CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND GIVEN IN 1891 BY HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE Cornell University Library arV156 Introduction to PhilosoPlJiy,..;, 3 1924 031 172 020 olin.anx Cornell University Library The original of tliis bool< is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031172020 FRAU JOHANNA ROCHLITZ AND THE MEMORY OF GEORG ROSENBERGER IN FRIENDSHIP AND VENERATION INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY a Iban&booFi (or Students ot PSYCHOLOGY, LOGIC, ETHICS, ESTHETICS AND GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OSWALD KULPE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND ESTHETICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF WURZBURG Translated from the German (1895) Wj- b°. pillsbury INSTRUCTOR IN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY J- And ^i\o(ro6viJ,ev avev fjuXaKias). And Cicero says that knowledge of the hest things, and the ability to use this knowledge, in whatever department they may be acquired, are termed 'philosophy.' All these uses of the word indicate that there is a peculiar province of knowledge which we are impelled to exi^lore not by any practical need, but by the simple desire for knowledge itself. Xow there can be no doubt that self- preservation or some other equally practical end lies behind the first beginnings of all knowledge. All the more remarkable, then, is this distmction of a special province of knowledge, which men investigate from the pure desire to know, without obtaining any direct profit for themselves or for the society in which they live. We employ to-day a single name for such knowledge in all its branches, and call it 'science.' Evidently, then, 'science' and ' philosophy ' spring from a common root. 3. But philosophy came to mean a great deal more than this, even among the ancients. At first, before its results had been acliieved, we find philosophical activity, philosophising, the centre of attraction. But as the stock of knowledge increased, and the thoughts of other generations could be regarded by the objective light of history, the name was gradually extended to a certain sum of acquired knowledge, products of this phUosopliical activity. When Socrates, pressing the etymological significance of the teim, calls himself a philosopher (a striver after wisdom), as distinguished from the Sophists (teachers or possessors of wisdom), he is not really exalting with a sincere mind the endeavour after knowledge for knowledge' sake, but rather passing a sceptical judgment upon the certainty of knowledge or the possibility of knowing. His disciple Plato takes up a more positive and objective attitude on the question of what constitutes philosophy. Thus we read, e.g., in the Theaetetus, of " geometry or any other philosophy "; while in the Euthydemus we find a general definition of philosophy regarded as acquisition of knowledge (kt'^o-is kiruTTriii.-qi). More than this : there are passages which define the philosopher as one whose efforts aim at a knowledge of the eternal, of the essential nature of things, and thus give a quite definite objective meaning § 2. The Definition of Philosophy to philosophy. "We find a still closer definition in Aristotle's "first philosophy" {TrpuiTq vitik6., the foriiici- were natural!; known as rot /iera rot ^vtriKa.. This arrangement, originally chronc logical only, was later looked upon as logically correct; and it is n unusual thing to find philosophers, even as late as the eighteentl century, judicially discussing the douhle meaning of the ^i-eTa.. Th Aristotelian metaphysics treated of the most general determination of heiag, and attempted to elaborate a theory of the universe. Henc it is by no means true to say that Aristotle created the science t which his writmgs have furnished a name : metaphysics ha already been studied by the philosophers of both the earlier am later Ionian schools, — among others, by Plato. The ten ' dialectics,? which occurs in Plato (c/. § 3. 1), covers the dis cussion of topics similar to those examined by the Aristoteliai metajihysics. At a later time, however, the word fell into dig repute, through its scholastic associations. Dialectics was one the regular subjects in the curriculum of the schools of the middl ages, but came to be regarded as nothing more than an apprentice ship in hairsplitting and barren disputation. Nevertheless Schleiemiachei (1768-1834) revived the term, to cover meta physical and epistemologicai disquisitions; and Hegel brought i The General Fhilosophical Disciplines -^ ^ into temporary favour Ijy his use of the dialectical, method (c/. § 3. 4). More recently still, E. Diihring has called his acute essay on space, time, causahty and infinity 'natural dialectics' (1865). 2. Keeping to our definition of philosophy as a science of principles (§2. 8), we must regard metaphysics as the science of the mod general principles. It will, therefore, be concerned with such concepts as those of being, becoming, possibility, actuality, necessity, etc. Many philosophers, however, following Wolff, have regarded these matters as the subject of a special branch of metaphysics, ontology. Lotze, e.g., divides liis meta- physics (2nd ed., 1884; Eng. trs., 1887) into ontology, cosmology and psychology, and assigns to the first-named the duty of deciding the most general determinations of being. From another point of view, metaphysics has been conceived of as a theory of the real, in contradiction to the theory of the phenomenal, which is furnished by the' special sciences. Its problem would then be the cognition of the self-existent, of that which must be regarded as existing, absolutely, behind the world of appearances. "VYe find this idea of metaphysics in Descartes and Sjoinoza (1632-1677), Leibniz (1646-1716) and Herbart, Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and E. von Hartmann; though the reasons that each of these philosophers gives for regarding such a science as possible differ pretty widely from those given by the others. Metaphysics, then, takes shape aa ^ theory of the universe ; something which rounds off and in a certain measure corrects the knowledge attained by the separate sciences. And it is in this meaning of metaphysics that we have the root of that indf^uality which characterises not it alone bvit all philosophy. For 'a theory of the universe, to vise popular language, is not only the work of the 'under- standing,' not only an intellectual analysis and recomposition of scientific data, but also the creation of 'feeling' and 'will,' of a mind which approaches those data with definite needs and require- ments. It must satisfy the demands not only of the intellect, but also of the will,— in more general phrase, of human Hfe. Hence it is this sense of the word metaphysics that philosophers have in §4- Metaphysics 23 view when they distinguish a whole number of divergent ' schools ' ; the terms monism and dualism, materialism and spirit- ualism, etc., stand for metaphysical opposites. Even Kant, who set out to rob metaphysics of its title to existence as a part of scientific loiowledge, admitted that he was dealing with an irrepressible requirement of human reason, and did not for a moment believe that his criticism had made all attempts at metaphysics impossible. 3. The chief result of Kant's ' critique of all metaphysics ' is the l^roof tha t every metaphysics must be preceded by an investigation that- KscrrtTS" 1aiovm"as'"TKrifepr&Ter ttative of a ' critical ' philo- sophy. His demonstration of the unscientmc cnaracter of current metaphysical essays in all the three departments of theoretical philosophy distinguished by "Wolff — rational psychology, cosmology and theology — is irrefragable. It runs somewhat as follows. (1) The conclusion ot rational psychology, the assumption of an imperishable and substantial mind, rests upon a paralogism or erroneous inference : it involves argument from the ' I ' familiar to everyone as logical subject to an ' I ' as substantial existence. (2) Cosmology makes certain statements with regard to the spatial, temporal and causal attributes of the universe, and declares that they possess universal validity. The claim is un- founded : for precisely ojjposite assertions can be demonstrated to be equally worthy of credence. Thus arise what are known as the ' cosmological antinomies.' The finitude and infinitude of space, time and causality are proven with equal cogency. (3) Finally, Kant subjects the customary proofs of the existence of God offered by rational theology^the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological — to a destructive criticism, and again suc- ceeds in showing that the methods of proof employed are scientifically inadequate. We cannot argue from the idea of a supreme or most perfect being to his existence ; we cannot infer a final ^yaiisR from the fact of an order of nature in the universe ; and we cannot conclude from the purposive course of natural phenomena that it is the work of a supreme regulating intelligence {cf. §22). 24 The General Philosophical Disciplines To the metaphysical ideas which find treatment in these different connections, Kant opposes the extremely happy and fruitful conception of a 'regulative principle.' He understands by this an hypothesis which is intended to regulate scientific investigation, without putting forward any claims of its own to independent significance, i.e., a highest principle wMch owes its place simply to considerations of expediency. Since in the scientific investigation of nature, e.g., it is convenient to set out from the assumption of the infinity of the universe, this, and not the contrary assumption of its finitude, is raised to the rank of a regulative principle ; but its adoption does not pledge the investi- gator to include the metaphysical doctrine of infinity in his general theory of the universe. When, however, Kant comes to discuss the question of the freedom or determination of the will, he is led to the conclusion that we may at least assert the possibihty of an uncaused begiiming of any series of events, provided that they lie outside the sphere of phenomena — the only objects of scientific knowledge — or of possible experience. It was on this basis that Kant, later on, worked out his metaphysics of ethics, in which he demanded the acceptance of freedom of the will. 4. The post-Kantian philosophy is perhaps more rife in meta- physical speculation than that of any other period. We shall look for metaphysics, however, less in the works of the ' idealists,' Fichte, vSchelling and Hegel, than in Kant's ' realistic ' followers, Herbart and Schopenhauer. For the r ealists made an express attempt to obtain knowledge of the essentSTnature^Qf-things, to get an idea of the character of the ' thin g in itself,' which Kant believed to lie behind the world of phenomena, but which he declared, in his critical discussion of the limits of human know- ledge, to be wholly inaccessible to scientific determination. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, on the other hand, desired primarily merely to systematise the Kantian philosophy. C. L. Eeinhold (1758- 1823) began in the same way, with the search for a general principle valid for the whole faculty of knowledge. The result of his efforts was a supreme principle of ideation, by means of whicli unity was brought into the critique of pure reason. § 4- Metaphysics 25 Kant's tlieoretical philosophy. Fichte went a step farther, endeavouring to trace back both tlie critique of pure reason and the critique of practical reason (the ethics) to ultimate prin- ciples. The concept of the self isroved to be best adapted to his purpose : Kant makes it a final logical presupposition of know- ledge, i.e., of the theoretical philosophy; and 'will' is defined in the practical philosophy as the thing in itself which lies behind the complex of phenomena constituting the nature of man. Tlie^ idea of the ego can thus be regarded as the culmination of Kant's theoretical and practical philosoishy alike. Schelling (1775-1854:) and Hegel, with the same end in view, rose to a yet higher abstraction. Schelling introduced the idea of absolute identity as the supreme principle of all philosophical knowledge; Hegel made use of the corresponding idea of absolute existence, or, simply, of the 'absolute.' It is evident from the above historical sketch that for these three philosophers metaphysics was a secondary result, not a chief end of philosophical enquiry. Indeed, Hegel's recognition of thought and being, reason and reality, as two completely distinct fields, is a sufficiently clear indication of his rejection of a special metaphysics as science of the existential nature of things. The modern tendency to make Hegel's 'speculative' metaphysics responsible for the general discredit into which philosophy subsequently fell is, therefore, historically unjusti-" fiable. Hegel's undertaking was, as a matter of fact, conceived entirely in the spirit of latter-day science; he planned to give a comprehensive logical deduction and exposition of things as they were. Objection cannot be taken to his intention, but only to his manner of carrying it out. 5. In England metaphysics has never succeeded in obtaining a peiTOanent foothold. English philosophy is an expressly empirical philosophy; and it seems never to have occurred to the great English thinkers, even as a possible problem, to combine natural philosophy and psychology with ethics, and so to approach the questions which form the peculiar subject- matter of continental metaphysics. They will have philosophy The General Philosophical Disciplines studied just as if it were a special science, or at least employed for tlie furtherance of the special (more particularly the natural) sciences. The few excei:)tions — Berkeley (1685-1753) and some of the Scottish philosophers — simply serve to jDrove the rale. This position with regard to metaishysics has recently been defended in detail by Herbert Spencer, and has become known as agnostkism. Spencer admits the existence of an absolute, corresponding to Kant's thing in itself, and lying behind the world of phenomena, but mak gs all knowled ge consist in i^ations, and thus leaves the absolute indefinable, — -not even to be cEafacterised by any negative statement that might serve to determine its nature. The tliinkers of tliis_ school are also frequently- lallsd- J}QSitin4?i. Positivism originally meant the conception of philosophy expounded by A. Comte in his Courg de pMlosoiMe podtice (6 vols., 1830-42); the idea of philosophy as nothing more than a systematisation of the special sciences. Recently, however, the name has been used with a wider signifi- cation, and there are not a few philosophers at the present day who might properly be classed as positivists. Characteristic of the positivist attitude are the rejection of aU metaphysics, and the recognition of philosophy as a universal science and of experience as the sole source and sole object of knowledge. In this sense of the term, David Hume (1711-1776) was a positivist. E. Laas, whose book on ' Id£a;iism_jnd Positivism ' (3 vols., 1879-1884) is a critical and historical accounr"of'the~ differences between these two great branches of philosophical thought, puts the dawn of positivism as far back as the sophist Protagoras. And the ISTeo-Kantians of our own time, whose chief representatives are F. A. Lange (f 1875), H. Cohen, P. Natorp, K. Lasswitz, etc., have by their insistence upon the critical side of Kant's teaching taken up an attitude to meta- physics which shows the closest resemblance to that of positivism. 6. We cannot decide between these conflicting opuiions until we have definitely marked out the field of metaphysics. If we under- stand by metaphysics what is stiU sometimes understood by it, the theory of the most general concepts employed for the § 4- Metaphysics 2 7 determination of empirical data (and space § 5- Epistemology 33 possible. In the same way, the twelve categories which constitute the original possession \of our understanding enable us to express the fundamental propositions of natural science with regard to matter, change and the uniform connection of phenomena, in necessary formulae. This a priori, then, — which in Kant himself still has many of the attributes of an innate mental character, though by the modern representatives of his epistemology, the Neo- Kantians, it is used more correctly to designate a presupposition of scientific knowledge. tha|' is independent of experience, — this a p)-iori is the root of all- necessity and universality. At the same time, the a ■priori elements cannot of themselves, in Kant's opinion, furnish us with knowledge. They become fruitful only when appUed to the materia,l of experience. Hence their employ- ment beyond the Hmits of possible experience, in what is called the ' transcendent ' sphere, is merely pseudo-scientific, and can lead to no result (c/. § 4. 3). The works in which Kant expounds his epistemological views are the Kritih der reinen Vernunft (1781) and the Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Metaphysilc (1783). 5. In the writings of Kant's immediate successors epistemology appears under different names. "We have already mentioned Fichte's term Wissenschaftslehre, science of knowledge (c/. §5. 1). In his elaboration o f this discipline Fichte comes to defi nite _fajta^pImical_co nclusions as to t he^ principle whic h underlies_the order of t he universe,^.aJid p asses far beyond thej units of epist e- mology proper. The same thmgTsTrueof Schelling's ' philosophy of identity,' of Hegel's 'logic,' of Herbart's 'metaphysics' and^ of Schopenhauer's system. No one of these authors makes any attempt to define the boundaries of strictly epistemologicd enquiry. Since t he sixth decade of the presentcentury_thp convictio'n'Eas growii_among_G;ernian philosophers that_a^saund epistemology can alone furxosh-an-Adfigjiata basis for phjlosephy-ia general, and a reliable criterion of the inferences drawn from the investigators of the special sciences. Materiahsm, the metaphysical assumption that matter is the principle of aU things (cf. §16), was the direct occasion of the return to Kant which this conviction brought with it. Hegel's speculative philoso phy crumbled beneath 34 The General Philosophical Disciplines the attacks of_ tIig_esijarical disciplines and of this cautious new philosophy, and philosophical science began by slow degrees to recover its lost ground. To-day, the first thing demanded of a philosopher is a com.2lfito^^aiailiarity with epistemology, which there is a great tendency to regard as actually equivalent to 'philosophy,' — so far, at least, as philosophy can lay claim to any scientific import; and the high value set upon epistemology has extended beyond philosophy. Men of eminence in the special sciences, like Helmholtz, Fick, Mach, etc., have attempted to answer the episte- mological questions which lie behind their sciences. So in Protestant theology : Eitschl's school, in particular, are convinced that the scientific exposition of the contents of the Christian religion presupposes not a metaphysics, but Kant's or Lotze's epistemology, 6. There can be no doubt that epistemology deserves the high position thus accorded to it. But in face of the multiplicity of opinions concerning its special problem, we are caUed upon to delimit its sphere of application as precisely and definitely as we_ can. If one understands by ' knowledge ' the obtaining of know- ledge or knowing, i.e., the acts or processes which lead to knowledge, epistemology evidently becomes a part of psychology. For these activities cannot imply anything but psychical functions ; indeed, we often hear of a 'psychology of knowledge,' whose subject-matter consists of all the conscious processes involved in the acquisition of knowledge, — sensation, perception, memory and imagination, attention and thought, etc. The old psychology spoke in the same sense of &,facultas cognosdtiva, within which it distinguished between lower and higher faculties of knowledge. The point of view from which all these processes are considered is that of the purpose which they are conceived to fulfil or to be capable of fulfilling : what must be the nature of those psychical functions — so the question runs — which lead, have led and can lead to knowledge? This teleological standpoint, which is thoroughly characteristic of the older psychology, makes the psychology of knowledge an applied science. Epistemology, as thus defined, would, therefore, be a department of applied psychology. "We trace the same tendency in certain modern names §5. Epistemology 35 for psychical processes. The phrases 'sensation of weight,' 'sensation of resistance,' 'sensation of movement,' denote those simple sensation qualities which give rise to the idea of a heavy, fixed or moving object. 7. If epistemology were nothing more than a part of applied psychology, it could not (1) form the presupposition of all the disciplines engaged with a certain subject-matter, but would itself presuppose the quite definite science of psychology. (2) Moreover, on such a definition it must be looked upon as one of the special sciences, since empirical psychology, which constitutes its founda- tion, has already become a special science (c/. §8. 9). (3) Further, it would bear no relation to the weighty questions of the validity and limits of human knowledge ; for no amount of applied psy- chology could help us to determiae the value or extent of possible knowledge. (4) Finally, it would be whoUy unable, under these circumstances, to undertake any objective investigation of the general problems of the distinction between subject and object, of causality, of development, etc. All that it could do would be to show the course which the processes of scientific enquiry or acquisition most usefully take in the mind of some particular individual; but then it ■^ould entirely lose the character of a scientific philosophy and general philosophical discipline. It seems evident, therefore, that epistemology cannot be regarded as a theory of knowing. The other meaning which we can give the term is that of the ' science of the results of obtaining knowledge or knowing, the science of knowledge as acquired. But again, in this very general sense, epistemology would run the risk of confusion with logic and the special sciences. Now we can distinguish logic from epistemology (as we shall see latfer: §6) by entrusting to it the exclusive treatment of the formal principles of knowledge; and if we hand over the special contents of knowledge to the special sciences, we are obviously left with an epistemology whose peculiar province is that of the g&rmi^ contents of knowledge. The discipline would, on this view, be occupied with those con- cepts whose comprehensive application in difierent special sciences 36 The General Philosophical Disciplines made them the logical presuppositions of these sciences, and prevented their adequate discussion within the limits of any individual science. 8. Epistemology treats, then, not of any special facts which can be separated from other special facts, nor yet of those more general contents of knowledge which can still be disposed of within a restricted field of scientific enquiry, but of matter so general that it is common and essential to all, or at least to great groups of the special sciences. The reader wiU better understand what is meant if we give a list of the objects which come under this category. (1) The first business of epistemology will be the definition of the phrase ' contents of knowledge ' in its most general sense, — an examination of the question of the possibihty of knowledge. Such an examination is of special importance in connection with the 'limits' ofjjaewledge, which are generally admitted ailfl often" enough make their appearance in the course of a scientific discussion. Closely related to this last question are (a) the distinction between ' transcendence ' and ' immanence,' between whatllifi§. beyond'i.all experience, and what is contained , in experience , (&) the antitE^is of the a priori and the a posterioi'i, of what in human knowledge is independent of experience and what is dependent upon experience; (c) the enquiry into the conditions of the 'necessity' and 'universal validity' of statements, i.e., into the nature of the contents which imake these statements possible, etc., etc. (2) In the second place, epistemology wUl have to test the fundamental division 6f the contents of knowledge into 'subjective' and 'objective.' This division is so far-reaching that it differentiates the two great departments of natural science and psychology ; aU that can be regarded subjectively is handed over to psychology, aU that can be objectified, to natural science. It is clear that the examination could not be carried out by a psychological epistemology; and it follows that the school of subjective idealism, which adopts the psychological point of view and looks upon every datum of knowledge as an idea of the knowing subject (c/. §26. 1 if.), § 5- Epistemology 37 has barred the way to any solution of the problem involved. (3) In the third place, epistemology must consider the not less fundamental division of knov^^ledge into ' formal ' and ' material ' constituents. (4) As a fourth problem we might set down the investigation of being and becoming, or change, and of one of the more special forms of change, development. Besides these enquiries, which constitute the logical presupposition of all the special sciences, epistemology wUl be occupied with certain less general concepts, common only to definite groups of sciences. (5) Under this head faU the concepts of matter, force, energy, life, mind, the relation between psychical and physical processes,/ etc. As a rule, however, these special questions are discussed in/ particular philosophical disciplines, such as natural philosophy or psychology. 9. We need use no argument to prove that our definition gives epistemology the significance of a fundamental philosophical science. On the other hand, we may pause for a moment to notice that it compiletely nullifies a difficulty which has often been urged from the dialectic standgoiiit against the recognition of epistemology as a separate discipline. The question has been raised, how the value and validity of knowledge can be deter- mined when we are always obliged to use the knowing mind in coming to our determination. If we posit the validity of know- ledge in the latter case, it is plain that no further investigation of the validity of knowledge is necessary. If we do not, then we have no criterion by wHch to judge of validity or invalidity at all. Now this line of argument will, evidently, holcL-^idyi-^ against the conception of epistemology., as a theory o^liTWioing. /It has^na. force whatsoever when brought agauKT^ffiiLdeiiiiition of the diHciplme as fTscieffiC^rCf' the most general contents of knowledge. There can be no doubt tharb-epistcmologicallnV^igations are among the most difficult in the whole realm of philosophy. Not only does their conceptual character require a very peculiar capacity for abstract thought; their dependence upon the progress of the special sciences — which cannot but exert great influence upon our knowledge of the most general contents of science — demands, at 38 Thz General Philosophical Disciplines the same time, a familiarity with the status of all the special branches of scientific work. Moreover, through the action of a psychological law of universal validity, which cannot be further discussed at present, we find that the most general concepts arc those first formed by popular and philosophical reflection ; so that epistemology runs a risk of suffering from the confusion of popular linguistic usage and from association with all sorts of metaphysical theories and beliefs. Although the science is, in principle, as capable of attaining to necessity and universal validity as any other discipline, still the difficulties which it has to meet are fuUy sufficient to explain the fact that epistemological antitheses stiU play a part in philosophy, and that the conception of the study as a whole cannot as yet be said to have become whoUy clear and definite. "We may note that in the special sciences, too, it is the most general theories which are least capable of a formidation which shall exempt them from discussion and disagreement. 10. The varying use of the term 'logic' has led to the frequent inclusion of epistemological expositions in works which bear that title, and which also deal with the problems peculiar to logic in its narrower sense. We shall here, then, merely mention the names of those modem writers who have given epistemology a place in their logics : Schuppe, Lotze and Wundt. The works themselves will be cited under § 6. We append a list of strictly epistemological treatises. H. Cohen, Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung, 2nd ed., 1885. (The chief epistemological work of the Neo-Kantians.) A. Riehl, Der philosophische Kritizimius, 2 vols., 3 parts, 1876-87. (The first volume contains an historical exposition, beginning with Locke.) E. von Schubert-Soldern, Grundlagen einer Erkenntnisstheorie. 1884. J. Volkelt, Erfahnmg unci Denlxn. 1885. R. Avenarius, Kritih der reinen Er/ahrung. 2 vols. 1888-90. G. Heymans, Die Gesetxe und Elemente dcs v:{sseu$cliaftlichen Dcnliens. 2 vols. 1890-94. (Contains also a short sketch of logic.) F. Erhardt, Metaphysik. I. ErJcenntnisstlieorie. 1894. (Takes up n. position nearly allied to that of Kant with regard to the apriority of space and time.) L. Basse, Philosophie und Erkenntnisstheorie. I. 1894. (Contains a critical discussion of different epistemological tendencies, in connection with the question of the possibility of a metaphysics, together with an outline of a system of philosophy.) §6. Logic 39 [L. T. Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge. 1896.] A history of epistemology is much needed, but still remains to be written. § 6. Logic. 1. Logic, defined as the science of the formal principles of knowledge, was founded by Aristotle. True, we find in earlier thinkers anticipations of and contributions to the science ; many of the Platonic dialogues, in particular, contain discussions of the formation of concepts, of definition, and of the deductive pro- cedure. But it was not tUl the time of Aristotle that logic was raised to the rank of an independent discipline and its divisions systematically classified. The theory of inference and proof Aristotle calls ' analytics ' (to. a.vaXvriKa) ; in the prior analytics he treats of inference, in the posterior of proof, of definitions, of classifications and of the inductive procedure. The theory of dialectical inference or reasoning from probabilities he calls 'topics' (ra TOTTiKo). The book irepl Ip/iTjvetas deals with the proposition and the judgment; the book inpl Karr/yoptalv (of doubtful authenticity) discusses fundamental concepts. The editors and commentators of the Aristotelian writings named all these logical treatises, taken as a whole, the opyavov, and the science which they expounded, logic : Aristotle himself had used only the temi analytics. The Stoics, of whom Zeno and Chrysippus deserve special mention, supplemented the Aristotelian logic by epistemo- logical disquisitions and the theory of hypothetical and disjunctive inference. After the sixth century A.D., the most important propositions of the organon were included in the text-books of the 'seven liberal arts,' and thus took a prominent place in the curriculum of the Christian schools of the middle ages. The name of the discipline was now changed to dialectics, to accord with the Stoic subdivision of logic into dialectics and rhetoric {cf. §§3. 1 ; 4. 1). Logic came to be a favourite field of philosophic activity among the scholastics, and the Aristotelian 'syllogistic,' the theory of inference, was developed with great subtlety. Elaborate deductions of permissible and impermissible inferences were made, the criteria being the general or special form and the positive or negative 40 The General Philosophical Disciplines quality of the judgments contained in them. At the same time an important part was played by the controversy between nominalism and realism. The nominalists maintained that general concepts are merely names {univei-saUa sunt nomind); the realists asserted that they are real determinations, the real nature of the objects which they designate {universalia sunt realia). 2. In the modern period the Aristotelian logic held its own for some length of time. Melancthon's text-books retained it even in the Protestant schools. But the general revolt against Aristotle and the scholastics which characterises the beginnings of modern philosophy led to various changes, more or less violent and radical, in the complexion of the science. Petrus Eamus (fl572), it is true, diverges much less seriously from the Aristotelian con- ception than his zealous polemics would lead us to infer. His service consists in a systematisation of logic, which has persisted with but slight alteration to our own day ; logic is divided into four parts, the theories of the concept, of the judgment, of inference and of method. Bacon's attack is more energetic. He discards the syllogism and the deductive procedure altogether, on the ground that they do not further knowledge and cannot lead to any advance in science, and eulogises induction in their stead as the one true and normal path to scientific knowledge. His opposition to Aristotle is expressed even in the title of his work upon logic, the Novum Organon. We must admit that the method which Bacon describes as induction could not pass muster under that name at the present day. But nevertheless the im- pulse which he gave, perhaps a little too vigorously, to the* development of the methods emjDloyed in the past and to be employed in the future by the empirical science whose awakening he saw, has had a very considerable influence upon the history of logic. The enquiries undertaken by his successors, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, into the concept and its relation to the word are not only acute but of permanent value. The methodical rules prescribed by Descartes have had far less efFect. Apart from his adoption of clearness and distinctness of knowledge as the test of truth, he demanded no more than §6. Lo^c 41 the analysis of difficulties, the orderly arrangement of thoughts, and complete synopses or enumerations. Mathematics supplied him ■with an ideal of scientific exposition. Spinoza held mathematics in still higher esteem ; while Leihniz and Wolff try to found the procedure of all the sciences, so far as possible, upon mathe- matical models. Wolff wrote a systematic logic, which he regarded as the foundation of philosophy in general (cf. § 3. 3). He divides logic, in his usual way, into a theoretical and practical discipline. The former deals with concept, judgment and inference, in Aristotelian fashion; the latter seeks not only to formulate technical scientific methods, hut also to lay down similar rules for the conduct of life. 3. We owe to Kant the separation of logic from epistemology, and a new and fruitful classification of its subject-matter. He defines it as the science of the right use of reason and under- standing according to the a priori principles of ' how the under- standing should think,' i.e., subsumes it on the one hand to the idea of end, making it to some degree a technical or norma- tive discipline, and on the other assigns to it a purely formal function. His division of logic is best shown by the following table : t Logic. , ' , General. Special. Pure. Applied. Doctrine of Elements. Methodology. ' The feature of this scheme which has found most general acceptance is the distinction of methodology, the theory of method, from the theory of the elements (concept, judgment and inference). In modern times there has appeared a whole series of excellent and formative treatises on logic. The pahn of highest merit among them all must be awarded to the work of John Stuart MiU (t 1872), the first logical reformer. Mill's System of Logic, Batiocinative and Inductive, was published in 1843, and had run into eight editions before the death of its author. Follow- ing the traditions of English logic. Mill makes induction the 42 The General Philosophical Disciplines centre of his whole enquiry, and attaches very httle importance to deduction and the syllogism. F. Ueberweg's System der Logik (5th ed., revised by Jiirgen Bona Meyer, 1882) is especially valuable for its numerous historical excursus. M. "W. Drobisch has attempted in his Neue Darstellung clei- Logik (5th ed., 1887) to work out a purely formal logic, upon Herbartian principles ((•/. § 2. 7). The most recent German works, on the other hand, have endeavoured to steer a middle course between Hegel's metaphysical conception of the science (c/. § 3. 4) and Herbart's purely formal standpoint. At the same time many important changes have been introduced in the treatment of certain parts of logic. Thus C. Sigwart {Logik, 2nd ed., 2 vols., 1889-93; tr. by Helen Dendy, 1894) gives judgment the most prominent place in his discussions, while B. Erdmann {Logik, vol. I., 1892) has, in name at least, completely eliminated the theory of the concept. H. Lotze {System der PUlosophie. I. Logik, 2nd ed., 1880; Eng. tr., 2nd ed., 1888), W. Schuppe {Erkenntnisstheoretische Logik, 1878) and W. Wundt {Logik, 2nd ed., 2 vols., 1893 ff.) combine episte- mological disquisitions with the development of properly logical theories. Th. LijDps' Grundzilge der Logik, 1893, is a brief but very clear and suggestive exposition of logic from the psycho- logical point of view. Lastly, among historical treatises we may mention the monumental work of K. von Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Ahendlande, whose four volumes (1855-70) bring the reader, unfortunately, no farther than the first thirty years of the sixteenth century, and F. Harms' GeschicMe der Logik (1881). 4. Logic is, without doubt, the most advanced of all the philosophical disciplines, both as regards the mode of formulation and the certainty and finality of its statements. Xcvertheless, we find here as elsewhere differences in method of treatment and ia individual theory. Hegel's assumption of the identity of thought and existence, and the metaphysical logic which grew out of it, may, it is true, be considered to have been definitely abandoned at the present day, thanks more especially to the adverse criticism of . Trendelenburg's Logische Untersucliungen (3rd ed., 1870). But alongside of this an epistemological, a purely formal and a psycho- §6. Logic 43 logical logic have grown up and flourished, while the last few decades have added a mathematical logic to the list. JUpistenio- logical logic treats of the general contents of knowledge in connection with the properly logical questions. The purely formal logic takes no account at all of contents or of the significance of the forms of thought for scientific knowledge. The psycliological view makes logic a department of psychology ; thought, and, in particular, correct thought, are considered as psychical processes. Finally, mafhematical logic has earned its special title by the invention of a new system of symbols, a logical algorithm or calculus. Again, we may draw a distinction between logical treatises according as they emphasise the normative character of the science, the laying down of rules and precepts for the opera- tions of thought, or merely look upon scientific thought itself as the object of a descriptive or explanatory investigation. In face of these divergences of opinion, we cannot attempt to give any detailed criticism of separate theories, but must confine ourselves to the presentation, in a consistent way, of what we take to be the prevailing view of the problems of logic. 5. We defined logic above (§5. 1) as the science of the formal principles of knowledge. By ' formal principles ' wo mean ' the general relations, presupposed in every instance of the acquisition of knowledge, between the objects of knowledge and the symbols (words, letters, figures, etc.) which designate or represent them. The dictionary may be said to give us these relations, in so far as it gives the meanings of piarticular words; and conversation or communication of any kind presupposes a knowledge of the relations obtaining between the expressions employed and the objects to which they refer. With logic, ho'^^•ever, it is different. Logic does not try to find out all the possible meanmgs of particu- lar symbols ; it is content to furnish a scientific exposition of the general facts and laws of these relations, i.e., to state the conditions under which every special system of nomenclature or terminology must be worked out and applied. But, further, it concerns itself only with that sort of knowledge which leads to scientifically valid results, and accordingly claims the title of propaedeutic to 44 The General Philosophical Disciplines all scientific knowledge. Since, however, limitation of the aim of a science necessarily means a sharp definition of the purpose which it subserves, logic turns aside from the consideration of the various possible paths to knowledge, and even of those which have actually been trodden in the past, and becomes a normative disci- pline, i.e., a science whose object is not a datum, something given, but must be termed ideal, realisable only under certain conditions. The ideal aim of all science is a universally valid formula or a system of universally valid formulae. Logic, therefore, shows us the conditions under which this ideal can be attained, i.e., lays down definite rules for scientific investigation in general. In this sense we can accept the current definition of it as the 'art of thinking,' including under the word ' thinking ' all the operations which constitute the objective conditions of the attainment of the purpose described above. Such conditions would be the formation of useful concepts, a system of classification, an inductive or deductive procedure, etc. And since, again, a complete scientific account of all these rules presupposes a knowledge of the elements which go to determine them, logic is not only a methodology, but also a theory of the elementary processes. Thus the concept, the meaning of a symbol, is a logical element in every scientific formula ; and judgment, the scientific formula itself, is an element in more complicated thought - connections ; and inference, the logical colligation of scientific formulae, is the next higher element in a comprehensive scientific argument. In this way the theory of concept, judgment and inference becomes a necessary propajdeutic to the higher normative function of logic, which it must attempt to discharge in the form of a methodology. 6. A fcAV critical remarks ujjon the psychological and mathe- matical methods of treating logic may help to explain and justify our view of its nature and purpose. No one can deny that scientific formulae, with all that appertains to them, are spoken or written by subjects, and may therefore be regarded as the voluntary actions or thought-activities of individuals. But this is no reason for subsuming logic to psychology. For (1) logic and epistemology, as forming part of a general science of know- §6. Logic 45 ledge, have to determine the presuppositions of all the sciences, inclusive of psychology. Logic, then, obviously, cannot be a department of psychology; if it were, it could not do its duty, at any rate so far as psychology was concerned. (2) We may say that where the subject-matter of logic and of psychology is the same, it is treated from an entirely different point of view. Psychology, in dealing with concepts, tries to show how they take shape in the course of the individual life, and what psychical states are implied in their use. It has to answer questions as to the general or special nature of the ideas, as to the reproduction of symbols by various perceptions, as to the peculiar conditions under which the hearing, reading and writing subject is placed. The logical discussion of concepts is completely foreign to these enquiries. For logic, concepts are simply the relations between name and object; and it deals only with the general forms of such relations and the objective con- ditions of their employment. (3) The fact that judgments must be termed voluntary actions or operations of thought tells us absolutely nothing of their validity, their truth or falsehood. On the contrary, the dependence of scientific formul£e on the subject who may happen to use them is for logic entirely irrelevant. It is a matter of complete indifference whether the judgment is read, heard or written ; whether it arouses this association or that; how far the attention is involved in it, etc. (4) It is only when we separate logic and psychology in this way that we can understand how logic could attain as early as it did to the form of an exact science, and could remain as Uttle affected as it has, even down to the present time, by the changes and advances in psychological knowledge. 7. The new science of mathematical logic seeks to represent all the relations existing among concepts, analytically, by means of appropriate symbols, and to derive conclusions or deduce new facts from these data by mathematical conversions and trans- formations. The foundation of the logical algorithm, in its strict form, was laid by G. Boole in his work, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854). After him W. S. Jevons, J. Venn, 46 The General Philosophical Disciplines C. S. Pierce and E. Schroeder ( Vorlemngen iibei- die Algebra dei- Logik, I., 1890) have done most to develope the science. We may illustrate its procedure by one simple example. The fundamental form of all categorical judgments is expressed in the relation ae^h, when the sign = indicates equality of extension, and the sign ( the subordination of a to &. If, now, a ^^ h and h ^ c, it is inferred that a =^ c. A grave objection to the view that this logic can ever be the whole of logic is that it confines all relations among concepts to the extension of the concepts. Eecently, however, an attempt has been made, with some success, to transcend this exclusive logic of extension, and subject the contents of concepts to a similarly mathematical mode of exposition (logic of contents). "We would, nevertheless, call attention to the following arguments ; (1) With a few entirely trivial exceptions, mathematical logic is a superfluity. Nothing is gained by it which cannot be gaiaed, and gained more easily, by means of verbal logic. It pre- supposes not only familiarity with the expressions current in ordinary logic, but the further knowledge of the symbolic language peculiar to itself. (2) The method of treatment often does violence to logical terms, never exliibiting them except as dressed out quantitiyely and deductively in mathematical garb. Indeed, there is a great deal (the theory of the concept or of induction, e.g.) which cannot be adequately represented at all in mathematical form. (3) The experiment was frequently tried, in earher times, of representing certain logical proportions or relations in a simple and pictorial way by aid of geometrical figures or brief analytical proofs. But this procedure is simply a procedure sometimes followed by mathematics itself — a concrete realisation of the logical connection — and not in any sense a mathematical logic. (4) It is clear that logic gains nothing in force or accuracy by mathematical formulation; for it is the logical element, of course, that gives mathematics its force and accuracy. It is only because mathematics is freer than any other science of aU the confusing properties natural to a knowledge whose contents is § 6, Logic 47 sharply defined, or whose subject-matter has penetrated to the popular consciousness, that it gives us most directly and plainly the impression of logical precision and necessity. (5) Mathematical logic — though its representatives usually fail to see this — consists simply of a peculiar technique, a special method of colligating concepts and judgments with one another ; it is not a theory of thought or of the purposive employment of the functions of knowledge. But then it cannot be logic itself, whose business it is to supply us with just this theory. LiTEKATUBE. La logiqiie ou I' art de penser. 1662 and later. (This is the ' Port Royal ' logic ; one of the most famous works of the Cartesian school : C/.P.41). F. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, 1883 (cf. p. 42). [B. Bosanc^uet, Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge, 1888.] B. THE SPECIAL PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINES. § 7. Natural Philosophy, 1. The philosophical thought of ancient Greece begins with natural philosophy. The two principal schools of pre-Socratic pliilosophers are usually termed the 'earlier' and 'later' natural philosophy ; and aU the various attempts of the time to determine the nature of things were directed predominantly upon nature, upon the external objects of perception. Indeed, this purpose played so large a part in the scientific enquiry of the age that, even when attention was given to man liimself and the things of mind, the activities which attracted greatest notice were those that seemed to contribtite most to a knowledge of external nature. It is not difficult to find a. reason for the prominence accorded to nature at a period when interest in general philosophical investiga- tion was just awaking. (1) Even to-day, popular thinking looks upon ' things '—solid, heavy, coloured, resonant things — ^s having absolute existence, and entirely disregards the share which the perceiving subject undoubtedly has in the perceptiouvof such objects. Objectification, that is, is the most natural attitude for us to take up towards 48 The Special Philosophical Disciplines experience, and only a mature reflection can teach us that what seems so objective is in part a product of internal and external factors, in part something given — primarily, at any rate — solely in our idea. Philology bears out this judgment by showing that names for the objects of sense perception are earlier developed than names for the subjective functions of seeing, hearing, sensing, perceiving, etc. (2) The exclusive interest which a primitive civiHsation takes in the external in nature is determined by the supreme importance of a knowledge of natural processes, in order that they may be subjugated, calculated, foreseen. Indeed, it is true to say in general that the impulse to knowledge, when we first meet with it, is rooted in the impulse to self-preservation ; and that even when (as here in philosophy: c/. §2. 2) it begins to develope a force of its own, its course is for some time determined by considerations of the value and advantage of the knowledge obtained for the purposes of practical Hfe. 2. The most important theory of natural philosophy in old Greek thought, if not in that of the whole of antiquity, is the theory propounded by the Atomists. They were the first to draw any sort of clear distinction between the external world, as determinable only in a quantitative way, and the internal, as determinable only in terms of quality. It can be proved that this purely mechanical view of nature, which reappeared at the beginning of modern philosophy, was to some extent a necessary coroUary of Anaximenes' tlieory that air was the essence of all things. In later Greek and mediaeval thought, however, the atomistic theory, important as it might have been for scientific investigation, was displaced by the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, who taught that natural things have no real existence at aU, but are rather the negation of real existence, — or at most contain the possibility or potentiaUty of existence, — while true reality is to be found in form, in ideas or concepts. Alongside of this subordina- tion of matter went the substitution of a teleological or purposive theory for the purely mechanical, causal view of the colligation of natural processes. Plato discusses the questions of natural phUo- ]"]. Natural Philosophy 49 sophy in the Tiirweus ; Aristotle principally in the to <^v(tik6. or cftvcriKr] a.Kp6a(ris — the treatise ordinarily cited as the Physics. Neither in the Atomists nor in Plato and Aristotle do we find any distinction made between a special natural science and a more general natural philosophy. The interest in natural philosophy shows a great faUing off in the succeeding schools. Epicurus, however, deserves especial gratitude for having accepted Democritus' doctrine of the atoms, practically unchanged. The contempt for nature which is so marked a feature of Christian philosophy is to he explained, in part, by the influence of Platonic ideas ; the sensible and material is not simply appearance, mere phenomenal existence, but also evil, the bad principle (c/. § 9. 3). It is only occasionally in the middle ages that we come across any less negative attitude toward natural objects and occurrences. Roger Bacon (f 1294) is marked out by his greater knowledge of their import and personal share in their investigation. 3. With the beginning of modern natural science — with the coming of men like Copernicus, GalUei and Kepler — aU this is altered. It is not by chance that just where we find the first trace of the new philosophy, in Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-64), Bernardinus Telesius (1508-88) and the rest, we find also the greatest emphasis laid upon natural philosophy. But how close the connection still was between philosophy and special science is seen in the fact that Galilei and Kepler both regarded themselves, primarily, as philosophers, and arrived at their gi-eat discoveries by way of very general considerations. The results of all these enquiries have exerted a vast influence upon the philosophical view of the universe. "We may conveniently arrange them under the five following heads. (1) The first important result of modern natural science to be mentioned here, was the disproof of the 'heaven of fixed stars' of the ancients, and the consequent hypothesis of the infinity of space. Out of this grew that antithesis of the sensible and the supersensible or insensible, of which every religiously coloured metaphysics had thenceforth to take account, so The Special Philosophical Disciplines The solid vault of the sky was turned to an infinite mass of vapour, and those who still clung to the religious ideas of a world beyond this world could not now think of it as realised in sensible form, but only in insensible. The antithesis soon came to be identical with that between bodily and mental, physical and psychical. (2) A second great result was the discovery of a strict uniformity in the relations of all bodies, and of the possibility of a thorough-going application of mathematics to natural phe- nomena. This banishes all arbitrariness and indeterminism from the realm of perception, and drives them to take refuge in the only region left, — that of mind or morals. The antithesis of sensible and supersensible or insensible thus takes over a new meaning from that of nature and mind or morals, mechanism and freedom. 4. (3) In the third place, the basal assumptions of modern natural science have led to an exact definition of matter as objective, and to the important doctrine of the subjectivity of the qualities of sense (c/. § 5. 1). Galilei distinguishes between the essential and the accidental properties of bodies. In the former class he puts form, relative magnitude, position, time, movement or rest, number, and isolation or contiguity with other bodies. AU these attributes are inseparable from the idea of body. On the other hand, it is not necessary to the existence of a body that it should be white or red, bitter or sweet, resonant or mute, pleasantly or unpleasantly odorous ; these are aU expressions for the effects of bodies upon our sense organs. Here again it is evident that the antithesis of physical and psychical assumes a new and more exact form. (4) A fourth principal result is the change in our estimation of the importance of the earth, and of ourselves who live upon the earth and are devoted to the acquisition of knowledge con- cerning it. The earth has ceased to be the centre of the universe, and is now merely one of the numerous planets which circle round the sun, an infinitesimal point in the infinity of space. The proud claim of man to be the final purpose of the world's §7- Natural Philosophy 51 development gives place to a more modest conception of his destiny ; and the dogmatic theories of earlier centuries are trans- formed to a sceptical valuation of the capacity of our faculty of knowledge. We are brought to a consciousness of the sub- jectivity, the inevitable limitation of human knowledge and human appreciations. (5) Fifthly and lastly: the impression produced by these pioneer researches in natural science meant a better understanding of the value which all observation and all experience have for all knowledge, if only they are controlled by a rational purpose and combined with the deductive activity of the understanding. Galilei declares that a thousand reasons are not able to prove a real experience untrue. At the same time, however, the new antithesis of outer and inner experience is brought upon the stage of philosophic thought. 5. There is no trace of any theoretical separation of natural science from natural philosophy until towards the end of the eighteenth century. Descartes' Prindpia jaJiilosophiae combines the two. Wolff's terms 'experimental physics' and 'rational cosmology ' are indicative rather of different methods of exposition (c/. § 3. 3) than of a difference in subject-matter. JSTor did Newton, to whom we owe the establishment of the fundamental concepts of modem physics, draw a distinction between physics and philosophy. Natural philosophy may be said to have assumed an independent place with the appearance of three works, at the end of the eighteenth century : the Systeme de la iiature of 1770, Kant's Metaphysisehe Anfangsgriinde der Naturioissenscliaft (1786), and ScheUing's Entvmrf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (1799). The aim of the first of these was rather propagandist than scientific. The name Mirabaud appeared upon the title-page; but the actual author was, in all probability. Baron Holbach (f 1789). The book proceeded, however, from the group of ' Encyclopaedists,' -and evidently contains contributions from other hands, — from Diderot in particular. Its first volume is devoted to the exposition of a purely materialistic metaphysics (§ 16). The whole of the second volume is a polemic against religion, and especially the Christian 52 The Special Philosophical Disciplines faith. The results attained by the natural science of the time are worked up with great skill into a single system of natural phenomena ; but no account is taken of any definite investigation. Kant's Metaxjtiysisclie Anfangsgriinde is simply an attempt to establish the a irriwi principles of all natural science, and conse- quently deals exclusively ^vith the most general concepts, — those of matter, motion, force, etc. Kant arrives at what is called a chjnamie conception of nature, and finds the essential character of the phenomena of external nature in forces which are distributed in space, and act and react upon one another. At this point Schelling takes up the qiaestion. He developes the Kantian theory of nature, more especially upon the organic side, applying the teleological arguments {rf. § 20) which Kant had set forth in liis Kritili de)' Urtheilsltraft (1790). The Avhole of nature, he thinks, is a graduated system of purposes, beginning with its lowest, most insignificant and crudest forms, and rising to its highest, richest and most delicate manifestation in the mental life of man. Here, then, the question of the development of natural phenomena is set in the forefront of philosophical enquiry. 6. Schelling's theory of development was largely and boldly conceived, and despite the fantastic form which it assume.d in the hands of its author and his more immediate school — of whom Steffens was most prominent in geology and Oken in biology — found general acceptance among workers in natural science at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Not a few of the men who later did good work in the field of exact research were originally adherents of Schelling's natural philosophy. The widespread dis- repute into which it fell when its scientific inadequacy was realised, taken together with the overthrow of the Hegelian philosophy, led to a general distrust in any contributions to natural science, in the wider sense of the term, offered by philosophers proper. We can see now that limited material was chiefly to blame for the in- sufficiency of the natural philosophy in matters of detail, and that its great value lay not in the special knowledge which it embodied, but in its ability to satisfy the craving for a consistent explanation of things, an explanation that should include the whole of nature, § 7- Natural Philosophy 53 organic as well as inorganic, psychical as well as physical. Recently it has grown to be the custom for scientific workers to try and satisfy their own philosophic needs, and for philosophers to approach the special problems of natural philosophy only under the more general formulation of metaphysics or of epistemology and logic. This state of affairs is not one for us to congratulate ourselves upon. The philosophical ideas propounded by the repre- sentatives of natural science are invalidated, almost without excep- tion, by ignorance of the history of philosophy and by a prejudiced estimate of conclusions drawn from experiences and results within one special field. On the other hand, we hope to show in what follows, by an enumeration of the objects with which a natural philosophy would have to do, that the task of instituting a general investigation into the principles of natural science confronts philo- sophy to-day just as it did a century ago. 7. It is plainly characteristic of natural philosophy to overlap metaphysics on the one side and epistemology and logic on the other. The collection and working-over of scientific results are exceedingly important for a general theory of the universe, while natural science speciaUses, by particular application, the most general contents and forms of knowledge. We abstract here from the possible import of natural philosophy for a theory of the universe. Its remaining problems fall into three groups. (1) The first group consists of certain definite epistemological questions. Chief of these are the questions of the reality of the external world, of the meaning of ' law,' and of the concepts of causation, substance and development. That their discussion is a purely logical prerequisite of work in natural science is clear enough ; all of the concepts named, as well as the hyjDothesis of the existence of an external world, play a part in the expositions of the special sciences, — but none of them receive that careful and comprehensive treatment which their very general significance would lead us to expect. They can obtain it only at the hands of a natural philosophy. (2) In the second place, natural philosophy must critically examine the methods and fundamental concepts of the natural 54 The Special Philosophical Disciplines sciences. The problems mentioned under (1) are not confined to the domain of natural science, though they are there given a special application ; the problems of this second group are couched in terms of concepts and methods which have been shaped by the natural sciences, and find scientific use only within their limits. Here belong matter, force, energy, motion, and the spatial and temporal factors of natural occurrence. These concepts, like the others, although they constitute quite special preconditions of scientific knowledge, are not subjected to the critical examination they deserve by natural science itself. And those refined procedures, by which the natural sciences are ever attaining to greater knowledge, must also furnish weighty matter for logical consideration. 8. (3) Finally, we must entrust to natural philosophy the task of thorough analysis and appreciation of scientific theories, or at least of those which possess any wide significance: the atomic theory, the biological theory of evolution, the mechanical and vitalistic theories of life, etc. Under this heading we shall look for an epistemological determination of the meaning of the term ' theory,' as employed by natural science, and a decision between the many opposing hypotheses, made on the basis of an intimate knowledge of the facts upon which they rest, and with an eye to their metaphysical value. It need hardly be said that familiarity with the methods and results of scientific investigation is indis- pensable for the solution of aU these questions. It follows from what was said above iff. § 1. 6) that the modern literature of natural philosoiihy is exceedingly scanty. Special con- tributions have come from workers in natural science, and there are chapters dealing with natural philosophy in various epistemological and metaphysical treatises. Apart from these, we may call attention, in the first place, to the Philosophie der Nattirmssenschaft, by F. Schultze (2 vols., 1881-82). The first part contains a history of natural philosophy down to Kant ; the second gives a systematic exposition of ' critical empiricism.' The author has, however, confined himself to a discussion, from the Kantian standpoint, of the most general problems of natural philosophy. We may recommend, secondly, K. Kroman's valuable work, Uiuere Naturerhenntniss (1883 ; from the Danish). The book is §8. Psychology 55 devoted to an exclusively epistemological treatment of matliematios and natural science. K. Lasswitz' GescMchte der Atomidik (2 vols., 1890) is also a noteworthy contribution to the history of natural philosophy. \Cf. W. Whewell, History of the Liduotive Sciences and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 1837 and 1840.] § 8. Psychology. 1. While the distinction between exact work within the natural sciences and a philosophical consideration of the general principles underlying them was fully recognised in the eighteenth century, the analogous separation of psychology as a special science from psychology as a department of philosophical enquiry is only now in course of making. Our survey of the development of psycho- logy must, therefore, touch upon questions which reaUy belong to a deiinite and specialised discipline. The first thing necessary to the working-out of a psychology is a more or less clear and precise idea of the relation between physical and psychical, or a delimitation of the two fields of natural science and psychology. The contents and method of any 'psychology,' therefore, depend upon its author's personal con- ception of the nature of the psychical. We may conveniently distinguish three periods in the history of the science. (1) In the first, mind, the substrate of all psychical phenomena, is identified with the vital principle. This view carries with it a very broad interpretation of psychology. (2) In the second, the province of mind is limited by the definition of ' mental ' as that which can be known by internal perception. At this stage, i.e., the division of physical and psychical depends upon a sharp opposition of external and internal perception. (3) The third and, probably, final period, which has found its explicit formulation in quite recent times, makes the psychical co-extensive with the subjective, i.e., with what is dependent upon the experiencing individual. That element in direct, un- mediated, unreflecting experience which is dependent upon th? S6 The Special Philosophical Disciplines experiencing subject, and gives evidence of this dependence, is the psychical element in the experience. On the other hand, that element in it which is independent of the subject, and ■whose existence and mode of operation depend upon laws of their own, is termed objective or physical. 2. The view of the first period as to the nature of mind prevailed in antiquity and throughout the middle ages. It meets us unmistakably in the earliest systematic treatise upon psychology that has come down to us, Aristotle's Trept 4''"XV^- In the first book Aristotle gives a critical survey of previous psychological theories. In the second, he defines mind as the entelechy of the body, i.e., as its actuahsation or formative principle. At the same time he describes its faculties or divisions in detail. The lowest mental faculty is the nutritive function ; this belongs only to plants, the lowest organisms. Next above it stands the sensitive mind, which together with the nutritive is present in animals. The highest level of mental development is reached with the rational mind. Aristotle makes this the distinguishing characteristic of man, who possesses it along with the other two. ]S"ow an author who attributes the nutritive function to mind is evidently of the opinion that mind and vital principle are one and the same, i.e., that mind is the source of aU those peculiar phenomena which we group together under the name of 'life,' and oppose to the lifeless, to inorganic matter. The second book concludes with remarks upon the senses. In the third, Aristotle discusses perception and idea (memory, imagi- nation), the understanding, feeling, desire, and movement. Christian philosopliy took over from Aristotle the idea of a separation, conceptual if not actual, of the rational mind from the lower mental faculties. The division was not only useful as pointing the difference between man and the animals, — it distinguished a perishable and an imperishable element in the final work of creation, and provided a simple psychological basis for the sharp contrast of sense and reason, of the faculty for the things of time and of this world and the sense for things eternal and the world beyond. §8. Psychology 57 3. The same view obtained at the beginning of modern philosophy. The Italian natural philosophers generally divided mind into mortal and immortal, reasoning and merely perceiving parts. They laid, perhaps, an even greater stress upon the advantages possessed by the immortal part of mind in the acquisition of true knowledge. Its procedure is intuitive; it knows the truth by an immediate percejition; whereas the mortal part is dependent upon the senses and upon demon- stration or deduction. The mortal part, that is to say, is the substrate even of those activities which are ordinarily ascribed to the understanding,— inference from given assumptions, the logical colligation of concepts.' At this point the road lies open to a more consistent idea of psychology. When once it is realised that the ' intuitive ' knowledge of the human mind has not dwelt in it from all eternity, i.e., is not a connate possession of the mind, but little is needed to do away with the unnatural separation into mortal and immortal parts, and set up a new and better definition of 'mental.' The honour of effecting this refoiTn in psychology belongs to John Locke, the founder of modern epistemology (c/. §5. 2). With him the second period of psychology begins — the period characterised by the definition of mind as the substrate of the internal sense. It is clear that this theory must look upon all purely organic processes as physical and not psychical; for the processes of organic life are known through external perception in precisely the same way as inorganic phenomena. The wide acceptance of the two forms of sense or perception is seen in Leibniz' use of the terms ' perception ' and ' apperception,' the counterparts of Locke's ' sensation ' and ' reflection.' The German psychology of the eighteenth century employed the words simply to mean the activities of th6 external and internal senses. ^ The Cartesian differentiation of mind and body, by thought and exten- sion, is simply a special expression of the same fundamental idea. It has been more important for metaphysics than for psychology. What had previously been called the ' mortal ' part of mind, wis by Descartes referred to the physical realm. It followed aa a matter of course that animals were mindless and automatic. S8 The Special Philosophical Disciplines 4. Even to-day the diflference between psychical and physical is often referred to Locke's difference between internal and external perception, though a very little reflection shows that no clear idea of their relation can be gained from it. (1) In the first place, there is no 'internal sense,' in the strict meaning of the phrase, but only external senses, i.e., definite organs for the reception of stimuli. The expression can, therefore, never be used otherwise than figuratively, and even so is dangerous unless a clear idea of the nature of the function which it indicates has been previously acquired in some other way. (2) The antithesis of external and internal perception cannot be allowed to pass as an adequate expression for differences in the world of given facts. Modem epistemology has proved that our original experience does not fall apart into two different worlds, but is entirely unitary. The relations expressed by the phrases ' internal ' and ' external perception ' are of later growth, and depend upon all sorts of observations; there are not two radically and intrinsically different functions. In other words, the terms are not necessary and unequivocal names for separate, co-existent acts, but merely figurative expressions — not too happily chosen — of a deeper-lying distinction. (3) Finally, if the hypothesis of an external and internal perception were correct, we should be entirely at a loss in regard to the qualities of sense, i.e., to what is now called 'sensation.' For modem natural science, while it uses them as aids to the knowledge of objective processes, refers them as facts to the knowing subject (c/. § 7. 4). On the other hand, there can be no doubt that (as Locke himself definitely stated) they originate in external and not in internal perception; so that psychology would be precluded from discussing what is obviously a part of mental life. 5. Psychologists have thus been led, in recent years, to attempt another definition of the 'psychical.' The third period begins with a reference to the epistemological idea of the subject or the 'subjective.' The unitariness of all the original data of experience is admitted, but a distinction drawn between a §8. Psychology 59 subjective and an objective factor, from whose co-operation they result. 'Sensation,' 'idea,' 'perception,' are names for the subjective factor; 'objects,' and the 'properties,' 'states' and 'relations of objects' are expressions for the objective factor. But there are also phenomena in the original experiences which are of a purely subjective nature — the 'images' of memory, feelings, desires, volitions — and which accordingly admit only of psychological examination. It is evident that those who look to the difference of subject and object for the distinction between psychical and physical take a great deal of work upon them; they have to determine in each particular case what proportion of an experience is referable to subjective factors. But this is precisely what the workers in natural science do. Everyone who has had occasion to make scientific investigations knows that the first thing aimed at is a knowledge of the object, — of the objective, that is, with all its subjective accretions stripped off. The very idea of an 'error of observation,' above and beyond inaccuracies of circumstance or technique, is an indication that subjective states have something to say in the investigation of natural phenomena; and the popular notion that we see or hear ' something that isn't there,' or that what seems to be seen is ' only in our eye,' takes us straight to the selfsame difficulty. For the developed con- sciousness, as for the naive, every experience is an unitary whole; and it is only the habit of abstract reflection upon experience that makes the objective and subjective worlds seem to fall apart as originally different forms of existence. Just as a plane curve can be represented in analytical geometry as the function of two variables, the abscissae and the ordinates, without prejudice to the unitary course of the curve itself, so the world of human experience may be reduced to a subjective and an objective factor without prejudice to its real coherence (c/. § 26. 12 f.). E. Mach {Beitrage zur Analyse cler Empfindungen, 1886) and E. Avenarius (c/. § 5. 10) were the first to work out this view with full theoretical consistency. The author believes that he has given the first exposition of psychology, from the same standpoint, in his Grundriss der Psychologie (1893, tr. 1895). 6o The Special Philosophical Disciplines 6. From the earliest times attempts had been made, more or less independently of the prevailing opinion as to the nature of mind, to determine the interrelations of psychical and purely bodily processes. The theory of 'animal spirits' {spiritus animales), propounded in the second century a.d. by Claudius Galenus, found wide accejDtance as an explanation of the vital processes of the human body and their connection with certain psychical functions. It remained the current view, with but little modification, down to the end of the eighteenth century. The nerves were conceived of as very fine tubes, fitted directly to the most delicate branches of the blood vessels. Only the most fiery, mobile and subtle particles of the blood could force a way into them; and these particles formed the 'animal spirits.' The heart thus becomes the real central organ of all vital phenomena. Its heat, the vital warmth, causes the movement of the blood, which it propels to the remotest branches of the vascular system. As late as 1772, E. Platner, in his Anfhropologie, gave a physiological theory of attention based upon the hypothesis of animal spirits. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was more especially the affective processes that were singled out for physiological explana- tion. Descartes {Les passions de I'dme, 1650) regarded the emotions as the peculiar effects of an interaction between mind and body, and sought to reduce them to perceptible changes in the action of the heart. So had Melancthon — in the main a good Aristotelian — done before him, in the De anima of 1530. One of the most important adherents of this school was the Spanish philosopher Ludovicus Vives {De anima et vita, 1539). There can be no doubt that the physiological interpretation was greatly supported by the separation of the mind into mortal and immortal parts (§8. 2 f.) ; the idea that the mortal psychical functions depended upon certain bodily processes had nothing either dangerous or repugnant about it. The first logical systematisation of all the efforts of this age to formulate an exact theory of emotion is given by Spinoza, in the fm»tii book of his Ethics, We have in it an impartial examination of the interrelations between psychical and physical processes, but §8. Psychology 6i one which must of necessity undergo essential change with the entrance of psychology upon its second period. As a matter of fact, Locke's work was followed, especially in Germany, by the development of a pure psychology of internal perception, which, with more or less of consciousness, completely disregarded the physical conditions of mental phenomena. This is the Erfahrungs- seelenlehre, or 'empirical theory of mind,' which took its title from Chr. Wolff's psychologia empirica or experimentalis. 7. Pre-eminent among these psychologists of pure internal experience is J. N. Tetens. Certain chapters of his PJiilosophische Versuche uber die menschlische Natur unci ihre Entwicklung (2 vols., 1777) still possess considerably more than a mere historical interest ; their summary of the facts, as then known, is thorough and impartial, and their logical connection carefully worked out. Similar attempts to erect a consistent theory of psychical pheno- mena upon the basis of internal perception alone have been made down to our own day. Herbart's Lehrbuch zur Psyclwlogie (1816 and later) and Psychologie als Wissensehaft (2 vols., 1824-25) are among the most important. Herbart tried further, by aid of certain metaphysical assumptions concerning the nature and powers of the mind, and of mathematical formulae, to write an exact psychology, a mental 'statics and mechanics.' Among modern psychologists, F. Brentano {Psychologie vom empirisehen Stand- punkt, I., 1874) and Th. Lipps {Die Grundfhatsachen des Seelenle- bens, 1883) may be mentioned as representative of the same school. Besides Herbart, F. E. Beneke {Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Natur- wissenschaft, 4th ed., 1877) made a creditable attempt to build up a psychology without physiological assistance. There can be no doubt at aU that such a treatment of the science is possible in itself ; indeed, that it is the only available method of deaHng with some of the more complex mental states. When we are asked to describe the psychological mechanism of some sesthetical, ethical, logical or religious idea, emotion or voluntary action, we shall get no help towards a solution of our problem by referring the process in question to any sort of brain function. For the real problem here is simply the analysis of a complex mental experience, not 62 The Special Philosophical Disciplines the determination of its bodily conditions. If we can describe the elementary processes and their mode of co-operation in the complex whole with scientific accuracy, we have done everything in the way of an 'explanation' of the phenomena that can reasonably be demanded of us. A psychology of the internal experience only becomes exceptionable when it is obliged to have recourse to all kinds of auxiliary concepts or secondary hypotheses, which are themselves not deducible from internal experience. But our mental life, so far as we know anything about it, is by no means self-complete ; so that, as a matter of fact, most of the psychologists of this school are compelled to make a more or less free use of the ' unconscious ' in order to fill the gaps that they cannot but find in internal experience, and to base their theory of the elementary psychical processes on the hypothesis of a substan- tial mind, which stands behind the facts of consciousness, and controls and arranges them. Neither assumption can be said to satisfy the requirements of science. 8. So it has come about that physiological psychology, the beginnings of which we mentioned just now, has gradually risen to greater and greater importance. And since the new definition (that of the third period) of the subject-matter of psychology has also led to the connection of the subjectively conditioned, the psychical, with its condition, the corporeal individual, modem psychology has become a science of those elements in pure, primitive experience which depend upon corporeal experiencing subjects. We have been brought to this result not only by the work of psychologists proper, but also by that of the physiologists. It was the general custom, some years ago, to include mental phenomena in physiology, as specific functions of living beings. To be mentioned among the psychologists of the last century are D. Hartley (Ohservation on Man, 1749.), J. Priestley (t 1804) and C. Bonnet {Essay de Psyclwlogie, 1755 and later). H. Lotze's Medici7iische Psychologie (1852) marked a great advance in the scientific direction. Lastly, the new psychology received systematic formulation in W. Wundt's Qrundzilge det- physiologischen Psychologie (1874; §8. Psychology 63 2 vols., 4th ed., 1893). This work is dominated by the idea of a thorough-going psychophysical parallelism, i.e., by the hypothesis that some physical or physiological process can be correlated with every psychical process discoverable by internal perception. Everything that other theories woiild ascribe to the unconscious or to a substantial mind falls, on this view, within the purely physiological domain. The principle thus assures to physiological psychology the advantage of having none but observed, or at least observable, processes to describe and explain in the course of its exposition of mental phenomena. Psychophysical parallelism is not a metaphysical principle, and therefore has nothing to do with materialism (c/. § 16), which makes material movements the cause of psychical phenomena : the bodily is the ' condition ' of the mental in the sense that one magnitude is dependent upon another in a mathematical function, i.e., that uniform relations of change obtain between the two. In other words, it is only a ' regulative ' principle (c/. § 4. 3). 9. It is only on the assumption of an uniform connection of bodily and mental processes that we can make use of a new and valuable aid to psychological investigation, — experiment. The beginnings of psychological experimentation are to be found in certain of the older contributions to the physiology of the senses. The dependence of colour sensation upon definite properties of the physical stimulus, light, and the analogous relation of auditory sensation to acoustic phenomena, led to results, far back in the history of physical discovery, which a psychology of sensation can turn to good account. But experiment for explicitly psychological ends is a comparatively late feature of the science. Tetens (c/. § 8. 7) and Bonnet now and then give brief descriptions of experiments. It was not tiU 1849, however, when E. H. "Weber published his famous work on the sense of touch and common feeling (Ueler den Tastsinn und das Qemeinge- fulil, in E. Wagner's HandwarterhucTi der Physiologie), that any real impetus was given to a systematic employment of the ex- perimental method ; and not till 1860 that experimental psychology took shape from the fruitful investigations of G. T. Fechner 64 The Special Philosophical Disciplines {Elemente dm- Psyehophysik, 1860; 2nd cd., unchanged, 1889). Fechner meant by psychophysics an exact theory of the inter- relations of physical and psychical, and based the applicability of experiment upon the assumption that the dependence of sensation on stimulus can be mathematically expressed. Follow- ing him, Wundt has introduced experimental methods and results into his physiological psychology. We may take it, then, that the field of psychology as a special science has now been definitely marked out. In includes : (a) the reduction of more complex facts of consciousness to more simple; (6) the determination of the relations of dependency which hold between psychical processes and the physical (neural) processes which run parallel to them ; (c) the apj)Ucation of experiment, to obtain an objective measure of mental processes and an exact knowledge of their nature. The history of the development of the psychical life may, perhaps, be made the subject of independent scientific investigation. Herbert Spencer {TTie Principles of Psychology, 1855 and later) has written consistently from the developmental standpoint — onesidedly, however, since the whole of animal psychology and the psychology of childhood faU under the general rubric. Lastly, we may note that M. Lazarus and H. Steinthal have distinguished a 'psychology of peoples' from the ordinary individual psychology. Its purpose is the study of all those mental phenomena which cannot be explained from the individual organisation, but originate in and are peculiar to entire groups of individuals, 'peoples.' Language and custom are examples of such phenomena. 10. It is evident that aU the objects of enquiry which we have grouped together in the preceding paragraph belong to psychology in the sense of a special science, and not to a philosophical psychology; for all alike are as truly ultimate data, sheer facts, as are any 'natural' phenomena. If we define philosophy as the science of principles, we cannot call these psychological in- vestigations philosophical. Indeed, there is general agreement on the point among experimental or physiological psychologists. But it thus becomes all the more necessary to ask whether there \ § 8. Psychology 65 may not be a philosophical psychology alongside of the scientific, and, if so, in what relation it stands to the philosophy of mind or of the mental sciences which, since Hegel's day, we have been accnstomed to oppose to the philosophy of nature. We can best begin our answer to the question (1) By giving a list of the special problems which would fall within the sphere of a philosophical psychology (c/. §7. 7). In the first place (a) philosophical psychology has to discuss the epistemological and logical presuppositions of scientific or empirical psychology. These include the concepts of subject and individual, of psychical causality and psychical measurement, of the analytic, synthetic and genetic methods, etc. (6) It must further under- take a critical examination of the fundamental concepts employed by empirical psychology : consciousness and the unconscious, mind and its relation to body, the mental element, etc. (c) It must bring together the general theories of empirical psychology, and scrutinise them in the interests of philosophy : the theories of spatial and temporal ideas, of sensation, of association, etc. (2) "We come very close to metaphysics in the theories of substantiality and actuality. The former assumes a mind- substance, the latter asserts that the acts of consciousness, as directly given, constitute mental reality. (3) The discipline would be concerned with the antithesis of inteUectuahsm and voluntarism. InteUectualism finds the ultimate elements of mental experience in the intellectual processes, thought or idea ; voluntarism looks upon the phenomena of wUl as typical of the mental life at large. (4) The terms ' monism ' and ' dualism,' ' materialism * and 'spiritualism' (which we shall discuss in detail in Chapter III.) are indicative of different solutions that have been offered of the problem of the relation of psychical to physical. We find numerous essays of this philosophical-psychological tenor between the covers of epistemological and metaphysical works, or included in what is, for the most part, a scientific treatment of psychology. The first attempt in modern times to make philosophical psychology an independent discipline, is 66 The Special Philosophical Disciplines to be found in J. Eehmke's Lehrlmch der allgemeinen Psychologie (1894). Eehmke's example has been followed by G. T. Ladd, in The Philosophy of Mind, 1895. 11. A philosophical psychology in this meaning of the phrase is not a philosophy of mind or of the mental sciences : it has to do simply with the special presuppositions, basal concepts or theories of empirical psychology, and not by any means with those of aU the ' mental ' sciences. If these include empirical psychology itself, then, in the author's opinion, philosophical psychology can never be more than a part of a general philo- sophy of mind : the other departments would be those of the philosophy of law, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of history, and, perhaps, ethics and aesthetics. With such a variety of discipUnes to be covered by the single title, it would seem well to dispense with the idea of a general philosophy of mind, or of the mental sciences, altogether — all the more, as it does not offer any real contrast to the philosophy of nature. ^Esthetics, e.g., is obliged, in some respects, to take account of 'natural' processes; and it would not be fair to the objective significance of law, art, religion and history, if we considered them merely as mental products. In conclusion, we may mention certain works upon psychology, which have not been expressly named in the text. W. Volkmann, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 4th ed., 2 vols., 1894 f. (The standpoint is essentially that of Herbart. The work is characterised by detailed historical excursus and numerous references to the literature. The text is, in places, entirely out of date.) A. Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 1855 and later ; The Emotions and the Will, 1859 and later. (The author is a representative of the ' associationist ' psychology, which regards association as the funda- mental phenomenon in every psychological uniformity.) H. Hoflfding, Psychologie in Umrissen, 2nd ed., 1893. (From the Danish. English translation from the 1st ed. of the German, by M. G. Lowndes, 1891.) W. James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., 1890. W. Wundt, Vorlesungen iiher Menschen- und Thierseele, 2nd ed., 1892. (English translation, 1894.) Grundriss der Psychologie (also in English trs.), 1897. § 9- Ethics 67 E. B. Titchener, An Outline of Psychology, 2nd ed., 1897. G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology, 2 vols., 1896. r. Jodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 1896. F. A. Carus {Geschichte der Psychologie, 1808) and F. Hanns (Geschichte der Psychologie, 1878) have written general histories of psychology ; but both are very incomplete. The two volumes so far published (1880, 1884) of H. Siebeck's admirable Geschichte der Psychologie extend only as far as Thomas Aquinas. § 9. Ethics and the Philosophy of Law. 1. With ethics and aesthetics we enter upon an entirely new field. The philosophical disciplines which we have discussed hitherto rest upon one, if not upon a whole number of special sciences; but these two have no such basis. They themselves possess the character of special sciences, dealing with definite and ultimate facts. Ethics or moral philosophy is ordinarily regarded as a normative science (cf. §6. 4, 5), and its problem defined as the exact determination of the conditions which must be fulfilled if human volition and action are to be made 'moral.' In this sense it may be termed the art of conduct, just as logic is the art of thought. Since, however, the definition of the attribute 'moral' cannot be purely arbitrary, ethics has at the same time to take account of the historical development of moral judgments, and by analysing the principles or ideals which it finds in actual life, to try and make its precepts rational and consistent. Whether it performs this task well or Ul, ethics, at any rate, always draws a distinction between conduct as it is, and conduct which is en- joined, prescribed, or (at least) desired. Indeed, if the distinction is not made, there is no room for any special application of the predicate 'moral,' over and above the other attributes, to human sentiment, impulse, etc. True, it is sometimes said to-day, as it has been in the past, that there is no real difierence between 'moral' and natural volition and action. But we may agree to this, and yet not admit any exception to our rule. For if a 'natural' action is opposed to the action that, as a matter of fact, we find occurring, with the sanction of social usage and 68 The Special Philosophical Disciplines other ethical influences, we have, though in different words, the very distinction which our statement emphasised. 2. The first question that meets the moraUst, therefore, is that of the origination of this antithesis between unregulated, impulsive conduct and conduct regulated by some kind of law, precept or maxim. He will find it definitely answered by the results of investigation in the sphere of ethnic psychology. The first beginnings of a normative judgment of human conduct take the form of religious ideas and practices, and of those customary usages and rules of social intercourse which seem to be as old as society itself. At a very early stage of civilisation these two influences put a constraint upon the individual ; his actions are largely subjected to outside control, and his life follows a definitely prescribed course. It is not till comparatively late that the various regulative factors are split up iuto weU-marked groups. When this happens, we find reUgion, custom, law and morahty to have been the chief elements in the originally un- differentiated total sanction. Still later is the demand for the separate scientific investigation of the different classes of phenomena. Though poetry and the language of daily hfe gradually come to distinguish between religious and worldly wisdom, the consciousness of their connection is very slow to die. Hence it should not be surprising that Socrates, who is generally looked upon as the founder of ethics proper, expressly mentions two sources of moral order — the written laws of the state, and the unwritten laws of the gods. At the same time, the moral decay that he saw around him led him to attempt for his age what all later moralists have attempted for theirs, the discovery of universally valid moral principles. So he came to regard virtuous or moral conduct as the result of knowledge, something that could be communicated and taught. 3. Plato, like Socrates, tried to determine the conditions of the universal validity of moral standards. In the Phcedrus, Phcedo and Republic, ethics is brought into close connection ivith meta- physics. The antithesis of the sensible material, matter, and the form or idea or essence of things, becomes a contrast of § 9- Ethics 69 values : matter is the principle of what is base and evil, the 'idea' the precondition of everything good. Por Plato there can be but one virtue. And this is, in a sense, the con- dition of its universal validity; for we are apt to say of truth, too, that it must be one. All that is good comes, in the last resort, from God ; and true happiness is found only in the im- material world of pure ideas. Beauty alone can give sensible knowledge the imprint of the good, of moral value, and so enable us to catch a glimpse in it of the higher beyond it. The fuU realisation of virtuous endeavour presupposes a certain form of society, the state. In his ideal republic Plato describes the special conditions under which mankind might live a life that should satisfy all the requirements of human nature. Happiness (evSatfji.ovla) had been regarded by the pre-Socratic moralists as the contents of the ideal good, the one thing worth striving for. But we find no systematic formulation of a happiness-ethics before Aristotle. In the Mcomachean Ethics happiness is declared to be a state which may exist at many different degrees or stages, and the conditions for its attainment are said to vary correspondingly. Whereas the school of Aristippus of Gyrene (the 'Hedonist' or 'Cyrenaic,' as he is called), in the fourth century B.C., made simple sense-pleasure (tjSovij) the end of action, Aristotle is of the opinion that only a permanent happiness — an equable cheerfulness of temper, not to be ruffled by the accidents of life — can lay claim to the highest value, and there- fore rank as the final goal of all human effort. We achieve this happiness by the help of reason ; reason alone can assure a wise moderation of passion and desire, and protect us from the too much or the too little. A'irtue is the golden mean between the two extremes. Aristotle, hke Plato, emphasises the ethical im- portance of the state; but places the contemplative life of the sage and the philosopher higher than any form of political activity. 4. In the post-Aristotelian schools ethics shows a still more definite tendency to become an art of conduct. The Stoics did most for the continuance of ethical interest. They limited the field of the science by their very noteworthy idea of the dSi,dopa — 70 The Special Philosophical Disciplines indifferent neutral actions, which obtain ethical value only as means for the attainment of good ends. They further drew a sharp line of division between virtuous, dutiful, rational conduct (KaTopBwfia), and vicious, passionate action, emphasising it by the personal con- trast of the wise (good) man and the fool. "We see, then, that ancient ethics had drawn a whole series of valuable distinctions. The purpose and regulation of human voHtion and action, of goods, duties and virtues — all these had received close consideration. Christianity, however, introduced an entirely new point of view, characterised by three principal ideas : the idea of inevitable guilt, the command to love all men, and the belief that future blessedness or condemnation is necessarily determined by the moral quality of the life lived upon earth. (1) Ancient ethics is always convinced of the possibihty of a reahsation of its ethical ideals ; Christianity teaches that no man, however much he try, can attain to a guiltless hfe. Hence there is need of a liberating, saving power to remove the weight that must otherwise crush humanity down, and to hold out hope, at least, of a pure and happy existence. (2) We find traces, in ancient literature, of the idea of a love for humanity in general ; but it does not appear as a duty, still less as an obvious duty, till Christianity has come to declare that all men are the children of God, and therefore brothers. (3) And though the ancient world was familiar enough with the idea of happiness or misery after death, Christianity, here too, introduces a new factor, by setting the doctrine of future reward and punishment in close connection with the moral struggles and progress of the individual. That we reap what wo sow in the moral as in other fields— that our whole hope must centre in the grace of God, who will pardon even the sinner if he repent — these are the essential elements in the Christian doctrine, and not any special notions about heaven and heU. 5. Among the ethical problems which were brought into prominence for the first time by the rise of Christianity was the very important question of the freedom of the will. The ideas of merit and guilt, now so strongly emphasised, have no meaning § 9- Ethics 71 unless man can be considered free to choose between various possible courses of action. In the Christian ethics of the middle ages the freedom of the will came up, for the most part, only as connected with the further problem of the relation of man and human freedom to God and omnipotence. Nevertheless we find a clear recognition of the antithesis of determinism and indeter- minism, — distinct affirmations and denials of the freedom of the will (c/. §21). Yet another revival of ethical interest, prompted by religious motives, occurred at the Eeformation. The asceticism and shrinking from the world that characterised the middle ages, and, to a certain extent, the primitive Christians also, now gave way to the belief that a vocation in the world "is the one thing which satisfies all the requirements of the moral life, that our works here upon earth have a positive value, and that pleasure in earthly matters is permissible, since the world and all that is in it come from the hand of God. Along with this conviction went a deepening of the religious sentiment. Not by any outward works can we acquire a claim to happiness, to the grace of God, but only by a steadfast inward faith that triumphs over the world; and if we lack this faith, no outward ceremony may give us freedom or redemption from guUt. He who will be moral is thus taught to look to himself: his regeneration must take place within himself; his fight with the evil power of sinful passions is an inward conflict; and only faith in God and His mediator, Christ, can assure him courage, joy and peace. 6. Modern ethics endeavours, as Socrates endeavoured, to obtain an universally valid basis for moral standards. Very different paths have been followed in this attempt. One way, the most superficial, in which the problem has been attacked, is to model ethics upon mathematics. Thus Spinoza gives us an Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata ; and both Hobbes and Locke believe — though they give what are at least very ingenious reasons for their belief — that ethics can be deductively presented, and its conclusions made as strict and universally valid as those of mathematics. Apart from this superficial and analogical 72 The Special Philosophical Disciplines method, we can distinguish four different types of scientific ethics in modern philosophy. (1) Ethics is marked off from religion and metaphysics, and the empirical scientific treatment of moral questions advocated. (2) Ethics is based upon some already existing empirical science, such as psyoliology, political economy, biology, etc., and in tliis way itself acquires the character of a special science. (3) The 'moral' is identified with what is 'useful,' either to the individual or the community. This reduction of the idea of morality to other terms makes it possible to give a com- prehensive and fairly precise formulation of moral rules. (4) Lastly, ethics is buUt up on aprioristic foundations; moral laws or judgments of conscience are an original function or connate possession of the human mind, and morality is, therefore, independent of aU the varying theories of experience. These four views can be separated only in abstract reflection; in the concrete they are as a rule found together, and serve to supplement one another. Thus the independence of ethics as regards religion and metaphysics is confirmed by the relation in which it is brought to certain positive sciences, or by an aprioristic mode of treatment, etc. But as there seems to be no theoretical need of any particular grouping of the different standpoints, while, as a matter of fact, the history of ethics supplies instances of very various forms of colligation among them, we may be allowed to distinguish them for our present purpose as representative of the principal ideas underlying all the ethical activity of modern times. 7. At first, we find the ethical interest strongest in the English philosophy. Bacon gives occasional suggestions towards an in- dependent treatment of moral jjhilosophy ; Hobbes attempts to work out a definite ethical system. He sets out from the hypothesis of isolated and purely selfish individuals, and so comes to the conclusion that social life and peace are made possible only by a reasoned and calculating compliance of each with the demands of all : morality originates in reasoned reflection upon the useful and harmful. Locke, in a similar way, makes the 9- Ethics 73 relation of human volition and action to some kind of law the principal topic of ethical discussion. Agreement with the law means moral conduct, disagreement with-it, immoral. But there were, for Locke, three diiTerent kinds of law : the law of God, the law of the state, and the law of public opinion. Hence there must be three different forms of moral conduct. Under the divine law, action is dutiful or sinful ; under the law of the state, guilty or innocent ; under the law of public opinion, virtuous or vicious. Shaftesbury's definition of morality ("An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit," in the Gharaderisties of Men, etc., 1711 and later) is somewhat different. Ancient ethics had tended to connect the ethical with the sesthetical ; and Shaftesbury, too, finds the essence of morality in the harmonious relation of the selfish and social emotions, in the beauty of proportion or symmetry, and in the absence of any unnatural or aimless inclinations. At the same time, he com- bines happiness with harmony, and declares that the form in which morality is first presented to us is that of a judgment of value. The English ethics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, is not whoUy free from aprioristic elements. R. Cudworth, S. Clarke and J. Butler believed that all moral judgments and modes of conduct take their source from an original disposition or function. Hume {An Enquiry concerning the Prijiciples of Morals, 1751) and Adam Smith {Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759) give a very careful psychological analysis of the moral sentiment and judgment; and Smith, in particular, completely establishes the independent exjstence of, and true moral justification for, benevolence or sympathy. 8. Continental philosophy shows us a close connection of ethical discussion and metaphysics. It is only here and there, at least in the earlier period, that we find any advocacy of a treatment of morals apart from religion and from a preconceived metaphysics. Bayle (t 1706) and Helvetius (t 1771) were the principal champions of an independent ethics. For the most part the essence of morality was found in clear cognition and in the regulation of the emotions by the rational will. Upon this point Descartes, 74 The Special Philosophical Disciplines Spinoza and Leibniz are at one, despite their many differences on special questions. Perfection, defined in a purely theoretical, inteUectualistic way (c/. § 30. 5), appears alongside of happiness, as the ethical ideal. We have already seen (§ 5. 3f.) that apriorism was generally recognised at this time as the condition of universal validity and necessity; so that we can understand Kant's endeavour to give ethics scientific rank by basing it upon a priori principles. Kant declares, in direct contradiction of Eousseau, the repre- sentative of the '.natural' element in moral philosophy, that a ' categorical imperative,' which is in opposition to all our natural tendencies, determines the wUl towards morality. He further argues, however, against any attempt to define the contents of the moral law by reference, e.g., to the happiness of all or the perfection of the individual; for if an empirical element regulates moral conduct it is useless to pursue an enquiry into the conditions of the universal validity of ethics. The works in which Kant put forth his views upon moral philosophy are the Kritik der pi-ah- tischen Vernunft (1788), the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), and the Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). Ethics is here made the basis of a new metaphysics. The fact of a moral law which demands unconditioned realisation seems intelligible only on the assumption of a will freed from all constraint of natural causation; and the incongruity that exists, as a matter of fact, between virtue and happiness requires, Kant thinks, the immortality of the soul, and a divine being whose compensative justice can remove the contradiction. The post-Kantians have made ethics in most cases one of the most important aids to a metaphysics. J. G. Fichtc extends its range of influence still further. Knowledge is, to a certain extent, conditioned by the moral will. And the reality of other beings besides ourselves is the necessary precondition of our own moral efforts, of an ego struggling towards morality (System der Sittenlehre, 1798). 9. Ethics is not now accredited with this wide-reaching sig- nificance. Even Schelling and Hegel look upon it only as a transition science, a stage on the road to higher things, not itself furnishing the ultimate and supreme ideal. Herbart {Allgemeine § 9- Ethics 75 praldische Philosophie, 1808) effected its complete separation from theoretical philosophy. On his view the attribute ' moral ' cannot be regarded as determining the essential nature of any object or objects; but is simply the predicate in a judgment of taste, a determination of value. This kind of judgment contributes nothing to our knowledge of things; it is merely the expression of our subjective attitude to them. Now the passing of a judgment of value presupposes a standard of comparison; and this is given by the ideas of inner freedom, perfection, benevolence, justice and recompense. All five ideas furnish original and independent judgments of taste. Schopenhauer (Die beiden Grundprohleme cler Ethik, 2nd ed., 1860) follows Kant in the postulation of freedom, but restricts it to the first steps in the formation of character, the peculiar feature of an individual will. On the other hand, he refuses to accept the Kantian view of the purely f onnal significance of the moral law, and declares — in accordance with his pessimistic metaphysics — that sympathy is the ethical impulse par excellence. Schleiermacher's contribution to ethics (Grundlinien einer Kritih cler hisherigen Sittenlehre, 1803) is the distinction between theory of goods, theory of virtues, and theory of duties : each in its own way containing an exposition of the whole of moral science. In quite recent years, since the epistemological zeal of the sixties has somewhat cooled, there has been very great activity in the ethical field. A large number of good and suggestive works have been published, of which only a few can be mentioned here. Much labour has been devoted in par- ticular to the strengthening of the foundations of ethics, and the discovery of new facts of ethical import by investigation in certain of the special sciences — poUtical economy, sociology, psychology, etc. We may mention the following works : — E. vou Hartmann, Phanomenologie des sittlichen Beiousstseins. 1879. Second Edition under the title Das sittUche Bemisstsein. 1886. H. Spencer, The Principles of Ethics. 1879-93. W. Wundt, Ethik 2nd ed., 1892. Trs. in preparation. F. Paulsen, System der Ethik. 2 vols., 3rd ed., 1893. G. Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft. 2 vols., 1892-93. H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics. 3rd ed., 1884. 76 The Special Philosophical Disciplines We may also mention three admirable histories of ethics: — T. Ziegler, Geschichte der Ethik. I., Die EthiJc der Griechen und Eonier, 1881. II., Die chdstliche Ethik 2nd ed., revised, 1892. F. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie. 2 vols., 1882-89. [H. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics. 2nd ed., 1888.] 10. This hasty glance at the historical course of ethical thinking is enough to show that there has been a great diversity of opinion among moral philosophers. Indeed, there is no philosophical discipline, except metaphysics, which has given rise to so many schools and standpoints as has ethics. Terms like InteUectualism, Intuitionism, Eudsemonism, Evolutionism, etc., all stand for divergences of ethical theory, whether as regards the origin of moral precepts, or the real end of moral conduct, or the motives of moral action. This lack of agreement in first principles, as manifested in the liistory of the discipline, may be referred to the constant change to which moral ideals and judgments are subject. What we to-day look upon as moral, good or meritorious, may, ia earlier times, have been called by other names, or have lain altogether beyond the sphere of human volition. But the diver- gence of opinion obtains not only between period and period ; we find it at every moment of every period. "We have only to look round us now to discover it ; very little examination of different individuals, or, better stiU, of different social classes, wiU bring to light fundamental differences of moral judgment. This uncertainty as to the essential nature of morality extends, however, only to its contents ; no one disputes that requirements, laws, norms of some kind, have their place in the consideration of human conduct. Not a particular contents, but the form of the law or regulation, that is, has universal validity in the ethical realm. What direction the law takes, with what contents its form is fiUed, depends upon the needs, customs and opinions of a particular time. Under such circumstances an ethics which attempts to do more than bring out these general factors, and determine, with so much of probability as it may, the character of the morality conditioned by them, must possess a merely temporary significance. § 9- Ethics and Philosophy of Law 77 The same thing is true of the philosophy of law and political economy, whose contents are similarly determined by the stage of development to which the consciousness of justice and the code of law have attained, and by the economic conditions of the time. If, therefore, ethics is to become an empirical science, like these two, the first aim of the moralist must be the collection of facts over a wide range of conduct. Speculations as to the possible or necessary nature of moral volition and action expose him to the obvious risk of travelling out of the main current oi the moral development of his age, and thus condemning himself to fruitless labour and universal disregard. It is by mere chance, so to say, that an ethics of this sort can arouse any general interest. 11. The principal task, then, which we must assign to a scientific ethics, regarded as a separate discipline, is the collection and analysis of the ethical opinions current in its day. We are here in full accord with Herbart when he says that the form in which morality is first presented to us is that of certain judgments of value passed upon human voUtion and action. These judgments take two main forms, corresponding to the two headings of the quality and the intensity of the wUl judged. The terms ' good ' and ' bad ' belong to judgments of quality ; the terms ' merit ' and 'guilt' to judgments of intensity. Since, however, every determination of intensity presupposes some volitional quality, whose intensity it is, every appreciation of the strength or force of the wUl must carry with it an estimate of wiU-quality. Hence only acts of the good wUl can be meritorious, and only acts of the bad will guilty : — a proposition whose truth must not cause us to lose sight of the relativity of the concepts ' good ' and ' bad.' Armed with some such simple scheme as this, the moralist would have to collect the moral judgments of various individuals, professions, social classes, etc., and discover, by careful sifting of his material, whether any unitary laws or consistent theories were to be obtained from them. That done, proposals could be made, with real hope of successful result, for the improvement or perfec- tion of the moral consciousness. Only in this way does it seem possible to bring ethics into living contact with the moral 78 The Special Philosophical Disciplines development of a national life. It is not by leaning upon psychology, or political economy, or sociology, or any other special science, that ethics can attain to the rank of a universally valid discipline, but rather by taking its stand upon the facts which are peculiarly its own, accessible solely to its methods. The analysis of the moral consciousness as it is, and then the freeing of it from contradictions and inconsistencies, — those are the tasks set to a purely empirical ethics. Its character as a normative science is assured by the nature of the second problem. We need not decide, for the present, whether there can be a philosophical ethics side by side with the empirical. The question has never been raised, and may accordingly remain a cwa 23osterior. 12. The philosophy of law may be dealt vnth. much more briefly. It was originally an integral part of ethics, and is stUl generally treated as an appendix to moral philosophy. As 'justice' and 'morality' diverge, however — the former finding its expression in definite laws, promulgated and enforced by the state — the sciences that have to do with them become more and more distinct. A further ground of difierence is seen in the division of the science of 'justice ' into a philosophy of law and a special science of contemporary law; there is no such special science of 'morality.' The separation of the science of law from its philosophy is due to H. Grotius (f 1645). The science has to do with jus civile, positive law ; the philosophy ynth jus naturale, the law of reason or nature. Since Grotius' time, attempts have constantly been made to determine by a priori deduction the natural basis or real ground of law, regarded as independent of the wUl of a law-giver. Kant drew a sharp line between legality and morahty, defining legality as outward com- pliance with legal prescription. The philosophy of law has, further, been somewhat influenced by the work of K. Chr. F. Krause (f 1832), whose pupil, H. Ahrens, gained a wide reputation by his elaborate NaturrecM oder Philosophie des Meehts und des Staates (6th ed., 2 vols, 1870-71). We may also mention : — A. Trendelenburg, NaturrecM aufdem Gruiide der Ethik. 2nd ed., 1868. § 9- Ethics and Philosophy of Law 79 W. Schuppe, Grundniige der Ethik und BecMsphilosophie. 1881. A. Lasson, System der Eechtsphilosopkie. 1882. R. von Ihering, Der Zweck im, Becht. 2nd ed., 2 vols., 1884-86. E. Wallaschek, Stvdien mr BecMsphilosophie. 1889. K. Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und BecMsphilosophie. I. 1891. In the last-mentioned work the doctrine of natural law is vigorously attacked, and the philosophy of law defined as a philosophy of positive, i.e., actual, current law. [J. Lorimer, Institutes of Law. 1880. Sir H. Maine, Ancient Law. 11th ed., 1888. J: H. Stirling, Lectures on the Philosophy of Law. 1873.] 13. The true problem of the philosophy of law is usually obscured by a bad use of terms. It is customary to contrast the philosophy of law with the science of law, a mode of expression which would lead us to suppose that the philosophy can say some- thing more or something better than the science upon the facts of law, as they lie before us for treatment, or that the philosophy has a special kind of law for its subject-matter, different from the law of jurisprudence, the positive law established by human enactments and based upon human convention. Really, of course, the prob- lem of a philosophy of law must be similar to the problem of a philosophy of nature {cf. § 7. 7) ; it does not deal directly with the facts of law, but simply discusses the fundamental principles pre- supposed and the general theories developed by the corresponding special science. 'Law' for the philosophy is precisely the same as 'law' for the science: this latter including, we may note, not only the systematisation of existing laws, but also the 'general theory of law,' as it is called, and comparative jurisprudence. We can therefore state the problems which confront a philosophy of law, on lines similar to those which are followed in the cases of natural philosophy and philosophical psychology (c/. §§7, 8). They are three in number. (1) The philosophy of law must examine the epistemological and logical presuppositions of the science of law. Here belong all concepts of general significance which are applicable outside the special limits of jurisprudence, and therefore cannot be adequately defined by a particular science : those, e.g., of action, intention, 8o The Special Philosophical Disciplines will, attempt, accident, causality, law, freedom, etc. All these are general terms employed by other sciences than jurisprudence. Here belongs, further, the logical examination of the procedure, the peculiar method, of the science of law. 14. (2) The philosophy of law must undertake a critical in- vestigation of the fundamental ideas which find expression in the science, i.e., of the concepts employed exclusively by jurisprudence. Here belongs, in the first instance, the idea of justice. The very various definitions of the term given by jurists, in the present as in the past, necessitate a critical examination of the facts from which the idea has taken shape. Further to mention are the ideas of punishment, responsibility, the juristic 'person,' property, possession, etc. Here, too, we find divergent opinions, leading to more or less radical difierences of school or standpoint. (3) Lastly, a philosophy of law must examine the general theories of jurisprudence. It is hardly possible to draw an exact line of division between these last two problems, since a number of the fundamental ideas given under (2) have been made the basis for general theories. Thus there is a very great diversity of opinion as regards the meaning and purpose of 'punishment,' so that we have the ' deterrent ' theory, the ' reformation ' theory, the 'retribution' theory, etc. In the same way there is dispute as to the origin of justice, and different schools of law have given very different answers to the question, in the form of particular theories. Two have persisted to the present day : the theory that justice is referable to an original capacity or need of the acting individual, and may, perhaps, be deduced from the idea of a free personality ; and the contrary theory, that always and everywhere justice means a sum of precepts or rules of human conduct, supported by some kind of sanction, and that to understand or define it we must look to history and experience, not to a priori likelihood or arguments of pure reason. Note. — We may here say a few words about pedagogy. It is usual, at the present day, to exclude pedagogy from the circle of philosophical disciplines proper, despite the close connection of its topics, both in history and in fact, with those of philosophy. Herbart (Allgemeine §9- Pedagogy Padagogik, 1806), whose pedagogical doctrines are still dominant at least in Germany, souglit to make pedagogy an applied ethics and psychology. Ethics shows the goal of education, determines its end and aim ; psychology furnishes the method by which the end may be achieved. Such a view, however, can be correct only if ethical ends are made absolutely pre-eminent, and aesthetic and intellectual needs su.bordinated to them. And even so, it would hardly be right to call a pedagogy which aimed to be not merely a theory of education but also a theory of instruction, an 'applied ethics.' The aim or goal of instruction can be brought only by a very roundabout way into the sphere of ethical problems and definitions. On the other hand, the con- nection of pedagogy with psychology cannot be disputed. The process of learning and the process of instruction — the development of character and the work of education— are alike unintelligible vmless considered from the psychological point of view. And it were much to be desired that the intimate relation between the two disciplines should be ex- plicitly recognised, so that pedagogy might adapt itself without more delay to the living progress of psychology. The continued veneration for Herbart's pedagogy does not encourage us, however, to hope for any such result in the near future. §10, Esthetics. 1. Esthetics, like ethics, is concerned with the investigation of particular facts; it is not a critical appendix to some special science, whether the history of art, as Vischer believed, or any other. The aim of modem sesthetics, then, must be the same with that of modern ethics : to become a positive science. The two groups of facts with which it has primarily and most directly to do are the esthetic judgments of pleasure and displeasure, and art and artistic production. They are clearly distinguished in ancient philosophy. Plato, Plotinus and Longinus gave most atten- tion to the ideas of beauty and sublimity, i.e., to the contents of the aesthetic judgment ; Aristotle was principally desirous of contribut- ing something towards a theory of art, and accordingly propounds a theory of poetry, especially tragedy. Plato's views upon es- thetics are set forth for the most part in the Phaedrus, Symposium and PMlebus; Plotinus treats aesthetic questions in the first and fifth Enneads, and Aristotle chiefly in the Poetics. It is doubtful whether Longinus is the author of the work -n-ipl v^ovs. In all G 82 The Special Philosophical Disciplines these books, however, the philosophy of beauty is still mixed with ethics and metaphysics, and is very far from being a simple empirical investigation of given aesthetic judgments. And it is much the same with the aesthetics of the middle ages and the ffisthetio theories of modern times. Philosophic interest has centred in the establishment of certain ideals of artistic creation, and in general hypotheses as to the significance of beauty in the universe. At the same time, some writers, especially in England, — Shaftesbury, Burke and Home, for example, — have done much to further the psychological investigation of sesthetic feehng and appreciation. Home's Elements of Oritidsm (1762 and later) forms with Kant's work upon aesthetics the most valuable contribution to the science made by the eighteenth century. 2. The philosophy of art, as is readily intelligible, became a kind of empirical science at a comparatively early period. The name might with some reason be applied to Aristotle's Poetics itself, as well as to Leonardo da Vinci's treatise on paiutuig, the Art poetique of E". D. Boileau (fl711), the Beflexions critiques sur la poesie, la peinture et la musique (1719 and later) by J. B. Dubos, etc., etc. But aesthetics does not appear as a comprehensive discipline until the years 1750-58, when Alexander GottHeb Baumgarten (1714-1762) published his Aesthetica (2 vols.). The book was intended to fill a gap in Chr. Wolff's philosophical system. Wolff had contrasted the higher and the lower faculties of knowledge, and defined logic as the science of the higher. There seemed to be no corresponding science of the lower faculty, of sensible knowledge; and the new aesthetics was written to siipply the deficiency. The ideal of all higher knowledge is truth, complete clearness of ideas. Lower Icnowledge is always confused, obscure. Baumgarten finds the ideal of this latter sort of knowledge in beauty (a position, by the way, which had already been indicated by Leibniz). Beauty is the perfection of sensible knowledge, just as truth is the perfection of the knowledge of the understanding. The problems assigned to theoretital aesthetics, which Baumgarten, in the spirit of the Wolffian classification of philosophy, marks off from practical {utens, specialis) aesthetics, are three in number. jio. ^Esthetics 83 (1) It has to show what parts of sensible knowledge are beauti- ful, and so aid in the discovery of beauty. This portion of aesthetics is termed Heuristics. (2) It has to show what arrangements of these beautiful elements are beautiful, and therefore to be observed. This is the Methodology. (3) It has to ask how the beautiful and beautifully arranged elements may be beautifully expressed. This enquiry is termed Semeiotics. Baumgarten himself treats only of the first portion of this system of theoretical aesthetics. His pupil, G. F. Meier {Anfangsgriinde aller schonen Kunste unci Wissenschaften, 2nd ed., 1754), is an even more zealous advocate of the independence of aesthetics. With him began a period of energetic work upon the new science: and very soon, as the psychology of the time developed, there came to be a feehng that the subject-matter of aesthetics was not what Baumgarten had declared it to be ; that, in particular, beauty could not be termed oflf-hand the perfection of sensible knowledge, or, indeed, knowledge at all. The assertion, from the side of psychology, of an indepen- dent faculty of feeling led to the view that the true source of esthetics must be sought on that side of mind, in feeling.— Along- side of these attempts to determine the essential contents or object of the esthetic judgment, we find a large number of essays in the phUosophy of art. Thus J. J. Winckelmann endeavoured to set up general rules for the plastic arts, and G. E. Lessing and J. G. Herder to formulate a new theory of poetry. 3. Kant is the true founder of scientific aesthetics ; his Kritik der Urtheilskraft (1790) is an attempt to reconcde the conflicting views of his predecessors. iEsthetics is there divided into two distmct parts: the theory of beauty and sublimity, and an investigation of the nature of art and methods of esthetic classification. In the fii-st part, Kant is mainly concerned to separate aesthetics as clearly as. possible from ethics, logic and sense pleasure. It rests upon an a priori principle, viz., the assumption ol the communicableness of esthetic impressions, and of a teleo- logical harmony between the faculties of knowledge-imagination 84 The Special Philosophical Disciplines and understanding or reason. Beauty is direct disinterested pleasure in forms and relations; sublimity is direct pleasure in sometliing that baffles the interest of the senses, i.e., whose magnitude or power puts it beyond the grasp of sensibility. The philosophy of art shows that a work of art must awaken an idea of the beauty in things, and that genius is the subjective condition of exemplary work in art. Kant classifies the arts, according to the means employed for the expression of beauty, as those of words or articulation (the arts of speech), of gesticulation or deportment (the formative arts), and of modulation or tone (the arts of the play of sensations). The beautiful and sublime derive their greatest value, however, from their character as perfect symbols of the moral or the good. Kant's aesthetic theories had a marked influence upon Schiller's work in the same field {Briefe liber die msthetische Eraiehung, 1795). In substantial agreement with Kant as regards first principles, Schiller gives a less formal inter- pretation of the various phenomena of artistic activity, lays greater emphasis upon the value of aesthetics, and attaches greater importance to the beautiful as opposed to the moral (c/. the admir- able presentation of the relations of the two systems in E. Klihne- mann's Kanfs und Schiller's Begi-ilnduiig der Aesthetik, 1895). 4. The speculative tendency of the post-Kantian philosophy is clearly manifested in its aesthetics. A deductive procedure, of derivation from universal principles, is everywhere followed. Especially important is the discrimiuation of an ' aesthetics of contents ' and an ' aesthetics of form.' Hegel is the representa- tive of the former ; Herbart the founder of a purely formal aesthetics. Hegel {Vwlemngen iiher die ^stlietik, 1836-38: vol. X. of the collected Werke) defines aesthetics as the philosophy of art ; and art is, for him, the lowest form of reality of the absolute mind, which realises itself in the three stages of art, religion and philosophy. It foUows, of course, that natural beauty is merely a first step towards beauty properly so called, the beauty of art. The essence of artistic beauty resides for Hegel in the revelation of idea by matter, or in the manifestation of the eternal and unconditioned in the temporal and finite. § 10. MstheHcs 85 Such a conception of beauty lays most emphasis upon the idea which forms the real value of the aesthetic impression. At the same time, the various arts, and the history of art in general, show a serial development : we have first the pre- dominance of matter over idea, then a counterbalancing of one by the other, and finally a predominance of idea over matter. In this way Hegel obtains three different forms of art, the symbolic, classical and romantic, realised historically in Oriental, Greek and Christian art, and systematically in architecture, the plastic arts, and the trinity of painting, music and poetry. The Hegelian {esthetics, or sesthetios of contents, has found many disciples. We may mention the works of Ch. H. Weisse, System der Aestheti/c, 1830 ; Fr. Th. Vischer, Aesthetik, 3 parts, 1846-58; A. Zeising, Aesthetische Forsdiungen, 1855; M. Carrifere, Aesthetik, 2 vols., 3rd ed., 1885; and K. Koestlin, Aesthetik, 1869. 5. Among these the great work of Vischer takes first rank. True, it is — as the author himself came to see — sadly lacking as regards system and method ; but its wealth of historical notes and of detailed references to the various special arts makes it a mine of valuable information even for the rnodern student of aesthetics. Vischer defines his subject as the theory of the beautiful, and gives aesthetics second place, next after rehgion, in Hegel's trinity of art, rehgion and philosophy. The work is divided into three parts : a metaphysics of beauty, which deals with the general idea of the beautiful; a theory of beauty 'in one-sided existence,' i.e., as existing objectively in nature and subjectively in imagination; and a theory of the 'subjective- objective reaUty of the beautiful,' i.e., of art. Vischer classifies the arts according to the three forms of imagination, the con- structive, receptive or sensitive and poetic. Architecture, sculpture and painting correspond to constructive imagination, music to the receptive, and poetry to the poetic. In Herbart the term aesthetics has an entirely different signifi- cance, including not only what is ordinarily called aesthetics, but ethics as well (c/. § 2. 7). It is the science of the supplementing 86 The Special Philosophical Disciplines of what is by determinations of value. The faculty which enables us to make such determinations is named by Herbart, quite generally, 'taste.' Hence not only sesthetical but ethical judg- ments are 'judgments of taste.' ^Esthetics in the narrower sense has to do with our pleasure in forms ; and its problem is to discover the simple relations which run through aU the more compKcated works that evoke the aesthetic impression, and to define the ideas or ideals which govern aesthetic judgments of beauty and ugliness. These simple forms and relations Herbart finds, e.g., in the harmony and disharmony of tones and colours, in rhythm, as a pleasing or displeasing relation of time periods, and in symmetry, as a similar relation of spatial extents. He thinks it necessary, in aesthetics, to abstract entirely from the matter or contents of the pleasing or displeasing relations and forms, although the total effect of any work of art is largely determined by it. The Herbartian standpoint has been systemati- cally worked out by E. Zimmermann {Aesthetik. I., Gesehiehte der Aesthetik als philosophischer Wissencliaff, 1858; 11., Allgemeine Aesthetik als Fmimvissenschaft, 1865). Zimmermann pays special attention to the ideals of perfection, unity, etc., which Herbart had not defined at all exactly. 6. Eomanticism brought with it an exaggeration of the aestheti- cal point of view. Schelling, Fr. Schlegel and Schopenhauer, the principal philosophers of the romantic school, all lay stress, though each in his own way, upon the supreme importance of beauty and art. In ScheUing, everything appears in the form of a work of art : nature is a work of art, and the organism, and indeed the whole universe ; and beauty takes its place in the developmental series of subjective creations as the higher synthesis of science and morality. Schlegel, too, at a certain period of his philoso- phical develoiJment, fell into a sort of hero-worship, a cult of genius. The autocracy of genius, its full magnificence, fuids ex- pression in free criticism (irony) and free creation, unspoiled by any law. Lastly, Schopenhauer looks upon the state of aesthetic enjoyment as the highest form of earthly existence, the one condition in which we can conquer the cause of aU suffering — § 10. Esthetics 87 will. It makes an end of unrest and struggle; for him who is sunk in pure contemplation of the beautiful, intellect and idea have obtained the wished-for mastery over will; he is brought well-nigh to that saving last state of human existence, which is wiU-less nothing. On the other hand, Schopenhauer regards music as the highest of all the arts, because it is not, like the others, a form of idea, but a direct image of will itself, the essence of all things. 7. In quite recent times this metaphysical and logical stand- point has been largely given up, and a radically different con- ception of the object and methods of sesthetics has begun to take its place. To put it briefly, aesthetics is on the road to become empirical, instead of speculative or constructive ; and the empirical method is being applied not merely to judgments of pleasing impressions, but also to the arts themselves and the creative activity of the artist. Thus H. Taine {PMlosophie de Tart, trs. 1865) discourses of art mainly from the point of view of an historian of civilisation, emphasising the factors which seem to have determined the course of artistic production in time. It was he who introduced the words 'milieu' and 'moral tempera- ture,' which have since become so popular, to designate the total condition, mental and moral, of a given period. On the other hand. Grant Allen {Physiological Aesthetics, 1881) and Georg Hirth {Aufgahe der Kunstphysiologie, 2 parts, 1891) have attempted to discover the psychophysical conditions of the vogue of works of art, especially of plastic art. Finally, G. T. Fechner (Vorschule der Aesihetik, 2 parts, 1876) examined the empirical conditions of aesthetic pleasure and displeasure, and was able to demonstrate the validity of a very promising method, that of aesthetic experiment. Fechner distinguished three principal modes of experimental procedure: the methods of choice, of production and of application. The method of choice consists in the picking out of the most pleasing term of a whole series of different simple forms, geometrical figures, etc. That of pro- duction consists, e.g., in the drawing of some given figure or form in the proportions most satisfactory to the subjective feeUng of the The Special Philosophical Disciplines draughtsman. The method of application consists in the investi- gation of fashionable art-objects, or any objects of daily use, to determine the simple form-relations that arouse aesthetic pleasure. Zeising (4, above) had already made a large number of measure- ments by this last method, aU of which seemed to indicate that the most pleasing relation of two lines is that known as the 'golden section,' the proportion 8:13. Feohner confirmed Zeising's result for simple figures by the method of choice. There can be no doubt that experimental aesthetics may be extended to cover all pleasing relations in the sphere of sense impressions; and that it will bring to light a large number of new uniformities, and do away with the obscurity and arbitrariness of the older constructive aesthetics. — Another very important point in Fechner's work is the distinction of a direct and an associative factor in the aesthetic judgment. By the former he means the immediate conditions of pleasure lying in the object under con- sideration, quite apart from any secondary ideas aroused by it ; by the latter, reproduced ideas of the meaning of the object, previous experiences, etc. The distinction is evidently of crucial impor- tance for the experimental investigation of aesthetic judgments. 8. There can be no question that these recent enquiries inaugurate a new period in aesthetics, characterised by the purely empirical treatment of its subject-matter. The objects investi- gated by the science are on the one hand judgments of aesthetic pleasure and displeasure, and on the other works of art. The separation of the two groups shows that there was truth in the old distinction between a philosophy of beauty and a philosophy of art. The aesthetic judgment extends beyond works of art, since there is a beauty of nature as well as of art; and works of art give us more than the aesthetic judgment, since when we have decided as to the pleasingness or displeasingness of their impressiori we can go on to discuss the conditions of their origination, the relation between portrayal and portrayed, between form and contents, copy and model, etc., etc. (1) The first part of aesthetics, the theory of the aesthetic judgment, may be regarded as a portion of psychology, and, of § 10. Esthetics 89 course, of applied psychology. Its problem is to furnish an exact definition of the aesthetic judgment and its conditions in terms of psychology. "When viewed in relation to its objects, however, and especially in relation to the beauty of art, it takes on the character of a normative discipline, stating the external conditions which any given object must fulfil in order to be sestheticaUy pleasing. The dominant method of this part of aesthetics can and must be the method of experiment. (2) The province of the second half of empirical aesthetics, the theory of art, is negatively defined by the limits of a number of already existing purely technical disciplines: harmony and theory of composition in music, the rules of designing, colouring, engraving, etching, etc., in the plastic arts, and prosody in the art of poetry. That is to say, the technique of art, the statement of the objective conditions of the production of a work of art, may be ruled out of aesthetics. The problem that remains for the theory of art is (a) an investigation of the general relation of portrayal and portrayed within the work of art. The names idealism, realism and naturalism stand for different conceptions of this relation. (6) It has also to raise the question of the subjective conditions of the work of art, the temperament, imagination, memory, etc., of the creative artist. This part of aesthetics, like the first, is evidently psychological in nature, but can also take on the normative character, — rising above the mere determination of the mental attitude and furniture of the artist to the ideal construction of those features of his mental constitution which are most favourable for the production of a work of art that shall satisfy the canons of a severe (or, perhaps, of the severest) criticism. 9. In aesthetics, as in ethics, we are met by the problem of the existence of a philosophical discipline, over and above the special science of the same name ; and there are not a few philosophers at the present day who emphasise the value of a philosophy, or even a metaphysics, of the beautiful. But there is no occasion here to discuss the possibility of a philosophical aesthetics in any detail. The development of the science in the near future must be pre- eminently an advance along empirical lines ; and the philosophy of 9° The Special Philosophical Disciplines beauty or of art cannot take permanent shape until a certain measure of strictly scientific knowledge has been acquired. The objection so often urged against a scientific aesthetics, that judgments of taste are purely individual in their nature, and that therefore anytliing in the way of an universally valid proposition in sesthetics is an impossibility, is met by the fact that, so far, in all cases where it has been possible to examine the sesthetic judgment under unexceptionable conditions, i.e., experimentally, no trace has been found of ' purely individual ' taste, or even of irregularity in the formulation of taste-judgments. On the con- trary, there has been manifested a most surprising agreement in aesthetic judgment, an agreement which obliges us most emphati- cally to continue along the same path of enquiry. The belief in individual differences, expressed in the current phrase, De gustibus non est disputandum, is easily intelligible when we remember the complexity of the impressions which form the objects of aesthetic appreciation in ordinary life. Diversity of interests, differences in the associative factor, in attention, and even in the actual object of observation, are conditions which readily account for divergence of ' taste ' in every-day matters. The following works may be added to the literature quoted in the foregoing paragraphs : E. von Hartmann, Aesthetik. I., Die deutsche Aesthetih seit Kant. 1886 ; II., System der Aesthetik. 1887. Jij Cohen, Kant's Begriindung der Aesthetih. 1889. K. Groos, Einleitung in die Aesthetik. 1892. K. Grosse, Bie Anfange der Kunst. 1893. J. Walter, Die Geschichte der Aesthetik im Alterthum. 1893. H. von Stein, Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik. 1886. M. Schasler, Kritische Geschichte der Aesthetik, two parts. 1872. [B. Bosanquet, History of Aesthetics. 1892.] § II. Tke Philosophy of Religion. 1. We are helped towards a preliminary definition of the philosophy of religion by the distinction drawn above (§ 9. 13) between a philosophy of law and a science of law. On that §11. The Philosophy of Religion 91 analogy, we should have to oppose theology, as science, to the philosophy of religion, as a part of philosophy in general: the one dealing with some determinate positive religion, the other examining and testing the general concepts employed or assump- tions made by a special theology. As a matter of fact, however, we find that in the philosophy of religion, as in that of law, this simple conception has been ousted by another, quite different view. Just as the law of reason or nature is contrasted with the positive law of the state, so, within a given form of religion, the natural or rational elements have been separated off from the revealed. They consist of the religious ideas or feelings which can be deduced a j/fiori from the nature of man himself, and more especially from his highest faculty, reason. It is even probable that this division in religion served as model for the similar distinction in the sphere of law, where its application is evidently quite different and much more correct. In law, external enactments and outward conduct have the principal part to play; but the essence of religion has always been placed in a purely inward, subjective attitude, which manifests itself in all kinds of conduct, but constitutes a reality entirely apart. And, indeed, when we consider how frequently the religious life of the individual departs from the articles of belief and ceremonial duties prescribed by his creed, we cannot doubt the existence of an inward religion, a religion which has grown up from personal experience and by conflict with all manner of scientific objections, altogether aside from the objective, historical form assumed by a particular revealed religion. Hence it is in- telligible that the philosophy of religion has always asserted its right to investigate the facts of reUgion in relative indepen- dence of theology, and has only occasionally approached the problem which we assigned to it just now — the discussion of the value and philosophical significance of the fundamental theological concepts. 2. It was not till a comparatively recent period that the philo- sophy of religion received independent treatment. In ancient philosophy it formed an integral part of metaphysics; and in 92 The Special Philosophical Disciplines modem times, even down to our own day, the feeling has generally been that judgments of religion must be made from the meta- physical standpoint. Hence the attitude of a philosopher to religion or the idea of God has come to be looked upon as a criterion of his metaphysics; witness the terms theism, deism, pantheism and atheism (c/. § 22), which give clear expression to the relation of the two disciplines. Moreover, it was metaphysics that offered the first opposition to Christian dogmatics. Then again, in the English philosophy, the epistemological examination of the idea of revelation has led to a criticism of positive rehgion in general. The earliest independent treatment of the philosophy of religion is, perhaps, to be found in the writings of the Enghsh ' free thinkers ' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Toland, Tindal, etc. These men set out to lay a new foundation for the contents of religion in a criticism of Christianity and the doctrines of the church. The result of their efforts was a deism, a purely mechanical conception of the universe, accepted under stress of the discoveries of modem natural science, and leaving no room for a God who should interfere with the destiny of the world. Deism cut away the ground from under the feet of natural religion in the original, metaphysical or epistemological and psychological meaning of the word ; so that it had to be given an entirely new foundation, if a religious Hfe apart from positive theology were once more to seem philosophically possible. This work was done by Kant. He characterised the chief objects of religious belief as postulates of the moral consciousness, and thus endeavoured to assure them against aU protest from the side of theoretical ratiocination. The universal rule of mechanical laws stops short at phenomena ; things in themselves constitute a realm of freedom, which receives its necessary complement in the assumption of personal immortality and of an aU-powerful and aU- good God (c/. §9. 8). Kant defines religion, however, as the recognition of our duties as divine commands, and his own philo- sophy of religion (£)ie Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossm Vernunft, 1793) consists in a rationalistic interpretation of the dogmas of the Christian religion, which does not differ in any §11. The Philosophy of Religion 93 essential point from the older attempts of the period of the Illumination towards a religion in accordance with reason. 3. Kant was chiefly concerned to make religion a normative science and defend its right to a place within a philosophical system. Schleiermacher (Reden iiher die Religion, 1799) discusses it as a factor in history and a datum of psychology, and comes to the conclusion that all religion consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence. Hegel, on the other hand, brings religion into relation with, philosophy once more, describing it as the obscure and confused anticipation of philosophy. In recent times, the development of the philosophy of religion has followed three principal lines : the historical, psychological, and epistemological and metaphysical. Historically, it has as an object of investigation the origin and progressive evolution of religion ; psychologically, it attempts to describe the psychical processes constituting the rehgious life of the individual; epistemologically and metaphysi- cally, it asks for the justification of religious ideas and examines their connection with a general theory of the universe. Enquiries of this latter kind not infrequently result in the establishment of a new religious ideal, whose compatibility with the scientific and metaphysical theories of the age renders it acceptable where positive religious ideas have proved unsatisfactory. The philosophy of religion has been treated from this stand- point by : E. von Hartmann, Das religiose Bewusstsein der Menschheit im Stufen- gange seiner Entwicklung, 1881 ; and Die Religion des Geistes. 1882. 2nd ed., 1888. 0. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie. I., Geschichte der Religionsphilo- sophie von Spinom bis auf die Gegemoart. 3rd ed., 1893. II., Genetisch- speeulative Religionsphilosophie. 2nd ed., 1884. L. W. E. Kauwenhoff, Religionsphilosophie (trs. from the Dutch by von Hanne. 1889. New titular edition. 1894.) H. Siebeck, Lehrhuch der Religionsphilosophie. 1893. R. Seydel, Religionsphilosophie im Umriss mil historisch-kritischer Einleitung iiber die Religionsphilosophie seit Kant. 1893. [E. Caird, The Evolution of Religion. 1893.] [J. Martineau, A Study in Religions. 1888.] 94 The Special Philosophical Disciplines 4. It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that the position of the philosophy of religion within the circle of the sciences "in general, and of the philosophical disciplines in particular, cannot he very simply or definitely described. At one time it is occupied with the depiction and explanation of a given set of facts (historical and psychological standpoints), at another with a critical examina- tion of the possibility of these facts, or the establishment of a new religious ideal in connection with a determinate metaphysics (and ethics). In the former case, it is simply a special science. Many students of the philosophy of religion draw a distinction at this point between the speculative and empirical modes of treatment, and entirely exclude the latter from their consideration. The division seems to be wrong in theory, and impossible in practice. It is only because the general history of religion and general psychology leave untouched a number of j)roblems which can be discussed by a philosophy of rehgion, that historical and psychological investigation can be regarded as its special province. Reasoning from analogy in other fields, we may expect that the philosophy of religion will some day shake off its present hybrid character. And the reform mil probably begin on the side of the history of religion, since the student of the philosophy of religion generally lacks the wide range of previous knowledge that mastery of the historical material requires. In its psychological aspect, on the other hand, the philosophy of religion will probably continue to form a department of applied psychology; the independence and comprehensiveness of the religious life make it impossible to do full justice to the subject within the limits of a general psychology. The properly philosophical part of the science, however, is to be found only in its treatment of the second of the two problems mentioned above. As a philosophy of theology it has an extremely important function to discharge : it must carefully analyse the basal theological concepts, the ideas of God, revelation, sin, justification, worsliip, etc., and at the same time bring them into connection with related ideas in other fields, metaphysics, ethics, etc. It is noteworthy that this, the true vocation of a philosophy of religion, has (so far §12. The Philosophy of History 95 as the author's knowledge extends) never yet found explicit recognition. § 12. The Philosophy of History. 1. The extraorduiary complexity of the range of facts which we include under the name of history makes it probable that the science of history, not less than its philosophy, is among the latest products of human thought. And indeed it is only in our own century that we find any real distinction between a scientific treatment of historical facts and amateurish and dilettante writing upon past events. No previous age recognised that a special method and special preparation and training are required to obtain scientifically valid results from historical sources. And even at , the present day, and among the representatives of historical science, we meet with the statement that the artistic factor is of as much importance in historical work as the purely scientific : a sure indication that a science of history, in the strict sense of the word, does not yet appear to students in the historical field the obvious and only thing to work for. We need not be sur- prised, then, to discover that the philosophy of history shows the same imperfections and obscurities as its corresponding science. Three different views of its aim and province can be distinguished. (1) On the first of these, it has to do with the same subject- matter as the science of history, but must adopt, in contradis- tinction to the science, a speculative or pragmatic or explanatory mode of treatment. -While the science of history, that is to say, merely narrates what took place in the past, the philosophy of history must furnish an explanation, a reasonable basis, for the succession of events, and so introduce a rational connection into the sequence of things. In attempting such an explanation it takes into account various classes of facts which would otherwise be neglected : climate, the geographical position of a country, the racial characters of a nation, the economic conditions of develop- ment, etc., etc. So long as its enquiry is restricted to the examin- ation of these empirical data, the philosophy of history is evidently 96 The Special Philosophical Disciplines no more than a supplement to the science of history, and must give up its title of phUosophioal discipline whenever they are included in the province of history proper. As a matter of fact, the current division of the science into the history of civilisation and political history expresses in part, at least, the distinction drawn in earlier times hetween the philosophy and the science of history. 2. As a rule, however, a metaphysical problem has been assigned to the philosophy of history along with the empirical. An explanation based upon such insufficient data must be not only hypothetical but exceedingly imperfect; and it is therefore necessary to go beyond the operation of the empirical factors and put a metaphysical interpretation upion the course of liistory. A purely constructive factor thus takes its place among the conditions of historical occurrence. History is conceived of, e.g., as an education of the human race, or as a realisation of the dialectic process which controls the colligation of ideas and concepts, or, from the religious standpoint, as a growth in hohness, manifesting the decrees of God and discovering his purposes. In this sense, the philosophy of history is evidently dependent upon metaphysics, upon a definite theory of the universe ; and supple- ments the science of history not by searching out and evaluating empirical factors which its sister-discipline has neglected, but rather by presenting the facts under a new aspect, entirely foreign to historical science. — "We have here treated together these two attempts to establish the philosophy of history in an independent position, because they make their appearance together in the history of the discipHne. Representatives of this first view of the aim and province of the philosophy of history are : J. G. Herder, Ideen zu drier PMlosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. 1784-1V91. H. Lotze, Mikrdkosmus. Ideen zwr Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. 4th ed., 3 vols., 1884 fF. (trs., 4th ed., 1894). C. Hermann, PMlosophie der Geschichte. 1860. K. L. Michelet, Philosophie dor Geschichte. 2 vols., 1879-1881. § 12. The Philosophy of History 97 R. RochoU, Die PMlosopMe der Geschichte. 2 vols., 1878-1893. (The first volume contains a critical historical survey of previous contri- butions to a philosophy of history.) 3. (2) Another view assigns to the philosophy of history the task of laying a philosophic foundation for the science of history. So regarded, it consists in the application of epistemology and logic to a discipline which assuredly offers an unusually rich and fertile field for such investigation. For historical science has to surmount a peculiar difficulty in getting at the facts with which it desires to deal. These facts are, of course, in each special case, some group of past phenomena which refer to human fortunes, human volition or action. Obviously, they are not open to direct examination, but can be reached only by the help of more or less corrupt literary records or other sources of evidence. Hence the historical enquirer needs an extremely circumstantial training before he can begin work upon his real subject-matter; and historical procedure affords an interesting test of logical acumen. Not is it less valuable, from the standpoint of epistemology, to discuss the value, validity and truth of the insight gained by the historic method. It is more apt to be the case in history than in any other department that scientific investigation leads simply to probability, and not to certainty of result. In the same way the question must be raised, from the philosophical side, as to how far we are justified in supplementing defective records, and the idea of law in history be subjected to a careful analysis, Lastly, special attention should be given to the idea of progress, which is oftentimes accepted as a regulative principle in historical science. Closely connected with it is the idea of development, as the origination of the higher from the lower, of the more perfect from the less perfect, of the more complex from the more simple^ — It can hardly be said that the problems which we have here handed over to the philosophy of history have as yet received independent treatment. They are discussed sporadically in various books on logic (especially those of Sigwart and Wundt), in metaphysical treatises, and also in works dealing with the general methodology of the science of 98 The Special Philosophical Disciplines history (c/. especially E. Bemheim, Lehrhuck der historischen Methods, 2nd ed., 1894). 4. (3) The third view of the philosophy of history, together with a new name to denote it, is found in the 'positive' philosophy of A. Comte {cf. §4. 5). As a 'positivist,' Comte rejects all forms of metaphysical enquiry. Hence his philosophy of history cannot discuss the higher meaning of the course of historical events, or the working of ethical causes in the destinies of the universe, or the rule of a divine providence; but simply a certain group of natural phenomena, which the special science of history can deal with in but fragmentary fashion. It is only society that has a history: not the individual, and not inorganic nature. Comte's philosophy of history thus becomes a theory of the conditions and forms of human society in its present status and past development ; a ' sociology ' or social physics, divisible into a statics and a dynamics of society. Its method is based upon a comparison or analogy. Society may be regarded as an organism; and the results obtained by the science of animal organisms may accordingly serve as models for a theory of the stages, forms and elements of human society. The social statics emphasises the close connection of all the separate members of the social organism. The social dynamics declares that the human mind is the most important factor in social change, so that the stages or epochs of individual mental evolution are also stages or epochs of historical development. Comte distinguishes three of these stages, the theological, metaphysical and positive ; the last is final. The most eminent of Comte's successors in the sociological field is Herbert Spencer (The Principles of Sociology, 3rd ed., 1885). Spencer gives a general formula for the process of evolution or development, which purports to be universally applicable. All evolution proceeds from an incoherent homo- geneity to a coherent heterogeneity. The analogy between social ('super-organic') Ufe-forms and organic, especially animal types, is carried through in detail. Thus the growth of the cell finds its social parallel in the horde, tribe and race. The various classes of society are further compared with the different structures of the § 1 2. The Philosophy of History 99 organism: the army corresponding to the ectoderm, the labouring classes to the endoderm, and the industrial or commercial classes to the mesoderm. And as the ectoderm gives rise to the nervous system, the supreme structure of the animal organism, so the army furnishes the state with leaders, princes or chieftains. 5. The science that has taken shape since Comte's day under the name of sociology is, evidently, not a true philosophy of history. It forms a new supplement to history, comparable with Herder's attempt (2, above) to explain the course of historical occurrence from natural conditions and human endowment. It has also been justly pointed out that sociology has no claim to rank either as the only or as the only genuine philosophy of history. To make society the sole object of historical consideration is every whit as one-sided as to treat exclusively of political events or great personalities. A real philosophy of history must be a discipline which we can put upon the same plane with the phUosophies of nature and of law (§§ 7, 9). In that case, it wiU evidently have to do not with the facts of history themselves, with mental processes and the natural and social influences that determine them, but with the fundamental concepts and ideas presupposed by historical science, and the logical character of the methods which it employs (cf. what was said under 3, above). But there is also another problem to be solved. Previous attempts to put a metaphysical interpretation upon the course of history have been unsuccessful, because their authors sought to give an in- dependent exposition of what had already been described, fuUy and adequately, in history itself. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the results of historical science form an important, indeed an indispensable, part of the foundation of any compre- hensive metaphysics. "We must go to natural science and psychology for a theory of the existing universe and its shaping in time, when we are looking at things from the side of nature or in the light of individual mental development, but we may not neglect the other and equally valuable material that the science of history provides for the completing and perfecting of our theory. Nothing of any worth can be said as to the significance of a 100 The Special Philosophical Disciplines cosmic evolution, in the highest and widest meaning of the phrase, without knowledge of the history of past ages. A metaphysics thus founded upon history must, of course, shed a reflected light upon the body of facts that form its foundation; but the same thing holds, in precisely the same way, of natural science and psychology. "We may talk, if we wiU, of a higher meaning in history, without changing one iota of the facts established by scientific investigation. "We conclude, then, that the sciences principally concerned, besides psychology, in the philosophy of history, are metaphysics, epistemology and logic. Under this third heading we may mention the very suggestive work by Q. Simmel, Bie. Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie. 1892. The following books make valuable contributions to the history of the discipline : R. Mint, Hie Philosophy of History in Europe. I. 1874. (Treats only of French and German investigators). The first part of this vol- has appeared in a 2nd, greatly altered ed., under the title : Historical Philosophy in France, French Belgium and Switzerland. 1893. F. de Kougemont, Les deux cit^s; la philosophic de I'histoire aux diffSrerents Ages de I'humanit^. 2 vols., 1874. (Contains a very complete bibliography). R. Fester, Rousseau und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie. 1890. P. Earth, Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und der Hegelianer his auf Marx und Hartmann. 1890. § 13. Supplementary and Critical Remarks. 1. The reader may have been surprised to find in the foregoing Sections no discussion of two other philosophical sciences, which would naturally be classed with the special disciplines: the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of language or of philology. There are two reasons for their omission. (1) Neither of them is, as a general rule, represented ia uni- versity lecture courses, while those that we have mentioned form part of the ordinary curriculum at almost every seat of learning. (2) And the same thing holds of philosophic Hteratuie. "We find not a little space allotted to mathematics and philology in § 13- The Philosophy of Mathematics loi logical, epistemological and psychological treatises; but there are hardly any systematic works devoted to the exclusive con- sideration of their philosophical aspects. — It is, therefore, only a matter of accident, so to say, that the philosophies of mathe- matics and language do not receive a place in our list of philosophical disciplines. The accident itself is the more striking since essays in these two fields form part of the very earliest material that we possess for a history of philosophy. Pythagoras made a notable beginning in the philosophy of mathematics, and Plato, in his Gratylus, laid the foundations of a philosophy of language. Moreover, mathematics and philology were among the first of the special sciences to cut themselves loose from philosophy; and we might, therefore, reasonably have expected that they would have formed the subject of particular and extended philosophical investigation. We shall try to show in what follows why it is that the facts do not correspond to this expectation. 2. (1) The universal applicability of mathematics makes it the most general of all the special sciences. Among the attributes of given reality — quality, intensity, spatial and temporal character — there is only one, quality, which is not capable of mathematical treatment; each of the others can be subsumed under the fundamental concept of mathematics, the idea of magnitude. And since quality never occurs alone, since we do not ever find pure qualities among our empirical facts, there is, in principle, nothing which we cannot make the object of mathematical consideration. The possibility of a special appli- cation of mathematical method within a given department, however, depends further upon our ability to give a special definition to the general attribute of quantity, i.e., to translate the general idea of magnitude into the more special concept of number or measurable magnitude. Kemembering the universal significance of mathematics, as compared with the hmited range of the other sciences, we can understand that it very soon came to occupy a peculiar position among them, and was regarded as co-ordinate with philosophy rather than as an object of philo- sophical investigation. 102 The Special Philosophical Disciplines (2) But tliis is not all. The logical vigour and unitary- structure of mathematics have constituted it since the begin- nings of modern philosophy the ideal of all scientific work. Attempts have been made in aU earnestness to model the philosophical disciplines after its pattern, in order to assure to them its universal validity and necessity. Here, then, is a second obstacle in the way of an impartial and objective philosophy of mathematics. (3) Lastly, mathematics seemed to offer but scanty material for philosophical treatment. Its basal concepts were reducible to a comparatively small number; and in geometry, at any rate, the final justification of aU its fundamental definitions appeared to reside in pure intuition or perception. Diversity of contents was lost sight of in the interest of formal procedure, and philo- sophy accordingly found but little to lay hold of in mathematical exiDosition. But with the increasing differentiation of the mathematical disciplines, the concepts which they employ have grown more numerous and complex; and the time is assuredly not far distant when a philosopher of mathematical training will bring the philosophy of mathematics into systematic form. Even as it is, the ideas of continuity, multiplicity, function, and infinite and infinitesimal magnitude, and the antithesis of geometry and arithmetic or analysis, etc., present a rich field for epistemological, logical and perhaps, too, psychological investigation. — The practical diflS-Culty that confronts the student of this discipline, the mastery of the complex system of mathematical symbols, can here receive no more than bare mention. 3. With the ^Mlosophy of language the case is a little different. First among the disciplines to which we might look for the philosophical supplement to philology stands the science of logic. For logic, as we have seen (§ 6. 5), is occupied with the general significance of symbols, and especially of linguistic symbols ; and the close connection which obtained so long, chiefly through the influence of K. F. Becker, between logic and grammar, would give a positive reason for our choice. Nevertheless, logic cannot help us. In course of time the § ij. The Philosophy of Language. 103 difference between the two disciplines was clearly established, and it fell to psychology to furnish the philosophical treatment of philology, — which it did with such entire success that modern essays in the philosophy of language may fairly be classed all together as psychological. Alongside of individual psychology, which has given especial attention to the development of speech in children, there has grown up (chiefly under the impulse of linguistic research) an ethnic psychology (c/. § 8. 9), one of whose principal problems is the reference of the various stages in the development of language to general psychological con- ditions in the history of the race. Here belongs, of course, the vexed question of the origin of language. — Ifow we have seen (§ 8. 10) that this empirical psychology has abeady acquired the character of a special science, and may be expected, in the near future, to assume its outward form. Hence we cannot admit that the psychological treatment of linguistic facts will ever lead to a real philosophy of linguistic science. As a matter of fact, however, if we abstract from its relations to psychology, the contents of philology seem to offer no new problem for philosophy; so that a philosophical psychology would be able to meet all the requirements that could be made of a philosophy of language in this meaning of the phrase. On the other hand, the form of philology is as much calculated as its contents to arouse philosophical interest. The various methods which philology, in the general sense, has developed undoubtedly constitute a separate and peculiar field for logical enquiry. Here, however, an objection is raised by the science itself. Some of its most gifted representa- tives have declared that it is simply an aid to the study of liistory. And, indeed, there can be no question that textual criticism, exegesis, estimation of authorities, etc., consist simply of a body of rules and facts which every historian must know who has to base his knowledge of past events upon written records ; and that language itself forms but one of the many objects of historical investigation. Hence we must hand over this half of the philosophy of language for treatment by the general philosophy of history {cf. § 12. 3). 104 The Special Philosophical Disciplines Here, then, is the explanation of the fact that no attempt at a separate philosophy of language has as yet been made. And the reasons given render it probable that things -will remain in the future very much as they are at present. The omission of the Jiistory of philosophy from our Hst of philosophical disciplines hardly calls for special explanation. It must be regarded, of course, as a part of the general science of history, which includes the history of science. It may not, perhaps, be superfluous to insist that only a philosopher who has been trained in historical methods should enter upon research in the history of philosophy. 4. To these supplementary remarks we may add a few words by way of criticism. The survey of the philosophical disciplines which we have undertaken in this Chapter wiU have sufficed to convince the impartial reader of the justice of our objections to the current definition and classification of philosophy (§§ 2, 3). It cannot have escaped his attention that the sciences now classed together under the general title of philosophy stand upon very different planes. On the one hand we have metaphysics, furnish- ing a speculative supplement to the positive knowledge of the special sciences ; on the other, the science of knowledge, wliich in its two parts, epistemology and logic, is caUed upon to set forth and examine the most general contents and the most general form of all scientific thought. By the introduction of natural philo- sophy and philosophical psychology we see these general disciphiies brought into relation with more restricted fields; while ethics, asthetics, empirical psychology and sociology are one and all engaged in special enquiries, and slowly maturing into independent disciplines. And yet — all alike are ' philosojihy ' ! The facts now appeal to us with increased strength and renewed energy to define philosophy in some different way, and to map out its province upon some more satisfactory principle. And so we may end here with a reference forwards, to the place where we shall endeavour to answer their appeal (Chap. IV). CHAPTER III. SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT § 14. Classification of Schools of Philosophy. 1. The criticism of the two preceding Chapters has led us to reject the current idea of philosophy as an unitary body of know- ledge, and to distinguish a large number of diverse philosophical problems. It follows that there cannot be any unitary or all- embracing tendency in a man's philosophical thought, in the sense that, e.g., his metaphysical position forthwith determines his procedure in all other philosophical disciplines. We have rather to look for differences of tendency within the separate philosophical sciences ; and if we find the same term employed to express points of view in two different disciplines, to interpret it as indicating merely a general resemblance, and not a really close relationship. Thus we hear of ' formalism ' both in logic and in aesthetics ; but the word 'formal' means something entirely different in the two cases, and we should go very far wrong if we inferred that there was any necessary connection between the sciences. It is true that a philosopher is often characterised off-hand by a single name, as, e.g., an ' individuaUst ' or a ' pantheist.' That, however, merely means that a certain pliilosophical standpoint occupies a prominent place in his system, or expresses the opinion of the speaker that metaphysics is the most important philosophical discipline, and that one's attitude to it must therefore be taken to indicate one's philosophical attitude in general. The only way to be accurate is always to say in what department of philosophy the particular philosopher belongs to a particular school. By doing io6 Schools of Philosophical Thought this, we get rid at once of certain inconveniences and errors which arise solely from inaccuracy of linguistic usage ; e.g., the bracket- ing together of materialism as metaphysical theory and materialism as ethical principle. A favourite way of arguing against meta- physical materialism is to insist upon the unworthy estimate of man to which a materialistic principle leads in ethics ! 2. "We can distinguish schools or tendencies of thought not only in the contents attributed to a given science, but also in the general significance attached to it as a whole. Thus different schools give very different definitions of the problems of logic and psychology and epistemology. Difierences of this kind, so far as they are of any considerable importance for modem philosophy, we have already discussed in Chapter II. (§§ 5, 6, 8). Hence we shall confine ourselves in the present Section to differences in the current conceptions of the contents of the philosophical sciences, differences which can be thought of as existing side by side, compatibly with practical agreement as to the significance of each science as a whole. A difference of opinion in the appreciation or explanation of the same object is evidently indicative of a lack of universally vahd knowledge. Metaphysics, of aU the scientific disciplines, is the most liable to such differences : for the obvious reason that it travels farthest beyond the empirical determinations of the special sciences, and is at the same time least dependent upon the stage of progress to which any one of them may have attained. Hence we find in metaphysics an extreme variety and persistence of divergent schools. On the other hand, the greatest contrasts of standpoint occur in epistemology. !N"ot only has epistemology to formulate and examine, from the side of contents, the presupposi- tions of all scientific knowledge ((/. § 5) ; the results at which it arrives are also of influence upon tlie procedure — indeed, upon the recognition of the possibility — of metaphysics. The best scientific logics give us no ground for the distinction of funda- mentally different conceptions. Differences of tendency in natural philosophy and psychology wiU be considered along with the corresponding differences in metaphysics. There accordingly § 14- Classification of Schools 107 remains only one other philosophical discipline whose representa- tives are split up into different camps : ethics. We thus obtain the following main divisions : — A. Metaphysical schools. B. Epistemological schools. C. Ethical schools. 3. Our classification of metaphysical schools can take no account of differences of opinion upon the question of the possibility of the science. It may also disregard the divergent views as to the special methods to be employed in metaphysics. They depend either upon epistemological definitions or upon general theories of the nature of metaphysical enquiry, which we have not here to consider. The only thing left is the contents of metaphysical speculation. This we accept as the basis of classification, and proceed to arrange under five heads. The first two are of a general character, referring to all the principles that can find application in the construction of a theory of the universe. The last three are of a more special type, being concerned with quite definite factors within the total theory. (1) The first group of metaphysical schools can be classified according to the number of principles assumed for a theory of the universe. It is customary to distinguish the various views that can be held upon this question by the terms monism, dualism and pluralism. But as the difference expressed by the first two is at the present day predominantly qualitative, it seems better to make a purely quantitative antithesis, and to speak only of singularism and pluralism. The former explains o]- deduces all the phenomena of the universe from one 'single principle ; the latter declares that explanation is impossible without the assumption of a number of independent principles. (2) A second means of classifying metaphysical schools is afforded by the quality of the principles adopted by them. Here we can distinguish principles of existence and principles of occur- rence. As principles of existence we may have matter or mind or both or a fusion of the two,— corresponding to the schools of io8 Schools of Philosophical Thought materialism, spiritualism, dualism, and monism. As principles of occurrence we have causality, the mechanical inter-connection of cause and effect, and finality, the colligation of all processes from the point of view of purpose, — corresponding to the meta- physical schools of mechanism and teleology. 4. The special metaphysical schools may be classified by their attitude to three concepts which played a particularly prominent part in the German philosophy of the eighteenth century: the concepts of a supreme being (existence and attributes), of the free- dom of the will and of mind. (3) The third group may be termed, in general, the theological. Within it, metaphysical systems are classified according to their treatment of the idea of God. We can distinguish four typical attitudes ; those of pantheism, theism, deism and atheism. (4) The question of the freedom of the will divides meta- physics into two schools. That which accepts and defends it is indeterminisvi, that which opposes it, determinism. (5) A last ground of division is found in the various meta- physical definitions of the nature of mind. The theory of substantiality supports, that of actuality denies, the existence of a mind-substance. Further, the terms intellectualism and voluti- tarism stand for opposing views upon the qualitative character of the fundamental attributes or functions of the mental life. The intellectuahst regards thought or ideation as the essential activity of mind ; the voluntarist looks upon will as the source and sustaining power of mental existence. It may be said in general that not more than one of the metaphysical standpoints brought together in a class or group can be represented within a given philosophical system at a given time. They are antithetic, and consequently incompatible. On the other hand, the combination of standpoints which belong to difierent classes is almost always theoretically possible ; and, as a matter of fact, many total systems of metaphysics have been compounded of elements variously chosen from the five groups. A glance at the history of philosophy shows, however, that certain combinations have been preferred. Thus the spiritualist § 14- Classification of Schools 109 is usually a theist and a believer ia the substantiality of mind ; the monist as regularly pantheist and determinist, etc. We may infer from this that the different classes are not in reality wholly independent of one another ; and, indeed, it would be strange if one's belief concerning the general quality of the principles in- volved in a theory of the universe did not in some measure affect one's estimation of a special factor. In other words, a man's general philosophical attitude must, within certain Hmits, determine his attitude to special problems. "We shall find this rule exemplified later on, when we come to deal with the philosophical schools in detail. 5. It is easy to see how the different metaphysical categories can be applied to a particular system. We may, however, give a few illustrations. Spinoza must be termed singularist, monist and mechanist ; pantheist, determinist, actualist and intellectualist. These words describe the contents of his metaphysical system in aU essential points. Lotze, on the other hand, represents a very modified form of singularism, and is spiritualist, teleologist, 'theist, in- determinist and substantialist. We cannot speak of him either as intellectualist or voluntarist, since he recognises more than one fundamental attribute or function of mind. It is evident that the theories of the universe held by Spinoza and Lotze are, practically, direct opposites. Herbart and Leibniz stand in closer relation to Lotze, except that both are decided pluralists, as well as deter- minists and intellectualists. Herbart's metaphysics is a revival of that of Leibniz : tested by our categories, the two prove to be in complete agreement. The differences between the two philo- sophers are to be found in their attitude to epistemology and' ethics, and in the method by which they obtain their metaphysical results. It might be urged in objection to our classification that there are certain thinkers whose work cannot be subsumed to a category from each of the five classes. Where this is due to the incom- pleteness of a metaphysical system, the fault cannot, of course, be laid to the door of our schema. Nevertheless, there are theories Schools of Philosophical Thought — Lotze's theory of mind, e.g. — over and above those to which we have given special names, and to them our classification is not adequate. The reason that we do not extend the schema to include them is simply that there are no definite or generally accepted names to express them in philosophical hterature ; and it would be foreign to our present purpose to add new words to a terminology already complicated enough. 6. In epistemology there has been a divergence of opinion upon three principal questions : those of the origin of knowledge, of its validity or limitations, and of the nature of its objects or contents. We find the following schools of thought : (1) The origin of knowledge is placed by rationalism in the human mind, and by empiricism in experience. Criticism regards both mind and experience as concerned in the origination of knowledge, and attempts to determine the part played by each factor. (2) Dogmatism declares, without examination, that all kno\.=i ledge is valid. Scepticism, on the other hand, denies that any knowledge possesses universal oi" absolute vaHdity : knowledge is , subjective (subjectivism) or relative (relativisjn). Positivism (cf §4. 5) restricts the validity of knowledge to the field of immanence or experience; and criticism requires us accurately to determine the limits of human knowledge before we speak of transcendence, though it does not regard metaphysical enquiries as whoUy impossible or inadmissible. (3) Idealism makes the whole contents of knowledge consist of ideas, i.e., data of consciousness. Bealisin maintains, on the contrary, 'that there is an objective something existing outside of consciousness. Phenomenalisin regards the contents of knowledge as phenomena, and thus endeavours to take account of both the idealistic and the reaHstic factors. 7. Differences in ethical systems centre round four great problems of the moral life. The first is the question of the origin of morality, in the sense both of moral obligation and of the moral judgment. The others are the questions of the motives, the objects and the aims of moral volition and action. § 14. Classification of Schools (1) The autonomms ethical systems look for the origin of morahty in the acting individual himself; the heteronomous or authoritative systems find it in injunctions laid upon the individual from without, whether in the form of religious or of political laws. The origin of the moral judgment and of moral knowledge is placed hy intuitionism or apriorism in a connate disposition of the human mind; while empiricism or evolutionism makes them dependent upon the experience or evolution of the individual'^ and the race. (2) The efhics of feeling or affective ethics defines the motives of moral volition and action, in accordance with their psychological character, as feelings, emotions, etc. The ethics of reflexion, on the other hand, sees the impulse to morality in deliberation, a reflective process of the reason or the understanding. A further distinction is drawn within the ethics of reflexion between an ethics of the understanding and an ethics of reason, — where reason *. regarded as the higher mental faculty, determiaing the course of moral endeavour and achievement upon more general grounds. (3) The objects in which morjil purposes are to be realised are declared by individualism to be individual men. These are further defined either as the acting subject himself (egoism) or as other iudividuals (altruism). Universalism opposes this teaching, and afiirms that the object of moral endeavour must always be a community or society, e.g., the nation or the state. (4) The aim of morality is for subjectivism the production of a subjective state, that of pleasure or happiness {hedonism and eudcemonism); for objectivism, the attainment of an objective state, a condition of things determinable by objective standards or criteria. The names perfectionism, evolutionism, naturalism and utilitarianism indicate the various ways in which the definition of this state has been attempted. 8. "We may illustrate the working of these new categories by applying them to the philosophical systems instanced just now (cf 5, above). Spinoza, on the epistemological side, proves to be rationalist, dogmatist and realist. His moral system stands midway between an ethics of, feeling and an ethics of reflexion. Schools of Philosophical Thought It is autonomous, egoistic and objectivistic. Lotze, on the other hand, was in epistemology a criticist (in both senses of the word) and a realist; in ethics, an autonomist, intuitionist, adherent of the ethics of feehng, altruist and eudaemonist. In conclusion, we may note that certain of the expressions which we have defined above are used in different meanings. Thus ' evolutionism ' may apply not only to the development of the moral judgment, but also to a particular conception of moral ends. And the same thing is true of ' criticism.' The difficulty cannot be avoided, since the accepted nomenclature puts no other terms at our disposal; and it is far more important, from the point of view of the present book, to describe current linguistic usage than to try and correct its objectionable features. In one single case it seemed well to introduce a new word : objectivism. This was done, however, only in order to bring a number of related theories under their common genus. The following worts may be recommended for the study of the general subject of this Section: — R. Eucken, Geschichie und Kritik der Grwndhegriffe der Gegenwart. 1878. Second ed., imder the title. Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart. 1893. (The historical material, which constituted a principal feature of the first edition, and upon which the book depends for its chief value, has unfortunately been greatly curtailed in the second.) 0. Liebmarm, Zw Analysis der Wirklidikdt. 2nd ed., 1880. (A brilliant and suggestive discussion of problems in epistemology, natural philosophy, psychology, ethics and sesthetics.) O. Pliigel, Die Probleme der Philosophie und ihre Losungen. 3rd ed., 1893. (Herbartian in standpoint.) W. Windelband, Geschichie der Philosophie. 1892. Eng. trs., 1893. (This work gives a history of problems and ideas, as opposed to the usual chronological and biographical mode of treatment.) Note. — F. Paulsen has lately published an essentially different and much simpler classification of ethical schools. He distinguishes (1) the various conceptions of the highest good, the final aim of moral action; and (2) the different definitions of moral judgment. The question of what constitutes the highest good is answered, he thinks, by hedonism and energism (according to which a certain occupation with the affairs of life possesses an ethical value). The attribute of morality §15. Singularism and Pluralism 113 is predicated, by farmalistic ethics, of all action that corresponds to a moral law or norm ; by teleological ethics, of all action that attains a determinate end, achieves determinate results. In epistemology, too, Paulsen recognises but four principal schools: those of realistic empiricism, realistic rationalism, idealistic empiricism, and idealistic rationalism. Neither classification appears to be adequate to the facts, and the ethical lays itself open to further criticism by the absence of well-marked lines of division. A. METAPHYSICAL SCHOOLS. § 15. Singularism and Pluralism. 1. Singularism is the oldest metaphysical theory of western philosophy. In the earlier Ionian school of natural philosophy Thales chose water, Anaximander the infinite (to aTreipov), and Anaximenes air, as the principle from which everything has been derived, or in which the essence of all things consists; and Heraolitus defines fire and the Pythagoreans number in the same way. In every case it is one single principle that is taken as starting-point. Nevertheless, we do not find any explicit consciousness of the necessity or importance of an unitary principle until the time of the Eleatics (Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus). For them unity is an indispensable attribute of existence, the distinguishing mark of reality as opposed both to the many and to the changing which are unreal. Moreover, since change and multipUcity are alike data of sense perception, this preference of unity carries with It the belief that reason is the only reUable source of know- ledge.— On the other hand, pluralism, too, finds eminent repre- sentatives in pre-Socratic philosophy. Empedocles makes the four elements (fire, water, earth and air), and the moving forces of love and hate, principles from which to deduce the things and happenings of the universe: no one of them, he declares, can be reduced to any other, or brought under a still higher principle. Ihe Atomists (Leucippus, Democritus) give up the quaHtative differences of the elements in favour of a multitude of merely quantitatively different particles; and Anaxagoras can find only two independent explanatory principles.-matter. crude and chaotic 114 Metaphysical Schools which he conceives of as divided up into countless elements; and the ordering and arranging mind. Plato and Aristotle may be said to combine both views. Singularism holds its own in the theory of a supreme or ultimate creative or impelling agent; pluralism receives expression in the unmediated antithesis of contents and form, matter and idea. Plato undoubtedly inclines more definitely to the side of singu- larism: the idea of the good or of the divine nature is taken by him as absolute principle of all that is and that occurs. In Aristotle, on the contrary, the pure idea, immaterial form is merely the primuin niovens, and accordingly presupposes something that can be moved. The philosophy of the middle ages vacUlates in the same way between the two standpoints, though tending on the whole more towards the Platonic position. 2. The metaphysical systems of modern philosophy, like the mediaeval, have not always kept the two views sharply distinct. Descartes, it is true, draws a clear line of division between .body and mind, as two absolutely different qualities; yet both alike owe their existence to God, the one real 'substance.' In Spinoza's hands the Cartesian theory becomes a rigorous singu- larism; thought and extension are two of the infinitely numerous attributes of the divine substance — the only two comprehensible by human knowledge. Leibniz, apart from his confused treat- ment of the idea of God, is no less decidedly a pluralist. His universe consists of an infinite number of independent individual substances (monads). An explicit preference for a single principle is expressed in the Kantian philosophy, and in its logical developments, the systems of Pichte, ScheUing and Hegel. All three endeavour to deduce Kant's system from a supreme prin- ciple or highest concept, whether in the form of an original action of the ego (the ego posits itself), or of an absolute indifference or identity, or of absolute existence. Schopenhauer, too, is a singularist, but establishes his position in an entirely different way, setting out to give a positive interpretation of Kant's theory of the thing in itself, and making will the ultimate and only reality. Herbart entered a strong protest against the ' prejudice ' §15- Singularlsm and Pluralism 115 that everything must be deduced from a single principle. What is, he says, must be qualitatively simple, but need not be quali- tatively the same. And his explanation of experience leads him to a distinct pluralism, whose ultimate principles, the reals, show an unmistakable likeness to Leibniz' monads. Of quite recent metaphysicians, Lotze, von Hartmann, Fechner and Duhring may be cited as singularists, and Wundt as pluralist. Lotze has succeeded, in some measure, in combining both standpoints; he assumes the existence of independent, individual reals, and explains their interaction by the hypothesis of one all-embraeing substance. 3. Singularism has sometimes attempted to justify its stand- point on general grounds; pluralism never. We may distinguish four main arguments for the assumption of a single principle. (1) That which is logically most general must be one. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, in particular, are agreed upon this point. All special ideas must be referable to one highest idea; all special knowledge must be deducible, by a chain of inference, from one supreme proposition. And since, further, there is a perfect paral- lehsm between thought and existence (upon this, also, the three systems are in agreement), a highest idea or supreme proposition must also be the expression of a iirst principle of all existence or occurrence. (2) That which is most fundamental must be one. Human knowledge, explaining the world by cause and effect, must lead to the assumption of a last cause. This is, roughly stated, the reason given by Plato, Lotze and von Hartmann for the adoption of a single principle. \ (3) That which exists must, asybxisting, be one. This is the position of the Eleatics. Duhring propounds a similar theory : the all-inclusive existence must be unitary. (4) That which is lest and most beautiful must be one. The chief representative of this view is Plato. It is interesting to note, as was said just now, that pluralism has never attempted to justify its standpoint on general grounds. 4. We have in this fact the expression of a deep-rooted differ- ii6 Metaphysical Schools ence in tlie character of the two schools of thought. Singularism almost always goes together with a deductive, dialectical, aprioristic procedure ; pluralism is as regularly connected with inductive and empirical tendencies. We must not suiDpose, therefore, that trutbJ is necessarily on the side of the four arguments. If we look at them a little closely, they seem (aU but one) to proceed rather { from a respect for the superlative degree than from metaphysical conviction. Besides which, singularism confuses the logical sub-! sumption of special to more general concepts with real explanation. ! The manifold can never be reaUy explamed by the simple. The| Atomists were quite right when they said that multiplicity of empirical data demands multiplicity of actual existence. For we can adequately explain individual facts only by other individual) facts, and particular thmgs only by other particular things.! Special changes mean special conditions, and the whole notion of | cause and effect presupposes a temporal and quantitative relation j which can exist only as between individual and particular processes. Hence, while there is every reason to regard the system of logical concepts as an edifice that culminates in a single idea, that of itself cannot help us to the discovery of real principles wliieh may take the highest place in an explanatory theory of the universe, Eeverence for unity, whether ethical, sesthetical or mystical, has nothing at aU to do with a scientific metaphysics. And all aprioristic arguments for unity or multiplicity must accordingly te rejected. ' Of the other metaphysical schools, pantheism, theism, deism and monism belong to singularism ; and dualism (unless connected with some one of these theological views) to pluralism. No other metaphysical theory has any necessary connection ivith the question of the number of principles requisite for an explanation of the universe. § 1 6. Materialism. 1. So many difierent schools of thought are^grouped together under the name of materialism that it seems desirable in the first place to give a brief account of them all, and then to select 'tfiose § i6. Materialism 117 that possess any metaphysical significance. "We may distinguish two main forms : theoretical and practical materialism. Practical materialism is an ethical standpoint, and falls under the fourth category of our classification (§ 14. 7), the category of aim or end. It declares that the material good things of life are the only end worth striving for. Theoretical materialism may be either a regulative principle (§ 4. 3) or a metaphysical standpoint. As regulative principle it simply inculcates the rule that scientific investigation must always proceed as if matter were the o nly quality of reality, and therefore alone " capable of furnishing the explanation of a given fact. This position was maintained, e.g., by Fr. £ TLange, and is held to-day by certain physiologists and psychologists to be essential to their special work. As metaphysical standpoint, materialism appears in a monistic (i.e., singularistic : c/. § 14. 3) and a dualidia fornl. On the dualistic hypothesis there are two kinds of matter, a coarser and a finer, a more inert and a more mobile ; on the monistic, there is but one, — matter is unitary throughout. Finally, the monistic form itself has three subdivisions ; attributive materialism, which makes mind an attribute of matter; causal materialism, which makes it an effect of matter; and equative materialism, which looks upon mental processes as really material in character. For convenience' sake we may arrange all these diff'erent materialisms in a table as follows : — Materialism. Theoretical. Practical. Regulative Principle. Metaphysical Standpoint. Dualistic. Monistic. Attributive. Causal. Equative, '2. We are here concerned only with the metaphysical division of theoretical materialism. Its dualistic branch is confined to the philosophies of the ancient world, where it appears as atomism (founded by Leucippus, further developed by Democritus, and adopted later by the Epicureans), The theory is that the whole n8 Metaphysical Schools visible universe has arisen by the cohesion of small invisible particles, the atoms. Matter is essentially homogeneous in character, and all differences among phenomena are referable to the size, form and relative position of the atoms. The mind, like everything else, is composed of atoms, which are, however, in its case, very smooth, deUcate and round; or, as Lucretius put it in his De rerum natura, the smallest, roundest and most mobile that there are. This ancient materiahsm may be termed dualistic, since it regarded body and mind as composed of different atoms. The monistic materialism of modern philosophy makes its first appearance upon English soil. Hobbes declares that every real occurrence in the universe is movement. Even sensations and ideas are, at bottom, nothing else than movements of inward parts of the animal body. Later, with increased knoAvledge of the dependence of psychical states upon the body, materiahstic theory takes on a more special form. Jolm Toland, the free-thinker (1670-1721 or 1722), defined thought as a function of the brain, and Eobert Hooke, the 'experimental philosopher' (t 1703), held that memory was a material storage of ideas in the brain sub- stance. Hooke calculated that the number of ideas acquired Vy an adult during his Ufetime would amount to nearly 2,000,000, and gives us the comforting assurance that the microscope shows the brain to have plenty of room for them all. Pre-Kantian materialism reached its climax, however, in the French pliUosophy of the eighteenth century. La Mettrie (L'homme machine, 1748) endows matter with the power of acquiring motor force and' sensation, and designates mind as the cause of this power. Since the mind has its seat (or seats) in the body, it must be extended, and therefore material. It is, indeed, hardly con- ceivable that matter is able to think ; but there are many other things just as hard to understand. A great number of clinical experiences and of facts in comparative anatomy prove the dependence of psychical upon bodily processes, and it is only as part of the brain that mind can exercise its influence upon body. Very much the same ideas recur in the Systhme de la nature by Holbach (1770), the crowning work of this materialistic literature. ii6. Materialism 119 The main purpose of the author is to combat all and every form of supernaturalism, i.e., any view which assumes a principle or a world beyond and above the mechanical interconnection of natural, sensible, material things in the physical universe. The materialistic standpoint is here presented in much stricter form than by La Mettrie. Mind is simply body regarded under the aspect of certain functions or powers. No new arguments are alleged, however (c/. § 7. 5). 3. The nineteenth century witnessed a revival of materialism, due partly to the decay of Hegel's speculative philosophy and partly to the influence of a number of new observations and experiments on the connection of mind and body. A vehement discussion of these matters at the Natural Science Congress held in Gbttingen in 1854 led to the publication of a long series of works, all materialistic in tendency, chief of which are : C. Vogt's Kohlerglaube uhd Wissenschaft (1855), J. Moleschott's Der Kreislauf des Lebens (5th ed., 1887), and L. Biichner's Kraft und Staff (16th ed., 1888; trs., 4th Engl, from 15th German ed., 1884). The main difference between the new materialism and its eighteenth century forerunner lies in the fact that it shows some recognition of the need of an epistemological reason for its position. Thus Vogt affirms that the limitations of thought coincide with the limitations of sensible experience, the explanation being that the brain is the organ of mental function. This fact is as certain, he says, as that two and two make four. Nevertheless, our ultimate abstractions from phenomena will never be explicable, consciousness as little as muscular contraction (!). Here, as in related works, connections are made out in detail between mental capacity and the weight of the brain, the extent of its surface, and the number of its convolutions. The most important work of the whole school, however, is, without any doubt, Moleschott's Kreislauf. Its epistemological position is as follows. All exist- ence is existence through attributes; but there is no attribute which does not consist simply of a relation. Hence there can be no difference between the thing -in -itself and the thing-for-us. If we have found out all the attributes of matter that can exert Metaphysical Schools an influence upon our developed sense organs, then we have grasped the essence of things, and our knowledge, humanly speaking, is absolute. The materialist, Moleschott says, asserts the unity of force and matter, mind and body, God and the world. Thought is a movement, a recomposition of brain substance. It is an extended process, because, as certain pilycho- logical experiments — reaction experiments — show, it requires time for its consummation (!). The individual man is the sum of parents and nurse, place and time, air and weather, sound and light, food and clothing. We are the sport of every breath of air that plays upon us. 4. The various statements of Biichner's work are in hopeless confusion. In the first place he declares that force and matter, like mind and body, are merely terms to express two different sides or modes of manifestation of one and the same ultimate reahty, whose intimate nature is unlaiown to us. But this wholly monistic utterance is promptly contradicted by another, to the effect that matter was in existence long before mind, and that mind presupposes the organisation of matter. It is then curious to read, later on, that there is no matter without mind, and that matter is the seat of mental as well as of physical forces. Yet again, mind is defined as the collective expression for the total activity of the brain, just as respiration is a collective expression for the activity of the organs of breathing. How atoms, nerve- ceUs, and matter set to work to produce sensations and consciousness is a matter of complete indifference : it is enough to know that they do. Not content with this .unsurpassed confusion of ideas, the author kindly takes upon himself, in the second place, the remunerative task of distributing mental processes to particular brain ganglia, and packs away reason, imagination, memory, the sense of number, the sense of space, the sense of beauty, and many other things, into their separate cells. He cannot allow the developed consciousness of an adult man more than some 100,000 ideas, and so reaches the pleasing conclusion that the five hundred or thousand million ganglion cells leave full room for new mental constructs (and faculties f). § 1 6. Materialism 121 At the end of this brief historical survey we may mention the curious form of materialism — a materialism by logical deduction — represented by Ueberweg (f 1871). The things of the phenomenal world, Ueberweg says, are our ideas. As things are extended, ideas must be extended also. And as ideas run their course in the mmd, mind must be extended. And as, again, what is extended is matter, the mind must be material. There is no doubt that the exact opposite of this conclusion could be logically obtained from precisely the same data. 5. Since our historical exposition of the principal types of materialistic metaphysics has brought to view all the arguments that have been adduced in its favour, and the subforms of the monistic type are never found as pure and as sharply defined as we have made them, we may now, without further delay, attempt the task of a comprehensive criticism of materialism in general. If any metaphysics is justly to be termed dogmatic, it is the materialistic, j The arguments and reasons that materialists offer for their faith are extraordinarily feeble. Ancient philosophy was able to cope with the facts, in a certain measure, by its dualism of matters; and attributive and causal monism does not disjjute the qualitative pecuharity of mind. But equative materialism, unless it be turned into a monism of a different order (§ 19), is mere naive absurdity. Identity in idea may be asserted only where the characteristics of the objects or ideas in question can be regarded as identical. But it is an old and a very true observation that the attributes of the 'psychical' differ essentially, if not entirely, from those of the ' physical.' What then becomes of the dictum that mentality is a material process ? UntO. quite recently materiahsm had made no attempt whatsoever to provide itself with an epistemological foundation; and it is one of the results of the Kantian critique of knowledge that at last, in the nineteenth century, some such ventures have been iindertaken. But aU alike (as can be seen in our quotations from Vogt and Moleschott) leave the real difficulty easily and carelessly on one side. The only fact upon which the materialist can rely for support is the obvious and evident dependence of psychical processes upon physical. But philosophers Metaphysical Schools of other schools have cast no doubt upon the existence of this connection between the two groups of phenomena; and the fact must consequently be regarded as highly equivocal, not as a sure index of the correctness of materialism. Indeed, the following reasons force us to the conclusion that the materialistic hypothesis is neither the most plausible nor the simplest explanation of the fact. 6. (1) Materialism stands in contradiction to a fundamental law of modern natural science, the law of the conservation of energy; according to which the sum of energy in the universe always remains constant, and the changes that take place aU about us are simply changes in the distribution of energy, and involve an absolutely uniform transformation or exchange. The law evidently impUes that the series of 'physical' processes is a closed chaiu, in which there is no place for a new kind of phenomenon: the 'psychical' or 'mental' Brain processes, e.g., despite their extreme complexity, must be included in the circle of causes and effects, and all the changes produced in the brain substance by outside stimulus conceived of as propagated and diffused in a purely chemical or physical way. A theory of this universal validity leaves the mental side of things 'aU iti the air'; for how the secondary effect of mentality can be pro- duced without any the least loss of energy upon the physical side, is difficult to say. The only logical thing to do is to co- ordinate mental processes, as representing a special form of energy, with the ordinary chemical, electrical, thermal and mechanical energy, and to assume that the same uniform relation of trans- formation and exchange obtains between them as between the various 'physical' energies. But apart from the fact that this view is nowhere mentioned, stiU less worked out in any detail, in materialistic literature, there are several objections to it upon general grounds, all leading to the same conclusion, that the idea of energy as defined by natural science is inappHcable to mental processes. (2) The idea of matter, which plays so large a part in material- istic thinking, has neither met with such general acceptance nor §i6. Materialism 123 admits of sucli certain proof as to take rank, without further discussion, as a firm and adequate foundation for our direct conscious experience. The conflict between the mechanical and dynamical views of nature (c/. §7. 5) is not yet over; and the latter eliminates the idea of matter altogether. Nor can there be any doubt that it is possible to obtain a consistent explanation of nature on the dynamic hypothesis. But then materialism loses its foothold once and for all. 7. (3) Materialism cannot explain even the simplest psychical process. For it would be requisite that the process should be necessarily deducible from a certain definite group of material processes, given or assumed. But it is so difficult to conceive how a sensation could ever be the necessary and obvious consequence of a movement, that the materialists themselves do not pretend to a single ray of intellectual enlightenment in the matter. It is not true, as they urge when confronted with the argument, that the purely physical nexus is equally inconceivable. In the physical sphere, the necessity of a determinate occurrence can always be demonstrated by some conceptual or perceptual construction. Du Bois-Eeymond's eloqu.ent presentation of these old-world truths (Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens, 1872 and later) has helped to win acceptance for them in scientific circles, to which philosophy proper makes little appeal. (4) The idea of a relation of dependency is far more general than that of causal connection. The former inlplies only that two phenomena, a and h, are so related that every change in (or of) a is followed or accompanied by a corresponding change in (or of) &. By 'corresponding' change is meant a change which is qualita- tively or quantitatively equivalent to the given change; so that equal or similar processes in (or of) a lead to the appearance of equal or similar processes in (or of) h, or that greater, less, stronger, weaker, etc., changes on the one side are followed by changes in the same direction on the other. AU these conditions are fulfiUed, of course, by the relation of cause and effect; but it involves further a definite temporal connection, quite irrelevant to depend- ence as such, and thus forbids the inversion of the relation, which 124 Metaphysical Schools is perfectly possible under the less special formula. Hence the assertion of a relation of dependence between psycliical and physical processes must be sharply distinguished from the assertion of their causal connection. — Now an impartial observation shows that mind is dependent upon body, and body dependent upon mind. The unprejudiced investigator wiU, therefore, be content with the general idea of functional relation, and make no attempt to apply the more special law of causal connection in this particu- lar field. Materialism, on the contrary, starts out with the assumption of the special relation, unmindful of the difference between cause and dependence, and blind to the extreme one- sidedness of its position. 8. (5) EpistemologicaUy, materialism is guilty of a misunder- standing of the ultimate character of human experience. 'Sub- jective' and 'objective,' 'mind' and 'matter,' are not given a priori as independent magnitudes or qualities ; what we have to begin with is an undifferentiated whole. This is the 'datum of experience,' and it is only by fairly compUcated processes that we rise from it to the conceptual distinction between subject and object (c/. § 26). But materialism, in its search for the sole and only ground of existence, the essential reality of things, is not even satisfied to take this first result of conceptual abstraction, but chooses what we may call an abstraction of the second order, the idea of 'matter.' For 'objective' and 'material' are not by any means convertible terms. The 'objective' element in the datum of experience is simply the element which is not dependent upon the experiencing individual ; e.g., certain spatial and temporal attributes or relations. The idea of matter presupposes a common substrate of all these processes. Instead, therefore, of taking account of the fuU contents of original experience, materialism has raised a secondary product of conceptual abstraction to the rank of a metaphysical principle. (6) To the materialist, however, matter is not an ' idea ' at all, but a self-evident reality. He talks of the atoms as if they could be perceived by the senses, and regards matter as the seat of forces which operate upon us, etc. We have the word of sober §i6. Materialism 125 thinkers, who have attained to eminence in natural science, that this pictorial application of the idea of matter and its parts may be very useful, provided that it does not usurp the place of a true explanatory principle. The atoms would then be merely figures of speech, valuable just so far as they helped to simplify one's total conception of the interconnection of natural phenomena. But the correct idea of matter and its parts cannot be made pictorial, since it depends upon a twice repeated abstraction from the original data of perception. And so it comes about, as Mach says, that the atoms have been unhesitatingly endowed with certain attributes which contradict all previous observation. Materialism, that is, is all too ready to confuse the figurative idea of corporeal particles with the abstract idea of atoms. 9. (7) The sole purpose in the formation of the concept of matter is, as we have seen, to hypostatise the objective element in the datum of experience. There is no intention of paying the shghtest attention to its subjective side. This is the epistemological reason for holding to the closed series of causally connected physical * processes, as defined by the law of the conservation of energy. But the subjective element in the datum of experience is an ultimate character in human experience in general. Tones, colours and the rest of the qualities of sense, — processes of thought, acts of the will, feelings and emotions, — all alike are under all circum- stances and in aU their parts among the given things of experience itself. Matter, on the other hand, is an abstraction of the second order. How, now, can any connection such as that required by materiahsm, whether in its attributive or causal form, obtain between an original contents of experience and this abstract idea % It is much as if one should try to establish a causal or attributive relation between a good action and the concept of morality. The relation can exist only when the phenomena brought into con- ' nection are processes of the same order, or at least stand upon the ■ same level of abstraction. It follows from this discussion that materialism is not only a very hypothetical, but also an exceedingly improbable metaphysical explanation of the world-whole. It has now lost all standing in 126 Metaphysical Schools philosophical circles, but still enjoys a considerable vogue among physiologists and alienists, and is often used as a catchword, in the sense of a well-substantiated scientific theory, in the ordinary conversation of the educated classes. This is why we have offered so extended a criticism of its metaphysical pretensions. In conclusion we may mention the admirable work of F. A. Lange : Geschichte des Materialismiis und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart (3rd ed., 2 vols., IS'/G-TY ; 5th ed. [popular edition without notes], 1896 ; Eng. trs., 1892). § 17. Spiritualism. 1. Spiritualism, the direct metaphysical antithesis of materialism, appears much later than its rival in the history of philosophy. The only philosophical doctrine of antiquity that could possibly be termed spiritualistic — the Platonic theory of ideas — does not belong to spiritualism in the strict meaning of the word, since the 'idea' was simply the reality in the concept, and did not denote anything originally mental, a simple contents of internal experi-^ ence. We may, therefore, regard Leibniz as the first exponent of ■ spiritualism. According to the Leibnizian epistemology, meta- physics, like mathematics, must pursue a deductive method, must set out from what is simplest, what is absolutely clear and certain. The impressions of sense do not meet these requirements, since they give no clear information at all as to the origination of the qualities contained in them. Hence we must begin every philosophical enquiry with definitions, fonned in accordance with the laws of identity and contradiction. Leibniz' own metaphysical system is an instance in jDoint : in all its most important aspects it is developed from the definition of sub- stance. Descartes had defined substance as the being which so exists that it needs no other being for its existence, and concluded from this that God alone can properly be called substance. Yet it seemed to him that matter and mind, the res externa and the res cogitam, might also fitly be termed substance, since only God, and not any other being, was necessary to their existence. Spinoza objected to 117- Spiritualism 127 this lax use of terms, and asserting the material as well as the conceptual independence of substance, reserved the name for God. He defined substance as that which exists in itself, and is con- ceived by itself, i.e., as that the idea of which does not presuppose the idea of any other being, as its necessary source and origin. 2. Leibniz' definition is practically the same with that of Descartes. It runs as follows : substantia est ens per se existens. But while his predecessors had maintained the unity of substance, Leibniz combines with their definition the hypothesis of an infinite multiplicity of substances. Now that alone can exist by itself which has the power of action ; so that force, self-activity, is the essential mark of substance, and substance itself must be something immaterial, unextended. Following Giordano Bruno (t 1600), Leibniz calls these substances, the independent units of the sum of existence, inonads. They are the true atoms, as opposed to the phenomenal atoms of natural science ; they are the simple elements in everything complex, and therefore in- divisible and indestructible ; metaphysical points, as opposed to material or mathematical. Further : since their essence consists in self-activity, they cannot receive any impression, nothing can penetrate them ; and the apparent interaction of processes in the visible world depends solely upon a wise fore-ordination, the 'pre-established harmony,' in virtue of which the states of all substances correspond to one another without exerting any mutual influence. This limitation, again, helps us to a more exact, definition of the activity which we must assume to be present in substances. It wiU consist in a rep)~aesentare, i.e., in an idea or representation. Ancient philosophy had been wont to conceive of sense perception as a copy of the external world, and the con- ception is one that has appealed to the popular consciousness in all. ages. Leibniz makes use of it here, in working out the details of his metaphysics, — supplementing it, however, by the mathematical . idea of representation. He is thus led to the view that every monad ideates or represents the whole universe, and is in this sense a microcosm, a mirror of the all, uns concentration de I'univers. Yet again : since the idea is a mental act, the essence 128 Metaphysical Schools of the monad is a psychical quality. Things extended or corporeal are thus reduced to the level of mere phenomena, whose under- lying reality is to be found in a multiplicity of unextended substances. But not every monad mirrors the universe with equal clearness ; there are as many monads as there are degrees of clearness of the ideating activity. 3. The spiritualistic hypothesis then lapsed tiU it was revived in very much the same form by Herbart. He sets out from a general definition of the idea of existence. Being consists for him in absolute position, which is equally exclusive of relation and of negation. Now it is clear that a multiplicity of existential qualities would introduce a relative element into the idea of existence; whence it follows that existence must be conceived of as perfectly simple in character. Such a view, however, stands in contradiction to the experiential idea of a thing with many attributes. ReconciHation, -svithout violence done to the facts of experience, is only possible on the hypothesis of a multiplicity of existences, each of absolutely single nature. These are Herbart's reals, — incorporeal existences hke Leibniz' monads, but indefinable as regards their simple quality. The relations in which the reals stand to one another are those of disturbance, which they undergo, and of self-preservation, which they originate : every self-preservation cancels a disturbance " in such a way that it does not occur at aU." Now in the Herbartian psychology the' idea figures as the sole process in which our conscious mental life finds expression ; so that the self-preservations of the mental real may be regarded as ideas. At this point Herbart's spiritualism is plainly less rigorous than that of Leibniz : Herbart does not attempt to define the nature of the self-preservations of the reals constituting 'body,' or the simple quality of any real. Lotze is far less reserved in his attitude to the spiritualistic theory. He defines existence as a standing in relations, or a capacity to do and to suffer. Eelations, however, are oidy con- ceivable on the assumption of an unity which holds aU existences together. Lotze accordingly looks upon individual things as modifications of an absolute, or a substance. He further asserts §17. spiritualism 129 that tilings can be regarded as independent units only if we attribute to them a mental quality, thought of as analogous to our own consciousness. 4. In a certain sense we may term Wundt, too, a spiritualist. Setting out from a common source, the original reality of the object of idea (our 'datum of experience'; c/. § 26), scientific and psychological enqvtiry diverge to foUow different paths. The ultimate unit to which we are brought by a metaphysical con- sideration of the results of natural science is the atom, as merely quantitatively or formally defined. On the other hand, a parallel consideration of the range of psychological fact leads to the assumption of an ultimate unit of a qualitative character, which we caU wiU. The problem of ontological metaphysics is to reunite these divergent paths, and so obtain a conceptual definition of the original reality. We arrive at a will-atom as the essential unit of all existence. The purely formal determination of the atom-aspect of the unit is, however, unessential. The spiritualistic mode of thought is also found, quite frequently, outside the circle of philosophers von Faeh. In such cases it is ordinarily connected with the epistemological form of idealism (c/. § 26). For if we have made up our mind that the quality of all experience must be conceived of as idea, we may very easily go on to read this mental or spiritual process into the concepts employed in scientific investigation, and so to give even ' material ' existence a spiritual contents. Berkeley is the typical representa- tive of this point of view : his ' immaterialism ' or ' psychism ' recognised none but psychical substances, spirits. Sometimes judgments of value play a part in the scheme of thought ; mental processes being regarded as the more important, indeed as alone reaUy valuable, whUe ' material ' processes are reduced to the level of an unimportant and worthless mode of phenomenal existence. Spiritualism in metaphysics makes special appeal to those who hold a dynamic theory in natural philosophy (c/. § 7. 5). If the atoms are simply centres of force, and consequently unextended points, it is not difficult to believe that they can be adequately and exhaustively defined by some psychical quality. 130 Metaphysical Schools Attempts have also been made to demonstrate the validity of spiritualism by arguments from analogy. Thus Schopenhauer declares that it is only in ourselves that we can perceive the thing- in-itself as well as the phenomenon. It is therefore only from the analogy of our own nature that we can determine what, in the existences outside of us, corresponds to the phenomena that we think in space and time. Hence the universe as phenomenon is a sum of ideas ; but the universe as thing-in-itself is will. 5. The principal thesis of spiritualistic metaphysics admits of very much simpler formulation than that of materiahsm. It is that all empirically given processes, the material or corporeal in particular, are referable to a mental existence or process. The quality of this latter is defined on the analogy of our own con- sciousness, and conceived of as a more or less perfect expression of personal mental experience, varying with the degree of spontaneity and independent action manifested by natural objects. The more precise formulation, in its turn, allows us to make our critique of spiritualism much briefer and less complicated than was possible in the case of materialism. (1) It is very evident that psychology can be brought into complete harmony with a spiritualistic metaphysics. One objection, it is true, has been advanced. A spiritualistic interpretation of the universe, it is said, leaves the existence of other centres of con- sciousness, outside ourselves, unexplained; nay, more, it makes them inexplicable. But there seems to be no reason why a particular metaphysical interpretation of the movements of other individuals from which we are wont to infer their inner or psychical existence should imperil the conclusion that analogy has suggested. The facts themselves are not altered in any way by interpretation; we have merely to strip them of the scientific concepts in which they are ordinarily expressed, and clothe them in the new raiment of the spiritualistic hypothesis. Hence objections to spiritualism can be raised, if at aU, only from the side of natural science or epistemology. (2) But again, the store of ideas, laws and methods which has been laid up by scientific investigators will suffer no change at the § I/, spiritualism 131 hands of spiritualism. It is a matter of indifference whether we keep to the idea of material atoms and a mechanical connection between them, or attempt to modify it by positing a spiritual contents, in which we suppose their essential nature to consist. For in the latter case, as in the former, we must assume the existence of all the relations and the truth of all the rules whose universal validity has been established by the observation and calculation of natural science. 6. (3) Very much the same thing may be said from the point of view of epistemologi/. The phenomena of consciousness form the entire contents of aU ' data of experience.' There is no one concrete experience which cannot be regarded as sensation or idea or feeling, i.e., as mental process ; and the ' objective ' side of things consists simply of certain spatial or temporal attributes and relations of experiences which are customarily referred to formal concepts like those of 'matter' and 'energy.' If now a special meaning is read into these terms by the substitution of a spiritual existence for the ' material,' we seem to get, in place of mere magnitudes without quality, a definable contents in its full and complete reality. — True, we may go very far wrong in an attempt to reconcile a spiritualistic metaphysics with the teachings of epistemology: c/., e.g., the unfounded assertion that idealism is the necessary or self-evident (!) starting-point for any philosophical explanation of the universe (see § 26). We conclude, then, that the possibility of spiritualism must be conceded. It wUl, therefore, take rank above materiahsm, as not subject to direct disproof either by epistemology or by the special sciences concerned, — psychology and natural science. This does not mean, however, that it is preferable to all other possible metaphysical theories. On the contrary, when we try to apply it in detail, we are met by many and considerable difficulties. We pass to a brief consideration of them in what follows. 7. (1) In the first place, we must note that the spiritualistic interpretation of scientific concepts is extremely arbitrary, (a) Nothing compels us to believe that there lies dormant and con- cealed in the elements of matter a peculiar existence which we 132 Metaphysical Schools must conceive of on the analogy of our own consciousness. The forces which are supposed to be concentrated in the atoms stand in relation only to their changes of position, i.e., are simply the conditions of those transformations which are rendered per- ceptible by the movement of physical bodies. (&) Moreover, the idea of force is often regarded at the present day as superfluous and replaced by an exact statement of the spatial and temporal relations of masses to one another, (c) Lastly, there is no trace of any intimate connection between the physical relations and the relations ascertained by psychology to obtain among mental pro- cesses. Hence the results of natural science itself neither demand nor suggest the spirituaHstic interpretation of natural processes. (2) A further difficulty confronts us when we ask for some definite description of the mental existence which spiritualism ascribes to the material elements. Leibniz says that the capacity of representation (ideation) is the inner aspect of natural phenomena; Schopenhauer, that it is will; whik on a third view the whole series of events which manifest themselves in our individual experience must be transferred mutatis mutandis to physical bodies and their constituent parts. Here, again, the ideas of natural science give us no indication that one or other of these possibilities is necessarily true in fact. 8. (3) Nor does psychology afford any support to the spiritualistic hypothesis. It teaches that our personal mental Hfe is connected with an extremely complicated part of the physical organism — not at all that it is packed away in the ultimate material particles of the body. Modern physiological psychology does not place the seat of consciousness or mind in a point, or even in a cell of the brain : the immediate conditions of mental processes are situated in different quarters of the cerebrum, ' probably in the cerebral cortex. Hence there is no sort of precedent or analogy for the view that every atom represents a mental existence of the kind known to us in human consciousness. And if we descend with the comparative psychologist to the lowest levels of animal life, where a last trace of mentality may be suspected or conjectured, we are still brought to a halt at the cell or the cell-nucleus: there § 1 8. Dualism 133 is no warrant for placing the supposed rudiment of consciousness in the atom. As for the inorganic world, the scientifically-trained judgment finds no empirical reason whatever for endowing it with mental attributes. (4) Finally, epistemology has neither facts nor arguments in favour of spiritualism. Epistemologically regarded, mental exist- ence is merely one aspect of the data of experience, however completely it may coincide with their qualitative contents. The direct matter-of-fact of experience is not exclusively subjective or mental. Moreover, spiritualism makes two entirely arbitrary epistemological assumptions. (a) It asserts the independent existence of the atoms, i.e, of matter, the substrate of objective phenomena; and (6) it affirms that these hypostatised realities are spiritual or mental in nature. LiTERATUEB. B. Vacherot, Le, nouveau sinritualisme . 1884. (Attempts to put spiritualism upon a basis of natural philosophy, and to justify it by a critical discussion of other schools of philosophic thought.) Note. — Spiritualism is sometimes called idealism. This is due, in part, to the close connection which obtains between epistemological idealism and metaphysical spiritualism. — In our own day spiritism is fond of parading under the nobler name of spiritualism. § 18. Dualism. 1. The dualist looks u|)on mind and matter, the subjective and the objective, as two separate and independent existences. His view is that of the ' healthy human understanding,' and of the Christian dogmatist of the middle ages and the present time. It appeared comparatively early in the history of philosophy. Anaxagoras was the most pronounced dualist among the pre- Socratics (cf. § 15. 1). He definitely distinguishes vovs, the mental principle, from the cnrkpfLaTa or 6ixoio[ji,eprj, the innumerable ultimate material elements. Mind brings order and movement into what is in itself inert and chaotic matter ; it has the attributes of self- suT)sistence, simplicity, independence and self-identity. The two 134 Metaphysical Schools greatest philosophers of antiquity may also be tenned dualists. Plato separates matter (■w^'>)) from idea (etSos), the non-existent and empty from existence with its wealth of contents, sensible particularity from the real that finds expression in the generic idea. There is also a further difference, a difference of value, between them, which makes the -metaphysical distinction all the sharper. In Aristotle we have the same antithesis, though the separation of its terms is not so radical as in Plato ; it is expressed in the concepts of matter and form. Every individual being (dutria) is, in its concrete reality, formed matter ; matter alone is not capable of existence, nor — divinity excepted — can there he a pure form. The two determinations stand to one another as possibility and realisation, as potentiality and actuality (Suva/nis and £V6joyeta). Thus mind is defined as the ' entelechy ' or realisation of the body. Divinity is pure form, and vovs, as in Plato, is raised above all the other faculties of the human mind by the predicate of immortality. In mediaeval philosophy this dualism holds its own, both in metaphysics and in ethics. 2. There is a great difference between ancient and modem dualism. The dualism of ancient philosophy looks upon body and mind as the terms in one out of a whole number of valid antitheses, using them merely to illustrate the more general contrast of matter and form. Their relationship, that is, does not constitute a dualism, in virtue of any peculiar feature or import : they simply furnish an instance of dualism in its more general aspect. Descartes is the founder of modern dualism, and the tyi^ical exponent of dualistic metaphysics in modern philosophy. He makes the conceptual distinction of cm-pus and mem fundamental for metajihysics. The 'corporeal' is universally characterised by extension, the ' mental ' by thought. Hence there are two substances : a res extensa and a res cogitans (cf. § 17. 1), which exist independently, but stand in reciprocal relation to each other. How interaction between two completely dissimilar substances can be possible Descartes does not go on to explain. Later philosophers attempt to fill in this gap in his system. Among them the Occasionalists (Arnold Geulincx, § 1 8. Dualism 135 \ 1669) deserve special mention. Occasionalism regards a real interaction between existences so fundamentally different as impossible. The appearance of interaction is produced by the direct action of God (eoncursu Dei). Thus the ideas which we think we receive from the external world through excitation of the organs of sense are reaUy shaped by God in conformity with material things, and the movements of our body which seem to arise from a definite volition are regulated by Him in accordance with the mental intuition. Mind and body are, therefore, each of them only the accidental or apparent cause of changes occurring in the other, causae per oceasionem. They are but the opportunity, the occasion of the working of the true cause, which is God. It is remarkable that from that time to this — apart, of course, from modern representatives of mediaeval philosophy — there has hardly appeared a single vigorous or thorough-going exposition of the dualistic theory. At present, the standpoint is generally discredited as inadequate to the problem of interaction. In popular thought, however, it has still no rival beyond materialism (§ 16. 9); and we must also conclude, judging from the phraseology which they universally employ, whether with or without ' reserva- tion,' that it is the dominant view in the empirical disciplines of psychology and natural science. 3. This difference between the trend of thought in philosophy and in the special sciences and the popular consciousness cannot, of course, be allowed to pass as final or inevitable until the reason alleged for it — the impossibility of a dualistic solution of the problem of interaction in the form of a logical and consistent interpretation of the facts — is demonstrated beyond the reach of question. It is urged, as an insuperable difficulty in the way of dualistic explanation, that the law of cause and effect is necessarily inapplicable to two entirely disparate processes. But we must then ask whether qualitative likeness is, as a matter of fact, the invariable precondition of causal connection. And the answer seems to be that the causal law says nothing at all as to the likeness or unlikeness of the processes that stand in the relation of cause and effect. On the other hand, to dispute the applica- 136 Metaphysical Schools bility of the principle of causation to disparate processes, and then to deny, on that ground, that interaction is possible between corporeal and mental phenomena, as dualism defines them, looks very much like a circulus in prohando : for body and mind furnish the only instance of disparity, in the required sense of the word. As for mental phenomena themselves, no more objection is raised to their causal interconnection than to that of physical processes. It is truly a strange rule that is based upon one single instance, and then held to be valid simply in order that this single instance may be feought under it ! The empirical reasons for the idea of causation are given in the temporal succession and qualitative or quantitative equivalence of phenomena {cf. § 16. 7). It is evident from this that only changes, processes, can be causally related ; and that the modification which they undergo in a particular case must correspond both in direction and in magnitude, if there is to be any talk of caiisal connection between them. But causal equivalence has nothing whatever to do with likeness or un- likeness of kind. "We believe in the interaction of bodily and mental processes because we see that a more intensive sensation follows upon a stronger excitation of sense, and a more vigorous movement upon a more vehement impulse of the wUl; and our belief is not affected in the least by the difierence that undeniably exists between excitation and sensation or intention and movement. 4. The rightness of this view can be shown in another way. The processes of the material and mental worlds evince difierent degrees of qualitative likeness. Yet there is no corresponding difierence in the degree of confidence with which we subsume them to the law of cause and effect. Mechanical, electrical and chemical processes may aU be causally interconnected; nor has the very much greater difierence between feelings, ideas and volitions prevented psychologists from attempting their causal explanation. True, objections have frequently been raised against the causal inteiTelation of psychical processes, the principle of psychical causation : but the reason is not that there is any question of their essential similarity, but merely that the law of § 1 8. Dualism 137 equivalence does not seem to allow of exact application in the conscious sphere. We may, then, be allowed to dispute the validity of this venerable argument against a dualistic metaphysics. And if we are asked, in our turn, to show something of the mechanism of the causal nexus, to say just how it is that the cause produces the effect, we can answer with Hume and Lotze that the demand is a demand for the impossible. The actual working of the causal law is everywhere hidden from us, — even in the materiaMtealm, where its operation seems so entirely a matter of course. We must also note that the belief that the cause produces the effect imphes a metaphysical interpretation of the empirical facts. All that experience gives us is succession and equivalence. Dualism has sometimes been attacked from the standpoint of epistemological idealism (c/. § 26), upon the ground that it entirely overlooks the fact that what are called ' material ' things are given only in the form of ideas. We cannot here enter in detail upon the proof of the erroneousness of this statement. We may say, however, that it has no more weight as an argument against dualism than it had as an argument in support of spiritualism (c/. § 17. 6). 5. Psychology has no quarrel with metaphysical dualism. This is sufficiently clear from the circumstance that metaphysicians of very various schools use a dualistic terminology when they are dealing with psychological topics. With natural science, however, the case seems to be different. The hypothesis of interaction between two different substances, or, at least, two independent processes, appears to conflict with one of the fundamental laws of modern science— the law of the conservation of energy. We have already mentioned this law (r/. § 16. 6) in our criticism of metaphysical materialism ; and it seems to tell with equal force against dualism. But we must remember that materialism derives mental processes from physical, i.e., affirms a purely one-sided dependence of mind upon matter, whereas dualism assumes the interaction of the two. Hence the difficulty is by no means the same. We need only posit, as modern psychology does, an equivalence of mental and 138 Metaphysical Schools material processes. That granted, it follows that the amount of energy lost upon the physical side in the origination of a corresponding amount of mental energy will be replaced by the subsequent transformation of the mental back again into a new form of material energy. It will then make no difference whether or not a given quantum of mental energy is interpolated into the course of material processes; the law of the conservation of energy, in its ordinary acceptation, is not touched at all. We shall be obliged," finally, to credit the temporal succession of mental and material processes ; but we may assuredly do so without contra- dicting any fact of experience or any requirement of empirical science. Dualism may, then, be regarded at the present time as a possible metaphysical interpretation of experiential facts and scientific knowledge. § 19. Monism. 1. There can be little doubt that a monistic theory of the universe is that most generally accej)ted to-day, whether in scientific circles or among psychologists and metaphysicians. It appears in two principal forms. Either mind and matter are two ' sides ' of one and the same existence which is constituted by them, or they are modes of manifestation of an unitary existence, which in itself is separate and distinct from them. We may characterise these two forms as concrete and abstract monism. Abstract monism falls, again, into two divisions, according as the unitary existence is regarded as accurately definable or as absolutely unknoion. Besides these three fairly determinate forms of monistic metaphysics, we find the term ' monism ' used, especially in popular parlance, as the equivalent of materialism. On the other hand, we sometimes meet with the phrase ' spiritualistic monism.' This difference of usage is partly due to the fact that monism is not as a rule distinguished from singularism (c/. § 14. 3), so that it may either denote a peculiar qualitative definition of existence, or simply indicate the number of principles employed for that definition. § 1 9- Monism 139 (1) Concrete monism is one of the very oldest metaphysical theories. It occurs as animism or Jiylozoism, in connection with a kind of dualism, among quite primitive races. All nature is endowed with mind, on the analogy of the human individual. There is not the slightest recognition either of the difference between mechanical uniformity and the operation of psychical motives, or of the significance of a closed causal series. The arbitrary action of the individual is carried over to nature, and all sorts of natural phenomena pressed into the service of the theory, as signs of spontaneity and self-originated movement. Hylozoism is also the doctrine of the earliest Greek philosophers. Here, too, we have a confused mixture of monistic and dualistic thought. 2. Ko attempt at a consistent working out of this concrete monism appears among the later developments of phUosophyi Since mankind has learned that the organic and the inorganic are two separate provinces, that uniformity in material processes takes a different form from uniformity in psychical, and that we can speak of mind only where we may posit consciousness, — since this time, animism, and its useless generality of a mind in nature, have given place to some other type of metaphysical theory of existence. Now and again a hint of it occurs, as when the materialists put the unity of mind and matter upon the same plane with that of matter and force. But these scattered traces of loose jthinking are not enough to make us hesitate in declaring that concrete animism has practically disappeared from modern philosophy. As a matter of fact, it does not solve, but merely states, a problem. The unity of material and mental existence which it is concerned to uphold is nothing more than an empiri- cally given interconnection ; whereas the explanation of this inter- connection is the very task upon which metaphysics has to bend its energies. Animism must accordingly be considered merely as a stage of transition, and not as a final system. In this sense, it may still find a certain acceptance, as it does in Fechner and Wundt. Wlien these philosophers assert that mind is the inner unity of that which, regarded from the outside, we call body, and so go on to define mind and body as two different sides of a single 140 Metaphysical Schools existence which they together constitute, we have before us an exposition of concrete monism. Beading further, however, we arrive at the theory that mental existence furnishes an exhaustive expression for this unitary reality of things, and so witness the transformation of animism into spiritualism (§17. 4). 3. (2) Abstract monism has played a far more important part in the development of philosophic systems. Spinoza is its first typical exponent. Spinoza's one infinite substance, God or causa sui, is possessed of innumerable attributes. Only two of them, however, are accessible to human knowledge: extension and thought. Each of these finds expression in particular 'modes.' Thus the various physical bodies are modes of the attribute of extent, and the different individual minds modes of the attribute of thought. But since divine existence is possessed of a countless number of other attributes, its true nature remains unknown to us. We thus obtain the second sub-form (1, above) of abstract monism, according to which the common substrate of matter and mind is not exactly definable. On this theory there cannot, of course, be interaction, but only parallelism, with essential identity of the corresponding processes. Hence Spinoza's famous saying: Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum. Every ' event ' is, in its f uU significance, a process, conceived of as running its course within the one substance, God. Our per- ception of it in mind or body is limited, one-sided, fragmentary. Many modern philosophers take up this monistic attitude to the universe. If they do not speak of innumerable attributes of the original unity, they still firmly maintain that its nature is unknown, and that we obtain knowledge of its reality only from the parallel forms of external and internal occurrence. Hprbert Spencer, e.g., is a ' monist ' in this sense of the term. His agnosticism ((/. § 4. 5) is simply a disclaimer of all attempts to define the original reality. Fechner, too, vacillates between this position and that of spiritualism. 4. The other sub-form of abstract monism (the first in 1, above) is much bolder, taking upon itself to define the unity of mental and material, or, as it prefers to say, of the ideal and real aspects. §19. Monism 141 Pichte, Schelling and Hegel are its typical representatives. Fichte makes the absolute ego, or (in his later and simpler terminology) the absolute, the single source from which an individual ego and non-ego develope, — makes it, in brief, his one metaphysical prin- ciple. Schelling, on the other hand, regards absolute identity or indifference as the original existence. From the self-knowledge possessed by the absolute arises the antithesis of subject and object; but the difference between them cannot be more than quantitative, since their qualitative identity must not be disturbed. Individual things are, therefore, differences or powers of this quantitative sort; and even the contrast of real and ideal must be interpreted as simply formal or quantitative, not a difference of kind. Hegel's absolute appears at first in the indefinite form of 'being.' By the operation of the dialectic process the concept receives more and more of contents, until finally the nature of the absolute or God is laid bare in the particular definitions to which the impetuous onrush of the method leads. The special forms of absolute existence are nature and mind. A very similar standpoint has been worked out in recent years by von Hartmann, for whom the ' unconscious ' is the quality of the absolute. Lotze, too, may be regarded as a monist, since he identifies his aU-embracing substance (needed to explain the possibility of interaction among individual things), in the religious sense, with the idea of God, and endows it with ethical attributes; so that the original beuig' is not only creative substance, but also moral ideal, and guide of historical development. 5. In attempting to arrive at a critical estimate of metaphysical monism, we may rule its concrete form out of the discussion. Concrete monism is, without any doubt, merely a disguised dualism. It offers no real explanation of the way in which mental and material hold together. It expresses the facts somewhat differently from dualism, without really gaining an iota by its formulation. With abstract monism, on the other hand, the case is very different. The derivation of the two modes of phenomena from a single existence, known or unknown, seems to render their course in time and their parallelism more intelligible. We shall accordingly 142 Metaphysical Schools consider in what follows whether (and how far) this form of monism is in a position to furnish an adequate or satisfactory solution of the great problem which the special sciences give up. We need not, clearly, expect any opposition to it from the side of epistemology. It fully recognises the reality of the two-sided 'datum of experience'; it simply supplements experience by the hypothesis of an existence which underlies both sides or aspects. Nevertheless, it has to run the gauntlet of numerous objections, some purely logical, some psychological and scientific. We give the chief of these in the appended summary. (1) Abstract monism is guilty of a two-fold 'transcendence.' In the first place, it indefinitely extends the limits of the mental sphere ; in the second, it hypostatises a known or unknown unity of mental and corporeal. There is nothing in experience to necessitate the taking of either step ; so that we cannot but raise a logical objection to the theory — an objection which may well . take the form of the old scholastic rule : principia praeter neces- sitatem non sunt multiplieanda. 6. (2) The interpretation which abstract monism has to offer of the interaction of mind and body is neither the easiest nor the most obvious. Eecourse is had to it only when the simple idea of interaction, in the strict meaning of the term which is suggested by experience, seems to break down ; monism is then a last resort, a house of refuge from the supposed difficulties of duahsni. But the monistic interpretation is not by any means, as its champions strangely believe, an obvious deduction from experiential facts. Granted that one and the same thing has two different ' sides ' or modes of manifestation, it does not follow of necessity that these evince precisely parallel changes. A priori there are two other possibilities; the 'sides' may be altogether independent of each other (c/. form and quality, or intensity and duration of some concrete experience), or an inverse relation may obtain between them (as between the two component parts of a sphere of constant volume, where increase of one is accompanied by decrease in the other, and vice versa). There is consequently no reason why the particular relation between body and mind that we find in. experi- 1 9. Monism 143 ence should follow from the assumptions of abstract monism. And if the monistic theory needs bolstering by secondary hypotheses in order to make the given appear as the only possible relation, it becomes very much more complicated than a straight- forward dualism. Fechner makes use on occasion of the figure of a circle. One who stood within the circle would always and necessarily obtain a different view of it from one who stood outside. To which we may add that, despite the difference of standpoint, any change in the size of the area or form of the periphery would be a change for both observers. But, even as thus amplified, the figure (which, of course, cannot be regarded as the only adequate representation of monism in general) is of no great service; it oifers no explanation of the equivalence of material and mental. Lastly, to assert the essential identity of the two sides is simply to fall into the absurdities of equative materialism, which received its deserts in a previous Section (§ 16. 5). 7. (3) But monism professes to expound not merely the deter- minate relation of the individual mind and the animal body that belongs to it, but also a general relation between the outer and inner sides of all the elements of the universe. The consequence is that the distinction between the psychical as conscious pro- cess and all the purporting 'unconscious' processes, which the history of psychology shows to have been won with so much pains and labour, goes completely by the board. Paulsen , who makes a most eloquent appeal for a monistic metaphysics, does not scruple to extenome idea of mind to include the unconscious. He seems entirely to overlook the fact that such a procedure makes a scientific psychology absolutely impossible. If psychology is to be a science, it must take the form of an empirical, experiential discipline. This fantastic extension of the idea of the psychical bars the way completely to any exact formulation of a science of the psychical. (4) It is sometimes supposed that justice wiU be done to aU the facts if we posit an unbroken mental series as the counterpart of the known continuity of material processes. But we have seen 144 Metaphysical Schools that there is an inherent difficulty in the notion of psychical causation (c/. § 18. 4) : a difficulty which leaves it at least very doubtful whether the desired end can be regarded as attainable, even in imagination, by this hypothetical extension of psychical values. If no catisal connection is discoverable among the facts of the internal perception as given in experience, any attempt to extend the meaning of the phrase ' mental processes ' must- be declared hopeless from the outset. They cannot be defined except on the analogy of the facts of consciousness. 8. (5) But abstract monism also comes into collision with the teachings of empirical natural science. It completely ignores the line of division between the organic and the inorganic worlds, though no theory of development has as yet brought the two together. Now it is plain that no knowing subject can establish the presence of mental processes in the things or creatures outside of him except by analogical inference. And his inference becomes the more uncertain the less similarity there is between human expressive movements and the expressive movements of other creatures. Push the analogical expression as we wiU, it seems, from everything that we know at present, to be brought to a full and final stop at the elementary organism, the cell. The difference between the reaction of the cell to stimuli and the purely physico- chemical change of one inorganic body under the influence of another is so fundamental that the metaphysics which ignores it stands convicted, at the very least, of a disregard of facts. We cannot, therefore, bring ourselves to believe that monism offers the most plausible metaphysical interpretation of existence. The result of our criticism of the different metaphysical schools so far has rather been to show that, as things are, dualism can lay clarQi to possess the greatest probability, since it accords best of aU the metaphysical theories with the special sciences, and can also best meet the requirements of epistemology and logic. iEsthetical or ethical disinclination to a multiphcity of principles cannot under any circumstances furnish a theoretical argument against it (c/. § 15. 4). The least degree of probability, on the other hand, resides, if our criticism is sound, in the hypothesis of materia §20. Mechanism and Teleology 145 Spiritualism ■would stand next to duaHsm in the order of probability. In most monistic metaphysics the monism tends, as a matter of fact, to shade off into spiritualism. Note. — The term monism (doctrine of unity) has also been employed for the theory of the coincidence of God and the world, or pantheism., (cf. § 22). And in epistemology we often hear to-day of a monismfm the sense of a belief in the original unity of the contents of kng^edge, as contradistinguished from the dualistic separation of idea afid'^object (cf. § 26). — There is no want of literature upon monism, but so great a lack of any thorough historical and systematic treatment of the position, that it seems best to make no mention here of publications in which it is discussed. § 20. Mechanism and Teleology. 1. Mechanism takes for its general principle of occurrence the blind and necessary connection of cause and effect, as typified in 'natural' causation. The point of view is called 'mechanistic' because all connections of this kind can be regarded in the last resort as laws of motion, and the science of the laws of motion is termed mechanics. Mechanism evidently stands in close relation to materialism (cf. § 16), and is, as a matter of fact, always found along with materialism in the history of philosophy. This is true of the very earliest form of materialism, the atomism of the ancient Greek philosophers. Leucippus and Democritus conceive of all occurrence under the form of processes of movement, consisting partly in a free faU of the atoms, partly in the modification produced in this by mutual pressure or impact. In modern philosophy, Hobbes (§ 2. 5) and the author of the Systeme de la nature (§ 16. 2) are equally convinced of the universal validity of mechanism. However, it is not only materialists who support the theory ; it has found favour with monists as well (cf. § 19). Spinoza, 6.17., is as staunch a champion of mechanism as Hobbes. There is no free wiU to interrupt the connection of cause and effect ; nor is there any end' or purpose in things by M'hich "the course of events is directed. For Spinoza, however, li 146 Metaphysical Schools the mechanism of cause and effect coincides further with the logical relation of reason and inference; and thus arises the confusion between thought and existence which is so characteristic of his philosophy. 2. A similarly exclusive formulation of teleological metaphysics is not to be discovered in the history of philosophy. "\^Tierever the teleological princiisle is accepted, mechanism, too, receives recognition as one, though only a subordinate, form of occurrence. We see this, e.g., in Plato, the first indubitable teleologist in metaphysical history. In his view, everything has arisen and everything developes in accordance with purposes, prototypes of things, ' ideas.' But at the same time his estimate of the immediate occasion of each separate phase or stage of progress proceeds strictly by way of cause and effect. The antithesis of idea and matter is also expressed in the statement that the realm of ideas is governed by reason and purpose, but the material domain by a blind necessity. The co-ordination of the two forms of occurrence appears much more clearly and precisely in Aristotle. On the one hand we find change in the natural world in the form of movement through space ; tliis is subject to a purely mechanical uniformity. On the other, we have to conceive of the goal of aU development as a growth of form, of energy, of the actual principle. In this way a teleological uniformity is superimposed upon the mechanical. Nature does not act withoixt purpose, but turns everything to some useful end; and this general purposiveness can be ex- plained only upon the hypothesis that nature itself makes towards a definite goal, or works for the accomplishment of a definite purpose. Hence mechanical causes, though indispensable con- ditions of, or aids to, the realisation of this purpose, must not be regarded as 'causes' in the strict sense of the word. The real causes are the causae finales. The Aristotelian teleology is typical of a whole series of similar theories. Leibniz, e.g., essays to reconcile mechanism and teleology in the same way ; and in the present century Lotze is the exponent of an essentially similar position. §2o. Mechanism and Teleology 147 3. Kant was the first to attempt an analysis of the idea of purpose by a critical and empirical method, and to test its applica- bility to natural phenomena. His Kritik der Urtlieilslcraft treats of the teleologioal as well as of the aesthetic judgment (c/. § 10. 3). He describes the purposiveness of a natural object as both objec- tive and internal or immanent ; it consists in the congruence of the object with its idea, or the determination of the parts by the whole. The teleological view of nature is first suggested by the organism, all of whose members and functions are of service for the preservation of the individual and the race, and whose various constituent parts are constantly acting and reacting one upon another. From the organism it is extended over the whole of nature, which can also be regarded as a purposive system. The goal of natural development at large is the moral subject; for it is not till we arrive at morality that the question ' To what end ? ' ceases to have a meaning. The teleological view does not conflict with the mechanical if we are careful to make the idea of purpose a regulative (c/. § 4. 3) and not a constitutive principle. As a subjective maxim of the faculty of judgment, teleology will, therefore, find its most useful application in cases where a mechanical interpretation is not (or not at present) possible. The two views will accordingly supplement, and even assist each other, — teleology serving as an heuristic principle of causal iavestigation. To an intellect higher than our own the difference between the two standpoints would entirely disappear. Modern logicians, especially Sigwart and Wundt, define the relation between finahty and causality in very much the same way. 4. The cause of mechanism rose considerably in philosophical favour when the phenomena of life were declared to be one and all capable of mechanical interpretation. Descartes had paved the way for this view by his assertion that animals are automata or machines. But his theory was opposed by a vitalistie hypothesis, which looked upon all the phenomena of life as ruled by a peculiar principle — the 'vital force,' as it was^termed — and thus drew a sharp line of division between the living and the lifeless or 'mechanical,' Schelling's natural philosophy, in particular, uses 148 Metaphysical Schools this 'organic' theory to explain the development and forms of the animal kingdom. But the 'vital force' was rather a hindrance than an aid to scientific investigation. As a principle of explanation it was just as useless in the organic field as the various mental faculties of the eighteenth century psychology proved to be in the field of mmd. It was, therefore, a great step in advance when modern physiologists, with Lotze at their head, made mechanism a regulative princijjle in the study of the processes of life. Almost simultaneously with this revulsion agamst vitalism in physiology came the introduction of mechan- istic ideas into psychology. The old mental faculties were finally abandoned, and Herbart embarked upon no less an undertaking than the- writing of a mechanics of mind (c/. § 8. 7). Not long after, the belief, still widely current, that the manifestation of a transcendent purpose could be observed in the development of the animal sferies, was destroyed by the Darwinian theory of descent. Not by any economical limitation to the changes that lead to a de- sired end, so the theory tells us, but by a course of the most lavish extravagance, does the animal kingdom come by slow degrees to wear the garb of purpose. He alone is of influence for further develop- ment who can survive in the struggle for existence; and he alone can survive in that struggle whose organisation is in a high degree purposive. But this purposive organisation is merely a special case among many others, and realised only through accidental variation in the different members of a family or species. — In quite recent times, however, there has been a revival of vitaUstic tendencies. The internal conditions of development do not receive their due recognition at the hands of the Darwinians, and the problem of life is still as far from a solution as it was a hundred years ago. 5. They are but superficial 'observers and wholly lacking in ■ historical knowledge who declare with so much emphasis that teleology has lost its right to existence as mechanism has grown. Leibniz believed in a far wider dominion of mechanical laws than we can prove for them to-day, and Kant saw clearly enough what the main course of modern progress would be. Lotze, too, despite his brilliant criticism of the doctrine of ' vital force,' and his § 20. Mechanism and Teleology 149 purely mechamcal conception of organic life, was a teleologist from beginning to end. It must then be possible somehow to reconcile the two interpretations of natural occu.rrence. To test this con- clusion we will try to find out a little more definitely what is meant by mechanism and teleology, or causality and finality. (1) We u.nderstand by causality a relation of dependence of such a character that one member of it, the cause, mvTst be conceived of as invariably preceding the other member, the effect, in time (c/. §§16. 7; 18. 3). This definition does not say that the relation between two processes which may be called cause and effect is wholly unequivocal. True, we assume that one and the same cause must always produce a quite definite effect (the reader wiU not forget, of course, that there are cases, in which different circumstances co-operate to produce an observed effect). But the converse of the proposition, that one and the same effect can only be produced by one equally constant cause, has by no means the same claim to universal validity. On the contrary, we are taught by a whole series of facts that disparate processes may produce the same effect. "We can, therefore, as a general rule, easily infer effects, assuming definite causes to be given, but cannot so certainly argue from a given effect to the causes which must have led "to it. 6. In the realm of inanimate nature we are enabled to overcome this difficulty, owing to the uniform character which the causal relation there assumes. Astronomy, physics and chemistry can accordingly infer causes from given effects as definitely and con- fidently as they can derive effects from causes. But in the organic world the case is very different. Here it is always the effect that is given, — whether we term it 'life' or the 'preservation of the individual' or the .'preservation of the species' or 'form.' The factors which produce the effect are, on the other hand, so manifold and so inconstant that we can never argue with any certainty to a particular causal connection. A_simpl6^ mechanistic theory pf vital phenomena is, .consequently both impracticable and valueless, how- ever sure we may be that, at bottom, organic processes are as universally subject as inorganic to the law of cause and effect. 150 Metaphysical Schools (2) Finality, too, is a relation of dependence, so that it does not stand in absolute opposition to causality. Its two terms are the end and the means; and as strict a connection is assumed to obtain" between them as between cause and effect. Human voluntary action looks towards ends, and realises them by appropriately chosen means. The first peculiarity of this jsrocedure is, then, the anticipation of an effect : it is essential to an idea of purpose that the effect be foreseen, and the idea itself starts the causal series whose end or goal is judged to be the anticipated effect. Secondly, however, it nearly always implies a choice between various means or paths, all of which lead to the same end. Such means, as referred to the effect that is producible by them, are termed purposive. And we further distinguish degrees of pur- posiveness according to the greater or less degree of certainty, rapidity and ease with which the different possible means can produce the particular effect. 7. The parallel idea of degrees witliin the causal relation is entirely foreign to the mechanistic theory. This confines itself to the unequivocal, quite definite causal connections, in which one thing is simply 'cause,' and another simply 'effect.' On the other hand, it is of the very essence of the teleological stand- point to assume a great variety of means and contrivances, aU leading, though not all with equal directness, to one and the same end. We must not suppose, however, that anticipation of the effect, which seems to be possible only to a thinking and wQling creature, is one of its necessary preconditions. For it is where our actions show the nearest approach to an un- equivocal causal connection (habitual or impulsive actions) that teleological considerations are least in evidence; although even here purposive ideas are not wanting. ISTor must we think that it is necessary for the tel.eological judgment that the causal connection of means and end be completely known ; it is enough if we have an empirical series or regular arrangement of processes. Mechanism and teleology are thus seen to supplement each other in a very useful way. 8. FuUer justice would be done to both theories if they were §20. Mechanism and Teleology 151 not opposed to one another under the names of ' causality ' and 'finality.' Causality should rather rank as the superior con- cept, to which mechanism and finaUty are alike subordinate: mechanism being defined as 'unequivocally determined' and finality as 'equivocally determined causality.' The idea of purpose leads to a metaphysical transcendence only if we assume, in every case of its application to natural phenomena, the same anticipation of the efi'ect that appears in human voluntary action. If we assert, e.g., that every organism possesses ideas of end, whereby it must regulate its actions, or if we conceive of the universe as ruled by a supreme intelligence, which lays down its own ends and realises them in the series of natural occurrences, then we are undoubtedly guilty of introducing a metaphysical transcendence. It is to be noted, however, that while the former of these hypotheses is opposed to the facts of experience, the latter is easily harmonised with the results of the special sciences. This is true even if we do not venture, with Kant, to define the end towards which the whole course of nature trends. Indeed, the real difficulties of a theological appendix to a theory of the universe arise simply from the strange attempts that have been made to define the ends which a divine intelligence may have proposed to itself in the government of the world. — It follows from our whole discussion that 'purposeless,' in the strict sense of the word, must either mean 'mechanical,' or refer to some teleologically wrong relation that we have assumed to obtain between certain natural processes or arrangements. 9. It may be objected to the foregoing account of the mechanistic and teleological theories that it does not bring to light the real difference between them. Even in the in- organic sphere, in the domain of physical and chemical processes pure and simple, the same effect can be produced in a great variety of ways. A particular temperature, e.g., can be brought about by friction, by radiation and by the electric current. (1) Really, however, the effect in all these cases is not a constant phenomenon, always realised under the most varied IS 2 Metaphysical Schools conditions, but as transient and accidental, if one may use those terms, as the causes which give rise to it. (2) Moreover, the phenomenon of self-preservation has no true analogue in the inorganic sphere, where a complex is not marked off or protected from its surroundings, and where, consequently, we cannot stress any single function of the totality of inter- connected parts and processes as determined by or determining aU the rest. Nor do we find in the inanimate world the characteristic process of vicarious function, the substitution of one special function for another. (3) Finally, it is not correct to say in the inorganic sphere that the effect is better known than the cause, stiU less that it is the only thing given. The effect is never anything more than a transition point, which is just about as accessible to human observation as its conditions. — We see from aU these reasons why it is that the teleological view is applied only to the organic world, or why, if extended to the great whole of nature, it is valid only for certain aspects, in certain principles. There can be no doubt, however, that judgments of value have their part to play alongside of the purely theoretical arguments. Life and the preservation of individual or species seem more valuable than death and annihilation; and it is almost a matter of course to us to regard them as the effects which are to be realised by all possible means. "We have purposely steered our discussion clear of this point of view, because we are here con- cerned only with the theoretical question, and the facts themselves furnish us with matter enough to explain and justify the dis- tinction drawn between mechanism and teleology. It cannot be denied that the teleological hypothesis has been and may be advantageously employed by the science of life as an heuristic principle, and a principle of explanation of complex phenomena : it cannot be denied that the introduction of a similar conception in the sciences of inanimate nature has too often resulted in grave error. To understand this we must appeal to the interconnection of the facts themselves, not to any scale of values that may have been applied to the facts. §21. Determinism and Indeterminism 153 Literature. C. Sigwart, Btr Kampf gegen den Zweck In the Kleine Schriften. Vol. II., 2nd ed., 1889. P. Janet, Les causes fmales. 2nd ed., 1882. F. Erhardt, Mechanismus mid Teleologie. 1890. E. Kbnig, Die Entwichlung des Gausalproblems. 2 vols., 1888-90. § 21. Determinism and Indeterminism. 1. The antithesis of determinism and indeterminism bears a certain relationship to that of mechanism and teleology. Deter- minism asserts the universal validity of the causal connection, reduces everything to cause and effect, condition and consequence, motive and action; indeterminism, relying upon certain facts of the moral life, assumes that ' free ' acts, acts not causally con- ditioned, are at least possible. Nevertheless, the relation between the two antitheses is not very close. Mechanism and teleology can both be harmonised with a causal theory; and as a matter of fact the history of philosophy shows us not only mechanists but a number of teleologists too among the adherents of determinism. The one obvious connection is that of mechanism and determinism. Indeed, the mechanists are apt to let their determinism rise to fatalism, which holds that the world is a closed and immutable chaia of causes and effects, beyond the reach of modification by any action of the individual, and that everything that happens has been predetermined and calculated out, as if by some great mathematical formula. The author of the Systeme cle la nature (cf. §16. 2), e.g., seeks strongly to impress upon his reader the value of the fatalistic theory. To combat it we need only call to mind the arguments of the preceding Section (§ 20. 6flf.). We saw there that there were connections in the world other than those of mere mechanical causation ; and it foUows that we cannot ignore all the various ways in which the action of separate individuals may help to determine what we call the course of events. Indeterminism is ordinarily affirmed only in regard to the human wUl, because it. is only there that the psychological process of choice plays any important part, and that the moral 154 Metaphysical Schools and legal ideas of merit and guilt, responsibility and account- ability, can find application. 2. The problem of the freedom of the wOl received no large share of attention in ancient philosophy. The questions raised and answered by the Greek philosophers were questions of good and bad, not of merit and demerit. They did not, as a rule, place the ideal of moral action so high as to make it seem unattainable, or realisable only in a few fortunate cases; and so their ethics had no need to consider the painful contrast of action and intention, when with all desire for the highest good a man falls far short of its achievement. But the antithesis of wiU and deed was inevit- able. Historically, it is a product of Christianity (c/. §9.4 f.). Ever since it appeared, the conflict of determinism and indeter- minism has coloured the whole history of pliilosophy. The principal stages in the controversy will be considered in the following paragraphs. "We find in Spinoza a vigorous denial of the freedom of the wiU : his mechanistic metaphysics leads him, of course, to a clear-cut determinism. The feeling of freedom which we ex- perience in our actions is simply due to ignorance of the causes. Just as all the properties of a triangle foUow from the nature of the figure, so the whole behaviour of every living creature is the necessary consequence of its nature. Leibniz' deter- minism takes a slightly different form. He distinguishes between mechanical constraint and determination by motives. Motives can no more influence human voHtion and action by way of mechanical compulsion than a geometrical proposition can compel a man to recognise its truth. They move us without compelling us (incKnent sans necessiter). The articles of faith put forth by the i^hilosophy of the illumination and its rational religion included belief in the freedom of the will, along with that in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The adherents of this school tried to prove the possibility of free will by figures and analogies. Thus Tetens (c/. § 8. 7) compares the will to a steel spring. The direction in which it works depends upon the objects which accident has placed §21. Determinism and Indeterminism 155 around it, but tlie force of its action is an original and native character. In the case of the will, even the direction of resolve is self-determined. Just as the water can run out of a full vessel only at the place where an opening is made, but for the outflow to happen there must already have been a pressure of the water exerted upon that particular point, so the will is to be conceived of as potentially active in the direction in which its force is actually manifested upon the occasion of some accidental circumstance. 3. Kant places indeterminism upon a new and different basis (cf. § 9. 8). The fact from which his ethics sets out is the moral law, the categorical imperative, with its peremptory demand for unconditional obedience. A fact of this kind would be un- intelligible, he says, if we were not able at every moment to postulate the possibility of the law's fulfilment. Since, now, the universal rule of causal connection in the world of experience renders any such absolute possibility inconceivable, we must hold that the requirements of freedom are realised in the world of the transcendent, of the thing-in-itself. In other words, the will, in itself, is free; but the will as phenomenon (as object of experience) is woven into the inviolable network of cause and effect. SchojDenhauer has framed a very similar theory. He, too, takes his stand upon the distinction between phenomena, with their limitations of space, time and causality, and the invisible, inconceivable world of things in themselves. He dates the freedom of the will, however, from the moment of the first decision taken by the developing individual. The character of the individual is thereby determined for aU succeed- ing time : his actions proceed from the empirical causality of an imchangeable character. Herbart, on the other hand, declares that determinism is the only tenable position, since no other admits of any ordered system of human education, or prevents the dissolution of all things into arbitrariness and unreason. Lotze, however, returns to indeterminism. We cannot speak of a moral judgment of human actions, of accountability and responsibility, unless we assume a freedom of the wiU. Freedom iS6 Metaphysical Schools is an inexplicable fact: but we must and can prove that it is hannonisable with the empirical connection of cause and effect. Determinism is the dominant theory in the psychology, meta- physics and ethics of the present day, although indeterminism stiU holds its own in criminal jurisprudence, theological dogmatics and popular opinion. 4. The problem of the freedom of the wiU can be considered under three different aspects : metaphysical, psychological and ethical. We must note, in the first place, that no one would have thought of proposing any such exception to the general law of causal connection if definite facts of the moral life had not seemed 10 demand it. For the metaphysical considerations upon which indeterminism is based are both precarious and inadequate. Metaphysicians affirm and attempt to prove the possibility of freedom, but that is all: and the way in which that is done is neither scientifically nor logically satisfactory. They either call metaphors to their assistance, or posit two contrasting worlds, — a sphere of phenomena and a sphere of things in themselves. Freedom lies beyond the borders of knowledge or demonstration. It would not be freedom, in the true sense of the word, if it were necessarily deducible from given assumptions, or could be brought within the scope of some more general uniformity. The argument is sometimes urged that necessity is simply a product of our understanding, of that by which we know the world, and that the world itself has no part or lot in it. The reply is that it is impossible to say anything of the things that exist independently of our apprehension or estimation. Either we dispense with any kind of positive definition of things in themselves: in which case we leave no room for freedom; or we look upon them as knowable: in which case an uniformity of connection among them is inevit- able. Moreover, tliis antithesis of phenomenon and tliing-in-itself can never justify freedom in the special sense of freedom of the will ; and it is only with this that the moralist and the meta- physician who has entered his service are concerned : they care nothing for a freedom which should be shared by all things alike, the falling stone as well as the choosing will. Determinism and Indeterminism iS7 ISTor ia the case very different with the psychological arguments for indeterminism. The fact from which the psychological theory sets out is that of choice between various actions which appear equally possible. But introspection often shows that there was really a quite definite reason why the particular motive should prove effectual; and we are but following an accepted scientific plan if, in cases where perception or memory is not conscious of this preponderance of definite reasons, we nevertheless infer by analogy that the reasons must have been there. 5. Our internal experience is throughout of so fragmentary a character that this inference does not really present the least difficulty. Wliat we ordinarily call ' character,' e.g., is not a sum of clearly analysable processes, but a force in which the entire course of an individual develojDment is concentrated. The little of it that comes to the surface of consciousness hardly helps us even to guess at its fuU wealth of contents and energy. And the incongruity thus shown to exist between internal experience and its substrate is further evidenced by another undeniable fact of our mental life, viz., its high degree of independence of external or accidental influences. The simplest instance of our power to resist the constraint of the external world is that of following and holding by the attention a contents in itself weak and inconsiderable, despite the presence of other and far stronger stimuli. The scholar's absorption in mental work, and the poet's engagement in artistic production, close the door of consciousness, so that external occurrences of incomparably greater intensity may appeal in vain for notice. Fatalism entirely overlooks these facts ; and determinism is not inclined, as a rule, to give them the emphasis that they deserve. They are clear evidence of freedom in the sense of independence of external influences. At the same time, this freedom is evidently not identical with the freedom affirmed by indeterminism. This freedom shows itself in cases where there can be no question whatsoever of a legal or ethical judgment {e.g., in animals); and it certainly never means independence of aU. reasons. On the other hand, it is this freedom that we have in mind when we say that it is the task of reflection or reason to iS8 Metaphysical Schools direct the volition and action of mankind. Experience shows that the control of external circumstance extends over a wide range of conduct, though its limits are very different in different individuals ; so that we cannot entertain any douht as to the possibility of 'free' decisions in this empirical meaning of ' freedom.' Where a special interest or feeling of value is present to enhance the strength of the subjective motives, they may be regarded, under normal psychological conditions, as practi- cally irresistible. 6. The ethical judgments which indeterminism invokes are the judgments of merit and guUt (c/. § 9. 11). The resolution of the good will, which might have resolved differently, is meritorious; the resolution of the bad will, which might have resolved differently, is blameworthy. In both cases it is the addition " which might have resolved differently " that contains the characteristic assumption of freedom : the predicates ' good ' and 'bad,' which simply express a quality of will, have nothing to do with the question at issue. We can speak of actions as good or bad without being obliged to assume that they are undetermined. We desire to lay the greater emphasis upon this fact since, in our own opinion, the two attributes represent the two extremes of moral value. The consideration of different possibili- ties always presupposes a certain internal struggle ; and we would not award the palm of highest morality to him who can only bring himself to good resolve by victory over rival tendencies. Eather is a noble simplicity of goodness, that seems the necessary outgrowth of the inward nature, the highest goal of morality in man. We may suppose, too, that the goodness which springs into being without struggle against baseness or indifference loses nothing of its inherent force, whereas a meritorious deed always implies a loss of moral energy. On the other hand, the ideas of merit and guilt give us our sole means of estimating the intensity of the moral will; and both in daily life and in the court of justice the degree of criminal or virtuous endeavour is judged by the quality, number and strength of the motives opposing a determinate voluntary action. The significance of the two con- §21. Determinism and Indeterminism 159 cepts in this connection is generally overlooked; as a matter of fact, it makes them very important factors in moral appreciation. 7. Indeterminism, however, lays stress upon the statement that the agent might have decided otherwise than he did, and appeals to the old definition of necessity, which says that that is necessary whose opposite is impossible. If, now, something else than what actually happened was possible, the event cannot be called neces- sary ; and as we are not able to conceive of causal connection without this attitude of necessity, caimot either have been causally conditioned. The reply is that the idea of possibility does not in any way contradict the idea of necessity, and that consequently the definition of necessity formulated by Ch. Wolff cannot be universally valid. A thing is ' possible ' when certain, but not all, of its conditions are realised, and when not it alone, but many other things are dependent upon those particular conditions. Thus an occurrence is not unequivocally determined by the enumeration of its general conditions. We must know other 'special' con- ditions besides, if we are to be able to say that just this and nothing else wiU take place. Hence the necessity of one particu- lar process is perfectly compatible with the possibility of various other processes. For to say that other events are possible is simply to abstract in thought from the special conditions by which that which actually occurs is adequately and unambiguously explained. A thing can only be declared impossible when no single condition of its appearance is present. We can therefore (and rules are given for it in the logics) argue from a fact to its possibility, and from the necessity of a fact to its reality, — which, of course, includes possibility and a great deal more. On the other hand, it would be quite wrong to deduce any kind of impossibility — say, the impossibility of the ■ opposite — from a necessity. We are, on the contrary (to return to our special question) fuUy justified in maintaining the possibility of a different action from that actually perfornjpd, since every process of choice points to conditions (motives) which, if they had been present alone or in greater strength, would undoubtedly have diverted the activity into a different channel. i6o Metaphysical Schools 8. The conclusion of this logical argument is, then, that the moral judgments, which are concentrated, so to speak, in the ideas of merit and guilt, are entirely compatible with the full determination of the resolves actually taken by the wiU. Those who know anything of the complexity of the psychophysical factors concerned in voluntary action wiU readily admit that our bodily and mental organisation contains the possibility of very various actions indeed. Moreover, the fact of choice proves to superfluity that we can aim at a great variety of ends. It is, therefore, impossible to dispute the validity of the assertion that the agent might have acted otherwise than he did. The same result foUows from the ideas, more important in law than in ethics, of responsi- bility and accoiintability. That every man is the doer of his own deeds, and, a normal constitution presupposed, has a much greater share than accidental external circumstances in the performance of an action, is a truth that we may gather, without need of further explanation or confirmation, from the preceding discussion. The freedom, i.e., which the judge attributes to the criminal, is not the freedom of indeterminism, but independence of external deter- minants to action, and a mind in which considerations of the importance of the law of the state or of morality have free play and full force. If any other kind of freedom were intended, it would be absurd to try and determine the age of responsibility; and if the will were unconditioned, it could not be affected by intoxication and insanity, which are universally regarded as lessening the gravity of an offence, and as relieving the agent of accountability. On the other hand, the assumption of an unmotived and unregulated resolve does away with any kind of stability or continuity in internal development or in the relations of a man to his fellows. Indeterminism really aims a blow at the moral and legal judgment of mankind. 9. Lastly, no support can be found for indeterminism in the denial of a strict psychical causality (cf. § 18. 4). For this does not mean that there is no uniformity at all in the sphere of mind : it does not mean, therefore, that the choosing wiU is unconditioned. The psychologist defends his practice of using certain physical §22. Theological Metaphysics i6i processes as an aid to a scientific knowledge of the mental life by asserting that a direct causal connection among the phenomena of consciousness cannot he demonstrated. Thus the power of the will to resist the encroachment of accidental stimuli, even when intensive (c/. § 21. 5), — an undeniable fact of experience, — would remain completely inexplicable if we should insist on looking to introspection alone to furnish us with a means of explanation. For ethics and criminal law, however, it is entirely indiiferent whether the fact be referred exclusively to definite conscious processes, or also to something unconscious, something given in the psychophysical organisation, behind conscious processes. The denial of a special psychical causality is, therefore, of no im- portance whatever for the question of the freedom of the will. On the other hand, Leibniz is undoubtedly right when he points out the difierence between mechanical constraint and psychical motivisation. The process of choice and our independence of external determinants to action show little trace indeed of the uniformity and simplicity of the causal connection as posited by mechanism (c/. § 20). LlTEHAinEB. C. Gutberlet, Bie Wilhnsfrdhe.it und ihre Gegner. 1893. (Written from the libertarian standpoint). J. H. Scholten, Der freie Wille. Trs. into German by Manchot. 1874. (Defends determinism). M. W. Drobisch, Die moralische Statistik und die menschliche Wil- lensfreiheit. 1867. (Deterministic in the Herbartian sense). Fr. J. Mach, Die Willensfreiheit des Menschen. 1887. New (titular) ed., 1894. (Takes neutral ground). L. Traeger, Wille, Determinismus, Strafe. 1895. (Deterministic. Treats more particularly of practical questions, which it handles very ably). § 22. Tke Theological Schools in Metaphysics. 1. Metaphysicians are also divided into hostile camps by their attitude toward the questions connected with the idea of God. The theories whose philosophical aspect we have here to consider are those of theism, deism, pantheism and atheism. The first three, which make the idea of God positive, are included under the 1 62 Metaphysical Schools general name of mcmotlieism. In the history of religion we meet with other forms of belief, such as feticMsm and polytheism; hut these have never found support or representation in a philosophical metaphysics, and so need not be discussed in the present connec- tion. Certain minor divisions may be distinguished, however, witliin the four principal schools, and especially under the somewhat vague rubric of pantheism. The various theological beliefs are pretty closely related to the more general metaphysical theories (§ 14. 3). Theism ordinarily goes along with spiritualism and dualism ; pantheism has an affinity to monism; and atheism is a natural consequence of materiaUsm. The theist is, of course, always teleologist as well. It is clear even from this summary description that deism is the most colourless view of aU ; it harmonises with the greatest number of general theories. Practically, it is equivalent to atheism. For if we merely postulate a divine being to serve as the final cause of the world, we cannot take up any religious or ethical attitude to him, except that of an indefinite reverence. Theism and pantheism, on the other hand, rarely receive detailed treatment within the limits of theoretical philosophy. They acquire their real meaning from the moral attributes which are predicated of the divine being as highest ethical ideal, and from the religious attitude of veneration, worship, etc., which mankind takes up towards it. 2. Theism is the belief which has the longest list of names attached to it in the history of philosophy. To mention only the greatest, Plato and Aristotle among the ancients, and Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Herbart and Lotze among the moderns, aU repre- sent some form of theistic metaphysics. The common element in aU the different systems is the conception of a personal being, who is the cause of the world and the director of its course in time. Where attempts have been made to formulate a more definite idea of the qualities of this being, they have always arisen from some practical religious interest. Thus we are accustomed to speak of God as all-powerful, aU-wise and all-good : but the last attribute is, really, entirely foreign to theoretical §22. Theological Metaphysics 163 philosophy. The two other predicates may, however, he looked upon as postulates of metaphysical knowledge, since they indicate characteristics which must be present if the being who is charac- terised is to be judged adequate to his task in the universe. The emphasis laid by certain writers — Chr. H. Weisse (t 1866), H. Ulrici (f 1884), and J. H. Fichte (t 1879)— upon the part played by ethics in the construction of a theistic metaphysics has won for their doctrine the name of ethical theism. The arguments upon which a given theism is based are, naturally, dependent upon the special metaphysical views of its author. They are not the same for Plato as for Aristotle, for Descartes as for Leibniz, for Kant as for Herbart or Lotze. It is usual to bring together the principal arguments for theism urged by the different philosophers under the title of 'proofs of the existence of God.' "We may distinguish an ontological, a cosmological, a teleological (physico-theological), a logical and a moral proof. Another proof ordinarily added to the list — the proof e consensu gentium — need not be considered here, as it is valid only from the point of view of deism. There is, however, hardly a single one of the remaining five, with the exception of the moral proof, that applies exclusively to theism ; they serve the cause of deism and pantheism every whit as well. 3. (1) The various forms of the ontological proof need not be separately discussed here. They all reduce, in essentials, to an inference of existence from idea. One form, e.g., starts out from the idea of God as the ens Tperfectissimwn, and then argues that absolute perfection is not compatible with non-existence. Existence, i.e., is a necessary attribute of the idea of an all- perfect being. Descartes and Leibniz are fully agreed upon tliis view. True, Leibniz declares, as against Descartes, that the first thing to do is to prove the idea of a most real or most perfect being to be free from aU inherent contradiction ; but this does not touch the essential part of the argument. If the idea is free from contradiction, i.e., possible, the reality of the object which it designates follows just as necessarily for him as for Descartes. The pre-Kantian philosophers of the eighteenth century (Crusius, 164 Metaphysical Schools e.g., in Germany and Hume in England) raised valid objections to the ontological argument. Kant, whose criticism of the proofs of the existence of God has won him the title of ' the all-destroyer,' simply put these objections in more comprehensive form, giving them a general epistemological reference. Existence, he says, is never one attribute of an idea along with others. It is a predicate which we can apply only to objects of possible experience or perception, and does not add any new determination to the idea of those objects. There is, therefore, no difference between the possible and the actual in the sense that the conceptual contents of the former lack one attribute (the compleiyientum possihilitatis) which attaches to that of the former : conceptually considered, the two are exactly alike. Hence we may argue without more ado from the possibility of an idea to its existence, but not to the reality or existence of the object that corresponds to it. 4. Hegel gave a peculiar turn to the ontological proof. The absolute being at once idea and existence, it follows as a matter of course that the thought of God has its real counterpart. As thus formulated, the vahdity of the ontological argument stands and falls with the validity of the Hegelian principle of panlogism. And unfortunately that principle is wrong. Lotze adduces a logical consideration, which, though he does not regard it as constituting an actual proof, follows a line of thought similar to that of the ontological argument. If the greatest did not exist, he says, the greatest would not exist ; and it is inconceivable that the greatest thing conceivable should not exist. Persuasive as the word-play is, however, we need not spend time to show that it does not take us beyond the circle of our ovm thoughts or of the conceivable : it does not demonstrate existence. Closely akin to the ontological argument is Descartes' view that our thought can give rise only to what is adequate to us or it. But this always wears the character of finitude, limitation, imperfection. If, now, we form the idea of an infinite, perfect being, the idea cannot be a product of our own thinking, but must issue from a reality which corresponds to it. And the truth of God then becomes, in its turn, the warrant for the truth of our thought. §2 2. Theological Metaphysics 165 (2) Related to this, again, is the logical proof offered by Tren- delenburg (t 1872). Human thought knows itself as finite thought, but still strives to surmount every barrier. It knows itself dependent upon things, yet proceeds as if they were determinable by it alone. This assurance would be self-contra- dictory, if truth were not postulated in the real, or conceivability in things. Thought would be but the play of chance or the bold- ness of despair, if God, the truth, were not the common source and the band of union between thought and things. Here, too, it is not difficult to see where the spring is made from conceivability or truth to its objective guarantee in a true being. It would reaUy be much more correct to say : since all human understanding and knowledge are adapted only to the given or the properties of the given, they can find natural and legitimate application only within the limits of the given. If we seek to go beyond these limits, we may come to new words and definitions, but caiinot come to a larger measure of understanding. 5. (3) The eosmologieal proof argues from the fact that the world exists to a final cause of the world, in order to avoid the assumption of the eternity of matter or motion. Aristotle found a typical expression for this proof in his demand for a primum movens ; and Plato had previously emphasised the creative activity of God. The proof constantly recurs in modern philosophy, though no new reasons are adduced in support of it. The search for causes brings to light more and more remote conditions of the course of the universe. Then, finally, our knowledge of things comes to a standstill; we are face to face with something which cannot be explained. But facts which cannot be deduced from other facts bear the stamp of chance or accident upon them. If, then, we assert that matter and its movements cannot be further explained, we have reached in them a fact which is in the air, so to say,— a fact which is causeless. And if we further attempt to remove this last fact from the realm of chance, we are led to the assumption of a being who can be defined as creator of the world, causa mi, absolute intellect, etc. (a) This proof, too, received very thorough refutation at the 1 66 Metaphysical Schools hands of Kant. Causality, lie says, is a category applicable only to phenomena, to the empirically possible. It cannot carry us beyond the range of given fact, to a transcendent cause of the world. Furthermore, although the idea of chance is valid for the individual fact of experience, it does not follow from this that the whole universe may be regarded as a mere accident, which must have its necessary cause in a being outside of itself. (&) It is also to be noted that the cosmological proof does not furnish any argument for theism, but rather suggests a simple deism. Theoretically, too, nothing is gained for knowledge by this step beyond the last given fact of the universe. Whether we stop short at the eternity of matter and motion, or regard both as the work of a divine being, is indifferent for theory; for an actual derivation of the world from the creative activity of God would seem to be impossible, and his definition as causa sui gives our thought a purely arbitrary resting-place. (c) But, finally, the ceaseless advance of causal enquiry into the conditions of the given points merely to the observance of a regulative principle (§4. 3), by which we are forbidden to pause here or there in our search, and taught to regard every resting- place as provisional, a place to recruit our strength for still further investigation. 6. (4) The teleological proof argues from the purposive arrange- ment of the universe or of nature to a creator who frames and realises purposes. And since purposes admit of empirical demon- stration only as ideas in a mind, this creator must be further conceived of as intellect. The teleological proof appears in ancient philosophy, and is declared by Kant to be at once the clearest of all and the worthiest of consideration. It also furnished Herbart with the starting-point for his discussions in the field of the philosophy of religion. But, like the two preceding, it must be judged to be inadequate. In the first place, as Kant shows, we can argue from it only to an architect, a planner of the universe ; for the purposiveness of nature is manifested in its form, not in its contents. Secondly, Kant says, the teleological hypothesis is a subjective, regulative principle, and cannot be employed for § 22. Theological Metaphysics 167 transcendent conclusions. Lastly, it is doubtful (r/. § 20. 7) whether we may interpret a teleological theory to mean that an intellect furnished with purposive ideas is the necessary pre- supposition of an explanation of the world. Empirically, it is only the phenomena of life that suggest the idea of a purposive arrangement of parts and functions ; the teleological proof, on the other hand, regards the whole of nature as a system of purposes. Here again, then, we cannot really speak of a ' proof.' It has sometimes been urged that although no one of these arguments is sufficient in itself, nevertheless, all taken together deserve the title of proof. The plea does not hold, if only for the reason that the 'proofs' are by no means independent, but (as Kant pointed out) reaUy presuppose one another. The cosmo- logical proof refers back to the ontological, and the teleological to both the others. And if the foundation is insecure, that which is built upon the foundation must surely be insecure also. 7. (5) The mcrral proof of the existence of God argues either from the existence of an absolute moral law to a lawgiver, or from the incongruity of virtue and happiness to an all-good and all-powerful being who is able to harmonise them. But [a) the fact of an absolute moral law is by no means assured or universally valid; and (&) attempts have been made of late, and made with success, to explain moral norms from an evolutionary standpoint. Either of these objections is sufficient to rob the inference of a personal lawgiver of any binding force that it may seem to possess. In any event, however, the empirical incongruity be- tween an existence in accordance with moral requirements and a life Avhich completely satisfies the desires of the individual cannot be regarded as an adequate reason for the postulate of a divine justice. For (a) the argument simply implies a wish to see virtue rewarded with all the good things of life ; and there have been times when the one certain indication of moral character has been found in the avoidance of 'happiness,' in contempt of these same good things. Moreover, (6) the inference involves a two- fold transcendence. The proposed reconciliation requires not only a personal God, but the immortality of the individual as well. 1 68 Metaphysical Schools The result of all this discussion, then, is entirely negative. No one of the five ' proofs ' of the existence of God deserves its title ; and the five together accomplish no more than each can do alone. On the other hand, nothing that we have said touches the question of the possibility of the ideas which culminate in theism, and of the practical interests which may lead to a theistic hypothesis, although they neither possess nor need to possess any theoretical validity. Theism did not grow up on the soil of a theoretical metaphysics, but had its source in religious motives, and as a theory of the universe has always been shaped by religious ideas. And no religion has allowed the demand for an explanation of the world to determine its theistic theory. 8. The first beginnings of deism can be traced back to Herbert of Cherbury (t 1648). He wished to win recognition for a natural religion, a religion demanded and justified by reason, as contradistinguished from the historical religion that had authority for its foundation. No religion can lay claim to these titles unless it has found universal acceptance (by the consensiis omnium). The concept of religion — that is, the common element in all its forms — is made the criterion of its truth. The contents of the ideas thus obtained are set forth by the author in five propositions, which are declared to be truly catholic, i.e., universally valid principles. They affirm the existence of a supreme being, and the duty of worshipping him; assert that virtue and piety are the most important parts of the cultus divimis ; accept the ideas of repentance and retribution ; and profess expectation of reward and punishment in a future life. The founder of deism algo held the strange belief, which persisted even into the eighteenth century, that primitive religion embodied this pure universal idea, and that the specific characters of the historical religions have come into being through the cunning and deception of individual men. Deism was made much more definite by John Locke. He denied that there was any universal agreement as to the idea and worship of a divine being, and explained the concept of deity as formed by the combination and enhancement of the §2 2. Theological Metaphysics 169 most estimable qualities of man. He based the existence of God upon the cosmological argument. The principal repre- sentatives of deism after Locke were J. Toland (c/. § 16. 2) and M. Tindal. From their time on it also found adherents in France and Germany. F. M. A. de "Voltaire (f 1778) and H. S. Reimarus (f 1768) may be regarded as its most prominent exponents in the two countries. Deism, which has found enthusiastic disciples in our own century {e.g., Thomas Buckle, 1 1862), rests in part upon th6 same arguments as theism. God is a transcendent being, supra- mundane, the creator of the universe : but he has ordered everything so weU that any later interference in the course of events is not only unnecessary, but would seem to be in- compatible with his dignity. There can be no doubt that, practically regarded, deism comes very near to atheism ; for a personal attitude to a being who does not interfere in the course of the world can manifest itself only in quite general forms of veneration. Deism can no more be proven than theism, and the disadvantage under which it labours in con- sequence of its practical unfruitfulness has been the most important factor in its gradual disappearance. The world, it says, would be badly made, and God not a perfect being, if he were obliged constantly to devote himself to the control •and improvement of the course of events. Naturally, it is especially hostile to miracles. But if the deist were consistent in his idea of God — whom he endows with attributes which are but faintly shadowed forth in man — he would have to confess that he can know absolutely nothing of God's purposes and intentions in the creation of the world, or of what is compatible or incompatible with his dignity. 9. Pantheism, on the other hand, is very widely held at the present day. It is the form of theology which appeals most strongly to the scientific adherents of monism (§19. 1). Hence, in view of the great variety of opinions included under the title of monism, we shall be apt to infer a corresponding diversity of pantheistic theories. We may, as a matter of fact, 170 Metaphysical Schools distinguish between particular and universal pantheism, basing the distinction upon the different contents of the idea of God. Universal pantheism identifies the idea of God with that of the all, of 'the universe, without any further specification. Particular pantheism lays emphasis upon some definite aspect or attribute of the all, and of its connection with the idea of God. Thus the materialists who affirm the unity of God and the world hold a naturalistic pantheism, i.e., a pantheism which regards external nature as the equivalent of the idea of God. The Stoics look upon the inner being of the world or the world-soul as God : theirs is a spiritualistic pantheism. J. G. Fichte's system, again, is an ethical pantheism; for him the moral order that runs through the universe represents the divine being. Hegel's belief that the absolute idea reflects the being of God is a logical pantheism. K. Chr. Fr. Kjause (c/. § 9. 12) has tried to reconcile theism and pantheism in a panentheism, which places God at once above the world and in the world. And so on : the list does not by any means include all the difierent forms that pantheism has taken. Monism seems to owe its special attractiveness to a sort of kaleidoscopic variety ; and the confused multiformity of pantheism is surely one of the chief reasons that it has found so many supporters in an age averse as the present is to keen and accurate theugkL ^ 10. Universal pantheism has found historical expression in two principal forms : in the philosophy of the Eleatics and of Spinoza. Xenophanes and Parmenides identify existence with the idea of God ; and as there is nothing outside of or beyond existence, God is the universe. And Spinoza does not hesitate to speak (as Giordano Bruno spoke before him : rf. § 17. 2) of deus sive natura. He distinguishes a natura naturans and a naiura naturata as two sides or aspects of this single nature. God is the creative principle, and the world the created, passive. — Universal pantheism is also found, more or less explicit, in treatises upon aesthetics and the philosophy of religion. The positive sensations or feelings which arise in consciousness when one is lost in contemplation of nature or of a work of art are interpreted as a resignation of self §22. Theological Metaphysics 171 to the universe, a renunciation of personality, the merging of the individual in his environment, so that he ceases, as it were, to be an individual, and becomes simply a part of the world. The frame of mind is wholesome enough, no doubt; but it does not furnish a sufficient reason for the acceptance of pantheistic doctrines. Atheism and theism are perfectly well able to explain the appearance of the sensations and feelings in question. But this apart, pantheism has no better arguments to offer in defence of its position than theism had. We need not criticise what it has to say in detail, since the objections that we raised against the closely related theory of monism (c/. § 19) apply with very little change in the present connection. From the point of view of practical needs and interests, pantheism is far less satis- factory than theism ; we cannot conceive of a personal, moral, or religious relation to the universe or an aspect of it, except in a very confused and fanciful way. 11. The final outcome of our discussion seems, then, to be a rejection of all the proofs for the existence of God, i.e., an atheism. But we have merely wished to show that the necessity of the idea of God cannot be demonstrated by any theoretical argument, and that there is nothing in scientific investigation that necessarily takes us to it. It does not follow that there are no other reasons for rounding off our theory of the universe by a theological concept. And, as a matter of fact, all those who have included a positive definition of God within the limits of their philosophical system have laid the main emphasis upon the religious or ethical consequences which follow from it. Atheism, as set forth by L. Feuerbach (t 1872) or by E. Diihring, is theoretically incontrovertible. But its inability to satisfy man- kind, with all their ideals of moral conduct and all their rehgious needs, is reason enough for transcending or supplementing the powerlessness of theory to cope with it. And, after all, even when metaphysics has demonstrated or admitted that a particular theology cannot be proven, it has still a not unimportant task to perform : it must show the possibility of combining a theological hypothesis with all that we know of the universe from other 172 Metaphysical Schools sources. That is a sorry kind of book-keeping which sets down the items of belief upon one page and the items of knowledge on the other, and never comes to any settlement or adjustment of the two. And we shall not break free of it till we have brought the assumptions or requirements of our moral and religious life into harmony with the results of theoretical knowledge. It is natural that the attempts at reconciliation, past and present, should occupy themselves for the most part with theistic doctrine : theism is the form of theology that accords best with our practical interests. Literature. J. H. Fichte, Die theistische IFeltansicht und ihre Berechtigung. 1873. A. Drews, Die deutsche Speculation seit Kant rait hesonderer Buchicht awf das Wesen des Absoluten und die PersonlicMeit Gottes. 2 vols., 1893. 2ud ed., 1895. (The various philosophers are criticised from the standpoint of E. von Hartmann. The statement of their views is not always objective and just). Of. also the literature cited under § 11 (the philosophy of religion). § 23. T/ie Psychological Schools in Metaphysics. 1. In the most recent works on psychology we find a twofold antithesis of metaphysical theories. On the one hand there is difference of opinion as to the nature of mind. The theory of substantiality posits a substance underlying the individual mental processes ; the theory of actuality gives the name of mind to the sum total of mental processes themselves, as actually and imme- diately given in experience. In the second place there is difference of opinion as to the essential quality of the ' psychical' Intellec- tualism asserts that the intellectual processes of perceptipn, idea, thought, are the source or foundation of all the others. Voluntarism declares, on the contrary, that the phenomena of will, i.e., impulses, passions, emotions, feelings, are the determining and primary elements of our inner experience. The first attribute of mind-substance is the first attribute of substance in general, — stability. All the various 'states' of mind are phenomena or accidents of the permanent substance. Secondly, the existence of the mind-substance is self-constituted, §23. Psychological Metaphysics 173 independent of other existences. It stands in reciprocal relation to them, but can return, so to speak, of its own initiative, anything that it suffers at their hands. Thirdly, the mind-suhstance is indestructible, and consequently immortal. Fourthly, it is often defined as a simple existence, i.e., as something not compounded of parts, and therefore indivisible, unextended and immaterial ; and also as something whose peculiar and intrinsic quality is incompatible with any kind of multiplicity. As against all this, the actuality theory affirms that the unitary connection of actual mental processes forming our experience at a particular moment is the mind, and that we have no right to speak of a vehicle of the separate phenomena of feeling, thinking, willing, etc., if we mean anything more than just this interweaving of them into a single general whole. 2. Descartes is the real founder of the theory of substantiality. Ancient philosophy identified the mind with the vital principle, and therefore did not draw so sharp a distiaction between the material and the psychical. It was not till Descartes separated thinking substance from extended substance (c/. § 18. 2) that the idea of a mind-substance took clear and definite form. It recurs in Leibniz, but in a different dress (c/. § 17. 1, 2). The mind is there a monad, and stands in close connection with the many other monads that make up its body. These two views dominated the psychology of the eighteenth century. The notion that mind is a substance, and, as such, immortal and self-constituted, had been so completely assimilated by the general consciousness of the period, that it needed all the force of Kant's criticism to bring the transcendence of the theory into clear light. Among the meta- physicians of more recent times Herbart and Lotze are adherents of substantiality. Herbart makes the mind a real, the simple quality of which we do not know ; our experiences, the ideas that cross the threshold of consciousness, are the efforts whereby this real preserves itself in its interaction with other existences (c/. § 17. 3). Lotze says: "The fact of the unity of conscious- ness is also eo ipso the fact of the existence of a substance." Every mind, however, is " that which it gives itself out to be : 174 Metaphysical Schools an unity that lives in definite ideas, feelings and efforts." Mind- substance, that is, is not a mysterious essence behind the rich contents of our inner experience, but the unification of the inner experience. Here Lotze's view approaches very nearly to the theory of actuality, differing from it in little more than name. 3. The theory of actuality occupies a much less important place in the history of philosophy. It is only quite recently that actuality has been explicitly opposed to substantiality. "We may trace its first beginnings in Hume's doctrine that there is no occasion to hypostatise an individual psychical being; indeed, that the idea of a mental substance is whoUy inconceivable, and the self or mind to be regarded simply as a bundle or aggregate of perceptions. In our own time the theory of actuality has been carefuUy worked out and elaborately explained by Wundt (who gave it its name) and Paulsen. The constructive part of it takes the form of a criticism of the opposing view. This is legitimate, since actuality affirms nothing but what is already given in experience : it does not constitute a metaphysics, in the strict sense of the term ; whereas substantiality is really a metaphysics of psychology, criticism or rejection of which would seem to lead at once to the acceptance of the rival, empirical view. In what follows we have brought together the various points made by Wundt and Paulsen against substantiality. We add brief metacritical remarks, the gist of which is that the severity with which substantiaUty has been handled is very far from being deserved. The first four paragraphs refer to Paulsen, the last three to Wundt. (1) A mind-substance, we are told, is not an object of per- ception. Now of this there can be no doubt : but then the atoms cannot either be perceived, and the unconscious processes which Paulsen does not hesitate to accept never come within the range of possible experience. True, it might be replied that though the atoms are not perceptible, still, complexes of atoms are ; and the simple which gives rise to the complex must naturally be conceived of as equally existent. But in the case of mind, precisely the reverse might hold. Here it is the elements that are open to §23. Psychological Metaphysics 175 observation, the sensations and feelings that are experienced ; the substantial unity which is required to make the connection of all these elements intelligible might lie outside of the field of perception. 4. (2) "We are told, again, that no idea can be formed of the connection between the mind-substance and the psychical pro- cesses of experience. But neither can an idea be formed of the connection between psychical and physical phenomena which is assumed by monism. Moreover, Paulsen defines the mind as "the multiplicity of mental processes brought together in some inexplicable way to form a unity." So that the theory of actuality cannot, for its part, help us to understand the connection between the whole of mind and the individual mental elements. (3) We are told, once more, that the attributes of a mind- substance consist simply of negations. But self-constitution and stability are not negative predicates. And on the other hand the properties attributed to matter (with the exception of the empirical relations of bodies to one another) are in great part of a purely negative character. (4) The theory of substantiality declares that the occurrence of mere acts or functions in the absence of any vehicle or substrate is inconceivable. The theory of actuality replies that the difficulty disappears when we remember that a mental act, e.g., a feeHng, never occurs alone, but always in connection with a whole mental life. As if a number of acts could serve as the substrate of each individual act in the number ! The theory comes to this : that various simultaneous mental processes, which together simply give us more of the same experience that is given by each one alone, are able somehow to acquire a unifying function in virtue of which every individual process may be related to the whole. Now either we have here the old substance idea in a changed form (and this is suggested by Paulsen's "in some inexplicable way"), or the inconceivability which substantiality ascribes to actuality is left, after the ex- planation, just where it was before. We may note that the question has been raised, in this connection, whether the mind- 176 Metaphysical Schools substance itself would not need a further support or substrate. It is answered by a reference to the attribute of self-dependence or self-constitution, which has always been involved in the idea of subtantiality. 5. (5) We are told, further, that the distinction of phenomenon and thing-in-itself, first drawn by Kant, and later adopted practi- cally without change by Herbart, has no significance for the inner experience. There, we apprehend things exactly as they are; so that there is no reason why we should posit a mental substance to play the part of the thing-in-itself, and oppose it to our particular psychical experiences. Now we freely admit that the distinction of phenomenon and thing-in-itself has no special application in the sphere of psychological experience. We go farther, and declare that it is wrong wherever it is applied. But on the other hand, this distinction was not the primary, still less the only, influence in the formation of the idea of a mind-substance. Descartes and Leibniz spoke of mind-substance in the old days before Kant; and Lotze defends the theory upon quite other grounds. There is absolute agreement among a wide circle of psychologists at the present day, that some sort of supplement of what we call inner experience is necessary if we are to obtain a definite scientific idea of its field or subject-matter. The assumption of unconscious psychical excitations, and the endowment of particular psychical functions with properties and forces of which we get at most but slight indications in intro- spection, come under the same heading with the hjrpothesis of a mind-substance : all alike are attempts to satisfy this requirement of a supplement or completion of the conscious inner life. To rule out mind-substance, and introduce in its place the idea of a psychophysical substance — obtained by the ascription of mental characteristics to material substance — is not the way to reach a more fruitful or better-grounded theory (c/. the previous discussion of §19). 6. (6) It is said, too, that there is an inconsistency in the definition of the mind-substance, which is made at once stable and subject to change. But no one who has adopted the theory §23- Psychological Metaphysics 177 of substantiality attributes changeableness to the mind-substance. Every substance has accidents, phenomena, modes of expression, etc., predicated of it ; and so here the changes which actually take place in our mental life are referred to the empirically given phenomena of the mind-substance. (7) Lastly, it is said that the hypothesis of a mind-substance is not even useful for holding together the facts of experience. To which we may reply that no metaphysical hypothesis is useful for that purpose. Metaphysical theory simply supplements the results of scientific enquiry. Empirical psychology must, of course, always be kept perfectly free from any admixture of the substance idea in its description and explanation of facts. To say that the mind feels, thinks, wills, etc., does not give us the least insight into the origin and mechanism of these activities. But the philosopher who is concerned with the question of the connection of psychical and physical phenomena, and who comes to the con- clusion (as we did on what seemed good grounds: c/. §§18, 19) that dualism furnishes him with the most probable answer, will hardly be able to avoid recognising the independence of psychical existence and postulating for it a substantial underlying unity. It must be noted that our criticism of actuality does not carry with it a profession of faith in the rival theory of substantiahty. But it seemed desirable to show that the objections urged against the latter are not by any means of the nature of constraining arguments, and that consequently we must concede the possihility of substantiality, after as before. 7. The antithesis of intellectualism and voluntarism, like that of substantiality and actuality, did not become precise and explicit untn quite recently. There is no trace of it in ancient philosophy, as no attempt was there made to reduce the properties of the mind to a single essential function. Here, as before, the first impulse comes from Descartes : thought is the one characteristic attribute of mind-substance. Spinoza followed Descartes, except that he regarded the individual mind not as substance, but merely as a mode of the attribute of thought (c/. § 19. 3). A similar intellec- tualistic theory was propounded by Leibniz and worked out by his 178 Metaphysical Schools school. The universal activity of all monads is the activity of ideation or representation (c/. §17. 2). But the colourless gene- rality of this concept made it possible to endow the mind with a faculty of desire alongside of and co-ordinate with the faculty of knowledge. With the recognition of the faculty of feeling as a third facultas {cf. § 10. 2) the simple intellectualistic schema finally broke down. "We thus find no strict formulation of the theory until it was revived by Herbart. For him, ideas are the only true vehicles of conscious occurrence. The feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness arise from the relations of rein- forcement and inhibition (or arrest) that obtain among them ; and the impression of desire or aversion is produced by the rise of an idea in consciousness in face of certain obstacles or the opposition which it offers to rival ideas that would force it down. FeeHng and wUl are, that is,' merely by-products of the ideating forces, not independent and co-ordinate phenomena. This standpoint has not always been very vigorously insisted on by the Her- bartians, but, on the other hand, has never been entirely given up. They accordingly represent the inteUectuahsm of the present day. 8. The first hint of voluntarism appears in Kant, where it is a consequence of his ethical metaphysics. If freedom is necessary for the intelligibility of the absolute character of the moral law, then the thing-in-itself of our mental life must be a free will {cf. § 9. 8). Schopenhauer, however, was the fiist to expand this thesis to a general theory of the universe. For him the thing-in- itself is always wiU, wherever it occurs, whether in external nature or in the inner life ; and intellect is simply an instrument ready to the hands of will. Sometimes, but only in man, this secondary function frees itself from the dominion of wOl, and most completely in the state of passionless aesthetic enjoyment {cf. § 10. 6). Quite recently, Wundt and Paulsen have made an especially noteworthy attempt to put voluntarism upon a psycho- logical basis. Here, again, we will give the separate arguments of both thinkers, one by one, and append short critical comments to them. The first three are Paulsen's, the last Wundt's. §23. Psychological Metaphysics 179 (1) First of all we are told to look at the importance of will in the universal and individual development of the mental life. We cannot attribute any form of ideas, i.e., any intellectual processes, to the lowest organisms : they seem to be controlled by sheer blind compulsion. Impulse is, therefore, taken as the basal function of the inner life. So in the child it is the life of will that first makes its appearance, and only gradually that the activities of intelligence supervene upon it, in ever-increasing complexity. To this we have to reply that the idea of develop- ment, methodologically considered, would lead us to posit an undiiferentiated whole as the source of mental functions, and not a phenomenon which has acquired its specific differentia in the adult mental life. We must accordingly attribute to the lowest organisms an indefinable total something, of psychical character, out of which both intellectual and impulsive or volitional pro- cesses emerge by slow degrees in the course of evolution, until they become the distinguishable and co-ordinate states that we know. The mental life of the newly-born infant, we believe, on the other hand, to contain from the first not only desires and feelings but also a number of special sensations. 9. (2) But even in the developed mental life, we are told further, will is the primary and determining factor. WiU sets the final goal of every man's life ; and will originates and holds to aU the special purposes that are realised by individual actions. WiU also directs the attention, and chooses among the different stimuli to which consciousness is exposed. Interest, a pheno- menon of will, decides which of our experiences are to be stored away in memory and which forgotten. And the direction and trend of the course of ideas itself are governed by will, so that even our theoretical knowledge and judgments constantly betray its influence. To all of which the reply is that what is here described as will is not the simple impulse, the blind compulsion, that came before any differentiation of the mental processes. This will does not act bUndly, without reason; it is determined always by more or less complicated motives and reflections. Hence we might assert with equal truth that the really primary i8o Metaphysical Schools and determining factor in our mental life is not wUl, but that which occasions the wiU's activity. (3) The statement that voluntarism can be harmonised with a spiritualistic metaphysics, while inteUectualism cannot, is sufficiently disproved by a reference to history. Leibniz' meta- physics is spiritualistic, in spite of its inteUectualism. Moreover, there is the third possibility to be taken into account, that inteUectuahsm and voluntarism are ahke one-sided and conse- quently incorrect. Lotze's spiritualism tends towards this view (c/. § 14. 5). Lastly, however, in the light of the objections that we have raised against spirituaUsm (§ 17), we should not be able to admit that this incompatibility, were it proven to exist, had any value as an argument against inteUectuahsm. 10. (4) The ideas are declared to be subsidiary, not independent activities, and consequently incapable of explaining the unity that, as a matter of fact, characterises our mental Ufe. Moreover, their changes are so uncertain, and their connections so fragmen- tary, as to make them altogether unsuited for the discharge of an unifying function. And the feelings share this character with the ideas. The wiU is, therefore, the only thing left to which we can appeal; and its quaUtative constancy renders it eminently fitted for the task assigned to it. But this quaUtatively constant wiU is generally rejected by psychologists as an abstraction which does not correspond to the facts. Moreover, the unity of our mental life, or of our personaUty or character, is not a simple fact of experience, but itself a reflexion, upon the facts, and wears the appearance of an immediate experience simply because it is famUiar to the popular consciousness. The unity of the per- sonality is reaUy a hypothesis, based not so much upon any simple and constant psychical quahty as upon (1) the perception of a thorough-going interconnection of our separate mental acts, mediated by the association of ideas ; (2) the continuity of our mental development, which does not admit of sudden and violent transitions, of the co-existence of incompatible states of mind, etc. ; and (3) the constancy of the sensory background of our mental life, i.e., of the bodily form in which we are clothed. Epistemological Schools i8i The result of our critique of voluntarism^ is not by any means a proof of the correctness of intellectualism, but merely the knowledge that no one of the elementary processes of our mental life can be regarded as ' primary ' in any absolute and exclusive sense. Intellectualism and voluntarism are, therefore, both alike in the wrong. LiTBEATURE. 0. Fltigel, Die Seelenfrage. 2nd ed., 1890. (For the author's stand- point, cf. the literature to § 14.) J. H. Witts, Das Wesen der Seele und die Natur der geisiigen Vorgange im Lichte der Philosophie seit Kant und iher grun/Uegenden Theorien historisch-lcritisch dargestellt. 1888. (The writer is an adherent, but not a skilful advocate of the substantiality theory.) Gf. also the literature cited under § 8, and especially W. Volkmann, Psychologie. Vol. I. B. EPISTEMOLOGICAL SCHOOLS. § 24. Rationalism, Empiricism and Criticism. 1. The problem now before us is that of the origin of knowledge. Rationalism (also called apriorism) affirms that reason, a connate mental faculty, is the fountain of all true knowledge, and, more especially, the sole source and warrant of the two most important attributes of knowledge — necessity and universal validity. Mn- piricism, on the other hand, derives all knowledge from experience, and designates the mind or intellect prior to perception a tabula rasa. If it makes external experience, the experience mediated by the sense organs, primary and all-determining, it is called sensualism. Lastly, criticism attempts to reconcile the opposing claims of both the other schools. It explains knowledge as the resultant of a formal factor, deducible from the nature of the knowing intellect, and a material factor, constituted by the ' We have here discussed voluntarism only in its metaphysical form. The methodological voluntarism represented by Wundt in his later books (Logik, ii. 2 and Outlines of Psychology) is something essentially different. It simply declares that will processes ai-e the typical processes of the mental life, and that all the rest must therefore be explained by reference to them. Epistemological Schools sensations of sense-perception. If either of these factors is lacking, we can h^ve no real knowledge. It is wholly impossible, in particular, to derive facts of any scientific significance from pure reason, as rationalism asserts. The relation between rationalism and empiricism is of such a kind that empiricism completely excludes rationalism, -butr not wee versa. Rationalism simply denies that universally vahd and necessary knowledge can be obtained from exper|ence. It grants that a great mass of detailed knowledge comes from experience. Empiricism, on the contrary, wiU hear nothing of a creative reason which is to colligate concepts or intuitions a priori and put the stamp of truth and adequacy upon knowledge in general. 2. These epistemological differences did not play an imfiortant part in ancient philosophy. Our knowledge of pre-Socratic epistemology is very scanty; but the Eleatics seem to have been radical, and the atomists moderate rationaUsts. Plato, too, undoubtedly inchnes to rationalism, though he gives no clear formulation of its leading characteristics. Aristotle's system, the great compromise of the ancient world, is suggestive of criticism ; but matter and form mean very different tilings for him from what they mean for Kant, the founder of critical epistemology. In modern philosophy, on the other hand, the division of schools is sharply marked. Continental philosophy has been exclusively rationalistic, English philosophy as exclusively empirical. Francis Bacon, with whom English empiricism began, shows, it is true, some of the most pronounced features of rationalistic thought ; and we should not do justice to the philosophy of Hobbes if we termed it a pure empiricism. It was Locke who gave the theory its decisive and characteristic form. His attack upon all innate ideas or principles, whether in the field of theoretical knowledge or in the domain of practical moral injunctions, was the first open avowal of disbelief in the competency of pure reason to furnish any sort of a pri 178, i94f-. ^gSi; 204f. Contents, ^Esthetics of: 84 CoSHlQlgg2j^76f.j_22iij S'l ^42 Criticism: 23, 27, no, 112, 181S., 187, /p/ff. Definition: 7 Deism: 92, 108, 1 16, 161, 163, 166, i68i. ■ Dependency: S5f-> 63, 1231., I49f. Descent, Theory of: 54, 148 Desire, Faculty of: 16, 178 Determinism: 71, 108, /Jjff. Development, see Evolution Dialectic, Dialectical: 14, 17, 2 if., 30, 39. 96. 116, 141, «90. 198, 230 Dogmatic, Dogmatism: 32, liof., 121, 187S. Dualism: 23, 63, 107, n6f., 121, ^33^; 139, i4iff-> 145, 162,. 177 Index of Subjects 253 Duty: 70, 73. 75. 92. "o, 208, 217, 220, 222, 228, 230, 232, 234 Dynamic: 32, 123, 129, 202 Economics: 1 6 Ego: 23, 25, 74, 114. 141, -fPJff- Egoism: III, 213, 224I., 229, 234 Empirical, Empiricism: 17, 54, 77, 80, 87, 94ff., Iiof., 113, 116, 181&., 188, 2opff., 217 End, see Purpose Energism: 112 Energy: 37, 54, 122, 131, 137, 203 Entelechy: 56 Epistemology : 11, 14, 18, 20, j'off., 53f-, S7f-, 65. 79. 92f.. 97. loof., 102, 104, io6f., iloff., 113, 119, 121, i24f., 131, 133, 142, 144, TBI'S.., 236, 242, 244 Ethics: 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 31, 66, 67ff., 81, 85, 89, 104, 107, noffi, 117, 156, 158, 161, 19s, ao/ff., 240, 242, 243, see Feeling, Ethics of; Reflexion, Ethics of Etiinic psychology, see Psychology of peoples Eudaemonism : 76, inf., 227 ff., 233 f- Evolution: 35, 37, 52f., 97, ip8i., 148, 209, 2Ilff., 2Jof. Evolutionism: 76, ill, 20QS.,2^oi. Experience: 24, 26, 3 if., 36, 48, Si,S6,s8i., no, 115, 124, I2S, 133. 157. 116,1811, i84((., i87f., 192, 196 ff., 199, 204ff., 2C9, 217 Experience, Datum of: 58, I24i., 129, 131. 133. 142, 197. 199. ^o^f- External world: 53, 195, 196, 200, 205 Fatalism: 153, 157 Feeling, Ethics of: inf., 214S. Feeling, Faculty of: 83, 178 Fetichism: 162 Finality: 108, 7^6f. Force: 37, 52, 54, 120, 121,132, 139 Form, Esthetics of: 84 Formal, Formalism: 30, 35, 37, 39, 42, 104, 113, i8ii., 194 Freedom: 24, 50, 70, 75, 80, 92, 108, 145, 75'^ff., 178, 208 God: 23, 69, 70f., 74, 92, 94, 96, 98, 108, 114, I26f., 135, I40f., 154, 767 ff., 207 f. God, Proofs of existence of: 23, 162 S. Good (adj.): egf., 76f., 84, 154, 158, 207, 212, 221, 227, 234 Good (subst.): 75, 112, 114, 117, 154, 234 Guilt: 7of., 73. 77, I54, ijS, 160 Happiness: 69, 73f, in, 167, 190, 2 1 6, 227 ff. Hedonism: 69, in, 112, 227 Heterogony of ends : 212 Heteronomy: in, 207 f. Hylozoism: "139 Idealis m: 24, 26, 3 6, 89, no, 113, --rSgrTsi. «33. i37, ^94^- Immanence, Immanent: 36, no, 147, 188. Immaterialism : 129 Indeterminism : 71, io8f., 1J3S. Individual psychology : 64, 103 Individualism: 105, Ili,2l3,22jff., 229, 232, 234 Inference: 23, 39, 41, 44 Innate: 32f., 57, in, 181, l83f,, 209 ff. Intellectualism, ethical : 74, 76, 2i6i., 2ig, 22li. Intellectualism, psychological: 65, io8f., 172, 117^. 254 Index of Subjects Intuitionism, Intuitive: 32, 57, 76, inf., 187, sopf. Irrationalism ; 187, 194 Judgment: 39f., 41, ^f. Knowledge, Faculty of: 16, 23,24, 34, 82, 178, 187 Knowledge, Science of: 11, 30, 33, 44f., 104, 186, 195, 2?9f-. 243^-> 24s Knowledge, Theory of: 30; see Epistemology Language: 103 Life: 37, 56, /^7f., 149 Logic, II, i6f , 20, 30, 35, 38,^9ff., 53. 67, 79, 82, 97, 101, 102, 104, losf., 159, 170, 214, 236, 342i. Logic of contents : 46 Logic of extension : 46 Material: 30, 37, 118, iSiL, 195, 242 Materialism: 23, 33, S', 63, 65, 106, 108, i-/6ff., 135, I37f., 143, I44f., 162, 170, 196, 211, 217, 227, 238 Mathematics: 8, 15, 32, 41, 46 f., SS, 71, .^ooff., 126, 183, 241 Matter: 37, 50, 52, 54. 68, 113, 116S., 126, 165, 175, 202 Mechanical, Mechanism: 48, 50, 54, 92, io8f., 123, 131, 139, I4SK., I53f-i 161, 202, 206 Merit: 70, 73, 76f., 154, ijS, 160 Metaphysics: 9, 10, 14, 18, 2iS., S3f.. 57, 65, 68, 72, 73 ff., 76, 82, 85, 89, 91 ff., 94, 96, 98, 100, 104, I05ff., .rijS., 188, /p/ff., 236, 338, 24if., 243, 24S Method: i6f., 4of., 44, 65, 87f., 95, 97. 99, «9'. ^^ff- Mind: 22/., 37, j'fifF., 62f., 65, io8f , ii8«., 154, i-72ff., 181 Mode: 32, 140, 177 Monad: 114, isyi., 173, 178, 230 Monism: 23, 65, I07ff., n6ff., i2of., Tj^ff., 145, 162, 169,171, 175, 198 Monotheism: 162 Moral philosophy : 67 ; see Ethics Morality: 50, 67^1., 84, 92, iioff., "7, 147, 158, 207ff. Motive: 76, iiof., I53f., I57f., 179, 2-r^ff-, 234 Nativism: 209 f. Natural philosophy: 14, 16, 17, I9f-, 25, 37, 47^., 65f., 79, 99, 104, io5, 236, 240, 244 Natural science: 14, 17, 26, 30, 32f.,j6f.49ff.,53ff., 58, 92,99, 129, I30f., 135, 137, 144, 183, 195, 197, 202f-, 240, 243 Naturalism: 89, III, 170, 2^ii. Necessary, Necessity: 33, 36, 47, 74, 102, i45f., 156, 159, i8r, 183, iSji., 192, 204 Neo-Kantianism : 26, 33, 183 Nominalism: 40 Normative: 41, 44, 67, 78, 89, 93, 214 Object, Objectification, Objective: 3rf., 3Sf., 45, 47f., 50, 56,59, no, i24i., 131, 133, 147, 184, i86, 189, i94ff., I97ff., 20off., 203, 2osi., 229 Object of idea: 2^i., 129, 199, 204 Objectivism: in, 227S. Occasionalism: I34f. Ontology: 16, 22, 242 Organic, Organism: 52f., 57, 98, 132, 139, '44, HT^-, 179, 211 Index of Subjects 255 Panentheism: 170 Pantheism: 92, 104, lo8f., 116, , 145, 161, i6c/'S. Parallelism, psychophysical: 63. Pedagogy: 8of. Perception: 3if.,47, 55. //f-j "3, 174, i8if., 19s, 197, i99f.,20if., 204, 222 Perfection: 74f-) 82, 86, 163, 219, 3?of-, 23s Perfectionism: 111,229,2^0 Phenomenal, Phenomenalism: 22, no, 19s, 204. Phenomenology: 17 Phenomenon: 22, 24^., 33, 92, no, I29f., i5Sf., 166, 176, 1^3 Philosophising: i, 7f., 14 Philosophy, Classification of: i4ff. ,, Definition of: 7ff. ,, Disciplines of: 19 f., 2iff. „ History of: 104 ,, Problem of: 5, 236!?. ,, Schools of; I05ff. „ System of : 5, 241 ff. Philosophy of history: 20, 56, pjff., 103, 242 >^^ Philosophy of language : 100, io2i. Philosophy of law: 20, 66, 67, I ^8?i., 90, 99, 244 I Philosophy of mind: 17, b^i., 242 Philosophyof religion: 20, 66, goii., 242, 244 jPhysical: 50, 53, 55, ^i'ff., 63f., 65, 119, /2/fF., 175 Physics: I4ff., 51, 149 ■ Pluralism: 107, 109, //jff. Politics: 16 Polytheism: 162 Position, absolute: 128 Positivism: 26, 98, no, 186, 187, Practical philosophy : 2, 11, 15 f., 2 Pre-established harmony : 127 Principles, Theory of; 18 Psychical: 34, 37, 43, 50, S3, J-J-ff., 62, 65, 118, 72/ff,, 128, I43f., 160, 772fr., 196, 198, 204 Psychism: 129 Psychology: 12, 14, 16, l8ff., 22f., 25. 30= 34f-. 3(>> 43> 44f-. SS^-, 72, 75> 78f., 81, 83, 8Sf., 93f., loof., I02fif., 106, I29ff., 132, i35> i37< 143, «48, I56f-, 160, 772 ff., i8sf , 196, 201, 206, 222, 227, 236, 240, 242 f. Psychology of peoples : 6^,68, 103 Psychophysics : 64 Purpose: 23, 34, 52, 70, 76, 108, iioff., 7^6ff., i66f., 212, 21^, 226, 227 ff. Qualities, primary and secondary : 3 1 Rational, Rationalism: 17, 23, 92, iiof., 113, 181^., i87£, 209 Real, Reality: 22, 29f., 40, 53, 129, I40f., 192 Realism: 24, i,o, Uflffi I95> /ppff. Reals: 128, 173, 207 Reason: 9, 15, 23, 27, 29f., S6f., 70, 80, 84, 9t, III, 113, 146, 157, iSi'S., 187, 191, 192, 207, 216 Reflexion, Ethics of: inf., 2/^ff. Reformation: 71 Regulative principle: 24, 63, 97, 117, 148, 166 Relation: 32, 128 Relativism: no, i8gi. Religion; 12, 57, 34, 51, 66, 68, 72, 73, 84f., 9off., 162, 168, 190, 231 Responsibility: 154, 155, 160 Sceptical, Scepticism ; 51, no, 187, i8g'S. 2S6 Index of Subjects Science: 8^., lai., 15, 24, 27f., I92f., 237 Science, Mental: 18, 6ji., '2.i,\i. Science, Theory of, see Knowledge, Science of Sensualism: 181 Singularism: 107, 109, 113^., 117, 138 Sociology: igf,, 75, 78, g8i., 104, 243 Solipsism: 194 Soul, see Mind Special science: ^/ff., 17, ig, 26, 3S^; 49, 67, 81, 94, 95, loi, 104, 144, 187, 193, 23'j, 238, 23<)l., 243I. Spiritualism: 23, 65, loSf., 126S., 138, 140, 14S, 162, 170, 180 Subject, Subjectification, Subjective, Subjectivity: 31, 35f., 44f., 47f., sol, SS(;SSi., 124^; 133. ^47, 184, i86, 189, I94fif., 197 ff., 202f., 20^1, 227 Subjectivism, epistemological : no, 189 Subjectivism, ethical: no, 227 S. Substance: 32, 53, 65, 108, Ii4f., Z26i., I40f., IJ2S. Substantiality, Theory of: 65, io8f., 1^2^. Supernaturalism : 119, 187 Teleology: 17, 48, $2, io8f., 113, I4SS; 153, i62f-> i66f., 223 Temporal knowledge : 9 Theism: 92, io8f., 116, r6iS. Theology: isff., 23, 34, 91, 94, 108, 116, 151, i6ifi., 190, 192, 207, 224 Theoretical philosophy: I5f, 23, 25, 75. 162 Th ing in itselfx ^a^tfrrTig. 114, 119, 130, I55f., 176, 204 Thought: 43, 44, 65, 108, 116, Ii8ff., 134, 140, i64f., I72f., 177, 185, I98f., 238, 242 Topics: 39 Transcend, Transcendence, Trans- cendent: 28, 33, 36, no, 148, 151, 166, 173, 184, i87f., I93f., 228, 237, 242 Unconscious: 62{., 65, 141, 143, 161, 174, 176 Universal validity: 12, 27, 30 f.,, 33, 36, 44, 74, 78, 102, 106, 181, 183, iSji., 188, 191, 2o8f., 237 Universalism : iii, 213, 223£f., 229, 232, 234 Universe, Theory of: 2if., 27ff., 53, 93, 96, 99, 107, 109, 193, 237,241 Utilitarianism: in, 217, 228, 232^ Value, Judgments of: 73, 75, 77, 129, 152, 226 Virtue: 6gS., 73S., 75, 167, 216 Vital spirits : 60 Vitalism: 54, 148 Voluntarism: 65, lo8f., 172, 777£F, Will: 65, 73,77.80,87, 108, 114, I29f., 132, 150, lS3ff., 172, 17SS., 200, 208, 212, 2I4ff., 2I9ff. 238 Introduction to Philosophy concepts and judgments ceases, not only in fact but in theory also. By theory, therefore, we can obtain no more than a survey, more or less adequate, of the different possibilities which open before the thinking mind at the Hmit of human knowledge. That every age has chosen some one of these, and expended upon it aU the resources of subtlety and ingenuity, is due not so much to a constant curiosity to know, as to the inappeasable craving for a satisfactory background to human life, human volition and action, — for a comprehensive idea of what mankind and the universe are and mean that can be applied in every-day experience. That is why materialism has tried to recommend itself by asserting its power completely to satisfy all practicable requirements. Metaphysics is the old name for this first problem of philosophy. 4. (2) The second philosophical problem consists in the investi- gation of the presuppositions of science. Here belong, in the first place, certain general concepts, such as space, time, causality, etc., and, secondly, the methods and forms of scientific thought. In virtue of this problem, philosophy becomes a fundamental or central science, of a purely theoretical character, altogether remote from practical interests. On the other side, the problem demands from philosophy an independent analytical investigation of a definite group of facts, with which no other branch of knowledge is concerned. With the comprehensive outlook which it thus obtains, philosophy is in a position to ofier a soHd and sober criticism of work done in the special sciences. We all know how often the boundary line between fact and hypothesis or theory is overstepped, and how often the man of science presumes to judge of things which He entirely beyond the range of special scientific knowledge. In all such cases the fundamental science, philosophy, is called upon to raise its voice in warning or correction. Knowledge of presuppositions thus becomes a criterion of the results that depend upon them. The general name which we attach to this problem of philosophy is theory of science (Wissenschaftslekre). It is evident that the contents and method of the theory of science must be essentially difierent from those §31- The Problem of Philosophy 239 of metaphysics, and that we cannot argue legitimately from the one province to the other. 5. (3) The third problem of philosophy, and the problem whose subject-matter is especially liable to variation, is that of paving the way for neio special sciences and special scientific hnowledge. Eemembering this third problem, we can understand the changes that have taken place in the number and contents of the philo- sophical disciplines, and show a real contiauity of development in the aims and achievements of historical philosophy. There can be no doubt that metaphysics and the theory of science furnish material assistance toward the accomplishment of the desired end. Metaphysics calls our attention to the gaps that stUl exist in knowledge, but that may perhaps be filled up; and the theory of science uses its critical authority partly to insist upon a more solid foundation for scientific hypothesis, partly to indicate the general direction in which scientific work may be pushed on with greatest prospect of success. Nevertheless, the task requires for its fulfilment something which is possessed neither by the theory of science nor by metaphysics. It is so closely related to purely scientific enquiry that the reader may question whether it should be relegated to philosophy at all. And as a matter of fact we cannot point to any intrinsic or necessary criterion, whereby we may decide exactly when a special science, the way for which has been paved by philosophy, shows its right to an independent place in the sum of knowledge. The matter depends upon extraneous circumstances : when material or range of application has reached a certain limit it becomes inconvenient to regard the science any longer as a department of philosophy. ^Nevertheless, it is not a simple accident that philosophy has discharged this third function with such signal success. The man of science who exercises his powers exclusively on minor problems, on particular sections of experience, has naturally no comprehensive grasp of what is possible to science as a whole. — "We cannot give the problem a special title. It is most fittingly designated by the names of the special discipHnes which owe their origin to philosophical initiative. 240 The Problem of Philosophy 6. It is not necessary that the three philosophical problems should be approached separately. There are, on the contrary, a number of philosophical disciplines, in the strict sense, where the two first, if not aU three, receive treatment at the same time. Suppose, e.g., that we are setting out to write a natural philosophy. We shall (1) first of all go to the theory of science, and try to turn its criticisms to account in the special field of natural science. We shall, that is, pick out and examine the particular presup- positions upon which natural science depends. (2) We shall endeavour, secondly, to bring together in our natural philosophy all the contributions that natural science makes to metaphysics, and so clear the ground for a theory of the universe, so far as it can be built up upon scientific foundations. (3) Lastly, we may be able to work upon the third problem by raising new questions or erecting new hypotheses upon the basis of facts already known. — The same thing holds of philosophical psychology, and would hold of a philosophical ethics, if there had been opportunity for its development alongside of a special moral science. These facts show that we were right to give up an unitary definition of philosophy, and recognise a number of heterogeneous philosophical problems. In no other way could we explain how a bundle of entu-ely different ends or purposes, held together by the unity of the subject-matter in, which they are realised, comes to constitute a distinct discipline. And we are now further in a position to decide how far philosophical questions or philosophical points of view may justly be introduced into scientific exposi- tion. Philosophy must not assume an attitude of cahn aloofness towards the special sciences, and must not shield itself behind the high sounding — and empty — generality of the systematisation of scientific knowledge. It must stand in close and constant relation to the sciences, acting and reacting, taking from them what they have to give, and giving to them liberally of what they need. § 32. The Philosophical System 241 § 32. The Philosophical System. 1. From a scientific system we demand on the one side a complete classification of the ideas employed, and on the other a complete deduction of the positions held. That is the ideal of a scientific system j but there is hardly a single discipline that even approximates to it. Logic and mathematics are the only sciences which meet the requirements in any degree at all. It is, further, an essential precondition of an unitary system that the science admits of accurate definition ; the definition is the only guarantee of an internal and necessary connection among the principles or ideas distinguished by classification. It follows, therefore, that philosophy as a whole — the philosophy of § 31 — cannot be reduced to a system. (1) In the first place, the heterogeneity of the separate philosophical problems renders deduction from a sin^ejjighest definition impossible ; (2) and secondly, the variation in the subject-matter of the third problem makes philosophy dependent upon time and accident to a degree that is incompatible with the logical and universal vahdity of a systematic structure. But if we can have no hope of framing a system of philosophy in general, we need not despair of systematising certain departments of philosophical activity. We wiU. therefore attempt, in what follows, to set forth the main heads of a systematic arrangement within the three great divisions of i philosophy. At the same time we shall append brief remarks upon the method of exposition best suited to the difierent problems. 2. Metaphysics, as a theory of the universe based both upon science and upon the experience of practical life, falls into a general and a special part. General metaphysics developes the highest or ultimate principle of a world theory, and tries to make it adequate to all -the various requirements of scientific hypothesis and daily practice. Special metaphysics paves the way for this general treatment, by shaping the results of science to meet metaphysical needs. Adopting the current classification of science as mental and natural, we may subdivide special 242 Introduction to Philosophy metaphysics into a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of mind : the expressions have found acceptance La phUosopy, though neither of them is free from objection (c/. § 8. 11). From the metaphysics of nature we expect an orderly exposition of the material which the natural sciences contribute to a theory of the universe. It wOl get this material, for the most part, from astronomy, physics and geology on the one hand, and the biological sciences on the other. The metaphysics of mind we expect, similarly, to gather metaphysical material from the mental sciences. It will receive most assistance from psychology, ethics, the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of history. Since a metaphysics without transcendence seems to be impossible, and speculation can be exercised so much more freely and boldly in general than in special metaphysics, it would seem that the synthetic method is that best suited to the first great depart- ment of philosophical enquiry. Special metaphysics is an indispensable precondition of general. Hence we do not approve of the ordinary plan of placing ontology {i.e., general metaphysics) before cosmology and psychology {i.e., practically, the metaphysics of nature and of mind). Such an arrangement completely inverts the logical relation of the disciplines. 3. The theory of science has to investigate the presuppositions of all the sciences. It falls at once into two parts, corresponding to the distinction of 7nat^al and formal presuppositions. Any thought can be considered separately under the two aspects of form and contents ; and any science, or system of thoughts, can be looked at from the same points of view. The great divisions of the theory of science thus obtained are episteinology anS logic. Epistemology deals with the contents of the most general or highest concepts of all the sciences; logic with the uniformities of scientific thought. "Withm this first division we may make another, and distinguish between pure or general and applied or special epistemology and logic. The former are restricted to so much of form or contents as is common to all the sciences; the latter analyse and verify the formal and material presuppositions of particular sciences or groups of sciences. There are accord- § 32. The Philosophical System 243 ingly an epistemology and logic of the natural sciences, of mathematics, of the mental sciences, etc. The method which, in the nature of things, can best be followed by the theory of science is the method of analysis. Philosophy is not here concerned to supplement scientific results by new ideas, but only to analyse and classify, as accurately as may be, the material that the sciences themselves provide. Here too, therefore, the special or applied enquiry is the logical presupposition of the pure or general. Epistemology and logic most nearly approach the ideal of complete classification and deduction ; and so have yet another claim to rank as the fundamental philosophical sciences (c/. § § 5. 5, 6 ; 6. 4). 4. It is, of course, impossible to give a priori a list of sciences for which philosophy shall pave the way, or in which its methods shall stimulate to new activity. We cannot, therefore, hope to obtain any systematic classification of the lines of work included in the third philosophical problem. We can only indicate the status of afiairs at the present day, i.e., name the special sciences which, as things are, stand indebted to philosophy. It foUows from what we said in our second Chapter with regard to the special philosophical disciplines, that psychology, ethics, sesthetics, sociology and, in part, the philosophy of religion, would faU under this category. We must note, however, that when a department of philosophical knowledge becomes capable of standing alone, as a special science, it does not break free of philosophy altogether, but simply divides up into a philosophical and a scientific part. This is what will, undoubtedly, occur in the case of the five disciplines just mentioned. The division has gone farthest in psychology, and next farthest, perhaps, in sociology. In both instances it would be easy to show the need and scope of philo- sophical treatment, alongside of independent scientific work. The path which philosophy follows under such circumstances is best seen by reference to the philosophy of nature, where the separation is already complete. All departments of philosophy — metaphysics, epistemelogy and logic, and perhaps the unnamed discipline that points out new scientific problems or criticises the 244 Introduction to Philosophy theories of the special sciences from which it takes a name — all departments of philosophy have here comhined to devote their energies to one definite object (c/. § 31. 6). For this reason we took pains in Chapter II., when we were formidating the special problems of a philosophy of nature, a philosophy of law and a philosophy of religion, in the philosophical meaning of the terms, to emphasise the great variety of their contents. 5. The country of science was at first a monarchy ; but in the course of ages monarchy has given place to democracy. In the old time Queen Philosophy held undivided sway over the special disciplines, — settled their difierences, gave them wise counsel, and offered freely of her treasure of ideas and methods to satisfy their needs. And they came in brUliant companies, zealous to follow the hest of their sovereign, to model their carriage upon hers, to use her wealth for the increase of their own portion. Then on a sudden they awoke, as if from an evU dream. The way that had been shown them had led them astray ; the treasures they received were but worthless tinsel; and the fair proud form of the queen herself, the fonn they had all aped and envied, a lying perfection. So they hurled her from the throne. There followed years of self-reliance, that were years of pros- perity and success. But prosperity quickly led to arrogance and impatience of restraint. Soon there was no trace left of the order and system of the old kmgdom : anarchy reigned, and the sciences were an unruly mob, none regarding its neighbour. In the meantime the outcast and despised queen had pondered much ; she had thrown aside the hollow fruits of dialectic, and learned to be careful and accurate in small things, and to bow to the constraining power of facts. And when the busy-bodies of her old court would have laid violent hands upon the abandoned sceptre, and in their blindness chosen the soulless puppet of materialism to rule over them, then she stepped forth in the strong armour of epistemology to turn the storm, and with plain, wise words send back the rebels to their borders. Since that day her authority has steadily increased, not least because men see that the lust of power is gone out of her. She lives to-day in peaceful intercourse with § 32- The Philosophical System 245 her former subjects. By science, with science, and for science she works in all her forms : as metaphysics, as theory of science, and as pioneer of scientific enquiry. And science, on its side, is ready to accept the aid of philosophy, with her to serve the cause of knowledge, and for her to gather facts. It has been the aim of this Introduction to show that in the democracy of science philosophy has lost nothing of her true and proper usefulness, but labours and struggles with the ideal of her past ^ories ever present to her. INDEX OF NAMES ^nesidemus: 190 Ahrens: 78 d'Alembert: 16 Allen: 87 Anaxagoras: 113, 133 Anaximander: 113 Anaximenes: 48, 113 Aristippus: 69 Aristotle: 9, 15, 21, 31, 32, 39, 40, 41, 48, 49> 56, 60, 69, 81, 82, 114, 134, 146, 162, 163, 165, 182, 188, 216, 223, 228 Atomists: 48, 49, 113, 116 Avenarius : 38, 59, 193, 204 Bacon, Francis: 10, 15, 19, 40, 72, 182, 192, 224, 232 Bacon, Roger: 49 Bain: 66 Barth: 100 Baumgarten: 82, 83 Bayle: 73, 190 Becker: 102 Beneke: 12, 61 Bentham: 217, 232 Bergbohm: 79 Berkeley: 26, 40, 129, 195 Bernheim: 98 Berzelius: 13 Boileau: 82 du Bois-Reymond : 123 Bonitz: 9 Bonnet : 62, 63 Boole: 45 Bosanquet : 47, 90 Bradley: 47 Brentano: 61, 214 Briegleb: 3 Bruno: 127, 170 Buckle: 169 BUchner: 119, 120 Burke: 82 Busse: 38 Butler: 73 Caird: 93 Carri^re: 85 Cartesius, see Descartes Carus': 67 Charron: 190 Chrysippus: 39 Cicero : 8, 9 Clarke: 73, 210, 217 Cohen: 26, 38, 90 Comte: 19, 26, 98, 99, 192, 194, 218, 224, 233 Copernicus: 49 Crusius: 163 Cudworth : 73, 210, 216 Cumberland: 210, 218, 224, 232. Cusanus, Nicolaus: 49 Cynics: 232 Cyrenaics: 69, 224, 227 Darwin; 148, 211 Democritus: 31, 49, 113, 117, 145 JU^ 248 Index of Names Descartes: 10, 19, 22, 40, 47, Ji, 60, 73, 114, 126, 134, 147, 162, 163, 164, 173, 176, 177, 182, 188, 209, 224 Deussen: 30 Diderot: 51 Dieterich: 30 Drews: 172 Drobisch: 42, 161 Dubos: 82 ' Duhring: 22, IIJ, 171, 193 Eleatics: 113, 115, 170, 182 Elsenhans: 214 Empedocles: 113 Epicureans: 9, 15, 49, 117, 192, 216, 223, 224, 228 Erdmann: 42 Erhardt, F. : 38, 153 Erhardt, S. : 2 Eucken: 112 Fechner: 63, 64, 87, 88, 115, 140, 143 Fester: 100 Feuerbach: 171, 218 Fichte, J. G. : 11, 24, 25, 30, 33, 74. "4. "S. 141. 170, I9S. 210. 217, 224, 234 Fichte, I. H. : 163, 172 Fick: 34 Sint: 100 fftiigel: H2, 181 Galen: 60 Galilei: 31, 49, 50, 201 Geulincx: 134 von Gizycki: 233 Goring: 186 Groos: 90 Grosse: 90 - Grotius: 78 Gruber: 14, 194 Gutberlet: 161 \ Halleux: J 94 Hanne: 93 Harms: 42, 67 Hartley: 62, 129 von Hartmann: 22, 7Si 9°) 93i IIS, 141. 172, 206, 207, 224, Z33. 23s Haym: 14 Hegel: 11, 17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 29, 33. 42, 52, 65, 74, 84, 8S, 93> 114 IIS, "9, 141. 164, 170, 198, 207, 211, 217, 224, 230 Heinze: 14 Helmholtz: 13, 34 Helvetius: 73, 211, 227 Heraclides Ponticus : 7 Heraclitus: 113 Herbart: 2, 3, 11, 14, 18, 22, 24, 33, 42, 61, 66, 74, 77, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 109, 114, 128, 148, 155, 162, 163, 166, 173, 176, 178, 207, 210, 224 Herbert of Cherbury : 168 Herder : 83, 96, 99 Hermann: 96 Herodotus: 7 Heydenreich: 3 Heymans: 38 Hirth: 87 Hobbes: 10, 31, 40, 71, 72, 118, 145, 182, 207, 216, 224, 232 Hobhouse: 39 Hoffding: 66 Holbach: Si, 118, 14S, 2H Home: 82 Hooke: 118 Hume: 26, 32, 40, 73, 137, 164, 174, 182, 184, 188, 190, 191, 192, 224 Hutcheson: 218, 224 Ihering: 79 lonians: 21, 47, 113 Index of Names 249 James: 66 Janet: 153 Jevons: 45 Jodl : 67, 76 Kant: 3, 11, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 32, 33. 34. 41. S'. 52. 54, 74. 75, 78, 82, 83, 84, 92, 93. "4. 121, 147, 148, 151, 155. 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 173, 176, 178, 182, 183, 187, 188, 190, 193, 194, 195, 198, 204, 209, 210, 217, 221, 224, 225, 230, 234 Kepler: 49 Kirchmann: 208 Konig: 153, 206 Kostlin: 85 Kiause: 78, 170, 224 Kroman: 54 Kuhnemann: 84 Kiilpe: 59 Laas: 26, 192, 193 Ladd: 66 Lambert: 183 La Mettrie: 118, 119 Lange: 26, 117, 126 Lasson: 79 Lasswitz: 26, 55 Lazarus: 64 von Leclair: 198 Leibniz: 22, 29, 32, 41, 57, 74, 82, 109, 114, 115, 126, 127, 128, 132, 146, 148, 154, 161, 162, 163, 173, 176, 180, 182, 183, 188, 209, 217, 224, 230 Leonardo da Vinci : 82 Lessing : 83 Leucippus: 113, 117. '45 Liebmann: 112, 183 Liebig: 13 Lipps: 12, 42, 61, 230 Locke: 31, 32, 40, JZ, 58,61, 71, 72, 73, 168, 169, 182, 188, 192, 210, 211, 224, 232 Longinus: 81 Lorimer: 79 Lotze: 13, 22, 29, 30, 34, 38, 42, 62, 96, 109, no, 112, iij, 128, 137, 141, 148. 15s, 162, 163, 164, 173, 176, 180, 210, 224 Lucretius: 118 Mach, E. : 34, S9, 125, 204 Mach, F. R. J. : 161 Maine: 79 Manchot: 161 Martineau: 93 Maxwell: 13 Meier: 83 Melancthon : 40, 60 Melissus: 113 Meyer: 42 Michelet: 96 Mill: 41, 182, 193, 200, 217, 233 Moleschott: 119, 120, 121 Montaigne: 190 Natorp: 26 Newton: 19,202 Nietzsche: 232 Occasionalists : 1 34 Oken: 52 Parmenides: 113, 170 Paulsen: 2, 3, 12, 75, 112, 113, 143, 174, 175, '7»t _233 . Pfleiderer, E. : 234 Pfleiderer, O. : 93 Pierce: 46 Platner: 60 Plato: 8, 14, 21, 30, 39, 48, 49, 68, 69, 81, lOl, 114, IIS, "26, 134, 146, 162, 163, 165, 182, 188, 216, 223, 228 25° Index of Names Plotinus: 8i Prantl: 42 Priestley: 62 Protagoras: 26, 192 Pyrrho : 190 Pythagoras: 7, loi, 113 Ramus, Petrus: 40 Ranke: 13 Rawenhoff: 93 Rehmke: 66, 198 von Reichlin-Meldegg : 3 Reimarus: 169 Reinhold : 3, 24, igo Riehl: 38, 183, 193 Ritschl: 34 Rocholl: 97 Rougemont: 100 Rousseau: 74, 218, 232 Savigny : 13 Schasler: 90 Schelling: 2, 24, 25, 33, 51, 52, 74,86, 114, 115, 141, 147,211 Schiller: 84 Schlegel: 86 Schleiermacher : 21, 75, 93, 210, 224 Scholastics: 39, 216 Scholten: 161 Schopenhauer: 22, 24, 30, 33, 75, 86, 87, 114, 130, 132, 15s, 178, 196, 206, 210, 224 Schroder: 46 von Schubert-Soldern : 38 Schultze, F. : 54 Schulze, G. E. : 190 Schuppe: 38, 42, 79, 198 Schwarz: 206 Sextus Empiricus : 190 Seydel: 93 Shaftesbury: 73, 82, 218, 224, 228 Sidgwick: 75, 76,235 Siebeck: 67, 93 Sigwart: 42, 97, 147, 153, 235 Simmel: 75, 100 Smith: 73, 218, 224 Socrates: 8, 68, 71, 189, 207, 216, 223, 228 Solon: 7 Sophists: 8 Spencer: 19, 20, 26, 64, 75, 98, 140, 193, 212, 224 Spinoza: 22, 41, 60, 71, 74, 109, III, 114, 126, 140, 14s, 154, 170, 177, 182, 188, 224 Steffens: 52 von Stein : 90 Steinthal: 64 Stirling: 79 Stoics: 9, IS, 39, 69, 170, 216, 223, 232 Stout: 67 Striimpell: 4 Suabediss: 2 Tafel: 194 Taine: 13, 87 Telesius: 49 Tetens: 61, 63, 154 Thales: 113 Thomas Aquinas: 67, 216 Thucydides: 7 Tindal: 92, 169 Titchener: 67 Toland: 92, 118, 169 Traeger: 161 Trendelenburg: 42, 78, 165 Ueberweg: 11, 12, 14,42, 121 Ulrici: 163 Vacherot: 133 Venn: 45 Index of Names 251 Vischer: 81, 85 Vives! 60 Vogt: 119, 121 Volkelt: 38 Volkmann: 66, l8l Voltaire: 169 Wachter: 13 Wagner: 63 Walch: I, 3 Wallaschek: 79 Walther: 90 Watson: 235 Weber: 63 Weisse: 85, 163 Whewell: 55 Williams: 214 Willmann: 206 Windelband: 14, 112, 183 Winkelmann: 83 Witte: 181 Wolff: 10, 16, 19, 22, 23, 29, 41, 51, 61, 82, 159, 182, 217, 230 Wundt: II, 17, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29, 30, 38, 42, 62, 64, 66, 75, 97, IIS, 129, 139. 147, i74i 178, 181, 204, 212, 213, 224, 230, 231, 233, 23s Xenophanes: 113, 170 Zeising: 85, 88 Zeno, Eleatic: 113 Zeno, Stoic: 39 Ziegler: 76 Zimmermann: 86 INDEX OF SUBJECTS References to the more important passages are printed in italics Absolute: 17, 25, 26, 114, 128, 141, 164, 19s Accountability: 154, 155, 760 Actuality, Theory of: 65, lo8,772ff. Esthetics: 13, 18, 20, 66f., 81^., I04f., 243 Agnosticism: sbi., 140, 193 Altruism: inf., 213, 224^., 229, 234 Analytics: 39 Animal psychology : 64 Animism: I39f. Anthropology: 16 A posteriori: 36, 184 Apperception: S7 A priori, Apriorism: ^af., 3b, $2, 72ff., 78, 80, 83, 91, III, 116, 181^., 2ogS., 217 Art: 12, 65, 8lff., 44, 67, 214 Associatonist psychology: 66 Atheism: 92, 108, 161, 169, i^if. Atomism: 54, 118, 125, 14S Autonomy: inf., so^f. Bad: 69, 77, 227 Beauty: 69, 81 S. Body: 31, So, 56ff., 65, 114, i^8ff. 128, 132, 143, 20S(. Category: 16, 32f. 2J2 Causality: 35, S3. 6S. 80, 98, 108, 1231, iSSl, 144, i4SS; IS3. 'SS, iS9f., i6sf., 1841, 238 Christianity: 7of., 92; 154, 2l6f. 224, 226, 228 Concept: 4ofr., 441., 68, i63f., 192 Connate, see Innate Conscience: 72, sogff., 228, 233 Consciousness: 6s, no, 119, I32f., 139, IS7. 173. 178, i94f-, f9Sf; 204f. Contents, Esthetics of: 84 Cosinalog^76fj_22£j SI) 242 Criticism: 23, 27, no, 112, iSiff., 187, igiS. Definition: 7 Deism: 92, 108, 116, 161, 163, 166, i68i. • Dependency: SSf., 63, 73jf., I49f. Descent, Theory of: S4> 148 Desire, Faculty of: 16, 178 Determinism: 71, 108, 7j'jff. Development, see Evolution Dialectic, Dialectical: 14, 17, 2 if., 30. 39. 96, n6, 141, 190, 198, 230 Dogmatic, Dogmatism: 32, nof., 121, iS^e. Dualism: 23, 65, 107, n6f., 121, ■Wffi. 139, I4iff-. I4S. 162,. 177 Index of Subjects 253 Duty: 70, 73, 75, 92, no, 208, 217, 220, 222, 228, 230, 232, 234 Dynamic: s^t 123, 129, 202 Economics: 16 Ego: 23, 25, 74, 114, 141, /pj-ff. Egoism: iii, 213, 2241., 229, 234 Empirical, Empiricism : 1 7, 54, 77, 80, $7, 94ffi, liof., 113, 116, /■?/ff., 188, 2og%, 217 End, see Purpose Energism: 112 Energy: 37, 54, 122, 131, 137,203 Entelechy: 56 Episteraology: 11, 14, 18, 20, joff., S3f., S7f., 65, 79, 92f., 97, loof., 102, 104, io6f., Uoff., 113, 119, 121, i24f., 131, 133, 142, 144, 181^., 236, 242, 244 Ethics: 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 31, 66, 67ff., 81, 85, 89, 104, 107, iioff., 117, 156, 158, 161, 195, so^S., 240, 242, 243, see Feeling, Ethics of; Reflexion, Ethics of Ethnic psychology, see Psychology of peoples EudEemonism: 76, inf., ssyfi., 233 f- Evolution: 35, 37, S2f., 97, g8t., 148, 209, 21 iff., 23oi. Evolutionism : 76, 11 1, 509 ff. , 2jof. Experience: 24, 26, 3 if., 36, 48, 51, S6,5 ^37, 24^ Utilitarianism : i n, 217, 228, sjsf. Value, Judgments of: 73, 75, 77. 129, 152, 22b Virtue: bgti., 73S., 75, 167, 216 Vital spirits : 60 Vitalism: 54, 148 Voluntarism: 65, io8f., 172, 777ff. Will: 65, 73, 77, 80,87, 108, n4, i29f., 132, ISO, iS3fE, 172, 178R., 200, 208, 212, 2I4ff., 2I9ff. PLYMOUTH : W. BRENDON AND SON, PRINTERS.