> ^:^^s: Z~':v''<:\''~'t'!yu-ty^'}':^c^-j^ (l^atnsU Jlmucraitij ffilihrarg Eay.,.. F..j;i.j,...X.uc@.. Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924092342538 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 3 1924 092 342 538 /7^f^. cTxi c^cJt^ Dogmatic Theology BY WILLIAM G. T. SIIEDD, D.D. HOOSETELT PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINAST NEW YORK VOLUME L SECOND EDITION NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1889 ■' COFTRIGHT, 1888, BT CHARLES SCRXBNER'S SONS TROWS TO THE CLASSES FOR WHOM THIS THEOLOGICAL SYSTEI^I WAS PREPARED AND WHOSE FAITHFUL ATTENTION TO ITS DELIVERY WAS A CONSTANT ENCOURAGEMENT IT IS RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY fNSC:'.I3EJ> BY THE AUTHOR PREFACE. The immediate preparation o£ this treatise began in 1870, wlien tiie author was called to give instruction for a year in the department of Systematic Theology, in Union Theological Seminary. The work was resumed in 1874, when he was elected to this professorship, and was prose- cuted down to 1888, But some general preparation had been made for it, by previous studies and publications. The writer had composed a History of Christian Doctrine in the years 1854r-1862, which was published in 1863 ; and also a volume of Theological Essays containing discussions on original sin and vicarious atonement, and a volume of Sermons to the jSTatural Man predominantly theological in their contents. The doctrinal system here presented will be found to be closely connected with these preceding in- vestigations ; and this will explain the somewhat frequent references to them as parts of one whole. The Dogmatic History is the natural introduction to the Dogmatic The- ology. The general type of doctrine is the Augustino-Calvinis- tic. Upon a few points, the elder Calvinism has been fol- lowed in preference to the later. This, probably, is the principal difference between this treatise and contemporary ones of the Calvinistic class. VI PREFACE. Upon the subject of Adam's sin and its imputation, the author has been constrained to differ from some theologi- ans for whom he has the highest respect, and with whom he has in general a hearty agreement. In adopting the tra- ducian theory of the origin of the soul, in the interest of the immediate imputation of the first sin, he 'believes that he has the support of some of the most careful students of Scripture, and deepest thinkers in the history of the Church. This tlieory, however, even when adopted has not attained much explication. Some further development of it has been attempted ; with what success, the reader must judge. The doctrine of the Trinity has been con- structed upon the Nicene basis, but with more reference to the necessary conditions of personality and self-conscious- ness, and the objections to the personality of the Infinite introduced by modern pantheism. In respect to the onto- logical argument for the Divine Existence, the author is in sympathy with the a priori spirit of the old theology. The statement of the doctrine of Decrees, and of Regen- eration, is founded upon the postulate, that all holiness has its source in the Infinite will, and all sin in the self-deter- mination of the Finite. It will be objected by some to this dogmatic system that it has been too much influenced by the patristic, mediaeval, and reformation periods, and too little by the so-called " progress " of modern theology. The charge of scholas- ticism, and perhaps of speculativeness, will be made. The author has no disposition to repel the charge. While ac- knowledging the excellences of the present period in re- spect to the practical application and spread of religion, he cannot regard it as pre-eminent above all others in scienti- PREFACE. VI 1 fic theology. It is his conviction, that there were some minds in the former ages of Christianity who were called by Providence to do a work that will never be outgrown and left behind by the Christian Church; some men who thought more deeply, and came nearer to the centre of truth, upon some subjects, than any modern minds. Non omnia possnmus omnes. No one age, or church, is in ad- vance of all other ages, or churches, in all things. It would be difficult to mention an intellect in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries whose reflection upon the metaphysi- cal being and nature of God has been more profound than that of Anselm ; whose thinking upon the Trinity has been more subtle and discriminating than that of Athanasius ; whose contemplation of the great mysterj'' of sin has been more comprehensive and searching than that of Augustine ; whose apprehension of the doctrine of atonement has been more accurate than that formulated in the creeds of the Reformation. In drawing from these earlier sources, the writer believes that systematic theology will be made both more truthful and more vital. Confinement to modern opinions tends to thinness and weakness. The latest intelligence is of more value in a newspaper than in a scientific treatise. If an author in any department gets into the eddies of his age, and whirls round and round in them, he knows little of the sweep of the vast stream of the ages which holds on its way forever and forevermore. If this treatise has any merits, they are due very much to daily and nightly communion with that noble army of theologians which is composed of the elite of the fathers, of the schoolmen, of the reformers, and of the seventeenth century divines of England and the VIU PREFACE. Continent. And let it not be supposed that this influence of the theologians is at the expense of that of the Script- ures. This is one of the vulgar errors. Scientific and contemplative theology is the child of Revelation. It is the very Word of God itself as this has been studied, col- lated, combined, and systematized by powerful, devout, and prayerful intellects. In closing up the labors of forty years in theological re- search and meditation, the writer is naturally the subject of serious thoughts and feelings. The vastness and mystery of the science oppress him more than ever. Eut the evan- gelical irradiations of the Sun of righteousness out of the thick darkness and clouds that envelop the Infinite and Adorable God, are beams of intense brightness which pour the light of life and of hope into the utter gloom in which man must live here upon earth, if he rejects Divine Reve- lation. That this treatise may contribute to strengthen the believer's confidence in this revelation, and to incline the un- believer to exercise faith in it, is the prayer of the author. Union Theological Seminary, New York, May 1, 1888. CONTENTS OF VOLUME L THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. PAGE The True Method in Theological Science, . . . 3 CHAPTER II. Plan, Divisions, and Subdivisions, . .... 8 CHAPTER III. Nature and Definition of Theological Science, . 16 BIBLIOLOGY. CHAPTER I. Revelation and Inspiration, . . , . .61 CHAPTER II. Authenticity of the Scriptures, , . Ill CHAPTER III. Chedibility of the Scriptures, .... . 115 CHAPTER IV. Canonicity of the Scriptures, . 141 CONTENTS. THEOLOGY (DOCTRmE OF GOD). CHAPTEK L PAGE '/ruiiE AND Definition of God, ... , . 151 CHAPTER 11. Innate Idea of God, . .... 195 CHAPTER III. Arguments for the DrviNii Existence, . 231 CHAPTER IV. Trinity in Unity, 249 CHAPTER V. Divine Attributes, . „ 334 CHAPTER VI. Divine Decrees, , 393 CHAPTER VII. Creation, . 4(53 CHAPTER VIII. Providence, 507 CHAPTER IX. JIlRACLh-S, . ^ .533 THEOLOGICAL INTKODUCTIOIst. THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. CIIAPTEE L THE TKUE METHOD IN THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. There are a few topics that require to be discussed, prepar- atoi'y to the investigation of the several divisions in theolog- ical science. Some writers bring them under the head of Prolegomena, and others under the general title of Intro- du( lion. The principal of these introductory topics are: 1. The true method in theological science. 2. The plan, divisions, and subdivisions. 3. The nature and definition of theologi- cal science. 1. The true method of investigation in any science is natural. It coincides with the structure of the object. The method in anatomy is a good example. It follows the veins, if veins are the subject-matter ; the muscles, if muscles are ; the nerves, if nerves are. It does not cross and recross, but pursues a straight-onward course. The nat- ural method, consequently, is marked by ease and freedom. There is no effort to force a way through. " He winds into his subject like a serpent," said Goldsmith of Burke's oratorical method. The natural method necessitates a thorough knowledge of the nature and structure of the object. It is therefore generally the result of much study, and perhaps of many i THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. attempts. The first investigator is not so likely to strike upon the intrinsic constitution of a thing as the last one, because he has not the light of previous inquiries. Meth- ods of investigation are continually undergoing correction and modification, and are thus brought closer to the organi- zation of the object. Sometimes scientific genius hits by intuition immediately upon the method of nature. But such genius is rare. Ordinary talent must make many trials, and correct many errors of predecessors. The botan- ical method of Linnseus, excellent as it is, Las been modi- fied by Le Jussieii and De Candolle. Goethe adopted the theory that all the parts of a plant are varieties of the leaf — a theory that had been suggested by Linnaeus himself, but rejected by that great naturalist. Oken, in physiolog}'', advanced the view that all the parts of the skeleton are varieties of the vertebra. It is evident that the correctness of the methods of these investigators depends upon whether the view taken of the intrinsic natui'e and constitution of the plant or the skeleton is a correct one. 2. The true method of investigation is logical. Nature is always logical, because in nature one thing follows another according to a preconceived idea, and an established law. The incpirer, therefore, who perceives the natural structure and organization of an object will exhibit it in a logical or- der. Everything in the analysis will be sequacious, and the whole will be a true evolution. Theological science, like others, presents some variety in its methods of investigation, though less than most sciences. In the Ancient, Mediaeval, and Reformation periods the method commonly adopted Avas the theological. The Trin- ity was the basis. Beginning with the divine existence and trinal nature, the investigator then discussed the acts and works of God in creation, providence, and redemption. This is the method of John of Damascus, the Greek theologian )Jof the seventh century, in his "E/c^eo-ts ntcrTea)? ; that of Lombard, Aquinas, and Bellarmin, in their elaborate sys- THE TRUE METHOD. 5 terns ; that of Melanchthon, Calvin, and Tnrrettin, and of Lutheran and Calvinistic divines generally. The system sometimes followed the order of an accepted creed ; that of Calvin, the Apostles' Creed ; that of Ursinus, the Heidelberg Catechism. Calvin's Institntes are a fine example of the theological method. Xo system exceeds it in comprehen- siveness, precision, lucidity, and literary elegance. For an analysis of it, see the general syllabus in the Presbyte- rian Board's edition, pp. 41-44. During the present century another method has been ado[)ted by some theologians, namely, the chrisiological. God incarnate is made the basis of theological science, and the work of redemption controls the investigation. This is virtually Schleiermacher's method. He derives the ma- terial of theological science from the Christian conscious- ness ; and this is shaped by the feeling of dependence : {a) as related to God generally ; (h) as related to the fact of sin ; (c) as related to grace and redemption. Under the last two heads, most of Schleiermacher's system is to be found. Rothe's method is essentially christological. Those of Hase and Thomasius are formally so. Among English writers Chalmers employs the christological method. The Ameri- can theologian, H. B. Smith, adopts it. Edwards's History of Redemption may be regarded as a system of theology of this class. See the preface to it by his son. "While tliis method is interesting because it makes sin and salvation the principal theme and brings Christ the Be- deemer into the foreground, yet it is neither a natural nor a logical metliod. God incarnate is only a single person of the Godhead ; redemption is only one of the works of God ; and sin is an anomaly in the universe, not an original and necessary fact. The christological method, therefore, is fractional. It does not cover the whole ground. It is pref- erable to construct theological science upon the Trinity ; to begin with the trinal nature and existence of the God- head, and then come down to his acts in incarnation and G THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. redemption. It is not logical or natural to build a science xipon one of its divisions. Christology is a division in the- ology. The true method of investigation in theological science being structural, the divisions in it will be suggested by the principal objects then)selves. In theology the investigator has to do with God, ]Man, and tlie God-man. These are the beings who are concerned, and to whom the various topics refer. Theological themes relate sometimes to the divine being, sometimes to the liuman being, and sometimes to the divine-human. They bring to view sometimes the works and ways of the creator, sometimes the works and ways of the creature, and sometimes the works and ways of the redeemer. In this threefold series man stands for the creature gen- erally, including angels and the material world. Man is the head of the material creation, and a representative of the world of finite spirits. Angels and the material uni- verse are neither God nor the God-man, and belong imder the category of the finite and created, which man may very well stand for. Besides the divisions and subdivisions which spring out of God, man, and the God-man, there are some that relate to the Scriptures, and come under the general head of Bibliolo2:v. "Whether these should be discussed in connec- tion with dogmatic theology is somewhat disputed. The Bible, as the source of man's knowledge of God, man, and the God-man, does not, strictly speaking, constitute one of the objects of theological investigation, and some, conse- quently, would separate bibliology entirely from theol- ogy. Since bibliolog}^ is concerned with demonstrating that the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures are the inspired word of God, leaving their contents to be explained by exegetical and dogmatic theology, it is contended that it should not constitute a division in theological science. While there is some truth in this, it must be remembered THE TRUE METHOD. 7 that it is impossible to demonstrate the inspiration of the Bible, without proving that its teachings are in harmony with the true idea of God, and present rational and credible views of his works and ways. Bibliology, consequently, cannot be wholly severed from theology and investigated separately and in isolation from it, like mathematics or physics. It is organically connected with the several divi- sions of theological science, and in some of its parts, cer- tainly, is best discussed in connection with them/ AVe shall, therefore, regard Bibliology as an introduc- tory division in a complete theological system. At the same time it is obvious that as such an introductory division, the topics belonging to it cannot be discussed in much de- tail. The examination of the several books of the Old and New Testaments, for example, for the purpose of demon- strating their canonicity or their authenticity, can be made only in the briefest manner. The bibliological topics that require most discussion by the dogmatic theologian are Revelation and Inspiration. ' Systems of theology since the Reformation generaUy include it. It is found in those of Calvin, Turrettin, De Moor-Marck, Gerhard, Chemnitz, Quenstedt, Hutter, HoUaz, Buddeus, Doderlein, Baier, Bretschneider, Knapp, Ebrard, Schleiermacher, Twesten, Watson, HiU, Hodge, et alia. CHAPTEE IL PLAN, DIVISIONS, AND SUBDIVISIONS. DiTiDESTG, then, the topics that fall under the general title of Theological Science, in accordance with the four principal themes that have been mentioned, we have the following divisions : Bibliology, Theology (Doctrine of God), Anthro- pology, Christology, Soteriology, and Eschatology. Bibliology {fit^iov \6jo^) includes those subjects that re- late to the Bible. 1. Revelation and Inspiration. 2. The Authenticity of the Scriptures. 3. Their Credibility. 4. Their Canonicity. Theology {^eov \6yo<;) as a division in Theological Science, is employed in a restricted signification. It denotes that branch of the general science of theology which discusses the divine being. It includes : 1. The Xature and Defi- nition of God. 2. The Innate Idea of God. 3. The Argu- ments for his Existence. 4. His Trinitarian Existence. 5. His Attributes. 6. His Decrees. Y. His Works of Crea- tion and Providence, and his Miraculous Works. It is to be noticed that the doctrine of the trinity is an integrant part of theology, in the restricted signification of the term, because according to revelation trinality as neces- sarily marks the deity as unity. Here is one of the points of difference between Christianity and deism, or theism, as this term was used by Cudworth and Warburton. Deism discusses the divine nature as mere unity, by itself and alone, because it denies trinality in the divine constitution ; but Christianity, following the revealed idea of God, dis- cusses the divine unity only as triunity or trinity. Trini- PLAJSr, DIVISIONS. SUBDIVISIONS. 9 tarianlsm, according to Scripture, is not a subject separate from theology proper, but enters into it as a necessary constituent. The revealed idea of God as much implies his trinity as his eternity. The Socinian and the Mohammedan doctrine of God is deistical, in distinction from Christian. Each alike denies interior distinctions in the divine essence, and is anti-trinitarian. This intrinsic and necessary connection of trinality with unity in God is indicated in the patristic use of the terra "theologian," as the synonym of "trinitarian." In the patristic age, the apostle John was denominated o 3€6\ojo<^, because of the fulness with which he was inspired to teach the doctrine of the trinitj'. Gregory of ISIazianzum also ob- tained the same designation by reason of the ability of his trinitarian treatises. In modern phrase it would have been St. John the trinitarian, and Gregory the trinitarian. Antlirojpology {av!^p(i>'7rovX6'yo^) treats of man in his orig- inal, and in his fallen condition. It comprises the following subjects : 1. Man's Creation. 2. His Primitive State. 3. His Probation and Apostasy. 4. Original Sin: its nature, transmission, and effects. 5. Actual Transgression. This division is concerned mainly with the subject of moral evil. Man as a holy being has but a brief historj^, because his apostasy occurred at the beginning of his career. Hence, anthropology discusses sin principally. Christology {Xpccrrov X6709) treats of the person of the Redeemer. The subjects under this head are : 1. Christ's Theanthropic Person. 2. His Divinity. 3, His Humanity. 4. His Unipersonality. 5. Plis Impeccability. Soteriology (crwrT/pta? Isjo^oi) discusses the work of the Pedeemer. It naturally follows Christology. Having in- vestigated the complex person and characteristics of the redeemer, we are prepared to examine redemption itself. Since soteriology covers the whole field of the divine agency in the salvation of the human soul, it is abundant and varied in its contents. The work of Christ in atoning for sin, and 10 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. the application of this work to the individual b}^ the Holy Spirit, both belong to soteriology. T]ie entire process of re- demption is included, fi*om the foundation laid in the sacri- fice of the Son of God, to the superstructure reared upon it by the operation of the Holy Ghost. And as the Holy Ghost in efifectually applying the work of Christ makes nse of instru- mentalities, as well as employs his own immediate enei'gy, the means of grace come under tlie head of soteriology. Soteriology, then, comprises the following subdivisions : 1. The Mediatorial Offices of Christ, as prophet, priest, and king. Since the second of these offices holds a promi- nent place in the economy of redemption, it naturally fur- nishes much material. The doctrine of atonement is central in soteriology. Hence we have^ 2. Vicarious Atonement : its nature and extent. As this atoning work is made effect- ual in the case of the individual by the Holy Spirit, so- teriology passes to : 3. Regeneration and its consequences, viz. : 4. Conversion ; 5. Justification ; 6. Sanctification. Eut as sanctification is a gradual process carried on by the Holy Ghost in the use of means, we have to consider : 7. The Means of Grace, viz. : the word and the sacraments. And since these are employed only in connection with the Christian Church, this also comes into consideration with them. Some methods make a separate division of this last, under the title of Ecelesiology. Eschatology (€(r')(aTcov Xoyo^;) discusses the final issue and result of redemption in the winding up of human history. It treats of the last events in the great process, and em- braces the following subjects : 1. The Intermediate State. 2. The Second Advent of Christ. 3. The Resurrection. 4. The Final Judgment. 5. Heaven. 6. Hell. The proper mode of discussing any single theological topic is: 1. Exegetical. 2. Eational. The first step to be taken is, to deduce the doctrine itself from Scripture by careful exegesis ; and the second step is, to justify and de- fend this exegetical result upon grounds of reason. PLAN, DIVISIONS, SUBDIVISIONS. 11 Christian theology differs from every other branch of knowledge, by being tlie outcome of divine revelation. Consequently the interpretation of Scripture is the very first work of the tlieologian. When man constructs a sys- tem of philosophy, he must look into his own mind for the data ; but when he constructs the Christian system he must look in the Bible for them. Hence the first procedure of tlie theologian is exegetical. The contents and meaning of inspiration are to be discovered. Christian dogmatics is what he finds, not what he originates. The term "dogma" has two significations: 1. It de- notes a doctrinal proposition that has been derived exegeti- callj' from the Scriptures. 2. It denotes a decree or decision' of the Church. The authority of the dogma, iu the first case, is divine ; in the latter, it is human. Dogmatic the- ology, properly constructed, presents dogmas in the first sense; namely, as propositions formulated from inspired data. It is, therefore, biblical, not ecclesiastical in its sub- stance. There is no difference between it and the so-called "biblical" theology in this respect. If a dogmatic system imports matter from uninspired sources — say a school of philosophy, or a theory in physics — and makes it of equal authority with what it gets from the Scriptures, it is a spu- rious system. No tenets can be incorporated into syste- matic theology any more than into exegetical, that are contrary to revelation. The only difference between "bib- lical" and dogmatic theology is in the form. The first ex- amines the Bible part by part, writer by writer. The last examines it as a whole. Should "biblical" theology examine the Bible as a whole, it would become systematic theology. It would bring all the varieties under one scheme. The so- called "higher unity," to which the exegete endeavors to reduce the several " types " of " biblical " theology is really a dogmatic system embracing the entire Scriptures. Dogmatic theology may be thoroughly biblical or unbib- lical, evangelical or rationalistic; and so may "biblical" 12 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. theology. The systematic theology o£ Calvin's Institutes is exclusively biblical in its constituent elements and sub- stance. Calvin borrows hardly anything from human phi- losophy, science, or literature. His appeal is made continu- ally to the Scriptures alone. Iso theologian was ever less influenced by a school of philosophy, or by human science and literature, than the Genevan reformer. Dogmatic the- ology, as he constructed it, is as scriptural a theology as can be found in the ancient or modern churcli. " The first dog- matic works of the Eeformers, Melanchthon's Loci, Zwin- gli's Fidei Ratio, Calvin's Institutes, are in the proper sense biblical theology. They issued from the fresh, vital under- standing of the Scriptures themselves." Schenkel : On Biblical Theology, Studien und Kritiken, 1852. On the other hand the Institutes of "Wegscheider is rationalistic and unbiblical. This system, while appealing to the Scriptures, more or less, yet relies mainly upon the data of reason, and the principles of ethics and natural religion. And the same remark is true of the so-called " biblical " theology. This method, like the systematic, may con- struct a biblical or an Tmbiblical book ; an evangelical or a rationalistic treatise; atheistic or a pantheistic scheme. As matter of fact, all varieties of orthodoxy and of heterodoxy are to be found in this department. In Germany, in par- ticular, where this method has been in vogue for the last half century, both the theist and the pantheist, the evangel- ical and the rationalist, have been fertile in the use of it. Under the pretence of producing an eminently scriptural theology, a class of theologians and critics like Baur and Strauss have subjected the Scriptures to a more capricious and torturing exegesis than they ever received before. Thej^ contend that tho idea of Christ and of Christianity, as it is enunciated in dogmatic theology and the creeds, is errone- ous ; that the Gospels must be re-examined under higher critical principles, and the true conception of Christ and his religion be derived from the very text itself ; that is, what PLAN, DIVISIONS, SUBDIVISIONS. 13 of the text is left after they have decided what is spurious and what is genuine. Baur was active and prolific in the department of "biblical" theology, as distinct from syste- matic. He composed a Theology of the New Testament (Yorlesungen iiber neutestamentliche Theologie), but it is biblical neither in substance nor spirit. Strauss's Leben Jesu professes to present the theology of the Gospels — the true biography, opinions, and religion of Jesus Christ ac- cording to a scientific exegesis. But it is an intensely anti- biblical treatise. The disciples of Baur, the so-called Tii- bingen school, have produced a body of " biblical theology " that is marked by great caprice in textual criticism, and ingenuity in interpretation, but is utterly antagonistic to what the Christian mind of all ages has found in the Bible. The school of Kuenen and WelUiausen have employed this iuethod in the same general manner in interpreting the Old Testament. But anotlier class of German theologians and critics, like Neander, Tholuck, Ebrard, Weiss, and others, handle the '■ biblical " method very differentl3\ The results to which they come in their Lives of Christ, and their study of John, Paul, Peter, and James, are drawn from an unmutilated text, and agree substantially Avith the historical faith of the church, and with systematic theolog}'- as contained in the creeds. As, thei-efore, we have to ask respecting systematic theology, whose system it is ; so, also, in regard to " bib- lical" theology, we must s^^wJiose " biblical" theology it is. Systematic theology should balance and correct " biblical " theology, rather than vice versa, for the following reasons : 1. Because " biblical theology " is a deduction from only a part of Scripture. Its method is fractional. It examines portions of the Bible. It presents the theology of the Old Testament, apart from the !New : e.g., Oehler's Biblical Theology of the Old Testament ; of the ISTew Testament apart from the Old: e.g., Schmid's Biblical Theology of the New Testament ; of the Gospels apart from the Epistles; 1-1 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. of the Sjnoptists apart from John's gospel; the Petrine theology in distinction from that of the Pauline ; the Pauline in distinction from that of James, etc. Now this method, while excellent as a careful analysis of materials, is not so favorable to a comprehensive and scientific view as the other. Science is a survey of the whole, not of a part. True theological science is to be found in the long series of dogmatic systems extending from Augustine's City of God to the present day. To confine the theologian to the fragmentary and incomplete view given in "bibli- cal" theology, would be the destruction of theology as a sci- ence. 2. A second reason why "biblical" theology requires the balance and symmetry of systematic theology, is the fact that it is more easy to introduce subjective individual opinions into a part of the Bible, than into the whole of it. It is easier (we do not say easy) for Eaur to prove that Christianity was originally Ebionitism, if he takes into view only the Gospels, and excludes the Epistles, than it is if he takes the entire New Testament into the account. It is easier to warp the four Gospels up to a preconceived idea of Christ and Christianity, than it is to warp the whole Bible. This is the danger to which all interpretation of Scripture is exposed, which does not use the light thrown by the inter- connection and harmony of all the books of the Old and New Testaments ; and perhaps this is the reason why the pantheistic and rationalistic critic is more inclined to com- pose a " biblical," than a systematic theology. The attempt to understand revelation piecemeal, is liable to fail. In every organic product — and the Bible is organized through- out — the whole explains the parts, because the parts exist for the whole, and have no meaning or use separate from it. The interpretation of Scripture should be " according to the proportion of faith " {Kara rrjv dvaXoyiav r?}? Trto-reo)'?). Kom. 12 : 6. When the work of deriving doctrines from Scripture has been done, the theologian must defend them against attacks, PLAN, DIVISIONS, SUBDIVISIONS. 15 answering objections, and maintaining the reasonableness of revealed truth. The elder Protestant divines devoted great attention to this part of theological science, under the title of Theologia Polemica. Here is where religion and philosophy, faith and science meet. Human reason cannot reveal anytliing, but it can defend what has been revealed. It is important to notice at this point, that in respect to the doctrines of Christianity the office of reason is dis- charged, if it be shown that they ai-e self-consistent. A ra- tional defence of the doctrine of the trinity, for example, consists in demonstrating that there is no contradiction be- tween the several propositions in which it is stated. To require of the theologian a complete explanation of this truth ia proof of its rationality, is more than is demanded of the chemist or the astronomer in physical science. When the individual doctrines have been deduced, con- structed, and defended by the exegetico-rational method, they are then to be systematized. Systematic theology aims to exhibit the logical order and connection of the truths of Kevelation. Schleiermacher mentions as a rule that is to guide in the construction of a system of Christian doctrine, the exclusion of all heretlGal matter, and the retention of only what is ecGlesiastical. Glaubenslehre, § 21. Only the historical and catholic faith belongs to the Christian sys- tem, because it is more probable that the one catholic Clmrch has correctly understood and interpreted the Script- ures, than that the multitude of heretical schools and par- ties have. The substantial unity of the Church upon the cardinal doctrines of the trinity, the apostasy, the incarna- tion, and the redemption, can be expressed in one self-con- sistent system. But the diversity and contrariety of the numerous heretical sects cannot be. CHAPTER III. NATUBE AND DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. Theological Introduction not only divides and arranges the parts of theological science, but also defines its general nature, and assigns it a place in the sum-total or encyclopaedia of knowledge. The important point of definition belongs here, and also the connection of theology with other sci- ences. This brings us to consider the Katurc and Definition of Theological Science. Theology is a science that is concerned with both the In- finite and the Finite, with both God and the Universe. The material, therefore, which it includes is vaster than that of any other science. It is also the most necessary of all the sciences. "Divinity," says Coleridge (Table-Talk, March 14, 1833), "is essentially the first of the profes- sions, because it is necessary for all men at all times ; law and physics are only necessary for some men at some times." Theology must not be identified with ethics. This is greatly to narrow it. Ethics, strictly, is the science of morals or duties, and is very limited compared with theol- ogy. It includes : 1. Duties toward God. 2. Duties to- ward man. Ethics is concerned only with the moral law in both tables. It does not properly include the gospel or re- demption. Ethics is wholly legal. It is true that ethics is affected by Christian theology ; so that Christian ethics dif- fers greatly from pagan ethics. It is more comprehensive, because pagan ethics is confined to duties between man and man, while Christian ethics embraces duties toward God, DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 17 Christian ethics differs also from pagan in respect to the mo- tive presented. In pagan ethics, the motive is legal and founded in fear; in Christian ethics, the motive is evangeli- cal and founded in love. St. Paul indicates the motive in Christian ethics, in Kora. 12 : 1: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the rnercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, hoi}'', acceptable to God." Also in 2 Cor. 7:1: " Raving therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let UB cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." The motive for the discharge of Christian duty is the love of God in Christ towards the- forgiven sinner; There is no such motive as this in pagan ethics.. Yet theology contains immensely more than belongs^even to Christian ethics, because it includes the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, thC' apostasy^ and redemption, to- gether with those of eschatology. l^one of these divisions belong properly to ethics. Some of the systems of Christian ethics, like that of Kothe for example, are unscientific be- cause they confuse and confoimd departments of science, erase the lines between law and gospel, morality and re- ligion, and under the title of ethics discuss all the mysteries of revelation. Theology {9-gov Xoyo^) is the science of God. The Su- preme Being is the object and theme of theological investi- gation. The tei'm as we have before remarked has a wide and a restricted signification. In the wide and common meaning in which we now employ it, theology includes not only the trinitarian nature and existence of God, but also the relations of man and the universe to him. It is thus inclusive of religion ; and some define theology to be the science of religion. This definition has had considerable currency. It is defective however because it mentions God, the proper object of the science, only by implication and inference. But a technical definition ought to specify directly, not indirectly, the principal subject-matter. Keligio, according to Cicero, is derived from relego, and 18 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION". signifies a careful reflection or meditation of the mind. " Qni autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent, et tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, ex relegendo ; nt elegantes ex eligendo, a diligendo diligentes, ex intelligendo intelligentes." De natura deo- rum, II. 28. According to this etymology, religion means reverence and worship. These result from reflection upon God and divine things. But Lactantius disputes this ety- mology, and derives religio from religo. "Hoc vinculo obstricti deo et religati sumus : unde ipsa religio nomen rece- pit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo." Institu- tiones, lY. 28. According to this etymology, religion de- notes duty, or the obligation of the creature towards the Creator. Man is bound or tied back to God. In this sense, Shakespeare speaks of "religion to the gods." Timon, IV. i. Lactantius asserts, further, that mere meditation would not distinguish religion from superstition ; the true God from false gods. Hence the notion of obligation afforded by religo is necessary. Augustine takes the same view with Lactantius. City of God, X. iii. But whichever etymology be adopted, only the relations of man to God, not God himself, are indicated by the word " religion." To derive the definition of theology from this term, is to define a science from one of its parts or phases, rather than from its subject-matter or principal object of investigation. Religion, strictly, would discuss only the relations of man to the deity ; but theology treats first of the deity himself, and then iuferentially of the relations of the creature to him. Augustine (City of God, YIIL i.) defines theology to be "rational discussion respecting the deity;" de divinitate rationem sive sermonem. Turrettin (L v. 1) defines the ob- ject of any science to be " that which is principally treated of, and to which all the conclusions refer," and affirms that the object of theology is God and divine things. He argues that this is so from the names of the science, SeoXoyia and DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 19 Beoai^eta, and from the fact that the Scriptures, wHch are the fountain-head of the science, treat principally of God, The Westminster catechism (Q. 5) also favors this defini- tion of theology, in its statement that the " Scriptures prin- cipally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." Here, the nature and at- tributes of God are regarded as the primary matter, and man's relations and duty to him the secondary. Aquinas also adopts this definition. " Omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione dei, vel quia sunt ipse deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad deum ut ad principium,et finem. Unde sequitur quod deus vere sit subjectum Imjus scientiae." Summa, I. i. 7. It has been objected by John of Damascus (De ortho- doxa fide, III. xxiv.) that theology is not properly speak- ing the science of God, because it is impossible to say what God is. Aquinas (Summa, I. i. 7) replies to this objection, that '' if the qualities and relations of an object are the sub- ject matter of any science, it is proper to call it the science of this object." And it is certain that there could be no science of anything, if it is asserted that there must first be a perfect comprehension. There is no science of matter any more than of God, if by science be meant a knowledge that excludes all mystery. The ultimate elements in chem- istry are as much beyond complete apprehension as the divine attributes. Science isprofound and self-consistent knowledge. Depth and logical coherence are the two characteristics of scien- tific in distinction from popular apprehension. If state- ments result from a superficial view, they are not scientific ; and if they clash with one another, they are not science. The distinction between popular and scientific knowledge is founded upon this. The common mind oftentimes adopts errors and contradictions which the educated mind detects and rejects. Sometimes science itself is superficial, and un- worthy of the name. Astronomy preWous to Copernicus 20 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. was founded upon a superficial view of the heavens ; merely upon what every man's eyes saw when he looked abroad upon the surface of the earth, or above upon the surface of the sky. Space had no depth. It was only a plane surface. The result was a self-contradictory astronomy. 'New mo- tions in the heavens were continually appearing that con- flicted with the old, and when tliey were described upon the map of the heavens, it was, in Milton's phrase, " with cycle and epicycle scribbled o'er." Astronomical science was science falsely so called. But the mathematical studies combined with the more careful observations of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, penetrated the abysses of space, introduced depth into astronomy, threw out these contradictions, and now the scientific astronomy is truly such. Sometimes theories in pliysics pass for science for a gen- eration or two, but are subsequently found to be superficial and self -contradictory. Examples of these are the theory of vortices invented by Des Cartes ; the theory of sponta- neous generation advocated by Lamarck; and the theory of pseudo-evolution which just now has taken the place of the rejected doctrine of spontaneous generation, and is popular with the materialistic school of physicists. These theories are denominated scientific by their authors ; but true scien- tific progress finally demonstrates their falsity. The skeptical estimate of theology is unscientific, because it is founded upon a superficial knowledge of the sources and objects of the science. A few examples will show this. One of the most acute of modern skeptics was David Hume. His argument against miracles is the most ingenious of any that has been constructed, and is the arsenal from which modern infidelity obtains its keenest weapons. It was Hume's subtlety that awoke Kant's dogmatic slumbers, ac- cording to Kant's own statement. But Hume had no knowledge of Christianity that deserves the epithet sci- entific. He was not versed in the Hebrew and Greek DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 21 scriptures. According to Johnson (Bosweirs Life, anno 1766), " Hume owned to a clergyman in the bishopric of Durham that he had never read the New Testament with attention." No one would respect a critical estimate of Brahminism by one who had never carefully examined the Vedas, and the body of Hindoo literature growing out of them. Nor was Hume skilled in doctrinal theology. He was unacquainted with the careful analysis and close reason- ing of the Nicene trinitarianism, of the Chalcedon chris- tology, of the schoolmen, and of the Protestant divines. The whole immense body of patristic, mediseval, and mod- ern divinity was comparatively a terra incognita to him. His knowledge of the Christian religion did not go be- yond what was floating in the atmosphere. He lived in a Christian country'-, among a theological people, and knew something of Christianity by absorption. But lie never studied the documents and mastered the doctrines of the Christian religion as Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin stud- ied and mastered them ; as Cudworth studied pagan the- ology, and Schleiermacher studied Plato ; as Schlegel and Coleridge studied Shakespeare. The language of Bent- ley, the first classical scholar of his century, to Collins, is applicable to Hume in substance. Collins had remarked that the Bible " is the most miscellaneous book in the world, and treats of the greatest variety of things : creation, deluge, chronology and laws, ecclesiastical institutions, na- ture, miracles, building, husbandry, sailing, physics, phar- macy, mathematics, metaphysics, and morals," and draws the inference from this fact that " free thinking" is neces- sary ; " for to understand the matter of this book, and to be master of the whole, a man must be able to think justly in every science and art." "Very true!" says Bentley, in reply, " and yet all he has here said of his sciences is requi- site, were the English Bible supposed to be the very original. Add, therefore, to all the requisites here enumerated a sufficient skill in the Hebrew and Greek languages. Now 22 THEOLOGICAL L^TRODUCTION. pass 3-our verdict on the man from Lis own evidence and confession. ' To understand the Bible/ says he, ^ requires all sciences ; ' and two languages besides, say I. But it is plain from his book tliat he has condemned the whole Bible for a forgery and imposition. Did he do this without under- standing the matter of it? This is too scandalous for him to own. We must take it then that he professes himself accomplished in all sciences and arts, according to his own rule. But where has he, or any of his sect, shown any tolerable skill in science ? What dark passages of Scripture have they cleared ? Or of any book whatever? !Nay, to remit him to his ' sciences ' and ' arts,' what have they done in the languages, the shell and surface of Scripture ? A great master of the whole Bible, indeed, that can scarce step three lines in the easiest classic authors cited by him- self without a notorious blunder."^ Hume was not more learned than Collins in Christian theology, and these re- marks of Bentley hold true of him in all essential points. Another illustration of the superficial knowledge of the skeptic in the province of Christian theology is seen in Gibbon. Few writers have been more conscientious in their scholarship than tiie historian of the Decline and Fall. He liad read with great thoroughness all the Greek and Latin pagan writers who treat of the period with which he was concerned. His quotations from the Byzantine historians are never second-hand. But when he derives historical material from the Christian fathers, he is not so conscien- tious. He obtains much of his information in this instance from Tillemont : a very trustworthy authority, it is true, but still a secondary source. Gibbon's study of the Greek of Athanasius, and the Latin of Augustine, was not so thorough as his reading of Zosimus and Marcellinus. And the reason lay in his contempt for the former, as ecclesiastical writers. A church father ; though subtle like Athanasius, and pro- 1 Bentley : On Free Thinking, VIII. See Bp. Newton's exposure of the mis- takes of Bolingbroke. Prophecies, Dissertation L DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCB. 23 found like Angu8tine ; though among the finest intellects of the race, and so reckoned in literary history ; was, in his view, a superstitious man, and therefore his writings did not deserve continuous and complete perusal, but might be examined cursorily, and through the eyes of others.^ These remarks apply with equal force to the skepticism of this generation ; for there are no names in it superior to those of Hume and Gibbon, whether regard be had to learning or mental power. Such products as the survey of Modern Civilization by Buckle, and of the Intellectual Development of Europe by Draper, are specimens of su- perficial information and thinking concerning theological and metaphysical science. Almost exclusive attention is devoted to the material and physical aspects of civilization, the moral and religious elements in modern culture are over- looked, and the great problems of philosophy and theology are either unnoticed or else denied to be problems at all. The judgment passed upon either doctrinal or practical Christianity from this point of view, is neither profound nor self -consistent.^ As an an example of the ignorance of a literary man in scientific theology, consider the following from Froude (Short Studies, 3d Series, 115). " To represent man as an automaton sinning by the necessity of his nature, and yet as guilty of his sins ; to represent God as having or- dained all things, yet as angry with the actions of the pup- pets whom he has created as they are ; is to insist on the acceptance of contradictory propositions from which reason recoils, and to make Christianity itself incredible by a trav- esty of Christian truth." Froude believes this to be a true account of Protestant theology as formulated by Luther » A writer in the Quarterly Review for Oct. 1838 shows that Gibbon's account of Gnosticism is superficial, and sometimes positively erroneous. The Jcuowl- edge of Gnosticism must be derived from the Christian fathers. =* See a searching criticism of Draper, by Smith : Faith and Philosophy, 337-. 357. 24 THEOLOGICAXi INTRODUCTION. and Calvin. Eut it is pure misrepresentation ; not inten- tional, but the misrepresentation of ignorance. A writer versed in the history of opinions would not have attributed such views to Calvin, and the creeds of the Reformation, An erudite skeptic like Baur, for example, does not so de- scribe systematic Augustinianism and Calvinism. And when we pass to the infidelity of the masses, the truth of our assertion is still more evident. In no quarter is there so little scientific knowledge of the most powerful and beneficent religion on earth, as in the popular infidelity represented not by the treatise, but by the magazine and newspaper. The unbeliever of this grade may be moder- ately versed, perhaps, in some sections of natural science, and in the lighter parts of literature, but he is unacquainted with the loftier products in secular letters, and wholly ignorant of the systematic literature of the Christian Church. The skeptical estimate of Christian theology, conse- quently, is an unscientific one. A profound and accurate judgment must come from experts. As the scientific com- prehension of law is expected from jurists and not from laymen, so that of theology must be sought among philoso- phers and divines, and not among physicists and littera- teurs whose studies are devoted to very different branches of knowledge from ethics and theolog}'^, and who make guerilla incursions into this field merely for the purpose of attack. Every branch of knowledge has its recondite and abstract side, and hence, as in the case of law and medicine, the popular and superficial judgment must be corrected by the professional and scientific. " No one," says Winckel- mann (History of Art, I. i.), *' can form a correct judg- ment of Greek art, or of Greek literature, without having read repeatedly everything in the latter, and without having seen and examined if possible all the remains of the for- mer." Such thoroughness is eminently requisite in order to a just estimate of theological science, because it extends DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 25 over all spheres of being, and includes the deepest prob- lems and mysteries of existence. Theology, then, as the science of God, aims to obtain a knowledge of him that is free from contradictions, and is as profound as is possible, considering the nature of the sub- ject and the limitations of the human mind. If therefore it makes a statement of an abtruse doctrine like the trinity, it continues true to science. It does not affirm and deny one and the same thing. It asserts that God is one in re- spect to essence, and is three in respect to personal distinc- tions. These two propositions do not clash, because the idea of essence is different from that of person. Could it be proved that essence and person are identical conceptions, ti'initariauism would be shown to be self-contradictory and therefore unscientific. Again, the theological statements respecting the decree of God and the liberty of man are scientific, so far as self -consistence constitutes science. The theologian does not affirm that one and the same future event is necessitated for God and free for man, or free for God and necessitated for man. Eut he affirms, that one and the same future event may be certain for God and uncer- tain for man ; and that for both God and man it may be a free event, like the decision of the human will, or for both God and man a necessitated event, like the fall of a stone to the ground. Such is the creed statement. " Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God^ all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes ; either necessarily, or freely and contingently." Westminster Confession, V. ii. That is to say; when the second cause is a free cause, such as the human will, then the future act, which is free for both God and man, is uncertain for man and certain for God ; and when the second cause is a necessary cause, such as the force of gravity, then the future event, which is necessi- tated for both God and man, is certain for God and uncer- 26 THEOLOGICAL mXRODUCTION. tain for man. Whether I shall exert a particular, volition to-morrow is uncertain to me, but not to God. But if exerted, it is for both God and me alike a free act. Whether a particular stone shall fall to-morrow is uncertain to me, but not to God. But if it fall, it is for both God and me alike a necessitated event. There is no clashing or contra- diction in these statements, and they contain the essential truth respecting divine sovereignty and human liberty. When theology is denominated the science of God, it is not meant that God is completely comprehended. There may be science without omniscience. Otherwise, science would be impossible for any but the Infinite Intelligence. Yet the tendency of science is to explain exhaustively and completely. The longer a science is pursued, the more is known of the subject. The aim and endeavor is to reach a final and perfect comprehension. In theology, which em- braces the infinite as well as the finite, the goal can never be reached, either in this world or the next ; but more and more will be known, and the progress of the science will be onward forever and forever-more. *' The nature of a thing," says Aristotle (Politics, I. ii.), " is judged by its ten- dency." The tendency and aim of science towards a com- plete view evinces that it is profound in its nature. The superficial view is not rested in. Consider, for illustration, the anthropomorphic and materializing conception of God. This is unscientific. The descriptions of the deity borrowed from some resemblance to visible things, are taken literally by the anthropomorphist. But the theologian goes behind them to the real truth. " Thus, when the scriptures speak of God, and ascribe hands, eyes, and feet, to him, it is not designed that we should believe that he has any of these members according to the literal signification ; but the meaning is, that he has dk power to execute all those acts, to the effecting of which these parts in us are instrumental : ithat is, he can converse with men as well as if he had a tongue or a mouth ; he can discern all that we do or say as DEFINITION OP THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 27 perfectly as if he had eyes and ears; he can reach us as well as if he had hands and feet ; he has as true and substantial a being as if he had a body ; and he is as truly present everywhere as if that body were infinitely extended." King: On Foreknowledge, 468. 1. In defining the nature of theology, we remark in the first place, that it is absolute science, in contradistinction to relative knowledge. Theological doctrine is not true merely or only for the human intellect, but for all rational intelli- gence. The cognition, it is true, does not extend to the uttermost limits of the object, but so far as it does extend, and so far as the formulated statement is categorical and positive, it is conformed to the real nature and truth of the object. Man's conception of matter may be very different from that of the angel ; but man's conception of the divine holiness is the same in kind with that of the angel, and of God himself, though different in degree. The word "holy" conveyed the same idea to St. Paul that it would to the seraphim ; and it conveys the same idea to us that it did to him. It is erroneous to assert that what man calls right- eousness in God might be unrighteousness for the angels ; and that what the angels call wickedness in Satan might be moral excellence for man. The ideas of right and wroner are the same in kind in all rational intelligence. Two di- verse and contradictory conceptions of sin and holiness are impossible. There may be diverse and contradictory judg- ments as to whether a particular action is sinful or holy, but not as to whether sin is wrong and holiness is right. All rational beings have common principles of intelligence respecting moral truth, and this species of truth, if known at all, must be known absolutely. Relative knowledge is sufficient in the sphere of time and matter, but not of morals and eternity. There is too much at stake in the latter sphere. Whether man's knowledge of matter is ac- curate or not is of little consequence, taking the whole of his endless existence into account ; but if his knowledge of 28 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. God and morals is erroneous, his immortalitj is ruined.' The cognition, consequently, in such an important province as that of ethics and religion, must be absolute, not relative. " A relative notion of a thing," says Reid (Essay II. xviii,), "is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing at all, but only of some relation vphich it bears to something else." There is no science so rightly entitled to be denominated absolute, and metaphysically certain as theology. It is the assertion of materialistic schools in every age, that the sci- ence of matter and physical nature alone is certain, and that the science of mind and of God is not science in the strict sense. But the fact is exactly the contrary ; and this be- cause of the nature of the objects in each province. "That knowledge," says Milton (Reason of Church Government, XL), " that rests in the contemplation of natural causes and dimensions, must needs be a lower wisdom as the ob- ject is low." It is clear that no science can be any more a priori and necessary than its subject-matter. If an edifice rests upon the solid ground, it must be stationary ; if it rests upon the waves, it must fluctuate. An a priori sci- ence like geometry retracts no positions, and is immutable, because its data are mental axioms and the logical conclu- sions from them. An a posteriori science like geology is continually altering its positions, because it derives its data from the notices of the senses, and new notices show that old deductions were errors. Whether, therefore, the sci- ence of physical nature and matter is as necessar^'^ and im- 1 " Ib a man," says Plutarch (On Superstition), *' of opinion that indivisibles were the first origin of things ? It is indeed a. mistaken view, but makes no ulcer, no shooting searching pain. But is a man of opinion that -wealth is his chief good ? This error contains in it a canker ; it preys upon a man's spirits, it suffers him not to sleep, it makes him horn-mad." Similarly Frank (Christian Certainty, 105) remarks, " that it is of slight importance for the person of the observer, whether this physical object which I see before me is in truth as I tee it, or other than I see it. But the whole constancy and strength and worth of the personality depends upon the question whether this moral good which I ex- perience as real, has an actual existence or not ; the personality cannot free itself therefrom, without the innermost basis and supreme aim of its life being lost." DEFINITION OF TnEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 29 mutable as the science of God and the human mind, will depend upon whether physical nature and matter are as necessary and immutable, in their substance and proper- ties, as God and the rational soul of man. Let us com- pare the two. If there be anything fixed and uniform in the material world, it is the laws and forces that prevail there. These are sometimes denominated the necessary laws of matter. But when examined, the necessity of material laws is found to be only relative. They are necessary under the present arrangement, and in the existing system. liad the consti- tution of the material universe been different, they would have been different. There is no contradiction in the sup- position, that there might be a different system of nature from the present one ; that matter might have some differ- ent properties from what it now has, and that material laws might be other tnan they are. There is no escaping this, imless we adopt the position that matter is eternal. In this case, the properties and laws of matter have absolute, not relative necessity. But if we adopt the position of the theist, and concede that matter with its properties and laws was created ex nihilo by omnipotent power, then we can conceive, without self-contradiction, that the Creator could have constituted the material world upon a law of attraction operating inversely as the cube of the distance, as easily as he has made it upon the existing law operating inversely as the square. If he could not, then he is conditioned. There is something in the nature of matter, such as was supposed in the ancient vXt)^ which compels him to establish and form the material universe in the manner he has. There is an insuperable limit set by nature and matter to the divine power, so that God is powerless in any other direction than the one actually taken. He is merely a Gnostic demiurge, not a Biblical creator. The same is true of vegetable and animal types and forms. Granting that they are creations ex nihilo, there is 30 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. nothing to forbid the supposition that they might have been made upon a plan very different from tlie one actually employed by the Creator, It is absurd to suppose that the Omnipotent has exhausted his power in the existing uni- verse, or that the Omniscient can have only one scheme within his ken. These views of the sovereignty of God over the proper- ties and laws of matter, and of his free power to constitute the system of nature differently from what he has, are adopted by the leading minds in physical science. l^"ewton, at the close of his Optics, remarks, that " the motions of the planets are marked by certain small irregularities which appear to come from the mutual action of the planets and comets, and which will probably become greater and greater, in the course of time, until at last the system will again re- quire its author to put it in order." Leibnitz (Tlieodicee, Partie II. 345) thus speaks concerning the laws of motion : '^ The laws of motion which are operative in nature, and are verified by experience and observation, are not abso- lutely demonstrable like a geometrical proposition. They do not spring from a principle of necessit}^, but from a prin- ciple of perfection and order ; they are an effect of the will (choix) and wisdom of God. Hence these laws are a won- derful proof of the existence of an intelligent and free being, in opposition to the system of absolute and unreasoning (brut) necessity taught by Strato and Spinoza."' Similarly, Whewell (Astronomy and General Physics, I. iii.) remarks that "the force of gravity, so far as we can judge, might have been different from what it now is. It depends upon the mass of the earth ; and this mass is one of the elements of the solar system which is not determined by any cosmical necessity of which we are aware. We can- not see anything which would have prevented either the > Strato, B.C. 289, maintained that " there is inherent in nature an eternal and necessary principle of motion, or force, without intelligence, which is the only cause of the production or diBBolution of bodies." DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 31 size or the density of the earth from being different, to a very great extent, from what they are. We can very easily conceive the solar system so adjusted that the year should be longer or shorter than it actually is. If the earth were removed toward the solar centre by about one-eighth of its distance, the year would be shortened by about a month." After saying that the vegetable world has been adjusted to the year as it now is, "Whewell adds, that the length of either the solar or the vegetable year ** might have been different from what it is, according to any grounds of neces- sity which we can perceive." Only, if one were altered, the other would be adjusted accordingly.' Statements to the same effect are made by a writer in the London Quarterly Keview for July, 1876. " The law of the inverse square is but the mathematical expression of a property which has been imposed on matter from the crea- tion. It is no inherent quality, so far as we know. It is quite conceivable that the central law might have been dif- ferent from what it is. There is no reason why the mathe- matical law should be what it is, except the will of the Being who imposed the law. Any other proportion would equally well be expressed mathematically, and its results calculated. As an instance of what would occur if any other proportion than the inverse square were substituted as the attractive force of gravity, suppose at distances 1, 2, 3, the attractive force had varied as 1, 2, 3, instead of the squares of these numbers. Under such a law any number of planets miglit revolve in the most regular and orderly manner. But under this law, the weight of bodies at the earth's surface would cease to exist ; nothing would fall or weigh downwards. The greater action of the distant sun and planets would exactly neutralize the attractive force of the earth. A ball thrown from the hand, however gently, would immediately become a satellite of the earth, and 1 See, especially, Whewell'a recapitulation, I. xviii 32 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. would for the future accompany its course, revolving about it for the space of one year. All terrestrial things would obey the general law of the system, but would acknowledge no particular relation to the earth." Again, to take an illus- tration from optics. If the undnlatoiy theory of light be adopted, there does not appear to be any eternal and abso- lute necessity that exactly 458 million millions of vibrations, in a second, of the supposed ether, should produce the sensa- tion of violet color for the human eye, and 727 million mil- lions should produce the sensation of crimson. The Will that created the eye, and established these numbers and proportions, could have created a different eye, and estab- lished different proportions. If tliese positions of !Newton, Leibnitz, and Whewell are correct, it follows that absoluteness cannot characterize physical science, because the subject-matter of cognition within this province is not itself a priori and necessary. Knowledge, speaking generally, is the cognition of entity. Nonentity cannot be the subject-matter of human investiga- tion. A substance, or real being of some kind, is requisite for this. It is evident, therefore, that the absoluteness and certainty of a science will depend upon that of its subject- matter. If the subject-matter of a science has no necessity and absoluteness, the science will have none. Knowledge, then, that has physical and material substance and its prop- erties for its basis must be marked by contingency and relativity. For since matter and its laws might have been different, or might not have been at all, the knowledge of them is the knowledge of the contingent, the conditioned, and the mutable. When the subject-matter has a priori necessity, cognition acquires absolute certainty from it. This is the case with geometry. The data here are the in- tuitions of the mind, and the necessary conclusions from them. Geometry does not deal with matter and its phe- nomena, but with ideal points, lines, and surfaces. It is absolutely necessary that the radii of a circle should be DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 33 equal, but not that there should be a circular body like the sun. The laws of matter are not derived intuitively from the mind, like geometrical axioms, and then attributed to matter, but they are derived from matter, and then im- pressed upon the mind. Physical laws, as formulated, are deduced from the outer world, and have only relative neces- sity and certainty, because the outer world has only such. Axioms, on the contrary, are derived from the mind itself, and have a kind of certainty that cannot attach to a general- ization drawn from the observation of material phenomena- Ethics and pure mathematics have this in common, that they deal with ideas, not with substances. Eight and wrong, like a mathematical point and line, are not objective beings. Physics, on the contrary, deals with physical sub- stances. The former, consequently, are more certain sci- ences than the latter ; because there is no dispute about the nature of an intuitive idea, but there is about the nature of a physical substance. There cannot be two different views of a triangle, or of right and wrong ; but there can be of a piece of protoplasm, or a bit of granite. When we pass from the world of matter to that of mind and of morals, we find more than a relative necessity in the object of cognition. Unextended, incorporeal, spiritual substance is the entity in this case. The Divine mind and the human are the subject-matter of theological and meta- physical science. But mind is reason, and reason is marked by necessary and immutable properties. It differs from matter in this respect. Matter, conceivably, may be of an indefinite variety ; but we can conceive of only one species of reason. When God creates a rational being, he makes him after his own image ; but when he creates a physical substance, he does not create it after his own image, but as he pleases. This makes reason to be one and invariable in its essential properties, while matter is variable. We can- not conceive of God's creating two diverse kinds of rational mind, but we can conceive of his creating many kinds of 34 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. matter. All finite reason mnst resemble the infinite reason in kind. When God creates a rational spirit, he must, from the nature of the case, make it after his own likeness, and after no other pattern. But when he creates physical sub- stance, he is not thus restricted. God is immaterial, a pure spirit, without body parts or passions ; therefore when he creates physical substance, he creates something that has ,no resemblance whatever to himself. Matter, consequently, has nothing a priori, or intrinsically necessary, in its proper- ties. Even gravity, says Whewell (General Physics, II. X.), " is a property which we have no right to call necessary to matter, but have every reason to suppose is universal." Not being made after any original and eternal pattern drawn from ,the Divine essence, it may be made as God pleases, in an indefinite number of modes. But when finite mind and reason are created, they are made after the Divine image, and therefore can be of only one species and quality. Accordingly, the laws of mind have more of necessity in them than the laws of material nature have. The laws of thought, as enunciated in logic, are more immutable than physical laws. Logic is a priori in its regulative principles. Mathematics is necessary and absolute in its axioms and conclusions. We cannot conceive of a different species of logic or mathematics; but we can conceive of a different astronomy, chemistry, and geology — a different physics gen- erally. The movements of the planets might, conceivably, have been different ; but the movement of the human intel- lect in logical and mathematical processes could not have been otherwise. This is true also of moral law, as well as of mental. When we pass from the world of physics to the world of ethics, and examine the laws that rule and regulate in this realm, we find more than a relative necessity. Take the decalogue as summed up by our Lord : " Thou ehalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thy- self." This is for the rational universe what the law of DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 35 gravitation is for the physical. And it is necessary and absohite for all intelligences. We cannot conceive that it might have been different from what it is ; that the com- mand might have run thus : " Thou shalt hate the Lord thy God and thy neighbor." Neither can we conceive of such a modification of it, as to allow an equal degree of love toward the Creator and the creature. The golden rule^ " Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," is absolutely necessary. Neither the con- trary, nor any modification of it, is conceivable. No other rule for the conduct of finite rational beings could have been laid down by the Supreme Reason. Testing, then, the entity or substance which is the object of cognition in physics and metaphysics, respectively, by the properties and laws belonging to each, it is clear that absolute scientific certainty is to be claimed for the latter, not for the former. 1. There are three reasons, in particular, why physical science is relative knowledge. In the first place, it is to a great extent empirical or experimental. It is founded upon the observations of the five senses. But the senses never teach any a priori or absolute truth. They show what may be, and what actually is, but not what must be. They dis- close what occurs under certain actual circumstances, but not under all conceivable circumstances. By the senses, we know as a present fact that the sun rises in the east once in every twenty-four hours ; but the senses do not teach that this could not possibly be otherwise, and that the sun must of necessity rise in the east from eternity to eternity. Says Hume (Inquiry V.) : " The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradic- tion, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will rise to-morrow, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmative that it will rise. Similarly, Leibnitz (Nouveaux Essais, Avant- 36 THEOLOGIOAL INTRODUCTION. propos) remarks: *' Though the senses are necessary in or- der to the knowledge of actual facts, yet they are not suffi- cient in order to knowledge of all kinds ; since the senses give only present examples and instances, and teach only particular and individual truths. No matter how great the number of examples may be that establish a particular truth, they are insufficient to demonstrate the universal necessity of this truth ; because it does not follow that since a thing has uniformly occurred up to this moment, it will continue to occur forever. The Greeks and Romans noticed that in twenty-four hours, day uniformly turned into night, and night into day. But they would have erred, had they con- cluded that this fact is necessary and universal ; since it is not a fact in Nova Zembla. And it would be a yet more mistaken judgment, to conclude that this alternation of day and night is absolutely necessary at least within the temper- ate zone ; because it is possible for both the earth and the sun to cease to exist." 2. Secondly, the judgments of the senses are relative and variable, from the nature of the sensuous organs themselves. Tested mathematically and absolutely, no two persons see the same-sized object. The tree is taller for one man than for another. The shade of red is deeper for one eye than for another ; and not red at all for the color-blind. Pascal, perhaps the most metaphysical of mathematicians, speak- ing of the effect of magnifying glasses, asks : " After all, who is to take upon himself to affirm that these glasses have really altered the natural dimensions of the objects in ques- tion, but that, on the contrary, they may not have had the effect of restoring them to their original proportions, which our eyes had altered and contracted, in the same way that is done by the action of diminishing glasses." The Geo- metrical Spirit. The following experiment, from a trea- tise on heat, illustrates the relativity of sensuous percep- tions. Plunge the right hand into a vessel of tepid water, and the left hand into one of iced water. Then put both DEFINITION OP THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 37 into water of ordinary temperature. The latter will now seem to be cold, if we decide according to the sensation ex- perienced by the right hand ; but warm, if we judge by the left. Hence, says the author, it appears that there is no difference between heat and cold when we abstract our sen- sations, and consider only the body that impresses us. Thus it is evident that the sensuous data which enter so largely into natural and physical science are wholly subjec- tive. They depend upon the structure and condition of the organ. Size and figure are all in the eye. Sound is in the ear. If human eyes and ears had been made upon one plan, Lilliput would have been the actual world. If they had been made upon another, Brobdingnag would have been. " Sensation," says Cudworth, "is not science or intellection, because the soul by sense does not perceive the things them- selves, or the absolute natures of them, but only her own passions from them. Were sensation knowledge and under- standing, then he that sees light and colors, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colors, heat and cold : and the like of all sensible things." ^ " All that the optic nerve reports to us," says Helmholtz, " it reports under the form of a sensation of light, whether it be the beaming of the sun, or a blow on the eye, or an electric current in the eye. The acoustic nerve, again, transforms everything into phenomena of sound ; the nerve of the skin transforms all things into sensations of temper- ature or touch. The same electric current, whose existence the optic nerve reports as a flash of light, which the nerve of taste reports as an acid, awakens in the nerve of the skin the feeling of burning. The same sunbeam, which we call light when it falls upon the eye, we call heat when it strikes the skin." This shows the relativity of sensuous perception, A material object appears to us only in accordance with the ^ Epicurus, on the contrary, carried the doctrine that the Benses are the only measure of truth so far as to affirm, that the sun is no larger than it appearo. Des Cartes : Preface to Principles of Philosophy. 38 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. sensuous organ which transmits the impression, and not as an immutable object independent o£ the organ of sensation. But it is altogether different in the instance of a spiritual object like God, or the soul. God makes only one and the same impression of holiness, or wisdom, or omnipotence, if any is made at all ; and the very same qualities are attrib- uted to him by all intelligence that is not abnormal and vitiated. The list of the Divine attributes is one and inva- riable. The same is true of the human soul as an object of knowledge, and of its qualities. The human spirit has only one conceivable set of properties, and these are the same for all who are self-conscious and make an accurate report of self-consciousness. 3. Thirdly, the inferences from sensible phenomena, in phj^sical science, are relative and uncertain, because all the phenomena have not been seen. The material universe is too vast for all of it to come under the notice of men's senses. Though perhaps improbable, yet it is possible that some established and accepted generalizations, in the exist- ing physics, may be overthrown by future observations and new phenomena. The following facts illustrate the uncer- tainty of which we are speaking. "Water in cooling con- tracts down to forty degrees of Fahrenheit ; then if it con- tinues to cool it begins to expand, and at thirty-two de- grees freezes, which is very great expansion. Nature here reverses herself, and contradicts herself. The first part of her process would yield the generalization, that cold con- tracts substances ; the second, that cold expands substances. He who should have observed only the phenomena above forty degrees, would have deduced the general law, that water invariahly contracts in cooling ; and were he of a cer- tain school of phj^sicists, he would add to this, that it neces- sarily contracts. If upon this planet there were no natural or artificial temperature below forty degrees, the law that cold uniformly contracts substances would be regarded as well established and indisputable as the law of gravitation. DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 39 It is for this reason, that theories in physics are so un- certain and changing. Geology furnishes abundant exam- ples. Dr. Arnold (Life by Stanley, I. 142), speaking of the discussions of the British Association in 1839, says that ''' Murchison convinced Greenough and De La Beche that they must recolor their geological maps ; for what were called the Greywackes of North Devon, he maintains to be equivalent to the coal formation; and the limestones on which they rest are equivalent to the Old Bed Sandstone which now is to be sandstone no more, but is to be called the Devonian system." Agassiz, in his eulogy upon Hum- boldt, remarks that " Plumboldt's work upon the position of the rocks in the two hemispheres tells the history of that formation as it could be told in 1823, and is of course full of anachronisms." But what absolute certainty is there that the statements of any geologist in 1880, respecting the rocks of the globe, may not likewise be full of anachro- nisms ? There would be more approach to scientific cer- tainty in these empirical departments of knowledge which depend upon tentative experiments, and repeated observa- tions, if all the facts could be observed, or even a ma- jority of them. But the conclusions of the physicist are drawn from only a small, oftentimes infinitesimal portion of the phenomena. Only the testimony of an eye-witness, an actual observer with instruments, is regarded as of the first rate. But how little of such testimony enters into geological theories generally. What observer was on the ground when the coal-beds were forming ? We may grant that inferences that are plausible, and even probable, may be drawn from what is seen in a coal-mine to-day, as to what was being done in that spot ten million years ago, but absolute certainty is impossible. A convulsion by earth- quake, a fusion by fire, a deposit by flood ; in other words, some sudden catastrophe of nature ; might so dislocate strata, and melt up materials, and overlay with sediment, as entirely to alter a previous plan upon which natm-e had ■iO THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. been working for a million of years. But the observer of the present daj'- sees only the shattered debris, scoriae, mud or gravel, of the earth-quake, the fire, and the deluge, and knows nothing at all of that preexistent plan which lay be- hind them, and which was entirely obliterated by them. Yet he assumes that he is beholding the very first and original plan of all, and upon the strength of what he sees at this moment lays down a theory respecting the very creation and beginning of the globe. For these reasons, a theory in physics cannot have the completeness and certainty of a theory in ethics. There is no eternal and immutable physics, as there is an eternal and immutable morality. The principles that should govern the action of all moral agents throughout the universe are necessary ; but the principles that rule the material world are contingent. In this reference, the remark of Coleridge is correct. " The use of a theory in physical sciences is, to help the investigator to a complete view of all the hitherto discovered facts relating to the science in question. It is a collected view, J^ecopia, of all he knows, in one survey. Of course, so long as any pertinent facta remain unknown, no physical theory can be exactly true, because every new fact must necessarily, to a greater or less degree, displace the relation of all the others. The only necessarily true theo- ries are those of geometry ; because in geometry all the premises are necessarily true and unalterable. But to sup- pose that in our present exceedingly imperfect acquaintance with the facts, any theory in chemistry or geology is neces- sarily correct, is absurd." Table Talk, June 29th, 1833. Compare Herschel : Discourse, § 183. The skeptical attitude, then, which Hume asserted to be the proper one towards religion, is far more appropriate in reference to physical science, founded as it is upon the obser- vations of the senses and deductions from them. " The whole subject of religion," he remarks, "is a riddle and an inexpli- cable mystery ; doubt, uncertainty, and suspension of judg- DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAIi SCIENCE. 41 ment are the sole result of our closest examination." The way and manner in which the material universe arose from nonentity, and in which it is upheld from millennium to mil- lennium, " is a riddle and an inexplicable mystery " to phys- ical science. The deep and learned minds in this province acknowledge this. To the question, ''How did man origi- nate ? Quatrefages (Human Species, I. xi.) answers : '' I do not know." It is impossible to explain either the origin or the perpetuity of things by physical science. ITeither self-motion nor perpetual motion belongs to matter. But the former is requisite in order to the origin, and the latter in order to the perpetuity of anything in nature. Kespect- ing the mode in which the material universe came into ex- istence, the question of God to Job (38 : 4, 16-21) is con- clusive : " Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth ? Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea ? or hast thou walked in the search of the depth ? Have the gates of death been opened to thee ? Hast thou perceived the breadth of the earth ? Where is the way where light dwelleth ? And as for darkness, where is the place thereof I Knowest thou it because thou wast then born ? or because the number of thy days is great ? " Compared with the sum-total of phenomena in universal space and time, only a little is known of matter and its laws, and if the exclusive claim to an absolute cognition is set up for physical science, then it is proper to subject it to a skeptical criticism, and compel it to bring forth its proofs. Especially is this proper, when the theory is novel, and contradicts the his- torical physics. " I am a skeptic in physics," said one to an enthusiastic "scientist" who was endeavoring to convince him that life is an evolution from the lifeless. Extremes produce extremes ; and if tlie fanciful biology of Haeckel shall succeed in driving out the sober biology of Agassiz, there will be more of scientific than there is of religious skepticism. But skepticism in the bad sense of the term is an error 42 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. both in science and religion. If anything in the great do- main of material nature has been demonstrated by valid reasoning, the human mind will accept it as truth. There is much of this in the higher departments of physical sci- ence, Buch for example as astronomy. Copernicus, Kep- ler, and Newton have conclusively established truths and facts within this province. Astronomy contains much of certain knowledge, because it contains much that is mathe- matical. '' The apparent motions of the sun, moon and stars," says Whewell, " have been more completely reduced to their causes and laws, than any other class of phenom- ena." And it should be observed, that in this instance more has been accomplished by mental and metaphysical processes, than by sensuous and physical. Mathematical calculation has enabled the astronomer to solve astronomical problems which the senses, even aided by instruments, could not have solved. Le Yerrier discovered Neptune by the calculus, not oj the naked or the armed eye. Fresuel, by mathematical calculation, established certain facts I'e- specting refraction which contradicted the results of pre- vious experiment ; and certain other facts that had escaped experiment and observation. An eminent geometer dem- onstrated by mathematical optics, that the centre of the shadow made by a small circular plate of metal in a beam of light coming through an apertui*e is in fact no shadow, but an illumination precisely as bright as if the metal plate were away. This is utterly contrary to what appears to the eye of the observer. Herschel : Discourse, §§ 23, 24. But as w^e descend to lower departments in natural science, like geology for example, we find nothing of this mathematical certainty, and much doubtful theorizing built upon sensi- ble experiments and observations. Astronomy, moreover, is a comparatively certain science, not only because it em- ploys the calculus, but because it confines itself to existing' facts and phenomena. Its aim is to ascertain the present structure and motions of the solar system. Geology is un- DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 4:3 certain, because it proposes to describe a past state of things. It attempts to tell what existed millions of years ago, and even how the worlds were originally made ; which involves agencies and phenomena that occurred in '^ the dark back- ward and abysm of time," and which may have been totally different from what the present phenomena and agencies would imply as interpreted by the theorist. Still another reason for the greater certainty of astronom- ical science is found in the fact of its greater simplicit}''. It is confined to its own problems, and does not attempt those of other sciences. Says Ilerschel (Discourse, § 183), "it can hardly be pressed forcibly enough on the attention of the student of nature, that there is scarcely any natural phenomenon which can be fully and completely explained without a union of several, perhaps all, of the sciences. The great phenomena of astronomy, indeed, may be considered exceptions ; but this is merely because their scale is so vast that one only of the most widely extended forces of nature takes the lead, and all those agents whose sphere of action is limited to narrower bounds, and which determine the pro- duction of phenomena nearer at hand, are thrown into the background, and become merged and lost in comparative insignificance. But in the more intimate phenomena which surround us, it is far otherwise. Into what a complication of different branches of science are we led by the considera- tion of such a phenomenon as rain, for instance, or flame, or a thousand others which are constantly going on before our eyes." By reason of this simplicity and comparative free- dom from complication with other sciences, astronomy en- ables the investigator to be more certain in his conclusions than does chemistry or geology. It does not, like these latter, burden him with a multitude of particulars, or tempt him to solve the difiBculties arising from fanciful hypotheses and conjectures. It is worthy of notice that astronomy generally speaking has been believing, while geology has often been skeptical. 44 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION, The Keplers and Newtons were reverent minds, and the main current of astronomical science has corroborated both natural and revealed religion. It is also noticeable that none of tlie great discoveries in physics, like the laws of planetary motion, and the law of gravitation, have been made by materialists and atheists. Skeptical sections in the history of physics are barren sections, so far as original discovery is concerned. This is conceded by Lange, in his History of Materialism (I. i. 4). The inventive and power- ful intellects who discover laws, and make a positive addi- tion to the knowledge of material nature, express their faith and worship in the language of Kepler : " Father of the univei'se, what moved thee to raise a little feeble creature of earth so high as to make him a king, and almost a God, in thinking thy thoughts after thee ? I thank thee, Lord and Creator of all, that thou hast filled me with rapture over the works of thy hand, and hast enabled me to disclose to men the glory of thy creation, so far as a finite mind can comprehend thy infinity." The skeptical naturalists, on the other hand, belong to the second and third class of investi- gators, and have made few original contributions to science. The identification of matter and mind by the materialist blinds the human intelligence, so that its generalizations are false. The materialist may be an accurate observer of phenomena, but his conclusions from them are erroneous. The theories of spontaneous generation and the origin of species by natural selection are examples. Their authors were minute examiners of nature with both the naked and the armed eye, but little more. The report of what they saw is trustworthy ; but what they inferred is not. This inferiority is explained by Whewell's distinction between inductive and deductive habits of mind. Astronomy and General Physics, in. vi. Investigators of the first rank, by induction dis- cover hitherto unknown laws, and then those of the second rate by deduction draw conclusions, and construct schemes from them. Tiie Newton or the Kepler, when the law of DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 45 gravitation or of planetary motion bursts npon liis view with " the rapturous evpijKa,^^ is impressed with the idea of God as the author of it. Eat the investigator of a second- ary grade, who merely uses the discovery and applies it, is sometimes a disbeliever in a personal creator, a preconceived purpose, and a final end, because he regards the law itself as the eternal first cause.' He converts the law which has been discovered by his predecessors in science into a God ; as the African savages worshipped the plough which produced such wonderful effects in comparison with their rude mattock. The inventor of the plough never would have thought of deifying it. It appears then, after this examination of the materials and subject-matter of physical and theological science respec- tively, that in point of absolute validity and certainty the superiority is with the latter. Tested rigorously, the sphere of natural science is a region of only relative knowledge and certainty. There is nothing absolutely and eternally necessary in the laws and phenomena of matter. There is no absolute knowledge within this domain, because there is no absolute ohject to be known. Kant was correct in his celebrated but sometimes misapprehended position, that all cognition within the province of the natural and sensuous — within the region which falls to the understanding, in his nomenclature — is unaxiomatic and conditional, and that only within the domain of the moral and spiritual is there an absolutely certain intuition. What the practical rea- son perceives to be true, is true for all intelligence. The metaphysical ideas of God and the soul, of free will and immortality, of right and wrong, are absolute ; and all sci- ence that is founded upon them is of the same nature. But physical sensations and perceptions are individual, subjec- ' Him th.e Maker, we behold not ; calm He veils himself in everlasting laws, Which and not Him, the skeptic seeing, exclaims, * Wherefore a God? The world itself is God.' " Schiller : Don Carlos. 46 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. tive, and relative. Even tlie conceptions of space and time are only forms of the finite understanding, under which these sensations are massed and unified. The finite mind when cognizing sensible phenomena must cognize them as successive in time, and located in space, and its cognition of them is consequently gradual and incomplete. But the Infinite Mind is untrammelled by this gradual and sequa- cious mode of apprehension in time and space, and beholds all phenomena in the simultaneous and complete intuition of omniscience. Successive sensuous cognition is relative knowledge. It is true for man's senses, but not for the Di- vine reason. Material and sensible things, which are the subject-matter of physical science, are in continual flux and change. And even in regard to the invisible principles or forces beneath them ; even in regard to the laws of nature themselves ; we have seen that we cannot ascribe to them such a necessary and immutable quality as we must to spir- itual and metaphysical realities. For they are creations from nonentity, and are only one of the many various man- ners in which the Divine Mind can express itself in a mate- rial universe. But the mental and moral universe has no such conceivable variety. Keason is one and simple; mat- ter is manifold and complex. The whole domain of phys- ical nature is only a means to an end. It was created to be subservient to mind. It cannot, therefore, like the do- main of the moral and spiritual, which is an end in and of itself, have absolute and immutable characteristics, and there- fore cannot be the object of an absolutely certain knowledge/ "Moral certainty," says Frank (Christian Certainty, 104), "in distinction from natural certainty, is characterized by a firmness which in the latter case has its equal at most only as regards mathematical and logical certainty. A man may doubt the reality of the objects which he sees with bodily eyes and hears with physical ears, and still he does 1 Shedd : Literary Eesays, p. 301-305. On the inferiority of natural science to moraL see Plato: Phaedo, 96-100. DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 47 not on that account doubt the reality of the moral world, of which he is conscious. That is the abiding truth of the Kantian philosophy, which in the moral domain sets limits to the skepticism regarding objective realities; the truth also of Fichte's doctrine of the moral order of the world, tlie validity of which is not affected by the idealism in other respects." 2. A second characteristic of theology is, that it is fos- itwe science in contradistinction to negative knowledge. This ground is taken by theologians, in the affirmation that faith is intelligent, and not the blind and ignorant credu- lity of superstition. There is some real and true knowledge of the object of faith, although the object is still a mystery in many respects. Some of its properties and relations are known, but not all of them. For example, man knows that God is spirit, and not matter. This is a positive and ab- solutely true knowledge. Man also knows that spiritual substance is intelligent, and immortal, that is, incapable of dissolution by material causes. This also is a positive and absolutely true knowledge. ^. But how the intelligence of God is eternal and omniscient, comprehending all things simultaneously and without succession, and how his omni- presence is the presence of the whole deity at every point of space, and a multitude of other similar particulars — of these, he is ignorant. Man knows God " in part " with a true and valid knowledge ; but being also ignorant " in part," and by far the greater part, God is a mystery for him. But ifc would be absurd to say that because man knows only in part, therefore he does not know at all; that because he does not know everything, he knows nothing. Faith, therefore, though relating to the mysteries of God and the universe, is yet an intelligent act. It is denominated, in Eph. 3 : 18, 19, a "comprehension" of the "breadth and length, and depth and height " of revealed truth ; a " knowledge " of "the love of Christ which passeth knowledge." Faith is defined, in Heb. 12 : 1, as the " evidence" of unseen things. 4:8 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. The word eX,e7;)^o? in this passage denotes a mental convic- tion ; and a conviction is both intelligent and positive. Christian faith is a rational and confident conviction of the mind. According]}^ Calvin (Institutes, III. ii. 14, 15) defines faith to be " a solid constancy of persuasion, and a certain and steady knowledge ; " and adds, that " the knowledge of faith consists more in certainty than in comprehension. When we call it knowledge, we intend not such a comprehension as men commonly have of those things which fall under the notice of their senses. Tlie mind which attains to faith does not perfectly comprehend what it perceives, but, being persuaded of that which it cannot comprehend, it under- stands (intelligit) more by the certainty of this persuasion, than it would comprehend (perspiciret) of any human ob- ject by the exercise of its natural capacity." In this last statement, Calvin implies that a believer knows more cer- tainly concerning some of the qiialities of God, than he does concerning any of the properties of matter ; that religious cognition is closer to absolute truth than sensuous cognition is. It is more certain that God is holy and omnipotent, than that light is the undulation of an ether, and not a sepa- rate substance by itself. With this, the eminent school- man Hales agrees. " If we compare," he says, " the way in which the relation of faith, or conviction, to knowledge, is determined in theology, with the way in which it is in the other sciences, we shall find that the order is a reverse one. In the other sciences, conviction is brought about by the activity of reason, or mediated by thought, and scientific knowledge precedes conviction ; while the reverse holds true of religious matters. It is not till we have appropriated them by faith, that we can attain to a knowledge of them conformable to reason. These things can be understood only by those who are of a pure heart ; and we get this purity by keeping God's commandments." Hales " distin- guishes," says Neander (IV. 427), " a certainty of specula- DEFINITION OP THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 49 tion, and a certainty of experience; a certainty grounded in the intellectual agency, and another grounded in the feel- ings. Of the latter kind is the certainty of faith ; and with reference to this kind of certainty, theology is superior to the otlier sciences." The term '• positive " signifies that something is laid down (positum) respecting an object or idea. An aflBrmation is made that it is thus and so ; and not a mere denial that it is thus and so. To say that water is notjire^ conveys no information as to what water really is. Eut to say that water is a fluid resulting from the union of oxygen and hy- drogen gas, imparts some real knowledge of the nature of water, though it does not explain all the mj^stery connected with it This is a positive statement springing out of a positive yet not exiiaustive cognition. Water real!}' is a fiuid, and reaUy consists of two gases. Taking Aquinas's definition of science, as the knowledge of the qualities and relations of an object, it is evident tliat there may be posi- tive without pei'fect comprehension. An object has, we will say, fifty qualities or properties. I know twenty of them, and do not know the remaining thirty. My knowl- edge is valid and positive, so far. It is not merely negative and invalid in respect to the twenty known qualities. Again an object, we will assume, has twenty relations to other ob- jects. I know ten of them. My knowledge to this extent is positive. I have so much true information upon the sub- ject. To illustrate from the science of optics. The proper- ties of transmission, reflection, and refraction of light were known before those of double refraction and polarization. Suppose that the latter were not known at all, at the pres- ent time. It would not follow that the knowledge of light, so far as the properties of transmission, reflection, and re- fraction are concerned, is merely negative, and not real and true cognition. The knowledge conforms, so far, to the real nature of light. Again, the final cause, or use, of these latter properties of light, is still unknown. They are 4 50 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. not needed in order that the eye may see the outer world of forms and colors. " So far as has yet been discovered," says Whewell (Astronomy and General Physics, I, xvi.), "these latter properties and laws exert no agency whatever, and have no purpose in the general economy of nature." But the fact that the final cause and use of these properties and laws of diffraction and polarization is still unknown, does not prove that the existing knowledge which the phys- icist has of light is a mere negation. A negation may he employed after an affirmation has been made, in order to define an object or idea more care- fully. N"egative statements are of little value prior to af- firmative. After affirming of God what is excellent in the creation, we may then remove from the affirmation any de- fect by the negative method : as when it is said, that reason in God is the same in kind with reason in man, but not in degree. After saying that God is immanent in the uni- verse, we may say negatively, in oi'der to guard against a pantheistic interpretation of the term immanent, that God is not identical with the imiverse. And after savins: that God is distinct from the world, we ma}'' add that he is not separate from it, in order to avoid a deistical interpretation of the term distinct. The denial that theology is positive science, and that knowledge in morals and theology is positive cognition, is a skeptical position. Ilobbes took this ground, and was com- bated by Cudworth. Intellectual System, Ch. V. i. The theologian Euddaeus, in his Theses de atheismo et super- stitione, opposed Hobbes, " because he denied a positive conception of the Infinite and allowed only a negative one." The theologian Iluet, after having defended Christianity in the vigor of his life in his Demonstratio Evangelica, at the age of ninety wrote his treatise De la Faiblesse de I'Esprit Ilumain, to prove that before we affirm any- thing of an object we must perfectly comprehend it; and that therefore we have less right to affirm anything respect- DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 51 ing the Supreme Being, because we Lave a less perfect knowledge of him than of any other subject. This view has been run out to its logical result in the recent agnos- ticism, which contends that ^ve know nothing concerning God, and therefore can affirm nothing concerning him. Theology has been denied to be a positive science by some of its friends, as well as by its foes. The views of Hamilton and Mansel convert theology into a science of negations. lu asserting that inan has no positive cognition of the Infinite Being, and especially in contending that the human mind cannot logically think of the Infinite Being either as a per- son or a cause, because these conceptions are said to be con- tradictory to infinit}^, these philosophers, without intending it, lay the foundation for the same skepticism that Plobbes and Huet maintained. And their speculations have un- doubtedly strengthened the hands of the present generation of agnostics. If all that can be said by the theologian re- specting God is, that he is not this or that, then the mind has in fact no object before it, and no cognition whatever. It may not affirm anything whatever respecting such a Being. It cannot assert either that he is holy or unholy ; mighty or weak ; wise or foolish. The deity becomes the Unknovm and the Unknowable : a position that cuts np religion by the root, and introduces atheism in theory and practice. Mansel would save the mind from skepticism, by the re- mark that the contradiction which he finds between the con- ception of the Infinite and that of personality and causation is only relative. It is a contradiction for the human but not for the Divine mind. Hence man can ielieve in the exist- ence of an Infinite Being who is also personal and a cause, though it is self-contradictory to human intelligence. "It is true," he says (Keligious Thought, p. 106), " that we can- not reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes apj?arently contradictory to the notion of Infinity. But it does not fol- low that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own 52 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. minds ; it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God." But this reasoning implies that a man can believe what appears to him to be self-con- tradictory. This is impossible. It also iniplies that a con- tradiction for the human mind may be rational and logical for the Divine mind. This makes reason in man to differ in kind from reason in God ; so that what is logical and mathematical for one would be illogical and immathematical for the other. If this be so, man was not created in the image of God.^ Let us test this theory of negative knowledge by some particulars. Theology defines God to be a spirit. The idea which the human mind has of "spirit" is not exhausted, when it is said that spirit is not matter, or substance occupy- ing space. This would not distinguish it from a mathemati- cal point ; or from a thought ; or from a volition. "We have over and above this negative definition a positive notion, which we proceed to enunciate by specifying certain definite properties of spirit, such as intelligence and self-determina- tion; and certain qualities, such as benevolence, justice, and veracity. These properties and qualities are as positively conceived as are the properties of matter ; hardness, color, shape, and the like. That our knowledge of spirit is not all expressed in the statement that spirit is not matter, is also proved by the fact, that if it should be asserted that spirit is something semi-material we should deny it. This evinces that we have a notion in our minds of the real nature of spirit which throws out an imperfect and inade- quate definition like this. Consider, again, the eternity of God. Of this, it is con- tended we have only a negative apprehension. All that the human intellect can know, it is said, is that eternity is not time. But that our idea of eternity is not exhausted by this ^ On Hamilton's and Hansel's views, see Smith : Faith and Philosophy, 297- 33P); Porter: Human Intellect, 681-697; Hodge: Theology, I. 346-365 ; Muller: Science of Language, 2d Series, 596-600. DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 53 negation is proved by the fact that ^ve are not content to stop with itj but go beyond it, and endeavor to convey some further notion of eternity, by specifying positive characteris- tics. We define it as duration ; as duration without begin- ning or end ; and as duration witliout succession. We thus differentiate eternity from time; which is conceived of as duration beginning and ending, as a series of sequences, and as measured by the successive motions of the heavenly bodies. Again we define eternity as stationary; time as flowing. These are figures it is true, but they are employed to illustrate a positive idea in the mind. If we were con- tent with a negative definition ; with merely saying that eternity is not time ; we should not make use of any meta- phors at all, because we should not attempt any further enunciation of our idea of eternity. On the theory of a negative knowledge, time might be as well defined by say- ing that it is not eternity, as eternity would be by saying that it is not time ; and matter would be as well defined by saying that it is not mind, as mind would be by saying that it is not matter. But man's knowledge of either of these contraries, though imperfect in the sense of not exhaustive, is yet more than these negations express. The doctrine of a merely negative knowledge of spiritual objects and ideas originates in a tendency to materialism. The theorist is prone to regard nothing as positive and real in human conceptions that cannot be imaged to the senses. Mansel defines a conception to be a " representative image ; " and an image implies sensuous imagination. According to this view, positive knowledge is sensuous knowledge. But this is an error. Consider the common definition of God, as " an essence absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, powerful, necessarily existent, and the cause of all other beings." There is not a word in this definition that is unin- telligible, or that does not convey a positive notion, and yet there is no sensible idea, no idea that can be imaged to the senses, answering to any one of these words. " We have/' 51 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION says Ciidwortli (System, I. v.), " intelligible notions, or ideas, wliicli have no phantasms [sensible images] belong- ing to them. Of which, whosoever doubts may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading a sentence or two that he understands in any book almost that shall come to his hand ; and reflexively examining himself whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is ingenuous will quickly be forced to confess that he meets with many words which, though they have a meaning or intelligible notion, yet have no phantasm [image] belonging to tiiem. And we have known some who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently nonplussed and confounded in the first word quanqymm : they being neither able to deny that there was a meaning belonging to it, nor yet to affirm that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters/' Cudworth then gives the definition of God which we have just cited, in further proof of his position, and then adds that ''it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, Mdiich hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe that they have not the least cognition of anything not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding or conception which was not first in bodily sense : a doctrine highly favorable to atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest that what falls not under external sense is not therefore incon- ceivable and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification." It is indeed true that these positive definitions of eternity, of spirit, and kindred ideas, do not exhaust the subjects and leave them free from mystery. In the recent controversy DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAli SCIENCE. 55 respecting the knowledge of the Infinite and the Uncon- ditioned, which was stimulated into life by the views of Hamilton, there was not sufficient care taken upon either side to distinguish a positive from a perfect and complete conception. It seemed to be taken for granted by both parties, that man's knowledge of the Finite is superior to his knowledge of the Infinite, in respect to exhaustiveness and absoluteness. But man's cognition of matter and sensi- ble phenomena has limits and imperfection, as well as his cognition of God and the soul. "If anyone," says Jacobi (Fliegende Blatter), " will tell me what sense is, I will tell him what spirit is. We talk more easily about sense than about spirit, because there are at least five senses and only one spirit.'' The blade of grass which the naturalist picks up in his fingers and subjects to the microscope and chemical analysis, contains an ultimate mystery which he can no more clear away than he can the mystery of the Divine eternity or trinity. For the constitution of the smallest atom involves such baffling questions as, What is matter ? and, IIow does it originate ? Everything, be it finite or infinite, matter or mind, runs out into mystery. Speaking of law in material nature, Hooker (Polity, I. iii.), remarks that it "hath in it more than men have as yet at- tained to know, or perhaps ever shall attain ; seeing the travail of wading herein is given of God to the sons of men, that perceiving how much the least thing in the world hath in it more than the wisest are able to reach unto, they may by this means learn humility." The natural philosopher Boyle entitles one of his essays thus ; " Of man's great igno- rance of the uses of natural things : or, that there is no one thing in nature whereof the uses to human life are yet thoroughly understood." Much advance has been made in the knowledge of physical nature since Boyle's day, but the title to his essay is still suited to all physical treatises. "What in fact," says Frederick Schlegel (Philosophy of Life, Lect. lY.), "is all our knowledge of nature considered 56 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. as a whole, and in its inmost essence, but a mere speculative conjecture, and guess upon guess ? What is it but an endless series of tentative experiments, by which we are continually hoping to succeed in unveiling the secret of life, to seize the wonderful Proteus and to hold him fast in the chains of science ? " There is as much reason for asserting that man's concep- tion of matter is merely negative because there is an un- solved mystery in it, as there is for asserting the same re- specting spirit and the supernatural. Perfect definitions are as difficult in one case as in the other. It is no easier to define time than to define eternity. "I know Avhat time is," said Augustine, '^ when you do not ask me." That is to say, he had an intuitive notion of time that is trustwort])y and valid, but not clear of all obscurit}-, and which he found it difficult to enunciate. The same is true of the definition of space. Is it a real object ? Or only a form of thought, a scheme under which the understanding masses and unifies phenomena ? If by a positive conception be meant a cog- nition that is in accordance witli the real nature of the object so far as the cognition extends; if the term '^posi- tive" be understood to refer to the quality not the quantity of the knowledge ; then man's knowledge of the Infinite, or of spirit, is no more a negation than his knowledge of the Finite, or of matter. But it is the quality not the quantity of an idea, or a cognition, that determines its validity and trustworthiness ; that is, its conformity to the real nature of the object. Man's knowledge of God is like his knowledge of the ocean. He does not perfectly comprehend the ocean, but this does not render what knowledge he has of the ocean a merely negative knowledge. '' When we affirm," says Cud worth (System, Book I. Ch. v.), "that God is incompre- hensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of liis nature as doth per. fectly master, conquer, and subdue that vast object under it ; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 57 same, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now, it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understand- ings, he is utterly inconceivable [unthinkable] by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a nonentity. For it is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we can- not have such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. Though we cannot fully comprehend the deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of his perfection, yet we may have an idea or conception of a Being absolutel}'' perfect; as we may approach near a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it in our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nat- ure absolutely inconceivable is nothing ; but not whatso- ever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect under- standing." But while the deity is in one sense the most mysterious of all objects of knowledge, in another sense he is the most luminous. No idea so impresses imiversal man as the idea of God. Neither space nor time, neither matter nor mind, neither life nor death, not sun, moon or stars, so influence the immediate consciousness of man in every clime, and in all his generations, as does that " Presence " which, in Wordsworth's phrase, "is not to be put by." This idea of ideas overhangs human existence like the firmament, and though clouds and darkness obscure it in many zones, while in others it is crystalline and clear, all human beings must live beneath it, and cannot possibly get from under its all- embracing arch. The very denial of the Divine Existence evinces by its eagerness and effort, the firmness with which the idea of God is intrenched in man's constitution. A chimaera or a nonentity would never evoke such a passion- ate antagonism as is expressed in the reasonings of atheism. Were there no God, absolute indifference towards the notion 58 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. would be the mood of all mankind, and no arguments eitlier for or against it would be constructed. In this reference, the striking remark of Cudworth (Sys- tem, I. V.) applies. " It is indeed true, that the deity is more incomprehensible to us than anj^thing else whatever ; which proceeds from the fulness of his being and perfection, and from the transcendency of his brightness ; but for this very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that he is more knowable and conceivable than anything else. As the sun, though by reason of its excessive splendor it dazzle our weak sight, yet is notwithstanding far more visible, also, than any of the nebulosae stellae, the small misty stars. "Where there is more of light there is more of visibility ; so where there is more of entity, realitj', and perfection, there is more of conceptibility and cognoscibility ; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it, Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the deity, and overcome with its transcendent light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of dark- ness and incomprehensibility." BIBLIOLOGY. BIBLIOLOGY. CHAPTEE I. REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. Augustine: City of God, XV.-XYIII. Calvin: Institutes, I. vii.- ix. Gerhard : Loci (De Inspiratione). Lee : On Inspiration. Twes- ten : Dogmatik, I., ^ 23-28. Nitzscli : Christian Doctrine, g 36-47. Herder : Si3irit of Hebrew Poetiy. Lewis : Divine-Human in Script- ure. Smith, J. -: Discourses (Of Prophecy). Gaussen : On Inspi- ration. Rogers : Superhuman Origin of the Bible ; Reason and Faith. Martensen : Dogmatics, ^ 24-36. "Warrington : On Inspi- ration. Given : Revelation and Inspiration. Van Oosterzee : Dog- matics, I., 388-394. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, ^ 57-60. Bissell : Historic Origin of the Bible. Ladd : The Doctrine of Sacred Script- ure. Wordsworth: On Inspiration. Neander : Church History, II., 388-394. Hengstenberg : Christology (Prophecy). Alexan- der : Introduction to Isaiah (Prophetic Inspiration). Hayley : Dis- crepancies of the Bible. Hodge : Theology, I., 151-187. Uliici : Glauben und Wissen. Chris tlieb : Modern Doubt, Lecture II. Ban- nerman : On Inspiration. Terry: Hermeneutics. Davidson; Her- meneutics, XII. Rawlinson : Introduction to Chronicles, ^ 10 (Bible Commentary). Ccleridge : Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. Smith : Faith and Philosophy, pp. 1-48. Guizot : Medita- tions on Christianity, 1st Series, Briggs : Biblical Study. Hender- son : On Inspiration. Taylor : Spirit of Hebrew Poetry. Robson : The Bible, Its Revelation, Inspiration, and Evidence. Horne-Tre- gelles : Introduction. Bibliology (/Si/3\/ou Xo'709) includes all the topics relating to the written revelation of God : namely, the Inspiration, 62 BIBLIOLOGY. Authenticity, Credibility, and Canonicity of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. As has ah^eady been ob- served, this division is not so strictly necessary as are tlie others to the integrity of a theological system, 3^et since the- ological science depends for its validity and credibility upon the contents of the Bible, it is requisite in order to compre- hensiveness to devote some preliminary attention to the an- thority of these contents. The subject of Inspiration, in particular, cannot well be omitted. The Scriptures are entitled a revelation, and lience it is necessary first of all to define this term. It is employed in two senses : 1. General, or unwritten revelation ; 2. Special, or written revelation. Eevelation in its general and wide signification is any species of knowledge of which God is the ultimate source and cause. In this sense, all that man knows intuitively is revealed to him ; for even his axiomatic knowledge does not originate from himself independently and apart from his Creator. All that he knows in this manner, he knows through his intellect, and this intellect is the workmanship of God. Man cognizes in accordance with the laws of hu- man intelligence, and these laws are established by his Maker. General or tinwritten revelation, consequently, includes all that belongs to ethics and natural religion. In Script- ure, that moral and religious truth which man perceives immediately by reason of his mental constitution is called a '' revelation." For example, the knowledge of future retri- bution possessed by the pagan is so denominated. " The wrath of God," eays St. Paul, '^ is revealed {aTrofcdXvTTTeTai) from heaven," Rom. 1 : 18 ; and this wrath is subsequently described as operating in the workings of an accusing con- science, Kom. 2 : 15. The pagan's knowledge of the unity of God, and of such attributes as eternity, omnipotence, and sovereignty (-JeidrT??) is also represented as a Divine teach- ing. " That which may be known of God [in this intuitive REVELATIOIS" AND INSPIRATION. 63 manner] is manifest in them ; for God hath showed it unto them," Eom. 1 : 19, 20. This inward knowledge is also de- nominated a " law written in the heart/' Eom. 2:15; which has led to its being called an unwritten law. Turrettin (IL 1, 6) denominates it " revelatio naturalis." Unwritten or general revelation, then, is a particular form of human consciousness that is ultimately referable to Grod. It is denominated by English writers the '^ moral" or "re- ligious " consciousness ; by which is meant, a mode of con- sciousness that relates to moral and religious objects and truths, and is determined by them. The Germans call it the " God-consciousness ; " meaning thereby a form of con- ciousness of which God is the object. As the "sense-con- sciousness " denotes the sum-total of all the inward experi- ence that results from the impression made upon man by the material world, so the God-consciousness denotes the in- "ward experience resulting from the impression made by God upon the human spirit. This mode of man's con- sciousness not only has God for the object of it, but for the cause of it. And this in two ways : 1. First, the object generally is the cause of the subjective impression, by reason of the correlation between subject and object. The objec- tive coal of fire is the cause of the subjective sensation. The consciousness of physical pain is not produced by an act of will. The man is not the author of the sensation, but the object that causes it is. In like manner, man's con- sciousness of God is not produced by man's volition, but by God as an object that impresses him. 2. Secondly, God is not only the object of knowledge, but lie is also a personal and active agent who operates on the human mind so that it shall have this knowledo-e of Himself. In the phrase of St. Paul, God "reveals" and "manifests" his being and attributes within the human spirit. The coal of fire is the cause of the sense-conscious- ness, by the mere correlation between itself and the physi- cal sense. But God is the cause of man's knowledge of 64 BIBLIOLOGY. God not merely by the correlation between the two beings, but also by a direct energy operating upon man. An ir- rational object like a stone or a planet exerts no direct effi- ciency upon the cognizing mind of man ; and neither does a rational object like a human person. Sensation and cog- nition, in these instances, result from a passive impression made by the object. But in the God-consciousness, the ob- ject actively assists in the cognition . God causes the human mind to know God by an inward and immediate efficiencj^, in addition to the correlation which he has established be- tween tlie finite and Infinite Spirit. In St. Paul's phrase, he " shows," " reveals," and " manifests " himself. The Scriptures go yet further than this, and refer all the operations of reason to tlie Author of the human intellect. Xothing in human consciousness is independent of God, and isolated. God is the " Father of lights," of every kind. James 1 : 17. God " shows " whatever is known by virtne of the human constitution. Even human reason, which in the intuitions of mathematics and in the laws of loiric seems to be a self-sufficient faculty'-, is represented in Script- nre as dependent. Man is able to perceive intuitively, only because the Supreme Reason illumines him. " The Logos," says St. John (1 : 4, 9), "is the light of men, and coming into the world enlightens every man." " There is a spirit in man," says Elihu who in this instance speaks trul}^, " and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understand- ing/^ Job 32 : S. ITuman knowledge, then, considered from this point of view, is an unwritten revelation because it is not aboriginal and self-subsistent, but derived. It issues ultimately from a higher source than the finite intelligence. Human reason has the ground of its authoi'ity in the Supreme Reason. This is seen particularly in that form of reason which Kant denominates '^ practical," and whose judgments are given in conscience. Tliis faculty has an authority for man that can- not be accounted for, except by its being the voice of God. REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 65 If conscience were entirely isolated from the Deity, and were independent of Him, it could not make the solemn and sometimes terrible impression it does. No man would be afraid of himself, if the self were not connected with a liigher Being than self. Of the judgments of conscience, it may be said literally, that God reveals his own holy judg- ment through them. "Whence comes the restraint of con- science r' asks Selden (Table Talk). "From a higher Power ; nothing else can bind. I cannot bind myself, for I may untie myself again ; an equal cannot bind nae, for we may untie one another. It must be a superior Power, even God Almighty/' ' The wide use of the term revelation was more common in the Patristic church than it has been since. The first defend- ers of Christianity were called to vindicate it against poly- theism. They would naturally, therefore, select for defence such of its truths as were more particularly combated by paganism, such as the unity of God, and the first principles of natural religion generally. This led them to point out the grounds of these first truths of morals and religion in the human constitution ; so that the distinction between nat- ural and revealed religion though recognized was not em- phasized. All religious knowledge was represented as a revelation from God, partly through the light of nature, and partly in a supernatural manner. The first Apology of Justin Martyr is an example of this. See chapters viii., xviii., Ivii. But when polytheism ceased to be the great foe of Chris- tianity, and deism took its place, it became necessary to lay special stress upon the distinction between the unwritten and the written revelation. When the skeptic himself de- fended the claims of natural religion, and asserted the need- lessness of the gospel, then the Christian apologist was com- pelled to discriminate carefully between that knowledge which comes to man in the structure of his mind, and that 1 See Twesten : Dogmatik, 11. 146 ; Shedd : Theological Essays, 303, 304 ; Neander : Apostel-Geschichte, Abschnitt Sechster (Versohnung). 5 66 BIBLIOLOGY. which he receives through a supernatural source, and in a written word, in order to show the insuiBciency of the former to meet the wants of man as a sinner. General or unwritten revelation, though trustworthy^ is not infallible. This differentiates it from the special or written revelation. 1. In the first place, the ethical and religious teaching of God through the structure of the human mind is vitiated more or less by human depravity, (a). Sin darkens the in- tellect, so that there is not that clear perception which char- acterizes the angelic intuition, and which was possessed by the unfallen Adam. (5). Sin gives a bias to the will against the truth, so that even when there is an accm^ate perception, there is an endeavor to get rid of it. Men know God to be holy, but do not like to retain this knowledge. Rom. 1 : 28. (c). Sin weakens the power of intuition itself. Vice debili- tates the spiritaal and rational faculty, by strengthening the sensuous nature, {d). It is a part of the punishment of sin, that God withdraws for a time his common grace, so that there is little or no intuitive perception of moral truth. The human mind is left to sin. God " gave up to uncleanness those who changed the truth of God into a lie," Kom. 1 : 24. God "gave them over to a reprobate mind," Kom. 1 : 28. 2. Secondly, infallibility cannot be attributed to the un- written revelation, because of the limitations of the finite mind. Natural religion cannot be any more trustworthy than the human intellect itself is.' But the human intel- lect cannot be infallible, unless it is preserved from all error by an extraordinary exertion of Divine power. That ordinary operation of God in the human mind which is seen in ethics and natural religion, though sometimes reaching a high degree of certainty and validity, never reaches the point of absolute infallibility. Even when the unwritten revelation is rectified by the written revelation, we cannot attribute to it the absolute authority of the latter, because * See Oonybea-re ; Reply to Tindal, in Shedd : History of Doctrine, I, 208. REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 67 the rectification is more or less imperfect. The purest form of ethics and natural religion is to be found in Christendom, not in Paganism. The ethical system of Plato is not as cor- rect as that of Butler. But infallibility cannot be attributed to either, as it is to the ethics of the decalogue, and the sermon on the mount. See Ursinus : Christian Religion, Question 92. 3. Thirdly, the unwritten revelation is inadequate to the needs of man as a sinner, because it does not include those truths which relate to redemption. Its doctrines are suffi- cient only for a sinless being. Katural religion is silent re- specting the exercise of mercy. It reveals only law and justice : 0^777, not dyaTri]. St. Paul affirms that the wrath, not the compassion of God, is taught to men in the workings of conscience. This is the fatal lack in all the natural re- ligions of mankind. Many current treatises on Comparative JReligion are erroneous and misleading here. It is frequently contended that Boodhism and Confucianism are co-ordinate religions with Christianity, because they teach the golden rule, and other principles of ethics. But this does not prove the point. The distinguishing characteristic of Christianity is not the teaching of sound ethics, but the offer of mercy through a Divine mediator, and a radical change of human character. Christianity is gospel, not law ; but Confucian- ism and Boodhism, so far as they contain truth, are law, not gospel. If it can be shown that Boodhism and Confucian- ism actually secure the forgiveness and extirpation of human sin, then they may be classed with Christianity. But there is no pardon and no regeneration in any religion but that of Jesus Christ. "Who is he that forgiveth sins, but God only?" Hence the modern Christian, like the primitive, cannot concede that Christianity is merely one among several religions; merely one of the religiones licitae. Christianity is an exclusive religion for man, because it is the only re- demptive religion for him. Shedd : Theological Essays, 374r-376. 68 BIBLIOLOGY. In the common use of the term, revelation is employed in the I'estricted signification, and signifies the written word of God. The contents of the toritten revelation are as follows : 1. Scripture includes among its teachings those of un- written revelation : namely the first truths of ethics and natural religion. It assumes the validity of the doctrines of the divine existence, the unity of God, the immortality of the sou], the freedom of the will, and future reward and punishment. But these doctrines as taught in Scripture differ from the same doctrines as taught in Plato, for example : (a). By stronger evidence, and greater certainty. Immortality in the Phaedo is a hope and aspiration. In the gospel of John, it is the absolute assurance of personal knowledge and experi- ence. Christ is an eye-witness, in respect to the other world and the other life. The Son of man speaks that which he knows, and testifies that which he has seen, John 3 : 11. (5). By freedom from erroneous elements. Morality in the decalogue, and in the sermon on the mount, is not mixed with false ethics. In Plato and Aristotle it is : e.g., the destruction of sick infants and the community of wives (Republic, Y.); and the justifying of slavery (Ethics, L 4:-8), and of abortion, and the destruction of feeble off- spring (Ethics, YIII. 16). Natural religion in the unwritten form is vitiated by its connection with the impure reason of man ; in the written form, it is the pure reason of God. The Bible gives an inspired statement of natural religion ; Plato gives an uninspired statement. The first is infallible ; the second is more or less trustworthy, but not free from error. Whether polygamy is intrinsically immoral, cannot perhaps be determined by natural religion as deduced from the human mind alone ; but natural religion as enunciated by Christ makes polygamy to be wrong. " From the be- ginning it was not so," Matt. 19 : 8. Christ teaches that monogamy is founded in the created nature and constitution of man. Again, the monotheism of the Bible is without KEVELATIOis^ AND INSPIRATION. 69 error ; that of natural religion is more or less vitiated : either in teaching too much severity in God, as in Pagan- ism ; or too much indulgence in Him, as in the deistical schools of Christendom. 2. The written revelation contains many truths and facts that result from human observation and reflection. All that is historical^ in both the Old Testament and the New, is of this kind. The nari-ative, for example, of the journeyings of the children of Israel, is the record of eye-witnesses. The history. of the rise of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, as recorded in the books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, is an account drawn from contemporary sources. All that is geograj^hical is of this kind ; and all that is chronological. The natural history of the Scriptures is also the product of man's observation. But all this Biblical history, chronology, and geography, differs from corresponding matter in uninspired literature, by being unmixed with error. Biblical history is not leg- endary like that of early Greece and Home. Biblical chro- nology is not extravagant like that of Egypt, as reported to Herodotus by the piiests. Here the influence of inspiration IS very apparent. Moses was guided in collecting and com- posing the historical narratives in the Pentateuch. Hero- dotus was not thus preserved from error in gathering and writing his accounts of the Egyptians, Persians and Greeks. " Many of the sacred writers," says Hodge (1. 155), " although inspired, received no revelation. This was probably the fact with the authors of the historical books of the Old Testa- ment, The evangelist Luke does not refer his knowledge of the events which he records to revelation, but says he de- rived it from those ' who from the beginning were eye-wit- nesses and ministers of the word,' Luke 1:2. It is imma- tei"ial to us where Moses obtained his knowledge of the events recorded in the book of Genesis ; whether from early documents, from tradition, or from direct revelation. If the sacred writers had sufficient knowledge in themselves, or in 70 BIBLIOLOGY. those about them, there is no need to assume any direct revelation. It is enough for us, that they were rendered in- fallible as teachers." 3. The written word, besides the truths of natural re- ligion, and the facts and truths that come witliin the ken of the ordinary human intelligence, contains a series of truths tliat are altogether different from these. These are the most important part of tlie contents of Scripture, and con- stitute the most strictly supernatural element in the written word. Speaking generallj^, they are those truths and facts that relate to man's salvation from sin : viz., the trinity ; the creation and apostasy of man ; the incarnation ; and re- demption. The doctrine of sin, though a fact of conscious- ness, and thus belonging also to natural religion, has in the Scriptures certain features that imply special teaching, since human consciousness unassisted could not discover them : viz., the account of the temptation by Satan, and the fall in Adam ; and a profound analysis and delineation of sin itself, such as is given in the seventh and eighth chapters of Ro- mans. The doctrine of sacrificial atonement for sin is also a truth of natural religion ; but the Mosaic system of sacri- fices, so peculiar in its features, was given by the teaching of the Holy Spirit. " The Holy Ghost signified this, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made mani- fest, while the first tabernacle was yet standing," Heb. 9:8. This twofold variety in the contents of the Bible necessi- tates two varieties or modes of Divine operation upon the human mind: 1. Inspiration; 2. Revelation (proper). The distinction between these two is important, and the neglect of it has led to confusion. Inspiration is like Revelation, in that it is a superhuman influence upon the particular person selected to be the organ of the Divine mind. But inspiration goes no further thau to insure freedom from error in presenting that truth which has been obtained in the ordinary ways in which men ob- BEVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 71 tain truth ; while revelation discloses new truth that is inac- cessible to the ordinary human mind. A man may be in- spired, and yet not reveal anything. Much of the Bible is of this kind. But a man to whom a revelation is communi- cated, is also inspired to express and record it. Inspiration is more of the nature of superintendence ; revelation is more of the nature of instruction and information. The distinction between inspiration and revelation is an old one. Edwards (Mysteries of Scripture) marks the dis- tinction in the following manner. " We ought to distin- guish between those things which were written in the sacred books by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and those which were only committed to writing by the direc- tion of the Holy Spirit. To the former class belong all the mysteries of salvation, or all those things which respect tJie means of our deliverance taught in the gospel, which could not be known from the principles of reason, and there- fore must be revealed. But to the other class those things belong, which either are already known from natural relig- ion, but are of service to inculcate duty on man, and to demonstrate the necessity of a revelation of the means of salvation ; or all histories, useful to illustrate and assure us of the doctrines revealed, and which point out the various degrees of revelation, the different dispensations of salva- tion, and the various modes of governing the church of God ; all of which are necessary to be known in the further explanation of mysteries." Claude Frassen, a Franciscan monk and theologian of the 17th century, assumed three kinds of inspiration: 1. Inspiratio antecedens, or the revelation of things before un- known. This is revelation proper. 2. Inspiratio concomi- tans, or the security against error in the statement of truths or facts known in the ordinary way. This is inspiration in distinction from revelation. 3. Inspiratio consequens, or the divine authority stamped by inspired men upon writ- ings composed without inspiration ; e.g., the gospels of Mark 72 BIBLIOLOGY. and Luke approved by Peter and Paul. See Knapp : The- ology (Introduction). Lee, in his work on Inspiration has made the distinction with care. But he errs in contending that it is not found in the older writers. Citing Quenstedt as one who holds the " mechanical " theory, he quotes the following from him: "res quae in scriptura continentur, non solum per , assistentiam et directionem divinam infallibilem Uteris con- signatae sunt, sed singulari Spiritus Sancti suggestioni, inspi- ration!, et dictamini, acceptae ferendae sunt." Lecture I. Here, evidently, " suggestio " denotes " revelation," and "inspiratio" denotes "inspiration." In the same connec- tion, Quenstedt speaks of ; " res Sanctis scriptoribus natural- iter prorsus incognitae ; naturaliter quidem cognoscibiles, actu tamen incognitae ; non tantum naturaliter cognoscibiles, sed etiam actu ipso notae," and brings them all under the head of inspiration. Marking this distinction, the first position to be taken re- specting the Bible is, that it is all of it inspired. The origi- nal autograph-volume of inspiration was free from error. This does not mean that every sentence or proposition in Scripture contains a truth. The words of Satan to Eve (Gen. 3 : 4) were a falsehood. But those words were actu- ally spoken, and they are recorded with infallible accuracy. Some of the reasonings and inferences of Job's friends were false, but they occurred as they are related by the inspired penman. This theory of jylenary inspiration has been the gener- ally received doctrine of the Church. The following state- ment of Turrettin (IL iv. 5) contains it : " The sacred writers were so moved and inspired by the Holy Ghost, both in respect to thought (res ipsas) and language, that they were kept from all error, and their writings are truly au- thentic and divine." Quenstedt defines in a similar man- ner. " Scripture is infallible truth, free from all error ; each and everything contained in it is absolute truth (veris- REVELATION AJ^T* INSPIRATION. 73 sima) ; be it doctrine, morals, history, chronology, topog- raphy, proper names." Similarly Hollaz remarks, that " matters of genealogy, of astronom^^, of politics, though the knowledge of them is not necessary to salvation, are yet divinely revealed [inspired], because they serve to interpret and illustrate the truths that are necessary to salvation." Hase: Hutterus, § 44. These theologians, in these affirma- tions, have reference to the original autograph. The state- ment, be it doctrinal, historical, chronological, or geograph- ical, as it came from the inspired person himself, was accurate. But they concede that some minor errors have subsequently come into the scripture manuscripts, from copyists and translators, and that some have been introduced by critics and exegetes. The Westminster Confession (L ii. vi.) teaches that " all the books of the Old and !N"ew Testament are given by in- spiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life ; " and that "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts." The Scriptui-e proofs of the authority and in- fallibility of the scriptures are : 2 Tim. 3 : 16, " All script- ure is given by inspiration of God." Ileb. 1 : 1, 2, " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." 1. Cor. 2 : 13, " Which things we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." 2. Pet. 1 : 21, " Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." John 5 : 39, " Search the scriptures." Eom. 3:2, " Unto them were committed the oracles of God." Isa. 8 : 20, " Look ye to the law and to the testi- mony." The theory of plenary inspiration prevailed in the Patris- tic, Mediaeval, and Reformation periods. Luther has some- times been cited as adopting a different view, because of his T4 BIBLIOLOGY. opinion respecting the authority of the Apocalypse and the Epistle of James. But he questioned the canonicity of these portions of scripture. All scripture that he conceded to be canonical, he held to be infallible. The Christian fathers are sometimes said to have held a loose view of inspiration. But the view of Augustine was certainly a strict one, and it had high authority in the pa- tristic and mediseval churches. In his De Consensu Evan- gelistarum (I. xxxv.), he says : " Christ is the head and his apostles are the members. Whatever he wished us to read concerning his words and deeds, he ordered to be written down as if with his own hands ; and he who reads the nar- ratives of the evangelists will believe them as if he saw Christ himself writing by their hands and pens." Calixtus (1650), in Germany, introduced a less strict mid- dle theory; according to which the sacred writers were pre- served from all error in regard to doctrine necessary to sal- vation, but not in regard to subjects that have no such importance. His view found few advocates in his own day. Baumgarten (1725) reaffirmed it, maintaining that the Di- vine influence preserved the sacred writers from error only so far as the purpose of a revelation required, which is the salvation of the soul from sin ; this purpose, he said, would not be frustrated by unimportant errors in chronology, his- tory, topography, etc. This view, during this century, has gained ground particularly in Germany, Such evangelical theologians as Tholuck, Twesten, and Miiller adopt it. Cor- ner accepts it in part. " There are historical matters which stand in essential connection with the meaning and spirit of revelation. In this case, inspiration does not apply merely to non-historic eternal truths." Christian Doctrine, § 59, The theory is presented eloquently by Coleridge in his Con- fessions of an Inquiring Spirit. For a criticism, see Shedd: -Literary Essays, 336-342. j The objections to this middle theory of inspiration are the following : 1. The primary and the secondary matter in BEVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 75 Scripture, such as doctrine and history, are so indissohiblj connected with each other, that uncertainty in respect to the latter casts uncertainty upon the former. If for example the history of the residence of the Israelites in Egypt, and of their exodus and wanderings, is mythical and exaggerated like the early history of Assyria and Babylon, this throws discredit upon the decalogue as having been received from the lips of God on Sinai. If the history, geography, and chronology, in the midst of which the doctrinal elements of the Pentateuch are embedded, contain fictions and contra- dictions, these doctrinal elements will not be accepted as an infallible revelation from God. The same reasoning applies to the history and chronology of the New Testament. If the narrative by the four evan- gelists of the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ is more or less legendary, it will be impossible to secure for the doc- trines of Christ that undoubting belief which the church in every age has exercised in regard to them. This is clearly perceived by the skeptic. Strauss well knew that if he could succeed in proving the mythical character of the New Testament history, he would have little difficulty in destroy- ing human confidence in the New Testament dogmas. To say that if the doctrines of Scripture are held to be infallible, it is of no consequence whether the history and geography of Scripture are free from error, is like Schen- kel's assertion that if the spirit of Christ is with the church, it is of no consequence whether his body rose from the grave or not. It would be impossible for the church to believe that the spirit of Christ dwells and operates in his people, if the church at the same time were denying or doubting that Christ rose from the tomb. The primary and tlie sec- ondary, the doctrinal and the historical elements of Script- ure stand or fall together. This is illustrated by a fact in the history of rationalistic criticism. Graf "assigned a post- exilian origin to the great body of legislation found in Exo- dus, Leviticus^ and Numbers. The historical portion of this 76 BIBLIOLOGY. Griindsclirift, lie still maintained to be the oldest part of the Pentateuch. But here, as Kuenen said, was the Achilles heel of his theory. Hence Kiehm and others insisted that he had no right to separate the legislative from the historical portions, unless he renounced the leading principles of analy- sis as hitherto emploj^ed. Graf then yielded, and announced his conviction that the whole of the first Elohist, Jiistory as well as laws, is post-exilian. This view was afterwards elaborated by Wellhausen." Chambers: Pentateuchal Criti- cism. Essay I. 14. 2. It is improbable that God would reveal a fact or doc- trine to the human mind, and do nothing towards securing an accurate statement of it. This is particularly the case, when the doctrine is one of the mysteries of i*eligion. Such profound truths as the trinity, the incarnation, vicarious atonement, etc., require the superintendence and guidance of an infallible Spirit to secure an enunciation that shall not be misleading. Hence it is more natural to suppose that a prophet or an apostle who has received directly from God a profound and mysterious truth inaccessible to the human intellect, will not be left to his own miassisted pow- ers in imparting what he has received. Especially is it improbable that communications from the deity would be veiled in extravagant and legendary costume. 3. The middle theory of a partial inspiration is more diffi- cult to be maintained, than is the theory of plenary inspira- tion. Because if only a part of Scripture is infallible, it becomes necessary to point out which part it is. If any one asserts that there are errors in the Bible, he must demon- strate them. This is an arduous task. It is more difficult to prove that the narratives of the Pentateuch are forgeries of later writers, than to prove that they were composed by Moses. No one can demonstrate tliat the history of the exodus is legendary. The evidence for it as history is much greater than against it as fable. The arguments in favor of the scripture chronology are stronger than those against it. REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. U If they were not, the chronology would long ago have been rejected by the majority o£ students of the Bible ; the num- ber of believers would have been as small as the existing number of skeptics. It must be remembered that unsolved difficulties are not equivalent to a proof of the falsity of Scripture. Because a particular link in the chain of Biblical chronology, for ex- ample, cannot now be put in, it does not follow that this chronology as a whole is erroneous. The mere absence of complete proof of the affirmative is not a proof of the nega- tive. When there is a strong body of proof for a proposi- tion, the mere fact that at a certain point the proof is weak, or lacking, is not sufficient to discredit the demonstrative force of this body of proof. The fact that the skeptic can ask a question which the believer cannot answer, is not a proof that the skeptic's own position is the truth, or that the believer's position is false. The unsolved difficulties re- specting inspiration have often been palmed off as positive arguments for his own position, by the unbeliever. In maintaining the plenary inspiration of the Bible, we shall consider it first as containing matter that is revealed^ in distinction from inspired. All such revealed truth is in- fallible, that is, free from error. Revelation in the restricted sense, we have seen, denotes the communication of truth or facts hitherto unknown to man, and incapable of being deduced from the structure of the human intellect, or derived through the ordinary chan- nels of human information. It is generally indicated in the Old Testament by such phraseology as the following : "'The vision of Isaiah which he saw concerning Judah and Jeru- salem," Isaiah 1:1. " The burden of Tyre," Isa. 23 : 1. "The word of the Lord that came to Jeremiah, concerning the dearth," Jer. 14 : 1. " Then was the secret revealed to Daniel, in a night vision," Dan. 2 : 19 ; 10 : 1. " Thus saith Jehovah, Call unto me, and I will answer thee, and shew great and mighty things which thou knowest not," Jer. 78 BIBLIOLOGY. 33 : 2j 3. In the New Testament, St. Paul describes a revela- tion as a species of divine communication. "What shall I profit you, except I shall speak either by revelation {ev d'7roKd\ir\fr€i\ or by knowledge," 1 Cor. 14 : 6. *' When ye come together, every one of you hath a doctrine, hath a revelation {dTroKoXinfrtv), hath an interpretation," 1 Cor. 14:26. "I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord," 2 Cor. 12 : 1. The product of a revelation is de- nominated a "mystery." "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery," 1 Cor. 2 : 7. "Let a man so account of us as stewards of the mysteries of God," 1 Cor. 4 : 1. "Eehold 1 show you a mystery," 1 Cor. 15 : 51. A mystery is a truth or fact revealed without an explanation of it. The trinity is such. Oftentimes when a proof of a revealed truth is demanded, it is really an explanation that is asked for. The objector requires that the fact or truth be made clear to his mind ; in which case, the mystery is at an end. As an example of a revelation, consider 2 Thess. 2 : 3. St. Paul here informs the Thessalonian church of a fact that had been divulged to him from God : viz., that the second advent of Christ to the final judgment will not occur, imtil after a great apostasy in Christendom has taken place. He could not have obtained the knowledge from any human source. It was a secret which God disclosed to him. And it was infallible information. The future history of the world will evince that it is. Other examples of revelation are seen in the account of the resurrection of the body, in 1 Cor. 15 : 35-55 ; of the cessation of the work of redemp- tion, in 1 Cor. 15 : 24-28 ; and of the conversion of the Jews after the conversion of the Gentiles, in Kom. 11 : 25. The account, in Gen. 1, of the order and succession of events in the creation of the world, is a revelation. This is a his- tory which is both revealed and inspired. In tliis respect it differs from the history of the exodus of the Israelites, and similar histories in Scripture, which are inspired but not re- vealed. There was no human observer to witness the pro- REVELATION AND INSPIRATIOK 79 cess of creation, and to compose an account of it. The information of what was done in the six days must have been imparted by the Creator himself, who was the only actor and the only spectator. It could not have been derived from human records, or human science. Again the doctrine of the trinity is a truth not deducible by rational reflection, and therefore it is a revelation. In this respect, it differs from the doctrine of the unity of God. This latter is a truth capable of being inferred by the human intellect, as St. Paul (Rom. 1 : 19) teaches, from a contemplation of the works of creation outwardly and the operations of the hhman soul in- wardly. The trinity is a part of the written revelation ; but the divine unity is a truth of natural religion, or unwritten revelation. The doctrine of the trinity as stated ia the Bible is both revealed and inspired ; the doctrine of the divine tmity as stated in the Bible is inspired but not revealed. Again, the doctrine of vicarious atonement is a revela- tion. The doctrine of personal atonement, namely, that the transgressor must himself suffer, is a truth of natural re- ligion ; but that another competent person may and will suffer for him is a truth only of revealed religion. " The soul that sinneth it shall die " (Ezek. 18 : 4), is natural re- ligion. Christ " was made a curse for us " (Gal. 3 ; 13) ; Christ "is the propitiation for our sins" (1 John 2:2); is revelation. "Whether God will pardon sin, and in what way he will do it, can no more be determined by a priori reason- ing, than it can be determined by a priori reasoning whether another poet like Shakespeare will appear. It is a question of fact and of intention on the part of God ; and a fact must be known either by history, or by prophecy, which is history beforehand. And the only historical statement respecting the fact that God will forgive sin, is that of God himself in the written revelation. There may be conjectures and hopes in regard to the Divine mercy, but no certain knowledge except by a word from the Divine lips. The exercise of justice being necessary, the fact that it will be exercised so BIBLIOLOGY. is a part of the unwritten revelation. The wrath of God is revealed in the human conscience, Horn. 1 : 18. But the exercise of mercy being optional, and contingent upon the Divine will, the fact that it will be exercised is a part of the written revelation onl3\ To determine then how much of the Bible is revelation proper, and how much is only inspiration, we have but to examine its contents. Anything in its pages that may indis- putably be deduced by human reasoning, or be drawn from human sources of information, is not revealed. But every- thing else is. The genealogical tables in Matthew and Luke are not revelation. Much of the historical narrative in the Old Testament and [New Testament is not revelation. Geo- graphical and statistical data are no part of revelation in dis- tinction from inspiration. Kevelation in the restricted and technical use of the term is not human education and development. When the human mind unfolds its own powers and manifests its own internal resources, the product is human. Philosophy, ethics, and natural theology are not an extraordinary communication from the Supreme Reason. They are the evolution of finite reason, and the product of human inquiry and investigation. It is true that inasmuch as the human intellect is the work- manship of God, and its laws of thinking are imposed by its author, the result may be denominated a revelation in the wide sense of the term. But while it is an unwritten revela- tion, it is also a natural operation of the human mind. It has the characteristics of the human mind, and is associated with the darkness and error of the fallen human mind. For apostasy has hindered the pure development of the finite reason, so that while the unwritten revelation is sufiiciently valid and trustworthy to render man inexcusable for his polytheism and sensuality, it is not an infallible and un- erring light. The theory of Lessing, in his tract entitled Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, that revelation, meaning by it the REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 81 Christian system, is education or human development, is ex- actly wrong. He regards the Scriptures as only anticipating what the human mind could find out for itself, only more slowly and much later. But the distinguishing ti'uths of the Christian Scriptures are of such a nature that they cannot be deduced from premises furnished by man's intellect. They are historical, not a priori. They must be made known by testimony, not by reasoning. The mathematician by mathematical calculation cannot discover in what order the different species of creatures were made. The a priori method can do nothing here. If any man had happened to be present, and witnessed the creative work, he could have reported what he had seen. But no man can in an a priori manner discover the way and manner in which the world was created. Similarly, no man can deduce in an a priori manner from the nature and structui'e of the human mind, the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the vicarious atonement, and redemption. These are not an evolution of the human mind, but a disclosure from the Divine mind. .For the same reason, revelation is not the product of national education and development. The Old Testament is not Hebrew literature, in the sense that the Iliad and Greek Drama are Greek literature. The whole Hebrew nation was not inspired by the Holy Spirit, but only a chosen few individuals in it. The merely natural and na- tional development of the Hebrew mind produced the Tar- gums and Talmud, and the Habbinic literature generally, not the Old Testament scriptures. The latter were the work of Moses, Samuel, David, Isaiah and others — a small circle of Hebrews who were selected out of the Hebrew nation, and supernaturally taught in order that they might instruct their own people, and through them all other peoples. The sacred writers claim this for themselves, and it was conceded by the nation. SeeJosephus: Contra Apionem, I. 8. That the Old Testament scriptures are merely one of the literatures of the world, the work of the Hebrew nation and not a special reve- 6 82 BIBLIOLOGY. lation, is the postulate and foundation of all rationalistic criticism. "The Old Testament," says Maurice (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Ch. 1,), "is not the history of men's thoughts about God, or desires after God, or affections towards him. It professes to be a history of God's unveiling of himself to men. If it is not that, it is nothing ; it is false from beginning to end. To make it the history of the specu- lations of a certain tiibe about God, wo must deny the very root of any speculations which that tribe ever had. For this root is the belief that they could not think of him, unless he had first thought of them ; that they could not speak of him, unless he were speaking to them." An error of the same general nature is found in some evangelical critics, such as Weiss, for example. In his Biblical Theology of the New Testament, he assumes that the Gospels, primarily, were the product of the Primitive church as a whole, not of tlie Apostolic circle exclusively. In its first form, the Life of Christ was a narrative floating about in the first Christian brotherhood, and not a narrative composed directly or indirectly hj four apostles under the guidance of inspiration. The primitive account of Christ's words and deeds was very fragmentary^, and was subsequently supplemented and worked over into the four Gospels as the church now has them. There was an original Mark, from which the present Mark was derived, and that original came from the oral tradition of the first Christian brotherhood. " Our synoptic Gospels in their present form are probably of later orio^in than most of the other books of the New Testa- ment, and it is possible that many sayings of Jesus have been •taken up into them whicli were cither altogether, or at least in their present shape, foreign to the earliest tradition. The Johannean tradition is altogether excluded from the earliest tradition." Weiss : Theology of K T. § 10, 11. This view makes the Life of Christ to be the product not of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, but of the Primitive church; and this requires this church to have been divinely guided in de- REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. S3 scribing the life and actions of Christ, if the description is an infallible one. Accordingly^, the advocates of this view do not claim that the biographj^ of our Lord is free from er- ror, though truthful in the main. But the fact in the case is, that the first Christian brother- hood obtained all the knowledge it had of the life of Christ from its instructors and guides, the Apostles. The Christian brotherhood came into existence, only because the Apostles related what tliej had seen and heard during their disciple- ship and intercourse with the ascended Redeemer. The twelve apostles were expressly commissioned by their Mas- ter io ^rejpare an account of his life and teachings, and were promised divine aid and guidance in doing it. Matt. 10 : 5- 20 ; John 14 : 25, 26 ; 15 : 13-15. This important work M'as not left to the random method of an early ecclesiastical tradition — a metliod that would inevitably have mingled legend with true history, as is seen in the apocryphal Gos- pels. This theory of "Weiss and others, is exposed to the same objection that the Protestant urges against the Komish view of ecclesiastical tradition. To go back to a fallible tra- dition of the first Christian brotherhood for the Life of Christ, which is the foundation of Christianitj^ and of Chris- tendom, is like going back to the fallible tradition of the Komish church for Christian doctrine and polity. That the Gospels had an apostolical not an ecclesiastical origin, is proved by the fact that there was a StSaxv t(ov aTroaroXcov, in which the first brotherhood "continued." Acts 2 : 42. This was the common narrative of the Twelve Apostles respecting the life, teachings, and miracles of their Lord. This common oral account given by the Twelve, " which from the beginning were eye-witnesses and minis- ters of the word," Luke 1 : 2, some of the brotherhood at- tempted to commit to writing {avard^aaS^ac Bc^ytjacv, Luke 1:1); and to prevent the errors that would inevitably ci'eep into the life of Christ by tliis method, Luke tinder the superintendence of Paul writes the third Gospel. In order 84 BIBLIOLOGY. that the original number of eye-witnesses might be kept full after the death of Judas, a twelfth apostle was chosen out of those who had "companied with them all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among them." Mat- thias was chosen and ordained as an apostle, ''to be a wit- ness of Christ's resurrection," Acts 1 : 22. This testimony " with great power gave the apostles " in witnessing " of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus," Acts 4 : 33. This BiBaxi] Tct)v d'TToa-ToXcov was committed to writing by those four of the Twelve Apostles to whom the four canonical Gospels have been attributed by the church for nearly twenty cen- turies. These four Evangelists put into a fixed form the oral gospel which the Twelve had been teaching in their missionary work. The four were the agents of the Apos- tolic college, in doing what Christ commanded them to do when he promised " to bring all things to their re- membrance whatsoever he had said unto them." Justin Martyr, as early as 160, expresses the common belief of the church on this point, when he says that " the Apostles in the memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have thus delivered unto us what was enjoined upon them." Apology L Ixvi. See Presbyterian Review, Jan. 1887, 164-167. That the Bible as containing revealed truths and facts is infallible, is allowed by those who hold the middle theory of inspiration. All truths and doctrines of Scripture that are necessary to salvation are certainly without mixture of error, and are the infallible rule of faith and practice. It is not therefore the fact of infallible revelation that is disputed, but the fact of infallible inspiration. We turn to the con- sideration of this, which is the more difficult part of the general subject, 1. Inspiration is not sanctification. It is the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind, for the purpose of conveying religious truth to mankind. It has therefore a certain resemblance to regeneration, in having a Divine REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 85 author and source. But it differs from it, in that the aim is not to impart holiness but information. Inspiration is in- tellectual, while regeneration is spiritual. When the Holy Spirit inspires a person, he does not necessarily sanctify him ; he only instructs him and conveys truth by him. Ealaam was inspired tempoj-arily upon a certain occasion : "The Lord put words into his mouth," Xum. 23 : 5. And all that he said while under the influence of the Lord was free from error. Caiaphas also was temporarily inspired : " This he spake not of himself, but prophesied " (John 11 : 51) ; and the prophecy was fulfilled. Nay more, even a dmnb animal may be employed as the organ through which God conveys truth to men, as w^as the case with Balaam's ass. " The Lord opened the moutli of the ass " (Num. 22 : 28) ; and her expostulation was full of sense and truth. The ass made no mistake in anything she said to Balaam. The Divine message through her, as an instrument, was infallible. In the same manner, even a piece of un- conscious matter like the pillar of cloud, or the burning bush, may be employed as the mediunx of a theophany and of divine instruction through symbols. This shows that inspiration is only intellectual illumi- nation, and is entirely distinct from sanctification. If in- spiration involved sanctification, the degree of each must be equal, and infallibility in knowledge would require sinless- ness in character. Most of the organs of inspiration were in point of fact good men. "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." None of them however were sinless and perfect men, and yet they were infallible. They had a perfect knowledge on the points respecting which the}' were inspired, but they had not a perfect charac- ter. Peter was inspired, but he was defective in character, and was rebuked by Paul for his inconsistency in conduct. If we compare the result of the Apostolic council related in Acts 15, with the individual action subsequently of Peter spoken of in Gal. 2: 11-13, we see that the same person 86 BIBLIOLOGY. may as an imperfectly sanctified man recede from a position "whicli he had taken previously as an inspired man. The decision of the council respecting the Mosaic ceremonial law was the teaching of the Holy Ghost; but the weak yielding of Peter to the demands of Jewish Christians w^as the work- ing of sinful imperfection — of which Peter subsequently re- pented under the fraternal rebuke of Paul. Solomon was inspired to teach a certain class of truths, mainly ethical in distinction from evangelical, but his religious character, par- ticularly in his old age, has led some to doubt his salva- tion. The fact that inspiration is instruction, not sanctification, and that revelation is an objective information from God which does not depend on subjective characteristics in the person chosen as the medium of communication, explains how it is that a volume containing the most profound views of God and man that have yet been published on earth, could liave been produced amongst a people comparatively low in knowledge, civilization, and culture. The Hebrews were in- ferior to the Greeks and Itomans, in merely humanistic characteristics ; inferior in literature, art, and science. They produced very little in these provinces. But nothing in Greek or Roman theology and ethics will compare with the Scriptures of the Old Testament. The decalogue is the highest of moral codes; but Moses was the leader and head of a half civilized and degraded body of Egyptian slaves. Had his theological and religious knowledge been only that which his own environment in Egypt at the court of Phai'aoh would have furnished, he could no more have composed the decalogue, or the account of the creation in the opening of Genesis, than he could have composed Hamlet or the Prln- cipia. The immense disparity between the Old Testament as a book and the Hebrew people as a nation, shows that the knowledge of God and divine things contained in the former, but wanting in the latter, came ab extra. It was communicated from on high. REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 87 2. Inspiration is not omniscience/ Tlie operation of the Holy Spirit does not impart all triitli to the inspired mind, but only a portion of it. And it is religious truth that is principally conveyed. The Holy Spirit communicates sec- ular truth only so far as this is necessary to the imparting of religious truth. " The Bcriptnres jprincipally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God re- quires of man." "Westminster L. C. 5. They teach secular and scientific truth only in subserviency to this. Again, the knowledge of one inspired man may be less than that of another. There is a gradation in imparting re- ligious truth. In the beginning of the Old economy, the Holy Ghost disclosed tlic doctrine of tlie incarnation only to that extent in which it is seen in the i)romise respecting the "Seed of the woman.*' The doctrine continues to be divulged with increasing details, until in Isaiah it is greatly widened and enlarged. Tu the Xew Testament, the doctrine is as fully revealed as it will be, until the vision of the church by faith becomes tlie vision face to face. The apos- tle John knew more than Moses, respecting the pre-exist- ence, incarnation, and death of the Son of God. Yet the latter was infallibly inspired upon all points respecting which he has said anything. But he has not spoken upon as many points as St. John has. 3. Inspired truth is not necessarily completely compre- hensible. A doctrine or fact may be infallible, and yet mysterious. Because the Bible is not level to human in- telligence in all its teachings, it does not follow that it is not free from error. In 1 Pet. 1 : 10, 11, the Old Testa- ment prophets themselves are described as " inquiring and 1 Immer, Hermeneutica p. 18, argues against the infallibility of St. Paul, be- cause of the failure of his memory in regard to a certain particular. 1 Cor. 14 : 16. Because the apostle could not remember how many persons he had bap- tized, therefore his teaching in 1 Cor. 15 respecting the resurrection is fallible ! Upon the same principle, he should deny St. Paul's infallibility because he wag ignorant of the steam engine and telegraph. 88 BIBLIOLOGY. searching" into the meaning of the prophecies taught them by the Holy Spirit. The " sufferings of Christ, and the glory that sliould follow" are points that are mentioned. Defining inspiration positiveh^, it may be described as the influence of the Holy Spirit upon a human person, whereby lie is infallibly moved and guided in all his statements while under this influence. The general notion is that of an afflatus. There is an inibreathing of the Holy Spirit upon the human spirit. The epithet employed by St. Paul (2 Tim. 3 : 16) is S-eoTTveva-TO';. The consequence is an inward im- pulse and actuation of the mind. ''Holy men of God spake as they were moved (carried along, €po/x€voi) by the Holy Spirit," 2 Pet. 1:21. Analyzing, there is : {a). Suggestion of matter, both as to thought and language; aiding the memory is included in this (John 14 : 26) ; ' (5). Impulse to speak or write ; (c). Direction, by which the mind is preserved from error. We are aided in conceiving of the operation of the Holy Spirit in inspiration, by its analogy with his operation in regeneration, (a). It violates no laws of thought. (5). It leaves the individual peculiarities as it finds them. {c). It is thorough and all-pervading. Hence it affects the language as well as the thought. At this point, there is a difference of opinion among those who hold to plenary inspiration ; some affirming, and some denying the doctrine of verbal inspiration, in connec- "■ "In his extreme old age, the elder Adams was asked for an analysis of James Otis's speech in 1761 on the acts of the Board of Trade, which was five hours long. He answered that no man could have written the argument from memory ' the day after it was spoken,' much less 'after a lapse of fifty-seven years.' Adams then proceeded to compose a series of Letters on the subject filling thirty-three closely printed pages. Comparing these letters with letters written at or near the time, I am obliged to think that the venerable man blended together his recollections of the totality of the influence and doctrines of Otis during the years 1761-6. I own that I have had embarrassment in adjusting the authorities." Bancroft : History, IV. 416, If St. John did not compose and write his Gospel until A.d. 80, or 90, he certainly would have needed super- natural assistance in reporting so minutely and fully as he has the last discourse of Christ, some fifty or more years after its delivery. REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 89 tioii witli it. Everything depends, in settling this question, upon the view taken of the connection between thought and language. If words are merely arbitrary signs of ideas, like the algebraic symbols plus and minus, — mere marks, having no affinity with the ideas, and not prompted by them — then an idea might be suggested by inspii-ation with- out any prompting or suggestion of a word to express it. Tliought and language in tliis case are wholly diverse and disconnected, and if words are given to the prophet by whicli to exhibit the wordless thouo-hts that have been started iu his mind, it must be by dictation. Dictation is the standing objection to verbal inspiration. Upon this theory of language, it is assumed that the two processes of thinking and expressing thought can each go on by itself independently of the otlier, and that the thought does not naturally and inevitably prompt the word. When an author dictates to a eciibe, the scribe does not go througli the mental process along with the author ; any more than does the type-setter in setting up type ; any more than does the parrot in repeating human words. The scribe does not think the author's thoughts along with him, but mechani- cally writes down what he hears with his ear. In this in- stance, the ideas and the words, for the scribe, are entirely separated from each other. If this be the true theory of the relation of language to thought, then verbal inspiration would be dictation. But if it beheld that there is a natural affinity and a nec- essary connection between thought and language, then what- ever prompts thought prompts language, and an influence upon one is an influence upon the other. The suggestion of ideas inevitably involves the suggestion of words. Thought and language upon this theory are inseparable, so that when the Holy Spirit inspires a prophet, the mind of the prophet is so moved that he not merely thinks, but utters his thinking in language that is suitable and simultaneously imbreathed and prompted along with the thought. Both alike are theopneus- 90 BIBLIOLOGY. tic* This is wholly different from dictation. Dictation sep- arates thought and language ; verbal inspiration unites them. Verbal inspiration is the truth, if thought is prior to and suggests language ; but not if language is prior to and sug- gests thought. The inspired writer in this latter case does not have the thought until he has had the word, and the word is dictated to him by the Spirit, not prompted in him by the inspired thought in his own mind. That words are not arbitrary signs of ideas, having no natural connection and affinity with the ideas expressed by them, is proved ; 1. By Scripture. According to the Bible, an idea and its word are the same thing essentially. They are human thought in two different modes or forms. When a thought is in the mind, or unuttered, it is an idea. When that same thought is out of the mind, or uttered, it is a word. An idea is an internal word ; and a word is an ex- ternal idea. To speak, is to think externally ; and to think, is to speak internally. Accordingly, the Scriptures denomi- nate thinking internal speaking. *^ The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God," Ps. 14 : 1. " Begin not to say with- in yourselves," Luke 3:8. " Afterwards he said within himself," Luke 18 : 4. In these instances, thinking is men- tal speaking, and consequently speaking is vocal thinking. With this agrees our own modern usage. In common parlance, when men utter their thoughts in words, they are said to "think aloud." In Greek, X6709 signifies both reason and word. Reason is internal thought {\6709 ivSid^ero^) ; woi'd is external thought (X670? irpot^opuco^i), 2. By comparing the sounds of human language with ' Says Philippi (Glaubenslehre, Zweiter Kapitel), " While we maintain verbal inspiration (Wort inspiration), we do not mean the inspiration of each word separately and by itself (Wfirfcerinspiration)." As he explains his meaning, it eeems to be, that an apostle, or prophet, under the impulse of the Divine Spirit, originated a product that as a, unity and a whole was inspired both in matter and form, thought and language. But each particular word, one by one, was not mechanically and separately suggested to him. The process of infipiratiou was dynamical, continuous, and flowing. REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 91 other sounds. Human language is not mere unmeaning noise, like the sounds in material nature, such as that of falling water, or of thunder. These sounds have no sense or signification for the human reason. Isov is human lan- guage like the cries of animals, or the singing of birds. These sounds, though approaching nearer to human speech than do the sounds of material nature, yet contain no in- tellectual ideas or conceptions. They are thoughtless inar- ticulate cries, not language proper. But the sounds of every human language are thoughtful, and waken thought. They are not mere sounds, but sounds filled with sense and meaning for the human mind. See Torrey: Theory of Fine Art, 236. 3. By the fact that shades of an idea suggest varieties of words. This explains the origin of synonyms. The author of Proverbs denominates the second trinitarian person Wis- dom ; St. John denominates him Beason. The two phases of the revealed idea suggest the two different terms for it. 4. By the fact that men think in words, {a). If an Eng- lishman reads or speaks the French language, his thinking is connected with English words alone, unless he has made the French language as familiar as his own, and can think in it. Before he can grasp the idea, he must transfer it from the French word to the corresponding English one. !N^ot until this process has been gone through, is he master of the thought. Here, thought is necessarily connected with lan- guage. The following from a work of fiction illustrates this. " Madame de Lalouve spoke very good English indeed, and her accent, especially, was all but faultless, but she had the defect of thinking in French, and translating afterwards into our vernacular, and hence her speech occasionally lapsed into Gallic idioms and turns of language. It was quite otherwise with that other linguist whose nickname was Chinese Jack. He was one of those polyglot talkers who are possessed of the rare gift of thinking in any articulate tongue, from Hebrew to Japanese, and therefore of ex- 92 BIBLIOLOGY. pressing his thoughts as a Malay, or a Persian, or a Spaniard would do, and not as a scholar with an elaborate acquaint- ance with the language would do." (h). Intense thinking often causes audible wording or phrasing of the thought ; for example, whispering, or speaking aloud to one's self. (c). The dumb person, attempts to utter his thoughts in an in- articulate murmur or sound of some kind. His ideas strug- gle for utterance, impljang that an idea is incomplete with- out its word. {d). A tribe of men without an articulate language, if such could be found, would be without human ideas. Their range of consciousness would be like that of the brutes. Sometimes a particular word is found to be wanting in a language, and it is also found that the particular idea is wanting also. The missionary Higgs reports that the Dakota language contained no word for one quarter, or one eighth, and so on, because the people had no idea of such fractions. Tliey stopped with the notion of one half, in their calculations, and went no further mentally. " Only one word,'' he saj-s, "exists — Jiaiikay^ half. We mission- aries in writing out and improving the language can say hankay-hankay, the half of a half ; but the tribe do not. Besides liankay, there is nothing but the w^ord for a piece. Eut this is an indefinite word, and not suited for the cer- tainties of mathematics. The poverty of the language has been a great obstacle in teaching arithmetic. But the poor- ness of the language shows their poverty of thought in the same line." 5. Bj'" the fact that a peculiar kind of thought expresses itself spontaneously in a particular kind of phraseology. Poetic thought suggests and prompts poetic forms of lan- guage ; philosophic thought suggests and prompts philo- sophic forms, etc.^ ^ On the necessary connection of thought and language, compare Mtiller : Science of Language, First Series, Lectures I. IL IX. ; Science of Thought, I, 284, sq. Westcott : Study of the Gospels (Introduction). Shedd : Literary Es- says, 149-168, REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 93 Scripture itself asserts verbal inspiration. Jer. 1:9, "I have put words in thy mouth ; " Luke 21 : 12-15, "I will give you a mouth and wisdom " — both language and thought; Matt. 10:20, "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you ; " Acts 2 : 4, " They spake as the Spirit gave them utterance ; " 2 Peter 1 : 21, " Holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." AVords are carefully selected by the inspired mind, under divine guidance. In John 10 : 35, stress is laid upon the use of the word "gods" as applied to prophets and mag- istrates ; and in Gal. 3 : 16, upon the use of the singular " seed," not the plural " seeds." The neuter is employed instead of the masculine, when the idea of the impersonal becomes of great consequence ; e.g. : Luke 1 : 35, to yevvoa- fxevov aycov; John 10 : 30, eV instead of ei?. In Phil. 2 : 6, fiopip^ d-eov is used instead of ovala rSeov, because tlie idea is that of a particular trinitarian person, not of the divine essence simply. In John 17 : 24, the Receptus reads oiJ? SiScofcd^, and the uncials read o SiSto/cd^. If the idea in the mind of the inspired writer was that of the church as a collective unit}'-, the thought suggested the word 6. If it was that of particular individuals, the thought suggested the word oiJ?. The objections urged against the plenary inspiration of the Bible are the following : 1. There are discrepancies and errors in the history, geography, and chronology. In replying to this objection, it is to be remarked in the outset, that the correction of a book by itself is different from its correction by other books. There is only apparent error in the first case; in the second there is real error. If tlie witness himself while upon the stand explains satisfactorily certain varia- tions in his own testimony, this does not invalidate his tes- timony. But if another witness contradicts or corrects him, this awakens doubt and may invalidate. Now it is a fact that many of the difficulties of which we 94 BIBLIOLOGY. are speaking do not arise from a discrepancy between tlie Bible and other books, but between parts of the Bible it- self. For example, 2. Kings 8 : 20 asserts that Ahaziali was twenty-two years old when he began to reign, and 2 Chron. 22 : 2 asserts tliat he was forty-two years old at that time. One of these must be corrected by the other. Again, Luke relates that one of the malefactors reviled Christ, and the other did not ; Mark says that " they that were cruci- fied with him reviled him ; " and Matthew that " the thieves also which were crucified with him " insulted him. These variations can be shown to be consistent with one another, by comparing scripture with scripture, as is done in the ordinary Harmonies of the Gospels. It is plain, in reference to such seeming discrepancies, that inasmuch as eacli sacred writer knew what had been said by his pre- decessors, what appears to be contradiction to a modern reader must have been none for the original author. He evidently was not aware of any real discrepancy. For had he been, he would either have referred to it and har- monized it with his own, or else would have avoided it altogether by verbally conforming his own statement to that of his predecessor. The Bible then is self -rectifying. The book furnishes the materials for its own verification. This is wholly differ- ent from rectification from human sources, such as profane literature. When scripture explains or if need be corrects scripture, the divine explains and verifies the divine ; in- spiration explains inspiration ; spiritual things are compared with spiritual, 1 Cor. 2:13. But if scripture requires to be explained and corrected by human authorities, then the divine is rectified by the human. In the first case, the error is only seeming ; in the last, it is real. Another preliminary remark is, that minor and unessen- tial variations are positive proofs of truthfulness in a wit- ness. Had the Gospels been forged, there would not have been even seeming discrepancies, because pains would have REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 95 been taken to avoid them. Discrepancies of a certain kind, are sure proof of an absence of collusion and previous agree- ment between the evangelists. Variations are not neces- sarily contradictions. The testimonj^ of witnesses in court who agree in the general, is not rejected because of some unessential diversity. If each witness exactly and parrot- like repeated the other's testimony, he would be suspected for the very reason of exact similarit3\ There may be too much agreement between witnesses, as well as too little. Minor variations, consequently, are not inconsistent with plenary inspiration. As they are compatible with a true account, they are also compatible M'ith an infallible account. In saying that the Holy Spirit inspired both Matthew and John in writing a memoir of Christ, it is not meant that he guided them in such a way that each related the very same incidents in the very same manner, and in the very same words ; that he inspired them to produce i^o facsimiles. But the meaning is, that he guided each in such a manner that the individuality of each writer was preserved in the choice of incidents, in their arrangement, and in the phrase- ology ; and yet in such a manner that neither writer attrib- utes to Christ a parable wliicli he did not teach, a miracle which he did not work, or describes him as concerned in occurrences with which he really had nothing to do. Luke's order differs in some particulars from that of Matthew, but this does not prove that there is historical error in either of them. A biographer may know the actual and true order, and yet alter it for logical or rhetorical reasons. He may, for such reasons, throw together in one group a series of parables or miracles which were spoken or wrought at dif- ferent times, and still his account of the parables and mir- acles cannot be charged with mistake, because the grouping is apparent on the face of his narrative. Four different persons may be inspired to relate the biography of Christ, and may produce four narratives that are infallible, or free from error, without mentioning the 96 BIBLIOLOGT. very same incidentSj in tlie ver}'' same order, m the same degree of detail, and in the same phraseology. The object- or oftentimes seems to suppose that infallibility means not only freedom from error, but such an identity of state- ment as would amount to a fac-simile. The inscription on the cross is an example. Matthew reports that it was, " This is Jesus, the King of the Jews." Mark, that it "was, " The King of the Jews." Luke, that it Avas, " This is the King of the Jews." John, tliat it was, " Jesus of Xazareth the King of the Jews." Kow if infallibility means freedom from error in the statement actually made, and not the exclusion of every kind of variety in tlie man- ner of stating a fact, and so the production of a mere fac- simile, these four reports are infallible. Mark is not in error when he says that the inscription was, " The King of the Jews." These words were in the inscription, as the other reports show. He states the truth, though not the whole truth. Had he said in addition that these were the ipsis- sima verba, and were allilie words, he would have stated an error. From the list therefore of alleged discrepancies and er- rors, must be deducted all such as scripture itself enables the reader to correct. To these belong : [a). Errors of copyists. 2 Kings 8:26, " Ahaziah was two and twenty years old when he began to reign," compared with 2 Cliron. 22 : 2, " Forty and two years old when he began to reign." According to 1 Sam. 6 : 19, 50070 men were slain for looking into the ark ; seventy men probably being the number. Speaker's Commentary in loco. Says Kawlinson (Introduction to Chronicles), "Tlie condition of the text of Chronicles is far from satisfactory. Various readings are frequent, particularly the names of persons and places which occur in different forms not likely to have been used by the same writer. Numerous omissions are found, especially in the genealogies, where sometimes important names have dropt ont ; and sometimes the names which remain do not BEVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 97 agree with the numerical statement attached to them. But the most important corruptions are in the numbers in Sam- uel or Kings, sometimes unreasonably large, and therefore justly suspected. Other defects are a derangement in the order of the words, and the substitution of a more familiar term for one less known." (5). Errors in translation. (g). Discrepancies which greater fulness of detail in the narrative would remove. " Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio," says Horace. A harmony of the four Gospels that removes every difficulty without exception is probably not possible, be- cause of the sketch-like nature of the narrative. The Gospels are memorabilia, and were called a'7rofjuv7)^ovev^aTa at first. A series of memoranda, though agreeing in principal feat- ures, are generally difficult to reconcile in all particulars. The conciseness and brevity of one evangelist at a particular point, sometimes makes it difficult or even impossible to show his agreement in this particular with another evangelist who is fuller at this point. But no evangelist ever differs so greatly from the others as to destroy his own historical credibility, or that of the others. Differences sometimes arise from silence on the part of a writer, and these are alleged to be contradictions. Mark and John give no account of the mi- raculous conception of Christ by the Holy Ghost, yet both of them imply it. He is a supernatural and divine person for them both. There is nothing in Mark and John that contradicts the miraculous conception. John gives no ac- count of the institution of the Lord's Supper, but he records conversations of Christ that involve the fact. See John 6 : 48-58. Two inspired narratives may be each infallible, and yet one contain more information than the other. Had Matthew, for example, related two of Christ's temptations in the desert, and omitted tlie third, while Luke related all three, both accounts would have been inerrant, provided that Matthew had not positively asserted that there were only two temptations. There would be no just ground for 7 98 BIBLIOLOGY. saying that the two accounts contradicted each other. It is not necessary that an inspired person should know all things, or even report all that he does know ; but only that what he does report should be true. The evangelists were permitted and thus inspired to omit some incidents in Christ's life ; for it is improbable that the contents of the four Gospels contain all that the four evangelists knew concerning him. "There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be writ- ten," John 21 : 25. id). Discrepancies arising from a general statement by one witness, and a particular statement by another, and sometimes by one and the same witness. Matthew (27 : 44), and Mark (15 : 32), say that the thieves crucified with Christ reviled him. The reference here is to a class of men. Luke (23:39—43) says that one of them reviled him, and the other did not. He enters into detail, as the other evangelists do not. According to Acts 9 : 7, the com- panions of Saul heard the heavenly voice but " saw no man ; " according to Acts 22 : 9, they saw the light, but " heard not the voice." The very same person, namely Luke, who made the first statement made the last, and was not aware of any contradiction between the two. In the first passage, an indistinct sound from heaven is intended, as in Matt. 24 : 31 { On the subject of Christian certainty, in distinction from natural certainty, see the thoughtful treatise of Frank. CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 135 They are referred to by Christ and his apostles, as the source of information respecting religion generally, and all matters pertaining to human salvation. It is clear that they received them as authoritative, and a final arbiter upon such subjects. But this implies the credibility of the Old Testa- ment, if Christ and his apostles were not deceived in their opinion and judgment. That the reference of Christ, when he speaks of "the Scriptures," is to a well-known collection of inspired writings, is proved by Matt. 5 : 17. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets : I am not come to destroy but to fulfil." Our Lord here affirms that his mission will realize all that is promised in the Old Testament revelation. This revelation he denotes by the common Jewish designation: the Law and the Prophets, i.e. the Pentateuch and Prophetico-Historical books. There is the same reference to a collection of writings in John 7 : 19, 22, 23. " Did not Moses give you the law ? Moses gave unto you circumcision. A man receivetli circumcision on the sabbath day, that the law of Moses should not be broken." Here, the ceremonial law is more particularly meant, and this law is not taught in one book, or part of a book, of the Pentateuch, but runs through Exodus, Leviti- cus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. In Luke 2 : 22, Mary was purified " according to the law of Moses." Moses is represented by Christ as " giving " law in these books. In like manner, in Acts 15 : 21, the word Moses denotes a col- lection of sacred writings. "Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the syna- gogues every sabbath day." The Jewish congregations at the time of the Advent had the Pentateuch read to them by a reader, as both Jewish and Christian congregations now do, believing that it had the inspired authority of Moses. In the walk to Emmaus with two of his disciples, Christ " beginning at Moses and all the prophets, expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning him- self," Luke 24 : 27. He recapitulated and explained all the 136 BIBLIOLOGY. Messianic promises in the Old Testament ; beginning with the "Seed of the woman" in Genesis, and ending with t]ie "Messenger of the covenant" in Malachi. In Mark 12 : 26, Christ refers to the miracle of the burning bnsli as an act- ual fact, and denominates the book of Exodus iu which the account of it is contained, "the book of Moses.'' In Matt. 22 : 32, Christ quotes Jehovah's words to Moses from the burning bush — making a second reference to this miracle. If it is objected, that Christ only accommodated himself to the ancient Jewish opinion that Moses was the author of the book of Exodus without believing or endorsing it, the reply is, that Christ is arguing to prove to the Sadducees that the resurrection of the body is a fact. ISTow unless Jehovah actually spoke to Moses those words, and Moses recorded them without error, so that Christ is correct in calling Exodus "the book of Moses," his argument fails. If Jehovah did not speak the words, Christ did not prove his point. If Jehovah did speak them but Moses did not record them, he did not prove it ; because he refers to Moses as his authority. And if Jehovah did speak the words, but Moses did not record them infallibly, Christ's argument though having some validity would not be marked by infallibility. There may have been some error in the narrative. That Christ refers to a well-known collection, is also proved by his quotation from the Old Testament in Matt. 23 : 35. " Upon you shall come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias " (Barachias is want- ing in Luke 11 : 51, and in ^*'). Here our Lord mentions an event in Genesis and in Chronicles (2 Ch. 24 : 21, 22) ; the first and almost last book of the canon. Between these two events, he speaks of a series of righteous men whose blood was spilled in martyrdom. Who can doubt that he had in mind the entire Old Testament, which contains the account of these martyred servants of Jehovah. Tlie refer- ence to the murder of Zacharias proves that Chronicles be- CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 137 longed to the canon, in Christ's opinion. To say that Christ accommodates himself to the popular view without adopt- ing it himself, contradicts the connection of thought. Christ is denouncing the judgment of God upon the Pharisees. This would be an idle threat if there were no such series of martyrs, and no true account of them in the Old Testament scriptures. In Matt. 12 : 39, Christ cites the mii-acle ot Jonah as one which he believed, and his hearers also. But Jonah is comparatively a secondary book in the canon, and the miracle therein recorded more difBcuIt to believe than most. According to Luke 4 : 17-21, Christ read and com- mented on the 61st chapter of Isaiah. This shows that he did not regard the later prophecies of Isaiah as spurious. That the writings now received by the Christian church as the Old Testament canon were the same as those to which Christ and his apostles refer, is proved by the fol- lowing arguments : 1. They are the same which were translated into Greek by the Seventy, 285 B.C. For two centuries preceding the Advent, they had been received among the Greek- speaking Jews as the inspired volume. As a collection, they were called "the Scriptures." It is objected, that in the Septuagint version the apocryphal books are found. But they did not belong to it originally. That they con- stituted no part of the work of the Seventy, is proved by the fact that Philo and Josephiis do not mention them, though Sirach, one of the best of the apocryphal authors, wrote about 237 e.g. ; that Christ and his apostles never quote from them, though they quote from the Septuagint version of the Old Testament; that some of the manuscripts of the Septuagint version do not contain the apocrypha ; and that the Palestinian Jews never regarded the apocrypha as ca- nonical. The explanation of their presence in some of the manuscripts of the Septuagint is, that the Egyptian or Alex- andrian Jews had a higher estimate of the apocrypha than the Palestine Jews had, and appended them to the Old Tes- 138 BIBLIOLOGY. tament canon ; as, at a later date, some other apocryphal %vritings were appended to manuscripts of the New Testa- ment, and obtained some currency in the Patristic church. The Sinaitic manuscript, for example, contains the Epistle of Barnabas and the Pastor of Hermas; and the Alex- andrine contains the first Epistle of Clement of Rome and the apocryphal psalms attributed to Solomon. Such un- canonical compositions were occasionally copied into the manuscripts of the New Testament, by those who highly esteemed them, and in this manner gradually acquired some authority. By being appended to the canonical Old Testa- ment, the authority of the apocrypha increased, until finally it was declared to be canonical and inspired, by the council of Trent. The Patristic church, however, was not agreed concerning the apocrypha, and never adopted it in general council. Jerome (Prologus Galeatus) asserts that Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus do not belong to the canon. Melito, Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nazianzen, Athana- sius, Amphilochius, and Epiphanius give lists that do not include the apocrypha. Clement of Alexandria and Ire- naeus placed it on an equality with the canonical books. The North African fathers took this view in the council of Hippo (393), and in the 3rd council of Carthage (397). These small local councils included the apocrypha "inter scripturas canonicas." That the apocrj^pha is canonical and inspired, is a Komish, not a Patristic decision. The Re- formers rejected the Romish opinion, and denied the in- spiration and canonicity of the apocrypha. 2. They are the same writings which Philo and Josephus recognize as the Jewish Scriptures. Philo, in the first century, cites from most of them. Josephus (Contra Api- onem, I. 8) states that the Jews have '* twenty-two books which are justly believed to be divine." It is not certain ■ from the passage, which is somewhat obscure, whether Jo- sephus included Chronicles, Ezra, Esther and Nehemiah ; though the probability is that he did. The fact that CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 139 these are contained in the Septuagint version would favor this. 3. The Targums go to show that the books received by the Christian church as the Old Testament canon are the same as those received by the Jews. That of Onkelos is a Chaldee translation of the Pentateuch. Onkelos wrote about the time of the Advent ; othei*s say in the 2nd cen- tury. The Targum of Jonathan contains in Chaldee, Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah aad the Minor Prophets. 4. The Samaritan Pentateuch supports the genuineness of the Old Testament Pentateuch. The Samaritans received it from the ten tribes, in all probability, and the ten tribes must have had it at the time of their separation from Judah, B. c. 975 ; for they would not subsequently have taken it from Judah. 5. The great care with which their sacred books were preserved by the Jews, makes it highly probable that the books now received as the inspired canon of the Old Tes- tament are the same as those received by Ezra and Ne- hemiah. The Pentateuch by the command of Moses was deposited with the sacred things of the tabernacle, and pro- vision was made for its public reading from time to time. Deut. 31 : 9-13. Josephus in his autobiography says that Titus gave him leave to take from the "ruins of his coun- try " what he wished. He asked for the liberty of his own family, and the " holy books " of his people ; which were granted to him. 6. The language evinces the genuineness of the received Old Testament canon. All the varieties of Hebrew, from the early forms in Genesis and Job to the later in the Chal- dee of Ezra and JSTehemiah, are found in it. 7. The discoveries in the antiquities of Assyria, Baby- lonia, and Egypt support the genuineness of the Old Testa- ment. 8. The agreement in doctrine between the Old Testament 140 BIBLIOLOGY. and tlie New supports the genuineness of tlie former. The same general system of justice and mercy ; law and gospel ; sin and redemption; runs through both. "It is mere as- sertion, that fatherhood, filiation, and brotherhood are un- revealed in the Old covenant ; tlie truth is, they are re- vealed, but in a limited and mediate typical manner. It is an equally vague assertion to affirm that the God of the New Testament is not an indignant God, full of majesty and power, and that Christians ceased in every sense to be servants." Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 63. The relation of the earlier and later revelations to each other is well stated in tlie remark of Augustine, that '' the Kew Testament is latent in the Old, and the Old Testa- ment is patent in the New." The correctness of this is seen, by considering the irrvplications of the New Testa- ment. Take as one example out of a multitude, the words of Christ in Matt. 10 : 15, " Verily I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city." This affirmation of Christ implies {a) The historical credibility of Genesis. (jb) The truth of the miracles connected with the lives of Abraham and Lot ; and thus of the supernaturalism of the Pentateuch generally, {e) The responsibility and guilt of the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah ; and thus of all tlie primaeval populations, {d) The fact of a day of final doom, when they shall be judged according to the deeds done in the body, {e) The onmiscience and divine author- ity of Jesus Chi'ist, whereby he is entitled to make such an affirmation. CliAPTEK IV. THE CANONICITY OF SOEIPTUKE. Josephus : Contra Apionem, I. Du Pin : On the Canon, Cosin : On the Canon. Jones : On the Canon. Lardner : Credibility of the New Testament. Stnarfc : On the Canon. Alexander : On the Canon. Westcott : On the N. T. Canon. Credner : Zur Geschichte des Kanons. Home-Tregelles : Introduction. Davidson : Introduo- tion. Sohaff-Herzog : Encyclopsedia, Art. Canon. Kitto : Ency- clopaedia, Ai-t. Canon. Oharteris : On the Canon. Ladd : Sacred Scripture, Ch. IX. Eeuss : History of the Canon, Tr. by Hunter. Bleek: History of N. T. Canon (Introduction to N. T.). Oehler : Kanon des A. T. {Herzog: Enoyclopadie). Landerer : Kanon des N. T. (Herzog : Enoyclopadie). Smith : Dictionary, Art. Canon, Chambers : Canon of Scripture. The canonicity of a book means it3 right to a place in the collection of inspired writings ; and this depends upon the fact that it was composed by an inspired man, or under his direction. Canonicity therefore is very closely connected with authenticity or genuineness, and some would merge the two in one. If a book can be proved to be the gen- uine product of an evangelist or apostle, its canonicity is established. To determine whether a writing is canonical, is to determine whether it originated in the very restricted circle of inspired men, or in the very wide circle of ordinary men. In answering this question, some assistance is deriva- ble from the nature and contents of the book. Absurdities and contradictions, sentiments con tradicting the general tenor of revelation, and such like characteristics, would prove that a writing is not the product of inspiration, and 142 BIBLIOLOGY. therefore not canonical. Thus the subject of canonicity is also connected with that of credibility. At the same time, the question, Who is the author of the book? is different from the question. Is the book credible ? The former is the question when the subject of canonicity is under considera- tion. The inquiry respecting the authorship of a writing is mainly historical. To answer it, requires the testimony of competent witnesses; and the most competent witnesses are those who lived nearest to the time of the alleged origin and authorship. An eye-witness is the best of all ; and the next best witness is one who personally heard the testimony of an eye-witness, and so onward. Consequently, the Prim- itive church was better situated and qualified than the Modern church, to testify respecting the authorship of the Gospel of Luke or the Epistle to the Hebrews. More of documentary evidence, and more of personal testimony was accessible in the year 150 than in the year 1880. An Alex- andrine scholiast had more data for determining which of the Platonic dialogues are spurious, than any English or German philologist of the 19th century. The generation of Americans who lived at the close of the 18th century had the best advantages of any, for settling the question whether Jefferson was the author of the Declaration of In- dependence. The canonicity of a New Testament book is not settled by the authority of the Primitive church, but by its testi- mony. This mistake is frequently made. Coleridge (Table Talk, March 31, 1832) says that "we receive the books as- cribed to John and Paul as their books, on the judgment of men for whom no miraculous discernment is pretended. Shall we give less credence to John and Paul themselves ? " The Modern church does not receive John's Gospel and Paul's Epistles as canonical, on the "judgment," or decision, of the Primitive church respecting their contents, but on their testimony respecting their authorship. Testimony CANONICITY. 143 respecting canonicity is like testimony respecting miracles. The Modern church does not rest its belief in the miracles of our Lord on the authority of the first Christians, but on their witness and attestation. The authority of the first Christians is no higher than that of any other Christians, but their testimony is. Neither is the question of canonicity to be answered by the witness of the Holy Spirit in the consciousness of the believer. The teaching of the Holy Ghost, while indis- pensable to a saving apprehension of Biblical truth, is not available at this point. The Holy Spirit teaches in regard to the credibility, but not in regard to the canonicity of Scripture. The Divine Spirit does not inform any man, or class of men, who composed the book of Chronicles or of Joshua. This would be a revelation. God leaves the ques- tion respecting the authorship of particular books of Script- ure to be settled chiefly by historical testimony ; and, from the nature of the case, by the testimony of the earlier generations rather than of the later. The testimony to canonicity is in this respect like the testimony to miracles. It is not inspired and infallible, yet it is credible and trust- worthy. We go to the very first Christians of all for the testimony to miracles; and we must go to the earlier Christians for the testimony to canonicity. And as the proof of miracles does not depend upon the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit, neither does the proof of canonicity. Says Dorner (Doctrine, I, 96), "The testimony of the Holy Spirit gives us no immediate information upon the historic origin of a book, upon its source in an inspired author. It gives us no divine certainty as to the manner and method in which certain writings have arisen in history, so that it will not do to found the certainty of the truth and divinity of Scripture upon the experience of the divinity of the foi^m of Holy Writ." With this the Westminster Confes- sion, I. v., agrees, in mentioning as the first of the grounds of a historical faith in the Scriptures, " the testimony of the 14-4 BIBLIOLOGY. church," and making no mention at all of the inward teach- ing of the Spirit in this connection. The history of the Old Testament canon is obscure, ow- ing to its very great antiquity. Were it a modern product, as some assert, there would be more historical data. That the books of Moses were collected and arranged before Samaria was taken and the ten tribes carried away by the Assyrians under Shalmanesar, b.c. Y24, is evident from the fact that the Samaritans must have obtained the Pentateuch from the ten tribes and not from Judah. It is an ancient and widely current tradition, that Ezra made a complete collection of the books of the Old Testament, ex- cepting those few which were written after his time. An- other tradition, mentioned in 2 Maccabees 2: 13, attributes this work to Nehemiah. There is no good reason for doubt- ing that upon the return from the Babylonian captivity, B.C. 536, the revision and collection of the Old Testament canon occurred. The same Divine guidance that brought about, in such an extraordinary manner, the return of the Jews from their long captivity in the heart of Asia, and the restoration of the temple under Ezra and Nehemiah, would naturally have led to their re-collecting and re-editing those sacred writings upon which the future prosperity of the chosen people, and the accomplishment of its mission in the world, absolutely depended. The Jewish church and state without the Old Testament canon, would have been a mere empty shell. In this redaction of the Old Testament canon, the ancient and previously acknowledged writings of Moses and the earlier prophets were of course accepted, and to these were now added the later writings up to the time of Ezra. The division was three-fold. 1. The Law. 2. The Prophets. 3. The Hagiographa. It is the same that Christ refers to in Luke 24: 44, under the names of the law, the prophets, and the psalms. By the "psalms" is meant the whole third part, or the Hagiographa. Josephus mentions this three-fold division. Contra Apionem, I. viii. CAifONICITY. 145 According to him, the Law contains the "five books of Moses " : Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuter- onomy ; the Prophets comprise " thirteen books": Joshua, Judges with Ruth, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah with Lamentations, Ezekiel, Daniel, the twelve Minor Prophets, Job, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther; the Ilagiographa includes " four books of hj^tnus to God " : Psalms, Proverbs, Eccle- siastes and Solomon's Song. In all there are twenty-two books, equalling the number of the Hebrew alphabet. The Jews, following the Talmud, now make the Hagiographa to consist of eleven books : viz.. Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Dan- iel, Ezra, and Chronicles. Prideaux (Connection, I. v.) is of the opinion that Mala- chi was written after the time of Ezra. He argues also that the genealogy of the sons of Zerubbabel in 1 Chron, 3 : 19-24, being carried down to the time of Alexander the Great, 330 e.g., shows that this part of Chronicles was composed subsequently to Ezra. "It is most likely," he says, " that the two books of Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and Malachi were added to the canon in the time of Simon the Just, 300 B.C., and that it was not until then that the Jewish canon of the Old Testament was fully completed. And indeed these last books seem very much to want the exactness and skill of Ezra in their publication, they falling far short of the correctness which is in the other parts of the Hebrew scriptures." Rawlinson, on the contrary (Bible Commentary, 1 Chron. 3 : 19-24), regards Prideaux as in error in reckoning thirty years to a genera- tion. He himself reckons only twenty, and attributes Chronicles to Ezra, who died about b.c. 435. " The style of Chronicles is like that of Ezra," says Rawlinson. Mov- ers makes the date of Chronicles e.g. 400. Ewald assigns it to the time of Alexander the Great, e.g. 336-323. More is known respecting the manner of collecting the New Testament canon, though no particular action in de- 10 146 BIBUOLOGT. fining and authorizing it can be mentioned until after it has become universally received in the church. The four Gospels were from the first distinguished from the apocrj'phal. Justin Martyr (163) speaks of "memoirs" of Christ as the work of the evangelists. Irenseus (202) cites passages from all four of the canonical Gospels. Adv. Hsereses, XL xxii.-xxiv., et alia. Clement of Alexandria (220) and Tertullian (220) do the same. Tatian (175), and Ammonius (200), arrange harmonies of the four Gospels. Theodoret (457) found 200 copies of Tatian's harmony in the Syrian churches, which he took away from them, be- cause of some heresies it contained. Neander supposes that Tatian mixed some things with the canonical Gospels from the apocryphal. Origen (250) writes a commentary on Matthew and John. These facts prove the general accept- ance of four and only four Gospels as canonical, prior to A.D. 250. Yet there was no action of the church in a general council to this effect. The Epistles began to be collected very early. Ignatius (Ad Philadelphenses, v.) speaks of the Gospels, and the " Apostolical writings." The Epistles were sent from church to church, either in the original or in transcript. In Col. 4: 16, Paul bids the Colossians to send the letter he had written to them, to the Laodicean s, and to obtain his letter to the Laodiceans and read it themselves. This custom would naturally lead to the multiplication of copies, and the collection by different churches of the whole series of Epistles, as fast as they were written. The Vatican and Sinaitic manuscripts belong to the middle of the 4th century (a.d. 325-350). The former contains all the Gospels, and all the Epistles excepting Philemon, Titus, 1st and 2d Timothy, Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. The latter contains all the Gospels, all the •jEpistles, and the Apocalypse. The Muratorian canon !(a.d. 150) is much older than these oldest uncials, and mentions as accepted and canonical, the four Gospels, CANONICITY. 147 Acts, thirteen Epistles of Paul, two and perhaps three Epistles of John, Jude and Kevelation. And it is possible that 1st Peter is mentioned (provided "tantum" is an error for"unam"). It mentions Hebrews, perhaps, under the title of the "Epistle to the Alexandrians." It omits 2d Peter and James. The New Testament canon was thus collected and adopt- ed by the custom and usage of the churches, not by concil- iar action. The formation of a sy^nbol was similar ; for the Apostle's creed was not the work of the Apostolic college. The first conciliar action respecting the canon was by the council of Laodicea, in 360. This adopted the whole New Testament, excepting Revelation. It was a small council, and of little influence. The council of Hippo (393), and Carthage (397), established similar catalogues. But there was little call for this conciliar action, because the pi'actice and usage of the church had already anticipated it- THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). CHAPTER L NATUEE AND DEFINITION OF GOD. Aristotle: Metaphysics, XL vi., vii. Plato: Phaedo; Laws, X. 894-899. Anselm : Monologium, i.-Ti. ; xvii.-sxviii. Chamocke : Discourses (God a Spirit). Cudworth : Intellectual System, I. ii. ; V. iii. (Corporeal and uneitended substance.) More : Immortality of the Soul, I. i.-x.' Smith: Discourses (Immortality of the Soul; Existence and nature of God). Bates : Immortality of the Soul. Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, g 63. Ulrici : God and Nature. Christ- lieb : Modern Doubt, Lecture III. Muller : Sin, n. 113-139. The words of our Lord to the Samaritan woman, " God is a Spirit," John 4 : 24, although spoken for a practical pur- pose, are also a scientific definition. The original {Trvevfia 6 -Seo?) by its emphatic collocation of Trvevfiay and omission of the article, implies that God is spirit in the highest sense. He is not a spirit, but spirit itself, absolutely. The employment of the article in the English version is objec- 1 More departed from the common opinion, in contending tliat spiritual sub- stance has extension and the three dimensions, like material substance. It dif- fers from matter in having self-motion, and in not having impenetrability. It is not moved ab extra, and its presence does not exclude that of material sub- stance. He denied the schoolman's dictum, that the soul is all in every part of the body ; because this is incompatible with the view that spiritual substance is extended. 152 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). tionable, because it places the deity in a class with other spiritual beings. But this is not the thought of Christ, who asserts that ''no one knoweth the Father but the Son" (Matt. 11 : 27); thus claiming for himself a knowledge of the deity as the absolute and unconditioned spirit, who is not cognizable by the finite mind in the manner ajid degree that finite spirit is. Man knows the nature of finite spirit through his own self-consciousness, but he knows that of the Infinite spirit only analogically. Hence some of the characteristics of the Divine nature cannot be known by a finite intelligence. For example, how God can be indepen- dent of the limitations of time, and have an eternal mode of consciousness that is without succession, including all events simultaneously in one omniscient intuition, is inscrut- able to man, because he himself has no such consciousness. The same is true of the omnipresence of God. How he can be all at every point in universal space, baffles human comprehension, though it has some light thrown upon it, by the fact that the human soul is all at every point in the body. The Divine being is of an essence whose spirituality tran- scends that of all other spirits, human, angelic, or arch- angelic ; even as his immortality transcends that of man or angel. God is said alone to have immortality (1 Tim. 6 : 16), because his immortality is a parte ante, as well as a parte post. His immortality is eternity. And in the same man- ner, when the spirituality of God is compared with that of his rational creatures, it might be said that he alone has spirituality. The transcendent nature of the Divine spirituality is seen in the fact of its being formless and unembodied. "No man hath seen God at any time," John 1 : 18. " Ye saw no similitude," Dent. 4 : 12. The Infinite spirit cannot be so in- cluded in a form as not to exist outside of it. The finite spirit can be, and in all its grades is both embodied and limited by the body. NATURE OF GOD. 153 "That each, who seems a separate -whole, Should move his rounds, and, fusing all The skirts of self again, should fall Kemerging in the general soul, Is faith as vague as all unsweet : Eternal fcrrm shall still divide The eternal soul from all beside ; And I shall know him when we meet. "—Tennyson. The seeming exception to tins, in the instance of man be- tween death and the resurrection, is not really such. The disembodiment of the spirit is only temporary. The com- pleteness of the person requires the resurrection and reunion of the bodily form*. Hence in order to have communication with his embodied creature, man, the Supreme being assumes a form ; first in the theophanies of the Old Testament, and lastly in the in- carnation of the ]Srew\' In his own original essence he is formless, and hence could not have any intercourse with a creature like man, who is conditioned in his perception by the limitations of finite form. For this reason, " the Word became fiesh and dwelt among us full of grace and truth," John 1 : 14. Uniting with a human soul and body, "the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath expounded {e^rir^rjcraro) him," John 1 : 18. In Phil. 2 : 6, the trinitarian personality of the Logos is denomi- nated a "form of God" {f/,op(f>'^ 3-eov), This does not mean a visible corporeal embodiment, for it describes the Logos before his incarnation. A distinction, or mode of the divine essence is intended by it. This begotten, or filial "form" of God is purely spiritual and incorporeal^ and hence is compelled to assume a corporeal form ; namely, " the form of a servant " (jxopcp'j], explained by a-^vf^ay ^ But in both of these modes of manifestation, the Infinite Bpirit though in a form is not shut up and confined in it. The Son of Man was also in heaven, at the same instant that he was on earth in a human body. Jehovah, though pres- ent in the form of the burning bush, was at the same moment, omnipresent also. 154 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD). ver. 8) ; in order to have society with man. Some have supposed that the incarnation is necessitated not only by man's sin, but by the needs of the angelic world, in order that there may be intercourse between God and the angels. That there is a provision for this latter, and that God mani- fested himself to the holy and happy angels prior to and irrespective of the incarnation of the Word, is clear from the Biblical representations concerning such an intercourse. Compare Ps. 104 : 4 ; 103 : 20 ; 1 Kings 22 : 19 ; 2 Chr. 18 : 18 ; Isa. 6:5; Luke 15 : 10 ; Heb. 1 : 7; 2 : 5. But the em- bodiment of God the Son in a perishable human form, in- volves humiliation and suffering for the special purpose of atonement and redemption, and hence it cannot have refer- ence to the needs of the sinless angelic world. Moreover, there would be no reason for the adoption of man's nature and form, in order to a manifestation of God to the angels. While the spiritual essence of God is incorporeal and formless, it is at the same time the most real substance of all. Mere body or form does not add to the reality of an essence, because the form itself derives its characteristics and its reality from the informing spirit. " The things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. 11 : 3. Yisibles were not made of visibles, but of in- visibles. The phenomenon, consequently, is less real than the noumenon ; the visible than the invisible. God's incor- poreal and formless being is so intensely and eminently real, that all formed and corporeal being, in comparison, is unreal. "All nations before him are as nothing, and less than noth- ing, and vanitj''," Isa. 40 : 17. " Mine age is as nothing before thee," Ps. 39 : 5. " Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, thou art God," Ps. 90 : 2. " The more unbodied,'* says Smith (Nature of God, 123), "anything is, the more unbounded also is it in its effective power: body and matter being the most sluggish, inert, and unwieldy thing that may be, having no power from itself, nor over itself ; and there- NATURE OP GOD. 155 fore the purest mind must needs also be the most almighty life and spirit." * The transcendent reality of the Divine essence appears also in the fact that it is a necessary essence. The objective reality cannot even in thought, still less in fact, be sepa- rated from the subjective idea, as it can be in the instance of contingent and created substance. We can conceive of the non-existence of the created and contingent being of whom we have an idea, but not of the uncreated and neces- sary being of whom we have an idea. A being that might be a nonentity does not correspond to our idea of a neces- sary being. A necessary being, consequently, has more of being than a contingent being has. He is further from non- entity. God, therefore, is more real than any of his creat- ures, be they material or immaterial. The Infinite spirit is more real than the finite spirit ; and the finite spirit is more real than the body it inhabits, because it can exist with- out it. "While, however, there is this transcendence in the spirit- uality of God, there is also a resemblance between the Infinite and the finite spirit. The invisible, immortal, and intelli- gent mind of man is like in kind to the Divine nature, though infinitely below it in the degree of excellence. What the Arians erroneously asserted respecting the nature of the Son, would be true of the nature of man and angels, namely, that it is ofioiovaio^ with God, but not ofjLoovato<;. Man's 1 Claudienus of Vienne, in the 5th century, notes the following points of dif- ference between soul and body: 1. Everything is incorporeal which does not occupy space. The soul occupies no space. 3. Reason, memory, and will occupy no space. 3. The body feels the impression of touch in the part touched ; but the soul feels the impression as a whole, not in a part. 4. There is in all bodies a right and a left, an up and a down, a front and a back ; but nothing of the kind in the souL 5. The soul feels by visible organs, but feels invisibly. The eye is one thing, seeing is another ; the ears are one thing, hearing is another ; the hand is one thing, touching is another. We distinguish by the touch what is hot and what cold, but we do not touch the sensation of touch, which in itself is neither hot nor cold ; the organ by which we feel is a different thing from the sensation. Guizot : Civilization L 399, Ed. Bohn. 156 THEOLOGY {DOCTRINE OF GOD). spiritual nature resembles that of the deity, but is not iden- tical with it. If the difference between God and man is exaggerated, then the Infinite and finite are so separated from one another, that religion becomes impossible. God is practically reduced to a nonentity, by being placed wholly outside the sphere of human apprehension. He is so different from his rational creatures, that no analogies can be found between them, and nothing can be positively and absolutely affirmed concern- ing him. From this extreme and error, spring deism and agnosticism in theory, and epicureanism in practice. De- ism asserts the Divine existence, but with the fewest attri- butes possible. Bolingbroke denied that any of the mor- al attributes may be affirmed of God. Only power and adaptive intelligence as seen in physical nature, belong to the Supreme being. This is making the difference between the Infinite and finite so great, that the religious feel- ings of adoration, love, faith, and penitence are impossible. Hobbes taught agnosticism ; maintaining that God is so totally different from man, that he is not only incompre- hensible, but inconceivable, and not an object of thought. Cudworth, in opposition, maintained that God is conceiv- able, but not comprehensible ; or, in modern phrase, is ap- prehensible, but not comprehensible. Although God is an inscrutable mystery, he is yet an object of thought. " By mysterious doctrines, we mean," says Conybeare (On Scripture Mysteries) " those concerning which our ideas are inadequate, or indeterminate. This supposes that of mysterious doctrines we have some ideas, though partial and incomplete. Indeed, when we can frame no ideas, we can strictly speaking give no assent. For what is assent, but a perception that the extremes, the subject and pred- icate of a proposition, do agree, or disagree ? But when we have no manner of ideas of these extremes, we can have no such perception. And as no combination of terms act- ually without significance can make a real proposition, so no NATURE OP GOD. 157 combination of terms to us perfectly unintelligible can, with respect to us, be accounted a proposition. We maintain, therefore, that we have some ideas even of mysterious doc- trines. There is a vast difference between imintelligible and incomprehensible. That is unintelligible, concerning which we can frame no ideas ; and that is only incompre- hensible, concerning which our ideas are imperfect." On the other hand, if the resemblance between the Infi- nite and finite spirit is so exaggerated as to obliterate the distinction between the two, then materialistic theories in philosophy, and literalizing theories in theology arise. All the errors of gnosticism, of pantheism, and of anthropo- morphism are the consequence. Gnosticism and pantheism attribute evolution and development to the Divine essence, and thus subject it to the conditions and limitations of finite growth and succession. Upon this theory, an immutable consciousness that is omniscient, simultaneous, and succes- sionless, in other words, absolutely complete and perfect, cannot belong to the Supreme being. God's consciousness, according to the pantheist, is mutable, fractional, and in- creasing like tliat of man and angel. But this is anthropo- morphism ; God's mental processes are converted into those of man. Anthropomorphism sometimes exaggerates the re- semblance between God and man, so far as even to attri- bute sensuous organs and emotions to God. It is one of the few benefits in connection with the many evils that have been wrought by modern pantheism, that it has brought into view the absoluteness of the Deity ; his transcendent perfection of being. It is true that what pantheism gives with one hand, it takes back again with the other. In identifying man and the universe with God, it obliterates the distinction between the finite and Infinite, and thus abolishes the transcendent perfection of the Deity which it had so emphatically asserted. But setting aside this self-contradiction, which is characteristic of all error, and considering simply the energy with which a pantheist 158 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). like Hegel, for example, insists upon the unconditioned nat- ure of the Absolute spirit, we perceive that even fatal error may have an element of truth in it. There are two predicates which are of fundamental im- portance in determining the idea of God as a spirit : 1. Substantiality ; God is an essence or substance. 2. Person- ality ; God is a self-conscious being. Predicates are dis- tinguishable from attributes, as the base is from the super- structure. It is because God is a substance and a person, that he can possess and exert attributes. 1. In the first place, the idea of God as a spirit implies that of substance or essence^ because that which has no sub- stance of any kind is a nonentity. "Deus est qusedam sub- stantia ; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo, aliquid esse est." Augustine, on Ps. 68. God is ens : real actual being. He is not a mere idea, or construction of the mind, like a mathematical point or line. A mathematical point is not an entity ; it has no substan- tial being ; it exists only subjectively ; it is merely a mental construction. The same is true of space and time. These are not two substances. They are not objective entities or beings. Neither are they, as Clarke aflBrmed in his a priori argument for the Divine existence, the properties of a sub- stance or being ; because properties are of the nature of the substance, and have the same kind of objective reality with it. Space and time cannot be classed with either material or spiritual substance. And there are only these two kinds. A substance possesses properties. But space has only one property, namely, extension. This is not sufficient to con- stitute it a material substance ; and it is sufficient to show that it is not spiritual substance, because this is unextended. Time, again, has no one of the properties of matter, and thus is still further off from material substance than space is. And it certainly has none of the properties of mind.' ^ It should be noticed that it is not because space and time are invisible that they are not substances^ or entities. An entity may be invisible. The forces of NATURE OP GOD. 159 Plato (Sophist. 247, 248) defines substance, or objective being, as " that which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another ; " or " that which has the power of doing or suffering in relation to some other existing thing." Hence he says that "the definition of being or substance is simply, power." Now, whether sub- stance be defined as entity having properties, or as entity having power, God is a substance. He has attributes which he manifests in his works of creation and providence ; and he has power which he exerts in the universe of matter and mind. He makes an impression upon the human soul, as i-eally as matter and its forces do upon the human body. " I remembered God and was troubled," Ps. 77 : 3. Ter- ror in the soul because of God, is as vivid a form of con- sciousness as any physical sensation ; and if the objective existence of matter is proved by external sensation, the ob- jective existence of God is proved by internal consciousness. Man is not terrified by a nonentity. The Scriptures justify the application of the idea of substance to God, by denom- inating him " I am," Exod. 3 : 14 ; and '^ he who is," Kev. nature are invisible, but they are entities, not abstract ideas or forms of thought. They make an impresBiou upon substances. They are efficient powers. They an- swer to Plato's definition of substance. The force of gravity is like time in hav- ing none of the geometrical dimensions, but it cannot, like time in Kant's philos- ophy, be explained as a mere form of the understanding, the mode in which the human mind conceives. Gravity is a substantial or material force, and consti- tutes a part of the material universe. It is inmsible matter ; matter without form, but not without entity. The same is true of all the other forces of inor- ganic nature. Matter has an invisible and formless mode of existence in organic nature, as well as in inorganic. The principle of animal life is real entity, but it is without the geometrical dimensions, and is as invisible as the spirit of man, or of God. But it is matter, not spirit. The bodily life, the so-called animal soul of a dog ia nothing but matter. It constitutes no part of the moral and spiritual world. It dies with the body which it inhabits and vitalizes. It was the overlooking of the distinction between matter as visible and invisible, that led Butler, Wesley, Agassiz and others, to favor the doctrine of animal immortality. Because the dog's Boul is invisible like that of man, they concluded that it is immortal like his. But an invisible principle may be as perishable as a visible body ; and must be, in case it is a material or physical principle ; in case it belongs to the world of matter, not of spirit. 3 60 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). 1:4; and by attributing to him " godhead " (-Seor?;?), Coloss. 2 : 9, and a " nature" {(f>vy]) from the first and second, because he recognizes both their dis- tinctness of person and their unity and identity of nature. The circle of the divine self -consciousness is now complete. By the two acts of perception, and the three resulting dis- tinctions, the eternal Being lias made himself his own ob- ject, and has perceived that he has done so. And there is real trinality in the unity. For the subject-ego is not the object-ego ; the first "form of God" is not the second "form of God." And the third distinction who reunites these two in the perception of their identity of essence, is neither the subject-ego nor the object-ego; the third " form of God" is not the first or the second form, and yet is consubstantial with them both. The third distinction does not, like the first, posit an object, but only perceives the act of positing. There is, consequently, no second object ihdX requires to be reunited in the unity of essence. Hence the two acts and the three resulting distinctions are sufficient to complete the circle of self-consciousness.* ' For a fuller development of this subject upon this line, see note in Shedd : History of Doctrine, L 3C5-368 ; Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity, pp. 8, 9. Also Augustine : Trinity, XIV. vi,-viii. Guericke ; Church History, 203. Muller : On Sin, II. 136 sq. Billroth : Religions-Philosophie, § 89, 90. Wilberforce : Incarnation, III. Kidd : On the Trinity (Eternal Sonship) ; with Candliah's Introduction. Candlish ; Fatherhood of God. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, I. 413-462. Kurtz: Sacred History, §2. Christlieb : Modern Doubtj Lect. III. Passavant : Wille, p. 4. NATURE OF GOD. 189 Thus the Divine personality, in the light thrown upon it by the revealed doctrine of the trinity, is seen to be wholly independent of the finite. God does not struggle out into self-consciousness by the help of the external universe. Be- fore that universe was created, and in the solitude of his own eternity and self-sufficiency, he had within his own es- sence all the conditions of self-consciousness. And after the worlds were called into being, the divine personality remained the same immutable self-knowledge, unaffected by anything in his handiwork. " Oh Light Eterne, sole in thyself that dwellest, Sole knowest thyself, and known unto thyself, And knowing, lovest and smilest on thyself ! " Dante : Paradise, xxxiii. 125. This analysis shows that self-consciousness is trinal^ while mere consciousness is only dual. The former implies three distinctions ; the latter only two. When I am conscious of a tree, there is first, a subject, namely, my mind ; and sec- ondly, an object, namely, the tree. This is all there is iu the process of consciousness. But when I am conscious of myself, there is first, a subject, namely, my mind as a con- templating mind ; there is, secondly, an object, namely, my mind as a contemplated mind ; and, thirdly, there is still another subject, namely, my mind as perceiving that these two prior distinctions are one and the same mind. In this trinal process of self -consciousness, there is much m^ore than in the dual process of simple consciousness. The earlier pantheism of Spinoza differs from the later of Ilegel, in combating the doctrine of the divine personal- ity altogether, and in any form whatsoever. Hegel, as has been previously noticed, would obtain a kind of personality for the Infinite through the medium of the world, but Spinoza maintains that the Infinite, from the very idea of it, cannot be personal. If it should become so, it would cease to be infinite. He condensed his view in the dictum ; 190 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). ''oinnis determinatio est negatio;'' all limitation is nega- tion. A person in order to be such, must distinguish himself from something that is not himself. If God is personal, he must therefore be able to say that he is not the world. In personally defining himself, he sets limits to himself; and if he sets limits, he is not unlimited, and if not unlimited, not infinite. If God and the universe, says Spinoza, are two different substances, and exclude each other in the way the theist maintains, then God is not the All, and therefore not the Infinite. God plus the universe would be greater than God minus the universe. This reasoning proceeds upon a false idea and definition of the Infinite. It confounds the Infinite with the All. The two are wholly diverse. In the first place, the Infinite is the perfect. Consequently, it excludes all modes of ex- istence that are imperfect. But the All includes these. Secondly, infinite qualities of necessity exclude finite quali- ties ; but the All does not. One and the same being cannot be both infinite and finite. But the fact that a being is not finite and in this sense limited, does not make him finite. This is the obvious fallacy in the pantheistic position, that if God can distinguish himself as other than the world, and as not the world, he is not infinite. A limitation of this kind is necessary in order that he may be the Infinite. To say that a being is not finite ; to " determine " him by this " negative " (using Spinoza's dictum); is the very way to say that he is infinite. An infinite power cannot be a finite power; an infinite knowledge cannot be a finite knowledge. A physical force able to lift one hundred pounds cannot be a force able to lift only fifty pounds, any more than one hundred can be only fifty. The Infinite, therefore, does not like the All, comprise all varieties of being, possible and actual, limited and unlimited, good and evil, perfect and imperfect, matter and mind. The Infinite can create the finite, but cannot be the finite. Thirdly, tlie Infinite is simple ; the All is complex. Everything in the former is NATURE OF GOD. 191 homogeneous. The contents of the latter are heterogeneous. Fourthly, the Infinite is without parts, and indivisible; the All is made up of parts, and is divisible. The All, consequently, is a pseudo-Infinite, and to assert that it is greater than the simple Infinite is the same error that is committed in mathematics, when it is asserted that an infinite number plus a vast finite number is greater than the simple infinite. Mathematical infinity is neither in- creased nor diminished by the addition or subtraction of millions of units. In like manner, it is no increase of infinite and absolute perfection, to add a certain amount of finite imperfection to it. God's essence, for example, is eternal, immutable, and necessary ; the substance of the finite universe is temporal, mutable, and contingent. The former onust be, and cannot be conceived of as non-ex- istent ; the latter may or may not be. Xow, to add such an inferior and secondary species of being to the absolutely perfect and eternal essence of God, and regard it as in- creasing his eternity and immensity, or to subtract it and assert that it diminishes his eternity and immensity, is ir- rational. God's power again is infinite. This omnipotence would not be made more mighty, by endowing it with that infinitely less degree of power which resides in a man or an angel. The same is true of infinite knowledge. God's omniscience would not be made greater, by the addition of a narrow finite intelligence. To add contingent being to necessary being, does not make the latter any more neces- sary. To add imperfect being to perfect being, does not make the latter any more perfect. *'God," says Miiller (Sin, I. 14), '^ is a universe in himself, whether the world exist or not." The error of confounding the Infinite with the All has been committed b}^ writers who are far from pantheism, in their intention. The phraseology of Edwards is sometimes open to objection, in that he appears to combine God with the universe in one system of being, thereby making him a 192 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). part of the All, and obliterating the distinction between In- finite and finite existence. " If the deitj^," he says (Nature of Virtue), " is to be looked upon as within that system of beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or be- longing to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the system, and the cA^^part of it ; if it be proper to call him depart who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom, and without whom, all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence." This quali- fication of his remark, shows that Edwards had doubts whether it is proper to speak of one universal system of being; what he elsewhere calls "being in general;" of which God is a part.' In another place (End in Creation), he speaks still more unguardedly, when he says that " the first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect Being in general, and comprehends universal existence." This, if found in Spinoza, would mean that God is the All. A similar confounding of God with the All is found in Ed- wards on the Will (I. iii.), where he remarks that " there is a great absurdity in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying being in general." Here, " God " and " being in general " are convertible terms. Andrew Euller (Calvinism and Socinianism, Letter VII.) says that " God must be allowed to form the far greater proportion, if I may so speak, of the whole system of being." He probably borrowed this from Edwards. This is the same error that appears in the Greek pantheism, which regarded TO €V as TO Trdv. Corner (Christian Doctrine, I. 319) falls into the same error. " "We have previously regarded God as the infinite original Being or Essence — indeed as the original All of * It is also to be observed, that God cannot properly be denominated an object of benevolence or benevolent regard. Only a created being can be such. We bless God in the sense of adoring him, bat not in the sense of bestowing a bless- ing upon him. We do not wish him well, as we do or should all creatures. God is above this. To wish a being well, implies the possibility of his not being NATURE OF GOD. 193 being. God is originally the totality of being, and there- fore a universality attaches to him, inasmuch as somehow all being must originally be included in him." Cudworth (Int. Syst., TV. xvii.) fiuds the doctrine that God is All, in the Orphic poetry, but would interpret it in an allowable sense ; referring to such texts as 1 Cor. 15 : 28, " God is all in all ; " Acts 17: 28, "In him we have our being." But he thinks that the Stoics, and some others, held the doctrine in a "gross" pantheistic sense: there being " Spinozism be- fore Spinoza." Hamilton and Mansel confound the Infinite with the All, and employ this spurious idea in proving the position that the personal Infinite involves limitation and self-contradiction. If God distinguishes himself from the imiverse, then God minus the universe is less than God plus the universe. Hamilton, in his letter to Calderwood, ex- plicitly defines the Infinite as to ev kol ttclv. He also con- founds the Infinite with the Indefinite or Unlimited. See his list of antinomies, in Bowen's Hamilton, p. 522. The personality of the Essence or Godhead, must be dis- tinguished from that of a Person in the Essence or Godhead. Tlie existence of three divine persons in the divine essence results in the self-consciousness of the essence. This gen- eral self-consciousness of the triune Godhead must not be confounded with the particular individual consciousness of the Eather as Father, of the Son as Son, of the Spirit as Spirit. The person alitj^ of the trinity is not the same as tliat of one of its persons. The personality of a trinitarian per- son consists in the fatherhood, or the sonship, or the pro- cession, as the case may be. But the personality of the trinity consists not in any one of these individual peculiari- ties, but in the result of all three. The three hypostatical consciousnesses make one self-consciousness, as the three persons constitute one essence. The personality of one of the persons, the Greek trini- tarians denominated l8i6T7]v hia^KOiv. The Westminster Larger Catechism (105) mentions forty-six sins as varieties of atheism ; such as " ignorance of God, foi*- getfulness, disbelief, carnality, lukewarmness," etc. Milton (Samson Agonistes, 296) describes practical atheism : " For of such doctrine, never was there school But the heart of the fool, And no man therein doctor, but himself." The reason why the Scriptures make no provision against speculative atheism by syllogistic reasoning is, that syllogis- tic reasoning starts from a premise that is more obvious and certain than the conclusion drawn from it, and they do not concede that any premise necessary to be laid down in order to draw the conclnsion that there is a Supreme being, is more intuitively certain than the conclusion itself. To prove is, "e re certa incerta confirmare." "An argu- ment is something clearer than the proposition to be main- tained," says Charnocke. Bnt the judgment, " There is a God," is as universal, natural, and intuitive as the judg- ment, " There is a cause." Tlie latter judgment has been combated (by Hume, e.g.), as well as the former. And the principal motive for combating the latter is, the invalida- tion of the former. Men deny the reality of a cause, only for the purpose of disproving the reality of a First Cause. Another reason for the absence of a syllogistical argu- ment for the Divine existence in scripture, is suggested by Stillingfleet (Origines Sacrae, III. i.). He remarks that in the early ages of the world, the being of God was more universally acknowledged by reason of the proximity in time to the beginning of the world, and to such events as the flood, and the desti-uction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Hence Moses found little atheism to contend with. Fur- INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 197 thermore, the miracles connected witli Moses's own mission rendered arguments for the divine existence unnecessary. Under Sinai, God proved his existence by his miraculous presence to the senses. The evidence relied upon in the scriptures for the Divine existence is derived from the immediate and universal coti- sciousness of th^ human soul, as this is awakened and de- veloped by the works of creation and providence. St. Paul has given the fullest account of the subject, o£ any inspired writer, in Eom. 1 : 19, 20, compared with Acts 17 : 2^28 ; 14: : 16, 17. The positions which he lays down are the fol- lowing : 1. The pagan possesses a knowledge of God as invisible {ra dopara avrov) ; as eternal (affito? 8uva/Mi<;) ; as omnipo- tent {al'Bcof; hifvajXi^i) ; as supreme (-SeiOTT??) — sovereignty not godhead (A. V.), which would require ^eorrff; as in Col. 2: 9; as holy in revealing wrath (0^7^) against sin; as one God — there being only one almighty, supreme, and eternal being; as benevolent: Acts 17:25; 14:16; Eom. 2:4. Only the more general unanalyzed idea of God is attributed to the pagan, because there are degrees of knowledge, and his is the lowest. The unity, invisibility, onmipotence, eternity, retributive justice, and benevolence of the Divine being are represented by St. Paul as knowable by man as man, and as actually known by him in greater or less de- gree. 2. The pagan, thougli having an imperfect, yet has a valid and trustworthy knowledge of God. It is denominated aX'^^etav, Rom. 1 : 18. It is sufficient to constitute a foun- dation for responsibility, and the imputation of sin. Idol- atry is charged against the pagan as guilt, because in prac- tising it he is acting against his better knowledge, Rom. 1 : 20. Sensualit}'- is guilt for the same reason, Rom. 1 : 32. Unthankfulness is guilt, Rom. 1 : 21. Failure to worsliip tlie true God is guilt, Rom. 1 : 21. Accordingly, the West- minster Confession (I. i.) affirms that "the light of nature 198 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave man inexcusable." Sin is chargeable upon the heathen, because thej have not lived up to the light of nature. Any man is guilt}^ who knows more than he performs. The Divine esti- mate of human duty, and the Divine requirement, proceeds upon the created capacities of the human soul, not upon the use that man makes of them. Because the pagan was origi- nally endowed with the idea of one God, supreme, almighty, and holy, he is said by St. Paul to know God, and is con- sequently obligated to love and serve him so far as he knows him. The fact that the pagan's sin has vitiated this original idea, does not release him from this obligation, or prove that he is destitute of the idea, any more than the vice of man in Christendom, and the moral ignorance that ensues from it, release him from obligation. The foundation for these statements of St. Paul is the fact that the idea of God is natural to the human mind, like the ideas of space and time, and the mathematical ideas of a point, a line, a circle, etc. These latter ideas are always assumed as more or less present and valid in human intelli- gence. The degree of their development in consciousness varies in different races and civilizations; bnt, in some de- gree, they are universal ideas. An " innate " idea is one that results from the constitution of the mind. It is not a fixed quantity in human consciousness, but varies with the mental development. The idea of God is rational in its source. It is a product of the reason, not of the sense. In this respect, it is like the mathematical ideas. It is an intuition of the mind, not a dedu<;tion or conclusion from an impression npon the senses by an external object. St. Paul describes the nature of the perception by the participle voovfieva, which denotes the direct and immediate intuition of reason. The invisible attributes of God, which are not objects of the senses, and are not cognizable by them, are clearly seen by the mind INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 199 (z/ov?), says St. Paul. Tlie reason is stimulated to act by the . notices of the senses; but when thus stimulated, it perceives/- by its own operation truths and facts which the senses them^ selves never perceive. The earth and sky make the same sensible impression upon the organs of a brute that they do upon those of a man; but the brute never discerns the "invisible things" of God; the " eternal power and god- hood." There must always be something innate and subjective, in order that the objective may be efficient. The objects of sense themselves would make no conscious impression, if there were not five senses in man upon which to impress themselves. They make no conscious impression upon a rock. In like manner, the order, design, and unity of exter- nal nature would not suggest the idea of a Supreme being, if that idea were not subjective to man. *' Unless education and culture were preceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative predisposition, there w^ould be nothing for education and culture to work upon." ISTitzsch : Chris- tian Doctrine, § 7. Turrettin (III. ii. 5) asserts that even speculative atheism is only apparent and seeming, because there is in man " an in- nate knowledge of God, and consciousness of divinity (sensus divinitatis) which can no more be wanting in him, than a rational intellect ; and which he can no more get rid of than he can get rid of himself." Calvin (Inst., I. iii.) argues " that the human mind is naturally endowed with the knowl- edge of God." Compare Charnocke : Discourse I. (in initio). Pearson (Creed, Art. I.) remarks that 'Sve shall always find all nations of the world more prone to idolatry than to atheism, and readier to multiply than to deny the deity." Socrates (Pepublic, II. 378) would not have the mythologi- cal narratives concerning the gods made known to the young, because of their tendency to destroy the natural belief in the deity. " Neither if we mean our future guardians of the state to regard the habit of quarrelling as dishonorable, 200 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). should anything be said of the wars in lieaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue." The second book of the Republic enun- ciates ver}^ clearly the view of Socrates concerning the Divino nature, and shows that he regai'ded the knowledge of God as natural to man See especially, II. 379-383. St. Paul indi- cates the subjective and innate quality of the idea of God, by employing the verbs aTroKakvirroy and ^avepoo} respect- ing it. These imply that the source of the perception is internal, not external. It is a revelation in the human con- sciousness, and through the constitutional structure of the human intellect. Such verbs as these are never employed to describe tlie outwai'd impressions of the senses. The teaching of St. Paul respecting the innate idea is con- firmed by that of the pagan philosophers themselves. Cud- worth has discussed the heathen theology, as repi'esented by Greece and Kome, with immense learning and great candor, lie proves by abundant quotations, 1, That many of the pagan philosophers were "theists," that is, monotheists, and acknowledged one supreme God. 2, That the multiplicity of gods, of which they speak, does not denote many eternal and self-existent deities, but only inferior divinities produced by tlie Supiieme being, and subject to him : the word "gods" being emplof)'ed by them somewhat as it is in Scripture, to signify angels, princes and magistrates. Intellectual System, I. 370 sq. 417 sq. Ed. Tegg. The Greek and Ponian monotheism is well expressed in the following remark of Cicero (De Legibus, I. 8). " There is no animal excepting man that has any notion of God; and among men there is no tribe so uncivilized and savage (fera) wliicli, even if it does not know what kind of a god (qualem deum) it ought to have, does not know that it ought to have one." Tliirlwall (Flistory, XXII.) says that " Socrates acknowledged one Supreme being as the framer and preserver of the universe ; used the singular and plural number indiscriminately concerning the object of his adora- INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 201 tion ; and when he endeavored to reclaim one of his friends who had scoffed at sacrifices and divinations, it was, accord- ing to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exchisively from the works of one creator." 1. The natural monotheism of the pagan is proved by the names given to the Supreme being. The term for God is identical in languages of the same family. Says Miiller (Science of Language, 2d series, X.), '' Zeus, the most sacred name in Greek mythology, is the same word as Dyaus in Sanscrit, Jovis or Ju in Jupiter, in Latin, Tiw in Anglo- Saxon, preserved in Tiwsdaeg, Tuesday, the day of the Eddie god Tyr, and Zio in Old-High German. This word was framed once and once only ; it was not borrowed by the Greek from the Hindus, nor by the Romans and Ger- mans from the Greeks. It must have existed before the ancestors of those primeval races became separate in lan- guage and religion ; before they left their common pastures to migrate to the right hand and to the left." Says DeVere (Studies in English, p. 10), " the term for God is identical in all the Lido-European languages — the Indie, Iranic, Cel- tic, Hellenic, Italic, Teutonic, and Sclavonic." Grimm and Curtius (Griechische Etymologic, § 269) give this etymology of Zeus. When the name for the Supreme being is different, because the language is of another family, the same attribute or characteristic of supei'iority and supremacy over inferior divinities is indicated by it. The same deity whom the Greeks and Roman s called Zeus or J upiter, the Babylonians derTOTninated Belus and Bel, the Egj^ptians Ammon, the Persians ICtliras, the Xorth American Indian the Great Spirit. See Studien und Kritiken, 184:9. 2. This natural monotheism is proved by the title- in the singular number given to the Supreme divinity, Solon (Herodotus, I. 32) denominates him o ^Seo?, rb S-eiov. Soph- ocles speaks of 6 fiiyaf; <5e6?. Plato often denominates him o ^609. Other titles are, o Srjficovpjot;^ 6 rjye/xMVj 6 irpwrof; -Seo?, o nrpcdTo^ vov^, 6 v7raTo<; tcpeiovrcov (Homer), 'qirpovola 202 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD> (Plutarch). Horace (Carm., I. xii.) describes the Supreme deity as the universal Father, to whom there is nothing " simile aut secundum." " The name of one Supreme God," says Calvin (Inst., I. x.), '^has been universally known and celebrated. For those who used to worship a multitude of deities, wlienever they spake according to the genuine sense of nature, used simply the name of God in the singular number, as though they were contented with one God." The early christian Apologists universally maintained the position, that the human mind is naturally and by creation monotheistic. Tertullian (Apologeticus, 17) says, " God proves himself to be God, and the one only God, by the fact that he is known to all nations. The consciousness of God is the original dowry of the soul ; the same in Egypt, in Syria, and in Pontus. For the God of the Jews is the one whom the souls of men call their God. The Christians wor- ship one God, the one whom ye pagans naturally know ; at whose lightnings and thunders ye tremble, at whose benefits ye rejoice. We prove the divine existence by the witness of the soul itself, which, although confined in the prison of the body, although enervated by lusts and passions, although made the servant of false goods, yet when it recovers itself as from a surfeit or a slumber, and is in its proper sober condition, calls God by this name [deus, not Jupiter, Apollo, etc.J because it is the proper name of the true God. * Great God,' 'Good God,' and 'God grant,' are words in every mouth. Finally, in pronouncing these words, it looks not to the Koman capital, but to heaven ; for it knows the dwelling-place of the true God, because from him and from thence it descended." Clement of Alexandria, by numer- ous quotations from pagan writers, proves that there is much monotheism in them; which he denominates " Greek plagiarism from the Hebrews." Stromata, V. xiv. Lac- tantius (Institutions, I. 5) quotes the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Yirgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen poets knew the unity of God. He then cites Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 203 Seneca, to sliow that the pagan philosophers had the doc- trine. Augustine (De Civitate, IV. xxiv.-xxxi. ; VII. vi. ; VIII. i.-xii.) takes the same "view of pagan theology. " Varro " says Augastine, " while reprobating the popular belief in many divinities, thought that worship should be confined to one God ; although he calls this one God the soul of the world." Varro states that the liomans for more than one hundred and seventy years worsliipped without images. Minucius Felix (Octavius, 18) argues in a manner like that of Tertullian. " Audio vulgus, cum ad caelum manus tendunt nihil aliud quam denm dicuiit, et : ' Deus magnus est,'et; ' Deus verus est,' et ; 'Si deus dederit.' Vulgi iste naturalis sermo est, an christian! confitentis oratio? Et qui Jovem principem volunt, falluntur in nomine, sed de unapotestate consentiunt." Eusebins (Praepai-atio Evan- gelica, XL 13) quotes from the Tiniaeus, to prove that Plato agrees with Moses in teaching the unity of God. In the Praeparatio Evangelica (XI. 1), Eusebius maintains that " Platonis philosophiam, in iis quae omnium maxime neces- saria sunt cum ilia Hebraeorum convenire." Modern au- thorities agree with the Christian apologist. " Among all nations," says Kant (Pure Reason, p. 363), " through the darkest polytheism, glimmer some faint sparks of monothe- ism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from re- flection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the human understanding." That monotheism prevailed somewhat in Abraham's time in races other than the Hebrew, and in countries other than Palestine, is evident from the following Biblical data. Ilagar, the Egyptian, " called the name of the Lord tliat spake unto her, Thou God seest me," Gen. 16 : 13. Jeho- vah appears to Abimelech, the Philistine king, and Abime- lech said, '* Lord, wilt thou slay also a righteous nation ? " Gen. 20 : 3-8. Pharaoh, the Egyptian, speaks of Joseph as "a man in whom the spirit of God is," Gen. 41 : 38. Jethro, the priest of Midian, gives to Moses his son-in-law, 204: THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). the counsel of a god-fearing man. Ex. 18 : 9-12, 19-23. Balaam, in Mesopotamia, enunciates the doctrine of one God the sovereign ruler of all. JSTumbers 24: 16. Ruth, a Mo- abitess, speaks of God the Lord, Euth 1 : 16, 17. It is true that in some instances, as in those of Hagar and Ruth, this knowledge of God might have been received from those with whom they associated, but after subtracting these, it is still evident that considerable monotheism was current, particularly among the races descending from Shem. The Persian religion contains many monotheistic ele- ments. Cudworth (Yol. I. 471) remarks that upon the au- thority of Eubulus, cited by Porphyry, " we may conclude that notwithstanding the sun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a god, yet Zoroaster and the ancient Magi, who were best initiated in the Mithraic mysteries, asserted another deity superior to the sun, for the true Mithras, such as was TrdvTcov TroiTyTT^?, koI Trarrjp^ the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world, whereof the sun is a part." Similarly, Prideaux (Connection, I. iv.) says that Zoroaster reformed the Magian religion, by introducing a principle superior to the two Magian principles of good and evil, namely '^ one supreme God who created both light and darkness.'' Prideaux thinks that Zoroaster ob- tained the suggestion from Isa. 45 : 5-7. Herodotus (I. 131) asserts that the Persians have no images of the gods, no temples, no altars, and consider the use of them a sign of folly. Compare Rawlinson : Herodotus I. v. A writer in the Princeton Review, Oct 1869, affirms that the coun- trymen of Cyrus and Darius were not polytheists, and did not worship fire, or'any other idol, but one almighty God. The Persian monotheism was undoubtedly owing in part to Biblical influences. The captivity of Judah, and the residence of the Jews at Babylon, must have brought the Hebrew religion into contact with those of Assyria, Baby- lonia, and Persia. Jewish communities also flourished at INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 205 several great centres in central Asia, subsequent to the captivity. See Merivale: Roman History, LIY. But while tliis element of tradition is conceded, it does not explain tlie entire fact. The natural monotheism of the human mind remains a great and underlying factor in the problem. According to John 1 : 4, there is a natural apprehension of God ; and according to John 1 : 5, there is a sinful mis- apprehension of him. The Logos was "the light of men," and " the darkness comprehended not " this light. The fii'st statement I'elates to the innate idea of God given by creation ; the second, to the innate idea as vitiated by sin. The vitiation of an idea is not the eradication of it. If the idea of God were absolutely extinct in the human spirit, religion would be impossible. But man in all the varieties of his condition, has a religion of some kind in which a su- perior being is recognized. Hence, St. Paul does not ex- cept any portion of the human family from his description of human nature as furnished with religious ideas. His statement is sweeping and universal, that " when men knew God they glorified him not as God," and therefore are with- out excuse. It has been objected to this, that some tribes of men have been discovered destitute of the idea of God. But when the alleged fact has been investigated, it has been found that a very low grade of knowledge has been mistaken for blank ignorance. In some instances, the statement is that of an ignorant witness, and is contradicted by an intelligent one. Ben AH, Livingstone's guide, told Livingstone that the Ma- kondi " had no idea of a deity ; that they knew nothing of a deity, or a future state; had no religion except a belief in medicine ; and prayed to their mothers when in distress or dying." But Livingstone, on going among the Makondi, found them saying that " in digging for gum-copal, none may be found on one day, but God (Mungu) may give it to 206 THEOLOGY (DOCTRLNK OF GOD). US the next." h This showed me," he says, " that the con- sciousness of God's existence was present to their minds." Livingstone's Last Journals, p. 38. Respecting the African races generally, Macdonald (Africana, L 67) remarks : " We should say that their religion and its worship is practically polytheism. Beyond their polytheism, their language con- tains a few expressions that remind xis of pantheism, and a great many that speak of monotheism." Says Quatrefages (Human Species, XXXV.), " the result of my investigations is exactly the opposite to that to which Lubbock and St. Hilaire have arrived. Obliged in the course of my investi- gation to review all human races, I have sought atheism in the lowest as well as the highest. I have nowhere met it except in individuals, or in more or less limited schools, such as those which existed in Europe in tlie last century, or which may still be seen at the present day." The existence of an idea in the mental constitution, and its development in consciousness, must be distinguished f I'om each other. The idea of God is not so fully developed in one man or nation, as it is in another. Iso two men even in a Christian land are exactly alike in this respect. But their mental constitution is the same. One man has a moi'e impressive sense of the divine justice than another; an- other has a deeper consciousness of the divine mercy ; an- other of the divine wisdom. The idea of God has immense contents, and the varieties of its unfolding are innumera- ble^__^^^postasy from God and sin hinder tlie evolution of Ahe innate idea. They also confuse and corrupt its develop- ment in consciousness, so that a deeply immoral individual or nation, will exliibit less of a true knowledge of the deity than a comparatively moral individual or nation. The difference in the amount of moral intelligence shown in the history of the human family, consequently, is not due to any original difference in the structure of the human spirit, or in the constitutional provision which the Creator has made for a kn9wledge of himself, but to the greater or less de- INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 207 gree of human depravity. In proportion as a people are hostile to the innate idea of God, and do not " like to re- tain " it in consciousness, they are given over to a reprobate mind, and the idea either slumbers, or is mutilated and altered. The *' truth of God," that is, the true view and conception of God, is "changed into a lie;" that is, into polytheism, or pantheism, or atheism. Kom. 1 : 25, 28. The imbruted condition of the idolatrous world does not disprove the existence of the innate idea of the deity. A fundamental idea in the human constitution may be greatly undeveloped, or vitiated, and still be a reality. ISTo one will deny that the ideas of space and time belong as truly to the rational understanding of a Hottentot, as they did to that of Plato. But it would not follow, that because the Hot- tentot has not elicited the ideas of space and time by re- flection upon their nature and bearings, they are extinct M'ithin his mind. The axioms of geometry are as much in- tuitive truths for the Esquimaux, as they were for J^ewton ; but if they should be stated to the Esquimaux in words, his first look might be that of blank vacancy. In truth, it re- quires a longer time and more effort to bring the savage man to consciousness respecting geometi^ical truth, than it does to bring him to consciousness respecting the idea of God. The missionary, contrary to the view of those who^ assert that civilization must precede evangelization, finds that he can elicit the ideas of God, the soul, of sin and guilt, sooner and easier than he can the ideas of mathematics and' philosophy. Socrates, in the Platonic dialogue entitled Meno, takes a slave-boy who is utterly unacquainted with geometry, and by putting questions to him in his wonderful obstetric method, develops out of the boy's rational intelligence the geometrical proposition and demonstration, that the square of the diagonal contains twice the space of the square of the side. If the proposition had been stated to the boy in this form at first, he would have stared in utter ignorance. 20S THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). But being led along step by step, he comes out into the conclusion with as clear a perception as that of Socrates himself. Compare Cicero : Tusculan Questions, I. 24. To affirm, by reason of the undeveloped condition of the geo- metrical ideas in this slave's mind, that he was destitute of them, would be as erroneous as it is to deny the existence of the idea of the deity in every human soul, because of the dormant state in which it is sometimes found. Reason is more spontaneously active in some minds tlian in others ; but reason is alike the possession of every man. Pascal at the age of twelve discovered alone by himself, and without any mathematical instruction, the axioms and definitions of geometry, and actually worked out its theorems as far as the thirty-second proposition of Euclid. The doctrine of an innate idea and knowledge of God does not conflict with that of human depravity, and cannot be adduced in proof of the position that there is some nat- ural holiness in man. Natural religion, or the light of nat- ure, is not of the nature of virtue or Iioliness. This for two reasons. 1. A rational being may know that there is one God, and that he ought to be obeyed and glorified, and yet render no obedience or worship. The lost angels are an example. " Thou believest that there is one God ; thou doest well, the devils also believe and tremble," James 2 : 19. This natural knowledge of God is in the understand- ing only ; not in the will and affections. It is consequently not an element in the moral character ; but only a charac- teristic of the rational constitution. 2. Secondly, the idea of God is not man's product, but that of God. S^. Paul employs the phrase ^eo? e^avipoae, meeting it. frhe Creator is the author and cause of this knowledge in the creature. Whatever worth or merit, fierefore, there may be in this mental possession, is due to God not to man. Some* theologians have attempted to overthrow the doctrine of depravity, and establish that of natural virtue and merit, upon the ground of the lofty ideas INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 209 of God, freedom, and immortality, in the human spirit/ Were these ideas self-originated ; did man, being at first a tabula rasa, come by tliem through a laborious reasoning of his own, there would be some ground for the view. But the idea of God is a gift of God, as truly as any other gift proceeding from the divine hand. " That which may be known of God ; " all the religious knowledge which the hu- man spirit possesses by virtue of its constitution ; is a man- ifestation or revelation, for God has '* showed " it unto man. Tliat mode of human consciousness by which man is immediately and intuitively aware of his Maker, is as really the product of God, as is the breath in the nostrils. " Unser Gottesbewustsein ist imnier, wenn es ein wahres ist, auch ein von Gott bewirktes," says Twesten. All ego- tism, therefore, all merit in view of the lofty ideas in human nature, is excluded by the doctrine of creation and provi- dence, as much as it is by the doctrine of justification by grace. A man might as rationally claim that his faculty for perceiving geometrical truths is due to himself; and is of the nature of virtue, and rewardable, as to claim that his in- tuitive idea of God is a product of his agency for which he deserves the rewards of the future life. The assertion that the idea of the deity is the product of education, and not innate, is disproved by the following considerations. 1. The savage races have no education in this reference, but they have the idea. 2. If theism could be taught by priests and interested parties, then atheism could be taught by skeptics. But it has been found impossible to educate any considerable portion of the human family into disbelief of the divine existence. Atheism is sporadic, never gen- eral, or even local. 3. The terror before God which man- feels as a transgressor, is a strong motive for him to banish, the idea from his mind, if it could be done ; and it could be ^ Channing is one of the ablest, and most eloquent of them. See his sermon on Likeness to God. 14 210 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). done, if its existence depended merely upon instruction. Cease to instruct, and it would cease to exist. The more profoundly and carefully the forms of human consciousness are investigated, the stronger becomes the evi- dence for the Divine existence. Atheism is refuted by an accurate and exhaustive psycliology. This is apparent from an examination of both consciousness and self-consciousness. 1. In the first place, a proof of the Divine existence is found in man's Ood-conscioicsness^ considered as a universal and abiding form of human consciousness. Consciousness implies a real object that is correlative to it. There cannot be a universal and abiding consciousness of a non-entity. Sensuous consciousness proves the existence of a sensuous object, namely, matter. The shadow implies the substance. The same is true of that pai'ticular mode of liuman con- sciousness denominated the God-consciousness. If there were no God, this form of consciousness would be inexpli- cable, except upon the supposition of a mental mockery, or hallucination. There would be consciousness, without an object of consciousness. But it is too universal and con- stant, to be accounted for by imagination and self-delusion. Consciousness is alwaj's upon the side of theism, never upon that of atheism. Multitudes of men have been conscious that there is a God ; but not a single individual was ever conscious that there is not a God. Says La Bruyere (Les Caracteres, c. 16), " Je sens qu'il y a un dieu, et je ne sens pas qu'il n'j^en ait point." 2. In the second place, a proof of the Divine existence is found in man's self-consciousfiess. This, also, like man's God-consciousness, logically implies God's objective exist- ence. The reality of man as a finite ego involves that of an infinite ego. When I speak the word '' I," I certainly distinguish between mj^own substance and that of the ma- terial world around me, and thereby imply that there is such a world. It would be absurd to distinguish myself from mere non-entity. Now, as in the sense-consciousness INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 211 the existence of the outer world is necessarily implied, so in the self-consciousness the existence of God is implied. The consciousness of diversity and of alterity, in both cases, supposes the equal reality of the subject that cognizes and the object cognized. If the human spirit, by immediate self-consciousness, knows that it is a distinct individual self, and is not God, this proves not onlj^ that it has the idea of God, but that this idea has objective validity ; precisely as when the human spirit is immediately conscious that it is another thing than the external world, this proves not only that it possesses the idea of the external world, but that this idea has objective validity. >&^-consciousness, therefore, leads inevitably to the be- lief in the being of God. If I am conscious of myself as a self, it follows that I must be conscious of God as another self. The evolution of the self-consciousness runs parallel, and keeps even pace with the evolution of the God-conscious- ness. If the former is narrow and meagre, the latter will be so likewise. If self-consciousness and self-knowledge o are deep and comprehensive, the consciousness and knowl- edge of God will agree with them. " Never im me, noverim te," says Bernard. '' If I knew myself better, I should know God better," might be truly said by every human being, from Plato down to the most degraded fetisli worshipper. Just as soon as any man can intelligently say, "7 am," he can and logically must say, " God is." Just as soon as he can intelligently say, "Jam evil," he can and logically must say, " (9f?(f is holy." The antithesis and con- trast is felt immediately, in both cases ; and an antithetic contrast implies two antithetic and contrasted objects. The logical implication of the consciousness of a sinful self, is the consciousness of a holy God. He who knows darkness knows light, and he who has the idea of wrong necessarily has the idea of right. The imbruted pagan who is cited to disprove the view we are upholding, has as little knowledge of himself d.^ he has of the deity. His self -consciousness is 212 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINB OF GOD). as slightly developed as his God-consciousness. If a low grade of a particular form of human consciousness may be instanced to prove the non-entity of the object correlated to it, then the low form, and often the temporary absence of self-consciousness in the savage, would prove that he is not an ego. Compare Calvin's remarks upon " the connection between a knowledge of God, and the knowledge of our- selves." Instit., I. i. It follows, therefore, that man has the same kind of evi- dence for the Divine existence, that he has for his own per- sonal existence : that of immediate consciousness. But this is the most convincing and invincible species of evidence. We have a stronger proof that we ourselves exist, than that the world of matter around us exists ; of the existence of the ego than of the non-ego. A man's own existence is the most certain of all things. Berkeley denied that matter is a real entity, but not that his own mind is sucli. Locke, who was by no means inclined to undervalue the force of argu- ments derived from matter and sensuous impressions, never- theless places the evidence of self-consciousness at the high- est point in the scale. "The real existence of other things without us can be evidenced to us only by our senses ; but our own existence is known to us by a certainty yet higher than our senses can give us of the existence of other things ; and this is internal perception, or self-consciousness, or in- tuition." Locke: Des Cartes' proof of the being of God. Life and Letters, Bohn's Ed., p. 316. In like manner. Smith (Immortality, YI.) contends that " we know a thousand times more distinctly what our souls are, than what our bodies are. For the former we know by an immediate converse with ourselves, and a distinct sense of their operations ; whereas all our knowledge of the body is little better than merely historical, which we gather up by scraps and piece- meal from doubtful and uncertain experiments which we make of them. But the notions which we have of a mind, that is, of something that thinks^ apjprehends^ reasons^ and INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 213 discourses, are so clear and distinct from all those notions which we can fasten upon a body, that we can easily con- ceive that if all body-being in the world were destroyed, we might then as well subsist as we do now." Why then, it will be asked, has the Divine existence been disputed and denied ? Men, it is objected, do not dispute or deny their own self-existence. To this we reply, that they do. The reality of an absolutely personal existence for the human spirit not only can be disputed and denied, but has been. Pantheism concedes only a phenomenal and transient reality to the individual ego. The individual man, it is asserted, exists only relatively and apparently, not ab- solutely and metaphysically. He has no substantial being different from that of the Infinite, but is only a modification of the eternal substance. His experiences ; his thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears ; in other words, his self-con- sciousness, is phenomenal, and from the philosophic point of view an illusion. It lasts only seventy years. The indi- vidual is not immortal ; he is absorbed in the infinite sub- stance of which he is only one out of millions of modes. Now this is really a denial of self -consciousness, and it has been maintained by a dialectics even more acute, and a ratio- cination even more concatenated than any that has been employed by atheism in the effort to disprove the Divine existence. Spinoza and Hegel have defended this theory, with an energy of abstraction, and a concentration of mental power, unequalled in the annals of human error. That the denial of a true and real self-consciousness for man has been comparatively an esoteric doctrine, and has not had so much currency as the atheistic doctrine, arises from tlic fact that man lias not so strong a motive for dis- puting his own existence, as he has for disputing that of the deity. Men are not so afraid of themselves as they are of their Maker, and Judge — although if they were fully aware of the solemn implications of a per- sonal and responsible existence, they would find little to 214 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). choose between denying their own existence and that of God. Monotheism was the original form of religion ; panthe- ism and polytheism were subsequent forms. This is proved by the Bible, and the earliest secular records. According to Genesis, man was created a monotheist. His first estate was his best estate. He lapsed from a higher to a lower grade of both character and knowledge.* Cicero (Tusculan Questions) remarks that " quo propius homo aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae essent vera cernebat." The statements of the early poets and philosophers respecting a golden age, express the belief that the primitive condition of man was a high, not a low one. The earlier Greek poetry is more monotheistic than the later. There is less polj^theism in the Homeric the- ology than in that of Greece at the time of St. Paul. The number of inferior deities is greater in the last age of mythology, than in its first period. Mliller (Literature of Greece, H. 1-3) affirms that " the Homeric poems, though belonging to the first period of Greek poetry, do not, never- theless exhibit the first form of the Greek religion. The conception of the gods as expressed in the Homeric poems Buits a time when war was the occupation of the people, and the age was that of heroes. Prior to this, the nation had been pastoral, and the religion then was that earlier form which was founded upon the same ideas as the chief religions of the East. It was a nature-worship that placed one deity, as the highest of all, at the head of the entire system, viz., the God of heaven and of light ; for this is the meaning of Zeus in Greek, and of Diu in Sanscrit." Prideaux (Connection, I. iii.) derives idolatry from a cor- ruption of the doctrine of a mediator^ which is contained in the religion of Noah and Abraham. The nations regarded the sun, moon, and stars, as the habitations of intelligences 1 Upon this subject see Van Oosterzee: Dogmatics, XXV.; Hardwick : Christ and other Masters ; Stillingfleet : Origines, IIL V. INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 215 who were secondary divinities or mediator gods. This was the first stage in the process. As the planets were visible only in the night, they invented images to represent them. This produced image-worship ; Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Apollo, etc. This was the second and final stage in the process. The religion of the Yedas, puerile as it is in many respects, is superior to the popular religion of India at the present time ; showing that there has been a lapse from a higher and better knowledge. The earlier Varuna-Vedic literature is more spiritual and truthful than the later Indra- Vedic. See Cook : Origins of Religion, Essay I. llawlin- son (Egypt, X.) maintains that the " primary doctrine of the esoteric religion of Egypt undoubtedly was, the real es- sentia] unity of the Divine nature. The gods of the popu- lar mythology were understood, in the esoteric religion, to be either personified attributes of the Deity, or parts of nature which he had created considered as informed and inspired by him." The first step in the coiTuption of the primitive monothe- ism, is pantheism. Here the unity of God is still retained, but the difference in essence between him and the universe is denied. The fact that the idea of the Divine unity is pre- served proves that this idea is natural to the hnman mind. The second step in the decline from the primitive monothe- ism, is polytheism. Here, the unity or the one substance of pantheism is subdivided, and the subdivisions are person- ified ; showing an endeavor to regain the personality of God, which has been lost in pantheism. Pantheism is too abstract and destitute of elements that appeal to man's feel- ings, to be a popular religion. It is the idolatry or false worship of the philosopher ; while polytheism is that of the common mind. For an account of the modification of monotheism outside of revelation, see Guizot: Meditations, First Series, YII. It is an error to represent, as Schelling does in his Phi- losophy of Mythology, the various mythological systems as 213 THEOLOGY (DOCTBINE OF GOD). the normal and necessary action of the human mind work- ing its way up from a lower to a higher form of the relig- ious consciousness. This makes idolatry to be a regular and legitimate step, ordained by the Creator himself, in the progress of the human race toward a perfect religion. St. Paul takes the contrary view. According to him, the human mind is monotheistic by creation and in its struct- ure, and pantheism and polytheism are a progress down- ward, not upward. Idolatry is sin. But according to Schelling, idolatry is innocent, because it is a necessary movement of the human intellect. The tlieory taught by Hume in his History of Keligion, that polytheism was the primitive religion, and that monotheism is the result of human progress, is part of that general theory of man which holds that he was created low down the scale of existence, perhaps descended from the aniuial tribes, and through vast ages of time slowly struggles upward of and by him- self. The relics of monotheism found outside of the pale of revelation, in the various countries and civilizations, are traceable to two sources. 1. To the monotheistic structure of the human mind, in the way that has been described. This is the subjective and fundamental requisite. 2. To the influence of the primitive revelation from God, made in the line of Seth, fragments of which have floated down among the races of mankind.^ Both of these sources and causes of monotheism should be recognized. If only the first is acknowledged, justice is not done to traditional rec- ords and data. If only the second is acknowledged, and all the monotheism in human history is referred to a special revelation in early times, justice is not done to the constitu- tion of the human mind. It conflicts, moreover, with St. Paul's representations in Eom. 1. After this examination of the monotheistic structure of * Upon the influence of the patriarchal revelation, see Bolton : Evidences, IL; Stillingfleet : Origines Sacrae, III. v.; Gale: Court of the Gentiles. INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 217 the liuman spirit, considered as the foundation of natural religion, it is important to observe that natural religion is insufficient for human needs. The position of the deist, that the teachings of the human reason concerning the being and attributes of God are adequate, and that revealed re- ligion is superfluous, is untenable because there is nothing redemjAive in them. Natural religion manifests the justice of God, but not his mercy. The 0/37^ rov ^eov is revealed in the common human consciousness, but not the dyuTn] rov J^eov. The God-consciousness includes the Divine holiness, but not the Divine compassion. jNatural religion inspires fear, but not hope and trust. The monotheistic idea of the deity contains only such moral attributes as justice, veracity, and immaculate purity. In St. Paul's analysis, mention is made of omnipotence, sovereignty, unity, and retributive dis- pleasure ; but no mention is made of the attribute of mercy. The Divine benevolence is indeed displayed to the pagan, in the rain from heaven, and tlie fruitful seasons, Acts 14 : Y ; but providential benevolence is not pardoning mercy. The lost man and even the lost angel experiences the be- nevolence of God. lie maketh his sun to shine alike upon the evil and the good. Natural religion, consequently, is not an adequate religion for man, unless it can be proved that he does not need the mercy of God. The utmost that human reason can say respecting the ex- ercise of Divine mercy is, that it is a possibility. There is no self-contradiction in the proposition that God may show mercy to the guilty. Says Witsius (Apostles' Creed, Disser- tation XXV.), " if one carefully consider the all-sufficiency of the Divine perfections, according to that idea of the Su- preme being which is impressed by nature upon our minds, we will possibly conclude, or at least conjecture, that it is not altogether beyond the range of possibility, that a just and holy God may be reconciled to a sinner." But it may be objected that inasmuch as the attribute of mercy necessarily belongs to the Divine nature, a careful 218 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). analysis of the innate idea of God would yield this attribute to the heathen mind, and in this way the heathen might come to the knowledge tliat God shows mercy, and so find a redemptive element in natural religion. This objection overlooks the distinction between the existeiice of an attri- bute, and its exercise. Some of the Divine attributes are at- tributes of nature only, and some are attributes of both nat- ure and will. In the former ease, an attribute not only nec- essarily exists in the Divine essence, but it must necessarily be exercised. Truth, or veracity, is an example. God of necessit}'- possesses this quality, and he must of necessity manifest it at all times. Its exercise does not depend upon his sovereign will and pleasure. lie may not be truthful or not, as he pleases. The same is true of the Divine justice. But the attribute of mercy is not an attribute of nature only, it is also an attribute of will. Though mercy is an eternal and necessary quality of the Divine nature, and is logically contained in the idea of God as a being possessing ail per- fections, yet the exercise of it is optional, not necessary. Because God is a merciful being, it does not follow tliat he must show mercy to every object without exception, witliout any choice or will of his own. He says, '^I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy," Horn. 9 : 15. The exercise of this attribute depends upon the Divine good pleasure. It might have existed as an immanent and eter- nal attribute in God, and yet not have been extended to a single man. Because God has not shown mercy to Satan and liis angels, it does not follow that he is destitute of the attribute. To deny tlie freeness of mercy, is to annihi- late mercy. If mercy is a matter of debt, and God is obliged to show mercy, as he is obliged to be truthful and just, then mercy is no more mercy and grace is no more grace, Rom. 11 : 16.' God's mercy, in this respect, is like God's omnipo- j ^ It is no reply to say, that although God does not owe the exercise of mercy to the sinner, he owes it to Ttimself. For if God owes it to his own attributes and perfection of character, to pardon sin, a neglect or refusal to do so in a sin- INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 219 tence. God necessarily Las the power to create, but is un- der no necessity of exerting this power. If he had never created anything at all, he would still have been an omnipo- tent being. And so, too, if he had never pardoned a single sinner, he would still have been a merciful being in his own nature. INow it is because the exercise of mercy, nnlike that of truth and justice, is ojjtional with God, that the heathen cannot be certain that mercy will be exercised toward him. In thinking of the subject of sin, his own reason perceives intuitively that God must of necessity punish transgression ; and it perceives with equal intuitiveness that there is no corresponding necessity that he should pardon it. He can say with emphasis, "God must be just ;" but he can not say, " God must be merciful." Mercy is an attribute whose exercise is sovereign and optional, and therefore man cannot determine by any a priori method whether it will be ex- tended to him. He knows notliing upon this point, until he hears the assurance from the lips of God himself. When God opens the lieavens, and speaks to the human creature saying, " I will forgive your iniquity," then, and not till then, does he know the fact. Shedd : Natural Man, Sermon XVHI. Hence the religion of mercy and redemption is historical ^wdi promissory in its nature. It contains a testi- mony respecting God's actual decision and purpose concern- ing the exercise of compassion. It is a record authenticated and certified of what God has decided and covenanted to do in a given case ; and not a deduction from an a priori principle of what he must do of necessity. Natural religion, on the other hand, is neither historical nor promissory. It is not a historical narrative like the Old and Kew Testament ; and it contains no promise or covenant made by God with man. Natural religion is not a series of facts and events, but of truths only. pie instance would be a dereliction of duty to himself, and a spot on his charac- ter. Mercy, on this supposition, as well as on the other, is not grace but debt. 220 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). Consequently, natural religion, or the religion of justice, can be constructed in an a priori manner out of the ideas and laws of human intelligence; bat the gospel, or the re- ligion of mercy and redemption, can be constructed only out of a special revelation from God. Conscience can give the heathen a punitive, but not a pardoning deity. Man's natural monotheism does not include a knowledge of the Divine mercy, but only of the Divine holiness and dis- pleasure at sin. It is sufficient for man as created and sin- less ; but not for man as apostate and sinful. It is because the heatlien is a " stranger from the covenants of promise," that he " has no hope." Eph. 2 : 12. CHAPTEE III. ABGUMENTS FOE THE DIVINE EXISTENCE. Gangauf : Psychologie des Augiistinus, 82 sq. Anselm : Mono- logium; Proslogium. Tr. in Bib, Sacra, 1851. Hasse : Anselm, II. 233-286. Calvin : Institutes, I. i. iii. Des Cartes : Method, lY. ; Meditations, III. V. ; Principles of Philosophy, I. 14, 15. Tr. by Veitch. Leibnitz : De la demonstration Cart^sienne. Witsius : Apostles' Creed ; Dissertation, IV. v. More : Antidote to Atheism, I. viii. Stillingfleet : Origines Sacrae, III. i. 14, 15. Smith : Dis- courses (Existence of God). Charnocke : Discourses, I. II. Cud- worth : Intellectual System (Final Causes), II. 608-625. Ed. Tegg. Howe : Living Temple, I. ii. Clarke : Demonstration ; Answer to Letter VII. Bates : Existence of God. Locke : Understanding, IV. X. King : Life of Locke, 313. Ed. Bohn. Kant : Pure Eeason. p. 359-370. Tr. by Meiklejohn. Billroth : Beligions-philosophie, ^ 33 sq. Chalybaus : History of Philosophy, Lecture III. Ueber- weg : History of Philosophy, I. 383 sq. Hallam : Literature of Eu- rope, n. iii. Paley : Natural Theology. The Bridgewater Treatises. Janet : Final Causes. Martensen : Dogmatics, ^ 38-43. Domer : Christian Doctrine, I. 212 sq. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, II. Hodge : Theology, I. 204-237. Shedd : History of Doctrine, I, 231-238. Harris : Theism. Martineau : Study of Religion. Although the evidence for tlie Divine Existence which is most relied npon in Scripture, and which is common to all men, is that of immediate consciousness, yet certain syl- ]oo:istic arfifuments have been constructed which have the following uses : 1. They assist the development of the idea of God, and contain a scientific analysis of man's natural consciousness of the deity. These arguments all derive their force from the innate idea, and the constitutional structure of man. 222 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). Hence some theologians deny that tliej are proofs properly so called, and disparage them. Says Rosenkranz (Encyclo- padie, 6), " there are already in geometry, a hundred dem- onstrations of the Pythagorean proposition, all of which do what they promise. There are also numberless proofs of the being of God, none of which perform what they prom- ise. God is not a right-angled triangle, and for his exist- ence neither many nor convincing proofs can be discov- ered. There is only one argument for God's existence, and that he furnishes himself." Ilamann remarks that if he who denies the Divine existence is a fool, lie who would de- monstrate it is a still greater one. Hagenbach (Encyclo- padie, 291) says that the seeking after proofs of the Divine existence is proof enough. The human mind does not ir- repressibly, and perpetually search for the evidence that a non-entity exists. 2. Secondl}'-, these arguments reply to the counter-arguments of materialism and atheism. Of them, the principal are : The ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, the moral, and the historical. The Ontological Argument for the Divine Existence has fallen into disrepute for the last century or more. It is noAV very commonly regarded as involving a sophism. Kant de- clares it to be sophistical, as also he declares all the a pos- teriori arguments to be. Histoi-ians of philosophy, like Ueberweg, analyze it not only to give an account of it, but to refute it. In the current treatises in apologetics, it is rare to find an appeal to it as a conclusive demonstration. This is a different view from that entertained in the six- teenth and seventeenth centuries, and by the most powerful reasoners amons: the fathers and schoolmen. While, owins^ to the subtlety and geometrical nicety of the form of the argument, its cogency was not always acknowledged, and there was some dispute concerning its logical force, yet on the whole both the philosophers and theologians of those centuries regarded it as a valid argument, and fit to be em- ployed in the defence of theism. The English theologians ARGUMENTS. 223 made much use of it ; especially tliose who were deeply versed in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Cudworth, Stillingfleet, Howe, Bates, John Smith, and Henry More depend greatly upon it in their contest with tlie atheism of Hobbes and others. Des Cartes restated it in a modified form, and considered it to be a demonstration ; and Dea Cartes is the father of all modern philosophy that is found- ed in consciousness. The germ of the argument is found in the remark of Augustine (Trinity, VII. iv.) that "God is more truly thought than he is described, and exists more truly than he is thought." This is one of those pregnant propositions, so characteristic of the Latin father, which compress a theory into a nut-shell. The meaning of it is, that while man's idea of God is truer to the realit}'' than his description of him is, yet his idea is less true and credible than the reality itself. God's existence is more real than even our concep- tion of him is for our own mind ; and our conception, con- fessedly, is a reality in our consciousness. The subjective idea of God, instead of being more real than God, is less real. The "thing," in this instance, lias more of existence than the " thought " of it has. This is exactly contrary to the postulate that underlies all the reasoning against the ontological argument ; namely, that in no case is the object so real as the idea of it, and that therefore the existence of no object whatever can be inferred from the mere idea. Every subjective conception, it is contended, more certainly is, than its objective correspondent. Consequently, no mere thought, of any kind, can demonstrate the existence of a thing. This position, we may remark in passing, that the objec- tive can never be so certainly real as the subjective, is fatal not only to the ontological argument for the Divine exist- ence, but to the argument for all existence. It conducts to idealism immediately. If, for example, from the sub- jective sensation we cannot infer the objective existence of 224 THEOLOGY CDOCTRINE OF GOD). matter, the certainty of the material world is gone. The sensation is the only reality, and the " thing" is at best only a contingency. Possibly it exists, but there is no absolute certainty that it does. The assertion that because we have the mere idea of God there is no certainty of a correspond- ent Being, is essentially the same as the assertion that be- cause we have the mere sensation of matter there is no certainty of a correspondent substance. If the subjective cannot prove the objective in the former case, it cannot in the latter. The acute and powerful intellect of Anselm was the first to construct the ontological argument in a syllogistical form. And it will appear, we think, that its first form is its best. All the subsequent modifications have weakened rather than strengthened it. The metaphysical intuition that saw the heart of the doctrine of the atonement, saw also tbe heart of the doctrine of the Divine existence. The argument is derived, as the etymology (rov 6Vto9 X0709) denotes, from the idea of absolute andjyerfect in dis- tinction from relative and imperfect being. It runs as fol- lows. The human mind possesses the idea of an absolutely perfect Being ; that is, of a Being than whom a more per- fect cannot be conceived. But such perfection as this im- plies necessary existence ; and necessary existence implies actual existence : because if a thing must be, of course it is. If the absolutely perfect Being of whom we have the idea does not exist of necessity, we can conceive of a being wlio does so exist, and he would be more perfect than the former. For a contingent being who may or may not exist, is not the most perfect conceivable ; is not the absolutely perfect. In having, therefore, as the human mind unquestionably has, the idea of an absolutely perfect in distinction from a relatively perfect being, it has the idea of a being who ex- ists of necessity ; as in having the idea of a triangle, the mind has the idea of a figure with three sides. Wecessity of being, therefore, belongs to perfection of being. ABGUMENTS. 225 The strength of Anselm's argument lies in two facts. 1. That necessity of existence is an attribute of being, and a perfection in it. 2. That necessity of existence is an attri- bute and perfection that belongs only to absolute and infin- ite being, not to relative and finite being. 1. It is clear, in the first place, that necessity of existence is an attribute. It can be affirmed of one being, and denied of another. God has this characteristic quality, and angels and men have it not. Both necessity and contingency are attributes of being. And necessity is a higher charac- teristic than contingency of existence. That which must be, is superior to that which may or may not be. That which cannot without logical contradiction be conceived! not; to be, is more perfect than that which can be so conceived; Hence there are gi-ades of being. One species of being may be nearer to nonentity than another. The infinite and ab- solutely perfect is at an infinite remove from non-exist- ence ; the finite and relatively perfect is at only a finite dis- tance from nonentity. "We can conceive of the annihilation of the finite ; but the annihilation of the infinite is an ab- surdity. " It is truly said," remarks Howe (Vanity of Man as Mortal), " of all created things, that their non esse is more than their esse ; that is, they have more no-being than being. It is only some limited portion [degree] of being that they have ; but there is an infinitude [infinite degree] of being which they have not. And so coming infinitely nearer to nothingness than to fulness of being, they may well enough wear the name of ' nothing.' ^ All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him less than nothing,' Isa. 40 : 17. Wherefore the First and Fountain-Being justly appropriates to himself tlie name I Am, 3'ea tells us. He is, and there is none besides him ; thereby leaving no other name than that of * nothing ' unto creatures." 2. And, in the second place, necessity of existence is an attribute and perfection that is unique and solitary. It 15 226 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD), cannot be ascribed to a finite created thing, any more than eternity of existence, or immensity of existence, or immu- tability of existence can be. The idea of the absohitely per- fect differs from that of the relatively perfect, or the imper- fect, in implying necessity and excluding contingency. The two ideas are totally diverse in this particular, so that the analysis of the one will give a result wholly different from that of the other. Because the idea of a stone, or a man, or of any finite thing, will not yield real entity or exist- ence as the logical outcome, it does not follow that the idea of the infinite God will not. The nature of the ontological argument will be seen still more clearly, by examining the objections that have been urged against it, and also the modifications of it since the time of Anselm. 1. A contemporary of Anselm, the monk Gaunilo, in his tract entitled Liber pro Insipiente, or Plea for the Fool, raised the objection which has been repeated over and over again, that the idea of an object does not involve its exist- ence. "We have the idea of a tree, but it does not follow that there is an actual tree. We have the idea of a winged lion, but it does not follow that such a creature actually exists. The reply is, that the ideas compared are not analogous in respect to the vital point of necessary existence, but are wholly diverse. One idea is that of perfect and necessary being ; the other that of imperfect and contingent being. What is true of the latter idea is untrue of the former, and vice versa. The idea of a tree implies contingency, that it may or may not exist ; that of the absolutely perfect Being implies necessity, that he must exist. From the idea of the tree, we cannot prove actual objective reality, because of the element of contingency ; but we can from the idea of God, because of the element of necessity. If the idea of a thing implies that it may or may not exist, it does not follow from the idea that the thing does exist. But if the idea of a thing ARGUMENTS. 227 implies that it must exist, it does follow from the idea that the thing does exist. This objection, therefore, to the onto- logical argument breaks down, because the analogy brought in to support it is a spurious one. It is an example of the Aristotelian ^erd^aat^ et9 oXKo yivo<;. Analogical reasoning is valid between things of the same species ; but invalid if carried across into another species. Gannilo, arguing against Anselm, nrced that the idea of the "lost island" does not imply that there is such a thing. Anselm replies, that if Gaunilo will show that the idea of the "lost island" implies its necessary existence, he will find the island for him, and will guarantee that it shall never be a " lost island" again.' Gaunilo's objection overlooks the difference in kind be- tween infinite necessary and perfect being, and finite con- tingent and imperfect being ; between primary and second- ary substance ; between uncreated and created being, or between God and the universe. We are so accustomed in the case of finite beings and things to abstract necessity of existence from them, that we unthinkingly transfer this to God. Because we can logically conceive of the non-exist- ence of the finite, we suppose that we can of the infinite. But the two species of being differ toto genere. Respect- ing all finite beings or things, nothing more can be inferred from their nature and idea than possihility and perhaps ^probability of existence. Necessity and certainty of exist- ence cannot be inferred. But respecting infinite being, mere possibility and probability of existence are excluded by the very nature and idea of it. Possibility and contingency of existence are directly contradictory to the idea of perfect and infinite substance. In this instance, we cannot, as we can in the other, conceptually separate necessity of existence ^ Another flaw in Gaunilo's counter-argument is, that he starts from the con- ception of a Being •■' greater than all things else that exis(/' but Anselm starts from the conception of a Being " greater than all things else that can be con- ceived,'''' The latter implies a greater perfection than the former. From the former conception, Anselm would not attempt to prove actual existence. The ideal may be more perfect than the actual. 228 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). from substance. Infinite being, ex vi termini, is necessary being. Necessity, as a logical term, denotes so firm a connection between the subject and predicate, that it is impossible that they should be separated. If therefore substance and ne- cessity of OKistence cannot be separated from each other, even in thought or logical conception, in the instance of " the most perfect Being conceivable," it follows that the denial that such a Being exists is not only moral but logical " folly." The atheist is guilty not only of sin, but of un- reason. For it is a contradiction to suppose that the most perfect Being conceivable, that is, a necessarily existing Being, was non-existent a million of years ago, because this would make him a contingent and imperfect being. It is equally contradictory, for the same reason, to suppose that the most perfect Being conceivable will cease to exist at some future time. But there is no contradiction in suppos- ing that the angel Gabriel had no existence a million years ago, or that he will have none a million years hence, be- cause he is not the most perfect being conceivable. And there is no contradiction in supposing that the entire ma- terial universe was a nonentity a million years ago, unless it can be shown that it is the most perfect being conceiva- ble. The impossibility of separating necessity of being from absolute and perfect being, may be illustrated by the neces- sary connection between extension and matter. The idea of extension is inseparable from that of matter. To ask me to think of matter without extension is absurd. In like manner, to ask me to think of absolute perfection of being without necessity of being is absurd ; as absurd as to ask me to think of absolute perfection of being without eternity of being, or infinity of being. The being is not absolutely perfect, if it may be non-existent ; just as a substance is not material, if it is unextended. To conceive of the most per- fect being conceivable as a contingent being, or a non-ex- ARGUMENTS. 229 istent being, is impossible. Sajs Anselm (Proslogium, XXIL), " That which begins from non-existence, and can be conceived of as non-existing, and which unless it subsist through something else must return to non-existence, does not exist in the highest and absolute sense." Kant commits the same error with Gaunilo, in employing a spurious analogy. Objecting to the ontological argument, he remarks (Pure Reason, 365, Meiklejohn's Tr.) that "it is indeed necessary that a triangle have three angles if it exist, but there is nothing in the idea of a triangle that necessitates its existence." Very true ; and therefore the example is not pertinent. The idea of a triangle lacks the very element and attribute, contained in the idea of the most perfect being conceivable, upon which the whole force of the ontological argument depends — namely, necessity of existence. The predicate, " if it exist," connected with the subject, '^ a triangle," implies contingency. Kant's objec- tion is in fact even weaker than that of Gaunilo. To at- tempt to invalidate the ontological argument by emploj'ing the idea of a purely mental construction like the idea of a triangle, is even more illegitimate than to employ the idea of a real, though non-absolute and contingent object like a tree or a man. The idea of a triangle, like that of a mathe- matical point or line, is purely imaginaiy. There is no objective substance in any mathematical figure whatever. Angles, lines, surfaces, and points are not things. The idea of a triangle does not imply that it is heing of any kind, still less that it is necessary being. A triangle is not an entity. It cannot be brought under the category of sub- stance ; consequently it is a nonentity. It is a purely ideal construction, to which there is and can be no objective cor- respondent. It cannot be said to objectively exists either contingently or necessarily. Kant's analogy, consequently, is even more spurious than that of Gaunilo ; for a tree or a inan, though not having necessarily-real, yet has contin- gently-real existence. 230 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). Kant endeavors to prove that the ontological argument is a synthetical, not an analytical judgment ; that tlie con- clusion is not deduced from the premise, but imported into it. There is no better expositor of Kant than Kuno Fischer, and he gives the following account of Kant's ref- utation, as he regards it, of the ontological argument. " Kant affirms that the propositions asserting existence are synthetical judgments ; in other words, that existence is no logical attribute which we can find by analyzing a concept. This position completely destroys all ontology ; for it re- moves the possibility of concluding from the concept of a thing, its existence. If existence belongs to the attributes of a concept, the ontological proof is quite valid. If it be a logical attribute, it follows immediately from the concept by mere dissection, and the ontological proof is an analyti- cal judgment ; an immediate syllogism of the understand- ino;. If existence be a loorical attribute, it must stand in the same relation to the concept that other logical attributes do. The content of the concept must be diminished if I subtract existence, increased if I add it. The concept of a triangle, for example, is not changed, whether I merely represent it to myself, or whether it exist without me. The attributes which make a triangle to be such are entirely the same in both cases. It is the same with any other con- cept ; that of the deity." ' We place tlie finger tipon the last assertion in this ex- tract, and deny that what is said of the concept of the tri- angle is true of the concept of the deity — assuming it to be conceded, that the deity is the equivalent of Anselm's " most perfect Being conceivable." For if from the con- cept of the deity, or the absolutely perfect Being, the attri- bute of existence be subtracted, the concept is changed. It is no longer the concept of the most perfect Being con- ceivable. The concept of an existing Being is, certainly, ' Mahaflfy : Trauslation of Kuno Fischer on Kant, pp. 135, 358, 259. ARGUMENTS, 231 not the same as the concept of an imaginary Being. Take the characteristic of actual existence out of the concept of the deity, and it becomes the concept of an unreal or imaginary being ; and an unreal or imaginary being is not the most perfect Being conceivable. The content of the concept is changed in respect to both quantity and quality. It loses the attribute of objective existence, which dimin- ishes the quantity of the content. And the same loss in- jures the quality ; for imaginary being is nonentity, instead of perfect being. If one should say, " I have the concep- tion of a triangle, but it does not include tri-laterality," the contradiction is plain. Or should he assert that the at- tribute of tri-laterality can be subtracted from the concept of a triangle without altering the content, the error is pat- ent. But it is the same contradiction, to affirm that the idea of God as a perfect being does not include real objec- tive being, or that this characteristic can be subtracted from it without diminishing its contents. The rejecter of the onto- logical argument affirms such propositions as the following: **I have the idea of the most perfect Being conceivable; but it is the idea of a nonentity ; in other words, it is only an idea." "I have the idea of the most perfect Being conceiv- able ; but it is the idea of an imaginary being ; that is, it is merely a figment of my mind." This contradiction is well described by a French writer (Franck : Dictionnaire, Art. Anselme). ''He who rejects the belief of the Divine Exist- ence conceives, nevertheless, of a Being to whom a superior cannot be conceived. Only he affirms that this Being does not exist. But by this affirmation he contradicts himself, inasmuch as that Being to whom he attributes all these per- fections, yet to whom he at the same time denies existence, is found to be inferior to another being, who, to all his other perfections, joins that of existence. He is thus forced by his very conception of the most perfect being to admit that such a Being exists, inasmuch as existence makes a neces- sary part of that perfection which he conceives of," 232 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). It is overlooked hy Kant and Fischer, and by all who reason upon this line of analogj'^, that the idea of God, or the absolutely Perfect, is unique and solitary. God is not only unus but unicus. There is no parallel to him. No true analogue can be found. •' To whom then will ye liken God ? or what likeness will ye compare unto him ? " Isa. 40 : 18. To emplo}'" analogical reasoning in a case where all analogies fail, was the error of Gaunilo, and has been repeated from his day to this.^ 2. A second objection to the argument of Ansehn is that it amounts only to this : " If there be an absolutely perfect Eeing, he is a necessarily existent Being. One idea im- plies the other idea. It is only a matter of subjective no- tions, and not of objective existence. The absolutely per- fect Being may not exist at all ; but if he exist, he exists necessarily." Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, I. 384) em- ploys this objection. This objection, likewise, is self-contradictory, as is shown by the analysis of the proposition, " If the absolutely Per- fect exist, he exists necessarily." There is inconsistency between the protasis and apodosis. The word " if " in the former denotes contingency, and the word " necessarily " in the latter excludes contingency. The absolutely perfect Being is described in the protasis as one respecting whose existence it is proper to use a hypothetical term, and in the apodosis as one respecting whose existence it is improper to use it. This conditional proposition implies that the most perfect Being conceivable is both contingent and nec- essary. Coleridge (Works, lY. 408, Ed. Ilarper) urges this ob- jection, in the following terms: "The Cartesian syllogism 1 In this criticism, we have assumed, as Kant and Fischer do, that ''exist- ence " may be regarded as an attribute, and have argued from their point of view. As will be seen further on, existence ia not Btrictly an attribute. But if " necessity of existence," be substituted for "existence," the argument still holds good. Certainly if from the concept of the absolutely perfect Being, the attribute of necessity of existence be subtracted, the concept itself is changed. ABGUMBNTS. 233 ought to stand thus : The idea of God comprises the idea of all attributes that belong to perfection. But the idea of existence is such ; therefore the idea of his existence is in- cluded in the idea of God. Now, existence is no idea, but ^fact; and though we had an idea of existence, still the proof of a correspondence to a reality would be wanting ; that is, the very point would be wanting which it was the purpose of the demonstration to supply. The idea of the fact is not the fact itself." This objection holds against the Cartesian form of the argument, but not against the Anselmic. The idea of " existence," it is true, is one to wliich there may be no corresponding reality or fact. But the idea of " necessary existence " is not. " Existence " is ambiguous, and may mean contingent existence, as well as necessary ; in which case, the idea does not logically in- volve the reality or fact. But " necessary existence " has only one meaning, and logically involves a corresponding fact or reality. To say that a necessary being has no ex- istence, or may have none, is, of course, a contradiction in terms. And to say that the idea of necessaiy existence does not imply the idea of actual existence, is equally con- tradictory. But in reasoning analytically from an idea, the reasoner is entitled to all that the idea contains. Coleridge, like Kant and others, brings the idea of the infinite and finite, the uncreated and created, God and the universe, under one and the same category, and contends that what is true of one idea is of the other. As the idea of a tree, in Coleridge's phrase, is " tlie mere supposition of a logical subject, necessarily presumed in order to the con- ceivableness of the qualities, properties, or attributes" of the tree, so is the idea of God. The idea in both instances is a mere hyjjothesis, to which there may be no correspond- ing fact or reality. It is only " a mere ens logicum, the result of the thinker's own unity of consciousness, and no less contained in the conception of a plant or of a chimera^ than in the idea of the Supreme BeingP Works, 234 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). lY. 409. This implies that the idea of a plant or a chi- mera is a true analogue to that of the most perfect Being conceivable. 3. A third objection to Anselm's argument is that made by Leibnitz ; namely, that the argument supposes ihepossi- hility of the existence of the most perfect Being. This he thinks needs first to be demonstrated. And yet he adds, that '* any and every being should be regarded as possible vmtil its impossibility is proved." Leibnitz remarks that he "stands midway between those who think Anselm's argu- ment to be a sophism, and those who think it to be a dem- onstration," and that if the possibility of the existence of the most perfect Being were demonstrated, he should regard Anselm's argument as "geometrically a priori." De la De- monstration Cartesienne, 177. Ed. Erdmann. The reply to this half-way objection of Leibnitz is, that there is no greater necessity of proving tliat the most per- fect Being is possible, than of proving that any being what- ever is possible. That being of some kind is possible, is indisputable. That something exists is self-evident. To assert that there is nothing, is absurd. The premise with which Clarke begins his construction of the a priori argu- ment ; namely, " something exists; " is axiomatic, and must be granted by atheist and theist alike. The idea of " being " is certainly one that implies an objective correspondent. If I say, " I have the idea of being, but it is only an idea, there really is no being," I perceive the absurdity immediately. " The very words," says Coleridge (Works, IL 464. Ed. Harper), " there is nothing, or, there was a time when there was nothing, are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the proposition with as full and instantane- ous a light as if it bore evidence against it in the right of its own eternity." But if the mind does not perceive any ne- »»cessity of proving the possibility of being in the abstract, even of relative and contingent being, still less does it per- ceive a necessity of demonstrating the possibility of the ARGUMENTS. 235 most perfect being conceivable. On the contrary, there is more need of proving the possibility of a contingent than of a necessary being. That which may or may not exist is less likely to exist, than that which must exist and cannot be conceived of as non-existent, 4. A fourth objection to the ontological argument is, that it makes existence an attribute of a Being, when in fact it is being itself. The subject is converted into its own predi- cate. To assert that a Being possesses being, is tautology. This is a valid objection against one form of Des Cartes' statement of the ontological argument, but not against An- selni's. Des Cartes shortened the argument, by deriving actual being directly from the idea of absolute perfection of being, instead of first deriving, as Anselm did, necessity of being from absolute perfection of being, and then deriving actuality from necessit3\ The spi'ead of Cartesianism gave currency to this form of the argument ; and it is this form of it which most commonly appears in modern speculation. The English divines of the seventeenth century very gen- erally employ this mode. In Kant's polemic, the argument is stated in the Cartesian manner, not in the Anselraic. The following is an example : " Having formed an a priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace existence^ we believed ourselves safe in concluding that reality belongs to the object of the conception merely because existence has been cogitated in the conception." ^ If in this extract " necessity of existence " be substituted for ' Reine Vemunft, 463. Ed. Rosenkranz. Ueberweg (VoL II. 50) notices the difference between the two forms of the argument in the following remark : '* The Cartesian form of the ontological proof has a defect from which the An- selmic is free ; namely, that the premise, ' being is a perfection/ involves a very questionable conception of 'being' as a predicate among other predicates, while Anselm. has indicated a definite kind of being, namely, being not merely in our minds but also outside of them, as that in which superior perfection is involved." But this misses the true point of difference. Anselm's *' definite kind of being " is, necessity of being/' not being outside of our minds." This latter is objec- tive being, and is the same as Des Cartes' '^ existence." If this is aU the differ* ence between Anselm and Des Cartes, there is none at all. 236 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). "existence," the "illusion" which Kant charges upon the a priori reasoner disappears. Necessity of existence, as we have before remarked, is a true predicate, like eternity of existence, and immensity of existence, and all the other attributes that describe absolute being and differentiate it from relative and finite being. And from this predicate, the objective actual existence of that to which it belongs can be inferred. In omitting it, and attempting to make a predicate out of " existence " in- stead of " necessity of existence," Des Cartes lost an indis- pensable term of the syllogism, jumped directly from the premise to the conclusion, and exposed the argument to a valid objection.' But while Des Cartes' form of the argument is vicious reasoning, it suggests a profound truth. It directs attention to the difference in kind between jprimary and secondary being, and to the important fact already alluded to, that existence cannot even conceptually be separated from sub- stance in the instance of the absohite and perfect, as it can in that of the relative and imperfect. The finite may exist only in thought and imagination ; the infinite cannot. There may be no imperfect and contingent being ; there must be perfect and necessary being. The universe may be non-existent, but God cannot. And this, because ab- solute perfection of being excludes unreality of every kind. Consequently, it excludes imaginary being, which is no be- ing at all. And it excludes contingent and temporary being, because these are relative and imperfect grades. None of these are " the most perfect being conceivable." The absolute Being, therefore, is the only strictly real. All ^ Des Cartes seems to have been aware of the defect in this form of stating the argument. He more commonly employs " existence " in the Method, and the Meditations. But he uses " necessity of existence," in the Method, p. 79 ; Meditations, p. 67, 68 ; Principles of Philosophy, p. 119, 189, 190, 191. Veitch'a Trans. Ueberweg (History, II. 42, 49, 51); Schwegler (History, 175) ; and Locke (King's Life of, 314) represent Des Cartes as stating the argument in the Anselmic form. ARGUMENTS. 237 else, in comparison, is a shadow. Existence cannot be ab- stracted from substance of this kind, without clianging its grade. To attribute non-existence to the infinite, is to con- vert it into the finite. But existence can be abstracted con- ceptually from secondary and contingent substance without changing the species. In fact, it is substance of a secondary species for the very reason that it can be conceived of as non- existent. Des Cartes not only adopted Anselm's ontological argu- ment with a modification, but added another feature to it. His addition is the following. We have the idea of the most perfect Being. It does not come through the senses, because such a Being is not sensible. It is not a fiction or fancy of the mind ; this we know from our own conscious- ness. It is therefore, an innate idea, and must have been inlaid in our constitution by the most perfect Being himself. This is an a posteriori addition to the ontological argument. It is of the same nature with the cosmological argument. From the effect, the cause is infeiTed. The idea is a pro- duct which has God for its author. But to mix the a priori with the a posteriori argument is not to improve either. Locke (King's Life, p. 315 sq.) objects to Des Cartes' ar- gument, that it does not demonstrate anything more than the existence of the eternal matter of atheism. In this, he implies that eternity of being belongs to the idea of matter. But this is an error, because eternal being supposes neces- sary being, and necessary being supposes absolute perfec- tion of being. But matter is not the most perfect being conceivable. Consequently, it is contingent, not necessary beinof. *' Reason can annihilate matter in thouo;lit, always O CD ' u and without self-contradiction." Kant : Pure Heason. Meiklejohn's Trans, p. 379.' 1 See Locke, Understanding, IV. a., for the arguments for the Divine exist- ence. In this part of his work, he really admits the doctrine of innate ideas in the sense in which Plato taught them, though not in the mistaken sense in which he himself combats them. 238 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD). Stillingfleet (Origines Sacrae, III. i.) stated the ontologi- cal argument as follows. The perfectly clear perception of the mind is the strongest evidence we can have of the truth of anything. This postulate he borrowed from Des Cartes. "We have a perfectly clear perception that necessarj^ exist- ence belongs to the essence of God ; and if necessary exist- ence belongs to God's essence, it follows that actual exist- ence does. This clearness of the perception, it is to be noticed, shows that the idea of God is an idea of the rea- son, not of the imagination. It is accompanied with the conviction that it is a true idea, and not a mere inven- tion of the fancy, like the idea of a winged horse, for ex- ample. Samuel Clarke stated the ontological argument as fol- lows : It is certain that something has existed from all eternity. Absolute nonentity is inconceivable. Whatever has eternally existed is self -existent, and whatever is self- existent, is necessarily existent, and whatever is necessarily existent cannot be conceived as non-existent. The material world cannot be the " something " that has eternally existed, because we can conceive of its nonentity. Therefore the " something " which has eternally existed is God. Further- more, infinite space and time cannot be conceived of as non-existent ; yet they are not substances or beings of themselves. They must therefore be properties of some substance or being. God is this substance or being. Clarke's construction of the ontological argument is in- ferior to that of Anselm, for two reasons. 1. The " some- thing" which eternally exists may be confounded with the pantheistic ground of all things; the "substance" of Spi- noza. An eternal " something " does not necessarily suggest intelligence and morality in the "something." Anselm's " most perfect Being conceivable " does. 2. Space and time are not properties of any substance whatever. They are not properties of material substance ; nor of finite spir- itual substance ; nor of infinite spiritual substance. They AKGUMENTS. 239 are not properties of matter, nor of the human spirit, nor of the angelic spirit, nor of God. Edwards (Will, Ft. II. Sect, iii.) shows a hesitation con- cerning the ontological argument similar to that of Leib- nitz. He asserts that if man had '' sufficient strength and extent of mind," he would " intuitively see the absurdity of supposing God not to be ; " but adds, that " we have not this strength and extent of mind to know this certainty, in this intuitive, independent manner." This is saying that the human mind is not strong enough to perceive an absurdity. Yet Edwards adds, that " he will not affirm that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the being of God, without any evidence of it from his works," and that he thinks that " there is a great absurdity in the nature of things simply considered in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying Being in general." But, certainly, the human mind has sufficient '* strength and ex- tent," to perceive what is " absurd in the nature of things." The ontological argument has the endorsement of inspira- tion. The Hebrew Jehovah, in Ex. 3 : 14, denotes neces- sity of existence. " This term, as applied to God, intimates that to be is his peculiar characteristic ; that he is, in a sense in which no other being is; that he is self -existent, and can- not but be. In the opinion that in this lies the significance of the name, the ancient Jews and most scholars of emi- nence have concurred." * To give a name, in both the He- brew and the Greek intuition, is to describe the inmost and real nature of the thing. Plato, in the Cratylus (390), repre- sents Socrates as saying that " the right imposition of names is no easy matter, and belongs not to any and everybody, but to him only who has an insight into the nature of ^ Alexander : Kitto's Encyclopcedia, Art. Jehovah. Maimonides, the xlabbi of the I2th century, so explains Jehovah. See Lowman : Hebrew Ritual, p. 270. DelitzBch (Old Testament History of Bedemption, § 5S) says that "the name Jehovah denotes the One whose nature consists in being (Seyn), which contin- ually manifests itself as existence (Daaeyn) ; the eternal, and eternally living One. 240 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). tilings." The nomenclature given by the unf alien man to the objects of nature (Gen. 2 : 19, 20) implies a deep knowl- edge of nature. And when the deity chooses before all others the name I Am, or Jehovah, for himself, the refer- ence is to his absoluteness and perfection of being. The ethnic names in distinction from the revealed name of the deity imply attributes, not essence. The Teutonic " God " indicates that the deity is good. The Greek and Latin world employed a term (^eo9, deus) that lays emphasis upon that attribute whereby he orders and governs the universe. But Moses, divinely taught upon this point, chose a term which does not refer to any particular attribute, but to the very being and essence of God, and teaches that the deity must be, and cannot be conceived of as non-existent. He was not bidden to explain or justify the name, but only to announce it. This shows that the idea of a necessarily ex- istent being is one which the human mind readily accepts. The sweeping assertion is sometimes made that no idea whatever implies an external object corresponding to it. There is certainly one idea that does. It is that of being itself. If I say, " 1 have the idea of being, but it is only an idea : there is really no being," I perceive the absurdity im- mediately. It is the same as saying, " There is nothing." The postulate in Clarke's argument : " Something exists," must be granted by the atheist as well as b}^ the theist. But if this be true of the idea of being, it is still more so of the idea of Qiecessary being. If tlie general idea of being implies objective being corresponding to it, the special idea of necessary being certainly does. The ontological argument is of uncommon importance in an age tending to materialism, and to physical science. For it turns the human intellect in upon itself, and thereb}^ con- tributes to convince it of the reality of mind as a different substance from matter. The recent neglect of a priori methods, and over-valuation of a posteriori, is one of the reasons why matter has so much more reality for many ARGUMENTS. 241 men than mind. If an object is not looked at, it gradually ceases to be regarded as an object at all. When theorists cease to contemplate mental and moral phenomena, they cease to believe that there are any. The gaze of the physi- cist is intent upon the physical solely. Consequently, the metaphysical, or spiritual becomes a non-entity. Out of sight, it is out of mind, and out of existence, for him. Analyzing and observing matter alone, he converts every- thing into matter. The brain is the soul, and molecular motion is thought. What he needs is, to cultivate meta- physical in connection with physical studies ; a priori, in connection with a posteriori methods ; to look at mind as well as matter. In this way he gets a consciousness of mind, in distinction from the consciousness of matter. Consciousness is consciousness, however it be obtained. If it be the result of a purely mental process, it is as tz'uly consciousness as if it resulted from a purely sensuous pro- cess. When I am conscious of the agencies of my soul by introspection, this mode or form of consciousness is as real and trustworthy, as when I am conscious of the agencies of my body by sensation. It is of no consequence how con- sciousness arises, provided it does arise. Those a priori methods, consequently, which dispense with sensation and sensuous observation, and depend upon purely intellectual and spiritual operations, are best adapted to convince of the reality of an invisible and immaterial substance like the hu- man soul. Some men tell us that they want a philosophy of common things. The soul of man is a very common thing ; and if the physicist would spend as many hours in observing the phenomena of his soul, as he does in obseiwing the phe- nomena of an oyster, he would have as much consciousness of his soul as he has of the oyster. We acquire conscious- ness of an object by busying the mind about it. And if, after sufficient effort, the materialist should fail to obtain any consciousness of his mind, in distinction from his body, he would indeed have to conclude that he has none. 16 242 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). The Cosmological Argument is derived from the exist* ence of the universe (Koa-fiov \6709). It is implied in Heb. 3: 4, ^' Every house is builded by some man, but he who built all things is God." Its force depends upon the ax- iom that an effect supposes a cause. Aquinas (Summa, I. ii. 3) states the argument as follows : 1. Motion in the uni- verse implies a prime mover who is not moved ; and this is God. This form of the argument is valuable in reference to the mechanical physics, which resolves all existence into the movements of molecules or atoms. These atoms must either be self-moved, or moved by a prime mover other than the atoms. 2. Effects, generally, imply an efficient. 3. That which is contingent ; which might not be, and once was not ; implies that which is necessary, or that which al- ways was and must be. Kant (Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, 374,) objects, that the concept of causality cannot be pressed beyond the domain of sensuous existence, and therefore the first cause given by the cosmological argument would not be intelligent. But tlie world of finite mind is a part of the universe. The existence of the rational universe implies that of a rational first cause. Clarke (Answer to Letter VII.) makes the ob- jection, that the argument from causality will not prove the eternity, infinity, immensity, and unity of God. The temporal phenomena of nature prove that there has been from the beginning of the phenomena, a Being of power and wisdom sufficient to produce them. But that this Be- ing has existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity, cannot be proved from these temporal phenomena. It is necessary, therefore, says Clarke, to fall back upon the ne- cessity of the existence of God that is given in the rational idea of him. The same reasoning applies to the infinity of God. The universe is not known as infinite, or even as un- limited, because it is not completely known. We are, there- fore, arguing from only a finite effect, which would yield only a finite cause. ABGUMENTS. 243 Clarke's objection overlooks the fact, that every finite ob- ject implies original non-existence, and therefore creative power in the cause. Hence the quantity of being in the effect, is not the measure of the quantity of being in the cause. A grain of sand, even an infinitesimal atom of matter, if it be granted that it is not eternal but came into being from non-entity, would prove infinite power, equally with the immensity of the universe, because finite power cannot create ex nihilo. The absolute origination of the least amount of finite being requires omnipotence, equally with the greatest amount. The other objection of Clarke, viz : That the temporal phenomena of nature would prove only a temporal author of them, falls to the ground, when it is considered that it is inconceivable that the cause and the effect should begin to exist simultaneously. The cause must be older than the effect, from the nature of the case. Creation from nothing, in this case too, as in the previous one, implies that the cause of the phenomena in time must be prior to time. In John 1 : 1, it is said that the Logos was already in being " in the beginning " of time ; which proves that he existed in eternity. In like manner, God as the efficient cause of events in time must have existed before time, in order to be capable of such ac- tion at the very beginning of time. Hume objects to the cosmological argument, that it is a petitio principii. Cause and effect, he says, are relative terms, so that one implies the other. But whether the phenomenon is an effect^ is the very question. Hume de- nies that it is, asserting that it is only a consequent that follows an antecedent. There is no necessary connection between the two related phenomena. It is only the habit of seeing one succeed the other, that leads to the expecta- tion that they will invariably do so. Hume requires proof that any event is an effect^ proper ; for if thi*^ be granted, it follows of course that there is a cause. Father and son are relative terms. In constructing an argument to prove 244 THEOLOGY (DOCTRIKE OF GOD). that Napoleon Buonaparte had a father, it would not be al- lowable to begin by assuming that Napoleon Buonaparte was a son. This objection of Hume is the same as that of the ancient Pyrrhonist, as stated by Diogenes Laertius. *' Causation, the Pyrrhonists take away thus : A cause is only so in relation to an effect. But what is relative is merely conceived, and does not exist. Therefore, cause is a mere conception." Mackintosh : History of Ethical Phi- losophy. Note 2, The reply to this is the following : (a) Hume's view of the connection of one event with another, as being merely that of antecedent and consequent, is founded upon sensa- tion merely, not upon the action of reason. A brute's eye sees that one event precedes another, and this is all that the brute sees and knows. And, according to Hume's theory, this is all that the man should see and know. But the fact is, that the man knows much more than this. In his con- sciousness there are additional elements, that form no part of the animal's consciousness. A man not only sensuously sees that the one e^ent precedes another, but rationally _^6r- ceives that the one invariably and necessarily precedes the other. These two characteristics of invariability and neces- sity in the sequence are not given by the sense ; but they are by the reason. The animal does not perceive them. The real question, consequently, between Hume and his opponents is, whether animal sensation or human reason shall decide the case. A man's mind, unlike the brute's eye, perceives not merely the sequence, but the inanneT of the sequence, (b) All phenomena, without exception, either precede or succeed each other, and therefore, according to Hume's theoi'y, all phenomena ought to be either causes or effects. But we do not so regard them. The light of day invariably succeeds the darkness of the night, but we do not deem the former to be tlie effect of the latter. It is only of 2. particular class of antecedents and consequents, that we assert that one is tlie cause and the other is the ef- ARGUMENTS. 245 feet. The mark of this class is not merely ocular antece- dence, but efficient and necessary antecedence, {c) In mere succession, the antecedent and consequent may change places. The day may be either the antecedent or the con- sequent of the night. But in causation, the places of cause and effect cannot be so reversed. The cause must always be prior to the effect. {d) If the certainty of the con- nection between one event and another is the effect of custom, and not an intuitive perception, this certainty should increase in proportion to the number of instances. A man should be more certain that the explosion of gun- powder is the effect of its ignition, in the hundredth instance in which he witnesses it, than in the tenth instance. But he is not. The Teleological Argument ' is derived from a particular characteristic of the world : namely, the marks of design and adaptation to an end {Tiko<;) which appear in it. It is stated in Ps. 94 : 9. " He that planted the ear shall he not hear ? and he that formed the eye, shall he not see ? " The evident adaptedness of the eye for vision proves an in- telligent designer of the eye. This form of the argument for the Divine existence is the most popularly effective of any. It is an ancient argument. Cicero (Tusculan Ques- tions, L 23) states it in an eloquent manner, borrowing from Socrates and Plato. Xenophon presents it in the Memorabilia. Galen (De usu partium, V. v.) employs it in opposition to Asclepiades. The Eridgewater Treatises con- tain it in the fullest form. Paley's statement of it is marked by his usual lucidity and force.^ » Janet : Final Causes. Bell : The Hand. Kirby : History and Habits of Animals. ^ Final causes are more easily discovered in a narrow than in a wide sphere ; in biology than in astronomy. "When it is asked : Why do the planets revolve around the sun ? the eflicient cause is commonly meant. The inquirer asks for the particular force that causes the revolution. But when it is asked : Why do the motor nerves run along the limbs ? the final cause is commonly meant. The inquirer asks for th.Q purpose of this arrangement. 246 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). The teleological argument, like the cosmological, must not be confined to the material world, but extended to tlie intellectual ; as in Ps. 95 : 10, " He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know ? " The marks of design in the constitution of the human soul infer an infinite desio-n- o ing mind who created it. The human will is intended for volition, not for perception. The liuman imagination is made for picturing, not for reasoning. The human under- standing is designed for perception, not for volition. Chemistry furnishes some fine materials for this argu- ment. Elementary substances cannot be combined in any proportion at pleasure. The ratio in every instance is pre- determined ; the amounts are weighed out by the Author of nature with a nicety which no art can attain. For ex- ample, twenty-three ounces of sodium will exactly nnite with thirty-five and five-tenth ounces of chlorine, and make table salt. But if 23.5 ounces of sodium are put together with 35.5 ounces of chlorine, nature will put the extra half ounce of sodium on one side, and the remainder will unite. Cooke : Eeligion in Chemistry, p. 288. Crystallography, also, affords examples of symmetrical arrangement of par- ticles, in which geometrical proportions are invariable. The crystal is a petrified geometry. An objection similar to that urged against the cosmologi- cal argument, has been made to the teleological. There is adaptation^ it is said, but not design ; as there is sequence but not causality. Certain things are adapted to certain uses, but not made/br certain uses. The eye is adapted to vision, but has no designing author. When it is asked, how this striking adaptation is to be accounted for apart from design, the answer is : either by the operation of law, or by chance. To the latter explanation, there is a fatal objection in the mathematical doctrine of probabilities. nThe chance of matter's acting in this manner is not one in millions. Natural adaptation, upon this theory, would be as infrequent a phenomenon as a miracle. And yet adapta- ARGUMENTS. 247 tion to an end is one of the most common facts in nature ; occurring in innumerable instances. The other explanation, by law, is equivalent to the acknowledgment of a design- ing author, or else it is mere tautology. A law implies a law-giver ; because it merely denotes an invariable course of action, or a universal fact in nature. The law of gravita- tion is only a name for a general fact, namely, that matter attracts inversely as the square of the distance. The law is merely the rule of action in the case. To say, therefore, that the law of gravitation is the cause of gravitation, is to say that the fact itself is the cause of the fact ; that a gen- eral fact produces particular facts. There is nothing causa- tive in the law, any more than there is in the fact or facts which are its equivalent. Consequently, a law requires to be accounted for, as much as do the phenomena under it; and this carries the mind back to a creative author of law. Bacon objects to the inquiry for final causes, as leading to unfounded explanations and conjectures, thus hindering the progress of science. But Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, in endeavoring to find out the design and use of the multitude of valves in the veins. And, generally, the search after the purpose in nature has been the stimu- lus in physical science. That some of the conjectures re- garding final causes should prove to be erroneous, is un- avoidable to a finite intelligence. Aristotle (Metaphysics, I. ii.) contends that if the end or final cause cannot be found, science is impossible. There would be endless pro- gression in inquiry, with no terminus or goal. Scientific investigation would have no result. The Moral Argument is stated in two modes : 1 Con- science testifies to the fact of obedience, or of disobedience, of a moral law. This implies a law-giver. This is God. Calvin, Melanchthon, and Turrettin employ this mode. 2. We observe an inequality between the happiness of good and bad men, here upon earth. This requires an adjust- 248 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). nient hereafter. This implies a righteous arbiter and judge. The Historical Argument is derived from the historical fact, that all tlie nations have had the belief that there is a Supreme Being. Aristotle employs it, Metaphysics, XI. viii. Cicero, also, De Legibus, I. viii. ; and Grotius, ChriS' tian Religion, I. 12. CHAPTEE IV. TEINITY IN UNITY. Athanasius : Contra Arianos ; De Decretis Synodi Nicaenae (Ox- ford Library, Tr.). Augustine: De Trinitate ; De Civitate, XI. x. (Nicene Library, Tr.). Anselm : De Fide Trinitatis ; De Proces- Bione Spiritus. Hasse : Anselm, II. 287 sq. Aquinas : Summa, Pars I. Quest, xxvii. -xliii. Calvin : Institutes, I. xiii. 5. Ursinus : Christian Keligion, Quest. 25. Witsius : Covenants, I. ii. 6-7 ; Apostles' Creed, Dis. VI. Vn. XII. XXni. Turrettin : Institutio, m. xxiii.-xxxi. Hooker : Polity, V. li.-lvi. Stillingfleet : Trinity and Transubstantiation compared. Bull : Defensio Fidei Nicaenae (Oxford Library, Tr.). Pearson: Creed, L IL VH. Usher: On the Incarnation. Waterland : First and Second Defences ; Importance of Doctrine of the Trinity. Howe : Calm Discourse of the Trinity ; Trinity of Persons. Owen : Brief Declaration ; Saints* Fellowship ■with the Trinity ; Vindieiae Evangelicae ; Person of Christ. Leigh- ton : Theological Lectures (VII.). Cudworth : Intellectual System, n. 311-433 (Pagan Trinity). Edwards : Observations on the Trin- ity. Horsley : Belief of First Ages ; Tracts. Smith : Scripture Testimony. Magee : On Atonement. Wardlaw : Beply to Yates. Wilberforce : On the Incarnation. Kidd : On the Trinity. Tref- frey : The Trinity. Smeaton : On the Holy Spirit. Neander : His- tory, II. 403-477. Dorner : Christology (Nicene Trinity) ; Chris- tian Doctrine, § 28-32. Baur : Dreieinigkeitslehre, I. 395-470. Frank : Christian Certainty, g 33, 36. Billroth: Religions -Philoso- phie, ^ 89, 90. MiiUer : On Sin, II. 136 (Urwick's Tr.). Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 81-84. Martensen : Dogmatics, ^ 52-58, 181- 184. T. Maurice : Oriental Trinities. Morgan : Trinity of Plato and Philo. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, IV. Schaff : History, III. 600-689. Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 243-391 ; Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity. Breckenridge : Objective Theology, 231. It has been remarked, in the investigation of the Divine Nature, that the doctrine of the Trinity, though not dis* 250 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). coverable by human reason, is susceptible of a rational de- fence when revealed. This should not be lost sight of, not- withstanding the warning of the keen Dr. South (Sermon XLIII.), that '^ as he that denies this fundamental article of the Christian religion may lose his soul, so he that much strives to understand it may lose his wits." It is a noticeable fact, that the earlier forms of Trinita- rianism are among the most metaphysical and speculative of any in dogmatic history. The controversy with the Arian and the Semi- Arian brought out a statement and defence of the truth, not only upon scriptural but ontological grounds. Such a powerful dialectician as Athanasius, while thor- oughly and intensely scriptural; while starting from the text of scripture, and subjecting it to a rigorous exegesis ; did not hesitate to pursue the Arian and Semi- Arian dialec- tics to its subtlest fallacy in its most recondite recesses. If anyone doubts this, let him read the four Orations of Athanasius, and his defence of the Nicene Decrees. In some sections of Christendom, it has been contended that the doctrine of the Trinity should be received without any attempt at all to establish its rationality and intrinsic neces- sity. In this case, the tenets of eternal generation and pro- cession have been regarded as going beyond the scripture data, and if not positively rejected, have been thought to hinder rather than assist faith in three divine persons and one God. But the history of opinions shows that such sec- tions of the church have not proved to be the strongest de- fenders of the scripture statement, or the most successful in keeping clear of the Sabellian, Arian, or even Socinian departure from it. Those churches which have followed scripture most implicitly, and have most feared human speculation, are the very churches which have inserted into their creeds the most highly analytic statement that has yet been made of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Nicene Trinitarianism is incorporated into nearly all the symbols of modern Christendom ; and this specifies, particularly, TRINITY IN UNITY. 251 the tenets of eternal generation and procession with their corollaries. The English church, to whose great divines. Hooker, Bull, Pearson, and Waterland, scientific Trinita- rianism owes a very lucid and careful statement, has added the Athanasian creed to the Nicene. The Presbyterian churches, distinguished for the closeness of their adherence to the simple scripture, yet call upon their membership to confess, that " in the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity : God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding ; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father ; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son." "West- minster Confession, H. iii. In discussing the subject of the personality of God (183, sq.), we have seen that this involves three distinctions in the Infinite Essence. ' God cannot be self -contemplating, self- cognitive, and self-communing, unless he is trinal in his constitution. The subject must know itself as an object, and also perceive that it does. This implies, not three dis- tinct substances, but three distinct modes of one substance. Consequently, the Divine unity must be a kind of unity that is compatible with a kind of plurality. The unity of the Infinite being, is tri-unity, or trinity. God is a plural unit. The attempt, therefore, of the deist and the Socinian to construct the doctrine of the Divine unity is a failure, be- cause it fails to construct the doctrine of the Divine per- sonality. Deism, with Socinianism and Mohammedanism, while asserting that God is personal, denies that he is three persons in one essence. It contends, by implication, that God can be self-knowing as a single subject merely without an object ; without the distinctions involved in the subject contemplating, the object contemplated, and the perception of the identity of both. The controversy, consequently, is as much between the deist and the psychologist, as it is be- 252 THEOLOGY (DOCTRIKE OF GOD). tween him and the theologian. It is as much a question whether his theory of personality and self-consciousness is correct, as whether his interpretation of scripture is. For the dispute involves the necessary conditions of personality. If a true psychology does not require trinality in a spiritual essence in order to its own self -contemplation, self-knowl- edge, and self-communion, then the deist is correct ; but if it does, then he is in error. " That view of the Divine nature," says Smith (Faith and Philosophy, 191), " which makes it inconsistent with the incarnation and trinity, is philosophically imperfect, as well as scripturally incorrect." In speaking of the Divine unity, therefore, a peculiar kind of imity is intended, namely, a unity that is trinal. And when the Divine trinality is spoken of, a peculiar kind of trinality is intended, namely, a trinality that con- stitutes only one essence or Being. As a unity which ex- cludes trinality is not meant, so a trinality which excludes unity is not meant. "Cum dico unum, non me trinitatis turbat numerus, qui essentiam non multiplicat, non variat, nee partitur. Eursum, cum dico tria, non me arguit intuitus unitatis, quae ilia quaecumque tria, seu illos tres, nee in con- fusionem cogit, nee in singularitatem redegit." Bernard: De Consideratione, V. 8. Consequently, in reference to God, we may not discuss mere and simple unity, nor mere and simple trinality ; but we must discuss unity in trinality, and trinality in unity. See Athanasius : Contra Arianos, IV. 13 sq. "We may not think of a monad which originally, and in the order of nature, is not trinal, but becomes so. The instant there is a monad there is a triad. Neither may we think of a triad which originally, and in the order of nature, is not a monad, but becomes so. The instant there is a triad, there is a monad. VAovds ft Tpids &v, Tpids h fxovds &v. — Synesius. TRINITY IN UNITY. 253 The Christian trinity is not that of Sabellius and Py- thagoras: namely, an original untrinal monad that subse- quently, either in time or in the order of nature, becomes a triad : whereby four elementary and constituent factors are introduced into the problem; namely, one essence, and three additional persons. God is not one and three, but one in three. There is no primary monad, as sucli, and without trinality, to which the three distinctions are ad- juncts. There are only three constituent factors in the problem. For the essence has no existence outside of and apart from the three persons, so as to constitute a fourth factor in addition to these three. Tlie monad, that is, the essence, never exists in and by itself untrinalized, as in the Sabellian theory, and in the Pythagorean scheme of the tetractys, adopted by Coleridge (Works, V. 18, 19, 404). It exists only as in the persons ; only as trinalized. The essence, consequently, is not prior, either in the order of nature or of time, to the persons, nor subsequent to them, but simultaneous with them. Hence, the essence is not one constituent factor by itself, apart from the persons, any more than the persons are three constituent factors by themselves, apart from the essence. The one essence is si- multaneously three persons, and the three persons are one essence. The trinity is not a composition of one essence with three persons. It is not an essence without distinctions united with three distinctions, so as to make a complex. The trinity is simple and incomplex. " If," says Twesten (Dogmatik, II, 229), " we distinguish between theclearness of light and the different degrees of clearness, we do not imply that light is composed of clearness and' degrees of clearness." Neither is God composed of one untrinal, es- sence and three persons. It follows, consequently, that we cannot discuss the Divine unity by itself, exclusive of trinality, as the deist and the Soeinian endeavor to do. Trinality belongs as necessarily and intrinsically to the Divine unit}'-, as eternity does, to 254 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). the Divine essence, " I£," says Atlianasius (Oration 1. 17), " there was not a Blessed Trinity from eternity, but only a unity existed first, which at length became and grew to be a Trinity, it follows that the Holy Trinity must have been at one time imperfect, and at another time entire ; imperfect until the Son came to be created, as the Arians maintain, and then entire afterwards." The necessary connection between the Divine unity and trinality, is like that between the Divine essence and attri- butes. God's essence is not prior to and separate from his attributes. He is never an essence without attributes. The essence and its attributes are simultaneous and insep- arable. God cannot be conceived of as developing from an essence without attributes, into an essence with attri- butes. He is not essence and attributes, but essence in at- tributes. The whole essence is in each attribute ; and the whole essence is also in each trinitarian person. As we can- not logically conceive of and discuss the Divine essence apart from the Divine attributes, so we cannot logically conceive of and discuss the Divine unity apart from the Divine trin- ality. The unity of God is unique. It is the only unity of the kind. An individual man is one ; and any individual creat- ure, or thing, is one. But there are others like it, each of which is likewise numerically one. God is not merely one, but the only one ; not merely unus, but unicus. He is not one of a species, or one in contrast with another of the same kind. God is one God, and the only God. The no- tion of the unique must be associated with that of unit}'-, in the instance of the Supreme Being. God is not a unit^ but a unity. A unit, like a stone, or a stick, is marked by mere singleness. It admits of no in- terior distinctions, and is incapable of that inherent trinal- ity which is necessary to self-knowledge, and self -conscious- ness. Mere singleness is incompatible with society, and therefore incompatible with the Divine communion and TRINITY m UNITY. 255 blessedness. God is blessed only as he is self -knowing and self-communing. A subject without an object could not experience either love or joy. Love and joy are social. They imply more than a single person. The Scripture doctrine of the Divine plenitude favors distinctions in the Divine essence. Fulness of being im- plies variety of existence. A finite unit has no plurality or manifoldness. It is destitute of modes of subsistence. Meagreness and barrenness mark a unit ; opulence and fruitfulness mark a unitj-. This TrXypcofia, or, plenitude of the Divine essence, is spoken of in Eph. 3 : 19, " Filled with all the fulness of God ; " in Colos. 1 : 19 ; 2 : 9, " The fulness of the Godhead." Ambrose (De Fide, V. i.) marks the distinction as follows : " Singularitas ad personam per- tinet, unitas ad naturam." Says Twesten (Dogmatik, IL 228), " so far as plurality lies in the idea of the trinity, it is not contradictory to the unity belonging to the Divine essence, but only to that solitariness which cannot be har- monized with the living plenitude and blessedness which are ascribed to God in revelation, and which God possesses in himself, and independently of the finite." Owen (Doc- trine of the Trinity Vindicated) remarks that " it may be true, that in one essence there can be but one person, when the essence is finite and limited, but not when the essence is infinite." The following from Lessing (Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, § 73) is remarkable, as coming from one who would not be supposed to have devoted much study to metaph^^sical trinitarianism. " What if this doc- trine [the trinity] should bring us to see that God cannot possibly be one in the sense in which finite things are one ; that his unity must be a transcendental unity that does not exclude a kind of plurality (Mehrheit) ? Must not God have, at least, an absolutely perfect idea (Yorstellung) of himself ; that is, an idea in which is contained all that is in himself? But would all that is in himself be contained in this idea, if it included merely the notion, or bare possihil* 256 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). ity of his necessary and actual existence, as well as of his attributes ? Possibility might exhaust the nature of his at- tributes, but does it that of his necessary and actual exist- ence ? It seems to me that it would not. Consequently, God must either have nojperfeGt idea or image of himself, or else this perfect idea is as necessarily actual^ [that is, objectively real] as he himself is. The image or represen- tation of myself in a mirror, it is true, is nothing but an empty and unreal image of me, because it has in it only so much of me as is reflected by the rays of light falling upon the mirror. But if this image contained all — all without exception — which I myself contain, would it then be a mere empty and unreal representation ; or not rather a true du- plication of myself ? If, now, I affirm a similar self -dupli- cation in God, I get perhaps as near to the truth as the im- perfection of human language permits. And it is unques- tionable, that those who would make this idea which God has of himself level to the popular apprehension, could not express it more appropriately and clearly than by denomi- nating it a Son whom God generates from eternity." The argument for the truth and reality of the Trinity from the characteristics of the Christian experience, is con- clusive. There must be trinality in the Divine unity, in order to the exercise of the peculiar affections in the Chris- tian consciousness. The Christian experience as portrayed in the New Testament, and as expressed in St. Paul's case, for example, is both impossible and inexplicable, without the three persons in the one God. St. Paul is continually alluding, in his hopes and joys, to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Abstract the Father, Son, and Spirit, and leave merely a bare untrinal substance as the object of love, hope, and worship, and St. Paul's religious experience can- not be accounted for. If, from the common Christian con- sciousness, those elements should be eliminated which re- sult from the intuition of the Divine being as Creator, Redeemer^ and Sanctifier, little would remain. Let any TRINITY IN UNITY. 257 one think away all of Lis religious experience that relates to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and retain only what relates to the Divine essence as a monad and untrinalized, and he will perceive how very much of his best religious experience grows out of trinitarianism, and cannot grow out of unitarianism. Men cannot and do not love, pray to, and adore a mere abstract infinite nature. They love, ad- dress, and worship certain persons in that nature. Upon this point, Frank (System of Christian Certainty, § 33) re- marks as follows : " God is the unity, the one Eeing, who is the originating author and agent in the Christian expe- rience. But this unity has trinality in relation to this experience. God in judgment causes the sense of sin and guilt ; God in atonement expiates sin and guilt ; God in regeneration and conversion removes sin and guilt. Here are three modes or forms of God. Yet it is one absolute personal God, to wliom the Christian owes all this. In such way, and to this extent, the Christian is assured, by means of redemption and the objects of faith implied in it, of God as the triune God." Although trinal, the Divine essence is sirrvple^ not com- pound. In this respect, the unity of the finite spirit re- sembles that of the Infinite. The spirit of man is not com- posed of two substances. It is homogeneous. It is all spirit. A material unity is complex, being composed of a variety of elementary substances. Hence, there are varie- ties of matter, but not of spirit. By reason of its incom- plexity and simplicity, the Divine essence is indivisible. Not being made up, as matter is, of diverse parts or proper- ties, it cannot be divided or analyzed into them. "The nature of the Trinity is denominated simple, because it has not anything which it can lose, and because it is not one thing and its contents another, as a cup and the liquor, or a body and its color, or the air and the light and heat of it." Augustine : City of God, XI. x. The doctrine of the Divine unity, in opposition to poly- 17 258 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). theism, is taught in the Scriptures. Deut. 6:4, " The Lord our God, is one Lord." 1 Kings 8 : 60, " The Lord is God, and there is none else." Isa. 44: : 6, " Beside me there is no God." Mark 12 : 29, " The Lord our God is one Lord. John 10 : 30, " I and my Father are one " (eV). 1 Cor. 8 : 4, " There is none other God but one." Epli. 4:6,'' One Lord, one God and Father of all." Gal. 3:20, "God is one." No sin is more severely prohibited and threatened than the worship of idols. The rational proofs of the Divine unity are the follow- ing: 1. Unity is implied in the idea of God as the most perfect Being. Each of his infinite perfections excludes a second of the kind. There cannot be two eternal beiugs ; or two omnipotent ; or two supreme ; or two self-existent ; etc. "Hence," says Aquinas (Summa, L xi. 3), "the an- cient philosophers, as if compelled by the truth, in postulat- ing an infinite principle (principium), postulated only one Buch principle." Turrettin (III. iii. 7) cites Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, and Seneca as teaching the unity of the Supreme being ; pater hominum deorum- que. 2. The unity and harmony apparent in the created imiverse demonstrate the Divine unity. There would be two conflicting plans, had there been two creating archi- tects. The doctrine of the Trinity is one of revelation, not of natural religion, and therefore the first work to be done re- specting it, is to deduce it from the language of Scripture. It is not directly formulated, as an affirmative proposition, in any single text ; if 1 John 5 : 7 is spurious. But it is indirectly formulated in some texts, and taught part by part in many others. To collect, collate, and combine these, is to construct the dogma biblically. There are two general classes of Trinitarian texts : 1. Those which mention all of the three persons of the God- head. 2. Those which teach the deity of one or another of the .persons singly. TRINITY m UNITY. 259 1. Texts of the first class are the following: The account of the baptism of Christ, in Matt. 3 : 16, 17, mentions three persons. A person speaks from heaven, sajing : " This is mj beloved Son." The person who is spoken of in this ad- dress is the " beloved Son," and another than the person speaking. The " Spirit of God " who descended like a dove, alighting upon the Son, is still a third person, differ- ing from the other two. The person who speaks is not seen. The person spoken of is seen, and stands in the waters of Jordan. A third person is also seen, but, in the form of a dove, descending from heaven. It was a saying current in the daj-s of the Arian controversy : " Go to the Jordan, O Arian, and thou wilt see the Trinity." The term " Spirit," in this instance, does not denote some property or influence of God, because to descend from heaven in a personal form, and to take a personal attitude, is never at- tributed in Scripture, or anywhere else, to an impersonal influence or attribute. The formula which Christ gave his apostles for adminis- tering baptism to believers mentions the three persons of the Trinity, and thereby indirectly formulates the doctrine. Matt. 28 : 19, '* Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." The three are here represented as equal in dig- nity and authority. "Whatever be the significance of bap- tism, no discrimination is made between the relation which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost sustain to it. But that baptism is the recognition of the divinity of the person in whose name it is administered, is self-evident. Paul asks in amazement, if the Corinthians were baptized in the name of Paul ? 1 Cor. 1 : 13. When it is said that the Israelites " were all baptized unto Moses" (&? rov M^va-^v\ 1 Cor. 10 : 2, the meaning is not that they were baptized unto the name {eia to ovofia) of Moses, but with reference to (It?) the Mosaic doctrines and ritual ; as persons were said to be baptized "unto John's baptism " (Acts 19 : 3), in confirma- 260 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). tion of their belief ia John the Baptist's mission and preach- ing- The Apostolic benediction mentions all three persons. 2 Cor. 13 : 14, " The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all." Here, the apostle expresses the desire, that favor to the guilty through Christ as the mediator, from God the Father's love, may be made effectual by the Holy Ghost. Each person performs an office peculiar to himself. Three persons are mentioned in Eph. 4 : 4-6, " There is one Spirit, one Lord, one God and Father of all ; " and in 1 Peter 1:2, *' Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, and sprink- ling of the blood of Jesus Christ." There are, also, passages in which three persons are spoken of, who are distinguished from each other by cer- tain acts which each performs, and which could not be per- formed by a creature. John 15 ; 26, " But when the Com- forter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me." John 14: 16, "And I will pray {ipa>Ti]aa)) the Father, and he shall give you another Com- forter, that he may abide with you forever, even the Spirit of truth." In the first of these, mention is made of the Comforter who is sent, of the Son who sends him, and of the Father from whom he proceeds. In the second, the same persons are mentioned, but the Father sends the Com- forter. This is explained by the identity of essence in each person, whereby, in scripture the same act is sometimes re- ferred to more than one person. 1 Cor. 12 : 4-6, " There are diversities of [spiritual] gifts {j(apL(rpLdra\ but the same Spirit. And there are differences of [ecclesiastical] admin- istrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of [miraculous] operations (evepyi^fidrav), but it is the same God which worketh all in all." Here, the gifts, adminis- trations, and operations are such as could not proceed from TRINITY IN UNITY. 261 a creature ; and the three persons mentioned stand in the same relation to one another, and to the gifts, administra- tions, and operations. Eph. 2 : 18, "For through him, we both have access, by one Spirit, to the Father." Jude 20 : 21, " Praying in the Holy Ghost, keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ." liev. 1 : 4, 5, " Grace be unto you from him which is, and was, and is to come, and from the seven spirits which are before his throne, and from Jesus Christ." The " seven spirits " are the Holy Spirit designated by the Jewish sacred number, denoting infinite perfection. 2. The passages of the second general class, in which only a single trinitarian person is spoken of, will be presented under the heads of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. That the doctrine of the Trinity was taught in the Old Testament was generally maintained by the fathers, school- men, and divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu- ries. The language of Quenstedt expresses the common view of these authorities. " As the mystery of the Holy Trinity is proposed with sufficient clearness in the books of the Old Testament, so likewise from them alone the divin- ity of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, and thus the whole mystery of the Trinity can be demonstrated against any op- ponents who concede the inspiration of the Old Testament." Hase : Hutterus, p. 168. Calixtus questioned this position, in 1645, and was answered by Calovius. For the exegesis of the Fathers upon this point, see Irenaeus : lY. x. xi. ; Augustine : City of God, X.V1. vi. ; Confessions, XHL v. Speaker's Commentary : Gen. 1 ; 26 ; Isa. 32 : 1, 2. Au- gustine contended that man was made in the image of the triune God, the God of revelation ; not in that of the God of natural religion, or the untriune deity of the nations. Consequently it was to be expected that a trinitarian ana- logue can be found in his mental constitution, which he attempted to point out. All acknowledge that the Divine 262 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). unity has its coiTespondent in that of the human mind. But Augustine and the fathers generally go further than this. This, in their view, is not the whole of the Divine image. When God says, " Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," they understood these words to have heen spoken hy the Trinity, and ^tlie Trinit}^ ; by and of the true God of revelation : the Father, Son, and Holy Spii'it, one God. How far Moses co77vprehended the full meaning of the Divine teaching in these words, is one thing. Who it really was that taught, is another. The apostle Peter asserts that the Old Testament inspiration was a Trinitarian inspiration, when he says that " the prophets who prophesied of the grace that should come, searched what the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand of the sufferings of Christ." 1 Pet. 1 : 10, 11. The doctrine of the Trinity is revealed in the Old Tes- tament, in the same degree that the otlier truths of Chris- tianity are ; not with the clearness and fulness of the !Ne\v Testament, yet really and plainly. God is trinal in the Old Testament ; but with more vagueness than in the New. In the Old economy, only tlie general doctrine of three per- sons in the essence is taught. In the New dispensation, the characteristic differences between the three are speci- fied. The New Testament formula of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, together with the other data connected with this, yields the peculiarities of generation and spiration, of filiation and procession ; constituting a further develop- 2nent of the truth found germinally in the earlier revela- tion.' " The trinitarian conception of God," says Delitzsch (Old Testament History of Eedemption, 178, Curtis's Ed.), " is not a product of philosophical speculation, but the re- fiex, not only of the New Testament, but also even of the Old Testament facts of revelation. God and the Spirit of ' Compare Witsius : Covenants, I. ii. 5-7. Leighton ; Theological LecturcB, VU. Lee : Inspiration, Lecture III. p. 123. Domer : Chriatiau Doctrine, § 38. TRINITY m UNITY. 263 God are already distinguished upon the first page of the Holy Scriptures, and between both, the Angel of God stands as the mediator of the covenant, according to Gen. 16 ; and as the leader of Israel, according to Ex. 14 : 19. The angel of his presence, according to Isa. 63 : 9, is the saviour of his people." The passages in the Old Testament which imply the doc- trine of the Trinity are : 1. Those in which God speaks in the plural number. Even if no weight be attached to the phiralis excellentiae in the name Q"inb^, yet when God him- self employs the plural number in speaking of himself and his agency, it evidently supports the doctrine of personal dis- tinctions in the essence. Gen. 1 : 26, " God said, Let %^ make man after owr image." Gen. 3 : 22, *' God said, Behold the man is become as one of -ws." Gen. 11 : 7, " The Lord said. Let us go down, and there confound their language." Isa. 7:8," "Whom shall I send, and who will go for '^^s." The exegete would shrink from substituting " me " for " us," in these passages ; as he would fi*om substituting " I " for "we," and " my," for "our," in the sentence, "We will come unto him and made our abode with him," John 14 : 23. And yet it would be proper to do so, if there really is only a single person in the Supreme Being. " We might have supposed," says Augustine (City of God, XVL vi.), " that - the words uttered at the creation of man, ' Let us,' not Let me, * make man,' were addressed to the angels, had he not added, 'in our image;' but as we cannot be- lieve that man was made in the image of the angels, or that the image of God is the same as that of angels, it is better to refer this expression to the plurality of the trin- it3\" This remark of Augustine contradicts the explana- tion of Philo and Maimonides, who say that God addressed the angels, associating them with himself. Justin Martyr (Trypho, LXIL) finds the trinity in this passage. Compare, Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity. Nicene Library, III. 5. 264 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD). 2. Of less logical value in tliemselvesj yet having a de* monstrative force in connection with other proofs, are the trisagion in Isa. 6:3, "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of hosts ; " and the threefold address in JSTumbers 6 : 24-26, " The Lord bless thee, and keep thee ; the Lord make his face to shine upon thee ; the Lord lift np his countenance upon thee." " This formula of benediction," says Kurtz (Sacred History, § 46), " already contains the whole mystery of the divine Trinity, and of the redemption which was to be accomplished by it, in an undeveloped form, or like a germ. It was designed to aid in connecting with the relig- ious knowledge of the people a certain view, to be after- ward rendered more distinct, of the personality of the one God unfolded in three persons, and operating in a three- fold manner in the work of human salvation." 3. Still more important than either of the two preceding classes of texts, are those in which God is expressly dis- tinguished from God, as subject and object. The theopha- nies of the Old Testament, like the incarnation of the Son, are trinitarian in their implication and bearing. The narra- tive relating to Jehovah and Hagar, in Gen. 16 : 7-13, is an example. Here, the person who is styled in verses 7, 9, 10, 11, the " angel (tjijlb^q) of the Lord," is addressed in verse 13 as almighty God (bK) : " Thou God seest me." God is thus a person who sends (" of the Lord "), and a person who is sent (" angel "). The theophany of Jehovah to Abraham, described in Gen. 18 : 1-19, is another example. Here, one of the *' three men " spoken of in verse 2 is de- nominated Lord ("'Six), in verse 3, and Jehovah in verse 13 ; and is described by Abraham as the "judge of all the earth " in verse 25, before whom he himself is but " dust and ashes" (verse 27). In verse 14, this Jehovah-angel dis- tinguishes himself from " the Lord " (nin-;) by asking, " Is any thing too hard for the Lord ? " This could not be exchanged for : " Is anything too hard for me ? " The " men " in 18 : 22 are only two of the three. These two TRINITY IN UNITY. 265 went toward Sodom, leaving Abraham standing before the third, who is called Jehovah. In 19 : 1, these two angels come to Sodom. The theophany of Jehovah to Lot, in Gen. 19, is another example of the trinitarian distinctions. In verse 1, "two angels" (literally, ^^ the two angels": see 18 : 22) are sent by " Jehovah " (verse 13) to destroy Sod- om. In verse 18, one of these angels is addressed as " Lord " (^^m). The Masorites have the note, Kadesh^ i.e., " boly," to signify that " Lord " is employed in the divine sense, not the "profane" or human, as in 19:2 ("my lords"). The context favors the Masorite view; because Lot's words to the Lord, in 19 : 18-12, and the Lord's words to Lot, imply the deity of the angel; e.g., "/will over- throw the city." It is uncertain whether the "Jehovah" who " went his way as soon as he had left communing with Abraham " (Gen. 18 : 33) joins '' the two angels " that ^' came to Sodom at even " (Gen. 19 : 1) ; or whether one of these "two angels" is Jehovah himself. One or the other supposition must be made. The interchange of the singu- lar and plural in the narrative is striking. " It came to pass when they had brought them forth abroad that he said, Es- cape for thy life. And Lot said unto them^ Oh not so my Lord: behold now thy servant hath found grace in thy sight. And he said unto him. See, /have accepted thee ; I will not overthrow the city of which thou hast spoken," Gen. 18 : 17- 21. The theophany of Jehovah to Moses, in Exodus 3, is another instance of the subjective and the objective God. The person described in verse 2 as " the angel of the Lord," is denominated God (a^ib.it) in verse 4, and " the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," in verse 6. 4. There are passages in the Old Testament that speak of three persons in the Supreme Being. Isa. 48:16, "The Lord God, and his Spirit have sent me " (the Messiah). In Haggai 2 : 4, 5, 7, three persons are mentioned : " The Lord of hosts," his " Spirit," and the " Desire of all na- tions." If r-i^on (ver. 7) is rendered ra i/cXe/crd (Sept.), 266 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). still two divine persons are mentioned. This would prove distinctions in the Divine iiuit3% There are three persons who bring Israel out of Egypt : God ; the " angel " of God ; (Ex. 3 : 2,4 ; 23 : 20 ; 32 : 34) ; and the " Spirit " of God, Isa. 63:7-14. 5. All those passages in the Old Testament, which ascribe divine names and works to tlie Messiah, and divine opera- tions to the Holy Spirit, establish the doctrine of the trin- ity, by implication. These will be mentioned nnder the topics of the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Edersheim (Life of JesuSj Appendix IX,), by quotations from the Targums, Talmuds, and older Midrashim, shows that there are 456 passages in the O. T. (75 from the Pentateuch, 243 from the Prophets, and 138 from the Hagiographa) that are ap- plied by the Rabbins to the Messiah. Among them are 2 Sam. 7 : 14 ; "I will be his Father and he shall be my Son ; " Ps. 2:7," Thou art my Son, this day have I be- gotten thee." Compare Ileb. 1 : 5, 6. The Jews learned from the Old Testament that the Holy Spirit is a person. When John the Baptist tells the Phar- isees and Sadducees, that one would soon appear among them who would baptize them with the Holy Ghost (Matt, 3 : 7-11), he did not explain who the Holy Ghost is. He spoke of an agent known to them. So also in the instance of Christ's promise to his disciples, that he would send them the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, John 14 : 2G ; 15 : 13, 14. But this knowledge which is presupposed, must have been a common and current knowledge, derived from the Old Testament representations of God. Augustine (Confessions, XIII. 5) finds the trinity in Gen. 1 : 1, 2. The " beginning," he imderstands to be an agent, as in Kev. 3 : 14. " In principio " means, '' by the Begin- ning ; " that is, by means of him who causes to begin, or tforiginates. '^ Thou, Father, didst create heaven and 'earth in him who is the Beginning of our wisdom, which is thy Wisdom, of thyself, equal unto thee and coeternal, that TRINITY IN UNITY. 267 is, tliy Son." Dorner (Christian Doctrine, L 346) quotes Deut. 32 : 39, in comparison with Exod. 3 : 14. The same Being who sajs " I am I," also says " I am He." The technical term " trinity " is not found in Scripture ; and neither is the term '^ unity." The earliest use of the word is in Theophilus of Antioch (f 181, or 188), who re- marks that " the three days which were before the lumi- naries are types of the trinity." Ad Autolycum, IL 15. The term triad is employed by Plotinus (f 270), and Proclus (f 485). Tertullian (f 220) employs the term trinitas. Oj'igen (f 250) uses rpiW twice. Ilufinus, in translating Origen, employs trinitas. In the fourth century triunitas appears. The schoolmen discuss the triplicitas of the di- vine nature, in connection with the simplicitas. Baumgar- ten-Crusius : Dogmengeschichte, IL 120. Trinity is the abbreviation of tri-unity. God is trinal (trinum), not triple (triplex). Compare Augustine : Trinity, VI. vii. That which is triple is com- plex; it is composed of three different substances. That which is trinal is ineomplex ; it denotes one simple sub- stance, having a threefold modification. "We may speak of the trinal, but not of the triple deity." Hollaz, in Hase'a Ilutterus, 172. The German Dreieinigkeit is more accu- rate than Dreifaltigkeit ; and the English tri-unity than tlireefoldness, or triplicity. Dreieinheit comes still nearer to trinitas, than Dreieinigkeit. This latter leans toward tritheism, in denoting a unity of will and affection, rather than of nature. Dreiheit denotes trinality only. The term " person " does not denote an attribute of the essence, but a mode of the essence ; that is, a particular " form " of its existence, according to the term used by St. Paul, Phil. 2:6. It is proper to speak of a trinitarian mode, but not of a trinitarian attribute. A trinitarian per- son is sometimes defined as a "relation" of the essence. "Respondeo, dicendum quod relationes quaedara sunt in divinis realiter." Aquinas: Summa, L xxviii. 1. By a 268 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD). " relation/' here, is not meant an external relation of God to the finite universe ; as when the essence is contemplated in relation to space and time, and the attributes of immensity and eternity are the result ; but an internal relation of the divine essence towards itself. It is the essence in a certain mode, e.g., the Father, as related to this same essence in a certain other mode, e.g., the Son. The clue to the right construction of the doctrine of the Trinity, lies in the accurate distinction and defini- tion of Essence and Person. The doctrine is logically consistent, because it aflSrms that God is one in another sense than he is three ; and three in another sense than he is one. If it affirmed unity in the same respect that it affirms trinality, the doctrine would be self-contradictory. "To assert," says Conybeare (On Miracles), "that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct infinite Beings, and yet but one Being, is an express contradiction. To assert that they are three distinct Beings, of which two are inferior^ and yet each is God, is either to use the term God equivocally in this case, or else is an ex- press contradiction. But to assert, that there is but one di- vine nature or essence ^ that this undivided essence is com- mon to \hxQ% jpersons ; that by person when applied to God we do not mean the same as when applied to man, but only somewhat analogous to it ; that we have no adequate idea of what is meant by the word person when applied to God, and use it only because distinct personal attributes and ac- tions are ascribed to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in Scripture, is no contradiction. We do not assert [without qualification, and abstractl}^] that one. is three, and three are one ; but only that what are three in one respect may be one only in another. We do not assert that three beings are one being ; that three persons are one person ; or that three intelligent beings are one intelligent being (as the word person signifies when applied to men); but only, that in the same undivided nature^ there are three di^'erences TRINITY IN UNITY. 269 analogous to personal differences amongst men ; and though we cannot precisely determine what those differences are, we have no more reason to conclude them impossible, than a blind man hath to conclude the impossibility of colors be- cause he cannot see them." Athanasius (Cent. Ar., IV. 10) states the matter thus : " We assert the unity of the God- head as expressly and strenuously as the distinction and di- versity of the persons. "We believe the Father and the Son to be two, perfectly distinct from one another in their rela- tive and personal characters ; but withal we believe these two to be one God, one infinite essence or nature, the Son or Word begotten of the Father, united with him and in- separable from him in essence. And that illustration which we have so often made use of before, serves very well to explain our meaning, though by no means to explain the thing itself. Fire and light are truly distinct. The one is a body differently modified from the other, as is evident from their acting differently upon us. And yet they are one as to substance and general properties. For light is the issue of fire, and cannot subsist separate from it." The first proposition in the formulated statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is, that God is one in respect to Es- sence. The Greek terms that denote the essence are, ovaia, v7] is anarthrous. There are three "forms" of God. The wliole Divine essence (ova-la) subsisting {i'7rdp')(o3v^ not &v) in the Paternal form {pLope7'S07ial characteristic of paternity, but out of the essence itself. In generation, the first person does not communicate his liyjpostatical character, namely, his fatherhood, to the Son, but the whole undivided essence. The Son is rSeo? Ik Beov ; the essence in the Filial form or mode emanating from the essence in the Paternal form or mode. Again, the Spirit, though spiratedSy the Father and Son, yet proceeds not from the Father and Son stb persons but from the Divine essence. His procession is from one, namelj'', the essence ; while his spiration is iy two, namely, two persons. The Father and Son are not two essences, and therefore do not spirate the Spirit from two essences. Yet they are two persons, and as two persons having one numerical essence spirate from it the third form or mode of the essence — the Holy Spirit : their two personal acts of spiration concurring in one single procession of the Spirit. There are two spirations, because the Father and Son are two persons ; but there is only one resulting procession. See Turrettin, III. xxxi. G. According to the Greek view ^ The objections made by the English Arians and Semiarians (Clarke, Wbiston, etc.,) to the Athanasian doctrine were ; '^ That generation implies division of essence, and necessary generation implies outward coaction ; that generation is an act, and every act implies choice ; that necessary agents are no agents, and necessary causes are no causes ; that three persona must be three intelligent agents, and three agents cannot be one being, one substance, one God." Water- land : Second Defence, p. 4. TRINITY IN UNITY. 291 of the procession of the Spirit, there is only one act of spiration, tliat of the Father ; so that there is one spiration and one procession. The Biblical proof of these internal activities of the Di- vine essence is found : 1. In those passages which denominate the first person the Father^ the second person the Son, and the third per- son the Spirit. Ps. 2:7; Matt. 3 : 17; 28 : 19 ; John 1 : 14 ; Acts 13:33; Eom. 1:4; Heb. 1 : 8 ; 1 John 5 : 20. The terms father and son suppose generation. The terms are correlative, and must be taken in the same sense. If "father" and "son" are literal, so is "generation." If "generation " is metapliorical, so are "father" and "son." Whoever affirms that the second person of the trinity is literally and really the son of the first person, must, if he would not contradict himself, also affirm that the second person is literally and really begotten by the first. There is literally a communication of the Divine essence in the generation and filiation. 2. In those passages which denominate the Son " only " begotten, "own " son, and " dear" son. John 1 : 14, 18 ; 3 : 16, 18 ; 1 John 4:9; Coloss. 1 : 15 ; Heb. 1:6; Kom. 8 : 3, 32 ; Col. 1:13; Matt. 3 : 17 ; Eph. 1 : 6 ; 2 Peter 1 : 17. The second person in his original trinitarian status is denominated vt6<; ; in his estate of humiliation as mediator, he is sometimes called 7rat9. This latter term means " ser- vant," and is never used of the unincarnate Word. In Acts 3 : 13 ; Matt. 12 : 18 ; the phrase tto-?? //.ov denotes the same as " my servant," in Isa. 42 : 1. The Sept. renders '^;:3' by 7rat9. See Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 13 ; Bengel, on Matt. 12 : 18. 3. In those passages which technically denominate the third person the Spirit ; and those which speak of his pro- cession. " Spirit," in the technical trinitarian use, signifies that the third person is spirated or outbreathed by the Fa- ther and Son. The Hebrew '^^*' and the Greek irvevfia 292 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD) denote a breath, or breathing. Gen. 1:2; Num. 27 : 18 ; Ps. 51 : 11 ; Isa. 63 : 11 ; Hos. 9 : 7 (Gesenius in voce) ; Matt. 3 : 16 ; Luke 1 : 35 ; John 1 : 32, 33 ; 3:5, 6 ; Acts 2 : 4, et alia. Christ " breathed on his disciples, and said unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost," John 20 : 22. This spiration of the Spirit in time, was symbolical of the eternal spiration in the Godhead. The third person is also described as " proceeding " from the Fatlier, John 15 : 26. Though in this text it is not said that he proceeds from the Son also, yet there are texts that imply this. He is called the " Spirit of the Son," Gal. 4:6; the " Spirit of Christ," Eom. 8:9; the " Spirit of Jesus Christ," Phil. 1 : 19. The genitive in these passages denotes the source. It is noteworthy, that in the New Testament the third person is nowhere denominated the " Spirit of the Father." Fur- thermore, the Holy Spirit is " received from " Christ, John 16 : 14, 15 ; is " sent by " Christ, John 15 : 26 ; is " sent in the name of " Christ, John 16:26. The "mission" and " reception " of the third person from the second person, and in his name, favors the Latin doctrine of his spiration by and procession from him. Some trinitarians have attempted to hold the doctrine of the Trinity, while denying eternal generation, spiration, and procession. They concede that there are three eternal persons in the Godhead, denominated in Scripture, Father, Son, and Spirit, but contend that to go beyond this, and affirm such acts in the Godhead as generation and spiration, is to go beyond the record. They reject, or at least doubt, this feature in the Nicene Trinitarianism. But this is inconsistent. These trinal names, Father, Son, and Spirit, given to God in Scripture, force upon the theologian the ideas of paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession. He cannot reflect upon the implication of these names without forming these ideas, and finding himself necessitated to concede their literal validity and objective reality. He cannot say with Scripture that the first person TRINITY IN UNITY. 293 is the Father, and then deny or doubt that he "begets.'' ETe cannot say that the second person is the Son, and then deny or doubt that he is " begotten." He cannot say that the third person is the Spirit, and then deny or doubt that he " proceeds " by " spiration " (Spiritus quia spiratus) from the Father and Son. Whoever accepts the nouns, Father, Son, and Spirit, as conveying absolute truth, must accept also the corresponding adjectives and predicates, beget and begotten, spirate and proceed, as conveying absolute truth. Kecapitulating, then, we have the following internal marks (notae internae) or personal peculiarities, by which to distinguish the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit from each other. 1. The Father generates the Son, and spirates the Spirit. G-eneration and spiration are the eternal acts, the opera ad intra, that characterize the first Person. The first Person is distinguished b}' two acts, and no process. 2. The Son is generated by the Father, and together with him spirates the Spirit. Filiation is an internal process and spiration an internal act that characterize the second Person. The second Person is distinguished by one act, and one process. 3. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son. Procession is the internal process that marks the third Person. There is no internal act of the Holy Spirit ; but his external activity, especiallj'^ in redemption, is more marked than that of the first and second Persons. The third Person is distinguished by a process, and no act. Respecting the meaning of the terms generation and spiration, filiation and procession, little can be said, because inspiration has given but few data. The catholic trinitari- anism defines generation and spiration, as those eternal acts in the Godhead by which one person communicates the es- sence to, or rather with^ another. The term " communicate " must be taken etymologically. By generation, the Father makes the eternal essence common {icoivwvelv) to himself and the Son. The Son does not first exist, and the essence is ' then communicated to him. " The Father," says Turrettin 294 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). (III. xxix. 21)j " does not generate the Son either as pre- viously existing^ for in this case there would be no need of generation ; nor as not yet existing^ for in this case the Son would not be etei*nal ; but as coexisting^ because he is from eternity in the Godhead." " "When the Son says, 'As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself,' the meaning is not that tlie Father gave life to the Son already existing without life, but that he so begat him, apart from time, that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting him is co-eternal with the life of the Father who gave it." Augustine : Trinity, XV. xxvi. 47. The same statement and reasoning apply to the act of spiration. By spiration, tlie Father and Son make the eternal essence common to themselves and the Spirit. Tliej^ are not two persons that exist prior to the third, but eternally co-exist with him. The co-existence, in both generation and spiration, follows from the fact that it is one and the same numerical essence which is commu- nicated and constitutes the substance of each person ; and this essence cannot be any older in one person than in another. The results of these two eternal, constitutional, and nec- essary activities of generation and spiration in the Divine essence, are two distinct and personal emanations of the essence. There is no creation of a new essence, but a modi- fication of an existing one ; and this modification is a kind of issue^ or efflux. God the Son is the offspring of God the Father ; " very God of very God," (Ik r^? overlap). God the Spirit " proceeds " from the Father and the Son. The com- mon statements in the patristic trinitarianism respecting this emanation of the essence are the following : The Son is from the Father, not as an effect from a cause; not as an inferior from a superior ; not as created finite substance from uncreated infinite substance ; but as intelligence is from ■ intellect, the river from the spring, the ray from the sun. These illustrations were employed by the early trinitarians, TRINITY IN UNITY. 295 to denote the sameness of essence between the first and sec- ond persons, and the emanation of the latter from the former. This internal emanation was taught as early as Theophilus. " The word being God, and being naturally produced from God " {ifc ^eov ttg^vkw^;). Ad Autolycum, 22. Paraeus (Corpus doctrinae Christianae, XXV.) says : " Filius est genitus, spiritus sanctus procedit, sive emanat, a patre." The term " emanat " is explanatory of both "genitus" and " procedit," in this proposition ; because Paraeus held to the procession of the Spirit from both Father and Son. Paraeus in his notes on the Athanasian creed (Art, VII.), saj^s " tliat procession or emanation is the ineffable communication of the Divine essence, by which the third person of the trinity receives from the Father and the Son the same en- tire essence which the Father and the Son liave." Qnen- stedt enunciates the catholic view in the following man- ner: "Eternal generation is not by derivation, as in the instance of human generation ; nor by transfusion ; nor by any action that begins and ends. It is by an imceasing ema- nation, to which there is nothing similar in rerum natura." Ilase: Hutterus, 174. Similarly, Turrettin (III. xxxi. 1) describes the procession of the Spirit, as an " emanatio a patre et filio, distinctam a filii generatione." Bull defines as follows : " Patrem esse principium Filii et Spiritus Sancti, et utrumque ab ipso 'pxo'^Q.gQ.ri inter{oTej)roduGtio7ie^ non externa : unde fit, ut non modo ex Patre, sed hi ipso sint, et Pater in ipsis; neque in sacra Triade altera persona ab altera separari possit, sicut tres humanae personae ab in- vicem disterminantur." Defensio IV. iv. 9. Tlie term " emanation " is inapplicable to an opus ad extra, like creation, but not to the opera ad intra. When God creates the universe of matter and mind, he makes a new substance from nothing. The universe is not an efilux or emanation of the Divine essence. But when the Father generates the Son, this is an eternal emanation and outflow of the Divine essence. An emanation is of the same sub- 296 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). stance with that from which the emanation issues ; a crea- tion is a new and different substance from that of the crea- tor. The phrase '^ communication of essence," is preferable to '^ derivation of essence ;" though the latter is sometimes em- ployed by orthodox trinitarians. The term derivation is better suited to human than to Divine generation, because it denotes division and distrihution of a substance. When the Divine nature is communicated, it is communicated or " made common," as a whole undivided essence. In eternal generation, the entire Divine nature is caused to be the nature of the second person. But when finite human nature is derived, it is only a portion of human nature that is de- rived. In human generation, an abscided part of human Bubstance is separated from the common mass, and is made to become a distinct and separate human individual. Hence, it cannot be said, that the whole human nature is in each human person, as it can be that the whole Divine nature is in each Divine person. Human derivation is the transmis- sion of a separate fraction ; eternal generation is the com- munication of an undivided whole. "The generation of the Son of God is not like that of a man, which requires a separation and division of substance." Athanasius : Oration, I. 14. It has already been noticed that it is the characteristic of the Divine essence, that it can subsist indivisible and totally in -more persons than one. These adjectives are im- portant. For the human nature can also subsist in more persons than one ; but not indivisibly and totally. An in- dividual man, a human person, is only a part, and a very small part of the whole human nature or species. But the first, second, or third person of the Godhead is the entire Divine nature, in a particular mode of subsistence. All of the Divine substance is in each Divine person ; but not all of the human substance is in each human person. The whole of the Divine essence subsistinsc in a certain TRINITY IN UNITY. 297 mode constitutes God the Father, or God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit ; a part of the human substance, or specific nature, separated from the remainder of it by human gen- eration, constitutes the individual Peter, James, or John. A Divine person is denominated a subsistence in the es- sence ; a human person is denominated an individual ^(not in) the species. The preposition '*of " denotes division and separation of substance ; the preposition " in " excludes tliis. Saj^s Ursinus (Christian Eeligion, Q. 25), '^ in per- sons created, he that begetteth and generateth doth not communicate his whole substance to him that is begotten, for then he would cease himself to be a man ; but only a part^ which being allotted and severed out of the substance of him that begetteth is conveyed or derived unto him that is begotten, and so is made to be the substance of another individual or person, distinct from the substance of the in- dividual who begetteth. But in uncreated trinitarian per- sons, he tliat begetteth, or spirateth, communicates his whole essence to him that is begotten or proceeds ; 3'et so, that he who communicates doth retain the same essence, and that entire. The reason of this difference between a divine and a human person is, that the substance of man is finite and divisible; but that of God is infinite and indivisi- ble. And, therefore, the Divine essence, being the same numerically, and whole or entire, may be both communi- cated and retained simultaneously." The great mystery of the Trinity is, that one and the very same substance, can subsist as an undivided whole in three persons simultaneously. That a substance can be divided up, and distributed, so as to constitute a million or a billion of individuals, as in the instance of the human nature or species, is comparatively easy to comprehend. But that a substance without any division, or distribution, can at the same in- stant constitute three distinct persons, baffles the human understanding. In the sphere of matter, this would not only be incompreliensible, but absurd. A pint of water 298 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). could not possibly be contained in three different pint cups at oue and the same instant. But spirit is not subject to the conditions of matter; and as the whole Immansoul may all of it be in every part, and every point of the body, at one and tlie same instant, so the Divine essence may all of it be in each of the three Divine persons simultaneously. It is no contradiction, taking the nature of unextended spirit- ual substance into view, to &ay that the one numerical Divine essence is indivisibly and wliolly present at a million points of space at the same time, without making it a million of essences. If so, it is no contradiction to say that the one numerical Di^'ine essence subsists indivisibly and wholly in three modes or persons at the same instant, without making it three essences. If the plurality of points at which the Divine omnipresence is found does not multiply the essence in the first case, the trinality of the persons in which the Divine existence is found does not multiply the essence in the second case. It is here that the error of a specific, instead of a numeri- cal unity of the Divine essence, is apparent. In the case of specific unity, or the unity of a race, the one substance or nature is divided and distributed. The individuals are fractional parts of it. If the three persons of the Godhead constitute a Divine species, or a specific unity, as the mill- ions of human persons constitute a human species, then no sin(9/';!2(9?z only of the same nature with him, then the whole Divine essence is not in God the Son. And if so, no one of the Divine attributes, and still leas all of them, can be in God the Son. For a Divine attribute cannot be- long to a fraction of the essence. Consequently the Isicene Trinitarians uniformly explain and guard the statement that the Son of God is " of " the essence, and is " consub- stantial " with the Father, by saying that the eternal gener- ation differs from the human, by communicating the entire essence, and that each Divine person possesses the one Di- vine nature numerically and totally, not specifically and frac- tionally.^ The simultaneous existence of the undivided and total nature in each of the three persons, the Isicene trinitarians endeavored to illustrate by the figure of circum-incession (7rept')(^copi]o-L(;, circulatio). There is a continual inbeing and indwelling of one person in another. This is taught in John 14: 10, 11; 17: 21, 23: " Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me ? Believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. I pray that they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." ^ This, the Nicene 1 The English Arians : Clarke, Whiaton, Whitby, and others, denied that consubstantiality means one numerical substance possessed by each of the three persona. Hunt : Keligious Thought in England, III. 23. 3 Athanasius (Oration IH. 21) remarka that Christ prays here that the disci- ples "may imitate the trinitarian unity of nature, in their unity of affection. Had it been possible for the disciples to be in the nature of the Father as the Son is. he would have prayed ' that they may be one in CAee,* instead of ' one in 300 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). writers described metapliorically as an unceasing circulation of the essence, whereby there is an eternal intercommunion and interaction of being in the Godhead, so that each per- son coinheres in the others, and the others in each. " Each [person] is in each [person], and all [three persons] are in each [person], and each [person] is in all [three persons], and all [three persons] are one [being]." Augustine: Ti-inity, VI. 10. " The conimunit}^ of nature between the Son and the Father is like that between brio-htness and lis:lit, be- tween the stream and the fountain. The Son is in the sub- stance of the Father, as having his subsistence communi- cated to him out of that substance ; and again, the Father is in the Son, as communicating his substance to the Son, as the nature of the solar substance is in the rays, as intelli- gence is in the rational soul, and as the very substance of the fountain is in the waters of the river. The brightness of the sun is coeval with its substance or body. It is not a flame kindled or borrowed from it, but the offspring and issue of its substance or body. The sunbeams cannot be separated from that great fund of light. Tliey cannot be sup- posed to subsist, after their communication with the planet itself is cut off. And yet the sun and the brightness that flows from it are not one and the same tiling." Athana- sius, Oration III. 3, 4. " In trinitate maxime propria est et perfectissima ireptx'^pv^^'^j siquidem personae sese mutuo continent ; ita ut ubicunque una persona est, ibi reliquae duae existant, hoc est ubique omnes sint." Bull : Defensio, IV. iv. 14.' The terms first, second, and third, applied to the per- sons, are terms of order and relationship only. They imply no priority of nature, substance, existence, or excellence. > The Platonists employed this figure of circulatory movement, to explain the self -reflecting and seli-communing nature of the human mind. " It is not pos- sible for us to know what our souls are, but only by their Kti/^tretJ KvKKiKal, their circular and reflex motions, and converse with themselves, which only can steal from them their own secrets." Smith : Discourses (Immortality, IL). TRINITY IN UNITY. 301 Hence, the Son is sometimes named before the Father, 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; Gal. 1 : 1. Sometimes, the Spirit before the Son, Rev. 1 : 4, 5. The term " father " does not denote a higher grade of being, but exactly the same grade that the term " son " does. A human son is as truly man, as a hu- man father. He is constituted of human nature as fully and entirely as his father is. Augustine (Sermo 140, § 5) remarks that " if the Son were not equal to the Father, he would not be the son of God." The substance or consti- tutional nature determines the grade of being. A person having a human nature is ipso facto human ; whether he comes by it by the act of creation, as Adam and Eve did, or by propagation, as Cain and Abel did. So a person who possesses the Divine nature is ipso facto divine, whether possessing it by paternity, or filiation, or proces- sion. Christ asserts that " as the Father hath life in him- self, so he hath given to the Son to have life in himself," John 5 : 26. But " life in himself " is self-existence. As the Father has self -existence, so he has given to the Son to have self-existence. The difference in the manner in which self-existence is possessed by the Father and Son, makes no difference with the fact. The Son has self-exist- ence by communication of that essence of which self-exist- ence is an attribute. The Father has self-existence without communication of it, because he has the essence without communication of it. "While there is this absolute equality among the Divine persons in respect to the grade of being to which they be- long, and all are alike infinite and uncreated in nature and essence, there is at the same time a kind of subordina- tion among them. It is trinitarian^ or filial subordination ; that is, subordination in respect to order and relationship. As a relation, sonship is subordinate to fatherhood. In the order, a father, whether divine or human, is the first, and a son is the second. Hence the phrases " filial subordina- tion " and " trinitarian subordination " are common in trini- 302 THEOLOGY (DOGTRINB OF GOD). tarian writers. Tlie fourth section of Bull's Defence of the Nicene Faith is devoted to the proof of the subordination of the Son to the Father, in respect to his personal pecu- liarity of sonship ; the second and third sections having been devoted to the proof of his con substantiality and co- eternity with the Father, in respect to his essence. The trinitarian subordination of person, not of essence, must not be confounded with the Avian and Semi-Arian eubordination, which is a subordination of essence as well as of person. N"either must it be confounded with the theanthropiG or mediatorial subordination. This latter in- volves condescension and humiliation ; but the trinitarian subordination does not. It is no humiliation or condescen- sion for a son to be the son of his father. That the second trinitarian person is God the Son, and not God the Father, does not imply that his essence is inferior to that of the Father, and that he is of a lower grade of being, but only that his sonship is subordinate to the Father's paternity. The Son of God is an eternal, not a temporal son ; and an eternal son must have an eternal nature in order to be eter- nal. In the theanthropic or mediatorial sonship, there is an humbling, though no degrading of the eternal Son, be- cause of the assumption into union with the Divine nature of an inferior human nature. But in the Arian or Semj- Arian subordination, there is not only humiliation, but deg- radation. The Son of God, upon this theory, is of a lower grade of being than the Father, because he is of a different essence or nature. The following resume, condensed from the Dogmatics of Twesten (Theil II. §4:2), presents the subject of the notae internae in a clear light. '' The internal characteristics include the order according to which the Father is immutably tlie first, the Son immu- tably the second, the Spirit immutably the third person of the Trinity, and the ground ov foundation of this order in certain constitutional and necessary acts in the Divine es- TRINITY IN UNITY. 303 Bence. Since God is pure life and act (actns pnrissimus) ; and since bj virtue of his absolute independence and spon- taneity there is nothing in him inert or lifeless, nothing given independent of his act and nothing outwardly neces- sary ; those characteristics whereby the Divine persons are distinguished from each other must rest upon the Divine energizing ; namely, upon two eternally immanent acts, gen- eration and spiration. These acts are internal, because they have nothing but the Divine essence itself for an object. They terminate upon the Divine essence as modifying it, not upon the universe as creating it And they are personal acts, because it is not the Divine essence as common to the three persons, but as it subsists modified in particular per- sons, that is the subject or agent in the case. Hence it fol- lows, that these acts of generation and spiration are not to be regarded as the common action of all three persons, but as the particular action of one or more distinct persons — that of generation being the act of the first person, and that of spiration the act of the first and second. "But if the Father is unbegotten, does it not follow that he alone is the absolute Being? and is not this Arianism? Not so. For one and the same numerical essence subsists whole and undivided in him who is generated, as well as in him who generates ; in him who is spirated, as well as in those two who spirate. There can therefore be no inequal- ity of essence caused by these acts of generation and spira- tion. There may be, and there is an inequality in the several modes in which one and the same eternal essence subsists by virtue of these acts. The essence in the be- gotten mode or 'form' of the Son, is second and subordi- nate to the essence in the unbegotten mode or 'form 'of the Father. But this inequality of mode or ' form ' does not relate to time^ for the essence in the Son is as old as the essence in the Father ; nor to nature or constitutional being, for this is the same thing in both. It relates only to the personal characteristics of paternity, filiation, and proces- 304 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). sion. Hence the Atlianasiaa symbol can assert that ' in trin- itate, nihil prius aut posterius [tempore], nihil majus aut minus [natura], sed tota tres personas coeternas sibi esse et coequales,' and yet an inequality of relationship may be granted, if by this is meant merely that the Father is the generative source of the Son, and the Father and Son the spirative source of the Spirit ; or, in other terms, that the Sou's ^person is grounded in that of the Father, and the Spirit's j?6r5<9?z is grounded in those of the Father and Son, while yet the one eternal essence itself, which is identical in each, has no source and no ground." The external charaGteristics^ notae externae, of the three persons, are transitive acts, 02)era ad extra. They are ac- tivities and effects by which the Trinity is manifested out- wardly. They are the following : 1. Creation, preservation, and government of the universe, 2. Redemption. 3. In- spiration, regeneration, and sanctification. The first belongs officially and eminently to the Father ; the second to the Son ; the third to the Holy Spirit. The Father creates, yet by and through the Son : Ps. 33 : 6 ; Prov. 3:19; 30 : 4 ; John 5 : 17; Acts 4 : 24, 27. The Son redeems, yet com- missioned by the Father: Eom. 3 : 24 ; 5 : 11 ; Gal. 3 : 13 ; Eev. 5 : 9. The Spirit inspires and sanctifies, yet as sent by the Father and Son. He inspires the prophets : 2 Sam. 23 : 2, 19 ; 2 Peter 1 : 21 ; and sanctifies the elect : 1 Pet. 1 : 2. These works are occasionally attributed to another per- son. The Son creates : Col. 1 : 16 ; Heb. 1:3; Is. 44 : 24. The name Saviour is given to the Father : 1 Tim. 1:1; Jude 25. The Father sanctifies: John 17 : 17. Commonly, the Father raises Christ from the dead : Acts 13 : 30. But Christ " has power to take his life again : " John 10 : 18 ; and rises from the dead : Eom. 14 : 9 ; Acts 10 : 41 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 4. The Father *' judgeth without respect of persons," 1 Pet. 1 : 17 ; and yet '' all judgment is given to the Son," John 5 : 22 ; Mat. 25 : 31. This is explained by the unity of the essence. In every external operation of a person, TRINITY IN UNITY. 305 the whole essence operates, because the whole essence is in each person. The operation, consequently, while peculiar to a person, is at the same time, essential ; that is, is wrought by that one Divine essence wliich is also and alike in the other persons. An official personal act cannot, therefore, be the exclusive act of a person, in the sense that the others have no participation in it. " Tliere is no such division in the external operations of God, that any one of them should be- the act of one person without the concurrence of the others." Owen : Holy Spirit, IL iii. At the same time, an act like creation for example, which is common to all the persons of the trinity by virtue of a common participation in the- essence^ yet stands in a nearer relation to the essence- as subsisting in the Father than it does to the essence as subsisting in- the Son, or the Spirit. The same reasoning applies to re- demption and the second person ; to sanctification and the third person. Power, wisdom, and love are attributes com- mon to the Divine essence, and to each of the persons ; but both Scripture and theology appropriate power in a special way to the Father, wisdom to the Son or Logos, and love to the Holy Spirit, because each of these attri- butes stands in a closer relation to the particular person to whom it is ascribed, than to the others. The internal activities, on the other liand, unlike the ex- ternal, are attributed to one person exclusively of the other two, or else to two persons exclusively of the other one. Generation is the act of the Father only, the Son and Spirit having no share in it. Spiration is the act of the Father and Son, the Spirit having no participation in it. Filiation belongs to the Son alone. Procession belongs to the Spirit alone. According to the Greek, in distinction from the Latin doctrine of the third person, spiration is ex- clusively the Father's opus ad intra. The same remark re- specting exclusiveness is true of the incarnation. It is the second person exclusively, not the first or the third, who unites with human nature. 20 306 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD). The Deity of God the Father is undisputed, and hence there is less need of presenting the proof of it. The Di- vine names, attributes, works and adorableness, are ascribed to him. The term "Father" denotes an immanent and eternal relation of the first trinitarian person. God, in himself, and irrespective of any reference to the created universe, is a father : the Father of the Son. Were God primarily the Father because of his relation to men and angels, and not because of his relation to the second person in the God- head, his fatherhood would begin in time, and might conse- quently end in time. If there was once a time when God was not the Father of the Son, there may be a time when he will cease to be so. " It is the greatest impiety," says Cyril of Jerusalem (Catecheses, XL 8), " to say that after deliberation held in time God became a Father. For God was not at first without a Son, and afterwards in time be- came a Father." The hypostathcal or trinitarian paternity of God the Father as related to the Son, mast not be confounded with \\iQ ^providential paternity of God the Trinity as related to the creation. Only one of the Divine persons is the trini- tarian Father ; but the three persons in one essence consti- tute the providential and universal Father. The Triune God is generally the Father of men and angels by creation, and specially of the elect by redemption. Hence, the term Father applied to God has two significations. It may denote the Divine essence in all three modes, or in only one mode. The first clause in the Lord's prayer is an example of the former. When men say, '' Our Father who art in heaven," they do not address the first person of the Godhead to the exclusion of the second and third. They address, not the untriune God of deism and natural religion, but the God of revelation, who is triune, and as such the providential Father of all men, and the redemptive Father of believers. If a man deliberately and consciously intends in his suppli- TRINITY IN UNITY. 307 cation to exclude from his worship the Son and the Holy Spirit, his petition is not acceptable. " Re that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father," John 5 : 23. A man may not have the three persons distinctly and formally in his mind, when he utters this petition, and in this case he does not intentionally exclude any trinitariau person or per- sons ; but the petition, nevertheless, ascends to the Divine Three, not to a single person exclusively ; and the answer returns to him from the Triune God, not from any solitary person exclusively. " It is a doctrine," says Witsius (Lord's Prayer, Diss. VII. )? "firmly maintained by all orthodox divines, that the Father cannot be invoked in a proper manner, without at the same time invoking the Son and Holy Spirit, because they are one in nature and in honor. Nor can it, I think, be denied that, laying out of view the distinction of persons and looking only at what is common to all three persons in the Godhead, God may be denomi- nated our Father. Yet I cheerfully concur with those in- terpreters who maintain that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is particularly addressed in the first petition." Says Augustine (Trinity, Y. ii.), " That which is written, ' Hear, O Israel : the Lord our God is one Lord,' ought not to be understood as if the Son were excepted, or the Holy Spirit were excepted. This one Lord our God, we rightly call, also, our Father." The term Father denotes the Trinity in John 4 : 21, 23, 24. " The hour cometh when ye shall neither in this moun- tain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. The true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." Here the term Father is synonymous with " God " who " is a Spirit ;" the true object of worship. But Christ, in men- tioning the object of worship, had in his mind the God of revelation, not of deism ; trinal as he is in Scripture, not single as he is in natural religion ; the very same God in whose trinal name and being he commanded all men to be- lieve and be baptized. Christ's idea of God as the univer- 308 THEOLOGY (DOCTBmE OP GOD). sal Father was trinitarian, not deistic. In his intuition, and theology, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, and the Heavenly Father of angels and men. " The appel- lation Father, descriptive of the connection between God and his creatures, is true of every one of the Divine per- sons, and of the three Divine persons, one God. The [paternal] relation to the creatures is as true of the Son and Holy Ghost as of the Father, in respect to the Divine nature ; for all these persons are respectively, and in union, the Father of the universe ; the Father in creation, in gov- ernment, and in protection. The Son as Messiah is fore- told in his protecting kindness and mercy as * a Father to the fatherless.' " Ps. 68 : 5, 6 ; Isa. 9 : 6. Kidd : Eternal Sonship, Ch. Xni. A believer in the Trinity, in using the iBrst petition of the Lord's prayer, may have the first person particularly in his mind, and may address him ; but this does not make his prayer antitrinitarian. He addresses that person as the representative of the Trinity. And the same is true whenever he particularly addresses the Son, or the Spirit. If he addresses God the Son, God the Son implies God the Father. Each Divine person supposes and suggests the others. Each represents the others. Consequently, to pray to any one of the Divine Three is by implication and virtually to pray to all Three. ITo man can honor the Son without honoring the Father also. Says Christ, " He that hath seen me hath seen the Father also," John 14:9. In like manner, he that prays to the Son prays to the Father also. Says Turrettin (III. xxv. 2Y), ^^ The mind of the worshipper will not be distracted by the consideration that there are three Divine persons, if he remembers that the whole Divine essence is in each of the persons, so that if he worships one he worships all. With Gregory of Nazianzum, he may say : 'I cannot think of the one Supreme Being without being encompassed with the glory of the three persons ; and I cannot discern TRINITY IN UNITY. 309 the three persons without recurring to the unity of the es- sence.' " The hypostatical or trinitarian paternity of God, in dis- tinction from the providential, is mentioned in John 17 : 5. " Now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self." Here, Christ addresses the Father alone ; the first person of the Godhead exclusively. He did not address the Trin- ity, for he did not address himself, or the Holy Spirit. Respecting this trinitarian fatherhood, the Son says, "my Father," not " our Father." John 14 : 27 ; 15 : 1, 8, et alia. The baptismal formula, and the doxologies indisputably prove that paternity is an immanent and eternal relation of God. The rite that initiates into the kingdom of God would not be administered in three names denoting only certain temporal and assumed attitudes of the Supreme Being. Neither would a Divine blessing be invoked through three titles signifying only these. Baptism and invocation are acts of worship, and worship relates to the essential and eternal being of God. The hypostatical or trinitarian character of the first per- son is, that he possesses the essence " originally," in the sense that it is not communicated to him by one of the other persons. Augustine (Trinity, II. i.) thus speaks of the " original " or unbegotten possession of the essence by the Father. " We call the Son, God of God ; but the Fa- ther, God only, not of God. "Whence it is plain that the Son has another ^whom he is, and to whom he is Son; but the Father has not a Son o/'whom he is, but only to whom he is Father. For every son is what he is, of his father, and is son to his father ; but no father is what he is, of his son, but is father to his son." A common term applied to God, in the patristic age, to denote this peculiar- ity was, " unbegotten." ^' Next to. God, we worship and love the Word, who is from the unbegotten and ineffable God." ** We have the imbegotten and ineffable God." "We have 310 THEOLOGY (DOCTBINE OF GOD). dedicated ourselves to the unbegotten and impassible God," "He is the first-born of the unbegotten God." Justin Mar- tyr : Apology I. xxv., liii. ; II. xii,, xiii. " There are also some dissertations concerning the unbegotten God." Ru- finus: Preface to the Clementine Recognitions. In the writings of Athanasius, the Father is denominated cuyev- V7]r6^^ irigenerate or unbegotten, and the Son yevvrjTO'iy gen- erate or begotten. The phrase "Unbegotten God" implies and suggests the phrase " Begotten God." This denotes no more than the phrase " God the Son ; " the latter containing the substan- tive, the former the adjective. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, Y. xii.) remarks that "John the apostle says, no man hath seen God at any time. The only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him," Irenaeus (Adv. Haereses, lY. xx, 11) quotes this text in the same form : " The only begotten God which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." This patristic em- ployment of the phrase " Begotten God" strongly supports the reading fiovoyevrj^; ,5eo? in John 1 : 18, which has the support of a