed allowance of mule wagons with baggage and two days’ rations, besides ox wagons to take six days’ supplies. Thus the transport with each column was a complete unit. The organisation of Supply was newly systematised, the whole country being divided into twenty-one districts, each with its depot, from which the smaller stations received their provisions. The work had been severe and searching—so severe that the workman had now and again felt that he might be obliged to hand over his tools. ‘‘I am getting quite worn out,’’ he wrote privately, ‘‘but I mean to see it through if the authorities think me competent.’?’ He was even prepared to admit that his own supersession in the High Command might be no less beneficial than the subordinate changes which he himself thought it necessary to make: ‘‘T was much obliged for your kind telegram saying the Government still had confidence in me. I must say I should not have been surprised if my failure to bring this war to an end had induced the Government to come to a decision that a change was advisable.”’ * But the Government had no mind to look elsewhere— not only because they could not lay hand on any one more capable, but because they knew well that if Kitchener’s mills ground slowly they ground surely, and that success, if out of sight, was within his reach. His strength and confidence in himself—which never really failed him—were well and wisely sustained by the unswerving support of Roberts and Brodrick. Piqued and disappointed as they sometimes were by the reticence which, as they thought, marked his 1 Kitchener to Brodrick, 8.11.01. LOI ROBERTS AND BRODRICK 85 correspondence, no word even of impatient inquiry ever escaped them. As Roberts was his constant champion when military critics—not always experts —gave tongue,! so Brodrick stood as his- powerful advocate on the rare occasions when Parliament ap- peared to chafe at delays, or to ignore the peculiar and persistent difficulties which attached to a war of attrition. Perhaps they alone knew how com- plicated and kaleidoscopic was his task; perhaps they alone recognised not only what he had achieved, but what he had been called upon and competent to prevent. 1“I wish those who say that the war should be over would come out and show us how to do it.” (Kitchener to Roberts.) CHAPTER LIV On April 1 Schalk Burger, who for a week had been awaiting the Boer leaders at Kroonstad, received a message from Steyn that Klerksdorp would be a more convenient place for a conference. To Schalk Burger one place was as good as another if only peace could be promoted, and at Klerksdorp on April 9, in company with Botha and De la Rey, who joined him there, he met in conference Steyn, De Wet, Bremner, Olivier, and Hertzog—the last three being active members of Steyn’s Government. Thence they sent a message begging Lord Kitchener to meet them in person—time and place to be ap- pointed by him—and listen to direct peace proposals which they were prepared to submit, and ‘‘to settle all questions which may arise at once by direct con- versation and parley.’’ Kitchener at once invited them to Pretoria, and on April 12 at his house the representatives unfolded to him their story. Schalk Burger as spokesman professed an ardent desire for peace 1 with honour— attainable, it was thought, by an equitable treatment of six capital points, of which the first was purely 1On April 11 Kitchener telegraphed: “As far as I can gather, the position is as follows—the Transvaalers are for peace, the Free Staters more or less against.” 86 CHAP. LIV THE SIX POINTS 87 otiose: (1) All Forts in the Boer States to be dis- mantled; (2) the Franchise to be settled; (3) the English and the Dutch languages to be employed equally in the Schools; (4) a Customs, Postal, Tele- graph, and Railway Union to be established; (5) future differences to be settled by Arbitration and none but subjects of the parties to be arbitrators; (6) an Amnesty to be granted reciprocally. Steyn, who was evidently a very sick man, has- tened to add that, anxiousas all were for peace, they were equally set on securing the object for which the people had fought. ‘‘Does that mean independ- ence?’’ asked Kitchener quickly. Steyn nodded an afirmative—‘‘The people must not lose their self- respect.’’ Kitchener suavely suggested that men who had fought so well could never lose their self- respect, and begged his guests to face the real facts and bow to the inevitable, promising to advocate the grant of self-government in the near future.’ Both Presidents, however, stuck to their text— that the delegates could not proprio motu sign away the people’s independence. Kitchener, rather than set an abrupt term to a conversation, consented to submit the six points to the Home Government. The reply was quite friendly, but quite firm: His Majesty’s Government sincerely share the earnest de- 1He had written home some weeks earlier that the question the Boers would surely ask was—‘“How long would it be, supposing they behaved loyally, before self-government would be granted to the new Colonies?” He was in favour of giving some guarded indication of the terms, as he anticipated trouble with the natives in the Transvaal, “who,” he said, “for two and a half years have seen white men chased by other white men, have suffered considerably, and have got out of hand. The Boers have sold them rifies for food, and are now much afraid of them. ... If the future self-government is tied up by financial arrangements, I think in two or three years we should be quite safe, with a properly arranged franchise, to give self-government, and it might relieve us of a good deal of trouble to do so.” 88 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. sire of the Boer representatives, and hope that present nego- tiations may lead to that result. But we have already stated in clearest terms, and must repeat, that we cannot entertain any proposals which are based on the continued independence of the former Republics which have been for- mally annexed to the British Crown. At the second conference on April 14 Kitchener introduced Milner to the delegates, and must have breathed an inward sigh of relief that the official answer was evidently not going to break off nego- tiations. The Presidents still persisted that only on the basis of independence could they treat; but they suggested that the British Government should put forward its own alternative proposals, and Kitchener again agreed to advise his Government to formulate the terms which they would grant if independence were waived. Two favours were then asked: that one of the Boer representatives in Europe might be permitted to come back, and that an armistice should be granted for the delegates to consult their burghers. The first request was refused; nor was there to be any suspension of fighting. But Kitchener agreed, by way of compromise, to allow and arrange for the delegates’ free access to their people for consulta- tion, and to grant them the free use of the railway and the telegraph. The hands of Milner and Kitch- ener were helped by the arrival of Chamberlain’s despatch agreeing to accept ‘‘a general surrender on the terms of the offer made a year before at the Middelburg Conference,’’ and strengthened by the news of Kemp’s defeat at Roodeval, lan Hamilton’s despatch, with full details of the enemy’s losses com- LIV ARMISTICE REFUSED 89 ing to hand just at the right moment. The conver- sations were adjourned to facilitate the assembly of a conference of sixty representative burghers— thirty from each State—to be elected by the people, any commando whose leader should be chosen as a delegate to be immune from attack. The arrange- ment, without the calling of a military halt, offered some of the advantages of an armistice to the Boers and a little ‘‘easy’’ to ourselves.” Kitchener began to see daylight, and even to assign places to the Boer generals at the forthcoming Coronation ceremony : It is quite exciting [he wrote to Lady Cranborne] to think that by the 20th of next month we may have peace. It would be such a good thing for all if it came before the Cor- onation. How I would like to see Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey in the procession; it is quite on the cards, and it would do them a lot of good to see the crowds. (20.4.02.) On the evening of the 18th the Boer officials left Pretoria. Steyn retired to Wolmaranstad, hoping to nurse himself for the final assembly; the others began the last of their many rides, the weapon in their hands being now a ballot-box. Day by day 1“The lucky thing was that at that very moment [of the Roodeval victory] the Boer emissaries were in Pretoria consulting Lord K., who has many a time told me that his best persuasive to peace was the laying on the table at their Conference, on April 12, of my second wire announcing the completeness of our victory in the West. The full despatch, with details of the enemy’s losses, came to hand in the very nick of time.’”’ (Letter from Ian Hamilton.) 2“I hope you will agree,” Kitchener wrote to Roberts, “that I was right to resist an armistice, and at the same time to give them facilities for the meetings they require. I shall keep a close watch on these meetings, and any that are hostile shall have it sharp. A little rest for our men and horses will be a great advantage to us, and give us a really good fresh start if we have to go at it again. I do not mean I am giving up operations— only going a bit slow, and not annoying those that vote solid for peace.” (20.4.02.) 90 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. for three weeks the voting for the delegates pro- ceeded, but when the elected of the people repaired to the tryst with the Government at Vereeniging, they carried with them mandates so varying in colour and character that the Conference seemed more likely to rise in storm than to close with peace. In truth, Briton and Boer yearned alike for peace, but between them there still yawned the gulf of the independence question. The last year of toil and struggle had done nothing to relax England’s stern resolve, and the patriots were faced with the bitter alternative—either to yield the very object for which they had striven and suffered, or to fight on against an imperturbable and apparently inexhaustible enemy, with the assured prospect, after a prolonga- tion of the agony, of ultimate defeat. Kitchener knew that there was one stubborn opponent with whom he had to reckon. Steyn was adamant to argument, entreaty, or threat: I only fear that Steyn, in his ponderous way, will make a patriotic speech at the meeting and turn them round. He is a head and shoulders above the others, and has great influ- ence, owing to his better education and ability. On the whole, I think things look well. There is very little doubt that the Transvaal will vote solid for peace. De la Rey was the only doubtful one, and before he went away he said he would go with the majority of the Transvaalers. The Free Staters are doubtful, but they cannot go on alone, and we have so chaffed the Transvaal that they are being led by the nose by the smaller State that I really think they will stick it out this time. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 20.4.02.) A year ago the Free Staters were bellicose to a man, and the Transvaal had followed their lead— though only half-heartedly and hoping to get better LIV BOER DIFFERENCES 91 terms. Now Botha and the Transvaal Government were ‘‘solid for peace,’’ but they could not sign away independence without the endorsement of their constituents. The two States, largely under the influence of their leaders, regarded the crisis from different points of view. Steyn, with an exalted sense of his duty to his people, was prepared for its sake to sacrifice himself and everything else. Kitchener bore handsome witness to his pluck: Steyn’s eyes are bad and he is generally ill. He asked to see a Dutch doctor friend in whom he had confidence. As the doctor was very anxious, for his own purposes, to get the war over, I allowed this, and after examining Steyn he told him that unless he immediately took rest he would die in three weeks. Steyn said, ‘‘I know it, but I must give my life for the people.’’ Another doctor was called in, and he gave a similar opinion; but Steyn insisted on going out again. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 20.4.02.) His uncompromising spirit had been contagious, inflaming not only De Wet and his burghers under arms, but also the long-suffering women, who vehe- mently encouraged their menfolk to hold out. Very different was the prevailing tone of the Transvaalers. After Kruger’s hasty departure the Transvaal was governed by moderate and practical politicians of the stamp of Botha, Schalk Burger, and Smuts, who had never been wholly wedded to the war policy: they would fight on so long as there was any real chance of success, but were indisposed to sacrifice their people’s substantial interests on the altar of sentiment, however lofty. The Trans- vaalers cherished no illusions. While their cause and that of the Free State were substantially the same, the consequences in the two cases of defeat 92 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. had little in common. The Free State had far less at stake in the future, and was taking far fewer risks. She could, of course, lose—and did lose largely in men and money—but was sure in time to recover her former prosperity. The Transvaalers, on the other hand, had no mind to play the under-dog in their own territory —a disagreeable contingency no longer improbable. They had entered on the war to assert the right of one half of the population to absolute political control over the other half. The continuance of hostilities, however, bade fair in practice to bring about just the opposite. With the re-opening of the mines during the war a stream of Uitlanders had set in, and many more were on their way, This element was now rapidly becoming predominant, being reinforced both by Boers who had surrendered in the early days of the war, and by those who had openly sided with the British. The prudent patriot might well presage that with every week of war he would be placed at a further disadvantage with the British. On the British side the differences between Kitchener and Milner, though hardly less marked, lay in the respective angles from which they regarded the rédos of the war. There was no dis- agreement as to the method of conducting it, but by a curious change of their parts the Statesman was inclined towards stern measures, while the Soldier stood firm for reconciliation. Milner was insistent that British sovereignty in the newly- annexed Colonies must be the bedrock of the British terms. The Boers must be under no illusion as to who had won the war. We must not shelve the LIV BRITISH DIFFERENCES 93 responsibilities we had incurred towards those Boers who had attached themselves to us; their services must be duly rewarded. As for the minority who elung to their tattered banners of defiance, well— Vae victis! Milner held—and was strongly backed in his opinion—that military conquest must precede peace negotiations. By the proclamation of April 1901 the Boer leaders were outlaws; yet two of them, Schalk Burger and Steyn, were permitted to become delegates in the negotiations. This tacit amnesty was enlarged to cover all the members of both Boer Governments—amongst them Botha, De la Rey, De Wet, and Hertzog, outlawed alike in their civil and military capacities! 'The concessions made on both these points were distasteful to Milner, who objected to the Boer contracting parties being the leaders fresh from the field. He thought an easy attitude was uncalled-for and impolitic. The Boer forces were greatly reduced and daily diminishing; they were faced with a desperate shortage of food and of munitions of war. Our Army was at the zenith of its strength, and our pitiless blockhouse system had been perfected; and this just as the winter dreaded by the Boers was recurring. Surely, with its aid, the end must be at hand. In a word. Milner thought that our accounts with friend and foe must be strictly balanced, and that our bill for damages should be discharged to the last shilling. Kitchener, looking far ahead, believed that a peace based on the sheer exhaustion of our opponents might for ever preclude any real reconciliation,’ 1 “Baird, who talks Dutch (though they do not know this), Marker, my aide-de-camp, and Leggett are in constant attendance. The young Boers, of whom there are a considerable number as aides-de-camp, etc., talk 94 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER czar. rv and exclude any amicable incorporation of the Boer nation in the British Empire. We had won a long- contested struggle and it would become us to behave handsomely. A year earlier he had said: It will be good policy for the future of this country to treat them fairly well, and I hope I may be allowed to do away with anything humiliating to them in the surrender, if it comes off. And he maintained his opinion to the end: My views were that, once the Boers gave up their in- dependence and laid down their arms, the main object of the Government was attained, and that the future civil administration would soon heal old sores and bring the people together again. rather openly. They say that if no terms are made and they are forced to unconditional surrender they will hold themselves absolutely free to begin again when they get a chance and see England in any difficulty. On the contrary, if terms are arranged and independence is officially given up they will be unable to do so and will join us loyally.’ (Letter to Mr. Ralli.) CHAPTER LV Tue Cabinet, not unreasonably, declined to fix a date for the introduction of self-government, but, as Brodrick wrote on April 18, was disposed to be conciliatory as to the other two crucial points raised by the Boers. Indeed, the generous amnesty and liberal money grants for the re-settlement of the country might well have huffed some over-susceptible loyalists. The fateful meeting of the two Boer Governments and the sixty delegates took place on May 15 at Vereeniging, on the border of the two States. Relying on Kitchener’s promise that com- mandos which had sent their leaders to the Confer- ence should be immune from attack, the burghers had shrewdly elected as their representatives all their principal commanders. Steyn put in an appearance at the meeting, but, though his courage was as high and his brain as clear as ever, he was too weak and ill to take any active part in the proceedings. At the outset it seemed as if De Wet had succeeded in blighting the prospects of peace, for the Free State representatives and some of the Northern and Western Transvaalers had received an explicit order to stand fast by their independence. Schalk Burger led off the debate, and was at pains to save time and breath by reminding the Conference that the 95 96 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. British Government would decline to listen to any terms which in the slightest degree implied Boer independence. This did him the more credit, as he must have recognised that he might have to choose between the tragedy of a renewed struggle and the odium of a separate surrender. After the reading of a rather musty letter from the delegates in Europe, Botha rose and shrewdly cut at the root of the war party’s case by raising the nice legal ques- tion whether the delegates were absolutely tied by their mandates, thus throwing on the Free Staters the responsibility of forcing the Transvaalers to make peace without them. Hertzog, as a judge, declared that in law a delegate’s hands could not be tied—that as a plenipotentiary he must have an unfettered discretionary right to follow his own judgement. Smuts agreed with his learned friend, and the solid opinion of the two lawyers made a big dent in the irreconcilables’ armour. Botha at once followed up his advantage by drawing a gloomy picture of the condition of the Transvaal, where, although some districts could still hold out for a few weeks longer, others were already about to touch starvation point. Of the 11,000 Transvaal burghers in the field nearly 3000 had lost their horses, and their fighting strength had in the last twelve months been reduced by something like 40 per cent. The condition of the women—now no longer under British protection —was pitiable, and the attitude of the natives threatening. The whole situation cried aloud for immediate peace. Smuts, for his part, was fain to say that he definitely despaired of any success in Cape Colony. De Wet spoke tersely but fiercely, LV BOTHA’S ARGUMENTS 97 and declared that fighting was as practicable—and therefore as incumbent upon good Free Staters—as it had been a year earlier. ‘The now rather bewildered delegates, swayed hither and thither by the alternate arguments, were sorely tried in their endeavours to represent con- scientiously the views of their respective bodies of constituents. For the rest of the day and through- out the next the debate oscillated, one interesting fact emerging incidentally—the effectiveness of the blockhouse line in hindering inter-communication be- tween the commandos. It was not until the close of the second day that Kemp’s and De Wet’s invective was effectively countered by Schalk Burger, and the scale turned by Botha and De la Rey. Expanding his old, and expounding some new, arguments, Botha dwelt on the overmastering menace of the block- houses, the critical stage of the food trouble, the extreme shortage of horses, the enhanced sufferings of the women. The hope of intervention from abroad was as dead as that of internal trouble in Cape Colony, and British determination was as palpable as Boer discontent. De la Rey, whom De Wet with cool effrontery claimed on his side, was no less sagacious in counsel than he had been chivalrous in the field. He knew that with a word he could induce his followers to fight to a finish, but he was too shrewd—and too humane—to utter it. He personally could fight on—such was his contribution to the debate—but the Boer peoples could not. Let them beware lest, if the offer now made were refused, a far worse thing should befall them. De Wet bitterly taunted the Transvaalers with VOL. II H 98 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. abandoning a struggle which they had started and in which they had involved their friends of the Free State. With his fanatic ery of ‘‘This is a war of religion’’ the second day’s session broke up. On the 17th Smuts and Hertzog presented a draft proposal on four points: (1) Relations with Foreign Powers to be ended; (2) A British Protectorate to be established; (3) Swaziland, Witwatersrand, and other terri- tory to be ceded to the British; (4) A Defensive Alliance to be concluded with Great Britain. The draft was approved by the delegates, and a Commission, composed of Botha, De la Rey, and De Wet, together with Smuts and Hertzog, was deputed to negotiate at Pretoria with plenary powers to act as seemed best on the spot. On May 19 the Commission submitted to Kitchener and Milner these fresh suggestions, which Smuts and Hertzog endeavoured with ingenious casuistry to represent as not substantially differing from the British terms. Milner pulled them up short with a stern demand for a straight ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to the British pro- posals, which Smuts wished to consider as only a basis for negotiation. This drew from Kitchener the barbed remark that, supposing the new Boer proposals were granted, they would be at one an- other’s throats before a year was out. At this hectic moment luncheon intervened and afforded an hour for reflection. Before the afternoon conference Smuts had an informal talk with the two Englishmen, from which issued Milner’s suggestion that a form of document should be submitted to the burghers for a definite decision. De Wet as a matter of course Lv PEACE TERMS DRAFTED 99 was open-mouthed in protest, and a deadlock again threatered. It then occurred to Kitchener that fatal friction might be avoided if the military ele- ment were eliminated from the discussion and the settlement entrusted to a purely civil sub-committee. The suggestion was adopted, and the lawyers set to work—Milner, with Solomon at his elbow, was to confer with Smuts and Hertzog as to drafting an acceptable formula approximately on the lines laid down by Botha. For two long days Milner and his legal adviser matched their wits against the Boer lawyers. A concession was made to Boer sentiment; the new draft provided, not for a declaration of submission, but for a joint treaty, and the Boer signatories were described as acting on behalf of the Republics. To that extent in the preamble the fact of annexation was ignored; but this was more than compensated for by the opening clause, which promised that “‘the burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in their possession or under their control, and desist from any further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King Edward VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign.’’ The fact of annexation was here fully recognised, and in the second clause the late Republics were simply de- scribed as the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. Except in minor details, there were only two points in which the new draft differed from the Middelburg terms. The first related to the treatment of the Natal and Cape Colony rebels. The Boers could have no desire to interfere between the British Gov- ernment and its rebellious subjects, and it was now 100 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. settled that the Colonial Governments concerned should deal with the matter. The second was a more complicated question, and related to the payment of the debts, receipts, and war losses of the late Republics. Kitchener, deter- mined that anyhow the chances of reconciliation should not be vitiated by any haggling over a petty question of cash, telegraphed on May 21: We have been through deepest waters to-day on a point about which I do not quite agree with the position Milner took up. Article XI., as arranged by Milner, stated that a million would be given for notes issued by the Transvaal during the war; the Free State issued none, and only gave receipts, and was not considered at all when the Middelburg million was settled. All the Commission have expressed themselves most strongly, and said that they would not recommend peace unless we redeem the receipts as well as notes. They consider that, had they raised a loan, they could have paid everything in cash, and we should be re- sponsible ;—that their not having done so does not relieve us of the moral responsibility of paying just debts after full investigation before a judicial Commission. They argue that we have taken everything, and therefore left them abso- lutely no means to redeem receipts which they as officers gave by the authority of their Government, and feel this very deeply as a slur on their honour. If they had anything left they would not ask, but we having taken all, the debts they guaranteed become worthless unless we keep them, and they cannot go back to their people unless this point is conceded. Milner argues that we are not called upon to pay the ex- penses of the war waged against us, and that they had brought this on themselves by losing, and that he could not agree to any modification. I tried to get a limit fixed to cover all notes and receipts, and eventually they said three LV POLICY OF RECONCILIATION 101 millions would be sufficient ; and, if it was not, they agreed to a pro rata reduction. All other points suggested by Mil- ner were agreed to, and the Commission’s modification to Article XI. was introduced into the document which is being sent you. I told them that the extra two millions would be probably deducted from the sum to be allowed to re-establish farms, but they did not mind this argument at all, and only wished receipts paid. I judge it is vital to peace to grant this as it stands. Botha, De la Rey, and De Wet all practi- cally said they would not otherwise make peace, and this was written down by their secretaries, and will be known, of course, by all the irreconcilables. If the document is ap- proved by Government as it stands, I think we have every chance of peace quickly. CHAPTER LVI Tue Conference met again on May 28, and the final decision of the British Government was communi- cated to the Boer delegates. The draft treaty was practically unaltered, except as regards the financial clause, and the insertion of a proviso that persons who had been guilty of acts contrary to the usages of warfare should be tried by court-martial. The financial clause—to Milner’s satisfaction— was relieved of ‘‘compensation,’’ and the three mil- lions were now to be described as a ‘‘free gift’’ to be spent by local committees in each district on bringing the Boers back to their homesteads, and on the relief of persons who had been reduced to poverty by war losses—this to include National Scouts who had sided with the British. Milner impressed on the delegates that this document was absolutely final. It had to be submitted to the Convention just as it stood for a direct reply yea or nay. A definite period of three days was allowed for a definite answer to be given— this to expire on the evening of May 31. Steyn received the Commission in his tent and, before resigning his office of President of the Free State, shot his last bolt in a fierce denunciation of the treaty. The Report of the Commission was then read out to the Convention with the text of the draft treaty. A stream of questions followed the reading, and for two days the discussion dragged on. Kemp 102 CHAP. LVI THE BOER SUBMISSION 103 and Muller still held out, but their cooler brethren thought the terms too tempting to be sniffed at, and the Free Staters, turning their backs on De Wet, lent a willing ear to the new conditions. On the morning of the 31st Kitchener telegraphed, ‘‘Reports from Vereeniging state that a majority for peace is al- most certain.”’ Yet at that very minute a new cleavage had ap- peared between the two States. For a moment it looked as if ‘‘ Pull devil, pull baker,’’ would again be the order of the day, the deputy for part of Bloem- fontein—one Nieuhardt—moving the rejection of the British terms, while Piet Viljoen urged their accept- ance. But at this tense moment the totally unex- pected occurred. De Wet, who in the early morning had been strenuously talked to, and successfully talked over, by Botha and De la Rey, startled every- body by suddenly pronouncing for peace. His con- version was as complete as it was rapid, and at a hur- riedly convened meeting in his own tent he hustled all but half-a-dozen ‘‘last-ditchers’’ into voting with the peace majority. The motion was carried at 5.30 p.m. by 54 votes to 6, and Schalk Burger sounded a note of dignity at the obsequies of Boer independence: We are standing here at the grave of the two Republics. Much yet remains to be done, although we shall not be able to do it in the official capacities which we have formerly oc- cupied. Let us not draw our hands back from the work which it is our duty to accomplish. Let us ask God to guide us, and to show us how we shall be enabled to keep our na- tion together. We must be ready to forget and to forgive whenever we meet our brethren. That part of our nation which has proved unfaithful we must not reject. The commissioners hurried with their priceless 104 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. message of peace to Pretoria, and that night Kitch- ener telegraphed: The document containing terms of peace was signed here this evening at 10.30 p.m. by all Boer representatives as well as by Milner and myself. Brodrick added to the official message of thanks some welcome words of his own: You will have received the telegram expressing the thanks of His Majesty’s Government to Lord Milner and you, but I hope I may express the high sense which we entertain of your services throughout the negotiations. The last eight- een months have brought me much emphatic testimony about the confidence with which the Army in South Africa regards you as its Chief, and I am sure you will be glad to hear that the terms of surrender, in framing which you have had such a large share, appear thoroughly acceptable to the Public here. JI must also thank you personally for your frank correspondence, and unvarying helpfulness in all our difficulties. (2.6.02.) I am very grateful for all the rewards that have been showered upon me [Kitchener replied], but really what one feels is the sense of relief and security that no more regret- table incidents will occur. It was the fear of what might happen any minute that made life so unendurable. Thank God, that is all over now, and the end, I am glad to say, is equally well received on both sides. (8.6.02.) ‘‘We are good friends now,’’ said the British General to Botha, with a sigh of satisfaction that the very weary warfare was accomplished: he was think- ing perhaps how little had been required for a recon- ciliation fourteen months ago, and how little had been gained by either side in the interval. Yet it was something to the good that the burghers had come— LVI PEACE SIGNED 105 however reluctantly—to know, and above all to trust, the man who, twelve years later, was to rouse them again to battle and range them in line with the great armies he himself would call into being. At no time had Kitchener any idea of approaching the Boers with a corn-bin in one hand and a halter in the other. His main policy had been constructive rather than punitive. He set himself to master in fair fight, so that he might afterwards bring within the liens of a common interest ripening into a common loyalty a whole nation of fiery and faithful patriots. Most certainly he never entertained the theory—characteristically laid down just then by the German Staff—that the total intellectual and mate- rial resources of an enemy State must be destroyed. He felt rather that for the Boer Republics the prob- able alternative to union with England was vassal- dom to Germany, and was honestly convinced that a British-Boer union was possible, would redound to the benefit of both Boer and Briton, and would go far to settle the ‘‘Black’’ question. But if political independence was to be taken from the Boers with one hand, it was to be restored to them in a new and more secure form with the other. The change of status from a Republic to a British Dominion would leave democratic freedom untouched and with Brit- ish insurance added. ‘*The trial of strength,’’ Sir Bartle Frere had once told Lord Carnarvon, ‘‘will surely be forced upon you, and no good will be gained by postponement of it, if only we start with a good cause.’’ The cause for which Kitchener had worked till physical energy was almost exhausted, and nerves strained almost to 1 During the Zulu War, 1879, 106 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. snapping point, was neither that of the Kimberley diamond dealer nor that of the Uitlander on the Rand. He looked, and laboured, for a South Africa pacificata, a South Africa amica, who would harness all her energy to England’s efforts in the years when that effort would surely be made. He knew that unconditional surrender and a dictated peace could produce no true amity. He said at Johannesburg: There may be individuals amongst our former opponents whose characteristics and methods we do not like or approve of; but, judged as a whole, they are, I maintain, a virile race and an asset of first-rate importance to the British Empire, for whose honour and glory they may I hope before long be fighting side by side with us. Having fought and won, he sought to bring about a generous peace on the basis of mutual agreement, the only peace which he believed would serve to form an indissoluble bond. History may be trusted to assign their due to each of the triumvirate responsible for our conduct in South Africa during those three fateful years which opened at Bloemfontein in May 1899 and closed at Pretoria in May 1902. More particularly will mil- tary history draw the right distinction between the responsibility of command which Kitchener had to face and that which had confronted Roberts. It seems ungracious to insist, but it is irrefutably true, that the optimistic utterances of the latter before embarking for home tended to obscure the real situa- tion from the country, and that, all unwittingly, the great soldier cheapened his own legacy to his suc- cessor. Roberts arrived in England to receive an ovation which was abundantly deserved, but also to foster hopes which were unfortunately premature. LyI FUSING BRITON AND BOER 107 As early as October 1900 Rhodes had told the South African League that military complexities could be disregarded and attention concentrated on the best method of fusing Briton and Boer under our flag. Buller, who still had an immense public follow- ing, on his return in November assured us that the Boers no longer had any commander of distinction in the field, and that our troops need only hunt down a few desperadoes. To these dicta Roberts’s pro- nouncement a month later in Natal unhappily set his seal. Public opinion was for a time sadly at fault in South Africa as well as at home, although it is certain that to Milner and Kitchener the new—and true— conditions were painfully evident. Kitchener’s load was at least as heavy as that which had been laid on . his predecessor. Roberts had gone to South Africa the idol of the people, the chosen of the Government, the great leader of men who would surely wipe out the national discredit of previous failure and regild the rather tarnished prestige of our arms. He was to fight battles on the great scale and win spectacular successes with masses of men. Kitchener stepped in when operations in the field could arouse but scant enthusiasm—all the fizz and fun of fighting had evap- orated. No room existed for striking achievements; there were to be no more Paardebergs or Mafekings. It only remained to round up a few commandos and wind up a languishing campaign—a duty which Kitchener was expected to carry out, more suo, promptly and cheaply. During the next year and a half feeling at home underwent many disappoint- ments; and although confidence in the Commander- in-Chief was never impaired, the process of disillu- sion as to the war was painful, and the drafts on the 108 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER caape. tv public patience were considerable and constant. But there was also a faction—numerically very weak but vocally very strong—which, bent on misrepresenting Kitchener’s actions, construed his measures, born of sheer necessity, into methods of barbarism. There had always been people who honestly be- lieved that the Boers were in the right; there were political partisans who hated Chamberlain; there were the Irish Nationalists who hated England; there was the type of person known in long after years as Pacifist ; and behind all these there may quite conceiv- ably have been an active foreign-fed anti-British propaganda. This combination was able to invoke and exploit the characteristically British sentiment of humanity, holding Kitchener up to odium for the steps which he was forced to take towards finality. Englishmen naturally abhorred the idea of burning homesteads, of cattle-driving, of destroying crops— however well-proven it might be that the Boer farms were at once supply-stores and armouries. Both in Parliament and in the Press the man responsible was denounced as cruel and callous—not only for what he had done, but for what he was erroneously, and some- times malignantly, alleged to have done. Here, as always, his admirers, who were many, were his devoted champions; his critics, who were few, detracted little from his fame, nothing from his character. That character stood undimmed by any attempt to cast_a slur on it, but the quick sympathy which was in truth one of its chief ingredients was necessarily mated to an unsuspected sensitiveness, and wounds, though unheeded, were never unfelt. CHAPTER LVII KitcHENER arrived in Cape Town on June 23, and sailed for home on the Orotava the same day. The South African capital gave him a warm welcome, and at a farewell luncheon he put in a strong plea: ‘‘ Now that peace has come I ask you to put aside all racial feelings, and all Leagues and Bonds, and strive for the welfare of your common Colony.’’ The whole- some advice was taken, and exactly a month later in the same city, and almost in the same words, Louis Botha was emphasising the necessity of Dutch and English working hand in hand. Kitchener’s last words in South Africa were a tribute to Milner: We all have confidence in Lord Milner. For nearly three years I have worked in close connection with him, and I may say that our old friendship, which existed prior to my going to South Africa, has only been strengthened and increased by the time of stress through which we have passed together. The day after the Orotava had sailed, King Ed- ward underwent a serious operation. The Corona- tion, which had been fixed for that week, was of ne- cessity postponed, and Kitchener, who arrived in London on July 12, found himself summoned to the King’s sick-room to receive the Order of Merit, of which he was one of the original twelve members. The holding up of the festivities had produced an 109 110 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. air of gloom and anxious expectancy in London; but the holiday crowds, now assured that the King’s re- covery was only a matter of time, made Kitchener a popular hero. He was accorded the same honours as had been given to Lord Roberts, the Heir Apparent meeting him on his arrival, and as representing the Sovereign entertaining him at luncheon at St. James’s Palace. The whole route from Paddington to the Palace was lined by British and Colonial troops, and by representatives of the Indian Army among whom his duties were soon to lie; and the streets were packed by people, anxious to give a cheer to the man who was now recognised as the foremost soldier of the day. And at the Coronation a month later it was his figure, next to that of the King himself, which was most eagerly sought by the mass of onlookers on that sultry 9th of August. South Africa had not driven Egypt far back in Kitchener’s mind. Among the inevitable crowd of addresses and public congratulations which greeted him, one of the first was that from the Borough of Paddington. It happened that the Mayor of the bor- ough for that year was Sir John Aird, whose firm had constructed the Nile barrage at Assuan, and Kitchener’s first question as he stepped on to the platform was, ‘‘How’s the dam?”’ And a few weeks later, when presented with the freedom of the Grocers’ Company and a gift of cups, he ‘‘thought that he would leave the speech-making’”’ to his fellow-guest Mr. Chamberlain, but thanked his hosts for their continued interest in Gordon College, and assured them that the cups would be ‘‘useful in India.”’ There was no chance of escape from the ritual of LVII ARRIVAL IN LONDON 111 public dinners with the ensuing sacrifice of the emi- nent guest, the most cherished of all our institutions ; but the patience of audiences was not tried by long speeches. The Times reported him verbatim and in the first person—the final journalistic admission of greatness—but an industrious computation shows that the whole of his public remarks during three months in England occupy less space in that journal than one speech by Lord Rosebery or Mr. Asquith. But he spoke from his heart at Welshpool on September 7, when he urged on the old soldiers who had fought with him in South Africa ‘‘the great importance of not forgetting what you have learnt, and how greatly a man, whatever his spirit and pluck, is handicapped by want of training in a fight. You will therefore realise with me how essential it is that the young men of the country should join the military forces and become trained by those who have reaped experience during this war, so that they may in their turn be ready, if the necessity should arise, to take their places as trained men in the ranks. You must not forget that we shall not always have, nor do we wish to have, a war that lasts long enough to train our men during the campaign.’’ He spent his short vacation in a round of country- house visits. Powis, Hatfield, Welbeck, Wynyard, Knowsley, Whittingehame—Mr. Balfour had just become Prime Minister—alternated with a shooting trip to County Donegal, and—what appealed to him most—a visit to his maternal home at Aspall. In these brief weeks of recreation the soldier was learning with his usual painstaking some of those lessons of the social life from which his busy career 112 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. abroad had shut him out. He was by no means insensible to its attractions; nor was he one of those uncomfortable guests whom hostesses know too well, who insist on bringing their own preoccupations with them into every house they visit, and who give the impression that the world would stop were they to cease their appointed and burdensome round of business. Kitchener’s brain might be working all the time at the military problems of the future, but he gave no indication of it to his fellow-guests; when there was nothing to do, he made no pretence of doing it. He neither loafed nor seemed preoccupied. But the impressions made on him at this time were permanent. The peaceful charm of English country life and, what is not quite the same thing, of country-house life, appealed to him strongly; and when he left for the Kast that autumn he had already made up his mind that on his return he would buy a place of his own. For the rest, apart from his visit to Chatham— ‘‘which every Sapper must regard as the home of his youth’’—and Liverpool, where he was imperative as to the need of finding employment for discharged soldiers, he spoke as little as possible; and at Wel- beck, where he was asked ‘‘to say a few words about agriculture’’ before the local Agricultural Society, he frankly excused himself on the ground that ‘‘they knew a great deal more about that than he did.’’ His last public appearance on this visit was at Liverpool on October 11. His appointment to the office of Commander-in-Chief in India had been pub- lished for some weeks, but there were no indications of an immediate departure, and no announcements in the newspapers of the arrangements for that LvII TO KHARTUM AND INDIA 113 rather pompous leave-taking traditionally associated with those appointed to high military or adminis- trative command overseas. The reality was widely different. On the morning of Friday, October 17, twenty minutes before the boat train left Victoria, the railway officials were notified that a compartment which had been booked in the name of Mr. Cook would be occupied by Lord Kitchener. Shortly before the hour of departure, he appeared at the station, accompanied only by two personal friends; there was no retinue of offi- cials and attendants—not even a man-servant—and neither the passengers at Victoria nor the other travellers on the train were aware that this quiet farewell, less ostentatious than that often associated with a family trip to the Riviera or Switzerland, marked the beginning of the new period of military reform in India. The newspapers, baulked of their legitimate prey, remarked that in Paris two days later Kitchener went to Chantilly races and the theatre, but refused to grant the French correspondents an interview; on October 27, after spending a night in Rome, he landed in Egypt. The next few days were given to an inspection of the Assuan dam, which was traversed in trollies, and a visit to the Sudan, where he opened the Gordon College at Khartum on November 8. Here indeed, on a subject that lay so near his heart, he spoke at more length than he had ever done in those formal and perhaps rather irksome replies to congratulations in England. He once again em- phasised the need of education in the Sudan, and expressed himself fully satisfied with the founda- tions that had been laid; he remarked that he ‘‘could VOL. II I 114 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cmar.1vn not expect quicker progress—but was content to wait patiently for the future.’’ Ten years later he had the opportunity of seeing how far his hopes had been justified. A week later, after the inevitable banquet and garden-party at Cairo, he sailed for India. On the voyage he employed himself usefully in studying Hindustani,.and—from the biographer’s point of view—lamentably in strewing the Red Sea with the accumulated private correspondence of a quarter of a century. Perhaps he realised that the end of a period in his life had been reached, and he was now to be called upon to occupy his business in the greater waters of statesmanship. CHAPTER LVIII KITCHENER Was now vested with a command which had been the desire of his heart, and he must see to it that the choice was justified. He had served a good apprenticeship in Palestine and Cyprus, Egypt and the Sudan. His experience of authority during the next twelve years was rich in opportunity for strengthening a strong character and bracing the self-reliance of a public servant who could combine implicit loyalty to his chief with entire willingness to accept responsibility. His mental powers expanded and quickened with constant exercise, and while his companions noted his growth of character, his com- patriots at home marked him as the coming man. As Sirdar of the Egyptian Army he had effectively wrought to a high pitch of perfection some military material of fine quality but of doubtful stability. As ruler of the Sudan, carefully coached by Lord Cro- mer, he had mastered complex problems of civil government in a non-civilised community. The or- deal had been crucial; he emerged from it famous. The strenuous years behind him had proved him as a soldier and an administrator—the incident of Fashoda had disclosed the latent qualities of the diplomat. Much was expected of him in South Africa, where the task was in many ways more difficult, and per- 115 116 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. haps less to his taste, than any imposed upon him. Yet he not only set a satisfactory term to a long and bitter conflict, but sowed a seed of reconciliation which was to germinate and ripen into comradeship in arms in Europe and Africa alike. His work in India was to prove his powers in their full maturity. If in history his name will always be identified pri- marily with the creation of the new British Armies in the Great War, yet that achievement, for all its marvel and its miracle, was really the triumphant expansion of a military structure about which he had long been busy. And in that structure—solidly built and compacted to ensure the safety of the British Dominion in the stormy years which he saw ahead—a special prominence attaches to the sturdy ramparts he raised in India. As he often said, India was ‘‘England’s heel of Achilles,’’ and he re- garded its military security—next to that of the United Kingdom—as the chief factor in an effective system of Imperial defence. If Kitchener did much for India, India did much for him. Always a learner, he imbibed there lessons of life which stood him in good stead in the other high posts he was to be ealled to occupy. His already broad outlook broadened largely. With no diminution of strength or steadfastness his character mellowed; and its apparent hardness, never more than skin deep, was dissipated in the hitherto unex- plored interests of life which he at last permitted himself to penetrate and enjoy. Above all, his en- deavours to serve England’s great Asiatic Depend- ency were a preparation for and a prelude to his supreme effort to make England herself the domi- nant military power. LVIII THE INDIAN COMMAND 117 Although to become British Agent at Cairo had for years been his dream, Kitchener had made no secret of his more immediate wish to be posted to the Indian Command. Soon after the victory of Omdurman he was saying to Lord Roberts, ‘‘I have let the War Office know that later I should like an Indian billet,’’ and in 1900 his succession to the Command in India was already being canvassed. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon, wrote to him that summer: I heard the other day privately from home that you are to be our next Commander-in-Chief in India. I know well, from our conversations before I left England, how greatly set your heart has been upon Indian service, and I can truly say that I have not myself been backward in assisting you to realise your ambition. The Viceroy proffered his hearty support to the prospective Commander-in-Chief, assuring him that the force of his personality would overcome the tra- ditional jealousy between the Indian and the Home Services which every selection for the supreme com- mand was liable to revive: The Indian Army will regard itself highly complimented by the selection of a soldier of your great reputation as its Chief; and you will before long, by personal visits to all parts of India, and by inspection of all classes of native troops, ingratiate yourself with them and show your per- sonal concern in their welfare. Nor did he hesitate to admit that it was high time to set the military house in perfect order: I will not conceal from you that there are many respects in which Army administration in India seems to me capable of great reform, and in regard to which I look forward with 118 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. much confidence to the benefit of your vast energy and great experience. I see absurd and uncontrolled expenditure; I observe a lack of method and system; I detect slackness and jobbery ; and in some respects I lament a want of fibre and tone. Upon all these matters I shall have many oppor- tunities of speaking to you, and of suggesting abundant openings for your industry and force. This letter, however, was held back, the ‘‘private information’? being premature, and the reversion of the Indian Command remaining unsettled. In November! Kitchener, before taking over command in South Africa, wired to Mr. Brodrick at the War Office: ‘‘Am anxious to get India; can you help?”’ For the moment the help was withheld. Queen Vic- toria—well aware that, while Kitchener wanted to get the Indian Command, Mr. Brodrick wanted to get him to the War Office—wrote cryptically on December 14: ‘‘Upon the very important question of Lord Kitchener’s ultimate employment, here or elsewhere, the Queen thinks it not possible to decide anything yet.’’ But her Minister wrote more plainly: I have known for some time that you wish to go to India, and can assure you that, so far as I can assist to serve your wishes in any way, I will try to do so. But there is a very strong feeling, not only in the Cabinet, but outside, that your 1 Some weeks later Roberts wrote to him: ‘‘Please wire if you would like to have command of one of the Army Corps. ... We are going to divide the Home Army into Six Army Corps, and I will keep the Salisbury Plain for you, if you like—always supposing India is an impossibility.”” (25.1.01.) Kitchener wrote to thank Roberts for this offer, which he felt unable to accept: “When this is over I think I shall require a rest for a while. I have had practically no leave for a very long time, and I think I shall want a thorough change. I do not think, therefore, I should be available for a Command in England, and as the Indian Command is evidently impossible, some more civil work—after a time—would be more what I should look forward to. I daresay I may some day find my way back to Egypt again.” (16.2.01.) LVI INVITED TO WHITEHALL 119 presence at the War Office, as soon as you can be spared from South Africa, would give much confidence. . . . The oceasion is almost unique. The chance of reorganising the Army is not likely to recur in your lifetime, or mine, under similar conditions. You have the most recent and extended experience of any General in our service, or indeed in the world, of campaigns, since you have been at the centre both of Egyptian and South African expeditions. If you go to India, we should scarcely be able to avail ourselves of your experience at all. . . . If it influences you at all, I may say I have not taken the War Office with a view to half-measures. . . . You may not perhaps always have a Secretary of State who feels as strongly as I do the necessities of the case. But argument, coaxing, and drab visions of pos- sible unemployment were alike impotent to draw Kitchener a single step towards the War Office. To a friend who had been semi-officially asked to inter- vene, he wrote: Wyndham suggests my going to the War Office; I would sooner sweep a crossing. . . . I have no intention of going to the War Office in any capacity; so if India goes to any one else I shall have what I really want—a good long rest; and perhaps it will be the end of my military career. .. . Re- garding the work, it is not easy to explain, but I should be a hopeless failure at the War Office, under the existing admin- istration. . . . If I am not fit for India I am not fit for any- thing else. . . . But, as you say, I must not do what I wish, but what is good for the country. Jam quite willing to sac- rifice myself if I could do good. I sometimes wish I could get a bullet through my brain, as some of my best friends have had. For a while the issue lay between India and the Retired List, and after an unbroken spell of thirty years’ work the latter prospect was not devoid of 120 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. attraction. ‘‘You are splendidly indignant,’’ Kitch- ener wrote from Pretoria to Mr. Ralli in January 1901, ‘‘at my wanting a little rest after fifteen years’ continuous service, with only my short leaves. Why should a poor fellow like me have no pleasure or no time in his life to himself? But I am afraid I am grumbling again—I didn’t mean to.”’ The magnet of congenial work, however, proved irresistible ; he soon returned to the charge, and with better success: I fully recognise that my lack of experience of India ren- ders it difficult to place me at the head of military affairs there. Still, some Indian officers have told me that they considered it would be an excellent thing for the Indian Army to have some one in command who was not used to Indian routine, and could look at military matters from a larger standpoint than that of India alone. Also it is not unlikely that before long serious trouble may occur in India, which is really our heel of Achilles, and [ had therefore hoped to have the opportunity of gaining sufficient experience to be of use if war broke out. I fear that it was somewhat presumptuous on my part to look for- ward to the Indian Command; but after Lord Roberts’s recommendation I certainly did hope for it. I feel sure that I am not the man for the War Office, that I should be of very little use, and that I should be a certain failure. This is my personal conviction... If after talking the matter over with Lord Roberts, you feel that my want of experience in India might be overcome, so as not to stand in my way, I know you will do what you can for me. What- ever happens I shall always be grateful to you. 1 Four years later, when Mr. Brodrick had exchanged the War Office for the Indian Office, and was once again Lord Kitchener’s official chief, he resumes the topic in a prophetic vein: “After every one has failed [at the” War Office] there will be a call for some one, and you will not be able to avoid the War Office for ever!’ LVIII THE ATTRACTION OF INDIA 121 Mr. Brodrick, finding he could not lure his friend to Whitehall, was determined not to lose him for India, and Kitchener could write to him from Pre- toria: ‘‘Many thanks for the trouble you have taken on my behalf in arranging the Indian Command. I had almost given up hope of ever going to India, and now I feel there is still a chance of doing so, if all goes well out here.”’ In March 1901 the Viceroy took from his drawer the allocution he had composed eight months before, and in forwarding it exhorted Lord Kitchener in cordial terms not to postpone his coming longer than could be helped. Stress was laid on the fact that 1903 would be the fifth and—as was then supposed, the last—year of the writer’s tenure of office, and on the impossibility of crowding into it the necessary concerted efforts. The Viceroy proposed, but events disposed; for South Africa held Kitchener fast till the summer of 1902, and Lord Curzon’s final de- parture from India was postponed till 1905. CHAPTER LIX THE incoming Commander-in-Chief landed in India on November 28, 1902, in time to act as chief umpire at the Delhi Manceuvres—which impressed him as being curiously unlike war—and to put a few final military touches to the Coronation Durbar which the Viceroy was preparing with meticulous care and on a magnificent scale. ‘‘Let me say,’’ the Viceroy had written to him just before he left England, ‘‘ with what pleasure I am looking forward to the co-opera- tion in Indian government of the foremost soldier in the British Army.’’ Kitchener’s name and fame had of course preceded him, but there were sinister auguries that he would be handicapped by his own masterful temperament, no less than by his lack of Indian service. He was believed to have come pledged to carry out ‘‘preconceived notions,’’ and to be bent on drastic changes without pausing to learn local conditions. The criticism was only partly true in form, and wholly misleading in substance. The preconceived notions were that ‘‘an efficient army is simply an insurance against national disaster’’; that ‘‘expendi- ture of money on an inefticient army can no more be defended than the payment of premiums to an in- solvent company’’; and that ‘‘on sound business principles the efficiency of an army ought to be pur- chased at the lowest possible price.’’? And, far from 122 CHAP. LIX ARRIVAL IN INDIA 123 hustling on reforms, Kitchener with characteristic caution looked well about him before pronouncing any opinions—let alone proposing any changes. Quick to act when the moment for action had come, no one knew better how to play a waiting game. He never dawdled, but he never hurried; and the greater the object in view, the better able he was to exercise patience. Long delays which he judged in- evitable left him calm; little delays which he thought avoidable were apt tofret him. Ten laborious years were spent in preparing for the day when Gordon should be avenged. The recurring disappointments incidental to the wearisome winding-up of the South African campaign only stiffened his quiet determina- tion to see it through. But to be held up at a London street crossing was liable to be a provocation; to be detained for a few moments’ unnecessary conversa- tion was apt to rank as a real grievance. A new Commander-in-Chief was bound to form some first impressions. It needed no long Indian ex- perience to perceive how little had been done towards rendering our forces in India, during the critical first year of a campaign, independent of home assistance. It was patent, even to a newcomer, that Army Head- quarters were paper-logged with a plethora of corre- spondence and minute-writing, and its work impeded by the defective co-ordination of departments and the overlapping of their functions. Lord Curzon himself had written to Kitchener before his arrival: ‘**‘T regard military administration in India as bound up in interminable writing and over-centralisation, from which I have been doing my best to relieve it.’’ And not long after taking up his command Kitchener entirely endorsed this judgement: 124 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. I find I have hardly a moment here in this awful system of doing nothing but write Minutes, which apparently makes up the government of India! To get anything done, how- ever small, under the present system is the work of a life- time; and, as soldiers only hold their billets for five years, the result is evident, and is apparently exactly what the Government of India like. Some of my Minutes are, I fear, getting me disliked, as I cannot help pointing out how ab- surd the system is. (Letter to a friend, 11.3.03.) One step had to be taken quickly which, though of a revolutionary character, met with general approval. It had for some time been recognised that many bat- talions of the Indian Army fell short of the average standard, and that these defects were due to racial shortcomings. The historic cause of this inequality is easily traceable. In the early years of the Hast India Company’s rule constant wars in the Carnatic and the Dekkan gave a ‘‘bellyful’’ of fighting to the Bombay and Madras armies, and warlike adventur- ers from Upper India were constantly attracted to their ranks. But the conquest of Mysore and the overthrow of the Mahratta power shifted the focus of military activity from the south to the north, and Madras and Bombay soldiers found their occupation only in garrison duty. It came about that their re- cruits were enlisted from classes remarkable for cleanliness, docility, and aptitude in drill rather than for martial qualities. Meanwhile the conquest of the Punjab and the subsequent occupation of the Trans- Indus territory brought the Bengal Army into con- tact with the hardy Punjabis and the fierce tribesmen of the North-West Frontier, and incessant military activity afforded the officers opportunities of distine- tion and a practical training for war which were LIX RE-NUMBERING REGIMENTS 125 denied to their comrades in the other Presidencies. All this tended to damp the zeal and mar the efficiency of the Madras and Bombay armies, and not a little to foster jealousies between them and the Bengal Army. Nor did the post-Mutiny reorganisation of the Indian military system do anything to abate these heart- burnings, and service in the other Presidencies be- came increasingly unpopular. Young officers who were ambitious, or could wield influence, strained every nerve to be posted to the Bengal Staff Corps, with the result that the Madras and Bombay Staff Corps were always considerably under strength. The amalgamation of the three Staff Corps in 1891, the abolition of the Presidential armies in 1895, and the creation of Four Commands failed to pop- ularise military service in Madras and Bombay, the conditions of which remained unhealthily stagnant. The position in 1902 was that, though the old Presidential armies were defunct, the traditions and jealousies which had beset them were still very much alive in their successors. In two of the four Com- mands service was generally very popular. The keenest or best-befriended officers still made their way into Bengal or Punjab regiments, while the less ambitious aspirants or less favoured applicants had to soldier in Bombay or Madras. It was clearly un- desirable that certain units of the Indian Army should put on efficiency at the expense of the others; and in preparation for war a sound fighting level through- out the Army was infinitely preferable to a limited number of corps d’élite. Kitchener decided in favour of welding together all Indian units; this would en- tail renumbering the Native regiments in a uniform series and bringing their peace establishments up to 126 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. a uniform strength based on the requirements of the Field Army. He thought to increase the fighting value of the Indian Army by reconstituting nine Madras regiments into Punjabis, and five into Gur- khas, thus furnishing the North-West Frontier with fourteen sound battalions. And although Lord Ampthill, as Governor of Madras, pressed the polit- ical objection that the people of Southern India ought not to be deprived of the advantages of military serv- ice, he accepted the military counter-argument that “Gt is a well-known and incontrovertible fact that those natives of India who pass their lives in ease and prosperity, secure from outside incursions and war alarms, do unquestionably lose the qualities that make a good soldier.’’ And by keeping up so many of these regiments, the Indian Government was not only maintaining men with no fighting propensities, but was also ruining the professional zeal and effi- ciency of their young British officers. The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element in the Indian Army to preponderate un- duly. An increase in the Punjabi infantry had as its necessary sequel a further recruitment of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia, the Prime Minister of Nepal—an enthusiastic admirer of Kitchener—playing up splendidly in netting some 6000 Gurkhas in four years.* 1 Six years later the Maharaja of Nepal, as Marshal of the Nepal Army, ‘ was writing to Kitchener: ‘‘Your Excellency—tThe officers and men of the Nepal Army have been greatly elated and consider themselves highly honoured to reckon your Excellency as one of their Generals. They feel proud and elevated at the association of your Excellency’s illustrious name with them. I beg on behalf of myself and the other officers of the Nepal Army to present to your Excellency as a token of our sentiments a Nepalese LIx REGIMENTAL TITLES 127 The unification of the Army, besides securing par- ity of fighting value in the Native regiments, was also to do away with the persistent designation of regiments by their obsolete ‘‘Presidencies’’—a cus- tom both confusing and dangerous; one brigade on active service had actually contained three regiments bearing the same number! The new regimental des- ignations indicated the classes or countries from which corps were recruited, mention being no longer made of the former Presidential armies. Such titles as the ‘‘1st Bengal Infantry’’ or the ‘‘16th Bombay Infantry’’ disappeared, and in their place were adopted others, such as ‘‘1st Brahmans’’ or the “116th Mahrattas.’’ Scrupulous care was, more- over, taken in the re-numbering‘ to avoid wounding the esprit de corps of the Native regiments; the orig- inal numbers—or some association with them—were, whenever possible, retained, while historical titles were preserved and in many cases revived. The associations of regiments with famous leaders were perpetuated by appellations such as ‘‘Skinner’s Horse,’’ ‘‘Outram’s Rifles,’? or ‘‘Brownlow’s Punjabis,’’ which were added to the new regimental titles. For those Madras battalions who had fought with distinction in past wars was revived the name ‘“Carnatic.”’ Regulation Helmet with Plumes, as is worn by a General in the Nepalese ASI. 3 <2” 1“I am glad to say the Viceroy and Military Member both agree in the advisability of re-numbering the Indian Army as a whole. I am anxiously waiting your opinion on the papers Stanley took home before taking further steps. I am now assured if this is carried out I shall have all the Indian Army officers with me, and they will as you know carry with them the views of the Native officers and men. I am therefore in great hopes that this groundwork of organisation of the Indian Army will be sanctioned soon.” (Kitchener to Roberts, 12.2.03.) CHAPTER LX UNbERLYING all Kitchener’s thoughts for the future of India was the bedrock consideration of Defence. He determined to examine for himself her vulnerable side, and before he had been nine months in the country he had traversed the whole of the North- West Frontier. Circumstances had not suggested this feat to any of his predecessors, but to his then physical as well as mental activities the excursion was specially congenial. In the January of 1903 he made a preliminary inspection of the Tank, Wana, and Bannu sectors, and in February of the Khaibar Pass, Malakand, and Chakdarra. His larger tour was made in two jour- neys. With a fine contempt for the April heat he started from Nushki—far to the west of the hills round Quetta—and examined every pass and valley of importance from Baluchistan to the Khaibar, the route being by New Chaman, through the Zhob, Gumal, Tochi, and Kuram valleys, to Thal and Kohat. The inspections were in the nature of sur- prise visits, and the Commander-in-Chief, with only a small escort, penetrated into districts little known to any but Frontier officers. In August he tackled the northern section, through Gilgit,| Chitral, and Killa Drosh, to the lonely 1From Astok, a small village on the road to Gilgit, Kitchener wired to Hatfield for news of Lord Salisbury, who was gravely ill, and received an answer within four hours. } ; 128 cmap.tx TOUR OF THE FRONTIER 129 Shandur, Kilik, and Mintaka Passes, and on to the Pamirs. He wrote to Roberts from Chitral: We have had a delightful and very interesting tour so far, and I am very glad I came to these parts, and got an idea of the country. I went through Hunza and over the Mintaka Pass, sleep- ing one night in China on the Pamirs, and back next day over the Kilik Pass. We had to travel by very bad road over the mountains, as the river was too full to ford. Then back to Gilgit and on here by the same route as Kelly took when he marched to the relief of this place. We were received to-day with the wildest firing of match- locks and the mehter’s guns, bands, etc., which nearly drove my horse out of its senses. I start to-morrow for the Dorah Pass, shall then see the troops at Killa Drosh, and back to Gilgit via the Bolrogil Pass and the Darcot glacier. I expect to be back at Simla on October 24. The travelling was strenuous, nearly 1500 miles being covered in sixty days, and only at one place did the party pass two consecutive nights. Many of the excursions had to be made on foot over very rough ground, and this proved to be the last time Kitchener was able to walk any distance without great discomfort. During the tour he had time, while studying frontier problems at first hand, to digest the opinions of the experts to whom he lent a ready ear. He contrived also to sandwich between theours some useful talks with the Viceroy at Simla, on administrative topics, though he declined to draw up any definite proposals until he had occupied his post for at least a twelvemonth. 1 Four years later he wrote to Lady Salisbury: “I walked ten miles the o.her day, which is my record since my leg was broken. It was a painful experience, and I could not put my foot to the ground for the next two days, so I am not going to try it again.” VOL. II K 130 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. His first summer-time in India saw Kitchener’s social position happily established. The rumour which depicted him a stern and reckless innovator, prepared to trample on every tradition, was found to be no less fantastic than the picture which por- trayed him as a misanthrope and especially a mis- ogynist.1 A pleasant surprise was in store for Simla, where his appearance was sudden and un- expected. One afternoon ‘‘a burly sunburnt man’’ —as he was sketched—rode quietly in with a solitary companion, and next morning the station woke up to the fact that the Commander-in-Chief had arrived. Military officials made their way to their offices with unwonted punctuality, ‘‘a tall stranger riding down to join them there.’’ But outside business hours the Chief was found to be more than amenable to the Simla standard of hospitality. The ink was searcely dry in his visitors’ book before invitations began to flow out. Nor were these confined to a formal din- ner-party—the utmost that had been expected; a house-warming in the form of a ball was with char- acteristic promptitude arranged at Snowdon, and red-coated messengers were busy distributing the coveted cards. The ball made Kitchener’s reputa- tion as a host. He was evidently determined that his début in this capacity in India should be a sue- cess. He built out new rooms for the occasion, and was known to have thought out every detail and taken infinite personal pains to promote his guests’ 1 At a State banquet given in Kitchener’s honour at Bhopal by the Begum, his hostess was on the point of reading her address to him from behind a screen in the drawing-room, when Mrs. Bayley, the wife of the Resident, at Kitchener’s request, asked Her Highness to come into the dining-room. The Begum readily complied, coming forward and proposing Lord Kitchener’s health in the midst of the assembled company. Kitchener replied in a charming little speech (Pioneer Mail, April ’08). Lx HOSPITALITIES AT SIMLA 131 enjoyment. Those who nervously looked for a rather stand-offish reception were almost startled by the friendly greeting and the evident desire that everybody should have a good time in his house. And the reputed recluse soon showed himself abroad as a highly sociable personality. He was almost daily to be seen driving in a phaeton with a pair of fine English horses, a very smart A.D.C. by his side; and at dances, races, and polo he was a welcome figure, obviously interested in what was going on, and showing no inclination to retire into his official shell. Here is an opinion expressed of him at Simla that summer: His hand—the strong hand of one who decides slowly, but, having decided, pushes action surely to its goal, is beginning to appear in minor matters of military administration. He probes everything to the bottom. He is outspoken and gruff, but no one can fail to be impressed by the affection he inspires in those who are in contact with him. He at- taches the utmost importance to getting the best men avail- able into every appointment with which he has anything to do, irrespective of everything but efficiency. Formalities he dispenses with; minute writing he abhors. He has insti- tuted a weekly meeting of the heads of the great military de- partments to reduce inter-secretarial correspondence. He gets through an extraordinary amount of work with prob- ably less writing than any of his predecessors. This enables him to find time to take up long delayed schemes of reorgan- isation. He is to Lord Curzon what the broadsword is to the rapier. The confidence of the Native Army in him is growing. He is already the most popular man in India. CHAPTER LXI A cuosr study of the Army in India convinced the man charged with its efficiency that much in its exist- ing condition cried aloud for reform; that its dis- position, organisation, and methods of training were out of date; and that, though nothing like full value was being obtained from the fine material in his hands, public money was being lavished on objects which were obsolete. From the India Office itself came the suggestion that the distribution of troops—changed but little since the Mutiny—needed reconsideration. Units were scattered + throughout a large number of can- tonments, many of which no longer had either strategic or political importance. Regiments and battalions were isolated in small stations, with no opportunity of exercise with other arms; while, even in the larger stations, troops were grouped together with scant regard fe the exigencies either of com- bined training or of mobilisation. The existing organisation dated only from 1895, when tardy effect was given to the drastic recom- mendation of the 1879 Commission that the three 1 Kitchener wrote colloquially to Lady Salisbury: “The troops are all higgledy-piggledy over the country without any system or reason whatever. It will take years to get it right, but by working it out thoroughly we shall have a good plan and J hope make no more mistakes” (16.7.03). 3 cuaP.txt REDISTRIBUTION SCHEME 133 Armies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras should cease to exist as independent bodies, and form a single Army of India organised in four Commands and Districts. By this change unification of the Army was to some extent secured and Presidential control disappeared. But new conditions quickly arose; Baluchistan had been occupied and added to the Bombay Com- mand, while Upper Burma was absorbed in the Madras Command, although it had no geographical or political connection with Madras, or indeed any other Presidency. Moreover, by important changes in the numbers and composition of the Native Army, and by additions made to the British troops, the rela- tive strengths of the four Commands were rendered even more unequal than when the Commission sat. The partition of the Army into these Commands was therefore no longer aCministratively convenient, while the march of events had introduced conditions which made it organically defective. The Afghan War had shown that the Army in India was not suit- ably organised for operations of any magnitude. When Russia in 1883 occupied the Turkoman coun- try, seized Merv, and crept forward towards Herat, India had to prepare herself to speak effectively with an enemy, and the organisation of her military forces was found to be little short of chaotic. It had been recognised that a genuine field force was indispen- sable, but the numerous mobilisation schemes put forward from time to time to meet this requirement only emphasised, without remedying, the radical un- soundness of the distribution of the Army. The question of distribution split itself into two main problems :—(1) the Maintenance of the Internal 134 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. Security of the Country, and (2) its Protection from External Invasion. These two matters were inter- dependent, and any scheme for the reorganisation and redistribution of the Army must pay equal re- gard to both. Kitchener had first to determine under what sys- tem and on what scale the forces in India could be organised for field service. Without this as a standard no military problem could be satisfactorily solved—no military requirement accurately caleu- lated. In the absence of a definite aim or a fixed policy all true military reform would be held up; and until a well-considered and comprehensive scheme were adopted, there must be loss of power and much waste of money on fitful military expenditure. Accordingly, in November 1903, at the close of his frontier tours, the Commander-in-Chief sub- mitted to the Viceroy-in-Council his scheme for ‘‘ The Reorganisation and Redistribution of the Army in India.’’ Its essence was the substitution of Two Armies for the existing ‘‘Commands.’’ Its main ob- jects were three—(1) to reduce the garrison troops to the minimum essential for the country’s internal security, so as to set free the maximum force for service in the field; (2) to introduce a war organisa- tion in which every unit should have its allotted place and be ready for an immediate start on the signal for war; (3) to make the peace formations correspond, as closely as circumstances permitted, with war organisation, so that mobilisation should be smooth and easy. The question of Internal Defence was treated in personal consultation, and in complete harmony, with LXI INTERNAL DEFENCE 135 all the local Governments concerned. It was deter- mined by three main considerations—the protection of the chief arteries of communication, the power and resources of a possible armed rebellion, and the amount of help to be expected from the Volunteers, Imperial Service Troops, Frontier Militia, and Police. Due allowance was made for the more mod- ern advantages of railways and telegraphs, and for the unarmed state of the bulk of the population; al- though the fact was not blinked that certain Native States might require watching. An estimate was made of the respective values of the auxiliary forces named, the réle of the Police being specially taken into account. The minimum garrisons required for internal se- curity being thus fixed, it was easier to define the principles on which the Army of India should be or- ganised and distributed. The rapid improvement of the Russian communications in Central Asia had altered the situation on the North-West Frontier and the existing Field Army (so-called) was now both in- sufficient and badly disposed for action. Kitchener’s scheme led off with the formation of a Field Army of nine Infantry Divisions instead of four'; each Divi- sion to have four British to nine Indian battalions, or 3200 British to 6489 Native bayonets. In addi- tion to this infantry force there were to be eight Cavalry Brigades and some extra batteries of corps Artillery. On one matter of organisation—the abolition of 1 “If India had only the four, or possibly six, Divisions which are at present officially recognised as her Field Army available for service beyond the Frontier, I should not have been so long in forming an opinion; but on investigation I found that in reality she maintained a force sufficient to form no less than nine, and possibly more, Divisions for this purpose.” (Kitchener to Roberts, 27.7.03.) 136 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP, the Mixed Brigade system, and the substitution of Homogeneous Brigades, each composed exclusively of either British or Native battalions—expert opinion was so sharply divided that a decision was postponed pending further consideration, and it was not until the summer of the following year that a Conference convened by the Commander-in-Chief registered its vote. Kitchener, well assured that his plan was economi- cally as well as strategically sound, was fully alive to the considerable outlay involved, and he freely con- ceded that its completion should be gradual as funds became available. The attitude of the Indian Government towards the scheme was benign; the Military Department, ~ while challenging the accuracy of the financial figures, professed itself favourable, and the Viceroy, sharing both the particular doubts and the general approval of the Military Member, praised it as ‘‘a statesmanlike attempt to deal with the question on broad lines, and to provide an organisation that should suffice for at least a quarter of a century.’’ Lord Curzon judged it unlikely that ‘‘a better or more scientific plan could be produced,’’ and be- stowed upon it a comprehensive benediction: Its main advantages seem to me that it gives us a war organisation and a peace organisation in the same scheme, the two of course not being identical, but the latter being as closely assimilated to the former as circumstances permit ; and that it provides for the co-ordination, in the task of Imperial defence, of all the various armed forces which we possess in India, from the Regular Army to the armed Civil Police. LXI REORGANISATION APPROVED 137 The Council endorsed the Viceroy’s opinion, and the several local Governments were in cheerful agree- ment as to the adequacy of the precautions designed for internal defence. Finally, on September 1, 1904, the Secretary of State gave it his assent in so far as no new expenditure was entailed, and an Indian Army Order of October 28 laid down the principle that the Army in peace should be organised and trained in the same units of. command in which it would take the field. CHAPTER LXII In the November of 1903 Kitchener met with an accident from which he never entirely recovered. He was riding alone—a custom against which his A.D.C.’s vainly protested—into Simla from his coun- try house, Wildflower Hall, and the mishap occurred as he was passing through a narrow tunnel in which a row of timber supports left intervening spaces for the protection of foot-passengers. A native sud- denly jumped out of one of these alcoves and caused the horse to shy, the General catching his foot in a wooden upright and jamming his spur into the horse’s flank. The animal in bounding forward forced the foot right round, and both bones of the leg were fractured just above the ankle. The road was - not much frequented, and there was a very painful wait before a passing rickshaw was available for conveying the patient to his quarters, where his limb was set. Yet within a fortnight he was telegraphing to Sir Archibald Hunter, ‘‘My leg is doing well, and I trust I may not long delay my pleasure of seeing the Bombay troops.’”’ ‘‘K. is getting on very quickly,’’ wrote one of his Staff a month after the 1In 1913, under advice at Cairo, he determined that on his way home he would have the leg rebroken and reset by a German surgeon. Happily circumstances interfered with the visit to Germany, and an examination by a famous English specialist made it clear that the German operation would probably have resulted in gangrene and the loss of the limb. CHAP, LXII A SERIOUS ACCIDENT 139 accident occurred; ‘‘he dashes about all over the house on his crutches, and is now talking of going on tour to Madras early in February. It seems rather soon, but I daresay he will.’ The grouping of the nine Divisions took per- manent shape as and when set forth in the Com- mander-in-Chief’s Memorandum of January 30, 1904, entitled ‘‘The Preparation of the Army in India for War’’—a sequel to the scheme for Army Reorganisation and Redistribution. In its mature form, as amended in 1906-7, it marked a long stride in decentralisation. The nine Divisional Commanders were now in- vested with large independent powers, so as to enable them to dispose locally of all questions except those affecting either the Army as a whole or Divisions other than their own. They were authorised, when really necessary, to correspond direct with Army Headquarters, but expressly enjoined to take the fullest advantage of their new powers. It was im- pressed on them that an officer who habitually refers for orders questions with which he is himself entitled to deal, shows himself incapable of assuming respon- sibility, and ‘‘therefore wanting in one of the most essential qualifications for higher command.’’ ! This devolution of authority placed the Divisional Commanders in direct touch with Headquarters, and the sphere of the Lieutenant-Generals of Armies was rearranged. Disencumbered of other work, they retained their principal duty of training troops for 1Early in 1905 a Staff Officer was able to write: “One already sees G.O.C.’s of Divisions and Brigades taking upon themselves much greater responsibility than formerly; correspondence is consequently decreasing, and the tendency is for Divisional and Brigade Commanders to settle every- thing concerning their respective commands themselves.” 140 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. war, and in fact filled the part of Inspectors-General. The nine Divisions were combined in two groups, of five and four respectively, called the Northern and Southern Armies, each under the Inspectorate of a Lieutenant-General with his Staff. The training for war of the troops in each Division of course rested with the Generals of Divisions and Brigades. But in a wide area of country there was an obvious necessity for additional supervision and inspection, so as to obtain uniformity in training, discipline, and equipment, and in general prepared- ness for war. This work was allotted to the two Lieutenant-Generals, who were relieved from the dis- tractions of administrative and financial responsi- bility. i The twofold grouping of the Divisions was dictated by the strategical dispositions of the Army on the hypothesis of a campaign on the North-West Fron- tier. In the event of hostilities beyond the Frontier, and in support of our ally the Amir of Afghanistan, the armies in the field could advance by two main routes: (1) from Peshawar to Kabul, and (2) from Quetta to Kandahar, and would operate in two main bodies, with Kabul and Kandahar as their strategic pivots. Hence in peace the troops must be so distrib- uted that the Divisions would be conveniently placed in échelon on the main lines of railway, and that in war they could be rapidly concentrated and trans- ported towards the two main objectives: ‘‘It must not be forgotten,’’ Kitchener reminded the Council, “‘that distance is a factor of comparatively minor im- 1 Kitchener would entirely sink personal feeling where the public service was concerned and a General of marked. ability whom he strongly recom- mended for one of these large commands was a man with whom his own relations in Egypt had been somewhat troubled. in =» a es Oa Per, Wy, ADEN British Somaliland CEYLON INDIA Showing the Northern and Southern Armies,and the Nine Divisions as established 1907. B E -Brahmapuira R. Vat Vill 5 Andaman /$ ‘ George Philip & Son Ltd Be ee ee ae a Fa, i i = A, “> - f “ > WE WosToA, 7 ‘ = i Ae2itind bnelilemo€ Exit GROUPING OF DIVISIONS 141 portance in the railway concentration of troops for war. ... We want to move the troops from unhealthy stations. . . . In order to make the best use of our existing material it is necessary not only to do all in our power to mitigate climatic effects, but also to dis- tribute our available forces so as to secure their effi- cient training in fighting formations in time of peace.”” The five Divisions lying at the foot of the Himalayas and pointing towards Kabul were the Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Meerut, and Lucknow Divisions —these, with the three independent frontier Bri- gades of Kohat, Bannu, and Derajat, constituted the Northern Army. Ona lower line were the four Divi- sions pointing towards Kandahar—the Quetta, Mhow, Poona, and Secunderabad Divisions—which, with the garrisons of Burma and Aden, made up the Southern Army. It was inherent in the scheme that the two General Officers who had been answerable for the efficiency of the two armies in peace might expect to command them in war. The new disposition of the troops, hingeing as it ‘did on possible external developments, provoked a surmise, which Kitchener was at pains to contradict, that he favoured a ‘‘forward’’ policy. It was also ascribed to him by certain critics that le intended to mass the greater portion of the Indian Army in great ceantonments along the North-West Frontier, without regard either to the requirements of internal defence or to the health and comfort of the troops: T have seen it stated [he wrote] that we intend to place a large portion of the Indian forces on the North-West Fron- tier, whilst others seem to be under the impression that the troops are to be collected together in certain great canton- ments. Neither of these statements is in any way correct. 142 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. The principles on which we have been working are totally different. The distribution of the Army in India, as it stood before the present changes were introduced, has hardly seen any practical improvements since the days of the Mutiny. The military areas into which the country has hitherto been sub- divided have been mere geographical divisions of varied ex- tent, with a different number of troops in each. They were not such that peace formations were in any degree adapted to the requirements of war. The troops for the various Brigades and Divisions of the Field Army had to be drawn from widely separated: localities, and from different Com- mands. They could not be trained together in the tactical formations in which they would be employed in the field, and the numerous administrative details, on which every army must depend for its success and very existence, were extremely complex and unsatisfactory. These are the reasons which render it necessary to remedy some of the most glaring defects in the disposition of our forces. The label ‘‘ Redistribution Scheme’’ was perhaps thought to imply the massing of troops all along the North-West Frontier in positions whence at the mys- tic word ‘‘mobilisation’’ they would pour northwards, like greyhounds from the leash. This notion, which caused some shaking of old-fashioned heads, was a chimera. Of massing northwards there was very lit- tle. Hach Division of three Brigades was simply con- centrated in its own administrative area, where its General could lay his hand on every unit as needed for training or for war. Each Division was lodged in proper successive propinquity to its strategic line of railway, ready to meet trouble, external or internal; and each Divisional Commander could make his own arrangements, whether to deal with an emergency in LXI SYSTEM AT WORK 143 his Divisional Area, or to reply to a general call northwards. As a net result of Redistribution and Reorganisa- tion, India was for the first time able, while maintain- ing an ample garrison, to await without alarm any difficulties arising beyond the frontier, to despatch at short notice two great armies to the vital points of contact with the enemy—the line of the Helmund and the heights above Kabul—and to stand steady for at least a twelvemonth, until Imperial reinforcements from overseas should arrive. Great as were the strategic 1 advantages of the new order, its administrative and educative value was still greater. Every field division could, on mobil- isation, be formed from its own divisional area, and could proceed complete and self-contained to the field of action, leaving the garrison for internal de- fence at the strength already determined. The nine? fully equipped Divisions, each consisting of three Brigades, were estimated to provide approx- imately 120,000 men in all—as compared with the former four-division system, which had furnished only 70,000 effectives, and these ill-organized and never in complete tactical formation. Perversely enough, the scheme was subsequently 1 The system was first to be tested in the field in Sir James Willcocks’s operations in the Bazar Valley in 1907-8. Mr. Haldane wrote from the War Office on June 3, 1908: “I cannot let longer time pass without writing to you a line of congratulation on the admirable results on the North-West Frontier. The ease and speed with which the machine which you have con- structed works, illustrate in a striking fashion the enormous importance of organisation. What happened was possible only after scientific prepara- tion in a high degree. There is no doubt of the effect produced on training by organisation in large units, and I should like to see a pattern correspond- ing to what you have worked out obtain for all the forces of the Crown. We have it now at home. But we have not yet got it for our overseas force outside India.” 2 These were never quite completed, and each Division had only a single Brigade of Artillery. 144 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cme. rxx said to be tainted with over-centralisation, whereas devolution was its fundamental and permeating pur- pose. Kitchener always insisted that an efficient, well-trained, and well-disciplined army can be ac- quired only by the organising and training of the troops, as nearly as practicable, in the same forma- tions in peace as will be employed at the outbreak of war, under the same Commanders and with the same Staffs. It was with this aim that the Divisional system was substituted for the previous ‘‘Com- mands’’ and their subordinate ‘‘Districts’’; and the change marks a definite acceptance of Devolution, not as amere temporary expedient, but as a cardinal and constant principle. The policy was rightly describable as one of decen- tralisation, in so far as it relieved Headquarters of many details which were rather the concern of the Divisional Commander. The terms ‘‘centralisa- tion’’ and ‘‘decentralisation’’ bore, however, a cer- tain ambiguity. If Kitchener initiated a strength- ened centralisation of authority at Headquarters, thus rendering general control and supervision more thorough, he certainly fathered a measure of decen- tralisation which entrusted more discretion to, and demanded more responsibility from, the subordinate commanders. CHAPTER LXITIT Waite the Government of India never averted its eyes from Russian movements which, of geographi- cal necessity, involved India’s relations with Af- ghanistan, the subject was to be closely considered by Mr. Balfour’s newly-constituted Imperial De- fence Committee. It was obvious that the protection of the Indian frontier was predominantly a matter of transport and supply. Success would lie with whichever of the two Powers was the better able to mass troops on the decisive spot at the crucial moment, and there main- tain them; in a word, everything would turn on rapidity of railway construction. When Kitchener stepped on the scene, Russia had already developed and strengthened her lines of com- munication with her Afghan frontier. But the Amir’s other great neighbour, India, was hopelessly behind-hand with her strategic railways; her tactical communications were almost entirely lacking; her frontier defences were either inadequate or in em- bryo.t. The Prime Minister in the House of Com- mons in May 1905 cited Kitchener’s opinion that dur- ing the earlier phases of a war—which, to be con- clusive, must needs be prolonged—India ought to 1 Kitchener had written to Lady Salisbury: ‘In three years Russia may be rapping at our door with a double line of railway, and if in the meantime we have done nothing, we shall deservedly go to the wall.... The Curzons have been very kind and the weather is delightful, but I feel no pleasure in life if the Service suffers” (24.7.04). VOL. IT 145 L 146 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. have available eight divisions of infantry, with a corresponding quota of other arms, in addition to necessary drafts. That this provision would suffice for at least the first twelve months of the war was Mr. Balfour’s own anticipation; but he insisted in the strongest terms that we could not without danger tolerate the slightest diminution of those obstacles and difficulties which at present confronted an army invading Afghanistan. Above all, not a single step should be permitted on the part of the Amir which might facilitate the enemy’s transport; and any at- tempt to construct a railway within Afghan territory to connect with the Russian strategic railways should be regarded by us as a directly aggressive act. I have never suggested [Kitchener wrote] that we are in immediate danger of an attack by Russia, still less do I do so now. What I do want to call attention to is the fact—so conveniently ignored or slurred over by those who regard all talk of danger from Russia as mere panic-mongering—that the problem before us is something more than a mere Indian one, inasmuch as we have solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Amir’s dominions, and have pledged ourselves to de- fend his frontier. If we are to fulfil our obligations in this respect, what then becomes of the school which regards as impossible all idea of Russian aggression, and points to the intervening five hundred miles of mountainous and sterile country which separates the Russian frontier from ours? By making ourselves responsible for the integrity of the Afghan frontier, that frontier thereupon becomes in a mili- tary sense our own. As part and parcel of his military preparation Kitchener early in 1904 urged anew the cardinal point of the construction of strategic Frontier Rail- ways, which would bring up men and material to ‘ LXII FRONTIER RAILWAYS 147 such positions on or beyond the frontier as we might have to occupy. All authorities were agreed that the strategic front to be held at all costs against Russia was the Kanda- har—Ghazni—Kabul line, the two extremities of which were the objectives of India’s two newly-con- stituted Southern and Northern Armies. When Rus- Sia was approaching the southern or Kandahar end of our strategic front, we had lavished money on con- structing two railway lines to Quetta, and a single line thence to the Sind—Afghan border at Chaman, in the fond hope that it might be stretched to Kan- dahar. Kitchener advocated a direct line between Bombay and Sind. Till now Baluchistan—isolated by the deserts of Sind and Bikanir—could only be reached from Bombay either by sea, through Kara- chi, or by land circuitously through the Punjab. It was essential to bring Kandahar within easier reach. Herat, 485 miles distant from our railhead at Cha- man, was within 76 miles of the Russian post at Khushk. Kandahar was comparatively close to our frontier at Chaman, where we had stored railway plant for the extension of the line between these two points. A hostile Russia could occupy Herat with- out hindrance from us; we could of course forestall her in Kandahar; and with the Russians at Herat and the British at Kandahar, the interlying country would be the scene of first blows. But the Chaman —Kandahar extension, was indefinitely adjourned, largely because the old Amir was known to frown on it. Thus, the southern scheme was in suspense; in the north, towards the Kabul end of our strategic front, a scheme had yet to be adopted. Twenty years ear- 148 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. lier the Russian advance had been directed chiefly to- wards the Amir’s southern dominions; now the cen- tre of gravity had shifted; the growth of Russian rail- ways and Russian intrigues had brought northern Afghanistan, including the Amir’s capital, within the scope of the Muscovite’s menace. To protect Kabul against a coup de main Kitchener asked for two broad-gauge railways right up to the frontier. One of these—an extension of the Kuram valley line from Kohat with its present narrow-gauge railhead at Thal—he wished to carry to the foot of the Paiwar Kotal, the nearest point on the frontier to Kabul, 95 miles distant. Our troops, railed at this point, could within ten days be inside the Afghan capital; the new line would be invaluable for supplies and would enable us to closa our hand on Ghazni, a dozen marches off. The other broad-gauge line was to run through the Khaibar Pass to a terminus near Loi Dakka, at the eastern end of the Jalalabad valley, where a stock of 100 miles of broad-gauge material would be kept ready for a rapid extension of the railway into Afghan ter- ritory. For this, two alternative routes were sug- gested—one by the Kabul River, the other known as the Loi Shilman—Gakke route, with a terminus at Loi Dakka. Thecontroversy as to the relative merits of the two plans—in which, roughly, civilian opinion was pitted against military—was vehement and vo- luminous. Kitchener plumped for the Loi Shilman route after prospecting it in company with General Macdonald,! who had already surveyed its rival. His 1General, later Sir J., Macdonald, in a note of June 20, 1919, wrote: “There can be no doubt that the Loi Shilman line, had it been completed as Lord Kitchener wished, and connected with Lundi Kotal by a good military road, or by a light line up the Karu Shilman, would have been of great use in the present trouble with the Afghans.” e rs To Rawalpind/ Statute Miles 30 a Kilometres 7 o 25 Suggested line ters i io Rail ee ae taal isionen) ——+ Railways +—+—Proposed Strategic Railways with Bombay. 2 ey, a ies > Re IN a” i Ad A ~* ih NT EP . RTE A ‘ ‘ » a“ ~ id a - < ie a » aS) x & a : hts tl : ? Y Hen} “ey ~~” “ Le Be ' . Dee See he - % Te : . a) . . : oad aaa. a o wv a, dq & yaa $934 7 an he ” 3 ; Trgs + } ce *. “4 4 of ; , } : x intl g.. i aes SAL ok, ey | ; <> s ) ‘ aa d ~