BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF Bcnrg W. Sage 1S91 A'l^oyyf ' '-' A^////^^;; Cornell University Library VA40 .R32 Modern ships of war. olin 3 1924 030 753 564 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030753564 a 6 bo I 03 CQ O H O O ciS" o ►J <1 03 H O H P3 H M H ^r MODERN SHIPS OF WAR BY SIR EDWAED J. REED, M.P. I.ATE CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR OF THE BRITISH NAVY EDWARD SIMPSON REAR-ADMIRAL U.S.N. , LATE PRESIDENT U.S. NAVAL ADVISORY BOARD WITH SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTERS AND NOTES BY J. D. JERROLD KELLEY LIEUTENANT U.S.N. AUTHOR OF "the QUESTION OF SHIPS" " ARSIOEED VESSELS" ETC. ILLUSTEATED NEW YORK HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE 18 88 Copyright, 1887, by Harper & Brothers. All rights reserved. PREFACE. 4 FTER many years of neglect, the people of this country have -^^^ aAvakened to the necessity of creating a modern fleet. Frond as they were of the Navy's achievements in the past, they failed for a long time to exhibit any interest in its present or future, and met all claims for its re-establishment hy a denial of its usefulness, or by a lazy opti- mism of indifference which smilingly put the question by. Indeed, at one time, the popular solicitude disappeared completely, and outside of the service there was manifested neither an alarm at its degeneracy nor an appreciation of the dangers this made possible. With an apathy inexplicable upon any rational grounds, the notes of warning sounded by experts were unheeded, and the law-makers contented themselves by pinning their faith to what they called " the creative possibilities of American genius." They accepted this fallacy as a fact, they made this phrase a fetich, and with a fatuous hope believed it could, by some oc- cult inspiration, in the event of sudden, sharp, and short war, save them from the fighting-machines which twenty years of tireless ex]3eriment had perfected aljroad. In the end, hj a neatly balanced policy of pride and folly, the Navy was exhausted almost to dissolution. Then Con- gress lazily bestirred itself to action, and prescribed as a remedy three unarmored cruisers and a despatch-boat. Heroic treatment, not homoeopathy, was needed ; but, thanks to a naturally vigorous constitution, the bolus sufficed to lift the patient out of the throes, and to encourage him into a languid convalescence. Lucki- ly, the vessels became a party c|uestion, and their historic tribulations did so much towards educating the nation that a public sentiment was aroused which made a modern navy possible. It must be confessed, however, that the demand even yet is not so vociferous as to dominate aU other issues, though there is apparent everywhere a quickening de- sire for the country to take, if not the first, at least a respectable, place among the great maritime powers. yi PREFACE. With these new ideas came a desire for information Avliich could not be satisfied, because, curiously enough, the popular literature of the sub- ject is meagre, or rather it is unavailable. There are treatises in plenty which soar beyond the skies of any but experts ; there are handy manu- als wherein the Navy, Mke the banjo, is made easy in ten lessons ; but between these extremes nothing exists which is accurate, and at the same time free from those dismal figures and dry-as-dust facts that are so apt to discourage a reader at the outset. To meet this want, which was one by no means "long felt," these articles were originally pubhshed in Harper'' s Magazine^ and with a suc- cess that seemed to justify their collection in a more available, if not a more permanent, form. It ma}" ha said now that no changes of any moment have l)een made in the text, that the notes attempt only to luring down the data to the latest date, and that the appendices are need- ful additions which the limited space of a monthly publication neces- sarily forbade. The reader who has not foUowed the progress of naval war construction will undoubtedly find many surprises, l^oth in achieve- ment and promise, which may be difficult to understand, yet it is hoped that the non-technical manner in which Sir Edward Reed and Eear- admiral Simpson have written will do much to make plain this impor- tant National question. Both these gentlemen are authorities of the first rank, both are luminous writers, and each in his own country and own sphere has had an important influence upon war-ship design and armament. To those who read within the lines there awaits a morti- fying reahzation of our inferiority ; for during all the years that this country — masterful beyond compare in other material struggles — was so successfully neglecting its navy, foreign designers were achieving triumphs which are marvellous. "WitJi this knowledge there is sure to come a high appreciation of the intelligence exercised ; for the evoluti(jn of the battle-ship has l>een so rajnd, and the residtant type has S(.^ little in common with the wooden vessel of our war, that tliose avIio have solved the problems have practically created a new science. CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 1 THE BRITISH NAVY 12 Notes 52 THE FRENCH NAVY 67 Notes 92 THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 104 Notes 134 Italy 134 Russia 139 Spain 141 Austria 144 THE UNITED STATES NAVY 148 Notes 183 UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY 194 Notes 220 Guns 226 Machine and Rapid-fire Guns 234 SHIPS OF THE MINOR NAVIES 241 Till CONTENTS. PAGE APPENDIX 1 351 Submarine Warfare 351 Torpedoes 359 A Naval Reserve 361 Forced Draft 363 APPENDIX II 367 The Question of Types 367 APPENDIX III 283 Range of Guns 383 ILLUSTRATIONS. The Battle op Trafalgar, October 21, 1805. — From a drawing by ^ J. O. Davidson ^ Frontispiecs. The "Victory" 13 Ttie "Glatton" 15 The ' ' Dreadnought " 17 The "Inflexible " 19 Section of the " Amiral Duperre" 23 Section of the " Inflexible " 23 Section of the " Collingwood" 28 New Admiralty Ship 23 The ' ' Devastation " 24 The "Sultan" 27 Section and Plan of the "Alexandra". . 28 Section and Plan of the "Temeraire". . 28 Section and Plan of the "Nelson" 29 Section and Plan of the "Shannon"... 29 The "Alexandra" 30 The " Temeraire " 81 The "Hotspur" 84 The " Warspite " 87 Transverse Section of the "Mersey"... 38 The ' ' Inconstant " 41 The ' ' Colossus " 48 Transverse Section of one of the New " Scouts" 49 The ' ' Jumna " 50 The "Devastation:" French Armored Ship of the First Class 73 The "Courbet" (formerly the " Pou- droyant ") : French Armored Ship of the First Class 75 The ' ' Richelieu " 77 The "Amiral Duperre;" French Armor- ed Ship of the First Class 81 The "Vengeur:" French Iron-clad Coast- guard Vessel 87 British Torpedo Gun-boat of the "Grass- hopper" Class (side view) 90 The "Grasshopper" — Plan of Upper Deck, Poop, and Forecastle 90 The "Duilio" 105 Section of the " Italia" 110 Deck Plan of the " Italia" 110 The "Italia" Ill The " Esmeralda" 113 The " Amerigo Vespucci " 115 The " Catherine II." 119 Half-deck Plan of the " Sachsen" 121 Side Elevation of the " Sachsen" 121 Half -deck Plan of the " Kaiser " 122 ILLUSTRATIONS. Side Elevation of tlic " Kaiser" 122 The ■' Sachseu " 133 U. S. Side-wheel Steamer "Powhatan" 150 U. S. Frigate " Frankliu," of the " Merri- mac " Class 153 U. S. Sloop-of-war "Hartford" 153 U. S. Sloop-of-war " Brooklyn " 154 U. S. Sloop-of-war ' ' Kearsarge " 155 U. S. Iron-clad " New Ironsides" 156 U. S. Monitor "Passaic" 156 U. S. Double-turreted Monitor "Terror" 157 U. S. Frigate " Tennessee " 159 U. S. Sloop-of-war "Adams" 160 U. S. Sloop-of-war " Marion" 161 U. S. Sloop-of-war "Alert " (Iron) 163 U. S. Sloopof-war " Trenton" 163 U. S. Frigate "Chicago " (Steel) 169 Deck Plans of the U. S. Frigate "Chi- cago," showing Battery 171 Deck Plan of the U. S. Sloop - of - war "Atlanta," showing Battery 171 U. S. Sloop-of-war "Atlanta" (Steel).. 173 U. S. Despatch-boat ' ' Dolphin " 176 Light Draught Coast - defence Vessel, with Deck Plan 180 The Howell Torpedo 182 Bronze Breech-loading Cannon captured in Coroa, age unknown 194 Bronze Breech-loader used by Cortez in Mexico 195 Breech-loader captured in the War with Mexico 196 Bronze 13-pouuder, "El Neptuno," 1781 197 U. S. N. Carronade, Slide, and Carriage 198 U. S. N. Medium 33-pounder 199 U. S. N. 9-inch Dahlgren (9-inch Smooth- bore) 301 Horizontal Section of Mill wall Shield. . 204 A Krupp Gun on a Naval Carriage... 306 Alfred Krupp 207 Breech-loading Rifle-tube ready for re- ceiving Jacket 210 Breech-loading Rifle-jacket, Rough-bored and Turned 310 Putting the Jacket on a 6-inch Breech- loading Rifle-tube 211 Breech - loading Rifle after receiving Jacket 314 A Krupp Hammer 315 Transporting Cannon at Bremerhaven . . 217 Breech - loading Rifle after receiving Jacket and Chase Hoops 218 Breech-loading Rifle with Jacket, Chase Hoops, and Jacket Hoops in place. . 218 U. S. N. 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle. . . 218 Cartridge Case and Grains of Powder, U. S. N 220 Common Shells, U. S. N 220 Unburned and Partially Consumed Grains of U. S. N. Powder 333 Section of U. S. N. 6-inch Built-up Steel Breech-loading Rifle 223 Broadside Carriage for 6 -inch Breech- loading Rifle 233 Rapid-firing Single-shot Hotchkiss Gun 334 New 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 238 Longitudinal Plans of Nordenfeldt Boat 254 The Submarine JNIonitor "Peacemaker" 257 MODEEN SHIPS OF WAE. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. T~\ITTirN(T the last thirty years the changes in naval science have -L^ been so much greater than in its whole previous history as to be epoch-making. Eetween the wooden vessel of 1857 and the metal ma- chine of 1S87 there exist in common only the essential principles that each is a water-borne structure, armed Avith guns and propelled hj steam. Beyond this everything is chairged — model, material, machinerj^, rig, armament, equipment. In truth, so radical are the differences, and so sudden have been the developments, that authorities are widely sep- arated in o})inion, even u})on such a primary question as a universally accepted system of classification. But as this is necessary to a proper appreciation of the sul^ject, a generahzation may be ]nade in which wai*- vessels are divided into armored and unarmored types, the former in- cluding l)attle-ships, and the latter those employed in the police of the seas, in commerce protection or destruction, or in the attack of positions which are defenceless. In the absence of any accepted differentiations of these classes, the new British nomenclature may be adopted with safety, for to a certain degree it explains the terms and includes the types now used so vari- ously in different navies. Under this armored vessels are grouped into (1) battle-ships, (2) cruisers, (3) special types, such as rams and torpedo- boats, and (-t) coast - service ships ; and unarmored vessels cora]U'ise (1) cruisers, (2) sloops, (3) gun- vessels, (4) gun-boats, (5) despatch-vessels, and (6) torpedo- vessels. "As it was impossible to unite aU the qualities which are to be desired in a ship-of-war in a single vessel, it became necessary to divide the leading types into subdivisions, each specially adajited to the use of a particular arm, or to perform some special service. For the battle -ships designed for naval operations in European waters great offensive and defensive powers and evolutionary qualities are essential, 2 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. while tlie highest sea-going qualities, including habital)ility, are, in the opinion of some, less essential. For sea-going Ijattle-ships offensive and defensive strength must be partially sacrihced in order to secure uncjues- tionahle sea-worthiness. In ocean-going hattle-ships canvas is a valuable auxiliar}^ In battle-ships for European waters, masts and yards involve a useless sacrifice of fighting power. . . . Heavily armored ships intended for the hue of battle must necessarily carry powerful guns. They must be able to traverse great distances, and must therefore have considera- ble storage for coal. Great speed is recjuired to enable them to meet the inevitable contingencies of an engagement. In a word, the class of ships which may be called battery-ships must be furnished with very consideral:)le offensive and defensive power. Their great size, however, and the enormous weight of their armor and armament, necessitate such displacements as render them unfit for coast defence " (Beassey). While the antagonistic elements of offence, defence, speed, or endur- ance have caused the main differences of design in all types, the greatest variances with battle-ships are found in the distribution of armor for jirotection. A hasty summarization of the policies now adopted Ijy the great maritime nations sho-ws that the French generally adhere to a complete armor-belt at the water-line, that the Italians have in their latest ships totally abandoned side-armor, and that the English favor its partial employment. The popular idea that armor consists only of thick slabs of wrought-iron or steel, or of steel-faced iron, bolted to a ship's side, is erroneous. " In the earlier broadside ships," writes the present director of English naval construction, Mr. W. II. White, " this view was practically correct ; they had no armor or protected decks, the decks being covered only by thin plates fitted for structural purposes. But in the I)<-mHi(itioii class, and all subsequent ships, considerable and increas- ing weights of material are Avorked into the deck armor, and with good reason. Experiments showed conclusively that horizontal protection at the top of the armor-belt, or citadel, was of vital necessity, and even now (188T) it is open to question Avhether the ])rovision made for horizontal protection in relation to vertical armor is as large as it might advanta- geously be." The factors which have most influenced the jtroblem are the tor- pedo, ram, and g-un. Of these the last is indubitably of the highest importance, for the number and nature, the effective liandling, the dis- position and command, and the relative protection of the guns are the elements which control most powerfully the principles of ship design, hi the first stage of the contest between gun and armor the defence -was INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 3 victorious, but so rapidly have the art and science of or(hiance devel- oped that to-day the power of the hea\aest pieces as compared with the resistance of the heaviest armor is greater than ever before. The story of the contest can Ije briefly told. In 18.5.S tlie armament of the newest ships was principally a broadside battery of 32-pounders ; in this were included a few .5( 1-pound shell guns and one or two eight- inch GS-pounders, though of the whole numljer not one had an energy, that is, a force of blow when striking, sufficient to penetrate four and a half inches of Avronght-iron at short range. In the earliest iron-clads — the French La Glolre and the English AYarrior — batteries mainly of nine -inch calibre were carried, the latter mounting forty guns of all kinds. The Minotaur, the first representative ol the next English type, had fifty guns, but after this class Avas launched there appeared that dis- tinctively modern tendency to decrease the number of pieces while in- creasing the intensity of their fire. The succeeding vessels carried from fourteen to twelve pieces, until, in IST-t, the principle of concentration reached its maximum in giving the Inflexihle only four guns. These, like the Warrior s, were muzzle-loaders, and their relative dimensions and power may be compared as follows : Warrior. Inflexihh. 4-] tons HO tons Lcn"'th . . . 10 feet. ! 26 feet 9 inches. 8 inches. i 16 inches. 16 pounds. . 4.')0 pounds. 68 " ! 1700 '• 4.52 foot-tons. ' 26,370 foot-tons. None. .... 23 incl]es. Powder cliarf^e . Energy at 1000 yards Penetration of 4i inches of wroufrlit-iron at sliort ran!i:e Penetration of wronylit iron at 1000 yards The term energy, when employed to indicate the work that a gun can perform, is expressed in foot-tons, and signifies that the amount de- veloped is sufficient to raise the given weight in tons to the height of one foot. The piercing power of the Infle:rU)l k h projectile was, under the same conditions of charge and range, sufficient to penetrate twenty-fi\^e feet of granite and concrete masonry, or thirty-two feet of the best Port- land cement. When the thickness of armor-plating increased, gun-makers tried to overcome the resistance ])y giving greater energy to the shot. As this required large charges of powder and verv long guns, muzzle-loaders be- came impracticable on shipboard, and were supplanted by breech-loaders. From this stage guns developed greatly in power until, in 1882, those 4 MODERN SHirS OF WAR. desi,ii'ned i'<-\ wherein the principal guns, much reduced in number, were carried in a l^ox battery amidships, and given a fore-and-aft fire by means of recessed ports or outlying batteries. In 18(10 the Admiralty adopted the hrtastworh monitor, a low free-boarded structure, vtdiich was plated from stem to stern in the region of the -water-line, and had in its central porti(jn an armored breastwork that carried at each end a revolving turret. In 1870 this type was pronounced unsafe, and after a careful investigation by a special committee on design certain modifications were recom- mended. These did not affect materially the essential features of Sir Edward Keed's plan, for the complete water-line belt and the central armored battery were retained ; and to-day many of the critics who then denounced it claim that, after all, it is the true type of an ideal battle- ship. In 1872 the Italian naval authorities accepted the conclusions of the British committee, and laid down the first central citadel battle-ships, now known as the Duilio and Dandolo; and about the same time Mr. Barnaby, the new Chief Constructor of the British jSTavy, brought for- ward a similar design in the Inflexihle. The engines, boilers, and the bases of two turrets in this vessel are protected by an armored box- 6 MODERN SHirS OF WAR. shaped citadel, fi'(jm the extremities of which a liorizontal armored deck extends fore and aft l)elow tlie water-line ; above this deck an ar- mored superstructure completes the free-board, au.d has its unprotected spaces at the water-line, subdivided into numerous water-tight compart- ments. This sliip met with so nuicli hostile criticism that a committee was appointed to investigate the charges, but in the end the Admiralty plans were oflticially sustained. The French, with characteristic ability and inde]iendence, have in the mean time made many notalde departures from their first types of broadside ships. Believing in the association of heavy guns with light ones — mixed armaments, as the}' are called — the central armored case- mate of wholly protected guns has been rejected in order to give a maximum thickness of plating at the water-line. The largest guns are mounted en harljette — that is, in towers which protect the gun mechan- ism, and i)erniit tlie pieces to lie fired, not through port-holes, but over the rim of armored parapets. The French constructors reason, and \vith justice, that no single shot from a heavy gun should be wasted, and that, in addition to an extended range, gun captains must be en- abled, by keeping their eyes upon the enemy, to select the best oppor- tunity for firing. With broadside pieces this is impossible, for apart from the limited range, and the obscurity caused by the smoke, the port-holes through which the sighting has necessarily to be done are almost choked hy the gun-nmzzles. Turrets have their ol)jections also, because the poisonous gases which formerly escaped wholly from the muzzle will, as soon as the breech is opened, rush into the turret and make it almost uninhabitable, (^)ften after one discharge the air be- comes stifling, and in the iJulllo it deteriorated so cpuckly as to be unfit for respiration until a part of the turret-roof had been lifted. Then, again, structural difficulties not easily overcome in the turret are simjili- fied in the barbette, as the latter, with equal gun facilities, weighs tiftv per cent, less, and at the same time escapes all those chances of disable- ment which a well-placed shot is afmost sure to cause in any revolvino' system. At sea the chance of hitting tlie gun is never great, and the main things to protect are the gun machinery and the gunners ; the ar- mored wall of the barbette tower does this for the former, and the lat- ter have a fair fighting chance affoi'ded by the gun-shield. Of course war is not deer-stalking, and the i)atriot \\\w wants to go into battle so fully protected as to Ije in no danger liad better stop playing sailor or soldier, and take to the Avoods before the fighting begins. In addition to the heavy ordnance, the French mount a number of lighter pieces, and carry INTKODUCTOKY CHAPTKK. 7 poAverful secondary batteries of rapid lire and macliine-gims ; and suffi- cient armor defence is given, by a belt at the water-line, an armored deck, and a glacis and parapet for the barljette. It is quite probable that these purely military terms may seem odd Avhen a])plied to ships, but they are the only ones Avhicli can exactly explain what is meant, and, after all, they show how much a battle-ship has become a floating, trans- ferable fortress. The Italians were not altogether satisfied with the Dii'dl), as she lacked the high speed and coal endurance which they deem essential in any Mediterranean naval policy; so in ISTS they adopted an idea ad- vanced some years liefore in England, and startled the world with the Italia type. In this ship protection is given, not l)y vertical or side armor, but by an armored deck, Ijetween which and the deck aljove there is a very minute subdivision of the water-line space. The system is based upon the theory that the powei" to float must be obtained, not by keeping our projectiles, but by so localizing their effect as to make any penetration practically harmless. The Italia s heavy guns are car- ried in a central armored redoubt, at a height of thirty -three feet above the water-hne, and with their machinery and fittings Aveigh over two thousand tons. This fact shows the magnitude of the task accepted by her designer, for it means that a load nearly equal to the total weight of a first-class line-of-battle ship of the last century has to be sustained at this great elevation. Besides the main battery of four loPi-ton guns, eighteen six-inch breech-loading guns are carried — twelve in broadside on the upper battery deck, four in the superstructure before and abaft the redoubt, and two under cover at the extremities of the spar-deck. The redoubt is protected by seventeen inches of compound iron, inclined twenty -four degrees from the vertical ; and the complete armored deck, which is nearly three inches thick, dips forward to strengthen the ram, curves aft to cover the steering gear, and, at the ship's sides, extends six feet below the water-line. To cope with this formidaVjle rival, which, whether right or wrong in principle, must, under England's policy, be surpassed, the ships of the Admiral class were designed. In these the main battery is mounted in two barbettes built high out of water, near the extremities of the vessel, while in a central broadside are cai'ried the armor-piercing and rapid-fire guns. The engines, boilers, and barbette communications are protected by a water-line belt of thick armor which covers aljout forty-five per cent, of the ship's length ; at the upper edge of this there is a protective deck, and at its ends athwartships bulkheads are erected ; before and 8 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. abaft the belt and beneath the -^vater-Une there is a protective deck, to- gether with the usual minute subdivision into ^vater-tigbt compartments. The barbettes and the cylindrical ammunition tubes which extend from the belt-deck to' the barbette Hoors are strongly armored. Owing to the strong protest made against these vessels, more efficient annor pro- tection has been given to the battle-ships lately laid down. From tills very hasty and incomplete review it may be gathered that the hrst and most lasting influence in the develo])ment of battle- ships is due to France and England, though the Monitor had no httle share in the result. It is difficult to say, in the ceaseless struggle for something which, if not good, is new, what may be the outcome of the latest efforts to revolutionize the question, or, curiously enough, to bring it back to the point whence its departure was taken. Whatever may be the courage of one's opinion, there is not sufficient data — a iirst-class war can only supply these — upon which to say, Yea, yea ! or Nay, nay ! and prophecy is certain to be without honor, especially as the discussions given in the appendices demonstrate how the wisest and most experi- enced have no substantial agreement in views. An editorial in a late number of the Broad Arrow declares that "the days of annored plate protection are, in the opinion of many thinking men, coming to a close. The gun is victorious all along the line, and the increased speed given to the torpedo-boat, taken in con- junction Avith the destructive efficiency attained by the torpedo, makes it a questionable policy to spend such large sums of monev as heret(jfore upon individual ships." There is no room here to give the various aro-u- ments, though very clever and ingenious they are, b}- which this position is fortified ; it may be added, however, that to a large degree this is the -opinion of Admiral Aube, the late French Minister <;)f IMarine, and un- doubtedly this declaration re-echoes the shibboleth of those other French officers who, in the absolute formula of their chief, Gabriel Charmes, insist that " a scpiadron attacked at night by torpedo-boats is a squadron lost." Enghsh authorities, with a few notable exceptions, do not go so far as their more impulsive, or, from the Gallic stand-point, less conservative neighbors. Chief Constructor White believes that at no time in the war between gun and armor has the former, as the princi])al fighting factor so many chances of success. He concedes the value of light, quick-hrino- guns in association with heavy armaments, grants the importance of rams, tf»rpedoes, sulnnarine boats, and torpedo- vessels generally, but de- nies that the days of heavily armored battle-ships are ended. Lord INTEODUCTOEY CHAPTER. 9 Charles Beresford asserts that the vahie of large guns at sea is overesti- mated, advocates from motives of morals and efficiency mixed arma- ments, agrees to the great, yet subordinate, importance of the usual auxiliaries, and insists that England builds cumbersome and expensive battle-ships only because of their possession by her dangerous rivals. There are equally rigorous disagreements upon all the other types of armored, unarmored, and auxiliary vessels, as needs must be, so long as the naval policies of no two nations can be ahke. England and Eussia are at opposite poles, so far as their environments are concerned, and between France and Turkey the differences are as radical as their na- tional instincts and ambitions. But, among all, England is as isolated as her geographical situation. "Whatever fleets other nations may assemlile, whatever types other countries may deem best for their interests, Eng- land, whose existence depends upon her naval strength, must have all ; not only the best in quality, but so many of every class that she wiU be able to defend her integrity against any foe that assails it. England can take no chances. Upon one point alone, the necessity of high speed, is there substan- tial agreement. Less than four years ago fifteen or sixteen knots were accepted as a maximum beyond which profitable design could not be urged. Greater speed,' it is true, had been attained by our first type of commerce destroyer. In February, 1868, the Wani/panoag ran at the rate of 16.6 knots for thirty-eight hours, and made a maximum of 17.75 knots ; but great as was the achievement, there is a general acceptance of the fact that this vessel was a racing-machine, and not in the modern sense a man-of-war. Fighting-ships, with the power to steam thousands of miles at sea without recoaling, are now being built under contracts which, for every deficiency in speed or horse-power, pay penalties that at our former sum- mit of expectations would have been prohibitive to ship construction ; and, what is more startling yet, the bonus which goes to any increase upon this speed proves the co-relation between scientific attainment and popular appreciation of the subject, and shows how readily the impossi- bihties of yesterday become the axioms of to-morrow. The development of speed has therefore a special interest. Bet^veen 1859 and 1875, that tentative period which led to such wonderful reah- zations, the highest speed, under the most favorable circumstances, of large war vessels was fourteen knots ; in the smaller classes of unarmor- ed ships it ranged between eight and thirteen, while that attained by fast cruisers was from fifteen to sixteen and a half knots. In 1886 Italian 10 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. armored vessels made eighteen knots. Cruisers like the Japanese iYa- niwa Kan and the Italian ^-l//c/r7^> Ejihi reached nearly nineteen, and the lieina liege ntt\ launched in Feljruary last, is expected to steam over twenty. Torpedo vessels beginning in 187;^ Avith fourteen knots are now running twenty-five, and at the same time the type has so much increased in size and importance as to l)e an essential and not an acces- sory in naval warfare. It is impossible to explain the difficulties which have beset this de- velopment, because the conditions that surround any attempt at speed- increase are such as can be pro})erly understood only l^y tlnjse who have technical training ; and then, too, the great ocean racers have so much accustomed the public to wonderful sea performances that the results are accepted without a knowledge of the credit Avhich is due the me- chanical and marine engineers who have achieved them. But with greater experience the higher, surely, will be the appreciation which ev- ery one must give ; for, in the words of Chief Constructor White, " when it is realized that a vessel weighing ten thousand tons can be propelled over a distance of nine knots in an hour by the combustion of less than one ton of coal — the ten-thousandth part of her own weight — it will be admitted that the result is marvellous," and that " ' the way of a ship in the midst of the sea ' is Ijeyond full comprehension." It is often asked which has the better fleet, France or England. "Who can tell >. No one definitely. Admiral Sir li. Spencer Pujbinson, late Comptroller of the British Navy, declares, in the Coatempirai'ij Bcvieio of February, 1887, that " the number of armored vessels of the two countries may be stated approximately as fifty -five for England and fifty-one for France. Without going into further details, taking everv- thing into consideration, giving due weight to all the circumstances which affect the comparison, and assuming that the designs of the naval constructors on each side of tlie Channel will fairly fulfil the intentions of each administration (a matter of interminable disjnite, and Avhich nothing but an experiment carried to destruction can settle), the iron- clad force of England is, on the whole, rather superior to that of France. A combination of the navy of that Power with any other Avould com- pletely reverse the position. I should state as my opinion, leaving others to judge what it may be Avorth, that in fighting power the unarniored ships of England are decidedly superior to those of our rival's ; l)ut if the rai!<(in (Teiiv of the Fi'ench navy is— as has been frequently stated in that country, and l)y none nicn-e powerfully and categorically than bv the French Minister of Marine— the wide-spread, thorough destructi(ju INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 11 of British commerce, and the pitiless and remorseless ransom of every undefended and accessible town in the British dominions, regardless of any sentimentalities or such rubbish as the laws of Avar and the usages of civilized nations ; and if at least one of the raisona iVetre of the Brit- ish navy is to defeat those l^enevolent intentions, and to defend that commerce on which depends our national existence and imperial great- ness — then I fear that perhaps they have prepared to reahze their pur- pose of remorseless destruction rather better than we have ours of suc- cessful preservation." A long sentence this, but it emphasizes the great axiom that war is business, not sentiment, and teaches a lesson which this country will do well to learn. Fortunately, we are at last out of the shallows, if not fairly in the full flooding channel - w^ay, though many things are yet wanting with us. Perhaps this over-long chapter cannot be made to end more usefully than by quoting in proof of this the concluding paragraph of that brilliant article on naval policy w^hich Professor James Russell Soley, United States I^avy, contributed to the February (1887) number of Scrihners Magazine : " It is the part of wisdom," he writes, " to study the lessons of the past, and to learn what we may from the successes or the failures of our fathers. The history of the last war is full of these lessons, and at no time since its close has the navy been in a condition so favorable for their ajjplication. At least their meaning cannot fail to be understood. They show clearly that if we would have a navy fitted to carry on w^ar, we must give some recognition to officers on the ground of merit, either by the advancement of the best, or, what amounts to nearly the same thing, by the elimination of the least deserving ; that we must give them a real training for war in modern ships and with modern weapons ; that the direction of the naval establishment, in so far as it has naval direc- tion, must be given unity of purpose, and the purpose to which it must be directed is fighting efficiency ; that a naval reserve of men and of vessels must be organized capable of mobilization whenever a call shall be made ; and, finally, that a dozen or a score of new ships will not make a navy, but that the process of renewal must go on until the whole fleet is in some degree fitted to stand the trial of modern w^ar. Until this re- habilitation can be accomplished the navy will only serve the purpose of a butt for the press and a foot-ball for pohtioal parties and its offi- cers — a body of men whose intelligence and devotion would be equal to any trust wall be condemned to fritter away their fives in a senseless parody of tfieir profession." THE BRITISH NAVY. By sir EDWARD J. REED. WHEN timber gave place to iron and steel in the construction of war-ships, the naval possibilities of Great Britain became prac- tically illimitable. Prior to that great change the British Admiralty, after exhausting its home supplies of oak, had to seek in the forests of Italy and of remote countries those hard, curved, twisted, and stalwart trees which alone sufficed for the massive framework of its hne-of-bat- tle ships. How recently it has escaped from this necessity may be in- ferred from the fact that the present writer, on taking office at the Admiralty in 18G3, found her Majesty's dockyards largely stored with recent deliveries of Italian and other oak timber of this description. And here it may not be inappropriate for one whose earliest profes- sional studies were devoted to the construction of wooden ships, but whose personal labors have been most largely devoted to the iron era, to pay a passing tribute of respect to the constructive genius of those great l)uilders in w^ood who designed the stanch and towering battle- ships of the good old times. Skilful, indeed, was the art, sound, indeed, was the science, which enabled them to shape, assemble, and combine thousands of timbers and planks into the Gnux' de I)ieu of Great Har- ry's day (1514), the Smraigne of the Seas of Charles's reign (1037), the Royal ^Y^lliam of half a century later (1082-'92), the Vuion/, immor- talized l)y Nelson, and in our own early day such superb ships as the Queen., the Iloioe, and scores of others. Only those who have made a study of the history of sea architecture can realize the dilficulties \vhich the designers of such structures had to overccnne. With the introduction of iron and steel for ship-l.iuilding purposes the necessity for ransacking the forests of the world for timlxn- suitable for the frames and Ijeam-knces of ships passed away, and Great Britain, which early became, and thus far remains, tirst and greatest in the pro- duction of iron and steel, was thus invited to such a development of THE BRITISH NAVY. 13 navcil power as the Avorld has never seen. The mercantile marine of England at the present time fnrnislies a splendid demonstration of the readiness Avith which the commercial classes have ap[)reciated this great opportunity ; but the Eoyal Navy, by ahnost universtd assent, supplies a melancholy counter-demonstration, and shows that neither the capa- bilities of a race nor the leadings of Providence sufKce to keep a nation in its true position when it falls into the hands of fee))le and visionary administrators. Any one who will contrast the British navy of to-day with the British navy as it might and would have been under the ad- ministration, say, of such a First Lord of the Admiralty as the present Duke of Somerset proved himself in every de])artment of the naval service five-and-twenty years ago, will understand the recent outcry in England for a safer and more powerful fleet. THE "victory." From .1 photograph by Sj'nionds & Co., Portsmouth. It is impossible, as will presently appear, to describe the existhig British navy without making reference to those administrative causes which have so largely and so unhappily influenced it ; but the primary object of this chapter is, nevertheless, to describe and explain it, and only such references will be made to other circumstances as are indis- pensable to the fulfilment of that object. It is fitting, and to the present writer it is agreeable, in this place. 1-t MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. to take early note of a matter wliich lias, perhaps, never before been fully acknowledged, viz., the indebtedness of Great Britain and of Eu- rope to the United States for some invaluable lessons in naval construc- tion and naval warfare which were derived from the heroic efforts of their great civil wivc. The writer is in a position to speak with full knowledge on this point, as his service at the Admiralt}% in charge of its na,\'al c(justruction, connnenced during the American conflict, and con- tinued for some years after its fortunate conclusion. There can be no doubt whatever that from the Monitor and her successors European constructors and naval otRcers derived some extremely valuable sugges- tions. The Monitor system itself, pure and simple, was never viewed with favor, and could never be adopted by England, except under the severest restrictions, because the work of England has mainly to be done upon the high seas and in distant parts of the world, and the ex- tremely small freeboard of the Monitor, or, in other words, the normal sulnnersion of so very much of the entire ship, is higidy inconvenient and not a little dangerous on sea service, as the fate of the Monitor it- self demonstrated. But for the work the Monitor was designed to do in inland waters she was admiraljly conceived, and her appearance in the field of naval warfare startled seamen and naval constructors every- where, and gave their thoughts a wholly novel direction. In saying this I am not unmindful that seven years previously England had constructed steam-propelled " floating batteries," as they Avere called, sheathed with iron, and sent them to o]ierate against the defences of Eussia. But use- ful as these vessels were in many respects, their construction ]iresented no striking novelty of design, and their employment was unattended by any dramatic incidents to ])owerfully impress the naval mind. The Monitor was Ijotli more novel and more fortunate, and opened her ca- reer (after a severe struggle for life at sea) with so notaljle a display of her offensive and defensive cpialities that all eyes turned to the scene of her exploits, and scanned her with a degree of interest unknown to the then existing generation of sailors and ship-builders. Her form and character were in most respects singular, her low deck and erect revolv- ing tower being altogether unexampled in steamship construction. He must have been a dull and conservative naval architect, indeed, whose thouglits Ericsson's wonderful little fighting ship did not stinudate into unwonted activity. But the service rendered to Europe was not con- fined to the consti-uction and exploits of the Mon itor itself. The coast- ing passages, and, later fin, the sea-voyages, of other vessels of the Moni- tor type, but of larger size, wei'e watched with intense interest, and gave THE BRITISH NAVY. 15 to the naval world instructive experiences which could in no other way have been acquired. Some of these ex]ieriences were purchased at the cost of the lives of gallant men, and that fact enhanced their value. It is not possible to dwell at length upon tlie means by whicli the Monitor influence took effect in tlie navies of Europe, but it may be THE "CLATTON. doubted whether ships like the Thimdei'er, Devastation, and Dread- nought, which naval officers declare to be to-day the most formidable of aU British war-ships, would have found their way so readily into ex- istence if the Monitors of America had not encouraged such large de- partures from Old-world ideas. In this sense the Times correctly stated some years ago that the "American Monitors were certainly the pro- genitors of our Devastation, type." The one ship in the British navy which comes nearest to the American Monitor, in respect of the near- ness of her deck to the water, is tlie Ghdton, a very exceptional vessel, and designed under a very peculiar stress of circumstances. But even in her case, as in that of every other armored turret-sliip of the present IT) MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. writer's designi, the base of tlie turret and the hatclnvays over the ma- chinery and boilers were protected Ijy an armored breastwork standing high al)ove this low deck, whereas in the American Monitors the tm^ret rests upon the deck, which is near to the smooth sea's surface. "^Ve have here, in the featui'es just contrasted, tlie expression of a fundamental difference of view )>et\veen the American s\'stem, as aj)- plied to sea -going turret-shij)s, and the European system of sea -going shi])s introduced by the writer. It has never l)een possible, in our judg- ment on the British side of the Atlantic, t(j regard even such Mon- itors as the Puritan and Dictator were designed to l)e, as sufficiently proof to sea perils. At the time when these lines were penned the following paragraph appeared in English newspapers : " The Cunard steamer Serviu arrived at ISfew York j^esterday, being three days over- due. Dui'ing a heavy sea the boats, the bridge, and the funnel were carried away, and the saloon was flooded." Any one who has seen the Servi(c, and observed the great height above the smooth sea's surface at which her boats, bridge, and funnel are carried, will be at no loss to infer why it is tliat we object to ships with upper decks within two or three feet only of that surface. In short, it can be demonstrated that shi])s of the latter type are liable, in certain possible seas, to be com- pletely ingulfed even to the very tops of their funnels. In the case of the GlattoTh, which had to Ite ]>roduced in conformity to ideas some of which were not those of the designer, one or two devices were resorted to expressly in order to secure in an indirect manner some increase of the assigned buoyancy, and thus to raise the upper deck abi^ve its pre- scribed height. The officers who served in her, however, judici(3usly re- garded her, on account of her low deck, as fit only fVjr harlior service or restricted coast defence. A veiy dangerous coml^ination, as the Avriter regards it, Avas once pro])osed for his adoj)tion by the representative of a colonial govern- ment, but was successfully resisted. Tliis was the association of a "Coles" or English turret (wliicli ]xmetrates and ]>asses bodily through the ^veather deck) vvitli a low American IVLonitor deck. This was op- posed on the ground that witli such an arrangement there must of ne- cessity Ije gi'eat danger at sea of serious leakage around the base of the turret as the waves swept over the lower deck. It would l)e extremely difficult to give to tlie long, circular aperture around the turret any protection "which would tie cei'tain, while allowing the turret to revolve freely, both to withstand the lire of the guns and to resist the attack of the sea. THE BRITISH NAVY. 17 It will now be understood that while the Monitor system was from the first highly appreciated in Europe, and more especially in England, it never was adopted in its American form in the British navy. Eussia, Holland, and some other powers did adopt it, and the Dutch govern- ment had to pay the penalty in the total disappearance of a ship and crew during a short passage in the North Sea from one home port to another. In a largely altered form, and with many modificatieen attended by some great compensation, such as that which an immense increase in the thiclcness of the armor applied nright have provided, although no such increase could ever have compensated for such a reduction of the armored part of the ship as would have exposed the "whole ship to de- struction by the mere bursting in of the unarmored ends, which is what has been done. But although in the case of the large Life.:i:ihJc the citadel armor -was of excessive thickness, that is not true of the more recent ships of England, the armor of which sometimes falls short of that of the French ships, in two or three instances by as nmch as four inches, the French ships having 22-incli armor, and the English IS-ineh. But Ijy the condjined effect of injudicious economy and of erroneous de- sigiT, therefore — both furthered by a sort of frenzied desire on the part (_)f the British Adnriralty to stri]i the shi]is of armor, keep down their s]>eed, delay their com])letion, and otherwise ])aralyze the naval service, ai)})arent]y without understanding Avhat they were about— the British navy lias been brought into a condition which none Ijut the possible enemies of the country can regard without more or less dismay-. In order to illustrate the extent to wliich side armor has been de- nied to the British ships, as c(.)m])ar('d with the French, we refer the reader to these diagrams of the Amiml Dtqjerro (French) and of the THE BRITISH NAVY. 23 TnflexiUe and CoUukjiooocI (both English). The black portions repre- sent the side armor in each case. It is scarcely possible for any one friendly to Great Britain to look at these diagrams, and reaUze what tliey signify, Avithout profoundly regretting that a sufficient force of public opinion has not yet Ijcen exerted to compel the Admiralty to a much more liberal use of armor in the new first-class ships, the intended construction of which was announced to Parliament m Decemljer, 1885. L I I I I SECTION OP THE AMIEAL DUPERRB.' SECTION OF THE " IKFLEXIBLB." ^ □ a cr D □ □ □ H n 3 o O a SECTION" OP THE " COLLING WOOD." In these new ships, while the length of the partial belt has been slightly increased, no addition to its height al)Ove water has l)een made (as com- pared with the CiiUingioood or " Admiral " class), so that the slightest "hst" towards either side puts all the armor below water. To describe such ships as " armored ships " is to convey a totally false impression of their true character. A side view of one of these new ships shows that the two principal guns are carried high up forward in an armored tur- ret, which sweeps from right ahead, round the bow on each side, and well towards the stern, while several smaller guns are carried abaft with very thin armor protection to complete the offensive powers of ,the ship. The arrangement of the two principal guns in a turret for- NEW ADMIRALTY SHIP. 2i MODERN SHIPS OF WAE. ward resembles that of the Cori/jHcro)', but in her the armor rises high aljove the water, and a belt extends to the bow and nearly to the stern. It is a matter of inexjjressible regret that the armored surface of these new ships is so excessively contracted as to be wholly insufficient to preserve the ship from that terril)le danger to which so many of their predecessors have Ijeen exposed, vh., that of capsizing from loss of sta- bihty when the unarmored parts alone have been injured. There is a sense in which all the British ships to which reference has thus far been made may be roughly regarded as developments of, or at THE "DEVASTATION." least as starting from, the DevaMcaion, or British Monitor type of ship, for in all of them masts and sails have been done away Avith, and steam propulsion relied upon, a single military mast alone remaining.* We have now to notice another and more numerous class of sliips, which may be regarded as the lingering rei)resentatives of those sailing-ships which have come down to us through the long centuries, but which are now rapidly disappearing, yielding t.. the all-prevalent power of steam. Some of these sliips Avere Ijuilt for the line of battle, in their respective per' "" ' "^ ~ "' • . .. lods, but as they range in size from about one thousand tons of dis- * This is not .stiictly true of quite all the ships nnmcd, but it probtiblv will be true ere long, as none of them has more than a light au.^iliaiy rig, aud that will probably be aban- doned. THE BRITISH NAVY. 25 placement up to nearly eleven thousand tons, it is obvious that many of them were built for various other employments. In dealing with the full-rigged ships, we are taking account of types of war-ships Avhich, for all but secondary purposes, are passing away. It fell to the lot of the pi'esent writer (under the rule of Mr. Childers, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and of Admiral Sir Kobert Spencer Eoljinson, then Control- ler of the Navy) to introduce the mastless war-ship, and thus to virtually terminate what had certainly Ijeen for England a glorious period, vh., that of the taunt-masted, full-rigged, and ever-beautiful wooden line-of- battle ship. It is now, alas ! but too apparent (from what has gone be- fore) that in virtually terminating that period, and opening the era of the steam and steel fighting engine, we were also introducing an era in which fantastic and feeble people might but too easily convert what ought to have been the latest and greatest glory of England into her direct peril, and possibly even her eaiiy overthrow. The first British iron-clad (neglecting the " floating batteries '' of 1854) was the ^Yarrior, a handsome ship 380 feet long, furnished with steam-power, and provided with masts, spars, and a large spread of can- vas. Her ends were unprotected by armor, and her steering gear con- sequently much exposed. She was succeeded by a long series of full- rigged iron-clads, all of them supplied with steam-power likewise, the series continuing down to the present time. The little dependence which is now placed in the British navy upon the use of sail-power in armored ships will be seen, how^ever, when it is stated that of all the ships protected by side armor which are now under construction in the royal dockyards, but two are to be given any sail - power at all, and these are to be rigged on two masts only, although the ships are of large size, and intended for cruising in distant seas.* It is unnecessary in a popular subject of this description to dwell upon, or even to state, the minor differences which exist Ijetween the different tj'pes of rigged iron-clads. There are, however, some points of interest in connection with their armor and armament to be men- tioned. In the design of the first group (speaking chronologically) were commenced those changes in the disposition of the armor which con- tinue down to the present time, the British Admiralty being so mixed and so virtually irresponsible a body that it is not obliged to liave a mind of its own for any great length of time, even when many of the same men continue in office. * See Xote, page 27. 9* a6 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. The Warrioi; as we saw, and the sister ship Blach Prince, had a central armored battery only ; the same is true of those reduced 11 cw- riors, the Befenee and the Eesldance. But the next succeeding ships of the Warrior'' s size, the Minotaur and Agincourt, were fully armored from end to end ; and the somewhat smaller ship the Achilles was fur- nished Avith a complete belt at the water-line. The Hector and Valiant (improA-ed DcfenceH) had complete armor above the water, Ijut, oddly enough, had part of the Avater-line at each end left unarmored. A third ship of the Minotaur class, the Norilauuherland, was modified by the present writer at the bow and stern on his entering the Admiralty, the armor al)Ove water being there reduced, and an armored bow breast- work constructed. Within this armored breastwork were placed two heavy guns firing right ahead. With this exception, all these early ships, nine in number, were without any other protected guns than those of the broadside. These shii)s were followed by a series of rigged ships of the writer's design, viz., the Bdlerophon, Hercules, Sultan^ Penelojie, Invincilile, Ircjji Pttlxie, Vanguard, Siviftswre, and Triumph, all with hulls of iron, or of iron and steel combined, together with a series of rigged ships con- structed of wood, converted from unarmored hulls or frames, viz., Enter- prise, licsearch, Favmnte, Pallas, Lord Warden, Lord Clyde, and Pe- puhe. Every one of these ships was protected by armor throughout the entire length of the vessel in the region of the water-line, and in some cases the armor rose up to the upper deck. Most of them, how- ever, had the armor above the belt limited to a central batterv. The chief interest in these vessels now lies in the illustrations thev furnish of the evolution, so to speak, of bow and stern fire. In several of them a fire approximately ahead and astern (reaching to those directions within about twenty degrees) was obtained by means of ports cut near to the ship's side, through the transverse armored bulkheads. In others these bulkheads were turned inward towards the batterv near the sides of the ship in order to facilitate the working of the guns when firing as nearly ahead and astern as was ]ira,cticable. In the Sultan an upper- deck armored battery Avas adojited foi' the chxible pur]iose of formiuo- a redoubt from Avhich the ship could Ite mantpuvred and fought in action, and of pr(jviding a direct stern fire fi-om protected guns. In the five ships of the Lnvincihle class a direct head and stern fire Avas obtained from a someAvhat similar upper - deck battery, Avhich projected a few feet beyond the side of the ship. The rigged ships of later design than the Avriter's present a still THE BRITISH NAVY. 27 greater variety in the disposition of their armor and armaments. Tliis variety may be in part illustrated liy four examples, which for conven- ience are principally taken from Lord Brassey's book.* Tlie scales of these small drawings, as given there, are not all the same. These examples are the Alexandra, the Temeraire, the Nelson, and the Shan- TIIE SULTAN. 7ion. The Alexmdra (of which a separate view, in sea -going condi- tion, is given), which is prol)ably the best of the rigged iron-clads of the British na\'y, may be regarded as a natural, but not the less mer- itorious, development of the combined broadside and bow and stern fire of the central battery ships which preceded her. In her were pro- vided a broadside battery on the main-deck, a direct bow fire, also on that deck, and both a direct bow and a direct stern fire on the upper « "The British Navy.'^ 28 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. deck from within armor, as in tire InminciUe class. The guns employed for bow and stern tire were all availalile for broadside fire. The upper- deck battery did not ])roject be^'ond the main-deck as in the InmncMe class, the forward and after parts of the ship above the main-deck being SECTION AKD PLAN OP THE "ALEXANDRA.' SECTION AND PLAN OF THE " TEMEIiAIRE." greatly contracted in breadth in order to allow the guns to fire clear Ijoth for-\vard and aft. The Tc/rn'm/'/v is a smaller shi]) than the AJe.i'- (iiuJra. and has a battery similar to hers on the main-deck, but Avith one gun less on each side, the danger of a raking fire entering through the THE BEITISH NAVY. 29 foremost battery port being met by a transverse armored bulkhead, as shown in the plan of the ship. Slie is provided with an additional 1)ow fnm and a stern-chaser, carried high up in barbette towers, Ijut worked on Colonel Moncrieff's disappearing principle. t>--^,^^^ ST" SECTION AKD PLAN OP THE "NELSON. SECTION AND PLAN OF THE "SHANNON." ''The Tememlre fires three 25 -ton guns right ahead, against two 25 -ton and two IS -ton guns in the Alexandra ; on either bow, two 25-ton against one 25-ton and one IS-ton; right aft, one 25-ton against two 18-ton; on either quarter, one 25-ton against one IS-ton; on either beam, if engaged on one side at a time, two 25-ton and two IS-ton, with a third 25-ton available through only half the usual arc, against three 30 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. is-ton guns, with two of the same weight and one of 25-tons, each avail- able with the limitation just described." * The Alexandra is a ship of 9500 tons displacement, the Temeraire is of S500 tons ; after them came the NeUon (to which the Northampton is a sister ship), of 732o tons displacement. This vessel cannot be re- garded as an armored ship at all, in the usual sense of the word, having but a partial belt of armor, and none of her guns being enclosed within armor protection, although two guns for firing ahead and two for firing astern are partially sheltered by armor. Even less protection than this is afforded to the guns of the SJiannon, which also has but a partial l)elt of armor, and protection for two bow guns only. The comparatively THE " ALE.VAKDllA.' small size of the Shannon (5iOO tons displacement) relieves her in some degree from the reproach of being so little protected ; but it is difficult (to the present writer) to find a justification for Iniikhng ships of 7320 tons, like tlie Ndwn, and JYofthainpton, and placing them in the cate^orv of annor-plated sliips, seeing that tlieir entire batteries are ojien to the free entrance of shell fii-e from all guns, small as well as laro-e. Where a ship has a battery of guns ])rotected against fire in one or more direc- tions, but freely exposed to fire coming in other directions, to assume" that the enemy will be most likely to attack the armor, and avoid firino' into the oi)en battery, appears to be a reversal of the safe and well-ac- ■•'' From " Eiic hi i!iii hi ,!• 1 iiifri'ii 1 (i iMiVll''? th I'jijiii.i! iWi I' 111'!'. r^ . 1^ ilH'"" THE BRITISH NAVY. 33 cepted principle of warfare, ij*.?., that your enemy will at least endeavor to attack your vulnerable part. No doul)t, when the size ()r cost oard war-shijis that it may be consumed in the generation of steam \ It is very desirable that this information shoidd somehow be conveyed to Wliitehall in an impressive manner, and possi- Idy, if the combined intelligence of the two great nations to ^\•hich Harpers' publications chiefly a]ipeal be invoked in its favor, it may at length be understood and attended to even by the Admiralty, and one may hear no more of the protection of her Majesty's ships by means of their '' coal." Passing now from the so-called iron-clads of the British navy, we come to a class of vessels which have their boilers, etc., protected from MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. above l)y iron decks sweeping over them from side to side. The section of the Min'Kcij, one of the most important British ships of this type, wiU ilhistrate tlie s\'stem of construction. Various at- tempts have been made to impose numerous sliips of this kind upon a sometimes too credulous puljhc as armored vessels, and Lord Brassey, while publishing descriptions and drawings which dem- onstrated beyond all question that the buoyancy and stabil- ity of these ships are not at all protected by armor, nev- ertheless deliljerately includes some of them in his list of " armored shifts." "" Now, the thick iron deck certainly pro- tects (in some degree, accord- ing to its thickness) all that is below it against the fire of 'tkansvebsb section of the "merset." guns, and armor itself is some- times employed to protect the gun machinery ; Ijut the existence of a thickish deck under the water, or mainly under the water, occasionally associated with patches of armor aliove water here and there to pro- tect individual parts, does not constitute the ship itself an armored ship in any such sense of the term as is ordinarily accepted and under- stood. How can that be properly called an " armored shij) " which can be utterly destroyed by guns without any shot or shell ever touching such armor as it possesses '>. Tiie British Admiralty, in the " jSTavy Esti- mates" for 1883-84, under some unknown influence, put forward two ships of this descrijition as armored vessels, and was afterwards forced to remove them from that category, but only removed them to place them in another not less false, not less misleading, not less deceptive and dangerous, 7v',?., tliat of " i>rotected ships." Anil this most improper description is still applied to various ships of which the sjiecial chai-ac- teristic is that they themselves are not protected. If the ship's own. * The Italia ;md Lepanto, for example. THE BRITISH NAVY. 39 coal and stores may be regarded as her protection, or if tlie existence of a certain number of exposed and extremely thin internal plates can be so regarded, then may these vessels be deemed partly, but only partly, " protected ;" but if " ]irotected ship " means, as every hon- est-minded person nmst take it to mean, that the ship herself is protected by armor against shot and shell, then the designation " protected ship," as employed by the British Admiralty, is nothing less than an imposition. These ships are not i)rotected. Neither their power to float, nor their power to keep upright, nor their power to exist at all, after a few such injuries as even the smallest guns afloat can inflict, is " protected," as any war whatever is likely to demonstrate. Those who emphiy such language ignore the essential characteristic of a ship-of-war, and some of the gravest dangers which menace her. It is conceivable that in the old days, Avhen men wore armor, the protec- tion of the head with an " armet," and of the breast by a breastplate, might have justified the description of the man so defended as an " ar- mored man," although it is diflicult to see why, since he miglit have been put hors cle comhat by a single stroke. But protect the boilers and magazines of a ship how you will, if you do not protect the ship itself suftioiently in the region of the water-line to in-event such an invasion of the sea as will sink or capsize her, she remains herself essentially unpro- tected, liable to speedy and complete destruction, and cannot trulj^ Ije called a " protected ship." It must not for a moment be supposed that this is a mere question of words or designations. On the contrary, it is one of the most vital importance to all navies, and most of all to the navy of Great Britain. What the Admiralty says, the rest of the government, and bevond them the country, are likely to believe and to rely upon, and wlien the stress of naval warfare comes, the nation which has confidingly understood the Admiralty to mean " armored ships " and " protected ships " when it has employed these phrases, and suddenly finds out, by defeat follow- ing defeat, and catastrophe catastrophe, that it meant nothing of the kind, may have to pay for its credulity, allowable and pardonalde as it may be, the penalty of betrayal, and of something worse even than na- tional humility. On the other hand, it is not to be inferred from the oljjections thus offered to the employment of deceptive designations that olijection is also offered to the construction of some ships with hmited or partial pro- tection, falling short of the protection of the buoyancy and the stability, and therefore of the life, of the ship itself. It is quite impossible that 4:0 JIODEEN SHIPS OF WAR. all the ships of a navy like that of Great Britain, or of the navies of iiiajiy other pcjwers, can be made invulneraljle, even in the region of the water-line, t(_), all shot or shell. Indeed, there are services upon Avhich it is necessary to employ armed ships, but which do not demand the use of ai'inored or ])rotected vessels. Unarmored vessels, with some of their m(_ire vital contents ]irotected, suffice for such services. Moreover, even where it would be very desirable indeed to have tlie hull protected l>y armor to a sufficient extent to preserve the ship's buoyancy and staljility from ready destruction by gun-tire, it is often impracticable to give the ship that protection. This is true, for example, of all small corvettes, sloops, and gun-vessels, which are too small to float the necessary armor- plates, in addition to all the indispensable weights of hull, steam-machin- ery, fuel, armament, ammunition, crew, and stores. It would be both idle and unreasonable, therefore, to complain of tlie construction of some ships with the protecting armor limited, or even, in certain cases, with no protecting armor at all. Such ships must be built, and in considera- Ijle number, for the British navy. But this necessity should neither blind us to the exposure and destructibility of all such vessels, nor induce us to endeavor to keep that exposure and destructibiUty out of our own sight. StiU less should it encourage us to sanction, even for a moment, such an abuse of terms as to hold up as " armored " and " protected " ships those which, whether unavoidably or avoidahly, have lieen deprived of the necessary amount of armor to keep them afloat under the fire of small or even of moderately powerful guns. We are now in a position to review the British navy, and to see of what ships it really consists. In this review it will not be necessary to pass before the eyes of the reader that large nuniber of vessels of which even the boilers and magazines are without any armor or thick-plate protection whatever. It will help, nevertheless, to make the nature and extent of the navy understood if these are groujied and summarized in a few sentences. Neglecting altogether all large vessels with timber frames (whicli may be regarded as out of date, seeing that all the war vessels of considerable size now built for the navy have iron or steel frames), it may Ije first said tliat there are l)ut three ships of the large or frigate class in the British navy which carry no thick protecting plate at all, y is., the Inmnahmt, the S]\ah^ and the Raleigh. Of much less size than these, and equally devoid of protection, are the two very fast vessels, the Iris and Mercury, built as special despatch vessels, steam- ing at their best at about eighteen knots. Among the unarmored cor- vettes are the Active, Bacchante, Boadicea, Euryalus, Hover, and Volage THE BRITISH NAVY. 41 all exceeding fourteen knots in speed, and all more than three thousand tons displacement. Then follow thirty -six ' smaller and less swift cor- vettes, nearly one-half the number Imng built wholly of wood, most of which exceed, however, thirteen knots in speed ; and below these about an equal number of sloops of less speed and tonnage. The smaller gun- vessels and gun-boats need not be summarized. THE "ikconsta:nt." Passing on to vessels which, although themselves unarmored, have thick-plate decks to give some protection to the machinery, we observe first that there are eight ships of three thousand five hundred to three thousand seven hundred tons built and under construction, viz., the Am- phion, Arethusa, Leander, Phaeton, Mersey, Severn, Forth, and Thames* Lord Brassey very properly classes such of these vessels as he mentions in his lists as " unarmored ships," although, as before mentioned, when two of them — the Mersey and Severn — were designed, with a deck two inches thick, the Admiralty at first ventured to put them forward as " armored ships." * See Notes, page 58. 42 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. Ascending in the scale of protection, and dealing for the present "\vith sea-going vessels only, we come to a long series of ships ivhich ai'e undeserving of the designation of armored ships, because they are liable to destructif)n liy guns without tlie limited amount of armor which they carry lieing attacked at all. These ships are the Ii/qjerleiise and War- ftj/if<\ ]3reviously discussed, and also tJie Aja.r, A(/iune/nnon, Colossus, Ed- inljitrgJi, and the six lai^ge ships of the "Admiral" class. Any one who has intelligently pei'used the report of the c(jmmittee on the Inflex'Me Avould justify tlie inclusion of that ship in this category; but she is omitted hero out of deference to the strenuous exertions which were made to invent or devise some little stability for her, even when her bow and stern are supposed to lie badly injui'ed, and out of compassion upon those officers of the Admiralty who have long ago repented those trying compromises with conscience l^y aid of which they expressed some slight confidence in her aljility to float upright with her unar- mored ends badly damaged. She is omitted also out of gratitude to Lord Brassey for a sentence in which, while saving her from being placed in so dreadful a category, he honestly places some of the other ships in it without cpialification or circumlocution, ile says: "In one important particular the Ajax and A \ »q THE BPJTISH NAVY. 45 the known opinions of the present writer have been so far respected in these ships that their armored citadels, so called, have l)een nuule some- what longer and of greater proportionate area. The folhjwing figures have been given : Perceiitn2:e of wntec-liue iirea coveied hy armor. Inflexible 43. Agamemnon 45.4 Collingwood 54.15 Camperdo wn 56. 35 Eut any one who understands this question knows perfectl}^ "well that "percentage of water-line area covered by armor" in no way rep- resents the relative stal)ilities of these ships. Indeed, that is oljvious upon the face of the matter, because we have seen the Ajax and Arja- memnon pronounced devoid of the necessary sta)>ihty when injured, while the LiflexiNe is said to possess it, although the former vessel has 45^ per cent, of the water-line area covered, while the latter has but 42 per cent. But this is not the consideration which has led to the con- demnation of the whole "Admiral" class of so-called iron-clads as not possessing the essential characteristic of an armored ship, viz., the power to float, and to float with needful buoyancy and stability, all the time the armor is unpierced. The ground of that condemnation is to be found in the introduction into the "Admirals" of a dangerous comljina- tion from which the InfiexMe and Againemnon and other like ships are exempt — the combination of long unarmored ends comprising aljout for- ty-five per cent, of the water-line area with so shallow a belt of armor that, when the unarmored ends are injured and filled by the sea (as they would be in action), there would remain so httle armor left above water that a very slight inclination of the ship would put it all below water. In the Agamemnon class, smaU as the initial stability may be (and with the unarmored ends torn open it would be nothing), the armor is car- ried up to a reasonable height above water. But in the "Admiral" class all the advantage arising from a slightly lengthened citadel is more than destroyed l)y this lo^vering of the armor. So great is the consequent danger of these ships capsizing, if ever called upon to en- gage in a serious battle at close quarters, that the writer cannot consci- entiously regard them as " armored ships," but must in common fairness to the officers and men who are to serve in them, and to the nation which inight otherwise put its trust in them, relegate them to the cate- gory of ships with only parts j)rotected. It will be observed that nothing has yet been said about thickness of 46 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. armor, altliougli that is, of course, a very important element of a sliip's safety f»r danger. But important as it is, it has to be Ivept scrupulously separated from tlie question just discussed — the limitation of the armor's extent — because no misrepresentation and no misconception can well arise concerning the relative power or trustworthiness of ships armored variously as to thickness, while much misrepresentation has actually taken place, and much consequent misconception has actually arisen, on the other matter, more than one European government having delil)erately l^laced in the category of " armored ships " ships which in no true sense of the ^vord can be so classed. The following classifications will conform to the foregoing views, de- scribing as "armored ships" only those which have sufficient side-armor to protect them from being sunk or capsized by the fire of guns all the time the armor remains unpierced : BRITISH SHIPS OF WAR, BUILT AND BUILDIXG. ARMORED SHIPS WITH TmCK ARMOR. Na.me of Ship Tons nis- placenient Indicated Horee- power Speed, in Knots M.iximiim Thicliiiess of Armor, in Inches, Largest Guns, in Tons. 9,490 4,830 5,200 9,330 10,820 6,200 11,400 9,170 4,830 5,440 9,100 9.330 4.910 8.610 3,200 4,500 6,650 8,200 4.500 8.000 9,000 3,900 4,630 7.430 0,270 2,870 15 m 15 13f 14i 15 14 13 1? 13J 12 12 12 12 12 14 12 24 12 12 12 12 12 13 25 25 43 35 38 43 80 38 25 18 18 38 25 Conqueror Devastiition Dreadnought Hero Inflexible* . . Orion Rupert Superb Thunderer Glattonf AlnlOUED SOIP.S WITH MEDIUM ARMOR. Name of Snip Tons Dis- plarenietit. Indirated Horse- power. S|ieed, in Knots. Maximum Tlii.-l-inch 68-ton breech-loading rifles, t\v(j in each turret ; of eight 5-inch guns in broad- side on a covered deck protected by three inches of vertictil armor, and of eight 6-pounder rapid fire, ten 3-pounder Maxim, and four Gardner guns. The horse-power under forced draft is to be 12,000, and the estimated speed is 16i knots. The main ])attery originally designed for these ships included only one 6S-ton l)reech-loading rifle for each turret ; sub- sec[uently this plan was rejected, and the armament stated above Avas THE BRITISH NAVY. 57 adopted. " The economy of mounting the heavy gams in pairs arises not only from the increased power thus (jbtained frtjm a given weiglit of guns, but from the fact that it requires but httle more armor to protect two guns than to protect one. It also requires more machinery to work two guns separately than in pairs, and the magazine and ammunition supply arrangements of guns nnnmted separately are necessarily more complicated, and require more men to operate them than those mounted in pairs. " The French idea in mounting their heavy guns singly in three or four armored barbettes is evidently so to distriljute the gun-power as to leave a reserve of heavy guns in event of damage to one or more. But the demands for economy in weight are so great that two armored structures widely separated would seem to furnish as satisfactorj" a scat- tering of the heavy gun-power as is justifial)le. Guns mounted on the middle line suffer less disturbance in rolling than those mounted either in the waist or en echelon^ and their fire should be correspondinglj^ more accurate." * The Iinpirleuse and 'SVarsp'de have powerfid ram bows, a steel pro- tective deck, and a belt of compound armor which is 130 feet in length on the water-line, 8 feet in width, and 10 inches thick. The engines were designed to develop 7.500 horse-power and a speed of 16 knots, but on her trial the Imjierieuse attained with forced draft a maximum speed of 18.2 knots and 10,31:1: horse-power, and a mean speed, after four runs on the measured mile, of 17.21 knots. In September, 1880, with all guns and stores in place, and with 9()0 tons of coal in the bunkers, the Iriijyerieuse developed a mean speed of IG knots. The armament is com- posed of four 9.2-inch guns, mounted in four 8-inch plated circular bar- bettes, and situated one forward, one aft, and two in the waist ; on the gun-deck there are six 6-inch guns, and the secondary battery is made up of twelve 6-poun(ler rapid fire, ten 1-inch Nordenfelt, and four Gard- ner orms, and of four above-water and two submerged torpedo tulies. Owing to the increased weights of the armament, stores, machinery, and equipments put in these vessels since they were first designed, the draught of water is now found to be nearly three feet greater than was intencled. It is only fair to state that they were originally expected to carry but 400 tons of coal, though curiously enough, when this fuel capacity was subsequently increased to 12(H) tons, no allowance was made for the additional armored surface required. * "Recent Naval Progress," .luue, 1887. 58 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. The armored free-board was to have been 3 feet 3 inches at a draught of 25 feet, but the supplementary weights increased the draiiglit 11^ inches and reduced this free-board to 2 feet 3-J- inclies ; and later, when the full bunker capacity of iXH) tons was utihzed,- the draught was again increased li inches, and the free-l)oard lowered to 1 foot li inches. Finally it was for a time determined to carry 12hmtvs, Crocodile, and Malaha/r. The royal procession proceeded straight to its destination and passed between the lines, leaving the coast-defence ships, gun-boats, and torpedo- boats on the port hand. After steaming as far as the Horse ElboAV buoy the Victoria and Alhert turned to starboard, passed between the two columns of large ships, and then between the lines of the foreign war-vessels. As the yacht steamed slowly by the war-ships the crews cheered loudly, l)ut it was not until the Queen had gone through the double line that the royal salute was fired. On board such vessels as had no inasts the turrets, breastworks, and decks were lined with the crews, and the spectacle was as splendid as it was potent with an ear- nest evidence of mighty power. Altogether the fleet extended over four miles, and even this length was added to l>y the great troop-ships which steamed into fine and saluted the Queen as she made her prog- ress. The jubilee week was not without its accidents, for the Ajax and Devastation collided at the rendezvous, and subsequently the Agineourt and Blach Prince had a similar experience. These mishaps evoked much hostile criticism, and 'among other things gave currency to an ex- tract from a speech made by Lord Randolph (Jhurchill several weeks before. Speaking of the navy, he had declared that, " In the last twelve or thirteen years eighteen ships liave been either completed or designed by the Admiralty to fulfil certain purposes, and on the strength of the Admiralty statements Parliament has faithfully voted the monev. The total amount which either has been or will be voted for these ships is about ten millions, and it is now discovered and officially acknowledged that in respect of the purposes for which these ships were designed, and for the purposes for which these ten millions either have been or will be spent, the whole of the money has been absolutely misapplied, utterly wasted and thrown away." Sir Chai'les Dilke does not agree with this pessimism of his political opponent, though he, too, has something to say of the British fleet, in relation to its influence upon the present position of European politics, which is well worth quoting. " There is less to i)e said in a hostile sense with regard to the present position of the navy," he concedes, " than may be said, or must be said, THE BRITISH NAVY. 63 about the army. Clever German officers may write their ' Great Naval War of ISSS,' and describe the destruction of the British fleet by the French torjiedo-ljoats, but on the whole we are not iU-satisfied with the naval progress that has been made in the last three yeai's. There is plenty of room for doubt as to whether we get full value for our incjney ; but at all events our navy is undoubtedly and by universal admission the tirst navy in the world, and relatively to the French we ajjpear to show of ships built and building a number proportionate to our expen- diture. The discovery of the comparative uselessness of automatic tor- pedoes is an advantage to this country, and no great change in the (jp- ]iosite direction has recently occurred. M. Gabriel C'harmes has pointed out to France the manner to destroy our sea-borne trade, Ijut excellent steps have been taken since his book appeared to meet the danger which he obligingly made clear to us. It remains a puzzle to my civilian mind how Italy can manage to do all that in a naval sense she does for her comparatively small expenditure, and how, spending only from a fourth to a sixth what we spend upon our navy, she can nevertheless produce so noble a muster of great ships. But our naval dangers are, no doubt, dangers chiefly caused rather by military than by naval defects. Our navy is greatly weakened for the discharge of its proper duties Ijy the fact that duties are thrown upon it which no navy can efficiently dis- charge. As Admiral Hoskins has said, it is the duty of the commander of the British fleet to drive the hostile squadrons from the seas, and to shut up the enemy's ships in his different ports ; but, on the other hand, he has a right to expect that our own ports and coaling stations shall be protected by batteries and by land forces. This is exactly what has not 3'et l:>een done, although the defence of our coaling stations by fortresses and l:)y adequate garrisons is essential to the sustaining of our maritime supremacy in time of war. "It is only, however, by comparison with our army that I think our navy in a sound position. In other words, our military situation is so alarming that it is for a time desirable to concentrate our attention upon that, rather than upon the less pressing question of the condition of the navy. I must not be thought, however, to admit, for one single instant, that our navy should give us no anxiety. As long as France remains at peace, and spends upon her navy such enormous sums as she has been spending during the last few years, she will be sufficiently near to us in naval power to make our position somewhat doubtful ; make it depend, that is, upon how the different new inventions may turn out in time of war. Our navy is certainly none too large (even 64 MODERN SHIPS OF AVAR. wlien the coaling stations and commercial ports have been fortified, and made for the first time a source of strength rather than of weakness to the navy) f<:>r the duties which it has to perfornr. It would be as idle for us, with our present naval force, to hope to thoroughly command the Mediterranean and the Ked Sea against the French without an Italian alliance, as to try to hold our own in Turkey or in Belgium with our present armv- Just as the country seems now to have made up its mind to aljandon not only the defence of Turkey against Russia, but also the defence of the neutralitj' of Belgium, so it will have to make up its mind, unless it is jn'epared to increase the navy, to resort only to the Cape route in time of war. Italy being neutral, and we at war with France, we could not at present hope to defend the whole of our colo- nies and trade against attack, and London against invasion, and yet to so guard the Mediterranean and the Bed Sea as to make passage past Toulon and Algiers, Corsica and Biserta, safe. Our force is probaljly so superior to the French as to enaljle us to shut up their iron-clads ; but it -would probably be easier to shut in their Mediterranean iron-clads by holding tlie Straits of Gibraltar than to attempt to blockade them in Toulon. I confess that I cannot understand those Jingoes who think that it is enough to shriek for Egypt, without seeing that Egvpt cannot be held in time of war, or the Suez route made use of with the mili- tary and naval forces that we possess at present. " As against a French and Russian combination of course we are weaker still. Englishmen are hardly aware of the strength of Russia in the Pacific, where, if we ai'e to attack at all, we must inevitaljly fight her, and where, if we are to adopt the hopeless policy of remaining only on the defensive, we shall still have to meet her foi" the protection of our own possessions. Just as the reduction of the horse artillery, comparatively unimjtortant in itself, has shown that the idea of the protection of Belgian neutrality has been completely given up, so the abandonment of Port Hamilton, instead of its fortification as a protec- tion for our navy, seems to sliow that we have lost all hojie of being able to hold our own against Russia in the Xorth Pacific. On the 1st of August Russia will have upon her North Pacific station — cruising, that is, between Vladivostock and Yokohama — three new second-class protected ships — the Vladiinir, llonomakk, and the Dmitri Donshoi, of nearly six thousand tons apiece, and the Duke of EdinJmrgh, of four thousand six hundred tons ; one older protected ship, the Yitia:;, of three thousand tons ; four fast-sailing cruisers — the Na'iezdnil-, the Razh)>inil\ the Ojpritchnik, and the Djighite ; and four gun-boats, of which two are THE BRITISH NAVY. 65 brand-new this year. While talking about their European fleets, the Kiissians are paying no real attention to them, and are in(jre and more concentrating their strength in the North Pacific." " Tiie British navy," savs another writer, ■'•" '' is not in danger, and the British navy, whatever its shortcomings, is relatively far stronger than its thoughtless detractors would have us believe. Our ships do steer and our ships do steam — at least as well as those of other powers ; and, what is more, our ships will 'fight' and our ships will 'win,' in spite of the dismal forebodings of interested panic-mongers. " With the resources at our command, our armaments afloat admit of a I'apid development, in which no other country can compete with us. A French writer has truly said, ' La puissance d'une marine est moins dans son materiel a Hot, que dans I'outillage de ses arsenaux, et dans la puissance productive de ses chantiers.' " As a maritime power we are unequalled, and if we be true to our- selves we shall remain so." In 1886 the fighting ships of the British navy were summarized as follows : Siiii'.s. AKMUKEU. In commission and in reserve Deduct ships of doubtful value Total reliable armored ships.. UNARMORKD. In commission and in reserve Deduct ships of doubtful value Total reliable unarrnored ships Armored ships building Unarmored ships building Total Armored ships being completed Unarrnored ships being completed. . . Total Total armored ships Total unarrnored sldps Grand total of ships No. Guns. 50 50S 137 371 43 197 15 1131 76 183 1045 12 21 148 113 33 260 10 10 93 90 20 183 72 238 300 749 1333 2073 Ttisplacemcut. Tons. 339.750 50,78 288,970 221,957 27,760 194,197 89,660 24,650 114,310 84,880 26,790 111^670" 514,290 273,397 787,687 Hursi'iiower. 241.390 _ 30.970 210,42F~ 245,692 _ 37,470_ ^218,333" 114,000 .53,2.50_ "167,3.50 84,7.50 41,800_ ""l26,5.5(r 440,140 340,743_ 780,883 During the last year thirty-seven vessels of the following classes were stricken from the list, viz., five armored ships, seven cruisers of the third class, sixteen gun-vessels, one despatch-boat, and eighteen special service "Our War Ships," CusackSmilh. 66 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. gun-boats. The total net value, excluding ordnance equipments, of the fleet when it is kept at a normal war strength is $191,568,720, and the annual ship-lniikling exjienditures required to sustain this standard of efSciency is $8,793,440. This is a very cheap insurance upon the prop- erty, material and moral, which is at stake. The following table shows the armored and partiaUy protected ships now under construction or lately finished : Namk of Suip. TaRr.Kl'B. Trafalgar Nile..'. Victoria Sanspareil Biiiiibiirgli Hero BAKBET'lES. Auson Camperdown Benbow Howe Rodney Colliii!i:wood Imperieuse Warspite Itl.T.TEn OKUISKKS. Immorlalite Aurora Australia Galatea Narcissus Orlando Undaunted I'AKTIAl.r.V TRorroTEn Mersey Severn Thames Forth 11,940 11,940 11,470 11,470 9,150 6,200 10,000 10,000 10,000 9,700 9,700 9,1.50 8,500 8,500 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 3,. 500 3,500 8,. 500 3,500 Horse-power. Speed. 13,000 16.5 13,000 15.5 13,000 16.75 13,000 16.75 7,500 15.4 6,000 15.5 13,500 17.5 11,700 17.5 10,850 17.5 11,500 17.0 11,. 500 17.0 9,. 570 16.5 10,344 17.31 10,343 17.35 8,. 500 18,0 8,500 18.0 8,500 18.0 8,500 18.0 8,500 18.0 8,500 18.0 8,500 18.0 6,000 18.0 6,000 18.0 5,700 18.0 5,700 18.0 Touil Cost. £844,318 889,431 829,979 835,468 683,609 431,500 753,288 743,074 810,633 720,771 736,483 670,752 559.901 558,449 302,920 308,585 290,613 290,300 290,751 299,905 299,535 236,435 234,283 327,980 231,913 Armament. 4 67-ton, 8 5-in. 4 67-tou, 8 5-in. 3 110-ton. 1 10iu.,13 6in. 4 45-ton, 5 6-in. 3 45-ton, 4 6-in. 4 67-ton, 6 6 in. 4 67-ton, 6 6 in. 3 110-ton, 10 6-in. 4 67-ton, 6 6-in. 4 69-ton, 6 6 in. 4 44 ton, 6 6-in. 4 9.3-in., 6 6in. 4 22-lon, 6 6-in. 2 33-ton, 10 6 in. 2 22-ton, 10 6-in. 2 9.2-in., 10 6-iu. 2 9.3-in.,10 6-in. 3 9.3-in.,10 6-in. 3 9.2-in., 10 6-in. 3 9.3-in.,10 6 in. 2 8-in.,10 6 in. 3 8-in.,10 6in. 2 8-in., 10 6-in. 2 8-in., 10 6-in. In the notes upon the next chapter, additional data referring to gun- boats and torpedo-boats will be found. THE FRENCH NAVY. By SIR EDWARD J. REED. WE have now to pass under ^evie^^^ that vast array of naval con- structions which the Continental navies of Europe offer to our observation. It is not at all surprising that the introduction of steam-engines, of iron and steel hulls, and of armor-plating has been attended throughout Eurojje by even greater diversity of thought and practice than has char- acterized our naval progress — " our progress " here signifying that of both the United States and Great Britain. And this may, I think, truth- fully be said without in any degree neglecting the striking originality of the American Monitors, to wliich I endeavored to do justice. As regards two of the three great changes just adverted to, the only differences of oj^inion that have arisen have been in the nature of com- petitions rather than of conflicts. ISTo one, so far as I am aware, has ever proposed to revert to sail-power or to wooden hulls in important ships-of-war. On the contrary, the powers have been in continual com- petition in the effort to reduce the weights of the hulls of war-ships (apart from armor) by the extended use, first of iron, and afterwards of steel, and to apply the savings of weight thus effected to the develop- ment of engine -power, speed, and steaming endurance. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the development of armor has been pursued with less constancy and less earnestness, the result being that marked contrasts are exhiljited by European navies. It may be said, with little or no quahfication, that all other European naval powers followed, in the first place, tlie example set by the late Emperor Napoleon III., in La Gloiiv, by covering the whole of the ex- posed part of the war-ship's hull with armor-plating. AU the early iron- clads of Russia, Italy, Austria, and Germany were jirotected from stem-* to stern, and from a few feet below water to the upper deck. England did the same in the cases of a few ships, although she began, as we saw QS MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. befoi'e, with the Warrior type, in wliich the armor was hmited to the central part of the shijx But the system of completely covering the ex- posed ship with armor has now entirely and properly passed away from European jn-actice, and has been succeeded by varied arrangements of armor. The importance of giving effectual protection to the hull " between wind and water," as it is called (signifying from a few feet below the water-line to a few feet al)Ove that line), has been steadily recognized by Continental governments, with but the rarest exceptions. Nothing cor- responding to that wholesale aljandonment of armor for aljout a hun- dred feet at each end of the ship which has been practised in the British ships of the Infexihle a-nd Ad mind types is displayed in the line-of-l)attle ships of the Continent. In France, indeed, two such ships were laid down under some temporary influence, iv'.;., the Bi'enmis and the Chdrles Ifariel, but they appear to have soon fallen under suspicion, and there has not been, to my knowledge, any great disposition to complete them for service. A return made l>y the Admiralty to the order of the House of Commons has been printed, and says of the Brennns and Charles Martel : " Though these vessels still appear in the list of the French navy, l)ut little money has been voted for their construction in 1SS6, and all work on them is now reported to have been stopped." I know not what signihcance is to be attached to the fact, but I observe that these two ships Avere omitted altogether from the iron -clad ships of France pubhshed so recently as May, 1886, in the Universal JRegister of shipping, which Lloyd's Register Committee " believe will be found the most complete list that has yet been published." It seems not im- probable, therefore, that the dangerous system of exposing two-thirds of the shij)'s length to destruction from all kinds and every system of naval guns, even the smallest, which prevailed in the British navy for more than twelve years, and which has noAV hapjjily been superseded in the powerful new ships Nde and Trufidejar, obtained l)ut little more than momentary approval in France, and is likely to have led to tiie con- demnation of the only two ships in which it Avas attempted — a result which is creditable alike to Frencli science and to French sagacity. In Italy the Iii_fle:rd>le system (which has met in France with the fate we have just seen) obtained temporary favor, and was ado])ted in the Diiilio and the Ddndolo, two very large shifts, of 11,()0(:) tons each, of a speed exceeding fifteen knots, and each carrying four KJOton guns in tui-rets. Although these ships are 340 feet in length, even the armored belt amidships (if " belt " in any sense so short a strip of armor may be THE FRENCH NAVY. 69 called*) is but 1(»7 feet long, leaving therefore 233 feet of the sliip at the ends wholly devoid of water-line protection. As the author of the " citadel system," I cannot regard such an arrangement as this as a fair and reasonal)le embodiment of it, the discrepancy between the armored and unarmored portions being greater in these two ships than even in the AJa^ and Agamem».on,\vhich are perhaps the worst examples of the abuse of the citadel system in the British navy. It is to the credit of the Italian government that ships of this type were not rei)eated in their navy ; and it is but right to point out that there were excuses (which probablv ranked in the minds of the designers as rea.mu.^) for a more extreme pro])ortionate limitation of the citadels being adopted in the DiiMio and Dandolu than in the Aja/.r and Aijaniemnon. Among these were the possession by the Italian ships of heavier armaments, and of far greater steam-power and speed than the British ships possessed— a matter to which further reference will be made hereafter — and proba- bly, also, the adoption of somewhat finer water - hues as a means of attaining the superior speed. In this connection it may be well to observe that the question of leaving so-called armored line-of-battle ships \vithout armor at the ex- tremities is first one of principle, and afterwards one of degree. The principle (which should be observed in the design of every armored ves- sel which is intended for the line of Ijattle, or fox those close and severe contests of ship Avith ship which will probably supersede in a great de- gree the system of fighting in fines of battle) is tfiis : tfie proportion wfiicli the armored citadel bears to the unarmored ends must always be such as to enable the ship to keep afloat all the time the armor itself holds out against the attack of the enemy ; so that injuries to the unar- mored ends, however great or multiplied, sliall not alone suifice to de- stroy the sfiip. Whatever may occur in the future to mterfere with the application of this principle — and I do not deny that such interferences may arise under certain perfectly conceivable circumstances — notliing has yet happened to justify its abandonment, or to even justify the re- motest chance of its being violated. If a ship is not intended to close with an enemy, or to fight her any- how and anywhere on the open sea — Avliich certainly has lieen the domi- nant idea of the British navy, in so far as its great line-of-battle ships are concerned — if, for example, a combination of immense speed with * It is called a bell in Lloyd' i Uaiverml Register, but the term is very likely to mislead. — E. J. R. 5* iO MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. one or t^vo extremely powerful and well-protected guns should serve a particular oliject lietter than a slower and more fully protected ship would serve it — then even great destructiljility in the ship itself may justihably l)e ijicurred. But for general naval service, and in every case in which a shi]) is intended to accept battle with a poweii'ul antagonist and fight it out, or to force an action when she encounters such an ene- my, it cannot be wise to leave her so exposed that that enemy may al- most certainly sink her or cause her to capsize by merely pouring any kind of shot or shell into her unarmored parts. But even the observ- ance of the above general principle is not alone aU that is desirable in armored line-of -battle ships. It is not well to leave even so much of the ends of such ships wholly exjjosed as may lead to the speedy loss in action of her steaming or steering powers. The armor-belt should be of sufficient length to fairly guarantee the ship against prompt disablement in action, and to do this it must be cari'ied very much neai'er to the bow and stern than it has been in the cases of the Italian ships (Dirilio and Damlolo) now under notice. On the other hand, where ships are formed with fine waterdines, and the two opposite sides are consequently very near to each other for many feet, it is quite unnecessary to cover them with armor. The Ijuoyancy comprised between the two sides at such parts is very smaU, and consequently penetration can let l)ut little water into the ship, and do but httle harm. It is a matter for the exercise of professional judg- ment where to draw the line bet^veen the armored and the unarmored parts. In the new British shi]is Kile and TriifaJgm\ which have ex- cited great admiration in England, there are about sixty feet of length at each end left without armor, and as the ships have fine lines, but are nevertheless of considerable breadth at sixty feet from the ends, it seems probable that good judgment has been shown l_iy their designers in this matter. I have discussed this question at some length because it is one of primary consideration in the design of important armored ships, and because the al)andonment of a long belt of armor is also one of the few features of construction respecting which the designers of the Continent have steadfastly refrained from following the example set by the Ad- miralty Office at ^yhitehall from the years 1870 to 1SS5. It will com- plete the consideration of this In'anch of the suljject to sav that there are numerous ships of the iron-clad type in foreign navies in which the armor (justifiably, as has just been shown) stops somewhat shoi't of the ends, but very few indeed in which the length of the unarmored parts THE FRENCH NAVY. exceeds that of the armored. Among the last named may be mentioned a very questionable class of vessels {Sachsen type) in the German na\'y, and a much smaller sea-going vessel belonging to the Argentine lle- pnblic, named the Almirante Brown, which is a well-desig-ned vessel in other respects, but which, on account of her long defenceless bow and stern, woukl do better to avoid tlian to fight an enemy."- Having now dealt with the primary question of the defence of ships by means of armor -belts, we come to the greater or less defence be- stowed upon them above water. The course taken l)y the French de- signers, when the increased thickness of armor made it impossi1;»le to repeat the complete protection adopted in Ln Gloire and her compeers, Avas in some few cases that of belting the ship with armor, and giving great " tumble home" to the sides above water, excepting at the central armored battery, thus allowing that battery to project, and its guns to fire directly ahead and astern, past the inwardly inclined sides. This * It will be instructive to repeat here, before leaving this qvie.stion of partially armored ships, a comparison resembling that which I employed in a paper read at the Eoj'al United Service Institution, in which are set down in one column the displacements of certain Brit- ish and French ships, eleven of each, built and building, possessing maximum armor on the water-line of at least fifteen inches. As all the French .ships given have complete or all but complete armor-belts, it is proper to reckon their whole displacement tonnages as armored tonnage. But in the case of all the British ships which carry such thick armor they are deprived of armor altogether except amidships, and it is therefore misleading, and even absurd, to reckon their whole displacement tonnages as armored tonnage. For this reason I am obliged to give two tonnages for them, «*>., the armored and the unarmored, as I do below : FlUCNOlI SllIl'W. Briti.^k Sii PS. Armored. Utiiinnored. Tons. 5.210 4,160 4,160 4,580 4,580 4,580 4,800 4,800 4,900 4,900 4,900 51,570 Arniorerl. T..tal. Arairal Baudin Aniiral Dnperre Devastation Tons. 11,141 10,486 9,639 11,441 9,639 9,864 9,864 9,864 9,864 7,239 7,184 Inflexible Toils. 6,670 4,350 4,350 4.570 4,570 4,570 4,900 4,900 6,100 5,100 5,100 Tori^. 11.880 8,610 8,510 9,150 9,150 9,150 9,700 9,700 10,000 10,fl00 10,000 Agamemnon .... Colossus Edinburgh Collingwood .... Rodney HoiTIG Com bet Magenta Marceaii Neptune Camperdowii. . . . Benbow Ansnii Iiidomptable Totid 106,225 Tut.al 64,180 106,750 I have not thought it necessary to alter these figures in repealing this comparison, as they are sufficiently near the truth for the only p\u-pose for which I employ them, which is that of exhibiting the fact that whereas the above eleven British iron-clads (so called) fio-ure in the official tables of the British government as constituting an armored tonnage of 105,750 tons, nearly equal to that of the eleven French ships, they really represent but little more than half that amount of armored tonnage. — E. J. K. 72 • MODERN SHIPS OF VVAK. system has been strikingly carried out in the two sister sliips Cmirhet and JJevadatioa, the former of which is shown, stem on, in tlie cut on page 75, which is engraved from a ph(jtograph talcen after her launch, and befoi'e she began to receive her armor-plating. A representation of the sister vessel, l>(kHt station (forming one of the series of engravings given in tiiis chapter from draAvings specially executed for the purpose by Chevalier De Martino), forms our illustration on page 73. But generally in the French navy, and in nearly all but its earliest ships, direct head and stern fire has been obtained Ijy means of elevated and projecting towers, armor-plated to a sufficient height to protect the gun machinery, but with the guns themselves unprotected, and firing en harhette. In the case of the two ships Devastation and Courhet the main-deck projecting battery carries four guns, each commanding a full quadrant of a circle. The barbette batteries, standing up above the upper deck, carry a powerful gun on each side of the ship, with great range of fire. Having given these general indications of the system of attack and defence adopted in the French navy — by far the most important of all the Continental navies — it no^v becomes desirable to go luore into par- ticulars. It is not necessary to dwell upon the early iron-clads of France. The Gloire and a dozen others of like character were all built of wood, without water-tight bulkheads, without rams or spurs, with armor-plates from four to six inches thick only, and with guns of small caliljre and power. They may be left out of consideration in dealing with the pres- ent French navy. They were followed by six other vessels, also built of wood, l)ut with upper works of iron, viz., the Ocean, Marengo, Saffren, EicJteJieu, Colhert, Trident. They were arn\ored with ]ilates of a maxi- nnnn thickness of S^ inches, and carried four guns of lOf inches calibre, -weighing 23 tons each, with four IG-ton guns, and half a dozen light ones. They varied in some particulars, ranging in tonnage from 7000 to 8(»'J0 tons, in horse-po^ver from 3G0(.» to 4600, and in sj^eetl from 13 to 14^ knots. The Friedland is another vessel which is frecpiently classed with the previous six ships, the largest of which she generally resembles, but she is built of iron, and carries eight 23-ton guns, and none of the 16-ton. A committee which sat in 187l>, and -which had for its president and vice-presidents men no less eminent than the late M. Gambetta and MM. Alljert Grcvy and Jules Ferry, proncninoed these seven ships to be the strongest ai'mored ships of the French navy then in service. Such great advances liave since been made, liowever, that it is only necessary to add respecting these vessels that they were nearly all single-screw ships, THE "DEVASTATION:" FKENCII ARMORED SHIP OF THE FIRST CLASS. THE FRENCH NAVY. 75 THE "COUEBET" (fOKMERLY THE " FOUDROYANT ") : FRENCH ARMORED SHIP OP THE FIRST CLASS. and that tliey carried their princiiial armament at broadside ])orts on the main-deck, and in raised barl)8tte towers placed at the four corners of the central battery. The RlcheHeu was the largest of these vessels. Not one of the foregoing French ships of the early period conformed to conditions which were laid down officially in 1872 as those requisite for first-class French iron-clads, viz., that they should l^e constructed of iron (or steel), with water-tight compartments, be armored with plates 12 inches thick, with decks from 2 to 2| inches thick, armed with guns of 24 centimetres calibre, commanding certain prescribed ranges of fire, and furnished Avith spurs or ram stems. There were, however, four ships then under construction or trial which did conform to the prescribed conditions, vk., the two already spoken of — the Courhet 76 MODERN SPIirS OF WAR, and iK'iHiMatinii, and two others named the Redoutalle and the Amiral Duptrre. Witli these powerful ships may be said to have commenced the era of iron and steel line-of-battle ships in Fi-ance. We will now bring them, together with still more recent French ships of the hrst class, into a taljle in which their particulars may be conveniently grouped. Taui.e A.-JIODERN FRENCH ARMORED SHIPS OF THE FIEST CLASS.' Name of Ship. mtjiit in tons. Amiral Bavidia. .| 11,200 Amiral Duperre.i 10,800 Devastation 9,900 Formidable Fouflroyant ( 11,260 9,500 (now Courbet) )' I Hoclie ! 10,480 Magenta 10,480 Marceau , 10,480 Neptime I 10,480 Redoutable 9,030 Caiman 7,200 Furiex 5,700 ludomptable .... 7,200 Requin 7,200 Terrible 7,200 Tonnant 1 4,707 Iinlirntud S|).-cd I)rnu"ht Miixininni llor.si- m Length. Bre:ldth. of Thicknea.'^ powL-r.t Knots.t Fec-t. Water. Feet. of Arinof. Kcet. Indies. 8,320 15 319 70 25.8 22 8,120 14.2 319 70 25.8 22 8,320 14.5 312 69.8 25.5 15 8, .320 15 319 70 25.8 22 8,200 15 311 69.8 25.5 15 5,500 14 329 66 26.5 17.7 5,. 500 14 329 66 26.5 17.7 5,500 14 329 66 26.5 17.7 5,500 14 329 66 26.5 17.7 6,000 14.2 312 64.6 24.4 14 4,800 14 271 59 23 17.5 3,400 12 248 59 21.4 17.5 4,800 14 271 59 22.8 19.5 6,000 14.5 271 59 22.8 19.5 4,800 14 271 59 22.8 19.5 1,750 10 248 58.4 17.3 17.5 Heaviest Gun catried. of 4 (4 (4 3 (4 (4 4 /5 tons. 48 ■' 48 " 28 ■• 75 " 48 " 28 " .52 " 52 " .52 " .52 " 28 ■• 24 •■ 48 '■ 48 •■ 75 " 75 " 75 " 48 •■ The ship which alphabeticall_y falls last in this table among the ships of 9000 tons and upwards, the HedoutcMe, came first in point of time, trlz., in 1872, and her design marked the commencement of the new era in French iron-clad construction. One of the features of the change was, as already intimated, the abandonment of wooden hulls, which we had succeeded in accomplishing in England eight years before. The first design proposed by myself to the British Admiralty provided for an iron hull, and althougli the force of circumstances compelled us to construct my earliest war-vessels in timber, yet so strongly averse Avere we to the employment of so perishable a material as wood within an iron casing that Admiral Sir E. Spencer Eobinson succeeded in prevent- ing the construction of three out of five Avooden line-of-battle armored ships that had previously been proposed by the government of the day, For tbe reason before stated, tbc Brennus and Charles Martel are omitted from this table. •f These powers and speeds arc taken from Lloyd's Universal Register. ''^i'^"S':'<''!'|iiiiijt " '11 jHii!ii,isl!lii!iiI||i«iv.,!>i,i!',r' l||ili!!l|lili||l|||)ll!| ifi!i|f!|ii||iilliS!j[ii|iiiif:i!|| l'',i-iV'., '' l''i1.Wr ' ■ l:'ii-:s ,,,,,,1, ,i|,, „ilj*Sfit., ,„ #-||P*fr' -.'1-. THE FRENCH NAVY. Y9 and sanctifined Ijy Parliament. Tliis was in 1863 or 18r,i, the Lonl Clyde and Lord Wat'dcn being tlie last large armored wooden ships laid down in her Majesty's doclcyards. The French delayed the change for some years, as we see. M. De Bussy, the designer of the Ri'(JoutiiM<\ and a most accomplished naval constructor, built a very large part of the ship of steel, and l)y so doing brought the French dockyards into early acquaintance with the superi- ority of that material to iron for constructive purposes. The Ri'douta- liJv has armor of more than 14 inches in thickness upon her l)elt, and of 9^- inches upon her central Ijattery. She carries eight if.j-ton guns* — four in her central batterv, two in barbette half-towers, and tw(j on re- volving platforms at the bow and stern respectively. She also carries eight light 5i-inch guns. This ship generally resembles her successors, the Devastation and the Foudroyant (by the same designer), in so far as that her liatteries fire past sides, with great tumble home. Lord Brassey (in this respect somewhat erroneously following Mr. King, of the United States navy, in his able work upon " The "War-ships and Navies of the World "), saj^s, " The faculty of firing parallel to the line of keel is secured in the French ship l)y the tuml)le home of the ship's sides, and not by the projection of the battery beyond them, as in the English vessel (the Andaclous)r It is difficult to understand what this means, because it is obviously only by the projection of the battery beyond the sides of the ship which are before and after it that fore and aft fire can be obtained from the battery in either case. But it is not true that the battery of the Audacimis, any more than the Ijat- tery of the Redoidalile, projects beyond the breadth of the ship at the water-line, which would seem to be what is intended, and Lord Brassey may assure himself of the fact l^y looking at Plate IIL of his own work on " The British Navy," from which the above words are quoted. The Bed Old all e is a full-rigged ship, and nevertheless steams 14^ knots per hour. There is one particular in which the Decasiation and the Foudroyaid, like her as they are in general design, differ materially from the liedouialJe. I refer to the armament. The former two ships each carry four 34-centimetre 4S-ton guns in the main-deck battery, in heu of the four 25-ton guns of the RedoutaUe. The Amiral Duj>erre (designed by M. Sabattier, the able French chief constructor) claims a few words, as she differs materiaUy in type * Some returns say four of 28 tons, and four of 24 tons, all being of 27 centimetres calibre. I have adopted these in Table A. o 80 MODERN SHIPS OF AVAR. from tlie three ships just discussed. She has a complete belt of very thiclc armor from stem to stern — greatest thickness 22 inches, tapering to lo inches at the extremities, witli a thick deck (2 inches) at the top of the belt in the nsnal manner. But above this belt thei'e is no armored main-deck batterj^, as in the other ships, the chief armament, of fonr 4S-ton iruns, beino: carried in four elevated barbette towers, two of which are well forward, and project considerably to enable their guns to act efficiently as bow-chasers, and at the same time to command all round the broadside and right astern. To facilitate this the sides of the ship have great tumble home. The other two towers are situated at the mid- dle line of the ship, one near the stern, and the other farther forward, lietween the main and the mizzen masts. The main-deck, although with- out ai^mor defence, is not without armament, as it carries fourteen 5i-inch fio-pounder riHed breech-loadei's. Other particidars of the Amlral Du- ■perre are given in the table, and on page 81 is a view of her, engraved from a photograph with which I have l^een favored by a French officer. It will be observed from her description that the most characteristic feature of this great .ship of more than 10,0()0 tons is the absence of any guns protected by armor. The bai"bette towers, it is true, are armored with 12-inch plates, and the main-deck guns are under the protection of the thin plating of the ship's side, which latter is of little or no avail, however, against th(3 armament of other first-class ships. Practically the whole of the DuperrPs guns are unprotected. It may be added that during the discussions in London upon the " ships armored in places " an attempt was made to show that the Duperre, owing to her alleged small initial stability, was as devoid of stability when injured above the belt as certain vessels of the British Admiral class Avhen injured before and abaft the belt — a statement which I distrust, as I regard it as a mere inference from an experiment which I believe to be delusive. At the same time, the Diiperre Avould have l)een the l^etter for more initial stability. But it is obvious tliat all Ijelted or jxirtially belted vessels, in Avhich the l>elt is carried but a small heiglit above the water for the size of the ship, must run the risk of losing both buoyancy and stability very soon if even moderately inclined in or after battle, seeing that, with a moder- ate inclination only, the entire armor-belt on the depressed side of the ship must disappear beneath the sea's surface. The strenuous assertion of this source of danger, although it could not lead to nmcli increase in the staljility of the existing armored shi])s, has produced as one effect the busy and earnest efforts Avhich both English and French constructors have been recently making to subdivide their ships ahove the armor THE FRENCH NAVY. 83 into as many water-tight compartments as possible, and to stnff these compai'tments as fnll as possible of buoyant (or at least of ^vater-exclud- ing) materials. The necessity for resorting to this device, however, in tirst-class ships of nine, ten, or eleven thousand tons dis[)lacenient, and of something appi^oaching to five million dollars each in value, is not a thing for either French or English naval constructors to be proud of. But the assertion of the danger in question has had in England the further and very satisfactory result of bringing much more trustwcjrthy shi])s, like the Nile and Trafaltjur, into being, and of insuring the determined sup- ]>ort of these ships in Parliament whenever those who f(jolishly con- found mere cheapness with merit in sucli constructions seek to interfere with the progress of these magnificent vessels. Two other powerful ships of the French navy, closely resembling the Amii-ul Duperre, are the Ami ml Baudhi and the Fonnidahle. They are of ?,\ feet more beam than the Duperre (and therefore probaljly have much larger stability), and their displacement exceeds hers by W() tons. Their armaments chiefly differ from hers in the emi)loyment of three guns of 75 tons each in their to^vers, in lieu of the four guns of 48 tons of the Diiperre. The Neptune, IlocJie, Mnejenta, and M(H'ceau are four other powerful ships, as will have been seen from Table A, the principal armament of each consisting of four guns of 52 tons, carried in towers, with the exception of the ITocJie, which has t\vo of her four principal guns of 28 tons each only- Incidental mention has already been made on page 76 of two ships, the Cdlman and IndonrptcMe, wdiich, although of only 7200 tons, carry very thick armor (llJi inches), and as a matter of fact carry also guns of the heaviest type (75-ton). There are two other vessels of the same description, the Teprihle and Bequin. Careful note should be taken of these four steel-built vessels, which add greatly to the p(jwer of France. Each carries two of the very powerful guns just mentioned, and steams at a speed of 14|- knots. In the same category of thickly armored ships the French have yet one other ship, the Fnrieu.e, of 55(10 tons. Her armor is 17|- inches thick in places, and she is armed with two 48-ton guns. Her speed is 12 knots. The Tonnaid has the same armor and armament, but she is of nearly 1000 tons less displacement, drawing much less water, and steaming only at 10 knots per hour. We may sum up the facts relating to the larger class of French iron- clads which still rank among the efficient ships of 7U0( i tons and upward by saying that, in addition to the sixteen ships of which the particulars are given in Table A, there are on the efficient list the CiMert, Fried- 84 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. land, Marengo, Ocean, Richelieu, Stiff ren. Trident, Savole, Jievanche, Sur- velllanfe, and Ilerdlne, most of which have been previously described in general terms, and the remainder of which are of less than GOOO tons, and were built chiefly of \vood many years ago. The French navy further comprises thirteen armor-plated cruisers, of Avhich four have lately been dropped out of some official lists. Of the remaining nine, four are modern vessels, and all of about equal size and power. These are the Dugueselln, Vauhun, Bayard, and Tarenne ; but of these, while the first tAvo are built of steel, the last two are Ijuilt of wood, with iron topsides, as are all the remaining five vessels of this class. The subjoined table will indicate the inferior character of most of the vessels of this type : TAjii.i! B— FRENCH ARMORED CRUISERS. Namf UF Slill'. Bayard DuguescliQ Tureuue Vaubiin La Galissoaiere. Triomphaute. . . Victorieuse Reine Blanche . Tliftis Displiice- .5900 .5900 5900 5900 4700 4700 4600 3630 3620 Ind H.>rs( powe ted 4.560 4000 4250 4000 3370 2400 3310 1800 1860 Speed.. LeiigMi. Bieadlh 14.5 14 14.2 14 13 13.8 13.7 11.8 12 366 366 266 366 256 356 356 330 330 Feet. 57.3 57.2 57.2 57.3 49 49 49 46.2 46.2 Dianglit of Water, Feet. 23 3 33.3 23.3 33.3 23 23 23 21.8 21.8 Maxinilirn Tllitkliess of Ariiinr. 10 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 Heaviest Gaiia c:inied. 4 of 4 " 4 " 4 " 6 '■ 6 '• 6 '■ 6 •■ 6 •■ 16 tons. 16 16 16 16 16 10 8 8 Of the above ships it may be remarked that the Theth and Relnc Blanche have been nearly twenty years afloat, the Gallm-jnlere was launched in 1872, the Yictopieuse in 1875, and the Trlomjihante in 1877. The remainder of the nine, as previously stated, are modern vessels, the JJuguesclln being not yet completed. The Dagiieselln and her sister ships are of the Duperre type, much reduced in dimensions. There are nine completed coast-guard iron-clads and eight armored gun-boats in the French. navy, as follows: Taui.i: f.-FRENCU IRON-CLAD (.'OAST-GUARD VESSELS. NaMK ItK Sllll' Fulminant. ToriTierre. . TempSte . . Vengeur . . Belier Bouledogue Cerbere . . . . Taiireau. . . . Tigre Ui.«|)late- ineiit. Speed. Miisimiim Ainiur. Pti (; icipjil 11 1 1 y. 'i.ins. Knots. Ihches. No. Tons. 5000 13.22 13 3 28 5700 14 13 o 28 4523 12 13 2 28 4533 10.8 13 2 48 3600 13.3 8.5 o 16 3800 13.25 8.5 2 16 3800 11.4 8.5 o 16 2700 13 6 1 23 3500 13.5 8.5 2 16 THE FRENCH NAVY. 85 Taim.e D.— FRENCH IRON-CLAD GUN-BOATS. Namk of Ship. First Class. Second Class. Acheron. . Cocyte . . . Plilegeton _ Sty-^' f Flamme . . I Fu.'ice . . . . Mitraille. . [ Grenade . . Displnce- Spectl. Jl!i.xitnnni Piincipal ineiit. Tons. Aimor, GllllB. Knots. Inches. Nn. Turn. lf)39 13 8 28 1H39 13 8 1 28 163U 13 8 28 1639 13 IS 1 28 1045 13 8 J 16 104.') 13 8 ^ 16 1045 13 8 16 1045 13 8 1 16 The vessels in the tal)les (! and D are all revolving turret vessels, -with the exception of the Tnnreau and of the four second-class gun- boats, which fire their guns en lurhette. They embrace very different types of construction, involving different degrees of sea - worthiness — very low degrees in some of them, I fear. With the exception of the Tern j)et(\ they are all furnished with twin screws. The FaJudnatd, Ton- nerre, Tempite, and Yemjeur, in Table C, and the whole of the vessels in Table D (as yet incomplete), are of iron or of steel, or of the two com- bined ; the remainder have hulls principally built of wood. I have chosen for illustration the turret - vessel Veiigeur, as seen on page 87, which has been engraved from a photograph sent to me by a naval friend in France. We come now to the unarmored ships of France, and as in writing of these I purpose accepting the official classifications adopted in France, which are not identical Avith those employed in England, it ma_v be well to repeat here a caution which the British Admiralty has given in a memorandum prefixed to a recent "I'eturn" of theirs "showing the fleets of England, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Greece." The caution is to the effect that France includes under the heading of "cruisers" vessels of about similar value to the larger class of English sloops, which are excluded from the English " cruiser " class. I3ut I re- gret the necessity of observing that the Admiralty officers, while care- ful to put this explanation -well forward, appear to be equally careful to withhold an explanation of much greater moment concerning three French cruisers of large size and of greater importance — withheld in pursuance, apparently, and as I have most reluctantly come to fear, of an uncandid, and indeed of a misleading spirit, which seems to have taken possession of some persons who have to do with the preparation of Admiralty returns to Parliament. The exercise of this spirit has forced me ere now to draw the attention of Parliament to the matter. 86 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. and in one instance to have an official return, wliicli contained erroneous and too favoral)le classifications of British ships, withdrawn. Any (jne referring to the Parliamentary return of British and for- eign fleets just adverted to will find under the lieading of '' Fnarmored Vessels Building" two large and remarkably fast steel cruisers, the 2'a^fa.r\ launched at Brest in ISSl:, of 4420 tons, 7500 indicated horse-power, and 1(!^ knots speed, is also given without remark in the Parliamentary return as an '' unarmored " vessel. Kow even this last- named vessel has a steel deck one and three-fourths inches thick to pro- tect her boilers, machinery, and magazines, while the Tage and Cerile have such decks three inches thick. These, being mere decks, do not, of course, remove the ships out of the category of unarmored ships, and the return is correct in this respect. But now in this same return all the British ships provided with protecting decks of this cliaracter are kept out of the lists of unarmored or " unprotected '' vessels, and are classed separately, and are described as " protected " vessels. And not only is this true of vessels like the 2[('j'»et/ class, which have such decks two and one-half inches thick in places, but it is true likewise of some twenty vessels, ranging, many of them, as low as 142(.> tons in displace- ment, and with decks and partial decks of less thickness than that of the Sfax, the weakest of the three French ships in this respect. In short, while the twenty-two English ships are withheld fr(im the cate- gory of unarmored ships, although every one of them is inferior in pro- tecting decks to the three French ships, the latter are placed in the in- ferior category, and not a word of explanation is offered to prevent the uninitiated and unsuspecting reader from regarding as -weaker than our vessels those French vessels which are in fact the strongest and best ]n'otected. I nuist say that, as an Englishman, I grieve to see returns to the British Parliament made use of for the dissemination of informa- tion so misleading as this ; and I should do so if I could believe there Avas nothing but official negligence involved ; but I am sony to say I cannot doul^t that had the mere reproduction of foreign classifications put three of the very fastest and most important cruisers of our own THE FRENCH NAVY. 87 nav3^ of Admiralty origin, at the very great disadvantage to \vliich the French ships are put in this return, we should have had a very full and a very prominent explanation of the seeming discre])anoy given. It is to the credit of LloyiVn Rcghtcr office that what the Admiralty Office failed to do in a i)aper issued at the end of July was ])r(ipei']y done in their Uniwrml lh'(j inter, published two or three months earlier; for in the latter the three French ships are separately detailed under the heading of " Deck-protected Cruisers." It is absolutely necessary to bring to light the matter just explained, for other- wise the present state and the prospects of the French navy cannot lie properly understood, the Taije, Virile, antl iSfax be- ing, on the Avhole, the most important of the French shij)s which are without armor belts. Two others there are, however, Avhich are weaker than the T(«je and Sfuj. only in the fact of their being vithout spe cial deck protection. These are the / THE " VBNGEDK :" FRENCH IRON-CLAD COAST-GUAIiD VESSEL, SS MODEKX SHIPS OF WAR. I>iiqi!(-.siie and the Ti>itrvUJ(\ two ships approxhnately alike in size and construction, and Ijuth having their iron bottoms sheathed with two tliicknesses of wood and then cojipered, after the manner introduced by myself in II. j\I. S. Inrini! to 17 knots; two of 1430 tons each {Scout class), carrying four 5-inch 2-ton guns, with an estimated maximum speed of 16 knots; and two of 7S5 tons {Curlev: class), called ''gun and torpedo" vessels; speed, 15 knots; armament, one 6-incli 89-cwt. and three 5-inch 36-cwt. guns. There is also a class of "torpedo gun-boats" (the official designation, lait not one which ex- ])resses any very manifest distinction from the last-named class), which are of a very notable character. This (the GmssJiopjiei') class, of which each vessel is of only 450 tons displacement, is to be supplied with en- gines of 2700 indicated horse -power. The diagrams on page 90 ex- hibit the general form and particulars of these very remarkable little vessels, which are expected to steam at fully 19 knots (22 miles) per hour. Against the above torpedo-vessels of the British navy are to be set, in the French navy, four torpedo cruisers of 1280 tons, 17 knots speed, carrying each five 4-incli guns ; and eight torpedo despatch A-es- sels, each of 32<:» tons, and designed to steam at 18 knots, carrying ma- chine guns only ; such machine guns being also carried, of course, by aU the fast torpedo-vessels and gun-boats, bcjth French and English, pre- viously referred to, but in their cases in conjunction with their other "•uns. These 320-ton torpedo-vessels of France are to be driven by ma- chinery of 1800 indicated liorse-power. It may be observed with regard to these small craft furnished with such enormous steam-]wwer (in proportion to their size and tonnage) that there is much uncertainty as to the speeds which they will attain. * See Notes, page 263. 90 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. 'r&^T —i^Zlt m Not only are the builders without experience of similar vessels by which to guide themselves, but where the proportion of power to dis])lacement is so great, shght differ- ences both in luiUs and machinery, no less than in immersion and trim, may produce unforeseen results. As designers who fail to realize promised speeds are liable to l)e discredited, while those whose vessels surpasstheir promised speeds may be unduly praised, it is but reasonable to expect that the promised speeds will usually even be more than realized. This has been the case with the Bomhe, the first of the French torpedo despatch vessels Avhich have been tried un- der steam, and which, under the promise of IS knots, realized no less than IIH knots on the measured mile. It should be added that all of these extremely fast small craft in both navies are pro- pelled l)y twin engines and screws. As great public interest Avill be felt in the trials of these very novel and special vessels -*rll i^. M THE FRENCH NAVY. 91 — as mere steamers no less tlian os war ci-aft — it may Ije well to give their names, to facilitate their identification hereafter. English Torpedo (tun-b(jats : (rra.w/iojjij///)', A't/.tf/cs/ntke, S/nil<'i\ tSntid- fll — each having a displacement of 450 tons, 2700 horse-power, 200 feet length, 23 feet breadth, S feet draught, and a speed estimated at !'.♦ knots. French Torpedo Despatch Vessels: Jjoinhe, Coii/i-ivrfini'^ I)(Ujiii_\, I) ragonne, Flh-he, Lance, Sauit^Barhe, Salve — each having a displacement of 320 tons, 1800 horse-power, 194.3 feet length, 21.4 feet Ijreadth, .5.1 feet draught, and, with the exception of the Bomhe, a speed estimated at 18 knots. The actual speed of the Boinhe is 19.5 knots. Besides the above vessels, the two navies (English and French) are provided as follows with torpedo-boats : The Enghsh have nine small (50 feet long) and slow (14^- to 15 knots) of wood ; lifty small (fiO to 66 feet long) and slow (15 to 16 knots) of steel ; nineteen others of greater length, but all less than 93 feet, and of s])eeds varying from 16 to 10 knots; six of 100 to 113 feet, and 19 knots; hfty-three of 125 feet in length, and 19 knots; and two building, viz., one of 135 feet in length, and 22 knots, and one of 150 feet in length, and 20 knots ; in all, one hundred and thirty-nine torpedo-ljoats, of which the 135-feet boat car- ries four 3-pounder quick-firing guns, and the 150-feet boat carries five 6-pounder guns of that kind. The French have nine under 70 feet in length ; forty-one under 100 feet in length, steaming at 17 to 18 knots ; eighteen of 108 feet in length, somewhat faster; nine of 113 feet in length, steaming at 22 knots ; and fifty-one of 114 feet in length, steam- ing at 20 knots ; in all, one hundred and twenty' -eight torpedo-boats, all armed with machine guns only. As the nine slow wooden boats of the English navy can hardly be regarded as torped(j-boats at all, it may be said that of torpedo-boats, Ijuilt and building, the English have one hun- dred and thirty, and the French one hundred and twenty -eight, of which the English have seventy-nine completed, and fifty -one Ijuilding and completing, and the French have sixty -eight completed, and sixty build- ing and completing. The English navy is therefore slightly, but only slio-htly, in advance of the French in the matter of t(jrpedo-boats proper, while in respect of extremely fast sea-going torpedo-vessels of 320 and 45(J tons respectively, the English have three under construction and one completed, while the French have one (the Bomhe) completed and seven under construction. NOTES. OF the 15r»,(H»0,000 francs appropriated in France this year for the construction of -\var-ships nearly nine-tenths were set aside, not for the l)uilding of hirge armored vessels, but for the following fast cruisers and auxiliary classes : " Six cruisers, class L, 3(»,000,000 francs ; ten cruisers, class IL, 20,000,000 francs; twenty torpedo -catchers, 12,- 000,000 francs ; fifty gun-boats, 15,0OO,O0(J francs ; one hundred torpedo- boats, 25,000,0(J0 francs ; three coast-defence vessels, 25,000,000 francs. Notwithstanding the late change in administration this seeins to show that the policy of Admiral Aube, referred to in the introductory chap- ter, is still potent, and that the government believes the next war with Englantl will be carried on by French cruisers attacking British com- merce, and that sharp, destructive dashes will be made against the ene- my's C(jast b_v ships with great speed, and such sulHcient power that ' " all of England's litt(jral towns, fortified and unfortified, whether purely i ' ]ieace establishments or warlike," will be burned or pitilessly ransomed. " In any future war," continues this exponent of the new ideas, " France Avill come down from the heights of the cloudy sentimentality which ^ '^ has created that monstrous association of words, rigJitv of war, and her attack on every source of English riches will become not only legiti- mate but obligatory." V It is certain that French naval activity is now mainly directed to the construction of vessels just suited to these new theories. At the same time she has a formidable fleet of heavilv armored vessels, a rouo-h comparison with those of England being as follows, in the classes which have over fifteen inches of armor protection and carr}^ guns above forty- three tons in weight : Ships. Armor. No. films. Woiglit. 3 2H inclics . . 6 breecli-loading rifles . . . . 75 toas. 5 .... 20 .. 8 " . . 75 " 6 18 .. 8 " . . . . 50 " 3 .... 15 " .. 34 " .. 48 " 16 46 e England has three ships with armor from twenty -four inches to ighteen inches thick, and twelve ships with armor eighteen inches THE FRENCH NAVY. 93 thick ; three ships carry six llO-ton guns, six carry twenty-four C7-ton guns, five carry sixteen 43-ton guns, all breech-loading I'ifles, while ine the hghtness of huU and the gun armament of the torpedo-catcher with the sea-going jiowers of the cruiser. They are twin- screw steel vessels, 216 feet long, 29 feet 2 incites in beam, 15 feet 5 inches in draught, and with 3200 indicated horse-power are expected to develop 17 knots. The armament consists of five torpedo-tubes, five ■1-inch and six macliine guns. In England tlie Scout, the prototype of this class, is a twin-screw torpedo cruiser, 220 feet in length, 34 feet 3 inches in beam, and with 14 feet draught displaces 1450 tons. Like the Condor she is sulidivided into water-tight compartments and has a steel deck; on her trial she developed with forced draft 17.(> knots and 3350 horse-power. Her armament consists of eleven torpedo-tubes, four 6-inch rifles on central pivots, and eight Nordenfeldt guns. The Fearless is a sister ship to the Scout. So highly was the class es- teemed that eight others known as the Archer class were laid down, and of these the Coamch, MohawTx, Porpoise, Tartar, Archer, and Brifsh have THE FRENCH NAVY. 101 already undergone satisfactory steam trials, wliils the Si'rjjent and Rac- coon are approaching completion. All these vessels have a ]irotective deck extending throughout their length, and carry a battery of six (>inch guns on spons(>ns, two at each extremity, and two in the Avaist. On the final trials the Ai'dier developed under forced draft 17.8 knots and 4122 horse-po\ver, the Brlnh 18 knots and 3954 horse-power, tlie C'rmack 18 knots and 4003 horse-power, the Porpoise 17.5 knots and 3943 horse- power, and the Tartar 17.28 knots and 3824 horse-power. They have a very low coal consumption, and a coal endurance which was estimated in the Ardiers case to be sufficient for six days, or 2floO knots at fuU speed, or for 7000 miles at a lO-knot rate. Both the Eussians and the Austrians have vessels of this type, and there is no douljt of the favor with which it is looked upon. Besides the Granshojijjer class mentioned in the text, and which in- cludes the RdttlcKnulre, Spider, Sanelfy, and Sharpjsheiotcr, there are two steel cruising tor}>edo gun-vessels, the Curle-w and Land rail, of 785 tons; these are fitted with a protective steel deck throughout their length, and have a battery of one 6-inch gun, three 5-inch pivots, a supply of machine guns, and four torpedo-tubes. They were intended to develop 14 knots and 1200 horse-power, but on trial the Cwrleiv attained 15.081 knots and 1452 horse -power. Owing to a faulty design these ships draw with their proposed weights two feet four inches more water than was expected. In addition to these ships the English liave the com- posite gun-vessels Buzzard, Swcdlerw, Nymphe, and Daphne of lo40 tons ; the IcariiH and Acorn., of tlie Reindeer and MeJita type ; the Rattler, Wasp, BrarnMe, Lizard, I'iijmy, Plieamnt, Partridge, Plovei\ Pigeeni, and Peacock, all of 715 tons displacement, with an average speed of 13.5 knots and from 1000 to 1200 horse-power; and the two despatch and scout vessels Alacrity and Surprise. The last named displace 14o0 tons, and were designed for 30OO horse -power and 17 knots. Both exceeded these expectations, and the Alacrity was lately assigned a bat- tery of four 5-inch guns on sponsons, four fi-pounder ra])id fi]-e, and two five-barrelled N"ordenfeldts. It must be stated, however, that, so far torpedo -lioats are not as successful in practice as Admiral Aube would have had the naval world believe. " Swayed by the concurrent testimony of different officers who conducted or took part in the naval inanceuvj-es of 18S6, professional opinion appears to agree tliat torpedo-lioats are very delicate instru- ments at best, and that a greater tonnage is imperative Avhere service 102 MODERN SHirS OF WAR. at sea is anticipated. A day or two in even moderate weather is suffi- cient to exliaust tlie stancliest crew on account of the excessive bal- loting about, and a jirolonged voyage has been found to be fatally injurious to the adjustments of the Whitehead for horizontal accuracy. Furthermore, in such small, low craft a correct estimate of the distance, speed, or course of the enemy is most difficult, especially if the officer be in the conning tower, looking through the narrow sight-slits ; in anything of a seaway, also, accurate pointing is out of the question. . . . In the course of the past year Schichau has yielded to Thornycroft the honor of producing the fastest vessel in the world, the owner now being the Spanish Admiralty in place of the Eussian. This boat is the Ariete, with a speed of 2fi.lS knots. " It has become a question in the minds of some eminent designers and observers, notably M. Normand, whether or not the extreme speeds sought and ol)tained in some recent Ijoats are not excessive. Damage to the motive machineiy is more to be apprehended than any injury to the hull or casualty among the crew. When it is considered that under ordinary conditions of weather and service the speed of the fastest will be little greater than that of an ordinary twenty-knot boat, the pro- priety at once suggests itself of devoting to steel plate the extra weight of boiler, water, and engine necessary to jjroduce that practically super- fluous horse-power.""' The trials of this year have not confirmed the great promises made for the type Ijy its most al}le and influential advocates. Many of the English boats liroke down, and in few cases were the high speeds realized in actual sea duty. The truth is, torpedo-boats have been brought down to sucli a. condition of refinement to meet the special cir- cumstances of their wcjrk that it appears i>robal)le they have become too delicate for rough handling. Out of twenty-seven boats that were re- quired to steam a distance of one hundred miles, seven failed to run the course at all, having been, from one cause or another, practically dis- abled. Such a heavy percentage of failures — one resulted in a loss of life — under a trial test to which the boats might at any time be sub- jected, arouses a natural doul>t as to a policy which is sacrificing for cer- tain impracticable results cf)nsiderations that are of vital importance. So far as the French naval manceuvres proved this year, the torpedo- boats were not ecjual to the task assigned them. During these experi- ments a squadron of eight armoi'ed battle-ships, three cruisers, and two * Lieutenant Shroeder, IT. S. Navj'. THE FRENCH NAVY. 103 sea torpedo - Ijoats, under command of Viee-admira] Peyron, was sn|»- posed to represent a convoy (jf troop-sbi]is and o;uard-vosse]s which was to be intercepted on a voyage ivinn Toulon to Algiers hv a tor]iedo division of four cruisers, one store-ship, and sixteen lioats, with the Gahriel (7iiu'/// feet Ijroad, the other the same length, but only 5(.) feet broad, then the value of x Avill be the same for both, but the values of 'tf will be 216,000 and 125,000 respectively, the ship 60 feet broad having, cwtei'ls jiarihus, nearly double the citadel stability of the 50-feet broad ship. On tlie other jiand, if you wish to give the nar- rower ship the same citadel stability as the broader one, it will be nec- essary to malce her citadel no less than 172/^ feet long. Now the cita- del of the DuUhi is 107 feet in length,"- and the breadth is 64 feet 9 * I adopt this figure from Lord Brussey, who adopts it from Mr. King, but I am in- THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. Wi inches— say 05 feet. The citadel of the LiflexMe is 1 10 feet long, and its breadth 75 feet, the figures for the Aju.v Ijeing 140 feet and (Wi feet. Now presuming the citadels to be rectangular in each case, we shall have, Inflexible y^r^GlS.V.jO Ajiix ,?/,c=4.53,034 Duilio «/3j,_452 075 From whicli it would appear that the BuUio of 11,000 tons derives from this element of stability only about as much as the Ajax of 8500 tons derives from it, and only about three-fourths of that which the Infinxi- hle of 11,40(.» had allowed to her. There are other circumstances, of course, which enter into the stability of these ships, but nothing which I know of or can imagine to enaljle the Duilio to compare much more favorably in this respect with the other vessels, deficient as they them- selves are. AU this applies, of course, solely to the ability of these ships to dei:)end upon their armored citadels for safety in war : in peace they are all safe enough as regards stability, because they have their unarmored ends to add largely to it, although I should doubt if the Duilio is greatly over-endowed with stability even with her long unarmored ends intact. I now come to a series of ships in which the question of the amount of their armored stability does not arise, because they have no armored stability at all. For some reason or other Lloyds, in their Universal Iteyinter, following bad examples, have arrayed the Italia and her suc- cessors under the heading of " Sea-going Armor-clads." These slii])s are nothing of the kind, in any reasonable sense -of the word, but are, as ships, wholly unarmored, although carrying elevated armored towers, and some armor in other places. Mr. King (in his work previously re- ferred to) puts the facts correctly when he says : " The armor is only used " (in the form of a curved deck, be it under- stood) " to keep out shot and shell from tlie engines and boilers, the magazines, shell-room spaces, and the channels leading therefrom to the upper deck, and to protect the guns in the casemate when not elevated above the battery, and the gunners employed in firing them. But all other parts of the ship above the armored deck" (which is Ijelow water, clined to regard it as too small by about live feet, for I observe that in giving the length as 107 feet they give the breadth as 58 feet, whereas they give the breadth of the ship as 64f feet. I also observe that they both speak of au "armored citadel or compartment 107 feet in lenn-th," and the word "compartment " seems to point to inside dimensions, and although it seems odd to use these in such a case, it is probable that that has been done. But as there is considerable curvature in the transverse bulkheads, and as the greatest inside length has presumably been given, it may still be practically correct to regard the mean length of the battery as 107 feet. I regret that I have not the means at hand of making certain of the precise length.— E. J. R. 108 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. be it said), " all the guns not in the casemate, and all persons ont of the casemate, and not belo^v the armored deck, will be exposed to the ene- my's projectiles." Mr. King takes note of this total abandonment of side armor as a means of jireserving stability when a ship is pierced at the water-line, and regards this al)andonment as a bold defiance of the principles which I have laid down for some years past. I cannot say that I take this view of the matter. I have always discussed this matter from the Brit- ish navy point of view, and had these ships of the lialia type been built for the British navy in substitution of real iron-clads, while France, Kus- sia, and other European countries were still building such iron-clads, I should have certainly condemned them. The primary requirement of British first-class ships is that they shall be altle to close with and fight any enemy of the period whatever, and any defect which unfits tliem for this work, or makes it extremely dangerous to perform it, is a dis- grace to England. Even if armor were given up by other powers, it would be a matter for careful consideration in England whether enough of it for the ]irotection of their existence against contemporary gims should not be retained in her principal ships. England's a]:)ility to live as a nation and as the head of an empire is dependent upon her naval superiority, and no price to purchase that can l)e too great for her to pay. But with Italy the case was and is wholly different. She could not compete with England in naval power, and would not wish to if she could, ioT she is without an ocean empire to preserve. But Italy has European neigld)ors, and when she began to build these Italian and Lepantos she had for neighbor one power, France, which had unwisely persisted for years in building wooden armoi'-clads, neither strongly pro- tected nor swift, nor very powerfully armed ; and I am not at all sure that, to such a navy as France then had, a few extremely fast and very powerfully armed ships such as Italy built were not excellent answers. The Italia Avould have been available also against a very large propor- tion of the British iron-clad fleet, and of the fleets of Austria, Turkey, and Russia. Tlie idea of the Italian ministers clearly was to give weaker ships no time for long engagements with tliem, but to pounce upon them by means of enormous speed, and to destroy them at a blow l)v means of their all-powerful ordnance. They might Avell expect to \\i\.x% with such ships so great a command over the conditions under which they would give battle as to l)e well able to repair in time, and at least tem- porarily, such dangerous wounds as they might receive. But more than this cannot be said for such ships : they are not fit to engage in pro- THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 109 longed contests, or to tight such actions as by their assaiUts on su])erior numbers and their endurance of close conflict have won that " old and just renown" of which England is so deservedly proud. It seems to me as oljvious as anything can possiljly Ije that such ships as the Italift,, if once adopted as models for other great powers, would admit of easy and cheap answers. Ships of equal speed, merely belted with very thicic ar- mor, and armed with an abundance of comparatively light shell-guns, would effectually defy them. There would be no need of enonnous and costly armaments, or of ponderous armored to\vers, or of huge revolving turrets, for giving battle to ships which any shells -would be able to open up to the inroads of the sea, and which, being ojiened up, would lose their stability, and insist upon turning bottom upward. But for the purposes of the Italian government, as I conjecture them, the Italia class of ships, large as they are, have probably been excellent invest- ments, and may continue to be, so long as the priceless value of impreg- nable belts and interior torpedo defence is understood by so very few. The Italian government, having completed the Italia, is now press- ing forward Avith four other equally large ships (of over 13,000 tons each) of similar t\q3e, and with three others of 11,000 tons. Curiously enough, it keeps with these among the "war vessels of the first class" not only the Palest ro and Priiwijie Amedeo, of about 60(j0 tons, launched in 1871-72, but also the Roma, a wooden vessel of 5370 tons, launched twenty years ago, and some four or five iron ships, of 400() tons and of 12 knots speed, launched more than twenty years ago. I will not occu- py time and space by regarding the particulars of these old vessels (having omitted similar ones from my French tables), but will here give the par- ticulars of the modern vessels of the Italian first class, which alone deserve notice : MODERN ITALIAN WAR-SHIPS OF THE FIRST C'LASS. Name of Siitp. Duilio Duodolo. . . Italia Lepanlo . . . . Re Umberto Sicilia Sai-degna . . Lauria Morosiiii. . . Doria Displare- lueut. Tons. 11,140 11,200 13,900 13,550 13,350 13,250 13,250 11,000 11,000 11.000 llidiratpd Horse- power. 7,700 7,700 18,000 18,000 19,500 19,500 19,500 10,000 10,000 10,000 8peer.l. 11.1 11.2 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 Feet. 340 340 400 400 400 400 400 328 328 328 Feet. In. 64 4 64 4 74 73 4 74 9 74 9 74 9 67 67 67 Draught of Water. Feet. In. 26 8 27 27 28 28 28 27 27 27 Greatest Thickness of Armor. Inchts oil Sirles. 22 22 Inahes nn Towers, 19 19 19 19 19 14 14 14 Heaviest Guns caiTJed. 4 of 101 tons. 4 ■• 101 •• 103 103 106 106 106 103 103 103 110 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. The manner in which the towers and guns of tlie Italia type are ar- ranged is shown in section and in plan, wliicli are taken for convenience from the works of Mr. King and of Lord Brassey, and were prepared, I beheve, from official drawings.* Amons: her unarmored vessels, in ad- dition to a large number of , old and slow small craft, Italy possesses some fast mod- ern war-ships of the secontl and lower classes which are deserving of notice. In the first place, she has eight steel ves- sels ranging from 2500 tons to 3600 tons, which Lloyds descrilje as " deck-protected cruisers," with a total absence of any jus- tification, I think, excepting that other people have doubtless done so before, f There certainly are people who for business or other purposes would call anything a " protective deck," but why these eight vessels should be removed from the category of unarmored ships, and constitute a class SECTION OF THE ITALIA. DECK PLAN OP THE ' ' ITALIA. " Ijy themselves, is more than I can imagine even the slightest reason or justification for. I do not know any modern naval gun which will not ]ienetrate an inch steel plate when presented to it as it is in the curving down decks of these vessels. It appears to me a trifling Avitli serious matters to try and induce naval authorities, officers, and seamen to be- * See Notes, page i;i6. f LlnycVs Vniverml lier/i'ster falls into a still mnre notable error in respect to tlie speed of these vessels, for it assigns to tlie best of tliem a speed of only seven and one-half knots, and to some only five knots, whereas they are very much faster, as w'M presently be shown in the text. But the mistake, grave as it is, seems to me to have resulted only from a printer's error, for the removal of a vertical "lead" one column to the left would add ten knots to the speeds of all these vessels, and make them correct. — E. J. R. |iij[||j|ljl|if»fBiifl» THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TUKKLSII NAVIES. 113 lieve that these vessels, and similar ones wherever they are to l)e found, have any pretensions to be regarded as '' protected." These unarniored vessels are, however, notaljle for high speed, three of them being of fifteen knots, and the other five of seventeen knots. One of these 17-knot vessels, the Giovanni, Baumn, built by kSir AVilliam Armstrong & Co., at Newcastle-on-Tyne, so closely resemliles the Chil- ian vessel Esmeralda that the engraving of the latter vessel on this page may be taken to illustrate the general character of both. The l^readth (42 feet) is the same in each, and so is the draught of water (18|- feet), but the BauHan is a few feet longer than the other. The armament is almost precisely the same, being two guns of aljout twentj^-five tons, mounted one forward and one aft, and six of four tons. I have chosen TiLE "BBMEKALDA. the Esmeralda for the illustration of both vessels because (by the favor of Sir William Armstrong & Co.) T am in possession of an instantane- ous photograph of her at fuU speed, from which the engraving has been made. This is very interesting, because it exhiliits what few readers are likely to have seen, but what most will be glad to see, viz., the form which is taken by the permanent weaves that accompany such a ship w^hen steaming at the full speed of seventeen knots in comparatively still water. The engraving also well represents the position of the bow and stern guns. The 15-knot vessels of Italy are named Giojd, Amerigo Ve.ymeei, Sa- voia, and Colonilo, of which the Amerigo Vesjntcci is illustrated from a 8 114 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. drawing by De Martino on page 115. Those of seventeen knots, be- sides tlie Bausan, are the Etna, Vesuvio, Sti'oviholi, and Fleramosca. All the last-named vessels carry the same armament as the Bausan ; the others an armament of 4-ton guns only. The Itahan government also ]iossesses (bnilt or Ijuilding) eight other vessels exceeding or reaching fifteen knots in speed, of which two are built of wood and the remain- der of iron or steel. It has likewise of fast torpedo craft a 2000-ton vessel of nineteen knots, Avhich mounts six 6-incli guns and nine 6-pound- ers ; and four others of twenty knots, to carry machine guns, -viz., the T)-ij>oli and Goito, of 741 tons, and the Folgore and Saetta, of 317 tons. It is also proposed to build six others, of 741 tons and twenty knots, two of which, the Monzainbuno and Mmitebdlo, have l>een laid down at Spezzia. They have sixty-t^vo complete first-class torpedo-ljoats of over one hundred feet in length, and twenty-one second-class, already built, of less than one hundred feet. It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the Italian navy is one of much importance, capable of working great destruction upon an enemy's fleet of ordinary ships, able to cope with no inconsiderable num- l>er of modern vessels, and such as would enable the Italian people and government to speak with a voice that would have to be attentively heeded by any possible ally or any probable enemy in the event of Eu- ropean complications arising, or of a European war becoming imminent. This does great credit to successive Italian political administrations. Of late the German government has been very active in promoting commercial ship-building and ocean enterprise, but it has been very slack in the development of its imperial nav3^ and for this reason the Russian navy next claims our notice. Russia, with the continent of Europe in- terposed between its northern and its southern ports, is compelled to divide its naval strength into two, concentrating one part upon the Baltic and the other upon the Black Sea ; and both these divisions of its navy are under restrictions -which approach pretty nearly to the conditions of blockades. With winter comes the natural blockade of f Vonstadt and St. Petersburg on the Baltic, and this sometimes lasts so long that I have m3rself seen the first merchant-vessel of the year ap- ])roach Cronstadt on the 2!tth of May, (jr within a very few weeks of midsummer. In the South, Sebastopol and Nikolaiev are under the permanent domination of the Bosporus forts and fleets, and of European treaties, which are stronger still. The disasters of the war of 1854 and the pohtical engagements which ensued have also borne heavily upon the naval spirit of Russia, and it says much for the greatness of that THE "AMERIGO VESPUCCI. THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GEKMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 117 country that again, in spite of all these hinderances, it is raising its navy into a position of European importance. Considering the Blaclc Sea fleet first, the entire interest excited by its armor-clads centres in the three new 16-knot ships, the Catherine II., Sinojie, and Tchesme. These three ships are belted throughout with 18- inch armor, and are armed with six guns of forty tons and seven of four tons, this battery being fought en harhette in towers plated with armor fourteen inches thick. The Universal Register and the French Garnet agree in assigning to the Catherine II. a length of 320 feet and a tonnage of 10,000, and to the other two ships a length of 314 feet and a tonnage of about 8600. They also agree in describing the horse- power of each of the three ships as 9000 indicated, and the speed as 16 knots. The Admiralty Eeturn previously quoted gives them a speed of 15 knots, and equal tonnages of 10,800 tons.* I am unable to give the tonnage decisively, but I know that the tonnage originally intended for these ships was 9990, and I am in possession of the details of the corresponding weights. The discrepancies as to steam-power and speed are matters of great moment. I believe that both the Uni- versal Register and the French Carnet are wrong in associating a power of only 9000 horses with a speed of sixteen knots, the fifteen knots given by the Admiralty being the speed expected with 9000 indicated horse-power ; but this power is to be obtained with natural draught, while with forced draught the power is to be mcreased to 11,400, and the speed increased to sixteen knots. The formidable character of these ships needs no comment, although I cannot regard them as nearly equiv- alent to or as well designed as the somewhat larger Nile and Trafalgar of the British navy. The only other Black Sea armored vessels are the slow and small, but somewhat powerful, circular ships Novgorod and Vice -admiral Popoff, of which the latter is surrounded by 18-inch armor, and carries two guns of forty tons. A torpedo - vessel of the 600 ton class, developing 3500 horse-power, and 20 knots speed has been built at Nikolaiev. The Baltic fleet of Russia contains only one flnished iron-clad of much importance, the Peter the Great., of 9340 tons and 14 knots speed, carrying four guns of 40 tons ; but two other ships, the Emperor Alex- ander II. and the Nicholas /., of 8400 tons, are now under construction at St. Petersburg. No interest attaches to the Pojarsky, the four Ad- mirals, and several other old, weak, and slow armor-clads of the Baltic * See Notes, page 139. 118 MODERN SHIPS OF navy. This fleet comprises, however, eight belted cruisers, of which five are important. These are as follows : I Principal Armament | Name of Ship. Vladimir Monomach Dmitry Donskoi . . . . Admiral Nacliimoff . Alexander Nevsliy . . Emperor Nicholas... Di.splaceraenl. Tons. 5800 5800 7780 7573 8000 Indicated Hor.se-powcr. 7000 7000 8000 8000 HOOO Sjieed. Armor. Knots, 15.4 7 inch. 16.25 7-inch. 16 10-inch. 16 10-inch. 16 lOinch. of Guns. 9 tons. 29 " 9 " 9 " 40 ■' The only fast armored cruisers of the Baltic fleet are the Rynda and Vitlai; of 2950 tons, 3500 horse-power, and 15 knots speed ; and an- other, the Admiral Kornilof, now being completed at Nantes, to be much larger and faster. Among- torpedo-vessels there is the twin-screw steel Iljin, of 600 tons, which has steamed 20 knots, and carries 19 ma- chine guns ; another, of only 140 tons, but to steam 20 knots, has been built at Glasgow ; and a third, of like size, but of 17 knots, at St. Peters- burg. The torpedo-boats of the Russian navy are given in the Parha- mentary Return as below : Baltic Torpedo-boats. Completed : 4 over 100 feet in length ; 74 over 70 feet in length; 20 under 70 feet in length. Gompleied and building: 6 over 100 feet in length, of which 4 are over 150 feet long— total, 104. Black Ska Torpedo-boats. Completed: 5 over 100 feet in length; 8 over 70 feet in length; 6 under 70 feet in length. Completed and building: 7 over lOO'feet in length— total, 26. Russia has also a volunteer fleet consisting of ten vessels of no great fighting value ; a Siberian flotilla comprising nine gun-boats and other small craft ; a Caspian flotilla of seven small vessels ; and an Aral flo- tilla of still less moment. In the German armored navy four citadel vessels figure as having the heaviest (16-inch) armor, but these are of that objectionable Sachsen type to which I previously adverted. In order to let the reader see under what slight pretexts some people are prepared to regard ships as powerful iron-clads, I give engravings which represent the Sac/iseii in side view and in plan, these illustrations being taken from Captain J. F. von Kronenfels's " Das Schwinimende Flottenmaterial der See- machte." The shaded portion in the middle exhibits the extent of this ship's armor ; the long white ends are left to depend upon walls of * According to the Universal Begister; hut only two of nine tons (besides smaller ones) according to Admiralty Return to Parliament.— E. J. R. T' THE ITALIAN, KUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTKIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 121 cork, etc., which are very ])oor — nay, ahiiost imaginary — defences against the effects of explosive shells. In observing the limitation of the armor in this and similar ships one is tempted to ask, Why stop there ''. Why not shorten the armor, HALF-DECK PLAN OF TIIK SACHSEN. say to twenty or thirty feet of length, and make it a yard thick, and then enter her in the list of iron-clads as a vessel with armor three feet thick? Deck-plating, according to such constructors, is ample for the protection of engines and boilers, and everything else which is below water. I SIDE ELEVATION OF THE SACHSEN. The remaining three ships of this class are the Baiern, the Baden, and the Wiirtemberg. The engraving of the Sachsen re|)resents their general appearance. Their dimensions and other particulars will be given presently in table on page 125, but it will l)e observed that the annament is arranged in a forward and in a midship battery, giving right-ahead fire with four guns, a stern fire with two, and beam fire with three. The largest iron-clad of the German navy is the Kl'niig Wllhelm, of 9750 tons, which steams at 14-| knots. She is also the most thickly armor- plated (armor, twelve inches) ; but having been launched eighteen j'ears ago, her guns, although numerous, are only of fourteen tons weight. I designed this ship for his Majesty, the late Sultan of Turkey, Abdul-Aziz, but before she was much advanced in construction she was purchased 8* 122 MODERN SHIPS Oi-' NVAK. l\y the Prussian government, and passed from under my care. A few years later I designed the Kaiser and DeuUcldand for the Prussian gov- ernment ; and these vessels, built on the Thames, and launched in ls7-t, although 2000 tons smaller than tlie TlVMc////, steamed but one-fourth of a knot less (14;} knots). They cany lO-inch armor and lO-ton guns. These ships are described on page 125. The principal ships Irailt in Germany are the rreussen and the Fried pidi der Grosse, Avhich, although designed by the German Admiralty constructors, are but reproductions on a less scale, and with some variations, of the British turret shij) Ifonarch, designed by myself. Lord Brassey (in " The British Is'avy." vol. i., page 22) says : " In the mean time Germany had constructed three turret ships of precisely the same type as the Monarch, hut of some- what smaller dimensions. These were the Preussen, the Friedrich der Grosse, and the Grosser Kurfilrstr '" His lordship goes on to say (what I do not understand), " Their armor at the water-line is six inches thicker, while at the turrets it is two inches less, than that of the Jlon- arck.'' Kow, as Lord Brassey elsewhere says (page 326), "the Jlonareh SIDE ELEVATION OF THE " KAISEB. is protected with 8-inch armor," and (page 333), writing of the Preitssen, "that the armor-plates at the water-line are 9J inches thick, below the water 7j inches, and aliove the water Sj- inches," it is obvious that there * The Orosser Karfarst waa run into off Folkestone by the Kunig Wilheln, and foun- dered.— E. J. R, •SI r A^ V ^. THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 125 cannot be the difference of six inches which his first-quoted statement alleges. There doubtless was a difference of an inch, or possilily of two inches, in so tar as a few of the armor-plates were concerned, but not more, and how far this difference extended is very doubtful, seeing that nowadays if the constructor of a ship thickens but two or three plates on each side of his ship he feels entitled to speak of her as being ar- mored -svith plates of the maximum thickness, and to mislead mankind accordingly. Nor is this surprising, when we see in a late return to the British Parliament ships like the British C'olluig-wood class, the French Brennvs class, and the German Sachsen class gravely included in the lists of " armored vessels." The particulars of the German armored fleet, leaving out the IlaiiHit, a weak and weakly armed ship of only .35(H) tons and 12 knots speed, and all smaller armored craft, are as follows : SEA GOING AKMORED SHIPS OP GERMANY. Name of Ship. Konig Wilhelm .... Kaiser DeutschlaiKi Friedrich der Grosse Preussen Baden Baieru Sachsen Wlirtemberg Okl<'nl)urg Friedrich Karl Kronprinz Displacement. 9750 7550 7550 6600 6600 7280 7380 7280 7280 5200 6000 5480 Indicated Hor.se-po\ver, 8300 8000 8000 4930 4380 5600 5600 5800 5600 3900 3500 4800 .Speed. Maximum Armor. Knots. Iinhes. 141 13 14i 10 14i 10 14 9i 14 9+ 14 16 14 16 14 16 14 16 134 12 13+ 5 14i 5 Principal Armament 18 of 14 tons. 8 " 18 " " 18 '■ " 18 " .. j3 ,, " 18 " •• 18 " 18 " 18 •' IS " 9 •' 9 " 8 4 4 6 6 6 6 8 IC 16 All the above German ships are completed, and have been for a long time, with the exception of the Oldenhurg, which was not launched until 1884. The Baden was launched in 1880, the Baiern and Wdrtemhei'g in 1878, and all the rest earlier — the Ffledricli Karl and Kronprinz nearly twenty 3^ears ago. Germany appears to have no iron-clad, large or small, under construction at present. It is unnecessary to set forth in detail her small armored gun-vessels ; suffice it to say that she has one iron turret -ship, the Anninius, of 1560 tons, with 7i-inch armor, but only carrying four 9-ton guns, and steaming 10 to 11 kuots; and eleven iron vessels of 10 feet draught of water, 1090 tons displacement, TO(i horse-power, 9 knots speed, and 8-inch armor, each carrying one 12-inch gun of 37 tons. These were all built at Bremen, and launched between 1^6 JIODERN SHIPS OF WAR. 1870 and ISSO, inclusive. They are named after such agreeable creat- ures as basilisks, crocodiles, salamanders, scorpions, etc., but owing to their small speed would probabl}" prove of less aggressive habits than their names imply. They would nevertheless be very usefid in defend- ing the coasts and harbors. The abstention for the present of the German government from the consti'uction of armored ships nmst not be taken as im])lying that it prefers the fast unarmored cruiser as a type of war-ships, for it has no such cruiser built, and is building but three of very high speed, and one of 10 knots.* The particulars of these are as follows : N.^jiio OF Smp. Displaccmeut. IndK-itPd Horse-puwer. Speed. Kllr.tS. 18 18 16 19 Armament. Elisabeth Ariadne Charlotte Ttins. 4500 4S00 3360 2000 8000 8000 5400 Gu.is. 14 8 inch. 14 8-inch. 2 4- inch. The Admiralty Return makes no mention of the last ship, as she is but a despatch -vessel, but she is mentioned and particularized in the Uiiwersal liegiste?'. It is to be further observed that the first two ves- sels on this list are each to have a 3-incli deck, for the protection of the engines, boilers, etc., which fact has induced the Admiralty officers to designate them "protected ships," as they do their own ships of this really unprotected type, and as they have not designated the French cruisers luge and C<}cile. The German navy comprises a few modern and fast frigates, some of which have been honored with illustrious names, as will be seen from the following list : GERMAN UNARMORED FRIGATES. Name op Snir. Displacement. Indicated Horse-power. Speed. Knols. VSk 13i vsl 13i 15 15 15 15 Principal Armamcnl. Bismnrck TriHR. 2850 2850 2800 2800 3860 3860 3310 2810 2500 2.500 2500 2500 4800 4800 3000 3000 10 of'S'i'tous. 10 " 3i " 10 " 3i " 10 " si ■■ ( 2 •• o" " \ 10 •■ Si •■ 10 •• 3i •■ 18 •• 4 ■' 10 " 3i •• Moltke Stoscli Stein Prinz Adalbert .... Lcipzi'"'' Ctiiuiottc Gnciscniui * See Notes, page 145. THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 12" There are also some modern corvettes in this navy which may be classed in point of speed Avith the above frigates ; these are, GERMAN UNARMORED CORVETTES. .V.uii-: OK Ship. Displaccmout. Inrilcaled Horse-power. Speed. l'i-ij]ci]i;il .Vriiiiimeiit. Alexamlrine Arf'ona 2380 2330 2100 2160 2160 2160 2000 2400 3400 2100 3100 3100 2100 2.500 Kiii.t.s. *1.-) 15 14 13i- 14 14 15 10 of 4 tons. 10 ■• 4 ■' 10 " 4 " 10 •■ 4 •■ 10 " 4 " 10 ■' 4 " 8 •■ 4 " JIai'ie Olo-a ., boplHC Prey:! There are aliout a dozen other smaller and slower gun-vessels and gun-boats in the German navy, but they need not be considered here. As to sea-going torpedo-vessels, the German government tooJv tlie lead in the production of this type of ship, and had the Z'wthen launched at Blackwall as a despatch- vessel ten years ago, for a torpedo armament, and Avitli a speed of 10 knots — an example of naval enterprise worth remembering to the credit of Germany. The Bletz and I'feil, of 5(» per cent, larger tonnage, have since l^een produced in Germany, but only with a speed about equal to the ZietJieii.s. Two torpedo gun-ves- sels of 855 tons and nearly 20(H) horse-power, and 15 knots speed (of which vessels the Admiralty Return makes no mention), were launched at Bremen in 1884. The following is the Admiralty statement as to German torpedo "boats:" Completed, 58 (13 over loO feet in length). Completing and huilding, 2 torpedo division boats ; .30 torpedo - boats over one hundred feet in length. — Total, 90. Money was voted in lS81r-S5 for seventy torpedo-boats. "When these have been Ijuilt, the number of German torpedo-boats will be o]ie hun- dred and five, and these are to be increased to one hundred and fifty. Reviewing the condition of the German navy as set forth aljove, it becomes obvious that for some years past the policy of the imperial German government (contrary to that of the Prussian government, which, before the empire, built several large and powerful sea -going ships) has been to avoid all competition in naval matters with the great naval powers, and to apply its moderate expenditure to vessels of a defensive class, such as armored gun-boats and coast torpedo-l)oats — a * Lloyd's Universal Register appears to me to be in error concerning tlie speed of this and the next vessel. The Garnet gives their speed as fourteen lis- tria. Kaiser Max, and Prim Eugen, each of 3500 tons, 2700 indicated horse-power, and 13-^- knots speed, with S-inch armor (the thickest) on the belt, and each carrying eight guns of 9 tons. The unarmored ves- sels of Austria (other than those classed as torjiedo craft) are numerous, Init most of them are small and slow. Those of thirteen knots and up- ward are but three in numljer, the Laudon, Radetslf/, frigates of 3380 tons and 14 knots speed, and the wooden gun-vessel Ham, of 890 tons and 13^ knots speed. Austria is providing herself with several of Sir W. Armstrong & Co.'s light steel vessels of eighteen knots speed for torpedo service, of which she has one, the PetntJier, com])leted, and two others, the Leojiard and SeeJntnd (all of 1550 tons), under ci)nstruction. She had also four 14 -knot torpedo- vessels, built at Pola and Trieste. Of tor]5edo "boats" she has the folhnving: Gampleted, Fii'st class, 135 feet in length, 2; second class, over loO feet in length, IS ; third class, from 85 to 9(1 feet in length, 8. Incompleted, First class, 135 feet in length, 2 ; second class, over 100 feet in length, S. — Total, 38. :j; * See Notes, page 145. f See Notes, page 144. X See Notes, page 144. THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GEKJIAN, AirSTKIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 12!t The navy of Tarliey, Avliich was formidal>le a few years ago, possess- ing as it did some of the most powerful and etflcient iron-clads in tlie ^vorld at that period, both large and small, is rapidly declining in im- portance in presence of the powerful ships constructed or constructing in England, France, Eussia (Black Sea), and Italy. The Turkish navy would not have held its high position so long had it not been for the foresight of the late Sultan Abdul-Aziz, having all his armored ships Irailt of iron. There is not a wood-built iron-clad in the Turkish navy. The largest Turkish armored ship, and one still very powerful, is the frigate IfesoofUyeh, of 9(J<)() tons, built at Black wall, which in her main features resembles the German Koii'kj ^YilJl.elm, being, like her, of Eng- lish design, but instead of having eighteen main-deck guns of fourteen tons, she has twelve of eighteen tons, and her battery is consequently of less length. Her speed is fourteen knots. Next to her comes the II<- 'inidhjeh, launched in 18S5 at Constantinople, of similar type to the other vessel, but of only 6700 tons, and therefore carrying but 9-inch armor, and ten guns of fourteen tons, and steaming at a knot less speed. Tur- key has no less than thirteen other iron-clads, ranging in tonnage from 2000 to over (1000, in speed from 11 to li knots, and in armor from .5;^ to 9 inches. The most notable of these, if I may be allowed as its de- signer to say so,* has been the Feth-i-Bidend (" Great Causer of Con- quest "), built at the Thames Iron-works in 1869. This little vessel, al- though of only 2700 tons displacement, carried a 9-inch armor belt, and a main-deck l^attery of 6-inch armor protecting four 12-ton guns, placed at the four oblique sides of an octagonal battery, and steamed at four- teen knots — a speed imexampled at that time for an iron-clad of her small tonnage. It is a Avell- known fact that whenever of late years Turkey has had naval Avork to do, the Fdh-i- Bulend, on account of * Curiously enough, neither Lord Brassey, nor jNIr. King (United States Navy), nor Captain Von Kronenfels seems to liave l)een aware of tlie origin of tliis little ship's design, for it is mentioned by none of tiiem, .although all of them have been most ready to do me, in common with other.s, full justice in such matters. Jh-. King, for example, speaking of a ship previously mentioned, says, "The most powerful ship belonging to the Turkish navy is the Menoudiyeh. designed by Sir E. J. Reed, C.B., M.P. , built by the Thames Ship- linilding Company, delivered to the Sultan in 1876, and now the flag ship of the fleet." He would doubtless have as readily acknowledged the authorship of the Fith-i-Buknd'x design, had be been aware of it. As I was the Chief Constructor of the British Navy when I designed for the Sultan of Turkey this ship and the Fntikh (now the German Kimig Wil- lielm), I think it right to state that I did so not only with the sanction but by the orders of the Admiralty, and in pursuance of w-liat was then the declared policy of England, viz., that of giving Turkey the benefit of our good offices in efforts to produce a powerful fleet. Beyond a complimentary present of a jewelled snuffbox or two, I received no remunera- tion for my services to Turkey, and sought none, and desired none. — E. .J. R. 9 130 . MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. lier speed, handiness, and general efficiency, was selected by the late lamented Ilobart Pasha to perform its most active part. Of unarniored vessels Turkey has few worth mentioning as tighting ships, beyond three composite corvettes now under construction at Con- stantinople, one of llHio and one of llfiO tons, both of which are to steam at fourteen knots, their armament consisting of eight and six light, guns respectively ; and one other of G7() tons which is to steam fifteen knots* and tcj carry five light and f(jur machine guns. A steel torpedo- vessel which is to steam at twenty -one knots, and three torpedo cruisers complete the list of new vessels laid down. Turkey has six tor- pedo " boats " (_)ne hundred feet long, jjuilt in France ; six more of larger size, one hundred and twenty -live feet long, building in Germany ; and five of one hundred feet, building in Turkey and France — in all, seven- teen torpedo-boats. This review of Turkish naval force bears out the remark with which [ introduced it, and shows that, either from lack of support from the Western European powers or from some other cause, fighting supe- riority in the Black Sea is being effectually abandoned by Turkey to Russia. Captain Lord Charles Beresford, E.N., M.P. (now a sea lord of the Admiralty), Avho moved for the Admiralty Return to Parliament to which I have made repeated reference, included Greece among the pow- ers whose " fleets " Avere to be reported on ; but as Greece has but two small and weak iron-clads, and they are nearly twenty years old, and as she has no other at present even untler construction, the pretensions of her " fleet " are scarcely proportional to her political ambitions. She has but one fast cruiser, the Admiral Miaiil/'s, and she is only a 15-knot vessel, and carries nothing more in the way of guns than three of six tons and one of five tons. Greece's only " torpedo - vessel " steams no more than fourteen knots, and the Admiralty Eeturn assures Lord (Charles Beresford and the world that she has l)ut twenty -seven torpedo- lioats, of Avhich seventeen are over and ten under one hundred feet in length, and that she is not building any more. Considering the island interests of Greece and her situation in the Mediterranean, no one can ])ronounce her naval force as excessive, or regard her government as i)eing tempted to an}' high heroic policy by her possession of an impos- ing navy. I liave not mentioned the Spanish or Portuguese " fleets," nor is it * See Notes, page 141. THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 131 necessary to do much more than mention them now. Spain has only one finished iron -chid, of over thirteen and less than fourteen knots speed, and that is the Yitorla, which Avas hxunclied at Blackwall, on the Thames, more than twenty years ago. She has thin annf)r, and could attem])t but little in \var. Spain is, however, building a hirge steel tur- ret-ship, the Pelaijo, of 9G50 tons, at La Seyne, to carry two 3S-ton and two 4S-ton guns, with 18-inch armor on a citadel and 19^- on her turrets. She is to steam at sixteen knots. This one ship will, I presume, when finished, compose the armored "fleet" of Spain — that country once so great upon the sea. Of unarmored vessels of war Spain is building several, of which three are to have the advantage of stout steel decks, and one is to be very fast. It -will be well to assemble these unarmored vessels of fourteen knots and upward in a table : TAiiLi! G.— UNARMORED WAE-VESSELS OF SPAIN. VESSELS OF POUItTEEN KNOTS AND UrWAltD, INC1.UI5INO TOKPEDOVES3ELS. Name of Shh'. Dijiplacc'Uient. Indicated Hor.se power. .Speed. I'rlnelpul .\rmanient. Reina Rcijenta Tons. 4300 3000 3300 3300 3300 3000 3000 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1000 1000 400 108 108 88 11,000 4,400 4,400 4,400 4,400 4,400 4,400 1.600 1,600 1,500 1,500 1,600 1,600 3,300 3,300 4,000 1,300 1,300 1,000 Knots. 19 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14.8 15 15 24 23 23 20 Guns 4 of 8 inches. 8 " 6 tons. (4 " 6 " '( 4 " 3 •■ 8 " 4 •' ( 4 '• 6 " (4 " 3 •• 8 •■ 6 " 8 " 6 ■' 3 " 4 " 3 '■ 4 " 5 " 4| inches. 5 •■ 4;; " 5 " 4| " 3 " 4 tons. 6 " 4| inches. 6 " 4f •• Machine guns. Arag'on (wood) Castilla " Navarra " Reina Cristina Oristabel Colon Don Juan d'Au.sli'ia Infanta Isabel Isabel II Velasco Isia de Cuba Islas Filipinas Destructor (torpedo-catclier) Alcon (seagoing torpedo-boat) Azor Orion " Spain has likewise four 125-feet torpedo "boats" of 19 knots; one, 105 feet long, of 18 knots ; and three or four smaller ones.* Portugal has but one iron-clad, central battery type, of 2480 tons, 13^ knots speed, with 9 -inch armor, and two 28 -ton guns. Of unar- mored vessels she has but three exceeding twelve knots in speed, viz. : See Notes, page 143 i:]2 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. Name of Ship. Displacemeot, Indicated Horse-puwer. Speed. Liberal Tons. 500 500 1100 500 500 VHH) Knots. 10 16 18.3 Zaire Alldiiso de Albuquerque All the rest are very slow, and available for little else than harbor de- fence in time of war. This concludes our review of the navies of the Continent. The im- pressions which it has made upon my own mind are mainly these : The minor naval powers are falling more or less completely out of the lists of naval competition. Spain and Portugal have ceased to be, and Greece has not become, of any naval importance — Spain alone making some small effort to keep respectable, but even that effort is chiefly expend- ing itself — as that of the United States government is about to expend itself, liy-the-bye — in the production of very fast vessels, which may be useful in preying upon commerce, but which are scarcely fit to fight even pirates, and which a real war-ship would dispose of with a single round of her battery fire. They will l)e efficient in running away, no doubt, when danger arises; but "running away" Avas not the method by which the United States Avon naval distinction, nor that by Avhich Spain once became great and Greece immortal. The naval policy of Germany is defensive ; she is almost Avithont ])retensions upon the open sea. Turkey is slowly but surely succumbing to Russia, and in the near future the Russian Black Sea fleet Avill hold unquestioned mastery over Turkey. Italy has a naval role of her oAvn to play in Eurojie, and on the Avhole is playing it Avell. Austria would do Avell to hesitate in her present naval condition l^efore again exposing herself to the SAvift and destructive rmslaughts Avhich the tremendously armed and excessively fast Italian ships could make upon her. France is a really great naval ])OAver, and there are circumstances Avhich Avould make a naval conflict ItetAveen her and England one of the most uncertain in the hist(.)ry of the Avorld. The French have very largely abandoned the ]n'otection of their guns by armor ; Ave, most unhappily, have still more largely al)an- doned the protection of our ships, and it remains to Ije seen Avhich has been the most foolisli. In such a conflict the French Avould have this advantage over England — the overthrow of their guns, or the destruction of their gunners at them, Avould not prevent their ships themselves from Avithdrawing from action and repairing their injuries. What Avould be- come of our AJii.res, Ayainemiums, our Colliiir/tvoodn and Benho^vti (both THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 13:5 these latter with guns as much exposed as the French, by-the-l)ye), when their long, fragile ends had been smashed and water-logged, and theii' high speed consequently gone, is a questicjn which I prefer not tpose that the Italian naval forces could hold their own against the Fi-ench. The THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 135 Italian material is excellent, no doubt, but the results of Lissa are not encouraging. " To judge from naval expenditure, Italy seems to get a great dea] for her money. If we Avere to look at the figures we should suppose that there were five navies in the world worth counting — the British and French of the first class, and the Russian, German, and Italian of the second class ; but as a matter of fact the Russian and German na- vies are not worth counting by the side of the Italian navy of to-day. I doubt, however, whether the Italian, German, and Austrian navies could possibly hope to hold the Mediterranean against those of France and Russia, weak as is the Russian navy, in a general Continental war, so high is the estimate which I form of the power of France at sea. Russia, indeed, spends more upon her navy than does Italy ; Ijut Russia probably does not get her money's worth. Italy at the present moment, in addition to the two splendid ships which she has at sea, is building or equipping eight first-class sea-going iron-clads as against seven being built by France and eleven by ourselves, and she certainly seems to have, as regards the material of her fleet, achieved remarkable results at a low rate of cost. " The Italian fleet, in the event of war, would not have those scat- tered duties to perform which would fall to the lot of the French and English navies. The fleet of Italy would have to defend the Italian coast against attack, and if possible to keep up the communications with Sicily and Sardinia. Massowah would have to take care of itself, and the Italian fleet would be concentrated, while that of France, in some degree, would have to be dispersed over the whole world ; but unless France had to put forth on land such efforts as to need the men and guns of her navy for the defence of her own fortresses, the time of con- .centration in the Mediterranean would arrive, and a great strain would be imposed upon the Italian fleet. " Those who look upon the Italian navy as being a navy of offence because it consists chiefly of iron-clads of the first class capable of hold- ing the seas, forget the necessity imposed upon Italy by her shape and geographical position. It is impossible to defend the coast of Italy by fortifications, and there is no country so vulnerable. The mountains run down the centre of a long, narrow strip, and the strategic railway fines are easily reachable from the sea. On the south, too, Carthage once more threatens Rome. The Italian monster iron-clads are certainly not too numerous for the defence of the Italian coast, and in my belief the naval policy which has been pursued by Italy is one which was 130 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. necessary to lier existence, and she is to be congratulated upon tlie low price at which she has succeeded in obtaining her sjilendid ships." ''■ Owing to this extent and character of the Italian coast, the govern- ment believes that absolute safety canncjt be secured, and all that may be expected is the disturbance or defeat of any great attempt at in- vasion or bombardment. This the officials hope to effect by dividing the attention of the enemy's fleet, so that secondary means of defence may be utilized against all attacks. The question, therefore, resolves into one of ships. If armored vessels had to resist the gun alone, ef- fectual protection, they reason, could l^e given by increasing the thick- ness of armor ; Ijut since the invention of torpedoes, and the develop- ment of great speed in torpedo-boats, the bottoms of shi])s and not the armored sides will be the points of successful attack. The best vessels for their neeils, therefore, will be such as are capable of making the greatest impression on any given point ; that is, such as may be enabled by the partial abandonment of armor to carry enormously heavy guns, and have great speed, the highest coal endurance, and sufficient protec- tion, by new structural devices, to meet without fear any other vessel afloat. The first fruits of this policy were seen in the central-citadel battle- ships, Dnilio and Dandolo. Apart from their novelty, the mere fact that the Italians could produce such machines with home resources was a surprise to the rest of Europe. "The rise of iron ship -building in Italy," says the London Engineer^ " is almost a romance. It owes its origin to the far-seeing efforts of Italj^'s greatest statesman, Cavour. . . . Ten years ago it would have seemed ludicrous to the builders on the Clyde had they been told that a country Avhich liad no coal worth speaking of, and whose iron, though abundant, was difficult to get at, and where, moreover, not half a dozen men knew how to do the simplest iron ship-building job, Avould in the course of those years not only beat them in quality but in ]irice, and Avould be turning out the largest, the most powerful, and the best built vessels in the world. Such, however, is the case." Subsequently tlie Italian Admiralty realized that the ships of the Duilio design were deficient in speed and coal endurance, and that their construction forbade the efficient use of a secondary armament for de- fence against torpedo and other auxiliary boats. So, after nmcli earnest study, the Italia type has been adopted. The account in the text needs * " The Present Position of European Politics." THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NxVVIES. 137 no amplilication here, except to state that in her steam trials she made a maximum speed of 18 and a mean speed of 17. GG Imots per Ijour, al- tliongli tlie lS,0(tO indicated horse-])ower required by the contract was not developed. Eight of her G-incli guns, it may he added, have lately been removed. The lie Umheiio and S'u-ilui, are steel barbette ships, similar to the British Admiral class without the ])artial armor-belt. Their principal dimensions are, length 400 feet, Ijeam 71 feet 1) mches, mean draught 28 feet 7 inches, and displacement 13,251 tons. The engines of the former are to develop lit, .500 horse-power and 17 knots. A complete steel deck three and a half inches thick protects the under-water body. The battery is to consist of four 17-incli lOG-ton pair-mounted guns, carried on the fore-and-aft line in two barbettes, ■which are protected by 18.9 inches of steel armor. There are in addition a number of G-inch breech-loading rifles, and a sujiply of rapid-flre and machine guns, and of torpedo-tubes. The Sardegna, of the same general type as the Uinherto, is now being built at Spezzia. The Giovanni Baumn, built at Elswick between 1882 and 188.5, is a ram-bowed, schooner-rigged steel cruiser, similar to, but larger than, the Esmeralda, her dimensions l)eing, length 28() feet, breadth 42 feet, draught 18J feet, and displacement about 3100 tons. She has an under- Avater protective steel deck one and a half inches thick, and cork-filled cellular compartments about the water-line. The coal sup])ly is 6i)0 tons, the coal endurance 5000 miles at 10 knots, and with G0(i0 horse- power and 116 revolutions she made on trial a speed of 17.5 knots. Her battery consists of two 10-inch, six G-inch, and a secondary armament of rapid-fire and machine guns, and of torpedo-tubes. The steel cruisers mentioned in the chapter, the Etna, Stromljoli, and Vesuvio, are 283 feet G inches in length, 43 feet in beam, 19 feet 3 inches in draught, and displace 3530 tons ; with forced draft 7700 indicated horse-power and 19 knots are to be developed. Their armament is to consist of two 10-inch (25-ton) Armstrong breechdoadei's, mounted in an unarmored barljette on the fore and aft line, six G-inch guns on spon- sons, eight rapid-fire and machine guns, and four torpedo-tubes — two sub- merged at the bow and two aljove water in broadside. The Eieraniosca of the same class is slightly diff'erent in dimensions, and the Tripoli, Ooito, Monzaudjano, and Montehello are rapid torjiedo cruisers, 229 feet 6 inches in length, 25 feet 10 inches in beam, 9 feet G inches in mean draught, and of 741 tons displacement. They were designed to develop 4200 indicated horse-power and a speed of 22 knots ; but it is claimed that 138 . MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. tlie TrijwH, which ivas launched at Castellamare in August, 1886, real- ized a speed of twenty-foui- knots, and maintained a twenty-three knot rate for fifty miles. The engines of the Monzamhano and ILmtehello will lie triple-expansion, and those of the Tripoli and Goito of the two- c^'linder coni])ound inclined type. These vessels have three screws, one shaft coming out underneath the keel at an angle of eight degrees, while the others are carried farther forward on either side. The armament consists of four 57-millimetre and four 37-niillinietre rapid-fire guns, of three oT-millimetre revolving cannons, and of five torpedo-tul)es, two at the bow, hxed, and three training — one aft and one on each beam. The ('(Dijieiiza^ a small twin-screw cruiser of nearly the same dimen- sions, carries four 4.72-inch guns, together with rapid-fire and machine guns, and five torpedo-tubes. She is to develop 17.5 knots and 280(> horse-power, and, like the Tripoli class in general, has very light steel frames and plating, and resembles outwardly an enlarged torpedo-1)oat. The Folgore and Saetta are torpedo-vessels, similar in type to the Tn'p- oli, but smaller; the A)'vhitnede and the Galileo are armed despatch- vessels of the Bai'harigo type ; and the Voltiwno and Curtafone are cruising gnu-vessels. Other notable additions to the fleet are the par- tially protected steel cruiser Angela Emo, of 2100 tons, the Dogali, and the National Line steamer America. The Angela Etna Avas designed by Mr. White, and built at Elswick for the Greek government, but subse- c[uently she was bought by the Italians, and has, under her ne\v name, made a capital record. The Dogali is a twin-screw, lightly protected steel cruiser, Iniilt at Elswick. The displacement is 2000 tons, length 250 feet, and beam 37 feet; on the first trial the triple-expansion en- gines developed 8100 horse-power and a speed of 18.5 knots, and later, with 7600 horse-power and 154 revolutions, a speed of 19.66 knots was attained. The armament is to consist of six 5-incli guns mounted on sponsous — two on the forecastle, two on the poop, and two in the waist. The America is 441 feet 8 inches in length over all, 51 feet 3 inches in beam, 38 feet 5 inches in depth, draws 2(! feet aft, disj)laces 6500 tons, has a coal capacity of 1550 tons, antl develops i»O()0 horse-power and a, maximum speed of 17 knots on a consumption of 216 tons of coal per day. She is built of steel, was launched in 1884, purchased in January, 1887, and Avhen I'efitted is to do duty as a torpedo-depot and transport- vessel. Two iron cruising gun-vessels, the Miseno and Palinuro, of 648 tons displacement, 430 horse -power, and 10 knots speed, have lately been added to the fleet. THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 13tt KUSSIA. Russia has shown a marked independence in poUcy and design. Penned in the Black Sea by treaties, and blockaded in the Baltic for nearly half the year by ice, she has sought in coast-defence vessels, fast commerce - destroyers and torpedo - vessels, the fleet best suited to her necessities. In 1864 a number of monitors, built mainly upon Ericsson's system, were launched, and later four vessels, sea-going, ten-knot turret- ships, were constructed. These are known as the Adniiral class, and range in displacement from 3754 in the Lazareff to 3693 in the Tcli't- tchachoff. About 1871 a radical departure was made by the adoption for the Crimean defence of the ciroular or Popoffha type. As the shallow waters of this coast forbade the employment of anything normal in de- sign except light, unarmored gun-boats, recourse was had to a structure of circular form, which with heavy weights could carry a great displace- ment upon a relatively small draught. Two of these batteries, the Nov- gorod and the Admiral Popoff^ were laid down, the dimensions of the latter being as follows : extreme diameter 121 feet, diameter of bottom 96 feet, depth of hold at centre 14 feet, extreme draught 14 feet, and displacement 3550 tons. The nominal horse -power was 640, and the number of screws six ; the armament consisted of two 41-ton breech- loading guns mounted en harhette 13 feet 3 inches above the water-load line, and of four smaller pieces in an unarmored lireastwork. The Nov- gorod attained on her trial eight and a half knots, and the Popoff had a mean speed of eight knots. The Russians were the first to solve the i)roblem of an armored cruiser in which great speed could be combined with effective protection against the guns of a majority of the high-sea ships then afloat. The General Admiral, launched in 1873, and the best known of this class, is built of iron, wood sheathed under water, and coppered. She is 285 feet 9 inches in length, 48 feet 2 inches in beam, and with 21 feet mean draught has 4438 tons displacement. She Avas designed to steam 13 knots, carry 1000 tons of fuel, and have a coal endurance of 5900 miles at 10 knots ; the battery and belt are armored with six inch plates ; the belt is seven feet wide at the water-line, and has, level with its upper edge, a highly curved deck of iron. The type proved so successful that it has been reproduced and improved in most of the great navies. The Catherine II., Tehesme, and the Suiopo are the most powerful battle-ships of the Russian fleet. The first and second wex'e launched in May, 1886, the third in June, 1887 ; they are built of iron and steel l-tO MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. (wood sheathed and coppered), have ram hows, and are of the following dimensions : length :i:i'j feet, beam G\) feet, mean dranght 26.5 feet, dis- ]ilacement 10,181 tons. They are encircled by a belt of compound ar- mor twelve to eighteen inches thick, and have a complete 3-inch pro- tective deck. Within a ll-inch armored pear-shaped redoubt six 12-inch riftes are pair -mounted knots, and with forced 18.9 knots, were accom])lished. The 87-ton torpedo-boats Falh' and AdJe/\ built by Messrs. Yarrow' & Co., are 135 feet long, with 14 feet beam, 5^ feet draught aft and 2^ feet forward. The engines are of the three-cylinder, compound, surface- condensing type, and develo))ed 1250 horse -power and 22.4 knots in fighting trim. The coal supply of twenty -eight tons is expected to give an endurance of two thousand miles at ten knots. Their armament is composed of two machine guns and two torpedo-tubes, which discharge straight ahead. The JJabicht, a 90-ton torpedo-boat, built by Schichau, was designed to develop with a load of 14|- tons a speed of 2(ii knots,' and to have a coal endurance of 3500 miles at a loknot rate; but on trial she realized 21 77 knots for three hours. It is understood that future Ijoats will be much larger, approaching 300 to 4(Hi tons displace- ment. The budget for 18S7 provides 720,000 florins for torjiedo-boats and vessels. Though Austria holds a secondary place as a maritime power, she is. of all the Continental nations, the one most liable to ])recipitate the next great war, and it seems strange, therefore, that she tloes not try to ac- quire a great number of those special classes of shijis which, after all, are the only logical answers the weaker naval countries can make to the more ]7owerful. " While the Austrian military position, in spite of the desire of the emperor for military reform, is still weak, I cannot find words too strong to ])raise the political ability Avith which the Austrian empire is being kejit at peace and kept together. The Austrian empire is a mar- THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. l-tS vel of eqnilil)rium. The old simile of a house of cards is exactly a])j)li- cable to its situation; and just as in the exercises of acrobats, when seven or nine men are borne by one upon his shoulders, it is rather skill than strength which sustains them ; so, if we look to the Austrian C(jnstitu- tion, which we shall have to consider in the next paper in this series, it is a miracle how the faljric stands at all. At the same time it is impos- sible for Austria, although she can maintain her stability in times of peace, to impose upon either her Russian or her German neighljors as to her strength for war. Prince Bismarck is obliged, -with whatever words of puljlic and private praise for the speeches of the Austrian and Hungarian statesmen, to add the French and liussian forces together upon his fingers, and to deduct from them the Austrian and the Ger- man, with doubts as to the attitude of Italy, doubts as to the attitude of England, and contemptuous certainty as to the attitude of Turkey. " If Austria could have presented Prince Bismarck not only with an English alliance, Ijut with an English, Turldsh, and Italian alliance, he might possibly have allowed her to provoke a general war; but with the difficulties attendant upon a concession of territory to Italy, except in the last resort, and with Turkey at the feet of Russia, it was difficult for Prince Bismarck to go further than to say to Austria, ' Fight l)y all means, if you feel yourself strong enough to beat Russia single-handed. France and Germany will " see all fair," and you can hardly expect any- body effectually to help you.' Prince Bismarck deals Avitli foreign affairs on the principles upon which they were dealt with by King Henry VIII. of England, when that king was pitted against the acutest intellects of the empire and of France. His policy is a plain and simple policy, and not a policy of astuteness and cunning, and almost necessa- rily at the present time consists in counting heads." * There have been no additions of any importance to the fleets of the other European powers since the publication of Sir Edward Reed's article, and their policy has in no way been changed from that e])ito- mized in the text. The apathy of Germany is inexplicable, and as for the others, there seem, except with Turkey, perhaps, no good reasons why they should strive to create fleets, as they are either too poor to build and support them, or their dangers from maritime attack are not great enough to make a large navy necessary. Holland has lately launched the Johan Willem Frlso. Avliich is the last of six large cruisers, "of which the others are the Afjeh, Tromp, * Dilke. 10 i4t:; MODERN SlUrS OF WxVR. Kiiiiiij'in Emma der JVederhoulen, De Iii(j/ti'i\ and Yan Speyl:. . . . All these vessels are l)uilt of iron and steel, sheathed with wood to four feet above the ^ivater-line, and cop})ered. They are of 3400 tons displace- ment and of the following dimensions : Length 202 feet 5 inches, beam 3!) feet 4 inches, and mean draught 18 feet 4 inches. Their armament is six 6.7-inch Ivrup]) guns (one carried in the bow, one in the stern, and the others in l^roadside), four 4-.V2-inch Kru])p ])ieces in broadside, six 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and a supply of Whitehead torpedoes. The engines drive single screws, and have an estimated horse -power of 3000, which has been slightly exceeded by some and not attained by others. The speeds vary from 14.1 knots t(.> 14.7 knots. The coal sup- ply is 400 tons — sufficient for six and three-quarter days' steaming at full speed or for thirteen days at ten knots." "' Denmark has the YidJnjrie/u a steel cruiser of 2000 tons, fitted \\'itli a good battery and five torpedo-tubes, and designed to devehjp 50(.)0 horse-power and 17 knots. Her new double-turreted, armored, coast- defence vessel Ivei' Ilcitfeldt has developed a maximum speed of 15.6 knots. From data furnished by First-lieutenant Tasker II. Bliss, U. S. Artil- lery, the peace strength of the principal Continental nations may be summarized as follows : Pkkm.vnknt Establishment Co,ST. Country German}-.. Russia . . . Austria.. . It.aly Fi-ance . . . Eii.uland . . Population. 15,234000 78,000,000 38,000,000 20,000.000 37,672.000 35.000,000 Army. 1 Xavy. Total .AiMiiy, Navy, Total. 427,274111,109 760,000 29.008 287.000! 8.500 210,373 115,055 518,642 143,235 199,000 1 58,000 438,383 789,000 295,. 500 225,428 .561,877 257,000 186,000,000 146,000,000 58,500,000 41.000,000 119,250,000 78,000,000 .$10,000,000 20,. 500, 000 3,500,000 10,000,000 41,000,000 53,750,000 $96,000,000 166,500,000 62.000.000 51,000,000 100,250.000 131,750.000 A rough analysis of these figures shows that in strength of army Russia is first, France second, (Termany third, Austria fourth, Italy fifth, and Englanil sixth ; and that in naval strength England is first, France second, Russia third, Italy fourth, Germany fifth, and Austria sixth. The cost of each nation's navy is in direct i^roportion to its strength ofjx'r- ■sdiimd ; l)ut in armies England, thongh last in nundjers, changes place Avith Italy, which suj)ports its forces with the least expenditure. It may be added that in total cost England, with next to the smallest force, pays m(jre than (xermany, with the third largest in numbers. * Lieut. Colwcll, U.S.N., in " Receut Naval Proirrt THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES. 147 The percentage of expenditures is as follows : Si.:r\i(:k per Capita of 1'upulation'. Cost I'KR Man. Taxatinii ppr Inh.ihitaliL to Suiijinri Unj Peace Kslatili.sliiiii:-ijt. CimiUry. Ariny. Navy. Totiil. Anuy Navy. Geniiuuy . . . Russia Austria .... Italy France Ens'lund . . . 0.94 0.97 0.77 0.73 1.37 0..57 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.96 1.01 0.79 0.78 1.48 0.73 $201.00 $192.00 $204.75 $194.75 $230.00 $391.. 50 $900.00 .$707.00 .$411.75 .$064.25 .$931.00 $924.75 $2.12 $3,13 $1.65 $1.75 $4.35 $3.76 An examination of Llojjd^s Universal Register of SMjijmig for 1887 shows that the present condition of European navies may be popularly stated in this manner : England has 6 guns capaljle of penetrating 36 inches of unbacked iron, and 16 others Avhich can penetrate 28 inches of the same material ; Italy has 20 guns ^vhich can penetrate 33 inches of iron ; France has 11 guns which can pierce 27 inches, and 14 others al)le to penetrate 25 inches of unbacked iron. Russia has 20 guns and Spain 2 which can pierce 21 inches of iron. No other power has any guns ca- pable of equivalent results. In other words, of guns able to penetrate 24 inches of unbacked iron, France has 28, Italy 20, Russia 20, Spain 2, and Great Britain 22. In war-ships of 20 knots and above, England has 1, France 1, Italy 10, Spain 2, and other European nations 4; of 19 knots speed, England has 11 ships, France 10, Germany 3, Italy 2, and otlier nations 9 ; of 18- knot ships, England has 5, France 7, Germany 2, Italy 6, and other na- tions 6. English supremacy is, however, chiefly seen in 17-knot ships, of which she has 25, mounting 181 guns ; France, 4 with 20 guns ; Italy, 5 with 4t.) guns; and other nations 4 with 19 guns. England has 11 ships of 90 guns that can steam 16 knots, whereas France has 3 only of 58 guns. At 15 knots, France has 16 ships of 214 guns, and England 12 ships of 126 guns ; and at 14 knots, France has 28 ships of 334 guns, and England 15 ships of 252 guns. Summarizing these figures, it aj)- ])ears that with speeds above 14 knots England has 80 ships of 795 guns, France 69 of 699 guns, Germany 35 of 285 guns, and Italy 41 of 201 guns. Out of a total mercantile tonnage now afloat of 20,943,650, Great Britain and her colonies own 10,539,136. The total steam mercantile tonnage of the world is 10,531,843, and of this Great Britain and her col- onies own 6,595,871, or nearly two-thirds of the whole. THE UNITED STATES NAVY. IN TRANSITION. BY REAR-ADMIRAL EDWARD SIMPSON, U.S.N. THE condition of the navy of tlie United States is not such as any citizen of the country would desire. Pride in their navy was one of the earliest sentiments that inspired the hearts of the people when the United States took their place as a nation, and the memory of its deeds has not faded during the subsequent years of the countr3r's aggrandize- ment. Time was when that section of the country most remote from the sea-coast was indifferent to it, owing to the more immediate demand on its attention for the development of internal resources ; but the rapid settlement of our Western lands, and the annihilation of distance pro- duced by rapid communication, have tended to preserve the unity of inter- ests of the separate sections, and the happy system that obtains through which officers are appointed to the navy keeps it an object of personal concern to all the States of the Union. The present condition of the navy is not such as to satisfy the desire of the people that it should be sustained on a footing commensurate with the position of the nation, and in keeping with its ancient re])uta- tion. For many years circumstances have intervened to prevent a ju- dicious rehabilitation of the navy, notwithstanding that its needs have been faithfully presented to Congress year after year. The countiy has been wonderfully favored with peace at home and abroad, and no urgent call to arms has roused the nation to ])repare for war. The rapiditv with which a large fleet of cruising ships for blockading purposes Avas extemporized during our civil war has left a hurtful impression on the public mind that m an emergency a similar effort might prove equally efflcacious — disregarding altogether the difference in circumstances of contending with an enemy possessed of a naval force and with one pos- sessed of none. The economists have suggested that as all that relates to ships, guns, and motive forces was being rapidly developed by others THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 149 it would be a saving of the people's money to await results, and to ben- efit l:>y the experience of otliers ; and, again, party rivalry and conten- tions have assisted to postpone action. It has never l>een the intention tliat the navy should die from neg- lect and be obliterated. Yearly appropriations have l>een faithfully passed for the support of the personnel, and for such repairs as were found to be indispensable for the old ships that have )>een kept in commission ; but it is now seen that this system of temporizing has been the poorest kind of economy. This money has bsen invested necessarily in perishable material, the amounts have been insufficient to compass new constructions, whether in ships or guns, and the only use that could be made of them was to repair wooden ships and convert cast-iron guns, whereas the work needed was to construct steel ships and to fabricate steel guns. In referring to the navy of the past, it is impossible to avoid recalling the feeling of pride with which an American seaman — officer or man — walked the deck of his ship. This feeling was common to the naval and commercial marine. Our wooden ships that sailed the ocean from 184o to 1860 were the finest in the world. The old frigate CoiujresH in 1812 was the noblest specimen of the frigates of the day, and the sloop of war Portsmouth was unsurpassed as a corvette. The clipper ships of that period need no eulogy beyond their own record. These ships were the models for the imitation of all maritime nations, and among the constructors of the period can be recalled, without detriment to many others omitted, the names of Lenthall, Steers, Pook, and Delano. The poetry of sailing reached its zenith during this period. But there is no sentiment in progress ; its demands are practical and imperative, and the great motive power, steam, was being crowded to the front even during this the greatest development in the era of sails. Advanced ideas could not be resisted, and steam was admitted as an auxiliary ; but our development in naval construction still stood us in good stead, and enabled us to supply ships with auxiliary steam-power, which continued to be prominent for many years as standards to which others found it to their advantage to conform. Before the final abandonment in the navy of sailing-ships, pure and simple, an effort at a compromise was made by hmiting steam to side- wheel vessels, and a number of fine ships were built in the forties ^vhich did good service, and were a credit to the country, answering as they did the demands of the time. The 2f!ssisslj>2>i, Missouri, Susquehanna, Saranac, and Powhatan carried the flag to all parts of the world for 150 MODERN SHIPS OF AVAR. many years, some of them enduring to bear their share in the late war, while tlie I'liii'hdfiin was borne on the list of vessels of the navy until Avithin a few montlis. U. S. SIDE- WHEEL STEAMER ' ' POWHATAN. This vessel was built at Norfolk, Virginia, in the year 1S50. ITer length was 250 feet, l^eam 45 feet, draught of water 19.6 feet. She had a displacement of 39S0 tons, and attained a speed of 10.6 knots per liour with an indicated horse-power of 1172. The capacity of her coal- l)unkers was 630 tons. Her battery consisted of sixteen 9-incli smooth- Ixjre guns. She was l)uilt of seasoned live-oak, and though frequently under repairs, retained so much of the strength of her original cousti'uc- tion that she escaped the sentence of condemnation until recently. The Princeton, of great fame, and the San Jacinto, were the only slii]is with screw-propellers that a])])oared in the period under considera- tion, the screw then Ijeing considered of such doulitful propriety as to need the test of tentative experiments. These ships have long since dis- appeared, Ijut tlie screw remains, and side-wheels are mainly releo-ated to boats for inland waters. Confidence being estabhshed in the screw-propeller, construction on THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 151 the principle of aaxiliaiy steam-power was decided on, and sliips of dif- ferent classes were added to the navy in such numbers as the varied duties required. There were those at that time who, wise beyond their generation, recognized the full meaning of the advent of steam, and saw tha,t it must sup]")lant sails altogether as the motive power for ships. These advocated that new constructions should l)c given full steam-power, with sails as an auxiliary. But the old pride in the sailing-ship, with her taunt and graceful spars, could not be made to yield at once to the innovation ; nor could the old traditions pointing to the necessity of full sail-power be dispelled ; so it was considered a sufficient concession to admit steam on any terms, and thus the conservative and temporizing course was adopted of retaining full sail-})ower, and utilizing steam as an auxiliar}". The United States government was not alone in this policy. It was the conrse pursued l)y all other mai'itime nations, and for some years the United States retained the lead in producing the most perfect types in this ne^v phase of naval construction. In 1854 Congress passed an act authorizing the construction of the Merrhnao class of frigates. The famous ships immediately built under this act were the Memtnac^ Wahash, Minnesota, Roanol^e, and (oJoraihi. All of these vessels got to sea during 1856 and 1857, and were followed, at an interval of ten years, l>y the Fraiildln, which was a larger ship, and an improvement on the original type. The Franldln was built at Kittery, Maine. Her length is 266 feet, beam 51 feet, draught of water 21 feet. She has a displacement of 5170 tons, and attains a speed of K.) knots per hour Avith an indicated horse-power of 2065. The capacity of her coal-l:»unkers is 860 tons. Her frames are of seasoned hve-oak, and she is in use as a receiving-ship. The Merrimac was the first vessel of this type which got to sea. She Avas sent to European waters, and on her arrival in England, early in 1856, she became at once the ol:)ject of the closest scrutiny, resulting in the unqualified a]iproval of foreign naval architects. The English Admiralty proceeded to imitate the type, and many keels were soon kiid in order to repiYjduce it. The ships built after this model were the crack ships of the time in the English navy, and carried the flags of the commandei's-in-chief of fleets. In 1858, 1859, and 1860, the ILwiford class of large corvettes ap- peared. These are full-rigged ships. The class comprises the Hartford, BrooMyn, Pensacola, Rlchnond, and Lancaster. 152 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. The ITarfforil was Ijuilt at Boston in 1S5S. Her length is 225 feet, beam 44- feet, draught of water ls.3. She has a displacement of 29u() tons, and attains a speed of K) Icnots per hour witli an indicated horse- power of (t4(). The capacity of Iier coal-ljunkers is 241 tons. Her bat- tery consists of one S-incli muzzle-loading rifle (conyerted) and 12 9-incli smooth-bores. These ships were built of liye-oalv, and endure to the r. S. FRIGATE "FBANKLIN," OF THE " MERRIMAC " CLASS. present day. Tliey were reproduced liy England and France when they made their appearance, and are now, except the Trenton, the only ships in seryice whicli can accommodate a commander-in-cliief of a squadron. They are kept constantly employed showing the flag abroad, but it is witli difficulty that they are retained in suitable repair for seryice. This class of ships has good speed under sail, with the wind free, but their light drauglit preyents them from l)eing weatherly on a wind. Much of tlieir cruising is done under sail, whicli tends to lengthen their existence. Under tlie liite act of Congress prohibiting repairs on wooden s]ii])s when the expense sliall exceed twenty per cent, of the cost of a new yessel, these ships must soon disa]i]iear from the navy list. "When that time shall arrive, and steel cruisers sliall be substituted, the name of the Ifinifnrd should be preserved as closely associated with the glory that Farragut shed upon the navy. In 1859 a new ty]ie of sloop-of-\var was introduced, of which the Kcarsarge wiU serve as an example. This ship was built at Kittery, THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 153 Maine; her length is 199 feet, beam 33 feet, dranght of water 15.9 feet. She has a displacement of 1550 tons, and attains a speed of 11 knots per lionr with an indicated horse-power of 813. The capacity of her coal-lmnkers is 105 tons. Her liattery consists of two S-incli muzzle- loading rifles (converted), four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one OO-pouiider. This lias proved a very handy class of vessel, and for the year in which they were built were considered as having very fair speed under steam, the pi^oportion of space occupied l;)y boilers and engines being more than had l^een assigned in previous constructions. Several sliijis of this class were launched and put in commission before the ivar, and gave a new impetus to construction. U. B. SLOOP-OF-WAK "HAKTFORD.' The types of vessels that were built during the war were selected for special purposes. The effort was made to multiply ships as rapidly as possible to blockade the coast and to enter shoal harbors ; the " nine- ty-day gun-boats" and the " double-enders " were added to the navy list, and merchant steamers were purchased, and were armed Avith such bat- teries as their scantling would bear. All of these vessels have disappeared, with the exception of the Tallapoosa. The Juniata and Ossijxe, of the ir.i JIODEEN SnirS OF WAR. Kc(i)'Kiir6 feet, draught of water 15 feet. She had a disjilacement of 401. i tons, and attained a si)eed of six knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of TOO. The capacity of the coal-bunkers was 350 tons. Her battery consisted of twenty 11-inch smooth-ltore guns. She Avas built of wood, and was cov- ered with armor four inches in thickness, widely, witii the inclination given to her sides, made her impervious to the artillery that Avas used against her during the war. In one engagement with the batteries on Sullivan's Island, Charleston Harbor, lasting three hours, she Avas struck seventy times, but at the end of the action, except some damage to a port shutter oi' two, she AvithdrcAV in as perfect fighting condition as when the fight commenced. This ship does not appear on the navy THE UNITED STATES NAVY. I55 list, as she was destroyed by fire off the navy-yard at League Island rennsylvania. ^ ' The Man Itor was, without doubt, the most remarkable production of the cons ructive art that appeared during the war. Tlie origmal Moul- to^' was lost at sea, but our illustration presents tlie Pm.uc class of Momtors, which quickly followed the .a'iginal of this type The^ Pmmic was built of iron, and ^va.s launched in 1S(12 Her length IS 200 feet, beaux 46 feet, draught of water 11.0 feet. She has a displacement of I8.0 tons, and attains a speed of seven knots per hour wrth an imhcated horse-power of 377. The capacity of her coal-lmnk- eis IS UO tons. Her battery consists of one 15-incli smooth-l)ore and one 11-inch smooth-bore. Her sides are ],rotected l)y five inches of hun- mated iron, and lier turret by eleven inches of the" same. This vessel and eleven others of her class constitute the entire armored fleet of the United States. Too much credit cannot be awarded to Captain Ericsson for his brilliant conception of this floating battery, and the navy must .,^au«#Q U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR " KEAKS.iRGE. be ever grateful to him for preserving it from the dire disaster which was averted by the ai^pearance of the original Monitor at the moment of a great crisis. These vessels bore themselves well througli the storms of elemen^ts and battle during the war, proving capable of mak- ing sea-voyages, and of resisting the effects of the artillery that was in use during the period of their usefulness ; but an interval of more than 156 MODERN SniFS OF WAR. t^ventv years has produced such a change in artillery as to make the protection afforded by a few laminated plates of one-inch iron but a poor defence against "weapons which haye rol)bed this fleet of its once formidable character. Although many of the features of the original L'. S. IRON-CLAD " KEW IKONSIDES." design may be retained in new constructions, most of the details will be changed, notably in the turret, in consequence of the greater weight resulting from the increased thickness of armor. The central spindle around which the Ericsson turret reyolves must disappear, and the tur- ret must turn on rollers under the base. The effect produced abroad Ijy the success of Ericsson's Jfonitor is so familiar to all that it hardly needs more than a passing allusion here. There is no doubt that the Monltop was the prcigenitor of all the U. S. MONITOR "PASSAIC.' turreted yessels in the fleets of the world, though the essential ]3rinci})le of the vessel, however, was never viewed Avifh favor. This principle consists in the low freeboard, which, besides reducing the size of the target, is intended to contribute to the steadiness of the hull as a fr -^ .* >'#^ ' ' 1 !■ ■ l'4 ll ""1 l« M K 1 I 4 THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 159 gun platform by offering no resistance to the waves that are exj^ected to wash freely over the vessel's deck : the horizontal overhang of the Pasmic class is intended to contribute to resisting- a r(jllintj ]noti(jn. The vessel was designed to be as a raft on the water, constantly sulinierged by the passing waves, hermetically sealed to prevent the admission of water, and artiticially ventilated by means of blowers drawing- air down throuo-h the turret. This was the most startlino: feature about the construction. The protection afforded to the bat- tery by a cu'cular turret having the form best suited to deflect pro- U. S. FBIGATE "TENNESSEE." jectiles, the employment of machinery to point the guns by the rota- tion of the turret, the protection to motive-power, to anchoring appa- ratus, etc., all presented admirable points of advantage, but the almost perfect immersion of the hull, and the aljsence of motion due to the great stahility, are the essential features in the construction. The double - turreted Monitors, of which the Terror indicates the class, were built Avith a sponson, and it would have Ijeen better for the navy if this had been the only deviation made from the original design of Captain Ericsson. But it Avas not ; the great mistake was made of building this class of Monitors of wood — a style of construction which had been already condemned abroad, in consequence of the impossibility 1()U JIODEKN SHIPS OF WAR. U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR "ADAMS.' of repairing an armored vessel so constructed, it being necessary to re- move the armor for that purpose. The IllantonoinoJi, 3LinaiIn(icl\ and Terror were completed and put in commission. Tlie Mlantonomoh made a cruise to European waters, spreading the fame of Ericsson, and proving the aljilit_y of a vessel of this ty]>e to navigate the high seas ; the 2L>na(hi(ii'h made the voyage to tlie Pacific, passing tlirougli the Strait of Magellan ; and the Terror •was for a time on service on our eastern coast ; but their lifetime Avas of short duration, and they are now Ijeing reljuilt, or rather new ves- sels, three of which bear their names, are now under construction of iron, wliicli will serve to make them efficient and durable. THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 161 It will hardl}^ be a digression at this ))oiiit to cull attention more particularly to these doiible-turreted Monitors now nnder construction. Tliey bear the following names, viz., I'liritan, Terror, Aiiiphifr'de^ Ml- autonomoli, and Monculnovh. There was much contention a,l)out the completion of these vessels, and imaginary defects Avere ventilated in the newspapers. It may be that these attacks and erroneous state- ments prejudiced the public mind, and tliat the idea was entertained by some whose opinion is valued that there were grounds for the doulrts that had been expressed of their sea-worthiness. The practical effect of these statements was to prevent Congress from appropriating money for the completion of the vessels, and this course on the part of Con- gress might have confirmed some in their doubts. Several boards of IT. S. BLOOr-OP-WAK "MABION." officers, most competent experts, however, reported upon them, recom- mending their completion ; of these that made Ijy the Advisory Board may be regarded as a final decision, for it was accepted without C}ues- tion. The Advisory Boai'd reported as follows : "It is our opinion tliat it would be wise and expedient to tinisli these vessels at once, and for tlie following reasons, viz.: "1. The hulls, as they are at present, are of excellent workmanship, full.v up to the present standard condition of iron ship construction, whilst the flotation of the Puritan and the behavior of the Miantonomoh at sea confirm the correctness of the calculations of the designs. 11 162 MODERN SHIPS OF AVAR. "3. It is ensily possible to complete the vessels by taking advantage of the recent de- velopments in armor, guns, and machinerj^ without making any radical changes in the designs, so that then- speed, endurance, batter}^ power, protection, and sea-going qualities shall be full}' equal to those of any foreign iron-clad of simikir dimensions designed pre- vious to 1879. "3. The vessels may be finished so as to develop all the above-mentioned advantages without making tbeir total cost, when completed, in any way exorbitant, compared with the res\dts obtained ; again, the interests of our sea-coast defence require a force at least equal to that which would be represented by these vessels. U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAK "ALERT " We take the liberty of calling your attention to a certain erroneous impression which now exists with regard to tliese vessels. In one of the reports of these hulls a doubt was thrown on the correctness of the calculations of the Puritan. This doubt has spread in the public mind until it includes all the ships. The actual flotation of the Puritan and the Miantonomoh proves beyond question not only the reliability of the calculations, but also tiiat tlie hulls of these vessels are lighter in proportion to the total displacement than those of any iron-clad low freeboard hulls afloat, with two exceptions. "It has been the unfortunate custom, in arguments as to the value of the results to be obtained, to compare these vessels with such foreign ships as the Inflexible and the DuiUo, lo the evident disadvantage of the Monitors, no account whatever being taken of the fact that these vessels are double the size of the Monitors. If these bulls be compared with foreign ones of similar dimensions, no such disparitj^ will appear." These vessels, with the exception of the Monadnocl; have their ma- chinery in place ; the Miantonomoh has her side armor on ; the others tire finished as to their hulls, except the interior fittings, side armor, and turrets. The estimated cost to complete them is about four mill- THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 163 ions of dollars. When we consider the veiy slight defence that the country now possesses in the singie-turreted Monitors before alluded to, it AYOuld seem imperative to complete with all despatch these vessels, ^vhich would represent a force of real power. These vessels are of iron as to tlie hulls, but tliej^ will l)e armored Avith steel or compound armor, and will l:)e armed with the most pow- erful modern artillery that can Ije accommodated in their turrets. Their names appear in the navy list as '' l^uilding." Tliey were launched in 18 S3. The double-decked ship Tennessee was the only frigate, or " hrst-rate," borne, up to within a few months, on the list of vessels of the navy as available for sea-service. She was for many years in commission as the flag-ship of the North Atlantic Station, but this year she reached that U. S. SLOOP-OP WAR TREXTON- condition when the twenty per cent, law consigned her to " ordinary," from which she has lately been removed under the operatioii of the hammer of the auctioneer. She was launched in 1S65. Iler length was 335 feet, beam 45 feet, draught of water 21.8 feet. She had a displace- ment of 4840 tons, and attained a speed of 11 knots with an indicated horse-power of 1900. The capacity of her coal-bunkers was 381 tons. 104 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. Tier bcattery consisted of two S-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted), sixteen 9-incli smootli-bores, and four 8n-pounders. Tlie vessels next in order of construction are tliose of the Adams class, small sloops-of-war, whicli were launched in 1874. Tliese vessels were Imilt of wood. Tliey are convenient and handy, and perform the duty required of a cruiser in time of peace. Engine- ])OAver is developed in them to a. higlier degree tlian in tliose preceding them, hut in all else they are merely a repetiti(jn of earlier construc- tions. The Ailatii-s was launched in 1S74. Her length is 1S5 feet, Iseani 35 feet, draught of water 14.3 feet. >She has a displacement of 1375 tons, and attains a speed of 11.3 knots Avith an indicated horse-power of 715. The capacity of her coal-l)unkers is llo tons. Her battery con- sists of one 11-inch and four 'J-inch smooth-bores, and one GO-pounder. The ILir/'on class of sloops, launched about the same period, are of an increased displacement and speed, and built of wood. The length of the 21ario)i is 216 feet, beam 37 feet, draught of water 16.6 feet. She has a displacement of 1900 tons, and attains a speed of 12.9 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 966. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 135 tons. Her batter}' consists of one s-incli muzzle- loading rifle (convei'ted), six 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder. The AJ.rrt is one of three vessels that were built of iron in 1874, the exceptional and spasmodic indication of an effort to change the mate- rial for construction, much induced by pressure from the iron interests of the country. This effort was made in a A'ery mild and tentative manner, and was limited to this small class of diminutive vessels. The length of the Alert is 175 feet, beam 32 feet, draught of water 12.9 feet. She has a displacement of 102(t tons, and attains a speed of ten knots per hour wjth an indicated horse-power of 655. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 133 tons. Her battery consists of one 11-incli and four 9-inch smooth-l)ores, and one 60-pounder. The shock attending the lirst step towards a change in the material for construction was so great as to cause a suspension of the effort, and in 1876 was launched the Trenton, built of wood, Avliich represents the latest of that type on the list of the navy. The length of this ship is 253 feet, beam 4S feet, draught of water 20.6 feet. She has a dis- placement of 3900 tons, and attains a speed of 12.8 knots ])er hour with an indicated horse-power of 2S13. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 35(1 tons. Her battery consists of ten 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (con- verted). The above is a fair presentation of our old navy. Of such vessels THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 165 we have, larger and smaller, twenty-five Avliicli ai'e fit for service as crnisei's, exclusive of the old singie-turi'cted Monitors. These cruisers are built of wood, have low S})eed, and are armed Avitli smooth-hore guns, with a sprinkling of rifled cannon, converted on the Palliser svs- tem from smooth-bore cast-iron guns. (Jf what service is this force, this relic of a past age 'i The duties of a navy, apart from the consideration of war, are mani- fold. As stated by the first Advisory Board, it is required for " survey- ing, deep-sea sounding, the advancement and ])rotection of American connnerce, exjiloration, the protection of American life and property endangered by wars between foreign countries, and service in support of American policy in matters Avhere foreign governments are con- cerned." With such a poor force it must he evident that it was impossible to discharge in an efficient manner all the duties of a navy. Our work in foreign surveys is limited to that of one small vessel on the west coast of North America ; our deep-sea soundings are few and far be- tween, dotted along the tracks pursued l;iy our sliips while going to and returning from distant stations ; our commerce is protected ; but we are unable to support any positive policy that the government might decide to declare in reference to, for example, the Monroe dijctrine. To say nothing of European naval armaments, it is only necessary to point to some of the smaller powers in our own hemisphere that possess ships- of-war Avith which we have nothing fit to cope. Our people cannot desire to assume a position in the society of naval powers without supporting the position with dignity; they cannot Avisli their navy to be cited as a standard of inefficiency ; they cannot wish to force their representatives (the officers of the navy) into a position of humiliation and mortification such as is im]iosed l:»y Ijeing called on to deprecate criticism hy labored explanations. Better aljolish the navy and lower our pretensions. But the fact seems to be that the rapidity of naval devel(.)pment has not been properly appreciated, and it is after a long interval of indiffer- ence that, attention being at last centred on the suljject, it is seen how rapid its strides have been, and how utterly we are distanced in the race. There is evidently now in the country a growing desire to repair the effects of the past oversight, and we see Congress has moved in the matter. As all political parties now unite in the necessity of effort in this direction, the hope is inspired that the subject is to l)e separated from those of a partisan character, and that the rehabilitation of the 11* ll!C) AIODEIJX SHirS OF WAR. iiiivv will he ]int on its proper level, and accepted as a national question in which all ai'e alike interested. P(.)ssessed as we are now of a. navy sucli as has l^een indicated, the change that was instituted involved a most violent transition. In re- viewing our work of construction for over tliirtv years we saw no new type of cruiser. The only types of ships that we ])roduced were those that date Ijefore the war; since which we Init reproduced the same in classes of differing dimensions. From the sailing-ship wdth auxiliary steam-power we passed to the steamer with auxiliary sail-power ; but we had no full-powered steamers, with or without sails. As long as it ^vas considered necessary to spread as much canvas as ^vas used, the s])ace assigned to l>oders and engines was limited, and we failed to achieve full power ; and a reduction to the minimum of sail-power had to be acce])ted lief ore we could present a type of a fall-powered steamer. With the exception of two vessels of the Alert class built of iron, we had nothing but wooden hulls. We had continued to Ijuild in perish- alile material, requiring large sums to be spent in repairs, and ignoring the manufactures of the country which could have been aided in their development by the contrary course. "We permitted the age of steel to reach its zenith without indicating that we were aware of its presence. In these ships, with the exception of a few converted rifles of 8-incli calibre, our armaments consist of smooth-bore cast-iron guns which have composed our batteries for thirty 3^ears. These are now to be discarded, and their places to be filled with modern steel cannons. Torpedoes, movable tor]:»edoes, of which we know nothing practi- cally, are to be brought to the fi'ont, and are to form part of our equip- ment. Torpedo-boats are to be brought into use, and details innumera- ble are now to be studied and worked out. Conceive, then, a high-powered steamer witli a minimum of canvas, built of steel, armed with motlern steel artillery, and a secondary liattery of Ilotchkiss guns, fitted for launching movable torpedoes, with protec- tive deck over boilers and engines, divided int(_) many water-tiglit com- jiartnients giving protection to Inioyancy, and comjiare such a ship with the
1i>]^Ih, are, with the exception of the Cldcaut if steel plating Avas re- quired it had to be imported at great cost to the builder. Those Avho contemplated bidding on the proposals issued by the government for the first four vessels had to consider this matter. Mr. John Eoach, of New York and of Chester, Pennsylvania, undertook the manufacture of this material, and finding that success attended his experiment, he was aide to direct extensively the steel-works at Thurlow, Pennsylvania, to this line of lousiness, and Avhen the bids were opened it was found that this new industry, introduced through his enterprise, enaJJed him to underbid all competitors. After receiving the contracts for the slii])s, Mr. Eoach contracted with the Phoi'nix Iron Company, of Phoenixville, with Messrs. Park Brothers, of Pittsburgh, and the Norway Iron and Steel Works, of South Boston, for supplies of similar material : thus the first step in this effort to rehabilitate the navy resulted in introducing * Sec Notes fur later ships. lOS MODERN SHIPS OF WAK. a new industry into the country. The still more extensive development of industries that will attend the work of rehabilitation as it advances will he treated further on. Jiefore presenting- the types of cruisers "which are now to be intro- duced into the navy, it may l)e well to refer to an error that exists, or has existed, in the popular mind as to the signilication of a steel cruiser. To many who are uninformed in technical language the word steel, in connection with a vessel of war, implies protecting armor, and such mis- apprehension would convey the idea that a cruiser of steel is able to Contend witli an armored vessel. This is a mistake; there is protection obtained l)y constructing a vessel of steel, but not such as is ju-ovided by armor. The destructive effect of shell-firing and the development in nnidern artillery haxe made armor necessary for all vessels which can carry it, and has also made it necessary to provide all other protection possible to vessels that cannot carry armor. Although this protection cannot be gi\en absolutely to the hull of such ships and to the j)e>:son?iel, it is provided to the Imoi/atic// by the introduction of water-tight com- partments and protective decks, which limit the destructive effect of the fire of the enemy and localize the water that may enter through shot- holes. With a wooden hull it would not he possible to comljine this precaution because of the difficulty in making joints water-tight be- tween wood and metal, and in consetpience of the weight that Avonlcl be added to a wooden hull, which is already from sixteen per cent, to twenty per cent, heavier than if constructed of steel. The only defen- sive advantage possessed by a steel nnarmored cruiser over a wooden one is derived from this system of construction. The Chiaiijii is a steam-frigate, built throughout of steel of domes- tic manufacture, the outside plating being ^\ inch thick. Her length is 325 feet, beam -iS.^ feet, di-aught of water 11) feet. She has a displace- ment of 451 )(• tons, and will attain a minimum speed of 14 knots per hour with an indicated hoi-se-])ower of 5n(M). The capacity of her coal-bunk- ers is 1)40 tons, and she carries a battery of hmv S-inch steel breech-load- ing guns in half-turrets, and eight O-inch and two 5-inch steel breech- loaders on the gun-deck. This ship has nine athwart-shii« bulkheads, dividing the hull into ten main \vater- tight corai)artments, and the machinery and boilers are covered by a protective deck one and a half inches in thickness. "When the buidcers are full of coal she has a coal ])rotection nine feet thick from the water-line to eight feet above it. Tlie deck plans show the arrangement of the main battery, in addi- THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 171 ti(m to which she carries a powerful secondary liattery of Ilotchkiss rapid-firing sing-le-shot, and revc^lving cannons and (latling guns. The bow of the vessel is strengthened for using the i-ani with whicli she is fitted. The rudder and steering'-g'ear are under wafer. 8he has two screws — a subdivision of powder ^viiicli is given to all shi])s-of-war of over oi.Hio tons displacement — from which a great advantage is derived if one engine is broken down, as three-fourths of tlie speed can be main- tained with the other. Tlie advantage of this in a naval action is ob- vious. DECK TLANS OF THE U. S. FRKiATE CnrCAGO, SHOWING BATTERY. The Atlanta, of which the Boston is a counterpart, presents another type of a steel unarmored cruiser. She is a steam-corvette, or sloop-of- war, a single-decked ship. Her length is 27(1 feet, beam 42 feet, draught of water 16 feet 10 inclies. She has a displacement of 300O tons, and lias attained a speed of 15.5 knots per lujur Avith a maxhnum Iiorse- power of 3482. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 580 tons, and her Ijattery consists of two 8-inch steel l)reech-loading guns and six 0-inch, besides a secondary battery of Ilotchkiss and Gatling guns. In vessels of this class it is usual to have an open-deck battery, with a poop-deck and to]>-gallant forecastle at the extremities, but the effort has been made in this type to increase the effectiveness of the battery DECK PLAN OF THE U. S. SLOOP-OP-\VAK ATLANTA, SHOWING BATTERY. 172 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. by giving the guns a more extended lateral train than is possible when a ship is arranged with a forecastle and poop-deck. These, with the accommodations wliich they jtrovide, have been removed from the ends of the ship, and a superstructure has lieen erected amidships. This ar- rangement gives a clear swee}) forward and aft for the powerful 8-inch o-uns, enablino- the forward o-un to cover an all-around tire of from 40° abaft the bea-m on tlie port side to 30° abaft tlie beam on the starboard side, the after S-incli gun having a corresponding lateral sweep aft. Within the superstructure are mounted the six 6-inch guns, two on each side on the broadside, with a train of 6(t° before and abaft the beam, the other two being mounted at diagonalh^ opposite corners in such a way as to admit of their use either on tlie broadside or for fire ahead or astern. This oliject is achieved by mi is the first vessel, whether foi- naval or commercial purposes, that is built entirely of steel of domestic man- ufacture, and is the pioneer representative of otlier similar industries which will be develoi^ed as the rehabilitation of the navj' proceeds. She has proved herself eminently successful, and is the fastest sea-steamer of her displacement built in the United States, Avith perhaps the ex- ception of the steam-yacht Atahinta. She is a stanch vessel of great structural strength, and does credit to the ship-building profession of the country. Of the additional cruisers authorized hj the late acts of Congress, particulars will be found in the Notes. In one of the larger vessels the t}'pe of the Atlanta will be repro- duced on a larger scale, while the other vessel of the same class will be provided with a poop and top-gallant forecastle, and will cari'v her forward and after guns on sponsons, Ijy which means fire ahead and astern Avill be secured. This will make it necessary to limit the power of the battery of the second vessel to 6-inch guns, as the 8-inch gun cannot conveniently be carried on sponsons in a vessel of lOoO tons displacement. The heav}^ gun-boat Avill carry six C-inch guns, the forward and after ones on sponsons ; and the light gun-boat will carr}^ four of the same guns. In the construction of these additional vessels advantage has been taken of all our experience in our initial effort, and of whatever devel- opments may have been made by others since the earlier vessels were designed. The absolute departure from the old stanchxrds is apparent in ma- terial, in armament, in speed, and in rig. The causes that have led to this change in material may be found, first, in the change that has taken place in ordnance. The introduction of the rifled cannon, and its subsequent development, have increased very much the weight of this part of the equipment of a vessel-of-war, and the necessity of accommodating the stowage of charges of powder much increased in size, and of ammunition for the secondary batteries, which must be most liberally supplied, makes an absolute demand on ITO MODERN SHIPS Of VVAK. V. S. DESPATCn-BOAT DOLPniX. an increased portion of space. Again, the increased speed no^v consid- ered indispensable malves a similar demand for space, and carries with it as well an increased proportion of the total displacement. In a wooden hull it would 1)6 impossil)le to reconcile these demands, in consequence of tlie weight of the hull itself. The hull and hull fitting of an unarmored cruiser Ijuilt of wood will weigh from 49 per cent, to 52 per cent, of the total displacement. With high-powered engines it is doubtful if sufficiejl(t; st[rength can be ob- tained with even .52 per cent, of the displacement foi\he hull, and this must suppose the al)sence of all protection to bu(JYanc^''\as water-tight compartments. _ j- "^ The hull and fittings of a steel cruiser, exclusive of protective decks, will weigh from 31) ]ier cent, to 44 per cent, of the total displacement. Suppose a 4500-ton ship built of wood Aveigliing 50 per cent, of the total displacement, and the same ship built of steel weighing 4U per cent, of the total displacement, the respective weights of the hulls will be 2250 tons and 1800 tons, a difference of 450 tons, the steel hull beinp: one-fifth, or 20 per cent., lighter than the wooden one. This will allow for increased weight of e the duty of the government to provide the navy with a fleet of ten armored cruisers of the most approved type. These vessels would form the outer line of defence of the coast during war, and should be of such force as to be able to contend with any second-class armored vessel of other nations. Some of them should be always in commission during times of peace, if only for instruction and practice purposes, and one should be assigned to each squadron abroad to carry the flag of the rear-admiral in command, to assert our position in the society of naval powers, able to give substantial " support to American policy in mat- ters where foreign governments are concerned." The ability to contend with armored vessels of the first class must be reserved for another type of ships, which are styled " coast-defence vessels," and without which our new navy will not be thoroughly equipped for contributing its fuU share to defence at home. In consid- ering armored vessels, what was said before as to the character of com- promise that obtains in vessels - of - war must be borne in mind. All desirable features cannot be concentrated in any one ship ; the special duty for which the vessel is to be used controls the selection. The sea- going armored cruiser is expected to keep the sea for a lengthened period : she must have large coal endurance. She may be called on to sustain more than one engagement : her supply of ammunition must be large. Her speed must equal that of the fastest sea-going vessels of sim- ilar type to enaljle her to pursue an equal or to avoid a superior force : hence much space and displacement must be assigned to engines and boilers. Thus the amount of her armor and the weight of her battery are affected by these other demands, which are the more imperative. In the case of coast -defence vessels the conditions are changed, enabling in them the full development of both offensive and defensive properties. These vessels are assigned to duty on the coast : they must be as fit to keep the sea as are the armored cruisers, and they must be able to fight their guns in all weathers that the armored cruiser can fight ; but as they do not require the coal endurance nor the speed of the ship that is to keep the sea for lengthened periods, the weight saved in coal and machinery can be utilized m battery and armor. Such vessels constitute the main line of naval defence, as they can be made almost absolutelv invulnerable and irresistible. ISO MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. Under an act of a late Congress a boaril on "fortifications and other defences " was occupied in cijnsidering the defences of the coast, and there were recommended l)y this Board two classes of "floating ing liatteries "' (so called), coast-defence vessels, and one class of low free- board vessels for harbor defence. An examination of the designs of these vessels shows that they are replete with merit, and present some novel and valuable features. A justifiable limitation is put on the coal endurance and speed, though fair speed is secured ; and altogether the ])lans ])rove there can be designed vessels of comparatively small dimen- sions, light draught, great handiness and manoeuvring power, which can carry the heaviest guns, and be capable of contending on equal terms with the heaviest European l^attle-ships. The cut below represents the smaller of the type of coast-defence vessels. LIGHT DHAITGHT COAST-DEFEKCE VESSEL, "WITH DECK PLAN. The largest class will be armed with two IdT-ton guns in a turret, and two 26-ton guns in a l)ar]x'tte. The thickness of armor will vary fi'om 10 to Is inches. The second class will be armed with two TS-ton guns in a turret, and two 26-ton guns in a barbette. The thickness of armor will be from 11 to 16 inclies. The smallest vessels, for harbor defence, modified Monitors, will be armed with two 44-ton guns in a turret, and two 26-ton guns in a bar- bette. The thickness of armor will be from lu to 13 inches. THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 181 A fleet composed of such vessels as are repi^esented in the largest type would be able to engage an enemy at some distance from the coast — an important object in these days ^vhen the range of heavy rifled cannons makes it ]X)ssible to shell towns from a great distance, and at points remote from shore batteries. Nominally we have now a fleet of vessels for coast defence, the old war Monitors of the Passaic class ; but the contrast between them and the vessels recommended by the Fortifications Board is about equal in degree Avith that between our wooden fleet and the new steel cruisers. It is intended that a movable automatic torpedo shall be utilized by all armored vessels, either by means of a torpedo-boat to be carried by armored cruisers, or by the vessel itself in the case of coast and liarbor defence ships. The torpedo that has mainly succeeded thus far in recommending it- self to the naval powers is that invented by Mr. Whitehead. Xujuerous efforts have been made by others in this field, but the difficulties that surround it are made very apparent by the paucity of the results. It will be understood that the torpedo, when launched, is left entirely to automatic control ; hence, apart from the motive power, it is necessary that it shall possess directive power, vertically to control immersion and horizontally to control direction in the horizontal plane. In the AVhite- head torpedo the immersion is well regulated, and if no deflecting influ- ences are encountered, the direction is also preserved ; Ijut it fails where deflecting influences intervene. During the Turko-Russian war valua- able experience was gained, and instances are known where the torpedo failed to operate from want of directive power. An instance is cited where a torpedo was deflected by striking the chain of a vessel at an- chor, causing it to pass harmlessly to one side. Another instance is cited where the torpedo was deflected from the side of a ship owing to the angle at Avhich it struck. It is evident that perfection cannot be asso- ciated with a weapon of this class that has not a strong directive force inherent in it. The torpedo invented by Captain J. A. Howell, of the United States navy, possesses this property to an eminent degree, and it is regarded by most competent experts as the successful rival of the Whitehead. In the Howell torpedo the power is stored in a fly-wheel revolving with great rapidity in a longitudinal vertical plane, and its gyroscopic ten- dency makes it impossible for the torpedo to deviate from its original course in a horizontal plane ; the principle is the same as insures the accuracy of the rifle-bullet, enabhng it to resist deflecting influences. ISi MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. The latest exj)eriments of Captain Howell in controlling the immersion of his t(ii'pe(l("j Avere very successful, and it is probaljle that the auto- mobile torpedo for our new navy will be an American invention. Lilj- erality in experiments is indispensable in jierfecting a device of this kind ; it is to be hoped that such may be extended to the Howell tor- pedo.* The general reader is probably not aware of the effect on naval war- fare produced liy the introduction of the auto-mobile torpedo, affecting the constituents of the fleet itself. Formerly a fleet consisted of battle- ships alone, or with store-ships to provide consumable articles ; to these were later added despatch-boats for the service indicated by their title ; but since the introduction of the torpedo an additional fleet of torpedo- boats is considered necessary for the protection of the battle-ships. All THE HOWELL TUIirEDO. B, fly-whccl. C. C, screw propellers. />, divins; rudder. £, E, steering rudders. i^, water- oliamber containing automatic apparatus. (?, firing pin. H, position of gun-cotton magazine. armored ships are expected to carry at least one torpedo-boat, which is designed for operating against the enemy during an action at sea, and the universal adoption of this practice has led to the introduction into fleets of a new type of vessel called torpedo-boat catchers, whose pri- mary duty it is to destroy the torpedo-boats of the enemy. For this purpose these vessels have phenomenal speed, and besides their equip- ment of auto-moliile torpedoes, are provided with powerful batteries of single -shot and revolving Hotchkiss guns, capal)l3 of penetrating all parts of a torpedo-boat. This typo of vessel is now being tested by the English and the Continental governments, and forms one of the constituents of their fleets. The torpedo-boat is undoubtedly one of the features that should be introduced into our new navy, not only for their possible use on the high-seas, but for the purpose of supplementing the harbor-defence ves- sels, while the tyjie of vessel known as the torpedo-boat catcher would be a powerful auxiliary to the armored cruisers on the first line, or the more powerful vessels forming the second line of the coast defence. * See Notes, p. 257 NOTES. FOE the new navy of the United States Congress has authorized tlie construction of twenty-five vessels, of wliicli seven will be armored, sixteen unarmored, and two " such floating batteries, rams, or other naval structures for coast defence " as may be determined by the Navy Department. This list emljraces five double - turreted Monitors, one armored battle -ship, one annored cruiser, eight partially protected cruisers, one dynamite-gun cruiser, four gun-boats, one despatch-vessel, and two torpedo-boats. Of the twenty vessels already built or ordered but three are in commission. They vary so much in type that the fol- lowing conventional data may perhaps be of some use (see table on the following page), though it must be remembered that the perform- ances stated are theoretical, except in the cases of the Atlanta, Boston, and Dolpldn. The defects found in the Atlanta when first tested were so easily remedied that the machinery finally developed a maximum horse-power which was onlj^ a little less than that required by the contract ; while the Boston reached a maximum of -1248.5 horse-power. In his last report to the President the Secretary of the Navy said : " The Dolphin and the Atlanta having both been completed, and having had trial trips, it is possible to compare them in their results \\\\h similar vessels built contemporaneously elsewhere. The JDolpfdn, of 1500 tons displacement, can be compared with the Alacritij and Surprise, English despatch-vessels of 1400 tons each, and the IRlan, a French despatch- vessel of 1550 tons, all built contemporaneously. The DolphAn was designed for 2300 indicated horse-power, the Alacrity and Surprise each 3000, and the Milan 3900. The highest mean horse- power developed upon trial was, in the case of the Dolphin , less than 2200 ; of the Alacrity, 3173 ; of the Surprise, 3079 ; of the Milan, 4132. The highest speed of the Dolpldn, resulting from several trials, was 15.11 knots, running hght ; of the Alacrity, 17.95 knots ; of the Sur- prise, 17.8 knots ; of the Milan, 18.4 knots. "The Atlanta, the sister -ship to the Boston, can be compared with the Esmeralda, the Giovanni Bauscon, and the Afersey. AU three were ISi MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. O O O Ci t-- o o -t* JO lO o o o ^o -J £ JS ^ CI X' _ ^' o o o O O' o O O O O' o o o = O t- O -^^ r- o o f^D ■r^ 1- O' t- lO o o ooo o 10 = o CO G5 C5 cr ^ o^ ;d l-:^ o X '^ ^ Tt< O CO CO -* Oi CO LO JO JO JO ■>-< Ci r- 1— 1 .— ( -^ C^i '^i 1— 1 " ■ o* 1—1 T-< 1-H 1-H 1—1 0} o\ oi *J - t- -* -ro « 5 ■5 6 M • -_■ : tllll ^ - CD '^•^-^ CJ >^ S >-> 0) c 'E £ □ 1 B O £ : "J^ ^1 ?:■ S :^" ^ i^ a ^ X .= 'S r-H ^ a. CO g,Hh — ~2£.'5 co'^co -0 a <: ww>> «^i*5 (^ 0> CQ O (j> soopaiijoi oiiqoui omv CJ ^ 'JL o* If? ^ o - - - - . . - ^ ^ - c - - - - " O O O' o ~ ^ fti ?> o to oc o Lo X' CD 'X! o o o y: X o -o cc o c r o :d :d o ■^^ . . . . / 1' — 1 .—1 : T: : : : : : r 5' : : : : : '^ ^ ^ '^ Tt Tft W ^> Tf o '*X0107 0>CO 1-1 05^-+X0> CD"^ CO ~ o? 07 :o o ■ ^.-^ _- — ^,-^ ■_— — ,— ^_--— —, — ^ — -, ^^ .->. ' ■ ,— XJ s o o o o o o ^ o o o — ■ c O O Tf^ X o o ^1 '"'--'-^-. ;? CO t i = L-^_ ^^^ O O — . >« o o> -^ CO LO t' LO J-0 CO o -3 P- ^ ,_, ^ ,-H ,- - T— 1 1— ( r- 1— ( I— 1 '"' 1—. 1—1 1—i r?> o> o> -r VO cD o !r CO o o o CO CI cs ■ X"i< -:H -Tt^ -T) -^ -Xj rr. -tH cs .^ O i.O o* i> X X •* -rf 00 . _Q _ s H Ot T-t J- Oi C* 1—1—1 1— ( .— 1 1— ( 1— . ^ o o o ^ •— c? c> o o? o A'^ s Co C> lO ■x 05 ^ — 1 CD O CI coco ■^ ■ .d *J o o o o c -t ^ ^ CO -rf* -* -rj^ coco O; ^ Tf Ct ?13 1— i o 0. o O c: o o JO O O lO Ci O O O O . a jj GO lO i ci oi «^ CO c* o 0> CO CCi CO OJ ^ Ol CO CO OJ OJ £ . o (:- t^ i> o ^ ^ O O C: iO o CO Of o o ^ CO Ct - O'^ CO n S O O O X CO X C: t- -^iSSr-^ 'ci ■■ i.O o o ^ t- M^ O t- X b " H ^ CC CO CO 0' o o -TjH 02 CO ■>— CO -* '::fH r-( ^ -f '-^ v-^ r-> 6 ^' ^ 'ZT c : : : : GJ ^ t- rjl & X ■^^ Jf i '* fcb ,= "i. -^ d ■ i -J — — . , - . xll Jl 2^1 5^S o & s C^ s o «J ■^ j. : ~ " % ^f c ^ »^ 1 ^1 ^ r-\ ^ -"/ r- \~- l*' i i", . . . - X X' X ■x «^. . . . XXX rt 1—1 l— 1 T— i '~' . — . . . 1!5 Tf -* -* ^ rQ '^"j r^' OJ (- r- S t- t- t- (- t- XXX X X X X X X GO X X' X X x • Si2. j5 00 00 00 'O? X X X X XXX X X X X X X • — ^ — ^ —^-^^ ^."^ . CJ CJ !-■ 07 .^ • ■ CO -^ ^ c o o 1 1 ■- S 5 r CJ c f T "c 3 -fi 15 -^ 1- I^ z: 3 c c e-,^--;5f- pq o cj ca -^ Q O M :z, oo P QQOC5 H ^.:^ • t -i^Tiit" (i *• 9 n « (/I til 1 -• a a c t* < ^. -*■<•» ft ^5 "^.^ •- f- ^ THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 185 built in England: the Esmeralda for Chili, the Giovanni Bausan for Ital}^ and the Mersey for the English government. The Atlatita is of 3000 tons displacement; the Esmeralda, 29'20 ; the Giovanni Bausan, 3086 ; and the Mersey, 3650. The Atlanta was designed to attain an indicated horse-power of 3500, the Esmeralda and the Giovanni Bausan each 5500, and the Mersey COOO. The trials had of the Atlanta indicate that her engines will develop less than 3500 horse -power, while the Esmeredda developed 6000, the Giovanni Bausan 6680, and the Mersey 6626. The maximum speed of the Atlanta will be less than 15 knots, while that of the Esmercdda was 18.28 knots, the Glejvanni Bemsan 17.5 knots, the Mersey 17.5 knots." Thanks to the force of public opinion, liberal appropriations have been made for the navy. Leaving out of consideration the double- turreted Monitors, the additions to the fleet have been the cruisers Charleston, and BaJtUnore, the ISTo. 1 and 2 gun-boats, the cruiser New- ark, the two armored vessels, the torpedo - l^oat, the dynamite cruiser, the No. 4 and 5 cruisers, the No. 3 and 4 gun-boats of No. 1 type, and the floating batteries. The Stiletto, if accepted, will be bought from the Herreshoff Company ; all the rest, except the battle-ship, are to ]>e or have been constructed by contract in private yards. Of the ne^v ones the Charleston and No. 5 cruiser will be built at San Francisco ; gun-boat No. 2 at Baltimore ; the dynamite cruiser, gun-l)oat No. 1, the Bcdtlmore, Neioarl; and cruiser No. 4, at Philadelphia, and gun-boats Nos. 3 and 4 at New York. The steel partially protected cruiser Charleston, is, except in details of internal accommodations, a duplicate of t\\e Hani wa- Kan, which was in turn a progressive development of the tj'-pe-making Esmeredda, inas- much as she has greater speed, more powerful armament, and superior protection to stability. The plans of the Charleston were Ijought aljroad simply because they could not be made here ; and notwithstanding the twopenny-ha'penny criticisms this action evoked, its wisdom has been justified. The Charleston has neither poop nor forecastle, and the un- hampered ends give in action perfect freedom of fire for two 10-inch guns, which are mounted in low, thin-plated barl^ettes, situated on the ship's middle line, at a distance of sixty feet from the bow and stern respectively. These pieces are without armor protection, except that offered against machine-gun fire by a two-inch segmental shield. Be- tween these heavy guns a high waist stretches amidships, in which six 6-inch breech-loaders are mounted on sponsons or in projecting turrets. The secondary battery includes two 6-pounder rapid-fire guns, eight ma- 186 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. chine guns, and four above-water torpedo-tubes. The 10-inch guns must always be Ijrought back to the fore-and-aft hne for reloading, and their ammunition is passed through steel tubes "which extend below the pro- tective deck. The engines are double-compound, situated in separate compartments, and in the Nanlwa-Kan the type developed 7650 horse- power and ls.!» knots. In the twin-screw cruiser Baltimore a longitudinal water-tight bulk- head joins the double bottom, which runs under the engine and Ijoilers to a protective deck that extends the whole length of the ship, and is three inches thick on the flat top and four inches thick on the sloping sides. The machinery consists of a pair of triple-expansion compound engines which are to develop IS knots and 7500 horse-power Avith natu- ral, and 19^ knots and 10,750 horse-power with forced, draft. There are two separate engine-rooms and two boiler-rooms, and the normal coal capacity of 600 tons wiU Ije sufficient for ISOO knots. Additional space is provided for ?M) tons more, and with this total there ought to lie an endurance of 80()0 miles at 11 knots, and of 1-1,000 miles, or 75 days' steaming, at 8 knots. No sails except storm - sails will be provided. The Baltimore is to have a poop and forecastle, on which four 8-inch guns with direct fore-and-aft fire will be mounted. On the main deck six 6-inch guns will be carried in In'oadside, and the secondary batterj^ and torpedo-tubes are effective and well disposed. The maximum price fixed at first by Congress for the Xeaxirh was less than anv of the bids received, but at the last session the appropri- ation "was increased to $1,300,000, and the contract was awarded in Au- gust of this year. The Neicarh is a l)ark-i'igged, twin-screw cruiser of 4:083 tons displacement. A doul^le bottom extends through 129 feet of her length, and a protective deck, which rises fifteen inches above the water-line amidships, runs uninterruptedly fore and aft. Four feet above this the berth deck is built, the intermediate space being greatly suljdivided and utilized for stores. Numerous water-tight frames are "^vorked in the double bottom, and wherever practicable the cellular con- struction is employed. The engines are to develop 6(iO0 horse-power with natural draft, and S50(» horse-power and a maximum speed of eighteen knots with forced draft. Tliis vessel has a pooj) and forecastle, and the guns are carried on tlie upper deck. The main liattery consists of twelve 6-inch centre-pivot guns, furnished with segmental shields, and mounted on sponsons so as to obtain the greatest arc of fire ; the two guns nearest the bow and stern converge their fire at a point 1:00 feet distant from the ends of the ship, and those iu broadside can be concen- THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 187 trated within 100 feet of tlie ship. In addition to the secondary battery given in tlie table, tliere are six above-water torpedo-tul)es. The development of naval construction cannot ]>e [jroved more con- clusively than by comparing tlie new cruisers with those whicli were lirst laid down. In tire Atldnta, for example, the builder guaranteed that 664: tons of machinery Avould produce 3500 indicated horse-power ; but the Charleston must, before acceptance, develop 7000 horse-power for 710 tons of machinery ; that is to say, the energy for weight has been doubled within four years. The twin-screw gun-boat No. 1 is the prototype of a class that now include three vessels, and a very promising nucleus it is for a fleet to which the defence of the conntrj^'s coast must mainly be intrusted. The ship is to be built of steel, with a three and a half inch complete water- tight deck, so arched as to have a spring of about three feet in its great- est width, and a crown that will nearly reach the water-line level. Tliere is no double bottom, but the number of water-tight compartments is very great, and coffer-dams surround the engine and fire room hatches, and are carried to a height of eighteen inches above the main deck. The complement numbers 15(>, and the rig is that of a three-masted schooner, with a sail area of 4400 square feet. The machinery is esti- mated to indicate 2200 horss-power with natural draft, and 3300 with forced draft, and consists of two independent compound engines jilaced in separate compartments. The speed is given as sixteen knots, but it is probable this rate will lie considerably exceeded. The main battery consists of six 6-incli guns, the secondary of two 57-niillinietre rapid- fire guns, two 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and one short Clatling. Four of the 6-incli guns are mounted on the poop and forecastle — two forward, two aft — and the other pieces of this calibre are carried on spon- sons amidships, so as to have a large arc of fire about the beam. The elevated guns are eighteen feet above the low- water line, the centre ones ten feet, and all are mounted on central pivots and fitted -with protective shields. The torpedo armament is of great relative importance ; of the eight tubes supplied, the stem and stern ones are fixed and fitted with under-water discharge, while the other six can be trained, and are dis- tributed four forward and two aft. In gun-boat ISTo. 2 the machinery is to develop 900 horse-power with natural, and 1350 with forced, draft ; the engines, boilers, and magazines are placed beneath a steel deck three- eighths of an inch thick, which amidships is twenty-seven inches below the water-line at the edge and eight inches above at the crown. The armament consists of four '6-inch sponson-mounted guns, two 4:7-milli- 18S MODERN SHIPS OF AVAR. metre guns, two 37-iniUimetre revolving cannons, and one short Gat- ling. She is liarkentine rigged, with a plain sail area of 4480 square feet, and has a slightly ram-shaped, cast-steel stem. The complement is 100. The pneumatic-gun cruiser is to Ije armed with three of Zalinski's ]raeumatic dynamite guns (jf lOi-inch calibre, each of which is to throw a shell containing 2(tO pounds of high explosives for a distance of one mile, and to be capalde of being discharged at least once in two minutes. The guaranteed speed is twenty knots. Under the law of August 3, ISSl, authorizing the construction of two new ships, it was provided that these should be " sea-going, double- bottomed, armored vessels of about 6000 tons displacement, designed for a speed of at least sixteen knots an hour, with engines having all neces- sary appliances for working under forced draft, to have a complete tor- ]"iedo outfit, and be armed in the most effective manner,'' According to the circular issued by the Navy Department, one of these was to Ije an ar- mored cruiser, Avith a maximum draught of twenty-two feet, and the other a battle-ship, with a draught of twenty-three feet ; both were to be built of steel, with double bottoms, to have numerous water-tight compartments fitted with powerful pumping apparatus, and to be supplied throughout with perfect drainage and ventilation. A ram bow, twin screws, electric search-lights, torpedo outfit, and a protected steel-annored deck running the whole length of the ship and covering the boilers, engines, and mag- azines, were essentials ; while high power and economy were so equally demanded that, to a maximum maintained speed of seventeen knots when fully equipped, great coal endurance and small fuel consunqjfion were to fie added. In each vessel a space sufficient for two hundred and seventy peo])le, for provisions for three months, and for water for one month, ■was required. The cruiser was to have two-thirds sad-power on two or three masts, each supplied with a mihtary top fitted to mount one or more machine guns. The armament of this ship was to include ten steel breech-loading rifles — four of 10-inch and six of (i-inch calibre — and a sec- ondary battery of four fi-pounders, four 3-pounders, and two 1-pound- ei's, rapid-hre, and four 47-milliraetre and four 37-millimetre revolvino- cannons, all of the Ilotchkiss pattern, together with four GatliniT o-uns. There were to be fitted six torpetlo-tul:)es — one bow, one stern, and two on each side, of which at least one on each side forward -was to be under water. The heavy guns were to load in not less than two positions, and were to l)e protected by at least ten and a half inches of steel armor, properly backed ; the 6-inch guns were to be fitted with shields, and all the guns were to be arranged so as to obtain the greatest horizontal and THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 1.89 vertical fire consistent -^vitli otlier conditions. Any vertical armored protection at tlie water-line was to be at least eleven inches thick in the heaviest part, and thicker, if practicable. The armament of the line-of -battle ship was to consist of two 12-incli and six 6-inch guns, and of a secondary battery which included four 6-inch, six 3-pounder. and two 1-pounder rapid-fire guns ; of foui" 47-mil- limetre and four 3T-niillimetre revolving cannons, and of four Gatlings. The torpedo outfit was similar to that of the cruiser. The plans submitted were opened on April 1st of this year, and not- withstanding the difficulties which the displacement imposed upon the other requirements, no less than thirteen designs were received from ten different competitors. The most important of these were offered by the Thames Iron Sliip Buildmg Company and the Barro\v Ship Building Company, of Great Britain ; by A. II. Grandjean, Esq , of France ; and by Chief Constructor Wilson, Naval Constructor Book, and Lieutenant Chambers, all of the United States navy. The designs were suljmit- ted to a board, and this finally recommended the Barrow plan as best suited for the armored battle ship. So far as the armored cruiser was concerned, the Board reported as follows : " The marked differences in the essential features of the designs of armored cruisers of the Barrow Ship Building Company, Lieutenant W. I. Chambers, A. H. Grandjean, and the Thames Iron Works and Ship Building Company, prevent their classification in the order of merit. Each exhibits features which strong- ly commend themselves, but the Board does not consider it advisable for the government to build a vessel upon any one of these plans." The battle-ship, though designed by one of the most distinguished marine architects in England, has not in its present form received the general approval of experts, for between it and the plan submit- ted by the Bureau of Construction there seem to be differences of mer- its which are strongly in favor of the latter. The dimensions of the new ships are as follows : Barrow Ship. Length between perpendiculars, 290 feet ; on load water-line, 300 feet; extreme breadth, 64 feet 1 inch; mean draught, 23 feet 6 inches ; displacement, 6800 tons. NA^T Department Ship. Length between perpendiculars, 300 feet ; on load water-line, 310 feet; extreme breadth, .58 feet ; mean draught, 22 feet ; displacement, 6600 tons. The striking diiferences between these two ships are found in their relative stability and sea-going qualities. Mr. John, the designer of the Barrow ship, in a paper on " Atlantic Steamers," read before the Institu- tion of Naval Architects July 29, 1886, made the following statements : 190 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. " This question of stability will have to be carefully watched and studied within the next few years, because there is a tendency at present towards a rapid increase in the proportion of beam to length ; and as the draught of water in these large ships is limited, we must l)e careful that in seeking higher speeds with increased beam we do not get too much stability, and so render the vessels heavy rollers and very uncomfortable as passenger-ships. It is possible the future may see vessels of greater beam than any yet afloat in the merchant-service ; but if so, it is almost inevitable that they wdl have to be made higher out of water in oi'der to render them easy and comfortable at sea , Ijut even that has its limits. Perha])s it is well to give an extreme case, and here I will make use of our old friend Tlie Great Eastern. . . . Xow, for the purpose of trading it is quite clear that TJie Great Eastern cannot be loaded much deeper than other ships, while her beam is half as great again ; and the conse- quence is, her stability, as compared with our modern passenger - ships, is so excessive that she is bound to be a tremendous roller among the heavy seas in the Atlantic Her metacentric height, when loaded, was, I believe, stated by the late Mr. Fronde to be as much as 8.7 feet, which is from three to four times as much as is thought sufficient for ships in the ]iresent day, or consistent with their easy behavior at sea." Thus Mr. John himself regards 2.9 feet to 2.2 feet as the proper metacentric height for those steamers, and it is generally considered by modern designers that from 2.5 to 3.2 feet is most suitable for this class of armored ships, and is conducive to easiness of motion in a sea-way. The value of this quality to a ship intended for sea-fighting cannot be overestimated, for upon her steadiness as a gun-platform the aim and efficiency of her guns greatly dejiend. It will be noticed that this ship has exceptionally great beam, that of most ships of her class and displacement, varying from 54 to 59 feet, and judging from tlie sketches which have appeared, her water-line co- efficient is about 0.73. From an approximate calculation based on this assumption it is fomid that her metacentric height will be about six feet. The water-line coefficient may possibly be a httle finer than 0.72, and thus reduce the metacentric height, but if this ship is assumed to have a metacentric height of three feet, her Avater-line coefficient would be 0.62SS, Avhich is an inqKissihUlty, if her coefficient of fineness of displacement be that given in the published dimensions. Such a water- line and coefficient of fineness for 0300 tons ilisplaceraent would pro- duce a perfect rectangle iov a midship section. So that, unless her dimensions are changed, she will surely be a heavy roller, and after THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 191 much sea duty she will suffer such severe strains as to require frequent and costly repairs. The battle-ship designed at the Navy Department has very different qualities, if the dimensions already published be correct. To possess a metacentric height of three feet she Avould require a water-line co- efficient of 0.753, and a midship-section coefficient of 0.89 to 0.90, which is a good proportion for such a vessel. ]Srot only in sea-going qualities does the American design seem to l)e superior, but her l^attery is far more powerful and better disposed in every way, while her speed and endurance are equally as great as the plan recommended. Mr. John has adopted the echelon arrangement of heavy guns, a disposition which both the English and Italian governments have, after long trial, dis- carded in their latest ships. When the first sketches of a design are made, this arrangement of guns is theoretically perfect, as it is supposed to give quite as much power of fire ahead and astern as on each ]:iroad- side ; but when the design is developed and practically tested, it is found that too much of the ship's efficiency in other respects is sacrificed, that the powerful end fire is not attained, and that the broadside is greatly weakened, owing to the obstructed arcs of fire. Besides this, the guns, being placed at some distance from the mid- ship line, have less accurate fire in rolling, and the ship's propensities to roll are encouraged and are greater than would be the case if the guns were placed on the midship line. It is also found that the blast from the heavy guns is destructive to superstructures and other fittings on the upper deck. The Italians, indeed, have placed stout ventilat- ing shafts on their Italia and Lejianto to prevent the rearmost pair of heavj" guns from being trained within twenty degrees of the fore and aft line. This is done so that the blast from these guns will not pros- trate the gunners attending the other pair, notwithstanding the fact that those men are under the armor cover. The Duilio's forward smoke-pipe is placed entirely on the jiort side of the fore and aft line, in order to permit of one pair of turret guns firing ahead. The up])er- deck, 6-inch, central-pivot guns of the A ndrea Doi-la class are now to be placed wholly within the superstructure, in order to be out of danger from the blast of the heavy guns when the latter are fired near the line of keel, and the same change would have to be made with the upper- deck, 6-inch guns in the Barrow design. Similar objections exist to the Bureau of Construction design for an armored cruiser. This vessel, although possessing the bad features inherent in the echelon arrangement of heavy guns, does not have the 192 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. best ideas of the Barrow design, *. e.^ high freeboard, heavy guns mount- ed high above tlie water-line, and commodious quarters for officers and men. Botli designs besides have tlie very objectionable and old-fash- i(jned features of requiring the turrets to be revolved to fixed load- ing positions after being liretl. The Bureau cruiser, it may be said, is not saddled with too nmch metacentric height. She has ten feet less Iteam, her centre of gravity is about one foot lower, and unless her water-line coefficient is very full, she wiU have a metacentric height rather less than what is regarded to be the best. It is not surprising, however, that the Bureau plans are so different in efficiency, for while the better plan, the battle-ship, is original with the Navy Department, the armored cruiser is a copy of, and no suljstan- tial improvement over, that of the Brazilian ship Hiuchuelo designed several years ago. This ship is considered one of the best of her date, but great improvements in ship design have been made within the past fe^v years, and it is against the tendencies of American inventive genius to take a step backward. The general plans of cruisers No. 4 and 5 were pubhshed in the Neio Yorli Herald of June 1st, together with the following data : " They are to be twin-screw cruisers, 310 feet long on the water-line, 49 feet If inches extreme breadth, 18 feet 9 inches mean draught, dis- placing 4083 tons. The}^ are to have machinery of 10,500 indicated horse -power under forced draft. The maximum speed is 19 knots, rig that of a three-masted schooner, s]ireading 5400 square feet of sail. Thev will have a double bottom extending through 129 feet of the length. The framing in this portion is on the bracket system. Before and abaft the double bottom, above the protective deck, Z-bars form the transverse frames. The protective deck, which is nineteen inches alcove the Avater- line amidships, is flat across the top, with sides which slope down to a depth of four feet three inches below the water-line. The horizontal portion is two inches thick, the slope being three inches, reduced at both ends to one and a half inches. It extends uninterruj)te(lly forward and aft, and protects the machinery, magazines, and steering-gear, the ma- cliinery being further defended by the disposition of the coal-bunkers. Tlie main hatches in this deck are protected by armor-bars, and have coffer-dams extending to the upper deck. The guns are carried on the gun, forecastle, and ]ioo]> decks. ^'Armament. — The main battery, Avliich consists of twelve 6-inch breech -loading rifles, all on centre -pivot mounts, with two -inch seg- mental steel shields, is arranged on sponsons so as to obtain the greatest THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 193 possible arc of fire. The forecastle, the poop, and the bridges have been as much as possible availed of to shelter the guns. The two guns for- ward and the two guns aft converge their fire a short distance from the ends of the ship, and the broadside can be concentrated within 100 feet of the side. Four above-water torpedo-tubes are provided on the berth- deck, and two direct ahead under-water torpedoes in the bow. The sec- ondary battery is composed of four 47-millimetre revolvers, four 57-mil- limetre single-shots, two 37-millimetre revolvers, and one short Gatling. The coal capacity is 850 tons. The complement of men 300. . . . " To appreciate what is required to make nineteen knots an hour at sea, we have only to remember that the Umhria and Etruria are 500 feet long, with luore than 12,000 tons displacement and 14,500 indicated horse -power, ordinarily making 18|- and on special occasions 19 knots an hour. Now, to increase her speed to 20 knots an hour, the Umhria would require about 19,500 horse-power, which means 5000 extra horse- power for the extra knot. For a second extra knot would be required about 6000 horse-power more, making about 25,000 horse-power neces- sary to develop a speed of 21 knots." Gun-boats Nos. 3 and 4 are to be copies of gun-boat No. 1. No de- signs for the floating batteries and the torpedo-boat have been pub- lished. The Stiletto is one of the famous Herreshoff boats, and is now being tested in consequence of a favorable report made by a board of officers. On July 23, 1886, with a total displacement of twenty-eight tons, she made an average of 22.12 knots as the mean of four runs over the measured mile in a rough sea and fresh wind, and on July 30th she attained an average of 22.89 knots. These were excellent results for a boat ninety feet in length, and promised that the type, with cer- tain modifications, was equal to greater demands. The trial data of this year have not yet been published, though it is unofficially reported that her performance ^vas equally as creditable. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. F ROM the time of the introduction of cast-iron cannons in 1558 until I comparatively late period, development in naval artillery pro- ceeded at a very slow rate. The security that was attained by the adoption of cast-iron was so great, as compared with the danger attend- ing the use of the more ancient artillery, that the new guns were re- garded as fully su])plying all the demands of a suitable battery. The guns were muzzle-loaders, making the manipulation simple, the pre- vious rude attempts at breech-loading being aban- doned. Tlie numljer of ca ibres that were introduced was very numerous, partly to suit the weight of the batteries to the ships, and partly to accommodate the fancy of the time for plac- ing in dilferent parts of the ships guns vary- ing much in size and destructive effect. The general character of BliOXZE DREECII-LOADING CANNON CAPTUKED IN COREA, AGE UNKNOWN. the l)atteries and the multi])lication of cali bres can best Ije illustrated by noting the armament of two typical ships of the seventeenth century. The Royal Prince, a British ship built in lOlO, carried fifty-five guns. Of these, two were cuiinon-pctronel^OY 2-l:-pounders ; six Avere demi-eannon, medium 32-pounders ; twelve were ciih'criii.'t, IS-pounders, which were nine feet long ; eighteen were (Jenii-culi^crlns, nine-pounders ; thirteen were trdvfs, 5-]iounders, six feet long ; and four were 2x>rt-2>)eces, proba- bly swivels. These guns were disposed as follows: on the lower gun- UNITED STATES NAVAL AUTILLEKY. 195 deck, two 2-t-pounders, six medium 32-poiinders, and twelve IS-pound- ers ; on the upper gun-deck the battery was entirely of y-pounders ; and the forecastle and quarter-deck were armed with 5-pounders, and the bi'ood of smaller pieces which swelled the nominal armament. The Sovereign of the Seas, built in 1(J3T, in the reign of Charles I., was unequalled bj' any ship afloat in her time. She mounted on three gun-decks eighty-six guns. On the lower deck were thirty long 24- pounders and medium 32-pounders; on her middle deck, thirty 12-pound- ers and 9-pounders ; on the upper gun-deck, " other lighter orchiance ;" and on her quarter-deck and forecastle, " numbers of murdering pieces." kAiih tr-<- BRO>fZE BREECHLOADER USED BY COKTEZ IN MEXICO. In the obstinately contested actions between Blake and A^an Tromp in the Cromwellian time, the ships and batteries did not differ in any great degree from those contemporaneous in construction with the Sov- ereiyn of the Seas ; and when we remember the inferior character of the powder used in those days we can account for the duration of some of the engagements between the English and Dutch ships Avhich were sometimes protracted through three days. The brood of " murdering pieces " of small calibre and little energy was, after many years, dispersed by the introduction of carronades — a short cannon of large calibre, which was found to be a convenient sub- stitute for the 8-230unders and 9-pounders on upper decks, and for the " lighter ordnance," which was ineffective ; but this change was brought 196 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. BREECH-LOADER CAPTURED IN THE WAR WITH MEXICO. about slowly, as is seen hy referring to the batteries of some ships which fought at Trafalgar. The Spanish seventy-fours in that action had fifty-eight long 24- pounders on the gun-decks ; on the spar-deck, ten iron 36-pounder car- ronades and four long S-pounders ; and on the poop, six iron 2-l-pounder carronades — total, seventy -eight guns. The Victory, the English flag - ship, mounted on her three gun - decks ninety long 32, 24, and 12 pounders, and on the quarter- deck and forecastle, ten long 12-pound- ers and two 68- pounder carronades. The Santissima Trin idada mounted on the lower gun-deck thirty long 36-pounders ; on the second deck, thirty -two long IS-pounders ; on the third deck thirty- two long 12-pounders ; and on the spar-deck, thirty-two 8-pounders. In the British accounts she is said to have had one hundred and forty guns, w^hicli number must have included swivels mounted for the occasion. At the end of the eighteenth century the 18-pounder was the pre- ferred gun for the main-deck batteries of frigates, guns of larger calibre being found only on the lower decks of lins-of-battle ships. The 18- pounder was the maximum calil^re that was employed on board the ships of the United Colonies of North America in the war of the Revolution. The resources of the colonies did not admit of building ships to contend with vessels fit to take their jilace in line of battle, l)ut such as were constructed were well adapted to resist the small British cruisers, and to capture transports and store-shi])s. The so-called frigates of that day were vessels varying from six hundred to a thousand tons, and, accord- ing to their capacity, carried 12-]iounders or 18-]iounders in the main- deck batteries. There was usually no spar-deck, but the forecastle and quarter-deck, Avhicli were connected by gangways with gratings over the intermediate space, were provided with aii armament of light 6, 9, or 12 pounders. A few carronades came into use during this war. At the conclusion of this war the Colonial fleet disappeared, and it UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 19Y was not until the time of the depredations on tlie growing commerce of the United States by the Algerine corsairs tiiat Congress felt justi- fied in incurring the expense of establishmg a national marine. The ships which were built under the law of 1794 were fully up to the most advanced ideas of the time, and some of these ships carried on their gun-decks a full battery of Sl-pounders, thirty in number, while the oth- ers were armed with 18-pounders on the gun-deck, with spar-deck bat- teries of 9 and 12 pounders, the carronade not having been j-et definitely adopted for spar-deck batteries. It is not until the war of 1812 that Ave find tlie carronade fully es- tablished as the spar-deck armament of frigates. The (JonstitnticDi and the Gxierrih'e carried 32-pounder carronades of very similar weight and power in the place of the long guns of smaller calibre on the spar-deck. The original name of this piece of ordnance Avas the " Smasher," the leading purpose of the inventor, General Melville, of the British artil- lery, being to fire 68-pounder shot with a low charge, thus effecting a greater destruction in a ship's timbers by the increased splintering which this practice was known to produce. Carronades of small calibre were subsequently cast, which were adopted for spar-deck batteries of frigates and line-of -battle ships, and, as they grew in fa- vor, formed the entire battery of sloops-of-war and smaller vessels until about 18-10, when the attention that had been given for some years to the sul:)ject of naval ordnance began to assume tangible shape, and the effort was made to proceed in this matter in accordance with an intelhgent system. The advantage of large calibre was firmly impressed upon those who occupied themselves with the ordnance matters of the navy. As the fleet was developed, the 24-pounder gave way to the 32-pounder, and for the lower-deck battery of line-of-battle ships the 42-pounder Avas intro- 13* BRONZE 13-POUNDEB, "EL NEPTUNO," 1781. 198 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. (Inced. Some 42-pounder carronades were also introdnced as spar-deck batteries for these larger ships. With the disappearance of this class of ship the 4i'-pounder was abandoned, and the 32-pounder was retained as the maximum calilire, different classes being assigned to different sizes of ships. These classes were divided into the gun proper, with 150 pounds of metal to one of shot; the douijle- fortified gun, with 200 pounds of metal to one of shot ; and the medium gun, with 100 pounds of metal to one of shot. The carronade of the same calibre, mounted on a slide, had a proportional weight of 05 pounds of metal to one of shot. U. S. N. CARRONADE, SLIDE, AND CARRIAGE. In the interval between ISIO and 1S45 the double-fortified 32-pound- er was replaced by a gun of the same caliijre of 57 hundred-weight, called the long 82-pounder ; and to suit the capacity of the different classes of sliips then in the service, there were mtroduced the 32-pound- ers of 10 hundred-weight, 12 hundred-weight, and 27 hundred-weight, in addition to tlie regular medium gun of 32 hundred-weight. This pe- riod also marks the introduction of shell guns as part of the battery. To this time no explosive projectiles had been used with cannons properly so called ; their use had been limited to mortars and howitzers. The mortar was originally used for projecting huge balls of stone at high angles. The first practical use made (.)f them for projectino- boml)S was in 1024, but the unwieldy weight of the mortar and its bomli, the latter sometimes exceeding 300 pounds, pi-evented their use in field operations. To provide for this, light mortars were cast, which being mounted on wheels, were denominated howitzers. Frederick the Great of Prussia brought this form of artillery to its highest develop- UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 199 U. S. N. MEDIUM 33-POUNUER. ment for field and siege use, and tlie Continental ])o\vers of Europe adopted it to a large extent for projecting bombs at high angles of fire. The mortar has nev- er had a place in regular naval arma- ments ; it has been used afloat for bom- bardment of cities and fortified positions, but never with a view to contending with ships. The success attending the use of exjilosive projectiles at high ele- vations did not lead at once to their application to horizontal firing from cannons. An important link in the progress of the idea resulted from the effort to avail of the advantage of ricochet firing with Ijombs. In order to effect this, the angle of ele- vation had to be reduced to enalile the bomb to roll along tiie ground. The reduced angle of elevation was still greater than that used for cannon, but the success of the experiment led to the casting by the French of an 8-incli siege howitzer, which, in connection with the development in the manufacture of fuses, made it practical)le to apply the idea of firing shells, like shot, horizontally, and the chief object in view seems to have been to operate against ships. The combining of the elements necessary for the achievement of this important step in naval artillery is by common consent credited to General Paixhan, of the French artillery, who, though not claiming the invention of any of the numerous details involved in the system, succeeded in so judiciously arranging the parts as to make the system practicable by which the whole character of naval armaments was revolutionized. Following the progressive ideas of the age, shell-guns were intro- duced in the United States navy. These were of S-inch calibre, and of weights of 63 hundred-weight and 5.5 hundred-weight. The guns were shaped in accordance with the form adopted liy General Paixhan, and were easily distinguishable in the battery from the ordinary shot-gun. From this circumstance they obtained the title of Paixhan-guns, though there was nothing special in the gun itself to merit an appellation. The whole system was Paixhan's ; the gun was only a part of the system. It required many years to bring the shell-gun into such general ap- 200 MODERN SHIPS OF WAK. plication as to displace the solid-shot gun. The}' were assigned tenta- tively to ships in commission, and in 1853, by a navy regulation, the battery of a frigate was provided -with only ten of these guns, which were collected in one division on the gun-deck. The first vessel in the United States navy Asdiose battery was composed exclusively of shell- guns was the sloop-of-war Portmnoiitli, in 1850. This vessel carried a battery of sixteen 8-inch shell-guns of G3 hundred-weight. These were among tlie first of a new pattern of gun for \vhich the navy is indebted to the skill and study of the late Rear-admiral Dahlgren. The determination of the best form for cannons was a question which had occupied the minds of artillerists for some years. In the older guns the thickness of metal was badly distributed ; it was too uniformly ex- tended along the entire length, not arranged in such proportions as to accord with the differing strains along the bore. Colonel Bumford, of the United States Ordnance, had been among the first to consider this subject, and for many years the results of his experiments had guided construction to a great degree. General Paixhan made a further step in advance by reducing veiy much the thickness of metal along the chase of his guns, but it remained for Hear-admiral Dahlgren to pro- duce the ]ierfection of forni m the gun so widely known bearing his name. In this gun the thickness of metal is proportioned to the effort of the gases in the bore, and all projections and angular changes of form are suppressed, giving to aU parts a curved and rounded surface. The suppression of angular formations on the exterior of a casting has a remarkable effect on the arrangement of the crvstals wliile cooling-. These arrange themselves normal to the cooling waves, which, if enter- ing from directions not radial with the cylindrical casting, produce con- fusion in their arrangement, estaljhshing planes of weakness \vhere the AA'aves meet, which, in case of overstrain on the piece, assist rupture and determine tlie course of the fracture. With the introduction of the Dahlgren shell-gun the transition of tlie artillery of the United States navy may be said to have been com- pleted. The shell-gun of 9-inch and 11-inch calibres followed the S-inch, and ships were armed with such as were a]i]iro]iriate to their capac- ity as rayiidly as the new guns could be manufactured. "When fully equipped, the armament of the United States na\'j' was superior to that of any other navy in the world. The sul>stitution of shells for solid shot marks an important epoch in naval artillery. The ])robable effect of a shot could be predetermined and provided for ; that of a shell was unknown. In order to produce UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 201 serious injury with a shot, it was necessary to perforate tlie side of an enemy. This was not indispensable with a sliell ; Avitli the latter, perfo- ration might be dispensed ^vith, as penetration to such a dei)th as Avoukl give efficacy to the explosion might ]n'ove more destructive to the iiull than would absolute perforation. With the shot, damage Avas done to life i\nd material in detail ; with the shell, if successfully applied, de- struction was threatened to the entire fabric, with all it contained. Naval artillery entered a new ])liase ; the rough appliances of the ])ast would no longer answer all demands. The founder could not alone equij-) the battery ; the laboratory was called into use, and pressed to provide from its devices. The '' new arm " depended upon the successful Avorking of the fuse of the shell, wi,thout which it was but a hollow substitute for a solid shot, and this detail demanded the utmost care in preparation. It was the perfecting of this device which, more than aught else, delayed the general adoption of the ne^v artillery for so long a time after its advantaees had been recoo-nized. U. S. N. 9-INCH DAHLGREN (9-INCH SMOOTH-BOKE). The fuses that were used to explode the ancient boml)s were long wooden plugs, bored cylindrically, and filled with powder condensed by tamping it to a hard consistency. The fuse case projected from the bomb, and to avoid being bent by the shock of discharge, was placed carefully in the axis of hre. Before the discharge of the mortar the fuse was lighted by a match. In applying the fuse to shell-guns fired horizontally, the problem was so to arrange it as to ignite it by the 202 JIODEKN SHIPS OF WAR. flame of discharge, and so to siijiport it in the wall of the shell as to ^irevent any dislocation of the fuse composition, the cracking of which Avould ]iermit tiie ])enetration of the flame into the mass. This was successfully accomplished, and the United States navy fuse was justly famous, one feature of it being a simple Ijut most effective device called a " water-cap," which guai-ded against the injurious introduction of sand or water when the shell was flred en rirochd. The introduction of a safety-plug in the b(jtt(jni of the fuse case, •which recjuired the shock of discharge to displace it in order to open a way of communication be- tween the fuse and the bursting charge in the shell, and the absence of all accidents in manipulation, inspired such confidence that the new arm advanced to favor, and both officers and men ^vere proud to be iden- tified with it. Previous to the introduction of shells there had been in use incen- diary projectiles, not explosive, but intended to set fire to an enemy's vessel. II(_)t shot were applied to this purpose, but the use of these was chiefly confined to shore batteries, where a suitable heating furnace could be conveniently provided. The projectile for this purpose chiefly used from ships was the carcass, which was a shot in which several radial cylindrical holes were formed which were fiUed with powder tamped tedded in the stern-post of the Kearsarge, that vessel might have accompaiaied her antagonist to the bottom of the sea. The gallant attempt of Rear-admiral Lyons with the British wooden fleet before the forts of Sel)astopol is an instance which proved the use- lessness of sulijecting unarmored vessels to the steady tire of fortified positions using shells from their batteries. One other instance of a sea-fiyht can be cited in the engaffement in 1S70 between two Chilian armored vessels and the hghtly armored Peruvian turreted vessel Iluascar. The lliiasear was terribly over- matched during this fight, but at its conclusion her boilers and engines were intact, and indentations on her sides showed that her light armor had deflected a numljer of projectiles; but the effect of the shells that had burst on board of her was apparent in the great destructi(jn of life. The very decisive engagement whicli took place at Lissa in IsfiO, be- tween the Austrian and Italian fleets, should not l>e omitted in alluding to sea-fights of a late ])eriod ; but tliis action can hardly be cpioted as one in which the element of shell-fire can be recognized as the exclu- sive cause of destruction, for the remarkable impetuosity and dash of the attack and the desperate use of the ram produced a crisis which obviated the necessity for continuous l)ombardment with cannon. The necessity of providing a defence against shells was recognized both by England and France during tlie Crimean war, and a protection of armor Avas supplietl to some floating batteries Ijuilt at tliat time which were intended to operate before fortified positions ; and at the conclusion of the war the English built the Wa/n-tor and the Fi^encli built La Gloirc. These were the first specimens of iron-clad ships of war. They were capable of resisting successfully the entrance of shells from guns of the period. It is thus seen that almost coincident with 20i MODERN SHIPS u*' vvak. Hi the general adoption of horizontal shell - firing, naval construction en- tered a new phase, and a new problem was submitted to the naval artillerist. Against an iron-faced target the solid shot might be partially effect- ive, but the impact of the spherical shell was harmless, and the explo- sive effect of the bursting charge enclosed in it would be superficial. This was amply demonstrated in actual practice during our war expe- rience, notably at Mobile Bar, in the engagement with the Confederate iron-clad Tennessee, the roughly constructed armor of which vessel re- sisted a storm of our heaviest shells. The impotency of the spherical shell against armor being recognized by foreign governments, they proceeded to develop the rifled cannon, which with its elongated projectile offered the means of effecting the object of the time — to perforate armor with an explosive projectile. Our authorities, however, persevered in their faith in the smooth-bore, and held that the racliing effect of a spherical projectile of sufficiently large calibre was superior to that produced by the perforation of a rifle projectile of inferior diameter. The 15-inch and 20-inch smooth-bore cannons were cast in accordance with this idea, and the racking side of the question was so obstinately held that the British government im- ported in 18(37 from the United States a 15-inch gun for the purpose of determining by their own experiments what foundation there was for the advantages that were claimed for it. The gun was bought of L f|^jip?lff'::^fMll||Ili 1 HORIZONTAL SECTION OF MILLWALL SHIELD. Charles Alger & Co., of Boston ; it weighed nineteen tons, and threw a cast-iron spherical solid shot of about four hundred and fifty pounds. It was mounted at Shoeburyness, and was fired in competition witli English rifled cannons of 9-inch and l()-inch calibres. The result of the experiments went to show that against a target Avitli a ]>ower of re- sistance inferior to the energy of the projectile the efl'ect of the large spliere at short range is more disastrous than that of the elongated rifle projectile of the same weight ; but that against a target able UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 205 to resist the total energy of both the injury done by tlie ritle pro- jectile is by far the greater. The comparative effect is well shown on a target called the " Millwall Shield," consisting of a plate nine inches in thickness, backed l)y Hughes's hollow stringers — an arrange- ment of target which to the time of tlie experiment had proved in- Adncible. The 15-inch smooth-bore spherical shot rebounded from the target six feet, leaving a 3 -inch indentation on the plate, while the 9-inch rifle projectile, Aveighing two hundred and fifty pounds, made complete penetration of the plate, passing two or three inches into the backing, and the 10-inch rifle projectile, weighing four hundred pounds, penetrated to the rear of the backing itself. It should be mentioned in this connection that the United States government adopted during the war of the rebellion a rifled cannon proposed by Captain Parrott of the West Point Foundery, New Yorlv, of which many were introduced into Ijoth the navy and a,rmy, and did good service as long as the charges of powder were limited in weight ; but when these guns were called upon for work requiring great endur- ance, they proved untrustworthy and dangerous to those who served them. At the naval bombardment of Fort Fisher several of them burst, causing loss of life on board the vessels of Avhich they formed the ar- mament. They were constructed of cast-iron, having a coiled hoop of wrought-iron shrunk around the breech. They have ceased to form a part of our naval armament. During the vears of inaction in the United States that have inter- vened since these experiments, the smooth-bore partisans have had time to reflect and to learn lessons of practical usefulness from observing what has been transpiring abroad. Opportunities have been afforded to note the progress made in armor and artillery, and though the smooth-bore shell is still operative against unarmored vessels, the ad- vantages of the rifled gun under all the circumstances of navy expe- riences have been admitted, and in the transition through which our naval artillery is now passing we are not embarrassed by the presen- tation of views antagonistic to the principles on which it has been determined our new artillery is to be constructed. The system at the basis of our present acts is founded on a comprehensive view of the whole subject, and is intended to provide our ships with a surplus of offensive power over what their capacity for defence might seem to call for. Our navy will possess a certain number of armored vessels for coast defence, and armored sea-cruisers are certain to be included m the list, 206 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. but the more numerous class will be unarmored, and the first problem to be solved is that of providing for these a suitable armament. The work to be done by an unarmored cruiser must be done from a distance when risking an engagement with an armored enemy. The su- periority of armament must compensate for deficiency in defensive power Avhich precludes close quarters. To make these ships effective they must be armed with guns capal)le of doing an extraordinary amount of work, and yet the size of the vessels will not admit of their carrying guns of innnense weight. In order to get this amount of work out of a compar- A KKUPP GUN OS A NAVAL CAKKIAGE, atively light gun, we must secure great initial velocity for the projectile. This can only be done by burning a large charge of powder, which in- volves a long bore in which to burn it, while care is necessary to secure a large margin of strength in the material of which the gun is construct- ed. These essential denuxnds required a radical change in the form and material of our present armament; they also forced a change in the method of construction. The superior fitness for cannons of steel over cast-iron was recognized many years ago, but the diificulty of casting steel in large masses pre- ALFRED KRUPP. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 209 vented the introduction of steel guns, and the generally acce])tal)le treat- ment of cast-iron made it answer satisfactorily the demands for gun-metal not subjected to unusual strains. Mr. Frederick Kruj)]), of Essen, in Germany, was the first steel manufacturer who succeeded in casting steel in large masses, and he produced a num))er of steel guns cast from cruci- bles in solid ingots, which were bored, turned, and fashioned as in the case of cast-iron smooth -Ijore guns. These guns held a position in ad- vance of other manufactures on the score of strength of material. But the introduction of the I'itle system, the call hjr higher velocities, the increased charges of powder, with the consequent increase of strain, en- hanced by the friction attending tlie passage of the projectile forced along the bore, had the effect of calling attention to the 'weakness that was inherent in the method of construction of cannons. It is well known that an explosive force operating in the interior of a hollow cylinder of any thickness is not felt equally throughout the wall of metal ; the parts near the seat of explosion are called upon to do much more work in re- straining the force generated than are the parts more remote. It has been determined that the strain brought upon the portions of the wall is in inverse proportion to the squares of their distances from the seat of effort. Thus, in a gun cast solid, if we take a point two inches from the bore, and another four inches from the bore, the strain felt at those points respectively will be inversely in the proportion of four to sixteen, or, in other words, the metal at two inches from the bore will be strained four times as much as that at the distance of four inches. From this it can be seen that the metal near the seat of effort may be strained beyond its tensile strength, while that more distant is only in partial sympathy with it. Rupture thus originates at the interior portion, and the rest of the wall yields in detail. JSTo additional strength of material can change this relationship l^etween the parts ; they result from a law, and show that this method of construction for a cannon is untrustworthy where the strains approach the tensile strength of the material. The means of providing against this successive rupture of over- strained parts is found in the " budt-up gun," in which an interior tube is surrounded by encircling hoops of metal, which are shrunk on at suf- ficient tension to compress the portions which they enclose. This is the principle of " initial tension," which is the basis of the modern construc- tion of cannons. By adopting this method, an ingot to form a tulje to burn the required amount of powder can be cast of a light weight in comparison with what would be needed for a complete gun, and the strength and number of reinforcing rings to be shrunk around it can be li 210 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. readily determined, proportioned to the kno^yn strain that will be brought upon the bore of the piece. The late developments in the manufacture of steel by the open-hearth ])rocess remove all difficulty to procuring the necessarj' metal in masses siiitaljle for all parts of the heaviest guns. EREECII-LOADING RIFLE-TUBE HEADY FOE RECEIVING JACKET. The built-up steel gun is the one now adopted in Europe by the lead- ing powers, and it is the gun with which the United States navy will be armed ; but, before its final adoption, efforts were made to convert old smooth-bore cast-iron guns into rifles, and to construct new guns partially of steel and partly of ^vrought-iron. As some of these methods of con- version otfered an economical means of acquiring rifled cannons, our naval authorities were led into the error of countenancing the effort to a moderate degree. The system that was adopted was that originally suggested by JMr. P. M. Parsons in England, which was afterwards patented by Major Palliser, E. A., and bears his name. It consisted in enlarging the bore of a cast-iron gun, and inserting a tube of wrought-iron formed of a bar arranged in the form of a coil when heated. The tube was expanded by firing charges of powder, and afterwards rifled. The guns are muz- zle-loaders, and are not increased in length beyond that of the cast- iron gun Avhich forms the casing for the tube. The length is thus limited in order to preserve the preponderance of the ])iece, and because of the want of longitu- dinal strength in the coil, which cannot be depended on beyond a few tons' strain ; the arrange- ment of metal in a coil provides very Avell for circumferential or tano-ential strains, but in the Palliser conversion the loni>-itudinal strength de]3ends on the cast-ircjn casing. The idea of the coiled wrought-iron tulje originated with Professor Treadwell, of Harvard University, in lS-11. He utilized it bj" enclosing a tube of cast-iron or steel in the BREECn LOADING RIFLE-JACKET, ROUGH-BORED AND TURNED. PUTTING THE JACKET ON A 6-INCH BREECH-LOADING PJFLE-TUBE. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY, 213 same manner as it is applied in tlie wrought-iron Armstrong and Wool- "wicli guns. Tlie administration of our naval ordnance has al;)andone<^l conversions, and has concentrated its efiforts on the production of an armament of built-up steel guns. The system of construction that has Ijeen adopted originated in England, but was for many years ignored by the govern- ment authorities. It involved the use of steel in all its parts, and this was charged as an oljjection, as confidence in this metal ^vas not estab- lished in the minds of the English artillerists. That government com- mitted itself entirely to the wrouglit - iron gun proposed l)y Mr. (now Lord) Armstrong, whose system was a reproduction of that success- fully experimented on by Professor Treadwell, and the entire fo]-ce of the government Avorks at Woolwich and of the Armstrong works at Elswick-on-the-Tyne was occupied with the production of this style of ordnance. The English steel gun invented l)y C!aptain Blakely and Mr. J. Vavasseur was ignored in England, Ijut its merit could not be sup- pressed, and its superiority has forced a tardy recognition Ijy that gov- ernment. This gun came prominently^ into notice for a short time at the break- ing out of the war of the rel:)ellion : some guns were imported for the service of the Southern States. At the exhiljition in London m 1802 a Blakely 8.5-inch gun was one of the features of attraction in the depart- ment of oixlnance. The principle of the construction was shown in this gun, consisting in shrinking a long jacket of steel around an enclosed steel tube, tlie jacket extending to the trunnions. Mr. A^avasseur Avas the manager of the London Ordnance Works, and was associated with Captain Blakely in the manufacture of his earlier guns, but the entire business soon fell into the hands of Mr. Vavasseur, whose name alone is associated with the succeeding developments of the gun. In 1862 the guns manufactured l>y Mr. Krupp were solid forgings. He advanced Irat slowly towards the construction of built-up cannons, and it was not until the failure of some of his solid-cast guns that he entered on the built-up system. His first steps were to strengthen the rear portion of new guns by shrinking ou hoops, and to increase the strength of old guns he turned down the breech and shrunk on hoops. He confined this system of strengthening to the rear of the trunnions until he was reminded of the necessity of strength along the chase of the gun Ijy the blowing off of the chase of some 11-inch guns of his manufacture. His system was then modified so as to involve reinforcing the tube of the larger calibred guns along its whole length with hoops, 14* 214 MODERN SHIPS v/x „ ^^v. and his later and largest productions are provided with a long jacket re- inforcing the entire breech portion of the tube — a virtual ad(.)ption of the great element of strengtli which has always formed the essential feature in the A'avasseur gun which is now adopted in the United States nav}'. In the building up of the steel gun for the navy advantage is so taken of the elastic characteristic of the metal that all parts tend to mutual support. The gun proper consists of a steel tube and a steel jacket shrunk around it, reaching from the breech to and beyond the location of the trunnion-band. Outside the jacket and along the chase of the gun there are shrunk on such hoops as the kno\vn strain on the tube may make necessary for its su})port. The tube is formed from a casting which IS forged, rough-bored, and turned, and then tempered in oil, by which its elasticity and tensile strength are much increased. It is then turned on the exterior, and adjusted to the jacket, the proper difference being allowed for shrinkage. The jacket, previously turned and tem- pered, is then heated, and rapidly lo^vered to its place. The front hoops iiiiJijiteEwy BKEECH-LOADISG RIFLE AFTEK KECEn'ING JACKET. over the chase are then put on, and the gun is put into a lathe and turned to receive the trunnion-ljand and rear and front hoops. The gun is then fine-bored and rifled. Each part, as successively placed in position, is expected to compress the parts enclosed through the initial tension due to contraction in cool- ing. This tension is the greater the farther the part is rennived from the tube ; thus the jacket is shrunk on at a less tension than are the encir- cling hoops. By tiiis means full use is made of the elastic capacitv of the tul)e which contributes the first resistance to the expanding influ- ence of the charge. The tension of the jacket prevents the tube bemg forced up to its elastic limit, and it in turn experiences the effect of the tension of the other encircling parts which contribute to the general sup- port ; thus no part is strained Ijeyond its elastic limit, and on the cessa- tion of the pressure all resume their normal form and dimensions. A comparison of this method of C(jmmon and nuitual su]iport of parts with that given l)y the wall of a gun cast solid will serve to demonstrate the superior strength of the construction. In order to achieve this intimate A KRUPP HAMMER. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 217 TKANSPOKTING CANNON AT BREMEEHAVEN. ■n'orking of all the parts it is necessary that the metal of which they are respectively composed must be possessed of tlie same essential charac- teristics ; in a word, the gun must be homogeneous. It was tlie aljsence of this feature in the Armstrong gun whicli has caused its abolition. This gun was Ijuilt up, and the parts were expected to contril)ute mutual support, l^ut the want of homogeneity between the steel tulie and the encircling hoops of wrought-iron made it nnpossilile for them to work in accord, in consequence of the different elastic properties of the two metals, which, after fi^equent discharges, resulted in a separation of sur- faces between the tube and hoops, when the tube cracked from want of support. In the construction of the guns for the United States navy, as in the 218 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. ne\Y steel guns now being nianiifactured in England, the theory of the l)uih-aj) system is ])ractically conformed to ; more so than by Krupp or the Frencli artillerists, who use a thicker tube than is considered judi- cious at Woolwich or at the Washington navy -yard. Any increase of thickness of the tube beyond what is necessary to receive the initial pressure of the charge is open to the objections made to the gun with a solid wall, the proportion of the strain communicated to the hoops is retluced, and ru})ture may ensue from overstraining the tube. The thicker the tube, the less appreciable must be the compression induced by the tension of the encircling hoops. BREECH-LOADING RIFLE .\FTER EECEIVING JACKET AND CHASE HOOPS. The gun is a breech-loader. The system adopted for closing the breech is an American invention (see note, p. 257), l)ut having been em- ployed in France from the earliest experimental period, it is known as the French fei'iueture. A screw is cut in the rear end of the jacket to the rear of the tube, and a corresponding screw is cut upon a l)reech- plug. The screw threads are stripped at three equidistant places, the screw and plane surfaces alternating, thus form- ing what is called an "interrupted" or "slotted" screw. The screw portions of the breech -plug enter freely al(.)ng the plane longitudinal surfaces cut in * the tube, and being then turned one- sixth of its cir- BUEECH LOADING RII I T ^^^.nl JACKET, CHASE HOOPS, AND JACKET HOOPS IN PLACE. cumference, the screw of the plug locks in that of the tube, and the breech is closed. The success of this system of U. S. N. 6 INCH BREECH-LOADINO RIFLE. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 219 breech mechanism was not so pronounced on its introduction as it is to-day. The plug forms the base of the l)reech of the gun, and all the effort of the gases to blow out the breech is exerted at this point. The impact upon the end of the plug is very severe, and has a tendency to itpset the metal, thereby increasing the diameter of the plug, which "w^ould prevent its removal after the discharge of the jnece. With quick-burning powder, as was generally in use for cannons at the incep- tion of the breech-loading experiments, this result ensued if the charges of powder were carried above a certain limit, and the consequent re- striction that was put upon velocities was a serious obstacle to the adoption of the system ; but the progress that has been made of late years in the science of gunpowder manufacture has relieved the sub- ject from this embarrassment, j^owder being now provided which communicates very high velocities while developing pressures so mod- erate and regular as to be entirely under the control of the artil- lerist. The original guns, four in number, constructed with breech mechan- ism on the Yvencli fermeture principle for the British government dur- ing the Crimean war are now in the " Graveyard " at Woolwich Ar- senal. The projectiles for the new armament are of two kinds ; both, how- ever, are shells. That for ordinary use against unarmored vessels is styled the common shell, and is of cast-iron. The length bears a uni- form proportion to the gun, being in all cases thi'ee and a half calibres. The armor-])iercing shell is made of forged steel, and is three calibres in length. The following table gives the particulars, approximately, of the common shell : GfN. J.ei]gth. Wcipht. JUirsting Charge, Inches. Calilire. Pouri'lh. Poimde. 5 inr-li breccli-loiiding rifle. . . . 17.97 3,59 60 2 6-iiicli breech-loiidini? lifle. . . . 20.90 3,48 100 4 8-iucli liieeeh-loiuiing lifle. . . . 28.10 3,51 250 12 10-incli breecli-loading rifle. . . . 35,00 3.50 500 22 12 incli l)reecli-li)!idiiii;: rifle. . . . 42.00 3,50 850 38 16 iiicli breccli-luiuling rifle. . . . .56.00 3.. 50 2000 90 The armor-piercing shell of the same weight is reduced in length, and its walls are thicker; the bursting charge is consequently much reduced. The following are the particulars, approximately deter- mined : 220 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. (U-y. Length. WL-ifht. Pounds. 60 100 250 500 850 2000 Bur^Jting Cbiirge. Oi to o ase of the projectile. The uniform windage for all calibres is M inch ; thus, taking the 6-inch gun as an example, the diameter of the Ijore across the lands is 6 inches, the diame- ter of the shell is 5.9G inches, the depth of the grooves is .05 inch ; thus the diameter of the bore across the grooves is 6.10 inches. In order to per- CAKTRIDGE CASE AND GRAINS OF POWDER, IT. 8. N, ■'^■"'' ^^^ lOiaXmg llUg tO fill the grooves, it must have a diameter of 6.14 inches; this causes a stjueeze of .05 inch be- tween the lands and the rotating ring. There is no subject in the development of the new naval artillery more important than the powder. That used with the old artillery is entirely unsuited to the new conditiona that obtain in the modern high-power guns. A brown powder, introduced first in Germany, has exhibited de- cided advantages over all others, and the efforts to reproduce it have Ijeen thoroughly /\ COMMON SHELLS, U. S. N. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 221 successful at the Du Pont Mills. It is generally knf)wn as "cocoa" powder. Its peculiarity exists in the method of pi-eparing the chai'coal ; this affects the color, and results in a l)rown instead of a black powder. AVith this powder, experiments with the (3-inch gun give a muzzle veloc- ity of over 2(»0U feet per second with a projectile of 10() pounds, using charges of 50 pounds, and this result is obtained with less than 15 tons pressure per square inch in the powder chamber. The grain is pris- matic, with a central perforation, and as regards its rate of burning, is under complete control in the manufacture ; 1;he form provides an in- creasing surface for the flame during the period of comljustion, thus relieving the gun from abnormal pressures at the moment of ignition, but continuing the extreme pressure farther along tJie bore. The pro- gressive nature of the combusti(ni is very apparent Avhen comjuiring an unburned grain with others partially consumed, blo^v n out from the gun. The gun-carriage, which is a separate study in itself, is carried ta(ting lifle.. 425 R.'JO 2tnO 25,0S5 27.0 out 44 tons 14 inch sleel bi-cech-li adiiii^ rifle 6T5 IS.M) 2100 4I,2T0 3-2.2 550 75 tuns 16- inch sleel breech-U acting rifle.. 1000 2000 2100 61,114 3G.S 5T1 107 tons This energy, total energy, expresses the work that the gun can per- form. It is expressed in foot-tons, and signifies that the energy devel- oped is sufficient to raise the weight in tons to a height of one foot. Thus the projectile from the small 5-inch gun, weighing sixty pounds, fired with a charge of thirty pounds of powder, leaves the gun with an energy capable of lifting 1525 tons to the height of one foot ! Compar- ing this with the energy developed by the 100-ton hammer at the forge of Le Creuzot in France, the energy of which is 1610 foot-tons, Ave have a most striking illustration of the power of gunpowder, and the testi- mony in the table as to the energy developed per ton of gun more for- cibly exhibits the perfection of a manufacture which, Avith so little Aveight of gun, can develop such gigantic poAver. 222 MODERJf SHIPS OF AVAR. It is this power, united with a moderate weight of gun, which will enaljle our unarmored cruisers to hold their own with vessels moderately armored. The power of the battery is greater than is required to con- tend witli unarmored ships, there is a great surplus of power of offence. '■■.iii!,:S:klljIili,lliiil;»;i;& 4m ^•■C»«,i»;'i tINBURNED AND PARTIALLY CONSUMED GBAINS OF TJ. S. N. PO^YDER. and the effort is very properly made to sustain this at the highest prac- ticable point. Tlie table shows that the 5-inch gun can perforate 10.7 inches of wrought-iron at tlie muzzle ; but the results given in tallies are based on deliberate firing made on a practice -ground, with the posi- tion of the target nornud to the line of fire. Such conditions cannot obtain during an action at sea, for, besides the modified effect caused by increased distance of target, it must be liorne in mind that the side of an enemy's ship will be presented at varying angles, which introduces the element of deflection, than which no cause is more detrimental to penetration. Tliough the table states a fact, the practical effect of the projectile will be far less than is stated, hence the wisdom of providing a large surplus of power to compensate for the resistance to its oper- ation. li, L/i,^A »■ 7i,it /JIO . kJ^l^T^ SECTION OP U. S. N. 6-INCII BUILT-UP STEEL BREECH-LOADING RIFLE. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 223 It ^yi^ readily be conceded that the artillerist has a very responsil)le duty to pertoriu in so designing his gun that the ])arts shall lock and in- terlock to guard against chance of dislocation in the structure. A study of the illustration of the 6-inch built-up gun as constructed at the Wash- ington navy-yard \\'ill s]io\\' the system tliere ado})ted. In the list of guns each calibre is represented by one gun. We have not, as of old, several guns of the same calibre differing in weight ; multiplicity of classes will be avoided ; l)ut this Avill apply only to the main battery, for history is singularly repeating itself at this time in the restoration of the " murdering pieces " which have been cited as form- ing part of naval armaments in the seventeenth century. The needful- ness of machine guns for operating against men on open decks, for effecting entrance through port-holes, for repelling attacks in boats, and BROADSIDE CARRIAGE FOR 6-IKCII BRKECII-LOADIKG RIFLE. for resisting the a]")proach of torpedo-lwats, is so widely recognized that no vessel of Avar is considered properly ecpiipped without a secondary battery of these " murdering pieces." They are mounted on the rail, on platforms projecting from the sides and in the tops. The types adopted in the United States navy are the Hotchkiss revolving cannon and rapid-firing single-shot gims, and the smaller calibre machine guns of Gatling. Tlie heavier pieces, throwing shells of six pounds weight, are very effective against vessels of ordinary scantling. In contemplating the present condition of our new naval armament Ave have the consolation of knowing that, so far as concerns the study of the subject generally and in detail, the designs, and the initial manu- facture all has been done that could have been done with the resources 224 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. availal)le. What has been achieved has been without the facihties that are i^rovided in modern gun factories ; but notwithstanding all the drawbacks, it is jiroliably safe to assert that no guns in the world to- da}^ are superior to those that have been fabricated at the Washington navy-yard of steel on the new adopted pattern. The work at this ord- nance yard is carried on without ostentation ; there is no flourish of trumpets accompanying its operations ; it is not advertised, and the peo- ple do not yet know how much they owe to the ordnance officers of the RAPID-FIRING SINGLE-SHOT HOTCHKISS GUN. navy for the initiation of this new industry, Avhich enables us to assert our ability to advance in this manufacture through the incontrovertible proof of work accomplished. The results are meagre in quantity, and at the present rate of manufacture it will require many years to equip our fleet with modern artillery ; this should be remedied, as there is now no doubt as to the success of the productions of this establishment. The plant should be enlarged on a lil^eral and well-matured plan, and the work should l)e encouraged by generous appropriations. It may not be generally known that the steel forgings required for the few 8-inch and the two 10-inch guns now in hand were imported from abroad, for the reason that they could not be furnished of domestic man- ufacture, from the want of casting and forging facilities in the United States for work of such magnitude. This was a deficiency in our resources that required prompt attenti(jn to secure us a jiosition of independence in this important matter. The method of achieving the object was care- fully studied out by a mixed board of army and navy officers, and pre- sented in a tlocument known as the " (lun Foundery Board Report," and tlie subject received the attention of committees from both Houses of Congress. All of these reports virtually agreed as to the method, but UNITED STATES NAVAL AETILLEKY. 225 there was a useless delay in action ; large expenditures of money were required, and there was hesitancy in assuming the responsibility of rec- ommending it. The ol)ject Avas of national importance, however, and public opinion demanded its accomplishment. The officers of the navy have proved their ability to carry on the work successfully ; and if the opportunity be given they will establish the artillery (jf the United States navy in a position of which the country may again be proud. 15 NOTES. GUNS. THE United States no longer depend upon foreigners for gnns or armor, inasmuch as the circular issued in August, 1SS6, by the Navy Department inviting all domestic steel manufacturers to state the terms upon which tliey were willing to produce the steel plates and forgings recjuired for ships and ordnance, has met with a prompt response. Aljout 4500 tons were needed for armor, in plates varying from 20 feet hy S feet by 12 inches thick, to 11. r; feet by 4.3 feet by (3 inches thick ; and of the 1310 tons of steel forgings, 328 tons were intended for the tl-inch guns, TO tons for the 8-inch, and 912 tons for the calibres between 10 anil 12 inches, both inclusive. The rough -bored and turned forgings recpiired by the contract were to weigh 3^- tons for the 0-incli calibres, 5 tons for the 8-iiich, \)i tons for the KJ-inch, Of tons for the lOi-inch, and 12i tons for the 12-incli. From the time of closing the contract twenty-eight 6-inch forgings were to be delivered in one year, and the remainder within eighteen months. All the 8-inch were to Ije ready w^ithin Uvo years, and the 10-inch and larger cahljres within two jeavs and a half. The proposals opened on the 22d of last March showed that for the gun-forgings the Cambria Iron Company had bid $851,513, the Midvale Steel Company !t;l,3tt7,240, and the Bethlehem Iron Com- pany $l_t(.t2,23(» ; and that for the armor-iilatcs the Bethlehem Company had bid -$3,610,707, and the Cleveland Rolling-mill Company §;4,021,561. Subsequently the Navy Department awarded the contract to the Beth- lehem Company, wliich agreed to furnish aU the recpiired steel at a total cost of $4,512,!_t38.21». The tests are so rigorous that a liigli quality of steel is sure to be produced. The specificatious require the forgings to be of open-hearth steel of domestic manufacture, from the best quality of raw material, uniform in quality throughout the mass of each forging and throughout the Avhole order for forgings of tlie same calibre, and free from slag, seams, cracks, cavities, flaws, blow-holes, unsoundness, forei^'u substances. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 227 and all other defects affecting their resistance and value. While it is prescribed that the ingots sliall be cast solid, latitude is given to the method of production ; but no matter what method may be employed, the part to Ije delivered for test and accejrtance must be equal in quality and in all other respects to a gun ingot cast solid in the usual way, from which at least 30 per cent, of the weight of the ingot has been discarded from the up])er end and 5 per cent, from the lower end. For breech-pieces each ingot must be reduced in diameter by forging at least 40 per cent.; in case tubes are forged upon a mandrel from bored ingots, the walls must be reduced in thickness by forging at least 50 per cent. Forgings are to be annealed, oil tempered under such con- ditions as wiU assure their resistance and again annealed, and no piece will be accepted unless the last process has been an annealing one. The forging must be left with a uniformly line grain. All these excellent results are the direct outcomes of the report made in 188i by the Ordnance ]3oard. 1st. That the army and navy should each have its own gun-factory ; 2d. That the parts should be shipped by the steel-makers ready for finishing and assembling in guns; 3d. That the government should not undertake the production of steel of its own accord ; 4th. That the Watervliet Arsenal, West Troy, N. Y., should be the site of the army gun-factory ; and 5th. That the Wash- ington navy-yard should be the site of the navy gun-factory. JSTo ac- tion was taken upon the recommendation to establish gun - factories ; but at the first session of the Forty-ninth Congress an appropriation of $1,000,000 was made for the armament of the navy, of which sum so much as the Secretary determined might be emplo^'ed for the creation of a plant. Under this permission the gun-factory at the Washington navy-yard is now being estabUshed. The construction of the breech-loading steel guns for the new cruis- ers has been energetically pushed. Slight modifications in the original designs were made necessary by the adoption of slower burning powder, which carried the pressure still farther for^vard in the bore, and, in the case of some foreign guns, caused their destruction. Though our guns have not suffered from any such accident, it has been deemed a wise precaution to give the 8-mch guns of the Atlanta two additional chase- hoops, and to hoop all other pieces of this calibre to the muzzle. From a memorandum kindly furnished ny Lieutenant Bradbury, United States navy, it is learned tliat the number and calibre of the new guns now finished, under construction, or projected, are as fol- lo^\^s : 228 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. Name of Ship. 6-iDch. None. 3 None. Calibre. Dolphin li-incii. 1 6 G 8 6 4 13 6 6 None. 6 6 13 24§ None. 8-inch. None. 2 9 4 None. 2 None. lO-incb. None. 2 4 4 \ 4 4 None. None. 3 None. 8§ Atlanta* Boston* ... Cliicagof . . Gun-boat No. If Gun-boat No. 2 Newark Charleston Miantonomoh Terror Aniphitrite . . . Armored cruiser Armored battle-ship^. . . 2 Gun-boats 2 Cruisers Floating batteries This gives a total of two 5-inch, one hundred and three 6-inch, ten 8-inch, twent3'-six 10-iiich, and ten 12-inch. In his last report, Captain Sicard, Chief of Ordnance, states that " for the new ships approaching completion we have eighteen 6-inch, three 8-inch, and two 5-inch guns finished, and three 6-inch and five 8-inch well advanced, together with all the carriages for the Atlanta and Boston, and all for the CJiieago, except the 8-incli. . . . With brown powder the foUowinsr are the best results obtained in the 6-inch and S-inch guns. Gun. Powder. Muzzle VeloclLy, Pressure. 6-inch . . . American Browu. Westphnlian Brown. Foot eeooTi.Js. 2,105 2.013 Tons. 15.6 15.5 8 inch " It will be observed," he adds, " that the muzzle velocities are as high, while the chamber pressures are considerably below those which the guns were calculated to support in service." During the preliminary trials afloat of the Atlanta's battery in July, a few minor faults were unfairly given an importance by the newspa- pers which led the country to believe that the ship and her armament were useless. Unfriendly critics vented their spite and aired their igno- rance in condemnations which included all who had had anj^thing to do, * Complete. t Building at South Boston and West Point. X It is probable that the battery of the battle-ship will be two 6-inch, two 10-inch, and two 13-inch guns. § Probably. UNITED STxiTES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 229 even in the remotest degree, with tlie design and construction of vessel and gnn. Indeed, so bitter and persistent were they that for a time it seemed ahnost hopeless to expect any further good could come out of the Nazareth of public opinion. It -was not a question of politics, for the journalists of every political faith ran amuck riotously upon the sub- ject ; nor was it a matter of morals, where, through intelligent discus- sion, better things could be attained, for with brilliant misinformation and dogmatic dulness each scribe stuck his pin -feathered goose -quill into the navy's midriff — it being such an easy, such a safe thing to do — and then thanked Heaven he was a virtuous citizen. Finally, a board was appointed to inspect the ship and liattery, and after a thorough examination it made the following report : " In obedience to the Department's order of the 22d instant, the Board convened on board the Atlanta, Newport, Rhode Island, on the 25tli instant (July, 1S87), and made a careful examination of the ship, guns, carriages, and fittings, and of the damage sustained during the re- cent target practice, as reported by the Ijoard of officers ordered Ijy the commanding officer of the Atlanta. The Board proceeded to sea on the morning of the 25th instant, but were prevented from firing the guns by a heavy fog Avhich prevailed throughout the day. The ship was again taken to sea on the morning' of the 27th instant, and the guns were fired. No deficiencies were noted in the guns themselves other than a slight sticking of the breech-plug in 6-inch breech-loading rifle No. 5 (this disappeared during the firing), some difficulty in the man- agement of the lock of 6-incli In'eech-loading rifle No. 4, caused by slight upsetting of the firing-pin, and the bending of the extractor in 6-pounder rapid-fire No. 5. " The recoil and counter-recoil of the 8 and 6 inch guns were easy and satisfactory, except at the second fire of the 8-inch breech-loading rifle No. 1, when the gun remained in. (This was readil}^ run out with a tackle.) The action of the carriage of 8-inch l^reech-loading rifle No. 1 at the first fire was due to want of strength in the clips and clip cir- cles, and at the second fire to want of sufficient bearing and securing of the deck socket. It is believed tliat had the deck socket held, the car- riage would not have been disabled by the giving waj" of the clips. The training gear, steam and band, was uninjured ; the gun was readily trained when run out to place. The action of the after (3-inch shifting gun No. 4 was satisfactory, notwithstanding that the front clips had a play of half an inch. The action of the broadside carriages of 6-inch guns Nos. 5 and 18 was satisfactory, except the breaking of clips, the 230 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. starting of the copper rivets in tlie clip circles, and the wood screws in the training circles. " It is believed from the action of the carriage of G-inch breech-load- ing rifle No. 5, when the clips were removed, that the carriages can be safely used without clips. The clips, however, give additional security and steadiness to the carriage, and assist the pivot and socket in bearing the sliock of the discharge. The firing of the C-pounder rapid-fire guns developed a weakness in one leg of the cage mount of Xo. 4, due to im- perfect workmanship, and showed also the necessity of locking nuts on the bolts that secure the mounts to the ports. The tower mounts of the 3-pounder rapid-fire guns are unsatisfactory. Tliey cannot lie moved with facility ; the line of sight of the gun is obstructed at ranges be_yond IGOO yards, and the guns cannot be safely used as now fitted. For this reason 3-pounder rapid-fire No. 3 was not fired. The tripod mounts of the 1-pounder rapid-fire guns need stronger holding -down arrangements. The tower mounts of the -fT-millimetre revolving cannon are like those of the 3-pounder rapid-fire guns, and have the same defects. The mounts of the 37-millimetre in the tops are satisfactory. " Careful observation of the effect of the firing upon the hull of the vessel failed to develop any damage other than the breaking of the cast- steel port-sills a-nd the starting of some light Avood-work. The shock of discharge was slight on the berth-deck, and observers there were unaljle to oljserve which 0-inch gun had ijeen fired. The deck, hull, and fittings, with the exception of the port-sills, hinges to superstructure doors and vegetable lockers, and some of the light wood-work, have every appear- ance of strength and aljility to endure the strain of continuous firing of the guns. The lilast of the forward S-incli gun, when fired aliaft the star- board beam, will not permit the crews of the starlioard 3-pounder rapid fire and l-ixjunder rapid fire to remain at their guns. AYhen the after 8-inch gun is fired forward of the port beam, tlie creAvs of the after it-mil- limetre revolving cannon and (jf the port after 1-pounder rapid fire cannot remain at their guns. "When the forward G-inch shifting gun is fired on the ]iort bow or directly ahead, the crew of forward S-inch gun cannot remain at their places. When the after G-inch shifting gun is fired on the starboard quarter or directly aft, the crew of the after S-inch gun cannot remain at their gun. The inability to fire parts of the secondary battery under certain conditions is due to the great arc of fire given to the S-inch iruus. This can hardly be called a defect. It is thoue-ht that a screen can Ije ])laced between the 8 and 6 inch guns which Avill enable theiu to be worked together forward or aft. UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 231 " The pivot socket of the 8-incli carriage should have a l)roader bear- ing surface, and should be rigidly bolted to the steel deck and to the framework of the ship in such manner as to distriliute the strain over a krger area. The clips and clip circles of the S-inch and O-inch carriage should be made of steel. The clips should have larger bearing surfaces, and should lie shaped to fit the circle. The circle should have double flanges, and be bolted (not rivetedj on each flange to the steel deck. There should be no appreciable play between the clips and the circles. All bolts used in the battery fittings should have the nuts locked. "The clip rail of the tower mount should be altered to fit the mount. This change will make the compressors effective, and allow the guns to be useil with safety. The port-sills should be replaced by heav- ier sills, made of the best quality of malleable cast-steel. The plan of testing the hull, guns, and fittings of the Atlanta arranged hy the Board contemplated a more extended use of the main battery, l)ut the weak- ness developed in the port-sills and in the sockets of the 8-inch carriages rendered further firing inadvisable." Whatever conclusion may be drawn from this report, there is one fact which may serve as an important corollary. In the latest drills of the ships on the North Atlantic stiiimxi, the Atlanta won the champion pennant for the best gunnery practice, and this with guns and carriages which -were said to be completely disabled. The safe employment of high explosives for war purposes is looked upon by many as a solution of certain vexed ju'oblems, and much time and money have been given to the subject. From the nitro-glycerine products there has been a loudly heralded advance to melinite and robo- rite, of which the great things expected have not yet been realized. Among the most promising attempts to use dynamite in a projectile is that made with the pneumatic gun, perfected by Lieutenant Zalinski, of the U. S. Artillery, who has courteously furnished the following descrip- tion of the system : " The pneumatic dynamite torpedo gun is a weapon which has been evolved for the purpose of projecting with safety and accuracy very large charges of the high explosives. While a gun in name and form, it is practically a torpedo -projecting machine, the propelling force used being compressed air. The use of the compressed air gives uniformity and complete control of pressures and total absence of heat. This in- sures entire ?bsence of violent initial shocks from the propelling force ; it also eliminates danger of increasing the normal sensitiveness of the high explosives by heating while resting in the bore of the gun. TIae 232 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. ability to reproduce, time after time, absolutely the same pressure neces- sarily carries with it great accuracy of fire. The torpedo shell thrown by the gun is essentially arrow-like, and is very light and compact com- pared to the weiglit of charge thrown. This is a matter of no little im- portance on shipboard, as a very much larger number can therefore be caii'ied for a given weight and storage room. The torpedoes jirojected by this machine have a tAvofold field of action when acting against ships : first, the over-water hull, second, the under-water hull. " The shell is exploded liy an electrical fuse. This is brought into ac- tion if striking the over-water hull an instant Itefore full impact. If the shell misses tlie over-water hull and enters the water, explosion is pro- duced afte)' the shell is thoroughly buried, thus obtaining the fullest tamjiing effect of the water. The delayed action of the fuse can be con- trolled so as to cause the shell to go to the bottom befoi'e explosion en- sues. This is needed at times when the torpedo shell is used for counter- mining a system of submerged stationary torpedo defences. "Experiments against iron plates have shown that it is essential to have the initial point of explosion at the rear of the shell. When explo- sion takes place by simple impact from the front end, the injury to the plates is actually less than when a blank shell is used. " For these reasons the fuse has been arranged so that the initial point of explosion is at the rear of the shell. Xo attempt has been made to make a shell which can perforate armor l:)efore explosion. To do so would involve thickening the walls to such an extent as to mate- rially reduce the weight of the charge carried. Besides that, it is very doubtful whether a shell fully charged with gunpowder can perforate any considerable thickness of armor without previously exploding its bursting charge. IMuch more will tliis lie the case where the bursting charge is one of the moi'e sensitive high explosives. " The ]ineumatic torpedo-gun system has various fields of usefulness as an auxiliary ^var ap])liance. Among these are the following : " 1st. On swift-moving torpedo-lioats ; 2d. On larger war-vessels, for general use and for defence against surface and submarine torpedo-boats ; 3d. In land defences ; 4tli. For use in tlie approaches during land sieges. " Toi'pedo-boats carrying the pneumatic guns can commence effective operations at the range of at least one mile, as com])ared to not more than three hundi'ed yards of the boats carrying the ^Whitehead torpe- does. Their torpedo shell cannot be stopped by netting, as is the case with the latter. The chai'ges which can be thrown are also much greater. The guns to be carried on the pneumatic dynanute gun cruiser UNITED STATES NAVAL AETILLEKY. 233 now building for the United States government will throw shell charged with 200 and 400 pounds of explosive gelatine. These guns can be tired at the rate of one in two minutes, and indeed even more rapidly if required. " In the defence of a man-of-war no other means can as effectually stop the advance either of submarine boats or submerged moval)le tor- pedoes. This is due to the ability to explode the large charges when the shells are well submerged. Their radius of action \\-ill be so great as to avoid the necessity of making absolute hits. The chances of stop- ping the attack are thereby very much increased. " A tube of large calibre can be fixed in the bow, so as to Ije of use when advancing to the attack with the ram. An 18-inch shell, con- taining 1000 pounds of explosive gelatine, can be thrown 500 yards in advance of the ship, and that, too, without danger of running into the explosion of its own petard, as "would be the case in ejecting directly ahead ordinary torpedoes. This will be made more clear by the state- ment of the relative speed of the two classes. The pneumatic gun tor- pedo has a mean velocity of 400 knots for a range of one mile, as compared to 25 knots for a range of 200 yards of the Whitehead tor- pedo. Furthermore, there is no danger of the shell turning back, as is sometimes the case with the latter. " The opportunities of making an effective hit will be much greater with the torpedo shell than with the ram ; it will be easier to point the vessel fairly at the enemy's broadside when at the range of five hundred yards than to bring the ram in absolute contact with the enem3?'s side. The gun-tubes used are very thin (not exceeding three-Cjuarters of an inch in thickness), and ma}^ be of sections of any convenient length. The other portions of the supporting truss, reservoirs, etc., are also of comparatively light weight. They could be of large calibres, and the destructive effects producible by large charges of high explosives ^vill doubtless have a demoralizing effect upon the defence." Upon September 20th of this year a public trial was successfully made with the gun, the target being the condemned coast survey schooner SilUman. After firing two shots to verify the range, the gun was loaded with a projectile which was five and a half feet in length, contained fifty -five pounds of explosive gelatine, and was fired under an air pressure of 607 pounds. The torpedo rushed from the muzzle of the tube with a loud report ; in thirteen seconds it plunged into the water close under the starboard quarter of the SilUman, and exploding almost instantly, threw a great volume of water one hundred and fifty feet into the air. 23-4 MODERN snir.s of war. For a moment the schooner was hidden from view, Ijut when the mist cleared away it -was fonnd that her main-mast had toppled over the side. At a distance this seemed to be all the damage inilicted, but a closer inspection showed that all the wood-ends on deck had been loos- ened, that the cabin fittings had been thoroughly shaken up, and that water was running into the hold. Soon afterwards a fourth shot was fired. This landed very close to the starl)oard side of the vessel, and on explosion seemed to lift the tSllIhnan out of the water. The hull was very badly shattered ; the water-tank, which had been firmly fastened to the schooner's bottom, was blown up through the deck and floated on the wreckage, and the stump of the main-mast was capsized. The bow was held aljove water by barrel Inioys, and the fore- mast, which had heeled over to an angle of forty-five degrees, was sus- tained bj' the steel rigging that had Ijecome entangled in the pieces of wood floatiuii' to windward. MACHINE AND RAPID -FIEE GUNS. ()¥ the machine guns, the Gatling, Gardner, Nordenfeldt, and ]\Iaxim systems are the best known. The adoption of the Accles feed in the Gatling eliminates largely the liability of cartridge jams, and increases the rapidity of fire at all angles to twelve hundred shots per minute ; when this rapid dehvery of fire is not needed, Bruce's slower feed may be substituted. The Gardner gun is an effective weapon, but it has less rapidity of fire and smaller range of vertical train than the Gatling. The Nordenfeldt rifle-calibre gun has not oljfained the prominence of the others, and the Maxim, in which the energy of recoil is ingeniously applied t(j the Avork of loading and firing, is growing in favor. The Ilotchkiss revolving cannon was a wonderful steji — the 37, -tT, and 53 millimetre calibres firing 1 pound, -2\ pound, and 3i pound explosive ])roiectiles, with muzzle velocities of about 1400 feet per second. " The heavier nature of revolving cannon," declares Commander Folger, United States Navy, " proved somewhat unwieldy, and the change to the single barrel of increased length, and using a heavier powder charge, was a natural one, and in kee])ing with the growing ballistic ]iower of large guns. Though no longer denominated machine guns, the terra now being generally applied to a cluster of barrels, the rajiid-fire guns are a direct outgrowth of the larger calibres of machine guns, and are UNITED STATES NAVAL AKTILLERY. 235 classed with them as secondary l)attery arms. There are now in tlie service of all the great militarv powers rapid-firing guns of 47 and 57 millimetre calibre, tiring respectively explosive shells of o ponnds and (> pounds weight, at muzzle velocity of about ll.HJO feet per second. This will give with the G-pound gun a i-ange of about 2^ miles at 10 degrees elevation. These guns will tleliver, under favorable circumstances, per- haps ten aimed rounds per minute, and the shells perforating the sides of an unarmored vessel, and bursting, after passmg through into, sa}', twenty -five fragments, each with energy sufficient to kill a man, we have here a weapon of unequalled destructive capacity. It is beyond question that the conditions of combat between ships and forts are defi- nitely changed ))_v the advent of these guns. Even armored vessels with covered batteries are at a disadvantage, as a hail of missiles will seek the gun -ports and conning -towers wherever an enemy, from the nature of circumstances, takes close quarters. Exj)eriment abroad has also demonstrated that the projecting chase (forward body) of a large gun is extremely vulnerable, and liable to injury from the fire of the larger rapid-tiring pieces. " This system, which is just now so important an adjunct to the main battery of ships of war, is of but recent development. The first order received for a weapon of this kind by the Ilotchkiss firm came from the United States, and the guns now mounted in the new ships Boston, Atlanta, and Dolphin were delivered under it. Three calibres were obtained, vh., the 6, 3, and 1 pounder, as they are known in the United States navy, their usual names in other countries being the 57, 47, and 37 millimetre guns. Since their introduction the demand for larger calibres by most of the prominent naval powers has been so pressing that the Ilotchkiss Company has produced a 9-pounder and has a 33-pounder in course of manufacture. It is Ijelieved that this last calibre represents al)Out the limit of utility of the Ilotchkiss system, though the gain in time by the use of ammunition carrying the charge projectile and fulminate in one case will recommend it for use with much larger calibres, even where two men may be required to handle the cartridge." The most important trials of rapid-fire guns during the past two years are thus described by Lieutenant Driggs, United States navy : '' The various systems now in use, or being developed, are the Albini, Armstrong, Driggs-Schroeder, Gruson, Ilotchkiss, Krupp, Maxim, Nor- denfeldt. Of these the Armstrong has not been favorably received on account of the cumbersome breech-closing arrangement. This consists 236 MODEEN SHIPS OF WAR. in two side levers attached to and turning about the trunnions ; a cross- head connects tlie two levers, and by an eccentric motion one of them is pressed against or removed from the breech of the gun, thus closing or opening it. The Baiisdn has two of those guns, but with that known exception few, if any, have been put in service. " The Gruson gun is said to be very similar to the Ilotchkiss in its mechanism, though not as good. The Maxim and Hotchkiss are both well known. The JSTordenfeldt, which in Europe is the greatest rival of the Ilotchkiss, is entirely different from the guns heretofore made under this name. In the single-shot rapid-fire gun the breech is closed Avith a double breech-plug, which is revolved in the breech recess Ijv a cam motion. The plug is divided transversely ; the front half carries the firing-pin, and has only a circular motion in closing and opening; the rear half acts as a wedge, the first motion being downward and the second circular, the front half then moving with it. " One of the most complete tests to which guns of this class have been subjected was that conducted by the Italian government in Febru- ary of last year (1S85). The trials were made at Spezia, the following being offered for test : Ilotchkiss rapid - fire ; im]iroved Xordenf eldt rapid-fire on recoil carriage ; Armstrong rapid-tire ; and a rapid-fire gun made at the Government Works at A^enice. The Armstrong gun was not fired; the others were fired in the following order: Kordenfeldt, Ilotchkiss, and Italian. "The guns were mounted on board a small ship (the Vulcano) for firing at sea. A large target was fixed on the breakwater in the jnid- dle of the harbor of Spezia, and two smaller targets of triangular shape had been anchored, one 550 yards inside, and the other 550 yards out- side, the breakwater. The Yidcano was then placed 130tt to 1400 yards inside the breakwater, and fire liegun against the large target with the Nordenfeldt 6-pounder gun, which was worked by Italian sailors. A first series of eighteen shots were fired in forty-seven secontls. for rapid- ity of fire with rough aiming. A second series of sixteen shots were fii'ed in thirty-four seconds. The rapidity of fire with rough aiming and untried men was thus respectively at the rate of t^renty-three and twenty-eight shots per minute. jVfterwards, ten case-shots Avere fired with the gun almost level, in ortler to see how the lead bullets were spread over the range. Some of them were seen to touch the water 700 or SOU yards from the muzzle, and the whole range was well covered bv the 150 lead bullets contained in each of the Nordenfeldt case-shots. " The second part of the programme consisted of the firing at three UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 237 targets, respectively at 600, 1200, and 1800 j^ards, the ranges being only approximately known, changing the aim at every third shot, and firing under difficulty, owing to the movement of the ship. Twenty-one com- mon shells were fired, seven at each target, with good accuracy, and the shells on striking the water burst better at the shorter than at the longer ranges. " The firing at sea was closed witli one more series of ten rounds, fired rapidly in twenty-six seconds, in order to see if the gun would act well after being heated by the eighty-five rounds which had already been fired. Four of the last series were ring-shells, and burst on striking the water at the first impact, breaking into a larger numljer of pieces than the common sliells. The Nordenfeldt gun was then mounted on shore for tests of penetration. The plates used were : (1) a 5|-inch solid wrought-iron ; (2) a 1-inch solid (Cammell) steel plate ; (Z) one |-inch steel plate, at an angle of fifteen degrees to line of fire. The two thick plates were backed by ten inches of oak, and at right angles to line of fire and one hundred yards from the gun. The perforation was in every case complete, both with solid steel shot and chilled-point shells, these latter Inirsting in the wood Ijehind. The thin plate was then pat at more acute angle to the line of fire, and only when this angle was seven de- grees or eight degrees did the projectile fail to penetrate. The indicated muzzle velocity of this gun is 2130 feet, with a 6-pound projectile and charge of two pounds fifteen ounces. " A few days afterwards the Tlotchkiss gun went through the same trials and programme. For rapidity forty rounds were fired with rough aiming in tliree minutes, the rate being 13.3 per minute. The shooting was good, but the men serving the gun complained of Ijeing fatigued by the shocks from the shoulder-piece. The muzzle velocity was al>out 1085 feet, or about 300 feet below that of the Nordenfeldt. Last of all, the Italian gun was fired, but as it was designed for 1180 feet velocit}', it was not brought in direct competition with the otlier two guns in ])ower. The rapidity of fire oljtained, however, was about twent}' rounds per minute, and both the mechanism and recoil-carriage worked well.'-'' '' The Hotchkiss and Nordenfeldt guns were tried in competition at Ochta, near St. Petersburg, in September last (1886). The reports that have reached this country are very meagre, but are unanimous in favor of the Nordenfeldt gun. From what can be learned, the fire was first for rapidity, in which the Xordenfeldt discharged thirty rounds in one * From Army and Navy Gazette, February 37, 1886. 23S MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. minute, and the IL:)tclikiss twenty rounds in the same time, the initial velocity of the former being (li-t metres (20i7 feet) per second, while that of the latter was .j-tS metres (IT'i'T feet) per second. "The tire of both guns was directed ujion a target at ISOO metres (1960 yards) range. The Xordenfeldt scored nine hits, while the Ilotcli- kiss made none. It is more tlian liliely that this failure wac due more to defective })ointiug than to any defect of construction. " The trial closed with a very interesting and instructive experiment. " Four targets were placed at 600, SO(_i, 1000, and 120<.i metres ; each gun was to tire as rapidly as possible for thirty seconds, changing the range each fire, from the 60" up to the 12ihi metre target and back. During this test the Xordenfeldt is said to liave discliarged fifteen shots in tlie tliirty seconds, and to have made nine hits, Avliile the Hotchkiss KEW 6-INCII BREECH-LOADING lUFLE. scored but two hits and only discharged eleven rounds in thirtv-tAvo sec- onds. Here again the element of inaccurate sigliting may l)e largely responsiljle for tlie difference in the number of hits, but the great dis- ]iarity in tlie number of I'ounds tired must lie due to the mechanical de- fects in tlie Hotchkiss s^^stem l)y whicli the action of its breech-block is too slow. Notwithstanding the re]iorted success of the JSTordenfeldt gun in the trials, the Russian government ordered a number of Plotclikiss guns and no Nordenfeldts." The latest experiments with large calibred rapid-fire guns were those bf the Armstrong 36 and 70 pounder. The first piece differs materially from the new 33-pounder Hotchkiss; it is 4.724 inches in UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 239 calibre, 1-i feet 2^ inches length, and weighs 3-i Iiundred-weight. It was fired with seven and a half pounds of powder ten times in forty-seven seconds, or at a rate six times faster than that obtained with the serv- ice guns of like calibre. The TO-pounder was fired with both twenty- five-pound and thirty-pound charges, at a speed of from eight to ten rounds per minute. In the latest mount for the 36-pounder the gun is sujiported on a rocking slide wliicli pivots on transverse bearings, so that the piece moves only forward and backward on the slide ; eleva- tion and depression are given by a shoulder-piece attached to the slide, and the gun is secured at any desired angle with a clamp attached to the side of the slide. This development of rapid-fire pieces opens anew the discussion as to the comparative values of large and small calil)re guns. At the pres- ent stage of the question it is safe to say that, however necessary the large calibre may be in armored liattle-ships and coast-defence vessels, its usefulness in thin-skinned, high-powered cruisers is questionaWe. Abroad, the long-range guns which constitute the primary Ijatteries are being reduced in caliljre, while the secn is vital to success, heavy armaments must and will be emjiloyed ; but when this factor need not be consid- ered, a great many light guns, easily worked l>y hand, are the demands of the liour. The problem, fortunately, is nearer solution owing to the development now in progress ; and when this is coupled Avith the rap- idly increasing popularity of the 5-inch breech-loading all-steel rifle, our country notal)]y may congratulate itself that ordnance is reverting to a plane which other nations mistakenly and at great cost abandoned, and which the United States can readily attain. SHIPS OF THE MINOR NAVIES. EARLY in September of this year there sailed from England for the East five Chinese T\'ar-vessels of the latest types: the Clnli Yuan and Chiiuj Yuan, fast cruisers ; the Jtatg Yium and La! Yuan, coast- defence ships ; and a torpedo-boat as yet unnamed. Though the squad- ron was commanded by Admiral Lang, a captain in the Koyal Navy tem- porarily serving under the Chinese government, the other oificers Avere mainly, and the crews were AvhoUy, natives who had passed through English cruising and training ships. The CM/i Yllan was commanded by Captain Tang, who had under him nine English and fifteen Chinese officers and one hundred and fifty men ; the Ching Yuan was in charge of Captain Yih, and eleven English and fourteen Chinese officers, with the same complement ; while the other ships were officered and manned much the same way. There was, it is true, an English fleet surgeon, but each ship had its native medical officer and two chief engineers, one of whom was a Chinese. " On leaving S])ithead," stated the Herald cable despatch, " the fleet will proceed direct to Gibraltar, thence to Port Said, where it will take in coal ; it wiU stop at Suez, Aden, Colombo (where it will coal again), Singapore, Hong-Kong, Chefoo, and Taku, joining at this place the fleet already assembled under Admiral Ting, and replacing there many of the foreigners by native officers. The voyage is expected to occupy seventy-two daj-s — fifty-two at sea and twenty in harbor — and during this time the crews will be thoroughly practised in torpedo, gun, and other drills. This, of course, will in- volve a deal of hard work, such as would try the endurance of English sailors, but the Chinamen will be allowed a plentiful supply of beef and beer." Modern cruisers and armed battle-ships requiring the highest intelli- gence to fight, torpedo-drills, beef and beer — and all for that outer l)ar- barian whom our mobs murder just for a lark ! Here is a lesson for Congressmen ; here an example and a possible menace for this defence- less land. The Cliinese navy, though of recent growth, consists to-day of seven 16 2i2 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. armored and ten nnarmored ships of modern types, in addition to tor- ]iedo-l.)oats, and to at least tliirty other vessels which are not so obsolete as nine-tenths of the ships this country has in commission. Nearly ten years ago the Chinese government realized that its wood- en corvettes, gun - boats, and armed junks Avere no longer adapted to warfare, and ordered from the Vulcan Works at Stettin the two steel cruisers iWiii aS/iu. and JVan SJien. These are of 2200 tons displacement, and with 2400 horse-power have developed 1.5 knots speed ; their arma- ment is composed of two 8-incli and eight -ii-inch Armstrongs, and of lighter secondary pieces. In 1881 these ships were followed by the ar- mored battle-ships Chen Yikai and Ting Y'dan, and b}^ the steel cruiser TvJd Yiian. The battle-ships are built of steel, and have the following dimensions: length 290. .5 feet, beam 59 feet, mean draught 20 feet, dis- placement 7430 tons. Their compound armor extends throughout a central citadel 138 feet long, and around a neai'ly elliptical redoubt sit- uated at its forward end; the side armor is five feet wide, and has a thickness of 14 inches at the water-line, of 8 inches at the lower and of 10 inches at the upper edge ; the protection to the redoubt is 12, and to the connioig - tower 8, inches thick. The armament consists of four 12-inch Krupps, echeloned in pairs within the redoubt; of two 5.9-inch Krupps mounted forward and aft inside of machine-gun proof turrets ; of eleven Hotchkiss revolving cannons, and a supply of Whitehead tor- pedo-tubes. The engines are of the three-cylinder compound type, and develop 7300 horse-power and 15.5 knots. The ships have double bot- toms, minutely subdivided, and in addition to a cork belt forward and abaft the citadel a steel protective deck two inches thick curves to the extremities. The twin-screw steel cruiser Tehl Yiian is of 3200 tons displacement, and has two :sets of two -cylinder horizontal compound engines, which develop 2800 horse-power and a s]ieed of 15 knots ; her dimensions are : length 236 feet 3 inches, beam 34 feet 5 inches, and draught 15 feet 9 inches. The entire under- water body is covered by a curved steel deck, which is 4 inches thick, and extends 4 feet 9 inches below the water-line ; the s]iace lietween this tleck and the one above is used for coal-bunkers. " There are two machine-gun proof turrets on the fore and aft line, the base of the forward one being surmounted by a fixed tower armored with 15-inch steel, which extends to a height suf- ficient to protect the base of the turret, its machinery, and gun-carriages. The armament is composed of two 8.27-inch (21 centimetre) Krupps in the forward turret, of one 5.9-inch (15 centimetre) Krupp in the after turret, of two similar guns on the main deck aft, of five Hotchkiss re- THE MINOR NAVIES. 243 volving cannons, and of a supply of Whitehead torpedes, discharged through four above-water tubes." * Tlie swift protected cruisers Cli'ili Yuan and CMng Yiian were built at Elswick ; the unnamed torpedo-boat is of tlie Yarrow ty]5e ; and the coast-defence vessels King Yuan and .Lai Yiian were constructed at Stettin. The displacement of the cruisers is 28(>(i tons, length 2().s feet, beam 38 feet, depth 21 feet, and drauglit 14 feet forward and 16 feet aft. Each vessel has two pairs of triple-expansion engines. Both the engine and boiler rooms are divided into water-tight compartments by transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, and the machinery is so arranged that either boiler caji work on one engine or on both, and the change necessary to effect this can be made while the vessel is in motion. The result of this intercommunication between each engine and each boiler is that the vessel can proceed so long as any single boiler and engine are uninjured. In the four trial tri]")s, two with and two against the tide, with all their weights, armament, and Chinese crews on board, they attained an average speed of 18..53(i knots. The vessels are built of steel, and have two decks, the lower one consisting of four-inch steel plates, rising in the middle above the wa- ter-line and inclined at the sides so as to dip belo-w it. The engines, magazines, rudder-head, and steering gear lie below, and are protected by this deck. The openings in the deck are encircled by coffer-dams, armored with steel plates, inclined so as to deflect projectiles. The bows are formed and strengthened for ramming purposes. Additional protection is given to the vessel l)y a partition which is built on the protective deck parallel to the side of the ship ; this encloses a space that is eight feet wide, and is subdivided into a great number of water- tight compartments for the stowage of four hundred antl fifty tons of fuel. Both ships have double bottoms, minutely subdivided into water- tight compartments. The armament consists of three 21 -centimetre Kmpp guns — two mounted forward and one aft — all on centre-pivot, shield-protected Va- vasseur carriages ; of two 6-inch Armstrongs on sponsons, also Yavasseur mounted ; of eight 6-pounder rapid-fire Ilotchkiss ; and of six Gatling guns. There are four al^ove-^vater torpedo-tubes— two fixed (one in the bow, firing ahead, and one aft, pointed astern) and two training, one in each broadside. * Lieuteuant Colwell, United States Navy. 31i MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. There are two electric search-lights for each vessel, with a nominal power of 25,000 candles, while the cabins and rest of the ship are lighted with incandescent lamps. ''It is humiliating," writes the Army and Kavy Gasette, "but never- theless an actual fact, that two of the cruisers of the Chinese scjuadron under command of Admiral Lang are superior in certain novelties of construction to any of our own vessels of this class. In point of speed the two unarmored ships which have been turned out by the Elswick firm cannot be touched by our swiftest cruisers. They steam nearly nineteen knots an hour. The traversing and manipulation of their guns can be effected with such rapidity that when saluting the garrison at Portsmouth recently it appeared almost impossible that the guns could have been properly sponged between each discharge, the two bow guns especially keeping up a continuous roar. Only the two sponson 6-inch guns are from Armstrong's ; they are mounted on A^avasseur carriages, and fitted with singularly simple breech apparatus. The other three heavy guns are Krupp's 21-centimetres (about 8J-incli). These last are protected with a shield of entirely unique construction. It is of steel, and commencing from the trunnion ring spreads out into a wide shelter sufficient to accommodate the entire gun detachment. The sights are also under cover. The stern-chaser has a single sliield ; the two bow- chasers are included within one. The torpedo apparatus is most com- plete. In addition to the two tubes opening ahead and astern, which are well above the surface of the water, there are six others in connec- tion with the torpedo-room. " But the latest improvement which is observable on board is the steel armored conning-tower, fitted with Lord Armstrong's ]iatent telegraph and communications, for which a special royalty of four hundred pounds has to be paid. It is the most perfect scheme for conducting fighting operations that has ever come under our notice. A model for laying all the guns is prominently placed in front of the steering-wheel, which is under personal command of the officer m charge. On the left are tubes and telegra]3hs by which he can converse witli the officer in command of the gun detachment, and correct any mistakes observable in the la}'- ing of the guns. Then he can fire sinndtaneously, if desirable, or singly, if ]n'eferred. All stations on board are also in communication Avith this conning-tower. Hence the entire fighting power of the vessel, torpe- does and all included, is at the disposal of the officer in command within tiie conning-tower. Another useful modification has been effected in these vessels. The conning-tower, Avhich is at the foot of the foremost THE MINOR NAVIES. 245 fighting mast, has close to it the signal station, also protected with steel armor, so that the signaller therein is absolutely secure, and close to the commanding officer, from whom he receives and to whom he communi- cates outside signals." The torpedo-boat built by Yarrow is said to be the fastest of its size that has ever been launched, as it has reached a speed of about twenty-eight knots an hour. It is armed with two fixed 14-inch torpe- do-tubes in the bows, and one 14-inch training-tube on deck abaft the funnel. It is also supphed with a powerful armament of Hotchkiss and Gatling guns, and a strong electric search -hght so arranged as to be worked either from the conning-tower or from the deck. The King Yuan and Lai Yuan, built by the Yulcan Company at Stettin, are powerful vessels, effective for either coast defence or distant sea service. Their principal dimensions are : length 269 feet, beam 39 feet 4 inches, depth 25 feet 6 inches, mean draught 16 feet 8 inches, and displacement 2900 tons. They are built entirely of steel, with double bottoms extending two-thirds of the length, and the under-water body is divided by bulkheads into sixty-six water-tight compartments. The armor protection is compound, and consists of a belt six feet wide ex- tending the length of the machinery and boiler space, having a maxi- mum thickness of 9.5 inches at and above the water-line, and a mini- mum thickness of 5.1 inches. This belt is terminated at either end by thwartship armored bulkheads, 5.1 inches thick. At the forward end of the belt is a circular revolving turret eight inches thick, on top of which is the conning-tower, with an armor protection of six inches. The under-water body is protected by a complete steel protective deck, 1.5 inches thick over the top of, and three inches thick forward and abaft, the belt. A partial cork belt above the protective deck gives additional stability. The engines consist of two sets of three-cylinder compound type, situated in two separate compartments, driving twin screws, and developing 3400 horse-power with forced draft. The boil- ers, four in number, are placed in two separate compartments. A speed of about sixteen knots was attained. The armament consists of two 21-centimetre (8.27-inch) Krupps mounted in the turret ; of two 15-cen- timetre (5.91-inch) similar guns carried in recessed ports ; of two 4Y-mil- limetre Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns ; of five 37-millimetre revolving can- nons ; and of four torpedo-discharging tubes — three above- water and one in the bow below the water-line.* * Naval Intelligence, General Information Series No. 5. •2i6 MODERN SHIPS OF WAK. As additions to the lightly armored gun-boat Tiivig Sing, built in 1S75, China ordered this year from the Vulcan Company two heavy coast-defence vessels of TOGO tons displacement and 60(h;i horse-power, and laitl down at Foochow an armored gun-vessel. The T.s/iao Yong and Yiiiig Wni are steel cruisers built at Elswick, of 13JiJ tons displace- ment and 24r0n horse-power ; they have developed sixteen knots, and are armed with two 10-inch and four -fi-inch Armstrongs, with a secondary liattery of two lighter pieces and six machine guns. The Fee-chen, a small steel cruiser built at Sunderland, England, has triple -expansion engines, and is expected to develop thirteen knots. Her armament con- sists of two 0-incli Armstrongs and four lighter guns ; she is also fitted to do calile work. Three cruisers of the Xaa S/ni type are being con- structed in Chinese dockyards, besides sevei'al of the Kuang Chen class of gun-boats. The Japanese navy consists of forty vessels, of which eight only are modern. The classified armored fleet includes five ships, among them the Adsania Kan, formerly known as the SfonetruN Jacl'-ion ; none of these is of any importance except the central battery shiji Fu Soo. which was launched in 1877. In January of this year, however, the Ja]ianese government ordered from the Societe des Forges et Chant iers de la Mediterranee two coast-defence vessels, to be built on the ])lans of il. Bertin, constructing engineer of the Japanese navy. They are to be built entirely of steel, on the cellular plan, with two longitudinal and twelve transverse bulkheads. Their princijial dimensions are : length 20,'> feet '1 inches, beam 50 feet 6 inches, depth 31 feet inches, draught aft '21 feet 2 inches, displacement 1110 tons. The armament proposed is one 12.i3-inch (32-centimetre'i bi'eech-loader, eleven l:.72-incli (12-centi- nietre) l^reech-loadere, six rapid-fire guns, twelve revolving cannons, and four torpedo-tubes — one in the bow, one in the stern, and one each broad- side. Two independent triple-expansion engines, driving twin screws, and recpiired to develop 5100 indicated horse-po\ver with forced draft, and 3100 with natural draft, supplied with steam by six three-furnace Iniilers in two groups, furnish the motive power. The estimated maxi- mum s])eed is sixteen knots. A heavy ]irotective steel deck and a com- plete surrounding arrangement of coal-bunkers protect the engine and lioiler s]iace and magazines. The complement of officers and men will number four hundred. In March, 1SS7, a small armored gun-vessel, de- siii'ued 1 IV the same official, was laid down at the Ishikawa-Shima dockyard, Japan. The displacement is 750 tons, length 150 feet, and beam 25 feet.* * " Recent Naval Pro£rress." , THE MINOR NAVIES. 247 Of the unarmored vessels, the sister-ships Nanivja Kan (already de- scribed) and Takatsohio are at present the most important, though six modern cruisers now nnder construction in Japanese dockyards will soon be added to the fleet. The navy is manned and officered exclu- sively by natives, and the service is well administered and popular. Owing to possible complications with China, coast defence has become a live national question, and the wealthy Japanese are suljscriljing large sums for ships and forts. In addition to these voluntary contriljutions, the new tax which has been imposed will enable Japan to put herself in an excellent contUtion for attack or defence. The other navies not described in these pages have afloat or under construction but few modern shi])s-of-war. Still, there are vessels in the minor services which ought to be briefly described. One of these, the Almlratite Brown, of the Argentine navy, is a twin-screw, central-bat- tery steel ship which was launched in 18S0. Her dimensions are : length 240 feet, beam 50 feet, draught 20 feet 6 inches, and displacement 4200 tons. With 4500 horse-power she attained 13.75 knots, and her coal endur- ance is given as 4300 knots at KJ knots speed. Her armament is made up of eight 8-inch and six 4|-inch Armstrongs, and of four machine guns ; the armor is compound, nine inches thick on the belt and eight inches on the battery. There is also building in England for this government a central casemate steel cruiser of 4400 tons displacement. The armor on the casemate is to be compound, ten inches thick, and the armament is to be composed of eight 84nch breechJoading Armstrongs, with a secondary battery of rapid-fire guns and torpedo-tubes. The estimated speed is fourteen knots. In addition to these two vessels the Argentine navy has two small coast-defence turret-ships, one 14-knot steel cruiser (the Patagonia, which is similar in appearance to the United States steamer Atlanta), six gun-boats, eleven torpedo-boats, and a few other vessels of an unimportant character. The Brazilian navy has, exclusive of her capital torpedo-boat flotilla, over fifty vessels, of Avdiich a dozen are classed as armored. These last are mainly medium draught, coast-service turret-ships and river moni- tors, though among them are the Riachuelo and Aquidaban, twin-screw armored cruisers, and the Solimoes, an armored battle-ship. The Riaeh u- elo made a sensation when she first appeared, and is still one of the most formidable vessels in the world. She is built of steel, and has the fol- lowing dimensions : length 305 feet, beam 52 feet, draught 19 feet 6 inches, displacement 5700 tons. Her armor is compound, eleven inches thick on the belt and ten inches on the turret, conning-tower, and re- 2iS MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. (loiibt. She lias also a steel deck, Avliicli curves forward to strengthen the ram, and aft to protect the steering gear. Her armament consists of four ij-inch :^0-ton Whitworths (Armstrong altered) mounted in two echeloned turrets, and of six 5^-inch guns carried under cover in the superstructure. Her secondary battery includes fifteen machine Norden- feklts and five above-water torpedo-tubes. With 7300 horse-power she attained a speed of 16.71 knots, and is credited with a coal endurance of 4500 miles at 15 knots speed. The Aquidalan is of the same type and general ajipearance as the lilac/iuelo, but of smaller dimensions. Her length is 2S(.» feet, beam 52 feet, draught IS feet, displacement 4950 tons. The compound armor is from seven to eleven inches in thickness, and seven feet in width on the water-line belt, and is ten inches thick on the conning-toAver and on tne oval redoubts which protect the bases of the two echeloned turrets. The armored deck and redoubt roofs are l)uilt of steel, from two to three inches thick. The armament consists of four 9-inch 20-ton guns mount- ed in the turrets, and of four 70-pounders carried under the superstruct- ure. The secondary battery is made up of fifteen 1-incli [Nordenfeldts and five above-water torpedo-tubes. She developed on trial 6251 horse- power and a speed of 15.81 knots, and made on the voyage from Lisbon to Bahia 3600 knots in 13 days and 17 hours, and from Bahia to Rio Ja- neiro 750 knots in 2 days and 20 hours. The average speed for the passage from England to Eio Avas nearly eleven knots on a daily coal consumption of forty-three tons. The Chilian navy has the two iron - armored, twin-screw, central- battery ships Almlrante Coclirane and Blanco EncaJada, and the hghtly armored turret-ship lluascar. The Almirante CocJtrane and Blanco Enca- laihi, are 210 feet in length, 45 feet 9 inches in beam, 19 feet 8 inches in draught, and 3500 tons in displacement. The former carries four 9-incli and two 7-inch breech-loading Armstrong rifles, four lighter pieces, and seven machine guns. Before the alterations and repairs lately made, the Blanco Encalada had six 12-ton muzzle-loading Ai-mstrong rifles, four lighter pieces, and seven machine guns. The JIaascar was built in 1865, and is a slightly protected iron sliij) of 2032 tons displacement, 1050 horse - power, and 12 knots speed. Her battery consists of two 10-inch muzzle-loading Armstrongs and two 40-ponnders. Her wonder- ful record on the west coast of South America has made her name as fa- miliar in the mouth as a household word, and whatever may have lieen the justice of the war, there never can or will be a question of the superb courage with which she was fought by her gallant officers and crew. THE MINOR NAVIES. 249 Chili lias three wooden corvettes, the Chacahuco, (yilitjgins, and Pilco- 7nayo, one composite corvette, the Magellanei^, one steel cruiser, the Emneralda, five gun-boats, two paddle steamers, one despatch-boat, one transport, and eleven torpedo-boats. In April, 1885, The EmieraJda ran from Valparaiso to Callao, V2\)-2, miles, in one hundred and eight hours, the engines during the last eight hours barely turning over. In the exliaustive trials made before her departure from England the high- est speed attained was 18j knots per hour. The Emneralda is said to be at present in an inefficient condition, both as regards her speed and bat- tery power. In November, 188G, the Chilian government gave the Arm- strong firm an order for a powerful, partially -i)rotected steel cruiser, which is to be of 4.5n() tons dis]:)lacement, and to develop 1',} knots speed. Her armament is to consist of two lU-inch, one S-inch, and two 6-incli Armstrong breech-loaders, with a secondary battery of four 6-pounder rapid-Are guns, eight Hotchkiss revolving cannons, and eight torpedo-tubes. The cost of this vessel is to be ab(jut §l,5UO,OU0. APPENDIX I. SUBMAEIXE WARFARE. THE practicability of submarine navifration was established by the Dutch over two hundred and fifty years ago. Tlien, as now, its underlyino; idea, its claim for recognition, was the advantages the system gave in marine warfare. Nor is its battle value overestimated ; for such a boat, if successful, exercises an influence that is great in material uses, that is enormous in moral effects. Its development has been slow ; for though the problem was solved long ago, no practical results were attained until within the last thirty years. During the late war submarine boats were for the first time employed with such suffieient success that the great maritime powers have considered the type to have an importance which justified investigation. They reached this conclusion because no plan of defence exists which could defy the operations of a weapon that attacks not only matter but mind. There is no danger which sailors will not face ; because their environments are always perilous, and their traditions are rich with glorious records of seeming im- possibilities overcome by pluck and dash. They are willing always, even against the heaviest odds, to accept any fighting chance. They know that the unexpected is sure to happen. The spirit that made Farragut take the lead of his disorganized line in Mobile Bay still lives ; his clarion call of " Damn the torpedoes ! Follow me !" is a sea instinct, born of brine and gale, which never dies. Whatever coast fighting or port blockading may demand, sea battles are un- changed. History teaches that ships always closed for action, and that vessels fighting each other from beyond the circling horizons, or hull down, with long- range guns, are the dreams of shore inventors. Guns and ships have changed, but men and the sea are changeless. The fighting distance of to-day is not much greater than it was in Nelson's or in Perry's time ; and the next naval war will surely prove that battle will be nearly as close as in Benbow's age, when the gallant tars combed innocuous four-pound shots out of their pigtails, and battered each other within biscuit-throwing distance with deftly shied chocking quoins. It is fortunate, in the interest of good, square fighting, that the operative sphere of submarine boats is limited to coast work. Fortunate, because while the bravery and the grit are the same, the threatening of a danger which cannot be squarely met is apt to benumb the heart of the stoutest. A sailor hates to run ; he does not care to fight another day when the chance of the present is open before him ; but of what avail are the highest courage and skill against a dull, venomous dog of an enemy who crawls in the darkness out of the deeps, and, silently attaching a mine or torpedo, leaves his impotent foe to sure destruction ? Submarine mines may be countermined ; when necessary, defied ; guns may 252 APPENuiA 1. be silenced and torpedo-boats so riddled by rapid-fire guns that they will be disabled be3'ond the radius of their effective action ; automatic torpedoes may be checked by netting, or by the prompt manceuvrings of the attacked vessel ; ship may always fight ship. But what is the chance for braiu or brawn against a successful submarine boat, when the mere suspicion of its presence is enough in itself to break down the blithest, bravest heart of oak. It is here that their moral effects are enormous. The history of their development may be briefly told. In 1624 Cornelius ^'ari Drebble, a Hollander, made some curious experiments under the Thames. His diving-boat was propelled by twelve pairs of oars and carried a dozen per- sons, among them King James I. In 1771 Bushnell, of Connecticut, constructed a boat which Washington described in a letter to Jefferson as being a "machine so contrived as to carry the inventor under water at any depth he chose, and for a considerable time and distance with an appendage charged with powder, which he could fasten to a ship, and give fire to it in time sufficient for his returning, and by means thereof destroy it." Fulton borrowed Bushnell's idea, and in 1801 experimented successfully with it in the Seine. He descended under water, re- mained for twenty minutes, and after having gone a considerable distance, emerged. In 1851 a shoemaker named Phillips launched in Lake Michigan a cigar-shaped boat forty feet long and four feet in its greatest diameter. This was his first attempt, but in the course of a few years he so far perfected his arrangements for purifying the air that on one occasion he took his wife and children, and spent a whole dav in exploring the bottom of the lake. In the history of these boats, as told in the report of the Board on Fortifications, Phillips afterwards descended in Lake Erie, near Buffalo, and never reappeared. Many other attempts were made, the most successful being that of a Rus- sian mechanic, wdio in 185.5 built a diving-boat which was under such perfect con- trol that he could remain submerged for eight hours. The boat which sank the Hoasatonk was a remarkable submarine vessel ; it was about thirty-five feet long, built of boiler iron, and had a crew of nine men, of whom eight worked the pro- peller by hand, while the ninth steered and governed the boat. She could be submerged to any desired depth or could be propelled on the surface. After various mishaps she went out of Charleston harbor, attacked and sank the United States steamer Housatonic, then on blockade duty ; as she never returned, it is supposed that the reflex action of the torpedo destroyed her. In the report quoted above the results already attained in submarine naviga- tion are thus summarized by Captain Maguire, U.S.A. : 1. Submarine boats have been built in which several persons have descended (with safety) for a great distance below the surface of the water. 2. Submarine boats have been propelled on and under the surface in all di- rections. 3. The problem of supplying the necessary amount of rcspirable air for a crew of several persons for a number of hours has been solved. 4. Steam, compressed air, and electricity have been used as the motive power. 5. The incandescent electric light has been used for illuminating the interior of submarine boats. APPENDIX I. 253 6. Seeing ajiparatus have been made by which the pilot, wliile under water, may scan the horizon in all directions. 1. A vessel has been in time of war destroyed by a submarine l>oat. The latter, it is true, was also sunk, but it was for reasons that are no longer in force. As yet no perfectly successful boat of this type has been tried in any naval war, but there is no question that they will be used at the very first opportunity. Compared with a surface boat, the submarine has the following advantages : 1. It does not need so much speed. The surface boat demands this quality so as to get quickly within striking range of its torpedo, and tlien to escape speedily out of range of machine guns, etc. 2. Its submersion in the presence of the enemy prevents the engines being heard. 3. There is no smoke nor glare from the fires to cause its detection. 4. The boat and crow, being under water, are protected from tbe fire of ma- chine guns and rifles. 5. It is enabled to approach the enemy near enough to make effective even an imcontroUable fish torpedo. 6. It can be used with safety as a reconnoitring or despatch boat. 7. It can examine the faults in the lines of submarine mines, and replace mines exploded in action. Abroad, the Nordenfeldt boat has awakened the most interest, and here the American submarine monitor liolds the first place. The form of the Nordenfeldt boat is that of a cigar or of an elongated cylin- der tapering away to a fine point at each end. The outer case, built of stout steel, is calculated in its construction to resist sucii a pressure as would enable the boat to descend even beyond a depth of fifty feet, although that is set as the maximum for its diving operations. The cigar shape does not at first sight com- mend itself, even in the eyes of nautical men, on account of its supposed ten- dency towards a rolling motion. The experience, however, gained with the boat exhibited for the benefit of naval experts at Carlscrona, in iSeptember, 1885, has shown that very good sea-going qualities can be developed in a craft built upon such lines ; for this small vessel has weathered more than one gale in the Baltic, to say nothing of the severe storm it encountered at the entrance to tlie Kattegat when proceeding from Gottenburg to Copenhagen for the experimental trials. This quality results from the fact that each end of the boat forms a tank, which is filled with water, and as there is no extra buoyancy in those directions, and consequently no tendency to lift at those parts as with an ordinary vessel iu a sea-way, the vessel rises and falls bodily instead of pitching. It has been found that by going at a moderate speed and taking the seas a point or so on the bows the boat makes very good weather, as the waves, breaking on the snout, sweep over the fore part and expend their force before any portion of them can reach the central section. Steam, which is employed as motive power, is perfectly trustworthy as an ao-ent. There is nothing about its action, or the appliances connected with it, that is beyond the grasp of an ordinary engineer, whereas such can hardly be said as yet in respect either to electricity or the other agencies by which inventors have sought to obtain motion. The difficulty, however, has always been how to retain 254 APPENDIX I. steam pressure for any great length of time without carry- ing on combustion. This in the Nordenfeldt boat is secured in the following ingenious man- ner : A large reservoir or hf>t- water cistern (marked Q in the plate) is placed in the fore part of the boat, in communication with the boiler. The steam from the latter passes through a number of tubes in the reser- voir N, thus raising the temper- ature of its contents until the pressure stands at the same de- gree in both. AVhile the boat is at the surface, the maximum pressure once attained, as long as combustion is carried on, supplies quite enough steam both for driving the engines at full speed and for maintain- ing the contents of the cistern in the proper superheated con- dition. When the boat is sub- merged and the furnace doors are closed combustion ceases, and tlie steam given off by the hot water in the boiler and cistern is sufticicnt to keep the engines going for several hours. Submersion to the various depths required is secured by the motion of the vertically acting screws, S S, driven by small three - cylinder engines. The boat is so ballasted as al- ways to have spare buoyancy, and while a few revolutions of the screws will send her under water, the arrest of their motion is all that is required to bring her to the surface again. In this arrangement, as even the non-technical reader will read- ily understand, there is a great APPENDIX I. 255 element of safety, the rising motion being entirely independent of any machinery which might refuse to act at the required moment. Another advantage is also gained in the ease with which the horizontal position is maintained by regulating the speed of the screws. To assist in keeping this position there is a horizontal rudder or fin, R, at the bows, which, by a very ingenious arrangement of a plumb weight with other mechanism in connection with the steering tower, works both automatically and by hand. The torpedoes are carried on the outside of the boat, as shown at F. They are Swartzkoph or Whitehead, as the case may be, and are released by electrical action under the control of the captain, standing on the platform at P. is a cupola of stout glass by which a view is obtained occa- sionally when the boat is running submerged. Construction Details. — The following are the dimensions of the Turkish boat : length 100 feet, beam 12 feet, displacement 150 tons, speed 12 knots, and coal endurance sufficient for travelling 900 miles. The engines (E) are of the ordinary inverted compound surface condensing type, with two cylinders, and with 100 pound pressure indicate 250 horse-power. The circulating and air pumps being actuated by a separate cylinder, the main engine is left free to work or not, while a vacuum is always maintained to assist the various other engines with which the boat is fitted. In this respect it should be mentioned that all the engines are specially designed with such valve arrangements as will make the utmost use of the vacuum, it having been found that while the boat is run- ning beneath the surface as much power can be developed below the atmospheric line as above it. The boiler, B, is of the ordinary marine return-tube type, with two furnaces, and the heating surface is about seven hundred and fifty square feet. The tanks at each end of the boat contain about fifteen tons each, and there is a third of seven tons capacity at the bottom of the central compartment for regulating buoyancy. The coal is stored around the hot-water cistern as well as at the sides of the boiler and over the central ballast tank. Three men and the captain can efficiently work this boat, although she may carry a crew of seven, who could remain in her for over seven hours beneath the water without experiencing any ditficulty in respiration. No attempt is made as in some systems to purify the atmosphere by chemical means, as it is said to be quite unnecessary. The Practical Mcmagement. — The boat is operated in the following manner; Steam having been raised to the required pressure, the funnel is lowered, and water is let into the ballast tanks to bring the craft down to the proper trim for action. In this condition the screws, S S, are sufficiently under water to obtain the requisite thrust. The boat may still proceed at the surface for some time if the enemy be distant, but the conning-tower should be closed, and the cupola hatch and the furnace doors shut, before there is any chance of discovery. The vertically acting screws being started, the boat is then submerged to the cupola, and continues approaching until, according to circumstances, it becomes prudent to disappear entirely. The direction is taken at the last moment, and maintained by compass until within striking distance, when a torpedo is released, and the boat immediately turns in another direction. '2i>() APPENDIX I. In May of this year there was launched at Barrow a Nordenfeldt boat 110 feet in length and 13 feet in diameter. The engines are capable of developing good power, and a speed of 12 knots on the surface was realized. The boat was tried on the Bosporus during July under government supervision, and as these were satisfactory, it seems likely that a number of similar vessels will be built next year for the Ottoman navy. The original submarine monitor Peaccmal-cr is well known through its trials on the Hudson River in 1880, but since then so many improvements have been made in the direction of increased efticiency that it is confidently expected the boat just designed will surpass its former successes. It must be understood in the beginning that its essential principle remains the same, all the important im- provements being the outgrowth of the experience gained in previous experi- ments. Broadly defined, the new craft has a midship section, which through its high centre of buoyancy and low centre of gravity gives great stability of form, or, to make it plain to the non-technical reader, it difilers from the ordinar}- cigar and tortoise shaped boat in being more nearly like the section of a pear, the apex of which forms the keel. Its longitudinal section is not unlike the form gen- erall}' used, though the lines are such as have been found to give the form of least resistance and the highest speed. It is built of steel, with frames and spacings sufficient to stand the pressure of the lowest depth to which the boat is or can be expected to go. The old dimen- sions were : length 30 feet, depth 1 feet, and beam 8 feet. In order to obtain increased speed the present vessel will be 50 feet in length, 8 feet in beam, and 8 feet in depth, with a displacement of from thirty-five to forty tons, or an amount sufficient to carry the weights of the interchangeable boiler, of the sixtv horse- power engine, and of the provisions and fuel necessary for a surface cruise of one week, and, when necessar}^ for a constantly submerged cruise of twelve hours. The advantages claimed for the new Ijoat are that she is so self-sustaining as not to need the assistance of any other vessel ; that she is not an accessar}', but has in herself all essentials of defence ; and that she answers all possible necessi- ties for subnjarine work of any kind whatever, whether in peace or war. The increased speed will, it is hoped, give her power to attack modern vessels under wav. When submerged, as was proved last summer, she sent no bubbles of air to the surface, and had neither a wake nor a wash to militate against the possibili- ties of an absolutely secret attack. Besides these advantages, the boat is said to he a safe surface -cruising vessel, forming no target for the destructive action of an enemy's attack, and at the same time having a capacity for disappearing so readily under water and avoiding the possibility of discovery that the enemy will he unable to tell when, where, or how the assault upon him may be made. As in a former trial an accident proved the danger of an exposed conning- tower, the Submarine Monitor Company have provided a fin or guard for protect-, ing the new helmsman's lookout and companion-hatches. The waterlock appli- ance employed in the original boat has now an additional use in supplying a mode of egress and ingress, the opening being made telescopic, so as to permit surface runs in comparatively rough water. When submerged, the smoke-stack APPENDIX I. 257 acts telescopically, and is closed witli a water- tight valve. To avoid the necessity of divers going out of the boat when under water, there are various openings at places in the exterior skin to which rubber sleeves or arms, with a ra- dius sufficient to cover almost all practical neces- sities, will be litted. These apertures do not con- stitute planes of weakness or danger, because they are normally closed by stout water-tight dead- lights. The Westinghouse engine is employed, as its construction prevents, by the packing used, any radiation of heat and the consequent elevation of temperation below. The air-tight doors and bulk- heads work laterally, and the conuing-dome is made of steel, with such apertures as will enable the helmsman to have, when on the surface, an all-round view, and when submerged, a sufficient light to let him in the daytime read, at a depth of thirty feet, the time by his watch. Should the necessity arise, when submerged, the purity of the atmosphere below is preserved by passing the air through caustic soda, thus eliminating carbonic acid gas, and by reinforcing the loss of oxygen from tanks of compressed air. In the original experiments the boat was fre- quently submerged six hours at a time, and the crew of two men had no other air supplied than that which the boat carried down with her. Besides these chemical means there are rub- ber tubes floated by buoys, with nozzles which protrude above the wash of the surface water. There is in each tube an automatic valve, whicli prevents water coming through the pipe at the time the air is being pumped in, and the depth below the surface to which outside air can be supplied is limited only by the length of the pipe. In the plate, A represents a patented inter- changeable boiler, in which either hydro-carbon- ate fuel or caustic soda can be used, in both cases steam being the motive power. The interior boil- er for the use of the caustic soda is surrounded by a jacket, into which the steam exhausted from the engine can be used before it becomes so sat- urated as to create a back pressure on the engine, that is, for a period of twelve hours. When this 17 3.- ^ J -n' i'58 APPENDIX I. limit is attained, and the surface is reached, the soda can be blown off into an outer receptacle provided for the purpose, and then reheated and recharged. The In'dro-carbon fuel is ordinary mineral oil, carried in tanks of sufficient capacity for a surface run of a week. It mav be emphasized as an important fact that this method of exhausting- into the jacket of the boiler avoids the possibility of any bubbles appearing- on the surface, as was notably the case with the earlier Lay boats. Before diving, the caustic soda, which has been already heated by the combus- tion of the oil to the proper degree, acts in place of the ordinary' fuel, thus consti- tuting a sort of perpetual motion, until the point of saturation is reached, and back- pressure in the engine results. The boat, wheu on the surface, is run with the oil fuel, but as soon as it becomes necessary to dive this fire is extinguished, the after-hatch is opened by unlocking the door of the bulkhead separating- the after from the bulkheaded end of the vessel, and by a svstem of fans the hot air from the fire - room is driven outboard. Then the after telescopic hatch is reefed and secured, the soda is thrown from the re- ceptacle where it has been heated into the jacket of the caustic-soda boiler, the fires are put out, the smoke-stack is taken in and secureh' fastened, and the ma- chinist, leaving the engine - room, goes through the bulkhead door into the for- ward compartment, where he has complete control of the machinery and boiler by means of a duplicate set of gauges and levers. In case of an attack, the man do- tailed for operating- the main torpedo is left in the after compartment, where he has access to that weapon and to the buoy, reel, and other mechanical ajjpliances employed in its operation. The helmsman, who controls the steering apparatus that governs the horizon- tal and perpendicular rudders, also operates with his feet the levers which are connected by links to the throttle that supplies steam to cylinders K K. These last function like the ^Yesting-house brake, and are connected with pistons to the cylinders J J. Through their agency water is at will admitted into or forced out of the larger receptacles, either from one end or from both ends simultaneoush'. The effect of discharging water is of course to increase the buoyancy of the ves- sel ; and of admitting it, to decrease this quality so that without changing struct- ural weights the boat is enabled to rise or sink perpendicularly, or, by admitting more water in one end than in the other, to take a downward or an upward course. Though this does away with the necessity of the horizontal rudder, it is kept as an additional resource for steering. In case of accident to the connect- ing pipes or machinery the vessel is supplied with water receptacles and hand- pumps, which are able to govern its submergence so that should all other mechan- ism break down the Iioat is so completely under the control of the operator that it can at all times be brought to the surface. As an additional safeguard, there is on the outside of the boat a quantity of ballast which can be readily detached by the arms or sleeves previously described, and so effectively that the reserve buoyancy thus gained will alone carry the boat to the surface. In addition to the main torpedo and buoy resting in the cylindrical apertures aft, otlier torpedoes, connected iiy spans, are carried on deck. The method of their employment in attack is to go under the body of the vessel athwartship, and APPENDIX I. 259 to liberate them. As they are fitted with magnets, tliey '"'ill, it is claimed, v/hen freed, attach themselves to the bilges of the enemy's vessel, while the Peacemaker can continue her cruise and let them act automatically, or, backing off to a dis- tance greater than the depth of water in which she then is, safely explode them by conventional electrical appliances. Witli the increased speed of the present boat there are various methods of attacking vessels of war when under way, among them one wdiich is somewhat similar to that described above. The Peacemaker, when under the body of the vessel athwartship, would lii)cr- ate a buoy, B, that is connected with a torpedo, T, by a chain, the length of which depends upon the depth Vjeneath the buoy the torpedo is desired to float. The steel tow-line to the torpedo is payed out from reel G to a sulficient length, and then by going ahead with the boat the torpedo is drawn close under the opposite side of vessel from buoy B. In this position the torpedo can be exploded by electricity. If necessary, by liberating buoy B, while crossing the bow on the starboard side of the fore-foot of a vessel, the forward motion will draw the torpedo, T, close in to the opposite side ; then, by a system of push-pins on the torpedo, the operator learns that it is in close contact and ready for explosion by electricitv. Should the enemy's vessel be at anchor the tide can be employed for the purpose of bringing the buoy on one side of the vessel while the torpedo is on the other. The boat is supplied with the ordinary incandescent lights, or apparatus for liffhtinir the interior for nio-ht attacks. TORPEDOES. America has contributed to modern warfare many of its most valuable inven- tions. In the decade of 1850-60 the steam frigates of the Merrimac class revo- lutionized the naval constructions of the world, and became the models for the war-ships of the great maritime powers. In the same period our coast defences reached the high-water mark of modern development, and, soon to be crystallized, there were seething in the brains of American inventors ideas of guns, ships, and projectiles which made history. Though to-day our created contributions to quick peace through arrested or irresistible war are meagre, still many of the theories which make possible modern ordnance and ships are the fruits of American gen- ius and industry. Is the future to be as fertile in thought and deed? Are the destroyers of Ericsson, the dynamite safety shells of Hayes, the guns of Zalinski, the torpedoes of Howell, Sims, or Berdan, the turrets of Timby, the submarine monitors of Tuck, the gun-carriages of King or Buffington, the ordnance of Sicard, Benet — are these to prove that Yankee brain and brawn are potent yet for the mastery of the problem ? The country has no plainer duty than to foster by every care American ideas working in national ways of thought. It is rich, public sentiment is ripe and responsive, and Congress should encourage in peace the experiments which may make war impossible. In the question of ship armament and sea-coast fortifica- tions notably, the value of torpedoes is now so generally recognized that the 200 APPENDIX I. definite selection of some type has attained an importance which demands most careful consideration. All experts agree that they are vital, but there is not that consensus of opinion which within limits afhrms exactly what should be done. The Fortification Board in their report say : " It is not generally considered possible to bar the progress of an armored fleet by the mere tire of a battery ; some obstructions sutticient to arrest the ships within effective range of the guns is necessary. The kind of obstruction now relied upon is the torpedo, in the form of a submarine mine, and, except in special cases, exploded by electric cur- rents which are so managed that the operator on shore can either ignite the mine under the ship's bottom, or allow the ship to explode it by contact. In deep channels the submarine mines are Ijuoyant ; in comparatively shallow waters the}' are placed upon the bottom — the object in both cases being to touch or nearly approach the hull of the vessel. Submarine mines are not accessaries to defence, but are essential features wherever they can be applied." The Senate Committee on Ordnance and War-ships reported : " Concerning another class of torpedoes, ' tixed ' or ' anchored ' or ' planted,' technically known as submarine mines, there is a great popular misapprehension. Their value is greatlv over-estimated. They require picked and trained men for their manage- ment, electrical apparatus for their discharge and for lighting up the approaches, stations on shore secure against sudden assault, a flanking fire of canister and case shot and of machine guns (themselves protected), light draught picket-boats, and the overshadowing protection of armored forts and heavy guns. None of these tilings can be extemporized. The submarine mine alone is of little use, and it must accompany, not precede, more costly and less easily prepared means of defence." There is, however, a more definite agreement as to the value of torpedo-boats. The Fortification Board declare : " Among the most important means of conduct- ing an active defence of the coast is the torpedo-boat, which, although recently developed, has received the sanction of the nations of Europe, each one of which now possesses a large number of tliese vessels. Their use will be quite general. First, in disturbing blockades, and preventing these from being made close, as no fleet would like to lie overnight within striking distance of a station of these boats ; secondly, in attacking an enemy's ship enveloped in fog or smoke ; thirdly, in relieving a vessel pursued by the enemy ; and fourthly, in defending the mines by night and by day against attempts at countermining, and in many other ways not necessary to recapitulate." Impressed with the utility of this mode of defence, the Board recommended the construction of one hundred and fifty of these boats, and the organization of a special corps of otficers and men from the nav)' trained to their use. In England, Commander Gallwey does not hesitate to say that the torpedo- boat is for harbor defence so superior to the submarine mine that he would not be surprised if before long it superseded the latter altogether. In France, Charmes insists that an armored vessel will run the most serious risk if a torpedo- boat is allowed to approach unobserved to within one thousand to fifteen hun- dred feet; that the torpedo will surely triumph over the iron-clad, and that armor has been vanquished, not by the gun, but by the torpedo. APPENDIX I. 261 A NAVAL RESERVE. Among the problems to be solved by an efficient naval administration there is none more difficult or of greater importance than the formation of reserves of seamen. Our late war exposed the nation's weakness in sailors. At the begin- ning of hostilities the fleet, on paper, consisted of fort3'-two ships of all classes, mainly sailing-vessels, with a few paddle-wheel steamers, and less than ten screw- vessels with auxiliary power. Its personnel comprised seven thousand of all grades. And yet, to blockade a coast of over three thousand miles in length, the Secretary of the Navy had at his disposal but three effective vessels, and a reserve of only two hundred seamen on all the receiving-ships and at all the naval stations. As late as the first of July, 1863, there were not men enough to carry out efficiently the work imposed upon the navy, and of the thirty-four thousand blue- jackets twenty-five thousand were landsmen. Secretary Welles, at the end of the same year, complained that there were no reserve seamen, that the supply for im- mediate and imperative duties was so inadequate that one of the largest and fastest steamers destined for important foreign service had been detained for months in consequence of the need of a crew, and that many other vessels were very much short of their complements. The cause of this was want of foresight, of prudence, of national common-sense even. We did not lack the material from which crews could have been drawn, for in 1860 over seventy-five thousand men sailed in the American merchant marine, fifty thousand of whom, under any sys- tem of enrolment suited to our national instincts and prejudices, would, before the end of 1861, have been available for duty on shipboard. In peace there had been no organization, so when war came we were almost helpless, and as late as the end of 186.3 not twenty per cent, of the men who should have been ready for service were in government ships. Let doctrinaires theorize as they may, this was not the fault of our maritime class, for thousands of sailors and fishermen who had already entered the army were by force of law denied the opportunity either of enlisting in, or of being transferred to, the navy. In addition, the operation of the draft was made detrimental to the naval interests of the country, for it violated the Act of May, 1792, which ex- empts from military duty all mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States. Furthermore, the government unjustly discriminated against the seaboard towns, for not only was the seafaring class, which is fostered and cherished by all maritime governments, withdrawn from the element to which it has been accustomed, but in addition sailors actually afloat were taken from their ships and compelled, under the penalty of law, to enter the land service. It was not until 1864 that Congress finally enacted the law which enabled seamen serving as soldiers to be drafted into the navy. How different would have been the state of affairs had there existed in 1861 some system of government administration as to the creation of naval reserves, or more far-reaching still, had we been free from that illogical distrust which possessed the whole country ! The fear of too much centralization was the stock in trade of professional patriots, and the people, hampered by traditions which ■2l'>-2 AITENUIX I. had come down to us from our English ancestors, saw in any attempt towards ■ efficient war preparation in times of peace all the dangers they had heen taught to lielieve existed in standing armies. England acted more wiselv, for she had been taught a grim lesson by her adversities, and without fear we might have profited by her example. In the history of the Peninsula war, Napier, after picturing the horrors of the fearful Aj)ril night when Badajoz was stormed, asked, bitterly, "And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter when the application of a just science would have rendered the operations comparatively easy? " Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge into war, were quite igno- rant of its exercises ; because the English people are warlike without being mili- tary, and, under the pretence of maintaining liberty which they do not possess, opj)ose in peace all useful martial establishments. In the beginning of each war England had to seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure suc- cess." Equally has this always been the attitude of the American people towards every attempt made in peace to prepare for war. Besides this natioiud distrust, prejudices had to be overcome which have existed both in the navy and the mer- chant marine. Our naval officers have never made any determined effort to create a reserve, either because they have not fully grasped the correlation and interde- pendence of the navy and the merchant marine, or because they have doubted the wisdom of spending upon an outside issue appropriations which, given to the navj-, would produce a more immediate and tangible result. But from both points of view they are wrong, " for a navy unsupported by a merchant marine is a hot- house plant which may produce great results for a while, but cannot endure the strain of a long protracted campaign." From the merchant marine the personnel of the navy in war must come, and it is a fallacy to believe that by a small addi- tion to our ordinar}- naval resources we would be able to cope with the navies of other maritime powers, or that in a long war an efficient and nnmerous reserve is not of greater importance than a few more seamen permanently maintained in the navy during peace. To the merchants and ship-owners the question is one of vital importance. The earliest and most disastrous consequence of war will fall upon the shipping interest. Under any system of defence the necessities of the nav}' nmst with- draw seamen from the merchant service and raise the rate of wages. If, then, by timely precautions during peace, we can diminish the probability that war can occur at all ; if we are ready upon the outbreak of war to show that onr home- ward-bound ships are safe ; if we can abolish o'r modify the risk that the employ- ment of seamen would be abruptlj^ susjiendcd by embargo or interfered with bv" impressment or draft; if we can attach the sailor to his country, and prevent him from seeking employment under other flags, surely the owners of our ships and merchants will reap the greatest advantage. Abroad the importance of the sub- ject has been fully recognized. France, under a system which has existed for over two hundred and fifty years, maintains a reserve of 172,000 men, who are be- tween the ages of eighteen and fifty ; 05,000 of these are between the ages of APPENDIX I. 263 twenty and twenty-six, 15,000 are usually kept afloat, and 6000 more are quar- tered on shore. Germany lias 15,000, and England nearly the same nuniher. Notwithstandino; the decadence of our shipping intei'est we have a largo force from which to draw. The maritime population of tliis country numbers over 350,000, of whom 180,000 are available for the fleet. This number of course in- cludes all those in any way connected with sea industries, and embraces coasters, fishermen, whalers, yachtsmen, boatmen, and all workmen in ship-building yards and equipment shops and stores. To man our ships in time of war three means are open : voluntaiV enliscraent, draft or impressment, or employment of men enrolled in a naval reserve. It would be unreasonable to depend altogether upon the loval and unselfish patriot- ism of necessitous men serving before the mast, and there is a chance that mere enthusiasm would not induce a seaman to join the navy if employment was being ofl^ered elsewhere at increasing rates of pay. Impressment under any name is unpopular. In its common form it is illegal, and the draft is ever a last resort and always a dangerous measure. Nothing, then, remains as a certainty but to turn towards the naval reserve as the best means of manning our fleet. In time of war not only would the men enrolled come forward willingly and be immedi- ately available, but deserters would liave the machinery of the law put in motion for their apprehension, and popular feeling would be as earnest in support of their arrest as it would be opposed to all attempts which enforced the arbitrary powers of draft or impressment. No system exists abroad entirely suited to our necessities and our national instincts ; but, generally speaking, that adopted in England comes nearest to what we should employ. Naturally our lake sailors, coasters, fishermen, and yachts- men would form the main body of the reserve. These should be enrolled, divided into classes, be given each year a certain fixed sum of pay, with an increase for each day's drill, and at stated times they should be embarked for great gun prac- tice at sea, so they miglit learn sometliing of man-of-war routine and discipline. The officers could be drawn from the merchant marine, from the graduates of the school-ships, and from former officers of the regular and volunteer services who are now in civil life. FORCED DRAFT. The subject of forced draft is of great importance, and, as a corollary of high- speed development, is being studied with keen interest. There are wide difl'er- ences of opinion not only as to the proper systems, but even as to the value of the principle. The literature as yet is rather meagre, but an excellent compilation of ex- isting material will be found in the latest publication of the Naval Intelligence Office. "A forced draft in the furnaces," explains the Marine Engineer of September, 1887, " can be generated in two ways : first, by exhausting the uptakes and fun- nels of the products of combustion, when a greater flow of air will necessarily take place through the fire-bars ; and secondly, by increasing the pressure of the air in the furnaces beyond that of the atmosphere. The steam-lilast in marine boilers is well known to engineers as a means of quickly getting up the steam after 20-1 APPENDIX I. its pressure has dropped ; but the locomotives on our railways afEord a ver}' good illustration of how boilers may be continuously worked under forced combustion through a jet of steam exhausting the smoke-box and funnel of the products of combustion. This system of creating a draft involves a very large expenditure of steam and water, and as it is a sine qua tion in these days of high pressure that only fresh water should be used in boilers, and also as only a limited supply of this element can be carried in a ship, it follows that the plan of inducing a forced draft by means of a steam jet in the funnel cannot be well adopted in marine boilers. " Mr. Martin, the inventor of the well-known furnace doors, substitutes a fan in the uptake for the steam jet, and so arranges his funnel that in the event of the forced draft not being required the gases of combustion arising from natural draft will not be impeded in their exit to the atmosphere. lie claims for his invention that it does away with all necessity for closing in the stoke-holds or furnaces, and that in war-ships funnels could be dispensed with, as the gases and smoke could be discharged anywhere from the fans. He also claims that by his plan of pro- ducing a draft the boiler-tubes become much more etheient as heating surfaces, and that the ends of the tubes in the fire-box are not so lialjle to be burned awav, and that therefore there will be less chance of the boiler leaking round the tubes. There appears to be some grounds for these latter assumptions, for it is a well- known fact that the tubes of locomotive boilers, which are worked, as we have seen, on the exhaust principle, do very much more work than those of marine boilers before the}' are ferruled or rolled. It can also be shown by a very simple experiment that when the gases are sucked or drawn through the tubes the flame extends a much greater distance along the tube than when the gases are driven through the tubes. In this latter case the flame impinges on the tube-plates be- fore separating into tongues and entering the tubes; but when sucked through the tongues of flame commence at some little distance from the plate before pen- etrating the tubes, and the ends are not therefore burned as when the flame im- pinges directly on them. It may be urged, however, against Martin's system that owing to the greatly increased volume of the products of combustion due to their temperature, fans of from three to four times the size of those used in other sys- tems are required; also, that the uptakes have to be made larger and heavier to take in the fans ; and lastly, that the fans themselves are likely to be quickly ren- dered inefficient through working in a temperature of at least a thousand degrees. These objections prove so formidable that up till the present time Martin's plan of creating a forced draft has made little or no headway. " The other plan for creating an artificial draft in marine furnaces is to force air into them by means of fans. This is done either by closing in the whole of the stoke-hold and filling it with air of a pressure greater than that of the atmosphere, or by pumping the air direct into the furnace. This latter is the usual practice in the mercantile marine, where economy of fuel is sought after. Mr. Ilowden seeks, bv first heating the air, and then forcing it by means of fans into the furnaces and ash-pits, to insure a very rapid and complete combustion of the coal. His plan has been carried out in the Atlantic liner Ohio quite recently, and the results as published lead one to expect that with a little more progress in the direction in APPENDIX I. 265 which he is working our ships will be driven across the Atlantic without the ex- penditure of any fuel whatever. The fact of heating the air to a temperature of two hundred degrees before it enters the furnace cannot go very far in affecting either the rapidity or the completeness of the combustion of the fuel, and it cer- tainly cannot affect the economy. Where the tire-grate area is small compared with the total heating surface, good evaporative results are likely to be obtained ; and in the Ohio the tire-grate area was certainly smaller than is usual for the same sized boilers fitted with forced draft. The trip of the Ohio to America lias given somewhat different results to those of the official trials, and it is a question wheth- er any saving in weight, either in the apparatus required to produce forced draft under this system, or in the economy of fuel to be derived from it, has been ob- tained more than exists in the system of closed stoke-holds. "The only plan that seems to hold its own is the closed stoke-hold system, and the results that have been obtained with it in the navy are so satisfactory that Messrs. J. ct G. Thomson are about to adopt it in the two large Inman liners they are now building; and also several other firms are about to introduce it in prefer- ence to all other plans for increasing the efficiency of their boilers and promoting greater economy. In the Royal Navy space and weight are of such vital impor- tance that the boilers have to be constructed on principles the very reverse of those which exist in boilers specially designed for high evaporative work per pound of fuel ; and it is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the consumption of fuel per indicated horse-power has not been reduced since the introduction of forced draft; but, on the other hand, the capabilities of the boilers have been ex- panded far beyond the expectations of a few years ago. In the mercantile marine there is no reason whatever why the system of closed stoke-holds for creating a forced draft should not combine economy with greater efficiency in the boilers." These conclusions are not universally accepted, as will be seen in the fol- lowing extract from the article contributed by Assistant Engineer R. S. Griffin, United States Navv, to the Naval Intelligence Office publication mentioned at the beginning of this subject. " The forced-draft trials of the Archer class," he writes, " go far towards sus- taining the objections raised by Mr. Howden against the closed stoke-hold sys- tem. The trials of the Archer, Brisk, and Cossack had to be discontinued on sev- eral occasions, owing to leakage of the boiler-tubes ; and when it is remembered that these trials are for only four hours, and that no provision is made for hoist- ing ashes, it becomes a question of serious consideration whether the maintenance of this high power for such a short period brings with it advantages at all com- parable with the continued development of a reasonably high power with an eco- nomical expenditure of coal, such as is possible with the closed ash-pit system. " A number of steamers have been fitted with Howden's system during the past year, among others the Celtic, of the White Star Line, and the Ohio, of the International Navigation Company, One of the latest steamers fitted with this system is the City of Venice, whose engines were converted from compound to quadruple expansion. Her boilers were designed to develop 1800 indicated horse- power with eighty square feet of grate, but on trial she could only work off 1300 indicated horse-power, owing to some derangement of the valves. She was after- 2G6 APPENDIX I. wards tried with half the grate surface in use, when it was demonstrated that there would be no ditficultv in developing the power so far as the boilers were coneerned. Unfortunately, no data as to weight of boilers, space, or heating surface are obtainable. "In 1880 the ^Ulkinre was supplied with new boilers, fitted with a system of forced draft designed hj the Bureau of .Steam Engineering. It was originally the intention of the Department to put six boilers in this vessel, as in the Enter- prise and Xipsic, but with the introduction of the forced-draft system, which was purely experimental, this number was reduced to four, having a total grate sur- face of 128 square feet. The boilers were designed to burn anthracite coal with natural draft, and were of course unsuited to the requirements of forced draft, the ratio of heating to grate surface being only 25.6 to 1, and the water surface .and steam space being small. The maxiuuim indicated horse-power developed on trial was 1022, but any attempt to run at this or at increased power for any length of time was attended with so much priming of the boilers that the ti'ial had to be discontinued. xVlterations were made in the boilers to prevent the jjriming, but no continuous trial was had pireviously to the sailing of the AUianee. The results (jl)tained on a measured base were, however, sufficient to demonstrate the practica- bility of the system, and to show tluit a higher power could be maintained with the four boilers at forced draft than with the original eight boilers at natural draft. " The practical working of the system at sea presents no difficulty, as a recent ruu of the Alliance has demonstrated. On a continuous run of ten hours, using only two boilers with sixty square feet of grate (the grate surface of each boiler having been reduced to thirty), the mean indicated horse-power was 068 and the luaximum "744, being respectively 11.1 and 12.4 indicated horse-power per square foot of grate. There was an entire absence of priming, and no difficulty was ex- perienced in operating the forced-draft apparatus, the length of the trial having been determined by the arrival of the vessel in port. The coal burned was Welsh, of fair quality^ the consumpition being 29.9 pounds per square foot of grate. •' Tlie etficiency of the system may be judged b}' the results obtained fioiu an experimental boiler at the Washington Navy-yard. The boiler was of the marine locomotive type, and had a ratio of heating to grate surface of 32. 73 to 1, with a water space of 24.5 and a steam space of 163 cubic feet. The coal burned was ordinary Cumberland Valley bituminous, and the evaporation, when burning as much as forty pounds per square foot of grate, was 6.01, while with 37. .5 it was 7.24, and tliis with a moderate air pressure — 1.5 inches in ash-])it and one inch on furnace door." It is unfair to attempt the explanation of this system without accompanying drawings, but it may be stated that the air, drawn by fan-blowers from the heated portion of the tire-room, is forced through a pas.sage into the ash-pit and furnace, a portion of the current being directed by an interposed plate through the holes in the furnace frame. By the agency of a double row of holes the greater por- tiim of the air which enters tlie furnace jiasses around the frame, thence through other apertures to the space between the furnace door and lining, and finally to the furnace through the space between the lining and furnace frame. The supply of air when tiring or hauling ashes 's shut off by a damper. APPENDIX II.* TIIE QUESTION OF TYPES. Tlie following letter appeared in the Times (London) of April 4, 1885 : " SiK, — Maj' I request the favor of space in tlie Times ia which to comment upon llie opinions recently expressed b_v Sir Edward Reed and other writers respecting tlie designs of the Admiral class of ships in the lioyal Navy, and the four central-citadel ships which were laid down subsequently to the Inflexible'' "Having been close)}' associated with ]\Ir. Barnabj' in the designing of all these ships, with the exception of the Ajax and Agamemnon, I can speak with full knowledge of boili the history and intentions of the designs. "JMoreover, m}' share of the responsibility for the professional work involved in those designs remains, although my official connection with the constructive department of the Admiralty was severed years ago. It need hardly be added that the remaiks which follow simply embody my own opinions, and that I write neither as an apologist for Mr. Barnatjy nor as a champion of the ship-liuilding policy of the Admiralty. " The sweeping condemnation which has been pronounced against the most recent English battle-ships is based upon the consideration of one featiu'e only in their fighting efficiency, viz., the extent of the armor protection of their sides in the region of the water-line. There has been no discussion in the letters to which I have referred of the comparative speeds, armaments, or other cpialities of the French and English ships. But the fact that the French ships are armor-tielted from end to end, while the English ships have no vertical armor on considerable portions of the length at the region of the water-line, is considered by Sir Edward Reed so serious a matter that he .saj's, 'The French ar- mored ships must in all reason be expected to dispose of these English ships in a very few minutes by simply destroying their unarmored parts.' "From this opinion I most strongly dissent, for reasons which are stated below; and I venture to assert that if attention is directed simply to the possible effects of gun-fire, while the possibl}' greater risks incidental to attacks with the ram and torpedo are alto- gether neglected, then there is ample justification for the belief that the English ships of recent design can do battle on at least equal terms with their contemporaries in the French or any other navy. "In ail recent armored .ships, if the wholesale and extremely rapid destruction of the uuarmored portions of the ships which Sir Edward Reed contemplates actually took place, very considerable risks would undoubtedly result; but in my judgment these risks are not sensibly affected by the different distribution of the armor on the ships of the two great navies. And, further, there is every reason for doubting whether such whulesale destruction of the unarmored parts could be effected with the appliances which are now iivailable, not merely in 'a few minutes,' but in a very considerable time, and under the most favorable conditions for the attack. Nor must it be forgotten that armor, even of the greatest thickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships is not impenetrable to the attack of guns already atloat, wdiile the mitrniUe, which is driven back into a ship when arinor is penetrated, is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can be, and at- tacks directly the vital parts which the armor is intended to protect. * From the General Information Series No. V., V. S. Naval Intelligence Office. 26S APPENDIX II. "In support of these assertions I must ask permission to introduce certain detailed slatements wliicli appear to be absolutely necessary to a discussion of the subject, but which shall be made as brief and untechnical as possible. " It appears that the points raised by the discussion may be grouped under two heads. First, does the shortening of the belt in the English ships introduce such serious dangers if they have to do battle with the French ships? Secondly, what should be considered the principal uses of armor plating in modern war ships ? The second question may be considered to include the first; but it will be convenient to take the questions in the order in which they have been placed, as, after all, the greatest immediate interest centres in the comparison between e.visting ships. " At the outset it is important to remark that in the most recent designs of armored ships for all navies, increase in speed, armament, and thickness of armor has been as- sociated with a decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further, it has been considered important in most cases to distribute the armored positions of the heavy guns in the ships in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the princi- pal armament by one or two lucky shots which may happen when the lieavy guns are concentrated in a single citadel or battery. This distribution of the heavy guns alsr gives greater efficiency to the au.xiliary armament of lighter guns, and enables these heav) gims to be placed at a considerably greater height above water than was usual in former days, so tliat the chances of the guns being prevented from being fought in heavy weather are diminished, and their power as compared with the lower guns in earlier ships is in- creased, especially when firing with depression. "The days of the ' completely protected iron-clad,' with the broadside armored through- out the length from the upper deck down to five or six feet below the water-line, have long gone by. The 'central battery and belt' system has also been practically dropped, whether the batter}' contained broadside guns or forined a citadel protecting the bases of the turrets. In short, on modern battle-ships there now remains on!}- a narrow belt of ar- mor, rising from five or six feet below the load-line to two or three feet above it. This narrow strij:! of armor in the French ships extends from end to end, and is associated with a protective deck worked at the height of the top of the belt, and forming a strong roof to the hold spaces beneath. In the English ships of the Admiral class the belt of armor ex- tends somewhat less than half the total length, protecting one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty feet of the central portion of the ship (in which are situate the engines and boilers), and protecting also the communications fi-om the barbette towers to the mag- azines. At the extremities of the belt strong armored bidlvheads are built across the ships. The protected deck is fitted at the upper edge of the belt over the central portion. Before and abaft the bulkheads, where there is no side armor, the protection consists of a strong steel deck, situated from four to five feet below water, and extending to the bow and stern respectively. Upon tliis under-watcr deck are placed coal-bunkers, chain-lockers, fresh-water tanks, store-rooms, etc., the spaces between it and the deck next above being subdivided into a large number of water-tight compartments or cells by means of lon- gitudinal and transverse bulkheads. A water-tight top or roof to these compartments is formed b_y plating over the main deck-beams with thin slecl at the same height above wa- ter as the top of the armor-belt. In this manner the unarmored ends above the protective deck are not merely packed to a large extent with water-excluding substances when the vessel is fully laden, but they are minutely subdivided into separate compartments, which can only be thrown into communication with one another by means of yexy extensive in- juries to the partitions. "In all the modern French ships, as well as in the Admiral class, a light steel super- structure of considerable height is built above the level of the belt-deck; the living quar- ters of the crew and the stations of tlie auxiliary armament are contained within this light erection, which also surrounds the armored communications from the barbette towers to the inagazines. In this manner a ship with a small height of armored freeboard is con- verted into a high-sided ship for all purposes of ordinary navigation, sea-worthiness, and habitability ; while spaces are provided in which a more or less considerable number of APPENDIX 11. 269 HS'l't guns can be fought concurronlly with tlie heavy guns placed in tlie armor-protected stations. The radical difference, tlierefore, between the French ships and the AdiiUral class, independently of other considerations tlian the armor protection of tlie water-line, consists in the omission of the side armor at the extremities, and the use instead of the side armor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision and other arrangements for adding to the protection and securing tlie buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into which water may find access through the thin sides if Ihey are shot through and seriously dam- aged in action. If the completely belted French ship has to tight a vessel of the Admiral class, the latter has obviously the greater chance of damage to the narrow strips of the sides lying above the under-water deck before and abaft the ends of the belt. If the ac- tion takes place in smooth water, when the sliips are neither rolling nor pitching, but are simply in motion, the chances of hitting tliese narrow strips in tlie water-line region miglit not be very great; but it must be admitted that even the lightest guns would penetrate the thin sides of the English ships and admit more or less considerable quantities of water into the ends. If, on the other hand, tlie tight takes place in a sea-wa}', with the ships lolling and pitching, then the relative importance of penetration of these narrow strijis of the ends of the English ships becomes much less, because the belt armor of the French ships will be brought out of water for a considerable length of the bow and the stern by a very moderate angle of pitching, or tjy the passage of a comparatively low wave, and be- cause rolling motion of the sliips will alternately immerse or emerge the belt armor, even at the midships part, where it has its greatest thickness. In fact, as I have more than once said publicly, it is clearly an error to limit criticism to the longitudinal extent of the belt armor in modern ships, and to exclude consideration of the vertical extent of the armor above and below tlie load-line. Apart from any discussion of the question from the ar- tillerist's point of view, or any attempt to determine the probability or otherwise of the wholesale destruction of the unarmored portions of modern battle-ships by shell-fire from large guns, or by the projectiles from rapid-firing and machine guns, it is perfectly obvious to any one who will examine into the matter that the risk of damage to the light super- structures situated above tlie belt must be greater than the corresponding risk of damage to the narrow strips of side area exposed at the unarmored ends of the Adtniral class, be- tween the level of the belt-deck and the water-line. "Sir Spencer Robinson, after his inspection of the models shown him at the Admiralty, recognizes the fact that in the French belted ships (of which the Amind Duperre is an example), if the light sides above the belt-deck are destroyed or very seriously riddled in action, the ship would be capsized in a very moderate sea-way. He further emphasizes the statement that the ships of the Admiral class in the English navy, if similarly treated, would also capsize under the same conditions, and he appears to be surprised at the ad- mission having been made. The fact is that there has never been any assertion that the Admiral class would be safe against capsizing independently of assistance given to the armor-belted portions by the unarmored structure situated above. On the contrary, from the first, in the design of these ships, it was recognized that their stability, in the sense of their power to resist being capsized, if inclined to even moderate angles of inclination, was not guaranteed by the armor-belts. In this respect they were in identically the same position as all other armored ships with shallow water-line belts and isolated armored bat- teries placed high above water. "What has been said respecting the Admiral class is this: If the unarmored ends above the protective deck w-ere completely thrown open to the sea, then the initial stability (that is to say, the stiffness of the ships or their power to resist small inclinations from the up- rin-ht) would still be guaranteed by the central armored portions. So fully did we appre- ciate the fact that the life of the ship in action (as determined by her power to resist large inclinations) depends greatly upon the assistance given by the unarmored superstructures to the armor-belted parts, that we were careful to make the structural arrangements of the superstructures above the belts such that they could bear a very consideralile amount of riddlin,"- and damage from shot and shell without ceasing to contribute in the most impor- tant degree to the buoyancy and stability. 270 APPENDIX II. 'There are double cellular sides bet-ween the belt and upper decks; the main bulk- heads are carried up high above water; hatches and openings are trunked up and protect- ed b}' coffer dams. In short, ever}' possible precaution is taken to subdivide into com- partments, and th\is limit the spaces to which water can find access when the outer sides are penetrated or shattered, as well as to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot- holes in the sides. " Now, wilhout in the least intending to discredit the work of the French designers, I have to state that no corresponding or equal precautions have been taken in the portions of their ships lying above the belt-decks. And the absence of these features in the French ships is a great relative advantage to the English ships. Of course there is nothing to hin- der the French from imitating our practice, but thej^ are content to take the risks involved in a simpler construction, and in so doing the}' show their practical disbelief in the doc- trine of armor-protected staliiHiy. I am aware that some eminent authorities do not con- cur with Ibis view, and maintain that stability, and buoj'ancy should be guaranteed by armor. To this point I will revert hereafter, but for the present I am content to say that, as between the French ships and the Admiral class, the most serious risks of damage by gun- fire in action are of the same kind, and, praclicall}', are not affected by the shortening of the armor-belts in the English ships. " Next I would refer to the diflerences which are undoubtedly involved in shortening the belts of the English ships. In the first place, by dispensing with the side armor tow- ards the extremities a very considerable saving is effected in the weiglit and the cost of the armor fitted to the ships. Mr. Barnab}' has recently given an illustration of this, where a ship, in other respects unchanged, has to be increased from 10,000 to 11,000 tons in displacement in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to the ends. In the Colli iigirood herself quite as large a proportionate increase of size would be involved in having a thick armor-belt from stem to stern. This saving in weight and cost of armor might, of course, be purchased too dearly, if dispensing with the armor involved possiblj' fatal risks to the ship. However the result may be attained, there is universal agreement that a ship-of-wav should have her buoyancy, stability, and trim guaranteed as far as possible against the effects of damage in action. Now, in the Admiral class this matter was very carefully in- vestigated before the design was approved. In order to prevent derangement of the trim of the vessels by penetration of the light sides above the protective deck at one end, arrangements were made in the design by means of which water can be introduced into the spaces occupied by coal-bunkers, etc., before the ships go into action. "The extent to which water may be introduced is a matter over which the captain would necessaril}' have control. But even if the whole of the unoccupied spaces were filled with water, the increase in draught would not exceed fourteen to eighteen inches, and the loss in speed would not exceed half a knot. If onh' the coal-bunkers were flood- ed as a preliminary to action, the chance of any serious disturbance of trim, and conse- quent loss of manceuvring power or speed by damage to the light sides above the protec- tive deck and near the water, would be very small, and the ' sinkage ' of the vessel would be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme case, with the ends completely filled and a sinkage of fourteen to cigliteen inches, a ship of the Admiral class would go into action with practically her full speed available, and with her ends so protected by under- water deck and the water admitted above that deck that damage to the thin sides by shot or shell penetrating at or near the water line would not produce changes of trim or altera- tions of draught to any greater extent than would be produced if the armor-belt had been carried to the stem and stern. Nor would the admission of water into the ends render the vessel unstable. " It has been urged that the sinkage due to filling the tank ends with water is a disad- vantage, because it brings the upper edge of the belt armor in the Admiral class about fourteen to eighteen inches nearer the water than the upper edge of the belts of the French ships. It the greatest danger of the ships was to be measured by the smallness of their 'reserve' of 'armor-protected buoyancy' (that is to say, by the buoyancy of the part of the ship lying above her fighting water-line and below the belt-deck), then the Admiral APPENDIX II. 271 class would not compare favorably with the fully belted French ships. But I have already explained that this is not the true measure of tlie greatest danger arising from tlie effects of gun-tire, and that it would l)e a, mistake to assume that in either the Fi'encli or the Englisli ships tlie armor-belted portions of the vessels guarantee tlieir safetj' wlien dam- aged in action. "As between the Admiral class and the central-citadel ships of the Inflexible tj'pe there is a difference in this respect which has been much commented upon. When the ends of the citadel ships are tilled with water, tlie armored wall of the citadel still remains several feet above water; whereas, in the Admiral class, the top of the belt under similar conditions is very near the water-level. All that need be said on this point is that, not- withstanding the greater height of the armored wall above water, the citadel ships have practically no greater guarantee of safety against capsizing by means of armor-protected stability than the Admiral class. In both classes the armored portions requh'e the assist- ance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action. And, as has been stated above, this condition is true of all armor-clads with narrow armor-belts. " One other objection to the shortened belts yet remains to be considered. " It is urged that when the thin ends are broken through or damaged by shot or shell, jagged or protruding holes will be formed in the plating near the water-line, and then if the ships are driven at speed, the water will flow into the holes in large quantities, and produce serious changes of trim and loss of speed. In support of this contention, refer- ence is made to the published reports of experiments made with the Inflexibk's model about eight years ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must therefore content myself with a statement of my opinion, formed after a careful personal observa- tion of these model experiments. First, it cannot be shown from the experiments that the presence of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three feet above the still-water line would make any sensible difference in the dangers arising from the circumstances described. Holes in the thin sides above this belt would admit water in large quantities on the belt -deck when the vessel was under way, and if it could flow along that deck changes of trim and other disagreeable consequences would result. Secondly, it is certain that the numerous bulkheads and partitions, coffer-dams, etc., built above the belt-deck level in the Admiral class for the very purpose of limiting the flow of entering water would greatly decrease any tendency to check the speed or change the trim. Whether the belt" be short or long, it is evident that gaping holes low down in the light sides will make it prudent for a captain to slow down somewhat if he wishes to keep the water out as much as possible. But between such prudence and the danger of disaster there is a wide gulf. "Summing up the foregoing statements, I desire to record my opinion, based upon complete personal knowledge of every detail in the calculations and designs for the Ad- miral class, that the disposition of the belt-armor (in association with the protective decks and cellular sides, water-tight subdivision, etc., existing in tlie unarmored portions of the vessels situated above the protective decks) is such that the buoj^ancy, stability, trim, speed, and manreuvring capabilities are well guaranteed against extensive damage from shot and shell Are in action. And, further, that in these particulars the Admired class are capable of meeting, at least on equal terms, their contemporary ships in the French navy. "I must add that I am not here instituting any comparison between the 'lighting eflSciencies' of the ships of the two fleets; nor have I space in this letter to do so. Opin- ions have differed, and will probably always differ, as to the relative importance of the different qualities which go to make up fighting efficiency. There is no simple formula admitting of general application which enables the comparative fighting values of war- sliips to°be appraised. As the conditions of naval warfare change and war material is developed, so the balance of qualities in ship designing has to be readjusted, and estimates of the fighting powers of existing ships have to be revised. And, further, different design- ers, working simultaneously, distribute the displacement, which is their sum total of capi- tal to work'upon, according to their own judgments of what is wisest and best for the par- 2i'2 APPENDIX II. ticulai- condilioDS wliicli the sliips built from those designs liave to fulfil. The designer who has the larger displacement to work upon has the better oppoituuity of producing a more jiowertul ship; but it b}' no means follows that he will secure so good a combina- tion of qualities as a rival obtains on a smaller displacement. And hence I cannot but dissent from the doctrine that displacement tonnage is to be accepted as a fair measure of relative fighting efflcieucj', or that recent English ships are necessarily unable to fight recent French ships l)ecause they are of smaller displacement. "In the preceding remarks I have been careful to confine myself chiefly to the naval architect's side of the subject, as it would clearly be out of place for me to say much re- specting the artillerist's side. But, having liad tlie great advantage of knowing the views of some of the most experienced gun makers and gunnery ofllcers, and having studied carefully what has been written on tlie subject, I would venture to say a few words, "Fust, there seems, as was. previously remarked, every reason for doubting, in the actual conditions of naval gunner}', wiietlier it would be possible, not merely in a few minutes, but in a considerable time, to produce the wholesale destruction of the unar- mored parts of modern war-ships w'hich has been assumed in the condemnation of the Admiral class. If the C'oUingwood, or one of her successors, were siraplj' treated as a mov- ing target in a sea-way for the Amiral Duperre or one of her consorts, this would be a most improbable result. But, remembering that the C'ollingicood would lierself be deliver- ing heavy blows in return for those received, the chances of her disablement would nec- essarily be decreased. Secondly, it does not seem at all evident that the introduction of rapid-fire guns has such an important influence on the question of shortened belts as some writers have supposed. So far as machine guns are concerned, I well remember at the lioard meeting which decided to approve the building of the Collingicood the possible eff'ects of machine-gun flre were discussed at some length, both in reference to the adop- tion of the barbette system and to the system of hull protection. The rapid-firing gun which has since been introduced is now a formidaljle weapon; but it may be questioned whether its effects upon the unarmored portions of modern war-ships would be so serious as those res\ilting from the shell-fire of heavier guns, and therefore it cannot with cer- taintv be concluded that it would be advantageous to make arrangements for keeping out the projectiles from the rapid-firing guns now in use at the ends of the Admiral class. ]More especially is this true wlien it is considered that already rapid-fire guns of much larger calibre and greater power than the 6 pounder and 9-pounder are being made. To these guns three Indies of steel would be practically no better defence than the existing thin sides, and the real defence lies in the strong protective deck. Shell-fire from heavier guns will probably be found the best form of attack against the unarmored or lightly armored portions of battle-ships, especially now that the use of sleel shells witli thiu walls and large bursting charges is being so rapidly developed. "I would again say that on this side of the subject I do not profess to speak with au- thority, and it is undoubted that great differences of opinion prevail ; but it must not be forgotten tliat the Board of Admiralt}', by its recent decision annoiuiced in the House of Commons, has reaffirmed the opinion that from the ariillerist's point of view tlie existing disposition of the armor in the Admiral class is satisfactory. This has been done after the attention of the Board and the public has been most strongly directed to the supposed dangers incidental to the rapid destruction of tlie light superstructures lying above the under-water decks of the Admiral class. It would be folly to suppose that in such a matter any merely personal considerations would prevent the Board from authorizing a change which was proved to be necessary or advantageous. With respect to the possi- bility of making experiments which should determine the points at issue, I would only say that consideralile difficulties must necessarilj^ arise in endeavoring to represent the conditions of an actual fight; but in view of the diametrically opposite views which have been expressed as to the efliect of gun-fire upon cellular structures, it would certainly be advantageous if some scheme of the kind could be arranged, " There still remains to be considered the question of the uses of armor in future war- ships. This letter has already extended to too great a length to permit of any attempt at APPENDIX II. 273 a full discussion. It will be admiUed liy all who are interested in the questions of naval design that an inquiry into the matter is urgently needed, even if it leads only to a tempo- rary solution of the proljlem, in view of tlie present means of offence and defence. " Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor, but oblique or horizon- tal armor, is regarded in different ways by dilTerent authorities. For example, I under- stand Sir Edward Reed to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of a watei- line belt, extending over a very considerable portion of tlie length, and that such armor, in association with a strong protective deck, and armored erections for gun-stations, etc. should secure the buo^'ancy, trim, and stability of the vessel. At the other extreme we have the view expressed in the design of the grand Italian vessels of the Italia class. In them the hull-armor is only used for the purpose of assisting the cellular hull subdivi- sions in protecting buoyanc}', stabilitjr, and trim, taking the form of a thick protective deck, which is wholl}' under water, and above which comes a miuutely subdivided region, which Signor Brin and his colleagues consider sufficient defence against guo-tire. "In tliese Italian vessels tlie only thick armor is used to protect the gun-stations, the pilot-tower, and the communications from those important parts to the magazines and spaces below the protective deck. The strong deck, besides forming a base of the cellular subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of the ship lying below it. "Between these two types of ships come the Admiral class of the English navy and the belted vessels of the French navy, whose resemblances and differences have been described above. "In addition, there are not a few authorities who maintain that the development of the swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at least questionable, seeing that to attempt to protect ships by thick armor either on decks or sides, and to secure liigh speeds and heavy armaments, involves the construction of large and expensive vessels, which are necessarily exposed to enormous risks in action from forms of under-water attack, against which their armor is no defence. In view of such differences of opinion, and of the heated controversies which have arisen therefrom, the time seems certainly to have arrived when some competent bodj' should be assembled by the Admiralty for the purpose of considering the designs of our war-ships, and enabling our constructors to proceed wilh greater assurance than they can at present. Questions affect- ing the efficiency of the Royal Xavy clearly ought not to be decided except in the most calm and dispassionate manner. The work done by the Committee on Designs for Ships of War fourteen years ago was valuable, and has had important results. What is now wanted, I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry into the condition of the navy, and one of the branches of that inquiry which will require the most careful treatment is embraced in the question, ' What are the uses of armor in modern war-ships ?' " My own opinion, reached after very careful study of the suljject, is that very serious limitations have to be accepted in the disposition and general efficiency of the armaments, if the principle of protecting the stability at considerable angles of inclination by means of thick armor is accepted, the size and cost of the ships being kept witliin reasonable limits. There is no difficulty, of course, apart from considerations of size and cost, in fulfilling the condition of armor-protected stability; but it may be doubted whether the results could prove satisfactory, especially when the risks from under-water attacks, as well as from gun- fire, are borne in mind, and the fact is recognized that even the thickest armor carried or contemplated is not proof against existing guns. No vessel can fight without running risks. It is by no means certain, however, that the greater risks to be faced are those aris- ing from damage to the sides in the region of the water-line and consequent loss of stabil- ity. So far as°I have been able to judge, it appears possible to produce a better fightings machine for a given cost by abandoning the idea of protecting stability, buoyancy, and trim entirely by thick armor, and by the acceptance of the principle that unarmored but specially constructed superstructures shall be trusted as contributories to the flotation and stability. Thick vertical side-armor, even over a portion of the length, appears to be by no means a necessary condition to an effective guarantee of the life and manageability of a ship when damaged in action; and it seems extremely probable that in future the great dis- 18 274 APPENDIX II. tinclion between battleships and protected ships will not be found in the nature of their bull protection in the region of the water-line, but in the use of thick armor over the sta- tions of the heavy guns in battle-ships. "The decisions as to future designs of our battle-ships is a momentous one. It can only be reached by the consideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of alter- native proposals. It cannot be dissociated from considerations of cost for a single ship. " On all grounds, therefore, it is to be hoped that a full and impartial inquiry will be authorizetl without delay; for it may be assumed that, however opinions differ, there is the common desire to secure for the British navy the best types of ships and a sufficient num- ber to insure our maritime supremacy. I am, sir, your obedient servant, "W. H. White. "Elswick Works, March 26th." The following reply by Sir Edward Eeed appeared in the Times of April 8, 1SS5, the omitted portions being personal allusions which liave very little bearing upon the discussion, and which are of no interest to a professional reader outside of England : " It is not Mr. White's fault but his misfortiuie that he is compelled to admit the per- fect correctness of the main charge which I have brought against these six ships, viz., that the}' have been so constructed, and have been so stripped of armor protection, that their armor, even when intact and untouched, is wholly insutficient to prevent them from cap- sizing in battle. Mr. White expends a good deal of labor in attempting to show that their unarmored parts would have a better chance of keeping the ships upright and afloat than I credit them with, which is a secondarj-, although an important, question; but he frankly admits that these six ships of the Admiral type are, and are admitted to be, so built tliat their 'stability in the sense of the power to resist being capsized if inclined to even mod- erate angles of inclination is not guaranteed by their armor-belts.' "I have no doubt it would suit the purposes of all those who are or who have been responsible for those ships if I were to allow my.self to be drawn, in connection with this question, away from the essential points just adverted to into a controversy upon the eiforts made by the Admiralty to give to these ships, which have been denied a reasonable amount of armor protection, such relief from the grave dangers thus incurred as thin sheet compartments, coffer-dams, coals, patent fuel, stores, etc., can afEord. (Cork is what was at first relied upon in this connection, but we hear no more of it now.) But I do not intend to be drawn aside from my demand for properly armored ships of the first class by any references to these devices, and for a very simple reason, rh., all such devices, whether their value be great or small, are in no sense special to armored ships; on the contrar}' they are common to all ships, and are more especially applied to ships which are unable to car- rj' armor. The application of these devices to ships stripped of armor does not make them armored ships, any more than it makes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored ves sel an armo)-ed ship; and wduit I desire, and what I confidently rely upon the country demanding before long, is the construction of a few line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe by armor, in lieu of the present ships, which, while called armored ships, in reality depend upon their thin unarmored parts for their ability to keep upright and afloat. Besides, I do not believe in these devices for ships intended for close fighting. I even believe them like- ly, in not a few cases, to add to their danger rather than to their safety. If, for example, a raking shot or shell should let the sea into the compartments on one side of the ship, while those on the other side remain intact and buoyant, this very buoyancy upon the uninjured side of the ship would help to capsize her. " Mr. White says that no vessel can fight witliout running risks, and thinks that thick, vertical side-armor, even over a portion of the ship's length, is not a necessary guarantee of the life of a ship. Well, sir, we are all at liberty to think, or not think, what we please. APPENDIX II. 275 so far as our sense and jiidgnient will allow us; but Mr. White, like all other depreciators of side-armor, fails utterly to show us what else there is which can be relied upon to keep shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent shell that burst inside a ship from spreading destruction all around. Pie refers us to no experiments to show that the thin plate divisions and coffer-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for the purpose proposed. In the absence of any such experiments, he tells us, as others have told us, that Signor Brin and colleagues in the Italian Admiralty consider 'a minutely subdivided re- gion' at and below the water-line ' suflieient defence against gun-flre.' But I do not think Signor Brin believes anything of the kind ; what he believes is that the Italian government cannot afford to build a fleet of properly' armored linc-of-battle ships for hard and close fighting, and that, looking at their limited resources, a few excessively fast ships, with ar- mor here and there to protect particular parts, and with ample capabilities of retreat to a safe distance, will best serve their purpose. I do not say that he is wrong, and I certainly admire the skill which he has displayed in carrying out his well-defined object. But that object is total!}' different from ours, and our naval habits, our traditions, our national spirit, the very blood that tlows in our veins, prevent sucli an object from ever becoming ours. "Mr. White all through liis letter, in common with some of his late colleagues at the Admiralt)', thinks and speaks as if naval warfare were henceforth to be chiefly a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of the enemy'.s way; and this may be more or less true of contests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the line-of-battle ship Culliagwood to be supposed to steam straight up to the enemy, I should like to know? and if she does, what is to prevent the enemy from pouring a raking fire through her bow, and ripping up at once, even with a single shell, every compartment between the stem and the transverse armored bulkhead? " It distresses me beyond measure to see our ships constructed so as to impose upon them the most terrible penalties whenever their commanders dare, as dare they ever have, and dare they ever will, to close with their foe and try conclusions with him. Why, sir, it has been my painful duty over and over again to hear foreign officers entreat me to use all my influence against the adoption in their navy of ships with so little armored surface as ours. On one occasion the ColUiigwood herself was imposed upon them as a model to be imitated, and I was besought to give them a safer and better ship. ' How could I ever steam up to my enemy with any confidence,' said one of the officers concerned, ' with such a ship as that under my feet?' "Mr, White coolly tells us that the ColUngwood, with five hundred tons of water log- ging her ends to a depth of seven or eight feet, will not be much worse off than a ship whose armore4 deck stands two and a half or three feet above the water's surface, and his reason is that even above this latter deck the water would flow in when the ship was driv- ing ahead with an injured bow. Well, sir, I will only say that sailors of experience see a very great difference between the two cases, and I can but regard such theorizings as very unfortunate basis for the designs of her Majesty's ships. " I have said that Mr. White's assumptions as to the immunity of tbe above- water com- partments and coffer-dams from wide-spread injury by shell-fire rest upon no experimental data; I go on to say that such data as we have to my mind point very much the other way. The Iluascar was not an unarmored vessel, and such shell as penetrated her had first to pass through some thin armor and wood backing; yet after the Cochrane and Blanco Eii- calocla bad'defeated her she presented internally abundant evidence of the general destruc- tion which shell fire produces. An officer of the Cochrane, who was the first person sent on board by tbe captors, in a letter to me written soon afterwards, said : ' It requires seeing to believe the destruction done. . . . We had to climb over heaps, table-high, of dehrU and dead and wounded. ... We fired forty-five Palliser shell, and the engineers who were oa board say that every shell, or nearly so, must have struck, and that every one that struck burst on board, doing awful destruction.' " Speaking of the injury which the Cochrane received from a single shell of the Huas- car be said: ^It passed through the upper works at commander's cabin, breaking fore and 276 APPENDIX II. aft bulkhead of cabins, lireakinj!; skylight above ward-room, thwartship bulkhead of wood, passed on, cut in two a 5-iocli iron pillar, through a store-room, struck armor-plate, glanced off, passing through plating of embrasure closet at corucr, finishing at after gun-port, and went overboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and terminated at after batteiy port on port side, which is finished with the wide angle-iron, carrying out a part of the angle-iron in its flight.' " This was a shell of moder.ate size, from a moderate gun. but it is obvious that it would have made short work of penetrating those very thin slieets of steel which constitute the compartments, coffer-dams, etc., upon the resistance of which, to my extreme surprise, those responsible for the power and safety of our fleets seem so ready to place their main Uependence. * ^ ->:- ^- vj * * " For resistance to rams and torpedoes, and for the limitation of the injuries to be effected by them, as niucli cellular subdivision as possible should be supplied; but, as against shot and shell, subdivision bj' their sheet-steel is no guarantee whatever of safety in any ship, least of all in liue-of-battle ships, which must be prepared for fighting at close quarters. " I must now ask for space to remark upon a few minor points in !Mr. White's letter. He seems to consider that the scant armor of the Admiral class is somehow associated with the placing of the large, partly protected guns of these ships in separate positions, 'in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots, which may happen when the heavy guns are concentrated on a single citadel or battery.' SuflSce it to reply that in the proposed new designs of the Adnuralty ships uow before Parliament, which have almost equalli' scant partial belts of armor, the guns are nevertheless concentrated in a single battery^. "Again, Jlr. White sa3's the Admiralty have declined to adopt m_y advice to protect the Admiral class in certain unarmorcd parts with 3 inch plating, and declares that such plating would practically be no better defence against rapid-fire guns than existing thin sides; but has he forgotten the fact that my suggestion has been adopted in the new de- signs for the protection of the battery of G-inch guns, although it is perversely withheld from those parts of the ship in which it might assist in some degree in prolonging the ship's ability to float and to resist capsizing foices? "Mr, White makes one very singular statement. He takes exception to my claiming for the Inflexible type of ship, on account of tlieir armored citadel, a much better chance of retaining stability in battle than the Admiral type possesses, because, he says, 'in both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the nnarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee then- security »when damaged in action.' The fair inference to be drawn from this would be that where the principle long ago laid down by me, and supported by Mr. Barnaby in the words previouslj' quoted, is once departed from, the danger must in all cases be so great as to exclude all distinc- tions of more or less risk, jMr. AVhite can hardly mean this; but if he does not, then ou what grounds are we told that a ship whicli has no armor at all left above water at an in- clination say of six or eight degrees is no v.-orsc off than a .ship which at those angles and at still greater ones has a water-tight citadel over one hundred feet long to help hold lier up? ■J, ■» -X- -s- n * ■\- "I am not at all ilisposed to enler into a discussion as to the relative stabilities of the English and French ships under various conditions. The French ships have armored belts two and a half to three feet above water from end to end. That fact, other things being presumed equal, gives them an immense advantage over our sliips, which iu battle trim liave belts scarcely more than a foot wide above water, and for less than half their length. It is quite possible that the French constructors may have given their ships less initial sta- bility than ours; from such information as I possess I believe they have; but iu so far as the ship l)elow the armor-deck, and the action of shot and shell upon that part of her, are concerned, whatever stability they start with in battle they will retain until their armor is APPENDIX II. 277 pierced; ■whereas our ships may have a large proportion of theirs talien from tliem with- out their armor being pierced, and their armored decl^s are then less than half the height of those of the French ships above water. * » -x- -s K * ■:;. " I will add that I doubt if the French sljjps are dealt fairly by at Whitehall. I lately heard a good deal of the e.xlreme taper of their armor-belts at the bow, and the Amiral Duperre was always quoted in instance of this. It is true that this ship's armor does taper from flftj'-five centimetres amidships to twenty-five centimetres at the stem, but she stands almost alone auiong recent important ships in this respect, as the following figures will show; Namk of Ship. Amiral Baudin Formidable . . . Hoche Magenta Marceau Caiman Fulminant . . . . Furieuse Indoniptable . . Requin Terrible of Arnmr Ainid.siiip. 0!) 45 4.5 45 50 sa .'■0 50 50 Thickness of .Armor at Bows. 50 CenLinietres. 40 40 40 40 40 32 37 40 "A friend writes me: 'Comparing the Amiral Duperre with the Amiral Baudin, De- voMation, Formidable, aud Foudroyant, which are ships of about her size, the following peculiarities are observable; The Duperre is about three feet narrower than the other ships mentioned, aud has fully fifteen inches less metacentric height. She is also slightly deeper in proportion to her breadth than the other ships,' "As narrowness, small metacentrie height, and e.Ycessive depth all tend to reduce sta- bility, it would appear that the Adrairalt)' office has, as 1 supposed, been careful to select a vessel not unfavorable to their purpose. But however this may l)e, it is no business of mine to defend the French ships in the details of their stability, nor even to defend them at all; and, as a maiter of fact, the French Admiralty, although stopping far short of ours, has in my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing the armored stability at considerable angles of inclination. But their falling into one error is no justification for our falling into a mucli greater one, and deliberately repeating it in every ship we lay down. In this connection I will onlj' add that the experiments performed at our Admi- ralty on models must be viewed with great distrust for a reason not yet named. They deal only, so far as I am acquainted with them, with models set oscillating or rolling by waves or otherwise. But the danger thus dealt with is a secondary one; the primary one is that due to 'list' or prolonged inclination to one side. What sort of protection against the danger of capsizing from this cause can be possessed by a ship the entire armor on each side of which becomes immersed even in smooth water when the ship is inclined a couple of degrees only, and which then has no side left to immerse, save such as single shells can blow into holes ten by four feet? " It is to be observed that although Mr. White does not venture to join the only other apblogist for these deficiently armored ships in stating that India-rubber umbrella shot- stoppers are to be employed for their preservation in battle, he does go so far as to tell us that the spaces into which water would enter when the unarraored parts have been pene- trated have been subdivided 'to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides ' and I know independently that a good deal of reliance is placed at the Admi- ralty upon the presumed ability to stop such holes as they are made. But the whole thing is a delusion. The officer of the Cochrane, before quoted, said, ' I wish to state that shot- 2 lb APPENDIX II. plugs are out of Uie question after or at such a fight. Thej' are entirely' useless. Not a hole was cither round, square, or oval, hut different shapes— ragged, jagged, and torn, the inside parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribhons; some of the holes inside are as large as four by three feet, and of all shapes. There are many shot-plugs on board here, all sizes, conical shapes and long, but they are of no use whatever.' " Mr, White's letter invites many other comments, but I have said enough to show that it in no way chauges my view of the question of armor-plated liue-of-battle ships. In so far as it advocates a further abandonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful de- vices in lieu thereof, it is aheadv answered by anticipation by the Admiralty itself. Until I wrote my recent letters to you, our Admiralty thought as Mr. White still thinks, and tended as he still tends. In the case of all our recent cruisers but two they had abolished side-armor altogether. To my public appeal for armor-belted cruisers they have, how- ever, responded, and are about to order si.x of such ships. So far, so good. We ought to be grateful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wish these cruisers were to be faster, much faster, but in Admiralt3' matters the country mu3t be thaukful for small mercies. " It only remains for me to note with satisfaction one or two of the points upon which Mr. White is in agreement with myself. He admits that it 'would certainly be advan- tageous' to carry out those experiments which I regard the Admiralty as afraid to make, Tiz., experiments to test the effect of gun-fire upon the subdivided but unarmored parts of ships. ******* "It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the abandonment of armor has not at all been forced npou us by unavoidable circumstances, nor is it from any intrin- sic necessity that we go on refusing to provide our ships with torpedo defence. On not immoderate dimensions, at not immoderate cost, ships might be built, still practically in- vulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo alike, ships which could dispose of the Admiral class of sliips more quickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest antagonist that she is likely to encounter. But in order to produce such ships we must revive the now abandoned principle tliat armor, and armor alone can save from destruction those ships whose business it is to drive our future enemies from the European seas and lock them up in their own ports." The Committee on Designs of 1872, previously alluded to, contained si.xteen members, of whom six were naval ofBcers. Two of those members, Admiral George Elliot, E.N., and Rear-admiral A. P. Ryder, R.X., dissented so far from their colleagues that they could not sign the report, and accordingly they sub- mitted a very able minority report embodying their views. The first of the " general principles " laid down in their report is as follows : "That it is of the last importance that the modifications in existing types of men-of- war which the committee have been invited to suggest shouki be calculated not merely to effectually meet the necessities of naval warfare now and in tlie immediate future, but in full view of the probable necessities of naval warfare in the nKuc remote future." It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant officers to observe in some designs of the present day a confirmation of their forecast in many particulars. The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present controversy, by Admiral Elliot, appeared in the Times (London) of April 24, 1885, and contain the pith of his oft-quoted arguments: "My first impression on reading these letters in the Times is one of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of side-armor venus cellular-deck armor, but that their attention APPENDIX II. 279 lias been directed to this feature of design only as connected with a particular type of sliip, namely, the CoUingicuod, which vessel is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to buoyancy, and tlierefore not truly lepresentative of eillier. Mr. White's defence of tlie unarmored ends of the Colliiiffwood is so far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development of tlie celluhir deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an exponent of the real merits of this system. "I am quite aware tliat the main point at issue between tliese two distinguished naval arcliiteets lias been more closely confined to the question of stability than to that of flota- tion as displayed in the design of the Callingwood, and in this scientific view of the case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point out that the cellular-deck prin- ciple per se does not involve any such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight of a central citadel. Jlr. White acknowledges that this top weight will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the unarmored ends, aud on this danger point Sir Edwaid Reed fixes his sharpest weapon of attack. ******* " The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to the best advantage for defensive ])urposes, and in order to discuss Sir Edward Reed's opinions in a concise form I will deal with the question solel_y as concerning the use of side-armor of less than twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does not appear probable that if combined with .idequate gun protection, and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of much greater displacement than the CoUingioood class, I feel justified, however, iu discussing the question on this basis, because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved armoi-ed ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck water-line protection in nil's class of war-ship in favor of tills thin armor-belt. "The relative value of these two S3'Stems of water-line protection, namely, an all-round belt versus a raft bod}', must not only be ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel, and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties of the combatants. "Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view with much regret the one-sideduess of the conclusions arrived at b}' the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as 'doubtful devices' aud 'useless contrivances,' etc, because they indicate preju. dice and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is called 'stripping sliips of armor,' on the other side no admission is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing reliance ou such a delusive defensive agency as an armor plate known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encoun- tered; and in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity hereafter. "Sir Edward Reed's comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is al- most apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all that will stand between the life and death of a ship— that 280 APPENDIX II. is to Siiy, belwacn one well-directed shell and the magazines and boilers— which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited. Also, in referring lo tlie baneful effects of raking tire and shell explo- sion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern to be armor-plated — a matter of the highest tactical importance as a defence against raking tire, which is unobtainable in a belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt. This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow rain encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct bits and depressed fire at tlie water- line belt, and by these tactics the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far between. "I may also express the opinion that for repairing damages in a raft-bodied ship at the water-line far more efficacious means can be resorted to than the ordinary shot-plugs, and that the use of cork bags for closing shot-holes in the coSer-dam sides, if they are open at the top, is far from being an unreasonable or 'stupid contrivance,' as it is called, considering that, as a general rule, the perforations through thin plating would not be ragged or extensive. Sir Edward Reed's wise suggestion to make the outer skin of the coffer-dam of two-inch steel plates would render machine-gun tire of little avail. The injurious effects of shell lire would, I reckon, be far more fatal if the projectile exploded in passing through the ten-inch belt than if it burst at some distance inboard after pene- trating thin plating. I think it will be admitted without dispute that this feature of de- sign must be governed to a great extent by tactical considerations, the object sought for being to secure out of a given weight of steel the greatest amount of fighting vitality con- sistent with the power of manoMivring available between skilful antagonists. This view of the case is especiall}' applicable to single actions at sea, when a clever tactician will select his mode of fighting according to the offensive and defensive properties known to be possessed by his opponent, tmd in tliis respect an armor-plated bow and stern will afford enormous advantages, both for attack and defence, if the plating is extended as higli as the upper deck. " In tlect actions the ram and torpedo will require more attention than the gun attack, and that feature of battle introduces another disputed point, namely, the limit of size of ship; but that question is outside the scope of the present discussion, and I shall conclude m_y arguments by a strong expression of opinion that, as gunpowder has so completely mastered the pretensions of outside armor protection, the direction in which prudence leans towards defensive properties in future designs for sbips-of-war is that of deflection rather than of direct resistance, and that in this respect science has not reached its utmost limit of invention. "The prevailing disposition to regulate the power of the gun by the size of the vessel is, I consider, a great mistake, seeing that the additional weight of a powerful gun is not inadmissible, even in such vessels as our belted cruisers, and looking to the strong induce- ment held out by the continued use of armor-plating, even of such moderate thickness as ten inches. In the splendid steamers purchased from the mercantile marine, which are being armed with light guns only, one 35 -ton gun would greatly add to their fighting power, but the cause of this omission may probably be found in the answer to the ques- tion. Where are the guns?" The followino' reply appeaix'd in the Times (London) of May 1, 1885 : " Brn, — The letter of Admiral Sir George Elliot . . . deals ably and candidly with a subject of such fundamental importance to our navj- that I venture to offer a few observa- tions upon it. "I am glad to see that the gallant admiral separates his case and the cellular or raft- deck system from any connection with the CoUiiigwood or Admiral type of ship, but I APPENDIX II. 281 regret that he has treated my criticisms of that Icind of ship just as if I had applied tliern in the abstract to tlie system which lie advocates. This is not fair either to the gallant of- ticcr lumself or to me, as will presently appear. "If Sir George Elliot will remove the cellular or raft-deck question completely away from the very iinsatisfactory and unpleasant region of Admiralty practice, and let it he treated upon its merits, wliile I shall still have to respectfully submit to liini some caution- ary considerations, I shall also be prepared to make to him some very considerable conces- sions. One thing I should find it desirable to press upon him is the absolute necessity of giving closer attention to the provision of stability, lie treats the subject mainly as a question of ' buoyancy,' and wisely so from his point of view ; but ' stability,' or the power of resisting capsizing, comes first, and on this he declines to offer an opinion. Again, when the gallant otiicer speaks of a ' raft ' deck, I would point out that this may be a very different thing from a cellular- deck. The characteristic of a raft is that it is usually formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular steel if you please, but in that case wdierever injury lets in Avater the steel so far ceases to be a raft, which helps to float its load, and becomes a weight to help sink it. Now, cells formed of thin steel do not upon the face of the matter appear to be safe materials for a raft which is to be sub- ject to the multitudinous fire of small guns and the explosions of shells of all sizes. It needs a very skilful artificer to build a .safe floating raft of thin steel for such a purpose, especially when regard is hail to the dangers of raking fire, against wdiich bow and sleru armor would not sufHcienlly jjrovide. "Having expressed these cautions, I will go on to say that in my opinion the main idea of your gallant correspondent, which he has so long and so steadil}' developed, is nev- ertheless a sound one, and one which has a great future. I do not, of course, for a mo- ment admit with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. 1 believe the Dreadnought, though of old design, would still fight a good action against all ships now ready for sea, and have to fear only a very exceptional, and therefore either a very skilful or very fortu- nate, shot. The recent Admiralty ships, where they are armored, are practically jsroof against almost every gun afloat. Further, I have satisfied myself that if the existing re- strictions imposed upon us by the absence of floating docks adapted to receive ships of great breadth were removed (these restrictions crippling us to a most unfortunate degree), and if certain professional conventionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it would be perfectly practicable to build war-ships no larger and no more costly than the Inflexible, with enough side-armor more than a yard (three feet) thick to preserve their sta- bility, and at tlie same time made ram-proof and torpedo-proof. Meanwhile, of all the vulnerable objects afloat, tl;e recent guns themselves, by reason of their absurdly long and slender liarrels, left fully exposed to all fire, are among the most vulnerable. " Still, the raft-deck system has a wide field before it, and I am quite prepared to admit that I believe in its practicability and in its sufficient security for certain classes of vessels if properly carried out. This it has not yet been in any single instance. Even in the case of the great Italian ships, as in our own, there are elements of weakness which would be fatal to the system in action, but which are not unavoidable. Allow me to assure Sir George Elliot that I have largely and closely studied this suliject, and that my main objec- tions to it are not objections of principle. "If the raft-deck system is to be adopted, it must in my opinion be carried out in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than hitherto, and with the aid of arrangements which I have for a long time past seen the uecessily of, and been engaged upon. ^. Jf -;:- -X- -» ^ * "To my mind the Admiralty, while protecting certain parts and contents of their largest ships from injury from shell fire, have made the fatal error of failing to protect the" ship itself, which contains them all, from being loo readily deprived of stability and made to capsize. The advocates of the alternative system must not repeat this error, or, if they do, they must not expect me to become their ally. On the other hand, if they will join me in despising what are merely specious elements of safety, and in demanding those which are real, if they will insist that our principal and most costly ships at least shall be 2S2 APPENDIX II. so constructed as to keep afloat and upright for a reasonable length of time in battle, in spite of any form of attaclc, so as to give their gallant crews a fair chance of achieving liieir objccls, they will not find me averse to any improvement whatever. When a suita- ble opportunity offers I shall be happy to show to Admiral Sir George Elliot that he has not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or raft-deck system, and that it has, in fact, capabilities which possibly he himself may not yet have fully realized." The same number of the Times contains a reply to Mr. Reed's letter of April 8, 188.5, by Mr. White, mainly devoted to a refutation of certain charges of no in- terest to us, but containing the following paragraphs : "I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edward Reed quotes a description of the damage done to the Huascar in her action with the two Chilian irou-clads. " This description seems to me one of the best possible illustrations of a remark in my previous letter, that ' the mitraills w-hich is driven back into a ship when armor is pene- trated is proliabl}' as destructive as any kind of projectile can be.' Had the Uuascar not had weak armor, but light sides only, the local injuries might have been less. The other case cited of a shell which entered the unarmored stern of the Cvclirane shows how little damage may be done when a projectile passes through thin plating. At the bombardment of Ale.\aiulria there were many such examples on board our ships, although it must be frankly admitted that the engagement is no sutticieut indication of what shell fire may do. A good deal of use has been made of the single case where a sliell in bursting blew a hole ten bv four feet in the thin side-plating of the Superb. The case was quite exceptional, whether it be compared with the other hits on the same ship or with the injuries done to the unarmored sides of other ships. Moreover, in that case exceptional injury is traceable to special structural arrangements at the embrasure near the battery port, where the shell struck. These cases do not prove that the light unarmored structures in the Admiral c\a&s are likely to be destroyed in such a rapid and wholesale manner as has been asserted. Nor, on the other hand, do they indicate conclusively what damage shell-tire may do in future actions. On these points, as I have before remarked, experiment might be made with advantage. But, on the other hand, there is good evidence that armor so thin as to be readilj' penetrable to many guns may be a serious danger, and that armor over the vital liarts of ships should be strong if it is to be a real defence. ^ -rf vf ^- * -K- * " In matters of ship design the constructors of the uav}' are onl}' the servants of the Board, and while tliey must take sole responsibility for professional work, the governing features in the designs are determined by higher authorities, among whom are officers of large experience, both as seamen and gunners. And it is certaiiilj^ not the practice of the constructive department to intrude themselves or their advice into matters for whicli nei- ther their training nor their experience fits them to give an opinion. ^ ^f ■» ^- * * * " I make no attempt to be either a sailor or a gunner, but am content to seek informa- tion fiom the best authorities in both branches. As the result of this study of tactics and gunnery, I have been led to the belief tliat the sea-fights of the future are not likely to he settled altogether or chiefly b}' the effects of gun-fire. This is not quite the same thing as Sir Edwaid Keed attributes to me when he says that 'Mi'.White thinks and speaks as if naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of an enemy's way.' "Nor do I think that the designers of the Ilalian war-ships will indorse the descrip- tion of their views and intentions, with which Sir Edward Reed has favored us in his let- ter and elsewhere. I have the honor of knowing his excellency Sigiior Brin (now Minister of Marine) iind other members of the constructive corps of the Italian navy, and from their statements, including the powerful publications of Signer Brin, 'La Nostra Marina Militaire,' I have no hesitation in saying that in spending larger sums on single ships than have ever before been spent, tlie Italian authorities think, and are not alone in thinking, that they are producing the most powerful fighting ships afloat." APPENDIX III. RANGE OF GUNS. " From Report of JJ. S. Fortification Board. GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIDLY NINE TO TEN MILES. EngUind . Fr:inct' . . Italy . . . . Gernianv. Brazil . Ship. Inflexil^le Fiiedland Redouljtablo Diigiiesuliii "1 Bayard [ Tufeniie [ Vauban J Fulininant \ Tonneire \ Diiiiio Dandolo Sacliseii ") Baiern Wiirtemberi; Baden .....' Wespe Viper Biune Miicke Scorpion Basilisl\ Canielenii Croeodil Kiacliuelo. Iiiclu.s. 24 14 9J 13 21.7 21.7 17.25 11 Draught. Fn-t. In. 25 4 29 4 24 10 24 10 21 4 28 28 9 19 8 10 20 4 2 4 Inihes. 16 10.0 10.6 9.5 10.6 17 17 10.2 12 Besides a large nundjer on unarmored vessels and on armored vessels not yet coHjpleted. GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIBLY TEN MILES OR UPWARD. Nation. Ship. BInxiniuui Armor. Drauglit. Gims. Calibre. England Comincror . . Indies. 12 18 18 21.6 15 19 17S 13f 18.9 8 14 Feet. In. 24 26 3 26 3 26 9 24 11 24 7 16 9 16 9 30 3 10 2 20 Number. 2 4 4 4 ( 2 ( 4 2 2 2 4 1 4 Incliei. 12 12 12 13.4 10.6 13.4 1 6 5 13.4 13.4 17 12 12 Colossns Edinbnrdl Amiral Duperre Devastation and Fondroyant. Terrible u " Tialv Italia . Germany Salamander ) Natter \ Hummel J China Ting Yuen ) 284 APPENDIX III. GUNS EANGIXG POSSIBLY TEN MILES OR UPWARD SHORTLY TO BE AFLOAT. Natjon. Sliip. Jlaximtim Armor. I.ielu.8. 18 18 18 18 IS IS 12 IS IS 21* 21|- 19-i- m 17f ni- ls. 9 17.7 17.7 17.7 24 24 24 8 Draught. Guns. Number. 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 o J 2 ( 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 Calibre. Enpilanil C(jllinfr\vood . . F«t. In. 26 3 25 3 27 27 3 27 3 27 3 24 27 3 27 3 26 26 21 7 24 7 27 3 27 3 29 6 25 11 29 6 25 11 27 25 25 15 Inches. 12 13,5 17 13.5 13.5 13.5 12 16.25 16.25 16.5 16.5 13.4 16.5 13.4 10.6 13.5 17 17 17 17 12 12 12 13.8 KnHiu^v. . ('anijierdown ^< Ho we u u Hero u Kenown France Sanspareil Amifal Bauditi Indoniptable ) Caiman . - Maroeau ) Hoehe - Jhigenta } Neptune . .... . Italy Lopaiito . .... Riiggiero di Liiuriu u Kussia V. Morosiiii . . . Catherine II. Denmark , Sinope Tordeiiskiuld w. THE END. mm