>^:\ B 173 Z5l c.l CORNSL-i university libr'ary t' ^*-^ T* '-' ■j FROM 4.^ ^,\A" Date Due f^'\k^^^jm,M^ L--MAL^^mtm PRINTED IN im:^m^X4i^ NO. 23233 B 173 Z51™*" ""'""""y Library V.I "''llniilfiiiiiiiiiimiSNiffl^^^ = from the e olln 3 1924 032 290 920 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032290920 A HISTOEY OF GEEEK PHILOSOPHY FKOM THE EARLIEST PERIOD t6 THE TIME OF SOCRATES WITH A GMNEBAL INTRODUCTION TRANSLATED FHOM THE GERMAN OF DK E. ZELLEE FROFUSSOR IK THB TJNITEESITT OF B^SRLIN iait\ i\t g.«tIjor's saratioit BY S. F. ALLBYNE IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I. LONDON LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO. 1881 Y All rights reserved A^yy^^' CORNELL^ UNIVERSITY LIBRARY^ '^6^ f TRMSLATOE'S PREFACE. The present work is a translation of the fourth and last edition of the first part of Dr. Zeller's 'Philo- sophie der Griechen.' That this part, containing the General Introduction to the entire subject g,nd the his- tory of the earliest philosophers, should appear after others dealing with the later periods, is in some mea- sure to be regretted, because Greek Philosophy is best treated as a whole, and gains immensely by being studied in the order of development; yet those who are acquainted with the previously translated portions of Dr. Zeller's work will be the more ready to welcome the introductory volume, without which, indeed, many things in the later philosophy, and in Dr. Zeller's treat- ment of it, would have remained comparatively obscure. There is no need to speak highly of a work so well known. The translator has endeavoured to make her version as literal as possible, considering the require- ments of the English language and its deficiency in precise equivalents for German philosophical terms — a vi THAIfSLATORS PREFACE. deficiency giving rise to many difficulties which she cannot hope to have always successfully overcome. She desires to express her hearty thanks to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, for his valuable assistance in reading over the proof sheets, especially in regard to the Greek notes. It is, perhaps, necessary to add, respecting the numerous references, that Vol. I. and II. stand for the volumes of the present translation, and Part I. II. and III. for the divisions of the German work. Clifton : December 6, 1880. AUTHOE'S PREFACE. Twenty tears ago, when I published in its later form the first volume of this work, originally designed on a different plan, and a far more limited scale, I ex- plained in the following words the principles which had guided me in its composition : ' In the treatment of my subject I have constantly kept in view the task which I proposed to myself in my first approaches to it ; viz. to maintain a middle course between erudite en- quiry and the speculative study of history : neither, on the one hand, to collect facts in a merely empirical manner ; nor, on the other, to construct a priori theories ; but through the traditions themselves, by means of cri- tical sifting and historical combination, to arrive at a knowledge of their importance and interdependence. This task, however, in regard to the pre-Socratic philo- sophy was rendered peculiarly difiScult by the character of the sources and the divergencies of modern opinions respecting them : it was impossible adequately to fulfil it without a number of critical discussions^ often descending to the minutest details. , That the clearness viii AUTHOR'S PREFACE. of the historical exposition, Jibwever, might not be thereby impaired, I have consigned these discussions as much as possible to the notes, -where also the testi- monies and references respecting the authorities find a fitting place. But the writings from which these are taken are many, and some of them difficult to obtain, so that it has often been necessary to give the quota- tions at length to make it possible for the reader to test the authenticity of my exposition without an unwarrant- able expenditure of time. Thus the amount of notes, and consequently the size of the whole volume, have increased to a considerable extent ; but I hope I have chosen rightly in attending before all things to the scientific requirements of the reader, and in doubtful cases preferring to economise his time rather than the printer's paper.' I have kept to the same points of view in the pre- paration of the following volumes, and of the new editions which have since become necessary. The hope that I have therein adopted the proper course has been fully justified by the reception given to my work ; and though the principle (not previously quite unknown to me) has recently been pressed upon my attention, that the ancient philosophers must be treated philosophically, I have never yet been able to convince myself that the method hitherto pursued by me has been a mistake. I still hold, more strongly than ever, that the philosophic apprehension of systems of philosophy (which, however must be distinguished from philosophic criticism) en- AUTHORS PREFACE. ii tirely coincides with the historic apprehension of them. I can never indeed consider that a proper history has been written if the author has stopped short at the bare enumeration of isolated doctrines and statements without enquiring as to their centre of gravity, examining their interconnection, or tracing out their exact meaning ; without determining their relation and importance to the various systems collectively. But, on the other hand, I must protest against the misuse of the noble name of philosophy for the purpose of depriving his- torical phenomena of their distinctive character, of forcing upon the ancient philosophers inferences which they expressly repudiate, of effacing the contradictions and supplying the lacunae of their systems with adjuncts that are pure inventions. The great phenomena of the past are much too great in my eyes for me to suppose that I could do them any service by exalting them above their historical conditions and limitations. In my opinion, such a false idealisation makes them smaller instead of greater. At all events, nothing can thereby be gained for historic truth, before which every predi- lection for particular persons and schools must give way. Whoever would expound a philosophic system must re- produce the theories held by its author in thp connection which they had in his mind. This we can only learn from the testimony of the philosophers themselves, and from the statements of others concerning their doctrines; but, in comparing these testimonies, in examining their authenticity and credibility, in completing them by in- X AUTHORS PREFACE. ferences and combinations of various kinds, we must be careful to remember two things : in the first place, the inductions -which caiTy us beyond direct testimony must in each case be founded on the totality of evidence in our possession ; and when a philosophic theory seems to us to require certain further theories, we must always examine whether other portions of the author's system, quite as important in his estimation, do not stand in the way. Secondly, we must enquire whether we are justi- fied in supposing that the philosopher we are considering propounded to himself the questions which we are pro- pounding to him, returned to himself the answers which we derive from other statements of his, or himself drew the inferences which to us appear necessary. To. pro- ceed in this spirit of scientific circumspection has been at any rate my own endeavour. To this end, as will be seen in the later no less than in the earlier editions of my work, I have also tried to learn from those writers who here and there, on points of greater or lesser importance, have differed from me. If I am indebted to these writers for many things that have assisted in the completion and correction of my exposition, it will nevertheless be understood that, in all essential points, I could only re- main true to my own view of the pre-Socratic philo- sophy, and have defended that view as persistently and decidedly as the interest of the subject demanded, against objections which seemed to me unconvincing and untenable. I dedicated the second edition of the present work AUTHORS PREFACE. xi to my father-in-law, Dr. F. Chk. Baue, of Tiibingen. In the third I was obliged to omit the dedication, because he to whom it was addressed was no longer among us. But I cannot refrain from recalling in this place, with affection and gratitude, the memory of a man who was not only to me in all personal relations a friend and father, but also, in regard to my scientific labours, has left for me and for all his disciples a shining example of incorruptible love of truth, untiring perse- verance in research, inexhaustible diligence, penetrative criticism, and width and coherence in the treatment of history. Berlin : October 18,1876. ■ CONTENTS OK THE FIEST VOLUME. Teanslatob's Pbefacb Authoh's Pekfacb . GENERAL INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. AIM, SCOPE, AND METHOD OP THE PRESENT WORK 1-^ CHAPTER TI. ORIGIN OP GREEK PHILOSOPHY. i. Supposed derivation of Greek philosophy from Oriental ■ speculation W ii. Native sources of Greek philosophy. 1. Religion 49 a. Greek religion ...... 4!^ b. The Mysteries 69 iii. Native sources of Greek philosophy (continued). 2. Moral life': civil and political conditions iv. Native sources of Greek philosophy (continued). 3. Cosmology /S3 V. Ethical reflection. 4. Theology and Anthropology in relation to Ethics . ^ ,109, I xiv CONTENTS OF THE FIBST VOLUME. ''•'chapter III. PACK ON THE CHARACTEK OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 129-163 CHAPTER IV. THE PRINCIPAL PERIODS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK_ PHILOSOPHY (\6i-\&5J FIRST PERIOD. THE PRE-SOCKATIC PHILOSOPHY. ^HTBODXICTIOH. On THE ChAEACTBE AND DEVELOPMENT OP Philosophy in the Fihst Peeiod " . ... . 184-210 FIRST SECTION. THE EARLIER lONIANS, PYTHAGOREANS, AND ELEATICS. I. The Eabliee Ionian Phtsios. 1. Biales ' 211 \2. Hpaximander 227 iB. ^haximenes .......... 266 ■tti ^Bitfir adtierents of the Ionian School. Diogenes of ApoUonia 280 iM II. The Pythagoeeans. ;" ^B't^B^ of o""" knowledge in regard to the Pythagorean pUilo- """ly 306 ■ ^BM*^^ ^^^ ^^^ Pythagoreaijs ...... 324 ■ ^Bi i-vtnagorean philosophy : its fundamental conceptions : " ^ ' Number and the Elements of Number . . ... 368 4.' Systematic development of the Number system, and its appli- cation to Physics ^jg CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. iv FACHG 3. Beligious and ethical doc trii'"' "f tl'ff T'Y^'"'a"TBfir-'' ' . . 181 6. Retrospective summary : character, origin, and antiquity of the Pythagorean philosophy i . . . . . . 496 7. Pythagoreanism in combination with other elements: Alemaeon, Hippasus, Ecphantus, Epicharmus . . . . . . 321 III. The Elbatics. 1. Sources in regard to their doctrines. Treatise on Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgiaj . . .... ^ 933 1 2. Xenophanes — . . . . . . . . . . 536j- Pajmeuiilcs -r" . . . . . ... r^tio j 4. Zeno .-^ 608 .5. Melissus 627 6. Historical position and character of the Eleatio School . . Q^SJ ERRATA. Page 4, line 9— for Shepherd Boir/toi read herda of grazing Boo-itof. 54, line 2 from foot— /or particulars read particular. 72, line 19— for seventeenth read seventh. 94, 2, line 17— for sup. p. 93 read sup. p. 91, 3 ; cf. 98, 4. 145, 1, line 2— for the Protagoras read Protagoras. 214, a. line 28 (first column) — for Anacolius read Anatolius. ■ 219, 3, line 10 (second column)— ;^or affinity read infinity. 231, n. line 20 (first column)— /o»- 233, 1 read 228, S. 247, 1—for 223, 1 read 233, 1. 251, line 9— for surrounds read surrounded. 260, i—for l.')l, 1 rend 2S1, 1. 263, 2— for pp. 197, 200 read 241, 244. 265, 3— for 197 read 241. 269, 2, line 8— for 268, 1 rearf 267, 1. 288, 3— for 241,-1 read 241, 2. 289, 1, line 9— for 291, 1 read 291, 2. * 292, 1—for 290, 4 reod 291, 1. 352, 1—for 336, 4 read 336, 5. 434, 2, line 2— for 426, 6 read 429, 6. 444, 1, line 3— ^ir conservation read assertion. 444, 2— for 442, 1 read 443, 1. 468, 1, line 5 from foot (second column)— /or 415 reod 526. 627, 3— for 372, 1 read 372, 4. 527, 4, line 4 from foot— /or 491 rend 528. .531, 2— for 529, 5 read 530, 2. 538, 1—for 547, 1 read 548, 1. 543, 1, line 14 (second column)— ^/or 547, 1 read 548, 1. 654, i—for 547, 1 rend 548, 1. 554, i—for 542, 1 rend 643, 1. 560, 1, lines 18 and 19— for infra read supra ; for 544,, 1 read 545, 1. 566, 1—for 549, 1 rend 548, 2 ; for 560, 2 read 662, 5. 587, line 8 — omit therefore 608, 2, lines 4 and 7—for 543 read 617, n. ; for 590, 1 read 591, 1. 623, line 19 — for connections read connection. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GEEEKS IN ITS HISTOEICAL DEVELOPMENT. INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. AIM, SCOPE^AND METHOD OF THE PBBSBNT WORK. The term Philosophy, as in use among the Greeks, varied greatly in its meaning and compass.' Originally it denoted all _m sillial_C]jJJjiCfi^aM---all effort ^ direction of culture ; ^ even as aojiia, the word from wWcE'iTisaerived, was applied to every art and every kind of knowledge.' A more restricted significance seems first to have been given to it in the time of the Sophists, when it became usyal to seek after a wider knowledge by means of more special and adfequate ■ Cf. the valuable evidence of imKaxlas. The same vague use of Eaym in Erseh and Gruber's Allge- the word is long after to be met meine Encyklopaedie, sect. iii. b. 24, -with even among writers who are p. 3 sqq. not unacquainted with the stricter Thus Croesus says to Solon (Herodotus, i. 30) that he had heard ' Cf. Aristotle's Eth. Nic. vi. 7, is <^i.\Baoipi(i»i 7^1' voKK^v fleapfijs sub init., and the verse quoted by eiveHfv iTrf\ii\v9as. Similarly, Pe- him from the Homeric Margites. ricles (Thueydides, ii. 40), in the Cf. also infra, the section' on the funeral oration : i\oKa\oviJi.ei' ycip Sophists. fjiei^ eiiTcKelas Kctl tpiKoffoipoufifv &vev INTRODUCTION'. instruction than ordinary education and the urunethodi- cal routine of practical life could of themselves afiford.' By Philosophy was now understood the study of things of the mind, pursued not as an accessory employment and matter of amusement, but exclusively and as a separate vocation. The word Philosophy, however, was not as yet limited to philosophic science in its present acceptation, nor even to science in general, for which other designations were much more in vogue : to philo- sophise was to study, to devote oneself to any theoretic activity.^ Philosophers in the narrower sense, down to the time of Socrates, were ordinarily designated as wise men or Sophists,' and, more precisely, as physicists/ A more definite use of the word is first met with in Plato. P1a.f,9c.a.1 1s fhat. ^an a philosop her who in his speculation and his practice has regard tq.essence, and not to appearance ; Phil^p^Jas he apprehends it, is it in this way {Paneg. c. 1) when he calls his own activity T^y Trepl toJs h^ovs tptKoffo(j>iav; or even simply meansgenerally to cogitate, to study. Isocrates uses DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. a the elevation of the mind towards true Eeality, — the scientific cognition and moral exposition of the idea. Finally, Aristotle still furthe r jimife ft.fi .sptofi of 'PViil"- i sophy, by wholly excluding from it practical activity ; burTr''5iJ^u^r]][^^^uiIIS2S^i3«ad.-a. narrower definitioEu^A^OT^gg.^;^QjJl(ajBid«»^ includes all scientific kn owledg e and research ; according to the narrower, it is restricted toenc|^i^ concerning the ulti- mate caiises of things, the so-called 'First Philosophy .1' Scarcely, however, had this beginning been made towards a precise determination of Philosophy when the attempt was again abandoned ; Philosophy in the'^ post-Aristotelian schools is sometimes exclusively de- [ fined as the practice of wisdom, the art of happiness, I the science of life ; eometimes it is hardly discriminated | from the empirical sciences, and sometimes confounded with mere erudition. This confusion was promoted, not only by the learned tendencies of the Peripatetic school and of the whole Alexandrian period, but also and more especially by Stoicism, since Chrysippus had included in the circle of his so-called philosophical enquiries the arts of grammar, music, &c., while his very definition of Philosophy, as the science of things divine and himian, must have rendered diflScult any precise limitation of its domain.' After this period science became more and more involved with mythology and theological poetry, to the increasing disturbance of the boimdaries of both these spheres ; and the concep- ' Appealing to this definition, wathy, says he, is the business of a Strabo, at the opening of his work, philosopher. ^Further authorities declares geography to he an essen- for the above will be given in the tial part of philosophy ; for poly- course of this work. b2 4 INTRODUCTION. tion of Philosophy soon lost all distinctness. On the one hand, the Neo-Platonists regarded Linus and Orpheus as the first of philosophers, the Chaldean oracles as the primitive sources of the highest wisdom, Etnd the sacred rites, asceti-cism and theurgic superstition of their school as the true philosophy ; on the other, the Christian theologians, with equal right, glorified mo- nastic life as Christian philosophy, and gave to the various sects of monks, including even the Shepherd Boa-KOi, a name which Plato and Ajristotle had reserved for the highest activity of the human intellect,' But it is not merely the name which is wanting in accurate limitation and fixity of import. Uncertainty of language usually iinplies uncertainty of thought, and the present case forms no exception. If the extent of the- term Philosophy was only gradually settled, Philo- sophy itself only gradually appeared as a specific form of intellectual life. If the word fluctuates between a wider and a narrower significance, Philosophy similarly fluctuates; being sometimes restricted to a definite scientific sphere, and sometimes mingled with alien ingredients of various kinds. The pre-Socratic Philp- sophy devdoBgdjWsdi-pariijEJxixflMifecliQnjsiit^ logical ideas. Even for Plato the mythus is a necessity. ^iXo(roi\o!roipia. (^(\aThis conception, however, changes with the philosophic standpoint of individuals and of whole periods ; and thus it would appear that the sphere of the history of Philosophy must constantly change in like manner and in the same proportion. The dilemma lies in the DEFINITION OF PSIJ^SOPSY. 7 nature of things and is in no way to be avoided ; least of all by basing our procedure, not on fixed conceptions, but on confused impressions, and indefinite, perhaps contradictory, ideas;, or by trusting, each writer for himself, to an obscure historical sense to determine how much he shall include in his exposition or reject from it. For if philosophic conceptions alter, subjective impressions alter yet more, and the only resource that woiddat last remain to us in this uncertain method — namely, a reference to learned usage — would not improve matters from a scientific point of view. One thing, at any rate, follows from these reflections. We must have, as the basis of our exposition, as true and exhaustive a theory as we can of the essence of Philosophy. That this is not altogether impracticable, and that some degree of unanimity is attainable on the subject, there is all the more reason to hope, because we are here concerned not with the terms and constituents of any one philosophic system, but with the general and formal conception of Philosophy, as it is assumed, tacitly, or in express terms, in every system. Dififerent opinions are possible, to some extent, even here ; but this diflS- culty is common to all walks of knowledge. We can only, each one of us according to his ability, seek out the truth, and leave what we find to be corrected, if necessary, by advancing science. How Philosophy is to be defined, is therefore a question which philosophic science alone can answer. I must here confine myself to a statement of the results at which I have arrived in regard to the matter, so far as this is necessary for the task I have in hand. I con- S INTRODUCTION. sider Philosophy, first, as a purely theoretic activity ; that is, an activity which is solely concerned with the ascertainment of reality ; and from this point of view, I exclude from the conception and history of Philosophy 3,11 practical or artistic efforts as such, irrespective of bheir possible connection with any particular theory of the world. I next define Philosophy more precisely as science. I see in it not merely thought, but thought that is methodical, and directed in a conscious manner bo the cognition of things in their interdependence. By this characteristic, I distinguish it as well from the unscientific reflection of daily life as from the religious md poetical view of the world. Lastly, I find the dis- tinction between Philosophy and other sciences is this : — ;hat all other sciences aim at the exploration of some specific sphere, whereas Philosophy has in view the sum total of existence as a whole, seeks to know the individual in its relation to the whole^ and by the laws )f the whole, and so to attain the coiTelation of all knowledge. So far, therefore, as this aim can be shown :o exist, so far and no farther I should extend the do- nain of the history of Philosophy, That such an aim (ras not clearly evident from the beginning, and was at Srst abundantly intermingled with foreign elements, we lave already seen, nor can we wonder at it. But this leed not prevent our abstracting from the aggregate of jreek intellectual life all that bears the character of Philosophy, and considering it in and for itself, in its listorical manifestation. Tliere is, indeed, some danger, n this mode of procedure, of doing violence to the ictual historical connection ; but this danger we may gM:eek philosophy. 9 escape by allowing, full weight to such considerations as the following : the i constant interminglement of philo- sophic with other elements ; the gradual nature of the development by which science won for itself an inde- pendent existence ; the pecidiar character of the later syncretism ; the importance of Philosophy for culture in general, and its dependence oh existing conditions. If due account be taken of these circumstances, if in the several systems we are careful to distinguish what is philosophical from what is merely accessory, and to measure the importance of the individual, in regard to the development of philosophic thought, by the precise standard and concept of Philosophy, the claims of historic completeness and scientific exactitude will be equally satisfied. The object of our exposition having been thus determined on one of its sides, and the Philosophy of the Greeks clearly distinguished from the phenomena akin to it and connected with it, there remains the farther question as to the extent and boundaries of Greek Philosophy; whether we axe to seek it only among the members of the Greek race, or in the whole field of Hellenic cultiure ; and, in the latter case, how the area of that field is to be determined. This is, of course, more or less optional ; and it would in itself be perfectly legitimate either to close the history of Greek science with its passage into the Eoman and Oriental world, or, on the other hand, to trace its effects down to our own time. It seem^ however, most natural to call Philosophy Greek, so long as there is in it a pre- ponderance of the Hellenic element over the foreign. 10 INTRODUCTION. and whenever that proportion is reversed to abandon the name. As the former is the case not only with the Graeco-Eoman Philosophy, but also with the Weo- Platonists and their predecessors ; as even the Judaic- Alexandrian school is much more closely related to the bontemporary Greek Philosophy, and had much more influence on its development, than any phenomenon of the Christian world, I include this school in the compass of the present exposition. On the other hand, I exclude from it the Christian speculation of the first centuries,, for there we see Hellenic science overpowered by a new principle in which it henceforth lost its specific character. The scientific treatment of this historical material must necessarily follow the same laws as the writing of history in general. Our task is to ascertain and to expound what has happened ; a philosophic construction of it, even if this were possible, would not be the affair of the historian. But such a construction is not possible, for two reasons. First, because no one will ever attain to so exhaustive a conception of humanity, and so exact a knowledge of all the conditions of its historical development, as to justify his deducing from thence the particulars of its empirical circumstances, and the changes undergone by these in time : and next, because the course of history is not of such ajaature that it can be made the object of an a priori con- struction. For history is essentially the product of the free activity of individuals, and though in this very activity an universal law is working, and through this activity fulfilling itself, yet none of its special effects, and not even the most important phenomena of history HISTORICAL METHOD; AGAINST HEGEL. 11 ia all their particular features, can be fully explained from the point of view of a priori necessity. The actions of individuals are subject to that contingency which is the heritage of the finite will and under- standing ; and if frpm the concuiTence, the collision, and the friction of these individual actions, a regular course of events as a whole is finally produced, neither the particular in this course, nor even the whole, is at any point absolutely necessary. All is necessary in so far only as it belongs to the general progress, the logical framework as it were of history ; while as to its chrono- logical manifestation, all is more or less contingent. So closely are the two elements interwoven with each other that it is impossible, even in our reflections, wholly to separate them. The necessary accomplishes itself by a number of intermediaries, any one of which might be conceived other than it is ; but, at the same time, the practised glance can detect the thread of historical necessity in notions and actions apparently the most fortuitous ; and from, the arbitrary conduct of men who lived hundreds and thousands of years ago, circumstances may have arisen which work on us with all the strength of such a necessity.' The sphere of history, therefore, is distinct in its nature from that of Philosophy. Philosophy has to seek out the essence of things, and the general laws of events ; history has to exhibit definite given phenomena of a certain date, and 'to explain them by their empirical conditions. ' A more particular discussion moral order of the world. — Theah- of these questions will be found gieches Jahrbuch, v. vi. (1846 and in my, dissertation on the freedom 1847) ; cf. especially vi. ^20 sqq. ; of the human will, on evil, and the 253 sqq. 12 INTRODUeriON. Each of these sciences requires the other, hut neither 3an he supplanted by or substituted for the other ; nor in its procedure can the history of Philosophy take the same course' that would be applicable to the formation af a philosophic system. To say that the historical sequence of the philosophic systems is identical with the logical sequence of the concepts which characterise bhem,' is to confound two very different things. Logic, as Hegel conceived it, has to expound the pujre cate- gories of thought as such ; the history of Philosophy is concerned with the chronological development of human thought. If the course of the one were to coincide with that of the other, this would presuppose that logical or, more precisely, ontological conceptions form the essential content of all systems of Philosophy ; and that these conceptions have been attained in the progress of history from the same starting-point, and in the same order as in the logical construction of pure con- cepts. But this is not the case. Philosophy is not merely Logic or Ontology ; its object is, in a general sense, the Eeal. The various philosophic systems show us the smn total of the attempts hitherto made to gain a scientific view of the world. Their content, therefore, cannot be reduced to mere logical categories without ' Hegel's Gesohichte der Philo- Christiania, in a letter addressed sopkie,i.4S. Against this asser- tome, hearing the title Demlogicis tion objections were raised by me rationis in dcserihenda phihsopkixB in the JahrJmoher der Gegmviart, historia (Christiania, 1860), to de- 1843, p. 209, sq. ; and by Sehweg- fend the proposition of Hegel. In ler in his Gesohichte der Philoso- consequence of this treatise, which phie, p. 2 sq. ; which objections I cannot here examine in detail, I I repeated in the second edition of have made some changes in the the present work. This gave occa- form of my discussion, and also sion to Herr Monrad, professor at some additions. HISTORICAL METHOD; AGAINST HEGEL. ^ 13 depriving it of its specific character and merging it in the universal. Moreover, while speculative Logic begins with the most abstract conceptions, in order yfeitcfe to attain to others more concrete, the historical development of philosophic thought starts with the consideration of the concrete, first in external natui-e, then in man, and leads only by degrees to logical and metaphysical abstractions. The law of development also is different in Logic and in History. Logic is occupied merely with the internal relation of concepts, irrespective of any chronological relation ; History treats of the changes effected in course of time in the notions of mankind. Progress, from anterior to posterior con- cepts, is regulated, in the former case, exclusively according to logical points of view ; each conclusion is therefore linked to the next that is properly deducible from it by. thought. In the latter case, progression takes place according to psychological motives ; each philosopher constructs out of the doctrine inherited from his predecessors, and each period out of that handed down to it by tradition, whatever their own apprehension of the doctrine, their modes of thought, experiences, knowledge, necessities, and scientific re- sources enable them to construct; but this may possibly be something quite other than what we, from our stand- point, should construct out of it. Logical consequence can only regulate the historical progress of Philosophy to the extent that it is recognised by the philosophers, and the necessity of following it acknowledged ; how far that is the case depends on all the circumstances by which scientific convictions are conditioned. Over and above 14 INTRODUCTION. what may be directly or indirectly derived from the earlier Philosophy, either by inference or polemic, a decisive in- fluence is often exercised in this respect by the conditio-^^ and necessities of practical life, by religious inte' :■ '''''*-^ by the state of empirical knowledge and general cclrture.^ It is impossible to regard all systems as merely the consequences of their immediate predecessors, and no system which contributes special thoughts of its own can in its origin and contents be thus restricted. What is new in those thoughts arises from new experiences having been made, or new points of view gained for such as had been previously made ; aspects and elements of these which before were imnoticed are now taken into account, and some particular moment is invested with another meaning than heretofore. Far, then, from assenting to the Hegelian position, we must rather maintain that no system of Philosophy is so constituted that its principle may be expressed by a purely logical conception; not one has formed itself out of its pre- decessors simply according to the law of logical progress. Any survey of the past will show us how impossible it is to recognise, even approximately, the order of the Hegelian or any other speculative logic in the order of the philo- sophic systems, unless we make out of them something quite different from what they really are. This attempt is, therefore, a failure both in principle and practice, and the truth it contains is only the universal conviction that the development of history is internally governed by regular laws. This conviction, indeed, the history of Philosophy ought on no account to renounce ; we need not confine LAWS AND UNITY OF HISTORY. 15 ourselves to the mere amassing and critical testing of traditions, or to that unsatisfactory pragmatic pro- cedure which is content to explain particulars severally in rCi^ence to individual personalities, circumstances and;,ix,ttuences, but attempts no explanation of the whole as such. Our exposition must, of coiirse, be grounded upon historical tradition, and all that it treats of must either be directly contained in tradition, or derived from it by strictest deduction. But it is impos- sible even to establish our facts, so long as we regard them merely in an isolated manner. Tradition is not itself fact ; we shall never succeed in proving its trust- worthiness, in solving its contradictions, in supplying its lacunse, if we do not keep in view the coimection of single facts, the concatenation of causes and effects, the place of the individual in the whole. Still less, how- ever, is it possible to understand facts, apart from this interconnection, or to arrive at a knowledge of their essential nature and historical importance. Where, lastly, our exposition is concerned with scientific sys- tems, and not merely with, opinions and events, there the very nature of the subject demands, more urgently than in other cases, that the particular shall be studied in relation to the aggregate ; and this demand can only be satisfied by the co ncatenati on of every particular known to us through tradition, or deducible from tradition, into one great yhole. The first point of unity is constituted by indi- viduals. Every philosophic opinion is primarily the thought of some particular man, and is, therefore, to be explained by his intellectual character and the cir- 16 INTRODUCTION. cumstances under which it was formed. Our first task, then, will be to unite the opinions of each philosopher into a collective whole, to show the connection of those opinions with his philosophic character, and to enquire into the causes and influences by which they were originally conditioned. That is to say, we must first ascertain the principle of each system, and explain how it arose ; and then consider how the system was the out- come of the principle : for the principle of a system is the thought which most clearly and fundamentally ex- presses the specific philosophic character of its author, and forms the focus of union for . all his views. Every individual thing in a system cannot, of course, be ex- plained by its principle; all the knowledge which a philosopher possesses, all the convictions which he forms (often long before his scientific thoughts become matured), all the conceptions which he has derived froin multifarious experiences, are not brought even by himself into connection with his philosophic principles ; accidental influences, arbitrary incidents, errors and faults of reasoning are constantly interposing them- selves, while the gaps in the records and accounts often prevent our pronouncing with certainty on the original connection of the various constituents of a doctrine. All this lies in the nature of things ; but our problem must at any rate be kept in view until we have exhausted all the means in our power for its solution. The individual, however, with the mode of thought peculiar to him, does not stand alone ; others ally them- selves with him, and he allies himself with others ; others come into collision with him, and he comes into LAWS AND UNITY OF HISTORY. 17 collision with others ; schools of philosophy are formed having with each other various relations of dependence, agreement, and contradiction. As the history of Philo- sophy traces out these relations, the forms with which it is concerned divide themselves into largfer or smaller groups. We perceive that it is only in this definite connection with others that the individual became and effected that which he did become and effect ; and hence arises the necessity of explaining the specific character and importance of the individual by reference to the group which includes him. But even such an explanation as this will not in all respects suffice ; for each individual, besides the characteristics common to his class, possesses much that is peculiar to himself. He not only continues the work of his predecessors, but adds something new to it, or else disputes their pre- suppositions and conclusions. The more important, however, a personality has been, and the farther its historical influence has extended, the more will its individual character, even while opening out new paths, disappear and lose itself in the universal and necessary course of history. For the historical importance of the individual depends upon his accomplishing that which is required by an universal need ; and so far only as thi? is the case, does his work become part of the general possession. The merely individual in man is also the transitory ; the individual can only work in an abiding manner and on a grand scale when he yields himself and his personality to the service of the universal, and executes with his particular activity a part of the common work. VOL. I. c 18 INTRODUCTION. But if this hold good of the relation of individuals to the spheres to which they belong, is it not equally true of the relation of these spheres to the greater wholes in which they are comprehended ? Each nation and, generally speaking, each historically coherent por- tion of mankind, has the measure and direction of its spiritual life traced out for it, partly by the inherent specific qualities of its membefs, and partly by the physical and historical conditions that determine its development. No individual, even if he desires it, can withdraw himself from this common character ; and he who is called to a great sphere of historical action will not desire it, for he has no ground for his activity to work on except in the whole of which he is a member ; and from this whole, and thence only, there flows to him by numberless channels, for the most part unnoticed, the supplies by the free utilization of which his own spiritual personality is formed and maintained. But for the same reason all individuals are dependent on the past. Each is a child of his age as well as of his nation, and as he will never achieve anything great if he does not work in the spirit of his nation,' so surely will he fail unless he stands on the ground of all previous historical acquirement. If, therefore, the spiritual store of man- kind, as the work of self-active beings, is always subject to change, this change is of necessity continuous ; and the same law of historical continuity holds good also of each smaller sphere, so far as its natural development is not hindered by external influences. In this process of ' Or of the whole to which he belongs — his church, school, or what- ever it may be. LAWS ANB UNITY OF*SISTORY. 19 development each period has the advantage of the cul- ture and experience of the previous periods; the historic development of mankind, therefore, is upon the whole a development towards ever higher culture — a progression. But particular nations, and entire groups of nations, may nevertheless be thrown back into lower stages by external misfortunes, or their own internal exhaustion ; important tracts of human cultm'e may long lie fallow ; progress itself may at first be accomplished in an in- direct manner, through the breaking up of some imper- fect form of civilisation. In defining, then, the law of historical progress in its application to particular phenomena, we must be careful to explain progress merely as the logical development of those qualities and conditions which are originally inherent in the character and circumstances of a nation, or field of culture. This development in every individual case is not necessarily an improvement ; there may come dis- turbances and seasons of decay, in which a nation or a form of civilisation ceases to exist, and other forms work their way forward, perhaps painfully and by long and circuitous paths, to carry on the development of history. Here, too, a law is present in the historic evolution, inasmuch as its general course is determined by the nature of things ; but this law is not so simple, nor this course so direct, as we might have anticipated. Moreover, as the character and sequence of the historic periods are the result of law and hot of chance, the same may be said of the order and character of the various developments contained in them. Not that these developments can be constructed a •priori in 2 20 INTRODUCTION. reference to the general concept of the sphere in ques- tion ; that of the State, for instance, or Eeligion, or Philosophy, But for each historic whole, or for each of its periods of development, a definite course is marked out by its own fundamental character, by its external circumstances, by its place in history. That the course thus prescribed by existing conditions should be ac- tually' followed, is not more wonderful than the fulfil- ment of any othier calculation of probabilities. For, though accidental circumstances often give an impulse and a direction to the activity of individuals, it is natural and necessary that among a great number of men there should be a variety of dispositions — of cul- ture, of character, of forms of activity, of external con- ditions — sufficient to furnish representatives of all the different tendencies possible under the given circum- stances. It is natural and necessary that each historical phenomenon should either, by attraction or repulsion, evoke others which serve to supplement it ; that the various dispositions and fOTces should display themselves in action ; that all the different views of a question that may be taken should be stated, and all the different methods of solving given problems should be tried. In a word, the regular course and organic articulation of history are not an a priori postulate ; but the nature of historic conditions and the constitution of the human mind involve that the historic development should, not- withstanding all the contingency of the individual, follow, on the whole and in the main, a fixed law ; and to recognize the working of such regularity in any given case, we need not abandon the terra firma of HISTOMY OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 facts, we need only examine the facts thoroughly, and draw the conclusions to which they themselves contain the premises. What we ask, therefore, is but the complete applica- tion of a purely historic method. We would have no theoretic construction of history, proceeding from tljeory to fact ; our history must be built up from below, out of the materials that are actually given. It stands to reason, however, that these materials cannot be made use of ia their rough state ; we must call in the aid of a searching historical analysis to determine the essence and internal connection of all the phenomena concerned. This conception of our problem will not, I trust, be open to the charges raised against the Hegelian constiTic- tion of history. Rightly understood, it can never lead to the distortion of facts, or the sacrifice of the free movemient of history to an abstract formalism., since it is upon historical facts and traditions, and upon these alone, that we propose to base our reasoning' as to^ the relation of past phenomena r only in what has been freely produced shall we seek for historical necessity. If this be thought impossible and paradoxical, we might appeal to the universal conviction of the rule of a Divine Providence — a conception which before all things implies that the course of history is not fortuitous, but is determined by a higher necessity. In case, however, we are dissatisfied (as we may reasonably be) with an argument resting solely on faith, we have only to examine more closely the concept of liberty to convince ourselves that liberty is something other than caprice or chance, that the free activity of man has its inborn 22 INTRODUCTION, measure in the primitive essence of spirit, and in the laws of human nature ; and that by virtue of this internal subjection to law, even what is really fortuitous in the individual act becomes necessity in the grand course of historic evolution. To follow this course in detail is the main problem of history. Whether in regard to the history of Philosophy it is necessary or even advantageous for the writer to possess any philosophic conviction of his own, is a question that would scarcely have been raised had not the dread of a philosophic construction of history caused some minds to overlook the most simple and obvious truths. Few would maintain that the history of law, for instance, would find its best exponent in a person who had no opinions on the subject of juris- prudence ; or political history, in one who embraced no I theory of politics. It is hard to see why it should be ' otherwise with the history of Philosophy. How can the historian even understand the doctrines of the I philosophers ; by what standard is he to judge of their importance ; how can he discern the internal connection of the systems, or form any opinion respecting their reciprocal relations, unless he is guided in his labours by fixed philosophic principles ? But the more de- veloped and mutually consistent these principles are, the more must we ascribe to him a definite system ; and since clearly developed and consistent principles are undoubtedly to be desired in a writer of history, we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is necessary and good that he should bring with him to the study of the earlier Philosophy a philosophic system of his own. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 It is possible, indeed, that his system may be too contracted to interpret for him. the meaning of his predecessors ; it is also possible that he may apply it to history in a perverse manner, by introducing his own opinions into the doctrines of previous philosophers, and constructing out of his own system that which he should have tried to understand by its help. But we must not make the general principle answerable for these faults of individuals ; and still less can we hope to escape them by entering on the history of Philosophy devoid of any philosophic conviction. The human mind is not like a tabula rasa, the facts of history are not simply reflected in it like a picture on a photographic plate, but every view of a given occurrence is arrived at by independent observation, combination, and judgment of the facts. Philosophic impartiality, therefore, does not consist in the absence of all presuppositions, but in bringing to the study of past events presuppositions that are true. The man who is without any philo-J sophic stand-point is not on that account without any stand-point whatever ; he who has formed no scientific opinion on philosophic questions has an unscientific, opinion about them. To say that we should bring to "the history of Philosophy no philosophy of our own,( really means that in dealing with it we should give the preference to imseientific notions as compared with scientific ideas. And the same reasoning would apply to the assertion ' that the historian ought to form his system in the course of writing his history, from history itself; that by means of history he is to emancipate ' By Wirth in the Jahrbuoher der Gegenwart, 1844, 709 sq'. , 24 INTRODUCTION. himself from any preconceived system, in order thus to attain the universal and the true. From what point of view then is he to regard history, that it may do him this service ? From the false and narrow point of view which he must quit that he may rightly comprehend history ? or from the universal point of view which history itself must first enable him to attain? The one is manifestly as impracticable as the other, and we are ultimately confined within this circle : that he alone completely understands the history of Philosophy who possesses true and complete philosophy; and that he only arrives at true philosophy who is led to it by understanding history. Nor can this circle ever be entirely escaped : the history of Philosophy is the test of the truth of systems ; and to have a philosophic system is the condition of a man's imderstanding history. The truer and the more comprehensive a philosophy is, the better will it teach us the importaruse of previous philosophies ; and the more unintelligible we find the history of Philosophy, the greater reason have we to doubt the truth of our own philosophic conceptions. But the only conclusion to be drawn from this is that we ought never to regard the work of science as finished in the historic any more than in the philosophic domain. As in a general manner. Philosophy and Experimental Science mutually require and condition one another, so it is here. Each forward movement of philosophic knowledge offers new points of view to historic reflec' tion, facilitates the comprehension of the earlier systems, of their interconnection and relations; while, on the other hand, each newly attained perception of the HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 25 manner in which the prohlems of Philosophy have been solved or regarded by others, and of the internal con- nection and, consequences of their theories, instructs us afresh concerning the questions which Philosophy has to answer, the different courses it may pursue in an- swering them, and the consequences which may be anticipated from the adoption of each course. But it is time that we should approach our subject somewhat more closely. 26 INTROBUCTION. CHAPTEE II. , ORIGIN OF GKEEK PHILOSOPHY. § I. — Is Oreek FJiilosophy derived from Oriental Speculation ? In order to explain the growth of Greek Philosophy, we must first enquire out of what historical conditions it arose ; whether it evolved itself as a native product from the spirit and culture of the Greek people, or was transplanted from without into Hellenic soil, and grew up under foreign influences. The Greeks, we know, were early inclined to ascribe to the Eastern nations (the only nations whose culture preceded their own) a share in the origin of their philosophy ; but in the' most ancient period, certain isolated doctrines merely were thus derived from the East.' As far as our information extends, not the Greeks, but the Orientals, were the first to attribute such an origin to Greek Philosophy generally. The Jews of the Alexandrian school, edu- cated under Greek influences, sought by means of this theory to explain the supposed harmony of their sacred writings with the doctrines of the Hellenes, agreeably to their own stand-point and interests ;'' and in the same manner the Egyptian priests, after they had become ' Of. infra, the chapters on ject will be found in the chapter Pythagoras and Plato. relating to the Judaic Alexandrian * Further details on this suh- Philosophy. ORIENTAL ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 27 acquainted, under tte Ptolemies, with Greek Philosophy, made great boast of the wisdom, which not only pro- phets and poets, but also philosophers were said to have acquired from them.' Somewhat later, the theory gained admittance among the Greeks themselves. When Greek Philosophy, despairing of its own powers, began to ex- pect its salvation from some higher revelation, and to seek for such a revelation in religious traditions, it was natural that the doctrines of the ancient thinkers should ' We find nothingin Herodotus as to any Egyptian origin of Greek Riilosophy. In regard to religion, on the other hand, he not only maintains that certain Greek cults and doctrines (especially the wor- ship of Dionysus and the doctrine of Transmigration, ii. 49, 123) were imported from Egypt to Greece, but says in a general manner (ii. 52) that the Pelasgi at first adored their deities simply under the name of the gods, and after- wards received the partioularnames of these gods (with the few excep- tions enumerated in c. 50) from' Egypt. That this assertion is chiefly founded on the statements of the Egyptian priest appears pro- bable from c. 50 ; and still more fromc. 54, where Herodotus relates from the mouth of these priests a story of two women who, carried off by Phoenicians from the Egyp- tian Thebes, founded the first ora- cles — one in Hellas, the other in Libya. This story manifestly arose from a rationalistic interpreta- tion of the Dodonaic legend of the two doTes (c. 55), and was imposed on the credulous stranger through the assurances of the priests, that what they told about the fate of these women they had ascertained by repeated enquiries. As the priests then represented themselves to be the founders of the Greek re- ligion, so at a later period they claimed to be the founders' of Greek Philosophy. Thus Grantor (ap. Proelus in Tim. 24 B) says, in refer- ence to the Platonic myth of the Athenians and Atlantides : /iaprv- povat Se Koi oi npotprlTai ruv Alyv- TTTiap 4v ffriiKats rain in ffaCofieyats ravra yeypd^Qat Keyopres — there- with giving a valuable hint for es- timating the worth of such state- ments ; and Diodorus asserts, i. 96 : the Egyptian priests related, ix rwv kyaypatpay rap ip rats iepais $l$\ois, that Orpheus, Musseus, Lyciirgus, Solon, &c., had come to them ; and moreover, Plato, Py- thagoras, Eudoxus, Demoeritus, and CEnopides from Chios, and that relies of these men were still shown in Egypt. These philosophers had borrowed from the Egyptians the doctrines, arts, and institutions which they transmitted to the Hel- lenes ; Pythagoras, for example, his geometry, his theory of num- bers, and transmigration ; Demo- eritus, his astronomical knowledge ; Lycurgus, Plato and Solon, their laws. 28 INTRODUCTION. be ascribeji to the same source ; and the more difficulty there was in explaining these doctrines from native tradition, the more readily was their origin attributed to races, long since revered as the teachers of the Greeks, and whose wisdom enjoyed the highest reputa- tion, because the unknown has generally a charm, for the imagination, and seen, as it must be, through a mysterious haze, is wont to look greater than it really is. Thus, after the period of Neo-Pythagoreism there spread, chiefly from Alexandria, the belief that the m.ost important of the ancient philosophers had been in- structed by Eastern priests and sages, and that their most characteristic doctrines had been taken from this source. This opinion in the following centuries be- came more and more general, and the later Neo- Platonists especially carried it to such an extent that, according to them, the philosophers bad been scarcely more than the promulgators of doctrines perfected ages before in the traditions of the Asiatic races. No wfmder that Christian author^, even after the time of the Eefor- mation, continued the same strain, doubting neither the Jewish statements as to the dependence of Greek Philo- sophy on the religion of the Old Testament, nor the stories which made Pho&nicia,ns, Egyptians, Persians, Babylonians and Hindoos the instructoi-s of the ancient philosophers.* Modem science has long ago discarded the fables of the Jews respecting the intercourse of the ' Among these the Alexandri- the Hellenic philosophers generally ans were j^in preeminent. Cle- are repf eseoted as having borrowed mens dwells with especial predileo- portions of the truth from the He- tion on this theme in his Stromata. brew prophets, and given them out Plato to him is simply i li •E.fipalav as their own (ibid. 312 C, 320 A). ^ocratic philosophy does, indeed, remind us in certain /isolated notions of the mythic cosmogony, but in the / main it developed itself either~qiiite independently of the religious belief, or in express opposition to it. How could this possMy be it U-reek~gcience were an offshoot of the sacerdotal wisdom of the EasT? We must further enquire whether, the Greeks at the time of their first attempts at Philosophy could have IMPROBABILITY OF THE ORIENTAL THEORY. 45 I been taught anythin g consIdCT abla_in this sphere by Orientals. There is no historical or even probable evidence to show that either of the Asiatic nations with which they came in contact possessed any philosophic science. We hear ^ indeed, of theological and cosmo- logical.a0tior^^ut all these,_sQj^¥_as_^y really appear to gojb ack to an tiguity, are_jo_iiid©- and fanciful that the Grre eks could s carcely have received from them any impulse towards philosophic thought which their own mythLccaiLd _not just as welT have afforded. The^^^red books of Egypt probably cont ained only prescripts for ri tual, ecclesia stical -and_ci£iLl^^> interspersed perhaps wi>,b vgiyimTHjTnyfhg ; in the jggTii[j;_nntinp£^jT'^|iTi1rig of their co ntents there is no trace of the scientific, dogmatic theology which modem writers have sought to discover.' To the Egyptian priests themselves, in the time of Herodotus, the thought of an Egyptian origin in regard to Greek Philosophy never seems to have occurred, eagerly as they strove, even then, to derive Grreek myths, laws, and religious ceremonies from • Both, loc. cit. p. 112 sqq., even the last-mentioned ten proba- and p. 122. He appeals to Cle- bly treated, not of the nature of mens, Strom, vi. 633 B sqq. Sylb., the gods, but of religions -worship, ■where the Hermetic books being and perhaps, in connection -with mentioned it is said : there are ten this, of mythology : when Clemens books. TO €15 tV Ti/iV aviiKovra tUv says that these ■writings contained TTop' ouTOis 6e3c Bol tV AiyuTTrfoj' the whole 'Philosophy' of the evtrdPuay itcpiexovra • olov irepl Egyptians, the word must be taken Bviuhuv, i,TapxS>v, Siii/av, tix'"", in the indeterminate sense of which irofitrav, eoprair Ka\ tH'V to^tois I have spoken above, p. 1 «q. More- S/ioluv, and ten other books irepi over, we do not know in the least Te i/(f/Mi)p Koi Bwv Kol TTJs 3Aris how old these books were, or iraiScias ran Upiav. But that the whether they continued up to the contents of these books were time'of Clemens withoutalteratione even in part scientific, cannot be and additions, deduced from the words of Clemens; 46 INTRODUCTION. Egypt, and little as they shrank from the most trans- parent inventions' in pursuance of this end. The scientific discoveries which they claim to have given to the Greeks,^ are confined to astronomical determinations of time, /['hat the doctri ne of transmigration originated iin Eg ypt is o nly a coniecture oi Herodotus ; ' and when he says (ii. 109^ that t he Gre eks appear to ha ve learnt geo metry there, he fo unds t he assertion not on Egyptian statements, as Diodorus does^ T^"^- "" Tn'fi_r«-am observa- tion. This justifies the supposition that in the fifth centur y the Eg yptians had not troubled themselves m uch abott t-Gxfiek_ j)r any o ther Philosophy. Even PlatOjjudgingfrom the p reviousl y quoted passage in the fourt h book of the ' Eepublic,' must have been ignora jit of the existence of a Phcenician" or Egyptian Philjgophy. Nor does Aristotle seem to have been aware of the philosophic efibrts^of the Egyptians, will- ing as he was to acknowledge them as forenmners of the Greeks in mathematics and astronomy.* Demo- ' Thus" (ii. 177) Solon is said to have borrowed one of his laws from Amasis, who came to the thron'e twenty years later than the date of Solon's code ; and (c. 118) the priests ass are the historian that what they related to him ahont Helen they had heard from Meue- laus' own mouth. We have already seen examples of this procedure, supra, p. 27, note 1. 2 Herod, ii. 4. ' ii. 123. ■* To the astronomical ohserva- tions of the Egyptians (on the coniunctions of the planets with each other and with fixed stars) he appeals in Metcorol. i. 6, 343, b 28; and in Metaph. i. 1, 981, b 23 he says : Sib irepl AfyinrToi' oi fiaOjiixaTtKol irpSnov rexvai trvve- ffTTiffav. iicei yiip aipelBri axo^Ceiy rh Tuv Upeuv ^dvos. This very passage, however, mates it pro- bable that Aristotle knew nothing of any ptiilngnpTiif^ f.y)r|ii,;i>y pursued i n Kgyp t. He contends loc. cit. that knowledge is on a higher level when it is pursued only for the end of knowing, than when it serves the purposes of practical necessity, and observes, in connection with this, that purely theoretic sciences therefore first arose in places where people were sufficiently free from anxiety about the necessaiies of IMPROBABILITY OF THE OMIENfAL THEORY. 47 critus assures us that he himself, in geometrical know- ledge, was quite a match for the Egyptian sages whose acquaintance he made.^ So late as the time of Diodorus, when Greek science had long been naturalised in Egypt, and the Egyptians in consequence claimed for themselves the visits of Plato, Pythagoras, and Democritus,'' that which the Greeks are said to have derived from Egypt is confined to mathematical and technical knowledge, civil laws, religious institutions, and myths ; * these only are referred to in the assertion of the Thebans (i. 50) 'that Philosophy and the accurate knowledge of the stars was first invented among them,' for the word Philosophy is here equivalent to Astronomy. Admitting, then, that the Egyptian mythologists referred to by Diodorus may have given to the con- ceptions of the gods a naturalistic interpretation in the spirit of the Stoics ; '' that later syncretists (like the life to be able to devote themselves cians ; perhaps Eudemus had al- to such sciences. The above-quoted ready expressed the same opinion, •(lords indirectly confirm this asser- if indeed Proclus in Euclid. 19, o tion. Had Aristotle considered (64 f. Friedl.) took this statement Philosophy as well as Mathematics from him. to be an Egyptian product, he ' In the fragment in Clemeus, -would have been particularly un- Strom, i. 304 A, where he says of likely to omit it in this connection, himself after mentioning his distant since it is Philosophy of which he journeys : koL Xoyiuv avBpdnruv asserts that as a purely theoretical TrXtlarav iaiiKovira koI ypainiiiifiv science it stands higher than all ^ucfleVios /ieri tmoSi^ios ovScis kio merely technical knowledge. , That /ie nafriiWa^e, oiS' oi Alyvwrtav the rudiments of astronomy came KaKe6fievot 'ApTreSotdirrtu. The in- to the Greeks from the barbarians, terpretation of the last word is and more particularly from the questionable, but the term must in Syrians and Egyptians, we are told any case include those of the in the Wpinomis of Plato 986 E sq. Egyptian sages who possessed the 987 D sq. Similarly Strabo xvii. most geometrical knowledge. I, 3, p. 787, ascribes the invention ' i. 96, 98. of Geometry to the Egyptians, and " Cf. c. 16, 69, 81, 96 sqq. that of Arithmetic to the Phceni- ' Diod. i. 11 sq. 48 INTROBPCTION. author of the book on the mysteries of the Egyptians, and the theologians quoted by Damascius)' may have imported their own speculations into Egyptian myths ; that there may have existed in the time of Posidonius a Phcenician manuscript reputed to be of great antiquity, and passing under the name of the philosopher Moschus or Mochus ; ^ that Philo of Byblus, under the mask of Sanchimiathon, may have constructed a rude cosnlology from iPhcenician and Greek myths, from the Mosaic history of creation, and from confused reminiscences of Philosophy — such questionable witnesses can in no way prove the real existence of an Egyptian and PhcEnician Philosophy. Supposing, however, that among these nations, at the time that the Grreeks became acquainted with them, philosophic doctrines had been found, the transmission of these doctrines to Greece was not at all so easy as may perhaps be imagined. Philosophic conceptions, especially in the childhood of Philosophy, are closely bound up with their expression in language, and the knowledge of foreign languages was rarely to be met with among the Greeks. On the other hand, the inter- preters, educated as a rule for nothing but commercial intercourse and the explanation of curiosities, were of little use in enabling people to understand instruction in philosophy. Moreover, there is not a single allusion on which we can rely, to the use of Oriental works by Greek philosophers, or to any translations of such works. > Se Princ. c. 125. Damaseius worthy source for the Jiistorv of expressly calls them ol hiyimTioi. Egyptian antiquity. Kofl'^/iSj(/>iA.(i(7o(/)oi7e7o>'(iTes. They " Vide infra, the chapter on are therefore the most untrust- Democritus. « THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 51 element in Oriental and Northern mythology) that this fabled world is wanting in the conditions of reality ! Amidst all the poetry how clearly we recognise that sane and vigorous realism, that filie perception of what is harmonious and natural, to which, in later times, after deeper study of the universe and of man, this same Homeric heaven ^necessarily proved such a atum- bling-block. Thus, although the intellectual culture of the Homeric -period is separated by a wide inter- val from the'iiSe of philosophy, we can already trace in it the peculiar genius out of which Philosophy sprang. It is the farther development of this genius as manifested in the sphere of religion, of moral and civil life, and in the general cultivation of taste and of the intellect, which constitutes the historical preparation for Greek Pliilosophy. The religion of the Greeks, like every positive religion, stands to the philosophy of that people in a relation partly of affinity and partly of opposition. What distinguishes it from the religions of all other races, however, is the freedom which from the very beginning it allowed to the evolution of philosophic thought. If we turn our attention first to the public ritual and popular faith of the Hellenes, as it is repre- sented to us in its oldest and most authentic records, the poems of Homer and Hesiod, its importance in the development of philosophy cannot be mistaken. The religious presentation is always, and so also among the Greeks, the form' in which the interdependence of all phenomena and the rule of invisible powers and uni- B 2 52 INTRODUCTION. versal laws first attains to consciousness. However great may be the distance between faith in a divine govetnment of the world, and the scientific knowledge and explanation of the universe as a connected whole, ' they have at any rate something in common. Eeligious faith, even under the polytheistic form it assumed in Greece, implies that what exists and happens in the world depends on certain causes concealed from sensu- ous perception. Nor is this all. The power of the gods must necessarily extend over all parts of the world, and the plurality of the gods is reduced to unity by the dominion of Zeus and the irresistible power of Fate. Thus the interdependence of the universe is proclaimed; all phenomena are co-ordinated under the same general causes ; by degrees fear of the power of the gods and of relentless Fate yields to confidence in the divine goodness and wisdom, and a fresh problem presents itself to reflection — viz. to pursue the traces of this wisdom in the laws of the universe. Philosophy, indeed, has itself been at work in this pmification of the popular faith, but the religious notion first con- tained the germs from which the purer conceptions of Philosophy were afterwards developed. The peculiar nature of Greek religious belief, also, was not without influence on Greek Philosophy. The Greek religion belongs in its geiieral character to the class of natural religions ; the Divine, as is sufiBciently proved by the plurality of gods, is represented under a natural figure essentially of the same kind as the Finite, and only exalted above it in degree.. : Man, therefore, does not need to raise himself above, the THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 53 world that surrounds him, and above his own actual nature, that he may enter into communion with the Deity ; he feels himself related to God from the very outset. No internal change of his mode of thought,^ no struggle with his natural impulses and inclinations, l '^ is demanded of him ; on the contrary, all that is in [ human nature is legitimsatte in the sight of God — the most godlike man is he who cultivates his human powers I most effectually, and religious duty essentially consists i in man's doing to the glory of God that which is ac- / cording to his own nature. The same stand-point isf evident in the Philosophy of the Greeks, as will be I shown further on; and, though the philosophers as a rule, took few of their doctrines directly from religious tradition, and were often openly at variance with the popular faith, still it is clear that the mode of thought to which the Hellenes had become accustomed in their religion was not without influence on their scientific tendencies. It was inevitable that from the naturalistic religion of Greece there should arise, in the first in- stance, a natSiralistic philosophy. The Greek religion, furthermore, is distinguished from other naturalistic religions in that it assigns the highest place in existence neither to external nature, nor to the sensuous nature of man, as such, but to hu- man nature that is beautiful and transfigured by spirit. Man is not, as in the East, so entirely the slave of external impressions that he loses his own independence in the forces of nature, and feels that he is but a part of nature, irresistibly involved in its vicissitudes. Neither does he seek his satisfaction in the unbridled 64 INTKOnUCTtON. freedom of rude and half-savage races. But, while living and acting with the full sense of liberty, he con- siders that the highest exercise of that liberty is to obey the universal order as the law of his own nature. Although, therefore, in this religion, Deity is conceived as similar to man, it is not common human nature that is ascribed to it. Not only is the outer form of the gods idealised as the image of the pure:st beauty, but their essential nature, especially in the case of the Hellenic gods proper, is formed by ideals of human activities. The relation of the Greek to his gods .was therefore free and happy to an extent that we find in no other nation, because his own nature was reflected and idealised in them ; so that, in contemplating them, he found himself at once attracted by affinity, and elevated above the limits of his own existence, without having to purchase this boon by the pain and trouble of an in- ternal conflict. Thus, the sensuous and natural become the immediate embodiment of the spiritual ; the whole religion assumes an aesthetic character, religious ideas take the form of poetry ; divine worship and the object of that worship are made material for art ; and though we are still, speaking generally, on the level of naturalistic religion, nature is only regarded as the manifestation of Deity, because of the spirit which re- veals itself in nature. This idealistic character of the Greek religion was no doubt of the highest importance in the origin and formation of Greek philosophy. The exercise of the imagination, which gives universal significance to the particulars of sense, is the prepara- tory stage for the exercise of the intellect which, ab- THE RELIGION OF THE %ltEEK8. 65 stracting from the particular as such, seeks for ' the general essence and universal causes of phenomena. While, therefore, the Greek religion was based upon an ideal and aesthetic view of the world, and encouraged to the utmost all artistic activity in setting forth this view, it must have had indirectly a stimulating and emancipa- ting effect upon thought, and have prepared the way for the scientific study of things. From a makerial point of view, this idealistic tendency of religion was beneficial principally to Ethics ; but from a formal point of view, the influence of religion extended to all parts of Philosophy ; for Philosophy presupposes and requires an endeavour to treat the sensible as a manifes- tation of spirit, and to trace it back to spiritual causes. Some of the Greek philosophers may possibly have been too rash in their procedure in that respect ; but this we shall not at present consider. The more readily we admit that their doctrines often give us the impression of a philosophic poem full of bold inventions, rather than a work of science, the more clearly we shall see the connection of those doctrines with the artistic genius of the Greek nation, and with the aesthetic character of its religion. But although Greek Philosophy may owe much to religion, it owes more to the circumstance that its de- pendence on religion never went so far as to prevent, or essentially to restrict, the free movement of science. The Greeks had no hierarchy, and no inviolable dog- matic code. The sacerdotal functions were not with them the exclusive property of a class, nor were the priests the only mediators between the gods and men ; but 66 INTRODUCriOm each individual for himself, and each community for itself, had a right to offer up sacrifices and prayers. In Homer, we find kings and chiefs sacrificing for their subjects, fathers for their families, each person for him- self, without the intervention of priests. Even at a later poripd, when the development of a public cult in temples gave more; importance to the sacerdotal order, the func- tions pf the priests were always limited to certain offer- ings ^nd ceremonial observances in their particular localities ; prayers and sacrifices were still oifered by the laity, and a whole class of matters relating to religious ceremonial were left, not to priests, but to public func- tionaries designated by election, or by lot — in part in combination with officers of the community or state — to individuals and heads of families. The priests, therefore, as a class, could never acquire an influential position in Greece at all comparable with that which they enjoyed among the Oriental nations.' Priests of certain temples, it is true, did attain to considerable importance on account of the ofacles connected with those temples, but, on the whole, the priestly office con- ferred far more honour than influence ; it was a politi- cal dignity, in respect to which reputation and external qualifications were more regarded than any particular mental capability ; and Plato ^ is quite in harmony ' This, ty the way, is one of teen transmittedincounectjonwith themost striking argumentsagainst it. If this had anywhere been the the hypothesis of any considerable case, we should find the importance transmission of cults and myths of the priests become greater the into Greece from the East; for farther wewent back into antiquity, these Oriental cults are so closely whereas m point of fact it is ex- bound up with the hierarchical aetly the contrary, system that they could only have * Polit. 290 0. TSE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 57 with the spirit of his country when he makes the priests, in spite of all the honours accorded to them, merely servants of the commonwealth.' But where there is no hierarchy, a dogmatic code, in the sense of a general law of faith, is manifestly impossible ; for there are no organs to frame and maintain it. Even in itself, however, it would have been contrary to the essence of Greek religion. That religion is not a finished and per- fected system that had grown up from one particular spot. The ideas and traditions which the Greek races brought with them from their original abodes were carried by each individual tribe, community and family into dif- ferent surroundings, and subjected to influences of the most various kinds. Thus, there arose a multiplicity of local rites and legends ; and from these, a common Hellenic faith gradually developed itself, not by the systematising of theology, but by a free convergence of minds; in which convergence the most important factor, beside the personal intercourse and religious ceremonies of the national games and festivals, was Art, and above all, Poetry. This explains the fact, that in" Greece there was never, properly speaking, a system of religious doctrine generally admitted, but only a myth- ology ; and that the conception of orthodoxy was abso- lutely unknojra. Every one was indeed required to honour the gods of the State ; and those who were convicted of withholding the prescribed honours, or of trying to overthrow the religion of the State, were often visited with the severest punishments. But ' Cf. Hermann, Lehrhuch der 44 sq. for more detailed proofs of Griech. Antiguitaten, ii. 168 sqq., the above statements. 58 INTH OB UCTION. though Philosophy itself was thus haxdly dealt with, in the person of some of its representatives, on the whole, the relation of individuals to the faith of the community was far freer than among nations who possessed a definite confession of faith guarded by a powerful priesthood. The severity of the Greeks against religious innovation had immediate reference not to doctrines, but to cult ; only so far as a doctrine seemed to involve consequences prejudicial to public worship did it become the object of attack. As to theological opinions, properly so called, they were left unmolested. The Greek religion possessed neither a jDody of theological doctrine nor written sacred records. It was founded entirely upon traditions respecting the temples, descriptions of the poets, and notions of the people : moreover, there was scarcely any tradition which was not contradicted by others, and in that way lost much of its authority. Thus, in Greece, faith was loo indefinite and elastic in its form to admit of its exercising upon reason either an internal supremacy, or an external restraint, to the extent that we find to have been the case in other countries. This free attitude of Greek science in respect to religion was full of important results, as will be evi- dent if we consider what would have become of Greek Philosophy, and indirectly of our own, without this freedom. All the historical analogies that we can adduce will give us but one answer ; namely, that the Greeks would then have been as little able as the Oriental na- tions to attain an independent philosophic science. The speculative impulse might indeed have been awake, THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 59 but, jealously watched as it would have been by theology, internally cramped by religious presuppositions, and shackled in its free movement, thought could scarcely have produced anything more than a religious specula- tion akin to the ancient theologic cosmologies ; and even supposing that at a much later period it had turned to other questions, it could n&ver have had the acuteness, freshness, and freedom by which the Philo- sophy of Greece became the teacher of all the ages. The Hindoos were the most speculative nation of the East, and their civilisation was of the highest antiquity, yet how greatly inferior were they, as regards philoso- phic achievement, to the Greeks ! The same must be said of the Christian and Mohammedan Philosophy in the Middle Ages, though this had the advantage of being preceded by the Greek. In both cases, the principal cause of the inferiority manifestly lay in the "depen- dence of science upon positive dogmas ; and the jGreeks are to be considered as singularly fortunate in having escaped this dependence through the force of their peculiar genius, and the favourable course of their his- torical development. It has been usually supposed that between Philo- sophy and the religion of the mysteries a closer bond exists. In the mysteries, according to this view, a purer, or at any rate a .more speculative, theology was imparted to the initiated ; and, by means of the mys- teries, the secret doctrines of Eastern priests were trans- mitted to the Greek philosophers, and through them to the Greek people in general. But this theory has no better foundation than the one we have just been dis- 60 INTRODUCTION. cussing in regard to Oriental Science. It is proved beyond a doubt, by the most recent and thorough investigations ^ of the subject, that originally no philo- sophic doctrines were conveyed in these religious cere- monies ; and that at a later period, when such doctrines began to be connected with the mysteries, thiff occurred under the influence of scientific researches. Philosophy, therefore, should be regarded rather as having imparted wisdom to the mysteries than as having received it from them. The mysteries were originally, as we have every reason to believe, ritualistic solemnities, which, in their religious import and character, differed nothing' from the public worship of the 'gods, and were only carried on in secret because they were designed for some particular community, sex, or class, to the exclusion of any other, or because the nature of the divinities to whom they were sacred demanded this form of cult. The first, for example, applieis to the mysteries of the Idsean Zeus and the Argive Here, the second to the Eleusinian mysteriesj and especially to the secret rites of the Chthonian deities. Mysteries fi^st appeared in a certain opposition to public religion, partly because elder cults and forms of worship which had gradually disappeared from the one were maintained in the other, and partly because foreign rites like those^'of the Thracian Dionysus and ' Among whieh the following der Klass. Mterth. (under the have been chiefly consulted: Lo- headings Mythologie, Mysteria, beck's fundamental work {Aglao- Meimnia, Orpheus); lastly, the phamtm, 1829), and the short but Grieckisohe Mythologie of the same thorough exposition of Hermann author. On the mysteries in (Griech. Antiq. ii. 149 sqq.), espe- general, cf. also Hegel's Phil, der cially Preller's Demeter mid Per- Geschichte, 301 sq. ; Msthetik, ii. s^Jume, as well as his, investiga- 57 sq. ; Phil, der lie!, ii. 150 sqq. tions in Pauly's Hedl-EncyklopcBdie THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 61 the Phrygian Cybele were introduced as private cults under the form of mysteries, and blended themselves, in course of time, more or less with the ancient secret rites. But in neither case can the mysteries have con- tained philosophic theorems, or doctrines of a purer theology essentially transcending the popular faith.' This is sufficiently proved by the circumstance that the mysteries most frequently celebrated were accessible to all the Greeks. For even had the priests possessed any higher wisdom, how could they have imparted it to such a mixed multitude ? And what are we to think of a secret philosophic doctrine into which a whol^jiation could be initiated without a long course of previous in- struction, and without having its faith shaken in the traditional mythology ? Speaking generally, it is not at all in keeping with the habits of the ancients to take advantage of ceremonial observances for the purpose of instructing the people by means of religious discourses. A Julian might make the attempt in imitation of Christian customs ; but in classical times there is not a single instance of it, nor does any trustworthy witness ever assert that the mysteries were designed for the in- struction of those who took part in them. Their parti- cular end appears far more in those sacred rites, the witnessing of which was the privilege of the initiated (EpoptEs) ; whatever oral communication was combined with these ceremonies seems to have been restricted to short liturgical formulae, directions for the performance of the holy rites, and sacred traditions {iBpoX \6yoi), like ' As Lobeck, loo. cit. i. 6 eqq., •whieli distingliislies him, expresses has exhaustively shswn. Leibniz, himself to the same effect in the with the sound historical judgment Preface to the Theodicee, section 2 , 63 INTRODUCTION. those which were elsewhere connected with particular acts of worship ; tales about the founding of cults and holy plaeesjjibout the names, origin, and history of the -godsTo whom this worship was sacred ; in a word, my- thological explanations of the cult given by the priests, or even by laymen, to those who asked for them. These liturgical and mythological elements were afterwards made use of to combine philosophical and theological doctrines with the mysteries, but that such was the case from the beginning is a theory without foundation. There is no trustworthy authority for it, and on general grounds it is unlikely that the mythopcfiic imagination should ever have been dominated by philosophic points of view : or that at a later period there should have been introduced into mystic usages and traditions ideas and hypotheses which the scientific reflection of the Grreeks had not as yet attained. In course of time, indeed, with the deepening of the moral consciousness, the mysteries gradually acquired a higher signification. When the school of the Orphics, whose doctrines from the first are parallel to Greek Philosophy,' was founded in the ' The first certain trace of the of the Homeric poems) published, Orphic writings, and of the Or- under the names of Orpheus and phioo-Dionysiac consecrations, is Musseus, oracular sayings and to be found in the well-attested hymns (TEXeral) which he had statement (vide Lobeck, loe. cit i. himself composed. This forgery 331 sqq., 397sqq., 692sqq. ; cf. Ger- falls somewhere between 640 and hard, Jleber Orpheus imd die Or- 520 b.o. It is probable, however, phiker, Abhandlungen der Berl. not only that Orphic hymns and Acad.\66l\ Hist. Phil. Kl. ^. 12, oracles had been in circulation pre- 75 ; Schuster, De vet. Orphicte viously to this, but that the union theogonis indole, 1869, p. 46 sqq.) of the Dionysiac mysteries with that Onbmacritus (who resided at the Orphic poetry had long ago the court of Pisistratus and his been accomplished. Two or tliree sons, and with two or three other generations later, the names of the persons, , undertook the collection Orphics and Bacehios were used THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 63 sizth century before Christ, or even earlier, the in- fluence of the philosophers upon this mystic theology seems to have been far greater than the reaction of the theologians upon Philosophy ; and the more we con- sider particular Retail, the more doubtful it becomes whether on the whole Philosophy ever borrowed any- thing considerable from the mysteries or mystic doc- trines. There are two points especially, in regard to which the mysteries are supposed to have exercised an im- portant influence on Philosophy : these are Monotheism and the hope of a future life. A speculative interpre- tation has also been given to some other doctrines, but they appear to contain nothing beyond the common ty Herodotus (ii. 81) as identical, and Philolaus appeals in support of the doctrine of transmigration (vide infra, Pyihag.) to the utter- ances of theancienttheologiansand soothsayers, by whom we must chiefly understand Orpheus and the other founders of the Orphic mysteries. Aristotle's testimony certainly cannot be adduced in favour of the higher antiquity of the Orphic theology. Philoponus indeed observes (De an. F, 5, in re- ference to a passage from Aristotle, De an. i. ,5, 410, b. 28) that Aris- totle, speaking of the Orphic poems, says the poems 'called' Orphic — ^7r€iS^ fl^ SoK€i 'Optpetas elvai TCt cttt], us Kol avrhs 4v rots 'jrepl . Clemens, Strom, i. 333 A: of. Schuster loc. cit. and p. .55 sq. For further remarks vide infra.) 64 INTRODUCTION. and ordinary thoughts of all mankind.* Even, however, in these two cases, the influence seems neither so certain nor so considerable as has commonly been believed. In regard to the unity of God, thfe theistic conception proper is as little to be found in the mystic as in the popular theology. It is impossible to imagine how the unity of God in the Jewish or Christian sense ^ could be inculcated at the feasts of the Eleusinian deities, or of the Cabiri, or of Dionysus. It is a different matter, certainly, in respect to the pantheism which appears in a fragment of the Orphic theogony,^ where Zeus is described as the beginning, middle, and end of all things, the root of the earth and sky, the substance and essence of air and of fire, the sun and moon, male and female; where the sky is called his head, the sun and moon are his eyes, the air is his breast, the earth his body, the lower world his foot, the aether his infallible, royal, omniscient reason. Such a pantheism was not incompatible with polytheism, a soil which the mysteries never quitted. As the gods of polytheism were in truth only the various ' For example, the mythus of Empedocles to have made allusion the slaying ofZagreus by the Titans to it — v. 70 (H2). (forfurtherdetailscf.Lobeck, i. 615 '^ We find the unity of God in sqq.), to -which the Neo-Platouists, this sense affirmed in so-called ' and before them even the Stoics, Orphic fragments {Orphica, ed. had given a philosophic interpreta- Hermann, Pr. 1-3), of which some tion, hut which in its original were probably, and others certainly, i meaning was probably only a composed or altered by Alexan- * rather crude variation of the drian Jews. well-worn theme of the death of ' Vide Lobeck, p. 520 sqq. ; f^ Nature in winter, with which the and Hermann, Fr. 6. Similarly the ^ thought of the o\7), Zeiis niaaa. Albs 5" (K irdvTa TeruttTOi.' The idea in this verse, however, and other similar ideas to be found in- those portions of the Orphic writinggi supposed to be ancient, contain nothing essentially in advance of a conception familiar to Greek religion, and the gist of which was already expressed by Homer when he calls Zeus the Father of gods and men.* The unity of the divine element which polytheism itself recog- nises, was made concrete in Zeus^ as king of the gods ; and so far, all that exists and all that happens is ulti- mately referred to Zeus. This idea may perhaps be expressed by calling Zeus the beginning, middle, and end of all things ; but the expression certainly does not ' In the enquiry into the Or- the circumstance that the word* phio cosmogony, infra. quoted from Orpheus by Proelus ' Ap. Prodis in Timceus, S5 F, in Timeeus, 310 D ; Plat. Theol. 17, and the Platonic scholiast, p. 451, 8, p. 363: t^ Se Aiki) ■KoXiiraivas Bekk. ^i))eIireTo, coincide with the Pla- ' Laws, ir. 715 E. Further tonic passage. AfKrj is also called references as to the employment of TroXirrowos in ParmenideS: v. 14. this Terse by the Stoics, Platonists, ' Of. also Terpander (about Neo-Pythagoreins and others, are 650 b.c"), Pr. 4:.Zeii nivTiav apx^ given by Lobcck, p. 529 sq. iri.ir:av i,yi\Taf. * This theory is supported by THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES 67 imply that Zeus is himself the ideal aomT^\ex.{Inbegriff) of all things.' There is consequently no evidence that the standpoint of the religious notion, which conceives the gods as personal beings, side by side with the world, has here been exchanged for that of philosophic specu- lation, which regards them as representing the general essence of the universe. The case is somewhat different in regard to the second point in question, belief in immortality. The doctrine of metempsychosis seems really to Jiave passed from the theology of the mysteries into Philosophy. Even this doctrine, however, was in all probability originally connected, not with all, but only with the Bacchic and Orphic mysteries. Those of Eleusis, being sacred to the Chthonian divinities, were regarded as specially important in their irlfluence upon man's future life. The Homeric hymn to Demeter already speaks of the great difference in the other world between the lots of the initiated and uninitiated ; ^ and there are later eulogies of these mysteries, from which it is clear that they guaranteed happiness not only in this life, but in the life to come.' There is nothiug here, however, to imply that the souls of the initiated are to come to life again, or that they are immortal in any other sense than was admitted by the ordinary faith of the Greeks. ' Even monotheism allows ex- S\j8ior, %s rdS' Siramfv hix^ovlaiv pressions such as ^| avrov koI heBp^irtav 5i' auToO real «ts ahrhv Tct irdvTa %s 8' areK^s UpSiy, ts t' %fip.opos, (Bomans xi. 36) — h o6t# iSifiev oSroB' ifiolitv Kal KtvoifieSa leal ia-jxiy (Apg. alaar fx^i, (pSiiievis vep, inh i 17, 2S), without meaning by them eip^iemi. that the Knite is actuaUy merged » q{ ^.jjg references in Lobeck, ™ Deity. i. 89 gaq. i. * v. 480 sqq. ^^ 68 INTRODUCTION. In this world wealth and fruitful fields* were expected from Demeter and her daughters in return for worship rendered to them ; and in a similar manner, after death, the partakers of the m.ysteries were assured that they should dwell in Hades, in closest proximity to the di- vinities they had honoured, while the uninitiated were threatened with being cast into a marsh.^ If these rude notions, at a later period, and among the more educated, received a spiritual interpretation,^ there is- ho reason to suppose that this was so originally, or that the initiated were promised anything in the future except the favour of the infernal gods ; the popular opinions about Hades remained quite un- affected by them. Even Pindar's celebrated utterances carry us no farther. For in saying that the partakers of the Eleusinian mysteries know the beginning and end of their life,* he does not assert the doctrine of transmigration,* and though in other passages this doctrine is undoubtedly brought forward,^ it is still ' Hymn to Ceres, 486 sqq. f^i/ iari, to7s 8' SAAoicrt iiiai^ ixii '' Aristides, Eleusin, p. 42 1 XKnd. Kcuci. The same is asserted of the Diony- . nn -n -n t\ sian mysteries (to which perhaps , „ ^T'^- ^'- 8 (1^1* ■f«f5'f): ' bhisheliefitselfmayoriginallybave "^P'"- So-tij iSav ic«i^ el r ■ > CKEl THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 69 questionable whether the poet borrowed it from the Eleusinian theology ; and even if he did apply the Eleusinian myths and symbols in this sense, it would not certainly follow that such was their original meaning.' In the Orphic theology, on the contrary, transmigra- tion is clearly to be found, and the probabilities are very strongly against its having com.e there through the medium of the philosophers. Several writers mention Pherecydes as the first who taught immor- tality,^ or more precisely, transmigration;* but the testimony of Cicero and other later authors is not sufE- cient, in the absence of older evidence,* to prove this statement. Even if we admit the probability that Pherecydes spoke of transmigration, the assertion of his liaving been the first to do so rests only en the fact that no previous writings are known to contain that ' The revival of dead nature ii^iKvowTai koI fiypovrai ix ruv in tlie spring was considered in the TiBveiiTup. cult of Demeter as the return of ^ Cic. TMsc. i. Ifi, 38, and after souls from the under world, and him Lactantius, Instit. vii. 7. 8. harvest was looked upon as the Augastmc.Acad.m.i'l {ll),B/piat. descent of the souls thither j( vide 137, p. 407, B. Miar. Preller, Dem. wnd Peri. 228 sqq. ; ' Suidas; *« peKuSiis ; Hesyehius, Griech. Mythologk, i. 254, 483) ; and Ve Ms qui erud. clar. p. 66, Orelli ; this does not apply solely to the Tatian c. Grac. c. 3, 25, according souls of plants, to which it prima- to the obvious correction in the rily relates, but to the souls of edition of Maurus. Cf. Porphyry, men. At these seasons also de- Antr. Nymph, c. 31. Preller also parted spirits appear in the upper (Ehein. Mm. iv. 338) refers with world. It was easy to interpret some appearance of probability these notions as implying the en- what is quoted by Origen (c. Cels. trance of human souls into the vi. p. 304) from Pherecydes, and visible world from the invisible, Themist. Or. ii. 38. a, to the doe- and their return into the invisible trine of Transmigration, again. Cf Plato, Pluedo, 70 C: * Cf. Aristoxenus, Durie and iraKaths fjiiv oZv lim tis \6yos, . . Hermippus — so far as they have &>s elalv \cd ipux"'] MepSe ai- been quoted in Diog. i. 116 sqq. uSiiivai iaet Koi vd\ip ye Sevpo and viii. 1 sqq. 70 INTRODUCTION. doctrine. Still more uncertain is the theory' that Pythagoras was the first to introduce it. Heracleitus clearly presupposes this ; Philolaus expressly appeals to the ancient theologians and soothsayers^ for the theory that souls were fettered to the body, and as it were buried in it, as a punishment. Plato' derives the same theory from the mysteries, and more particularly from the Orphic mysteries ; and Pindar teaches that certain favourites of the gods are to be permitted to return to the upper world, and that those who thrice have led a blameless life will be sent to the islands of the blest in the kingdom of Cronos.* In this last representaticHi, we perceive an alteration in the doc- trine ; for whereas the return to corporeal life is else- ' Maxinras Tyr. xti. 2; Dio- genes, viii. 14; Porph. v. ; Pjth. 19. ^ Ap. Clemens, Slrom. ili. 433 A, and preifiovisly ap. Cieero, Hor- iens. Pr. 85 (iv. 6, 483 Or.) This passage, as well as others from Plato, will be quoted at length in the section on the Pythagorean Metempsychosis, infra. » Phcedo, 62 B; O-at. 400 B. Cf. Phado, 69 C, 70 C ; Laws, ix. 870 D ; and Lobeck, Aglaoph. ii. 795 sqq. * Pindar's eschatology follows no fixed type (cf. Preller's Demetcr und Persephone, p. 239), while, in many places, he adopts the nsual notions about Hades, in Thren. 2 it is said that after the death of the body, the soul, which alone springs from the gods, remains alive ; and in two places transmi- gration is alluded to, tiz. in Thren. Pr. 4(110), quoted by Plato, Meno, 81 B: irevdeos Se'JeToi, 4s rhv 5TTcp6ev ahiov Kelrav ivdrtp ^T6t &vSi5o7 iliu^^v irAXtVf 4h Tav ficuri\ries ayavoi Kcd ff64vei XpittTTVol iTotpi(^ ^eyttrroi ivSpes oS|ovt'- is Si -riv Kom}iv Xpivov ^pues oyvoi icphs ardptiiruv And 01. ii. 68, after mention of the rewards and punishments in Hades Sirot S' 4T6\ixaffav iffrpis fKaTfpaBi pLcivams oiri itipmay aS&CQiv Ix^'^ ^"Xi^", treiXnv Aihs iShv -irapi TUpivov Tip duced the cult of Dionysus, which eial ol ''E.\k'l\vuv 4xP'll ei'Siis Tck the other hand, in C. 53, he inti- ovvi/iaTa oi yptuptn. Cf. c. 81: mates that he considers the Orphic Toiffi 'Op^moiai Ka\eiifi4mun Kol poems more recent than Homer BaKx""''"''! o^"'' ^^ AiyinrTloLiTi. and Hesiod. THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 73 might be urged, in support of this view, that similar notions have been found among races which never in any way came under Egyptian influence.' Nor can we altogether dispute the possibility of different nations, without any historical connection, having arrived at the same opinions concerning a future state. Even so strange a theory as transmigration seems to us may thus have been reached in several cases independently one of the other. For if the natural desire to escape ■death engenders a universal belief in immortality, a bolder fancy, in nations not yet capable of spiritual ab- straction, might well shape this desire and belief into the hope and expectation of a return to earthly life. ^ li, in primis hoc volwiit persuadere (Bruidee) non interire animas, sed ah aliis post mortem transire ad alios. Diodor. v. 28, sub fin. : evurxi^t yhp Trap* aiiroh d Ilu9a'Y6pov \6yoSf in Tos ij/uxas t&v avOp^irav dfla- vdrovs ejvcu (Tu/iBefftjKe koX Si' 4raf ^pitTfievtov TrdKiv jStoui/, els trepov ffufia rris ^uxvs eiaBvofieyr]^. Oa this account many persons, adds Dio- dorus, place letters to their friends on the funeral pile. So Ammian. Mare. xv. 9, sub fin. ^ If the soul is conceived as a breath-like essence which dwells in the body, and leaves it after death according to the , opinion of the ancients, and especially of the Greeks, the question inevitably arises whence this essence comes, and whither it goes. For answer to this qiiestion, a child-like imagi- nation is most easily satisfied with the simple notion that there is a place, invisible to us, in which the departed souls remain, and from which the newly born come forth. And we do, in fact, find in many ' According to Herodotus, iv. 94 sq., the Thracian Getse believed that the dead came to the god Zal- moxis or Gebeleizin ; and every five years they sent a messenger to this god by means of a special hu- man sacrifice, entrusted with com- munications to their departed friends. That the theory of trans- migration was involved in this cannot be deduced from the state- ment of the Greeks of the Helles- pont, that Zalmoxis was a scholar of Pythagoras, who had taught the belief in immortality to the Thra- cians. Herodotus says that it was the custom of another Thracian tribe (Her. v. 4) to bewail the newly born, and to praise the dead as happy; because the former are about to encounter the ills of life, while the latter have escaped from them. But this custom proves even less than the other in regard to metempsychosis. The Gauls, how- ever, are said to have believed, not only in immortality, but also in transmigration : Csesar, S. Gall. vi. 74 INTRODUCTION. However this may be, it appears certain, that among the Greeks the doctrine of transmigration came not from the philosophers to the priests, but from the priests to the philosophers. Meantime it is a question whether its philosophic importance in antiquity was very great. It is found, indeed, with Pythagoras and his school, and Empedocles is in this respect allied with them; a higher life after death is also spoken of by Heracleitus. But none of these philosophers brought the doctrine into such a connection with their scientific theories as to make it an essential constituent of their philosophic system : it stands with them all for a self- dependent dogma side by side with their scientific theory, in which no lacuna would be discoverable if it were removed, A philosophic basis was first given to the belief in immortality by Plato ; and it would be hard to maintain that he would not have arrived at it without the assistance of the myths which he employed for its exposition. From all that has now been said, it would appear that Greek Philosophy in regard to its origin was no more indebted to the religion of the mysteries than to the public religion. The views of nature which were contained in the mysteries may have given an impulse to thought ; the idea that all men need religious con- secration and purification may have led to deeper study of the moral nature and character of man ; but as different nations, not merely the this there is but a step to the belief in a tingdom of the dead, theory that the same souls which but the idea that souls return to previously inhabited a body should the body from the lower regions of afterwards enter another body, the earth or from heaven. From TBE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 75 scientific instruction was not originally contemplated in the tales and practices of the mystic cult, any philosophic exposition of these presupposed that the expositor had already attained the philosophic stand- point ; and as the mysteries were after all only made up of general perceptions and experiences accessible to everyone, a hundred other things could really perforin for Philosophy the same service that they did. Philo- sophy did not require the myth of Kore and Demeter to reveal the alternation of natural conditions, the passage from death to life and from life to death ; daily observation suflSced for the acquisition of this know- ledge. The necessity of moral purity, and the advan- tages of piety and virtue, needed not to be proclaimed by the glowing descriptions of the priests concerning the happiness of the initiated and the misery of the profane. These conceptions were immediately con- tained in the moral consciousness of the Grreeks. Nevertheless, the mysteries were by no means without importance in regard to Philosophy, as the results of our enquiry have shown. But their importance is not so great, nor their influence so direct, as has often been imagined. § HI. — Tlie Native Soii/rees of Gh-eek Philosophy continued. MOEAL LIFE, CIVIL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS. The ideality of the Greek religion finds its counter- part in the freedom and beauty of Greek life ; it is impossible to regard either of these characteristics, strictly speaking, as the ground or consequence of the 76 INTR OD UCTION. other ; they grew up side by side, mutually requiring and sustaining one another, out of the same natural temperament and under the same favourable conditions. As the Grreek reverenced in his gods the natural and moral order of the world, without therefore renouncing in regard to them his own value and freedom, so Greek morality stands in a happy mean between the lawless license of barbarous and semi-barbarous races and the slavish obedience which subjects the peoples of the East to the will of another and to a temporal and spiritual despotism. A strong feeling of liberty, and at the same time a rare susceptibility to measure, form, and order; a lively sense of community in existence and action ; a social impulse which made it an absolute necessity for the individual to ally himself to others, to subordinate himself to the common will, to follow the tradition of his family and his country — these qualities, so essential in the Hellenes, produced in the limited area of the Greek states a full, free and harmonious life, such as no other nation of antiquity can exhibit. The very narrowness of the sphere in which their moral perceptions moved was in itself favourable to this result. As the individual knew that be was free and had a right to protection only as being a citizen of this or that state, and as, in the same way, his relation to others was determined by their relation to the state to which he belonged, every one from the beginning had his problem clearly marked out for him. The maintaining and extension of his civil importance, the fulfilment of his civil duties, work for the freedom and greatness of his people, obedience to the laws, — GREEK POLITICAL LIFE. 77 these constituted the simple end which the Grreek definitely proposed to himself, and in the pursuit of which he was all the less disturbed because his glances and endeavours seldom strayed beyond the limits of his home, because he excluded the idea of seeking the rule of his actions elsewhere than in the laws and customs of his state, because he dispensed with all the reflections by which the man of modern times labours to reconcile, on the one side, his individual interests and natural rights with the interest and laws of the commonwealth, and, on the other, his patriotism with the claims of a cosmopolitan morality and religion. We cannot, indeed, regard this narrow conception of moral problems as the highest possible conception, nor can we conceal from ourselves how closely the dismem- berment of Gbeece, the consuming disquiet of its civil wars and party struggles, not to speak of slavery and the neglect of female education, were connected with this narrowness ; but our eyes must not therefore be closed to the fact that on this soil and from these presuppositions a freedom and culture arose which give to the Greeks their unique place in history. It is easy also to see how deeply and essentially Philosophy was rooted in the freedom and order of the Greek state. There was not, indeed, any immediate connection be- tween them. Philosophy in Greece was always the 1/ private concern of individuals, states only troubled themselves about it in so far as they interfered with all doctrines morally and politically dangerous ; it received no positive encouragement or support from cities and princes until a late period, when it had long 78 INTRODVCTION. passed beyond the highest point of its development. Nor was public education concerned with philosophy, or science of any kind. At Athens, even in the time of Pericles, it scarcely included the first rudiments of what we should call scientific culture ; nothing was attempted beyond reading," writing, and a certain amount of arithmetic: history, mathematics, physics, the study of foreign languages, and so forth, were altogether ignored. The philosophers themselves, and especially the Sophists, were the first to induce certain individuals to seek for wider instruction, which, how- ever, was even then restricted almost exclusively to rhetoric. Besides the above-mentioned elementary arts, ordinary education consisted entirely of music and gymnastics ; and music was primarily concerned, not so much with intellectual training as with proficiency in the Homeric and Hesiodic poems, and the popular songs, singing, playing on stringed instruments, and dancing. ' But this education formed complete and vigorous men, and the subsequent discipline of public life engendered such self-confidence, demanded sudh an exercise of all the powers, such acute observation and intelligent judgment of persons and circumstances, above all, such energy and worldly prudence, as must necessarily have borne important fruit to science when- ever the scientific need arose. That it could not fail to arise was certain ; for in the harmonious miny- sidedness of the Grreek character, the development of moral and political reflection called forth a correspond- ing and natural development of speculative thought ; and not a few of the Greek cities had attained, by QREBK EDUCATION. 79 means of civil liberty, a degree of prosperity which ensured leisure for scientific activity to some at least of their citizens. Although, therefore, in ancient times, the political life and education of the Greeks had no direct concern with Philosophy; and although, on the other hand, the earliest Philosophy, as a rule, neglected ethical and political questions, yet the train- ing of men and the fact that circumstances took the form required for the production of Philosophy were important elements in its history. Freedom and severity of thought were the natural fruits of a free and law-directed life ; and the sound and sterling characters which grew up on the classic soil of Greece could not fail, even in science, to adopt their standpoint with decision, and to maintain it clearly and definitely, with full and unwavering purpose.' Lastly, it was one of the chief excellences of Greek education that it did not split up human nature, but, by the even development of all the powers of man, so'.ight to make of him a beautiful whole, a moral work of art. This trait we may venture to connect with the fact that Greek science, especially in its commencement, chose the path that is indeed generally taken by thought in its infancy — the path downward from above ; that it did not form a theory of the whole from the aggrega- ' This intimate connection of Parmenides gave laws to his native politics with philosophy is strik- city, and that Zeno perished in his ingly shown by the fact that many attempt to free his countrymen. of the anc'ent philosophers were Empedocles restored democracy in distinguished as statesmen, legis- Agrigentum; Archytas was noless lators, political reformers and great as a general than as a states- penerals. . The political activity of man ; and Melissus is probably Thales and of the Pythagoreans is the same person who vanquished well known. We are told that the Athenian fleet. 80 INTRODUCTION. tion of individuals, but sought to gain a standard for the individual from the study of the whole, and at once to shape a collective representation from the existing fragments of cosmical knowledge ; that philosophy in Greece preceded the particular sciences. X If we examine somewhat more closely the circum- stances which conditioned the progress of Greek culture before the appearance of philosophy, two phenomena especially claim our attention : these are the republican form of the government, and the spread of the Greek races by colonisation. THe centuries which immedi- ately preceded the earliest Greek Philosophy, and those which partly coincided with it, are the times of the legislators and of the tyrants, of the transition to those constitutional forms of government on the soil of whi^h Greek political life attained its highest perfection. When the patriarchal monarchy of the Homeric period, in consequence of the Trojan war and the Doric migra- tion, and through the extinction, disqualification , or banishment of the ancient royal houses, had entirely given place to oligarchy, the aristocracy became the means of spreading freedom and higher culture through- out the smaller circle of the ruling families. After- wards when the oppressions and internal deterioration of these families had evoked the resistance of the masses, the popular leaders came mostly from the ranks of their hitherto masters, and these^demagogues almost everywhere eventually became tyrants. But as the government by a single person, because of its very origin, found its chief adversary in the aristocracy, and, as a counterpoise, was forced to fall back for support POLITICAL LIFE OF THE GREEKS. 81 upon the people, it became itself a means of training and educating the people to freedom. The courts of the tyrants were centres of art and culture ; • and when their rule was overthrown, which generally happened in the course of one or two generations, their inheritance of power did not revert to the earlier aristocracy, but to moderate constitutions founded on fixed laws. This course of things was as favourable to the scientific as to the political training of the Greeks. In the efiforts and struggles of this political movement, all the powers which public life brought to science must have been aroused and employed, and the feeling of youthful liberty imparted to the spirit of the Grreek people a stimulus which must needs have affected their specula- tive activity. Thus the laying of the foundations of the scientific and artistic glory of Greece was eagerly carried on side by side with the transformation of her political circumstances ; a connection of phenomena which is very striking, and which shows that among the Greeks, as among all healthy nations, culture has been the truit of liberty. This general revolution was effected more quickly in the colonies than in the mother country ; and the existence of these colonies was of the highest importance in regard to it. During the 500 years which elapsed between the Doric conquests and the rise of Greek Philosophy, the Greek races had spread themselves, by means of organised emigration, on all sides. The islands ' For example, those of Peri- wise men, there is no tradition of ander, Polycrates, Pisistratus, and the pljilosophera being connected his sons. But, excepting the etory with tyrants before the appearance of Periander's relation totheseren of the Sophists. VOL. I. 82 INTRODUCTION, 6f the Archipelago, as far as Crete and Ehodes ; the western and northern coasts of Asia Minor ; the shores of the Black Sea, and the Propontis ; the coasts of Thrace, Macedonia and lUyria ; of Magna Grrascia and Sicily, were covered with hundreds of settlements; Greek colonists had penetrated even to distant Gaul, to Gyrene, and to Egypt. Most of these settlements attained to' prosperity, cultiire, and free constitutions, sooner than the states from which they emanated. Not only did the very disruption from their native soil pro- duce a freer movement, and a different organisation of civil society, but their whole situation was much more convenient for trade and commerce, for enterprising activity, and for all kinds of intercourse with strangers than was the case with the cities of Greece proper ; it was therefore natural that in many respects they should outstrip the older states. How greatly they did so, and how important the rapid growth of the colonies was in 'regard to the development of Greek Philosophy, is best seen from the fact that all the Greek philosophers of note, before Socrates, one or two Sophists only excepted, belonged either to the Ionian and Thracian colonies, or to those in Italy and Sicily. Here at the limits of the Hellenic world were the chief settlements of a higher culture, and as the immortal poems of Homer were a gift from the Greeks of Asia Minor to their native country, so also Philosophy came from the east and west to the centre of Greek life ; there to attain its highest . perfection, favoured by a happy combination of aU forces, and a coincidence of all necessary conditions, at an epoch when, for most of the colonies, the COSMOLOGY. 83 brightest period of their history had passed away be- yond recall. How thought gradually developed itself under these circumstances up to the poiat at which the earliest scientific endeavours, in the strict sense of the word, were made, we learn to some extent from the still existing records of early cosmology and ethics, though our information from these sources is far from being complete. §' IV. — Native Sources of Greek Philosophy contitmedC. COSMOLOGT. In a people so richly endowed as the Greeks, and so eminently favoured by circumstances in regard to their intellectual development, reflection must soon have been awakened, and attention directed to the pheno- mena of nature and of human life ; and attempts must ') early have been made, not merely to explain the external ) world in reference to its origin and causes, but also to ,' consider the activities and conditions of mankind from / more general points of view. This reflection was not, indeed, at first of a specifically scientific kind, for it was not as yet regulated by the thought of any general . interdependence of things according to fixed law. Cos- mology, until the time of Thales, and, so far as it allied itself with religion, even longer, retained the form of a mythological narrative ; Ethics, until the time of ■ Socrates and Plato, that of aphoristic reflection. The fortuitous, and sometimes even miraculous, interference of imaginary beings took the place of the interdepen- G 2 84 INTRODUCTION. dence of nature ; instead of one central theory of human life, we find a number of moral sayings and prudential maxims, which, abstracted frona various experiences, not unfrequently contradicted one another, and, at the best, •were reduced to no general principles and brought into no scientific coimection with any theory of human nature. Though it would be a mistake to overlook this 'distinction, and to place either the mythic cosmologistsi- OT the gnomic poets in the number of the philosophers,' as has been done by some writers, both ancient and •modem, yet we ougtt not, on the other hand, to under- Tate the importance of these early attempts, for they •were at least useful in calling attention to the questions which science had first to consider, and in accustoming thought to combine particular phenomena under general points of view ; and thus a good deal was done towards a beginning of science. The most ancient record of mythic cosmology among the Greeks is the Theogony of Hesiod. How much of this work is derived from still more ancient tradition, and how much is invented by the poet him- self and his later revisers, cannot now be discovered with certainty, nor is this the place to enquire. It is ' As was certainly done in the ally addicted to representing the most flourishing period of Greek ancient poets as the earliest philo-' Philosophy by the Sophists and by sophers, by the allegorical inter- the adherents of systems of natural pretation of their writings ; and in Philosophy. Plato is evidence of the Neo-Platonists this practice the former in Proi!. 316 D, cf. iiiii. passed all bounds. Tiedemannwas SSSEsqq. ; and of the latter there the first to declare Thales the is. mention in Crat. 402 B; and starting-point of Philosophy, vide* alsoinAristotle.ilfeiapA.i. 3,983 b, his Geist der lepeculativen PhUoso^%' 27 (cf. Schwegler on this passage), phie, i. Preface, p. xviii. * The Stoics afterwards were especir COSMOLOGY. SESIOD. 85 enough for our purpose to observe that the Theogooy, with the exception of a few subsequent interpolations, was undoubtedly known to the earliest philosophers in its present form.' We find in it nothing approaching to a scientific apprehension or solution of the cosmo-, logical problem. The poet proposes to himself the question from which all cosmogonies and histories of creation start, and which, indeed, obviously suggests, itself even to the most undisciplined intellect, — the question as to the origin and causes of all things. But in the Theogony this question has not the scientific importance of an enquiry into the essence and reasons of phenomena. With childlike curiosity the poet asks : Who made all things ? and how did He make them ? and the answer simply consists in positing as the first being something that cannot be explained away by thought, and making the rest originate from this by means of some analogy drawn from experience. Now experience points out two kinds of origin. All that we see either forms itself naturally, or else is made with a design by definite individuals. In the former- case production takes place by the action of the ele- ments, by growth, or by generation ; in the latter, either mechanically by the elaboration of some given material, or dynamically, as we work upon other men • Cf. Petersen ( Ursprimg tind shall hereafter consider) and the Alter der Hesiod : Theog. (Progr. der remarkable utterance of Herodotus, Hambwrgischm Gymn.), 1862), who "ii. 63, are decided evidence against seems to me to have proved at any the supposition that the Theogony rate this much, whatever we may is no older than the sixth century ; think of , his other theories. The the general character of its con- polemic of Xenophanes and Hera- ceptions and language, however, cleitus against Hesiod (which we attest this even more strongly. 86 INTRODUCTION. by the mere expression of our will. All these analogies are applied, in the cosmogonies of different nations, to the origin of the world and of the gods ; as a rule, several of them at once, according to the nature of the object in question. To the Greeks the analogy of generation must have been the most obvious, be- cause, in accordance with the particular bent of their imagination, they had personified the various parts of the world as beings akin to humanity, whose origin could be represented in no other way. In any case they must have kept to an analogy drawn from nature, for Greek thought was too naturalistic and polytheistic to maintain, like the Zoroastrian and Judaic religions, that everything had been called into existence by the mere fiat of a creator. In Greek mythology the gods themselves were created, and the deities worshipped by the people belong altogether to a younger race of gods.; there is, therefore, no divinity who can be regarded as the first cause of all things, without beginning, and who possesses absolute power over nature. So in Hesiod it is the genesis of the gods on which his whole cosmogony turns. Most of these genealogies, and the myths con- nected with them, are nothing more than the expression of eimple perceptions, or picture-thoughts, of the. kind that imagination everywhere produces when the know- ledge of nature is in its infancy. Erebus and Nyx are the parents of ^Ether and Hemera, for day in its brightness is the son of night and darkness. The earth brings forth the sea of herself alone, and rivers in her union vfith the sky ; for the sources of streams are fed by the rain, while the ocean appears to be a mass of COSMOLOGY. SESIOD. 87 water which has been from the beginning in the depths of the earth. Uranus is emasculated by Cronos, for the sun-heat of harvest time puts an end to the fertilising showers of the sky. Aphrodite springs from the seed of Uranus, for the rain in spring awakens the genera- tive iinpulse of nature. The Cyclopes, Hecatonchires and giants, the Echidna and Typhceus are children of G-sea ; other monsters are the progeny of night or of the waters, partly because of their originally physical import, partly because what is monstrous cannot spring from the bright heavenly gods, but only from darkness and the unfathomable deep. The sons of Gssa, the Titans, were overthrown by the Olympians ; for as the light of heaven subdues the mists of earth, so the all- ordering Deity has bound the wild forces of nature. The thought contained in these myths is very limited ; whatever in them transcends the most obvious per- ceptions is the result, not of reflection concerning the natural causes of things, but of an activity of fancy from which, even when it produces something really significant, we must be careful not to expect too much. Even in the , combination of these myths, which is principally, no doubt, the work of the poet, we fail to discover any leading thought of deeper import.* The ' Brandis (Geschichie der tion of the higher principle. Bat Griech-Eom. Phil. i. 75) finds not these thoughts are much too ab- raerely in the beginning of the stract to admit of our seeking in Theogony, but also in the myths them the motive of the mythopoeio of the dethronement of Uranus, and fancy. The poet does not seem to the conflict of the sons of Cronos have been influenced by any specu- with their father and the Titans, lative idea even in the arrangement the doctrine that the determinate of these myths ; the three genera- proceeds from the indeterminate, tions of the gods merely form the and that there is a gradual e-volu- thread on which he strings his 88 INTROBUCTION. passage in the Theogony whicli sounds most like a philosophic conception of nature, and was almost the only passage employed by the ancient philosophers in that sense,' is the commencement of the poem (v. 116 sqq.). Chaos was the first to exist, then came Earth (with the abyss, or Tartarus) and Eros. Of Chaos were born Erebus and Night ; Earth first brought forth of herself the sky, the mountains, and the sea ; then in marriage with the sky she produced the progenitors of the different families of gods, except the few that are derived from Erebus and Night. This representation certainly attempts to get at some notion of the world's origin, and we may so far consider it as the beginning of cosmology among the Greeks ; but as a whole it is very crude and imperfect. The poet asks himself what was really the first of all things, and he finally aWdes by the Earth as the immovable basis of the Cosmos. Out- side the Earth was nothing but gloomy night, for the luminaries of heaven were not as yet in existence. Erebus and Night are therefore as old as the Earth. In order that another should be produced from this first one, the generative impulse or Eros must have existed from the beginning. Such then are the causes of all things. If we exclude all these beings from our thought, there remains for the imagination only the idea of infinite space, which at this stage of culture it does not con- ceive in an abstract manner as empty mathematical space, but concretely as an immeasurable, waste and genealogies, and by which he con- the edition of Hesiod of Gaisford- nects them together externally. Keiz, verse 116. ' Proof of this ■will be found in COSMOLOGY. HESIOD. 89 formless mass. The first of all things, therefore, in reality is Chaos. In some such way as this perhaps the foregoing- theory of the beginning of the world may have arisen in the mind of its author.^ It is founded, indeed, upon a desire for enquiry, an endeavour to attain clear and coherent notions, but the interest which rules it is that of the imagination rather than that of thought. No question is asked concerning the essence and general causes of things, the problem is merely how to learn something about the actual facts .relating to the primitive condition of the world and to its ulterior developments; and in the solution of this problem, we naturally find that the poet is guided by the intuitions of his imagination, and not by intelli- gent reflection. The commencement of the Theogony is, considering its date, a thoughtful and pregnant myth, but it is not as yet a philosophy. The next writer after Hesiod of whose cosmology we know anything at all definite is Pherecydes of Syros,* ' Whether this author or some plain this circumstance" as showing older poet was the composer of the that the myths subsequently intro- Theogony is, as has already heen duced belonged to the older tra^ observed, of little importance, dition, and the opening verses Brandis ( Gesck. der Gr.-Bom. Phil, to the author of the Theogony i. 74) supports the latter theory, itself. It is unlikely, he says, that the '■' For his life, age, and writings, poet, had he invented the myth of cf. Sturz, Pherecydis Fragmmta, p. Tartarus as one of the first princi- 1 sqq. Preller in the Wmn. Mus. pies of the world, or of Eros as the ir. (1846) 377 sqq. Allgem. En- creativeprineiple,woald have made cyclop, of Ersoh and Griiber, iii. no further use of them in his Cos- 22, 240 sqq. Art. Pherecydes, Zim- mology. But not to speak of the mermann inFichte'sZeiiseJ?vfi!/«r doubtful origin of the 119th verse, Philosophie, &c. sxiv. B, 2 H. S. 161 which mentions Tartarus, but sqq. (reprinted in Zimmermann's which is wanting in Plato (Symp. Studien. Vienna, 1870, p. 1 sqq.). 178 B), and Aristotle {Metaph. i. 4, This last, however, credits the old 984 b, 27), I should rather ex- mythographer .with much that is 90 INTRODUCTION. a contemporary of Anaximander ; ' in later story a mira- culous person like Pythagoras.^ In a work, the title of which is variously given, he says that there existed before all things, and from eternity, Zeus, Chronos, and Chthon.' By Chthon he seems to have understood the alien to him. Conrad, De 'Pkerecy- dis Syrii /state atgue cosmologia. Coblenz, 1867. ' He is described as such by Diogenes, i. 121, and Eusebius, Chron. 60 01. The former, probably following Apollodorus, places his most flourishing period in the 59th Olympiad (540 B.C.), and the latter in the 60th Olympiad. Suidas (*fp6K.) in a very obscure passage fixes his birth in 01. 45 (600-696 ?.c.). His age is given by the Pseudo-Lucian {Macrob. 22, a pas- sage "where he certain!}' seems to be meant) as 85. Neither of these statements, howerer, is altogether trustworthy , though perh aps neither is far from the truth ; and there are besides other reasons against our drawing any such definite con- clusion as Ocnrad, who thus sums up (p. 14) his carpful discussion of this question: Phereoydes was bom m the 45th Olympiad or shortly before, and died, ' octogena- riusfere,' towards the end of the 62nd Olympiad. (Between 01. 45, 1, to 62, 4, moreover, there are only 71-72 years.) Nor does the asser- tion thit Pythagoras tended him in his last illness help us at all, partly because it is itself very untrust- worthy, and partly because this occurrence is placed by some before Pythagoras' emigration to Italy, and by others in the last period of his life. Cf. Porph. Vita Pythag. 455 sq. ; Iamb. Vita Pythag. 184, 252 ; Diog. viii. 40. ' Cf. the anecdotes in Diog. i. 116 sq. ' The commencement of this work, in Diog. i. 119 (cf. Damas- cius, Be Princ. p. 384; and Con- rad, p. 17, 21) was as follows : Zeifv fiev Kal Xpovos es ael Kal Xdiiv ^v. XBoviji Se ivofia iysvero Trj, iiveiS^ ainy lehs yepas Stdoi. Sy yepas we cannot, with Tiedemann ( Griechenlands erste Pkilosophen, 172), Sturz (loc. cit. p. 45) and others, understand motion ; nor with Braudis the original qualita- tive determination, for this latter is far too abstract a conception for Pherecydes, and he can hardly have regarded the earth as moved. Neither interpretation, in fact, can be got out of the word; what it means is : Since Zeus conferred honour upon her. We may either understand by this honour, what always seems to me the most pro- bable, the adornment of her surface, mentioned immediately after (the garment with which Zeus covered the earth) ; or else, with Conrad.p. 32, the honour of her union with Zeus, by which the Earth became the mother of many gods (p. 74, 2). Pherecydes means to derive the name 777 from yepas. This circum- stance of itself forbids the substi- tution of irepos for yfpas, proposed by Eose, De Arist. tibr. ord. 74 ; but the sense we should get by this change is, in my opinion, very un- satisfectory. COSMOLOGY. PHERECYDE8. 91 earth ; by Chronos, or Cronos,' that part of heaven nearest the earth, and the deity ruling it ; ^ by Zeus, the highest god, disposing and forming the whole' universe, and himself at the same time the highest heaven.^ ' So he is called by Hermias (Irrisio, c. 12), who expressly says that Kp6i'os is the same as Xp6po5. In Damascius, on the contrary, ■where Conrad, p. 21, also reads Kp6vov, I find in the manuscripts no other reading than Xp6vov. ' By the Cronos of Phereeydes is generally understood Time — so Hermias loc. cit. and Probus on Virgil's Eclogues., vi. 31. Phere- eydes himself indicates this signifi- cation when he puts Xpims instead of Kp6vos, Yet it is scarcely credi- ble that so ancient a thinker should have placed the abstract conceptioij of Time among the primitive causes ; and Cronos, in fact, ap- pears as a much more concrete na- ture when it is told of him (vide infra) that he created from his seed fire, wind and water, and that he was the leader of the gods iij the conflict with Ophioneus. Thatthis only means that in course of time fire, wind and water arose, and that in course of time Ophioneus was conquered, I cannot believe. If the gods at strife, with Ophioneus re- present certain powers of riat;;re,, Cronos, their leader, must be something more real than merely Time ; and if fire, wind and water were formed from the seed of Chro- nos, this seed must be conceived as a material substance, and Chro- nos must consequently represent a certain part, or certain constituents, of the world. If we consider that fire, wind and water are formed in the atmosphere during tempests, and that the fertilising rain is re- presented in the mythus of Uranus as the seed of the god of heaven ; that Chronos, according to this original import, was not the god of Time in abstracto, but the god of the warm season, of the time of harvest, of the sun-heat (Preller, Griech. Mythol. i. 42 sq.), and, as such, was a god of heaven — that he was so regarded by the Pythago- reans when they identified the vault of heaven with Xp6vos, and called the sea the tears of Chronos (vide infra, Pythagorean system) — if we consider all this, the opinion given above, concerning which even Conrad's (p. 22) and Brandis's adverse judgment ( Gesch. der Entw. der Griech. Phil. i. 59) have not shaken me, will appear to have far the most probability in its favour. ' To Zeus, as the divine creator of the universe, the passage in Aris- totle's Metaphysics, xiv. 4, 1091 b, 8, refers ; oi ye /j-efjuyfievm avTuiv (scil. tSiv ap^aiwy ttoititSiv) koI t^ 4t^ fivifLKus ajracTa \4yety, oTov ^epeK^Sijs Kal eVepot Tiyes, rh yevfria'ai/ irpurov &pLffTov TiOeaci. As the notion of Zeus as god of heaven is based upon the idea of thp sky itself, and as the gods of Phereeydes generally represent at the same time certain parts of the world, we may assume that he did not discriminate the world-creating power, which he calls Zeus, from the upper portion of the sky. The assertioji of Hermias and Probas (foe, cit.) that by Zeus he under- stood .^ther, and of Probus {loc. cit.) that he understood fire, show 92 INTROBUCTION. Chronos produces from his seed fire, wind and water ; the three primal beings then beget numerous other gods in five families.' When Zeus, in order that he might fashion the world,^ had changed himself into Eros (who, according to the ancient theory, must be the world- that we are here concerned ■with an interpretation of the Stoics, and not with an original and authentic text. That Hermias should reduce .aSther and Earth to the ttoiovv and iriaxov is also entirely in harmony ■with the Stoic point of view. Cf. Zeller, Phil, der Ghr. Part III. a, 1 19, second edition. ' Bamascius, loc. cit. : rhv Be ^p6vov TTOirtffai 4k tov yivov eavrov •jrvp Kal irviv^a, KOi iiStop, , . . ^| &i/ iv veme fivxois dirtprjuei/wv iroKK^v yei/eetp ffvffrrivai Becov, t^v ■nsvTiiivxov Ktt\ovfi4v7i», To the same /lux"' ("-^ Brandis thinks, p. 81) the statement of Porphyry perhaps refers (2)e antro nymph. c. 31), according to which Phere- cydes mentions fivxoiis^ ical fiodpovs Kol &vTpa Kal 6i/pas' Kal wiKas ; though Porphyry himself sees in them the yeveffeis Kal airoyeveffeis ^uxSiv. Preller (Rh. Mus. 382, Encgcl.2i3) thinks thatPhereeydes here intends to speak of five admix- tures, in various proportions, of the elementary substances ( JEthfer,Fire, Air, Water, Earth), in each of which one of these elementary sub- stances predotainateis. It seems to me, however, very hazardous to as- cribe to the ancient philosopher of Syra a theory of the Elements in the sense of Empedodes or Aris- totle (a theory which presupposes a far more developed stage of phi- losophic reflection); or to believe that he anticipated Philolaus in fixing the number of these elements at five. Conrad's modification also of this interpretation, by which the five livxol are made to signify the five layers, circumfolding feaeh other, of earth, water, air, fire and sether (loo. cit. p. 35), attributes to Pherecydes, as it appears to me, a view of the world that is too scien- tific and too similar to Aristotle's ; the theory, especially, of a fiery sphere invisible to us, and the pre- cise discrimination of aether from fire and air, is, according to all other traces of it, much later. It ■would be more reasonable to sup- pose that Pherecydes distinguished Olympic gods, fire-gods, wind-gods, water-gods and earth-gods. Suidas says that the work of Pherecydes was named kitiiiiuxos, from the liuxoi. Preller {Eh. Mus. 378) conjectures instead vevTf/ivxos. Conrad (p. 35) adds to the above- mentioned five fivxol the two divi- sions of the lower ■world. Hades and Tartarus. Itis supposed(thoughthis is not quite clear from Origen, C. Cels. vi. 42) that Pherecydes him- self distinguished Hades and Tar- tarus. Nothing certain, however, can be made out on the subject. Plato, in Soph. 242 C : i liiv (jxGoc St7i7etTOl) cbs Tpla t^ Svto, TroAe/iei 5e aW^Aots ivlare avruy itTTa in/, Tore Be Kal ipl\a yiyvd^sva ydfiovs Tc Kal 't6kovs Kal rpa^as tuv iKydvay 7rop6;^6Tai, doubtless refers to the exposition we have been considering. ' Proclus in Tim. 156 A. COSMOLOGY. PHEllECYDES. 93 foroiing force), he made, we are told, a great robe, on wMch he embroidered the earth and Ogenos (Oceanos), and the chambers of Ogenos ; he spread this robe over an oak upborne by ■wings' (i-rroirTspos), that is, he clothed the framework of earth floating in space ^ with the varied surface of land and ocean.' Ophioneus, with ' His words in Clemens, Strom. \i. 621 A, run thus : Z4s iroici (papos fiiya re Kai Ka\6v koL iv ouTip iroi(£iAX« 75)1' Kal iyTjvbi' koX Tct, aryrivov BeSjLtaTO. In reference to this, Clemens (642 A) says : v iirSirrfpos Spvs koL rb eir' ourp n€irotKi\fjLevov tpapos. ' The -wings in this case denote only free suspension, not swift motion. ' Conrad opposes the ahove explanation on two accounts. First he agrees (p. iO) with Sturz (p. 51), that the winged oak is not merely the framework of the earth, but of the whole universe, and that the woof spread over the oak is the sky. Against this, I can only repeat what I have already, in the second edition of this work, replied to Stxirz, that the tissue on which land and sea are embroidered (this alone can be meant by the words iv avT^ TToiKiWei ; and Clemens also calls the os and XBovla as the three first principles of Pherecydes {Be prmo. c. 124, p. 384). Again, when Pherecydes, according to Damascius, says that fire, air' and water were made by Chronos 4k tov y6voti laurov, how can it be maintained that Zeus separated them out of XB ov Tobs irpiirovs, otov viKra, k.t.\., aWii rhv A(o, and did not therefore regard the world-ruling power or Zeus ■ as the Trparov. Pherecydes must himself have so regarded him. This, as Conrad rightly observes, also excludes the theory that Zeus first became lord of heaven and king of the gods by the overthrow of Cronos. COSMOLOGY. PHERECYDES. 95 essential result to be gathered from scattered fragments and traditions respecting the doctrine of Pherecydes. If we compare it with the Hesiodic cosmogony, it undoubtedly evinces progress of_ thought. We find, even thus early, a definite attempt to discriminate, on the one hand, between the material constituents of the universe — the earth, and the atmospheric elements ; and, on the other, between matter and plastic force. In what is said of the conflict of Chronos with Ophi- oneus, we seem to discern the thought that in the attainment of the present cosmical order the forces of the abyss were limited by the influence of the higher elements.' But the expression of all this is mythical, and in accordance with the older cosmological mytho- logy. The world is not formed by the natural operation of original matter and forces ; it is wrought by Zeus with the mysterious power of a god ; the reduction of phenomena to natural causes, which is the first real commencement of Philosophy, is not here to be found. It would therefore be of little importance to the history of Philosophy to know that Pherecydes took certain details of his theory, such as the personality of Ophioneus, from Phoenician or Egyptian mytho- logy; but whether important or not, the statement cannot be adequately proved by the testimony of so untrustworthy a writer as Philo of Byblus ; ^ and the distinction between the destroying serpent god of Pherecydes and the serpent-shaped Agathodsemon is so ' The serpent is a chthonio he. cit., and Allg, Enayolo. p. 244. animal, probably signifying Ophi- ^ In Euseb. loo. cit. oneus. Vide Preller, Bhein. Mm. 96 INTR OB UCTION. apparent, that we might as well identify the former with the serpent form of Ahriman, or even, like Origen (loc. cit.), with the serpent of the Mosaic paradise, if so obvious, and among the Grreeks so common, a symbol required a foreign derivation to account for it. The impossibility of referring the whole cosmogony of Phe- recydes, in its essential features,' to the Egyptians, will at once appear on an intelligent comparison of his pre- sentations with the Egyptian myths.^ The assertions of certain later and untrustworthy writers' as to his Oriental teachers are of little importance as evidence.'' If our knowledge is itaperfect in regard to Phere- cydes, it is still more so in respect, to some others, who contemporaneously, or nearly contemporaneously, with him set up various cosmological theories. Of Epimen- ides, the well-known hierophant of Solon's time,^ we ' Zimmermann, loc. cit. next, it was easy and obvious to ' Another doctrine attributed connect the teacher of Pythagoras to Pberecydes, and wliich equally (who was known to have held the jnnst have come from the East, Egyptian doctrine of Transmigra- the dogma of Transmigration, has tion), as well as Pythagoras him- already been discussed, p. 68 sq. self, with the Egyptians. The " Josephus, Contr. Apion. 1, 2, Chaldeeans, in what concerns Phe- end, rectons him as belonging to recydes, were perhaps first added . theEgyptian and Chaldsean schools, by Josephus; while the statement Cedren., Synops. i. 94 B, represents of Suidas probably originates with him as travelling into Egypt. Suidas Philo of Byblus. (*Eji)6K.) says he used the secret ' On the personality of Epi- writings of the Phoenicians ; the menides, his activity in Athens, and Grnosticlsidorus in ClemenSjjSiiroOT. the stories that connected them- yi. 642 A, represents him as in- selves with him, cf. Diog. i. 109 spired by the prophecy of Cham ; sqq. ; Suidas, 'EiriMeWSjjs ; Plu- by which, however, is probably in- tarch's iSolon, 12 ; S. Sap. Conv. 14; tended, not the Egyptian and Phoe- An, seni s. ger. resp. i. 1 2, p. 784 ; Def. nician wisdom as a whole, but a orac. i. l,p. 409; Be fac. Inn. 24, Gnostic work bearing that title. 25, p. 940 ; Plato, Laws, i. 64? D * We are, in the first ptace, (and also my treatise on the y.na- entirely ignorant on what tradition chronisms of Plato, AbhavcUungeK these statements are based ; and ' der BerliniscJien Akademie, 1873. EPIMENIDES. 97 are told by Damascius that,' according to Eudemus, he admitted two first causes, — the Air and Night ; ' and proceeding from these a third, Tartarus. From them sprang two other beings, not precisely designated, whose union produced the egg of the universe ; a denotation of the celestial sphere which is found in several cos- mogonies, and which very naturally resulted from the representation of the world's origin as analogous to the development of animal life. Whether this notion was transplanted from Western Asia to Greece, whether it was arrived at independently by Grr(3ek mythology, or whether, lastly, it had been preserved in a,ncient tra- dition from the earliest sources of the Grreek race, — are questions we must leave unanswered. From this egg other existences were produced. The thought contained in this cosmogony, as far as our meagre information enables us to criticise it, is unimportant, whether we consider Epimenides himself to have made the altera- tion in the Hesiodic representation, or, in doing so, to have followed the example of some more ancient predecessor. The same holds good of Acusilaos,^ who was much more closely allied to Hesiod, for he repre- sents Chaos as bringing forth a male and a female being — Erebus and Night; ^thes, Eros,^ Metis, and History of Philosophy, p. 95 sq.) ciple. What Damascius quotes from him 'Ap. Damascius (foe. eii.) again is taken from his own theogony, according to Eudemus ; Brandis, Diog. i. 111. p. 86, also rightly refers to Plato, ' VePrinc. c. 124, p. 384, Kopp. Symposium, 178 C, Sehol. Theocrit. 2 These two principles evidently argum. lA. -xm. C\e,m. Al. Strom. represent, after the manner of the Ti. 629 A. Josephus contra Apio- Hesiodic Theogony, a sexual nem, i. 3. syzygy : the Air, d i.i\p, is the male ' Schol. Theocrit. classes him principle ; Night, the female prin- as the son of Night and jEther. VOL. I. H INTRODUCTION. a number of divinities being the result of their union. There are some other traces of cosmogonic tradition ;^ but we pass them over, in order to proceed at once to the consideration of the Orphic cosmogonies.* Four versions of such cosmologies are known to us under the name of Orpheus. In one of these, the version used by Eudemus ' the Peripatetic, and most probably before his time by Aristotle^ and Plato,' ' Alluded to by Brandis. loo. cit., p. 86. It is said that Ibycus, Fr. 28 (10), like Hesiod, made Eros spring from Chaos ; and that the comic poet Antiphanes, ap. Ire- nseus {adv. Hmr. ii. 14, 1), differed on some points from Hesiod. ^ For what follows, cf. Schuster, Se vet. Orphioce Theogonice indole. Leipzig, 1869. ""Damaseius, c. 124, p. 382. That by this Eudemus is intended the pupil of Aristotle, is plain ftom Diogenes, Proaem. 9. Cf. Damas- cius, p. 384. * Metaph. xii. 6, 1071 b, 26 : &s \lyovffiv 01 OeoK6yoi ol 4k vvtcrhs yevvavTes. 75td. xiv. 4, 1091 b, 4: 01 S^ iroiriTal oi i,pxau>i tairr) d/iolas, rf $ao'l\€(ieiv KaX SpX«l' (jjatrlv oh Tobs irpt^TOVs, oToy vivTa Kal oiipavhy 9l x*^^ ^ wK^ai^bj/, aWa rhv Aia. These words cannot refer simply to systems in which Night, though placed among the oldest deities, occupies only a third or fourth place (as is the case in the Hesiodic and ordinary Orphic theogony). They presuppose a cosmology in which either Night alone, or Night in conjunction with other equally original principles, has the first place ; for Metaph. xii. 6 treats of the primitive state which preceded all Becoming ; and in reference to this, Aristotle says it is equally im- possible for the theologians, who make all things arise out of Night, and for the physicists, who com- mence with the mixture of all things, to explain the beginning of motion. Also the second passage agrees so little with the ordinary Orphic cosmology, that Syrianus, commenting on it (Schol. in Arts. 935 a, 18), finds fault with Aris- totle for misrepresenting the Or- phic doctrine. This passage must equally pointto a theogony like that spoken of by Eudemus ; for here Night is made the first principle ; as with Hesiod, Chaos, and with Homer, Oceanus ; the sky it cer- tainly is not in either of the repre- sentations known to us ; but in the Eudemie Orpheus, the sky occupies the second place, and in Hesiod the third. As the Endemic Orpheus alone, as far as we know, with the exception of Epimenides, puts Night in the place of Chaos as the first of all things, it is very probable that Aristotle, as Well as his scholar Eudemus, may be referring to him. ' Schuster {loo. cit. 4 sqq.) thinks this is probable from Crat. 402 B, and Tim. 40 D sq. (where by the poets who afBrm themselves to be the sons of the gods are meant Orpheus and Musseus ; these are mentioned by name, Rep. 364 B, while nothing of the kind is said ORPHIC ■ COSMOGONIES. 99 Night is represented as the first of all things. Beside Night are placed the Earth and the sky,' both of which apparently proceeded from Night, as with Hesiod the Earth came forth from Chaos ; Night being here sub- stituted for Chaos.^ The children of Uranus and Grsea are Oceanus and Thetis ;' obviously a very slight departure from the Hesiodic tradition. A second theogony (perhaps an imitation, or possibly the foun- dation of Pherecydes' story of the battle of the gods) seems to be alluded to by Apollonius,* for he represents his Orpheus as singing how at first earth and sky and water separated themselves out of the commingling of all things, how sun and moon and stars began their courses, and mountains, rivers and animals came into being ; how Ophion and Eurynome, daughter of Oceanus, ruled in Olympus, how they were afterwards hurled into of Hesiod). It is no argument yej/effOai ruv cra/juiTav), Cliaos. He against it (as Schuster shows), that begins with those gods who, as in the verses quoted by Cratylus, parents, open the series of gods the marriage of Oceanus and The- springing from sexual union;, what tys is described as the first mar- was prior to the earth and the riage, whereas they themselves are heavens he does not enquire, the children of Uranus and Gsea ; ' Eudemus, loc. cit. ; Joannes and because the 71im««s begins the Lydus, i)e mensibus, ii. 7, p. 19, sketch of the Theogony with the Sckow. His words, -rpets TrpSroi kot' words, Tiis re kclI Ovpavov iraTSes 'Opipea i^e^XdffTTifraif apya}, vh^ Kol 'nK(ai>6i re Kai T>j8{is eyeviaBjiv, it 7? Kol obpavis, are rightly applied does not follow that Plato denies to this Endemic ' Theology of Or- Nighttobe thefirstprinciple. If the pheus ' by Lobeck, i. 494. passagerelatedtotheHesiodicTheo- " In favour of this theory, vide gony (which does not, like Plato, Arist. Metaph. xii. 6 (supra, 98, 4), make Cronos and Ehea children of and especially Damascius, p. 382 : Oceanus and Thetys), Chaos and ti Sh iiapk t^ IlepnraTrjTiK^ EuS^/ui^ Night would still have been passed avay^ypap-^ht) &is tov 'Optpius oZffa over ; but Plato could as well BeoXoyia Tvati rh votyrhv ifn&irrja'ev leave out Night in this passage as ... airh Se rrjs vuKrhs itrof{jaaTO Aristotle, Metaph. xiv. 4, the earth ; t^c axp^v. and Metaph.i. 8, 989 a, 10 (<(>i)o-i ' AccordingtoPlato;cf.p.98,5. Be KOI 'HfffoSos -r^v yiiv irpdyniv * Argonaut, i. 494 sqq. H 2 ,100 INTRODUCTION. the ocean by Cronos and Ehea, and tliese in their turn were overthrown by Zeus. Traces of this theogony are also to be met with elsewhere ;' but philosophic concep- tions are as little to be detected in it as in the poems of Hesiod. A third Orphic cosmogony^ places at the beginning of cosmical development water and primi- tive slime, which latter solidifies and forms the earth. From these two a dragon arises, winged, and with the face of a god : on one side he has the head of a lion, and on the other that of a bull. He is called by the mythologists, Heracles and Chronos, the never-aging one ; with him is united Necessity, or Adrastea (accord- ing to Damascius, in a hermaphrodite form), who is said to be spread abroad incorporeally throughout the universe to its remotest ends. Chronos-Heracles pro- duces a gigantic egg.^ which, dividing in the midst, forms with its upper half the sky, and with its lower, the earth. There seems to have been further mention* of a ' Cf. what is cited by Preller, aside Ophion and EuTjuome. Bhem. Mus. N. F. iy. 38£ sq., from " Ap. Damascius, 381. Atlie- Lycophr. Alex. v. 1192; and Tzet- nag. Supplic. c. 15 (18). zes, in h. 1., Schol. Aristoph. Nuh. ' According to Brandis, i. 67, 247 ; Schol. Mschyl. Prom. 966 ; Ohronos first tegot JEther, Chaos Lueian, Tragodopod. 99. Though and Erebus, and afterwards the Orpheus is not named in these pas- egg of the world ; Lobeck's view of sages, we find in them, as in the , the passage {Aghopk. i. 485 sq.), Orpheus of ApoUonius, thatOphion, however, seems to me undoubtedly Chronos and Zeus are regarded as correct; according to this view, the three kings of the gods, of what is said of the begetting of whom the two first were overthrown .Sther &c. is referred, not to the by their successor. Perhaps the cosmogony of Hellanicus, but to statement of Nigidius Figulus re- the usual Orphietheogony in whidh lates to the same theogony (Serv. it is really to be found. ad Eel. iv. 10), namely, that ac- ' The confused representation cording to Orpheus, Saturn and of Damascius leaves it somewhat Jupiter were the first rulers of the uncertain whether these features world ; the tradition which he fol- really belong to this theogony. lows, however, seeias to have set ORPHIC COSMOGONIES. 101 god who had golden wings on his shoulders, bulls' heads on his haunches, and a huge snake appearing among various animal forms on his head ; this god, described, by Damascius as incorporeal, is called Protogonos or Zeus, and also Pan, as bringing order into all things. Here not only is the symbolism far more complicated than with Eudemu^, but the thoughts, too, are in advance of the cosmogonies we have been considering. Behind Chronos and Adrastea are the abstract notions of time and necessity ; the incorporeality of Adrastea and Zeus presupposes a' discrimination of corporeal and spiritual which was unknown even to Philosophy until the appearance of Anaxagoras ; the spreading out of Adrastea through the universe reminds us of the Platonic doctrine of the World- soul ; and in the con- ception of Zeus as Pan we recognise a pantheism, the germ of which lay, indeed, from the beginning in the naturalistic religion of the Greeks, but , which cannot be proved by authentic evidence to have actually existed before the period when the individuality of the various gods had been destroyed by religious syn- cretism, and when Stoicism had done much to spread abroad the pantheistic theory of the universe ; for none of the older systems, however pantheistic in tendency, had so great or so general an influence. The pantheistic element comes out still more clearly in the story of the birth and swallowing of Phanes ' (infra, pp. 104, 106). ' That this trait was present in mentioning Phanes from any other the Orphic theogony of Hellanicns exposition than that from which is clear from Athenag. c. 16 (20), he had previously made quotations for it is most improbable that he exactly corresponding with the should havetakeu the Orphic verses Hellanicus theogony of Damascius. 102 INTRODUCTION. If, therefore, this cosmogony, as is usually supposed,' was known to Hellanicus of Leshos in the middle of the fifth century, we must assign many ideas which ap- peared only in the later Greek Philosophy to an earlier period. Lobeck, however (loc.cit.), and Miiller ^ rightly question whether such could have been the case. Damascius himself hints at the doubtful source of the account he follows;^ its content bears pretty evident internal traces of an after date, and as we certainly know that spurious writings of a very late period were circulated * under the name of the Lesbian logographer, Cf. Schuster, p. 32, whose other conjectures, however, p. 83, do not commend themselves to me. ' Which Brandis accepts, loc. cit. p. 66. ^ Frogmenta hist. Grtsc. i. xxx. ' His words, loc. cit., are : Toiaurr; fiep ^ awiiQiis ^Optptnij 6so\oyia. t] de Karb^ rhv 'lep^vvfiov (pepofi^vTt icaX 'EWdvtKov, ^irep jct^ Kai 6 avr6s iaiiv, oSrais ex^i. They appear to me to convey that the work of which they are treating was attri- buted to Hieronymus as well as to Hellanicus, and that Damascius himself, or his authority, was of opinion that under these two names one and the same author was con- cealed.; who in ithat case naturally could not have been the ancient logographer of Lesbos. * Vide Miiller, loc. cit. Schu- ster, in his excursus on the theo- gony of Hellanicus, loc. cit. pp. 80- 100, conjectxires with Lobeck that its author was Hellanicus, other- wise unknown to us, tlie father of the philosopher Sandon (Suidas, 'Xipiiuv), whose son (the Stoic Athenodorns of Tarsus) was the instructor of Augustus, and whom Schuster calls, I know not why, ApoUodoras. This conjecture has in its favour that Sandon, according to Suidaii, wrote imoSiafis fls 'OpoivtKiKii, but who cannot possibly (as Muller, loo. oit., be- lieves) be the same person as the Peripatetic of Bhodes. It seems a probable conjecture (Muller, ii. 450) that he was the person who, according to Damascius, had trans- mitted this Orphic theogony ; and the idea gains considerable support from the observation (Schuster, loo. cit. 90 sqq.) that this theogony in its commencement, just where it differs from the ordinary Orphic theogony, coincides with the Phoe- nician cosmogonies. This Hierony- mus may have affixed the name of Hellanicus to the kiyinmaKh, at the same time that he published the Phcenician history under his own name, and may have expressed him- self in both works to the same effect concerning the Orphic theo- gony. That he composed such a theogony is, as we have said, un- likely. He seems rather to have confined himself to developing what he took from the common theogony by borrowing the notion of water and primitive slime from the Phoenician cosmology. His exposition must have been used by Athenagoras as well as by Damas- cius, for a Neo-Platonist can hardly be suspected of dependence on the 104 INTRODUCTION. Lobeck considers that we have a more ancient Orphic cosmogony in that designated by Damascius (c. 123, p. 380) as the usual Orphic theogony, or the one contained in the rhapsodies, and of which many fragments and notices^ have been preserved. Here Chronos is represented as the first of ail existences. He brings forth ^ther and the dark immeasurable abyss, or Chaos : from these he then forms a silver egg, out of which, illuminating all things, proceeds Phanes, the first-bom god, called also Metis, Eros, and Ericapseus ; * he contains within himself the germs of all gods, and for this reason, as it would appear, is described as her- maphrodite, and endowed with various animals' heads, and other attributes of the kind. Phanes alone begets Echidna, or Night, and, in marriage with her, Uranus and Grsea, the progenitors of the intermediate races of gods, whose history and genealogy are essentially the same as with Hesiod. When Zeus attains sovereignty he devours Phanes, and consequently is himself (as in our previous quotation from Orpheijs') the ideal sum {iTibegriff) of all things. After having thus united all . Christian apologist (Schuster, p. jority of commentators, I consider 81); and besides, the exposition of an Eastern origin probable, though Damascius goes farther than that I must leave it an open question of Athenagoras ; what is said in whether Delitzsch (cf. Schuster, the former of Hellanieus and Hie- loc. cit.) has most reason for refer- ronymus is wanting in the latter. ring it to the Cabbalistic designa- ' Cf. Lobeck, ho. dt. 405 sqq. tion of the first of the ten Sephi- ^ There have been many conjee- roth, pSJS '^<^S (long-visaged), tures as to the signification of this ^^ Schelling (ff<,«i v. Samothr. W. (Jena, 1862), who derives it from preferring the Old Testament tap and KdTros or Kiitvs (breath), t,,-..,, _.r„ /i or ■ \ vmtorumvemaUtmafflatu^; Schus- °-®^ J^^ (long-suffenng). ter, loc. cit. 97 sq. With the ma- ^^- ""K". P- "4 sq. ORPHIC COSMOGONIES. 105 things in himself, he again puts them forth, producing the gods of the last generation, and forming the world. Among the stories of the younger gods (for the rest of which I must refer the reader to Lobeck), the most striking is that of Dionysus Zagreus, son of Zeus and Persephone, who, rent in pieces by the Titans, comes to life again in the second Dionysus, after Zeus has swallowed his heart, which was still entire. The theory that this whole theogony dates from the period of Onomacritus and the Pisistratidse, since the time of Lobeck ^ has found much favour, but I am unable to support it. The utterances of ancient authors which are supposed to contain allusions to such a theogony, do not carry us beyond the theogony which Eudemus made use of. Its existence is first distinctly, attested in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise on the world,^ subsequently therefore to the Christian era, or at any rate not long before it;* for, as we have seen (supra, p. 65 sq.), the passage from the Platonic Laws (iv. 715 E) proves nothing, and still less can be de- duced from the Aristotelian citation,'' on which Brandis* relies so much. Since Plato in the ' Symposium ' (178 B) does not mention Orpheus among those who assert the antiquity of Eros, we may rather indeed suppose that ' Lobeck, however, advances it is rather earlier. Varro in Au- (p. 611) very cautiously, ut statim gustiue's Oivit. Dei, vii. 9, gives us cessurus, si quis Theogoniam Orphi- two verses of his, which seem to earn Platone aut recentiorem out refer to the Orphic theogony, and certe non invito antiquiorem esse perhaps to the particular passage demcmstraverit. quoted from irepi ndcr/itau. Yet he ^ C. 7 ; according to Lobeck (i. was only a later contemporary of 522 and else-where) we must sup- Cicero, pose this to he an interpolation. ' Metapk. xiv.4; cf. supra, p. 98,4, ' The date of Valerius Soranus ' Loo. eit. p. 69. 106 INTR OB UCTION. the doctrine of this theogony, in regard to Eros- Phanes, was unknown to him ; and since Aristotle's in- dications, as above noted, only correspond with the theogony used by Eudemus, we cannot refer them to any other. If, however, Plato, Aristotle, and Eudemus did not possess that representation of the Orphic doc- trines, which was at a later period in ordinary use, we must conclude with Zoega^ and Preller,^ that it was not in circulation until after their time. I agree like- wise with Zoega that so learned a mythographer as Apollonius^ would scarcely have made Orpheus sing of Ophion and Eurynome as the first rulers of the world, and Cronos and Rhea as the second, if the Orphic tra- dition then current had recognised Phanes and the elder gods. Even subsequently to this there are still traces to show that Phanes, the illuminating one, the centre of the subsequent Orphic cosmogony, was only another name for Helios, who, according to the later representa- tion, was a much younger god.* Lastly, if we consider the story of Phanes, with the description of Zeus that is involved "in it, with reference to its internal character and purpose, we shall find that it is impossible to assign ' ^MaraiiJin^'eM, edited by Wei- Mus. c. 47, p. 164, Bull, from the cker, p. 215 eqq. Orphic^ ipKoi: T]i\i6v re, (pdvriTa ' In Pauiys Real-Encyl. t. 999. iii-yav, koI viKra jiiKaivav — ^avTira ' CI. supra, p. 99. fi4yav, standing here, as the want * Diodoru8,i. 11 : many ancient of a connecting particle shows, in poets call Osiris, or the sun, Diony- apposition to ^e'Xioy : Helios the BUS : Si/ ESfLoXTos /iiv . . . currpo- great illuminator. lambliehus, ^avij Ai6vuaov . . . 'Opipehs Si- Theol. Arith. p.' 60 : the Pythago- Tofoe/ca fuv Ka\eov(ri ^iviiTd re nal reans call the number ten (pdnnrcl Ai6vu(Tuv. Maorob. i. 18: Orpheus koI ijXioK. Helios is often named solemvolensintelliqi ait inter cetera: *o6'6toi<; e.g. Iliad, xi. 735. Od. I . . i>v S^ vvv KaKioviTi iitnp-i t€ v. 479 ; in the epitaph in Biog. viii. KKi ^idnvaoii. Theo. Smyrn. Be 76, and elsewhere. « ORPHIC COSMOGONIES. 107 this story to a very early period. Not only do we clearly discover in it that pantheism of which we have already spoken,' but the story can only be accounted for by a desire to reconcile the later interpretation, according to which Zeus is the ideal sum of all things, and the unity of the world, with the naythoJogical tradition which represents him as the progenitor of the last generation of gods. To this end the Hesiodic myth of the swal- lowing of Metis by Zeus . (in its origin most likely a rude symbolical expression for the intelligent nature of the god) is introduced. Metis being combined with the Helios-Dionysus of the earlier Orphic theology, with the creative Eros of the cosmogonies, and also perhaps with Oriental divinities, to form the personality of Phanes. Such an attempt, it is clear, could not have been made until the period of that religious and philosophic syncretism, which from the third century before Christ gradually gained ground, and was first reduced to a system by the allegorical interpretation of myths among the Stoics.^ To that period therefore we ' Tide mpra, p. 64 sq. tury. In this, however, as it ' Schuster is of a different seems to me, the peculiar character opinion, though he agrees with me of the Orphic fragments has not in placing the rhapsodic theogony been sufficiently attended to. Pan- not earlier than the last century, theistio conceptions are certainly or last but one, before Christ. The found in the poets of the filth cen- verses, he sajs (p. 42 sq.), iirhich tury, and even earlier ; but it is are quoted in the writing irepl one thing to say generally, ' Zeus ic(j.\ai' yeviii ToiljSf Kol wrong to call the gods the authors afSpav. II. xxiv. 625 : The fate of evil, which he himself has of mortals is to live among sighs ; brought down upon himself by his Zeus decrees prosperity or adver- faults. HOMER AND SESIOB. 113 crime, on the contrary, will be punished by the gods.' He recommends frugality, diligence and contentment, and warmly rebukes the opposite faults ; ' he says it is better to keep the toilsome path of virtue than to follow the more attractive road of vice ; ^ he counsels prudence in business, friendliness to neighbours, courtesy to all who are courteous to us/ He complains of the troubles of life, the cause of which he seeks, like the mythologists, in wrong done to the gods by the pride and presumption of men/ In the account of the five ages of the - world,* he describes (it may be under the influence of historical reminiscences ^ ) the gradual de- terioration of man and his circumstances. Though in this Hesiod departs considerably, in many respects, from the spirit of the Homeric poems, yet the stage attained by moral reflection is in both cases essentially the- same. But in Hesiod it assumes a more independent attitude, for which reason only we recog;nise in him, rather than in Homer, the precursor of the Gnomic poets. We should be better able to trace the farther de- velopment of this reflection if more remained to us of ' 'Ep7o Kol ri/iepai, 200-283, contented with his originally happy 318 Bqq. and childlike state, stretched forth ' Ibid. 359 eqq. 11 sqq. 296 his hand towards good things sqq. which God had forbidden him.' ' lUd. 285 sqq. « "Epya ical Ti/iepai, 108 sqq. * Ibid. 368 sqq. 704 sqq. 340 ' Of. Preller, Demeter und Per- sqq. sephone, 222 sqq. ; Griech. Mythol. ' In the myth of Prometheus i. 59 sq. ; Hermann, Ges. Abh. p. ^Zfya (to! fifiepai, 42 sqq.; Theo- 306 sqq. and others. We must gnis, 507 sqq.). of which the general not, however, be too minute in our significance is the same as other conjectures concerning the histo- mythical explanations of the evils rical circumstances on which this by which we feel ourselves op- mythus is founded, pressed; namely, that man, dis- TOL. I. I 114 INTRODUCTION. the numerous poems written in the next three centu- ries. Very few of such fragments as we possess carry tis 'beyond the beginning of the seventh century, and these "Contain scarcely anything relevant to our present enquiry. Even from the fragments of the seventh century we can glean but very little. "We may listen, indeed, to Tyrtseus,' exalting courage in battle, and death for one's country ; or describing the disgrace of the coward and the unhappiness of the conquered ; we get from Archilochus^ (Fr. 8, 12-14, 51, 60, 65), from Simonides of Amorgos ^ (Fr. 1 sqq.), from Mimnermus ^ (Fr. 2 et paseim), complaints of the transitoriness of youth, the burdens of old age, the uncertainty of the future, the fickleness of men ; and, at the same time, exhortations to limit our desires, to bear our fate man- fully, to commit the results of our actions to the gods, to be moderate both in sorrow and in joy. We find in Sappho ' gnomic sentences, such as these : ' The beau- tiful is also good, the good is also beautiful ' (Fr. 102); ' Wealth without virtue does not profit, but in their union lies the acme of happiness,' Nor must we omit to mention in this connection Simonides' elaborate satire on women (Fr. 6). On the whole, however, the older lyricists, as also the great poets in the end of the seyenth century, Alcseus and Sappho, and long after thetn Anacreon, seem to have dealt but sparingly in such general reflections. It was not until the sixth century, contemporaneously, or nearly so, with the rise ' Fr. 7-9 in Bergk's edition of « About 700 b.o. Greek lyrics, to which the follow- " Before 650 B.c. ing quotations relate. Tyrtseus * About 600 B.C. lived about 685 B.c. ' ' About 610 b.o. GNOMIC POETS. SIXTH CENTURY. 115 of Greek' Philosophy, that the didactic element in poetry appears to have again attained greater import- ance. To that period belong the G-nomie poets —Solon, PhocyUdes, and Theognis ; their sayings, however, even irrespective of what we know to be interpolated, are mostly of doubtful authenticity. During the first half of the sixth century ^sop also lived, whose legendary form seems at any rate to prove that instructive fables about animals, in connection with the general growth of moral reflection, had then become greatly developed and popularised. In all these writers we find, as compared with the older poets, an advance clearly indicating that thought had ripened by the acquisition of more varied experience, and by the study of more complex situations. The Gnomic poets of the sixth century had before their eyes an agitated political existence, in which the manifold inclinations and pas- sions of men found ample scope, but in which also the vanity and evil of immoderate aims and inljemperate conduct had been demonstrated on a grand scale. •Their reflections, therefore, are no longer concerned merely with the simple afl"airs of the household, the village, or the ancient monarchy ; the condition of man as to his political circumstances is the prominent and determining element even in their general moral pre- scripts and observations. They heap up lamentations over the misery of life, the illusions and instability of men, and the vanity of all human endeavours ; but it is only to assert the more forcibly that the moral problem consists in seeking man's' greatest happiness in the maintenance of just measure, in the order of I 3 116 INTRODUCTION. the commonwealth, in the impartial distribution of justice, in the reasonable repression of his desires. This tone is already predominant in the elegies ascribed to Solon. No mortal, we are there told, is happy, all are full of trouble' (Fr. 14); each thinks to find the right, and yet no one knows what will be the result of his doings, and no one can escape his destiny (Fr. 12, 33 sqq., Fr. 18);^ hardly any can be trusted (cf. Fr. 41), none keeps measure in his efforts; the people by its own injustice destroys the city, which the gods would have protected (Fr. 3, 12, 71 sqq.). As opposed to these evils, the first necessity is law and order for the state, contentment and moderation for the individual ; not wealth, but virtue, is the highest good ; superfluity of possessions begets only self-exaltation ; man can be happy with a moderate amount, and ought in no case to draw down upon himself the certain punishment of Grod by unrighteous gains.* The well-being of the state depends upon a similar disposition. Lawlessness and civil discord are the worst evils, order and law the greatest good for a commonwealth ; right and freedom, for all, obedience to the government, just distribution of honour and influence — these are the points which the legislator should keep in view, no matter what 4 offence he may give by it.' ' Fr. 14. ovie fidjeap oiSelj in B-esioA, Fi. iS, 5 ei passim. jreXcTot jSporbs, aWtfe iroviipol = In Herodotus, 1, 31, Solon irivres ; here 7roi/r|pbs, in opposition distinctly says that death is better to liiicap, is not to be understood for men than life, actively (jTiivof, causing evil), but » Fr. 7, 12, 15, 16, and the passively (irSvos, suffering evil, -vrell-known story of Herodotus, i. irlirovos), as in the well-kno-wn 30 sqq. verse of Epicharmus' (vide infra, * Fr. 3, 30 sqq. 4-7, 34, 35, 40. chapter on Pythagoreism, sub fin.) PHOOYLIBES. THEOONIS. 117 "We meet with the same principles in the few au- thentic fragments that remain to us of the writings of ■Phocylides (about 540 B.C.). Noble descent is of no avail to individuals, nor power and greatness to the state, unless in the one case wisdom is superadded, and in the other order (Fr. 4, 5). Mediocrity is best ; the middle rank is the happiest (Fr. 12) ; justice is the ideal sum of all virtues.' With these ideas Theognis ^ also substantially agrees; but in this writer we find sometimes his aristocratic view of politics, and some- times his dissatisfaction with his lot (a consequence ' of his own personal and political experiences), brought into undue prominence. Brave and trustworthy people are rare, Theognis thinks, in the world (v. 77 sqq. 857 sqq.). Mistrustful circumspection is the more to be recommended in our intercourse with our fellow men (v. 309, 1163), the harder it is "to fathom their sentiments (v. 119 sqq.). Truth, he complains (v. 1135 sqq.), and virtue, sincerity and the fear of God ; have deserted the earth ; hope alone remains. Vain is J. the attempt to instruct the wicked, instruction will not alter them.' Fate, however, is as unjust as mankind. The good and the bad fare alike in the world (v. 373 sqq.) ; good fortune does more for a man than virtue (v. 129, 653); foolish conduct often brings happiness, r and wise conduct, misery (v. 133, 161 sqq.); sons ' suffer for their fathers' crimes; the criminals them- ' Fr. 1 8, according to others, Plato remarks in the Meno, 95 D) of Theognis, or perhaps taken from it is not very consistent that The- Bome unknown writer. ognis should say in v. 27, 31 sqq. ^ A native of Megara, contem- et passim, that from the good we porary of Phocylides. learn good ; and from the evil, evil. ' V. 429 sqq., with which (as 118 IjSTRODUCTION. selves go unpunished (731 sqq.). Wealth is the only thing that men admire ; ' he who is poor, be he never so virtuous, remains wretched (137 sqq. 649). The best thing for man, therefore, is never to be born ; the next best to die as soon as possible (425 sqq. 1013) : no one is truly happy. But though this sounds very dis- consolate, Theognis ultimately arrives at the same prac- tical result as Solon ; not indeed in reference to politics, for he is a decided aristocrai>— the nobly born are with him the good ; the mass of the people, the bad (e g. V. 31-68, 183 sqq. 893 et passim). His general moral standpoint, however, approaches very nearly to that of Solon. Because happiness is uncertain, and because our lot does not depend upon ourselves, he tells us we have all the greater need of patience and com^age, of equability and self-possesfion in good fortune and in evil (441 sqq. SQl sqq. 657). What is best for man is prudence, what is worst is folly (895, 1171 sqq. 1157 sqq.) ; to guard against arrogance, not to overstep the right measure, to keep the golden mean, is the height of wisdom (151 sqq. 331, 335, 401, 753, 1103 et passivi). Here, a philosophic moral principle is of course still wanting, for these scattered rules of life are not as yet based upon general enquiries concerning the essence of moral activity, but the various influences and experiences are already beginning to unite, much more consciously and definitely than with the older poets, to form a uniform and connected theory of human life. 'V. 699 sqq. Cf., among tan, who by some authors is others, the Fragment of Alcaeus in reckoned one of the seven wise X)iog. i. 31, and the saying there men. quoted of Aristodemus the Spar- THE SEVEN SAGES. 119 Antiquity itself marked the importance of the epoch when ethical reflection began to be more decidedly developed, by the legend of the seven sages. Their names, as is well known, are variously given, ^ and such details as have come down to us respecting their lives ^ sound so improbable that we must regard them as fiction rather than history. The maxims, too, which are ascribed to them^ are intermingled to such an extent ' Only four are mentioned in all the enumerations : Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon. Besides i these, Plato (Proi. 343 A) names also Cleobulus, Myso and Chilo; \ instead of Myso, most writers (as 11 Demetrius Phalereus ap. Stobaeus, Moril. 3, 79 ; Pausanias, x. 24 ; Uiog. i. 13, 41 ; Plutarch, Conv. 8. Sap.) substitute Periander for Myso. Euphorus ap. Diog. i. 41, and the author mentioned anonymously in Stobseus, Floril. 48, 47, hare Anacharsis. Clemens, Strom, i. 299 B, says the accounts fluctuate between Periander, Ana- charsis and Epimenides; the last is mentioned by Leander, who has also Leophantus in place of Cleo- bulus (Diog. loc. cit.) ; Dicsearchus leaves the choice of the three doubtful sages to be decided be- tween Aristodemus, Pamphilus, Chilo, Cleobulus, Anacharsis, and Periander. Some include also Py- thagoras, Pherecydes, Acusilaus, and even Pisistratus, in the num- ber (Diog. and Clemens, loo. cit.). Hermippue ap. Diog. {loc. cit.) men- tions seventeen names among which the accounts are divided ; viz. Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilo, Myso, Cleobulus, Periander, Anacharsis, Acusilaus, Epimenides, Leophantus, Pherecydes, Aristode- mus, Pythagoras, Lasus of Her- mione, Anaxagoras ; if we add Pam- philus and Pisistratus, and the three named by Hippobotus (ap. Diog. loc. cit., together with nine others), Linus, Orpheus, and Epi- charmus, we get in all twenty-two persons of very various periods, who were counted among tlie seven wise men. ' For instance, the anecdote related in Diog. i. 27 sqq.. Phoenix in Athen. xi. 496, and elsewhere in different versions, of the tripod (or, as others say, the goblet, cup, or dish) which was fished up out of the sea, and intended for the wisest, was first given to Thales, passed on by him to another, and so on, until at last it returned to him again, and was dedicated by him to Apollo. Cf. the accounts of the meetings of the four sages in Plutarch; Solon, 4; Diog. i. 40 (where two descriptions of such meetings, probably analogous to those of Plutarch, are quoted from Ephorus and a certain Archetimus ; cf. also the statement of Plato {Vrotag. 343 A) about the inscrip- tions they dedicated together at the temple of Delphi ; the interpolated letters, ap. Diogenes, the assertion in Plut. De Ei. a. 3, p. 386, about Periander and Cleobulus. « Vide Diog. i. 30, 33 sqq. ; 88 sqq. 63, 69 sqq. 86 sq. 97 120 INTRODUCTION. with later ingredients, and with proverbial expressions of unknown origin, that very few can be traced with any certainty to either of these men.' They are all, however, of the same character, consisting of isolated observations, maxims of prudence, and moral sentences belonging entirely to the sphere of popular and practical wisdom.^ This quite accords with the circumstance that most of the seven sages were celebrated as states- men and lawgivers.^ We cannot' but agree, . there- forai with Dicsearchus * in regarding them as intelligent men, and capable legislators, but not as philosophers, or wise men in the sense of the Aristotelian School.* They only represent the practical culture which, about the end of the seventh century, received a new impulse in connection with the political circumstances of the •Greek nation. Though they cannot be reckoned philo-> sqq. 103 sqq. 108; Clemens, apophthegms. Strom, i. 300 A sq. ; the collections ' Solon and Thales were thus •of Demetrius Phalereus and Sosi- distinguished, as is well knoTrajPit^ ades ap. Stobseus; Floril. 3, 79 sq. ; tacus was Aesymnetes of Mytilene; Stobseus himself in different parts Periander, tyrant of Corinth ; Myso, ofthe same woi^k, and many others, according to Hipponax (Fr. 34 b, ' For example, the lyric frag- Diog. i. 107), had been declared by ments in Diog. i. 71, 78, 85; the Apollo the mosc blameless of men ; word of Pittacus, which Simonides the name of Bias w»s used prover- quotes in Plato, Prot. 339 C; that bially for a wise judge (Hipponax, ■of Cleobulus, also quoted by Si- Demodicus, and Heraeleitus ap. monides, ap. Diog. i. 90 ; that of Diog. i. 84, 88 ; Strabo, xiv. 12, p. Aristodemus, quoted by Alcseus, 636 Caa. ; Diodorus, Exo. de virtute Diog. i. 31. et vit. p. 552 Wess). Chilo is said " The remarkable statement of by Herod, (i. 59) to have inter- Sextus {Pyrrh. ii. 65, M X, 45) — preted a miraculous portent, which would presuppose physical ' Diog. i. 40. Similarly Plu- enquiries in others of the wise men tarch, Solon, c. 3 s««J fin. The as- besides Thales; yiz. that Bias sertion to the contrary in the maintained the reality of motion — Greater Hippias, 28 1 c, ascribed to stands quite alone, and is probably Plato, is manifestly incorrect, only an idle and ingenious de- * Cf. Arist. Metaph, i. 1, 2; duction from one of his poems or Elh. N. vi. 7. THE SEVJBN SAGES. 121 sophers, in the stricter meaning of the term, they stand on the threshold of Philosophy, a relation which tradition has strikingly expressed by distinguishing as the wisest of the seven, to whom the mythic tripod re- turns after completing its round, the founder of the first school of Natural Philosophy. In order to acquaint ourselves thoroughly with the soil from which Greek Philosophy sprang, we have still to consider how far the notions of the Grreeks about Grod and human nature, before the middKT of the sixth century, had been altered in the course of advancing culture. That some change had occurred we may take for granted, for in proportion as the mofal consciousness is purified and extended, the idea of Deity, from which is derived the moral law and the moral government of the universe, must also become purified and extended; and the more man realises his liberty and his superiority to other natural existences, the more will he be inclined to distinguish the spiritual element of his own nature in its essence, origin and future destiny from the corporeal element. The pro- gress of morals and of ethical reflection was therefore of great moment to theology and anthropology ; but their influence was more broadly apparent when Philo- sophy had attained to an independent development. The older poets, subsequent to Homer and Hesiod, in their notions of Deity, do not essentially transcend the standpoint of their predecessors 4 we can only discover, by slight indications, that a purer idea of Grod was gradually forming itself, and the presupposed plurality of gods more and more giving place to the 122 INTRODUCTION. conception of Zeus as the moral ruler of the universe. Under this aspect Archilochus celebrates him when he says (PV. 79) that he beholds the works of men, both the evil and the good, and even watches over the doings of animals ; and the more the poet is convinced that fate and fortune order all things, that the mind of man changes like the day which Zeus allots to him, that the gods raise those that are fallen, and east down those that stand (Fr. 14, 51, fi9) — the more earnest are his exhortations to commit all things to God. So also Terpander ' consecrates the introduction of a hymn (Fr. 4) to Zeus, as the beginning and director of all things; and the elder Simonides sings (Fr. l)that ZeuS has in his hand the end of all that exists, and orders it as he wills. But similar passages are to be found even in Homer ; and in this respect the difference between the two poets is, perhaps, only, one of degree. Solon more decidedly passes beyond the older anthropomorphic idea of God, when he (13, 17 sqq.) says, ' Zeus, indeed, watches over all things,, and nothing is hidden from him, but he is not aroused to anger by individual acts as mortals are ; when crime has accumulated, punish- ment breaks in like the tempest which sweeps the clouds from the sky, and so, sooner or later, retribution overtakes everyone.' Here the influence of moral re- flection reacting upon the notion of Deity cannot be mistaken.^ We see the same reflection in Theognis ' A later contemporary of 160, and other passages), but the Archilochus, about 680 B.C. express antithesis of Divine retri- 2 That the Divine retribution butive justice, and of human pas- is often long withheld is a thought sion, shows a purer conception of • which we continually meet with, Deity., even as early as Homer (7^. iv. ANTHROPOLOGY. 123 with a different result; for the thought of the gods' power and knowledge leads him to doubt their justice. ' The thoughts of men,' he says, 'are vain (v. 141, 402) ; the gods bring to pass all things as seemeth them good, and vain are all a man's efforts if the daemon has destined him to adversity. The gods know the mind and deeds of the just and of the unjust' (v. 887). This consideration is sometimes connected (as in v. 445, 591, 1029 sqq.) with exhortations to resignation, but in other places the poet irreverently accuses Zeus of ■treating good and evil alike, of loading sinners with wealth, of condemning the righteous to poverty, and of visiting the sins of fathers on their innocent children.' If we may suppose such reflections to have been at all frequent in those tirnes, we can, the more easily under- stand that some of the ancient philosophers should contemporaneously have opposed to the anthropomor- phic notions of polytheism an essentially different conception of God. This conception, indeed, could only have come from Philosophy ; unphilosophic reflec- tion did no more than prepare the way for it, without actually quitting the soil of the popular faith. The same may be said of anthropology. The history of this order of ideas is completely bound up with the theories about death and a future state. The dis- crimination of soul and body originates in the sensuous ' V. 373. h TouTp fi'Oipif till re SiKaioi' ^xciv ; ZeO ^fXe, 6ou/i{£f(W ffe' irit yap irdif' ©tc. Teaffiv ayiiffO'sis , . . avipdmav S" eS olaia viov koX evuhv similarly 731 sqq., where theques iKaiTTou . . . ti*"* is likewise asked : jrSs S^ creu, KopovlSri, toX^h? voos »«<' tout' ieapiruv |8o(n\e0, iruj fij-Spas i\tTpol/s ' ^fTl SiKawv k.t.K. 124 INTRODUCTION. man from his experience of their actual separation, from beholding the corpse out of which the animating breath has departed. Therefore the notion of the soul at first contains nothing but what may be immediately derived from that experience. The soul is represented as an essence of the nature of breath or air ; as cor- poreal (for it dwells in the body and quits it at death in the manner of something extended '), but without the completeness and power of the living man. In regard to the soul after its separation from the body and de- parture to the other world, we know from the Homeric representations what was thought on the subject ; ^ the substance of the man is his body ;^ the bodiless souls in Hades are like shadows and shapes of mist, or like forms which appear in dreams to the living, but cannot be grasped ; vital power, speech, and memory have deserted them ; * the sacrificial blood of offerings restores their speech and consciousness, but only for a little time. A few favoured ones, indeed, enjoy a happier fate ; ^ while ' The soul of a murdered per- and beneath the earth {Od. xi. son, for instance, escapes through 297 sqq.) ; Menelaus and Eliada- the -wound. Cf. 11. xvi. 505, 856 ; manthus, who, the one as the son- xxii. 362, and many other pas- in-law, the other as the son of Zeus, sages in Homer. were taken to Elysium instead of 2 Od.-s.. 490 sqq.; si. 34 sqq. dying. {Od. iv. 661 sqq.) The 3 51 sqq. 215 sqq. 386 sqq.; 466 strange statement that Hercules sqq. ; xxiT. 8ub init. ; 11. i. 3 ; was himself in Olympus, while xxiii. 69 sqq. his shadow remained in Hades ' The atnhs in opposition to ( Od. xi. 600) — a notion in which the ifux^j l^- i- *■ ' later allegorists have sought so * This is the usual description, many profound meanings — is to with which Od. xi. 540 sqq. 667 he explained simply from the fact sqq. is certainly at rarianee. that vv. 601-603 are an interpola- ' e.g. Tiresias, who by the tion of a later period, when the hero favour of Persephone retained his had been deified, and it was there- consciousness in Hades ; the Tyn- fore impossible to think of him as daridae, who alternately lived above any longer in Hades ANTHROPOLOGY. 125 the saying of Achilles that the life of the poorest la- hourer is better than dominion over shadows, applies to all the rest. But as this privilege is limited to solitary- cases, and is connected not with moral worth, but with some arbitrary favour of the gods, we can hardly seek in it the idea of future retribution. This idea comes out, it is true, more strongly in Homer, when he speaks of the punishments undergone by souls after death ; but here again only marked and exceptional offences against the gods * incur these extraordinary penalties, which, therefore, have rather the character of personal revenge ; and the future state generally, so far as any part of it, either for good or for evil, goes beyond an indistinct and shadowy existence, is determined far more by the favour or disfavour of the gods than by the merits of mankind. A more important conception of the future life might be found in the honours accorded to the dead, and the idea of universal moral retribution. From the former sprang the belief in daemons, which we first meet with in Hesiod.^ This origin of daemons is shown, not only by the hero-worship which afterwards sprang up, but by the passage in Hesiod ^ which says ' The Odyssey, xi. 575 sqq., re- poet rppresents (Fr. 34) Diomede, lates the punishment of Tityus, like the Homeric Menelaus, as be- Sisyphus and Tantalus ; and in //. coming immortal. Pindar, Nem. iii. 278, perjured persons are x. 7, says the same thing. Achilles threatened with punishment here- is placed by Plato in the Islands after. of the Blest {Symp. 179 E; cf. ' 'Epya Kol fin4pai, 120 sqq. Pindar, 01. ii. 143); Achilles and 139 sq. 250 sqq. ' Diomede likewise— vide the Soolion ' Loc. cit. 165 sqq. Cf. Ibycus of Callistratus on Harmodius Fr. 33 (Achilles we read married (Bergk Jjyr. gr. 1020, 10, from Medea in Elysium). The same Athen. xt. 695 B). 126 INTRODUCTION. that the great chiefs of the heroic times were taken after their death to the Islands of the Blest. The theory of opposite states, not merely for individuals, but for all the dead, is contained in the doctrine we lately considered of the mystic theologians, that in Hades the consecrated ones live with the gods, the unconsecrated are plimged in , night and a miry swamp. But this notion must have acquired a moral significance later on; at first, even when it was not so crudely appre- hended, it was still only a means of recommending the initiatory rites through the motives of hope and fear. Transmigration ' took its rise more directly from ethical considerations ; here it is precisely the thought of moral retribution which connects the present life of man with his previous and future life. It appears, however, that this doctrine in early times was confined to a somewhat narrow sphere, and becanie more widely difiused first through the Pythagoreans and then through Plato. Even the more general thought on which it is founded, the ethical conception of the other world as a state of universal retribution, seems to have been slow to receive recognition. Pindar, indeed, presupposes this concep- tion,'"' and in after writers, as in Plato,' it appears as an ancient. tradition already set aside by the enlightenment of their time. In the Lyric poets, on the other hand, we find, when they speak of the life beyond, that they still keep in all essential respects to the Homeric repre^ sentations. Not only does Anacreon recoil with horror from the terrible pit of Hades (Fr. 43), but Tyrtaeus ' Vide mpra, p. 67 sqq. ' Bep. i. 330 D, ii. 363 C. » Vide mpra, p. 70, note i. ANTHROPOLOGY. 127 top (9, 3) has no other immortality to set before the brave than that of posthimious fame ; Erinna (Fr. 1) says the glory of great deeds is silent with the dead ; and Theognis (567 sqq. 973 sqq.) encourages himself in the enjoyment of Ufe by the reflection that after death he will lie dimib, like a stone, and that in Hades there is an end of all life's pleasures. There is no evidence in any Greek poet before Pindar, of the hope of a future life. "We find then, as the result of our enquiry up to this point, that in Greece, the path of philosophic reflection had been in many ways cleared and prepared, before the advent of Thales and Pythagoras, but that it had never been actually attempted. In the religion, civil institutions, and moral conditions of the Greeks, there was abundant material, and varied stimulus for scien- tific thought : reflection already began to appropriate this material ; cosmogonic theories were propounded : human life was contemplated in its different aspects from the standpoint of religious faith, of morality, and of worldly prudence. Many rules of action were set up, and in all these ways the keen observation, open mind and clear judgment of the Hellenic race asserted and formed themselves. But there was as yet no at- tempt to reduce phenomena to their ultimate ground, or to explain them naturally from a uniform point of view from the same general causes. The formation of the world appears in the cosmogonic poems as a fortuitous event, subject to no law of nature ; and if ethical reflection pays more attention to the natural connection of causes and effects, on the other hand it 128 INTRODUCTION. confines itself far more than cosmology within the limits of the particular. Philosophy learned indeed much from these predecessors, in regard both to its form and matter ; but Philosophy did not itself exist until the moment when the question was propounded concerning the natural causes of things. CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 129 CHAPTEE III. ON THE CHARACTEK OF GREEK PHILOSOPHT. In seeking to determine the common characteristic which distinguishes a long series of historical pheno- mena from other series, we are at once encountered by this difficulty: — that in the course of the historical development aU particular traits alter, and that conse- quently it appears impossible to find any single feature which shall belong to every member of the whole that we want to describe. Such is the case in regard to Greek Philosophy. Whether we fix our attention on the object, method or results of PhUosophj, the Grreek systems display such important dififerences among themselves, and such numerous points of contact with other systems, that, as it would seem, we cannot rest upon any one characteristic as satisfactory for our purpose. The object of Philosophy is in all ages the same — Eeality as a whole ; but this object may be ap- proached from various sides and treated with more or less comprehensiveness ; and the Greek philosophers differ in this respect so greatly among themselves, that we cannot say wherein consists their common difference from others. In like manner, the form and method of scientific procedure have so often altered both in Greek and other philosophies, that it seems hardly VOL. I. K 130 INTRODUCTION. possible to bbrrow any characteristic distinction from thence. I cannot, at any rate, agree with Fries ' in his assertion that ancient Philosophy proceeds epagogically, and niodem epistematically ; that the one advances from facts to abstractions, from the particular to the univer- sal, the other from the universal, from principles, to the particular. For among the ancient philosophers, we find the pre-Socratics employing almost exclusively a dogmatic, constructive method ; and the same may be said of the Stoics, Epicureans, and, more especially, of the Neo-Platonists. Even Plato and Aristotle so little confine themselves to mere induction that they make science, in the strict sense of the word, begin with the derivation of the conditioned from first principles. On the other hand, among the modems, the whole of the large and influential empirical school declares the epagogic method alone to be legitimate ; while most of the other schools unite induction with construction. This distinction, therefore, cannot be carried out. Nor can we assent to the observation of Schleiermach|,er,^ that the intimate relation persistently maintained between poetry and philosophy is characteristic of Hellenic, as compared with Indian Philosophy, where the two ele- ments are so blended as to be indistinguishable from each other, and with the Philosophy of northern nations, where they never entirely coincide ; and that as soon as the mythologic form loses itself, with Aristotle, the higher character of Greek science is likewise lost. The last assertion is indeed untrue, for it was Aristotle who conceived the problem of science most clearly and defi- ' Geschichte der Phil. i. 49 sqq. « Ibid, p. Ig. CHARACTER OF t GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 131 nitely ; and of the other philosophers, not a few were quite independent of the mythological tradition — for example, the Ionian physicists, the Eleatics, Atomists, and Sophists, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Epi- curus and his successors, the New Academy, and the Sceptics; others, with the freedom of a Plato, made use of mythology merely as an artistic ornament, or sought, like the Stoics and Plotinus, to support it by a philosophic interpretation, without allowing their philosophic system to be conditioned by it. On the ; other hand. Christian Philosophy was always depen- dent on positive religion. In the Middle Ages, this dependence was far greater than the dependence of Philosophy upon religion in Greece, and in modem times it has certainly been no less great. It may be urged that the Christian religion has a different origin and a different content ; bijt this is a secondary con- sideration in regard to the general attitude of Philoso- phy to Keligion. In both cases, unscientific notions are presupposed by thought without any previous demon- stration of their truth. But, in fact, no such decisive contrast in scientific procedure is anywhere discoverable as would justify us in ascribing one definite method, universally and exclusively, to Greek, and another to modem Philosophy. As little do the results on each side bear out such a distinction. We find among the Greeks, Hylozoistic and Atomistic systems, and these are also to be foimd among the moderns ; in Plato and Aristotle we see a dualistic idealism opposed to ma- terialism, and it is this view of the world which has become predominant in Christendom ; we see the sen- k2 132 INTHODUCTION. sualism of the Stoics and Epicureans reproduced in English and French empiricism ; and the scepticism of the New Academy in Hume; the pantheism of the Eleatics and Stoics may be compared with the doctrine of Spinoza; the Neo-Platonic spiritualism with Christian mysticism and Schelling's theory of identity ; in many respects also with the idealism of Leibnitz ;■ even in Kant and Jacobi, in Fichte and Hegel, many analogies with Greek doctrines can be shown ; and in the ethics of the Christian period there are few propositions which have not parallels in the sphere of Greek Philosophy, Supposing, however, that in all cases parallels were not forthcoming, still the features peculiar on the one hand to Greek, and on the other to modem Philosophy, could only be regarded as generally distinctive of each, if they existed in all the Greek systems, and were absent from all the modern. And. of how many characteristics could this be asserted ? Here again, therefore, we have failed to discover any true mark of distinction. Nevertheless, an unrij/istakable family likeness binds together the remotest branches of Greek science. But as the countenances of men and women, old people and children, often resemble one another, though their individual features are not alike, so is it with the spiritual affinity of phenomena that are connected his- torically. It is not this or that particular characteristic whicn is the same; the similaxity lies in the expression of the whole, in the formation of corresponding parts after the same model, and their combination in aji an£.- logous relation ; or if this is no longer the case, in our being able to connect the later phase with the earlier, CHARACTER OF GREEK P^HILOSOPHY. 133 as its natural consequence, according to the law of a continuous development. Thus the aspect of Greek Philosophy altered considerably in the lapse of years ; yet the features which subsequently showed themselves were already present in its earliest shape ; and however strange its appearance in the last centuries of its his- torical existence, closer observation will show that the original forms are even then discernible, although time- worn and decomposed. We must not, indeed, expect to find any particular quality' unaltered throughout its whole course, or equally present in each of the systems ; the general character of Grreek Philosophy will have been rightly determined if we succeed in indicating the pri- mitive type, in reference to which the different systemsy in their various declensions from it, are intelligible. If, for this purpose, we compare Grreek Philosophy with the corresponding productions of other nations, what first strikes us is its marked difference from the more ancient Oriental speculation. That speculation, the concern almost solely of the priests, had wholly developed itself from religion, on which its direction and content constantly depended ; it never, therefore, attained a strictly scientific form and method, but re- .mained partly in the shape of an external, grammatical, and logical schematism, partly in that of aphoristic pre- scripts and reflections, and partly in that of imaginative and poetical description. The Grreeks were the first who gained sufficient freedom of thought to seek for the liruth respecting the nature of things, not in religious tradition, but in the things themselves ; among them first a strictly scientific method, a knowledge that follows 134 INTR OB TiCTIOJit. no laws except its own, became possible. This formal character at once completely distinguishes Greek Philo- sophy from the systems and researches of the Orientals ; and it is scarcely necessary to speak of the material opposition presented by the two methods of conceiving the world. The Oriental, in regard to nature, is not free, and has consequently been able neither to explain phe- nomena logically from their natural causes, nor to attain liberty in civil life, nor purely human culture. The Greek, on the contrary, by virtue of his liberty, can per- ceive in nature a regular order, and in human life can strive to produce a morality at once free and beautiful. The same characteristics distinguish Greek Philo- sophy from that of the Christians and Mohammedans in the Middle Ages. Here, again, we find no free en- quiry : science is fettered by a double authority — by the theological authority of positive religion, and by the philosophical authority of ancient authors who had been the instructors of the Arabians and of the Chris- tian nations. This dependence upon authority would of itself have sufficed to cause a development of thought quite different from that of the Greeks, even had the dogmatic content of Christianity and Moham- medanism borne greater resemblance to the Hellenic doctrines than was the case. But what a gidf is there between Greek and Christian in the sense of the early and mediaeval Church ! While the Greek seeks the Divine primarily in nature, for the Christian, nature loses all worth and all right to existence in the thought | of the omnipotence and infinity of the Creator; and nature cannot even be regarded as the pure revelation CSARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 135 of this omnipotence^ for it is distorted and ruined by sin. While the Greek, relying on his reason, seeks to) know the laws qf the universe, the Christian flees from the errors of reason, which to him is carnal, and darkened by sin, to a revelation the ways and mysteries of which he thinks himself all the more bound to reverence, the more they clash with reason and the natural course of things. . While the Greek endeavours to attain in human life the fair harmony of spirit and nature, which is the distinctive characteristic of Hellenic morality ; the ideal of the Christian lies in an asceti- cism which breaks off all alliance between reason and sense: instead of heroes, fighting and enjoying like men, he has saints displaying monkish apathy ; instead of Gods full of sensual desires, sexless angels ; instead of a Zeus who authorises and indulges in all earthly delights — a God who becomes man, in order by his death openly and practically to condemn them. So deeply rooted an opposition between the two theories of the world necessitated an equal contrast in the ten- dencies of Philosophy : the Philosophy of the Christian Middle Ages of course turned away from the world and human life, as that of the Greeks inclined to them. It was, therefore, quite logical and natural that the one Philosophy should neglect the investigations of nature which the other had commenced ; that the one should work for heaven, the other for earth ; the one for the Church, the other for the State ; that the science of the Middle Ages should lead to faith in a divine revelation, and to the sanctity of the ascetic as its end, and Greek science to the understanding of nature's laws, and to the 136 INTRODUCTION. virtue which consists in the conformity of human life tO' nature ; that, in short, there should exist between the two Philosophies a radical opposition coming to light even when they apparently harmonise, and giving an essentially different meaning to the very words of the ancients in the mouths of their Christian successors. Even the Mohammedan view of the world is in one re- spect nearer to the Greek than the Chi-istian is, for in the moral sphere it does not assume so hostile an atti- tude to man's sensuous life. The Mohammedan philoso- phers of the Middle Ages bestowed also greater attention on natural research, and restricted themselves less ex- clusively to theological and theologico-metaphysical questions than the Christians. But the Mohammedan nations were wanting in that rare genius for the intel- lectual treatment and moral ennobling of natural in- stincts by which the Greek was so favourably distin- guished from the Oriental, who was careless of form, and carried both self-indulgence and self-mortification to excess. The abstract monotheism, too, of the Koran is even more directly opposed to the deified world of the Greeks than the Christian doctrine is. The Moham- medan Philosophy, therefore, in regard to its general tendency, must, like the Christian, be pronounced essen- tially different from the Greek. In it we miss the free outlook upon the actual world, and therewith the activity and independence of thought, so natural to the Greeks ; and though it starts from a zealous desire for the know- ledge of nature, the theological presuppositions of its dogmatic creed, and the magical conceptions of the latest antiquity, are always in the way. Lastly, the CHAHACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 137 ultimate aim which it proposes to itself consists far more in the consummation of the religious life and the attainment of mystic abstraction and supernatural illu- mination, than in the clear and scientific nnderstauding of the world and its phenomena. On these points, however, there can be little con- troversy. It is a far more difiicult task to determine the specific character of Greek Philosophy as distin- guished from the modem. For modem Philosophy itself arose essentially under Greek influence, and by means of a partial return to Greek intuitions ; it is, , therefore, in its whole spirit, far more allied to Hellenic Philosophy than the Philosophy of the Middle Ages, in spite of its dependence on Greek authorities, ever was. This similarity is heightened, and the difficulty of difi'erentiating them increased, by the fact that the old Philosophy, in the course of its own development,j approximated to the Christian conception of the world, (with which it has been blended in modem science) and paved the way for that conception. The doctrines which were the preparation for Christianity are often very like Christian doctrine modified by classical studies ; the original Greek doctrines resemble in many respects the modern doctrines which subsequently developed them- selves under the influence of the ancients; so that it seems hardly possible to assign distinctive characteristics that are generally applicable. But there appears at the outset this fundamental difference between the two Philoso- phies — viz. that the one is the earlier, the other the later ; the one is original, the other derived. Greek Philosoph y sprang from the soil of Greek national life and of_ the _.138 ^ a-y^ — '-INTRODUCTION. ^ "-^ ^y^ Greek view of the -world ; even when it passes beyond ' the original limits of the Hellenic sphere and prepares the transition from the ancient period to the Christian, its essential content can only be understood in relation to the development of the Greek spirit. Even at that period we feel that it is the abiding influence of .J classic ideas which hinders it from really adopting the !>- later standpoint. Conversely, with the modem phUo- S sophers, even when at first sight they seem wholly to return to the ancient modes of thought, we can always, ?on closer inspection, detect motives and conceptions foreign to the ancients. The only question is, therefore, where these motives and conceptions are ultimately to be sought ? All human culture results from the reciprocal action of the inward and the outward, of spontaneity , and receptivity, of mind and nature ; its direction is, therefore, principally determined by the relation that exists between these two sides, which relation, as we have already seen, was always more harmonious in the Greek race than in any other, by reason of its peculiar character and historical conditions. The distinctive peculiarity of the Greeks lies, indeed, in this unbroken unity of the spiritual and the natural, which is at once the prerogative and the confining barrier of this classical nation. Not that spirit and nature were as yet wholly undiscriminated. On the contrary, the great superiority '\ of Greek civilisation, as compared with earlier or con- temporary civilisations, essentially depends on- this fact ■ — that in the light of the Hellenic consciousness there disappears, not only the irrational disorder of primitive CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 139 and natural life, but also that fantastic confusion and interminglement of the ethical with the physical, Which we almost everywhere jaeet with in the East. The Greek attains his independence of the powers of nature by the free exercise of his mental and moral activity ; transcending merely natural ends, he regards the sensible as an instrument and symbol of the spiritual. Thus the two spheres are to him separate ; and as the ancient gods of nature were overpowered by the Olympian deities, so his own natural state gives place to the higher state of a moral culture that is free, human, and beautiful. But this discrimination of spirit and nature does not as yet involve the theory of radical opposition "and contradiction — the systematic breach between them which was preparing in the last centuries of the ancient world, and has been so fully accomplished in fibe Chris- tian world. The spirit is always regarded as the higher element in comparison with nature; man looks upon his free moral activity as the essential aim and content of his existence ; he is not satisfied to enjoy in a sensuous manner, or to work in servile dependence on the will of another ; what he does he will do freely, for himself; the happiness which he strives for he will attain by the use and development of his bodily and mental powers, by a vigorous social Kfe, by doing his share of work for the whole, by the respect of his fellow citizens ; and on this personal .capability and freedom is founded that proud self-confidence which raises the Hellene so far above all the barbarians. The reason that Greek life has not only a more beautiful form, but also a higher content than that of any other ancient 140 INTR OD UCTION. race, is because no otlier was able to rise with such freedom above mere nature, or with such idealism to make sensible existence simply the sustainer of spiritual. If then this unity of spirit with nature were understood as a unity without difference, the expression would ill serve to characterise it. Kightly apprehended, on the other hand, it correctly expresses the distinction of the Greek world from the Christian Middle Ages and from modern times. The Greek rises above the world of outward existence and absolute dependence on the forces of nature, but he does not on that account hold nature to be either impure or not divine. On the_ contrary, he sees in it the direct manifestation of higher powers; his very gods are not merely moral beings, they are at" the same time, and originally, powers of natiu-e ; they have the form of natural existence, they constitute a plurality of beings, created, and like imto men, restricted in their power of action, having the tmiversal force of nature as eternal chaos before them, and as pitiless fate above them ; far from denying himself and his nature for the sake of the gods, the Greek knows no better way of honouring them than by the cheerful en- joyment of life, and the worthy exercise of the talents he has acquired in the development of his natural powers of body and mind. Accordingly moral life also is thi-oughout founded upon natural temperament and circumstances. From the standpoint of ancient Greece it is impossible that man should consider his nature corrupt, and himself, as originally constituted, sinful. There is, consequently,, no demand that he should re- nounce his natural inclinations, repress his sensuality, CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 141 and be radically changed by a moral new birth; no demand even for that struggle against sensuality which our moral law is accustomed to prescribe even when it is no longer based upon positive Christianity. On the con- trary, the natural powers as such are assumed to be good, and the natural inclinations as such to be legitimate ; morality consists, according to 'the truly Greek ccmcep- tion of Aristotle, in guiding these powers to the right end, and maintaining these inclinations in right measure and balance : virtue is nothing more than the intelligent and energetic development of natiural endowments, and the highest law of morals is to follow the com'se of nature freely and rationally. This standpoint is not a result of reflection, it is not attained by a struggle with the opposite demand for the renunciation of natm:e, as is the case with the modems when they profess the same principles ; it is, therefore, quite untrammelled by doubt and uncertainty. To the Greek it appears as natural and necessary that he should allow sensuality its rights as that he should control it by the exercise of will and reflection ; he can regard the matter in no other Hght, and he therefore pursues his course with full security, honestly feeling that he is justified in so doing. But among the natural presuppositions of free activity must also be reckoned the social relations in which each individual is placed by his birth. The Greek allows these relations an amount of influence over his morality, to which in modem times we are not accustomed. The tradition of his people is to him the highest moral authority, life in and for the state the highest duty, far outweighing all others; beyond the 142 INTRODUCTION. limits of the national and political community, moral obligation is but imperfectly recognised ; the validity of a free vocation determined by personal conviction, the idea of the rights and duties of man in the wider sense, were not generally acknowledged until the transitional period which coincides with the dissolution of the ancient Greek standpoint. How far the classical epoch and view of hmnan life are in this respect removed from ours, appears in the constant confusion of morals with politics, in the inferior position of women, especially among the Ionian races, in the conception of marriage and sexual relations, biit above all in the abrupt opposi- tion between Greeks and barbarians, and the slavery which was connected with it, and was so indispensable an institution in ancient states. These shadow-sides of Greek life must not be overlooked. In one respect, - however, things were easier for the Greek than for us. His range of vision, it is true, was more limited, his relations were narrower, his moral principles were less pure and strict and universal than ours ; but, perhaps, on that very account, his life was the more fitted to form complete, harmoniously cultured men and classical characters.' The classic form of' Greek art was also essentially conditioned by the mental character we have been de- scribing. The classic ideal, as Vischer " well remarks, is the ideal of a people that is moral without any break ' Cf. Hegel's PhU. der Gfsch. der Phil. s. Kant, i. 79 sqq. ; and p. 291 sq. 297 sqq. 305 sqq. ; ^s- especially the thoughtful and for- thetik, ii. 66 sqq. 73 sqq. 100 sqq. ; cible remarks of Vischer in his Gesch. der Phil. i. 170 sq. ; Phil. Msthetik, ii. 237 sqq. 446 sqq. ' der Bel. ii. 99 sqq. ; Braniss, Gesch. . ' Msth. ii. 459. CSARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 143 \ with nature ; there is consequently in the spiritual con- tent of its ideal, and therefore in the expression of that ideal, no surplus which cannot be unrestrainedly poured forth in the form as a whole. The spiritual is not ap- prehended as opposed to the sensible phenomenon, but in and with it ; consequently, the spiritual attains to artistic representation only so far as it is capable of direct expression in the sensible form. A Greek work of art bears the character of simple, satisfied beauty, of plastic calm ; the idea realises itself in the pheno- menon, as the soul in the body with which it clothes itself by virtue of its creating force ; there is as yet no spiritual content which resists this plastic treatment, and which could not find its adequate and direct repre- sentation in the sensible form. Greek art consequently only attained to perfection where, from the nature of the subject,no task was proposed to it which could not be com- pletely accomplished in the way we have just described. In plastic art, in the epic, in classic architecture, the Greeks have remained unrivalled models for all time ; on the other hand, in music they seem to have been far behind the modems ; because . this art, more than any other, by its very nature leads us back from the fugitive external elements of tone to the inner region of feeling and of subjective mood. For the same reasons their painting seems only to have been comparable with that of the modems in respect of drawing. Even Greek lyric poetry, great and perfect as it is of its kind, diflfers no less from the more emotional and subjective modem lyric poetry than the metrical verse of the ancients from the rhymed verse of the modems ; and if, on the one 144 INTRODUCTION. hand, no later poet could have wxitten a Sophoclean drama, on the other, the ancient tragedies of fate as compared with modern tragedies since Shakespeare, fail in the natural evolution of events from the characters, from the temperament of the dramatis personcB ; and thus, like lyric poetry, instead of fully developing its own particular form of art, tragedy has still in a certain sense the epic type. In all these traits one and the same character is manifested : Greek art ■ is distinguished from modern by its piire objectivity; the artist in his creation does not remain within himself, in the inner region of his thoughts and feelings, and his work when accomplished suggests nothing internal which it has not fully expressed. The form is as yet absolutely filled with the content ; the content in its whole compass attains determinate existence in the form ; spirit is still in undisturbed union with nature, the idea is not yet separated from the phenomenon. We must expect to find the same character in Greek Philosophy, since it is the spirit of the Hellenic people that created that Philosophy, and the Hellenic view of the world that there receives its scientific expression. ^., This character, first shows itself in a trait which indeed J is not easy to define in an exhaustive and accurate jj manner, but which must strike every student in the writings and fragments of ancient Philosophy: in the whole mode of treatment, the whole attitude which the i author adopts in reference to his subject. That freedom and simplicity, which Hegel praises ' in the ancient philo-!>J .sophers, that plastic repose with which a Parmenides, a ' Geaoh. der Phil. i. 124. CHAHACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 145 Plato, an Aristotle handle the most difficult questions, is the same in the sphere of scientific thought as that which in the sphere of art we call the classic style. The philosopher does not in the first place reflect upon himself and his personal condition : he has not to deal with a number of preliminary presuppositions and make abstraction of his own thoughts and interests that he may attain to a purely philosophic mood ; he is in such a mood from the very beginning. In the treat- ment, therefore, of scientific questions he does not allow himself to be disturbed by other opinions, nor by his own wishes ; he goes straight to the matter in hand, desiring to absorb himself in it, to give free scope to its working within him ; he is at peace as to the results of his thought, because ready to accept whatever approves itself to him as true and real.' This objectivity was no doubt far more easily attainable for Greek Philosophy? than for our own ; thought, having then before it neither\ a previous scientific development nor a fixed religious system, could grapple with scientific problems froni their | j . very commencement with complete freedom. Such ob- jectivity, furthermore, constitutes not only the strength, I but also the weakness of this Philosophy ; for it is essentially conditional on man's having not yet become I mistrustful of his thought, on his being but partially W ' Take, for example, the well- the shortness of human life.' f known ntterancesoftheProtagoras: These propositions were in the ' Man is the measure of all tJiings, highest degtee offensive at that of Being how it is, of non-Being how period; there "was in them a de- it is not.' ' Of the gods I have mand for a complete revolution of I nothing to say ; neither that they all hitherto received ideas. Yet I are, nor that they are not ; for how statuesque is the style ! With fl there is much that hinders me, — what classical calmness are they " the obscurity of \j matter and enunciated ! VOL. I. L 146 INTRODUCTION. conscious of the subjective activity through which his presentations are formed, and therefore of the share which this activity has in their content ; in a word, on his not having arrived at self-criticism. The diflference, however, between ancient Philosophy and modem is here strikingly and unquestionably displayed. This characteristic suggests further points for re- flection. So simple a relation to its object was only possible to Greek thought, because, as compared with modern thought, it started from a much more incom- plete experience, a more limited knowledge of nature, a less active development of inner Ufe. The greater the mass of facts with which we are acquainted, the more complicated are the problems which have to be solved in attempting their scientific explanation. The more accurately, on the one hand, we have come to iii- vestigate external events in their specific character ; the more, on the other, has our inner eye become keen for introspection, through the intensifying of religious and moral life ; the more our historical knowledge of human conditions widens, the less possible is it to apply the analogies of human spiritual life to natural phenomena, and the analogies of the external world to the pheno- mena of consciousness ; to rest satisfied with imperfect explanations abstracted from limited and one-sided ex- perience, or to presuppose the truth of our conceptions without accurate enquiry. It naturally followed, there- fore, that the problems with which all Philosophy is concerned should in modem times partially change their scope and significance. Modem Philosophy begins with doubt ; in Bacon, with doubt of the previous science ; CHARACTER OF GREEK FHIL080FHY. 147 in Descartes, with doubt of the truth of our concep- tions generally — absolute doubt. Having this starting-^ point, it is forced from the outset to keep steadily in view the question of the possibility and conditions of knowledge, and for the answering of that question it institutes all those enquiries into the origin of our conceptions, which at each new turn that they have taken have gained in profundity, in importance, and in extent. These enquiries were at first remote from Greek science, which, firmly believing in the veracity of thought, applied itself directly to the search for the Eeal. But even after that faith had been shaken by Sophistic, and the necessity of a methodical enquiry had been asserted by Socrates, this enquiry is still far from being the accurate analysis of the intellect undertaken by modern Philosophy since Locke and Hume. Aristotle himself, though he describes how conceptions result from experience, investigates very incompletely the conditions on which the correctness of oiur conceptions depends ; I and the necessity of a discrimination between their objective and subjective constituents never seems to occur to him. Even the scepticism posterior to Aristotle gave no impulse to any more fundamental and theoretic investigations. The empiricism of the Stoics and the sensualism of the Epicureans were based as little as the neo-Platonic and neo-Pythagorean speculation on en- f quiries tending to supply the lacunae in the Aristotelian theory of knowledge. The criticism of the faculty of ■ cognition, which has attaiiied so great an importance for modem Philosophy, in ancient Philosophy was proportionally undeveloped. Where, however, a clear L 2 148 INTROBVCTION. recognition is wanting of the condition&. under which scientific enquiry must be undertaken, there science must necessarily itself be wanting in that certainty of procedure which due regard to those conditions alone can give. Thus we find that the Greek philosophers, even the greatest and most careful observers among them, have all more or less the failing with which philosophers have been so often reproached. They are apt to cease their enquiries prematurely, and to found general concepts and principles upon imperfect or in- sufficiently proved experiences, which are then treated as indisputable truths and made the basis of farther inferences ; to display, in short, that dialectical ex- ■clusiveness which is the result of employing certain presentations universally assumed, established by lan- guage, and recommending themselves by their apparent accordance with nature, without further enquiring into their origin and legitimacy, or keeping in view while so employing them their real foundation in fact. Modern Philosophy has itself been sufficiently faulty in this respect; it is humiliating to compare the speculative rashness of many a later philosopher with the circumspection displayed by Aristotle in testing the theories of others, and in examining the various points of view that arise out of the questions he is discussing. But in the general course of modem science the demand for a strict and exact method has more and more made itself felt, and even where the philosophers themselves have not adequately responded to this demand, the other sciences have afforded them a far- greater mass of facts and laws empirically established; and further, these CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY, 149' facts have been much more carefully sifted and tested^ and these laws much more accurately determined, than, was possible at the period of ancient Philosophy. This higher development of the experimental sciences, which distinguishes modem times from antiquity, is closely connected with that critical method in which Grreek Philosophy and Grreek science generally were so greatly deficient. The distinction of subjective and objective in our conceptions is nearly allied to the distinction of the intellectual and corporeal, of phenomena within us and phenomena without. This distinction, like the other, is generally wanting in clearness and precision with the ancient philosophers. Anaxagoras, it is true, represents spirit as opposed to the material world ; and in the Platonic School this opposition is developed to its fullest extent. Nevertheless, in Greek Philosophy, the two spheres are. constantly overlapping one another. On the one hand, natural phenomena, which theology had considered to be immediately derived from beings akin to men, continued to be explained by analogies derived from human life. On such an analogy were based not only the Hylozoism of many ancient physi- cists, and that belief in the animate nature of the world which we find in Plato, the Stoics and neo-Platonists, but also the teleology which, in most of the philosophic schools since Socrates, has interfered with, and not un- frequently overpowered, the physical explanation of nature. On the other hand, the true essence of psychic phenomena was also not determined with accuracy ; and if only a certain number of the ancient philosophers 150 . INTRODUCTION. contented themselves with such simple materialistic explanations as were set up by many of the pre-Socratic physicists, after them by the Stoics and Epicxureans, and also by individual Peripatetics; yet even in the spiritualistic psychology of a Plato, an Aristotle, or a Plotinus we are surprised to find that the difference between conscious and unconscious forces is almost ig- nored, and that hardly any attempt is made to conceive the different sides of human nature in their personal unity. Hence it was easy to these philosophers to explain the soul as compounded of distinct and radi- cally heterogeneous elements ; and hence, too, in their conceptions relating to Grod, the world-soul, the spirits of the stars, and similar subjects, the question of the personality of these beings is generally so little con- sidered. It was in the Christian period that the feeling of the validity -and importance of human personality first attained its complete deivelopment ; and so it is in niodern science that we first find on this point con- ceptions sufficiently precise to render the confusion of personal and impersonal characteristics so frequently met with in ancient philosophy henceforward impossible. The difference between Greek ethics and our own has been already touched upon ; and it need scarcely be said 3 that all our previous remarks on this subject equally j apply to philosophic ethics. Much as Philosophy itself contributed to transform the old Greek conception of moral life into a stricter, more abstract, more general '% morality, the characteristic features of the ancient view were in Philosophy only gradually effaced, and were always more or less present down to the latest period of CEARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 151 antiquity. Not until after Aristotle was the close unioil of morals with politics, so inherent in the Greeks, dis- solved ; and down to the time of Plotinus, we can still clearly recognise the aesthetic treatment of ethics, which was also essentially distinctive of the Hellenic spirit. The spiritual life of the Greeks in the thousand years that elapsed between the rise and close of their Philosophy certainly underwent great and important changes, and Philosophy was itself one of the most efficient causes by which these changes were brought ' about. As Greek Philosophy represents generally the character of the Greek spirit, it must also reflect the transformations which in course of time that spirit has undergone ; and the more so, because the greater num- ber and the most influential of the philosophic systems belong to the period when the older form of Greek spiritual life was gradually melting away; when the human mind was increasingly withdrawing itself from the outer world, to be concentrated with exclusive energy upon itself — and when the transition from the classic to the Christian and modem world was in part preparing, and in part already accomplished. For this reason, the characteristics which appeared in the philosophy of the classical period cannot be unconditionally ascribed to the whole of Greek Philosophy ; yet the early character of that Philosophy essentially influenced its entire sub- sequent course. We see, indeed, in the whole of its development, the original unity of spirit with nature gradually disappearing ; but as long as we continue on Hellenic ground, we never find the abrupt separation 152 INTRODUCTION. between them, which was the starting-point of modem science. In the commencement of Greek Philosophy, it is before all things the external world which claims at- tention. The question arises as to its causes ; and the answer is attempted without any preliminary enquiry into the human faculty of cognition; the reasons of phenomena are sought in what is known to us through the external perception, or is at any rate analogous to it. But, on the other hand, just because as yet no exact discrimination is made between the external world and the world of consciousness, qualities are ascribed to cor- poreal forms and substances, and efifects are expected from them, which could only in truth belong to spiritual beings. Such are the characteristics of Greek Philo- sophy up to the time of Anaxagoras. During this period, philosophic interest chiefly confines itself to the consideration of nature, and to conjectures respecting the reasons of natmral phenomena; the facts of con- sciousness are not yet recognised or investigated, as special phenomena. This Philosophy of nature was opposed by Sophistic, which denied man's capacity for the cognition of things, and directed his attention instead to his own practical aims. But with the advent of Socrates, Philosophy again inclined towards a search for the Eeal, though at first this was not formulated into a system. The lesser Socratic schools, indeed, contented themselves with the application of knowledge to some one side of man's spiritual life, but Philosophy as a whole, far from maintaining this subjective view of the Socratic CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 15S principle, culminated in tte vast and comprehensive systems of Plato and Aristotle, the greatest achieve- ments of Greek science. These systems approximate much more closely to modern Philosophy, on which they have had an important influence, than the pre^ Socratic physics. Nature is with them neither the sole nor the principal object of enquiry ; side by side with physics, metaphysics has a higher, and ethics an equal prominence, and the whole is placed on a firmer basis by the enquiries concerning the origin of knowledge and the conditions of scientific method. Moreover, the unsensuous form is distinguished from the sensible phenomenon, as the essential from the acci- dental, the eternal from the transitory; only in the cognition of this unsensuous essence — only in pure thought — is the highest and purest knowledge to be sought. Even in the explanation of nature, preference is given to the investigation of forms and aims as com- pared with the knowledge of physical causes ; in man, the higher part of his nature in its essence and origin is discriminated from the sensual part ; and the highest problem for mankind is accordingly found exclusively in the development of his spiritual life, and above all of his knowledge. Although, however, the Platonic and Aristotelian systems show themselves thus akin in many respects to modern systems, yet the peculiar stamp of the Greek spirit is unmistakably impressed on them both. Plato is an idealist, but his idealism is not the modem subjective idealism : he does not hold with Fichte, that the objective world is a mere phenomenon of consciousness ; he does not, with Leibniz, place per- 154 INTRODUCTION. cipient essences at the origin of all things ; the ideas themselves are not derived by him from thought, either human or divine, but thought is derived from partici- pation in the ideas. In the ideas the universal essence of things is reduced to plastic forms, which are the object of an intellectual intuition, in the same way that things are the object of the sensuous intuition. Even the Platonic theory of knowledge has not the character of the corresponding enquiries of the mo- derns. With them, the main point is the analysis of the subjective activity of cognition ; their attention is primarily directed to the development of knowledge in man according to its psychological course and its conditions. Plato, on the other hand, keeps almost exclusively to the objective nature of our presentations; he enquires far less about the manner in which intui- tions and conceptions arise in us, than about the value attaching to them in themselves ; the theory of know- ledge is therefore with him directly connected with metaphysics : the enquiry as to the truth of the pre- sentation or conception coincides with that respecting the reality of the sensible phenomenon and of the Idea. Plato, moreover, however low may be. his estimation of the phenomenal world in comparison with the idea, is far removed from the prosaic and mechanical modern view of nature ; the world is to him the visible god, the stars are living, happy beings, and his whole expla- nation of nature is dominated by the teleology which plays so important a part in Greek Philosophy posterior to Socrates. Though in his ethics he passes beyond the ancient Gresek standpoint, by the demand for a philoso^ CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 155 phic virtue founded on science, and prepares the way for Christian morality by flight from the world of sense ; yet in the doctrine of Eros he maintains the aesthetic, and in the institutions of his Eepublic the political character of Grrepk morality in the most decided manner ; and despite his moral idealism, his ethics do not disclaim that inborn Hellenic sense of naturalness, proportion, and harmony which expresses itself in his successors by the principle of living according to nature, and the theory of goods and of virtue founded on that principle. The Greek type, however, comes out most cleajrly in Plato's mode of apprehending the whole problem of Philosophy. In his inability to separate science from morality and religion, in his conception of Philosophy as the complete and universal culture of mind and character, we clearly recognise the standpoint of the Greeks, who made far less distinction between the dififerent spheres of life and culture than the mo- derns, because with them the fundamental opposition of spiritual and bodily perfection was much less de- veloped and insisted on. Even in Aristotle this stand- point is clearly marked, although, in comparison with that of Plato, his system looks modern in respect of its purely scientific form, its rigorous conciseness, and its broad empirical basis. He, too, regards the concep- tions in which thought sums up the qualities of things as objective forms antecedent to our thought ; not indeed distinct from individual things as to their ex- istence, but as to their essential nature, independent ; and in determining the manner in which these forms are represented in things, he is guided throughout by the 166 INTRODUCTION. analogy of artistic creation. Although, therefore, he hestows much greater attention on physical phenomena and their causes than Plato does, his whole theory of the world hears essentially the same teleologic aesthetic character as Plato's. He removes the Divine spirit from all living contact with the world, hut in his con- ception of nature as a uniform power working with full purpose and activity to an end, the poetic liveliness of the old Grreek intuition of nature is apparent; and when he attributes to matter as such a desire for form, and deduces from that desire all motion and life in the corporeal world, we are reminded of the Hylozoism which was so closely related to the view of nature we are coiKidering. His notions about the sky and the hea- venly bodies which he shares with Plato and most of the ancients, are also entirely Grreek. His ethics alto- gether belong to the sphere of Hellenic morality. Sen- sual instincts are recognised by him as a basis for moral action, virtue is the fulfilment of natural activities. The sphere of ethics is distinguished from that of politics, but the union between them is still very close. In politics itself we find all the distinctive featinres of the Hellenic theory of the state, with its advantages and imperfections : on the one hand, the doctrine of man's natural vocation for political community, of the moral object of the state, of the value of a free constitution ; on the other hand, the justification of slavery and con- tempt for manual labour. Thus, while spirit is still closely united to its natural basis, nature is directly related to spiritual life. In PMo and Aristotle we see neither the abstract spiritualism, nor the purely physical CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 157 explanation of nature of modern science ; neither the strictness and universality of our moral consciousness, nor the acknowledgment of material interest which so often clashes with it. The oppositions between which human life and thought move are less developed, their relation is more genial and harmonious, their adjust- ment easier, though certainly more superficial, than in the modern theory of the world, originating as it does from far more comprehensive experiences, more difficult struggles, and more complex conditions. Not until after the time of Aristotle does the Grreek spirit begin to be so greatly estranged from nature that the classical view of the world disappears, and the way is being prepared for the Christian. How greatly this change in its consequences affected also the aspect of Philosophy, will hereafter be shown. In this period of transition, however", it is all the more striking to observe that the old Grreek standpoint was still sufficiently influential to divide the Philosophy of that time very clearly from ours. Stoicism no longer carries on any independent investigation of nature ; it withdraws itself entirely from objective enquiry and substitutes the interest of moral subjectivity. Yet it continues to look upon nature as the thing which is highest and most divine ; it defends the old religion, inasmuch as it was a worship of the powers of nature ; subjection to natural laws, life according to nature, is its watchword ; natural truths {^va-LKoL evvoiai) are its supreme authority ; and though, in this return to what is primitive and original, it concedes only a conditional value to civil institutions, yet it regards the mutual interdependence of all men, 158 INTRODUCTION. the extension of political community to the whole race, as an immediate requirement of human nature, in the same manner as the earlier Grreeks regarded political life. While in Stoicism man breaks with the outer world in order to fortify himself in the energy of his inner life against external influehces, he yet at the same time entirely rests upon the order of the universe, spirit feels still too much bound to nature to know that it is in its self-conciousness independent of nature. But nature, consequently, appears as if filled with spirit, and in this direction Stoicism goes so far that. the dis- tinction between spiritual and corporeal, which Plato and Aristotle so clearly recognised, again disappears, matter becomes directly animate, spirit is represented as a material breath, or as an organising fire ; and, on the other hand, all human aims and thoughts are transferred to nature by the most external teleology possible. In Epicureanism the specific character of the Greek genius is otherwise manifested. Hylozoism and teleo- logy are now abandoned for an entirely mechanical explanation of nature; the vindication of popular re- ligion is exchanged for an enlightened opposition to it, and the individual seeks his happiness, not in sub- mission to the law of the whole, but in tlie undisturbed security of his individual life. But that which is according to nature is the highest, to the Epicurean as to the Stoic ; and if in theory he degrades his external nature into a spiritless mechanism, so much the more does he endeavour to establish in human life that beautiful harmony of the egoistic and benevolent im- pulses, of sensuous enjoyment and spiritual activity, CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 159 which made the garden of Epicurus the abode of Attic refinement and pleasant social intercourse. This form of culture is as yet without the polemical asperities which are inseparable from modern repetitions of it, on account of the contrast it presents to the strictness of Christian ethics; the justification of the sensual element appears as a natural presupposition which does not require any preliminary or particular apology. However much then Epicureanism may remind us of certain modern opinions, the difference between that which is original and of natural growth, and that which is derived and the result of reflection, is unmistakable on closer examination. The same may be said of the scepticism of this period as compared with that of modern times. Modem scepticism has always some- thing unsatisfied about it, an inner uncertainty,, a secret wish to believe that which it is tiying to disprove. Ancient scepticism displays no such half-heartedness, and knows nothing of the hypochondriacal unrest which Hume himself* so vividly describes; it regards ignorance not as a misfortune, but as a natural necessity, in the recognition of which man becomes calm. Even while despairing of knowledge it maintains the attitude of compliance with the actual order of things, and from this very source evolves the drapa^la which is almost impossible to modem scepticism, governed as it is by subjective interests.^ Even neo-Platonism, far removed as it is from the ' On Human Naiwe, took i. ' Cf. Hegel's remarks on the part iv. eeotion 1, 509 sqq. ; subject. Gesch. der Phil. i. 124 Jacobi's translation. sq. 160 - INTRODUCTION. ancient Greek spirit, and decidedly as it approaches that of the Middle Ages, has its centre of gravity still in the antique world. This is evident, not only from its'close relation to the heathen religions, the last apologist for which it would certainly not have become had no essential and internal aflSnity existed between them, but also in its philosophic doctrines. Its abstract spiritual- ism contrasts, indeed, strongly with the naturalism of the ancients ; but we have only to compare its concep- tion of nature with that of contemporary Christian writers, we need only hear how warmly Plotinus defends the majesty of nature against the contempt of the Gnostics, how keenly Proclus and Simplicius dispute the Christian doctrine of the creation, in order to see in it an offshoot of the Greek spirit. Matter itself is brought nearer to mind by the neo-Platonists than by the majority of modem philosophers, who see in the two principles essentially separate substances ; for the neo-Platonists opposed the theory of a self-dependent matter, and explained the corporeal as the result of the gradual degradation of the spiritual essence. They thus declared the opposition of the two principles to be not original and absolute, but derived and merely quantitative. Again, though the neo-Platonic meta- physics, especially in their later form, must appear to us very abstruse, their origin was similar to that of Plato's theory of Ideas ; for the properties and causes of things are here regarded as absolute essential natures, over and above the world and man, as objects of an intellectual intuition. Moreover, these essences bear to each other a definite relation of higher, lower, and CHARACTER OF OREEK PHILOSOPHY. 161 'Co-ordinate, and thus appear as the metaphysical coun- terpart of the mythical gods, whom neo-Platonic alle- gory itself recognised in them, recognising also in their progressive emanation from the primitive essence the analogue of those theogonies with which Greek specu- lation in the earliest times began. To sum up what we have been saying. In the Philosophy of the middle ages, spirit asserts itself as alien and opposed to nature : in modem Philosophy, it' strives to regain unity with nature, without, however, losing the deep consciousness of the difference between the spiritual and the natural : in Greek Philosophy is represented that phase of scientific thought in which the discrimination and separation of the two elements are developed out of their original equipoise and har- monious co-existence, though this separation was never actually accomplished in the Hellenic period.- While, therefore, in Greek, as in modern Philosophy, we find both the discrimination and the union of the spiritual and the natural, this is brought about in each case in a different manner and by a different connection. Greek Philosophy starts from that harmonious relation of spirit to nature in which the distinguishing characteristic of ancient culture generally consists; step by step, and half involuntarily, it sees itself compelled to discrimi- nate them. Modem Philosophy, on the contrary, finds this separation already accomplished in the most effec- tual manner in the middle ages, and only succeeds by an effort in discovering the unity of the two sides. This difference .of starting-point and of tendency de- VOL. I. M . 163 INTRODUCTION. termines the whole character of these two great phe- nomena. Grreek Philosophy finally results in a dualism, which it finds impossible to overcome scientifically ; and even in its most flourishing period the development of this dualism can be traced. Sophisticism breaks with simple faith in the veracity of the senses and of thought. Socrates breaks with unreflecting obedience to existing custom. Plato opposes to the empirical world an ideal world, but is unable to find in this ideal world any explanation of the ol^her; he can only explain inatter as something non-existent, and can only subject human life to the idea by the arbitrary measures of his State. Even Aristotle keeps pure spirit entirely distinct from the world, and thinks that man's reason is infused into him from without. In the lesser Socratic schools and the post- Aristotelian Philosophy this dualism is still more evident. But we have already seen that, in spite of this tendency, the original presupposition of Greek thought asserts itself in decisive traits ; and we shall find that the true cause of its incapacity to re- concile these contradictions satisfactorily lies in its refusal to abandon that presupposition. The unity of spiritual and natural, which Greek thought demands and presupposes, is the direct unbroken unity of the classic theory of the world; when that is cancelledy* there remains to it no possible way of filling up a' chasm which, according to its own stand-point, cannot exist. The Hellenic character proper is not of course stamped with equal clearness on each of the Greek systems; in the later periods especially, of Greek CSARACTER OF GREEK PSIL080FHY. 163 Philosophy it became gradually blended with foreign elements. Nevertheless, directly or indirectly, this character may plainly be recognised in all the systems ; and Grreek Philosophy, as a whole, may be said to move in the same direction as the general life of the people to which it belongs. 164 INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER IV. PEINCIPAL PEKIODS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GEEEK PHILOSOPHY. We bave divided Greek Philosophy into three periods, of which the second begins with Socrates and ends with Aristotle. The propriety of this division must now be more closely examined. The utility of such a course may seem indeed doubtful, since so eminent a historian as Eitter' is of opinion that history itself recognises no sections, and that therefore all division of periods is only a means of facilitating instruction, a setting tip of resting places to tafe breath ; and since even a disciple of the Hegelian school ■• declares that the History of Philosophy cannot be written in periods, as the links of History consist wholly of personalities and aggregates of individuals. TMs latter observation is so far true that it is imipossible t© draw a straight chronological line across a series of historical phenomena without Separating what is really united, and linking together what is really distinct. For, in regard to chronology, the boundaries of successive aevelopments Overlap each other ; and it is in this that the whole continuity and connection of historic as of natural development con- • Gesch. der PhU., 2nd edition, ' Marbach, Gesch. der Phil., Pref. p. xiii. Pref. p. viii. PRINCIPAL PERIODS. 165 sists. The new form has already appeared, and has begun to assert itself independently, while the old form is still in existence. The inference from this, however, is not that the division into periods is to be altogether discarded, but only that it must be based upon facts, and not merely upon chronology. Each period lasts as long as any given historical whole continues to follow one and the same direction in its development ; when this ceases to be the case, a new period begins. How long the direction is to be regarded as the same must be decided, here and everywhere, according to the part in which lies the centre of gravity of the whole. When from a given whole, a new whole branches off, its beginnings are to be referred to the subsequent period in proportion as they break with the previous historical connection, and present themselves under a new and original form. If any one supposes, however, that this grouping together of kindred phenomena is merely for the convenience of the historian or his reader, and has no concern with the matter itself, the discussions in our first chapter are amply sufficient to meet the objection. It surely cannot be con-sidered un- important, even for the purposes of convenience, where the divisions are made in a historical exposition ; and, if this be conceded, it cannot be unimportant in regard to the matter itself. If one division gives us a clearer survey than another, the reason can only be that it presents a truer picture of the differences and rela- tions of historical phenomena ; the differences must, therefore, lie in the phenomena themselves, as well as in oiu" subjective consideration of them. It is un- 166 INTRODUCTION. deniable, indeed, that not only different individuals, but also different periods, have each a different character, and that the development of. any given whole, whether great or small, goes on for a time in a definite direction, and then changes this direction to strike out some other course. It is this unity and diversity of historical character to which the periods have to conform; the periodic division must represent the internal relation of phenomena at the different epochs, and it is con- sequently as little dependent on the caprice of the historian as the distribution of rivers and mountains on that of the geographer, or the determination of natural kingdoms on that of the naturalist. What division then shall we adopt in regard to the history of Greek Philosophy ? It is clear from our second chapter that the commencement of this history ought not to be placed earlier than Thales. He was the first, as far as we know, who, in speaking of the primitive causes of all things, abandoned mythical language ; — though it is true that the old custom of making the history of Pliilosophy begin with Hesiod is I not even in our days, wholly discarded.' Socrates is generally considered as the inaugurator of the next great movement, and for this reason the second period, is usually said to open with him. Some historians, howeVer, would bring the first period to a close before the time of Socrates ; for example, Ast,^ Eixner,' and Braniss. Others^ again, like Hegel, would prolong it beyond him. ' It is still followed by Fries, * Gnmd/risa Hner Gesch. der Geseh. der Phil., and Deutinger, Phil., 1 A § 43. Gesch. der Phil., Vol. 1. * Gesch. der Phil., i. 44 sq. FIRST PERIOD. 167 Ast and Eixner distinguish in the history of Greek Philosophy the three periods of Ionian Realism, Italian Idealism, and the Attic combination of these two ten- dencies. Braniss ' starts with the same fundamental dis- tinction of Eealism and Idealism, only he attributes both these tendencies to each of the first two periods. According to him, therefore, Greek thought, like Greek life, is determined by the original opposition of the Ionic and Doric elements. Absorption in the objective world is the characteristic of the Ionic ; absorption in self, of the Doric race. In the first period, then, this opposition develops itself in two parallel directions of Philosophy, the one realistic, the other idealistic; in the second, this opposition is cancelled, and lost in the consciousness of the universal spirit; and in the third, the spirit, deprived of its content through So- phistic, seeks in itSelf a new and more lasting content. According to Braniss, therefore, there are three periods of Greek Philosophy. The first, beginning with Thales and Pherecydes, is further represented on the one side by Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heracleitus ; and on the other by Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Parmenides ; a Doric antithesis being opposed at each stage of this period to the Ionic thesis ; finally, the results of the previous development are summed up in a harmonious manner by the Ionian Diogenes and the Dorian Empe- docles. It is recognised that Becoming presupposes Being, that Being expands itself into Becoming, that the inner and outer, forfn and matter, unite in the con- sciousness of the universal spirit ; the percipient spirit ' Gesch. der Phil, s. Kant, i. 102 eqq. ; 135 ; 150 sq. 168 IlfTRODUCTION. stands over against this universal spirit, and has to reflect it in itself. Here, the second period commences ; and in its development there are three moments. By Anaxa- goras, spirit is distinguished from the extended object; by Democritus, it is opposed to the object as a purely subjective principle; by the Sophists, all objectivity. is placed in the subjective spirit itself ; the universal is at length completely suppressed, and spiritual life is en- tirely lost in the actual sensible presence* Thus thrown back -upon itself, however, the spirit is forced to define its reality in a permanent manner, to enquire what is its absolute end, to pass from the sphere of necessity, into that of liberty, and in the reconciliation of the two principles to attain the ultimate end of speculation. This is the commencement of the' third period, which extends from Socrates to the end of Greek Philosophy. Much may be urged against this derivation. In the first place, we must question the discrimination of an Ionic Realism and a Doric Idealism. What is here called Doric Idealism is, as we shall presently find,' neither idealism nor purely Doric. This at once de- stroys the basis of the whole deduction. Ast and Rixner, moreover, divide the Ionic and Doric Philo- sophy into two periods ; a division quite unwarrantable,, since these two philosophies were synchronous, and powerfully reacted upon each other. It is to some ex- tent then more correct to treat them, like Braniss, as moments of one interdependent historical series. But we have no right to divide the series, as he does, into two parts, and make the difference between them. '. Cf. the Introduction to the Krst Period. ^ FIUST PERIOD. 169 analogous to that between the Socratic and pre-Socratic Philosophy- Neither of the three phenomena assigned hy Braniss to his second period has this character. Atomistic (even as to date, hardly later than Anaxa- goras) is a system of natural Philosophy, as much as any other of the earlier systems ; and to the Empedo- clean system especially (by virtue of a similar attitude to the Eleatics) it stands in so close an affinity that we cannot possibly place it in a- separate period. It dis- covers no tendency to regard spirit as purely subjective, — its sole concern is the explanation of nature. So, too, in Anaxagoras we recognise a Physicist, and a Physicist anterior to Diogenes, whom Braniss places; before him. His world-forming mind is primarily a physical principle, and he makes no attempt to enlarge, the sphere of Philosophy beyond the accustomed limits. There is, therefore, no good ground for making as decided a line of demarcation before him as before Socrates. Even Sophistic cannot be separated from the systems of the first period, as will presently appear. The two periods into which Braniss has divided tbe pre-Socratic Philosophy are followed by a third, com- prehending the whole further course of Philosophy to the end of Greek science. This partition is so rough, and takes so little account of the radical differences of thq later systems, that it would of itself furnish a sufficient reason for repudiating the construction of Braniss. On the other hand, however, Hegel goes too far in the contrary direction. He considers these differences so great that the .opposition between the Socratic and the pre-Socratic schools has only a secondary importance 170 INTRODUCTION. in comparison with them. Of his three main periods, the first extends from Thales to Aristotle, the second comprehends all the post-Aristotelian philosophy, with the exception of neo-Platonism ; the third embraces neo-Platonism. The first, he says,' represents the com- mencement of philosophising thought until its develop- ment and extension as the totality of Science. After the concrete idea has been thus attained, it makes its appearance in the second period as forming and per- fecting itself in oppositions: a one-sided principle is carried out through the whole of the presentation of the world ; each side developing itself as an extreme, and constituting in itself a totality in regard to its contrary. This breaking up of science into particular systems results in Stoicism and Epicureanism. Scep- ticism, as the negative principle, opposed itself to the dogmatism of both. The affirmative is the cancelling of this opposition, in the theory of an ideal world, or world of thought; it is the idea developed into a totality in neo-Platonism. The distinction between the old naturalistic philosophy and later science is brought forward as a ground of classification in the first period; it is not Socrates, however, who is the inaugurator of a new series of development, but the Sophists. Philosophy attains in the first part of this ' Gesch. der Phil., i. 182 (cf. sqq., 290) makes one period from ii. 373 sq.). This, however, does Thales to Aristotle (which is the not quite agree with the previous second according to him), and distinction of four stages, i. 118. divides it into three parts: I, Similarly Deutinger, whose expo- From Thales to Heracleitus; 2, sition I cannot further discuss, from Anaxagoras to the Sophists ; either here or elsewhere {loc. cit. 3, from Socrates to Aristotle. p. 78 sqq., 140 sqq„ 152 sqq., 226 FIRST PERIOD. 171 period, in Anaxagoras, to the conception of vovs; in the second part, vovs is apprehended by the Sophists, Socrates, and the imperfect Socraties, as subjectivity ; and in the third part, vovs developes itself as objective thought, as the Idea, into a totality. Socrates, there- fore, appears only as continuing a movement begun by others, not as the inaugurator of a new movement. The first thing that strikes us in this division is the great disproportion in the content of the three periods. While the first is extraordinarily rich in re- markable personages and phenomena, and includes the noblest and most perfect forms of classic philosophy, the second and third are limited to a few systems which are unquestionably inferior in scientific content to those of Plato and Aristotle. This at once makes us suspect that too much of a heterogeneous character is included in this first period. And, in point of fact, the diflTerence between the Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy is in no respect less than that between the post-Aristotelian and the Aristotelian. Socrates not only developed a mode of thought already existing ; he introduced into Philosophy an essentially new principle and method. Whereas all the previous Philosophy had , been immediately directed to the object, — while the question concerning the essence and causes of natural phenomena had been the main question on which all others depended, — Socrates first gave utterance to the conviction that nothing could be known about any object until its universal essence, its concept, was determined ; and that, therefore, the testing of our presentations by the standard of the concept — philo- 172 INTRODUCTION. sophic knowledge of self — is the beginning and the condition of all true knowledge. Whereas the earlier philosophers first arrived at the discrimination of pre- sentation from knowledge through the consideration of things themselves ; he, on the contrary, makes all knowledge of things dependent on a right view as to the nature of knowledge. With him, consequently^; there begins a new form of science, Philosophy based ' upon concepts ; dialeetie takes the place of the earlier dogmatic ; and in connection with this. Philosophy makes new and extensive conquests in hitherto unex- plored domains. Soerat«s is himself the founder of Ethics ; Plato and Aristotle separate Metaphysics from Physics ; the philosophy of nature — until then, the whole of philosophy — now becomes a part of the whole; a part which Socrates entirely neglects, on which Plato bestows hardly any attention, and even Aristotle ranks below the ' first philosophy/ These changes are so penetrating, and so greatly affect the general con- dition and character of Philosophy, that it certainly appears justifiable to begin a new period of its develop- ment with Soerates. The only question that might arise is whether to make this beginning witii Soerates, or his precursors the Sophists. But although the latter course has been adopted by distinguished authors,' it does not seem legitimate. Sophistic is doubtless the » In siddition to Hegel, ef K. F. of the first great period with the Hermann, Gesch. d. Platoniemtis, Sophists ; Hermann and Ueberweg i. 217 sqq. Ast {Gesoh. der Phil., make them the commencement of p. 96). VehBnRBg(^Grundrisa der their second period ; and Ast of his Gesoh. der Phil, i. § 9). Hegel, third, however, opens the second section FIUST PEJRIOD. 173 end of the old philosophy of nature, but it is not as yet the creation or beginning of a new philosophy : it destroys faith in the possibility of knowing the Real, and thereby discourages thought from the in- vestigation of nature ; but it has no new content to ■offer as a substitute for what it destroys ; it declares man in his actions, and in his presentations, to be the measure of all things, but it understands by man, merely the individual in all the contingency of his opinions and endeavours ; not the universal essential nature of man, which must be sought out scientifically. Though it is true, therefore, that the Sophists share with Socrates the general character of subjectivity, yet they cannot be said to have inaugurated, in the same sense that he did, a new scientific tendency. The closer definition of the two stand-points proves them to be very distinct. The subjectivity of the Sophists Is only a consequence of that in which their philosophic achieve- ment mainly consists — viz., the destruction of the earlier dogmatism : in itself this subjectivity is the end of all Philosophy; it leads to no new knowledge, nor even, like later scepticism, to a philosophic temper of mind ; it destroys all philosophic effort, in admitting no other criterion than the advantage and caprice of the indi- vidual. Sophistic is an indirect preparation, nftt the positive foundation of the new system, which was introi duced by Socrates. Now it is usual, generally speaking, to commence a new period where the principle which dominates it begins to manifest itself positively with creative energy, and with a definite consciousness of its goal. We open such a period in the history of religion 174 INTRODUCTION. ■with Christ, and not with the decay of naturalistic re- ligions and Judaism ; in Church history, with Luther and Zwinglius, not with the Babylonian exile, and the schism of the Popes ; in political history, with the French Revolution, not with Louis XV. The history of Philosophy must follow the same procedure; and, accordingly, we must regard Socrates as the first repre- sentative of that mode of thought, the principle of which he was the first to enunciate in a positive manner, and to introduce into actual life. ^ With Socrates then the second great period of Greek Philosophy begins. On the subject of its legitimate extent there is even more diflference of opinion than on that of its commencement. Some make it end with Aristotle,' others with Zeno,^ or Cameades ; ^ a third class of historians, with the first century before Christ;* while a fourth is disposed to include in it the whole course of Grreek Philosophy after Socrates, including the neo-Platonists.' In this case, again, our decision must depend on the answer to the question, how long the same main tendency governed the development- of Philosophy ? In the first place the close interconnection of the Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian philosophy is unmistakeable. Socrates first demanded that all knowledge and all moral action should start from knowledge of conceptions, and he tried to satisfy this demand by means of the epagogic method, which he introduced. The same conviction forms the starting- ' Brandis, Fries, and others. * Tennemami(GV«»<;9'isS), Ast, '^ Tennemann.inhislargerwork. Eeinhold, Schleiermaeher, Kitter, » Tiedemann, Geist. der Spek. Ueberweg, and others. FhiL. ' Braniss, vide si^ra. SECOND PERIOB. 175 point of the Platonic system; but what in Socrates is merely a rule for scientific procedure, is developed by Plato into a metaphysical principle. Socrates had said : Only the knowledge of the concept is true know- ledge. Plato says : Only the Being of thp concept is true Being, the concept alone is the truly existent. But even Aristotle, notwithstanding his opposition to the doctrine of Ideas, allows this : he too declares the form or concept to be the essence and reality of things ; pure form, existing for itself ; abstract intelli^ gence, restricted to itself — to be the 'absolutely real. He is divided from Plato only by his theory of the . relation of the ideal form to the sensible phenomenon, and to that which imderlies the phenomenon as its universal substratum — matter. According ta Plato, the idea is separated from things, and exists for itself; consequently the matter of things, having no part in the idea, is declared by him to be absolutely unreal. According to Aristotle, the form is in the_ things of which it is the form ; the material element in them must, therefore, be endgwed with a capability of receiving foym; matter is not simply non-Being, but f the possibility of Being ; matter and form have the same content, only in different fashion — in the one it is undeveloped, in the other developed.. Decidedly as this contradicts the theory of Plato considered in its . specific character, and energetically as Aristotle opposed his master, yet he is far from disagreeing with the uni- versal presupposition of the Socratic and Platonic philo- sophy, viz. the conviction of the necessity of knowledge based on concepts, and of the absolute reality of form. 176 INTRODUCTION On the contrary, his very reason for discarding the doctrine of Ideas, is that' Ideas cannot be substantial and truly existent, if they are separated from things. Thus far then we have a continuous development of one and the same principle ; it is one main fundamental intuition which is presented in these three forms. So- crates recognises in the concept the truth of human thought and life ; Plato, the absolute, substantial rea- lity ; Aristotle not merely the essence, but also the forming and moving principle of empirical reality; and in all we see the development of the self-same thought. But with the post-Aristotelian schools this order of development ceases, and thought takes another direction. The purely scientific interest of Philosophy gives place to the practical ; the independent investiga- tion of nature ceases, and the centre of gravity of the whole is placed in Ethics : and in proof of this altered position, all the post-Aristotelian ^chools, so far as they have any metaphysical or physical theory, rest upon older systems, the doctrines of which they variously interpret, but which they profess to follow in all essen- tial particulars. It is no longer the knowledge of things as such with which the philosopher is ultimately concerned, but the right and satisfactory constitution of human life. This is kept in view even in the reli- gious enquiries to which Philosophy now applies itself more earnestly. Physics are regarded by the Epicu* reans only as a means to this practical end ; and though the Stoics certainly ascribe a more independent value to general investigations concerning the ultimate grounds of things, yet the tendency of tho^e investiga- THIRD PERIOD^ 177 tions is nevertheless determined by that of their Ethics. In a similar manner, the question of a criterion of truth is answered from a practical point of view by the Stoics and Epicureans. Lastly, the Sceptics deny all possi- bility of knowledge, in order to restrict Philosophy entirely to practical matters. Even this practical philo- sophy, however, has changed its character. The earlier combination of Ethics with politics has ceased ; in place of the commonwealth in which the irfdividual lives for the whole, we find the moral ideal of the wise man who is self-sufficient,' self-satisfied, and self-absorbed ^ The introduction of the idea into practical life no longer appears as the highest object to be attained ; but the independence of the individual in regard to nature and humanity, — apathy, drapa^ia, flight froni the world of sense ; and though the moral consciousness, being thus indifferent to the outward, gains a freedom and univer- sality hitherto unknown to it, though the barriers of nationality are now first broken down, and the equality and affinity of all men, the leading thought of cosmo- politism is recognised, yet on the other hand Morality assumes a one-sided and negative character, which was alien to the philosophy of the classic period. In a word, the post-Aristotelian philosophy bears the stamp of an abstract subjectivity, and this so essentially separates it from the preceding systems that we have every right to conclude the second period of Greek Philosophy with Aristotle. It might, indeed, at first sight, appear that an analogous character is already to be found in Sophistic and the smaller Socratio schools. But these examples VOL. I. N 178 INTRODUCTION. cannot prove that PhilosopTiy as a whole had received its later bent in the earlier period. In the first place, the phenomena which prefigure in this way the after philosophy are few in number, and of comparatively secondary importance. The systems which give the measure of the period and by which the form of Philo- sophy, generally speaking, was determined, bear quite another character. And in the second place, this affinity itself, when more closely examined, is less than it appears on a superficial glance. Sophistic has not the same historical significance as the later scepticism ; it did not arise out of a general lassitude of scientific energy, but primarily out of an aversion to the pre- vailing naturalistic philosophy; and it did not, like scepticism, find its positive completion in an unscien- tific eclecticism or a mystic speculation, but in the Socratic philosophy of the concept. The Megaric philosophers are rather ofifshoots of the ELatics than precursors of the sceptics ; their doubts are originally directed against sense-knowledge, not against reason- knowledge. A universal scepticism is not required by them, nor do they aspire to arapa^la as the practical end of scepticism. Between Aristippus and Epicurus there exists this striking difference : the former makes immediate and positive pleasure the highest good, the latter absence of pain, as a permanent condition. Aris- tippus seeks the enjoyment of that which the external world offers; Epicurus seeks man's independence in regard to the external world. Cynicism, indeed, pushes indifference to the outward, contempt of custdm, and repudiation of all theoretic enquiry further than the THIRB PERIOD. 179 Stoa, but the isolated position of this school, and the crude form of its doctrine, suflSciently prove how Uttle can be argued from it as to the whole contemporary mode of thought. This remark applies to all these im- perfect Socratic schools. Their influence is not to be compared with that of the Platonic and Aristotelian ■ doctrines ; and they themselves prevent the possibility of their more important action, by disdaining to develop the principle of intellectual knowledge into a system. Only after the Greek world had undergone the most radical changes could attempts like those of the im- perfect Socratics be renewed with any prospect of success. I The second period then, closes with Aristotle, and the third begins with Zeno, Epicurus, and the contem- porary scepticism. Whether or not it should extend to the conclusion of Greek Philosophy is a doubtfid qjiestion. We shall find later on,* that in the post- Aristotelian philosophy three divisions may be dis- tinguished : the first, including the bloom of Stoicism, of Epicureanism, and of the older Scepticism ; the second, the period of Eclecticism, the later Scepticism, and the precursors of neo-Platonism ; the third, neo- Platonism in its various phases. If we count these three divisions as the third, fourth, or fifth periods of Greek Philosophy, there is this advantage, that the several periods are much more equal in duration than if we make all three into one period. But though they are thus equalised chronologically, they become even more disproportionate in content ; for the one ■ Vide the Introduction to Part III. H 2 180 INTRODUCTION. century from the appearance of Socrates to the death of Aristotle embraces an amount of scientific achieve- ment equal to the eight or nine following centuries put together. And, what is here most essential, Philosophy in these 900 years moves in the same uniform direction. It is governed by an exclusive subjectivity, which is estranged from the purely speculative interest in things, and reduces all science to practical culture and the happiness of man. This character is displayed (as we have just obserTed)^ by Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism!. It is seen in the Eclecticism of the Roman period, wabich seleets \idiat is probable out of the different systems entirely from practical points of view, and according to. the standard of subjective feeling and interest. Finally, it is an essential part of neo-Platonisni. This will be shown more in detail hereafter ; at present it is enough to notice that the attitude of the neo- Platonists to natural science- is exactly the same as that of the other schools posterior to Aristotle; and that their physics tend in the same direction as the Stoical teleology, only more excluBi\rely. Their ethical doctrine is also very closely allied to that of the Stoics, being in- deed the last outcome of that ethical dualism which developed itself after the time of Zeno; and the dualism contained in their anthropology had already been pre- pared by Stoicism. In regard to religion, the position originally adopted by neo-Platonism was precisely that of the Stoa, and even its metaphysic, including the doctrine of the intuition of the Deity approaches much nearer to the other Aristotelian systems than might at first sight be- supposed. The neo-Platonic theory of THIRD PERIOD. 181 emanation, for example, is an unmistakable repetition of the Stoic doctrine of the Divine reason permeating the whole universe with its various forces : the only ultimate distinction between them is the transcendency of the Divine ; from which arises for man, the require- ments of an ecstatic contact with Deity. This transcen- dency itself, however, is a consequence of the previous development of science, and of the sceptical denial of all objective certainty. The human spirit, scepticism had said, has absolutely no truth within itself. It must, therefore, says neo-Platonism, find truth absolutely out- side itself, in its relation to the Divine, which is beyond its thought and the world cognisable by thought. But it follows that the world beyond is presented entirely according to subjective points of view, and determined by the necessities of the subject ; and just as the dif- ferent spheres of the real correspond to the different parts of human nature, so the whole system is desigfned to point out and to open the way for man's communion with Grod. Here too then, it is the interest of human spiritual life, not that of objective knowledge as such, which governs the system ; and thus neo-Platonism fol- lows the tendency peculiar to the whole of Philosophy subsequent to Aristotle. While, therefore, I attach no undue'importance to this question, I prefer to unite the three sections into which the history of Philosophy after Aristotle is divided into one period,' although its outward extent far exceeds that of either of the preceding periods. To sum up, I distinguish three great periods of Crreek Philosophy. The philosophy of the first is Physics, or more accurately a physical dogmatism; it 182 INTRODUCTION. is physical, because it primarily seeks to explain natural phenomena from their natural causes, without making any definite discrimination of spiritual and corporeal in things, or the causes of things ; it is a dogmatism, be- cause it directly pursues the knowledge of the objective, without any previous enquiry into the conception, pos- sibility, and conditions of knowledge. In Sophistic, this attitude of thought to the external world is at an end, man's capacity for the knowledge of the real is called in question, philosophic interest is averted from nature, and the necessity of discovering a higher principle of truth on the soil of human consciousness makes itself felt. Socrates answers the demand in declaring the cognition of the concept the only way to true knowledge and true virtue ; from which Plato further concludes, that only pure concepts can be true reality ; he establishes this principle dialectically in conflict with ordinary presentative opinion, and deve- lops it in a system embracing Dialectic, Physics, and Ethics. Finally, Aristotle discovers the concept in the phenomena themselves, as their essence and entelechy, carries it in the most comprehensive manner into all the spheres of the actual, and establishes the prin- ciples of the scientific method on a firm basis for after times. In place of tlie former one-sided philosophy of nature there thus appears in the second period a philo- sophy of the concept, founded by Socrates and perfected by Aristotle. But since the idea is thus opposed to the phenomenon, since a full essential Being is ascribed to the idea, and only an imperfect Being to the pheno- menon, a dualism arises, which appears indeed more GBNERAL SUMMARY. 18S glaring and irreconcilable in Plato, but which even Aristotle is unable to overcome either in principle or in result; for he, too, begins with the opposition of form and material, and ends with that of God and the world, of spiritual and sensible. Only the spirit in its absoluteness, directed to no external object and suf- ficing to itself, is perfect and infinite ; that which is external to it cannot increase this inner perfection or be otherwise than valueless and indifferent for it. So, too, the human spirit ought to seek its unqualified satisfaction in itself, and in its independence of every- . thing external. Thought in pursuing this tendency withdraws from the object into itself, and the second period of Greek Philosophy passes into the third. Or to state the same more succinctly. The spirit, we might say, is, during the first stage of Greek thought, immediately present to itself in the natural object ; in the second it separates itself from the natural object, that it fnay attain a higher truth in the thought of the super-sensible object ; and in the third it asserts itself in its subjectivity, in opposition to the object, as supreme and unconditioned. The stand-point, however, of the Greek world is thereby abandoned, while at the same time no deeper reconciliation of the opposing elements is possible on Greek soil. Thought being thus separated from the actual, loses its content, and becomes involved in a contradiction, for it maintains subjectivity to be the final and highest form of being, and yet opposes to it the Absolute in unattainable transcendency. To this contradiction Greek Philosophy ultimately succumbed. 184 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. FIEST PEEIOD, THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. INTEODDCTION. CHAEACTEB AND DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY DURING THE FIRST PEEIOD. FouK , schools are usually distinguished in the pre- Socratic period — the Ionic, the Pythagorean, the Eleatic, and the Sophistic. The character and internal relation of these schools are determined, partly accord- ing to the «;ope, partly according to the spirit of their, enquiries. In regard to the former, the distinctive peculiarity of the pre-Socratic period is marked ih the isolation of the three branches which were afterw&rdi united in Greek Philosophy: by the lonians, we are told. Physics were exclusively developed ; by the Pytha- goreans, Ethics ; by the Eleatics^ Dialectic : in Sophistic, we are taught to see the decline and fall of this ex- clusive science, and the indirect preparation for a more comprehensive science.' This difference of scientific, tendency is then brought into connection with the in- • Schleiermachsr, Gesch. der view, and adopted the foUomng; Phil, p, 18 sq., 61 eq. ; Eitter, division: 1. The older Ionian Gesoh. der Phil. i. 189 sqq. : Bran- Physics, including the Heracleitean* - ias, Geach. der Gr.-Bom. Phil. i. doctrine. 2. TheEleatics. 3. T}i6|i 42 sqq. ; Fichte^ Zeitschr.fiir Phi,- attempts to reconcile the opposition i to. xiii. (1844) p. 131 sqq. In his of -Being and Becoming (Empe-» Gesch. der Entmoklmgen d. Grieoh. docles, Anaxagoras, and the Ato- >.' PhU.'{i. 40), which appeared sub- mists). 4. The Pythagorean ' doc- sequently, Brandis abandoned this trine. > 5. Sophistic, rMi j PHYSICS, ETHICS, DIALECTIC. 185 trinsic difference between the Ionic and Doric tribes : ' some writers 2 making this the basis of their whole theory of ancient Philosophy, and deriving from the particialar traits of the Ionic and Doric character, the philosophic opposition of a realistic and an idealistic theory of the world. How the further division of our period is then connected with this point of view has been shown already. These differences, however, are by no means so real or so deeply seated as is here presupposed. Whether the Pythagorean doctrine was essentially ethical, and the Eleatic, dialectical in character, or whether these elements can be regarded as determining the two systems, we shall presently enquire ; and we shall find that they, as much as any part of the pre-Socratic Philosophy, arose from the inclination of natural science to investigate the essence of things, and especially of natural phenomena. Aristotle makes the general assertion that with Socrates, dialectical and ethical enquiries began, and physical enquiries were discontinued.' Hermann is, therefore, quite justified ' Of. Sehleiermaehfir, loc. cit., nor Dorians, tut a nnion of the- p. 18 sq. ' Among the lonians,' he two ; they are Ionian by birth, and says, 'the Being of things in man Dorian by language.' Bitter ex- is the predominant interest, and presses simihir opinions, loc. Hi. calm contemplation finds its ex- Hitter shares them to some extent preasion in Epic poetry. Among (p. 47), and in a less degree^ the Dorians the Being of man in Brandis, p. 47. things predominates ; man strives ^ Att, Rixuer, Braniss (vide against things, asserts his inde- mpra, p. 166 sqq.) Petersen, Phi- pendence in regard to them, and lologisch. histor. Studien, p. 1 sqq. ; proclaims himself as a unity in 'Seima,nn,Geaokichte tmd System des lyric poetry; Hence the develop- PWo, i. 141 sq., I6O4. cf. Bbckh's ment of Physics by the lonians, excellent remarks on this subject, and of Ethics by the Pythagoreans: Philolaiis, p. 39 sqq. As Dialtetic, is equally opposed tc 'Part. Amm. i. 1, 642 a, the two branches of Philosophy, 24 : among the earlier philoso- 60 the Eleatios are neither lonians phers there are only scattered fore- 186 THE PBE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. ia saying that it is impossible to maintain, even froifl the stand-point of the ancient thinkers, that Dialectics, Physics and Ethics came into existence together, and were of equal importance contemporaneously, for there could have been no question of any leading ethical principle until the preponderance of spirit over matter had been recognised ; nor could Dialectic, as such, have been consciously employed, before form in contrast with matter had vindicated its greater affinity to spirit.' The object of all philosophic investigation, he con- tinues, in its commencement was nature, and if even enquiry was incidentally carried into other spheres, the "standard which it applied, being originally taken from natural science, remained foreign to those spheres. We are, therefore, merely importing our own stand-point into the history of the earliest philosophic systems, in ascribing a dialectic character to one, an ethical ' character to another, a physiological character to a third ; in describing this system as materialistic, and that as formalistic, while all in truth pursue the same end, only in different ways.' The whole pre'-Socmticfii Philosophy is in its aim and content a philosophy of nature, and though ethical or dialectical conceptions ■may appear here and there in it, this never happens to such an extent, nor is any system sufficiently dis- casts of the conception of formal ittl ^Kpdrovs Se touto likv ijul^BiN causes : airLoi/ 5e rov ft^ iKdeip robs - rh Se C^reiv to irepl tpiireas' ^Ai?€*, TrpoyeveffTepovs ini rhv Tpoirov toC- irphs Se rijv xph^^f^oif aper^v Kot rqv, 8t< rb rl ^w ehat ual rb 6plKayovvris tois &\\ais ipuaio- he had been clearly cooscious of \6yois, iti ri ye iv tovt' iariv the difference between spiritual and iaov a\tT8yYT6v fiTTiKainepieihrjipei' i corporeal, he would not thus have KoAoi/ievos obpavds. expressed himself even in his hypo- * Metaph. i. 6, 987 b, 25 sqq. thkical explanation of phenomena. ^Metaph. i. 5, 989 a, 15: ' V. 94 sqq. ^Ivomai iii koI oItoi rhy apiSfiity ' Genet. Darst. der platan, vofil^ovns apx^v eTcoi /tol us SKtiv Ideenlehre, i. 378, cf. 28 sq. toTs oiat, ttol Sis irciflij re koI c{etj. » Metaph. i. 8, 989 b, 29 sqq. Ibid, b, 6: ioliauTi S' i>s iv 8^^)^ The Pythagoreans, it is true, admit eiBei t4 ffroix"" tc£tteii'' ^k toutuv non-sensible principles, but they yip &s hvTtap%6vTD>v aupeoTAvai nevertheless confine themselves en- tal ireirXiiirfiai a.a\ tV oiiaiav. 190 TSE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPST. ■with Protagoras, Democritus and Empedocles, among those who held that the sensible only is the real; ' and it is from this source that he derives the Eleatic theory of the sensible world.^ On all these points we must allow him to be fully justified. The Italian philo- sophers likewise commence with an enquiry into the essence and grounds of sensible phenomena ; and they seek for these in that which underlies things, and is not perceptible to sense. In so doing, they transcend indeed the ancient Ionian Physics, but not the later systems of natural philosophy. That the true essence of things is to be apprehended not by the senses, but by the understanding alone, is also taught by Hera- cleitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomistic Philosophy. They, too, hold that the ground of the sensible lies in the not-sensible. Democritus himself^ thorough materialist as he was, has no other definition for matter than the Eleatic conception of Being : Hera- eleitus considers the law and relation of the wholeto -be alone the permanent element in phenomena ; Anaxa- goras is the first who distinguishes spirit clearly and definitely from matter, and he. is for that reason, in a* iwell-known passage of Aristotle, placed far above all, his predecessors,' If, therefore, the opposition of Ma- ' Metaph. iv. 5, 1010 a. 1 Hapfievlii)v\ Siek rb iiiiBiv jikv &KKo, (after speaMng of Protagoras, De- irapo tV tuv aXaBiiTiiv ouaiav ^o- mocritus. Empedocles. and Parme- \afi$iiveiv elyai, roiairas Se -rirar nides): aKriov Sk t^j S6^s Toirois, [sc. ItKiviiTovs] vofiiraixpaToi ipiireis 5ti irfpl luv T&v ^rraii' riiv a\ii9ftai/ etvcp iarai ris yi/utrts 1) (I>p6viiiris, eo-K^irow, t4 S' ivra inteXafiov ftvat o8ti» /ifrimyKay 4irl ravra rois t4 oio-flijTck n6vov. 4KeiSer \6yovs. ' Oe Ccelo, iii. 1, 298 b, 21 ff: » Mefapki. 3,984 b, i5:mdv^ iKeiyai i^ [ol irepi Vlc\tffff6v re Kal rts iiniav iyetvai icaSairfp 4v Tois C4'^t^- h LONIANS AND DORIANS.. 191 terialism and Idealism is to furnish a principle of division for ancient philosophy, this division must be limited not only, as Braniss maintains, to the epoch pre- ceding Anaxagoras, but preceding HeracIeituSy/ Even then, strictly speaking, it is not applicable, nor does it take account of the intermediate position of the Pythagoreans between the lonians and the Eleatics. This double tendency of philosophic thought is also said to correspond with the opposition of the Ionic and Doric elements, and, accordingly, all the philosophers ^ until the time of Socrates, or rather Anaxagoras, are assigned either to an Ionic or a Doric series of develop- ment. This division is certainly more exact than that j of some of the ancient historians,' who divided the whole of Greek Philosophy into Ionian and Italian. But even in regard to the most ancient schools, so far AS their internal relations have to be represented, such a division can hardly be carried out. Among the Dorians, Braniss counts Pherecydes, the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics and Empedocles. Ast makes the addition of Leucippus and Democritus. Now it is difficult to see how Pherecydes can be placed among the Dorians, and the same may be said of Democritus, and probably Koi li> rfi (l>i(r€i rhv dtriov rov K6irtiov Galen (Hist. Phil. c. 2, p. 228) KoiTTJSTi^easirdaiisoTovirfitlXin/i^ivri Kiihu; this lastfurtherdivides the irap' t'mij Kiyovras robs wpdrepov. Italian philosophers into Pythago- ' Diogenes, i. 13; that he is reans and Eleatics, and so far agrees here following; older authorities is with the theory of three schools — clear (as Br^ndis loc. cit. p. 43 Italian, Ionian, and Eleatic (Cle- sho-ws) from the fact of the schools mens, Al. Strom, i. 3O0 c.) The re- he mentions only coming down to view of the earlier philosophers in the time of Clitomachns (129-110 Aristotle'sfirstbookof Metaphysics B.C.) cf. Augustine. Civ. Dei. ■viii. followstheoriler of dogmatic points 2 ; the Aristotelian Scholiast, Schol, of view, and would be out of place in Arist., 323, a, 36, and the Fseudo- in regard to our present purpose. 192 TEE PRE-SOCRATIC PBILOSOPSY. of Leucippus. Moreover, the founder of Pythagorisrii was by birth an Ionian of Asia Minor ; and though the Doric spirit manifests itself in his mode of life, his philosophy seems to betray the influence of the Ionian Physics. Empedocles was born,' it is true, in a Doric colony; but the language of his poem is that of the Ionian epos. The Eleatic School was founded by an Ionian of Asia Minor, it received its final development in an Ionian settlement, and in the person of one of its last great representatives, Melissus, it returned to Asia Minor.' There remain, therefore, of pure Dorians, only the Pythagoreans, with the exception of the founder of the school, and, if we will, Empedocles. It has been said that it is not necessary that the philosophers of either division should belong to it also by birth ; ^ and this condition certainly ought not to be insisted on ( in the case of every individual. But it is surely indis- 1 pensable with regard to each division as a "whole ; all j their members should be either Doric or Ionic, if not I by birth, at least by education. Instead of this, we *& / find more than half the so-called Dorian philosophers, / not only belonging by birth and extraction to the I lohian race, but receiving their education from it, / through national customs, civil institutions, and what \^is especially important^ languages Under these cir- cumstances, differences of tribe are of very secondary moment. They may have influenced the direction of ' Petersen (Philol. hist. Stu- has been shown by Hermann, dim, p. 15) also thinks he can dis- ZeiUchrift fur Alterthumsw., 1834, cover an ^olic element in the p. 298. Eleatics. That there is not the ' Braniss, loc. oit. p. 103. slightest ground for this conjecture I ^ONIANS AND DORIANS. 193 thought, but, cannot be regarded as having determined it.' In the ulterior development of these two series, the Ionian and the Dorian, Braniss opposes Thales to Pherecydes, Anaximander to Pythagoras, Anaximenes to Xenophanes, Heracleitus to Parmenides, Diogenes of ApoUonia to Empedocles. Such a construction, how- ever, does great violence to the historical character and relation of these men. On the Ionian side, it is incor- rect to place Heracleitus beside the earlier philosophers of that school, for he does not stand in a relation of simple progression to Anaximenes, as Anaximenes stands to Anaximander. Diogenes, on the other hand, was entirely uninfluenced by the philosophy of Hera- cleitus ; we cannot, therefore, say with Braniss (p. 128) that he was expressly related to that philosopher, and that he summed up the result of the whole Ionic development. Braniss is even more arbitrary in his treatment of the Dorians. In the first place, Phere- cydes, as has already been said (p. 89 sq.), is not, pro- perly speaking, a philosopher, still less is he a Doric or idealistic philosopher ; for what we know of him bears a close relation to the old Hesiodic-Orphic cosmogony, the mythic precursor of the Ionic Physics. Even the dis- crimination of organising force from matter, on which Braniss lays so much stress (p. 108) had been brought forward in a mythic manner by Hesiod, and in a more definite and philosophic form by Anaxagoras the Ionian ; whereas it is entirely wanting in the Italian Eleatic*,* ' So Bitter alsodeeidesji. 191 sq. as plastic force; but this second ^ The second part of Parme- part speaks only from the point of nides'poem (v. 131) mentions Eros view of ordinary, opinion. VOL. I. O 194 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. and is of doubtful value among the Pythagoreans. It is true that the belief in the transmigration of souls was shared by Pherecydes with Pythagoras, but this isolated doctrine, which is rather religious than philosophic, cannot be taken as decisive for the position of Phere- cydes in history. Further, if we connect Xenophanes with Pythagoras, as Parmenides is connected with Xenophanes, or An'aximenes with Anaximander, we ignore the iaternal difference which exists between the Eleatic stand-point and the Pythagorean. It is manifestly improper to treat a doctrine which has a principle of its own, essentially distinct from the Pythagorean principle, and which developed itself in a separate school, as a mere continuation of Pytha- gorism. Again, as we shaU. presently show, to place Empedocles exclusively in the Pythagorean-Eleatic series is to close our eyes to all aspects of the question but one. Lastly, what right has Braniss to pass over the later development of Pythagorism accomplished by Philolaus and Archytas ; and the development of the Eleatic doctrine effected by Zeno and Melissus, while he recognises men like Anaximenes and Diogenes of ApoUonia, who were in no way more important, as representatives of particular stages of development? His scheme is a Procrustean bed for historical pheno- mena, and the Doric Philosophy suffers doubly. At the one end it is produced beyond its natural propor- tions, and at the other it is denuded of members which are essentially part of its growth. The same holds good of Petersen's * earlier attempt ' PMlol. hist. Stud. pp. 1-iO. p. 286 sqq.),- from -whom the aboTe On the other hand, cf. Hermann remarks are partly taken, (Zeitschr. fw 'Alterthunmu., 1834, lOJXIAJVS AND DORIANS. 196 to determine the historical relation of the pre-Socratie schools. Here, too, the general principle is the oppo- sition of realism, or rather materialism, and idealism. This opposition developes itself in three sections, each of which is again subdivided into two parts : first, the opposing elements stand over against one another in sharp contrast; and secondly, there arise various at- tempts to conciliate them, which, however, accomplish no real adjustment, but still incline to one or other of the two sides. In the first section, the oppositions begin to develop themselves — the mathematical idealism of the Doric Pythagoreans confronts the hylozoistic materialism of the older lonians (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heracleitus and Diogenes), A reconcilia- tion is next attempted on the idealistic side by the Eleatics ; on the materialistic by the physician Elothales of Cos, his son Epieharmus and Alcmseon. In the second section, the contrasts become more marked ; we encounter, on the one hand, pure materialism, in the Atomists ; on the other, pure idealism in the later Pythagoreans, Hippasus, (Enopides, Hippo,: Ocellus, Timseus, and Archytas. Between these two, we find on the idealistic side the pantheism of Empedoeles, on the materialistic side the dualism of Anaxagoras. In the third and last section both tendencies pushed to excess equally lead to the destruction of Philosophy through the scepticism of the Sophists. Thus one uniform scheme is undoubtedly carried through the whole pre- Socratic Philosophy, but it is a scheme that scarcely corresponds with the actual order of history. It is unwarrantable, as we have just seen, to divide the philo- o !i 190 THE PRE-SOCItATIC PHILOSOPHY. sophers of this period into materialists, or realists, and idealists. Nor can we, for reasons to be stated more fully later on, admit the propriety of placing Hera- eleitus in one category with the ancient lonians, among the materialists. On the other hand, we must demur to the separation of the later Pythagoreans from the earlier; because the so-called fragments of their writings, which alone would justify it, are certainly to be re- gairded as forgeries of the neo-Pythagoreans. How the Eleatics can be assigned to an intermediate position between the lonians and Pythagoreans, whereas they carried to the utmost that abstraction from the sensible phenomena which the Pythagoreans had begun, it is difficult to say, nor can we concur in opposing to the Eleatics, Elothales, Epicharmus, and Alemseon as ma- terialists with incipient dualism. These men were not, indeed, systematic philosophers ; but any isolated philo- sophic sentences they ado.pted seem to have been chiefly derived from the Pythagorean's and Eleatic doctrines. Lastly, how can Empedocles be considered an idealist ; and Anaxagoras with his theory of vovs a materialist ? and how can the system of Empedoeles, with its six primitive essences, of which four were of a corporeal kind, be described as pantheism, and more particularly ,as idealistic pantheism ? ' ' Steinhart is allied -with Bra- ism, but a mixture of the Doric and niss and Petersen {Allg. Encykl. n). Ionic elements. The Ionic Philo- Ersoh. und Grube, Art. 'lonische sophy he considers to have had Sohide,' Sect. 2, vol. xxii. 457. He three stages of development. In distingnishes.like them, the Ionic Thales, Anaximander, and Anaxi- and Doric Philosophy ; in the case menes, he says, -we first find obscure ■ of the Pythagoreans, however, and and scattered intimations of a still more in that of the Eleatics, spiritual power that rules in the what he finds is not pure Dorian- world. In Heracleitus, Diogenes, GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS. 197 The foregoing discussions have now paved the way for a positive determination of the character and course of philosophic development during our first period. I have characterised tJie Philosophy of that period (irre- spectively for the present of Sophistic), as a philosophy of nature. It is so by virtue of the object which oc- cupies it : not that it limits itself exclusively to nature in the narrower sense, — that is to' say, to the corporeal, and the forces unconsciously working in the corporeal ; for such a limit of its sphere would necessarily presup- pose a discrimination of spiritual ,and corporeal which does not as yet exist. But it is for the most part occupied with external phenomena; the spiritual, so far as that domain is touched, i-s regarded from the same point of view as the corporeal ; and consequently there can be no independent development of Ethics and Dialectic. All reality is included under the conception of Nature, and is treated as a homogeneous mass, and since that which is perceptible to the senses always forces itself first upon our observation, it is natural that everything should at first be derived from those prin- ciples which appear most adapted to explain sensible existence. The intuition of nature is thus the starting- and above all in Anaxagoras, the to me .a doubtful proceeding to recognition of the spiritual princi- separate EDvpedocles from the pie becomes constantly clearer. Atomists and Anaxagoras, to whom Lastly, LeucippuB and IJemocritus he is so nearly related ; nor can I deny the spiritual principle in a, convince myself that the Atomistic conscious manner, and thus prepare Philosophy had its origin in a reac- the destruction of this exclusively tion against the theory of a world- physical philosophy. Leaving out forming spirit, and is later in its of the question the opposition of origin 5ian the Anaxagorean phy- the Doric and Ionic elements, the sics. And lastljr, as will presently importance of which Steinhart him- appear, I cannot altogether agree self considerably reBtricts, it seems witi Steinhart's view of Diogenes. 198 TSE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. point of the earliest philosophy, and even when imma/- terial principles are admitted, it is evident that they have been attained through reflection on the data fur- nished by the senses, not through observation of spiritual life. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, for in- stance, is immediately connected with the perception of regularity in the relations of tones, in the distances and movements" of the heavenly bodies; and the doctrine of Anaxagoras of the vovs which forms the world has refer- ence primarily to the wise organisation of the world, and especially to the order of the celestial system. Even the Eleatic theses of the unity and unchange- ableness of Being are not arrived at by opposing the spiritual as a higher reality to the sensible pheno- mena ; but by eliminating from the sensible all that seems to involve a contradiction, and by conceiving the corporeal or the plenum in an entirely abstract manner. Here too, therefore, it is, generally speaking, nature with which Philosophy is concerned. To this its object, thought still stands in an irmneh diate relation, and considers the material investigation of nature as its first and only problem. The knowledge of the object is not as yet dependent on the self-know- ledge of the thinking subject, on a definite conscious- ness of the nature and conditions of knowing ; on the discrimination of scientific cognition and imscientific pre- sentation. This discrimination is constantly spoken of from the time of Heracleitus and Parmenides, but it appears, not as the basis, but only as a consequence of the enquiry into the nature of things. Parmenides denies the trustworthiness of the sensuous perception^ GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS. 199 ioecause it shows us an immoveable Being ; Empedocles, because it makes the union and separation of material substances appear as a process of becoming and passing away; Democritus and Anaxagoras, because it cannot reveal the primitive constituents of things. We find in these philosophers no definite principles as to the nature of knowledge which might serve to regulate , objective enquiry, in the way that the Socratic demand for knowledge based on conceptions probably served Plato: and though Parmenides and Empedocles in their didactic poems exhort us to the thoughtful con- sideration of things, and withdrawal from the senses, they do so almost always in an exceedingly vague manner ; and it does not follow because such a discrimi- nation finds place in their poems, that in their systems it may not be the consequence instead of the presuppo- sition of their metaphysic. Although, therefore, their metaphysic laid the foundation for the after develop- ment of the theory of knowledge, it is not itself, as yet, a theory of knowledge. The pre-Socratic Philosophy is, as to its form, a dogmatism : thought, fully believing in its own veracity, applies itself directly to the object ; and the obgective view of the world first gives rise to the propositions concerning the nature of knowledge which prepare the way for the later Philosophy of con- ceptions. If we ask, lastly, what are the philosophic results of A / the first period, we fend, as has already been pointed {/ out, that the pre-Sooratic systems attempted no accu- rate discrimination between the spiritual and the cor- poreal. The early Ionian physicists derived everything 200 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. from matter, which they held to be moved and animated by its own inherent force. The Pythagoreans substitute number for matter ; the Eleatics, Being, regarded as in- variable Unity : but neither of them, as we have already remarked, distinguished the incorporeal principles as to their essential nature, from the corporeal phenomenon. Consequently, the incorporeal principles are themselves apprehended materially, and so in man, soul and body, ethical and physical, are considered from the same points of view. This confusion is particularly striking in Heracleitus, for in his conception of everliving fire he directly unites primitive matter with taotive force and the law of the universe. The Atomistic philoso- phy is from the outset directed to a strictly material explanation of nature, and therefore neither within man nor without him does it recognise any immaterial element. Even Empedocles cannot have apprehended his moving forces in a purely intellectual manner, for he treats them precisely like the corporeal elements with which they are mingled in things ; so too in man the spiritual intermingles with the corporeal ; blood is the faculty of thought. Anaxagoras was the first to teach definitely that the spirit is unmixed with any material element ; but in Anaxagoras we reach the limit of the ancient Philosophy of Nature. Moreover, according to him, the world-forming spirit operates merely as a force of nature, and is represented in a half sensible form as a more subtle kind of matter. This particular example, therefore, cannot afifect our previous judgment of the pre-Socratic Philosophy so far as its general and predominant tendency is concerned. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS. ' 201 All these traits lead us to recognise as the charac- teristic peculiarity of the first period, a preponderance of natural research over introspective reflection ; an absorp- tion with the outer world which prevents thought from bestowing separate study on any object besides nature, from distinguishing the spiritual from the corporeal in an exact and definite manner ; from seeking out the form and the laws of scientific procedure for themselves. Overborne by external impressions, man at first feels himself a part of nature, he therefore knows no higher probleSi ^-for his thought than the investigation of nature, he applies himself to this problem, impartially and directly, without stopping previously to enquire into the subjective conditions of knowledge ; and even when his investigation of nature itself carries him be-j yond the sensible phenomena as such, yet he does not advance beyond nature considered as a whole, to an/ ideal Being, which has its import and its subsistence in itself. Behind the sensible phenomena, forces and substances are indeed sought which cannot be perceived by the senses ; but the effects of these forces are the things of nature, the essences not apprehended by sense are the substance of the sensible itself, and no- thing besides ; a spiritual world side by side with the material world has not yet been discovered. How far this description applies also to Sophistic we have already seen. The interest of natural research and the belief in the truth of our presentments are now at an end, but no new road to knowledge and higher reality is as yet pointed out ; and far from opposing the kingdom of the spirit to nature, the Sophists regard ^ 203 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. man himself as a merely sensuous being. Although, therefore, the pre-Socratic natural philosophy is abolished in Sophistic, Sophistic like its predecessors, knows of nothing higher than Nature, and has no other material to work on ; the change consists not in oppos- ing a new form of science to a previous form, but in making use of the existing elements, particularly the Eleatic and Heracleitean doctrines, to introduce doubt into scientific consciousness, and to destroy belief in the possibility of knowledge. Thus we are compelled, by the results of our in- Testigation, to bring the three oldest schools of Philo- sophy — the Ionian, the Pythagorean, and the Eleatic — into a closer connection than has hitherto been cus- tomary. They are not only very near to each other in respect to time, but are much more alike in their scientific character than might at first sight be sup- posed. While they agree with the whole of the early Philospphy in directing their enquiries to the explana^ tion of nature, this tendency is in their case more rparticularly shown in a search for the substantial J ground of tnl^gs : in demanding what things are in their proper essence, and of what they consist; the problem of the explanation of Becoming, and passing away, of the movement and multiplicity of phenomena is not as yet distinctly graspedIT" Thales makes all things originate and consist in water, Anaximander in infinite matter, Anaximenes in air ; the Pythagoreans say that everything is Number ; the Eleatics that the All is one invariable Being. Now it is true that the Elea- tics alone, and they only subsequently to Parmenides, GENERAL CHAHACTERISTICS. 203. denied movement and Becoming, whereas the lonians and the Pythagoreans minutely descrihe the formation of the world. But they neither of them propounded the question of the possibility of Becoming and of divided Being in this general manner, nor in the estab- lishment of their principles did they attempt particular definitions in regard to it. The lonians tell us that the primitive matter changes ; that from matter, originally one, contrary elements were separated and combined ih various relations to form a world. The Pythagoreans say that magnitudes are derived from numbers, and from magnitudes, bodies ; but on what this process was based, how it came about that matter was moved and transmuted, that numbers produced something other than themselves, — they make no scientific attempt to explain. What they seek is not so much to explain phenomena from general principles, as to reduce phe- nomena to their first principles. Their scientific in- terest is concerned rather with the identical essence of things, the substance of which all things consist, than with the multiplicity of the phenomena and the causes of that multiplicity. When the Elaitics, there- fore, entirely denied the Becoming and the Many they merely called in question an unproved presupposition of their predecessors ; and in apprehending all reality as a unity absolutely excluding multiplicity, they only carried out more perfectly the tendency of the two older schools. Heracleitus was the first to see in motion, change, and separation, the fundamental quality of the primitive essence ; and the polemic of Parmenides first occasioned Philosophy to enquire more 204 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. thoroughly into the possibility of Becoming.^ With eracleitus, then, philosophic development takes a new direction : the three older systems, on the contrary, fall together under the same class, inasmuch as they are all satisfied with the intuition of the substance of which things consist, without expressly seeking the cause of multiplicity. and change, as such. This substance was sought by the lonians in a corporeal matter, by the Pythagoreans in number, by the Eleatics in Being as such. By the first it was apprehended sensuously, by the second mathematically, by the third metaphysi-. cally; but these differences only show us the gradual development of the same tendency in a progression from the concrete to the abstract ; for nimiber and mathe- matical form are a middle term between the sensible and pm*e thought; and were afterwards regarded, by Plato especially, as their proper connecting Unk. The turning-point which I here adopt in the development of the pre-Socratic Philosophy has been already remarked by other historians in respect of the Ionian schools. On this ground Schleiermacher^ first distinguished two periods in the Ionian Philosophy, the ' From this point of view it conception of Being and Becoming, might seem preferable to commence But the connection between Parme- the second section ofthe first period nides and Xenophanes would thus with Parmenides, as well as Hera- be broken ; and as the doctrine of cleitus, as my critic in the Reperto- Parmenides, in spite of all its his- riiim of Gersdorf (1844, H. 22, p. torical and scientific importance, 335) proposes, seeing that up to the approximates closely in its content time of these two philosophers (as and tendency to the earlier sys- he observes) the question, whence tems, it appears on the whole bet- all things arose, had been answered tor to make Heracleitus alone the by theories of matter, and that starting-pointof the second section. Heracleitus and Parmenides were ' Gesch. der Phil. ( Vorl. v. J. the first to enquire concerning the 1812) p. 33. EARLIER AND LATER PHYSICISTS. 205 second of which begins with Heracleitus. Between this philosopher and his predecessors, he says, there is a considerable chronological gap, probably in consequence of the interruption occasioned to philosophic pursuits by the disturbances in Ionia. Moreover, while the three most ancient lonians came from Miletus, Philo- sophy now spreads itself geographically over a much wider sphere. Also, in the content of his philosophy, Heracleitus rises far above the earlier physicists, so that he may, perhaps, have derived little from them. Eitter,' too, acknowledges that Heracleitus differs in, many respects from the older lonians, and that his theory of the uniyersal force of nature places him quite in a separate order from them. Brandis,^ in still closer agreement with Schleiermacher, holds that with Heracleitus commences a new period in the de- velopment of the Ionian Philosophy, to wbich, besides Heracleitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, De- mocritus, Diogenes, and Archelaus likewise belong ; all these being distinguished from the earlier philo- sophers by their more scientific attempts to derive the multiplicity of particulars from a primitive cause, by their more explicit recognition or denial of the dis- tinction between spirit and matter, as also of a Divinity that forms the world ; and by their common endeavour to establish the reality of particulars and their varia- tions in opposition to the doctrine of the Eleatic One, These remarks are quite true, and only, perhaps, open to question with regard to Diogenes of Apollonia. But it ' Gesch. der Phil. 242, 248 ; ' Gr.-rSm. Phil. i. 149. Ion. Phil. 65. ^J^. _\ h 206 TSJE PBE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. is not enough to make this difference the dividing-line between two classes of Ionic physiologists ; it is deeply ^-looted in the whole of the pre-Socratic Philosophy. Neither the doctrine of Empedocles, nor that of Anaxa- goras, nor that of the Atomists can be explained \j the development of the Ionian physiology as such ; their relation to the Eleatics is not the merely negative rela- tion of disallowing the denial of Eeality, Becoming, and Multiplicity ; they positively learned a good deal from the Eleatic school. They all acknowledge the great .principle of the system of Parmenides, that there is no Becoming or passing away in the strict sense of the terms ; consequently they all explain phenomena from the combination and separation of material elements, and they in part borrow their concept of Being directly from the Eleatic metaphysics. They ought, theref<)re, to be placed after the Eleatic school, and not before it. In gard to Heracleitus, it is less certain whether, or how far, he concerned himself with the beginnings of the Eleatic Philosophy ; in point of fact, however, his posi- tion is not only entirely antagonistic to the Eleatics, but he may generally be said to en ter upon a new co urse altogether dive^ent froinp._tlLat_hithertoJollowed! In denying all fixedness in the constitution of things, and recognising the law of their variability as the only per- manent element in them, he declares the futility of the \ previous science which made matter and substance the ; chief object of enquiry ; and asserts the investigation lof the causes and laws which determine Becoming and 'Change to be the true problem of Philosophy. Thus, although the question as to the essence and material EARLIER AND LATER PHYSICISTS. 207 substance of things was not overlooked by Hera- cleitus and his followers, any more than the account of the formation of the world was omitted by the lonians and Pythagoreans, the two elements stand with each af them in a very different relation. In the one case, the enquiry as to the substance of things is the main point, and the notions about their origin are dependent upon the answer given to this question ; in the other, the chief question is that of the causes of Becoming and Change, and the manner of conceiving the original substance of Being depends upon the determinations which appear necessary to the philosopher to explain Becoming and Change. The lonians make things arise out of the rarefaction and condensation of a primitive matter, because this best adapts itself to their notion of primitive matter; the Pythagoreans hold to a mathematical construction, because they reduce every- thing to number; the Eleatics deny Becoming and Motion, because they find the essence of things in Being alone. On the contrary, Heracleitus makes fire the primitive matter, because on ,this theory only can he explain the flux of all things ; Empedocles presup- poses four elements and two moving forces ; Leucippus and Democritus presuppose the atoms and the . void, because the multiplicity of phenomena seems to them to require a multiplicity of material primitive elements, • and the change in phenomena a moving cause ; Anaxa- goras was led by siiiular considerations to his doctrine of the ofioio/ieprj and the world-intelligence. Both sets of philosophers speak of Being and Becoming ; but in the one case the definitions respecting Becoming / 208 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. appear only as a consequence of their theory of Being ; in the other, the definitions of Being are merely pre- suppositions in the theory of Becoming. In assigning, therefore, the three most ancient schools to a first division of pre-Socratic Philosophy, and Heracleitus, and the other physicists of the fifth century to a second, we follow not merely the chronological order, but the \ internal rd ^tion. of these philosophers. The course of philosophic development in the second division may be more precisely described as follows : — First, the law of Becoming is proclaimed by Heracleitus unconditionally as the universal law of the world ; the reason of which he seeks in the original constitution of matter. The concept of Becoming is next enquired into more particularly by Empedocles and the Atomists. Greneration is identified with the union, and decease with the separation of material elements : consequently, a plurality of original material elements is assumed, the motion of which has to be conditioned by a second principle distinct from them ; but whereas Empedocles makes his primal elements of matter qualitatively dif- ferent one from another, and places over against them moving force in the mythical forms of friendship and discord, the Atomists recognise only a mathematical difference between the primitive bodies, and seek to ■ explain their motion in a piu-ely mechanicEil manner from the operation of weight in empty spa^e ; space they consider indispensable, because without it, as they believe, no plurality and no change would be possible. This mechanical explanation of Nature Anaxagoras finds inadequate. He therefore sets spirit beside matter as THE LATER PHYSICISTS. 209 moving cause, discriminates them one from the other as the compound and the simple, and defines primitive matter as a mixture of all particular matters ; a mix- ture, however, in which these particular matters exist and are already qualitatively ' determined. Heraclei- tus explains these phenomena dynamically, from the qualitative change of one primitive matter, which is conceived as essentially and perpetually changing ; Empedocles and the Atomic philosophers explain them mechanically, from the union and separation of different primitive matters ; Anaxagoras finally is persuaded that they are not to he explained hy mere matter, hut by ' the working of the spirit upon matter. At this point, in the nature of the case, the purely physical explana- tion of nature is renounced ; the discrimination of spirit from matter, and the higher rank .which it assumes in opposition to matter, demands a recasting of science generally on the basis of this conviction. As, however. Thought is as yet incapable of such a task, the imme diate result is that philosophy is bewildered in regard to its general vocation, despairs of objective knowledge, and places itself, as a means of formal development, in the service of the empirical subjectivity which acknow- ledges the validity of no universal law. This is effected in the third section of the pre-Socratic Philosophy by means of Sophistic' ' Tennematin and Fries adopt distinguish the two main currents this arrangement of thepre-Socratic of ancient physics, and, as before schools on purely chronological noticed, he separates Sophistic from grounds. Hegel bases it on scien- the other pre-Socratic doctrines. It tific observations concerning the is to be foiD'd, too, in Braniss, to internal relation of the systems, whose general presupposition I He does ndt, however, expressly must nevertheless demur. Among VOL. I. P 210 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PniLOSOPHY. the more recent ■writers, Noack, and previously Schwegler, adopt my riew ; Haym, on the contrary {Allg. Encyk. Sect. 3 B. xxiv. p. 25 sqq.), though in harmony with me in other respects, places Heracleitus before theEleatics. In his history of Greek Philosophy, p. 11 sq.Sch-weg- ler discusses: 1, the lonians; 2, the Pythagoreans ; 3, the Eleatics ; and 4, Sophistic, as the transition to the second period. He defends the subdivision of the lonians into earlier and later, for the reasons stated on p. 202 sq. ; and assigns to the earlier, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes ; to the later, He- racleitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. So also Ribbing {Platon. Ideenlehre, i. 6 sqq.) con- siders that since Heracleitus, Empedocles, the Atomists, and Anaxagoras are, in their principles, lower than the Pythagoreans and Bleatics, they, as -well as the older lonians, must be placed before them. Ueberweg has the follow- ing division : 1, the older lonians, including Heracleitus ; 2, the Pythagoreans ; 3, the Eleatics ; 4, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomiste. The Sophists he places in thesecondperiod, of which they form the first chapter ; Socra- tes and his succpssors, as far as Aristotle, constitute the second; Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scep- ticism, the third. I cannot now enter upon any detailed examina- tion of these differentclassifications. It will be seen in the course of this exposition what are my objec- tions to the theory of Striimpell ( Gesch. der Theoret. Fhil. der Grie- chen, 1864, p. 17 sq.), in point of chronology as well as the internal aspects of the subject. His expo- sition of the pre-Socratie Philoso- phy is as follows : First, the older Ionian Physiologists, starting from the contemplation of the changes in nature, arrive in Heracleitus at the conception oforiginalBecoming. To this doctrine the Eleatics op- pose a system which entirely denies Becoming, whilecontemporaneously the later Physicists, on the one side Diogenes, Leucippus, and De- mocritus : on the other,' Empedo- cles and Anaxagoras, reduce it to mere motion. A reconciliation of the opposition between Becoming and Being, and between Opinion and Knowledge, was attempted by the Pythagoreans ; and Sophistic is a dialectic solution of this oppo- sition. It will suffice at present to say that the position of Hera- cleitus, the Eleatics, Diogenes, and more especially the Pythagoreans, appear to me more or less misre- presented by this arrangement. . THAZES. 211 § I.— THE EARLIEE lONIANS, THE PYTHA- GOEEANS AND ELEATI08. THE EAELIEK IONIAN PHTSICS.' I. THALES.' Thales is reputed to be the founder of the Ionian Naturalistic Philosophy. He was a citizen of Miletus, a contemporary of Solon and Croesus,* whose ancestors third edition) ; Hansen (Abhand- lungen der Jconigl. sacks. Gesellsch. der Wissensehaft. vol. xi. ; Math, phys. Kl. vol. vii. p. 379) ; Martin {Bevtte Arckhloffique, nouv. sir., vol, ix._lS64, p. .184), and other autho- rities, that which occurred on the 28th, or, according to the Grego- rian calendar, the 22nd of May, 585 B.C. Pliny, in his Natural History, ii. 12, 53, places it in the fourth year of the 48th Olympiad (684-6 B.C.), 170 A.U.O. ; Eudemus ap. Clemens, Stromaia, i. 302 A, about the fourth year of the 50th Olympiad (580-576) ; Eusebius in his Chron. in 01. 49j 3, 682-1 ; they, therefore, take the second eclipse, which is most accurately calculated hy Pliny. About the same time (under the Archon Da- masius, 686 B.C.) Demetrius Phale- reus ap. Diog. i, 22 makes Thales and the rest to have received their designation of the seven wise men. According to ApoUodorus, Diog. i. 38, Thales was 78 years old ; (Decker's proposal, p. 18 sq., to sub- stitute 96 does not commend iteel? to me) according to Sosicrates (ibid.), 90; according to Pseudo Lucian {Maorob. 18), 100 ; according to Syncell. (p. 213 C), more than 100. His death is placed by Dio- genes, he. eit., in the 58th Olym- 2 ' Ritter, Gesch. der Ion. Phil., 1821. Steinhart, Ion. SchuU, Allg. Eneyk. v. ; Ersch und Gniier, Sect. II., vol. xxii. 457-490. ^ Decker, I)e Thal-ete Milesio. Halle, 1865. Older monographs in Ueberweg, Grundriss. der Gesch. der Phil., i. 35 sq., 3rd edition. " This is beyond question ; but the chronology of his life (on which cf. Diels on the Chronicle of Apol- lodorus. Skein. Mus., xxxi. 1, 15 eq.) cannot be more precisely fixed. According to Diogenes i. 37, Apol- lodorus placed his birth in the first year of the 3Sth Olympiad, i.e. 640-639 B.C. Eusebius places it in the second year of the 36th Olympiad, and Hieronymus also in the 35th Olympiad, Chron. 1. But this statement is probably founded only on some approximate calcula- tion of the eclipse of the sun, which Thales is said to have pre- dicted (vide «/?•. p. 213, 3). This is not, asnsedformerlytobesupposed, the eclipse of 610 b.c. ; but, ac- cording to Airy (On the Eclipses of Agathocles, Thales, atid Xerxes, Philosophical Transactions, vol. cxliii. p. 179 sqq.); Zech (Astrono- mische TIntersuohungen der wich- tigeren Finsternisse, &c., 1 863, p. 57, with which ef. Ueberweg, Grund- riss der Gesch. der Phil, i. 36, 212 THALES. are said to have immigrated to their later home from Phoenicia, but more probably from Boeotia.' The con- piad ; likewise by Euaebius, Hiero- nymus, and CyriUus, loo. cit. ; but in that case, as is shown by Dials, and confirmed by Porphyry (ap. Ahwlfaradasch, p. 33, ed. Pooocke), }]is birth cannot have been assign- ed by Apollodoms to 01. 35, l,but to 01. 39, 1 (624 B.C.; 40 years before tbfe eclipse), and. the diver- gent statements must be ascribed to some ancient corruption of the text in 1^« source consulted by Diogenes. As to the manner of Thales's death and his burial-place, some untrustworthy accounts are to be found in Diog.. i. 39, ii. 4 ; Plut.,. Solon, 12 ; some epigrams relating to' him, in Anthol. vii. 83 sq., Diog. 34. WhethertheThales mentioned in Arist. Polit. ii. 12, 1274 a, 25, as the scholar of Ono- macritus, and the teacher of Ly- curgus and Zaleucus, is the Milesian philosopher, or some other person, matters little; aiid the unfavour- able judgment, which, according to Aristotle, ap. Diog. ii. 46 (ijf, indeed, the statement be his at all), Phereeydes passed upon Thales, is equally unimportant. ' Herodotus, i. 170, says of him : &d\eu aySphs W.t\rifflov, rh avelcaicv ytvos 46vtos ^oivtKos ; Clemens, Strom, i. 302 C, simply calls him ^oivi^ rh yivos ; and, ac- cording to Diogenes, i. 22, (where, however, Eoper, Fhilol. xxx. 663, proposes to read i'Ttoki/rfiiitaav, and ^X6«*), he seems to have been regai'd«d as a Phcenician im- migrant, settled in Miletus. This statement is probably founded on the fact that his ancestors belonged to the Cadmean tribe in Boeotia, who were intermingled with the lonians of Asia Minor (Herod, i. 146 ; Strabo, xiv. 1, 3, 12, p. 633, 636;Pausan.vii.2,7). Aecordingto Pausanias, a great number of The- ban Cadmeans established them- selves in Priene, for which reason the name of the place was altered • to Cadme. HeUanicus in Hesychius sub voc. also calls the inhabitants of Priene KaS/iioi. For Diogenes, i. 22, says ; ^v Toivuv 6 0a\^s, &s /lEi/ 'Hp^^OTOS fcal Aovpts Kal AijfjLd- Kptrds (pvi^h "Jrarphs /lev 'Efa^ufou, fiTjTphs Se KKeo^ovKljnjs, 4k tuv ®Tj\iBuv (or 0i}A.uS.) o'i etffi ^olvt- Kes, evyevetrraTOi T&v . airi KdS/xou Kal 'Aylivopos. He thus explains- the ^oTi'if by 'descendant of Cad- mus ' ; following either Duris or Democritus, or, at any rate, some very trustworthy source. Herodo- tus, however, shows by the word hviKoSfV that not Thales himself, but only his remote ancestors had belonged to the Phoenicians. If Thales was only in this sense ioTvil, his nationality, even if the story of the immigration of Cad- mus have any foundation in his- tory, is Greek and not Phoenician ; nor is this statement affected by the circumstance (vide Schuster, Aeta'soc. philol. Lips. iv. 328 sq. ; cf. Decker, Se Thole., 9) that ihe father of Thales perhaps lore a name that was Phoenician in its origin. Diog., loc. cit., and 1, 29, according to our text, calls him in the genitive 'E|B;tt(o«. Por this we must read 'E^afiiov ; and some manuscripts have 'Eia/iiKov or 'E^aiivoi\ov, which certainly points to a Semitic extraction. But this Graeco-Phcenician name, like that of Cadmus and many othersj may BIOGRAPHY. 313 sideration in which he was held by his fellow- citizens is sufficiently shown by the place which he occupies as chief of the seven sages.* This has refei-ence in the first instance, it is true, to his practical ability and worldly prudence of which other proofs have come down to us ; * but we hear also that he distinguished h'^T '"^^ ^y ^V knowledge of mathematics and astronomy ,^and that he have been kept up- centuries long among the Phoenicians settled in Greece. We cannot infer from it a direct Phoenician descent, either for Thales or his father. His mother's name is wholly Greek. ' Cf. p. 119 sq.; Timon ap. Diog. i. 34; Cic. Legg. ii. 11, 26 ; Ac^. ii. 37, 118; Aristophanes, Glmds, 180; Birds, 1009; Plautus, Bud. iv. 3, 64 ; Bacck. ,i. 2, 14. In Ca^t. ii. 2, 124, Thales is a pro- Yerbial name for a great sage. For sayings ascribed to him cf. Diog. i. 35 sgq. ; Stoliaeus, Floril. iii. 79, 5 ; Plutarch, 8. sap. conv. c. 9. ' According to Herodotus, i. 170, he counselled the lonians, be- fore ,their subjugation by the Per- sians, to form a confederation with a united central government to re- sist them ; and, according to Diog. 25, it was he who dissuaded the Milesians from provoking the dan- ■gerous enmity of Cyrus by an alliance with Croesus. It is not consistent with this, and in itself is hardly credible that he should have accompanied Croesus in his expedition against Cyrus (as Hero- dotus relates, i. 76), and by plan- ning a canal, should hare enabled him to cross the Halys. It is still more incredible that Thales, the first of the seven wise men, should have been such an unpractical theorist, as a well-known ajieedote represents him, Plato, ThecBtetus, 174 a; Diog. 34, cf Arist. Mth. N. vi. 7, 1141 b, 3, &c. Little more, however, is to be said for the story of the oil presses, intended to re- fute this opinion ; not to mention the anecdote in Plutarch, iSoZ. anim. c. 13, p. 971. The assertion (Cly- tus ap. Diog. 25), iiavi\fn\ abTbv ^eyovivai Kttl tSiaffT^j/, cannot be true in this universal sense ; and the stories about his celibacy, for which cf. Plutarch, Qu. conv. iii. 6, 3, 3 ; Sol. 6, 7 ; Diog. 26 ; Stobseus, blorU., 68, 29, 34, are equally worthless. ' Thales is one of the most celebrated of the ancient mathe- maticians and astronomers. Xeno- phanes eulogises him" in this respect, cf. Diog. i. 23 ; 8oKeI 8e Kara Til/as vpwTOS turrpoXoyrifft^i Kal T}\ia.Kh.s iKX^^&is KoX rpoiras Trpoenreiv^ &s <^T\(nv E^S-qfios iv ry irepl Tbiv hfTTpoKoyoufiiviav iiTTopltf hBey avrbv Kal 'p.evotpoipTjs Kal 'HpdSo-< ros Bavfiii^et' fjuxprvpei S' airr^ Koi *Hp(i«\€tTos KaX Ariii6KpiTOS. Pho- nix ap. Athen. xi. 495, d : &a\fis yhp, ^ffris aiTTeptav ovfi'tffTos etc. (others read iurrewv). Strabo, xiv. ■ i, 7, p. 635 : ■0a\fls . . . 6 vpa- Tos (l}u p. 324 Mart, and re- peated by Anacolius, in Fabric. . Bihl. gr. iii. 464. The latter says, following Eudemus : eoA^s Se [«Spe irpwTOs] Ti\iov iKXii^lV Koi T^v Karh rhs Tponots aitrov ireploBoi/ [al. TrdpoSovl &S ouK itni ael avfiPaivei. (On this opinion, which we meet with elsewhere, ef. Martin loo. cit. p. 48). In partial agreement with this, Diogenes says (i. 24 sq. 27) that Thales discovered tV iirh rpoirris iirl rpon^v iriipoboy of the sun, and declared the sun to be 720 times as large as the moon. He, or according to others,' Pytha'-' goras, first proved that the triangles constructed on the diameter of a circle. are rectangles (irpSrox koto- ypd^ai k^kKov rb Tpiycavov 6p6o- 'yiiviov) ; that he perfected the theory of the Jns Sc rfuTOv e« AJ'tutptoi' iXQliiv ff.eTi]ya- yev eis tV 'EXAdSa t)j?/ Beuipiav TaiTKiVy KoX TToWcfc juev- aixbf cSpe, ■noWuv Se tos. ctp;^eis tow jtter' avrhv i7iryii(raTo. Whence Proolus got this information, he does not state, and though it is- not improbable that Eudemus may be his -au- thority, we know not whether the whole account conies from that Bekk. (of. Decker, foa. cit., p. 26 sg,.), a conjecture as to the reason of the overflowings of the Nile was also attributed to Thales, and may perhaps be connected with this statement (Diodca:. i. 38 ; Diog. i. 37). If it be true that Thales was engaged in trade (Plutarch, iSol. 2, asserts this,- prefixing ' ^atrlv'), wSTl might suppose that he was flrst led 1 to Egypt by his commercial jour- I neys, and then made use of hisf opportunity for the advancement! of his knowledge: We canna^j however,, reg^jd his presence an Egypt as absolutely proved, pro- bable as the assertion may be ; since the- tradition on the subject cannot be traced further back than Eudemus, whose date is still 250 or 300 years from that of Thales's supposed journey, still less can his acquaintance with the Chaldseans be proved by such late and uncer- tain testimony as that of Josephus, Contra Apionem, i. 2 ; or the lengths of his stay in Egypt by that of the j Placita falsely attributed to Plu- I tarch (i, 3, 1). A scholium {schol. j iri Ar. 533, a, 18) states that he ' was sent for into Egypt as a \ teacher of Moses — a specimen of \ ^onrce, nor who ma.y be the a.iitb^^^ the manner in which history was rities of Eudemus. Tliales's. Egyp- « manufactured in the Byzantine pe- tian journey, his intercourse with 1 riod and even earlier. That he de • the priests of that country, and | rived philosophical and physical the mathematical kno'wledge which I theories from the East, as well - h e gained from them are spoken I as geometrical and mathematical of by Pamphile and Hieronymuq, f knawledge, is not asserted by any xf- 216 THALES. That he inaugurated the school of ancient physicists is affirmed by Aristotle,* and seems well established. He is at any rate the first whom we know to have instituted any general enquiry into the natural causes of things, ijXjjontradistinction to his predecessors, who contented themselves partly with mythical cosmogonies, and partly with isolated ethical reflections.^ In answer to of our witnesses, except perhaps lambliohns and the author of the Fladta. Eoth's attempt (Gesch. der Abendl. Phil. ii. a, 116 sqq.) to prove this from the affinity of his doctrine with that of Egypt, falls to the ground so soon as we as- cribe to Thales, only what there is good reason for ascribing to him. ' Metaph. i. 3, 983 b, 20. Bonitz, in commenting on this pas- sage, rightly reminds us, that it is not Greek Philosophy in general, but only the Ionian Physics, the origin of which is here attributed to Thales. Theophrastus says {ap. Simp. PAj/e. 6 a, m), but only as a conjecture, that there mast hare been physicists before Thales, but that his ' name caused them all to be forgotten. Plutarch, on the other hand (Solon, c 3, end), re- marks that Thales was th6 only one of his contemporaries who ex- tended his enquiry to other than practical questions {Trepairtpa ttjs XP^ias ^{uceVflai t^ Beapicf). Simi- larly Strabo (sup. p. 213, 3) Hip- polyt. Befut. Hair. i. 1 ; Diog. i. 24. The assertion of Tzetzes (Chil. ii. 869, xi. 74) that Phereoydes was the teacher of Thales has no weight, and is besides contradicted by the chronology. ^ Thales does not appear to hare committed his doctrines to writing. (Diog. i. 23, 44; Alex. in Metaph,. \. 3, p. 21, Bon. The- mist. Or. xxvi. 317, B; Simplicius, De an. 8 a, cf. Philop. Be an.G i; Galen, in lEpp. de Nat. bom. i. 25, end, vol. xv. 69 Kiihn.) Aristotle always speaks of him from some uncertain tradition, or from his own conjecture (Metaph. i. 3, 983 b, 20 sqq., 984 a, 2; De ccelo, ii. 13, 294 a, 28; De an.i. 2, 405 a, 19, c. 6, 411 a, 8; Polit. i. 11, 1259 a, 18, cf. Schwegler, i» ilife- taph, i. 3) ; similarly Eudemus, ap. Prochis in Euclid. 92 (352), Both (Gesch. der Abendl. Phil. ii. a. Hi.) concludes that the supposed Thale- sian writings must be genuine, be- cause of their agreement with the propositions attributed to Thales. This is a strange inference, for in the first place he himself only con- siders two of the writings authen- tic ; and as to the contents of these two, nothing has been handed down to us. These writings are the vavTtK^ aiTTpo\oyia and the treatise irepl TpoTT^j. In the second place it is obvious that traditions jtbout Thales's doctrine might as easily have been taken from spurious writings, "as, on the other hand, the authors of such writings might have taken advantage of floating traditions. Among the works as- cribed to Thales the vaartKii iarpo- \oyla (mentioned by Diog. 23, Simpl. J%s. 6 a, m) seems to have WATER AS PRIMITIVE MATTER. 217 this enquiry, he declared water to be the matter of vhigji all things consist, and from which they must have arisen.' As to the reasons of this theory, nothing was known by the ancients from historical tradition, Aris- totle ^ indeed says that Thales may have been led to it been tlie oldest. According to Simplicius, it was his only -work. Biugenes says it was held to be a work of Phocus the Samian. Ac- cording to Plutarch (Pyth. orac. IS, p. 402), who considers it ge- nuine, it was written in verse ; it seems to be intended by the liri), mentioned in Diog. 34. Whether the poem, irepl TrtTsdpav, ascribed to him by Saidas (0oX.), is or is not identical with the vauTM^ iarpoKoyia, cannot be ascertained. Two other works, which many writers consider to be his only writings, Trepl rpoirrjs Kal 'unineplas, are qiioted in Diog. 23 (cf. Suidas). The Pseudo-Galen (In, Hippocr, Be hwntor. i. 1, 1, vol. xvi. 37, •K) quotes a work, irtpi dpx^v ; but this testimony is itself sufficient to prove that the work is not authen- tic. Neither the verse quoted Diog. 35 (cf. Decker, p. 46 sq.), nor the letter (ibid. 343 sq.) can be considered as genuine. To which of these writings Augustine refSrs in Civ. D. viii. 2 (where he asserts that Thales left books of instruc- tion) it is not of much oonsequencS to know. The same may be said of the doubtful allusions to books of his in Josephus (C. Apion. i. 2), and of the quotations in Seneca, Nat.qu. iii. 13, 1, 14. 1 ; iv. 2, 22; vi. B, 1 ; Plutarch, Plao. i. 3 ; iv. 1 ; Diodorue, i. 38 ; Selwl. m Apoll. Bhod. iv. 269. ' Arist. Metaph. i. 3, 983 b, 20 : ®a\T\s fikv & ttjs rotairris [sc. tTTOixeiov Kol apx^v TUf 6vTtjiv'\ Cic. Acad.n. 37, 118: Thales . . . ex aqua dicit constare omnia, and many others (a list of these is given in Decker, p. 64). "We find in Stobaeus, Eel. i. 290, and ^Imoet word for word in Justin. Coh. ad Gr. c. S ; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 2, the expression : apxh" twi" fii'ToiJ' OTre^^vaTO rb SSivp, ^^ fiSaros y6.p ipTl6ffti^ iypav ^x^'"' ''^ ^' Wmp ctpxV T^S ^itrews elyai tois itypois. By Bep/ibv is not to be understood (as by Brandis, i. 114) warmth gene- rally, including that of the stars (see following note) ; it relates to the vital heat of animals, to which irdyraiy is limited by the contest. 218 TEALES, through observing that the nourishment of all animals is moist, and that they all originate from moist genus ; but this he expressly states to be merely his own conjec- ture. It is only by later and less accurate authors that the conjecture of A ristotle is asserted as a fact, with the farther additions tESt plants draw their nourish-" ment from water, and the stars themselves from damp vapours; that all things in dying dry up, and that water is the all-organising and. all-embracing element ; ' that we must assume one primitive matter, because otherwise it would be impossible to explain the trans- formation of the elements one into another ; and that that one matter must be water, because everything is derived from water, by means of rarefaction and con- densation.^ All this makes it difficult for us to come to any definite conclusion on the subject. It is possible that the Milesian philosopher may have been influenced by the considerations that Aristotle supposes ; he may have started from the observation that everything living arises from a liquid, and in decaying, returns to ' Plut. Plac. i. 3, 2 sq. (so Eu- phrastus does not relate to therea- sebius. Ft. Ev. xiv. 14, 1, and in sons of the system of Ttales,and essential agreement ■with this, thst we have consequently no right Stobseus, loo. eit.); Alex, ad Me- to conclude (as Brandis does, i. 1 U taph. 983 b, 18; Philoponus, sqq.) the existence of trustworthy I'hys. A, 10; Be an. A., 4t a,; documents concerning Thales's rea- Simplicius, Fhys. 6 a, 8 a ; Be soning from the supposed agree- codo 273 b, 36; Karst. Schol. in mentof AristotleandTheophrastus. Arid. 514 a, 26. It has been al- '' Galen. Be Stem. sec. Hoppocr. ready shown by Eitter, i. 210, and i. i, vol. i. 442, 444, 484, speaHng Krische {Forschtmgen aufdem Ge- simultaneously of Thales, Anax- biete der alien Philoaophie, i. 36) imenes, Anaximander, and Herac- that Simplicius is here speaking leitus. It was in truth Diogenes only from his own conjecture or of ApoUonia (vide infra) who first that of others, that the subsequent proved the unity of matter by the passage where he refers to Theo- transformation of the elements. WATER AS PRIMITIVE MATTER. 219 a liquid state ; but other observations may likewise have conduced to this theory, such as the formation of solid ground from alluvion, the fertilising power of rain and of streams, the numerous animal population of the waters ; in conjunction with such observations, the old myth of Chaos and of Dceanos, the father of the gods, may also have 'had some effect on him ; but the exact state of the case cannot be ascertained.. Nor can we gay whether he conceived his primitive watery matter as infinite ; for the assertion of Simplicius ' is mani- festly based upon the Aristotelian passage which he is elucidating;" and this passage does not mention Thales. It does not even affirm that any one of the philosophers who held water to be the primitive matter, expressly attributed the quality of infinity to that element. Supposing such an assertion had been made, it would be more reasonable to, refer it to Hippo' {vide vnfra) than to Thales, for the infinity of matter is else- where universally regarded as a conception first enter- tained by Anaximanderj Thales. most likely never raised such a question at all. He is said to have discriminated' from water, as ' Fhys. 105 b, m: al iijkv %v n be hel4 (with Plata and the Pytha- ffruxfion iiroTt94vT€s toOto iireipop goreans) as sonxething self-depend- (Kt-fov T^ ntyeSei, Siffirep 0aA.ijs /ifv ent, existing for itself. Aristotle, iSup, etc. therefore, does, not say all the '' Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 16 : oi 8e Physicists regard primitive matter TTipl v!re(iis cacavTes liei mroTiieairiv as infinite, but all give to the infi- erepav tivo, ipvcrui r^ airslptp tuv nite some element as substratum ; Xeyo/iivuv (TToixfiav, oTav USap ^ and this he could very vfell say oe'po fi Tb jueroju rauTav, even if certain physicists had not " The question there is {loo. expressly mentioned the affinity of cit.) not -whether primitive xnatter the first principle. The -word is infinite,, but whether the infinite airavT^s is limited by the contest is the predicate of a body from to those Physicists who admit an ■which it is distinguished, orjs to iirf ipov. 220 TSALES. primitive matter, the deity or spirit which permeates, this matter, and from it forms the world.' Aristotle,^ . however, expressly denies that the ancient physiologists, among whom Thales stands first, distinguished the moving cause from matter ; or that any other philo- sopher except Anaxagoras (and, perhaps, before him Hermotimus) ha,d brought forward the doctrine of an intelligence organising the world- How could Aristotle have used such language if he had known that Thales named God the reason of the world ? But if he did not know it, we may be sure that the assertions of later writers are not based upon historical tradition. More- over, the doctrine which is attributed to Thales entirely accords with the Stoic theology ; ^ the very expression in Stobseus appears to be borrowed from the Stoic termi- nology ; ^ Clemens of Alexandria,^ and Augustine,* dis- tinctly declare that neither Thales nor the physicists ' Cie. N. Oe. i. 10, 26. Thales tov ffToix^idSovs iypov Siva/uv . . . aguam dixit esse iniiivm re- Beiav Kiin\TM^v, avTov. Philoponus, rum, Bewm autem earn mentem, De An. C. 7 n, makes ThaJes to qutB ex agua cuncta jingeret, & st2it%- have said :^ ws ri •irp6vota ^expt tuv ment ■which, as Krische obseryes iax^ruv Si^Kei /cal ovSei/ outV (Forsehwngen, 39 sq.), is the same T^rBivn. in subfitaace, and is apparently ' Metaph. i. 3, 984 a, 27 b. 15. taken originally from the same ' God is described, for example source as that of Stobseus {Eel. i. by Seneca {3/iaii. qu.prol. 13) as the 56) : 0aA^s mvv toS Kdcr/wv rhv mens universi ; by Cleanthes (vide Behv, and the eimilar passage in TertuUian, Apologet. 21) as the Plut. Plac. i. 7, 11 (consequently spirittis permeator imiversi ; by •we must not in Eus. Pr.Ev.siv. Stobseus, Eel. i. 178, as Sim/us 16, 5, readwithGaisford:9a\^Tb[/ kii/ijtik)) tjjs BXijt; by Diogenes, K6aii.iiv thai Bein, but vovv toS vji. 138, as yovs, which pervades Kia-fiov ee6v). Athenag. 8v,pplic. e. all things (SIiikhv). I 21 ; Galen, Hist. PhU. c. 8, p. 251 ; * Strom, ii. 364 d; cf. Tert. e. Kiiha. Marc. i. 13, Thales aquam {Deum ' Oicero, he. cit. cf. Stobseus, promtmiiavit). loo. cit. : rh Si nrav cfit^vx"" ■'/"» <"»' " CiV, D, viii. 2. Saijiivwt irhripes' SiiiKeiv Se leal Si& OROAmSING FORCE. 221 -who succeeded him regarded God or the Divine Spirit as the framer of the universe, but that Anaxagoras was ■the first to hold this doctrine. We may, therefore, certainly conclude that the opposite theory is an error of the post-Aristotelian period, the source of which we shall presently find in some passages of Aristotle. It hy no means follows from this that Thales personally be- ■ lieved in no god or gods ; 'but the tradition that credits him with the thesis that God is the oldest of all things, because He has had no beginning, is not very trustworthy. For this assertion is no better attested than the innu- merable other apophthegms ascribed to the seven sages, and was probably attributed to Thales originally in some collection of their sayings in the same arbitrary manner that other sayings were attributed to the rest. Moreover, Xenophanes is elsewhere invariably considered as the first who, in opposition to the Hellenic religion, declared the Deity to have had no beginning. Accord- ing to certain authors, Thales taught that the world is fuU of gods. This statement is much more probable than the preceding.^ But what are we to understand by ' Plut. S. sap. conv. e. 9 ; Diog. i. personal 0e6s. Tertullian (Apolo- S5 ; Stobseus, Eel. i. 5i. This is get. c. 46) transfers Cicero's story no doubt the meaning also of the (N. D. i. 22, 60) about Hiero and statements in Clemens, Strom, v. Simonides to Croesus and Thales ; S9o A (and Hippolyt. Befut. h(sr. i. bat this is a mere oversight/ 1), according to which Thales re- * Arist. De An. i. 6, 411 a, 7: plied to the question : ri itrri rh koI eV t^ S\^ Se rives auriiti [tV 9uoii ; t!) liijTe ApxV M''* Te'Aos ^X^"} i^f^'X^o' aatv, SBfy foms Kal ^xov. For immediately after, BaAfis if^Bri iravra ir\^p7j Seuy another saying of Thales is quoted ehat. Diog. i. 27: rhv K6aiJ.ov tonceming the omniscience of God l/ufnixov Kal SaifiivayirA'iipTi. Simi- (the same given in Diog. 36 and larly Stobseus (vide supra, p. 220, 3). Valer. Max. vii. 2, 8). Conse- The same proposition is also ap- quently, the impersonal fleioi'. has plied in a moral sense (Cicero, Legg, here the same significance as the ii. 11, 26). 222 THALE8. the expression, the dififusion of the soul throughout the universe ? Aristotle's cautious ' perhaps ' shows us how little such an interpretation is supported by tradition. Indeed, it may safely be asserte d that not only later writers, hut Aristotle himself, in hi s own way, asc rib^_ notions to Tbales which we have no right to ex pect from him. That he conceived all things as living, and personified all active forces after the analogy of the human soul, is certainly probable, because this is in harmony with the imaginative view of nature which everywhere, and especially among the 'Greeks, precedes scientific enquiry : it is, therefore, quite credible that he may (as Aristotle aflSrias) have attributed a soul to the magnet,' on account of its power of attraction — that is to say, regarded it as a living being. In the same manner , doubtless, he conceived his prim itive matter as living, so that, like the ancient Chaos, it could beget all things by itself, without the intervention of an or- ganising spirit. It is also entirely consonant with ancient Greek thought that he should see present deities in the forces of nature, and a proof in the life of nature, that nature is full of gods. But we cannot believe that he combined the several powers of nature, and the souls of separate beings, in the notion of a world'soul; for that notion presupposes that the infi- nite multiplicity of phenomena has become a unity in the conception of the world ; and that eflScient power ' Be An. i. 2, 405 a, 19 : ?oi(cc outJiv kcH to"s d<|ri5;^ois SiS(!rai 8e /col 0a\5s l| &v cmofivriiuivfiooin iffux^s riRaaipSjievov ^k t^s fiayirflTi- Kirnrmdv ti tV "['"xV iTo\oj3eii», Sos Kal toS T\\fKTpov. Cf. Stob. Eel. elfirsp rbv XCffoy %<^i) ■^vxhv fx^iv, i. 758 : ©oA^i icol t4 ipvrrh f/iif/uxa oTi rbii ffiSripov itivei. Diog. i. 24 : (ipa. ORGANISING FOR^E. 223 is distinguished from matter and conceived as analo- ■^ gous to the human spirit, not only in particular indi- viduals, where this is natural in the simpler stages of opinion, but in the universe generally. Both ideas seem to lie, beyond the first narrow limits of early philosophy, and the historical evidence does, not justify us in attributing them to Thales.* We may con- clude, therefore, that while he conceived his primitive matter as living and generative, while he shared the -religious faith of his people, and applied it to the consideration of nature, he. knew nothing of a world- soul or of a spirit permeating matter and forming the universe.^ As to the manner in which things originated from water, Thales seems to be silenf. Aristotle certainly says that the physicists, who hold one qualitatively de- termined primitive matter, make things arise out of it bytrarefaction_and condensation,^ but it does not follow that all these philosophers without exception were of that opinion.'' Aristotle might have used the same form of expression if only the majority had held it, ' Plut. Flac. ii. 1, 2 : 0oX))s hylozoism. Kal 01 owr' airou %yii Tbv Kifirfioi' can- ' Phys. i. 4, at the commenee- not of course be taken as historical ment : &is S' oi po- SO entirely confuses Thales with o-Tos h rri 'IirTop!^ ttjc fuiviaiTiy Anaximenes, that he attributes to eI/n)Ke Kol T^y vvKvanv. (This Thales the doctrine of air as primi- saying, rapreover, ought only tive matter, to be applied to the ancient ' Of. p. 120, and p. 213, 3. lonians. Theophrastus ascribed ' Plut. Plac. ii. 13, 1 ; Achill. also to Diogenes rarefaction and Tat. /sa^. c. II. BOCTRINES ATTRIBUTED TO THALES. 225 masses, analogous to the earth, that the moon receives her light from the sun,' and so forth ; but even of the philosophic doctrines of the unity of the wqrld,^ the iniinite divisibility and variability of matter,* the un- thinkableness of empty space,^ the four elements,^ the mixture of matters,^ the nature and immortality of the soul,' the daemons and the heroes.* All these originate with such untrustworthy witnesses, and most of them either directly or indirectly so entirely contradict more credible testimony, that we can attach no value to them whatever. "What Aristotle^ gives as a tradition is more ..likely to be true, — viz. that Thales supposed the earth ' Plut. Plac. ii. 28, 3; Plut. Conv. sap. C 1 5 (Jus Se 0a\^s Xeyei, rTJs 7^s avaipeOeiffTis avyj(yaty rhy S\ov e^eai xiffiiov) can hardly be quoted, as the Banquet of Plutarch is not a historical work. Moreover, the meaning is doubtless merely that the annihilation of the earth would (not will at some time) be fol- lowed by a destruction of the whole universe. 2 Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 2. » Plut. Plao. i. 9, 2; Stob. Eel. i. 918, 348. * Stob. i. 378, where the older reading, MyvuiTav,, recommended by Eoth, Abendl. Phil. ii. 6, 7, is grammatically inadmissible. ' According to the fragment of the spurious writing, nepl apx^v (Galen, vide supra, p. 216, 2), and /perhaps also Heraclit. Alleg. horn. o. 22, the four elements are expressly reduced to water. Jt will here- after be shown that Empedooles was the first to establish four as the number of the material ele- ments. « Stob. i. 368. In the parallel passage of. Plutarch's Piacjte, i. 17, VOL. I. 1, Thales is not named : ot lipxatot is the expression used, which is evidently more correct, and was probably the original expression of Plutarch. ' According to Plutarch (^Plac. iv. 2, 1) and Hemes. (Nat. horn. c. 2, p. 28), he described the soul as ipiffis aetKipTjTOS ^ aiiTOKiVTiTOS ; ac- cording to Theodoret, GV. aff. cur. V. 18, p. 72, as (futris 4kI>/i)tos (where, however, det/ctj'ijTos possibly ought to be read) ; an interpolation to which the passage of Aristotle quoted above doubtless gave occa- sion. Tertullian, Ve An. c. 5 at- tributes to Thales and to Hippo the theorem that the soul is com- posed of water. Philoponus, Be An. c. 7, restricts this to Hippo, while, in another passage. Be An. A 4, he ascribes it both to Hippo and Thales. Choerilus ap. Biog. i. 24, and Suidas, 0aX?s, says that he was the first to profess be- lief in immortality. ' Athenag. Supplic, c. 23 ; Plut. Plac. i. 8. ' Metaph. i. 3, 983 b, 21 ; Be Ccelo, ii. 13, 294 a, 29. Q 226 THALES. to float on the water ; for this would harmonise per- fectly with the theory of the earth's origin from water, and easily adapt itself to the old cosmological notions : we may also connect with it the further state- ment ^ that he explained earthquakes by the movement of the water. This last assertion, however, seems to rest entirely on one of the writings falsely ascribed to Thales, and doubtless the ultimate source of other doctrines that have been attributed to him. The statement of Aristotle is better attested, but we gain little information, even from him, as to the doctrine of Thales as a whole.^ All that we know of it may, in fact, be reduced to the proposition that water is the matter out of which everything arises and consists. The reasons that determined him to this theory can only now be conjectured ; how he more closely defined the process of the origination of things from water is also very uncertain ; but it is most probable, that he considered primitive matter, like nature in general, tc: be animate, and that he held to the indeterminate con- ception of beginning or generation, without defining this as brought about by the rarefaction or condensa- tion of the primitive matter. However meagre and insignificant this theory may seem, it was, at least, an attempt to explain phenomena by one general natural principle, and in this light it was of the highest importance ; we find that a series of ' Plut. Plac. in. 15, 1 ; Hippol. militates against the supposition Refut. hmr. i. 1 ; Sen. Nat. gu. vi. (Plut. Plac. iii. 10) that he held the 6 ; iii. 14. The last, however, earth to be spherical, a conception seems to refer to a treatise falsely which is foreign to Anaximander attributed to Xhales. and Anaximenes, and even to ' On the other hand, this theory Anaxagoras and IJiogenes. ANAXIMANBER. 227 more extended enquiries are directly connected with those of Thales, and that even his immediate successor was able to attain much more considerahle results. II. ANAXIMANDEB.^ Whekeas Thales had declared water to be the primitive matter of all things, Anaximander^ defined this original • Sohleiermaolier, XJeher AnOxi- mcmdros (1811 j Werke, Fhilos, ii. 171 sqq.) ; Teichmiiller, Studien zv/r Gesch. der Begr. 1-70. I re- gret that I cannot make use of Lyng's treatise, ' On den loniake Saturphiloiophi, iscer Anaximan- ders ' {Abdruck aus den Vid. SeU- kabets ForhanMinger for 1866), as I am not acquainted with the lan- guage in which it is written. ^ Anaximander was a fellow- citizen of Thales, and alao bis pupil ana suceesspr, according to later authorities (Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 30 ; Math, ixi 360; Hippolyt. Eefut. her. i. 6 ; Simpl. Fhys. 6 a, m ; Suidas, &c. ; this is likewise implied by the epithet Iraipos, ap. Simpl. Be Ccelo, 273 b, 38 ; Schol. in Arist. 514 a, 28 ; Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 1 ; of Sodalis in Cicero, Acad. ii. 37, 118; of yy^pi/ioi, in Strabo, i. 1, 11, p. 7 ; and the latter is actu- ally interchanged with fiaSTfriis, ibid. xiv. 1, 7, p. 638). According to ApoUodorus (Diog. ii. 2) he was sixty-four years old in the second year of the 88th Olympiad, 846-7 B.C., and died soon afterwards, so that his birth must have occurred in 01. 42, 2 (611 B.C.), or, as Hippo- lytuB (Refut. i. 6) thinks, in 01. 42, 3. Pliny (Hist. Nat. ii. 8, 3) says he discovered the inclination of the zodiac. The worth of these state- ments we cannot certainly esti- mate ; but there is much to be said for the conjecture of Diels {Shein. Mus. xxxi. 24) that Anaximander gave his age in his own work as six- ty-four; that ApoUodorus (who, ac- cording to Diogenes, had this work in his hands), following some inter ■ nal evidence, calculated that tV work was written in ;01. 88, 2 ; and that the statement of Pliny is based on the same calculation, iii- asmuch as he found mention of the obliquity of the ecliptic in this work. But Diogenes adds, as a quotation from ApoUodorus : htna- aavrd tttj iiiKiara Kara UoKuKpdriiy rhv Sa/iou Tipaymr, which is rather surprising, as Anaximander was considerably older ihun Polycrates, and died about 22 years before him. Yet we need not, with Diels, loc. cit., assume that thfise words originally related to Pythagoras (whose ax/iii certainly falls under Polycrates, as he is said to have emigrated in his reign when forty years old), for they are also to be ex- plained as the inexact reproduction of an observation of A,poliodoruB respecting Anaximander. I am in- clined to suspect that ApoUodorus, in order to get a synchronistic date after the manner of ancient chrono- logists, had made the iMjiii of this philosopher (ttj)) pretty nearly co- incide with the commencement of the tyranny of Polycrates, which is 82 22S ANAXIMANDER. element as the infinite, or the unlimited.' By the in- finite,, however, he did not understand,^ like Plato and the Pythagoreans, an incorporeal element, the essence of which consists exclusively in infinity; but an in- finite matter : the infinite is not subject but predicate, it designates not infinity as such, but an object to which the quality of being infinite belongs. It is in this sense only, says Aristotle,^ that all the physicists generally placed in the third year of the 53rd Olympiad, and in the 44th year of Anaxiinander's life. Eusehius (Xlkron.) assigns Anaxi- mander to , the 51st Olympiad. Nothing is known of his per- sonal history, but the statement (.Elian, V. H. iii. 17) of his being the leader of the Milesian colony in Apollonia indicates that he filled a distinguished position in his natiye place. His book, irepl (piffeas, is said to have been the first philosophical -writing of the Greeks (Diog. ii. 2 ; Themist. Orat. xxvi. p. 317 0. "When Clemens, Strom, i. 308 C, says the same of the work of Anaxagoras, he is evi- dently confusing him with Anaxi- mander). Brandis rightly observes, however (i. 12,5), that according to Diogenes, he. cit., the work must Tiave been rare, even in Apollodo- rns's time, and Simplicius can only have known it through the quota- tions of Theophrastus and others. Suidas mentions several writings of Anaximander's, but this is doubtless a misunderstanding ; on the other hand, a map of the world is attributed to him (Diog. loo. eit. ; Strabo, loc. cit. after Eratosthenes ; Agathemerus, Gteogr. Inf. 1). Eu- demus, ap. Simpl. De Coilo, 212 a^ 12 [Sohol. in Jrist. 497 a, 10) says he was the first who tried to determine the sizes and distances of the heavenly bodies. The in- vention of the sundial was as- cribed to Anaximander by Diog. ii. 1, and Ens. Pr. Ev. x. 14, 7 ; and to Anaximenes by Pliny, Nat. Hist. ii. 76, 187, in both oases er- roneously, as is probable ; for the invention, accordng to Herod, ii. 109, was introduced into Greece by the Babylonians ; but it is possible that one of these philosophers may have erected in Sparta the first sundial ever seen there. ' Arist. Vhys. iii. 4, 203 b, 10 sqq. ; Simpl. Fhys. 6 a, and many others ; see the following note. ' As Schleiermacher, loc. cit, p. 176 sq., exhaustively proves. » Fhys. iii. 4, 203 a, 2: mirra as ipxh" TiKO TiScairi tui' Svtuv [rb ftireipoi'], oi fjLev &trvep ot Huflo- •y6peiot Kol TlKdrav, Kaff airh, obx Sis (rv^&ePtiKdsTivi erepipfaXh' oiKriay airrh liv rb &iretpov . . . . ot 8e irepl (piffetos otTrai'Tes &€l viroTtBeaiTty ^Teptxir Tiiot tpitriv T^ ctirefp^ Tuy XeyopLeviav (TTOtxc^uy, oTov iJ5wp il aepa f) rh fi^ra^b to6tuj/. Cf. Mc' taph. X. 2, 1063 b, 15. According to the theory of the Physicists the ly was not itself a substance, but had some ipitris for its substratum, iKflvwu yh.p 6 ftiv tis tptXiav ehai (pTifft Th ev S S' ciJpai 6 Si (Anaxi- mander) rh Hireipoy, J'HE INFINITE, 229 speak of the infinite; and among the physicists he unquestionably reckons Anaximander.^ According to the unanimous testimony of later authors,^ Anaximan- der's main argument for his theory was that the infinite, and the infinite alone, does not exhlaust itself in con- stantly producing. This is the very argument that Aristotle quotes * as the chief ground for maintaining an infinite corporeal matter; and be does so in Speaking of the theory which we recognise as Anaxiuiander's, viz. that the infinite is a body distinct from the de- terminate elements. From the infinite, Anaximandej (whom Aristotle for that reason places beside Empe- docles and Anaxagoras) derived particular kinds of matter, and the world which is compounded of them, by means of separation'^ {Ausscheidung), a doctrine ^hich would be impossible unless the infinite were itself something material. Lastly, though it is difficult to discover how this philosopher precisely defined his infinite, all testimony is agreed as to its corporeal nature ; and among the passages of Aristotle which possibly may refer to Anaximander, and of which some must of necessity refer to him, there is none which does not imply this corporeal nature.' That he in- ' Cf. loe. dt. p. 203 h, 13 ; vide aurSriTSv, ef. a. i, 203 b, 18, and infra. Plut. loc. cit. * Cic. Acad. ii. 37, IM ; .glimpl. * Vide inf. p. 234, 3, and p. 250. Be Coelo, 273 b, 38 ; Sohol. 514 a, ' In our text of Simpl. Phys. 28 ; Philop. PAys. L, 12 m ; Plut. 32 b, o, we have: ivoicras ras Plaoiia, i. 3, 4, and to the same ivavTiSTTjras iv r^ vKOKufxevtf effect Stob. Eel. i. 292.: Key^i oh>- iwclpcf fort am^fiUTi iiCKpiveP'233, l)identifies Anaximander with Empedocles (it also identifies him with Anaxime- nes), and that, according to my vieir, the same opinion is ascribed to him as to Melissus, proves no- thing. We cannot conclude that because the (j>i\la of Empedocles is not a corporeal matter that there- fore Anaximander's Stireipov is none ; nor can it be pronounced impossible that Melissus should have been led to a determination of Being, which brought him into contact with Anaximander, as Plato was brought with the Pythagoreans by his doc- trine of the Unlimited. In fine (p. 11), Aristotle, of whose words, moreover (Pk/s. iii. 4, 203 b, 4), Michelis has a -wrong conception, must himself, according to this writer, have distorted Anaximan- der's doctrine ; and all other autho- rities, especially Theophrastus, in his utterance, quoted p. 233, 1, must be held guilty of the same thing. Prom this point, however, all pos- sibility of any historic demonstra- • tion is at an end, and Michelis substitutes for it a simple sic volo, sic jubeo. ' Striimpell, (Cfesch. dear theor. Fhil. derGr. 29) ; Seydpl {Fortschritt der Metaph. irmerhcdb der Schule dis Jon. hyhsoismus, Leipzig, 1860, p. 10) ; and Teichmiiller {Studien zwr Gesch. der Begr. 7, 57) believe that the &neifiov means with Anaximan- der that which is qualitatively in- determinate, as distinguished from determinate substances. But the word seems to have first received this signification from the Pytha- goreans, and even -with them it is a ■ derived signification ; the original meaning is ' the Unlimited ' (only that the Unlimited, as applied to numbers, is that which sets no limit to division nor- to augmenta- tion, vide infra, Fyth.). For Anaxi- mander this signification results partly from the same cause that he assigns for the aireipi'a of primitive matter (viz., that it would other- wise be exhausted) ; and partly from this consideration, that it. is precisely because of its infinity that the (meipov can embrace all things. 232 ANAXIMANDER. that this proof is not conclusive ; but it might never- theless have appeared sufiBcient to the unpractised thought of the earliest philosophers,' and we must at any rate allow that Anaximander, by maintaining the theory, first raised an important question in philo- sophy. So far there is little room for disagreement; but opinions are greatly divided as to the more precise meaning of Anaximander's primitive matter. The ancients are pretty nearly unanimous in asserting that it did not coincide with either of the four elements ; ^ according to some it was not a determinate body at aU, others describe it as intermediate between water and air, or again between air and fire ; while a third account represents it as a mixture of all particular kinds of matter; a mixture in which these have been always contained, as distinct and determinate, so that they can be evolved from it by mere separation, without any change in their constitution. This last theory has formed the basis in modern times' of the assertion ' The same mistake, however, Anaximander for Anaximenes, re- ■was made by Melissus, and after- peatedbyacopyist from the text of ■wards by the Atomist, Metrodorus ; Sextus, or some other author whom vide infra, Mel. and Metrod. he was transcribing. In the Pt/rrh. ' Authorities will presently be iii. 30 he gives a correct account of given. The Pseudo-Aristotelian both these Philosophers, writing, De Mdieso, &c., c. 2, 975 ' Ritter, Gesch. der Icm. Phil. b, 22, alone maintains that his pri- p. 174 sqq., and Gesoh. der Phil. i. mitive matter is water (vide infra) 201 sq., 283 sqq., where his former and in Sextus, Math. x. 313, it is concession that Anaxagoras held said that he made all things arise, things to be contained, in primitive ^J ki/hs Kol TToioB, namely, air. But matter only as to theii germ and although his name is twice men- capability, and not as distinct tioned, it seems very probable that from each other, is virtually ra- the statement may have sprung tracted. from the erroneous substitution of , THE INFINITH. ii'iZ that among the earlier, no less than anaong the later / Ionic philosophers, there were two classes — the Dy- namists and the Mechanists — i.e. those who derived all things from one primitive matter by means of a vital transformation, and those who derived them from a j multiplicity of unchanging primitive matters by means of separation and combination in space. To the first belong Thales and Anaximenes, Heracleitus and Dio- genes; to the secondj^AB^i^al^Ser, with Anaxagoras and Archelaus. "We will now examine this theory, since it has an important bearing not only on the doctrine before us, but also on the whole history of ancient Philosophy. Much may be said in its behalf. Simplicius ' ap- pears to ascribe the same view to Anaximander which we find in Anaxagoras, viz. that in the separation of matters from the infinite, kindred elements become united, gold particles with gold particles, earth with earth, and so on, these different and distinct kinds of * Fhys. 6 b, u ; after a descrip- y6pas' ifp' oE SiaKpiv6iieva rois re tion of Anazagoias's doctrine of ndafiovs koI tJji/ tuv &)0\.aiv pitriv the primitiTe elements, he proceeds iyevvriaav. ' Ko! o8ta/oJi- ' Be Ccelo, iii. 3, 302 a, 15 : fuivBpou. iffra 5^ ffroixeiov twi/ ffUfi&Tfav, * Fhys. i. 4 ; &5 S* ol ipvciKol els ft tSa^o (rdfiara Siaipetrai, ivu- KeyovffL S^o rp&itoi elfflv. ol jwev yhp vtipxov SuvdiJiei fj ivepyiitf .... ey iroL'fia'avTes rh iv (TU/jia ih uiroKei- iv iihv y^p irapKl ^tJA^j Kal 6K(i(rT^ fievoVf ^ TWv Tpiav (Water, Air, lav rotoiTuv eveffrt Swdfiei trvp Kal Fire) n, tj &\\o, S ^o'ti irvphs f-^f yri' (fioKfpct yiip tbCto 4^ ^Kitvuv irvKiiSrepov &ipos 5e AeirrdTepoc, iKKpirdfuva, THE INFINITE. 235 actually, but potentially ; therefore, wten he says tha<' Anaximander represents the particular substances as separating themselves from the primitive matter, it does not at all follow that they were, as these definite subT stances, included within it. The primitive matter can be equally conceived as the indeterminate essence out of which the determinate is ultimately developed by a qualitative change. As to the comparison of Anaxi- mander with Anaxagoras and Empedocles, it may as easily refer to a remote as to a particular resemblance between their doctrines,' and it is the former kind of ' In the passage just quoted, Phys. i. 4, Aristotle distinguishes those philosophers ^who place primi- tiTe matter in a determinate body from Anaximander and those, 8(roi iv Kal TToKKu. (pcuTiv, who maintain that the ev (the primitive matter) is at the same time one and many, because it is an assemblage of many substances qualitatively dis- tinct. We may indeed question whether Anaximander is to be counted among these latter; the words, KOI iffoi S', are not conclusive against it ; since they may not only be explained, ' and similarly those,' &o., but also, and 'generally speaking, those.' Biit (cf. Seydel loo. ci-t. p. 13) in the subsequent passage, 4k toC ntyyMTos, &c., the Kol oStoi cannot include Anaxi- mander, for he is the only person with whom the oJtoi (through the Ka!).ean be compared, since healone; not the €v TToiiiffavTes t5 ^v ffufia, taught an eKxpiffis of the ivavTi6Tr)- Tcs out of the Ic. If so, however, the philosophers, Baoi ^v »ai iroTiAa ^turiveivai, while they were likened with Anaximander in regard to the iKvpuris, are at the same time dis- criminated from him in another respect ; he cannot, therefore, be counted among those who consider primitive matter tobelxKol TroWd, and he did not conceive it as a mass of various matters, retain- ing their qualitative differences in the mixture. Biisgen (Ueber d. &TTeipov Anaximanders, Wie^aden, 1867, p. i sq.) thinks that in this passage Anaximander must be reckoned among those who admit the ec Kai iroAXct, as there would otherwise be no contrast between him and those who assume one uniform first principle (Anaxime- nes, &c.) ; but he misconceives the [rain of ideas. Anaximander is not placed with Empedocles and Anaxagoras in an opposition to Anaximenes and others, in regard to the Unity or Plurality of primitive substances, but in regard to the manner in which things proceed from them (rarefaction and conden- sation or separation) ; it is, how- ever, at the same time pointed out how Anaximander differs from these two philosophers ; and subse- quently how they differ from one another. Biisgen's attempt (p. 6) 236 ANAXIMANDER. reference that is intended. In the same way Anaxi- mander's primitive matter might be called fitr/iui, or at any rate might be loosely included under this ex- pression (which primarily relates to Empedocles and Anaxagoras), without ascribing to Anaximander the theory of an original mixture of all particular matters in the 'specific sense of the phrase.' We cannot there- fore prove that Aristotle ascribed this doctrine to him. Nor does Theophrastus ; he expressly says that Anaxa- to press into his service Fhys. i, 2, sub init., andi. 5, sub init. is also a mistake ; for in the first of these passages Anaximander, if he 'were named at all, would be ranked among those who assume a jda apxh Kifovfievri; and the second does not aim at a complete enume- ration of the different systems: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans, are none of them mentidned, and it is only in a forced manner that Heracleitus can be brought in under the .category of those who hold the rarefaction and condensation of primitiTe matter. ' Separation corresponds to mixing (juv yap airav fii^U ftrri Kol X'xp'o'Mi'ii S'S it said in Metaph. i. 8. 989 b, 4 ; a passage well worth comparing with the one before us) ; if all things arose by separation from the primitive matter, this matter was previously a mixture of all things. In the same way, therefore, that Aristotle can speak of a separation or division, when the separated elements were only potentially contained in the primi- tive matter, he can likewise, in the same case, speak of a mixture. It is -not the least nece«sary that the fuy/ui should first have been brought about by a meeting to- gether of the particular substances, as Biisgen (p. 3, 7, 11 sq. of the treatise mentioned in the pre- ceding note) seems to assume in regard to the &neipov of Anaxi- mander; this, indeed, is absolutely incompatible with the concept of primitive matter, of the Eternal and the Uubecome. In consider- ing the above-mentioned passage, it must also be observed that here the fuyiia is primarily ascribed to Empedocles, and only in the second place to Anaximander, by the addition Kal 'Ayoli/iavSpot;. We might here admit a slight zeugma, so that the word, which in its full power could only be used of Empedocles, might be ap- plied in its general conception (Unity including in itself a Multi- plicity) to Anaximander, and this is all the more justifiable, since the passage belongs to a section of Aristotle which (perhaps because it was originally a draft intended for his own use) is unequalled among all his writings for scant expression, and in which the proper- meaning of the author is often only discoverable by completing thoughts which he has scarcely indicated. THE INFINITE. 237 goras can only be held to agree with Anaximander on the subject of primitive matter if we attribute to him as his original principle a matter without definite qualities (/iia (pvcrts aopicrros), instead of a mixture of deter- minate and qualitatively distinct substances.' That the doctrine of Anaxagoras might ultimately be reduced to this theory, which is certainly divergent from its primary sense, had already been remarked by Aristotle.'' Theophrastus ^ drew the same inference, and makes his comparison of Anaxagoras with Anaximander contingent on its admission. This shows that he ascribed to Anaximander a primitive matter in which no particular qualities of bodies were as yet present, not a matter that comprehended all particular substances as such within itself. Besides, the text in question does, not attribute this latter doctrine to Anaximander ; for the words to which this meaning is ascribed* refer to Anaxagoras.^ Moreover these words are not given by ' In the words quoted between plies to the nearer of two previ- inverted commas, p. 233, 1, /col oBt» ously named subjects, cf. e.g. Plato, jueV — 'Ayali/nivSp^i), the only passage Polit. 303 B; Phiedr. 231 C, that Simplicius there cites textu- 233 A, E ; Arist. Metaph. i. 4, ally from him. 985 a, H sq. ; Sext, Pyrrh. i. 213. ' Metaph. i. 8, 989 a, 30 ; cf. That this is only possible when ibid. xii. 2, 1069 b, 21. the idea indicated by ixe^vos and ' Thv 'Ara^aydpav fis rhv 'Ako- nearer in order of words is farther (liaavSiiov avvaiBSiv, as it is said in in the thought of the author I Simpl. Phys. 33 a. cannot admit (Kern, Beitr. zur ' Simp. loo. cit. from ixelms Darstelhmg der Phil, des Xmo^ yip to vTrapxivrav, where Erandis phanes, Danzig, 1871, p. 11 : Biis- (Gr. Bom. Phil. i. IS) sees a. st&te- gen's observations on the same ment about Anaximander emana- subject, and on the iweipov of ting from Theophrastus. Anaximander, I must pass over). ' These words may certainly When, for example, Aristotle says refer to Anaximander, but they (Metaph. xii. 7, 1072 b, 22) : rh may also refer to Anaxagoras; for yip SeKTiKbf toC voifrov koI t^s though ixfhos usually points to oiirlas voSs' ivepyel Sh fX""- ^o'''' the more remote, ic very often ap- iKiivo (the Ix^"* ^^^ ivepyilv, ac- 238 ^NAXIMANBER. Simplicius as a quotation from Theophrastus, but as an expression of his own opinion. This may be based upon the testimony of Theophrastus, and the conjecture is in itself probable enough. But it can only be main- tnal thought) jiia\A.oi' toutou (in a higher degree than the mere faculty of thinking)^ & Soxet o vovs 6e7ou cxfiv; — EHEifo relates not merely to what is the nearer in order of words, hut also to the principal idea ; to^tov to what is farther, and is only introduced in a compa- risonwith it. When (Ibid. x. 2, heginning) it is asked whether the ev is a self-dependent substance, as the Pythagoreans and Plato think, 71 fiaKKov vjr6KeiTai ris (pitTis, koI 7r£s Set yvwpifiuTepas Xexfl^^oi Koi ^aWoy SoTrep ol Trepl tp6(rews : iKel- vtav yip, and so forth (vide m/pra, p. 228, 3), it cannot he supposed that the physicists' to which the ^Keffucref^rSjare farther from Aris- totle's thought than the Pythago- reans and Plato. Similarly in the Fhcedrus, 233 E, the TrpoaaiTowres, to which iK(imL relates, are not only the nearest mentioned term, but also the leading idea. Still less could we expect to find this rule' 6f Kern's scrupulously carried out by so recent a writer as Simplicius. In this case it is not Anaximander, but Anaxagoras, of whom he pri- marily speaks. If ixeivos be re- ferred to Anaximander, we make Simplicius say: 1. According to Theophrastus Anaxagoras'sdoctrine of primitive substances is similar to that of Anaximander. 2. Anaxi- mander admitted that particular substances were contained as ' such i n the &irftpov, and were moved in regard to one another when the process of separation took place. 3. But motion and separation wer« derived (not by Anaximander, but) by Anaxagoras from vovs. i. Anaxagoras, therefore, seems to as- sume an infinity of primitive sub- stances, and one moving force, vols. 5. If, however, we substitute for the mixture consisting of many substances (t. e. the theory which, according to this explanation, be- longed to Anaximander) a simple homogeneous mass, the theory of Anaxagoras would harmonise with . that of Anaximander. Of these five propositions, the second would stand in no sort of connection with the third and fourth, and would be in striking contradiction to the fifth ; and in the fourth, the infer- ence that Anaxagoras therefore be- lieved in an infinity of matters, has no foundation in the preceding proposition : ixelvos, therefore, can only be Anaxagoras. Even the &neLpov, of which this ^Keivos is said to have spoken, forms no ob- stacle, for Anaxagoras (vide p. 879, German text) maintained the aiTEipfa of primitive substance very decidedly; and Kern is surprised that the expression, AireLpov, gene- rally used to describe Anaximan- der's primitive matter, should designate that of Anaxagoras, but this passage shows (ef. also Me- taph. i. 7, 988 a, 2, where Aristotle applies to his doctrine the expres- sion oLTreipia ruv (TroLx^icav, as Kern himself observes) how little we need regard that difficulty. Theo- phrastus directly reduces the pri- mitive substances of Anaxagoras to the ipiiTLS Toi) ajreipov. THE INFINITE. 239 tained so long as it opposes nothing that demonstrably comes from Theophrastus. ScUeiermacher > and Brandis^ have conclusively shown that Simplicius had no accurate and independent knowledge of Anaximander's doctrine, and that his utterances on the subject are involved in glaring contradictions. His evidence, therefore, should not induce us, any more than that of Augustine and Sidonius or Philoponus, to attribute to Anaximander a doctriile explicitly denied to him by Theophrastus. On the other hand, the testimony of so trustworthy a witness as Theophrastus, together with the further evidence hereafter to be cited, justifies us in main- taining that this philosopher did not regard his primitive matter as a mixture of particular matters, and that consequently it is improper to separate him, as an adherent of a mechanical system of physics, from the dynamists Thales and Anaximenes. And this so miich the more, as it is improbable, on general grounds, that the view which Eitter attributes to him should belong to so ancient a period. The theory of unchanging primitive substances presupposes, on the one side, the reflection that the properties of the several kinds of matter could have had no beginning, any more than matter as a whole ; but among the Grreeks we do not meet with this thought until after the period when the possibility of Becoming was denied by Parmenides, to whose propositions on this subject Empedocles, Anaxa- goras, and Democritus expressly go back. On the other side, this theory (of unchanging primitive matter) is united in Anaxagoras with the idea of an intelligence > Loo. cit. 180 sq. ' Gr. Bom. Fhil. i. 125. 240 ANAXIMANDER. that orders the world ; and even the analogous notions of Empedocles and the atomists were conditioned by their conception of efficient causes. None of these philosophers could have conceived a primitive matter as qualitatively unchangeable, if each — Anaxagoras in vovs, Empedocles in Hate and Love, the Atomists in the Void — had not also admitted a special principle of tnovement. No one has discovered any such doctrine in Anaximander ; * nor can we conclude, from the small fragment known to us of his work,^ that he placed motive force in individual things, and supposed them to come forth by their own impulse from the original mixture ; it is the infinite itself ' that moves all things. All the conditions, therefore, of a mechanical theory of physics^ are here wanting, and we have no ground for ' Ritter, Gesch. derPhil. i. 284. ■2 Ap. Simpl. Fhys. 6a: ^J Sv Se 7] yeveais ifffi rots oZffi KaX r^v tpBopctv eis ravra yitfeaOai KaTOL 7h XP^^^' SiSovat yap avrct rlffty Koi BIkiji/t^s oSiKias kotJi ttivtov xpiiwu Tdlij/. Simplicius adds that Anaxi- mander is speaking ■troiTjTLKuTepots ' According to the statement in Arist. Phys. iii. 4, quoted infra p. 248, 1. * That is, of mechanical Phy- sics in the sense which Eittor gives to the expression in his division of the Ionian Philosophers into Dyna- mists and Mechanists ; by Mecha- nists he understands those who make the determinate matters, as such, preexist in primitive matter ; by Dynamists, those who make the distinguishing properties of the de- terminate matters first develope themselves in their emergence from a qualitatively homogeneous primi- tive matter. It is not, however, incompatible with the latter theory that natural phenomena should further be mechanically explained, by the movement and mixing of the matters that have issued from the primitive matter. As Anaxi- mander (this is proved by Teich- miiller, loo. oit., p. 58 sq., and will hereafter appear in this work) adopted this latter procedure, it must not surprise us, though the inevitable result is that neither a purely mechanical cur a purely dynamical explanation of nature was proposed and completed by him. StiU less ought it to asto- nish anyone (as it does Teioh- miiller, p. 24) that I should refiisa to Anaximander a specific moving ■principle, while I afterwards (vide infra) make the movement of the heavens proceed from the Sireipov. I deny that Anaximander had a moving principle distinct fiom ANAXIMANDER. 241 seeking such a theory in Anaximander in opposition to the most trustworthy evidence. If Anaximander did not conceive his primitive matter as a mixture of particular substances, but as a homogeneous mass, we must next enquire what was the nature of this mass. The ancients, beginning with Aristotle, unanimously assert that it consisted of none of the four elements. Aristotle several times mentions the view that the primitive matter in re- gard to its density is intermediate between water and air,' or between air and fire,^ and not a few ancient writers ''have referred these assertions to Anaximan- der ; for example, Alexander,^ Themistius,' Simplicius,® l*hiloponus,^ and Asclepius.* But although this theory has been recently defended' against Schleiermacher's objections,'" I cannot convince myself that it is well the pH/mitive matter, the i-ireipov; opposed to one another, one element and' I maintain, precisely for that conceived as infinite would an- reaeon, that he placed the motive nihilate all the rest. The Infinite poTfer in this primitive matter it- must, therefore, be inteimedjate self, and derived the motion of the among the various elements. This heavens from that of the fiireipoc. thought can hardly belong to Where is the contradiction ? Anaximander, as it presupposes ' De Cceh, iii. 5, 303 b, 10; the later doctrine of the elements ; Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 1 6 ; c. 5, 205 a, it is no doubt taken from Arist. 25 ; Gen. et Gorr. ii. 5, 332 a, 20. Phi/s. iii. 5, 204 b, 24. ' Phys. i. 4, 1S1 a, ]2,Yiie inf. ' Phi/s. lOi ; 105 b; 107 a; p. 248, 1; Gen. et Cmr. loo. cit. 112 b; De Ccelo, 273 b, 38; 251 and ii. 1, 328 b, 35 ; Metaph. i. 7, a, 29 ; 268 a, 45 (Schol. in Ar. 988 a, 30; i. 8, 989 a, 14. 614 a, 28; 610 a, 24. 613 a, 35). ' Cf. Schleiermaoher, loo. cit. ' De Gen. et CotY. 3 ; Phys. A 175; Brandis, Gr. Bom. Phil. i. 1 32. 1 ; C 2, 3. * In Mete^h. i. 5, 7, pp. 34, 2 ; » Schol. in Arist. 663 b, 33. 36, I ; 45, 20 ; 46, 28 ; and ap. ° Haym, m der Allg. EneyJcl. Simpl. 32 a. iii. Sect. B, xxiv. 26 sq. ; F. Kern, ' Phys. 18 a, 33 a; 33 b (pp. in the Philo/ogus, xxvi. 281, and p. 124, 230, 232 sp.). The ground 8 sqq. of the treatise mentioned of this definition is here, p. 33 a, supra, p. 237, 5. thus stated : As the elements are "■ Loo. cit. 174 sqq. VOL. I. E 242 / ANAXIMANDER. fdunded. One of the Aristotelian passages quoted cer- tainly seems to contain a reference to expressions which Anaximander employed;^ but the reference is itself questionable, and even if it be admitted, it does not follow that the whole passage relates to him ;^ while. ' " Be Coelo, iii. 6, at the begin- ning: evioi yh,p ev ii6vov iiroTlBePTOi Kal TOVTtav ol fiej/ liSatp^ oi S* depce, ol 5' aSaros fiev XeTrrdrepoy, aepos Se 'jrvKv6ripov, % irepiex^tu (paffl irdfTas Toi)s oipavoiis &veLpov Sc cf. Phj/s. iii. 4, 203 b, 1 {supra, p. 248, 1), where the words ■nepi4j(eiv HirayTa koX TtdvTa Kv$epv§i/ are, with some pro- bability, ascribed to Anaximander ; and Hippolytus, Sefut. Hier. i. 6. * The words, & wepiex^iv — iiiret- pov Sv admit of two interpretations. They may either be referred solely to the subject immediately preced- ing the 35aTos Ke^rdrspov, &c., or to the main subject of the whole proposition, the ec. In the former case, those who make primitive matter a something intermediate between air and water, would be credited with the assertion that this intermediate something embraces all things. In the latter case, the sense of the passage would be as follows : some assume only one primitive matter — either water, or air, or fire, or a body that is more subtle than water, and more dense than air ; and this primitive mat- ter, they say, embraces all worlds by virtue of its unlimitedness. In point of grammar the second in- terpretation seems to me undoubt- edly the best'; but one thing may certainly be urged againstit (Kern, Beitrag. &e., p. 10), that, accord- ing to Fhys. iii. 5, 205 a, 26, ovSih Th %v Koi atreipov irvp iirolriaev ouSe y^y rujf fl>virio\6yay (Heracleitus, ibid. 205 a, 1 sq., is particularly classed among those who regaid the All as limited), and that con- sequently the relative clause, h tc- pUx^iy, &c., cannot contain any reference to those who made fire their primitive matter. But such inaccuracies are not so very un- common with Aristotle? and in the present instance I do not think it impossible that in a comprehensive statement, such as we have here, he should have ascribed the infinity of matter, either explicitly or im- plicitly admitted by the great majority of philosophers, to all without exception, and should have expressed this doctrine in the words of the man who first intro- duced it. On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that one of the philosophers (or if only one held it, the one philosopher) who made the primitive matter intermediate between water and air, may have adopted Anaximander's expression, Trepiexetv •nd.vras to^s ovpavobs, to characterise its infinity (Anaxi- mander himself, Phys. iii. 4, only says, irepiexeiv Sirai/To) ; in the same way that Anaximenes (vide infra) says of the air that it S\ov Thv K6tr/jLoy •irept4xfi, and Diogenes {Fr. 6, iiifra) also applies to the air another expression of the Anaxi- mandrian fragment : iriyra KvPep- v^v. The passage we have been considering, therefore, does not warrant us in ascribing to Anaxi- mander a doctrine which, as will THE INFINITE. 243 on the other hand, the very next words clearly imply the contrary. For Aristotle here ascribes to the philo- sophers, who believed the primitive matter to fee some- thing intermediate between air and water, the theory that things originated from primitive matter by means of rarefaction and condensation; and this he distinctly denies of Anaximander.^ No other passage can be quoted from Aristotle to show that he found this definition of primitive matter in Anaximander's writ- ings.^ As to the statements of later writers, they immediately be shown, is not ascribed ,to him by Aristotle. ' Aristotle thus continues {Be Coelo, iii. 5) immediately after the words quoted above : 3(roi niv oiv rh ev Tovro irotovirij/ SSwp ^ depa ^ SdaTos nev \etrr6repott cUpos S^ TVKy6Tepoj/, elr' ix tovtov •KvKv6TTyTi Kai iiavirtiri rSXXa yevvwffLv, &c. 2 Kern, PMlolog. xxvi. 281, thought that the passage (quoted sup. 228, 3), Phys. iii. 4, might be so taken ; since, according to this, Anaximander must be reckoned among the philosophers who con- ceive of the Infinite as a body in- termediate between two elements. In the Beitrag sur Phil, der Xm., p. 8, he prefers to interpret the words thus : the physicists all as- sign as sabstratum to the Infinite one of the elements, or that which is intermediate between them. I cannot adopt this explanation. I think tlfat Aristotle would have expressed this thought otherwise. He would have said perhaps : fcro- TiOeatrii/ erepav riva /pdffiv r^ iiveiptj}, /•6Ta{Ji Toirav. On the other hand, I still consider that the words, frepay riva ipiaiv ray Aeyofieyuy OToiy^itny, may have a more general signification, an elemental body, diflerent from itself, so that the matter underlying all particular substances would be included under the expression. The possi- bility of this view appears, not only from Aristotle's comprehensive use of a% re Kol maintains the ctireipfa of the bmoio- fiSwros' \4yerai yap Stfi^cirepus. lifpv, and of tie atoms ; these must ' Even he is uncertain, in the also, therefore, be a erepa Di/ lyB^x^''""' '*' &ireipov ^fpdapTO Uv ^87} ToWa' elvat T,h &7[eipov ffufia, aire us A.6- vvv S' erepov eivai (j>a(nv e| oS • yovffl Tiyes rh Tropefc Tci (rrotxeta, ^^ o5 TauTO. TiavTayiwiia-iy, 0S6' air\iis. e'urlydp ' Simp. 11 a; Themist. 33 a, Tiyes, 01 TovTO iroiov(ri rh &nftpov, (230 sq.). i^X o6k Siipa^ SSap, as n^ rSWa THE INFINITE. 247 indeed, which points to the later theory of the elements, can hardly have been so stated by Anaxiraander. But whether Aristotle inferred it, after his manner, from some ambiguoiTS utterance, or arrived at it by his own conjecture, or whether later authors may, perhaps, have interpolated it, the doctrine in support of which it is adduced no doubt belongs originally to Anaximander. Theophrastus expressly says so' in describing Anaxi- mander's Infinite as One matter without qualitative determinateness ; and with this Diogenes^ and the Pseudo-Plutarch,^ and among the commentators of Aristotle, Porphyry, and probably also Nicolaus of Damascus,* agree ; of these the two first, at any rate, appeared to have used a special .source. Simplicius himself says elsewhere the same thing.^ That Anaxi- mander's primitive matter was not a qualitatively determined matter is, therefore, certain ; the only doubt that remains 'is whether he expressly denied to it all determination, or' merely abstained from qualifying it at all. The latter hypothesis is the more probable of the two ; it is actually maintained by some of our authorities, and appears simpler and, therefore, more in accordance with so ancient a system, than the other theory, which constantly presupposes considerations like those above cited firom Aristotle ; it also furnishes the ' Ap.Simpl.vides«^rfl,p.223,l. ' Simpl. Phys. 32 a. ' ii. 1 : ItpttiTKep apxh" ««! aroi- ' Fhys. Ilia: Xiiavaiv oi Trepl Xetoy tJ) ^.TreipoVj ob Siopl^uy ctepa ^ ^Ava^iiiavSpoi/ [rh &Tr*;ipov eTvai] rb SSwp fi &Wo TU irap^ rit ffToix^Ta ^ oZ rh ffrotx^^a ' Plac. i. 3, 5 : anapriva 8e yevvairiv. 6 a : Ac'yei S' ainriv olnos fi^ \4yuv ri iffri rb fiffctpov, [tV c'PX^*'] M^^ OSwp i.}iKo rav trirepov ot^p 4ffTtv ^ 05wp ^ 7^ ^ KaKovfievuv (TTOixslay, a\A' erdpav i^AXa Ttyii (Tc^uaTa. Tti'^ tp6fftjf &treipov. Also 9 b. 248 ANAXIMANDER. most reasonable explanation of the fact that Aristotle only mentions Anaximander when he is discussing the question of the finiteness or infinity of matter, and of the production of things from it, and not when he is dealing with its elementary composition ; for in the case we are assuming, no distinct utterance of Anaxi- mander would have been known to him on this point, as on the two former (not even the negative state- ment that the Infinite is not a particular substance), _ and so he prefers to be wholly silent on the subject. I / therefore believe that Anaximander held simply to this proposition : that the Infinite or infinite matter existed I before particular things. As to the material constitu- I tion of this primitive substance, he has given us no I precise information. Anaximander further taught that the Infinite is eternal and imperishable.' In this sense he is said to have designated the first principle of all things by the expression a/3%'7.^ . He conceived motive power ' Ariet. Fhys. iii. 4, 203 b, 10 koI Trivras irepiexeic Tohs Kfiff/tous] (cf. Be Cain, iii. 5 ; supra, p. 242, thinks likely. More recently Diog. 2). The Infinite is without begin- ii. 1 : Tcb /ih fiffm neTojSiiWeiy, rh ning or end, etc. : Sib, Kofliirep Se irav d/icTi'^KriTOii fli/ai. Xeyofiev, oi jairns apxh, A\V oBtt) ^ Hippolyt. loc. cit., and Simpl. TMvSAXoireTi'oiSaKelKolTrepiex*"' Fhys. 32 b, certainly assert this; aTracTa xal Trivra Kv$epii^i>, as and Teichmiiller (Stud. z%r Geseh. tjxMiv Sa-ai fi^ TTOioviri raph rh £»«- der Begr. 49 sqq.), -who disputes it, pov SA\aj ahias, olov voZv ^ <()i*.lw does violence, as it seems to me, to Kol tout' eXvai rd deioy hedvarov - the -wording of these passages. It yap Ka\ avdXfepev, as ^iriy i is another question whether the 'Am^lfiavSpos /cal oJ irAeiUTot twi/ statement is true, and this we can v. The words in spaced scarcely ascertain. Like Teich- type are probably taken from Anaxi- miiller, I cannot regard it as self- mander's work ; only for avdiKeBpor, evident, that he employed the ex- i,yTipu may have been substituted as pression apxii ; and my doubt is Hippolytus,iJe/«tfi!gr. i. 6[TatiT7ji' strengthened by the circumstance (tV opxV) 8' aiBuH/ iivai Koi cLyhpie that a similar remark about Thales PRIMITIVE MATTER. 249 to be combined from the begiflning with matter ;' or, as Aristotle says { loc. dt), he taught that the Infinite not merely contained, but directed all thing s." He thus regarded matter, a fter the manner of the early Hylo- zoism, as self-moved and living ; and in consequence of this motion he supposed it to produce all things from itself. When Aristotle (loc. cit.), therefore, designates Anaximander's Infinite as the Divine essence, he describes it correctly,' though we do not know whether Anaximander himself used that expression.* " ^oth(GescJi.derAbendl.Phil. ii. a, 142) belieyes that the self- dependent moving force attributed to the Infinite presupposes an in- telligence, a conscious spiritual nature, and that the Infinite of Anaximander must thus be con- ceived as infinite spirit ; but this is an entire misapprehension of the contemporary modes of thought, and is contradicted by Aristotle's vpell-known assertion (Metapk. i. 3, 984 b, 15 sq.) that Anaxagoras ■was the first who declared vous to be the principle of the world. In appealing for want of any other evidence to the words of Theo- phrastus quoted above (p. 233, 1), he has overlooked the fact that Anaximander is here compared -with Anaxagoras 'Only in respect of 'his definition of the (ra/MTiKii (ttoi- X'e'B. Not to mention other inac- curacies, this does away with the discovery, of which Eoth {loc. cit.) is so proud, that Anaximander's doctrine of the Aveipov has more theological than physical import- ance, and that it is in complete harmony with the Egyptian theo- logy, as he endeavours to prove. < The text of Simpl. Phys. 107 a, whieh is only a paraphrase of (that he called water ipx^) I can discover neither in Diog. i. 27, nor elsewhere ; and consequently I cannot credit it. But if Anaxi- mander did call his Infinite the apxh or tjie apxh irdvTav, or designate it in any other similar manner, this would only be saying that the Infi- nite was the beginning of all things, .which is iar enough from the Platonic and Aristotelian con- cept of the dpyii, the ultimate cause. ' Hut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 1 : 'Ava^lfmvipov . . . rh &Tretpov (pdvai T^v tratrav aWiav exeii/ ttjs tov vamhs yeveirei&s t6 koi ^dopa;. Herm. Irria. c. 4 : 'Apo|. tov vypov irpea ^vrepav apxhv ehtu \eyei t^v diSiov KlviitriVf Kal Td^rj ret juev yivvm&ai tbl Se (pBetpeirOai. Hip- polyt. I.e. : trpbs Se TOirifi Kivr\triv dtSioj/ elyai, iy ^ ffvfi^aivsi yiveaBai Tohs oipavois. Simpl. Phys. 9, p. : &netp6v Ttva (f>{nrLV . . , . dpxh^ ^€0eTO, ^s TTjv dtStov KivTiffiv ahiav' ' eXtrai T7ts r&v ivrav- yeveaeas ^Keye. Similarly 107 a; 257 b. ^ The expression Kv^epv^v, whieh, in its simplest meaning, signifies the guidance of the ship's movements by the rudder, here re- lates primarily to the movement of the celestial system. 250 ANAXIMANDER. We are farther told that he represented particulai' suhstances as developing themselves from the primitive matter by means of separation (sKKpivecrdai,, uTroKpU veadai),^ and Anaximander himself seems to have used this word ;^ but what he precisely understood by sepa- ration does not appear. He apparently' left this con- ception in the same uncertainty as that of the primitive matter, and that which floated before his mind was merely the general notion of an emergence of the several matters distinct from one another, out of the original homogeneous mass. We hear, on the other hand, that h e made the division of heat and cold the first result of this separation.^ From t^e mixture of the passage we have quoted from Aristotle, cannot of course be ad- duced in support of it. I am unahle to give such a decided negative to this question as Eiisgen does, loo. oit.j p. 16 sq. ; but Anaximander certainly could not have named his Infinite rb fleiby in the monotheistic sense ; he only called it d^lov, divine. ' Arist. Phys, i. 4, vide supra, p. 234, 3 ; Plutarch in Eus. loo. cit. ; Simpl. Phys. 6 a : ou/c hKKoiov- fUvov rod ffToix^iov riiv yeyetriv irotsi, clW* anoKpivofievav Tav ivav- rlwv 5ict T^s dtSlov Kij^o'eois, And similarly ibid. 32 b; 61 b (vide supra, pp. 228, 3; 233, 1), Tjhere, however, Anaximander's doctrine is too much confused with that of Anaxagoras, Themist. Phys. 18 a; 19 a (124, 21 ; 131, 22 sq.) ; Philo- ponus, Phys. C 2. The incorrect statement of Simplicins that Anax- imander believed in rarefaction and condensation, was no doubt based upon the false supposition that his primitive matter was intermediate between two elements, and that he was consequently alluded to by Aristotle, I)e Coelo, iii. 5 (vide supra, p. 212, 1) ; Phys. i. 4, at the beginning (vide supra, p. 234, 3); cf. Philoponu?, Phys. c. 3. " We gather this partly from the use of the word ^rjiri in Arist. loo. oU., and also from considering the manner in which he reduces both the cosmogony of Empedocles and th^t of Anaxagoras to the concept, iKKpiveffBat. Moreover, it is impossible to see how Aristotle and his successor could have been led to attribute the iKKpuris to An- aximander, unless they had found ic in his writings. ' Simpl. Phys. 32 b : -rhs 4vav- ri6rT]Tas . . . ^KKpiveadal (piifftv' ^Aya^ifjLai/^pos . . . ivavrtdrJiTes Se eiVi 6ep[ihv, ifivxphv, ^nphv, iyphv Kal at &\\\oybs (ripatpav irept^Ovat Tij) Trepl r^v yriv aepi, &s t^ SevSpcp tl>\ot6v,^irTtvos atroppayeitrris Kol ejfs Tivas aTroKKeKrBeia-tjs k^kKovs inro- ffrrivai rdv t/i\lov kkI t^v ffiK'iivT\v 252 ANAXIMANDEE. that we find upon the subject.' The heavenly bodies were formed of fire and air ; when the fiery circle of the universe burst asunder, and _the fire w^sj)ent^up in_ wheel-sh aped husks of compressed air, from the apertures of which it streams forth ; the stoppage of these aper- tures occasions eclipses of the sun and moon, and the waxing and waning of the moon are produced in the same way.^ This fire is kept up . by the exhalations ' On the other hand, I cannot agree with TciehmuUer (Joe. cit. pp. 7, 26, 58) that he conceived his iireipov as originally a great sphere, and the eternal motion of it (supra, p. 248 «g.) as a rotation wherehy a spherical envelope of fire was parted off and spread over the surface of the mass. No such notion is ascribed to Anaximander by any of our authorities ; for the a^aijia Tcujiis lay, not round the Hirfipoi', but around the atmosphere of the earth. Indeed, if we say that the Infinite comprehends all things, or all worlds (pp. 242, 1 ; 248, 1 ), we exclude the presupposi- tion that it is itself comprehended by the limits of our world. But a spherical Infinite is in itself so great and so direct a contradiction, that only the most unquestionable evidence could justify our ascribing it to the Milesian philosopher ; and, in point of fact, there exists no evidence for it at all. ' Hippolyt. Befiit. i. 6; Plut. in'EuB. loo. cit. ; Plac. ii. 20, 1 ; 21, 1 ; 26, 1 (Galen. Hwt. Fhil. 1 5) ; Stob. Eel. i. 510, 524, 548; Theo- doret, Gr. aff. Cur. iv. 17, p. 58 ; Achilles Tatius, Isag. c. 19, p. 138 sq. All these writers agree in what is stated in our text. If, however, we attempt any closer definition of this conception, we find consider* able divergencies and lacunae in the accounts. Plutarch, ap. Enseb. only says that the sun and moon were formed when the fiery globe burst asunder, and became en- closed within certain circles. Hip- polytus adds that these circles have openings in the places when we see the stars ; the stopping up of these occasions eclipses and the phases of the moon. According to the FlacUa, Stobseus, Pseudo-Ga- len, and Theodoret, Anaximander conceived these circles as analogous to the wheels of a cart ; there were openings in the hollow circle of the wheel filled with fire, and through ' these openings the fire streamed out. Finally, Achilles Tatius says that Anaximander thought the sun had the form of a wheel, from the nave of which the light poured in rays (like the spokes) spreading out as far as the circam* ference of the sun. The last theory formerly seemed to me to deserve the preference. I must, however, concede to Teichmiiller (Studien, p. 10 sq.), who has carefully ex- amined all the texts on this subject, that that of Achilles Tatius does not look very authentic; and as we are farther informed (Plae. ii. 16,3 ; Stob. 516) that Anaximander made the stars iirb -rav nirKav koI raf aipaipav, iip' Hy exaaros jSc'/Stikc FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 263 of the earth ; and, again, the heat of the sun assists the drying up of the globe and the formation of the sky.' That the moon and planets shine by their own light ^ follows necessarily from Anaximander's theories respecting them. The movement of the heavenly bodies he derived from the currents of air caused ^ipeaiai, which is confirmed by the Tpoirol ToB ot>pai/oO, attributed to him by Aristotle {Meteor, ii. 2, 355, a, 21), it now appe&rs to me pro- bable that Both (fiesch. der Abendl. Phil. ii. a, 165) has taken theright riew in interpreting the wheel- shaped circles filled with fire (Both wrongly eaya encompassed with fire on the outside) as the starry spheres ; these spheres, in their rotation, pour forth fire through an aperture, and produce the pheno- menon of a fiery body circling round the earth. As, however, these rings only consist of air, Teichmiiller is not wrong (p. 32 sq.) in disputing the theory of solid spheres and a solid firmament (Both, loo. cit. ; Gruppe, Cosm. Spst. d. Gr. p. 37 sqq.) as held by Anaxim'ander. In agreement with this view, there is the statement (Stob. 548 ; Plao. ii. 25, 1 ; Galen, e. 16) that, ac- cording to Anaximander, the moon is a circle nineteen times as large as the earth ; since it is quite pos- sible that this philosopher, for reasons unknown to us, may have considered the circumference of the moon's orbit (which in that case would coincide with the moon's sphere) to be nineteen times the size of the earth's circumference. When, however, we learn from the same source (Stob. i. 524 ; Plac. 20, 1; 21, 1 ; Galen, Hist. Phil. e. 1.4, p. 274, 276, 279, K.) that he made the suu's circle twenty-eight times as large as the earth, and the sun itself (the opening of this circle which we behold as the sun's disc) the same size as the earth — this is incompatible with the theory that the sun's circle is the sun's sphere, and its size, consequently, that of the sun's orbit ; for that the sun's orbit should be only twenty-eight times as large as the sun's disc, is a glaring contradiction of ocular evidence, which we cannot ascribe to Anaximander. Hippolytus, how- ever, says (as TeichmuUer, p. 17, rightly observes) eTtoi Si rhv nixKov TOW TiK'iQV eTrTaKaieiKotrtir\afflova ttis iTi\i]vit^, and if we connect with this the statement that the moon is nineteen times as large as the earth, we shall have the sun's orbit 513 times the size of the earth's circumference, and consequently. 513 time^ that of the sun's circum- ference, which would of course seem sufficient to Anaximander. But from the nature of our evidence we cannot pass certain judgment in the matter. ' Arist. Meteor.ii. 1 (cf. p. 251, 1); ibid. a. 2, 355 a, 21, where Anaximander is not indeed men- tioned, but according to Alexan- der's trustworthy statement {loc. cit. and p. 93 b) he is included. ' What is asserted in the Pla- cita, ii. 28, and Stob. i. 656, of the moon, is denied by Diog. (ii. 1), but (as appears from the passages we have quoted) without foundation. 254 ANAXIMANDER. by tlie revolution of the' spheres ; ' his theories on their position and magnitudes^ are as arbitrary as we might expect in the childhood of astronomy ; if, however, he really taught that th e stars w ere carried round by the movement of circles out of which they r eceived t he fires by which they shine, he claims an important place in the history of astronomy as the author of the theory of the spheres. The same would apply to his discovery of the obliquity of the ecliptic,' if this has been rightly ' Arist. and Alex., of. previous note and sapra, p. 251, 1. In what ■way the rotation of the heavens is effected, Aristotle does not say, hut his words in C. 2, as also in the passage cited p. 251, 1, from c. 1, can scarcely hear any other construction this : than that the heavens are moved by the iryeii^a- To, an idea which is also found in Anaxagoras and elsewhere (Ideler, Arist. Meteor, i. 497). Alexander .thus (Joe. cit.) explains the words of Aristotle, quoted p. 261, 1 : vypov yctp ^rros tou irepl T^y yrjv t6ttov, ret vpara t^s v'yp6rT\TOS {mi rov 7i\(ov t|oT/i£f€(r9oi KaX ylveffOai rh •Kveifia/ri t€ ^| avrov icol TpoTrhs TiKiov Te Koi ffeK'fjVTls, &>s Siet rhs ir/iiSas rairas Kal tAs avaOvfud- ireis K&Kelvav Tcis rpoirets Troiovjiivoiv, %vQa 7] toi5t7;s airrois xoptyyia yiverat trepl TouTa TpeTTOfievwy. Whether the remark that Theophrastiis as- cribes this view to Anaximander and Diogenes, refers to this por- tion of Anaximander's exposition is not quite certain. Teichmiiller's theory, loc. eit. 22 sqq., that Anaxi- mander derived the movement of the firmament from the turning of the aveipov, conceived as spherical, on its axis, I cannot admit, for the reasons given, p. 252, 1, irre- spectively of the testimonies just quoted. Nor can I admit, as Teich- miiller alleges, that there is any con- tradiction in my connecting (p. 249, 2) the irdvTa KvPfpv^v, ascribed to the Infinite, with the movement of the heavens, while I here derive this movement from the Trye^fiwra. When Anaximander says that the Infinite by its own movement pro- duces that of the universe, this does not prevent his describing (cf. 250 sq.) more particularly the manner in which that movement is brought about, and seeking accordingly the approximate cause for the revolu- tion of the starry spheres in the currents of the air. ' According to Stob. 610, and the Plac. if. 15, 6, he placed the sun highest, then the moon, and the fixed stars and planets lowest (Eoper in Pkilologus, vii. 609, wrongly gives an opposite inter- pretation). Hippolytus says the same, only without mentioning the planets. On the size of the sun and moon cf. p. 263. The state- ments of Eudemus, quoted p. 234, 2, refer to these theories. » PUny, Hist. Nat. ii. 8, 31. Others, however, ascribe this dis- covery to Pythagoras ; vide ir^ra, Pyth. FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 255 ascribed to him. In accordance with the notions of antiquity, Anaximander, w^ are told, regarded the stars as gods, and spoke of an innumerable or infinite multitude of heavenly gods.' The Earth he supposes to have existed at first in a liquid state, and to have been gradually formed by the drying up of the moisture by means of the surrounding fire ; the rest, having become salt and bitter, running off into the sea.^ Its shape he conceives as a cylinder, the height of which is a third part of its breadth ; we inhabit its upper surface.' At rest in the centre of all thiags, its equilibrium is maintained because it is equally distant from the extreme limits of the universe.* The animals also, he tho ught, originated from primi- tive slime, under the influence of the sun's heat, and as the idea of a gradual succession of animalspeoies cor- responding with the periods of geological formation was ' Cicero, N. D. i. 10, 25 (after '' Tide siipm, p. 251, 1. Philodemus), Anaximandri autem ■' Plutarch in Eus. Fr. Ev. i. 8, opinio est nativos esse Beos, longis 2 ; Plac. iii. 1 0, 1 ; Hippolyt. Befut. interva,lUs orientes, occidentesque i. 6. Diogenes (ii. 1) makes the eosqm irmumerahiles esse mundos. form of the earth spherical instead Flac. i. 7, 12 : 'Ava^lfiavSpos robs of cylindrical, hut this is an error. cur-repas ovpavlovs Beois. Stob. in Teiohmiiller goes thoroughly into the parallel passage Eel. i. 66 : the subject, loc. cit. 40 sqq. * Piva^iuta/Zpos dTre Sueh a sphere miis'^ have (inthepassagequotedi-Mpra, p. 233, been perforated like a sieve, since l)ofAnaxagoras, to whom nobody each star indicates an opening in attributed the theory of several it ; and (according to p. -254, 2) it systems, that TOus.accordingto him, -would have hidden the sun and produced roiis re K6anovs koI t^v moon from us. * INFINITE SERIES OF WORLDS. 259 On the other hand, the assertion which ascribes to Anaximander an infinity of successive worlds seems to be borne out by his system. The correlative of the world's formation is the world's destruction; if the world, as a living being, developed itself at a definite epoch out of a given matter, it may easily be supposed that it will also be dissolved, like a living being, into its constituent elements again. If creative force and movement, as essential and original qualities, be ascribed to this primitive matter, it is only logical to conclude that by virtue of its vitality it will produce another world after the destruction of our own ; and for the same reason it must have produced other worlds prior to the earth. Thus we assume an infinite series of successive worlds in the past and in the future. Plutarch, indeed, expressly says of Anaximander, that from the Infinite, as the sole cause of the birth and destruction of all things, he considered that the heavens and the innumerable worlds arise in endless circulation,^ and Hippolytus speaks to the same effect.^ ' The Infi- nite of Anaximander,' he says, ' eternal and never growing old, embraces all the worlds ; but these have each of them a set time for their arising, their exist- ' Ap. Eus. Fr. Ed. i. 8, 1 : - Eefut. i. 6 : oStos apxhv efri (^Ava^ifjLavdp6v ^atrt) rh ^ireipov tpdyat rStv ovriov tpiifftv Tipk tov OTretpou, 4^ r^v irnffay alrfai^ ^y(€iv rrfs tov ^s yivecfBcu roijs oiipai/oits Kai robs 4v Travris yeveffsis re . , , Kai (pdopas. airrois Kdfffiovi. rairvv S' cCiSiov ejyai ef o5 S^ tpTjfn rois re oiipavobs Kai dyiipoj, ^v Kai irdyras irepiexety anoKeKpiffOaL Kai Ka66\ov Tohs S,-Kav- robs KAtrfiovs. \fyet Se y^pdvov Tas anetpovs 6vras Kdfffious. air.e^^- us ajptfffleyiis t^s yevdireojs Kai xvs vara Sf t^i/ tp6ophv yiveffQat Koi iro\it ovirias Kai t^s tpdopas. These pvo- irpiiepov T^v yivitriv i\ aireipov positions seem, by the way, to be diuyoi ayaKVK\ovij.eviitv irdvTay taken from another source from airiiv. what follows. S '2 260 ANAXIMANDER. ence, and their destruction.' ' Cicero, too,^ makes mention of innumerable worlds, which in long periods of time arise and perish ; and Stobseus attributes to Anaximander the theory of the future destruction of the world.' This is also countenanced by the state- ment that he believed in a future drying up of the sea,* for in that case there would be an increasing prepon- derance of the fiery element, which must ultimately result in the destruction of the earth, and of the system of which it forms the centre. The same theory of a constant alternation of birth and destruction in the universe was held by Heracleitus, who approaches more, closely to Anaximander than to any of the ancient Ionian physicists, and also most probably by Anaxi- menes and Diogenes. We have reason, therefore, to suppose that Anaximander also held it ; and that he already taught the doctrine of a perpetual vicissitude between the separation of things from the primitive ' In neither of these passages lasted them all. With Plutarch, can the innumerable worlds be un- the arising or passing away toS derstood otherwise than as sueces- ■lrav^hs ■ and the di/aitu/fA.ou/ii£'coj» sive worlds. When Hippolytus irivTi^v avrSiv, sufficiently show that directly connects with his mention successive worlds are intended, of the K6&fi0L the remark that the ' In the passage quoted at time of their beginning is deter- length, supra, p. 255, 1, where the mined, this can only mean that words, longis intervallis orientes these xSa/ioi have a definite duri- occidentesque, can only apply to tion, and we must then explain the worlds of which one arises when the plurality thus : there are many other disappears, eyen supposing worlds, because each world only that Cicero or his authority con- lasts for a time. The connection fused these worlds with the itircipoi of the two propositions, that the ovpavol designated as gods by JETEipai/ is eternal, and that it em- Anaximander. braces all worlds —points to the ' Eel. i. 416. Anaximander same result. It might embrace all ... ^dofriiv rhv K6anov. coexisting worlds even if it were * Theophrastus, and probably not eternal; but it could only em- also Aristotle, mpra, p. 151, 1. brace successive worlds, if it out- INFINITE SERIES OF WORLDS. 261 matter, and their return to primitive matter ; as well as an endless series of worlds in succession, which was the natural result of that doctrine.' Whether he likewise maintained the co-existence of an infinite number of systems, or of a plurality of systems apart from one another, as the Atomists after- wards did, is another question. Simplicius, and ap- parently Augustine,, assert this of him ; ^ and some few modern writers have agreed with them.' But Augus- tine certainly does not speak from his own knowledge, and he does not tell us his authority. Nor is Simplicius ' What Sehleiermacher urges {loo. cit. 197) against this theory does not seem to me conclusive. Anaximander, he thinks (according to the texts qiioted, supra, p. 229, 2, 3), could not have supposed a time in which generation was ar- rested, and this must have been the case from the commencement of a. world's destruction to the arising of a new world. But in the first place, the words, 'Iva t) yivetxis fj.'^ imKelwri, do not assert that 'gene- ration may never and in no way be arrested,' but rather that ' the generation of perpetuaUynew beings can never cease.' It does not cease if it is continued in a new world instead of the one destroyed ; and thus it becomes very questionable whether we can attribute to Anaxi- mander a notion which, strictly understood, would exclude a begin- ning as well as an end of the world ; namely, the notion that oa accoilnt of the incessant activity of the first cause (vide stq>. p. 249, 1) the world can never cease to exist. He might think that he was proving this activity all the more .conclu- sively by making it always form a new world after the destruction of an old one. Rose's opinion (Arisi. lib. ord. 76) that the theory of an alternative formation and des- truction of worlds, is a vetuetissima cogitandi ratione plane aliena has been already answered in the text. We find this theory in Anaximenes, Heracleitus, and Dijogenes (to ail of whom, however, Kose equally denies it) ; and moreover in Empe- docles. 2 Simpl. Phys. 257 b: ot net* yb.p aneipovs t^ ir\^06t rohs k6v fJ.fy aei ytvofievav &\Ka3V Se (f}6€ipo^4vuv. Cf. inf. p. 262, 2. Aug, Civ. D. viii. 2 ;. rertim principia singrularum esse credidit injmita, et innumerabiles mvmdos gignere et qnaecunque in eis oriuntur, eoaque mundos modo dis- solvi modo iterum gigni existimavit, quawita guisque aetate sua manere potu,i-nt. ^ Biisgen especially, p. 18 sq. of the. work mentioned (^sii/pra, p. 235, 1). 2C3 ANAXIMANDER. quoting from Anaximander's writings,' and he clearly betrays that he is not sure of what he is saying.^ No trustworthy evidence from any other source can be cited in favour of this philosopher's having held such a theory,^ a theory which his general system not merely As already observed on p. 237 s\., and clenrly proved by the con- tradietioi.s resulting from the com- parison of the expressions shown to be his, supra, pp. 233, 1 ; 241, 6 ; 244, 1, 2. 2 Cf. De Caelo, 91 b, 34 {Schol. in At. 480 a, 36) : ol 5e Koi t^j fjiavSpos .ftev &7rfipov rtf fieyeOei r^v apxh^ defieyos, airsipovs e| aiiTOu h O K €1. AeuKiTTTTUS Sh KOi ^71fJl.6KpL- ros aTretpovs Tip TrKijdeL tous k6u^ovs, &e. lliid. 273, b 43: koI fcdir/ious dtreipovs oiirus KoX exttffTOV toiv K^a^tav «£ oiTreipov rov rotoilrov aroix'^iov inre6eT0, &s 5 o K e i. ' The state of the case in re- gard to Cicero and Philodemus has already been investigated, pp. 257 ; 260, 2; where the passages cited (p. 259, 1, 2) from Hippolytiis and Plutarch have also been sufficiently considered. Plutarch indeed says in the preterite ; to{is re ovpavobs avoKeK^ltrSai /cat KoddXov rols airav- Ttts direipovs ^vras K6tTfj.ovs, but that proves nothing ; for in the first place the xdcrfioi may have the same meaning as oi/pai'ol (ef. p. 258), and in the next, it might be said of successive vcorlds that an infinite number of them had come forth from the cmeipov ; for they had already been innumerable in the past. It has also been shown (p. 267) that Stobaeus, i. 56, proves nothing. When Stobasus (i. 496) says 'Ava^iuavSpos ' hva^ifiirns 'Ap- X^\aos Sifoipdfris Aioyirris Asiiair- tros ATifj.6vpiTos 'ZmKovpos dveipohs k6it^ovs ^v t^ direiptfi Kara iraffav vepia.'yayijy. TOiV 5' direlpovs diro .... nepi t)]V "Zdp^etav aXuffiv, 4Te\evTT}je be r^ e|7jK0(rT^ rplrri o\vii.TittSt, and that Suidas thence derives his statement : yeyovev iv ry ve' Q\vfnri(i5i 4v Trj ^dpBetov aKt&trei are Kvpos 6 TlepaTjs Kpoiaov KaBetKev. Only, says Diels, Suidas or some later interpolator has wrongly introduced Eueebius's date 4v Tp ve' oXu/uiriaSi. The conquest of Sardis that Diogenes means is the conquest by Cyrus (01. 58, 3, or 646 B.C.), and the word, yiriavvi, or 7«76W^Tai (as is oft^ the case) relates not to the hi i th, but to the time of life, the a/c/x^. The work of Anaximenes, a small fragment of which has been handed down to us, was, according to Diogenes, written in the Ionic dialect ; the two insignificant letters to Pytha- goras, which we find 'in Diogenes, are of course apocryphal. ' Arist. Metaph. i. 3, 984 a, 6, ' Ava^ifievTjs de a4pa Kal Aioyivris irpdrepov USaTos Kai fldMtrr* apxv'^ rtdeacri rav dTr\fii>;/ autfidTuv, and all later writers without excep- tion. ' As is assumed by Kitter, i. 217, and still more decidedly by Brandis, i. 144. " Hippolyt. Befui. hctr. i. 7: ^hvafyiitviis 5\ . . . aepa iiveipov ^tpri 268 ANAXIMENES. is perfectly applicable to the air around us,, and our au- thorities evidently so understand it, for they none of them ever allude to such a distinction, and the majority of their texts expressly designate the primitive matter of Anaximenes as one of the four elements, as a qualitatively determined body.' On the other hand, he ascribed one property to the air, which Anaximander had already employed to discriminate primitive being from all things derived; he defined it as ipfinite in regard to quantity. This is not only universally attested by later writers,^ but Anaximenes himself implies such an opinion^ in saying that the air em- braces the whole world ; for when the air is conceived as not comprehended by the vault of heaven, it is much easier to imagine it spread out to infinity than to place any definite bound to so volatile a substance. Moreover tV apx^" f?""'! ^1 »" TO. yeySiifva defimta. N. J), i. 10, 26: Anaxi- ri yiyov6ra, Kal ra 4ff6fiiva Kai meries aera deiim statuit, ewmque Biohs Koi Beta yiveffdai, ra Be \ot7ra gigni (a misapprehension on "which ^K Tuy TQ\)Tov dTroy6vQJV. Th Se elios cf. Krische, i.'66) essegueimmensum rov dipos roiovrov -^rav jUey &fia- et infinitum et semper in motu ; Ki^raTos fi, if^ei fi5rj\oi', S^\oi)(r0ai Diog. ii. 3 : ovros dpxvv d^pa elire St T^j ^vxp^ Kal T^ Bepfi^ Kal rtf KaX rb Ihrnpov ; Simplicius, Phys. 5- ^0Teplj5 Kol T$ Ktvovuhtf. b : 'Ava^inavSpov, Kci 'Ava^iiiernv ' E. g. Aristotle, loo. oiL, and ... Ik /tej/, ireipov Se t$ iityiBei rh Phys. i. 4 ; Pint. ap. Ens. Pr. Ev. o-tolx^iov moScfievovs ■ ibid. 6 a, i. 8, 3: 'Ava^i^evriv Se (patririivTav vide preceding note; ibid. 106 b, hAuf apxh" Til' aipa f'meiv Kal Tjide supra, p. 219, 1; ibid. 273 TovTOV , eTvai r^ fjiiv yevei iirupov h : ev t^ atreip^ . . . rq? 'Ava^t/xe' Ta7s Bh irepl avrbv ^016771(11^ iipuTfie- vous Kal 'Ava^ifidvSpov. Also Sim- yov. Simpl. Phi/s. 6 a, u : /jioi/ /lii/ plieius, Oe Ccelo, vide infra ; ibid, riiv inroKtiiiivTiv (^iaw Kol &Keip6v 91 b, 32 [Schol. 480 a, 35) : 'Ara- ipritrtt/ , , , ouK a6ptffTov 6^ . . . ^tfievTjs Thv depa &Treipov dpx^f eJyat • aWa &pia'fi4ytjVf h.4pa \fyav aiiT'iiy. \4yuv. So Se Ckelo, vide infra, p. 270, 3. ' In the words quoted by Pint. 2 Plut. and Hippol., vide the Plae. i. 3, 6 (Stob. Eel. i. 296) : two previous notes. Cic. Acad. ii. oTov ^ ^vx^ rj Tjfierepa &^p oiffa 37, 118: Anaximenes .injmitmrn (rvyKparfT iinas, xal i\ov rhy Kitr/iov aera;sed ea, qiuB ex eo oriretitttr nyevfia Kal iiip Tepiex^'- AIR. 269 Aristotle' mentions the theory according to which the world is surrounded by the boundless air. This passage, it is true, may also apply to Diogenes or Archelaus, but Aristotle seems to' ascribe the infinity of primitive matter to all those who consider the world to be sur- , rounded by this matter. We can scarcely doubt there- fore that Anaximenes adopted this conception of Anaxi- mander. He also agrees with him in the opinion that the air is in constant movement, is perpetually changing its forms,^ and consequently perpetually generating new things derived from it ; but what kind of movement this is, our authorities do not inform us.* Lastly, it is said ' Phys. iii. 4 ; vide supra, p. 219, 2 ; ibid. c. 6, 206 b, 23 : Sffirep rov KiffixQVj oS Ti oit&la i) &\\o tl ToiovTov, &Treipov elvai. Cf. also the paBsage quoted on p. 242, 1 ; J)e Cotlo, iii. 5. 2 Plutarch ap. Eus. Pr. Be. i. 8, according to the quotation on p. 268, 1 : yepvaaSat Se irivTa Kwri. Tiva vW- yufftv TO^TOv, KciX iriiKiv apaiwfftv. T^c 76 ^.ijv Klvriffiif 6| aiojyos an- dpxiiv. Cic. N. D. i. 10 (note 1). Hippolyt. according to the quota- tion, sup. p. 268, 1 : KipetaBai 5e KaX aei'ou yap (lera^dWetv titra fisTa^dK- \«, el fiii Koioi-ro. Simpl. Phys. 6 a : kIvtiitiv Se Kol oZtos dtStov i TTOici Si' SiK Kol TTiv fieTaPo\^v ylve- ' irpbs /ueTo;8o\^K. prommiiavii). * Vide supra, p. 268, 3. RAREFACTION AND CONDENSATION. 271 the body decomposes and perishes. It was natural for Anaximenes to suppose that such might also be the case with the world. For the^Delief that the world was ani mate g as very ancient, and had already been intro- duced into physics by his predecessors. So in the manifold and important effects of the air, which are patent to observation, he readily found proof that it is the air which moves and produces all things. But philosophy had not yet attained to the discrimination of motive cause from matter. The above announcement, therefore, was equivalent to' saying that the air is the primitive matter; and this theory was likewise sup- ported by common observation, and by a conjecture which might easily occur to the mind. Eain, hail, and snow, on the one hand, and fiery phenomena on the other, may equally be regarded as products of the air. Thus the idea might easily arise that the air must be the matter out of which all the qther bodies are formed, some of them tending upwards, and others downwards ; and this opinion might likewise be based on the appa- rently unlimited diffusion of the air in space, especially as Anaximander had declared the infinite to be the primitive substance. All things then, says Anaximenes, spring from the air by rarefacti on or b ^jjoadensartion.' These processes ' Aristotle {Phys. i. 4, sub initj further testimony, cf. Plut. Be Pr. Be Ccelo, iii. 5, sub init. Tide supra. Frig. 7, 3, supra, pi 272, 2 ; Pint, p. 243, 1 ) ascribes this theory to a ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 3, siipra, ■wiiole class of natural philosophers, p. 269, 2 ; Hippolyt. Kefut. i. 7 ; It was so peculiar to Anaximenes Hermias, Irris. e. 3 ; Simpl. Phj/g. that Theophrastus assigns it to him 6a; 32 a. The expressions by alone (perhaps, however, ho means whiQh rarefaction and condensation alone among the earliest philoso- are designated are various. Aris- phers), vide stipra, p. 224, 2. Por totle says /livaffts and iriicvains ; in- 272 ANAXIMENES. he seems to have regarded as resulting from the move- ment of the air.' Earefaction he makes synonymous with heating, and condensation with cooling.^ The stages through which matter has to pass in the course of these transformations he describes somewhat un- methodically. By rarefactiqn air changes into fire ; by condensation it becomes wind, then clouds, then water, then- earth, lastly stones. From these simple bodies compound bodies are then formed.^ The texts stead of iiaiiuais, Plutareli and Simplicius hare apaluats, apaiov- 7I(ri, rh St kpaihn Kul rb x'^apbv {ouTW TTUS OVOfJLOITaS KoL T^ p-flUATL) Bepfidv. In support of this, as is furtherobserved, Anaximenes urged that the air which is breathed out with the open mouth is warm, and that which is ejected in closing the lips is cold; the explanation given by Aristotle being that the one is the air inside the mouth, and the other the air out'-ide it, Hippol. loc.eit. (p. 267, 3, and note 3, infra). According to Porphyry, ap. Simpl. Pkys. 41 a. Aid, Anaximenes re- garded the moist and the dry as fundamental contraries ; this state- ment is, however, open to suspicion ; the more so, because Simplicius bases it upon a hexameter, which he says emanated from Anaximenes, but which is elsewhere ascribed to Xenophanes (vide infra, chapter on Xenophanes), and which cannot have been taken from the prose of Anaximenes. Most likely, as Brandis thinks (Schol. 338 b, 31, loc. cit.}, Uevo^diniv should be sub- stituted for 'Ava^ifiiyriv. ' Simpl. Phys. 32 a ; and pre- viously in the same terms, p. 6 a : 'Ava|iju6i/f}s apaiovfjtej/ov fitv rhy a4pa TrSp yiveffBai fniiri, wvKvoi- pLCVov he dytuoy, elra vei^os, elra In liah\ov SSap, •fro yfiy, elra \l8ms, ri 8e iWa ix rouTuy. Hippol. FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 273 therefore which suppose Anaximenes to have fixed the number of the elements at four,' are to be considered inexact as to this point. In the formation of the world, the condensation of the air first produced the earth,^ which Anaximenes conceived as broad and flat, like the slab of a table, and for that reason, supported by the air.' He ascribed after the passage quoted p. 267, 3 : irvKvoifievov yhp koL apaioifievov Sid- tpopov ^alvs ffOai' irav yhp ils t6 dpaiSrepov Staxvdy irdp yij/effOaty fieffas 5e itrav eis depa •TrvKyoifievoy ^1 d4pos vetpos aTTOreKeffB^ icaTct r^y Tr6\Tiirtv, instead of which, perhaps, we should read : /jtetras Se irtiKiu els depUf irvKV. 4^ acp, ve^. aTTOTeAettrfloi K. T. iri'Xijffu' — as E6per(PMoZ. vii. 610), and Duncker (in his edition) contend — perhaps, however, dv4- fiovs may he concealed in the Ii4(ras, and the following words should be otherwise amended : en Se /laWoi/ SSupf ^l irKetov ttvk- vadevTo, yTJy, koI els rh fidKiara WK- ytirarov Mdovs. &ffTe t& Kupu^ara TTJs yepeireus ivavria eivai depfiSv re Kol }^uj^p6u .... avefxovs Sc 761/j'a- (r6ai, Srai/ ^KveirvKva^evus d a^p iipiuii>8eU (peprirai (which no doubt means, when the condensed air spreads itself out anew ; unless we should substitute for ipaiaSels, hpBets, carried up aloft, which, in spite of the greater weight of the condensed air, would be quite as possible in itself as the presence (p. 274, 2) of earth-like bodifs in the heavens), ^FweXSivrti, 5e /cai ettI vKelov imxv&ev^a vetfyrj yevvaffSai [yevr^v, or, trvpeXBdpros koI itrl ir\e7oc iraxvbf pros v. yewairBat], /col oStus els Shap fiera^AWetv. ' Cie. Acad. ii. 37, 118 : gigni autem terram aquam ignem tiim ex VOL. I. 1 his omnia. Hermias loc. cit. ; Ne- mes. Nat. Horn. c. 5, p. 74, has the same, but less precisely. 2 Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 3 : TriKov/Jieyov Sh rod Stepoz TrptjjTriif yeyevris irerahnv rhv ^JXioy). Of the stars, on the contrary, the same authori- ties {Eel. }. 510; Plac. ii. 14) say that Anaximenes made them ?i\a>v SiKrjv KaraTreirriyepai t^ KpvfrraK- \oei5e(; and in accordance with this, Galen {Hist. Phil. 12) ^ays: 'Aval. T^v trepupopav riiv i^QyrdTtjv ynivvv eimt {Plac. ii. 11, 1). Our text has instead : rriv irepupopiiv rhv iluTiiTw TTjs yrjs etfcu rhv oipav6v ; but the pseudo-Galen here seems to give the original reading. It is possible then that Anaximenes, as TeichmiiUer {loc. cit. 86 sqq.) supposes, made only the sun, moon and planets float in the air, and considered the flxed stars as fas- tened into the crystalline vault of heaven, in whatever way he may have explained the origin of this latter (TeichmiiUer thinks that like Empedocles, Plac. ii. 11, 1, he sup- posed it to be formed of air liqui- fied by the action of fire). But in that case Eippolytus must have expressed himself very inaccu- rately. ^ Hippol. loc. cit.: yeyovevai Se T&, &o'Tpa 4k yrjs Sik rh ttjv iKfidSa iKraifTTis aviffTOffBaL, ^s apaiovfievrjs Th trvp yiveffBai, ix Se rov wphs IM€Teupt^afi4vov Toiis a.ffr4pas irvv- IffTiurBai. elvai SI Kol ysdiSeis affiv, &X\h irepl yriv, ittrirepe] irspl ri]v Ji^erepav Ke(pa\}iv trrpe(t>eTai rb TrtMov, KpiTTT&rdai re rhy T^Aioj/ ovx ^Ti y^v yei/Sfievov, aAA' inrh riov t^s y^s u^Kor^pav fiepiov ffKendfievojfj icoLBmttjv irKeio- va Tj/iay avrov yevofieifijv avStTraatp. Stob. i. 610 : oux ^^ tV 7?" SJ> aA\& TTcpl awT^y tTrp^tpeffOai tous acrrepas. According to these tes- timonies (that of Hippolytus espe- cially, seems to come from a trust- worthy source), we should include Anaximenes among those of whom Aristotle says m Meteor, ii. 1, 354 a, 28 : rh iroWobs ireiffdiivai rmt apxoiutv pieTe(opoK6ywv rhv ^\ioy /J.}) (I>4peff6ai inrb 7^1/, oi\\& Trepl T^v yrjif Ka\ rbv Ttiiroi/ tovtov, dtpavi^effQcu Se Kal TTOistv ytSftra Si& rb v^\^v eivai Trpbs &pKjov T^v yriy. Anaximenes is the only philosopher, so far as we know, who had recourse to the mountains of the north, for the explanation of the sun's nightly disappearance, and there is besides so great a similarity between tl)e words of Hippolytus concerning him, and those of Aristotle concern- ing the ancient meteorologists, that we may even conjecture with some probability that Aristotle is here thinking specially of Anaximenes. Teichmiiller thinks {loo. cit. p. 96) that the words, apxatoi fUTfwpo- h6yot, do not relate to physical theories, but like the apxpo\6yos is never used by him except in this passage), he understands {Meteor, i. 1 sub init.) a specific branch of natural science (/iepos t^s fiMSpv ToiiTTjs), and in this, as he expressly remarks (foe. cit.). he agrees with the ordinary use of the words ; me- teorology, meteorosophy, and the like, being common expressions to designate natural philosophers. Cf. for example, Aristophanes, Nub. 228; Xen. Sj/mp. 6, 6; Plato, Apol. 18 B, 23 D; Prot. 316 C. We know that Anaxagoras, Dioge- nes and Democritus also made the sun go laterally round the earth (infra, vol. ii.). Naw it might .. seem that if Anaximenes conceived the segment of the circle which the sun describes between his rising and setting above the horizon, to be continued and completed iuto a whole circle, he must necessarily have supposed it to be carried be- neath tlie earth. But even if this circle cut the plane of our horizon, it would not therefore be carried T 2 276 ANAXIMENES. orbits he attributed to the resistance of the air.' In the stars no doubt we must look foi- the created gods of under the earth, that is, under the base of the cylinder on the upper side of which we live (cf. p. 273, 3) ; it would form a ring passing round this cylinder, obliquely indeed, but still laterally ; it would go not vw\> yrfv, but Ttepi 7JJI', As Anaximenes made this circle dip at a certain distance from the northern edge of the earth's habitable surface, which edge, according to his geographical ideas, would not be very far from the northern shore of the Black Sea, he might well believe that without some elevation of the earth at this, its northern verge, the sun would not entirely disappear from us, and that in spite of such eleva- tion, some of its light would pene- trate to us even at night, if it were not diminished (according to the opinion of Hippolytus) by the great distance. But I by no means exclude the possibility that, ac- cording to Anazimenes, the sun and stars (of the stars, indeed, he expressly says this) and by infer- ence the planets (if he supposed the fixed stars to be fastened into the firmament, vide p. 274, 1) may have descended at their setting, either not at all, or very little be- low the surface of the horizon. As he imagined them to be flat like leaves (vide p. 274, l)and, therefore, borne along by the air, he might easily suppose that when they reached the horizon, the resistance of the air would hinder their far- ther sinking (vide the following note). What has now been said will, I hope, serve to show the true value of E6th's strictures (Gesch. der ahendl. Phil. 268) on those who cannot see that a lateral motion of the stars is absolutely impossible with Anaximenes. Teichmiiller (loo. ctt.) admits that he held a lateral rotation of the sun around the earth, a rotation in which the axis of its orbit stands obliquely to the horizon. Only he thinks that after its setting it does not move close round the earth, or upon the earth behind the high northern mountains (p. 103)— a notion which, so far as I know, no one has hitherto ascribed to Anaxi- menes. In the Viae. ii. 16, 4, and therefore, also in Pseudo-Galen, c. 12, we read, instead of the words quoted above from Stob. i. 310: 'Avo|i;ieV7is, Siwlas iirh (Gralen, manifestly erroneously, reads eirl) T^v yrji/ Kot irepl ai/T^v ffrpe^eirBat Tobs aiTTepas. Teichmiiller con- cludes from this passage (p. 98) that the motion of the sun (of the heavenly bodies) is the same above and beneath the earth, that the circular movement of the firma^ ment has the same radius above and below. But irfpl does not mean above, and whatever kind of motion it might in itself characte- rise, as contrasted with mrh (this we have already seen in the passa- ges from Aristotle, Hippolytus and Stobseus), it can only be used for a circular lateral movement. In the Placita, it seems to me we have simply an unskilful correction, oc- casioned perhaps by some mutila- tion or corruption of the true text, and authenticated by the other writers. ' Stobseus, i. 524, says : 'Avaii- fieinis vipivov vTrdpXfv rhy 5)\ioi' d/tretp-fivaro, iinh TrenvKvatiiVOu Se i^epof Kol iniTirivov i^aSoifieva to FORMATION OF TSE WORLD. a77 whom Anaximenes, as well as Anaximander, is said to have spoken ; ' bat the same doubt arises in his case as in Anaximander's, viz., whether the infinitely many worlds ascribed to him ^ relate to the stars or' to an in- finite series of successive systems.' However this may be, we are justified by the testimonies of Stobseus'' and &aTpa, Ths Tpoircks TroiEitrdai. Simi- l,arly Plac. ii. 23, 1 : 'A. imh ireiru- KVa}fie:/ou &4pos Kol aPTtT^nov i^cadsiadai Tcfc &(rrpa. In toth au- thors this stands under the heading irepi rpoTTuv tjXIou (in Stobaeus, nepl oiiffias ijXiov , . . koX rpoirwu, &e.), and they probably, therefore, meant what are usually called the two solstices, which Anaximenes might have explained in this man- ner consistently with his notion of the sun. It is noticeable, however, that they both speak of the dis- placement (Stobseus says also rpo- iroi) of the &crTpa, to which rpoiral in this sense are not elsewhere at- tribured. It is, therefore, probable that the proposition ascribed by these writers to Anaximenes had originally another meaning, and signified that the stars were forced by the resistance of the wind from the direction- of their course. The expression employed does not hin- der this interpretation. Aristotle himself speaks (i)e Ccelo, ii. 14, 296 b, 4) of rpoval ruv AffTpuy; Meteor, ii. 1, 363 b, 8, of Tportal ri\iov Kol ae\iiin\s ; and ihid. 355 a, 25, of TpoTToi ToO ovpavov ; and Anaxagoras, who is so often allied with Anaximenes in his astrono- mical theories, taught, according to Hippol. i. 8, line 37 : rpmras Si vuteitrdou KaX Tfi\iov Kal (TeK-fjvriv &ir(09ov/j.ei'Ovs imb rov aepos, ffi\-ljv7jv Sh TToW&Kts TpeTreaGat Slol rh ni] SiivOfrdai Kpanlv tov ij/uxpoO. Tpoffr; seems to designate every change in the orbit of the heavenly bodies, which altered the previous direc- tion of their course. Thus the proposition of Anaximenes quoted above must have been intended to explain, not the sun's deviation at the solstices, but the circular orbit of the heavenly bodies — those, at least, which are not fixed in the firmament. At the same time, however, it may be that he wishes to explain why their orbits are con- tinued without descending, or in descending very little, beneath the plane of our horizon, vide previous note. Uy rpoitaX he would mean in that case the inflexion in the curves described by them. ' Hippol. vide supra, p. 267, 3 ; Aug. Civ. D. viii. 2 : omnes rerum eausas infinito a&ri dedit : nee deos negavit aut tacuit: non tamen ah ipsis aerem factum, sed ipsos ex aere faotos credidit ; and after "him, Sidon. ApoU. xv. 87 ; cf. Krische, Forsch. 55 sq. 2 Stob. Eel. i. 496 ; Theod. Gr. aff. cur. iv. 15, p. 68. ' That he did not assume a plurality of co-existent systems, is expressly stated by Simplioius, vide p. 278, 1. ■* Loo. ait. 416 : 'AvaltnavSpot, 'Avc^tfievTjs, ^Apa^ay6pas, ^Apx^^oSj /^loyevris, Ae^Kiinros ^Baprhv rhy K6ir^av, Kal ni ^ru'iKol (ftBaprhv rhy K6(T^oy, Kar*, iKiripuatv S4. The destruction of the world 6y fire is 278 ANAXIMENES. Simplicius,' which mutually support and complete one another, in attributing to him tlie doctrine of an alter- nate construction and destruction of the world. The hypotheses concerning the origin of raiu, snow, hail, lightning, the rainbow,'^ and earthquakes,' which are ascribed to Anaximenes, sometimes on good au- thority, are for us of secondary importance; and his theory of the nature of the soul,* based chiefly upon the ordinary popular opinion, he himself does not seem to have further developed. /^ This survey of the doctrines . attributed to Anaxi- ( menes may now enable us to determine the ques- tion already raised : did Anaximenes owe nothing to Anaximander except in some minor points of his en- qidry ?® It seems to me that his philosophy taken as a whole clearly betrays the inflruence of his predecef- sor. For Anaximander had in all probability already expressly_a,sserted not only the infinity, but the ani- mate nature and perpetual motion of primitive matter. Anaximenes reiterates --these theories, and, by virtue of them, seems to reach his conclusion that air is the primitive matter. It is true that he returns from the here ascribed, not to Anaximander, Floril. Ed. Mein. iv. 151). Theo &c., but only to the Stoics ; though in Arat. v. 940. it is not improbable that Anaxi- ' Arist. Meteor, ii. 7, 365 a, 17 mander also held it. Vide supra, b, 6 ; Plac. in. 15, 3 ; Sen. Qu. Nat. p. 260. vi. 10 ; cf. Ideler, Arist. Metearol. ' Fhys. 257 b, : iaoi i,fl fih i. 585 sq. Perhaps iii this also (^airiv elvai K6ni\oxos, &c., are to be con- nected ■with eKKeif/ev, and not with Tcfc 'HriffiSSov iieritWa^aVj &c. ' The statements of the an- cients respecting him, and the frag- ments of his ' work, have been carefully collected and annotated by Sehleiermaoher {Ueber Diogenes V. Apoilonia, third section of his collected works, ii. 149 sqq.) and by Panzerbieter {Diogenes Apollo- niates, 1830). Cf. also Steinhart, Allg. Encycl. of Erseh and Gruber, Sect. I. vol. XXV. 296 sqq. ; Mul- lach, Fragm. Fhilos. Gr, i. 252 sqq. Of his life we know very lit- tle. He was a native of Apoilonia (Diog. ix. 57, &c.), by which Ste- phen of Byzantium {De TJrb. s. v. p. 106, Mein.) understands Apoi- lonia in Crete, but as he -wrote in the Ionic dialect, it is doubtful if this can be the city. His date ■will hereafter be discussed. Act cording to Demetrius Phalerius ap. Diog. he. oit., he was in danger through unpopularity at Athens, by which is probably meant that he ' was threatened with similar charges to those brought forward against Anaxagoras. But there may be some confusion here with Diagoras. The assertion of Antis- thenes, the historian (ap. Diog. I. c), repeated by Augustine, Civ. Dei, viii. 2, that he attended the instructions of Anaximenes is merely based on conjecture, and is as worthless in point of evidence as the statement of Diogenes (ii'6) that Anaxagoras was a hearer of Anaximenes ; whereas, in all pro- bability, he was dead before Anaxi- menes was born, cf. Krische, Forsch. 167 sq. Diogenes's work, irepl ^iaea^, was used by Simplicius, but (as Krische observes, p. 166) he does not seem to have been ac- quainted with the second book of it, which Galen quotes in Hip- poor, vi. Epidem. vol. x^vii. 1 a, 1006 K. That Diogenes composed two other works is doubtless an error of this writer, founded on a misapprehension of some of his utterances (Phys. 32 b), vide Schleiermacher, p. 108 sq.; Pan- zerbieter, p. 21 sqq. 286 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. veloped ideas had been introduced into it. On one side he is closely connected with Anaximenes, on another he in all probability transcends him : not only is his expo- sition more methodical in form and more careful as to details, but he is also distinguished from his predecessor in having ascribed to the air, as primitive cause and primitive matter, certain spiritual qualities, and having tried to explain the life of the soul by the air so appre- hended. To gain a fixed basis for his enquiry,' he determined the general characteristics which must belong to the primitive essence. On the one hand he said it must be the common matter of all things, and on the other, an essence capable of thought. His argument for the first assertion was the following. We know that things change one into another, that sub-« stances mix, and that things influence and afiect each other. None of these phenomena would be possible if. the various bodies were distinct as to their essence* They must therefore be one and the same, must have sprung from the same substance, and must be resolved into the same again.^ In proof of the second assertion, ' According to Diogenes, vi. i^ian kbX ov t^ aiirh ihv ueTe'iriTrre 81 ; ix. 57, his work began with ttoXXoxo'S koI riTepoiodro, oiiSafiri the words : A.1J70U itavrhs apx6ii.(pov oStc idaycaBai iXK-l\\ois iiSuraro, SoKeet fiOi XP^'^" ^^""■^ "^^ tipxV oSre a^i\iiais t^ kTcptf oSre $\i^n avainfmr^iiTriTOf Trope^effflai, tt/v 5e ... ou5' &j/ oUtg ^urbi/ 4k t7)s yrjs ipfiTinfiilv air\rii' Kol aeiiviiv. (pvvai, oSre ^ifov ofire SWo yivMai ' Fr. 2 ap. SimpL Phys. 32 b : oftSey, el ju); oijTm auvlffrcno, Surre ifiLoi 8e 5oK«i, Tb fiev ^iimav fniiii, toiut}) ehtti. aWb, Trivra touto (k •tT&vra tA i6vra ctirb tov avTOV tov a\)TOv ^epoio6fuva &K\ore irepoiovaBai Kal rb airb elvat. Kol oAAoTa 7(7i'fToi Kol 4s i-b airrb 4i/o- rovTO fSSii\oy. el yap in r^Se t^ X"P"'- Fr. 6, ap. Si^pl. 33 a': K6/ rh 'K6iTiiif 46vTa, el louriav ti ^y rb ourb yivifrai, and Arist. Gen. et eTepov TOV hepov erepor 4dv t^ lUji Corr. i. 6, 322, b, 12. What Dio- THE PRIMITIVE ESSENCE. 287 Diogenes appealed in a general manner to the wise and felicitous distribution of matter in the world ; ' and more particularly, to this testimony of our experience — that life and thought are produced in all living natures by the air which they breathe, and are bound up with this substance.^ He therefore concluded that the substance of which all things consist must be a body eternal, unchangeable, great and powerful, and rich in knowledge.^ All these qualities he thought he dis- covered in the air ; for the air penetrates all things, and in men and animals produces life and conscious- ness ; the seed of animals, also, is of a nature like air> He, therefore, with Anaximenes, declared air to be the matter and ground of all things." This is attested almost unanimously ^ by ancient writers ; and Diogenes himself says' that air is the essence in which reason ^enes ix. 57, says he taught — viz. * Vide notes 1 , 2, and "t. that nothing eomea from nothing ' Ox as Theophrastus Be SensiD or to nothing — is here indeed pre- 8, 42. Cicero, Nl D. i. 12, 29, says supposed, fcut whether he expressly the Deity ; cf. Arist. Phys. iii. 4 enunciated this principle we do not {mpra, p. 248, 1). Sidou. Apoll. know. XT. 91, discriminates the air of Dio- ' Fr. 4, Simpl. loo. cit. ; oh yap genes as the matter endowed with tui oStu SeSdadai [so. tV apxh"^ creative energy, from God, but this ot6j/ T6 ^v &v€i} v(yfi(nos, ^trre iravTcav is of course unimportant. /t€Tpa ^x^'", X^'/""'"'' ''■' ""'' flepeos " The passages in question are Kal vvKrhs Kal TjiiepTjs Koi veruv /cal given in extenso by Panzerbieter, aviiiMV (cal eviiSiv koI tSi ftAAo rf p. 53 sqq. In this place it is Tis jSo^Aerat iwoeeaBaij edpiffKoi sufficient to refer to Arist. Meiaph. hv oBto) Situeeiiieva iis amffrhy i. 3, 984 a, 6 ; De An. 405 a, KiWiara. 21 ; Theophrast. ap. Simpl. Phya. " Fr. 5, ibid : eri Si irphs roirois 6 a. Ka\ ToSe iifydKa irriiifia' &v6pa:Tros ' Fr. 6, ap. Simpl. 33 a: Koi yiip Kal 'reb &\\a ^^a hvaicviovTO. fioi SoKeet rb t^i/ vdrjaiv ^X^^ fTvai C^ei T^ hfpiy Kai Tovro ahrots Ka\ 6 &iip Ka\e6p.cyos vvh tuv avBptivwv, ^vtxjh i^Tt Kt^ vdritrts , . . Kal 4av koL 6irb roirov vilvTa koI Kv^epvaadai airoXAnx^ dirodj/^fricei Kal 7j ySrjcrts Kol^ irdpTwv Kparteiy. itTrb yhp not iviKii-nfi. toiJtou Sok^ei K6qs eJj/ai (instead of ' Fr. 3 from Simpl. Ph/s. 33 a. dirh Panzerbieter here reads auroC; 288 BIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. dwells, and which guides and governs all things, because its nature is to spread itself everywhere, to order all and to be in all. Nicolaus of Damascus, Porphyry,' and in one passage,^ likewise Simplicius, attribute to Diogenes as his first principle the substance intermediate between 'air and fire,' so often mentioned by Aristotle. This is unquestionably an error, into which they were probably misled by Diogenes' opinion, that the soul, by analogy with which he defines his primitive essence,^ was of the nature of warm air. Nor can I agree with Eitter's similar theory ,° that the primitive essence of Diogenes was not the ordinary atmospheric air, but a more subtile kind, ignited by heat ; for not only do all the accounts, and Diogenes' own explanations, speak of the air as ' that which is usually called air ; ' but accord- ing to his own principles it would have been impossible for him, while deriving all things from air by rare- faction and condensation, to seek the original principle (that which constituted the basis of all the different forms and changes of the atmosphere), not in the this I prefer to Mullach's amend- ($av iry'D/narSB^s iart koX voiis 5^ Tct irApra t^ o6t^ which Panzerbieter (p. 59) refers Koi fp (tal 6p^ Kol cbcoiti Kol tV in support of his hypothesis. Vide fiWTjv v67iiiiv ?Xf' ^' '■'''' ""'■oC also p. 268, 2. vdvra Kol itpe^ris SeUminv, adds * Gesch. der Phil. i. 228 sqq. Simplicius : 8ti koI rh avipfia tui' THE PRIMITIVE ESSENCE. 289 common aerial element, but in some particular kind of air.' Schleiermacher s conjecture also ^ is improbable, that Diogenes himself held air to be the primitive matter, but that Aristotle was doubtful as to his mean- ing, and so ascribed to him sometimes the air in general, sometimes warm or cold air. Such hesitation on the part of Aristotle respecting the principles of his predecessors is without precedent ; from his whole spirit and method it is far more likely that he may have sometimes reduced the indefinite notions of earlier philosophers to definite concepts, than that he should have expressed himself in a vacillating and uncertain manner in regard to their definite theories. Aristotle repeatedly and decidedly declares that the principle of Diogenes was air ; he then speaks of some philosophers, without naming them, whose principle was intermediate between air and water. Now it is impossible that these statements can relate to the same persons ; we cannot doubt, therefore, that it is air in the common accepta- tion of the word, which our philosopher maintains to be the essence of all things. We find from the above quotations that Diogenes, in his more precise description of the air, ascribed to it two properties which correspond to the requirements ' Though he may have gene- rally to be the first principle, that rally described the air in compa- there are different kinds of air — rison with other bodies as the warmer, colder, and so forth. Fur- AeirTo/i€p€TTOToy or AeTrTrfraTov ther particulars on this point will (Arist. Be An. loc. oit.), it does not be giveri later on. follow that he held the rarest or ' In his treatise on Anaxi- warmest air alone to be the primi- mander, Werke, 3te Abth. iii. 184. tive matter; on the contrary, he Cf. on the contrary, Panzerbieter, says in Pr. 6 (vide imfra, p. 291, 1), 56 sqq. after having declared the air gene- VOB. I. U 290 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. claimed by him in general for the primal matter. As the substance of all things, it must be eternal and imperishable, it must be contained in all things, and permeate all things; as the cause of life and order in the world, it must be a thinking and reasonable essence. In the air these two aspects are united ; for, according to Diogenes' view,, heccmae the air permeates all things, it is that which guides and orders them ; because it is the basal matter of all, all is known to it ; because it is the rarest and subtlest matter, it is the most movable, and the cause of all motion.* We are expressly told" that he spoke of the air as the Infinite, and the state- ment is the more credible, since Anaximenes, whom Diogenes in other respects follows most closely, employed a similar definition. Moreover Diogenes describes the air in the same way that Anaximander describes his airsipov ; and Aristotle says that the infinity of primi- tive matter was held by most of the physiologists.' But this definition seems to have been regarded by him as of minor importance" compared with the life and force of the primitive essence ; that is his main point, and in it he discovers the chief proof of its air-like nature. On account of this vitality and constant motion, the air assumes the most various forms. Its motion consists, according to Diogenes (who here again follows ' Videp. 287,7, andArist.De^». roitov ih Aoiirct, yiviaKeiv, § ii i. 2, 406 a, 21 : Aioye'yijs 5', Surwep KiwriTaTov, KivTiriichv etvai. erepol rives, aepa (seil. fiire'^ajSe t^v ' Simpl. Fhye. 6 a. ProhaWy jf/vx^ir), TovTov oltideh irivrav Xettto- after Theophrastus : tt^v Si toC litpearaTov elvai Ka! hpx^v "al ith iravrbs (piffiv i,ipa Ko! othis ijniiriy TovTO yaiiaxfiv re Kal Kivuv t)\v &ireipov elvai Koi itSiov. ifivX^>'t ? I"' "■pSTiJi' iiTTi Kal Ik ' Vide p. 269, 1. RAREFACTION AND CONDENSATION. 291 Anaximenes), in qualitative changes, in rarefaction and condensation ; ' or, which is the same thing, in heating and cooling ; and so there arise in the air endless modifications in respect of heat and cold, dryness and dampness, greater or less mobility,^ &c., corresponding to the different stages of its rarefaction or condensation. For the rest, Diogenes does not seem to have enume- rated these differences systematically, after the manner of the Pythagorean categories, though he must have derived the different qualities of things, some from rarefaction, some from condensation, and must so far have coordinated them on the side of heat or cold.' Nor do we find any trace of the four elements; we do not know whether he assumed definite connecting media between particular substances and the primi- ' Plut. ap. Eus. Fr. Ev. i. 8, 13 : KOfffioiroiet Se oStoos' Sti tou iramis Ktvov/ievov Kal y fihv cLpaiou ^ S^ TTVKvov yevofievov Sirou ffweKiptjire rb wKvhv av(rrpotl>^j' Troiijirai, xal oSraj Tct \oi7ra Kara rhv avrhtf \6yoy rh Kovtpirara t^jv &t/a rd^iy \a^6v' TO rbv ^Kiov &,TroT€\4ffai. Simpl. loo. cit. after the words just quoted : i^ ou Trvtci/oviievov Kal fiavovfiei/ov Kal fierafidWopTos rois irdOeat r^v tuv &\\uv yivsffBai fioptpiiv, Kal ravTa fief' QedtppoffTOS Itrropet irepl xov ^loyeVous. Diog. ix. 57, cf. what is cited from Aristotle, p. 243, 1, and Arist. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 336 a, 3 sqq. = J'V.6,sMpra,p.287,7(afterthe words 3 T( ju^ fierdxet toiitov) : p.er4xei Bh oitSk %v ifidicas rh tTepov t4» erep^, a\\^ iroWol rpoTroi Kal avTov TOU aipos Kal rrjs voiiiTios eiffiv. effri ykp troK^rpoTYos, Kal Oepfi^jepos Kal ^uxpiripos Kol ^-iipiTipos Kal itypir^pos Kal OTaaifi^epos kqX o^v- ripriv Kivi]fftv exwy, Kal 2t\Xat7ro\Xal eTepon^cies iveitri ky^ riBovris Kal Xpo'V^ Sir€ipo:. Panzerbieter ex- plains TiSov^ (p. 63 ?q.) by taste, as the word also stands in Anazago- ras Fr. 3; Xenophon, ^»ai. ii. 3, 16. ^liill better would be the analogous meaning ' smell,' which the word has in a fragment of Heracleitus. ap. Hippol. Sefut. JSier. ix. 10 ; and in Theophrastus, De Sensu, 16, 90. Sohleiermaoher, loo. oit. 154, trans- lates it feeling ( GefuM) ; similarly Schaubach {Anaxagor. Fragm. p. 8 6 ) Affeotio ; Eitter, Ge^oh. der Ion. Phil. 50, behaTiour (^VerAalten) ; Gesch. der Phil. i. 228, inner dis- position (innerer Muth) ; Brandis, i. 281, internal constitution {innere Beschaffenheit) ; Philippson, "e\-n dvBpuTlvn, p. 205, bona conditio interna. ' As Panzerbieter sets forth in detail, p. 102 sqq. TT 2 292 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. tive substance, or identified the endless muMplicity of particular substances with the innumerable stages of rarefaction and condensation, so that the air would become at one stage of condensation water, at another flesh, at a third stone. The most probable supposition, however, and the one which seems to result front the above statements of his about the different kinds of air, and also from his opinion on the development of the foetus (vide infra) — is that he employed neither of the two modes of explication exclusively, and, generally speaking, in the derivation of phenomena, followed no fixed and uniform method. The first result of condensation and rarefaction was to separate from the infinite primitive substance, the heavy matter which moved downwards, and the light matter which moved upwards. From the former the earth was produced ; from the latter, the sun, and no doubt the stars also.' This motion upwards and down- wards Diogenes was forced to derive in the first place from heaviness and lightness, and secondly, from the inherent animation of matter as such. For the moving intelligence with him absolutely coincides with matter ; the different kinds of air are also different kinds of thought (Fr. 6); that thought was added to material substances, and set them in motion,^ is a view which would have been impossible to him. But after the first division of substances has been accomplished, all motion proceeds from the warm and the light.* Diogenes ex- plained the soul of animals to be warm air ; and so in ' Plutarch,Tide*M^r'a, p.290, 4. Ill sq. 2 As Panzerbieter represents, " Fr. 6, supra, p. 287, 7. FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 293 the system of the world he regarded warm matter as the principle of motion, the efficient cause ; and cold dense matter,^ as the principle of corporeal consistency. In consequence of heat,^ the universe he thought had acquired a circular motion from which also the earth took its round shape.' By this circular motion, how- ever, he seems to have intended merely a lateral motion ; and by the roundness of the earth a cylindrical, and not a spherical shape ; for he assumed with Anaxagoras that the inclination of the earth's axis towards its surface arose subsequently from some unknown cause (Ik Toil avTOfidrov), and that the axis at first ran per- pendicularly down through the earth.* He was the Anaxagoras maintaiDed : /ierck rh ffvffTTivui T^v K6s, adds the author doubtless in his own name, mh irpovoias, in order to show the difference between the habitable and uninhabitable zones). Anaxagoras, however, said, accord- ing to Diog. ii. 9 : tA S' &inpa kot' apx^s fiev da^xmSus 4vex&V^ou &ffre KoTck Kopv(j>iiv TTJs ^ijs (perpendicu- larly over the upper surface of the earth, which, like Anaximenes ami others, he supposed to be shaped like a cylinder, cf. vol. ii. Aiiax.') i hv ail (paivifj.€i/Qu eXvai TrdKuy, Simpoi' Se tV ^ic\i(nv \a0e7y, so that, ac- cording to this, the stars in their daily revolution would at first have only turned from east to west late- rally around the earth's disc, and those above our horizon would never have gone below it. The obliquity of the earth's axis to its surface was produced later, anil caused the paths of the sun and ' From the union of these by means of vSriats arose (according to Steinhart, p. 299) sensible air. I know not, however, on what evi- dence this assumption is based ; it seems to me inadmissible for the reasons I brought forward against Ritter on p. 288. Nor do I see any proof of the accuracy of the further observation that ' the sensible air is supposed to consist of an infinite mmiber of simple bodies ; ' for Dio- genes is never mentioned by Aris- totle in the passage, De Part. Anim. ii. 1, to which note 33 refers. '' Whether primitive heat or the siin's heat, is not stated, but from Alex. Meteorolog. 93 b, the sun's heat seems to be intended. ' Diog. ix. 57 : r'liii Se y%v arpoy- yiKiiVf ipjipeiafiipriv iy rip fUatp^ rijy aiffToaiv eiKTjipvtav /caret rijv ^k TOV Bepfiov irepKpophv Koi tttj^iv iinh TOV \livxpov, on which cf. Panzer- bieter, p. 117 sq. * According to thePlac. ii. 8, 1 (Stobseus, i. 358; Ps. Galen, c. 11, to the same effect) Diogenes and 294 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. more disposed to adopt Anaxagoras's notion as to the shape of the earth, and the original motion of the heavens, since Anaximenes had led him to the same result. Like Anaximander, he conceived of the earth in its primeval state as a soft and, fluid mass gradually dried by the sun's heat. This is also proved by its having received its form in course of the rotation. What remained of the primitive liquid became the seas, the salt taste of which he derived from the evapo- ration of the sweet portions : the ■ vapours developed from the drying up of the moisture served to enlarge the heavens.' The earth is full of passages through which stars to cut the plane of the hori- zon ; hence arose the alternation of day and night. What we are to think in regard to the details of this system is (as Panzerbieter, p. 129 sqq. shows) hard to say. If the whole universe, that is, the heavens and the earth, inclined to the south, nothing would have changed in the position of the earth in relation to tie heavens, and the temporary disappearance of most of the stars below the horizon, and the alternation of day and night, would be inexplicable. If the heavens (or which is the same thing, the upper end of the earth's axis) had inclined to the south, the sun in its revolution around this axis would have come nearer and nearer the horizon the further south it •went. It would have risen in the ■west and set in the east ; -we should have had midnight when it was in the south ; midday when it was in the north. If, on the other hand, the earth had inclined to the south and the axis of the heavens had re- mained unaltered, it would seem that the sea and all the waters must have overflowed the southern part of the earth's surface. Pan- zerbieter, therefore, conjectures that Anaxagoras made the heavens incline not to the south, but to the north, and that in the passage in the Placita we should perhaps read irpoff^6peioy or /ieao^6peiov; instead of ii.i(!T\ix^piv6v. But considering that our three texts are agreed iipon the word, this is scarcely credible. Vfe shall, however, find (infra, vol. ii.) that Leucippus and Democritus believed in a depression of the southern part of the earth's disc. If these philosophers could discover an expedient unknown to us but satisfactory to them, by which they could escape the obvious difficulties of this hypothesis, Dio- genes and Anaxagoras could also have discovered one ; and on the other hand, their theory of the in- clination of the earth gives us a clue to the opinions of Leucippus and Democritus on the same subject. ' Arist. Meteor.n. 2, 365 a, 21 ; FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 295 the air penetrates : if the outlets of these are blocked up, there are earthquakes.^ In the same way Diogenes held the sun and stars ^ to be porous bodies, of a forma- tion like pumice stone, the hollows of which are filled with fire or fiery air,* The theory of the origin of the stars from moist exhalations,^ in connection with that just quoted from Alexander on the growth of the heavens by the evaporations of the earth, would lead us to conjecture that Diogenes supposed the sun alone to have been at first formed from the warm air drawn upwards, and the stars to have afterwards arisen from the vapours evolved by the sun's heat, by which vapours the sun himself was thought to have been continually sustained. As this nourishment is at times exhausted in each part of the world, the sun (so at least Alexander represents the doctrine of Diogenes) changes his place, as a beast his pasture.* Alex. Meteorol. 91a; 93 b, pro- cit.) that the stars, according to bably following Theophrastus ; cf. Diogenes, are SKiTrfoiai (exhalations) supra, p. 254, 1. toB Kda/aov ; and he is probably ' Seneca, Qu.Nat. vi. IS; cf. more correct than Eitter (i. 232) iv. 2, 28. who, by SiiiTryaiai, understands or ■ ' Among which he likewise gans of respiration. Theodoret, reckoned comets, Plac. iii. 2, 9 ; loa. cit., ascribes the Biairyoii to unless Diogenes, the Stoic, is here the stars themselves; it would be meant. easier to connect tbeLa with the ' Stob. Eel. i. 528, 552, 508 ; fiery vapours streaming from the Plut. Plac. ii. 1 3, 4 ; Theod. Gr. af. stars. oMn iv. 17, p. 59. According to the * Gf. p. 254, 1. Some other last three passages, meteoric stones theories of Diogenes on thunder are similar bodies; but it would and lightning (iStob. i. 594; Sen. seem that they only take fire in Qu. Nat. ii. 20), on the winds, Alex, falling; Tide Panzerbieter, 122 sij. loc. cit. (cf. Arist. Meteor, ii. 1, . ' So, at least, Stob. 522 says of beginning), on the causes of the the moon, when he asserts that inundation of the Nile (Sen. Qu. Diogenes held it to be a leiirffripoei- Nat. iv. 2, 27 ; Schol. in Apollon. Shs ivaii/ia, Panzerbieter, p. 121 Shod. iv. 269) are discussed by sq., interprets in the same way the Panzerbieter, p. 133 sqq. statement in Stob. 508 (Plut. loo. 296 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. Diogenes shared with Anaxagoras and other phy- sicists the belief that living creatures ' and likewise plants ^ were produced out of the earth, no doubt by the influence of the sun's heat. In an analogous manner he explained the process of generation, by the influence of the vivifying heat of the body of the mother on the seed.' In accordance with his general standpoint, he thought the soul to be a warm, dry air. As the air is capable of endless diversity, souls likewise are as various as the kinds and individual natures to which they belong.'' This substance of the soul he appears to have derived partly from the seed,' and partly from the outer air entering the lungs after birth ;^ and its warmth, according to the above theory, from the warmth of the mother. The difi^usion of life throughout the whole body he explained by the theory that the soul or warm vital air streams along with the blood through the veina.^ In ' Flacita, ii. 8, 1 ; Stob. i. 358. tuv hTepoidiaeav Sfucs Si, &c.{supra, ' Theopirastus, Hist. Plant, p. 287, 7) ; of. Tlieophrastus, De Hi. 1, 4. 8enm, 39, 44. ' For further details, cf. Pan- ' For he expressly remarks that zerbieter, 124 sqq., after Censorin. the seed is like air (xveufiaTciSes) Di. Nat. c. 5, 9 ; Plut. Flac. y. and foam, and derives thence the 15, 4 etc. designation, a())poS£(rio. Vide i«pra, ' Fr. 6, after the -words quoted, p. 287, 7 ; Clemens, iPcsdag. i. 106 C. p. 291, 1 : KaX irivruv ^a\ov ; sight, "when the ' The somewhat ambiguous image that enters the eye combines statements, Pteeite iv. 18,2; 16, with the air within (fifYi/ufffloi). 3 ; confused by the introduction of * Loo. eit. 42 : 8ti Se i ipris the Stoic fiye/ioviKhv, are discussed dhp aiVflcJyerai luicpiv i:v ix6piov toS by Panzerbieter, 86, 90; further fleoC, aifliflov thai, iri -rroKK&Kis details are given by Theophrastus, irpis &K\a riv vovn ^x""''" oilf loc. cit. ; cf. Philippson,"T\7) avSpa- &pap,iv oSr' iiKoioiiev. Trivri, 101 sqq. " Theophrastus, loo. cit. 43. ' Plac. V. 23, 3. ' Vide sttpra, p. 296, 2 ; Theo- * Smell, says Theophrastus, phrastus, loc, cit. 44 sqq. ; Plac. loc. cit., he attributed t^ irepl rhv v. 20. iyic4'Taiv, ret Diogenes is also described as a /iev TTAeicTTo r)6f>av ri S^ goras by Augustine, Civ, Dei, viii. kutA AeiKiTTTTov \iyaii. Cf. supra, 2 ; and Sidon, Apoll. xv. 89 sqq. ; p, 290, 1 ; p. 291, 1 ; with the ap- and for the same reason apparently HIS HISTORICAL POSITION. 301 he appeared later than Anaxagoras, and wrote in partial dependence upon him. The carefulness of Diogenes in regard to the details of natural science, and especially the great precision of his anatomical knowledge, would assign him to a period when observation had made some advances : the period of a Hippo and a Democritus.' In the same way we shall find reason to suppose him later than . Empedocles. On these grounds some de- pendence of Diogenes on Anaxagoras seems probable, and the internal evidence of their doctrines is wholly in favour of this view. The striking similarity between them makes it hardly credible that these doctrines should have been produced independently of each other.^ Not only do Diogenes and Anaxagoras both require a world-forming reason, but they require it on the same ground, that the order of the universe was otherwise inexplicable to them : both describe this reason as the subtlest of all things; both derive the soul and life essentially from it.^ We cannot, however, consider Anaxagoras as dependent on Diogenes, and Diogenes as the historical link between him and the older physicists.'' in Cic. N. D. i. 12, 29, hia name hwh, Atiaxaff. Fragm. -p. 32 ; Stein- comes last among all the pre-So- hart, loc. cit. 297, considers Dio- eratio philosophers. genes to he rather earlier than ' This date is further supported Anaxagoras. hy the circumstance which Petersen ' Cf. the section on Anaxagoras, has shown to be probable in his infra. Sippooraiis Scripia ad Temp, Bat. . * Schleiermacher on JDiog. Disposita, part i. p. 30 (Hamb. Werke, 3te Abth. ii. 156 sq., 166 1 839, Gym-Prngr.), namely that sqq. ; Braniss, Gesch. der Phil. s. Aristophanes, A'mJ. 227 sqq., is al- Kant, i. 1 28 sqq., vide supra, p. 1 67. lading to the doctrine of Diogenes Krische is less positive, vide Forsck. spoken of on p. 297, 6; which doc- 170 sq. Schleiermacher, however, trine in that case must even then afterwards changed his opinion, for have attracted attention in Athens, in his Gesch. d. Phil. y. 77 he de- ' J?anzerbieter, 19 sq. ; Schau- scribes Diogenes as an eclectic with-- 302 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. Schleiermacher indeed thinks that had Diogenes been acquainted with the work of Anaxagoras, he must have expressly opposed Anaxagoras' theory that the air is something composite ; but in the first place we have no evidence to show that he did not oppose it ; ' and in the second we have no right to apply the standards of modem philosophy to the methods of the ancients, nor to expect from these latter a profound investigation of theories differing from their own, such as even a Plato did not always impose upon himself. The main prin- ciple of Anaxagoras, however, the separation of the organising reason from matter, Diogenes seems to me clearly enough to oppose, in his 6th Fragment.^ Schleiermacher indeed finds no trace in the passage of any polemic of this kind, but merely the tone of a person who is newly introducing the doctrine of vovs ; but the care with which Diogenes demonstrates that all the qualities of intelligence belong to the air, gives me the opposite impression. In the same way it seems to me that Diogenes' is so careful to prove the unthink- ableness of several primitive substances, because he had been preceded by some philosopher who denied the unity of the primitive matter. That he is alluding to Empedocles only, and not to Anaxagoras,* is improbable, considering the many other points of contact between Diogenes and Anaxagoras. If, however, he had Empe- docles chiefly in view, that alone would show him to be out principle belonging, -witli the Phys. 32 b : wpii ^v(rio\6yovs di^-ei- Sopbists and Atomists, to the third priKei/ai, oj/s Ka\6i aiirbs (ro^uTTis. section of pre-Socratic philosophy, ' Vide supra, p. 287, 7. the period of its decay. ° Fr. 2, vide supra, p. 286, 2. ' He says of himself in Simpl. * Krische, p. ifl. SIS HISTORICAL POSITION. 303 a younger contemporary of Anaxagoras, and his philo- sophy might be supposed to have appeared at a later date than that of Anaxagoras. Schleiermacher con- siders it more natural that spirit should first have been discovered in its union with matter, and afterwards in opposition to it ; but this is hardly conclusive in regard to Anaxagoras's relation to Diogenes ; for the direct unity of spirit with matter, which was the starting point of the elder physicists, we do not find in Diogenes ; on the contrary, he introduces thought, because the purely physical explanation of phenomena does not satisfy him. But if the importance of thought has once been re- cognised, it is certainly more probable that the new principle should be first set up in abrupt opposition to material causes, than that it should be combined with them- in so uncertain a manner as by Diogenes.' The whole question is decided by this fact, that the con- ception of a world-forming reason is only logically carried out by Anaxagoras ; Diogenes on the contrary attempts to combine it in a contradictory manner, with a standpoint entirely out of harmony with it. This in- decisive sort of eclecticism is much more in keeping with the younger philosopher, who desires to make use of the new ideas without renouncing the old, than with the philosopher to whom the new ideas belong as his original possession.'' Diogenes is therefore, in my ' This is also in opposition to subsequent inclination of the vault Krische, p. 1 72. of heaven ; the opinion that the stars ^ We cannot argue much from are stony masses ; or on the doc- the agreement of the two philoso- trine of the senses, for such theories phers in certain physical theories, are, as a rule, so little connected such as the form of the earth, the -with philosophic, principles, that primitive lateral movement and either philosopher might equally 304 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. opinion, an adherent of the old Ionian physics, of the school of Anaximenes ; sujBSciently affected by the ' philosophic discovery of Anaxagoras to attempt a com- bination of his (Anaxagoras') doctrine with that of Anaximenes, but for the most part following Anaximenes in his principle and the application of it. That there would be a retrograde movement,^ according to this view, from Anaxagoras to Diogenes proves nothing; for historical progress in general does not exclude re- trogression as to particulars : ^ that Anaxagoras, on the other hand, cannot be immediately related to Anaxi- menes' is true ; but we have no right to conclude from this that Diogenes (rather than Heracleitus, the Elea- tics or the Atomists) forms the coimecting link between them. Lastly, though the theory of the o/MoiofiEprj may be a more artificial conception than the doctrine of Diogenes,* it by no means follows that it must be the more recent ; it is quite conceivable, on the contrary j, that the very difficulties of the Anaxagorean expla- nation of nature may have had the effect of confirming Diogenes in his adherence to the more simple and ancient Ionic doctrine. The same might be con- jectured in regard to the dualism of the principles professed by Anaxagoras ; * and thus we must regard ■well have borrowed them from the to follow Empedocles. other. But Diogenes' explanation " Sehleiermacher, loc. cit. 166. of the sensuous perception, at any ' From Anaxagoras to Arche- rate, shows a development of the laus there is a similar retrogression. doctrine of Anaxagoras (vide Phi- ' Sehleiermacher, loc. cit. lippson, 'T\Ti ivepairlvii, 199), and ' Ibid. his superiority in empirical know- ° On this account, Brandis (i. ledge marks him rather as a con- 272) considers Diogenes, with Ar- temporary of Democritus than a chelaus and the Atomists, in the predecessor of Anaxagoras. In his light of a reaction against the theories also of the magnet he seems d\ialism of Anaxagoras, CHARACTER AND PLACE IN HISTORY. 305 the theory of Diogenes as the attempt of a later philo- sopher, partly to save the physical doctrine of Anaxi- menes and the earlier lonians as against the innovations of Anaxagoras, and partly to combine them with each other,' However noteworthy this attempt may be, the philosophic importance of it cannot be ranked very high ; ^ the chief merit of Diogenes seems to consist in his having enlarged tiie range of the empirical know- ledge of nature, and laboured to prove more completely the life and teleological constitution of nature in de- tail. But these ideas were themselves supplied to him by his predecessors, Anaxagoras and the ancient phy- sicists. Greek philosophy, as a whole, had in the time of Diogenes long since struck out paths that conducted it far beyond the point of the earlier Ionian physics.^ ' As is thought by most modern writers, of. Eeinhold, Gesch. d.PhU. i. 60 ; Fries, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 236 sq. ; Wendt zu Tennemann, i. 427 sqq. ; Brandis, loo. cit. ; Philippson, loc. 7j(n liTjdeTrore dtayvavaf ica] oi/9iv &ToTron, hpSws ffTpaTTiyovvra TjTTtjBrivai, Beck- ahrobs irepl eKoarov Beupeiv ' Trepl mann's doubt of this passage is v^p tos t&v Saoii' (pitrios op6&s unfounded. Cf. also Diog. 79. We SLayv6i'Tes ^iieWov Koi Trepl tuv Karci should be inclined to read 'Apx'"'"'''"' f^pos o?" ^"tI StfieirBcu. for 'Apxirov in the text of lambli- ^ Vide Beckmann, p. 23. VOL. I. T 322 THE PYTHAGOREANS. for it is not merely impossible to prove' that this doctrine was known to the Pythagoreans, but Aristotle's evidence is most distinctly to the contrary.^ Since therefore in the fragments of the so-called Archytas we encounter Platonic as well as Peripatetic doctrines and expressions, we must consider these a sure sign of a later origin, and consequently reject by far the greater number of the fragments. Even supposing the modem case for their defence were successful, they could not be regarded as records of the Pythagorean doctrines ; for if they can only be rescued by making their author a Platonist, we cannot be sure in any given case how far they reproduce the Pythagorean point of view. A contemporary of Archytas, Lysis the Tarentine, has latterly been conjectured by Mullach' to be the author of the so-called Grolden Poem ; but the corrupt passage in Diogenes viii. 6 ^ is no evidence for this, and the work itself is so colourless and disconnected, that it looks rather like a later collection of practical precepts, some of which had perhaps been long in circulation in a metrical form.' In any case, however, it does not ' Plato's utterances in the So- ' In his edition of Hierocles, phist, 24:6 sqq. cannot, as Petersen p. 20 ; Fragm. Philos. i. 413. (loo. oit.) and Mallet {Ecole de * yiypavrai Si r^ TIu8ay6oif Megare, liii. sq.) believe, relate to &ii.iiaTa Tpla, ircuSevTtKby, iroA.i- the later Pythagoreans (cf. ii. a. Ti/cAy, ^mmdv rb 5« ra, 71, 4) ; it would seem, therefore, that Melampusfis pri- marily alluded to among the ' an- For Roth's explanation (ii. b, 74) that Herodotus purposely avoided mentioning Pythagoras from his antipathy to the Cro- toniatea, who were hostile to the Thurians, is not only very far- fetched, but demonstrably false. Herod, does mention him in ano- ther place (iv. 95), and with the honourable addition : '^Wiivwv ov T^ SLO'deveffrdrcfi (To^htt?? Ilv6ay6pT} ; and in ii. 123 (previous note) he passes over his and other names, not from aversion, but forbearance. If he is silent as to his connection with Egypt, the most natural rea- son for his silence is that he knew nothing of any such connection. Also in ii. 81 (vide supra, p. 332, 2), he would doubtless have expressed himself otherwise, if he had derived the Pythagoreans from Egypt in the same manner as the Orphics. * None of our authorities, at any rate, who speak of Pythago- ras' Egyptian journeys, refer to Aristoxenus. 334 PYTHAGORAS. journeys of Pythagoras in the East ; our authorities become more copious as we recede from the philoso- pher's own time, and more meagre as we approach it ; before the beginning of the fourth century they entirely fail. Each later writer has more to tell than his pre- decessor ; and in proportion as the acquaintance of the Greeks with the Oriental civilised nations increases, the extent of the journeys which brought the Samian philosopher to be instructed by them likewise increases. This is the way that legends are formed and not his- torical tradition. We cannot, indeed, pronounce it im- possible that Pythagoras should have gone to Egypt or Phoenicia, or even to Babylon, but it is on that account all the more indemonstrable. The whole character of the narratives of his journeys strengthens the sup- position that, as they now stand, they can have been derived from no historical reminiscence ; that it was not the definite knowledge of his intercourse with foreign nations which gave rise to the theories as to the origin of his doctrine; but, conversely, the presupposition of the foreign source of his doctrine which occasioned the stories of his intercourse with the barbarians There is quite enough to account for such a presupposition, even if it were founded on no actual contemporary tradition, in the syncretism of later times, in the false pragmatism ' which could only explain the similarity of Pythagorean doctrines and usages with those of the East by the theory of personal relations between Py- thagoras and the Orientals, and in the tendency to ' There is no English equivalent the tendency to explain the history for the German word Pragmatismus, of thought by imaginary eombina- •whieh may perhaps be explained as tions of faet. — Note by Translator. HIS EMIGRATION. 335 panegyric of the Pythagorean legend which loved to concentrate the ■wisdom of the whole human race in its hero.' The statement that Pythagoras visited Crete and Sparta, partly to become acquainted with the laws of those countries, partly that he might be initiated into the mysteries of the Idsean Zeus, stands on no better foundation.* The thing is in itself conceivable, but the evidence is too uncertain, and the probability of any historical tradition as to these details too scanty to allow of our placing any trust in the assertion. So, too, the, theory that the philosopher owed his wisdom to Orphic teachers ^ and writings, even though it may not be wholly wrong as to the fact, is doubtless based, as it stands, not on any historical reminiscence, but on the presuppositions of a period in which an Orphic theosophy and literature had formed itself to some extent under Pythagorean and Neo-Pythagorean in- fluences. The truth is, that we possess no document which deserves to be considered a historical tradition concerning the education of Pythagoras and the re- sources at his command. Whether it be possible to supply this want by inferences from the internal nature of the Pythagorean doctrine, we shall enquire later on. . The first luminous point in the history of this ' Because Pythagoras could from writings which he studied; scarcely have attained that ' poly- it is possible, however, that these Wathy,' for which he is extolled by may have been collected by him HeradeituB (vide mfra, p. 336, 4), previously on his journeys, otherwise than by travels (Chaig- '' Justin, xx. 4 ; Valer. Max. net, i. '40; Schuster, Heraol. 372), viii. 7, ext. 2; Diog. viii. 3 (Epi- it does not at all follow that he menides) ; Iambi. 25; Porph. 17, went to Egypt, or visited non-Hel- cf. p. 363, 2. lenie countries. Moreover, Hera- ' Vide supra, p. 330, 2. cleitus rather derives his learning 336 PYTHAGORAS. philosopher is his emigration to Magna Grrsecia, the date of which we cannot precisely fix,' nor can we do more than conjecture the reasons which led to it.^ His activity, however, does not seem to have begun in Italy. The ordinary accounts, it is true, do not leave space for a long period of activity in Samos. Other texts, however, maintain that he at first laboured there successfully ' for some time, and if this assertion, con- sidering the fables connected with it and the untrust- worthiness of its evidence, may hardly seem deserving of notice, yet the manner in which Pythagoras is mentioned by Heracleitus and Herodotus would appear to bear it out/ Heracleitus soon after the death of this philosopher speaks of his various knowledge and of his (in Heracleitus's opinion erroneous) wisdom, as of a thing well known in Ionia." Now, it is not likely that the report of it had first reached Ionia from Italy. For, according to other testimony (vide infrci), ' Vide supra, p. 324, 2. Iambi. 28 says he did so in order to ^ The statements of the ancients avoid the political activity, which are probably mere arbitrary con- the admiration of his fellow-citizens Jectures. Most of them assert with would have forced upon him. Aristoxenus (ap. Porph. 9) that the ' Antipho. ap. Porph. 9 ; Iambi, tyranny of Polycrates occasioned 20 sqq., 26 sqq. his migration (Strabo, xiv. 1. 16, p. * As Ritter pertinently re- 638;Diog.viii. 3; Hippolyr.ifc/ui. marks, Fyth. Phil. 31. "What i. 2, sub init. ; Porph. 16; The- Brandis says to the contrary does mist. Or. xxiii. 286 b ; Plut. Plac. not appear to me conclusive, i. 3, 24 ; Ovid. JkTetam. XV. 60, etc.), ' Fr. 22, ap. Diog. viii. 6: and that this assertion contradicts tlvBaySfnis t/ivii(rdpxov 'urroplriv the uncertain story of Polycrates's ija-Kriffev av6pinniiv fiAxtaTo. ir&vrav, commendatory letters to Amasis is koI iKKe^dfisuos rairas rots ffvyyptt- no argument against it. But it (t>hs iirolTiffev ecavrov (ro