CORNELL UNlv^ERSITY LIBRARY GIFT OF G. H,. Sabine. Cornell University Library B 1571.M64 1901 Utilitarianism 1924 024 370 805 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tlie Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024370805 ^-t. s, /^^C, WORKS BT JOHN STUART MILL. A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, EATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE. Crown 8vo, 3s. Sd. KILLICK'S STUDENT'S HANDBOOK OF MILL'S LOGIC. Crown 8to, 3s. 6d. PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. Library Edition, 2 volumes, 8vo, 30s.. Cheap Edition, crown Svo, 3s. Sd. CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. Crown Svo, 2s. UTILITARIANISM. Svo, 2s. U. NATURE ; THE UTILITY OF RELIGION ; THEISM. THREE ESSAYS. Svo, 5s. ON LIBERTY. Crown Svo, Is. id. INAUGURAL ADDRESS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS. Crown Svo, Is. EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILO- SOPHY. Svo, 16s. ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND. By JAMES MILL. A New Edition, accompanied by Notes, Illustrative and critical. By Alexander Bain, LL.D., Andeew Findlatbe, and Geoege Geotb. Edited, with additional Notes, by John Stuabt Mill. Two volumes, Svo, 28s. LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. LONDON, NEW YOBK {t BOMBAY UTILITARIANISM UTILITARIAIfISM JOHN STUART MILL FOURTEENTH IMPEESSION LONGMANS, GREEN AND GO. 39 PATBRNOSTEK BOW, LONDON NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 1901 CONTENTS. CHAPTEE I. PAOE GENKHAL REMARKS 1 CHAPTER II WHAT UTILITARIANISM IS ...... . 8 CHAPTER III. OP THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OP THE PRINCIPLE OP UTILITV 39 CHAPTER IV. OP WHAT SORT OP PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OP UTILITY IS SUSCEPTIBLE 52 CHAPTER V. OF THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY . 62 UTILITAEIANISM. CHAPTEK I. GENERAL REMARKS. THERE are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human know- ledge, more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lin- gers, .than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respe cting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawnof philosophy, the question concerning the summum honum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality^ ha.R bftftn anrimm+Pirl t.bfl mq,i-n problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth 2 UTILITARIANISM. Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conver- sation) f.Vift tTiRor y of utilitarianism against the ijO Elila? moralitY of t he so-caUed sophist . It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty, and in some cases similar discordance, exist respecting the first principles of aU the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the most certain of them, mathematics ; without much impairing, generally in- deed without impairing at all, the trustwoi-thiness of the conclusions of those sciences. An apparent ano- maly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon, what are called its first principles. Were it not so, there would Be no science more precarious, or whose conclusions were more insufl&ciently made out, than algebra; which derives none of its certainty from what are conamonly taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the ele- mentary noti'ons with which the science is conversant ; and their relation to the science is not that of ipunda- tions to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light. Butjyiou^_in science^ the_ particular truths precede the general theory, th ejepntrary might be expected ;tobethej^^_ with a practica Lart-Such as mpralsj)rJgg]slalaQttJ-AU ' action is for t he sake of some end, and rules of action. GENEKAL REMARKS. 3 jtv seems EBfem^i to suppose, must take their whol e chairacfcer and ^lour from the end to which they are RTihF fftrvipint- When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right a nd wrbng must be the means, one would think, of ascertaiaaajtg what is right or wrong, aad no t a consequence o t having already ascertaJMed it . '*rhe difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For — ■- besides that the existence of such a mo ral instinct is itself one of tfae~matters in disputg^those believers in it who have any pretensions to philosophy, have been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually pre- sent. O ur moral faculty, according to all t hose of its inte^greterSjwhoMe-fiiititledJailhfi^^ supp lies us o nly with the general principles o f moral judgmfen!l3s'.4.„i t i s f ii b rand h o f bur rea soB^-aot oTour seiisilive' faculty ; and nmst_ be looked to for t he abstract doctrines ofinorality jujiiog^^ l l lpg n^ n,^i li ii: jhfi-con^e^e? The int uitive, no less than whsit may be term ed the inductive, scRooTof etEcsTinsists oil the tiecessity of general laws. They both a^ee that the morality of an mdividiiial action is not a que^ion of direct perceptibil, b'lit of the application of a law to an individual case. T|if|'|?ecognise also, to a great extent, the same moral laws ; but differ as to thS" evidence, and the' source from which* they derive their authority. Ajcccirdtag to the one opinion, the 4 UTILITARIANISM, principles of morals are evident h priori, requiring nothing to conunand assent, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. Asc ording to the oth ^ doctrine, right and w rong, as w^U. as truth a nd false - h ood, a re ques tions of observation and experi ence. But both hold equally tha t morality must be deduced from principles ; ^nd t.hp! intnit ,iv e school affirm as stronffly as the inductive, that there is a science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the d priori principles which are to serve as the premises of the science'; stUl more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various principles to one first principle, or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of & priori authority, or they lay down as the com- mon groundwork of those maxims, some generality much less obviously authori,tative than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one fundamental prin- ciple or law, at the root o f all morality, or if there be — * : r- ' P ' " i — — « — ^ H I , J I'll I . iii j^ ]i i i. I, f^ ' s If i j. ' I . several^ there sh ould be a determinate ord er of pre- cedence among th em ; and t he one princip le, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to b fi-a df-evident. To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism of past and present ethical doc- trine. It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs GENERAL BEMARKS. 5 have attained, has been mainly due to the tacit in- fluence of a standard not recognised. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentimen,ts, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effect of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility , or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority 1 Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwiUing to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further, and say that to all those d, priori mo- ralists who deem it necessary to argue at al l, utilitar ian a,r[c niTinP!nt ,H a.rft inrlispp.nsa.blp. I t is not my presen t purpose to criticise these thinkers ; but I cannot help rdferrifig;'," for illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of Eth ics, by Kant. This remarkable man, whose system of thought wOl long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the treatise in question, lay down an nm'vftr sal first p rin- fiplft n.s t.hp. nriorin fl.nirl'gr'nnnd nf innrfl.l nbli ga.+,i nn ;3 is th is : — ' So ac t, that the rule on whi ch-lh mi actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational ^ ^^'^' ~-But when he begins to deduce from this i precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any 6 UTILITAEIANISM. contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impos- sibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the 'most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adpption would be such as no one would choose to incur. @n the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, attempt to contribute something towards theunderstandingahdapg reciatio n of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptibIe~Dfr''T!tis evident that this cannot "Be'^^oof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. 'Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good, by its conducing to health ; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure ; but what groof is it possible to give that pleasure is good ? If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof "We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as arnen- able to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty ; and neither does that faculty G-ENEEAL REMAUKS. 7 deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Conside- rations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine ; and this is equivalent to proof. We shall examine presently of what nature are these considerations ; in what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula ^ But it is a preliminary condition of rational accept- ance or rejection, that the formula should be correctly understood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception ; and that could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatly simplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, there- fore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard,! shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken interpretations of its meaning. Having thus pre- pared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to throw such light as I can upon the question, con- sidered as one of philosophical theory. UTILITAIMANISM. CHAPTER II. WHAT UTILITAEIANISM IS. A PASSING remark is aU that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of rightand wrong, use the term in that r estricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure.^ An apology is due to the philosophical opponents of utilitarianism) for even the momentary appearance of confounding them with any one capable of so absurd a misconception ; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the contrary accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its gtossest form, is another of the common charges against uti- litarianism : and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of persons, and often the very same persons, denounce the theory " as im- practicably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practically voluptuous when the word pleas ure precedes the word utility." Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, whq^ main- tained the ^fehfiOEjLxiEjjdality, meant by it, not some- thing to be contradistinp;uishgd from pleasure, but pleasure itself, togetheTwith exemption from pa in ; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeaHeo r the ornamental, have always declared that the usftfiil ITS MEANING. 9 means these, amon g other thin gs. Yet the common herd, inciudmg the herd of writers, not only in news- papers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word utilitarian, f while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or 'the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms ; of \beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the tierm thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparage- ment, but occasionally in compliment ; as though it implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted, use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning. Those who intro- duced the word; but who had for many years discon- tinued it as a distinctive appe llation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it," if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this utter degradation,* The creed which accepts a"s the foundation of morals . ytility. or t he Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to ] promote happines s, wrong as they tend to produce the * The author of this essay has reason for believing himself to be the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use. He did not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Gait's Annals of the Parish. After using it as a designation for several years, he and others abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as a name for one single opinion, not a set of opinions — ^to denote the ireeognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of ap- plying it — ^the term supplies a want in the language, and offers, in many cases, a convenient mode of avoiding tiresome circumlocution. 10 TTTiLITAEIANISM. rpivftrsfi of happine ss'^'^ Ev kfenmess isiafeended^a - ^re, and the absence of painj J^rny^||irmp.Rfij paifi,,. fljjjjfchR privation of pieasure Tr To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said ; in particular, what thin^ it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure ; andjai. what eyt ent this is left an open ques tion. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory o f life on wh ichJJxisLJhfiOEjU^-imnaJiAjs.^^ — .^"i^^T; ^'^^tpTgas^T-ft. fl.n4 f^-^.edom from pain, ^re^ " only things jdeeirable-.aa-finda.«a and that all. desffaT^ things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppo se tha t life has (as they expr ess. it), no higher end than ple asure — ^no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit — they designate as utterly mean and grovel- ling ; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened ; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants. When thus attacked, the E picureans b a,ve always!, answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degradiag light ; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be .ITS MEANING. 11 gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation : for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's con- ceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happinesswhidi does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultliBss in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as weU as Christian elements require to be included.,.,' But there is iio kn own Epiciiarean theory of Jife which does n ot assign to the pleasures of the intellect , of the feelings ^d imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures thanto those of me^ e .s|n^aa tion. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian pp^rs {pr^enef arTrave~"pIace d the superiority of mjtfEaF'eveii^ IJld'i ty pleasures chiefly in the gre ater permanency, safet y, uncostliness. & c.. of the former-^ tha,tis, m their circumstantial advantages rather than in their inirinsie nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fuUy proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. Jt is qui te cgpypatibi tewlth the principle of utility to recognise tffe febt, that some hmds of pleasure aremore desirable gii^laore valuab le th an others . It would be absurd that while, m estimating all other things, quality is 12 UTILITABIANISM. co nsidered as well ag^ quantitY jJie estimation of plea- sures should be supposed to d^end on quantity alone. If I am asked, what TmeaiTby clifference of quality in pleasures, or what makesone pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of tw opleasures, if th ere be one to w hich all or almjagi all who ha v e experien ce of bot h give a decide d pre- fgrftngPij iVrftRpftntiyp pf f^.Tiy fftpli ng of moral ob li gation to prefer it, t hat, is the more desirable pleasure . K one of the two is, by those who 'are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be at- tended with a greater amount of discontent, arid would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be per- s^uaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for ITS MEANING. 13 the most complete satisfaction of alltl^ rlpsirpis wJa ich_ they have in common with him. /If they ever fancy' they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undes^aljjgin their own eyes, y A ^bemgof hi gher iacul£ies requires m^ejfco make him^happ yTls^p aCTe acute sufferingj and is certainl y accessible to it at^^re ^ aoints^ than one of^an inferio r typ e ; but in spite of these liabiliti#, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwilling- ness; we may attribute it to jaride , a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable ; we may refer it to the love of libert y and perso nal independence , an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the in- culcation of it ; to the love Q£.paBrer. or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of'desire to them. Who e ver sup poses that this prefer ence takes place a t a sacr ifi ce of happine ss^z^that t Be~superior being7 in anythin g like equal, circum- stances, is not happi^ Jbhanjjhe inferior — con f ounds t he two verg iiiffeceTit idfia&„af.haippineaa. ai mLcontent. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of 14 UTILITARIANISM. enjojnnent are low, has the gi-eatest chance of having them fully satisfied ; and a highly-endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bear- able ; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels :^fc at all ihg good which those imperfections qualrfy.''^itis bstt^, to be a human beii^'^S^^^^W-^^'h^' «■ pipr satisfied^ better to be SJDerates dis satisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opmion, it is because , they only know their own side of the question. The other party to^ the comparison knows both sides. It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influeflee &# temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the in- trinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable ; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that healtlsf , is the greater good. It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for evBry- thing noble, as they advance in years sink into indo- lence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures itrpreference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already ITS MEANING. 15 become incapable of the, other.** Oapaeity for the nobler feelings is in most/ natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only Jiy hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance ; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies awa^ if the occupations to ■v^fei|^ their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. TVten lose their high aspirations as they lose their in- tellectual tastfts, because they have not time or oppor- tunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves! 'to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones| to which they have access, or the only ones whicW they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be] questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever know- ingly and calmly preferred the lower ; though many, in aU ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both. From this verdict of the only 'competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the£feeatp^^^having of two pleasures, or which of two modps of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of plea- sm-es, since there. is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. Whajt means are there of determining which is the acutest of two 16 UTILITAIMANISM. pains, or the inteiisest of ttpo pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage ;of those who are familiar with both ?^Neimet' pains ^i^or pleasure are homo- geneous, iand pai^ is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What iis there to decide whether a par- ticular pleasure is yorth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? ^Ehen, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in ki7id, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard. I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable con- dition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard ; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest ■happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether I noble charaigter is always the happier for its noble- less, there can be no doubt that it makes other jeople happier, and that the world in g en eral is immensely a gEliner by it. UtilitariamSTffiKcSfore, could only attain i{s end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is coneferned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit.* But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous ITS ME ANING ; 17 ^ According t o the Griseatest Happiness Principle, as above explainedT the^ullim ate end, with reference to and fer the sake of which ajU/other things are desirajble (whether we are considering our own. good or that of other people), i84n--exis.teiicjs_£2£fiinpt-aa far as possible from pain.and a,a rich a,R poRsihle in ■^ftioyqiL^itel^ Q'^^if i-^f-f oin toLauantity and quality : tti& tes f of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their cfpportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observatiQii,-are best furnishe3~with tHemeans of comparison; This, being, according to the utilitarian fjpinion, the- end of human action, is necessarily also the st aindard of morality : which fliay accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent piissibie, secured to all mankind ; and not to them only, but so iaa? as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation. ^ Against this doctrine, however, rises another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action ; because, in the first place, it is unattain- able : and they contemptuously ask, What right hast thou to be happy ? a question which Mr. Carlyle clenches by the addition. What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to he ? Next, they say, that men can do without happiness ; that all noble human beings have felt this, and could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation ; which lesson, thoroughly learnt and 18 UTILITARIANISM. submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue. The first of these objection ajazo ald go to th eiroot"of bhe matter were it well fo unded ; for if no happine ss g^te JTerira;d"at~aIt^ Jail^^ attai nmgnt of it^f^nnt bft the en d ^^ rmorality. or of any rational conduct. Though, even in that caSej" something might stUl be said for the utilitarian theory ; since utility includes not.solel^y 4hg^P^^^^^^ o fjiappiness. but the preve ntion or mitigia,ti'nn nf nn}iflppiTiess.4lftnd if the former aim be chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide recommended under certain conditions by Noyalis. When, however, it is thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at least an exaggeration. If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash ofenjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame, ."^f this the philo- sophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture ; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various plea- sures, with a decided predominance of the active over thepassive, and having as the foundation of the whol e, notja-fixpect- more J&moJife^ikan .it.. i^_ capable. of ttTS MIANING. 19 bestawing,- A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has al\uays appeared worthy of the name of happiness. And such an existence is even, now the lot of many, during some considerable portion of their lives^^ ,T^© present wretched edu(^pon, and wretched social fprangements, are the only real hindrance to its being attainable by almost alL ;, i^he objectors perhaps may doubt whether human beings, if taught to consider happiness as the end of life, would be satisfied with such a moderate share of it. But great numbers of mankind have been satis- fied with much less. | The main constituents of a s&tisfied life appear to be two, either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the pnrpnsp • frfln- quillitv. and excjiement. With inuch ' tranq^fOKy, many find tWf Ifiey eam be content with very little pleasure : with much excitement, many ca,n reconcile meinselves to a considerable quantity of pain. ' There isiassuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even the mass of mankind to unite both ;. since the two are •so far from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance, the prolongation of either being a preparation for, and exciting a wish for, the other,^ It is only ihose in whom indolenfee. amounts to a vice, that do not desire excitement after an interval of repose ; it is lonly those in whom the need of excitement is a disease, that feel the iyanquUlity which follows excitement dull ^nd insipid, instead of pleasurable in direct pro- |)0®ti®® to the excitement which preceded it. When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it iT^aluable to them, the cause generally is^ caring for 20 TJTILITAKIANISM. nobody but themselves. To those who have neither puHic nor private aflPectiohs, the excitements of life are much 'curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death : while those who leave after them objects of personal affeetion, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an in- terest in life on the eve of death, as in the- vigour of youth and health. Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want of mental cultivation. A cultivated mind — I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties — ^finds sources of inexhaustible interest in aU that surrounds it ; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and present, and their prospects in the fiiture. It is possible, indeed, to become indifferent to all this, and that too without having exhausted a thousandth part of it ; but only when one has had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these things, and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity, * Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an amount of mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest in these objects of cgntem-i plation, should not be the inheritance of every one born in a civilised country. As Httle is there an in- herent necessity that any human being should be a selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling or care but those ITS MEANING; 21 ' which centre in his own miserable individ^iality. Some- thing far superior to this is sufficiently common even now, to give ample earnest of what the human species may be made. Genuine private aflPections, and a sin- cere interest in the public good, iare possible, though in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought up human being. In a world in which there is so much to inter- est, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, every one who has this moderate amount •of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable ; and unless isuch a person, through bad laws, or subjection to the wUl of others, is denied the liberty to use the sources •of happiness within his reach, he will not fail to find this enviable existence, if he escape the positive evils •of life, the great sources of physical and mental suf- fering — such as indigence, disease, and the unkind- ness, worthlessness, or premature loss'of objects of affection. The main stress of the problem lies, there- fore, in the contest with these calamities, from which it is a rare good fortune entirely to escape ; which, as things now are cannot be obviated, and often cannot be in any material degree mitigated. Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying offering, may be completely extinguished by the '^rfidwittof society, combined with the go^d sense and providewce of individuals. |Even that most intractable •of enefSlS, disease, mjty be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral education, 22 UTILITARIANISM. and proper control of noxious4fi#aw4cess»nwhile the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe. And every advance in -that direction relieves us from some, not only of the chances which cut short our own lives, but, what concerns us still more, which deprives us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up. As for vicissitudes of fortune, and other dis- appointments connected with worldly circumstances, these are principally the effect either of gross impru- jdence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect social institutions. All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort ; and though their removal is grievously slow — though a long succession of generations will perish in the breach before the conquest is completed, and this world becomes all that, if will and knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be made — ^yet every mind" sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, however small and unconspicuous, in the endea- vour, will draw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent to be without. And this leads to the true estimation of what is said by the objectors concerning the possibility, and the obligation, of learning to do without happiness. UnqtiestiioTi flibl yj^tispossible to do w ithout happiness j its ^is done inv olu ntarily ^^ r-TrvnftT:p^-f.wPTit;ipt,}||=i_Qf mankind, eVen in those parts of our present world which are least deep in barbarism ; and it often has to l^e done yoluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which he prizes more than his EPS MBAifI»<*, 23 individual happiness. But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others, or some of the requisites of happiness ? It is noble to be capable of resigning "entirely one's own portion of happiness or chances of it : but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end ; it is not its own end ; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be| made if the hero or martyr did not believe that id would earn for others immunity from similar sacri| fices ? Would it be made, if he thought that hisl renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, bmt to make their lot like his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness ? All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happi- ness in the world ; but he who does it, or professes tq do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of . admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should. Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state,. I fully aofaiowledge that the readiness to make sugh-E-sacf ifice is the hig hest virtue which-jsanlbe ^3and_ in man. I will add, that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising such happiness as is attain- 24 UTILITARIANISM. able. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making ' him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him : which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquil- lity the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, with- out concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end. Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self-devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them, as either to the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. The utilitaria n morality does recognise in human beings the pow er of sacri- ficing their own gre atest good for the good of othera. It o nly refuses toad mi t that t'Eie'iacnlic e is itself a good. A sacri fiP i P -ST^+i -' l i '1"fH ii ^ p I i nrvrnr i r. nr ir nd to Tncrease, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others ; either .of mankind collec- tively, or of individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind. I must again repeat, what the assailants of utUi- tarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own hap- piness, but that of all concerned. ' As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism re- quires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics . ITS MEANING. 25 of /utility. To do as one would be done by, and to lo^'e one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As th e means of m arking jthe.Jiear-est.-.ap,pr.Qach t o this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole ; and secondly, that education and opinion, which "have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between hisjgw n happiness and the good of the whole/; espe- . cially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, a& regard for the universal happiness prescribes : so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness tohimself, consistently with conductopposed to the general good, but also that a di rect impulse to promot e the gene ral good may be in every individual .on e of the habituaTmotiv es of ac t4g3a:;rajid'tK^ ments connected therewith may fill a large and promi- nent place in every human being's sentient existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality repre- sented it to their own minds in this its true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it : what more beautiful or more exalted develop- ments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates. The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be 26 UTILITARIANISM. charged with representing it in a discreditable lig«ht. On the contrary, those among them who entertain anything Hke a just idea of its disinterested character, sometimes find fault with its standard as being too high for humanity. They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the in- ducementof promoting the general interests of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of mt)rals, and to confound the rule of action with the motive of it. Jt is the business of ethics to tell us swhat are our duties, or by what test we ma y_kmiw ih^T; but no system'^f ethics requires that the sole motive^ofali we doJhaJjj2B-aJeeliiig^^fduty2_£2_jyie contraiy, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if ,the._rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the nfOre-ttig uat to utilitari^ jMsmrjfeaXjLlUMiS^'-^^^^^ ^^' apprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have gone |b eyoT ]rl aly nost all others in affirming^ that the mo tive has n othing to do with the morali ty of the_a gtion, tho ugh much with the worth o£ .thft-ag£nt. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble : he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.* But to speak only of actions '^ An opponent, whose intellectual and moral fairness it is a plea- sure to acknowledge (the Eev. J. Llewelyn Davies), has objected to- this passage, saying, " Surely the rightness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does depend yery much upon the motive with ITS MEANING. 27 done from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the '"■worId7or society at large. The g reat majority of go od iWi^nR arp infJpmTErn nnt forthft henpfit nf thft wm--TfT7 butfor that of i ndividuals, of which the good of the world is made up ; and the thought s of the most vir- tuous maif need not on these occasions travel beyond ■which it is done. Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape from him, saved him from droSvnifag simply in order that he might inflict upon him more exquisite tortures, would it tend to clearness to speak of that rescue as 'a morally right action ? ' Or suppose again, according to one of the stock illustra- tions of ethical inquiries, that a man betrayed a trust received from a friend, because the discharge of it would fatally injure that friend himself or some one belonging to him, would utilitarianism compel one to call the betrayal ' a crime ' as much as if it had been done from the meanest motive ? " I submit, that he who saves another from drowning in order to kill him by torture afterwards, does not differ only in motive from him who does the same thing from duty or benevolence ; the act itself is different. The rescue of the man is, in the case supposed, only the necessary first step of an act far more atrocious than leaving him to drown would have been. Had Mr. Davies said, " The Tight- ness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does depend very much " — not upon the motive, but — ■'' upon the inteittimi" no utilita- rian would have differed from him. Mr. Davies, by an oversight too common not to be quite venial, has in this case confounded the very different ideas of Motive and Intention. There is no point which utilitarian thinkers (and Bentham pre-eminently) have taken more pains to illustrate than this. The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention — that is, upon what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it inakes no differeijice in the act, makes none in the morality - •though it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual disposition — a bent of character from which useful, or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise. 28 UTILITARIANISM. the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights— that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations — of any one else,!. The multi- plication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object ol" virtue : the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words, to be a jaublic benefacto r, are but exceptional ; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society in general, need concern themselves habitually about so large an object. In the case of abstinences indeed — of things which people forbear to do,from moral considerations, though theconsequences in the particular case might be beneficial — it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be con- sciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain fjFrom it. The amount of regard for the public in- Iberest implied in this recognition, is no greater than fis demanded by every system of morals ; for they all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly perni- cious to society. The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the doctrine of utility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose of a standard of morality, and of the very meaning of the words right and wrong. It_.is often affinned that-UtUitarianism re nders men cold and unsympathizing ; that it chills - ITS MEANING. 29 their moral feelings towards individuals ; that it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideiration of ^J «/ ^^ .a-SL, I ,_|. |iiiiiii« iiniKiniwiin „|g, ij mill i i „ r,^ ,,.T— i"— the consequencesof ac tio ns, not taking into the ir moral estimate the qualities from w hich those act ions emanate. If the assertion means that they do not iHowtheir j udgment respecting the r ightness 6r wrong- ness of an action to be influenced by their opinion pf the qualities of the person who does it, this is a com- plaint not against utilitarianism, but against having any standard of morality at all; for certainly no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or a bad man, stiH less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are rele- vant, not to the estimation of actions, but of persons ; and there is nothing in the utilitarian theory inconsis- tent with the fact that there are other things which interest us in persons besides the rightness andwrong- ness of their actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of language which was part of their system, and by which they strove to raise themselves above all concern about anything but virtue, were fond of saying that he who has that has everything ; that he, and only he^ is rich, is beautiful, is a king. But no claim of this description is made for the virtuous man by the utilitarian doctrine. Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are ^perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are also aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous characteF,and that actionslwhich are blame- able often proceed from qualities entitled to praise. When this is apparent in any particular, case, it modi- 30 UTILITARIANISM, fies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of the agent. I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people ; but it is an unpopularity which they must share with every one who regards the distinction between right la,nd wrong in a serious light ; d,nd the reproach is I not one which a conscientious utilitarian need be .anxious to repel. If no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look on the morality of actions, as measured by the utilitarian standard, with too exclu- sive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the other beauties of character which go towards making a human being loveable or admirable, this may be ad- mitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not their sympathies nor their artistic perceptions, do fall into this mistake ; and so do all ■other moralists uuder the same conditions. What -can be said in excuse for other moralists is equally .available for them, namely, that if there is to be .any error, it is better that it should be on that side. As a matter of fact, we may affirm that among utili- tarians as among adherents of other systems, there is ^every imaginable degree of I'igidity and of laxity in the application of their standard : some are even puri- tanically rigorous, while others are as indulgent as can possibly be desired by sinner or by sentimentalist. But on thewhole, a doctrine which brings prominently forward the interest that mankind have in the re- ITS MEANING. 31 pression and prevention of conduct which violates the moral law is likely to be inferior to no other in turning the sanctions of opinion against such violations. 'It is true, the question, What does violate the moral law ? is one on^which those who recognise different standards of morality are likely now and then to diflfer. But difference of opinion on moral questions was "not first introduced into the world by utili- tarianism, while that doctrine does supply, if not always an easy, at all events a tangible and intelli- gible mode of deciding such differences. It may not be. superfluous to notice a few more of the common _misa£gTehensions of utilitarian ethics, even those which - are so obvious^ and~grossTEaE~it might appear impossible for any person of candour and intelligence to fall into them : since persons, even of considerable mental endowment s, often give them- selves so little trouble to understand the bearings of any opinion against which they entertain a prejudice, and men are in general so little conscious of this voluntary ignorance as a defect, that the vulgarest misunderstandings of ethical doctrines are continually met with in the deliberate writings of person^ of the greatest pretensions both to high principle and,, to philosophy. We not u11c6iStai0to:ly hear the (ioctrine' of utility inveighed, against as a godless doctrine. If" it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, abftve all things^ the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is 32 UTILITARIANISM. not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. ' If 'it be meant that utili- tarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that an utili- tarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. But others besides utilitarians have been of opinion that the Christian revelation was intended, and is fitted, to inform the hearts and minds of mankind with a spirit which should enable them to find for themselves what is right, and incline them to do it when found, rather than to tell them, except in a very general way, what it is : and that we need a doctrine of ethics, carefully followed out, to interpret to us the will of God. Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss ; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian morahst as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action, by as good a right as others can use it for the indication of a transcendental law, having no con- nection with usefulness or with happiness, t Again, Utility is often summarily stigmatized as an immoral doctrinp by giving it the nameof Expediency,- an8' taking advantage of the popular use of that term to contrast it with Principle. But the Expedient, in the sense in which it is opposed to the Right, gene- rally means that which is expedient for the particular interest of the agent himself; as when a minister sacrifices the interest of his country to keep himself ITS MEANING. 33: in place. When it means anything better than this; it means that which is expedient for some immediate object, some temporary purpose, but which violates a rule whose observance is expedient in a much higher degree. The Expedient, in this sense, instead of being the same thing with the useful^ is a branch of the hurtful. Thus, it would often be expedient, for the purpose of getting over some momentary embarrass- ment, or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instru- inental ; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation frbm truth, does that much towards weaken- ing the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilisation, virtue, everything on which human hap- piness on the largest scale depends ; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and that he who, for the sake of a convenience to himself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all nioralists ; the chief of which is when the with- holding of some fact (as of information from a male- 34 UTILITARIANISM. factor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would preserve some one (especially a person other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognised, and, if possible, its limits defined ; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it fiiust be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marki;ng out the region within which one or the other preponderat es. Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to reply to such objections as this — that there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness. This is exactly as if any one were to say that it is impossible to guide our conduct by Christianity, because there is not time, on every ©ceasion on which anything has to be done, to read through the Old and New Testaments. The answer to the objection is, that there has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species^ During all that time mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions ; on which expe- rience all the prudence, as well as all the morality of life, is dependent. Eeople talk as if the commence- ment of this course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first time whether murder andrtheft are injurious to human happiness. Even then I do not think that he would find the ITS MEANING. 35 question very puzzling ; but, at all events, the matter is now done to his hand. It is truly a whimsical supposition, that if mankind were agreed in consider- ing utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion. There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we sup- pose uniYeEsal—idi0ey-"fc-0-be-«oi]J£aiied;mth it, but on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this time have acquired po s iti ve be l i e & ao Lu Lhu uflu ets of some a(3tions^nJhLeic_-happB:es8i' and the beliefs whicK^ave thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude; and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better. That philosophers might easily do this, even now, on many subjects ;\ that the received code of ethics is by no means of divine right ; and that mankind have still much to learn as to the effects of actions on the general happi- ness, I admit, or rather, earnestly maintain. The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the pre- cepts of every practical art, admit of indefinite im- provement, and, in a progressive state of the human mind, their improvement is perpetually going on. But to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing ; to pass over the intermediate generali- sations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place of his ultimate destination, is not to forbid the 36 UTILITARIANISM. use of land-marks and direction-posts on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than^ another. Men really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject, which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concernment. Nobody argues that the art of naviga- tion is not founded oil astronomy, because sailors can- not wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calcu- lated ; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish. And this, as long as foresight is a humanquality, it is to be presumed they will continue to do. ^Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by : the im- possibility of doing without them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument against any one in particular : but gravely to argue as if no such secondary principles could be had, and as if mankind had remained tiU now, and always must remain, without drawing any general conclusions from the experience of human life, is as high a pitch, I think, as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical con- troversy. The remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly consist in laying to its charge the common infirmities of human nature, and the general difficulties which embarrass conscientious ITS MEANING. 37 persons in shaping their course through life. We are told that an utilitarian will be apt to make his own particular case an exception to moral rules, and, when under temptation, will see an utility in the breach of a rule, greater than he will see in its observance. But is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us with excuses for evil doing, and means of cheating our own conscience? They are afforded in abundance by all doctrines which recognise as a fact in morals the existence of conflicting considerations ; which aU doctrines do, that have been believed by sane persons. It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. T here is no ethical creed which does not temper the S33rfrer imoda- tinn-fcQ-pPiP.n1ia.rit,i' es of circumstances : and under every creed, at the opening thus made, self-deception and dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral system under which there do not arise? unequivocal cases of co nfligbing-eM igatipn. These" are the real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct. They are overcome practically with greater or with less success according to the intellect and virtue of the individual ; but it can hardly be ^'e- tended that any one will be the less qualified for dealing with them, from possessing an ultimate standard to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred. If utility is the ultimate source of moral] 38 UTILITARIANISM. 'obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible. Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better than none at all : while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them ; their claims to precedence one over another rest on little better than sophistry, and unless deter- mined, as they generally are, by the unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility, aiford a free scope for the action of personal desires and partiali- ties. We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary •principle is not involved ; and if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognised. 39 CHAPTER III. OF THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY. nnHE question is often asked, and properly so, in J- regard to any supposed moral standard — ^hat is its sanetion ? what are the motives to obey it ? or more specifically, what is the source of its obligation ? whencfidngs it, derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question ; which, though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian m'orality , as if it had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in regard to all standards. It arises, in fact, whenever a person is called on to adop^ astandaxd_or refer morality to any basis on wihich Eehas not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obli- gatory; and when a person is asked to believe that this morality derives its obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox ; the siipposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem ; the superstructure seems to stand better without than with, what is represented as its foundation. He says to himself, I feel that I 40 UTILITARIANISM. am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive ; but why am I bound to promote the general happi- ness ? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference ? If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of the moral sense be correct, this dif- ficulty will always present itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences — ^until, by the improvement of educa- tion, the feeling of unity with our feUow creatures shall be (what it cannot be doubted that Christ in- 'tended it to be) so deeply rooted in our character, and to our- own consciousness as completely a part of our nature, as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily weU- brought-up young person. In the meantime, how- ever, the difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt'to analyse morality and reduce it to principles ; which, unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity. The^ principle of utility either has, or there is no rea son why it might not have, all the sanctions w hich bel ong to any other system of morals. Those sanc- tions are either external or internal. ■ Of jh e externa l f sanctions it is not necessary to speak at any leng th. T hey_axe, Jbheiinpejof^yau r^aiid -the fear of di^ea- sjire fronLouiLMlxaL,creatj yes or from the Kulef of the Univ erse,, along with wba.tevPii - we may ha.vp: nf isy mpathy of affection for them or of Iovr anH ^^ e of Him, j ndimngjLis4a-do-JEs will independently of ITS SANCTIONS. 41 sel fish consequence s. There is evidently no reason why all these motives Tor observance should not attach themselves to the utilitarian morality, as com- pletely and as powerfully as to 3,ny other. Indeed, those of them which refer to our fellow creatures are sure to do so, in proportion to the amount of general intelligence ; for whether there be any other ground of moral obligation than the general happiness or not, men do desire happiness ; and however imperfect may be their own practice, they desire and commend all conduct in others towards themselves, by which they think their happiness is promoted. With regard to the religious nldtive , if men believe, as most profess to do, in hihe goodness of God, those who think that conduciveness to the general happiness is the essence,- 6r even only the criterion, of good, must necessarily believe that it is also that which God approves. The whole force therefore of external reward and punishment, whether, physical or moral, and whether! ptoceeding from God or from our feUowmen, togetheij with all that the capacities of human nature admitJ of disinterested devotion to either, become available to enforce the utilitarian morality, in proportion as that morality is recognised ; and the more powerfully, the more the appliances of education and general cultiva- tion are bent to the purpose. So far as to external sanctions. The internal sane- tion of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same^a feeling in our own mind ; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly- cultivated moralnaturesrises, in the niore serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and 42 ■ UTILITAEIANISM, connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, andnot^ with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence ofCgB- science : though in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists, the simple fact is in general all en- crusted over with collateral associations, derived from s ympathy , fromJove, and still more from fear ; from aU the forms of r eligious feeling; from the recollec- tions of childhood and of all our past life ; from^jelf; esteem^desireoftEe esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasemgaL This extreme complication is, I apprehend, the origin of the sort of mystical character which, by a tendency of the human mind of which there are many other examples, is apt to be attributed to the idea of moral obligation, and which leads people to believe that the idea cannot possibly attach itself to any other objects than those which, by a supposed mysterious law, are found in our present experience to excite it. Its binding force, howev e r, consists in the e xistence of a mass of f eeling ■wh ijeh-Btust--hf!, broken through in order to do w hat violates our standard o£ ^ight, and which^jf .we, do.nesfirihekss-YJplate, thai' standard^jviU probably i3ave_to,ba£ncguntered_after- wards in the^po. of remorse. Whatever theory w6 have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it- Tl\e ultimate sanction, therefore, of--all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in oui' own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, what is the san ction of that particular standard.x2 We may answer, the same as of all other moral standards — t he CQ p.- seLentiou £ fepliags of mankind. Undoubtedly this ITS SANCTIONS. 43 sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to ; but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one. On them morality of any kind ha,s no hold but through the external sanctions. ' Meanwhile the feelings exist, a fact in human nature, the reality of which, and the great power with which they are capable of acting on those in whom they have been duly cultivated, are proved^ by experience. No reason has ever been shown why they may not be cultivated io as great intensity in connection with the utilitarian, as with any other rule of morals. There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who sees in moral obhgation a transcendental fact, an o>>jftfvfr.iye j-ea]jts belonging to the province of ' ^hingajjajthemselves,' i s likely to be mpiie , obedien t t£L.it than one who believes it to be e ntirely sub- jecti ye, ha ving its" seat in hurnan,_CQiis ciousness _only., But whatever a person's opinion may be on this point of Ontology, t be-force he is really urged by is his own subj ec tive feeling^ and is ex p^t.ly mpasnrpd byvPs streiigtL__Np nne's belj pif tba.t Dut yjs^an ntgactive reality jiS- stronger than the b^lirfthati3Qdia.soi_yet- jiheJaeHefm God, apart fromthe expeciati£ffi_ofi|;Ctual Eenard. . aruL„pun r8Ement, _^ly~Qpera tes on condu ct^ thr0Tagh.- and in prQporti CTLto,jfche subjecti ve religi ous feelingi. The sanction, so far as it is disinterested, W always in the mind itself; and the notion, therefore^ of the transcendental moralists must be, that this sanction will not exist in the mind unless it is believed to have its root out of the mind ; and that if a person is able to say to himself. That which is restraining 44 UTILITABIANISM. me, and which is called my conscience, is only a feeling in my own mind, he may possibly draw the conclu- sion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases, and that if he find the feeling inconvenient, he may ^digregard it, and endeavour to get rid of it. But is this danger confined to the utilitarian morality ? Does the belief that moral obligation has its seat outside the mind make the feeling of it too strong td be got rid of? The fact is so far otherwise, that aU. moralists admit and lament the ease with which, in the generaUty of minds, conscience can be silenced or stifled. The question. Need I obey my conscience ? is quite as often put to themselves by persons who never heard of the principle of utility, as by its ad- herents. Those whose conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this question, if they answer it affirmatively, will not do so because they believe in the transcendental theory, but because of the external sanctions. It is not necessary, for the present purpose, to de- cide whether the feeling of duty is innate or implanted. Assuming it to be innate, it is an open question to what objects it naturally attaches itself; for the philo- sophic supporters of that theory are now agreed that the intuitive perception is of principles of morality, and not of the details. Jf, there be anything ioiiate inJjv^wigttPr I T .sqft ut* rgafpn wliy +h( ^, fpiPilingj whicli isimnate^ouldnotbe that of regard ^ the plea sures ja nd pams of othersT IT there Isany principle of morals which is intuitively obligatory, I should say it must be that. If so, the intuitive ethics would coincide with the utilitarian, and there would be no further quarrel between them. Even as it is, the intuitive ITS SANCTIONS. 45 faioralists, though they believe that there are other intuitive moral obligations, do already believe this to be one ; foj^thgy unanimous ly hold that a large portion , of morality turns npnn t,hp. p.ni-|pirlftT-a.+.irm dlj e to the i ntere s ts of our fellow^creaturea . Therefore, if the belief in the transcendental origin of moral obligation gives any additional efficacy to the internal sanction, it appears to me that the utilitarian principle has already the benefit of it. On the other hand, if, as js my o: gn-belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason t he less-natural. It is natural to man to speak, to reason, to build cities, to cultivate the ground, though these are acquired faculties. The moral feelings are not-Jndeed-a-pada if our j iature, in the sense of being in any perceptible degree present in alL.Q£jisj__but_ this, unh appily^s a fac t admi tted by those who believe the most stretniSusly in their transcendental origin. Like the other acquired capa- cities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a n atural outgrowth fro nLit-: GapabJ B, like them, in a certai n small degre e, 'of spri nging up spontaneously ; and susceptible of being brou ght by cufEivatitTn:"toahigh JBgi£a-i3f-xievsl^^ ment. Unhappily it is also susceptible, by a sufficient ~use of the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direc- tj^on^^so that there TsTiardly anything" so absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of these influences, be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience. To doubt that the same* potency might be given by the same means to the principle of utility, even if it had no foundation 46 UTILITARIANISM. in human nature, would be flying in the face of all experience. But njLora l associations which are wholly of ar tificial fn-pgjjnp^ wViftt). iTitfillectual cult ur e goes on, yie ld by de grees tQ -iihe4iissoMiig_ force of an alysis : anJlf t he frglirg "^ duitig'^j wTipn aagnmaf,F^(| ^ith uti lit y, wou ld appear equally arbitrary ; if there were no leading department of our nature, no powerful class of senti- ments, with which that association would harmonise, which would make us feel it congenial, and incline us not only to foster it in others (for which we have abundant interested motives), but also to cherish it in ourselves ; if— thg re yere not, in short, a^ natural bp.sis-a£-seniim ent for utilitarian _moraIity,_itjmight w ell happen th atthis assoc iation also ,^ven after it "had bem jmplanted by^ducation . naight^Se analysed assiay^ But there is this basis of powerful natural senti- ment ; and this it is which, when once the general happiness is recognised as the ethical standard,^ wiU constitute the strength of the utilitarian ^ morality. This,|ei3!Ljfi3imdarfeio n. is that of the snf Mgj%|gHtiga_ of BoariBBd-; th e desire to be in u nity with our fellow creatures, which is^ jIreajy^jT^wfigETpT?^ in h^majxJiatuxeL^-aBdJ iappily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilisation. The social state is at once so natural, so ne,cessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circum- stances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body ; and this association is rivetted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state ITS SANCTIONS. 47 of savage independence. Any condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of society, becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's con- ception of the state of things which he is born into, and which is the destiny of a human bdrig. fNow^ ' ^cle'E ybetweenri tom'aji beings. except in th^ rftlatinn of , mailer and slave, is manifestly impossible 'on any .other footing -iJaan_ that. the intj& Eests-af..aU are to be jnsultedjT^Ssgi^ SJjetwe e n equals pan nnly^Yig^^ thTu nderstanding that th e interests of all are to be re garded equally. And since in alTstate of civilisa- tion, every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, every one is obliged to live on these terms with somebody.; and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody. In ' this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests. They are _ under a necessity o f conceiving +|wirijgp.1vAS fi.a_ai^1pfi.st-fthwbajning frnm nil i-,Ka-gyf>si«fty- inj< uries. and (if on ly^r-thfiir-Own_^r otectron) li ving in a, i=iia,te nf coBsia nt protest against them. They are also familiar with the fact of co-operating with others, and proposing to themselves a collective, not an indi- vidual, interest, as the aim (at least for the time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there . is at least a temporary feeling Jbhat the .in ter^ts_^ rj^hprg ar e their own interests . Not only does 'aU strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others f it also le ads him to identify hiis j^eZmga more. and m ore^ 18 UTILITARIANISM. wtMt^ f.Vipir gnnr\^ or at least with an ever greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course ipays regard to others. * Thg.gQQd Qf others_becomes to him a thing naturally and neces- sari lv t o bo alLun de dto. like any of the physi cal con- ditions of our^ yigj;|fiTiicR^ Now, whatever amount of this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demon- strate it, and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others ; and even if he has none of it himself, he is as greatly interested as any one else that others should have it. Conseguentiy, the s mallest germs of th e '•fe eling are laid j iold of and nourished by the contagion of ^sympathy and the i nfluences of educ ation ; and a complete web of corroborative association is woven round it, by the powerful agency of the external sanctions. 'This mode of conceiving ourselves and human life as civihsationgoes on, is felt to be more and more natural. Every step in political improve- ment renders it more so, by removing the sources of opposition of interest, and levelling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still practicable to disregard. In an iJ^proiipg-^tete-Q£ihejuim aji mind, the influencesare canstant^ujnt he incre ase, which tend to generate in ea^h individual a feehng of unity with all the rest ;. Vhich feeling, if perfect, would make him never think /of, or desire, any beneficial condition for ^himself, in I the benefits of which they are not included. If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and .ITS SANCTIONS.. 4^ of opinion, directed', as it once was in the case of religion, to make eveiy person grow up from infancy surrounded on all. sides both by the profession and by the practice of it, I think that no one, who can realize this conception, will feel any misgivings about the Siuffieiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness tobrality. To any ethical student who finds the realization difficult, I recommend, as a means of faci- litating it, the second of M. Comte's two principal works, the Systhme de Politique Positive. I entertain the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that treatise ; but I think it has superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the, servicg of humanity , even without the aid of belief ui a Providence, both the physical power and f|iA g/^pial f^ffir>ap,y n f a religjou ; making it take hold of human life, and colour all thought, feeling, and action, in a manner of which the greatest ascendency ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste ; and of which the danger is, not that it should be insufficient, but t hat it should be so exces^ siv e as to interfer eunduly with human freedom and individuality. Neither is it necessaiy to the feeling which eonsti' tutes the binding force of the utilitarian morality on those who recognise it, to wait for those social influ- ences which would make its obligation felt by mankind at large. In the comparatively early state of hum aTV advancement in which we now live, a person cannot indeed feer~that "entireness of sympathy with' all others, which would make any real discordance in the general direction of their conduct in life impossible ; D 50 UTILITARIANISM. but already a person in whom the social feeling is at all developed, cannot bring himself to think of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness, whom he must desire to see defeated in their object in order that he may succeed in his. The deeply-rooted con sPiptiinn whipji every ind ividual^Pin no w ha,s of himself asa socis| | L tends to make him feel it one of his haturaL wants that there should be harmony betwee n^ bjs_ ^filing nnf^ a.iT p s and th*^"^ "f hia fftllnw nrpa±l^vf^ , "fffliflEerences of opinion and of mental culture make it iuapossible for him to share many of their actual lii^ags — perhaps make him denounce and defy those feelings — he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and theirs do not conflict; that he is not opposing himself to what they really wish for, namely, their own good, but is, on the contrary, promoting it. ^^^iia, feel mg inanost ind ividual s is much inferior in s trength -. to their selli^h feelings, and is often wantine alto- ^gether. But to those who have it, It possesses aU the characters of a natural feeling, j It does not jjresent itsetf to their minds as a superstitio ruif. education^ a law des pntifially im posed by the pnwgr of society, but as an attribute whinh it wnnlrl n ot be wdT Si' _ them"to be without. This conviction is the ul timate sanctioB-o£th e gi-eatest-happiness morality . This it i s which makes any m i nd, of we llzdea^elope d feeling s. I work with, and not against^ he outward motives to , care for others, aifoi-ded bvwhat 1 havelcalled the I eac±fimal_^anctionsj_ andwhen those sanctions are wanting, or act m an opposite direction, constitutes in itself a powerful internal binding force, in propor- .ITS SANCTIONS. 51 tion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character ; since few but those whose mind is a moral blank, could bear to lay out their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels. 52 UTILITARIANISM. CHAPTER IV. OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY IS SUSCEPTIBLE. IT has already been remarked, that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. Tobe inca pable of Pg g^JT ^asoriin^ ig^ pnmTnnn to_aUJiratjrinciples ; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those. of our conduct. But the former, bein g: matters of fact, i]q.ayjbejhft subjjectjjfa djrect^ppeal tc tthe fa culties which ju d^ge-of fact— gamely, our senses, a nd_oui_ i nternal consciousn egs^ Oanan' appeal be made to the same faculties on questions of practical ends ? Or by what other faculty is cognizance taken of them%1 ,...J^ufistieiBfl'''dbfflIt^^ in other words, q uestid^ what things are desirable. Th€'titMitMi..afn dSteSe" is, that hapginess is desiraWe, and the only thin^ desirable, a s^ an end ; all other things bg gg O^j desirable as means to that euSK What ought to be required of this doctrine — whal; conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil — ^to make good its claim to be believed ? The onlf^ proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it : and so of the other sources of our experience. In like lanner, I anprehead, Jhe_sQle_evu^ ^ it i« po ggiHg -HOW PROVED. '53 to jrad ygejfcbjilajj^ingjsdesiraljie, is that people [^^^^[^^bsireitj Ifthe en3^TraiSflAie-«tEitariaii doctrine proposes to^itself were not, in theory and in practice, ackno-vrledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. Mo reason ean be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. T his, how ever;, being a fe^t, we have not only all the | pr oof/ which the case admits, of, but all which it is possible to pequire, the happiness is a good : that each person's happiness is a good to that" person, and the general happiness, th erefore, a good tf)-;|hF' niggrpgfiitf; nf nil persons. rH appin ess has made out' -its title as one of tbg_^idg_of co nduct, Eind~consequentTy one of th e c riteria of m orality. ; But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distin- guished from happiness. They. desire, for example, virtue, and .the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness. And hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem that they have a; right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of approbation and disapprobation, •, But. does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people de^iye virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to 54 UTILITABIANISM. be desired ? the very reverse. Jtuiiaiiitiain&sot-OBly that vir tue is to be desired, but th at it is to be desired disintoes±sd]^V-&*™i^'Seifi' Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original con- ditions by which virtue is made virtue ; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than" virtue; yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from considerations of this description^ which is virtuous, they not only place virtueat the very iheaij nf tbft thing a whif.b nifPi gnnd -^p rno^^nQ \^ j^ho 'ultimate end, b"^' "'"h ey also recognise as a, p s ychnlng iV^ c al fact the possibility of it s being , to the -iodividual. a good in itself, withoutj ooking to any end beyond it ; and hold, that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner — a ^. thi iTig^dftHJrajjftjTi jtigglf; i n although, i n the individual instance, it should ot produce those other desirable consequences which t tends to produce, and on account of which it is held to be virtue. This opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the Happiness prmci^ Tliiti lligl'L'dluuLtj of liiippJTiPiSPi nrB yery^'variousrand each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate. The prin- ciple of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example, health, are to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. TJiey arei desired and 4ediable in and for themselv e^fbesides hftiwg mflaTng, they^xe_a^rt]of^[£^r]'"7irbl^^ HOW PROVED. 55 utilitf irian doctrine, is not naturally a nd originallj;^ part of the end, but it is^pable o f becoraing so j^and in those who love it disinterestedly it hsi-s bec oine so, Em^P ^desired and cherished, not^agameans to hap piness.Jbut--as-ti-i3arfe-of4Jieii iii app /^KiUustrate this farther, we may remember that rvirtue is not the only thing, originally a means, and which if it were not a means to anything else, would, be and remain indiffereixt, ^ut which by associa tiom with whajL-j t, is a mea ng _^to, co mes^ to be__ assirgdJQy ^andthat too with the utmost intensity J What^ for example, shall we say^FtKelove^fmoney^?. inhere is nothing originally more desirable aboutmoney than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy ; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, injuaJi^^ses, desired^ in and for itself ; the lesire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. It may then be said truly, that money is desired not for the sake of an^^ndrb^fe- as p art of the end. From being a means to happiness, it 1 iTas come to be itself a principal ingredient of the in- dividual's conception of happiness. The same may be said of the majority of the.great objects of human life 7^) for example, o£,^jrigpexcept that to each of tEesei^Kere is a certain amount of immediate pleasure annexed, which has at least the semblance of being naturally inherent in them; a thing which cannot be said of money. Still, however, the strongest natural 56 UTILITARIANISM. attraction, both of power and of fame, is the immense aid they give to the attainment of our other wishes; ^nd it is the strong associatioii thus generated between them and all our objects of desire, which gives to the direct desii-e of them the intensity it often assumes, so as in some characters, to surpass in strength, all i other desires. In these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they are means ta What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness,, has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession ; and is made unhappy by failure to obtaia it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the. desire of happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included in happi- ness. They are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. HappinessJsniaLan abstr act idea, but a concrete wh(^ ; and these are g.ome of its parts. Arid the utilitarian standard sanc- tions and approves their being so. Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happi- ness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, Jieeefifte~iiLJ hemselv es sources of pleasu re mor ejvaIuable-4hfbB~ihe4Hdmitiye pleasures, bQthin_ ^rmanency, in the sp aga^Jiuman'Wisterice tibatth&s ji^re capable of c overiug, and evenTnmtenSty^ ISrtjie, according to the utilitanancoHCBptTon, is a good of this description. There was no original desire •HOW PROVED. 57' of it, or motive to it. sa ve its copr lnnivftngsgjjypT^gfiZirj and e^xeciaJrly4Q q).rotection f'r om,.paiii. But through the association thus forraed, it- may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good ; and with this difference between iti and the love of money, of power, or of, fame,, that all' of these may, a,nd often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which mak es him Somuch a blessi ng to them as the cultivation of tha! disinterested l ove of vir tue. [A nd consequently, tlm -*Silitscria,iL 5iaii3sif a.7'wtiiJ'e it tolerates and approves tft9§§"6ther acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they wotrld be more injurious to' the genef af haiipihess than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the Rultivatim <-»f-tbp. Imro-Q^viv^i^g up to the greatest ^stt"6ingth possible, as being above all things important It results from the preceding considerations, that there is -in reali fcmQtbip g d esired pxcepiLJhappiness. Whn ,tp,vp,r in l. dpf=iirftrl nt.h erwise than as a mea ng to some end beyond itself, and ultimatel y to happines s, is ""desired as itself^ a part of happiness, and isnot desired for its elf unti l~it"has become so. Those who I desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because th^ consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for; both I'easons united ; as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together, the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would 58 UTILITARIANISM. desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for. We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is suscep- tible. If the^ op injon whir.h T have now stated is psychologically true— ifji uman na ture^ isso^consti- ^ ^ed-^as^o desi renfltihiTig wVnV.h is not either a p art of happiness or a m eans of happiness, we can have no ^^er pro of, ano we requi re~no otEerT thatj Kese'Sre t^e on lythings desi rable. If so, happiness is the sole enaoThuman action^ and~the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole. And now to decide whether this is really so ; whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence is a pain ; we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and experience. depRndent^ like all similp^ gnps- jtions. upon evide nces — It can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, as- sisted by observation of others. I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, wiU declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon ; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact : that to think of an object as desirable^uuless f or the sake "t)f its consequences), and to thmtqfrT^ pleasant, are one and the same thing ; and that to desire any- thing, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility. . HOW PROVED. 59 So obvious does this appear to me, that I expect it will hardly be disputed : and the objection made will be, not that desire can possibly be directed to any- thing ultiniately except pleasure and exemption from pain, but that the will is a. j i f fpr^nf -t-.bi'pg fr^ na-desire l that a person of confirmed virtue, or any other person whose purposes are fixed, carried out his purposes without any thought of the pleasure he has in con- templating them, or expects to derive from their ful- filment ; and persists in acting on them, even though these pleasures are much diminished, by changes in his character or decay of his passive sensibilities, or are outweighed by the pains which the pursuit of the purposes may bring upon him. All this I fully admit, and have stated it elsewhere, as positively and em- phatically as anyone. Will thp tiftivp phpTinTTinTinTi , in a different thing from desire, the state of passive sensi- bility, and though originally an oifshoot from it, may in time take root and detach itself from the parent stock ; so much so, that in case of an habitual pur^ pose, instead of wiUing the thing because we desire i t -we often desire it only because we will it. This, how- ever, is but an instance of that familiar fact, thB £pwer of habit, and is nowise confined to the case of virtuous actions. Many indifferent things, which men ori- ginally did from a motive of some sort, they continue to do from habit. Sometimes this is done uncon- spiously, the consciousness coming only after the action : at other times with conscious volition, but volition which has become habitual, and is put! into operation by the force of habit, in opposition perhaps to the deliberate preference, as often happens with those who have contracted habits of vicious or hurtful 60 UTILITAEIANISM. indulgence. Third and last comes the case in which the habitual act of wUl in the individual instance is not in contradiction to the general intention pre- vailing at other times, but in fulfilment of it ; as in the case of the person of confirmed virtue, and of aU who pursue deliberately and consistently any deter- minate end. The distinction between will and desire thus understood, is an authentic and highly impcortant psychological fact ; but the fact consists solely in this — ^at will, like all o tbeg-pftfts^jfour consti tution, is amenable to habit, and that we^ay \^lj^ prom haM i what_ffi£-B e longer dGs ire^&r-ii ^elf, or desire _jonIy because we will it . Iti&jigLt he less true JLbfliLwiU> in the beg i nning, is enti n^vproduc ed by de sire ; in- eluding in that term the repelling influence of pain as well as the attractive one of pleasure. Let us take into consideration, no longer the person who has a confirmed will to do right, but him in whom that virtuous will is still feeble, conquerable by temptationj and not to be fully relied on ; by what means can it be strengthened ? How can the will to be virtuous, where it does not exist in sufilcient force, be implanted or awakened ? Only by making the person desire virtue — ly-Biaking-himjbh ink of it in a pleasurable hg Et^or ,of its absence in a painful one. It is by associatmg the doing right wrEh pleasurej'or the doing wrong with pain, or by eliciting and impressing and bringing home to the person's experience the pleasure naturally involved iiL-th&-Qnex>rjbhepain in the other, that it is possible to call jforth that mCTto be virtuous, whicBJ when_go^rniedj3gliS--TaIho^^ of either^ 3r pain._yi^ill4H^ tho phild of d^ai^ J^EmtiaS^^ \put of the dominion of its parent only to come under HOW PEOVED.. 61 j^l^o f habitr -^hat which is the result of habit affords no presumption of being intrinsically good; and there would be no reason for wishing that the pur- pose of .virtue should become independent of pleasure and pain, were it not •^■ha.-f,|-|-,Vir inflnnnrr of thr pkn surable and painfiil associations w]i i&la~ -p ' j!om|jtt ^ virtue is not sufficiently tn 'he , rlepff"^"r' ■-"^^—•p'^ T uner ring constan cy of actior II I ! II in I ii imWT I ^.^ ^ _.^a^Mi ^^ ^ suppor t oOiabit.. Both i TTifeplm g^^jjfj- m^-^»ti HWj BSEit IS the only thing wmi^Limparts certainty ; and it is because of the importance to others of being abk to rely absolutely on one's feelings and conduct, anc to qneself of being able to rely on one's own, that th^ will to do right ought to be cultivated into thif habitual independence. In other words, this state the will is a means to good, not intrinsically a gooc and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is eithe itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure < averting pain. But if this doctrine be true, the principle of utili'by is proved. Whether it is so or not, must now be left to the consideration of the thoughtful reader. 62 ITTiLITARIANISM. CHAPTER V. ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AJSTD UTILITY. IN all ages of speculation, one of the strongest obstacles to the reception of the doctrine that Utility or Happiness is the criterion of right and wrong, has been drawn from the idea of Justice. The powerful sentiment, aud apparently clear perception, which that word recalls with a rapidity and certainty resembling an instinct, have seemed to the majority" of thinkers to point to an inherent quality in things ; to show that the Just must have an existence in Nature as ^something absolute — generically distinct fi'om every variety of the Expedient, and, in idea,, opposed to it, though (asja^ commonly acknowledged) never, in the long run, disjoined from it in fact. In the case of this, as of our other moral senti- ments, there is no necessary connexion between the question of its origmj; and that of its binding force. [That a feeling is bestowed on us by Nature, does not necessarily legitimate all its promptings. The feeling of justice might be a peculiar instinct, and might yet require, like our other instincts, to be controlled and enlightened by a higher reason. If we have intel- lectual instincts, leading us to judge in a particular way, as well as animal instincts that prompt us to act in a particular way, there is no necessity that the former should be more infallible in their sphere than HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 63 the latter in theirs; it may as well happen that wrong judgments are occasionally suggested by those, as wrong actions by these. But though it is one thing to believe that we have natural feelings of justice, and anothier to acknowledge theioa as an ultimate criterion of conduct, these two opinions are very closely con- nected in point of fact. Mankind are always pre- disposed to believe that any subjective feeling, not otherwise accounted for, is a revelation of some ob- jective reality. Our present object is to determine whether the reality, to which the feeling of justice corresponds, is one which needs any such special reve- lation ; whether the justice or injustice of an action is a thing intrinsically peculiar, and distinct from all its other qualities, or only a coinbination of certain of those qualities, presented under a peculiar aspect! For the purpose of this inquiry, it is practically important to consider whether the feeling itself, of justice and injustice, is sui generis like our sensations of colour and taste, or a derivative feeling, formed by a com- bination of others. And this it is the more essential to examine, as people are in general willing enough to allow, that objectively the dictates of justice coin-/ cide with a part of the field of General Expediency / but inasmuch as the subjective mental feeling cj£ Justice is different from thatwhich commonlyattaches to simple expediency, and, except in extreme (3ases of the latter, is far more imperative in its demands)\ people find it difficult to see, in Justice, only a par- ticular kind or branch of general utility, and think th^t its superior binding force requires a totally different origin. To tha-ow light upon this question, it is necessary !64 TTTILITAEIANISM. • I to attempt to ascertain what is, "the distinguisliing I character of justice, or of injustice : what is the ' quality, or whether there is any quality, attributed in common to all modes of conduct designated as unjust (for justice, like many other moral attributes, is best defined by its opposite), and distinguishing them from such modes of conduct as are disapproved, but with- out having that particular epithet of disapprobation appKed to them. If, in everything which men are ac- customed to characterize as just or unjust, some one common attribute or collection of attributes is always present, we may judge whether this particular attri- bute or combination of attributes would be capable of gathering round it a sentiment of that peculiar charac- ter and intensity by virtue of the general laws of our emotional constitution, or whether the sentiment is inexplicable, and requires to be regarded as a special provision of Nature. If we find the former to be the case, we shall, in resolving this question, have resolved also the main problem : if the latter, we sha,U have to seek for some other mode of investigating it. . To find the common attributes of a variety of ■objects it is necessary to begin by surveying th^ objects themselves in the concrete. Let us therefore advert successively to the various modes of action, and arrangements of human affairs, which are classed I by universal or widely spread opinion, as Just or as Unjust. The things well known to excite the senti- ments associated with those names, are of a very multifarious character. I shaU pass them rapidly in review, without studying anyparticular arrangement. |» the. first place, it is mostly considered unjust to HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 65 deprive any one of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law. Here, therefore, is one instance of the application of the terms just and unjust in a perfectly definite sense, namely, that it is just to respect, unjust to violate, J the legal rights of any one. But this judgment admitsi of several exceptions, arising from the Other forms in which the notions of justice and injustice present themselves. For example, the person who suffers the deprivation may (as the phrase is) have forfeited the rights which he is so deprived of : a ca^e. to which we shaU return presently. But also, ^ Secondly ; the legal rights of which he is deprived,' may be rights which ought not to have belonged to him ; in other words, the law which confers on him these rights, may be a bad law. When it is so, or when (which is the same thing for our purpose) it is supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it. Some maintain that no* law,' however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an indi- vidual citizen ; that his opposition to it, if shown at all, should only be shown in endeavouring to get it altered by competent authority. This opinion (which condemns many of the most illustrious benefactors of mankind, and would often protect pernicious iustitu- tions against the only weapons which, in the state of things existing ait the time, have any chance of suc- ceeding against them) is defended, by those who hold it, on grounds of expediency ;! principally on that of the importance, to the common interest of mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law. Other persons, again, hold the directly con- trary opinion, that any law, judged to be bad, may E 66 DTILITARIANISM. blamelessly be disobeyed, even though it . be not judged to be unjust, but only inexpedient ; while others would confine the licence of disobedience to the case of unjust laws ; but again, some say, that aU laws which are inexpedient are unjust ; since every law imposes some restriction on the natural liberty, of mankind, which restriction is an injustice, unless legitimated by tending to their good. Amot^ thi^j diversities of opinion, it seems to be universally ad- mitted that there may be unjust laws, and that law, consequently, is not the ultimate criterion of justice, but may give to one person a benefit, or impose on another an evil, which justice condemns. When, however, a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same ways in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infi"ing- ing somebody's right ; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and IS called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case of injustice consists in taking or with- holding from any person that to which he has a moral right. Thirdly, it is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or evil) which he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest a^d most emphatic form in which the idea of justice is" con- ceived by the general mind. As it involves the notion of desert, the question arises, what constitutes desert ? Speaking in a general way, a person is un- derstood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he does wrong ; and in a more particular sense, to de- HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 67) sea^ve good from those to whom he does or has done; good, and evil from those to whom he does or has done evil. The precept of returning good for evil^ has never Taeen regarded as a case of the fulfilment of justice, but as one in which the claims of justice are waived, in obedience to other considerations. Fourthly, it is confessedly unjust to break faith with any one : to violate an engagement, either ex- press or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by our own conduct, at least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily. Like the. other obligations of justice already spoken of, this^Sne is not regarded as absolute, but as capable of being overruled by a stronger obligation of justice on the other side ; or by such conduct on the part of the person concerned as is deemed to absolve us from our obligation to him, and to constitute a, forfeiture of the benefit which he has been led to expect. Fifthly, it is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be partial ; to show favour or pre- ference to one person over another, in matters to which favour and preference do not properly apply. Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some other duty; for it is admitted, that. iavQu.r_and jpre- ference are not always censurable, and indeed-the cases in which they are condemned. arELxathfiKjhe ex- ception than the rule. A pei«on would be more likely to be blamed than applauded for giving his family or friends no superiority in good offices over strangers, when he could do so without violating any other duty : and no one thinks it unjust to seek one person in preference to another as a friend, connexion, or 68 XTTILITAEIANISM. companion. Impartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory, but this is involved in the more general obligation of giving to every one his right. A tribunal, for example, must be impartial, because it is bound to award, without regard i;o any other consideration, a disputed object to the one of two parties who has the right to it. There are other cases in which impartiality means, being solely in- fluenced by desert ; as with those who, in the capacity of judges, preceptors, or parents, administer reward and punishment as such. There are cases, again, in which it means, being solely influenced by considera- tion for the public interest ; as in making a selection among candidates for a Government employment. Impartiality, in short, as an obligation of justice, may be said to mean, being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the particular case in hand ; and resisting the solici- tation of any motives which prompt to conduct dif- Iferent from what those considerations would dictate. Nearly allied to the idea of impartiality, is that of equality; which often enters as a component part both into the conception of justice and into the practice of it, and, in^ the eyes of many persons, constitutes its essence. But in this, stUl more than in any other case, the notion of justice varies in different persons, and always conforms in its variations to their notion of utility. Each person maintains that equality is the dictate of jiistice, except where he thinks that^ expediency requires inequality. The justice of giving equal protection to the right of all, is maintained by those who support the most outrageous inequality in the rights themselves. Even in slave countries it is HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 69 theoretically admitted that the rights of the slave, such as they ai"e, ought to be. as sacred as those of the master; and that a tribunal which fails to enforce ^hem with equal strictness is wanting in justice ; while, at the same time, institutions which leave to the slave scarcely any rights to enforce, are not deemed unjust, because they are not deemed inexpe- dient. Those who think that utility requires distinc- tions of rank, do not consider it unjust that riches and social privileges should be unequally dispensed ; but those who think this inequality inexpedient, think it unjust also. Whoever thinks that govern- ment is necessary, sees no injustice in as much in- equality as is constituted by, giving to the magistrate powers not granted to other people. Even among those who hold levelling doctrines, there are as many questions of justice as there are differences of opinion about expediency. Some Communists consider it un- just that the produce of the labour of the community should be shared on any other principle than that of exact equality; others think it just that those should receive most whose needs are greatest ; while others hold that those who work harder, or who produce more, or whose services are more valuable to the com- munity, may justly claim a larger quota in the divi- sion of the produce. And the sense of natural justice may be plausibly appealed to in behalf of every one of these opinions. Among so many diverse applications of the term Justice, which yet is not regarded as ambiguous, it is a matter of some difficulty to seize the mental link which holds them together, and on which the moral sentiment adhereing^ to the term essentially depend. (7 UTILITABIANISM* , Perhaps, in this embarrassinent, some, help may: be derived from the history of the word, as indicated by its etymology. In most, if not in all, languages, the etymology of the word which corresponds to Just, points to an origin connected either with positive law, or with that which was in most cases the primitive form of law- ^autbo- ritative custom. Justwm is a form of jussum, that which has been ordered. Jm is of the same origin. AiKaiov comes from S/kij, of which the principal meaning, 3,t least in the historical ages of Greece, was a suit at law. Originally, indeed, it meant only the mode or manner of doing things, but it early came to mean the jprescribed manner; that which the recognised autho- rities, patriarchal, judicial, or political, wo^ld en- force. Becht, from which came right and righteous, is synonymous with law. The original meaning,' indeed, of recht did not point to law, but to physical straight' ' ness; asifTOTO^and its Latin equivalents meant twisted OY tortuous; and from this it is argued that right did not originally mean law, but on the contrary law meant right. But however this may be, the fact that recht and droit became restricted in their meaning to posi- tive law, although much which is not required bylaw is equally necessary to moral straightness or rectitude, is as significant of the original character of moral ideas as if the derivation had been the reverse way. The courts of justice, the administration of justice, are the courts and the administration of law. La justice, in French, is the established term for judicature. There can, I think, be no doubt that the idSe mkre, the primitive element, in the formation of the notion of justice, was conformity to law. It constituted the entire ideai HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 71 ■among the Hebrews, up to the birth of Christianity ; as might be expected in the case of a people whoselaws attempted to embrace all subjects on which precepts Were required, and who believed those laws to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being. But other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who knew that their laws had been made originally, and still continued "to be ' made, by men, were not afraid to admit that those men might make bad laws ; might do, by law, the same things, and from the same motives, which, if done by individuals, without the sanction of law, would be called unjust. And hence the sentiment of injustice came to be attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such laws as ought to exist, including such as ought to exist but do not : and to laws themselves, if supposed to be contrary to what ought to be law. In this manner the idea of law and of its injunctions was still predominant in the notion of justice, even when the laws actually in force ceased to be accepted as the standard of it. It is true that mankind consider the idea of justice and its obligations as applicable to many things which neither are, nor is it desired that they should be, regulated by law. Nobody desires that law should interfere with the whole detail of private life ; yet every one allows that in all daily conduct a person may and does show himself to be either just or unjust. But even here, the idea of the breach of what ought to be law, still lingers in a modified shape. It, ^fi^ ^iway-s give us pleasure, and chime in with our feel- ings of fitness, that acts which we deem unjust should he puuished, though we do not always think it expe- dieni-fehiast this should be done by the tribunals. We 72 UTILITARIANISM. forego that gratification on account of incidental in- conveniences. We should be glad to see just conduct enforced and injustice repressed, even in the minutest details, if we were not, with reason, afraid of trusting, the magistrate with so unlimited an amount of power over individuals. When we think that a person is bound in justice to do a thing, it is an ordinary form of language to say, that he ought to be compelled to do it. We should be gratified to see the obligation enforced by anybody who had the power. If we see that its enforcement by law would be inexpedient, we lament the impossibility, we consider the impunity given to injustice as an evil, and strive to make amends for it by bringing a strong impression of our own and the public disapprobation to bear upon the offender. Thus the idea of legal constraint is stiU the generating idea of the notion of justice, though undergoing several transformations before that notion, as it exists in an advanced state of society, becomes complete. The above is, I think, a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin and progi-essive growth of the idea of justice. , But we must observe, that it contains, as yet nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral obligation in general. For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not caU anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it ; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures ; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own con- science. This seems the real turning point of the dis- tinction between morality and simple expediency. It HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 73 is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of itsi forms, that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty.^/; Measons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may militate against actually exacting it ; but the person himself, it is clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dis- like or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do ; it is not a case of moral obligation ; we do not blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. How we come by these ideas of deserving and not deserving punishment, will appear, perhaps, in the sequel ; but I think there is no doubt that this dis- tinction lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong ; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ instead, some other term of dislike or dispa- ragement, according as we think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it ; and we say that it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, according as we would wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled or only persuaded and exhorted to act in that manner.* This, therefore, being the characteristic diiference ** See this point enforced and illustrated by Professor Bain, in an admirable chapter (entitled " The Ethical Emotions, or the Moral Sense "), of the second of the' two treatises composing his elaborate and profound -work on the Mind. 74 . UTILITAEIANISM. which marks off, not justice, but morality in general, from the remaining provinces of Expediency and "Worthiness ; the character is still to be sought which distinguishes justice from other branches of morality. Now it is known that ethical writers divide moral duties into two classes, denoted by the ill-chosen ex- pressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect obliga- tion ; the latter being those in which, though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice ; as in the case of charity or beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practise, but not towards any definite person, nor at any pre- scribed time. In the more precise language of philo- sophic jurists, duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right. I think it will be found that this distinc- tion exactly coincides with that which exists between justice and the other obligations of morality. In our survey of the various popular acceptations of justieei the term appeared generally to involve the idea of a personal right — a claim on the part of one or more individuals, like that which the law gives when it confers a proprietary or other legal right. Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a pos- session, or in breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, orworse than other people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposi- tion implies two things — a wrong done, and some assignable person who is wronged. Injustice may also be done by treating a person better than others ; but the wrong in this case is to his competitors, who HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 7$ •are al30 assignable persons. It seems to me that this feature in the case — a, right in some person, correlative to the mpral obligation — constitutes the specific dif- ference between justice, and generosity or beneficence. Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right. (_No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, bei- .cause we' are not morally bound to practise those vir- tues towards any given individual.} And it will be found, with respect to this as with respect to every cor- rect definition, that the instances which seem to conflict with it are those which most confirm it. For if a moralist attempts, as some have done, to make out that mankind generally, though not any given individual, have a right to all the good we can do to them, he at once, by thatthesis,include8 generosity and beneficence within the category of justice. He is obliged to say, that our utmost exertions are due to our fellow crea- tures, thus assimilating them to a debt; or that nothing less can be a sufficient retvrn for what society does for us, thus classing the case as one of gratitude;' both of which are acknowledged cases of justice. Wherever | there is a right the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence : and whoever does not place the distinction between justice and morality in general where we have now placed it, will be found to make no distinction between them at all, but to merge all morality in justice. Having thus endeavoured to determine the distinc- tive elements which enter into the composition of the idea of justice, we are ready to enter on the inquiry, whether the feeiling, which accompanies the idea, is 76 UTILITARIANISM. attached to it by a special dispensation of nature, or whether it could have grown up, by any known laws, out of the idea itself; and in particular, whether it can have originated in considerations of general expe- Idiency. I conceive that the sentiment itself does not arise rfrom anything which would commonly, or correctly, be termed an idea of expediency ; but that, though the sentiment does not, whatever is moral in it does. We have seen that the two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are, the desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or indi- viduals to whom harm has been done. Now it appears to me, that the desire to punish a person who has done harm to some individual, is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy . It is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done or attempted,.jigainst ourselves, or against those with whom we sympathise. The origin of this sentiment it is not necessary here to discuss. Whether it be an instinct or a result of intelligence, it is, we know, common to all animal nature ; for every animal tries to hurt those who have hurt, or who it thinks are about to hurt, itself or its young. Human beings on this point, only differ frorn other animals in two par- ticulars. First, in being capable of sympathising, not solely with their offspring, or, like some of the more noble animals, with some superior animal who is kind to them, but with all human, and even with all HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 77 sentient, beings. Secondly, in having a more de- veloped intelligence, which gives a wider range to the whole of their sentiments, whether self-regarding or sympathetic. By virtue of his superior intelligence, even apart from his superior range of sympathy, a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which' he forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally, is threatening to his own, and calls forth his instinct (if instinct it be) of seli-defence. \ The same superiority of intelligence, joined to the power of sympathising with human beings generally, enables him to attach himself to the collective idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind, in such a manner that any act hurtful to them rouses his instinct of sympathy, and urges him to resistance. . , The sentiment of justice, in that one of its elements which consists of the desire to punish, is thus, I con- ceive, the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance, rendered b y intellect and sympathy ap plicable to those injuries" that is, to those hurts, which wound us through, or in common with, society at large. This sentiment in itself, has nothing moral in it ; wh at is moral is, the exclusive subordinati^ uo£-it^i»^4hd social s ympa thies, so ast o wait on and obey th eir na jL Fo r the natural feeling tends to make us resent indiscriminately whatever any one does that is dis- agreeable to us; but when Eaoralisgd— t^z^-'the-seeiai feeling, it only acts in the directions conformable to the general good ; . just persons resenting a hurt to society, though not otherwise a hurt to theniselves, and not resenting a hurt to' theimselves, however, 78 UTILITARIANISM. painful, unless it be of the kind which society has a common interest with tljem in the repression of. It is no objection against this doctrine to say, that when we feel our sentiment of justice outraged, we are not thinking of society at large, or of any collec- tive interest, but only of the individual case. It is common enough certainly, though the reverse of com- mendable, to feel resentment merely because we have suifered pain ; but a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling, that is, who considers whether an act is blameable before he allows himself to resent it — such a person, though he may not say expressly to 'himself that he is standing up for the interest of society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for hisown. If he is not feeling this — if he is regarding the act solely as it affects him individually — he is not con- sciously just : he is not concerning himself about the justice of his actions. This is admitted even by anti- utilitarianmoralists. When Kant (as before remarked) propounds as the -fundamental principle of morals, ' So act, that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational beings,' he virtually ac- knowledges that the interest of mankind collectively or at least of mankind indiscriminately, must be in the mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the naorality of the act. Otherwise he uses words without a meaning ; for, that a rule even of utter selfishness could not possibly be adopted by all rational beings — that there is any insuperable ob- stacle in the nature of things to its adoption — can- not be even plausibly maintained. To give any meaning to Kant's principle, the sense put upon it HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 79 must be, that we^ught to shape our conduct by a rule which all ratioiial beings might adopt wiihhenefit to their collective interest. \ To-jsecapitulate; the idea of justice supposes two tjaings ; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed com- mon to Ml mankind, and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule. There is involved, in addition, the conception of some defi- nite person who suffers by the infringement ; whose rights (to use the expression appropriated to the case) are violated by it. And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal .desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathises, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its morality ; from the former, its peculiar impressive- ness, and energy of self-assertion. I have, throughout, treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person, and violated by the injury, not as a ^parate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms in which the other two elements clothe themselves. These elements are, a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand, and a demand for punish- ment on the other. An examination of our own minds, I think, will show, that these two thinga include all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right. When we call anything a person's right, we. mean that he has a valid claim on society to pro- 80 UTILITARIANISM. tect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion, .If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, t» have something guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right to it. If we desire to prove that anything does not belong to him by right, we think this done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take measures for securing it to him, but should leave it to chance, or to his own exertions. Thus, a person is said to have a right to what he can earn in fair professional competition; because society ought not to allow any other person to hinder him from endeavouring to earn in that manner as much as he can. But he has not a right to three hundred a-year, though he may happen to be earning it ; because society is not called on to provide that he shall earn that sum. On the contrary, if he owns ten thousand pounds three per cent, stock he has a right to three hundred a-year ; because society has come under ah obligation to provide him with an income of that amount. To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the' possession of. If the objector goes^on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility^ ^_Jf that expression does not seem to""convey a" sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feehng, it is because there goes to the. composition of the sentiment, not a rational only but also an animal element, the thirst for retaliation ; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive •3? HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 81 kind of utility which is concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests. Nearly aU other earthly benefits are needed by one person, not needed by another ; and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or replaced by something else ; ^ut securit y no human b eing canp ossibly_ doja4thout ; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment ; since nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything the next instant by who- ever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. Now this most indispensable of all necessaries, after phy- sical nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play. Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our fellow creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings round it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the dif- ference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a real diiference in kind. The claim assumes^ that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency and inexpediency. The feelings concerned are so powerful, I and we count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in others (all being alike interested)^ that ought and should grow into must, and recognised indispensa- bility becomes a moral necessity, analogous to phy- sical, and often not inferior to it in binding force. r 82 UTILITARIANISM. If the preceding analysis, or something resembliag it, be not the correct account of the notion of justice ; if justice be totally independent of utility, and be a standard per se, which the mind can recognise by simple introspection of itself; it is hard to understand why that internal oracle is so ambi- guous, and why so many things appear either just or unjust, according to the light in which they are regarded. We are continually informed that Utility is an uncertain standard, which every different person interprets differently, and that there is no safety but in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakeable dictates of Justice, which carry their evidence in themselves, and are independent of the fluctuations of opinion. One would suppose from this that on questions of justice there could be no controversy ; that if we take that for our rule, its application to' any given case could leave us in as little doubt as a mathematical demonstration. So far is this from being the fact, that there is as much difference of opinion, and as fierce discussion, about what is just, as about what is useful to society. Not only have different nations and individuals different notions of justice, but, in the mind of one and the same indi-' vidual, justice is not some one rule, principle, or maxim, but many, which do not always coincide in their dictates, and in choosing between which, he is guided either by some extraneous standard, or by his own personal predilections. For instance, there are some who say, that it is unjust to punish any one for the sake of example to others ; that punishment is just, only when intended HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 83 for the good of the sufferer himself. Others maintain the extreme reverse, contending that to punish persons who have attained years of discretion, for their own benefit, is despotism and injustice, since if the matter at issue is solely their own good, no one has a right •to control their own judgment of it ; but that they may justly be punished to prevent evil to others, this being an exercise of the "legitimate right of self- defence. Mr. Owen, again, affirms that it is unjust to punish at aU ; for the criminal -did not make his own character; his education, and the circumstances which surround him, have made him a criminal, and for these he is not responsible. All thpse opinions are extremely plausible; and so long as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down to the principles which lie under justice and are the source of its authority, I am unable to see how any of these reasoners can be refuted. For, in truth, every one of the three builds upon rules of justice con- fessedly true. T*he first appeals to the acknowledged injustice of singling out an individual, and making him a sacrifice, without his consent, for other people's benefit. The second relies on the acknowledged justice of self-defence, and the admitted injustice of <#3rcing one person to conform to another's notions of what constitutes, his godd. The Owenite invokes the admitted principle, that it is unjust to punish any one for what he cannot help. Each is triumphant so long as he is not compelled to take into consideration any other maxims of justice than the one he has selected; but as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face, each disputant seems to have exactly as mjiah. to say for himself as the others. No one of them can 34 UTILITARIANISM. carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally binding. These are difficulties; they have always been felt to be such ; and many devices have been invented to turn rather than to over- come them. As a refuge from the last of the three, men imagined what they called the freedom of the will ; fancying that they could not justify punishing a man whose will is in a thoroughly hateful state, unless it be supposed to have come into that state through no influence of anterior circumstances. To escape from the other difficulties, a favourite contri- vance has been the fiction of a contract, whereby at some unknown period all the members of society engaged to obey the laws, and consented to be punished for any disobedience to them ; thereby giving to their legislators the right, which it is assumed they would not otherwise have had, of punishing them, either for their own good or for that of society. This happy thought was considered to get rid of the whole difficulty, and to legitimate the infliction of punishment, in virtue of another received maxim of justice, volenti non fit iniuria .- that is not unjust which is done with the consent of the person who is supposed to be hurt by it. I need hardly remark, that even if the consent were not a mere fiction, this maxim is not superior in, authority to the others which it is brought in to supersede. It is, on the contrary, an instructive specimen of the loose and irregular manner in which supposed principles of justice grow up. This particular one evidently came into use as a help to the coarse exigencies of courts of law, which are sometimes obliged, to be content with very uncertain presumptions, on account of the greaterj HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 85 evils which would often arise from any attempt on their part to cut finer. But even courts of law are not able to adhere consistently to the maxim, for they allow voluntary engagements to be set aside on the ground of fraud, and sometimes on that of mere mis- take or misinformation. Again, when the legitimacy of inflicting punish- ment is admitted, how many conflicting conception's of justice come to light in discussing the proper ap- portionment of punishment to offences. No rule on this subject recommends itself so strongly to the primitive and spontaneous sentiment of justice, as the lex talionis, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Though this principle of the Jewish and of the Mahomedan law has been generally abandoned in Europe as a practical maxim, there is, I suspect, in most minds, a secret hankering after it ; and when retribution accidentally falls on an offender in that precise shape, the general feeling of satisfaction evinced, bears witness how natural is the sentiment tb which this repayment in kind is acceptable. With many the test of justice in penal infliction is that the punishment should be proportioned to the offence ; meaning that it should be exactly measured by the nioral guilt of the culprit (whatever be their standard for measuring moral guilt) : the consideration, what amount of punishment is necessary to deter from the offence, having nothing to do with the question of justice, in their estimation : while there are others to whom that consideration is all in all ; who maintain that it is not just, at least for man, to inflict on a fellow creature, whatever may be his offences, any amount of suffering beyond the least that will suffice 86 UTILITARIANISM. to pi-event him from repeating, and others from imi- tating, his misconduct. To take another example from a subject akeady once referred to. In a co-operative industrial asso- ciation, is it just or not that talent or skill should give a title to superior remuneration ? On the negative side of the question it is argued, that whoever does the best he can, deserves equally well, and ought not in justice to be put in a position of inferiority for no fault of his own; that superior abiUties have already advantages more than enough, in the admiration they excite, the personal influence they command, and the internal sources of satisfaction attending them, with- out adding to these a superior share of the world's goods ; and that society is bound in justice rather to make compensation to the less favoured, for this un- merited inequality of advantages, than to aggravate it. On the contrary side it is contended, that society receives more from the n:;ore efficient labourer ; that his services being more useful, society owes him a larger return for them ; that a greater share of the joint result is actually his work, and not to allow his claim to it is a kind of robbery ; that if he is only to receive as much as others, he can only be justly re- quired to produce as much, and to give a smaller amount of time and exertion, proportioned to his superior efficiency. Who shaU. decide between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice ? Justice has in this case two sides to it, which it is impossible to bring into harmony, and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides ; the one looks to what it is just that the individual should receive, the other to what it is just that the community should give. Each, HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 87 from his own point of view, is unanswerable ; and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the preference. How many, again, and how irreconcileable, are the standards of justice to which reference is made in dis- cussing the repartition of taxation. One opinion is, that payment to the ■ State should be in numerical proportion to pecuniary means. Others think that justice dictates what they term graduated taxation ; taking a higher percentage from those who have more to spare. In point of natural justice a strong case might be made for disregarding means altogether, and taking the same absolute sum (whenever it could be got) from every one : as the subscribers to a mess, or to a club, all pay the same sum for the same privileges, whether they can all equally afford it or not. Since the protection (it might be said) of law and govern- ment is afforded to, and is equally required by, all, there is no injustice in making all buy it at the same price. It is reckoned justice, not injustice, that a dealer should charge to all customers the same price for the same article, not a price varying according to their means of payment. This doctrine as applied to taxation,finds no advocates, because it conflicts strongly with men's feelings of humanity and perceptions of so- cial expediency ; but theprinciple of justice which itin- vokes is as true and as binding as those which can be appealed to against it. Accordingly, it exerts a tacit influence on the line of defence employed for other modes of assessing taxation. People feel obliged to argue that the State does more for the rich than for the poor, as a justification for its taking more from 88 UTILITARIANISM. them : though this is in reality not true, for the rich would be far better able to protect themselves, in the absence of law or government, than the poor, and indeed would probably be successful in converting the poor into their slaves. Others, again, so far defer to the same conception of justice, as to maintain that all should pay an equal capitation tax for the protection of their persons (these being of equal value to all) and an unequal tax for the protection of their pro- perty, which is unequal. To this others reply, tl^at the all of one man is as valuable to him as the all of another. From these confusions there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian. Is, then, the difference between the Just and thp Expedient a merely imaginary distinction ? Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking that justice is a more sacred thing than policy, and that the latter ought only to be listened to after the former has been satisfied ? .By no means. The expositio^ we have given of the nature and origin of the senti- ment, recognises a real distinction ; and no one of those who profess the most sublime contempt for the consequences of actions asan element intheirmorality, attaches more importance to the distinction than I do. While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 89 than any other rules for the guidance of life; 'and the notion which we have found to be of the essfence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an indi- vidual, implies and testifies to this more binding obligation. The moral rules which^xbid_majikindJ»-huft.e»e- another (in whichjvs_inust~-nev-er--feFget--4;0-4-nd[ude wrongfurinterference with each_o;dier^fceedom.)-are more vitarijo "human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs. They havis also the peculiarity, that they are the main element in determining the whole of the social feelings of mankind. It ^sj^heir observance which alone_preserves peace among human beingsT? obe- dience to thenTwere not the rule, and disobedience' the exception, every one would see in every one else a probable enemy, against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself. What is hardly less important, these are the precepts which mankind have the strongest and the most direct inducements for im- pressing upon one another. By merely giving to each other prudential instruction or exhortation, they may gain, or think they gain, nothing : in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence they have an unmistakeable interest, but far less in degree : a person may possibly not need the benefits of others ; but he always needs that" they should not do him hurt. Thus the moralities which protect every indi- vidual from being harmed by others, either directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once those which he himself has most at heart, and those which he has the strongest 90 UTILITARIANISM. interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed. It is by a person's observance of these, that his fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of human beings, is tested and decided ; for on that depends his being a nuisance or not to those with whom he is in contact. Now it is these moralities primarily, which compose the obligations of justice. The most marked cases of injustice, and those which give the tone to the feeling of repugnance which characterizes the sentiment, are acts of wrongful aggression, or wrong- ful exercise of power over some one ; the next are those which consist in wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due ; in both cases, in- flicting on him a positive hurt, either in the form of direct suffering, or of the privation of some good which he had reasonable ground, either of a physical or of a social kind, for counting upon. The same powerful motives which command the observance of these primary moralities,^ nj oin — tAie p unishment of tho Rp wVio vinkta t . bmn ; - and as the inipulses of self-defence, of defence of others, and of vengeance, are aU called forth against such persons, retribution, or evil for evil, becomes closely connected with the sentiment of justice, and is universally in- cluded in the idea. Good for good is also one of the dictates of justice ; and this, though its social utility is evident, and though it carries with it a natural human feeling, has not at first sight that obvious connexion with hurt or injury, which, existing in the most elementary cases of just and unjust, is the source of the characteristic intensity of the sentiment. But the connexion, though less obvious, is not less real. He who accepts benefits, and denies a return of them HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 91 when needed, inflicts a real hurt, by disappointing one of the most natural and reasonable of expectations, and one which he must at least tacitly have encou- raged, otherwise the benefits would seldom have been conferred. The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact that it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise. Few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them in the hour of need; and few wrongs are greater than this mere withholding of good ; none excite more resentment, either in the person suffering, or in a synipathizing spectator. The principle, therefore, of giving to each what they deserve, that is, good for good, as well as evil for evil, is not only included within the idea of Justice as we have defined it, but is a proper object of that intensity of sentiment which places the Just, in human estimation, above the simply Expedient. Most of the maxims of justice current in the world, and commonly appealed to in its transactions, are simply instrumental to carrying into effect the prin- ciples of justice which we have now spoken of That a person is only responsible for what he has done voluntarily, or could voluntarily have avoided ; that it is unjust to condemn any person unheard; that the punishment ought to be proportioned to the offence, and the like, are maxims intended to prevent the just principle of evil for evil from being perverted to the infliction of evil without that justification. The 92 UTILITAHIANISM, greater part of these common maxims have come mto use from the practice of courts of justice, which have been naturally led to a more complete recognition and elaboration than was likely to suggest itself to others, of the rules necessai-y to enable them to fulfil their double function, of inflicting punishment when due, and of awarding to each person his right. That first of judicial virtues, impartiality, is an obligation of justice, partly for the reason last men- tioned ; as being a necessary condition of the fulfil- ment of the other obligations of justice. But this is not the only source of the exalted rank, among human obligations, of those maxims of equality and impar- tiality, which, both in popular estimation and in that of the most enlightened, are included among the pre- cepts of justice. In one point of view, they may be considered as corollaries from the principles already laid down. If it is a duty to do to each according to , its deserts, returning good for good as well as repress- ing evil by evil, it necessarily follows that we should , : treat aU equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have deserved equally well of us, and that society should treat aU equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have deserved equally well absolutely. This is the highest abstract stan- dard of social and distributive justice; towards which all institutions, and the efibrts of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost possible degree to con- verge. But this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and not a mere logical corol- lary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. Greatest-Happiness Principle. That principle is a mere form . of words without rational signification, unlessone person'shappiuess, supposed equalin degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, ' everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,' might be written under the principle of utility as an explana- tory commentory.* The equal claim of everybody to "* This implication, in the first principle of the utilitarian scheme, of perfect impartiality between persons, is regarded by Mr. Herbert Spencer (in his Social Statics) as a disproof of the pretensions of utility to be a sufficient guide to right ; since (he says) the principle of utility presupposes i?he anterior principle, that everybody has an equal right to happiness. It may be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons. This, however, is not a pre- supposition ; not a premise needful to support the principle of utility, but the very principle itself ; for what is the principle of utility, if it be not that ' happiness ' and ' desirable ' are synonymous terms ? If there is any anterior principle implied, it can be no other than this, that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happi- ness, as of all other measurable quantities. [Mr. Herbert Spencer, in a private communication on the subject of the preceding Note; objects to being considered an opponent of Utili- tarianism, and states that he regards happiness as the ultimate end of morality : but deems that end only partially attainable by empirical generalizations from the observed results of conduct, and completely attainable only by deducing, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action, necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. With the exception of the word " necessEixily," I have no dissent to express from this doctrine ; and (omitting that word) I am not aware that any modern advocate of utilitarianism is of a different opinion. Bentham, certainly, to whom in the Social Statics Mr. Spencer particularly referred, is, least of all writers, chargeable with unwillingness to deduce the effect of actions on happiness from the laws of human nature and the universal conditions of human life. The common charge against him is of relying too. 94 UTILITARIANISM. happiness in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator, involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which that of every individual is included, set limits to the maxim ; and those limits ought to be strictly con- strued. As every other maxim of justice, so this, is by no means applied or held applicable universally ; on the contrary, as I have already remarked, it bends to every person's ideas of social expediency. But in whatever case it is deemed applicable at all, it is held to be the dictate of justice. All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when I some recognised social expediency requiresthe reverse. And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated ; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correc- tion of which would make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The entire history of social im- provement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom or institution after another, from being a exclusively upon such deductions, and declining altogether to be bound by the generalizations from specific experience -wrhich Mr. Spencer thinks that utilitarians generally confine themselves to. My own opinion (and, as I collect, Mr. Spencer's) is, that in' ethics, as in all other branches of scientific study, the consilience of the results of both these processes, each corroborating and verifying the other, is requisite to give to any general proposition the kind and degree of evidence which constitutes scientific proof.] HOW CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE. 95 supposed primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an universally stigmatized in- justice and tyranny. So it has been with the distinc- tions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians ; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of colour, race' and sex. It appears from what has been said, that justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any others ; though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice. Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call anything justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this useful accom- modation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining that there can be laud- able injustice. The considerations which have now been adduced resolve, I conceive, the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals. It has always been evi- dent that all cases of justice are also cases of expedi- ency : the difference is in the peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former, as contradistinguished from the latter. If this characteristic sentiment has been 96 XTTILITARIANISM. sufficiently accounted for ; if there is no necessity to assume for it any peculiarity of origin ; if it is simply the natural feeling of resentment, moralized by being made coextensive with the demands of social good ; and if this feeling not only does but ought to exist in all the classeiS of cases to which the idea of justice corresponds ; that idea no longer presents itself as a stumbling-block to the utilitarian ethics. Justice remains the appropriate nameforcertain social utilities^ which are vastly more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a class (though not more so than others may be in par- ticular cases) ; and which, therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment not only different in degree, but also in kind ; distin- guished from the milder feeling which attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or con- venience, at once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner character of its sanctions. THE END. Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson &^ Co. London &■ Edinburgh H Classitieb Catalogue OF WORKS IN ■GENERAL LITERATURE PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.G. gi AND 93 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, and 33 HORNBY ROAD, BOMBAY. CONTENTS.- PAGE 10 BADMINTON LIBRARY (THE) BIOGRAPHY, PERSONAL ME- MOIRS, &c. 7 CHILDREN'S BOOKS 25 CLASSICAL LITERATURE, TRANS- LATIONS, ETC. 18 COOKERY, DOMESTIC MANAGE- MENT, &c. - - - . - z8 EVOLUTION, ANTHROPOLOGY, &C. - - - - 17 FICTION, HUMOUR, &c. - 20 FUR, FEATHER AND FIN SERIES 12 FINE ARTS (THE) AND MUSIC 29 HISTORY, POLITICS, POLITY, POLITICAL MEMOIRS, &c. - 3 LANGUAGE, HISTORY AND SCIENCE OF - - 16 MENTAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY - MISCELLANEOUS AND CRITICAL WORKS ... MISCELLANEOUS THEOLOGICAL WORKS - ... POETRY And THE DRAMA POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ECO. NOMICS POPULAR SCIENCE SILVER LIBRARY (THE) SPORT AND PASTIME . STONYHURST PHILOSOPHICAL SERIES TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE, THE COLONIES, &c. WORKS OF REFERENCE - 14 29 32 19 17 24 26 10 16 9 25 INDEX Page 3,18 Abbott (Evelyn) (T. K.) - (E. A.) - Acland (A. H. D.) Acton (Eliza) AdeanetJ. H.)- £schylus Ainger (A. C.) - Albemarle (Earl of) Allen (Grant) - Amos (S.) Angwin IM. C.) Ansiey (F.) Aristophanes Aristotle - Arnold (Sir Edwin) (Dr. T.) - Ashbourne (Lord) Ashby iH.) Ashley (W. J.)- Avebury ( Lord) AyrelKev. J.) - - 14. 15 14 24 3 z8 20 18 14 9.19 3 3 28 3. 17 17 25 Bacon - - - 7, 14 Baden-Powell (B. H.) 3 Bagehol (W,) 7, 17, 27, 30 Bagwell IK.) - 3 Bailey (H. C.l - - 20 Pain (Alexander) - 14 Baker (J . H.) - - 27, 30 (Sir S. W.) - 9, 10 Balfour (A. I.) - 11,32 (Lady Betty) - 5 OF AUTHORS Page Ball (John) - 9 Banks (M. M.) - ^ 20 Baring-Gould(Rev.S.)a7,30 Barnett (S. A. and H.J 17 Baynes (T. S.) - - 30 Beacoiisfield (Earl of) 20 Beaufort (Duke of) - 10, 1 1 Becker (W. A.) - 18 Beesly (A. H.) - - 7 Bell (Mrs. Hugh) ig Bent (J. Theodore) - 9 Besant (Sir Walter). 3 Bickerdyke (J.) 11, la, 13 Bird (G.) Blackburne Ij. H.) - Bland (Mrs. Hubert) Boase (Rev. C. W.) - Boedd^r (Rev. B.) - Boyd (Rev. A. K. H.) 30, Brassey (Lady) (Lflrd) Bray (C.) - Bright (Rev. J. F.) - Rroadfoot (Major W.) Brown (A. F.) . Bruce (R. I.) - Uuck (H. A.) - Buckland (J as.) Buckle (H.T.). Bull(T.) - Hurke lU. R.) . Burns (C. L ) - Burrows (Montagu) AND EDITORS. Page Butler (E. A.) - - 24 Creed (S.) (Samuel) - 18,20,30 Creiehton (Bishop) - Crozier(J. B.) - Curzon of Kedlestoa (Lord) - Ciistance (Col. H. - Cutts (Rev. E. L.) Cameron of Lochiel 12 CampbelKRev. Lewis) 18,32 Camperdown (Earl of) 7 Cawthorne(Geo.Jas.) X3 Chesney (Sir G.) - 3 Childe-PemfaertonCW.S.) 7 •Chola' - - - 20 Cholmondeley-Pennell (H.) - - - II ChurchilUW. Spencer) 3, 20 Cicero - - - 1^8 Clarke (Rev. R. F.) - 16 Clodd (Edward) - 17, 24 ClutterbuckCW. J.)- g Co'enso (R. J.) - 29 Coleridge (S. T.) - 19, 20 Comparetti (D.) L^oninKton (John) - Conway (Sir W. M ) Conybeare (Rev. W. J.) & Hnwson (Dean) Conlidge (W. A. B.) Corbn (M.) Corbet! ifulian S.) - Coutis (W.) - Coventry (A.) - Cox (Harding) Crake (Rev. A. D.) - Crawford (J. H.) - (R.) - - - Page 20 4.5 7. 14 4 12 5 Dallinger (F. W.) - 5 , Davidson (W. L.) 15, 16, 32 Davies (J. F.) - i8 Dent (C. T.) - - 11 De Sails (Mrs.) - 29 De Tocqueville (A.) - 4 Devas (C. S.) - - 17 Dickinson (G. L.) - 4 (W. H.) . . 30 Do.ugall (L.) - - 20 Dowden (E.) - - 31 Doyle (A. Conan) . 21, Pu Bois (W. E. B,). 5 Dufferin (Marquis of) iz Dunbar (Mary F.) - 20 Bbrington (Viscount) 12 Ellis (J. H.) - 13 Evans (Sir John) 30 Farrar (Dean) - - 16, 31 Fitzmaurice (Lord E.) 4 Folkard (H. C.) - 13 Ford (H.) - - . I, (W.J.) - . IJ INDEX OF AUTHORS AND ETDlTORS—continuedSi Page Fowler (Edith H.) 21 Francis (Francis) 13 Francis (M. E.) - 21 Freeman (Edward A.) 5 Freshfield (D. W.) - 11 Froude ([ames A.) 4, 7, g, 21 Fuller (F. W.) - - 4 Furneaux (W.) 24 Gardiner (Samuel R.) 4 Gathorne-Hardy (Hon. A. E.) - - 12,13 Gibbons (J. S.) 12 Gibson (C. H.)- 14 Gleig (Rev. G. R.) 8 Goetbe - - ig Going (C. B.) - - 25 Gore-Booth (Sir H. W.) 11 Graham (P. A.) - 13 (G. F.) - - 16 Granby (Marquis of) 12 Grant (Sir A.) - - 14 Graves (R. P.) - 8 Green (T. Hill) t5 Greene (E. B.)- 5 Greville (C. C. F.) 4 Grose (T. H.) - 15 Gross (C.) 4, 5 Grove (F. C.) - 11 (Mrs. Lilly) - 11 Gurdon (Lady Camilla) 21 Gurnhill (J.) - 15 Gwilt (J.) - 25 Haggard (H. Rider)- 21, 3T Hake (O.) - - - 12 Halliwell-Phillipps([.) 8 Hamilton (Col. H. B.) 4 Hamlin (A. D. F.) - 2g Harding (S. B.) 5 Harte (Bret) - 21 Harting (J. E.) - 12 Hartwig (G.) 24 Hassall (A.) 7 Haweis (H. R.) 8, 30 Head (Mrs.) 2g Heath (D. D.) - 14 Heathcote (J. M.) 12 (C. G.) - 12 (N.) - g Helmholtz (Hermann von)- - - - 24 Henderson (Lieut- Col. G. F.) - 7 Henry (W.) - 12 , Hehty (G. A.) - - 26 Herbert (Col. Kenney) 12 Herod (Richard S.) - 13 Hiley (R. W.) - 8 Hillier (G. Lacy) 10 Hime (H. W. L.) - 18 Hodgson (Shadworth)l5, 31 Hoenig (F.) - - 31 Hogan(J.F.) - 7 Holmes (R. R.) 8 Holroyd (M. ].) 8 Homer - - 18 Hope (Anthony) 21 Horace - - 18 Houston (D. F.) - 5 Howard (Lady Mabel) 21 Howitt(W.) - g Hudson (W. H.) 24 Huish (M. B.) - 29 Hullah (I.) 29 Hume (David) - 15 Hunt (Rev. W.) 5 Hunter (Sir W.) - 5 Hutchinson (Horace G.) II, 13 Ingelow (lean) - iq Ingram (T. D.) 5 lames (W.) - - 15 Jameson (Mrs, Anna) 29 lefferies (Richard) lekyll (Gertrude) Jerome (Jerome K.) - Johnson 0' & J- H.) Jones (H. Bence) Jordan (W. L.) Joyce (P. W.) - 5, Justinian : Page 31 31 22 31 23 17 22, 31 15 Kant (L) - - 15 Kaye (Sir J. W.) 5 Kelly (E.)- - 15 Kent (C. B. R.) 5 Kerr (Rev. J.) 12 Killick (Rev. A. H.) - 15 Kingsley (Rose G.) - 29 Kitchin (Dr. G. W.) 5 Knight (E. F.) - - 9, 12 Kbstlin y.) 8 Ladd (G. T.) - - 15 Lang (Andrew) 5, 10, II, 13, 17,18,19,20,21,22, 26, 31, 32 Lapsley (G. T.) - 5 Lascelles (Hon. G.) 10, 12 Lawrence (F. W.) 17 Laurie (S. S.) - 5 Lawley (Hon. F.) - 11 Lear (H. L. Sidney) - 29 Lecky (W. E. H.) 5, 15, 19 Lees (J. A.) - - 9 Leslie (T. E. Cliffe) - 17 Levett- Yeats (S.) 22 Lillie (A.)- - 13 Lindley (J.) . 25 Loch (C. S.) 30 Lodge (H. C.) - 5 Loftie (Rev. W. J.) - 5 Longman (C. J.) 10,13,30 (F. W.) - - 13 (G. H.) - -11,12 (Mrs. C. J.) 29 Lowell (A. L.) - 5 Lubbock (Sir John) - 17 Lucan - - 18 Lutoslawski (W.) 15 Lyall (Edna) - 22 Lynch (H. F. B.) - g Lyttelton (Hon. R. H.) 10 (Hon. A.) - - 12 Lytton (Earl of) 5, ig Macaulay (Lord) 5, 6, ig Macdonald (G.) - g (Dr. G.) - - 19, 32 Macfarren (Sir G. A.) 29 Mackail (J. W.) - 8, 18 Mackinnon (J.) 6 Macleod (H. D.) - 17 Macpherson (Rev. H. A.)l2 Madden (D. H.) - 13 Magnusson (E.) 22 Maher (Rev. M.) - 16 Malleson (Col. G. B.) 5 Mann (E. E.) - - 29 Marbot (Baron de) - 8 Marchment (A. W.) 22 Marshman (j. C.) - 8 Martineau (Dr. James) 32 Maryon (M.) - - 31 Mason (A. E. W.) 22 Maskelyne (T. N.) 13 Matthews (B.) 31 Maunder (S.) - 25 Max Miiller (F.) 8, 15, 16, 17, 22, 31, 3? May (Sir T. Erskine) 6 Meade (L. T.) - - 26 Melville(G.J.Whyte) 22 Merivale (Dean) - 6 Mernman 'H. S.) 22 Mill (John Stuart) - 15, 17 Millias (J. G.) - 13 Milner (G.) 31 Moffat (D.) - - 13, 19 Monck (W. H. S.) 15 Page Montague (F. C.) .6 Moon (G. W.) - 19 Moore (T.) - 25 (Rev.Edward) - 14 Morgan (C. Lloyd) - 17 Morris (Mowbray) - 11 (W.) 18, 19,20,22, 30,31 Mulhall (M. U.) - 17 Nansen (F.) 9 Nash (V.) - 6 Nesbit (E.) - 20 Nettleship (R. L.) - 15 Newman (Cardinal) - 22 Oldfield (Hon. Mrs.) 7 Onslow (Earl oO - II, 12 Osbourne (L.) - 23 Park(W.) - - 14 Payne-Gallwey (Sir R.) - - - II, 14 Pearson (C. H.) 8 Peek (Hedley) - - 11 Pemberton (W. S. Childe-) - - 7 Pembroke (Earl of) - 12 Pennant (C. D.) - 12 Phillipps-Wolley (O.) 10, 22 Pitman (C. M.) - 11 Pleydell-Bouverie (E. O.) 12 Pole (W.) - - 14 Pollock (W. H.) - 11, 31 Poole (W.H. and Mrs.) 2g Pooler (C. K.) - - 20 Poore (G. V.) 31 Pope (W. H.) 12 Powell (E.) - - 6 Praeger (S. Rosamond) 26 Prevost(C.) - 11 Pritchett (R. T.) 12 Proctor (R. A.) 14, 24, 28 Tyrrell (R. Y.) - Raine (Rev. James) - 5 Randolph (C. F.) 6 Rankin (R.) - 20 Ransome (Cvril) 3, 6 Raymond (W.) 22 Reader (Emily E.) 23 Rhoades (J.) - 18 Rice (S. P.) 10 Rich (A.) - - 18 Richardson (C.) - 10, 12 Rickaby (Rev. John) 16 (Rev. Joseph) - 16 Ridley (Sir E.) - 18 (Alice) 23 Riley (J. W.) - 20 Roget (Peter M.) - 16, 25 Romanes (G. J.) 8, 15, 17, 20, 32 (Mrs. G. J.) - 8 Ronalds (A.) - 14 Roosevelt (T.) - 5 Ross (Martin) - - 23 Rossetti (Maria Fran- cesca) - - - 31 Rotheram (M. A.) 29 Rowe (R. P. P.) II Russell (Lady)- 8 I ' Saintsbury (G.) 12 Sandars (T. C.) - 15 Savage- Armstrong(G.F.)20 Seebohm (F.) - 6, 8 Selous(F. C.) - 10, 14 Senior (W.) - - n, 12 Sewell (Elizabeth M.) 23 Shakespeare - 20 Shand (A I.) 12 Shaw (W. A.) - 6 Shearman (M.) - 10, 11 Sinclair (A.) - - 12 Smith (R. Bosworth) 6 (T. C.) - - 5 (W. P. Haskett) 10 Zeller (E.) Somerville (E.) 23 Sophocles - 18 Soulsby(LucyH.) 31 Southey (R.) - 31 ~ Spahr (C. B.) 17 Spedding Q.) 7, 14 Stanley (Bishop) 24 Stebbing (W.) - 8, 23 Steel (A. G.) - 10 Stephen (Leslie) - 10 Stephens (H. Morse) 6 Sternberg (Count Adalbert) - 7 Stevens (R. W.) - 32 Stevenson (R. L.) 20,23,26 Stock (St. George) - 15 Storr(F.)- - - u^ Stuart-Wortley(A.J.) 11, is' Stubbs (J. W.) - - ; Suffolk & Berkshire (Earl of) - - II Sullivan (Sir E.) 12 Sully (James) - - 16 Sutherland (A. and G.) 7 (Alex.) - - 16, 32 (G.) - ■ 32 Suttner (B. von) 23 Swan (M.) - 23 Swinburne (A. J.) 16 Symes (J. E.) - 17 Taylor (Meadows) 7 (Una) - 23 Tebbutt (C. G.) 12 Terry (C. S.) - 8 Thornhill (W. J.) 18 Thornton (T. H.) 8 Todd (A.) - 7 Toynbee (A.) - - 17 Trevelyan (Sir G. O.) 6, 7, 8 (G. M.) - - 6, 7 Trollope (Anthony)- 23 Turner (H, G.) 32 Tyndall (J.) - 7, 10 18 Upton(F.K.and Bertha) 26 Van Dyke (J. C.) 30 Virgil - - 18 Wagner (R.) - 20 Wakeman (H. O.) 7 Walford (L. B.) 23 Wallas (Graham) 8 Walpole (Sir Spencer) 7 Walrond (Col. H.) - 10 Walsingham(Lord)- II Ward (Mrs. W.) - 23 Warwick (Countess of) 32 Watson (A. E. T.) 10,11,12 Weathers (J.) - 32 Webb (Mr. and Mrs. Sidney) - - 17 (T, E.) - 16, 19 Weber (A.) - 16 Weir (Capt. R.) - 11 Wellington (Duchess of) - 30 West (B. B.) - 23 Weyman (Stanley) - 23 Whately(Archbishop) 14,16 White (W. H.) - 20 Whitelaw (R.) - Wilcocks (J. C.) 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