CJnrnfU Cam Btl^oal Hibtatg 
 
Cornell University Library 
 KF 12S4.S53 1898 
 
 V.I 
 
 A treatise on the law of negligence / 
 
 3 1924 019 317 670 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 92401 931 7670 
 
A TREATISE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 
 
 BY 
 
 THOMAS G. SHEARMAN 
 
 AND 
 
 AMASA A. REDFIELD 
 
 FIFTH EDITION 
 
 SUBSTANTIALLY REWRITTEN 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES 
 
 Vol. I 
 
 NEW YORK 
 BAKER, VOORHIS & COMPANY 
 
 1898 
 
Copyright, 1869, 1870, 1874, 1880, f888, 1898, 
 By THOMAS G. SHEARMAN and AMASA A. REDFIELD. 
 
 2D-PARS0NS PRINTING COMPANY 
 PRINTERS AND ELECTROTYPERS 
 ALBANY, n. Y. 
 
PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION. 
 
 The last edition of this treatise (published ten years ago and 
 long since out of print) was so entirely rewritten and remodeled, 
 as to be a new book. It has not been necessary to make such 
 a radical revision, in preparing the present edition ; but the 
 number of new decisions made within the last ten years has 
 been so enormous, and the extension and changes of the law 
 thereby made so great, that almost every section even of this 
 edition has been rewritten ; and some chapters have been 
 entirely recast. This has been especially the case with regard 
 to the chapters on Master and Servant ; the law of which has 
 been, in most American states, very much unsettled until 
 within the last five or ten years. 
 
 The first edition of this book contained 613 sections, in 673 
 pages; the fourth edition contained 772 sections, in 1226 pages ; 
 the present edition contains 788 sections, in 1336 pages. But 
 as a smaller type has been now used, the real increase in matter 
 is fully one-third over the last edition, or equivalent to over 
 four hundred pages of new matter. The first edition cited 
 about 4700 cases; the fourth edition over 10,000 cases; and the 
 present edition, over 16,000 cases, or nearty four times the 
 original number. On a close calculation, not less than 40,000 
 citations of these cases appear in the notes, on different perti- 
 nent points. Very many cases not appearing in the ofificial 
 reports are cited from the volumes of the National Reporter 
 system, and all ofificially reported cases appearing in duplicate 
 in that series have been cited from it as well as from the official 
 series, for the benefit of practitioners who may lack facilities 
 of reference to the ofificial reports of foreign states. 
 
 The total amount of matter in the present edition is therefore 
 fully three times as much as that contained in the first edition, 
 and nearly, not quite, a third more than that contained in the 
 last edition. Nevertheless, this result has come about in spite 
 
 [i] 
 
U PREFACE. 
 
 of the utmost effort to compress statement, to avoid repetition 
 and to exclude unnecessary citations. So far from having any 
 desire to make the book large, it has been the constant aim of the 
 authors to reduce it to the smallest size, consistent with the 
 greatest usefulness. More than 20,000 reported decisions (for 
 the most part omitted altogether from the official reports), 
 have been excluded, as being unnecessary; because, on 
 examination, they were found to be mere re-afifirmations of 
 some general principle, already amply illustrated by cited 
 cases in the same jurisdiction, and the facts involved were not 
 sufificiently novel to justify expanding the notes to the great 
 length which their citation would involve. To the end, also, 
 of condensing the text, a number of sections have been left 
 out or consolidated with other sections ; but it is believed that 
 no omission has been made which will detract from the sub- 
 stantial value of the book. 
 
 With the exception of fifteen or twenty Scotch cases, there 
 is not a single citation in these volumes which has not been 
 verified by reference to the original reports. 
 
 It was originally intended to include within the scope of this 
 work all the law of Negligence, considered as a tort, and to 
 exclude everything else ; and it is only by reference to this 
 that the general plan of the book can be readily understood. 
 It was found, however, that the dividing line between tortious 
 negligence and breach of contract was uncertain in several 
 important branches of business; and therefore the entire law 
 of Negligence, whether tortious or not, with reference to 
 attorneys, bankers, passenger carriers, physicians and tele- 
 graphs, was included. On the other hand, the subject of 
 Shipping was omitted, partly because that subject has been so 
 fully covered by numerous treatises, and partly because it is 
 governed by admiralty law, while this work was intended to 
 deal only with the common law, as modified by statute. The 
 responsibility of carriers of goods was not considered, because 
 they are generally liable as insurers, unless protected by 
 special contract. The chapter of Damages was added because 
 there was not, when the first edition of this book appeared, 
 any treatise on that special subject, which stated the law 
 concerning damages in cases of negligence, in a convenient 
 form or in entire harmony with the theory of this treatise. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It must be conceded that, in a scientific Code of civil law, 
 there would be no separate chapter on Negligence. The very 
 first definition of negligence shows that a strictly scientific 
 arrangement of the law would call for a statement of rights 
 and duties, rather than of the facts which show neglect to 
 perform those duties or to respect those rights. 
 
 Nevertheless, a great mass of judicial decisions had clus- 
 tered themselves under the general title of Negligence, long 
 before this or any other book had been planned under that 
 title; and the number of such cases is constantly increasing. 
 
 In the preparation of the various editions of this book, not 
 less than forty thousand reported cases have been examined, 
 nearly all of which had a direct bearing upon some question 
 of negligence. After throwing out thousands of these, as 
 obsolete or repetitious, there remain 16,000 cases in these 
 volumes, over 6,000 of which are from reports published within 
 the last ten years. We leave others to estimate the vast 
 nuniber of unreported cases which must have been tried within 
 the same period. It is manifest that there is an enormous and 
 increasing amount of such litigation, and that it demands treat- 
 ment as, practically, a separate department of the law. 
 
 There is much lamentation over the continual increase of 
 negligence suits ; and the courts have sometimes expressed 
 impatience with it. Indeed, it has become quite common for 
 judges to state, as the ground of decisions, the necessity of 
 restricting litigation. Reduced to plain English, this means 
 the necessity of compelling the great majority of men and 
 women to submit to injustice, in order to relieve judges from 
 the labor of awarding justice. We venture to suggest that, if 
 justice were more certainly and promptly rendered, there 
 would be much less disposition to resist just claims or to push 
 unjust ones. It is because so many erroneous decisions are 
 
 [iu] 
 
IV INTRODUCTION. 
 
 still made, and because court proceedings are so full of com- 
 plexities and delays, that unjust suitors are encouraged to take 
 the chances of law, as if it were a lottery. 
 
 There is no difficulty in accounting for the multiplication of 
 negligence cases. All men fail a hundred times to use the 
 proper degree of care and diligence in the performance of 
 some duty, where they fail once to perform the duty itself. 
 And while total failure to perform a contract usually causes 
 legal injury to one person only, carelessness in the attempt to 
 perform it usually injures more than one person, if it injures 
 any. Then the rapid advance of civilization, with all its 
 inventions and delicate complexities, immensely increases the 
 number and importance of duties and the difficulty of fully 
 performing them. Finally, while the measure of damages, in 
 cases of contract, is generally capable of easy computation, the 
 measure of damages for mere negligence in the attempted 
 performance of a duty is in most cases incapable of exact com- 
 putation and must be settled by compromise. It is inevitable 
 that a very large proportion of such cases should be referred 
 to the compromise of a jury. 
 
 It is indeed to be regretted that the prosecution of negli- 
 gence claims has so largely become a mere trade, conducted 
 on shares, by lawyers whose runners are eager in their pursuit 
 of clients. But this is mainly due to the unfortunate and 
 unnecessary construction put upon the New York Code of 
 Procedure, at an early day, and followed almost everywhere, 
 by which the courts shirked the duty of control over their 
 officers, and allowed lawyers to practice extortion, under the 
 name of free contract. The only remedy is for the courts to 
 resume supervision over contracts between client and counsel, 
 and to confine fees to a reasonable amount. 
 
 The fact must also be recognized that an immense amount 
 of fraud and perjury is resorted to in preparing and prose- 
 cuting negligence claims. The temptation to overstate the 
 actual injury, even in well-founded actions, is very strong! 
 and the manufacture of fictitious claims has become a 
 regular business. The prejudice of ordinary juries against 
 defendants in such actions, especially when wealthy corpora- 
 tions are the defendants, has been commented upon in scores 
 of judicial opinions and illustrated in thousands of cases. 
 
INTRODUCTION. V 
 
 These considerations, we believe, have led the courts in 
 many cases to lay down general rules of law, intended to 
 restrict claims for negligence within narrow limits. But this 
 seems to us unjust and unwise. A rule of law, framed with 
 intent to make fraudulent claims difificult, may easily make 
 just claims impossible. The true remedy is, on the part of 
 the courts, to use resolutely the power of ordering new trials, 
 in unsatisfactory cases, and on the part of great corporations, 
 to meet all just claims with such manifest fairness as to estab- 
 lish a reputation for willingness to do what is just and fair, 
 without compulsion. We have known instances in which 
 the adoption of such a policy, in place of the opposite one, has 
 made it very difficult for any plaintiff to recover a verdict 
 against railway companies thus acting. 
 
 After making the fullest allowance for all wrongs done 
 by the prejudices of jurors and the frauds of claimants, it is 
 certain that the maintenance of the right of private action for 
 damages in cases of negligence is essential to the welfare of 
 the entire community. It is the only effective protection 
 which society has against wholesale destruction of life and 
 property, through the reckless indifference of men to the 
 rights and safety of others. This recklessness is shown by all 
 men occasionally, by most men frequently, and by vast num- 
 bers of men habitually. 
 
 The gigantic development of power for harm as well as 
 good, in the modern use of steam, electricity and explosives> 
 placed increasingly under the control of irresponsible servants, 
 whose duties make them so familiar with danger that they 
 cease to appreciate it, has made it impossible to protect society 
 against their errors by criminal prosecutions, if for no other 
 reason than that the courts could not be multiplied suffi- 
 ciently to meet the situation. 
 
 The concentration of these powers in the hands of corpora- 
 tions makes the very idea of restraint by criminal law absurd. 
 One private action for damages involves a penalty more severe 
 than ten public prosecutions. 
 
 Private actions for negligence, therefore, answer a great 
 public purpose and render a public service, such as can be ren- 
 dered in no other way. Damages, recovered in such actions, 
 are the only punishment which is feared by those who control 
 
VI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the tremendous forces now daily used in business; and nearly- 
 all the progress which is made in reducing the dangers of 
 these forces is due to the fear of those damages. 
 
 The stubborn resistance of business corporations, common- 
 carriers and mill-owners to the enforcement of the most mod- 
 erate laws for the protection of human beings from injury, and 
 their utter failure to provide such protection of their own 
 accord, ought to satisfy any impartial judge that true justice 
 demands a constant expansion of the law in the direction of 
 increased responsibility for negligence, instead of attempts, 
 unfortunately too common, to restrict such responsibility by 
 introducing new exceptions. 
 
 The law of master and servant, in its relation to the law of 
 negligence, affords perhaps the most striking example, within 
 the last half century, of gross injustice done by this disposition 
 to restrict responsibility and suppress litigation. 
 
 A small number of able judges, devoted, from varying 
 motives, to the supposed interests of the wealthy classes, and 
 caring little for any others, boldly invented an exception to 
 the general rule of masters' liability, by which servants were 
 deprived of its protection. Very appropriately, this exception 
 was first announced in South Carolina, then the citadel of 
 human slavery. It was eagerly adopted in Massachusetts, 
 then the centre of the factory system, where some decisions 
 were then made in favor of great corporations, so preposterous 
 that they have been disregarded in every other state, without 
 even the compliment of refutation. It was promptly followed 
 in England, which was then governed exclusively by landlords 
 and capitalists. And when the fifteen judges of Scotland 
 unanimously declared that it had never been the law of 
 Scotland, four English law lords reversed their decision. 
 
 The final piece of judicial legislation was enacted in the 
 famous case of Wilson v. Merry, where, by the wholly irrele- 
 vant dictum of two superannuated kw lords, the doctrine of 
 " vice-principal " was abolished. This led to a reaction. As 
 the courts, while asserting unlimited power to create new and 
 bad law, denied their power to correct their own errors, the 
 legislature intervened, and to a large extent the whole defense 
 of "common employment" has been taken away in Great 
 Britain. And now, not a single voice is raised in Great Britain 
 
INTRODUCTION VU 
 
 in justification of the doctrine once enforced by the unanimous 
 opinions of the English courts. The infallible Chief Justice 
 Shaw and Chancellor Cairns have fallen so low, on this 
 point at least, that " there are none so poor as to do them 
 reverence." 
 
 The results of this combination of boldness in making bad 
 law and timidity in undoing it have been most disastrous. 
 Great corporations, finding that diligence and humanity only 
 increased their liabilities, naturally selected officers who were 
 careful not to know too much about the faults of servants or 
 of implements. The loss of life and the amount of human 
 suffering which have ensued from the want of adequate 
 pressure upon the great carrying companies to protect their 
 servants from injury in their service have been appalling. 
 
 Most American courts have sought to multiply exceptions 
 to the great exception, and have refused to follow the English 
 House of Lords in its blind zeal for the exemption of capital 
 from responsibility. Indeed, outside of Maine, Massachusetts, 
 New York, New Jersey and Mississippi, American courts have 
 been as much in advance of English courts, in this respect, as 
 American legislatures have lagged in the rear of the British 
 parliament. 
 
 For it is a fact, not to be denied, that the legislature of 
 Great Britain, for the last half-century, has been constantly in 
 advance of nearly every American legislature in protecting 
 from the rapacity and oppression of unscrupulous masters not 
 only the public at large, but also their servants, and especially 
 women and children. All our statutes giving a right of 
 action for death, limiting hours of labor, restricting the forced 
 labor of women and children, requiring precautions against 
 unhealthy conditions in places of work, prohibiting " pluck-me 
 stores" and providing for the enforcement of such laws by 
 government inspection, were in substance copied from British 
 statutes. There is probably not one state in the entire Union 
 which, even yet, has a code of labor laws as favorable to labor- 
 ers as that of Great Britain ; while there is certainly not one in 
 which those laws are so faithfully enforced. 
 
 With each successive edition of this treatise more and more 
 freedom has been used in criticising decisions of even the 
 highest courts. The conflict of opinions among these courts 
 
Vlll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 makes this absolutely necessary in some instances, and justi- 
 fiable in all. Judges are not infallible. Not only does their 
 present disagreement prove this ; it is far more signally illus- 
 trated by the unanimous condemnation, in one generation, of 
 the unanimous decisions of a previous one. The truth is, that 
 every good statute affecting a general rule of law is passed to 
 correct either a previous bad statute or a previous bad judicial 
 decision. The doctrine of stare decisis, which seldom stands 
 in the way of a court of last resort, when its passions or preju- 
 dices are involved, is constantly used as an excuse for refusing 
 to recognize changed social conditions, where the plainest 
 justice requires it. 
 
 There should be much less hesitation than there is, in courts 
 of last resort, in acknowledging previous mistakes and overrul- 
 ing their own erroneous decisions. And if, instead of making 
 new iron rules (which must in time become obsolete and 
 oppressive), legislatures would devise some method by which 
 the courts could declare that to be law which is known to be 
 justice, without disturbing contracts or operating retroactively, 
 the whole law might be vastly improved. We believe this to 
 be possible, but, unfortunately, far from probable. Legisla- 
 tures are unwilling to relinquish powers which they are unable 
 to use; and judges are reluctant to assume new duties. 
 
 Nevertheless, within the narrow limits allowed to them by 
 precedent, American judges have upon the whole made for 
 themselves an honorable record by their decisions upon these 
 questions. It is particularly noteworthy that, even after 
 allowing for some recent reactionary decisions, the general 
 tendency of the Federal courts has been towards a liberal 
 interpretation of the law of negligence in favor of the public, 
 and especially of servants. This is all the more remarkable 
 and commendable, because Federal judges are not merely 
 entirely independent of the popular vote, but never owe 
 their appointment to what is usually spoken of as popular 
 influence. 
 
 From the tone of these remarks, and indeed from the gen- 
 eral tone of these volumes, it might not unreasonably be 
 inferred that the authors were engaged in prosecuting claims 
 upon negligence against corporations. That inference, how- 
 ever, is not at all justified by the facts. The personal and 
 
INTRODUCTION. IX 
 
 professional interests of the authors are almost exclusively on 
 the side of great corporations and of defendants in negligence 
 cases. The writer of this introduction has only twice in his life 
 been counsel for the plaintiff in a negligence case ; while both 
 the authors have been counsel for defendants in many such 
 cases. The views here expressed are the result of an impartial' 
 study of the whole situation, while constantly engaged in 
 the professional service of railway companies and other 
 corporations. 
 
 The truth is that equal and exact justice, in all these 
 matters, is in the long run as much for the interest of business 
 corporations as it is for the interest of those who deal with 
 them. If their agents are permitted to be reckless in their 
 treatment of customers or of fellow-servants, they inevitably 
 become reckless in their treatment of the corporate property. 
 Indeed, it seldom happens that a railway servant's negligence 
 inflicts injury upon any one, without at the same moment 
 inflicting serious injury upon the railway property. And, 
 although it may seem hard to make the railway company 
 suffer for injury to a stranger, as well as for loss of its own 
 property, experience shows that this double liability is none 
 too much, indeed not enough, to secure a careful administra- 
 tion of such property. 
 
 March 15, 1898. T. G. S. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Part I. General Principles. 
 
 II. Liabilities arising out of Personal Relations. 
 
 III. Public Corporations and Officers. 
 
 IV. Public Ways. 
 V. Carriers. 
 
 VI. Personal Services. 
 VII. Management of Property. 
 VIII. Measure of Damages. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Chapter I. Negligence in General. 
 II. Proximate Cause. 
 
 III. Degrees of Negligence. 
 
 IV. Questions of Fact and Law. 
 V. Evidence. 
 
 VI. Contributory Negligence. 
 VII. Parties. 
 VIII. Deceased Persons. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL. 
 
 VOL. 1 — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 1. Negligence variously defined 3 
 
 2. DifHculty of exact definition 3 
 
 xi 
 
Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOL. I — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 3. Definition of actionable negligence 3 
 
 4. Negligence and concurring damage distinguished 3 
 
 5. Analysis of a cause of action on negligence 4 
 
 6. Dr. Wharton's definition reviewed 4 
 
 7. Election between intended and unintended injury 5 
 
 8. Duty, an essential element 6 
 
 9. The duty must be to use care 7 
 
 10. The duty must be legal not merely moral 8 
 
 11. No unreasonable duty required 9 
 
 12. In determining duty, regard to be had to era 10 
 
 13. Violation of duty imposed by statute or ordinance 11 
 
 13a. Regulations for public benefit only 14 
 
 14. A personal duty cannot be delegated 14 
 
 15. No negligence where there is no breach of duty 15 
 
 16. Inevitable accident 16 
 
 17. Apparent exceptions to rule as to inevitable accident 18 
 
 18. What is. not inevitable accident 19 
 
 19. Absence of intent to produce damage 20 
 
 30. Distinction between negligence and fraud 20 
 
 21. Defendant's anticipation of injury not essential 21 
 
 23. Election between cotnract and tort 22 
 
 23. Damage an essential element 28 
 
 24. Damage must be special to plaintiff 34 
 
 24a. Bight to recover over 24 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 Sec. 25. Breach of duty must cause the damage 26 
 
 26. Breach of duty raust be the proximate cause 27 
 
 27. Breach of statutory duty 38 
 
 38. Natural and continuous sequence, defined 29 
 
 29. Foreseen and unforeseen consequences of negligence 31 
 
 30. Extraordinary consequences of negligence 33 
 
 31. Intervening cause, breaking connection 34 
 
 32. Intervening cause must be either a superseding or a respon- 
 
 sponsible cause 36 
 
 33. Superseding cause and inevitable accident, distinguished. . . 37 
 
 34. Intervening responsible cause, not superseding 37 
 
 35. Intervening cause illustrated 38 
 
 36. Intervening cause must be culpable 39 
 
 37. Intervening cause must be a free agent 40 
 
 38. Intervener not culpable, if ignorant of facts 41 
 
 39. Superior force concurring with defendant's negligence .... 42 
 
 40. Superior force concurring with defendant's delay 44 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Xlll 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 VOL. I— PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 41. The theory of two degrees of negligence 47 
 
 48. Its impracticability in modern affairs 48 
 
 43. Unsatisfactory tests of " ordinary care" 49 
 
 44. Necessity of an exceptional degree of care 50 
 
 45. The requirement just and reasonable 51 
 
 46. •' Utmost care," when required 52 
 
 47. Three degrees of care required 54 
 
 48. Correlative degrees of negligence 55 
 
 49. " Gross," "ordinary " and " slight " negligence defined 56 
 
 50. Standard of ' ' great care " stated 57 
 
 51. Application of the rule to passenger carriers 57 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 Sec. 53. Negligence, a question of mingled law and fact 60 
 
 53. Province of court and jury 61 
 
 54. Questions proper for the jury 64 
 
 55. Proximate cause, when question for the jury 67 
 
 56. When question should not be left to the jury : 68 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Sec. 57. Plaintiff's burden of proof 73 
 
 58. What will shift burden to defendant 76 
 
 59. Presumptions of negligence 78 
 
 60. Illustrations of presumptive negligence 79 
 
 60a. Admission and declarations 80 
 
 60b. Other similar accidents 83 
 
 60c. Subsequent repairs 84 
 
 CHAPTER YI. 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 Sec. 61. General rule 87 
 
 62. Contributory negligence under statutory claims 90 
 
 63. Reason of rule 93 
 
 64. When no defense 94 
 
 65. Fault must be that of injured party or his agent 96 
 
 66. Doctrine of " identification." 97 
 
 66a. Stranger's contributory fault no excuse for plaintiff's 100 
 
 67. Husband and wife : 101 
 
 68. Knowledge of principal, when imputed to agent 103 
 
XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOL. I — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 69. Knowledge of agent, when imputed to principal 108 
 
 70. Contributory negligence of children 103 
 
 71. Negligence of parent, in parent's action 103 
 
 73. Parents must be actually in fault 105 
 
 73. Degree of care required from child 106 
 
 73a. Age of discretion 110 
 
 74. Imputation of parent's negligence ; New York rule 115 
 
 75. New York rule criticised 117 
 
 76. Imputed negligence ; Illinois rule 118 
 
 77. Identification of child and custodian 118 
 
 78. True rule ; no imputation of parental negligence 118 
 
 79. No imputed negligence, if child careful 120 
 
 80. Imputed negligence ; limitations of rule 130 
 
 81. Imputed negligence ; parent must be acting as such 180 
 
 82. Imputed negligence ; parent must be negligent in fact 131 
 
 83. Imputed negligence ; age of child 121 
 
 84. Imputed negligence ; lunatics, etc 133 
 
 85. Plaintiff not prejudiced unless actually in fault 123 
 
 86. PlaintiflE not prejudiced by want of more than ordinary 
 
 care 135 
 
 87. Ordinary care defined 137 
 
 88. Care required of infirm, etc 130 
 
 89. Efifect of mistaken judgment under sudden alarm 131 
 
 90. Duty of looking and listening 134 
 
 91. Effect of defendant's advice or invitation 135 
 
 93. Plaintiff not bound to anticipate negligence 137 
 
 93. Plaintiff's fault must contribute to injury 140 
 
 94. Plaintiff's fault i^st proximately contribute to injury 143 
 
 95. Negligence increasing damages only, no bar 145 
 
 96. Plaintiff's fault need not be cause of injury 146 
 
 97. Effect of technical trespass 147 
 
 98. Technical trespass, no bar 150 
 
 99. Defendant's later negligence ; rule in Davies v. Mann 150 
 
 100. Illustrations of rule 155 
 
 101. Plaintiff last in fault 156 
 
 102. Comparative negligence 156 
 
 103. Rule in Georgia, Florida and Tennessee 158 
 
 104. Plaintiff's violation of statute , 159 
 
 105. Plaintiff's fault in representative capacity 163 
 
 106. Burden of proof ; conflict of decisions 163 
 
 107. Burden of proof on plaintiff , 164 
 
 108. Burden of proof on defendant 166 
 
 109. Burden ought to be on defendant 168 
 
 110. Presumption againstinegligence ; how over-balanced. ..... 169 
 
 111. What proof of care sufficient 171 
 
 113. Inference from circumstances 173 
 
 113. Pleading: absence of fault 174 
 
 114. Questions of fact and law 175 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 VOL. I — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 115. Persons directly or indirectly injured 180 
 
 116. Who may sue on breach of contract 183 
 
 117. Liability for selling dangerous goods 185 
 
 118. Private actions upon public obligations 186 
 
 119. Reversioners and mortagees 187 
 
 120. Landlords and tenants 188 
 
 130a.Railroads 190 
 
 121. Infants and lunatics 192 
 
 122. Who are jointly liable 193 
 
 123. Who are not jointly liable 195 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 Sec. 124. No common-law remedy for injuries causing death 196 
 
 125. The statutory remedy 198 
 
 126. The English statute (Lord Campbell's act) 198 
 
 127. American statutes 198 
 
 128. Peculiar statutes 200 
 
 129. Cumulative statutes 201 
 
 130. [Omitted] 203 
 
 131. Action ; vehen brought where injury occurred 203 
 
 132. Action ; when may be brought in another state 204 
 
 133. Who may bring action 206 
 
 134. For whose benefit action may be brought 209 
 
 135. No action without surviving statutory beneficiary 209 
 
 136. Illegitimates ; when entitled to benefit of the statute 210 
 
 137. Pecuniary injury ; how far essential to action 211 
 
 138. Miscellaneous points ; . . . 213 
 
 139. Effect of survival statutes 213 
 
 140. Effect of releases and settlements 215 
 
Xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF PERSONAL 
 RELATIONS. 
 
 Chapter IX. Liability of Masters for Sbrvants. 
 X. Liability of Masters to Servants. 
 XI. Liability of Servants. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 VOL. I — PAGE_ 
 
 Sec. 14L General rule of liability 318 
 
 143. Principle of the rule 318 
 
 143. [Omitted] 330 
 
 144. Agency necessary to create responsibility 230 
 
 145. Master's liability for servant's acts under implied authority, 322 
 
 146. Master liable for acts in course of employment '. 224 
 
 147. What acts are within employment 325 
 
 148. Master not liable for acts outside of employment 328 
 
 149. [Omitted] 239 
 
 150. Liability for servant's vcillful acts 339 
 
 151. Ostensible authority for willful acts, 331 
 
 152. [Omitted] '. 333 
 
 153. Willful acts ; when consequence of negligence 233 
 
 154. Liability for negative results of willful act 234 
 
 155. Disobedience of master's orders 236 
 
 156. [Omitted] 237 
 
 157. Liability for sub-agents or strangers 237 
 
 158. Implied liability of owner of vehicle 338 
 
 159. Ownership of other property; how far implies liability. .. . 339 
 
 160. Who is to be deemed a master 340 
 
 161. Nominal master when not liable 243 
 
 163. Liability for servant hired out 244 
 
 163. Liability of trustees for employee's acts 345 
 
 164. Who is a "contractor " 346 
 
 165. When contractor and when servant 247 
 
 166. Effect of employer's control over contractor 349 
 
 167. Effect of right of dismissal 250 
 
 168. Employer not liable for contractor's negligence 351 
 
 169. Negligence of subcontractor and part-contractor 353 
 
 170. [Omitted] 254 
 
 171. Employer liable for persons selected by him 254 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, XVll 
 
 VOL. I — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 172. Liability for servant compulsorily employed — pilots 254 
 
 173. Liability of owner for persons employed on land 255 
 
 174. Liability of employer for his own fault 257 
 
 175. Employer liable for act contracted for 259 
 
 176. Omission of duty not excused by contracting to have it 
 
 done 260 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 Sec. 177. Limitations of master's liability to servant 263 
 
 178. Reason assigned for rule 365 
 
 179. The real reason 267 
 
 180. The general rule 268 
 
 181. Who are servants 371 
 
 182. Volunteer, when considered servant 272 
 
 183. "Who is a volunteer assistant 273 
 
 184. Master does not insure against risks '. 274 
 
 185. What risks servants assume 276 
 
 185o. What risks servants do not assume 281 
 
 1856. What facts servants may presume 283 
 
 186. Risks assumed under special orders 286 
 
 186a. Risks of service outside of ordinary employment 289 
 
 187. Master liable for his own negligence 291 
 
 188. Concurrent negligence 292 
 
 189. Degree of care required of inaster 293 
 
 190. Duration of master's duty and exemption 295 
 
 191. Duty to select competent f eUow-servants 297 
 
 192. Evidence of negligence in employment of servant 299 
 
 193. Duty to employ sufficient force 303 
 
 194. Duty to provide proper instrumentalities 304 
 
 194a. Duty of inspection and repair 808 
 
 195. Limits of master's liability for instrumentalities 311 
 
 196. Master's duty as to instrumentalities not his own property 319 
 
 197. Illustrations of master's liability 320 
 
 198. Low bridges 324 
 
 198a. Low bridges ; contributory fault '. 326 
 
 199. Low bridge cases limited 327 
 
 200 [Omitted] 328 
 
 301. Other dangerous projections 339 
 
 202. Master's duty to prescribe and enforce rules 330 
 
 303. Master's duty to guard and warn against unusual risks 333 
 
 203a. Duty of supervision : • ■ 336 
 
 304. Delegation of master's personal duties 337 
 
 205. Illustrations of non-transferable duties 340 
 
 206. What is sufficient notice to master 344 
 
 307. Contributory negligence 345 
 
 307a. What is not contributory negligence 350 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — b.] 
 
XVlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 vol.. I— PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 207b. Disobedience of rules and orders 353 
 
 208. Basis of imputed assumption of risks from master's neg- 357 
 
 ligence 358 
 
 209. Servant accepting employment with notice of defects 359 
 
 209o. Servant continuing with notice of defects 363 
 
 210. Effect of refusal to repair 364 
 
 211. True rule as to effect of servant's knowledge 366 
 
 211a. Special risks incurred under coercion 366 
 
 212. Test of servant's prudence 367 
 
 218. Excusable omissions of usual care 369 
 
 214. Notice of defect, without notice of danger, immaterial. . . . 371 
 
 215. Effect of master's promises and assurances 377 
 
 216. Presumption as to servant's knowledge 379 
 
 217. Means of knowledge ; duty to investigate 383 
 
 218. Application of rule to minors . 386 
 
 219. Special duties of masters to minors 389 
 
 219a. Inexperienced servants 391 
 
 220. Servant's knowledege of master's personal defects 392 
 
 231. Servant's duty to warn and complain 394 
 
 222. Burden of proof 396 
 
 223. What is sufficient proof 401 
 
 224. Who are fellow-servants 403 
 
 225. Who are not f eUow-servants 404 
 
 226. American rule ; vice-principals not fellow-servants 405 
 
 237. British rule ; no vice-principals 406 
 
 228. British rule criticised 407 
 
 229. British rule condemned at home 408 
 
 230. Who are vice-pirncipals ; general managers 411 
 
 231. Who are vice-principals ; New York rule 413 
 
 232. Principle of New York decision generally accepted 415 
 
 238. In what duties servants act as vice-principals 423 
 
 233a. Examples of who are, or are not, vice-principals 435 
 
 233b. Peculiar local rules 438 
 
 284. Servants must be in common employment 439 
 
 235. Common employment ; general rule 430 
 
 236. Who are in common employment under general rule 431 
 
 237. Who are not in common employment 481 
 
 238. Common employment ; association rule 484 
 
 289. Illustrations of common employment 436 
 
 240. [Omitted] 486 
 
 241. Illustration of fellow-servant in common employment 
 
 under all rules 43g 
 
 241a. Effect of statutes and codes 440 
 
 241b. Statutes of general application 441 
 
 241c. Statutes applying to railroad companies 443 
 
 241d!. Exemption from liability by special contract 446 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XIX 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 
 
 VOL. I — PACK. 
 
 Sec. 343. Servant's liability to master 456 
 
 243. Servant not liable to third person for nonfeasance 456 
 
 344. Servant liable to third person for misfeasance 458 
 
 245. Servant's liability to fellow-servants 460 
 
 246. Liability of shipmasters 461 
 
 247. Servant not liable for negligence of a fellow-servant 462 
 
 248. Joint liability of master and servant 463 
 
 PART III. 
 
 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND OFFICERS. 
 
 Chapter XII. Municipal Corporations. 
 
 XIII. Public Officers. 
 
 XIV. Incorporated Public Trustees. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. 
 
 Sec. 249. The state cannot be coerced by suit 464 
 
 250. Extent of state's immunity 466 
 
 251. Liability of state by its own consent 466 
 
 253. [Consolidated with § 253] 467 
 
 253. Municipal corporations as state-agencies 467 
 
 254. Statutory test of corporate liability 469 
 
 255. Public and private functions of corporations 471 
 
 256. Liability of counties, towns, etc. , generally 473' 
 
 357. Liability of counties in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Indiana 
 
 and Iowa 477 
 
 258. Liability of New England towns 479 
 
 259. Common-law liability of New England towns 483 
 
 260. [ConsoUdated with § 291] 484 
 
 360a. Maintenance of jails, etc 484 
 
 261. Statutory liability for mob violence 485 
 
 262. Adoption and execution of laws and ordinances 487 
 
 363. Discretionary powers — granting licenses 493 
 
 264. [Omitted] 494 
 
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOL. I — PACE. 
 
 Sec. 265. Supplying water and apparatus for extinguishing fires 494 
 
 266. Providing for public health 497 
 
 267. Providing public schools 498 
 
 268. [Consolidated with § 258] 499 
 
 269. [Consolidated with § 262] 499 
 
 270. [Consolidated with § 262] 499 
 
 271. Devising plan of public improvement 499 
 
 272. Error of judgment distinguished from negligence 500 
 
 273. [Consolidated with § 272] 503 
 
 274. Planning ineflftcient or injurious drainage 503 
 
 275. Duty to remedy defects in plan 507 
 
 276. Discretion in the application of limited funds 508 
 
 277. [ConsoUdated with § 374] 509 
 
 278. How far professional advice will excuse defect in plan. . . 509 
 
 279. Statutory directions as to plan 510 
 
 280. [Consolidated with §281] 511 
 
 281. Liability for breach of ministerial duties 511 
 
 282. [Consolidated with §381] 514 
 
 283. Damage consequent on authorized act 514 
 
 284. [Consolidated with § 334] 516 
 
 285. Municipal lands and structures 516 
 
 286. Management of water and gas service 520 
 
 287. Maintenance and repair of sewers 521 
 
 288. [Consolidated with § 358] , .' 525 
 
 289. Implied liability for non-repair of streets 535 
 
 290. [Consolidated with § 367] 528 
 
 291. Implied liability for negligence of agents 528 
 
 393. [Consolidated with § 391].; 533 
 
 293. [Consolidated with § 291] 533 
 
 294. [Consolidated with § 291] 533 
 
 295. Departments of government, not agents of city 533 
 
 296. When departments are city's agents 534 
 
 397. [Omitted] 585 
 
 398. Independent contractors not agents 535 
 
 399. Liability limited to matters within jurisdiction 537 
 
 300. [Consolidated with § 299] 539 
 
 301. Recovery over by corporation 540 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 Sec. 303. Immunity of political officers 543 
 
 303. Immunity of judicial officers 543 
 
 304 to 309. [Omitted] 546 
 
 310. Quasi-jvLdicial officers, how far protected 547 
 
 311. [Consolidated with § 310] 549 
 
 313. Non-judicial public officers classified 549 
 
 313. Negligent performance of ministerial duties 549 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xxi 
 
 VOL, 1 — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 314. Liability for nonfeasance 551 
 
 315. [Consolidated with § 813] 552 
 
 316. [Consolidated with § 314] 552 
 
 31 7. Presumption in favor of officer 552 
 
 318. [Consolidated with § 313] 553 
 
 319. Liability for negligence of subordinates 553 
 
 320. [Omitted] 554 
 
 321. Liability of post-masters for subordinates 554 
 
 323. Liability of army and navy officers 555 
 
 833. Public-school officers and boards 556 
 
 334. [Consolidated with § 340] 557 
 
 335. Liabihty of government-contractors 557 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 
 
 Sec. 326. Former rule of liability of statutory trustees 559 
 
 337. Present rule of liabihty in England 560 
 
 338. Incorporated administrative boards 563 
 
 339. Voluntary corporations performing public functions 563 
 
 330. Trustees not hable when agents only 564 
 
 331. Trustees of public charities 565 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 PUBLIC WAYS. 
 
 Chapter XV. Highways. 
 
 XVI. Turnpike Roads. 
 XVII. Bridges. 
 XVIII. Canals. 
 XIX. Construction and Maintenance of Railroads. 
 XX. Railroad Injuries to Animals. 
 XXI. Railroad Injuries to persons. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 Sec. 333. Highways are public works ... 568 
 
 333. What are highways within the rule 570 
 
XXU TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOL. 1— PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 334. When liability in respect to highway attaches 573 
 
 834a. Obligation dependent on jurisdiction of structure 576 
 
 335. Liability pending construction of way 577 
 
 336. When obligation ceases 578 
 
 337. No common-law duty to repair highways 579 
 
 338. Statutory liability for defective ways 580 
 
 339. Implied liability 583 
 
 340. Liability of road-officers 584 
 
 341. Contract obligations to repair 586 
 
 342. [Consolidated with § 359] 586 
 
 343. Obligations of abutting owners as to highway 586 
 
 344. [Omitted] 590 
 
 345. Joint and several liability for defective way 590 
 
 346. Defects in way concurring with other causes 591 
 
 347. [Omitted] 594 
 
 348. Duty to rebuild destroyed highway 504 
 
 349. [Consolidated with § 356] 595 
 
 350. What are statutory " defects " 595 
 
 351. Defects in margins of way. . 598 
 
 353. When whole width must be passable 600 
 
 353. Sidewalks and street-crossings 601 
 
 354. Overhanging roofs, awnings, trees, etc 603 
 
 355. Objects on highway likely to frighten horses 605 
 
 356. Duty to guard and light defective highway 608 
 
 357. [Consolidated with § 359] 612 
 
 358. Authorized interference with highway 613 
 
 359. Liability of licensee of use of street 616 
 
 360. [Consolidated with § 359] 620 
 
 361. Obstructions incident to building operations 630 
 
 362. Obstructions incident to trafiBc 633 
 
 363. Obstructions from natural causes 634 
 
 364. [Consolidated with § 363] 639 
 
 365. Individual liability for wrongful obstruction 630 
 
 366. [Consolidated with § 367] 631 
 
 367. Ground of liability for defective ways 631 
 
 368. Actual notice of defect 635 
 
 369. When notice will be implied 639 
 
 370. Who may maintain action 644 
 
 371. Damages must be special 646 
 
 373. [Omitted] .;.. 647 
 
 373. Notice of injury preliminary to action 647 
 
 374. Defenses 649 
 
 375. Contributory negligence 650 
 
 376. Traveler's knowledge of defect 654 
 
 377. Care required in traveling at night 659 
 
 378. Defect in plaintiff's carriage, harness or horses 660 
 
 379. Unskillful or improper driving 663 
 
 380. Negligent stowing and excessive weight of load 664 
 
 381. Sunday traveling 665 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xxiii 
 
 VOL. r — PAGE. 
 
 383. [ConsoUdated] 665 
 
 383. [Consolidated] 665 
 
 384, Action over against third person 666 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 TURNPIKE ROADS. 
 
 VOL. II — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 385. Turnpikes are highways 669 
 
 386. Maintenance of road 669 
 
 387. Statutory liability for non-repair 
 
 388. Re-appropriation of road by the public 671 
 
 389. Eflfect of change of control 673 
 
 CHAPTER XVH. 
 BRIDGES. 
 
 Sec. 390. Bridges distinguished from highways 673 
 
 391. [Consolidated with § 390J 674 
 
 393. Approaches to bridges 674 
 
 393. Abutments and railings 675 
 
 394. By whom bridge was repairable 676 
 
 395. Bridge across navigable stream 677 
 
 396. Management and protection of draw -bridges 678 
 
 897. Toll-bridges 679 
 
 CHAPTER XVni. 
 
 CANALS. 
 
 Sec. 398. State canals 680 
 
 399. Obligation of canal companies to navigators 680 
 
 400. Construction of canals 681 
 
 401. Maintaining bridges, locks, etc 681 
 
 402. Maintaining embankments, etc 683 
 
 403. Repair of towing-path and fencing canal 683 
 
 404. Duties of boat-owners 683 
 
 405. [Omitted] 684 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF RAILROADS. 
 
 Sec. 406. Track, road-bed, bridges, etc 685 
 
 407. What dangers must be provided against 686 
 
 408. Railroads on highways 688 
 
 409. [Omitted] 690 
 
 410. Accessories of railroads 690 
 
 411. [Omitted] 693 
 
XXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOL, II — PACE. 
 
 Sec. 412. Rights of compensated land-owners 693 
 
 413. Obligations of lessor or lessee 694 
 
 414. Interference with highway 696 
 
 415. Restoration of roads and bridges 698 
 
 416. Road-bridges over railroads 699 
 
 417. Highway crossing at level. 701 
 
 417a. Other crossings at level 704 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 RAILROAD INJURIES TO ANIMALS. 
 
 Sec. 418. English rule as to keeping animals in '. 707 
 
 419. Where English rule does not prevail 710 
 
 420. Unequal operation of common-law rule 713 
 
 421. Statutory regulations 714 
 
 422. Application and validity of statutes 718 
 
 423. When fences must be put up 719 
 
 424. Fences must be ' ' sufficient " 720 
 
 425. Fences miust be maintained 722 
 
 426. Frightening animals on fenced roads 725 
 
 427. Duty to signal to cattle 728 
 
 428. Care towards trespassing cattle ' 729 
 
 429. Checking or stopping train 731 
 
 430. Checking speed for trespassing cattle , 734 
 
 431. Statutory rules as to checking speed 735 
 
 432. Presumption as to negligence 738 
 
 433. When animal is riglitfully on track 739 
 
 434. Whex'e fences are not required 741 
 
 435. Fences and cattle-guards in towns 745 
 
 436. Injury must be owing to defect in fence 746 
 
 437. Effect of adjoining owner's agreement 748 
 
 438. Employment of adjacent owner to build fence 750 
 
 439. Adjacent owner's option to build fence 750 
 
 440. Compensated owner of land cannot recover 751 
 
 441. Company's agreement to fence 751 
 
 442. Grants of right of way 753 
 
 443. Who may enforce contract to fence 753 
 
 444. Liabihty where one company uses another's track 753 
 
 445. Liability of lessees of road 754 
 
 446. Liability of other parties 7,55 
 
 447. Application of fence laws to personal injuries 756 
 
 448. For what injuries company is liable 756 
 
 449. Who entitled to benefit of statute 758 
 
 450. Notice of defect, when to be given , 759 
 
 451. Contribtuory negligence on fenced roads 760 
 
 451a. Contributory negligence on unfenced roads 761 
 
 452. Owner's willful conduct 766 
 
 453. Rule in Illinois, etc 767 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 VOL. II — PAGR. 
 
 Sec. 454. Rule in Maryland and Georgia 767 
 
 455. Degree of care in maintaining fence 768 
 
 456. Company's action against owner 770 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 RAILROAD INJURIES TO PERSONS. 
 
 Sec. 457. Care required to avoid injury to persons 771 
 
 458. Illustrations of want of care 773 
 
 459. Negligence of other persons or companies 775 
 
 460. Rate of speed 778 
 
 461. Care required of railroads on and near highways 780 
 
 462. [Transferred to § 485a] 783 
 
 463. Care required at highway crossings. 783 
 
 464. Care required at other crossings 788 
 
 464a. Intersecting railroads 793 
 
 465. Care of stationary cars and engines 793 
 
 466. Gates, flagmen and watchmen 794 
 
 466a. Duty to maintain fences 797 
 
 467. Neglect of statutory precautions 798 
 
 468. Omission to ring or whistle at crossings 803 
 
 469. Presumptions in such cases 805 
 
 470. Who entitled to benefit of statutes 807 
 
 471. Trains running backwards 808 
 
 473. Contributory negligence 810 
 
 473. What is not contributory negligence. 813 
 
 474. Fractious horse 815 
 
 475. Crossing track in view of train 816 
 
 476. Duty to look and listen 819 
 
 477. When failure to look and listen excused 826 
 
 478. Obstructions to view 831 
 
 479. Crossing when highway is blocked 835 
 
 480. Traveling along the track 837 
 
 481. Infirm persons 843 
 
 481a. Children 844 
 
 4816. Deceased persons 847 
 
 483. Effect of contributory negligence on statutory liabilities. . 848 
 
 483. Duty to avoid effects of contributory negligence 850 
 
 484. Duty to anticipate contributory negligence 885 
 
 485. Evidence of negligence 860 
 
 485a. Street cars 864 
 
 485b. Electric and cable cars 867 
 
 485c. Street cars ; contributory negligence 868 
 
XXvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PART V. 
 
 CARRIERS. 
 
 Chapter XXII. Carriers of Passengers. 
 XXIII. Telegraphs. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. 
 
 VOL. II — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 486. Obligations of carrier not merely in contract 875 
 
 487. "Who are common carriers of passengers 876 
 
 488. Who deemed passengers 877 
 
 489. Who not passengers 880 
 
 490. When relation begins and ends 883 
 
 491. Liability to free passengers 885 
 
 492. Who are not free passengers 886 
 
 493a. Quasi passengers 887 
 
 493. Ejection of Passengers 889 
 
 494. Carrier not insurer 896 
 
 495. Degree of care required 897 
 
 496. Application of the rule requiring great care 901 
 
 497. Obligation as to vehicle 902 
 
 498. Exceptions as to certain vehicles 905 
 
 499. Carrier's liability for the condition of the road 906 
 
 500. Liability for acts of strangers 907 
 
 501. When ordinary care only required 908 
 
 503. Liability in case of divided ownership 910 
 
 503. Accidents beyond carrier's line 912 
 
 504. Limitation of liability by notice or contract 913 
 
 505. Validity of restrictions on liability 914 
 
 506. Approaches, accommodations, etc 917 
 
 507. [Consolidated with § 490] 920 
 
 508. Negligence in starting and stopping 930 
 
 509. Duty to passengers alighting 924 
 
 510. Duty to assist passengers in getting on and off 937 
 
 511. Duty to maintain guard against egress 930 
 
 513. Duty to preserve order 930 
 
 513. Liability for servant's malicious acts 934 
 
 513a. Passengers on freight trains 936 
 
 514. Obligations of stage-coach proprietors 939 
 
 515. Obligations of carriers by steam vessels 941 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXvii 
 
 VOL. n — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 516. Presumption of negligence 942 
 
 517. Presumption of negligence, how rebutted 946 
 
 518. Evidence 947 
 
 519. Contributory negligence 95O 
 
 520. Getting on and oflE moving vehicle 954 
 
 521. Getting on and off in other cases 961 
 
 538. Statutes as to platforms, etc 966 
 
 523. Passengers in improper place 967 
 
 524. Changing places on train 974 
 
 525. Crossing tracks 976 
 
 536. Care of passengers' personal effects 978 
 
 527. [Omitted] 983 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 TELEGRAPHS. 
 
 Sec. 528. Nature of the business 983 
 
 539. Its peculiarities 984 
 
 530. Bisks to which it is exposed 984 
 
 581. Statutory regulations 985 
 
 533. Obligations not merely in contract 987 
 
 533. [Consolidated with § 586] , 987 
 
 534. Telegraph companies, common carriers 987 
 
 535 Reasons for considering them such 989 
 
 536. Obligation to furnish telegi'aphic facilities 990 
 
 537. Responsible only for negligence 991 
 
 538. Unlawful messages 991 
 
 539. Degree of care required 993 
 
 540. Duty as to receiving messages 994 
 
 640a. Duty as to delivery 995 
 
 541. Messages must not be altered 997 
 
 543. Evidence of negligence 998 
 
 543. To whom company is responsible 1000 
 
 544. Connecting lines 1003 
 
 545. Power to make regulations 1004 
 
 546. Certain reasonable rules considered 1005 
 
 547. Certain unreasonable rules considered 1006 
 
 548 Notice of rules necessary 1008 
 
 549. Customer must actually know the rule 1009 
 
 550. Limitation of liability by mere notice 1009 
 
 551 . Limitation of liability by contract 1010 
 
 553. Proof of special contract 1011 
 
 553. Validity of contracts exempting from liability generally. . 1012 
 
 554. Validity of other stipulations 1014 
 
 555. Effect of stipulations 1017 
 
 556. Evidence under special contract 1030 
 
 556a. Contributory negligence 1021 
 
XXVIU TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PART VI. 
 
 PERSONAL SERVICES. 
 
 Chapter XXIV. Attorneys and Counsellors. 
 XXV. Bankers and Bill Collectors. 
 XXVI. Clerks and Recording Officers. 
 XXVII. Notaries Public. 
 XXVIII. Physicians and Surgeons. 
 XXIX. Sheriffs and Constables. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW. 
 
 VOL. II — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 557. The relation of attorney and client 1023 
 
 558. Degree of skill, etc. , required of an attorney 1035 
 
 559. General rule of liability 1036 
 
 560. When liable for gross negligence only 1038 
 
 561. Liability to summary jurisdiction of court 1028 
 
 563. Obligation not dependent upon compensation 1029 
 
 563. Retainer implies professional employment only 1030 
 
 564. Ad'vice of counsel, how far a protection to an attorney. . . 1031 
 
 565. Negligence a question for the jury 1031 
 
 56ei. Burden of proof 1032 
 
 567. Negligence in instituting proceedings 1033 
 
 568. Obligation to proceed in the cause 1034 
 
 569. Conduct of cause 1034 
 
 570. Obligation to take collateral proceedings ■. 1036 
 
 571. [Consolidated with § 569] 1037 
 
 572. Proceedings after trial 1037 
 
 573. Compromising suit or judgment 1038 
 
 574. Negligence in conveyancing and searching titles 1039 
 
 575. Negligence in keeping and investing money 1041 
 
 576. Liability for disclosing privileged communication 1041 
 
 577. Liability for partners or agents 1043 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 BANKERS AND BILL COLLECTORS. 
 
 Sec. 578. Who are bankers 1043 
 
 579. Obligation to use care IO43 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xxix 
 
 bEC. 580. Duty to present bill for payment or acceptance 1044 
 
 580a. Duty to remit proceeds of collection 1046 
 
 581. Duty to give notice of dishonor of bill 1047 
 
 583. Liability for negligence of sub-agents 1049 
 
 583. Exceptions to the rule . 1053 
 
 584. Personal liability of sub-agents IO54 
 
 585. Collection by notary 1054 
 
 586. Who may sue for banker's negligence 1056 
 
 587. Banker not bound to sue upon paper 1057 
 
 587a. Burden of proof 1057 
 
 588. Special deposits IO59 
 
 589 . Liability of directors 1061 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 CLERKS AND OTHER RECORDING OFFICERS. 
 
 Sec. 590. General rule of liability 1063 
 
 591. Illustrations of the rule 1063 
 
 593. False certificates, and mistakes in recording 1064 
 
 593. Liability of towns for negligence of their clerks 1065 
 
 CHAPTER XXVn. 
 NOTARIES PUBLIC. 
 
 Sec. 594. General rule of liability for negligence 1066 
 
 595. [Consolidated with § 594] 1067 
 
 596. [Consolidated with § 585] 1067 
 
 597. Standai-d of care in presenting and protesting bills 1667 
 
 598. Illustrations of liability 1068 
 
 599. Giving notice of dishonor of bills 1069 
 
 600. Negligence must be direct cause of indorser's discharge. . . 1069 
 
 601. Defenses by notary 1070 
 
 603. Liability for defective acknowledgments 1070 
 
 CHAPTER XXVHI. 
 PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. 
 
 Sec. 603. Right to recover for services 1073 . 
 
 604. Obligation of unpaid physician 1073 
 
 605. Obligation of paid physician 1073 
 
 606. Degree of skill required 1074 
 
 607. He is bound to have skill 1075 
 
 608. Standard of skill not absolute 1076 
 
 609. Tests of skill 1077 
 
 610. Character of disease may determine degree of skill 1078 
 
 611. And so may the habits and tendencies of the patient 1079 
 
XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOL, II — PAGE, 
 
 Sec. 613. Physicians not liable for errors of judgment 1079 
 
 613. Duty of continuing in attendance 1080 
 
 614. Evidence of negligence and burden of proof 1081 
 
 615. Contributory fault 1083 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES. 
 
 Sec. 616. Common-law liability 1084 
 
 617. Sheriff must owe a duty to plaintiff 1084 
 
 618. Liability for misconduct of deputy 1085 
 
 619. Diligence in executing process 1086 
 
 620. Inadequacy of levy 1088 
 
 621. Safe-keeping of property 1089 
 
 623. Duty as to sale of property 1089 
 
 623. Liability for not returning writ ; and false return 1090 
 
 634. Liability for insufficient sureties 1091 
 
 625. Liability for escape 1092 
 
 PART VII. 
 
 MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY. 
 
 Chapter XXX. Care of Animals, 
 
 XXXI. Driving and Riding. 
 XXXII. Fences. 
 
 XXXIII. Fire. 
 
 XXXIV. Explosives, Machinery and Miscellaneous 
 
 Cases. 
 XXXV, Gas and Electrical Works. 
 XXXVI. Land and Structures. 
 XXXVII. Water and Water-courses. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 CARE OF ANIMALS. 
 
 Sec, 636. Owner's liability for injuries committed by animals 1094 
 
 627. Owner's liability for animal's trespass 1096 
 
 638. Owner's notice of disposition of animal 1097 
 
 639. Presumption of notice of disposition 1099 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXl 
 
 VOL. n — PAGE. 
 
 bEC. 630. what deemed sufficient notice 1101 
 
 631. What kind of notice necessary ] 103 
 
 683. Sufficient evidence of notice 1103 
 
 683. Keeping infectiously diseased animals 1106 
 
 634. Animals running at large 1108 
 
 635. Who will be deemed owner of animal 1110 
 
 636. Ownership of animal ; how proved 1113 
 
 637. Imputed knowledge of animal's habits 11 13 
 
 638. Separate owners, when jointly liable 1114 
 
 639. Contributory negligence 1115 
 
 640. Driving trespassing animals off land 1117 
 
 641. Negligence in impounding cattle 11 19 
 
 642. [Omitted] 1119 
 
 643. Injuries to a dog fighting another 1119 
 
 CHAPTER XXXL 
 
 DRIVING AND RIDING. 
 
 Sec. 644. Management of horses and vehicles 1130 
 
 645. Examples of negligence 1131 
 
 C46. Rate of speed 1123 
 
 647. Injuries from driving vicious or runaway horses 1125 
 
 648. [Consolidated with § 647] 1126 
 
 649. Rule of the road , 1126 
 
 650. [Consolidated with § 649] 1137 
 
 651. Persons on wrong side assume risk; 1127 
 
 653. Application of rule of the road 1 138 
 
 653. Cycling 1129 
 
 654. Contributory negligence 1131 
 
 CHAPTER XXXn. 
 FENCES. 
 
 Sec 655. English common-law rule as to fences 1137 
 
 656. Peculiar American common-law rule 1138 
 
 657. Statutory regulations 1138 
 
 658. Effect of contract to maintain fences 1139 
 
 659. Who entitled to protection of animals by fence 1140 
 
 660. Who entitled to protection against animals by fence 1141 
 
 661. Who are liable for defects of fence 1141 
 
 662. Injuries to animals from insufficient fence 1143 
 
 663. Injuries by animals from insufficient fence 1143 
 
 664. Division fences 1143 
 
 CHAPTER XXXni. 
 
 FIRE. 
 
 Sec. 665. Fire accidentally kindled on one's own land 1145 
 
 666. Liability for spread of fire 1147 
 
XXXll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOL. II — PAGE, 
 
 Sec. 667. Proximate cause of injury 1152 
 
 668. Fire purposely kindled 1153 
 
 669. Fire kindled to clear land 1155 
 
 670. Firing other land 1156 
 
 671. Statutory liability 1157 
 
 672. Fire communicated from locomotives 1158 
 
 673. Duty to use approved appliances 1 160 
 
 674. Other neglect than want of approved appliances 1162 
 
 675. Evidence of origin of fire 1164 
 
 676. Burden of proof 1167 
 
 677. [Omitted] 1172 
 
 678. Combustibles on right of way 1172 
 
 679. Contributory negligence 1175 
 
 680. Negligent use of adjacent land 1178 
 
 681. [Consolidated with § 680] 1181 
 
 682. [Consolidated with § 679] 1181 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 EXPLOSIVES, MACHINERY, AND MISCELLANEOUS CASES. 
 
 Sec. 683. Management of machinery 1182 
 
 684. Who may complain of negligent management 1184 
 
 685. Statutory duty to fence machinery 1184 
 
 686. Negligent use of fire-arms, etc 1184 
 
 687. [Consolidated with § 686] 1187 
 
 688. Negligent use of fire- works, etc , 1187 
 
 688a. Blasting 1188 
 
 689. Storing of dangerous material 1190 
 
 690. Vendors and bailors of dangerous material 1191 
 
 691 Pharmacists, opticians, etc 1193 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 GAS AND ELECTRICAL WORKS. 
 
 Sec. 692. Duty in construction and manufacture 1194 
 
 693. Duty of inspection and repair 1195 
 
 694. [Consolidated with § 693] 1198 
 
 895. Contributory actof stranger 1198 
 
 696. Defense of contributory negligence 1198 
 
 697; Negligenceof company's servants 1199 
 
 698. Electrical works 1199 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 LAND AND STRUCTURES. 
 
 Sec. 699. Obligation of owner of land 1202 
 
 700. Liberty in use of premiees 1203 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXlll 
 
 VOL. II — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 701. Interference with lateral support 1304 
 
 701a. Owner's absolute liability 1307 
 
 703. Dangerous structures 1309 
 
 703a. Uiolation of building laws : fire escapes . 1312 
 
 703. Liability to travelers on adjoining highway 1314 
 
 704. Liability to business visitors 1217 
 
 705. Liability to person entering under bare license 1230 
 
 706. Owner's liability to his invited guest 1334 
 
 707. Unusual or improper use of land or buildings 1226 
 
 708. Landlord's liability for defects arising after lease 1226 
 
 709. Liability to tenant for defects at date of lease 1329 
 
 709a. Liability to strangers for defects at date of lease 1331 
 
 710. Liability of partial lessor 1232 
 
 7^. [Consolidated with g 709] 1334 
 
 713. Tenant, when not liable. '. 1234 
 
 713. Tenant, when liable 1235 
 
 714. [Consolidated with §343] 1236 
 
 715. [Consolidated with § 703] t236 
 
 716. Miner's absolute liability 1336 
 
 717. Miner's liability for negligence 1837 
 
 718. Liability for condition of unfinished buildings 1288 
 
 719. Trap-doors, hoist ways, hatchways, etc 1238 
 
 719o. Passenger elevators 1240 
 
 720. Traps for trespassers 1242 
 
 721. Dripping water and snow 1343 
 
 722. [Consolidated with § 709] 1244 
 
 723. Occupants liability for leakage 1344 
 
 724. Liability where landlord and tenant are both in fault 1245 
 
 735. Wharfingers, etc 1246 
 
 726. Inspection of wharves 1348 
 
 737. [Omitted] 1249 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 WATER AND WATER COURSES. 
 
 Sec. 738. Artificial collections of water 1250 
 
 729. Rights of riparian owners 1252 
 
 730. Erection of dams 1255 
 
 731. Overflowing the banks of streams 1256 
 
 733. Care in construction and maintenance of dams 1257 
 
 738. Diversion of water-course 1258 
 
 734. Fouling of streams and wells 1260 
 
 735. Drainage of surface water 1263 
 
 736. Interference with water 1364 
 
 737. Obstruction of navigation 1266 
 
 738. Obligation to remove wrecks 1267 
 
 [Law OF Neg. Vol. I— c] 
 
XXXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PART VIII. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVIII, 
 MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
 
 I. Damages Generally. 
 
 VOL. H — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 739. General rule of damages 1268 
 
 740. Uncertainty ; how resolved 1270 
 
 741. Damages which might be avoided 1271 
 
 742. Disease resulting from injury 1272 
 
 743. Future damage 1275 
 
 744. Loss of profits 1276 
 
 745. Speculative or illegal profits not allowed 1278 
 
 746. Recovery not to exceed value of property 1279 
 
 747. Interest as damages 1379 
 
 748. Exemplary damages 1280 
 
 749. Exemplary damages against masters 1283 
 
 749a. Damages against municipal corporations 1285 
 
 II. Damage to Property. 
 
 750. Damage to real property 1286 
 
 751. Damage to personal property 1290 
 
 752. Damage to animals 1 1291 
 
 753. Damages against attorneys 1292 
 
 753a. Telegraph damages 1293 
 
 754. Telegraph damages limited by want of notice 1295 
 
 755. Telegraph damages in particular cases , 1297 
 
 756. Social telegrams 1301 
 
 757. Statutory penalties 1303 
 
 III. Damage to the Person. 
 
 758. Damages for personal injuries 1304 
 
 759. Expenses of cure 1306 
 
 760. Loss of time 1308 
 
 761. Bodily and mental suffering 1311 
 
 761a. Ejection of passengers 1313 
 
 763. Circumstances of parties 1315 
 
 763. Damages in favor of husband, master, etc 1316 
 
 764. [Consolidated with § 763] 1317 
 
 765. Insurance, etc., not deducted from damages 1318 
 
 IV. Damages for Death. 
 
 766. Damages in case of death, general rule 1319 
 
 767. Peculiar statutes 1321 
 
 767a. Actions on surviving rights 1323 
 
 768. For whose benefit recovery allowed 1324 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXV 
 
 VOL. II — PAGE. 
 
 Sec. 769. What is pecuniary damage 1334 
 
 770. Expenses incurred by death 1337 
 
 771. Loss of parent 1338 
 
 772. Loss of child 1339 
 
 773. Loss of husband or wife. . 1830 
 
 774. Loss of collateral relatives 1333 
 
 775. Damages for death, how ascertained 1333 
 
 776. Statutory limitations of amount 1336 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \Iieferences a7-e to sectio7ts.'\ 
 
 Aaron v. Broiles, 263 
 
 Abbett V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 54, 56 
 
 V. Johnson county, 256, 257. 
 Abbitt V. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 207a, 
 
 471 
 Abbot V. Gore, 676, 678 
 
 V. McCadden, 773 
 Abbott V. Jackson, 713 
 
 V. Johnstown, etc. R. Co., 459 
 
 V. Kalbus, 436 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 735 
 
 V. Kerswell, 619 
 
 V. Kimball, 631 
 
 V. Macfle, 34 
 
 V. Smith, 583 
 
 V. Wolcott, 379 
 Abel V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 202, 
 
 203 
 Abeles v. Bransfleld, 115 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co. , 754 
 Abend v. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co., 
 
 307&, 338, 341 
 Abendroth v. Greenwich, 354. 
 Abernethey v. Van Buren, 379 
 Abilene v. Cowperthwait, 353, 356, 
 
 358 
 Abraham v. Reynolds, 178, 335, 334, 
 
 706 
 Abrahams v. California Powder Co., 
 117 
 
 V. Deakin, 145 
 Achtenhagan v. Watertown, 376 
 Acker v. Alexandria, etc. R. Co., 
 130a 
 
 V. Anderson, 876 
 
 V. New Castle, 374 
 Acme Coal Min. Co. v. Mclver, 307, 
 
 309a 
 Adams v. Adams, 641 
 
 V. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 
 V. Carlisle, 8, 107 
 
 V. Chicopee, 363 
 
 V. Cost, 148 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 133 
 V. Fletcher, 703 
 
 V. Hall, 628, 638 
 
 Adams v. Hannibal, etc R. Co., 518 
 
 V. Hemenway, 686 
 
 V. Iron Clififs Co., 239 
 
 V. Lancashire, etc. R. Co., 89 
 
 V. Natick, 356 
 
 V. New Jersey Steamb. R. Co., 
 536 
 
 V. Salina, 748 
 
 V. Spangler, 620 
 
 V. Young, 30, 666 
 Adasken v. Gilbert, 2416 
 Adkins v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 216 
 Adolph V. Central Park, etc. R. Co., 
 
 480, 485a 
 Adsit V. Brady, 118, 313, 338 
 Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 203, 207 
 <Etna Insurance Co. v. Alton City 
 
 Bank, 582, 585 
 Agnew V. Corunna, 355 
 Agricultural, etc. Assn. v. State, 772 
 Agricultural Bank v. Commercial 
 
 Bank, 585 
 Ahern v. Kings countv, 356 
 
 Y. Oregon Tel Co., 359, 698 
 
 V. Steele, 119, 130, 343, 708, 
 709a, 725 
 Aiken v. Telegraph Co., 543, 553 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 
 555 
 Ainley v. Manhattan R. Co., 764 
 Aireton v. Davis, 633 
 Aitcheson v. Madock, 569 
 Aitken, Matter of. 561 
 Akerly Lumber Co. v. Rauen, 194 
 
 V. White, 709 
 Akers v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 410, 
 484 
 
 V. Overbeck, 117, 690 
 Akersloot v. Second Ave. R. Co., 508 
 Akridge v. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 741 
 Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Anderson, 
 477 
 
 V. Arnold, 748 
 
 V. Blivens, 433 
 
 V. Carroll, 139, 131 
 
 V. Chapman. 431, 480 
 
XXXVlll 
 
 References] 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 66, 520 
 
 V. Frazier, 493, 513, 749 
 
 v! Fulghum, 131 
 
 V. Harris, 150 
 
 V. Hawk, 60a, 518, 533 
 
 V. Hill, 742 
 
 V. Jones, 429 
 
 V. McAlpin, 457 
 
 V. MoAlpine, 47, 419, 439, 430, 
 431, 451a 
 
 V. Moody, 11, 428 
 
 V. Phillips, 460 
 
 V. Powers, 439 
 
 V. Eoach, 2075 
 
 V. Sellers, 5C9, 748, 749 
 
 V. Summers, 461 
 
 V. Waller, 189 
 
 G. 8. R. Co. V. Hill, 518 
 
 V. Linn, 464 
 
 V. Richie, 309a 
 
 Midland R. Co. v. McDonald, 
 2076 
 Alamango v. Albany county, 350, 
 
 3,')6, 260 
 Alaska, The, 134, 183 
 
 Mining Co. v. Whelan, 64 
 Albany v. Cunliff, 8, 334a 
 
 V. Watervliet, 354 
 Albee v. Flovd Co., 392, 393 
 Albers v. Western U. Tel. Co., 554 
 Albert v. Albany R. Co., 71 
 
 V. BleeckerSt. R. Co., 634, 645, 
 654, 751 
 
 V. Northern, etc. R. Co., 58, 675, 
 676 
 
 V. State, 133, 726 
 
 V. Sweet, 464a 
 Alberts t. Vernon, 369 
 Albina Ferry Co. v. The Imperial, 737 
 Albion V. Hetrick, 66, 114, 376 
 
 Lumber Co. v. De Nobra, 486 
 Albrecht v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. 
 341e 
 
 V. Queens County, 256 
 Albritton v. Huntsville, 389, 369 
 Albro V. Agawam Co., 236 
 
 V. Jaquith, 345 
 Alcorn v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 2076 
 
 V. Philadelphia, 291 
 
 V. Sadler, 729 
 Alden v. Minneapolis, 274 
 
 V. TSr. y. Central R. Co., 45, 497 
 Aldrich v Concord, etc. R. Co., 60c 
 
 V. Gorham, 346 
 
 V. Monroe, 647 
 
 V. Pelham, 272 
 
 V. Tripp, 386 
 Aldridge v. Great Western R. Co. , 16 
 
 V. Midland Furnace Co., 60a, 
 189 
 Alexander v. Big Rapids, 356 
 
 V. Card, 303 
 
 V. Central Lumber Co., 216 
 
 Alexander v. Chicago, etc. R, Co., 424 
 V. number, 18, 743, 761 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 2076, 
 
 219a 
 V. Macauley, 619 
 V. Milwaukee, 274, 283 
 V. Mount Sterling, 53. 
 V. New Castle, 346 
 V. Oshkosh, 367 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 181 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 476 
 V. Vicksburg, 265 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 753a, 
 755 
 Alexandria, etc. R. Co. v. Brown, 459 
 
 V. Herndon, 506, 510 
 Alford V. Metcalf , 186a 
 Alger V. Boston, 291 
 
 V. Lowell, 93, 114, 133, 346 
 V. Mississippi, etc. R. Co., 419 
 Allan V. State Steamship Co., 57, 
 
 605, 691 
 AUard v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 676 
 AUaway v, Wagstafl, 701, 716 
 Allegheny City v. Campbell, 285 
 Allegany county v. Broadwater, 377 
 Allegheny county v. Gibson, 261 
 Allen V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 287, 
 295, 449 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 859 
 V. Burlington, etc. E. Co., 406, 
 
 410 
 V. Chippewa Falls, 371, 274, 863 
 V. Deming, 104 
 T. Goodwin, 333 
 V. Hancock, 378 
 V. Hayward, 14, 165, 168, 173, 
 
 378 
 V. Johnston, 704 
 V. Logan City, 309a 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 476 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 764 
 V. Merchants' Bank, 581, 583, 
 
 585, 599 
 V. New Gas Co. , 322 
 V. Smith Iron Co., 195 
 V. Southwestern R. Co., 145 
 V. State, 813 
 V. Suydam, 573a 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 195 
 V. Willard, 8, 57, 111, 165, 166, 
 
 169 
 V. Williamsburgh Sav. Bank, 
 
 588 
 County V. Cre vision, 8G9. 380 
 Allenderv. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 31, 
 
 506, 508, 510 
 AUentown v. Kramer, 374 
 Allerton, v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 90, 
 476 
 etc. Co. V. Egan, 184, 208 
 AUisv. Columbian University, 704 
 Allison V. Richmond, 299 
 
References'^ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. XXXIX 
 
 Allison V. Western, etc. R. Co., 170, 
 
 690 
 Allyn V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Alperin v. Earle, 707, 710 
 Alpern v. Churchill, 680 
 Altnow V. Sibley, S56 
 Alton V. Gilmanton, 569 
 
 V. Hope, 362 
 
 V. Midland R. Co., 116, 486 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Baugh, 419 
 
 V. Deitz, 408 
 Altorf V. Wolfe, 157, 765 
 Altvater v. Baltimore, 291, 295 
 American Ex. Co. v. Haire. 598 
 
 Express Co. v. Sands, 505 
 
 Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 13S 
 
 Tel. Co. V. Walker, 588 
 
 U. Tel Co. V. Daugherty, 553 
 
 Waterworks Co. v. Dougherty, 
 93, 761 
 Americus v. Chapman, 356 
 
 R. Co. V. Luckie, 103 
 Amerine v. Porteus, 719a. 
 Ames V. Broadway, etc. R. Co. 74, 
 
 V. Oilman, 557 
 
 V. Jordan, 163 
 Amiable Nancy, The, 744 
 Amick V. O'Hara, 640 
 Animerman v. Wyoming Canal Co. , 
 
 389 
 Amsbey v. Hinds, 336 
 Amsterdam Knitting Co., v. Dean, 
 
 739 
 Amy V. Supervisors, 313 
 Anchor Brewing Co. v. Dobbs Ferry, 
 
 274 
 Andersen v. N. Y. &Cuba S. S. Co., 
 
 719 
 Anderson v. Akeley Lumber Co., 
 311a 
 
 V. Alton Nat. Bank, 583 
 
 V. Bath, 355, 378 
 
 V. Bennett, 233, 333 
 
 V. Brownlee, 343 
 
 V. Buokton, 627, 633 
 
 V. Cape Fear Steamb. Co., 673 
 
 \. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 60c, 108, 
 435, 451a, 480, 766, 775 
 
 V. Citizens' R. Co., 508 
 
 V. Dickie, 120 
 
 V. Duckworth. 315 
 
 V. East, 262, 354, 703 
 
 V. Hervey, 118 
 
 V. Johett, 591 
 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 195 
 
 V. Milliken, 310 
 
 V. Minneapolis St. R. Co., 485 
 
 V. Minnesota etc. R. Co., 197 
 
 V. Morrison, 114, 218 
 
 V. Northern Mill Co. , 1856 
 
 V. Northern Pac. Lumber Co., 
 315 
 
 V. Pyper, 497 
 
 Anderson v. Roberts, 303 
 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 518 
 
 V. Scholey, 495, 614, 516 
 
 V. Scully, 404 
 
 V. Standard Gas Co., 693 
 
 V. Steamboat Co., 356 
 
 V. Thunder Bay Boom Co., 730. 
 
 731 
 V. Wasatch, etc. R. Co., 58, 
 
 676 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 553 
 V. Wilmington, 263, 287, 389 
 Andre v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 434 
 Andreson v. Ogden Union R. Co., 
 
 303 
 Andrews v. Boedecker, 141, 164 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 187 
 V. Green. 155 
 V. Hartford, etc. R. Co., 185, 
 
 189 
 V. Hawley, 563 
 
 V. Mason City, etc. R. Co., 426 
 Andrist v. Union Pac. R. Co., 524 
 Angell V. Hill, 655 
 
 V. Simmons, 641 
 Anglin V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 185 
 Angus V. Dalton, 701 
 V. Lee, 718 
 V. Radin, 637 
 Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. 
 
 Peterson, 784 
 Anna Maria, The, 744 
 Annacker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 466, 485 
 Annapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 
 418, 456 
 etc. R. Co. V. Gantt, 58, 666, 
 675, 676 
 Anne Arundel County v. Duckett, 
 257, 363, 381 
 V. Duval, 391, 398, 368 
 Annett v. Foster, 166 
 Anniston Pipe Works v. Dickey, 195 
 Anon., 731 
 
 Anselment v. Daniell, 644 
 Ansteth v. Buffalo R. Co., 489 
 Anthony v. Adams, 399 
 V. Glens Falls, 363 
 V. Lapham, 739 
 V. Leeret, 195 
 Antisdel v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 435, 
 
 455 
 Apnel V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 
 
 S09a, 316 
 Apple V. Marion county, 376 
 Applebee v. Percy, 630 
 Appleby v. Erie Bank, 588 
 Appleton V. Water Commissioners, 
 
 391 
 Arcade File Works v. Juteau, 303 
 Archer v. Ft. Wayne, etc. R. Co., 523 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 458, 506 
 
xl 
 
 Re/crcnces'\ TABLE ■ OF CASES. \fl->'<: t" sections. 
 
 Arctic Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 61, 65 
 Arden v. Tucker, 577 
 Arent v. Squire, 57 
 Arey v. Newton, 379 
 Argus V. Sturgis, 376 
 Arizona Lumber Co. v. Mooney, 195 
 Arkadelpiiia Lumber Co. v. Bethea, 
 185 
 
 V. Windham, 289 
 Arkansas Tel Co. v. Eatteree, 698 
 Arkerson v. Dennison, 195, 197 
 Arnibruster v. Auburn Gas Co., 698 
 Armour v. Czischki, 772 
 
 V. Hahn, 184, 339, 241 
 Armstrong v. Ackley, 369 
 
 V. Beadle, 131 
 
 V. Cooley, 155 
 
 V. Forg, 319 
 
 V. Medburv, 703, 704 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. B. Co., 490 
 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. E. 
 Co., 464. 
 
 V. Oregon, etc. E. Co., 333&, 
 238 
 
 V. Toler, 104 
 
 county V. Clarion county, 301 
 Arms worth v. Southwestern E. Co., 
 
 775 
 Arn V. Kansas City, 274 
 Arnold v. Blaker, 343 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 185, 195 
 
 V. Foot, 729 
 
 V. Henry county, 356 
 
 V. Holbrook, 343 
 
 V. Illinois, etc. E. Co., 61 
 • V. Norton, 633 
 
 V. Phila., etc. E. Co., 476 
 
 V. Eobertson, 574, 753 
 
 V. San Jose, 358, 389 
 Arnot V. Bingham, 580a 
 Arrowsmith v. Nashville, etc. E. Co., 
 
 130a, 413, 493 
 Arthur v. Cohoes, 363 
 Arthurs v. Chatfield, 655 
 Artusy v. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 481 
 Artz v. Chicago; etc. E. Co., 66, 93, 
 
 103, 4(j3, 476 
 Aryman v. Marshalltown, 369 
 Ash V. Baltimore, etc. E. Co., 133 
 Ashby V. White, 310 
 Ashford v. Thornton, 134 
 Ashley v. Port Huron, 374, 387 
 
 V. Boot, 33 
 Ashworth v. Stanwix, 187 
 Askew v. Hall, 254 
 Aspegren v. Kotas, 640 
 Assop V. Yates, 309a 
 Aston v. Heaven, 494, 694 
 
 V. Newton, 334, 351 
 
 V. Nolan, 701 
 Atchison v. Challiss, 263, 274 
 
 V. Dullam, 16, 686 
 
 Atchison v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 667 
 
 V. King, 389, 367 
 
 V. Twine, 361 
 Atchison, etc. E. Co. v. Ayers, 57 
 
 V. Bailey, 73 
 
 V. Bales, 58, 666 
 
 V. Baty, 423 
 
 V. Bell, 437 
 
 V. Betts, 419 
 
 V. Brassfield, 58, 341c 
 
 V. Brown, 493 
 
 V. Campbell, 410 
 
 V. Cash, 436 
 
 V. Chance, 758, 761 
 
 V. Cochran, 158 
 
 V. Davis, 430 
 
 V. Dickerson, 761a 
 
 V. Elder, 436 
 
 V. Farrow, 180 
 
 V. Feehan, 54 
 
 V. Frier, 508 
 
 V. Gabbert, 453 
 
 V. Gants, 493 
 
 V. Gibson, 676 
 
 V. Hague, 467, 478, 485 
 
 V. Henry, 102, 145, 417, 513, 749 
 
 V. Hill, 478 
 
 V. Hughes, 519, .520, 775 
 
 V. Huitt, 115, 674, 750 
 
 V. Johns, 458 
 
 V. Johnson, 489, 533 
 
 V. Koohler, 341c 
 
 V. Lannigau, 185a 
 
 V. Ledbetter, 195 
 
 V. Lindley, 513a 
 
 V. Loree, 426 
 
 V. Love. 198 
 
 V. McCiurg, 463 
 
 V. McGinnis. 761 
 
 V. McKee, 60c, 1856, 197, 203a 
 2 5, 233a, 238 
 
 V. Midgett, 315, 761 
 
 V. Miller, 359 
 
 V. Moore, 204, 205, 333 
 
 V. Morgan, 102 
 
 V. Myers. 196, 233a 
 
 V. Napole, 133, 206 
 
 V. Parsons, 417a 
 
 V. Penfold, 196 
 
 V. Plaskett, 479 
 
 V. Plunkitt, 94 
 
 V. Priest, 481 
 
 V. Eeesman, 2076, 466a. 
 
 V. Eiggs, 453 
 
 V. Eoach, 503 
 
 V. Eowan, ] 98, 169 
 
 V. Sadler, 215 
 
 V. Schroeder, 311a 
 
 V. Seeley, 238 
 
 V. Shaft, 431, 453 
 
 V. Shean, 477 
 
 V. Smith. 74 
 
 V. Stanford, 38, 675 
 
References'] TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 xli 
 
 Atchison v. Todd, 481a 
 
 V. Townsend, 478, 482 
 
 V. Wagner, 189 
 
 V. Walz, 467 
 
 V. Weber, 137 
 
 V. Willey, 739 
 
 V. WUson, 223, 771, 773 
 
 V. Winston, 189 
 
 V. Zeilcr, 189 
 Athens Mfg. Co. v. Rucker, 731 
 Atkinson v. Abraham, 114, 719 
 
 V. Goodrich Tr. Co., 30, 31, 666 
 
 V. Illinois Milk Co., 644. 
 
 V. Mott, 655 
 
 V. Newcastle Water Co. , 9 
 
 V. Oelsner, 645 
 Atlanta v. Buchanan, 368, 375 
 
 V. Champe, 369 
 
 M. Martin, 363 
 
 V. Milam, 353 
 
 V. Perdue, 353, 367 
 
 V. Wilson, 346, 356 
 Atlanta Cotton Co. v. Speer, 190. 230 
 Atlanta Oil Mills v. Coffey, 706, 751 
 Atlanta R. Co. v. Keeny, 761a 
 Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. Ayers, 65, 103 
 
 V. Ayres, 62 
 
 V. Dickerson, 50S, 520 
 
 V. Gravitt, 71, 470 
 
 V. Hudson, 424 
 
 V. Johnson, 743 
 
 V. Kimberly, 168 
 
 V. Leach, 85 
 
 V. Smith, 111. 219 
 
 V. Venable, 138 
 
 V. Walker, 60a, 104 
 
 V. Wood, 703, 761 
 
 V. Wyly, 103 
 Atlantic Factory Co. v. Speer, 705 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Burt, 430 
 
 V. Dunn, 749 
 
 V. GnflEen. 419, 431 
 Atlas Engine Works v. Randall, 73, 
 
 203, 218 
 Attaway v. Cartersville, 291 
 Attorney-General v. Bradford Nav. 
 Co., 401 
 
 V. Brown, 249 
 
 V. Royal College of Physicians, 
 603 
 Atwater v. Canandaigua, 262, 274 
 At well V. Keluff, 313 
 Atwood V. Atwater, 303 
 
 V. Bangor, 274 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 144 
 Atz V. Newark Lime Co., 195 
 Au V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 
 769 
 Auchmuty v. Ham, 123, 628, 635, 
 
 636, 638 
 Aufdenberg v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 519, 520 
 Augerstein v. Jones, 195 
 
 Augusta, The, 172 
 
 V. Cone, 358 
 
 V. Hafers, 369 
 
 V. Hudson, 108, 285, 346 
 
 V. Lombard, 728 
 Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 219, 233 
 
 V. Davis, 772 
 
 V. Hill, 203 
 Augusta R. Co. v. Andrews, 97 
 
 V. Glover, 518 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Killian, 54, 
 225 
 
 V. McEIniurry, 103, 468 
 
 V. Randall, 748, 756 
 
 V. Renz, 87, 523 
 Aurandt v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 56 
 Aurora v. Bitner, 334a 
 
 V. Brown, 60b 
 
 v. Colshire, 334 
 
 V. Dale, 376 
 
 V. Hillman, 93, 367, 368, 369 
 
 V. Pulfer, 262, 375 
 
 V. Reed, 274 
 
 V. Seidelman, 356 
 
 R. Co. V. Grimes, 107 
 Austin V. Appling, 217 
 
 V. Carter, 340 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 678, 
 679, 741 
 
 V. Colegate, 367 
 
 V. Great Western, etc. R. Co., 
 61, 491 
 
 V. Long Island R. Co., 478 
 
 V. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 
 18, 94, 99, 100 
 
 V. Ritz, 289, 334, 351, 368, 375, 
 745 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Beatty, 47, 89 
 
 V. Groethe, 241c 
 
 V. Saunders, 428 
 Avegno v. Hart, 652 
 Averitt v. Murrell, 669, 671 
 Avery v. Bowden, 56 
 
 v. Maxwell, 655 
 
 V. People, 640 
 
 V. Syracuse, 343, 369 
 Avey V. Galveston, etc. R. Co., 73a 
 Avilla V. Nash, 202 
 Aycock V. Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 678 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co.,99, 
 437, 429 
 Aycrigg v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 147, 
 
 148 
 Ayer v. Starkey, 671 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 542 
 Ayers v, Richmond, etc. R. Co., 233& 
 
 V. Russell, 3^3. 612 
 Ayles V. Southeastern R. Co., 517 
 Avlesworth v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 407, 419, 425. 451a 
 Ayrault v. Chamberlin. 577 
 
 V. Pacific Bank, 583, 585 
 
xlii 
 
 References'^ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Ayres v. Hammondsport, 363 
 V. Western R. Co., 310 
 Aznoe v. Conway, 054 
 
 Babbage v. Powers, 343, 703, 708 
 Babbitt v. Bumpus, 559 
 Babcock v. Fitchburg R. Co., 56, 673, 
 675, 676 
 V. Gifford, 340 
 v. Guilford, 373 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 194a, 223, 
 332, 3416 
 Baber v. Broadway, etc. R. Co., 151 
 Babson v. Rockport, 86. 346, 370, 379 
 Bachelder v. Heagan, 57 
 Bacon v. Boston, 358, 263, 353, 358 
 
 V. Benchley, 310 
 Baddeley v. Granville, 63 
 Bagley v. Consolidated Gas Co., 185 
 Bagnall v. Northwestern R. Co., 728, 
 
 736 
 Bahr v. Lombard, 60, 223 
 Baikie y. Chandless, 559 
 Bailie v. Augusta Savings Bank, 582 
 Bailey v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 750 
 "v. Hartford, etc. R. Co., 426 
 V. Lawrence county, 256 
 y. New York, 385, 386, 391, 395, 
 
 733 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 53, 194o, 
 
 304, 223, 333 
 V. Wiggins; 303 
 V. Merrell, 690 
 Baird v. Daly, 60c, 344 
 
 V. Pettit, 334, 336, 337 
 V. Ratclifl, 557 
 V. Sbipman, 343 
 y. Williamson, 717, 736 
 Bajus V. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 195 
 Baker v. AUegheney, etc. R. Co., 197 
 V. Bolton, 124 
 V. Byrne, 719 
 y. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 190, 233, 
 
 484 
 y. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 483 
 y. Flint, etc. R. Co., 73, 73a 
 y. Greenfield, 337 
 y. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 458 
 y. Manhattan R. Co., 23, 508, 
 
 519, 520 
 v. Maryland Coal Co., 114 
 v. Morris, 144 
 y. North East, 355 
 y. Pendergast, 93 
 y. Portland, 93, 110, 379 
 y. Robbins, 418 
 V. State, 349 
 v. Tibbetts, 706 
 y. Wentworth, 606 
 y. Western, etc. R. Co., 91 
 y. Westmoreland, etc. Gas Co., 
 108. 696 
 
 Balcom y. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 
 419, 432 
 Baldwin v. Bank of Louisiana, 585 
 
 y. Barney, 104 
 
 y. Calkins, 731 
 
 y. Casella, 630 
 
 y. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 197,459 
 
 V. Ensign, 365, 634 
 
 y. Fairhaven, etc. R. Co., 490, 
 513 
 
 v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 493 
 
 y. Green, 336 
 
 y. Greenwood Turnp. Co., 85, 
 346 
 
 y. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 195, 
 317, 230, 333 
 
 y. U. States Tel. Co., 503, 534, 
 544, 555, 741, 754 
 
 y. Western R. Co., 739, 758 
 
 y. Western U. Tel. Co., 755 
 BalhofE y. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 197, 
 
 333a 
 Baldridge Bridge Co. y. Cartrett, 346, 
 
 378 
 Bales y. Wingfield, 619, 632 
 Ball V. El. Paso, 876 
 
 y. Grand Trunk R. Co., 674 
 
 y. Herbert, 333 
 
 y. Winchester, 256, 391, 337, 
 338, 370 
 
 y. Woodbine, 262 
 Ballard y. Hitchcock Mfg. Co., 194a, 
 195 
 
 y. Tomlinson, 734 
 Balle y. Detroit Leather Co., 203, 
 
 209a 
 Ballou y. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 195, 
 459 
 
 y. Farnum, 163, 413 
 
 y. State, 251, 387 
 Balsbaugh v. Frazer, 557 
 Balsley v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 459 
 Baltimore, The, 61 
 
 y. Appold, 729, 735 
 
 y. Brannon, 375 
 
 y. Holmes, 85, 114, 376 
 
 y. Marriott, 108. 363, 371 
 
 y. Pendleton, 289 
 
 y. Pennington, 257, 358 
 
 y. Poultney, 261 
 
 y. Baker, 257 
 
 y. Schnitker, 287 
 
 Breweries Co. v. Ranstead,701a 
 
 Elevator Co. v. Neal, 236 
 
 etc., R. Co. y. Bahrs, 57, 457 
 
 y. Bambrey, 493 
 
 y. Barger, 513, 749 
 
 v. Baugh, 230, 232, 233, 3S3a 
 
 V. Blocher, 749 
 
 y. Boteler, 93, 114, 414, 760 
 
 y. Brady, 178. 
 
 v. Camp, 192, 233a 
 
 v. Colvin, 473 
 
Referenceil TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 xliii 
 
 JBaltimore, etc. E. Co. v. Country- 
 man, 750 
 
 V. Depew, 87, 476 
 
 V. Fifth Baptist Ch., 374, 701a, 
 743 
 
 V. Fitzpatrick, 479 
 
 T. Fryer, 71 
 
 V. Griffith, 478 
 
 V. Henthorne, 191, 193, 306, 760 
 
 V. Kane, 530, 531 
 
 V. Kemp, 74i 
 
 V. Kreiger, 434, 455 
 
 V. Lamborn, 418, 454 
 
 V. Leathers, 807a 
 
 V. McClellan, 433 
 
 V. McDonnell. 18, 73, 74, 99 
 
 V. McElroy , 433 
 
 V. Mackey, 195, 196, 197, 769 
 
 V. Mulligan, 09, 438 
 
 V. Mvers, 531, 533 
 
 V. Noell, 516 
 
 V. Paul, 413 
 
 V. Reaney, 94, 701 
 
 V. Reynolds, 333a 
 
 T. Rowan, 189, 198 
 
 V. Schwindling, 73, 481a 
 
 V. Shipley, 58, 674, 763 
 
 V. Stanley, 771 
 
 V. State, '600, 73, 73, 93, 100, 
 309a, 480, 490, 530, 535, 769 
 
 \. Strickler, 198 
 
 V. Sulphur Spring, 39 
 
 V. Swann. 498, 516, 517 
 
 V. Then, 775 
 
 T. Thomas, 436, 448 
 
 V. Walborn, 13, 478 
 
 V. Warr, 193 
 
 V. Whitacre, 108, 476 
 
 V. Whittaker, 114 
 
 V. Whittington, 113, 303 
 
 V. Wightman, 51, 495, 516 
 
 V. Wilkinson, 531, 533 
 
 V. Wood, 437 
 
 V. Woodruff, 673 
 
 T. Worthington, 466 
 
 V. Sherman, 480 
 
 Traction Co. v.Appel, 485a, 485c 
 V. Wallace, 481, 485c 
 Baltimore Trust Co. v. Atlanta 
 Traction Co., 341 
 etc. Road v. Cason, 533 
 etc. Turnp. Co., v. Bateman, 
 
 379, 346 
 V. Cassell, 94, 357, 378 386 
 V. Crowther, 357, 386 
 V. Leonhardt, 516 
 V. Parks, 386 
 V. State, 374, 771 
 Baltzer v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 89, 
 
 307a 
 Bamberger v. Citizens' R. Co., 71, 
 
 73a, 485 
 Bamford v. Turnley, 701a 
 
 Bancroft v. Boston, etc. R. Co. , 65 
 
 139, 308, 531, 767a 
 Banister v. Wakeman, 303 
 Bank v. Bossieux, 589 
 
 V. Brainerd School District, 356 
 V. Butler, 585 
 V. Marston, 598 
 V. Mott, 617 
 V. Planters' Bank, 350 
 Bank of Antigo v. Union Trust Co., 
 583 
 California v. Western U. Tel. 
 
 Co., 589 
 Clarke Co. v. Gilman, 580a 
 Hanover v. Kenan, 587a 
 Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co., 
 
 310 
 Kentucky v. Wister, 349 
 Lindsborg v. Ober, 583. 584, 585 
 Louisville v. First Nat. Bank, 
 
 583 
 Mobile V. Huggins, 580, 581 
 New Hanover v. Kenan, 581 
 Rochester v. Gray. 585 
 Rome v. Curtiss, 633 
 Scotland v. Dominion Bank, 
 
 580a 
 U. S. V. Goddard, 581 
 Utica V. McKinster, 579, 586 
 Van Diemen's Land v. Bank of 
 
 Victoria, 580 
 Washington 'v. Triplett, 580, 
 583, 584 
 Banks v. Highland St. R. Co., 64 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co., \mh. 317 
 Bannagan v. Dist. of Col. 363, 387 
 Bannon v. Lutz, 54. 317, 333 
 
 V. Romiser, 750 
 Barada v. Carondelet, 313 
 Barbee v. Reese, 94 
 Barber v. Abendroth, 736 
 
 V. Essex, 108, 336, 358 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 406, 
 
 468, 483 
 V. Eoxbury, 350 
 Barbour v. Ellsworth, 366, 399 
 V. Horn, 356, 349o 
 county V. Brunson, 356 
 Bard v. Penn. Tr, Co., 533 
 
 V. Yohn, 147 
 Bardwell v. Jamaica, 367, 390, 393, 
 741 
 V. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 530 
 Barker v. Loomis, 840 
 v. Paulson, 54 
 V. Savage, 61, 114, 353, 654 
 T. Worcester. 104 
 Barkley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 475, 
 485 
 V. Wilcox, 735 
 Barley v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 458 
 Barlow v. McDonald, 639 
 V. Scott, 179 
 
xl 
 
 IV 
 
 Kl^erences] TABLE OF CASES. [f"-' to sections. 
 
 Barnard v. Leigh, 633 
 
 V. Poor, 665 
 
 V. Shirley, 734 
 
 V. Ward, 619 
 Barnes v. Chapin, 684 
 
 V. Chicopee, 356 
 
 V. District of Columbia, 249, 
 353, 285, 289, 291, 296 
 
 V. Hannibal, 274 
 
 V. Hurd, 115, 644 
 
 v. Keene, 763 
 
 V. Marcus, 375, 376 
 
 y. Martin, 115 
 
 V. Means, 606, 607 
 
 V. Newton, 53, 353 
 
 V. Shreveport R. Co., 73a, 457, 
 485c 
 
 V. Smith, 593 
 
 V. Snowden, S7.'i 
 
 V. Ward, 343, 708 
 
 V. Willett, 625 
 Barnett v. Johnson, 388 
 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 203 
 Barney v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 481a, 705 
 
 V. Keokuk, 333 
 
 V. Lowell, 258, 391 
 
 V. Prentiss, 550 
 
 Boat Co. V. New York, 291 
 Barnowski v. Helson, 58 
 Barnum v. Terpenning, 634, 639 
 
 V. Vandusen, 637, 633, 635, 659 
 Barr v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co , 437 
 
 V. Kansas, 287, 346, 868, 374, 
 375 
 
 V. Stevens, 371 
 Barracouta, The, 686 
 Barre v. Reading, 64, 493 
 Barrett v. Brooks, 257 
 
 V. Dolan, 656, 664 
 
 V. Hammond, 367, 869 
 
 V. Third Avenue R. Co., 31, 65, 
 66 
 
 V. Maiden, etc. R. Co., 638, 635 
 
 V. Market St. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Smith, 646 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 1, 73 
 
 V. Walworth, 355 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co , 555 
 Barringer v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 474 
 Barron v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 417, 
 426 
 
 V. Detroit. 285 
 Barry v. Arnould. 318 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 207b 
 
 v. Lowell, 287 
 
 V. Midland R. Co., 145 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 73, 
 417a, 464, 481o, 705 
 
 V. St. Louis, 168 
 
 V, Terkildsen, 843, 375 
 Barstow v. Berlin, 86, 853, 477 
 
 Barstow v. Old Colony B. Co., 1 13, 236 
 Barthold v. Philadelphia, 285 
 Bartholomew v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 
 
 508. 
 Bartlett v. Baker, 726. 
 
 V. Boston Gas Co., 35, 695 
 
 V. Crozier, 314, 340 
 
 V. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 417, 
 425, 434 
 
 V. Harksett, 355 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 547 
 Barton v. Goran, 608 
 
 V. McDonald, 334a, 365 
 
 V, Montpelier, 334, 351, 368, 388 
 
 T. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 477 
 
 V. Pepin County Agricul. Soc, 
 705. 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 56 
 
 V. Springfield, 87, 89 
 
 V. Syracuse. 274, 281, 287 
 
 V. Reid, 178. 180, 285, 239 
 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire, 46, 
 
 143, 318, 335, 336, 339 
 Barvvick v. English Joint Stock 
 
 Bank, 145 
 Bass V. Cantor, 588 
 
 v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 60a, 
 419, 673, 676 
 Bassett v. Fish, 93. 356, 333, 339 
 
 V. Godschali, 310 
 
 V. St. Joseph, 289, 334 
 Bastable v. Syracuse, 274 
 Batchelder v. Heagan, 668, 669 
 Batchelor v. Fostescue, G5 
 
 V. Planters' Bank, 589 
 Bateman v. Black, 333 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. etc. R. Co., 60c 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 540a 
 Bates V. Fremont, etc. R. Co., 433 
 
 V. Horner. 291 
 
 V. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 73 
 
 V. N. Y. & New England R. 
 Co., 468, 474 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 505 
 
 V. Rutland, 291 
 
 V. Westborough, 287 
 Battersby v. New York, 363 
 Battersou v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 216 
 Battishill v. Humphrey, 467 
 Battle V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 465 
 Batto V. Chandler, 619 
 Batton V. South, etc. Ala. R. Co., 513 
 Batty V. Duxbury, 358 
 
 V. Font, 574 
 Bauer v. Indianapolis, 606 
 
 V. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 468 
 
 V. Rochester, 298 
 Baughman v. Shenango, etc. R. Co., 
 
 94, 408 
 Bau.gus V. Atlanta, 258 
 Bauiec v, Harlem R. Co., 56, 191, 193 
 Bauman v. Campau, 362 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. ii^re to sections. 
 
 xlv 
 
 Baumgartner v. Mankato, 408 
 Baxendale v McMurray, 734 
 Baxter v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 57, 423 
 
 V. Chicago, 35.5 
 
 V. Dominion Tel. Co. , 531 
 
 V. Roberts, 203 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 654 
 
 V. Taylor, 119 
 
 V. Winooski Co., 8, 256, 258 
 
 V. Winooski Tump. Co., 371, 
 387 
 Bay City, etc. R. Co. v. Austin, 446 
 Bay ley v. Eastern R. Co., 466 
 
 V. Manchester, etc. R. Co. , 64, 
 145. 151 
 Baylor v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 198 
 Bay Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Harris, 73a 
 Beach, The Wm. N., 737 
 
 V. Bay State Steamboat Co., 
 124, 131 
 
 V. Elmira, 274 
 
 V. Furman, 303 
 
 V. Leahy, 256. 267 
 
 V. Parmeter, 6.52 
 Beal V. Lowell, etc. R. Co., 523 
 Beale v. Railway Co., 748 
 Beall V. Athens, 355 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 207b 
 Beals V. See, 121 
 Bean v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 197 
 
 V. Western N. C. R. Co., 188, 
 194a, 216 
 Beanstrom v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 
 476 
 Bear v. AUentown, 274 
 Beard v. Conn. R. Co., 410, 490, 502 
 
 V. Murphy, 701, 728 
 Beardsley V. Smith, 256, 258 
 
 V. Swann, 758 
 Beasley v. Western U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Beardstown v. Smith. 375 
 Beasley v. Western U. Tel. Co., 539, 
 
 541, 549, 554. 556a 
 Beatty v. Gilmore, 53, 61, 108 
 Beatrice v. Knight, 274 
 
 V. Leary, 273, 274, 735 
 
 V. Reid, 359 
 Beatty v. Central Iowa R. Co., 410, 
 
 414 
 Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mining Co. , 
 
 11, 37. 688a, 743 
 Beaulieu v. Finglam, 17. 665, 668 
 
 V. Portland Co., 5(3, 57, 58, 223 
 Beaupre v. Pac, etc. Tel. Co., 754 
 Beazan v. Mason City, 289 
 Bechdolt v. Grand Rapids, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 434 
 Becht V. Corbin, 113 
 Beck V. Carter, 98, 343, 703, 704, 705 
 
 V. Dyson, 633 
 
 V. German Klinik, 613 
 
 V. Ki tanning Water Co., 365 
 V. Portland, etc. R. Co., 467 
 
 Becke v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 66, 
 
 46U 
 Becker v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 241 
 V. Keokuk Water-works, 265 
 V. Janinski, 604 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 556 
 Beckerle v. Weiman, 651, 654 
 Beckford v. Montague, 623 
 Beckman v. Consolidation Coal Co., 
 209a 
 V. Georgia Pac. R. Co.. 139 
 Beckwith v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 114 
 V. Oatman, 691 
 V. Shordike, 627 
 V. Whalen, 335 
 Bedell v. Berkey, 704 
 
 V. Long Island R. Co., 673, 676 
 Bedford v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 58, 
 675 
 V. Neal, 376 
 
 R. Co. V. Brown, 114, 207 
 etc. R. Co. V. Rainbolt, 516 
 Beecher v. Derby Bridge Co. , 749a 
 Beehler v. Daniels, 705, 719 
 Beekman v. Saratoga, etc. !R. Co., 
 
 333 
 Beebe v. Ayres, 493 
 Beems v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 92 
 Beers v. Arlransas, 249 
 
 V. Hendrickson, 573 
 V. Housatonic R. Co., 53, 61, 86 
 93, 99, 107, 114 
 Beesley v. Wheeler Co., 195, 232 
 Beeson v. Busenbark, 341c 
 
 V. Green Mt. Min. Co., 764 
 Beetz V. Brooklyn, 358 
 Beags V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 666, 
 
 675 
 Behling v. Southwest Penn. Pipe 
 
 Lines, 666 
 Behm v. Armour, 197 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 540, 
 754 
 Beilfus V. N. T., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co 233 
 Besiegel v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 13, 
 56, 86, 417, 466, 469, 477, 485 
 V. Seymour, 373 
 Belair v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 91, 
 
 315. 222 
 Beldingv. Black Hills, etc. R. Co., 
 139 
 V. Black Hills, etc. R. Co., T67a 
 V. Johnson, 128 
 Belford y. Canada Shipping Co., 190 
 Belk V. People, 35, 654 
 Belknap v. Boston, etc. R. 'Co., 749, 
 762 
 V, Trimble, 729 
 Bell V. McClintock, 16, 732 
 
 V. West Point, 389 
 Bellefontaine, etc. R. Co. v. Bailey, 5S 
 
xlvi 
 
 Re/crences\ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Bellefontaine, etc. R. Co. v. Hunter, 
 463, 475 
 R. Co. V. Reed, 419, 434 
 etc. R. Co. V. Snyder, Sr., 71, 
 
 476 
 V. Snyder, Jr., 38, 71, 77, 78 
 Bellemire v. Bank of U., S., 582, 585, 
 
 598 
 Bellinger v. Craigue, 606, 607 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 733 
 Bellows V. Pennsylvania, etc. Canal 
 Co., 203 
 V. Sackett, 731 
 Bellune v. Wallace, 119 
 Belt V. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 131 
 Belton V. Baxter, 114, 375, 475, 652, 
 
 654 
 Beltz V. Yonkers, 367, 369, 375 
 Belyea v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 759 
 Bemis v. Arliugtou. 355 
 
 V. Connecticut, etc. R. Co., 46, 
 439, 449, 463 
 Bemiss v. New Orleans, etc, R. Co., 
 
 523 
 Bemis v. Temple, 354 
 Bemus v. Howard, 613 
 Benage v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 2076 
 Benedict v. Goit, 385 
 Benfield v. Vacuum Oil Co., 195 
 Bengtson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185, 309a 
 Benjamin v. Holyoke R. Co., 4856 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 359 
 Benmore. The, 57 
 Benn t. Null, 180, 195 
 Benner v. Atl. Dredging Co., 688a! 
 
 Livery, etc. Co., v. Busson, 491 
 514 
 Bennet v. Moita, 172 
 Bennett v. Brooklyn R. Co. , 73a 
 V. Brooks, 104 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 418, 436 
 V. Button, 487 
 V. Fifield, 355 
 
 V. Greenwich, etc. R. Co., 197 
 Y. Ives, 344 
 T. Kelly, 343 
 V. Lockwood, 28 
 T. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 704 
 V. Lovell, 355 
 ■V. Marion, 740a 
 ■V. N. Jersey Transp. Co., 66 
 V. New Orleans, 262 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 473, 
 
 473 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. Co., 
 
 531 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 207a, 
 
 316, 223 
 V. Peninsula Steam P. Co., 487 
 V. Scutt, 669 
 
 Bennett v. Standard Glass Co., 194a 
 
 V. Syndicate Ins. Co., 54 
 
 V. Truebody, 164 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 425 
 
 V. Whitney, 313, 314 
 Bennison v. Walbank, 609 
 Benoit v. Troy, etc. R. Co., 647 
 Bensel v. Lynch, 625 
 Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., 
 705 
 
 V. Central Pac. R. Co., 483 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 739,785 
 
 V. Maiden, etc. Gas Co., 744 
 
 v. Suarez, 708 
 Benthall v. Seifert, 735 
 Bentley v. Atlanta. 341 
 
 V. Georgia Pac. R. Co., 480, 484 
 
 V. Phelps, 313 
 Benton v. Boston Hospital, 366 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 107, 476 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 64 
 
 V. Craig, 569 
 Benvsrare v. Pine Valley, 873 
 Benzing v. Steinway, 31, 194, 197, 
 
 304. 
 Bequettev. People's Tr. Co., 86 
 Berberich v. Ebach, 169 
 Berea Stone Co. , v. Kraft, 3836 
 Barg V. Boston, etc. Min. Co., 330 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 87, 877 
 
 V. Parsons, 61, 168, 688a 
 Bergerv. Minneapolis Gas Co., 701a. 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 185 
 Bergman v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 471 
 Bergquist v. Chandler Iron Co., 185a. 
 
 V. Minneapolis, 389 
 Bei'gstrom v. Staples, 231 
 Berlin v. Gorham, 281 
 Bernard v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 673 
 Bernardi v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 208 
 Bernauer V. Hartman Steel Co. , 165 
 Bernhard v. Reeves, 709 
 
 V. Rensselaer, etc. R. Co., 53, 
 54, 463 
 
 V. Western Pa. R. Co., 516 
 Bernina, The, 66 
 Berrigan v. N. Y. , Lake Erie etc. R. 
 
 Co , 303 
 Berry v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co.. 413 
 
 v. Missouri, Pac. R. Co., 538 
 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 65 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 114, 
 476 
 
 v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. , 449 
 Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin, 47, 195, 
 
 305 
 Besel V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 202, 241 
 Bess v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 151 
 Bessant v. Gt. Western R. Co., 424 
 Bessex v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 194, 205. 
 
Re/erencesi TABLE OF CASES. iare to sections. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 Betheav. Raleigh, etc.,R, Co., 451a 
 
 Bethel v. Otis, 686 
 
 Bethje v. Houston, etc. R. Co., 57 
 
 Bethlehem v. Haus, 387 
 
 Betts V. Glovei-sville, 374, 363 
 
 V. Norris, 630 
 Betz V. Limingi, 343 
 Beuhring v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 341 
 Bevard v. Hoffman, 303, 310 
 Bevier v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co. , 
 
 57 
 Bevins v. Ramsey, 591 
 Beyel v. Newport News, etc. R. Co., 
 
 483 
 Beynon v. Garrat, 633 
 Beynon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 478 
 Bibb V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 166, 168, 
 
 181 
 Bibby v. Carter, 713 
 Bickford v. Darcy, 569 
 
 V. Richards, 33 
 Biddle v. Hestonville, etc, R. Co., 64 
 Bidelman v. State, 351, 334a 
 Bidwell V. Murray, 338, 380 
 Bielenberg v. Montana Union R. Co. , 
 
 433 
 Bieling v. Brooklyn, 354. 354 
 Bier v. JeflEersonville, etc. R. Co., 341 
 Bierbach v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 
 
 114, 654 
 Bierbauer v. N. Y. Central R. Co. , 
 
 137, 769, 775 
 Bierhaus v. Western U. Tel. Co., 540, 
 
 549, 754, 755 
 Biering v. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 676 
 Big Creek Stone Co. v. Wolf, 194, 303 
 Bigelow V. Nickerson, 133 
 
 V. No. Missouri R. Co., 431 
 V. Randolph, 356, 358, 359, 267, 
 
 386, 337 
 V. Reed, 61, 93, 96, 107, 654 
 V. Rutland, 86, 107, 379 
 V. Weston, 350, 35: 
 Biggs V. Huntington, 389. 338, 351 
 
 V. West Newton, 376 
 Bignell v. Clarke, 641 
 Bilbee v. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 466 
 Bileu V. Paisley, 146, 588 
 Bill 7. Norwich, 367 
 V. Smith, 111 
 Billings V. Fitchburg R. Co., 675, 678 
 V. Lafferty, 591 
 V. Worcester, 363, 367 
 Billman V. Indianapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 30, 436 
 Billows V. Moors, 183 
 Bills V. Ottumwa, 86 
 Binford v. Johnston, 36, 686 
 Binks V. South Yorkshire R., etc. 
 
 Co., 403 
 Bird V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 479 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 517 
 
 Bird V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 39 
 V. Holbrook 97. 705, 730 
 T. Long Island R. Co. , 194a, 499 
 Birge v. Gardiner, 64, 73, 78, 97, 703, 
 
 705 
 Birkbeck v. Stafford, 569 
 Birket v. Williams, 655 
 Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 
 73, 137, 645, 773 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 553 
 V. Whitehaven, etc. R. Co., 
 459, 503 
 Birmingham v. Dorer, 115, 763 
 V. Lewis, 356, 374, 761 
 V. McCary, 398 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 497, 
 
 499 
 V. Starr, 369, 375, 376 
 V. Tayloe, 363, 367 
 Birmingham R. Co. v. Allen, 186, 
 197, 3416 
 V. Clay, 530 
 V. Haie. 508. 516 
 V. Smith, 508 
 Birmingham, etc. R. Co. v. Bowers, 
 88, 483 
 Mineral R. Co. v. Harris, 433, 
 
 451a 
 Water Works Co. v. Hubbard, 
 
 146, 689 
 Union R. Co. v. Alexander, 
 359 
 Birney v. N. Y. &. Washington Tel. 
 
 Co., 534, 537, 547, 548, 555 
 Bisaillon v. Blood, 78 
 BiachoflE v. People's R. Co.. 495 
 Bishop V. Bedford Charity, 708 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 439 
 V. Elv, 133, 644 
 V. Goshen. 353, 363 
 V. North, 673 
 V.St. PaulR. Co., 743 
 V. Williamson, 331 
 Bissell V. Michigan Southern, etc. R. 
 Co.. 706 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 493, 504, 
 505, 551 
 Bitner v. Utah Cent. R. Co , 468 
 Bittle V. Camden, etc. R. Co., 426 
 Bizzell V. Booker, 670 
 Bjbjian v. Woonsocket Rubber Co., 
 
 241 
 Bjorman v. Ft. Bragg Redwood Co., 
 
 214 
 Black V. Aberdeen, etc. R. Co. , 678 
 v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 16 
 V. Columbia, 265, 289 
 V. Maitland, 708 
 V. Manistee, 376 
 V. Third Ave, R. Co., 508 
 Blackman v. Gardiner Bridge, 758 
 
 V. Simmons, 639 
 Blackmore v. Toronto R. Co., 488, 493 
 
dviii 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. W' '" s>:ction!. 
 
 Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 
 
 14, 154, 153, 243, 547 
 Blackwell v. Lynchburg, etc. R. Co., 
 89, 688a, 775 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 482 
 
 V. Wiswall, 144 
 Bladton v. Dold, 223 
 Blaechinska v. Howard Mission, etc. 
 
 115, 703, 760 
 Blagrave v. Bristol Water Co. , 8 
 Blaine V. Chesapeake, etc. E. Co., 419. 
 Blair v. Deakin, 734 
 
 V. Erie R. Co., 178, 492, 505 
 
 V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co., 
 472 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 421 
 
 V. Perpetual Ins. Co., 254 
 Blaisdell v. Portland, 335 
 Blaiser v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 95 
 Blake v. Ferris, 168, 173, 174, 699 
 
 V. Lowell, 368 
 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., ISO, 191, 
 235, 241 
 
 V. Midland R. Co., 766, 773 
 
 V. Newfield, 352, 356 
 
 V. Pontiac, 260, 291 
 
 V. St. Louis, 289 
 
 V. Thirst, 167 
 Blakely v. Devine, 274 
 Blakeley v. Troy. 863, 869 
 Blakemore v. Bristol, etc. R. Co., 637 
 Blaker v. N. J. Midland R. Co., 470 
 Blakeslee v. Consolidated R. Co., 
 
 585c 
 Blamires V. Lancashire, etc. R. Co., 9 
 Blanchard v. Baker, 729, 733 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 467, 
 480, 482 
 
 V. New Jersey, etc. R. Co., 93 
 
 V. Stearns, 810 
 Bland v. Shreveport R. Co., 206 
 Blank v. Livonia, 367, 869 
 Blanton v. Dodd, 185a 
 Blatt V. McBarron, 705 
 Blaustein v. Guindon, 362 
 Blenkiron v. Gr. Central Gas Co., 696 
 Blessiugton v. Boston, 358 
 Bleyl V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 417 
 Bliss V. Baltimore, etc. Tel. Co., 539 
 
 V. Deerfield, 834, 835 
 
 ■V. Johnson, 729 
 
 V. Rice. 730 
 
 V. South Hadley, 72, 73a, 370 
 
 V. Wilbraham, 53, 378 
 Blizzard v. Danville, 287 
 Block V. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 54 
 Blodgett V. Bartlett, 520 
 
 V. Boston, 870, 379, 258 
 
 V. Royalton, 334 
 Blomquist v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 233 
 Blood V. Nashua, etc. R. Co., 733 
 
 V. Sayre, 303 
 
 Blood V. Spaulding, 661 
 
 V. Tyngsborough, 86, 379 
 Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 117 
 Bloomington v. Annett, 367, 369 
 V. Bay, 333 
 V. Legg, 367, 369 
 v. Perdue, 86 
 V. Rogers, 376 
 Bloor V. Delafield, 86, 355 
 Blossom V. Dodd, 210, 552 
 Blount V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 4816 
 Bloxham v. Florida Cent. R. Co., 249 
 Bloyd V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 208a, 
 
 228, 233, 238a 
 Blue V. Aberdeen, etc. R. Co., 666, 
 
 678 
 V. Briggs, 244 
 Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 13, 
 
 55, 213 
 Blum V. So. Pullman Car Co. 526 
 Blumb v. Kansas City, 167, 173, 298 
 Blunt V. Aiken, 708 
 Bly V. Whitehall, 368, 375, 377 
 Blyhl V. Waterville, 272 
 Blyth V. Birmingham Water Co., 2, 
 
 11, 16, 19, 407, 728 
 V. Topham, 703 
 Blythe v. Denver, etc. R. Co., 16 
 Board of Education v. Mobile, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 417 
 Boatwright v. Northeastern R. Co., 
 
 180, 283, 233a 
 Boden v. Demwolf, 190 "' 
 Bodge V. Philadelphia, 285 
 Bodkin v. W. U. Tel. Co., 739 
 Boehm v. Duluth, etc. E. Co., 493, 
 
 513a 
 V. Mace, 719a 
 Boettger v. Scherpe Iron Co., 217 
 Bogard v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 241 
 Bogart v. Delaware, etc R. Co , 406 
 Bogenschutz v. Smith, 209a, 221 
 Boggess V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 493, 513a 
 Boggs V. Great Western R. Co., 476 
 Bohan v. Avoca, 274 
 
 v: Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 471 
 V. Port Jervis Gas Co.. 701a 
 Bohanan v. Peterson, 561 
 Bohen v. Waseca, 289, 354. 
 Bohl v. Carson, 580 
 Bohn V. Havemeyer, 208 
 Boick V. Bissell, 634 
 Boikens v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 
 508 
 Boing V. Raleigh and Gaston R. Co., 
 
 752 
 Bolan V. Williamson, 331 
 Boland v. Missouri R. Co., 16, 78, 73a, 
 
 99. 654 
 Bolch V. Smith, 684 
 Boldt V. Murray, 608, 611 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 289 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. iare to sections. 
 
 xl 
 
 IX 
 
 Bolingbroke v. Swindon, 155 
 Bolinger v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 461 
 Bollinger v. Texas, etc. R. Co., 479 
 Bolton V. Calkins, fili'J 
 
 V. Colder, 649, 652 
 V. Georgia Pac. E. Co., 307 
 , V. New RocheUe, 263, 287 
 Bomar v. Louisiana, etc. R. Co., 196 
 Bonafoua v. Walker, 616 
 Bonce v. Dubuque, etc. E. Co., 107, 
 
 516 
 Bond V. Evansville, etc. R. Co., 417a, 
 455 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co,, 473 
 V. Smith, 107, 376, 704 
 V. Ward, 620 
 V. Wilder, 633 
 Bonebraie v. Huntington county, 
 
 369. 380 
 Boniface v. Relyea. 158, 169 
 Bonnell v. Bowman, 619 
 Bonner v. Bryant, 182 
 
 V. Glen, 533 
 Bonner v. Grumbach, 516 
 -V. May field, 407 
 V. Wingate, 39, 107 
 Bonnet v. Galveston, etc. R. Co., 216 
 Bonney v. Bush wick R. Co., 508 
 Bonsall v. Lebanon, 343 
 Boom V. Reed, 613 
 V. Utica. 299 
 Boon V. Allegheny, etc. P. E. Co., 54 
 Boone Co. v. Mutcfaler, 31 
 Booth V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 123, 187, 
 188, 193, 204, 305 
 V. Meri-iam, 709 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 688a 
 V. Woodbury, 254 
 Boothby v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 55 
 Boots V. Washburn, 340 
 Borohardt v. Wausau Boom Co., 731 
 Borgman v. Omaha, etc. R. Co., 283 
 Bormann v. Milwaukee. 185 
 Borman v. Sangren, 708 
 Born V. Alleghenny, etc. Plank-road 
 
 Co , 389 
 Borschart v. Tuttle, 61 
 Borst V. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co., 
 
 436, 451, 473 
 Borup V. Nininger, 588 
 Bosozzi V. Harris, 639 
 Boss V. Litton, 654 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 499 
 Boster v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 486 
 Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 374 
 V. Crowley, 885 
 V. Gray. 708, 713 
 etc. R. Co., V. Boston, 338 
 V. O'Reilly. 60, 760a 
 etc, Steamboat Co. v. Munson, 
 738 
 Boswell V. Barnhart. 181. 773, 775 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I— d.] 
 
 Bostwick, Ex parte, 336 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. E. Co., 39, 40 
 V. Barlow, 340 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. E. Co., 99, 
 438 
 Boswell V. Hudson River E. Co., 505 
 Bosworth V. Swansey, 104 
 Bott V. Pratt, 13 
 Bottomley v. United States, 317 
 Bottoms V. Seaboard R. Co., 73a, 99, 
 
 484 
 Boucher v. New Haven, 363, 353, 
 
 358, 367, 369 
 Bougher v. Scobey, 566 
 Bouknight v. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 
 
 413 
 Boulder v. Fowler, 886 
 
 V. Niles, 289 
 Boulton V. Crowther, 283, 326 
 Bourdier v. Morgan's, etc. R. Co., 
 
 735 
 Bourget v. Cambridge, 846 
 Bourgo V. White, 719a 
 Bourne v. Diggles, 562, 566 
 Bouwmeester v. Grand Rapids, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 458, 463,480,488 
 Bowcher v. Noidstrom, 245 
 Bowe v. Hunking, 708, 709 
 Bowen v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 195 
 v. Detroit R. Co., 408 
 V. Flanagan, 645 
 V. Huntington, 353 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 477, 
 
 517 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 676 
 V. State, 251, 898, 401 
 Bower v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 478 
 
 V. Peate, 176 
 Bowers v. Connecticut River R. Co,, 
 196, 197, 381, 2416 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 206 
 Bowes V. Boston, 138, 338, 355 
 Bowles V. Lane, 767a 
 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 773 
 Bowling V. Arthur, 585, 599 
 Bowling Green Sav. Bk. v. Todd, 561 
 Bowman v. Cornell. 623 
 
 V. Tallman, 558, 559, 565, 567 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co. 430, 438, 
 
 485 
 V. Woods, 607, 609 
 Bowne v. Hyde, 578 
 Bowser v. Wellington, 654 
 Bowsley v. Speer, 785 
 Bowyer v. Burlew, 634 
 Box V. Atchison, etc. R. Co. 455 
 V. Jubb, 739 
 V. Kelso, 680 
 Boxford V. Essex, 348 
 Boyce V. Calif ornia Stage Co. , 487, 516 
 V. Cheshire R. Co., 675 
 V. Fitzpatrick, 188 
 V. Manhattan E. Co., 92, 506 
 
1 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 Boyd V. Conklin, 729, 735 
 
 V. Harris, 185 
 
 V. Insurance Patrol, 123, 255, 
 331 
 
 V. Oddous, 113 
 Boyland v. New York, 262, 299 
 Boyle V. Hazleton, 367 
 
 T. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 430 
 
 V. N. Y. & N. England R. Co., 
 185 
 Boynton v. Rees, 730 
 Brabbits v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 206 
 Brabham v. Hinds county, 256 
 Brace v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 333, 435 
 
 V. Y^ale, 730 
 Bracey v. Carter, 5.')9 
 Brackenbury v. Pell, .573 
 Braclvenridge v. Fitchburg, 378 
 
 V. McFarlane, 557 
 Brackett v. Lubke, 165 
 
 V. Norton, 573 
 Bradbee v. London, 363 
 Bradbury v. Benton, 334, 335 
 Bradford v. Anniston, 346, 368, 369 
 
 V. Boston & M. R. Co., 90, 492a 
 
 V. Downs, 95 
 Bradley v. Andrews, 16 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co. , 417, 463 
 467 
 
 V. Buffalo, etc. E. Co., 57, 434 
 
 V. Fisher, 303 
 
 V. Fort Wayne, etc. R. Co., 56, 
 508 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 506 
 
 v. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 195, 
 233 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 91, 160, 
 180, 185&, 203 
 
 V. Sattler, 772 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co. , 533 
 Bradshaw v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 186, 209a 
 Bradstreet v. Everson, 577, 582, 587a 
 Bradt v. Walton, 563 
 Bradwell V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 
 57, 87, 108, 359 
 Brady v. Ball, 655 
 
 V. Chicago, 401 
 
 V. Little Miami R. Co., 580 
 
 V. Lowell, 258, 353 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 60b 
 
 V. New York, 254 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 516 
 
 V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Bragg V. Bangor, 367 
 Brailey v. Southborough, 258, 338 
 Braine v. Spaulding, 566 
 Bramwell v. Lucas, 575 
 Brancli v. Macon, etc. R. Co., 349 
 Branch Bank v. Knox, 580 
 Brand v. Schenectady, etc. R. Co., 
 93, 96, 457, 463, 473 
 
 Brandenburg v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 44U 
 
 Brann v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 410 
 
 Brannan v. Kokomo, etc. R. Co., 66, 
 66a 
 
 Brann v. Chicago, R. Co., 194a, 205 
 
 Brannock v. Elmore, 168, 175, 688a 
 
 Branson v. Labrot, 705 
 
 Brash v. Steele, 773 
 
 Braaheaisv. Western U. Tel. Co., 531, 
 540a 
 
 Bransom v. Labrot, 73, 97 
 
 Brant v. Plumer. 371 
 
 Brass v. Maitland. 690 
 
 Brassell v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 477, 
 521, 525 
 
 Brawn v. Laurens county, 393 
 
 Bray V. Latham, 742 
 
 V. Wallingford, 258 
 
 Brayton v. Fall River, 258, 735 
 
 Braxton v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co.. 467 
 
 Brazier v. Bryant, 561 
 
 Brazil, etc. Coal Co. v. Cain, 233 
 V. Gaffney, 218 
 Coal Co. V. Hoodlet, 185a 
 
 Breckenf elder v. Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 Co., 477 
 
 Breckenridge v. Bennett, 705 
 V. Hicks, 215 
 
 Breen v. Field, 209a 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 516 
 
 V. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 195 
 
 Breese v. U. S. Tel. Co., 534, 537, 547, 
 552, 553 
 
 Brehni v. Great Western R. Co., 39, 
 516 
 
 Bi-eig V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 215 
 
 Brember v. Jones, 654 
 
 Bremner v. Williams, 497 
 
 Brendlinger v. New Hanover, 363 
 
 Brennanv. Ellis, 176 
 
 v. Fairhaven, etc. R. Co., 84, 
 
 148 
 V. Friendship, 110 
 V. Front St. R. Co., 213 
 V. Gordon, 21!)a, 233, 233a 
 V. Limerick Union, 266 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 207& 
 V. Molly Wilson Co., 133 
 V. St. Louis, 334 
 
 Bi-enstein v. Mattson, 90 
 
 Brent v. Kimball, 638, 640 
 
 Brentner v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 425 
 
 Bresnahan v. Michigan Central, 64, 
 480 
 
 Brevig V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
 Brewer v. Crosby, 628 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 493, 504 
 
 Brewster v. Davenport, 263 
 
 Briant v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 678, 
 680 
 
 Brezee v. Powers, 703 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. i'i'-e to sections. 
 
 Brice v. Bauer, 630 
 Brick V. Bosworth, 213 
 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 231 
 Brickell v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 66a, 476, 477 
 Brickman v. South Car. R. Co., 197 
 Bricker v. Phila., etc. R. Co., 486, 
 
 488 
 Bridge, Matter of. 334 
 Bridge v. Grand Junction R. Co., 86, 
 
 93 
 Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 233 
 
 V. Williams, 397 
 Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 
 
 390 
 Bridger v. Asheville, etc. R. Co., 73, 
 
 730!, 410, 760 
 Bridges v. North London R. Co., 
 57, 59, 509, 530 
 
 V. Perry, 621 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 194a 
 
 V. North London R. Co., 57, 59 
 Briegel v. Philadelphia, 267, 387 
 Brien v. Bennett, 490 
 Briggs V. Dearborn, 631 
 
 V. Guilford. 61, 348 
 
 V. Klosse, 701 
 
 V. Minneapolis St. R. Co., 38 
 
 V. Newport News and M. "V. 
 Co 319 
 
 V. N.' Y. Cent. R. Co., 765 
 
 V. Oliver, 59 
 
 V. Taylor, 600, 618 
 
 V. Titan, 333 
 
 V. Union R. Co., 520 
 
 V. Warden, 303 
 Brigham v. Foster, 557 
 Bright V. Barnett Co., 316 
 Brighthope R. Co. v. Rogers, 674, 675 
 Brightman v. Bristol, 361 
 
 V. Grinnell, 641 
 Brignoli v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 758 
 Brill V. Eddy, 99 
 Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 589 
 Brine v. Great Western R. Co., 359 
 Brinkley Mfg. Co. v. Cooper, 705 
 Brinkman v. Bender, 113 
 Brinkm^'er v. Evansville, 355, 365 
 Briscoe v. Alfrey, 636 
 
 V. Bank, 249. 
 Bristol, etc. R. Co. v. Collins, 343, 503 
 
 V. Johnson, 356 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Tucker, 416 
 British Cast Plate Co. v. Meredith, 
 336 
 
 Mutual Inv. Co. v. Cobbold. 574 
 Britten v. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 512 
 
 V. Cummington, 99, 350, 370, 
 378 
 
 V. Grand Rapids R. Co., 508 
 
 V. Great Western, etc. Co., 685 
 
 V. Great Western Cotton Co., 
 9, 63, 314 
 
 Britton v. Green Bay Water Co., 118, 
 t!65 
 
 V. !Niccolls, 585 
 
 V, Street R. Co., 760 
 Broadwell v. Kansas City, 298 
 
 V. Swigert, 61 
 
 V. Wilcox, 663 
 Broburg v. Des Moines, 353, 369 
 Brock V. Barnes, 566 
 
 V. Copeland, 639 
 
 V. Connecticut, etc. R. Co., 424 
 
 V. Gale, 745 
 
 V. Hopkins, 591 
 Brockbank v. Whitehaven, 115. 
 Brockert v. Central R. Co., 130a 
 Broderick v. Detroit Union Depot 
 
 Co., 186a, 190, 194 
 Brodeur v. Valley Falls Co., 326, 235 
 Brodie v. Carolina Midland R. Co., 
 
 510, 521 
 Brohl V. Lingeman, 144 
 Bromley v. Birmingham, etc. R. Co., 
 
 108 
 Bronson v. Coffin, 419, 443 
 
 V. Southburv, 72, 73, 78, 356, 
 3P3 
 Brown v. Skowhegan,_388, 251, 370 
 Brooke v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 197 
 
 V. Ramsden. 209a 
 
 V. Winters, 734 
 Brookfield v. Remsen, 623 
 Brooklyn v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 
 
 341, 408,414 
 Brooks V. Boston, 333, 370, 739 
 
 v. Boston, etc. K. Co., 114 
 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 469 
 
 V. Day, 574 
 
 V. Hart, 649, 651 
 
 V, Lincoln St. R. Co., 485c 
 
 V. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 434, 
 436, 455 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 207b 
 
 V. Schwerin, 115, 654, 760 
 
 V. Somerville, 298, 358, 368 
 
 V. Taylor, 638 
 Brookville v. Arthurs, 133, 389, 384 
 
 Turnp. Co. v. Pumphrey, 306 
 Brooksville v. Pumphrey, 346 
 Broschart v. Tattle, 101, 654 
 Brosnan v. Sweetzer, 719 
 Brosman v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 198, 
 
 316 
 Brotherton v. Manhattan Beach 
 
 Imp. Co., 704 
 Brouillette v. Con. River R. Co., 110 
 Broult v. Hanson, 653 
 Brow v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 160 
 Brower v. New York. 285 
 Brown v. Atlanta, 367 
 
 V. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 676 
 
 V. Barnes. 530 
 
 V. Bowen, 731 
 
 V. Brooks, 679 
 
u 
 
 Rc/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. i^re to sections. 
 
 Brown v. Brown, 209a 
 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 13, 139, 
 
 467, 675, 676, 678 
 V. Byroads, 207 
 V. Cayuga, etc. E. Co. 413, 
 
 700a 
 V Central Pac. B. Co., Ill 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 731, 
 
 742, 745 
 V. Collins, 16, 17, 701 
 V. Congress St., etc. E. Co., 1, 
 
 57. 
 V. Dean, 734 
 
 V. Dist. of Columbia, 289 
 V. Duplissis, 359 
 V. Elliott, 723 
 ■V. European, etc. E. Co., 74, 
 
 114 
 V. Fairhaven, 122, 301, 394 
 V. Giles, 627 
 V. Glasgow, 334 
 V. Great Western R. Co., 114 
 V. Guyandotte, 260, 291 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 408, 
 
 413, 417 
 V. Howard, 574, 575 
 V. Howe, 121 
 V. lUius, 93, 696, 734 
 V. Jefferson, 376 
 V. Jefferson County, 257 
 V. Kendall, 16 
 V. Lent, 247 
 V. Lester, 591 
 V. Louisville, etc. E. Co., 207b, 
 
 481, 484 
 V. Lynn, 61, 92, 97 
 V. McAllister, 701a 
 V. Mallett, 788 
 V. Marshall, 691, 743 
 V. Maxwell, 61, 180 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. E. Co., 112, 
 
 425, 476 
 V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 676 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 93,408, 
 
 463, 477, 495 
 V. N. Y. Gas Co., 693 
 Y. Nichols, 562 
 T. Postal Cable Co., 553 
 V. Providence, etc. E. .Co., 413 
 V. Purdy, 612 
 V. Purviance, 147 
 V. Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 513a 
 V. Robins, 701 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 484 
 V. Scofleld, 395 
 V. Skowhegan. 388, 251, 370 
 V. Sennett, 241a 
 V. Sherer, 73a 
 V. Smith, 310 
 
 V. South Kenebeck Soc, 104 
 V. Sullivan, 93, 99 
 V. Susquehanna Boom Co., 11 
 V. Vinal Haven, 206 
 
 Brown v. Watson, 371, 749a 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 545, 
 754 
 
 V. Winona, 205 
 
 V. Wysong, 343 
 Brownell v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 60a 
 Browning v. Hanford,621 
 
 V. Owen county, 399 
 
 V. Springfield, 256, 289 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co., 188, 775 
 Brownlee v. Alexis, 369 
 Brownlow v. Metropolitan Board, 
 
 359 
 Brozekv. Stein way R. Co., 654 
 Bruce v. Baxter, 566 
 
 V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 133, 
 133 
 Bruker v. Covington, 110 
 Brumble v. Brown. 587a 
 Brumfleld v. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 
 540a 
 Brummit v. Furness, 669 
 Brunell v. Hopkins, 671 
 Brunner v. American Tel. Co., 148, 
 365 
 
 V. Blaisdell, 57 
 Brunette v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 475 
 Brunker v. Cummins, 703 
 Brunswick v. Braxton, 289 
 
 etc. Co. V. Rees, 703, 713 
 
 etc. R. V. Clem, 2075 
 Brunswig v. White. 690, 773 
 Brusch V. St. Paul R. Co., 523 
 
 V. Long Island R. Co., 673 
 Brusso V. Buflfelo, 175, 176, 398, 373, 
 
 654 
 Bruswitz V. Netherlands Steam Nav. 
 
 Co., 39, 502 
 Bryan V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 505 
 Bryant v. American Tel. Co., 555, 
 754, 755 • 
 
 V. Biddeford, 104, 334, 351, 388 
 
 V. Central, etc. R. Co., 680 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. . 488 
 
 V. Randolph, 345, 359, 373 
 
 V. Rich, 146, 154, 513 
 
 V. St. Paul, 266 
 
 v. Westbrook, 299 
 Brydges v. Walford, 623 
 Brydon v. Stewart, 187, 190, 194, 197 
 Brymer v. Southern Pac. R. Co.. 184 
 
 195, 233 
 Bryson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Buchanan v. Barre, 385 
 
 v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 473 
 
 V. Duluth, 287 
 Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co. , 104 
 
 v. Fitchburg, etc. E. Co., 104 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 89, 509, 
 520 
 Buchanan v. West Jersey R. Co., 85 
 Buck V. Biddeford, 351, 353, 367 
 
Re/erences'X TABLE OF CASES. lare to sections. 
 
 liii 
 
 Buck V. Glons Falls, 363 
 
 V. Webb, 498 
 Buckalew v. Tennessee Coal Co., 181, 
 
 767 
 Buckbee v. Brown, 735, 736 
 Bucki V. Cone, 157 
 Buokland v. Conway, 557 
 Buckley v, Gee, 639 
 
 V. Cunningham, 783 
 
 V. Gould, etc. Mining Co., 341 
 
 V. Gray, 563 
 
 V. Guttapercha M'fg Co., 318, 
 319 
 
 V. Knapp, 763 
 
 V. Leonard, 636, 638, 639, 633 
 
 V. New Bedford, 374 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 490 
 Buckmaster v. Great Eastern R. Co. , 
 
 504 
 Buckner v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 333 
 Budd V. United Carriage Co., 516 
 Buddin v. Fortunato, 1 1 5 
 Buddenberg v. Chouteau Tr. Co. , 139 
 Buddington v. Bradley, 739 
 
 V. Shearer, 638, 035, 638 
 Bueck V. Lindsay, 654 
 Buel V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 89, 519 
 Buelow V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Buenemann v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 
 506 
 Buesching v. St. Louis Gas Light 
 
 Co., 58, 108, 363, 708, 713 
 Buffalo V. HoUoway, 174, 801, 356, 384 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 467 
 
 etc. Turnp. Co. v. Buffalo, 399 
 Buffit V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 486, 490, 
 
 503 
 Buffum V. Harris, 785 
 Buford V. Grand Rapids, 374 
 
 V. Houtz, 419, 656 
 Bulkley v. N. Y. & N. Haven R. Co., 
 
 57, 433, 451a 
 Bull V. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 341 
 Bullard v. Boston, etc. R., 518 
 Bullington v. Newport News, 751 
 Bullitt V. Clement, 808 
 Bullock V. Babcock, 131 
 
 V. Durham, 368, 874 
 
 V. New York, 346, 376 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 93 
 Bulmer v. Oilman, 558, 565 
 Bulpit V. Matthews. 655 
 Bunch V. Edenton, 389, 346, 356 
 Buncombe Turp. Co. v. Baxter, 885 
 Bunderson v. Burlington, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 735 
 Bundschuh v. Mayer, 635 
 Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co., 
 10, 361 
 
 V. Rio Grande W. R. Co., 451a 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 193 
 
 Bunt V. Sierra, etc. Co., 185, 807 
 Bunting v. Central Pac. R. Co., 64, 
 476 
 
 V. Hogsett, 66 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 417a 
 Bunyan v. Citizens' R. Co., 483c 
 Burbank v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 410, 
 493a 
 
 V. Pillsbury, 443 
 
 V. West- Walker Ditch Co., 105 
 Bureh v. Hardwicke, 391 
 Burchfleld v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 
 
 445 
 Burdick v. Babcock. 333 
 
 v. Cheadle, 709 
 
 v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 750 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 197 
 
 V. Worrall, 649, 651, 654 
 Burford v. Grand Rapids, 363 
 Burg V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 467, 
 
 480 
 Burger V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 479 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 483 
 Purges V. Wickham, 497 
 Burgess v. Davis Sulphur Ore Co., 
 60b, 815 
 
 V. Gray, 165 
 Burghart v. Gardner, 563 
 Burgin v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 530 
 Burk V. Campbell, 633 
 Burk V. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 
 
 464 
 Burke v. Broadway, etc. R. Co., 71 
 
 73 
 Burke v. Daley, 664 
 
 V. De Casto, etc. Co., 163 
 
 v. Elliott, 813 
 
 V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 680, 
 750 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 110, 473, 485 
 
 V. Parker, 185 
 
 V. Shaw, 148 
 
 V. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 193, 
 307 
 
 V. Trevitt, 833 
 
 V. Witherbee, 606, 189, 195, 678 
 Burkett V. Bond, 111 
 Burley v. Bethune, 808 
 Burling v. 111. Central R. Co. 468 
 Burlington, etc., R. Co., v. Crockett, 
 193, 307, 333, 3336 
 
 V. Pranzen, 419 
 
 V. Koonce, 417 
 
 V. Webb, 451a 
 
 V. Westover, 666, 676, 678, 679 
 Burnard v. Haggis, 131 
 Burnell v. West Side R. Co., 185 
 Burnham v. Butler, 645 
 
 V. Strother, 637 
 Burnet v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 
 
 99, 483 
 
liv 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. {are to sections. 
 
 Burnett v. Contra Costa County, 356 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 581 
 Burnhani v. Byron, 258 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co., 509 
 Burns v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 195 
 
 V. Cork, etc., R. Co., 45, 51, 497 
 
 V. Bradford, 367, 369 
 
 V. Elba, 114, a58, 389, 367, 374 
 
 V. Glens Falls, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co., 
 133 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 413. 
 
 V. McDonald, 166, 168 
 
 V. North Chicago, etc. MiU Co., 
 466 
 
 T. Norton, 303 
 
 V. Ocean S. S. Co., 197 
 
 V. Pethcal, 245 
 
 V. Poulson, 116, 147 
 
 V. Sennett, 195, 334, 383, 341 
 
 V. Washburn, 3416 
 
 V. Yonkers , 356 
 Buron v. Denman, 333 
 Burr V. Beers, 118, 543 
 
 V. Plymouth, 351, 363 
 Burrell v. tJncamphor, 367 
 
 V. Uncapher, 31, 367 
 Burrill v. Augusta, 365 
 
 V. Eddy, 335 
 Burroughs V. Housatonic R. Co., 673 
 Burrows v. Erie, etc. R. Co., 61, 530 
 
 V. Lake Crystal, 369 
 
 V. March Gas Co., 31, 35, 65, 
 695 
 Burt V. Douglas Co. R. Co., 534 
 
 V. Horner, 587 
 
 V. Wrigley, 699 
 Burton v. Chattanooga, 374 
 
 V. Fulton, 310, 313 
 
 V. McClellan, 671 
 
 V. No. Missouri R. Co., 431 
 
 V. Philadelpliia, etc. Co., 436 
 
 V. Tannehill, 119 
 
 V. West Jersey Ferry Co.. 515 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 766 
 Bush V. Barnett, 516 
 
 V. Brainard, 433, 730 
 
 V. Geneva, 363, 368 
 
 V. Portland, 374 
 
 V. Steinnian, 168, 173, 699 
 Bushby v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. Co., 
 
 185&, 194, 305 
 Bussell V. Steuben, 356 
 Bussian v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 436 
 Bussy V. Donaldson, 173 
 Busteed v. Parsons, 303 
 Butcher v. Hyde, 704 
 
 V. Providence Gas Co., 693 
 
 V. West Virginia, etc. R. Co., 
 483 
 Bute V. Potts, 014 
 
 Butler V. Ashworth, 258, 340 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 241c, 424 
 
 V. Gushing, 59. 703 
 
 V. Kent, 371, 739 
 
 V. Malvern, 368 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 60a, 764 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 408, 
 
 463, 464 
 V. Oxford, 369, 378 
 V. Peck, 735 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co., 519. 
 
 523 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co.. 520 
 V. Steinway R. Co. , 493 
 V. Townsend, 195, 197, 224, 
 339, 699 
 Butman v. Hussey, 733 
 Butner v. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 
 
 756 
 Butterfield v. Forrester, 86, 379 
 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 476, 481 
 Button V. Frink, 57, 107, 647, 649 
 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 61, 
 
 65, 94, 99, 102, 110. 
 V. Kinnitz, 747 
 Butts V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Buxendin v. Sharp, 629 
 Buxton V. Northeastern R, Co., 418, 
 
 459, 466a, 503 
 Buzzell V. Laconia Manf'g Co., 107, 
 
 184, 194, 197, 223 
 Byerly v. Anamoso, 334, 356 
 Byrne v. Boadle, 59, 60, 158, 159 
 V. Farmington, 374 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 73, 
 
 414 
 V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 
 
 61, 144, 464a, 483 
 V. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 644, 
 
 649 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 739 750 
 V. N.'y. Central R. Co,, 464, 
 
 468. 471, 481a 
 V. Syracuse, 341, 375, 377 
 Byrnes v. Cohoes, 374 
 
 T. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 195, 302 
 V. Palmer. 574 
 
 Cable V. Cooper, 303 
 
 Cablett V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. . 97 
 
 Cadden v. American Steel Barge 
 
 Co., 195 
 Cadwell v. Arnheim, 647 
 Cagger v. Lansing, 56 
 Cagney V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 195 
 Cahill V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 481 
 
 V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 66, 
 470, 477, 484 
 
 v! Eastman. 17, 701a 
 
 V. Hilton, 207a, 223 
 
 V. Layton, 97 
 
Re/erencesi TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 Iv 
 
 Cahn V. Western U. Tel. Co., 538, 
 
 753a, 750 
 Cahoon v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 426 
 Cain V. Minneapolis, etc. R Co., 493 
 
 V. Syracuse, 263, 281, 354 
 Cairncross v. Pewankee, 355, 376 
 Cairo, etc. R. Co. v. Murray, 451a, 453 
 V. Stevens, 735 
 V. Woolsey, 453 
 Cake V. Cannon, 619 
 Calder v. Chapman, 335 
 V. Hacket, 303 
 V. Smallev, 120,709a 
 V. Walla Walla, 363 
 Calder wood v. North Birmingham 
 
 R. Co., 520 
 Caldwell v. Murphy, 495, 523 
 
 V. N. J. Steamboat Co., 45, 51, 
 
 57, 60, 495, 497, 515 
 V. Shepherd, 557 
 V. Slade, 713, 719 
 Calkins v. Barger, 16, 669 
 
 V. Hartford. 606 
 Call V. Butt(!rick, 734 
 V. Mitchell, 303 
 Callagan v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 91 
 Callahan v. Bean, 73a. 74 
 
 V, Burlington, etc. R. Co., 160 
 V, Eel River R. Co., 73 
 V. Morris, 258 
 V. Warne, 54, 61, 113, 690 
 Callaway v. Mellett, 493 
 Callett V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 523 
 Calumet Iron Co. v. Martin. 107, 113 
 Calvert county v. Gibson, 257 
 Calwell V. Boone, 391 
 Camden Co. v. Belknap, 310 
 Camden, etc. R. Co. v. Baldauf, 550 
 
 V. Hoosey, 523 
 Cameron v. Brvan, 630, 748 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 193 
 V. Reynolds, 618 
 V. Union Tr. Line, 743, 525 
 Camp V. Barney, 163 
 
 V. Hartford, etc. Stmb. Co., 505 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 550 
 V Wood, 704, 709, 710 
 Campbell v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 57 
 V. Bear River Co., 16, 47 
 V. Boyd, 705 
 V. Bridwell, 419 
 V. Brown, 628 
 V. Cook, 230, 2336, 241c 
 V. Eveleth, 219a 
 V. Goodwin, 676 
 V. Harris, 181, 764 
 V. Kalamazoo, 289, 338 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 483 
 V. Kincaid, 562 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 194 
 V. Lunsford, 207, 701 " 
 V. Montgomery, 261. 289. 295 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 675, 676 
 
 Campbell v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 474. 
 485 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 150 
 V. Page, 637 
 V. Perkins, 486 
 V. Phelps, 248, 618 
 V. Portland Sugar Co., 122, 248, 
 
 492a, 704, 725 
 V. Pullman Car Co., 513, 526 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 475 
 V. Seaman, 701a 
 V. Somerville, 301 
 V. Stakes, 121 
 
 V. Stillwater. 346, 355, 358, 617 
 V. Trimble, 635 
 V. Webb, 303 
 V. U. S. Foundry Co., 675 
 Co. V. Roediger, 192 
 Canada Cent. R. Co. v. McLaren, 676 
 Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Johnston, 
 
 233a 
 Canandaigua v. Foster, 384 
 Canavan v. Stuyvesant, 707 
 Candee v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 483 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 503 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 547, 
 553, 754 
 Candelaria v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 
 
 480 
 CandiflE v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 150, 
 
 513a 
 Canefox v. Crenshaw, 657 
 Canfield v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 150, 
 
 359, 749 
 Caniff V. Blanchard Nav. Co., 404 
 Cannavan v. Conklin, 120, 735 
 Canning v. Williamstown, 749a, 711 
 Cannon v. Midland, etc. R. Co., 506 
 Cannons v. Western U. Tel. Co., 7.54 
 Canterbury v. Attornev-General, 665 
 Caution V. Eastern R.'Co., 672, 674, 
 
 676 
 Canfcwell v. Appleton, 375 
 Capen v. Foster, 310 
 Capper v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 333, 
 
 239 
 Carbine v. Bennington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 198 
 Card V. Case, 629 
 
 v. Eddv. 307a 
 V. Ellsworth, 89, 355 
 V. N. Y. and Harlem R. Co., 
 100, 428, 484 
 Carey v. Berkshire, etc. R. Co., 65, 124 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 V. Lawless, 321 
 Carhart v. Auburn Gas Co., 693 
 Cark v. Lebanon, 355 
 Carle v. Bangor, etc. R. Co. 241a 
 Carleton v. Caribou, 346 
 
 V. Franconia Iron, etc. Co., 
 704, 726 
 
Ivi 
 
 Rcfercnces'\ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Carlile v. Parkins, 623 
 
 Carlin v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 94, 
 
 107, 480 
 Carlisle v. Brisbane, 66 
 
 V. Sheldon, 67 
 Carlon v. Ireland, 30 
 Carlson v. North West. Tel. Co. , 303a, 
 338, 332, 333 
 V. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 185, 
 
 406, 775 
 V. Phcenix Bridge Co., 195 
 V, Sioux Falls, 185 
 V. Stocking, 164 
 Carlton V. "Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 438, 429 
 Carlyon v. Lovering, 734 
 Carman v. New York, 155, 299 
 
 V. SteubenvUle, etc R. Co., 175 
 Carmi v. Ervin. 66 
 Carmichael v. Bank of Penna., 597 
 Carmody v. Boston Gas Co. , 693 
 Carner v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 750 
 Carney v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 90,476 
 
 V. Marseilles, 374 
 Carpenter v. Blake, 605, 606, 607, 613, 
 614 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 459, 500 
 V. Central Park, etc., R. Co., 
 
 408 
 V. Cohoes, 8, 834a, 393 
 V. Eastern Trans. Line, 49 
 V. Latta, 639 
 
 V. Mexican Nat. R. Co., 317 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 536 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 761a 
 V. Washington, 493 
 Carples v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 
 
 739 
 Carpue t. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 45 
 Carr v. Ashland, 373 
 
 V. Eel River, etc. R. Co., 508, 
 
 530 
 V. Northern Liberties, 363, 374 
 V. North River Const. Co. , 471 
 V. Sheehan, 704 
 V United States, 349 
 V. West End R. Co., 110 
 Carraher v. San Francisco Bridge 
 
 Co., 436, 464, 466 
 Carrier v. Dorrance, 56 
 Carrico v. West Va., etc. R. Co., 93, 
 
 99, 176, 499, 516, 519 
 Carrington v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 64, 484 
 V. St. Louis, 385, 368 
 Carroll v. East Tennessee, V. & G. 
 Ry. Co., 207 
 V. Interstate Tr. Co. , 523 
 V. Minnesota, etc. R. Co., 64. 
 
 476 
 V. New Haven R. Co., 532, 523 
 V. Rigney, 713 
 
 Cairoll V. St. Louis, 263 
 
 V. Staten Island R. Co., 13, 45, 
 51, 92, 93, 104, 486, 494, 497, 
 515 
 
 V. Weiler, 636, 638 
 
 V. Willcutt, 3416 
 
 V. Williston, 195 
 Carruthers v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 195 
 Carskaddon v. Mills, 705 
 Carson v. Federal St. R. Co., 485c 
 
 v. Leathers, 157, 510 
 Carstairs v. Taylor, 16, 708 
 Carsten v. No. Pacific R. Co., 761a 
 Carter v. Bennett, 557 
 
 V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 359 
 
 V. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 688 
 
 v. 111. Cent. R. Co., 748 
 
 V. Kansas City R. Co., 497 
 
 V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 61, 64 
 
 V. Oliver Oil Co., 194a, 313 
 
 v. Rahway, 289 
 
 V. Tallcott, 559, 578 
 
 V. Towne, 34, 56, 686 
 Carterville v. Cook, 346 
 Carthage Turnp. Co. v. Andrews, 760 
 Cartter v. Cotter, 219a 
 Cartwright v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 531 
 Carver v. Detroit, etc. Plank-road 
 
 Co., 54 
 Carville v. Westford, 356 
 Gary v. Chicago, 398 
 
 V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 503 
 
 V. Curtis, 249 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 421 
 Case V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 407 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 453, 
 466 
 
 V. Northern Central R. Co., 58, 
 676 
 
 V. Perew, 18, 404 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 425 
 
 V. Terrell, 249 
 
 V. Waverlv, 289, 369 
 Casement v. Brown, 166, 168, 737 
 Casey v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 218 
 
 V. Fitchburg, 376 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 233b, 
 338 
 
 V. Maiden, 375 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 110 
 
 V. Smith, 74 
 
 V. Tama county, 257, 390 
 Cashill V. Wright, 49 
 Casparey v. Portland, 291 
 Cass V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 58 
 
 V. Dicks, 735 
 Cassaday v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 
 
 216. 2416 
 Cassida v. Oregon R. etc. Co., 484 
 Cassidy v. Stockbridge, 350, 351 
 
Re/crences\ TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 Ivii 
 
 Cassidy v. Angell, 108 
 
 V. Le Fevre, 744, 750 
 
 V. Maine Central R. Co., 91, 
 233 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 735 
 
 V. Poughkeepsie, 287 
 Castalia Trout Club Co. , v. Castalia 
 
 Sporting Club, 733 
 Castle V. Duryee, 318, 333, 686 
 
 V. Parker, 718 
 Castro V. Bennet, 568 
 Caswell V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 473 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 680 
 
 V. St. Mary's, etc. Road Co., 
 363 
 
 V. Worth, 62, 685 
 Catawissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, 53, 
 
 64, 99, 225, 480 
 Catharine, The, v. Dickenson, 61 
 Catlett V. Young, 63 
 Caton V. Sedalia, 346 
 Catron v. Nicholsi 669 
 Cauley v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 73 
 Caulfleld v. Bullock, 810 
 Cavanagh v. Boston, 299 
 
 V. Dinsmore, 147 
 
 V. Ocean Steam Nav. Co., 131 
 Caverly v. McOwen, 559 
 Cavillaud v. Yale, 562 
 Cawfleld v. Ashevile R. Co., 508 
 Cayzer v. Taylor, 46, 65, 188, 194, 197 
 Cecil V. Pacific R. Co., 436 
 Center v. Finney, 645 
 CentevviUe v. Woods, 93, 289, 346, 
 
 384 
 Central R. Co. v. Attaway, 93 
 
 V. Brantley, 189 
 
 V. Brewer, 145 
 
 V. Brunswick, etc. R. Co., 13, 
 104, 467 
 
 V.' Chapman, 307 
 
 V. Coggin, ."16 
 
 V. Combs, 504 
 
 V. Curtis, 13 
 
 sr. Da Bray, 333, 233a 
 
 V. Dixon, 479 
 
 V. Feller, 88, 477, 481 
 
 V. Freeman, 114 
 
 V. Glass, 463. 483 
 
 V. Gleason, 103, 408 
 
 V. Golden, 481a 
 
 V. Green. 530. 
 
 V. Ingram, 429 
 
 V. Keegan, 194 
 
 V. Kent, 16 
 
 V. Lanier, 61 
 
 V. Lee, 431 
 
 V. Letcher, 493a 
 
 V. Mason, 107 
 
 V. Miles, 533 
 
 V. Mitchell, 103 
 
 V. Moore, 54, 61, 762 
 
 V. Morris, 130a 
 
 Central R. Co. v. Murray, 750 
 
 V. Nash, 103 
 
 V. Newman, 64, 103 
 
 V. Passmore, 185a 
 
 V. Peacock, 154 
 
 V. Perry, 87, 488, 510 
 
 v. Phinazee, 93 
 
 V. Raiford, 470, 480 
 
 V. Roberts, 486 
 
 V. Rouse, 773 
 
 V. Rylee, 73, 464 
 
 V. Ryles, 194 
 
 V. Sears, 60a 
 
 V. Serfass, 761 
 
 V. Sims. 185 
 
 V. Small, 58 
 
 V. Smith, 103, 480, 508. 
 
 V. State. 368 
 
 V. Stoermer, 335 
 
 V. Summertord, 428 
 
 V. Thompson, 103, 769, 775 
 
 V. Thomas, 519 
 
 V. Van Horn, 93, 509 
 
 V. Vaughn, 484 
 
 V. Denson, 484 
 
 Branch R. Co. v. Andrews, 
 371 
 
 Brancli, etc. R. Co. v. Hothani, 
 53,54 
 
 Branch R. Co. v. Lea, 453 
 
 Pass R. Co. V. Chatterson, 
 749 
 
 V. Kuhn, 123 
 
 V. Rose. 530 
 
 V. Stevens, 96 
 
 Ohio R. Co. V. Lawrence, 
 419, 429, 460 
 
 Texas R. Co. v. Nycum, 485 
 
 Trust Co. V. East Tennessee 
 R. Co., 2076 
 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 183 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co.. 407, 
 410 
 
 U. Tel. Co. V. Swoveland, 536, 
 753a 
 Centralia v. Baker, 375 
 
 V. Krouse. 88, 376 
 
 V. Scott, 86, 378 
 Cesar v. Karutz, 709 
 Chacey v. Fargo, 36, 369 
 Chadbourne v. New Castle, 361 
 Chaddock v. Plummer, 34 
 Chadeaj-ne v. Robinson, 735 
 Chadron v. Glover, 334a, 373 
 Chadwick v. McCausland, 334 
 Chaffee v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 477, 
 535, 654 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 56, 483, 
 519, 536 
 Chalkley v. Richmond, 387 
 Chamberlain v. Enfield, 60b, 346, 
 350. 355 
 
 v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 180 
 
Ivi 
 
 11 
 
 Re/ercnc< 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. [«« to sections. 
 
 Chamberlain v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. , 
 99 484 
 
 V. Oshkosh, 363 
 
 V. Wheatland, 378, 647 
 Chamberlin v. Morgan, 615 
 Chambers v. Matthews, 657, 659 
 Champaign v. Forrester, 287 
 
 V. Patterson, 334, 353 
 Champion, v. Crandon, 271, 274 
 Champlain v. Pen Yan, 354 
 Champlin v. Pen Yan, 281 
 Chandler v. Fremont county, 257 
 
 V. Rowland, 730 
 
 V. Lazaras, 721 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. E. Co., 138 
 Chapel V. Smith, 733 
 Chapin v. Walsh, 707 
 Chaplin v. Hawes, 649, 651 
 Chapman v. Chapman. 564 
 
 V. Cook, 351, 356 
 
 V. Copeland. 733 
 
 V. Erie R. Co., 191, 192 
 
 V. Macon, 369 
 
 V. Milton. 334a, 338, 367 
 
 f New Haven R. Co., 31, 102 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 425 
 
 V. Rochester, 255, 274, 734 
 
 V. Rose, 20 
 
 V. Roth well, 704 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 206 
 
 V. State, 249, 725 
 
 V. Thornburgh, 617 
 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co., 756, 761 
 Charlebois v. Gogebic, etc. R. Co., 
 
 137, 1G8 
 Charles v. Taylor, 167, 235 
 Chai'liss V. Rankin, 701 
 Charlock v. Freel, 166, 298, 359 
 Charlwood v. Greig, 632 
 Chartiers v. Phillips, 378 
 
 Gas Co. V. Lynch, 168 
 
 etc. Turn p. Co. v. Nester, 343 
 Chase v. Burlington and N. R. Co., 
 207a 
 
 V. Cabot, etc. Bridge Co., 397 
 
 V. Chase, 419, 657 
 
 V. Heaney, 574, 592 
 
 V. Lowell, 350, 354 
 
 V. Maine Central R, Co., 107 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 61, 95, 
 750 
 
 V. Oshkosh, 269, 351 
 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Chaseniore v. Eichai'ds. 729 
 Chataign v. Bergeron, 686 
 Cliatfleld V. Wilson, 700 
 Chattanooga v. State, 332 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Brown, 413 
 
 V. Clowdis, 473, 769, 775 
 
 V. Huggins, 51, 495 
 
 V. Liddell, 502, 748 
 
 T. Whitehead, 159 
 Chatsworth v. Ward, 369 
 
 Chattertou v. Frankfort, 384 
 Chavanne v. Frizola, 581 
 Chedsey v. Canton, 258 
 Cheeney v. Ocean S. S. Co., 203, 233 
 Cheetham v. Hampson, 120, 708 
 Cheeves v. Danielly, 37, 735 
 Chenango Bridge Co. v. Lewis, 395 
 Cheney v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 463, 
 
 471 
 Chenery V. Fitchburg R. Co., 97, 464 
 Chenowith v. Chamberlin, 597 
 Cherokee, etc. Coal Co. v. Britton, 
 717 
 
 Coal Mining Co. v. Limb, 772 
 
 Packet Co. v. Hilson, 492a 
 Cherry v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 503 
 Chesapeake, etc. R. Co. v. Clowes, 
 534 
 
 V. Dyer County, 415 
 
 V. Foster, 62, 483 
 
 V. Hafner, 198 
 
 v. Lash, 317 
 
 V. McDowell, 185, 231 
 
 V. McMichael, 3336 
 
 V. Osborne, 413 
 
 V. Reeves, 508 
 
 V. Wells, 493 
 
 V. Yost, 63 
 Chesley v. Mississippi, etc. Boom Co., 
 47 
 
 V. Thompson, 115 
 Chesson v. Roper Lumber Co., 233a 
 Chevallier v. State, 249 
 Chewning v. Ensley R. Co , 476 
 Chicago V. Apel, 356 
 
 V. Baboook, 375 
 
 V. Bixby, 353 
 
 V. Crooker, 353 
 
 V. Crosby, 343 
 
 V. Dalle, 369 
 
 V. Gallagher, 273, 356 
 
 V. Herz. 353 
 
 V. Hesing. 71, 356 
 
 V. Hoy, 355, 367 
 
 V. Joiiey, 167 
 
 V. Johnson. 356 
 
 V. Keefe, 137, 370 
 
 V. Kelly, 749a 
 
 V. Langlass, 353, 749a 
 
 V. McCarthy. 353, 369 
 
 V. McDonald, 356 
 
 V. McGiveu, 53, 353, 367 
 
 V. McGraw, 399 
 
 V. McLean, 761 
 
 V. Major, 71, 73a, 134, 135, 137, 
 368, 766, 775 
 
 V. Martin, 389, 334a, 749a 
 
 V. Morse 375 
 
 V. O'Brennan, 709a 
 
 V. O'Brien, 343 
 
 V. Powers. 369 
 
 V. Robbins, 24a, 168, 175, 385 
 
Re/ercncesi TABLE OF CASES. la-re to sections. llX 
 
 Chicago V. Schmidt, 346 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Delcourt, 520 
 
 V. Starr, 7cla 
 
 V. Dewey, 479 
 
 V. Stearns, 103 
 
 v. Dickson, 154, 194a, 436, 485, 
 
 V. Turner, 399 
 
 513a, 523 
 
 V. Wright, 356, 393, 396 
 
 V. Diehl, 433 
 
 Bottling Co. V. McGrinnis, 147 
 
 V. Dillon, 417 
 
 Brick Co. V. Reinneiger, 319 
 
 V. Dohertv, 493 
 
 Brick Co. v. Sobkowiak, 315, 
 
 V. Donahue, 86, 99 
 
 330 
 
 V. Dougherty, 468 
 
 Cab Co. V. McCarthy, 645 
 
 V. Doyle, 341 
 
 City R. Co. V. Henry, 763 
 
 V. Drake, 508 
 
 Coal Co, V, Norman, 321, 333 
 
 V. Dumser, 421 
 
 etc. Coal Co. v. Peterson, 341d 
 
 V. Dunn, 426 
 
 Forge Co. v. Van Dam, 315 
 
 V. Dunleavy, 460 
 
 Packing Co. t. Rohan, 309ffl 
 
 V. Eininger, 73a, 466, 470 
 
 etc. Smelting Co. v. Collins, 
 
 v. Fenn, 437, 626 
 
 307 
 
 V. Few, 195 
 
 R. Co. V. Gillam, 773 
 
 V. Finch, 450 
 
 etc. R.-Co. V. Adams, 493 
 
 V. Fisher, 49, 53, 457, 473, 
 
 V. Armstrong, 195 
 
 478 
 
 V. Arnol, 51 3« 
 
 V. Flexman, 154, 513 
 
 V. Artery, 190 
 
 V. Florens, 463. 
 
 V. Avery, 49, 196, 410 
 
 V. Flynn, 202, 2076 
 
 V. Baltz, 673 
 
 V. Frazer, 490, 506 
 
 V. Barnes, 441, 668 
 
 V. George, 51, 516 
 
 V. Barrie, 100, 435, 438, 430, 
 
 V. Gertsen, 476 
 
 436 
 
 V. Gilbert, 675, 678 
 
 V. Bayfield, 186, 186a, 303a, 
 
 V. Goebel, 471 
 
 319, 233 
 
 V. Gomes, 461, 475 
 
 V. Beatty, 317 
 
 V. Goss, 94 
 
 V. Becker, 71, 73 
 
 V. Goyette, 673, 676 
 
 V. Bednorz, 485 
 
 T. Grablin, 99, 410, 466a, 484 
 
 V.Bell, 110, 473, 476, 490 
 
 V. Gregory, 73, 199 
 
 V. Bert, 480 
 
 V. Gretzner, 463, 476, 485 
 
 V. Bills, 64 
 
 V. Gross, 233 
 
 V. Bixby, 100 
 
 V. Hague, 531 
 
 V. Blevins, 306 
 
 V. Hans, 434, 435 
 
 V. Blumenthal, 516 
 
 V. Harney, 71, 191 
 
 V. Boekoven, 705 
 
 V. Harris, 451a 
 
 V. Boggs, 13, 463 
 
 V. Harwood, 90, 103 
 
 V. Bolton, 521 
 
 V. Hatch, 475 
 
 v. Bradfield, 439 
 
 V. Hawk, 505 
 
 V. Brannegan, 451a 
 
 V. Hazzard. 61, 498 
 
 V. Bryant, 489 
 
 V. Hedges, 64, 4816 
 
 V. Burger, 680 
 
 V. Heinrich, 426 
 
 V. Byrum, 495, 530 
 
 V. Henderson, 437 
 
 V. Camp, 485c 
 
 V. Hinds, 478, 4816 
 
 V. Cam pbell, 4,34 
 
 V. Hines. 113, 1856,317, 761 
 
 V. Carpenter, 467 
 
 V, Hogarth, 100, 463, 483 
 
 V. Casey, 148 
 
 V. Hotz, 27 
 
 V. Cauffman, 100, 419, 427, 455, 
 
 V. Houston, 476, 483 
 
 483 
 
 V. Howard, 189, 323, 341 
 
 V. Caulfield, 457, 761 
 
 V. Hunerberg, 743 
 
 V. Chambers, 61, 180, 417a 
 
 V. Hoyfc, 238 
 
 V. Champion, 1856 
 
 V. Hunt, 673 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 113 
 
 V. Ingraham, 485c 
 
 V. Clampit, 58, 676 
 
 V Jackson, 194, 197, 304, 216 
 
 V. Clark, 53, 103 111, 181, 439 
 
 V Jacobs, 475 
 
 V. Clough, 473, 477 
 
 V. James, 431 
 
 V Coss, 479 
 
 V. Johnson, 198, 199, 484 
 
 V. Crisman, 27, 63, 478 
 
 V. Jones, 419, 439 
 
 V. Cross, o2-T 
 
 V. Keefe, 388 
 
 V. Dannel. 451 
 
 V. Kellam, 419, 463 
 
Ix 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 455 
 V. Kerr, 189, 195, 203 
 V. Kneirim, 194a, 317, 233a 
 V. Krueger, 465 
 V. Landauer, 509, 517, 520 
 V. Lane, 466, 4T6 
 V. Lee, 90, 93, 102, 461, 478 
 V. Legg, 428 
 V. Levy, 107 
 V. Lewis, 495, 499 
 Y. Logue, 73a, 481a 
 V. Lonergan, 197 
 V. Lowell, 521. 535 
 V. Luebeok, 477, 478 
 V. Lundstrom, 203a, 233, 3336 
 V. McAra, 500 
 V. McArthur, 461 
 V. McBride. 666 
 V. McCarthy, 413 
 V. McCuIlooh, 772 
 V. McDaniels, 113, 427, 468 
 V. McGraw, 209a 
 V. McLallen, 52 
 V. McLaughlin, 73, 241c, 484 
 V. Matthews. 199 
 V. May, 333, 333 
 V. Means, 530 
 V. Meech, 410 
 V. Metcalf, 417, 751 
 V. Miller, 88, 89 
 V. Moranda. 282. 235, 238, 762 
 V. Morris, 135, 137, 766 
 V. Morton, 425 
 V. Murphy, 180,341 
 V. Murray, 73 
 V. Nash, 451a 
 V. Nelson, 461, 478 
 V. Netolicky, 467, 4816, 485 
 V. O'Brien, 338 
 V. Olson, 480 
 
 B., etc. R. Co. V. Oleson, 54 
 etc. R. Co. V. Ostrander, 673, 
 
 675, 676 
 V. Parkinson, 89 
 T. Patchin. 57, 419 
 V. Payne, 766 
 V. Peacock 493 
 R. Co. V. Pelletier, 493, 513 
 etc. R. Co. V. Pennell, 666, 676, 
 
 679 
 V. Perkins, 466, 467 
 V. Peterson, 1856 
 V. Pillsbury, 513 
 V. Pontius, 241c 
 V. Pratt, 195 
 V. Prescott, 91, 479 
 V. Prouty, 483 
 V. Quaintance. 673 
 V. Ransom, 122 
 V. Ravburn. 7 
 V. Reid, 425 
 
 V. Robinson, 463, 478, 485 
 V. Rolvink, 123 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Ross, 177, 
 178, 224, 233, 233a 
 
 V. Rung, 206 
 
 T. Russell, 199, 406 
 
 V. Ryan, 47, 87, 99, 460, 476 
 
 V. Sandeis, 464 
 
 V. Scates, 520 
 
 V. Seirer. 450 
 
 V. Shannon, 137, 238, 457, 775 
 
 V. Sharp, 471, 477 
 
 V. Simonson, 680 
 
 T. Sims, 451a 
 
 V. Smith, 64, 680, 750 
 
 V. Snyder. 237 
 
 V. Spilker, 67, 87, 106, 460, 485 
 
 V. Spring, 473 
 
 V. Stafford, 180. 
 
 V. Stahlev, 241c 
 
 V. Starmer, 467, 478, 758 
 
 V. State, 349 
 
 V. Still. 403. 481,485 
 
 V. Stumps, 73, 465, 484, 485 
 
 V. Sullivan, 191, 192 
 
 V. Swett, 191, 194, 238, 769, 775 
 
 V. Sykes, 56, 91, 473 
 
 V. Taylor, 193, 197, 302, 238 
 
 V. Tilton, 478 
 
 V. Triplett, 65, 88, 468, 488 
 
 V. Trotter, 11, 516 
 
 V. Utley, 419, 421, 424 
 
 V. Walsh, 471 
 
 V. Warner, 410, 761 
 
 V. West, 64, 151 
 
 V. Whipple. 413 
 
 V. White, 408 
 
 V. Whitton, 183 
 
 V. Wilcox, 73a, 78, 218 
 
 T. Willard, 498 
 
 V. Williams. 478, 666, 668, 675 
 
 V. Wilson, 477 
 
 T. Woodworth, 419 
 
 V. Wvmore. 54, 99, 100, 484 
 
 V. Young, 233a 
 
 v. Youngs, 497 
 Chick V. Newbury county, 338 
 Chickering v. Robinson, 303 
 Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 
 
 580 
 Chidsey v. Canton, 337, 388, 749a 
 Child V. Boston, 287 
 Childrey v. Huntington, 346 
 Childs V. Boston, 275 
 
 v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 463 
 
 V. West troy, 851 
 Chiles V. Drake, 686 
 Chilton V. Carbondale, 876 
 
 T. Union Pac. R. Co., 771 
 China v. Southwick, 16 
 Chipman v. Palmer, 123 
 Chisholm v. Atlantic Gas Co., 693 
 
 v. Northern Pac. R. Co.. 455 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 457 
 
 v. State, 111, 375, 398, 401 
 
Re/erenccs\ TABLE OF CASES. \fl-re to sections. 
 
 Ixi 
 
 Chittenden. Matter of, 561 
 Choate v. San Antonio, etc. R.Co. , 508 
 Chollette v. Omaha, etc. R. Co., 503 
 Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 577 
 Chope V. Eureka, 258, 289, 337 
 Chopin V. Badger Paper Co., 219 
 Chouteau v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 421 
 
 V. Rowse, 313 
 Chown V. Parrott, 569, 573 
 Christensen v. Union Tr. Line, 485 
 Christian v. Columbus, etc. R. Co., 
 150, 769 
 
 V, Illinois Central R. Co., 99, 
 4«4 
 
 V. Railway Co., 190 
 Christie v. Chicago, etc. p. Co., 410 
 
 V. Griggs, 491, 497, 516 
 Christy v. Douglas, 557 
 Christman v. Bruce, 310 
 Christner v. Cumberland, etc. Coal 
 
 Co., 13 
 Chrystal v. Troy, etc. R. Co., 13, 73a, 
 
 467 
 Church r. Cherry field, 57, 353, 363 
 
 V. Cliicago, etc. R. Co., 207, 493 
 
 V. Mumford, 562 
 
 of the Ascension v. Buckhart, 
 703 
 
 of Ascension v. Buckhart, 343, 
 702 
 Churchill v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. , 
 573 
 
 v. Fewkes, 333 
 
 V. Holt, 310, 65, 384 
 
 V. Rosebeck, 93 
 Cicero, etc. R. Co. v. Meixner, 102, 
 
 520 
 Cielfield v. Browning, 217 
 Cincinnati v. Penny, 274 
 
 V. Stone. 166. 175, 291, 298 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Barber, 203 
 
 V. Barker, 666. 680 
 
 V. Butler, 92, 107, 460, 482 
 
 V. Carper, 91. 148, 488, 520 
 
 T. Chester, 115, 766 
 
 V. Claire, 414 
 
 V. Clark. 233a 
 
 V. Conley, 190 
 
 V. Farra, 478 
 
 V. Gaines. 426 
 
 V. Grames, 114, 215, 478 
 
 V. Hoffhines, 440 
 
 V. Howard, 63, 87, 485 
 
 V. Kassen. 99 
 
 V. Lang, 186a 
 
 V. McMullen. 58, 133, 304, 233a 
 
 V. Madden. 186n 
 
 V. Margrat, 333a, 341c 
 
 V. Mealer, 197 
 
 V. Palmer, 338b 
 
 V. Parker, 436 
 
 V. Ridge, 437, 455 
 
 Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Sampson, 
 198, 198a 
 
 V. Smith, 53, 100, 430 
 
 V. Smock. 675, 680 
 
 V. Snell, 535 
 
 V. Stanley, 451a 
 
 V. Stoneoipher, 431 
 
 V. Street, 451a 
 
 V. Waterson, 64, 419, 437, 658 
 
 V. Whitcomb, 46, 485a, 485c 
 
 V. Wood, 451a 
 
 V. Wright, 73, 73a, 144, 476 
 Circleville v. Neuding, 176, 298 
 Ciriack v. Merchants' Woolen Co. , 218 
 Citizens' Bank v. Howell, 585, 598 
 
 Coach Co. V. Camden, etc. R. 
 Co., 485a 
 
 Gas Co. V. O'Brien, 693 
 
 Loan Asso'n v. Friedley, 559 
 
 etc. R, Co. V. Foxley, 54 
 
 R. Co. V. Hobbs. 741 
 
 V. Ketcham, 359 
 
 V. Lowe, 773 
 
 V. Spahr, 520 
 
 V. Willoeby, 493, 748, 749 
 
 St. R. Co. V. Steen, 485c, 746 
 
 V. Twiname, 495, 521, 764 
 City Nat. Bank v. Clinton Co. Nat. 
 Bank, 581, 587a 
 
 R. Co. V. Findley, 508 
 
 V. Jones, 99 
 
 Y. Lee. 523 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Moores, 144 
 Claflin V. Wilcox, 644 
 Clague V. New Orleans, 291 
 Clairain v. Western U. Tel. Co., 233 
 Clampit V. Chi(;ago, etc. R. Co., 464, 
 
 483. 485 
 Clancy v. Byrne, 120, 708 
 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 4S5c 
 Clanin v. Fagan, 636 
 Clapp V. Ellington, 380 
 
 V. Kemp, 160, 165 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 185a. 775 
 Clapper v. Waterford, 60a, 334, 374 
 Clara, The, 61 
 Clara Killam, The, 18 
 Clardy v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 425 
 Clare v. National City Bank, 159, 166 
 Clarendon Land Co. v. McClelland, 
 
 633 
 Clarey y. Wiley, 635 
 Clarissy v. Fire Department, 365, 395 
 Clarita. The, 18, 86, 160 
 Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tr. 
 
 Co.. 115 
 Clark V. Adair county, 256 
 
 V. Adams, 640 
 
 V. Barnes, 209a 
 
 y. Barrington, 378 
 
 y. Binghamton, etc. Bridge 
 Co., 383 
 
Ixii 
 
 R./.rcnces] TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Clark V. Boston, etc. E. Co., 451a, 
 
 467, 477 
 
 V. Chambers, 34, 65, 73, 74 
 
 V. Chicago, 363 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 371, 516 
 
 V. Chambers, 684 
 
 V. Corinth, 348, 363 
 
 V. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 533 
 
 V. Epworth, 389, 368 
 
 V. Foot, 669 
 
 V. Foxcroft, 623 
 
 V. Fry, 1 75, 389 
 
 V. Koehler, 146 
 
 V. Lebanon, 346 
 
 V. Lincoln county, 256 
 
 V. Liston, 195 
 
 V. Lockport, 289 
 
 V. Manchester, 705, 767a 
 
 Y. Marshall, 574 
 
 V. Merchants', etc. Trans. Co., 
 
 2416 
 V. Midland R. Co., 466 
 V. Miller, 813, 314 
 T. Missouri Pao. R. Co., 217, 
 
 468, 476 
 
 Y. Nevada Land, etc. Co., 743 
 
 T. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 207 
 
 V. Northern Pao. R. Co., 478 
 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 39 
 
 v. Richmond, etc. R. Co. 198 
 
 ■y. Rochester, 274 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 301, 341 
 
 V. Shoe, etc. Co., 85 
 
 V. Starin, 145 
 
 T. State, 352 
 
 V. Tremont, 373 
 
 V. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 168, 
 423 
 
 V. Waltham, 370 
 
 V. Washington, 291 
 
 V. Westcott, 761 
 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 430 
 
 V. Wilmington, 283 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co. 99 
 
 V. Waltham, 285 
 Clarke v. Anderson, 723 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 678 
 
 V. French, 784 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 64, 1.50 
 
 V. Pennsylvania Co., 89 
 
 V. Rhode Isl. El. Light Co., 705 
 
 V. Richmond, 375 
 
 V. Holmes, 311, 315 
 Clarkin v. Biwabik Bessemer Co., 
 
 689, 705 
 Clarksville, etc. Turnp. Co. v. Atkin- 
 son, 385 
 Clatsop Chief, The, 233 
 Clay V. Central R. Co., 137 
 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co.. 23 
 
 V. Wood, 654 
 
 Clayards v. Dethick, 86, 89, 93 
 
 V. Forrester, 86 
 Claybaugh v. Kansas City, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 185, 203 
 Clayburgh v. Chicago, 118 
 Clayton v. Brooks, 376 
 Clear Lake, etc. Co. v. Lake county, 
 
 261 
 Cleary v. Phila, etc. R. Co., 475 
 Cleaveland v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 429 
 
 v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 676 
 Clegg V. Dearden, 717 
 Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central R. Co,,230, 
 749 
 
 v. Taylor, 702 
 Clemence v. Auburn, 373, 37«, 353, 
 
 863 
 Clemmens v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 55, 666 
 Clement v. Canfleld, 444, 445, 457 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 549, 
 552, 555 
 Clements v. La. Electric Co., 18, 87, 
 
 111 
 Clendinen v. Black, 557 
 Cleveland v. Bangor, 850 
 
 V. Bangor St. R. Co., 408 
 
 v. Central R. Co., 56 
 
 V. King, 367. 
 
 V. N. J. Steamboat Co., 28, 367, 
 487, 488. 496, 511 
 
 V. Spier, 12 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Adair, 481, 481tt, 
 484 
 
 V. Ahrens, 431 
 
 V. Beckett, 493 
 
 V. Baddely, 467 
 
 T. Brown, 194, 195, 307a, 230, 
 425 
 
 V. Crawford, 65, 108, 114, 476, 
 477, 478 
 
 V. Corrigan, 73 
 
 T. Curran, 492, 505 
 
 V. De Bolt, 431 
 
 V. Doerr, 485 
 
 V. Elliott, 94, 99, 419. 483, 663 
 
 V. Keary, 208a, 233, 233& 
 
 V. Harrington, 13, 473 
 
 V. Keely, 461, 473, 479 
 
 V. Ketcham, 492 
 
 V. McConnell, 435 
 
 V. Mauson. 78 
 
 V. Mara. 60(x 
 
 V. Martin, 190, 194 
 
 V. Maxwell, 513a 
 
 V. Newell, 516 
 
 V. Rice, 427 
 
 V. Rowan. Ill, 770 
 
 V. Schneider, 91, 160 
 
 V. Scudder. 451a 
 
 V. Sloan, 60a, 194a, 217 
 
 V. Stephenson, 484 
 
References\ TABLE OF CASES. \fli-e to sections. 
 
 Ixiii 
 
 Cleveland v. Sutherland, 760 
 
 V. Swift, 4vi5 
 
 V. Tartt, 481a, 484 
 
 V. Terry, 47, 61, 87, 88, 93, 94, 
 457, 463, 481 
 
 V. "Walrath, 536 
 
 V. "Walter, 198 
 
 V. Wynant, 606, 436, 474 
 
 Provision Co. v. Liuimertnaier, 
 719 
 
 Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 
 319 
 Cleves V. Willoughbv, 708 
 Clifford V. Atlantic Cotton Mills, 708 
 
 V. Dam. 130. 3.i9, 365, 368, 375 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 180, 385, 
 341 
 
 V. Davis, 703 
 Clifton V. Hooper. 619 
 Cline V. Crescent City R. Co., 31, 889 
 Clinton v. Boston Beer Co. , 73a, 77 
 
 V. Cedar Rapids, etc. R. Co., 
 333 
 
 V. Howard, 365 
 Clodfelter v. State, 349 
 Clopp V. Mear, 719 
 Clothier v. Webster, 337 
 Clough v. Hoffman, 719 
 Cloughessey v. Waterbury, 363, 373 
 Clow V. Pittsburgh Traction Co., 516 
 Clulow V. McClelland, 380 
 Clune V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 674 
 Cluney v. Cornell Mills, 307 
 Clussman v. Long Island R. Co., 704 
 
 V. Merkel, 573 
 Clyde V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 195 
 Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Davis, 189, 195, 
 
 335 338 330 
 Coal Co. V. Estievenard, 307, 309a 
 
 V. Jones, 309a 
 Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones, 717 
 Coale V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 58, 
 
 675 
 Coan V. Marlborough, 287 
 Coates V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 110 
 
 V. Canaan. 376 
 
 V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 666, 
 676, 079 
 Cobb V. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 154 
 
 V. Gt. Western R. Co., 513 
 
 V. Kansas Citv, etc. R. Co., 433 
 
 V. Portland, 391 
 
 V. Standish, 86, 3M, 356, 379 
 Cobden v. Kendrick, 576 
 Coburn v. Muskegon B. Co., 737 
 Cochran v. Dinsmore, 57 
 
 V. Miller, 748 
 Cochrane v. Frostburg, 363 
 
 V. Little, 558 
 
 V. Maiden, 391 
 Cockerham v. Nixon, 631. 633 
 Cockle V. South Eastern R. Co., 531 
 Cockrum v. Williamson, 340 
 
 Coddington v. Brooklyn, etc, R. Co., 
 51, 495 
 
 V, Davis, 585 
 Codner v. Bradford, 334 
 Cody V. N. Y. &New England R. Co., 
 
 519 
 Coe V. Piatt, 685 
 
 v. Wise, 386 
 Coffee V. N. Y. , New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 831, 341& 
 Coffield V. Harris, 661 
 Coffin V. Palmer, 373, 377 
 Cofield V. McCabe, 150 
 Coggin V. Central R. Co.. 160 
 Coggswell V. Baldwin, 638 
 
 V. West St. R. Co., 499, 503, 533 
 Coglan V. Third Ave. R. Co., 83 
 
 V, Dinsmore, 581 
 Cogswell V. Lexington, 351, 356 
 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. 
 R. Co.. 750 
 
 V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 88,480 
 Cohen v. Dry Dock. etc. R. Co., 150 
 
 V. Hume, 3H3 
 
 V. New York, 263, 358 
 Cohens v. Virginia 349 
 Cohn V. Kansas City. 376 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 466 
 Cohoes V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 333 
 Coit V. Sheldon, 563 
 Coke Co. V. Roby, 330 
 Colburn v. Richards, 729 
 Colby V. Wiscasset, 758 
 Colchester v. Brook, 100 
 Colden v. Thurber, 834 
 Cole V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 186a 
 
 V. Fisher, 355, 686 
 
 V. Goodwin, 210. .550 
 
 V. Medina. 262, 289 
 
 V. Muscatine, 283 
 
 V. Nashville, 863, 263 
 
 V. Newburyport, 355 
 Colegrove v. Harlem R. Co., 133 
 
 V. New Haven R. Co., 31, 98, 
 96 
 Colelli V. N. J. Concentrating 
 
 Works, 702 
 Coleman v. Chester, 289 
 
 V. Flint, etc R. Co., 485 
 
 v. Kansas City. etc. R. Co.. 415 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., .533, 
 524 
 
 V. Southeastern R. Co , 519 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 194a, 233a 
 Coles V. Burns, 634 
 
 V. Clark, 119 
 Colewell V. Manhattan R. Co.. 519 
 Coif V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 201, 216 
 Colfax Coal Co. v. Johnson, 194a 
 Colgrove v. Smith, 176, 35(1 
 CoUett V. London, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
XIV 
 
 Re/erctices} TABLE OF CASES. {are to sections. 
 
 Collett V. Northwestern R. Co., 45 
 Colley V. Westbrook, 367, 360 
 Collier v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 413 
 V. Georgia R. Co. , 414 
 V. Steiiihardt, 204, 241 
 Collins V. Alabama, etc. R. Co. , 150 
 V. Bristol, etc. R. Co., 544 
 V. Chatiers Valley Gas Co., 734 
 V. Council Bluffs, 363, 742 
 T. Crimmins, 195 
 V. Davidson, 89 
 V. Dodge, 375, 758 
 Y. Dorchester, 60b, 356 
 V. Leafey, 356, 363 
 V. McDaniel, 591 
 V. Middle Level Com., 34 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 673, 
 
 675, 676, 679, 765 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 704 
 V. Philadelphia, 274, 287 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 235, 341 
 V. So. Boston R. Co., 77 
 V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 50C 
 V. Waltliam, 274 
 Collis V. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 481a 
 Collyerv. Penn. R. Co., 180, 195,204 
 Colman v. Anderson, 303 
 Colomau v. Georgia R. Co., 492a 
 Colorado Coal Co. v. Carpita, 307 
 
 Coal, etc. Co. v. Lamb, 230, 772 
 Electric Co. v. Lubbers, 186a 
 Land Co. v. Hartman, 751 
 Mortg. Co. V. Rees, 31,605, 719a 
 etc. R. Co. V. Holmes, 61 
 V. Naylon, 233, 233a 
 R. Co. V. Ogden, 184, 186 
 Central R. Co. v. Martin, 241 
 Midland R. Co. v. O'Brien, 212, 
 233 
 Colrick V. Swinburne, 729, 733, 750 
 Colt V. Noble, 581 
 
 V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 508 
 Colton V. Beardsley, 313 
 
 V, Onderdonk, 689a 
 Columbia, The, 133 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Farrington, 672 
 Columbus V. Jacques, 334a 
 V. Ogletree, o67, 368 
 V. Sims, 356, 760 
 V. Strassner, 367, 376, 759 
 etc. R Co. V. Arnold, 233 
 V. Bradford, 113, 114, 313 
 V. Bridges, 307, 769 
 V. Erick. 194a, 341c 
 V. Farrell, 506, 509 
 V. Powell. 146, 488 
 V. Webb, 184, 304, 323, 241 
 Colvin V. Holbrook, 343 
 V. Peabodv, 688 
 V. Siitherland, 703. 
 Combs V. Purrington, 654 
 Comer v. Coiisol. Mining Co., 332 
 
 Comerford v. Dupuy, 656 
 
 Comes V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 678 
 
 Comings v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 433 
 Commercial Bank v. Barksdale, 585, 
 597 
 
 V. Rowland, 580a 
 
 V. Union Bank, 248, 580, 583, 
 f)84, 586 
 
 V. Varnum, 585, 597 
 Comm'l U. Tel Co. v. N. E. Tele- 
 
 IDhone Co., 536 
 Comminge v. Stevenson, 122, 689 
 Commissioners v. Duckett, 340 
 
 V. Martin, 337 
 
 etc. V. Rose, 573 
 Common^vealth v. Bartlett, 633 
 
 V. Boston, 358 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 107, 128, 
 135, 466, 525 
 
 V. Bowman, 333 
 
 V. Bridge Co.. 395 
 
 V. Central Bridge Co., 356 
 
 V. Charlestown, 334, 395 
 
 V. Deertield, 333, 374, 393 
 
 V. Erie, etc. R. Co., 332, 859 
 
 V. Fisk, 883 
 
 V. Forrest, 658 
 , V. Green, 256 
 
 V. Hopkinsville, 333, 337 
 
 V. Josselyn, 104 
 
 V. Knox, 104 
 
 V. Lightfoot, 620 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Low, 334 
 
 V. McCoy. 638 
 
 V. Magee, 633 
 
 V. Matlack, 349 
 
 V. Milliman, 383 
 
 V. Nashua, etc. R. Co., 883, 359 
 
 V. New Bedford Bridge Co., 
 896 
 
 V. Newbury, 334 
 
 V. Newburvport, 833 
 
 V. Old Colony, etc. R. Co., 333 
 
 V. Passmore, 363 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 415 
 
 V. Petersham, 334 
 
 V. Rodes, 349 
 
 V. Sampson. 104 
 
 V. Springfield, 258 
 
 V. Thompson, 609 
 
 V. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 333, 
 359, 493 
 
 V. Wilkinson, 885 
 
 V. Worchester Tump. Co. 389 
 
 Bank v. New York, 391 
 Comstock V. Des Moines R. Co., 434, 
 
 486 
 Conant v. Griffin, 763, 766 
 Conaty V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 477, 485a 
 Condict V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 33, 40 
 
Re/erences] 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. V^re to sections. 
 
 Ixv 
 
 Condict V. Jersey City, 2o8, 3S9, 295 
 Condiff V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 85 
 Condon v. Mo. Paoilic R. Co., 205 
 
 V. Sprigg, 709a 
 Condran v. Ctiicago, etc. R. Co., 489 
 Cone V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 26, 188 
 Cones V. Benton county, 2")6, 357 
 
 V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 4816 
 Confer v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 674 
 Congdon v. Central, etc. R. Co., 418 
 V. Cooper, 618 
 V. Norwich, 363, 376 
 Conger v. St. Paul. etc. R. Co., 513 
 Congrave v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 
 
 241a 
 Congi-ess Spring Co. v. Edgar, 638, 629 
 Congreve v. Morgan, 175, 365, 367 
 
 V. Smith, 14, 120, 175, 365, 367, 
 703 
 Conhooton Road v. Buffalo, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 709a 
 Conklin v. School District, 256 
 
 V. Thompson, 121, 262, 355, 688 
 Conlan v. N. Y. Central R. Co.. 233 
 Conley v. Cincinnati, etc. K. Co., 458 
 
 V. Portland, 333 
 Conlon V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 207a 
 
 V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 194 
 Conn V. May, 671 
 Conneaut v. Naef, 376 
 Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. New 
 
 Haven R. Co., 28, 115, 124 
 Connell v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co.. 
 512 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Connelly v. Hamilton Woolen Co., 
 316 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 211 
 V. New England R. Co., 525 
 T. N. Y. Central R. Co., 93, 113, 
 475 
 Conners v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 
 99, 139 
 V. Hennessey, 173 
 Connerton v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 
 Co., 4816 
 Connolley v. Davidson, 237 
 Connolly v. Boston, 104 
 
 V. Crescent City R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Eldredge, 185 
 
 V. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 54, 
 
 73a, 104, 654 
 V. Trenton R. Co., 475 
 V. Waltham, 54, 233 
 Connor V. Citizens' R. Co., 114 
 
 V. Electric Traction Co., 13 CI, 
 
 467 
 V. State, 750 
 Connor.s 7. Adams, 314 
 V. Morton, 192, 216 
 V. New York, 263. 296 
 Conover v. Commonwealth, 621 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — e,] 
 
 Conrad v. Gray, 192 
 
 V. Ithaca, 28, 289, 291, 328, 356 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 544, 
 554 
 Conradt v. Clauvo, 704 
 Conroy v. Gale, 313, 325 
 
 T. Iron Works, 91 
 
 V. Vulcan Iron Works, 215 
 Consol. Coal Co. v. Bruce, 1856 
 
 V. Clay, 209a, 235 
 
 V. Haenni, 188a 
 
 V. Wombacher, 113, 333 
 
 Gas Co. V. Crocker, 99, 693, 696 
 
 Ice Machine Co. v. Keifer, 133 
 
 Mining Co. v. Clay, 195, 331 
 
 Tr. Co. V. Hone, 770 
 
 V. Reeves, 054 
 
 Traction Co. v. Scott, 73a, 90, 
 485c 
 Consumers' Gas Co. v. Perrego, 693 
 Content v. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185 
 Continental, The, 61 
 Continental, etc. Co. v. Stead, 92, 
 46H, 476 
 
 Nat. Bank v. Nat. Bank Com- 
 monwealth, 555 
 Cen verse v. Walker, 97, 705 
 Conway v. Furst, 168, 173, 207 
 
 V. Grant, 639 
 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 195 
 
 V. Jefferson, 370 
 
 V. Jett, 623 
 
 V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 508 
 Conyers v. Postal Tel. Co., 531, 589 
 Cook V. Anderson, 665 
 
 V. Atlanta, 374, 376 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 484 
 
 V. Champlain Transp. Co., 53, 
 CI, 85, 080 
 
 V. Charlestoivn, 355 
 
 V. Gourdin, 39 
 
 V. Harris, 334 
 
 V. Macon, 291 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 112 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 258, 287, 353, 363 
 
 V. Montague, 355, 713 
 
 T. Morea, 635 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 56 
 
 V. Parham, 180 
 
 V. Pickrel, 639 
 
 V. Rhodes, 577 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 204, 314, 
 230 
 
 V. Wilmington Electric Co., 
 359 
 Cooke V. Baltimore, etc, R. Co. , 485a 
 
 V. Bait. Tr. Co. 4856, 485c 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 359 
 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 154 
 
 T. Waring. 626, 633, 633 
 Coolbroth V. Maine Central R. Co., 
 185 
 
Ixvi 
 
 References'] TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Coolej' V, Brainerd, 423 
 
 V. Freeliolders, etc. 356 
 Coolidge V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 675 
 Coombs V. New Bedfoi-d Card Co., 
 46, 74 
 v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 
 
 203, 218, 219 
 
 V. Purrington, 353, 375 
 
 V. Tophaui, 378 
 Coomes v. Houghton, 148 
 Coon V. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 180, 
 
 241 
 Coontz V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 194a 
 Cooney v. Great Northern R. Co., 207 
 Coonley v. Albany, 20J 
 Cooper, Matter of, 303 
 
 T. Butler, 217 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 189, 203 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 60a 
 
 V. Delavan, 557 
 
 V. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 489. 
 
 v. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co., 471, 
 477, 766, 772 
 
 V. McJunkin, 323 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 180 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 194a, 
 
 204, 205, 2.i3 
 
 V. St. PaulR. Co., 530 
 
 V. Waterloo, 343 
 Coops V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 137, 
 
 207 
 Coots V. Detroit, 185a, 265, 370 
 Coopwood V. Baldwin, 561 
 Cope V. Hampton Co., 54, 56 
 Copeland v. Draper, 637 
 Coplev V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 107 
 Coppins V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 188, 
 
 191, 193 
 Corbalis v. Newberry, 393 
 Corbett v. Troy, 363 
 Corbin v. American Mills, 160, 165 
 Corby V. Hill, 705 
 
 Corcoran v. Delaware, etc. E. Co., 
 203, 341 
 
 V. Gas Co., 315 
 
 V. Holbrook, 194, 197, 336, 330 
 
 V. Peekskill, 60c 
 Cordell v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 113, 
 
 114, 468, 478 
 Core V. Ohio River E. Co., 191, 193 
 Cork V. Blossom, 702 
 Corlett V. Lavenworth, 89, 376, 379 
 Corlin v. West End E. Co., 520 
 Corliss V. Smith, 681 
 
 V. Worcester, etc. E. Co., 767a 
 Cornelius v. Appleton, 376 
 Cornell v. Detroit E. Co., 474, 485a 
 
 V. Skaneajeles E. Co., 417a 
 Corning v. Southland, 618, 633 
 
 V. Troy Iron Works. 729 
 
 Cornish v. Farm Building Ins. Co., 54 
 
 Cornman v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 
 
 407, 410, 496, 506, 713 
 
 Cornwall v. Sullivan E. Co., 418 
 
 V. Charlotte, etc. E. Co., 108 
 Corona V. Galveston, etc. E Co. ,3a3& 
 Correll v. Burlington, etc. E. Co., 5S 
 
 V. Eailroad Co., 92 
 Corrigan v. Union Sugar Eeflnery, 
 
 150 
 Corry v. Great Western E. Co., 419 
 Corsi V. Maretzek, 609 
 Corson v. Maine Cent. E. Co., 19J 
 Cortland Co. v. Herkimer Co. , 6Ua 
 Corts v. Dist. of Columbia, 363, 376 
 Corwin v. N. Y. & Erie E. Co., 63, 
 431, 437, 440, 445, 449, 451a, 
 453 
 Cosby V. Commonwealth, 303 
 Cosgrove v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 426, 
 469, 474, 475 
 
 V. Ogden, 74, 82, 146 
 
 V. Pitman, 193 
 Cosner v. Center ville, 376 
 Coster V. Albany, 349 
 Costikyan v. Rome, etc. R. Co., 523 
 Cosulich V. Standard Oil Co., 16, 55, 
 
 57, 665, 666, 683 
 Cotchett V. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 
 
 533 
 Cothran v. W. U. Tel. Co., 744, 753a 
 Cott V. Lewiston R. Co., 415 
 Cotter V. Lindgren, 163, 398 
 Cotterell v. Jones, 563 
 Cotterill v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 85 
 Cotton V. N. Y. , Lake Erie, etc. E. 
 Co., 417a 
 
 V. Wood, 8, 56, 645, 654 
 Cottrell V. Finlayson, 561 
 
 V. Marshall Infirmary, 11 
 Couch V. Charlotte, etc. E. Co., 233, 
 333a 
 
 V. Steel, 9 
 
 V. Watson Coal Co., 60c 
 Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 141 
 
 V. Williamette St. E. Co., 474 
 Coullard v. Tecumseh Mills. 319a 
 Coulter V. American Exp. Co., 89 
 
 V. Great Northern E. Co., 467 
 
 V. Pine, 380, 765 
 Counsell v. Hall, 315 
 Counter v. Couch, 104. 644 
 Countryman v. East Tennessee, etc. 
 
 E. Co., 61 
 Coupe Co. V. Maddick, 148 
 Coupland v. Hardingham, 120, 343 
 Courson v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 453 
 Court V. Coroner, 256 
 Courtney v. Baker, 146 
 
 V. Cornell, 204 
 Courvoisier v. Eaymond, 763 
 Cousins V. Hannibal, etc. E. Co., 147, 
 421, 435 
 
 V. Paddon, 559 
 Couts V. Neer. 703 
 Covert V. Valentine, 733 
 
Re/erencesi TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 Ixvii 
 
 Covington v. Bryant, 61, 356 
 
 V. United States, etc. R. Co., 
 
 132, 384a, 406 
 V. Western, etc. H. Co., 520 
 Co., V. Kinnev, 356 
 R. Co. V. Packer, 763 
 Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 66 
 Cowan V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 188, 
 194a 
 V. Union Pac. R Co., 419 
 Cowden v. Wright, ll.'i 
 Cowen Lumber Co. v. Western U. 
 Tel. Co.. 553 
 V. Sunderland, 709 
 Cowhill V. Roberts, 190 
 Cowles V. Balzer, 657, 663, 664 
 V. Kidder. 731, 733 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 197, 
 Qoo 2S3 
 Cowley V. Colwell, 673 
 
 V. Sunderland, 385, 683 
 Cowperthwaite, v. Sheffield, 585 
 Cox V. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 434 
 
 V. Burbridge, 637, 638, 629, 634 
 V. Livingston, 568 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 434 
 V. Sullivan, 559 
 V. Westchester Turnpike Co., 
 57, 375 
 Coxe V. Robbins. 655. 664 
 Coxon V. Gt. Western R. Co., 343, 
 
 503 
 Coy V. Utica, etc. R. Co., 457 
 Coyle V. Chicago, etc. K. Co., 633 
 V. Conway, 633 
 V. Long Island R. Co. , 466 
 V. Pierrepont, 163 
 Coyne v. Union Pac. R. Co., 213, 333 
 Cracker t. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 513 
 Craddock v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. 
 
 475 
 Craft V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 307a, 
 484 
 V. Parker, 117 
 Crafter v. Metropolitan R. Co., 56, 503 
 Craf ton v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co. , 433 
 Crafts v. Boston, 113 
 Craig V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 193 
 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co.. 476 
 V, Sedalia, 3S0, 3J4 
 V. Watson, aT-'i 
 Craighead v. Brooklyn R. Co., 496 
 Cragie v. Hadley. 589 
 Crain v. Petrie, 633 
 Craker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 154, 
 
 749 
 Cram v. Met. R. Co., 73, 530 
 Cramer v. Burlington, 60c, 93, 114 
 
 V Oppenstein. 633 
 Crandall v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 
 3.1, 57, 666 
 V. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 476 
 
 Crandall v. Loomis, 713 
 
 V. Mcllrath, 193 
 Crandell v. Eldridge, 664 
 Crane v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 307 
 
 Elevator Co. v. Lippert, 114, 
 
 743 
 V. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 478 
 V. Northfield, 53 
 V. Warner, 634 
 Cranston v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 470 
 Cratty v. Bangor, 104 
 Craven v. Smith, 180, 188, 313, 314 
 Crawford v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 478 
 V. Georgia R. Co. , 51 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 435, 
 
 451a 
 V. West Side Bank, 588 
 V. William. 634 
 Crawfordsville v. Bond, 274, 368 
 
 V. Smith, ooS 
 Crawley v. Georgia R. Co. , 429 
 Crawson v. W. U. Tel. Co.. 756 
 Creamer v. West End R. Co., 485c, 
 
 490 
 Crebarry v. National Transit Co., 307 
 Creed v. Hartraann, 14, 175, 375 
 V. Kendall. 73 
 
 V. Pennsylvania, etc. R. Co., 
 61, 99, 488, 523 
 Cregan v. Marston, 194a, 195 
 Cregin v. Brooklyn, etc. K. Co., 764, 
 
 708, 713 ■ 
 Creighton v. Kaweah Canal Co., 739 
 Cremer v. Portland, 86 
 Crenshaw v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 434 
 V. Ullman, 166, 175 
 Cressey v. Northern, etc. R. Co., 418, 
 
 431, 451a 
 Crest V. Erie R. Co., 675 
 Crew V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co.. 57 
 Crilly V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 209a 
 Crine v. East Tenn., etc. R. Co., 513a 
 Crispin v. Babbitt, 177, 180, 203, 331, 
 
 338 
 Crissey V. Hestonville. etc. R. Co., .508 
 Criswell v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 
 303a, 3i3 
 Crittenden v. Wilson, 731 
 Crocheron v. North Shore, etc. Ferry 
 
 Co., 496 
 Crocker v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 
 646 
 V. McGregor. 605 
 Croft V. Alison, 146, 151, 153 
 (Jrofts V. Waterhouse, 494 
 Crogan v. Schiele, 70o 
 Cromarty v. Boston, 353 
 Crommelin v. Coxe. f-9 
 Crompton v. Lea, 717 
 Cronin v. Delavan, 86, 333 
 
Ixviii 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 Cronk v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 47, 67i 
 Cronkite v. Wells, 546 
 Crocker v. Bragg, 733 
 
 V. Hutchinson, 56P, 570, 573, 
 753 
 Crookshank v. Kellogg, 56 
 Crooni V, Chicago, etc. R. Co., 510 
 Crosby v. Hungerford, 619 
 Cross V. California St. Cable R. Co., 
 48Sc 
 
 V. Elmira, 378 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 761a 
 
 V. Kent, 131 
 
 V. Koster, 343, 702 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 531 
 
 V. Kansas Citv, etc. R. Co., 
 488 
 
 V. Kistler, 588 
 
 V. Williams, 623 ■ 
 Crossley v. Lightowler, 739, 734 
 Crouch V. Charleston, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 
 396 
 Grouse v. First Nat. Bank, 581, 587a 
 Crow V. Mechanics', etc. Bank, 587 
 Crowell V, Sonoma county, 356 
 Crowhurst v. Amersham Board, 17 
 Crowley v. Appleton, 319a 
 
 V. Cutting, 1856, 2416 
 
 V. Pacific Mills, 219a 
 
 V. Panama R. Co., 134, 131 
 Crown V. Orr, 184, 185, 316, 318 
 Crowther v. Yonkers, 356, 375, 377 
 Crozier v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 535 
 
 V. Read, 634 
 Cruden v. Pentham, 649, 654 
 Cruni V. Conover, 35 
 Crumplev v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 108, 129, 468 
 Crusselle v. Pugh, 144, 709 
 Crutchfield v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 197, 208 
 Crystal v. Des Moines, 352 
 
 Ice Co. V. Sherlock, 303a, 333 
 Cuddeback v. Jewett, 408 
 Cuddy V, Horn, 66, 133 
 Cufe V. Newark, etc. R. Co,, 26, 167, 
 
 173, 699 
 Culbertson V. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 
 477, 652 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 473 
 Cullen T. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 476, 483 
 
 V. Lord, 637 
 
 V. National Roofing Co., 2076 
 
 V. Norton, 303a, 331 
 Cullman v. McMinn, 379 
 Culp V. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 436 
 Culver V. Streator, 391 
 Cumberland v. WUlison, 274, 391 
 
 etc. Iron Co. v. Scally, 54, 56 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Fazenbaker, 65 
 
 V, State, — 
 
 Valley R. Co. v. Hughes, 23,406 
 
 Cuming v. Brooklyn R. Co., 759, 763 
 Cumisky v. Konosha, 375, 376. 
 Cumming -v. Brooklyn R. Co., 79, 
 
 417, 468, 468 
 Cummings v. Bannon, 574 
 
 V. Center Harbor, 379 
 
 V. National Furnace Co. 59, 93 
 
 T. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 128 
 
 V. Riley, 635 
 
 V. Worcester, etc. R. Co., 523 
 Cummins v. Presley, 99 
 
 V. Seymour, 263, 373 
 
 V. Syracuse, 61, 377 
 Cunard S. S. Co. v. Carey, 225 
 Cunningham v. Bucklin, 310 
 
 V. Denver, 367 
 
 V. International R. Co., 164, 
 173, 699 
 
 V. Lyness. 64, 102, 113 
 
 V. Macon, etc. R. Co., 249 
 
 V. Merrimac Paper Co., 307 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 717 
 Curl V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 493 
 Curley v. Harris, 191, 335 
 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 133, 
 466 , 
 
 Curran v. Arkansas, 349 
 
 V. Boston, 360 
 
 V. Merchants' Mfg. Co., 318 
 
 V. Warren Chem., etc. Co., 57 
 
 V. Weiss, 723 
 Currier v, Boston Music Hall, 704 
 
 V. Lowell, 358 
 
 V. Ogdensburg, etc. R. Co., 359 
 Curry v. Buffalo, 254 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 63, 421, 
 436 
 
 V. Mannington. 389 
 Curtain, v. Somerset, 703 
 Curtin v. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Curtis V. Avon, etc. R. Co., 110 
 
 V. Dineen, 160 
 
 V. Kiley, 176 
 
 V. Leavitt, 579 
 
 V. Mills, 639 
 Curtiss V. Ayrault 733 
 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 53, 
 499, 516, 758 
 Gushing v. Adams, 359, 361 
 
 V. Bedford, 291 
 
 V. Boston, 367 
 
 V. The Fraser, 61 
 Cusick V. Adams, 8, 705 
 
 V. Norwich, 369 
 Gutting V. Marlor, 589 
 Cuylerv. Rochester, 299 
 
 Dabney v. State Bank, 251 
 DaceyV. Old Colony R. Co., 54 
 Daggett V. Cohoes, 274, 287 
 Dahl V. Milwaukee R. Co., 54 
 Dahlstrom V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 13, 473, 479, 484 
 
Re/erencesi TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 Ixix 
 
 Daigle V. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 185 
 Dailey v. Dismal Swamp Canal Co., 
 
 743 
 Daily v. Eichmond, etc. B. Co., 483 
 
 V. Worcester, 356 
 Dalay v. Savage, 709a 
 Dale V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 60e, 
 516 
 
 V. Humfrey, 179 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 310, 
 214, 315 
 
 V. Syracuse, 358, 375 
 
 V. Webster countv, 350, 376 
 Daley v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 138, 194a 
 
 V. Norwich, etc. R. Co., 71, 78, 
 87, 93, 97 
 
 V. Quick, 709 
 
 V. Schaaf, 186, 187 
 Dallas V. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 341 
 
 V. Scliultz, 387 
 
 etc. E. Co. V. Spicker, 108 
 Dairy mplev. Meade, 333 
 Dalton V. Denton, 735 
 
 V. Favour, 686 
 
 V. Eeceivers of Atlantic, etc. 
 R. Co., 163 
 
 V. Salem. 873 
 
 V. Southeastern R. Co., 137, 
 769, 770 
 Daly V. Butchers & Drover's Bank, 
 583, 583 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 676 
 
 V. Dfitroit C. R. Co., 473 
 
 V. Hinz, 74 
 
 V. New Jersey Steel Co., 137 
 
 V. Sang, 191, 193 
 Dalyell v. Tyrer, 160, 163 
 Dampman v. Penna. R. Co., 516 
 Damon v. Boston, 356 
 
 V. Scituate, 104, 379, 654 
 Damont v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 
 89 
 Damour v. Lyons, 93, 374 
 Dana v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 303, 
 
 305 
 Danaher v. Brooklyn, 355, 266 
 Danbury, etc. R. Co. v. Norwalk, 399 
 Danenhoffer v. State, 333 
 Daniel v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 333a, 341 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 8, 25, 
 57, 93, 417, 494, 500 
 
 V. PetersburgR. Co., 154 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 754 
 Daniels v. Athens, 392, 393 
 
 V. Ballentine. 40 
 
 V. Clegg, 86, 379, 644, 649 
 
 V. Denver, 289 
 
 V. Hart, 459 
 
 V. Lebanon, 377 
 
 V. N. Y. & New England R. 
 Co., 73 , 
 
 V. Potter, 120 
 
 Daniels v. Savannah, etc. E. Co., 137 
 V. Staten Island, etc. R. Co., 
 
 13, 60c, 476 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 194a 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 510 
 Danner v. So. Carolina R. Co., 108, 
 
 419, 433 
 Danolds v. State, 251 
 Dantzler v. De Bardeleben Coal Co., 
 
 34b 
 Danville v. Makemson, 356 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Brown, 410 
 etc. Turnp. Co. v. Stewart, 66, 
 375, 377, 386 
 Dargan v. Mobile, 291 
 Darling v. Bangor, 374 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 430 
 
 V. N. Y., Providence, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 301 
 V. Thompson, 732 
 V. Westmorland, 369 
 Darlington v. New York, 254, 261, 
 
 285, 363 
 Darmstetter v. Moynahan, 176 
 Darracott v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185, 3076 
 Darrigan v. N. Y. & New England 
 R. Co., 205, 333, 333a 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 180 
 Darrington v. State Bank, 250 
 Dartmouth Spinning Co. v. Achord, 
 
 185 
 Dartnell v. Howard, 575 
 Dascomb v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 469 
 Dashner v. Mills county. 256 
 Daub v. Northern Pac.'R. Co., 233 
 Daube v. Tennison, 78 
 Daugherty v. Herzog, 702 
 Daughtery v. Am. U. Tel. Co., 7.54, 
 
 755 
 Dauntley v. Hyde, 569 
 Dave V. Morgan's La. R. Co.. 493 
 Davenport v. Brooklyn R. Co., 531 
 v. Ruckman. 88, 130, 381, 36.'), 
 375, 481, 709a, 712 
 Daves v. Southern Pac. Co., 232, 345 
 Davey v. Chamberlain, 133 
 y. Jones, 585 
 
 V. London, etc. R. Co., 477 
 V. Southwestern R. Co., 477 
 Davi V. The Victoria, 325 
 David V. Southwestern R. Co., 771 
 Davidson v. Cornell. 214 
 V. Davidson, 57 
 V. MonklandR. Co., 61 
 V. Nichols, 690 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 484, 
 
 485 
 V. Portland, 104 
 y. Southern Pac. Co., 758 
 Davies v. England, 219a 
 V. Huebner, 336 
 
Ixx 
 
 Rc/erencei\ TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 Davies v. Mann, 99, 646, 651 
 
 V. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 
 
 207 
 Davis, The, 249 
 
 V. Augusta Factory, 218 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. K. Co., 185 
 
 V. Bangor, 350 
 
 V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 434 
 
 V. Button, 194 
 
 V. California St. R. Co., 376 
 
 V. Campbell, 640 
 
 V. Central Congregational Soc, 
 
 706 
 V. Central R. Co., 194a, 230, 
 
 233 
 V. Charlton, 355 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 26, 28, 
 
 97, 407, 464, 495, 499, 505, 516, 
 
 521 
 V. Clinton Water Works Co., 
 
 118, 26-) 
 V. Corry, 369 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 180, 192, 
 
 221 
 V. Dudley, 370, 378 
 V. Evans"! '''Ola 
 V. Fuller, 729 
 T. Garrett, 40 
 V. Getchell, 730 
 V. Graham, 215 
 V. Guarnieri, 690 
 T. Guilford, 378 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 V. Hill, 356 
 V. Jackson, 334 
 V. Jerkins, 396 
 V. Kansas City R. Co., 478 
 V. Kingston, 363 
 V. Knoxville, 260 
 V. Lamoile Turnp. Co., 258 
 V. Lamoile Plank-road, 336, 386, 
 
 387 
 V. Leominster, 358 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 524 
 V. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 365 
 V. Montgomery, 262 
 V. New England R. Co.. 132, 
 
 133 
 V. New York, 332 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 93, 476, 
 
 477 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 185&. 20ta, 2416 
 V. N. Y. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 
 223 
 V. Nuttallsburg Coal Co., 2076 
 V. Omaha, 358 
 V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 94 
 V. Somerville, 104 
 V. Vermont Central R. Co. , 39, 
 
 204 
 V. Wabash R Co., 429 
 V. Walker, 633 
 
 Davis V. Winslow, 730 
 Da we V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Dawkins v. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 148 
 Dawson v. Lawley, 563 
 
 V. Manchester, etc. R. Co., 497 
 
 V. Merchants' Bank, 619 
 
 v. Midland R. Co., 418, 449 
 
 V. Sloane, 719a 
 Dax V. Ward. 569 
 Day V. Akeley Lumber Co., 60c, 672 
 
 V. Brooklyn R. Co.. 150 
 
 V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 207 
 
 V. Day, 340, 345, 394 
 
 V. Highland St. R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Milford, 350 
 
 V. Mt. Pleasant, 356 
 
 V. New Orleans R. Co., 419 
 
 V. Reynolds, 117, 592 
 Dayharsh v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 280, 233 
 Dayton v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R, 
 Co., 449 
 
 V. Pease. 274, 278, 281, 289, 291 
 
 V. Robert, 729 
 
 V. Rutherford, 733 
 Dealey v. Muller, 73a 
 Dean v. Biaithwaite, 644 
 
 V. Brock, 243 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 675 
 
 V. Gridley, 313 
 
 V. New Milford, 257 
 
 V. Omaha, etc. R. Co., 449 
 
 V. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 
 154 
 
 V. Sullivan R. Co., 466a 
 Deane v. Clayton, 97, 640 
 
 V. Roaring Fork Light Co. . 222 
 Deans v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 
 
 484 
 Dearborn v. Dearborn, 566, 570, 572, 
 753 
 
 v. Union Nat. Bank, 588 
 De Baker v. Southern Cal. R. Co., 
 
 273 
 Dibbins v. Old Colony R. Co., 475 
 Debevoise v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 131, 132 
 Debolt V. Carpenter, 333 
 DeCamp v. Sioux City, 31. 346 
 Decker v. Gammon, 365, 627, 634 
 
 V. Scranton, 363 
 Dederichs v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 
 
 473 
 Deeds v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 
 2076 
 Deery v. Camden, etc. R. Co., 521 
 Defer v. Detroit, 274 
 Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 701a 
 Deford's Case. 398 
 Deford v. State, 168 
 DeForest v. Jewett. 185, 209 
 DeForrest v. Wright, 168 
 DeFrance v. Spencer, 669, 671 
 
References'] TABLE OF CASES. Iflre to sections. 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 Degg V. Midland E. Co. 183, 183 
 DeGinther v. New Jersey Homo, etc., 
 
 702a 
 Degnan v. Jordan, 207 
 De Graff v. N. Y. Central, etc, R. 
 
 Co., 57, 184, 217 
 De Groot v. United States, 249 
 De Ham v. Mexico R. Co. , 131 
 De Haven v Kensington Nat. Bank, 
 
 588 
 Dehority v. Whitcomb, 709 
 Dehring v. Comstock, 60 
 Deiseu v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 760, 
 
 775 
 Deitrich v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 73a 
 Dekalb county v. Cook, 341 
 DeKay v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 525 
 Delafield v. Illinois, 249 
 Delahousaye v. Judice, 735 
 Delamatyr v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 509, 519. 520 
 Delaney v. Hilton, 206 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 54, 
 
 90, 464 
 V. Penna. R. Co., 725 
 V. Rochereau, 705 
 Delano v. Case, 589 
 Delassus v. United States, 317 
 Delaware, etc. Canal Co. v. Carroll, 
 230 
 V. Goldstein, 400, 735 
 V. Lee, 399 
 
 Iron Works V. Nuttall, 195, 203 
 etc. R. Co. V. Ashley, 492, 513a, 
 
 523 
 V. Cadow.481 
 V. Converse, 417, 461, 485 
 V. Hefferan. 475 
 V. Jones, 773 
 
 V. Salmon, 37, 31, 666, 678 
 V. Shelton, 417 
 V. Toffey, 108 
 V. Trautwein, 104, 486, 506 
 V. Walsh, 493 
 Delger v. St. Paul, 289 
 Delhi V. Youmans, 735 
 Delie v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 743 
 Dells V. Stollenwerk, 147 
 Delmonico v. New York, 274, 291 
 De Loge v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 54 
 De Lozier v. Kentucky Lumber Co., 
 
 219 
 Delphi V. Evans, 283 
 Delude v. St. Paul R. Co., 1855, 188 
 Delzell V. Indianapolis R. Co. , 408 
 Deming v. Grand Trunk R. Co. , 40 
 V. Merchants' Cotton Press Co. , 
 
 40 
 v. The Argonaut, 719 
 Dfimitz V. Benton, 662 
 De Montmorency v. Devereaux, 567 
 Dempsev v. N Y. Central R. Co., 410 
 V." Rome, 369, 376 
 
 Den V. Hill, 317 
 Denby v. Miller, 362 
 Denison v. Lincoln, 639 
 V. Sanford, 376 
 V. Seymour, 246 
 Denman v. Johnston, 646 
 Denman v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 99 
 Dennett v. Wellington, 379 
 Denni'ck v. Central R. Co. , 133 
 
 V. Railroad Co., 65 
 Denning v. Gould, 197 
 Dennis v. Harris, 679 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 516 
 Dennison v. Seymour, 515 
 Denny v. Manhattan Co., 943 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 40 
 Denslow V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 
 733 
 Denton v. Kernochan, 723 
 Denver v. Aaron, 368 
 V. Capelli, 274 
 V. Clements, 334 
 V. Dean, 868 
 V. Dunsmore, 281, 289 
 V. Saulcey, 373 
 V. Solomon, 350, 699, 709a 
 V. Williams, 291 
 Consolidated Electric Co. v. 
 
 Simpson, SOO 
 Electric Co. v. Simpson, 60 
 etc. R. Co. V. DeGraff, 675 
 V. Dotson, 750 
 V. Driscoll, 233, 233a 
 V. Gustafson, 161. 477 
 V. Harris, 743, 749 
 V. Henderson, 419 
 V. Lorentzen, 759 
 V. Morton, 60c, 666 
 V. Outcalt, 422 
 V. Robbins, 55 
 V. Robinson, 429 
 V. Ryan, 13, 108, 476 
 V. Simpson, 197 
 V. Wilson, 137 
 V. Woodward, 516 
 Tramway Co. v. Cloud, 486, 748 
 V. Dwyer, 488, 491 
 V. Nesbit. 185 
 V. Reid, 46, 516, 523 
 Deny v. Correll, 638 
 Derby v. Kentucky R. Co., 198 
 
 Bank v. Landon, 619 
 Dermont v. Detroit, 274 
 DeRouflgny v. Peale, 569 
 DeRozas v. Metropolitan R. Co., 521 
 Derr v. Lehigh V. R. Co., 185 
 DeRutte V. N. Y., Albany, etc. TeL 
 
 Co. 503, 532, 537, 544 
 Derwort v. Loomer, 51, 495, 514 
 Deslettes v. Baltimore, etc. Tel. Co., 
 
 543 
 Detroit v. Blackebv. 258. 289 
 V. Chaffee, 398, 343, 384 
 
XXll 
 
 RcfcrcKcesI TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Detroit v. Corev, 387, 391, 358 
 V. Putnam, 289 
 etc. R. Co. V. Havt, 434 
 V. Van Stein burg. 53, 107 
 
 Detwiler v. Lansing, 334, 356 
 
 Deutscli V. Abeles, 7U8 
 
 De Van v. Pa., etc. Canal Co., 56 
 
 Deverill v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 56 
 
 Deville v. Southern, etc. R. Co., 85 
 V. So. Pacific R. Co., 474 
 
 Devine v. Boston & A. R. Co.. 2416 
 T. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 207 
 
 Devitt V. Pacific R. Co., 198, 308 
 
 Devlin v. Gallagher, 13, 58 
 V. Smith, 38, 184, 189 
 
 Dewald v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 521 
 
 Deweese v. Meramec Iron Co. 188 
 V. Meramec Mining Co., 303 
 
 Dewey v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 195, 
 196, 233a 
 T. Leonard, 669 
 
 Devvire v. Bailey, 87. 93 
 
 T. Boston, etc. R. Co., 490, 533 
 
 De Woolfe v. . TGI 
 
 Dexter v. Canton Toll-bridge Co., 3S0 
 
 Deyo Y. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 494, 517 
 
 Deyoe v. Saratoga Springs, 291 
 
 De Young v. Irving, 219 
 
 Diamond t. Brooklyn, 369 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 678 
 Brick Co. v. N. Y. Cent. R. 
 
 Co., 451 
 Iron Co. V. Giles, 1856 
 Match Co. V. New Haven, 274 
 Mill Co. V. Groesbeeck, 587a 
 
 Diana, The. 173 
 
 Dibble v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 140 
 
 Dick V. Railroad Co., 56, 235 
 
 Dicken v. Liverpool Salt Co., 73a, 
 705 
 
 Dickens v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 56, 
 769 
 
 Dickerson t. Wason, 580a 
 
 Dickey v. Maine Telegraph Co., 25, 
 3.)1, 359 
 
 Dickins v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 135, 
 708 
 
 Dickinson v. Boyle, 39 
 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 136 
 V. Port Huron, etc. R. Co., 406 
 V. Worcester, 735 
 
 Dickson v. Hollister. 93, 702, 703, 742 
 V. Kewanee Electric Light Co., 
 
 361, 370 
 V. McCoy, 365, 628, 634 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 66 
 V. Omaha, etc. R. Co., 94, 317, 
 
 466a 
 V. Parker, 656 
 V. Renter's Tel. Co., 543 ^ 
 V. Waldron, 145, 150 
 
 Diebold v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 480 
 
 Dieboldt v. U. S. Baking Co., 307 
 Diehl V. Lehigh Iron Co. . 207 
 Diehm v. Cincinnati, 367 
 Dietrich v. Northampton, 370 
 Digby V. Kenton Works, 103 
 Dillaye v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 498 
 Dillingham v. Anthony, 154 
 V. Fields, 359 
 V. Harden, 217 
 V. Parker, 478 
 V. Pierce, 492a 
 V. Snow, 303 
 V. Teeling, 506 
 Dillon V. Acme Oil Co., 734 
 V. Hunt, 765 
 
 V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 184 
 V. Washington Gaslight Co., 
 359 
 Dimes v. Petley, 99 
 Dimock v. Suflfleld, 351, 355, 379 
 Dimmitt v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 500 
 Dingley v. Star Knitting Co., 223 
 Dinnihan v. Lake Ontario Imp. Co., 
 
 704 
 Dirmeyer v. O'Hern, 758 
 Disbrow v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 478 
 Distler v. Long Island R. Co., 530 
 District of Columbia v. Armes, 606, 
 369 
 V. McElligott, 91, 21.1, 289 
 v. Washington Gaslight Co., 
 
 384 
 V. Woodbury, 249, 263, 289, 367, 
 560, 758 
 Ditberner v. Rogers, 162 
 Ditchett v. Spuyten, etc. R, Co., 93, 
 
 114, .145, 708 
 Dittrich v. Detroit. 369, 376 
 Dixon v. Baker, 274 
 
 V. Bell, 35, 116, 686 
 
 v. Board of Works, 283 
 
 V. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 359, 
 
 531 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 303, 
 
 237, 238 
 V. Pluns, 703 
 V. Ranken, ISO 
 V. San Antonio, 367 
 V. Waohenheimer, 703 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co., 196, 
 553 
 Dlauhiv. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 482 
 Dobbin v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 283 
 Dobbins v. Brown, 16, 57, 233 
 Dobbyn v. Northern Pac. R. Co,, 668 
 Dobiecki v. Sharp, 458, 477, 506, 519, 
 
 704 
 Dockerty v. Hutson, 639 
 Dodd V. Holme, 701 
 Doel V. Sheppard, 685 
 Dodge V. Boston, etc. S. S. Co., 487, 
 490, 519 
 V. Granger, 265, 395 
 
Re/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. [«>-? to section: 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 Doggettv. 111. Central R. Co., 533 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 38, 
 93, 94, 99, 433, 460, 667, 679 
 Doherty v. Sweetzer, 645 
 
 V. Waltham, 856 
 Dohn V. Dawson, 361 
 Doing V. N. Y,, Ontario, etc. R. Co., 
 
 194, 194a, 303 
 Dolan V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 90. 14(;, 466, 476 
 
 V. Newburgh, etc. R. Co., 444, 
 453 
 Dolfinger v. Fishback, 636 
 Dollard v. Roberts, 710, 763 
 DoUer v. Union R. Co. , 485c 
 Dolph V. Ferris, 637 
 Dolrey v. Ontario, etc. R. Co., 449 
 Dominguez v. Orleans R. Co., 408 
 Donahoe v. Old Colony R. Co., 1855, 
 303 
 
 V. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 85 
 Donahue v. Drowne, 307a 
 
 V. Enterprise R. Co., 630 
 
 V. Kendall, 710 
 
 V. State, 334, 705 
 Donald v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 448 
 Donaldson v. Boston, 368 
 
 V. Haldane, 558, 563, 575 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 54, 
 99, 113 
 
 V. Mississippi, etc. R. Co,, 137, 
 775 
 
 V. Wilson. 708 
 Donham v. Wild, 631 
 Donnegan v. Erhardt, 466a 
 
 499, 500 
 Donnelly v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 476, 
 705 
 
 V. Brooklyn R. Co, 66a, 475 
 
 V. Brown, 195 
 
 V. Fitch, 606 
 
 V. Hufschmidt, 344, 759 
 
 V. Jenkins, 719, 733 
 
 V. Tripp, 399 
 Donner v. Ogilvie, 709 
 Donoho V. Vulcan Iron Works, 870 
 Doiiohue V. New York, 374 
 
 V. State, 8 
 
 V. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 367 
 Donovan v. Board of Education, 367, 
 395, 319, 339 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 675 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 431, 
 451a 
 
 V. Hartford St. R. Co., 57, 490 
 
 V. Laing, 161 
 ■ V. McAlpin, 367, 819 
 
 V. Oakland R. Co., 176 
 Dooley v. Meriden, 363, 376 
 
 V. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 480, 484 
 
 V. Sullivan, 856, 353 
 Dooner v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 196, 197, 307a, 313 
 
 Doran v. East River Ferry Co., 488, 
 491 
 
 Dorchester Bank v. New England 
 Bank, r 83 
 
 Dore V. Milwaukee, 383 
 
 Dorlon v. Brooklyn, 391 
 
 Dorman v. Ames, 709a 
 
 V. Broadway R. Co., 483, 485 
 V. Kane, 111 
 
 Dorn V. Oyster Bay, 363, 369 
 
 Dornin v. McCandless, 619 
 
 Dorr V. McCuUough, 114 
 V. Simerson, 735 
 
 Dorrance v. Commonwealth, 619, 633 
 
 Dorrity v. Eapp, 701 
 
 Dorsey v. Racine, 373 
 
 Dosdall V. Olmsted county, 356 
 
 Doso v. Billlngton, 750 
 
 Doss V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 493a 
 
 Doster v. Charlotte St. R. Co., 436 
 
 Dotton V. Albion, 369 
 
 Dougan v. Champlain Transp. Co., 
 60&, 60c, 87, 367, 496 
 
 Dougherty v. Amer. U. Tel. Co., 543 
 V. Bunting, 371 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 520 
 V. Missouri R. Co., 61, 495, 508 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 194a 
 V. West Superior Iron Co. , 113, 
 186, 311a 
 
 Doughty V. Penohscot, etc., Co., 333 
 
 Douglas V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 675 
 
 Douglass V. East Tennessee, etc. R. 
 Co., 427 
 V. Placerville, 254 
 V. Stevens, 95 
 
 Doulon V. Clinton, 3G7 
 
 Doupe V. Genin, 710 
 
 Dow V. Rowe, 618 
 
 Dowd V. Boston & A. R. Co., 241& 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 513a 
 
 Dowell V. Burlington, etc. R. Co , 
 185 
 V. Gen. Steam Nav. Co., 61, 99 
 V. Guthrie, 57, 686, 688 
 
 DowUng V. Allen, 319, 309a, 330 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 73, 
 481a 
 
 Downer v. Lent, 310 
 
 V. Madison Co. Bank, 600 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 334 
 
 Downes v. Harper Hospital, 331 
 
 Downey v. Hendric, 523 
 V. Sawyer, 203, 218 
 
 Downing v. Herrick, 303 
 
 Downs V. High Point, 287 
 
 Dows V. Cobb, 32 
 
 Dox V. Postmaster-General, 321 
 
 Doyle V. Baird, 307a 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 409, 473 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., W 
 V. Detroit Omnibus Co., 015 
 V. FitchburgR. Co., 190 
 
1 
 
 XXIV 
 
 Rc/crenccs\ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 Doyle V. Lynn, etc. R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Pennsylvania, etc. R. Co., 
 114 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 195 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 709 
 Drais v. Hogan, 573 
 Drake v. Hudson River R. Co., 333 
 
 V. Kiley, 94 
 
 ■V. Lady EnsleyCoal Co., 734 
 
 V. Lowell, 383, 350, 353, 358 
 
 V. Mount, 61, 636 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 2076 
 
 V. N. Y. Lackawanna, etc. R. 
 Co., 781 
 
 V. Penna. R. Co., 531 
 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 61, 
 441 
 
 V. Rogers, 336 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co. , 186 
 Dressell v. Kingston, 298 
 Drew v. Coulton, 310 
 
 V. Hicks. 735 
 
 V. New River Co., 359 
 
 V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 78a, 115, 
 510 
 
 V. Sutton, 258, 356 
 Driess v. Friederich, 758, 763 
 Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 759 
 DriscoU V. Carlin, 146, 334, 336, 374 
 
 V. Fall River, 192 
 
 V. New York, 110 
 
 V. Norwich, etc. R. Co., 413 
 DrisscoU V. Scanlon, 148 
 Dritt V. Snodgrass, 323 
 Drommie v. Hogan. 81 
 Drovers' National Bank v. Anglo- 
 Am., etc. Co., 583 
 Drury v. "Worcester, 335 
 Drymala v. Thompson, 304, 205 
 Duame t. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 471, 
 
 477 
 Dubach v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 359 
 Dube V. Lewiston, 233 
 Dublin, etc. R. Co. v. Slattery, 54, 
 
 87, 89. 464, 476 
 DuBois Y. Decker, 95 
 
 V. Decket, 604, 613, 615 
 
 V. Kingston, 57, 110, 358, 367 
 Du Boise v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 463, 
 
 485 
 Dubuque, etc. Ass. t. Dubuque, 375 
 
 Wood, etc. Co. V. Dubuque, 
 40, 739 
 Duckworth v. Johnson, 137, 766, 769 
 Dudley v. BoUes, 649 
 
 V. Camden, etc. Ferry Co., 93, 
 94, 536 
 
 Y. Camden, etc. R. Co., 487 
 
 Y. Front St. R. Co., 508 
 
 Y. New Orleans Canal Co., 386 
 
 Y. Smith, 514 
 
 Y. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 Dufer V. Cullv, 639 
 
 Duff Y. Budd, 47 
 Duffees ^ . Judd, 664 
 Duffy Y. Baltimore, 361 
 
 " Y. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 473, 
 476 
 
 Y. Dubuque, 354, 369, 370 
 
 V. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 419, 
 437, 443 
 
 Y. Upton, 317 
 Dugan Y. Bridge Co., 895, 737 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 108 
 Duggan V, Hansen. 637, 663 
 Duggins V. Watson, 61, J46, 154 
 Duke V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 436 
 
 Y. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 759 
 Dumas y. Stone, 209a 
 Dumont y. Kellogg, 729 
 Dun Y. Seaboard, etc. R. Co., 519 
 Dunbar v. Boston, 291 
 Duncan v. Bancroft, 733 
 
 Y. Buffalo, 863 
 
 Y. Breithaupt, 557 
 
 V. Findlater, 168, 326 
 
 Y. Klinefelter, 625 
 
 Y. RomeR. Co., 485c 
 
 Y. W. U. Tel. Co., 753a 
 Dunckle Y. Kocker, 627 
 Duncombe's Case, 343 
 Dundas v. Lansing, 368, 369, 376 
 Dundee Mortgage Co. v. Hughes, 574 
 Dundon y. N. Y., New Haven, etc. 
 
 R. Co , 466 
 Dungan v. Read, 23 
 Dunham's Appeal, 53 
 Dunham Towing Co. v. Dandelin, 89 
 Dunkirk, etc. R. Co. v. Mead, 449 
 Dunlap Y. Northeastern R. Co., 207& 
 
 V. Reliance, 516 
 
 Y. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 195 
 
 Y. Monroe, 317, 319, 321 
 Dunleavey v. Stock well, 669 
 Dunn v. Barnwell, 350, 355 
 
 Y. Brown county, 256 
 
 Y. Brown Co. Agr. Soc, 706 
 
 Y. Grand Trunk R. Co., 61, 488, 
 533 
 
 Y. Kyle, 589 
 
 Y. New Haven Steam b. Co., 
 525 
 
 Y. Wilcox county, 256 
 Dunnigan v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 455 
 Dunning y. Bird, 640 
 Dunsback v. Hollister, 365, 371, 701a 
 Dupen V. Keeling, 563 
 Du Pratt V. Lick, 178 
 Dupuy v. Union, 338 
 Durant y. Palmer, 108, 353, 353. 713 
 Durbin y. Oregon R. Co., 90, 476 
 Durden y. Barnett, 629 
 Durfee v. .Tohnstown R. Co., 413 
 Durgin v. Kennett, 664 
 
 Y. Lowell, 356 
 
Re/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. Wre to sections. 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 Durgin v. Munson, 203 
 
 V. Neal, 843 
 Durham v. Goodwin, 627 
 Durkee v. Central Pac. R. Co., 518 
 Durkln v. Sharp, 203a, 204, 233a 
 Durrell v. Johnson, 108 
 Duryee v. New York, 747 
 Dusli V. Fltzhugh, 103 
 Dutliie V. Washburn, 367, 375 
 Dutton V. Weare, 104, 363 
 Duval V. Hunt, 133, 2;;J0, 773, 774 
 Duvallv. Baltimore, etc. R. (Jo., 426 
 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 476 
 Duxbury v. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 
 
 414 
 Dwight V. Elmira, etc. R. Co., 750 
 Dwinell v. Abbott. 114, 466 
 Dwinelle v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 154, 490, 513 
 Dwyer v. American Exp. Co.. 282 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 679, 766 
 
 V. N. Y. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 90 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 311 
 
 V. Woulfe. 23, 574, 603 
 Dyer v. Depui, 731 
 
 V. Erie R. Co., 66, 93, 417 
 
 V. Talcott, 107 
 
 V. Woodbury, 619 
 Dygert v. Bradley, 10, 16 
 
 ads. Crane, 633 
 
 V. Schenck, 14, 279, 365, 374, 
 390 
 Dysinger v. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185 
 Dyson v. N. Y. & New England R. 
 
 Co., 463 
 Eads V. Gains, 701 
 
 V. Marshall, 346 
 
 T. Metropolitan R. Co., 493, 513 
 Eager \. Barnes, 577 
 Eagle V. Kabrick, 762 
 
 Bank v. Chapin, 581 
 
 Packet Co. v. Defries, 60 
 Eakin v. Brown, 120, 123, 712 
 Eames v. Patterson, 657 
 
 V. Salem, etc. R. Co., 449 
 Earhart v. Youngblood, 638 
 Earing v. Lansingh, 649 
 Earl V. Camp, 303 
 
 V. Crouch, 705 
 
 V. Van Alstine, 636, 639 
 Earlev. Hall, 119. 699 
 Earp V. Palkner, 6^3 
 Easley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 473 
 Ea=on V. East Tenn., etc. R. Co., 481a 
 Easter v. Hall, 168 
 
 V. Little Miami R. Co., 437 
 Eastland v. Fogo, 384 
 Eastman v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 737 
 
 V; Clackamas county, 356 
 
 V. Curtis, 1856 
 
 V. Judkins, 631 
 
 Eastman v. Lake Shore R. Co., 2076 
 
 T. Meredith, 356, 358, 285, 337 
 
 V. Sanborn, 743 
 Easton v. Houston, etc. R. Co., 185 
 
 V. Neff, 262 
 
 V. Waters, 493 
 Eastwood V. Ketsof Min. Co , 302 
 East Haddam Bank v. Soovil, 582, 585 
 East Line, etc. R. Co. v. Rushing, 
 508 
 
 V. Scott, 186a, 193, 3076 
 East Omaha R. Co. v. Godola, 523 
 East River Bank v. Kennedy, 573 
 East Saginaw R. Co. v. BoJm, 46, 77, 
 
 84 
 East St. Louis R. Co. v. Allen 60a 
 
 V. Eisentraut. 733 
 
 V. Gerber, 444 
 
 V. Hightower, 195 
 
 V. Jenks, 481a 
 
 V. O'Hara, 461, 467 
 East St. Louis Storage Co. v. Crow, 
 
 307 
 East Tenn. Coal Co. v. Harshaw, 
 
 481a 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Aiken, 
 11, 10a, 195 
 
 V. Bayliss, 47, 419, 430 
 
 V. Bridges, 303, 2076 
 
 V. Conner, 520, 521 
 
 V. Daniel, 428 
 
 V. De Armond, 233, 238 
 East Tenn., etc. R. Co. v. Duffield, 
 
 91, 210 
 East Tenn esse, etc. R. Co. v. Duggan, 
 103 
 
 R. Co. v. Fain. 103, 473, 483 
 
 V. Feathers, 470 
 East Tenn., etc. R. Co. v. Fleetwood, 
 
 513 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Green, 
 
 533 
 East Tenn., etc. R. Co. v. Gurley, 
 192. 207rt, 235 
 
 V. Hall, 066 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. t. Hart- 
 lev, 485 
 
 T. Head, 209a 
 
 v. Hesters, 666, 676 
 
 V. Holmes, 520 
 
 V. Hughes. 520 
 
 V. Hull, 103 
 
 V. Kane, 410 
 
 T. King, 493, 748 
 
 V. Kornegay, 475 
 
 T. Lee, 748 
 
 V. Lilly, 135 
 EastTenn., etc. R. Co. v. McClure,760 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Maloy, 
 133 
 
 V. Markens. 66a 
 
 V. Massengill, 530 
 
 V. Miller, 517 
 
Ixxvi 
 
 Re/eyenccs'] TABLE OF CASES. [«'-'• t" sections. 
 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Reyn- 
 olds, 195 
 V. Rush, 235, 241 
 V. St. John, 99, 483 
 East Tenn., etc. R. Co. v. Scales, 
 
 431, 469 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 
 
 60a, 3076, 233a 
 East Tenn. , etc. R. Co. v. Stewart, 233 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Swaney, 469 
 R. Co. V. Turvaville, 203 
 etc. R. Co. V. Watson, 506 
 V. Watters, 419, 448 
 V. Winters, 13 
 V. White, 458, 469 
 V. Wright, 53 
 Eastern Ky. R. Co. v. Powell, 480, 484 
 Eaton V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 31, 65, 
 486, 500 
 V. Crips, 646, 654 
 V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 61 
 V. European, etc. R. Co., 168 
 V. Fairburv Waterworks Co., 
 
 265 
 V. FitohburgR. Co., 466 
 V. Manitowoc Co., 353 
 V. Oregon R. Co., 679 
 V. Winnie, &i) 
 Eocles V. Darragh, 361 
 
 V. Stephenson, 562 
 Eckensberger v. Amend, 654 
 Eckerd v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 509, 
 
 759 
 Eckhart v. Wickwire, 343 
 Eckert v. Long Island Co., 85 
 Ecliff V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 73, 489 
 Eddy V. Adams, 195 
 V. Bodkin, 215 
 V. Dulaney, 433 
 V. Elliott,"493 
 V. Evans, 419, 437 
 V. Kinney. 064 
 V. Lafayette, 433, 672, 676, 678, 
 
 679, 751 
 V. Prentice, 194a 
 V. Rider, 493 
 V. Rogers, 309a 
 V. Wallace, 520 
 Eden v. Lexington, etc. R. Co., 134 
 Edenville v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 334 
 Edgar v. Costello, 134 
 Edgerly v. Concord, 353, 365 
 Edgerton v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 
 61, 488, 502, 513a, 516, 523 
 V. New York, 295 
 Edmonson v. Moberly, 274, 734 
 Edmundson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 173 
 Edrina;ton v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 673 
 Edsall V. Howell. 750 
 
 V. Vandemark, 644, 645 
 
 Edson V. Central R. Co., 37, 426, 437 
 Edwards v. Beebe, 751 
 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 444 
 
 V. Cahawba, 550 
 
 V. Carr, 31 
 
 V. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 785 
 
 V. Dickinson, 321 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 431 
 
 V. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 144, 
 
 704, 709 
 V. Jones, 157 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 493 
 V, Lord, 57, 495 
 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 451 
 T. Pocahontas, 360 
 V. Three Rivers, 368. 369 
 Ef ron V. Wagner Car Co. , 526 
 Egan V. Dry Dock, etc. R. Co.. 683 
 Egenor v. N. Y. & Rockaway Beach 
 
 R. Co., 412 
 Egerer v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 333 
 Eggleston v. Columbia Turnp. Co., 
 
 386 
 Ehrgott V. New York, 36, 28, 30, 55, 
 255, 381, 389, 396, 346, 739, 
 740, 743, 749a, 751, 760 
 Ehmcke v. Porter, 215 
 Ehrisman v. East Harrisburg R. Co., 
 
 485c 
 Eichel V. Senhenn, 634, 639 
 Eichhorn v. Missouri, etc. R. Co , 510 
 Eichler v. St. Paul Furniture Co., 195 
 Eighmie v. Rome, etc. R. Co., 666, 
 
 678 
 Eikenberry v. Bazaar, 256 
 Eilert V. Green Bay. etc. R. Co., 463 
 Eisenberg v. Missoui'i Pac. R. Co., 
 
 705 
 Eisenbrey v. Pennsylvania Co., 119 
 Ekendahl v. Haves. 218 
 Elbin v. Wilson," 310 
 Elder V. Bemis. 161 
 
 v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 30, 
 734 
 Eldridge v. Atlas S. S. Co., 186, 186a, 
 333 
 V. Long Island R. Co., 89, 519 
 Eleanor, The, 322 
 Elgin V. Kimball, 274 
 
 V. Renwick, 86, 377 
 Hyd. Co. V. Elgin, 750 
 etc. R. Co. V. Raymond, 73 
 Eliason v. Grove, 748 
 Elizabethtown, etc. R. Co. v. Combs, 
 
 334 
 Elkhardt v. Ritter, 346 
 Elkington v. Holland, 574 
 Elkins V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 73, 87, 
 476. 4S1 
 V. McKean, 38, 117 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 194, 196 
 Ell V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 383, 
 341a 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. We to sectwns. IxXvll 
 
 EUedge v. National City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 241a 
 Ellet vfSt. Louis, etc. R. Co., 39, 113, 
 
 517 
 EUinger v. Phila., etc. R. Co., 500 
 Ellington v. Beaver Dam Co., 235, 
 
 288 
 Elliott V. Carlson. 705 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 56, 207, 
 241a 
 
 V. Concord, 358 
 
 V. Field, 133 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 729 
 
 V. Hall, 38 
 
 V. Herz, 638 
 
 V. Newport R. Co., 519 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Northeastern R Co., 70^ 
 
 V. Oil Citv, 274 
 
 V. Philadelphia, 291 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 65, 194 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543 
 Ellis V. Duncan, 735 
 
 V. Great "Western R. Co., 485 
 
 V. Amer. Tel. Co., 534, 537, 545, 
 553 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 90, 
 463, 476 
 
 V. Loftuslron Co., 627 
 
 V. Lynn, etc. R. Co. , 4856 
 
 V. McNaughton, 361 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 197, 410 
 
 V. Peru. 376 
 
 V. Portsmouth, etc. R. Co., 676 
 
 V. Sheffield Gas Co., 175 
 
 V. Southwestern R. Co., 61, 
 451a 
 Ellison V. Georgia R. Co., 413 
 Ells V. Pacific R. Co., 435 
 Ellsworth V. Campbell, 563 
 
 V. Central R Co.. 416 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 488, 493 
 
 V. Lord, 708 
 Elmer v. Locke, 188, 194a, 241 
 Elmore v. Drainage Comr's, 256 
 
 V. Hill. 54, 619 
 
 V. Overton, 323 
 El Paso county v. Bish, 256 
 
 V. Causey, 385 
 Elster V. Springfield. 11 
 Elting V, East Chester, 5;85 
 Elwood V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543 
 Ely V. Des Moines, 375 
 
 V. Niagara county, 261 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R, Co,, 114 
 
 V, Rochester, 737 
 
 V. Thompson, 803 
 Elyton Land Co. v. Mingea, 66, 376 
 Elze V. Bauniann, 645 
 Emblen v. IMvers. 748 
 Embler v. Wallkill. WUa. 354 
 Embi-ey v. Owen, 789, 780 
 
 Emerson v. Lowell Gas Co. , 60&, G92, 
 
 693 
 Emery v. Boston & M. R. Co., 743 
 
 V, Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 114 
 Emma Oil Co. v. Hale, 209a 
 Emmerlingv, Graham, 600 
 Emmerson v. St. Louis, etc. R, Co., 
 
 434 
 Emmons v. Minneapolis, etc. R, Co., 
 
 750 
 Emory v, Minneapolis Exposition, 704 
 Emporia v. Schmidling, 36, 376 
 Engel V. Breitkreitz, 108 
 Engel V. Eureka Club, 175 
 
 V, Smith, 719 
 Engelhardt v, Delaware, etc, R. Co., 
 
 193 
 Engine Works v. Randall, 208u 
 England v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 530 
 Engle V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 58 
 English V. Brennan, 1,59 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 859 
 V. Southern Pac. Co., 467 
 Engstrom v. Ashland Iron' Co., 194, 
 
 197 
 Enk V. Brooklyn R. Co., 535 
 Ennis v. Gray, 698 
 Enright v. Atlanta, 110, 369 
 
 V. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 
 
 424, 451a 
 V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 241 
 Ensign v. Livingston county, 256 
 Ensley R. Co. v, Chewning, 468 
 Entwistle v. Feighner, 60a 
 Eppendorf v. Brooklyn R. Co., 37, 
 
 510, 520 
 Erd V. Chicago, etc. R, Co., 674, 680 
 
 V. St, Paul, 375, 876 
 Erickson v. Twenty-third St, R. Co., 
 54 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 100, 
 
 208, 483 
 V, Duluth. etc. R. Co., 451a 
 Erie v. Caulkins, 298 
 
 V. Magill, 87, 376 
 
 v. Schwingle, 108, 285, 289, 
 
 8.-)8, 868. 874, 876 
 Iron Works ^'. Barber, 740, 744 
 R. Co. V, Decker, 675 
 etc R. Co. V. Schuster, 78 
 Tel. Co. V. Grimes, 98, V>-\ 
 Ernst V, Hudson River R, Co.. 5::, 86, 
 
 91. 92, HI, 466, 468, 477 
 Erwin v. Blake. 578 
 
 V Neversink Steamboat Co., 
 
 772 
 V, St. Louis, etc. R. Co. , 78a 
 Eshleman v. Martic, 760 
 Esrey v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 475, 
 
 483, 484 
 Ess V. Truscott, 597 
 Estelle V. Lake Crystal, 358 
 Estes V. Troy, 334 
 
Ixxviii 
 
 Referenc:£\ TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \iiyc to sections. 
 
 Esvvin V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 480 
 
 Ethridge v. Philadelphia, 289 
 
 Eufaula v. Simmons, 274, 750 
 
 Euler V. Sullivan, 701a 
 
 Eureka Co. \ . Bass, 215 
 
 Eustace v. Jahns, 843 
 
 Evans v. Adams Express Co., 654 
 
 V. American Iron Co., 218 
 
 V. Atlantic, etc. E. Co.. 181 
 
 V. Chamberlain, 185&, 192, 217 
 
 V. Chessmond, 717 
 
 V. Concord R. Co., 13, 4816 
 
 V. Davidson, 145 
 
 V. Foster, 303 
 
 V. Huntington, 867 
 
 V. Keystone Gas Co., 606, 693, 
 750 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co , 
 466 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 241c 
 
 V. McDermott, 628 
 
 V. Merriweather, 729 
 
 V. Newland, 1:25 
 
 V. Rudy, 526, 751 
 
 V. Thurston, 619 
 
 V. Utica, 86,87, 375, 376 
 
 V. Watrous, 559. 569, 573 
 
 etc. Brick Co. v. St. Louis, etc, 
 R. Co., 467 
 Evanston v. Fitzgerald, 853 
 
 V. Gunn, 285 
 Evansville v. Decker, 255, 262, 271, 
 272, 274 
 
 v. Wilter, 369 
 
 etc. E. Co. V. Barbee, 424 
 
 V. Barnes, 185, 489 
 
 v. Baum, 230 
 
 V. Carvener, 21, 376, 408 
 
 V. Gates, 493 
 
 V. Crist, 408 
 
 V. Barting, 512 
 
 V. Duel, 222 
 
 V. Duncan, 521 
 
 V. Griffin, 97, 705 
 
 V. Guyton, 191, 192 
 
 V. Henderson, 185, 218, 241 
 
 V. Hiatt, 85, 113, 480 
 
 V. Holcomb, 203 
 
 V. Krapf, 207, 485 
 
 V. Lowdermilk, 61, 102. 
 
 V, Maddux, 219a 
 
 V. Marohn, 482 
 
 V. Hosier, 417a, 455 
 
 V. Ross, 422 
 
 V. Willis, 434 
 
 V. Wolf, 71, 74 
 Evarts v. Kiehl. 303 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 99 
 Everett v. Hydraulic Co., 16, 17, 701a, 
 732 
 
 V. Los Angeles. 653 
 
 V. Los Angeles R. Co., 480. 480c 
 
 V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 489 
 
 Evers v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 
 363 
 ■V. Long Island City, 289 
 V. Philadelphia Traction Co., 
 73a, 4y5c 
 Evertson v. Sutton, 303 
 Evison V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 485 
 Eviston Y. Cramer, 749 
 Ewald V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 190, 
 
 241 
 Ewan V. Lippincott, 225 
 Ewen V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 65t 73a 
 Ewing V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 419, 
 435, 453 
 V. North Versailles. 55 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 761 
 Excelsior Brick Co. v. Haverstraw, 
 336 
 Electric Co. v. Svceet. 693 
 Exchange Rank v. Sutton Bank, 581 
 Fire Ins. Co. v. Delaware, etc. 
 
 Canal Co., 399, 725 
 Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank. 
 382, 578 
 Explorer, The, 131 
 Eyre v. Jordan, 709 
 
 Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 582, 585, 
 
 598 
 Faber v. Carlisle Mfg. Co.. 232 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 467, 478 
 Face V. Ionia. 384a 
 Factors, etc. Ins. Co. v. Werlein, 61 
 Fagundes v. Central Pac. R. Co., 241 
 Fahey v. Harvard, 867, 384 
 Fahn v. Reichart, 669 
 Fahy v. Fargo, 581, 587a 
 Failing v. Fargo, 587a 
 Fair v. Philadelphia, 271, 274, 287 
 Fairbank Canning Co v. Innes, 185a 
 Fairbanks v. Haentzche, 203 
 
 V. Kerr, 28, 35, 55 
 Fairchild v. Bentley, 629 
 
 V. California Stage Co., 51, 495, 
 516 
 Fairfield v. Baldwin, 617 
 Fairlawn Coal <'o. v. Scranton, 287 
 Fairmount Cemetery v. Davis, 217 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Stutler. 116, 486, 
 508 
 Fake v. Addicks, 630, 639 
 Fales 1. Cole, 664 
 
 V. Dearborn, 653 
 Falkiner v. Great Southern, etc. R. 
 
 Co.. 510 
 Fall River Works v. Fall River, 334 
 Fallon V. Boston, 47, 375 
 
 v. Central Park, etc. R. Co., 82 
 
 V. O'Brien, 365, 634 
 Falls V. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 
 502. 506 
 
 Mfg. Co. V. Oconto River Imp. 
 Co., 729 
 
Re/erences'l TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 Falvey v. Northern Transp. Co., 550 
 
 Fan joy v. Seales, 707 
 
 Farber v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 151 
 
 Faren v. Sellers, 132, 166, 233 
 
 Faris v. Hoberg,. 705 
 
 Farish v. Reigle, 51, 486. 495, 514. 516 
 
 Farley v. Chicago, etc. E. Co.. 417 
 
 V. New York, 263, 358, 370 
 
 V. Philadelphia, 350 
 
 V. Picard. 639 
 
 V. Philadelphia Traction Co., 
 497 
 Farlow V. Kellv, 519 
 Farly v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 444 
 Farman v. Ellington 313, 340, 367 
 Farmer, The, v. McCraw, 61, 91 
 Farmers' Bank v . Champlain Transp. 
 Co., 503, 544, 550 
 
 V. Chester, 313 
 
 V. Newland, 580a, 583, 587a 
 
 V. Owen, 584 
 
 etc. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 
 580 
 Farnham v. Camden, etc. R. Co., 505 
 Farnum v. Concord, 350, 351 
 Farquar v. Roseberg, 289 
 Farr v. Spartenburg. etc. R. Co., 413 
 Farrand v. Marshal, 701 
 Farrantv. Barnes, 690 
 Farrar v.- Greene, 87, 346, 375, 378 
 Farrell v. Oldtown, 850 
 Farrelly v. Cincinnati, 8, 789 
 Farrer v. Greene, 87 
 Farris v. Cass Ave. R. Co., 483 
 Farve v. Louisville, etc R Co., 460 
 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. 
 
 Co., 178, 180, -35, 341 
 Fash V. Third Ave. R. Co., 408, 480 
 Fassett v. Roxbury, 114 
 Fassion v. Landrey, 865 
 Faulkner v. Aurora, 263 
 
 V. ErieR. Co., 191, 
 Fauvia v. New Orleans, 261 
 Favor V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 410,436 
 Favre v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 113, 
 
 51!) 
 Fawcett v. Dole, 310 
 
 V. York, etc. R. Co., 418, 449 
 Fay V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 410 
 
 V. Parker, 61, 741 
 
 V. Prentice, 731 
 Feather v. Reading, 353 
 Feaver v. Montreal Tel. Co. . 543 
 Federal St., etc. R. Co. v. Gibson, 494 
 Fee V. Columbus, 368 
 Feeley v. Pearson Cordage Co., 309a, 
 
 314 
 Feeney v. Long Island R. Co., 466, 
 
 477, 743 
 Fehnrich v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
 
 73a, 473 
 Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 104, 130a, 
 .503, 516 
 
 Felch V. Allen, 207 
 
 V. Concord R. Co., 99, 481, 484 
 Felder v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Felice v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 203 
 Fell V. Buriington, etc. R. Co., 467 
 
 V. Brown, 557 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 493 
 Fellows V. Gilhuber, 709 
 Felt V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 735 
 Felton V. Aubrey, 73, 481a 
 
 V. Deall, 144 
 Feltham v. England, 195, 227 
 Fenaille v. Coudert, 559, 574 
 Fenderson v. Atlantic City R. Co., 
 
 195 223 
 Fennell v. Seguin St. R. Co., 662 
 Fenneman v. Holden, 88 
 Fennimore v. New Orleans, 285 
 Fent V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 30, 666, 
 
 674 
 Fenton, Matter of. 501 
 
 V. Dublin Steam Packet Co., 
 163 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 485o 
 Ferguson v. Columbus, etc. R. Co., 
 73, 78 
 
 v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 734, 
 750 
 
 V. Hubbell, 164, 666, 669 
 
 V. Kinnoull, 123 
 
 V. Virginia, etc. R. Co., 417a 
 
 V. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 408 
 Fernandez v. Sacramento, etc. R. 
 
 Co.. 94,114 
 Fernow v. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 441 
 Fero V. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 85, 86, 
 
 680 
 Ferren v. Old Colony R. Co., 194 
 Ferris v. Aldrich, 719, 719a 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 449 
 
 V. Union Ferry Co., 511 
 
 V. Carson Water Co., 265 
 Ferriss v. Berlin Machine Works, 315 
 Ferriter v. Tyler, 833 
 Ferry v. Manhattan R. Co., 500, 516 
 Fertich v. Michener, 323 
 Fettritch v. Dickenson, 480 
 Ficken v. Jones. 58, 684 
 Fickle V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 4^6 
 Fiedler v. S. Louis, etc. R Co., 483 
 Field V. Apple River Log Co., 737 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 63 
 
 v. Gibbs, 563 
 
 V. Lelean, 179 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 58, 
 675. 676 
 Fiero v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 213 
 Fife V. Oshkosh, 843, 368 
 Fifleld V. Northern R. Co., 187, 194 
 
 V. Phcenix, 263 
 Fik Hon v. Spring Vallev Water 
 Co., 680 
 
XXX 
 
 Re/erences'\ TABLE OF CASES. 1"'-^ *<> sections. 
 
 Filbert v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 195 
 Filburn v. People's Palace Co., 639 
 Filer v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 54, 87, 
 
 91, 92, 519, 530 743, 760 
 Files V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 91 
 Fillebrown v. Hoar, 761 
 Filliter v. Phippard, 17, 665, 668 
 Fillmore v. Booth, 659 
 Finch V. Board, etc., 367 
 
 V. Board of Education, 395, 
 
 339 
 V. Karste, 582, 584, SSTa 
 Findlay v. Russell Wheel Co., 233 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 554 
 Brewing Co., v. Bellman, 703 
 Fines v. Sillery, 193 
 Fink V. Evans, 427 
 V. Coe, 110 
 
 V. Desmoines Ice Co., 194 
 V. Missouri Furnace Co. , 73a 
 V. Potter, 51 
 V. St. Louis, 298. 358 
 Finklestein v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 461, 471, 481a 
 Finlayson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 480 
 V. Utica Mining Co., 195 
 Finley v. Bradley, 656 
 
 V. Hudson R. Co. , 489 
 V. Langston, 670, 671 
 Finn v. Adrian, 376 
 Finnegan v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 490 
 V. Fall River Gas Works Co., 
 
 114, 693, 696 
 V. Moore, 356 
 Finnell v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 
 197, 207 
 Finney v. Curtis, 628 
 Firkins v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 60a 
 Firmstone v. Wheeley, 736 
 First Nat. Bank v. Bank of Denver, 
 584 
 V. City Nat. Bank, 583 
 v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 583, 
 
 587, 587a 
 V. Graham, 49 
 V. Ocean Nat. Bank, 34, 588 
 V. Mansfield Savings Bank, 582 
 V. Rex, 588 
 
 V. Sprague, 579, 583, 592 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 
 
 739, 753a, 754 
 V. Zent, 588 
 Firth V. Bowling Iron Co., 661, 663, 
 
 701a 
 Fischer v, Langbein, 567 
 Fish V. Chicago, etc. R. Co , 666, 675 
 V. Dodge, 118, 130, 709a 
 V. Ferris, 121 
 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 3076 
 V. Kellv. 56-3 
 V. Skut, 638, 636 
 
 Fisher v. Boston, 265 
 
 v. Cambridge, 379 
 
 V. Chicago, etc , R. Co., 185 
 
 V. Clark, 633 
 
 V. Cook, 144, 719 
 
 V. Farmers' Loan, etc. Co., 438 
 
 v. Franklin, 380 
 
 V. Golladay, 690 
 
 V. Gordon, 619 
 
 T. Jansen, 719, 758, 700 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 144, 154 
 
 V. Monongahela R. Co., 478 
 
 V. New York, 873 
 
 V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 333 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 437 
 
 V. Prowse, 343 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 495 
 
 V. Thirkell, 365, 703, 708 
 
 T. Vanmeter, 632 
 
 V. West Virginia, etc. R. Co., 
 510, 523 
 Fishkillv. Fishkill Plank Road Co., 
 
 256 
 Fisk V. Havana, 334 
 
 V. Fitohburg R. Co., 201, 3416 
 
 V. Framingham Mfg. Co., 708 
 
 V. Wait, 93 
 Fiske V. Forsjthe, etc. Bleaching 
 
 Co., 54 
 Fitch V. New York, 363, 263 
 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 676, 680 
 
 V. Scott, 569 
 Fitts V. Cream Citv E. Co., 57 
 Fitz V. Boston, 85o", 353 
 Fitzgerald v. Binghamton, 374 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 239 
 
 V. Binghamton, 354 
 
 V. Connecticut Paper Co., 
 18.")a, 209a, 311a, 214 
 
 V. Honkomp, 333 
 
 v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 199 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 71, 74, 
 418, 424, 466a 
 
 V. Weston, 60a, 93, 110 
 Fitzpatrick v. Garrison Ferry Co., 
 683 
 
 V. Slocum, 254 
 Flack V. Gref'n Island, 334 
 Flagg V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 451 
 
 V. Hudson, 346 
 
 V. Millbury, 104 
 
 V. Worcester, 373, 283, 287. 299 
 Flaherty V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 31, 66 
 Flanders v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 201" 
 
 V. Meath, 103 
 
 V. Norwood, 367 
 Flannagan V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 185 
 Flannegan v. Chesapeake, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 23:V( 
 Flannery v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 '512 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 750 
 
References^ TABLE OF CASES. \.are to sections. IxXXl 
 
 Flansburg v. Basin, 632 
 
 Flattes V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 27, 93, 
 
 439, 467 
 Fleck V. Union R. Co., 523 
 Fleckenstein v. Dry-i)ock, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 48oa 
 Fleeraing v. Orr, 626, 629 
 Fleet V, Hollenkerap, 46, 691 
 Fleisohner v. Pacific Cable Co., 540, 
 
 55.J, 755 
 Fleming v. Beck, 38 
 
 V. East Brooklyn R. Co., 488, 
 
 493 
 V. Davis, 739, 733 
 V. Manchester, 275 
 V. Northampton Bank, 589 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 V. Suspension Bridge, 286 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 7.33 
 Flemming v. Western Pacific R. Co., 
 
 112, 476 
 Fletcher v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 54 
 V. Barnett, 378 
 
 V Boston, etc.. R. Co., 47, 502 
 V. Braddick, 173 
 
 V. Ellsworth, 356 
 V. FitchburgR. Co., 478 
 V. Peto, 235 
 V. Rylands, 9, 17, 668 
 Fletchers v. Bradley, 618 
 Flike V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 188, 193, 
 
 204, 331 
 Flinn v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 412, 
 67-3, 673, 675, 676 
 
 V Phil., Wilm., etc. R. Co., 
 504, 519 
 
 Flint V. Gloucester Gas Co., 695 
 
 V. Norwich, etc. R. Co., 410, 
 
 • 426. 513 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Lull. 6a, 419, 434 
 Flitter! ing v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 
 450 
 Floette V. Third Ave. R. Co. , 181 
 Flood V. Western TJ. Tel. Co., 217 
 Flora V. Naney, 334a, 376 
 Flori V. St. Louis, 67, 256, 271 
 Plorida v. Pullman Car Co., 536 
 
 Central, etc. R. Co. v. Wil- 
 liams, 88, 103 
 
 R. etc. Co. V. Webster, 523 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Williams, 20, 463, 
 483 
 
 So. R. Co. V. Hirst, 64, 523, 748. 
 Flournoy v. Jeffersonville. 303 
 Flower v. Bolingbroke, 573 
 
 V. Penn., etc. R. Co., 481a, 493 
 Floyd V. Nangle, 569 
 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 466 
 Flovtrup V. Boston, etc. R., 510 
 Fluker v. Georgia R. Co. , 144 
 Flynn v. Beebe, 184 
 
 V. Campbell, 216 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I— f.] 
 
 Flynn v. Canton Co., 14, 357, 343 
 V. Central R. Co., 457 
 V. Eastern R. Co , 479 
 V. Gallagher, 60 
 V, Kansas City R, Co., 186, 204, 
 
 215 
 ■V. Manhattan R. Co., 676 
 V. Neosho, 370 
 V. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 
 
 94, 666, 678, 680 
 V. Taylor, 363 
 Foels V. Tonawanda, 369, 741 
 Fogarty v. Finlav, 594, 603 
 Fogassi V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 531 
 Fogg V. Nahant, 846, 379 
 Foley V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 203 
 
 V. Jersey City Electric Co., 216 
 V. New York, 373 
 V. Pettee Machine Works, 203 
 V. Troy, 363 
 V. Wyeth, 701 
 Follman v. Mankato, 66, 274 
 Folsom V. Lewis, 130 
 
 V. Underbill, 384 
 Fones v. Phillips, 203, 233 
 Fontaine v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 
 
 130a, 444, 445 
 Foot V. Wiswall, 246, 515 
 Fopper V. Wheatland, 653 
 Foran v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 478 
 Forbes V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 458 
 V. Escambia county, 356, 2S6 
 V. Lee Conservancy Board, 363 
 Ford V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 197, 417 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 91, 204, 
 
 211, 314, 233a 
 V. Kendall School District, 267 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. , 195, 
 
 202, 203 
 V. Lyons. 195 
 V. Parker, 321 
 V. Perkerson, 617 
 T. Southwestern R. Co. , 496 
 V. Umatilla Co., 94, 108, 367 
 Fordham ». Brighton, etc. R. Co., 
 89 
 V. London, etc. R. Co., 519 
 Fordvce v. Briney, 194, 202, 207a 
 
 " V. Edwards, 207a, 211, 216, 217 
 V. Jackson, 493. 500 
 V. Lowman, lS5a 
 V. McCants, 772 
 V. Manuel, 761a 
 V. Merrill. 506 
 V. Nix, 513 
 Forker v. Sandy Lake, 375 
 Forks V. King. 376. 379 
 Forney v. Geldmacher, 647 
 Forster, Matter of, 561 
 Forsyth t. Atlanta, 262 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 521 
 V. Hooper, 165 
 Fort V. Orndoff, 744 
 
Ixxxii 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \fl-i-e to sections. 
 
 Fort V. Whipple, 204. 230, 2t8 
 
 Fort Covington v. U. States, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 750 
 Fort Edward, etc.. Plank Road Co. 
 
 V. Payne 385 
 Fort Hill Stone Co. v. Orm, 180 
 Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 395 
 Fort Scott, etc. R. Co. v. Karracker, 
 676 
 
 V. Sparks, 51.3a 
 
 V. Tubbs, 679, 750 
 Fort Smith v. York, 289, 337 
 
 Oil Co. V. Slover, 185 
 Fort Wavne v. Breese, 376 
 
 V. Coombs, 287, 368 
 
 V. DeWitt, 367. 369 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Gruff, 217 
 
 V. Herbold. 434 
 
 V. Hinebaugh. 445, 446 
 
 V. O'Keefe, 448 
 
 V. Woodward, 452 
 Fort Worth v. Crawford, 262, 385 
 
 R. Co. V. Ferguson, 413 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Floyd, 773 
 
 V. Graves, 201 
 
 V. Hyatt, 497 
 
 V. Kennedy, 495 
 
 V. Mackney, 61 
 
 V. Measles," 73 
 
 V. Peters. 233& 
 
 V. Robertson, 758 
 
 V. Viney, 508 
 
 V. Wallace, 676, 750 
 Fortin v. Easthampton, 369 
 Forward v. Pittard, 16 
 Fosberry v. Waterford, etc. R. Co., 
 
 416 
 Fosburg V. Phillips Fuel Co., 195, 332 
 Foshay v. Glen Haven, 355 
 Fobs v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 521 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 473 
 Foster v. Chattanooga, 265 
 
 V. Dixfleld, 111 
 
 v. Essex Bank, 150, 589 
 
 V. Goddard, 649 
 
 V. Holly, 100 
 
 V. Jack, 537 
 
 V. Minn. Central R. Co., 241 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 330 
 
 V. Pusey, 185, 209a, 319a, 232, 
 233 
 
 V. St. Louis, 274 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R Co., 436, 448 
 
 V. Swope, 702 
 Foulkes V. Metropol. Dist. R. Co., 502 
 Fournet v. Morgan's etc. S. S. Co., 
 
 115 
 Fowle T. Alexandria, 255. 263 
 Fowler v. Athens Waterworks Co , 
 265 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 533 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 335, 241 
 
 Fowler v. Linguist, 346, 351, 367 
 
 V. Lock, 181 
 
 V. Mott, 373, 333 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 476 
 
 V. Sargent, 607 
 
 V. Strawberry Hill, 334a 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 537, 
 545. 554 
 Fowlkes V. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 140 
 Fox V. Borkey, 57. 761 
 
 V. Buffalo Park, 706 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 2076, 
 213 
 
 V. Glastenbury, 86, 87 107 212, 
 376 
 
 V. Jones, 558, 567 
 
 V. New York, 285, 496, 506, 521 
 
 V. Northern Liberties, 291 
 
 V. Peninsular Lead Works, 203 
 
 V. Sackett, 93, 376 
 
 V. Sand ford, 180 
 
 V. Spiing Lake Iron Co., 194a 
 Fox worthy v. Hastings, 343, 363 
 Foy V. London, Brighton, etc. R. Co.^ 
 
 91. 509,519 
 Fracev. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 30, 53, 666 
 Fraker v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 180 
 Framraell v. Little, 635 
 France v. Rome, etc. R. Co., 195 
 Francis v. CockreU 704 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co , 
 2076,210, 211,215 
 
 V. New York Steam Co., 519 
 
 V. Schoellkop, 750 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 554, 756 
 Francisco v. Troy, etc. R. Co , 523 
 Frank P. Lee, The, 18 
 
 V. Conradi, 708 
 Franke v. St. Louis, 92, 703 
 Frankel v. New York, 367 
 Frankford. etc. Turnp. Co. v. Phil. 
 
 & Trenton R. Co.. 672, 673 
 Frankfort Bridge Co. v. Williams, 386 
 Frankland v. Cole, 569 
 Franklin v. Harter, 110, 375 
 
 v. Low, 331 
 
 V. Smith, 603 
 
 V. Southeastern R. Co., 115, 
 137, 679 
 
 V. Southern Cal. R. Co., 525 
 
 v. Winona, etc. R. Co., 188 
 
 Turnp. Co. v. Crockett, 386 
 Franz v. Mulligan, 710 
 Frary v. Allen. 356 
 Fraser v. Freeman, 150 
 
 V. Red River Lumber Co., 195 
 
 V. Tupper, 666 
 Frauenthal v. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 
 531 
 Frazer v. Kimler, 636 
 
 V. Lewiston, 358 
 
 V. South, etc. Ala. R. Co., 483 
 
References\ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. IxXxill 
 
 Frazer v. W. U. T. Co., 753a 
 Frazier v. Georgia R. Co. , 133 
 
 V. New Orleans Gas, etc. Co., 
 
 5«5, 599 
 V. Penn. R. Co , 193. 209a, 226 
 Freburg v. DaYenport, 274 
 Freeh v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 
 57, 108, 480, 4a3, 485 
 Fredenburg v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 
 
 194, 197 
 Frederick v. Lansdale, 287 
 
 V. Marquette, etc. R. Co., 493 
 Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 
 
 500 
 Freeberg v. St. Paul Plow Works, 
 
 307 
 Freelove v. Cole, 557 
 Freeman v. Duluth, etc. R. Co., 466, 
 476 
 V. Glens Falls Paper Mill Co. , 
 
 13, 719 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co. , 753a. 
 Freemantle v. London & Northwest- 
 ern R. Co., 673, 675, 680 
 Freeport v. Isbell, 262, 356 
 
 V. Marks, 349 
 Freer v. Cameron, 704, 719 
 Freidman v. Mathes, 313 
 Fremont, etc. R. Co. v. Crum, 750 
 V. Harlin, 750 
 V. Marley, 735, 747. 750 
 V. Pounder, 448, 455 
 French v. AuUs, 195 
 
 V. Brunswick, 107, 111, 367 
 
 V. Camps, 333 
 
 V. Conn. River Lumber Co., 
 
 750 
 V. Donaldson, 401 
 V. Taunton Br. R. Co., 87, 464, 
 466, 477 
 Frericks v. Bermes, 758 
 Frey v. Lowden, 53 
 Frick V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 73, 78, 
 
 483 
 Friedman v. Gold, etc. Tel. Co., 536 
 
 V. Railroad Co. , 60a 
 Friel v. Citizens' R. Co., 195 
 Friend v. Hamill, 310 
 V. Ingersoll, 760 
 Frier V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 674, 675 
 Friess v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 463, 
 
 466, 468 
 Frink v. Coe, 495, 514, 749 
 V. Potter, 89, 497, 519 
 V. Schrover, 743 
 V. Scovei, 633 
 Frith V. Bowling Iron Co., 39 
 Fritsch v. Allegheny, 289 
 Fritts V. New^ England R. Co., 436 
 Fi-itts V. Jenner, 54 
 
 V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 3070 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 433 
 
 Frizell v. Cole, 485 
 
 Frobisher v. Fifth Ave. Tr. Co., 497, 
 520 
 
 Fromm v. Ide, 23 
 
 Frost V. Belmont, 254 
 
 V. Berkeley Phosph. Co., 701a 
 V. Milvvaukte. etc. R. Co., 464 
 V. Portland, 348, 350 
 V. Waltham, 110, 375, 376 
 
 Frostburg v. Dufty, 374 
 
 Frostbury v. Hitchins, 389 
 
 Fry V. Derstler, 115 
 
 Fuchs V. St. Louis, 387 
 
 V. Schmidt, 118, 703 
 
 Fulks, V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 530 
 
 Fuller V. Atlanta, 274 
 V. Bennett, 69 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 113 
 V. Chicopee Mfg. Co , 738 
 V. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 57, 164, 
 
 165 
 V. Grand Rapids, 398 
 V. Hyde Park, 375 
 V. Jackson, 334a. 368, 369, 743 
 V. Jewett, 194, 194a, 197, 204, 
 
 233 705 
 V. Na'ugatuck R. Co., 53, 115, 
 508 
 
 Fulliam v. Muscatine, 352, 376 
 
 Fulsom v. Underbill, 37G 
 
 Fulsome v. Concord, 340 
 
 Fulton V. Tucker .S-IS, 3s4 
 
 Bag, etc. Mills v. Wilson, 2076, 
 
 241 d 
 county V. Rickel, 357 
 Fire Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 118, 
 
 313, 335, 311 
 Iron Works v Kimball, 380 
 etc. R. Co. V. BuLler, 472 
 St. R. Co. V. McConnell, 359 
 
 Fultz V. Wycoff, 633 
 
 Funk V. St. Paul R. Co.. 241c 
 
 Funston v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 463, 
 478 
 
 Furlong v. Carroll, 668 
 
 Furley v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 633 
 
 Furman St., Matter of, 383 
 
 Furnell v. St. Paul, 389, 353 
 
 Furnish v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 494, 
 516 
 
 Fusili V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 481 
 
 Futch V. Walker, 625 
 
 Gaasbeck v. Saugerties, 356 
 Gabrielson v. Waydill, 233 
 Gadsden R. Co. v. Causter. 93, 495, 
 
 521 
 Gaffney v. Brown, 704 
 
 V. Inmau Mfg. Co., 207 
 Gage V. Pontiac, etc. R. Co., 415 
 Gagg V. Vetter, 54 
 Gagnon v. Seaconnet Mills, 185a 
 Gahagan V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 93, 479 
 
Ixxxiv 
 
 Refercnces^ TABLE OF CASES. Urc to seclions. 
 
 Gahan v. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Gaillard v. Smart, 569, 573 
 Gailoi- V. Heriiok, 256 
 Galbraith v. West End R. Co., 49, 654 
 Galen v. Clyde Plank Road Co., 256 
 Galena, etc R. Co v. Crawford, 431 
 
 V. Dill, 58, 463, 468 
 
 V. Fay, 60a, 495, 524 
 
 V. Griffen, 436 
 
 V. Jacobs, 102 
 
 V. Loomis, 27, 469, 482 
 
 V. Rae, 155 
 
 V. Yarwood, 53, 495, 516, 519 
 Galesburg v. Benedict, 369 
 V. Hall, 376 
 
 Electric Co. v. Manville, 426 
 Gall V. Funkenstein, 563 
 Gallagher v. Bowie, 495, 514, 761 
 
 V. New England R. Co., 421, 
 436 
 
 V. Piper, 237 
 Gallaher v. Thompson, 605, 607 
 Gallena v. Hot Spring, etc. R. Co., 
 
 151,-493 
 Galligan v. Metaoomet Mfg. Co.. 705 
 Gallin v. London & Northw. R. Co., 
 
 505 
 Galloway v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 1, 
 410, 492a 
 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 178 
 Galpin v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 
 418, 676 
 Galveston v. Barbour, 358, 763 
 
 V. Gonzales, 384 
 
 V. Hemmis, 370, 376 
 
 V. Posnainsky, 258, 289, 346 
 
 V. Smith, 369 
 
 Land Co. v. Levy, 703 
 
 Oil Co. V. Morton, 705 
 
 City R. Co. V. Hewitt, 483 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Arispe, 185, 193 
 
 V. Brocken, 90 
 
 V. Cooper. 531 
 
 V. Delehanty, 205 
 
 V. Downey, 751 
 
 V. Drew, 209a, 210, 330 
 
 V. Duelm, 460 
 
 V. Faber, 192, 241 
 
 V. Garteiser, 413 
 
 V. Home, 750 
 
 V. Kutac, 66, 67, 476 
 
 V. Lempe, 185 
 
 V. Long. 496 
 ■ V. Matula, 463, 472 
 
 V. Moore, 73, 78 
 
 V. Norris, 238 
 
 V. Ryan, 88 
 
 V. Ryon, 484 
 
 V. Smith. 2H3& 
 
 V. Sweeney, 2075 
 
 V. Templeton. 194a 
 
 V. Thornsberry, 759 
 
 V. Waldo, 241c 
 
 Galveston v. Ware, 741 
 
 V. White, 359 
 
 v. Worthy, 767, 775 
 Galvin v. Gualala Mill Co., 671 
 
 v. New York, 31, 107, 111, 113, 
 114, 181, 207a, 285 
 
 v. Old Colony R. Co., 189, 207 
 Gambert v. Hart, 658, 559, 565 
 Gamble v. Hine, 319 
 
 v. St. Louis, 334 
 Gammage v. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 
 
 4816. 
 Gandy v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 58, 676 
 
 v. Jubber, 120 
 Gangewer \. Pbila. , etc. R. Co., 475 
 Ganiard v. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 87, 
 
 490, 521 
 Gannon v. Housatonic R. Od., 181 
 Gardner v. Bennett, 6()o 
 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 476 
 
 v. Heartt, 19, 20, 119 
 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 54, 
 194 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. Co. , 489 
 
 V. Smith, 431, 423, 446, 451a 
 
 V. State, 333 
 
 V. Ward, 310 
 Gardiner v. Johnston, 274 
 Garfield v. Douglass, 303 
 Garland v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 483 
 
 V. Towne, 17, 348 
 Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 376. 313, 338 
 Garmon v. Bangor, 46, 68, 86, 644 
 Garner v. Green, 383 
 Garnett v. Slater, 334 
 Gamier v. Porter. 669 
 Garrahy v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 233 
 Garratt v. Canandaigua, 271, 274 
 Garrett v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 58, 
 114, 680 
 
 V. Freeman, 668 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 555, 755 
 Garris v. Portsmouth, etc. R. Co., 16, 
 
 419 
 Garrison v. Barnes, 635 
 
 V. New York, 285 
 Garry v. Lafayette, 299 
 Gartland v. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 218 
 Gartside Coal Co v. Turk, 218 
 Garwood v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 729 
 Gas Fuel Co. v. Andrews, 692 
 Gaston v. Mace, 737 
 Gaston v. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 749 
 Gates V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 191 
 
 V. Fleischer, 607 
 
 V. Latta, 688a 
 
 V. Neal, 810 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 214, 
 416 
 
 V. Southern Minn. R. Co., 189 
 
 V. State, 319a 
 Gaughan v. PhiladeJphiia, 375 
 
References'] TABLE OF CASES. {.are to sections. IxXXV 
 
 Gaul V. Rochester Paper Co., 316 
 Gautret v. Egerton, 401, 705 
 Gavett V. Manchester, etc. R. Co., 89, 
 
 520, 523 
 Gavigan v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 186 
 Gavin v. Chicago, 370 
 Gavitt V. Jackson, 343 
 Gay V. Cambridge, 367, 373 
 
 V. Essex, etc. R. Co., 73 
 V. "Wadley, 429 
 V. Winter, 65, 108, 111, 112 
 Gayette V. Fitchburg, etc. R. Co., 232 
 Gavford v. Nichols, 173 
 Gaylor v. Hunt, 303 
 Gaylord v. New Britain, 363 
 Gaynor v. Old Colony, etc. R. Co., 
 
 53, 54, 107, 490, 525 
 Gearns v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 588 
 Geddis v. Bann feeservoir, 288 
 Gee V. Metropohtan R. Co., 60, 65, 
 
 85, 89, 92 
 Geer v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 415 
 
 V. Darrovv, 165 
 Geiselman v. Scott, 85, 615 
 Geismer v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 155 
 Geloneck v. Dean Pump Co., 194 
 General Steam Nav, Co. v. British, 
 
 etc., Nav. Co., 160 
 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Mann, 61 
 Genenz v. De Forest, 682 
 Geneva v. Brush Electric Co., 384 
 Genung v. N. Y. & New England R. 
 
 Co., 675, 676, 678 
 Geoghegan v. Atlas Steamship Co., 
 
 57. 131 
 Geogheghan v. N. Y., New Haven, 
 
 etc. R. Co., 520 
 George & Richard, The, 133 
 George v. Fisk, 89 
 
 v. Haverhill, 89 
 V. Skivington, 38, 116 
 Georgia R. Co. v. Berry, 750 
 V. Brown, 241c 
 V. Burke, 439 
 V. Carr. 467 
 V. Daniel, 470, 483 
 V. Dougherty, 493, 749 
 V. Eskew, 95, 493 
 V. Fisk, 431 
 V. McDade, 108 
 V. Mayo, 408 
 V. Middlebrooks, 433 
 V. Miller, 241c 
 V. Nelms, 195, 341e 
 V. Newaome, 154, 436 
 V. Olds, 493 
 V. Parks, 433 
 V. Pittman, 103 
 V. Thomas. 436 
 V. Wood, 151 
 V. Wvnn, 135 
 
 Georgia etc. R. Co. v. Anderson, 440 
 V. Asmore, 498 
 V. Davis, 108 
 V. Dougherty, 493 
 V. Hallman. 307 
 V. Harris, -)33 
 V. Neely, 99, 108, 419, 428 
 V. Oaks, 187 
 V. Parks, 359 
 V. Rhodes, 180, 216 
 Central R. Co. v. Phinazee, 413 
 Midland R. Co. v. Evans, 113, 
 
 463 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Davis, 201, 20T& 
 V. Doolev, 241d 
 V. Hughes, 66, 516 
 V. Lee, 476 
 V. Love, 516 
 V. Money, 448 
 V. Propst, 114 
 V. Underwood, 519 
 Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 
 
 333 
 Geraghty v. New, 115 
 Gerald v. Boston, 375 
 Geraty v. Nat. Ice Co., 645 
 Gerdes v. Christopher Foundry Co., 
 
 362 
 Gerety V. Phila. R. Co., 477 
 Gerhard v. Bates, 28 
 Gerhard t v. Boatman's Savings Inst., 
 
 585 
 GeritY v. Haley, 106 
 Gerlach v. Edelmeyer, 60, 160, 163, 
 
 225 
 Germaine v. Muskegon, 376 
 German Amer. Bank v. Auth, 589 
 Nat. Bank v. Burns, 583 
 Theo; School v. Dubuque, 271, 
 274 
 Gerren v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 
 
 435 
 Germantown Pass. R. Co. v. Brophy, 
 
 519 
 Gerrish v. Edson, 624 
 
 V. New Haven Ice Co., 281, 233 
 Gessley v, Missouri Pac. R. Co., 471 
 Gettwbrth v. Hedden, 701 
 Getty v. Hamhn, 374 
 Gheens v. Golden, 113 
 Gherkins v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 484 
 Gianfortone V New Orleans, 361 
 Gibbon v. Coggon, 6i9 
 Gibbons v. Phoenix, 376 
 
 V. United States, 249 
 V. Wilkesbarre R. Co., 89, 485e 
 V. Williams, 78a, 74 
 Gibbs V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 436 
 
 V. Liverpool Docks, 387 
 Giblin v. McMullen, 49 
 Gibnev v. Lewis, 748 
 V. State, 30, 85 
 
Ixxxvi 
 
 References'] TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 Gibraltar Sanitary Commissions v. 
 
 Orflla. 254 
 Gibson v. Denton, 702 
 
 V. Emerson, 257 
 
 V. ErieR. Co., 178, 185, 198, 209 
 
 V. Huntington, 370 
 
 V. Leonard, 27, 53, 685, 705, 719 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 215 
 
 V. Northern Central R. Co., 
 204 
 
 V. Oregon Short Line, etc. R. 
 Co., 203 
 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 184, 194 
 Gier v. Los Angeles R. Co., 193 
 Giger v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 455 
 Gilberson, Exx>arte. 558 
 Gilbert t. Beach, 174 
 
 T. Boston, 375 
 
 T. Guild, 219a 
 
 V. Roxburj'. 363 
 
 T. Savannah, etc. R. Co., 735 
 
 V. Trinity House, 337 
 
 V. Schwenck, 115 
 
 V. West End R. Co., 496 
 
 V. Williams, 559, 568, 569 
 Gilbertsonv. Forty second St. R. Co., 
 
 7S8, 761 
 Gilbraith v. Littiech, 336 
 Gilchrist v. South Omaha, 356 
 Giles V. Diamond, etc. Co., 70S 
 
 V. School District, 256 
 Gill V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 419, 437 
 
 T. FJomrighausen, 213 
 
 V. Longher, 567 
 
 V. Middleton, 708 
 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 493 
 Gillenwater v. Madison, etc. R. Co., 
 
 234, 486, 491 
 Gillerly v. Madison, 287 
 Gillespie v. Lincoln, 265 
 
 V. McGowan, 58, 703 
 
 V. Newburgh, 85, 90, 375, 476 
 
 V. Palmer, 310 
 
 T. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 16 
 Gillett V. Johnson, 729 
 
 V. Kindei'liook, 274 
 
 V. Western R. Co., 408, 751, 
 7.52 
 Gilliam v. Roddick, 313 
 Gilligan v. Harlem R. Co., 115, 739 
 Gillingham v. Christen, 668 
 Gillis V. Great "^Vestern R. Co. , 449 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 410, 
 418. 492"n, 705 
 
 T. Western U. Tel. Co., 547, 
 553 
 Gillison v. Charleston, 274 
 Gilloon V. Reillv, 710 
 Gillrie v. Lockport, 363 
 Gillshannon v. Stoney Brook R. Co., 
 
 61, 289 
 Gillum V. Sisson, 97 
 Gilman v. Deerfield, 89 
 
 Gilman v. Eastern R. Co., 191, 203a, 
 239 
 
 V. Hovev, 574 
 
 V. Lacoiiia, 256, 370 
 
 V. Noyes, 55 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Spencer, 37 
 Gilmartin v. Neve York, 299 
 Gilmore v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 
 516 
 
 V. Di-iscoll, 701 
 
 V Federal St. R. Co , 485b 
 
 V. Oxford Iron Co. , 232 
 
 V. Philadelphia, etc R. Co., 
 490 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co.. 205 
 Gilpatriok v. Biddeford, 374 ■ 
 Gilson V. Collins. 243 
 Gilsinger v. Saugerties Water Co., 
 
 729 
 Ginna v. Second Ave. R. Co.. 523 
 Ginnon v. Harlem R. Co., .519 
 Giraudi v. Electric Imp. Co., 698 
 Gisson V. Schwabacher, 194 
 Gist V. Western U. Tel. Co., 753a 
 Given v. Western U. Tel. Co., 540, 
 
 540a 
 Givens v. Briscoe, 573 
 
 V. Kentucky Cent. R. Co., 139 
 
 V. Paris, 291 
 Gladman v. Johnson. 630 
 Glascock V. Central Pac. R. Co., 476 
 
 482 
 Glasier v. Hebron, 356 
 Glass V. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 480, 
 
 484 
 Glassey v. Hestonville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 56, 71, 73a 
 Glazebrook v. West End R. Co., 485a 
 Gleason v. Amsdel, 157, 
 
 V. Boehm, 61 
 
 V. Bremen, 107. 375 
 
 V. Clark, 568. 569 
 
 V. Excelsior Mfg. Co., 114, 209 
 
 V. Kellogg. 559 
 Gleeson v. Brummer. 107 
 
 V. Virginia Midland R. Co., 
 407, 516 
 Glendening v. Sharp. 476 
 Glenn v. Winters, 117 
 Glezen v. Rood, 634 
 Glidden v. Moore, 634 
 Glossen v. Gehman, 194a 
 Glossop V. Pole, 623 
 Glover v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 219 
 
 V. Mersman, 703 
 Gluck V. Ridgewood Ice Co., 725 
 Glushing v. Sharp, 466, 477 
 Goddard, Matter of, 343 
 
 V. Austin, 617 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 151, 
 
 154.513, 749 
 V. Mcintosh, 376 
 
Refere7ices-\ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. IxXXvll 
 
 Godeau v. Blood, 632 
 Godfrey v. Gibbons, 618 
 
 V. Kings county, 256 
 Godfrey v. Dalion, 564 
 
 V. Jay, 566, 569, 570 
 Godly V. Hagerty, 709 
 Goeltz V. Ashland, 289, 346 
 Goetchens v. Matthewson, 310 
 Gofr V. Chippewa River, etc. E. Co., 
 307 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 145 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 132, 198, 
 219 
 Goins V. Moberly, 353 
 Gold V. Philadelphia. 371 
 Goldberg v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 531 
 Golden V. Clinton. 369 
 
 V. Newbrand, 1.50 
 Goldie V. Werner, I85a 
 Goldrick v. Bristol Co. Savings 
 
 Bank, 588 
 Goldstein v. Chicago, etc. E. Co.. 87 
 Goldthwait v. Haverhill R. Co., 309a 
 
 V. East Bridgewater, 350 
 Goltz v. Milwaukee, etc. E. Co., 317 
 Gonzales v. Galveston, 346 
 
 V. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 54, 
 481, 530, 531 
 Goooh V. Asso. for Relief of Aged 
 Females, 331 
 V. Bowyer, 703 
 V. Stephenson, 664 
 Good V. Altoona, 734 
 Goodale v. Tuttle, 735 
 Goods V. Martin, 633 
 Goodes V. Boston, & A. E. Co., 209 
 Goodenough v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 
 
 478 
 Goodin v. Des Moines, 333, 353 
 Goodfellow v. Boston, etc. E. Co., 
 235, 477 
 v. New York, 868 
 Goodhart v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 
 
 743, 758. 759. 760 
 Goodloe V. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 513 
 Goodman v. Gay, 634 
 V. Harvey, 30 
 V. Simonds, 30 
 V. Walker, 558. 564 
 Goodno V. Oshkosh, 759 
 Goodnowv. Walpole Emery Mills, 185 
 Goodrich v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 
 473, 763 
 V. Chicago, 263 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 194a, 196. 309a, 317 
 V. Starr. 633 
 Goodridge v. Washington Mills Co., 
 
 316 
 Goodsell V. Hartford, etc. R. Co., 134, 
 767 
 V. Taylor. 487, 719a 
 Goodwin v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 533 
 
 Goodwin v. Central E. Co., 480 
 V. Hersom, 605 
 V. Nickerson, 133 
 V. Smith, 633 
 Gordon v. Boston, etc. R. Co.. 606 
 V. Cummings, 704, 710, 719 
 V. Farrar, 310 
 V. Grand St. R. Co , 519 
 V. Louisville, etc. E. Co., 429 
 V. Peltzer, 130, 703 
 V. Eeynolds' Card Co. , 319 
 V. Eichmond 108, 375 
 Gorham v. Gross, 17 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. E. Co., 
 
 197, 743 
 V. Springfield, 381 
 Gore V. Brazier, 574 
 Gorman v. McArdle, 13, 185&, 333, 
 702a 
 V.Minneapolis, etc. E. Co., 319a 
 V. Pacific E. Co., 419 
 Gormley v. Ohio, etc. E. Co., 335, 341 
 
 V. Sanford, 735 
 Gorton v. Erie E. Co., 483 
 Goshen v. England, 95, 869 
 V. Myers, 389, 334, 394 
 Turnp. Co. v. Sears, 346, 355, 
 386 
 Gosport V. Evans, 867, 376 
 Gothard v. Alabama, etc. E. Co., 64 
 
 89, 99, 478 
 Gottlieb V. N. Y, Lake Erie, etc. E. 
 
 Co., 459 
 Gottsberger v. New York, 395 
 Gottwald V. Bernheimer, 647 
 Gough V. Bryan, 115 
 Gould V. Bangor, etc. E. Co. , 448 
 V. Booth, 374 
 V. Boston Duck Co., 729 
 V. Gt. Northern R. Co., 434 
 V. McKenna, 61, 93, 9.5, 741 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 668 
 V. Slater Woolen Co., 690 
 V. Topeka, 355, 273 
 Gourdier v. Cormack, 144, 173, 702 
 Govei'nment St. E. Co. v. Hanlon, 
 
 73, 78 
 Governor v. Allen, 249 
 V. Carter, 630 
 V. Dodd, 591 
 V. Justices, etc., 356 
 V. Powell, 620 
 V. Wiley, 591 
 Gowen v. Gla'ser, 673, 675 
 
 V. Harley, 185, 307, 223 
 Gozler v. Georgetown, 383 
 Grabenheimer v. Budd, 619 
 Grabrues v. Klein. 654 
 Gradin v. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 488 
 Graeff v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 
 494, 497 
 Graff V. Detroit City R. Co., 485c 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 195 
 
1 
 
 XXXVIU 
 
 Referencesl TABLE OF CASES. [«''« *' sections. 
 
 R. 
 
 Canal Co., 
 
 Co. 
 
 608, 615 
 E. Co., 
 
 Greatz v. McKenzie, 688a 
 Graham v. Albert Lea, 334a 
 V. Boston, 370 
 V. Chicago, St. Paul, etc 
 
 Co., 195 
 V. Delaware, etc 
 
 448 
 Y. Newburg Coal Co., 215 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 325 
 V. Payne, 629, 633. 639 
 V. Pennsvlvania Co., 61 
 V. Toronto, etc. R. Co., 61 
 Grahlman v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 
 455 
 Gram v. Northern Pacific R. Co< 
 
 108, 118. 666. 678 
 Granim v. Boener, 107, 606 
 Granby v. Michigan Cent. 
 
 428 
 Grandona v. Lovdal, 701a 
 Grand Rapids v. "Wvman, 57, 358, 369 
 etc. R. Co. T.'Cox, 475, 477 
 V. Judson, 57 
 V. Monroe, 418, 435 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Cummings, 
 188 
 V. Ives, 53, 61, 99, 466, 467, 
 
 485a 
 V. Jennings, 765 
 v. Latliani, 24a 
 V. Richardson, 53, 675, 680 
 V. Siebald, 414 
 v. Stevens. 488 
 T. Walker, 495 
 Granger v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 475 
 V. Pulaski county, 256 
 V. Seneca Falls. 272 
 Grangier v. Hughes, 561 
 Grannis v. Branden, 614 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co, 
 V. Cummings, 671 
 Grant v. Baker, 108 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 479 
 
 V. Brooklyn, 356 
 
 V. Erie, 263, 265 
 
 V. Kuglar. 737 
 
 V. Ludlow, 47 
 
 V. Newton, 22 
 
 V. Pennsylvania, 
 
 Co., 323 
 V. Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 499 
 V. Ricker, 635 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 195 
 V. Varney, 195 
 Gratoit v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 472 
 Gran v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co,, 448 
 Gravelle v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 197, 233 
 Graver Tank Works v. McGee, 209a 
 Graves v. Brewer, 185 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 425 
 v. Rochester, 396 
 V. Santway, 607 
 
 Graves v. Shattuck. 354, 370, 653 
 
 V. Thomas, 97, 703 
 Graville v. Manhattan R. Co., 523 
 
 185& 
 
 etc. Canal 
 
 Graw V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 40 
 Gray v. Boston Gaslight Co., 34a, 
 120, 343 
 V. Brackenridge, 557 
 V. Brooklyn, 254 
 V. Central R. Co., 747 
 V. Coombs, 97, 720 
 V. Danbury, 416 
 V. Emporia, 367 
 V. Harris, 343. 705, 728, 733 
 V. McDonald, 64 
 V. Pullen, 123, 176 
 V. Rochester, etc. E Co., 523 
 V. Scott, 73, 472, 473 
 V. Schriber, 735 
 V. Wass, 573 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 538 
 Grayson v. Lynch, 633 
 
 V. Wilkinson, 569 
 Grayville v. Whitaker 393 
 Greany V. Long Island R. Co., US, 
 
 114. 476, 477 
 Greasly v. Codling, 371 
 Great Falls Co. v. Worster, 731 
 Great Northern R. Co. v. Harrison, 
 
 486, 488, 491 
 Great Western R. Co. v. Bacon, 437 
 V. Blake, 459, 503 
 V. Braid. 406, 407 
 V. Geddis, 27, 427 
 V. Haworth, 374, 680 
 V. Miller, 493, 749 
 V. Morthland, 57, 419, 436 
 Greeley v. Federal St. etc. R. Co., 408 
 
 irrigating Co. v. House, 728 
 Green v. Banta, 204 
 
 V. Birge, 122, 701 
 
 V. Burke, 121, 313 
 
 V. Clarke, 33 
 
 V. Cross, 309a 
 
 V. Danby, 350, 353, 363 
 
 V. Dixon, .'i75 
 
 V. ErieR. Co., 99 
 
 V. Harrison county, 256 
 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 124, 
 
 764, 768 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 484 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co. , 186, 
 
 308, 211, 315 
 V. New York. 354 
 V. Portland, 359 
 V. State, 251 
 county V. Eubanks, 256 
 etc. R. Co. V. Bresmer, 209a 
 Greenberg v. Kingston, 334 
 
 V. Whitcomb Lumber Co., 219a, 
 24.=i 
 Greene v. Linton. 705 
 Greenfield \, Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 675, 676, 750 
 
Re/erences-\ TABLE OF CASES. Wre to sectioKS. IxXxix 
 
 Greenland v. Chaplin, 28, 61, 100 
 Greenleaf v. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 
 209a 
 V. Illinois, etc. E. Co., 54, 111, 
 207a. 218, 223 
 Greenough v. Gaskell, 576 
 Green Ridge R. Co. v. Brinkman, 
 
 666, 670 
 Greensboro v. McGibbonv, 289 
 Greenwald v. Marquette,'etc. R. Co., 
 
 241 
 Green way v. Conroy, 218 
 Greenwell v. Washington Market 
 
 Co., 719a 
 Greenwood v. Callahan, 114 
 V. Louisville, 265, 289 
 V. Phila.,etc. R. Co., 477 
 V. Westport, 285 
 Greer v. Louisville, etc. E. Co., 233& 
 Gregg V. Wyman, 104 
 Gregor v. Cadv, 708 
 Gregory v. Adams, 258, 370 380 
 V. Brown, 308 
 V. Bush, 735 
 
 V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 4S4 
 V. Layton, 668, 672 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 
 760 
 V. Ohio River R. Co.. 146 
 V. Woodworth, 107, 109, 113 
 Gresham v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 482 
 Grey v. Mobile Trading Co., 58,. 113 
 Grethen v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Grider v. Tally, 310 
 Gridley v. Bloomington, 343, 365, 384 
 Grier v. Sampson, 653 
 Gries v. Zeck, 638 
 Griffen v. Auburn, 605, 376 
 V. Colver, 744 
 v. Glen Mfg. Co., 313 
 V. Johnson, 369 
 V. New York, 262, 867, 376 
 V. Ohio, etc. R. O)., 185 
 V. Sanbornton, 8, 338, 371 
 V, Willow, 53 
 Giffln V. Boston & Alb. R. Co., 206 
 V. Ganaway, 630 
 V. United El. Light Co.. 698 
 Griflath V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 66a 
 483 
 V. Follett, 310 
 V. Lewis, 712. 72S 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 509, 521 
 V. Utica. etc. R. Co. , 523 
 Griffiths V. Clift, 645 
 
 V. Earl Dudley, 140, 178 
 V. Gidlow, 180, 209a 
 V. London, etc. Docks Co., 222 
 V. Northwestern R. Co., 410 
 V. WolfraDi, 245 
 Griggs T. Fleckenstein, 61, 64, 66, 94, 
 104. 634, 645 
 
 Grigsby v. Chappell, 383, 397 
 
 V. Clear Lake Water Co., 709a 
 Grill v. Gen. Iron Screw Co., 48 
 Grimes v. Eddy, 633 
 v. Keene, 286 
 
 v. Pennsylvania Co., 488, 490 
 Grimm v. Greenbush. 363 
 Grimmelman v. Union Pac. R. Co 
 
 233 
 Grimmell v. Chicago, etc. E. Co. 
 
 429, 430 
 Grimsley v. Hawkins, 60 
 Grindev v. MacKechnie, 703 
 Grinnell v. Tavlor, 634 
 Grippen v. N.'Y. Central R. Co., 61, 
 63, 64, 92, 93, 96, 417, 460, 
 463, 408, 471, 484 
 Grisim v. Milwaukee R. Co., 518 
 Griswold v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 
 493a 
 Griveaud v. St. Louis Cable, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 407 
 Groesbeck v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 481?) 
 Groff v. Ankenbrandt, 709a 
 
 V. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., 
 207 
 Grondin v. Duluth, etc. R. Co., 434 
 Groner v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 470 
 Gross V. Pennsylvania, etc. R. Co., 
 146 
 V. Portsmouth, 295 
 Grosse v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 434 
 Grossenback v. Milwaukee. 353 
 Grosso V. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 124 
 Grostick v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 90, 
 
 470 
 Grote V. Chester, 15, 278 
 
 V. Chester, etc. Co. , 406, 497 
 Grotenkemper v. Hai-ris, 766 
 Grotsch V. Stein way R. Co., 742 
 Grove v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 421 
 
 V. Fort Wayne, 289, 352 
 Grows V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 475 
 Grube v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 193 
 
 V. St. Paul, 205 
 Grumbine v. Washington, 291 
 Grundy v. Janesville, 309 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 439, 
 433 
 Gschwend v. Millvale, 375 
 Gubasco V. New York, 354 
 Guelich v. Nat. State Bank. 582 
 Guenther V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 114, 
 
 484 
 Guerdes v. Christopher Foundry Co., 
 
 376 
 Guerdon v. Corbett. 56 
 Guggenheim v. Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 463. 472, 47s 
 Guichard v. New, 01, 73o, 719a 
 Guille V. Swan, 85, 122 
 
xc 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. ia.re to sections. 
 
 Guilloz V. Ft. Wayne, etc. R. Co. 
 
 485a 
 Guinard v. Knapp Co., 217 
 Guldseth v. Carlin, 703 
 Gulf, etc. R. Co. V. Anderson, 477 
 
 V. Barnett, 493 
 
 Y. Benson, 673, 678 
 
 V. Blohn, 3.33b 
 
 V. Box, 426, 474 
 
 V. Breitling, 468 
 
 V. Campbell, 513a 
 
 V. Cash, 431, 451a 
 
 V. Chllds. 419 
 
 V. Compton, 763, 767, 772 
 
 V. Cusenberry, 668 
 
 V. Dawkins, 533 
 
 T. Donahoo, 735 
 
 V. Donnelly, 215 
 
 T. Fox, 99 
 
 V. Finley, 773 
 
 V. Gassoamp, 376 
 
 V. Geer, 553 
 
 V. Gierse, 89 
 
 \. Greenlee, 467 
 
 V. Hamilton, 479 
 
 V. Harriett, 309a 
 
 V. Helslev, 735 
 
 V. Hodges, 51, 468 
 
 V. Hudson, 421 
 
 V. Jackson, 185, 195 
 
 V. Jones, 319 
 
 V. Jordon, 531 
 
 V. Keith, 431 
 
 V. Killebrew, 494, 519 
 
 V. Kirkbride, 493 
 
 T, Kizziah, 185, 188,217 
 
 V. Levy, 538, 543, 756 
 
 V. Loonie, 753a, 754 
 
 V. Lowe, 680 
 
 V. McGowan, 60c 
 
 V. McLean, 679 
 
 V. McWhirter, 73 
 
 V. Miller, 537 
 
 V. Jlontgomery, 417 
 
 V. Moore, 749 
 
 V. Ogg, 434 
 
 V. Pendry, 473 
 
 V. Pettis, 194a 
 
 V. Pomeroy, 407 
 
 V. Pool, 750 
 
 v. Redeker, 197 
 
 V. Rowland, 678 
 
 V. Ryan, 3076 
 
 V. Shieder, 478 
 
 V. Smith, 457 
 
 T. Southwick, 770, 773 
 
 V. Styron, 73 
 
 V. Taylor, 407 
 
 V. Trott, 761 
 
 V. Washington, 419, 438, 441 
 
 V. Wells, 189, 2836 
 
 V. Williams, 217 
 
 V. Wilson, 492, 500 
 
 Gulf, etc. R. Co. V. Witte, 666 
 
 etc. Tel. Co. v. Richardson, 756 
 Gullett V. Lewis, 573 
 Gullikson v. McDonald, 260, 291 
 Gulline v. Lowell, 370 
 Gulliver v. Blauvelt, 865 
 Gulzoni V. Tyler, 503, 518 
 Gumb V. Twentv-third St. R. Co., 760 
 Gunibel v. 111. Cent. R. Co., 676 
 Gumz V. Chicago, etc. R. Co.. 89 
 Gunderson v. Northwestern Elevator 
 
 Co., 78 
 Gunn v. Ohio River R. Co., 99, 481a 
 Gunter v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., 184, 
 
 204, 3:^3 
 V. Wicker, 94, 99 
 Gurley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 464, 
 
 479 
 Gustafsen v. Washburn, etc. Mfg. 
 
 Co., 2416 
 Guta V. Lake Shore etc. R. Co., 476 
 Guthrie v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 205 
 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 206 
 Gutridge v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 
 194a, 410 
 Gwathney v. Little Miami R. Co., 
 
 413, 708 
 Gwinnell v. Earner, 709a 
 Gwynn v. Duffield, 691 
 
 Haack v. Fearing, 686 
 Haas v. Balch, 186, 215 
 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 185 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co , 2076, 
 
 213. 476 
 V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co., 
 
 63, 417, 478 
 V. Missionary Society, 381 
 Haase v. Oregon R. Co. , 489 
 Rachel v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 525 
 Hackett v. Middlesex Mfg. Co., 719a 
 v. Western Union Tel. Co., 164 
 Hackford v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 113, 
 
 472, 476 
 Haden v. Sioux City, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 
 341c, 758 
 Hadley v. Baxendale, 754 
 V. Tavlor, 343. 703 
 v. Western U. Tel. Co., 531, 
 754 
 Haehl v. Wabash R. Co., 151, 775 
 Haesley v. Winona , etc. R. Co. , 73 
 Haetsch v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Hafiford v. New Bedford, 265 
 Hagan v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 673, 
 675. 676 
 
 V. Pi-ovidence. etc. R. Co., 749 
 Hager V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 482, 
 
 485 
 Haggerty v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 207 
 
 V. Thomson, 709a 
 Hagins v. Cape Fear R. Co., 180, 
 333a 
 
Rj/erences ] TABLE OF CASES. [.are to sections. 
 
 xci 
 
 Hagood V. Southern, S49 
 
 Hahn v. So. Pacific E. Co., 410, 426 
 
 Haight V. Keokuk, 363 
 
 V. New York, 266, 295 
 Haile v. Texas, etc. R. Co., 761 
 Haines v. Hall, 737 
 
 V. Lewiston, 373 
 V. Roberts. 701, 706 
 V. Schultz, 749 
 V. Welch, 731 
 Hale V. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 480 
 V. Dutant, 708 
 V. Huntley, 621 
 V. Johnson, 165 
 V. Smith, 57, 107, 112 
 V. Weston. 371 
 Haley v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 94 
 V. Earle, 93 
 
 V. Jump River R. Co., 217 
 V. Keim, 224 
 
 V. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 139, 335 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. , 675 
 Hall V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 51 
 
 V. Connecticut River Steamb. 
 
 Co , 495, 749 
 V. Corcoran, 104 
 V. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 206 
 V. Hollander, 115 
 V. Johnson, 204 
 V. Lacy, 737 
 
 V. Manchester, 333, 334, 353 
 V. Man son, 353, 377 
 V. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 151, 493 
 V. Norwalk, 258, 259, 338 
 V. Ogden City R. Co., 55, 99, 
 
 485c. 654 
 V. Pac. R, Co., 205 
 V. Pickard, 644 
 V. Rankin, 691 
 V. Ripley, 104, 379, 646 
 V. Smith, 14, 340 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 410 
 V. Tillson, 725 
 V. Unity, 351 
 Halley, The, 172 
 Hallahan v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 518, 519 
 Halloran v. Harlem R. Co., 435 
 Hallower v. Henlev, 194 
 Halpin v. Kansas City, 289, 356, 369 
 
 V. Third Ave. R. Co., 535 
 Halstead v. New York, 299 
 Halverson v. Minneapolis, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 424 
 Hani V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 480, 488, 493, 535 
 v. New York, 255, 267. 285, 295, 
 733 
 Haman v. Omaha R. Co., 493 
 Hamden v. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 
 415 
 Hamilton v. Caledonia R Co., 488 
 V. Cutts, 574 
 
 Hamilton v. Des Moines, etc. R. Co 
 750 
 V. Feary, 709 
 
 V. Galveston, etc. R. Co., 319 
 V. Great Falls R. Co., 495, 516 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 133 
 V. McPherson, 95, 741 
 V. Morgan's S. S. Co., 73a, 139, 
 
 471 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 60a. 
 V. Rich Hill Coal Co., 311 
 V. State, 336 
 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 492a 
 V. Third Ave. R. Co., 493 
 V. Walla Walla, 230 
 county V. Mighels, 256, 285 
 Hamlin v. Yazoo, etc. R. Co., 58 
 Hamm v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 478 
 Hammack v. White, 644, 647 
 Hammargran v. St. Paul, 60c 
 Hammill v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 481 
 Hammon v. Southeastern R. Co., 680 
 Hammond v. Melton, 639 
 V. Mukwa, 49, 85, 378 
 V. St. Pancras, 11 
 V. Schiff, 701 
 County V. Johnson, 194 
 V. Mason, 194 
 Hampson v. Taylor, 110, 334, 363, 376 
 Hampton v. Pullman Car Co., 518 
 
 526 
 Hance v. Cayuga, etc. R. Co., 61, 455 
 Hancke v. Hooper, 605 
 Hancock v. Walsh, 251 
 
 v. York. 738 
 Hand v. Baynes, 40 
 
 V. Brookline, 386 
 V. Klinker, 3C2 
 Handy side v. Powers, 35, 55 
 Haney v. Kansas City, 18 
 
 V. Pittsburgh R. Co., 213 
 Haniford v. Kansas City, 358, 368 
 Hankins v. N. Y.. Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co.. 305, 231, 333, 333a 
 V. Watkins, 16, 18, 19, 686 
 Hankinson v. Charlotte, etc. R. Co 
 
 468 
 Hanks v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 464 
 v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 510 
 Hanley v. Huntington, 334 
 Hanlon v. Ingram, 669 
 V. Keokuk, 376 
 Y. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 54, 
 
 99 
 V. South Boston R. Co., 467 
 Hanly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 194, 
 
 195 
 Hanna v. Chattanooga, etc. R. Co., 
 181 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 132 
 v. Granger, 233 
 
xcu 
 
 Refcrenccsl TABLE OF CASES. Wc '" sections. 
 
 Hanna v. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co., 
 
 451a 
 Hannah v. Connecticut River R. Co., 
 
 194a, 307a, 313 
 Hannaher v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 
 407, 413 
 Hannem v. Pence, 343, 701a 
 Hannibal, etc. R. Co. v. Fox, 203, 
 203a, 305, 333 
 V. Husen, 633 
 V. Kenney, 419, 456 
 V. Martin, 490, 503, 523 
 V. Swift, 486 
 Hannigan v. Union Warehouse Co., 
 
 181 
 Hannon v. Agnew, 310, 330 
 
 V. St. Louis county, 285, 386 
 Hanover, etc. R. Co. v. Coyle, 481 
 Hanrahan v. Cochran, 646 
 
 V. Manhattan Co., 606, 519 
 Harirathy v Northern Central R. Co. , 
 
 180, 184, 309a 
 Hans V. Louisiana, 249 
 Hansan v. So. Pacific R. Co., 417a, 
 
 457, 481 
 Hanscom v. Boston, 338, 367 
 Hanselman v. Carstens, 614 
 Hansley v. Janes ville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 748 
 Hanson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 417, 
 426 
 V. Eastern, etc. R. Co., 749 
 V. European, etc. R. Co., 154 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 520 
 V. Schneider, 189 
 Hanvey v. Rochester, 399 
 Harbor v. Kallager, 367 
 Hard v. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 180, 
 
 184, 189 
 Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R., 
 
 etc. R. Co., 343, 403, 703 
 Hardegg v. Willards, 146 
 Hardenburgh v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 
 493 
 Harder v. Minneapolis, 373 
 Harding v. Boston, 166 
 v. Fahey, 16 
 V. Hale, 334 
 V. Jaspar, 334 
 V. Townshend, 765 
 Hardrop v. Gallagher, 703 
 Hard wick v. Georgia R. Co., 519 
 Hardy v. Brooklyn, 354, 263, 379 
 V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 335 
 V. Keene, 291, 354 
 V. Milwaukee R. Co., 518, 740, 
 
 743 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co. , 231 
 V. N.Y. Cent. R.Co., 493 
 V. North Carolina Cent. R. Co. , 
 180, 193, 407 
 Hare v. Mclntyre, 345, 688 a 
 Hargis v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 474 
 
 Hargreaves v. Deacon, 8, 97, 705 
 
 Harkin v. Crumbie, 710 
 
 Harkins v. Pittsburgh, etc. Traction 
 
 Co., 73a 
 Harkness v. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 
 542, 553 
 Harlan v. Lumsden, 617, 618 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 24, 35 
 Harley v. Buffalo Car Mfg. Co., 195 
 
 V. Butawville R. Co., 428 
 Harlinger v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 137, 151. 769, 773 
 Harlow v. Humiston, 279, 365 
 Harman v. Tappenden, 310 
 Harmond v. Pearson, 738 
 Harper v. Milwaukee, 258, 287 
 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 132 
 Harr v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 217 
 Harrell v. Albemarle, etc. R. Co., 
 
 436 
 Harrigan v. Brooklyn, 353, 375 
 
 V. Clarksburg, 338 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 209a 
 
 V. Wilmington, 274, 287, 367 
 Harriman v. Boston, 369 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 484, 
 688 
 
 V. Stowe, 244 
 
 V. Wilkins, 618 
 Harrington v. Binns, 572 
 
 V. Buffalo, 363 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 449 
 
 V. Fuller, 618 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 192 
 
 V. Ward, 313 
 Harris, The C. P., 736 
 
 V. Atlanta, 391 
 
 V. Cameron, 34 
 
 V. Commercial Ice Co., 654 
 
 V, Fisher, 635 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 513a 
 
 V. Hewitt, 185a 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 150 
 
 V. Mabry, 148 
 
 V. McNamara, 139, 164, 167, 168 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 476 
 
 V. Newbury, 373 
 
 V. Nicholas, 150 
 
 V. Perry, 719, 723 
 
 V. Ryding, 716 
 
 V. School District, 256 
 
 V. Shebek, 219 
 
 V. Simon, 688a 
 
 V. Stevens, 493a 
 
 V. Thompson, 333 
 
 V. Vigo county, 357 
 
 V. Uebelhoer, 66a 
 Harrisburg v. Saylor, 278 
 Harrisburgh, The, 124, 133 
 
 V Taylor, 298 
 Harrison v. Adamson, 656 
 
 V. Baltimore, 266 
 
 V. Berkley, 28 
 
Re/erencci\ TABLE OF CASES, [<""« to sections. 
 
 XCIU 
 
 Harrison v. Brega, 593 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 178, 179, 187 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 428 
 V. Collins, 298 
 V. Denver, etc. R. Co., 186 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 231, 
 
 230, 333 
 V. Fink, 493, 519 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 65, 
 
 133, 738 
 V. Redden, 803 
 V. Sutter, 769 
 
 V. Washington, etc. R. Co., 530 
 Harroun v. Brush El. Light Co., 698 
 Hart V. Albany, 333, 833 
 V. Bridgeport, 261 
 ^. Brooklyn, 367 
 V. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 759 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 466 
 V. Cole, 710 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. Co., 114, 725 
 V. Devereux, 93, 482 
 V. Frame, 559, 564, 567 
 V. Grinnell. 704 
 V. Hill, 338 
 V. Hudson, 587 
 V. Hudson River Bridge Co., 
 
 54, 57, 58. 107, 113, 114, 396 
 V. Lancashire, etc. R. Co., 60c 
 V. Naumberg, 195 
 V. N. Y., etc. Dock Co., 238 
 V. Red Cedar, 376, 377 
 V. Ryan, 701 
 
 V. Washington Park Club, 626 
 V. Western R. Co., 666 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 556 
 Harter v. Morris, 24, 566 
 Hartfleld v. Roper, 10, 73, 73a, 74, 75, 
 
 84 
 Hartford v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 833, 241c 
 V. Talcott, 18a, 343 
 etc, R. Co. V. Jackson, 179 
 county V. Hamilton, 257 
 V. Wise, 857, 389 
 Hartigan V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 133 
 Hartley v. Harriman, 639 
 Hartsliorn v. Chaddock, 750 
 Hartstein v. W. U. Tel. Co., 758a 
 Hartwig v. Bay State Shoe Co., 
 181, 307 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 57, 473 
 v. N. P. Lumber Co., 202 
 Harty v. Central R. Co., 470, 480 
 Hartzall v. Sill, 780 
 Hartzig v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 513a 
 Harvard College v. Stearns, 371 
 Harvey v. Alturas Gold Min. Co., 
 215 
 V. Dunlop, 10, 16 
 V. Hillsdale. 291 
 V. N. y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 193, 233a. 335,241 
 
 Harvey v. Virginia, 249 
 Harwood v. Bennington, etc. R. Co., 
 421 
 V. Lowell, 338, 749a 
 HaskeU v. New Bedford, 358, 274 
 
 V. No. Adirondack R. Co., 750 
 V. Penn Yan, 368 
 Hass V. Philadelphia, etc. S. S. Co., 
 
 234 
 Hassa-v. Junger, 61 
 Hassenyer v. Mich. Central R. Co., 
 86, 812 
 V. Railroad Co., 379 
 Hastings v. Central Crosstown R. 
 Co., 533 
 V. Halleck, 559, 569, 572 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 497 
 Hasty V. Sears, 241 
 Hatch V. Dwight, 731 
 V. Fogerty, 559 
 
 V. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 883, 
 395 
 Hatcher v. Dunn, 313 
 Hathaway v. Des Moines, 230 
 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 56 
 V. Hinton, 340 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 193, 
 
 832 
 V. Tinkham, 626 
 V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 74 
 Hathorn v. Richmond, 607 
 Hatt V. Nay, 193, 331 
 Hatter v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 185 
 Hattermann v. Siemann, 1 17 
 Hatton V. Holmes, 603 
 Hauch V. Hernandez, 678 
 Haugen v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 666, 
 
 678 
 Haugh V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 158. 
 
 185&, 317 
 Haughey v. Hart, 343, 703 
 Hauser v. Central R. Co. of N. Jer- 
 sey, 485 
 Hausman v. Madison, 363 
 Haven v. Pittsburg Bridge Co., 376 
 Havener v. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Havens v. Erie R. Co., 469, 483 
 Haverly v. McClelland, 591 
 
 V. State Line, etc. R. Co., 55, 
 679 
 Hawes v. Fox Lake, 355 
 Hawker v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 467 
 Hawkeye Lumber Co. v. Diddy, 619 
 Hawkins v. Front St. R. Co., 516, 
 
 533, 764 
 v. Great Western R. Co., 178 
 V. Johnson, 185a 
 V. Phythian, 119 
 Hawks V. Northampton, 350, 408 
 
 V. Winans, 530 
 Hawley v. Atlantic, 356 
 
XCIV 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. [<"-' '" sections. 
 
 Hawley v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 87 
 V. Gloversville, 368 
 V. Northern Central R. Co., 91, 
 186, 309a, 315 
 Hawksworth v. Thompson, 133, 348 
 Hawver v. Whalen, 14, 359 
 Hawxhurst v. New York, 398, 345 
 Haxton v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 
 434 
 Hay V. Cohoes Co., 9, 688a 
 Haycroft v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 54, 73, 476, 477 
 Hayden v. Attleborough, 334, 356, 
 393 
 v.'ciark, 365 
 
 V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 478 
 V. Smith ville Mfg. Co., 184, 
 191, 318, 683 
 Hayes v. Cambridge, 338 
 
 V. Bush, etc. Mfg. Co., 73, 3076 
 T. Forty-second St. R. Co., 56 
 V. Michigan Central R. Co. , 8, 
 
 9, 37, 57, 88, 443, 466a, 481 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 130a, 
 
 477 
 V. Norcross, 73a 
 V. Oshkosh, 365 
 V. Porter, 313. 616 
 V. R. R. Co., 393 
 V. Waldron, 739, 730, 734 
 V. West Bay City, 14, 368 
 V. Williams, 54, 133, 778 
 Haygood v. Justices, etc., 356 
 Hayman v. Hewett, 639 
 Hayne v. Rhodes, 559, 575 
 Hayiies, Matter of, 574 
 
 V. East Tennessee R. Co., 302 
 V. Tunstall, 619 
 Hays V. Gainesville R. Co., 99 
 V. Gallagher, 58 
 V. Kennedy, 16 
 V. Millar, 143 
 V. Miller, 669 
 Hay ward v. Merrill, 103 
 Haywood v. Charlestown, 334 
 
 V. N, Y. Central R. Co., 466 
 Hazard v. New England Ins. Co., 179 
 
 V. Robinson, 731 
 Hazard Co. v. Volger, 764 
 Hazeltine v. Concord R. Co., 676 
 Hazen v. West Superior Lumber Co., 
 
 303 
 Hazelhurst v. Brunswick Lumber 
 
 Co., 816 
 Hazlett V. Commercial Nat. Bank, 
 
 580a, 
 Hazman v. Hoboken Land, etc. Co., 
 
 511 
 Hazzard v. Council Bluffs, 386, 387, 
 
 375 
 Heacock v. Sherman, 359, 390 
 
 V. State, 398 
 Headen v. Rust, 419 
 
 Healey v. City Pass. R. Co., 151 
 
 V. New York, 93 
 Heaney v. Long Island R. Co., 56, 
 
 463, 467, 476, 478 
 Heard v. Hoi man, 744 
 Hearne v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 90, 
 
 475 
 Heath, Matter of, 310 
 
 V. Barman, 385 
 
 V. Met. Exhibition Co., 709 
 
 V. Stewart. 460 
 
 V. Williams, 781 
 Heaven v. Pender, 1, 8, 38, 116 
 Heavey V. Hudson, etc. Paper Co., 
 
 318 
 Heazle v. Indianapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 494 
 Hebbard v. Berlin, 350 
 Hebron v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 439 
 Hecht V. Ohio, etc. R. Co., 140 
 Hector v. Boston El. Light Co., 698 
 
 Min. Co. V. Robertson, 64 
 Heddles v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 467, 
 
 761 
 Hedin v. Suburban R. Co. , 485c 
 Hedges v. Kansas City, 67 
 Hedley v. Pinkney S. S. Co., 337 
 Heeg V. Licht, 17, 689, 701a 
 Heeney v. Sprague, 13, 13a, 348 
 Hefferen v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 195, 
 
 318 
 Hegan v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 485a, 
 
 653 
 Hegeman V. Western R. Co., 14, 45, 
 
 410, 497 
 Heidenheimer v. Ellis, 747 
 Heidenwag v. Philadelphia, 398, 361 
 Heil V. Glanding, 61, 68, 99, 748, 758 
 Heimann v. Western U. Tel. Co., 554 
 Heine v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 333 
 Heinemann v. Heard, 57 
 Heininger v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 
 
 436 
 Heinlein v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 490, 
 
 493a 
 Heintze v. New York, 118 
 Heirn v. McCaughan, 115 
 Heissenbuttel v. New York, 335 
 Heizer v. Kingsland, etc. Mfg. Co., 
 
 117 
 Heland v. Lowell, 379 
 Helena v. Thompson, 273, 274 
 Helfenstein v. Medart, 185, 207& 
 Helfrich v. Ogden R. Co., 301 
 Heller v. Abbott, 45 la, 453 
 
 V. Sedalia, 365 
 
 V. Stremmel. 353 
 Helm V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 183 
 
 V. O'Rourke, 185b 
 Helmke v. Stetler, 639 
 Heltonville Mfg. Co. v. Fields, 1856, 
 
 207a 
 Hembling v. Grand Rapids, 346, 369 
 
References^ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 xcv 
 
 Hemtningwav \. Chicago, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 510,520 
 Henavie v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 654 
 Henckev. Milwaukee R. Co., 495 
 Henckes v. Minneapolis, 363 
 Henderehott v. Ottumwa, 389 
 Henderson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 417, 455 
 V. Covington, 256 
 V. Davis, .i34 
 V. Minneapolis, 274 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 
 58 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 479 
 V. Sandefur, 263 
 V. Stevenson, o04 
 V. Walker, 341c 
 V. "Williams, 203 
 Co. V. Phila. & Reading R. Co., 
 675, 676 
 Hendrick v. Cook, 733 
 
 V. Ilwaco R. Co., 139 
 V. Walton, 139 
 Hendricks v. Johnson, 739 
 Hendricksen v. Meadows, 704, 719 
 Hendrikson v. Great Northern R. 
 
 Co., 4816, 483 
 Hendrix v. St. Joseph, etc. R. Co., 
 
 449 
 Henkel v. Murr, 708, 709, 710 
 Henley v. Lyme Regis, 381 
 Hennessey v. Brooklyn R. Co., 81 
 
 V. New Bedford, 291 
 Hennies v. Vogel, 115 
 Henning v. Caldwell, 477 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 359 
 Henry v. Braokenridge Lumber Co., 
 57 
 V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 97, 
 
 674 
 V. Dennis, 35, 39 
 V. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 419 
 V. Klopfer, 645, 764 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 194a, 
 
 241 
 V. Ohio River R. Co., 735 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 38, 55 
 V. So. Pacific R. Co., 28, 30, 666, 
 
 675 
 V. Staten L R. Co., 341 
 V. Wabash W. R. Co., 197 
 Henshaw v. Noble, 343 
 Hepburn v. Philadelphia, 359 
 Hepfel V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 73a, 
 
 99. 
 Herdt v. Rochester, etc, R. Co., 533 
 Herlisch v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 331 
 Hermann v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 
 124 
 Hermans v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 478 
 Heme v. So. Pac. R. Co., 678 
 
 Herold v. Meyers, 656, 662 
 
 V. Pflster, 318 
 Herr v. Lebanon, 378 
 Herrick v. Gary, 633 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 131 
 V. Sullivan, 647 
 Herring v. Dist. of Columbia, 274 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 93, 480 
 Herrington v. Corning, 263 
 
 V. Lansingburgh, 175, 398 
 V. Phoenix, 369 
 Herron v. Western U. Tel. Co , 542 
 
 543, 555, 754, 755 
 Hersom's Case, 303 
 Herstine v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 516 
 Heslop V. Metcalfe, 568 
 Hess V. Lupton, 720 
 V. Pegg, 254 
 V. Rosenthal. 194 
 Hesser v. Grafton, 876 
 Hession v. Wilmington, 387 
 Hetfield v. Towsley, 303 
 Hetrich v. Deachler, 739, 730 
 Hett V. Pun Pong, 573 
 Heucke V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 54, 
 
 60c 
 Hewey v. Nourse, 668 
 Hewett V. Swift, 244, 348 
 Hewison v. New Haven, 263, 350, 355 
 Hewitt V. Eisenbart, 759 
 
 V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 309a, 221 
 V. Walker, 659 
 Hewlett V. George, 766 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 536, 546 
 Hexamer v. Webb, 144, 164, 165, 168 
 
 173, 361 
 Hey V. Philadelphia, 346 
 Heymann v. Cunningham, 618 
 Heywood v. Hildreth, 623 
 Hiatt V. Des Moines, etc. R. Co., 410 
 Hibbard v. Thompson, 61, 99, 615, 741 
 
 v. W. U. Tel. Co., 547, 553 
 Hickenbottom v. Delaware, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 508 
 Hickey v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 61, 473, 
 533 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 114, 463 
 V. St. PaulR. Co., 485o 
 V. Taaffe, 195, 318, 319 
 V. Waltham, 850 
 Hickman v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 113 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 531 
 Hickok V. Hine, 786 
 
 V. Plattsburgh, 381, 389, 338, 
 358 
 Hicks V. Dorn, 325 
 
 V. N. Y.. New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 468, 468, 477 
 V. Pacific, etc. R. Co., 73, 458 
 Hide V. Thornborough, 701 
 Higert v. Greencastle, 353 
 
XCVl 
 
 References} TABLE OF CASES. i^re to sections. 
 
 Higgins V. Boston, 378 
 
 V. Butcher, 124 
 
 V. Central, etc. R. Co., 133, 133 
 
 V. Chesapeake, etc. Canal Co., 
 16, 402 
 
 V. Deeney, 74 
 
 V. Dewey, 21. 30, 666, 669 
 
 V. Glens Falls, 353, 375 
 
 V. Harlem R. Co., 532 
 
 V. Kendrick, 631 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 238 
 
 V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 505 
 
 V. Watervliet Turnpike, etc. 
 Co., 150, 151, 493 
 Higgs V. Maynard, 144 
 High V. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 483 
 Highland Ave. R, Co. v. Burt, 508 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Donovan, 523 
 
 V. Sampson, 167, 483, 485c 
 
 V. Walters. 2416 
 
 V. Winn, 7 
 Higley v. Gilmer, 606 
 Hildreth v. Lowell, 299 
 Hill V. Allen, 559 
 
 V. Applegate, 97 
 
 V. Balls, 633 
 
 V. Boston, 256, 358, 267, 281, 
 285, 337 
 
 V. Charlotte, 363, 355 
 
 V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 739 
 
 V. Concord R. Co., 449 
 
 V. Featherstonhaugh, 559 
 
 V. Fond du Lac, 334a 
 
 V. Gust, 46, 114, 219 
 
 V. Livingston, 394 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 65 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 419 
 
 V. New Haven. 108 
 
 V. New York, 362 
 
 V. Ninth Ave. R. Co., 516, 518 
 
 V. Ontario, etc. R. Co., 680 
 
 V. Portland, etc. R. Co., 436 
 
 V. Rensselaer county, 261 
 
 V. Schneider, 688a, 701a 
 
 V. Seekonk, 375, 379 
 
 V. Sewell, 617, 619 
 
 V. Smith, 283 
 
 V. State, 340 
 
 V. Supervisors, etc., 337 
 
 V. Tionesta. 370 
 
 V. United States, 349 
 
 V. West End R. Co , 508 
 
 V. Western U Tel. Co., 554, 754 
 Hillard v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 434 
 Hiller v. Sharon Springs, 367 
 Hilliard v. Richardson, 168, 173, 699 
 Hilliker v Coleman, 733 
 Hillman v. Newington, 66 
 Hilsdorf v. St. Louis, 391 
 Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 710 
 Hilton V. Granville. 716 
 
 V. Whitehead, 716 
 
 Hilts V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 192 
 Himmerman v. Satterlee, 333 
 Hinckley v. Emerson, 629 
 Hlndal v. Blades, 624 
 Hinckley v. Cape Cod R. Co., 107, 
 111, 112, 476 
 
 V. Horazdowski, 218 
 
 v. Krug, 23 
 
 V. Penobscot, 104 
 
 V. Somerset. 356, 369 
 Hindman v. Oregon R. etc. Co., 421, 
 451a 
 
 V. Timme, 3'i5 
 Hine v. Gushing, 666, 703 
 
 V. Wooding, 657 
 Hiner v. Fond du Lac, 343 
 Hines v. Charlotte, 363 
 
 V. Lockport, 253, 263, 374 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 185a 
 Hinken v. Iowa Central R. Co., 476 
 Hinkle v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 463, 
 
 464, 476 
 Hinman V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 421 
 Hinshaw v. Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 521 
 Hinz V. Starin, 702, 704 
 Hipkins v, Birmingham Gas Co., 
 
 692, 693 
 Hirsoh v. New York, etc. R. Co., 525 
 Hissong V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 241c 
 Hitchcock -v . Burgett, 605, 607 
 Hitchins v. Frostburg, 27.S 
 Hite V. Blanchford, 633 
 
 V. Whitley county, 256 
 Hixon V. Lowell, 258, 333, 350 
 Hixson V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Hoadley v. Northern Tr. Co.. 40 
 Hoag V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. , 28, 
 30, 666 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 66a, 67 
 Hoagland v. Culvert, 313 
 Hoar v. Maine Central R. Co., 61, 535 
 
 V. Merritt, 195 
 Hoard v. Peck, 115 
 Hoben v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 96 
 Hobbs V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 233a 
 
 V. Stauer, 195, 197 
 Hoboken Land, etc. Co. v. Hoboken, 
 729 
 
 V. Lally, 92 
 Hoby V. Built, 568 
 Hockett V. State, 536 
 Hockstedler v. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 
 
 674 
 Hocum v.'Weitherick, 108, 113 
 Hodge v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 412, 731 
 
 V. N. Y. Contral R. Co., 425 
 Hodges V. Buffalo, 299 
 
 V. New Hanover Tr. Co., 521 
 
 V. Percival, 60c, 719a 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 468 
 Hodgkins v. Chappell, 606 
 
References^ TABLE OF CASES. \.are to sections. 
 
 XCVll 
 
 Hodgkins v. Eastern R. Co. , 341 
 
 V. Rockport, 323, 367 
 Hodgkinson v. Ennor, 734 
 
 V. Fernie, 322 
 Hodgson V. Lynch, 619 
 Hodnett v. Boston, etc. R. Co. 137 
 
 774 
 HodsoU V. Stallebrass, 115 
 Hoehn v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 530 
 Hoey V. Dublin, etc. R. Co., 191, 315 
 V. Felton, 38 
 V. Natick, 367 
 Hoflf V. West Jersey R. Co., 673 
 Hoffman v^ Adams, 219 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 675, 676, 
 
 679 
 V. Clough, 316 
 V. Dickinson, 186, 315 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 64, 
 
 150, 151, 473, 513, 535 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 748 
 V. Tuolumne Water Co., 16, 732 
 V. Union Ferrv Co., 114 
 Hofnagle v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 8, 
 
 34 
 Hogan V. Central Pac. R. Co., 180 
 
 V. Kentucky Union R. Co. , 414 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 56, 60 
 V. Noi-thfleld, 60b 
 V. Smith, 19i 
 V. Tyler, 4816 
 Hoge V. Raymond, 123 
 Hogele V. Wilson, 316 
 Hogenson v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 
 735 
 Hogg V. Martin, 565 
 
 V. Zanesville Canal Co., 338 
 Hoffgatt V. Biglev, 313 
 Holbrook v. Utica, etc. R. Co., 25, 57, 
 
 107, 516, 519 
 Holbrow V. Wilkins, 603 
 Holcomb V. Danby, 104 
 Holdane v. Cold Springs, 333 
 Holden v. Fitchburg R, Co., 178, 197 
 V. Liverpool Gas Co., 113 
 V.Rutland, etc. R. Co., 433, 662, 
 
 664 
 V. Shattuck, 365, 634, 657 
 V. Winn. Lake Cotton Co., 
 739 
 Holder v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 431, 
 448 
 V. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 140 
 Hole V. Sittingbourne R. Co., 14, 176 
 Holker v. Parker, 573 
 Holladay v. Marsh, 659, %^ 
 Hollady v. Kennard. 39 
 Holland v. Bartch, 653 
 V. Brown, 770 
 V. Sparks, 97 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 193 
 HoUenbeck v. Berkshire R. Co., 139, 
 767a 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — g.] 
 
 HoUenbeck v. Johnson, 626 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 323 
 V. Winnebago county, 255, 256, 
 285 
 Hollender v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 468 
 HoUey v. Torrington, 122 
 
 V. Winoski Turnp. Co., 393 
 Holliday v. Marsh, 659 
 
 V. St. Leonard's, 326 
 Hollingsworth v. Saunders county, 
 
 256 
 Hollis V. W. U. Tel. Co., 755 
 Holloran v. Union Iron Co., 309a 
 HoUoway v. Lockport, 376 
 Holly V. Boston Gas Co., 47, 53, 74, 
 
 77, 81, 093, 693 
 Holman v. Boston Land Co., 668, 673, 
 679 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 37, 63, 
 
 437, 467 
 V. Tovirnsend, 338, 363, 371 
 Holmes v. Allegheny Tr. Co., 508, 
 521 
 V. Carolina Cent. R. R. Co , 
 
 748, 749 
 V. Central R. Co., 480 
 v. Clarke, 91 
 V. Corthell, 371 
 V. Drew, 703 
 v. Hamburg, 367 
 V. Mather, 647 
 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 704, 705 
 V. Onion, 163 
 V. Paris, 367 
 V. Peck, 559 
 V. South. Pac. Coast R. Co., 
 
 476, 483 
 V. South. Pac. R. Co., 101 
 V. Union Tel. Co., 144 
 V. Wakefield, 64, 493 
 Holmgren v. Twin City R. T. Co., 
 
 48r)c 
 Holsraan v. Boiling Spring Bleach- 
 ing Co. , 7^4 
 Holstine v. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 64 
 Holt V. Spokane, etc. R. Co., 60c 
 
 V. Whatley, 108, 113 
 Holton V. London, etc. R. Co., 514 
 
 V. Waller, 709 
 Holtzman v. Hoy, 614 
 Holyoke v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 499, 
 
 758 
 Holzniann v. Monell, 719 
 Homan v. Liswell, 616 
 
 V. Stanley, K59. 703 
 Homer v. Everett, 704 
 
 V. Watson, 736 
 Homestake Mining Co. v. FuUerton. 
 
 12, 185a 
 Hommert v. Gleason, 310 
 Honegsberger v. Second Ave. R. Co., 
 71,73. 74, 75 
 
xcviii 
 
 References} TABLE OF -CASES. {"re to sections. 
 
 Honey v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 67 
 Honlahan v. New American File Co., 
 
 219 
 Honner v. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 180 
 Honsee v. Hammond, 729, 734, 750 
 Hood V. New Haven R. Co., 508, 544 
 Hook V. Worcester, etc. R. Co. , 57 
 Hooker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 483 
 
 V. Miller, 97 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. Co , 733 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. Canal Co., 
 399, 403 
 
 V. Rochester, 274 
 Hooper v. Goodwin, 313 
 
 V. Johnstown, etc. R. Co., 73a, 
 414 
 
 V. Snead Iron Works, 19.") 
 Hoosier Stone Co. v. McCain. 185 
 Hoover v. Beech Creek R. Co., 207 
 
 V. Heim, 115 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 675 
 Hope V. Fall Brook Coal Co., 195 
 Hopkins v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 115, 
 748, 749, 758, 764 
 
 V. Rush River, 376 
 
 V. Utah N. R. Co., 108 
 
 V. \Villard, 573 
 
 Bridfre Co. v. Burnett, 185 
 Hopkinson v. Knapp, etc. Co., Ill, 
 
 773 
 Hoppe V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 13, 
 
 72, 467 
 Hopper V. Reeve, 644 
 Hopping V. Quin, 559, 567 
 Horan v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 207a, 
 
 207& 
 Horey v . Haverstraw, 335 
 Horn V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 431 
 
 V. Baltimore, 283, 299 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co. , 483 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 256 
 Hornbein v. Blanchard, 635 
 Home V. Meakin, 637 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 207 
 
 V. Pudil, 303 
 Horner v. Coffey, 358 
 
 V. Nicholson. 197 
 
 V. Watson, 717 
 Hornsby v. Eddy, 241c 
 Horton v. Ipswich, 367, 376 
 
 V. Nashville, 263 
 
 V. Norwalk, etc. R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Sullivan, 735 
 
 V. Taunton, 355. 378 
 
 V. Trompeter, 376 ' 
 Hortsman v. Covington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 413 
 Hosack V. College of Physicians, 354 
 Hosic v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 185a, 
 
 186, 197 
 Hoskins v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 481, 485 
 
 Hoskins v. Phillips, 563 
 
 Hoskinson v. Cent. Vt. R. Co. , 666, 
 
 675 
 Hosmer v. Old Colony R. Co., 505 
 Hot Springs R. Co. y. Dial, 182 
 
 V. Newman, 439 
 Hotel Ass'n v. Walter, 114, 719 
 Holh V. Peters. 56, 108, 338 
 Houck V. Wachter, 8, 371 
 Houfe V. Fallon, 287 
 
 V. Fulton, 258, 333, 884, 346, 
 375, 379, 390, 393, 395 
 Hough V. Railroad Co., 108, 205 
 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 91, 187, 
 189, 194, 197, 204, 208, 210, 
 311, 214, 215 
 Houghkirk v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 
 Co., 137, 466. 769, 775 
 Houghtaling v. Shelly, 346 
 Houghton V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 478 
 Houlden v. Smith, 303 
 Houlihan v. Connecticut River R. 
 
 Co.. 133. 18.5a 
 Hounsell v. Smyth. 97, 703, 705 
 Hourigan v. No well, 117 
 Housatonic R. Co. v. Knowles, 456 
 House v. Houston Water Works Co., 
 265 
 
 V. Metcalf , 606, 709a 
 
 V. Montgomery county, 257 
 Houser v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 232 
 Houseman v. Girard, etc. Asso., 8, 
 
 117 
 Houston V. Brush, 159, 194, 194a, 
 197, 305, 333, 703 
 
 V. Culver, 203 
 
 V. Gate St. R Co. , 493a 
 
 V. Isaacks, 368, 375 
 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 341 
 
 V. Traphagen, 703 
 
 V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 460, 
 480 
 Houston, etc. R. Co. v. Boehm, 758 
 
 V. Brin, 47, 464a 
 
 V. Boiling, 489, 533 
 
 V. Carson, 463 
 
 V. Clemmons. 61, 523, 524 
 
 V. Conrad, 185 
 
 V. Cowser, 108 
 
 V. Devainy, 525 
 
 V. Dunham, 194a, 205 
 
 V. Fowler, 186a 
 
 V. Gorbett, 51, 102, 146 
 
 V. Hampton, 181, 235 
 
 V. Leslie, 742 
 
 V. McNamara, 316 
 
 V. Marcelles, 204 
 
 V. Meyers, 207 
 
 V. Miller, 218 
 
 V. Moore, 61, 523 
 
 V. Nixon, 467 
 V. Oram, 205 
 
Ke/erences-\ TABLE OF CASES. {arc to sections. XCiX 
 
 Houston, etc. R. Co. v. Parker, 407 
 V. Reason, 93 
 V. Richards, 476 
 V. Richart, 408, 743 
 V. Rider, 235 
 
 V. Simpson, 73, 78, 410, 434 
 V. Smith. 58, 480, 484 
 V. Stewart, 146, 478 
 V. Sympkins 93, 483 
 V. Washington, 488, 513 
 V. Willie, 758 
 V. Wilson, 467 
 V. Woodlock, 485c 
 Houston St. R. Co. v. Autrey, 408 
 
 V. DeLesdernier, 359 
 Hovell V. Howell, 177 
 Hover v. Barkhoof, 313, 314, 340, 374 
 
 V. Pennsylvania E. Co., 131 
 Howard v. Benton, 700 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 774 
 v. Grover, 607, 6' 3 
 v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 479 
 V. North Bridge water, 350, 351 
 
 3.i3 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 463 
 V. San Francisco, 365 
 V. Union Freight R. Co., 359 
 V. Worcester, 267 
 Howard county v. Legg, 257, 272 
 
 36!) 
 Howard Oil Co. v, Davis, 758 
 
 v. Farmer, 186 
 Howd V. Miss. Central R. Co., 194a, 
 
 326 
 Howe V. Castleton, 380 
 V. Mason, 303 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 477 
 V. Newmarch, 151 
 V. New Orleans, 362 
 V. Ohniart, 35, 706 
 V. Plainfleld, 367 
 V. Sinclair, 120a 
 V. Young, 645 
 Howell V. McCoy, 729, 784 
 V. Ransom, 566 
 V. Young, 574, 575 
 Ho wells V. Landore Co., 387 
 Howenstein v. Pacific R. Co., 13 
 Howes V. Rose, 690, 691 
 Howitt V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 
 54 
 Howland v. Edmonds, 378 
 
 V. Vincent, 703 
 Howser v. Cumbei'land, etc. R. Co., 
 
 485- 
 Howsmon v. Trenton Water Co., 
 
 365 
 Hoy V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 673 
 
 V. Sterett, 739, 730 
 Hoye V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 466 
 Hoyer v. North Tonawanda, 367 
 Hoyle V. Excelsior Steam Laundry 
 Co., 216 
 
 Hoyleman v. Kanawha, etc. R. Co , 
 
 661 
 Hoyt V. Hudson, 56, 108, 114, 262 
 374, 739 
 V. Jeflfers. 30, 666. 668, 675 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 87, 473 
 Hrebik v. Carr, 510 
 Hubbard v. Boston, etc. R. Co. , 417. 
 478 
 V. Concord, 353, 376 
 V. Switzer, 591 
 Hubbart v. Phillips, 562 
 Hubbel V. Virogua, 363 
 Hubbell V. Yonkers, 356, 367 
 Huber v. Wilson, 203 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 433 
 Hubert v. Bedell, 639 
 
 v. Groves, 371 
 Hubgh V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 
 65, 134 
 Huchting v. Engel, 121 
 Huckshold v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 469 
 Hudson V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 60c 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 213 
 V. Johnson, 573 
 V. Oceans. S. Co., 195 
 V, Roberts, 639, 631 
 V. Wabash R. Co., 479 
 Huerzeler V. Central, etc R. Co., 72 
 Huey V. Gahlenbeck, 719 
 Huflv. Ames, 78, 318, 233 
 V. Austin, 683 
 V. Ford, 160, 161 
 V. Poweshiek county, 357 
 Hufford V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co., 
 
 151, 493 
 Huffman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 193 
 
 V. San Joaquin county, 256 
 Hughbanks v. Boston In v. Co., 165 
 Hughes V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 191, 263 
 V. Bingham, 336 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 506 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 478 
 V. Fond du Lac, 368, 373 
 V. Hannibal etc. R. Co., 419, 
 
 448 
 V. Lawrence, 363 
 V. McCoy, 303 
 V. Macfie, 73 
 
 V. Monroe county, 256, 266 
 V. Muscatine, 53, 61 
 V. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 435 
 V. Providence, etc. R. Co., 279, 
 
 359 
 V. Pullman Car Co., 497 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 755 
 Hughlett V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 521 
 
Re/erences^ TABLE OF CASES. U""'' to sections. 
 
 Huhn V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 209a, 
 
 215 
 Huizega v. Cutler, etc. Lumber Co., 
 
 760 
 Hulbert v. Topeka, 133 
 Hulehan v. Green Bay, etc. R. Co., 
 
 194, 194a, 205 
 Hulett V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 185 
 Hull V. East Line, etc. R. Co., 509. 
 
 V. Hall, 194 
 
 V. Kansas City, 346. 379 
 
 V. Richmond, 384, 337, 352, 358 
 Hume V. New York, 281, 354, 367 
 
 V. Oldacre, 123 
 Humes v. Knoxville, 283 
 Hummel v. Seventh St. Terrace Co., 
 
 700 
 Humphrey v. Douglass, 640 
 
 V. Hathorn, 019 
 
 V. Wait, 708 
 Humphreys v. Armstrong Co., 92, 
 256, 376 
 
 V. Mears, 326 
 Humphries v. Brogden, 716 
 Hun V. Cary, 589 
 Hund V. Geier, 71 
 Hundhausen t. Bond, 175, 359 
 Hungerford v. Bent, 709, 709a 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 219a 
 Hunn V. Michigan Cent. R. Qo., 188, 
 
 208a, 280, 233, 775 
 Hunsaker v . Borden, 256 
 Hunt V. Hoboken Land, etc. Co., 744 
 
 V. Lowell Gas Co., 60&, 61, 95, 
 693 
 
 V. Missouri R. (^o. , 31 
 
 V. New York, 255, 287, 869 
 
 V, Penn. R. Co., 166 
 
 V. Pownal, 346, 355, 356, 378 
 
 V. Salem, 370 
 
 V. Vanderbilt, 168 
 Hunter v. Caldwell, 565, 567 
 
 V. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 413 
 
 V. Cooperstown, etc. R. Co., 
 91, 519, 530 
 
 V. PhiUips, 619 
 
 V. Windsor, 593 
 
 V. Weston, 334 
 Huntingdon, etc. R. Co. v. Decker, 
 
 191, 230 
 Huntington v. Runinill, 753 
 Huntley v. Bulwer, 559 
 Huntoon v. Trumbull, 67 
 Huntress v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 466, 
 
 4816 
 Hurd V. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 418, 
 
 452 
 Hurdman v. Northeastern R. Co., 
 
 728 
 Hnrlbut v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 506 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 2076 
 Hurley v. Bowdoinham, 369 
 
 V. N. Y., etc. Brewing Co., 742 
 
 Hurst V. Burnside, 86 
 
 V. Detroit R. Co., 137, 766 
 Hurt V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 102, 
 510 
 
 V. Southern R. Co., 491 
 Hussey v. Coger, 231, 233 
 Husson, Matter of, 561 
 Hustede v. Atlantic Refining Co. , 725 
 Huston V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 
 419, 443 
 
 V. Iowa county, 257 
 
 V. Mitchell. 573 
 Hutching v. Littleton, 367 
 Hutchins v. Brackett, 321. 325 
 
 T. Priestly, etc. Co.. 719 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 766 
 Hutchinson v, Boston Gas Co., 693 
 
 V. Brand, 625 
 
 V. Concord, 350 
 
 V. Cunimings, 708 
 
 V. Granger, 731 
 
 V. Metliuen, 53 
 
 V. Guion, 91 
 
 V. Olympia, 289 
 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 250 
 
 V. York, etc. R. Co., 180 
 
 V. Ypsilanti, 363 
 Hutnsing v. Bousquet, 310 
 Hutson V. King, 703 
 
 V. New York, 281, 313, 334, 
 358, 374 
 Button V. Windsor, 90, 769 
 Huyett V. Phil., etc. R. Co., 672, 
 
 675, 676 
 Hyams v. Webster, 859 
 Hyatt V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 215 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 448 
 
 V. Rondout, 262, 289, 356, 874, 
 393 
 Hyde v. Jamaica, 108, 258. 384 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 480 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co.. 181 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 78 
 
 Park V. Gay, 104 
 Hydraulic Works v. Orr, 78, 705 
 Hyer v. Chamberlain, 429 
 Hyman v. Nye. 514 
 Hynes v. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 
 466a 
 
 laicherv. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 
 480 
 Iba V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 435 
 Ide V. Bremer Co. Bank, 580 
 Ihl V. Forty-second St. R. Co., 73, 
 
 73a, 74, 79, 187, 769 
 Ikard v. W. U. Tel. Co.. 756 
 Ilfrey v. Sabine, etc R. Co., 89 
 Illick V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 185 
 Illidge V. Goodwin, 35, 629, 634 
 Illings worth v. Boston El. Light Co., 
 
 698 
 
Illinois 
 
 References-\ TABLE OF CASES. W^ to sections. CI 
 
 )is Central R. Co. v. Able, 89, 
 
 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Slater, 72, 
 
 531 
 
 73, 463, 485, 773 
 
 V. Arnold, 435 
 
 V. Slatton, 490, 520 
 
 V. Axley, 513a 
 
 V. Spence, 333, 333a, 775 
 
 V. Baches, 408 
 
 V. Stassen, 207 
 
 V. Baker, 439 
 
 V. Swearingen, 435, 438, 451a 
 
 V. Barron, 459 
 
 T. Swisher, 185 
 
 V. Beard, 417a 
 
 V. Sutton, 60a 
 
 V. Bentlev, 415 
 
 V. Varnadore, 481a 
 
 V. Bowles", 207 
 
 V. Wall, 410 
 
 V. Buckner, 88, 474, 481 
 
 V. Welch, 199, 205 
 
 V. Carraher, 419, 705 
 
 V. Weldon, 771 
 
 V. Copeland, 503 
 
 V. Winslow, 307 
 
 V. Cox, 238 
 
 Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. Benton, 34 
 
 V. Cragin, 57, 58, 93, 111, 114, 
 
 V. Ebert, 481 
 
 473 
 
 V. Finnigan, 95 
 
 V. Crider, 433 
 
 V. Gilhs, 27 
 
 V. Davidson, 519 
 
 V. Hetherington, 13, 480 
 
 V. Dick, 62, 104. 464, 476 
 
 V. Hoffman, 99, 471 
 
 V. Dickerson, 435, 455 
 
 V. Patterson, 307 
 
 V. Finney, 486 ' 
 
 V. Schultz, 93, 473 
 
 V. Frazier, 678 
 
 Illinois Steel Co. v. Schymanowski, 
 
 V. Frelka, 459 
 
 186 
 
 V. Gilbert, 137, 203, 470 
 
 Ilott V. Wilkes, 730 
 
 V. Goddard, 475 
 
 Ilwaco, etc. Nav. Co. v. Hedrick, 73, 
 
 V. Godfrey, 64, 480 
 
 410 
 
 V. Goodwin, 435 
 
 Inihoff V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 490 
 
 V. Grabill, 459 
 
 Imler v. Springfield. 374, 287 
 
 V. Hall, 480 
 
 Imperial v. Wright, 3S4 
 
 V. Hammer, 749 
 
 Improvement Co. v. Munson, 56 
 
 V. Harris, 194a 
 
 Ince V. East Boston Ferry Co., 112 
 
 V. Heisner, 407 
 
 Independence v. Ott, 123 
 
 V. Hobbs, 509 
 
 V. Yakel, 384 
 
 V. Hunter, 138, 341c 
 
 Indermaur v. Dames, 704, 719 
 
 V. Hutchinson, 461, 480, 481 
 
 Indiana v. Woram, 249 
 
 V. Jewell, 191, 217, 331 
 
 Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 205, 333, 
 
 V. Kanouse, 444 
 
 333, 758 
 
 V, King, 144 
 
 Indiana etc. R. Co. v. Barnhart, 13 
 
 V. Larson, 471 
 
 V. Burdge, 7, 19 
 
 V. Latham, 151 
 
 V. Craig, (i7-J 
 
 V. Latimer, 493 
 
 V. Greene, 111, 114, 475 
 
 V. McClelland, 666, 673, 676, 679 
 
 V. Hammock, 476 
 
 V. BIcKay, 679 
 
 V. Overman, 113, 666 
 
 V. McKee, 4ola, 455 
 
 V. Overton, 7 
 
 V. Meachem, 513a, 523 
 
 V. Quick, 434, 43C 
 
 V, Middlesworth, 100, 438 
 
 V. Sawyer, 434 
 
 V. Miller, 735, 750 
 
 V. Schertz, 448 
 
 V. Mills, 672, 676, 678 
 
 V. Snyder, 206. 333a 
 
 V. Minor, 513 
 
 V. Wheeler, 463 
 
 V. Morrissey, 193 
 
 Indiana Cent. R. Co. v. Gapen, 434 
 
 V. Murphy, 467 
 
 V. Hudelson, 464 
 
 V. Neer, 303, 307& 
 
 V. Leamon, 417(( 
 
 V. Noble, 100, 438 
 
 Indianapolis v. Caldwell, 94 
 
 V. Nowicki. Ill, 113 
 
 V. Huffer, 273 
 
 V. O'Connell, 410 
 
 V. Cook, 877 
 
 V. O'Keefe, 533 
 
 V. Emmelman, 870 
 
 V. Person, 427 
 
 V. Kingsbury, 334 
 
 V. Fendergrass, 139 
 
 V. McClure, 334 
 
 V. Phelps, 37, 437, 428, 435 
 
 V. Murphv, 369 
 
 V. Phillips, 60, 184, 410 
 
 V. Scott, a.-iG, 369 
 
 V. Price, 219a, 410 
 
 Indianapolis R. Co., Rutherford, 519 
 
 V. Read. 178, 505 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Adkins, 455 
 
 V. Sheehan, 513, 513 
 
 V. Beaver, 492 
 
en 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Birney, 
 
 740, 741 
 
 V. Blackman, 468 
 
 V. Bonnell, 434 
 
 V. Busli, 758 
 
 V. Caldwell, 418 
 
 V, Caudle, 107, 430, 436 
 
 V. Grand all, 434 
 
 V. Elliott, 422 
 
 V. Galbreath, 461 
 
 V. Guard. 434 
 
 V. Hall, 425 
 
 V, Harter, 435 
 
 V. Horst, (il, 108, 495 
 
 V. Irish, 424 
 
 V. Johnson, 241 
 
 V. Keeley, 137 
 
 V. Kinney, 434 
 
 V. Logan, 425 
 
 V. Love, 184, 194 
 
 V. MoBrown, 448 
 
 V. McOlaren, 480, 483 
 
 V. McClure, 428 
 
 V. Marshall, 424 
 
 V. Means, 57 
 
 V. Meek, 449 
 
 V. Mustard, 752 
 
 V. Oestel. 434 
 
 V. Ott, 215 
 
 V. Paramore, 58, 674 
 
 V. Petty, 437 
 
 v. Pitzer, 481a 
 
 V. Robinson, 451 ffl 
 
 V. Shinier, 419, 451a, 455 
 
 V. Snelling, 425 
 
 V. Solomon, 445 
 
 V. Stables, 102, 468 
 
 V. Stout, 65, 87, 89, 133 
 
 V. Thomas, 417a, 434, 455 
 
 V. Toy, 184 
 
 v: Truitt, 425, 450 
 
 V. Watson, 56, 215 
 
 V. Wright. 451a 
 
 Union R. Co. v. Cooper, 154 
 V. Neubacher, 466 
 
 Water Co. v. American Straw- 
 board Co., 734 
 Indig V. Nat. City Bank, 583 
 Ingalls V. Adams Ex. Co. , 99 
 
 V. Bills, 45, 51, 65, 89, 494, 497, 
 519 
 IngersoU v. Randall, 178 
 Ingebregtson v. N. D. Lloyd, S. S. 
 
 Co., 1856, 194a, 195, 233a 
 Ingerman v. Moore, 219a 
 Ingwersen t. Rankin, 708 
 Inland, etc. Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 
 
 93, 99 108 
 Inman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 419 
 
 V. Elberton R. Co., 674, 675 
 
 V. Potter, 723 
 
 V. Reck, 100 
 Insurance Co. v. Seaver, 55 
 
 Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 26, 55, 666 
 International, etc. R. Co. v. Arias, 
 219a 
 
 V. Bell, 189 
 
 V. Cock, 498 
 
 V. Cooper, 148, 513 
 
 V. Eckford. 54, 120a, 521 
 
 V. Garcia, 88, 101, 481, 749 
 
 V. Graves, 476 
 
 V. Hall, 202 
 
 V. Halloran, 16, 407 
 
 V. Hester, 89 
 
 V. Hinzie, 2076, 241d 
 
 V. Hughes, 448 
 
 V. Kernan, 196, 204 
 
 V. Kindred, 114, 139 
 
 V. Kuehn, 64, 475, 485 
 
 V. McDonald, 463, 767 
 
 V. Miller, 749 
 
 V. Mulliken, 510 
 
 V. Neff, 473, 477 
 
 V. Neira, 471 
 
 V. Prince, 523 
 
 V. Ryan, 238 
 
 V Smith, 463, 483, 493, 509 
 
 V. Telephone Co., 7-18 
 
 V. Timmerman, 676 
 
 V. Welch, 495 
 Internat. Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 
 
 543, 75ii 
 Interstate, etc. R. Co. v. Fox, 215 
 Ireland v. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 672 
 
 V. Oswego, etc. Turnp. Co., 
 356, 386 
 Ireson v. Pearman, 574 
 Irey v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 475 
 Irion V. Lewis, 303 
 Irish v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 91 
 
 v. Rockford, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 Iron R. Co. v. Mowery, 516, 519 
 Ironton v. Kelly, 176, 391 
 Irvine v. Flint, etc. R. Co., 202, 213 
 
 V. Wood, 120, 365, 368, 709a, 713 
 
 V. Fowler & Wood, 120 
 Irwin V. Richardson, 731 
 
 V. Sprigg, 108, 343, 709a 
 Isaacs V. Third Ave. R. Co., 154, 513 
 Isabel V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 71, 
 
 73, 99, 483 
 Isbell V, New Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 
 93, 99, 438, 430 
 Island Coal Co. v. Risher, 188 
 Isola v. Weber, 776 
 Israel v. Clark, 497 
 Ivay V. Hedges, 707 
 Ivens V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Iveson V. Moore, 371 
 Ivorv V. Bank of Missouri, 580 
 
 V. Deer Park, 53, 334, 338, 346, 
 356, 374 
 
 Jacaud v. French, 570 
 
 Jacker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 55 
 
Re/erf)ices\ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \_a7-e to sections. 
 
 cm 
 
 Jackinan v. Mills 734 
 Jackson v. Allegheny City, 285 
 V. Bartlett, 573 
 V. Bellevieu, 355, 378 
 V. Boone, 367 
 V. Buena Vista, 377 
 V. Chicago, etc. B. Co., 4^7, 
 
 672 
 V. Crilly, 528 
 V. Georgia R. Co., 211a 
 V. Grand Av. R. Co., 495 
 V. Greene county, 356 
 V. Greenville, 375 
 V. Hartwell, 256 
 V. Hyde, 56 
 V. Kiel, 362, 750 
 V. Nashville, etc. Ry. Co., 417a 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 131 
 V. Pool. 369 
 V. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 430, 
 
 449 
 V. Schmidt, 361, 748 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 150, 
 
 151 
 V. Smithson. 629, 634 
 v. Wagner, 350 
 
 V. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 39, 698 
 v. Union Bank. 582, 585, 598 
 Co. V. Nichols, 60a 
 Jacksonville v. Drew, 298 
 V. Lambert, 274 
 etc. R. Co. V. Cox, 412 
 V. Garrison, 432 
 V. Peninsular Land, etc. 
 Co., 28, 58, 666, 672, 
 673. 674, 675, 680 
 V. Prior, 421, 455 
 V. Southworth, 20 
 V. Wellman, 432 
 Jacoboski v. Grand Rapids, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 56 
 Jacobs V. Bangor, 376 
 
 V. Humphrey, 622 
 V. McDonald, 619 
 Jacobsen v. Cornelius, 11 
 Jacobsmeyer v. Poggemoeller, 636 
 Jacobsohn v. Belmont, 580 
 Jacobson v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 471 
 Jacoby v. Ockerhausen, 631 
 Jacques v. Bridgeport R. Co., 745 
 Jaflfe V. Harteau, 683, 708, 709 
 Jager v. Adams, 49 
 
 v. Coney Island, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Jagger v. German Amer. Bank, 581 
 James v. Emmet Mining Co., 341 
 v. Harrodsburg, 262 
 V. Portage, 333 . 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 767 
 V. San Francisco, 358, 298, 356, 
 375 
 Jameson v. Taylor, 618 
 Jamieson v. N. Y. & Rockaway R. 
 Co., 675, 747 
 
 Jammisonv. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 518 
 Jansen v. Atchison, 289, 343 
 Janny v. Great Northern B. Co., 
 
 513a 
 Janvier v. Vandever, 622 
 Jaques v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 194a, 
 
 230, 231, 233a 
 Jaquinta v. Citizens' Tr. Co., 481a 
 Jardine v. Cornell, 493 
 Jarman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 195 
 Jarrett v. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 520 
 Jarvis v. Brooklyn El. R. Co., 506 
 Jayne v. Sebewaing Coal Co., 207 
 Jean v. Pennsylvania Co., 735 
 Jefferis v. Phila., etc. R. Co., 680 
 Jefferson v. Bradv, 108 
 
 V. Chapman, 102, 176, 356, 368, 
 
 377 
 county V. St. Louis county, 356 
 etc. R. Co. V. Rogers, 749 
 JefEersonville v. Louisville, etc. Ferry 
 Co., 285 
 etc. R. Co. V. Adams, 99, 435 
 V. Avery, 436 
 V. Bo wen, 71, 74 
 V. Dunlap, 421, 434, 448, 
 
 453 
 V. Goldsmith, 97 
 V. Hendricks. 133, 494, 
 
 495, 508, 520 
 V. Hendrickson, 89 
 V. Huber, 434 
 V. Lyon, 436, 451a 
 V. Nichols, 437, 451a 
 V. Parkhurst, 435 
 V. Peters, 434 
 V. O'Connor, 336 
 V. Ross, 63 
 V. Stout, 89 
 V. Sullivan, 425, 438 
 V. Underbill, 451a 
 Jeffrey v. Bastard, 634 
 
 V. Bigelow, 630, 633 
 Jeflfry v. Keokuk, etc. R. Co. 87 
 Jeffs V. Rio Grande, etc. R. Co., 55 
 Jenkins v. Central R. Co., 473 
 
 V. Hooper Irrigation Co., 738 
 V. McGill, 633 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 241 
 V. Turner, 418 
 V. Waldron, 310 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 785 
 Jenks V. Wilbraham, 878, 741 
 Jenne v. Sutton, 262 
 Jenner v. Joliflfe, 313, 616, 621 
 Jenney v. Brooklyn, 265, 387 
 
 Electric Co. v. Murphy, 309a 
 Jennings v. Albion, 378 
 v. Burton Co., 635 
 v. Iron Bay Co , 195 
 V. McConnell, 566 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 676 
 
CIV 
 
 References] 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Jennings v. St. Joseph, etc. R. Co., 
 484 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 476, 477 
 
 V. Tacoma R. Co., 1856, 207 
 
 V. Van Schaick, 359, 375, 703 
 710 
 
 V. Wayne. 85 
 Jennison v. Kii'k, 283 
 Jensen v. Barbour, 165 
 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 476 
 
 V. Waltham, 291 
 Jersey City v. Kiernan, 258, 287 
 Jesperson v. Phillips, 668. 
 Jessen v, Sweigert, 130 
 Jesser v. Gifford, 119 
 Jessup V. Osceola county, 374 
 
 V. Sloneker, 243 
 Jeter v. Haviland, 573 
 Jetter v. Harlem R. Co., 13, 93, 467 
 Jewell V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 61, 530 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 157 
 
 V. Parr, 56 
 Jewett \. Keene. 767o 
 
 V. Klein, 90 
 
 V. New Haven, 265 
 Jewhurst v. Syracuse, 334a, 356 
 Job T. Harlan, 628 
 Jobe V. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Joch V. Dankwardt, 53, 192, 761 
 Jochem t. Robinson, 363 
 Joel V. Morison, 147 
 Johanns v. National Accident Soc, 
 
 520 
 Johanson v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 483 
 
 V. Howells, 626 
 John V. Bacon, 506 
 Johns V. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 502 
 
 V. Stevens, 731 
 Johnson, Ex parte, 189 
 
 V. Agricultural Ins. Co., 58 
 
 V. Alston, 5(19 
 
 V. Ashland Water Co., 182 
 
 V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 412, 735 
 
 V. Barber, 150, 244, 671 
 
 V. Belden, 93, 313, 325 
 
 V. Bellingham Bay Imp. Co., 
 
 113, 194 
 
 V. Boston, 225 
 
 V. Boston Towboat Co., 194a 
 
 V. Bruner, 58, 187 
 
 V. Canal, etc. R. Co., 99, 480 
 
 V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co. , 195, 
 
 207&, 460, 476 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 73a, 
 
 114, 451a, 455, 667, 676, 735, 
 750 
 
 V. District of Columbia, 371, 
 
 274 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 333 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 197, 306 
 V. Friel, 3.59 
 V. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 66, 410 
 
 Johnson v. Haverhill, 350 
 V. Holyoke, 753 
 V. Hovey, 207, 2076 
 V. Hudson River E. Co., 94j 
 
 107, 109, 111, 457, 461, 485o 
 V. Husband, 54 
 V. Irasburgh, 104 
 V. Jordan, 735 
 
 V. Lake Superior E. Co. , 481 
 V. Lewis, 709a, 729, 730, 753 
 V. Lindsay, 225, 227 
 V. Long Isl. R. Co., 775 
 V. Lowell, 863 
 V. McMillan, 708, 708 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 93, 
 
 475 
 v. Manhattan R. Co., 605, 369, 
 
 760 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 451a 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 54, 56 
 V. Netherlands Nav. Co. , 225 
 V. New Orleans, 291 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 40, 47 
 V. Northern Pac. E. Co., 486, 
 
 673, 676, 743 
 V. N. W. Tel. Co., 81 
 V. Patterson, 97, 720 
 V. People, 104 
 V. Philadelphia, 346 
 V. Ramberg. 704 
 V. Reading R. Co. , 485c 
 V. Richmond, etc. E. Co., 116, 
 
 178, 197 
 V. St. Paul, 369 
 V. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 201, 
 
 241c 
 V. Salem Turnpike Co., 408, 
 
 887, 389 
 V. Spear, 159 
 
 V. Steam Gauge Co. , 213, .702a 
 V. Tacoma Lumber Co., 708 
 V. Tillson, 102 
 V. Wells, 761 
 
 V. West Chester, etc. R. Co., 89 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 554 
 V. Whitefield, 350 
 V. Wing, 655, 664 
 V. Winona, etc. R. Co., 51, 495 
 Johnston v. Gwathney , 623 
 V. Hastie, 164 
 
 V. Eichmond, etc. R. Co., 223 
 V. Sutton, 302 
 Johnstown Cheese Mfg. Co., v. 
 
 Veghte, 729 
 Joliet V. Conway, 762 
 V. Harwood, 175 
 V. McCraney, 369 
 V. Schufelt, 378 
 V. Verley, 262, 356 
 V. Weston, 369 
 Joliet etc. R. Co. v. Jones, 441 
 V. Velie, 196 
 
References-] TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 cv 
 
 Jolley V. Hawesville, 261 
 Jolliffe V. Brown, 483 
 Jolly V. Detroit, etc. E. Co., 207 
 Jones, Matter of, 561 
 V. Adams, 729 
 V. Alabama Mineral E. Co., 
 
 233 
 V. Albany, 373 
 V. Andover, 104,- 118, 334 
 V. Baltimore, etc. E. Co., 506, 
 
 520 
 V. Belt, 645 
 V. Bird, 359 
 V. Blair, 635 
 V. Boston, 350 
 V. Boyce, 519 
 V. Carey, 632, 635, 639 
 V. Chantry, 175, 361 
 v. Chicago, etc. E. Co.. 424, 
 
 425, 429, 519, 520, 521 
 V. Columbia, etc. E. Co., 419, 
 
 432 
 V. Crow, 734 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. E. Co., 
 
 477 
 V. Fay, 611 
 
 V. Festeniog E. Co., 668, 672 
 V. Florence Mining Co., 219a 
 Y. Galena, etc. R. Co., 422 
 V. Glass, 151 
 V. Granite Mills, 195 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co., 186, 
 
 219 
 V. Lancaster, 340 
 V. Lewis, 559 
 V. Liverpool, 171 
 V. Louisville, eifcc. E. Co., 63 
 V. Loving, 349 
 V. McMinimy, 175 
 V. McGuirk, 631 
 V. Malvern Lumber Co. , 222 
 V. New Haven, 118, 256, 259, 
 
 350, 354 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. E. Co., 
 
 58, 114, 184 
 V. North Carolina E. Co., 93, 
 
 438, 432 
 V. Old Dominion Cotton Mills, 
 
 218 
 V. Owen, 626 
 V. Perry, 633 
 V. Eoberts, 303 
 V. Robertson, 735 
 V. St. Louis, etc. Packet Co., 
 
 195 216 
 V. St.' Louis, etc. B. Co., 225, 
 
 492, 505, 735 
 V. Seligman, 446 
 V. Sheboygan, etc. R. Co., 453 
 V. Sherwood, 628 
 V. Snow, 355 
 V. State, 636 
 V. Sutherland, 207 
 
 Jones V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 508 
 
 V. Troy, 863 
 
 V. United States, 251 
 
 V. Utica, etc. E. Co. 73, 764 
 
 V. Vroom, 605 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. E. Co., 735 
 
 V. Waltham, 358 
 
 V. Werden, 303 
 
 V. Westerhausen, 334 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co. , 556 
 Jordan v. Asheville, 108 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 477. 
 
 V. Cincinnati, etc.. E. Co., 133 
 
 V. Crump, 97, 720 
 
 V. Gallup, 633 
 
 V. Lassiter, 670 
 
 V. N. Y. & New Haven E. Co., 
 104, 502 
 
 V. Peckham, 368 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 735 
 
 V. Wells. 192 
 
 V. Wyatt, 669 
 JosUn V. Grand Eapids Ice Co., 171, 
 
 760 
 Joslyn V. Detroit, 289 
 
 V. King, 588 
 Joy V. Winnisimmet Co., 494 
 Joyce V. Martin, 709a 
 
 V. Worcester, 185 
 Joyner v. Great Barrington, 351 
 
 V. So. Carolina R. Co., 432 
 Jucker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 743 
 Judah V. McNamee, 603 
 Judd V. Ballard, 686 
 
 V. Gushing, 666, 702 
 Judge V. Cox, 633 
 
 V. Meriden, 363, 287 
 Judioe V. Southern Pac. Co., 748 
 Judkins v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 307 
 Judson V. Giant Powder Co., 689 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 476, 
 
 483 
 V. Hudson River E. Co., 61 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. E. Co., 415 
 
 V. Olean, 195 
 June V. Boston, etc. E. Co., 483, 490 
 Jung V. Stevens Point, 114, 375 
 Jungnitsch v. Michigan Iron Co., 
 
 191, 193 
 Junior v. Missouri Electric Co., 207 
 Justice V. Pennsylvania Co., 333 
 Jutte V. Hughes, 701o, 738 
 
 Kaare v. Troy Steel Co., 185, 195, 
 
 309a 
 Kaes V. Mo. Pacific E. Co., 449 
 Kahl V. Lene, 117 
 
 V. Memphis, etc. E. Co., 131 
 Kahle v. Hobein, 669 
 Kahn v. Love, 708 
 Kaillen v. Northwestern Bedding 
 
 Co., 219 
 Kain v. Larkin, 63, 64 
 
CVl 
 
 Re/i-rnues'] TABLE OF CASES. [<"•«■ to sections. 
 
 Kain v. N. Y. & New England R. 
 Co., 472 
 
 V. Smith, 114, 120, 120a, 122, 
 186, 210, 214, 215 
 Kaiser v. Hiith, 709, 712 
 Kalbfleisch v. Long Island R. Co., 
 
 85, 679 
 Kalbus V. Abbott, 474 
 Kalembach v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
 
 451 
 Kalis V. Shattuck, 708, 709 
 Kane v. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 91 
 460, 477 
 
 V. Johnson, 745 f 
 
 T. Mitchell Transp. Co., 775 
 
 V. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., 332 
 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. 
 Co., 74B 
 
 V. Northern Cent. R. Co., 213 
 
 V. Mitchell Transp. Co., 225 
 
 V. Savannah, etc. R. Co., 2076 
 Kankakee Electric R. Co. v. Lade, 
 426 
 
 etc. R. Co. T. Horan, 119, 750 
 
 Water Co. v. Reeves, 70ia 
 Kennenberg v. Alpena, 363 
 Kansas City v. Bermingham, 289, 
 358 
 
 V. Bradbury, 368 
 
 V. Brady, 291 
 
 V. Lemen, 291 
 
 V. Manning, 353 
 
 V. Slangstrom, 122, 287, 733 
 Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. Berry, 489 
 
 V. Brady, 679 
 
 V. Burton, 207, 207a, 2416 
 
 V. Butts, 676, 678 
 
 V. Cook, 407, 476, 484, 750 
 
 V. Cranmer, 99, 483 
 
 V. Cravens, 427 
 
 V. Cutter, 138 
 
 V. Dorough, 520 
 
 V. Dye, 2076 
 
 V. Fite, 748 
 
 V. Fitzsimmons, 73, 410 
 
 V. Flynn, 91 
 
 V. Hammond, 202 
 
 V. Kier, 748 
 
 V. Kirksey, 197, 419 
 
 V. Landis, 453 
 
 V. Little, 230 
 
 V. Lundin, 407 
 
 V. McDonald, 464a 
 
 V. Mower, 422 
 
 V. Peavey, 102, 178, 231 
 
 V. Phillibert, 108 
 
 V. Pointer, 102, 108, 471 
 
 V. Riley, 393 
 
 V. Rogers, 750 
 
 V. Ryan, 189, 195 
 
 V. Sanders, 767 
 
 V. Salmon, 65, 233 
 
 V. Spencer, 421, 424 
 
 Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. Stoner, 123, 
 464a 
 V. Twombly, 114 
 V. Webb, 195, 24 6 
 V. Whipple, 73, 99 
 V. White, 523 
 V. Wiggins, 451a 
 V. Wood, 451a 
 Kansas, etc. Coal Co. v. Brownlie, 
 
 192 
 Karl V. Maillard, 719 
 Karr v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 431 
 
 V. Parks, 72, 73a, 83, 89, 115 
 Karsen v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 676 
 Kates V. Pullman Car Co., 536 
 Kauflfman v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 
 114 
 V. Maier, 307 
 Kavanagh v. Brooklyn, 374, 299 
 Kavanaugh v. Janesville, 115, 376, 
 
 764 
 Kaveney v. Troy, 363 
 Kay v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 10, 47, 
 
 73, 78, 458, 463, 766 
 Kean v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 93, 
 473 
 V. Det)-oit, etc. Mills, 186, 193 
 Keane v. Waterford, 363 
 Kearney v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 139, 
 767o 
 V. London & Brighton R. Co., 
 
 59, 60 
 V. N. J. Central R. Co., 413 
 V. Thoemanson, 374 
 Electric Co. v. Laughlin, 185a, 
 203, 219a 
 Kearns v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 216 
 
 V. Sowden, 654 
 Keatis v. Cadogan, 709 
 Keating v. Cincinnati, 274 
 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 7, 518 
 
 V. Kansas City, 362 
 
 V. Michigan Central R. Co., 91, 
 
 148 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 519, 531 
 V. Stevenson, 699 
 Keatley v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 
 
 241c 
 Keats V. National Heeling Mach. Co. , 
 
 203 
 Keech v. Baltimore, etc. Co., 418, 
 
 454 
 Keefe v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 490 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 307 
 Keegan v. Kavanagh 186 
 
 V. Western R. Co., 180, 194, 
 197 
 Keeley v. Erie R. Co., 494 
 
 Brewing Co. v. Parnin, 355 
 Keenan v. Brooklyn R. Co., 137, 773 
 V. Edison Electric Co., 331 
 
Xe/erejzces] TABLE OF CASES. [im to sections. 
 
 cvu 
 
 Keenan v. Gutta Peroha Man^fgCo., 
 630 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 
 2076 
 V. Southworth, .321 
 Keffe V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 73, 
 
 683, 705 
 Kehoe v. Allen, 195 
 Kehler v. Schwenk, 186, 186a, 195, 
 
 218 
 Keightlinger v. Egan, 639 
 Keil V. Chatiers Co., 749 
 Keitn v. Union R., etc. Co., 13, 467 
 Keital v. St. Louis Cable, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 414 
 Keith V. Easton 350, 355 
 V. Howard, 310 
 V. Keir. 155 
 V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 
 193, 231 
 V. Pinkham, 523 
 V. Walker Iron Co., 223 
 Kell V. Nainby, h11 
 Kelleher v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 201 
 Keliher v Connecticut, etc. R. Co., 
 
 434 
 Keller v. Gaskill, 219, 222 
 V. Oilman, 764 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 56, 
 
 137 
 V. Sioux, etc. R. Co., 60a 
 Kelley v. Cable Co. , 230 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 114 
 V. Columbus, 703 
 V. Fond du lac, 376 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 475 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 410 
 V. Milwaukee, 363 
 V. Ryus, 194 
 
 V. Silver Springs, etc. Co., 185 
 Kellney v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 
 116, 483 
 Kellogg v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 55, 
 93, 666, 678. 680 
 V. Gilbert, 573 
 V. Janesville, 289 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 114, 
 
 476, 477 
 V. Northampton, 334 
 Kelly V. Barber Asphalt Co., 218 
 V. Bemis, 303 
 V. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 
 
 485c 
 V. Cohoes Knitting Co., 703 
 V. Columbus, 356 
 V. Doody, 375, 376 
 V. Duluth. etc. R. Co. , 473 
 V. Erie Tel. Co.. 304 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 
 58. 114 
 V. Hendrie. 480 
 V. Howell, 174 
 
 Kelly V. Johnson, 181 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 502, 506 
 T. New York, 144, 165, 166, 
 
 168, 173, 298 
 V. N. Y. & Sea Beach R. Co., 
 
 56, 57, 497 
 V. Shelby R. Co., 203 
 V. So. Minnesota R. Co., 417 
 V. Tilton, 629, 689 
 V. Twenty-third St. R. Co., 774 
 V. Union R Co. , 99 
 Kelsay v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 476 
 Kelsey v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 666, 
 678 
 V. Glover, 350, 353, 356, 375 
 V. Jewett, 25, 57 
 V. Staten Island Rapid Transit 
 R. Co., 478 
 Kelty V. Second Nat. Bank, 580 
 Kelver v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 434 
 Kemmish v. Ball, 633 
 Kemp V. Burt, 558, 567 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 553 
 Kemper v. Louisville, 743 
 Kenady v. Lawrence, 373 
 Kendall v. Albia, 272, 376, 758, 759 
 v. Boston, 58, 705 
 V. Brown, 611 
 V. Council Bluffs, 257 
 V. Kendall, 654 
 V. Stokes, 313 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531, 
 554 
 Kendrick v. Fowle, 673, 680 
 Keng V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 114 
 Kenna v. Central Pac. R. Co., 807 
 Kennard v. Burton, 71, 87, 107, 
 
 652, 654 
 Kennayde v. Pacific R. Co., 476 
 Kennedy v. Broun, 557 
 V. Cecil Co. , 94 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 194a 
 V. Cumberland, 334 
 V. Lake Superior, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185a, 207 
 Lansing, 358 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 185, 209a, 
 
 241 
 V. Ne%v York, 385, 725 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 115 
 V. Pennsylvania Co., 216 
 V. Ryall, 141, 346, 313, 515, 
 
 690 
 V. Standard Sugar Refinery, 
 767a 
 Kennet's Petition, 383 
 Kennett v. Durgin, 630 
 
 T. Engle. 628 
 Kenney v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 13, 
 476, 478, 675, 676 
 
CVlll 
 
 Rc/crcnccs\ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. Wc to sections. 
 
 Kenney v. N. Y. Cent. E. Co., 492, 
 
 504. 505 
 Kennon v. Gilmer, 514, 631, 758 
 Kenny v. Barns, 723 
 
 V. Cunard Steamship Co., 195, 
 283 
 Kensington v. Wood, 273 
 Kent V. Dawson Bank, 583 
 V. Lincoln, 606, 373 
 V. Wilmington, 307 
 Kentucky, etc. Bridge Co. v. Quin- 
 kert, 508, 519 
 Hotel Co. V. Camp, 73a, 719a 
 Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Ackley, 
 238 
 V. Riddle, 761 
 T. Conner, 433 
 V. Gastineau, 73a 
 V. Smith, 102, 461 
 V. Talbot, 433 
 
 V. Thomas, 61, 102, 108, 523 
 Kenworthy v. Ironton, 376, 393 
 Ken von T. Western U. Tel. Co., 755 
 Keokuk t. Dist. of Keokuk, 343, 384 
 Packet Co. v. Henry, 493a, 
 531 
 Kepperly v. Ramsden, 168 
 Kern v. De Castro Sugar R'f g Co. , 
 
 28, 195 
 Kerns v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 216 
 Kerr v. Forgue, 73 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 133 . 
 V. O'Connor, 628, 638 
 V. West Shore R. Co., 737 
 Kerrigan v. Hart, 55 
 
 V. South Pac. R. Co., 503 
 Kersey v. Kansas, etc. R. Co., 192, 
 
 241 
 Kershan v. Gates, 637 
 Kerwacker v. Cleveland, etc. E. 
 Co., 61, 63, 99, 100, 102, 419, 
 656 
 Kesee v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 679, 
 
 680 
 Kesler v. Smith, 766 
 Kessel v. Butler, 760 
 Kessler v. Lockwood, 633, 635 
 Kester v. W. U. Tel. Co., 756. 
 Ketcham v. Cohn, 175 
 Keutgen v. Parks, 75 
 Kevern v. Providence Min. Co., 188 
 Kewanee v. Depew, 89, 102 
 Keyes v. Bank of Hardin, 579 
 V. Marcellus. 352, 356 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 761 
 Keyser v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 458, 
 
 466a, 481a, 483 
 Keystone Bridge Co. v. Nev^berry, 
 
 235 
 Kibele v. Philadelphia, 286, 287, 369, 
 
 693 
 Kidder v. Barker, 633 
 
 v. Dunstable, 346, 644 
 
 Kidwell V. Houston, etc. R. Co., 
 
 204 
 Kieffer v. Hummelstown, 346 
 Kiernan v. New York, 356 
 Kies V. Erie, 265, 273 
 Kilbane v. Westchester R. Co. , 654 
 Kilev V. Kansas City, 263, 854, 369 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 534, 
 550, .553, 755 
 Killea v. Foxon, 195 
 Killian v. Augusta, etc. R. Co., 197 
 Killien v. Hyde, 89 
 Killion V. Power, 723 
 Kilroy v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 225 
 
 V. Foss, 207 
 Kimball v. Bath, 356, 358 
 
 V. Boston, 370 
 
 V. Conolly, 592 
 
 V. Cushman, 161 
 
 V. Davis, 619 
 
 V. Perry, 618 
 
 V. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 550 
 Kimbro v. Edmondson, 633 
 Kimbrough v. State, 380 
 Kimmer v. Weber, 197, 224, 280, 241 
 Kincaid v. Hardin county, 255, 256, 
 257 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 410 
 Kinchelo v. Priest, 579 
 Kingv. Boston, etc. R. Co.. 218 
 
 V. Ford, 686 
 
 V. Ford River Lumber Co., 
 319a 
 
 V. Fourchy, 567 
 
 v. Livermore, 169 
 
 V. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 53 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 144, 
 173 
 
 V. Ohio, etc. R. Co., 410, 512 
 
 V. Orser, 618 
 
 V. Oshkosh, 358 
 
 V. St. Landry, 256 
 
 V. Thompson, 110 
 
 V. Tiffany, 733 
 Kingsbury v. Dedham, 855 
 Kingsley v. Bloomiugdale, 378 
 Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 784 
 Kinnard v. Willmore, 619 
 Kinnev v. Central R. Co., 178, 232, 
 505 
 
 V. Corbin, 207 
 
 V. Crocker, 466 
 
 V. Folkerts, 743, 758, 760 
 
 V. Louisville R Co., 512 
 
 V. Tekemah, 334a 
 
 V. Troy, 363 
 Kinnion v. Davies, 629 
 Kinnison v. Carpenter, 803 
 Kinsey v. Jones, 840 
 Kinsley v. Lake Shore E. Co. , 536 
 
 V. Morse, 376 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 CIX 
 
 Kipperly v. Ramsden, 107 
 Kirby v. Boylston, etc. Asso., 14, 343, 
 710 
 
 V. Penn. E. Co., 244 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 Kirk V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 285 
 
 V. Glover, 573 
 
 V. Homer, 353, 369 
 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 438 
 Kirkpatrick v. Knapp, 343 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 53, 204 
 Kirksey v. Pryor, 619 
 Kirtley V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 484 
 Kissenger v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 
 
 466 
 Kistler v. Thompson, 716 
 Kistner v. Indianapolis, 20, 262, 289 
 Kitchell V. Brooklyn R. Co., 78a5 
 Kitchen v. Carter, 56, 703 
 Kittredge v. Bellows, 619 
 
 V. Elliott, 638, 632 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 358 
 Klanowski v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 
 
 93. 471 
 Klatt V. Milwaukee, 356. 369 
 Klauder v. McGrath, 132 
 Kleiber v. People's R. Co., 89 
 Klein v. Dallas, 258, 389, 368 
 
 V. Jewett, 490, 535, 758 
 
 V. Thompson, 759 
 Klenberg v. Russell, 634 
 Klepsch V. Donald, 688a, 767, 773 
 Kline v. Central Pac. R. Co., 64, 151, 
 493, 520 
 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co.. 756 
 Kling V. Buflfalo. 363, 376 
 
 V. Kansas City, 334 
 Klipper v. Coffey, 104 
 Klochinski v. Shores Lumber Co., 
 
 233 
 Klutts V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 31 
 Knahtla v. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 55, 
 
 233 
 Knapp, Matter of, 561 
 
 V.Sioux City, etc. R. Co., 31, 
 89, 197, 758 
 Knauss v. Brua, 713 
 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. De Hass, 
 
 632 
 Knight V. Abert, 418, 655. 703, 705 
 
 V. Albemarle, etc. R. Co., 56 
 
 V. Brown, 735 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 672, 675 
 
 V. Cooper. 184, 207& 
 
 V. Fox, 169 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 448 
 
 V. Pontchartrain R. Co., 65 
 
 V. Portland, etc R. Co., 45, 
 495. 499, 505 
 
 V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 Knightlinger v. Egan, 631 
 Knights V. Quarles, 574 
 
 Knightstown v. Musgrove, 66, 289 
 Knisley v. Pratt, 685 
 Knoop v. Alter, 702 
 Knott V. Wagner, 686 
 Knour v. Wagoner, 640 
 Knowles v. Crampton, 61, 645 
 
 V. Muller, 633 
 
 V. Muscatine, 336 
 
 V. Norfolk R. Co., 493, 749 
 Knowlton v. Bartlett. 618 
 
 V. Milwaukee R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Pittsfield, 350 
 Knox V. Hall Steam Power Co., 719a 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 39 
 
 V. Pioneer Coal Co., 207 
 
 county V. Montgomery, 357 
 Knoxville, etc.. R. Co. v. AcufE, 61, 
 
 140, 482, 483 
 Knoxville v. Bell, 289 
 Knupfle V. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 
 
 13. 340 
 Kobe V. No. Pacific R. Co., 434 
 Koch V. Ashland, 863, 376 
 
 V. Sackman Inv. Co., 175, 750 
 Koelsch V. Philadelphia Co., 35, 387, 
 
 690, 693 
 Koester v. Ottumwa, 389 
 Kohn V. Lovett. 97, 703 
 
 V. McNulta, 196, 197 
 Kokomo V. Mahan, 374 
 Kolb V. Klages, 683 
 
 V. O'Brien, 318 
 Kollock V. Madison, 289, 341, 359 
 Kolsti V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 53 73 
 Koney v. Ward, 639 
 Koons v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 71, 
 78, 410 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 541 
 Koontz V. Oregon R. Co., 675, 676 
 Koppf V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 412 
 Kornetzski v. Detroit, 367 
 Korrady v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 137, 475, 482 
 Korte V. St. Paul Coal Co., 703 
 Kosmak v. New York, 387 
 Kountz V. Brown, 748 
 Kramer v. Market St, R. Co., 183 
 Krans.v. Baltimore, 387 
 Krantz v. Rio Grande R. Co., 513 
 Kranz v. Long Island R. Co., 194, 333 
 Krause v. Davis county, 357 
 
 V. Morgan, 207a 
 Kraut V. Frankfort. 31 
 Krebs Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 751 
 Krebs v. Minneapolis, etc R. Co., 
 
 451a 
 Kreger v. Bismarck, 399 
 Kreig v. Wells. 73a 
 Kreis v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 484 
 Krenzar v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 481a 
 
ex 
 
 Re/i^re7ices\ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. [«>-«■ to sections. 
 
 Kreuziger v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 
 
 762 
 Krev V. Schlussner, 719 
 Krippner v. Biebl, 666, 669 
 Kroener v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 307a 
 Krogg V. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 60a, 
 
 330 
 Krogstad v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 
 333 
 Krom V. Schoonmaker, 131 
 Kroy V. Chirago, etc. R. Co., 186, 
 
 309a, 231 
 Kriieger v. Bronson, 86 
 Kruse v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 195 
 Krzywoszynski v. Consol. Gas Co., 
 
 697 
 Kucera v. Merrill Lumber Co., 73a, 
 
 185a 
 Kudiok V. Leliigh Val. R. Co., 303, 
 
 341 
 Kuhn V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 
 451o 
 V. Jewett, 30, 666 
 V. Walker, 379 
 Kuhnen v. Union R. Co., 485o, 485&, 
 
 485c 
 Kuhns V. Wisconsin, etc. R. Co., 60c 
 Kumler v. Junction R. Co., 334, 341 
 Kumiiiel v. Gerraania Sav. Bank, 
 
 588 
 Kunz V. Troy, 73. 381, 396, 346, 369 
 Kurz Ice Co. v. Milwaukee, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 676, 678 
 Kutner v. Fargo, 749 
 Kuttner v. Lindell R. Co., 66 
 Kwiotkowski v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 
 Co.. 476 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 481b 
 Kyle V. Southern Electric, etc. Co., 
 
 359 
 Kyne v. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 74, 
 
 3r)5. 359 
 Kyser t. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 434, 436 
 
 Lacas v. Detroit R., 530, 759 
 Lackawanna, etc. R. Co. v. Chene 
 
 with. 466», 500 
 » v.Doak, 58, 673, 675 
 Lackin v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 434 
 Lackland v. North Missouri R. Co., 
 
 359. 363 
 La Clef V. Concordia, 360 
 Lacon v. Page, 353 
 Lacour v. New York. 373, 744 
 Lacrny V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co.. 202. 207b, 317 
 Lacy V. Winn. 653 
 Ladd V. Foster, 89. 766 
 V. French. 340 
 V. New Bedford, etc. R. Co., 
 
 184, 189, 497 
 
 Ladonceur v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 
 476 
 La Duke v. Exeter, 346 
 Laethem v. Fort Wayne, etc. E. Co., 
 
 485a 
 Lafayette v. Allen, 365 
 
 V. Larson. 367 
 
 V. Nagle, 374 
 
 V. Timberlake, 363 
 
 V. Weaver, 60c 
 Lafayette, etc. R. Co. v. Adams, 103, 
 460, 463 
 
 V. Huffman, 74. 
 
 V. Shriner, 418, 430, 434, 435, 
 451a 
 Laflerty v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 448 
 LafSn, etc. Powder Co. v. Tearney, 
 
 689. 70U 
 I-afflin V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 60b, 
 
 195, 503, 510, 519, 673 
 Lafittev. New Orleans R. Co., 145, 
 
 513 
 La Flamme v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 
 
 451a 
 La Grange v. Southwestern Tel. Co. 
 
 555, 556 
 Lagrone v. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 336 
 Lahey v. Central Park R. Co. , 485e 
 Laicher v. New Orleans R. Co. , 88 
 Laing v. Colder, 516, 739 
 Laird v. Pittsburgh Tr. Co., 493 
 
 V. Otsego, 355, 373 
 Lake v. Milliken, 38, 31. 55, 133, 378 
 
 V. Mining Co., 186 
 Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. Acres, 486 
 
 V. Bradford, 473, 484 
 
 V. Bell, 332 
 
 V. Carson, 459 
 
 V. Clark, 678 
 
 V. Cloes, 761a 
 
 V. Craig, 197 
 
 V. Cruzen, 675, 678 
 
 V. Helmerick, 675 
 
 V. Kirts, 675 
 
 V. Kneadle, 434 
 
 V. McHenry, 194a 
 
 V. Mackey," 73, 479 
 
 V, Matthews, 7 
 
 V. Mays. 493 
 
 V. Middleeoff, 675 
 
 V. Mugg, 769 
 
 V. Zoffinger, 468 
 Lake Roland R. Co. v. McKewen, 
 
 485a 
 Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Bodemer, 
 49, 64, 484 
 
 V. Boyts, 66 
 
 V. Brown, 513a, 538 
 
 V. Clemens, 479 
 
 V. Franz. 463, 466 
 
 V. Hart. 90 
 
 V. Hessions, 137 
 
 V. Hundt, 458 
 
References'] TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 CXI 
 
 Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Johnsen, 
 103, 743 
 
 V. Johnson, 463 
 
 V. Knittal, 185, 2076 
 
 V. Lavalley, 198, 333 
 
 V. McCormick, 184, 195 
 
 V. Mcintosh, 415, 473 
 
 V. Miller, 69, 88, 107 
 
 V. Murphy, 2U2 
 
 V. Parker, 93, 95 
 
 V. Pinchin, 473, 479 
 
 V. Prentice, 749 
 
 V. Rosenzweig, 151, 743, 749 
 
 V. Saltzman, 495 
 
 V. Spangler, 178 
 
 V. Stupak. 191, 193, 209 
 
 V. Sunderland, 473 
 Lake Side, etc, R. Co. v. Kelly, 673, 
 
 676 
 Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Erickson, 
 
 1 U. 174. 207a 
 Lakin v. Oregon Pac R. Co., 157 
 
 V. Willamette Val. etc. R. Co., 
 413 
 Lamar county v. Clements, 334 
 Lamb v. Lyon, 497 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 426 
 Lambert v. Pembroke, 334a, 369 
 
 V. Sandford, 573 
 Lambeth v. Joffrion, 621 
 
 V. North Carolina R. Co., 519, 
 .520, 533 
 Lambkin v. Southeastern R. Co., 39 
 Lamline v. Houston, etc. R. Co., 508 
 Lammert v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 473 
 Lamport v. Laclede Gas Co., 118 
 Lampkin v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 513 
 Lamoreux v. Luzerne county, 357 
 Laraotte v. Boyce, 216 
 Lanark v. Dougherty, 102 
 Lancaster Canal Co. v, Parnaby, 285, 
 
 399 
 Lancaster v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. 
 
 Co., 175,701 
 Landa v. McDermott, 644 
 Landolt v. Norwich, 363 
 Landon v, Humphrey, 606, 607 
 Landridge v. Levy, 38 
 Landru v. Lund, 358, 703 
 Landsberger v. Magnetic Tel. Co., 
 
 755 
 Lane v. Atlantic Works, 13, 31, 35, 
 99, 107, 122 
 
 V. Brvant, 60a 
 
 V. Cotton, 319, 821 
 
 V. Crombie. 107, 375 
 
 V. Crosby, 303 
 
 V. Hancock, 338, 850, 856, 867, 
 369 
 
 V. Hitchcock. 119 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 433 
 
 Lane v. Minnesota Agric. Soc, 629 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 93 
 V. Syracuse, 345 
 V. Wheeler, 346 
 V. Woodbury, 256, 267 
 Laney v. Chesterfield County, 63, 
 
 375, 376 
 Lang V. Holiday Creek R. Co., 417 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 151, 763 
 Langan v. Atchison, 35S, 376 
 V. Iron, etc. R. Co., 493a 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 90, 92 
 Langdon v. Potter, 573 
 Lange v. Benedict, 303 
 
 V. Schoettler, 766, 767 
 Langford v. United States, 249, 251 
 Langhoff v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 13. 467 
 Langin v. N. Y. & Brooklyn Bridge 
 
 Co., 499 
 Langley v. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 
 531 
 Langlois v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 466a 
 
 V. Cohoes, 370 
 Lanigan v. N. Y. Gas Co.. 696 
 Laning V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 91, 
 191, 192, 194, 304, 208, 315, 
 230 
 Lannen v. Albany Gas Co. , 81, 697 
 Lanphier v, Phipos, 558. 606 
 Lansing v. Coney Isl. R. Co., 495 
 V. Smith, 8, 365, 371, 737 
 Y. Stone, 665 
 V. Toolan, 258, 271 
 Lapham v. Curtis, 16, 17, 701a 
 
 V. Rice, 345 
 La Pierre y. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185, 209a 
 Lapointe v. Middlesex R. Co., 516 
 Laporte county v. Ellsworth, 380 
 Lappread v. Detroit, 368 
 Lapsley v. Union Pac. R. Co., 66, 
 
 468 
 Laramie county v. Albany county, 
 
 254 
 Laricli v. Moies, 216, 233 
 La Riviere v. Pemberton, 65 
 Larkin v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 66 
 V. O'Neill, 605. 704 
 V. Saginaw county, 256 
 Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co., 8, 
 
 97, 705 
 Larock v Ogdensburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 
 144 
 Larrabee v. Sewall. 86 
 Larsh v. Des Moines, 368, 376 
 Larson v. Central R. Co. , 60 
 V. Grand Forks, 289 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 341c 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 167 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 185, 
 207 
 
CXll 
 
 Re/erences] TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 Larson v. Tobin, 361 
 
 Larue v. Farron Hotel Co., 709a 
 
 Lary v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 97, 
 
 705 
 Larzalere v. Kirchgessner, 767 
 Lasala v. Holbrook, 701 
 La Salle v. Porterfield, 367 
 
 V. Thorndike, 763 
 Lasky v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 54, 
 
 184, 230, 233, 333a 
 Lassiter v. Western U. Tel. Co., 556 
 Lasure v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., 230 
 Latch V. Rumner R. Co., 517 
 Latham v. Roach, 704 
 Lathrop v. Central, etc. R. Co., 336 
 Latremouille v. Bennington, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 209a. 221, 323 
 Lattin v. Smith, 303 
 Latty V. Burlington, etc. R. Co.. 434 
 Laude v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 449 
 LaUe V. Madison, 369 
 Laugher v. Pointer, 173, 699 
 Laughlin v. Eaton, 115 
 
 V. Street R. Co. , 53 
 Laumier v. Francis, 735 
 Laurel v. Blue, 291 
 Lavallee v. St. Paul. etc. R. Co., 341c 
 Laverenz v. Chicago, etc. R. Co.. 93, 
 
 477 
 Laverone v. Mangianti, 638 
 Lavery v. Manchester, 346 
 Law V. Ewell, 557 
 
 V. Kingsley, 334a, 343 
 Lawler v. Baring Boom Co., 16 
 Lawlor t. Fi-ench, 630 
 Lawless v. Connecticut River R. Co., 
 
 87, 204, 314 
 Lawrence v. Combs. 659 
 
 V. Fox, 118, 543 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 395 
 
 V. Green, 487, 516, 519 
 
 V. Hagemeyer, 185&, 315 
 
 V. Harrison, 573, 576 
 
 V. Jenkins, 39 
 
 V. McCalmot, 587 
 
 V. McGregor, 40 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 436 
 
 V. Mt. Vernon, 334, 350 
 
 V. New Bedford, 358 
 
 V. Potts, 568 
 
 V. Sherman, 313 
 
 V. Stonington Bank, 583 
 Lawrenceburgh v. Wesler, 336 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Montgomery, 61, 
 523 
 Laws -v. No. Carolina, etc. R. Co., 
 
 419 
 Lawson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 493, 
 533 
 
 V. Merrill, 60, 719 
 
 V. Seattle, 265 
 
 V. State, 619 
 
 V. Truesdale, 185, 197, 307a 
 
 Lawton v. Erwin, 619 
 
 V. Giles, 676 
 
 V. Little River, etc. R. Co., 489 
 
 V. Little Rock, etc. R. Co., 8 
 Lawyer v. Smith, 671 
 Lax V. Darlington, 89 
 Lay V. Midland R. Co., 416 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 99 
 Layne v. Ohio River R. Co., 419, 430 
 Lazarus v. Toronto, 731 
 Lazell V. Kapp, 654 
 Leak v. Rio Grande, etc. R. Co., 54 
 Leake v. Georgia Pac. R. Co., 476 
 Leame v. Bray, 18, 644 
 Learned v. Tangeman, 729 
 Learoyd v. Godfrey, 704, 705 
 Leary v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 185,310, 
 311a 
 
 v. Woodruff, 725 
 Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. 
 
 Morgan, 588 
 Leavenworth v. Hatch, 66 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Forbes, 100 
 
 V. Rice, 87, 468, 476 
 Leavenworth Lodge v. Byers, 700 
 Leavitt v. Terre Haute R. Co., 426 
 
 467, 474 
 Lebanon v. McCoy, 186, 209a, 317 
 
 V. Olcott, 383 
 
 Light Co. V. Leap, 159, 693 
 Le Bahn v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 207f> 
 Le Baron v. Joslin, 107, 654 
 Le Beau v. Telephone, etc. Co., 875 
 Lechman v. Hooper, 116 
 Lechner v. Newark, 653 
 Le Clare v. St. Paul, etc, R. Co. 91 
 Lederman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 
 73a, 485 
 Ledgerwood v. Webster City, 368 
 Ledig V. Gerniania Brewing Co., 645 
 Ledyard v. Jones, 619, 623 
 
 V. Ten Eyck, 333 
 Lee V. Ayrton, 573 
 
 v. Barkhampsted, 350, 358, 367 
 
 V. Burk, 633 
 
 V. Central R. Co. , 185 
 
 V. Detroit, etc. Works, 180 
 
 V. Dixon, 567 
 
 v. Hardeway, 619 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 431, 424, 451a 
 
 V. Publishers' Co., 114, 719a 
 
 V. Riley, 365, 627 
 
 V. Sandy Hill, 299 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 214 
 
 V. Troy. etc. Gas Co., 109, 111, 
 113, 114 
 
 V. Union R. Co., 87, 355 
 
 V. Vacuum Oil Co., 689, 693 
 
 V. Western TJ. Tel. Co., 541, 
 543 
 
 V. Woolsey, 186, 313 
 
Re/erencesi TABLE OF CASES. {fl-re to sections. 
 
 CXIU 
 
 Leebrick v. Republican Val., etc. R. 
 
 Co., 424 
 Lee county v. Yarbrough, 256 
 Leeds v. Amherst, 740 
 
 V. Met. Gas Co., 740, 760 
 V. Richmond, 298 
 Le Forest v. Tolman, 133, 628 
 Legg V. Britton, 140 
 Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal, 
 etc. Co., 16 
 county V. Hoffors, 262, 374 
 etc. Coal Co. v. Hayes, 314 
 etc. R. Co. V. Greiner, 94 
 Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 60a 
 Valley R. Co. v. McKeon, 55, 
 666 
 Lehman v. Brooklyn, 58, 73a 
 
 V. Brooklyn R. Co., 761, 766, 
 769 
 Lehman Co. v. Siggenian, 186 
 Lehn v. San Francisco, 274 
 Lehr v. Stein way, etc. R. Co., 523 
 Leiber v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 750 
 Leidlein v. Meyer, 735 
 Leigh V. Omaha R. Co., 630 
 V. Omaha St. R. Co., 56 
 V. Westervelt, 333 
 Leighton v. Sargent, 605, 613, 614, 
 
 761 
 Leishman v. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 
 
 54 
 Leistritz v. American Zylonite Co., 
 
 318 
 Le Lievre v. Gould, 8 
 Leman v. New York, 299 
 Le May v. Canada Pac. R. Co., 
 241a 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 464 
 Lemmon v. Chanslor, 51, 516 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 435 
 Lemon v. Hayden, 334 
 Lendberg v. Brotherton Iron Min. 
 
 Co., 207 
 Lennon v. Rawitzer. 57 
 Lent V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 87, 524 
 Lentz V. Carnegie, 750 
 Lenz V. Aldrich, 710 
 Lenzen \'. New Braufels, 265 
 Leonard v. Collins, 187, 189 
 
 V. Columbia Nav. Co., 132 
 V. Fitohburg R. Co., 753 
 V. N. Y., Albany, etc. Tel. Co., 
 529, 532, 534, 537, 544, 754, 
 755 
 V. Storer, 708, 710 
 Leoni v. Taylor, 256 
 Leopard v. Chesapeake, etc. Cailal 
 
 Co., 401 
 Leopold V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 54 
 Lepnick v. Gaddis, 705. 706 
 Le Roy v. Blauvelt, 623 
 
 [Law of Nkg. Vol. I — h.] 
 
 Lesan v. Maine Central R. Co., 90, 
 
 476 
 Leslie v. Lewiston, 71, 74 
 
 V. Pound, 120 
 
 V. Rich Hill Coal Co., 717 
 
 V. Wilson, 22 
 Lessard v. Stram. 729, 735 
 Lesser v. Wunder, 603 
 Lester v. Pittsford, 35, 53, 57, 108 
 Lettis V. Horning, 635 
 Levenson v. Pullman Car Co., 536 
 Leviness v. Post. 146 
 Levy V. Campbell, 495 
 
 V. New York, 263 
 
 V. Salt Lake City, 286, 289 
 Lewark v. Carter, 618 
 Lewenthal v. New York, 274 
 Lewis V. Atlanta, 367 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 91, 488, 493, 520 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 458 
 
 V. Emery, 191 
 
 V.Flint, etc. R. Co., 28 
 
 V.Fremont, etc. R. Co., 428 
 
 V. Gamage, 573 
 
 V. Hughes, 689 
 
 V. London, etc. R. Co., 509, 520 
 
 V. Montgomery, 2416 
 
 V. New Orleans, 291 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 417, 468 
 
 V N. Y., New England, etc. R. 
 Co., 215 
 
 V. N. Y. Sleeping Car Co., 525 
 
 V. Palmer, 303 
 
 V. Puget Sound R. Co. , 480 
 
 V. Raleigh, 260 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 205 
 
 V. Samuel, 559 
 
 V. Schultz, 669, 671 
 
 V. Seifert, 185, 303, 332, 233a 
 
 V. State, 249, 250, 251, 360 
 
 V. Stein, 734 
 
 V. Terry, 117 
 Lexington, etc. R. Co. v. Huffman, 
 
 127 
 Leydecker v. Brintnall, 710 
 Leyden v. N. Y. Central R. Co. , 436 
 Libbv V. Maine Central R. Co., 407 
 " V. Scherman, 185a, 1856, 333 
 Lichtenberger v. Merriden, 353 
 Liddle v. Keokuk, etc. R. Co., 445 
 Lienau v. Dinsmore, 587a 
 Liermann v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 87 
 Light V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 186 
 Lilienthal v. Campbell, 313 
 LiUy V. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 135 
 
 V.N. Y.Centi-alR. Co., 188,197 
 Lillstrom v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 417 
 Lily V. Boyd, 753 
 Limekiller v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 133, 133 
 Liming v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 679 
 
CXIV 
 
 Re/ercnccs\ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \arc to sections. 
 
 Limpus V. London Omnibus Co., 145. 
 
 146 
 Linch V. Pittsburgh Tr. Co., 523 
 
 V. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 186 
 Linck V. Scheffel. 633, 639 
 Lincoln v. Barre, 53 
 
 V. Beckman, 760 
 
 V. Boston, 262, 358 
 
 V. Buck master, 30 
 
 y. Calvert, 356, 368 
 
 T. Detroit, 287 
 
 V. Hapgood, 303, 310 
 
 V. Power, 376 
 
 V. Saratoga, etc. R. Co., 760 
 
 V. Smith, 358, 369 
 
 V. Walker, 108, 289 
 
 V. Woodward, 369 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Sutherland, 735 
 
 Rapid Transit Co. v. Nichols, 
 89 359 
 Lindall v. Bode, 223 
 Lindeberg v. Crescent Min. Co., 186a 
 Lindeman v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 91 
 Lindholm v. St. Paul, 363 
 Lindley v. Polli County, 356 
 Lindsay v. Connecticut, etc. R. Co., 
 57 
 
 V. Winn, 653 
 Lindsey v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 533 
 V. Danville, 764 
 
 V. Des Moines, 367 
 <!. Leighton, 699, 710 
 Lindvall v. Woods, 195, 332, 333 
 Line v. Taylor, 628, 633 
 Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 
 
 Linfield vt Old Colony R. Co., 417, 
 
 468. 467 
 Link V. Phila., etc. R. Co., 476 
 
 V. Sheldon. 606 
 Linnehan v. Rollins. 165, 166 
 
 V. Sampson, 85, 630, 639 
 Linsley v, Bushnell, 365, 758 
 Linton Coal Mining Co. v. Persons, 
 
 185, 207a 
 Lion, The? 172 
 Lipe V. Blackwelder, 640 
 Lipfeld V. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 
 
 413 
 Liscomb v. New Jersey R. Co., 506 
 Lissa v. Goodkind, 723 
 Litchfield v. Vernon, 332 
 Littaur V. Narragansett Pier R. Co., 
 
 476 
 Little V. Barreme, 332 
 
 V. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 483 
 
 v. Dusenberry, 503 
 
 V. Hackett, 66 
 
 V. Lathrop, 655, 659 
 
 V. McAdaras, 708 
 
 V. Madison. 263, 355 
 
 V. Summerlee Iron Co., 182 
 
 Little V. Superior, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 485a 
 
 V. Wirth, 710 
 Littlefield v. Brown, 635 
 
 V. Norwich, 369 
 Littlejohn v. Fitchburg R. Co., 491, 
 
 503 
 Little Miami R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 
 304 
 
 V. Stevens, 224, 226, 233b 
 
 V. Wetmore, 150 
 Little Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Barry, 
 233a 
 
 V. Cagle, 196 
 
 V. Chapman, 731, 735 
 
 V. Dick, 99 
 
 V. Duffey, 184. 194a, 316 
 
 V. Eubanks. 108, 178 
 
 V. Finlev, 4i9 
 
 V. Harrell, 516 
 
 V. Haynes, 484 
 
 V. Henson, 432, 463 
 
 V. Holland, 432, 463 
 
 V. Lawton. 492a 
 
 V. Miles, 493, 523 
 
 V. Moseley, 304, 217 
 
 V. Payne, 432 
 
 V. Perry, 56 
 
 r. Tankersly, 520 
 
 V. Townsend, 178, 184 
 
 V. Trotter, 4^9 
 
 V. Turner, 432 
 
 V. Voss, 3 1 7 
 Little Rock v. Willis, 274, 291 
 
 etc. Tel. Co. v. Davis, 757 
 Littleton v. Bacon, 55 
 
 V. Richardson, 355, 384 
 Littlewood v. New York, 140 
 Lively, The, 744 
 Livermore v. Camden county, 289 
 
 V. Freeholders, etc. 256 
 Livezey v. Schmidt, 735 
 Livingston v. Adams, 729, 7S2 
 
 V. Cox, 577 
 
 V. Radclifif, 573 
 Lloyd V. Albemarle, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 463 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 520 
 
 V. Lloyd, 741 
 
 V. New York, 354, 287 
 
 V. Ogleby, 653 
 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 434 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 63, 
 484 
 Loar V. Heinz, 340 
 LobdeU v. New Bedford, 367, 368 
 Loberg v. Amherst, 353, 358 
 Lock V. First Div. etc. R. Co., 61 
 Locke V. St. Paul. etc. R. Co., 418 
 
 V. State. 398 
 Lockhart v. Lichtenhaler, 66 
 
 V. Little Rock, etc., R. Co., 
 130a, 207a, 418 
 
lie/erences] TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 cxv 
 
 Lockwood V. Chicasro, etc. R. Co. 
 463 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 137, 769 
 Locust, etc. Iron Co. v. Gorrell, 717 
 Loeb V. Attica, 104 
 Loeber v. Roberts, 668 
 Loeser v. Humphrey, 645, 743 
 Loewer v. Sedalia, 393 
 Lofdahl V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 480 
 Lofrano v. N. Y. & Mt. Vernon 
 
 Water Co.. 319a 
 Loften V. Vogles, 65 
 Loftus V. Union Ferry Co., 606, 367, 
 
 496, 511 
 Logan V. Gednev, 419 
 
 V. New Bedford, 356 
 V. N. Carolina R. Co., 333, 413 
 V. People, 334 
 V. Wabash R. Co., 675 
 V. W. U. Tel Co., 756 
 Logansport, etc. R. Co. v. Caldwell 
 
 436 
 Logansport v. Dick, 175, 398 
 
 V. Justice, 368, 369 
 Logue V. Link, 639 
 Lohr V. Phillipsburg, 367, 368, 369 
 Loker v. Brookline, 105, 340, 353, 363 
 Lombar v. East Tawas. 374 
 Lombard v. Chicago, 353 
 V. Lenox, 761 
 V. Oliver. 310 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Christian, 518 
 London and Northwestern R. Co. v. 
 
 Skerton. 416 
 Long V. Coronado R. Co., 3C7, 309a 
 V. Milford, 96 
 V. Morrison, 607 
 V. Orsi, 559, 567 
 Longenecker v. Pennsylvania R. 
 
 Co., 108 
 Longmeid v. Holliday, 116 
 Longmore v. Great Western R. Co. , 
 
 531 
 Loom is V. Pearson, 39 
 
 V. Terry, 97, 98, 628, 639, 633, 
 639 
 Looney v. Joliet, 368 
 V. McLean, 710 
 Loop V. Litchfield, 117 
 Loper V. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Lopez V. Cent., etc. Mining Co., 108, 
 
 316 
 Loranger v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 195 
 Lord v. Carbon Iron Co., 717 
 
 V. Pueblo Smelting and Refin- 
 ing Co., 207 
 V. Wormwood, 640, 659, 660 
 Lorence v. Ellensburgh, 367 
 Lorentz v. Robinson, 186, 187 
 Lorillard v. Monroe, 338 
 
 liOrillard v. Monroe county, 356, 263, 
 
 291 
 Lorimer v. St. Paul City R. Co., 11, 
 
 241a 
 Loring v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 307 
 V. Worcester, etc. R. Co., 675 
 Lorman v. Benson, 333 
 Lortz V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 478, 
 
 481, 4816 
 Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los 
 
 Angeles, 374 
 Losee v. Buchanan, 16, 17, 60, 668, 
 683, 70ia 
 V. Clute, 8, 117 
 V. Water vliet R. Co., 508 
 Lothrop V. Fitchburg R. Co., 307 
 Loucks V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 461 
 
 463, 474, 478 
 Loughlin v. State, 231, 333a 
 Loughran v. Des Moines, 743 
 Louis V. Union Pac. R. Co., 675 
 Louisiana v. Jumel, 349 
 
 V. New Orleans, 354, 261 
 Louisville Canal Co. v. Murphy, 108, 
 401, 705 
 etc. R. Co. V. Ballard, 46, 418, 
 437, 429, 513, 749 
 Louisville v. Baker, 54 
 V. Banks, 198 
 V. Bean, 135 
 V. Belclier, 423, 440 
 v. Berg, 534 
 V. Berkey, 188, 202 
 V. Berry, 773 
 V. Binion. 219a 
 v. Bisoh, 523 
 V. Black, 483, 676 
 V. Boland, 303 
 V. Bowler, 233 
 V. Brantley, 3336 
 V. Breckenridge, 493 
 V. Breedlove, 191 
 V. Bryant, 2076 
 V. Burke, 139, 480 
 V. Campbell, 195 
 V. Case. 66, 758 
 V. Caudle, 445 
 V. Cavens, 2336, 335 
 V. Cayce, 509 
 V. Clarke, 769 
 V. Cockerel, 410 
 V. Cochran, 429 
 V. Coleman, 461 
 V. Conins, 99, 2336 
 V. Commonwealth, 463 
 V. Coniff, 62 
 V. Conrad, 493 
 V. Coulton, 222 
 V. Crawford, 90, 480 
 V. Creek, 66, 67 
 V. Crunk, 493a. 508, 520 
 V. Davis, 189, 341d 
 
CXVl 
 
 References] TABLE OF CASES. [/"-e to sections. 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Depp, 520 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Nitsche, 666, 
 
 V. Douglass, 154 
 
 668 
 
 V. DunKin, 64 
 
 V. NorthingtoD, 742 
 
 V. Earl, 207a 
 
 V. Orr, 1856, 189, 233, 241d, 767 
 
 V. Ellis, 493 
 
 V. Ousler, 427 
 
 V. Etzler, 439 
 
 V. Park, 495 
 
 V. Faylor, 505 
 
 V. Pearson, 2076 
 
 V. Fleming, 103, 481, 510 
 
 V. Pedigo, 516 
 
 V. Filbern, 180 
 
 V. Petty, 195 
 
 V. Foley, 2076, 217 
 
 V. Phillips, 433, 480 
 
 V. Fox, 93, 513 
 
 V. Pitt, 135 
 
 V. Frawley, 104, 219, 219a, 760 
 
 V. Posev, 431 
 
 V French, 460, 478 
 
 V. Potts, 471 
 
 V. Gaines, 493 
 
 V. Raines, 213 
 
 V. Goetz. 108, 114 
 
 V. Eeagan, 185a, 2076, 410 
 
 V. Goodbar, 455 
 
 V. Eeese. 676 
 
 V. Gower, 53 
 
 V. Eeidmond, 431 
 
 V. Greer, 748 
 
 V. Red, 54 
 
 V. Gutenkunz, 94 
 
 V. Eice. 438, 431 
 
 V. Haokman. 417 
 
 V. Richards, 476 
 
 V. Hailey, olSa 
 
 V. Richardson, 60a, 3076, 2416 
 
 V. Hairstown, 480 
 
 V. Eicketts, 531 
 
 V. Hall, 87, 198, 199 
 
 V. Eitter, 495, 499 
 
 V. Banning, 1856, 2076 
 
 V. Eobertson, 235 
 
 V. Hart, 434, 678 
 
 V. Robinson, 180, 336, 241 
 
 V. Hawthorn, 225 
 
 V. Santford, 113 
 
 V. Hays, 735 
 
 V. Schmetzer, 480 
 
 V. Hendricks, 516 
 
 V. Schmidt. 436, 451, 461 
 
 V. Hinder, 195 
 
 V. Sears, 73a, 485 
 
 M. Hodge, 415, 735 
 
 V. Shanklin, 336 
 
 V. Holsapple, 509, 530 
 
 V Shanks, 73, 93 
 
 V. Howard, 103, 468 
 
 V. Sheets, 238 
 
 V. Hurst, 434 
 
 V. Shivell, 89 
 
 V. Hurt, 7, 93, 99 
 
 V. Sickings 519 
 
 V. Jackson, 748 
 
 V. Simmons, 421, 433 
 
 V. Johnson, 493 
 
 V. Smith, 432 
 
 V. Jones, 57, 516, 743 
 
 V. Snyder, 31, 495, 497 
 
 V. Katzenberger, 536 
 
 V. Spain, 436 
 
 V. Kelly, 185a, 524 
 
 V. Sparks, 750 
 
 V. Kelsey, 433 
 
 V. Spenn, 678 
 
 V. Kenley, 188, 206, 221 
 
 V. Stanger, 436 
 
 V. Kingman. 488, 499 
 
 V. State, 359 
 
 V. Krey, 484 
 
 V. Stommel], 63, 65, 90, 107, 
 
 V. Krinning, 30, 666, 680 
 
 476, 478, 483 
 
 V. Lahr, 232 
 
 V. Stone, 461 
 
 V. Lee, 470, 520 
 
 V. Stutts, 185, 195 
 
 V. Lockridge, 107 
 
 V. Sullivan, 493 
 
 V. Logan, 493 
 
 V. Sumner, 441 
 
 V. Lohges, 483 
 
 V. Taylor, 676 
 
 V. Lucas, 410, 506 
 
 V. Thomas, 436, 448 
 
 V. McCorkle, 676 
 
 V. Thompson, 471, 488 
 
 V. McCoy, 47, 457, 495 
 
 V. Trammell, 767 
 
 V. McEwan, 513, 518 
 
 V. Treadway, 506 
 
 V. Malone, 675, 676 
 
 V. Utz, 307a, 3076 
 
 V. Markee, 2076 
 
 V. Wade, 493 
 
 V. Martin, 233a 
 
 V. Ward, 204. 3076, 217 
 
 V. Melton, 458. 469 
 
 V. Watson, 64 
 
 V. Miller, 216, 674. 675, 678 
 
 V. Weams, 11, 51 
 
 V. Milton, 418, 442 
 
 V. Webb, 73a, 101, 482 
 
 V. Mitchell. 675 
 
 V. Whitesell, 62, 451a 
 
 V. Moore, 233a 
 
 V. Williams, 196, 451a, 483, 484 
 
 V. Mothershed, 207, 3076 
 
 V. Wilson, 3076 
 
 V. Natchez, etc. E Co., 676 
 
 V. Wolfe, 94, 506, 519, 748 
 
Re/erences\ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. [."v to sections. 
 
 CXVll 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Wood, 91, 
 151, 508, 513, 758 
 
 V. Woods, 54. 3076 
 
 V. Wright, 198, 773 
 
 V. Yniestra, 108 
 
 V. Zink, 484 
 Louisville, New Orleans, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Mask, 508 
 
 & N. R Co. V. Hawkins, 317 
 
 etc. N. R. Co. V. Wallace, 307 
 
 etc. Turnp. Co. v. Nashville, etc. 
 Turnp. Co.. 385 
 Lounsberry v. Bridgeport, 115 
 Love v. Atlanta, 266 
 
 V. Hall, 568 
 
 V. Raleigh, 399 
 Lovegrove V. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 
 241 
 Loveland v. Gardner, 703 
 Lovejoy v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 201 
 
 V. Dolan, 653 
 Lovell V. Howell, 316 
 Lovenguth v. Bloomington, 86, 375, 
 
 376 
 Lovett V. Saleai, etc. R. Co., 73a, 83, 
 
 99, 473 
 Lovingston v. Bauchens, 158 
 Low V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 735, 736 
 Lowe V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 307(i, 
 3076, 775 
 
 V. Guard, 703 
 
 V. Salt Lake City, 97, 98, 385 
 Lovrell V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 34a, 
 173, 384, 414, 699 
 
 V. Glidden, 384 
 
 V. Moscovir, 335 
 
 V. Proprietor of Locks & Canais, 
 401 
 
 V. Short, 365, 384 
 
 V. Spaulding, 343, 353 
 Lower v. Franks, 615 
 
 V. Segal, 133 
 Lowery v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 408 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 36,39, 30, 
 37, 60, 355, 436, 676 
 
 V. Rowland, 750 
 
 V. Western U. Tel Co., 739, 753a 
 Lowry v. Guilford, 569 
 
 V. Thompson, 249 
 Loyd V. Columbus. 299 
 Luby V. Hudson River R. Co., 00a, 
 
 518 
 Lucas V. Coulter, 708 
 
 V. Mich. Central R. Co., 749 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 61 
 
 V New Bedford R. Co., 493a, 
 508, 530 
 
 V. N. "$. Central R. Co., 135 
 
 V. Pennsylvania Co., 123 
 Lucco V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 197 
 Lucey v. Ingram, 173 
 
 V. Hannibal Oil Co.. 207, 309a 
 Lucy V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 513 
 
 Lucia V. Meech, 661 
 Lucot V. Rodgers, 735 
 Ludlow V. Fargo, 289, 368 
 
 V. Yonkers. 744 
 Luebke v. Berlin Mach. Works, 309a, 
 318 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R, Co. , 303 
 Luede v. Mukwa, 378 
 Luedtke v. Jeffery, 649, 654 
 Luke V. Brooklyn, 361 
 Lukin v. Godsall. 750 
 Lumbly v. Backus Mfg. Co., 363 
 Lumley v. Caswell, i\l 
 Lumpkin v. Southern R. Co., 207 
 Lund v. Hersey Lumber Co., 197 
 
 V. Tyngsborough, 60a, 355, 375 
 Lundeen v. Livingston Electric Light 
 
 Co., :J54 
 Lundquist v. Duluth R Co., 241 
 Lunt V. Northwestern R. Co., 466, 473 
 Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 729, 735 
 
 V. Worcester, 363 
 Lutton V. Vernon, 367, 375 
 Luttrell V. Hazen, 146, 155 
 Lutz V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 139 
 Luvenguth v. Bloomington, 86, 375, 
 
 376 
 Lux v. Haggin, 729 
 Lyberg v. Northern Pao R. Co., 315 
 Lyddy v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 13 
 Lyendecker v. Martin, 619 
 Lygo V. Newbold, 705 
 Lyman v. Amherst, 376 
 
 V. Edgerton. 593, 593 
 
 v. Gipson, 659 
 
 V. Hampshire, 123, 376 
 
 V. Union R. Co., 48.5a! 
 Lyme Regis v. Henley, 118 
 Lynch v. AUyn, 1856, 203, 3416 
 
 V. Boston & A. R. Co., 307 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 557,559,630 
 
 V. Cowell, 569, 573 
 
 V. Davis, 609 
 
 V. Erie, 376 
 
 V. Grayson, 6:;i3 
 
 V. Hubbard, 343 
 
 V. Knight, 761 
 
 V. McNally. 638, 631, 639 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 71, 73, 
 73a, 139, 145 
 
 V. New Rochelle, 346. 485c 
 
 V. New York, 93, 363, 274, 375, 
 375 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 499, 
 500 
 
 V. Nurdin, 31, 34, 35, 73, 319 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 113 
 
 V. Smith, 73, 74, 79 
 
 V. St. Joseph, etc. R. Co., 464. 
 484 
 
 V. Stone, 403 
 
 V. Willard, 557 
 
 V. Wilson, 574 
 
cxviii 
 
 Rc/c} 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \iire to sections. 
 
 Ljnds V. Clark, 702 
 Lynn v. Adams, 340 
 Lyon V. Cambridge, 356 
 
 V. Logansport, 353, 875 
 Lyons v. Boston Towage Co., 185 
 
 V. Brookline, 37U 
 
 V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 185, 
 137 
 
 V. Desotelle, 104 
 
 V. Erie R. Co., 81, 86 
 
 V. Merrick, 365, 637, 634, 635 
 
 V. Rosenthal, 58, 60 
 Lyttle V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 195, 
 206, 207a, 215 
 
 McAdams v. Sutton, 628 
 
 McAdoo V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 46, 480 
 McAdory v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 775 
 McAllen v. Western U. Tel. Co., 753a 
 McAllister v. Albany, 358 
 
 V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 480 
 V. Clement, 23, 602 
 V. Hammond, 644 
 McAlpin V. Powell, 73, 97, 702a, 707 
 McAndrew v. Electric Tel. Co., 547, 
 
 550 553 
 McAndrews v. Burns, 180, 234, 236 
 V. Collerd, 9 
 
 V. Montana Union R. Co., 215 
 McArthur v. Green Bay, etc. R. Co., 
 104 
 V. Pease, 633 
 V. Saginaw, 358, 289 
 MoAuley v. Boston, 363 
 McAunich v. Mississippi, etc. R. Co., 
 
 98, 523 
 McBride v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Ill 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 233 
 McCabe v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 410 
 
 V. O'Connor, 121, 699, 709a 
 McCafferty v. Spuvten, etc. R. Co., 
 
 173, 175 
 McCaffrey v. Twenty-third St. R. 
 
 Co., 56 
 McCahill v. Detroit R. Co., 73a, 523 
 
 V. Kipp, 35, 123, 629, 634 
 McCaig V. Erie R. Co., 57, 60 
 MoCaldin v. Parke, 59, 60b, 725, 726 
 McCall v. Chamberlain, 421, 445 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 476 
 McCalla v. Multnomah county, 256 
 McCallum v. Long Island R. Co., 468, 
 477 
 V. McCallum. 307 
 McCampbell v. Cunard S. S. Co., 
 
 309a. 216, 233 
 McCamus v. Citizens' Gas Co.. 359 
 McCandless v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 57, 414, 436 
 V. McWha, 430, 605, 606, 608, 
 615 
 
 McCann v. Newark etc. R. Co., 55 
 V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 73a 
 v. Tillinghast, 150 
 V. Waltham, 295 
 McCaraher v. Commonwealth, 593 
 McCarragher v. Rogers, 60b, 73, 194a, 
 
 318. 338 
 McCarroll v. Kansas City, 358 
 McCarten v. Flagler, 703 
 McCarthy v. Boston, 391, 399 
 V. "Boston Duck Co., 57 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 131 
 V. Far Rockaway, 387 
 v. Foster, 705 
 V. New England Order, etc. 
 
 137 
 T. Oshawa, 353 
 V. Portland, 165, 358 338, 870, 
 
 379 
 V. Syracuse. 703 
 V. Young, 636 
 McCarty v. Lockport. 368 
 McCaskill v. Elliott. 629, 631 
 McCaslin v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 520 
 McCaughey v. Providence, 291 
 
 V. Tripp. 291 
 McCauley v. New York, 647 
 V. Smith, 719 
 
 v. Tennessee Coal, etc. Co., 523 
 McCawley v. Furness, etc. Co., 178 
 McCerren v. Alabama, etc. R. Co., 
 
 436 
 McCharles v. Horn Silver Mining 
 
 Co., 209a, 333 
 McChesney V. Panama R. Co., 18ob. 
 
 383a 
 McClain v. Brooklyn R. Co., 87, 408, 
 
 473, 485c 
 McClallen v. Adams, 613 
 McClarey v. Sioux, etc. R. Co., 40, 
 
 875 
 McClarney v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 194o. 197 
 McCleary v. Frantz, 686 
 V. Kent, 174 
 V. Lowell, 104 
 McClellan v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 667 
 McClelland v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 473 
 v. Scroggin. 668 
 McClenaghan v. Brock, 494, 685 
 McCleneghan v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., 
 
 731, 741 
 McCloskey v. Chautauqua Ice Co 
 645 
 V. Moies, 338, 363 
 McClung V. Dearborne, 146 
 McClure v. Red Wing, 374 
 
 V. Sparta, 353 
 McConnell v. Dewey, 356 
 McCool v. Galena, etc. R. Co., 487 
 v. Grand Rapids, 379 
 
References-\ TABLE OF CASES. i<"-s to sections. 
 
 CXIX 
 
 McCootnbs v. Akron, 274 
 McCord V. High, 313 
 
 V. Ossining, 355 
 McCormack v. Sornberger, 665 
 MoCormick v. Burt, 838 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 435 
 
 V. Horan, 735 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 413, 
 
 437 
 V. Monroe, 375 
 V. Washington, 380 
 V. Winters, 735 
 
 Machine Co. v. Burandt, 315, 
 719 
 McCoster v. Long Island, etc. R. Co. 
 
 331 
 
 McCouU V. Manchester, 363, 386, 358 
 
 McCoun V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 158 
 
 McCoy V. California, etc. R. Co., 
 
 451a 
 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 
 113, 749 
 V. So. Pacific R. Co., 449, 450, 
 451a 
 McCready v. South Carolina R. Co. , 
 
 673, 676 
 McCreary v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 417 
 MoCreery v. Willett, 635 
 MoCue V. National Starch Co., 319a 
 MoCullooi V. Blackhavvk County, 
 
 357, 336 
 McCullough ^. Shoneman, 144 
 McCuliy V. Clarke, 53, 57, 665 
 MoCummins v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 676 
 McCutcheon v. Homer, 363, 389 
 McDade v. Chester, 363 
 McDaniel v. Highland Ave. R. Co., 
 
 533 
 McDeruiott v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 408 
 V. Iowa Falls R. Co., 185a, 207 
 V. Kentucky Cent R. Co., 484 
 V. Kingston. 358, 368 
 McDonald v. Ashmead, 334a 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 520 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 480, 
 
 506. 510 
 V. Eagle Mfg. Co., 230 
 V Illinois Cent. R. Co., 509 
 V. International, etc. R. Co., 
 
 460, 482 
 V. Jodrey, 629 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 531 
 V. Lockport, 384 
 V. Long Isl. R. Co., 508, 531 
 V. Mallory, 131 
 
 V. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 366, 331 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 306 
 V. Montgomery R. Co., 93, 516, 
 
 520 533 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 136 
 
 McDonald v. Savoy, 111 
 V. Toledo, 363 
 V. Toledo R. Co., 485a 
 V. Toledo St. R, Co., 359 
 McDonnel v. Eliaa Brevring Co., 654 
 McDonough v. Lanher, 190 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 530 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. K. Co., 434 
 V. Virginia City, 363, 289 
 McDougall V. Campbell, 557 
 
 V. Central, etc. R. Co., 108, 111 
 V. Salem, 370 
 McDowell V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 435 
 McDuffie V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 478 
 McElligott V. Randolph, 190, 303a, 
 
 307a, 233 
 McElroy v. Albany, 391 
 
 V. Nashua, etc. R. Co., 413,486, 
 495, 503 
 McEniry v. Waterford, etc. R. Co. 
 
 341 
 McFadden v. Kingsbury, 340 
 
 V. Santa Anna, etc. R. Co., 67 
 McFarland v. Benton, 591 
 V. Crary, 577 
 V. Swiart, 703 
 McFee v. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 748 
 
 ';49 
 McGafflgan v. Boston, 369 
 McGahan v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 
 
 693 
 McGarry v. Loomis, 74. 79, 370 
 
 V. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 630, 
 631 
 McGatrick v. Wason, 104, 161, 197 
 McGearty V. Manhattan R. Co., 503 
 McGeary v. Eastern R. Co., 73a 
 McGee v. Boston Cordage Co., 194, 
 194a 
 V. Consolidated R. Co., 485c 
 V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 509, 
 513 
 McGettigan v. Potts, 701 
 McGhee v. Drisdale, 493 
 
 V. White, 477 
 McGibbon v. Baxter, 668 
 McGill V. Compton, 705 
 V. Monette, 115 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 478 
 McGilvray v. West End R. Co., 513 
 McGinity v. New York, 367 
 McGinley v. Levering, 283 
 McGinness v. Canada So. Bridge Co., 
 
 195, 197 
 McGinty v. Athol Beservoir Co., 
 
 195 
 McGlynn v. Brodie, 209a 
 McGoldrick v. N. Y. Cent., etc. R. 
 
 Co., 375, 721 
 McGonigle v. Canty, 303 
 V. Kane, 197 
 
cxx 
 
 Ke/crenccs\ TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 McGovern v. Central Vermont R. 
 Co., 54, 203, 212, 230 
 
 V. Columbus Mfg. Co., 241c 
 
 V. N. y. Central E. Co., 73, 90, 
 466, 471, .473, 477, 4Sla 
 McGowan v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 28, 
 187 
 
 V. Larsen, 737 
 
 V. St. Louis Ore, etc. Co., 775 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 52 
 
 V. International, etc. R. Co., 
 766, 767 
 McGrail v. Kalamazoo, 369 
 McGrath v. Bloomer, 61, 337 
 
 V. City, etc. R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 484 
 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 53, 57 
 
 V. Merwin, 104 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 13, 62, 
 87, 96, 417, 459, 466, 467 
 
 V. N. Y. & New England R. 
 Co., 2076 
 
 V. N. Pacific R. Co., 13 
 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 216 
 
 T. Walker, 703, 709a 
 McGraw v. Marion, 291 
 McGregor v. Boyle, 262 
 
 V. Brown, 623 
 McGrell v. Buffalo Office Bldg., 719a 
 McGrew v. Stone, 16, 21, 28, 46 
 McGuerty v. Hale, 60a, 195 
 MoGuiness v. Butler, 73 
 
 T. New York, 285 
 McGuinness v. Worcester, 363, 877 
 McGuire v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 73a 
 
 V. Grant, 144, 160, 701, 750 
 
 V. Hudson R. R. Co., 476, 477 
 
 T. Ringrose, 629 
 
 V. Spence, 370, 375, 703, 709a 
 
 V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 72, 
 461 
 McHenry Coal Co. v. Snedden, 748 
 McHugh V. Schlosser, 775 
 Mcllvaine v. Lautz, 663 
 Mclntire v. Plaisted, 640 
 
 V. Roberts, 35, 719 
 
 St. R. Co. V. Bolton, 183 
 Mcintosh V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 112 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 185 
 
 V. Slade, 172 
 Mclntyre v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 91, 
 137, 473, 519. 520, 524, 769, 
 771 
 
 V. Trumbull, 618 
 McKaig V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 233a 
 McKay v. Buffalo, 291 
 
 V. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 122, 
 359 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 754 
 McKee v. Bid well, 58, 60c, 355 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 203 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 729, 731 
 
 McKellar v. Detroit, 289, 353. 363 
 McKeller v. Monitor, 96, 367, 369 
 McKelvey v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 2L5 
 McKenna v. Baessler, 667 
 
 V. Martin, 712 
 
 V. St. Louis, 265 
 McKenzie v. Cheetham, 709 
 
 V. Northfleld, 376 
 McKeon v. Citizens' R. Co., 150 
 McKernan v. Manhattan R. Co., 493 
 McKillop V. Duluth St. R. Co., 408 
 McKimble v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 107 
 
 531 
 McKinley v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 154, 
 
 435 
 McKinney v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 481 
 
 V. Irieh Northern R. Co., 187 
 
 V. Jewett, 555 
 
 V. Neil, 89, 514, 516 
 
 V. Ohio, etc. E. Co., 445, 446 
 
 V. Western Stage Co. , 115 
 McKinnie v. Kilgallon, 719a 
 McKinnon v. Norcross, 1 1 
 MoKinster v. Bank of Utica, 580, 581 
 McKlssock V. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 58 
 McKone v. Mich. Cent. R. Co. , 506 
 
 T. Wood, 635 
 McKonkey v. Chicago, etc. K. Co., 460 
 McKune v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 
 478 
 
 V, Santa Clara Valley Mill, 60 
 McLane v. Sharpe, 494, 653 
 McLaren v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 493a 
 
 V. Canada Cent. R. Co., 679 
 
 V. Williston, 209a 
 McLarney v. Long Island R. Co., 213 
 McLaughlin v. Armfield, 13, 702a 
 
 V. Bangor, 749a 
 
 V. Charlotte, etc. E. Co., 359 
 
 V. Corey, 363, 760 
 
 V. Phila. Traction Co., 374, 376 
 McLaury v. McGregor, 90, 377 
 McLean v. Blue Point Co., 241a 
 
 V. Burbank, 514 
 
 V. Fiske Wharf, etc. Co., 708 
 
 Co. Coal Co. V. McVey, 772 
 McMahon v. Davidson, 31, 60, 66, 516 
 
 V. New York, 79, 83, 135 
 
 V. Northern Cent. R. Co., 73, 
 74, 108, 479 
 
 V. Port Henry Ore Co., 310, 215 
 
 V. Second Ave. E. Co., 118, 408, 
 341 
 McManus v. Carmichael, 333 
 
 V. Crickett, 151 
 
 V. Finan, 656 
 
 V. Lancashire, etc. R. Co., 505 
 
 V. Woolverton, 644 
 McMarshall v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 
 
 477, 481 
 McMaster v. 111. Central E. Co., 235 
 
 v. Montana E. Co., 429 
 
Re/erences] TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. 
 
 CXXl 
 
 McMellen v. Union News Co., 218 
 McMillan v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 
 73 
 V. Eastman, 319 
 V. Federal St. R. Co., 748 
 T. Union Brick Co., 189 
 Marble Co. v. Black, 89 
 McMullan v. Edison Electric Co. , 698 
 McMuUen v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 
 196 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 481a 
 McMurtray v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 530 
 McNaier v. Manhattan R. Co., 759 
 McNally v. Cohoes, 367, 369 
 V. Colwell, 665 
 V. Kerswell. 619 
 McNamara v. Clintonville, 346 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 513a 
 V. Logan, 217 
 V. MacDonough, 195, 341a 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 481b, 
 483 
 McNarra v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 679 
 M'Naughton v. Caledonian R. Co., 
 
 61, 94 
 McNeal v. Pittsburg, etc. R. Co., 474 
 McNeil V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Ctf., 216 
 McNerney v. Reading, 353 
 MoNeven v. Arnott, 705 
 McNevins v. Lowe, 606, 607 
 McNish V. Peekskill, 350, 377 
 McNown V. Wabash R. Co., 473 
 MoNulta V. Enoch, 508, 509 
 
 V, Lockridge; 4816 
 McNutt V. Livingston, 590, 591 
 McPadden v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 11, 494 
 McPeak v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 520 
 McPhee v. Scully, 193, 207a, 2416 
 McPheeters v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 419 
 McPherson v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 197, 771 
 McPheters v. Moose River Log Co., 
 735 
 V. Page, 244 
 McQueen v. Central, etc. R. Co., 61, 
 239 
 V. Elkhart, 363 
 McQuigan v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 
 207 
 McQuilken v. Central, etc. R. Co., 74, 
 
 108, 113 
 McQuillan v. Seattle, 377 
 McRickard v. Flint, 13, 467, 719 
 McRose V. Bottyer, 336 
 McSherry v. Canandaigiia, 333, 368 
 McTeer v. Lebow, 303 
 McVee v. Watertown, 73a, 369 
 McVeety v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 489 
 McVoy V. Knoxville, 93 
 
 McWilliams v. Detroit, etc. E. Co. , 93 
 
 V. Hopkins, 572 
 Macbeath v. Ellis, 573 
 Macaulay v. New York, 87, 654 
 Mace V. Reed, 486. 749 
 Mack V. Bensley, 730 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 89 
 Mackay v N. Y. Central R. Co., 87, 
 
 477, 478 
 Mackersy v. Raraseys, 583 
 Mackey v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 3076 
 
 V. Vicksburg, 705 
 Mackie v. Central R. Co. , 435 
 
 V. West Bay City, 373, 375 
 Mackin v. Alaska Refrigerator Co., 
 195, 319 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 304, 326, 
 331 
 
 V. People's R. etc. Co., 5'0 
 Macomber v. Nichols, 333, 395 
 
 V. Taunton, 351, Zm, 367 
 Macon v. Macon, etc. R. Co., 354 
 Macon, etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 63, 99, 103, 
 454, 463 
 
 V. McConnell, 679 
 
 V. Mayes, 459, 503 
 
 V. Sester, 419 
 
 V. Vaughn, 436, 437 
 
 V. Wvnn 
 Mad River R. Co. v. Barber, 178, 180, 
 184, 208, 214, 2336 
 
 V. Butler, 315. 
 Madden v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 
 230, 233, 235, 241 
 
 V. Minneapohs. etc. R. Co., 197 
 
 V. Occidental S. S. Co., 333 
 
 V. Port Royal, etc. R. Co., 510 
 Maddox v. Randolph county, 373 
 Madison v. Baker, 369 
 
 county V. Brown, 257, 376 
 
 R. Co. V. Bacon, 180 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Whiteneck, 431 
 Magarity v, Wilmington, 274, 289 
 Magee v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 307 
 
 V. Oregon R., etc. Co., 493 
 
 V. North Pac. R. Co., 207a 
 
 V. Troy, 358 
 Magie v. Cutts, 606 
 Maginnis v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 460, 
 
 463 
 Magner v. Truesdale, 476 
 Magoffin V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 139, 
 
 493 
 Magoon v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 479 
 Magor.v. Chad wick, 734 
 Maguire v. Cartersville, 734 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 113 
 
 V. Middlesex R. Co., 87 
 Mahar v. N. Y.. New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 520 
 Maher v. Atlantic, etc. R Co., 476 
 
 V. Boston & A. R. Co.. 199 
 
cxxii 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 Maher v. Central Park, etc. R. Co. , 
 111, 521 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 60 
 V. Winona, etc. R. Co., 426, 
 434, 448 
 Mahler v. Norwich, etc. Tr. Co., 131 
 Mahogany v. Ward, 346 
 Mahoney v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 
 413, 459 
 V. Dore, 114, 197, 209, 209a, 
 
 211a 
 V. Libbev, 348, 705 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 87, 376 
 V. N. Y. & New England R. 
 Co., 241 & 
 Mahanoy v. Scliolly. 257 
 Maier v. Randolpli. 146 
 Mailhot V. Pugh, 729 
 Mairs v. Manhattan Real Est. Ass'n, 
 
 TOla. 728, 747 
 Maker v. Slater Mill Co., 13, 702a 
 Malcolm v Fuller. 231, 241& 
 
 V, Richmond, etc. R. Co., 508, 
 
 Maiden, etc. R. Co. v. Charleston, 
 
 301, 345 
 Maley v. Shattuck, 322 
 Mah V. Lord, 145, 151 
 Mallach v. Ridley, 145 
 Mallory v. Griffey, 108 
 Malloy V. Hibernian Sav. Soc, 703 
 
 V. Staten Isl. Rapid Tr. R. Co., 
 725 
 
 V. Walker, 368, 378 
 Malmsten v. Marquette. 06 
 Malone v, Boston & Alb. R. Co. , 484 
 
 V. Hath.iwav, 204, 226, 230, 231 
 
 V. Hawlev, 194. 217, 223 
 
 V. Knowlton. 627 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 525, 
 761a 
 Maloy V. Port Royal, etc. R. Co., 241c 
 
 V. St. Paul, 376 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 88 
 Maltby v. Chicago, etc. R. Co.. 417 
 Manchester v. Hartford, 333, 353, 367 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Fullarton, 426 
 
 V. Wallis, 418, 449 
 Mancuso v. Cataract Construction 
 
 Co., 195 
 Mandel v. Wheeler, 207 
 Manderschid v, Dubuque, 289 
 Mandeville v. Reynolds, 317 
 Mangam v. Brooklyn R. Co., 54, 72, 
 
 73, 74, 82 
 Mangan v, Atterton, 34. 73, 74, 684 
 Manger v. Shipman, 629 
 Mangerton, The, 92 
 Manhattan Tr. Co. v, New York. 736 
 Manier v. Western U. Tel. Co., 554, 
 
 753a 
 Manley v. St. Helen's Canal Co., 865, 
 396, 401 
 
 Manley v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 475, 
 
 477 
 Manly v. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 73, 99 
 Mann v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 191, 204, 230, 233a 
 V. Oriental Print Works, 186a, 
 
 236 
 V. Phila. Tr. Co., 523 
 V. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 406, 
 
 417 
 V. Weiand, 66, 683 
 V. Williamson. 656 
 Car Co. V. Dupre, 758 
 Manning v. Adams, 161 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 209 
 V. Hogan, 195 
 T. Lowell, 274 
 V. Wilkin, 564 
 Manser v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 
 
 497 
 Mansfield v. Moore, 334a, 367, 868 
 
 Coal. etc. Co v. McEnery, 65, 
 87, 222, 766 
 Manson v. Manhattan R. Co., 457 
 Manufacturing Co. v. Morrissey, 208, 
 
 215 
 Manville v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 241 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 553, 
 555, 755 
 Manwell v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 451, 4.55 
 Manzoni v. Douglas, 56, 647 
 Marble v. Ross, 87, 97, 102, 103, 639 
 
 T. Worcester, 31, 346, 355 
 March v. Portsmouth, etc. R. Co., 
 
 395 
 Marean t. N. Y., Susquehanna, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 209 
 Mareau v. Vanatta, 639 
 Marden v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 475 
 Marfell v. New So. Wales R. Co., 484 
 Marietta, etc. R. Co. v. Stephenson, 
 
 449, 4-)la, 634 
 Marine Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 362 
 Marini v. Graham, 371 
 Marion v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 64, 
 758 
 County V. Riggs, 256 
 Mark v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 
 86, 740 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 477 
 Markel v. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 
 
 755. 757 
 Market v. St. Louis, 353 
 Markham v. Houston, etc. Naviga- 
 tion Co., 66 
 Markin v. Priddy, 418, 655, 656, 664 
 Marks v. Long Isl. R. Co., 760 
 
 V. Petersburg R. Co., 475, 481 
 V. Rochester R. Co., 283 
 Marpesia, The, 57 
 
References^ TABLE OF CASES. Wre to sections. CXXIU 
 
 Marquet v. La Duke, 629 
 Marquette, etc. E. Co. v. Spear, 679 
 Marr v. Western U. Tel. Co., 553, 
 
 741 
 Marrier v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 147 
 Marriott v. Baltimore, 262 
 Mars V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 35, 154 
 Marseilles v. Howland, 390 
 Marsel v. Bowman, 637 
 Marsh v. Bancroft, 634 
 V. Benton, 87 
 V. Branch Road, 388 
 V. Chickering. 195, 315, 217 
 V. Hand, 144, 635, 636 
 V. Herman, 195 
 V. Jones, 629, 635 
 v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 440 
 V. Whitmore, 559 
 Marshall v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 60a 
 V. Cohen, 713 
 V. Heard, 709 
 V. Hosmer, 618 
 V. Ipswich, 351, 356 
 V. Nagel, 573 
 V. Schricker, 52 
 V. Wabash R. Co., 136 
 V. Welwood, 17, 683, 701a 
 V, York, etc. R. Co., 22, 486 
 Marsland v. Murray, 73a 
 Martin v. Brooklyn, 291, 368 
 
 V. California Cent. R. Co., 207a 
 V. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 23, 
 
 506 
 V. Dufalla, 702 
 V. Georgia R. Co., 480 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 676 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 410 
 V. Kehoe, 476 
 
 V. Little Rock, etc. R. Co., 476 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 207a 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 675 
 V. N. Y. & New England R. 
 
 Co., 30, 666, 676 
 V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 60a 
 V. North Star Works, 31 
 V. N. Y., Ontario, etc. E. Co., 
 
 666 
 V. Pettit, 56, 710 
 V. Riddle, 735 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 40 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co.. 508, 521 
 V. Simpson, 721 
 V. Stewart, 4:^9, 451a 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 673 
 V. Towle, 60c 
 V. Temperely, 172 
 V. Tribune Asso., 169 
 V. Western Un. R. Co., 676, 680 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 544, 
 754 
 Martinez v. Gerber, 115 
 Marty v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 476 
 
 Marvin v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 666, 
 667 
 V. Maysville, etc. R. Co., 138 
 Y. Miller, 205 
 V. New Bedford, 369 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 545, 
 
 547 
 Safe Co. V. Ward, 8, 118, 258 
 Marwedel v. Cook, 704, 710 
 Maryland Central R. Co. v. Neubeur, 
 
 90, 476, 477 
 Marzetti v. Williams, 753 
 Mason v. Cotton, 729 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 481, 484 
 
 V. Ellsworth. 368, 749a 
 
 V. Hill, 729, 733 
 
 V. Hutchings, 624 
 
 V. Keeling, 631 
 
 V. Minneapolis E. Co., 483 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 64, 480 
 
 V. Morgan, 637 
 
 V. Eichmond, etc. E. Co., 186, 
 
 196, 207&, 230 
 V. Tower Hill Co., 58 
 Massengale v. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 
 554 
 Massie v. Peel Coal Co., 207 
 Massoth V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 13, 114, 467, 476, 477 
 Masters v. Troy, 363, 373 
 
 V. Warren, 758 
 Masterson v. Macon E. Co. , 520 
 
 v. N. Y. Central, etc. E. Co., 
 66, 359. 415 
 Masterton v. Mount Vernon, 263, 760 
 Mateer v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 196 
 Mather v. Rillston, 189, 194, 303, 207a, 
 
 219(1 
 Mathews v. Case, 233 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 676, 
 
 680, 765 
 V. Winooski Turnp. Co., 385, 
 389 
 Mathis v. Carpenter, 619 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 554 
 Matlock V. Strange, 303 
 Matson v. Maupin, 634 
 
 V. Port Townsend R. Co., 481a 
 Matta V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 476 
 Matteson v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 115 
 
 V. Strong, 639 
 Matthews v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 
 480, 483 
 V. Bonsee, 684, 705 
 V. Cedar Eapids, 375 
 V. DeGroof, 708 
 v. Kelsey, 362 
 V. Phila., etc. E. Co., 480 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 63 
 V. Warner, 61, 95, 741 
 Mattimore v. Erie, 93, 363, 369 
 Mattise v. Consumers' Ice Co., 185a, 
 194as, 283, 333a 
 
CXXIV 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections 
 
 Mattoon v. Freemantle, etc. R. Co., 
 
 67G 
 Matz V. St. Paul R. Co., 523 
 Matzer v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 97. 
 Mau V. Morse, 719a 
 Mauch Chunk v. KUne, 363 
 Mauerman v. Siemerts, 114 
 Maull V. Wilson, 665 
 Maultby v. Leavenworth, 377 
 Maumus v. Champion, 64 
 Maury v. Talmadge, 495,514 
 Maus V. Springfield, 876 
 Maverick v. Eighth Avenue R. Co., 
 
 51, 495 
 Max Morris, The v. Curry, 61 
 Maxey v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 483 
 Maxim v. Champion, 273, 340, 356, 
 
 367 
 Maximillian v. New York, 253, 255, 
 
 266, 281, 289, 295 
 Maxwell v. Mcllvoy, 321 
 May V. Burdett, 17, 626, 629 
 V. Princeton, 113 
 T. Central R. Co. , 480 
 V. Smith, 219, 219a 
 V. Whittier Mach. Co., 2416 
 Mayberry v. Concord R. Co., 449 
 
 V. Kelly, 303 
 Mayer v. Hutchinson Bdg. Co., 244 
 V. Laux, 702a 
 
 V. Thompson, etc. Bdg. Co., 
 122, 148 
 Mayes v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 317, 
 
 408 
 Mayhew v. Boyce, 649 
 
 V. Burns, 133, 700 
 Maynard v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 418, 438, 430 
 V. Buck, 53 
 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 419, 
 449 
 Maynell v. Saltmarsh, 371 
 Maypole v. Forsyth, 701 
 Mayo V. Boston, etc. R. Co., Ill, 112, 
 535 
 V. Spartenburg, etc. R. Co., 676 
 T. Wright, 614 
 Mayor, etc. v. Mayberry, 343 
 V. O'Donnell, 298' 
 V. Sheffield, 289, 333, 334, 367 
 May wood v. Logan, 709 
 Mazetti v. Harlem R. Co., 408 
 Mead v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 V. Derby. 2.")8, 334 
 V. New Haven, 255, 291 
 Meador v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 215 
 Meadville v. Erie Canal Co., 257 
 Meagher v. Cooperstown, etc. R. Co., 
 
 53. 485 
 Meara v. Holbrook, 163, 413 
 Mears v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 207a 
 Meares v. Wilmington, 289, 291 
 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Earp, 083 
 
 V. Merchants' Bank, 580, 598, 
 600 
 Mechanicsburg v. Meredith, 336 
 Mechesney v. Unity, 376 
 Meddaugh v. N. Y., Ontario, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 478 
 Meegan v. McKay, 628 
 Meehan v. More wood, 150 
 Meek v. N. Y. Central R, Co., 197 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 93,480, 
 483 
 Meeker V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 448 
 Meeks v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 73, 
 
 74, 483 
 Meesel v. Lynn. etc. R. Co., 533 
 Meeteer v. Manhattan R. Co., 743 
 Megargee v. Philadelphia, 380 
 Meggett V. W. U. Tel. Co., 753a 
 Megow V. Chifcago, etc. R. Co.. 675 
 Mehan v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 87, 
 
 214 
 Mehegan v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 475 
 Meibus v. Dodge, 73, 639 
 Meier t. Morgan, 187 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 12, 45, 
 
 495 
 V. Shrunk, 630, 634, 639 
 Meinzer v. Racine. 374 
 Meister v. Lang, 721 
 Meixell v. Morgan, 735 
 Melchert v. Amer. U. Tel. Co., 538 
 Melhado v. Poughkeepsie Trans. Co., 
 
 515 
 Melhop V. Seaton, 619 
 Mellen v. Morrill, 709 
 
 V. Western R. Co., 395, 413 
 Mellor V. Merchants' Mfg. Co., 207, 
 2416 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 488, 
 492 
 Mellors v. Shaw, 56, 187, 197 
 Meloy V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., ISSa, 
 
 197, 467 
 Melsheimer v. Sullivan, 639 
 Melzer v. Peninsular Car Co., 219a 
 Memphis v. Kimbrough, 285 
 V, Lasser, 291 
 V. Overton, 333 
 V. Waterworks Co., 358 
 Memphis Packet Co. v. McCool, 516 
 v. Nagel, 749 
 V. Pikey, 133, 513 
 Memphis, etc. , R. Co. v. Askew, 184 
 V. Blakenv, 419 
 V. Copeland, 62, 103, 479 
 V. Graham, 2076 
 V. Hembree, 95 
 V. Jobe, 96 
 V. Jones, 433 
 V. Kerr, 419 
 V. Lvon, 429 
 
Re/erencef\ TABLE OF CASES. [<"-^ '''' sections. 
 
 cxxv 
 
 Memphis, etc. , R. Co. v. Sanders, 458 
 
 V. Stringfellow, 520 
 
 V. Thomas, 207 
 
 V. Whitfield, 509, 510, 758 
 
 V. Womack, 464, 473 
 Menard v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 60c, 
 
 485 
 Mendell v. Wheeling, 265, 286 
 Menger v. Laur, 654 
 Menomonee River, etc. R. Co. t. Mil- 
 waukee, etc. R. Co., 56, 073, 
 675 
 Mentzer v. Armour, 193 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 756 
 Mercer v. Corbin, 653 
 
 V. Woodgate, 343 
 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Goodman, 
 583 
 
 Bank v. Spicer, 580 
 Mercier v. Mercier, 56 
 Meredith v. Reed, 626 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co.,4S0, 
 483 
 Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 705 
 Meridian v. Hyde, 376 
 Merkle v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 470 
 Meri-ifleld v. Lombard, 734 
 
 V. Worcester, 258, 274, 734 
 Merrigan v. Boston, etc. R. Co'., 13, 
 
 60c. 466 
 Merrill, Matter of, 459 
 
 V. Claremont, 346 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 490, 518 
 
 V. Hampden, 850, 367, 375 
 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co., 23, 
 753a 
 
 V. Wilbraham, 358 
 Merrimann v. Phillipsburg, 376 
 Merritt v. Brinkeroff, 730 
 
 V. Earl, 16 104 
 
 V. Fitzgibbons, 863 
 
 V. Lambert. 557 
 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 520 
 
 V. Parker, 729 
 
 V. Read, 303 
 Merryman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 73a 
 Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 827 
 
 V. Gibbs, 14, 176, 254, 281, 
 319, 336, 327, 725, 726 
 Mertz V. Detweiler, 614 
 Merwinv. Manhattan R. Co., 496, 523 
 
 V. Rogers, 303 
 Merz V. Brooklyn, 354 
 Meservey v. Lockett, 649 
 Messenger v. Dennie. 73a, 90, 654 
 
 V. Pate. 685 
 Messerole v. Brooklyn R. Co. , 525 
 Metallic Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. 
 
 Co., 464 
 Metcalf V. Baker, 758 
 
 Metcalf V. Hetherington, 326 
 
 V. Cunard S. S. Co., 705 
 Metropolitan Asyl. Dist. v. Hill, 283 
 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackson, 54 
 
 V. Johnson, 90, 485c, 760, 764 
 
 V. Moore, 488 
 
 St. R. Co. V. Powell, 66 
 Metz V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 120a, 163, 
 413 
 
 V. Soule, 249 
 Metzgar v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 673 
 Metzger v. Schultz, 709a 
 Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Lauricella, 
 500, 516 
 
 v. Shean, 196 
 
 Nat. R. Co. V. Mussette, 35 
 Meyer v. King, 690 
 
 V. Lewis, 644 
 
 V. Midland, etc. R. Co., 100, 
 460, 483 
 
 V. No. Missouri R. Co., 435 
 
 T. Pacific R. Co., 53, 64, 493 
 
 V. People's R. Co., 94 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. 495, 
 490, 513 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 468 
 
 V. Tacoma Water Co., 733 
 
 v. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 676 
 Michael v. Alestree, 123 
 
 V. Roanoke Mach. Works, 185&, 
 207a 
 
 V. Stanton, 160 
 Michaels v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 39, 
 
 40 
 Miohels v. Syracuse, 368 
 Michigan Central R. Co. v. Austin ,316 
 
 v. Dolan, 180 
 
 V. Smithson, 196, 197 
 Michigan City v. Ballance, 367 
 
 V. Boeckling, 358, 367, 368, 369 
 Michigan, etc. R. Co. v. Coleman, 57, 
 107, 115 
 
 V. Lautz, 118 
 
 V. Leahy, 61 
 Mickee v. Wood Mach. Co., 216 
 Mickles v. Hart, 618 
 Middlesex Co. v. Lowell, 734 
 Middlestadt v. Morrison, 646 
 Middleton Co. v. Roycroft, 719a 
 Midland R. Co. v. Daykin, 449 
 
 v. Fisher, 443 • 
 Milarkey v. Foster, 365, 871 
 Miles V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 508 
 
 V. Worcester, 367 
 Milford V. Holbrook, 850, 384 
 Milhau V. Sharp, 859 
 Millard v. Jenkins, 303 
 Millen v. Fandrve, 640 
 
 V. Fawtrey. 640 
 Miller v. Boone county, 356, 393, 743 
 
 V. Chatterton, 787 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co.. 195485, 
 
cxxvi 
 
 Refercnces'\ TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 Miller v. Church, VOQa 
 
 V. Cohen, 647 
 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 
 509 
 
 V. Hancock, 710 
 
 V. Kimbraj-, 633 
 
 V. Laphatu, 729 
 
 V. Laubach, 785 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 66a 
 
 V. Iron county, 256, 263 
 
 V. McWilliams. 256, 35S 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 760 
 
 V. Mariner's Church, 95, 741 
 
 V. Martin, 668 
 
 T. Miller, 739 
 
 T. Minnesota, etc. R. Co., 168 
 
 T. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 203a, 
 304, 230, 233 
 
 V. Morristown, 274 
 
 V. N. y. Central R. Co., 114, 
 460 
 
 T. N. Y., Lackawanna, etc. R. 
 Co., 144 
 
 V. jST. y., Lake Erie, etc. R Co., 
 413 
 
 V. Ocean Steamship Co., 00c, 
 495, 496, 516, 523 
 
 V. Rochester Pav. Co., 68 
 
 v. Rucker, 310 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 519 
 
 V. St. Paul, 356, 358 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 195, 
 233, 233a, 241 
 
 V. Strivens, 645 
 
 V. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co., 483 
 
 V. Truesdale, 476 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 186, 207, 
 233 
 
 Y. Wilson, 574 
 
 V. Woodhead. 705 
 Millidgeville v. Cooley, 289 
 Millagan v. Wedge, 173 
 Milliken v. Western U. Tel. Co., 548 
 Milliman v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 93, 508 
 
 V. Oswego, etc. R. Co., 440 
 Mills V. Armstrong, 66 
 
 V. Brooklyn, 262, 274, 275 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 676, 679 
 
 V. Harlem R. Co., 633 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 521 
 
 V. Orange, etc. R. Co., 457 
 Milne v. Smith, 174 
 Milton V. Hudson River Steamboat 
 
 Co., 95, 741 
 Milwaukee v. Davis, 262, 384, 356, 377 
 Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. v. Arms, 47 
 
 V. Finney, 150, 154, 518 
 
 V. Hunter, 408, 474 
 
 V. Kellogg, 26, 30, 55, 666 
 Minard v. Mead, ll8 
 Miner v. Connecticut River R. Co., 
 65, 208 
 
 Minick v. Troy, 373, 875 
 Minneapolis Mill Co. v. St. Paul, 729 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Beckwith, 423 
 Minnikuyson v. Dorsett, 563 
 Minor v. Sharon, 92, 709 
 Minter v. Crommelin, 317 
 Minty v. Union Pac. R. Co., 180 
 Mississinewa Min. Co. v. Patton, 692, 
 
 693 
 Mississippi v. Johnson, 313 
 
 Cotton-Oil Mills Co. v. Ellis, 203 
 
 Ins. Co. V. Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co,. 672, 680 
 
 Logging Co. V. Schneider, 185, 
 203 
 
 Mills Co. V. Smith, 734 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Mason, 63, 99 
 Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107, 
 215 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Bradshaw, 451a 
 
 v. Cook, 492 
 
 V. Davidson, 671 
 
 V. Edwards, 73 
 
 V. Hogan, 222 
 
 V. Kirchoffer, 467 
 
 V. Leggett. 436 
 
 V. Miller, 492a 
 
 V. Palmer, 429 
 
 V. Prickryl, 666 
 ' V. Rogers, 102 
 
 V. Russell, 512 
 
 V. Simmons, 490 
 
 V. Thomas, 417 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Baier,54,516 
 
 V. Barber, 135, 196 
 
 V. Bartlett, 673, 676, 679 
 
 V. Bradshaw, 424 
 
 V. Brown, 53, 480 
 
 V, Cady, 676 
 
 V. Callahan, 518 
 
 V. Crenshaw. S17 
 
 V. Cullers, 666, 667, 676 
 
 V. Donaldson, 675 
 
 V. Dunham, 428, 444 
 
 V. Eckel, 434 
 
 V. Finley, 633 
 
 V. Geduev, 428 
 
 V. Gill, 448 
 
 V. Henry, 133 
 
 V. Holcomb, 513a 
 
 V, Humes, 423, 749 
 
 V. Ivy, 505 
 
 V. Johnson, 16, 470, 748 
 
 V. Jones, 160 
 
 V. Kaiser, 761a 
 
 V. Keyes, 783 
 
 V. Kincaid, 679 
 
 V. Lehmberg. 214, 410 
 
 V. Lee, 472, 478 
 
 V. Lewis, 188, 195, 197 
 
 V. Long, 506 
 
 V. Lyde, 189, 762 
 
 V. McCally, 241c 
 
Re/erences-\ TABLE OF CASES. lare to sections. CXXVll 
 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. McCanahan, 
 493 
 
 V. McElyea, 194a 
 
 V. Martino, 493 
 
 V. Moffatt, 467 
 
 V. Morrow, 431 
 
 V. Moseley, 114, 480 
 
 T. Patton, 191 
 
 V. Platzer, 673 
 
 V. Porter, 480 
 
 V. Renfro, 412 
 
 V. Roads, 449 
 
 V. Shufcrd, 49, 748 
 
 V. Somers, 301, 317 
 
 V. Stevens, 437 
 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 666, 667 
 
 T. Watson, 113 
 
 V. White, 85, 319a 
 
 V. Williams, 3336 
 
 V. Wilson, 430, 453 
 
 V. Wortham, 510 
 Mitchell V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 464,484 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. Co., 107, 516 
 
 V. Clapp, 628 
 
 V. CHnton, 108 
 
 V. Gi'assweller, 147 
 
 V. Harmony, 344 
 
 V. Keene, 719 
 
 V. Marker, 719a 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 476 
 
 V. Phila., etc. R. Co., 481a 
 
 V. Prange, 688a 
 
 V. Robinson, 230 
 
 V. Rochester, R. Co., 761 
 
 V. Rockland, 256, 366, 299 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 516, 
 523 
 
 V. Tacoma Ry. Co., 99, 485c 
 
 V. Tacoma R., etc. R. Co., 481a 
 
 V. Turner, 57, 378 
 
 V. Western R. Co., 508, 516 
 Mixter v. Imperial Coal Co. , 323 
 Moakler v Williamette Val. R. Co., 
 
 519 
 Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 124 
 Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Ashcrof t, 60a, 518 
 
 V. Caldwell, 437, 433 
 
 V. Clanton, 242 
 
 V. Crenshaw, 73 
 
 V. Davis, 467 
 
 V. Godfrey. 223 
 
 V. Gray, 676, 678 
 
 V. Holborn, 58, 207a, 2415 
 
 V. Hudson, 57, 419, 456 
 
 V. Kimbrough, 431 
 
 V. Malone, 457 
 
 V. Massey, 233 
 
 V. Seaes, 151 
 
 V. Smith, 232, 241 
 
 V. Stroud, 480 
 
 V. Thomas, 52, 57, 180 
 
 V. Wativ, 99, 772 
 
 V. Williams, 419, 421 
 
 Mobley v. Clark, 580 
 Mochler v. Shaftsbury, 652 
 Moe V. Smiley, 138 
 Moebus V. Becker, 16, 686 
 
 V. Herrmann, 73, 485a, 645, 
 654 
 Moeller v. Brewster, 207 
 Moellering v. Evans, 701, 750 
 Moffatt V. Tennev, 767 
 MofHtt V. Asheville, 260 
 Mohawk Bank v. Broderick, 580 
 Mohney v. Cook, 104 
 Moir V. Hopkins. 165 
 Molair v. Port Royal R. Co., 428 
 Molaske v. Ohio Coal Co., 319 
 MoUie Gibson Mining Co. v. Sharp, 
 
 203 772 
 MoUoy V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 151 
 Monaghan v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 233a 
 Monahan v. Worcester, 192 
 Monies v. Lynn, 338, 363, 368 
 IMonk V. New Utrecht, 271, 276, 337. 
 
 340 
 Monmouth Min. Co. v. Erling, 194a 
 Monongahela v. Fischer, 93 
 
 Bridge Co. v. Kirk, 283, 395, 
 737 
 
 City V. Fischer, 352 
 Monroe v. Collins, 310 
 
 V. Lattin, 114 
 
 County V. Flynt, 256 
 Monson, etc. Mfg. Co. v. Fuller, 728 
 Montieth v. Finkbeiner, 710 
 Montf ort v. Hughes, 244, 248 
 
 V. Schmidt, 654 
 Montgomery v. Alabama, G. S. R. 
 Co., 484 
 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. E. Co., 
 94 
 
 V. Koester, 632 
 
 V. Lansing Electric E. Co., 484 
 
 V. Locke, 729 
 
 V, Muskegon Co., 675 
 
 V. Scott, 53 
 
 V. Townsend, 274 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. E. Co., 421 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 554 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 419 429 
 
 V. Wright, 289, 376 
 Montgomery Co. Bank v. Albany City 
 Bank, 243, 580, 581, 582. 584, 
 Montgomery Gas Co. v. Montgomery, 
 
 etc. R. Co., 93, 108,418 
 Montgomery, etc. R. Co, v. Boring, 50ft 
 
 V. Mallette, 495, 516, 742 
 
 V. Stewart, 520 
 Monticello v. Fox, 274 
 Montrion v. Jefferys, 558 
 Moody V. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 233 
 
 V. McClelland, 701 
 
 V. McDonald, 748 
 
CXXVIU 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. Wre to sections. 
 
 Moody V.Minneapolis, etc. E. Co., 452 
 
 V. New York, 285 
 
 Y. Osgood, 56, 57, 646, 653, 759, 
 762 
 
 V. Ward, 686 
 Moon V. Ionia, 368 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 206 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 233, 
 233a, 233!5 
 Mooney v. Connecticut River Lum- 
 ber Co., 194a, 223 
 
 V. Lloyd, 557 
 
 V. Trovr Directory Co., 649 
 
 V. Williams, 303 
 Moor V. Ames, 303 
 
 V. Veazie, 333 
 Moore v. Abbot, 378 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 61, 108, 463, 
 
 475 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 481, 
 
 676, 678, 729 
 V. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 493 
 V. Clear Lake Water Works, 
 
 729 
 V. Des Moines, 495, 516 
 V. Edison Electric Co., 519 
 V. Floyd, 619 
 
 v. Gadsden, 13, 14, 343, 467 
 V. Goedel, 123, 723 
 V. Gt. Northern R. Co., 471 
 V. Huntington, 289 
 V. Kalamazoo, 367, 369, 741 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 355, 485a 
 V. Kenockee, 369 
 V. Keokuk, etc. R. Co., 481b 
 V. Levert, 664 
 V. Logan Iron, etc, Co,, 709 
 V. Louisiana Nat, Bank, 580 
 V, Metropolitan R. Co., 54, 145 
 V. Minneapolis, 853 
 V, Minneapolis, etc, R, Co,, 185 
 V. N, Y. Central R. Co,, 54, 476 
 V, Norfolk etc. R, Co., 207 
 V, Ohio River R, Co, , 493 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co, 64, 71, 
 
 185 
 V, Platteville, 368 
 V, Richmond, 289, 367, 368, 375 
 V. Sanborn, 150, 333 
 V, Shreveport, 107 
 V. Wabash, etc. Canal, 371 
 V. Wabash, etc, R. Co,, 230 
 V. Webb, 734 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 V. Westervelt, 56, 621 
 V. White, 657 
 
 Moorman v. Wood, 558, 566, 567 
 
 Morain v. Devlin, 131, 699 
 
 Moran v, Brovs^n, 195 
 
 V. Eastern R, Co.. 303 
 V. Harris, 187, 209a 
 
 Moran v. HoUings, 767a 
 V. Palmer, 351 
 V. Pullman Car Co., 262, 705 
 V. Racine Wagon Co., 60, 195 
 Morange v. Mix, 593 
 Morbaoh v. Home Min. Co., 1806, 
 
 215 
 Mordecai v. Solomon, 568 
 Moreland v. Boston, etc. R. Co,, 51, 
 495, 502 
 V. Leigh, 623 
 
 V. Mitchell County, 257. 393 
 Morey v. Nevcfane, 254, 256, 338 
 Morgan v, Bowes, 688a 
 V. Bowman, 167 
 V. Carbon Hill Co., 207 
 V. Cox. 686 
 V. Dudley, 303 
 V. Fremont County, 257, 368 
 V. Giddings, 567, 570 
 V. Hallowell, 356 
 V. Hudson Riv. Ore Co., 202 
 V. King, 333 
 V. Morley, 289 
 
 V, Pennsylvania R. Co., 97, 705 
 V. Pritchett, 257 
 V. Railroad Co,, 334 
 V, Roberts, 569 
 V, Smith, 164, 225 
 V. So, Pacific R. Co., 763, 764, 
 
 767 
 V. Tener, 582 
 V. Vale of Neath R. Co., 178, 
 
 180, 239 
 V. Van Ingen, 598 
 V. Gaisford, 644 
 Morning Light, The 61 
 Morrell v. Peck, 60c, 375, 393 
 Morrill v. Deering. 367 
 
 V. Gx-aham, 558 
 Morris v. Brown, 8 
 
 V, Chicago, etc, R, Co,, 99, 133 
 
 V. Council Bluffs, 274 
 
 V. East Haven, 111 
 
 V. Eighth Ave R. Co., 522 
 
 V. Eufaula Nat. Bank, 580, 580a 
 
 V, Fraker, 419 
 
 V, Lake Shore, etc. R; Co,, 56, 
 
 85 
 V, Litchfield, 356 
 V. N, Y, Cent, Co,, 496, 500 
 V. N. Y. Ontario, etc. R. Co., 
 
 488 
 V. Piatt, 16 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co.. 434 
 V, Strobel, etc, R, Co,, 703 
 V, Switzerland county, 2.i6, 257 
 V, Westminster Bank, 589 
 Canal Co, v, Ryerson, 16, 402 
 etc, R, Co, V, Haslan, 88, 476, 
 481 
 Morrisey v. Eastern R, Co,, 481a 
 V. Hughes, 188, 194 
 
Rejerences] 
 
 TABLE or CASES. We to sections. CXXIX 
 
 Morrissey v. Providence, etc. E. Co., 
 5J7, 466a 
 
 V. Wiggins Ferry Co., 91, 99 
 Morrison v. Broadway R. Co., 508, 530 
 
 V. Coleman, 737 
 
 V. Cornelius, 656, 66J 
 
 V. Davis, 38, 40 
 
 V. ErieR. Co., 75 
 
 V. General Steam Nav. Co., 93 
 
 V. Lawrence, 263, 299 
 
 V. Long Isl. R. Co., 760 
 
 V. Metropolitan Tel. Co., 719« 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., HI 
 
 V. New Haven R. Co. , 486 
 
 V. Shelby county, 376 
 Morrow v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 433 
 
 V. Sweeney, 705 
 Morse v. Belfast, 353 
 
 V. Boston, 363 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 449 
 
 V. Crawford, 131 
 
 V. Minneapolis R. Co., 606, 60c 
 
 V. Richmond, 351, 355 
 
 V. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 449 
 
 V. Sweenie, 313 
 
 V. Worcester, 374, 287 
 Morseman v. Manhattan R. Co., 759 
 Morss V. Boston & Maine R. Co. , 443 
 Morton v. Crane, 303 
 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 194,317, 
 333a 
 
 V. Gloster, 104 
 
 V. Smith 343 
 Mose V. Hastings, etc. Gas Co., 693 
 Mosely v. Jamison, 686 
 Moser v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 Moses V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 490 
 
 V. So. Pacific R. Co., 419, 434 
 Mosher v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Smithfield, 107 
 Moshier v. Utica, etc. R. Co., 413, 
 
 673 
 Mosier v. Beale, 638 
 Moskovitz V. Lights, 645 
 Moss v. Augusta, 291 
 
 V. Cummings, 313 
 
 v. Johnson, 184, 489 
 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 193 
 Mott V. Cherry vale Water, etc. Co., 
 365 
 
 v. Consumers' Ice Co., 143, 154 
 
 V. Havana Bank, 587a 
 
 v. Hudson River E. Co., 133, 
 464 
 Motey V. Pickle Marble, etc. Co., 38 
 Mouat Lumber Co. v. Wilmore, 675 
 Moulton V. Aldrich, 90, 93, 645 
 
 V. Gage, 317 
 
 V. Jose, 617 
 
 V. Moore, 630 
 
 V. Norton, 618 
 
 V. Sanford, 133, 346, 355 
 
 V. Scarborough, 636 
 
 Mound City Paint Co. v. Commercial 
 
 Nat. Bank, 578, 581 
 V. Conlon. 146 
 Mt. Carmel v. Guthridge, 356 
 Mt. Vernon v. Brooks, 353, 874, 375 
 Mower v. Leicester, 3.56, 358, 337 
 Mowrey v. Central R. Co., 91 
 Mowry v. Chaney, 115 
 
 v. Western U. Tel. Co., 553, 754 
 Moye V. Wrightsville, etc. R. Co., 429 
 Movlan v. Second Ave. R. Co., 500, 
 
 531 
 Moynahan v. Wheeler, 636 
 Movnihan v. Hills Co., 185a, 194, 304, 
 
 333 
 Muckle V. Rochester R. Co., 749 
 Muehlhausen v. St. Louis R. Co., 489 
 Mueller v. Milwaukee R. Co., 13 
 
 V. Ross, 379 
 Muhl V. Southern, etc. R. Co., 136 
 Mulcairns v. Janesville, 386, 763 
 Mulchahey v. Washburn Car Wheel 
 
 Co., 139 
 Mulcliey v. Methodist, etc. So., 248 
 Muldoon V. Seattle R. Co., 505 
 Muldowney v. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 
 
 56, 89, 207, 317, 331 
 Muldrow v. Missouri, etc. E. Co., 750 
 Mulhado v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 
 
 508, 531 
 Mulhern v. Lehigh V. Coal Co., 193 
 Mulherrin v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 
 64, 138 
 Mulholland v . Samuels, 598 
 Mullan V. Philadelphia S. S. Co., 226, 
 
 230, 334 
 V. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 513 
 MuUany v. Spence, 683, 705 
 MullenV. Glens Falls, 355 
 V. Owosso, 376, 379 
 V. Rainear, 707 
 
 V. St. John, 58, 59, 60, 159, 343 
 MuUer v. McKesson, 303, 638, 639 
 V. Minken, 710 
 V. Newburgh, 369 
 Mullett V. Mason, 633 
 Mulligan v. Crimmins, 232 
 V. Curtis, 73, 73a, 74 
 V.N. Y. Central R. Co., 476 
 V. Rockaway Beach R. Co., 154 
 Mullin V. California Horseshoe Co., 
 
 309a, 218 
 Mullins V Blaise, 688 
 Mulvehill v. Bates, 147 
 Mulvey v. R. I. Locomotive Works, 
 
 204, 236 
 Mumford v. Oxford, 119 
 Munch V. N. Y. Central E. Co., 435 
 Muncie St. E. Co. v. Maynard, 474, 
 
 485c 
 Mundle v. Hill Mfg. Co., 308, 309a, 314 
 Mundy v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. E. 
 
 Co., 407, 731, 733 
 
cxx.'C 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. Ure to sections. 
 
 Hunger v. Tonawanda R. Co., 61, 86, 
 
 97, 418 
 Muuk V. Watertown, 375, 379 
 Munn V. Pittsburgh, 334 
 
 V. Reed, 63, 73, 638, 639 
 Munro v. Pac. Coast Dredgitfg Co., 
 688a, 767 
 
 V. Gates, 731 
 Murch V. Concord R. Co., 61,413 
 
 V. Western N. Y., etc. R. Co., 
 - 480 
 Murdock v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Warwick, 378 
 Murfreesboro, etc. Co. v. Barrett, 386 
 Murgatrovd v. Robinson, 734 
 Murphy, Matter of. 310 
 
 V. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 519 
 
 V. Boston* Albany R. Co., 333 
 
 T. Boston, etc R. Co., 417a 
 
 V. Brooklyn, 334 
 
 V. Buffalo, 373 
 
 T. Caralli. 101 
 
 V. Central Park R. Co., 150 
 
 ■p. Chicago, 383 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 49, 107, 
 111, 679 
 
 V. Comm'rs of Emigration, 395 
 
 V. Crossan, 184, 194a 
 
 V. Dean, 61 
 
 V. Gloucester, 356 
 
 V. Greeley, 333 
 
 V. Hays, 60, 719a 
 
 V. Kelly, 735 
 
 V. Nassau El. Light Co., 645 
 
 V. New Haven R. Co., 139,767 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 93, 185, 307a, 770 
 
 V. Orr, 645, 654 
 
 V. Pollock, 193 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 193, 530 
 
 V. Smith, 337 
 
 V. Union R. Co , 493 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co. , 301 
 
 V. WeidmanCo., 654 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 480 
 Murray v. Archer, 699 
 
 v. Currie, 161, 163 
 
 V. Denver, etc. R. Co., 333 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 481 
 
 V. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 108, 307a, 
 307& 
 
 V. Knight, 197 
 
 V. Lardner, 30 
 
 V. McShane, 343, 703 
 
 V. Mo. Pacific R. Co., 467, 759 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 11, 435 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 338 
 
 V. So. Carolina, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 180, 341, 419, 433 
 
 V. The Charming Betsy, 333 
 
 V. Usher, 343, 380. 770 
 
 -V. Young, 638, 639 
 
 Murtaugh v. N. Y'. Central R. Co., 
 35, 185a, 311 
 
 V. St. Louis, 366 
 Muse V. Stern, 160 
 Musick V. Dold Packing Co , 333 
 Musselman v. Gallighei-, 115 
 Musser v. Lancaster St. E. Co., 410 
 Muster v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 303 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dake, 593 
 Myers v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 475, 
 476 
 
 V Burns, 744 
 
 V. Dodd, 655. 657 
 
 V. Fritz, 730 
 
 v; Hinds, 653 
 
 V. Holborn, 605 
 
 V. Hudson Iron Co., 185a, 194a 
 
 V. Kansas City, 113, 356 
 
 V. Meinrath, 104 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 530 
 
 V. Parker, 037 
 Myhan v. Louisiana Electric, etc. 
 
 Co.. 698 
 Mynard v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 555 
 Mynning v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 54, 
 
 107, 114, 481, 769 
 Mytton V. Midland R. Co., 343 
 
 Nadau v. White River Lumber Co., 
 
 319 
 Nagel V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 73, 
 73a 
 V. Missouri Pacific R. Co. , 31 
 Nagle V. Allegheny Valley R. Co., 
 73, 73a 
 V. California So. R. Co.. 531 
 Naglee v. Alexandria, etc. R. Co., 
 
 163 
 Nail V. Louisville, etc. R. Co. , 185a, 
 
 333 
 Nalley v. Hartford Carpet Co., 60c 
 Naltner v. Dolan, 575 
 Nance v. Newport News, etc. R. Co., 
 
 301 
 Nanticoke v. Warne, 67 
 Nappanee v. Ruokman, 743 
 Narragansett, The, 744 
 Nash v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 90, 464, 476 
 V. Sharpe, 760 
 V. Swinburne, 569 
 Nashua Iron Co. v. Worcester, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 34a 
 Nashville v Brown, 389 
 V. Sutherland, 287 
 Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Anthony, 439 
 V. Carroll, 63, 335. 338, 459 
 V. Comans, 431, 457 
 V. Eakin, 131 
 V. Elliott, 178, 319 
 V. Handman 316, 333, 341 
 V. Hembree. 35, 438, 439. 
 V. Hughes, 434 
 
Re/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. [«'-f to sections. CXXXl 
 
 Nashville, etc. E. Co. v. Jones, 184, 
 235 
 V. MoDanlel, 91, 233 
 V. Messino, 51, 499 
 V. Morrow, 421 
 V. Nowlin, 62 
 V. Prince, 139, 769 
 V. Sadler, 448 
 V. Smith, 65 
 V. Sprayherry, 132 
 V. Starnes, 154 
 V. Thomas, 431 
 V. Troxlee, 429 
 V. Wheless, 233a, 241 
 Nason v. Boston, 863 
 
 V. West, 57 
 Natchez, etc. R. Co. v. McNeil, 428 
 Nathan v. Charlotte St. K. Co., 99 
 National Bank v. Graham, 588 
 
 Park Bank v. Seabrook Bank, 
 
 580a 
 Steam Nav. Co. v. British Nav. 
 
 Co., 172 
 Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 212 
 Nations v. Johnson, 249 
 Navastota v. Pearce, 258 
 Nave V. Alabama, etc. R. Co., 484 
 
 V. Flack, 704 
 Naylor v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 185 
 
 V. Salt Lake City, 369 
 Nealv. Gillett, 64, 121 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 239 
 V. Price, 619 
 Neanow v. Uttech, 104. 645, 654 
 Nebraska City v. Campbell, 285, 289, 
 
 760 
 Necker v. Harvey, 225, 244 
 Neddov. Ticonderoga., 376 
 Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 131, 
 133, 138 
 V. King, 669 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 49, 
 
 184, 209a 
 V. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 
 11, 63, 99, 483 
 Needles v. Howard, 22 
 NefiE V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 199 
 V. Wellesley, 360, 375, 481 
 Nehr v. State, 634 
 Nehrbas v. Central, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 
 476 
 Neier v. Mo. Pacific R. Co., 461 
 Neighbour v. Trimmer, 303 
 Neilon v. Marinette, etc. Paper Co., 
 
 218 
 Neilson v. Hillside Coal Co., 207^ 
 Neiman v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co. , 
 
 478 
 Neimeyer v. "Weyerhaeuser. 181 
 Nelling v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 207 
 
 V. Industrial Mfg. Co., 217 
 Nelson v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 61, 99 
 V. Burrows, 589 
 
 Nelson v. Canisteo, 281, 289, 334, o35 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 209a 
 
 V. Chesapeake, etc, R. Co., 132 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co.. Ill, 216 
 
 V. Chicago, M., etc. R. Co., 241c 
 
 V. DuBois, 222 
 
 V. Duluth, etc. R. Co., 476 
 
 V. Totterall, 597 
 
 V. Galveston, etc. R. Co., 133, 
 140 
 
 V. Godfrey, 703 
 
 V, Great Northern R. Co., 431a 
 
 V, Harrington, 008 
 
 V. Helena, 108 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 773, 
 775 
 
 V. St. Paul Plow Works, 223 
 
 V. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 413, 459 
 Nesbit V. Garner, 66 
 Nesbitt V. Greenville, 367 
 Netherland-Am. Steam, Co. v. Hol- 
 lander, 763 
 Nettersheim v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 4816 
 Netzer v. Crookston, 287, 374 
 Neudoerffer v. Brooklyn R. Co., 476 
 Nevera v. Sears, 203 
 Neville v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 241c 
 Nevins v. Bay State Steamb. Co. , 5oO 
 
 V. Peoria, 273, 274, 28, 367 
 New Albany, etc. R. Co. v. Aston, 449 
 
 V. McCulloch, 113, 374 
 
 V. McNamara, 428, 430 
 
 V. Maiden, 437 
 
 V. Tilton, 422 
 New Bedford v. Taunton, 291 
 New Hampshire Sav, Bank v. Var- 
 
 num, 618 
 New Haven, etc. R. Co. v. Blessing, 
 481 
 
 Steamboat Co. v. Vanderbilt,^ 
 61, 93, 744 
 New Jersey Express Co. v. Nichols. 
 56, 63, 64, 80, 109, 112, 114, 760 
 
 R. Co. V. Pollard, 516 
 
 V. Kennard, 519 
 
 V. Morgan, 493 
 
 V. Young, 188, 207a, 209a, 215 
 
 Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 493 
 
 Nav. Co. V. Merchants' Bank, 
 23, 210 
 
 Trans. Co. v. West, 88 
 
 Traction Co. v. Danbech, 488 
 V. Gardner, 494 
 New Kioa v. Craven, 260 
 New Orleans v. Abbagnato, 261 
 
 Ins Asso. V. Harper, 123 
 New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Bour- 
 geois. 439 
 
 V. Burke, 513, 749 
 
 V. Burkett, 439 
 
 V. Field, 419 
 
 V. Hughes, 191, 305, 236 
 
CXXXll 
 
 References'^ TABLE OF CASES. W^ i" sections. 
 
 New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Hurst, 
 486 
 V. Jopes, 154 
 V. Mitchell. 90 
 V. Norwood, 161 
 V. Statham, 508, 510 
 V. Thomas, 523. 
 V. Thornton, 426 
 New Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Peter- 
 son, 233. 
 New World v. King, 495 
 New York v. Bailev, 173, 371, 285, 
 699 
 V. Bradv, 298, 301, 384 
 V. Corliss, 708 
 V. Dimick, 301, 384 
 V. Furze, 281, 287, 368 
 V. Workman, 265 
 Now York Biscuit Co. v. Rouss, 203, 
 
 219 
 New York, etc. Lumber Co. v. Brook- 
 lyn, 295 
 New York Min. Co. v. Rogers, 194a 
 New York, etc. E. Co. v. Cooper, 66 
 
 V. State, 416 
 New York Cent. R. Co. Lockwood, 
 
 492, 505 
 New York, Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Blumenthal, 513a 
 V. Doane, 509 
 V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co., 
 
 4!4a 
 V. Mushbrush, 492as 
 V. Woods, 508 
 V. Zumbaugh, 424 
 New York & Erie R. Co. v. Skin- 
 ner, 97, 418, 456 
 New York. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Atlantic Refg. Co., 93 
 V. Ball, 533 
 V. Bennett, 493 
 V. Leaman, 468 
 V. Lyons, 209a, 231, 530 
 V. Middlecofif, 674 
 V. Steinbrenner, 66, 143 
 V. Winter, 493 
 New York & New England R. Co. v. 
 
 Hyde, 241 
 New York, Phila. , etc. Co. v. Kellam, 
 476 
 T. Thomas, 678 
 New York, Susquehanna, etc. R. Co. 
 
 V. Marion, 199 
 New York & Brooklyn Sawmill, etc. 
 Co. V. Brooklyn, 255, 285, 291 
 New York Rubber Co. v. Rothery, 729 
 New York & Washington Tel. Co. v. 
 Dryburg, 583, 537, 541, 543, 
 546, 755 
 Newall V. Bartlett, 735 
 Newark, etc R. Co. v. Block, 54, 
 
 475, 485a, 485c 
 Newberry v. Getchell Co., 760 
 
 Newbert v. Cunningham, 634 
 Newbold v. Mead, 86 
 Newcomb v. Boston Protective Dept., 
 104, 265, 331 
 
 V. Montgomery county, 392 
 
 V. Van Lile, 647 
 Newdall v. Young, 705 
 Newell V. Smith, 503 
 
 V. Woolfolk, 688a 
 Newhall v. Ireson, 729 
 Newhard v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 463 
 Newhart v. St. Paul City R. Co., 314 
 Newhouse v. Miller, 654 
 Newkirk v. Milk, 633 
 Newlin v. Davis, 257 
 Newman v. Phillipsburg R. Co., 78 
 
 V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 431 
 Newnan v. Washington, 557 
 Newport V. Miller, 367, 369 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Dentzel, 333a, 
 3336 
 Newport News, etc. R. Co. v. Camp- 
 bell, 3076 
 
 V. Denser, 483 
 
 V. Howe, 233a 
 
 V. Stewart, 463 
 Newson v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 92, 
 
 471 
 Newstrom v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 
 485 
 Newton v. Bronson, 597 
 
 V. Central Vt. R. Co., 498, 519, 
 521 
 Ney V. Troy, 863 
 Niantic Min. Co. v. Leonard, 238 
 Niblett V. Nashville, 289 
 Nichol V. Canada Southern R. Co., 
 
 735 
 Nicholds V. Crystal Plate Glass Co., 
 
 185a, 317 
 Nichols V. Boston, 709a 
 
 V. Brush, etc. Mfg. Co., 323 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 241c 
 
 V. Laurens, 376 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 483 
 
 V. Marsland,16, 705, 733 
 
 V. Middlesex R. Co., 508 
 
 V. Minneapolis, 376 
 
 V. St. Paul, 389 
 
 V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 520, 508 
 
 V. Smith, 58, 111, 690 
 
 V. Thomas, 303 
 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. United States, 349 
 
 V. Washington, etc. R. Co., 
 417a 
 Nicholls V. Great Southern R. Co., 509 
 Nicholson v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 
 455 
 
 V. Erie R. Co., 97, 464, 465, 705 
 
 V. Lancashii'e, etc. R. Co. , 406, 
 473 
 
 V. Mounsey, 346, 822 
 
Re/eretices-\ TABLE OF CASES. I'^'-e to sections. CXXXIU 
 
 Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydr. Co., 
 8, 118, 265 
 
 V. Harriman, 65 
 Nleld V. London, etc. R. Co., 739 
 Niemann v. Michigan Cent. E. Co., 
 
 436 
 Niendorff v. Manhattan R. Co., 760 
 Nilan v. Richmond Gas Co., 355 
 Niles V. Martin, 250, 258 
 Nims V. Mt. Hermon School, 148 
 
 V. Troy, 287 
 Nininger v. Norwood, 735 
 Niskern v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 679 
 Nitrophosphate Co. v. London, etc. 
 Dock Co., 16, 31, 33, 61, 738 
 Niver v. Rochester, 376 
 Nix V. Texas, etc. Co., 317, 2336 
 Nixon V. Bogin, 579 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 90, 476 
 
 V. Selby Lead Co., 233 
 Njus V. Cliicago, etc. R. Co., 131 
 Noble V. Cunningham, 471 
 
 V. Desmond, 624 
 
 V. Richmond, 289, 337, 368 
 
 V. St. Joseph, etc. R. Co. . 495 
 Noblesville Gas Co. v, Loehr, 377 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Gause, 147 
 Noe V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 731, 750 
 Nolan V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 52 
 
 V. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 522, 
 523 
 
 V. King, 361, 375 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc, R. Co., 476 
 Noll V. Phil. & Reading R. Co., 307, 
 
 235 
 Nolton V. Western R. Co., 486, 491, 
 
 493, 706 
 Noonan v. Albany, 363, 374. 735 
 
 V. N. Y. Central E. Co., 335, 458 
 
 V. Stillwater, 343 
 Nordheimer v. Alexander, 18 
 Nordyke, etc. M. Co. v. Van Sant, 
 
 191, 194 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Bohannan, 
 675, 750 
 
 V. Briggs, 3076 
 
 V. Brown, 195, 241 
 
 V. Burge, 457, 477 
 
 V. Carper, 464, 480 
 
 V. De Board, 481 
 
 v. Donnelly, 241 
 
 V. Dunnaway, 99 
 
 V. Ferguson, 57 
 
 V. Groseclose, 78, 488 
 
 V. Harmon, 483 
 
 V. Hoover, 193, 304, 233a 
 
 V. Jackson, 194, 195 
 
 V. Lipscomb, 748 
 
 V. McDonald, 309 
 
 V. McGavock, 434 
 
 V. Marshall, 496 
 
 V. Nuckols, 180, 188, 191, 335, 
 338 
 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. NunnaUy, 
 1856, 194a 
 
 v. Ormsby, 49, 78 
 
 V. Phelps, 188 
 
 V. Prinnell, 508 
 
 V. Shott, 488 
 
 V. Stone, 478 
 
 V. Thomas, 188, 233 
 
 V. Ward, 223 
 
 V. Wilson, 476 
 
 V. Wysor, 493 
 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Emmert, 
 317 
 
 V. Jackson's Adm'r, 195 
 
 V. Johnson, 4J1 
 Normal v. Gresham, 377 
 Normania, The, 515 
 Norris v. Androscoggin R. Co., 421, 
 488, 451a 
 
 V. Kohler, 158 
 
 V. Litchfield, 61, 93, 94, 104, 
 379, 393 
 
 V. Saxton, 652 
 
 V. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 415 
 
 V. Warner, 62S, 630 
 Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 263 
 
 V. Moyer, 354 
 North v. Smith, 150, 645 
 North Baltimore R. Co. v. Arnreich, 
 
 485c 
 North Birmingham R. Co. v. Calder- 
 
 wood, 96, 110 
 North Chicago R. Co. v. Brodie, 773 
 
 v. Cook, 508 
 
 V. Cotton, 516 
 
 V. Eldridge, 114, 519 
 
 V. Gastka, 151 
 
 V. Williams, 499, 520 
 
 Rolling Mill Co. v. Johnson, 
 338, 471 
 Northcott V. Smith, 641 
 North Hudson R. Co. v. Flannigan, 
 
 481a 
 North Lebanon v. Arnold, 256 
 North Manheim v. Arnold, 355 
 North Penn. R. Co. v. Heileman, 468, 
 476 
 
 V. Kirk, 85, 114, 766 
 
 V. Mahoney, 73, 77, 78 
 
 Y. Rehman, 418, 659 
 
 V. Robinson, 473 
 North Side R. Co. v. Tippins, 485a 
 North Staffordshire R. Co. v. Dale, 
 
 416 
 North Vernon v. Voegler, 373, 274 
 Northern, etc. R. Co. v. Price, 61, 
 95, 99 
 
 Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 701 
 Northeastern R. Co. v. Barnett, 144 
 
 V. Martin, 428 
 North Eastern Co. v. Sineath, 4.?2 
 Northern Central R. CIo. v. State, 58, 
 61,93, 108, 111 
 
cxxxiv 
 
 Ke/erences} TABLE OF CASES. W'-e to sections. 
 
 Northern Indiana E. Co. v. Martin, 
 
 455 
 Northern Pac. Coal Co. v. Richmond, 
 
 318 
 Northern R. Co. ▼. Amato, 114, 1856 
 
 V. Austin, 478 
 
 V. Babcock, 132, 133, 215 
 
 V. Beaton, 239 
 
 V. Blake, 197 
 
 V. Cavanaugh, 233a 
 
 V. Charless, 203, 205, 289 
 
 V. Craft, 225 
 
 V. Egeland, 186, 207a 
 
 V. Ellison, 129 
 
 V. Everett, 185b, 213, 217 
 
 V. Hambly, 233, 235, 239, 241 
 
 V. Herbert, 193, 194, 204, 205, 
 233a, 241a 
 
 V. Hogan, 341a 
 
 V. Lewis, 666, 675, 678, 679 
 
 V. Mares, 108, 191, 211, 216 
 
 V. Mase, 233a, 341c 
 
 V. Mortenson, 199 
 
 V. Nickels, 3075 
 
 v. O'Brien, 108, 238 
 
 V. Pauson, 493, 
 
 V. Peterson, 330, 235 
 
 V. Poirier, 204 
 
 V. Smith, 233a 
 
 V. Urlin, 60a 
 Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Danielson, 
 188, 303 
 
 R. Co. V. Hack, 493 
 Norton v. Cooper, 569 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 417, 426, 470 
 
 V. Ittner, 87 
 
 v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 209a 
 
 V. Mansfield, 299 
 
 V. St. Louis, 343 
 
 V. Scholefield, 734 
 
 V. Sewall, 38, 117, 690 
 
 T. Volentine, 729 
 
 V. Volzke, 73a, 218 
 
 v. Wiswall, 708 
 Norwalk Gas Co. v. Norwalk, 166, 
 
 168, 175 
 Norway v. Jensen, 238 
 Norwich v. Breed, 703 
 
 Gas Co. V. Norwich City Gas 
 Co., 358 
 Norwood V. Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 26, 
 475, 483 
 
 V. Somerville, 356, 376 
 Nosier v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 477, 
 
 482 
 Novock V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
 
 207 
 Nowell V. Wright, 318, 340 
 Noxon V. Hill, 803 
 Noyes v. Boscawen. 66 
 
 V. Colby, 627; 633 
 
 T. Gardner, 368 
 
 V. Shepherd, 87 
 
 Noyes v. Smith, 180, 189, 194 
 
 V. Wood, 195 
 Nuckolls V. Gaut, 656 
 Nugent V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 413 
 
 V. Kauffman Milling Co., 2C3 
 
 V. Mississippi Levee Com'rs, 328 
 
 V. Smith, 16 
 Nulsen v. Priesmeyer. 683 
 Nunn v. Georgia R. Co. , 510 
 Nurse v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 492 
 Nuttv. Southern Pac. R. Co., 189, 195 
 Nutter V. Gallagher, 737 
 Nutting V. Conn. River R. Co., 503, 
 
 544 
 Nuzum V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 468, 481 
 
 O'Bannon v. Louisville, etc. R, Co., 
 
 433 
 O'Barr v. Alexander. 559 
 O'Brien V. Capvvell, 708 
 
 V. Dredging Co., 233 
 
 V. Greenbaum, "708 
 
 V. Loomis, 760 
 
 V. McGhnchy, 74, 79, 114 
 
 V. Miller, 647 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 498 
 
 V. Rideout, 2416 
 
 V. St. Paul, 374, 287 
 
 V. Tatum. 108. 719 
 
 V. Western Steel Co., 719a 
 O'Bryan v. Amsterdam, 375 
 O'Callaghan v. Bode, 704 
 O'Connell v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 180, 333 
 
 V. Jarvis, 626 
 
 V. Lewiston, 104 
 
 V. St. Louis Cable, etc. R. Co., 
 495 
 
 V. St. PaulR. Co., 485c 
 
 V, Samuel, 150 
 O'Connor v. Adams, 46, 1 14, 203 
 
 V. Andrews, 703, 709, 710 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 73, 73a 
 
 V. Fond du Lac, etc. R. Co., 
 735 
 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 16, 78 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 92, 113, 
 463 
 
 V. New York, 363 
 
 V. North Truckee Co., 94 
 
 V. Pittsburg, 383, 332, 334a 
 O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley R. 
 Co., 61. 184, 194, 239, 488, 523 
 
 V. Duluth, etc. R. Co., 233, 406 
 
 V. East River Gas Co., 197 
 
 V. Patton, 61 
 
 V. Providence, etc. R. Co., 469 
 O'Donohoe v. Whitty, 566 
 O'Driscoll V. Faxon, 215 
 O'Dwyer v. O'Brien, 708, 710 
 O'Flaheretv v. Union, etc. R. Co., 
 71," 72, 73a 
 
Re/e^inces-\ TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \are to sections, CXXXV 
 
 O'Hale V. Sacramento, 258 
 
 O'Hara v. Brophy, 563 
 
 O'Harra v. Portland, 254 
 
 O'Kane v. Treat, 336 
 
 O'Keefe v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 94, 
 
 103, 114, 480 
 O'Laughlin v. Boston & Maine R. 
 Co., 513 
 V. Dubuque, 351, 375 
 O'Linda v. Lothrop, 703 
 O'Loughlin v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 307a 
 O'Maley v. Dom, 649 
 
 V. So. Boston Gaslight Co., 316, 
 341& 
 O'Malley v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 2076, 217 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co. , 73 
 O'Mara v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co. , 
 479 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 137, 
 458, 481, 763, 769, 775 
 O'Meara v. New York, 365, 295 
 O'Mellia v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 307a, 311, 775 
 O'Neal V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 309a 
 O'Neil V. Detroit, Zm 
 
 V. Dry- Dock, etc. R. Co., 485a 
 
 V. Lynn, etc. R. Co., 518 
 
 V. N. Y., Ontario, etc. R. Co., 
 
 675. 678 
 V. O'Leary, 2416 
 V. New Orleans. 289 
 V. N. Y. Ontario, etc. R. Co., 
 
 30 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 459 
 V. So. Carolina R. Co., 751 
 V. West Branch, 369 
 O Neile v. Neilson, 61 
 O'Neill V. Keokuk, etc. R. Co., 3075 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 197 
 V. Third Ave. R. Co., 485c 
 O'Reilly v. N. Y. & New England R. 
 Co., 133, 133 
 T. Utah, etc. Stage Co., 654 
 O'Rorke v. Union Pac. R. Co., 308 
 O'Rourke v. Hart, 175 
 V. Monroe, 356 
 V. Peck, 726 
 V. Sioux Falls, 363 
 O'Shaughnessy v. Suffolk Brewing 
 
 Co., 73a 
 O'SiiUivan v. Victoria R. Co., 180 
 O'Toole V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 
 477 
 Oakes v. Hill, 310 
 
 V. Spalding, 635 
 Oakham v. Holbrook, 16, 353 
 Oakland Agric. Soc. v. Bingham, 154 
 R. Co. V. Fielding, 115, 408, 703 
 Oates V. Union Pac. R. Co., 133 
 Oatts V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. , 484 
 Ober V. Crescent City R. Co., 520 
 
 Oberdorfer v. Pbila., etc. R. Co., 475 
 Oberfelder v. Doran. 719« 
 Ocean S. S. Co. v. Cheney, 238 
 
 V. Matthews, 206 
 Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Campa- 
 nia Tr Espanola, 34a, 7;25 
 
 V. Compania Tr. Espanola, 285 
 Och V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 516 
 Ocheltree v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 436 
 Oehsenbein v. Shapley, 96, 101, 150 
 Odell V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 307 
 
 V. Schi'oeder, 391 
 
 V. Solomon, 713 
 Odivrne v. Svford, 731 
 Odlin V. Stetson, 563 
 Ogburn v. Connor, 735 
 Ogden V. Rummens, 194 
 Ogg V. Lansing, 255, 366, 391 
 Ogeir V. Albany R. Co., 481a 
 Ogilvie V. Edinburgh, 891 
 Oglesby v. Smith, 654 
 Ogley V. Miles, 218, 219 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. AUender, 489 
 
 V. Brubaker, 421 
 
 V. Burrow, 95 
 
 V. Cole, 426, 448 
 
 V, Collarn, 53, 180, 192, 206 
 
 V. Cope, 493 
 
 V. Craycraft, 451a 
 
 V. Dunbar, 130a, 459 
 
 V. Dunn, 193, 222 
 
 V. Eaves, 483 
 
 V. Fitch, 445, 446 
 
 V. Gullett, 61 
 
 V. Haramersley, 60a, 71, 234 
 
 V. Heaton, 194a 
 
 V. Hecht, 61, 760 
 
 V. Hill, 475 
 
 V. Jones, 451a 
 
 V. Lackey, 16, 433 
 
 V. McCartney, 673 
 
 V. McDonald, 461, 468 
 
 V. Meisenheimer, 433 
 
 V. Muhling, 486 
 
 V. Nickless. 113 
 
 V. O'Donnell 431 
 
 V. Pearcy, 217, 233a 
 
 V. People. 421 
 
 V. Reed, 468. 485 
 
 V. Robb, 338 
 
 V. Schiebe, 531 
 
 V. Selby, 485, 492, 505 
 
 V. Shanefelt, 678, 680 
 
 V. Simms. 506 
 
 V. Stein, 333a 
 
 V. Stransberry, 506 
 
 V. Stratton, 99, 530 
 
 V. Tindall, 341, 766, 769 
 
 V. Trowbridge, 355 
 
 V. Voight, 516, 519 
 
 V. Wachter, 735 
 
 V. Walker, 113, 463, 483 
 
CXXXVl ,.^efcrcncts'\ TABLE OF CASES. \_are to iccUotis. 
 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 54, 774 
 
 So. R. Co. V. Morey, 175 
 
 Valley R. Co. v. McKinley, 185 
 
 V. Watson,' 513a 
 Oil City Fuel Co. v. Boundy, 93 
 
 Gas Co. V. Robinson, 65, 94, 696 
 
 Creek R. Co. v. Keighron, 26, 
 141, 161, 666 
 Olathe V. Mizee, 375 
 Old Colony R. Co. v. Stevens, 34a 
 Oldenburg \. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 114, 477, 478 
 Oldfleld V. Harlem R. Co., 78a, 83, 
 
 135, 137, 410, 775 
 Oldham v. Sparks, 568 
 Old stein v. Firemen's Bld'g Ass'n., 
 
 371 
 Oleson V.Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 478 
 
 V. Tolford, 53 
 Olfermann v. Union Depot R. Co., 516 
 Olive V. Marble Co., 683 
 
 V. State, 833 
 
 V. Whitney Marble Co., 148 
 Oliver v. Kansas City, 334 
 
 V. La Valle, 55, 743 
 
 v. North East R. Co., 408 
 
 V. No. Pao. Tr. Co., 758 
 
 V. Worcester, 358, 259 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 518, 
 533 
 Olmstead v. Brewer, 303 
 
 V. Dennis, 314 
 Olney v. Riley, 367 
 Olson V. Cliicago, etc. R. Co., 451, 475 
 
 V. Chippewa Falls, 378 
 
 V. McMurray Cedar Lumber 
 Co., 316 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 309a, 
 ol3a, 735 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 185 
 
 V. Worcester, 338, 369 
 dwell V. Milwaukee, 47 
 Omaha v. Ayer, 108, 376 
 
 V. Cunningham, 356 
 
 V. Jensen, 398, 356 
 
 V. Olmstead, 389 
 
 V. Randolph, 356 
 Omaha Fair Ass'n v. Missouri Pac. 
 
 R. Co., 679 
 Omaha, etc. R. Co. v. Bradv, 54, 417, 
 436, 466 
 
 V. Brown, 731 
 
 V. Chollette, 49, 532 
 
 V. Clark, 436 
 
 V. Cook, 488 
 
 V. Crow, 493 
 
 V. Doolittle, 93 
 
 V. Krayenbuhl, 207a, 213, 238. 
 460 
 
 V. Martin, 99, 520 
 
 V. Morgan, 235 
 
 V. O'Donnell, 483 
 
 Omaha, etc. R. Co. v. Ryburn, 417 
 
 V. Standen, 406 
 
 V. Talbot, 66, 485 
 
 V. Wright, 428 
 Omaha St. R. Co. v. Cameron, 485a 
 
 V. Lochneisen, 54 
 
 V. Martin, 54 
 Ominger v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 477 
 Omslaer v. Pittsburg, etc. Tr. Co., 
 485c 
 
 V. Traction Co., 475,476 
 Onderdonk v. N. Y. & Sea Beach R. 
 Co., 509 
 
 v. Smith, 735 
 Onondaga Co. Bank v. Bates, 597 
 Opsahl V. Judd, 104 
 Orange, etc., R. Co. v. Miles, 57 
 
 V. Ward, 114 
 Orcutt V. Kittery Bridge Co., 370. 397 
 
 V. Northern Pac R. Co., 490 
 
 V. Pacific Coast R. Co., 427 
 Ordway v. Bacon, 618 
 
 V. Canisteo, 285 
 Oregon R. Co. v. Sm alley, 423 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Tracey. 307c/, 216 
 Orgall V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 137 
 Orlando v. Pragg, 299 
 Orleans v. Perry. 94, 376 
 Orman v. Maddix, 233 
 Ormond v. Holland, 184 
 Ormsbee v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 88, 
 
 476, 481, 482 
 Orne v. Roberts, 628 
 Orr V. Cedar Rapids, etc. R. Co., 114, 
 
 483 
 Orsdol V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 729 
 Ortmayer v. Johnson, 723 
 Orttel V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 197 
 Orvif V. Elmira, etc. R. Co., 733 
 Osage City v. Larkins, 365 
 Osborn v. Adams. 635 
 
 V. Gillett, 124 
 
 V. Lenox, 628 
 Osborne v. Detroit, 368, 375 
 
 V. Hamilton. 367, 368 
 
 V. Knox, etc. R. Co., 183 
 
 V. London, etc. R. Co., 309a, 314 
 
 V. McMasters, 145 
 • V. Morgan, 348, 345 
 Oshkosh V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 359 
 Osincup V. Nichols, 638 
 Osmond v. Widdicombe, 390 
 Ostertag v. Pacific R. Co., 479 
 Osten V. Jerome, 785 
 Oszkoscil V. Eagle Pencil Co., 318 
 Otis V. Janesville, 66 
 
 V. Thorn, 66 
 Ott V. Buffalo, 377 
 Ottawa V. Parks, 384 
 V. Walker, 386 
 V. Washabaugh, 289 
 Gas Co. V. Graham, 750 
 
Rcfcrences-\ TABLE OF CASES. {."-re to sections. CXXXVU 
 
 Otten V. Cohen, 36 
 OttendorfE v. Willis, 645 
 Ottersbach v. Philadelphia, 693 
 Ouderkirk v. Central Nat. Bank, 588 
 Ouillette v. Overman Wheel Co., 322 
 Ould V. Richmond, 254 
 Outen V. North, etc. St. R. Co., 520 
 Ouverson v. Grafton, 66, 355, 876 
 Overby v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 106, 108, 110 
 Overholt v. Vieths, 704, 772 
 Overman Wheel Co. v. Griffin, 111, 
 
 212 
 Overton v. Freeman, 169, 173. 699 
 Oviatt V. Dakota Central R. Co. , 513a 
 Ovington v. Lowell, etc. R. Co. , 408 
 Owen V. Brockschmidt, 767, 770 
 
 V. Ft. Dodge, 368, 373, 377 
 
 V. Gt. Western R. Co., 509 
 
 V. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 410 
 
 V. State, 249 
 
 county V. Washington, 390 
 Owens V. Gatewood, 621 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 503, 
 758 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 464, 
 478 
 
 V. People's R. Co. , 485c 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. H. Co., 108 
 Owensboro Water Co. v. Duncan, 22 
 Owings V. Jones, 86, 108, 120, 709a, 
 
 726 
 Oxford V. Leathe, 120 
 
 V. Peter, 146 
 
 Lake Line v. Steadham, 426 
 Oystherbank v. Gardner, 719 
 
 Pacific Cable Co. v. Fleischner, 540 
 
 R. Co. v. Brown, 451a 
 
 v. Houts, 461 
 
 Tel. Co. V. Underwood, 554 
 Pack V. New York, 144, 165, 166, 168, 
 
 173, 298 
 Packard v. New Bedford, 876 
 
 V. Voltz, 256 
 Packet Co. v. McCue, 65 
 Paddock v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 
 493, 761a 
 
 V. Cameron, 618 
 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 406 
 
 V. Somes, 735 
 Paducah, etc. R. Co. v. Hoehl, 61, 
 73a, 108, 468, 477 
 
 Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water 
 Co., 22, 265 
 PafE V. Slack, 628 
 Page V. Bucksport, 28, 346 
 
 V. Defries, 146 
 
 V. HoUingsworth, 627, 655 
 
 V. Mille Lacs Lumber Co., 737 
 
 V. Olcott, 663 
 
 V. No. Carolina R. Co., 433 
 
 V. Robinson, 119 
 
 Page V. Weatherfield, 262, 334 
 Paine v. Boston, 249 
 
 V. Delhi, 287 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 194, 194a 
 Painter v. Pittsburgh, 165, 173, 699 
 Painton v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 54 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, 298 
 Pakalinsky v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 
 
 62, 467, 472 
 Palfrey V. Portland, etc. R. Co., 124 
 Palmer v. Andover, 346, 348, 356, 
 378, 393 
 
 V. Ashley, 559 
 
 V. Barker, 649 
 
 V. Crane, 623 
 
 V. Dearing, 87, 111, 114, 710 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 45, 46, .54, 497, 516 
 
 V. Denver, etc. R. Co., 197 
 
 V. Gallup, 619, 630 
 
 V. Holland, 582 
 
 V. Lincoln, 298 
 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 303, 
 230 233 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 58, 676, 
 680 
 
 V. Mulligan, 730 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 466, 477, 
 4816 
 
 V. Penn. Co., 519 
 
 V. Portsmouth, 346, 370 
 
 V. St. Albans, 266 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 437 
 
 V. Silverthorn, 656 
 
 V. Utah, etc. R. Co., 413 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 150 
 Palysv. Erie R. Co., 475 
 Pannell v. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Pantam v. Isham, 665 
 Panton v. Holland, 701 
 Pantzar v. Tilly, etc. Mining Co., 197, 
 
 204, 3070, 230, 333 
 Pappa V. Rose, 810 
 Parcells v. Auburn, 377 
 Pardee v. Robertson, 619, 623 
 Parish v. Eden, 368 
 Park V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 192 
 
 V. O'Brien, 107, 114, 684, 639, 
 654 
 
 Hotel Co. V. Lockhart, 195 
 Parke county v. Sappenfield, 898 
 Parker v. Adams, 107, 654 
 
 V. Barnard, 704, 705 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 393 
 
 V. Boston, etc. Stmb. Co., 506, 
 518 
 
 V. Fenn, 619 
 
 V. Georgia Pac. R. Co., 61, 87 
 
 V. Griswold, 733 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 238 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. , 424, 
 437 
 
 V. Laredo, 387 
 
cxxxvni 
 
 li^/erences] TABLE OF CASES. [<"■' to sections. 
 
 Parker v. Lowell, 287 
 
 V. Macon. 262, 289, 354 
 
 V. Mise, 748 
 
 V. N. Y. & New England E. 
 Co., 203a, 241 
 
 V. Pennsylvania Co., 480 
 
 V. Portland Pub. Co., 97 
 
 V. Rensselaer, etc. R. Co. , 435. 
 444 
 
 V. Rolls, 574 
 
 V. Springfield, 376 
 
 V. Walrod, 303 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 469, 472 
 Parkhill v. Brighton, 376 
 Parkliurst v. Johnson, 203 
 Parkinson Sugar Co. v. Riley, 190 
 Parks V. Alta Cal. Tel. Co., 532, 755 
 
 V. Greenville, 291, 840 
 
 v. Newburyport, 735 
 Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co., 386 
 Parody v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 215 
 Parris v. Green Island, 375 
 Parrish v. Pensaeola, etc. R. Co., 180 
 Parrott v. Dearborn, 619, 621 
 
 V. Housatonic R. Co., 747 
 
 V. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 747 
 
 V. Wells, 11, 16, 38, 47, 57, 689 
 Parry v. Smith, 695 
 Parshall v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 760 
 Parsons v. Goshen, 299 
 
 V. Lindsay, 749a 
 
 V. Manchester, 369 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 773 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 91. 
 114, 460, 478, 490, 525 
 
 V. San Francisco, 254 
 
 V. Winohell, 244, 248 
 Partenheimer v. Van Order, 638 
 Partlow V. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 460 
 Parvis v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 
 47.87 
 Pasquini v. Lowi-y, 702 
 Passamaneck v. Louisville, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 62 
 Passenger R. Co. v. Young, 151 
 Pastene v. Adams, 36, 704 
 Pastoris v Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 521 
 Patch v. Covington, 265, 289 
 Patchen v. Walton, 356 
 Paterson v. Colebrook, 53 
 
 V. Society, etc., 281 
 
 V. WaUace, 54, 87, 189, 194, 215 
 
 Bank v. Hamilton, 633 
 Patneand v. Claire. 736 
 Patnode v. Harter, 3076 
 
 V. Warren Cotton Mills, 318, 
 2416 
 Patoka V. Hopkins, 274 
 Patrick v. Pote, 86 
 Patridge v. Scott, 701 
 Patry v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
 Patten v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 55, 
 455. 506 
 
 V. Libbey, 739, 752 
 
 V. Rea, 147 
 
 V. Wiggin, 606, 607, 613 
 Patterson v. Brooklyn, 254 
 
 V. East Bridge Co., 396 
 
 V. Heminway, 719a 
 
 V. Philadelphia R. Co., 114 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 91, 
 186, 206, 310, 211, 314, 215, 
 321, 226, 230 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 518 
 Pattison v. Syracuse Nat. Bank, 588 
 Patton V. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 185, 
 203 
 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 
 480 
 
 V. Montgomery county, 357 
 
 V. West End, etc. R. Co., 453 
 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 186, 
 332, 233 
 Pauley v. Steam Gauge, etc. Co., 13, 
 
 702a 
 Paulitsch V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 508, 
 
 510 
 Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 65, 188 
 Paulson V. Pelican, 373 
 Pawling V. Hoskins. 195 
 Paxson V. Sweet, 343 
 Paxton V. Boyer, 16 
 Payne v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 63, 66, 
 73a, 94, 417, 473, 481a, 483 
 
 V. Humeston, etc. R. Co., 483 
 
 V. Irvin, 710 
 
 V. Reese, 114, 189. 195 
 
 V. Rogers, 120, 133, 708 
 
 V. Smith, 646 
 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 414 
 Peabody v. Oregon R., etc. Co., 493 
 Peach V. Utica, 88, 374, 481. 
 Peachey v. Rowland. 173 
 Peacock v Dallas, 368 
 Peake v. Buell. 718 
 Peard v. Mt. Vernon, 363 
 Pearl v. Macaulay, 645 
 Pearsall v. Western U. Tel. Co., 541, 
 543, 545, 547, 549, 552, 753a, 
 755 
 Pearson v. Cox, 169 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 419, 
 451a 
 
 V. Lable, 298 
 Peart v. Meeker, 328 
 Pease v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 333 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. E. Co., 493 
 Peaslee v. Chatham, 114 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 192, 203 
 Peavey v. Robbins, 310 
 Peavy v. Georgia R. Co., 493 
 Peck V. Austin, 362 
 
 V. Batavia, 8 262, 281, 289, 338 
 
 V. Ellsworth, 358, 370 
 
Re/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. l^re to sections. CXXXIX 
 
 Peck V. Goodberlett, 735 
 V. Hurlburt, 623 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 675 
 
 V. N. Y. & N. Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 67, 89 
 Peckham v. Burlington, 345 
 
 V. Henderson, 365 
 
 V. Lebanon, 383 
 Pederson v. Rushford, 185 
 
 V. Seattle R. Co., 519 
 Peers v. Elliott, 673 
 Peet V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 435 
 Peetz V. St. Charles R. Co., 375 
 Peil V. Rheinhart, 114, 710 
 Peirce v. Walters, 100 
 Peisser v. Shanning, 733 
 Pekin v. Brereton, 371 
 
 V. MoMahon, 71, 78, 285, 705 
 
 V. Newell, 279 
 Pelky V. Palmer, 608 
 Peltier v. Bradley 649 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 463 
 Pelton V. Schmidt, 704, 705 
 Pence v. Chicago, etc. R Co., 476 
 Pendergast v. Union R. Co., 194, 231, 
 
 505, 523 
 Pendlebury v. Greenhalgh, 174 
 Pendleton v. Kinsley, 512 
 
 St. R. Co. V. Shires, 457 
 
 V. Stallman, 457, 463 
 Pennington v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 
 207 
 
 V. Streight, 313 
 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co., 755 
 
 V. Yell. 550, 565, 570, .572 
 Penniston v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 506 
 Pennsylvania Hall, Re. 261 
 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc. 
 
 Bridge, 250, 283 
 Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Bentley, 
 5 i, 58, 108 
 
 V. Bard, 399 
 
 V. Graham, 9, 257,371,387,758 
 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, 217 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes, 185a, 468 
 
 V. Bray, 493 
 
 V. Brush, 317 
 
 V. Burgett, 185& 
 
 V. Congdon, 318 
 
 V. Conlan, 13, 53, 467 
 
 V. Connell, 493, 761a 
 
 V. BUett, 120a 
 
 V. Gallaher, 182 
 
 V. Hensil, 467 
 
 V. Horton, 13 
 
 V. Keane, 477, 773 
 
 V. Krick, 463 
 
 V. Langendorf, 85 
 
 V. Lynch, 231 
 
 V. McCaffrey, 193, 213, 217 
 
 V. McCormack, 197, 217 
 
 V. Marion, 87, 410, 506 
 
 V. Martin, 531 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Meyers, 476, 480, 
 482, 483 
 V. Morel, 478 
 V. Nevrmeyer, 513a 
 V. Ralhgeb, 476 
 v. Roney, 85 
 V. Roy, 51, 495, 526, 769 
 V. Rudel, 477 
 V. Sears. 198 
 V." Stegemier, 91 
 V. Toomey, 513 
 V. Whitcomb, 204, 2076 
 V. Whitlock, 30, 665 
 Pennsylvania Lead Co., Re 701a 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ackerman, 
 468. 476 
 V. Aiken, 476, 485 
 V. Aspell, 61, 530 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 737 
 V. Bantom, 486, 766, 769 
 V. Barnett, 53, 436, 
 V. Beale, 476, 477 
 V. Bock, 71 
 V. Books, 766 
 V. Butler, 771 
 
 V. Canal Commissioners, 254 
 V. Coon, 47 
 V. Gallentine, 113 
 V. Goodenough, 67 
 V. Goodman, 485 
 V. Hammill, 464 
 V. Henderson, 60c, 473, 493, 505 
 V. Hensil, 13, 35, 27, 57 
 V. Hope, 36, 55, 666 
 V. Horst, 54, 479 
 V. Jones, 120a 
 V. Keller, 766 
 V. Kelly, 73a 115, 763 
 V. Kerr, 30, 666 
 V, Lacey, 55 
 V. Kilgore, 508, 530 
 Pennsylvania, etc. R. Co. v. Langdon, 
 61, 533, 766 
 v. Leary, 90, 476 
 V. Lewis, 73 
 V. Lyons, 508, 530 
 V, MoCloskey, 519 
 V. ]\IcKinney, 516, 
 V. McTighe, 87 
 V. Matthews, 466 
 V. Middleton. 333 
 V. MiUer, 729 
 V. Mooney, 110 
 V. Ogier, 91, 137, 766, 775 
 V. Patterson, 399 
 V. Price. 138, 335. 486, 488 
 V. Riblet, 418. 422 
 V. Righter, 56, 102, 113, 476 
 V. Russ, 144 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 130a 
 V. Smith, 7 
 V. Smith. 19 
 V. Stranahan, 675 
 
cxl 
 
 Referencesl TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc. R. Co. v. Vandi- 
 ver, 64, 151, 493 
 
 V. Wachter, 185, 235, 341 
 
 V. Watson 675 
 
 V. Weber, 108, 114, 463 
 
 V. Werner, 89, 477 
 
 V. Wilson 758 
 
 V. Zebe, 531, 766 
 
 V. Zink, 207a. 317 
 Pennsylvania Tel. Co. v. Varnau, 60, 
 
 89 
 Penny v. Rochester, R. Co., 78a, 485, 
 
 485c 
 Penruddock's Case, 709o 
 Pensacola Gas Co. v. Pebley, 693 
 Penso V. McCormick, 73 
 Penton v. Murdock. 633 
 People V. Ames, 619 
 
 V. Auditor, 817 
 
 V. Bristol, etc. Turnp. Co., 810 
 
 V. Brooklyn, 345 
 
 V. Butler, 602 
 
 V. Campbell, 319 
 
 V. Canal Board, 398 
 
 V. Colbv, 603 
 
 V. Colerick, 619 
 
 V. Commissioners, etc, 337 
 
 V. Cunningham, 832, 363 
 
 V. Dennison, 249 
 
 V. Eastwood, 110 
 
 V. Elk River Mill, etc. Co., 734 
 
 V. Express, 338 
 
 V. Faulkner, 303 
 
 V. Goshen Turnp. Co., 387 
 
 V. Hillsdale Turnp. Co., 348, 
 886, 388 
 
 V. Jackson, 834a 
 
 V. Kerr, 833, 485a 
 
 V. Kingman, 338 
 
 V. Lambie, 338 
 
 V. Lamborn, 569 
 
 V. Little Vallev, 338 
 
 V. Loechfelm, 333, 334 
 
 V. Medical Soc, 323 
 
 V. Hiles, 2i3 
 
 V. Morrell, 354 
 
 V. New York, 572 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 470 
 
 V. Pease, 310 
 
 V. Plymouth Plank Road Co., 
 386 
 
 V. Saratoga, etc. R. Co., 390 
 
 T. Seaman, 310 
 
 V. Stocking, 303, 310 
 
 V. Supervisors, etc., 337 
 
 V. Tallmadge, 349 
 
 V. Telephone Co., 536 
 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 415 
 
 V. Ulster Co., 340 
 
 V. Vanderbilt, 334a 
 
 V. Waterford, etc. Turnp. Co., 
 273 
 
 V. Watertown, 249 
 
 People's Bank v. Morgolofski, 719a 
 
 Pass. R, Co. V. Green, 473 
 
 Savings Bank v. Cupps, 588 
 Peoria v. Johnston, 386 
 
 V. Simpson, 345, 709a, 713 
 Peoria Bridge Ass'n, v. Loomis, 389, 
 
 743, 758 
 Peoria, etc. R. Co. v. Champ, 453 
 
 V. Herman, 87 
 
 V. Lane, 457, 503, 534 
 
 V. Miller, 461 
 
 V. Puckett, 207 
 
 V. Reynolds, 516 
 
 V. Rice, 89, 238 
 
 V. Siltman, 62 
 Pepin V. Dunham, 618 
 Pepper v. So. Pacific Co., 426, 474, 767 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 553, 754 
 Peppercorn v. Black River Falls, 
 
 759, 760 
 Percival v. Jones, 303 
 Perdue v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 24l?> 
 Perigoy v. Sellick, 733 
 Perez v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 514 
 
 V. Rayband, 709 
 Perigo V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 217 
 Perionovrsky v. Freeman, 605 
 Perkins v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 523 
 
 V. Eastern, etc. R. Co., 57, 107, 
 418, 434, 435, 436 
 
 V. Eighmie, 688 
 
 V. Fayette, 346, 352, 355 
 
 V. Fond du Lac, 86, 258, 353, 
 876 
 
 T. Lawrence, 286 
 
 V. Mossman, 629 
 
 T. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 151 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 491, 505 
 
 V. Oxford, 301 
 
 V. Perkins, 640 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 448 
 Perley v. Chandler, 365 
 
 V. Foster, 620 
 Perrin v. Hill, 577 
 Perringv. Rebutter, 557 
 Perry v. Buss, 310 
 
 V. Cedar Falls, 377 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 480 
 
 V. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 407, 
 425 
 
 V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 333 
 
 V. Ricketts, 194, 196 
 
 V. Rogers, 233 
 
 V. Smith, 672 
 
 V. Worcester, 105 
 Perse v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 483 
 Pershing v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 407, 
 
 495 
 Peru V. Brown, 374, 387 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Basket, 448 
 Peschel v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 195, 
 233 
 
References\ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 cxli 
 
 Petaja v Aurora Iron Co., 195,233 
 Peter v. Denison. 688a 
 
 V. Kendall, 338 
 Peters v. Harrison Wire Co. , 194 , 
 
 V. Lindsborg, 291 
 
 v.Rylands, 502 
 Petersbury v. Applegarth, 285 
 Petersen v. Sherry Lumber Co., 216 
 
 V. Coal Co.. 232 
 
 V. New York, 299 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 
 V. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 
 451a 
 Petrel, The, 237 
 Petrie v. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 103, 
 
 468. 478, 769, 770, 775 
 Pettengill v. Yonkers, 93, 386, 298, 
 
 346, 356, 369 
 Pettigrew v. EFansville, 274 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. Steel Co. , 144 
 Pettingill v. Chelsea. 258, 287 
 
 V. Clean. 369 
 Pettit V, May, 634 
 Peverly v. Boston, 86, 523 
 Peyton v. Texas, etc. R. Co., 85, 460, 
 
 467 
 Pfau V. Reynolds, 359 
 Pfeffer v. Cutter, 207 
 Pfeiffer v. Brown, 736 
 Phelon V. Stiles, 141, 146 
 Phelps V. Cutter, 619 
 
 V. Dolan, 310 
 
 V. Mankato, 334 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 743 
 
 V. Nowlen, 700 
 
 V. Wait, 123, 244, 348, 645 
 Philadelphia v. Gavagnin, 285 
 
 V. Weller, 358 
 Philadelphia Iron, etc. Co. v. Davis, 
 
 197 
 Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Anderson, 
 39, 407, 459, 516, 531 
 
 V. Boyer, 25, 51, 57, 63, 66, 86, 
 495 
 
 V. Brannen, 154 
 
 V. Constable, 666 
 
 V. Cooper, 123 
 
 V. Davis, 407, 735 
 
 V. Derby, 143, 146, 154, 155, 486, 
 491, 706 
 
 V. Edelstein, 509 
 
 V. Ervin, 13 
 
 V. Fronk. 463 
 
 V. Hagan, 93 
 
 V. Hassard, 73 
 
 V. Hendrickson, 680 
 
 V. Henrice. 58 
 
 V. Hogeland, 66 
 
 V. Hummell, 97, 480, 481a, 484 
 
 V. Keen an, 195 
 
 V. Kellam, 460 
 • V. Killips, 436 
 
 V. Larkin, 749 
 
 Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Latshaw, 
 676 
 
 V. Layer, 465 
 
 V. Lehman, 104 
 
 V. Long, 87, 71, 73, 78, 114, 461 
 
 V. McCormick, 509 
 
 V. Peebles, 476 
 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. Towboat 
 Co., 104, 395 
 
 V. Rice, 493 
 
 T. Schultz, 676, 680 
 
 V. Spearen, 53, 73, 99, 464, 483 
 
 V. State, 235 
 
 V. Stebbing, 8, 37, 57, 111 
 
 V. Stimpson, 317 
 
 V. Stinger, 10, 436, 451, 474 
 
 V. Trainer, 194 
 
 V. Yeiser, 11, 673 
 
 V. Yerger, 58, 676 
 Philadelphia & Reading R. Co. v. 
 Derby, 706 
 
 V. Smith, 709a 
 Philadelphia Traction Gov, Lightcap, 
 4856 
 
 V. Orbann, 493, 748 
 Phillips v. Bridge, 573 
 
 V. Brigham, 40 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 325 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 118, 335, 341 
 
 V. County Court, 338 
 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 476 
 
 V. De Wald, 35, 645 
 
 V. Dickerson, 28, 742 
 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 
 480 
 
 V. Edsall, 569, 572 
 
 V. Huntington, 334, 376 
 
 V. Library Co., 706 
 
 V. Michaels, 215, 218 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 458, 
 477 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 31, 66, 426 
 
 V. New York & New England 
 R. Co., 479 
 
 V. Northern R. Co., 144, 489 
 
 V. Railway Co., 207a 
 
 V. Rennselaer, etc. R. Co., 530 
 
 V. Ritchie county, 376 
 
 V. Southwestern R. Co., 758, 
 760 
 
 V. Veazie, 358 
 Philpott V. Penn. R. Co. , 773 
 Phinney v. Phinney, 343 
 Phipps V. Millbury Bank, 581 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. N. Y. Cent. R. 
 
 Co., 675 
 Phcenixville v. Phoenix Iron Co. 359, 
 
 365 
 Phyfe V. Manhattan R. Co., 745 
 Pickard v. Smith, 14, 176, 314, 713 
 Pickens v. Diecker, 634 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
cxlii 
 
 Re/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Pickering v. Orange, 031 
 Picliett V. Pearsons, 566 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 484, 
 775 
 Pidgeon v. Long Island R. Co., 194 
 
 Y. Williams, 573, 575 
 Pieart v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 321 
 Piedmont, etc. R. Co. v. McKenzie, 
 
 16 
 Pielke v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 667 
 Pierce v. Atlanta Cotton Mills, 195 
 
 T. Blake, 569 
 
 V. Central Iowa R. Co. , 241c 
 
 V. Connors, 73a, 138, 645, 773 
 
 V. Dart, 371 
 
 v. New Bedford, 263 
 
 V. Partridge, 619 
 
 V. Strickland, 619 
 
 V. Whitcomb, 705 
 Piercy v. Averill, 313, 363 
 Pierrepont v. Loveless, 164 
 Pierson v. Gale, 303 
 
 V. Glean, 709a 
 Pietzner v. Shinniok, 421 
 Piggot V. Eastern Counties R. Co., 
 
 675, 676 
 Pigott V. Engle, 649 
 Pike V. Brittan, 710 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 467 
 
 V. Emerson, 573 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 85 
 
 V. Megam, 249 
 
 V. 5Iegoiin, 310 
 Pilkingtou v. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 193, 
 
 207& 
 Pillsbury t. Moore, 709a 
 Pilot Boy, The, 495 
 Pimm V. Roper, 613 
 Pinckney v. Western XJ. Tel. Co., 
 
 539, 584, 543 
 Pine V. St. Paul R. Co., 748 
 Pine Bluff Light Co. v. McCain, 695 
 
 V. Schneider, 693, 690 
 Pincjree v. Leyland, 209a 
 Pinkham v. Topsfield, 863 
 Pinnev v. Hall, 704 
 Piollet V. Simmers, 104, 355, 381 
 Piper V. Cambria Iron Co., 307 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 467, 
 483, 485 
 
 V. Manny, 33 
 
 V. Menifee, 603 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. E. Co., 497 
 Pippen T. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 433 
 Pippin V. Sheppard, 116 
 Pitcher v. King, 630 
 
 V. Lennon, 702a 
 
 V. People's R. Co., 410, 521 
 Pitman v. Francis, 574 
 Pitrowsky v. Reedy Mfg. Co., 209a 
 Pitt V, Yalden, 558, 559, 573 
 Pittinger v. Hamilton, 334, 353 
 
 Pitts V. Gaince, 644 
 
 V. Lancaster Mills, 730 
 Pittston V. Harts, 356 
 Pittsburgh v. Grier, 89, 263, 285, 704, 
 725 
 
 V. Vining, 74 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Adams, 
 180, 186, 186a, 318 
 
 V. Allen, 437, 449 
 
 V. Andrews, 519 
 
 V. Bennett, 111, 475, 480, 482 
 
 V. Bingham 97, 419, 705 
 
 V. Bowyer, 434 
 
 V. Bumstead, 72 
 
 V. Burton, 478 
 
 V. Caldwell, 78, 84 
 
 V. Campbell, 58 
 
 V. Collins, 64, 87, 480 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 333 
 
 V. Cunnington, 434 
 
 V. Devinney, 234, 230, 333a, 
 3836 
 
 V. Donahue, 513 
 
 V. Dunn, 408 
 
 V. Ensign, 513 
 
 V. Evans, 54 
 
 V. Gilleland, 407, 413 
 
 V. Henderson, 188, 330 
 
 V. Henley, 195 
 
 V. Hinds, 513 
 
 V. Hixon, 678, 680 
 
 V. Ives, 410 
 
 V. Jones, 680 
 
 V. Karnes, 27, 427 
 
 V. Kirk, 146 
 
 V. Kitley, 479 
 
 V. Knutson, 467 
 
 V. Krichbaum, 114 
 
 V. Krouse, 490 
 
 V. Lewis, 333a, 333& 
 
 T. Lyons. 748 
 
 V. McClurg, 56. 519 
 
 V. Martin, 490, 519 
 
 V. Maurer, 463 
 
 V. Nelson, 85, 678 
 
 V. Pearson, 73 
 
 V. Pillow, 613 
 
 V. Powers, 180, 238 
 
 V. Ranney, 333ni, 3336 
 
 V. Redding, 481a 
 
 V. Ruby, 192 
 
 V. Euss, 486, 761a 
 
 V. Sentmeyer, 198, 207 
 
 V. Shields, 154 
 
 V. Smith, 64, 437, 450, 451a 
 
 V. Spencer, 66 
 
 V. Sponier, 479 
 
 V. Stuart, 418 
 
 V. Sullivan, 189 
 
 V. Taylor, 28, 436, 451, 379, 748 
 
 V. Thompson, 184, 496 
 
 V. Williams, 516 
 
 V. Wright, 114 
 
Re/erences'\ TABLE OF CASES. \fl-re to sections. 
 
 cxliii 
 
 Pittsburgh etc. E. Co. v. Yundt, 417 
 
 Pixley V. Clark, 738, 731, 733 
 
 Plank V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 194, 313 
 
 road Co. v. Thomas, 385 
 Plant V. Long Island R. Co. , 333 
 
 Ins. Co. V. Cook, 61, 735 
 Planz V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 64, 107 
 Piatt V. Farney, 708 
 
 V. Forty-second St., etc. R. Co., 
 531 
 
 V. Johnson, 739, 730 
 
 V. Sherry, 616 
 Platte, etc. Canal Co. v. Do well, 13 
 
 Milling Co. v. Dowell, 72, 108 
 Plattsmouth v. Mitchell, 353, 376 
 Platz V. Cohoes, 67, 104, 381 
 Playford v. United K. Tel. Co., 533, 
 
 543 
 Pleasants v. Fant, 56 
 Pleon V. Staff, 709 
 Plopper V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 531 
 Pluckwell V. Wilson, 651 
 Plumleigh v. Dawson, 733 
 Plumley v. Birge, 63, 73, 639 
 Plummer v. Dill, 705 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 477 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 476 
 Plunkett V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 434 
 Plymouth v. Graver, 356 
 
 V. Painter, 313 
 Poeppers v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 55, 
 
 666, 678 
 Poirier v. Carroll, 310, 315 
 Poland V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 185 
 
 V. Earhart, 686 
 Polaria, The, 146 
 Polerv. N. Y. Central R. Co., 435, 
 
 441, 450. 455 
 Poling V. Ohio River R. Co., 160, 705 
 Polk V. Plummer, 349 
 Pollard V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 146 
 
 V. New Haven, R. Co., 533 
 Pollett V. Long, 30. 739, 733 
 Pollich V. Sellers, 309a 
 Pollock V. Eastern R. Co., 470 
 
 V. Louisville, 391 
 
 V. Stables, 179 
 Polly V. McCall, 731 
 Pomeroy v. Donaldson, 333 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 359 
 
 V. Westfield, 351 
 
 V. Granger, 700, 701 
 Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 60b, 
 
 333, 334, 363. 369, 373, 376 
 Pomponio v. N. Y. & New Haven R. 
 
 Co., 464, 481 
 Ponca V. Crawford 
 Pond v. Vanderveer, 618 
 Pontiac v. Carter, 363 
 Ponton V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 180, 341 
 Pool V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 61, 478 
 
 Poole V. Georgia Railroad & Bank- 
 ing Co., 508 
 
 V. Jackson, 367, 368, 369 
 
 V. North Carolina R. Co., 84 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co.. 488 
 Poor V. Sears, 66, 709a 
 Pope V. Commissioners, etc., 336 
 
 V. Kansas City R. Co., 457. 463 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 540a 
 Popson V. Leathem, 743 
 Port Jervis v. First Nat. Bank, 24a, 
 
 384 
 Port Royal, etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 
 
 3076 
 Porter v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co.. 317 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 492, 505 
 
 V. Pierce, 619 
 
 V. Sayward, 625 
 
 V. Waters- Allen Co., 191 
 Porter County v. Dombka, 369 
 Portland v. Richardson, 365 
 Posey v. Scofleld, 60 
 Poseyville v. Lewis, 376 
 Post V. Boston, 338 
 
 V. Lincoln, 736 
 
 V. Mumn, 333 
 
 V. Olmsted, 645 
 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 410 
 
 V. U. S. Exp. Co., 646 
 Postal Cable Co. v. Lathrop, 754 
 
 Tel. Co. V. Zopfi, 31, 359 
 Potter V. Bunnell, 359, 414 
 
 V. Castleton, 334. 351,356 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 54, 103 
 
 V. Faulkner, 183, 183 
 
 V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 475 
 
 V. Moran, 646, 654 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 233, 241 
 
 V. Seymour, 171 
 
 V. The Majestic, 504 
 
 V. Warner, 103, 615, 741 
 Pottner, v. Minneapolis, 307 
 Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 693 
 Poucher v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 178, 505 
 Poulin v. Broadway, etc. R. Co., 508 
 Pouilin V. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 486 
 Poulton V. Southwestern R. Co., 145 
 Pound V. Port Huron, etc. R. Co., 
 
 433, 448 
 Pounder v. North Eastern R. Co. 518 
 Powell V. Augusta, etc. Co. 743 
 
 V. Deveney, 31 85, 122 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 472, 
 476, 477 
 
 V. Mo. Pacific R. Co., 460, 475, 
 484 
 
 V. Salisbury, 663 
 
 V. Tuttle, 391, 597 
 
 V. Virginia Const. Co., 169 
 Power V. First National Bank, 588 
 
 V. Kent, 566 
 
cxliv 
 
 Re/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. W' to sections. 
 
 Powers V. Boston Gas Co., 698 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 513a 
 
 V. Council Bluffs, 374 
 
 V. Craig, 069 
 
 V. Davenport, 40 
 
 V. Harlow, 73, 688 
 
 V. Kindt, 638 
 
 V. N. Y , Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 209a, 217 
 
 V. Quincey, 77 
 
 V. Woodstock, 393 
 Pravie, etc. Co. v. Doig, 173, 699 
 Prather v. Kean, 589 
 
 Y. Lexington, 291 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 94, 
 108 
 Pratt V. Amherst, 350 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 463, 
 4fi4a 
 
 V. Gardner, 303 
 
 V. Hill, 303 
 
 y. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 217 
 
 V. Lamson, 730, 733 
 
 V. Prouty. 219 
 
 V. Weymouth, 291 
 
 Iron Co. V. Brauley, 71, 73a, 78 
 Pray v. Jersey City, 356. 258, 289 
 
 V. Omaha R. Co., 523 
 Prayther v. Dean, 588 
 Prendible v. Conn. River Mfg. Co., 
 
 214, 3415 
 Prentice v. Geiger, 739, 734 
 
 V. Wellsville, 185, 195 
 Prentiss v. Boston. 356 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 107, 111, 
 112. 
 
 V. Kent Manufacturing Co., 
 186a, 319 
 Presby v. Grand Trunk Ry., 426 
 Prescott V. Ball Engine Co., 195 
 
 V. Knowles, 628 
 Pressman v. Mooney, 645, 773 
 Preston v. Prather, 588 
 Prestwich v. Poley, 573 
 Pretty v. Bickmore, 709a 
 Prewitt V. Eddy, 482 
 
 V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 474 
 Price V. Bullen, 569 
 
 V. Ga Nun, 691 
 
 T. Houston Nav. Co., 180 
 
 V. New Jersey R., etc. Co,, 57, 
 418, 430 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 140 
 
 V. Sacramento, 356 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 61, 99 
 Prickett v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 419, 
 
 434, 453 
 Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 66, 108, 
 356, 377 
 
 V. Morrice, 310 
 Priest V. Nichols, 56, 57, 86 
 Prisstley v. Fowler, 184, 194 
 Priester v. Augley, 155, 686 
 
 Primrose V. Western U. Tel. Co., 545, 
 
 546, 553, 553. 754 
 Prince v. Lynn, 391 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co.. 
 415, 417a 
 Prince George County v. Burgess, 
 
 108, 357, 376 
 Princeton v. Gieske, 274 
 Prindle v. Fletcher, 367 
 Pringle v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 93 
 Pritchard v. La Crosse, etc. R. Co., 
 
 430 
 Probert v. Pliipps, 318 
 Probst V. Delamater, 189 
 Proctor V. Andover, 387 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R, Co , 129 
 
 V. Jennings, 26, 35 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 438 
 Promer v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185a, 303, 341c 
 Prosser v. Montana Central R. Co., 
 
 606. 108. 194, 197 
 Protector, The, 172 
 Prot. Epis. Church v. Anamosa, 299 
 Prothers v. Citizens' R. Co., 519 
 Providence v. Clapp, 258, 333, 350, 
 
 353, 363 
 Provost V. New Chester Water Co., 
 
 283 
 Pruitt V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 39, 
 
 40 
 Prvor V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 207f) 
 Pueblo V. Griffen, 760 
 
 v. Smith, 379 
 Puff v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 54 
 Puffer v. Orange, 356 
 Pullman Car Co. v. Bluhm, 31, 743 
 
 V. Gardner, 526 
 
 V. Gavin, 526 
 
 V. Harkins, 319a 
 
 V. Laack, 90, 188, 194, 304 
 
 V. Lawrence, 762 
 
 V. Lowe, 536 
 
 V. Martin, 536 
 
 V. Matthews, 536 
 
 V. Smith, 509, 526, 764 
 
 V. Taylor, 526 
 
 V. Trimble, 761 
 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 274 
 Purcell V. St. Paul R. Co., 36, 743, 761 
 Purdy V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 478 
 
 Y. Rome, etc. R. Co., 341d 
 Purinton v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 463, 
 
 483 
 Purl V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 63, 88 
 Purves V. Landell, 559 
 Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 69 
 Putnam v. Broadway, etc. R. Co., 
 512 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co. , 140 
 
 V. Wigg, 639, 639 
 Pye V. Faxon, 175, 701a 
 
 V. Mankato, 374 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. {.are to sections. 
 
 cxlv 
 
 Pyle V. Richards, 729 
 
 Pjm V. Great Northern R. Co., 137 
 
 769 
 Pyne v. Broadway, etc. R. Co., 485c 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co , 241 
 PzoUa V. Michigan Central R. Co., 62 
 
 Quackenbush v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 513a, 742 
 V. Wisconsin, etc. R. Co., 62 
 422, 451a 
 Quaid V. Cornwall, 197 
 Quaife v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 57, 58 
 Quarman v. Burnett, 171, 172, 173 
 Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 241 
 Queen. The, 172 
 
 V. Dayton Coal, etc. Co., 13,62, 
 73, 73a 
 Quested v. Newburyport, etc. R. Co., 
 
 457 459 
 Quick V. Minnesota Iron Co. , 216 
 Quigley v. Central Pac. R. Co., 493 
 Quill V. Empire State Tel. Co., 120a, 
 
 359 
 Quilty V. Battie, 635 
 
 V. Batty, 115 
 Quimby v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 415, 505 
 V. Vanderbilt, 503 
 V. Vermont, etc. R. Co. , 47, 57, 
 437 
 Quin V. Complete Elec. Co.. 162 
 
 V. Lowell Electric Light Co., 
 
 683 
 V. Moore, 135, 137, 766, 769 
 Quinoy v. Jones, 274, 701 
 V. Barber, 353 
 Canal v. Newcomb, 371, 400 
 Coal Co. V. Hood, 137, 194a, 
 
 205 
 Mining Co. v. Kitts, 203a, 235 
 etc. R. Co. V. Wellhoener, 27 
 Quinlan v. Manistique, 338 
 
 V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 647 
 V. Utica. 605, 369 
 Quinn v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. , 523 
 
 T. Johnson Forge Co., 186a, 
 
 758, 767a 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 189 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 512 
 V. O'Keefe, 104 
 V. Perham, 710 
 V. Power, 146, 147 
 V. South Carolina R. Co., 519, 
 749 
 Quirk V. Holt, 644. 654 
 
 Raasch v. Dodge county, 367 
 
 Rabe v. Sommerbeck, 690 
 
 Raben v. Central Iowa R. Co. , 510 
 
 Raby v. Cell, 56 
 
 Race V. Union Ferry Co. , 502 
 
 Radcliff V. Brooklyn, 283, 700 
 
 Eaden v. Geo. R Co.. 480 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — j.] 
 
 Radley v. Northwestern R. Co., 94 
 
 99 
 Radway v. Briggs, 333, 725 
 Rafferty v. Buckman, 766 
 Ragon V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 217, 406 
 Ragsdale v. Memphis, etc. R. Co 
 241 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 241c 
 Rahman v. Minnesota, etc. R. Co. 
 
 207a 
 Rahway v. Carter, 338 
 Raiford v. Mississippi, etc. R. Co. 
 
 419, 463 
 Rail V. Potts, 310 
 Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 249. 
 V.Barron, 413,502, 758 
 V. Brown, 120a, 413 
 V. Charles, 195 
 V. Cunnington, 417a 
 V. Fort, 46, 186a 
 V. Gladmon, 73, 108 
 V. Hambleton, 120a 
 V. Harris, 503 
 V. Hartley, 358 
 V. Houston, 90 
 V. Jones, 1, 61, 86, 2076, 523 
 V. Keegan, 195 
 V. Lacy, 132 
 V. Leech, 185 
 V. Lockwood, 550, 551 
 V. Mfg. Co., 210 
 V. Miller. 180 
 V. Norton, 63, 99 
 V. Ogden, 87 
 V. Peterson, 195 
 V. Reeves, 40 
 V. Richardson. 666 
 V. Richmond, 358 
 V. Rush, 241a 
 V. Stout, 53, 57, 73, 73 
 V. Tennessee, 249 
 V. Walker, 63, 103 
 Raine v. Alderson, 119 
 Raines v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 99 
 Rainey V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 27 
 Rains v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 198, 
 207 
 V. Simpson, 303 
 Rainy v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 466 
 Rai-sler v. Oliver, 319, 321 
 Rajowski v. Detroit, etc. R. Co. , 672 
 Ramm v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co , 
 
 513a 
 Ramsdell v. Morgan. 75 
 Ramsden v. Boston & A. R. Co., 151, 
 
 154 
 Ramsey v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 477 
 V. RushvLlle R. Co., 114, 351 
 Rand v. Syms. 644 
 Randall v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co 57 
 180, 334, 333a, 241, 341a 
 
cxl 
 
 VI 
 
 Re/ercncei\ TABLE OF CASES. [«« to sections. 
 
 Randall v. Brigham, 303 
 
 V. Cheshire Turnp. Co., 887, 397 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 263, 356 
 
 V. Ikey, 559 
 
 V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 125 
 
 V. Northwestern T. Co., 108 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 432 
 
 V. Silverthorn, 729 
 Randleaon v. Murray, 168 
 Randolph v. O'Riordan, 66, 649 
 Rankin v. Buckman, 256 
 
 V. Ingwersen, 708 
 
 V. Schaeffer, 574 
 Ransier v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 410 
 Ransom v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 62, 
 426, 470 
 
 V. Cothran, 567 
 
 V. Halcott, 620 
 
 V. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 758 
 Raphov. Moore, 254, 257,369, 397 
 Rappelyea v. Hulse, 644, 645 
 Rapson v. Cubitta, 1(!9, 173 
 Raridan v. Central Iowa R. Co., 741 
 Rascher v. East Detroit, etc. R. Co., 
 
 485c 
 Rasmussen v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 209a 
 Ratte V. Dawson. 705 
 Rau V. Minn. Valley R. Co., 713 
 Raub V. Los Angeles R. Co., 508 
 Ranch v. Lloyd, 54, 73, 73, 92, 479 
 Rauenstein v. N. Y., Lackawanna, 
 
 etc. R. Co., 416 
 Rawlston v. East Tennessee, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 207 
 Rawson v. Dole, 610, 625 
 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 210, 504 
 Rawstron v. Taylor, 734 
 Ray V. Birdseve, 572 
 
 T. Jeffries. 221 
 
 V. Manchester, 350, 355 
 
 V. Sellers, 709o 
 Raymond v. Keseberg, 743 
 
 V. Lowell, 3.i2, 353, 375 
 
 V. Sheboygan, 384 
 
 V. State, 249 
 Raynor v. Mitchell, 147 
 Raynsford v. Phelps, 313 
 Read v. Barker, 731 
 
 Y. Boston, etc. R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Edwards, 418, 524, 627, 628 
 
 V. Great Eastern R. Co., 140 
 
 V. Morse, 672 
 
 V. Nichols, 30, 667. 
 
 V. Spaulding, 39, 40 
 Readdy v. Shamokin, 764 
 Readhead v. Midland R. Co., 11, 494, 
 
 497 
 Reading v. Reiner, 384 
 
 R. Co. V. Ritchie, 56, 108, 463, 
 477 
 
 Readman v. Conway, 60c, 710 
 Reagan v. Casey, 225 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. . 202 
 Ream v. Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co., 107 
 Reardon v. N. Y. Card Co., 232 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co , 483, 485 
 
 V. St. Louis county, 256 
 
 V. Thompson, 705 
 Reary v. Louisville, etc. R. Co. , 89 
 Reber v. Bond, 513a 
 
 V. Herring, 615 
 
 V. Tower, 'l 97 
 Receivers v. Moore, 2076 
 Rector v. Pierce, 377 
 Redington v. Pacific Cable Co., 541 
 Reddington v. Phila. Tr. Co., 520 
 Reddon v. Union Pac. R. Co., 230 
 Redfield v. Oakland Consol. R. Co., 
 
 133, 771 
 Redigan v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 
 
 705 
 Redington v. N. Y., Ontario R. Co., 
 
 303 
 Redmond v. Delta Lumber Co., 323 
 
 V. Staton, 591 
 Rednor v. Lehigh, etc. R. Co., 506 
 Redpath v. Western U. Tel. Co.. 553 
 Red River Line v. Cheatham, 185 
 
 Mills v. Wright, 729 
 Redwood Cemetery v. Bondy, 334 
 Reece v. Rigby, 569 
 Reed v. Allegheny, 173, 298 
 
 v. Belfast, 358, 337, 338 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 478, 
 759 
 
 V. Cornwall, 334, 336, 388 
 
 v. Covington, etc. Bridge Co., 
 521 
 
 V. Darling, 602 
 
 V. Deerfield, 377, 379 
 
 V. Howell county, 256 
 
 V. Madison, 73, 370 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 676 
 
 V. New York, 343 
 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 139 
 
 V. Northfleld, 110, 376 
 
 V. Penn. R. Co., 665 
 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 751 
 
 V. Southern Express Co., 626 
 
 V. State, 738, 743 
 
 V. Stockraeyer, 186a 
 Reedie V. Northwestern R. Co., 167, 
 
 168, 173, 699 
 Reese v. Biddle, 180 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531, 
 756 
 Reeside v. Walker, 249 
 Reeves v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 61, 
 93. 93, 99, 418 
 
 V. Dubuque, etc. E. Co., 63, 
 476 
 
 v. Larkin, 359 
 
 V. State Bank, 583 
 
Re/erences'\ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. CxlvII 
 
 Regan v. N. Y. & New England E. 
 
 Co., 765 
 Reget V. Bell, 93 
 Regina v. Bamber, 348 
 
 V. Birmingham, etc. E. Co., 
 
 337, 393 
 V. Bucknall, 708 
 V. Glouce,stershii'e, 390 
 V. Heathcote, 310 
 V. Hornsea, 348 
 V. Lincoln, 893 
 V. London, etc. R. Co., 393 
 V. McFarlane, 250 
 V. McLeod, 350 
 V. Paul, 348 
 V. Ramsden, 343 
 V. Stephens, 145 
 V. Watts, 343 
 Regner v. Glens Falls, etc. R. Co., 
 
 493 
 Reho V. Hogan, 550 
 Rehler v. Western N. Y., etc. R. Co., 
 
 703 
 Reibel v. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 520 
 Reichla v. Gruensf elder, 309a 
 Reid V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 525 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 410, 466 
 Reifsnyder v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 458 
 Reilly v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 73, 
 158, 461 
 V. Racine, 336 
 V. Third Ave. R. Co., 485c 
 Reining v. Buflfalo, 3.54, 373 
 Reinke v. Bentley, 14(5, 761 
 Relper v. Nichols, 666 
 Reis V. Stratton, 640 
 Reiser v. Pennsylvania Co., 193 
 Reisert v. Williams, 319 
 Reiss V. N. Y. Steam Co., 16, 38, 57, 
 
 60 
 Relle V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543 
 Relyea v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 388 
 Rembe v. N. Y. , Ontario, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 91 
 Rembert v. So. Carolina R. Co., 415 
 Remer v. Long Island R. Co., 480, 
 
 483 
 Renick v. Orser, 635 
 Renneker v. South Carolina R. Co., 
 
 519 
 Renner v. Canfield, 686 
 Renwick v. Morris, 359, 371 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 875, 
 468 
 Requa v. Rochester, 363, 381, 390 
 Respublica v. Sparhawk, 261 
 Rettig V. Fifth Ave. Tr. Co. , 186, 383 
 Revill V. Pettit, 303 
 Rex V. Bucks, 390, 394 
 V. Carlisle, 363 
 
 Rex V. Cross, 362 
 
 V. Cuniberworth, 335 
 
 V. Deron, 393 
 
 V. Ecclesfield, 337, 394 
 
 y. Edmonton, 334 
 
 V. Flecknow, 343 
 
 v. Hendon, 337, 394 
 
 V. Jones, 332, 363 
 
 V. Kerrison, 408 
 
 V. Landulph, 348 
 
 V. Leake. 334 
 
 V. Long, 612 
 
 V. Machynlleth, 394 
 
 V. Montague, 348 
 
 V. Pedley, 120, 708 
 
 Y. Russell, 363 
 
 V. Severn, etc. R. Co., 333, 403 
 
 V. Simpson, 
 
 V. Stoughton, 333 
 
 V. ButcUell, 608 
 
 V. Ward, 363 
 
 V. Watts, 738 
 
 V. West Riding of York, 393 
 
 V. Whitney, 390 
 
 V. Yorkshire, 337 
 Rexford v. State, 351, 398 
 Rexter v. Starin, 85 
 Reynolds v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 196, 
 307, 319a 
 
 V. Clarke, 644 
 
 V. Graves, 605, 606 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 470 
 
 V. Hanrahan, 644 
 
 V. Hindman, 63 
 
 V. Hussey, 633 
 
 V. Keokuk, 111 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 73a, 113, 
 114 
 
 V. Niagara Falls, 759 
 
 V. Orvis. 303 
 
 V. Van Beuren, 703 
 Rheola, The, 141 
 Rheinhard v. New York, 396 
 Rhinelander v. Lockport, 278 
 Rhines v. Evans, 565 
 
 V. Eoyalton, 743 
 Rhing V. Broadway, etc. E. Co., 96 
 Rhoades v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 451, 
 
 475 
 Rhode Island. The, 744 
 Rhodes v. Cleveland, 374 
 
 V. Otis, 338 
 
 V. Roberts, 686 
 Ricard v. North Penn. R. Co., 138 
 Rice V. Des Moines, 743 
 
 V. Evansville, 273, 274 
 
 v. Flint. 374 
 
 V. Montpelier, 350, 351, 356, 893 
 
 V. Wilkins, 631 
 
 etc. Malting Co. v. Paulson, 
 195 
 Rich V. Keshena Imp. Co. , 733 
 
 V. Minneapolis, 359 
 
cxlviii 
 
 Re/erencesi TABLE OF CASES. W'^ to sections. 
 
 Rich V. Pierpont, 606 
 
 v. Rockland, 368 
 Richard v. San ford, 644 
 Richai'ds v. Chicago, etc. R. Ce., 480 
 
 V. Connell, 705 
 
 V. Enfield, 123, 346, 856, 370, 
 379 
 
 V. New York, 296, 334 
 
 V. Schlemener, 668 
 Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 
 190, 307 
 
 V. Cooper, 184 
 
 V. Crandall, 299 
 
 V. Great Eastern R. Co., 459 
 
 V. Kier, 16, 383, 739 
 
 V. Kimball, 344 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 89, 519 
 
 V. Milburn, 655, 664 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 133, 
 463, 476, 478 
 
 V. Royalton Turn. Co., 380 
 
 V. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 413 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 480 
 Richart v. Scott, 701 
 Richfield v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
 
 89 
 Richland's Iron Co. v. Elkins, 194 
 Richmond v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 466 
 
 V. Long, 355, 366, 391 
 
 V. Mulholland, 376 
 
 v. Sacramento, etc. R. Co., 94, 
 419, 456 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 530 
 Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 107 
 Richmond Granite Co. v. Bailey. 333 
 Richmond etc. R. Co. v. Allison, 745, 
 758 
 
 V. Brown, 99, 2076 
 
 V. Bivins, 207 
 
 V. Buice, 428 
 
 V. Burnett, 194a 
 
 T. Burnsed, 492 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 773 
 
 V. De Butts, 207 
 
 V. Didzoneit, 99 
 
 V. Dudley, 196, 2076, 217 
 
 V. Elliott, 204, 688 
 
 V. Farmer, 20, 89 
 
 V. Finley, 2076 
 
 V. Free, 2076 
 
 V. Freeman, 464a, 767 
 
 V. Garthright, 410 
 
 V. George, 188 
 
 V. Hammond, 769 
 
 V. Hissong, 3076 
 
 V. Howard, 93 
 
 V. Jefferson, 513 
 
 V. Jones, 2416 
 
 V. Medley, 678, 680 
 
 V. Mitchell, 209a 
 
 V. Moore, 410 
 
 Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Morris, 8. 
 
 V. Noell, 419 
 
 V. Norment, 211a, 335, 238, 758 
 
 V. Risdon, 216 
 
 V. Rush, 2076 
 
 V. Pickleseimer, 520 
 
 V. Powers, 525 
 
 V. Scott, 509, 519 
 
 V. Smith, 509, 521 
 
 V. Thomason, 2076 
 
 V. Vance, 748 
 
 V. Watts, 480 
 
 V. Wsems, 195 
 
 V. Williams, 283, 333a, 3336 
 
 v. Worley, 209a 
 
 V. Yeamans. 99, 463, 474 
 Richter v. Penn. R. Co., 128 
 Richstain v. Washington Mills Co., 
 
 203 
 Richter v. Harper, 679 
 Ricker v. Freeman, 31 
 Ricketts v. Birmingham St. R. Co., 
 502, 530 
 
 V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 120(1, 
 502, 749 
 
 V. East India Docks R. Co., 
 418, 449 
 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co., 755, 756 
 Rickhoff V. Heckman, 187 
 Riddle v. Bedford county, 313 
 
 V. Delaware county, 272 
 
 V. Proprietors of Locks, etc., 
 356, 337, 400 
 
 V. Westfield, 367 
 Ridenhour v. Kansas City R. Co., 73, 
 
 508 
 Rider v. Kinsey, 702 
 
 V. White, 688, 632, 639 
 Rideout v. Knox, 703 
 Ridley v. Tiplady, 569 
 Riedelv. Moran, 168 
 Rietman v. Stolte, 216 
 Riest V. Goshen, 107 
 Rigby V. Hewitt, 28 
 Rigdon V. Allegheny Lumber Co., 
 
 317 
 Rigler v. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 463, 
 
 474 
 Rigony v. Schuylkill county, 256, 289 
 Riggs V. Thatcher, 619 
 Rigney v. Tacoma Water Co., 739 
 Riley v. Baxendale, 184, 203 
 
 V. Farnum, 644 
 
 V. Galveston R. Co., 241c 
 
 V. Lissner, 708 
 
 V. O'Brien, 231 
 
 V. Rt Lake Tr. Co., 73a, 485a 
 
 V. Simpson, 708 
 Rima v. Rossie Iron Works, 213 
 Rindge v. Coleraine, 1 15 
 
 V. Sargent, 729 
 Ring V. Cohoes, 26. 346, 367, 740 
 Ringland v. Toronto, 363 
 
Re/ere7Lces\ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. {.'^'■i to sections. 
 
 cxlix 
 
 Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Ru- 
 
 benstein, 516, 760 
 Riordan v. Ocean S. S. Co., 113 
 Ripley v. Freeholders, etc.. 256, 395 
 Rippe V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 435 
 Ritchey v. West, 604, 606, 607 
 Ritchie v. Bowsfield, 173 
 
 V. Waller, 147 
 Rittenhouse v. Independent Tel. Co., 
 
 543, 754, 755 
 Ritz V. Austin, 127, 767 
 River Wear Co. v. Adamson, 16 
 Rivers v. Augusta, 363 
 Roach V. Ogdensburg, 371, 369 
 
 V. St. Joseph, etc. R. Co., 464 
 
 v. Western, etc. R. Co., 60a 
 Roanoke v. Harrison, 375 
 
 Nat. Bank v. Hambrick, 581 
 Robb V. Connellsville, 375 
 Robbins v. Chicago, 175, 176, 389, 
 365, 703 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 475, 477 
 
 V. Jones, 343, 709 
 
 V. Mount, 733, 734 
 
 V. Springfield R. Co., 90, 375, 
 385c, 485c 
 Robel V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 54 
 Roberson v. Kirby, 671 
 Robert v. Alexander, etc. R. Co., 463 
 Roberton v. New York, 97 
 Roberts v. Boston, 323 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 341 
 
 V. Detroit, 389 
 
 V. Great Western R. Co., 434 
 
 V. Johnson, 133, 508, 514 
 
 V. Quincy, etc. R. Co.. 436 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 753 
 
 V. Smith, 187 
 
 V. Sterling, 574 
 Robertson v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 114, 335 
 
 V. Cornelson, 318 
 
 V. Erie R. Co., 533 
 
 V. Miller, 730 
 
 V. N. Y. &ErieR. Co., 61 
 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 407 
 
 V. Wooley, 703 
 Robeson v. French, 104 
 Robinson v. Brennan, 622 
 
 V. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 140 
 
 V. Chamberlain, 341 
 
 V. Chamberlain, 118, 381, 313, 
 335 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 455 
 
 V. Cone. 73. 73tt, 78, 84 
 
 V. Evansville, 265 
 
 V. Fetterman, 657 
 
 V. Fitchburg, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 107, 192 
 
 V. Fovi^ler, 338 
 
 V. Gell, 591 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 425, 
 451a 
 
 Robinson v. Greenville, 363 
 
 V. Houston, etc. R. Co , 309a 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 56, 
 
 180 
 V. Marino, 638, 630 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 60, 66 
 V. N. Y. & Erie R. Co.. 359, 365 
 V. Northampton R. Co., 508 
 V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 73 
 V. People, 634 
 V. Pioche, 93 
 V. Rohr, 340 
 V. Shanks, 733, 750 
 V. Simpson, 758, 646 
 V. Ward, 753 
 V. Webb. 167, 173 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co. , 108 
 V. Western Pac. R. Co., 92, 
 
 113, 353, 471 
 V. West Virginia, etc. R. Co., 
 
 207b 
 V. Wilmington, 369, 377 
 Roblee v. Indian Lake, 356 
 Roblin V. Kansas City R. Co., 192, 
 
 207, 233 
 Robostelli v. N. Y., New Haven, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 460, 488 
 Robson V. Northeastern R. Co. , 509 
 Rochereau v. Jones, 603 
 Rochester v. Campbell, 13, 13a, 343, 
 384 
 V. Montgomery, 34a. 301, 343, 
 
 384 
 White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 
 14, 47, 374, 378 
 Rockford v. Hildebrand, 53, 289, S.iS, 
 367 
 V. Hollenbeck, 65 
 Rockford, etc. R. Co. v. Byam, 476 
 V. Connell, 433, 436 
 V. Delaney, 73 
 V. Irish, 438 
 V. Lynch, 440 
 V. Rafferty. 419 
 V. Rogers, 678 
 Rockingham Ins. Co. v. Bosher, 115 
 Rockwell V. Third Ave. R. Co., 417 
 Roden v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 470 
 Roddy V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 115, 
 
 317 
 Roderick v. Whitson, 303 
 Rodgers v. Central Pacific R. Co., 39, 
 189 
 V. Lees, 73 
 Rodman v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 233, 
 
 233a 
 Rodney v. St. Louis, etc. R- Co., 194, 
 
 197 
 Rodrian v. N. Y., New Haven, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 476 
 Roe V. Birkenhead R. Co., 145 
 V. Kansas City, 353 
 V. New York, 353 
 
cl 
 
 References] 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. Uye to sections. 
 
 Roeck V. Newark, 262 
 Roehrs v. RemhofE, 626 
 Roesner v. Hermann, 178 
 Rogahn v. Moore Mfg. Co. . 151 
 Rogers v. Atlantic City R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Florence R. Co., 166, 167 
 
 V. Kennebec Steamboat Co., 
 490, 505 
 
 V. Leyden, 188, 208, 215 
 
 V. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 203a, 226, 
 23^ 
 
 V. Newburyport, 421 
 
 V. N. Y. & Texas Land Co., 243 
 
 T. Overton, 109, 113 
 
 V. People, 256 
 
 V. Phelps, 343 
 
 T. Rhvmney R. Co., 464, 471 
 
 V. Rogers, 631 
 
 V. Shirley, 308, 373 
 
 V. Smith, llo 
 
 V. Taylor, 701 
 
 V. The St. Charles, 61 
 
 V. Mulliner, 303 
 
 V. Western U. TeL Co., 531, 
 538 
 
 etc. Works v. Hand, 234 
 Rohbach v, Pac. R. Co., 180 
 Rohrbough v. Barbour County Court, 
 
 346 
 Rolf V. Greenville, 363 
 Rolipillon v. Abbott, 645 
 Roike V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 674 
 RoUo V. Andes Ins. Co., 249 
 Rolseth V. Smith, 114 
 Rome V. Dodd, 93, 289 
 Rome, etc. Const. Co. v. Dempsey, 
 
 2076 
 Rome, etc. R. Co. v. Barnett, 484 
 
 V. Chasteen, 120a, 168 
 Romeo v. Boston & M. R. Co., 477 
 Romick v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 471 
 Romney Marsh v. Trinity House, 18, 
 
 39, 738 
 Romona Stone Co. v. Phillips, 194a, 
 
 333a 
 Rompillon v. Abbott, 85 
 Roney v. Aldrich, 664, 703 
 
 V. Ward, 628 
 Ronn V. Des Moines, 869 
 Rood V. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 11, 119, 
 
 412, 672 
 Roodhouse v. Christian, 334a, 367 
 Roof V. Railroad Co., 57, 108 
 Rooks V. Houston St. R. Co., 480, 
 
 485a. 485c, 653 
 Rooney v. Carson, 185 
 
 V. Randolph, 338 
 
 V. Sewell. etc. Cordage Co., 
 195, 203 
 Root V. Great Western R. Co., 503, 
 544 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. Car Co., 526 
 
 V. Wagner, 618 
 
 Rose V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 203 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 676 
 
 V. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 
 140, 505 
 
 V. King, 702a 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 761a 
 
 V. Miles, 371 
 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 509 
 
 V. Stevens, etc. Tranp. Co., 60 
 
 v. U. S. Tel. Co., 543 
 Roseback v. ^tna Mills, 2416 
 Rosedale v. Golding, 334a 
 Roseman v. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 
 
 493 
 Rosenbaum v. Newbern, 263, 291 
 
 v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 197 
 Rosenberg v. Des Moines, 367 
 
 V. Durfree, 73, 91 
 Rosenfield v Arrol, 733 
 
 V. Newman. 723 
 Rosenhain v. Galligan, 351 
 Rosenkranz v. Lindell R. Co., 760 
 Rosenthal v. Davenport, 591 
 Rosevear v. Osceola Mills, 369 
 Rose well v. Prior, 120 
 Rosiere v. Sawkins. 246 
 Ross V. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 
 680 
 
 V. Campbell, 618 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 191 
 
 V. Fedden, 723 
 
 V. lona, 346 
 
 V. Madison, 399 
 
 V. Pearson Cordage Co., 223 
 
 T. Reed, 317 
 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 99 
 
 V. Walker, 195 
 Rossire v. Boston, 291 
 Rost V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 673, 674, 
 
 678 
 Roth V. Metropolitan R. Co., 485a 
 
 V. Northern Pac. Lumber Co., 
 319a 
 
 V. Union Depot Co., 73, 481 
 Rothe V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Rothenberger v. Northwestern Mill- 
 ing Co.. 215 
 Rothstein v. Penna. R. Co., 520 
 Rott V, Forty-second St. Ferry Co. , 
 
 493a 
 Roughan v. Boston, etc. Block Co., 
 
 195 
 Roul V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 186 
 Roulston V. Clark, 61, 97, 705. 718 
 Rounds V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 150, 
 154 
 
 V. Mumford. 383 
 Rourke -v. White Moss Colliery Co., 
 
 162 
 Rouse V. Harry, 241 c 
 
 V. Hornsby. 241c 
 
 V. Somerville, 858 ' 
 
Referenc^sl TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 cli 
 
 Eoux V. Blodgett Co., 304, 315 
 Rowe V. Lent. 614 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 114 
 V. Portsmouth, 387, 367 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 735 
 Rowell V. Lowell, 133, 346, 356, 378 
 T. Railroad Co., 63 
 V. Stamford R. Co., 355 
 V. Williams. 358 
 Rowen v. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 64, 467 
 Rowland v. Baird, 703 
 V. Cannon, 65 
 
 V. Murphy, 701 
 Rowning v. Goodchild, 419, 331 
 Rowson V. Earle, 568 
 Rozell V. Andrews, 334 
 Rozelle v. Rose, 341 
 Ruck V. Williams, 338 
 Rucker v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. , 533 
 
 V. Smoke 749 
 RudJiman v. Smith, 147 
 Ruddock V. Lowe, 607 
 Rudolphe v. New Orleans, 366 
 Rudy v. Rio Grande W. R. Co., 493 
 Ruffner v. Cincinnati. R. Co., 58, 676 
 Ruggles V. Bucknor, 317 
 
 V. Nevada. 57, 369 
 Ruland v. South Newmarket, 114 
 Rummell v. Dilworth, 319, 219a 
 Rumpel V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 479 
 Rumsey v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 321 
 
 V. Nelson, 645 
 Runnels v. Bullen, 701 
 Runyan v. Patterson, 657 
 Runyon v. Central R. Co. 61 
 Rupard v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 463 
 Rusch V. Davenport, 393, 394 
 Rush v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 186 
 Rusher v. Dallas, 291 
 Rushville v. Adams, 855 
 
 V. Poe. 107 
 Russ V. Wabash etc. R. Co., 233 
 
 V. War Eagle, 488 
 Russell V. Beebe, 317 
 
 V. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 56, 
 483 
 
 V. Columbia, 358, 368 
 
 V. Cone, 634 
 
 V. Hanley, 455 
 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 180, 
 341 
 
 V. Men of Devon, 356 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 314 
 
 V. Monroe, 377 
 
 V. New York, 395 
 
 V. Palmer, 559, 572, 753 
 
 V. Reagan, 668, 669 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 307b 
 
 V. Roberts, 746, 751 
 
 V. Scott. 731 
 
 V. Stewart, 572 
 
 Russell r. Tillotson, 309a 
 V. Tomliuson, 638 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 
 554, 756 
 Rust V. Larue, 557 
 
 V. Low, 655, 658 
 Ruter V. Floy, 64 
 Rutherford v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 185 
 Rutledge v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 
 185, 303, 241 
 Ryall V. Central Pac. R. Co. , 483 
 
 v. Kennedy, 690 
 Ryall V. Mechanics' Mills, 3416 
 Ryan v. Bagaley, 230 
 V. Bristol, 107 
 V. Cumberland Iron Co., 61 
 V. Cumberland V. R. Co., 180, 
 
 236, 335, i;39 
 V. Fowler, 189, 194, 197, 223 
 V. Gross, 676. 
 V. Los Angeles Storage Co., 
 
 219a, 233. 233 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 107, 
 
 113 
 V. McCully, 180 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 506 
 V. Manufacturers', etc. Bank, 
 
 o87 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 17, 30, 
 
 55, 195, 666, G68, 739 
 V. Porter Mfg. Co., 217 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 660 
 V. Tarbox, 203 
 V. Wilson, 708 
 Rychlicki v. St. Louis, 274 
 Ryder v. Wombwell, 56 
 Ryerson v. Abington, 53 
 Rylands v. Fletcher, 666, 701a 
 
 Sabin v. Vermont Cent. R. Co.. 413 
 Sabine, etc. R. Co. v. Ewing, 317 
 
 V. Hanks, 457 
 
 V. Smith, 750 
 Sack V Dolese, 1 95 
 Sackett Street, Matter of, 333 
 Sacrider v. Brown, 597 
 Sadler v. Henlock, 165 
 Sadowski v. Michigan Car Co., 197, 
 
 204 
 Safford v. Drew. 135, 137, 766 
 
 V. Green Island. 363 
 Sagg V. Dickinson, 619 
 Sagers v. Nuckolls, 190 
 Saginaw R. Co. v. Bohn, 73 
 Sahlgaard v. St. Paul R. Co., 508, 520 
 Sahlien v. Bank of Lonoke. 581, 587a 
 St. Anthony's Falls v. Eastman, 113 
 St. Clair Nail Co. v. Smith, 215 
 
 St. R. Co. V. Eadie, 66 
 St. John V. New York, 744 
 St. Johns, etc. R. Co. v. Ransom, 678 
 
 V. Shalley, 165 
 
clii 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \fl-re to sections. 
 
 St. Johnsbury, etc. R. Co. v. Hunt, 
 
 446 
 St. Joseph V. McCabe, 310 
 
 V. Union R. Co., 384 
 St. Joseph, etc. R. Co. v. Chase, 673, 
 679 
 
 V. Grover, 419 
 
 V. Hedges, 38, 500, 516, 519 
 St. Louis V. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. 
 Co., 384 
 
 V. Gurno, 283 
 St. Louis Brick Co. v. Kenyon, a07, 
 
 209a 
 St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller, 31, 
 
 376, 397 
 St. Louis, etc. Packet Co. v. Keokuk 
 
 Bridge Co. , 895 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Amos, 482 
 
 V. Atchison, 530 
 
 V. Basham, 432 
 
 V. Bell, 73, 410 
 
 V. Biggs, 115, 753 
 
 V. Bloyd, 207 
 
 V. Box, 473 
 
 V. Britz, 338, 241 
 
 V. Byas, 414 
 
 V. Cantrell, 523 
 
 V. Christian, 481a 
 
 V. Crosnoe, 99 
 
 V. Curl, 120a 
 
 V. Davis. 206, 209, 493, 772 
 
 V. Dingman, 484 
 
 V. Dobbins, 761 
 
 V. Doyle, 743 
 
 T. Dunn, 463 
 
 V. Eggmann, 194 
 
 V. Ferguson, 436 
 
 V. Finley, 510 
 
 V. Fire Ass'n, 679 
 
 V. French, 307a 
 
 V. Gilham, 673 
 
 V. Goolsby, 633 
 
 V. Griffith, 490 
 
 V. Hagan. 432 
 
 V. Hardy, 493 
 
 V. Harper, 333 
 
 V. Harris. 413 
 
 V. Hauks, 418 
 
 V. Hecht, 679 
 
 T. Hendricks. 151 
 
 V. Herrin, 483 
 
 V. Higgins, 194a 
 
 V. Holman, 1856 
 
 V. Hopkins, 703 
 
 V. Huffman. 493 
 
 V. Irwin, 198 
 
 V. Jagerman, 184 
 
 V. Johnston, 771 
 
 V. Jones, 675 
 
 V. Kelton, 315 
 
 V. Knott, 169 
 
 V. Lemon, 209a, 333a 
 
 T. Lewis, 426, 461 
 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Linder, 436 
 
 V. LyQian, 751 
 
 V. McClain, ls8 
 
 V. McCormick, 133 
 
 V. Mackie, 493 
 
 V. Maddry, 94, 519, 765, 771 
 
 V. Marker, 216 
 
 V. Mathias, 18, 468 
 
 V. Mitchell, 497, 516 
 
 V. Monday, 483, 484 
 
 V. Morgart,, 61, 194a, 309a, 241 
 
 V. Murray, 89 
 
 V. Needham, 195, 333a, 410, 773 
 
 V. Odum. 463 
 
 V. Payne, 451 
 
 V. Person, 508 
 
 V Reagan, 489 
 
 V. Rice, 3076,5130, 533 
 
 V. Richardson, 678 
 
 V. Robbins, 194, 197 
 
 V. Rosenberry, 91, 520 
 
 V. Schumacher, 207 
 
 V. Shackelford, 233, 235 
 
 V. Sharp, 448 
 
 V. Smuck, 505 
 
 V. Snaveley, 676 
 
 V. Stapp, 436 
 
 V. Strotz, 676 
 
 v. Sweet, 51, 495, 771, 775 
 
 V. Tavlor, 433 
 
 V. Tippett, 478 
 
 V. Todd, 20, 419, 487, 451a 
 
 V. Torrey, 233 
 
 V. Triplett, 185a, 203 
 
 V. Valirius, 73 
 
 V. Vincent, 433 
 
 V. Walbrink, 409, 412 
 
 V. Washburn, 437 
 
 V. Weaver, 60c, 108, 189, 233, 
 238 
 
 V. Welch, 239 
 
 T. Whittle, 525 
 
 V. Willis, 168 
 
 V. Yarborough, 751 
 
 V. Yocum, 133 
 
 V. Yonley, 164, 668 
 St. Louis Press Brick Co. v. Kenyon, 
 
 223 
 St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 
 
 580a 
 St. Paul V. Kuby, 74, 375 
 
 V. Sietz. 166, 176 
 St. Paul. etc. R. Co. v. Duluth, 274 
 St. Peter v. Denison, 825, 701a 
 Sala V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 483 
 Saldana v. Galveston, etc. R. Co., 
 
 482, 483 
 Salem v. GoUer, 64 
 
 V. Harvey, 769 
 Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 789 
 Salem Stone Co. v. Griffin, 203 
 
 V. Hobbs, 217 
 
 V. O'Brien, 207 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. [fire to sections. 
 
 cliii 
 
 Salem Stone Co. v. Tepps, 317 
 Sales V. Western Stage Co., 51, 495, 
 
 514 
 Salina v. Trosper, 761 
 Salisbury v. Hirchenroder, 39, 343, 
 350 
 
 V. Gourgas, 569 
 Salladay v. Dodgeville, 741 
 Salmon v. Delaware, etc, R. Co., 680 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 472 
 Salter v. Ufcica, etc. R. Co., 89, 114, 
 
 475, 476, 747 
 Saltonstall v. Stockton, 519 
 Saltus V. Pruyn, 179 
 Salzman v. Brooklyn R. Co., 743 
 Sammon v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 207 
 
 V. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 241 
 Sample v. Vicksburg, 274 
 Samples v. Atlanta, 376 
 Sampson v. Goochland, 334 
 
 V. Hoddinott, 739 
 Samuel v. Commonwealth, 618 
 Samuels v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 509, 748 
 Samuelson v. Cleveland, etc. Mining 
 
 Co., 144, 166 
 Samyn v. McCloskey, 171 
 San Antonio, etc. R. Co. v. Adams, 
 194, 492 
 
 V. Bennett, 108, 775 
 
 V. Bowles, 13, 241c 
 
 T. Lynch, 513a 
 
 V. McDonald 213 
 
 V. Mechler, 463, 485c 
 
 V. Petersen, 434 
 
 V. Reynolds, 341c 
 
 V. Wallace, 207& 
 Sanborn v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 464 
 
 V. Madera, etc. R. Co., 204, 314 
 Sanders v. Etiwan Phosphate Co., 
 189 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 747 
 
 V. Reed, 119 
 
 V. Reister, 108. 343, 703 
 
 V. Teape, 636, 639 
 Sanderson v. Frazier, 108, 519 
 Sandford v. Clarke, 120 
 Sandham v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 46 
 Sandifer v. Lynn, 654 
 Sandwich v. Dolan, 95, 376 
 
 V. Nolan, 743 
 Sanford v. Augusta, 258, 338 
 
 V. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 61, 64, 
 151, 493 
 
 V. Standard Oil Co. 224 
 Sangamon Coal Co. v. Wiggerhaus, 
 206, 717 
 
 etc. Co V. Young, 633 
 Sappenfield v. Main St. R. Co., 195 
 Sarch v. Blackburn, 639 
 Sargent v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 506 
 
 V. Stark, 708 
 
 Sather v. Ness, 55 
 Satterfield v. Rowan, 734 
 Satterlee v. San Francisco, 313 
 Satterly v. Morgan, 241 
 Sauerborn v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 463 
 Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 262, 389, 334, 
 
 b34a, 335, 069 
 Saunders v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 516 
 
 V. Darling, 6:i4 
 
 V. Gun Plains, 393 
 
 V. Newman, 731 
 
 V. Southern Pac. Co., 492, 505 
 Saussy v. South Florida R. Co., 671 
 Sautter v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 31, 
 
 742, 769, 775 
 Savacool v. Boughton, 303 
 Savage v. Bangor, 351 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 425 
 
 v. Corn Exchange Ins. Co., 92 
 Savannah v. CuUins, 285 
 
 V. Spears, 387 
 
 V. Waldner, 354 
 
 v. Welson, 371 
 Savannah, etc. Canal Co. v. Bour- 
 quin, 402, 731, 743 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Beasley, 485c 
 
 V. Bryan, 485c, 513 
 
 V. Buford, 735 
 
 V. Day, 185&, 199 
 
 V. Flannigan, 190, 467, 773 
 
 V. Folks, 103, 2076 
 
 V. McConnell. 432 
 
 V. McLeod, 760 
 
 V. Meadors, 480 
 
 V. Phillips, 58, 165 
 
 V. Rice, 419 
 
 V. Shearer, 767 
 
 V. Slater, 458 
 
 V. Smith, 73« 
 
 V. Stewart, 480 
 
 V. Watts, 520 
 Savings Bank v. Ward, 8, 117, 574 
 Savoy V. Chapman, 573 
 Savcyer v. Corse, 118, 289, 325 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 16, 47, 
 494 
 
 V. McGiUicuddy, 710 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. B. Co., 8 
 
 V. Newburyport, 272 
 
 V. Northfleld, 358 
 
 V. Oakman, 104 
 
 V. Perry, 139 
 
 V. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 335 
 
 V. Sauer, 103, 749 
 
 V. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 432 
 Saxton V. Bacon, 55, 662. 657, 664 
 
 V. Hawksworth, 193 
 
 V. St. Joseph, 274 
 Saylor v. Montesano. 389, 368 
 Sayward v. Carlson, 332, 239 
 Scaggs V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 466 
 
cl 
 
 IV 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. [«« '" sections. 
 
 Scales V. Chattahoochee county, 256 
 Scamiiion v. Chicago, 298 
 Scanlon v. Boston, b58 
 
 V. Tenny, 509 
 Scanlon v. Boston & A. R. Co., 201, 
 
 209a 
 V. Watertown, 370 
 Scannal v. Cambridge, 346 
 Scarff V. Metcalf , 23b 
 Schaabs v. Woociburn, 654 
 Schacherl y. St. Paul R. Co., 520 
 Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 132, 160 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 489, 
 
 520 
 Schaefert v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 426, 476 
 Schaeffer v. Jackson, 346 
 Schaefler v. Sandusky, 376 
 Schafer v. New York, 334 
 Schaiblev. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 207, 239 
 Schall V. Cole, 197 
 Schanda v. Sulsberger, 710 
 Scharenbi-oich t. St. Cloud Fiber 
 
 Co., 185 
 Schattner v. Kansas City, 263, 374 
 Schatz V. Pfiel, 333 
 Schaub V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 773 
 Scbaum v. Equitable Gas. Co., 697 
 Scheflfer v. Kailroad Co., 26, 30 
 
 V. Washington, etc. R. Co., 65, 
 
 742 
 Scheflaer v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 484 
 Scheiber v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 533 
 Schell V. Plumb, 775 
 
 T. Second Nat. Bank, 703 
 Schenok v. Union Pac. R. Co., 422 
 Schepers v. Union Depot R. Co., 490, 
 
 530 
 Scherer v. Holly Mfg. Co., 233a 
 Schernierhorn v. Metropolitan Gas 
 
 Co., 160, 695 
 Scheunke v. Pine River, 346, 356, 369 
 Schexnaydre v. Texas, etc. R. Co., 
 
 484 
 Scliienfeldt v. Norris. 49 
 Schierhold v. North Beach, 73a, 74 
 Schiffmacher v. Kircher, 365 
 Scliild V. Central Park, etc. R. Co., 
 
 408 
 Schilling v, Chicago, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Schillinger v. Verona, 60a 
 Sehiinpf v. Sliter, 653 
 Schindlebeck v. Moon, 708, 713 
 Schindler v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 49, 78, 463, 464 
 Schlacker v. Ashland Iron Mining 
 
 Co., 186, 215 
 Schlaff V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 198 
 Schlenckner v. Risley, 313 
 Schlereth v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 
 238, 476, 48 1 
 
 Schlichter v. Phillipy, 374 
 Schlichting v. Wintgen, 140 
 Schlimgen v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 463, 475 
 Schlitz V. Pabst Brewing Co., 315 
 Schmeer v. Syracuse Gas Co., 693, 
 
 696 
 Schmid v. Humphrey, 104 
 Schmidt v. Adams, 146 
 V. Bauer, 704 
 V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 466, 
 
 473, 475 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 65 
 V. Cook, 61, 705, 710 
 V. Harkness. 649 
 V. Kansas Distilling Co., 73 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 73, 
 
 761a 
 V. Phila. etc. R. Co., 480 
 V. Stein way, etc. R. Co., 485a 
 Schmitz v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 461, 
 
 761 
 Schmolze v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Schuachne v. Baniett, 703 
 Sohneekloth v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 410, 451a 
 Schneider v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 241c 
 V. Second Ave R. Co., 89, 485c, 
 516 
 Schneir v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 57 
 
 V. Citizens' Tr. Co., 73a 
 Sohoenwald v. Metropol. Savings 
 
 Bank, 588 
 Schofield V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 90, 
 
 476 
 Schomer v. Rochester, 334a 
 Schonhoff v. Jackson R. Co. , 375 
 School District v. Ftiess, 298 
 Schopman v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 488, 
 
 502 
 Schreiber v. Twenty-third St. R. Co., 
 
 508 
 Schroeder v. Baraboo, 274 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 185a, 
 
 213, 333 
 V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 330 
 Sohroyer v. Lynch, 319, 331 
 Schrubble v. Con nell. 144 
 Schubert v. Clark, 117 
 Schulman v. Houston, etc. R. Co., 
 
 485a 
 Schulte V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 485a 
 Schultz V. Bower, 701 
 V. Byers, 701 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 85, 93, 
 
 99, 303, 307a 760 
 V. Milwaukee, 262 
 V. Second Ave R. Co., 508 
 V. Third Ave R. Co., 150, 154, 
 513 
 Shultze V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 521 
 
References'] TABLE OF CASES. [ar? U sections. 
 
 clv 
 
 Schulz V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 463 
 
 V. Johnson, 317 
 
 V. Kobe, 194, 194a, 207 
 Sohiim V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 478 
 Schumaker v. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 
 
 186 
 Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Farr, 750 
 
 V. McDonough, 732 
 Schwander v. Birge, 703a 
 Schwanzer v. Brooklyn R. Co., 743, 
 
 762 • 
 
 Schwartz v. Atlantic, etc. Tel. Co., 534 
 
 V. Coi-nell, 2u9a 
 
 V. Gilmore, 47, 703 
 Schweir v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 475, 
 
 483 
 Schwingschlegel v. Monroe City, 743 
 Scidmore v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 301 
 Sciolina v. Erie Preserving Co., 319 
 Scoggs V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 436 
 Scott V. Central R. Co., 185 
 
 V. Central Park, etc. R. Co., 519 
 
 V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Derby Coal Co., 209a 
 
 V. Des Moines, 385 
 
 V. Dublin, etc. R. Co., 99 
 
 V. Grover, 657 
 
 V. Hunter, 28, 39, 55 
 
 V. London Docks Co., 59, 60, 
 158 
 
 V. Manchester, 286 
 
 V. Montgomery, 356, 743 
 
 V. Nat. Bank of Chester Valley, 
 34, 588, 589 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 476 
 
 V. Shepherd, 37, 688 
 
 V. Simons. 708, 709 
 
 V. Sweeney, 333 
 
 V. United States, 333 
 
 V. Waithman, 634 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 433 
 
 V. Wilson, 333 
 
 V. Yazoo, etc. R. Co., 437 
 Scotti V. Behsmann, 645 
 Scottowe V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 506 
 Scoville V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 61, 
 99 
 
 V. Salt Lake City, 363 
 Scranton v. Booth, 179 
 
 V. Catterson, 334, 367, 368 
 
 V. Hill. 353 
 Scribner v. Kelley, 636, 638, 639 
 Scudder v. Crossan, 614 
 Scullin V. Dolan, 130, 343 
 Sculley V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc, R. 
 
 Co.. 520 
 Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. McDonough, 
 
 387. 399 
 Seaboard Mfg. Co. v. Woodson, 195, 
 331, 760 
 
 etc. R. Co. v. Joyner, 483 | 
 
 Scabrook v. Hecker, 703 
 Seaman v. Koehler, 66 
 
 V. New York, 285, 736 
 
 V. Patten, 310 
 Seare v. Prentice, 614 
 Searcy v. Holmes 47 
 Searing v. Saratoga, 387 
 Searle v. Kanawha, etc. R. Co., 51, 
 495, 769, 771 
 
 V. Lindsay, 180, 304 
 
 V. Parke, 148 
 Searles v. Ladd, 628 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 16, 26, 56, 
 57, 676 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 419, 451a 
 Sears v. Central R. Co., 307 
 
 V. Dennis, 89 
 
 V. Seattle R. Co.. 51, 495, 500 
 Seats V. Georgia, etc. R. Co., 108 
 Seaver v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 184, 
 
 189, 239 
 Seckinger v. Philibert Co., 194 
 Sebert v. Alpena. 388. 369 
 Second Nat. Bank v. Cummings, 580 
 Secord v. Chicago, etc R. Co., 209a 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 61, 95, 
 760 
 Seddon v, Bickley, 497 
 Sedgwick v. Illinois Central R. Co., 
 
 207b 
 Seefleld v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 56, 
 
 478 
 Seeley v. Crane, 557 
 
 v. Littlefleld, 851, 863 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 114, 
 666 
 
 v. Peters, 419 
 Seese v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 307& 
 Seely v. Peters, 655, 656 
 Seger v. Barkhamsted, 761 
 Seibert v. Erie R. Co., 485 
 
 V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 448 
 Seifert v. Brooklyn, 355, 363, 371, 
 
 275, 287 
 Seigel V. Eisen, 654 
 Seiler v. Western U. Tel. Co., 543 
 Selden v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 
 359 
 Selders v. Kansas, etc. R. Co. , 424 
 Seley v. So. Pac. R. Co., 197 
 Selfridge v. Lithgow, 619 
 Selinas v. Vermont Agr. Soc, 706 
 Sell V. Reitz Lumber Co., 719 
 Sellick V. Langdon, 28 
 Selma, etc. R. Co. v. Lacy, 131 
 
 V. Perkins, 256, 289 
 Selz V. Collins, 587a 
 Seneca Falls v. Zaiinski, 884 
 Senestre v. New York, 356 
 Senhenn v. Evansville, 346, 363 
 Senior v. Ward, 209a 
 Senn v. Southern R. Co., 183 
 
clvi 
 
 Re/erences'\ TABLE OF CASES. \art to sections. 
 
 Sentman v. Baltimore, etc. E. Co., 
 
 735 
 Sepert v. Alpena, S86 
 Serwe v. No. Pacific R. Co., 761a 
 Saska v. Chicago, etc. R. Co , 676 
 Sessengut v. Posey, 702 
 Sessions v. Newport, 350 
 Settle V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 194a, 
 
 197, 315 
 Settoon V. Texas, etc. R. Co,, 484 
 Severiu v. Eddy, 365 
 Severy v. Nickerson, 8, 97, 705 
 Sevier v. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 
 
 510 
 Sewall's Falls Bridge v. Fisk, 744 
 Seward v. Milford, 93, 356 
 Sewell -5. Cohoes, 334, 834a, 335 
 
 V. Moore, 702a 
 
 V. Webster, 104 
 Sexton V. Nervers, 623 
 
 T. Turner, 307 
 
 V. Zett, 359 
 Seybolt v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 57, 58, 59, 335, 492, 516 
 Seymour v. Cagger, 566 
 
 V. Citizens' R. Co., 104, 533 
 
 V. Cummins, 272, 371 
 
 v. Greenwood, 145, 151 
 
 V. Maddox, 223 
 
 V. Salamanca, 334, 335 
 Shaber v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co. , 63, 
 
 417, 477, 485. 762 
 Shackford v. Goodwin, 624 
 Shackleford v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 404, 470 
 Shackelton v. Manistee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 209a 
 Shadd V. Georgia, etc. R. Co., 230, 
 
 233, 233a 
 Shadier v. Blair county, 257 
 Shad well v. Hutchinson, 119 
 Shaffer v. Haish, 185 
 
 V. Riseley, 625 
 Shaftev v. Evans, 53 
 Shally \\ Danbury, etc. R. Co., 378 
 Shankenbury v. Metropolitan R. Co., 
 
 89 
 Shannon v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 520 
 
 v. Tama City, 334a 
 Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills, 204, 
 
 336 
 Sharp V. Evergreen, 338. 381 
 
 V. Grey, 45, 51, 497 
 
 V. Hawker, 561 
 
 V. Kansas City Cable R. Co., 
 516 
 
 V. Powell, 38 
 Sharrer v. Payson, 93, 488 
 Sharrod v. Northwestern R. Co., 460 
 Shartle v. Minneapolis, 389, 374, 743 
 Shattuck V. Rand, 719a 
 Shaw V. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 
 60a, 463, 762 
 
 Shaw V. Craft, 683 
 
 V. Crocker, 383 
 
 V. Btheridge, 735 
 
 T. Jewett,' 477 
 
 V. Kidder, 573 
 
 V. Madrid, 345 
 
 V. New York, etc. R. Co., 410 
 
 V. Philadelphia, 367 
 
 V. Reed. 148, 172 
 
 V. Sheldon, 185, 209, 215, 216 
 
 V. Sun Prairie, 367, 369 
 
 V. Waterbury, 378 
 Shawbut V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 
 334a 
 Shawhan v. Clarke, 18 
 Shawneetown v. Mason, 367 
 Shea V. Potrero, etc. R. Co., 92, 763 
 
 v. Reems, 143, 147, 160 
 
 V. St. Paul R. Co., 485, 485c 
 
 V. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 151 
 
 V. Wellington, 195, 3416 
 Sheates v. Home. 375 
 Sheboygan Lumber Co. v. Delta Tr. 
 
 Co., 672 
 Sheedy V. Chicago etc. R. Co., 194a 
 Sheehan v. Edgar, 758 
 
 V. Flynn, 735 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 302 
 
 Y. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 
 473, 475 
 Sheehy v. Burger, 6i4 
 
 V. Graves, 622 
 
 V. Kansas City, 2T4 
 Sheel V. Appleton, 369 
 Sheer v. Fisher, 718 
 Sheerman v. Toronto, etc. R. Co., 
 
 61 
 Sheets v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 2076, 
 209, 241 
 
 V. Connolly R. Co. , 73a 
 
 v. Ohio River R. Co., 493 
 Shefif V. Huntington, 108, 114 
 Sheffer v. Railroad Co., 94 
 Sheffield v. Central Union Tel. Co., 
 359 
 
 V. Harris, 2416 299 
 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Sheffler v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 134 
 Shelby v. Clagett, 289, 368, 369 
 Shelby county v. Blair, 374 
 
 v. Duprez, 257 
 Shelbvville, etc. R. Co., v. Lewark, 
 
 744 
 Shelbourne v. Yuba county, 266 
 Sheldon v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 438 
 
 V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 54 
 
 V. Hudson R. Co., 58, 673, 675 
 
 V. Skinner, 635 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co. 359 
 Shellabarger v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 434 
 Shelley v. Austin, 73a, 367 
 
Re/erences-\ TABLE OF CASES. i^^i: ta sections. 
 
 clvii 
 
 Shenandoah Val. R. Oo. v. Lucado 
 
 2076 
 Shepard v. Buflalo, etc. R. Co., 63 
 437, 441, 451a, 453 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 748 
 V. Creamer, 701a 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 241d 
 V. Pulaski county, 356 
 Shepardson v Colerain, 351 
 Shepherd v. Clielsea, I'^S, 346, 356 
 V. Hees, 663. 664 
 V. Lincoln. 313 
 V. Midland R. Co., 506 
 Shepp V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 675 
 Sherbourne v. Yuba county, 256 
 Sherfey v. Bartley, 97, 629, 639 
 Sheridan v. Bigelow, 28 
 V. Bean, 635 
 
 V. Brooklvn R. Co., 66, 73a 
 V. Charlick, 147 
 V. Foley, 60 
 V. Krupp, 709 
 V. Salem, 289 
 Sherley v. Billings, 513 
 Sherlock v. Ailing, 51, 494, 495 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 731 
 Sherlj' V. Billings, 154 
 Sherman v. Anderson, 449 
 V. Charlestown, 323 
 V. Fall River Iron Co., 61, 95, 
 
 696, 734, 741, 745, 758 
 V. Favour, 6->8 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 61 
 V. Grenada, 299 
 V. Inman Steamship Co., 39 
 V. Johnson, 124 
 V. Kortright, 57. 278 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 680 
 V. Minominee Lumber Co., 188 
 V. Oneonta, 367 
 V. Western Transp. Co., 404 
 V. Williams. 258 
 Sherrill v. Shuford, 619 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 540a, 
 543, 243, 553, 7.56 
 Sherrin v. St. Joseph, etc. R. Co., 230 
 Sherry v. N. Y. Central, etc. R Co., 
 
 114, 47fi, 477, 482 
 Sherwood v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 758 
 V. Distiict of Columbia, 369 
 V. Hamilton. 346 
 Shervel v. Fell. 625 
 Shields v. Durham, 260, 373 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 307. 
 
 307& 
 V. Edinburgh, etc. R. Co., 159 
 Shimmer v. Merry, 487 
 Shinklev. Covington. 285 
 Shipley v. Bolivar, 369 
 V. Colclough, 6.34 
 V. Fifty asso. 17, 343, 710, 731 
 Shippy V. Ausable 78, 371, 353, 368 
 Shipsey v. Bowery Nat, Bank, 581 
 
 Shively v. Hume. 729 
 Shockley v. Shepherd, 649 
 Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, 498 
 
 V. Lacey. 65 
 Shook V. Cohoes, 363, 368, 376 
 Short V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 241c 
 V. Railroad Co., 359 
 Shortel v. St. Joseph. 186 
 Showalter v. Fairbanks, 209a, 215 
 Shrewsbury v. Smith, 16, 730 
 Shufelt V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Shumwav v. Walworth Mfg. Co 
 1856, 203. 226, 230, 231, 233 
 Shute V. Princeton, 176 
 Shutt V. Cumberland Val. R. Co., 93 
 Sias V. Reed City, 377 
 Sibley v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 666 
 Sickles V. Missouri, etc. R. Co. , 523 
 
 V. N. J. Ice Co., Ill, 333 
 Siddall V. Pacific Mills, 219 
 Sidekum v. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 758 
 Sides V. Portsmouth, 358 
 Siber v. Blanc, 708 
 Siegel V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 478 
 Siegrist v. Arot. 142 
 Sielav. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 197 
 Sigler T. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 475 
 Sikes V. Manchester, 369 
 Silberstein v. Houston, etc. R. Co., 
 
 3.J9 
 Silliman v. Lewis, 93, 99 
 Sills V. Fort Worth, etc. R. Co., 772 
 Silsby Manuf'g Co. v. State, 398 
 Silver V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 419, 
 423 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 120, 
 
 395 
 Mining Co. v. McDonald, 89 
 Silvers V. Nerdlinger, 356 
 Simkins v. Columbia, etc. R. Co. , 433 
 Simmonds v. N. Y. & New England 
 
 R. Co., 667 
 Simmons v. Bradford, 570, 572 
 V. Brooklyn, 354 
 v. Camden, 383 
 v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 309a 
 v. East Tennessee R. Co., 313 
 V. Eversou, 703 
 Y. McConnell, 688a 
 V. N. Bedford, etc. Steamboat 
 Co., 51, 494, 495, 497, 512, 515 
 V. Peters. 194a 
 V. Rose, 570 
 Simms v. South Carolina R. Co., 56, 
 
 88, 410, 510 
 Simon-Reigel Cigar Co. v. Gordon- 
 
 Burnham Co., 733 
 Simonin v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 510 
 Simonds v. Henry, 607, 609 
 Simons v. Baraboo, 375, 376 
 v. Casco, 355 
 
clviii 
 
 Re/erences'\ TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections. 
 
 Simons v. Gt. Western R. Co. , 505 
 
 V. Seward, 709 
 Simonton v. Barrell, 573 
 
 V. Loring, 141, 723 
 Simpson v. Central Vt. R. Co., 2076 
 
 V, East Tennessee R. Co., 58, 
 676 
 
 V. Hand, 63 
 
 V. Griggs, 630, 635 
 
 V. Keokuk, 89, 274 
 
 V. Mercer, 24a 
 
 V. N. Y. Rubber Co. , 241d 
 
 V. Waldby, 583 
 Sims V. Am. Steel-Barge Co., 195 
 
 V. Butler county, 256 
 
 V. Macon, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Simson v. London General Omnibus 
 
 Co., 514,632 
 Sinai v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 735 
 Sinclair v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 485 
 Sindlinger v. Kansas Citv, 370 
 Siner v. Great Western R. Co., 89, 
 509, 519, 521 
 
 V. Stearne, 582 
 Singer v. Steele, 577 
 
 Manuf'g Co. v. Rahn, 160 
 Singleton v. Eastern Cos. R. Co., 74, 
 
 483 
 Sinram v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 634 
 Siordet v. Hall, 39 
 Sioux City v. Finlayson, 214, 215 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Smith, 99, 758 
 
 V. Stout, 705 
 Sipple V. State, 249, 251, 401 
 Sira V. Wabash R. Co., 513 
 Siren, The, 349 
 
 Sisco V. Lehigh, etc. R. Co., 201 
 Sisk V. Crump, 703 
 Skelton v. Larkin,. 703 
 
 V. Northwestern R. Co., 481 
 Skerritt v. Scallen, 193 
 Skinner v. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 45 
 Skipp V. Eastern Counties R. Co., 
 
 193 
 Skottowe V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 
 
 775 
 Sjorgren v. Hall, 203 
 Siate V. Grover, 283 
 Slater v. Baker, 612 
 
 V. Chapman, 209, 230 
 
 V. Jewett, 202, 331, 233a 
 
 V. Mersereau, 31, 132, 166, 169, 
 174 
 
 V. South Carolina R. Co., 10 
 Slattery v. O'Connell, 72 
 
 V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 241 
 Slavin v. State, 750 
 Slee V. Lawrence, 377 
 Sleeper v. Sandown, 88, 375, 481 
 
 V. Worcester, etc. R. Co., 114 
 Slinger v. Henneman, 628 
 Sloan V. Central Iowa R, Co., 241c, 
 413 
 
 Sloanev. Southern Cal. R. Co., 55, 
 
 495, 758 
 Sloman v. Heme, 619 
 Slosson V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 58, 
 
 107, 675, 676, 679 
 Sly V. Edgeley, 699 
 Small V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 58,666, 
 676 
 
 V. Howard, 607 
 Smalley v. Appleton, 31, 338, 346 
 Smallwood v. Norton, 564, 570 
 
 V. Tipton, 369 
 Smart v. Louisiana Electric Co., 216 
 
 V. Morton, 701 
 Smedes v. Elmendorf , 567 
 
 V. Utica Bank, 579, 581 
 Smedis v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 468, 
 
 477 
 Smeed v. Foord, 40 
 Smethurst v. Barton Square Cong. 
 
 Church, 343, 370, 701a 
 Smillie v. St. Barnard Dollar Store, 
 
 192 
 Smith V. Agawam Canal Co., 732 
 
 V. Alexandria, 274 
 
 V. Allen county, 256 
 
 V. American So., 649 
 
 V. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 74 
 
 V. Backus Lumber Co., 191, 215 
 
 V. Bailey, 158, 644 
 
 V. Baker, 209a, 211a 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 114, 
 478 
 
 V. Bai-reR. Co., 449 
 
 V. Belshaw. 144 
 
 V. Boston Gas Co., 693 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 104 
 
 V. Brooklyn, 363 
 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 1856 
 
 V. Buttner. 709a 
 
 V. Cairo, 37.i 
 
 V. Causey, 628, 629 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 419, 479. 494, 495, 508, 675 
 
 V. Citizens' R. Co.. 463 
 
 V. Clarkstown, 346, 353 
 
 V. Condry, 172, 744 
 
 T. Conway. 649 
 
 V. County Court, 346 
 
 V. Cranford, 734 
 
 V. Crescent City R. Co. , 480 
 
 V. Dedham, 258, 338, 370 
 
 V. Des Moines, 368, 369 
 
 V. Dobson, 122 
 
 V. Donohue, 628 
 
 V. Dumond, 607, 614 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 57, 108, 113 
 431 
 
 V. First National Bank, 56 
 
 V. Fletcher, 717 
 
 V. Floyd county, 356 
 
 V. Foran, 24a 
 
 V. French, 626 
 
Re/ercncesX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \_are to sections. 
 
 clix 
 
 Smith V. Gardner, 649, 653, 054 
 V. Georgia Pac. R. Co. , 531 
 T. Gillett, 56 
 v. Gould, 363 
 
 V. Great Eastern R. Co., 635 
 V. Griffith, 751 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 58, 
 
 680 
 V. Harlem R. Co., 335, 410, 495 
 V. Havemeyer, 735 
 V. Hays, 690, 691 
 V. Hestonville, etc. R. Co., 71 
 V. Holland, 303 
 V. Holmes, 593 
 
 V. Humeston, etc. R. Co., 241c 
 V. Irwin, 93, 218, 319 
 V. Jaques, 635 
 V. Judkins, 619 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 453 
 T. Keal, 143 
 V. Kenrick, 717 
 V. Kingston, 343 
 V. Leavenworth, 34, 389, 353, 
 
 367, 369 
 V. London, etc. Docks Co., 704, 
 
 705 
 V. London & So. West R. Co., 
 
 678 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 151 
 T. Lowell, 376 
 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 463, 475 
 V. Matteson, 639 
 V. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 241 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 485c 
 V. Milwaukee, 274, 391, 395 
 V. Milwaukee Builders, etc. 
 
 Exch., 13, 701a 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 481b 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 223 
 V. Montgomery, 638 
 V. New York, 275, 387, 350, 367 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49, 51, 
 
 148, 195, 465, 505, 551 
 V. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 45 
 V. N. Y. Susquehanna, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 104, 516 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 99, 101, 
 
 484 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 666, 
 
 676 
 V. Northumberland, 334 
 V. Occidental S. S. Co., 114, 
 
 216 
 V. O'Connor, 73, 78 
 V. Old Colony, etc. R. Co., 675 
 V. Overby, 761 
 V. Oxford Iron Co., 304, 219a, 
 
 233. 235 
 V. Pelah, 632, 639 
 V. Pella. 271, 279, 350, 367, 368 
 V. Peninsular Car Works, 194a, 
 
 203, 214 
 
 Smith v. Philadelphia, 386, 744 
 V. Potter, 304 
 V. Race, 633, 635 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 108, 
 
 513a 
 V. Rio Grande R. Co.. 114 
 V. Rochester, 365, 299, 369, 739 
 V. St. Joseph, 115, 376 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., lO.") 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 89, 
 
 341c, 490, 495 
 V. Sellars. 185 
 V. Sibley Mfg. Co., 209a 
 V. Simmons, 168 
 V. Sioux City, etc. R. Co., 56 
 V. Smith, 122 
 V. South Western R. Co., 38, 
 
 30, 666 
 V. Spitz, 148 
 V. Steele, 173 
 V. Team, 654 
 V. Thackerah, 701 
 V. Trawl, 303 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 207&, 
 
 233, 233a, 476, 477 
 V. Washington, 362, 383 
 V. Webster, 150 
 V. Wendell, 351 
 V. West Derby, 328 
 V. Western R. of Alabama, 16 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531, 
 538, 542, 544, 547, 553, 554, 
 753a 
 V. Whittier, 11 
 V. Wildes, 110. 375 
 V. Wright, 340, 390 
 V. Wrightsville, etc. R. Co., 89 
 Smith, etc. Shoe Co. v. Western U. 
 
 Tel. Co., 554 
 Smithwick v. Hall, etc. Co., 94, 95 
 Smoot V. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 184, 189, 
 206 
 V. Wetumpka, 108, 113, 289 
 Smothers v. Hanks, 606, 607 
 Smyth V. Bangor, 363 
 Snap V. People, 640 
 Snedicor v. Davis, 591 
 SneU V. Rochester R. Co., 359, 408 
 
 V. Smith, 135, 246 
 Snelling v. Brooklyn & New York 
 
 Ferry Co., 508,531 
 Sneider v. Treichler, 194a 
 Sneesby v. Lancashire, etc. R. Co , 57 
 Snider v. N. Orleans, etc. R. Co., 57 
 
 V. St. Paul, 385 
 Snodgrass v. Bradly, 150 
 
 V. Carnegie Steel Co., 68^) 
 Snow V. Adams. 350 
 
 V. Housatonic R. Co., 194a, 313, 
 
 214, 317, 335 
 V. McCracken. 638 
 V. Parsons. 729, 734 
 V. Provincetown, 86, 379 
 
clx 
 
 References] 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [_are to sections. 
 
 Snowden v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 624 
 Snyder v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 92, 
 108, 113, 678. 679, 680 
 
 V. Viola Mining Co., 235 
 
 V. Witner, 719 
 Sobieski v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 303 
 Socola V. Chess Carley Co., 690 
 Soderman v. Kemp, 195 
 Sohier v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 525 
 Sohn V. Cambern, 370 
 Solan V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 505 
 Solarz V. Manhattan R. Co., 195 
 Solen V. Virginia City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 461 
 Solomon v. Kingston, 261 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 89, 91, 
 520 
 Somerville v. City R. Co., 359 
 Sommers v. Marshfleld, 343, 873 
 Sonier v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 460, 490 
 Sonnenfeld Co. v. People's R. Co., 
 
 485c, 747 
 Soper T. Henry county, 257 
 Sorelle v. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Sorensen v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 135 
 
 V. Menasha, etc. Co., 58 
 Sorento v. Johnson, 368 
 Soule V. New Haven R. Co., 767 
 South V. Maryland, 617 
 South, etc. Ala. R. Co. v. Donovan, 
 13, 791 
 
 V. Jones, 431 
 
 V. McLendon, 758 
 
 V, Thompson, 467 
 
 V. Williams, 431 
 South Bend Iron Works v. Larger, 
 719 
 
 V. Paxon, 750 
 South Carolina R. Co. v: Nix, 133. 493 
 South Covington, etc. R. Co. v. Ware, 
 
 89 
 South Fla. R. Co. v. Rhoads, 493 
 
 V. Weese, 217, 332 
 South Omaha v. Cunningham, 113 
 South Ottawa v. Foster, 356 
 Southampton, etc. Bridge Co. v. 
 Southampton L. Board, 354, 
 327 
 Southcote V. Stanley, 706 
 Southeast, etc. R. Co. v. Stotlar, 476 
 Southerland v. Jackson, 334 
 Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Watts. 93 
 Southern Cotton-oil Co. v. De Vond, 
 
 223 
 Southern Cotton Press, etc. Co. v. 
 
 Bradley, 49 
 South. Exp. Co. V. Brown, 160, 749 
 
 V. Moon, 504 
 
 V. Newby, 504 
 
 V. Shea, 503 
 
 V. Texarkana Water Co. , 359 
 
 V. Thornton, 503 
 
 Southern R. Co. v. Banknight, 144 
 
 V. Kendrick, 508 
 
 v Moore, 211a 
 
 V. Pavey, 5(8, 531 
 
 V. Rice, 748 
 
 V Robbins, 53 
 
 V. SuUivan. 140 
 
 V. Walsh, 516 
 Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Croker, 215 
 
 V. Drake, 309o 
 Southern Marble Co. v. Darnell, 750 
 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Laflferty, 465 
 
 V. Kennedy, 151, 493 
 
 V. Johnson, 185, 207 
 
 V. Pool, 207 
 
 V. Ryan, 338 
 
 V. Seley, 197, 307 
 Southside Pass R. Co. v. Trich, 55 
 Southwell V. Detroit, 289, 338 
 South- West Imp. Co. v. Andrew, 185 
 
 Va. Co. V. Andrew, 113 
 Southwestern R. Co. v. Hankerson, 
 93, 114 
 
 V. Johnson, 480 
 
 V. Paulk, 89 
 
 V. Singleton, 530 
 
 Tel Co. V. Crank, 133 
 
 V. Robinson, 359 
 
 V. Woughter, 194a 
 Southwick V. Estes, 146, 155 
 Southworth v. Old Colony, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 379, 451, 474 
 Sowden v. Idaho, etc. Mining Co., 
 
 185a 
 Soward v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 434 
 Sowles V. Moore, 379 
 Spade V. Lynn. etc. R. Co., 761 
 Spaight V. McGovern, 640 
 Spangler v. San Francisco, 258, 374, 
 387 
 
 v. Sellers, 568 
 Sparhawk v. Salem, 356 
 Sparling v. Dwenger, 336 
 Spatz V. Lyons, 6i'a 
 Spaulding v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 58, 
 114, 150, 665, 676, 775 
 
 V. Flynt Granite Co., 196, 313 
 
 V. Jarvis, 480 
 
 V. Sherman, 369 
 Spear v. Cummings, 310 
 
 V. Phila.. etc. R. Co., 517 
 Spearbracker v. Larrabee, 289, 334, 
 
 369 
 Spears v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 54, 485 
 Speed V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 166. 469 
 Speer v. Greencastle Road Co. , 386 
 Spelman v. Fisher Iron Co., 219a, 
 690 
 
 V. Portage, 374 
 SpeUman v. Bannigan, 708 
 
 V. Lincoln, etc. R. Co., 51, 495, 
 516. 517 
 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co.. 749 
 
Re/erences\ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 clxi 
 
 Spence v. Schultz, 176 
 
 Spencer v. Campbell, 683 
 
 V. IlliDois Cent. R. Co., 463, 
 
 476, 477 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 519 
 V. Montana R. Co., 678 
 V. Ohio, etc. R. Co., 309a, 233, 
 
 V. N. y. Central R. Co., 197 
 
 V. Utica, etc. R. Co., 61 
 Spioer v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co.-, 
 470, 484 
 
 V. Cliicago, etc. R. Co.. 743 
 
 V. Elkhart county, 356 
 
 V. Lynn, etc. R. Co., 761a 
 
 V South Boston Iron Co., 194 
 Spier V. Brooklyn, 363 
 
 V. New Utrecht. 334 
 Spillane v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 73a 
 Spiller V. Woburn, 333 
 Spinner v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 418, 435, 455 
 Splittorf V. State, 8, 351, 377, 705 
 Spofford V. Harlow, 93, 99, 104, 651 
 Spohn V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 89, 
 
 761 
 Spokane, etc. R. Co. v. Holt, 71, 705 
 
 Truck, etc. Co. v. Hoefer, 47, 
 748 
 Spooiier V. Brooklyn R. Co., 519, 533 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 85, 
 97. 99, 406, 481a, 483 
 
 V. Freetown. 373 
 Spragins v. Houghton, 310 
 Sprague v. Attee, 318 
 
 V. Baker, 574 
 
 V. Fremoat R. Co., 419 
 
 V. Rochester. 368 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 754 
 
 V. Worcester, 737 
 Spray v. Ammerinan, 638, 640 
 Springett v. Balls, 775 
 SpringfleM v. Burns, 353 
 
 V. Doyle, 369 
 
 V. Le Claire, 387, 289, 398, 356, 
 358 
 
 V. Rosen oieyer, 376 
 Springtield Consolidated R. Co. v. 
 
 Welsch, GOa 
 Springfield Fire Ins. Co. v. Keese- 
 
 ville, 353. 285 
 Springfield Milling Co. v. Lane 
 
 county. 334 
 Springfield R. Co v. Clark, 485c 
 
 V. Flynn, 513 
 
 V. Welsh, 73a 
 Springier v. Bowdoinhain, 367 
 Sprong V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 110 
 Sprovv V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Spurrier v. Front St. R. Co.. 108, 485a 
 Squire v. Western U. Tel. Co., 755 
 Squires v. Chillicothe. 369 
 Staal V. Grand St., etc. R. Co., 758 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — k.] 
 
 Staats V. Hudson River R. Co. , 432 
 Stacev V. Dane Co. Bank, 583, 585, 
 598 
 
 V. Phelps, 378 
 
 V. Winona, etc. R. Co., 455 
 Stack V. Bangs, 313, 335, 397 
 
 V. Ciivanaugh. 12 1 
 
 V. Portsmouth. 353 
 Stackhouse v. Lafayette. 363 
 
 V. Vendig, 375. 703 
 Stackman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 89, 
 
 303, 207 
 Stackpole v. Healy. 33:J. 659 
 Stackus V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 476, 
 
 477 
 Stacy V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 676, 
 678 
 
 V. Phelps, 356 
 
 V. Portland Pub. Co., 748 
 Staetter v. McArthur, 639 
 Stafford v. Ingersoll, 637, 655, 657, 
 661 
 
 V. Oskaloosa, 6-'), 367 
 
 V. Reubens, 73a 
 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co.. 753a 
 Stager v. Ridge Ave. Pass. R. Co., 
 
 508, 531 
 Stanley v. Western U. Tel. Co., 546. 
 
 553 
 Stamm v. Southern R. Co., 458 
 Stanchfield v. Newton, 274 
 Standard Mfg. Co.'s Appeal, 306 
 Standard Oil Co. v. Bowker, 93, 194 
 
 V. Swan, 665 
 
 V. Tierney, 690 
 Stanford v. Roberts, 574 
 
 V. San Francisco, 273 
 Stanley v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 307 
 
 V. Davenport, 263, 355, SoS 
 Stannard v. Ullithorne. 559, 570, 574 
 Stanton v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 37, 
 436 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 104 
 
 v. Salem. 363 
 
 V. Springfield, 363 
 Stapenhorst v. Ameiican Mfg. Co., 
 
 733 
 Staple v. Spring. 130 
 Staples V. Schmid. 145 
 
 v. Staples, 556, 567 
 Stapley v. Brighton, etc. R. Co.. 466 
 Stark V. Lancastei', 38, 55 
 Starling v. Bedford, 373 
 Stasney v. Second A v. R. Co., 183 
 State, Ex parte. 349 
 
 V. Alburgh, 388 
 
 V. Allen, 313 
 
 V. Atkinson, 333, 334a 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 25, 
 106, 108, 113, 134, 133, 349, 
 475, 481,483, 489 
 
 V. Barksdale, 340 
 
 V. Beeman, 353 
 
ClXU J^r/crences] TABLE OF CASES. U^e to sertions. 
 
 State V. Bell Tel. Co. 536 
 
 State V. Perry, 657 
 
 V. Berdetta, 333 
 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 57, 
 
 V. Blanch, 619 
 
 93 
 
 V. BoUes, 56 
 
 V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 131 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 51, 66, 
 
 V.Porter, 619 
 
 417, 466 
 
 V. Powell, 95, 740 
 
 V. Boyce, 709 
 
 V. Proctor, 333 
 
 V. Broyles, 336, 340 
 
 V. Railroad Co. , 104 
 
 V. Burlington, 258 
 
 V. Raymond, 334 
 
 Y, Burton, 323 
 
 V. Robb, 310 
 
 V. Canterbury, 390 
 
 V. Ruland. 591 
 
 V. Carrick, 303 
 
 V. Rye, 374 
 
 V. Chappell, 340 
 
 V. St. Louis county, 256 
 
 V. Collins, 653 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 3o9 
 
 -V. Commissioners, 310 
 
 V. Seawell, 390 
 
 V. Compton, 390 
 
 V. Shinkle, 332 
 
 V. Culver, 33lj 
 
 V. Sloane, 591 
 
 V. Cumberland, 262 
 
 V. Society, etc., 343 
 
 V. Daniels, 310 
 
 V. Tupper, 672 
 
 V. Davis, 23, 492 
 
 V. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 362 
 
 V. Delesdenier, 249 
 
 ■^. Webber, 323 
 
 V. Deliesseline, 310 
 
 V. Welpton, 334 
 
 V. Frazer, 333 
 
 V. Western Maryland R. Co., 
 
 V. Frysburg, 348, 363 
 
 334, 239 
 
 V. Gas Co., 358 
 
 V. Whittaker, 303 
 
 V. Gennon, 258 
 
 V. Wilkinson, 333 
 
 V. Goff, 104 
 
 V. Williams, 832 
 
 V. Gorham, 332, 343, 358, 390 
 
 V. Wilmington Bridge Co., 359 
 
 V. Goss, 313 
 
 V. Tarrell 333 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 139, 
 
 V. Lanesville, etc. Tump. Co., 
 
 490, 5L0 
 
 397 
 
 V. Halifax, 340 
 
 Stanton v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 735 
 
 V. Hampton, 262 
 
 Steamboat New World v. King, 47, 
 
 V. Harrington, 619 
 
 51 
 
 T. Hastings, 310 
 
 Stearns v. Old Colony, etc R. Co., 
 
 V. Herod, 622 
 
 418 437, 440 
 
 V. Hill, 249 
 
 v. Reidy, 233 
 
 V. Hogg, 340 
 
 V. Richmond, 285 
 
 V. Horn, 334 
 
 Stebbins V. Central, etc. R. Co., 741 
 
 V. Housekeeper, 614 
 
 V. Keene, 379 
 
 V. Hudson county, 256 
 
 V. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 61, 95 
 
 V. Jones, 336 
 
 Stedman v. Rome, 368, 373 
 
 V. Joyce, 334 
 
 Steeg V. St. Paul City R. Co., 508 
 
 V. Kinney, 151, 493 
 
 Steel V. Kurtz, 766 
 
 Y. Lanier, 249 
 
 V. Lester, 123 
 
 T. Laveraok, 332 
 
 V. Southeastern R. Co., 395 
 
 V. Leffingwell, 253, 256 
 
 Steele v. Boston, 362, 285, 37U 
 
 V. Maine Central R. Co., 65, 
 
 V. Burkhardt, 64, 99, 104, 654 
 
 114. 475, 476, 524 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 93 
 
 V. Mainey, 336 
 
 V. Pacific Coast R. Co., 678 
 
 V. Malster, 178, 222, 232 
 
 V. Smith, 629 
 
 V. Manchester, etc. R. Co., 28, 
 
 V. Townsend. 550 
 
 53, 65 
 
 Steen v. St. Paul. etc. R. Co., 331 
 
 -V. Mann, 178 
 
 Steere v. Field, 635 
 
 V Mever, 602 
 
 Steffenson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 Y. Miller, 340 
 
 241c 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co. , 415 
 
 Stein V. Burden. 733 
 
 V. Mobile, 359 
 
 V. Council Bluffs, 367 
 
 V. Moore. 97, 720 
 
 V. Grand Ave. R. Co., 60fls 
 
 V. Morris etc. R. Co. . 334a, 862 
 
 Steinbrunner v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 
 ■V. Murf reesboro, 332 
 
 Co., 760, 775 
 
 V. Nebraska Tel. Co., 536 
 
 Steinhauser v Spraul, 209a, 345 
 
 V. Ownby, 619 
 
 Steinke v. Diamond Match Co. , 188 
 
References'"^ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 clxiii 
 
 Steinmetz v. Kelly, 64 
 Steinmeyer v. St. Louis, 263 
 Steiuweg v. Biel, 723 
 
 V. Erie E. Co., 45,51, 195, 496, 
 073 
 Steivermann v. White, 359 
 Stemp.n v. Harrison, 543 
 • Stephani v. Brown, 365 
 
 V. Manitowoc, 368, 396 
 Stephen v. Woodruff, 743 
 Stephens v. Davenport, etc. R. Co., 
 445 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 186 
 V. Hudson Knitting Co., 215 
 V. Macon, 108, 368 
 V. Martins, 93 
 Stephens, etc. Transp. Co. v. West- 
 ern U. Tel. Co., 737 
 V. White, 563 
 Stephenson v. Duncan, 215, 310 
 V. Rowland, 559, 564 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 89, 
 154 
 Steppe V. Alter, 703 
 Ster V. Tuety. 301 
 Sterger v. Van Sioklen. 705, 709a 
 Sterling v. Sohiffmacher, 359 
 Stertz V. Stewart. 675, 750 
 Stetler v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 188, 
 
 196 
 Stetson V. Faxon, 371 
 
 V. Kempton, 254, 299 
 Stettin, The, 173 
 Steubenville v. King, 834 
 Stevens v. Adams, 557 
 
 V. Armstrong, 05, 144, 160 
 V. Dudley, 313, 047 
 V. European, etc. R. Co., 497 
 V. Monges, 557 
 V. Nichols, 705, 718 
 V. Oswego, etc. R. Co., 63, 90 
 V. Rowe, 033 
 
 V. San Francisco, 193, 307, 241a 
 V. Stevens, ;i59 
 V. Walker, 559, 567 
 V. Woodward, 147 
 Stevenson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 89 
 V. Jewett, 197, 205 
 V. Joy, 159, 703, 710 
 V. Montreal Tel. Co., 544 
 V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 .419 
 V. Pullman Car Co., 520 
 V. Ravenscroft, 203 
 V. Wallace, 701 
 Steves V. Oswego, etc. R. Co., 469, 
 
 476, 481 
 Steward v. Milford, 851 
 Stewart v. Benninger, 655 
 
 V. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 146, 
 
 150, 154, 513 
 V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co.. 413, 
 416, 417a 
 
 Stewart v. Clinton, 274 
 V. Davis, 104 
 V. International, etc. R. Co., 
 
 506 
 V. Nashville, 375 
 V. New Orleans, 291 
 V. Ohio River R. Co., 185, 223 
 V. Pennsylvania Co., 434 
 V. Ripon, 743 
 V. State, 398 
 
 V. Terra Haute, etc. E. Co., 
 185 
 Stickney v. Maidstone, 346 
 V. Munroe, 142, 708 
 V. Saktn, 358, 370 
 Stier V. Oskaloosa, 377 
 Stiles V. Cardiff Steam Nav. Co., 630 
 V. Geesey, 99, 103 
 V. Hooker, 731 
 
 V. West Point, etc. E. Co., 
 493a 
 Stilling V. Thorpe, 289 
 Stillson V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 77, 
 
 78, 479 
 Still well V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 60a 
 Stimmel v. Brown, 701 
 Stimpson v. Sprague, 563 
 
 V. Wood, 77.i 
 Stimson v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 500 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 421 
 Stinson v. Fishel, 73") 
 
 V. Gardiner, 851, 370 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 471, 
 505 
 Stirk V. Central Railroad Co., 199 
 Stirling Bridge Co. v. Peai'l, 53 
 Stock V. Boston, 22, 280 
 V. Harris, 319 
 V. Wood, 107 
 Stockdale v. Lancashire, etc. R. Co., 
 
 488 
 Stockport Waterworks v. Potter, 734 
 Stockton V. Frey, 494, 514, 510, 758, 
 
 762 
 Stockwell V. Fitchburg, 334, 3:i7, 356 
 Stoddard v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 53, 87 
 V. Saratoga Springs, 363, 374 
 V. Winchester, 391, 369 
 Stodder v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 418 
 Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 110 
 Stoehr v. St. Paul, 374 
 Stoher v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 197, 
 
 407, 748 
 Stokes V. Railroad Co., 503 
 
 V. Saltonstall, 89, 487, 516 
 V. Tifft, 397 
 Stokes V. Trumi)er, 569 
 
 V. Attleboroiigh, 351 
 
 V. Cheshire R. Co., 173, 699 
 
clxiv 
 
 Re/erences\ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. [«« to sections. 
 
 Stokes V. Dry Dock, etc. R. Co., 73a, 
 107 
 
 V. Hills, 147 
 
 V. Hubbardstown, 346, 355, 
 363, 379 
 
 V. Hunt. 113, 702 
 
 V. New York, 354 
 
 V. Poughkeepsie, 363 
 
 V. Unlontown Water Co., 265 
 Stoneman v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 
 
 27, 437 
 Stoner v. Penn. Co., 521 
 
 V. Shugart, 656 
 
 V.Texas, etc. R. Co., 750 
 Stonehewer v. Farrar, 734 
 Storey v. Ashton, 147 
 Stormfeltz v. Manor Turnp. Co., 832' 
 
 V. Turnp. Co., 3S5 
 Storrs T. Utica, 14, 174, 175, 176, 298, 
 
 356, 358 
 Story V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 Stott V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 426 
 
 V. Harrison, 574 
 Stoughton V. Dimiok, 322 
 
 V. Porter, 365 
 Stout V. McAdams, 731 
 Stoutimore v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 440 
 Stover V. Bluehill, 38, 741, 742 
 Stowe V. Bishop, 53 
 Strader v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 225 
 Strain v. Babb, 591 
 Strand v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 93 
 Stratton v. Staples, 709 
 Strause f. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 
 
 739 
 Strauss v. Francis. 573 
 
 V. Newburgh R. Co., 66, 474 
 Strawbridge v. Philadelphia, 367 
 Street v. Holyoke, 353, 963 
 
 R. Co. V. Badie, 78 
 Streett v. Laumier, 645, 654 
 Streifif V. Milwaukee, 287 
 Streissguth v. Nat. German-Amer. 
 
 Bank, 583 
 Striker v. Plath. 703 
 Stringer v. Frost, 644, 654 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. , 91 
 Stringham v. Hilton, 195 
 
 V. Stewart, 194, 197, 719a 
 Strohl V. Levan, 644 
 Strohni v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 614, 743 
 Strong V. Campbell, 313 
 
 V. Canton, etc. R. Co., 483 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 424 
 
 V. Iowa Cent.R. Co., 203, 207&, 
 213 
 
 V. Pickering Hardware Co., 
 703 
 
 V. Sacramento, etc. R. Co., 87, 
 478 
 
 Strother v. Lucas, 317 
 
 Strouse v. Whittlesey. 654 
 
 Struck V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 463, 
 
 477 
 Strudgeon v. Sand Beach, 73a, 95 
 Strutzel V. St. Paul Ry. Co., 73a, 
 
 4856 
 Stryker v. Crane, 633 
 Stuart v. Clark, :i33 
 
 V. Havens, 358, 359, 361, 374, 
 
 703 
 V. Hawley. 669 
 V. Machias, 114 
 V. Machiasport, 110 
 V. West End. St. R. Co., 203 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 Stubbs V. Atlantic Oil Mills, 317 
 
 V. Beene, 559 
 Stuber v. Gannon, 639 
 Stubley v. Northwestern R. Co., 56, 
 
 463. 466, 476 
 Stucke V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 103, 
 
 418 
 Studeor v. Gouveneur, 355 
 Studer v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 425 
 Studley v. Oshkosh, 353 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 4816, 
 483, 484 
 Studwell V. Ritch, 419, 657, 664 
 Stuettgen v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 
 
 466a 
 Stumps V. Kelley, 638. 639 
 Sturges V. Robbins, 668 
 Sturtevant v. Plymouth Co., 385 
 Stutz V. Armour. 332 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 743 
 Suben v. Georgia, etc. R. Co., 493a 
 Submarine Tel. Co. v. Dickson, 21 
 Substitute, etc.. Matter of, 349 
 Suburban Electric Co. v. Nugent, 58 
 Sudbury v, Stearns, 310 
 Sugarman v. Manhattan R. Co., 676, 
 
 679 
 SuUens v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 729 
 Sullivan v. Boston, 358, 267 
 
 V. Boston & Albany R. Co., 698 
 
 V. Dunham, 688a 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co.. 185 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 214 
 
 V. Helena, 289, 358 
 
 V. Holyoke, 291 
 
 V. Indian Mfg. Co. , 46, 303, 218, 
 
 219 
 V. Jefferson Av. R. Co., 495, 
 
 500 
 V. Jones, 303 
 V. Louisville Bridge Co., 87,93, 
 
 209a 
 V. Lowell, etc. R. Co., 764 
 v. Mississippi, etc. R. Co., 180, 
 
 335, 341a 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 99, 
 129, 235, 238, 483 
 
References] TABLE OF CASES. {are to sections. 
 
 clxv 
 
 Sullivan v. N. Y., New Haven, etc. 
 R. Co., 19J, 195, 23.!, 477 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 
 4816 
 V. Old Colonv R. Co., 493 
 V. Oregon R." Co., 749 
 V. Pennsylvania Co., 471 
 v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 65, 
 
 500, 516 
 v. Scripture, 18, 639, 684, 647 
 v. Syracuse, 606 
 V. Tioga R. Co., 95, 235, 478 
 V. Union R. Co., 58 
 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 134 
 V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 458 
 V. Wamsutta Mills, 195 
 V. Zeiner, 701 
 Sullivan County v. Arnett, 359, 753 
 
 V. Sisson, 355 
 Sulzbaclier v. Dickie. 174 
 Suinmerfield v. W. U Tel. Co., 756, 
 
 761 
 SuQiniers v. Daviess county, 366 
 Sumnierhays v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 
 
 180, 191, 241 
 
 Sunderlin v. Hollister, 719 
 
 Susquehanna Depot v. Simmons, 358 
 
 Fertilizer Co. v. Malone. 701a 
 
 etc. Turnp. Co. v. People, 387 
 
 Sussex countv v. Strader, 356, 858, 
 
 2S5, 389, 390. 393 
 Suter V. Park, etc. Lumber Co., 197, 
 
 209a, 214 
 Sutherland v. Great Western R. Co., 
 505 
 V. Murray, 303 
 
 V. Standard Life Ins. Co., 533 
 V. Trov, etc. R. Co., 54, 61, 114, 
 193. 3076, 333a 
 Sutliff V. Johnson, 731 
 Sutphen v. North Hempstead, 370 
 Sutton V. Board of Police, 256, 398 
 V. Bennett, 686 
 V. Clarke, 14, 378 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 8, 56. 464. 465, 705 
 V. N. Y. , . Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 193 
 V. Omnibus Co. , 645 
 V. Snohomish, 389, 356, 368, 369, 
 
 373 
 V. Waite, 624 
 V. Wauwatosa, 104 
 Sutzin V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 483 
 Suydam v. Grand St. R. Co., 485o, 
 653 
 v. Moore, 344, 348, 433, 446 
 V. Vance, 559. 566 
 Swaboda v. Ward, 114 
 Swadley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 197, 
 
 307a 
 Swain v. Fourteenth St. R. Co., 
 485c 
 
 Swainson v. North Eastern R. Co., 
 
 225 
 Swannell v. Ellis, 566, 569 
 Swanson v. La Fayette, 185 
 V. Milton, 434 
 
 V. Mississippi, etc. Boom Co., 
 371 
 Swartz V. Gilmore, 166 
 Sweatland v. Illinois, etc. Tel. Co., 
 
 544, 545 
 Sweeney v. Barrett, 704 
 
 V. Berlin etc. R. Co., 178, 185, 
 185a, 195. 209 
 ) V. Butte, 35.S, 375 
 
 V. Central Pac. R. Co., 216 
 V. Gulf. etc. R. Co., 3386 
 V. Merrill, 666, 668 
 V. Murphv, 163 
 V. N. Y. Steam Co.. 99 
 Sweeny v. Old Colonv R. Co., 410, 
 
 417a, 473, 705,'706 
 Swearinger v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 
 
 434 
 Sweat v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 194a 
 Swett V. Cutts, 739, 735 
 Swezey v. Lott, 623 
 Swift V. Applebone, 638 
 V. New York, 355 
 V. Raleigh. 743 
 
 V. Staten Island, etc. R. Co., 
 .54, 73a 464, 473 
 Swindell v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 471 
 Swindler v. Hilliard, 550 
 Swinfen v. Ijord Chelmsford, 557, 569 
 
 v. Swinfen, 569 
 Swinyard v. Bowes. 587. 603 
 Swords V. Edgar, 13', 385, 343, 708, 
 
 709a. 725 
 Svenson v. Atlantic Mail S. S. Co., 
 
 158. 235 
 Sykes v. Lawlor, 646 
 V. Packer, 184 
 V, Pawlet. 370 
 Sykora v. Case Mach. Co., 140 
 Sylvester v. Maay, 639 
 Syme v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 433 
 Symes v. Nipper, 559 
 Symonds v. Clay county, 356, 260 
 Svracuse, etc. Plank-road Co. v. 
 
 People, 386, 387 
 Szathmary v. Adams, 708 
 
 Taber v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 46, 
 51, 111, 495, 530 
 V. Graffmiller, 833 
 Tabor v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Tacoma, 680 
 Taft V. N. Y., etc. R. Co., 426 
 Tagg V. McGeorge, 186, 219 
 Taintor v. Worcester, 253, 365 
 Talbot V. McGee, 569 
 Tallahassee v. Fortune, 389, 379 
 Talley v. Great Western R. Co., 536 
 
clxvi 
 
 Refcrenceil TABLE OF CASES. U""'' to sections. 
 
 Tally V. Ayres, 086 
 
 Talmadge v. Rensselaer, etc. R. Co., 
 
 423, 437 
 Talty V. Atlantic, 350 
 Tankei-sly v. Anderson, 573 
 Tanner V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 64. 
 480 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 675, 680 
 Tarrant v. Webb, 180 
 Tarry v. Ashton, 348, 712 
 Tarwater v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 53, 419 
 Tate V. Chambers, 303 
 
 V. Salmon, 249 
 
 T. St. Paul, 287 
 Taylor v. Alexander, 303 
 
 V. Atlantic Ins. Co., 11, 738 
 
 V. Austin, 287 
 
 T. Baldwin, 207, 697 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 731 
 
 V. Blacklow, 576 
 
 V. Carew Mfg. Co., 62, 1«5, 
 214, 719a 
 
 V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 219 
 
 T. Constable, 375, 376 
 
 V. Cumberland, 263 
 
 T. Davis county, 357 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 464 
 
 V. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 203a, 
 338 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 51, 60a, 
 495, 499, 748, 749 
 
 V. Hancock, 623 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 14, 
 343 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 207a 
 
 V. Manchester, etc. R. Co., 486 
 
 V. Monroe, 53 
 
 V. Mc Vernon, 875 
 
 V. New York, 708, 710, 725 
 
 V. Peckham, 258, 350 
 
 V. Penn. R. Co , 501, 506 
 
 V. Penn. Val. R. Co., 676, 678 
 
 V. Trask, 303 
 
 V. Wootan, 219 
 
 V. Yonkers, 26, 368, 876 
 Taylor, etc. R. Co. v. Taylor, 1856 
 
 V. Warner, 417, 769 
 Teall V. Barton, 668 
 
 V. Felton, 331 
 Tearney v. Smith, 840 
 Teator v. Seattle, 393 
 Tebbutt V. Bristol, etc. E. Co., 704, 
 
 706 
 Teipelv. Hilsendegen, 107, 113, 114 
 Tefft V. Wilcox, 606, 612 
 Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 558, 555, 
 556 
 
 V. Texas, 534 
 Telfer v. Northern, etc. R. Co., 61, 
 62, 65, 463, 469, 766 
 
 Temperance Hall Asso. v. Giles, 606, 
 
 703 
 Templeton v. Linn county, 256 
 
 V. Voshloe, 274 
 Ten Eyck v. Delaware, etc. Canal, 
 
 789 
 Tennessee Coal, etc. Co. v. Hamilton, 
 784 
 
 R. Co. v. Horndon, 207a, 774 
 Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Markins, 66 
 Tenney v. Lenz, 628 
 Tennis v. Iziterstate, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Terre Haute, etc. R. Co. v. Augustus, 
 57, 419, 421 
 
 V. Barr, 478 
 
 v. Buck, 111, 520, 521, 743 
 
 V. Clark, 476 
 
 V. Clem, 60c 
 
 V. (Jraham, 20, 88, 100, 102, 
 480 
 
 V. Hud nut, 278, 744 
 
 V. McKinley, 412 
 
 V. Mansberger, 207a, 233a 
 
 V. Schaeffer, 434 
 
 V. Smith, 417a, 437 
 
 V. Voelker, 54, 472, 477 
 Terrell v. State, 619 
 Terry v. Jewett, 477, 490, 525 
 
 V. New York, 267, 286, 291, 
 750 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 57, 61, 
 418, 487, 440 
 Tetherow v. St. Josephs, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 485, 771, 778 
 Tewksbury v. Buoklin, 635, 664 
 Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 194a 
 
 V. Alexander. 508 
 
 v. Bavliss, 751 
 
 V. Berry, 183 
 
 V. Best, 492a 
 
 V. Black, 150 
 
 V. Bowlin, 513 
 
 V. Breadow, 484 
 
 V. Brick, 218 
 
 V. Brown, 506 
 
 V. Buckelew, 516 
 
 V. Chapman, 426 
 
 V. Cody, 475, 485c 
 
 V. Cornelius, 506 
 
 V. Cox, 183 
 
 V. Crowder, 223 
 
 V. Cunipston, 203 
 
 V. Cunningham, 437 
 
 V. Davidson, 508 
 
 V. Douglas, 203, 219a, 761 
 
 V. Easton, 225 
 
 V. Edmond, 513 
 
 V. French, 216 
 
 V. Geiger. 129 
 
 V. Gentry, 111, 4816 
 
 V. Glenn. 486 
 
 V. Hamilton, 497, 516 
 
 V. Hare, 480 
 
References^ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. clxVll 
 
 Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v, Harrington, 
 191, 241 
 
 V. Hohn, 201 
 
 V. James, 493 
 
 V. Johnson, 191, 193, 197, 513 
 
 V. Kirk, 337 
 
 V. Lester, 307& 
 
 V. Levi, 54 
 
 V. Levine, 676 
 
 V. Lowry, 463 
 
 V. McAtee, 194 
 
 V. McGilvary, 493a 
 
 V. McKee, 209a 
 
 V. MoLane, 521 
 
 V. Mays, 506 
 
 V. Miller, 508, 510 
 
 V. Minnick, 309 
 
 V. Mitchell, 435 
 
 V. Moody, 151 
 
 V. Moore, 198, 2076 
 
 V. Morin, 760 
 
 V. Mother, 151, 493 
 
 T. Murphy, 108, 113 
 
 V. O'Donnell, 78 
 
 V. Overall, 519 
 
 V. Overheiser, 313 
 
 V. Pierce, 518 
 
 V. Pollard, 508 
 
 V. Reed. 207a, 233b 
 
 V. Roberts, 483 
 
 V Robertson, 133 
 
 V. Rogers, 209a, 331 
 
 V. Ross. 678, 679 
 
 V. Scott. 424 
 
 V. Scoville, 154 
 
 V. Smith, 309a 
 
 V. Spradling, 468, 473 
 
 V. Suggs, 516 
 
 V. Tatman, 341c 
 
 V. Thompson, 194 
 
 V. Vallie, 406 
 
 V. Watkins, 89, 464, 484 
 
 V. Whitmore, 330 
 
 V. White. 22J 
 
 V. Williams, 513 
 
 V. Young, 92, 419, 439 
 Texas Tel. Co. v. Seiders. 540 
 Thain v Old Colony R. Co., 203 
 Tharsis Sulphur Co. v. Loftus, 310 
 Thatcher v. Central Traction Co., 31, 
 4S5c 
 
 V. Great Western R. Co., 516 
 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 675, 676 
 Thayer v. Arnold, 655, 664 
 
 V. Boston, 259, 299 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 191, 
 495 
 Theall v. Yonkers, 345, 394 
 Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 374 
 Thieme v. Gillen, 359 
 Thiessen v. Belle Plaine, 367 
 Third Nat. Bank v. Vicksburgh Bank, 
 582 
 
 Thirteenth St. R. Co. v. Boudron. 94, 
 
 533 
 Thoburn v. Campbell, 667 
 Thom V. Pittard, 330 
 Thoman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 
 
 307 
 Thomas v. Brooklyn, 333, 760 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 460, 
 481a, 484 
 
 V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 464 
 
 V. Findlav, 265 
 
 V. Henges, 709a, 735 
 
 V. Kenyon, 61, 93, 95, 731, 738, 
 736 
 
 V. Lancaster Mills, 40 
 
 V. Leland. 333 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 494 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 185, 
 196 
 
 V. Morgan, 629, 633 
 
 V. Phila., etc. R. Co., 516 
 
 V. Quartermaine, 214, 241& 
 
 V. Railroad, ,120a 
 
 V. Rhymney R. Co., 459, 503 
 
 V. Koyster, 645 
 
 V. Schee, 574 
 
 V. Weed, 625 
 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co., 60, 
 87, 357.376 
 
 V. Winchester, 26, 38, 116, 690, 
 691 
 
 Iron Co. V. AUentown Min. 
 Co., 717 
 Thompkins v. West, 759 
 Thompson v. Allis Co., 207a, 319a 
 
 v. Bank of So. Car.. 581, 585 
 
 V. Beaver. 323 
 
 Y. Belfast, etc. R. Co., 509 
 
 V. Boston &M. R. Co.. 207 
 
 V. Bridgewater. 62, 375 
 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 476, 481a 
 485c 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 341 
 
 V. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 451 
 
 V. Crocker, 730 
 
 v. Dickinson, 567 
 
 V. Dodge, 653 
 
 V. Duncan. 113 
 
 V. Evans, 310 
 
 V. Harlem R. Co., 441 
 
 V. Jackson, 303 
 
 V. Johnston Co., 197, 318 
 
 V. Kyler, 655 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 31, 
 125 
 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 119 
 
 V. Nat. Express Co., 645, 654 
 
 V. North Missouri R. Co.. 108 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 460. 463, 467,476, 477 
 
 V. Polk countv, 274 
 
 V. Quincv, 368 
 
 V. Truesdale, 493 
 
clxviii 
 
 References'] TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 Thompson v. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 531. 54a, 553, 756 
 V. YaiLOj, etc. R. Co., 488, 493 
 Thomson v. Manhattan E. Co., 512 
 Thorburn v. Smith, 150 
 Thoresen v. La Crosse R. Co., 485a 
 Thornburg v. American Strawboard 
 
 Co., 136 
 Thorne v. California Stage Co., 488 
 Thornton v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 
 
 476 
 Thorogood v. Brvan, 66, 74, 75, 77, 86 
 Thorp V. Brookfield, 114 
 
 V. Concord R. Co., 493 
 V, Minor, 144, 635 
 Thorpe v. Brumfitt, 734 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 113, 
 
 193,214, 215 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 526 
 V. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 422 
 Thorne v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 445 
 Thrussell v, Handyside, 211a 
 Thurber v. Harlem, etc. R. Co., 73, 
 74. 481a 
 V. Martin, 729 
 Thuringer v. N. Y. Cent., etc. R. Co.. 
 
 55, 95, 345 
 Thurman v. Cherokee R. Co., 241 c 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 64 
 Thurston v. Hancock, 701 
 
 V. Percival, 557 
 Thwaites v. Mackerson, 567 
 Thyng v. Fitchburg R. Co., 195 
 Tibbv V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 492, 
 
 505 
 Tice V Bay City, 368. 369 
 Tiernan v. Commercial Bank, 585 
 Tierney v. Cliicago. etc. R. Co., 463 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 205 
 V. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 146, 
 
 225 
 V. Troy. 295, 343 
 Tiers v. New York, 346 
 Tiffin V. McCormack, 160, 164, 167, 
 
 701a 
 Tifft V. Tifft. 626 
 
 V. Buffalo, 332 
 Tift V. Jones. 95, 397 
 
 V N. Y., Providence, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 451a 
 V. Towns. 386, 389 
 Tighe T. Lowell. 370 
 Tilford V. New York, 299 
 Tillett V. Lynchburg, etc. R. Co., 
 519 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 519. 
 Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 135, 
 137. 769, 771, 775 
 V. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 58, 86 
 Tillock V. Webb. 104 
 Tillotson V Smith. 729, 735 
 Timlin v. Standard Oil Co., 120, 709 
 Timm v-. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 192 
 
 Timmons v. Central Ohio R. Co., 81 
 Timpson v. Manhattan R. Co. 506 
 Timony v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 485c 
 Tin d ley v. Salem. 258 
 Tinker v. N. Y., Ontario, etc. R. Co., 
 406 
 
 V. Ontario, etc. R. Co., 426 
 
 V. Russell, 262, 336 
 Tinkham v. Sawyer, 219 
 
 V. Stockbridge, 392 
 Tinsman v. Belvidere, etc. R. Co., 
 
 250, 283 
 Tipping v. St. Helen Smelting Co., 
 
 701a 
 Tisdale v. Norton, 8 
 Tissue v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 189 
 Titcomb v. Fitchburg R. Co., 392 
 Titter V. Iowa county, 257 
 Titus V. Bradford, 185 
 
 V. Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 583 
 
 V. New Scotland. 377 
 
 V. Korthbridge, 346, 378 
 Tobey v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 213 
 
 V. Hudson, 363 
 Tobias v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 4 5, 
 
 463. 475. 4816 
 Tobin V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 481a, 
 483. 485c 
 
 V. Portland, etc. R. Co., 410, 
 49ia, 506 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 555, 
 556a 
 Toby V. Leonard, filS 
 Toddv. Cochell, 47,701a 
 
 V. Flight, 708. 709 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 3C2 
 
 V. Old Colony, etc. R. Co., 491, 
 519 
 
 V. Rome, 334 
 
 V. Rowley, 606, 105 
 
 V. Troy. 346, 363, 376 
 Tolbot V. West Virginia, 748 
 Toledo V. Cone, 289, 291 
 Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Apperson. 499 
 
 V. Baddeley, 758 
 
 V. Bailev, 111 
 
 V. Barlow, 428, 430 
 
 v. Black, 178 
 
 V. Brooks, 489 
 
 V. Burgan, 443 
 
 V. Clark, 408 
 
 V. Cline, 468, 477 
 
 V. Cohen, 425 
 
 V. Cole, 421 
 
 V. Conroy, 184, 194a, 204, 499 
 
 V. Coen, 673 
 
 V. Crittenden, 67, 426 
 
 V. Cupp, 434, 435 
 
 V. Daniels, 425 
 
 V. Darst, 436 
 
 V. Deacon, 13 
 
 V. Dnrkin. 238 
 
 V. Eder, 425 
 
Re/erences-\ TABLE OF CASES. [ore to sections. clxlx 
 
 Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Eddy, 221 
 
 V. Endres, 678 
 
 V. Fenstemaker, 445 
 
 V. Foster, 53. 427 
 
 V. Fowler, 423 
 
 V. Franklin, 434 
 
 V. Fredericks, 197 
 
 V. Furgusson, 470 
 
 V. Goddard, 61, 63, 69, 87, 463, 
 476 
 
 V. Grush. 492a 
 
 V. Harmon. 1.55, 461, 463 
 
 V. Hauck, 471 
 
 V. Howell, 435, 436 
 
 V. Ingraham, 197, 428 
 
 V. Jackson, 436 
 
 V. Kingman, 676 
 
 V. Larmon, 58 
 
 V. McGinnis, 458 
 
 V. Maine, 458 
 
 V. Maxfield, 680 
 
 V. Miller, 66, 424 
 
 V. Moore, 60. 65, 234, 238 
 
 V. Muthersbaugh, 666 
 
 V. O'Connor. 58, 238, 467 
 
 V. Owen, 435 
 
 V. Parker, 95 
 
 V. Pence, 440 
 
 V. Pindar, 55, 674, 741 
 
 V. Riley, 93 
 
 V. Rumbold, 444 
 
 V. Sieberns, 439 
 
 V. Sweeney, 368, 434 
 
 V. Thomas, 455 
 
 V. Trimble, 219 
 
 V. Tucker. 740 
 
 V. Wand, 678 
 Toll Bridge Co. v. Langrell, 396 
 Tollanil V. Wilmington, 390, 393 
 Tolman v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 107, 
 
 111, 112, 114, 476, 481b 
 Tombs V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 437, 
 
 452 
 Tomkins v. N. Y. Ferry Co. . 511 
 Tomle V. Hampton, 703, 709a 
 Tomlinson v. Brown, 119 
 
 V.' Derby, 8 
 Tompkins v. Clay St. R. Co., 66, 122 
 
 V. Kanawha, 94 
 
 V. Sands, 303 
 Toms V. Whitby, 346 
 Tonawanda R. Co. v. Hunger, 1, 20, 
 
 433 
 Toncray v. Dodge Co., 49 
 Tone V. New York, 295 
 Toner v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 232, 
 
 233 
 Tonnesen v. Ross, 191 
 Toole V. Beckett, 710 
 Tooniey v. Albany, 262 
 
 V. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 56, 
 
 58. 410, 502 
 V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 145 
 
 Toomey v. Donovan, 188, 2-116 
 V. New York, 295 
 
 V. Sanborn, 705 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co.. 480 
 Topeka v. Sherwood, 334a, 343 
 
 V. Tuttle, 289, 355 
 
 R. Co. V. Higgs, 495, 523 
 Topping V. St. Lawrence, 137, 766 
 Torbush v. Norwich, 265 
 Torians v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 194a, 338 
 Torongo v. Salliotte, 223 
 Torrey v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 523 
 
 V. Scranton, 735 
 Totten V. Cole, 640 
 
 V. Phipps. 87, 91, 377 
 Tondv V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 429 
 Tourtellot v. J'helps, 729 
 
 V. Rosebrook, 8. 57. 668, 609 
 Tousey v. Roberts, 710, 719a 
 Toutloff V. Green Bay, 343 
 Towanda Coal Co. v. Heeman, 64 
 Tower v. Providence, etc. R. Co., 
 418. 437 
 
 V. Rutland, 334 
 
 V. Utica. etc. R. Co., 526 
 Towler v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 94 
 Town V. Armstrong, 7US 
 
 V. Lampshire, 634 
 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co.. 188 
 Towne v. Nashua, etc. R. Co.. 418 
 Towner v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 207 
 Townley v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 73a, 
 461, 484 
 
 V. Fall Brook Coal Co.. 668 
 Towns V. Cheshire R. Co., 418 
 
 V. Railroad Co.. 188 
 
 V. Vickburg, etc. R. Co., 233 
 Townsend v. Bell, 734 
 
 V. Briggs, 761 
 
 V. Langles, 219a 
 
 V. Libbey, 619 
 
 V. McDonald. 729 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 493 749 
 
 V. Paola. 743 
 
 V. Susquehanna Turnp. Co., 
 272, 386 
 
 V. Wathin, 97, 720 
 Tozer v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 743 
 Traction Co. v. Scott, 73 
 Tracey v. Poughkeepsie. 363 
 Tracy v. Cloyd, 322 
 
 v. Hornbuckle, 249 
 
 V. Pullman Car Co., 526 
 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 57, 421, 
 434, 435. 444 
 Tradesmens' Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. 
 
 Bank, 582 
 Transit, The, 751 
 
 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 249, 
 263, 283 
 
 v. Bowner, 223 
 
 V. UUman, 120a 
 
cl 
 
 XX 
 
 Referenced 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 {are to sections. 
 
 Tranter v. Sacramento, 2S9 
 Trapnell v. Red Oak, 368 
 Trask v. California, etc. R. Co., 216 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 241b 
 V. Shotwell, 719 
 Traver v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 76^ 
 Travers v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 74Da 
 Travis v. Pierson, 751 
 Treadwell v. Nevr York, 286, 291 
 
 V. Whittier, 487, 719a 
 Treasurers, etc. v. McDowell, 573 
 Treat v. Bates, 735 
 v. Lord, 333 
 Trego v. Honevbrook, 298 
 Tremain v. Cofioes Co., 688a, 701a 
 Tremblay v. Harndin, 223 
 Trenton Water-Power Co. , Matter of, 
 
 359 
 Trevor v. Wood, 543 
 Trexler v. Greenwich, 356, 378 
 Tribette v. III. Cent. R. Co., 674, 675 
 Trice v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 422 
 Triese v. St. Paul, 334 
 Trigg V. McDonald, 619 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 761 
 Triliay v. Brooklyn Lead Min. Co. , 
 
 280 
 Trinidad Nat. Bank v. Denver Nat. 
 
 Bank, 587o 
 Trinity Lumber Co. v. Denham, 195 
 Trinity, etc. R. Co. v. Lane, 413 
 
 V. Schofield, 750 
 Tripp V. Lyman, 350, 363, 367, 874 
 Tritz V. Kansas City, 334 
 Trompen v. Verhage, 628 
 Tronghear v. Lower Vein Coal Co., 
 
 341 
 Trousclair v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 
 
 61 
 Trout V. Virginia, etc. R. Co., 419, 
 
 430 
 Trow v. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 
 418, 430. 451a 
 Trower v. Chadwiok, 701 
 Troy V. Cape Fear, etc. R. Co., 114 
 etc. R. Co. V. Boston, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 120a 
 Troxel v. Vinton, 350, 378 
 True v. Internat. Tel. Co., 547 
 Truex v. Erie R. Co., 523 
 Trumbull v. Nicholson, 573 
 Truntle v. North Star Woolen-Mill 
 
 Co., 203, 214 
 Truro, The, 197 
 Trustees, etc. v. Tatman, 256 
 Tubervil v. Stamp, 665, 669 
 Tubbs V. Michigan Cent. R. Co. , 535 
 Tucker V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 480 
 V. Bradley 619 
 V. Conrad, 334 
 V. Henniker, 87, 378 
 V. Illinois Cent. R. Co. , 702 
 
 Tucker v. Mowrey, 104 
 
 V. Newman, 119, 721 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 73a, 
 122, 476, 4816 
 
 V. West, 104 
 Tuel V. Weston, 141 
 Tuell V. Paris, 368 
 Tuff V. Warman, 61, 93, 94, 99, 100 
 Tuffree v. State Centre, 90, 379 
 Tuller V. Talbot, 496, 514 
 Tully V. N. Y. & Texas S. S. Co., 816 
 
 V. Texas S. S. Co., 719 
 Tunney v. Midland R. Co., 839 
 Tunnicliffe v. Bay R. Co., 764 
 Tupper V. Clark, 631, 657 
 Turley v. Thomas, 649 
 Turner v. Buchanan, 355 
 
 V. Craighead, 632 
 
 V. Cross, 241c 
 
 V. Haar, 39 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 180a 
 
 V. Hawkeye Tel. Co., .544 
 
 V. Indianapolis. 365, 370 
 
 V. Newburgh, 93, 298, 367, 369, 
 375 
 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 218 . 
 
 V. Phillip.s, 557 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 57 
 
 V. Thomas, 703 
 
 V. Tuolumne Water Co. , 402 
 
 V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 509 
 Turnier v. Lathers, 57, 704 
 Turnpike Co. v. Champney, 310 
 
 V. Jackson, 376 
 
 Road V. Brosi, 385 
 Tuteur v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 771 
 Tutis V. North bridge, 379 
 Tuttle V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 59, 115 
 
 V. Farmington, 378, 741 
 
 V. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 7(J8, 709 
 
 V. Holyoke, 356 
 
 V. Lawrence, 379 
 
 V. Love, 243, 6)8 
 Twigg V. Ryland, 630 
 Twist V. Winona, etc. R. Co., 73a 
 Twogood V. New York, 368, 376 
 Twomblev v. Leach, 612 
 Twomey v. Swift, 195 
 Twomley v. Central Park, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 89, 518, 519 
 Tyler v. Kelley, 483 
 
 V. Nelson. 654 
 
 V. Old Colony R. Co., 468 
 
 V. New York, etc. R. Co., 477 
 
 V. Ricamore, 666 
 
 V. Sites, 481, 484 
 
 V. Sturdy, 333 
 
 V. Third Ave. R. Co., 739 
 
 V. Western U. Tel Co., 536, 
 540. 553, 556, 755, 756 
 
 V. Wilkinson, 730 
 
 V. Williston, 393 
 Tylor V. Alvord, 303 
 
Re/erences^ TABLE OF CASES. We to sections. 
 
 clxxi 
 
 Tyndale v. Old Colony, R. Co., 232 
 Tyrrell v. Eastern R. Co., 407 
 Tvson V. Keokuk, etc. R. Co., 455 
 
 V. South & N. Ala. R. Co., 233 
 V. State Bank, 580, 583 
 
 Usgla V. West End R. Co., 47, 54,516 
 Ulbricht v. Eufala Water Co., 739 
 Uline V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 743 
 Ulrich V. St. Louis, 260 
 
 V. Dakota Trust Co., 701 
 Umback v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 195 
 Underhill v. Manchester, 361 
 Underwood v. Waldron, 99 
 Undhejsm v. Hastings, 654 
 Unger v. Forty-second St. R. Co., 
 
 647 
 Union v. Durkes, 358 
 Union Bank v. Geary, 572 
 Union Brass Mfg. Co., v. Lindsay, 
 
 709a 
 Union Canal Co. v. Pinegrove, 401 
 Union Ice Co. v. Crowell, 736 
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Adams, 90, 474, 
 477 
 
 V. Arthur, 676, 679 
 
 V. Billiter, 235 
 
 V. Buck, 678 
 
 V. Callaghan. 55, 332, 233a, 485 
 
 V. Daniels, 194a, 206, 223 
 
 V. De Busk. 675, 676 
 
 V. Doyle, 333, 383a, 233b 
 
 V. Dunden, 73, 775 
 
 V. Dyche, 739, 735 
 
 V. Erickson. 238 
 
 V. Estes. 207, 321 
 
 V. Fort, 307a, 318, 233 
 
 V. Gilland, 678 
 
 V. Hand, 495 
 
 V. Harris, 431 
 
 V. Harwood, 465 
 
 V. High, 421 
 
 V. James, 57, 194 
 
 V. Jarvi, 185b, 233 
 
 V. Jones, 743, 764 
 
 V. Keller, 675, 676 
 
 V. Kelley, 235 
 
 T. Knowlton. 435 
 
 V. McCollum, 679 
 
 V. McDonald, 13, 56, 73, 467, 
 705, 717 
 
 V. Mertes, 99, 483 
 
 V. Monden, 317 
 
 V. Nichols, 486, 493 
 
 V. O'Brien, 108, 194, 197, 410 
 
 V. Patterson, 438 
 
 V. Rassmussen, 431, 467 
 
 V. Rollins, 102, 418 
 
 V. Springsteen, 206 
 
 - Sue, 506 
 
 ,. Williams, 676 
 
 V. Young, 180 
 
 Union R. Co. v. Kallaher, 160, 459 
 
 V. Sehlacklet, 133 
 
 V. State, 473, 476 
 
 V. Stone, 341, 346 
 Union Packet Co. v. Clough, 491, 518 
 Union S. S. Co. v. New York, 61 
 Union Stockyards Co. v. Larson, 194a 
 Union etc. Co. v. Rourke, 705 
 Union Trust Co. v. Cuppy, 731 
 United Electric R. Co. v. Shelton 
 123 
 
 So. of Shakers v. Underwood, 
 150, 588, 589 
 United States v. Arredondo, 317 
 
 V. Clark, 351 
 
 V. Clarke, 349 
 
 V. Collier, 319 
 
 V. Eckford, 349 
 
 V. Hillegas, 349 
 
 V. Lee, 349 
 
 V. McLemore, 349 
 
 V. O'Keefe, 249 
 
 V. Peachy, 701 
 
 V. Thompson, 349 
 United States Mortgage Co. v. Hen- 
 derson, 558 
 United States Rolling Stock Co. v. 
 
 Wilder, 186a, 317 
 United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 
 545, 518 
 
 V. Wenger, 755 
 United Tel. Co. v. Cleveland. 588 
 Upham V. Detroit City R. Co., 533 
 Urquhart v. Boutell, 646 
 
 V. Ogdensburg, 263, 371 , 363 
 Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., 133 
 Uther V. Rich, 30 
 
 Van Alstyne v. Freeday, 340 
 
 Van Amburg v. Vicksburg, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 233, 233a 
 Van Antwerp v. Linton, 243 
 Van Atta v. McKinney, 557 
 Van Bergen v. Van Bergen, 731 
 Van Den Heuvel v. National Furnace 
 
 Co., 195 
 Van Dusen v. Letellier, 194a, 333a 
 Van Duzer v. Elmira, etc. R. Co., 
 
 395, 407 
 Van Dyke v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., 
 
 19/ 
 Van Epps v. Commissioners, 356 
 Van Fleet v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 665 
 Van Frachen v. Ft. Howard. 373 
 Van Hoesen v. Coventry, 739 
 Van Horn v. Burlington, etc. B. Co., 
 
 419, 438, 451o 
 Van Horn v. Des Moines, 265 
 Van Inwegen v. N. Y. , Lake Erie, 
 
 etc. R. Co., 53 
 Van Leuven v. Lyke, 17, 636, 637, 
 
 629, 657 
 Van Natta v. People's R. Co., 73a 
 
clxxii 
 
 References'] TABLE OF CASES. \flre to sections. 
 
 Van Nostrand v. N. Y., Lake Erie, I 
 etc. R. Co., 675 
 
 V. Wallkill Val. R. Co., 678 
 Van Novden v. Robinson, 13, 683 
 Van Pelt v. Davenport, 262, 274, 278 
 Van Praag v. Gale, 703 
 Van Sandau v. Brown, .leS 
 Van Schaick v. Hudson River R. Co. , 
 480, 521 
 
 V. Sigel, 590, 592 
 Van Slyok v. Hogeboom, 625 
 Van Steenburgh v. Thornton, 194 
 
 V. Tobias, 123, 638 
 Van Vranken v. Clifton Springs, 356 
 Van Wart v. Woolley, 581, 582, 603 
 Van Wickle v. Manhattan R. Co., 
 
 241 
 Van Winkle v. American Steam 
 Boiler Ins. Co., 122 
 
 V. Brooklyn R. Co., 500, 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 184 
 Vaccari v. Maxwell, 313 
 Vail V. Amenia, 256 
 
 V. Broadway R. Co., 523, 533 
 
 V. Jackson, 573 
 Vale V. Bliss, 703 
 
 Valin V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 484 
 Valleau v. Chicago, etc. R. Co , 421 
 Vallo V. U. S. Exp. Co., 89, 741 
 Valparaiso v. Cartwright, 287 
 Voltez V. Ohio, etc. R. Co., 238 
 Vance v. Franklin, 376 
 Vandalia v. Husa, 355 
 Vandegrift v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 418, 419 
 
 V. Rediker, 57, 418, 428, 446 
 Vandemark v. Porter, 335 
 Vandenburg v. Ti-uax 19, 37 
 Vanderbeck v. Hendrey, 97, 705 
 Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turnpike 
 
 Co., 154 
 Vanderheyden v. Young, 303, 310 
 Vanderkar v. Rennselaer, etc. R. Co.. 
 
 435 
 Vanderpool v. Husson, 361 
 Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 368, 869 
 Vanderwerken v. New Haven R. Co , 
 
 131 
 Vanderworker v. Missouri Pac, R. 
 
 Co., 434. 435 
 Vandewater v. N. Y. , New England 
 
 R. Co.. 463, 464, 467, 468 
 
 V. Williamson, 598 
 Vanduzer v. liehigh, etc. R. Co., 421 
 Vandyke v. Cincinnati, 343 
 Vanesse v. Catsburg Coal Co., 185b 
 Vannest v. Fleming, 735 
 Vantine v. The Lake, 744 
 Varick v. Smith. 333, 737 
 Varney v. Manchester. 370 
 Yarnham v. Council Bluffs, 759 
 Varnum v. Martin, 566, 567 
 Vass V. Waukesha, 363 
 
 Vaughan. The Mary J., 747 
 
 V. Biggers, 317 
 
 V. Menlove, 665 
 
 V. Taff Vale R. Co., 11, 16, 47, 
 85, 672, 674, 680 
 Vaught V. Johnson county, 257 
 Vaughtman v. Waterloo, 291 
 Vaux V. Scheffer, 61 
 Vawter v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 133 
 Veazie v. Penobscot R. Co., 359, 384, 
 
 414 
 Veeder v. Little Falls, 48, 334a 
 Veerhusen v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 418, 434, .449 
 Velte V. United States, 251, 729 
 Venables v. Smith, 147 
 Vennal v. Garner, 92, 100 
 Vermillion county v. Chipps, 380 
 Vermont v. Leicester, 334 
 Verner v. Alabama R. Co., 484, 525 
 Verrill v. Minot, 370, 749o 
 Vertrees v. Newport News, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 472, 489 
 Vessel Owners' Towing Co. v. Wil- 
 son, 737 
 Vick V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 184, 339 
 Vickers v. Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 73a 
 Vicksburg v. Hennessey, 92, 107, 289, 
 
 375 
 Vicksburg, etc. R. Co. v. Hart, 467 
 
 V. Howe, 490 
 
 V. McLain, 98, 113, 386 
 
 V. McGowan, 97 
 
 V. O'Brien, 513 
 
 V. Patton, 419, 748 
 
 V. Putnam, 758 
 Victor Coal Co. v. Muir, 307, 209a, 
 
 217 
 Victor Min. Co. v. Morning Star Min. 
 Co., 701 
 
 V. Penna. R. Co., 520 
 Victorian R. Com. v. Coultes, 761 
 Victory V. Baker, 343, 705 
 Vieths V. Skinner, 377 
 Vigo county v. Daily, 256, 357 
 Vilas V. Bryants, 583 
 
 V. Downer, 557 
 Vinal V. Dorchester, 350, 358 
 Vincennes Water-Supply Co. v. 
 
 White, 166, 317 
 Vincent v. Brooklyn, 254, 391 
 
 V. Groome, 569 
 
 V. Morgan's R. Co., 476 
 Vincett v. Cook, 60, 343 
 Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Schwab, 53 
 
 Vinyard v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 Co., 4.50 
 Virginia, etc. R. Co. v. Roach, 91 
 
 V. Sanger, 14, 51,406 
 
 V. White. 467, 471 
 Virginia Midland R. Co. v. Barksdale, 
 480 
 
Re/erences-\ TABLE OF CASES. \.are to sections. clxxiil 
 
 Virginia Midland R. Co. v. Boswell, 
 
 480 
 V. Washington, 413 
 Virtue v. Police Commissioners, 326 
 Voak V. Northern Central R. Co., 89, 
 
 426, 437, 468 
 Vogel V. MoAuIiffe, 761 
 
 V. New York, 262, 298 
 Vogg V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 476 
 Volkman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 432 
 Volkmar v. Manhattan R. Co., 60 
 Volz V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 180, 
 
 2336 
 Von Raden v. N Y., New Haven, 
 
 etc. R. Co., 13 
 Von Steuben v. Central R. Co., 413 
 Von Wallhoffen v. Newcombe, 573 
 Voorhees v. Martin, 303 
 Vormus v. Coal Co. , 190 
 Vosburgh v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 194 
 Vosper V. New York, 354 
 Voss V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 526 
 Vreeland v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 307, 
 
 483 
 Vruland v. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 
 
 476 
 Vroman v. Rogers, 726 
 Vrooman v. Lawyer, 639 
 
 Wabash v. Carver, 380 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Jones, 481, 484 
 V. McDaniels, 189, 191. 203 
 v. Williamson, 417tt, 424, 4155 
 Wabash, etc. R. Co.v. Brown, 187, 436 
 V. Forshee, 435, 436 
 V. Hawk, 233 
 V. Hicks. 478, 485 
 V. Koenigsam. 494 
 V. Locke, 16, 57 
 V. Nice, 434, 451a 
 V. Rector. 749 
 
 V. Shacklet, 66, 123, 185, 520 
 V. Fretts, 436 
 V. Wallace, 103, 483 
 Western R- v. Brow. 60a, 193 
 Wabasha v. Soiithworth, 384 
 R. Co. V. Defiance, 334 
 Wade V. Lerov, 7.i8, 760 
 Wadswoith v" Duke, 225 
 V. McDougall. 730 
 V. Marshall, 568, 688a 
 V. Tillotson, 729, 730 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co.. 531, 756 
 Waffle V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 735 
 Wagner v. Bissell, 656 
 
 V. Jayne Co., 209a, 215 
 V. Long Tel. R. Co., 729 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 513a 
 V. Woolsey, 135 
 Wait V. Bennington, etc. R Co., 434, 
 455, 466a 
 v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 455 
 
 Waite V. Nortlieastern R. Co., 74, 77 
 Waixel v. Harrison, 688 
 Wakefield v. Connecticut, etc. R. 
 Co., 13, 37, 436, 468, 469 
 
 V. Moore, 616 
 
 V. Newport. 258, 299 
 Wakeham v. St. Clair, 351, 369, 375 
 Wakelin v. Southeastern R. Co., 
 
 109, 114 
 Wakeman v. Gowdy. 566, 587 
 
 V. Hazleton, 557 
 
 v. Robinson, 16 
 Walbert v. Trexler, 190 
 Walcott V. Swampscott, 291 
 Waldele v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 60a, 
 
 477 
 Waldo V. Beokwith, 47 
 
 V. Goodsell, 134, 138 
 
 V. Wallace, 303, 303 
 Waldron v. Haverhill, 259, 285 
 
 V. Hopper, 644 
 Walkenhauer v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 466a 
 Walker v. Bank of State of N. Y., 
 580, 581 
 
 V. BoUing, 204 
 
 V. Boston & Maine R. Co., 341, 
 436 
 
 V. Butz, 731 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 689 
 
 V. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 433 
 
 V. Erie K. Co., 517, 758, 760 
 
 V. Globe Mfg. Co., 733 
 
 V. Goodman, 567 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co., 116 
 
 V. Hallock, 313 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 148 
 
 V. Herron, 633, 663 
 
 V. Hobbs, 709 
 
 V. Kansas City, 393 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 216, 
 775 
 
 V. Lookport, 353 
 
 V. Midland R. Co., 466 
 
 V. Pt. Pleasant, 334 
 
 V. Reidsville, 377 
 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 763 
 
 V. Stevens, 577 
 
 V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 530 
 
 V. Wasco county, 256 
 
 V. Westfield, 108 
 
 V. Wildman, 576 
 
 V. Winstanley, 705 
 Walkup V. May, 654 
 Wall V. Delaware, etc. R. Co. , 193 
 
 V. Des Moines, etc. R. Co., 433 
 
 V. Highland. 373, 375 
 
 V. Livezay, 516 
 Wallace v. Central Vt. R. Co., 1856, 
 199, 307a, 313 
 
 V. Douglas, 628 
 
 V. Evans. 334 
 
 V. Lent. 709 
 
clxxiv 
 
 Re/erencelrl TABLE OF CASES. [""-^ to sections. 
 
 Wallace v. Merrimac Eiver Nav. Co., 
 104, 154 
 
 V. Morss, 121 
 
 V. Muscatine, 387 
 
 V. N. Haven, etc. R. Co,, 73a 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 437, 
 460, 467 
 
 V. Standard Oil Co., 219 
 
 V. Suburban B. Co., 483, 485c 
 
 V. Western N. C. E. Co., 518a, 
 760 
 
 V. Wilmington, etc. E. Co., 
 506, 5.'1 
 Waller v. Dubuque, 391 
 
 V. Hebron, 888, 856 
 
 V. Lasher, 14 
 
 V. Southeastern E. Co., 241 
 Walley v. Holt, 121 
 Walling V. Congarce Constr. Co., 185 
 Wallis V. Lambat, 557 
 Wallsworth v. McCuUough, 303 
 Wain V. Beaver, 563 
 Walpole V. Carlisle, 559 
 Walrath v. Eediield, 739 
 Walser v. W. U. Tel. Co , 753a 
 Walsh V. Buffalo, 363, 373 
 
 V. Consol. Laundry Co., 185 
 
 V. Fitchburg E. Co., 410, 705 
 
 V. Mead, 343 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 485 
 
 V. New York, 295, 83u 
 
 V. N. Y., etc. E. Co., 410 
 
 V. Oregon, etc. E. Co., 108 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 185, 
 205 
 
 Y. Trustees of Brooklyn Bridge, 
 295, 330 
 Walter v. Kensinger, 115 
 
 V. Post, 744 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 519, 533 
 Walthani v. Kemper, 256, 258 
 Walters v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 65, 
 73, 78, 84, 85 
 
 V. Collins Park E. Co., 530 
 
 V. Phila. Traction Co., 508 
 
 v. Sykes, 618 
 Walther v. Pacific E. Co., 436 
 Walthers v. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 435 
 Walton V. Booth, 691 
 
 V. Brighton, etc. E. Co., 684, 
 639 
 
 Y. N. Y. Central Sleeping Car 
 Co., 148 
 Wanata, The, 93 
 
 Wanless v. Northeastern R. Co. , 466 
 Wann v. Western U. Tel. Co., 553, 
 
 553 
 Wannaraaker v. Burke, 209a 
 Wanstall v . Pooley, 157 
 Warburton v. Great Western E. Co., 
 
 178, 325, 334 
 Ward, The, 132 
 
 Y. Andrevcs, 701 
 
 Ward V. Brown, 635 
 
 V. Central Park E. Co., 523 
 
 V. Chesapeake, etc. H. Co., 307 
 
 Y. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 93, 461 
 
 V. Fagan, 710 
 
 V. Fagin, 708 
 
 V. Farwell, 334 
 
 Y. Folly, 334 
 
 Y. Hartford county, 356 
 
 Y. Jefferson, 25y, 367 
 
 Y. Lee, 577 
 
 Y. Louisville, 361 
 
 Y. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 679 
 
 Y. Newark, etc. Turnp. Co. , 386, 
 
 388 
 Y. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 493 
 Y. North Haven, 346, 894 
 V. Southern Pac. E. Co., 97, 
 
 114, 484, 485 
 Y. Young, 150, 160 
 Warden v. Old Colony R. Co., 197 
 Wardlaw v. California R. Co., 56, 
 
 531 
 Ware v. Allen, 739 
 
 V. Gay, 516 
 Warfield v. N. Y. , Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 477 
 Ward well v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 
 
 493 
 Warn v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 303 
 Warner v. Chamberlain, 633, 761 
 Y. Erie E. Co.. 184, 230 
 Y. Griswold, 577 
 V. Holyoke, 363, 856 
 Y. McGarry, 384 
 V. N. Y. Central E. Co , 460, 
 
 463, 475 
 V. Southern Pac. Co., 749 
 Warren Y. Boston, etc. E. Co., 466, 
 761 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 430, 
 
 486 
 Y. Clement, 838 
 Y. Fitchburg, etc. E. Co., 65, 
 
 91, 473, 477, 488, 490, 506 
 V. Kauffman, /09 
 V. Keokuk, etc. E. Co., 437 
 Y. Wright. 353 
 
 Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 585, 
 598 
 Warsaw y. Dunlap, 358 
 Washburn v. Tracy, 653, 654 
 
 etc. Mfg. Oo. V. Worcester, 
 358 
 Washington v. Baltimore, etc. E. 
 Co., 419 
 V. Missouri, etc. E. Co., 333 
 Y. Nashville, 343 
 Y. Ealeigh, etc. E. Co., 503 
 Y. SmaU, 369 
 Y. Spokane E. Co. , 519 
 Gas Co. Y. Dist. of Columbia, 
 693 
 
Kc/erctices\ TABLE OF CASES. W^ to sections. clxXV 
 
 Washington Ice Co. v. Lay, :!33, 334 
 
 Natural Gas Co. v. Wilkinson, 
 
 333 
 
 Washington, etc. R. Co. v. Brown. 503 
 
 V. Harmon, 104, 108, 114, 508, 
 
 743 
 V. McDade, 184, 188 
 Wasmer v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 85, 
 
 94, 379, 40:i, 415, 459 
 Wasmuth v. Butler, 645 
 Wasson v. Canfleld, 303 
 V. Mitchell, 310 
 V. Pettit, 56, 703 
 Water Co. v. Duncan, 118, 175, 298 
 Waterbury v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 61, 489 
 V. Wester velt, 618 
 Waterford, etc. R. Co. v. Kearney, 
 416 
 etc. Turnp, Co. v. People, 386, 
 387 
 Waterhouse v. Wait, 618 
 Waterloo Milling Co. v. Kueniter, 
 
 583 
 Waterman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 55, 743 
 V.Connecticut, etc. R. Co., 413 
 Watertown v. Cowen, 333 
 Waters v. Bay View, 374 
 
 V. Greenleaf Lumber Co., 165, 
 
 750 
 V. Moss, 656 
 V. Pioneer Fuel Co., 165 
 Pierce Oil Co. v. King, 680 
 Watier v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 451a 
 Watkins v. County Court, 354 
 v. Goodall, 710 
 V. Lynch, 336 
 V. Penna. R. Co., 503 
 V, Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 530 
 V. Roberts, 39 
 Watkinson v. Bennington, 619 
 Watson V. Bauer. 57 
 
 V. Georgia Pac. R. Co., 580 
 V. Houston, etc. R. Co., 185 
 V. Kingston. 371, 374, 383 
 V. Lisbon Bridge Co., 393. 752 
 V. Minneapolis R. Co., 485a, 
 
 485c 
 V. Mound City R. Co., 485c 
 V. Muirhead, 558, 559, 574 
 V. Northern R. Co,. 522, 
 V. OxannaLand Co., 506. 705 
 V. St. Paul City R. Co., 51, 495 
 V. Todd, 618 
 Lodge V. Drake, 701 
 Watt V. Nevada Cent. R. Co,, 673, 
 
 675, 745, 751 
 Watts V. Boston Towboat Co. , 321 
 V. Hart, 184, 185, 303, 341 
 V. Porter, 575 
 
 e. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 480 
 Waud V. Polk county, 369, 376 
 
 Waxahachie v. Connor, 334 
 Way V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 207, 488 
 V. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 56, 107 
 V. Powers, 144, 147 
 V. R. R. Co., 113 
 V. Townsend, 303 
 Wayne Turnp. Co. v. Berry, 3P9 
 Weare v. Fitcliburg, 89, 333, 353 
 Weatherhed V. Bray, 374 
 Weaver v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 
 133, 138 
 V. Bullis, 73, 75 
 V. Devendorf, 249, 303 
 V. IseHn, 318 
 V. Ward, 686 
 Weavers v. Wood, 121 
 Webb V. Browning, 557 
 
 V. Denver, etc. R. Co., 338, 
 
 763, 767 
 V. Portland Mfg. Co. 730, 733 
 V. Portland, etc. R. Co , 457, 
 
 466 
 V. Rennie, 194 
 
 V. Rome. etc. R. Co., 30, 55, 
 665, 666 
 Webber v. Closson, 418 
 V. Hoag, 632 
 V. Piper, 194a, 195 
 Weber v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 479 
 V. Creston. 334a, 369 
 V. Kansas City R. Co., 520 
 V. Morris, etc" R. Co., 7C5 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 417, 457, 
 
 463, 466, 476 
 Wagon Co. v. Kehl, 215 
 Webster v. Elmira, etc. R. Co , 516 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co. , 488 
 v. Fleming, 729 
 V. Hillsdale county. 256 
 V. Hudson River" R. Co., 31, 
 
 65, 66, 359 
 V. Quimby, 623 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co., £9, 93, 
 
 465, 519, 523 
 V. Symes, 30, 666, 668 
 Weckerlv v. Geyer, 310 
 Wed dell "v. Hapner, 735 
 Wedgwood v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 194a, 204 
 Weed V. Ballston Spa, 368, 369, 374, 
 376 
 V. Greenwich, 359 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 477 
 V. Panama R. Co., 14, 146, 150, 
 
 155, 495, 513 
 V. Saratoga, etc. R. Co.. 23 
 Week V. Fremont Mill Co., 21 (J 
 Weeklund v. So. Oregon Co., 185, 195 
 Weeks v. Lyndon, 379 
 
 V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 
 93. 477, 480 
 v. Shirley, 338, 749a 
 Weems v. Mathieson, 187, 194 
 
clxxvi 
 
 References] TABLE OF CASES. ["« to sections. 
 
 Weet V. Brockport, 118, 281, 289 
 Weger v. Pennsylvania R. Co , 180 
 Wegmann v. Jefferson City, 274 
 Wegner v. Calder, 612 
 Welin V. Gage county, 256 
 Weick V. Lander, 31, 35, 359 
 "Weidekin v. Snelson, 785 
 Weidenian v. Tacoma R. Co , 60 
 Weiglitman v. Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co., 510 
 
 V. Washington, 118, 356, 273, 
 378, 285 
 Weilv. Dry Dock, etc. R. Co., 73, 
 
 73a, 82 
 Weiler v. Manhattan R. Co., 55, 531 
 "Weimer v. Sloane, 558 
 Weirs v. Jones county, 367, 369, 376 
 Weis V. Madison, 56, 374 
 Weisenberg v. Appleton, 369, 743 
 
 V. Winneoonne, 133, 394, 396 
 Weiss %'. Pennsylvania R. Co., 108, 
 
 114 
 Weisser v. Denison , 69 
 Weissner v. St. Paul City R. Co., 73 
 Weitner v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co. , 
 
 399 
 Welch V. Brainard, 207 
 
 V. Durand, 748 
 
 V. McAllister, 704 
 
 V. Pullman Car Co., 526 
 
 V. Sage, 30 
 
 V. Wesson, 64, 646 
 Weld V. Chadbourne, 618 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 115 
 Welddes v. Edsell, 590 
 Weldon V. Harlem R. Co., 147, 639, 
 
 634 
 Welfare v. Brighton R. Co., 56, 159, 
 
 194 
 Wellcome v. Leeds, 358 
 Weiler v. Burlington, 263 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 92, 114, 
 473, 4816 
 
 V. London, etc. R. Co., 509 
 
 V. McCormick, 343, 354, 703 
 Welles V. Hutchinson, 598 
 Welling V. Judge, 645, 654 
 Wellington v. Downer Oil Co., 117 
 
 V. Greyson, 358, 367 
 Wellman v. Susquehanna Depot, 346, 
 
 356, 376. 378 
 Wells V. Beal, 418 
 
 V. Brooklyn R. Co., 485c 
 
 V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 198 
 
 V. Coe, 317 
 
 V. Denver, etc. Ry. Co., Ill, 
 773 
 
 V. Howell. 655 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 103, 
 505 
 
 V. Sibley, 368, 703 
 
 V. World's Med. Asso., 612 
 
 Wells V. Gortorski, 209a 
 
 etc. Co. V. Miskowicz, 218 
 Wellsborough, etc. Co. v. Griffin, 388 
 Welsch V, Hannibal, etc. E. Co., 466 
 Welsh V. Argyle, 376 
 
 V. Jackson, 99 
 
 V. Rutland, 265, 373 
 
 V. St. Louis, 398 
 
 V. Wilson, 362 
 Welter v. St. Paul, 289 
 Welty V. Indianapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 453 
 Wend V. Bond, 659 
 WendaU v. Baxter, 725, 736 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. E. Co., 
 73a 
 
 V. Pratt, 16 
 Wendell v. Corbin, 525 
 
 V. Baxter, 333 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 90, 475, 476 
 
 V. Troy, 118, 363, 389, 358, 367. 
 374 
 Wentworth v. Jefferson, 104 
 Wenzlick v. McCotter, 343 
 Werk V. Illinois Steel Co., 207 
 Werle v. Long Island R. Co., 533 
 Werely v. Persons, 60a 
 Wertheimer v. Howard, 303 
 Wertz V. Western U. Tel. Co., 553 
 Wescott V. N. Y. & New England R. 
 
 Co., 2076 
 Wesley Coal CJo. v. Healer, 89 
 West V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 678, 679 
 
 V. Eau Clair, 369, 375 
 
 V. Forrest, 758 
 
 V. Lynn, 350 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 709a 
 
 V. Martin, 93 
 
 V. St. Paul Nat. Bank, 581 
 
 V. Ward, 39 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 543, 
 756 
 West Branch Bank v. Fulmer, 581, 
 
 587a 
 West End, etc. R. Co. v. Mozely, 508 
 Westchester, etc. R. Co. v. McElwee, 
 53. 54 
 
 R. Co. V. Miles, 493 
 West Chicago, R. Co. v. Craig, 490 
 
 V. Devyer, 307a 
 
 V. Martin, 516 
 West Jersey R. Co. v. Ewan, 114 
 
 V. Paulding, 60c 
 West Mahoney v. Watson. 346 
 West Orange v. Field, 274 
 West Point Iron Co. v. Reimert, 739 
 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 737 
 Westaway v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 464 
 
 V. Frost, 563 
 Westbrook v. Mobile, etc. E. Co., 71, 
 73a, 78 
 
Re/ere7iLCs\ TABLE OF CASES. \are to sections, clx.wii 
 
 Westcott V. Fargo, 555 
 "Westerberg v. Kinzua R. Co., 71 
 Westeriield v. Levis, 73, 78 
 Western Coal Co. v. Ingraliam, 1856, 
 
 717 
 Western College v. Cleveland, 361 
 Western Maryland B. Co. v. Harold, 
 490, 500 
 V. Kehoe. 476, 484 
 V. Stockdale, 493 
 Mining Co. v. Ingraham, 233a 
 Western, etc. R. Co. v. Atlanta, 289 
 V. Bishop, 195, 241d 
 V. King, 457 
 V. Ledbetter, 761a 
 V. Moore, 769 
 V. Roberson, 61 
 V. Steadly, 431 
 V. Strong, 133, 178, 241d 
 V. Trimmier, 439 
 V. Young, 13, 73, 761 
 Western Railway v. Sistrunk, 13 
 Western Savings Fund v. Philadel- 
 phia, 285, 286 
 Western Stone Co. v. Whalen, 192 
 Western Transp. Co. v. Nevrhall, 550 
 Western U. Tel. Co. v. Adams, 553, 
 757 
 V. Allen, 531 
 V. Arevine, 553 
 V. Aubrey, 755 
 V. Barnes, 540a 
 V. Beringer, 543, 756 
 V. Bierhaus, 531 
 V. Blanchard, 534,538,558,554. 
 
 555 
 V. Boots, 541 
 V. Bowen, 753a 
 V. Brightwell, 531 
 V. Broesche, 539, 540, 555 
 V. Brovi^n, 739, 753a 
 V. Bruner, 540a 
 V. Buchanan, 539 
 V. Call Pub. Co., 534 
 V. Carew, 532, 534, 537, 548, 
 
 553 
 V. Carter, 5Wa, 754, 756 
 V. Clarke, 531, 540a 
 v. Clifton, 754 
 V. Cline, 756 
 V. Cobbs, 554 
 V. Coffin, 543, 754, 756 
 V. Cohen, 537, 755 
 V. Collins, 755 
 V. Cook, 542 
 V. Cooledge, 554 
 V. Cooper, 540a, 542, 756 
 V. Crall, 543, 553, 753a 
 V. Crawford, 553, 755 
 V. Culberson, 554 
 V. Cunningham, 239, 543, 549, 
 
 749, 754. 756 
 V. Davis, 531 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I— 1.] 
 
 Western U. Tel. Co. v. De Jaries, 539 
 V. Dougherty, 554 
 V. Dozier, 540 
 V. Dubois, 543 
 V. Dunfield, 554 
 V. Edsall, 537, 540, 541, 543, 
 
 552 
 V. Edwards, 531 
 V. Eskridge. 539, 543, 754 
 V. Evans, 543 
 V. Eyser, 85. 359 
 V. Fatman, 555, 754, 755 
 V. Fellner, 753a 
 V. Fenton, 553, 555, 755, 757 
 V. Ferguson, 538, 554 
 V. Fontaine, 534 
 V. Fore, 543 
 
 V. Georgia Cotton Co., 540, 546 
 V. Gidcumb. 756 
 V. Griffin. 531 
 V. Griswold, 543 
 V. Hall, 23, 755 
 V. Haman, 754 
 V. Hamilton, 531 
 V. Harding, 540, 756 
 V. Harper, 753a 
 V. Hearn, 553 
 V. Henderson, 540a, 546, 554, 
 
 756 
 V. Hoffman, 71, 77, 78 
 V. Hope, 537 
 V. Houghton, 540a 
 V. Howell, 543 
 V. Hutcheson, 538 
 V. Hyer, 541, 754 
 V. James. 554, 755 
 V. Jobe, 540a, 554, 754 
 V. Johnson, 543 
 V. Jones, 531, 540, 543, 653, 554 
 V. Karr, 540a, 554 
 V. Kemp, 531, 541, 554 
 V. Kendzora, 753a 
 V. Kerr. 756 
 V. Kinney, 757 
 V. Kinsley, 554, 7.56 
 V. Liddell, 543, 546 
 V. Linn, 555. 754, 756 
 V. Linney, 755 
 V. Lively, 754 
 V. Longwill, 543. 755 
 V. Lowrey. 531, 553, 754 
 T. Lydon, 756 
 V. Lyman, 544, 555 
 V. McCoy, 540a. 554 
 V. McDaniel, 556a 
 V. McGuire, 546 
 V. McKibben, 531, 543, 554,755 
 V. McLaurin, 538 
 V. McMuUen, 303 
 V. Mansfield, 531 
 V. Martin, 754 
 V. May, 546. 554 
 V. Meek, 542, 547 
 
cl 
 
 xxvm 
 
 References] TABLE OF CASES. [«'•<■ '» sections. 
 
 ■Western U. Tel. Co. v. Mellon, 531, 543 
 V. Meredith, 554 
 V. Merrill, 540a 
 V. Meyer, 540tt 
 V. Michelson, 531, 555 
 V. Moore, 531, 540a. 545, 546 
 V. Moss, 531 
 V. MuUins, 148 
 y. Munford. 544 
 V. Murphey, 531 
 V. Nations, 756 
 V. Neel, 540, 549 
 V. Neil, 534 
 V. Neill, 555 
 V. Newhouse, 756 
 V. O'Keefe, 549 
 V. Patrick, 531, 556a 
 V. Pelzer, 540 
 V. Pendleton, 531, 757 
 y. Phillips, 554, 555 
 V. Piner, 553, 554 
 T. Power, 531 
 V. Pruett, 540a, 552 
 V. Quinn, 18 
 V. Rains, 554 
 V. Randies, 756 
 V. Reeves. 541 
 V. Reynolds, 546, 754 
 V. Richman, 543, 555 
 T. Robinson, 755 
 V. Rogers, 756 
 V. Rosentreter, 540a, 555 
 V. Rountree, 531 
 T. Ryals, 531 
 V. Scircle. 543, 757 
 V. Sheffield. 754, 755 
 V. Short, 543, 553, 754 
 V. Shotter, 755 
 V. Shumate, 544 
 V. Simpson, 555, 756 
 V. Smith, 543. 5o6a, 753a, 756 
 V. Stevenson, 553 
 V. Stone, 756 
 V. Stratemeier, 554, 756 
 V. Taylor, 540a 
 V. Teague, 546 
 V. Terrell, 554 
 V. Thorn, 698 
 Y. Timmons, 54, 531 
 Y. Trotter, 546 
 V. Trumbell, 554 
 Y. Valentine, 754, 755 
 V. Watson, 753a 
 V. Way, 555 
 Y. Wilhelm. 755 
 Y. Williford, 755 
 Y. Wilson, 540, 543, 754 
 V. Wingate, 546 
 V. Womack, 546, 756 
 V. Wood, 543. 756 
 V. Woods, 540a 
 
 Y. Yopst, 104.540a, 546, 554,555 
 V. Young, 540a 
 
 Weston V. Alden, 739 
 
 Y. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., 87,93 
 506, 704, 705 
 
 V. Tailors of Potter-row, 733 
 
 Y. Troy, 363, 375 
 Wetmore v. Atl. Lead. Co., 333 
 
 Y. Little Miami R. Co., 154 
 
 Y. Tracy, 365 
 Weyant v. Harlem R. Co., 144 
 Weyerhauser v. Dun, 583, 587a 
 Weyl v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 476 
 Weymire v. Wolfe, 65 
 Weymouth V. Broadway, etc. R. Co., 
 533 
 
 Y. New Orleans, 341 
 Whaalen y. Mad River, etc. R. Co., 
 
 180, 335, 339, 341 
 Wbalenv. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 471 
 
 v. Citizens' Gas Co., 376 
 
 v. Gloucester, 709a 
 
 Y. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 216, 406 
 
 Y. N. Y. Central R. Co., 477 
 
 Y. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 114 
 Whaley v. Bartlett, 233, 230 
 
 V. Laing, 85 
 Wharton v. Stevens, 735 
 What Cheer Coal Co. v. Johnson, 330 
 Whatman v. Pearson, 155 
 Wheatley v. Baugh, 739 
 
 V. Chrisman, 734 
 
 Y. Mercer, 256 
 Wheaton v. Hadley, 369 
 Wheelan v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 775 
 Wheeler v. Brant, 626, 638, 639, 633, 
 643 
 
 V. Berry, 1^6a 
 
 T. Cincinnati, 265 
 
 Y. ErieR. Co., 425 
 
 Y. Nesbitt, 303 
 
 Y. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 673, 674, 
 675, 676 
 
 V. Patterson, 310 
 
 v. Plymouth 263, 358 
 
 Y. Rowell, 657 
 
 Y. St. Joseph Stock. Yards Co , 
 705 
 
 v. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 
 503 
 
 Y. Thomas, 618 
 
 V. Townshend, 751 
 
 V. Troy, 338 
 
 Y. Wasson Mfg. Co., 203 
 
 Y. Westport, 87, 89, 358 
 
 Y. Worcester, 735 
 Wheeler, etc. Co. v. Boyce, 749 
 Wheelock v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 Wheelson y. Hardisty, 56 
 Wheelwright y. Boston, etc. R. 
 
 473 
 Whelan v. N. Y.. Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 758, 760 
 Whelden y. Chappel, 104 
 Wherry v. Duluth, etc. R. Co., 479 
 
 ,89 
 
 Co., 
 
Re/erences-\ TABLE> OF CASES. Wre to sections. clxXlX 
 
 Whilton V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 470 
 Whipple V. Fair Haven, 368 
 Whirley v. Whitman, 73, 86 
 Whissler v. Walsh, 647 
 Whitaker v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 518 
 
 V. West Boylston, 376 
 Whitbeok v. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 
 419, 432 
 
 V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 750 
 Whitcomb v. Bari-e, 115 
 
 V. Oilman, 104 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 481a 
 White V. Atlanta R. Co., 530 
 
 V. Augusta, etc. R. Co., 480 
 
 V. Bond county, 356 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 516 
 
 V. Central R. Co., 480 
 
 V. Chapin, 735 
 
 V. Charleston, 256 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co,, 673, 750 
 
 V. Chowan county, 856 
 
 V. Concord R. Co., 57, 108, 433, 
 433 
 
 V. Crisp, 788 
 
 V. FitchburgR. Co., 463, 495 
 
 V. France, 705 
 
 V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co , 
 493 
 
 V. Hindley Local Board, C28 
 
 V. Hoyt, 179 
 
 V. Kennon, 238 
 
 V. Lang, 104 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 303, 
 3076, 338 
 
 V. Milwaukee R. Co., 743 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 678 
 
 V. Montgomerv, 708, 709, 713, 
 73:3 
 
 V. Nellis. 115 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 483 
 
 V. N. Y.. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 673 675 
 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 513 
 
 V. Phillips, 735, 726 
 
 V. Quincy, 3!i2 
 
 V. Reagan, 574 
 
 V. Road District, 356 
 
 V. South Shore R. Co., 733 
 
 V. The Governor, 249 
 
 V. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., 472 
 
 V. Webb, 119 
 
 V. West End R. Co.. 530 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 553, 
 555. 556 
 
 V. Whittemann Lithographic 
 Co.. 219a 
 
 V. Wilcox. 616 
 
 V. WinnisimmetCo., 487 
 
 V. Yazoo City, 262. 274, 737 
 White River Log Co. v. Nelson. 731 
 White Water R. Co. v. Butler, 509 
 White, etc. R. Co. v. Quick, 434 
 
 Whitehead v. Greetham, 563, 575 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 513a 
 Whitehouse v. Birmingham Canal 
 Co., 403, 738 
 
 V. Fellows, 359 
 Whitelaw v. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 319a 
 Whitelegge v. De Witt, 569 
 Whiteley v. Pepper, 141, 176 
 Whitesell v. Hill, 603 
 Whitesides v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 433 
 Whitfield V. CarroUton, 385, 367 
 
 V. Despenser, 319, 331 
 
 V. Meridian, 389, 368, 374 
 
 V. Paris, 291 
 Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 124, 
 181 139 
 
 V. Southbridge, 376 
 Whitlock V. Comes, 530 
 Whitmore v. Boston, etc. E. Co., 307 
 Whitney v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 
 130a. 444, 445 
 
 V. Cliflford. 58, 174 
 
 V. Essex, 334 
 
 V. Hitchcock, 763 
 
 V. Leominster, 606 
 
 V. Lynn, 368 
 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 410, 451 
 
 V. Merchants' Ex. Co. 569, 587a 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 350 
 
 V. Ticonderoga, 338 
 Whiton V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 133 
 Whittaker v. Coombs, 331 
 
 \. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 99, 
 114, 192, 203, 203a 
 
 V. Harlem R. Co., 13 
 
 V. Helena, 66 
 
 V. West Boylston, 376 
 Whittemore v. Thomas, 635 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 540a, 
 546 
 Whitten v. Hartin, 686 
 Whittier v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 437, 
 451a 
 
 V. CocliecoMfg. Co., 729 
 Whyte V. Nashville, 343 
 Wichita v. Coggshall. 374 
 Wichita, etc. R. Co v. Davis, 103, 476 
 
 V. Gibbs. 159 
 Wicks V. De Witts, 363, 374 
 Wickware v. Bryan, 303 
 Wickwire v. Angola, 384 
 Wiedmer v. N. Y. Elev. R. Co., 60 
 Wiel V. Wright, 654 
 Wiggett V. Fox, 325 
 Wiggins V. Boddington. 371 
 
 V. Hathaway, 321 
 
 V. Tallmadge. 333 
 Wigmore v. Jay, 65, 180, 327 
 Wilber v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 207 
 Wilbrand v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 480 
 Wilbur V, Hubbard, 636, 638 
 
elx 
 
 XXX 
 
 References^ TABLE OF CASES. \fl-re to sections. 
 
 Wilcox V. Brown, 619 
 V. Chicago, 265 
 V. Hausch, 729 
 V. Plummer, 567, 753 
 V. Rome. etc. R. Co., 476, 483 
 V. N.Y., Lake Erie, etc. E. Co., 
 478 
 Wild V. Oregon, etc. E. Co., 203 
 
 V. Paterson, 265 
 Wilde V. Lynn, etc. E. Co., 533 
 Wilder v. Maine, etc. R. Co., 418, 419, 
 422, 451a 
 T. St. Paul, 834 
 V. Speer, 641 
 V. Stanley, 31 . 
 Wilds V. Brunswick, etc. R. Co., 472 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 61, 64, 
 65, 90,96, 103, 111,463,475 
 Wiley V. Slater, 643 
 
 V. Strickland, 303 
 Wilkes V. Dinsman, 317 
 
 V. Hungerford Market Co., 371 
 Wilkie V. Bolster, 516 
 Wilkins v. McCue. 739 
 
 V. Rutland, 286, 338 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 1, 468 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 Wilkinsburg v. Home for Aged 
 
 Women, 343 
 Wilkinson v. Detroit Steel Works, 176 
 V. Fairrie, 704 
 V. Parrott, 635 
 V. State, 104 
 Will V. Mendon, 60a, 334a 
 
 V Postal Cable Co., 546, 554 
 Willard v. Cambridge, 370, 371 
 V. Killingworth, 254 
 V. Newbury, 358, 389 
 V. Pinard, 114, 343 
 V. Sherborne, 338, 373 
 Willetts V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 84 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. C. R. Co., 750 
 Willey V. Allegheny, 725 
 V. Belfast, 346 
 V. Ellsworth. 351, 356 
 V. Catling, 256 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 735 
 V. Portsmouth, 351, 356 
 Williams v. Barber. 739 
 V. Bower, 303 
 V. Bridges, 619 
 V. Cameron, 131 
 V. Central R. Co., 207 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 470, 
 
 476, 483 
 V. Churchill, 223 
 V. Clinton, 87, 377 
 V. Clough, 197 
 V. Cummin gton, 334 
 V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 85, 199 
 V. East India Co. , 690 
 V. Edmunds, 94 
 V. Fresno Canal Co., 175 
 
 Williams v. Gale, 739, 736 
 
 V. Gardiner, 74 
 
 V. Gibbs, 567 
 
 V. GUman, 618 
 
 V. Grand Rapids, 262, 389 
 
 V. Grealy, 654 
 
 V. Great Western R. Co., 57, 
 417 
 
 V. Groucutt, 704 
 
 V. Hart, 592 
 
 V. Hays, 131, 413 
 
 V. Hingham Tump. Co., 387 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 484 
 
 V. Ladew, 733 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co-, 535 
 
 V. McDonald, 589 
 
 V. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 61, 64, 
 418, 430 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 193, 217 
 
 V. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 489 
 
 V. Moray, 639 
 
 V. Mostyn, 619 
 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 307&, 
 465 
 
 V. O'Keefe, 56, 646 
 
 V. Pullman Car Co., 151, 492, 
 536 
 
 V. Reed, 572 
 
 V. Richards, 644, 646, 654 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 189, 
 194a, 221 
 
 V. Sheldon, 122, 123 
 
 V. South, etc. R. Co., 139 
 
 V. Stillwell, 356 
 
 V. Tilt, 75 
 
 V. Tripp, 388 
 
 V. Vanderbilt, 503 
 Williamson v. Barrett, 744 
 
 V. Lacy, 303 
 
 .V. Louisville Reform School, 
 331 
 
 v. Newport News, etc. Co., 209 
 
 V. Oleson. 735 
 
 V. Price, 173 
 
 V. Sheldon Marble Co., 218 
 
 V. Wadsworth, 160 
 Willingham v. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 
 538 
 WiUis V. Long Isl. R. Co., 516, 519, 
 533, 533 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 131 
 
 V. Oregon R., etc. Co.. 180 
 
 V. Perrv, 107, 733 
 
 V. Walters, 657 
 Willy V. MuUedy, 703a 
 Wilmott V. Corrigan R. Co., 533 
 Willoughby v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 
 
 473 
 Wilmington v. Vandegrif t, 362 
 Wilson v. Blackbird Creek M. Co., 
 283, 333 
 V. Atlanta, 373, 389 
 V. Atlanta, etc. E. Co., 674 
 
Rd/ertfi^ 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. We u sections, clxxxi 
 
 Wilson V. Baltimore, etc. E. Co., 536 
 V. Brett, 49 
 V. Burr, 557 
 V. Charleston, 376 
 V. Coffin, 5(i6 
 V. Cunningham, 46, 461 
 V. Dumreath Red Stone Co., 
 
 332 
 V. Granby, 749a 
 V. Hillhouse. 617 
 V. Jefferson county, 357, 337 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 633 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 113, 
 
 307 
 V. Marsh, 310 
 V. Merry, 180, 191, 334, 337, 
 
 338, 331 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 207 
 V. New Bedford, 386, 701a, 738 
 V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 
 408 
 V. New York, 363, 374, 375 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 178 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 466, 476 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 433 
 V. Northern R. Co., 449 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 89, 
 
 516, 519, 675 
 V. Ontario, etc. R. Co., 438 
 V. Owens, 143 
 V. Peverly, 146 
 V. Phoenix Powder Co., 689 
 V. Railroad Co., 113 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 468 
 V. Russ, 559 
 v. So, Pac. R. Co., 759 
 V. Spafford 355 
 V. Steel-Edge Stamping Co., 
 
 307, 319 
 V. Strobach, 619 
 V. Susquehanna Turnpike Co., 
 
 373, 379, 386 
 V. Syracuse, 376 
 V. Trafalgar, etc. Road, 376 
 V. Tread well, 708 
 V. Tremont Mills, 186 
 V. Troy, 286. 391, 367 
 V. Tucker, 574 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 436 
 V. Waddell, 736 
 V. Wheeling, 176, 389, 398 
 V. White, 169 
 V. Willimantic Linen Co., 194, 
 
 197, 305 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 434, 433 
 V. Winona, etc. R. Co., 315 
 V. Wright, 623 
 V. York, etc. R. Co.,30 
 Wiltse V. State Bridge Co., 148 
 Wiltsie V. Tilden, 289, 363 
 
 Wilton V. Middlesex R. Co., 489, 491, 
 
 493 
 Winans v. Randolph, 686 
 Winbigler v. Los Angeles, 358, 289 
 Winch V. Conservators of the Thames, 
 
 354 327 
 Winchell v.' Abbott, 54, 476 
 Windsor v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 453 
 Wines v. Rio Grande R. Co., 433 
 Winey v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 476 
 Wingate v. Mechanics' Bank, 581, 
 
 583 
 Winkv. Weiler, 190 
 Winn Case, 63 
 
 V Lowell, 88. 368, 481 
 V. Rutland, 381 
 Winnegar v. Central, etc. R. Co., 513 
 Winner v. Oakland, 67. 376 
 Winnt V. International, etc. R. Co., 
 
 137 
 Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 263, 385 
 Winship v. Enfield. 61, 110, 346, 350, 
 
 355, 374, 378 
 Winslow V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 535 
 V. Mt. Pleasant, 340 
 V. Pleasant Prairie, 430 
 Winsmore v. Greenbank, 709a 
 Winstanley V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 466, 467 
 Winston v. Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 439 
 Winter v. Central Iowa R. Co. , 741 
 
 V. Federal St. R. Co., 485c 
 Winterbottom v. Wright,. 8, 116 
 
 V. Derby, 8 
 Winters v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co, 
 519 
 V. Jacobs. 658 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 78, 
 
 4S5a 
 V. New York, 286 
 Wintuska v. Louisville, etc. E. Co., 
 
 333 
 Wischam v. Rickards, 183. 
 Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ross, 130a, 
 
 413 
 Wise V. Ackerman, 60h, 197 
 
 v. Covington, etc. R. Co., 54 
 V. Freshly, 751 
 V. So. Covington, 513 
 V. Withers, 303 
 Wiseman v. Booker, 418 
 Wiswall V. Brinson, 173, 699 
 
 V. Doyle, 72 
 Witham v. Portland, 367 
 Witherell v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 489 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 418 
 Witherly v. Regent's Canal Co., 61, 
 
 65, 99, 401 
 Withers v. North Kent R. Co., 16, 
 
 407 
 Witowski V. Brennan, 619 
 
clxxxii 
 
 Rc/crcmes-\ TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Witte V. Dieffenbach, 361 
 
 V. Hague, 244 
 
 V. Stifel, 718 
 Wittenberg v. Tietz, 702 
 Wittkowsky v. Wasson, 56 
 Wiwirowski v. Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 1]3 
 Wixon V. Bear River, etc. Co., 734 
 
 V. Newport, 258, 367 
 Woburn v. Boston, etc. R. Co. , 384 
 Wohlfahrt v. Beckert, 117, 690 
 Wolf, Matter of, 561 
 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 
 201 
 
 V. Holton, 340 
 
 V. Kilpatrick, 144, 705, 708 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. Water Co., 16 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 Wolfe V. Dorr, 619 
 
 V. Erie Tel. Co., 359 
 
 V. Mersereau, 153 
 Wolff Mfg. Co. V. WUson. 645 
 Wolfskehl V. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 
 543 
 Wolsey V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 2076 
 Wolski V. Knapp Co., 319 
 Womack v. Central R. Co., 124 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 556 
 Wonder v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 195, 204 
 Woo Dan v. Seattle R. Co., 520 
 Wood V. Bodine, 621 
 
 V. Bridgeport, 375 
 
 V. Brooklyn R. Co., 533, 523 
 
 T. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 58 
 
 V. Clapp, 606, 607 
 
 V. Edes, 729 
 
 V. Farnell, 803 
 
 v. Gilboa, 273 
 
 V. Heiges, 185, 195 
 
 V. Hopkins, 563 
 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 521 
 
 V. Larue, 640 
 
 V. Locke, 413 
 
 V. Luscomb, 651 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 436 
 
 V. Mears, 359 
 
 V. N. Y. Central E. Co., 485 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 421 
 
 V. School District, 168, 298 
 
 V. Watertown, 291, 367, 760 
 
 V. Waterville, 105, 340, 375 
 
 V. Wand, 733 
 
 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 531 
 
 River Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 
 581, 585 
 Woodard v. Boscobel, 343, 743 
 
 I'. Michigan, etc. R. Co., 131, 
 132 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 476 
 
 Woodbridge v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 473 
 
 V. Marks, 626 
 Woodbury v. Owosso, 368, 380, 744, 
 
 760 
 Woodcock V. Calais, 299 
 Woodell V. West Virginia, Imp. Co., 
 
 201 
 Wooden v. Mt. Pleasant Lumber, etc. 
 Co., 729 
 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 133, 133 
 Woodhead v. Gartness Mineral Co., 
 
 245 
 WoodhuU v. New York, 291 
 Woodman v Hubbard, 104 
 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co.. 58, 359 
 
 V. Nottingham, 1 15, 393 
 
 V. Tufts, 709a, 731 
 Woodring v. Foi-ks Township, 365 
 Woodruff V. Bowen, 702, 705 
 
 V. ErieR. Co., 130a 
 
 V. North Bloomfield Gravel Co., 
 283 
 
 V Northern Pac. R. Co., 484 
 
 Sleeping Coach Co. v. Diehl, 
 526 
 Woodrum v. Clay, 633 
 Woods V. Boston, 375 
 
 V. Colfax county, 256 
 
 V. Groton, 356, 398 
 
 V. Jones, 61 
 
 V. Kansas Citv, 262, 287 
 
 V. Lindvall, 194, 330 
 
 > . Lloyd, 705 
 
 V. Long Island R. Co., 194 
 
 V. Missouri, etc. R. Co., COc 
 
 V. Naumkeag, 709 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 519 
 
 V. Trinity Parish, 703 
 Woodward v. Aborn, 89, 734 
 
 V. Griffith, 662 
 
 v. Hancock, 609 
 
 V. Purdy, 663 
 
 V. Washburn, 115 
 
 V. West Side R. Co., 99 
 Woodyard v. Kentucky Cent. R. Co., 
 
 464 
 Wooley V. Grand St. R. Co., 606,376, 
 
 408, 410 
 Woolf V. Chalker, 97, 638, 629, 632, 
 
 689 
 Woolf oik V. Macon,, etc. R. Co., 487 
 Wooliscroft V. Norton, 443 
 WooUey v. Baldwin, 313 
 Woolery V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 89 
 Woolsey v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 489 
 Woolwinev. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 
 56, 705 
 Wooster V. Broadway, etc. Co., 110 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 99 
 Wooton V. Dawkins, 97, 730 
 Woram v. Noble, 119, 709a 
 Worcester v. Canal Bridge Co. , 356 
 
References} TABLE OF CASES. [are to sections. clxXxiil 
 
 Worden v. Humeston, etc. R. Co 
 306, 309«, 214 
 V. New Bedford, 259, 291 
 V. Witt. 340 
 Wordsworth v. Willan, 649, 651, 654 
 Work V. Hoofnagle, 592 
 Workman v. Great Northern R. Co , 
 33, 750 
 V. New York. 295 
 Works V. Junction R. Co.. 395 
 Wormell v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 185 
 Wormley v. Gregg, 629 
 Wormwood v. Waltham, 373 
 Worsley v. Scarborough, 69 
 Worster v. Forty-second St. etc. R. 
 
 Co.. 359, 407, 408, 417 
 Worth V Edmonds. 95 
 
 V. Gilling, 633 
 Worthen v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 530 
 
 V. Love, 636 
 Worthington v. Central Vt. R. Co., 
 523 
 
 V. Mencer, 88 
 
 V. Parker, 709 
 
 V. Wade, 702 
 Wragge v. South Carolina, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 27 
 Wray v. Evans, 160, 169 
 Wren v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 485 
 Wright -V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 64 
 
 V. Briggs, 254 
 
 V. Brown, 61, 99 
 
 V. Calif ornia Cent, R, Co,, 493 
 
 V, Chicago, etc, R, Co., 512, 665 
 
 V, Child, 622 
 
 V, Cincinnati, etc. R, Co,, 477 
 
 V, Clark, 49 
 
 V, Compton, 244, 248, 688a 
 
 V. Defrees, 249 
 
 V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 73 
 
 V, Hazen, 303 
 
 V, Holbrook, 285 
 
 V, Illinois, etc. R, Co., 93, 95, 
 741 
 
 V. Illinois, etc. Tel. Co., 61 
 
 V. Indianapolis, etc. R. Co., 418 
 
 V. Kansas City, 376 
 
 V, Maiden, etc. R. Co., 71, 74, 
 467, 468 
 
 V, MidlandR, Co.,459, 503 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 192, 
 194, 315, 231,241 
 
 T. Northwestern R. Co., 183 
 
 V. Pearson, 6:8 
 
 V. Rawson, 190 
 
 V. St. Cloud, 376 
 
 V, Shindler, 730 
 
 V, Wheeler, 591 
 
 V. Wilcox 244, 248 
 
 V, Williams, 734 
 
 V. Wilmington, 271, 387, 367 
 
 V. Woodcock. 383 
 
 V. Wright, 657 
 
 Wrinn v. Jones, 652 
 
 Wrought Iron Range Co. v, Martin, 
 
 194 
 Wuotilla V. Duluth Lumber Co., 314 
 Wust V, Erie Iron Works, 215 
 Wyandotte v. White, 85, 289 
 Wyatt V. Citizens' R. Co., 53, 87, 520 
 
 V. Great Western R, Co , 89, 
 93, 479 
 
 V. Harrison, 701 
 
 V. Williams, 124 
 Wychoff V. Queens Ferry Co., 487 
 Wyld V. Pickfod, 49 
 Wylde V. Northern R. Co., 520 
 Wylie V. Birch, 619 
 Wyllie V, Palmer, 117, 148 
 Wymanv. Leavitt, 761 
 
 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 493 
 
 V. Penobscot, etc. R. Co., 444, 
 445 
 
 V, Philadelphia, 363 
 
 V. State, 334 
 Wymore v. Mahaska countv, 78 
 Wynn v. Allard, 110, 114, 644 
 
 V, Central Park, etc. R. Co., 
 473, 495, 497 
 
 v. City, etc. R. Co., 73a, 99 
 Wynne v. Conklin, 219 
 
 Yahn v, Ottumwa, 67 
 Yale V. Hampden Turnp. Co., 387 
 Yancey v. Wabash, et(;. R. Co., 476 
 Yankton Fire Ins. Co. v. Fremont, 
 
 etc. R. Co., 666 
 Yarmouth v. France, 311o, 314 
 Yarnall v. St. Louis, etc. R, Co., 86, 
 
 93 
 Yarnell v. Kansas City R. Co., 492a, 
 
 508, 510, 516 
 Yates V. Brown. 172 
 V. Judd, 387 
 V. Lansing, 803 
 V. McCuUough Iron Co., 316, 
 
 238a 
 V. Squires, 148 
 Yazoo, etc. R. Co. v. Brumfleld, 439 
 
 V. Davis, 412 
 Yeager V, Atchison, etc. R. Co., 476 
 V, Burlington, etc. R. Co., 319a 
 V. Tippecanoe, 256 
 Yearn an v, Noblesville Foundry Co,, 
 
 319a 
 Yearance v. Salt Lake City, 353 
 Yearsley v. Sunset Telephone Co., 
 
 207 
 Yeaton v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 185 
 Yeaw V. Williams, 53, 346, 850 
 Yeazel v. Alexander, 633 
 Yelton v. Evansville, etc. R. Co., 140 
 Yeomans v. Contra Costa, Nav. Co., 
 
 180, 493 
 Yerex v. Eineder, 735 
 Yeriau v. Linkletter, 748, 749 
 
ClxXxiv References} TABLE OF CASES. L.i'v to seetions. 
 
 Yerkes v. Keokuk, etc. K. Co., 51G 
 
 Yoakum v. Mettasch, 99 
 
 Yonge V. Kinney, 516 
 
 Yonoski >-. State, 104 
 
 Yoidy V, Marshall county, 380 
 
 York V. Canada Atl. S. S. Co., 725 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 605 
 
 V. Davis, 658. 604 
 
 V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 431 
 Youll V. Sioux City etc. R. Co., 331 
 Young V. Burlington Mattress Co., 
 195 
 
 V. Charleston, 258, 289 
 
 T. Gentis, TIO 
 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 460 
 
 V. Harvey, 343, 703 
 
 V. Herbert, KO:i 
 
 V. Hosmer, 624 
 
 V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 449 
 
 V. Macomb 338, 374 
 
 V. Murray, 6:^0 
 
 V. New Haven, 355 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 476, 477 
 
 V. Old Colony R Co., 464, 475 
 
 V. Pennsylvania Co., 503 
 
 V, Road Commissioners, 356 
 
 V. South Boston Ice Co., 649 
 
 V. Spencer. 119 
 
 V. Waterville, 389, 333, 334a, 
 543 
 
 V. W. U. Tel. Co., 756 
 
 V, Yarmouth, 351, 358 
 
 Youngblood v. Sexton, 354 
 Youngstown v. Moore, 374 
 Ysleta V. Babbitt, 286 
 Yule V. New Orleans, 265 
 
 Zagelmeyer v. Cincinnati, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 493 
 Zanesville v. Fanan, 358 
 Zeigler v. Danbury, etc. R. Co., 160, 
 
 177, 325 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 463. 
 
 475 
 V. Railroad Co., 90 
 V. South, etc., R. Co., 422 
 Zemlock v. United States, 251 
 Zemp V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 eOtt. 516 
 Zenner v. Blessing, 625 
 Zettler v. Atlanta, 56, 90. 375 
 Ziegler v. Commonwealth, 592 
 Ziemann v. Kieokhefer Elevator Mfg. 
 
 Co., 710a 
 Zimmerman V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 
 61, 88, 464, 481 
 V. Long Isl. R. Co.. 497 
 v. Union R. Co., 48oa 
 Zintek v. Stimson Mill Co., 317, 232, 
 
 233 
 Zoebisch v. Tarbell, 97. 705 
 Zuccarello v. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 
 
 386. 414 
 Zurn V. Tetlow, 218 
 Zwack V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 
 Co.. 467 
 
THE 
 
 LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, 
 
PART I. 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 II. 
 
 III. 
 
 IV. 
 
 V. 
 
 VI. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Negligence in General. 
 
 Proximate Cause. 
 
 Degrees of Negligence. 
 
 Questions of Fact and Law. 
 
 Evidence. 
 
 Contributory Negligence. 
 
 Parties. 
 
 VIII. Deceased Persons. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL. 
 
 3 1. Negligence variously defined. 
 
 2. Difficulty of exact definition. 
 
 3. Definition of actionable negli- 
 
 gence. 
 
 4. Negligence and concurring 
 
 damage distinguished. 
 
 5. Analysis of a cause of action on 
 
 negligence. 
 
 6. Dr. Wharton's definition re- 
 
 viewed. 
 7 Election between intended and 
 unintended injury. 
 
 8. Duty, an essential element. 
 
 9. The duty must be to use care. 
 
 10. The duty must be legal not 
 
 merely moral. 
 
 11. No unreasonable duty re- 
 
 quired. 
 13. In determining duty, regard to 
 
 be had to era. 
 13. Violation of duty imposed by 
 
 statute or ordinance. 
 
 S13a, 
 
 , Regulations for public benefit 
 
 only. 
 A personal duty cannot be 
 
 delegated. 
 15. No negligence where there is no 
 
 breach of duty. 
 Inevitable accident. 
 Apparent exceptions to rule as 
 
 to inevitable accident. 
 What is not inevitable accident. 
 Absence of intent to produce 
 
 damage. 
 20. Distinction between negligence 
 
 and fraud. 
 Defendant's anticipation of in- 
 jury not essential. 
 Election between contract and 
 
 tort. 
 
 23. Damage, an essential element. 
 
 24. Damage must be special to 
 
 plaintiff. 
 24a. Right to recover over. 
 
 14. 
 
 16. 
 17. 
 
 18 
 19, 
 
 21 
 
 23 
 
 Law of Neg. Vol. I — l 
 
 [1] 
 
§ 2] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 2 
 
 § I. Negligence variously defined. — Many definitions 
 of negligence have been attempted, none of which appears to 
 us to be quite satisfactory, as no one of them has proved to 
 be satisfactory to the framer of any other.' The truth is that 
 a strictly correct definition is always difficult to give, and 
 absolutely correct definitions of legal rights are often utterly 
 impossible. .The number of words, in any language, runs far 
 short of the number of distinct conceptions ; and the attempt 
 to reduce abstract ideas into a precise form of words must 
 generally fail. In attempting to add a definition of our own 
 to the number which have already been submitted by judges 
 and scholars, we do not hope to cover all the ground, but seek 
 only to add one more to the list of imperfect definitions 
 from which, eventually, something more complete may be 
 developed. 
 
 § 2. Difficulty of exact definition of negligence. — Negli- 
 gence, in its technical legal sense, must obviously be so 
 defined as to exclude all acts and omissions which do not vio- 
 late any legal obligation, as well as many which do. It is 
 
 ' " Actionable negligence consists (Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 448 ; 
 in the neglect of the use of ordinary to same effect, Galloway v. Chicago, 
 care or skill towards a person to etc.E.Co., 87Iowa,458; 54N.W.447; 
 whom the defendant owes the duty Wilkins v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 101 
 of observing ordinary care and skill, Mo. 93 ; 13 S. W. 893). '• Negligence 
 by which neglect the plaintiff, with- is the failure to observe for the pro- 
 out contributory negligence on his tection of the interests of another 
 part, has suffered injury to his per- person, that degree of care, precau- 
 son or property" (Brett, M. R., tion and vigilance which the circum- 
 Heaven v. Pender, L. R. 11 Q. B. stances justly demand, whereby 
 Div. 503, 507). "Negligence is the such person suffers injury." (Cooley 
 omitting to do something that a on Torts, 630 ; to same effect, Brown 
 reasonable man would do, or the v. Congress St. etc. R. Co., 49 Mich, 
 doing something that a reasonable 153 ; Barrett v. Southern Pac. R. 
 man would not Ao—not intention- Co., 91 CaL 396; 37 Pac. 666). "Neg- 
 ally" (Per Alderson, B. , in Blyth v. ligence, even when gross, is but an 
 Birmingham Water Co., 11 Exch. omission of duty" (Tonawanda R. 
 781). " Negligence is the failure to Co. v. Munger, 5 Den. 355, 267 ; 
 do what a reasonable and prudent Thomas v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 109 
 person would ordinarily have done Mo. 187; 18 S. W. 980). For a coUa- 
 under the circumstances of the tion and discussion of decisions, in 
 situation ; or doing what such a which negligence has been defined, 
 person under the existing circum- see 11 Amer. St. Rep. 548, note; 12 
 stances would not have done" Id. 700, note. 
 
3 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. [§ 4 
 
 extremely difficult to make such a definition as will include 
 all cases of real negligence, while excluding all such breaches 
 of duty as the failure to pay a debt or perform any other 
 express contract, and especially the failure of a common 
 carrier of goods to perform his common-law duty; all of 
 which are outside of the strict law of negligence. Dr. Whar- 
 ton's definition is open to the objection that it includes all 
 these breaches of duty, provided that they are inadvertent. 
 But it is often the case that they are purely inadvertent ; and 
 still they do not fall within the scope of a proper definition of 
 negligence ; for, if they did, contributory negligence would be 
 a bar to an action thereon. It will not suffice to say that this 
 would only be the rule where the inadvertency was alleged by 
 the plaintiff himself. It is an old form of pleading to allege 
 that the defendant neglected to pay his note ; but that does 
 not enable the defendant to plead contributory negligence. 
 Neither would it do so in an action against a common carrier 
 of goods, having no special contract. But, if the complaint 
 against a carrier should confine itself to an averment that the 
 defendant had neglected to use ordinary care in the carriage 
 or delivery of the goods, without alleging that he was a com- 
 mon carrier, or anything equivalent thereto, the plaintiff could 
 not recover without proof of actual negligence. 
 
 §3, Definition of actionable negligence. — The definition 
 which we offer is this : Negligence, constituting a cause of 
 civil action, is such an omission, by a responsible person, to 
 use that degree of care, diligence and skill which it was his 
 legal duty to use for the protection of another person from 
 injury as, in a natural and continuous sequence, causes unin- 
 tended damage to the latter. 
 
 § 4. Negligence and concurring damage distinguished- 
 It will be advantageous to carry the analysis a little further. 
 The foregoing definition attempts to define the negligence 
 which affords the ground of a civil action. But this includes 
 two distinct elements — negligence and damage — both of 
 which must concur,^ in order to form the ground of an action, 
 just as fraud and damage must concur, to sustain an action on 
 
 ' See § 23 post. 
 
§•6] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 4 
 
 fraud. The two elements are, however, distinct ; and the result 
 of mingling them too closely has been to introduce that confu- 
 sion of ideas, under which the same courts at one time hold 
 that a clear violation of law is negligence per se, and at another 
 time that it is only " evidence," or even only " some evidence " 
 of neghgence; the truth being that every breach of duty to 
 observe the degree of care required by law is negligence, and 
 not merely evidence of it, but that, damage caused to the 
 plaintiff being an indispensable element in his cause of action, 
 the clearest proof of negligence, standing by itself, is only 
 " some evidence " of his right to recover. 
 
 § 5. Analysis of a cause of action on negligence. — 
 
 A cause of action upon negligence, then, should be thus 
 analyzed. Negligence in the defendant and damage to the 
 plaintiff must concur. Negligence consists in : 
 
 1. A legal duty to use care ; 
 
 2. A breach of that duty ; 
 
 3. The absence of distinct intention to produce the precise 
 damage, if any, which actually follows. 
 
 With this negligence, in order to sustain a civil action, there 
 must concur: 
 
 1. Damage to the plaintiff; 
 
 2. A natural and continuous sequence, uninterruptedly 
 connecting the breach of duty with the damage, as cause and 
 effect. 
 
 §'6. Dr. Wharton's definition reviewed. — In this defi- 
 nition, we have purposely sought to include every element of 
 that given by Dr. Francis Wharton, in his learned and able 
 treatise,' which our view of the law would justify. We gladly 
 acknowledge our indebtedness to him, and were anxious to 
 adopt his language, without change, so as to avoid further con- 
 flict of definitions. But we are unable to accept his definition, 
 in two important respects. Dr. Wharton defines negligence 
 as always implying inadvertence in the act complained of 
 
 1 Dr. Wharton proposes the fol- agent, in the discharge of a legal 
 
 lowing : " Negligence, in its civil re- duty, as produces, in an ordinary 
 
 lations, is such an inadvertent im- and natural sequence, a damage to 
 
 perfection, by a responsible human another." (Negligence, § 3). 
 
5 GENERAL PRIX'CIPLES. [§ / 
 
 This is not necessary. The inadvertence, which marks the 
 distinction between negligence and willful injuries, relates to 
 the damage, rather than to the act which causes the damage. 
 Thus, a railroad engineer may willfully shut his eyes and go to 
 sleep. If, while thus asleep, he runs over a man, the test 
 which would determine whether his act was merely gross 
 negligence or was a willful injury would be to ascertain 
 whether, when he closed his eyes, he saw the man upon the 
 track or believed that he would be there, or not. If he 
 believed that he would inflict the injury, or if he intended to 
 do it, his act would cease to be mere negligence, but not other- 
 wise. Doubtless, it would be a fair question for the jury; but 
 it could not be ruled upon as a point of law. So, if a mis- 
 chievous boy should strike a horse, for the very purpose of 
 making it run away, his act would be one of willful injury, as 
 to the owner of the horse, but only of negligent injury, as to 
 a child run over by the horse, in a distant street. Again, 
 Dr. Wharton seems to exclude an entire omission from his 
 definition. It may be true that in most cases the negligence 
 complained of consists in the imperfect performance of a duty; 
 but this is hardly sufficient reason for excluding the idea of 
 total omission from the definition of negligence. 
 
 § 7. Election between intended and unintended injury.— 
 
 In applying any definition of negligence to the facts 
 of a special case, it must be born in mind that the injured 
 party has the right to treat some acts as negligent, although, 
 in fact, they were willful and malicious. The plaintiff is not 
 to be turned out of court, simply because he has understated 
 his case. Leaving out of view those cases in which the com- 
 mon law, forbidding private actions upon felonies, until after 
 they had been criminally prosecuted, may remain in force, it 
 is clear that the plaintiff may elect between suing on a charge 
 of willful injury or on a mere charge of negligence, wherever 
 the facts are susceptible of a double construction. It does 
 not lie with .the defendant to insist that he has been 
 criminal, instead of merely careless. In making his election, 
 however, the plaintiff must remember that he will be bound 
 by it. If the complaint sets up a case of willful injury, it 
 cannot be sustained by evidence of mere negligence, however 
 
§8] 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 gross,* while, on the other hand, if it charges negligence only, 
 the plaintiff cannot put in evidence facts, the only relevancy 
 of which consists in proving intentional injury, such as would 
 sustain an entirely different action.^ Any degree of negligence, 
 however gross, may be proved under a general averment of 
 negligence ; but nothing more.' 
 
 § 8. Duty, an essential element of negligence. — The first 
 element of our definition is a duty. If there is no duty, there 
 can be no negligence.' If the defendant owed a duty, but did 
 not owe it to the plaintiff, the action will not lie.^ And there 
 
 'Highland Ave., etc. R. Co. v. 
 Winn, 93 Ala. 306 ; 9 So. 509 ; Louis- 
 ville, etc. V. Hurt, 101 Ala. 34 ; 13 So. 
 180; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Rayburn, 
 153 111. 290; 38 N. E. 558 ; S. P., Indi- 
 ana, etc. R. Uo. V. Overton, 117 Ind. 
 253 ; 20 N. E. 147 [engineer willfully 
 ran over cow] ; Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Matthews, 13 Ind. App. 355 ; 41 N. E. 
 843 [conductor assaulted and ejected 
 passenger]. Under a complaint, al- 
 leging that the injury was caused in 
 a • ' willful, reckless, careless and un- 
 lawful manner," held, that plaintiff 
 could not recover, without showing 
 a willful injury. (Indiana, etc. E. 
 Co v. Burdge, 94 Ind. 46.) We 
 doubt very much, however, the cor- 
 rectness of this particular applica- 
 tion of the principle. A ' ' willful 
 manner" does not usually imply a 
 willful injury. 
 
 ' Where plaintiff charges negli- 
 gence, and not willful injury, he 
 cannot prove the latter. (Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co. V. Smith, 98 Ind. 43). 
 
 3 Keating V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 104 
 Mich. 418 ; 63 N. W. 575. See § 20 
 post. 
 
 ' Heaven v. Pender, L. R. 11 Q. B. 
 Div. 503, .507 ; Cotton v. Wood, 8 0. 
 B. N. S. 56S ; Carpenter v. Cohoes, 
 81 N. Y. 31: Sutton v. N. Y. Central, 
 etc. R Co., 66 Id. 343; Cusick v. 
 Adams, 115 Id. 55; 31 N. E. 673; 
 
 Larmore v. Crown Point Co., 101 
 N. Y. 391 : Splittorf v. State, 108 l"d. 
 205 ; Donohue v. State, 113 Id. 143 ; 
 Allen V. Willard, 57 Pa. St. 374; 
 Tourtellot v. Rosebrook, 11 Mete. 
 460 ; Severy v. Nickerson, 1£0 Mass. 
 306 ; Parker v. Portland Pub. Co., 69 
 Me. 173 ; Lawton v. Little Rock, etc. 
 R. Co., 55 Ark. 428; 18 S. W. 543; 
 Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich, 1. 
 
 2 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 
 195 ; Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494 ; 
 Houseman v. Girard, etc. Asso., 81 
 Pa. St. 256; Marvin Safe Co. v. 
 Ward, 46 N. J. Law, 19 ; Nickerson 
 V. Bridgeport Hydr. Co., 46 Conn. 
 24; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 
 Mees. & W. 109 ; Heaven v. Pender, 
 L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 303, reversed on 
 other grounds but approved as to 
 this, 11 Id. 503. See Hofnagle v. N. 
 Y. Central R. Co. (55 N. Y. 608), 
 where defendant owed a duty to a 
 workman's employer, but not to the 
 workman, s. P., Morris v. Brown, 
 111 N. Y. 318 ; 18 N. E. 723 ; Sawyer 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. E. Co., 38 Minn- 
 103 ; 35 N. W. 671 [defect in freight 
 car-appliance injuring servant of a 
 connecting company then using car 
 in its own business on its own line]. 
 Mortgagees advanced money to a 
 builder upon the faith of certain cer- 
 tificates given by a surveyor, which 
 contained untrue statements, the 
 
7 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. [§ 9 
 
 can be no duty to do any act which one has no legal right to 
 do.^ The plaintiff must state and prove facts sufficient to 
 show what the duty is,* and that the defendant owes it to him." = 
 If the duty is owed to the public at large, no action 
 can be maintained by a private individual, without showing 
 that it was for some reason specially owing to him.^ Thus, 
 where the defendant wrongfully stopped up a public way, and 
 persons having occasion to pass thereby, being thus prevented 
 from passing, trespassed upon adjoining land of the plaintiff, 
 in order to find a convenient path, the defendant was held not 
 liable to the plaintiff.'' 
 
 § 9. The duty must be to use care.— Not without some 
 hesitation, we have concluded to adhere to the old doctrine, 
 that the duty upon which alone an action for negligence will 
 lie is a duty to use care, including, in that word, such skill and 
 diligence as due care would require in each case. This is un- 
 doubtedly true with regard to all actions for negligence in 
 matters of contract ; and, upon the whole, it seems better to 
 exclude from the definition of negligence all actions upon 
 duties imposed by law, requiring more than the exercise of 
 care, skill and diligence. Wherever an absolute duty to do a 
 
 result of the negligence of the sur- plaintiflE must show that the corpo- 
 
 veyor, but there was no fraud on his ration owed a duty to the plaintiff, 
 
 part, and no contractual relation be- as one of the general public, to 
 
 tween him and the mortgagees, repair the bridge. (Peck v. Batavia, 
 
 Held, that he was not liable to them 33 Barb. 634 ; Albany v. Cunliflf, 3 
 
 in an action for negligence. (Le N. Y. 165 ) See Cusick v. Adams, 
 
 Lievre v. Gould, 4 Reports, 374; 1 115 Id. 55 [private bridge] and cases 
 
 Q B. [1893] 491). supra. 
 
 " Carpenter v. Cohoes, 81 N. Y. « Thompson, Negl. 341, 754, citing 
 
 31 ; Veeder v. Little Falls, 100 Id. "Winterbottom v. Derby, L. R. 3 Ex. 
 
 343 [a city not responsible for not 316 ; Houck v. Wachter, 34 Md. 
 
 fencing a bi-idge approach belonging 365; Baxter v. Winooski Co., 33 
 
 to the state]. See § 384, posi. Vt. 114; Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 
 
 '' Hayes v. Michigan Central R. 153 ; Tisdale v. Norton, 8 Mete. 
 
 Co., Ill U. S. 338; Philadelphia, 388 ; Adams v. Carlisle, 31 Pick, 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Stebbing, 63 Md. 504 ; 146 ; Griffin v. Sanbornton, 44 N. H. 
 
 Daniel v. Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 346 ; Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn. 
 
 5 H. L. 45 ; 3 C. P. 316, 591. 562; Farrelly v. Cincinnati, 3 Disney, 
 
 * Hence in every action against a 516. See §g 118, 333, post. 
 
 public corporation for negligence in ' Blagrave v. Bristol Water Co. 1 
 
 omitting to repair a bridge, the Hurlst. & N. 369. 
 
§ lO] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 8 
 
 certain thing is imposed, the question ceases to be one of 
 negligence.^ 
 
 § 10. Duty must be legal, not merely moral. — The amount 
 or degree of care which it is the duty of any person to exer- 
 cise, in a particular case, will be considered ; first, under the 
 head of degrees of care, and next, under the various titles into 
 which the practical application of these general principles is 
 divided. But it may be well to state here the universal prin- 
 ciple that, as the duty, the breach of which constitutes negli- 
 gence, must be a legal duty, all duties of imperfect obligation, 
 imposed only by generosity, kindness, charity or even abstract 
 justice, but not by the law of the land, are necessarily ex- 
 cluded. Morally speaking, it would be gross negligence for a 
 man of ordinary strength to let a little child lie helpless when 
 it had fallen down, and he could easily raise it and show it the 
 way home ; but human law cannot impose such a duty, because 
 it would do more harm than good to attempt to enforce such 
 a duty by an action for damages. Negligence, therefore, as 
 the term is used in law, is confined to a neglect of that kind 
 and degree of care which the law demands. There are many 
 cases in which it might be desirable that a greater degree of 
 care should be used than the law requires ; but it is only the 
 lack of such care or diligence as the law demands, in the par- 
 ticular case, which constitutes negligence.^ 
 
 ■ See Pennsylvania, etc. Canal Co. 379, post. The correctness of the de- 
 V. Graham, 63 Pa. St. 290 ; Hay v. cision in Couch v. Steel was doubted 
 Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; McAndrews in Atkinson v. Newcastle Water Co., 
 V. Collerd,43N. J. Law, 189: Fletcher L. R. 3 Ex. Div. 441. 
 V. Rylands, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 ; Couch ' Dygert v. Bradley, 8 Wend. 469. 
 V. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 403 [failure to Thus, where a stone was thrown 
 keep a proper supply of medicines which hit plaintiff's daughter in the 
 on board ship as required by statute] ; eye, but it did not appear to have 
 Blamires V. Lancashire, etc. R. Co., been done negligently, the defendant 
 L. R. 8 Ex. 283 [non-compliance with was held not liable. Yet it was 
 statutory i-equirement to maintain obvious that there must have been 
 means of communication between some negligence. (Harvey v. Dun- 
 passengers and guards]; Britton v. lop, Hill & D. Supp. 193.) So, where 
 Great Western Cotton Co., L. R. 7 one driving a wagon on the highway 
 Ex, 130 [neglecting statutory duty to with all due care, ran over a child 
 fence fly wheel]. See Hayes v. whom he did not see, and could not 
 Michigan Central R. Co., Ill U. S. reasonably be expected to see. (Hart- 
 238 and cases cited under §§ 268, field v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615.) Cul- 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 [§II 
 
 § II. No unreasonable duty required. — The law makes no 
 unreasonable demands. It does not require from any man 
 superhuman wisdom or foresight. Therefore no one is guilty 
 of negligence by reason of failing to take precautions which 
 no other man would be hkely to take under the same circum- 
 stances. If one uses every precaution which the then existing 
 state of science affords/ and which the most prudent man 
 would use under the circumstances, he is not held responsible 
 for omitting other precautions which are conceivable,^ even 
 though, if he had used them, the injury would certainly have 
 been avoided.^ If he uses all the skill and diligence which 
 
 pable negligence is the omission to 
 do that which a reasonable, prudent, 
 and honest man would do ; or doing 
 that which such a man would not 
 do in the circumstances of a particu- 
 lar case (Kay v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 65 Pa. St. 269). Negligence is "the 
 absence of care according to the cir- 
 cumstances" (Per.Paxson, J., in Phil- 
 adelphia, etc. R Co. V. Stinger, 78 
 Pa. St. 225). S. P., Bunnell V.Ber- 
 lin Iron Bridge Co. 66 Conn. 24 ; 3 
 Atl. 533. 
 
 ' See Readhead v. Midland R. Co., 
 L. R. 4 Q. B. 379 ; McPadden v. N. 
 Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 478. 
 Negligence is not absolute or in- 
 trinsic, but always relative to some 
 circumstance of time, place or per- 
 son (Needham v. San Francisco, etc. 
 R. Co., 37 Cal. 410 ; Smith v. Whit- 
 tier, 95 Id. 279 ; 30 Pac. 529 ; Elster 
 V. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82; 30 N. 
 E. 274). 
 
 ^ A railroad company is not liable 
 for injuries caused by sparks from 
 its locomotives, when it has used 
 all the means kno^vn to science 
 to extinguish them, and kept a 
 reasonable watch upon the track, 
 even though it might have prevented 
 the mischief by keeping an army of 
 men to watch the track and put out 
 the sparks (Rood v. N. Y. & Erie 
 R. Co., 18 Barb. 80 ; Vaughan v. Taflf 
 
 Vale R. Co., 5 Hurlst. & N. 679; re- 
 versing s. c. 3 Id. 743 ; Philadelphia 
 R. Co. V. Yeiser, 8 Pa. St. 366). For 
 other cases of duty to prevent spread 
 of fires from locomotives, see§§ 672, 
 613, post. The mere fact that a better 
 method might have been provided 
 for putting a machine in and out of 
 gear does not prove negligence in not 
 providing it (Jacobsen v. Cornelius, 
 52 Hun, 377 ; 5 N. Y. Supp. 306). 
 In Lorimer v. St. Paul City R. Co. 
 (48 Minn. 891 ; 51 N. W. 125), an 
 electric railway company was held 
 not liable for accidents resulting 
 from its non-use of a device the 
 practical utility of which had not 
 then been demonstrated, though six 
 months after the accident such de- 
 vice was jirovided on all its cars. Use 
 of improvement, not obligatory, un- 
 til its actual utility or superiority is 
 demonstrated by use (Alabama, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Moody, 92 Ala. 279; 9 So. 
 238). See §§57, 58, posi. 
 
 3 The text, thus far, is cited and 
 approved in Parrott v. Wells, 15 
 Wall. 524 [the nitro-glycerine case]. 
 A water-supplying company which 
 had constructed its works upon the 
 best known system, and kept them 
 in good order for twenty-five years. 
 at the end of which time a frost of 
 unprecedented severity caused the 
 pipes to burst, held not liable for in- 
 
§12] 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 lO 
 
 can be attained by reasonable means, he is not responsible for 
 failure.'' Indeed, as will be hereafter seen, he is not bound to 
 use even as much as this. But the mere fact, that the precau- 
 tions necessary to avoid injury to others are so expensive as to 
 consume all the profits of the business, is not enough to show 
 that such precautions are unreasonable.^ Where a statute 
 imposes a duty for the public benefit, it is to be presumed, in 
 the absence of very clear language to the contrary, that it was 
 only intended to require the use of care and diligence, and not 
 to make any one, and especially not a public body, absolutely 
 responsible for the performance of the act prescribed, when 
 no practicable degree of care and diligence would have called 
 for such performance.* 
 
 § 12. In determining duty, regard to be had to era. — In 
 
 determining what is the duty, the failure in which constitutes 
 
 juries caused thereby. (Blyth v. 
 Birmingham "Water Co. 11 Exch. 
 781.) s. P. as to a dam (Cottrell v. 
 Marshall Infirmary, 70 Hun, 495 ; 34 
 N. Y. Supp. 381). Instructions that 
 a carrier was liable for the fall of a 
 passenger "if the fall could have 
 been averted by the skill or care of 
 the defendant, "were held erroneous. 
 (Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Trotter, 61 
 Miss. 417.) Instructions that a horse- 
 car company was bound ' ' as far as 
 human foresight and care would 
 enable it, to carry the plaintiff with 
 safety," held, erroneous (Louisville 
 R. Co. V. W^eams, 80 Ky. 420). s. p. 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Aiken, 
 89 Tenn. 345 ; 14 S. W. 1083 [protec- 
 tion against contact with machin- 
 ery]. 
 
 * Taylor v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 9 
 Bosw. 369 ; McKinnon v. Noroross, 
 148 Mass. 533 ; 20 N. E. 183 [furnish- 
 ing supply of new rope to foreman, 
 for derrick, if old one proved insuffi- 
 cient]. 
 
 ^ Where plaintiff, passing along a 
 road, was injured by defendant's 
 negligently blasting without cover- 
 
 ing the mine, the defendant cannot 
 answer that the profits of the busi- 
 ness do not warrant the expense of 
 such precautions. The question of 
 necessity is for the jury. (Beau- 
 champ V. Saginaw Mining Co., 50 
 Mich. 163.) 
 
 " Hence, a public body, charged by 
 statute with a duty, absolute in 
 terms, to cleanse its sewers, is not to 
 be held liable for not keeping its 
 sewers cleansed at all events and 
 under all circumstances (Hammond 
 V. St. Pancras, L. R. 9 C. P. 316). 
 The defendant's charter required it 
 to maintain booms " sufficiently 
 strong to secure all the lumber con- 
 tained therein." Held, not to re- 
 quire the performance of what in 
 the nature of the case cannot be per- 
 formed ; that if the defendant's 
 boom broke from inevitable acci- 
 dent, the defendant was not respon- 
 sible. (Brown v. Susquehanna Boom 
 Co., 109 Pa. St. 57; 1 Atl. 156.) To 
 same effect is Murray v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 3 Abb. Ct. App. 339 
 [railroad fence blown ,down in night 
 time]. See § 383, post. 
 
II 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. [§ 1 3 
 
 negligence, regard is to be had to the growth of science, and 
 the improvement in the arts, which take place from generation 
 to generation;' and many acts or omissions are now evidence 
 of gross carelessness, which a few years ago would not have 
 been culpable at all, as many acts are now consistent with 
 great care and skill, which in a few years will be considered 
 the height of imprudence. Thus, the introduction of the 
 steam engine has made it necessary that more care should 
 often be used in the management of horses than was formerly 
 necessary ; the invention of the safety lamp made it a careless 
 act to enter a bituminous coal mine with an open candle; and 
 the invention of improved tools, machinery, and modes of 
 working, has made it negligent to use old-fashioned and more 
 dangerous ones.^ 
 
 § 13. Violation of duty imposed by statute or ordinance. — 
 
 The violation of any statutory or valid municipal regulation, 
 established for the benefit of private persons, is of itself 
 sufificient to prove such a breach of duty as will sustain a 
 private action for negligence, brought by a person belonging 
 to the protected class, if the other elements of actionable neg- 
 ligence concur.' Thus, the violation of a statute or ordinance 
 
 ' See Meier V. Pennsylvania R. Co., Pac. R. Co. v. McDonald, 153 U. S. 
 
 64 Pa. St. 235 and cases supra. 363 ; 14 S. Ct. 619 ; Queen v. Dayton 
 
 » Defendant's servant was drill- Coal, etc. Co., 95 Tenn. 458; 3i S. W. 
 ing a hole in a gas-main, in a 460 [child employed in mining, con- 
 thoroughfare, using for the purpose trary to statute, can recover there- 
 a" diamond point" chisel, which for]). So held, as to city ordinances 
 caused particles of iron to fly off, and (Jetter v. Harlem R. Co., 2 Abb. Ct. 
 injured plaintiff's eye. Held, that App. 458 [running train at greater 
 the accident would have been speed than allowed by city ordi- 
 avoided by drilling or screening, and nance] ; Massoth v. Delaware, etc. 
 defendant was liable (Cleveland v. Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 534 [violation of 
 Spier, 16 C. B. N. S. 390 ; § 673, post), ordinance as to rate of speed at 
 The fact that shafts having project- street crossing] ; McGrath v. N. Y. 
 ing bolts were in common use in Central R. Co , 63 Id. 582; Lane v. At- 
 mines without being covered will lantic Works, 111 Mass. 136 ; Toledo, 
 not relieve a mining company from etc. R. Co. v. Deacon, 63 111. 91 ; 
 liability for injuries caused by un- Devlin v. Gallagher, 6 Daly, 494; 
 guarded bolts (Homestake Min. Co. Langhoff v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 V. FuUerton, 16 C. C. A. 545; 64 Fed. 19 Wise. 515 ; Mueller v. Milwaukee 
 923.) R. Co.,86Id. 340; 56N. W. 914). On 
 
 ' So held, as to statutes (Union this point, Brown v. Buffalo, etc. R. 
 
§13] 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 12 
 
 regulating the speed of vehicles, horses, or trains,^ or requiring 
 special signals or warnings to be given upon their approach, * 
 or lights to be shown,* or requiring buildings to have fire 
 escapes,^ trap doors,^ or requiring " splices " on electric 
 wires to be perfectly insulated,' is such a breach of duty as 
 may be made the foundation of an action by any person 
 
 Co. 23 N. Y. 191, is completely over- 
 ruled (Massoth V. Delaware, etc. 
 Canal Co., supra). Violation of city 
 ordinance does not, however, neces- 
 sarily make injury willful (Illinois, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Hetherington, 83 111. 
 510). There are cases in which it 
 was decided that this principle ap- 
 plied to city ordinances (Heeney v. 
 Sprague, 11 R. I. 456 ; Phila. etc. R. 
 Co.- V. Ervin, 89 Pa. St. 71.) But 
 such ruling was not necessary to a 
 decision, and the overwhelming 
 weight of authority is again'st them. 
 They are well reviewed in Bott v. 
 Pratt, 33 Minn. 323 ; 23 N. W. 237. 
 A mere request of village authorities 
 to a railroad company, to erect gates 
 at street crossings, imposed no duty 
 upon the latter to do so) Daniels 
 V. Staten Island, etc. R. Co., 125 N. 
 Y. 407 ; 26 N. E. 466 ; compare Mer- 
 rigan v. Boston, etc, R. Co., 154 Mass. 
 189; 28 N. E. 149). 
 
 'Beisiegel v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 14 Abb. N. S. 29 ; Pennsylvania Co. 
 V. Conlan, 101 111. 93 ; Baltimore R. 
 Co. V. McDonnell, 43 Md. 552 ; 
 Liddy v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 40 Mo. 506 ; Langhofl v. Milwaukee, 
 etc. R. Co., 19 Wise. 515; Hoppe v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 61 Id. 357; 21 
 N. W. 227 ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Mathias, 50 Ind. 65 ; Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. HensU, 70 Id. 569 ; Cleve- 
 land, etc. R. Co. V. Harrington, 131 
 Id. 426 ; 30 N. E. 37; Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. Horton, 132 Ind. 189; 31 
 N. E. 45 ; Bluedorn v. Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co., 108 Mo. 439; 18 S. W. 
 1103 ; Dahlstrom v. St. Louis, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 108 Mo. 525; 18 S. W. 919; 
 South, etc. Ala. R. Co. v. Donovan, 
 84 Ala. 141 ; 4 So. 142; and cases, 
 supra. 
 
 ' Such as sounding bell or whistle 
 (McGrath v. N. Pacific R. Co., 63 N. 
 Y. 522 ; Jetter v. Harlem R. Co., 3 
 Abb. Ct. App. 458; Lane v. Atlantic 
 Works, 111 Mass. 136; Howenstein 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 5) Mo. 30 ; Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Boggs, 101 Ind. 522 ; 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Walborn, 
 127 Ind. 142 ; 26 N. E. 207; Evans v. 
 Concord R. Co. [N. H.] 21 Atl. 105 ; 
 Kenney v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 105 
 Mo. 270 ; 16 S. W. 837 ; Western Rail- 
 way V. Sistrunk, 85 Ala. 352; 5 So. 
 79 ; Denver, etc. R. Co. v. Ryan, 17 
 Colo. 98; 28 Pac. 79; San Antonio, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Bowles, 88 Tex. 634 ; 
 32 S. W. 880 ; East Tennessee, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Winters, 85Tenn. 240; 1 S. W. 
 790 [a peculiar statute].) 
 
 " Whittaker v. Harlem R. Co., 51 
 N. Y. Superior, 287. 
 
 ' Pauley v. Steam Gauge, etc. Co., 
 131 N. Y. 90; 29 N. E. 999; 30 Id. 
 865 ; McLaughlin v. Armfleld, 58 
 Hun, 376 ; 12 N. Y. Supp. 164 ; Gor- 
 man V. McArdle, 67 Hun, 484; 23 
 N. Y. Supp. 479 ; The Frank P. Lee, 
 34 Fed. 480 ; afii'g 30 Id. 277. But 
 compare Maker v. Slater Mill Co., 
 15 R. I. 112 ; 23 Atl. 63. 
 
 «McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 
 233 ; 21 N. E. 153; Freeman v. Glens 
 Falls Mill Co., 61 Hun, 125 ; 15 N. Y. 
 Supp. 657. 
 
 ' Clements v. Louisiana Electric 
 Light Co., 44 La. Ann. 693 ; 11 
 So. 51. 
 
13 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. [§ 1 3 
 
 belonging to the class intended to be protected by such a 
 regulation, provided he is specially injured thereby. The 
 violation of such a statute of the United States may be made 
 the basis of an action for negligence in a state court.^ These 
 principles apply, not only where the statute or ordinance 
 declares that persons violating it shall be liable for any damage 
 sustained by reason of its breach,' but also where it contains 
 no such provisions, and simply imposes a penalty by way of 
 fine or otherwise, for disobedience.^" Nor is the plaintiff, in 
 such a case, bound to prove that the act required by the law 
 was one which, by its nature, was essential to the exercise of 
 due care by the defendant." It is held in New York,'^ and 
 Pennsylvania,'^ that the violation of a statute or ordinance of 
 this kind is not negligence as matter of law, but only " some 
 evidence of negligence." In other states, such as Georgia, 
 Indiana, Missouri, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Colorado, such 
 violation is " negligence /(??■ se."^^ It seems to us that the true 
 rule is, in all such cases, that the violation of such a statute or 
 ordinance should always be deemed presumptive eyidence of 
 negligence, which, if not excused by other evideftce,- including 
 all the surrounding circumstances, should be deemed conclu- 
 sive. But, if it appears upon the whole evidence that the cir- 
 cumstances were such as would convince a prudent man that 
 the real object which the legislators had in view would be much 
 better served by the breach of a technical rule than by its 
 
 8 Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co., reaffirmed (Moore v. Gadsden, 93 
 
 58 N. Y. 126 ; Van Norden v. Bob- N. Y, 13 ; Rochester v. Campbell, 133 
 
 inson, 45 Hun, 567 [steamboat not Id. 405; Chrystalv. Troy, etc. R. Co., 
 
 inspected]. 124 Id. 519). 
 
 'This was the case in Carroll v. '^ Connor v. Electric Traction Co., 
 
 Staten Island R. Co., supra. 173 Pa. St. 602; 34 Atl. 238. 
 
 i» Most of the cases already cited " Western, etc. R. Co. v. Young, 
 belong to this class, especially under 81 Ga. 397 ; 7 S. E. 912 ; Central Rail- 
 note 1 of this section. road, etc. Co. v. Curtis, 87 Ga. 416 ; 13 
 
 " Jetter V. N.Y.& Harlem R. Co., S. E. 757; Indiana, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 2 Abb Ct. App. 458. Barnhart, 115 Ind. 399 ; 16 N. E. 121; 
 
 1= Knupfle V. Knickerbocker Ice Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 333; 23 N. W. 
 
 Co., 84 N. Y. 488 ; applied to statutes. 237 ; Smith v. Milwaukee Builders' 
 
 McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 232 ; etc. Exch., 91 Wise. 360; 64 N. W. 
 
 21 N. E. .153. See the first case criti- 1041 ; Keim v. Union R. Co.,' 90 Mo. 
 
 cised and disapproved (Bott v. Pratt, 314; 2 S. W. 427; Platte, etc. Canal 
 
 33 Minn. 333; 33 N. W. 237) but Co.v. Dowell, 17Colo. 376;30Pac. 68. 
 
§ 14] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. I4 
 
 Strict observance, the defendant should not be held guilty of 
 negligence in such a breach. And such negligence may not 
 necessarily warrant recovery of damages ; for it must be a 
 cause of the injury.'^ It is certainly wrong to instruct a jury 
 that mere proof of such negligence entitles the plaintiff to 
 recover.^* Therefore, under special circumstances, the jury 
 might excuse an omission to give signals, required by a 
 statute, as prudent under those circumstances." 
 
 § 13a. Regulations for public benefit only. — The breach of 
 regulations, which are established for the public benefit only, 
 and not for the benefit of individuals, does not furnish a 
 ground of private action. Thus, under a statute or ordinance 
 requiring lot owners to keep sidewalks in repair or free from 
 ice, persons injured by failure to do so cannot recover from the 
 lot owners.^ The remedy is against the municipality alone. 
 It follows that the municipality, after paying damages in such 
 a case, cannot recover from the lot owner.^ 
 
 § 14. A personal duty cannot be delegated.— One who is 
 
 personally bound to perform a duty cannot relieve himself 
 from the burden of such obligation by any contract which he 
 may make for its performance by another person. Therefore, 
 the fact that he may have used the utmost care in select- 
 ing an agent to perform this duty,i or that he has entered into 
 a contract with any person by which the latter undertakes to 
 perform the duty, is no excuse to the person upon whom the 
 obligation originally rested, in case of failure of performance. 
 
 '= Christner v. Cumberland, etc. Gray, 249 ; Moore v. Gadsden, 93 N. 
 
 Coal Co., 146 Pa. St. 67; 23 Atl. 331 ; Y. 13 ; Taylor v. Lake Shore, etc, R. 
 
 Bott V. Pratt, supra. Co., 45 Mich. 74; Heeney v. Sprague, 
 
 " Van Eaden v. N. Y. , Ne w Haven, 1 1 R. I. 456. See § 343, post. 
 
 etc. R. Co. 56 Hun, 96 ; 8 N. Y. = Rochester v. Campbell, 133 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 914. 405; Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 
 
 " Wakefield v. Connecticut, etc. R. 525. 
 
 Co., 37 Vt. 380; recognized in Bott 'Rochester White Lead Co. v. 
 
 V. Pratt, supra ; and see Central Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463 [constructing 
 
 Railroad, etc. Co. v. Brunswick, etc. street sewer] ; Grote v. Chester, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 87 Ga. 386; 13 S. E. 520 ; and R. Co., 2 Exch. 251. But see Sutton 
 
 see § 27, post. v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29 ; Hall v. Smith, 
 
 ' Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312; 2 Bing. 156. 
 Kirby v. Boylston, etc. Asso., 14 
 
IS 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 [§i5 
 
 His obligation is to do the thing, not merely to employ 
 another to do it.^ Thus, a municipal corporation, bound to 
 repair its streets, is not relieved from liability for non-repair 
 by the fact that it has made a contract for such repairs with 
 a responsible and competent person;^ and a railroad company 
 cannot defend itself against the claims of passengers for in- 
 juries, by showing that it has employed the best servants that 
 it could possibly obtain,* or purchased its locomotives and 
 cars at the best factories.^ 
 
 § 15. No negligence where there is no breach of duty. — 
 
 As a matter of course, there can be no negligence where there 
 is no breach of duty. It must appear, therefore, not only that 
 the defendant owed a duty, but also that he did not perform 
 
 'Hole V. Sittingbourne R. Co., 6 
 HurlBt. & N. 488 ; Pickard v. Smith, 
 10 C. B. N. S. 480. In the latter case 
 the distinction is clearly pointed out 
 between the responsibility of a person 
 who causes something to be done 
 which is wrongful, or fails to perform 
 something which there was a legal 
 obligation on him to perform, and 
 the liability for the negligence of 
 those who are employed in the work. 
 Williams, J., said: " If the perform- 
 ance of the duty be omitted, the fact 
 of his having intrusted it to a person 
 who also neglected it, furnishes no 
 excuse, either in good sense or in 
 good law." See Mersey Docks v. 
 Gibbs (L. R. 1 H. L. 93), where many 
 cases on this point are reviewed; 
 Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 
 20 N. Y. 48 [carrier's failure to de- 
 liver freight, caused by servants' 
 strike] ; Weed v. Panama R. Co. 17 
 N. Y. 363 [detention of passenger 
 train by company's servants]. See 
 § nQ.post. One contracting to do 
 an unlawful thing, such as making 
 excavations in a highway, or cutting 
 into a party-wall and the like, cannot 
 relieve himself from liability by 
 
 having the contractor stipulate to 
 guard against accidents. (Dygert 
 V. Schenck, 33 Wend. 446 ; Congreve 
 V. Smith, 18 N. Y. 79; Creed v. 
 Hartmann, 29 Id. 591; Hawver v. 
 Whalen, 49 Ohio St. 69 ; 39 N. E. 1049; 
 Waller v. Lasher, 37 111. App. 609. 
 
 = Storrs V. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; 
 Grote V. Chester, etc. R. Co.,3Exch. 
 251 ; Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q. B. 960. 
 It is no excuse for a city, leaving a 
 street unlighted at night, that the 
 city had coritracted with another to 
 light the street (Hayes v. West Bay 
 City, 91 Mich. 418; 15 N. W. 1067). 
 For other cases see § 297, post, 
 
 * Thus, if by reason of work done 
 by a railroad company in the neigh- 
 borhood of their track, a stone rolls 
 on the track and obstructs it, that 
 work being such that any negligence 
 in its performance would be likely to 
 cause such an obstruction, they are 
 liable to a passenger for an accident 
 caused by the obstruction, although 
 they employed a skilled contractor 
 to perform the work (Virginia, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Sanger, 15 Gratt. 330.) 
 
 ' Hegeman v. Western R. Co., 13 
 N. Y. 9. 
 
§ l6] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. l6 
 
 it. If, therefore, the accident complained of was inevitable, it 
 is not a case of negligence. 
 
 § i6. Inevitable accident. — Inevitable accident is a 
 broader term than " the act of God." That implies the 
 intervention of some cause, not of human origin and not 
 controllable by human power.^ An accident is inevitable, 
 if the person by whom it occurs neither has, nor is legally 
 bound to have, sufficient power to avoid it or prevent its 
 injuring another.^ In such a case, the essential element of 
 a legal duty is wanting; and it cannot, therefore, be a case 
 of negligence. Therefore, no one can be made responsible 
 for damage caused to another by an act which is strictly 
 lawful under all the circumstances, unless he has been neg- 
 ligent in the manner of doing the act.^ Thus, a carrier, who 
 had unwittingly received a parcel of nitro-glycerine, which 
 exploded on the way, was held not liable for damage done 
 thereby.* So, one who, in self-defense, justifiably fires a 
 pistol at an assailant, and in so doing accidentally shoots 
 an innocent person, is not liable for the damage thus done.^ 
 
 ' Nugent V. Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. was applied in Ohio, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Div. 433 ; Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. E. Lackey (78 lU. 55), notwithstanding 
 27; Merritt y. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115 ; a statute which made i-ailroad corn- 
 Hays V. Kennedy, 41 Pa. St. 378. panies chargeable for all funeral ex- 
 See Ely the v. Denver, etc. E. Co., 15 penses in case of persons dying or 
 Colo. 833 ; 35 Pao. 703. killed by accident upon their cars. 
 
 ' See Carstairs v. Taylor, L. R. 6 ■^ Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall. 534. 
 
 Ex. 317; Blyth v. Birmingham Water ^ Morris v. Piatt, 33 Conn. 75 ; S. P. 
 
 Co. 11 Exoh. 781; Losee v. Buchanan, Paxton v. Boyer, 67 111. 182 ; 16 Am. 
 
 51 N. Y. 476 [boiler explosion] ; Dob- Rep. 615. The burden is on defend- 
 
 bins V. Brown, 119 Id. 188 ; 23 N. E. ant to prove that the gun was not 
 
 537 [stopping of hoisting apparatus] ; either intentionally or negligently 
 
 Reiss V. N. Y. Steam Co., 128 N. Y. aimed at the person shot (Atchi- 
 
 103 ; 38 N. E. 24 [escape of steam from son v. Dullam, 16 111. App. 42). See 
 
 heating apparatus] ; Gosulich v. also, Moebus v. Becker, 16 N. J. 
 
 StandardOilCo. 122N.Y. 118; 35 N. Law, 41 ; Bradley v. Andrews, 51 
 
 E. 259 [explosion of oil, communi- Vt. 530 ; Hankins v. Watkins, 77 
 
 eating fire to plaintiff's property]. Hun, 860 ; 28 N. Y. Supp. 867 [hunt- 
 
 2 Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall. 534; ing accident]. Where the defendant, 
 
 Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 ; in endeavoring to separate his dog 
 
 Searles v. Manhattan R. Co., 101 Id. from another with which it was 
 
 661 ; Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 443 ; fighting, accidentally struck the 
 
 Vaughan v. Taff Yale R. Co., 5 Hurlst. owner of the latter dog, it was held, 
 
 & N. 678. The doctrine of the text that he was not liable for his acci- 
 
17 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 [§i6 
 
 Many other instances might be cited.« Much less can any 
 one be held guilty of negligence, when the injury of which 
 he is the alleged cause is caused solely by the " act of God,'"' 
 
 dental blow (Brown v. Kendall, 6 
 Cush. 292). 
 
 * Dygert v. Bradley, 8 "Wend. 473 
 [canal boats' collision] ; Harvey v. 
 Dunlop, Hill & D. Supp. 193 [throw- 
 ing stone] ; Calkins v. Barger, 44 
 Barb. 434 [fire] ; Aldridge v. Great 
 "Western R. Co., 3 Man. & G. 515 ; 
 McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 436; 
 Lawler v. Baring Boom Co., 50 Me. 
 443 ; Boland v. Missouri R. Co., 36 
 Mo, 484 ; Garris v. Portsmouth, etc. 
 R. Co., 2 Ired. Law, 334 ; Harding v. 
 Fahey, 1 Greene, 877 ; Wabash, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Locke, 113 Ind. 404 ; 14 N. 
 E. 391 ; O'Connor v. Illinois Cent. R. 
 Co., 83 Iowa, 105 ; 48 N. "W. 1003 ; 
 Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442 [fright- 
 ened horse]. In the last case tlie ques- 
 tion of inevitable accident is fully 
 stated and discussed, with reference 
 to leading cases, by Doe, J. See 6;| 
 636, 647, post. 
 
 ' Nugent V. Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. 
 Div. 444 (per James, L. J.) ; Nichols 
 V. Marsland, L. R. 10 Ex. 255; 
 affi'd. 2 Ex. Div. 1 ; Nitrophosphate 
 Co., V. London, etc. Dock Co. L. R. 
 9 Ch. Div. 303 ; River "Wear Co. v. 
 Adamson, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 743 ; 
 Blyth V. Birmingham "Water "Works 
 Co. 11 Exch. 781. A storm may be 
 of such unusual violence as properly 
 to be the " act of God " (Nichols v. 
 Marsland, L. R. 10 Ex. 355, per 
 Bramwell, B). A railroad embank- 
 ment which had been standing five 
 years in a country subject to floods, 
 was undermined by an extraordinary 
 flood, and sank in the night-time, by 
 reason of which an express train left 
 the line and a jsassenger was injured. 
 Held, " the company was not bound 
 to have constructed their embank- 
 ment so as to meet such extra- 
 Law op Neg. "Vol, 1 — 3 
 
 ordinary floods" ("Withers v. North 
 Kent R. Co., 3 Hurlst. & N. 969). 
 The same rule prevails generally in 
 this country (International, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Halloran, 53 Tex. 46 ; s. c. 
 37 Am. Rep. 744 ; Gillespie v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 6 Mo. App. 554). 
 The following were cases of extra- 
 ordinary floods or other causes at- 
 tributed to the act of God, and not 
 ordinarily foreseen and preventable, 
 and for which there was no liability: 
 China v. Southwick, 12 Me. 238 ; 
 Lapham v. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371 ; Shrews- 
 bury V. Smith, 12 Cush. 177; Oak- 
 ham V. Holbrook, 11 Id. 299 ; "Wendell 
 V. Pratt, 12 Allen, 464 ; Bell v. Mc- 
 Clintook, 9 "Watts, 119 ; Lehigh 
 Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal, etc. Co. , 
 4 Rawle, 9 ; Higgins v. Chesapeake, 
 etc. Canal Co., 3 Harr. 411 ; Morris 
 Canal Co. v. Ryerson, 37 N. J. Law, 
 457 ; Richardson v. Kier, 34 Cal. 64 ; 
 Everett v. Hydraulic Flume Co., 33 
 Id. 225; Campbell v. Bear River Co., 
 35 Id. 679 ; Hoffman v. Tuolumne 
 "Water Co., 10 Id. 413; "Wolf v. St. 
 Louis, etc. "Water Co., 10 Id. 541 ; 
 Piedmont, etc. R. Co. v. McKenzie, 
 75 Md. 458 ; 24 Atl. 157 ; Central 
 R. etc. Co. V. Kent, 87 Ga. 403 ; 13 
 S. E. 503 [water spout washing out 
 culvert] ; Black v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 30 Neb. 197; 46 N. "W. 488 [snow 
 storm preventing moving of trains] ; 
 Smith V. "Western R. of Ala., 91 Ala. 
 455 ; 8 So. 754 [sudden and unpre- 
 cedented overflow of river] ; Slater 
 V. South Carolina R. Co., 39 S. C. 
 96 ; 6 S. E. 936 [earthquake] ; Mis- 
 souri Pac. R. Co. V. Johnson, 73 Tex. 
 95 ; 10 S. W. 325 [sudden freezing 
 and thawing]. See other cases 
 cited under §§ 665, 668, 686, 728, 783, 
 post. 
 
§ 1 7] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 1 8 
 
 or a public enemy,' within the legal meaning of those 
 phrases. 
 
 § 17. Apparent exceptions to rule as to inevitable acci- 
 dent. — In the nature of things, there can be no exception to 
 this rule. But there has been such conflict in its application 
 as to create some seeming exceptions. These relate chiefly to 
 the keeping of dangerous things. Thus, in England, it was 
 long adjudged that every man was bound, at his own peril, to 
 keep his own fire on his own land, and that, if he kindled a 
 fire, whether purposely or by accident, he was liable for its 
 spread upon adjoining land, quite irrespective of any negli- 
 gence on his part.* This doctrine was relaxed by statute.^ 
 At a very recent date, it was also adjudged that one who col- 
 lects a vast mass of water on his land, which, in its nature, 
 must be destructive if it escapes, is bound absolutely to keep 
 it safely there, and is liable for its escape, even though he may 
 be entirely free from the faintest shade of negligence.^ And 
 it has generally been held that one who keeps wild and savage 
 animals must keep them at his own peril, and is liable for all 
 injuries done by them if they escape, although such escape 
 was caused by inevitable accident.* But all these decisions, if 
 correct, simply take these cases out of the realm of negligence 
 and put them in the same class with the liability of common 
 carriers of goods. No question of care, diligence or skill is 
 involved, and therefore no negligence. The mere act of keep- 
 
 8 Where a railroad train is, with- to the growing of a poisonous tree, 
 
 out fault on the part of the company, If its branches extended over a 
 
 precipitated into a chasm, spanned neighbor's land, the owner of the tree 
 
 by a bridge destroyed by an armed is held liable for all injuries done 
 
 force of the enemy, the carrier is not thereby to animals eating the leaves 
 
 liable (Sawyer v. Hannibal, etc. (Crowhurst v. Amersham Board, L. 
 
 E. Co., 37 Mo. 240). R. 4 Ex. Div. 5). 
 
 iBeaulieu v. Finglam, 2 H. IV, "May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101. 
 
 fol. 18, pi. 6 ; cited, 23 N. Y. 366. This rule as to wild and savage ani- 
 
 No negligence was pleaded in that mals, was approved in Van Leuven 
 
 case. V. Lyke (1 N. Y. 515), but that was 
 
 ^ These statutes related only to only a dictum, and may well stand 
 
 purely accidental lires (Filliter v. upon the ground that they are a 
 
 Phippard, 11 Q. B. 347). nuisance. The law of negligence 
 
 ' Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3 H. does not apply to nuisances (Heeg 
 
 L. 330. This rule has been applied v. Licht, 80 N. Y. 579). 
 
19 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 [§I^ 
 
 ing a savage and dangerous animal may indeed be well deemed 
 an act of negligence. The old English rule as to fire is uni- 
 versally considered never to have been law in this country;^ 
 and the modern extension of this rule to accumulations of 
 water, is rejected in New York,^ New Hampshire,'' Vermont,^ 
 New Jersey,^ California.i" though accepted in Massachusetts" 
 and Minnesota, ^^ where the principle is applied to other cases. 
 
 § i8. What is not inevitable accident. — But in order to 
 prove that an accident was inevitable, it is not always enough 
 to show that, under the circumstances existing at the time, it 
 could not have been then avoided. It must also be the fact 
 that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence which 
 brought about any of those circumstances.^ For if, by pre- 
 vious negligence, he brought himself or his property into cir- 
 cumstances of such difificulty or peril as to make it impossible 
 for him to escape from them without injuring his neighbor, he 
 cannot excuse himself by showing that he would have done 
 more injury, if he had not attempted to escape. His original 
 fault deprives him of the right to plead inevitable accident.^ 
 
 'Eyan v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 35 N. Y. 210 ; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 
 N. X". 476. See §§ 665, 738, post. 
 
 ^ See Losee v. Buchanan, supra. 
 
 ' Brown V. Collins, n3 N. H. 443 ; 
 Garland v. Towne, 55 Id. 57. 
 
 8 See Lapham v. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371. 
 
 'Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. 
 Law, 333. 
 
 '» Everett v. Hydraulic Flume Co., 
 23 Cal. 225. 
 
 " Shipley v. Fifty Asso., 101 Mass. 
 251 [snow falling from roof] ; Gor- 
 hani V. Gross, 125 Mass. 238 [wall 
 falling on adjoining land]. 
 
 '2 Cahill V. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324. 
 
 ' The Clarita, 23 Wall. 1 ; Austin 
 V. New Jersey Steamboat Co. , 43 N. 
 Y. 75 ; Romney v. Trinity House, L. 
 R. 5 Ex. 204 ; 7 Id. 247. If there is 
 any fault, there is liability, as where 
 one, getting on the wrong side of 
 the road in a dark night, drives 
 
 against another (Leame v. Bray, 3 
 East, 593), or pulls the wrong rein 
 (Wakenian v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213). 
 See Shawhan v. Clarke, 24 La. Ann. 
 890 ; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Quinn, 
 56 111. 319 ; Sullivan v. Scriptm-e, 3 
 Allen, 564; Alexander v. Humber, 
 86 Ky. 565 ; 6 S. W. 453 ; Haney v. 
 Kansas City, 94 Mo. 334 ; 7 S. W. 
 417 ; Nordheimer v. Alexander, 19 
 Can. S. C. R. 248 [fall of house-wall 
 during high wind after a fire]; and 
 oases cited under §§ 645-653, post). 
 Where the unintentional shooting of 
 one hunter by another might have 
 been avoided, if he had previously 
 looked to see what was within the 
 range of his gun the accident was 
 not inevitable (Hankiris v. Watkins, 
 77 Hun, 360; 28 N. Y. Supp. 867). 
 See § 686, post. 
 
 ■2 All the doctrines of the text are 
 sustained in The Clarita, 23 Wall. 1. 
 
§ 20] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 20 
 
 And one who, by inevitable accident, causes an injury, must 
 use due care to prevent the consequences of the accident from 
 extending further than is inevitable.^ 
 
 § 19. Absence of intent to produce damage necessary 
 element. — The last element of negligence, and that which 
 {distinguishes it from fraud or other willful injury, is the 
 absence of any distinct intention to produce the precise dam- 
 •age to the plaintiff, which actually follows as a result of the 
 negligence.' If such an intention is alleged in a complaint, 
 the action is based upon willful injury, and can only be sus- 
 tained upon that ground.^ If it is not so alleged, evidence of 
 an actual intent to cause the damage which is the basis of the 
 action is inadmissible.^ But it often happens that evidence 
 comes out at the trial, in a perfectly proper way, from which a 
 jury might fairly infer actual malice, and occasionally, of such 
 a nature that no sensible men could infer anything less. In 
 such cases, no malice being pleaded, the plaintiff's counsel 
 ought not to be allowed to argue to the jury that it was a 
 case of real malice ; and the court should carefully instruct the 
 jury that they cannot award damages upon any theory more 
 severe than that the defendant had been so grossly negligent 
 as to be indifferent whether he injured the defendant or not. 
 All this, however, is, of course, subject to the power of the 
 court to amend the pleadings and to allow a change of the 
 original issue. 
 
 § 20. Distinction between negligence and fraud. — There 
 is, necessarily, a marked distinction between negligence and 
 
 See Case v. Perew, 46 Hun, 57 [run- struck by iron coupling-pin thrown 
 
 ning a barge into canal boat when by the wheel of a passing car]), 
 
 use of steam tug might have pre- ^ Ante, § 6; "Wharton, Negl. g 11; 
 
 vented collision]. Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio, 333, 236 ; 
 
 3 The Clara Killam, L. R. 3 Adm. Blyth v. Birmingham Water Co., 11 
 
 161. The fact that the accident was Exch. 781. 
 
 so unusual and extraordinary that it "Indiana, etc. R. Co. v. Burdge, 
 
 could not reasonably have been ex- 94 Ind. 46. 
 
 pected to happen does not relieve de- ^ Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Smyth, 
 
 fendant from the effect of his negli- 98 Ind. 43 ; Vandenburgh v. Truax, 
 
 gence (Doyle v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 4 Den. 464 ; Hankins v. Watkins, 77 
 
 77 Iowa. 607 ; 43 N. W. .555 [plaintiff Hun, 360. 
 
21 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. [§ 21 
 
 fraud. Sir William Jones, in his celebrated treatise on Bail- 
 ments, somewhat confounded the two, speaking of gross negli- 
 gence as equivalent to fraud. But this is a misuse of terms. 
 If it is meant that the effects of such negligence are as preju- 
 dicial as those of positive fraud, that is a point of no import- 
 ance, since the most trivial negligence may be attended with 
 the same results. If it is meant that the motive is as bad, that 
 is an assertion which cannot be sustained, without confining 
 the remedy for gross negligence to a very limited class of 
 cases ; since, if it is once fully understood that the proof re- 
 quired to support an allegation of gross negligence is equal to 
 that required to establish fraud, juries will hesitate long before 
 affixing such a stigma upon men who have evidently meant no 
 wrong, although exceedingly careless. Gross negligence may 
 be evidence from which fraud might be inferred ; but is not 
 the same thing. In this view all of the latest authorities 
 concur.^ 
 
 § 21. Defendant's anticipation of injury not essential. — 
 
 It is not an essential element of negligence that the defendant 
 should have anticipated, or have had reason to anticipate, that 
 his carelessness would injure another person.' The improb- 
 
 ' Thus, in the decisions arising But numerous decisions of the same 
 upon negotiable paper, it is settled court establish in effect the opposite 
 that although gross negligence may doctrine. See Gardner v. Heartt, 3 
 be evidence of bad faith, it is not the Denio, 336, and cases under §S^ 1 and 
 same thing (Goodman v. Harvey, 3, ante. It is held in Indiana (Terra 
 4 Ad. & El. 870; TJther v. Rich, 10 Haute, etc. R. Co. v. Graham, 95 
 Id. 784 ; Carlon v. Ireland, 5 El. & B. Ind. 386), that gross negligence is 
 765; Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137 ; not, as matter of law, " willfulness," 
 Welch V. Sage, 47 Id. 143 ; Murray and even if the defendant was guilty 
 V. Lardner, 3 Wall. 110 ; Goodman of gross negligence, recklessness, 
 V. Simonds, 30 How. U. S. 452). In or wantonness, he could plead con- 
 cases arising upon other questions, tributoi-y negligence on the part of 
 the same rule is adhered to (Gard- plaintiff. The negligence of a pas- 
 ner v. Heartt, 3 Denio, 383 ; Lincoln senger-carrier may be gross, without 
 V. Buckmaster, 33 Vt. 653; Wil- being willful or intentional (Jackson- 
 son V. York, etc. R. Co., 11 Gill & J. ville, etc. R. Co. m. Southworth, 33 
 58, 79; see Tonawanda R. Co. v. III. App. 307; affl'd 135 111, 350; 35N. 
 Hunger, 5 Denio, 355.) In St. Louis, E. 1093). s. p., Richmond, etc. R. Co. 
 etc. R. Co. V. Todd (36 III. 409), the v. Farmer, 97 Ala. 141; 13 So. 86.) 
 court defined gross negligence as ' The defendant's ship in drawing 
 "amounting to willful injury." up her anchor, injured the plaintiff's 
 
22] 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 22 
 
 ability of injury to another is a circumstance that might be 
 taken into account, but which is not conclusive of the ques- 
 tion. If, however, no reasonable person could have anticipated 
 that injury to another might ensue, we think that there could 
 be no negligence. It is certainly not essential that the negli- 
 gent person should have anticipated injury to the particular 
 person who was in fact injured, or the particular kind of injury 
 produced. 
 
 § 22. Election between contract and tort. — The owner of 
 property may recover directly from the wrong-doer for any 
 tortious injury to the property, without noticing any contract 
 which the wrong-doer may have made with respect to such 
 property, of which the wrongful act is a violation.* This is so, 
 whether the contract was made with the owner himself ^ or 
 
 submarine telegraph. It was held 
 that the defendant was liable, if he 
 used the anchor or ship without 
 availing himself of the means of 
 knowledge at his command, even 
 though he was not aware of the posi- 
 tion of the cable ; but not otherwise 
 (Submarine Tel. Co. v. Dickson, 
 15 C. B. N. S. 759). A. moored 
 barges in the middle of a stream in 
 such position that if any of them 
 should sink it would probably injure 
 the barges of others. One of them 
 sank by an accident which did not 
 involve negligence in A. and injured 
 barges of B. A. was held liable to 
 B. (McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 
 436). One who negligently sets and 
 keeps fire on his own land is liable 
 for injuries done by its direct com- 
 munication to the property of 
 another, though he might not have 
 anticipated the manner in which it 
 was communicated (Higgins v. 
 Dewey, 107 Mass. 494). One who un- 
 lawfully places or causes an obstruc- 
 tion in a public highway, will not be 
 heard to say that he did not antici- 
 pate an injury resulting therefrom 
 (Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Carvener, 
 
 118 Ind. 51 ; 14 N. E. 738). See cases 
 cited under § 865, post. 
 
 ' "For tortious acts, independent 
 of the contract, a man may be sued 
 in tort, though one of the conse- 
 quences is a breach of his contract " 
 (Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410 ; 21 
 N. E. 871 ; Bickford v. Richards, 154 
 Mass. 163; 27 N. E. 1014; Ashley v. 
 Root, 4 AUen, 504; Dungan v. Read, 
 167 Pa. St. 393; 31 Atl. 639 [injuries 
 to horse hired by defendant] ). In 
 Fromm v. Ide (68 Hun, 310 ; 28 N. Y. 
 Supp. 56), defendant contracted with 
 plaintiff to lower and extend two 
 ditches in the highway so that they 
 would drain plaintiff's land, but he did 
 the work so carelessly that, instead 
 of draining the land, they emptied 
 the water upon it. Held, that plain- 
 tiff's right of action did not depend 
 upon the contract, but upon , de- 
 fendant's duty not to injure plain- 
 tiflf's property, and an action of tort 
 would lie. See S. C. on a former trial, 
 60 Hun, 333 ; 14 N. Y. Supp. 802. 
 
 'Green v. Clarke, 12 N. Y. 348 
 [carrier receiving goods from for- 
 warder liable to owner for loss.] So 
 a master can recover from a carrier 
 
23 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 [§23 
 
 with any other person, and even though the contract is under 
 seal.* The contract, if made with any other person than the 
 owner, does not give that person an exclusive right to sue for 
 damage to the property ; * and if made with the owner, it does 
 not prevent him, or any person who afterwards acquires title to 
 the property,' from enforcing his rights without relying upon 
 the contract, except, of course, so far as those rights are waived 
 by the contract. 
 
 § 23. Damage, an essential element of negligence. — As 
 
 already said (§ 4), neither negligence without damage, nor 
 damage without negligence, will constitute any cause of action. 
 The concurrence of the two elements is essential. Some dam- 
 age must be inferable from the facts pleaded and proved ; or 
 
 (Grant v. Newton, 1 E. D. Smith, 
 95), or innkeeper (see Needles v. 
 Howard, Id. 54 ; Piper v. Manny, 31 
 Wend. 282), for the loss of his prop- 
 erty placed in the defendant's charge 
 by a servant traveling with it as its 
 ostensible owner. Such an action 
 may be brought in the name of a 
 firm where one of the partners, 
 traveling alone, deposits baggage 
 containing partnership property 
 with a carrier or innkeeper, who 
 negligently loses it (Needles v. 
 Howard, supra.) So a servant, 
 whose master paid for tickets for 
 both, may recover for his own bag- 
 gage lost on the journey (Marshall 
 V. York, etc. R. Co., 21 L. J. [C. P.] 
 34). But in all such cases the action 
 must be founded upon the tort, and 
 cannot be sustained at all upon the 
 contract ; because carriers of per- 
 sons and innkeepers always deal 
 with their customers as principals, 
 and the most important part of the 
 contract being always made by the 
 customers as principals, they cannot 
 
 be allowed to divide it, and claim 
 that the contract, in respect to their 
 baggage, was made for the benefit 
 of other persons, while retaining 
 themselves the rights growing out 
 of the contract in respect to their 
 persons (see Weed v. Saratoga, etc. 
 R. Co., 19 Wend. 534; Needles v. 
 Howard, supra). 
 
 5 LesUe v. Wilson, 3 Brod. & B. 
 171.' 
 
 ' Green v. Clarke, 12 N. Y. 343 ; 
 New Jersey Steam Co. v. Merchants' 
 Bank, 6 How. U. S. 344 ; Cumber- 
 land Valley R. Co. v. Hughes, 11 Pa. 
 St. 141 ; Paducah Lumber Co. v. 
 Paducah Water Co., 89 Ky. 340; 13 
 S. W. 249 [breach of contract be- 
 tween a city and a water company 
 to keep the foi'mer supplied with 
 certain quantity of water is ground 
 for action by private person for loss 
 by fire through insufficient supply 
 of water]. See, also, Owensboro 
 Water Co. v. Duncan (Ky.) 33 S. W. 
 478. 
 
 » Dows V. Cobb, 12 Barb. 310. 
 
§ 24a] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 24 
 
 no action will lie.* But nominal damage is enough to sustain 
 the action.' 
 
 § 24. The damage must be special to plaintiff. — It is not 
 
 only essential to the maintenance of an action for negligence 
 that some damage should have been suffered, but that dam- 
 age must have been suffered by the plaintiff, or he has no 
 cause of action.' If, by reason of a breach of duty owed to 
 the public, he has suffered no special damage, that is, no dam- 
 age other than such as every other member of the community 
 has suflered in equal measure, a private citizen has no right to 
 sue.^ 
 
 § 24a. Right to recover over. — It is not necessary that 
 the plaintiff's damage should have resulted immediately from 
 the defendant's negligence ; it is enough if the plaintiff, being 
 legally liable, though not personally in fault, for a third per- 
 son's injuries, due to the defendant's negligence, has been 
 compelled to answer therefor to the person injured. In such 
 a case, the principal delinquent is bound to indemnify his 
 codelinquent, their fault being unequal;' and this whether 
 
 'McAllister v. Clement, 75 Cal. for plaintiff 10,000 barrels of petro- 
 
 182 \ 16 Pac. 775 [notary's failure to leum, the market price of which, 
 
 take proper acknowledgment of when the message ought to have 
 
 mortgage]; Hinckley v. Krug (Colo.) been delivered, was $1.17 per barrel, 
 
 34 Pac. 118 [negligence of attorney] ; but when received by addressee had 
 
 Dwyer V. Woulfe, 40 La. Ann. 46 ; 3 advanced to .$1.35 per barrel. The 
 
 So. 360 [notary's failure to seasonably addressee did not purchase. Held, 
 
 register a mortgage]; s. P., Clay v. that plaintiff could recover only 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co., 81 Ga. 385; nominal damages. 
 
 6 S. E. 813 [delay in delivering tele- ' No one has a right of action upon 
 
 graph message] ; State v. Davis, 117 negligence who is not injured there- 
 
 Ind. 307 ; 20 N. E. 159 ; Merrill v. by (Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Me. 97 ; 2 492 ; Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. Benton, 
 
 Atl. 847. Martin v. Columbia, etc. 69 111. 174 ; Smith v. Leavenworth, 
 
 R. Co. (32 S. C. 593 ; 10 S. E. 960) 15 Kans. 81 ; Scott v. Nat. Bank of 
 
 seems to us to have been a case for Cliester Valley, 72 Pa. St. 471 ; 
 
 nominal damages. Harlan v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 65 
 
 'Baker v. Manhattan R. Co., 118 Mo. 22; First Nat. Bank v. Ocean 
 N. Y. 533 ; 23 N. E. 885. In Western Bank, 60 N. Y. 278). 
 Union Tel. Co. v. Hall (124 U. S. 444 ; '•' See § 333. post 
 8 S. Ct. 577), defendant telegraph ' Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Cam- 
 company delayed delivery of a nies- pania Transatl., 134 N. Y. 461; 31 
 sage instructing the addressee to buy N. E., 987; s. c, on second trial, 144 
 
25 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 [§24a 
 
 any contractual relation existed between them or not.^ Thus 
 a servant is liable to his master for damages, which the latter 
 has been required to pay to a stranger for the servant's negli- 
 gence, in the master's work, without the master's fault.' So a 
 municipal corporation is entitled to recover, from one who has 
 rendered a highway unsafe, damages which it has been com- 
 pelled to pay to traveler ;* and on the same principle, an abut- 
 ting owner against whom a recovery has been had for injuries 
 suffered by a traveler on the street, from the fall of his chim- 
 ney, may recover the amount paid, from a third person whose 
 wrongful act caused the chimney to fall.' So a carrier is 
 entitled to recover from one whose unnecessary obstruction of 
 a station-platform caused damage to a passenger, for which 
 the carrier was compelled to pay.* 
 
 N. Y., 461 [lessee of public pier 
 against sub-lessee]. "The liability 
 grows out of the affirmative act of 
 the defendant, and renders him li- 
 able not only to the party injured, 
 but also mediately liable to any party 
 who has been damnified by his ne- 
 glect" (per Euger, C. J., Port Jervis 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 96 N. Y. 550 
 [defendant made excavation in 
 street] ; Rochester v. Montgomery, 
 73 N. Y. 65; Lowell v. Boston, etc. 
 R. Co., 33 Pick. 24 [highway cases]). 
 Plaintiflf's horse took fright at de- 
 fendant's engine and ran over a third 
 person, who recovered damages 
 against plaintiff. Held, the latter 
 could recover the same from defend- 
 ant on showing that he could not 
 
 have prevented the accident and that 
 defendant could (Nashua Iron Co. 
 V. Worcester, etc. E. Co., 63 N. H. 
 159). 
 
 2 Lowell V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 23 
 Pick. 24, and cases supra. 
 
 ' Churchm V. Holt, 137 Mass. 165; 
 S. C, on new trial, 131 Id. 67; Simp- 
 son V. Mercer, 144 Mass. 413; Smith 
 V. Foran, 48 Conn. 244 ; Grand Trunk 
 E. Co. V. Latham, 63 Me. 177, and 
 cases cited under g 243, post. 
 
 ^ Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; 
 4 Wall. 679, and other cases cited 
 under § 301, posi. 
 
 ' Gray v. Boston Gas-light Co., 114 
 Mass. 149. 
 
 6 Old Colony R. Co. v. Stevens, 148 
 Mass. 363; 19 N. E. 373. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 § 25. Breach of duty must cause the 
 damage. 
 
 26. Breach of duty must be the 
 
 proximate cause. 
 
 27. Breach of statutory duty. 
 
 28. Natural and continuous se- 
 
 quence, defined. 
 39. Foi'eseen and unforeseen con- 
 sequences of negligence. 
 
 30. Extraordinary consequences of 
 
 negligence. 
 
 31. Intervening cause, breaking 
 
 connection. 
 33. Intervening cause must be 
 either a superseding or a re- 
 sponsible cause. 
 
 § 33. Superseding cause and inevit- 
 able accident, distinguished. 
 
 34. Intervening responsible cause, 
 
 not superseding. 
 
 35. Intervening cause illustrated. 
 86. Intervening cause must be 
 
 culpable. 
 
 37. Intervening cause must be a 
 
 free agent. 
 
 38. Intervener not culpable, if ig- 
 
 norant of facts. 
 
 39. Superior force concurring with 
 
 defendant's negligence. 
 
 40. Superior foi'ce concurring veith 
 
 defendant's delay. 
 
 § 25. The breach of duty must cause the damage. — We 
 
 now come to the most important and difficult part of the gen- 
 eral definition of a right of action upon negligence — the connec- 
 tion between the negligent act or omission and the damage. 
 No action can be maintained upon an act of negligence, unless 
 the breach of duty has been the cause of the damage. The fact 
 that the defendant has been guilty of negligence, followed by 
 an accident, does not make him liable for the resulting injury, 
 unless that was occasioned by the negligence. The connection 
 of cause and effect must be established.' And the defendant's 
 breacli of duty, not merely his act, must be the cause of the 
 plaintiff's damage.^ The defendant's negligence may put a 
 
 ' Daniel v. Metropolitan R. Co. , L. '^ One suing for injuries must not 
 
 R. 3 C. P. 316, 323 ; Holbrook v. only prove negligence, but that the 
 
 Utica, etc. R. Co. , 13 N. Y. 336 ; injury resulted from the negligence 
 
 Harlan v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 65 (Kelsey v. Jewett, 38 Hun, 51 ; Wil- 
 
 Mo. 33; CiTim v. Conover, 14 Ind. liams v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 39 
 
 App. 364 ; 43 N. E. 10a9, and cases Id. 430 ; Murtaugh v. N. Y. Central 
 
 infra. R. Co., 49 Id. 456 ; 3 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 [26] 
 
27 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 [§26 
 
 temptation in the way of another person to commit a wrong- 
 ful act, by which the plaintiff is injured ; and yet the defend- 
 ant's negligence may be in no sense a cause of the injury.^ 
 
 § 26. Breach of duty must be the proximate cause. — The 
 
 breach of duty, upon which an action is brought, must be not 
 only the cause, but the proximate cause, of the damage to the 
 plaintiff.' We adhere to this old form of words, because, 
 while it may not have originally meant what is now intended, 
 it is not immovably identified with any other meaning, and is 
 the form which has been so long in use that its rejection would 
 make unintelligible nearly all reported cases on the question 
 involved.^ The proximate cause of an event must be under- 
 stood to be that which, in a natural and continuous sequence,' 
 unbroken by any new, independent cause,* produces that event, 
 
 483 ; State v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 58 Md. 483 ; Dickey v. Maine Tele- 
 grapli Co., 43 Me. 493 ; Philadelphia, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Boyer, 97 Pa. St. 91 ; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 
 569 ; Lester v. Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158 ; 
 Crandall v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 16 
 Fed. 75 ; Nashville, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Hembree, 85 Ala. 481 ; 5 So. 173). 
 See note on allegation and proof of 
 negligence, 20 Abb. New Cas. 336. 
 
 3 See §§ 8-13, ante. 
 
 ' Kistner v. Indianapolis, 100 Ind. 
 210 ; ScheflEer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. 
 S. 249. 
 
 ^ The use of the old vcords, "proxi- 
 mate cause," is approved by Earl, J. , 
 in Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 364, 
 281 ; Norwood v. Ealeigh, etc. E. Co., 
 Ill N. C. 236 ; 16 S. E. 4 ; Florida, etc. 
 E. Co. V. WUliams, 37 Fla. 406 ; 20 
 So. 558 ; Davis v. Chicago, etc. E. Co. 
 [WiscJ, 67 N. W. 167. For appli- 
 cations of the rule, see §§ 57-60, 
 ;post. 
 
 3 Wharton, Negl. § 3, modified. 
 
 * Oil Creek E. Co. v. Keighron, 74 
 Pa. St. 320 ; Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 
 7 Wall. 52. As to what will be such 
 an intervening cause, see Wharton, 
 
 Negl., §§ 134-143; Milwaukee, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; 
 Lowery v. Manhattan E. Co. , 99 N. Y. 
 158 ; Cuff V. Newark, etc. R. Co., 35 
 N. J. Law, 17 ; and § 31, el seq.,post. 
 In his work on Torts, p. 69, Judge 
 Cooley states the following proposi- 
 tions : " (1.) In the case of any dis- 
 tinct legal wrong, which in itself 
 constitutes an invasion of the right 
 of another, the law will pre- 
 sume that some damage follows 
 as a natural, necessary and proxi- 
 mate result. Here the wrong itself 
 fixes the right of action ; we need not 
 go further to show a right of re- 
 covery, though the extent of re- 
 covery may depend upon the 
 evidence. (2.) When the act or 
 omission complained of is not in 
 itself a distinct wrong, and can only 
 become a wrong to any particular 
 individual through injurious conse- 
 quences resulting therefrom ; this 
 consequence must not only be 
 shown, but it must be so connected 
 by averment and evidence with the 
 act or omission, as to appear to 
 have resulted therefrom according 
 to the ordinary course of events, 
 
§27] 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 28 
 
 and without which that event would not have occurred.^ 
 Proximity in point of time or space, however, is no part of the 
 definition. That is of no importance, except as it may afford 
 evidence for or against proximity of causation, that is, the 
 proximate cause which is nearest in the order of responsible 
 causation.* 
 
 § 27. Breach of statutory duty. — All authorities agree that 
 the plaintiff cannot recover upon mere proof of his injury, co- 
 incident with the defendant's breach of a statute or ordinance 
 of the kind mentioned in § 13. In such a case, the action 
 would fail for want of connection between the defendant's 
 negligence and the plaintiff's damage. The plaintiff must 
 prove that the breach of regulations was the proximate cause 
 of his damage. That will not be presumed. ' And therefore 
 non-compliance with a statutory requirement, however 
 
 and as a proximate result of a suffi- 
 cient cause. (3.) If the original act 
 was wrongful, and would naturally, 
 according to the ordinary course of 
 events, prove injurious to some other 
 person or persons, and does actually 
 result in injury through the inter- 
 vention of other causes which are 
 not wrongful, the injury shall be re- 
 ferred to the wrongful cause, passing 
 by those which were innocent. But 
 if the original wrong only becomes 
 injurious in consequence of the inter- 
 vention of some distinct wrongful 
 act or omission by another, the in- 
 jury shall be imputed to the last 
 wrong as the proximate cause, and 
 not to that which was more remote." 
 ^- Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 
 397; and see §^5 31, 32, post. An ac- 
 cident " cannot be attributed to a 
 cause, unless without its operation, 
 the accident would not have hap- 
 pened " (Ring V. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 
 83; to the same effect, Ehrgott v. 
 New York, 96 Id. 283 ; Cone v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. R. Co., 81 Id. 206; Searles 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 101 Id. 661; 
 Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 Id. 203). 
 
 ^" The primary cause may be the 
 proximate cause of a disaster, though 
 it operate through successive instru- 
 ments. The question always is, was 
 there an unbroken connection be- 
 tween the wrongful act and the 
 injury — a continuous operation ? 
 Did the facts constitute a continuous 
 succession of events so linked to- 
 gether as to make a natural whole? 
 Or was there some new and inde- 
 pendent cause intervening between 
 the wrong and the injury?" (Pur- 
 cell V. St. Paul R. Co., 48 Minn. 134; 
 50 N. W. 1034). 
 
 ' Hayes v. Michigan Central E. 
 Co., Ill U. S. 328, 240; Pennsyl- 
 vania Co. V. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569 ; 
 Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Steb- 
 bing, 63 Md. 504 [train running 
 at greater rate of speed than that 
 allowed by ordinance]. See the fol- 
 lowing among many other cases, 
 to the same effect: Quincy, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Wellhoener, 72 111. 60; 
 Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. Gillis, 68 Id. 
 317; Great Western R. Co. v. Ged- 
 dis, 33 Id. 305; Stoneman v. At- 
 lantic, etc. R. Co., 58 Mo. 503 ; Hoi- 
 
29 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 [§28 
 
 stringent, affords no ground of action, if compliance therewith 
 would not have prevented the injury.^ 
 
 § 28. "Natural and continuous sequence," defined. — 
 
 Very great difficulty has been found in determining what dam- 
 ages should be considered as flowing, in a "natural and con- 
 tinuous sequence," from an act of negligence, especially when 
 it is not a matter of contract liability. On the one hand, it 
 has been maintained that, in cases of tortious negligence, the 
 defendant should be held responsible for all damages which do 
 in fact result from his wrongful acts, whether they could have 
 been anticipated or not. ^ On the other hand, it has been 
 maintained that he should not be held responsible for any 
 damages except such as he could, in the exercise of reason- 
 able foresight, have foreseen as the probable consequences of his 
 act.^ As a middle ground, it has been asserted that he should 
 
 man v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 62 Id. 
 563 ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Hotz, 47 
 Kans. 637 ; 38 Pac. 695 ; Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Chrisman, 19 Colo. 30 ; 34 
 Pac. 386 ; Cumberland, etc. R. Co. v. 
 State, 73 Md. 74 ; 30 Atl. 785 ; Mor- 
 rissoy V. Providence, etc. R. Co., 15 
 R. I. 371 ; 3 Atl. 10 ; Rainey v. N. Y. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 68 Hun, 495; 33 
 N. Y. Supp. 80. Under the South 
 Carolina statute making railroad 
 companies liable for a neglect to give 
 signals, which ' ' contributed to the 
 injury," it is only necessary, for a re- 
 covery, to show that the neglect con- 
 tributed to, not that it proximately 
 caused, the injury (Wragge v. South 
 Carolina, etc. R. Co.,47S. C. 105; 35 
 S. E. 76). 
 
 ' Flatles v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 35 
 Iowa, 191 ; Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Phelps, 39 111. 447 ; Oilman, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Spencer, 76 Id. 193. See, also, 
 Edson V. Central R. Co., 40 Iowa, 47 ; 
 Delaware, etc. R. Co. v. Salmon, 89 
 N. J. Law, 399 ; Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Hope, 80 Pa. St. 373 ; Stanton 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 91 Ala. 383; 
 8 So. 798. Where sounding a loco- 
 
 motive whistle is as likely to in- 
 crease as to diminish danger to one 
 on the track, failure to use it as re- 
 quired by statute will not constitute 
 negligence (Galena, etc. R. Co v. 
 Loomis, 13 111. 548 ; Illinois Central 
 R. Co. V. Phelps, 39 Id. 447 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. V. Karnes, 13 Ind. 
 87 ; Wakefield v. Connecticut, etc. 
 R. Co., 37 Vt. 330.). 
 
 ' Ehrgott V. New York, 96 N. Y. 
 264; Smith v. Southwestern R. Co., 
 L. R. 6 C. P. 14 ; affi'g s. c. 5 C. P. 
 98 ; Henry v. So. Pacific R. Co. , 50 Cal. 
 183, pQr McKinstry, J.; Fairbanks v. 
 Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86 ; McGrew v. Stone, 
 53 Id. 436 ; Morrison v. Davis, 20 Id. 
 171 ; Scott V. Hunter, 46 Id. 193 ; Lake 
 V. Milliken, 62 Me. 240 ; Atchison, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Stanford, 12 Kans. 354; 
 Proctor V. Jennings, 6 Nev. 83 ; Phil- 
 lips V. Dickerson, 85 lU. 11; Doggett 
 v. Richmond, etc. R. Co.,78N. C. 305; 
 State V. Manchester, etc. R. Co., 52 
 N. H. 538 ; Stark v. Lancaster, 57 Id. 
 88. 
 
 2Rigby V. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 239; 
 Hoey V. Felton, 11 C. B. N. S. 143 ; 
 BoviU, C. J., Sharp V. Powell, L. R. 
 
§28] 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 30 
 
 be made responsible for such damage as is known by common 
 experience to usually follow such a wrongful act.^ The 
 weight of authority seems to be decidedly against holding 
 the defendant liable for all the actual consequences of his 
 wrongful acts, when they are such as no human being, even 
 with the fullest knowledge of the circumstances, would have 
 considered likely to occur ;^ and, on the other hand, the best 
 authorities seem to be quite opposed to the theory that he 
 should be held liable only for such consequences as he ought 
 himself to have foreseen.^ So much difficulty, indeed, has 
 
 7 C. P. 233 ; Sheridan v. Bigelow, 
 93 Wise. 436 ; 67 N. W. 733. " In de- 
 termining what is proximate cause, 
 the true rule is that the injury must 
 be the natural and probable conse- 
 quence of the negligence, such a 
 consequence as, under the surround- 
 ing circumstances of the case, might 
 and ought to have been foreseen by 
 the wrong-doer, as likely to flow 
 from his act" (per Paxson, J., Pitts- 
 burgh So. R. Co. V. Taylor, 104 Pa. 
 St. 306 ; s. P. Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc. 
 B. Co., 80 Id. 393). Or such as "a 
 person of ordinary intelligence might 
 have expected" (McGowan v. Chi- 
 cago etc. B. Co., 91 Wise. 147 ; 64 N. 
 W. 891 ; Davis v. Chicago, etc. E. 
 Co.,93Wisc.470; 67 N. W. 16 ; Motey 
 V. Pickle Marble, etc. Co., 74 Fed. 
 155.) 
 
 = Gerhard v. Bates, 3 Ellis & B. 
 490 ; Selleck v. Langdon, 55 Hun, 19 ; 
 
 8 N. Y. Supp. 573 ; Whart. Negl. §§ 
 16, 74-77. 
 
 ^Kern v. DeOastro Sugar Co., 135 
 N. Y. 50 ; 35 N. E. 1071 [fall of eleva- 
 tor] ; Reiss v. N. Y. Steam Co., 138 N. 
 Y. 103 ; 38 N. E. 34 [steamer explo-. 
 sion] ; Cleveland v. N. J. Steamboat 
 Co., 135 N. Y. 399 ; 36 N. E. 337 
 [steamboat passenger rush] ; Henry 
 V. St. Louis, etc. B. Co., 76 Mo. 388 
 [passenger being ordered out of car 
 stepped to a neighboring track, and 
 while waiting there was injured by 
 
 another train] ; s. p., Lewis v. Flint', 
 etc. B. Co., 54 Mich. 55; Briggs v. 
 Minneapolis St. B. Co., 53 Minn. 36 ; 
 53 N. W. 1019; Bellefontaine, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399; 
 Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. New 
 Haven B. Co., 35 Conn. 365; Harri- 
 son V. Berkley, 1 Strobh. 535, 549 ; 
 Bennett v. Lockwood, 30 Wend. 
 333 ; Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 
 343 ; Jacksonville, etc. E. Co. v. Pen- 
 insular Land etc. Co., 37 Fla. 1 ; 9 
 So. 661. "The general rule is, that 
 a man is answerable for the con- 
 sequences of a fault which are nat- 
 ural and probable ; but if this fault 
 happen to occur with something 
 extraordinary and unforeseen, he 
 will not be liable" (McGrew v. 
 Stqne, 53 Pa. St. 436). 
 
 « In Ehrgott v. New York (96 N. 
 Y. 364), the court emphatically re- 
 fused to hold that the defendant 
 was only liable for such damages as 
 might reasonably be supposed to be 
 in the contemplation of both parties 
 as the probable result of the acci- 
 dent ; and Earl, J., commenting upon 
 the various forms of stating the rule 
 which are given in the text, said : 
 " These various modes of stating the 
 rule are all apt to be misleading, and 
 in most cases are absolutely worth- 
 less as guides to the jury. * « * 
 When a party commits a tort, result- 
 ing in a personal injury, he cannot 
 
31 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 [§29 
 
 been felt in attempting to lay down a rule to cover all possible 
 cases, that some of the ablest judges have declined to state 
 any fixed rule,* and have indicated a disposition to leave all 
 doubtful cases to the juryj 
 
 § 29. Foreseen and unforeseen consequences of negli- 
 gence. — The practical solution of this question appears to us 
 to be that a person guilty of negligence should be held respon- 
 sible for all the consequences which a prudent and experienced 
 man, fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact 
 existed (whether they could have been ascertained by reason- 
 
 foresee or contemplate the conse- 
 quences of his tortious act. * * * 
 Here, nothing short of omnis- 
 cience could liave foreseen for a 
 minute what the result and effect 
 of driving into this ditch would be. 
 * * * The best statement of this 
 rule is, that a wrong-doer is respon- 
 sible for the natural and proximate 
 consequences of his niisconduct ; and 
 what are such consequences must 
 generally be left for the determina- 
 tion of the jury" In that case the 
 plaintiff recovered $25,000 for injur- 
 ies suffered from a defect in a high- 
 way, resulting months afterwards in 
 a permanent spinal disease ; and this 
 judgment, though set aside in the 
 lower court, was reinstated and af- 
 firmed in the Court of Appeals. See 
 cases cited under note 1, supra. 
 
 « Page V. Bucksport, 64 Me. 53, 
 per Peters, J. To same effect, Stover 
 V. Bluehill, 51 Id. 441. Where logic 
 and common sense cannot be recon- 
 ciled, logic must give way (Willey 
 V. Belfast, 61 Me. 575 ; per Barrows, 
 J.). In Fleming v. Beck (48 Pa. St. 
 309), Agnew, J., said: "In strict 
 logic it may be said that he who is 
 the cause of loss should be answer- 
 able for all the losses which flow 
 from his causation. But in the 
 practical workings of society, the 
 law finds, in this as in a great 
 
 variety of other matters, that the 
 rule of logic is impracticable and un- 
 just. The general conduct and the 
 reflections of mankind are not 
 founded upon a nice casuistry. 
 Things are thought and acted upon 
 rather in a general way, than upon 
 long, laborious, extended and trained 
 investigations. Among the mass of 
 mankind, conclusions are generally 
 the results of hasty and partial re- 
 flection. Their undertakings, there- 
 fore, must be construed in view of 
 these facts; otherwise they would of- 
 ten be run into a chain of conse- 
 quences wholly foreign to their in- 
 tentions. In the ordinary callings 
 and business of life, failures are fre- 
 quent. Few, indeed, always come 
 up to a proper standard of perform- 
 ance—whether in relation to time, 
 quality, degree or kind. To visit 
 upon them all the consequences of 
 failure would set society upon edge 
 and fill the courts with useless and 
 injurious litigation. It is impossible 
 to compensate for all losses; and the 
 law therefore aims at a just dis- 
 crimination, which will impose upon 
 the party causing them the propor- 
 tion of them that a proper view 
 of his acts and the attending cir- 
 cumstances would dictate." 
 ' See cases cited under § 55, post. 
 
§ 30] PROXIMATE CAUSE 32 
 
 able diligence or not) would, at the time of the negligent act, 
 have thought reasonably possible to follow, if they had 
 occurred to his mind.' This definition covers all the fire 
 cases elsewhere referred to ; since one who knew all the facts 
 (including the dry kindling matter on the line of connection, 
 the exposure of property to injury, the force of the wind and 
 the other circumstances which made it probable that the fire 
 would spread, as it actually did) could have foreseen the result 
 as not improbable. Yet, in several of those cases, it is prob- 
 able that no one person did know all these facts ; and certainly 
 the defendants did not. So, in the Lowery case,' any one 
 who knew that travelers were in danger from such collisions 
 would have deemed the ultimate event a not improbable one. 
 On the other hand, hardly any one would have had such a 
 result in his mind, at the time, as likely to occur. The test 
 of probability, in that case, was evidently this, that any one, 
 to whom the idea of such a result had been suggested, would 
 have seen that it might naturally occur. 
 
 § 30. Extraordinary consequences of negligence. — In one 
 
 case in New York,' and two in Pennsylvania,' it has been held 
 that negligence entails no liability for extraordinary conse- 
 quences, although caused by ordinary means ; and while these 
 decisions have been overruled everywhere else, and are practi- 
 cally overruled in New York,' where they originated, their 
 
 ' This seems to us to be the neces- 49 N. Y. 420 ; PoUett v. Long, 56 Id. 
 
 sary result of the latest and best de- 200 ; Lowery v. Manhattan E. Co. , 99 
 
 cisions ; although nowhere stated iu Id. 158 ; 1 N. E. 608 ; Frace v. N. Y. 
 
 this exact language. See Lowery v. Lake Erie, etc. E. Co. , 143 N. Y. 182 ; 
 
 Manhattan E. Co. (99 N. Y. 158 ; 1 38 N. E. 103, 189 ; Eead v. Nichols, 118 
 
 N. E. 608), where defendant was held N. Y. 324 ; 23 N. E. 468 ; O'Neil v. N. 
 
 liable for a burning coal dropped on Y. Ontario, etc. E. Co., 115 N.Y. 579 ; 
 
 a horse, which, running against a 33 N. E. 217 ; Gibney v. State, 137 N. 
 
 traveler, caused him to injure plain- Y. 1 [child fell through a state bridge, 
 
 tiff, in his own effort to escape. into a canal ; its father plunged after 
 
 » !J9 N. Y. 158 ; 1 N. E. 608. it and both were drowned : state 
 
 'Eyan v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 35 liable]. The decision in Ehrgott v. 
 
 N. Y. 210. New York (96 N. Y. 364), is reaUy 
 
 ^ Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Kerr, 63 more directly opposed to the princi- 
 
 Pa. St. 353. pie of the Eyan case than most of 
 
 ^ See the manner in which the the decisions in which that has been 
 
 Eyan case is limited and explained expressly overruled, 
 away, in Webb v. Eome, etc. E. Co., 
 
33 PROXIMATE CAUSE. [§ 30 
 
 -continued affirmance in Pennsylvania* entitles them to con- 
 sideration. The point decided in those cases was that a 
 •defendant, who had negligently kindled a fire, should not be 
 held responsible for its spread over an unusually long distance, 
 in consequence of an unusually high wind prevaiHng at the 
 time. The defect in this reasoning is that, although the wind 
 was extraordinary, and the actual consequences extraordinary, 
 yet the extension of the fire itself was only the reasonable and 
 natural consequence of the extraordinary wind, which existed 
 at the time of the negligent act. The true doctrine is that the 
 defendant is liable for even extraordinary damage, if it is the 
 result of his negligence, operating in a natural and continuous 
 sequence. If the circumstances, in the presence of which he 
 was negligent, were extraordinary, and so were likely to make 
 the result of his negligence extraordinary, that is an additional 
 reason why he should have been especially careful not to be 
 negligent at such a time. Accordingly, one who negligently 
 allows fire to escape on his neighbor's land, when a gale of 
 unusual force is blowing, is all the more to blame for being 
 negligent at so peculiarly dangerous a time, and should be held 
 responsible for all the damage done by reason of the gale car- 
 rying the fire to a distance which it would not have reached 
 under an ordinary wind. This latter view, in substance, is 
 taken by the Supreme Court of the United States,^ and by the 
 
 ■*Hoag V. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co., vator, and whether it was the result 
 
 85 Pa. St 298. Compare, however, of the continued effect of the sparks 
 
 Elder v. Lykens Val. Coal Co., 157 from the steamboat, without the aid 
 
 Id. 490 ; 27 Atl. 545. of other causes not reasonably to be 
 
 * In Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. v. Kel- expected." The court then went on 
 
 logg (94 U. S. 469), the U. S. Supreme to say: "The question always is. 
 
 Court denied the authority of Ryan was there an unbroken connection 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co. (35 N. Y. 210) between the wrongful act and the 
 
 and Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kerr (62 injury, a continuous operation? Did 
 
 Pa. St. 363), and affirmed the ruling the facts constitute a continuous suc- 
 
 of the Circuit Court (Miller and Dil- cession of events, so linked together 
 
 Ion, JJ.) which instructed the jury as to make a natural whole, or was 
 
 " to find whether the burning of the there some new and independent 
 
 mill and lumber was the result natu- cause intervening between the 
 
 ■^"^.rally and reasonably to be expected wrong and the injury ? It is admit- 
 
 from the burning of the elevator; ted that the rule is difficult of appli- 
 
 whetRer it was a result which, under cation. But it is generally held, 
 
 the circumstances, would naturally that, in order to warrant a finding 
 
 ioUow from the burning of the ele- that negligence or an act not 
 [Law of Neo. Vol 1—3] 
 
§31] 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 34 
 
 courts of Ohio/ Massachusetts/ Connecticut,' New Jersey,' 
 Indiana,"* Illinois," Michigan,'^ Wisconsin,'^ California, ^^ and 
 practically all other states,*^ as well as by the best English, 
 decisions." 
 
 § 31. Intervening cause, breaking connection. — The 
 
 second alternative involves many important questions. In the 
 first place, the causal connection must be actually broken, the 
 sequence interrupted, in order to relieve the defendant from 
 responsibility. The mere fact that another person concurs or 
 co-operates in producing the injury or contributes therefo, in 
 
 amounting to wanton wrong, is the 
 proximate cause of an injury, it 
 must appear that the injury was the 
 natural and probable consequence 
 of the negligence or wrongful act, 
 and that it ought to have been fore- 
 seen in the light of the attending 
 circumstances. » * * "vVe do 
 not say that even the natural and 
 probable consequences of a wrongful 
 act or omission are in all cases to be 
 chargeable to the misfeasance or non- 
 feasance. They are not, when there 
 is a sufficient and independent cause 
 operating between the wrong and 
 the injury. * * * In the na- 
 ture of things there is in every 
 transaction a succession of events, 
 more or less dependent upon those 
 preceding, and it is the province of 
 a jury to look at this succession of 
 events or facts, and ascertain whether 
 they are naturally and probably con- 
 nected with each other by a contin- 
 uous sequence, or are dissevered by 
 new and independent agencies, and 
 this must be determined in view of 
 the circumstances existing at the 
 time." The effect of the decision in 
 that case was to sustain a recovery 
 under extraordinary circumstances, 
 on the ground that nevertheless the 
 damage done was in fact the natural 
 and probable sequence of the wrong- 
 ful act. But in Scheffer v. Railroad 
 
 Co. (105 U. S. 349), while thorpughly 
 approving the former decision, the 
 court held that where a railroad col- 
 lision, caused by the negligence of 
 the defendant, produced such severe 
 bodily injuries to the deceased as 
 eventually to produce insanity, under 
 the influence of which he committed 
 suicide, the negligence of the defend- 
 ant was too remote in the chain of 
 causes to be considered a proximate 
 cause of the death. 
 
 « Adams v. Young, 44 Ohio St. 1. 
 
 ' Higgins v. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494. 
 
 * Martin v. New England R. Co., 
 63 Conn. 331; 35 Atl. 339. 
 
 » Kuhn v. Jewett, 33 N. J. Eq. 647. 
 
 " Billman v. Indianapolis, etc. R. 
 Co., 76 Ind. 164 ; Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Krinning, 87 Id. 351 ; but com- 
 pare Pennsylvania Go. v. Whitlock, 
 99 Id. 16. 
 
 " Pent v. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 59 111. 
 849. 
 
 '^Hoyt V. JefiCers, 30 Mich. 181; 
 Webster v. Symes [Mich.], 66 N. W. 
 580. 
 
 " Atkinson v. Goodrich Tr. Co., 60 
 Wise. 141. 
 
 1" Henry v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 
 50Cal. 183. 
 
 '5 See the cases collected under 
 § 666, post. 
 
 " Smith v. Southwestern R. Co., 
 L. R. 6 C. P. 14 ; afE'g s. C. 5 Id. 98, 
 
35 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 [§31 
 
 any degree, whether large or small, is of no importance.* 
 If the injuries caused by the concurrent acts of two persons 
 are plainly separable, so that the damage caused by each 
 can be distinguished, each would be liable only for the 
 damage which he caused ; ^ but if this is not the case, 
 all the persons who contribute to the injury by their 
 negligence are liable, jointly or severally, for the whole 
 damage.^ It is immaterial how many others have been in 
 fault, if the defendant's act was an efficient cause of the 
 
 ' Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. 
 547 ; 5 N. E. 449 ; Webster v. Hud- 
 son River E. Co., 38 N. Y. 260 ; Bar- 
 rett V. Third Avenue R. Co., 45 Id. 
 628 ; Galvin v. New York, 113 Id. 
 223 ; 19 N. E. 675 ; Phillips v. N. Y. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 657 ; 
 37 N. E. 978 ; Eaton v. Boston, etc. 
 R. Co., 11 Allen, 500 ; Drommie v. 
 Hogan, 153 Mass. 29 ; 26 N. E. 337 ; 
 Martin v. North Star Works, 31 
 Minn. 407 ; Delaware, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Salmon, 39 N. J. Law, 299 ; At- 
 kinson V. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 
 Wise. 141 ; Hunt v. Missouri R. Co., 
 14 Mo. App. 160 ; St. Louis Bridge 
 Co. V. Miller, 138 111. 465 ; 28 N. E. 
 1091 ; Colorado Mortg. Co. v. Rees, 
 21 Colo. 435 ; 42 Pac. 42. See other 
 cases under § 35, post. The law is 
 said to be different in Iowa (DeCamp 
 V. Sioux City, 74 Iowa. 392 : 37 N.W. 
 971 ; Knapp v. Sioux C. R. Co., 65 
 Iowa, 91 ; 21 N. E. 198). But this is 
 owing entirely to a misapprehension 
 of the loose language of Shaw, C. J. , 
 in one of his hair-splitting opinions 
 (Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray, 395;, 
 which related only to the construc- 
 tion of a peculiar statute, and is not 
 followed except as to that. 
 
 2 See Nitro-Phosphate Co. v. Lon- 
 don, etc. Docks Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 
 503, where this principle was applied 
 to injury caused in part by negli- 
 gence and in part by "act of God." 
 
 "Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; 
 Chapman v. New Haven R. Co., 19 
 
 N. Y. 341 ; Colegrove v. New Haven 
 R. Co., 30 Id. 492 ; Barrett v. Third 
 Av. R. Co., 45 Id. 638 ; Johnson v. 
 N. W. Tel. Co., 51 N. W. 325 ; 48 
 Minn. 433 ; Johnson v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 31 Minn. 57 ; Flaherty v. 
 Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 39 Id. 338 ; 
 40 N. W. 160 ; Powell v. Deveney, 
 3 Cush. 300 ; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 
 111 Mass. 140 ; Lake v. MiUiken, 63 
 Me. 240; Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 
 420 ; Wilder v. Stanley, 65 Vt. 145 ; 
 36 Atl. 189; Weick v. Lander, 75 
 lU. 93. It may be impossible to 
 apportion the damages caused by 
 the concurring negligence of two 
 wrong-doers who cause a single in- 
 jury to a third person ; neverthe- 
 less, either is responsible for the 
 combined result (Slater v. Mer- 
 sereau, 64 N. T. 138 ; afB'g 5 Daly, 
 445). In that case, a contractor for 
 the erection of a building sublet a 
 portion of the work to an independ- 
 ent contractor. Each of them was 
 negligent in performing his respect- 
 ive portion of the work. It was 
 held that, as the negligence of the 
 contractor, united with that of the 
 sub-contractor, caused the injury, he 
 was liable for the whole of the re- 
 sulting damages. Compare Burrows 
 V. March Gas Co., L. R. 5 Exch. 67; 
 affi'd L. R. 7 Exch. 96. See Thatcher 
 V. Central Traction Co., 166 Pa. St. 
 66; 30 Atl. 1048 ; Edwards v. Carr, 
 13 Gray, 234 ; and other cases cited 
 under § 133, post. 
 
§ 32] PROXIMATE CAUSE. 36 
 
 injury.* Therefore, in an action against one who, by negli- 
 gence, inflicted an injury which would naturally cause death, 
 it is no defence to show that the injured person was so unskill- 
 fully treated as to hasten his death, ^ or that, by proper treat- 
 ment, his life would have been saved. Nor, in such an action, 
 is the defence that the decedent died from an independent 
 disease made out, unless it is clearly shown that he must have 
 died from it, when he did, even if he had not suffered from the 
 defendant's negligent act.* Of course, where two causes con- 
 tribute in producing the injury, for both of which defendant 
 is responsible, no question of proximate cause arises.'' 
 
 § 32. Must be either a superseding or a responsible 
 cause. — The connection between the defendant's negligence 
 and the plaintiff's injury may be broken by an intervening 
 cause. In order to excuse the defendant, however, this inter- 
 vening cause must be either a superseding or a responsible 
 cause. It is a superseding cause, whether intelligent or not, if 
 it so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negli- 
 gence that it alone, without his negligence contributing 
 thereto in the slightest degree, produces the injury. It is a 
 responsible one, if it is the culpable act of a human being, who 
 is legally responsible for such act. The defendant's neg- 
 ligence is not deemed the proximate cause of the injury, 
 when the connection is thus actually broken by a responsi- 
 
 * McMahon v. Davidson, 13 Minn, pleton (75 Wise. 18 ; 43 N. W. 826) it 
 
 857 ; Postal Tel. Co. v. Zopfi, 93 was held that if plaintiff had a con- 
 
 Tenn. 369 ; 24 S. W. 633 ; Boone Co. stitutional tendency to disease, and 
 
 ■V. Mutchler, 137 Ind. 140 ; 36 N. E. the injury was the proximate cause 
 
 534 ; Cline v. Crescent City R. Co., of aggravating that tendency, plain- 
 
 43 La. Ann. 327 ; 9 So. 123. tiflE might recover. To same eflfect, 
 
 " Nagel V. Missouri Paciflo E. Co., Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Snyder, 117 
 
 75 Mo. 653. Compare Sauter v. N. Y. Ind. 485 ; 20 N. E. 384. 
 
 Central R. Co. , 66 N. Y. 50 ; Lyons v. ' As where the unusual speed of 
 
 Erie R. Co., 57 Id. 489 ; Klutts v. St. the car and the state of the pave- 
 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 75 Mo. 642 ; Pull- ment were the two contributing 
 
 man Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 111. 20 ; causes, and defendant was responsi- 
 
 Allender v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 37 ble for both. (Kraut v. Frankford, 
 
 Iowa, 264. etc. R. Co , 160 Pa. St. 337 ; 28 Atl. 
 
 ^ Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mining 783.) s. p. Burrell v. Uncapher, 117 
 
 Co., 50 Mich. 163. Compare Thomp- Pa. St. 353; 11 Atl. 619 [object in 
 
 8on V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 91 Ala. road frightening horse, andunrailed 
 
 496 ; 8 So. 406. In Smalley v. Ap- embankmentj. 
 
37 PROXIMATE CAUSE. [§ 34 
 
 ble intervening cause. But the connection is not actually 
 broken, if the intervening event is one which might, in the 
 natural and ordinary course of things, be anticipated as not 
 entirely improbable, and the defendant's negligence is an 
 essential link in the chain of causation. Of course, the very 
 definition of a superseding cause implies that the defendant's 
 negligence cannot be the cause of the injury. 
 
 § 33. Superseding cause and inevitable accident, distin- 
 guished. — The first alternative needs little comment. It is 
 simply the case of inevitable accident, which has already been 
 considered, with only this difference, that such accident occurs 
 after the defendant has been negligent, and when, perhaps, 
 but for the intervention of that accident, he might have been 
 liable. But it must be carefully noted that inevitable accident, 
 in order to furnish a complete defence in such a case, must be 
 the sole cause of the injury, and therefore that it is no defence, 
 if, but for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff would not 
 have been exposed to injury from such accident;^ while, if it 
 contributed to any part of the resulting damage, it is only a 
 defence, in case that part of the damage can be accurately dis- 
 tinguished from the rest.^ 
 
 §34. Intervening responsible cause, not superseding. — 
 
 The second alternative, of a responsible but not superseding 
 cause, needs further statement. If the negligent acts of two 
 or more persons, all being culpable and responsible in law for 
 their acts, do not concur in point of time, and the negli- 
 gence of one only exposes the injured person to risk of injury 
 in case the other should also be negligent, the lia:bility of the 
 person first in fault will depend upon the question whether the 
 negligent act of the other was one which a man of ordinary 
 experience and sagacity, acquainted with all the circumstances, 
 could reasonably anticipate or not. If such a person could 
 have anticipated that the intervening act of negligence might, 
 in a natural and ordinary sequence, follow the original act of 
 
 ■ Condict V. Grand Trunk R. Co. etc. Docks Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 503 ; 
 
 54 N. Y. 500 ; St. JosepJr; etc. B. Co, Worfilnan v. Great Northern R. Co., 
 
 V. Hedge, 44 Neb. 448 ; 62 N. W. 887. 33 L. J. Q. B. 379. 
 
 2 Nitro- Phosphate Co. v. London, 
 
§35] 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 38 
 
 negligence, the person first in fault is not released from liability 
 by reason of the intervening negligence of another.' If it 
 could not have been thus anticipated, then the intervening 
 negligent person alone is responsible.^ 
 
 § 35. Intervening cause illustrated. — Thus, one who leaves 
 a horse loose and unattended, in a city street, is responsible for 
 injuries done by the horse in running away, although that 
 might not have happened but for the wrongful act of a stranger 
 in frightening it,* and though, after the horse began to run, 
 its owner did his best to stop it.^ So also the owner of any 
 machine, or other thing capable in its nature of doing injury, 
 is liable for injury which ensues to a person, not himself 
 careless, in consequence of the owner's negligently leaving it 
 exposed and unguarded, in a public place, and its being there 
 set in motion by a negligent person.^ So where a gas com- 
 
 ' Clark V. Chambers, L. R. 3 Q. B. 
 Div. 337 (practically overruling Man- 
 gan V. Atterton, L. E. 1 Ex. 239) ; 
 Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29 ; Abbott 
 V. Macfie, 3 Hurlst. & C. 744 ; Collins 
 V. Middle Level Com., L. R. 4 C. P. 
 279. 
 
 2 See Hofnagle v. N. Y. Central 
 E. Co., 55 N. Y. 608. Where the de- 
 fendant negligently sold gunpoveder 
 to a child, but the child gave all the 
 povcder to its parents, who after- 
 ward allowed the child to take some 
 of it, by the explosion of which he 
 was injured, the defendant was held 
 not liable, and quite correctly, be- 
 cause all effect of his negligence had 
 been cured by the intervening pru- 
 dence of the child's parents in taking 
 charge of the gunpowder, and their 
 subsequent negligence in allowing 
 the child to have it again could not 
 restore the connection between the 
 defendant's original imprudence and 
 the final injury (Carter v. Towne, 103 
 Mass. 507). The purchase by a father, 
 for his son eleven years of age, of 
 a toy-gun, cannot be held to have 
 been made in reasonable anticipa- 
 
 tion of an injury caused by the use 
 of the gun by another boy to whom 
 the son lent it (Harris v. Cameron, 
 81 Wise. 289 ; 51 N. W. 437 ; S. P. 
 Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 325 ; 
 50 N. W. 135). 
 
 ' Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29 ; 
 lUidge v. Goodwin, 5 Carr & P. 192 ; 
 Rompillon v. Abbott, 1 N. Y. Supp. 
 663 ; 49 Hun, 607, mem. One who 
 left his cart in the street unattended, 
 with which, while so standing, an- 
 other cart came in collision, in con- 
 sequence of which plaintiff was in- 
 jured, is liable (Powell v. Deveney, 3 
 Cush. 300). s. P., Proctor v. Jennings, 
 6 Nev. 83 ; Phillips v. De Wald, 79 
 Ga. 732 ; 7S. E. 151; Belkv. People, 
 125 111. 584 ; 17 N. E. 744. See § 645, 
 post). For cases of injuries caused by 
 defects in highways, the negligence 
 of third persons contributing, see 
 §§ 346, 347, post. 
 
 » McCahill v. Kipp, 2 B. D. Smith, 
 413. 
 
 'Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 
 Mass. 140 ; Weick v. Lander, 75 111. 
 93 ; s. P. Clark v. Chambers, L. R. 3 
 Q. B. Div. 337 ; Mars v. Delaware 
 
39 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 [§36 
 
 pany furnishes leaky pipes, and thus by its negligence fills the 
 plaintiff's room with gas, it is responsible for an explosion 
 caused by a gasfitter taking a lighted candle without due cau- 
 tion, for the purpose of finding where the leak was/ The rule 
 that the defendant is liable "for any negligence of other persons 
 which he might have anticipated as the result of his own, has 
 been carried to such an extent as to hold that where the 
 defendant descended in a balloon upon private grounds, and 
 the spectacle attracted upon the grounds a crowd of people, by 
 whom the premises were injured, he was liable to the owner 
 for the damage ; ' but this decision is condemned, upon satis- 
 factory grounds.' 
 
 § 36. Intervening cause must be culpable. — The chain 
 of responsible connection is not broken so long as the defend- 
 ant is in any proper sense the cause of the plaintiff's injury, 
 
 etc. C. Co., 8 N. Y. Supp. 107 ; 54 
 Hun, 635, mem. [locomotive] ; Mexi- 
 can Nat. R. Co. V. Mussette, 86 Tex. 
 708 ; 26 S. W. 1075 [locomotive]. So 
 held as to a gun left loaded and 
 primed (Dixon v. BeU, 5 Maule & S. 
 198). In Henry v. Dennis (93 Ind. 
 452), defendant left an open barrel of 
 fish brine in the street ; a stranger 
 emptied the barrel into the street ; 
 plaintiff's cow drank the brine and 
 was killed thereby ; defendant held 
 liable. See note to this case 47 Am. 
 Eep. 381. "Where an open cellar- way 
 in a public building was insecurely 
 covered by a bench, easily movable, 
 and which in fact was removed by a 
 third person, shortly before the plain- 
 tiff fell through the opening, the own- 
 er's negligence held to be the proxi- 
 mate cause of the injury (Howe v. 
 Ohmart, 7 Ind. App. 32 ; 38-N. E. 466). 
 See Handyside v. Powers, 145 Mass. 
 133 ; 13 N. Y, 463 ; Mclntire v. Roberts, 
 149 Mass. 450 ; 33 N. E. 13. 
 
 " Burrows v. March Gas Co. , L. R. 
 5 Ex. 67, affl'd, 7 Id. 96. In Bartlett 
 V. Boston Gas Co. (117 Mass. 533), 
 where the gas company was held 
 
 not liable for an explosion, the cir- 
 cumstances were alike in every 
 respect, except as to contributory 
 negligence. In Koelsch v. Philadel- 
 phia Co. (153 Pa. St. 355 ; 35 Atl. 522), 
 a third person, not defendant's agent, 
 struck the match which caused the 
 explosion; defendant held liable, as 
 being responsible for the escape of 
 the gas from defective main. See 
 § 693, post. 
 
 5 Guille V. Swan, 19 Johns, 381. 
 
 « Wharton, Negl. § 95. In Fair- 
 banks V. Kerr (70 Pa. St. 871, it was 
 held that where a street preacher at- 
 tracted a crowd around him, and 
 some of them mounted a pile of 
 stones, and by their weight broke 
 them, it was a question of fact for 
 the jury, and not one of law, whether 
 the speaker should have anticipated 
 this result. In the latter case it is to 
 be observed that it was the very ob- 
 ject of the street preacher to collect 
 a crowd, whereas, in the former case, 
 a crowd was probably the last thing 
 which the descending balloonist de- 
 sired. 
 
§ 37] PROXIMATE CAUSE. 40 
 
 unless the person whose act intervenes is culpable. If such 
 person's act is innocent it is no defence.^ And, generally 
 speaking, the intervener must be one who can be held respon- 
 sible in an action at law for the damage. But the act of the 
 State or of the United States might intervene to break the 
 connection of responsibility, and yet no action be allowed. 
 The intervention of a private person, however, can never re- 
 lieve the defendant from liability for an injury of which he 
 was the cause, unless such person could be made responsible 
 in an action. If, therefore, the intervener is so young, or a 
 person of such weak mind, that greater care than he shows 
 could not reasonably be expected from him, such intervention 
 is no defence.' This doctrine is fully illustrated in the chap- 
 ter on Contributory Negligence. 
 
 § 37. Intervening cause must be a free agent. — Neither is 
 the intervening cause sufficient, if the intervener was not a free 
 agent, since he could not be culpable in his act or responsible 
 for it. ^ Thus, where the defendant chased a boy with an axe,, 
 and the boy, escaping into the plaintiff's store, injured property 
 in his terror, the defendant was held liable for the damage. ^ 
 
 • Thus, where a traveler upon a another boy, six years old, to fire one- 
 sidewalk in a city street steps upon of the cartridges, thereby killing one- 
 a loose board forming part of the of the boys who bought it, defend- 
 walk, so that the end of the board ant was held liable (Binford v. John- 
 tips up and strikes another traveler, ston, 82 Ind. 426; s. p., Otten v. 
 the latter has his remedy against the Cohen, 1 N. Y. Supp. 430). But see 
 city, whose duty it was to maintain § 34, ante. 
 
 the sidewalk (Emporia v. Schmid- ^ Wharton, Negl. §§ 89, 138. The 
 
 ling, 33Kans. 485). To same effect, familiar "squib case" is an aptillus- 
 
 Chacey v. Fargo, 5 N. Dak. 173; 64 N. tration of the doctrine. In that case, 
 
 W. 933. Plaintiff went into defend- A., in violation of a statute, threw a 
 
 ant's lutaber yard to purchase lum- lighted squib into a market house, 
 
 her. A team caught a projecting and it fell near B. The latter, to 
 
 end of one of the titybers ; it fell on prevent injury to himself, seized it 
 
 plaintiff. Held, that the negligence and threw it near C, who in turn 
 
 of defendant in piling the lumber threw it toward D.,who was injured 
 
 was the proximate cause of the in- thereby. A. was held liable to D. 
 
 jury (Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87). for the injury of which his act was 
 
 " Thus, where defendant sold pis- the proximate cause (Scott v. Shep- 
 
 tol-cartridges to children, knowing herd, 2 W. Blackst. 892; s. c.,3 Wils.- 
 
 that they were dangerous and that 403). 
 
 the purchasers were unfit to use ^ Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio, 
 
 them, and the purchasers allowed 464. 
 
41 PROXIMATE CAUSE. [§ 38 
 
 So where, by the defendant's negligence, a horse was fright- 
 ened and ran away, bringing its driver into collision with the 
 plaintiff, the defendant was held liable.^ The same principle 
 appHes to all cases in which the intervener acts so completely 
 under the influence of sudden alarm as not to be responsible 
 for his acts, especially if this alarm is caused by the defend- 
 ant's fault ; although we do not think that an indispensable 
 condition. This point will be illustrated in the chapter on 
 Contributory Negligence. 
 
 §38. Intervener not culpable if ignorant of the facts.— 
 
 Neither is the alleged intervener culpable, if he was ignorant of 
 the facts which would, if known, have imposed a duty of 
 special care upon him. And, therefore, the intervention of a 
 person, thus ignorant, is no defence, even though his act was 
 the sole immediate cause of the injury. Thus, where the de- 
 fendant negligently sells to a third person, in a concealed form, 
 for the plaintiff's use, poison or other articles likely to cause 
 personal injury, and such person innocently and unsuspectingly 
 gives them to the plaintiff, who is injured thereby, he can re- 
 cover damages from the defendant. ^ And if the person who 
 
 ' Lowery v. Manhattan R. Co., 99 (Heaven v. Pender, infra). Thomas 
 N. Y. 158 ; 1 N. E. 608. A. was injured v. Winchester (6 N. Y. 897) goes still 
 by B.'s horse, which was frightened further ; its authority has been ques- 
 by the overturn of the sleigh to tionedi (see Bigelow on Torts, 609 ; 
 which it was attached, on a heap of Wharton, Negl. g 91 ; Heaven v. Pen- 
 snow and ice, wrongfully left in a der, L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 503) ; but we 
 highway by C. Held, that C.'s act think it correct. It is reaffirmed in 
 was the proximate cause of A.'s in- Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470. In 
 jury (Lee v. Union R. Co., 12 R. I. 1 Law Quarterly Review, 516, the edi- 
 383). So where, in consequence of tor, approving the decision in Elliott 
 defendant's changing the course of a v. Hall, 15 Q. B. D. 315, to the effect 
 creek, beavers dammed it up, cans- that the seller of coals, who sends 
 ing the water to overflow adjoining them in a truck, with a loose trap, 
 land, he was held Uable for resulting door in it, is liable to the buyer's 
 injury (Cheeves v. Danielly, 80 Ga. servants if they go through the trap- 
 114; 4 S. E. 903). See similar cases door in the course of unloading the 
 cited under §§ 355, 436, 636, post. coals, adds: " Perhaps it is not too 
 
 ' George v. . Skivington, L. R. 5 much even to hope that the Court of 
 
 Exoh. 1 ; Norton v. Sewall, 106 Appeal will some day follow the 
 
 Mass. 143 ; Elkins v. McKean, 79 Pa. leading New York case of Thomas v. 
 
 St. 493 : Langi-idge v. Levy, 3 Mees. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, which, 
 
 & VV. 519 ; affirmed, 4 Id. 387 ; said though regarded with a kind of sus- 
 
 by Brett, M. R., to be badly reported, picious fear by English commenta- 
 
§39] 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 42 
 
 shipped the nitro-glycerine, in the well-known case arising out 
 of its explosion while in transit,^ could have been found, it is 
 evident that the fact of the explosion having been directly 
 caused by the rough handling of the carrier would have been 
 no defence to him, since the carrier had been deceived by him 
 as to the nature of the goods. 
 
 § 39. Superior force concurring with defendant's negli- 
 gence. — It is universally agreed that, if the damage is caused 
 by the concurring force of the defendant's negligence and some 
 other cause for which he is not responsible, including the " act 
 of God " or superior human force directly intervening, the 
 defendant is nevertheless responsible, if his negligence is ohe 
 of the proximate causes of the damage, within the definition 
 already given.' It is also agreed that, if the negligence of the 
 defendant concurs with the other cause of the injury, in point 
 of time and place, ^ or otherwise so directly contributes to the 
 plaintiff's damage that it is reasonably certain that the other 
 cause alone would not have sufficed to produce it,' the defend- 
 
 tors, is, in our opinion, very good 
 law." 
 2 Parrot v. WeUs, 15 "Wall. 534. 
 .' HoUaday v. Kennard, 13 Wall. 
 254 ; Bostwick v. Baltimore, etc. E. 
 Co., 45 N. Y. 713 ; Michaels v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 30 Id. 564 ; Eead t. 
 Spaulding, Id. 630 ; George v. Fisk, 
 33 N. H. 33 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Sulphur Spring, 96 Pa. St. 65; 
 Watkins v. Roberts, 38 Ind. 167 ; 
 Pruitt V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 63 
 Mo. 537 ; Clark v. Pacific R. Co., 89 
 Id. 184. The filling of a steamer's 
 boilers over night, to be ready for 
 starting next morning, resulting in 
 the freezing of the water and burst- 
 ing of the pipe during the night, is 
 negligence, though shown to be cus- 
 tomary to fill the boilers of outgoing 
 vessels over night (Siordet v. Hall, 
 4 Bing. 607). It is negligent for a 
 ferryman to start a little boat across 
 a river when a dangerous wind is 
 blowing (Cook v. Gourdin, 3 Nott & 
 
 M. 19) ; or for a vs^agoner to start 
 across a stream with an insufiicient 
 team(Loomisv. Pearson, Harp. 470) ; 
 and they will not be excused for a 
 loss occurring by reason of the wind 
 or sudden rising of the stream. In 
 Jackson v. Wisconain Tel. Co. (88 
 Wise. 348 ; 60 N. W. 430), a telephone 
 company negligently left a wire con- 
 necting plaintiflE's building with 
 another greatly higher building sur- 
 mounted by a high pole. Plaintiff's 
 building was burned by reason of 
 lightning striking the pole on the 
 other building, and being conducted 
 along the wire to his. Held, that the 
 leaving of the wire between the two 
 buildings was the proximate cause of 
 the fire and the company was liable. 
 
 « Scott V. Hunter, 46 Pa. St. 193. 
 See Cooley on Torts, 73. 
 
 ' See Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Sul- 
 phur Spring, 96 Pa. St. 65. The 
 defendants' vessel, owing to their 
 negligence, struck, and was driven 
 
43 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 [§39 
 
 ant is liable, notwithstanding he may not have anticipated or 
 been bound to anticipate the interference of the superior force 
 which, concurring with his own negligence, produced the dam- 
 age/ But if the superior force would have produced the same 
 
 by the wind and tide upon a sea-wall, 
 damaging the same. In that state 
 of the weather and tide, it was im- 
 possible to prevent this result, after 
 the ship had once struck. Held, 
 that defendants were liable for the 
 damage caused to the wall (Romney 
 V. Trinity House, L. R. 5 Ex. 204 ; 
 affl'd, 7 Id. 247). In Sherman v. 
 Inman Steamship Co. (26 Hun, 107), 
 it was held that, if the jury were 
 satisfied that the captain was negli- 
 gent in endeavoring to continue a 
 voyage in the disabled condition of 
 the steamer, the plaintiff was enti- 
 tled to recover for loss of cargo 
 shipped by him. 
 
 * Woodward v. Aborn, 35 Me. 271 
 [wrongfully placing deleterious sub- 
 stance near plaintiff's well, into 
 which an extraordinary freshet car- 
 ried it, spoiling the water]. In 
 Frith V. Bowling Iron Co. (L. R. 3 
 C. P. Div. 254), defendant, being 
 bound to maintain a division fence, 
 constructed it with old wire rope ; 
 this decayed by rust, and some of 
 the fragments fell on plaintiff's land 
 and were swallowed by his cow, 
 causing her death. Defendant held 
 liable. Compare Henry v. Dennis, 
 93 Ind. 453 (supra, % 35, n. 3). In 
 Lawrence v. Jenkins (L. R. 8 Q. B. 
 274), defendant negligently suffered 
 fence to be broken down ; plaintiff's 
 cow escaped and was killed ; defend- 
 ant held liable, s. p., West v. Ward, 
 77 Iowa, 333 ; 42 N. W. 309 [defend- 
 ant left plaintiff's fence open ; mare 
 escaped, and was injured in a wire 
 fence]. An action lies by a passenger 
 against a can-ier, if the injury oc- 
 curred in part from an unforeseen 
 cause, and in part by negligence 
 
 (Brehm v. Great Western R. Co., 
 34 Barb. 256). The defendant had 
 wrongfully placed a dam across a 
 stream on plaintiff's land, and al- 
 lowed it to remain there ; being 
 swept away by a freshet, the rush 
 of water injured plaintiff's prop- 
 erty ; defendant held Uable (Dick- 
 inson V. Boyle, 17 Pick. 78). In 
 an action for obstructing a water- 
 course, where the overflow was in- 
 creased by the effects of melting 
 snows and falling rains, neither the 
 court nor jury are required to dis- 
 criminate between the damages so 
 caused and those resulting from the 
 action of the living stream (Bird v. 
 Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 30 Mo. App. 
 365). The fact that a railroad cul- 
 vert would not have given way but 
 for the breaking of a dam on ad- 
 joining property, over which de- 
 fendant had no control, will not pre- 
 vent recovery by a passenger, if the 
 negligent manner of the culvert's 
 construction contributed to the in- 
 jury (Bonner v. Wingate, 78 Tex. 
 333 ; 14 S. W. 790 ; Ilfrey v. Sabine, 
 etc. R. Co., 76 Tex. 63; 13 S. W. 165). 
 To same effect, Turner v. Haar, 114 
 Mo. 385 ; 3i S. W. 737 ; Webster v. 
 Rome, etc. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 113 ; 21 
 N. E. 735 [leaving cars unsecured 
 on side track whence they were 
 blown by high winds.] See § 465, 
 post. In Rodgers v. Central Pa- 
 cific R. Co. (67 Cal. 607; 8 Pac. 
 377), defendant's bridge fell by 
 reason of its defects, combined with 
 an enormous fall of water from 
 " a cloud-burst ; " defendant held 
 liable, s. P., Philadelphia, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Anderson, 94 Pa. St. 356 ; 
 Davis V. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 55 
 
§4o] 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 44 
 
 damage, whether the defendant had been negligent or not, his 
 negligence is not deemed the cause of the injury.' 
 
 § 40. Superior force concurring with defendant's 
 delay. — In the application of this principle, a serious 
 difference of opinion has arisen as to what is a natural 
 sequence of negligence, exposing the property of another 
 to injury. In Pennsylvania,' Massachusetts,^ Ohio,* 
 
 Vt. 84. In Ellet v. St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co. (76 Mo. 518), a storm of un- 
 usual severity carried away a rail- 
 way embankment. The defendant 
 ran a train without first causing the 
 road-bed and track to be carefully 
 examined, and a train was wrecked 
 in consequence. The company was 
 held liable. Where the servants of 
 a railroad company, aware that a 
 bridge on the line had been carried 
 away by a flood, neglected to take 
 steps to warn and stop an approach- 
 ing train, the company was held 
 liable (Lambkin v. Southeastern R. 
 Co.,L. R. 5. App. Cas. 353). The de- 
 fendant hung a sign over a street, in 
 violation of an ordinance ; it was 
 blown down by the vsrind in an ex- 
 traordinary storm, and in its fall a 
 bolt, which was part of its fasten- 
 ings, struck and broke plaintifE's 
 window ; defendant held liable 
 (Salisbury v. Hirchenroder, 106 
 Mass. 458). For cases of street ob- 
 structions occasioned, in part, by 
 natural causes — winds, ice and 
 snow — see § 363, post. 
 
 ' Thus where a building is carried 
 away by a flood, which a culvert 
 under defendant's railway embank- 
 ment was not sufficiently large to 
 pass, a charge, in effect, that de- 
 fendant's negligence concurring 
 with the act of God, although that 
 negligence did not produce the in- 
 jury, and its absence would not have 
 prevented it. was sufficient to render 
 the defendant liable, was held 
 
 erroneous. (Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Sulphur Springs, etc. 96 Pa. St, 65). 
 ' ' To create liability, it must have 
 required the combined effect of the 
 act of God and the concurrent negli- 
 gence to produce the injury " (lb. ; 
 compare Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Anderson, 94 Pa. St. 351). Where a 
 lurch of the vessel caused a passen- 
 ger to trip on socket fixed in floor 
 of saloon, alleged to have been in- 
 sufficiently lighted, held the cause of 
 the fall was the action of the sea, and 
 the carrier was not liable (Bruswitz 
 V. Netherlands Steam Nav. Co., 64 
 Hun, 263 ; 19 N. Y. Supp. 75). The 
 working loose of long lumber on two 
 freight cars, properly packed and in- 
 spected, so that the ends of the lum- 
 ber struck a passing car, held to be 
 an accident which could not have 
 been anticipated (Knox v. N. Y., 
 Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 69 Hun, 93 ; 
 23 N. Y. Supp. 198). 
 
 ' In Morrison v. Davis (20 Pa. St. 
 171), a canal boat started with alamo 
 horse ; a consequent delay occurred, 
 pending which the goods were lost 
 by an extraordinary flood. But for 
 the lameness of the horse the boat 
 would have passed the place where 
 the flood occurred. Carrier not 
 liable. 
 
 2 Denny v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 13 
 Gray, 481 ; Hoadley v. Northern Tr. 
 Co., 115 Mass. 304. 
 
 ' One who, having engaged to 
 tow a barge over Lake Michigan, 
 delayed commencing the voyage, so 
 
45 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 [§40 
 
 lowa,^ Nebraska,^ and Arkansas,^ as well as in the United 
 States Supreme Court/ it is held that where a carrier, by 
 negligent delay, exposes goods to injury by the "act of God," 
 or other cause for which he is not responsible, and which he 
 could not naturally foresee, he is not liable for injuries arising 
 from such a cause, although they would not have affected the 
 goods if he had not negligently delayed their transportation. 
 This decision is put upon the ground that he could not 
 reasonably have anticipated such a result of his delay, and 
 that, for aught that he could possibly foresee, promptness 
 might have exposed the goods to the risk quite as much as 
 delay.' In New York,' New Hampshire,*" Missouri," and 
 Tennessee,'^ the very opposite doctrine is firmly settled. In 
 all courts, the act of a master of a vessel, in deviating from 
 
 that after it was commenced a storm 
 was encountered in whicli the barge 
 was lost, was not liable for the loss, 
 although the delay was unreasonable 
 and unnecessary, and although the 
 barge but for the delay would prob- 
 ably have been safe (Daniels v. 
 Ballantine, 33 Ohio St. 532). 
 
 ^ Where plaintiff deposited wood 
 at one end of a bridge, which he in- 
 tended to take over the bridge into 
 the city, but was delayed by the 
 neglect of the city to repair it, and 
 the wood was subsequently carried 
 away by a flood, it was held that he 
 could not recover (Dubuque Wood, 
 etc. Co. V. Dubuque, 30 Iowa, 176). 
 
 " Where a train, being behind 
 time, was upset by a gale of wind, 
 which it would have escaped had it 
 been on time, held, that the carrier 
 was not liable (McClary v. Sioux, 
 «tc. R. Co. 3 Neb. 44). 
 
 ^ Martin v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 55 Ark. 510 ; 19 S. W. 314. 
 
 ' Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 
 176 ; Thomas v. Lancaster Mills, 34 
 U. S. App. 404; 71 Fed. 481. 
 
 * Colt, J., Hoadley v. Northern 
 Transp. Co., 115 Mass. 804. 
 
 9 In New York, it is well settled 
 
 that if the defendant's delay was un- 
 reasonable, and such delay exposed 
 the goods to loss, e. g., by fire, the 
 loss is to be attributed directly to the 
 defendant's fault (Condict v. Grand 
 Trunk R. Co., 54 N. Y. 500, and cases 
 cited). Compare Read v. Spaulding, 
 30 N. Y. 630 ; Bostwick v. Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co., 45 Id. 713 ; and Michaels 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 30 Id. 
 564, where forwarder was held liable 
 for delay in forwarding goods, by 
 which they became damaged by ex- 
 traordinary rise of water in river. 
 So held also in Graw v. Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 361. In 
 Smeedv. Foord (1 El. & El. 603), the 
 delay was in the delivery of a 
 threshing machine, with knowledge 
 on the part of the company that 
 it was needed to thresh wheat in 
 the field. The grain was injured 
 by the delay. The carrier was held 
 liable. 
 
 ■o Deming v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 
 48 N. H. 455. 
 
 " Pruitt V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 63 Mo. 537, and cases cited. 
 
 "^ Deming v. Merchants' Cotton 
 Press Co., 90 Tenn. 306; 17 S. W- 
 89. 
 
§4o] 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 46 
 
 the usual course of his voyage, would be held the proximate 
 cause of damage caused by a tempest, in itself the act of God.'* 
 
 '3 Davis V. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716. 
 Same rule as to cai-riers by land 
 (Powers V. Davenport, 7 Blackf. 497 ; 
 liEwrence v. McGregor, Wright, 193 ; 
 Phillips V. Brigham, 26 Ga. 617). 
 If a carrier agrees to transport goods 
 by canal, and he takes them out to 
 
 sea (Hand v. Baynes, 4 Whart. 204), 
 or agrees to send them by one line 
 of boats and sends them by another 
 (Johnson v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 33 
 N. Y. 610), and they are lost by act 
 of God, he is Liable. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 5 41. The theory of two degrees of 
 negligence. 
 
 42. Its impracticabiUty in modern 
 
 affairs. 
 
 43. Unsatisfactory tests of " ordi- 
 
 nary care." 
 
 44. Necessity of an exceptional 
 
 degree of care. 
 
 45. The requirement just and rea- 
 
 sonable. 
 
 §46. " Utmost care," when required. 
 
 47. Three degrees of care defined. 
 
 48. Correlative degrees of negli- 
 
 gence. 
 
 49. "Gross," "ordinary" and 
 
 " slight " negligence defined. 
 
 50. Standard of "great care" stated. 
 
 51. Application of the rule to pas- 
 
 senger carriers. 
 
 § 41. The theory of two degrees of negligence.— We de- 
 sire to express the obligation under which we, in common with 
 the courts and the bar, have been placed by the eminent 
 ability and learning with which Dr. Wharton has expounded 
 the Roman law concerning degrees of negligence, dnd by which 
 he has cleared up the confusion which had so long existed 
 upon this subject. He has conclusively shown that the real 
 Roman law did recognize degrees of negligence, or rather 
 degrees of care and skill to be required, and that it did not 
 recognize the division and definition of these degrees which 
 were invented by the scholastic jurists of the Middle Ages. 
 
 We should be glad to accept and follow Dr. Wharton's 
 theory to the fullest extent, if we could feel justified in doing 
 so. We shall accept the definitions which he has drawn from 
 the Roman law ; but we are compelled to differ from him upon 
 one important point ; although, in doing so, we vary nearly as 
 much from the theory of our first three editions as we should by 
 accepting his views without qualification. In those editions, 
 which were all issued before Dr. Wharton's work appeared, 
 we referred to the difficulties and confusion which surrounded 
 the whole question of degrees of negligence, and, while insist- 
 ing that some difference in the degree of care, diligence and 
 skill to be required from persons in very different positions 
 
 [47] 
 
§ 42] DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 48 
 
 must be recognized, we admitted that the definitions usually 
 given of these degrees were unsatisfactory. 
 
 The analysis of Dr. Wharton shows clearly wherein these 
 definitions were unsatisfactory and also why they were so. 
 They were not derived from the real Roman law, framed, as 
 that was, by jurists dealing with practical affairs; they were 
 invented by mere students, having no experience of practical 
 life. So far, the reasoning of Dr. Wharton is conclusive. He 
 goes further, however, and insists that only two degrees of 
 care or negligence should be recognized in our law, as only two 
 were acknowledged by the Roman jurists. 
 
 These are (i) the care to be required by one who is not, and 
 does not profess to be, a good man of business or an expert in 
 the affairs under consideration, and (2) the care to be required 
 of one who is, or professes to be, such an expert. The care 
 required from the first class might be called slight; and the 
 care required from the second class might be called ordinary. 
 Great care, he holds, should not be demanded in any case, if it 
 is to be understood as implying anything more than what is 
 here called ordinary care, the care of an expert, measured by 
 what is usual among good men of business in the same line. 
 
 § 42. Its impracticability in modern affairs. — It is quite true 
 that the middle-age definitions of the degrees of care, and still 
 more the application of those definitions to particular cases 
 and the reasons assigned for it, were the product of mere 
 abstract speculation, without the aid of practical experience. 
 The result of all attempts to apply these speculations to 
 practice has been to drop out of sight nearly all the examples 
 of great care and slight negligence which were given in the old 
 books. But a new class of cases has arisen within the last 
 century, in which, as the result of that very experience which Dr. 
 Wharton justly considers the true foundation of all theories in 
 law, the courts of Great Britain and the United States have 
 felt so strongly the necessity of a special, unusual degree of 
 care, that they have actually invented a fourth degi'ee, and, 
 not content with that great care and responsibility for slight 
 negligence which the medieval jurists defined, they have held 
 defendants to the duty of using the utmost care, and to 
 responsibility for the slightest negligence. 
 
49 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. [§ 43 
 
 Dr. Wharton attempts to prove that, in all these cases, only 
 ordinary care has really been exacted, that is, the care usually 
 shown in such cases by a good man of business, accustomed to 
 that line of business. But in this, we think, he fails. 
 
 §43. Unsatisfactory tests of "ordinary care."— Every 
 possible definition of ordinary care fails, when it is attempted 
 to include within it the actual decisions of the best courts as 
 to the duty of carriers of persons. Dr. Wharton admits that 
 the general language of the leading judicial opinions is incon- 
 sistent with the theory that ordinary care only is required in 
 such cases.' But he urges that this language is only theoretical, 
 and that the courts, when stating as a principle that the utmost 
 care and skill, the highest degree of prudence and the greatest 
 foresight, are demanded from carriers, only mean that they 
 must use that degree of care and skill " which a good specialist, 
 skilled in his particular department, is accustomed to apply," ^ 
 or " which good business men of the class are accustomed, 
 under similar circumstances, to apply." ^ If, by these expres- 
 sions, it is meant that the standard of care and skill main- 
 tained by the best specialist who can be found by the 
 passenger, after a diligent search for the best man, is to be 
 enforced against all carriers, that would establish a rule even 
 more stringent than that which we assert. But if, as doubtless 
 is the case, it is meant that no greater care and skill are re- 
 quired than such as is generally shown by average good busi- 
 ness men of the same class, and especially such as they usually 
 bestow upon their own protection, under similar circumstances, 
 these phrases are misleading. They are not mere students or 
 "schoolmen" who have invented a different rule ; they are 
 judges, the majority of whom have been more or less engaged 
 in railway business, and many of whom were for years actively 
 engaged in the defence of railway companies against claims for 
 personal injuries. Yet they are unanimous, or very nearly so, 
 in requiring the managers of railways, steamboats, etc., to use 
 a degree of care, diligence and skill for the protection of pas- 
 sengers, which they know perfectly well that such carriers 
 never would, use, if it were not for these decisions, and which 
 
 ' "Wharton, Negligence, § 636. = Id. § 629. 
 
 » Id. § 636. 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 4] 
 
§ 44] DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 50 
 
 the men who conduct the practical details of such business 
 rarely use for their own protection.* The courts are not in- 
 fluenced by prejudice, in thus holding common carriers to an 
 ideal, though not really impracticable, standard of perfection. 
 They do it because, from long experience and observation of 
 affairs, they know that, if they lowered their standard to the 
 average degree of care used by those who are reputed to be 
 good and careful railway managers and servants, human life 
 would be needlessly put in peril every day. 
 
 §44. Necessity of an exceptional degree of care. — Let us 
 
 suppose that the plaintiff has left a watch to be repaired. If 
 the defendant has used as much skill and care in the work as 
 is usual among watchmakers reputed to be good and reason- 
 ably skillful workmen, the plaintiff cannot recover damages for 
 a defect in the work, even though he proves that such a defect 
 was never known in the work of two or three of the most 
 famous watchmakers in the world. But, on the other hand, 
 let us suppose the plaintiff to have been injured by a railway 
 accident, caused by a flaw in a wheel. Jf the plaintiff proved 
 that three of the best railway companies had a thoroughly 
 tested, convenient and practicable process in use, by which 
 they could and would have discovered this flaw, and that this 
 fact was known to the defendant, the plaintiff can recover, in 
 spite of proof that three hundred other companies did not use 
 such a test.* The only question in such a case is whether even 
 as much proof as this would be necessary. This is but one of 
 many instances in which the courts have sternly enforced the 
 rule that common carriers of passengers, and especially those 
 who use steam or electric power, must use, not that de- 
 gree of care which is usual among prudent and competent car- 
 riers, but that degree of care which the court can see 
 ought to be used by them all, and is in use by a few 
 unusually prudent carriers. And it is worthy of note, as 
 indicating the force of the considerations which have led 
 practical men to recognize the necessity of this exceptional 
 degree of care, that it has been established and enforced, 
 
 ^ For the rule of the degree of care ' See cases under next section, 
 requiied of carriers of passengers, 
 see |§ 51, 495, ■post. 
 
5 I DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. [§ 45 
 
 with the severest strictness, by judges who had been coun- 
 sel for railway companies when at the bar, many of them 
 owning railway stock while on the bench, and that while 
 many legislatures have been wholly controlled by railway cor- 
 porations, none of them ever ventured to relax the stringency 
 of this rule. 
 
 § 45. The requirement just and reasonable.— While no 
 definition of ordinary care calls for more care than prudent ex- 
 perts generally use for their own protection, it is settled law 
 in most American States, if not in all, that a carrier of passen- 
 gers by steam, is responsible for any defect in engines, cars or 
 other means of transportation which could have been detected 
 by any known test, either while in use ' or in the process of 
 manufacture.^ As a matter of fact, not one practical railway 
 official in a thousand would ever apply these tests for his own 
 protection if he had not formed the habit of doing so for the 
 sake of passengers; and we are confident that not one in ten, 
 if one in a hundred, would do it even now, if they were the 
 only passengers in the train. We feel confident, moreover, 
 that neither the railway companies nor the car manufacturers 
 ever applied to any one car, which they did not specially sus- 
 pect of defects, all the tests which the courts unanimously hold 
 them bound to apply to every car. So the courts hold that 
 common carriers are bound to adopt all inventions which have 
 been demonstrated to increase the safety of passengers, and 
 which are in actual use tjy some carriers.^ But a great major- 
 ity of railways in America are still without many of these im- 
 provements ; and very few of them would ever be adopted by 
 railway officials, merely for their own protection; while 
 
 ' Ingalls V. Bills, 9 Meto. 1 ; Stein- R. Co., 16 Q. B. 984 ; and other cases 
 
 weg V. Erie R. Co., 43 N.Y. 123 ; Car- cited under §§ 410, 497, post. 
 
 roll V. Staten Island R. Co., 58 Id. ^ Hegeman v. Western R. Co., 13 
 
 126; Caldwell V. N. J. Steamboat N. Y. 9 ; Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bing. 457 ; 
 
 Co., 47 Id. 282 ; Alden v. N. Y. Cen- 2 Moore & S. 620; Burns v. Cork, 
 
 tral R. Co.. 26 Id. 102 ; reaffirmed, etc. R. Co., 13 Irish C. L. 543. 
 
 Palmer v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., ' Caldwell v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 
 
 120 N. Y. 170 ; Meier v. Pennsylvania 47 N. Y. 282 ; Smith v. N. Y. & Har- 
 
 R. Co., 64 Pa. St. 325 : Carpue v. lem R. Co., 19 Id. 127 ; Knight v. 
 
 Brighton, etc. R. Co., 5 Q. B. 749; Portland R. Co., 56 Me. 234; see 
 
 Skinner v. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 5 Meier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 64 Pa. 
 
 Exch. 787 ; Collett v. Northwestern St. 225, and §§ 51, 410, 495, 497, post 
 
§ 46] DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 52 
 
 many would never be adopted at all, if it were not for 
 fear of heavy damages in negligence suits. Wherever no 
 such risk is incurred, and therefore no interference of 
 the courts is dreaded, some of the most farpous carry- 
 ing companies in the world have shown a callous disre- 
 gard for the comfort and safety of passengers, which indicates 
 clearly enough what would be the fate of passengers if the 
 courts had accepted as a standard the ordinary care of good 
 business men in that line. The shocking immoralities and 
 filthy discomforts of Atlantic passenger ships, prior to 1850, if 
 not later, which continued and increased until legislatures in- 
 terposed ; the practice, at one time common, of adding petro- 
 leum cars to passenger trains ; the continued use of stoves in 
 American cars, notwithstanding repeated and frightful losses 
 of life from this cause ; and the persistent refusal of English 
 railway managers to afford any means of communication be- 
 tween passengers and guards, are but a few among a multitude 
 of examples which might be cited. 
 
 §46. "Utmost care," when required. — The modern de- 
 mand for the exercise of what is often called " the utmost 
 care " is largely due to the essentially modern regard for 
 human life and the development of applied science. It is only 
 within a very recent period that life has been considered more 
 sacred than property ; and, side by side with the growth of 
 this feeling, there has been a wonderful extension of human 
 powers by means of new inventions. In ancient times, it 
 would have seemed preposterous to claim a greater degree of 
 care for the preservation of the life of a slave than for the 
 statue of an emperor; and it would have" seemed the height of 
 tyranny to hold any man of business to a degree of care which 
 no one in that business had ever displayed, and to require him 
 to do that which every one in the business believed to be im- 
 possible. But, in our own time, legislatures have absolutely 
 forbidden gas companies to cast their refuse into rivers ; 
 although these companies unanimously declared, with entire 
 sincerity, that they could not conduct their business at all in 
 any other way. So legislatures have compelled manufacturers 
 to consume their own smoke ; although none of them knew 
 how to do it. And the result, in these and other cases, has 
 
S3 
 
 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§46 
 
 fully vindicated the wisdom of this stern legislation. When 
 factories were compelled to consume their smoke, their owners 
 paid inventors to devise a method of doing so. When gas 
 companies were threatened with ruin, if they could not 
 dispose of their refuse, they paid the cost of experiments, 
 which resulted in the invention of aniline colors and in- 
 creased the wealth of the gas companies themselves, while 
 putting an end to an intolerable nuisance, which they had 
 always declared to be unavoidable. In the light of such 
 experiences, the courts are justified in holding those who 
 take charge of the lives of human beings to any degree of 
 care which is not incompatible with the transaction of busi- 
 ness, especially when its practicability has been demonstrated 
 by its adoption in that business by the most careful class of 
 persons.' 
 
 •Taber v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 71 
 N. Y. 489 ; Wilson v. Cunningham, 
 3 Cal. 241 ; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 
 St. 436; Fleet v. HoUenkemp, 13 B. 
 Monr. 219. " Not ordinary, but ex- 
 traordinary, diligence is required as 
 to passengers, and the company is 
 responsible for the utmost care and 
 watchfulness, and answerable for 
 the smallest negligence" (Sandham 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 88). 
 S. P., Bemis v. Connecticut, etc. R. 
 Co., 42 Vt. 375; Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co., V. Ballard, 2 Meto. (Ky.) 177; 
 Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553, 
 per Davis, J. A railroad company 
 is bound to use " the utmost care and 
 diligence which human prudence 
 and foresight will suggest " to secure 
 the safety of its passengers (Palmer 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 120 
 N. Y. 170 ; 24 N. E. 302). See §§ 51, 
 495, post. A much greater degree 
 of care is required in driving along 
 a thoroughfare that is crowded and 
 obstructed with teams and foot pas- 
 sengers than along one that is free 
 from such obstructions (Garmon v. 
 Bangor, 38 Me. 443 ; Cayzer v. Tay- 
 lor, 10 Gray, 274 ; Denver Tramway 
 
 Co. V. Reid, 4 Col. App. 53 ; 35 Pac. 
 269; McAdoo v. Richmond, etc. R. 
 Co., 105 N. C. 140 ; 11 8. E. 316, and 
 cases cited under §§ 461-464, post). 
 It may be "ordinary caution" in a 
 master to apprise an adult servant 
 of a danger to be guarded against in 
 the use of machinery, while in the 
 case of one not yet beyond the years 
 of thoughtless childhood it would be 
 gross and most culpable, if not crim- 
 inal, carelessness for a master to con- 
 tent himself with pointing out 
 dangers not likely to be appreciated, 
 or, if appreciated, not likely to be 
 kept in mind with sufficient distinct- 
 ness and caution, and against which 
 effectual precaution ought to be 
 provided (Bartonshill Coal Co. v. 
 McGuire, 3 Macq. H. L. 300 ; O'Con- 
 nor V. Adams, 120 Mass. 427; Sullivan 
 V. India Mfg. Co., 113 Id. 396 ; Coombs 
 V. New Bedford, etc. Co., 103 Id. 5T'.' ; 
 Hill V. Gust, 55 Ind. 45 ; East Sagi- 
 naw R. Co. V. Bohn, 27 Mich. 50'.. 
 See § 219, post). A heavy electric 
 car requires greater caution in its 
 management than an ordinary 
 vehicle (Cincinnati R. Co. v. Whit- 
 comb, 14 C. 0. A. 183 ; 66 Fed. 915). 
 
§ 47] DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 54 
 
 § 47. Three degrees of care defined. — Our conclusion is 
 therefore, that three degrees of care are and should be recog- 
 nized and enforced by the law of modern times, to wit : 
 
 (i.) Slight care, which is the care usually bestowed upon 
 the matter in hand by persons having no special knowledge of 
 or experience in such matters, but having the average prudence 
 of that general class of society to which the person whose 
 conduct is in question belongs. 
 
 (2.) Ordinary care, which is the care usually bestowed upon 
 the matter in hand by persons accustomed to deal with such 
 matters and having the average prudence of the general class 
 of society to which the person whose conduct is in question 
 belongs. If the matter is one of business, ordinary care also 
 implies the possession and use of such knowledge and expe- 
 rience, with respect to similar matters, as is usually possessed 
 by men of good business habits in that line.^ 
 
 (3.) Great care, which is the care usually bestowed upon the 
 matter in hand by the most competent, conscientious, prudent 
 and careful class of persons engaged in the business to which 
 such matters belong, no matter how few such persons may be, 
 if they are numerous enough to have a recognized existence as 
 a class. 
 
 In every case it must be understood, as an essential part 
 of the definition, that the test applied is the kind of care 
 usually exercised by persons of the class referred to, under 
 circumstances similar to those of the case under consider- 
 ation,' where their own interests are to be protected from a 
 
 ' See Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin, Grant v. Ludlow, 8 Ohio St. 1 ; Cleve- 
 
 93 Va. 791 ; 33 S. E. 869 ; Olwell land, etc. R. Co. v. Terry, Id. 570, 
 
 -V. Milwaukee R. Co., 93 Wise. 581 ; Fallon y. Boston, 3 Allen, 38; 
 
 330 ; 66 N. W. 363; Houston, etc. Fletcher v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 1 Id. 
 
 E. Co. V. Brin, 77 Tex. 174 ; 13 S. W. 9, 15 ; Holly v. Boston Gas Co., 8 Gray, 
 
 886. 133, 131 ; Parvis v. Philadelphia, etc. 
 
 « This branch of the definition ap- R. Co., 8 Del. 486 ; 17 Atl.703 [railroad 
 
 plies to aU the degrees of care (John- crossing] ; Spokane Truck, etc. Co. 
 
 8on V. Hudson River R. Co., SON. Y. v. Hoefer, 3 "Wash. St. 45 ; 35 Pac. 
 
 65; affirming S.C., 6 Duer, 633; Field, 1073 [hoisting safe]). Determining 
 
 J., Parrot v. WeUs, 15 Wall. 534; what was reasonable care, the appar- 
 
 "Willes J. , Vaughan v. TafE Vale R. ent danger of causing death or seri- 
 
 Co. , 5 Hurlst. & N. 679 ; Kay v. Penn- ous bodily injury may be considered, 
 
 sylvania R. Co. , 65 Pa. St. 369 ; Penn- and the jury may decide that rea- 
 
 sylvaniaR. Co. v. Coon, 111 Id. 430 ; sonable care required a high degree 
 
55 
 
 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§48 
 
 similar injury,' and when they honestly intend to be careful.* 
 What they do, or omit to do, when in a careless or reckless 
 mood, is ntever any standard by which to judge. 
 
 §48. Correlative degrees of. negligence. — The degrees of 
 negligence are, of course, correlative to the degrees of care. 
 
 of care (Uggla v. West End R. 
 Co., 160 Mass. 351; 35 N. E. 1126). 
 " Negligence is want of care under 
 the circumstances. No fixed rule of 
 duty, applicable to all'cases, can be 
 «stablished. A course of conduct, 
 justly regarded as resulting from the 
 exercise of ordinary care under some 
 circumstances, would exhibit the 
 grossest negligence under other cir- 
 cumstances; the opportunity for de- 
 liberation and action, the degree of 
 danger, and many other considera- 
 tions of like nature, affect the stand- 
 ard of care which may be reasonably 
 required in a particular case " (Ster- 
 rett, J., in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Coon, supra). '-Gross negligence is 
 a relatiye term. It is, doubtless, to 
 be understood as meaning a greater 
 -want of care than is implied by the 
 term ' ordinary negligence,' but after 
 all it means the absence of the care 
 that was requisite under the circum- 
 stances" (Davis, J., Milwaukee, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Arms, 91 U. S. 494). See 
 Steamboat New World v. King, 16 
 How. (U. S.) 469 ; Cronkv. Chicago, 
 etc. B. Co., 3 So. Dak 93 ; 52 N. W. 
 430; Austin, etc. R. Co. v. Beatty, 73 
 Tex. 593 ; 11 S. W- 858 ; Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co. v. Ryan, 63 111. App. 264. 
 
 3 Rochester White Lead Co. v. 
 Rochester, 8 N. Y. 463 ; Duff v. Budd, 
 3 Brod. & B. 177 ; Schwartz v. Gil- 
 more, 45 111. 455 ; Searcy v. Holmes, 
 45 Ala. 325 ; Sawyer v. Hannibal, etc. 
 R Co., 37 Mo. 340. This is a vital 
 element of the definition, very often 
 overlooked. Thus, in determining 
 whether a railroad engineer has been 
 negligent in running over a horse, 
 
 the test of his care is not the care 
 generally taken by an engineer to 
 avoid injuring other people's horses, 
 but the care which a prudent engi- 
 neer would take if he saw his oivn 
 horse upon the track (Alabama, etc. 
 R. Co. V. McAlpine, 75 Ala. 113 ; East 
 Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Bayliss, Id. 
 466, and cases cited). In Quimby v. 
 Vermont, etc. R. Co. (33 Vt. 387), it 
 was held that this rule was tog favor- 
 able to the defendant, presumably 
 because the engineer might, as a 
 matter of expediency, choose to en- 
 danger the life of the beast rather 
 than check the train. Where a reser- 
 voir burst, and the water did dam- 
 age to an adjoining garden, it was 
 held that the owners of the reservoir 
 were bound to take the same degree 
 of care which they would have been 
 likely to take had the garden been 
 their own (Todd v. Cochell, 17 Cal. 
 98), and no greater care (Campbell 
 V. Bear River Mining Co., 35 Id. 679 ; 
 S. P., Waldo V. Beekwith, IN. Mex. 
 97). The degree of care over logs of 
 others in its possession required of a 
 boom company is that which an or- 
 dinarily prudent man in charge of his 
 own property would exercise (Ches- 
 ley V. Mississippi, etc. Boom Co., 39 
 Minn. 83 ; 38 N. W. 769). Gross neg- 
 ligence is the failure to take such 
 care as a person of common sense 
 and reasonable skill in like business, 
 but of careless habits, would observe 
 in avoiding injury to his own person 
 or life, under circumstances of equal 
 or similar danger (Louisville, etc. R, 
 Co. V. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403). 
 ■'Wharton, Negligence, §46. 
 
§ 49] DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 56 
 
 Strictly speaking, it is not correct to divide negligence into 
 degrees at all, because there can be no negligence, within the 
 legal meaning of the term, except where the degree of care 
 required by law in the particular case has not been given ; * and„ 
 indeed, it is a solecism to speak of "ordinary negligence," 
 since, if the negligence were ordinary (that is, in accordance 
 with the usual course of practice among all men of average 
 prudence), it would cease to be negligence at all. But the at- 
 tempt to confine legal terms within such precise limits as thi& 
 leads to more subtle and useless refinements than any which 
 have been suggested as resulting from the use of the objec- 
 tionable phrases. These terms are in familiar use and are per- 
 fectly well understood ; and any attempt to dispense with 
 them will cause far more confusion than it clears away. We 
 adhere, therefore, to a classification of negligence, correspond- 
 ing with the classification of care. 
 
 §49. " Gross," "ordinary" and " slight" negligence, de- 
 fined. — Gross negligence is the want of slight care ; ^ ordinary 
 negligence is the want of ordinary care ; ^ and slight negligence 
 is the want of great care. 
 
 'Grill V. Gen. Iron Screw Co., L. (Sohindler v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 
 R. 1 C. P. (iOO. 87 Mich. 400 ; 49 N. W. 670). To 
 
 ' Gross negligence is the want of same effect Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 slight diligence (See First Nat. Bank Co. v. Bodemer, 139 111. 596 ; 29 N. E. 
 V. Graham, 85 Pa. St. 91 ; Wright V. 692. The term "criminal negli- 
 Clark, 50 Vt. 130; Smith v. N. Y. gence," as used in a statute making 
 Central R. Co., 24 N.Y. 322). "Want railroad companies liable for all in- 
 of ordinary care" and "gross negli- juries to passengers, except such as 
 gence" are not equivalent terms arise from the "criminal negligence'' 
 (Galbraith v. West End R. Co., 165 of the passenger, held to mean "gross 
 Mass. 572 ; 43 N. E. 501 ; Chicago, etc. negligence," or such negligence as 
 R. Co. V. Avery, 8111. App. 133). They would amount to a flagrant and reek- 
 were erroneously confounded in Gib- less disregard of the passenger's own 
 blin V. McMuUen (L. R. 3 P. C. 317). safety, and a willful indifference to 
 Gross negligence is that entire want the injury liable to follow (Omaha, 
 of care which would raise a pi'esump- etc. R. Co. v. Chollette, 33 Neb. 143;. 
 tion of a conscious indifference to 49 N. W. 1114). 
 
 consequences (Southern Cotton Press. ^ See definitions of ordinary care, 
 
 etc. Co. V. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587 ; f ol- ante, § 47 ; Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 
 
 lowed. Mo. Pacific R. Co. v. Shuford, 26 ; Schienfeldt v. Norris, 115 Id. 
 
 72 Id. 165). It implies a thoughtless 17; Moore v. Cass, 10 Kans. 288; 
 
 disregard of consequences, without Murphy v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 the exertion of effort to avoid them 38 Iowa, 539 ; Carpenter v. East- 
 
57 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. [§ 51 
 
 § 50. Standard of " great care." — In the foregoing defi- 
 nitions, our principal doubt is whether we have raised the 
 standard of great care sufficiently high. Certainly, the objec- 
 tion which has been so forcibly urged against the culpa levis- 
 sima of the mediaeval jurists has no application to the 
 definitions of great care and slight negligence here given. It is 
 indeed absurd to require from any person perfection in care, dili- 
 gence or skill. No human being is capable of maintaining so 
 high a standard. It would be grossly unjust and impracticable 
 to require from any ordinary person even that extraordinary 
 degree of care which single individuals of eminent prudence 
 and ability have succeeded in maintaining. But when the ut- 
 most degree of care required is that which has been demon- 
 strated to be practicable by its observance on the part of a 
 recognized class of persons engaged in similar affairs, there is 
 no injustice or impracticability in requiring that standard to 
 be observed by all persons who undertake that business, espe- 
 cially when such a requirement is only made in a few specific 
 branches. 
 
 § 51. Application of rule to passenger carriers. — It is 
 
 the settled rule of common law throughout the United States, 
 and probably also in Great Britain and Ireland, that common 
 carriers of persons, and especially railway companies, are liable 
 for any damage suffered by their passengers, which is proxi- 
 mately caused by the failure of such carriers to use the highest 
 degree of prudence, and, in some cases, the utmost human 
 skill and foresight.' This precise language is constantly used 
 
 em Transp. Line, 67 Barb. 570; Eighth Ave. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 378; 
 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Ormsby, Caldwell v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 47 
 
 27 Gratt. 455 ; Toncray v. Dodge Id. 283 ; Taber v. Delaware, etc. R. 
 
 County, 33 Neb. 803 ; 51 N. W. Co., 71 Id. 489). "A railroad com- 
 
 235 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Fisher, pany that neglects to provide safe 
 
 49 Kans. 460 ; 30 Pac. 463 ; Need- and roadworthy vehicles for passen- 
 
 ham V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., gers, when the omission to do so is 
 
 85 Ky. 433 ; 3 S. W. 797, and, fraught with imminent danger to 
 
 generally, Cashill v. "Wright, 6 El. human life, and injury occurs there- 
 
 & Bl. 891 ; Wyld v. Kckford, 8 by, is not only culpably negligent, 
 
 Mees. & W. 443 ; Wilson v. Brett, 11 but, I think, practices a fraud upon, 
 
 I(j. 113. and exhibits bad faith in respect to 
 
 ' So in New York (Maverick v. those it undertakes to carry " (per 
 
SI] 
 
 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 58 
 
 in charging juries, and it is sustained by such controlling au- 
 thority as to make it useless to discuss its propriety at any 
 length. But while these words cannot be excepted to, the 
 current of decisions shows that a carrier is entitled to have 
 them explained to the jury. The courts do not hold that car- 
 riers are bound to use the highest degree of prudence or skill 
 
 Wright, J., Smith v. N. T. Central 
 R. Co., 34 N. Y. 233). It does not, 
 however, insure the safety of its 
 vehicles (Carroll v. Staten Island 
 B. Co., 58 N. Y. 126). A carrier of 
 passengers, when approaching a 
 dangerous place, is "bound to use 
 the highest degree of care and prud- 
 ence, the utmost skill and foi'e- 
 sight " (Coddington v. Brooklyn, 
 etc. E. Co., 103 N. Y. 66). And so in 
 substance held in England (Sharp v. 
 Grey, 9 Bing. 457) ; in Ireland (Burns 
 V. Cork, etc. R. Co., 13 Irish C. L. 
 543) ; in Maine (Edwards v. Lord, 49 
 Me. 279) ; in Massachusetts (Ingalls v. 
 Bills, 9 Mete. 1 ; Simmons v. N. Bed- 
 ford, etc. Steamboat Co., 97 Mass. 
 361 ; Moreland V. Boston, etc. E. Co., 
 141 Mass. 31 ; 6N. E. Eep. 235) ; in 
 New Hampshire (Taylor v. Grand 
 Trunk E. Co., 48 N. H. 304 ; com- 
 pare State V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 58 
 Id. 408) ; in Connecticut (Derwort v. 
 Loomer, 21 Conn. 245) ; in Pennsyl- 
 vania (Philadelphia, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Boyer, 97 Pa. St. 91) ; in Virginia (Par- 
 ish V. Eeigle, 1 1 Gratt. 697 ; Virginia, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Sanger, 15 Id. 230 ; Bal- 
 timore etc. E. Co. V. Wightman, 89 
 Id. 431) ; in West Virginia (Searle v. 
 Kanawha, etc. R. Co., 32 W. Va. 370 : 
 9 S. E. 248) ; in Georgia (Crawford v. 
 Georgia E. Co., 62 Ga. 566; Chatta- 
 nooga, etc. E. Co. V. Huggins, 89 Id. 
 494 ; 15 S. E. 848) ; in Tennessee 
 (Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Messino, 1 
 Sneed, 2201 ; in Indiana (Sherlock v. 
 Allins. 44 Ind. 184) : in Illinois (Fink 
 V. Potter, 17 111. 406 ; Chicago, etc. 
 E. Co. V. George, 19 111. 510) ; in 
 
 Iowa (Sales v. Western Stage Co., 4 
 Iowa, 547) ; in Missouri (Lemmon v. 
 Chansler, 68 Mo. 340) ; in Arkansas 
 (St. Louis, etc. E. Co. v. Sweet, 57 
 Ark. 387 ; 31 S. W. 587) ; in Nebraska 
 (Spellman V. Lincoln, etc. E. Co., 36 
 Neb. 890 ; 55 N. W. 270) ; in Minnesota 
 (Johnson V. Winona, etc. R. Co., 11 
 Minn. 396 ; Watson v. St. Paul City 
 R. Co., 42 Id. 46 ; 43 N. W. 904 ; Hall 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 46 Minn. 439 ; 
 49 N. W. 239) ; in California (Fair- 
 child v. California Stage Co., 13 Cal. 
 599) ; in Washington (Sears v. Seattle 
 E. Co., 6 Wash. St. 337 ; 38 Pac. 389); 
 and in all Federal Courts (Pennsyl- 
 vania Co. V. Roy, 103 U. S. 451); 
 Curtis, J. , saying, in New World v. 
 King (16 How. [U. S ], 469) : "When 
 carriei-s undertake to carry passen- 
 gers by the powerful but dangeroiis 
 agency of steam, public policy and 
 safety require that they be held to 
 the greatest possible care and dili- 
 gence." In Texas, a railroad com- 
 pany is required to use such means 
 and foresight, in providing for the 
 safety of passengers, "as persons of 
 the greatest care and prudence 
 usually exercise in similar cases" 
 (Houston, etc. E. Co. v. Gorbett, 49 
 Tex. 573; see Gulf, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Hodges, 76 Id. 90 ; 13 S. W. 64). But 
 in Kentucky, an instruction that de- 
 fendant was bound, "as far as human 
 foresight and care would enable it, 
 to carry plaintiff with safety," was 
 held erroneous, as insisting on an im- 
 practicable degree of care (Louisville 
 K. Co. V. Weams, 80 Ky. 420). For 
 cases in other states, see §g 495, 498. 
 
59 DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE. [§ 5 I 
 
 which could be conceived of as possible to man. They are 
 only held to the highest degree which has been demonstrated 
 by experience to be practicable. Thus railway companies are 
 responsible for their failure to use improvements and new 
 inventions, the value of which has been demonstrated by 
 actual experience,^ but not for omitting to try mere experi- 
 ments or to adopt untried and unproved inventions.' These 
 qualifications bring even this strong language, in our opinion, 
 within the Hmits of our standard definition of "great care," 
 but to no lower degree. 
 
 ^ CaldweUv. N. J. Steamboat Co., ' steinweg v. Erie B. Co., 43 N. Y. 
 47 N. Y. 282, and cases cited under § 123 
 496, post. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 53. Negligence, a question of min- 
 gled law and fact. 
 
 53. Province of court and jury. 
 
 54. Questions proper for the jury. 
 
 § 55. Proximate cause, when ques- 
 tion for the jury, 
 56. When question should not be 
 left to the jury. 
 
 § 52. Negligence, a question of mingled law and fact. — 
 
 The definition of negligence, already given, shows upon its face 
 that negligence is a question of mingled law and fact.-' It in- 
 cludes, indeed, two questions : ( i ) whether a particular act has 
 been performed or omitted, and (2) whether the performance 
 or omission of this act was a breach of a legal duty.' The first 
 of these is a pure question of fact; the second a pure question 
 of law.^ But damage to the plaintiff, as well as negligence in 
 the defendant, must be proved, in order to establish a cause of 
 action ; and thus the further questions arise, whether the 
 plaintiff has suffered damage, and whether the defendant's 
 negligence was the proximate cause of that damage. The first 
 of these questions is mainly, though not exclusively, a ques- 
 tion of fact ; the second is about equally one of fact and of law. 
 
 ' This is illustrated by many cases, 
 cited under gi; 54 and 56. Whether 
 a given state of facts constitutes 
 negligence, is generally a question 
 of law ; but whether a particular 
 negligence contributed to the catas- 
 trophe, is a question of fact (Cata- 
 wissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, 53 Pa. 
 St. 282). 
 
 ^ Tarwater v. Hannibal, etc. E. Co. 
 42 Mo. 193. " Negligence may be de- 
 fined to be a failure to perform some 
 act required by law, or doing the act 
 in an improper manner. The law 
 determines the duty; the evidence 
 shows whether the duty was per- 
 
 formed. What duty rested upon de- 
 fendant was question of law. Was 
 that duty properly performed is a 
 question of fact " (Nolan v. Nevir 
 Haven, etc. R. Co., 53 Conn. 461). 
 To same effect, Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 V. McLallen, 84 111. 109 ; Gibson v. 
 Leonard, 37 111. App. 844 ; Marshall 
 V. Schrioker, 63 Mo. 308 ; McGowan 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R Co., 61 Id. 528 ; 
 Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Thomas, 42 
 Ala. 672. But this broad language 
 seems to be limited by other decisions 
 of the same courts. (See next sec- 
 tion.) 
 
 [60] 
 
6l QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. [§ 53 
 
 § 53. Province of court and jury. — Considering, first, the 
 issue of negligence alone, it is to be observed that few cases 
 readily resolve themselves into the simple elements stated in 
 the last section, so that the distinction between the province 
 of the court -and that of the jury can be sharply drawn. There 
 are no abstract rules, defining so clearly the duties of men, 
 under all circumstances, that the court can state them with- 
 out passing upon any question of fact. The extent of the de- 
 fendant's duty is to be determined by a consideration of all 
 the surrounding circumstances. The law imposes duties upon 
 men, according to the circumstances in which they are called 
 to act. And though the law defines the duty, the question, 
 whether the circumstances exist which impose that duty upon 
 a particular person, is one of fact.* In very many cases, the 
 law gives no better definition of negligence than the want of 
 such care as men of ordinary prudence or good men of business 
 would use under similar circumstances. Of course, this raises 
 a question of fact as to what men of this character usually do 
 under the same circumstances. This is a. point upon which a 
 jury have a right to pass, even though no evidence of the 
 usage were given ; for they may properly determine the ques- 
 tion by referring to their own experience and observation.^ 
 
 ' See an excellent opinion, cover- under the circumstances," has been 
 
 ing all this ground, in McCully v. held reversible error (Louisville, etc. 
 
 Clarke, 40 Pa. St. 399. R. Co. v. Gower, 1 Pickle [Tenn.], 
 
 2 The terms " ordinary care," 465 ; 3 S. W. 824. See Missouri 
 
 "reasonable prudence,'' and such Pacific R. Co. v. Brown, 75 Tex. 367 ; 
 
 like terms have a relative signifi- 13 S. W. 1117; Houston, etc. R. Co. 
 
 cance, and cannot be arbitrarily de- v. Smith, 77 Tex. 179 ; 13 S. W. 973). 
 
 fined ; and, when the facts are such The usual practice of others in the 
 
 that reasonable men differ as to same business or employment under 
 
 whether there was negligence on the like circumstances may be shown to 
 
 part of the plaintiff, the determina- indicate whether ordinary care was 
 
 tion of the matter is for the jury ; used in a special instance (Maynard 
 
 hence it is not error to instruct them v. Buck, 100 Mass. 40 ; Cass v. Bos- 
 
 to fix the standard for reasonable, ton, etc. R. Co. , 14 Allen 448 ; Cook 
 
 prudent, and cautious men accord- v. Champlain Transp. Co., 1 Denio, 
 
 ing to their judgment and experi- 91; Kolsti v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 
 ence (Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 33 Minn. 133 ; 19 N. W. eo.) ; compare 
 
 13 S. Ct. 679 ; 144 U. S. 408). .But Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson 
 
 explaining to a jury the " care of a 91 U. S. 454 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 man of ordinary prudence " as " just Clark, 108 111. 113). A party's sys- 
 
 Buch care as one of you, similarly tem or course of business may be 
 
 employed, would have exercised proved to show whether he had ex- 
 
§53] 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 62 
 
 Indeed, they must do so ; since expert evidence on such points 
 is usually not admissible.' Consequently a case of this kind 
 
 a highway was or was not defective 
 or dangerous, where the accident 
 happened (Lester v. Pittsf ord, 7 Vt. 
 158 ; Hutchinson v. Methuen, 1 
 Allen, 33 ; Lincoln v. Barre, 5 Gush. 
 590 ; Ryerson v. Abington, 103 Mass. 
 531 ; Yeaw v. Williams, 15 E. 1. 20 ; 
 Montgomery v. Scott, 34 Wise. 838 ; 
 Griffin v. Willow, 43 Id. 509 ; Barnes 
 V. Newton, 46 Iowa, 567 ; Rockford 
 V. Hildebrand, 61 111. 155). He can- 
 not give his opinion as to the com- 
 parative danger of the place where 
 the accident occurred and another 
 .place on the road (Ivory v. Deer 
 Park, 116 N. Y. 476 ; 33 N. E. 1080) ; 
 nor state what cause or occasion he 
 saw for the accident (Patterson v. 
 Colebrook, 39 N. H. 94) ; nor 
 whether, in his opinion, the acci- 
 dent would not have happened if, 
 etc. (Crane v. Northfield, 33 Vt. 134) ; 
 nor whether the defendant's leaving 
 his horse unhitched, under the cir- 
 cumstances, was the act of a pru- 
 dent man (Stowe v . Bishop, 58 Vt. 
 498 ; 3 Atl. 490) ; nor whether a rail- 
 road crossing was dangerous (King 
 V. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 98 Mo. 
 335; 11 S. W. 563). An opinion 
 that a stage was not overloaded is 
 inadmissible (Oleson v. Tolford, 37 
 Wise. 337). A witness cannot be 
 asked what he thought about the 
 danger of doing a certain thing 
 (Sterhng Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 111. 
 351) ; nor how the bridge in ques- 
 tion compared, in respect to the con- 
 dition of repair, with other bridges 
 (Bliss V. Wilbraham, 8 Allen, 564). 
 In Connecticut (Taylor v. Monroe, 43 
 Conn. 36 ; Dunham's Appeal, 37 Id. 
 193), and in Pennsylvania (Beatty v. 
 Gilmore, 16 Pa. St. 463), opinions of 
 witnesses may be given as to 
 whether an obstruction in a highway 
 was dangerous. See, also, Chicago 
 
 ercised due care on a particular oc- 
 casion (Holly V. Boston Gas Co., 8 
 Gray, 133 ; PuUer v. Naugatuck R. 
 Co., 31 Conn. 557). " There is no ab- 
 solute mle as to what constitutes 
 negligence ; that conduct which 
 might be so termed in one case, be- 
 ing in another properly considered 
 ordinary care ; nor, in cases where 
 it is concurrent, will the same rule 
 apply to adults and to children. It 
 is, therefore, always a question of 
 fact for the jury, under the instruc- 
 tion of the court, as to the relative de- 
 gree of care, or the want of it, grow- 
 ing out of the circumstances and 
 conduct of the parties " (Philadel- 
 phia, etc. R. Co. V. Spearen, 47 Pa. 
 St. 300). See, to same effect, Curtiss 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 30 Barb. 
 383 ; McGrath v. Hudson River R. 
 Co., 33 Id. 144 ; Galena, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Yarwood, 17 111. 509, 519 ; Galena, 
 etc. E. Co. V. DiU, 33 111. 364, 371 ; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101, 111. 
 93 ; Westchester, etc. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Elwee, 67 Pa. St. 811, 315 ; McCuUy 
 V. Clarke, 40 Id. 399; Pennsylvania 
 Canal Co. v. Bentley, 66 Id. 30 ; 
 State V. Manchester, etc. R. Co., 53 
 N. H. 539 ; Vinton v. Schwab, 83 
 Vt. 613 ; Detroit, etc. R. Co. v. Van 
 Steinburg. 17 Mich. 99 ; Wyatt v. 
 Citizens' R. Co., 55 Mo. 485 ; Stod- 
 dard V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 65 Id. 
 514 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Fisher,' 
 49 Kans. 460 : 30 Pac. 463. 
 
 'Where the facts from which 
 negligence is sought to be inferred 
 are within the experience of all men 
 of common education, the jury 
 must determine the question of 
 negligence without the aid of ex- 
 perts (Shafter v. Evans, 58 Cal. 83 ; 
 Southern Kansas R. Co. t. Robbins, 
 43 Kans. 145 ; 33 Pac. 113). A wit- 
 ness cannot state his opinion that 
 
63 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 [§53 
 
 must be left to the jury, even if there is no conflict of evi- 
 dence/ unless, indeed, there is evidence enough to decide this 
 point as well as all other questions in the cause. 
 
 V. McGiven, 78 111. 347 ; Alexander 
 V. Mount Sterling, 71 Id. 366 ; 
 Hughes V. Muscatine, 44 Iowa, 672 ; 
 Laughlin v. Street R. Co., 63 Mich. 
 220; 28 N. W. 873. Witnesses, though 
 employees of defendant, where they 
 were not responsible for the system 
 of spark arresters adopted by the de- 
 fendant, and were testifying upon a 
 subject well known among those 
 familiar with railroad engines, and 
 the system of spark arresters in 
 existence or adopted by different 
 railroads, are competent to testify 
 that the particular system adopted 
 by defendant was in general use, 
 and that it, in fact, arrested sparks 
 as well as any kind known (Frace v. 
 N. E. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 148 N. 
 Y. 182; 38 N. E. 102). A person 
 experienced in the running and 
 management of. railway trains is 
 competent to testify as to whether, 
 under an assumed state of facts, 
 which the evidence tended to prove, 
 all judicious and proper precautions 
 were taken by the defendant's ser- 
 vants to prevent injuries (Cincin- 
 nati, etc. R. Co. V. Smith, 22 Ohio 
 St. 227). The engineer of the locomo- 
 tive, if an expert, may testify that it 
 was impossible to stop the train, 
 after he discovered animals on the 
 track (Bellefontaine, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Bailey, It Ohio St. 333J. So it is 
 competent to show by experts the dis- 
 tance in which the trsfin could have 
 been stopped. (Meagher v. Coop- 
 erstown, etc. R. Co., 75 Hun, 455 ; 27 
 N. Y. Supp. 504). Evidence that an 
 engine was often repaired and would 
 not sustain a full head of steam and 
 afterwards exploded, makes the 
 question of negligence one for jury 
 (Kirkpatrick v. N. Y. Central, etc. 
 
 R. Co., 79 N. Y. 240). Where the 
 alleged inconipetency of the engi- 
 neer is in question, what training is 
 necessary to make one a competent 
 engineer is a question for the jury 
 (Joch v. Dankwardt, 85 111. 331). But 
 where the injury does not involve 
 questions of science and skill, 
 opinions of witnesses are inadmissi- 
 ble, e. g., whether a brakeman 
 could displace the rod of a car-brake, 
 if the pin had remained in it, 
 or whether a pin could be lost out on 
 the road (Bailey v. Rome, etc. R. 
 Co., 55 Hun, 509 ; 8 N. Y. Supp. 780). 
 For other illustrations, see cases 
 supra, and Frey v. Lowden 70 Cal. 
 550; 11 Fac. 838 [capacity of a 
 ditch to carry off water] ; Van 
 Inwegen v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 76 Hun, 53 ; 28 N. Y. Supp. 169 
 [that blowing a locomotive whistle 
 was malicious] ; East Tennessee, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Wright, 76 Ga. 533 
 [that the damage to goods resulting 
 from the "blowing" of bilge- water 
 in hold of vessel was occasioned by 
 negligence]. 
 
 ■> Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 
 657, 664, per Hunt, J. ; Bernhard v. 
 Rensselaer, etc. R. Co., 1 Abb. Ct. 
 App. 131 ; Ernst v. Hudson Riv. R. 
 Co., 35 N. Y. 9; Westchester, etc. R. 
 Co. V. McElwee, 67 Pa. St. 311 ; 
 Gaynor v. Old Colony, etc. R Co., 
 100 Mass. 208, It has been said that 
 whether there was negligence or 
 want of care, in whatever degree, 
 in either of the parties, will not, 
 though the circumstances be ad- 
 mitted, be decided by the court as 
 matter of law, but will be left to 
 the jury (Beers v. Housatonic R. 
 Co. 19 Conn. 566). See, to same 
 effect, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bar- 
 
§54] 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 64 
 
 § 54, Questions proper for the jury. — The question of 
 negligence must be submitted to the jury as one of fact, not 
 only where there is room for difference of opinion between 
 reasonable men as to the existence of the facts from 
 which it is proposed to infer negligence/ but also where there 
 is room for such a difference as to the inferences which might 
 
 nett, 59 Pa. St. 259 ; Johnson v. 
 Brunei-, 61 Id. 58 ; Toledo, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Foster, 43 lU. 415 ; Ohio, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Callarn, 73 Ind. 361 ; Cen- 
 tral Branch, etc. E. Co. v. Hotham, 
 22 Kans. 41 ; Meyer v. Pacific E. Co., 
 40 Mo. 151. But this must be limited 
 as stated in § 56. 
 
 ' In various cases it is said the 
 question is for the jury if there is 
 some evidence (Bernhard v. Eens- 
 selaer, etc. E. Co., 1 Abb. Ct. App. 
 131 ; Cumberland, etc. Iron Co. v. 
 Scally, 27 Md. 589 ; Johnson v. Mis- 
 souri Pacific E. Co., 18 Neb. 680; 26 
 N. W. 347) ; or any evidence tend- 
 ing to show actionable negligence 
 (Sheldon v. Flint, etc. E. Co., 59 
 Mich. 172 ; 26 N. W. 507 ; LouisvUle, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Eed, 154 111. 95; 89 
 N. E. 1086) ; or any evidence, though 
 slight (Paintonv. Northern Cent. E. 
 Co., 83 N. Y. 7 ; Moore v. Metropoli- 
 tan E. Co. 2 Mackay [D. C.],437) ; or 
 when the case upon the facts is not 
 free from doubt (Mynning v. Detroit, 
 etc. E. Co. 59 Mich. 257 ; 26 N. W. 
 514; Eobel v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 35 
 Minn. 84 ; 27 N. W. 305 ; but see § 57, 
 post): or if the facts are in substantial 
 dispute (Newark, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Block, 55 N. J. Law, 605 ; 27 Atl. 
 1067). It is said that the question 
 should not be withdrawn from the 
 jury unless the facts clearly warrant 
 it (Boon v. Allegheny, etc. P. E. 
 Co., 101 Pa. St. 334) ; or if there is 
 more than a scintilla of evidence 
 (Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Horst, 110 
 Pa. St. 226 ; 1 Atl. 217). The facts 
 
 being doubtful, the case was held to 
 have been properly left to the jury, 
 in the following, among many other, 
 cases : Gonzales v. N. Y. & Harlem. 
 R. Co., 88 N. Y. 440 ; Feler v. N. Y. 
 Central E. Co., 49 Id. 47 ; ConnoUy v. 
 Knickerbocker Ice Co. 114 Id. 104 ; 
 21 N. E. 101 ; McGovern v. Central 
 Vermont E. Co., 123 N. Y. 280 ; 25 
 N. E. 373 ; Central E. Co. v. Moore. 
 24 N. J. Law, 824 ; Eauch v. Lloyd, 
 31 Pa. St. 358 ; West Chester, etc. E. 
 Co. V. McElwee, 67 Id. 311 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. E. Co. V. Evans, 53 Id. 
 250 ; Fritz v. Jenner, 166 Id. 292 ; 31 
 Atl. 80; Fiske v. Forsyth, etc. Bleach- 
 ing Co., 57 Conn. 118 ; 17 Atl. 356; 
 Delaney v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 38 Wise. 67 ; Elmore v. Hill, 51 Id. 
 365 ; Donaldson v. Milwaukee, etc. 
 E. Co., 21 Minn. 293; Callahan v. 
 Warne, 40 Mo. 131 ; Fletcher v. At- 
 lantic, etc. E. Co. 64 Id. 484 ; Green, 
 leaf V. Illinois, etc. E. Co., 29 Iowa, 
 14; Gagg v. Vetter, 41 Ind. 228; 
 Atchison, etc. E. Co. v. Feehan, 47 
 111. App. 66 ; affi'd 36 N. E. 1036 ; 
 Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465 ; 30 
 Pac. 352 ; Wise v. Covington, etc. E. 
 Co., 91 Ky. 537; 16S. W. 351; Western 
 Union Tel. Co. v. Timmons, 98 Ga. 
 345 ; 20 S. E. .649 ; Augusta, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Killian, 79 Ga. 284 ; 4 S. E. 
 165 ; Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. Woods, 
 105 Ala. 561; 17 So 41; Missouri Pac. 
 Ey. Co. V. Baier, 37 Neb. 285 ; 55 N. 
 W. 913; Chicago, B. etc. E Co. v. 
 Oleson, 40 Neb. 889 ; 59 N. W. 854 ; 
 International, etc. R. Co. v. Eck- 
 ford, 71 Tex. 374; 8 S. W. 679. 
 
6s 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 [§54 
 
 fairly be drawn from conceded facts.^ Where this is the case, 
 the issue must go to the jury, no matter what may be the 
 
 '' H the inferences to be fairly- 
 drawn from the circumstances are 
 not certain, it is for the jury to de- 
 cide (Hart V. Hudson E. Bridge Co., 
 80 N.Y. 622 ; Bernhard v. Rensselaer, 
 etc. R. Co.,1 Abb. Ct. App. 131; 
 affirming s. C.,33 Barb. 165 ; Johnson 
 V. Bruner, 61 Pa. St. 58 ; Howett v. 
 Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 166 Pa. St. 
 607; 31 Atl. 386). See Abbett v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 483. 
 Omaha St. R. Co. v. Loehneisen, 40 
 Neb. 37 ; 58 N. W. 535 ; Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Wymore, 40 Neb. 645 ; 58 
 N. W. 1130. A question as to the 
 existence of negligence should not 
 be withdrawn from the jury unless 
 the conclusion follows, as matter of 
 law, that no recovery can be had 
 upon any view which can be properly 
 taken of the facts which the evi- 
 dence tends to establish (Gardner 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 150 U. S. 
 349 ; 14 S. Ct. 140; Terre Haute, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Voelker, 31 111. App. 314 ; 
 affi'd, 139 111. 540; 32 N. E. 30). Un- 
 less an inference of negligence or its 
 absence is necessarily deducible from 
 undisputed facts and circumstances 
 (Dahl V. Milwaukee R. Co. , 63 Wise. 
 653 ; Lasky v. Canadian Pacific R. 
 Co., 83 Me. 461 ; 33 Atl. 867 ; Bannon 
 V. Lutz, 158 Pa. St. 166 ; 27 Atl. 890) ; 
 or if the evidence is not so plain that 
 reasonable men might not reach dif- 
 ferent conclusions on the subject 
 (Erickson v. Twenty third St. R. Co. , 
 71 Hun, 108 ; 24 N. Y. Supp. 603), the 
 case should be submitted to the jury. 
 See, to same effect, Bennett v. Syn- 
 dicate Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 254; 39 N. 
 W. 488. Although there is no dis- 
 pute about the facts, yet, if they are 
 numerous in details (Central, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Hotham, 23 Kan. 41 ; compare 
 Johnson v. Husband, Id. 277), or if 
 [Law of Neq. Vol. 1—5] 
 
 the facts are complicated, and the 
 general knowledge and experience 
 of mankind do not at once condemn 
 the conduct as careless (Gay nor v. 
 Old Colony R. Co., 100 Mass. 208; 
 Connolly v. Waltham, 156 Id. 868; 
 31 N. E. 302 ; Mangam v. Brooklyn, 
 38 N.Y. 455 ; Haycrof t v. Lake Shore, 
 etc. R. Co. 64 Id. 636 ; West 
 Chester, etc. R. Co. v. McElwee, 67 
 Pa. St. 311 ; Paterson v. Wallace, 1 
 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748), or the reverse, 
 the question whether they establish 
 negligence must be submitted to the 
 jury. Where there are special cir- 
 cumstances which call for the deter- 
 mination of the applicability to the 
 case at bar, of general principles 
 governing similar cases, as testified 
 to by uncontradicted experts, the 
 question is properly submitted to 
 the jury (Cornish Farm Build- 
 ings Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 295). 
 Thus whether in operating an elec- 
 tric railroad, it was negligent not to 
 maintain a guard wire over the trol- 
 ley wire so as to prevent a fallen tel- 
 ephone wire from resting thereon 
 and charging it with electricity, to 
 the injury of one on the street, is for 
 the jury (Block v. Milwaukee St. 
 R. Co., 89 Wise. 371 ; 61 N. W. 1101) ; 
 and so is the question whether the 
 system and manner of inspecting 
 cars were all that might be required 
 of a carrier (Palmer v. Delaware, 
 etc. Canal Co. 130 N. Y. 170 ; 24 N. 
 E. 303) ; and whether a train-dis- 
 patcher should have sent orders 
 directly to the conductor and en- 
 gineer of a train, thus lessen- 
 ing the possibilities of the tele- 
 graph operator's misinterpretation 
 of the dispatcher's order (Sutherland 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 46 Hun, 373) ; 
 and whether it was negligence to 
 
§54] 
 
 QUESTIONS OF KACT AND LAW. 
 
 66 
 
 opinion of the court as to the value of the evidence ^ or the 
 credibility of the witnesses.* So, if the issue narrows itself 
 to a distinction between what is reasonably safe and what is 
 not so, the question is emphatically one for the jury.^ It is 
 for the court to say whether there is any evidence in the case 
 from which negligence might reasonably be inferred ; and then 
 it is for the jury to say whether, from the facts thus proved, 
 negligence ought to be inferred.^ 
 
 run a train -without a light or flag- 
 man on the track (Winchell v. Ab- 
 bot, 77 Wise. 371 ; 46 N. W. 665) ; or 
 at the rate of 25 miles an hour over 
 a city street-crossing (De Loge v. 
 N. Y. Central, etc. E. Co., 93 Hun, 
 149 ; 36 N. Y. Supp. 697). 
 
 'Where there is conflicting evi- 
 dence on a question of fact, whatever 
 his ovrn opinion as to the value of 
 that evidence, the judge must leave 
 the consideration of it to the jury. 
 (Dublin, etc. E. Co v. Slattery, L. E. 
 3 App. Cas., 1155 ; Carver v. Detroit, 
 etc. Plank-Eoad Co. 61 Mich. 584 ; 28 
 N. W. 721). Whether there is rea- 
 sonable evidence of negligence to be 
 left to the jury is a question for the 
 judge; it is for the jury to say 
 vyhether and how far the evidence 
 is to be believed (Metropolitan E. 
 Co. V. Jackson, L. E. 3 App. Cas. 
 193 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Baker, 
 106 Ala. 634; 17 So. 452). 
 
 •• Where there is testimony on be- 
 half of plaintiff which, alone, if 
 believed, would warrant a jury in in- 
 ferring negligence, the case should 
 be submitted to the jury, no matter 
 how strong or persuasive be the 
 countervailing proof (Citizens, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Foxley, 107 Pa. St. 537 
 [car running over child] ). See, 
 among many other cases, to the same 
 effect, Swift v. Staten Island, etc. 
 E. Co., 133 N. Y. 645, mem. ; 25 N. E. 
 378 ; Barker v. Paulson, 116 N. Y. 
 660, mem.; 33 N. E. 959; Puff v. 
 Lehigh Valley E. Co., 71 Hun, 577 ; 
 
 24 N. Y. Supp., 1068; Leopold v. 
 Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 74 Hun, 
 187 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 1133 ; Moore v. 
 N. Y. Central, etc. E. Co., 75 Hun, • 
 381 ; 27 N. Y. Supp. 449 ; Hanlon v. 
 Missouri Paciflc E. Co., 104 Mo. 381 ; 
 16 S. W. 233 ; Omaha, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Brady, 39 Neb. 27 ; 57 N. W. 767 ; 
 Potter V. Chicago, etc, R. Co., 46 
 Iowa, 399 ; Texas, etc. E. Co. v. Levi, 
 59 Tex. 674 ; Leak v. Eio Grande, 
 etc. E. Co., 9 Utah, 246 ; 33 Pac. 1045. 
 ^ Leishman v. Brighton, etc. E. 
 Co., 23 Law Times, 712; Uggla v. 
 West End St. E. Co., 160 Mass. 351 ; 
 35 N. E. 1126 ; Dacey v. Old Colony 
 E. Co., 153 Mass. 112 ; 26 N. E. 437 ; 
 Heucke v. Milwaukee, etc. E. Co., 
 69 Wise. 401 ; 34 N. W. 243. 
 
 * Metropolitan E. Co. v. Jackson, 
 3 App. Cas. 193, and cases, supra. It 
 is for the court to say what act or 
 omission is evidence of negligence, 
 but generally it is for the jury to say 
 whether the evidence establishes 
 negligence (Omaha St. E. Co. v. 
 Martin, 48 Neb. 65 ; 66 N. W. 1007). 
 Hence, where the accident was caused 
 by the breaking of a draw-bar, a 
 charge that "the mere fact that a 
 drawbar of a car breaks when struck 
 by another car in motion, is not suf- 
 ficient to establish negligence," in- 
 vades the province of the jury 
 (Ohio, etc. E. Co. v. Wangelin, 153 
 111. 138 ; 38 N. E. 760). Whether a 
 certain act or omission is competent 
 evidence of negligence is for the 
 court, but whether such evidence 
 
67 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 [§SS 
 
 § 55- Proximate cause, when for the jury.— Where the right 
 to recover depends upon the question whether the defendant's 
 neghgence was the proximate cause of the defendant's injury, 
 that is to be submitted to the jury, under proper instructions,^ 
 
 convicts a party of negligence" is for 
 the jury (Spears v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 43 Neb, 730; 62 N. W. 68, 
 S. P., Cope V. Hampton Co. 43 S. C. 
 17; 19 S. E. 1018). 
 
 ' " It is the province of a jury to 
 look at the succession of events or 
 facts, and ascertain whether they are 
 naturally and probably connected 
 with each other by a continuous 
 sequence, or are dissevered by new 
 and independent agencies, and this 
 must be determined in view of the 
 circumstances existing at the time " 
 (per Strong, J., in Milwaukee, etc 
 R. Co. V. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469) To 
 the same effect are Insurance Co. v. 
 Tweed, 7 Wall. 44 ; Insurance Co. v. 
 Seaver, 19 Id. 531 ; Ehrgott v. New 
 York, 96 N. Y. 364 ; Cosulich v. 
 Standard Oil Co. 133 Id. 118 ; Webb 
 V. Rome, etc. R. Co. , 49 Id. 430 : 
 Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86 ; 
 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McKeen, 90 
 Id. 133 ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Lacey, 88 Id. 458 ; Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Hope, 80 Id. 873 ; Scott v. 
 Hunter, 46 Id. 193 ; Willey v. Bel- 
 fast, 61 Me. 569 ; Lake v. Milliken, 62 
 Id. 340 ; Handyside v. Powers, 145 
 Mass. 133 ; 13 N. E. 463 ; Saxton v. 
 Bacon, 31 Vt. 540 ; Littleton v. Rich- 
 ardson, 33 N. H. 59 ; Stark v. Lan- 
 caster, 57 Id. 88 ; Gilman v. Noyes, 
 Id. 637 ; Clemens v. Hannibal, etc. 
 R. Co., 53 Mo. 366 ; Toledo, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Pindar, 53 111. 447 ; Kellogg v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 36 Wise. 223; 
 Jacker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 53 Id. 
 150 ; Sather v. Ness, 43 Minn. 379 ; 
 44 N. W. 138 ; Denver, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Robbins, 3 Colo. App. 313 ; 30 Pac. 
 261 ; Jeffs v. Rio Grande, etc. R. Co., 
 9 Utah, 374 ; 35 Pac. 505 ; Knahtla v. 
 
 Oregon, etc. R. Co., al Oreg. 136 ; 37 
 Pac. 91. For different illustrations of 
 the general rule, see McCann v. New- 
 ark, etc., R. Co., 58 N. J. Law, 643; 34 
 Atl. 1053; OUver V. La Valle, 36 Wise. 
 593 ; Waterman v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 82 Id. 613 : 53 N. W. 347; 
 Pceppers v. Missouri, etc. R. Co. , 67 
 Mo. 715 ; Southside Pass. R. Co. v. 
 Trich, 117 Pa. St. 390 ; 11 Atl. 637; 
 Weiler v. Manhattan R, Co., 53 Hun, 
 373 ; 6N. Y. Supp. 320 ; Thuringer v. 
 N. Y. Central, etc. R. Go., 83 Hun, 
 33 ; 31 N. Y. Supp. 419 [water drip- 
 ping from defendant's tank formed 
 ice on sidewalk] ; Haverly v. State 
 Line, etc. R. Co., 135 Pa. St. 50; 19 Atl. 
 1013 [whether spread of apparently 
 extinguished fire was caused by wind 
 thereafter rising] ; Ewing v. North 
 Versailles, 146 Pa. St. 309 ; 23 Atl. 
 338 [whether town's failure to build 
 a fence on highway caused railroad 
 collision with animals] ; Bluedorn v. 
 Missouri Pacific R. Co., 131 Mo. 258 : 
 25 S. W. 943 [whether excessive 
 speed of train caused the accident] ; 
 Booth by v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 66 
 N. H. 343 ; 34 Atl. 157 [whether sta- 
 tion being closed was proximate 
 cause of illness of passenger wait- 
 ing on platform for delayed train, 
 in inclement weather] ; Patten v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 33 Wise. 524 
 [similar] ; Sloane v. Southern Cal. R. 
 Co., Ill Cal. 668; 44Pac.330 [whether 
 the humiliation consequent on plain- 
 tiff's wrongful expulsion from de- 
 fendant's car was the proximate 
 cause of her subsequent nervous 
 paroxysms] ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Callaghan, 6 C. C. A 305 ; 56 Fed. 988 
 [whether conductor's ordering train 
 ahead, or engineer's disregarding 
 
§ 56] QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 68 
 
 unless it is entirely free from doubt.^ It has been already 
 pointed out that the diiificulties surrounding this question are 
 often so great that the courts are unable to arrive at a conclu- 
 sion which can be safely stated, as matter of law, to govern 
 future cases, even upon undisputed facts.^ They, therefore, 
 prefer to leave the decision of such cases to a jury, which, if 
 it decides erroneously in the particular case, will at least not 
 prejudice the rights of any future htigant; whereas one erro- 
 neous decision of the court, as in the famous Ryan fire case,'' 
 may throw a whole department of law into confusion, and in- 
 juriously affect hundreds of persons before it can be corrected. 
 
 §56. When questions should not be left to jury. — The 
 
 courts have sometimes used such broad language as to the 
 necessity of leaving the question of negligence to the jury that 
 it might be inferred that every case must be so left ; * but this 
 is not true. When the facts are clearly settled, and the course 
 which common prudence dictated can be so clearly discerned 
 that only one inference can be drawn, it would be the duty of 
 the court to set aside a verdict contrary to such inference ; * 
 and whenever that is the case, it is the duty of the court to 
 take the case away from the jury and direct a verdict of a non- 
 suit, as the case may require.^ The question is then one of 
 law, for the court to decide.^ And it is now well settled in all 
 
 danger signal caused the accident] ; N. Y. 417, 437. The amount and 
 
 S. P., Hall V. Ogden City R. Co., 13 character and the weight and effect 
 
 Utah 343; 44 Pac. 1046. of evidence in rebuttal of the infer- 
 
 ^ Henry v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., ence arising from the facts shown 
 
 76 Mo. 388 ; Kerrigan v. Hart, 40 are questions of law, when the evi- 
 
 Hun, 389. dence is undisputed (Menomonie 
 
 ^ See § 28, ante. River, etc. Co. v. Milwaukee & N. E. 
 
 ^Ryan v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 35 Co., 91 Wise. 447 ; 65 N. W. 176). 
 
 N. Y. 210. ^ Where the facts are undisputed 
 
 ' See Central R. Co. v. Coggin, 73 and such that only one conclusion 
 
 Ga. 689; Cleveland v. Central R. Co., can be drawn from them, the ques- 
 
 Id. 793 ; Cumberland, etc. Iron Co. v. tion of negligence is one of law 
 
 Scally, 27 Md. 589. (Dickens v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 1 
 
 'Kitchen V. Carter, 47 Neb. 776; 66 Abb. Ct. App. 504 ; Keller v. N. Y. 
 
 N. W. 855. Central R. Co. , 2 Id. 480 ; Indianapolis, 
 
 3 Elliott V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 150 etc. R. Co. v. Watson, 114 Ind. 20 ; 15 
 
 U. S. 245 ; 14 S. Ct. 85 ; Union Pacific N. E. 834 ; Wool wine v. Chesapeake, 
 
 R. Co. V. McDonald, 152 U. S. 363 ; etc. R. Co., 36 W. Va. 329 ; 15 S. E. 
 
 14 S. Ct. 619 ; Cagger v. Lansing, 64 81; Knight v. Albemarle, etc. R. Co., 
 
69 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 [§S6 
 
 the English and the chief American courts that a mere scintilla 
 of evidence is not enough to go to the jury.'' There must be 
 evidence upon which reasonable men could reasonably and 
 properly find the fact of negligence ; or, in default of this, a 
 nonsuit should be ordered.^ The case should not be left to 
 the jury, but the complaint should be dismissed, if there is no 
 evidence of negligence,'' or if the evidence only suggests a 
 
 110 N. C. 58; 14 S. E. 650; Russell v. road Co., 38 Ohio St. 389), and Illi- 
 Carolina Cent. R. Co., 118 N.C. 1098; nois (Guerdon v. Corbett, 87 lU. 272 ; 
 24 ,S. E. 512; Cope v. Hampton, 42S.C. Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Sykes, 96 Id. 
 17; 19 S. E. 1018; Jacoboskiv. Grand 162, 176), and Nebraska (Smith v. 
 Rapids, etc., R. Co., 106 Mich. 440; 64 Sioux City, etc. R. Co., 15 Neb, 
 N.W. 461; Bradley V. Ft. Wayne, etc. 588; 19 N. W. 638; Johnson v. 
 R. Co., 94 Mich. 35 ; 53 N. W. 915 ; Missouri Pao. R. Co., 18 Neb. 
 Seefeld v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 70 690 ; 26 N. W. 347 ; Leigh v. Omaha 
 Wise. 216 ; 35 N. W. 278 ; Aurandt v. St. R. Co., 30 Neb. 132 ; 54 N. W. 134). 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 90 Iowa, 617 ; 57 Where the doctrine of "scintilla of 
 N. W. 442 ; Wardlaw v. California R. evidence " prevails, the court cannot 
 Co., Cal. ; 42 Pac. 1075). See, also, take the case from the jury v^hen 
 Beisiegal V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 40 there is any evidence tending to 
 N. T. 9 ; Stubley v. Northwestern R. prove the issue (Robinson v. Louis- 
 Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 13; Crafter v. ville,eto. R. Co.,2 Lea, 594 ; Smithv. 
 
 Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 
 300 ; Glassey v. Hestonville, etc. R. 
 Co., 57 Pa. St. 172 ; Pittsburgh, etc. 
 
 Gillett, 50 111.290). See § 54, ante. 
 
 ^ Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 
 
 Ex. 32, 39 ; Improvement Co. v. Mun- 
 
 R. Co., V. McClurg, 56 Id. 294 ; Carter son, 14 Wall. 442. See Babcock v. 
 
 v. Towne, 108 Mass. 507 ; Chaflfee v. Fitchburg R. Co., 140 N. Y. 308 ; 85 
 
 Old Colony R. Co., 17 R. L 658 ; 24 N. E. 596. "Negligence is ordina- 
 
 Atl. 141. rily a question for the jury, but only 
 
 '• Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 when the facts would^ authorize the 
 
 Wall. 442, 448 ; Hathaway v. East jury to infer it" (per Andrews, J., 
 
 Tenn. etc. R. Co. , 29 Fed. 489 ; Jewell Sutton v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 66 
 
 \ Parr, 13 C. B. 909, 916 ; Avery N. Y. 243 [accident which could 
 
 v. Bowden, 6 El. & B. 953 ; Mellors v. not have been anticipated]) ; s. P., 
 
 Shaw, 1 Best & S. 437 ; Wheelson v. Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 120. 
 
 Hardisty, 8 El. & B. 232 ; Bauleo ' De Vau v. Penn. etc. Canal Co., 
 
 V. Harlem R. Co., 59 N. Y. 356, 366. 130 N. Y. 632 ; 28 N. E. 532 ; Reading, 
 
 Cases in which a scintilla of evi- etc. R. Co., v. Ritchie, 102 Pa. St. 
 
 dence was allowed to go to the jury 425 ; Manzoni v. Douglas, L. R. 6 Q. 
 
 are found in Arkansas (Little Rock, B. Div. 145 [horse bolting without 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Perry, 37 Ark. 164), assignable cause ; driver not lacking 
 
 South Carolina (State v. Boles. 18 in skill] ; Pennsylvania R. Co., v. 
 
 S. C. 534; see Carrier v. Dorrance, Righter, 42 N. J. Law, 180; N. J. 
 
 19 Id. 30; Simmsv. South Carolina Express Co. v. Nichols, '33 Id. 434; 
 
 R. Co., 26 Id. 490 ; 2 S. E. 486), loioa Barton v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 53 
 
 (Muldowney v. Illinois, etc. R. Co., Mo. 253 ; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wise. 
 
 32 Iowa, 176 ; Way v. Illinois, etc. R. 405 ; Hoyt v. Hudson, 41 Id. 105. 
 Co., 35 Id. 585), Ohio (Dick v. Rail- 
 
§S6] 
 
 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 70 
 
 possibility of negligence/ or is as consistent with the absence 
 of all negligence as with its existence." The court has no 
 right to allow a jury to act upon " mere surmise or conjecture." i" 
 On the other hand, if negligence and the necessary damage 
 proximately flowing from it are so clearly proved, both in fact 
 and inference, that there is no room for an honest difference 
 of opinion between reasonable men, the court should direct a 
 verdict for the plaintiff." There are some cases in which the 
 courts seem to have held that such a direction should never be 
 
 s Bauleo v. Harlem E. Co., 59 N. 
 Y. 356; McCaffrey v. Twenty-third 
 St. R. Co., 47 Hun, 404 ; Raby v. Cell, 
 85 Pa. St. 80 ; Wittkowsky v. Was- 
 son, 71 N. C. 451 ; Mercier v. Mercier, 
 43 Ga. 333; Zettler v. Atlanta, 66 Id. 
 195; Crookshank v. Kellogg, 8 Blackf. 
 (Ind.) 256; Weis v. Madison, 75 
 Ind. 241. The court must be able 
 " to perceive what more the de- 
 fendant could have done or was 
 bound to do," than he actually did, 
 before allowing a jury to pass upon 
 the question (Kelly v. Sea Beach 
 R. Co., 109 N. Y. 44 ; 15 N. E. 879). 
 
 ' If the evidence would justify an 
 inference consistent with the absence 
 of negligence on the part of the de- 
 fendant, just as well as it would an 
 inference of negligence, the plaintiff 
 cannot recover (Smith v. First 
 National Bank, 99 Mass. 605 ; Cotton 
 V. Wood, 8 C. B. N. S. 568 ; Toomey 
 v. Brighton, etc. E. Co., 3 Id. 146; 
 Baulec v. Harlem R. Co., 59 N. Y. 
 356 ; Hayes v. Forty-second St. R. 
 Co., 97 Id. 359; Priest v. Nichols, 116 
 Mass. 401 ; Beaulieu v. Portland Co., 
 48 Me. 291 ; Jackson v. Hyde, 28 Up- 
 per Canada, 294 ; Deverill v. Grand 
 Trunk R, Co., 25 Id. 517 ; Welfare v. 
 Brighton R. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 693). 
 This language has been used so often 
 that Moody v. Osgood (54 N. Y. 488) 
 cannot be considered a valid author 
 ity against it. When the fact is that 
 the damages claimed in an action 
 were occasioned by one of two causes, 
 
 for one of which defendant is re- 
 sponsible, and for the other not, the 
 plaintiff must fail, if it is just as 
 probable that they were caused 
 by the one as by the other (Searles 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 101 N. Y. 661). 
 See post, § 57, n. 4. 
 
 i» Martin V. Pettit, 117 N. Y. 118, 
 134 ; 22 N. E. 566 (sub mom. Wasson 
 V. Pettit) ; Morris v. Lake Shore, etc. 
 E. Co., 148 N.Y. 182, 185 ;43N. E. 579. 
 While negligence of a railway com- 
 pany, in operating a train at a cross- 
 ing may be made out from the proof 
 of all the surrounding circum- 
 stances, including the absence of 
 signals and the rate of speed; yet, 
 unless there is something in that 
 proof, taken as a whole, which, if 
 believed by the jury, would estab- 
 lish a failure on its part to perform 
 a legal duty, or to use reasonable 
 care and prudence in what it did, the 
 case should not be submitted to them 
 (Heaney v. Long Island E. Co., 113 
 N. Y. 122; 19 N. E. 422). 
 
 "Hogan V. Manhattan E. Co., 149 
 N. Y. 33; 43 N. E. 403; Moore v. West- 
 ervelt, 1 Bosw., 357. Even if there 
 be controversy in the evidence as 
 to some facts, yet if those that are 
 uncSontroverted clearly and indis- 
 putably establish negligence, it is 
 a question of law for the court 
 (Abbett V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 30 
 Minn. 483 ; s. P., Cook v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 1 Abb. Ct. App. 433 ; 
 Williams v. O Keef e, 24 How. Pr. 16). 
 
71 QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. [§ 56 
 
 given, but that the farthest extent to which the court can go, 
 in favor of a plaintiff, is to leave the question to the jury. 
 But this is not sustained by the best authorities, and is entirely 
 inconsistent with principle. All courts pass upon the contrib- 
 utory negligence of the plaintiff, as matter of law, when clearly 
 proved ; and, if courts are qualified to do this, they are equally 
 competent to decide the same issue against the defendant. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 § 57. Plaintiff's burden of proof. 
 
 58. What will shift burden to de- 
 
 fendant. 
 
 59. Presumptions of negligence. 
 
 60. Illustrations of presumptive 
 
 negligence. 
 60 a. Admission and declarations. 
 60 b. Other similar accidents. 
 60 c. Subsequent repairs. 
 
 § 57. Plaintiff's burden of proof. — In an action founded 
 upon negligence, the burden of proof of course rests upon the 
 plaintiff.* He must make out his case by a clear preponder- 
 ance of evidence;^ but he is not bound to do so beyond a 
 reasonable doubt.* The burden of proof as to defendant's neg- 
 
 'Parrott v. Wells, 15 Wall. 534; 
 Bridges v. North London R. Co., 
 L. R. 6 Q. B. 377 ; 7 H. L. 233 ; The 
 Marpesia, L. R. 4 P. C. 212 ; The Ben- 
 more, L. R. 4 Adm. 133 ; Caldwell v. 
 N. J. Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 382 ; 
 affi'g 56 Barb. 435 ; Curran v. War- 
 ren Chem. etc. Co., 36 N. Y. 158 ; 
 Moody V. Osgood, 54 Id. 488 ; Hale v. 
 Smith, 78 Id. 480; Allan v. State 
 Steamship Co., 132 Id. 91 ; 30 N. E. 
 483 [ship's physician furnished from 
 the ship's stores calomel when qui- 
 nine was called for]; Illinois, etc. R. 
 Co. T. Cragin, 71 111. 177 ; Brown v. 
 Congress St. R. Co., 49 Mich. 153; 
 Button V. Frink, 51 Conn. 843 ; Dono- 
 van V. Hartford St. R. Co. , 65 Id. 301 ;. 
 33 Atl. 850. As to admissibility of 
 opinion-evidence, and the practice of 
 others in the same employment, see 
 § 53, ante. As to burden and suffi- 
 ciency of proof in actions by servants 
 for master's negligence, see §§ 323, 
 333, post; in actions against munici- 
 pal corporations in respect to public 
 
 works, highways, etc., see §§ 390, 
 867, 383, post; in actions against rail- 
 roads for negligent construction and 
 maintenance of track and acces- 
 sories, see § 411, post; in actions 
 against railroads for collisions with 
 animals, see § 483, post; and for col- 
 lisions with persons, see § 485,po.si; 
 in actions bj' passengers against car- 
 rieiv^e^s|§ 516-518 ; as to origin of 
 fire, see^^^675, 676 ; in management 
 of gas wor&B, see § 697, post. 
 
 '' Searles v. Manhattan R. Co. , 101 
 N. Y. 661 ; 5 N. E. 66 ; McCaig v. 
 Erie R. Co., 8 Hun>599. Plaintiff's 
 . testimony that the frog in which he 
 was injured was then unblocked is 
 sufficient to carry the question to the 
 jury, though a number of witnesses 
 testify that, just after the accident, 
 the frog was found to be properly 
 blocked (Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
 James, 163 U. S. 485 ; 16 S. Ct. 1109). 
 
 ' In actions upon negligence, issues 
 of fact are to be determined by the 
 jury upon the preponderance of evi- 
 
 [73] 
 
71 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§S7 
 
 ligence remains upon plaintiff throughout the trial.* The 
 extent to which it continues upon him, even where the issue 
 is as to his own contributory negligence, will be considered in 
 the chapter of Contributory Negligence.^ It is certainly the 
 duty of the plaintiff to prove affirmatively that the defendant 
 has been negligent. It is not enough for him to prove that he 
 has suffered damage by reason of some event which happened 
 upon the defendant's premises," or even by reason of some act 
 or omission of the defendant.'^ He must also prove that the de- 
 
 dence; and it is not necessary that 
 defendant's negligence should be 
 proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
 (Seybolt v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 95 N. y. 562 ; Hart v. Hudson 
 River Bridge Co., 80 Id. 623; Brad- 
 well V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 139 Pa. 
 St. 404 ; 30 Atl. 1046 ; Quaife v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 48 Wise. 513 ; Hart- 
 vfig V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 49 Id. 
 358 ; Fitts v. Cream City R. Co. , 59 
 Id. 333; Kelly v. Hannibal, etc. R. 
 Co., 70 Mo. 604; Louisville, etc. R.Co. 
 V. Jones, 83 Ala. 376; 3 So. 903, aad 
 cases cited under § 54, ante). 
 
 ^ The burden of sustaining the af- 
 firmative of the issue remains on the 
 plaintiff throughout the trial; and 
 the jury must be satisfied from the 
 whole case that the allegation is 
 established (Heinemann v. Heard, 
 63 N. Y. 448 ; Dowell v. Guthrie, 99 
 Mo. 653; 13 8. W. 900). 
 » See §§ 106-109, post. 
 ' Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. 
 188 ; 33 N. E. 537 ; Curran v. War- 
 ren Chemical Co., 36 N. Y. 153; 
 Nason v. West, 78 Me. 353 ; 3 Atl. 
 913. The mere fact of an explosion 
 in an oil refinery does not raise a 
 presumption of negligence (Cos- 
 ulich V. Standard Oil Co., 133 N. Y. 
 118 ; 35 N. E. 259). S. P., Henry v. 
 Brackenridge Lumber Co., 48 La. 
 Ann. 950; 30 So. 331 [injury from 
 defendant's machinery] ; Davidson 
 V. Davidson, 46 Minn. 117; 48 N. W. 
 
 560 [negligence cannot be pre- 
 sumed merely from fall of elevator- 
 weights] ; Turnier v. Lathers, 59 
 Hun, 633, mem.; 13 N. Y. Supp. 
 500 [elevator rope breaking] . 
 
 ' Reiss V. New York Steam Co., 
 138 N. Y. 103; 38 N. E. 34 [steam 
 pipes furnished by defendant ex- 
 ploded]. A defect in a highway 
 at a particular time and place, 
 is not to be inferred merely from 
 the fact that an injury was sus- 
 tained at that time and place ; but 
 that fact may be taken into con- 
 sideration, in connection with the 
 other facts of the case (Church v. 
 Cherryfield,-33 Me. 460 ; Sherman v. 
 Kortright, 53 Barb. 367). The con- 
 dition of the road in the immediate 
 vicinity of the place where the acci- 
 dent occurred may be shown (Cox 
 V. Westchester Turnpike Co., 33 
 Barb. 414), but not in the "locality " 
 generally (Ruggles v. Nevada, 63 
 Iowa, 185 ; see Grand Rapids v. Wy 
 man, 46 Mich. 516). In an action 
 against a railway company, for in 
 juries to cattle on its track (unless 
 some statute declares proof of in- 
 jury prima facie evidence of negli- 
 gence), proof that the cattle were 
 injured by the defendant's engines 
 is not enough (Sneesby v. Lanca- 
 shire, etc. R. Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 363 ; 
 1 Q. B. Div. 43; Bradley v. Buffalo, 
 etc. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 437 : Tracy v. 
 Troy, etc. R. Co., 38 Id. 433 ; Perkins 
 
§57] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 74 
 
 fendant in such act or omission violated a legal duty incumbent 
 upon him.' He must, therefore, prove that the defendant has 
 violated some contract ° or rule of law,*" thus infringing upon the 
 plaintiff's known rights;" or else he must prove facts and 
 circumstances, from which it can be ascertained with reason- 
 able certainty what particular precaution the defendant ought 
 to have taken but did not take.'** If a defect was not obvious, 
 
 V. Eastern R. Co., 29 Me. 307 ; May- 
 nard v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 115 Mass. 
 458 ; Baxter v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 102 Id. 388 ; "White v. Concord R. 
 Co., 30 N. H. 307; Smith v. Eastnrn 
 R. Co , 35 Id. 357; Hook v. Wor- 
 cester, etc. R. Co., 58 Id. 251 ; Bulk- 
 ley V. N. Y. &New Haven R. Co., 37 
 Conn. 479 ; Lindsay v. Connecticut, 
 etc. R. Co., 27 Vt. 643 ; Quimby v. 
 Vermont Central R. Co. 23 Id. 387 ; 
 Vandegrift v. Rediker, 23 N. J. 
 Law, 185 ; Pi'ice v. New Jersey, 
 R. etc. Co., 31 Id. 239; 33 Id. 19; 
 Galpin v. Chicago, etc. Co., 19 
 Wise. 637 ; McCandless v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 45 Id. 365 ; Turner v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 76 Mo. 361; 
 Orange, etc. R. Co., v. Miles, 76 Va. 
 773; Campbell v. Atlantic, etc. R. 
 Co., 4 Hughes' C. C. 170; Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., V. Patchin, 16 111. 198 ; 
 Great Western R. Co., v. Morthland, 
 30 Id. 451 ; Indianapolis, etc. R Co., 
 V. Means, 14 Ind. 30 ; Schneir v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 40 Iowa, 337 ; 
 Grand Rapids R. Co., v. Judson, 35 
 Mich 507 ; Mobile, etc. R. Co., v. 
 Hudson, 50 Miss. 572 ; Bethje v. 
 Houston, etc. R. Co., 36 Tex. 604). 
 See § 419, post. The rule is other- 
 wise in South Carolina (Murray v. 
 So. Carolina R. Co., 10 Rich. Law, 
 237 ; Roof v. Railroad Co., 4 S. C. 61 ; 
 see§ 432, posf). 
 
 8 Dubois V. Kingston, 102 N. Y. 
 219 ; 6 N. E. 373 ; McGrath v. Hud- 
 son River R. Co., 33 Barb. 144: 
 Terry v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 33 Id. 
 574 ; Robinson v. Fitchburg, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 7 Gray, 93 ; Tourtellot v. Rose- 
 brook, 11 Mete. 460; Lester v. Pitts- 
 ford, 7 Vt. 158 ; AUen v. Willard, 
 57 Pa. St. 374 ; M'CuUy v. Clarke, 
 40 Id. 399 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 V. Bahrs, 28 Md. 647; Freeh v. 
 Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 39 Id. 574; 
 State V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 60 
 Id. 555 ; Herring v. Wilmington, 
 etc. R. Co., 10 Ired. Law, 403; 
 Baohelder v. Heagan, 18 Me. 83; 
 Beaulieu v. Portland Co., 48 Id. 291 ; 
 Mobile, etc. R. Co., v. Thomas, 43 
 Ala. 673 ; Fuller v. Citizens' Bank, 
 15 Fed. 875 ; Crandall v. Goodrich 
 Transp. Co., 16 Id. 75 ; Crew v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 30 Id. 87 ; Button 
 V. Frink, 51 Conn. 342; Illinois Cen- 
 tral R. Co., V. Cragin, 71 lU. 177 ; 
 Terre Haute, etc. R. Co , v. Augus- 
 tus, 21 Id. 186 ; Wabash, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Locke, 112 Ind. 404; 14 N. E. 
 391 ; Michigan Central R. Co., v. 
 Coleman, 28 Mich. 440 ; Norfolk, 
 etc. R. Co., V. Ferguson, 79 Va. 241 ; 
 and cases cited under §§ 8-13, 25- 
 27, ante. 
 
 9 McCaldin v. Parke, 143 N. Y. 
 564 ; 37 N. E. 662 [plaintiil's vessel, 
 while under charter by defendant, 
 struck a I'ook on approaching de- 
 fendant's wharf ; plaintiff held 
 bound to show contract to furnish 
 sufficient depth of water] ; Arent v. 
 Squire, 1 Daly, .847. Compare Wat- 
 son V. Bauer, 4 Abb. N. S. 373. 
 
 '» See cases cited under § 13, ante. 
 
 " See § 27, ante. 
 
 ■''Daniel v. Metropolitan R. Co., 
 L. R. 8 C. P. 216, 591 ; 5 H. L. 45 
 
75 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§57 
 
 there must be some evidence from which it can be inferred 
 how it might and ought to have been discovered.'^ He must 
 also prove facts from which it can fairly be inferred that the de- 
 fendant's negligence was the cause,^* and the proximate cause,'^ 
 of the injury. Mere surmise or conjecture, on any of these 
 points, will not do." 
 
 In that case, Willes, J. , said: " It is 
 necessary for the plaintiff to estab- 
 lish * * * reasonable probability 
 that the accident resulted from the 
 want of some precaution which the 
 defendant might and ought to have 
 resorted to; and I go further and say 
 that the plaintiff should also show 
 with reasonable certainty what par- 
 ticular precaution should have been 
 taken." This language was cited 
 with approval in Hayes v. Michigan 
 Central R. Co. (Ill U. S. 238), and 
 in Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Steb- 
 bing (63 Md. 504). s. P. .Williams v. 
 Great Western R. Co., L. R. 9 Exch. 
 157 ; Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 WaU. 
 657 ; Randall v. Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co., 109 U. S. 478; Lovegrove v. 
 Brighton, etc. R. Co., 16 C. B. N. S. 
 669. The judgment given by Willes, 
 J., was reversed, but this doctrine 
 was distinctly affirmed. S. P., Kelly 
 V. Sea Beach R. Co., 109 N. Y. 44 ; 
 lo N. E. 879. Plaintiff cannot show 
 that other fastenings could have 
 been used, without proof that they 
 were in common use (McCarthy 
 V. Boston Duck Co., 165 Mass. 
 165; 43 N. E. 568). Where the 
 complaint specifies the negligence 
 Complained of, and the court finds 
 that the defects claimed could not 
 have caused the accident, it is not 
 incumbent on defendant to show that 
 no other defect could have produced 
 the injury (Lennon v. Rawitzer, 
 57 Conn. 583; 19 Atl. 334). Where 
 mismanagament of the engine which 
 set the fire was the only negligence 
 alleged, defendant was not obliged 
 
 to prove that the engine was in good 
 condition (Atchison, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Ayers, 56 Kans. 176 ; 42 Pac. 722). 
 
 '» De Graff v. N.Y. Central R. Co., 
 76 N. Y. 125. 
 
 '■• Cochran v. Dinsmore, 49 N. Y. 
 249; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 Id. 188 ; 
 33 N. E. 537 ; Geoghegan v. Atlas 
 Steamship Co., 146 N. Y. 369; 40 
 N. E. 507. Plaintiff is not bound to 
 show the precise cause; it is enough 
 if he shows the injury to be attribu- 
 table to one or other of several causes 
 (e. g., sparks from one or other of 
 defendant's locomotives) , for each of 
 which defendant is responsible (Be- 
 vierv. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 13 
 Hun, 254, 357) . But where goods were 
 injured by two different causes for 
 only one of which defendant is re- 
 sponsible, the burden of proof is on 
 plaintiff to show that the damage 
 was occasioned by the latter cause 
 (Priest V. Nichols, 116 Mass. 401 ; 
 Snider v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 48 La. Ann. 1; 18 So. 695; s. P., 
 Searles v. Manhattan R. Co., 101 N. 
 Y. 661). 
 
 '' Holbrook v. Utica, etc. R. Co., 
 13 N. Y., 236 : Kelsey v. Jewett, 28 
 Hun, 51; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Boyer, 97 Pa. St. 91 ; Fox v. Borkey, 
 126 Id. 164; 17 Atl. 604; Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569; Crandall 
 V. Goodrich Transp. Co,, 16 Fed. 75. 
 See § 54, ante. 
 
 " Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N.Y. 188 ; 
 23 N. E. 537 [unsafe machinery]. 
 Recovery for explosion of a boiler 
 cannot be had, though an inexperi- 
 enced man had been placed in charge, 
 
58] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 1^ 
 
 % 58. What will shift burden to defendant. — The plaintiff 
 is not bound to prove more than enough to raise a fair pre- 
 sumption ^ of negligence on the part of the defendant and of 
 
 it being shown that the explosion 
 was not due to his negligence, and 
 the cause being left to mere conjec- 
 ture (Brunner v. Blaisdell, 35 Pa. 
 St. 170 ; 33 Atl. 607). In an action for 
 injuries caused by defendant's fright- 
 ening plaintiff's horse and causing it 
 to run away, the defendant is enti- 
 tled to have the jury charged, liter- 
 ally or in substance, that no recovery 
 could be had without proof to their 
 satisfaction that the frightening of 
 the horse was the cause of the acci- 
 dent (Mitchell V. Turner, 149 N.Y. 
 39; 43 N. E. 403). 
 
 ' But to be sufficient to sustain a 
 verdict, this presumption must be 
 the conclusion from facts proved 
 or admitted, and not a presumption 
 from a presumption (Philadelphia, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Henrice, 93 Pa. St. 
 434 ; Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Id. 
 144 ; Northern Central R. Co. v. 
 State, 54 Md. 113 ; Sorenson v. 
 Menasha, etc. Co., 56 Wise. 338). In 
 actions for damages caused by fire 
 communicated from defendant's 
 locomotive, the bui'den has been 
 held in some courts to be on plaintiff 
 to prove more than this origin of the 
 fire (Gandy v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 30 Iowa, 420; Albert v. Northern, 
 etc. R. Co., 98 Pa. St. 316 ; Philadel- 
 phia, etc. R Co. V. Yerger, 73 Id. 
 131; Henderson v. Philadelphia, etc. 
 R. Co., 144 Id. 461 ; 33 Atl. 851 ; In- 
 dianapolis, etc. R. Co. V. Paramore, 
 
 31 Ind. 143 ; Ruffner v. Cincinnati, 
 etc. R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 96). But in 
 other states, this evidence casts the 
 burden on the defendant to disprove 
 negligence : New York — Case v . 
 Northern Central R. Co., 59 Barb. 
 644 ; Sheldon v. Hudson River R. 
 Co., 14 N. Y. 318 ; Field v. N.Y. Cen- 
 
 tral R. Co., 32 Id. 339 ; Missouri — 
 Coale V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 60 Mo. 
 327 ; Palmer v. Missouri Pacific E. 
 Co., 76 Id. 317 ; Bedford v. Hannibal, 
 etc. R. Co., 46 Id. 456 ; compare 
 Smith V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 37 
 Id. 387 ; Tennessee — Simpson v. East 
 Tennessee R. Co., 5 Lea, 456 ; Wis- 
 consin — Spaulding v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 30 Wise. 110 ; 33 Id. 582. By 
 statute in Maryland, Illinois, Iowa, 
 Arkansas and Utah, the burden is 
 placed on railroad companies to dis- 
 prove negligence in cases of fire 
 communicated by sparks from en- 
 gines (see Annapolis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Gantt, 39 Md. 115 ; Baltimore, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Shipley, 39 Id. 251 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc R. Co. V. CJampit, 63 
 111. 95 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Campbell, 86 Id. 443 ; Toledo, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Larmon, 67 Id. 68 ; Slosson v. 
 Burlington, etc. R. Co., .51 Iowa, 
 294 ; Small v. Chicago, etc. R Co., 
 50 Id. 338 ; Engle v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 77 Id. 661 ; 37 N. W. 6 ; Tilley v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 49 Ark. 535 ; 6 
 S. W. 8; Anderson v. Wasatch, etc. 
 R. Co., 3 Utah, 518). See § 671, 
 post. The fact that the roof fell 
 while defendant was raising it was 
 sufficient evidence of defendant's 
 negligence in executing the work to 
 go to the jury (Barnowski v. Hel- 
 son, 89 Mich. .523; 50 N. W. 989). 
 As to when an inference that dece- 
 dent came to his death through hav- 
 ing touched uninsulated wire \vas 
 justified, see Suburban Electric Co. v. 
 Nugent, 5i N. J. Law, 658; 34 Atl. 
 1069. What evidence will sustain a 
 verdict on a charge of negligent lay- 
 ing of rails, see Woodman v. Metro- 
 politan R. Co., 149 Mass. 335; 31 N. E. 
 483. As to burden of proof in statu- 
 
77 EVIDENCE. [§58 
 
 resulting injury to himself. Having done this, he is entitled 
 to recover, unless the defendant produces evidence sufficient 
 to rebut this presurnption.^ It has sometimes been held not 
 sufficient for the plaintiff to establish a probability of the de- 
 fendant's fault ; ^ but this is going too far. If the facts proved 
 make it probable that the defendant violated his duty, it is for 
 the jury to decide whether he did so or not. To hold other- 
 wise would be to deny the value of circumstantial evidence. 
 As already stated, the plaintiff is not bound to prove his case 
 beyond a reasonable doubt ; * and, although the facts shown 
 must be more consistent with the negligence of the defend- 
 ant than with the absence of it, they need not be incon- 
 sistent with any other hypothesis.^ It is well settled that 
 evidence of negligence need not be direct and positive.^ Cir- 
 cumstantial evidence is sufficient.' In the nature of the case, 
 
 tory actions against railroad com- lyn, 29 Id. 234. See, too, Beaulieu v. 
 
 paniesfor injuries from operation of Portland Co., 48 Me. 291. 
 
 locomotives, cars and machineiy, '' Seybolt v. N. Y. , Lake Brie, etc. 
 
 see Central R. Co. v. Small 80 Ga. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 582 ; Quaife v. Chi- 
 
 519 ; 5 S. E. 794 ; Savannah, etc. R. cago, etc. R. Co. , 48 Wise. 513 ; 
 
 Co. V. Phillips, 90 Ga. 829; 17 S. E. Johnson v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 25 
 
 82; Hamlin v. Yazoo, etc. R. Co., Hun, 251 ; Hays v. Gallagher, 72 Pa. 
 
 72 Miss. 39 ; 16 So. 877; Mobile, etc. St. 136 [plaintiff, found hurt under 
 
 R. Co. V. Holborn, 84 Ala. 133 ; 4 So. bridge, said he had fallen from 
 
 146 ; and against railroad companies bridge, but manner of his fall was 
 
 for injuries to animals from neglect not shown; case for jury]. See § 
 
 to fence track, etc., see § 421, post, 57, ante. 
 
 and for injuries to persons from = Toomey v. Brighton R. Co., 3 C. 
 
 neglect of statutory precautions, see B. N. S. 146, 150. " The plaintiff is 
 
 K 467, post. not bound to prove his case so 
 
 ' Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Bent- clearly as to exclude the possibility 
 
 ley, 66 Pa. St. 30 ; Sullivan v. Union of any other theory " (Whitney v. 
 
 R. Co., 7 N. Y. App. Div. 238 ; 40 N. Clifford, 57 Wise. 156). 
 
 Y. Supp. 84. See also, Mullen v. St. ^ Direct and positive evidence is 
 
 John, 57 N. Y. 567 ; Atchison, etc. not required. Any circumstance 
 
 R. Co. V. Bales, 16 Kans. 252; Ken- from which negligence maybe rea- 
 
 dall V. Boston, 118 Mass. 234 ; McKee sonably inferred may be sufficient 
 
 V. Bidwell,74Pa.St. 218; Toledo, etc. (Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Brassfield, 
 
 R. Co. V. O'Connor, 77 111. 391 ; Cor- 51 Kans. 167 ; 32 Pac. 814 ; Cincin- 
 
 rellv. Burlington, etc. R.Co., 38 Iowa, nati, etc. R. Co. v. McMullen, 117 
 
 120 ; Grey v. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ind. 439 ; 20 N. E. 287). 
 
 Ala. 387 ; Kcken v. Jones, 28 Cal. 618 ' Circumstantial evidence alone 
 
 [plaintiff lawfully in street injured may authorize the finding of negli- 
 
 by defendant's cattle driven there], gence (Jacksonville, etc. R. Co. v 
 
 2 Sheldon v. Hudson River R. Peninsular, etc. M'f 'g Co. , 27 Fla. 1, 
 
 Co., 29 Barb. 326; Lehman v. Brook- 157 ; 9 So. 661). 
 
§ 59l EVIDENCE. 78 
 
 the plaintiff must labor under difificulties in proving the fact of 
 negligence ; and as that fact itself is always a relative one, it is 
 susceptible of proof by evidence of circumstances bearing more 
 or less directly upon the fact of negligence, a kind of evidence 
 which might not be satisfactory in other classes of cases, open 
 to clearer proof. This is on the general principle of the law of 
 evidence, which holds that to be sufficient or satisfactory evi- 
 dence, which satisfies an unprejudiced mind.* Proof that 
 similar accidents do not happen from similar things, when 
 properly managed, is competent to raise a presumption of neg- 
 ligence, where an accident has happened.' 
 
 §59. Presumptions of negligence. — In many cases, the 
 maxim "r^i' ipsa loquitur '^ applies. The affair speaks for 
 itself.' The accident, the injury, and the circumstances under 
 which they occurred, are in some cases sufficient to raise a pre- 
 sumption of negligence, and thus cast upon the defendant the 
 burden of establishing his freedom from fault. Proof of an 
 injury, occurring as the proximate result of an act of the de- 
 fendant, which, would not usually, if done with due care, have 
 injured any one, is enough to make out a presumption of neg- 
 ligence. When a thing which causes injury is shown to be 
 under the management of the defendant, and the accident is 
 such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, if 
 those who have the management use proper care, it affords 
 reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the de- 
 fendant, that the accident arose from a want of care.' So, also : 
 
 * Gandy V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., ' Mason v. Tower Hill Co. , 83 Hun, 
 
 30 Iowa, 431; Garrett v. Chicago, 479; 32 N.Y. Supp. 36 [splice in rope], 
 
 etc. R. Co.,3GId. 128; Hart v. Hud- ' Cummings v. National Furnace 
 
 son R, Bridge Co., 80 N. Y. 623 ; Co., 60 Wise. 603 ; Briggs v. Oliver, 
 
 Jones T. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 4 Hurlst. & C. 403 ; Mullen v. St. 
 
 28 Hun, 364 ; Lyons v. Rosenthal, 11 John, 57 N. Y. 567 ; Kearney v. 
 
 Id. 46; Nichols V, Smith, 115 Mass. Brighton, etc. R. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 
 
 332 ; Quaife v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 761 ; affi'g s. c, 5 Id. 411 ; Byrne v. 
 
 48 Wise. 513 ; Wood V. Chicago, etc. Boadle, 3 Hurlst. & C, 723. 
 
 R. Co., 51 Id. 196; Illinois Central V. ' Scott v. London Docks Co., 3 
 
 Cragin, 71 111. 177 ; McKissock v. St. Hurlst. & C, 596 ; Seybolt v. N. Y., 
 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 73 Mo. 456; Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 563 ; 
 
 Bueschingv. St. Louis Gas Light Co., Butler v. Gushing, 46 Hun, 521; 
 
 73 Id. 219 ; Kelly v. Hannibal, etc. Tuttle v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 48 
 
 R. Co , 70 Id. 604 ; Lackawanna, etc. Iowa, 286 [where satisfactory expla- 
 
 B. Co. V. Doak, 53 Pa. St. 379. nation was given]. 
 
79 EVIDENCE. [§ 60 
 
 " Where it is shown that the accident is such that its real 
 cause may be the negligence of the defendant, and that, whether 
 it is so or not, is within the knowledge of the defendant, the 
 plaintiff may give the required evidence of negligence, with- 
 out himself explaining the real cause of the accident, by prov- 
 ing the circumstances, and thus raising a presumption that, if 
 the defendant does not choose to give the explanation, the real 
 cause was negligence on the part of the defendant."^ 
 
 § 60. Illustrations of presumptive negligence. — Not only 
 is it evidence of negligence to show that the defendant or his 
 chattel was trespassing on the plaintiff's premises, and that the 
 injury occurred in consequence of that trespass, but it is also 
 sufficient to show that something belonging to the defendant, 
 which ought not to have been on the highway at the time, in- 
 jured the plaintiff while he was on the highway. Thus, the 
 falling of cinders,' or of a bolt ^ from an overhead railroad, or 
 the fall of overhead telegraph wires upon the road below;' 
 the fall of a barrel from a window,* or of bricks from a bridge, 
 or other building' is sufificient evidence of negligence, without 
 proving actual want of care as the cause of such fall. For, 
 on such a state of facts, the presumption is that the defendant 
 has violated the duty which the law imposes upon him, of 
 
 2 Per Chanuell, B., Bridges V. North 41 Pac. 499; Larson v. Central R. 
 
 LondonR. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B., 377,391. Co., 56 111. App. 363. 
 
 'Lowery v. Manhattan R. Co., 99 * Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurlst & C. 
 
 N. Y. 158; 1 N. E. 608. But not so, 733 ; Scott v. London Docks Co., 3 Id. 
 
 where only one cinder, smaller than 596 [bag coffee] ; Dehring v. Com- 
 
 a pinhead, fell in plaintiff's eye, and stock, 78 Mich. 153 ; 43 N. W. 1049 
 
 there was no evidence that more [bales hay]. 
 
 than this one coal ever fell (Wied- ^"Itis not a matter of common 
 
 mer v. N. Y. Elev. R. Co., 114 N. Y. occurrence for bricks to come loose 
 
 463 ; 81 N. E. 1041 ; rev'g 41 Hun, and to faU from the fabric to 
 
 a84). ■ which they belong '' (Kearney v. 
 
 ' Volkmar v. Manhattan E. Co., London and Brighton R. Co., L. R. 
 134 N. Y. 418 ; 31 N. E. 870 ; Hogan 5 Q. B. 411; 6 Id. 759). Where one 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 149 N. Y. 33 ; engaged in a building is injured by a 
 43 N. E. 403 ; Maher v. Manhattan R. falling brick, in the absence of ex- 
 Co., 53 Hun, 506 ; 6 N. Y. Supp, 309. planation by the contractor doing the 
 
 'Thomas V. Western Union Tel. brick work, it will be presumed that 
 
 Co., 100 Mass. 156; Penn. Tel. Co. v. it occurred from want of reasonable 
 
 Varnau (Pa.), 15 Atl. 634 ; Denver care on his part (Sheridan v. Foley, 
 
 Electric Co. v. Simpson, 21 Colo. 371 ; 58 N. J. Law, 330; 33 Atl. 484). 
 
§6oa] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 80 
 
 using due care to keep his property off the highway.^ On 
 proof, however, that the defendant has used due care for that 
 purpose, the burden of proof is again upon the plaintiff, to 
 show other negHgence,' such, for example, as that the defend- 
 ant did not use a proper degree of care to control his property, 
 after it had got upon the highway. So the fall of a building,8 
 a scaffold,' an elevator, '" or other hoisting machinery," the 
 sudden giving way of the door of a railway carriage,'^ the fall 
 of a gangway plank between a ship and wharf, '^ or the explosion 
 of a boiler," is presumptive evidence of negligence. 
 
 § 60a. Admissions and declarations. — An admission by 
 either party personally, out of court, that he was in fault, is 
 entitled to great weight, but is not necessarily conclusive 
 against him.' But admissions by a husband against his 
 
 « Mullen V. St. John, 57 N. Y. 
 567 ; MoKune v. Santa Clara Valley- 
 Mill, etc. Co., 110 Cal. 480 ; 42 Pac. 
 980. 
 
 'Searles V. Manhattan R. Co., 101 
 N. Y. 661; 5 N. E. 66 ; McCaig v. 
 Erie R. Co., 8 Hun, 599. 
 
 8 Mullen V. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567 ; 
 Vincett v. Cook, 4 Hun, 318. Other- 
 wise, where an effort is being made 
 to tear down a building, and it 
 merely falls before it is expected to 
 fall (Weidemanv. Tacoma E. Co., 
 7 Wash. St. 517 ; 35 Pac. 414). 
 
 'See Flynn v. Gallagher, 53 N. 
 Y. Superior, 534. 
 
 '" Moran v. Racine Wagon Co., 74 
 Hun, 454 ; 26 N. Y. Supp, 853 ; Law- 
 son V. Merrall, 69 Hun, 378 ; 33 N.Y. 
 Supp. 560 ; Gerlaoh v. Edelmeyer, 
 47 N. Y. Superior, 393. In Murphy 
 T. Hays (68 Hun, 450 ; 33 N. Y. 
 Supp. 70) held otherwise, as against 
 a servant, where elevator started up 
 suddenly. 
 
 " Lyons v. Rosenthal, 11 Hun, 46. 
 
 '« Gee V. Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 
 8Q. B. 161. 
 
 " Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 
 lU. 598. 
 
 " Illinois Central R. Co. v. Phillips, 
 55 111. 194 ; Bahr v. Lombard, 58 N. 
 J. Law, 238 ; 23 Atl. 167 [explosion 
 oil pipe] ; Grimsley v. Hankins, 46 
 Fed. 400. Evidence sufficient to re- 
 pel presumption ; see Reiss v. N. Y. 
 Steam Co., 138 N. Y. 103 ; 38 N. E. 
 34 ; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 ; 
 McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357 ; 
 Robinson v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 20 
 Blatch. 338 ; Rose v. Stevens, etc. 
 Transp. Co. , Id. 41 1 ; Posey v. Scofield, 
 10 Fed. 140. Explosion is not even 
 presumptive evidence of negligence 
 in favor of the operator himself 
 (Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 77 111. 
 217). Compare Caldwell v. N. J. 
 Steamboat Co., 56 Barb. 425; affl'd47 
 N. Y. 283. 
 
 ' Zemp V.Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 9 Rich. Law, 84. Compare Cooper v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 134, 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Hammersley 28 
 Ind. 371, Firkins v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 61 Minn. 31 ; 63 N. W., 172, 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. State, 
 81 Md. 371 ; 33 Atl. 201 ; as to 
 injured person's declarations made 
 at any time, being admissible, as 
 against interest. The fact that the 
 
8i 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§6oa 
 
 wife,^ by a wife against her husband,' or by a servant against his 
 master/ are not competent evidence. Declarations of any 
 person engaged in the transaction, including the plaintiff, are 
 admissible against the defendant, when part of the res gestce ;^ 
 but to be so, they must have been substantially simulta- 
 
 person killed had warned others 
 against committing the act which 
 caused his death, is admissible to 
 prove contributory negligence (Le- 
 high Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 
 Pa. St. 433); and so are warnings 
 given to the deceased (Central R. 
 Co. V. Sears, 59 Ga. 436). 
 
 " Keller v. Sioux, etc., R. Co., 27 
 Minn., 178; 6 N. Mr. 486. 
 
 ^Stillwell V. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 34 N. Y., 29. Compare Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Richardson, 66 
 Ind., 43 ; Fitzgerald v. Weston, 53 
 Wise. 354. 
 
 ■•Luby V. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 17 
 N. Y. 131 ; Hamilton v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral, etc. R. Co., 51 Id., 100; 
 Butler V. Manhattan R. Co., 143 
 Id. 417 ; 38 N. E., 454. Declarations 
 of defendant's servant, at the time 
 of the accident, that plaintiff was 
 not to blame (Lane v. Bryant, 9 
 Gray, 245), or made afterwards as to 
 cause of the accident (Alabama, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Hawk, 72 Ala. 113 ; 
 Aldridge v. Midland Furnace Co., 
 78 Mo. 559 ; McGuerty v. Hale, 161 
 Mass. 51; 36 N. E. G83), are inad- 
 missible. But what was said by de- 
 fendant's foreman when the accident 
 was reported to him has been held 
 competent as res gestae (Wabash 
 Western R. v. Brow, 13 C. C. 
 A. 332; 65 Fed. 941). Declarations 
 and admissions of a public officer 
 are inadmissible to b'ind a municipal 
 
 son made at the time of the injury 
 or immediately afterwards, are ad- 
 missible as part of the res gestae 
 (Stein V. Grand Ave. R.Co., 10 Phil. 
 440 ; Friedman v. Railroad Co., 7 Id. 
 303; Lund v. Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. 
 36 ; Brownell v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co. 47 Mo. 339 ; Entwistle v. 
 Feighner, 60 Id. 314; Bass v. Chicago, 
 etc. R.Co., 42 Wise. 654) Plain- 
 tiff's contemporaneous declarations 
 as to the nature and extent of his 
 injury, ai'e admissible (Werely v. 
 Persons, 28 N. Y. 344 ; Gardner v. 
 Bennett, 38 N. Y. Super. 197 ; 
 V/ill v. Mendon, Mich. ; 66 
 N. W. 58). But it is error to per- 
 mit the nurse and physician to 
 testify that plaintiff told them, 
 some time after the accident, that 
 a piece of nail had come out of 
 his knee, and to permit the physician 
 to point out the scar of the hole out 
 of which the plaintiff had told him 
 the nail had come, as such matters 
 are mere hearsay (Boston, etc. R. 
 Co V. O'Reilly, 158 U. S. 334; 15 S. Ct. 
 830). See Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Walker, 93 Ga. 462; 21 S. E. 48. 
 On an issue, however, as to whether 
 plaintiff's injuries were temporary 
 or permanent, physicians may tes- 
 tify as to plaintiff's utterances and 
 exclamations when undergoing phy- 
 sical examination during two years, 
 and the fact that plaintiff is a 
 competent witness does not alter 
 
 corporation of which he is the agent-,— the rule (Northern Pacific R. Co. v. 
 
 unless they are part of tlie res gestae. Urlin, 158 U. S. 271 ; 15 S. Ct. 840). 
 
 (Cortland Co. v. Herkimer Co., 44 To same effect, East Tennessee, etc. 
 
 N. Y. 23 ; Clapper V. Waterford, 131 R. Co. v. Smith, 94 Ga. 580 ; 80 S. 
 
 Id. 383). E- 12''! Jackson Co. v. Nichols, 139 
 
 'Declarations of the injured per- Ind. 611; 38 N. E. 536. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 6] 
 
§ 6ob] EVIDENCE. 82 
 
 neous with the transaction.* Dying declarations are not 
 admissible in civil actions, in favor of the declarant.' 
 
 § 60b. Other similar accidents. — The fact that premises 
 or appliances have been used for many years by many persons, 
 without injury, or that no evidence was produced that any 
 other person than the plaintiff had been injured, being a 
 strong circumstance in disproof of negligence in the use of 
 such premises or appliances, ^ evidence is admissible of previ- 
 ous accidents from precisely the same cause, at the same place ^ 
 
 ' Declarations made afterwards solidated E. Co. v. Welsch, 155 111. 
 (even within half an hour) and con- 511 ; 40 N. E. 1034. 
 Btituting merely a narrative of a past ' Waldele v. N. Y. Central, etc. E. 
 transaction, are not part of the res Co., 95 N. Y. 375, 287; Spatz v. 
 gestce, and not admissible as such Lyons, 55 Barb. 476; Marshall v. Chi- 
 (Waldele v. N. Y. Central R. Co., cago, etc. E. Co., 48 111. 475. 
 95 N. Y. 375 ; Martin V. New Haven, 1 Lafflin v. Buffalo, etc. E. Co., 
 etc. E. Co., 103 Id. 626 ; Cleveland, 106 N. Y. 136 ; 13 N. E. 599 ; Dougan 
 etc. E. Co. V. Mara, 26 Ohio St. 185 ; v. Ohamplain Transportation Co. , 56 
 Illinois Central E. Co. v. Sutton, 43 N. Y. 1 ; Loftus v. Union Ferry Co., 
 III. 438 ; Galena, etc. E. Co. v. Fay, 4 Id. 455 ; Burke v. Witherbee, 98 
 16 Id. 558 ; Fitzgerald v. Weston, Id. 563 ; McCaldin v. Parke, 142 Id. 
 52 Wise, 354 ; SchilUnger v. Ver- 564 ; 37 N. E. 633. Where an act of 
 ona, 88 Id. 317 ; 60 N. W. 372 ; a brakeman in mounting a car was 
 Shaw V. Boston, etc. E. Co., 8 Gray, not, per se, negligent, it is competent 
 45 ; Taylor v. Grand Trunk E. Co. , to show that, under the same cir- 
 48 N. H. 304 ; Mobile, etc. E. Co. v. cumstances, experienced brakemen 
 Ashcroft, 48 Ala. 16 ; Eoach v. West- perform the same act as he did 
 ern, etc. R. Co., 93 Ga. 785 ; 21 S. E. (Prosser v. Montana Central R. Co., 
 67 [declaration made twenty min- 17 Mont. 372 ; 43 Pac. 81). 
 utes after accident, at a distance ^ Wooley v. Grand Street, etc. E. 
 from the scene] ; Cleveland, etc. E. Co., 83 N. Y. 121 [plaintiff's sleigh 
 Co. V. Sloan, 11 Ind. App. 401 ; 39 upset by striking a street-railroad 
 N. E. 174 [ten minutes]. Declara- switch] ; Quinlan v. Utica, 11 Hun, 
 tions by the engineer and fireman 317; affi'd, 74 N. Y. 603 ; Morse v. 
 of a train, made within ten min- Minneapolis, etc. E. C, 30 Minn. 465; 
 utes after a collision, and while 16 N. W. 358 [defective switch] : Hig- 
 the injured persons were being ley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 90; Todd v. 
 taken from the wreck, are admissi- Eowley, 8 Allen, 51 ; Donnelly v. 
 ble (East St. Louis E. Co. v. Fitch, 136 Mass. 558; Hogan v. North- 
 Allen, 54 111. App. 37); and so are field, 56 Vt. 731. In an action for an 
 statements made by the general injury to plaintiff's trees caused by 
 manager of the road when he had escaping gas, evidence as to the con- 
 come to the wreck, immediately dition of other trees in that vicinity 
 after the accident, as to its cause after the construction of defendant's 
 (Krogg V. Atlanta, etc. E. Co., 77 gas line is competent (Evans v. Key- 
 Ga. 203). See, also, Springfield Con- stone Gas Co., 148 N. Y. 113 ; 42 N. 
 
83 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 [^ 6ob 
 
 or from a precisely similar cause, at another place.'' But 
 in the latter instance, the evidence must show not only that 
 both places were under defendant's control, but also that all 
 conditions were, in every material respect, precisely the 
 same.* It has been held in one case, that this evidence is 
 only competent for the purpose of proving constructive notice, 
 and therefore that evidence of subsequent accidents is inadmis- 
 sible.^ But this decision stands alone; and it is quite incon- 
 sistent with the reasoning in other cases of superior authority, 
 which treat this evidence as material, if not even necessary, to 
 prove a thing dangerous, which is usually not so." 
 
 E. 513). To same effect, see Dis- 
 trict of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. 
 S. 519 [sidewalk] ; McCarragher v. 
 Rogers, 120 N. Y. 536 ; 34 N. E. 813 
 [machine] ; Pomfrey v. Saratoga 
 Springs, 104 N. Y. 459 ; 11 N. E. 43 
 [sidewalk] ; Colorado Mortg. Co. v. 
 Rees, 31 Colo. 435 ; 43 Pac. 43 [eleva- 
 tor] ; Hanrahan v. Manhattan E. 
 Co., 53 Hun, 420 ; 6 N. Y. Supp. 895 
 [railroad platform] ; Larkin v. 
 O'Neill, 48 Hun, 591 [stairway] ; 
 Aurora v. Brown, 13 Bradw. 133 
 [sidewalk] ; Calkins v. Hartford, 33 
 Conn. 57 [same] ; Kent v. Lincoln, 
 33 Vt. 591; Wooley v. Grand St. E. 
 Co., 83 N. Y. 121 ; Collins v. Dor- 
 chester, 6 Cush. 396. So held, where 
 horses were frightened by an ob- 
 struction (Crocker v. McGregor, 76 
 Me. 382; Gordon v. Boston, etc. R. 
 Co., 58 N. H. 396; House v. Met- 
 calf, 27 Conn. 631 ; compare Cleve- 
 land, etc. R. Co., V. Wynant, 114 Ind. 
 535 ; 17 N. E. 118). The fact that no 
 accident ever before happened in the 
 mine where plaintiff was injured is 
 inadmissible to show the mine was a 
 safe place to woi-k in (Burgess v. 
 Davis Sulphur Ore Co., 165 Mass. 71; 
 43 N. E. 501). Nor is the fact that 
 a large number of persons had passed 
 over a footway without accident, 
 competent evidence that the foot- 
 way was not a nuisance (Temper- 
 
 ance Hall Asso. V. Giles, 33 N. J. Law, 
 260). s. P., Bauer V. Indianapolis, 99 
 Ind. 56. 
 
 3 Brady v. Manhattan R. Co., 15 
 Daly, 272 ; limited to this,127 N. Y. 46. 
 
 * Brady v. Manhattan R. Co., 137 
 N. Y. 46 ; rev'g s. C, 15 Daly, 372 ; 
 6 N. Y. Supp. 533. On the question 
 whether a certain act or omission 
 which caused the injury, was negli- 
 gence, it may be shown that, under 
 substantially the same circumstances, 
 the same act or omission had pro- 
 duced similar injuries on former 
 occasions (Morse v. Minneapolis, 
 etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 465 ; 16 N. W. 
 358; Hunt v. Lowell Gas Co., 8 Allen, 
 169 ; Emerson v. Lowell Gas Co., 
 3 Id. 410 ; Hodgkins v. ChappeU, 138 
 Mass. 197 ; Griffin v. Auburn, 58 N. 
 H. 131 ; Wise V. Ackerman, 76 Md. 
 375 ; 35 Atl. 434). Vicious habits of a 
 horse may be shown by proving cases 
 of like misbehavior both befoi-e and 
 after the act in question (Magie 
 V. Cutts, 133 Mass. 535 ; Chamber- 
 lain V. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356 ; cf. 
 Whitney V. Leominster,136Mass. 35). 
 
 ' Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 53 
 Hun, 111 ; 4 N. Y. Supp. 848. 
 
 ' See particularly cases cited in 
 Quinlan v. Utica, 11 Hun, 317 ; 
 affi'd, 74 N. Y. 603; also, Sulhvan 
 V. Syracuse, 77 Hun, 440; 39 N. Y. 
 Supp. 105. 
 
§6ocl 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 84 
 
 §6oc. Subsequent repairs. — The defendant's voluntary con- 
 duct, subsequent to an accident, in respect to a structure or 
 appliance in connection with which an accident happened, such 
 as making alterations or repairs, or taking other precautionary 
 measures to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents, may 
 be proved, as tending to show the defendant's control of the 
 property,' and his responsibility for its repair ; ^ if that is 
 disputed. But such evidence is inadmissible by itself, to show 
 that the former condition was unsafe, and that defendant was 
 negligent in so maintaining it;^ for such subsequent improve- 
 
 iMorrell v. Peck, 88 N. Y. 398; 
 Bateman v. N. Y. Central, etc. E. Co., 
 47 Hun, 429 ; Lafayette v. Weaver, 
 92 Ind. 477. 
 
 ^Eeadman v. Conway, 126 Mass. 
 374; Woods v. Missouri, etc. E. Co., 
 51 Mo. App. 500. 
 
 ^Hammargren v. St. Paul, 69 N. 
 W. 470. The best statement of this 
 rule, and the reasons for it, is in 
 Morse v. Minneapolis, etc. E. Co., 30 
 Minn. 465 ; 16 N. W. 858. The rule 
 has been repeatedly enforced in 
 New York, although never with a 
 statement of reasons approaching to 
 the clearness of Judge Mitchell's 
 opinion in the Minnesota case. See 
 Dougan v. Champlain Transp. Co., 
 56 N. Y. 1 [boarding up unprotected 
 gang-space in steamboat] ; Baird v. 
 Daly, 68 N. Y. 547 [reducing rate of 
 speed after accident] ; Dale v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. E. Co., 73 Id. 468; Cor- 
 coran V. Peekskill, 108 Id. 151. The 
 same rule is now the law of New 
 Hampshire (Aldrich v. Concord, 
 etc. E. Co., N. H. ; 29 Atl. 408 ; 
 overruling Martin v. Towle, 59 N. H. 
 31). It has also been adopted in most 
 other states. See Menard v. Boston, 
 etc. E. Co., 150 Mass. 386; 28 N. E. 
 214 [railroad gates] ; Nalley v. Hart- 
 ford Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524 ; Couch 
 V. Watson Coal Co., 46 Iowa, 17; 
 Hudson V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 59 Id. 
 581 ; Cramer v. Burlington, 45 Id. 627; 
 
 Hodges v. Percival, 132 111. 53 ; 23 N. 
 E. 423 [defendant supplied elevator 
 with an air-cushion, to prevent in- 
 jury from similar falls]; Terre Haute, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Clem,l<!3 Ind. 15 ; 23 N. 
 E. 965 ; Anderson v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. , 87 Wise. 195 ; 58 N. W. 79 [reduc- 
 ing rate of speed] ; Heucke v. Mil- 
 waukee E. Co., 69 Wise. 401 ; 84 N. 
 W. 243 ; Kuhns v. Wisconsin, etc. 
 E. Co., 76 Iowa, 67; 40 N. W. 92 ; Day 
 V. Akeley Lumber Co., 54 Minn. 522; 
 56 N. W. 243 [repairing saw-dust 
 burner, after fire caused by emission 
 of sparks] ; Gulf, etc. E. Co. v. Mc- 
 Gowan, 78 Tex. 355 ; 11 S. W. 336 
 [subsequentlj' enlarging culvert] ; 
 Holt V. Spokane, etc. E. Co., 
 Idaho, ; 35 Pac. 39 [filling up a well, 
 after child had fallen in it] ; Denver, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Morton, 3 Colo. App. 
 155 ; 32 Pac. 345 ; St. Louis, etc. E. 
 Co. V. W^eaver, 85 Kans. 412 ; 11 Pac. 
 408 [increasing capacity of water- 
 way] ; but compare Atchison, etc. 
 E. Co. V. McKee, 37 Kans. 592 ; 15 
 Pac. 484 [subsequent repair of ma- 
 chine]. It is also the law in England 
 (Hart V. Lancashire, etc. E. Co., 21 
 Law Times, N. S., 261). The rule is 
 otherwise in Pennsylvania (Pennsyl- 
 vania E. Co. V. Henderson, 51 Pa. St. 
 315 ; McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Id. 218 
 [defendant, after accident, placed a 
 light at the opening of cellar] ) . It is 
 not an infringement of this rule to 
 
85 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§6oc 
 
 ments might be taken from excessive precaution; and the 
 effect of admitting such testimony would obviously be to dis- 
 courage improvement and punish careful and considerate per- 
 sons. Evidence of such repairs having been made under the 
 order, or even the request, of a public authority, is admissible, 
 as a practical concession that they ought to have been made 
 before.* 
 
 admit proof that, after the breaking 
 of an appliance, a substitute therefor 
 which was on hand at the time of 
 the accident and could have then 
 been used, was in fact thereafter 
 used for successfully working the 
 apphance (Miller v. Ocean Steam- 
 ship Co., 118 N. Y. 199 ; 23 N. E. 463 ; 
 Merrigan v. Boston, etc. B. Co., 154 
 Mass. 189 ; 38 N. E. 149 [railroad 
 gates] ; See Daniels v, Staten Is. etc. 
 
 R. Co., 135 N. Y. 407; 36 N. E. 
 466). 
 
 ■•This is extremely well put by 
 Mitchell, J. in Morse v. Minneapolis, 
 etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 465 ; 16 N. W. 
 358. But the mere fact of such an 
 ordinance having been passed and 
 notice thereof given to the defendant 
 is incompetent (West Jersey R. Co. 
 V. Paulding, 58 N. J. Law, 178; 33 
 Atl. 381). 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 §61. 
 62. 
 
 63. 
 64. 
 65. 
 
 Gteneral rule. § 83. 
 
 Contributory negligence under 
 
 statutory claims. 
 Reason of rule. 
 When no defense. 
 Fault must be that of injured 
 
 party or his agent. 
 
 66. Doctrine of "identification." 
 66a. Stranger's contributory fault 
 
 no excuse for plaintiff's. 
 
 67. Husband and wife. 
 
 68. Knowledge of principal, when 
 
 imputed to agent. 
 
 69. Knowledge of agent, when 
 
 imputed to principal. 
 
 Contributory negligence of chil- 
 di-en. 
 
 Negligence of parents, in 
 parent's action. 
 
 Parent must be actually in 
 fault. 
 
 Degree of care required from 
 child. 
 73a. Age of discretion. 
 74. Imputation of parent's negli- 
 gence ; New York rule. 
 
 New York rule criticised. 
 
 Imputed negligence ; Illinois 
 rule. 
 
 Identification of child and cus- 
 todian. 
 
 True rule; no imputation of 
 parental negligence. 
 
 79. Noimputednegligence, if child 
 
 careful. 
 
 80. Imputed negligence ; limita- 
 
 tions of rule. 
 
 81. Imputed negligence; parent 
 
 must be acting as such. 
 83. Imputed negligence ; parent 
 must be negligent in fact. 
 
 [86J 
 
 70. 
 
 71. 
 
 73, 
 
 73. 
 
 75. 
 76. 
 
 77. 
 
 78. 
 
 84. 
 
 85. 
 
 87. 
 88. 
 89. 
 
 90. 
 91. 
 
 92. 
 
 93. 
 
 94. 
 
 95. 
 
 96. 
 
 97. 
 98. 
 99. 
 
 100. 
 101. 
 102. 
 103. 
 
 104. 
 105. 
 
 106. 
 
 107. 
 
 Imputed negligence ; age of 
 
 child. 
 Imputed negligence; lunatics, 
 
 etc. 
 Plaintiff not prejudiced unless 
 
 actually in fault. 
 Plaintiff not prejudiced by 
 
 want of more than ordinary 
 
 care. 
 Ordinary care defined. 
 Care required of infirm, etc. 
 Effect of mistaken judgment 
 
 under sudden alarm. 
 Duty of looking and listening. 
 Effect of defendant's advice or 
 
 invitation. 
 Plaintiff not bound to antici- 
 pate negligence. 
 Plaintiff's fault must contribute 
 
 to injury. 
 Plaintiff's fault must proxi- 
 mately contribute to injury. 
 Negligence increasing damages 
 
 only, no bar. 
 Plaintiff's fault need not be 
 
 cause of injury. 
 Effect of technical trespass. 
 Technical trespass, no bar. 
 Defendant's later negligence; 
 
 rule in Davies v. Mann. 
 Illustrations of rule. 
 Plaintiff last in fault. 
 Comparative negligence. 
 Rule in Georgia, Florida and 
 
 Tennessee. 
 Plaintiff's violation of statute. 
 Plaintiff's fault in representa- 
 tive capacity. 
 Burden of proof : conflict of 
 
 decisions. 
 Burden of proof on plaintiff. 
 
^7 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 6l 
 
 § 108. Burden of proof on defendant. 
 
 109. Burden ought to be on defend- 
 
 ant. 
 
 110. Presumption against negli- 
 
 gence : how over-balanced. 
 
 5 111. What proof of care sufficient. 
 
 112. Inference from circumstances. 
 
 113. Pleading : absence of fault. 
 
 114. Questions of fact and law. 
 
 §6l. General rule.— One who, through the mere negli- 
 gence of another/ suffers an injury which would not have 
 happened,^ but for his own or his agent's^ wrongful act* 
 
 " This rule applies only to cases of motive, with notice that it was con- 
 mere negligence (Sanford v. Eighth trary to defendants' orders to the 
 Ave. K. Co., 23 N. Y. 348, and other engineer, he cannot recover for in- 
 cases cited under g 64, post). juries received through the defend- 
 « Wilds V. Hudson River R. Co., 24 ants' negligence, while on the loco- 
 N. Y. 431) ; Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 motive (Robertson v. N. Y. &ErieR. 
 U. S. 439 ; Woods v. Jones, 34 La. Co., 23 Barb. 91). This rule was ap- 
 Ann. 1086 ; Murphy v. Deane, 101 plied in Waterbury v. N. Y. Central 
 Mass. 4o5; Hickey v. Boston, etc. R. etc. R. Co. (31 Blatchf. 314), and 
 Co. , 14 Allen, 429 ; Thomas v. Ken- Austin v. Great Western, etc. R. Co. 
 yon, 1 Daly, ]33;Tuff V. Warman, 5 (L. R. 3 Q. B. 443). Compare Carter 
 C. B. N. S. 573 ; affirming s. c, 3 Id. v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 98 Ind. 552. 
 740 ; Central R. Co. v. Moore, 24 N. So a conductor of a train, having 
 J. Law, 824 ; Runyon v. Central R. control of its speed, who suffers it to 
 Co., 25 Id. 556; Moore v. Central R. run at a rate of speed above that 
 Co., 24 Id. 268; Telfer v. Northern, allowed by the rules of the company, 
 etc. R. Co., 30 Id. 188 ; Pennsylvania, or is careless in " the make up " of 
 etc. R. Co. V. Langdon, 92Pa. St. 21; the train, and runs backward, is 
 Northern Central R. Co. v. State, 31 guilty of such contributory negli- 
 Md. 357 ; Paducah, etc. R. Co. v. gence as will prevent his recovering 
 Hoehl, 13 Bush, 41 ; Covington v. for a resulting injury (St. Louis, etc. 
 Bryant, 7 Id. 348 ; Kentucky, etc. R. R. Co. v. Morgart, 45 Ark. 318 ; 
 Co. V. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160 ; Hous- Sutherland v. Ti-oy, etc. R Co., 125 
 ton, etc. R. Co. v. Clemmons, 55 N. Y. 737 ; 26 N. E. 609 [killing of 
 Tex. 88 ; Colorado, etc. R. Co. v. locomotive engineer by collision 
 Holmes, 5 Colo. 197. It is not neces- would not have occurred but for his 
 sary that the plaintiff's negligence running train contrary to company's 
 should have amounted to more than rules]). So a passenger who jumps 
 a careless exposure of his person or from a moving train, against the re- 
 property to the risk of injury. See monstrance of the train-men (Penn- 
 Hughes V. Muscatine, 44 Iowa, 673 ; sylvania R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 
 Trousclair v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., St. 147 ; Jewell v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 80 Cal. 531; 33 Pac, 358. This will Co., 54 Wise. 610; Burrows v. Erie 
 appear from the great majority of R. Co., 63 N. Y. 556); or rides in a 
 cases hereafter cited. baggage car, contrary to the rules 
 ' See S^§ 65-86, post. of the company (Pennsylvania R. 
 * Terry v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 23 Co. v. Langdon, 93 Pa. St. 31 ; Ken- 
 Barb. 574 ; Roulston v. Clark, 3 E. tucky Central R. Co. v. Thomas, 79 
 D. Smith, 366. Therefore, where the Ky. 160 ; Houston, etc. E. Co. v. 
 plaintiff rode upon defendants' loco- Clemmons, 55 Tex. 88), even with 
 
g 6lJ CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 88 
 
 or want of ordinary care ^ proximately contributing thereto,* 
 
 the consent of the conductor (Penn- way, without light]; Eunyon v. Ceu- 
 sylvania R. Co. v. Langdon, supra), tral R.Co.,25N. J. Law, 556 ; Graham 
 or upon a freight train (Houston, etc. v. Pennsylvania Co., 139 Pa. St. 149 ; 
 R. Co. V. Moore, 49 Tex. 31 ; Eaton 21 Atl. 151 ; Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Gul- 
 V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 57 N. Y. lett, 15 Ind. 487 ; Evansville, etc. R. 
 382 ; Sherman v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co. v. Lowdermilk, Id. 130 ; McGrath 
 Co., 72 Mo. 62), or on hand-cars, in v. Bloomer, 73 Wise. 29; 40 N. W. 
 violation of the company's rules 585 ; Cummins v. Syracuse, 100 N. 
 (Hoar v. Maine Central R. Co., 70 Y. 637, rev'g 29 Hun, 144 [walking 
 Me. 65 ; McQueen v. Central Branch needlessly in darkness, in dangerous 
 R. Co., 30Kans. 689 ; Pool v. Chicago, place]; Countryman v. East Tennes- 
 etc. R. Co., 53 Wise. 657) , is willfully see, etc. R. Co., 89 Ga. 835; 16 S. E. 
 negligent. As to riding on the roof 84 [railway servant did not carry 
 of a freight-car, see Indianapolis, etc. lamp, in crossing yard at night]; Ft. 
 R. Co. V. Horst (93 U. S. 291). If a Worth, etc. R. Co. v. Mackney, 83 
 passenger is received on a freight Tex. 410 ; 18 S. W. 949 [fireman on 
 train, though against the rule of the one of two colliding trains failed to 
 company, and pays his fare, the rela- keep a lookout] ; O'Donnell v. Patton, 
 tion of carrier and passenger is 117 Mo. 13 ; 22 S. W. 903 [plaintiff 
 established, and he may recover undermined a pile of shavings which 
 (Edgerton V. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., he was hauling away]. See cases 
 89 N. Y. 237 ; Creed V. Pennsylvania, cited under § 87 et seq. post. 
 etc. R. Co., 86 Pa. St. 139 ; Ryan v. ' To make it a defense, the plain- 
 Cumberland Iron Co., 33 Id. 884; tiff'sfault must be a proximate cause 
 O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley R. of his injury (Grand Trunk R. Co. v. 
 Co., 59 Id. 239; Dunn v. Grand Ives, 144 U. S. 408 ; 13 S. Ct. 679 ; Plant 
 Trunk R. Co., 58 Maine, 187 ; Murch Inv. Co. v. Cook, 20 C. C. A. 625; 74 
 V. Concord R. Co., 29 N. H. 9 ; Gill- Fed. 503). "Contribute" is the word 
 shannon v. Stoney Brook R. Co., 10 used in most of the decisions. See 
 Cush. 238 ; Lawrenceburg, etc. R. Wilds v. Hudson River R. Co. , 24 N. 
 Co. V. Montgomery, 7 Ind. 476 ; Y. 430; Johnson v. Hudson River R. 
 Arnold v. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 88 lU. Co., 20 Id. 65, 73; Button v. Hudson 
 273 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Hazzard, River R. Co., 18 Id. 248; Hunger v. 
 26 Id. 375 ; Lucas v. Milwaukee, etc. Tonawanda R. Co., 4 Id. 349; NewHa- 
 R. Co., 33 Wise. 41 ; Sheerman v. ven Steamboat Co. v. Vanderbilt, 16 
 Toronto, etc. R. Co., 34 Upper Can- Conn. 420 ; Knowles v. Crampton, 55 
 ada, Q. B., 451 ; Graham v. Toronto, Id. 336 ; 11 Atl. 593; Winship v. En- 
 etc. R. Co., 23 Id. C. P. 541). For field, 43 N. H. 197; Norris v. Litch- 
 further illustrations of passengers' field, 35 Id. 271; Briggs v. Guilford, 
 contributory negligence, see § 519 8 Vt. 264 ; Drake v. Mount, 33 N. J. 
 post. Law, 441; Drake v. Philadelphia, etc. 
 
 sWildsv. Hudson River R. Co., 24 R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 340; Connor v. 
 N. Y. 430 [looking and listening, at Electric Tr. Co., 173 Id. 603; 34 Atl. 
 railway crossing]; Johnson v. Hud- 388 ; Cleveland, etc. E. Co. v. Terry, 
 son River R. Co., 30 Id. 65 ; Button 8 Ohio St. 570 ; Ohio, etc. E. Co. v. 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 18 Id. 348; Gullett, 15 Ind. 487 ; Toledo, etc. R. 
 Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J. Law, 475; Co. v. Goddard, 35 Id. 185 ; Ohio, etc. 
 34 Atl. 886 [descending strange stair- R. Co. v. Hecht, 115 Id. 448 ; 17 N. 
 
89 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 61 
 
 cannot recover at common law''' any compensa- 
 
 E. 297 ; Dougherty v. Missouri E. cover, if by the use of ordinary care 
 Co., 97 Mo. 647; 11 S. W. 351 ; Cal- he might have avoided the injury 
 lahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131 ; Michi- (Beers v. Housatonic R. Co., 19 
 gan, etc. R. Co. v. Leahey, 10 Conn. 566 ; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 
 Mich. 193 ; Griggs v. Flecken- Pa. St. 463 ; Runyon v. Central R. 
 stein, 14 Minn. 1 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co., 25 N. J. Lavsr, 556 ; Hassa v. 
 Co. V. Chambers, 15 C. C. A. 327; 68 Junger, 15 Wise. 663 ; Central R. Co. 
 Fed. 148 ; Witherley v. Regent's Ca- v. Lanier, 83 Ga. 587 ; 10 S. "W. 279). 
 nal Co., 13 C. B. N. S. 3 ; Dowell v. In Scotland the same principle has 
 Gen. Steam Nav. Co., 5 EI. & B. 195; been expressed in various forms 
 Ellis V. Southwestern R. Co. , 3 Hurlst. (M'Naughton v. Caledonian R. Co. , 31 
 & N. 424. Sometimes the language Dunlop, 160 ; Davidson v. Monkland 
 used is, that the plaintiff cannot re- R. Co., 17 Dunlop, 1088; O'Neile v. 
 coverif his own negligence corecwrred Neilson, 20 Dunlop, 437). These va- 
 (Hance v. Cayuga, etc. R. Co. , 36 riations of language are of no prac- 
 N. Y. 428 ; Button v. Hudson River tical importance, as it will be found 
 R. Co., 18 Id. 248; Cook v. Cham- that the meaning of the court was 
 plain, etc. R. Co., 1 Denio, 91 ; Heil substantially the same in each case, 
 V. Glanding, 43 Pa. St. 493 ; Pennsyl- and the decisions all stand on one 
 vania R. Co. v. Aspell, 28 Id. 147 ; principle, which is, however, best 
 Woods V. Jones, 34 La. Ann. 1086), expressed in the word "contribut- 
 or co-operated in producing the in- ing," thougli it has' been criticised 
 jury (Terry v. N. Y. Central R. Co., as "much too loose," and as " a very 
 23 Barb. 574 ; Timmons v. Central unsafe word" (Crompton, J.,Tuff v. 
 Ohio R. Co., 6 Ohio St. 105; Ker- Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 578, 584). 
 whacker V. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 3 Undoubtedly it is a word which 
 Id. 173). " It is not the contributing should not be used in charging 
 act, but contributory negligence, that a jury, without explanation. As 
 defeats recovery" (Guichard v. qualified in the text, we believe it to 
 New, 84 Hun, 54 ; 31 N. T. Supp. be entirely proper and intelligible. 
 1080) . See Schmidt v. Cook, 30 Abb. ' In admiralty, the loss is equitably 
 N. C. 285. In other cases, it is said apportioned, according to the degree 
 simply that the plaintiff must be of negligence on each side (The 
 without fault (Spencer v. Utica, etc. Clara, 103 U. S. 208 ; The Max Mor- 
 E. Co., 5 Barb. 387 ; Brown v. Max- ris v. Curry, 187 Id. 1; 11 S. Ct. 39 ; 
 well, 6 Hill, 592) , or that, as between affi'g 28 Fed. 881 ; The Morning 
 the parties, the injury must be caused Light, 2 Wall. 550 ; The Baltimore, 8 
 solely by the defendant's fault (Grip- Id. 377 ; The Continental, 14 Id. 345; 
 pen V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 40 N.Y. Gushing v. The Fraser, 21 How. U. 
 84; Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Me. 325), S. 184 ; Rogers v. The St. Charles, 19 
 or that he cannot recover if the in- Id. 108 ; The Catharine v. Dickinson, 
 jury is the result of the want of 17 Id. 170 ; Vaux v. Sheffer, SMoore, 
 ordinary care on the part of both P. C. 75). But in a court of com- 
 parties (Reeves v. Delaware, etc. mon-law, the same rule is applied to 
 E. Co., 30 Pa. St. 454; Williams v. cases of maritime collisions as to any 
 Michigan Central R. Co., 3 Mich, other (Arctic Ins. Co. v. Austin, 69 
 359 ; Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. N. Y. 470 ; Dowell v. General Steam 
 118), or that the plaintiff cannot re- Nav. Co., 5 El. & Bl. 195 ; Gen. Steam 
 
§62] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 90 
 
 tion^ for such injury, unless its more proximate cause is the 
 omission of the other party, after having notice of the danger' 
 to use due care to prevent injury.'** This rule applies to all 
 cases of mere negligence, no matter how gross it may be." 
 
 § 62. Contributory negligence under statutory claims. — 
 
 The rule forbidding a recovery for negligence where a plaintiff 
 has contributed to the injury by his own fault, is generally held 
 
 Nav. Co. V. Mann, 14 C. B. 137 ; 
 Wright V. Brown, 4 Ired. N. C. Law, 
 95 ; Union S. S. Co. v. New York, 
 etc. S. S. Co., 24 How. U. S. 307 ; 
 The Farmer v. McCraw, 26 Ala. 189 ; 
 Broadwell v. Swigert, 7B. Mon. 39). 
 The common-law rule has been 
 altered by statute in some states, as 
 in Kentucky, Tennessee and Geor- 
 gia, where the admiralty rule is 
 adopted in some cases. See Miller v. 
 Smythe, 95 Ga. 288 ; 33 S. E. 532 ; 
 Western, etc. R. Co. v. Eoberson, 9 C. 
 C. A. 646 ; 61 Fed. 592 ; Knoxville, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Acuff, 92 Tenn. 
 36 ; 20 S. W. 348 ; Byrne v. Kansas 
 City, etc. R. Co., 9 C. C. A. 666; 61 
 Fed. 605. 
 
 ^ In the absence of special statutes 
 (such as those of Kentucky, Tennes- 
 see and Georgia) , it is a complete bar 
 to any claim, as all the cases show, 
 unless it only served to increase the 
 damage, and not to produce the in- 
 jury (Stebbins v. Central Vt. R. Co., 
 54 Vt. 464; Hunt v. Lowell Gas 
 Co., 1 Allen, 348; Sherman v. Fall 
 Eiver Iron Co., 2 Id. 524 ; Hibbard v. 
 Thompson, 109 Mass. 286 ; Chase v. 
 N. Y. Central E. Co., 24 Barb. 273 ; 
 Gould V. McKenna, 86 Pa. St. 397 ; 
 Wright V. Illinois, etc. Tel. Co., 30 
 Iowa 195 ; Matthews v. Warner, 29 
 Gratt. 570 ; Secord v. St. Paul, etc. 
 R. Co., 5 McCrary, 515; Fay v. 
 Parker, 53 N. H. 348 ; Lawrence v. 
 Housatonic E. Co., 29 Conn. 390 ; 
 Borschart v. Tuttle, 59 Id. 1 ; 31 Atl. 
 939 ; and cases cited under § 63,po.si) . 
 
 A party was not bound to take legal 
 measures to restrain the continuance 
 of reckless blasting on adjoining 
 property before he sustained as much 
 damage as he did (Berg v. Parsons, 
 84 Hun, 60; 31 N. Y. Supp. 1091). 
 The Englisli mle is, that the defend- 
 ant is liable, if at all, for the whole 
 damage (Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 
 Exch. 243), except where the effect 
 of the plaintiff's negligence is plainly 
 separable from that of the defend- 
 ant (Nitro-Phosphate, etc. Co. v. 
 London, etc. Docks, L. E. 9 Ch. Div. 
 503). 
 
 ' See S^ 99, post ; Barker v. Savage, 
 45 N. Y. 191 ; Brown v. Lynn, 31 
 Pa. St. 510 ; Northern, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Price, 29 Md. 420 ; Lock v. First Div. 
 etc. E. Co., 15 Minn. 350; Nelson v. 
 Atlantic, etc. E. Co., 68 Mo. 593; 
 Scoville V. Hannibal, etc. E. Co., 81 
 Id. 434 ; Zimmerman v. Hannibal, 
 etc. E. Co., 71 Id. 476 ; Price v. St. 
 Louis, etc. E. Co., 72 Id. 414 ; Parker 
 V. Georgia Pac. E. Co., 83 Ga. 539; 
 10 S. E. 233 ; Factors', etc. Ins. Co. v. 
 Werlein, 42 La. Ann. 1046 ; 8 So. 435. 
 
 '» Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. 
 546. In that case, the plaintiff hav- 
 ing fettered the forelegs of his 
 donkey, turned him out on the high- 
 way to graze. The defendant, driv. 
 ing recklessly, ran over the donkey. 
 The plaintiff having obtained a ver- 
 dict, a rule for a new trial was re- 
 fused. See § 99, post, for a larger 
 discussion of this doctrine. 
 
 " See S 64, post. 
 
9f 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§62 
 
 applicable to causes of action given by statute.^ Under a 
 statute giving a right of action for all damages sustained or 
 injury suffered " by reason " or "inconsequence" of neglect 
 to do some act, the ordinary rule as to contributory negligence 
 is not excluded from the operation of the statute. In such 
 case, the practical construction given to the statute is that the 
 injury is not suffered by reason or in consequence of the de- 
 fendant's neglect, but rather in consequence of the plaintiff's 
 want of ordinary care to avoid exposure to the injury. Thus, 
 where a statute requires railroad companies to ring bells when 
 approaching a highway crossing, or keep a flagman stationed 
 there, or use other means to warn travelers, and making them 
 liable to another person who suffers injury by reason of their 
 omission to use such means, contributory negligence is a good 
 defense.^ But where a statute gives an absolute right of action 
 
 ' In Caswell v. Worth (5 El,.& B. 
 849), it was claimed that one who 
 suffered injury from an omission 
 to fence machinery, as required by 
 statute, could not be prejudiced by 
 his contributory negligence. But 
 the court held otherwise, s. P., Eey- 
 nolds V. Hindman, 32 Iowa, 146 ; 
 Curry v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 43 
 Wise. 665, and cases infra. See, 
 however, remarks of Pigott, B., in 
 Britton v. Gt. West. Cotton Co., L. 
 E.7Exch. 130, 139. 
 
 '^ Where the statute does not other- 
 wise provide, the rule requiring the 
 plaintiff to show that at the time of 
 the injury he was in the exercise of 
 due care governs. (Thompson v. 
 Bridgewater, 7 Pick. 187 ; Munn v. 
 Reed, 4 Allen, 431 ; Plumley v. Birge, 
 134 Mass. 57 ; Taylor v. Carew Manfg. 
 Co., 148 Id. 470 ; 10 N. E. 308 ; Passa- 
 maneck v. Louisville, etc. E. Co., 98 
 Ky. 195; 33 S. W. 630). s. P., Pakalin- 
 sky v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 83 N. Y. 
 434; McGrath v, N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 63 Id. 523 ; Stevens v. Oswego, 
 etc. R. Co., 18 Id. 432; Field v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 14 Fed. 832; 
 Telfer v. Northern, etc. R. Co., 80 
 
 N. J. Law, 188 ; Reeves v. Dubuque, 
 etc. R. Co., 93 Iowa, 33 ; 60 N. W. 
 343 ; Purl v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 73 
 Mo. 168 ; Holman v. Chicago, etc. E. 
 Co., 63 Id. 563; Payne v. Chicago, 
 etc. K. Co., 139 Id. 405 ; 31 S. W. 885 ; 
 Pzolla V. Michigan Central E. Co., 
 54 Mich. 373 ; Memphis v. Copeland, 
 61 Ala. 376 ; Peoria, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Siltman, 88 111. 529 ; Eansom v. 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co., 63 Wise. 178; 
 33 N. W. 147. The failure o^ a rail- 
 way company to maintain sign- 
 boards at crossings, as required by 
 statute, is not negligence as to persons 
 who in fact know of the existence 
 and location of the crossing (Haas v. 
 Grand Rapids, etc. E. Co., 47 Mich. 
 401; Shaber v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 38 Minn. 108 ; Cincinnati, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Howard, 134 Ind. 280 ; 24 N. E. 
 892 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co., v. Stom- 
 mel, 126 Ind. 35; 25 N. E. 863; 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Crisman, 19 
 Colo. 30 ; 34 Pac. 286 ; Laney v. 
 Chesterfield County, 39 S. C. 140 ; 7 
 S. E. 56 [action under Gen. St. g 
 1087, against county for injuries from 
 defective highway]). Mr. Beach has 
 collected a great number of cases in 
 
§62] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 92 
 
 for injuries suffered, where certain precautions are not taken, 
 without qualifying the Hability, so as to confine it to injuries 
 suffered "by reason" or "inconsequence" of such neglect, 
 this rule does not apply, and contributory negligence is no 
 defense. Thus, where a statute requires railroad companies to 
 fence their roads, and declares that, if they omit to do so, they 
 shall be liable to the owners of all cattle which may be injured 
 by trains running on such unfenced roads, contributory negli- 
 gence is (generally speaking) no defense.^ 
 
 support of the general proposition 
 that a plaintiff, guilty of contribu- 
 tory negligence, cannot recover on 
 the ground that the defendant's 
 negligence is a violation of some 
 statutory obligation (Contrib. Neg. 
 2d ed. § 49). 
 
 3 Shepard v. Buffalo, etc. E. Co., 
 35 N. Y. 641 ; Corwin v. N. Y. & Erie 
 R. Co., 13 Id. 42 ; JeffersonviUe, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Eoss, 37 Ind. 545 ; Louisville, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Whitesell, 68 Id. 297; 
 Lloyd V. St. Louis, etc. E. Co. 128 Mo. 
 595 ; 29 S. W. 153. In Flint, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Lull (28 Mich. 510),Cooley, J., 
 said : " If contributory negligence 
 could constitute a defense, the pur- 
 pose of the statute might be in a 
 great measure, if not wholly, de- 
 feated ; for the mere neglect of the 
 railway company to observe the di- 
 rections of the statute would render 
 it unsafe for the owner of beasts to 
 suffer them to. be at large, or even on 
 his grounds, in the vicinity of the 
 road, so that if he did what, but for 
 the neglect of the company, it 
 would be entirely safe and proper for 
 him to do, the very neglect of the 
 company would constitute its pro- 
 tection, since the neglect alone 
 rendered the conduct of the plaintiff 
 negligent." So held under Tennessee 
 Code (§1167) declaring company's lia- 
 bility for all damage^ resulting from 
 failure to keep a lookout on locomo- 
 tives (Nashville, etc. E. Co. v. Now. 
 Un, 1 Lea, 523 ; Eailroad Co. v. 
 
 Walker, 11 Heisk, 383 ; NasbviUe, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Carroll, 6 Id. 347 ; Chesa- 
 peake, etc. E. Co. V. Foster, 88 Tenn. 
 671 ; 13 S. W. 694). So, under a simi- 
 lar statute in Georgia (Macon, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Davis, 27 Ga. 113 ; Winn 
 Case, 2G Id. 200 ; Atlanta, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Ayres, 53 Id. 12). So, in New 
 York, in an action for death by 
 "wrongful act,'' under Co. Civ. Pro. 
 § 1902 (Kain v. Larkin, 56 Hun 79 ; 
 9 N. Y. Supp. 89 [decedent shot by 
 defendant]) . So, in Kentucky, under 
 a statute (Gen. Stat. ch. 57, § 3) pro- 
 viding for the recovery of punitive 
 damages in certain cases where death 
 results from defendant's " willful 
 negligence " (Jones v. Louisville, etc. 
 E. Co.,82Ky. 610). See lUinois Cent. 
 E. Co. V. Dick, 91 Ky. 434 ; 15 S. W. 
 665 ; Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. Coniff 
 (Ky.) 27 8. W. 865 ; Chesapeake, etc. 
 E. Co. V.Yost (Ky.), 29 S. W. 326. 
 So, under Illinois statute giving a 
 right of action for injuries occasioned 
 by willful neglect to fence coal mine 
 shafts (Catlett v. Young, 143 111. 74 ; 
 32 N. E. 447). So, under Wisconsin 
 statute requiring raih-oads to fence 
 their right of way (Quackenbush v. 
 Wisconsin, etc. E. Co., 71 Wise. 472 ; 
 37 N. W. 834). So, under Tennes- 
 see statute, forbidding employ- 
 ment of boys in mines (Queen 
 V. Dayton Coal Co., 95 Tenn. 458; 
 82 S. W. 460). In Rowell v. Eail- 
 road Co. (57 N. H. 132), under a statute 
 giving railway companies an insur- 
 
93 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 63 
 
 § 63. Reason of rule.— The reason of the rule which denies 
 relief to an injured party who has contributed to the injury 
 by his own fault has been variously stated. Perhaps the 
 majority of opinions are in favor of basing it upon the other rule, 
 confining liability to the party who is the proximate cause of an 
 injury;! and it is said that, where the plaintiff's negligence has 
 contributed to his injury, his act is the proximate cause thereof 
 and not the act of the defendant. But there are innumerable 
 cases in which contributory negligence has been held to bar 
 a recovery, where such negligence was certainly no more a 
 proximate cause of the injury than the negligence of the de- 
 fendant, if even as much so. It has, therefore, been asserted 
 that the reason of the rule is that the defendant is not liable 
 for an injury of which his negligence was not the sole cause.^ 
 But this is plainly not true, since the concurring negligence of 
 a stranger is no defense ; ^ and, even allowing for that error in 
 the definition, it still remains incorrect, unless the rule lying 
 at the foundation of the famous case of Davies v. Mann,* now 
 recognized by every court, both in England and America, with 
 one or two exceptions, is to be ignored. The fact that courts of 
 admiralty have always ordered compensation in cases of con- 
 tributory negligence, apportioning the damages as they deemed 
 to bejust under the circumstances, and that this course has been 
 universally acquiesced in and has given general satisfaction, 
 affords strong proof that the stern rule of common law is not 
 founded upon any immutable principle, but is simply the re- 
 sult of judicial unwillingness to trust juries to apportion 
 damages between parties in fault : a task for which very few 
 juries are competent. We think that the Supreme Court of 
 California has stated the exact truth in holding that the reason 
 
 able interest in the property along cending shaft; Coal Miners' Act, 
 
 the line of their road, the plaintiff's 1872]. 
 
 contributory negligence was held no ' Wharton, Negligence, § 300. 
 defense to an action for the negli- ' Grippen v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 gent communication of fire. Under 40N. Y. 34. See Philadelphia, etc. 
 a similar statute in Missouri, no Co. v. Boyer, 97 Pa. St. 91 ; New- 
 negligence short of fraud will bar Jersey Express Co. v. Nichols, 83 
 plaintiff'sright to recover (Matthews N. J. Law, 434 ; Toledo, etc. Co. v. 
 V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 121 Mo. 298; Goddard,35Ind. 185 ; Mississippi, etc, 
 34 S. W. 591). See Baddeley v. Gran- R. Co. v. Mason, 51 Miss. 234. 
 ville, 19 Q. B. Div. 423 [absence of ^Seo^ 66, post. 
 banksman, while miner was as- ■• 10 Mees. & W., 546. See §99, posf. 
 
§64] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 94 
 
 of the rule is simply the impossibility in most cases of 
 equitably apportioning the damages between the parties in a 
 common-law action,' and that, where this impossibility does 
 not exist, the rule itself does not apply. ^ 
 
 § 64. When no defense. — The rule excluding a re- 
 covery in cases of contributory negligence is of course 
 only applicable to actions founded upon negligence. It 
 is universally conceded that the greatest contributory fault, 
 including a willful trespass, is no defense in an action 
 for willful injuries.^ Thus a trespasser upon, .a railroad 
 train, or street car, who is pushed off,' or forced,^ or fright- 
 
 ' Needham v. San Francisco, etc. 
 R. Co., 37 Gal. 409. See, also, to 
 similar effect, Simpson v. Hand, 6 
 Whart 311 ; Heil v. Glandin 43 Pa. 
 St. 493, 499 ; Railroad Co. v. Norton, 
 24 Id. 469 ; Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, 
 etc. R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 173. 
 
 * Needham v. San Francisco, etc. 
 R. Co.,37Cal. 409. 
 
 'Sanford v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 
 33 N. Y. 343; Kain v. Larkin, 56 
 Hun, 79 ; 9 N. Y. Supp. 89 [wiUful 
 shooting] ; Welch v. Wesson, 6 Gray, 
 505 ; Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 
 59 ; Banks v. Highland St. R. Co., 
 136 Id. 485 ; Steinmetz v. Kelly, 73 
 Ind. 443 ; Salem v. GoUer, 76 Id. 291 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Bills, 118 
 Ind. 321 ; 20 N. E, 775 [ejection from 
 train] ; Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 
 567 ; Williams v. Michigan, etc. R. 
 Co., 3 Mich. 259 ; Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Smith, 46 Id. 504 ; Cincinnati, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 
 434 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 
 36 Id. 134 ; Tanner v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co., 60 Ala. 631 ; Gothard v. Ala- 
 bama, etc. R. Co., 67 Id. 114; Cen- 
 tral R. Co. V. Newman, 94 Ga. 560 ; 
 31 S. E. 319 ; Bunting v. Central, etc. 
 R. Co., 16 Nev. 377 ; Holstine v. Ore- 
 gon, etc. R. Co. , 8 Oreg. 163 ; Hector 
 Min. Co. V. Robertson, 23 Colo. 491 ; 
 45 Pao. 400 ; Alaska Min. Co. v. 
 
 Whelan, 64 Fed. 462 ; 12 C. C. A. 
 235. 
 
 ^Barre v. Reading R. Co., 155 Pa. 
 St. 170 ; 26 Atl. 99 ; Thurman v. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co., Ky. ; 34 S. 
 W. 893 [trespasser ejected from train]. 
 Though a carrier has the right to 
 eject from his vehicle a person un- 
 lawfully there, he is bound, in doing 
 BO, to use no unnecessary violence, 
 and not to subject the trespasser to 
 the hazard of serious personal injury 
 (Sanford v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 23 
 N. Y. 343 ; Hoffman v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 87 N. Y. 35 ; Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Vandiver, 43 Pa. St. 365; 
 Holmes v. Wakefield, 13 AJlen, 580; 
 Meyer v. Pacific R. Co., 40 Mo. 
 151 ; Kline v. Central Pacific R. Co., 
 37 Cal. 400 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Dunkin, 93 Ind. 601 ; Carter v. 
 Louisville, etc. Co., 98 Id. 553). 
 
 2 Biddle v. Hestonville, etc R. 
 Co., 113 Pa. St. 551 ; 4 Atl. 485 ; s. c. 
 again, 16 Id. 488. While a mere or- 
 der to quit the train, given while it 
 is in motion, may not always be 
 equivalent to force, as to an adult 
 (see Benton v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 
 55 Iowa, 496 ; 8 N. W. 330), it is, in 
 the case of a mere child (Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. West, 135 111. 320 ; 17 
 N. E. 788), and in the case of any 
 young person (e, g., 16 years), the 
 
95 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§64 
 
 ened/ into jumping off, while the train is in motion, is not 
 debarred from recovery by his own fault, either in originally 
 entering the car, or in quitting it, while in motion. Con- 
 tributory negligence is as good a defense to a claim founded 
 upon gross negligence, as to any other ;5 except where such 
 negligence is so wanton and reckless, as to imply a willingness 
 to injure, or entire indifference to conequences.^ Yet this, 
 after all, is only another form of stating the well-known rule in 
 Davies v. Mann, that is, that even a trespasser can recover for 
 any want of ordinary care in avoiding injury to him, after his 
 presence is known to the defendant.'' 
 
 question is for the jury (Benton v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., supra; Kline 
 V. Central Pac. E. Co., 37 Cal. 400). 
 * Clarke v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 R. Co. 40 Hun, 605. In Planz v, 
 Boston, etc. R. Co. (157 Mass. 377 ; 
 32 N. E. 356), where plaintiff was 
 stealing a ride on a freight train, 
 was ordered off while it was sta- 
 tionary, refused to obey, and was 
 then driven off while it was in mo- 
 tion, his contributery negligence was 
 held to be fatal to his recovery. 
 This decision was clearly wrong. In 
 Marion v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. (.59 
 Iowa, 438 ; 13 N. W. 415), it was held 
 that, while the company would be 
 liable for such an act on the part of 
 a conductor, it was not liable for the 
 act of a brakeman (and see Towanda 
 Coal Co. V. Heeman, 86 Pa. St. 418). 
 But this decision was also wrong, in 
 relieving from liability for the brake- 
 man's act. See the conclusive rea- 
 soning in Hoffman v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 87 N. Y. 35 ; s. p.. Bay ley v. 
 Manchester, etc. R. Co., L. R. 8 C. 
 P. 148. 
 
 * Wilds V. Hudson River R. Co., 
 24 N. Y. 430 ; rev'g 33 Barb. 503 ; 
 Grippen v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 40 
 N. Y. 34, 51 ; Neal v. Gillett, 33 Conn. 
 437 ; Rowen v. New Haven R. Co. , 
 59 Id. 364 ; 31 Atl. 1073 ; New Jersey 
 Express Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. 
 
 Law, 434 ; Catawissa E. Co. v. Arm- 
 strong, 49 Pa. St. 186 ; Cunningham 
 v. Lyness, 33 Wise. 336 ; Maumus v. 
 Champion, 40 Cal. 131 ; Carroll v. 
 Minnesota, etc. R. Co., 13 Minn. 30; 
 Griggs V. Fleckenstein, 14 Id. 81; 
 Ruter V. Foy, 46 Iowa, 133 ; Carring- 
 ton V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 88 
 Ala. 473 ; 6 So. 910 ; Florida So. R. Co. 
 V. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1 ; 11 So. 506 ; Inter- 
 national, etc., R. Co. V. Kuehn,ll 
 Tex. Civ. App. 31; 31 S. W. 3S3. 
 
 * Lake Shoi'e, etc. R. Co. v. Bode- 
 mer, 139 111. 596 ; 39 N. E. 693 ; Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Watson, 90 Ala. 
 68 ; 8 So. 349. In Gray v. McDonald 
 (104 Mo. 303 ; 16 S. W. 398), it was 
 held that the fault of one killed in a 
 personal encounter, in not avoiding 
 the conflict, was no defense to an 
 action for his wrongful death, the 
 doctrine of negligence having no 
 application to the case, a man's right 
 to personal security being absolute. 
 
 ' See § 99, post. In some cases it 
 is said that a trespasser can only re- 
 cover for willful injuries (Wright 
 V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 139 Mass. 
 440 ; Moore v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 
 99 Pa. St. 301 ; Mulherrin v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. B. Co., 81 Id. 366; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. V. Collins, 87 Id. 
 405 ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. God- 
 frey, 71 111. 501 ; Bresnahan v. Michi- 
 gan Central, 49 Mich. 410 ; Chicago, 
 
§65] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 96 
 
 § 65. Fault must be that of injured party or his agent. — 
 
 It is only the contributory fault of the injured party, or of 
 some one whose fault is imputable to him, that can excuse 
 the defendant. The fault of a mere stranger, however much 
 it may contril^te to the injury, is no defense for one whose 
 negligence was J^^proximate cause. ^ For convenience, we 
 speak of ijje^injuf^d party as the plaintiff; but it is, of course, 
 to be unoersttn&d^ha^ in an action for injuries causing death, 
 contributory'^ fault~oH<he deceased person is a bar to the 
 action, to precisely the same extent as if he were the plaintiff 
 of record,^ while the contributory fault of the actual plain- 
 
 etc. E. Co. V. Hedges, 105 Ind. 398 ; 
 7 N. E. 801 ; Mason v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 27 Kans. 83). But this is 
 erroneous, and overruled every- 
 where. Nor vcas it necessary to the 
 decision of any case. 
 
 ' Arctic Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 69 
 N. Y. 470 ; Webster v. Hudson River 
 R. Co., 38 N. Y. 161 ; Barrett v. 
 Third Ave. R. Co., 45 Id. 628 ; Paul- 
 mier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. Law, 
 151 ; Sullivan v. Philadelphia, etc. 
 R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 234 ; Eaton v. Bos- 
 ton, etc. R. Co., 11 Allen, 505 ; War- 
 ren V. Fitchburg, etc. R. Co., 8 Id. 
 227 ; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Mete. 1 ; Cay- 
 zer V. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274: 
 Churchill v. Holt, 127 Mass. 163 ; 
 Harrison v. Great Northern E. Co., 3 
 Hurlst. & C. 231; Gee v. Metropolitan 
 R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 161, 174^ Clark v. 
 Chambers, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 327. 
 See § 32, ante, and § § 94, 122, post. 
 For a full discussion of this principle, 
 see Cooley on Torts, 132. A gas 
 pipe laid in a street leaked, and the 
 leaks were not stopped by the gas 
 company when complaint ■was made 
 to it. It was held that this negli- 
 gence of the company was the proxi- 
 mate, not the remote cause of an ex- 
 plosion, and the fact that the city 
 contractor, in building a sewer, had 
 disturbed and broken the pipe, had 
 no efifect to shift the cause (Oil City 
 
 Gas Co. V. Robinson, 99 Pa. St. 1). 
 A gas company supplied plaintiff 
 with a defective service pipe to con- 
 vey gas from its main to his meter ; 
 and the gas, leaking, exploded 
 through the negligence of a gas-fitter 
 employed by plaintifiE. The cause of 
 action was held to be the negligence 
 of the company ; from the conse- 
 quences of which, the intermediate 
 negligence of a person not in plain- 
 tiff's service could not relieve it 
 (Burrows v. Marsh Gas Co., L. R. 5 
 Exch. 67). A person tripped by 
 another's stepping on the end of a 
 plank laid lengthwise in a walk, 
 which, being unsupported, gives 
 way and throws up the opposite end, 
 is not guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence (Rockford v. Hollenbeck, 34 
 111. App. 40). 
 
 ' In an action for injuries causing 
 death, the sole test on the question 
 of contributory negligence is whether 
 the decedent himself was so far free 
 from fault, as to have entitled him to 
 maintain an action had he lived 
 (Dennick v. RaUroad Co., 103 U. S. 
 11 ; Scheflfer v. Washington, etc. R. 
 Co., 105 Id. 249 ; Packet Co. v. Mc- 
 Cue, 17 Wall. 508 ; Witherley v. Re- 
 gents' Canal Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 2 ; 
 Batchelor v. Fortescue, L. R. 11 Q. 
 B. Div. 474 ; Wigmore v. Jay, 5 
 Exch. 354 ; Mansfield Coal, etc. Co. v. 
 
97 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§66 
 
 tiff in such an action would be no defense, except conceivably 
 in some extraordinary case which has never yet occurred.* 
 And, where the action is brought by a parent or master, for 
 the loss of service caused by an injury to a child or servant, 
 the negligence of either the plaintiff of record or of the person 
 actually injured is to be deemed the negligence of the plaintiff, 
 within the meaning of this chapter.* The plaintiff is responsi- 
 ble for the contributory fault of his agent in the affair,^ on the 
 same principles and under the same conditions as he would be, 
 if he were sued upon such fault. 
 
 § 66. Doctrine of " identification."— As already stated, the 
 fact that the injury was caused by the joint negligence of the 
 defendant and a mere stranger is universally admitted to be no 
 defense.* But, in the famous case of Thorogood v. Bryan,^ an 
 
 MoEnery, 91 Pa. St. 185 ; Gay v. 
 Winter, 34 Cal. 153 ; Cleveland, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 631 ; 
 Carey v. Berkshire R. Co., 1 Cush. 
 475 ; Bancroft t. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 97 Mass. 275 ; State v. Manchester, 
 etc. R. Co., 52 N. H. 528 ; Bradbury 
 T. Fui-long, 13 R. I. 15 ; Nickerson v. 
 Harriman, 38 Me. 277 ; State v. 
 Maine Central R. Co., 60 Id. 490 ; 
 Telfer v. Northern, etc. R. Co., 30 
 N. J. Law, 183 ; Cumberland, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Fazenbaker, 37 Md. 156 ; Row- 
 land V. Cannon, 35 Ga. 105 ; Berry 
 V. Northeastern R. Co., 72 Id. 137; 
 Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. Ayers, 53 Id. 
 13 ; Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 
 6 Heisk. 174 ; Hill v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co., 9 Id. 823 ; Hubgh v. New 
 Orleans, etc. R. Co., 6 La. Ann. -495 ; 
 Knight V. Pontchartrain R. Co., 23 
 Id. 463; Lofton v. Vogles, 17 Ind. 
 105 ; Indianapolis, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Stout, 53 Id. 143 ; Toledo, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Moore, 77 111. 217; Schmidt v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 83 Id. 405 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Triplett, 38 Id. 
 483 ; Ewen v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 38 Wise. 613; Walters v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 41 lo-wa, 71 ; Shoemaker 
 V. Lacey, 38 Id. 377; Weymire v. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — 7J 
 
 Wolfe, 52 Id. 533 ; Elliott v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 67 Mo. 272 ; Kan- 
 sas, etc. R. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kans. 
 83). 
 
 ^ In such an action, the contribu- 
 tory negligence of the plaintiff of 
 record or of any other person inter- 
 ested in the recovery is not an avail- 
 able defense (Button v. Hudson R. 
 R. Co., 18 N. Y. 248 ; Wilds v. Hud- 
 son R. R. Co., 24 Id. 430 ; Cleveland 
 etc. R. Co. V. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 
 631). 
 
 " See §i^ 70-86, 'post. As to hus- 
 band and wife, see § 67, pofd. 
 
 ' Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Stom- 
 mel, 126 Ind. 35 ; 25 N. E. 863 ; 
 Miner v. Connecticut River R. Co., 
 153 Mass., 398; 26 N. E. 994; La 
 Riviere v. Pemberton, 46 Minn. 5 ; 
 48 N. W. 406. See Eaton v. Boston, 
 etc. R. Co., 11 Allen, 500 ; Stevens v. 
 Armstrong, 6 N. Y. 435. Owner of 
 team, riding in it, allowed a com- 
 panion to take the reins. Held, 
 liable for latter's contributory fault 
 (Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 57 Iowa, 749 ; 
 11 N. W. 668). 
 
 ' See cases cited under § 65, ante, 
 and § 122, post. 
 
 2 8C. B. 115. 
 
§66] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 98 
 
 English court invented a new application of the old Roman 
 doctrine of identification, and held that a passenger in a pub- 
 lic vehicle, though having no control over the driver, must be 
 held to be so identified with the vehicle, as to be chargeable 
 with any negligence on the part of its managers which con- 
 tributed to an injury inflicted upon such passenger by the 
 negligence of a stranger. In former editions, we devoted 
 much space to the refutation of this doctrine of "identifica- 
 tion." But it is needless to do so any longer, since the entire 
 doctrine has, since our first edition, been exploded in every 
 court, beginning with New York and ending with Penn- 
 sylvania.^ It was finally overruled in England a few years 
 
 3 Little V. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 ; 
 6 Sup. Ct. 391 ; where the question 
 was fully and ably discussed. Ap- 
 plied to case of wagon driven by 
 plaintifiE's brother (Lapsley v. Union 
 Pac. E. Co., 50 Fed. 172 ; affi'd. 51 Id. 
 174 ; 2 C. C. A. 149 ; 4 U. S. App. 543). 
 So in New York (Webster v. Hud- 
 son River E. Co., 38 N. Y. 260; Bar- 
 rett V. Third Ave. E. Co., 45 Id. 628 ; 
 Sheridan v. Brooklyn E. Co., 36 Id. 
 39 ; Phillips v. N. Y. Central, etc. E. 
 Co., 127 Id. 6r)7; 27 N. E, 978). So 
 held, as to persons accepting an invi- 
 tation to ride with the driver in 
 fault (Eobinson v. N. Y. Central, 
 eto. E. Co. , 66 N. Y. 11 ; Dyer v. 
 Erie R. Co., 71 Id. 238 ; Masterson v. 
 N. Y. Central, etc. E. Co., 84 Id. 247 ; 
 Strauss v. Newburgh E. Co., 6 N. 
 Y. App. Div. 264 ; 89 N. Y. Supp. 
 998). Negligence of a street-car driver 
 is not imputable to the conductor 
 (Seaman v. Koehler. 123 N. Y. 646 ; 
 25 N. E. 353) . So in Alabama (Otis v. 
 Thorn, 23 Ala. 469 ; Georgia Pacific 
 E. Co. V. Hughes, 87 Id. 610 ; 6 So. 
 413 ; Elyton Land Co. v. Mingea, 89 
 Ala. 521; 7 So. 666); California 
 (Hillman v. Newington, 57 Cal. 56 ; 
 Tompkins v. Clay St. R. Co., 66 Id. 
 163: 4 Pac. 1165); Georgia (East 
 Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Markens, 88 
 Ga. 60 ; 13 S. E. 855 [public hack] ; 
 
 Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Powell, 89 
 Ga. 601 ; 16 S. E. 118; [private con- 
 veyance] ; Illinois (Wabash, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Shacklet, 105 111. 364 ; Carmi 
 v. Ervin, 59 111. App. 555 ; compare 
 Toledo, etc. E. Co. v. Miller, 76 Id. 
 278); Indiana (Albion r. Hetick, 
 90 Ind. 545 ; Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Spencer, 98 Id. 186 ; Brannan v. 
 Kokomo, etc. E. Co., 115 Id. 115; 17 
 N. E. 20a [intoxicated driver run- 
 ning a toll-gate] ; Knightstown v. 
 Musgrove, 116 Ind. 121 ; 18 N. E. 452 ; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Creek, 130 
 Ind. 139 ; 29 N. E. 481 ; Lake Shore, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Boyts, 16 Ind. App. 640: 
 43 N. E. 667, and other cases) ; Iowa 
 (Nesbit V. Garner, 75 Iowa, 314; 39 
 N. W. 516 ; Larkin v. Burlington, 
 etc. E. Co., 85 Iowa, 493 ; 52 N. W. 
 480 ; overruling Artz v. Chicago, etc. 
 E. Co., 34 Iowa, 153 ; Payne v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. E. Co. , 39 Id. 523) ; Kansas 
 (Leavenworth v. Hatch, 57 Kans. 57; 
 45 Pac. 65 [plaintiff driven by ser- 
 vant of owner of carriage on lat- 
 ter's invitation]) ; Kentucky (Louis- 
 ville, etc. E. Co. V. Case, 9 Bush, 728 ; 
 Danville, etc. Tump. Co. v. Stewart, 
 2 Mete. [Ky.] 119 ; Cahill v. Cincin- 
 nati, etc. E. Co., 93 Ky. 345 ; 18 S. 
 W. 3 [ride on invitation] ) ; Maine 
 (State v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 80 Me. 
 430; 15 Atl. 36); Maryland (Phila- 
 
99 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY XEGLIGEN'CE. 
 
 [§66 
 
 ago.* The only remnant of this doctrine which remains in sight 
 anywhere is the theory that one who rides in til private convey- 
 ance thereby makes the driver his agent, and is thus responsible 
 for the driver's negligence, even though he has absolutely no 
 power or right to control the driver. This extraordinary 
 theory, which did not even occur to the hair-splitting judges 
 in Thorogood v. Bryan, was invented in Wisconsin, and sus- 
 tained by a process of elaborate reasoning;^ and this Wisconsin 
 decision, in evident ignorance of all decisions to the contrary, 
 was recently followed, with some similar reasoning, in Montana ^ ; 
 and in Nebraska,''' without any reasoning whatever; which 
 last is certainly the best method of reaching a conclusion, 
 directly opposed to common sense and to the decisions of 
 
 delphia, etc. R. Co. v. Hogeland, 66 
 MJ. 149 ; 7 Atl. 105) ; Massachusetts 
 (Poor V. Sears, 154 Mass. 539 ; 28 N. 
 E 1046 ; Randolph v. O'Eiordon, 155 
 Mass. 331 ; 29 N. E. 583 [hired car- 
 riage] ) ; Michigan (Cuddy v. Horn, 
 40 Mich. 596 ; 10 N. W. 32 ; Malm- 
 sten V. Marquette, etc. E. Co., 49 
 Midi. 94; 13 N. "W. 373); Minnesota 
 (McMahon v. Davidson 12 Minn. 
 357 ; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Id. 
 81 ; Follman v. Mankato, 35 Minn. 
 522; 29 N. W. 317; Flaherty v. 
 Minneapolis, etc. R, Co., 39 Minn. 328 ; 
 40 N.W. 160) ; Mississi]}pi (Alabama, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Davis, 69 Miss. 444 ; 
 13 So. 693 ); Missouri (Becke v. Mis- 
 souri Pac. R. Co., 103 Mo. 544; 13 
 S. W. 1053 [stage coach] ; Dickson 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 104 Mo. 491 ; 
 16 S. W. 381 [stagecoach]) ; Kuttner 
 V. LindeU R. Co., 29 Mo. App. 502 ; 
 [stxnet-c-ax]); New Hampshire (Noyes 
 V. Boscawen, 64 N H. 361 ; 10 Atl. 
 690 [riding on invitation of owner 
 in carriage driven by his servant]) ; 
 New Jersey (Bennett v. New Jersey, 
 etc. Trans. Co., 36 N. J. Law, 225 ; 
 N. Y.. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. Stein- 
 brenner, 47 Id. 161 [hired carriage]); 
 North Dakota (Ouverson v. Grafton, 
 fi N. D. 281; 65 N. W. 676 [plaintiff 
 
 requested a ride in another's car- 
 riage]) ; Ohio (Covington Transfer 
 Co. V. Kelly, 36 Ohio St. 86 ; St. 
 Clair St. E. Co. v. Eadie, 43 Id. 91 : 
 1 N. E. 519 [negligence of a father 
 driving his daughter not to be im- 
 puted to her]) ; Texas (Galveston, 
 etc. E Co. V. Kutac, 72 Tex. 643 ; 11 
 S. W. 127 ; Markham v. Houston, etc. 
 Navigation Co. 73 Tex. 247 ; 11 8. 
 W. 131 ; Johnson V. Gulf, etc. E. Co., 
 3 Tex. Civ. App. 139 ; 31 S. W. 374) ; 
 Virginia (New York, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Cooper, 85 Va 939; 9 S. E. 321). 
 Pennsylvania held out, until 1891, 
 when its highest court, in Bunting v. 
 Hogsett (139 Pa St. 363 ; 21 Atl. 31), 
 unanimously overruled its own deci- 
 sion in Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 
 Pa. St. 151, and Phila. etc. R. Co. v-. 
 Boyer, 97 Id. 91, in which Thoropood 
 V. Bryan had been followed. 
 
 '' Mills V. Armstrong, L. R. 13 App. 
 Cas. 1 ; affirming s. c. suh. nom ; 
 The Bernina, L. R. 13 Prob. Div. 5S. 
 
 ^ Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 
 Wise. 513 ; followed, Otis v. Janes- 
 ville, 47 Wise. 433 ; 3 N. W. 783. 
 
 " Whittaker v. Helena, 14 Mont. 
 124 ; 35 Pac. 904. 
 
 ' Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 
 Neb. 637; 67 N. W. 569. 
 
§ 66a] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. ICO 
 
 twenty other courts. The notion that one is the "agent" of 
 another, who has not the smallest right to control or even ad- 
 vise him, is difficult to support by any sensible argument. 
 This theory is universally rejected,* except in the three states 
 mentioned, and it must soon be abandoned even there. 
 
 § 66a. Stranger's contributory fault no excuse for 
 plaintiff's. — In the natural reaction against the false doctrine of 
 " identification," attempts have been made to excuse a plaintiff 
 from using care to avoid injury, by showing that he relied upon 
 a stranger to do so for him. But such excuses have always 
 failed. No one can be allowed to shut his eyes to danger, in 
 blind reliance upon .the unaided care of another, without 
 assuming the consequences of the omission of such care.' And 
 one who needlessly entrusts himself to the control of one whom 
 he knows to be incompetent, contributes thereby, in some 
 degree, to injuries which result from such incompetency.^ 
 Whethei" such negligence proximately contributes to the injury, 
 depends upon all the circumstances. These principles have 
 thus far been applied only to cases of injuries to passengers in 
 vehicles, managed by negligent persons ; but they have a 
 broader application. 
 
 s Even in Pennsylvania, the Wis- protest against her husband driving 
 
 consin theorywas al way ;i repudiated across the track does not constitute 
 
 (Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. St. 544; negligence as matter of law. It is a 
 
 6 Atl. 373 ; Mann v. Weiand, 81 Pa. question for the jury (Hoag v. N. Y. 
 
 St. 243). Central, etc. E. Co., Ill N. Y. 199; 
 
 ' A person riding in a wagon with 18 N. E. 648). And a passenger in a 
 
 another, who is conocious of danger public hack is under no duty to 
 
 and risk assumed by the driver, and supervise the driver at a raUroad 
 
 makes no objection or effort to avoid crossing, nor to look or listen for ap- 
 
 it, is chargeable with "the neglect of preaching trains, unless she has some 
 
 sucli driver (Donnelly v. Brooklyn reason to distrust the diligence of 
 
 R. Co., 109' N. Y. 16 ; 15 N. E. 733; the driver (East Tennessee, etc. R. 
 
 Brickell V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., Co. v. Markens, 88 Ga. 60; 13 S. E. 
 
 130 N. Y. , 390 ; 24 N. E. 449 ; Griffith 855). 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 44 Fed. ^ This qualification is expressly 
 574; Brannen V, Kokomo, etc. R. Co., stated in most, if not all, the cases 
 115 Ind. 115 ; 17 N. E. 303; Miller v. cited under§ 66, ante. But goingin 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 138 Ind. 97 ; 37 a boat, in charge of a blind man, but 
 N. E. 339). But the degree of care to able-bodied and familiar with the 
 be exercised varies vfith the circum- management of boats, is not of it- 
 stances and emergencies, and a wife's self contributory negligence (Har- 
 failure to seize the reins, jump out or ris v. Uebelhoer, 75 N. Y. 169). 
 
lOI CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 67 
 
 § 67. Husband and wife.— The application of this rule to 
 the case of husband and wife is not free from difficulty, ow)|- 
 ing to the great changes which have been made in the com- 
 mon law as to their relations. Under the rule of the common 
 law, which denied to the wife any right to bring an action, 
 separately from her husband, for damages suffered by her 
 through the negligence of a stranger, it was doubtless proper 
 to hold that the contributory negligence of the husband 
 barred the wife's right to recovery, as effectually as it did the 
 husband's.^ Even after some change had been made in the 
 common law in relations of husband and wife, yet the form of 
 action remaining the same, it was held that the negligence 
 of a husband, while the wife was under his immediate care, 
 was imputable to the wife, so as to bar her recovery, as much 
 as it would have barred his.^ But in New York, Indiana and 
 Missouri and other states, where the change has been radical, 
 and married women have a right to recover in such cases 
 damages for their own separate use, the contributory fault of 
 a husband, while in company with his wife, is not chargeable to 
 her, in such an action.* At common law, a wife's contribu- 
 tory negligence is available against her husband's action for 
 loss of her services.'' But it is not so, in a state where she has 
 been relieved of all common-law disabilities, and he, of all re- 
 sponsibility for her torts.^ 
 
 1 Nanticoke v. Warue, 106 Pa. St. St. Louis, 3 Id. 231 ; Louisville, etc. R. 
 
 373 ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Good- Co. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139 ; 30 N. E. 
 
 enoush, 55 N. J. Law, 577 ; 28 Atl. 3 ; 481 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Spilker, 
 
 Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Crittenden, 42 134 Ind. 380 ; 33 N. E. 280 ; Galveston, 
 
 111. App. 469. etc. R. Co. v. Kutao, 76 Tex. 473 ; 
 
 ' Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440 ; 13 S. W. 327). 
 
 Yahn v. Ottumwa, 60 Iowa, 429 ; '' "Winner v. Oakland, 158 Pa. St. 
 
 Peckv. N. Y. & New Haven, etc. R. 405; 37 Atl. 1111. Under the Civil 
 
 Co., 50 Conn. 379 ; Huntoonv. Trum- Code of California (S§ 163, 164, 169, 
 
 bull, 3 McCrary C. C. 314. 172) , damages for personal injuries 
 
 'The contributory negligence of the to the wife being community prop- 
 husband will not bar the wife from erty and recoverable only in a joint 
 recovering for her personal injuries action by husband and wife, it is 
 she being free from negligence, held that the husband's contributory 
 though sitting by his side in a wagon negligence is a bar to such an action 
 driven by him (Platz v. Cohoes, 24 (McFadden v. Santa Ana, etc. R. Co., 
 Hun, 101 ; affi'd 89 N. Y. 219 ; Hoag 87 Cal. 464 ; 35 Pac. 681). 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., Ill N. '• Honey v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 59 
 Y. 199 ; 18 N. E. 648 ; Hedges v. Fed. 4'23. 
 Kansas City, 18 Mo. App. 62 ; Flori v. 
 
§ 69] CONTRIBUTORV NEGLIGENCE. I02 
 
 § 68. Knowledge of principal, when imputed to agent. — 
 
 Notice to a principal of a danger to his property does not 
 prejudice his right to recover for an injury occasioned by such 
 danger, while his agent, who was not aware of its existence, 
 had exclusive charge of his property, unless the circumstances 
 were such that the principal could and should, in the exercise 
 of ordinary care, have communicated his knowledge to the 
 agent, in time to avoid the injury. For example, if the princi- 
 pal knows of an obstacle in the road, created by the negligence 
 of another, and nothing appears to make it his duty to warn 
 his agent of the special danger caused by such obstacle, and 
 the agent, not knowing the fact, drives his principal's wagon 
 against such obstacle, the principal may, nevertheless, recover 
 from the party in fault. ^ 
 
 § 69. Knowledge of agent, when imputed to principal. — 
 
 On the same principle, notice to an agent of the existence of 
 a danger is not necessarily imputable to his principal. In 
 order to charge the principal with contributory negligence, in 
 not personally watching for and avoiding danger known to his 
 agent, but not known to him, it must appear that the agent is 
 so far in fault, for not communicating his knowledge, that the 
 principal would have a right of action against him for breach 
 of duty.^ But where the master's property, while in charge of 
 his servant, is exposed to a danger of which the servant has 
 notice, the servant's knowledge ,of the danger of negligence 
 contributing to the injury will be imputed to the master. 
 Thus, in a case where the plaintiff's servant, having plaintiff's 
 team in charge, stopped in the highway, and, leaving the 
 horses unhitched and unattended, engaged in a boisterous 
 altercation with the defendant, which so frightened the horses 
 that they ran away and were injured, it was held that the 
 negligence of the servant in thus exposing the horses, unat- 
 tended on the highway, was a good defense to an action by 
 the master ; the test being that the servant was guilty of such 
 negligence as would have precluded him, if he had been thie 
 
 ' Garmon v. Bangor, 38 Me. 443; ' See Weisser v. Denison, 10 N. Y.' 
 Miller v. Rochester Pav. Co., 66 68; Fuller v. Bennett, 3 Hare, 403: 
 Hun, 634; 21 N. V. Supp. 651. Worsley v. Scarborough, 3Atk. 393. 
 
I03 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ Jl 
 
 owner of the horses, from maintaining a similar action against 
 the defendant.^ 
 
 § 70. Contributory negligence of children.— The applica- 
 tion of the rules concerning contributory negligence to cases of 
 injuries suffered by small children has been found a matter of 
 considerable difficulty. The obvious hardship of requiring 
 from a little child a degree of care and a soundness of judg- 
 ment in anticipating and avoiding danger, which are not 
 found in the majority of grown-up persons, and the apparent 
 hardship, on the other hand, of compelling strangers, whose 
 negligence has not contributed any more to the injury of chil- 
 dren than the negligence of their own parents or guardians, to 
 compensate for the whole loss, have so embarrassed the courts 
 as to lead to many inconsistent and irreconcilable decisions. 
 Some judges solved the difficulty by holding that even babies 
 are bound in law to use as much care and discretion in avoid- 
 ing injury, as could be expected from adults. Other judges, 
 shocked at this harsh rule, adopted the equally short method 
 of declaring that the rule of contributory negligence did not 
 apply at all to small children. Still others adopted a midway 
 course, holding that small children were not bound to use any 
 greater care than was usually possessed by children of thd| 
 same age, but that the negligence of their parents or guarj' 
 dians, in suffering them to be exposed to injury, was to be 
 imputed to them. Under this conflict of opinion, we must at- 
 tempt to state what seems to us to be the true rule, noting the 
 deflections on one side or the other from that rule, which are 
 supported by authority in the different states.* 
 
 § 71. Negligence of parents in parent's action.— It may 
 
 be as well, in the first place, to eliminate from the discussion 
 a class of cases, which have been improperly mingled with the 
 others, thus creating confusion. When a parent or master 
 sues, for his own benefit, to recover damages for the technical 
 
 •^ Puterbaugh v, Reasor, 9 Ohio St. ' See the cases collected and re- 
 484. To the same effect, Toledo, viewed (Beach, Contr. Neg. 3d ed. 
 etc. R. Co. V. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185 ; §S 116-143). 
 Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Miller, 35 
 Mich. 374. 
 
§7'1 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 104 
 
 loss of service caused to him by the injury of a child or ser- 
 vant, the contributory negligence of the actual plaintiff,^ or 
 his agent, ^ is of course a good defense. And in such an action 
 any contributory negligence of the child or servant, which 
 would sufifice to bar an action brought in his name, will also 
 preclude a recovery by the parent or master.' It is obvious 
 that decisions in such cases afford no support to the doctrine 
 that the negligence of the parent is to be imputed to the child. 
 Yet they are continually cited for that purpose, both in 
 opinions and digests. The distinction between the two classes 
 of cases, is, however, well illustrated in two Ohio decisions. 
 A child brought an action upon his own injuries, and the court 
 held that his father's contributory negligence was no defense.^ 
 The father brought another action upon the same injury, to 
 
 ' Of the many authorities in sup- 
 port of this rule, we may cite the 
 following: Leslie v. Lewiston, 63 Me. 
 468 ; Daley v. Norwich, etc. E. Co., 
 26 Conn. 591 ; Wright v. Maiden, etc. 
 E. Co., 4 Allen, 283 ; Glassey v. Hes- 
 tonville, etc. E. Co., 57 Pa. St. 173; 
 Philadelphia, etc. E. Co. v. Long, 75 
 Id. 257 ; Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Bock, 
 93 Id. 437 ; Smith v. Hestonville, etc. 
 E. Co., 93 Id. 450 [plaintiff permitted 
 young son to serve drivers of horse- 
 cars with water] ; Westerberg y. Kin- 
 zua E. Co., 143 Id. 471 ; 21 AtL 878 ; 
 Baltimore, etc. E. Co. v. Fryer, 30 
 Md. 47 ; Pratt Coal Co. v. Brawley, 
 83 Ala. 371 ; 3 So. 555 [sending child 
 across railroad] ; Bamberger v. Citi- 
 zens' E. Co., 75 Tenn. 18 ; 31 S. W. 163 ; 
 Ohio, etc. E. Co. v. Hammersly, 28 
 Ind. 871 [permitting a boy to serve 
 laborers on a construction train with 
 water] ; Jeffersonville, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Bowen, 40 Id. 5t5 ; 49 Id. 154 ; Evans- 
 ville, etc. E. Co. v. Wolf, 59 Id. 89 ; 
 Chicago v. Hesing, 88 111. 204 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. E. Co. v. Becker, 84 Id. 
 483; Hund v. Geier, 72 Id. 393 ; Chi- 
 cago V. Major, 18 Id. 349 ; Pekin v. 
 McMahon, 154 Id. 141; 39 N. E. 484 ; 
 Isabel V. Hannibal, etc. E. Co., 60 
 
 Mo. 475; Koons v. St. Louis, etc. E. 
 Co., 65 Id. 592; O'Flaherty v. Union, 
 etc. E. Co., 45 Id. 70; Lynch v. Met- 
 ropolitan E. Co., 112 Id., 420 ; 20 S. 
 W. 642; Spokane, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Holt, Idaho, ; 40 Pac. 56. 
 
 "Pratt Coal Co. v. Brawley, 83 
 Ala. 871 ; 3 So. 555 [fault of grand- 
 mother in charge] ; Albert v. Albany 
 E. Co., 5 N.. Y. App. Div. 544 ; 39 N. 
 Y. Supp. 430 [mother sent young 
 child across street, knowing it to be 
 dangerous]. 
 
 ' Moore v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 99 
 Pa. St. 301; Honegsberger v. Second 
 Ave. E. Co., 2 Abb. Ct. App. 378 ; 
 Burke v. Broadway, etc. E. Co., 49 
 Barb. 529 [both these cases have 
 been overruled on other points, but 
 not on this], s. P., Kennard v. Bur- 
 ton, 35 Me. 39; Fitzgerald v. St. 
 Paul, etc. E. Co., 29 Minn. 336 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Harney, 28 Ind. 
 28 ; Atlanta, etc. E. Co. v. Gravitt, 
 93 Ga. 369 ; 20 S. E. 550 ; Westbrook 
 V. Mobile, etc. E. Co., 66 Miss. 560; 
 6 So. 331 ; Bamberger v. Citizens' E. 
 Co., 75 Tenn. 18 ; 31 S. W. 168. 
 
 " Belief on taine, etc. E. Co. v. Sny. 
 der, Jr., 18 Ohio St. 399. 
 
I05 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 72 
 
 recover for loss of service ; and the same court held his con- 
 tributory negligence to be a complete defense.^ 
 
 § 72. Parent must be actually in fault.— Even in an action 
 by the parent or master, however, it is to be remembered 
 that he must be actually m. fault, in order to bar his recovery 
 on the ground of his contributory fault. This branch of the 
 rule has sometimes been overlooked ; but it has been well 
 pointed out and enforced in later cases, especially in Penns}-!- 
 vauia. Where a parent or guardian has done all which can 
 reasonably be expected of one in his circumstances, he is not 
 debarred from recovery by the mere fact that he has not thrown 
 as many restraints around his child for its protection as would 
 be reasonably expected from parents having more means at 
 their command. Thus, a poor woman, earning her daily bread, 
 is not necessarily in fault, because she does not restrain her 
 child from wandering in the street. In these and all similar 
 cases, all the circumstances are to be taken into account ; and 
 the question to be determined is whether the plaintiff took as 
 much care of his child as reasonably prudent persons of the 
 same class and with the same means ordinarily do.^ If the 
 guardian of a child has taken ordinary care of him, and, not- 
 withstanding the use of such care, the child escapes into a 
 dangerous place, there is no negligence on the part of the 
 guardian.^ Furthermore, the parent's fault is of no import- 
 ance, if the child acted with as much prudence as would be 
 
 ^ Belief ontaine, etc. E. Co. v. Sny- ant's negligence being conceded, a 
 
 der, Sr., 34 Ohio St. 670 ; both cases judgment for the son was proper, 
 
 approved in Pratt Iron Co. v. Braw- ' Philadelphia, etc. E. Co. v. Long, 
 
 ley, mpra. "Western Union Tel. Co. 75 Pa. St. 357 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. 
 
 V. Hoffman (80 Tex. 430 ; 15 S. W. v. Pearson, 73 Id. 169 ; Kay v. Penn- 
 
 1048) was a joint action by a father sylvania R. Co., 65 Id. 377 ; Pennsyl- 
 
 and his minor son for failure to de- vania R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Id. 33 ; 
 
 liver a telegram sent by the mother O'Flaherty v. Union, etc. R. Co., 45 
 
 to a physician to attend the son. Mo. 70 \ Isabel v. Hannibal, etc. R. 
 
 whosearm had that day been broken. Co., 60 1(1.475; Frick v. St. Louis, 
 
 The telegram was not delivered for etc. R. Co., 75 Id. 541; Walters v. 
 
 nine days, and in the meantime the Chicago, etc. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 71 ; 
 
 parents made no further effort to Hoppe v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 61 
 
 procure a physician until it was too Wise. 357. 
 
 late to save the arm. Held, the ' "Weil v. Dry Dock, etc. R. Co., 
 
 father's contributory negligence 119 N. Y. 147 ; 33 N. E. 487 ; Huer- 
 
 barred his recovery, but, defend- zeler v. Central, etc. R. Co. , 139 N. 
 
§73] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 1 06 
 
 required from an adult.^ For then it is not a proximate cause 
 of any injury. 
 
 § 73. Degree of care required from child. — It is now set- 
 tled by an overwhelming weight of authority that a child is 
 held, so far as he is personally concerned, only to the exer- 
 cise of such degree of care and discretion as is reasonably to 
 be expected from children of his age.^ No injustice is done to 
 
 Y. 490; 34 N. E. 1101; Mangam v. 
 Brooklyn R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455 ; Rail- 
 road Co. V. Stout, 17 Wall, 657 ; Karr 
 v. Parks, 40 Cal. 188 ; Mulligan v. 
 Curtis, 100 Mass. 512 ; Creed v. Ken- 
 dall, 156 Id. 291 ; 31 N. E. 6 ; Slattery 
 V. O'Connell, 153 Mass. 94 ; 26 N. E. 
 430 ; Eauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. St. 358 ; 
 Bronson v. Southbury, 37 Conn. 199 ; 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. State, 30 
 Md. 47 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Bumstead, 48 111. 221 ; Elgin, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Raymond, 148 Id. 241 ; 35 N. 
 E. 729 ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. 
 Slater, 129 111. 91 ; 21 N. E. 575; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Shanks, 
 132 Ind. 395 ; 31 N. E. 1111 ; Weiss- 
 ner V. St. Paul City R. Co., 47 Minn. 
 468 ; 50 N. W. 606 ; McGuire v. 
 Alcksburg, etc. R. Co., 46 La. Ann. 
 1543; 16 So. 457. The question of 
 the parent-plaintiff's contributory 
 negligence is for the jury (Bliss v. 
 South Hadley. 145 Mass. 91 ; 13 N. 
 E. 353 ; Reilly v. Hannibal, etc. R. 
 Co., 94 Mo. 600 ; 7 S. W. 407 ; Platte, 
 etc. Milling Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 
 376 ; 30 Pac. 68, and cases, supra. 
 
 3 Wiswell V. Boyle, 160 Mass. 42 ; 35 
 N. E. 107. To similar effect, Union 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Macdonald, 153 U. S. 
 263 ; 14 S. Ct. 619, 
 
 ' Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 
 Wall. 401 ; Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 
 Id. 657 ; Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 
 29. In Railroad Company v. Glad- 
 mon (15 Wall. 401), Hunt. J., said: 
 " Of an infant of tender years less 
 discretion is required [than of an 
 
 adult] ; and the degree depends upon 
 his age and knowledge. Of a child 
 of three years of age less caution 
 ■would be required than one of seven, 
 and of a child of seven less than one 
 of tvpelve or fifteen. The caution 
 required is according to the maturity 
 and capacity of the child ; and this 
 is to be determined in each case by 
 the circumstances of that case." In 
 Ranch v. Lloyd (31 Pa. St. 358), 
 Woodward, J., said : " Children are 
 to be held responsible only for the 
 discretion of childi-en." In Thurber 
 V. Harlem, etc. R. Co. (60 N. Y. 326) , 
 it was held that the degree of care 
 required of a child (in this case a 
 boy of nine) was to be graduated by 
 the age and capacity of the indi- 
 vidual ; and if the jury were of the 
 opinion that the boy had shown the 
 possession and exercised prudence 
 and discretion in as great a degree 
 as could be expected, they were 
 justified in finding a verdict for 
 plaintiff. Acts that in an adult 
 would be contributory negligence, 
 such as would justify a non-suit, in 
 an infant would be properly a ques- 
 tion to be left to the jury (Barry 
 V. N. Y. Central, R. Co., 93 N. Y. 
 389; McGovern v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 67 N. Y. 417 ; Jones v. Utica, 
 etc. R. Co., 36 Hun, 115). A verdict 
 for a boy of seven who was injured 
 in trying to get on a moving train, 
 there being no negligence on the 
 part of train hands, cannot stand 
 (Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Stumps, 69 
 
I07 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [^73 
 
 the defendant by this limitation of the defense of contributory 
 neghgence, since the rule itself is not established primarily for 
 
 111. 409). See McMahon v. Northern 
 R. Co., 39 Md. 438; Cram v. Metro- 
 politan R. Co., 113 Mass. 88; Ecliff 
 V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 64 Mich. 196 ; 
 31 N. W. 180. It has been said that 
 the presumption that a child of four- 
 teen has capacity to avoid danger 
 can only be overthrown by clear 
 proof of the absence of such discretion 
 (Nagle V. Allegheny Valley R. Co., 88 
 Pa. St. 35) . But see Hayes v. Bush 
 Man'g Co., 41 Hun, 407 ; and Cincin- 
 nati R. Co. V. Wright, 54 Ohio St. 
 181 ; 43 N. E. 688. And in Haycraft v. 
 Lake Shore R. Co. (64 N. Y. 636), the 
 question whether a girl, nearly 
 seventeen, whose injury was clearly 
 due to her own carelessness, was 
 guilty of contributory negligence, 
 was left to the jury under an in- 
 struction that she was not to be held 
 to so high a degree of care as an 
 older person would be. It is not, as 
 matter of law, negligence to allow 
 a child of four and one-half years to 
 play on the sidewalk with her 
 brother, six years of age, in a thickly 
 populated portion of a city, on an 
 August afternoon, but the question 
 is for the jury (Birkett v. Knicker- 
 bocker Ice Co., no N. Y. 504 ; 18 N. 
 E. 108; affi'g 41 Hun, 404). The 
 rule stated in the text has been 
 recognized by the courts of the fol- 
 lowing states : Alabama (Govern- 
 ment R. Co. V. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70 ; 
 Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Crenshaw, 65 
 Id. 566); California (Rosenberg v. 
 Durfree, 87 Cal. 545 ; 26 Pac. 793) ; 
 Connecticut (Birge v. Gardiner, 19 
 Conn. 507 ; Bronson v. Southbury, 
 37 id. 199) ; Georgia (Western, etc. 
 R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 897 ; 7 S. E. 
 912 ; S. C, 83 Ga. 512 ; 10 8. E. 197 ; 
 Central, etc. B'k'g Co. v. Rylee. 87 Ga. 
 491 ; 13 S. E. 584) ; Illinois (Kerr v. 
 Forgue, 54 111. 483 ; Chicago, etc. v. 
 
 Gregory, 58 Id. 326 ; Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Murray, 71 Id. 601 ; Rockford, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Delaney, 83 Id. 198 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Becker, 76 Id. 
 25 ; 84 Id. 483 ; Illinois Central R. Co. 
 V. Slater, 139 Id. 91 ; 31 N. E. 575) ; 
 Indiana (St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 "Valirius, 56 Ind. 51 1 ; Atlas Engine 
 Works V. Randall, 100 Id. 393) ; 
 Iowa (McMillan v. Burlington, etc. 
 R. Co., 40 Iowa, 331) ; ^art,sas (Kansas 
 Pacific R Co. V. Whipple, 39 Kans. 
 531 ; 18 Pac. 730) ; Maryland (Balti- 
 more, etc. R. Co. V. State, 30 Md. 47 ; 
 Baltimoi'e, etc. R. Co. v. McDonnell, 
 43 Id. 534) ; Mas.iachusetts (Munn v. 
 Reed, 4 Allen, 431 ; Lynch v. Smith, 
 104 Mass, 53 ; Plumley v. Birge, 134 
 Id. 57; O'Connor V. Boston, etc. R. 
 Co., 185 Id. 353 ; Elkins v. Boston, etc. 
 R. Co., 115 Id. 190) ; Michigan (East 
 Saginaw R. Co. v. Bohn, 37 Mich. 503 ; 
 Wright v. Detroit, etc. R. Co, 77 Id. 
 133 ; 43 N. E. 765) ; Missouri (Boland 
 v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 36 Mo. 484 ; 
 O'Flaherty v. Union R. Co., 45 Mo. 
 70 ; Hicks v. Pacific, etc. R. Co., 04 
 Id. 430 ; Lynch v. Metropolitan, etc. 
 R. Co., 113 Id. 420 ; 30 S. W. 643 ; 
 Ridenhour v. Kansas City R. Co., 
 103 Mo. 370 ; 14 S. W. 760; ; New Jer- 
 sey (Traction Co. v. Scott, 58 N. J. 
 Law, 683; 34 Atl. 1094) ; New Yorl; 
 (Thurber v. Harlem, etc. R. Co., 
 60 N. Y. 336 ; McGovern v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 67 Id. 417; Ibl 
 v. Forty-second St. R. Co., 47 Id. 
 317; Mangam v. Brooklyn R. Co., 
 38 Id. 455 ; Byrne v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 83 Id. 630 ; Dowling v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 90 Id. 670 ; Barry v. 
 N. Y. Central R. Co., 93 Id. 389; 
 Weaver v. Bullis, 14 N. Y. Supp. 
 338 ; affl'd, 128 N. Y. 634 [overruling 
 Honegsberger V. Second Ave. R. Co., 
 3 Abb. Ct. App. 378 ; 1 Keyes, 574] ; 
 McCarragher v. Rogers, 130 N. Y. 
 
§73] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 io8 
 
 his benefit, and he can never be made Hable, if he has not 
 been himself in fault.^ Thus where one is driving a horse 
 with ordinary care, at a rate of speed suited to the locality, he 
 is of course not liable for an injury by the horse to a child 
 who suddenly throws himself in the way, and is run over be- 
 fore the driver can prevent it.' So, if a child, proceeding in 
 reckless haste, however natural to his age, should rush against 
 a railroad car while in motion, the driver of the car or engineer 
 of the train not seeing him, it is obvious that his own act is 
 the sole cause of his injury; and even though he may be 
 entirely free from blame, the most that can be said in his favor 
 is that the case is one of inevitable accident ; and the owner of 
 the car is no more responsible for his injury than would have 
 been the owner of a wall against which the child had thought- 
 lessly struck himself.* It was held in some English cases, that 
 
 526; 34 N. E. 812 [boy of 13]) 
 North Carolina (Mauly v. Wil 
 mington, etc. R. Co., 74 N. C. 655) 
 Ohio (Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Cor- 
 rigan, 46 Ohio St. 383 ; 20 N. E. 466 
 Lake Erie, etc., K. Co. v. Mackey, 53 
 Ohio St. 370; 41 N. E. 980; Pennsyl- 
 vania (Rauch V. Lloyd, 31 Pa. St. 
 358; Smith v. O'Connor, 48 Id. 818 ; 
 North Penn. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 
 Id. 187 ; Gray v. Scott, 66 Id. .845 ; 
 Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Hassard, 
 75 Id. 367 ; see Philadelphia, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Spearen, 47 Id. 300); South 
 Carolina (Bridger v. Asheville, etc. 
 R. Co., 37 S. C. 456; 3 S. E. 860); 
 Tennessee (Queen v. Dayton, etc. 
 Iron Co. 9.) Tenn. 458 ; 33 S. W. 460) ; 
 Texas (Galveston, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Moore, 59 Tex. 64 ; Houston, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Simpson, 60 Id. 103) ; Vermont 
 (Robinson v. Cone, 32 Vt. 715) ; 
 Washington (Rotli v. Union Depot 
 Co., 13 Wash. St. 535 ; 43 Pac. 641) ; 
 Wisconsin (Schmidt v. Milwaukee, 
 etc. R. Co. 23 Wise. 186 ; Meibus v. 
 Dodge, 38 Id. 300 ; Reed v. Madison, 
 83 Id. 171 ; 53 N. W. 547). 
 
 '^ Felton V. Aubrey, 20 C. C. A. 436 ; 
 74 Fed. 350). 
 
 ' This was substantially the case 
 in Hartfield v. Roper (31 Wend. 
 615), and the court, therefore, held 
 the defendant free from negligence. 
 The opinion of the court upon all 
 other points has been generally dis- 
 proved (see Rauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. 
 St. 858 ; Robinson v. Cone, 23 Vt. 
 313), and has been completely over- 
 riiled, so far as it undertakes to 
 require from a little child the same 
 degree of care as from a grown per- 
 son. See Moebus v. Herrmann, 108 
 N. Y. 349 ; 15 N. E. 415 ; and Beach, 
 Contrib. Negl. 2d ed. § 119, ef seq.. 
 
 ■•Burke v. Broadway R. Co., 49 
 Barb. 539. The dicta of the court, 
 in that case, upon the general ques- 
 tion of the care required from a 
 child, have been overruled, and are 
 of no authority ; but upon this par- 
 ticular point, assuming that the facts 
 were as above stated, the decision 
 was correct, s. P. , Felton v. Aubrey, 
 30 C. C. A. 436; 74 Fed. 350 ; Baker v. 
 Flint, etc. R. Co., 68 Mich. 90 ;35 N. 
 W. 836. In Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 McLaughlin (47 111. 365) , it was held 
 not to be tlie duty of a railroad com- 
 pany to guard its cai-s so as to pre- 
 
I09 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§73 
 
 if a child's own act directly brings the injury upon him, while 
 the negligence of the defendant is only such as exposes the 
 child to the possibility of injury, the latter cannot recover 
 damages.^ But these decisions .have been condemned in Eng- 
 land/ and are directly opposed to the current of American 
 cases.'' The law has been settled to the contrary, in America, 
 by the famous series of turn-table cases, in which railroad com- 
 panies were held liable by the Federal Supreme Court, as well 
 as by several state courts of last resort, for injuries suffered by 
 little children, in consequence of their own acts in meddling 
 with railroad turn-tables, which were left open to public access, 
 unfastened and unguarded, although, of course, perfectly 
 harmless, if let alone.^ When such turn-tables are kept in a 
 
 vent children from climbing over 
 them. 
 
 s Hughes V. Macfie, 2 Hurlst. & C. 
 744 ; Mangan v. Atterton, L. R. 1 
 Ex. 2:i9 ; 4 Hurlst. & C. 388. 
 
 6 Clark V Chambers, L. B. 3 Q. B. 
 Div. 337, 339. 
 
 ■" Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn. 507. 
 In that case, the defendant negli- 
 gently hung a gate, and the plain- 
 tiff, who was six or seven years old, 
 shook the gate, which fell upon him. 
 The jury having found, in respect to 
 the age, condition, and circumstances 
 of the plaintiff, that he was guilty of 
 no negligence, it was held that even 
 if the plaintiff was a trespasser, he 
 could recover. In Kunz v. Troy (104 
 N. Y. 344, rev'g 36 Hun, 615), it 
 was held that a boy less than six 
 years old could recover for injuries 
 caused by his pulling down upon 
 himself a bar-eounter, which had 
 been negligently suffered by the city 
 to obstruct a sidewalk. So in Mc- 
 Guiness v. Butler (159 Mass. 233; 
 34 N. E. 359), it was held that 
 a child who, in play with other 
 boys, interfered with marble slabs 
 resting on private property, and par- 
 ticipated in throwing the stones over 
 on himself, could not recover for 
 his injuries, though defendant may 
 
 have been negligent in leaving the 
 slabs where he did, and though the 
 child's conduct was such as might 
 reasonably have been expected of 
 him. 
 
 8 Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 
 657; affi'g 3 Dill. 294. These 
 turn-table cases were unfavorably 
 noticed by Miller, J., in McAlpin v. 
 Powell (70 N. Y. 126), where a boy of 
 ten years was not allowed to recover 
 for injuries received from a defect- 
 ive fire-escape. But they have been 
 followed in California (Meeks v. 
 Southern, etc R. Co., 56 Cal. 513 ; 
 Barrett V. Southern Pacific R. Co., 91 
 Id. 396 ; 37 Pac. 666 ; Callahan v. Eel 
 River, etc. R. Co., 93 Cal, 89 ; 28 Pac. 
 104) ; Georgia (Ferguson v. Colum- 
 bus, etc. R Co,, 77 Ga. 103) : Kansas 
 (Union Pacific R. Co. v. Dunden, 37 
 Kans. 1 ; 14 Pac. 501 ; Kansas, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Fitzsimmons, 23 Kans. 686) ; 
 Kentucky (Bransom v. Labrot, 81 
 Ky. 638 [lumber piled loosely in de- 
 fendant's yard ] ) ; Louisiana ("West- 
 erfield v. Levis, 43 La. Ann. 63 ; 9 So. 
 53 [boy got on a street-roller left un- 
 cared for in street] : but compare 
 O'Connor v. Illinois Central R. Co , 
 44 La. Ann. 339; 10 So. 678 [cars 
 stored in an enclosed lot] ) : Massa- 
 chusetts (Gay V. Essex, etc. R. Co., 
 
§73a] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 I lO 
 
 place not readily accessible and where children could not be 
 reasonably expected to enter,' or if they were properly fas- 
 tened or guarded/" the companies are not thus liable. In that 
 case there would be no negligence on the part of the com- 
 panies. 
 
 § 73a. Age of discretion. — Everywhere, it would seem, a 
 person of over fourteen years of age is presumed to be capa- 
 ble of using some reasonable degree of care for his own pro- 
 tection;^ and in New York, this line has been once drawn at 
 twelve years.^ This, however, is a mere presumption, at all 
 events, up to eighteen years, if not to twenty-one ; and the 
 
 159 Mass. 238 ; 34 N. E. 186 [cars left 
 standing in street with unfastened 
 brakes, likely to attract children] ; 
 but compare Daniels v. N. Y. & New 
 England R. Co., 154 Mass. 849 ; 28 N. 
 E. 283) ; Michigan (Powers v. Har- 
 low, 53 Mich. 507, a dynamite case) ; 
 Minnesota (O'Malley v. St. Paul, etc. 
 E. Co., 48 Minn. 289 ; 45 N. W. 440 ; 
 Keff e V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 21 
 Minn. 207) ; Missouri (Koons v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co. 65 Mo. 592 ; Nagel 
 V. Missouri, etc. E. Co , 75 Id. 653) ; 
 Nebraska (Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Bailey, 11 Neb 332) ; Pennsylvania 
 (Hydraulic Works v. Orr, 83 Pa. St. 
 332 ; Cauley v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 Co., 95 Id. 398 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Schwindling, 101 Id. 258) ; South 
 Carolina (Bridger v. Asheville, etc. 
 R. Co., 25 S. C. 24) ; Tennessee 
 (Whirley v. Whitman, 1 Head. 610 ; 
 Bates V. Nashville, etc. R. Co. 90 
 Tenn. 36; 15 S. W. 1069); Texas 
 (Houston, etc. R. Co v. Simpson, 60 
 Tex. 103 ; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Styron, 
 66 Tex. 421 ; 1 S. W. 161 ; Gulf, etc. 
 R. Co. V. McWhirter, 77 Tex. 356 ; 14 
 S. W. 26 ; Ft. Worth, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Measles, 81 Tex. 474 ; 17 S. W. 124) ; 
 Washington (Ilwaco, etc. Nav. Co. v. 
 Hedrick, 1 Wash. St. 446; 25 Pac. 
 835). 
 
 ' St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Bell, 81 
 111, 76 ; Schmidt v. Kansas Distilling 
 Co., 90 Mo. 284; IS. W. 865. 
 
 " Bates V. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 
 90 Tenn. 86 ; 15 S. W. 1069 ; Haesley 
 V. Winona, etc. R. Co., 46 Minn. 283 ; 
 48 N. W. 1023 ; Kolsti v. Minneapolis, 
 etc. R. Co., 32 Minn. 133. For pecu- 
 liar cases, in which defendant was 
 held liable to children, see Penso v. 
 McCormick, 125 Ind. 116 ; 25 N. E. 156 
 [hot ashes on lot] ; Gunderson v. 
 Northwestern Elevator Co. , 47 Minn. 
 161 ; 49 N. W. 694 [machinery 
 started] ; and for cases in which chil- 
 dren could not recover, see Rodgers 
 V. Lees, 140 Pa. St. 475 ; 21 Atl. 399 
 [machinery in motion from unknown 
 cause] ; Missouri, etc. R. Co. v. Ed- 
 wards, 90 Tex. 60 ; 86 S. W. 430 
 [child of eight, disobeying orders to 
 quit] : Robinson v. Oregon, etc. R. 
 Co., 7 Utah, 498 ; 27 Pac. 689 [un- 
 guarded handcar]. 
 
 ' See Pratt Iron Co. v. Brawley, 83 
 Ala. 371 ; 3 So. 555. 
 
 2 Tucker v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 124 N. Y. 308 ; 26 N. E. 916. 
 This case, so far as it held a boy of 
 twelve bound to as much care as an 
 adult, is clearly overruled by the 
 superior authority of Swift v. Staten 
 I. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 645 ; 25 N. E. 878 
 
Ill 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§73a 
 
 question is for the jury.' The division line, between responsi- 
 ble and irresponsible age, is not for the jury, but must be 
 decided by the court.^ In analogy to the rule which holds a 
 child, under seven years of age, incapable of crime, some 
 courts have also considered them incapable of negligence;^ 
 but it is generally held that this is not to be conclusively pre- 
 sumed.^ Juries may be depended upon not to overrule this 
 presumption, except in perfectly clear cases. Some degree of 
 
 ' At eighteen years a full degree of 
 care is required (Shelley v. Austin, 
 74 Tex. 608 ; 12 8. W. 753) ; but not 
 at sixteen (Kucera v. Merrill Lumber 
 Co., 91 Wise. 637 ; 65 N. W. 374) ; or 
 at fifteen (Swift v. Staten Island R. 
 Co., 123 N. Y. 645; 35 N. E. 878; 
 Kentucky Cent. B. Co. v. Gastineau, 
 83 Ky. 119). 
 
 '■ in the case of a boy between 
 fourteen and fifteen years of age, 
 Paxson, J., in Nagle v. Alle- 
 gheny, etc. E. Co. (88 Pa. St. 
 35), said : "At what age must 
 an inf.ant's responsibility for negli- 
 gence be presumed to commence? 
 This question cannot be answered 
 by referring it to a jury. That 
 would furnish us with no rule 
 whatever. It would give us a mere 
 shifting standard affected by the 
 sympathies or prejudices of the jury 
 in each particular case. One jury 
 would fix the period of responsibility 
 at fourteen, another at twenty or 
 twenty-one. This is not a question 
 of fact for the jury, but of law for 
 the court." S. P., Deitrich v. Balti- 
 more, etc. R. Co., 58 Md. 347. But 
 compare many cases elsewhere cited, 
 apparently to the contraiy. 
 
 ^ It has been said that a child of 
 four years (Hamilton v. Morgan's 
 Co., 43 La. Ann. 834 ; 8 So. 586 ; 
 Barnes v. Shreveport R. Co., 47 La. 
 Ann. 1318 ; 17 So. 783 ; Erie, etc. R.. 
 Co. V. Schuster, 113 Pa. St. 413; 
 Fink V. Missouri Furnace Co., 10 Mo. 
 App. 61), or less than sLx (Schnur v. 
 
 Citizens' Tr. Co , 153 Pa. St 39; 25 
 Atl. 650; Dicken v. Liverpool Salt 
 Co., 41 W. Va. 511; 23 S. E. 583 [child 
 under three] ; Bay Shore, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Harris, 67 Ala. 6) , is incapable of 
 negligence. In Alabama, the rule is 
 said to be, that negligence cannot be 
 imputed to a child under seven ; 
 while a child between seven and 
 fourteen is presumed to be incapable 
 of it (Pratt Iron Co. v. Brawley, 83 
 Ala. 371; 3 So. 555). 
 
 " Chicago R. Co. v. Wilcox, 138 111. 
 370 ; 34 N. E. 419 [question always 
 for jury ; error in charging thac 
 child of six was not responsible] ; 
 Pekin v. McMahon, 154 111. 141 ; 39 
 N. E. 484 [child over seven may be 
 responsible] ; Hayes v. Norcross, 162 
 Mass. 546; 39 N. E. 382 [boy of five 
 and one-half]; Erwin v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co., 90 Mo. 390 ; 9 S. W. 577 
 [boy of eleven]. From the nature of 
 the case, it is impossible to prescribe 
 a fixed period when a child becomes 
 sni juris, some reaching the point 
 earlier than others, according to 
 natural capacity, • physical condi- 
 tions, training, habits of life and 
 surroundings. Unless the court can 
 safely decide the fact in the case of 
 a child of very tender years (e. g. 
 seven) it is a question for the jury 
 (Stone V. Dry Dock, etc. R. Co., 115 
 N. Y. 104 : 31 N. E. 712 ; rev'g 46 Hun, 
 184). A child under two years is 
 clearly not responsible (Bottoms v. 
 Seaboard R. Co., 114 N. C. 699 ; 19 S. 
 E. 730). 
 
§73a] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 1X2 
 
 care may justly be required, even from children of six or seven 
 years. But such a child is everywhere presumed to be in- 
 capable of contributory negligence." In nearly all the cases, 
 the question of the power and duty of any child, between 
 three and twelve years of age, to exercise care for its own pro- 
 tection, is held to be for the jury.^ But in Massachusetts, the 
 question has been taken away from the jury, in the case of a 
 child of eight years' and even five years and a half.^" And in 
 
 ' Stone V. Dry Dock, etc. R. Co., 
 supra; Johnson v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 56 Wise. 274; Westbrook v. Mo- 
 bile, etc. R. Co., 66 Miss. 560 ; 6 So. 
 U21 [at five years, presumed not 
 responsible]. 
 
 * Spillane v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 Ill Mo. 555 ; 20 S. W. 293 ; Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Sears, 11 Ind. App. 654 ; 
 38 N. E. 837 [eight years] ; Avey v. 
 Galveston, etc. R. Co., 81 Tex. 243 
 [ten yea.rs] ; Bridger v. Asheville, etc. 
 R. Co., 25 S. C. 24 ; 3 S. E. 860 [eleven 
 years] ; Fehnrich v. Michigan Cent. 
 R. Co., 87 Mich. 606 ; 49 N. W. 890 
 [boy of fourteen, question of con- 
 tributory negligence for the jury] ; 
 McCann v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 117 N. 
 Y. 505 ; 28 N. E. 164 [boy of thirteen]. 
 The court properly left it to the jury 
 to say whether a bright, intelligent 
 child, aged seven yeai-s and ac- 
 customed to being out in the street, 
 was or was not sui Juris (Kitchell v. 
 Brooklyn R. Co., 6 N. Y. App. Div. 
 99 ; 39 N. Y. Supp. 741) ; s. P., Penny 
 v. Rochester R. Co., 7 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 595 ; 40 N. Y. Supp. 172 ; Ben- 
 nett V. Brooklyn R. Co., 1 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 305 ; 87 N. Y. Supp. 447 [eight 
 years] ; Guichard v. New, 9 N. Y. 
 App. Div. 485 ; 41 N. Y. Supp. 456 
 [bo}- of eight years, warned of dan- 
 ger]; Payne v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 129 Mo. 405 ; 31 S. W. 885 [colored boy 
 of eleven years, crossing track] : 
 Savannah, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 93 
 Ga. 742 ; 21 S. E. 157 [boy of nine 
 years]. " Whether the injury might 
 
 have been avoided by the exercise of 
 that care and discretion which was 
 reasonably to be looked for in a boy 
 of his years " (Pensylvania R. Co. v. 
 Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372) is for the jury 
 to determine (Johnson v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 49 Wise. 529 ; 56 Id. 274 ; 
 Ewen v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 38 Id. 
 614 ; Townley v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 53 Id. 626 ; Vickers v. Atlanta, 
 etc. R. Co., 64 Ga. 306 ; Wynn v. 
 City, etc. R. Co., 91 Id. 344 ; 17 S. E. 
 649 ; Nagle v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 
 75 Mo. 653 ; Paducah, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hoehl, 12 Bush, 41; Reynolds v. N. 
 T. Central, R. Co., 58 N. Y. 248 ; 
 Ihl V. Forty-second St. R. Co., 
 ■47 Id. 817; Connolly v. Knicker- 
 bocker Ice Co., 114 Id. 104 ; 31 N. E. 
 101 ; Mulligan v, Curtis, 100 Mass. 512 ; 
 Bliss V. South Hadley, 145 Id. 91 ; 13 
 N. E. 352 ; Dealey v. MuUer, 149 Mass. 
 432 ; 21 N. E. 763, and cases supra. 
 See § 114, post). The jury found 
 specially that plaintiff, seven years 
 old, was ordinarily bright, knew the 
 danger of crossing before an ap- 
 proaching train, did not see it, but 
 would have seen it if he had looked 
 in the proper direction. General 
 verdict for plaintiff sustained 
 (Baker v. Flint, etc. R. Co., 68 Mich. 
 90 ; 35 N. W. 836). 
 
 ' Messenger v. Dennie, 137 Mass. 
 197 [boy dropping from rear of 
 sleigh]. 
 
 '» A boy five and one-half years of 
 age, with his mother's permission, 
 started to go across a street, darted 
 
"3 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§73a 
 
 New York, a child, over seven, has been held responsible as 
 matter of law for willful disobedience of proper orders." The 
 true rule would seem to be that the court should take the 
 question away from the jury, where the clear weight of evi- 
 dence shows that the child had a capacity for self-protection, 
 which it culpably omitted to use, in face of a danger which it 
 knew and sufficiently appreciated;'^ but not otherwise.*' 
 Subject to these qualifications, a child is responsible for that 
 degree of care, and that only, which could reasonably be ex- 
 pected from him, considering his age, capacity and experi- 
 ence." Where the fiction of imputed parental negligence still 
 
 quickly from the curb, and was 
 struck by defendant's horse ; when 
 he started he could have been but a 
 few feet from him. The accident 
 occurred in broad daylight. Held, 
 that plaintiff failed to exercise the 
 care which ordinarily careful boys 
 of his age would exercise, and could 
 not recover (Hayes v. Norcross, 162 
 Mass. 546 ; 39 N. E. 382 . 
 
 ■' A boy of seven, who willfully 
 runs in front of a train, in spite of 
 warnings and efforts to restrain him, 
 cannot recover damages iWendell v. 
 N. y. Central R. Co., 91 N. Y. 420). 
 That case, however, was tried upon 
 the assumption that the boy was old 
 enough to justify his parents in al- 
 lowing him to go out freely. In 
 Twist V. Winona, etc. K. Co. (39 
 Minn. 164 ; 39 N. W. 403), a boy over 
 ten who, in disobedience of parental 
 warning, interfered with a turn- 
 table, was held responsible. 
 
 " Wendell v. N. Y. Central, etc. E. 
 Co., 91 N. Y. 420 ; Reynolds v. N. Y. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 58 Id. 248; 
 Hooper v. Johnstown, etc. R. Co., 
 59 Hun, 131; 13 N. Y. Supp. 151 
 [girl of eleven on familiar path] ; 
 Sheets v. Connolly St. R. Co. , 54 N. J. 
 Law, 518; 24 Atl. 483 [intelligent 
 girl of ten]. A boy of thirteen, 
 knowing the danger which he as- 
 sumed, is responsible (Merryman v. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 8] 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 85 Iowa, 634 ; 
 53 N. W. 545) ; Wallace v. New 
 Haven, etc. R. Co., 165 Mass. 336 ; 43 
 N. E. 1135 [girl of thirteen going be- 
 tween sections of train]. 
 
 '^ Brown v. Sherer, 155 Mass. 83 ; 
 39 N. E. 50 [girl of six skipping in 
 front of horse] ; O'Shaughnessy v. 
 Suffolk Brewing Co., 145 Mass. 569 ; 
 14 N. E. 779 [girl of eight struck by 
 wagon, while sitting on curb, with 
 feet in gutter] ; Hepfel v. St. Paul, 
 etc. R. Co., 49 Minn. 263 ; 51 N. W. 
 1049 [boy of twelve stealing ride] ; 
 Guichard v. New, 84 Hun, 54 ; 31 N. 
 Y. S. 1080 [boy of eight, peering into 
 elevator] ; McGuire v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 37 Fed. 54 [boy of ten struck 
 by train] ; see Lynch v. Metropolitan 
 R. Co., 113 Mo. 430; 30 S. W. 643 
 [boy of ten run over by car]. It is 
 not enough that a boy should know 
 that his act was wrong, if he does 
 not know that it is dangerous 
 (Bridger v. Asheville, etc. R. Co., 25 
 S. C. 24). s. P., McCahill v. Detroit 
 R. Co., 96 Mich. 156 ; 55 N. W. 668 
 [disobedience of father ; but no proof 
 of comprehension of danger]. 
 
 '■' The law demands the exercise of 
 care and prudence equal to plaintiff's 
 actual capacity, age, knowledge and 
 experience : no less (Van Natta v. 
 People's R. Co., 133 Mo. 13 ; 34 S. W. 
 505; Queen V. Dayton Coal Co., 95 
 
§76a] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 114 
 
 lingers (as in Massachusetts) a child, allowed by its parents to 
 go alone, in public places, is charged with such capacity as 
 such a child ought to have, before being allowed to do so." 
 In other courts, no such rule prevails. ^^ In actions brought by 
 parents, etc., for their damage through injuries to their chil- 
 dren, the question whether they were negligent in permitting 
 children to encounter danger by going out alone, involves 
 much the same consideration of age, intelligence and capacity; 
 and the requirement of parental watchfulness and restraint 
 varies, in inverse proportion, according to the age of the 
 child. Reference must be made to the reported cases." 
 
 Tenn. 4.')8 ; 32 S. W. 460 ; Louisville, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Webb, Ky. ; 35 
 S. W. 1117); and no more (Cons- 
 Traction Co. V. Scott, 58 N. J. Law, 
 682; 34 Atl. 1094; Strudgeon v. 
 Sand Beach, Mich. ; 65 N. W. 
 616 [bo}' of ten] ; Norton v. Volzke, 
 158 111. 403 ; 41 N. E. 1085). So held, 
 as to boys of seven years (Spring- 
 field R. Co. V. Welsh, 155 111. 511 ; 
 40 N. E. 1034 ; Kentucky Hotel Co. 
 V. Camp [Ey.] 30 S. W. 1010 ; Pierce 
 V. Connors, 20 Colo. 178 ; 37 Pac. 
 721 ; Stone v. Dry Bock, etc. R. Co., 
 115 N. Y. 104; 21 N. E. 712); and 
 even sixteen (Kucera v. MerriU Lum- 
 ber Co., 91 Wise. 637 ; 65 N. W. 374.) 
 
 '* Hayes v. Norcross, 162 Mass. 
 546 ; 39 N. E. 282. The truth is that 
 the defendant in that case vras not 
 in fault ; and that veas the proper 
 ground of decision. 
 
 '* Cincinnati R. Co. v. Wright, 54 
 Ohio St. 181 ; 43 N. E. 688 [boy of four- 
 teen]; compare Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 v. Eininger, 114 111. 79; 29 N. E. 
 196, in vFhich boy's age did not 
 appear. 
 
 " It has been held not negligence, 
 as matter of law, for the parents of 
 a child six or seven years old, to 
 allovs? him to go into the streets un- 
 attended. The question of negli- 
 gence in such case must be left to the 
 jury (Oldfield v. Haj-lemE. Co., 14 N. 
 
 Y. 310). The same ruling veas made 
 in the case of children of seven (Riley 
 V. Salt Lake Tr. Co., 10 Utah 428 ; 37 
 Pac. 681), eight (Drew v. Sixth Ave. 
 R. Co., 26 N. Y, 49) ; nine (Sheridan v. 
 Brooklyn, etc. R. Co. 36 Id. 39) , and 
 ten years of age (Karr v. Parks', 40 
 Cal. 188). Nor, in the case of a child 
 eleven years old, is it necessarily 
 negligent to allow him to go out 
 alone, even after dark (Lovett v. 
 Salem, etc. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557). 
 But it has been held negligence, as 
 matter of law, to allow a child of 
 about two years (Hartfleld v. Roper, 
 21 Wend. 615), two years and four 
 months (Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 
 401), seventeen months (Kreig v. 
 Wells, 1 E. D. Smith, 74), four years 
 (Glassey v. Hestonville, etc. R. Co., 
 57 Pa. St. 172 ; see Lehman v. Brook- 
 lyn. 29 Barb 234\ five (Clinton v. Bos- 
 ton Beer Co., 1U4 Mass. 514 ; 41 N. E. 
 1070), or even six years of age (Chi- 
 cago V. Starr, 42 111. 174), to go thus 
 unattended, in the absence of some 
 explanation. See, however, to the 
 contrary, as to a child about two 
 years old, Boland v. Missouri R. Co., 
 36 Mo. 484 ; as to one less than four 
 years old, Robinson v. Cone, 22 
 Vt; 213, and as to a child of four, 
 Chicago V. Major. 18 111. 349 ; McVee 
 V. Watertown, 93 Hun, 306. And, 
 in Karr v. Parks (40 Cal. 188), it was 
 
"5 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§74 
 
 § 74. Imputation of parent's negligence : New York 
 rule. — The Supreme Court of New York, in the leading case 
 of Hartfield v. Roper,* invented a rule that where a child, so 
 young as not to be held responsible for the exercise of such 
 care as is required from persons of full age, fails to exercise 
 that care, the negligence of his parents or other lawful custo- 
 dians is to be imputed to the child, in the same manner as if 
 they were acting under his direction, instead of his acting under 
 theirs. Some of the decisions put this doctrine on the ground 
 that the parent must in law be deemed the agent of the child ;^ 
 while in other decisions the courts refused to consider the ques- 
 tion as one of agency, and put their rule upon the ground that 
 the child is identified with its guardian:' a legal fiction which 
 
 held not necessarily negligent to let; 
 a child of five years go alone upon 
 an unfrequented street. See, also, 
 Schierhold v. North Beach, etc. R. 
 Co. (40 Cal. 447). Very slight explana- 
 tions were held sufficient to send the 
 case to a jury where a boy foar 
 and two-thirds years old, was al- 
 lowed to go alone in the vic- 
 inity of railroad tracks (Led- 
 erman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 165 Pa. St. 118 ; 30 Atl. 735) ; or 
 where a child escapes fiom control 
 (Weil V. Dry Dock R. Co., 119 N. Y. 
 147 ; 33 N. E. 487 [two years old] ; 
 Marsland v. Murray, 148 Mass. 91 ; 
 18 N. E. 680 [less than five] ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Logue, 158 111. 631 ; 
 43 N. E. 53 [twenty-one months]. 
 See Chrystal v. Troy, etc. R. Co., 
 105 N. Y. 164 ; 11 N. E. 880 [seven- 
 teen months] ; Bamberger v. Citi- 
 zens' R. Co., 95 Tenn. 18 ; 31 S. W. 
 163.) Where a child of three years 
 was sent out under the charge of his 
 sister, aged nine and a half, held, 
 that the question must be left to 
 jury (Ihl V. Forty-second St. R. Co., 
 47 N. Y. 817). S. P., Evers v. Phila- 
 delphia Traction Co., 176 Pa. St. 376 ; 
 35 Atl. 140 [child four and one- 
 half years in charge of another, 
 eight years] ; Harkins v. Pittsburgh, 
 
 etc. Tr. Co., ITS Pa. St. 146 ; 33 Atl. 
 1044 [custodian a boy of four- 
 teen]. So as to children, both un- 
 der six years (Strutzel v. St. Paul 
 Ry. Co., 47 Minn. 543 ; 50 N. W. 
 690) . Permission by the parent of 
 a child three years old to play in the 
 street, accompanied by another child 
 seven years older, is not such neg- 
 ligence as to prevent a recovery 
 (Stafford v. Reubens, 115 111. 19(5). 
 When a child eighteen months old, 
 strays on the track and is injured, 
 while prima facie, negligence is im- 
 putable to the parent, still the ques- 
 tion is for the jury (Gibbons v. Wil- 
 liams, 135 Mass. 333; McGeary v. 
 Eastern R. Co., Id. 363; compare 
 O'Connor V. Boston, etc. R. Co., Id. 
 353.) 
 
 1 31 Wend. 615 ; s. C, 34 Am. Rep 
 373. 
 
 ' See the cases collected and re- 
 viewed on all points covered by this 
 section, in Beach, Contr. Negl. 3(1 
 ed., §§119-130. 
 
 3 This seems to have been partly 
 the ground of the decision in Waite 
 V. Northeastern R. Co.. El., Bl. & E, 
 719 ; afiQ'd, Id. 738. In that case 
 the negligence charged was only a 
 failure to warn P. ; and the child 
 could not have understood any warn- 
 
§74j 
 
 COXTRIBUTORV NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 ii6 
 
 led to the famous and now exploded decision of Thorogood 
 V. Bryan/ which we have already noticed. For one or the 
 other reason, or no reason, this rule of imputed negligence 
 seems to be at present established in New York,^ Maine,'' 
 Massachusetts,'' Delaware,^ Maryland,' Indiana,'" Minnesota," 
 Kansas,'^ and California;'^ although there is an increasing 
 disposition in all these states to moderate the stringency 
 of the rule. It is probably adopted in England ;" although 
 the recent overruling of Thorogood v. Bryan '^ and Mangan 
 
 ing. The decision was put upon the 
 ground that defendant's implied con- 
 tract was only to carry the child, 
 subject to proper care on the part of 
 the custodian. 
 
 ■> 8 C. B. 115 ; see § 66, ante. 
 
 ^ The rule is assumed to be law, in 
 Thurber v. Harlem, etc. R. Co., 60 
 N . Y. 333 ; McGarry v. Loomis, 63 Id. 
 104 ; Ihl V. Forty-second St. R. Co., 
 47 Id. 333 ; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 
 Id. 255 ; Mangam v. Brooklyn R. Co., 
 88 Id. 455 ; affi'g 36 Barb. 330 ; Hon- 
 egsberger v. Second Ave. R. Co., 3 
 Abb. Ct. App. 378. The rule is of 
 course followed blindly, in all the 
 lower courts ; Williams v. Gardiner, 
 .58 Hun. 508 ; 13 N. Y. Supp. 613 ; 
 Ames V. Broadway, etc. H. Co., 56 
 N. Y. Superior, 3 ; 4 N. Y. Supp. 803. 
 
 " Leslie v. Lewiston, 63 Me. 468 ; 
 Erown v. European, etc. R. Co., 58 
 Id. 384 ; compare O'Brien v. Mo- 
 GUnchy, 68 Id. 552. 
 
 •■ Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass. 53 ; 
 Gibbons v. Williams, 135 Id. 333; 
 Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Id. 513 ; 
 Casey v. Smith, 153 Id. 394 ; 35 N. 
 E. 734; Wright v. Maiden, etc. R. 
 Co., 4 Allen, 383; Callahan v. Bean, 
 9 Id. 401 ; Holly v. Boston Gas Co., 8 
 Gray, 123. In Coombs v. New Bed- 
 ford Card Co. n03 Mass. 572), how- 
 ever, it was held that a boy of four- 
 teen, who is negligently and 
 improperly sent by his parents to 
 work at dangerous machinery, is 
 
 injured, through the negligence of 
 the proprietor, has a remedy against 
 the proprietor, notwithstanding the 
 parent's negligence. 
 
 ' Kyne v. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 8 Del. 185 ; 14 Atl. 932. 
 
 ' McMahon v. Northern, etc. R. 
 Co., 39 Md. 439 ; Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co. V. McDonneU, 43 Id. 534; but 
 limited in the latter case. 
 
 '» Jeflersonville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Bowen, 40 Ind. 545 ; Hathaway v. 
 Toledo, etc. R. Co., 46 Id. 25 ;Evans- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. v. Wolf, 59 Id. 89 ; 
 Pittsburgh v. Vining, 37 Id. 513 ; 
 Lafayette, etc. R. Co. t. Huffman, 28 
 Id. 287. 
 
 " Fitzgerald v. St. Paul, etc. R. 
 Co., 39 Minn. 336 ; St. Paul v. Kuby, 
 8 Id. 166. 
 
 " Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 
 38 Kans. 541 ; Smith v. Atchison, etc. 
 R. Co., 35 Id. 738. 
 
 " Meeks v. Southern Pacific R. 
 Co., 53 Cal. 603 ; 56 Id. 513 ; Schier- 
 hold v. North, etc. R. Co. , 40 Id. 447 ; 
 McQuilken v. Central, etc. R. Co., 64 
 Id. 463 ; 3 Pac. 46 ; assumed in Daly 
 V. Hinz, 113 CaL 866; 45 Pac. 693; 
 Higgins V. Deeney, 78 Cal. 578 ; 31 
 Pac. 438. 
 
 " Singleton v. Eastern Cos. R. Co., 
 7 C. B. [N. S.] 387 ; Mangan v. Atter- 
 ton. L. R. 1 Ex. 339. This is said to 
 be the law of Scotland (Campbell on 
 Negl., § 81). 
 
 '^ See s; 66, ante. 
 
117 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§75 
 
 V. Atterton/^ logically requires a re-consideration of this 
 point. 
 
 § 75. New York rule criticised. — The rule of imputed 
 negligence, founded upon a dictum in Hartfield v. Roper/ 
 has undoubtedly been afifirmed in many cases in New York 
 courts of original jurisdiction; and it has been often men- 
 tioned by the Court of Appeals as if it were settled law.^ But 
 it is a remarkable fact that the question has never been 
 squarely presented to any court of last resort in New York, 
 for decision ; and apparently the question has never been 
 argued there. In only one case was a decision made upon 
 even a part of that issue; and in that^ the injured child was 
 twelve years old, and was old enough to know better than to 
 jump off a moving train in motion, but was fairly dragged off 
 by her father. The court assumed, without the slightest dis- 
 cussion, that the parent's negligence was chargeable to the 
 child. But there, the father, by almost forcibly carrying off 
 his daughter, was the direct cause of her injury; and if she 
 consented to his act, as she undoubtedly did, she was old 
 enough to be responsible. The result of our examination of 
 the cases is to satisfy us that the last of the long series of so- 
 called decisions on this point is like the first, a mere dictum, 
 uttered without hearing argument and without consideration. 
 The main question is entirely open to review in the Court of 
 Appeals.* And, as that court did not hesitate to overrule a 
 decision of the Supreme Court, ^ on a point of commercial and 
 statutory law, which had been acted upon for thirty years 
 without question, we can see no good reason why it should 
 not break through the precedents on this important question, 
 and allow it to be argued as new, in accordance with the wise 
 
 '« In Clark v. Chambers, L. R. 3 was, therefore, a perfectly proper 
 
 Q. B. Div. 337. defense. As to the authority of this 
 
 1 31 Wend. 615. case, see Weaver v. BuUis, 14 N. Y. 
 
 2 See last section. Supp. 338 ; affl'd, without opinion, 
 
 3 Morrison v. Erie R. Co., 56 N. Y. 138 N. Y. 634. 
 
 303. » Wilhams v. Tilt, 36 N. Y. 319 ; 
 
 ^ Honegsberger v. Second Ave. R. overruling Ramsdell v. Morgan, 16 
 
 Co. (3 Abb. Ct. App. 378 ; 1 Keyes, Wend. 574, and Keutgen v. Parks, 3 
 
 574) , was an action by the father in Sandf . 60. 
 his own right ; and his negligence 
 
§78] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. IlS 
 
 policy of the English Court of Appeal, in overruling Thoro- 
 good V. Bryan, after it had stood for thirty-eight years. 
 
 § 76. Imputed negligence ; Illinois rule. — [^Omitted: see 
 
 §78]. 
 
 § 77. Identification of child and custodian. — In former 
 editions, we discussed at length the application of the doctrine 
 of "identification" to the case of a child; a doctrine which 
 was thus applied in England,' in Massachusetts ^ and Mis- 
 souri,^ but wholly rejected in Ohio,^ Pennsylvania,^ and Texas.* 
 But as this idea is now exploded, and would, upon principle, 
 require that a wife, when submitting to the guidance and con- 
 duct of her husband, should be chargeable with his negligence, 
 which is certainly not the law in America, we do not see how 
 this rule is to escape the fate of Thorogood v. Bryan. 
 
 § 78. True rule : no imputation of parental negligence. — 
 
 Without further discussion of the supposed " New York " rule, 
 we content ourselves with saying that the Vermont rule, as it 
 may be called, from having been first clearly adjudged in Ver- 
 mont, commends itself to our judgment, and is abundantly 
 justified by the reasoning of the courts which have adopted it. 
 This rule, which has now been adopted in at least twenty 
 states,' is, that the contributory negligence of a parent, guar- 
 
 ' Waite V. Northeastern E. Co., El. which were as prudent as could be 
 
 B. & El. 719. expected at his age. s. P., CoUins v. 
 
 « Holly V. Boston Gas Co., 8 Gray, South Boston E. Co., 142 Mass. 801. 
 
 133. It is now held, in Massachu- * Belief ontaine E. Co. v. Snyder, 
 
 setts, that the question whether a 18 Ohio St. 399. See all the cases 
 
 parent exercised reasonable care collected in Thompson, 1189-1191. 
 
 over a child, run over in the street, * North Penn. E. v. Mahoney, 57 
 
 is for the jury (Powers v. Quincy, Pa. St. 187. 
 
 etc E. Co.. 163 Mass. 5 ; 39 N. E. 345). "Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hoff- 
 
 See Clinton v. Boston Beer Co., 164 man, 80 Tex. 420 ; 15 S. W. 1048. 
 
 Mass. 514; 41 N. E. 1070. ' Eobinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213. 
 
 2 Stillson V. Hannibal, etc. E. Co., A boy three years and nine months 
 
 67 Mo. 671. In East Saginaw E. Co. old, while coasting in the highway, 
 
 T. Bohn (37 Mich. 503), it was held lying upon his breast upon a sled, 
 
 that a little child, sent out in charge was run over by a sleigh . It was 
 
 of an older one, is not deprived of held that he was not precluded from 
 
 remedy by acts of the older child, redress: the court (Eedfield, J.) 
 
119 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§78 
 
 dian, or other person having control of a child is not to be 
 imputed to the child itself and is no defense to the child's 
 action ; inasmuch as such guardian is not the agent of the 
 child, and the doctrine of identification is a pure fiction. 
 Such an overwhelming weight of authority, as well as of argu- 
 ment, entitles us to treat the so-called "New York rule" 
 as obsolete. 
 
 saying: "We are satisfied that 
 although a child or idiot or lunatic 
 may to some extent have escaped 
 into the highway through the fault 
 or negligence of his keeper, and so 
 be improperly there, yet if he is hurt 
 by the negligence of the defendant, 
 he is not precluded from his redress. 
 If one knew that such a person is in 
 the highway, or on a railway, he is 
 bound to a proportionate degree of 
 watchfulness, and what would be 
 ordinary neglect in regard to one 
 whom the defendant supposed a per- 
 son of full age and capacity, would 
 be gross neglect as to a child or one 
 known to be incapable of escaping 
 danger." This rule is law in Ala- 
 bcnna (Government St. R. Co. v. 
 Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70 : s. P., Pratt Iron 
 Co. V. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371 ; 3 So. 
 5o">) ; Connecticut (Daley v Norwich, 
 etc. R. Co., 26 Conn. 591; Bronson 
 V. Southbury, 37 Id. 199 ; Birge v. 
 Gardiner, 19 Id. 507); Georgia (Fer- 
 guson V. Columbus, etc. R. Co., 77 
 Ga. 102) ; Illinois (Chicago R. Co. v. 
 Wilcox, 138 111.370; 27 N. E. 899, 
 reviewing all the Illinois cases ; s. 
 c, 24 N. E. 319, is probably a minor- 
 ity opinion, concurring on this point. 
 The doctrine was reaffirmed in 
 Daube v. Tennison, 154 111. 210 ; 89 
 N. E. 989 ; Iowa (Wymore v. Ma- 
 haska County, 78 Iowa, 396; 43 N. 
 W. 264 ; Walters v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 41 Iowa, 71); Louisiana (West- 
 «rtield v. Levis, 43 La. Ann. 63 ; 9 
 So. 53); Michigan (Shippy v. Au 
 Sable, 65 Mich 494 ■. 48 N. W. 584, 
 
 per Champlin, C. J.; Schindler v. 
 Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 87 Mich. 400 ; 
 49 N. W. 670); Mississippi (West- 
 brook v. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 66 Miss. 
 560; 6 So. 321); Missouri (Frick v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 75 Mo. 542, 
 595 ; Boland v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 
 36 Id . 484 ; see Stillson v. Hannibal 
 etc. R. Co., 67 Id. 671 ; Winters v. 
 Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 99 Id. 509 ; 
 12 S. W. 652); NebrasJca (HufE v 
 Ames, 16 Neb. 139; 19 N. W. 623); 
 New Hampshire (Bisaillon v. Blood, 
 64 N. H. 565 ; 15 Atl. 147 [a very 
 pungent criticism of the supposed 
 New York rule]) ; New Jersey (New- 
 man V. Phillipsburgh R. Co. 52 N. 
 J. Law, 446; 19 Atl. 1103); Ohio 
 (Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Manson, 
 30 Ohio St. 451 ; Bellefontaine, ct:-. 
 R. Co. V. Snyder, 18 Id. 399 ; Street 
 R. Co. V. Eadie, 43 Id. 91); Pennsyl- 
 vania (Smith V. O'Connor, 48 Pa. 
 St. 218 ; North Penn. R. Co. v. Ma- 
 honey, 57 Id. 187 ; Kay v. Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co., 65 Id. 269 ; Philadel- 
 phia, etc. R. Co. v. Long, 75 Id. 257 ; 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 
 74 Id. 421) ; Texas (Galveston, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Moore, 59 Tex. 64 ; Houston, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Simpson, 60 Id. 103; 
 Texas, etc. R. Co. v. O'Donnell, 58 
 Id. 27 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
 Hoffman, 80 Id. 420 ; 15 S. W. 1048) ; 
 Utah (Hyde v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
 7 Utah, 356 ; 26 Pac. 979) ; Virginia 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Groseclose, 88 
 Va. 267 ; 13 S. E 454 ; Norfolk, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Ormsby, 27 Gratt. 455). 
 
§ 8l] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. I20 
 
 § 79. No imputed negligence, if child careful. — The so- 
 called New York rule, wherever it is followed, is to be applied 
 only to cases in which a child has itself failed to use that de- 
 gree of care which would be required from an adult. If it has 
 in fact been as free from negligence as an adult would be ex- 
 pected to be, no amount of negligence on the part of its 
 parents or guardians can affect its right to recover, except, of 
 course, as their acts, in breaking the sequence of events, might 
 affect the same right in any other person. The whole theory 
 of imputed negligence rests upon the assumption that the 
 child has acted in a manner which would be negligent, if it 
 had been of full age.' 
 
 § 80. Imputed negligence ; limitations of rule. — \Omitted 
 as now unnecessary)^. 
 
 § 81. Imputed negligence ; parent must be acting as 
 such. — Under the "New York rule," the negligence of a 
 parent or guardian, when not acting in that capacity, is not 
 chargeable to his child, even though it tends to expose the 
 child to injury from other persons. Thus, if a gas company, 
 being called upon to repair a leak, sends an agent, who care- 
 lessly strikes a light in a cellar full of gas, thus causing an 
 explosion which injures a child, the fact that the leak was 
 caused by the negligence of the child's father would be no 
 excuse for the gas company.' On the other hand, if gas 
 
 ' In our first edition (1869), we E. Co., 104 Id. 669 ; 10 N. E. 855 ; 
 said: "This limitation is not ex- O'Brien v. McGlinchy, 68 Me. 552). 
 pressly sactioned by the decisions, See Ihl v. Forty-seoond St. E. Co., 
 but is so obviously consistent with 47N. Y. 323 ; McMahon v. New York, 
 good sense, and with the facts upon 33 Id. 643 ; South, etc. Ala. E. Co. v. 
 which the decisions were based, that Donovan, 84 Ala. 141 ; 4 So. 142. 
 its propriety cannot be doubted. ' Lannen v. Albany Gas Co., 46 
 Thus, it would be impossible to say Barb. 264 ; affl'd, 44 N. Y. 459. To 
 that a child, even though barely hold otherwise "would be "visit- 
 able to walk, may be run over with ing the sins of the fathers upon the 
 impunity, while on the sidewalk, children ' to an extent not contem- 
 conducting itself in the same man- plated in the Decalogue, or in the 
 ner as grown persons." This doc- more imperfect digests of human 
 trine has now received the fullest law " (Id.). The text is quoted and 
 judicial sanction (Lynch v. Smith, approved in Hennessey v. Brooklyn 
 104 Mass. 52; McGarry v. Loomis, R. Co., 6 N. Y. App. Div. 206 ; 39 
 63 N. Y. 104 ; Cummings v. Brooklyn N. Y. Supp. 805. 
 
121 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 83 
 
 should leak in a house to such an extent as to make it con- 
 tributory negligence on the part of a father himself to remain 
 in the house, his negligence in keeping his children in the 
 house under such circumstances must be imputed to them.' 
 
 3 
 
 § 82. Imputed negligence ; parent must be negligent in 
 fact. — Furthermore, under the New York rule, it is to be 
 observed that the guardian must have been guilty of actual 
 negligence in the care of the child, in order to prejudice the 
 child's right of action for negligence on the part of a stranger. 
 The mere fact that a child is found in an exposed and dan- 
 gerous position is not conclusive proof of negligence on the 
 part of its guardian.' If the guardian of the child has taken 
 reasonable care of it, and, notwithstanding the use of such 
 care, the child escapes into a dangerous place, there is no 
 negligence on the part of the guardian to be imputed to the 
 child.« 
 
 §83. Imputed negligence ; age of child. — Under the New 
 York rule, great difficulty arises in defining the age at which a 
 child becomes subject to the rule of imputed negligence, and still 
 more in defining the age at which it will be deemed negligent 
 on the part of its parents or guardians to suffer it to go abroad 
 unattended or attended only by a very young person. On the 
 
 '■^ Holly V. Boston Gas Co. , 8 Gray, escaped through the window into the 
 
 132. The particular application of street, where he was almost imme- 
 
 the principle in this case seems to us diately run over by a horse railroad 
 
 very questionable, inasmuch as the car carelessly driven. Held, that he 
 
 facts did not make it clearly neces- could recover against the railroad 
 
 sary or wise for the plaintiff or her company if the jury should deem 
 
 father to leave the house. Indeed, that sufficient care had been taken 
 
 it might have been out of their of him, and a non-suit was set aside, 
 
 power to do so. To similar effect, Weil v. Dry Dock, 
 
 ' Mangam v. Brooklyn R. Co., 38 etc. R Co., 119 N. Y. 147; 33 N. E. 
 
 N. Y. 455 ; Coghlan v. Third Ave. 487. Permitting a child six years 
 
 R. Co., 7 N. Y. App. Div. 124 : 39 N. old to go out by himself in a quiet 
 
 Y. Supp. 113; see notes to § 114, street (Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 
 
 pout. 25o), or permitting a child five years 
 
 ' Mangam v. Brooklyn R. Co. , old to remain alone in a room with 
 
 mpra. In that case, a child less an open door (Fallon v. Central Park, 
 
 than four years old vsras left alone in etc R. Co., b4 N. Y. 13), is not con- 
 
 the room for a very few minutes, the elusive of contributory negligence 
 
 front door being locked ; and he on the part of the parent. 
 
§ 84] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 122 
 
 one hand, it has been apparently held that a jury may find 
 it to be culpable negligence on the part of parents to allow 
 boys of ten years old to go out alone;' though not so as to 
 boys of eleven years ;^ but in such cases, and even in the case 
 of a child six years old, it has been held that it is not conclusive 
 evidence of negligence on the part of the parent to show that 
 the child was allowed upon the streets unattended.' Beyond 
 these limits it is difficult to say what the rule is, or whether 
 any will be enforced with such rigidity as to take the question 
 away from the jury. We can only refer to the cases as reported.* 
 
 § 84. Imputed negligence ; lunatics, etc. — All that is here 
 said with regard to children is equally applicable to lunatics of 
 any kind,' with this difference as to the obligations of others 
 towards them, that the sight of a child in peril ought to be 
 sufficient to induce every mature person to take greater care 
 than he otherwise would ;^ whereas a lunatic does not neces- 
 sarily manifest his infirmity by his appearance, and one who is 
 not aware of that fact is not to be blamed for dealing with 
 him as a person of ordinary intellect.* 
 
 'See Karr v. Parks, 40 Cal. 188; ^oidfield v. Harlem E. Co., 14 N. 
 
 Lovett V. Salem, etc. E. Co., 9 Allen, Y. 310 ; affi'g s. c, 3 E. D. Kmith, 
 
 557. 103. 
 
 2 McMahon v. New York, 33 N. Y. •> See notes to § 73a, ante. 
 
 642, 647. In that case, the defendant ' Willetts v. Buffalo, etc. E. Co. , 14 
 
 was repairing an old well in front of Barb. 585 ; see Hartfleld v. Eoper. 31 
 
 the plaintiif's house, and, in conse- Wend. 615, 619. 
 
 quence of negligence in covering it, ' East Saginaw E. Co. v. Bohn, 37 
 
 the plaintiff's son, a boy of eleven Mich. 508 ; Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co. v. 
 
 years old, fell into it and was killed. Caldwell, 74 Pa. St. 421 ; Brennan v. 
 
 In an action by plaintiff, as adminis- Fairhaven E. Co. , 45 Conn. 284 ; 
 
 trator of his son, it was held that Walters v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 41. 
 
 negligence of the parents of the child Iowa, 71, 76. See this distinction 
 
 did not necessarily form a defense to commented upon by Eedfield, J., in 
 
 theaction, and Wright, J., remarked: Eobinson v. Cone (32 Vt. 213, 335); 
 
 "The deceased was not an infant, s. c, in full. Thompson, Negl. 1129. 
 
 incapable of taking proper care of ^ A lunatic was traveling on a rail- 
 
 himself in the street. ■ • Had he road, in charge of his father, and the 
 
 survived the injury, and been with- father left him in one car and took a 
 
 out fault himself, he could have re- seat in another. The lunatic not 
 
 covered, notwithstanding his father paying his fare after repeated re- 
 
 or mother were guilty of negligence; quests, the conductor, in ignoi-ance 
 
 and so may his administrator, such of his condition, put him off the 
 
 injury causing his death." train ; he wandered about the track. 
 
123 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§85 
 
 § 85. Plaintiff not prejudiced, unless actually in fault.— 
 
 The plaintiff's right to recover is not affected by his having 
 contributed to his injury, unless he was m fault in so doing.' 
 It is possible for the plaintiff not only to contribute to his own 
 injury, but even to be himself its immediate cause, and yet to 
 recover compensation therefor.^ Thus he has a right to 
 assume some risk of personalinjury, when necessary to escape 
 a greater risk.^ So one who, seeing his property imperiled, 
 hastens to protect it, and in doing so imperils his own person, 
 is not necessarily deprived of remedy thereby. It is his right 
 and duty to protect his property, so long as he can do so 
 without recklessly exposing himself to injury.^ One who im- 
 perils his own life, for the sake of rescuing another from 
 imminent danger, is not chargeable, as matter of law, with con- 
 tributory negligence ; and, if the life of the rescued person was 
 
 and was run over by another train 
 and killed. Held, that there was 
 negligence on the part of the father, 
 which was attributable in law to the 
 lunatic, and none on the part of the 
 conductor (Willetts v. Buffalo, etc. 
 E. Co., 14 Barb. 585). "Where a deaf 
 mute slave, who was walking on a 
 railroad, with his back to an ap- 
 proaching train, was killed by the 
 train, it not appearing that the engi- 
 neer knew of the slave's infirmity, 
 and it being shown that the usual 
 warning was given by the steam 
 whistle, it was held, that the rail- 
 road company was not liable (Poole 
 v. North Carolina R. Co., 8 Jones [N. 
 C.]Law, 340). 
 
 ' He must be shown to have ne- 
 glected some duty (Missouri Pacific 
 R. Co. V. White," 80 Tex. 203; 15 S. 
 W. 808). 
 
 ' Gee V. Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 
 8Q. B. 161, 174; Whaley v. Laing, 
 2 Hnrlst. & N. 476). See this doc- 
 trine applied in Baldwin v. Green- 
 woods, etc. Co., 40 Conn. 2a8 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. V. Nelson, 51 Ind. 
 1 50 ; Hammond v. Mukwa, 40 Wise. 
 35 ; Schultz V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 44 Wise. 638 ; Walter v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 39 Iowa, 33; Wyandotte v. 
 White, 13 Kans. 191 ; Baltimore v. 
 Holmes, 39 Md. 241 : Geiselman 
 V. Scott, 35 Ohio St. 86; Gillespie 
 V. Newburg, 54 N. Y. 468 ; Jennings 
 V. Wayne, 63 Me. 468. The text was 
 expressly approved in Western Union 
 Tel. Co. V. Eyser, 2 Colo. 141. 
 
 ^ Such as jumping on or off a plat- 
 form (Buchanan v. West Jersey R. 
 Co., 53 N. J. Law, 265 ; 19 Atl. 254. 
 
 ■• Rexter v. Starin, 73 N. Y. 601 ; 
 Wasmer v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 80 Id. 212. In the first case, the 
 plaintiff's boat was fastened to a 
 pier, and he was on another boat 
 adjoining, when he saw a barge 
 approaching his boat, and, appre- 
 hending a collision, he ran on his 
 own boat, the barge struck it, and a 
 piece of timber torn off by the col- 
 lision injured him. Held, that it 
 was plaintiff's right and duty to 
 look to the safety of his boat ; and 
 it was for the jury to say whether 
 the act was reasonable under all the 
 circumstances. To same effect, see 
 North Penn. R. Co. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 
 St. 15. 
 
§85] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 124 
 
 endangered by the defendant's negligence, the rescuer may re- 
 cover for the injuries which he suffered from the defendant in 
 consequence of his intervention.' There need be no fear that 
 this principle will make any one liable for the cost of volun- 
 teered benevolence, without being himself in fault. No one is 
 liable at all, unless he is in fault. Thus a railroad company 
 could not be made liable for injuries suffered by one who, with 
 the most praiseworthy motives, rushed in front of a train to 
 rescue another who was unlawfully on the track, and of whose 
 presence the engineer in charge had no notice, actual or con- 
 structive, the train being prudently managed. In such a case 
 neither party would be in fault, and, therefore, neither could 
 recover damages." This privilege of rescue under obvious 
 danger is not to be extended to cases in which mere property 
 is imperiled ; nor even, it has been held, to the rescue of sensi- 
 tive animals, such as horses ;'' although we should incline to 
 
 * Where one threw himself in front 
 of a train for the purpose of saving 
 the life of a child, it was held that 
 he was not necessarily negligent in 
 so doing (Eckert v. Long Island R. 
 Co.,43N. Y. 502). "The law has 
 so high a regard for human life that 
 it will not impute negligence to an 
 effort to preserve it, unless made un- 
 der such circumstances as to consti- 
 tute rashness in the judgment of 
 prudent persons " (per Grover, J., Id.). 
 s. P., Spooner v. Delaware, etc. B. 
 Co., 115 N. Y. 22 ; 21 N. E. 696 [chil- 
 dren on track] ; Gibney v. State, 137 
 N. Y. 1 ; .S3 N. E. 142 [father trying 
 to save his child from drowning] ; 
 Condiff V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co. , 
 45 Kans. 256 ; 35 Pac. 562 ; Peyton 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 
 861 ; 6 So. 690 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. 
 Langendorf, 48 Ohio St. 316 ; 38 N. 
 E. 173; Clark v. Shoe, etc. Co., 16 
 Mo. App. 463. In Evansville, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Hiatt (17 Ind. 102) and At- 
 lanta, etc., R. Co. V. Leach (91 Ga. 
 419 ; 17 S. E. 619) , no negligence was 
 proved against the railroad com- 
 pany. Dicta on other points in these 
 
 cases should be disregarded. The 
 principle of the Eckert case has been 
 approved, even in Massachusetts 
 (Linnehan v. Sampson, 136 Mass, 506). 
 
 * " It is only when a railroad com- 
 pany, by its own negligence, created 
 the danger, or, through its negli- 
 gence, is about to strike a person in 
 danger, that a third person can vol- 
 untarily expose himself to peril in 
 an effort to rescue such person and 
 recover for an injury he may sus- 
 tain in that attempt . . . The negli- 
 gence of the company as to the 
 person in danger is imputed to the 
 company, with respect to him who 
 attempts the rescue ; and if not 
 guilty of negligence as to such per- 
 son, then it is only liable for negli- 
 gence occurring with regard to the 
 rescuer, after his efforts to rescue the 
 person in danger commenced " 
 (Henry, J., in Donahoe v. Wabash, 
 etc. R. Co., 83 Mo. 560). This was 
 the true ground for the decision in 
 Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. Leach, supra. 
 
 ' Morris v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. , 
 148 N. Y. 183 ; 42 N. E. 579 [ex- 
 posure made to save cattle from 
 
125 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENXE. 
 
 [§86 
 
 the opinion that taking a nnoderate degree of personal risk in 
 such a case ought not to be considered a fault. So a railroad 
 engineer who, at a time of threatened collision, remains at his 
 post and faces a danger which he could personally escape, in 
 the hope of saving others upon the train, is not chargeable 
 with contributory negligence ; for he is at least doing right, if 
 not performing a positive duty, even though he runs into cer- 
 tain death.^ And upon this principle it is, that no proper use 
 of his own land, though exposing him to greater risk from 
 the negligence of others than would be the case if a different 
 use were made of it, will deprive any one of a remedy for 
 such negligence.^ 
 
 § 86. Plaintiff not prejudiced by want of more than 
 ordinary care. — The contributory negligence of the plaintiff, 
 when relied upon to defeat his recovery, must consist of at 
 least ordinary negligence, that is, want of ordinary care.' His 
 failure to take unusual care is no defense to the action;^ 
 
 train] ; Deville v. Southern, etc. R. 
 Co., 50 Cal. 383 ; Pike v. Grand Trunk 
 E. Co., 39 Fed. 2.55 [structure on tire], 
 
 *Cotterill v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 47 Wise. 634 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. 
 Koney, 89 Ind. 453. 
 
 9 In Kalbfleisch v. Long Island E. 
 Co. (102 N. Y. .'■;30 ; 7 N. E. 557), it 
 was held not to be negligence for 
 the proprietor of a varnish factory, 
 which was adjacent to a railway, to 
 set some varnish out of doors in the 
 process of manufacture, where it was 
 set on fire by sparks from a passing 
 locomotive, which had a defective 
 spark arrester. The mere location 
 and use of a railroad do not operate 
 as a prohibition upon branches of in- 
 dustry which may be endangered by 
 its vicinity. To same effect, Cook 
 V. Champlain, etc. Co., 1 Denio, 
 91 ; Vaughan v. Taff Vale E. Co., 3 
 Hurlst. & N. 743 ; see Fero v. Buffalo, 
 etc. E. Co. , 22 N. Y. 209. 
 
 ' The words "ordinary care" are 
 used in almost every case upon this 
 subject, as, for example, in Hunger 
 
 V. Tonawanda E. Co. (4 N. Y. 349) ; 
 Garmon v. Bangor (38 Me. 443); 
 Owings V. Jones (9 Md. 108) ; Davies 
 V. Mann (10 Mess. & W. 546) ; 
 Bridge v. Grand Junct. E. Co. (3 Id. 
 244) ; Butterfield v. Forrester (11 
 East, 60), and innumerable later 
 cases. See, among other cases, 
 Priest V. Nichols, 116 Mass. 401 ; 
 Peverly v. Boston, 136 Id. 366 ; Eail- 
 road Co. v. Jones, 9.t U. S. 439 ; com- 
 pare, however, N. J. Express Co. v. 
 Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 434 ; Cronin 
 V. Delavan, 50 Wise. 375; Phila- 
 delphia, etc. E. Co. V. Boyer, 97 Pa. 
 St. 91. "The plaintiff, in order to 
 show that he was in the exercise of 
 due care, must prove that he acted 
 as men of ordinary prudence exer- 
 cising this faculty, and possessed of 
 sufficient .sense and capacity to act 
 intelligently, would have acted under 
 similar circumstances " (per Devens, 
 J., Patrick v. Pote, 117 Mass. 297). 
 
 2 So it has been repeatedly ad- 
 judged, in cases involving the risk 
 of life and limb (Ernst v. Hudson 
 
§86] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 126 
 
 while, on the other hand, his use of slight care will not enable 
 him to recover, if with ordinary care he could have avoided 
 the injury. Therefore, one who is engaged in the performance 
 of any work in which he has only undertaken to use slight care 
 for the benefit of his employer, is none the less bound to use 
 ordinary care for his own preservation from injuries to which 
 that work makes him liable ; while, even if he had entered into 
 an express contract to take extreme and unusual care in the 
 performance of the work, he would not be bound to use more 
 than ordinary care, so far as his own preservation from injury 
 was concerned. Substantially the same standard of ordinary 
 care is applied to the conduct of a woman as to that of a man 
 in questions of contributory negligence.^ No one can be 
 
 River E. Co., 35 N. Y. 9, 26 ; Beisie- 
 gel V. N. Y. Central E. Co., 34 Id. 
 632, 628, 632 ; Fero v. BuflEalo, etc. E. 
 Co. 22 Id. 209 ; Beers v. Housatonic 
 E. Co., 19 Conn. 566 ; Bloor v. Dela- 
 fleld, 69 Wise. 273 ; 34 N. W. 115 ; 
 Bequette v. People's Tr. Co. , 2 Greg. 
 200), as well as in cases involving 
 injury to property only (Newbold v. 
 Mead. 57 Pa. St. 487; Bridge v. 
 Grand June. E. Co., 3 M. & W. 244 ; 
 Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115; 
 Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B. 439 ; 
 Butterfleld v. Forrester, 11 East, 60 ; 
 Whirley v. Whiteman, 1 Head, 610). 
 Therefore, a vessel at anchor, with 
 the usual watch on deck, which suf- 
 fered injury from another drifting 
 against her, was held not to be in 
 fault, although, if she had been bet- 
 ter lighted and watched, she proba- 
 bly could have lifted anchor in time 
 to avoid injurj' (The Clarita, 23 Wall. 
 1). For other illustrations of this 
 rule, see Lyons v. Erie E. Co. , 57 N. 
 Y. 489 ; Mark v. Hudson Eiver Bridge 
 Co., 103 Id. 28; Evans v. Utica, 69 
 Id. 166; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Donahue, 75 111. 106 ; Centralia v. 
 Scott, 59 Id. 139 ; Elgin v. Eenwick, 
 86 Id. 498 ; Luvenguth v. Blooming- 
 ton, 71 Id. 338 ; Bills v. Ottumwa, 35 
 Iowa, 107 ; Larrabee v. Sewall, 66 
 
 Me. 376 ; Barstow v. Berlin, 34 Wise. 
 357 ; Krueger v. Bronson, 45 Id. 198 ; 
 Perkins v. Fond du Lac, 34 Id. 435. 
 "Slight negligence is the want of 
 extraordinary care and prudence, 
 and the law does not require of a 
 person, injured by the carelessness 
 of others, the exercise of that high 
 degree of caution as a condition 
 precedent to right to recover " (Cre- 
 mer v. Portland, 36 Wise. 93) . We 
 have found but one case in which a 
 contrary opinion was even intimated 
 (Hurst V. Burnside, 13 Greg. 530), 
 and this is a mere obiter dictum. 
 
 ' Hassenyer v. Mich. Central E. 
 Co., 48 Mich. 305; Yarnall v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R Co., 15 Mo. 575 ; Snow 
 V. Provincetown, 130 Mass. 580 ; Fox 
 V. Glastonbury, 39 Conn. 304. Per- 
 mitting a woman to drive a horse 
 upon a highway is not conclusive of 
 the plaintiff's want of care (Cobb v. 
 Standish, 14 Me. 198 ; Bigelow 
 V. Eutland, 4 Cush. 347 ; Babson 
 V. Rockport, 101 Mass. 93 ; Blood v. 
 Tyngsborough, 103 Id. 509). A wo- 
 man may be presumed to be some- 
 what lacking in knowledge, skill, 
 dexterity, steadiness of nerve and 
 coolness of judgment in driving, so 
 that a person meeting her under cir 
 cumstances threatening a collision 
 
12/ 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§87 
 
 required to make efforts beyond his powers,* nor such as must 
 needs be futile. 
 
 § 87. Ordinary care defined. — Ordinary care does not re- 
 quire one absolutely to refrain from exposing himself to peril.' 
 But it implies the use of such watchfulness and precautions 
 to avoid coming into danger,^ and such effort to escape from ^ 
 or mitigate it, when actually in danger, as a person of ordinary 
 prudence would use for his own protection, under the same 
 circumstances, in view of the danger to be avoided.* If the 
 
 should govern his conduct with 
 some regard to her probable defi- 
 ciencies (Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 
 33 ; compare Bloomington v. Perdue, 
 99 111. 329). 
 
 " Tilley v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 49 
 Ark. 535 ; 6 S. W. 8. 
 
 ' It is not necessarily negligence, 
 as matter of law, for one to expose 
 his person or property to peril (Dub- 
 lin, etc. R. Co. V. Slattery, L. R. 3 
 App. Cas. 1155 ; Jeffrey v. Keokuk, 
 etc. R. Co., 56 Iowa, 546). If the 
 danger is not so great or imminent, 
 that a man of ordinary prudence 
 would refuse to encounter it, incur- 
 ring it is not contributory negli- 
 gence (Stoddard y. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 Co., 65 Mo. 514; Railroad Co. v. 
 Ogden, 3 Colo. 499). It is not negli- 
 gence per se for one who knows that 
 there is ice on the pavement to at- 
 tempt to pass over it, even at night 
 (Evans V. Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; s. P., 
 Dewire v. Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; 
 Weston V. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., 73 
 N. Y. 595). " The fact that a person 
 voluntarily takes some risk is not 
 conclusive evidence, under all cir- 
 cumstances, that he is not using due 
 care " (Lawless v. Connecticut River 
 R. Co., 136 Mass. 1; s. P., Thomas 
 v. Western Union Tel. Co.', 100 Mass. 
 156 ; Mahoney v. Metropolitan R. 
 Co., 104 Id. 73). 
 
 ' One who unnecessarily exposes 
 himself or property to a known dan- 
 
 ger, assumes all the risks reasonably 
 to be apprehended from such a course 
 of conduct (Mehan v. Sj racuse, etc. 
 R. Co., 73 N. Y. 58.5 ; Goldstein v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 46 Wise. 404 ; 
 Simpson v. Keokuk, 34 Iowa, 568 ; 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Depew, 40 
 Ohio St. 121 ; Corlett v. Leaven- 
 worth, 27 Kans. 672 ; Mansfield, etc. 
 Coal Co. V. McEnery, 91 Pa. St. 185 ; 
 Erie v. Magill, 101 Id. 616 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. V. Collins, 87 Id. 
 405 ; Sullivan v. Louisville Bridge 
 Co., 9 Bush, 81. 
 
 3 Parker v. Georgia Pac. R. Co. , 83 
 Ga. 539 ; 10 S. E. 233. 
 
 •> Filer v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49 N. 
 Y. 47 ; Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Goddard, 
 25 Ind .185. This is sufficient (Totten 
 v. Phipps, 52 N. Y. 354, 357 ; Ganiard 
 V. Rochester, etc. R. Co., 50 Hun, 22. 
 26; Clements v. La. Electric Co., 44 
 La. Ann. 692; 11 So. 51). For in- 
 stances of application of the rules as 
 to ordinary care, laid down in the 
 text, see Eppendorf v. Brooklyn R. 
 Co., 69 N. Y. 195 ; Dougan v. Cham- 
 plain, etc. Co., 56 Id. 1 ; Macauley v. 
 New York, 67 Id. 602 ; Maguire v. Mid- 
 dlesex R. Co., 115 Mass. 239 ; Elkins 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., Id. 190; French 
 V. Taunton Br. R. Co., 116 Id. 537 ; 
 Barton v. Springfield, 110 Id. 131 ; 
 Marble v. Ross, 124 Id. 44 ; Kennard 
 V. Burton, 85 Me. 39 ; Noyes v. Shep- 
 herd, 30 Id. 173 ; Daley v. Norwich, 
 etc. R. Co., 26 Conn, 591 ; Williams 
 
§ 8;] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 128 
 
 danger is remote or slight, the care required to avoid it may 
 be such as would, under other circumstances, be called slight. 
 If the danger is near or extraordinary, the care and vigilance 
 required to avoid it may be such as, under a slighter peril, might 
 be deemed extraordinary. Care must be proportioned to the 
 circumstances.^ In either case, the plaintiff is bound to take 
 that degree of care which persons of ordinary* care and pru- 
 dence are generally accustomed to use under similar circum- 
 stances, but no more." It is not enough that he should use 
 "his own best judgment." That is not the proper test.^ 
 Nor, on the other hand, is it always necessary "to exercise the 
 best judgment or to use the wisest precaution."' It is not 
 enough that the plaintiff should act prudently, in view of the 
 
 V. Clintoo, 28 Id. 266 ; Fox v. Glas- Pa. St. 316 ; Hawley v. Chicago, etc. 
 
 tonbury, 39 Id. 204; Philadelphia, R. Co., 71 Iowa, 717; 29 N, W. 787; 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Long, 75 Pa. St. 257 ; Parvis v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 8 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Ryan, 70 111. Del. 430 ; 17 Atl. 702) are sufficient. 
 
 21 1 ; Augusta, etc R. Co. v. Renz, 55 ' Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Terry, 8 
 
 Ga. 126 ; Central R. etc. Co. v. Perry, Ohio St. 570, 581. Thus, one who 
 
 58 Id. 461 ; Crommelin v. Coxe, 30 passes along an obstructed highway, 
 
 Ala. 318; Gothard v. Alabama, etc. "isbound to observe ordinary care,' 
 
 R. C. 67 Id. 114; Richmond, etc. R. that is, such care as a reasonably pru- 
 
 Co. V. Morris, 31 Gratt, 300 ; Indian- dent man, under the circumstances, 
 
 apolis, etc. R. Co. v. Stout, 53 Ind. would exercise to preserve himself 
 
 143 ; Wyatt v. Citizens" R. Co., 55 Mo. from injury (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 
 485 ; Norton v. Ittner, 56 Id. 351 ; McTighe, 46 Pa. St. 316 ; Farrer v. 
 
 Jeffrey v. Keokuk, etc. R. Co., 56 Greene, 33 Me. 574 ; Wheeler v. 
 
 Iowa, 546 ; Leavenworth, etc. R. Co. Westport, 30 Wise. 392). See § 375, 
 
 V. Rice, 10 Kans. 426 ; Strong v. post. No greater care is required 
 
 Sacramento, etc. R. Co., 61 Cal. 326. {see post, g 519 ; Totten v. Phipps, 53 
 
 ^ Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Howard, N, Y. 354). 
 
 124 Ind. 380 ; 24 N. E. 893. Due « Berg v. Milwaukee, 83 Wise. 599 ; 
 
 care must be exercised in advance of 53 N. W. 890 ; Liermann v. Chicago, 
 
 the injury, not merely " at the time " etc. R. Co., 82 Wise. 286 ; 52 N. W. 9l! 
 
 (Peoria, etc. R. Co. v. Herman, 39 111. 'Lent v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 
 App. 287. See Palmer v. Dearing, 93 130 N. Y. 467 ; 24 N. E. 658. While 
 
 N. Y. 7). it is true that "mere error of judg- 
 
 "It will not do to substitute the ment is not negligence," the danger 
 
 words "average prudence," in a of charging this to a jury is well 
 
 charge to a jury (Marsh v. Benton, illustrated bycomparing the opposite 
 
 75 Iowa, 469; 39 N. W. 713). But fates of two cases in which this was 
 
 tlie words "ordinary prudence" done : Hoyt v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 
 (Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Spilker, 134 R. Co. (118 N. Y. 399 : 38 N E 565) 
 
 Ind. 380 ; 33 N. E. 380 ; 34 Id. 218), reversed ; and McClain v. Brooklyn 
 
 or "a reasonably prudent man" R. Co. (116 N. Y. 459 ; 33 N. E. 1063), 
 
 (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McTighe, 46 affirmed. 
 
129 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 87 
 
 knowledge which he actually had.^" He is responsible for his 
 ignorance of that which he ought to have known." As there 
 are different classes in society, with widely different degrees of 
 intelligence, the plaintiff is not required to exercise more care 
 than is usual, under similar circumstances, among careful and 
 prudent persons of the class to which he belongs,^^ if that class 
 is numerous enough to have a well-recognized existence, and 
 is one which reasonably informed men are aware must be 
 exposed to similar dangers.'^ Undoubtedly, these definitions 
 are all vague and unsatisfactory." It is not possible to frame 
 a definition of "prudence " or " ordinary care," which will be 
 perfectly clear and accurate. Prudent men often act impru- 
 dently ; and their conduct then furnishes no standard.^' In 
 special cases, it may be, in a large sense, prudent to take great 
 personal risks, for the sake of a great good. A surgeon, called 
 to attend a dangerous case, might wisely leap off a train in 
 motion, rather than be carried by the station. One who knew 
 that a mob was in waiting for him at the first station might 
 "prudently " leap off before reaching it. But common carriers 
 are not required to participate in such risks. The best test 
 which can be given is the general example of men reputed to 
 be prudent, when using such prudence as they have, with refer- 
 ence to the protection of themselves or others from the effects 
 of the defendant's acts. 
 
 '"Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 " " Whether plaintiff was neg- 
 
 Ala. 113 ; 8 So. 371. ligent depended upon the particular 
 
 "Brad well V. Pittsburgh, etc. B. facts admitted or satisfactorily 
 
 Co., 153 Pa. St. 105 ; 25 Atl. 623. proved in the case. If the facts thus 
 
 li'Mackayv. N. Y. Central R. Co., established constituted negligence, 
 
 35 N. Y. 75, 80 ; Paterson v. Wallace, then whether they exhibited such 
 
 1 Macq. H. L. 748. To the contrary, conduct as an ordinarily prudent 
 
 however, is Tucker v. Henniker, 41 man might reasonably be expected 
 
 N. H. 317. to indulge in or not, it was none the 
 
 '2 This qualification is our own, but less negligence. The most prudent 
 
 we think clearly just. A New York men are not always exempt from 
 
 railroad company ought not to be carelessness; and, when actually 
 
 obliged to anticipate any negligence negligent,* the law attaches the same 
 
 peculiar to Chinese, while in Cali- consequence to their negligent con- 
 
 f ornia it might reasonably be re- duct as to similar conduct in others ' 
 
 quired of railroad officers that they (per Mitchell, J., Pennsylvania Co. 
 
 should do so. V. Marion, 104 Ind. 239 ; 3 N. E. 
 
 " See McGrath v. N, Y. Central R. 874). 
 Co., 59 N. Y. 468. 
 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 9] 
 
§ 88] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. I30 
 
 § 88. Care required of infirm. — The plaintiff's own condi- 
 tion may be such as to seriously modify his duty with regard 
 to self-preservation. If he is in the prime of life, active, alert, 
 vigorous, far-sighted and clear-headed, he may without impru- 
 dence, take what might theoretically be considered a certain 
 amount of risk, since he would be almost absolutely certain 
 to place himself in no actual danger thereby. On the other 
 hand, if he is old or infirm, lame, sick or weak, or even if he 
 has dim sight, or is for any reason apt to lose his presence of 
 mind under the appearance or sight of danger, he would not 
 be justified in taking a risk which would be nothing to a vigor- 
 ous and far-sighted man.* Thus it would often be gross neg- 
 ligence for a decrepit or lame person to cross a street railway, 
 within the same distance of an approaching car at which a 
 person of ordinary health and strength would have a right to 
 cross without hesitation. In other words, every person must 
 use that degree of care which prudent persons of his class, 
 taking all circumstances into account, including health, strength 
 and habits of body and of mind, would use,^ when acting 
 prudently. Negligence is not imputed to persons bereft of 
 their senses, as the deaf or the blind, on account of their fail- 
 ure to use senses which they have not. But if such a person, 
 knowing his incapacity, needlessly places himself in a position 
 in which danger is probable, without means on his part to 
 avert it, that is negligence.^ The incapacity of such a person 
 
 ' Deceased was killed in the fore- eyesight (Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 
 noon of the day on a railway which 177 ; see Sleeper v. Sandown, 53 N. 
 ran through his farm. He was sixty H. 244) , or extremely aged (Centra- 
 years of age, decrepit, hard of hear- lia v. Krouse, 64 111. 19) . As to the 
 ing, and of defective sight, and was care required of such persons when 
 seen just before the accident walking traveling on a highway, see § 375, 
 at a moderate gait along the railroad post ; or when crossing a railroad 
 and on the trestle, where he was track, see § 481, post. 
 killed by a coming train. Held that, ^ Deafness does not furnish an ex- 
 under the facts and circumstances, ouse for the negligence of one who, 
 he was guilty of such contributory when about to cross a track saw 
 negligence as to preclude a recovery smoke of locomotive, but without 
 (Maloy V. Wabash, etc. E. Co., 84 stopping to find out which way it 
 Mo. 370). was coming, drove on and was in- 
 
 ' So held, as to persons partially jured (Purl v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 
 blind (Peach v. Utica, 10 Hun, 477 ; Co., 73 Mo. 168). Compare Zimmer- 
 
 compare Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 man v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 71 Id. 
 
 N. Y. 568), or having poor and weak 476. In crossing a railroad track, 
 
131 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§89 
 
 to use care in one direction imposes on liim the duty of exer- 
 cising, for his own protection, a degree of care in other direc- 
 tions that will, as far as possible, compensate for his impaired 
 senses or other disability.* 
 
 § 89. Effect of mistaken judgment under sudden alarm. — 
 
 In judging of the care exercised by the plaintiff, reasonable 
 allowance is always made for the circumstances of the case ; 
 and if the plaintiff is suddenly put into peril, without having 
 sufificient time to consider all the circumstances, he is excusable 
 for omitting some precautions or making an unwise choice, 
 under this disturbing influence, although, if his mind had been 
 clear, he ought to have done otherwise.^ This is especially 
 
 it is negligence for a deaf person 
 not to keep a sharp lookout for ap- 
 proaching trains (Illinois Central R. 
 Co. V. Buckner, 28 111. 399 ; Orms- 
 bee V. Boston, etc. E. Co., 14 R. I. 
 102 ; Birmingham, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Bowers, 110 Ala. 328; 20 So. 345; Gal- 
 veston, etc R. Co. V. Ryon, 80 Tex. 
 59 ; 15 S. W. 588) . Deafness calls 
 for increased vigilance with the 
 eyes (Cleveland, etc, R. Co. v. Terry, 
 8 Ohio St. 570 ; International, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Garcia, 75 Tex. 583 : 13 S. 
 W. 223). To same effect, Fenneman 
 V. Holden, 7.'5 Md. 1 ; 22 Atl. 1049. 
 ■* Hayes v. Michigan, etc. R. Co., 
 Ill U. S. 228 ; Central, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Feller, 84 Pa. St. 226 ; Winn v. Low- 
 eU, 1 Allen, 177 ; Cleveland, etc, R. 
 Co. V. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Miller, 46 Mich. 
 533; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Mil- 
 ler, 25 Id. 279 ; Morris, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Haslan, 33 N. J. Law, 147 ; New 
 Jersey Trans. Co. v. West, 33 Id. 91 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Triplett, 38 
 111. 483 ; Terra Haute, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Graham, 46 Ind. 339; Cogswell v. 
 Oregon, etc. R . Co., 6 Oreg. 417 ; 
 Laicher v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 
 28 La. Ann. 320 ; Purl v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co., 73 Mo. 168 ; Simms v. 
 South Carolina R. Co., 36 S. C. 490 ; 
 
 3 S. E. 301 ; Worthington v. Mencer, 
 96 Ala. 310 ; 11 So. 73 [dull intellect]. 
 It is gross negligence in a blind per- 
 son to attempt to cross a network of 
 railroad tracks unattended, when ho 
 knows that trains are passing to and 
 fro (Florida Central, etc. R. Co. v. 
 WiHiams, 37 Fla. 406 ; 20 So. 558). 
 
 ' Bucher v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 98 N. Y. 128 ; Salter v. Utica, etc. R. 
 Co., 88 Id. 43, 49 ; Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Werner, 89 Pa. St. 59 [plain- 
 tiff, in endeavoring to escape injury 
 from a train, was struck by a loco- 
 motive going in the opposite direc- 
 tion] ; Mack v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 30 Minn. 493 [plaintiff, hearing a cry 
 of danger, ran in front of the loco- 
 motive and was injured]. The plain- 
 tiff knew of a defect in a sidewalk, 
 -but being frightened by the attempt 
 of a strange man to seize her, ran 
 along the sidewalk without thought 
 of the defect, and was injured. 
 Held, she was not prevented from 
 recovering (Barton \ . Springfield, 
 110 Mass. 131) ; and in a similar case 
 (Weare v. Fitchburg, Id. 334), wliere 
 the woman, alarmed by hearing that 
 her children were in danger, ran to 
 her home without thought of the 
 sidewalk, a recovery was had. Mere 
 mental abstraction will not excuse a 
 
§89] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 132 
 
 true, if his peril is caused by the defendant's fault.^ If one is 
 placed, by the negligence of another, in such a position that he 
 is compelled to choose instantly, in the face of grave and 
 apparent peril, between two hazards, and he makes such a 
 choice as a person of ordinary prudence placed in such a posi- 
 tion might make, the fact that, if he had chosen the other 
 hazard, he would have escaped injury, is of no importance.' 
 
 failure to observe a defect of which 
 the traveler has knowledge (Oilman 
 V. Deerfield, 15 Gray, 577 ; Kewanee 
 V. Depew, 80 111. 119 ; compare 
 George v. Haverhill, 110 Mass. 506 ; 
 Wheeler v. Westport, 30 Wise. 392) . 
 ^ One ' ' who places another in peril 
 cannot complain if he does not exer- 
 cise the best judgment in extricating 
 himself from such peril" (Voak v. 
 Northern Central R. Co., 75 N. Y. 
 330, 323 : Coulter v. American Exp. 
 Co., 56 Id. 585 ; Wheelock v. Boston, 
 etc. R. Co., 105 Mass. 203; Pennsyl- 
 vania, etc. R. Co. V. Werner, 89 Pa. 
 St. 59 ; Gibbons v. Wilkesbarre R. 
 Co., 155 Id. 279 ; 26 Atl. 417 ; Vallo 
 V. U. S. Exp. Co., 147 Pa. St. 404 ; 23 
 Atl. 594 [trying to avoid missile] ; 
 Blackwell v. Lynchburg, etc. R. Co., 
 Ill N. C. 151 ; 16 S. E. 12 [plaintiff 
 killed while seeking refuge from 
 blast without notice] ; Richmond, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Farmer, 97 Ala. 141; 
 12 So. 86 ; Clarke v. Pennsylvania 
 Co., 132 Ind. 199; 31 N. E. 808; 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Miller, 46 
 Mich. 532 ; 9 N. W. 841 ; Wesley 
 Coal Co. V. Healer, 84 111. 126 ; Dun- 
 ham Towing Co. V. Dandelin, 143 111. 
 409 ; 32 N. E. 258 ; Smith v. St. Paul, 
 etc. R. Co. , 30 Minn. 169 ; Wilson v. 
 Northern Pac. E. Co., 26 Id. 278; 
 Gumz V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 52 
 Wise. 672 ; Stackman v. Chicago, 
 etc. E. Co., 80 Id. 433 ; 50 N. W. 
 404 ; Lincoln Transit Co. v. Nich- 
 ols, 37 Neb. 832; 55 N. W. 872; 
 Silver Mining Co. v. McDonald, 14 
 Colo. 191 ; 23 Pac. 346 ; Karr v. 
 
 Parks, 40 Cal. 188 ; Stephenson v. 
 Southern Pac. E. Co., 103 Id. 143 ; 84 
 Pac. 618 ; 36 Id. 407 ; Ladd v. Fos- 
 ter, 31 Fed. 827 ; Collins v. Davidson, 
 19 Id. 83 ; Stevenson v. Chicago, etc. 
 E. Co., 18 Id. 493 ; 5 McCrary, 634. 
 But compare Muldowney v. Illinois, 
 etc. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 462, and Peck 
 V. New Haven R. Co., 50 Conn., 379 
 [jumping from wagon, in fear of 
 collision with train] ). A plaintiff is 
 not necessarily to be regarded as 
 having contributed to his own in- 
 jury by acting in a manner prima 
 facie dangerous and imprudent, if 
 there is evidence of acts or omis- 
 sions of the defendant, by which 
 he might have been put off 
 his guard (Dublin, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Slattery, L. E. 3 App. Cas. 1155. 
 See Knapp v. Sioux City R. Co., 65 
 Iowa, 91 ; 21 N. W. 198). In Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Parkinson (56 Kans. 
 652 ; 44 Pac. 615), a boy fifteen years 
 old, when delivering raUroad mail 
 to the baggage master on a car, being 
 rudely cursed by the baggage man, 
 became confused, and stepped in 
 front of an approaching engine on 
 another track close by, and was in- 
 jured. Held, proper to refuse to 
 direct a verdict for defendant. 
 
 ' Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 
 101 ; Eldridge V. Long Island R. Co., 
 1 Sandf . 89 ; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Mete. 
 1 ; Frink v. Potter, 17 111. 406 ; 
 Southwestern R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 
 356 ; McKinney v. Neil, 1 McLean, 
 540 ; Pennsylvania Tel. Co. v. Var- 
 nau (Pa.), 15 Atl. 624; Gibbons v. 
 
133 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§89 
 
 Even if, in bewilderment, he runs directly into the very dan- 
 ger which he fears, he is not in fault/ The confusion of mind, 
 caused by such negligence, is part of the injury inflicted by 
 the negligent person ; and he must bear its consequences. 
 When the question is one of mere inconvenience, and not 
 actual danger, some moderate risk may be taken, if there is no 
 obvious danger.^ But the plaintiff will be chargeable with 
 contributory negligence, if he runs the risk of an obvious and 
 serious danger, merely to avoid inconvenience.^ No such 
 allowance is made in favor of one whose own fault has 
 brought him into the peril which disturbs his judgment.'' 
 
 Wilkesbarre, etc. R. Co., 155 Pa. St. 
 379 ; 36 Atl. 417. This principle ap- 
 plies to the case of plaintiffs who 
 are injured by jumping from car, at- 
 tempting to get off under such cir- 
 cumstances, although no harm 
 happened to the car (Buel v. N. Y. 
 Central E. Co., 31 N. Y. 314 ; Twom- 
 ley V. Central Park, etc. R. Co., 69 
 Id. 158 ; Smith v. Wrightsville, etc. 
 R. Co., 83 Ga. 671; 10 S. E. 361 ; 
 Woolery v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 107 Ind. 599 ; 8 N. E. 336 ; Peoria, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Rice, 144 111. 337 ; 33 
 N. E. 951 ; South Covington, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Ware, 84 Ky. 367 ; 1 S. W. 
 493 ; Kleiber v. Peoples R. Co., 107 
 Mo. 340 ; 17 S. W. 946 ; Spohn v. 
 Missouri Pao. R. Co., 101 Mo. 417 ; 14 
 S. W. 880 [train robbery] ; St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Murray, 55 Ark. 348 ; 18 
 S. W. 50 ; S. P., Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. ShiveU [Ky.], 18 S. W. 944. Com- 
 pare Sears v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 310 ; 
 Wilson V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 36 
 Minn. 378 ; Pittsburgh R. Co., v. 
 Grier, 33 Pa. St. 54 ; Indianapolis, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Stout, 53 Ind. 143 ; Jeffer- 
 sonville, etc. R. Co. v. Swift, 36 Id. 
 459, 476). A passenger who leaps 
 from a train while moving at a rate 
 of speed whicli makes death or great 
 bodily injury inevitable, is guilty of 
 negligence to a degree of rashness ; 
 unless the circumstances are such as 
 
 to induce in his mind the belief that 
 to remain will result in greater bodily 
 harm (Card v. Ellsworth, 65 Me. 547). 
 
 •* McMillan Marble Co. v. Black, 89 
 Tenn. 118; 14 S. W. 479 [boy ran 
 under falling rock] ; Texas, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Watkins, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 1 ; 
 36 S. W. 760 [woman jumped in 
 front of train] ; Killien v. Hyde, 63 
 Fed. 173 [fireman of tug, in collision, 
 jumped overboard]. 
 
 ^ Gee V. Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 
 8 Q. B. 161 ; Fordham v. Brighton, 
 etc. R. Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 619 ; Clay- 
 ards V. Dethick, 13 Q. B. 439 ; Wyatt 
 V. Great Western R. Co., 6 Best&S. 
 709 ; Siner v. Great Western R. Co., 
 L. R. 3 Exch. 150 ; Johnson v. West 
 Chester, etc. R. Co., 70 Pa. St. 357. 
 
 ' Solomon v. Manhattan R. Co. , 
 103 N. Y. 437, 443 ; 9 N. E. 430 ; 
 Adams v. Lancashire, etc. R. Co., 
 L. R. 4 C. P. 739 ; a very doubtful 
 case. To the same effect, Richard- 
 son V. Meti'opolitan R. Co., L. R. 3 C. 
 P. 374, note ; Lax v. Darlington, 5 
 Exch. Div. 38. See, also, Gavett v. 
 Manchester, etc. R. Co., 16 Gray, 501 ; 
 Damont v. New Orleans, etc. R. 
 Co., 9. La. Ann. 441; Illinois Cen- 
 tral V. Able, 59 lU. 131 ; Jefferson- 
 ville, etc. E. Co. v. Hendricks, 36 
 Ind. 328; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. La 
 Gierse, 51 Tex. 189. 
 
 ' An error of judgment in one 
 
§90] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 134 
 
 § 90. Duty of looking and listening. — One of the most 
 familiar applications of the rule requiring ordinary care to 
 avoid injury, is the requirement that the plaintiff should have 
 used watchfulness to discover the approach of dangers which 
 might reasonably be apprehended, or, as it is usually ex- 
 pressed, that " he must look and listen." Innumerable illus- 
 trations of this rule will be found in railroad cases.' But the 
 
 suddenly placed in peril by his 
 own fault does not relieve him 
 from the consequences of the negli- 
 gence which caused such position 
 (Schneider v. Second Ave. R. Co., 
 133 N. Y. 583 ; 30 N. E. 753 ; Rich- 
 field V. Michigan Cent. E. Co., 
 Mich. ; 68 N. W. 218; Baltzer 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 83 Wise. 459 ; 
 53 N. W. 885; Shankenbery v. 
 Metropolitan E. Co., 46 Fed. 177 ; 
 Eeary v. Louisville, etc. E. Co., 40 
 La. Ann. 32 ; 3 So. 390 ; Austin etc. 
 E. Co. V. Beatty, 73 Tex. 592 ; 11 S. 
 W. 858. See a hard and doubtful 
 case, International, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Hester, 73 Tex. 40 ; 11 S. W. 1041. 
 
 '§§ 472-478, post. Thus, no re- 
 covery can iisually be had for in- 
 juries suffered by one who without 
 looking carefully both ways along 
 the track of a raUroad, walked or 
 drove across or along it, and was 
 run over by a train (Schofield v. 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co , 114 U. S. 615 ; 
 Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 Id. 697 ; 
 AUerton v. Boston & M. R. Co., 146 
 Mass. 241 ; 15 N. E. 621 ; Wilds v. 
 Hudson Eiver R Co., 34 N. Y. 430; 
 Steves v. Oswego, etc. R. Co., 18 Id. 
 422 ; Wendell v. N. Y. Central, etc. 
 R. Co., 91 Id. 420 ; Nash v. Same, 125 
 Id. 715 ; 26 N. E. 266 ; Ellis v. Lake 
 Shore, etc. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 506 ; 21 
 Atl. 140; Penn. R. Co. v. Leary, ,56 
 N. J. Law, 705 ; 39 Atl. 678 ; Hearne 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 50 Cal. 482 ; 
 Zeigler v. Railroad Co., 5 S. C. 221 ; 
 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 
 Ga. 500 ; 16 S. E. 49 ; Chicago, etc. 
 
 R. Co. V. Harwood, 80 111. 88 ; Lake 
 Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Hart, 87 Id. 529 ; 
 New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 
 53 Miss. 808; Grostick v. Detroit, 
 etc. R. Co., 90 Mich. 594; 51 N. W. 
 667 ; LouisviUe, etc. R. Co. v. Stora- 
 mel, 126 Ind. 35 ; 25 N. E. 863 ; Lesan 
 V. Maine Central R. Co., 77 Me. 8-"i ; 
 Maryland Central R. Co. v. Neubeur, 
 63 Md. 391 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Crawford, 89 Ala. 340 ; 8 So. 343 ; 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Brocken, 
 59 Tex. 71 ; Delaney v. Milwaukee, 
 etc. R. Co., 33 Wise. 67; Nixon v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 84 Iowa, 331; 
 51 N. W. 157 ; Carney v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 46 Minn., 320 ; 48 N. W. 
 912 ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Adams, 
 33 Kans. 437 ; Durbin v. Oregon R. 
 Co., 17 Oreg. 5 ; 17 Pac. 5. See g§ 
 473, 476, post. These are but ex- 
 amples, from hundreds of cases. 
 More are given under Chap. XXI. 
 A large collection is given in Patter- 
 son on K. R. Accident Law, 168, and 
 Beach, Contr. Negl. (3d ed.) § 181. 
 Exceptions to the i-ule are stated in 
 Dolan V. Delaware Canal Co., 71 N. 
 Y. 285 ; McGovern v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 67 Id. 417 ; Jewett v. Klein, 
 37 N. J. Eq. 550 ; Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Lee, 87 111. 454. See §§ 477, 
 478, post. And the rule does not ap- 
 ply with the same strictness to city 
 street railroads, having no exclusive 
 right of way (Robbins v. Springfield 
 R. Co., 165 Mass. 30; 43 N. E. 334; 
 Consol. Traction Co. v. Scott, 58 N. J. 
 Law, 683; 34 Atl. 1094). 
 
135 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§91 
 
 rule denying a right of action for negligence, in cases in which 
 the plaintiff, by simply looking, would have avoided the 
 injury, is one of wide application. Thus, one who, in conse- 
 quence of not looking, steps over the edge of a sidewalk,^ or a 
 hoist-way,^ or otherwise fails to use proper watchfulness,* can- 
 not recover for such injuries. But contributory negligence is 
 not imputable to any one for failing to look out for a danger 
 which he has no reasonable cause to apprehend.^ 
 
 § 91. Effect of defendant's advice or invitation. — The 
 
 plaintiff may often be deemed to have used ordinary care, 
 when acting under the express invitation or advice of the de- 
 fendant, even though, but for that circumstance, his conduct 
 would be deemed clear evidence of negligence.^ Thus, where 
 
 'One who, while walking on a 
 sidewalk, five feet wide.in the enjoy- 
 ment of saflicient light and eyesight, 
 stepped off into a ditch and was 
 injured, cannot recover (McLaury v. 
 McGregor, 54 Iowa, 717 ; s. P., Hut- 
 ton V. Windsor, 34 Upp. Canada [Q. 
 B.], 487 ; see Zettler v. Atlanta, 60 
 Ga. 195). 
 
 ^Brenstein v. Mattson, 10 Daly, 
 336. 
 
 ''Plaintiff, while riding in one 
 buggy and looking and talking to 
 persons in another, drove into a 
 child's swing suspended between the 
 sidewalk and the traveled part of 
 the street. Held, contributory neg- 
 ligence (Tuffree v. State Centre, 
 57 Iowa, 538). One who, without 
 necessity, joins a crowd leaving a 
 ferryboat, which is so dense as to 
 prevent his seeing where he treads, 
 and whose foot is caught between 
 the boat and the dock, is guilty of 
 contributory negligence (Dwyer v. 
 N. y.. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 47 N. J. 
 Law, 9 ; S. c. on second trial, 7 Atl. 
 417; S. C, without opinion, 48 N. J. 
 Law, 373) ; but not so if he was 
 unexpectedly surrounded by the 
 crowd (Id.). A boy was riding on 
 the runners of a sleigh. He sud- 
 
 denly dropped from the sleigh with- 
 out looking behind him, and a 
 horse, which was following behind, 
 struck him. Held, contributory 
 negligence (Messenger v. Dennie, 
 137 Mass. 197). As to duty to look 
 before and behind while driving, see 
 § 054, post. 
 
 ^Langan v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 72 Mo. 39a ; Moulton v. Aldrich, 28 
 Kans. 300 [not bound to prepare for 
 runaway horse] ; plaintiff's failure 
 to look for a defect due to defend- 
 ant's negligence, and unsuspected by 
 him, is not contributory negligence 
 2}er se, but is for the jury (Gillespie 
 V. Newburgh, 54 N. Y. 468). S. P., 
 Bradford v. Boston & M. R., 160 
 Mass. 392 ; 35 N. E. 1131 [mailbags 
 thrown from trains] ; Pullman Pal- 
 ace Car Co. V. Laack, 143 111. 242 ; 
 32 N. E. 385. 
 
 ' Lewis V. Delaware, etc. Co., 145 
 N. Y. 508 ; 40 N. E. 348 ; Filer v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 49 N. Y. 47; Mclntyre 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 37 Id. 287; 
 Foy V. London, Brighton, etc. R. 
 Co., 18 C. B. (N. S.) 325; Cincinnati, 
 etc, R. Co. V. Carper, 113 Ind. 36 ; 
 13 N. E. 132 [following train con- 
 ductor's directions as to alighting 
 from train] ; Irish v. Northern Pac. 
 
§91] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 136 
 
 gates at a railroad crossing are, as a rule, closed when trains 
 are near, the fact that they are open dispenses with the usual 
 obligation to look and listen.^ Much more is this the case, 
 where the man in charge signals the train to proceed.' But, 
 in order to justify the plaintiff's conduct under circumstances 
 otherwise questionable, it must appear that the invitation or 
 advice actually proceed^ from the defendant or some agent 
 for whose act he was, at least apparently, responsible ; * and 
 even then such advice will not be a sufficient excuse, if the 
 defendant was clearly not as well aware of the actual danger 
 as the plaintiff was, or if, the advice being given only by an 
 agent of the defendant under a mere general or implied author- 
 ity, the circumstances were such that the plaintiff could not 
 reasonably have believed that the defendant intended to au- 
 thorize the agent's act.^ Neither can the plaintiff excuse 
 
 R. Co., 4 Wash. St. 48; 29Pac. 845. 
 See, also, Louisville, etc. B. Co. v. 
 Wood, 113 Ind. 544 : 14 N. E. 573. 
 These cases limited in Solomon v. 
 Manhattan E. Co., 103 N. Y. 437 ; 9 
 N. E. 430. 
 
 ^Cleveland, etc. E. Co. v. Schnei- 
 der, 45 Ohio St. 678 ; 17 N. E. 321 ; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Stegemier, 118 
 Ind. 305 ; 20 N. E. 843 ; Lindeman v. 
 N. y. Central, etc. E. Co., 42 Hun, 
 306 ; S. C, on appeal, after new trial, 
 11 N. Y. St. Eep. 837; Callagan v. 
 Delaware, etc. E. Co., 53 Hun, 276; 
 5 N. Y. Supp. 285; Kane v. New 
 Haven, etc. R. Co., 9 N. Y. Supp. 
 879 ; 56 Hun, 648, mem. See notes 
 to § 473, post. 
 
 ' Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Prescott, 
 59 Fed. 237; 8 C. C. A. 109 ; Warren 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 8 Allen, 237. 
 Defendant's leading a horse over the 
 track implies that it is safe (Rembe 
 V. N. Y., Ontario, etc. R. Co., 103 
 n! Y. 731 ; more fully, 7 N. E. 797). 
 
 * Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Daniel, 12 Lea, 386, where a bridge 
 watchman was injured while work- 
 ing to clear a tunnel of fallen rock, 
 under orders of a servant of the rail- 
 
 road company whose duty it was to 
 look after killed stock. The plaintiff 
 is not negligent, in obeying the di- 
 rections of one who is apparently 
 (although not actually) authorized 
 by a corporation defendant to give 
 such directions (Mo wrey v. Central E. 
 Co., 66 Barb. 43 ; affi'd, 51 N. Y. 666). 
 ^An act, outside of any implied 
 authority of the agent, is no ex- 
 cuse for the plaintiff ; e. g., where 
 an invitation is given to ride on 
 freight trains (Files v. Boston, etc. 
 R. Co., 149 Mass. 204 ; 21 N. E. 311 ; 
 Virginia, etc. E. Co. v. Eoach, 83 
 Va. 375 ; 5 S. E. 175 ; Stringer v. Mis- 
 souri Pac. E. Co., 96 Mo. 299 ; 9 S. 
 W. 905 ; Keating v. Michigan Cent. 
 E. Co., 97 Mich. 154; 56 N. W. 346 
 [directing child to jump on moving 
 train] ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Rosenberry, 45 Ark. 256 [getting off 
 train moving 13 miles an hour]). In 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Sykes (96 111. 
 162) , plaintiffs intestate tried to pass 
 under a freight train obstructing the 
 sidewalk, at invitation of conductor, 
 and was injured so that he died. 
 Held the question of negligence 
 should have been left to the jury. 
 
137 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ 92 
 
 himself, on this ground, for taking an unmistakably improper 
 risk.'' The defendant's advice or direction is an excuse only 
 when the plaintifT might honestly think the question of negli- 
 gence doubtful J If the defendant, by his own act, has thrown 
 the plaintifT oS his guard, and given him good reason to 
 believe that vigilance was not needed, the lack of such vigi- 
 lance on the part of the plaintiff is no bar to his claim,* 
 especially if the defendant has done so by means of positive 
 misrepresentations, upon which the plaintiff relied.' Promises 
 or assurances, unfulfilled, have the same effect, although not 
 intentionally false." All these rules are especially applicable 
 in favor of children." 
 
 §92. Plaintiff not bound to anticipate negligence.— As 
 
 there is a natural presumption that every one will act with due 
 care,i it cannot be imputed to the plaintiff as negligence that 
 
 ' Cassidy v. Maine Central E. Co., 
 76 Me. 488. 
 
 ■" In Dist. of Columbia v. Mc- 
 EUigott (117 U. S. 621), a laborer 
 under a road supervisor, at work 
 on a gravel bank, discovered the 
 bank to be in a dangei-ous condition, 
 and reported the fact to the super- 
 visor, vyho said he vrould have a 
 man vs^atch it. The laborer con- 
 tinued to vrork for half a day, when 
 the bank fell and injured him. 
 Held, reversing a judgment below 
 for the laborer, that it was his duty, 
 having knowledge of the dangerous 
 condition of the bank, to exercise 
 care in protecting himself from 
 harm, and to disregard any assur- 
 ances of his superior, s. P., Baker 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co., 68 Ga. 699 ; 
 Hunter v. Cooperstown, etc. R. Co., 
 136 N. Y. 18; 26 N. E. 958. This 
 limitation is recognized in other 
 cases already cited. 
 
 8 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 
 Pa. St. 60 ; Ernst v. Hudson River 
 R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9, 38 ; Paterson v. 
 Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. 748 : see 
 Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co. , 47 
 
 Mo. 521. The text was cited and 
 approved in Totten v. Phipps, 52 N. 
 Y. 354. 
 
 » Hutchinson v. Guion, 5 C. B. N. 
 S. 149. 
 
 '» Hawley v. Northern Central R. 
 Co., 82 N. Y. 870 [assurance of 
 repairs] ; Bradley v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 63 N. Y. 99 [promise to warn 
 of danger]. To similar effect : 
 Holmes v. Clarke, 6 Hurlst. & N. 
 340; Hough v. Texas, etc. R Co., 
 100 U. S. 213 ; Laning v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 49 N. Y. 531 ; Ford v. 
 Fitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 261 1 Pat- 
 terson V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 70 
 Pa. St. 389 ; Belair v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 43 Iowa, 663 ; Le Clare v. St. 
 Paul, etc. E. Co., 20 Minn. 9 ; Con- 
 roy V. Iron Works, 63 Mo. 347 ; Kan- 
 sas City, etc. R. Co. v. Flynn, 78 Id. 
 195 ; East Tenn., etc. R. Co. v. Duf- 
 field, 13 Lea, 63. A traveler may 
 rely on published regulations (Par- 
 sons V. N. Y. Central, R. Co., 113 
 N. Y. 355 ; 21 N. E. 145). 
 
 " Rosenberg v. Durfee, 87 Cal. 
 545; 36 Pac. 793. 
 
 ' Daniel v. Metropolitan R. Co., L. 
 
§92] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 138 
 
 he did not anticipate culpable negligence on the part of the 
 defendant,- or of a stranger.' He has a right to assume that 
 every one else will obey the law (including not only the com- 
 mon law, but also any statutes^ or city ordinances^), and to 
 act upon that belief.'' But if the plaintiff sees, or by or- 
 
 R. 5 H. L. 45 ; The Mangerton, 1 
 Swabey, 120 ; Vennal v. Garner, 1 
 C'r. & M. 21, and cases infra. Com- 
 jaare Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Young, 60 
 Tex. 201. 
 
 'N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Atlantic RefgCo., 129 N. Y. r,97 ; 29 
 N. E. 829 ; Turner v. Newburgh, 109 
 N. Y. 801; 16 N. E. 344 [highway] ; 
 PettengiU v. Yonkers, 116 N. Y., 
 5.58 ; 22 N. E. 1095 [same] ; Boyce v. 
 Manhattan R. Co., 118 K. Y. 314 ; 23 
 N. E. 804 [railroad platform]; Shutt 
 V. Cumberland Val. R. Co. 149 Pa. 
 St. 266 ; 24 Atl. 305 [same] ; O'Con- 
 nor \ . Missouri Pac. R. Co. , 94 Mo. 
 150 ; 7 S. W. 106 [railroad-crossing]; 
 Central R. & B. Co. v. Attaway, 90 
 Ga. 656 ; 16 S. E. 956 [implements] ; 
 Newson t. N. Y. Central R. Co., 29 
 N. Y. 383, 891 ; Ernst v. Hudson 
 River R. Co., 35 Id. 9, 35 ; Carroll t. 
 New Haven R. Co. , 1 Duer, 571 ; Fox 
 V. Sackett, 10 Allen, 535 ; Reeves v. 
 Delaware, etc. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 454 ; 
 Stephens v. Martins (Pa.), 17 Atl. 243 
 [blast witliout notice] ; Bullock v. 
 Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 105 N. C. 
 180 ; 10 S. E. 988. Evidence that the 
 plaintiff requested the defendant to 
 perform the act which caused the 
 injury, does not tend to prove con- 
 tributory negligence, if the injury 
 was not a natural result of such act 
 carefully performed (Fisk v. Wait, 
 104 Mass. 71). To same effect, Gee 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 
 161, 171 [passenger may rely on car 
 door being fastened]. See, also, Cleve- 
 land, etc. R. Co. V. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 
 570 ; Reeves v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 30 Pa. St. 454 ; Brown v. Lynn, 31 
 Id. 510 ; Kellogg v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 
 Co., 26 Wise. 223 ; Seward v. Milford, 
 21 Id. 491 ; Langan v. St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co., 72 Mo. 392 ; Damourv. Lyons, 
 44 Iowa, 276 ; Moulton v. Aldrich, 28 
 Kans. 306 ; Robinson v. Western Pac. 
 R. Co., 48 Cal. 409 ; Shea v. Potrero, 
 etc. R. Co., 44 Id. 414. 
 
 2 Murphy v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 R. Co., 118 N. Y. 527 ; 23 N. E. 813 
 [fellow servants] ; Franke v. St. Louis, 
 110 Mo. 516 ; 19 S. W. 938 [falling 
 wall]. A brakeman tried to un- 
 couple cars ; finding them moving 
 too fast, he signaled the engineer to 
 slow up, and not waiting to see if his 
 signal was obeyed, made a second 
 attempt and was killed. Held, not 
 contributory negligence, as he had a 
 right to believe that his signal would 
 be immediately obeyed (Beems v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 58 Iowa, 150). 
 
 ■•Klanowski v. Grand Trunk R. 
 Co., 57 Mich. 535 ; 34 N. W. 801. 
 
 ^A traveler has a right to presume 
 that a railway company will con 
 form to a city ordinance, regulating 
 the rate of speed of its trains within 
 the city limits (Hart v. Devereux, 41 
 Ohio St. 565). Lulled into a sense of 
 security by a knowledge of such an 
 ordinance, and assuming that the 
 company will comply with it, it is 
 not negligence for him, in the ab- 
 sence of apparent danger, not to use 
 the precaution in crossing the track 
 which he otherwise should (Meek 
 V. Pennsylvania E. Co., 38 Ohio St. 
 632 ; see Baker v. Pendergast, 32 Id. 
 494; Correll V. Railroad Co., 38 Iowa, 
 120). 
 
 ' Continental, etc. Co. v. Stead, 
 95 U. S. 161 ; Jetter v. Harlem R. 
 Co., 2 Abb. Ct. App. 458; Filer v. N. 
 
139 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 r§92 
 
 dinary care could see, that the defendant has in fact negligently 
 exposed him to the risk or injury, or will probably do so, he 
 can no longer rely upon this presumption, and must use all the 
 additional precautions, on his own part, which a person of 
 ordinary prudence would use, in view of the circumstances as 
 they are, and not as they ought to be.'' Nevertheless, even 
 where the plaintiff sees that the defendant has been negligent, 
 he is not bound to anticipate all the perils to which he may 
 possibly be exposed by such negligence, or to refrain absolutely 
 from pursuing his usual course on account of risks to which he 
 is probably exposed by the defendant's fault. Some risks are 
 taken by the most prudent men ; and the plaintiff is not de- 
 barred from recovery for his injury, if he has adopted the 
 course which most prudent men would think it prudent to 
 take under similar circumstances.^ 
 
 Y. Central E. Co., 59 N. Y. 351 ; 
 Weston V. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., 73 
 Id. 595 ; Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Shultz, 64 111. 173 ; Steele v. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 43 Iowa, 109; Robinson 
 V. Western Pacific R. Co., 48Cal. 409; 
 Mc Williams v. Detroit, etc. Co., 31 
 Mich. 374; Snyder v. Pittsburgh, 
 etc. R. Co., 11 W. Va. 14 ; Schultz 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 44 Wise. 
 638 ; Minor v. Sliaron, 113 Mass. 477 ; 
 Philadelphia R. Co. v. Hagan, 47 
 Pa. St. 344. 
 
 ■" In Dudley v. Camden, etc. Ferry 
 Co. (45 N. J. Law, 368) , and Hobo- 
 ken Land, etc. Co. v. Lally (48 Id. 
 604, Ct. of Errors), it was held that 
 one who has charge of horses on a 
 ferryboat cannot recover, if he omits 
 to guard them, even if they are not 
 properly guarded by the ferry- 
 master, Woodruff, J., in Grippen 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co. (40 N. Y. 34), 
 said: "Each has a right, in gov- 
 erning his own conduct to assume 
 that all others will perform their 
 duties also, and act accordingly, un- 
 less and until he sees, or, by the 
 exercise of ordinary care, might see, 
 that it is dangerous to do so. But it 
 
 will not permit a party, in reliance 
 on such an assumption, to neglect 
 his own means of self-preservation." 
 If the peril of doing a certain thing 
 is known to plaintiff, and means are 
 provided for its being done in safety, 
 as where a city has provided suitable 
 steps for pedestrians to reach a side- 
 walk, raised above ths level of the 
 roadway, it is negligence for the 
 plaintiff not to use such means 
 (Vicksburg v. Hennessey, 54 Miss. 
 391). One who was injured while 
 driving over a railway crossing, will 
 not be exonerated from the presump- 
 tion of contributory negligence, be- 
 cause of failure to give the statutory 
 signals, or because the train was run 
 at a rate of speed forbidden, if it 
 appears that by the exercise of 
 proper diligence he might have 
 avoided the injury (Cincinnati, etc. , 
 R. Co. V. Butler, 103 Ind. 31 ; 3 N. 
 E. 138). Especially, if he drove reck- 
 lessly on the track, without looking 
 or listening (Weller v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 130 Mo. 635 ; 33 S. W. 1061 ; 
 35 Id. 533). 
 
 "This section was quoted and fol- 
 lowed by the court in Johnson v. 
 
93] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 140 
 
 § 93. Plaintiff's fault must contribute to injury. — The 
 
 plaintiff's negligence or other fault does not affect his right to 
 recover for an injury caused by the defendant's negligence, if 
 it did not in any degree contribute to bring upon him the injury 
 of which he complains ; ' and some courts have held that it is 
 
 Belden, 2 Lans. 433. See Reeves v. 
 Delaware, etc. E. Co., 30 Pa. St. 454. 
 The defendant is not necessarily ex- 
 cused, merely because the plaintiff 
 knew that some danger existed 
 through the defendant's neglect, 
 and voluntarily incun-ed such dan- 
 gar. The amount of danger and the 
 circumstances which led the plain- 
 tiff to incur it, are for the considera- 
 tion of a jury (Clayards v. Dethick, 
 13 Q. B. 439). Therefore, where the 
 plaintiff, in f uU view of obstructions 
 left in the road, led his horse over 
 tliem, and the horse fell and was 
 killed, it was a question for the jury, 
 whether the plaintiff was negligent 
 or not (Id). Where a traveler 
 crossed a bridge which he knew to 
 be somewhat unsafe, but which the 
 county ofificers had not closed nor 
 warned people not to i^ass, it was 
 held that he was not in fault 
 (Humphreys v. Armstrong Co., 56 
 Pa. St. 204). So in Pennsylvania a 
 traveler, whose path is wrongfully 
 impeded by araih-oad train standing 
 across it, may recover for injuries 
 suffered in attempting to cross befoi-e 
 the train (Rauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. 
 St. 358) . But the contrary was held 
 in two very arbitrar}' and unjust 
 cases (Gahagan v. Boston, etc. R. 
 Co., 1 Allen, 187- Wyatt v. Great 
 Western R. Co., 6 Best and S. 709). 
 In Dewire v. Bailey (131 Mass. 169), 
 the plaintiff entered defendant's 
 public hall ; on coming out, he 
 slipped on an accumulation of snow 
 and ice in front of the door. He 
 was held not precluded from re- 
 covery by the fact that he noticed 
 the snow and ice in going in. A 
 
 teacher was injured by stepping in 
 a hole in the school-house floor, 
 which she had seen three weeks 
 previous ; part of time it had been 
 covered with paste-board. When 
 she fell she was looking at the pupils 
 and their books. Held, not con- 
 tributory negligence(Bassett v. Fish, 
 75 N. Y. 303). 
 
 ' Inland Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 
 189 U. S. 551 ; 11 S. Ct. 653 ; South- 
 ern Bell Tel. Co. v. Watts, 13 C. C. 
 A. 579; 66 Fed. 460; Webster v. 
 Rome, etc. R. Co. 115 N. Y. 113; 21 
 N. E. 725 ; afii'g 40 Hun, 161 ; Savage 
 V. Corn Exchange lus. Co. , 36 N. Y. 
 655 ; Haley v. Earle, 30 N. Y. 308 [no 
 helmsman] ; Morrison v. General 
 Steam Nav. Co., 8 Exch. 733 ; Baker 
 V. Portland, 58 Me. 199 ; Norris v. 
 Litchfield, 35 N. H. 371 ; Alger v. 
 Lowell, 3 Allen, 403 ; Churchill v. 
 Rosebeck, 15 Conn. 359 ; Cummings 
 V. Nat. Furnace Co., 60 Wise. 603; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Hurt, 101 
 Ala. 34 ; 13 So 130 ; Gadsden R. Co. 
 V. Causler, 97 Ala. 237 ; 12 So. 4;i9 ; 
 Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Parker, 
 131 111. 557 ; 23 N. E. 337 [excessive 
 speed]. The absence of signals re- 
 quired by law is immateria;!, if the 
 defendant saw the plaintiff's vessel 
 without them (Silliman v. Lewis, 49 
 N. Y. 379). T)ie plaintiff had been 
 injured by noxious vapors created 
 by the defendant — held, the fact 
 that the plaintiff himself created 
 other bad odors upon his own land, 
 was immaterial (Brown v. Illius, 37 
 Conn. 84). If the traveler could not 
 have seen or heard the train, had he 
 tried to do so it is not material that 
 he did not look and listen (Dyer v. 
 
141 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§93 
 
 of no importance unless it substantially or essentially contributed 
 to the injury.^ But other courts, fearing that this would leave 
 too much discretion to juries, hold that the plaintiff's want of 
 ordinary care is a bar to the action if it contributed in any 
 degree, however slight, to bring about the particular accident 
 which caused the injury.^ The defendant is not excused from 
 liability by any negligence of the plaintiff, not amounting to a 
 want of ordinary care in avoiding the injurious consequences 
 of the defendant's negligence.'' His negligence must not only 
 concur in the transaction, but must co-operate, either in causing 
 
 Erie R. Co., 71 N. Y. 228 ; Davis v. N. 
 Y. Central R. Co. , 47 Id. 400 ; Connelly 
 V. New York Central R. Co., 88 Id. 
 346 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Lee, 87 
 111. 454 ; Laverenz v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 56 Iowa, 689 ; State v. Philadel- 
 phia, etc. R. Co., 47 Md. 76). To the 
 same effect. The Wanata, 95 U. S. 
 600 ; Blanchard v. New Jersey, etc. 
 Co., 59 N. Y. 292 ; Flatles v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 35 Iowa, 191 ; Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co, V. Fox, 11 Bush, 495 ; Cen- 
 tral R. Co. V. Van Horn, 38 N. J. 
 Law, 183 ; Rome v. Dodd, 58 Ga. 288 ; 
 Centerville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192 ; 
 Omaha R. Co. v. Doolittle, 7 Neb. 
 481 ; Gould v. McKenna, 86 Penn. St. 
 397 ; McAunich v. Mississippi, etc. R. 
 Co., 30 Iowa, 838 ; Pringle v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 64 Id. 613. "Where a per- 
 son gets on a moving train, his neg- 
 ligence in so doing does not con- 
 tribute to his death, caused by his 
 being pushed therefrom by an em- 
 ploye of the company (Sharrer v. 
 Paxson, 171 Pa. St. 26 ; 33 Atl. 120). 
 '"Substantially" (Daley v. Nor- 
 wich, etc. R. Co., 26 Conn. 591 ; New 
 Haven Steamboat, etc. Co. v. Van- 
 derbilt, 16 Id. 420 ; West v. Martin, 
 31 Mo. 375). '-Essentially" (Mont- 
 gomery Gas Co. V. Montgomery R. 
 Co., 86 Ala. 372 ; 5 So. 735). In Sulli- 
 van V. Louisville Bridge Co. (9 Bush, 
 81), it was said that to constitute a 
 defense, plaintiff's negligence must 
 
 have been an efficient cause of the 
 injury. So also in Spoflord v. Har- 
 low, 3 Allen, 176 ; Bigelow v. Reed, 
 51 Me. 325. It has been held unjust 
 to the plaintiff to charge that he can- 
 not recover, if his negligence "con- 
 tributed in any appreciable degree " 
 (Erie Tel. Co. v. Grimes, 82 Tex. 89 ; 
 17 S. W. 831). 
 
 ^ This was expressly held in Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co.v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598, 
 It has been held that a court is bound 
 upon request to charge the jury that 
 the injury must be "solely" caused 
 by the defendant's fault (Grippen v. 
 N. Y. Central R. Co., 40 N. Y. 34 ; 
 Bigelow V. Reed, 51 Me. 335). But 
 this is obviously erroneous. See g 05, 
 ante. It has been held not sufficient 
 to charge that it must be essentially 
 so caused (Grippen v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co. , supra ; Oil City Fuel Co. v. 
 Boundy, 122 Pa. St. 449 ; 15 Atl. 865, 
 and it has been held error to charge 
 that it must materially contribute 
 (Artz V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 
 293 ; Mattimore v. Erie, 144 Pa. St. 
 14; 23 Atl. 817; Monongahela v. 
 Fischer, 111 Pa. St. 9 ; 2 Atl. 87). 
 
 "Brown v, N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 31 Barb. 385 ; affl'd, 32 N. Y. 597 ; 
 Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. 546; 
 Bridge v. Grand Juno. R. Co., 3 Id. 
 244 ; Doggett v. Richmond, etc. R. 
 Co., 78 N. C. 305. See § 61, ante. 
 
§93] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 142 
 
 the injury, or in exposing himself or his property to it.° If 
 the injury would have occurred, notwithstanding the exercise 
 of all due care by the plaintiff, his omission to take such care 
 is immaterial." Thus, the fact that the plaintiff was intoxi- 
 cated at the time of the injury, while no excuse for his negli- 
 gence,'' and indeed competent and material evidence of 
 contributory negligence,* is not of itself sufficient to defeat his 
 action,' unless it is proved or is reasonably to be inferred from 
 
 'Carroll v. New Haven, etc. E. 
 c;o. , 1 Duer, 571 ; Colegrove v. New 
 Haven, etc. E. Co., 20 N. Y. 493. 
 
 «Carrico v. West Va. etc. E. Co., 
 39 W. Va, 86 ; 19 S. E. 571 ; Smith 
 V. Irwin, 51 N. J. Law, 507 ; 18 AtL 
 853 ; Eichmond, etc. E. Co. v. How- 
 ard, 79 Ga. 44 ; 3 S. E. 436 ; Beers v. 
 Housatonic E. Co., 19 Conn. 560 ; 
 Thomas v. Kenyon, 1 Daly, 133 ; 
 McDonald v. Montgomery E. Co., 110 
 Ala. 161; 20 So. 317; Wright v. Illi- 
 nois, etc. E. Co., 20 Iowa, 195. See 
 Colegrove v. New Haven, etc. E. 
 Co., 6 Duer, 383 ; affi'd, 30 N.Y. 493 ; 
 TuflE V. Warman, 5 C. B. [N. S.] 573 ; 
 affi'g s. C, 3 Id. 740; Northern 
 Central E. Co. v. State, 81 Md. 357 ; 
 Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470 ; 10 
 S. W. 288. The only case opposed is 
 Reeves v. Delaware, etc. E. Co. (30 
 Pa. St 454), and that is a mere 
 dictum. 
 
 ' The plaintiff's intoxication at the 
 time of the injury will not relieve 
 him from the legal consequences of 
 his contributory negligence (Kean 
 v. Baltimore, etc. E. Co.. 61 Md. 
 154; MilUman v. N. Y. Central, etc. 
 E. Co., 66 N. Y. 643; Herring v. 
 Wilmington, etc. E. Co., 10 Ired. 
 Law, 403 ; Jones v. North Carolina 
 E. Co., 67 N. C. 125 ; Toledo, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Eiley, 47 111. 514 ; Illinois, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Cragin, 71 Id. 177 ; Yar- 
 nall V. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 75 Mo. 
 575 ; Houston, etc. E. Co. v. Symp- 
 kins, 54 Tex. 615 ; Weeks v. New 
 Orleans, etc. R. Co., 33 La. Ann. 
 
 615 ; Fitzgerald v. Weston, 53 Wise. 
 354). 
 
 « Strand v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 67 
 Mich. 380 ; 34 N. W . 713 ; Lynch v. 
 New York, 47 Hun, 524 ; Brand v. 
 Schenectady, etc. E. Co. , 8 Barb. 368. 
 
 ' The mere fact of intoxication will 
 not establish want of ordinary care. 
 The jury must determine whether 
 the intoxication contributed to the 
 injury ; and if it did not, it is of no 
 importance (Ditchett v. Spuyten, 
 etc. E. Co., 5 Hun, 164 ; affi'd, 67 N. 
 Y., 425 [injury by defects in road] ; 
 Alger V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 403; 
 Eobinson v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 461 ; 
 Aurora v. Hillman, 90 lU. 61 ; Ward 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 85 Wis. 601 ; 
 55 N. W. 771 ; Central E. Co. v. 
 Phinazee, 93 Ga. 488 ; 21 S. E. 66). 
 Plaintiff while partially intoxicated 
 was injured in consequence of de- 
 fects in the sidewalk. Held, it was 
 for the jury and not for the court to 
 say whether the intoxication con- 
 tributed in any way to the injury 
 sustained. Because one is intoxi- 
 cated, it cannot be presumed that he 
 is negligent. "A drunken man is as 
 much entitled to a safe street as a 
 sober one, and much more in need of 
 it " (Healy v. New York, 3 Hun, 708, 
 quoting from Robinson v. Pioche, 5 
 Cal. 461 ; Houston, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Reason, 61 Tex. 613 ; Baltimore, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Boteler, 38 Md. 568). To 
 similar effect, American Waterworks 
 Co. V. Dougherty, 37 Neb. 373 ; 55 
 N. W. 1051 ; Dickson v. Hollister, 
 
143 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§94 
 
 the circumstances that it prevented him from taking ordinary- 
 care to avoid the injury.^" So the fact that the plaintiff was 
 acting in violation of a municipal ordinance, or even of a 
 statute, is not material, if such violation did not contribute to 
 the injury." 
 
 § 94. Plaintiff's fault must proximately contribute to 
 injury. — The plaintiff's fault does not affect his right of action, 
 unless it proximately contributed to his injury.' It must be a 
 proximate cause, in the same sense in which the defendant's 
 
 ia.3 Pa. St. 421 ; 16 Atl. 484. So as W. Va. 579 ; Torapkins v. Kanawha, 
 to any other form of debauchery 21 Id. 234; Baltimore, etc. E. Co. v. 
 McVoy V. Knoxville, 85 Tenn. 19 ; Reaney, 43 Md. 117 ; Kennedy v. 
 1 S. W. 498. Evidence that one Cecil Co., 69 Id. 65; 14 Atl. 524; Gun- 
 killed at a railroad crossing was ter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 ; Doggett 
 given to the habit of intoxication is v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 73 Id. 305 ; 
 not admissible on the issue of con- Thirteenth St. R. Co. v. Boudron, 93 
 tributory negligence (Lane v. Mis- Pa. St. 475 ; Drake v. Kiley, 93 Id. 
 souri Pao. R. Co., 133 Mo. 4 ; 33 S. W. 492 ; Oil City Gas Co. v. Robinson, 
 645). Under a statute in Georgia, 99 Id. 1 ; Dudley v. Camden, etc. 
 one who, being voluntarily drunk, Ferry Co. , 45 N. J. Law, v,%% ; Louis- 
 places himself on a railway track, is ville, etc. R. Co. v. Wolfe, 80 Ky. 83 ; 
 not entitled to recover, whether the Louisville Gas Co. v. Gutenkunz, 83 
 defendant was negligent or not Id. 433 ; Barbee v. Reese, 60 Miss. 
 (Southwestern R. Co. v. Hankerson, 906 ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Maddry, 
 61 Ga. 114). See § 110, post. 57 Ark. 306 ; 21 S. W. 473 ; Meyer v. 
 i» Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 People's R. Co., 43 Mo. 533 ; Dickson 
 111. 177 ; Cramer v. Burlington, 43 v. Omaha, etc. R. Co., 134 Mo. 140 ; 
 Iowa, 315. And see Reget v. Bell, 77 27 S. W. 476 ; Williams v. Edmunds, 
 111. 593 ; Johnson v. Louisville, etc. 75 Mich. 93 ; 43 N. W. 534 ; O'Con- 
 R. Co., 104 Ala. 341 ; 16 So. 75; nor v. North Truckee Co., 17 Nev. 
 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. State, 81 
 Md. 371; 32 AtL301. 
 
 " See § 104, "post. 
 
 ' Eadley v. Northwestern R. Co,, 
 L. R. 1 App. Cas. 754; Sheffer v. 
 Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249 ; Austin v. 
 
 345 ; 30 Pac. 883; Ford v. Umatilla 
 County, 15 Greg. 813 ; 16 Pac. 33 [in- 
 toxication of plaintiff] ; Davis v. 
 Oregon, etc. R. Co.,. 8 Greg. 173 
 [same]. See Thompson, Negl. 1151. 
 The fact that plaintiff left his horse 
 
 N. J. St. Co., 43 N. Y. 75, 83 ; Isbell untied in the street will not de- 
 
 V. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 37 Conn. 
 393 ; Smith wick v. Hall, etc. Co. , 
 59 Id. 361 ; 31 Atl. 924 ; Cleveland, 
 etc. R. Co v. Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474 ; 
 
 feat a recovery for defendant's 
 negligence, if plaintiff's negligence 
 vsras not in any proper sense the 
 immediate or proximate cause of the 
 
 Richmond v. Sacramento, etc. R. Co., accident (Wasmer v. Delaware, etc. 
 18Cal. 351; Flynn v. San Francisco, R. Co. 80 N. Y. 213; Griags v. 
 etc. R. Co., 40 Id. 14 ; Fernandez v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81). The fail- 
 Sacramento, etc. R. Co., 53 Id. 45; ure of one about to cross a railroad 
 Indianapolis v. Caldwell, 9 Ind. 397 ; track, to stop, look and listen, is im- 
 Towler v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 18 material, if it was not the proximate 
 
§94] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 144 
 
 negligence must have been a proximate cause in order to give 
 any right of action.^ It is, of course, not correct to say that 
 negligence which does not occur at the time of the injury 
 necessarily does not proximately contribute thereto.' Great 
 difficulties arise in charging juries upon this point. No jury 
 could ever understand what " proximate " means. In most 
 reported cases, it has been held permissible to say that the 
 plaintiff's negligence is no defense, unless it directly contributes 
 to the injury;* but such an instruction is not tolerated in New 
 York,^ and perhaps not in Georgia.^ 
 
 cause of the injury, as where the killing of animals, the court in- 
 casualty was wholly due to the de- structed the jury that ' ' proximate 
 f ective condition of the crossing, for negligence is negligence at the time 
 which the railway company was re- of the happening of the injury com- 
 sponsible (Baugham v. Slienango, plained of ," that " remote negligence 
 etc. R. Co., 92 Pa. St. 335). An is that which does not occur at the 
 instruction to the jury asked by a time of such injury." Held, error 
 turnpike company, to the effect that (Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Goss, 17 
 even if it were negMgent in repairing Wise. 441). See § 26, ante. 
 its road, yet if the plaintiff were driv- * Norris v. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271 ; 
 ing a fractious horse, or was unable Lehigh, etc. R. Co. v. Greiner, 113 
 to control his horse because of a Pa. St. 600, 605 ; Farmer v. McCraw, 
 weakness of his arm, he was not en- 
 titled to recover, was properly re- 
 fused (Baltimore, etc. Turnp. Co. v. 
 Cassell, 66 Md. 419; 7 Atl. 805). 
 Plaintiff's intoxication is there- 
 fore, no defense, if it only re- 
 motely contributed to his injury 
 (Davis V. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 8 Oreg. 
 
 172). See § 93, ante. It has been Co., 37 Id. 316. 
 
 26 Ala. 189 ; Cleveland, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570 ; Orleans v. 
 Perry, 24 Neb. 831 ; 40 N. W. 417 ; 
 McNaughton v. Caledonian R. Co., 
 31 Dunlop, 160. See Haley v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 21 Iowa, 16 ; 
 O'Keefe v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 32 
 Id. 467 ; Carlin v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 
 held, however, error to charge 
 that negligence remotely con- 
 
 " Button V. Hudson River R. Co., 18 
 N. Y. 248. Nevertheless, where the 
 
 tributing to .the injury is not only negligence with which the plain- 
 material (Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. tiff is charged is such as operated di- 
 Plunkitt, 25 Kans. 188) . Such phrases, rectly, if at all, to produce the injury, 
 however scientifically correct, are, a new trial will not be granted on 
 when used to a jury, without ex- account of the judge's charging the 
 planation, often misleading. jury that they must find for the 
 
 ' See definition, § 26, ante. A plaintiff upon this issue, unless his 
 
 charge which implies that contribu- negligence operated directly to pro- 
 
 tory negligence, to defeat recovery, duce the injury (Johnson v. Hudson 
 
 must be the sole proximate cause of River R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65; Tuff v. 
 
 the injury, is erroneous (Payne v. Warman, 5 C. B. [N. S.] 573 ; 2 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 129 Mo. 405 ; 13 Id. 740). 
 
 S. W. 885. « Prather v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 3 In an action for the negligent 80 Ga. 427 ; 9 S. E. 530 ; Montgomery 
 
145 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§95 
 
 § 95- Negligence increasing damages only, no bar. — By 
 
 the " injury," contribution to which by the plaintiff's fault is 
 said to be a bar to his action, must be understood the par- 
 ticular event which causes damage to the plaintiff, not the 
 damage itself. If the plaintiff in no degree contributed by 
 his want of ordinary care to expose himself to the act by 
 which he was injured, it is no bar to his action that, by any 
 fault of his own, he aggravated the consequences of that 
 injury.! -pj^^j. f^^.^.^ jj established, only goes to mitigate the 
 damages recoverable by him.^ He cannot recover compensa- 
 tion for any damage which he might have avoided by the 
 use of ordinary care and diligence, after becoming aware 
 of the injury of which he complains;' but he can recover 
 for any other damage ;'' and the utmost result of such negli- 
 gence on his part would be to reduce his recovery to a 
 nominal sum. Where the plaintiff has suffered two distinct 
 injuries, with respect to only one of which he is charge- 
 
 V. East Tennessee, etc. E. Co., 94 Ga. 
 333 ; 21 S. E. 571. 
 
 ' Bradford v. Downs, 126 Pa. St. 
 622 ; 17 Atl. 884 ; Gould v. McKenna, 
 86 Pa. St. 297 ; Matthews v. Warner. 
 39 Gratt. 570; Secord v. St. Paul, 
 etc. R. Co., 5 McCrary, 515; Smith- 
 wick V. Hall, etc. Co., 59 Conn. 261 ; 
 21 Atl. 934 ; Thomas v. Kenyon, 1 
 Daly, 132 ; DuBois v. Decker, 52 Hun, 
 610 ; 4 N. Y. Supp. 768 [disobeying 
 surgeon's directions] ; Standard Oil 
 Co. V. Bowker, 141 Ind. 12 ; 40 N. E. 
 128 [same] ; Strudgeon v. Sand Beach, 
 
 Mich. ; 65 N. W. 616 [same]. 
 
 '^ Goshen v. England, 119 Ind. 368 ; 
 21 N. E. 977. See § 741, post. 
 
 ' Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 
 72 ; Milton v. Hudson River Steam- 
 boat Co., 37 Id. 310 ; Chase v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 34 Barb. 273 ; Sher- 
 man V. Fall River Iron Co., 2 Allen, 
 524 ; Hunt v. Lowell Gas Co,, 1 Id. 
 343 ; Wright v. Illinois, etc. E. Co., 
 20 Iowa, 195 I Tift v. Jones, 53 Ga. 
 538 ; Georgia R. Co. v. Eskew, 
 86 Id. 641 ; 12 S. E. 1061 [expelled 
 passenger walking, when he could 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — 10] 
 
 have ridden] ; Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Burrow, 32 111. App. 161 [same]; 
 Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. Hembree, 
 84 Ala. 183 ; 4 So. 393 [value of dead 
 animal deducted] ; Sandwich v. Do- 
 lan, 34 111. App. 199 [not employing 
 competent physician]. WJiether the 
 refusal of plaintiff to have a limb 
 amputated, as advised by lii.s physi- 
 cian, contributed to his death so as 
 to bar a recovery is for the jury 
 (Sullivan v. Tioga R. Co., 113 N. Y. 
 643; SON. E. 569). 
 
 ■* Where the damage caused by 
 the negligence of defendant was in- 
 creased by the negligence of plaintiff, 
 the latter can recover up to the time 
 when his contributory negligence 
 began to affect the result (Stebbins 
 v. Vermont Central R. Co., 54 Vt 
 464 ; quoting § 32 of our earlier edi- 
 tion). See Miller v. Mariner's 
 Church, 7 Me. 51 ; State v. Powell, 
 44 Mo. 433 ; Douglass v. Stevens, 18 
 Id. 363 ; Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. Finni- 
 gan, 31 111. 616; Toledo, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Parker, 49 Id. 385 ; Worth v. Ed- 
 monds, 53 Barb. 40. 
 
§96] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 146 
 
 able with contributory fault, he can nevertheless recover for 
 the other.' 
 
 § 96. Plaintiffs fault need not be cause of injury.— It is 
 
 not essential to this defense that the plaintiff's fault should have 
 been, in any degree, the cause of the event by which he was 
 injured.^ It is enough to defeat him, if the injury might have 
 been avoided by his exercise of ordinary care.^ The question 
 to be determined in every case is, not whether the plaintiff's 
 negligence cmised, but whether it contributed to the injury of 
 which he complains.^ This it may do by exposing him to the 
 risk of injury, quite as effectually as if he committed the very 
 act which injured him.* Neither is it necessary that the 
 plaintiff's negligence should have contributed to the injury in 
 any greater degree than the negligence of the defendant.' 
 
 5 In Northern Central R. Co. v. 
 Price (29 Md. 420), the decedent, 
 ■while negligent, was run over by a 
 train. The trainmen laid his appar- 
 ently lifeless body in a -warehouse at 
 night. In the morning, it was found 
 that decedent had survived, and he 
 afterwards died from loss of blood. 
 The company was held liable, not- 
 withstanding plaintiff contributed to 
 causing the collision. Whether one 
 injured by falling on ice, negligently 
 allowed to accumulate on the side- 
 walk, was negligent in not discover- 
 ing the ice is for the jury (Thuringer 
 V. N. Y. Central, E. Co., 71 Hun, 
 526; 24 N. Y. Supp. 1087; Lake 
 Shore, etc. E. Co v. Parker, 131 
 111. 557 ; 23 N. E. 287 [whether loco- 
 motive engineer was negligent in 
 approaching at a particular rate 
 of speed a switch, which was mis- 
 placed, when his view was obscured 
 by smoke] ; Blaiser v. N. Y, Lake 
 Erie, etc. E. Co.. 110 N. Y. 638 ; 17 
 N. E. 692 [plaintiff struck, at cross- 
 ing, by engine without headlight or 
 warning]) . 
 
 ' Colegrove v. New Haven E. Co., 
 80 N. Y. 492 ; Memphis, etc. E. Co. 
 
 v. Jobe, 69 Miss. 4o2 ; 10 So. 672 ; 
 s. p., McKeller v. Monitor, 78 Mich. 
 485 ; 44 N. W. 412. Much less that 
 it should be the sola cause (Central 
 Pass. R. Co. V. Stevens, Ky. ; 
 22 S. W. 312 ; North Birmingham R. 
 Co. V. Calderwood, 89 Ala. 247 ; 7 So. 
 360). 
 
 ' See § 87, ante. 
 
 'Brand v. Schenectady, etc. R. 
 Co., 8 Barb. 368. 
 
 * Oohsenbein v. Shapley, 85 N. Y. 
 214. Where there are various steps 
 in the happening of an accident, 
 culminating in plaintiff's injury, his 
 negligence contributing to the initia- 
 tion of the events, will bar his re- 
 covery for injuries sustained by the 
 last event, though, as to that, he was 
 without fault (Rhing v. Broadway, 
 etc. R. Co., 53 Hun, 321; 6 N. Y. 
 Supp. 641 [plaintiff trampled on by 
 horses after collision witli street 
 car]). 
 
 5 This is well settled (Wilds v. 
 Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 430 ; 
 Grippen v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 40 
 Id. 34 ; Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Me. 325 ; 
 Hoben v. Burlington, etc. R. Co. , 20 
 Iowa, 562. It is so held, even in 
 
147 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§97 
 
 §97. Effect of technical trespass. — The mere fact that the 
 plaintiff, when he suffered the injury, was technically trespass- 
 ing on the defendant's premises, and would not have been 
 injured if he had not so trespassed, is not conclusive evidence 
 of contributory negligence.' The decisions upon this point, 
 even in the same court, are probably not reconcilable with each 
 other; and they certainly cannot be reconciled by any mere 
 quotations from their language. But a principle can be found 
 which will reconcile all decisions which ought to stand, includ- 
 ing nearly all reported, disregarding dicta and looking to the 
 
 Illinois (see § IQi,' post). The law 
 does not undertake, when both 
 parties have been negligent, to 
 measure the degree of negligence of 
 each, nor will it allow a recovery by 
 the party least in fault against the 
 other (McGrath v. N. Y. Central, 
 etc. R. Co., 59 N. Y. 4G8 ; Long v. 
 Milford, 137 Pa. St. 122 ; 20 Atl. 
 425). 
 
 > Lowe V. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah, 
 91 ; 44 Pac. 1050 [approving our text] ; 
 Daley v. Norwich, etc. R. Co., 26 
 Conn. 591 ; Birge v. Gardiner, f9 Id. 
 507 ; Brown v. Lynn, 31 Pa. St. 510 ; 
 Vicksburg, etc. R. Co. v. McGowan, 
 62 Miss. 682. The keeper of ferocious 
 dogs is liable to a technical trespasser 
 who, without warning, approaches 
 the premises and is attacked by them 
 (Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496; 
 Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 ; Woolf 
 V. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121). To the 
 same effect, Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 
 Sneed, 58; see S 639, post In Bird 
 V. Holbrook (4 Bing. 628), the defend- 
 ant had put spring guns in the 
 ground, for the obvious purpose of 
 injuring trespassers. Not having 
 put up any notice of warning, he was 
 held liable to a trespasser injured by 
 one of these guns. Recovery al- 
 lowed for trespassing colt, injured by 
 vicious mule at large (Hill v. Ap- 
 plegate, 40 Kans. 31 : 19 Pac. 315). 
 Except in the case of dogs that have 
 killed his sheep (Rev. St. 1889, c. 
 
 54), a man has no right to set baits 
 of poisoned meat on his premises for 
 dogs that may trespass there, and is 
 liable to their owners for injuries to 
 such dogs (Gillum v. Sisson, 53 Mo. 
 App. 516). In Townsend v. Wathen 
 (9 East, 277) , the defendant set traps 
 in his wood, baited with strong- 
 scented meat. The wood being un- 
 inclosed, the plaintiff's dogs entered 
 it, attracted by the meat, and were 
 caught in the traps: held, plaintiff 
 could recover, notwithstanding his 
 dogs were trespassers. See Wooton 
 V. Dawkins, 2 C. B. [N. S.] 412; Jor- 
 dan V. Crump, 8 Mees. & W. 782; 
 Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489, in 
 which plaintiff wdfe not allowed to 
 recover for dog killed by a spike, 
 placed by defendant, with notice. 
 Compare Johnson v. Patterson, 14 
 Conn. 1; Gray v. Coombs, 7 J. J. 
 Marsh, 478 ; Hooker v. Miller, 37 
 Iowa, 613. A person may protect 
 his house from burglary by setting 
 a spring gun (State v. Moore, 31 
 Conn. 479). Stepping on a railroad 
 track to rescue another from injury 
 by an approaching train is not a 
 trespass-.(Spooner v. Delaware, etc. 
 R. Co., 115 N. Y. 22 ; 21 N. E. 696), 
 nor is going on another's premises 
 where a fire is raging, endangering 
 life and safety, for the honest pur- 
 pose of saving life or property 
 (Henry v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 
 67 Fed. 426). 
 
§ 97] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. I48 
 
 real points decided. This principle appears to us to be that, 
 in order to defeat his recovery, the plaintiff's trespass must be 
 culpable, from a common-sense point of view, and not in the 
 technical sense which would include every neglect to comply 
 with the letter of the law. Unless the plaintiff has done some- 
 thing which persons of ordinary prudence and moral sense 
 would feel to be careless or morally wrong, involving a reason- 
 able possibility of injury either to himself or to the person 
 upon whose premises he is trespassing, he should not be de- 
 barred from his right of action for negligence ; but the de- 
 fendant should be left to recover such damages as he can for 
 the trespass. Thus, an entry upon a vacant, unfenced lot is a 
 trespass, just as truly as an entry into a house with closed 
 doors ; but the presumption as to negligence in one case is 
 vastly different from that in the other. In one of those vehe- 
 ment opinions which make some of the Pennsylvania reports 
 such entertaining reading, but such unsafe guides, it was 
 asserted that an entry upon the land of an unfenced railroad 
 stood upon the same footing with an entry into a bedroom;^ 
 but this doctrine confounds all moral and some legal distinctions. 
 The comparison fails at every point. The injury which a stranger 
 does to the railroad company by entering upon its way is infini- 
 tesimal; while the risk to himself is great. The injury which 
 he does to his neighbor by secretly entering his bedroom is 
 great ; while the risk to himself, if undiscovered, is infinitesi- 
 mal. In each case, it is true, the effect upon the trespasser's 
 right to sue for damages may be the same ; but this will be for 
 very different reasons. If he walks along the track, he know- 
 ingly takes the risk of fatal injuries, and should not recover, 
 for that reason. If he secretes himself in the bedroom he 
 knowingly engages in a gross invasion of his neighbor's rights, 
 and should not recover, for that reason. Most of the reported 
 cases which appear at first sight inconsistent with this proposi- 
 tion, and all of them which are not inconsistent with other 
 and better-considered decisions, will prove, upon examination, 
 to be cases which turned, not upon contributory negligence, 
 but upon the question whether the defendant owed any duty 
 to persons in the plaintiff's situation, which he had neglected 
 
 = Phil. etc. R. Co. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. St. 375 ; see N. Y. & Erie E. Co. 
 V. Skinner, 19 Id. 301. 
 
149 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§97 
 
 to perform,^ which is an entirely different matter. Yet noth- 
 ing is more common than to find the two questions confused 
 with each other in judicial opinions. A large majority of the 
 apparently adverse cases, moreover, are railroad cases, in which 
 the trespasser knowingly exposed himself to injury. They 
 have, therefore, no bearing upon the question of the effect of 
 a mere technical trespass. We have been unable to find any 
 case of a mere trespass, in which any different rule is applied 
 from that which is applied by the same courts to the case of 
 one who enters by a bare license. In both, the real decision 
 is that the defendant is not bound to anticipate the presence 
 of a stranger, and therefore is not negligent in failing to pro- 
 tect him against injury.* 
 
 'For examples of such cases, see 
 Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co., 
 101 N. Y. 391; Nicholson v. Erie R. 
 Co., 41 Id. 535; Severy v. Nickerson, 
 130 Mass. 306 ; Hounsell v. Smyth, 
 7 C. B. [N. S.] 731; Parker v. Port- 
 land Pub. Co., 69 Me. 173 [absence 
 of a duty insisted on] ; Augusta B. 
 Co. V. Andrews, 89 Ga. 653 ; 16 S. E. 
 203. 
 
 ■•Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Hum- 
 mell, 44 Pa. St. 875 ; N. Y. & Erie 
 R. Co. V. Skinner, 19 Id. 301; Matze 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 1 Hun, 417 ; 
 Munger v. Tonawanda R. Co., 4 
 N. Y. 349 ; Roberton v. New York, 
 7 Misc. 645 ; 38 N. Y. Supp.l3 ; Ward 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 25 Greg. 
 433 ; 36 Pac. 166, and cases cited. 
 See § 705, post. And it will be pre- 
 sumed that he was not aware of 
 their presence- (Chenery v. Fitch- 
 burg R. Co., 160 Mass. 311; 35 N. E. 
 544 ; Holland v. Sparks, 93 Ga. 753 ; 
 18 S. E. 990 ; Cablett v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co., 57 Ark. 461; 21 S. W. 
 1062). In all the following cases, 
 usually, cited as authorities for the 
 proposition that a trespasser cannot 
 recover because he is a trespasser, 
 the courts really decided nothing 
 more than is stated in the text. 
 In all, travelers took shelter from 
 
 storms, without invitation: Lary v. 
 Cleveland, etc. R, Co., 78 Ind. 323 
 [taking shelter in a ruined house] ; 
 Converse v. Walker, 80 Hun, 596 
 [shelter in hotel] ; Pittsburgh, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Bingham, 29 Ohio St. 364 
 [station house] ; Parker v. Portland 
 Publishing Co., 69 Me. 178. PlaiAtiff, 
 a boy, going through a lumber yard 
 was injured by the fall of lumber 
 fifty feet from the highway (Van- 
 derbeck v. Hendry, 34 N. J. Law, 
 467). See, also, Jefferson ville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Goldsmith, 47 Ind. 43 ; 
 Morgan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 
 Fed. 78. Compare Graves v. Thomas, 
 95 Ind. 361, as distinguished in 
 Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Griffin, 
 100 Id. 331; Cahill v. Layton, 57 
 Wise. 600 ; Davis v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 58 Id. 646; Bransom v. Labrot, 
 81 Ky. 638. No recoveiy was allowed 
 in the following cases: Hargreaves 
 V. Deacon, 35 Mich. 1 [child coming 
 on defendant's premises, some dis- 
 tance from highway, fell into an un- 
 covered cistern ] ; McAlpine v. 
 Powell, 70 N. Y. 126 [child getting 
 on fire-escape attached to house, fell 
 through defective trap door] ; Rouls- 
 ton v. Clark, 3 E D. Smith, 366 
 [going through a building in pro- 
 gress of erection] ; Kohn v. Lovett, 
 
§99] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 15O 
 
 § 98. Technical trespass no bar. — The overwhelming 
 weight of authority, both in number of decisions and in sound- 
 ness of reasoning, by which is established the right of little 
 children to recover damages for injuries suffered while tres- 
 passing, should alone be sufficient to settle this question.^ 
 Innocence and mistake are no excuse for a trespass;* and 
 therefore one committed by a child is just as truly a trespass 
 as if committed by an adult. The owner of premises has pre- 
 cisely the same right to eject a child therefrom, as he has to 
 eject a full-grown man. He has the same right to recover 
 nominal damages in each case. But when he is sued for dam- 
 ages caused by his negligence towards a trespasser, he finds 
 that there is a wonderful difference between the probable 
 result of the suit, if the plaintiff is a child, and the probable 
 result of a like suit by an adult. Is there any intelligible 
 ground of distinction to account for this difference, except that 
 the child is presumably not guilty of conscious negligence, 
 while the man presumably is? When the man proves that he 
 was ignorant of the fact that he was trespassing, or shows that 
 his trespass was only technical, and such as he might reason- 
 ably suppose would not be objected to by the defendant, and 
 did not in fact produce any appreciable injury or annoyance, 
 his right to recover is just as good as that of an infant.^ All 
 this is well settled. And what inference can possibly be drawn 
 from such decisions, if not that the plaintiff's trespass is only a 
 circumstance tending to prove contributory fault upon his part, 
 and not in and of itself such fault or attended with the usual 
 effects of such fault ? 
 
 § 99. Defendant's later negligence ; rule in Davies v. 
 Mann. — It is now perfectly well settled that the plaintiff may 
 recover damages for an injury caused by the defendant's neg- 
 
 44 Ga. 251 [plaintlflE, responding to ' See § 73, ante; Vicksburg v. Mc- 
 
 a tire alarm, ran through defendant's Lain, 67 Miss. 4 ; 6 So. 774. 
 
 store and fell down an opening] ; ' Per Andrews, J., Beck v. Carter, 
 
 Zoebisch v. TarbeU, 10 Allen, 385 68 N. Y. 283, 289. 
 
 [plaintiff going into a room of fac- ^ Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 406. 
 
 tory on the door of which " no ad- and other cases cited under last sec- 
 
 mittance" was painted] ; S P., Sev«ry tion. Text quoted and approved 
 
 V. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306. (Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah. 91; 
 
 44 Pac. 1050). 
 
^51 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§99 
 
 ligence, notwithstanding the plaintiff's own neghgence ex- 
 posed him to the risk of injury, if such injury was more imme- 
 diately caused by the defendant's omission, after > becoming 
 aware of the plaintiff's danger,^ to use ordinary care ' for the 
 
 purpose of avoiding injury to him.* We know of no court of 
 
 1 Defendant's negligence must be Ct. 653) ; and by every court in the 
 subsequent to plaintiff's. Recovery Union, except possibly Pennsyl- 
 cannot be had for the killing by a vania. It is the lavir in Alabama 
 train of a trespasser, by reason of (Gothard v. Alabama, etc. R, Co., 
 the fact that the train vpas not prop- 67 Ala. 114 ; Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 erly equipped with appliances for v. Hurt, 101 Id. 34; 13 So. 130); 
 stopping it quickly (Smith v. Nor- California (Needham v. San Fran- 
 folk, etc. R. Co., 114 N. C. 728; 19 cisco, etc. R. Co., 37 Cal. 409); Col- 
 S. E. 863, 923 ; Sullivan v. Missouri orado (Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. Cran- 
 Pac. R. Co., 117 Mo. 214; 28 S. W. mer, 4 Colo. 524) ; Connecticut (jBbeU. 
 149). "The obligation is mutual to v. New Haven, etc. R. Co., 27 Conn, 
 use care to avoid the consequences 393) ; Delaware (Cummins v. Pres- 
 of each other's negligence " (North- ley, 4 Harr. 815) ; Georgia Macon, 
 em Central R. Co. v. Price, 29 Md. etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 18 Ga. 679 ; 
 430, and see § 101, post. Georgia, etc. R. Co. v. Neely, 56 Id. 
 
 ' In all the cases cited in note 4, 540) ; Illinois ( Illinois, etc. R. Co. 
 
 with two or three exceptions, the v. Hoffman, 07 111. 287 ; Chicago v. 
 
 defendant was fully aware of the Donahue, 75 Id. 106 ; Ohio, etc. R. 
 
 plaintiff's danger. Co. v. Stratton, 78 Id. 88 ; Chicago, 
 
 'A charge that defendant is liable etc. R. Co. v. Ryan, 131 Id. 474 ; 23 
 unless its servants did everything in N. E. 885 ; City R. Co. v. Jones, 61 
 their power to prevent the accident 111. App. 183 [attention diverted by a 
 prescribes too stringent a rule (Mo- runaway team]) ; Indiana (Jefferson- 
 bile, etc. R. Co. V. Watly, 69 Miss. viUe, etc. R. Co. v. Adams, 48 Ind. 
 145; 13 So. 825). To same effect, 402; Wright v. Brown, 4 Id. 95); 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Dunnaway Iowa (Balcom v. Dubuque, etc. R. 
 93 Va. 29: 34 S. E. 698. Co. , 21 Iowa, 102 ; Kuhn v. Chicago, 
 
 ■•This principle, first enunciated in etc. R. Co., 42 Id. 420; Searles v. 
 
 Davies v, Mann (10 Mees. & "W. 546), Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 35 Id. 490 ; 
 
 in different language, has been ac- Morris v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 45 Id. 
 
 cepted in this form by every court 29; Deeds v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 in England, including the House of 69 Id. 164 ; 28 N. W. 488 ; Conners 
 
 Lords (Radley v. Northwestern R. v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 87 Iowa, 
 
 Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 754 ; Scott v. 147 ; 53 N. W. 1092 ; Haden v. Sioux 
 
 Dublin, etc. R. Co., 11 Irish C. L. City, etc. R. Co. , 92 Iowa, 226 ; 60 N. 
 
 •337; Dimes v. Petley, 15 Q. B. 376, W. 537); Kansas (Kansas Pac. R, 
 
 283 ; Tuff v. Warman, 5 C. B. [N. S.] Co. v. Whipple, 39 Kans. 531 ; 18 P, 
 
 573 ; Witherley v. Regent's Canal 730) ; Kentucky (Louisville, etc. R, 
 
 Co., 13 Id. 3) ; by the U. S. Supreme Co. v. Collins, 3 Duvall, 116) ; Louisi- 
 
 Court (Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, anas (Johnson v. Canal, etc. R. Co. 
 
 144U. S. 408; 13 S'. Ct. 679 [an in- 37 La. Ann. 53); Maryland (Balti 
 
 structive case] ; Inland, etc. Coasting more, etc. R. Co. v. Mulligan, 45 Md 
 
 Co. V. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551 ; 11 S. 486 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Mc 
 
§99] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 152 
 
 last resort in which this rule is any longer disputed ; although 
 the same rule, in substance, but inaccurately stated, has been 
 made the subject of strenuous controversy.^ But, furthermore, 
 
 Donnell,43 Id. 534 ; Consolidated Gas 
 Co. V. Crocker, 82 Id. 113 ; 33 Atl. 
 423 [entering with light a cellar filled 
 vrith gasj); Massachusetts (Lane v. 
 Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104 ; Brit- 
 ton V. Cummington, Id. 347 ; Hib- 
 bard v. Thompson, 109 Id. 288; 
 Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Id. 59 ; 
 Lovett V. Salem, etc. R. Co., 9 Allen, 
 557 ; Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Id. 176) ; 
 Michigan (Underwood v. Waldron, 
 33 Mich. 232) ; Minnesota (Donaldson 
 V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 21 Minn. 
 293 ; Ingalls v. Adams Ex. Co., 44 
 Id. 128 ; 46 N. W. 335 ; Hepfel v. St. 
 Paul, etc. R. Co., 49 Id. 263; 51 N. 
 W. 1049 ; Evarts v. St. Paul, etc. R. 
 Co., 56 Minn. 141 ; 57 N. W. 459); 
 Mississippi (Mississippi, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Mason, 51 Miss. 234 ; Christian v. 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co., 71 Miss. 287; 13 
 So. 710) ; Missouri {Morrissej T.Wig- 
 gins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 380 ; Boland 
 V. Missouri R. Co., 30 Id. 484 ; Isabel 
 V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 60 Id. 475 ; 
 Nelson v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 68 
 Id. 593 ; Price v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 Co., 72 Id. 414 ; Hanlan v. Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co., 104 Mo. 381 ; 16 S. W. 
 233 ; Brill v. Eddy, 115 Mo. 596 ; 22 
 S. W. 488 ; Chamberlain v. Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co., 132 Mo. 318; 33S.W.437); 
 Nebraska (Burnet v. Burlington, 
 etc. R. Co., 16 Neb. 333 ; Sioux City, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Smith, 22 Id 775 ; 36 
 N. W. 285 ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Mertes, 39 Neb. 448 ; 58 N. W. 105) ; 
 New Hampshire (Feloh v. Concord 
 R. R.,66N. H. 318; 29 AtL 557); 
 New York (Silliman v. Lewis, 49 
 49 N. Y. 379; Button v. Hudson 
 River R. Co.. 18 N. Y. 248, per Har- 
 ris, J. ; Austin v. N. J. Steamboat 
 Co., 43 Id. 75; Green v. Erie R. 
 Co., 11 Hun, 383 ; Sweeney v. N. Y. 
 
 Steam Co., 15 Daly, 312 ; 6 N. Y. 
 Supp. 538 ; Whittaker v. Delaware, 
 etc. Canal Co., 49 Hun, 400); North 
 Carolina (Aycock v. Wilmington, 
 etc . R. Co. , 6 Jones, 231 ; Gunter v. 
 Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 ; Manly v. 
 Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 74 Id. 655 ; 
 Doggett V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 78 Id. 305 ; Lay v. Richmond, etc. 
 R. Co., 106 Id. 404; 11 H. E. 412; 
 Clark V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 
 109 N. C. 430; 14 S. E. 43); Ohio 
 (Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Elliott, 28 
 Ohio St. 340 ; Kerwhacker v. Cleve- 
 land, etc. R. Co., 3 Id. 173 ; Cincin- 
 nati, etc. R. Co. V. Kassen, 49 Id. 
 230; 31 N. E. 282); Texas (Gulf, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Fox, 6 S. W. 569) ; 
 Vermont (Ross v. Troy, etc. R. Co., 
 49 Vt. 364 ; Trow v. Vermont, etc. 
 R. Co., 24 Id. 487) ; West Virginia 
 (Carrico v. West Virginia Cent. etc. 
 R. Co., 35 W. Va. 389 ; 14 S. E. 12); 
 PVisconsin (Woodward v. West Side 
 R. Co., 71 Wise. 625 ; 38 N. W. 347 ; 
 Little V. Superior, etc. R. Co., 88 
 Wise. 402; 60 N. W. 705). 
 
 'In Pennsylvania, Woodward, J., 
 referring to Beers v. Housatonic R. 
 Co. (19 Conn. 566), criticised the 
 language there used, and added : " I 
 prefer our own mode of holding the 
 law ; that if the injury result from 
 the want of ordinary care of both 
 parties, neither has remedy against 
 the other ; but if it be not in any de- 
 gree ascribable to the negligence of 
 one party — due regard being had to" 
 all the circumstances of his ^.losi- 
 tion — he may have redress from 
 the other " (Reeves v. Delaware, etc. 
 R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 4.54). But in that 
 case, the decision was in favor of 
 the plaintiff, and we think that the 
 doctrine of the text is substantially 
 
153 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§99 
 
 the plaintiff should recover, notwithstanding his own negli- 
 gence exposed him to the risk of injury, if the injury of which 
 he complains was more immediately caused by the omission of 
 the defendant, after having such notice of the plaintiff's dan- 
 ger as would put a prudent man upon his guard, to use ordi- 
 nary care for the purpose of avoiding such injury.^ It is not 
 necessary that the defendant should actually know of the dan- 
 ger to which the plaintiff is exposed. It is enough if, having 
 sufficient notice to put a prudent man on the alert, he does 
 not take such precautions as a prudent man would take under 
 similar notice. This rule is almost universally accepted.''' The 
 
 accepted in Pennsylvania. Compare 
 Philadelphia, etc. E. Co. v. Spearen, 
 47 Id. 300 ; Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Id. 
 439; Creed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 86 Id. 139 ; Eailroad Co. v. Norton, 
 24 Id. 465 ; Catawissa R. Co. v. Arm- 
 strong, 49 Id. 193 ; Heil v. Glanding, 
 43 Id. 493. 
 
 "Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W., 
 546. The celebrated " donkey case." 
 Davies negligently left his donkey 
 on the highway, fettered, so that it 
 could not escape. Mann, di-iving 
 rapidly and carelessly, ran over the 
 donkey. The report does not show 
 whether Mann's driver was aware of 
 the donkey's presence on the road or 
 not. It was held that the plaintiff 
 was entitled to recover, on the 
 ground that " although the ass may 
 have been wrongfully there, still 
 the defendant was bound to go 
 along the road at such a pace as 
 would be likely to prevent mischief." 
 S. P., Wynn v. City, etc. R. Co., 91 
 Ga. 344 ; 17 S. E. 649 [young child 
 trespassing on street car] ; Schulz v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 57 Minn. 271 ; 59 
 N. W. 193 ; Sullivan v. Missouri Pac. 
 E. Co., 117 Mo. 314 : 33 S. W. 149 ; 
 Kelly V. Union R. Co., 95 Mo. 379 ; 
 8 S. W. 430 ; Scoville v. Hannibal, 
 etc. R. Co., 80 Mo. 484 ; "Welsh v. Jack- 
 son, Id. 466 [overruling earlier cases] ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Grablin, 88 
 
 Neb. 90 ; 56 N. W. 796 ; 57 Id. 533 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Wymore, 40 
 Neb. 645 ; 58 N. W. 1120 ; Omaha R. 
 Co. V. Martin, 48 Neb. 65 ; 66 N. W. 
 1007 ; Bottoms v. Seaboard, etc. R. 
 Co., 114 N. C. 099; 19 S. E. 730 
 [child on track] ; Lloyd v. Albe- 
 marle, etc. R. Co., 118 N. C. 1011 ; 34 
 S. E. 805 [person lying helpless on 
 track] ; East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. 
 V. St. John, 5 Sneed, 534 [boy sleep- 
 ing on track] ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Crosnoe, 73 Tex. 79 ; 10 S. W. 343 ; 
 Yoakum v. Mettasch, Tex. Civ. 
 App. ; 36 S. W. 139 [person on 
 track at private crossing] ; Mitchell 
 V. TacomaR. Co., 9 Wash. St. 120; 
 37 Pac. 341 [child on track] ; Gunn v. 
 Ohio River R. Co., 37 W. Va. 421 ; 16 
 S. E. 628 [same] ; and other cases, 
 swpra. 
 
 ' In a very few cases, courts have 
 refused to extend the rule so far 
 (Keefe v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 92 
 Iowa, 183 ; 60 N. W. 503 [compare 
 Wooster v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 74 
 Iowa, 593 ; 38 N. W. 425] ; Raines v. 
 Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 39 W. Va. 
 50 ; 19 S. E. 565. Plaintiff must 
 show that defendant had actual 
 knowledge of his danger, and could 
 have avoided the injury by or- 
 dinary care (Richmond, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Didzoneit, 1 App. D. C. 482 ; 
 see Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Yea- 
 
§99] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 154 
 
 most reckless persistence, on the part of one exposed to dan- 
 ger, will not justify another in consciously refraining from 
 using care to avoid injury to him.* This qualification of the 
 doctrine of contributory negligence, often called "the rule 
 in Daviesv. Mann," from the leading case on this subject, 
 has been much criticised. But those criticisms turn mainly 
 upon the language used by Baron Parke in that case, which 
 is, perhaps, too broad, and which has not been here 
 adopted ; although it has been literally repeated in the 
 highest court of England,' as well as in that of the United 
 States.^" It is possible, too, that the application of the 
 principle in Davies v. Mann was erroneous; but that does 
 not affect the validity of the principle which lay at the 
 foundation of that case. That principle is that the party 
 who has the last opportunity of avoiding accident, is not 
 excused by the negligence of any one else. His negligence, 
 
 mans, 86 Va. 860:12 8. E. 946). In 
 Denman v. St. Paul, etc. E. Co. (26 
 Minn. 357), it was held that the neg- 
 ligence of one who sat down outside 
 of a railroad, 6 or 8 inches from the 
 rail, fell asleep and was run over, was 
 such as to prevent a recovery, though 
 he could have been seen by the en- 
 gineer, but was not actually seen. 
 
 * The wisdom of this rule is strik- 
 ingly illustrated in Spoouer v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. R. Co. (115 N. Y. 22 ; 21 
 N. E. 696), where plaintiff's foot was 
 caught in the rail and she could not 
 escape. 
 
 'Eadley v. London & North- 
 western R. Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 
 754. In that case, Lord Penzance 
 said: "Though the plaintiff may 
 have been guilty of negligence, and 
 although that negligence may in 
 fact have contributed to the acci- 
 dent, yet if the defendant could, in 
 the result, by the exercise of ordi- 
 nary care and diligence, have 
 avoided the mischief which hap- 
 pened, the plaintiff's negligence will 
 not excuse him." 
 
 ■°In Inland, etc. Coasting Co. v. 
 Tolson (139 U. S. 551, 558) the trial 
 court charged that even if the plain- 
 tiff had been" guilty of contributory 
 negligence . . . yet the con- 
 tributory negligence on his part 
 would not exonerate the defendant 
 and disentitle the plaintiff from re- 
 covering, if it be shown that the 
 defendant might, by the exercise of 
 reasonable care and prudence, have 
 avoided the consequences of the 
 plaintiff's negligence." Held, that 
 this charge " contained nothing of 
 which the defendant has a right to 
 complain." In that case, however, 
 defendant was fully aware of the 
 facts. The same language was re- 
 peated in Grand Trunk R. Co. v. 
 Ives, 144 N. Y. 408, 429. So, also, in 
 other American cases (Little Rock, 
 etc, V. Dick, 52 Ark, 402 ; 12 S. W. 
 785 ; Nathan v. Charlotte St. R Co., 
 118 N. C. 1066 ; 24 S. B. 511 ; Brown 
 V. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470 ; 10 S. W. 
 288; Hall v. Ogden E. Co., 13 Utah, 
 243 ; 44 Pac. 1046). 
 
IS5 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ lOO 
 
 and not that of the one first in fault, is the sole proximate 
 cause of the injury." 
 
 §100. Illustrations of rule. — Thus, one who negligently 
 leaves a domestic animal on a highway or railroad, may recover 
 from one who, seeing it, or being in fault for not seeing it, 
 does not use proper care to avoid running over it.' So, if a 
 vessel fails to exhibit proper lights and take the proper side 
 of the channel, this is no defense in favor of one who, having 
 warning, fails to use proper care to avoid doing an injury.* 
 So, if a locomotive engineer sees persons or property on the 
 track, though unlawfully there, he must use ordinary care to 
 avoid a collision.^ Even if a trespasser obstinately remains 
 
 "Dowell V. Gen. Steam Nav. Co., 
 5 EI & B. 195, 206; Bostwick v. 
 Minneapolis, etc. E. Co., 2 N. Dak. 
 440 ; 51 N. W. 781 ; Hays v. Gaines- 
 ville E. Co., 70 Tex, 603 ; 8 S. W. 
 491 ; see Eichmond, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Brown, 89 Va. 749 ; 17 S. E. 133. 
 
 ' Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. 
 646 ; Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, etc. 
 E. Co., 3 Ohio St. 173 ; Leaven vrorth, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Forbes, 37 Ji:ans. 445 ; 
 15 Pac. 595 ; Card v. Harlem R. Co., 
 50 Barb. 39. The American cases, 
 in which a contrary opinion is ex- 
 pressed, will be found, upon analyz- 
 ing them, to be cases in which the 
 negligence of the defendant con- 
 sisted merely in not foreseeing the 
 negligence of the plaintiff ; for 
 which, as we have already shown, 
 the defendant is not responsible. 
 See § 93, ante. 
 
 « Taff V. Warman, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 
 57;J ; 3 Id. 740 ; Greenland v. Chap- 
 lin, 5 Exch. 343 ; Vennall v. Garner, 
 1 Cro. & Mees. 21 ; Inman v. Eeck, 
 L, E , 2 P. C. App. 35 ; Austin v. N. 
 J. Steamboat Co.. 43 N. Y. 75 ; see 
 Foster v. Holly, 38 Ala. 76. "Where 
 oysters are negligently left in the 
 channel of a navigable river, oiHcers 
 of a vessel, knowing them to be 
 there, are not justified in running 
 
 against and destroying them, there 
 being room to pass without doing so 
 (Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339, 
 377). 
 
 ' Illinois Central E. Co. v. Mid- 
 dlesworth, 46 111. 494 ; Kerwhacker v. 
 Cleveland, etc. E. Co., 3 Ohio St. 
 172. Where a wagon stuck in the 
 rails, it was held that the engineer 
 had no right to assume that it would 
 be taken oflf the track before he 
 reached it, but was bound to stop 
 the train (Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Ho- 
 garth, 38 111. 370). And, generally, 
 an engineer ought to slacken speed, 
 on seeing a child on the track (see 
 Philadelphia, etc. E. Co. v. Spearen, 
 47 Pa. St. 300). The engineer is not 
 absolutely bound to stop, however, 
 even if he sees a child upon the 
 track ; for if, in the exercise of a 
 sound judgment and great care, he 
 believes that the child can easily 
 escape, and will do so, he need not 
 slacken speed after giving the usual 
 signals (Id.). To same effect : Meyer 
 V. Midland, etc. E. Co., 3 Neb. 330. 
 Much more does this apply to a per- 
 son of mature age, upon the track 
 (Terre Haute, etc. E. Co. v. Graham, 
 46 Ind. 339 ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Bixby, 84 111. 83). But not so, if he 
 is so situated that he cannot easily 
 
§ I02] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 1 56 
 
 upon the track, in spite of warnings, the train must be 
 stopped, if necessary to avoid injuring him.* Where common 
 experience has shown that persons or cattle are constantly 
 upon the track, a recovery may be had for injuries suffered by 
 them through the neglect of the engineer to look out for 
 them, even if he did not see them.^ 
 
 § loi. Plaintiff last in fault. — The foregoing rule obviously 
 does not apply, where the plaintiff's contributory negligence 
 is, in order of causation, either subsequent to^ or concurrent 
 with ' that of the defendant. Therefore, while one negligently 
 walking upon a railroad is generally entitled to recover if 
 an engineer, seeing him, makes no effort to check the train, 
 he cannot recover if, after becoming aware of his danger, he 
 makes no proper effort to escape.^ So, one who, after notice 
 that a boiler is to be tested in a reckless manner, persists in 
 standing by until it explodes, cannot recover.* 
 
 § 102. Comparative negligence. — In Illinois, the doctrine 
 of " comparative negligence " was, until recently, firmly esta- 
 blished. It is not easy to state this doctrine with accuracy ; 
 but in most of the decisions it was said that, where both 
 parties had been guilty of negligence contributing to the 
 injury, the plaintiff could nevertheless recover, if his negli- 
 gence had been slight, compared with that of the defendant, 
 which had been gross.' Although similar expressions were 
 
 escape (Peii-ce v. Walters, 164 111. 560 ; = Holmes v. South. Pac, etc. R. Co., 
 
 45 N. E. 1068). See §§ 438, 483, 484, 97 Cal. 161 ; 31 Pac. 834. 
 
 post ; also § 99, ante. ^ Intei-national, etc. B. Co. v. Gar- 
 
 ■• Erickson v. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., cia, 75 Tex. 583 ; 13 S. W. 223. Ap- 
 
 41 Minn. 500 ; 43 N. W. 333. plied (two judges dissenting) to the 
 
 ' Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Cauflfman, case of an intoxicated man, not 
 
 38 111. 434 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. aware of his danger (Smith v. 
 
 Barrie, 55 Id. 226; Cincinnati, etc. Norfolk, etc. R. Co. supra; Louis- 
 
 R. Co. V. Smith, 33 Ohio St. 337 ; see ville, etc. R. Co. v. Webb, 90 Ala. 
 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. V. State, 33Md. 185; 8 So. 518 [injury at railroad 
 
 543 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v.Wymore, crossing]). 
 
 40 Neb. G45 ; 58 N. W. 1130. Not so, * See Ochsenbein v. Shapley, 85 N. 
 
 where engineer has no reason to ex- Y. 214. 
 
 peot them (III. Central R. Co. v. No- ' An instruction " that if plaintiflE 
 
 ble, 142 111. 578 ; 33 N. E 684). was guilty of some negligence, but , 
 
 'Smith V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co. 114 defendant of gross negligence, and 
 
 N. C 728 ; 19 S. E 863, 933. plaintiflf's negligence was slight com. 
 
157 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 102 
 
 at one time used by the courts in other states,' this dis- 
 tinction was not finally accepted anywhere else in America, 
 Great Britain or Ireland.^ It has now been abolished in 
 
 Illinois;* and, therefore, we omit the discussion of the 
 question, which was given at length in our last edition. 
 
 pared with the negligence of de- Bush, 166 ; Kentucky, etc. R. Co. v. 
 fendant, plaintiff might recover," Thomas, 79 Ky. 160; but see Ken- 
 correctly states the former law of tucky, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 93 Id. 
 Illinois as to comparative negligence 449 ; 20 S. W. 392) ; Massachusetts 
 (Chicago V. Stearns, 105 111. 554 ; (Marble v. Ross, 134 Mass. 44) ; Mis- 
 S. P., Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Lee, 60 souri (Hurt v. St. Louis, etc. R. Go., 
 Id. 501 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Har- 94 Mo. 355 ; 7 S. W. 1) ; New Jersey 
 wood, 90 Id. 435). This rule was first (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Righter, 43 
 formulated by Breese, J , in Galena, N. J. Law, 180) ; New York ("Wells v. 
 etc. R. Co. v. Jacobs (30 111. 478); N. Y. Central R. Co., 24 N. Y. 181 ; 
 and was continually re-affirmed Wilds v. Hudson River R. Co., Id. 
 ' down to 1891 (Indianapolis, etc. R. 430) ; Pennsylvania (Potter v. War- 
 Co. V. Stables, 63 111. 313; Chicago, ner, 91 Pa. St. 363 ; Stiles v. Geesey, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Clark, 70 Id. 276 ; 71 Id. 439) ; Tennessee (East Tennes- 
 Kewanee v. Depew, 80 Id. 119 ; see, etc. R. Co. v. Aiken, 89 Tenn. 
 Hayward v. MerrUl, 94 Id. 349 ; 345 ; 14 S. W. 1083 ; East Tennessee, 
 Wabash, etc. R. Co. v. Wallace, 110 etc. R. Co. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 33; 13 
 Id. 114 ; Jefferson v. Chapman, 127 S. W. 419) ; Texas (Houston, etc. R. 
 Id. 438 ; 20 N. E. 33 ; and scores of Co. v. Qorbett, 49 Tex. 573 ; Mis- 
 other cases. The latest seems to be souri, etc. R. Co. v. Rogers, 89 Tex. 
 [1891] Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. 675 ; 36 S. W. 343 ; TVisconsin (Potter 
 Johnsen, 135 111. 641; 20 N. E. v. Chicago, etc. R., 31 Wise. 377; 
 510.) 32 Id. 615 ; Cunningham v. Lyness, 
 
 ' Ohio (Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, Id. 336). Some decisions in Kansas 
 
 etc. R. Co. , 3 Ohio St. 172) ; Indiana (Union Pacific R Co. v. Rollins, 5 
 
 (Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Lowder- Kans. 167 ; Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Id. 
 
 milk, 15 Ind. 120 ; Lafayette, etc. R. 466 ; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Pointer, 
 
 Co. V. Adams, 26 Id. 76) ; Wisconsin 14 Id. 37 ; Wichita, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 (Stucke V. Milwaukee,' etc. R. Co., Davis, 37 Id. 743; 16 Pac. 78) seemed 
 
 9 Wise. 183) ; New York (Chapman to indicate that the rule of compara- 
 
 V. New Haven R. Co., 19 N. Y. 341 ; tive negligence was adopted there. 
 
 Button V. Hudson River R. Co., 18 But it has finally been decided that 
 
 Id. 348). it is not (Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 The doctrine of comparative Peavey, 39 Kans. 170 ; Atchison, etc. 
 
 negligence has been expressly re- R. Co. v. Morgan, 31 Id. 77 ; Atchi- 
 
 jected in Alabama (Memphis, etc. R. son, etc. R. Co. v. Henry, Kans. ; 
 
 Co. V. Copeland, 61 Ala. 376) ; Indi- 45 Pac. 576). 
 
 ana (Terre Haute, etc. R. Co. V. Gra- ■"" The doctrine of comparative 
 
 ham, 95 Ind. 386) ; Iowa (Johnson v. negligence has been abolished in 
 
 Tillson, 36 Iowa, 89 ; Artz v. Chicago, Illinois " (Cicero, etc. , R. Co. v. Meix- 
 
 etc. R. Co., 44 Id. 284 ; O'Keefe v. ner, 160 111. 330 ; 43 N. E. 823 ; Lanark 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 33 Id. 467) : Ken- v. Dougherty, 153 111. 163 ; 38 N. E. 
 
 tucky (Digby v. Kenton Works, 8 893). 
 
§i03] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 IS8 
 
 But some such rule has been adopted by statute, in South 
 CaroHna.^ 
 
 § 103. Rule in Georgia, Florida and Tennessee.— It is 
 
 frequently said that the rule of comparative negligence is ac- 
 cepted in Georgia.! Qne or two Georgia decisions seem to 
 justify this statement;^ but the later cases seem to hold a 
 different rule, for which a dissenting judge in an early case 
 struggled hard,' and, as it appears, in the end successfully. 
 This is, to require the jury to mitigate damages in proportion 
 to" the plaintiff's contributory negligence.* In Tennessee, 
 
 ' In South Carolina,- by Gen. St. 
 S. C. g 1529, plaintiff cannot recover 
 where the injury was caused by de- 
 fendant's negligence, if the person 
 injured was, at the time, guilty of 
 gross or willful negligence, which 
 contributed to the injury. See Pet- 
 rie V. Columbia, etc. R. Co , 29 S. C. 
 303 ; 7 S. E. 515. 
 
 ' "Wharton, Negl. § 334 ; Marble v. 
 Ross, 124 Mass. 44 ; O'Keefe v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 32 Iowa, 467. See 
 the cases reviewed in Thompson, 
 Negl. 1 16.'), and Beach, Contr. Negl. 
 (2d ed.) § 88. 
 
 'Augusta, etc. R. Co. v. McEl- 
 murry, 24 Ga. 75 ; Macon, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Davis, 27 Id. 113. 
 
 ^Benning, J., Macon R. Co. v. 
 "Wynn, 26 Ga. 250. 
 
 * • ' For the same reason that recov- 
 ery is wholly defeated when plain- 
 tiff's negligence is shown to have been 
 the sole cause of the injury, it will be 
 defeated, in part, when his negli- 
 gence is shown to have been part of 
 the cause," per Beckley, J. (Georgia, 
 etc. R. Co. V Neely, 56 Ga. 540). To 
 recover at all, plaintiff's fault must 
 have been less than defendant's 
 (Central R. Co. v. Newman, 94 Id. 
 .560; 21 S. E. 219). In Georgia R. 
 Co. V. Pittman (73 Ga. 835). held, 
 that unless the decedent's negligence 
 must of itself alone have caused the 
 death, then it was for the jury to 
 
 diminish damages " in proportion to 
 the negligence of the decedent." 
 Compare East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Duggan, 51 Ga. 212 ; Georgia R. 
 Co. v, McDade, 59 Id. 73 ; Central, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Mitchell, 63 Id. 181 ; 
 Savannah, etc. R. Co. v. Folks, 76 
 Id. 527; Central R. Co. v. Thomp- 
 son, Id. 770 ; Central R. Co. v. Nash, 
 81 Id. 580 ; 7 S. E. 808. Code, Ga. § 
 2972, provides that in suits for per- 
 sonal injuries, if by ordinary care 
 the plaintiff could have avoided the 
 consequences of the defendant's neg- 
 ligence, he cannot recover. Section 
 3034 provides that, if the plaintiff 
 and a railroad defendant are both in 
 fault, the former may recover, but 
 the jury shall diminish the damage 
 in proportion to his fault. The latter 
 section applies only to cases in which 
 the plaintiff could not have avoided 
 the consequences of the defendant's 
 negligence (Americus R. Co. v. 
 Luckie, 87 Ga. 6 ; 18 S E. 105). Code, 
 g 2034, has no application where the 
 complainant is guilty of gross negli- 
 gence (Central R. Co. v. Smith, 78 
 Ga. 694 ; 3 S. E. 897). See Atlanta, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Ayers, 53 Ga. 12; Fland- 
 ers V. Meath, 27 Id . 358 ; compare 
 Central, etc. R. Co. v. Gleason, 69 
 Id. 200 : Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v.Wyly, 
 65 Id. 120 ; which turn upon the 
 meaning of statutes. 
 
159 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 104 
 
 under peculiar statutes, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, 
 unless the direct cause of his own injury, is, in actions against 
 railroad companies, not a bar to his action, but is to be consid- 
 ered in mitigation of damages.' A similar statute was enacted 
 in Florida, in 1887.* This is substantially an adoption of the 
 admiralty rule; which is certainly nearer ideal justice, if juries 
 could be trusted to act upon it. 
 
 § 104. Plaintiff's violation of statute — If the plaintiff 
 is acting in violation of a statute or ordinance at the 
 time of the accident, and such violation proximately con- 
 tributes to his injury, he is guilty of 'contributory fault, 
 and is as much debarred from recovery, as in other 
 cases of contributory negligence.' But, if such violation 
 did not so contribute to the injury, it is no defense.^ In 
 
 « Dush V. Fitzhugh, 2 Lea, 307 ; S. E. 317 ; Central R. Co v. Bruns- 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Walker, 11 Heisk. wick, etc. R. Co., 87 Ga. 386 ; 13 S. 
 
 383 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Mem- E. 520. 
 
 ing, 14 Lea, 128 ; East Tennessee R. ' So held, as to ordinances (Steele 
 Co. V. Fain, 12 Id. 35 ; Louisville, v. Burkhard, 104 Mass. 59 ; Hall v. 
 etc. R. Co. V. Howard, 90 Tenn. 144; Ripley, 119 Id. 135 ; Klipper v. Cof- 
 19 S. W. 116. fey, 44 Md. 117 ; Baker v. Portland, 
 « The statute of 1887, c. 3744, § 1, 58 Me. 199) ; and as to statutes (Con- 
 provides that no person shall recover nolly V. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 
 damages from a railroad company N. Y. 104 ; 21 N. B. 101 [child on 
 for injury occurring by his own con- car platform] ; Seymour v. Citizens' 
 sent, or through his own negligence, R. Co., 114 Mo. 266 ; 21 S. W. 739 
 but that, if he and the agents of the [same] ; Atlanta R. Co. v. Walker, 
 company both are at fault, he may 93 Ga. 462 ; 21 S. E. 48 [violating rule 
 recover damages, to be diminished of the road] ; Quinn v. O'Keefe, 9 N. 
 by the jury in proportion to the Y. App. Div. 68 ; 41 N. Y. Supp. 116 
 amount of fault attributable to him. [same ; proper side of road being 
 Held, that in giving the statute in a obstructed]; Damon v. Scituate, 119 
 charge, the court should instruct Mass. 66 ; Counter v. Couch, 8 Allen, 
 that the jury should not take into 436 ; Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Id. 176 ; 
 consideration any negligence of Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81 ; 
 either of the parties which did not Neanow v. TJttech, 46 Wise. 581). 
 proximately contribute to the injury In Sutton v. Wauwatosa (29 Wise. 
 (Florida Cent. R. Co. v. Williams, 37 21), the subject was fully discussed 
 Fla. 406; 20 So. 558). by Dixon, C. J., who said: "To 
 ' So held, as to city ordinances make good the defense [of illegality] 
 (Newcomb V. Boston Prot. Dep., 146 it must appear that a relation ex- 
 Mass. 596 ; 16 N. E. 555 ; followed isted between the act or violation of 
 Broschart v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 1 ; 21 law on the part of the plaintiff, and 
 Atl. 935). To same effect, McGrath the injury or accident, of which he 
 V. City, etc. R, Co., 93 Ga. 312 ; 20 complains ; and the relation must 
 
CUNTRIBUTURV XF.GLIGENCE. 
 
 1 60 
 
 Massachusetts-^ and Maine,* which were originally one state, 
 and in Vermont,^ general travel on a highway on Sunday has 
 always been prohibited ; and it is therefore held in those 
 states, that an ordinary Sunday traveler cannot recover for 
 injuries suffered from obstacles in the road^ or other negli- 
 
 have been such as to have caused or 
 helped to cause the mjury or acci- 
 dent, not in a remote or speculative 
 sense, but in the natural and ordinary 
 course of events as one event is 
 known to precede or follow another." 
 Hence it was held that the fact 
 that a traveler was violating the 
 Sunday law had no natural or 
 necessary tendency to cause the in- 
 jury happening to him from a defect 
 in the highway, and that he could 
 recover for the injury, s. p., Bald- 
 win V. Barney, 13 R. I. 393 ; Platz v. 
 Cohoes, 39 N. Y. 319. 
 3 Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 98, § 3. 
 * Maine Rev. Stat. ch. 134, § 30. 
 Traveling on Sunday, after sunset, is 
 not a violation of the statute in 
 Maine ; because the " Sabbath " ends 
 then (Bryant v. Biddeford, 39 Me. 
 193). 
 
 ' Vt. Gen. Stat. ch. 93, § 3. " No 
 one shall travel on the Sabbath or 
 the first day of the week, except 
 from necessity or charity" (lb.). 
 The Neio Hampshire statute declares 
 that "no person shall do any work, 
 business or labor of his secular call- 
 ing to the disturbance of others, etc. , 
 on the first day, etc." (N. H. Gen. 
 Stat. ch. 355 § 3). In that state, 
 traveling on Sunday, in such a man- 
 ner as not to disturb others, does not 
 bar a recovery for an injury by a de- 
 fect in the highway (Dutton v. 
 Weare, 17 N. H. 34). In New Jersey 
 (Rev. Stat. 1877 ; Laws, 1884, 1885), 
 all traveling and all worldly business 
 on land or water, necessity and 
 charity excepted, are forbidden : 
 one passenger train may be run each 
 way, and ferryboats may make 
 
 regular trips. A few other states 
 may have similar prohibitions. In 
 Wisconsin a violatioit of the Sun- 
 day law is declared to be no defense 
 to an action for an injury suffered 
 on Sunday, and every one may be 
 the judge of the necessity of travel- 
 ing on that day (Rev. Stat. 1878, 
 supplement 1879, 1884). 
 
 ' Bosworth V. Swansey, 1 Mete. 
 363 ; Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen, 18 ; 
 Hall V. Ripley, 119 Mass. 135 ; Lyons 
 V. Desotelle, 134 Id. 387 ; Smith v. 
 Boston, etc. R. Co., 130 Id. 490 ; Hyde 
 Park V. Gay, 130 Id. 589 ; ConnoUy 
 V. Boston, 117 Id. 64; Tillock v. 
 Webb, 56 Me. 100 ; Cratty v. Ban- 
 gor, 57 Id. 433. Unless the traveler 
 makes it appear that he was upon an 
 errand of charity or necessity, he 
 cannot recover (Feital v. Middlesex 
 R. Co., 109 Mass. 398; Bucher v. 
 Fitchburg, etc. R. Co., 131 Id. 156 
 Davis V. Somerville, 138 Id. 594 
 Doyle V. Lynn etc. R. Co., 118 Id, 
 195 ; Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Id. 351 
 O'Connell v. Lewiston, 65 Me. 34 
 Davidson V. Portland. 69 Id. 116). 
 Walking for exercise in the open air 
 on Sunday is not a violation of the 
 statute (Hinckley v. Penobscot, 43 Me. 
 89.) In Massachusetts, it has been said 
 that the statute does not prohibit an 
 act which, under the circumstances, 
 is morally fit and proper to be done 
 on the Sabbath (Commonwealth v. 
 Knox, 6 Mass. 76 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Josselyn, 97 Id. 411 ; Commonwealth 
 V. Sampson, 97 Id. 407 ; Flagg v. 
 Millbury, 4 Cush. 343). Hence, exe- 
 cuting a will on Sunday is proper 
 fBennett r. Brooks, 9 Allen, 118). So 
 is walking for the purpose of making 
 
i6i 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§I04 
 
 gence ; though he can recover for wanton or wilful injuriesJ 
 It would seem to follow that any one who is actually engaged, 
 during every moment of the time in which he suffers an injury 
 by the negligence of another, in some unlawful proceeding, 
 could not recover for such injury in those states. But this 
 application of the Sunday law has been repudiated by all the 
 other courts which have passed upon it.' The principle stated 
 
 a social call (Barker v. Worcester, 
 139 Mass. 74) ; but not so, as to rid- 
 ing (Stanton v. Metropolitan R. Co., 
 14 Allen, 485). In Illinois, it is held 
 that the moral fitness and propriety 
 of what was done are not to be judged 
 of in the abstract, but are to be de- 
 termined under the circumstances of 
 each particular case (Johnson v. 
 People, 31 111. 460). As matter of law, 
 it is not always unnecessary to work 
 on Sunday to prevent a great waste 
 of sap, in making maple sugar 
 (Whitcomb v. Oilman, 35 Vt. 297). 
 It is not an honest belief that a ne- 
 cessity for traveling exists, but the 
 actual existence of the necessity, 
 which renders Sunday traveling law- 
 ful (Johnson v. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28 ; 
 see, also, Holcomb v. Danby, 51 Id. 
 438 ; McCleary v. Lowell, 44 Me. 116, 
 per Wheeler, J). The federal courts 
 will recognize as binding the deci- 
 sions of a state court, as to non- 
 recovery for injuries received while 
 traveling on Sunday (Bucher v. 
 Chesliire R. Co., 125 U. S. 555 ; 8 
 S. Ct. 974). 
 
 ' In Wallace v. Merrimac River 
 Nav. Co. (134 Mass. 95), it was held 
 that if the injury was wantonly or 
 wilfully inflicted, the fact that 
 plaintiff was traveling on Sunday is 
 no defense. See § 64, ante. The 
 plaintiff, while unlawfully traveling 
 on Sunday, was bitten by defend- 
 ant's vicious dog. Held, that he 
 could recover (White v. Lang, 128 
 Mass. 598). It is no defense to an 
 action for a conversion of property 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — 11] 
 
 that it was let to defendant on Sun- 
 day. Thus one who hires a horse to 
 drive three miles, on Sunday, but 
 goes six miles further, and by over- 
 driving kills the horse, is liable for 
 conversion (Morton v. Gloster, 46 
 Me. 520 ; Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 
 N. H. 67) . Compare, to the contrary. 
 Gregg V. Wyman, 4 Cush. 332 ; 
 Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R. I. 230, 233. 
 In Myers v. Meinrath (101 Mass. 366), 
 it was held that an action for the 
 conversion of a chattel delivered on 
 Sunday in exchange for aUother 
 retained by the defendant notwith- 
 standing the retuin of the other by 
 plaintiff, would not lie. Compare 
 Tucker v. Mowrey, 13 Mich. 378. 
 Relief has been denied to one who 
 on Sunday was aiding the owner to 
 clear out his wheel pit, and while 
 doing so was injured by the negli- 
 gence of the owner (McGrath v. Mer- 
 win, 118 Mass. 467) ; and to one who 
 was defrauded in a trade of horses 
 on that day (Robeson v. French, 13 
 Mete. 24). 
 
 * New Uampshire (Dutton v. Weare, 
 17 N. H. 34 ; Norris v. Litchfield, 35 
 Id. 271 ; Sewell v. Webster, 59 Id. 596, 
 Wentworth v. Jefferson, 60 Id. 158 ; 
 Allen V. Deming, 14 Id. 133 ; Wood- 
 man V. Hubbard, 25 Id. 67) ; Rhode 
 Island (Baldwin v. Barney. 12 R. I. 
 393 ; Whelden v. Chappel, 8 Id. 230) ; 
 Connecticut (See Horton v. Norwalk, 
 etc. R. Co.. 66 Conn. 272; 33 Atl. 
 914): New York (Carroll v. Staten 
 Island R. Co., 58 N. Y. 126 ; Platz v. 
 Cohoes, 89 Id. 219 ; Merritt v. Earl. 39 
 
§ I04] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 162 
 
 in the early Massachusetts decisions doubtless exempted towns 
 from liability for defects in highways, causing injuries to per- 
 sons unlawfully traveling on Sunday, because the town ofificers 
 were not bound to anticipate such traveling; but it is an un- 
 justifiable extension of the rule to hold that a railroad com- 
 pany, for example, is exempt from all liability for its negligent 
 management of trains, in which it carries passengers on Sunday. 
 Such decisions are plainly subversive of the rule in Davies v. 
 Mann. Nevertheless, such is the common law of Massa- 
 chusetts.' It seems desirable to retain this account of the old 
 Massachusetts law, since the discussion elsewhere could not be 
 understood without reference to it. But the whole of this 
 judicial construction of the Sunday law was abrogated by 
 statute in 1884;*" and that law affords no longer any defense 
 to an action for personal injury in Massachusetts. 
 
 Id. 115) ; New Jersey (Smith v. N. Y., 
 Susquehanna, etc. R Co., 46 N. J. 
 Law, 7 ; Delaware, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Trautwein, 53 Id. 169 ; 19 Atl. 178) ; 
 Pennsylvania (Mohney v. Cook, 26 
 Pa. St. 343 ; Piollet v. Simmers, 106 
 Id. 95) ; Maryland (Philadelphia, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Lehman, 56 Md. 209) ; Ken- 
 tucky (Commonwealth v. Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co., 80 Ky. 291 ; Illinois Cen- 
 tral R. Co. V. Dick, 91 Id. 434 ; 15 S. 
 W. 665) ; Indiana (Yonoski v. State, 
 79 Ind. 393 ; Loeb v. Attica, 83 Id. 
 175 ; Wilkinson v. State, 59 Id. 416 ; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Frawley, 
 110 Id. 18; 9 N. E. 594; compare 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Yopst, 
 118 Ind. 348 ; 20 N. E. 222) ; Wisconsin 
 (Sutton V. Wauwatosa, 29 Wise. 21 ; 
 Knowlton v. Milwaukee R. Co., 59 
 Id. 278; Mc Arthur V. Green Bay, etc. 
 R. Co , 34 Id. 139) ; Minnesota (Op- 
 sahl ■" Judd, 80 Minn. 126); Iowa 
 (Schmid v. Humphrey, 48 Iowa, 653) ; 
 Arkansas (Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark. 
 618 ; Tucker v. West, 29 Id. 386 : 
 State V. GofE, 30 Id. 289) ; Federal 
 Courts (Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Phila. etc. Towboat Co. 33 How U. S. 
 209 ; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 
 
 258 ; Sawyer v. Oakman, 7 Blatch. 
 290). As to West Virginia, see State 
 V. Railroad Co., 34 West Va. 783 ; 
 Ohio, see McGatrick v. Wason, 4 
 Ohio St. 566. See § 93, ante. 
 
 ' Thus it has been held that a street- 
 car driver or conductor cannot re- 
 cover for injuries sustained by a 
 collision with the car of another 
 company while performing his ordi- 
 nary duties on Sunday (Day v. High- 
 land St. R. Co., 135 Mass. 113); nor 
 can a passenger on a street- car, 
 riding on Sunday, for the purpose of 
 making a social call, recover of the 
 car company for injuries (Stanton v. 
 Metropolitan R. Co., 14 Allen, 485). 
 A locomotive engineer, performing 
 the ordinary duties of his employ- 
 ment on Sunday, violates the statute, 
 imless the running of the train is a 
 work of necessity or charity ; and if 
 it is not, 8.nd while so laboring, he is 
 injured by a defect in the railroad 
 track, his illegal act necessarily con- 
 tributes to cause his injury (Read v. 
 Boston, etc. R. Co. , 140 Mass. 199). 
 
 " Stat. 1884, ch. 37. That the acci- 
 dent occurred on Sunday is therefore, 
 now, no defense to a personal injury 
 
163 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ Ic6 
 
 § 105. Plaintiff's fault in representative capacity.— Al- 
 though the point is not made entirely clear by reported cases, 
 we think that any act of the plaintiff which contributes to his 
 injury, although done by him purely in some representative 
 capacity as agent, executor, or public ofificer, is a defense to 
 his action, as much as if it had been done in his individual 
 capacity. Thus, where an executive officer had, by his own 
 fault in his official capacity, failed to provide for the proper 
 repair of a highway, it was held that he could not recover for 
 injuries suffered by him through defect of such highway.^ But 
 of course the plaintiff must be in fault, in a legal sense ; and if 
 he has made an error which contributes to his injury, but for 
 which he is not legally in fault, this is no defense to the action. 
 Thus, a public officer, deciding in a semi-judicial capacity in 
 favor of a plan for certain public work, is not deemed guilty of 
 contributory negligence, in his action for damages suffered by 
 him through defects in such work, although such defects were 
 the result of the adoption of that plan; since he could not be, 
 in a legal sense, in fault, in his decision.^ 
 
 §106. Burden of proof ; conflict of decisions. — The ques- 
 tion as to which party bears the burden of proof on the issue 
 of contributory negligence, has been the subject of many con- 
 flicting decisions ; and the courts are still divided upon it. 
 Practically, all the courts agree that the fact of contributory 
 negligence is to be taken into account, no matter how it ap- 
 
 action (Jordan v. New Haven R. Co., ground that, being a corporator and 
 
 165 Mass. 346 ; 43 N. E. Ill ; Barker officer, he must be equally in 
 
 V. "Worcester, 139 Mass. 74). fault with all the officers, but this 
 
 ' Todd V. Rowley, 8 Allen, 51 ; was of course overruled (Burhank v. 
 
 Wood V. Waterville, 4 Mass. 432; 5 "West-Walker Ditch Co., 13 Nev. 431). 
 
 Id. 294 ; see Loker v. Brookline, 13 ' The plaintiff, while a member of 
 
 Pick. 343. See a very peculiar case, a city council, concurred with it in 
 
 in which the plaintiff, being an officer adopting a plan for a bridge. The 
 
 of the defendant corporation, had bridge was built, and the abutments 
 
 offered to do certain work necessary placed so that they obstructed the 
 
 to avoid in jury to his property by the flow of the water more than was 
 
 defendant's ditch, and had been pre- necessary, in consequence of which 
 
 vented from doing so by other officers plaintiff's mill was stopped. Held, 
 
 of the corporation. Injuries resulted that plaintiff could recover (Perry v. 
 
 to him; the corporation set up a de- Worcester, 6 Gray, 544). The dicta 
 
 fense of contributory negligence in of this case go beyond the text, but 
 
 his action, apparently on the mere cannot, as we think, be sustained. 
 
§ I07] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 164 
 
 pears, whether by affirmative evidence on the part of the de- 
 fendant, or by inference from the evidence on the part of the 
 plaintiff. It is quite immaterial who proves the fact, so long 
 as it is proved.' This is a just rule, and may be considered 
 universally settled. And on the other handrit is agreed that 
 the plaintiff need not produce direct evidence of his having 
 used due care, if the fact sufficiently appears upon the whole 
 case.' As to whether the plaintiff is bound to prove, as part 
 of his case, his freedom from contributory negligence, three 
 different rules have been proposed : (i) That plaintiff's care 
 is presumed, and if plaintiff can prove his case without showing 
 contributory negligence, the burden is on the defendant. (2) 
 That plaintiff's care is not presumed, and the burden is on him 
 to prove affirmatively the exercise of due care. (3) That, in the 
 absence of evidence, there is no presumption either way, i. e., 
 that neither care nor want of it is presumable, and that, if the 
 facts show a duty of care, the plaintiff must give some evidence 
 from which the jury may infer that he exercised it ; otherwise 
 he need not. 
 
 § 107. Burden of proof on plaintiff.— In Maine, Massachu- 
 setts, Connecticut, New York, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, 
 Iowa, Mississippi and Louisiana, the burden rests upon the 
 plaintiff of proving either that he was free from contributory 
 negligence or that the injury is in no degree attributable to any 
 want of ordinary care on his part.* 
 
 < Washington, etc. R. Co. v. Mosher v. Smithfleld, 84 Id. 334 ; 24 
 
 Harmon, 147 U. S. 571 ; 13 S. Ct. Atl. 876). 
 
 557 ; State v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., So in Massachusetts (Planz v. Bos- 
 
 69 Md. 339 ; 14 Atl. 685 ; Gerity v. ton, etc. R. Co., 157 Mass. 377 ; 83 N. 
 
 Haley, 29 W. Va. 98 ; 11 S. E. 901; E. 356; Stock v. Wood, 136 Mass. 
 
 Overby V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 353; Hinckley v. Cape Cod R. Co. 
 
 37 W. Va. 524 -, 16 S. E. 813 ; Chicago, 120 Id. 257 ; Prentiss v. Boston, 113 
 
 etc. R Co. V. Spilker, 134 Ind. 380 ; Id. 43 ; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 107 
 
 33 N. E. 280 ; 34 Id. 218. Id. 104 ; Gaynor v. Old Colony B. Co., 
 
 « See § 111, post. 100 Id. 208 ; Robinson v. Fitchburg 
 
 ' So held in Maine (Chase v. Maine R. Co., 7 Gray, 92 ; Parker v. Adams, 
 
 Central R. Co., 77 Me. 63; Gleason 12 Mete. 415 ; Bigelow v. Rutland, 4 
 
 V. Bremen, .50 Id. 222 ; Buzzell v. Gush. 247; Adams v. Carlisle, 21 Pick. 
 
 LaconiaManfg. Co.,48Id. 113; Per- 146; Lane v. Crombie, 12 Id. 177). 
 
 kins V. Eastern, etc. R. Co., 29 Id. The burden, however, is upon the 
 
 307 ; Kennard v. Burton, 25 Id. 39 ; defendant to show plaintiff's gross 
 
 French v. Brunswick, 21 Id 29; or wiUful negligence (Copley v. New 
 
i65 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ 107 
 
 Haven, etc. R. Co., 136 Mass. 6). 
 In an action under the Massa- 
 chusetts statute making common 
 carriers liable for the death of a pas- 
 senger, caused by their negligence, 
 it is not necessary for the plaintiff to 
 prove that the deceased, if a pas- 
 senger, was not negligent (McKimble 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 139 Mass. 543 ; 
 3 N. E. 97 ; Commonwealth v. Bos- 
 ton, etc. E. Co., 134 Mass. 311). 
 
 So in Connecticut (Ryan v. Bristol, 
 63 Conn. 36 ; 37 Atl. 309 ; Button v. 
 Frink, 51 Conn. 343 ; Fox v. Glaston- 
 bury, 39 Id. 304 ; Beers v. Housa- 
 tonic R. Co., 19 Id. 566; Park v. 
 O'Brien, 33 Id. 339). 
 
 So in New York (Hart v. Hud- 
 son River Bridge Co., 84 Id. 66; 
 Hale V. Smith, 78 Id. 480 ; Holbrook 
 V. Utica, etc. R. Co., 12 Id. 336; 
 Tolman v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 98 
 N. Y. 198 : Bond v. Smith, 113 N. 
 Y. 378 ; 31 N. E. 138 ; Stone v. Dry 
 Dock, etc. B. Co., 115 N. Y. 104 ; 31 
 N. E. 713). In Gleeson v. Brummer 
 (87 Huu, 465 ; 84 N. Y. Supp. 875), 
 Van Brunt, P. J., dissenting, held 
 that the rule was seriously modified 
 by Galvin v. New York, 113 Id. 
 333 ; 19 N. E. 675. In Johnson v. 
 Hudson River R. Co. (30 N. Y. 64 ; 
 affi'g 6 Duer, 633), Denio, J., said: 
 " I am of opinion that it is not a rule 
 of law, of universal application, that 
 the plaintiff must prove aiHrmatively 
 that his own conduct on the occa- 
 sion of the injury was cautious and 
 prudent. The onusprobandi in this, 
 as in most other oases, depends upon 
 the position of the affair, as it stands 
 upon the undisputed facts. The cul- 
 pability of the defendant must be 
 affirmatively proved before the case 
 can go to the jury, but the absence of 
 any fault on the part of the plaintiff 
 may be inferred from circumstances ; 
 and the disposition of men to take 
 cai-e of themselves and keep out of 
 difficulty may properly be taken into 
 
 consideration. Nor is it correct to 
 say, as a general rule, that the de- 
 fendant must himself prove, in order 
 to establish his defense, that the 
 plaintiff was guilty of negligence. 
 That, as well as the absence of fault, 
 may be inferred from the circum- 
 stances ; and the negligent act of the 
 defendant may be of such a miti- 
 gated character, that a party com- 
 plaining of an injury from it ought 
 to show that it occurred without 
 fault on his own part. . . . The 
 true rule, in my opinion, is this : 
 The jury must eventually be satis- 
 fied that the plaintiff did not, by any 
 negligence of his own, contribute to 
 the injury. The evidence to estab- 
 lish this may consist in that offered 
 to show the nature or cause of the 
 accident, or in any other competent 
 proof. To carry a case to the 
 jury, the evidence on the part of the 
 plaintiff must be such as, if believed, 
 would authorize them to find that 
 the injury was occasioned solely by 
 the negligence of the defendant. It 
 is not absolutely essential that the 
 plaintiff should give any affirmative 
 proof touching his own conduct on 
 the occasion of the accident. The 
 character of the defendant's delin- 
 quency may be such as to prove 
 prima facie the whole issue ; or the 
 case may be such as to make it neces- 
 sary for tlie plaintiff to show, by 
 independent evidence, that he did 
 not bring the misfortune upon him- 
 self. No more certain rule can be 
 laid down." We quote this opinion 
 thus at length, because it is the best 
 statement of the rule anywhere 
 made, and it was followed in Galvin 
 V. New York, 113 N. Y. 323. 
 
 The most stringent rule is main- 
 tained in Indiana (Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Stommel, 136 Ind. 35 : 35 N. 
 E. 863 ; Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 
 146 Ind. 600; 39 N. E. 553; Cincinnati, 
 etc. R. Co. v. Butler, 103 Ind. 31; 
 
§io8] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 1 66 
 
 § I08. Burden of proof on defendant. — In the Supreme 
 Court of the United States,^ and in Alabama,' Arizona,' 
 Arkansas,* Cahfornia,' Colorado,^ Delaware,'^ Florida,' Georgia,' 
 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Lockridge, 
 93 Id. 191 ; Rushville v. Poe, 85 Id. 
 83 ; Biest v. Goshen, 42 Id. 339 ; 
 Ream v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 49 
 Id. 93; Gramm v. Boener, 56 Id. 
 497 ; Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Caudle, 60 Id. 113. 
 
 So also in Illinois (Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Levy, 160 111. 385 ; 43 N. E. 
 357 ; Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 
 107 111. 44 ; Kipperley v. Ramsden, 
 83 Id. 354 : Dyer v. Talcott, 16 Id. 
 300 ; Aurora R. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Id. 
 585). The cases are fully cited, and 
 the rule afiSrmed, in Calumet Iron 
 Co. V. Martin, 115 111. 358 ; 3 N. E. 
 456. 
 
 So also in Iowa (Gregory v. Wood- 
 worth, 93 Iowa, 246; 61 N. W. 962; 
 Slosson V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 51 
 Iowa, 294 ; Bonce v. Dubuque, etc. R. 
 Co., 53 Id. 278 ; Murphy v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co.. 45 Id. 661 ; Way v. Illinois, 
 etc. R. Co., 40 Id. 341; Carlin v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 37 Id. 316 ; Ben- 
 ton V. Central R. Co., 43 Id. 193). 
 See the very reverse held Ijy the 
 same court, apparently unaware of 
 its own decisions (Willis v. Perry, 93 
 Iowa, 397 ; 60 N. W. 737). 
 
 So in Michigan (Mitchell v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R, Co., 51 Mich. 336 ; Teipel 
 V. Hilsendegen, 44 Id. 461 ; Le Baron 
 V. Joslin,41 Id. 313 ; Michigan, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Coleman, 38 Id. 440; Lake 
 Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Miller, 35 Id. 
 274 ; Detroit v. Van Steinburg, 17 
 Id. 99 ; see Mynning v. Detroit, etc. 
 R. Co., 67 Mich. 677 ; 35 N. W. 811). 
 
 So in Mississippi (Vicksburg v. 
 Hennessy, 54 Miss. 391 ; Central, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Mason, 51 Id. 334) . 
 
 So in Louisiana (Moore v. Shreve- 
 port, 3 La. Ann. 645 ; Ryan v. Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co., 44 Id. 806 ; 11 So. 30). 
 
 ' Washington, etc. R. Co. v. Har- 
 mon, 147 U. S. 571 ; 13 S. Ct. 557 ; In- 
 land, etc. Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 
 U. S. 551 ; 11 S. Ct 653 ; Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Mares, 133 U. S. 
 710 ; 8 S. Ct. 331 ; see Union Pacific 
 R. Co. V. O'Brien, 161 U. S. 451 ; 16 S. 
 Ct. 618 ; Hough v. Eaih-oad Co., 100 
 U. S. 313 ; Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hoist, 93 Id. 291 ; Railroad Co. v. 
 Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401. 
 
 ' Bromley v. Birmingham, etc. R. 
 Co., 95 Ala. 397 ; 11 So. 341 ; Georgia, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Davis, 92 Ala. 300 ; 9 So. 
 253 ; Montgomery Gas Co. v. Mont- 
 gomery, etc. R. Co., 86 Ala. 372 ; 5 
 So. 735 ; O'Brien v. Tatum, 84 Ala. 
 186 ; 4 So. 158 ; Mobile, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Crenshaw, 65 Ala. 566 ; Holt v. 
 Whatley, 51 Id. 569 ; Smoot v. We- 
 tumpka, 24 Id. 112. 
 
 ^ Lopez V. Central, etc. Mining Co., 
 1 Ariz. 464 ; 3 Pac. 748. 
 
 " Little Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Eu- 
 banks, 48 Ark. 460 ; 3 S. W. 808. 
 
 ' McDougall V. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 63 Cal. 431 ; Nehrbas v. Central, etc. 
 R. Co., 63 Id. 330; McQuilken v. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 50 Id. 7 ; Robin- 
 son V. Western, etc. R. Co., 48 Id. 
 409 ; Gay v. Winter, 84 Id. 153. 
 
 " Platte, etc. Milling Co. v. DoweU, 
 17 Colo. 376 ; 30 Pac. 68 ; Denver, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Ryan, 17 Colo. 98 ; 28 
 Pac. 79 ; Sanderson v. Frazier, 8 Colo. 
 79 ; 5 Pac. 633. 
 
 ' Jefferson v. Brady, 4 Houst. 626. 
 
 * Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Yniestra, 
 21 Fla. 700. 
 
 ' Augusta V. Hudson, 88 Ga. 599 ; 
 15 S. E. 678 ; Prather v. Richmond, 
 etc. R. Co., 80 Ga. 427 ; 9 S. E. 530 ; 
 Seats V. Georgia, etc. R. Co., 86 Ga. 
 811 ; 13 S. E. 88 [statutory action 
 for death]. 
 
167 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§io8 
 
 Idaho/" Kansas," Kentucky," Maryland,^^ Minnesota," Mis- 
 souri,^^ Montana," Nebraska," New Hampshire," New 
 Jersey,'' North Dakota,^" Ohio,^' Oregon,^' Pennsylvania,^^ 
 Rhode Island,^* South CaroHna,^' South Dakota,2« Texas," 
 
 '"Hopkins v. Utah N. E. Co., 3 
 Idaho, 277 ; 13 Pac. 343. 
 
 " St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Weaver, 
 85 Kans. 413 ; 11 Pao. 408 ; Kansas, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Phillibert, 35 Kans. 583 ; 
 Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. Pointer, 9 Id. 
 630 ; 14 Id. 38. 
 
 "Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Goetz, 
 79 Ky. 443 ; Kentucky, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Thomas, Id. 160 ; Louisville Canal 
 Co. V. Murphy, 9 Bush, 523 ; Padu- 
 cah, etc. R. Co. v. Hoehl, 33 Id. 43, 
 
 "Prince George County v. Bur- 
 gess, 61 Md. 29 ; State v. Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co., 58 Id. 482 ; Freeh v. Phila- 
 delphia, etc. R. Co., 39 Id. 574 ; Mc- 
 Mahon v. Northern Central R. Co., 
 Id. 438 : Northern Central R. Co. v. 
 State, 31 Id. 357. So far as Balti- 
 more V. Marriott (9 Id. 160), Irwin v. 
 Sprigg (6 Gill, 300), and Owings v. 
 Jones (9 Md. 108; hold the contrary, 
 they are overruled. 
 
 "Engel V. Breitkreitz, 39 Minn. 
 433 ; 40 N. W. 519 ; Hocum v. Wei- 
 therick, 33 Minn. 153. 
 
 "Crumpley v. Hannibal, etc. R. 
 Co., Ill Mo. 152 ; 19 S. W. 820 ; Mit- 
 chell V. Clinton, 99 Mo. 153 ; 13 S. 
 W. 793 ; Stephens v. Macon, 83 Mo. 
 345 ; Buesching v. St. Louis Gas 
 Light Co , 73 Id. 219 ; Thompson v. 
 North Missouri E. Co , 51 Id. 190. 
 
 '* Prosser v. Montana Cent. R. Co., 
 17 Mont. 372 ; 43 Pac. 81 ; Nelson 
 V. Helena, 16 Mont. 21; 39 Pac. 
 905. 
 
 " Anderson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 
 35 Neb. 95 ; 52 N. W. 840 ; Omaha 
 V. Ayer, 32 Neb. 375 ; 49 N. W. 445 ; 
 Durrell v. Johnson, 31 Neb. 796 ; 48 
 N. W. 890 ; Lincoln v. Walker, 18 
 Neb. 244 ; 30 N. W. 113. 
 
 "Smith V. Eastern, etc. R. Co., 35 
 
 N. H. 366 ; White v. Concord, etc. R. 
 Co., 30 Id. 207. 
 
 " Delaware, etc. R. Co. v. Toffey, 
 38 N. J. Law, 535 ; N. J. Express 
 Co. V. Nichols, 32 Id. 166 ; 33 Id. 
 434 ; Durant v. Palmer, 29 Id. 544 ; 
 Moore v. Central E. Co., 24 Id. 268. 
 
 "" Gram v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 1 N. Dak. 252 ; 46 N. W. 973 ; San- 
 ders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 151 ; North- 
 ern Pac. R. Co. V. Mares, 123 U. 
 S. 710; 8 S. Ct. 331 [a Dakota 
 casej. 
 
 " Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Whit- 
 acre, 35 Ohio St. 637 ; Cleveland, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Crawford, 24 Id. 636. 
 
 " Ford V. Umatilla Co., 15 Oreg. 
 313 ; 16 Pac. 33 ; Grant v. Baker, 13 
 Oreg. 339 ; 7 Pac. 318 ; distinguish- 
 ing Walsh v. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 10 
 Oreg. 350. 
 
 ^^ Baker v. Westmoreland, etc. 
 Gas Co., 157 Pa. St. 593 ; 37 Atl. 789 ; 
 Bradwell v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 139 Pa. St. 404 ; 20 Atl. 1046 ; Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. V. Weber, 76 Pa. St. 
 157 ; Longenecker v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 105 Id. 328 ; Reading, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Ritchie, 103 Id. 425 ; Mallory 
 V. Griffey, 85 Id. 375 ; Weiss v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 Id. 387 ; 87 
 Id. 447 ; Penn. Canal Co. v. Bentley, 
 66 Id. 80 ; Erie v. Schwingle, 33 Id. 
 384 ; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Id. 46:i. 
 
 " Cassidy V. Angell, 12 R. I. 447. 
 
 ^* Crouch V. Charleston, etc. R. Co., 
 31 S. C. 495 ; Carter v. Columbia, etc. 
 R. Co., 19 Id. 30; Roof v. Railroad 
 Co., 4 Id. 61 ; Danner v. South Caro- 
 lina E. Co., 4 Eich. Law, 329. 
 
 2« Smith V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 4 
 S. Dak. 71 ; 55 N. W. 717. 
 
 " San Antonio, etc. E. Co., v. Ben- 
 nett, 76 Tex. 151 ; 13 S. W. 319 ; Dal 
 
§I09] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 1 68 
 
 Vermont,^ Virginia,'' Washington,'" West Virginia,'' and Wis- 
 consin,'' the burden of proof as to contributory negligence 
 rests upon the defendant, and it must therefore be estabHshed 
 by a clear preponderance of proof.'' Whatever doubt there 
 may have been as to the rule adopted in North Carolina'* was 
 set at rest by statute, in 1887, casting the burden of proving 
 negligence upon the defendant.'' 
 
 § 109. Burden ought to be on defendant. — The weight of 
 authority in support of the rule that the burden of proof of 
 contributory negligence is upon the defendant is now so com- 
 pletely overwhelming, that we omit most of our own argument 
 in its favor, contained in earlier editions, when a majority of 
 decisions were the other viay. We then stated that our own 
 view of the question agreed^ entirely with that expressed by 
 the late Judge Duer.' That able judge held negligence on the 
 part of the plaintiff to be a mere matter of defense to be proved 
 affirmatively by the defendant, although it might, of course, 
 be inferred from the circumstances proved by the plaintiff. 
 
 las, etc. R. Co. v. Spioker, 61 Tex. 
 427; Houston, etc. E. Co. v, Cowser, 
 57 Id. 293; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Murphy, 46 Id. 350 ; Murray v. Gulf, 
 etc. E. Co., 73 Tex. 3 ; l! S. W. 125. 
 
 =8 Walker v. Westfield, 89 Vt. 246 ; 
 Hill V. New Haven, 87 Id. 501 ; Bar- 
 ber V. Essex, 27 Id. 63 ; Hyde v. 
 Jamaica, 27 Id. 443 ; Lester v. Pitts- 
 ford, 7 Id. 158. 
 
 " Gordon v. Eichmond, 83 Va. 436; 
 2 S. E. 737. 
 
 3» Spurrier v. Front St. E. Co., 3 
 Wash. St. 659; 39 Pac. 346 ; North- 
 ern Pacific E. Co. V. O'Brien, 1 Wash. 
 St. 599 ; 31 Pac. 33.-. 
 
 "Overby v. Chesapeake, etc. E. 
 Co., .37 W. Va. 524; 16 S. E. 813; 
 Johnson v. Chesapeake, etc. E. Co., 
 86 W. Va. 73 ; 14 S. E. 433 ; Fowler 
 V. Baltimore, etc. E. Co., 18 W. Va. 
 579 ; Sheff V. Huntington, 16 Id. 317; 
 Snyder V. Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co., 11 
 Id. 14. 
 
 "'Hoth V. Peters, 55 Wise. 405; 
 
 Eandall v. North\^Btern T. C0.7 54 
 Id. 147 ; Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 
 43 Id. 513 I Bessex v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 45 Id 477; Hoyt v. Hud- 
 son, 41 Id. 105 ; overruling some 
 earlier cases. The rule is not 
 changed by the statute making rail- 
 road companies liable for injuries to 
 employes "without contributory 
 negligence on his part " (Dugau v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 85 Wise, 609 ; 55 
 N. W. 894). 
 
 23 Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Mares, 
 133 U. S. 710 ; 8 S. Ct. 321. 
 
 3* See Owens v. Eichmond, etc. R. 
 Co., 88 N. C. 503 ; as interpreted in 
 Aycock V. Raleigh, etc. E. Co., 89 
 N.C. 321 ; Cornwall V. Charlotte, etc. 
 E. Co. , 97 Id. 11 ; 2 S. E. 659 ; Smith v. 
 Eichmond, etc. R. Co., 99 N. C. 241 ; 
 5 S. E. 896. 
 
 »= Statutes, 1887, ch. 33 ; Jordan v. 
 Asheville, 112 N. C. 743 ; 16 S. E. 760. 
 
 ' Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 
 5 Duer, 21. -#. 
 
169 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ I lO 
 
 He pointed out that parties were never required to prove 
 negative matters of this kind, and also that it had never been 
 held necessary, in a complaint upon negligence, to aver that 
 the plaintiff had taken due care.' When only ten states out 
 of forty-five adhere to a rule condemned by the Supreme 
 Const of the United States, it would be a waste of time to 
 discuss the question further. 
 
 § 110. Presumption against negligence : how over- 
 balanced. — Slight circumstances may overbalance the pre- 
 sumption of freedom from negligence which we suppose to 
 exist in favor of a plaintiff. Thus, his being found in a posi- 
 tion of presumptively needless danger, unexplained,^ his in- 
 toxication at the time of the accident,^ even to a slight degree,^ 
 and any other circumstances which might cast doubt upon his 
 care at the time, must be considered by the jury. If it ap- 
 pears that any defects in the things or faults in the persons 
 employed by the plaintiff contributed to his injury, the 
 burden is clearly upon him to show, not only that he did not 
 know or suppose that such defects or faults existed, but also 
 that he was in no fault for not knowing of their existence.* 
 
 i^This is now settled law in New Central, etc. E. Co., 73 Hun, 33 ; 25 
 
 York (Lee v. Troy, etc. Gas Co., 98 N. Y. Supp. 1009. 
 
 N. Y. 115), and in England (Wakelin ^ Intoxication is competent, but 
 
 V. Southeastern R. Co , L. B. 12 App. not conclusive, evidence of negli- 
 
 Cas 41). The contrary is settled in gence (Stuart v. Machiasport, 48 Me. 
 
 Indiana (Rogers v. Overton, 87 Ind. 477 ; Baker v. Portland, 58 Id. 199 ; 
 
 411), and Iowa (Gregory v. Wood- Wynnv. AUard, 5 "Watts & S., 524 ; 
 
 worth, 61 N. W. 962). As to Illinois, see § 93, ante, and §§ 114, 473, pos«). 
 
 see § 113, post. " Fitzgerald v. Weston, 52 Wise. 
 
 ' See Button v. Hudson River R. 354 ; 9 N. W. 13. 
 
 Co., 18 N. Y. 248 [injured person ^Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197. 
 
 seen lying upon track, before train The fact that plaintiff was incapable 
 
 came along]. The slight presump- by reason of years or of physical or 
 
 tion that deceased stopped, looked mental infirmity of taking the 
 
 and listened before crossing a rail- same care of himself as ordinarily 
 
 road track is overborne by evidence prudent persons take is competent 
 
 that he was struck by a moving train evidence, but not enough of itself 
 
 the instant he set foot upon the (Curtis v. Avon, etc. R. Co., 49 Barb. 
 
 track, and that the view was unob- 148 ; Casey v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 structed (Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. 6 Abb. N. C. 104 and 116, note). It 
 
 Mooney. 126 Pa. St. 344 ; 17 Atl. 5901. cannot be laid down as a universal 
 
 To the same effect, Burke v. N. Y. rule that it is negligence for a blind 
 
§110] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 170 
 
 Forgetfulness of that which was well known, and ought to 
 have been remembered, is some evidence of negligence.' And 
 if it appears certain that the plaintiff neglected some duty, 
 and highly probable that, if he had not neglected it, he would 
 not have suffered the injury, the question of contributory 
 negligence cannot be left to the jury, but must be decided 
 adversely to the plaintiff.^ Evidence as to his general habits 
 of negligence, unconnected with any proof that he gave way 
 to such habits at a time when they might have contributed to 
 his injury, is not usually competent.' 
 
 man to walk in public street un- 
 attended. It should be left to the 
 jury (Smith v. Wildes, 143 Mass. 81 ; 
 10 N. E. 446 [trap door in sidewalk] ; 
 Franklin v. Harter, 127 Ind. 446 ; 26 
 N. E. 882 [cellar-way in sidewalk]) ; 
 see § 375, post. When plaintiff's 
 own evidence tends to show con- 
 tributory negligence, the burden of 
 proof is shifted to the plaintiff (North 
 Birmingham R. Co. v. Calderwood, 
 89 Ala. 247 ; 7 So. 360 ; Overby v. 
 Chesapeake, etc. E. Co., 37 W. Va. 
 524; 16 S. E. 813). 
 
 * ii.ttempting in the dark to pass 
 an open cellar-way in a sidewalk, 
 with knowledge of, but for the time 
 forgetting its existence, is contribu- 
 tory negligence (Bruker v. Coving- 
 ton, 69 Ind. 33), and will cast the 
 burden on plaintiff to show that he 
 was justified in exposing himself to 
 the danger (Coates v. Burlington, 
 etc. R. Co., 62 Iowa, 486 ; s. p.. King 
 V. Thompson, 87 Pa. St. 365 ; Frost 
 V. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85 ; Eeed v. 
 Northfield, 13 Pick. 94 ; see DriscoU 
 V. New York, 11 Hun, 101 ; see § 
 101, ante, and § 476, post). A person 
 running along a lighted street with 
 which he was familiar and stumbling 
 over a stepping-stone at the edge of 
 the sidewalk, where there was 
 abundant room for him to pass. 
 Held, guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence ( Dubois V. Kingston, 102 N. 
 Y. 219 ; 6 N. E. 273). 
 
 •Sprong V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 60 
 Barb. 30 ; Fink v. Coe, 4 Greene 
 [Iowa], 555 ; Stoeckman v. Terre 
 Haute, etc. R. Co. 15 Mo. App. 503. 
 
 ' There is no rule of evidence which 
 authorizes the introduction of testi- 
 mony to prove that the plaintiff, 
 injured by a defect in a highway, 
 was habitually reckless or careless 
 (Brennan v. Friendship, 67 Wise. 
 223 ; 29 N. W. 902). On the other 
 hand, evidence that plaintiff's dri- 
 ver had always been a very care- 
 ful driver is inadmissible to show 
 that the driver's negligence did not 
 contribute to the injury (Wooster v. 
 Broadway, etc. Co., 72 Hun, 197 ; 25 
 N. Y. Supp. 378). In Hampson v. 
 Taylor (15 R. I. 83 ; 8 Atl. 332), evi- 
 dence of plaintiff's intemperate 
 habits was held inadmissible, the 
 court saying: " If the plaintiff was 
 sober when he fell [on an icy side- 
 walk], the fact that he was of in- 
 temperate habits would not preclude 
 his recovery, and we do not think 
 that the mere proof that he was of 
 intemperate habits would warrant 
 the inference that he was not sober. 
 The accident occurred in the early 
 morning, and the sidewalk was ad- 
 mittedly glazed with ice." Compare 
 Enright v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. 288. Tes- 
 timony as to plaintiff's habits of 
 sobriety is inadmissible to contradict 
 direct evidence that he was intoxi- 
 cated at the time of the accident 
 
171 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§III 
 
 § III. What proof of care sufficient. — In the few courts 
 which require the plaintiff to prove affirmatively the exercise 
 of due care, it is nevertheless universally held that such proof 
 need not be direct, but may be inferred from circumstances ; ^ 
 and that the exercise of such care may be inferred from the 
 absence of all appearance of fault on his part, under the cir- 
 cumstances of the case.^ The circumstances may be considered 
 in connection with the ordinary habits, conduct and motives 
 of men ; ^ and the fact that, when last seen, a deceased person 
 was proceeding with due care,* or was found in a situation 
 indicating the exercise of such care,' will sustain a finding in 
 
 (Carr v. West End R. Co., 163 Mass. 
 360 ; 40 N. E. 185). Intoxication may 
 be proved by opinions of eye-wit- 
 nesses (People V. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 
 563), but not by declarations of a third 
 person, not made a part of the res 
 gestae (Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Bell, 
 79 111. 102). See § 60a, ante. Evi- 
 dence of plaintiff's previous boasts 
 as to his ability to keep out of the 
 way of trains, and escape danger, is 
 admissible as bearing upon his care- 
 lessness and readiness to take risks 
 (Brouillette v. Connecticut River R. 
 Co., 163 Mass. 198 ; '38 N. E. 507). 
 ' So held in Maine (French v. 
 Brunswick, 31 Me. 39 ; Foster v. Dix- 
 field, 18 Id. 380) ; Massachusetts 
 (Mayo V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 104 
 Mass. 137 ; Prentiss v. Boston, etc. 
 R. Co., 112 Id. 43; Nichols v. Smith, 
 1 15 Id. 333 ; Hinckley v. Cape Cod R. 
 Co., 120 Id. 357) ; New York (John- 
 son v. Hudson River R. Co., 30 N. Y. 
 64; Ernst v. Hudson River Co., 35 
 Id. 9 ; Wilds v. Hudson River Co., 
 24 Id. 430 ; Palmer v. Bearing, 93 
 Id. 7 ; Tolman v. Syracuse, etc. R. 
 Co., 98 Id. 198 ; Lee v. Troy, etc. 
 Gas Co., Id. 115 ; Taberv. Delaware, 
 etc. R. Co., 71 Id. 489; Maher v. 
 Central Park, etc. R. Co., 67 Id. 63; 
 Galvin v. New York, 113 N. Y. 
 223 ; 19 N, E. 675 : Chisholm v. 
 State, 141 N.Y. 346 ; 36 N. E. 184; 
 
 Sickles V. N. J. Ice Co. , 80 Hun, 313 ; 
 30 N. Y. Supp. 10); Iowa (Nelson 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 564 ; 
 Murphy v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 45 
 Id. 661); Illinois (Illinois Cent. R. 
 Co. V. Cragin, 71 111. 177) ; Indiana 
 (Indiana, etc. R. Co, v. Greene, 106 
 Ind. 379 ; Terre Haute, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Buck, 96 Id. 346, 36a) ; Louisiana 
 (Clements v. Louisiana Electric Light 
 Co., 44 La. Ann. 693 ; 11 So. 51.) 
 
 ^ In a collision, the presumption is 
 in favor of a plaintiff, whose vessel 
 lies at anchor, as against one in 
 motion (Bill v. Smith, 39 Conn. 206). 
 
 ' Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 
 30 N. Y. 64 ; affi'g 6 Duer, 633. It is 
 not indispensable that the plaintiff 
 should produce eye-witnesses as to 
 the manner in which the accident 
 occurred to show due care on the 
 part of one deceased; but that fact 
 may be inferi-ed from the circum- 
 stances, in connection with the or- 
 dinary habits and conduct of men 
 in the presence of a known danger 
 (Galvin v. New York, 113 N. Y. 
 333 ; 19 N. E. 675 ; Illinois Central 
 R. Co., V. Nowicki, 148 111. 29 ; 35 N. 
 E. 358 [collision at railroad cross- 
 ing]). 
 
 * Greenleaf v. Illinois Central R. 
 Co.. 39 Iowa, 14. 
 
 ' Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 
 supra. In California, it has been 
 
§"I] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 172 
 
 his favor. An inference of care arises in favor of one deceased, 
 from the instinct of self-preservation ; * though in some courts 
 this alone is not enough to establish the fact ; it is only where 
 there is no reliable proof to the contrary, or there is a rational 
 doubt upon the evidence as to the conduct of the party, that 
 such a presumption can be invoked.' Evidence that the 
 injured person was careful and prudent, and that he had 
 been careful on other occasions, is not competent to disprove 
 contributory negligence, where he is living;' but if he is 
 
 held that though there was some evi- 
 dence showing negligence on the 
 part of the deceased, for whose 
 death the action was brought, yet a 
 verdict for plaintiff might be sup- 
 ported on the theory that the jury 
 did not consider such negligence 
 the proximate cause of the accident, 
 but as caused proximately by the un- 
 skillfulness and incompetency of the 
 train-engineer (Brown v. Central 
 Pac. R. Co., 68 Cal. 171 ; 7 Pac. 447 ; 
 8 Id. 828). 
 
 « Texas, etc. E. Co. v. Gentry, 163 
 U. S. 353 ; 16 S. Ct. 1104; 111. Cen- 
 tral R. Co. V. Nowicki, 148 111. 39 ; 
 35 N. E. 858; Northern Cent. E. 
 Co. V. State, 31 Md. 357; Gay v. 
 Winter, 34 Cal. 153; Mac Dougal 
 V. Central R. Co., 63 Id. 431 ; Mor- 
 rison V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 63 
 N. Y. 643; Greenleaf v. Illinois Cen- 
 tral R Co., 29 Iowa, 14; Hopkin- 
 son V. Knapp. etc. Co., 93 Id. 338 ; 60 
 N. W. 653). See Allen v. Willard, 
 57 Pa. St. 374 ; Cleveland, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Rowan, 66 Id. 393 ; McBride 
 V. Northern Pacific R. Co., 19 Oreg. 
 64 ; 23 Pac. 814, and cases supra. In 
 Reynolds v. Keokuk (73 Iowa. 371 ; 
 34 N. W. in\ where plaintiff was a 
 witness on her own behalf, it was 
 held that inferences of plaintiff's 
 care arising from the instinct of self- 
 preservation, were not to be indulged 
 
 ' Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Steb- 
 bing, 63 Md. 504 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Bennett, 9 Ind. App. 92 ; 35 
 N. E. 1033. 
 
 * Morris v. East Haven, 41 Conn. 
 254 ; McDonald v. Savoy, 110 Mass. 
 49 ; compare Dorman v. Kane, 5 
 Allen, 38 ; Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 94 Ga. 107 ; 30 S. E. 763 
 [train hand coupling cars] ; Wells v. 
 Denver & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 7 Utah, 
 483 ; 27 Pac. 688 [brakeman coupling ■ 
 carsj. Evidence that a prudent man 
 would have acted in the same man- 
 ner as plaintiff acted has been held 
 to be admissible (Burkett v. Bond, 
 12 111. 87). Evidence that one killed 
 at a railroad crossing was a sober and 
 industrious man, possessed of all his 
 faculties, and that his attention was 
 probably distracted by two trains 
 passing in opposite directions, made 
 apHma facie case of due care on his 
 part (Illinois Central R. Co. v. No- 
 wicki, 148 111. 29 ; 35 N. E. 358) ; so, 
 also, that evidence that a person 
 killed by the explosion of a boiler, 
 under his management, was a com- 
 petent and careful engineer, was suf- 
 ficient to raise a presumption of due 
 care on his part, at the time, there 
 being no eye-witnesses of the occur- 
 rence (Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Bailey, 
 145 111. 159 ; 33 N. E. 1089). See Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Clark, 108 111.- 
 113. 
 
173 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. [§ 112 
 
 dead, such evidence is admissible,' especially if no eye-wit- 
 nesses can be found.*" 
 
 § 112. Inference from circumstances. — In the same courts, 
 freedom from contributory fault may be inferred in favor of a 
 deceased person, from the absence of all appearance of such 
 fault.* Though there was no eye-witness of the accident, and 
 although its precise cause and manner of occurrence are 
 unknown, an inference of freedom from fault on the part 
 of the injured person becomes possible, if the surrounding 
 circumstances indicate that the accident might have hap-, 
 pened without such fault. In such a case, a question of fact 
 arises, to be solved by the jury. But where the circum- 
 stances do not tend to establish the existence of some cause 
 of the accident, consistent with care on the part of the in- 
 jured person, and contributory negligence is the only and nec- 
 essary inference to be drawn, the plaintiff has not successfully 
 borne the burden resting upon him.^ Where the facts sur- 
 rounding the occurrence of the accident are only partially 
 disclosed, and they are equally consistent with the plaintiff's 
 
 ' Overman Wheel Co. v. Griffin, 67 of negligence, and the court erred 
 
 Fed. 659 ; 14 C. C. A. 609 ; Illinois in directing a nonsuit. 
 Cent. R. Co. v. Nowicki, 148 111. 29 ; ^ Tolman v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 
 
 35 N. E. 358. 98 N. Y. 198 ; Becht v. Corbin, 93 
 
 '0 Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Bailey, 145 N. Y. 658 ; Connelly v, N. Y. Central 
 
 111. 159 ; 38 N. E. 1089. R. Co., 88 Id. 346 ; Greany v. Long 
 
 'Mayo V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 104 Island R. Co., 101 Id. 419; Hinckley 
 
 Mass. 137 ; Prentiss v. Boston, 113 v. Cape Cod R. Co., 120 Mass. 257 ; 
 
 Id. 43 ; Cook v. Metropolitan R. Co., Ince v. East Boston Ferry Co., ,106 
 
 98 Id. 861 ; Maguire v. Fitchburg R. Id. 149 ; Barstow v. Old Colony R. 
 
 Co., 146 Id. 879 ; 15 N. E. 904 ; Mc- Co., 143 Mass. 535 ; ION. E. 255 ; Ryan 
 
 Intosh \. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 36 v. Louisville, etc. B. Co., 44 La. Ann. 
 
 Fed. 061. In Galvin v. New York 806 ; 11 So. 30. To similar effect, 
 
 (113 N. Y. 223; 19 N. E. 675), there in courts holding to the other rule, 
 
 being no affirmative evidence of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Righter, 42 
 
 negligence on the part of deceased, N. J. Law, 180 ; N. J. Express Co. 
 
 and no eye-vpitness of the accident, v. Nichols, 33 Id. 434; Flemming v. 
 
 and no question as to defendant's "Western Pacific R. Co. , 49 Cal. 253 ; 
 
 negligence, held it was for the jury McQuilken v. Central Pacific B Co., 
 
 to determine the degree of care 50 Id. 7 ; Donaldson v. MilwaAee, 
 
 which deceased was bound to exer- etc. R. Co., 21 Minn. 293 ; Brown v. 
 
 else, to infer the motive which led Milwaukee, etc. B. Co., 32 Id. 165; 
 
 him to the hatchway where he was Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131 ; 
 
 killed, and to pass upon the question Myers v. Kansas City, 108 Id. 480 ; 
 
§"3] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 174 
 
 care on the one hand, and want of care on the other, the plain- 
 tiff must suffer a non-suit.* 
 
 § 113. Pleading absence of fault. — In those courts which 
 hold that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, it is never- 
 theless the general rule that the plaintiff need not expressly 
 aver in his pleading the absence of contributory fault.' This 
 inconsistency is explained by the courts on the ground that 
 the absence of contributory negligence is necessarily implied in 
 an averment that the defendant caused the injury, since (it is 
 
 18 S. W. 914; Dougherty v. West 
 Superior Iron Co., 88 Wise. 343 ; 60 
 N. W. 274. 
 
 'Crafts V.Boston, 109 Mass. 519. 
 In New York, this rule has been ap- 
 plied to deceased persons (Hart v. 
 Hudson River Bridge Co., 84 N. Y. 
 56 ; Hale v. Smith, 78 Id. 483 ; Rey- 
 nolds V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 58 Id. 
 248 ; Cordell v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 75 Id. 330 ; Riordan v. Ocean S. S. 
 Co., 124 N. Y. 655 ; 26 N. E. 1027 
 [stevedore killed coming up from 
 hold of vessel] ; Wiwirowski v. Lake 
 Shore, etc. R. Co., 124 N. Y. 420 ; 26 
 N. E. 1023). But not so in some other 
 states adhering to the general rule 
 (Teipel v. Hilsendegen, 44 Mich. 465 ; 
 7 N. W. 82; 111. Central R. Co. v. 
 Nowioki, 148 111. 29 ; 35 N. E. 358 ; 
 Way V. R. R. Co. , 40 Iowa, 345 ; Gay 
 V. Winter, 34 Cal. 153). The New 
 York cases are mostly obiter dicta. 
 
 ' So held in Massachusetts (Fuller 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 134 Mass. 491; 
 May V. Princeton, 11 Mete. 443) ; New 
 York (Lee v. Troy, etc. Gas Co., 98 
 N. Y. 115 ; Hackford v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 6Lans. 381; affi'd 53 N. Y. 
 654); though it is not improper to 
 allege the fact (Lynch v. Second Ave. 
 R. Co., 7 N. Y. App. Div. 164 ; 39 N. 
 Y. Supp. 1103) ; iHmois (Consolidated 
 Coal Co. V. Wombacher, 134 111. 57 ; 
 24 N. E. 627 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hines. 182 111. 161; 23 N. E. 1021: 
 contra, Calumet Co. v. Martin, 115 
 
 111. 358; 3 N. E. 456); 
 (Hickman v. Kansas City, etc. R. 
 Co., 66 Miss. 154 ; 5 So. 235 ; Vicks- 
 burg V. McLain, 67 Miss. 4 ; 6 So. 
 774). Of course no such averment is 
 required in states where contributory 
 negligence is a mere defense (Smoot 
 V. Wetumpka, 34 Ala. 113 ; Holt v. 
 Whatley, 51 Id. 569 ; Thompson v. 
 Duncan, 70 Id. 334 ; Columbus, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Bradford, 86 Id. 574 ; 6 So. 
 90 ; Wilson v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 85 Ala. 369 ; 4 So. 701 ; South- West 
 Va. Co. V. Andrew, 86 Va. 270 ; Balti- 
 more, etc. R. Co. V. Whittington, 
 30 Gratt. 805; Snyder v. Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co., 11 W. Va. 14 ; 
 Georgia Midland, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Evans, 87 Ga. 673 ; 13 S. E. 580). 
 O'Connor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 94 Mo. 150 ; 7 S. W. 106 ; Thorpe v. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co., 89 Mo. 650 ; 2 
 S. W. 8 ; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Murphy, 46 Tex. 356 ; Hocum v. 
 Witherick, 22 Minn. 152 ; Smith v. 
 Eastern R. Co., 35 N. H. 356 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 20 Wis. 533; Gram v. Northern 
 Pac. R. Co., 1 N. Dak. 252 ; 46 N. W. 
 973 ; Johnson v. Bellingham Bay 
 Imp. Co., 13 Wash. St. 455 ; 43 Pac. 
 370 ; Boyd v. Oddous, 97 Cal. 510 ; 33 
 Pac. 569 ; Robinson v. Western Pa- 
 cific R. Co., 48 Cal. 409). But there 
 is one strange decision to the con- 
 trary, State V. Baltimore, etc R Co 
 (Md.), 26 Atl. 865. 
 
175 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ "4 
 
 said) he did not cause it, if the plaintiff assisted in causing it. 
 This is very unsatisfactory reasoning; and the logic of the 
 Indiana and Iowa courts, which require the plaintiff expressly 
 to aver in his pleading the fact of his due care, since he must 
 prove it on the trial, is far more sound.^ The defense of con- 
 tributory negligence, where it is a matter of defense, is admis- 
 sible under the general plea of not guilty or under a general 
 denial.' 
 
 § 114. Questions of fact and law. —The rule as to what 
 evidence will suffice to go to the jury on the issue of con- 
 tributory negligence, as a question of fact, is substantially the 
 same as that which governs the submission to the jury of the 
 defendant's negligence, subject, of course, to the rule held by 
 the particular court as to the burden of proof. It is a general 
 rule, applicable in all courts, that the question is to be sub- 
 
 'Evansville, etc. E. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 
 Ind. 103 ; i-e-affirmed in Pennsylva- 
 nia R. Co. V. Gallentine, 77 Id. 333 ; 
 Rogers v. Overton, 87 Id. 411 ; Ohio, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Walker, 113 Id. 196 ; 
 15 N. E. 334 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Sandford. 117 Ind. 365 ; 19 N. E. 770. 
 So in lov^a (Gregory v. Wood worth, 
 61 N. W. 963). It is sufficient to al- 
 lege that the injury occurred without 
 plaintiff's fault (Rogers v. Overton, 
 supra ; Gheens v. Golden, 90 Ind. 437 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Nickless, 71 Id. 371 
 Michigan, etc. v. Lautz, 39 Id. 538 
 Indiana, etc. R. Co. v. Overman, 110 
 Id. 538 ; 10 N. E. 575), or that the 
 injury was caused wholly by the 
 negligence of the defendant (Brink- 
 man V. Bender, 93 Ind. 331 ; Wilson 
 V. Railroad Co., 83 Ind. 336 ; Ander- 
 son V. Hervey, 67 Id. 430 ; Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. McDaniel, 134 Id. 166 ; 
 33 N. E. 738). In Texas, it is held that 
 where the petition discloses a state of 
 facts, which if unexplained would 
 make out a prima facie case of con- 
 tributory negligence, freedom from 
 fault must be averred (Tex. etc. R. 
 Co. V. Murphy, 46 Tex. 356). In 
 
 Kentucky, if plaintiff's contributory 
 negligence appears on the face of 
 the complaint, it is demurrable 
 (Favre v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 91 
 Ky. 541; 16 S. W. 370). 
 
 ^Holden v.' Liverpool Gas Co., 3 
 C. B. 1 ; St. Anthony's Falls v. East- 
 man, SO Minn. 377 ; Cunningham v. 
 Lyness, 33 Wise. 345 ; EUet v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 76 Mo. 518 ; Grey 
 V. MobUe Ti-ade Co. 55 Ala. 387. But 
 otherwise in Missouri (Stone v. Hunt, 
 94 Mo. 475 ; 7 S. W. 431), in Nebraska 
 (South Omaha v. Cunningham, 31 
 Neb. 316 ; 47 N. W. 930) and Texas 
 (Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Watson, 
 73 Tex. 631; 10 S. W. 731). Of 
 course, contributory fault may be 
 shown under a general denial in 
 courts adhering to the minority rule 
 (Jones V. Andover, 10 Allen, 18 ; New 
 Albany v. McCulloch, 127 Ind. 500 ; 
 36 N. E. 1074). As to variance be- 
 tween proof and pleading, see McCoy 
 V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 5 Del. 
 599 ; and as to pleading contribu- 
 tory negligence, see 13 Am. St. Rep. 
 75, note. 
 
§"4] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 176 
 
 mitted to the jury, not only where there is sufficient testimony 
 as to the actual facts to leave a reasonable doubt,' but also 
 where the inferences which might be fairly drawn from the 
 facts are not certain and invariable, and might lead to different 
 conclusions in different minds. The court is not at liberty to 
 withhold the question from the jury, simply because it is fully 
 convinced that a certain inference should be drawn, so long as 
 persons of fair and sound minds might possibly come to a 
 different conclusion.* Where the evidence makes out a clear 
 
 ' Doyle V. Pennsylvania, etc. E. 
 Co., 139 N. Y. 637 ; 34 N. E. 1068 
 [conflict as to ringing bell] ; Hoff- 
 mau T. Union Ferry Co. , 68 N. Y. 
 885 [precautions of steamers] ; Peil v. 
 Reinhart, la7 Id. 381 ; 27 N. E. 1077 
 [knowledge of defect in stairway] ; 
 Parsons v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 113 
 N. Y. 355 ; 31 N. E. 145 [alighting 
 from train] ; Beckwith v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 54 Hun, 446 ; affi'd 125 N. 
 Y. 759 ; 27 N. E. 408 [railroad cross- 
 ing] ; Miller v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 82 Hun, 164 ; affi'd 146 N. Y. 367 
 [railroad crossing] ; Seeley v. N. Y. 
 Central E. Co., 8 N. Y. App. Div. 
 402 ; 40 N. Y. Supp. 866 [same] ; 
 Keng V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 160 
 Pa. St. 644; 28 Atl. 940 [railroad 
 crossing] ; Smith v. Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co., 158 Pa. St. 82 ; 27 Atl. 847 [care 
 at crossing] ; Baker v. Maryland 
 Coal Co., 84 Md. 19 ; 35 Atl. 10 
 [knowledge of new danger] ; Georgia 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Propst, 83 Ala. 518 ; 
 3 So. 764 [knowledge of rule]. To 
 similar effect. North Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Eldridge, 151 111. 542 ; 88 N. E. 
 246 ; Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 
 274; Garrett v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 36 Iowa, 121 ; Kelly v. Hannibal, etc. 
 R. Co., 70 Mo. 604 ; Mauerman v. 
 Siemerts, 71 Id 101 ; Monroe v. Lat- 
 tin, 25 Kans. 391 ; Swaboda v. Ward, 
 40 Mich. 420 ; Teipel v. Hilsendegen, 
 44 Id. 461 ; 7N. W. 82; Kelley v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 53 "Wise. 74 ; John- 
 son V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 49 Id. 529; 
 
 Hoyt V. Hudson, 41 Id. 105 ; Kansas 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Twombly, 3 Colo. 125 ; 
 Fernandes v. Sacramento R. Co., 52 
 Cal. 45 ; International, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Kindred, 57 Tex. 491 ; Bierbach v. 
 Goodyear Rubber Co., 14 Fed. 836; 
 15 Id. 490. Even where plaintiff's 
 own testimony is confused and con- 
 tradictory as to whether he stopped, 
 looked, and listened at a place where 
 he ought to have done so, yet he is 
 entitled to go to the jury (Ely v. 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 158 Pa. St. 
 238 ; 27 Atl. 970). 
 
 ' Where evidence is conflicting, 
 or is capable of different interpre- 
 tations, or if the inferences to be 
 drawn from it are doubtful, it is 
 the province of the jury to pass 
 upon it (Belton v. Baxter, 58 N. Y. 
 411 ; Hart v. Hudson River Bridge 
 Co., 80 Id. 622 ; WeUer v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 120 Mo. 635; 23 S. W. 
 1061 ; 25 Id. 532 ; Cincinnati, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Grames, 136 Ind. 39 ; 84 N. E. 
 714 [disapproving Conner v. Citizens' 
 R. Co., 105 Ind. 62 ; 4 N. E. 441] ; 
 Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Crawford, 
 24 Ohio St. 631 ; Orr v. Cedar Eapids, 
 etc. R. Co., Iowa, ; 62 N. W. 851). 
 This is probably the rule in England 
 (see Brown v. Great Western R. Co., 
 52 Law Times, 622 ; reviewing the 
 cases) . To the same effect, Robertson 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 160 Mass. 191 ; 
 35 N. E. 775 [continued use of de- 
 fective locomotive while repairing] ; 
 Emery v. Raleigh, etc. R. Co., 103 N. 
 
177 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ 114 
 
 case, it is a question of law.^ Where it is the rule that the 
 burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, the question cannot 
 be left to the jury, if all the facts and all the inferences 
 
 the jury (Palmer v. Deariug, 93 N. Y. 
 7 ; Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513 ; 
 30 N. E. 360 ; Finnegan v. Fall River 
 Gas Works Co., 159 Mass. 311; 34 N. 
 E. 523). The question of contributory 
 negligence, as a general rule, can- 
 not resolve itself into one 01 lavp-, but 
 must be submitted to jury, as que.s- 
 tion of fact (O'Brien v. McGlinchy, 
 68 Me. 552 ; Brown v. European, etc. 
 E. Co., 58 Id. 384; Sleeper v. Wor- 
 cester, etc. R. Co., 58 N. H. 520; 
 Ruland v. South Nevpmarket, 59 Id. 
 291 ; Fassett v. Roxbury, 55 Vt. 552 ; 
 Willard v, Pinard, 44 Id. 34 ; Brooks 
 T. Boston, etc. R. Co., 135 Mass. 21 ; 
 Greenwood v. Callahan, 111 Id. 298 : 
 O'Connor v. Adams, 120 Id. 427; 
 Beers v. Housatonic R. Co., 19 Conn. 
 566; Park v. O'Brien, 23 Id. 339; 
 Smith V. Rio Grande R. Co., 9 Utah, 
 141 ; 33 Pao. 636). Where facts con- 
 stituting contributory negligence are 
 so disconnected from facts constitut- 
 ing defendant's negligence that it 
 cannot be determined as a matter of 
 law that the one was the cause or 
 sequence of the other, their rela- 
 tion or dependence should be sub- 
 mitted to the jury (Smith v. Occi- 
 dental Co., 99 Cal. 403; 34 Pac. 
 84). If the evidence of contributory 
 negligence is not so conclusive as to 
 warrant setting aside a verdict, the 
 question should be left to the jury 
 (Washington, etc. R. Co. v. Harmon, 
 147 U. S. 571 ; 13 S. Ct. 557 ; Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Amato, 144 U. S. 465 ; 
 12 S. Ct. 740 ; Crane Elevator Co. v. 
 Lippert, 11 C. C. A. 531 ; 63 Fed. 942). 
 ^Tolman v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 
 98 N. Y. 1 98 ; and other cases cited, 
 see § 113, note 3, ante ; and in addi- 
 tion. West Jersey R. Co. v. Ewan. 00 
 N. J. Law, 574 ; 27 Atl. 1064 [Ct. of 
 Errors] ; Mynning v. Detroit, etc. R. 
 
 C. 309 ; 9 S. E. 139 ; [continued use 
 of brickyard made dangerous by 
 defendant's negligence]; Spaulding 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., Iowa, ; 67 
 N. W. 337 ; [uncoupling cars in 
 motion] ; Rolseth v. Smith, 38 Minn. 
 14; 35 N. W. 565; [demurrer to 
 complaint] ; and see Greany v. Long 
 Island R. Co., 101 N. Y. 419 ; 5 N. E. 
 435 ; Kellogg v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 79 N. Y. 73 ; Lee v. Troy, etc. Gas 
 Co., 98 Id. 115 ; Sherry v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral, etc. R. Co., 104 Id. 653; 10 N. 
 E. 138 ; Whittaker v. Delaware, etc. 
 Canal Co., 126 N. Y. 544; 37 N. E. 
 1043 ; Galvin v. New York, 112 N. 
 Y. 333, 229 ; 19 N. E. 675 ; Salter v. 
 Utica, etc. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 43 ; Kain 
 V. Smith, 89 Id. 375 ; Orange, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Ward, 47 N. J. Law, 560 ; N. 
 J. Express Co. v. Nichols, 32 Id. 166; 
 Berry v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 Id. 
 141 ; North Penn. R. Co. v. Kirk, 90 
 Pa. St. 15 ; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Long, 75 Id. 257. In Payne v. 
 Reese (100 Pa. St. 301), a worknian in 
 a colliery walked into a cloud of 
 steam which he saw coming out of 
 hole in footpath where he was ac- 
 customed to walk, the steam in fact 
 proceeding from a defective blow- 
 pipe which his employer should have 
 kept in repair. Held, question of 
 contributory negligence for jury, 
 and it was error for court to decide 
 it. To same effect Baltimore v. 
 Holmes, 39 Md. 243 ; SheflE v. Hunt- 
 ington, 16 W. Va. 807 ; Central R. 
 Co. V. Freeman, 66 Ga. 170 ; Louis- 
 vUle, etc. R. Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 
 442 ; Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45 ; Ramsey 
 V. Rushville R Co., 81 Id. 394 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. v. Wright, 80 Id. 
 183 ; Albion v. Hetrick, 90 Id. 545. 
 The degree of care required under 
 the circumstances is a question for 
 [Law op Neq. Vol. 1 — 12] 
 
§"4] 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 178 
 
 which could reasonably be drawn therefrom point just as much 
 to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as to its absence, 
 or if the facts do not justify any inference upon the subject.* 
 But considerable difificulty is experienced in applying this 
 principle to the case of deceased persons; some cases applying 
 it strictly,' and others holding that it will not be presumed that 
 
 Co., 67 Mich. 677 ; 35 N. W. 811 ; Co- 
 lumbus, etc. R. Co. V. Bradford, 86 
 Ala. 574 ; 6 So. 90 ; Gleason v. Ex- 
 celsior M'fg Co., 94 Mo. 201 ; 7S. W. 
 188 ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Moseley, 
 57 Fed. 921 ; 6 C. C. A. 641. Where 
 the fact is incontrovertible that a 
 locomotive engineer was brought 
 into the peril which caused his death, 
 in part by his disregard of the com- 
 pany's known rules as to rate of 
 speed, having observed which a col- 
 lision would have been avoided, his 
 co-operating negligence is an infer- 
 ence of law; and a nonsuit should 
 be granted (Sutherland v. Troy, etc. 
 R. Co., 125 N. Y. 737 ; 26 N. E. 609). 
 * Barker v. Savage, 45 N. Y. 191 ; 
 Ditchett V. Spuyten, etc. R. Co., 5 
 Hun. 165 ; 67 N. Y. 425 ; Stuart v. 
 Machias, 48 Me. 477 ; Alger v. Low- 
 ell, 3 Allen, 403 ; Thorp v. Brookfield, 
 36 Conn. 321 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Boteler, 38 Md. 568 ; Burns v. 
 Elba, 32 Wise. 605 ; Cramer v. Bur- 
 lington, 42 Iowa, 315 ; O'Keefe v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 33 Id. 467; 
 Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 111. 
 177 ; Whalen v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 Co., 60 Mo. 323 ; Wynn v. Allard, 5 
 Watts & S. 534 ; Southwestern, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Hankerson, 61 Ga. 114; 
 and cases cited under § 112, ante. 
 But in a recent Indiana case, it was 
 held that where plaintiflf alleges he 
 was not negligent, and no facts ap- 
 pear to indicate that he was, the 
 court cannot presume contributoi-y 
 negligence ( Bedford R. Co. v. 
 Brown, 143 Ind. 659 : 43 N. E. 359 ); 
 and, in New York, there being no 
 proof of contributory negligence. 
 
 the court will assume, after verdict 
 for plaintiff, that he was without 
 fault (Rowe v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 83 Hun, 153 ; 31 N. Y. Supp. 
 304). The jury have the right to 
 believe the plaintiff's unsupported 
 testimony that he looked and listened 
 for the train at a highway crossing 
 (Hickey v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 8- 
 N. Y. App. Div. 123 ; 40 N. Y. Supp. 
 484). 
 
 'So held, where there was no 
 direct testimony as to the care or 
 negligence of the deceased ; for his 
 general reputation for carefulness 
 and the natural instinct of self- 
 preservation do not in such a case 
 afford sufBcient proof of the absence 
 of contributory negligence (Indi- 
 ana, etc. R. Co. V. Greene, 106 lud. 
 279 ; CordeU v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 75 N. Y. 330 [a mere oUter 
 dictmn] ; Peaslee v. Chatham, 69 
 Hun, 389 ; 23 N. Y. Supp. 628 ; see 
 State V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 76 
 Me. 357 ; see § 111, ante). A boy of 
 sixteen was found dead between 
 tracks. The engine by which he 
 was killed could have been seen 750 
 feet distant. It was a fair day and 
 with little wind. Held, that the 
 proof did not warrant a finding that 
 there was no negligence on the part 
 of the deceased (Reynolds v. N. Y. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 248 ;. 
 s. P., Wakelin v. Southeastern R. 
 Co., L. R. 12 App. Cas. 41 ; Lee v. Pub- 
 lishers, 55 Mo. App. 390). Where the 
 circumstances point as much to de- 
 cedent's negligence as to its absence, 
 or point in neither direction, a non- 
 suit is proper (Dorr v. McCuUough. 
 
179 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§II4 
 
 the deceased did not look or listen, in the absence of any cir- 
 cumstances which tend to raise such a presumption.' Of 
 course, in those courts which hold that the burden of proof is 
 upon the defendant, the presumption is in favor of a deceased 
 person upon all such points.' In all courts, when there is any 
 evidence from which an inference of contributory negligence 
 might reasonably be drawn, the court must instruct the jury 
 that the plaintiff cannot recover, if his negligence contributed 
 to produce the injury, in the manner hereinbefore stated.^ 
 
 8 N. Y. App. Div. 337; 40 N. Y. 
 Supp. 806 [railroad crossing] ; Ward 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 25 Oreg. 
 433 ; 36 Pac. 166 ; Kaufifman v. 
 Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 144 Ind. 456; 
 43 N. E. 446). 
 
 ' The fact that there is no affirma- 
 tive evidence showing that one who 
 was killed while crossing a railroad 
 track, either looked or listened does 
 not justify a presumption that he 
 did not look, and was, therefore, 
 negligent (Massoth v. Delaware, etc. 
 Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 534). So. as to 
 his care in general (Jones v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 28 Hun, 364 ; affi'd, 
 93 N. Y. 688) ; Oldenburg v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 124 N. Y. 414; 26 
 N. E. 1021 [deceased, looking at 
 rough sidewalk, kiUed by backing 
 engine] ; Atkinson v. Abraham, 45 
 Hun, 338 [falling down dark hatch- 
 way] ; Troy v. Cape Fear, etc. R. 
 Co , 99 N. C. 298 ; 6 S. E. 77 
 [intoxicated man's foot caught 
 in rail ; run over at crossing]. 
 
 ' Where the plaintiff did not prove 
 affirmatively that deceased had 
 stopped and looked and listened, it 
 was to be presumed that he had ; and 
 although a witness testified that de- 
 ceased could have seen the train 
 coming, if he had looked, this was 
 held not to justify an instruction to 
 
 find for defendant (Weiss v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co., 79 Pa. St. 387 ; see, 
 also, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Weber, 
 76 Id. 157). 
 
 * Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Krich- 
 baum, 24 Ohio St. 119. Where there 
 is evidence of contributory negli- 
 gence an instruction ignoring it is 
 erroneous (Guenther v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co., 95 Mo. 386 ; 8 S. W. 371). 
 Where the court charged that the 
 plaintiff cannot recover if his own 
 negligence conti'ibuted to the injury, 
 yet so instructed the jury that they 
 might reasonably believe that this 
 rule only applies when the defendant 
 is not negligent ; held, error (Balti- 
 more, etc. R. Co. V. Whittaker, 34 
 Ohio St. 643 ; Dwinnell v. Abbott, 74 
 Wise. 514 ; 43 N. W. 496 ; see Patter- 
 son V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 4 
 Houst. 103). As to necessity of ex- 
 plicit instructions on this point, see 
 Hart V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 67 
 Hun, 648 ; 22 N. Y. Supp. 3 ; Jung v. 
 Stevens Point, 74 Wise. 547; 43 N. 
 W. 513. An instruction that plain- 
 tiff is entitled to recover for injuries 
 sustained by him, if caused solely by 
 defendant's negligence and want of 
 reasonable care, sufficiently implies 
 that plaintiff must be free from con- 
 tributory negligence (Hotel Ass'n v. 
 Walter, 33 Neb. 280 ; 36 N. W. 561). 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 I 115. Persons directly or indirectly 
 injured. 
 
 116. Who may sue on breach of 
 
 contract. 
 
 117. Liability for selling danger- 
 
 ous goods. 
 
 118. Private actions upon public 
 
 obligations. 
 
 § 119. Reversioners and mortagees 
 120. Landlords and tenants. 
 120a. Railroads. 
 131. Infants and lunatics. 
 123. Who are jointly liable. 
 123. Who are not jointly lia:ble. 
 
 § 115. Persons directly or indirectly injured. — As a matter 
 of course, the person directly injured by negligence is a proper 
 plaintiff; but it is not necessary, in order to maintain such an 
 action, that the plaintiff should have been thus directly injured. 
 An indirect injury will sufifice to give a cause of action.^ But 
 the injury must be a proximate result of the defendant's fault. 
 Thus, a master can recover compensation for a tort which de- 
 prives him of the labor of his servant,^ although the servant 
 can recover separate damages for his own personal loss ; and it 
 is upon this ground that a parent can recover for an injury to 
 his child.' So, at common law, a husband can recover dam 
 
 ' See cases cited under § 34a, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. 
 
 ante. 
 
 ' Hall V. Hollander, 4 Barn. & Cr. 
 6G0 ; Martinez v. Gerber, 3 Man. & 
 G. 88 ; 3 Scott N. R. 386 ; Gough v. 
 Bryan, 3 Mees. & W. 770 ; Gilbert 
 v. Schwenck, 14 Id. 488 ; Hodsoll v. 
 Stallebrass, 11 Ad. & El. 301 ; Wood- 
 ward V. Washburn, 3 Denio, 369. 
 As to the measure of damages in 
 such actions, see § 763, post. As to 
 imputing servant's negligence to 
 master, see § 71, ante. 
 
 'White V. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; 
 Kennedy v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 35 Hun, 186 ; Gilligan v. Har- 
 lem R. Co., 1 E. D. Smith, 453; 
 
 St. 373 ; Oakland R. Co. v. Fielding, 
 48 Id. 330 ; Birmingham v. Dorer, 
 3 Brewster, 69. As the action is 
 based upon the relation of master 
 and servant which exists between 
 the parent and child (Karr v. Parks, 
 44 Cal. 46 ; Hoover v. Heim, 7 
 Watts, 63 ; Cowden v. Wright, 34 
 Wend. 439), the relation must exist 
 or the action does not lie, as where 
 the parent has relinquished his right 
 to the child's services, or the child 
 is so young that his services are 
 worthless (Hall v. Hollander, 4 
 Barn. & Cr. 660 ; compare Franklin 
 V. Southeastern R. Co., 3 Hurl. & N. 
 
 [180] 
 
I8l 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ 115 
 
 ages sustained by him for the loss of the services and society 
 of his wife, caused by the act of a third person ; or an action 
 may be maintained by both husband and wife for her own 
 injuries/ or by the wife separately, in those jurisdictions where 
 the statute has changed the common law in this regard.^ And 
 
 211; Drew v. Sixth Av. R. Co., 26 
 N. Y. 49 ; Abeles v. Bransfield, 19 
 Kans. 16). A mother cannot sue 
 for injuries to minor child where 
 father was living at the time of the 
 injury, though he died before action 
 brought (Geraghty v. New, 7 N. Y. 
 Misc. 80 ; 27 N. y'. Supp. 403). 
 
 ^ Brockbank v. Whitehaven, etc. 
 R. Co., 7 Hurlst. & N. 834 ; Matteson 
 V. N. Y. Central E. Co , 35 N. Y. 
 487 ; Mowry v. Chaney, 43 Iowa, 
 609 ; Smith v. St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456 ; 
 Cincinnati, etc. E. Co. v. Chester, 57 
 Ind. 297 ; Hopkins v. Atlantic, etc. 
 R. Co., 36 N. H. 9. Where the action 
 is in the name of husband and wife 
 for an injury to tlie latter, the hus- 
 band is but a nominal plaintiff, and 
 the measure of damages is tlie injury 
 sustained by the wife ; no recovery 
 can be had for the husband's loss of 
 her services, nor for his expenses of 
 her cure (Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 
 N. Y. 343 ; Fuller v. Naugatuck E. 
 Co. , 2 1 Conn. 557 ; Barnes v. Hurd, 
 11 Mass. 59; Barnes v. Martin, 15 
 Wise. 263; Heirn v. McCaughan, 32 
 Miss. 17). See generally Whitcomb 
 V. Barre, 87 Vt. 148: Laughlin v. 
 Eaton, 54 Me. 156 ; McKinney v. 
 Western Stage Co., 4 lovra, 420; 
 Kavanaugh v. Janesville, 24 Wise. 
 618; Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 328; 
 Fry V. Derstler, 2 Yeates, 278 [hus- 
 band and wife had voluntarily sepa- 
 rated] ; Hoard v. Pock, 56 Barb. 203 
 [defendant secretly selling large 
 quantities of laudanum to plaintiff's 
 wife]. Under the Louisiana Code, 
 a suit for personal injuries and 
 wrongs done to a wife must be 
 brought by her husband in his own 
 
 name (Fournet v. Morgan's, etc. S. 
 S. Co., 43 La. Ann. 1202 ; 11 So. 541). 
 As to actions for injuries causing 
 death, see post, % 124, et seq. As to 
 negligence of wife imputed to hus- 
 band, see § 67, ante. 
 
 ^ The wife must sue alone for her 
 own damages, in states where she is 
 given the right to do so (Hennies v. 
 Vogel, 66 111 401 ; Michigan, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440 ; Tut- 
 tle V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 42 Iowa, 
 518 ; Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Id. 
 383). In New York, since L. 1890, 
 c. 248, amending Co. Civ. Proc, 
 § 450, a husband is not a necessary 
 or a proper party to an action for 
 damages to the person, estate or 
 character of his wife. By L. 1890, c. 
 51, a married woman is given a right 
 of action for injuries to her property, 
 person, etc., "in all cases in which 
 an unmarried woman or a husband 
 now has a right of action by law." 
 This legislation supersedes the de- 
 cision, in BlsBchinska v. Howard 
 Mission, etc. (180 N. Y. 497 ; 29 N. E. 
 755), that a married woman could 
 not recover, in an action for personal 
 injuries, consequential damages for 
 loss of wages received from her hus- 
 band as a seamstress in his employ. 
 As to the right in New York, before 
 1890, of a married woman to sue in 
 her own name for personal injuries 
 without joining her husband, see 
 Weld V. N. Y., Lake Brie, etc. E. 
 Co., 68 Hun, 249 ; 23 N. Y. Supp. 
 974. In Connecticut, under Gen. 
 St. § 3673, providing that " any per- 
 son injured in person or property by 
 means of a defective road or bridge, 
 may recover damages," etc., a bus- 
 
§ii6] 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 182 
 
 a bailee can recover to the consequent loss of his hire.' But 
 a life insurance company cannot recover from a railroad com- 
 pany the amount voluntarily paid by the former upon the 
 death of a person killed by the negligence of the latter com- 
 pany, since the damages are too remote and indirect, even if 
 an action for death, at the suit of the insurer, would lie at, all, 
 which it would not.'' 
 
 § 116. Who may sue on breach of contract. — Negligence 
 which consists merely in the breach of a contract will not 
 
 band cannot maintain an action 
 against a city for the loss of his 
 wife's services and society, resulting 
 from injuries to her so caused 
 (Lounsbury v. Bridgeport, 66 Conn. 
 361 ; 34 Atl. 98) . In Pennsylvania, 
 the statute giving married women 
 control of their property, and au- 
 thorizing them to engage in business, 
 does not authorize a woman to sue 
 for loss of ability to do household 
 work (Walter v. Kensinger, 13 Pa. 
 Co. Ct. 222). In New York, a mar- 
 ried woman has such freedom of 
 control over her own real property 
 that her husband cannot, without 
 her consent, maintain a vicious 
 domestic animal thereon, and she is 
 liable for injuries committed by such 
 animal, although it is owned by the 
 husband (Quilty v. Battie, 135 N. Y. 
 201 ; 82 N. E. 47). 
 
 «McGill V. Monette, 37 Ala. 49. 
 Both the bailee and general owner 
 of cliattels may recover for their in- 
 jury or loss ; a recovery by one 
 barring a recovery by the other 
 (Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N. H. 
 387; Eindge v. Coleraine, 11 Gray, 
 1.57). But a mere bailee of a chattel 
 for hire cannot recover for injuries 
 to it (Buddin v. Eortunato, 10 N. Y. 
 Supp. 115 [carriage left with plaintiff 
 to be painted] ) , unless he has un- 
 dertaken to return it in good condi- 
 tion (St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Biggs, 
 50 Ark. 169 ; 6 S. W. 724 [agister of 
 
 cattle]). Hence, an auctioneer, to 
 whom a horse is entrusted for sale, 
 cannot recover for defendant's neg- 
 ligent injury of the animal, he being 
 under no liability therefor to the 
 owner (Claridge v. South Stafford- 
 shire Tr. Co. [1892], 1 Q. B. 423). 
 Two or more tenants in common 
 may jointly maintain an action 
 against a third tenant in common 
 for his injury to the common pro- 
 perty (Chesley v. Thompson, 3 
 N. H 9). 
 
 '' Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
 New Haven R. Co., 25 Conn. 265; 
 Rockingham Ins. Co. v. Bosher, 39 
 Me. 253. "Insurers have been per- 
 mitted to recover against the authors 
 of their losses . . . not by color 
 of their own legal right, but under 
 . . . the doctrine of subrogation " 
 (per Storrs, J., Connecticut Mut. Life 
 Ins. Co. V. New Haven R. Co., 
 supra). In Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Huitt (1 Kans. App. 788; 41 Pac. 
 1051), an insurer who had paid the 
 loss on property burned by sparks 
 from defendant's locomotive, was 
 brought in as plaintiff with the 
 owner, on a separate prayer to be 
 subrogated to the rights of the 
 owner under an agreement with 
 him. Held, under the Kansas Code, 
 that the insurer was a proper party ; 
 that there was no misjoinder of 
 causes of action, and tliat a verdict 
 for plaintiffs would not be disturbed. 
 
l83 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. [§ Il6 
 
 afford ground for an action by any one, except a party to the 
 contract, or a person for whose benefit the contract was avow- 
 edly made.i Therefore, an unborn infant, injured by an injury 
 to its mother, caused by negligence in her transportation by a 
 common carrier, cannot, after his birth, sue the carrier.^ But 
 where, in omitting to perform a contract, in whole or in part, 
 one also omits to use ordinary care to avoid injury to third 
 persons, who, as he could with a slight degree of care foresee, 
 would be exposed to risk by his negligence, he should be held 
 liable to such persons for injuries which are the proximate 
 result of such omission.^ As admirably put by Mr. Horace 
 Smith:* " The true question always is: Has the defendant 
 committed a breach of duty, apart from contract ? If he has 
 only committed a breach of contract, he is liable to those only 
 with whom he has contracted; but if he has committed a 
 breach of duty, he is not protected by setting up a contract in 
 respect of the same matter with another person." This prin- 
 ciple is not stated positively in any decision or judicial opinion, 
 except the masterly opinion of Lord Esher, in Heaven v. 
 Pender,' which was not concurred in by a majority of the 
 
 ' See Heaven v. Pender, L. E. 11 (now Lord Esher), which will be 
 
 Q. B. Div. 508. Thus, a master can- presently quoted. In Thomas v. 
 
 not sue upon injuries suffered by the Winchester (6 N. Y. 397), the dis- 
 
 servant from the negligence of a car- tinction was said to be between acts 
 
 rier of such servant (Alton v. Mid- which were dangerous to human life, 
 
 land R. Co., 19 C. B. [N. S] 213; and those which were not. But in 
 
 Fairmount, etc. R. Co. v. Stutler, 54 Winterbottom v. Wright (10 Mees. & 
 
 Pa. St. 375). In Roddy v. Missouri W. 109), and George v. Skivington 
 
 Pac. R. Co. (104 Mo. 234; 15 S. W. (L. R. 5 Exch. 1), the rule will be 
 
 1112), the employee of one with found nearly as we have stated it 
 
 whom defendant )iad contracted to above. See Longmeid v. HoUiday, 6 
 
 furnish, on his own side track, Exch. 761 [selling a lamp unfit for 
 
 properly equipped, cars for the use by which buyer's wife was in- 
 
 transportation of stone, was held not jured] ; Pippin v. Sheppard, 11 Price, 
 
 entitled to recover for injuries re- 400 [apothecary liable for administer- 
 
 sulting to him from the defendant's ing improper medicines to one other 
 
 failure to furnish cars with proper than the party contracting with 
 
 brakes, as agreed. him] ; Dixon v. Bell, 5 Maule & Sel. 
 
 ' Walker v. Great Northern R. Co., 198. 
 
 28 L. R., Jr., 69 — Q. B. D. " Negligence, Am. ed. 10. 
 
 3 This is substantially the rule 'L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 503; given 
 
 which we stated in our earlier fully in Smith, 12-17. The material 
 
 editions, modified slightly to con- part of this opinion is as follows : 
 
 form to the opinion of Brett, M. R. " Plaintiff was a workman in the em- 
 
ii61 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGEN'CE. 
 
 184 
 
 court; but their dissent turned rather on the particular 
 language used than on the precise principle involved. In any 
 event, we think that it is sound, and must be finally accepted 
 
 ploy of Gray, a ship-painter. Gray 
 entered into a contract with a ship- 
 owner, whose ship was in the de- 
 fendant's dock, to paint the outside 
 of the ship. The defendant, the 
 dock-owner, supplied, under a con- 
 tract with the ship-owner, an ordi- 
 nary stage, to be slung in the 
 ordinary way outside of the ship for 
 the purpose of painting her. It 
 must have been known to the de- 
 fendant's servants, if they had con- 
 sidered tlie matter at all, that the 
 stage would be put to immediate use, 
 that it would not be used by the ship- 
 owner, but would be used by such a 
 person as the plaintiff, a working 
 ship-painter. The ropes by which 
 the stage was slung, and which were 
 supplied as part of the instrument 
 by the defendant, had been scorched 
 and were unfit for use, and were 
 supplied without a reasonable careful 
 attention to their condition. When 
 the plaintiff began to use the stage, 
 the ropes broke, the stage fell, and 
 the plaintiff was injured. The court 
 below held that the plaintiff could 
 not recover. . . . The questions 
 which we have to solve in this case 
 are, what is the proper definition of 
 the relation of two persons, other 
 than the relation established by con- 
 tract or fraud, which imposes on the 
 one of them a duty towards the 
 other to observe, with regard to the 
 person or property of such other, 
 such ordinary care or skill as may be 
 necessary to prevent injury to his 
 person or property ; and whether the 
 present case falls within such defini- 
 tion. When two drivers or two 
 ships are approaching each other, 
 such a relation arises between them 
 
 when they are approaching each 
 other in such a manner that, unless 
 they use ordinary care and skill to 
 avoid it, there will be danger of an 
 injurious collision between them. 
 This relation is established in such 
 circumstances between them, not 
 only if it be proved that they actually 
 know and think of this danger, but 
 whether such proof be made or not. 
 It is established, it seems to me, be- 
 cause any one of ordinary sense, 
 who did think, would at once recog- 
 nize that if he did not use oi'dinary 
 care and skill under such circum- 
 stances there would be such danger. 
 And every one ought, by the uni- 
 versally recognized rules of right 
 and wrong, to think so much with 
 regard to the safety of others who 
 might be jeopardized by his conduct ; 
 and if, being in such circumstances, 
 he does not think, and in conse- 
 quence neglects, or if he neglects to 
 use oi'dinary care and skill and in- 
 jury ensues, the law, which takes 
 cognizance of and enforces the rules 
 of right and wrong, will force him 
 to give an indemnity for the injury. 
 . . . The proposition which these 
 recognized cases suggest, and which 
 is therefore to be deduced from 
 them, is that whenever one personis 
 by circumstances placed in such a 
 position with regard to another that 
 every one of ordinary sense who did 
 think would at once recognize that, 
 if he did not use ordinary care and 
 skill in his own conduct with regard 
 to those circumstances, he would 
 cause danger of injury to the person 
 or property of the other, a duty 
 arises to use ordinary care and skill 
 to avoid such injury." 
 
1 85 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. [§11/ 
 
 everywhere. It has been applied in New Jersey « and 
 Virginia.'' 
 
 § 117. Liability for selling dangerous goods. — Applying 
 
 this principle, most of the adjudged cases fall easily into line. 
 Where a defective article is sold, with a warning to the buyer 
 that it is dangerous, the seller is not liable to a third person ; 
 because it is the fault of the buyer in using it, not of the 
 seller in selling it, which is the proximate cause of the stran- 
 ger's injury.i Dangerous things may lawfully be made and 
 kept, if they are kept in places where it is not reasonable to 
 expect that any one can be injured by them; and therefore 
 the seller's responsibility ends, when he has parted with them 
 to a person who knows as much about them as he does.^ 
 Searchers of public records, whether public officials or not, do 
 not owe any general duty to the public to leave no erroneous 
 certificates of search lying about ; and, therefore, they are not 
 liable to any one for errors in searching, except the persons 
 who directly employ them.^ But one who knowingly sells an 
 article intrinsically dangerous to human life or health, such as 
 poison, explosive oils or diseased meat, concealing from the 
 
 ' In Lechman v. Hooper (53 N. J. See, also, Kellny v. Missouri Pac. R. 
 
 Law, 253 ; 19 Atl. 315), plaintiff's Co., 101 Mo. 67; 13 S. W. 806. 
 
 employer and the defendant con- ' So held, as to a wheel, liable to 
 
 tracted for separate parts of a build- burst at any time (Loop v. Litchfield, 
 
 ing, the latter to build a wall. The 43 N. Y. 351) ; and as to poison 
 
 plaintiff, while at work on the build- (Wohlfhart v. Beckert, 93 N. Y. 490 ; 
 
 ing, was injured by the fall of the Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143 ; and 
 
 wall, of the insecure condition of as to gunpowder (Abrahams v. Cali- 
 
 which he had no notice. Held, the fornia Powder Co., 5 N. Hex. 479 ; 33 
 
 defendant was liable. Pac. 785). See Glenn v. Winters, 17 
 
 •^ In Johnson v. Richmond, etc. R. Misc. 597 ; 40 N. Y. Supp. 659 [unsafe 
 
 Co. (86 Va. 975 ; 11 S. E. 839), a rail- coach]. 
 
 road company had promised dece- ' A manufacturer of fireworks is 
 
 dent's employer, with whom it had not liable for damages resulting from 
 
 contracted to straighten its line, that the negligent use thereof by a third 
 
 its trains would not pass the scene of person (Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 
 
 the work faster than six miles an 248 ; 33 N. E. 381). 
 
 hour. Held, that plaintiff was en- ^ Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 
 
 titled to have the jury charged that 195 ; Houseman v. Girard, etc. Asso. 
 
 if they believed such promise was 81 Pa. St. 256 ; Day v. Reynolds, 23 
 
 made, and that decedent's death was Hun, 131 ; see Kahl v. Lene, 37 N. J. 
 
 caused by its violation, without his Law, 5 ; and §§ 590, 616, post. 
 fault, they should find for plaintiff. 
 
§ii8] 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 1 86 
 
 buyer knowledge of that fact, is responsible to any person 
 who, without fault on the part of himself or any other person, 
 sufficient to break the chain of causation, is injured thereby.* 
 And we see no reason why the same rule should not apply to 
 articles known to be dangerous to property. 
 
 g Ii8. Private actions upon public obligations. — As any 
 
 person for whose benefit a contract was expressly made can 
 sue for a breach thereof, although not himself a party to the 
 contract,^ it follows that when a contract is made with the 
 state ^ or a municipality^ expressly for the benefit of a class of 
 persons, any one of that class, specially injured by a breach of 
 the contract, may sue thereon. So, if a specific duty is 
 
 * Wellington v. Downer Oil Co., 
 104 Mass. 64 ; Hourigan v. Nowell, 
 110 Id. 470 ; Elkins v. McKean, 79 
 Pa. St. 493. In Losee v. Clute (51 
 N. Y. 494), the Commission of Ap- 
 peals refused to apply this rule to 
 the sale of a defective steam-boiler. 
 But we agree with Judge Thompson 
 (Negl. 333), that this decision cannot 
 be sustained on this ground, if on 
 any. The Commission's decisions, 
 it may be well to mention, are not 
 as binding as those of the regular 
 Court of Appeals. The rule of the 
 text has been constantly affirmed 
 (Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 
 457; 10 S. E. 118 [patent medicine] ; 
 Schubert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331 ; 
 51 N. W. 1103 [ladder]; Craft v. 
 Parker, 96 Mich. 245 ; 55 N. W. 813 
 [spoiled meat] ; Lewis v. Teri-y, 111 
 Cal. 39; 43 Pac. 398). It must be 
 shown that the article was danger- 
 ous (Heizer v. Kingsland, etc. M'f'g 
 Co., 110 Mo. 605 ; 19 S W. 630). See 
 Hattermann v. Siemann, 1 N. Y. 
 App. Div. 486; 37 N. Y. Supp. 405 
 [bailment of infected clothing] ; 
 Akers v. Overbeck, 18 Misc. 198 ; 41 
 N. Y. Supp. 383 [bailor's knowledge 
 of defect essential]. 
 
 ' Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 ; 
 Burr V. Beers, 24 Id. 178. 
 
 ''Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N. 
 Y. 389 ; Fulton Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 
 37 Id. 648; Weet v. Brockport, 16 
 Id. 101 , note ; Lyme Eegis v. Hen- 
 ley, 1 Bing. N. C. 333 ; Jones v. New 
 Haven, 34 Conn. 1 ; Weightman v. 
 Washington, 1 Black, 39 ; Phillips v. 
 Commonwealth, 44 Pa. St. 197 ; Saw- 
 yer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 330. The cases 
 of Fish V. Dodge (38 Barb. 163), and 
 Minard v. Mead (Id. 174, n.) are over- 
 ruled. 
 
 ^McMahon v. Second Ave. R. Co., 
 75 N. Y. 231 ; Marvin Safe Co. v. 
 Ward, 46 N. J. Law, 19. A water 
 company contracted to supply a city 
 with water. FaiUng to do so, the 
 city was unable to extinguish a fire. 
 Held, the company was not liable to 
 a citizen who suffered damages by 
 the fire (Nickerson v. Bridgeport 
 Hydraulic Co., 46 Conn. 34; Davis 
 V. Clinton Water Works, 54 Iowa, 
 59) ; Britton v. Green Bay Water 
 Co., 81 Wise. 48 ; 51 N. W. 84 ; s. p.. 
 Water Co. v. Duncan, Ky. ; 33 
 S. W. 478. But see Lampert v. 
 Laclede Gas Co. (14 Mo. App. 376), 
 where a gas company was held 
 liable to a private action for a breach 
 of contract with the city, to keep its 
 lamp-posts and lamps in repair. See 
 §§ 380, et seq. post. 
 
18; 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§"9 
 
 imposed upon any person by law, or by a legal authority, an 
 action may be sustained against him by any person who is 
 specially injured by his failure to perform that duty.'' Both 
 classes of actions are regarded as actions in tort for negligence ■ 
 although the former class would seem to be technically founded 
 on contract. 
 
 §119. Reversioners and mortgagees. — One who has a 
 
 fixed reversionary interest in property, whether real or personal,' 
 has a right to sue immediately for any injury to such property 
 which will depreciate its value when it comes into his hands ;^ 
 and is entitled to recover damages to the extent of such prob- 
 able depreciations.' Nor is it any bar to his recovery, that the 
 injury of which he complains is one which may possibly cease 
 before he comes into possession, if it is in its nature perma- 
 nent, and will probably continue, in the absence of some 
 afifirmative action.* A mere trespass, however, having no per- 
 manent effect upon the property, constitutes no cause of action 
 in favor of a reversioner, even though committed for the pur- 
 
 * Adsit V. Brady, 4 HUl, 630 ; Clay- 
 burgh V. Chicago, 25 111. 440 ; Wen- 
 dell V. Troy, 39 Barb. 329 ; affi'd 4 
 Abb. Ct. App. 563; see RobiDsonv. 
 Chamberlain, supra. Compare, how- 
 ever, Fuchs V. Schmidt, 8 Daly, 317; 
 Heintze v. New York, 50 N. Y. Su- 
 perior, 295. 
 
 ' Hawkins v. Phythian, 8 B. Monr. 
 515. 
 
 2Jesser v. Gifford, 4 Burr. 3141; 
 Tomlinson v. Brown, Sayer, 215. 
 Building an adjoining house so that 
 the rain drips upon the reversioner's 
 land, is a permanent injury within 
 this rule (Tucker v. Newman, 11 Ad. 
 & El. 40). So is an excavation, 
 causing a falling of the soil (Raine 
 V. Alderson, 4 Bing. N. C. 70S ; 6 
 Scott, 691). So as to permanent 
 overflow of land (Kankakee, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Horan, 131 111. 288 ; 23 N. E. 
 621). As to a reversioner's right of 
 action against an elevated railroad 
 company for an infringement of the 
 appurtenant easements of abutting 
 
 land, during the existence of a pre- 
 ceding life estate, see Thompson v. 
 Manhattan R. Co., 130 N. Y. 860; 
 29 N. E. 264. 
 
 ' Cases cited in last note. One in 
 possession of land under a contract 
 to purchase is considered the equit- 
 able owner, and may recover dam- 
 ages against one who negligently 
 sets fire to woods and fences (Rood 
 V. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 18 Barb. 80 ; 
 Hays V. Miller, 6 Hun, 320). 
 
 ^Thus, in an action by a rever- 
 sioner for the obstruction of ancient 
 lights, it was objected that the ob- 
 struction might be removed, either 
 by the voluntary act of the defend- 
 ant, or by process of law, before the 
 reversioner came into possession. 
 But this objection was overruled 
 (Jesser v. Gifford, 4 Burr. 2141 ; 
 Tomlinson v. Brown, Sayer, 215). 
 To same effect see (per Tenterden, 
 C. J.) Shadwell v. Hutchinson, 4 
 Carr. & P. 333 ; Moo. & M. 350. 
 
§ I20] PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 1 88 
 
 pose of claiming title,' much less where there was no such 
 intention, as in a case of mere negligence there could not be. 
 Nor does the continuous repetition of an injury make it per- 
 manent, within the meaning of this rule. Its continuance, 
 however probable, cannot afford a present cause of action to 
 the reversioner, if it depends upon the affirmative exercise of 
 human volition.* But though a mortgagee may sue for trespass '' 
 upon conversion^ of the mortgaged property, he cannot main- 
 tain an action for a merely negligent injury to the mortgaged 
 premises, even though he has thereby lost his security.' The 
 owner of the reversion, even after he enters into possession, is 
 not responsible to strangers for defects in the condition of the 
 premises, existing when he took possession, if he had no notice 
 thereof, or was not negligent in omitting to repair. The neg- 
 ligence of the former tenant in possession will not be imputed 
 to him.'" Much less is he liable before he takes possession." 
 
 § 120. Landlords and tenants. — Where injury results from 
 the negligence of a landlord, either in constructing or uphold- 
 ing the property, he is responsible; but he is not, in general, 
 responsible for the negligence of his tenant in the use of it. 
 If an injury results from the negligence of the tenant, in any 
 
 ' Thus, a landlord cannot maintain ' Earle v. Hall. 2 Mete. 353 ; Page 
 
 an action for a mere entry upon his v. Robinson, 10 Gush. 99 ; Sanders v. 
 
 tenant's land, if no injury is done to Reed, 12 N. H. 558. 
 
 the land itself; even though the 'BeJlune v. Wallace, 3 Rich. Law, 
 
 entry was made for the purpose of 80 ; Burton v. Tannehill, 6 Blackf . 
 
 claiming title (Baxter v. Taylor, 4 470. See Coles v. Clark, 3 Cush. 399; 
 
 Barn. & Ad. 72). An apparently White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302. 
 
 opposing opinion of Tenterden, C. J., 'Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio, 233. 
 
 in Young v. Spencer (10 Barn. & Cr. But see Lane v. Hitchcock, 14 Johns. 
 
 153), has been restricted in its effect 313. 
 
 to the mutual relations of landlord '" Ahern v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203 ; 
 
 and tenant (Baxter v. Taylor, 4 Barn. 22 N. E. 193. So held, where the 
 
 & Ad. 73, Mumford v. Oxford, etc. defendant had purchased the land 
 
 R. Co., 1 Hurlst. & N. 34). shortly before the plaintiff's injury, 
 
 ' Thus, the nuisance of perpetual which arose from a defective cellar- 
 hammering in a railway company's cover, which it was the tenant's duty 
 workshop, although morally certain to repair, and of which the defend- 
 to continue, affords no ground for ant had no notice (Woram v. Noble, 
 an action by the landlord of adjoin- 41 Hun, 398). 
 
 ing leased land for the injury to his "Eisenbrey v. Pennsylvania Co., 
 
 reversion (Mumford v. Oxford, etc. 141 Pa. St. 566 ; 21 Atl. 639. 
 R. Co., 1 Hurlst. &N. 34). 
 
189 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. [§ I20 
 
 manner, the tenant is liable. But both the landlord and the 
 tenant may be liable for the same injury : the former for 
 negligent construction, and the latter for negligent use of the 
 premises.^ The landlord is, of course, answerable for nui- 
 sances existing on the premises when he made the lease ;^ and 
 of which he has had notice;' but he is not answerable for a 
 nuisance erected afterward on the premises by his tenant, un- 
 less he subsequently renews the lease with knowledge of the 
 nuisance.* The landlord is not responsible for a nuisance which 
 existed on the land, when he first acquired the right of 
 possession, until he has notice thereof.^ Nor, in the absence 
 of a covenant in the lease,^ is he liable for the consequences of 
 natural decay of the premises, — as where fences are suffered 
 by the tenant to fall into decay, whereby a stranger's cattle 
 stray and are injured.'' If the owner of land constructs a 
 nuisance {e. g., an excavation underneath the sidewalk con- 
 necting with his premises), he must, at his peril, notwithstand- 
 ing a demise of the premises, keep it in such a condition as 
 that the safety of travelers shall not be impaired by its being 
 there. And the tenant of the premises, if he uses and enjoys 
 the benefit of them, is bound to the same vigilance. Therefore, 
 where one is injured by falling into a coal hole underneath the 
 
 'Per Woodruff, J., Eakin v. but not otherwise (Ahem v. Steele, 
 
 Brown, 1 E. D. Smith, 44. See Ir- 115 N. Y. 203 ; overruling Rex v. 
 
 Tine V. Wood, 51 N. Y. 324 ; Swords Pedly, 1 Ad. & E. 827). See Gandy 
 
 V. Edgar, 59 Id. 34 ; Folsom v. Lewis, v. Jubber, 5 Best & S. 78, 485 ; re- 
 
 85 Ga. 146 ; 11 S. E. 606 ; Gordon v. versed, 9 Id. 15 ; Owings v. Jones, 9 
 
 Peltzer, 56 Mo. App. 599 ; Weymouth Md. 108. In Jessen v. Sweigert (G6 
 
 V. New Orleans, 40 La. Ann. 344 ; 4 Cal. 182), a landlord was held re- 
 
 So. 318 [grantee of franchise of pub- sponsible for an insecure awning 
 
 lie market]. which he " suffered " the tenant to 
 
 ' Rosewell v. Prior, 13 Mod. 635 ; put up. 
 
 1 Ld. Raym. 713 ; Congreve v. ^ Ahern v. Steele, supra. 
 
 Smith, 18 N. Y. 79, 84 ; Clifford v. « Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Blacks. 350. 
 
 Dam, 81 Id. 53 ; Swords v. Edgar, 59 ' Cheetham v. Hampson, 4 T. R. 
 
 Id. 34 ; Clancy v. Byrne, 56 Id. 129 ; 318 ; Coupland v. Hardingham, 3 
 
 Davenport v. Ruokman, 37 N. Y. Campb. 398; Daniels v. Potter, 4 
 
 568 ; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 312 ; Carr. & P. 266 ; Staple v. Spring, 10 
 
 Anderson V.Dickie, 26 How. Pr. 105. Mass. 74. The lessee's liability is 
 
 ' Not otherwise (Ahern v. Steele, not affected by the fact that he had 
 
 115 N. Y. 303 ; 22 N. E. 193). not convenanted to make repairs 
 
 ■> Then he is (Sandford v. Clarke, (Timlin v. Standard Oil Co., 54 Hun, 
 
 L. R. 31 Q. B. Div. 398 [coal hole]) ; 44 ; 7 N. Y. Supp. 158). 
 
§ I20a] PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. I90 
 
 sidewalk in front of the premises, by reason of the cover being 
 left unfastened, he has his remedy against the owner and the 
 tenant jointly.* So where the lease reserved to the lessor the 
 right to use as much of the premises as his business might 
 require, it was held that the lessor was liable, jointly with the 
 lessee, for injuries to the plaintiff resulting from their non- 
 repair, both being in its joint possession.' But where, during 
 the term, the tenant has surrendered exclusive possession 
 to the landlord, for a brief period, for the purpose of repairing, 
 the landlord is solely responsible for the consequences of a 
 negligent maintenance of the premises during the interim ; his 
 possession, irrespective of ownership, being the ground of his 
 liability." The tenant of part of a building, not personally in 
 fault, is not liable to a tenant of another portion of the same 
 building for damages resulting from the defective construc- 
 tion of the demised premises, or from the insufficiency of a 
 fixture therein." 
 
 § I20a. Railroads. — Railroad franchises, and property ac- 
 quired thereunder, inasmuch as they are largely intended for 
 
 » Irvine v. Fowler and Wood, 5 Standard Oil Co., 54 Hun, 44 ; 7 N. 
 
 Eobertson, 482 ; 4 Id. 138 ; affi'd 51 Y. Supp. 158 [ruinous wall]). 
 
 N. Y. 224 ; Timlin v. Standard Oil ' Cannavan v. Conklin, 1 Daly, 
 
 Co., 54 Hun, 44 ; 7 N. Y. Supp. 158 509. 
 
 [fall of demised building]. The '" Leslie v. Pound, 4 Taunt. 649 
 landlord's liability was affirmed in [uncovered cellar- way opening on 
 Calder v. Smalley, 66 Iowa, 219. highway]. In Oxford v. Leathe, 
 One who comes into possession of (165 Mass. 254 ; 43 N. E. 92), the lease 
 premises, attached to which there of a building for public exhibition 
 is an excavation encroaching upon purposes provided that the lessor 
 the highway, may be regarded as so should take charge of the box office 
 sanctioning it as to be liable for an each night until the nightly rental 
 injury sustained by a passer-by in was paid. Held, that lessor was 
 consequence of it (Davenport v. liable to one who, waiting outside 
 Ruckman, 10 Bosw. 20 ; affi'd 37 N. for the doors to open, was injured 
 y . 568) . To hold a lessee liable for by a structural defect in the build- 
 injuries due to an original structural ing. 
 
 defect, he must be shown to have " Eakin v. Brown, 1 E. D. Smith, 
 
 had notice or knowledge of the de- 36. Owner of house not liable for 
 
 feet (Silver V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., unauthorized and improper throw- 
 
 101 Mo. 79 ; 13 S. W. 410 [bridge ing down by a third person of a 
 
 piers not built according to statutory chimney securely built (Scullin v. 
 
 requirements] ). Actual notice, how- Dolan, 4 Daly, 163 ; compare Gray v. 
 
 ever acquired, is enough (Timlin v. Boston Gas-light Co. , 114 Mass. 149). 
 
191 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. [§ I20a 
 
 the benefit of the public, stand on a different footing from 
 private property, in respect to the continuing liability of the 
 owner for their proper condition and management, notwith- 
 standing their alienation. The principle is settled, that a rail- 
 road company cannot escape the performance of any duty 
 imposed by the laws of its incorporation, or the general laws 
 of the state, by voluntarily surrendering its franchises and 
 property to another, by lease, mortgage or otherwise, without 
 the consent of the legislature.^ And notwithstanding the 
 state's consent to such alienation, the company will still con- 
 tinue to be liable for injuries to third persons, by reason of its 
 failure to comply with a statutory requirement, as to the con- 
 struction of its road, such as fencing its track, or placing 
 suitable cattle guards at proper places.^ But for injuries sus- 
 tained in the operation of the road by the lessee, over which 
 the lessor has no control, the lessee is solely liable,' unless the 
 lease was unauthorized, in which case both lessor and lessee 
 are liable;* the latter, his servants and employees, being 
 regarded as the servants and agents of the former. But no 
 such relation of agency exists between the owner of a railroad 
 
 ' Thomas v. Railroad, 101 U. S. 71 ; Tel. Co., 93 Hun, 545 ; 35 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 Railroad Company v. Brown, 17 470 [telegraph-pole in highway]. 
 
 Wall. 445 ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. '^ Arrowsmith v. Nashville, etc. R. 
 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 118 U. S. 309 ; Co., 57 Fed. 165 [lessor not liable to 
 
 6 S. Ct. 1094 ; Feital v. Middlesex R. passenger] ; Hayes v. Northern Pac. 
 
 Co., 109 Mass. 398 ; Troy, etc. R. Co. R. Co., 20 C. C. A. 53 ; 74 Fed. 379 
 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 86 N. Y. 10,7; [lessor not liable to lessee's em- 
 
 Woodruff V. Erie R. Co., 35 Hun, ployee] ; Central, etc. R. Co. v. Mor- 
 
 246 ; Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Dunbar, 30 ris, 68 Tex. 50 ; 3 S. W. 457 [refusal 
 
 111. 633 [loss of goods] ; Transporta- of facilities for shipping freight] ; 
 
 tion Co. V. Ullman, 89 Id. 344 ; Cen- International, etc. R. Co. v. Eckford, 
 
 tral R. Co. v. Morris, 68 Tex. 50 ; 3 71 Tex. 374 8 S. W. 679 [injury to 
 
 S. W. 457 [lessee refused facilities passenger] ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 for shipping goods ; lessor liable] ; Curl, 38 Kans. 633 [track without 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Hambleton, 40 Ohio cattle guards] ; Whitney v. Atlantic, 
 
 St. 496 [changing grade of city etc. R. Co. 44 Me. 363 [lack of 
 
 street] ; Rome, etc. R. Co. v. Chas- fence] ; Fontaine v. Southern Pac. 
 
 teen, 88 Ala. 591 ; 7 So. 94; Acker V. R. Co., 54 Cal. 645 [same] ; and 
 
 Alexandria, etc. R. Co., 84 Va. 648 ; cases cited under g 445, post. 
 
 5 S. E. 688 ; Ricketts v. Chesapeake, ^ See § 413, post. 
 
 etc. R. Co., 33W. Va. 433; 10 S. E. * Pennsylvania Co. v. Ellett, 133 
 
 801 [injury to passenger]. The prin- 111. 654 ; 34 N. E. 559 [collision at 
 
 oiple, of course, applies to other pub- highway crossing]. See cases cited 
 
 lie companies (Quill v. Empire State under § 413, post. 
 
§ I2l] 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 192 
 
 and an appointee of the court, under whose exclusive^ direc- 
 tion the property is operated. In such case, the owning 
 company is not, in general, liable for the negligence of the 
 court's ofificer or his employees.^ 
 
 § 121. Infants and lunatics. — Infants' and lunatics,^ with- 
 out regard to their degree of incapacity,' are liable, in a civil 
 action, for the damage caused by such acts of theirs as would, 
 in sane adults, amount to a tort, of either willful wrong* or 
 culpable negligence.' This liability rests, not upon the usual 
 
 'A railroad company may be 
 liable as a carrier, notrwitLstanding 
 the appointment of trustees for it, 
 where the road is not in their exclu- 
 sive possession and control, to the 
 exclusion of the officers and em- 
 ployees of the company (Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co. V. Jones, 155 U. S. 333 ; 
 15 S. Ct. 136). The fact that the 
 road was operated at the time of 
 the injury, by trustees named in the 
 company's mortgage, is no defense, 
 where they were not acting under 
 the order of any court (Wisconsin 
 Cent. E. Co. v. Ross, 143 111. 9 ; 31 N. 
 E. 412 ; Lockhart v. Little Rock, etc. 
 R. Co., 40 Fed. 631). 
 
 «Metz V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 58 
 N. Y. 61 [assignee in bankruptcy] ; 
 In Kain v. Smith (80 N. Y. 458 ; rev'g 
 11 Hun, 552), defendant assumed 
 management of property in addition 
 to that of which he was appointed 
 receiver. Held, he was personally 
 liable for its mismanagement. To 
 same effect Turner v. Hannibal, etc. 
 R. Co., 74 Mo. 602 ; Brockert v. Cen- 
 tral R. Co , 82 Iowa, 369 ; 47 N. W. 
 1026 ; Howe v. St. Claii-, 8 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 101 ; 37 S. W. 800 ; and other 
 cases cited in Thompson on Corpora- 
 tions, §§ 6366, 7138, 7148. 
 
 ' Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend. 139 ; 
 Bullock V. Babcock, 3 Id. 391 
 [" willful " injury] ; Green v. Burke, 
 23 Id. 490 ; Wallace v. Morss, 5 Hill, 
 391 ; Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 
 
 218 [boy of fourteen throwing squib] ; 
 Fish V. Feri-is, 5 Duer, 49 [overdriv- 
 ing horse] ; Walley v. Holt, 35 Law 
 Times, 631 [same] ; Burnard v. Hag- 
 gis, 14 C. B. N. S. 45 [same]; Huchting 
 V. Engel, 17 Wise. 230 [child under 
 seven trespassing] ; Neal v. Gillett, 
 23 Conn. 437 [negligence]. An infant 
 as the owner or occupant of lands is 
 under the same responsibility as any 
 other person for a nuisance or for 
 the negligent use or management of 
 the property, although he may have 
 a general guardian (McCabe v. 
 O'Connor, 4N. Y. App. Div. 354 ; 38 
 N. Y. Supp. 572 [dangerous wall]). 
 
 2 WiUiams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442 ; 
 38 N. E. 449 [negligent order of ship- 
 master] ; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 
 499 [killing ox] ; Morain v. Devlin, 
 132 Mass. 88 [nuisance] ; Cross v. 
 Kent, 33 Md. 581 [burning barn] ; 
 Brown v. Howe, 9 Gray, 84 [burn- 
 ing house] ; Beats v. See, 10 Pa. 
 St. 56 ; Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 
 Barb. 647 [false imprisonment] ; see 
 Williams v. Cameron, 26 Id. 173 ; 
 Weaver v. Wood, Hobart, 134. 
 
 3 Neal V. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437; 
 Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wise. 230 
 [child under seven] ; overruling the 
 opinion expressed in Wharton, Negl. 
 §88. 
 
 ■• Most of the cases cited belong to 
 this category. 
 
 = Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 443 ; 
 38 N. E. 449, quoting with approval 
 
193 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ 122 
 
 principle of personal fault (for there may be none), but upon 
 the broad ground that, where one of two innocent persons 
 must bear a loss, he must bear it whose act caused it.^ 
 
 § 122. Who are jointly liable. — If several persons are 
 jointly bound to perform a duty, they are jointly and severally 
 liable for omitting to perform or for performing it negligently.^ 
 Persons who co-operate in an act directly causing injury are 
 jointly and severally liable for its consequences, if they acted 
 in concert,^ or united in causing a single injury, even though 
 acting independently of each other.' Thus the proprietors of 
 
 our old section 57, in whioli we 
 argued this point. The law is other- 
 wise held in New Hampshire (Stack 
 V. Cavanaugh, N. H. ; 30 Atl. 350. 
 
 * Williams v. Hays, supra. 
 
 ' Ferguson v. Kinnoull, 9 Clark & 
 F. 351. 
 
 ° Kansas City v. Slangstrom, 53 
 Kans. 431 ; 36 Pac. 706 [city and pri- 
 vate corporation] ; Elliott v. Field, 
 21 Colo. 378 ; 41 Pac. 504 [city and 
 individual] ; Brookville v. Arthurs, 
 153 Pa. St. 334 ; 35 Atl. 551 [borough 
 and landowner] ; Ho] ley v. Torring- 
 ton, 63 Conn. 436 ; 38 Atl. 613 [bor- 
 ough and town]. In Maine and 
 Massachusetts, a town is not liable 
 for injuries caused by defects in 
 the highways, arising partly from 
 the negligence of the town, and 
 partly from that of a private per- 
 son (Richards v. Enfield, 13 Gray, 
 344; Rowell v. Lowell, 7 Id. 100; 
 Alger V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 403 ; Shep- 
 herd V. Chelsea, 4 Id. 113 ; Moulton 
 V. Sanford, 51 Me. 137). But this is 
 on the special ground that municipal 
 corporations are liable in such cases 
 only by force of the statute, and that 
 the statute does not cover cases of 
 such joint negligence. We presume 
 that the third party in fault would 
 be held liable for the entire damage 
 (see Smith v. Smith, 3 Pick. 621 ; 
 McCahill v. Kipp, 3 E. D. Smith, 
 413; Powell v. Deveney, 3 Cush. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 13] 
 
 300 ; Mott V. Hudson River R. Co., 8 
 Bosw. 345 ; g 345, post). Where an 
 injury is the result of two concurring 
 causes, the person who is responsible 
 for one of these causes is not exempt 
 because the person who is responsible 
 for the other may be equally culpable 
 (Lake v. Milliken, 63 Me. 340 ; Lane 
 V. Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104; 
 Booth V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 73 N. Y. 
 38 ; Han-ison v. Great Northern R. 
 Co. , 3 Hurlst. & C. 331). Two railroad 
 companies, jointly maintaining a 
 bridge over a stream, are jointly lia- 
 ble for the consequences of an origi- 
 nal error in its construction, whereby 
 ice backs up and destroys a bridge 
 above (Covington v. United States, 
 etc. R. Co., 8 N. Y. App. Div. 233 ; 40 
 N. Y. Supp. 313). s. p., Lucas V.Penn- 
 sylvania Co., 120 Ind. 205 ; 119 Id. 583 ; 
 2i N. E. 973 [railroads jointly main- 
 taining defective platform] ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Ransom, 56 Kans. 
 559 ; 44 Pac. 6 [trains in collision] ; 
 Consol. Ice Machine Co. v. Keifer, 134 
 111. 481 ; 25 N. E. 799 [owner and con- 
 tractor] ; Faren v. Sellers, 39 La. 
 Ann. 1011 ; 3 So. 363 [same]; Van 
 Winkle v. American Steam Boiler 
 Ins. Co., 53 N. J. Law, 340 ; 19 Atl. 
 473 [inspector of boiler] ; Guille v. 
 Swan, 19 Johns. 381 ; see Williams 
 V. Sheldon, 10 Wend. 654; Hawks- 
 worth V. Thompson, 99 Mass. 77. 
 5 Colegrove v. Harlem B. Co., 6 
 
§122] 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 194 
 
 two vehicles, both of which are managed so carelessly as to 
 injure a third person by their collision, are jointly liable for 
 the damage done, although in no way connected in business 
 together.^ Two municipal corporations, each owning half a 
 bridge uniting their territories, are both liable for its negligent 
 construction or management.^ And so the owners of a party 
 wall, dividing their two lots, are jointly liable for injuries sus- 
 tained in consequence of its falling, through decay and want of 
 repair.^ And, where a master is liable for the tortious negli- 
 gence of his servant, the latter is jointly liable with him.''' In 
 all these cases, the liability is several, as well as joint. Any 
 
 Duer, 383 ; 30 N. Y. 492 ; Slater v. 
 Mersereau, 64 N. Y. 138; Gray v. 
 PuUen, 5 Best & S. 790 ; see Wabash, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Shacklet, 105 lU. 364 ; 
 Cuddy V. Horn, 40 Mich, 596 ; 10 N. 
 W. 33 ; Schaefer t. Osterbrink, 67 
 Wise. 495 ; 30 N. W. 933. All per- 
 sons who aid or assist in creating and 
 maintaining a nuisance are liable for 
 the damages (Comminge v. Steven- 
 son, 76 Tex. 643 ; 13 S. W. 556). So 
 held, where electric wires, main- 
 tained concurrently by diffei-ent par- 
 ties, are so related to each other and 
 so erected that one is likely to fall 
 across the other, and produce de- 
 structive consequences (McKay v. 
 Southern Tel. Co., Ill Ala. 337; 19 So. 
 695; Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Crank, 
 Tex. Civ. App. ; 37 S. W. 38) ; 
 and where live electric wares became 
 entangled through the fault of two 
 owners (United Electric E. Co. v. 
 Shelton, 89 Tenn. 433; 14 S. W. 
 863). 
 
 ^Colegrove v. Harlem E. Co., 30 N. 
 Y. 493 ; N. Y., Phila. etc. R. Co. v. 
 Cooper, 85 Va. 939 ; 9 S. E. 331 ; Cen- 
 tral Pass. R. Co. V. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578 ; 
 6 S. W. 441 ; Tompkins v. Clay, etc. 
 R. Co., 66 Cal. 163 ; Kansas, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Stoner, 49 Fed. 309 ; 4 U. S. 
 App. 109 ; 1 C. C. A. 231. And where 
 A. lent a wagon to B. and C. , who 
 each furnished a horse, and then, at 
 their invitation, A. rode with them, 
 
 B. driving, it was held that all three 
 were jointly liable for the negligence 
 of B. in driving too fast (Bishop v. 
 Ely, 9 Johns. 394). To the same 
 eflfect is Davey v. Chamberlain. 4 
 Esp. 229. In Smith v. Dobson (3 
 Man. & Gr. 59), plaintiff's barge was 
 sunk by a swell in the river, caused 
 by two steamers, only one of which 
 was owned by the defendant. The 
 jury gave a verdict for £30, on the 
 ground that, the total damage being 
 £80, this was a fair proportion for 
 tlie defendant's share in the trans- 
 action ; and the court refused to in- 
 terfere Avith the verdict on plaintiff's 
 motion. 
 
 ° Weiserbeng v. Winneconne, 56 
 Wise. 667 ; 14 N. W. 871 ; Lyman 
 V. Hampshire, 140 Mass. 311 ; 3 N. E. 
 211 ; Brown v. Fairhaven, 47 Vt. 386 ; 
 see § 394, post. 
 
 8 Klauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa. St. . 
 138 ; Tucker v. N. Y. Central, etc. 
 R. Co., 124 N. Y. 308 ; 36 N. E. 916 
 [fall of part of front wall of three 
 buildings owned by defendants in 
 severalty ; all liable]. 
 
 'Phelps V. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78; 
 Michael v. Alestree, 3 Levinz, 173 ; 
 Steel V. Lester, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 
 121 ; Campbell v. Portland Sugar 
 Co. , 62 Me. 552 ; Mayer v. Thompson, 
 etc. Bldg Co., 104 Ala. 611 ; 16 So. 
 620 ; Green v. Berge, 105 Cal. 52 ; 38 
 Pac. 539 ; see 65 248, post. 
 
195 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 [§ 123 
 
 one of the parties in fault can, therefore, be sued alone, and is 
 responsible for the entire damage.' 
 
 § 123. Who are not jointly liable. — Persons who act sepa- 
 rately, each causing a separate injury, cannot be made jointly 
 liable, even though the injuries thus committed are all inflicted 
 at one time, and are precisely similar in character.' Thus where 
 a stream is polluted by the discharge of sewage therein, by 
 different parties, each from his own premises, and each acting 
 separately and independently of the others, each is liable to 
 the exent of the injury inflicted only by him, and not for all 
 the injury suffered by plaintiff.^ So separate owners of ani- 
 mals cannot at common law be made jointly liable for different 
 injuries committed by their animals respectively, though all 
 happening as part of a single transaction.^ And persons who 
 separately rent different portions of a single building are not 
 jointly liable for their negligent use of the premises.* A 
 sheriff and his predecessor in ofifice cannot be made jointly 
 liable for the loss of property taken or held by either.^ 
 
 'Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458, 468 ; 
 Roberts v. Johnson, 58 Id. 613 ; 
 Lyman v. Hampshire, 140 Mass. 311 ; 
 Hume V. Oldacre, 1 Stark, 352, and 
 cases, supra. 
 
 "Williams v. Sheldon, 10 Wend. 
 654. Where, through the sole negli- 
 gence of one or two persons engaged 
 in a common purpose, an injury is 
 done, the person actually the cause 
 ■ of the injury is alone liable (Boyd 
 V. Insurance Patrol, 113 Pa. St. 269 ; 
 22 Rep. 666). 
 
 = Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N. Y. 51. 
 " The fact that it is difficult to sepa- 
 rate the injury done by each one from 
 the others furnishes no reason for 
 holding that one tort feasor should 
 be liable for the acts of others with 
 whom he is not acting in concert." 
 (per Miller, J., lb.) A joint judg- 
 ment against both defendants not 
 sustained, where there was no con- 
 cert of action between them, nor a 
 concurrent neglect of a duty com- 
 mon to both (Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Rolvink, 31 111. App. 596; see 
 
 Independence V. Ott, 135 Mo. 301; 36 
 S. W. 634). 
 
 ^ Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio, 495 ; 
 Van Steenburgh v. Tobias, 17 Wend. 
 563. 
 
 ■* Where persons occupy the same 
 building, and have each the privilege 
 to use the water pipes under his 
 own right of use or occupation, each 
 is held responsible only for damages 
 resulting from jiegligence on his own 
 part ; and neither is responsible for 
 the negligence of the others, though 
 they may be jointly liable where 
 their right is joint (Jloore v. Goedel, 
 7 Bosw. 591 ; see Eakin v. Brown, 1 
 E. D. Smith, 36 ; Payne v. Rogers. 
 2H. Blacks. 349). 
 
 ^ New Orleans Ins. Asso. v. Harper, 
 32 La. Ann. 1165. A deputy con- 
 stable levied an execution upon the 
 goods of another than the execution 
 debtor. Held, that the constable, 
 the deputy and the constable's sure- 
 ties could not be joined in one action 
 for the tort of the deputy (Hoge v. 
 Raymond, 25 Kans. 605). 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 Who may bring action. 
 
 For whose benefit action may 
 be brought. 
 
 No action without surviving 
 statutory beneficiary. 
 
 Illegitimates ; when entitled 
 to benefit of the statute. 
 
 Pecuniary injury ; how far 
 essential to action. 
 
 Miscellaneous points. 
 
 Effect of survival statutes . 
 
 Effect of releases and settle- 
 ments. 
 
 § 124. No common-law remedy for injuries causing 
 death. — The common law allowed of no remedy, by way of a 
 civil action, for an injury causing the death of a human being.' 
 Such injury must necessarily precede death; and the law did 
 not allow any cause of action for an injury to the person to 
 survive him. The husband or master of the deceased was not 
 
 124. 
 
 No common-law remedy for 
 
 § 133. 
 
 
 injuries causing death. 
 
 134. 
 
 125. 
 
 The statutory remedy. 
 
 
 126. 
 
 The English statute- (Lord 
 Campbell's act). 
 
 135. 
 
 127. 
 
 American statutes. 
 
 136. 
 
 128. 
 
 Peculiar statutes. 
 
 
 129. 
 
 Cumulative statutes. 
 
 137. 
 
 130. 
 
 [Omitted]. 
 
 
 131. 
 
 Action ; when brought where 
 
 138. 
 
 
 injury occurred. 
 
 139. 
 
 132. 
 
 Action ; when may be brought 
 in another state. 
 
 140 
 
 ' A private criminal action was 
 allowed in cases of murder. The 
 last instance of this kind was the 
 famous case of Asliford v. Thornton 
 (1 Barn. & Aid. 405), in which the 
 defendant insisted upon his right to 
 trial by battle. The right of action 
 was soon afterward taken away by 
 statute. "It is a singular fact that 
 by the common law the greatest in- 
 jury which one man can inflict on 
 another, the taking of his life, is 
 without a private remedy " (Good- 
 sell V. Hartford, etc. R. Co., 33 Conn. 
 55). "Since it is now established 
 that in the courts of the United 
 States no action at law can be main- 
 
 tained for such a wrong [causing 
 death], in the absence of a statute 
 giving the right, and it has not been 
 shown that the maritime law, as ac- 
 cepted and received by maritime 
 nations generally, has established a 
 different rule for the government of 
 courts of admirality from those 
 which govern courts of law in mat- 
 ters of this kind, we are forced to 
 the conclusion that no such action 
 wiU lie in the United States courts, 
 under the general maritime law" 
 (Waite, C. J., The Harrisburgh, 119 
 U. S. 199 ; reaffirmed, The Alaska, 
 130 U. S. 201; 9 S. Ct. 461). 
 
 [196J 
 
197 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 [§I24 
 
 allowed to sue, because the only damage recognized by the 
 law was the loss of service during the lifetime of the servant ; 
 and the death of the servant, therefore, worked no injury to 
 the master of which the law could take notice. And, if the 
 act causing death amounted to a felony, the general rule of the 
 common law, forbidding any civil suit upon a felony, would 
 alone have sufficed to exclude a claim for damages. Whatever 
 may be said of these arguments, the conclusions thus reached 
 formed a settled doctrine of the common law. No one, 
 whether as executor, master, parent, husband, wife, or child, or 
 in any other right or capacity, could maintain an action for 
 damages on account of the death of a human being.^ 
 
 ^ The earliest reported decision 
 upon this point was in an action for 
 the battery of the plaintiff's wife, 
 "whereby she died." It was held 
 that the right of action was merged 
 in the felony (Higgins v. Butcher, 
 Yelv. 89; 1 Brownl. & G. 205). The 
 first reported case of negligence in 
 which the question arose was before 
 Lord Ellenborough (Baker v. Bolton, 
 1 Campb. 493), who instructed the 
 jury that the plaintiff, who sued for 
 the loss of his wife's services, could 
 only recover for his loss during her 
 lifetime, although her death was 
 caused by tlie defendant's negli- 
 gence. All the decisions in cases 
 where an executor or administrator 
 sought to maintain the action have 
 been one way (Whitford v. Panama 
 E. Co., 23 N. Y. 465 ; affi'g 3 Bosw. 
 67 ; Crowley v. Panama R. Co. , 
 30 Barb. 99; Beach v. Bay State 
 Steamboat Co., 30 Id. 433). A hus- 
 band cannot sue for the death of 
 his wife (Green v. Hudson River 
 R. Co., 3 Abb. Ct. App. 277; affi'g 
 28 Barb. 9 ; Eden v. Lexington, etc. 
 R. Co., 14 B. Monr. 304 ; Womack v. 
 Central R. Co., 80 Ga. 133; 5 S. E. 
 63 ; Grosso v, Delaware, etc. R. Co. , 
 50 N. J. Law. 317 ; 13 Atl. 333), nor 
 a wife for the loss of her husband 
 
 (Carey v. Berkshire R. Co., 1 Cush. 
 475 ; Palfrey v. Portland, etc. R. 
 Co., 4 Allen, 55 ; Wyatt v. Williams, 
 43 N. H. 103; Hubgh v. New 
 Orleans, etc. R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495 ; 
 Hermann v. New Orleans, etc. R. 
 Co., 11 Id. 5 ; State v. Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co., 69 Md. 339; 17 Atl. 88), 
 noi a parent for the loss of his child 
 (Carey v. Berkshire R. Co., 1 Cush. 
 475 ; Sherman v. Johnson, 58 Vt. 40 ; 
 Sullivan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 1 
 McCrary C. C. 301 ; Sheffler v. Min- 
 neapolis, etc. R. Co., 33 Minn. 125; 
 compare Edgar v. Costello, 14 S. C. 
 20), nor a master for the death of 
 his servant (Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 
 8 Exch. 88). Neither can any one 
 maintain an action for any indirect 
 loss which he sustains by the death 
 of another person, such, for example, 
 as the loss which an insurer of the 
 life sustains by that event (Conn. 
 Life Ins. Co, v. New Haven R. Co., 
 25 Conn. 265 : see § 115, n. 6, ante). 
 In Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame 
 (95 U. S. 754) , the defendant having 
 willfully killed a person whose life 
 was insured by the plaintiff, the lat- 
 ter sued for the amount of the policy 
 paid by it, as damages caused to it 
 by defendfint's ace. The action was 
 not sustained. 
 
§ 127] DECEASED PERSONS. I98 
 
 § 125. The statutory remedy. — The multiplication of fatal 
 accidents in later times, and the practical impossibility of 
 securing the punishment of mere carelessness by means of 
 criminal proceedings, induced the British legislature to inter- 
 fere; and, by the statute known as " Lord Campbell's Act," 
 passed in 1846, a remedy by civil action was given to the per- 
 sonal representative of every person killed by the fault of 
 another, and leaving a parent, husband, wife, or child. Beginning 
 with New York, in 1847, this statute has been in substance in- 
 corporated into the legislation of every American state; the 
 points of difference being only in relation to the persons by 
 whom or for whose benefit the action may be brought, the 
 form of action (which in some cases is by indictment), and the 
 measure of damages. Under any of these statutes, proof of 
 death by the defendant's act is not, per se, enough to warrant 
 a recovery. There must be some proof of the defendant's 
 wrong-doing in the matter.' And the death must appear to 
 be the proximate result of his wrongful act or neglect.^ 
 
 § 126. The English statute (Lord Campbell's act). — The 
 
 English statute after which our own statutes are largely 
 modeled, is as follows: "Whensoever the death of a person 
 shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the 
 act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not 
 ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action 
 and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every 
 such case, the person who would have been liable if death had 
 not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwith- 
 standing the death of the person injured, and although the 
 death shall have been caused under such circumstances as 
 amount in law to felony." ' 
 
 § 127. The American statutes.— The earlier American 
 statutes, like that of New York,' closely copied the phraseology 
 of the English original; others, of later dates, modified it 
 
 ' Evans v. Newland, 34 Ind. 113. ' 9 & 10 Vict. c. xciii, § 1. In 1864 
 'Wagner v. Woolsey, 1 Heisk. (27 and 28 Vict, xcv.) the statute 
 235 ; Thompson v. Louisville, etc. E. was amended in respect to the par- 
 Co., 91 Ala. 496; 8S0. 406 : Randall v. ties by whom, or for whose benefit. 
 New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 45 La. the action might be brought. 
 Ann. 778 ; 13 So. 166. i L. 1847, ch. 450. 
 
199 DECEASED PERSONS. [§ 12/ 
 
 more or less, besides extending the liability to corporations, 
 particularly railroad companies ; or to persons engaged in par- 
 ticular occupations, e. g., carriers of passengers, mine owners, 
 etc. ; or to particular wrongful acts, such as dueling. States 
 which had not, at the date of our last edition, adopted similar 
 legislation, have since done so, as have all the recently admitted 
 states, the organized territories, and the District of Columbia. 
 In New York, the Constitution of 1894 declares that the right 
 of action for damages for injuries resulting in death shall never 
 be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be limited 
 by statute.^ And by the Constitution of Mississippi, it is 
 declared that " where death ensues from any injury to 
 employees, the legal or personal representatives of the person 
 injured shall have the same right and remedies as are allowed 
 by law to such representatives of other persons."^ The pres- 
 ent New York statute provides that " the executor or adminis- 
 trator of a decedent, who has left, him or her surviving, a 
 husband, wife, or next of kin, may maintain an action to 
 recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect, or default by 
 which the decedent's death was caused, against a natural per- 
 son who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an 
 action in favor of the decedent, by reason thereof, if death had 
 not'ensued." A reference to the latest statutes of the several 
 states and territories is given in the note.^ 
 
 "Art. 1, i^ 18. The provision of through willful act or omission, or 
 Co. Civ. Pro. § 1904, which had gross negligence." See Winnt v. In- 
 limited the damages to a sum " not ternational, etc. E. Co., 74 Tex. 32; 
 exceeding |5,000," was amended 11 S. W. 907 ; Ritz v. Austin, 1 Tex. 
 accordingly, by striking out the Civ. App. 455 ; 20 S. W. 1029. 
 limitation (L. 1895, ch. 946), the ^7lZa6ama (Code, 1887, § 2589). 
 amendment taking effect January 1, Arizona (Rev. Stat. 1887, art. 
 189(5. 2145, subd. 2. et seq ). 
 
 3 Const. 1890, § 193. Substantially Arkansas (Dig. Stat. 1894, § 5911). 
 
 the same provision appears in the California (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 376, 
 
 Kentucky Constitution of 1891(§ 241), 877). 
 
 under which it is held that a legal Colorado (Miles' Stat. 1891, §§ 
 
 representative of the decedent, hav- 1509-1511). 
 
 ing neither widow nor child, may Connecticut (Gen. Stat. 1888, §§ 
 
 maintain the action (Lexington, etc. 1008-9). 
 
 R. Co. V. Huffman, Ky. ; 32 S. W. Delaware (Rev. Stat, 1852, c. 105, 
 
 611). The Texas Constitution (art. as am'd, 1874 ; see L. 1866, c. 31), 
 
 16, § 26) gives a right of action for District Columbia (Comp. Stat, 
 
 exemplary damages for "homicide 1894, ch. 49). 
 
§128] 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 200 
 
 § 128. Peculiar statutes. — In Georgia, the remedy given is 
 for " homicide," which word the statute defines as including all 
 cases where the death of a human being results from a crime or 
 from crminal or other negligence.' In Massachusetts, remedies 
 are given where the life of a passenger is lost by reason of the 
 
 Ohio (Rev. Stat. 1894, § 6134). 
 
 Oklahoma (Comp. Stat. 1893, 
 §§4311,4313). 
 
 Oregon (Code Civ. Pro., 1892, 
 §371). 
 
 Pennsylvania (Brightly's Purd. 
 Dig. 1894, p. 1603, §§ 1-7). 
 
 Rhode Island (Pub. Stat. 1883, 
 c. 204, §20). 
 
 South Carolina (Rev. Stat. 1893, 
 §2315). 
 
 South Dakota (Comp. L. 1887, 
 §§5498-9; L 1891, c. 4). 
 
 Tennessee (Code, 1896, §§4025-29). 
 
 Texiis (Rev. Stat. 1888, §2899). 
 
 Utah (Comp. L. 1888, § 2961 ; see 
 §§3178, 3179). 
 
 Vermont (Com-p. Stat. 1894, § 3451). 
 
 Virginia (Code, 1887, §2903). 
 
 Washington (Code Pro. 1891, 
 § 138). 
 
 West Virginia (Code, 1891, c. 
 103, § 5). 
 
 Wisconsin (Annot. Stat. 1889, 
 §425.5). 
 
 Wyoming (Code, 1887, § 3364a). 
 
 Mr. Tiffany's " Law of Death by 
 Wrongful Act" [St. Paul, 1893] con- 
 tains a full compilation and analy- 
 sis of the statutes of tlie several 
 states. 
 
 ' The facts that defendant fur- 
 nished liquor to a third person while 
 the latter was drunk, and failed to 
 protect plaintiff's husband from such 
 person, and that the latter killed 
 plaintiff's husband in defendant's 
 saloon, while defendant was present, 
 deceased not being there as a guest, 
 do not render defendant liable for 
 the killing (Belding v. Johnson, 86 
 Ga. 177 ; 13 S. E. 304). 
 
 Florida (Rev. Stat. 1892, §§ 3343- 
 44). 
 
 Georgia (Code, 1887, § 588). 
 
 Idaho (Rev. Stat, of Terr, adopted 
 by state, Jan. 28, 1891, §§ 4099, 
 4100). 
 
 Illinois (Rev. Stat. 1895, chap. 70, 
 
 §§ 1. 2). 
 
 Indiana (Rev. Stat. 1894, § 285 ; 
 see § 267). 
 
 Iowa (Rev. Stat. 1888, §§3525-27). 
 
 Kansas (Comp. L. 1885, c. 80, 
 § 432, as am'd 1889, c. 131). 
 
 Kentucky (Gen. Stat. c. 57, § 3 ; 
 see Stat. 1894, c. 1, g 6). 
 
 Louisiana (Rev. Civil Code, 1889, 
 art. 2315). 
 
 Maine (Stat. 1891, c. 124). 
 
 Maryland (Pub. Gen. L. [Poe's 
 Code, 1888], art. 67, §§ 1-4). 
 
 Massachusetts (Pub. Stat. 1882, c. 
 52, § 17 ; c. 73, § 6 ; c. 113, § 212 [as 
 am'd 1883] ; Stat., 1886, c. 140). 
 
 Michigan (HoweU's Stat. 1883, 
 § 8313). 
 
 Minnesota {Qeu. Stat. 1894, §5918). 
 
 MissiKsippi, (Code, 1892, § 663). 
 
 Missouri (Rev. Stat., 1889, § 4426). 
 
 Montana (Code Civ. Pro. 1895, §§ 
 578-9). 
 
 Nebraska (Comp. Stat., 1895, § 
 2503). 
 
 Nevada (Comp. Laws, 1885, § 3898). 
 
 New Hampshire (Pub. Stat. 1891, 
 c. 191, S§ 8-14). 
 
 New Jersey (Rev. L. 1877, p. 293 
 [act of Mar, 3, 1848]). 
 
 New Mexico (Comp. Laws, 1885, 
 § 2309, as am'd L. 1891, c. 49). 
 
 Neio York (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1903- 
 4, as am'd 1895). 
 
 North Carolina (Code, 1883, §1498). 
 
 North Dakota (Code, 1895, § 5974). 
 
20I DECEASED PERSONS. [§ 1 29 
 
 negligence of the proprietors of a steamboat, stage coach, or 
 common carriers of passengers, or by the unfitness or gross negli- 
 gence or carelessness of their servants or agents ; also where 
 the life of a person is lost by reason of a defect or want of 
 repairs of a highway, tramway, causeway or bridge, or for 
 want of suitable rails on such way or bridge; also where, by 
 reason of the negligence or carelessness of a corporation operat- 
 ing a railroad, or street railway, or the unfitness or gross negli- 
 gence or carelessness of its servants or agents, the life of a 
 passenger, or of a person being in the exercise of due dili- 
 gence, and not a passenger or in the employment of such cor- 
 poration, is lost ; also where, by reason of the negligence or 
 carelessness of a corporation operating a street railway, or of 
 the unfitness or gross negligence or carelessness of its servants 
 or agents, the life of a passenger or of a person being in the 
 exercise of due diligence, and not a passenger or in the 
 employment of such corporation, is lost.^ In Pennsylvania, 
 where the decedent lost his life while lawfully engaged or 
 employed on or about the roads, works, depots and premises 
 of a railroad company, or in or about any train, or car therein 
 or thereon, of which company such person is not an employee, 
 the right of action and recovery against the company is only 
 such as would exist if such person were an employee ; but this 
 limitation does not apply to passengers.^ In Virginia, it is 
 specially provided that a libel may be brought against a ship 
 or vessel and its owners.* 
 
 § 129. Cumulative statutes. — In certain states, special 
 remedies are given, in addition to those provided generally for 
 
 'See Commonwealth v. Boston, may proceed at the same time (Bowes 
 
 etc. R. Co., 126 Mass. 61 [licensee of v. Boston, 155 Mass. 344; 29 N. E. 
 
 private track] ; Daley v. Boston, etc. 633). 
 
 R. Co., 147 Mass. 101 ; 16 N. E. 690 ' See Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. St. 
 
 [death of one unloading coal from 136 ; 17 Atl. 228 ; Mulherrin v. Dela- 
 
 vessel into defendant's cars]. The ware, etc. R. Co., 81 Pa. St. 300; 
 
 right of action given to an adminis- Ricard v. North Penn. R. Co., 89 Id. 
 
 tiratorfor the benefit of the widow 193; Penn. R. Co. v. Price, 96 Id. 
 
 and children, is independent of the 267 ; Richter v. Penn. R. Co., 104 Id. 
 
 administrator's right to sue for dam- 511; Cummings v. Pittsburgh, etc. 
 
 ages suffered by the. intestate during R. Co., 92 Id. 82. 
 
 his lifetime from the injury which * Code, 1887, § 3902. 
 caused his death, and both actions 
 
§ 129] DECEASED PERSONS. 202 
 
 death caused by wrongful act, or declaring that causes of action 
 for personal injury survive the death. In Alabama,' Indiana,^ 
 lowa,^ Oregon,'' Utah,^ Idaho, Montana, California and 
 Washington, special additional statutes exist relating to 
 the death of minors. In Arizona," Colorado,'' Connecticut,' 
 South Dakota,' Maine,'" Minnesota," Missouri,'^ Nebraska," 
 New Mexico," Rhode Island,'^ Texas '° and Wisconsin," 
 special provision is made for actions against common car- 
 riers. In Arkansas,'' special provision is made for the killing 
 of an adult by a railroad company. In Kentucky, special 
 remedies are given for killing by the use of fire-arms, or by 
 certain dangerous weapons ; also for killing in a duel." In 
 Michigan, special actions are maintainable against railroad 
 companies, and against railroad-station and depot companies.^" 
 In Rhode Island, an action is given for loss of life due to fail- 
 ure to maintain fire escapes.^' In Washington, special pro- 
 vision is made for death by duelling, falling through holes in 
 sidewalks and streets, and in other cases, where decedent 
 was a minor.^^ Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, 
 Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico 
 
 ' Code, 1887, § 2588 ; see "Williams W. 76 ; Buddenberg v. Chouteau 
 
 V. South, etc. R. Co., 91 Ala. 635 ; Tr. Co., 108 Mo. 394 ; 18 S. W. 970 ; 
 
 9 So. 77; Harris v. McNamara, 97 Lynch v. Metropolitan B. Co., 113 
 
 Ala. 181 ; 13 So. 103 ; Alabama, etc. Mo. 420 ; 20 S. W. 643. 
 
 K. Co. V. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126 ; 11 So. '^ Comp. Stat. 1895, § 4014. 
 
 803. '* Comp. Laws, 1885, § 2808 ; see 
 
 ' R. S. 1894, § 267. Lutz v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., N. 
 
 2 Code, 1888, § 2556. Mex. ; 30 Pac. 912. 
 
 < Code Civ. Pro. 1893, § 34. '» Comp. Stats. 1883, ch. 340, § 15. 
 
 » Comp. Laws, 1888, § 3178. " Rev. Stat. 1888, art, 2899, siibd. 
 
 « Rev. Stat. 1887, art. 3145, subd. 1. 1 ; see Hendrick v. Walton, 69 Tex. 
 
 ' Miles' Stats. 1891, art. 1508. 192 ; 6 S. W. 749 ; Texas, etc. R. Co! 
 
 « Gen. Stat. 1888, § 1383. v. Geiger, 79 Tex. 13 ; 15 S. W. 314. 
 
 9 Comp. Laws, § 5498. " Annot. Stat. 1889, § 1816 a. 
 
 '» Rev. Stat. 1883, c. 51, §§ 68, 69, " Dig. Stat. 1894, § Solo. 
 
 c- 53, § 7. 19 Stats. 1894, c. 1, g§ 4, 5, 6, 10. 
 
 " Gen. Stat. 1894, § 1950. ™ Annot. Stat. 1882, §§ 3391-93 ; 
 
 '2 Rev. Stat. 1889, §4435 ; see Proc- 3491-93. 
 tor V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co. 64 Mo. =' L. 1890, c. 826, § 8. 
 113 ; Sullivan v. Missouri Pac. R. " Code, 1891, |§ 138-9 ; see North- 
 Co., 97 Id. 113 ; 10 S.W. 853 ; Crump- ern Pac. R. Co. v. ElHson, 3 Wash, 
 ley V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co.. 98 Mo. St. 335; 38 Pac. 333; Hendrick v. 
 34 ; 11 S.W. 344: Magoffin V. Missouri Ilwaco R. Co., 4 Wash. St. 400; 30 
 Pac. R. Co., 102 Mo. 540; 15 S. Pac. 714. 
 
203 DECEASED PERSONS. [§ I3I 
 
 and Wisconsin have followed the example of England in 
 enacting Employers' Liability Acts, which are collated at 
 the end of chapter X. 
 
 § 130. [Omitted.] 
 
 § 131. Action ; when brought where injury occurred. — 
 
 These statutes are not to be construed as giving a right of 
 action upon injuries which occur outside of the jurisdiction of 
 the state enacting the statute, and in a territory where no such 
 rule of law prevails.^ Being contrary to the common law, it 
 will not be presumed that similar statutes exist elsewhere;^ 
 and therefore an action of this kind cannot be maintained, if 
 the fatal injury occurred outside of the jurisdiction of the state 
 in which the statute relied upon was enacted. The complaint, 
 in such an action, ought to show affirmatively that the injury 
 occurred within a territory where the law gives the remedy 
 in such cases ; and it states no cause of action, if it leaves this 
 in doubt;' much more, if it shows that the injury occurred out- 
 side of the state, without averring a law in that place, giving a 
 remedy.^ It makes no difference in this respect that both 
 parties to the injury were citizens of the state by which the 
 statute was enacted, or that the wrong-doer was a corporation 
 
 ■ Debevoise v. N. Y., Lake Erie, Co., 31 Minn. 11; Hyde v. Wabash, 
 
 etc. E. Co., 9S N. Y. 377 ; Whitford etc. R. Co., 61 Iowa, 441 ; 16 N. W. 
 
 V. Panama R. Co., 23 Id. 465 [injury 351 ; s. p., applied to actions, under 
 
 in New Granada] ; Crowley v. Pan- foreign statutes, for injuries not re- 
 
 ama R. Co., 30 Barb. 99 ; Beach v. suiting in death ; Njus v. Chicago, 
 
 Bay State Steamboat Co., 30 Id. 483; etc. R. Co., 47 Minn. 92 ; 49 N. W. 
 
 Vanderwerken v. New Haven R. 527 ; Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., 
 
 Co., 27 Id. 244 ; State v. Pittsburgh, 48 Ohio St. 623 ; 30 N. E. 69 ; Ala- 
 
 etc. R. Co., 45 Id. 41; Selma, etc. bama, etc. R. Co. v. Fulghum, 87 Ga. 
 
 R. Co. V. Lacy, 43 Ga. 461 ; Wood- 263 ; 13 S. E. 649. 
 
 ard v. Michigan, etc. R. Co., 10 Ohio 'Debevoise v. N. Y., Lake Erie, 
 
 St., 121 ; Hover v. Pennsylvania etc. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 377 ; Armstrong 
 
 R. Co., 25 Id. 667 ; Nashville, etc. R. v. Beadle, 5 Sawyer, 484, and cases 
 
 Co. V. Eakin, 6 Coldw. 582 ; McCar- under last note. 
 
 thy V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 18 Kans. ^ggach v. Bay State St. Co., 30 
 
 46; Willis v. Mo. Pacific R. Co., 61 Barb. 433. 
 
 Tex. 432; Belt v. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 4 ^Debevoise v. N. Y., Lake Erie, 
 
 Tex. Civ.App. 231; 22 S.W. 1062 [text etc. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 377; Kahl v. 
 
 quoted and followed] : Alabama, etc. Memphis, etc., R. Co , 95 Ala. 337 ; 
 
 R. Co. V. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126 ; 11 So. 10 So. 661 ; Jackson v. Pittsburgh, 
 
 803 : Herrick v, Minneapolis, etc. E. etc. R. Co., 140 Ind. 341; 39 N. E. 663. 
 
§ 132] DECEASED PERSONS. 204 
 
 chartered by that state,^ or that the injury was caused by 
 breach of a contract entered into in that state/ or (except in 
 Michigan'') that the decedent was brought into the state while 
 living.^ But if the injury happened at sea, the statutory action 
 will lie, if the vessel was at the time within the maritime juris- 
 diction of a state having such a statute,' or if the vessel was 
 duly registered there.'" 
 
 § 132. Action ; when may be brought in another state. — 
 
 If such an action is authorized by the law of the state where 
 the injury occurred, it may be brought in any state having a 
 
 = Whitfordv. Panama R. Co., 23 a short distance of the New York 
 N. Y. 465 ; 3 Bosw. 67 ; Crowley t. shore. Held (rev'g 45 Barb. 226), that 
 Panama R. Co., 80 Barb. 99. the state court had jurisdiction, as 
 
 * Cases under last note. In Belt v. the sound was a mere inland arm of 
 Gulf, etc. R. Co. (4 Tex. Civ. App. the sea. New York courts will en- 
 331; 23 S. W. 1063), the injuries caus- tertain an action for death caused on 
 ing death were inflicted in the board a British ship on the high seas, 
 Indian Territory by decedent's fellow founded on the English statute 
 servant ; both were employed in (Cavanagh v. Ocean Steam Nav. Co. 
 Texas by the defendant, which was [Sp. T.] 13 N. Y. Supp. 540 ; 19 Civ. 
 chartered in Texas, and the road was Pro. E. 391) , or on board a vessel ly- 
 operated by orders issued from offices ing in a foreign port not more than 
 in that state. Held, nevertheless, two miles from shore, provided such 
 an action could not be maintained death is actionable by the law of the 
 for the death in Texas, upon a dis- foreign country (Geoghegan v. Atlas 
 similar statute of the Indian Terri- S. S. Co. [Com. PI.] 3 Misc. 224 ; 22 
 tory. N. Y. Supp. 749). 
 
 ' In Michigan, the statute provides '" So held in England (The Ex- 
 that though the injury was inflicted plorer, L. E. 3 Adm. 289), and in 
 on the high seas or in any other navi- New York (McDonald v. Mallory, 77 
 gable waters, or on land without the N. Y. 546). There the injury occur- 
 state, yet if the injured person died red on a New York registered 
 within the state, in consequence of steamer, on a voyage to Galveston, 
 such injury-, the criminal offense Held, that an action would lie under 
 may be prosecuted in the state the statute in New York. "The 
 (Howell's Stat. 1883, i^ 9420) . Zooms in quo was not within the act- 
 
 ^Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., ual territorial limits of any state or 
 38 Vt. 294 ; DeHam v. Mexican R. nation, nor was it subject to the laws 
 Co.. Tex. Civ. App. ; 22 S. W. 249 of any government, unless the rule 
 [injury occurred in Mexico, which which exists from necessity is ap- 
 gives no such remedy]. plied, that every vessel on the high 
 
 'Maliler V. Norwich, etc. Tr. Co., seas is constructively a part of the 
 35 N. Y. 353. In that case, the in- territory of the nation to which she 
 jury occurred on a sloop, sunk by a belongs, and its laws are operative on 
 collision in Long Island Sound, within board of her" (per Rapallo, J.). 
 
205 DECEASED PERSONS. [§ 1 32 
 
 similar law.' The Federal courts hold that it may, in that 
 case, be brought in any state ; ^ and we think this the correct 
 opinion, although the Massachusetts ^ and some other courts 
 hold the contrary. No doubt, if the statute is a penal one, it 
 should not be enforced outside of the state enacting it ; but most 
 of these statutes are not penal ; although one of the Massa- 
 chusetts statutes is.* The Federal courts have jurisdiction of 
 an action under the state statute; and such jurisdiction is not 
 subject to limitation by a proviso in the statute that the statu- 
 tory damages are recoverable in the state courts only.' 
 
 'A " substantial similarity " is all action arising under the Arkansas 
 
 that is required. The fact that, by statute (St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 the statute of the state where the McCormick, 71 Tex. 660 ; 9 S. W. 
 
 fatal injury happened, the action 540). 
 
 would lie against receivers of rail- ^ Dennick v. Central R. Co. , 103 U. 
 roads, v^hile it would not under that S. 11 ; Texas, etc. li. Co. v. Cox, 145 
 of the state where the action against Id. 5SJ3 ; 12 S. Ct. 005 ; Northern 
 a receiver -was brought, is not such Pac. B. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 
 an inconsistency as will forbid the 190 ; 14 S. Ct. 978. 
 action (Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 ' Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 
 IT. S. 593 ; 12 S. Ct. 905). To same 109 ; Richardson v. N. Y. Central R. 
 effect. Wooden v. Western, etc. R. Co., 98 Id. 85 ; Davis v. New Eng- 
 Co., 126 N. Y. 10 ; i!6 N. E. 1050 ; land R. Co., 143 Id. 301 ; 9 N. E. 
 Leonard v. Columbia Nav. Co., 84 815 [but see now, Higgins v. Central, 
 X. Y. 48 ; Debevoise v. N. Y., Lake etc. R. Co., 155Mass. 176; 29N. E534]; 
 Erie, etc. R. Co., 98 Id. 377; West- Woodard v. Michigan, etc. R. Co., 
 ern, etc. R. Co. v. Strong, 53 Ga. 10 Ohio St. 121 ; Vawter v. Mo. 
 461; So. Carolina R. Co. v. Nix, 68 Pacific R. Co., 84 Mo. 679; Lime- 
 Id. 572 ; Bruce v. Cincinnati, etc. R. kiUer v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 33 
 Co., 83 Ky. 174; Morris v. Chicago, Kans. 83; see Railroad Co. v. Lacy, 
 etc. R. Co., 65 Iowa, 727 ; Nashville, 43 Ga. 461. 
 
 etc. R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. ■• By Mass. St. (c. 112, § 212) a rail- 
 
 853 ; Nelson v. Chesapeake, etc. R. road company may be punished 
 
 Co., 88 Va. 971; 14 S. E. 838; by a fine or " assessed " for damages 
 
 Burns V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co., for negligently causing death. Being 
 
 113 Ind. 169 ; 15 N. E. 330 ; Cincin- penal, no action will lie upon it in 
 
 uati, etc. R. Co. v. McMuUen, 117 Rhode Island (O'Reilly v. N. Y. & 
 
 Ind. 439 ; 20 N. E. 287; Hanna v. New England R. Co., 16 R. L 388; 
 
 Grand Trunk R. Co., 41 111. App. 17 Atl. 906), or Vermont (Adams v. 
 
 116 [Illinois action entertained on Fitchburg R. Co., 67 Vt. 76; 30.AtL 
 
 the Canadian statute, the "policy 687). 
 
 of the statutes of both being the 'Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Whitton, 
 
 same"]. Since the right of action in 13 Wall. 370 ; American Steamboat 
 
 Arkansas is dissimilar to that in Co. t. Chase, 16 Id. 522 ; Harper v. 
 
 Texas, the Texas courts will not Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 36 Fed. 102; 
 
 undertake to enforce a cause of Qoff v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 36 Id. 
 
§ 133] 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 206 
 
 § 133. Who may bring action. — The action is to be brought 
 by the party to whom the right of action is given by the stat- 
 ute. It is not thought of sufficient general interest to give, in 
 detail, the diverse provisions of the several state-statutes which 
 designate the particular persons, or class of persons, to whom 
 the right of action is given. In general, it may be said that 
 most of the states give the right of action to the decedent's 
 personal representatives, i. e. the executor of his will or the 
 administrator of his goods, etc. ; ' while in others it is given to 
 his legal representatives,^ or else directly to the person or per- 
 sons for whose benefit the remedy is afforded. In those states 
 in which special provision is made for the wrongful death of a 
 minor, the right of action is generally given to the father, or. 
 
 299 ; Wearer v. Baltimore, etc. E. 
 Co.. 21 D. C. 499). The proviso of 
 the Wisconsin statute (g 4255) requir- 
 ing an action under it to be brought 
 in a court of Wisconsin, has been 
 held, by a Federal court, void as a 
 condition on the right previously 
 granted, which would operate to ex- 
 clude the jurisdiction of Federal 
 courts (Bigelow v. Nickerson, 17 C. C. 
 A. 1; 70 Fed. 113). As to jurisdic- 
 tion of admiralty courts, independ- 
 ent of statute, see The Harrisburg, 
 119 U. S. 199 ; 7 S. Ct. 140 ; The 
 Alaska, 130 U. S. 201 ; 9 S. Ct. 461 ; 
 The Columbia, 27 Fed. 704; The 
 Ward, 23 Id. 900. 
 
 ' This is the meaning of statutes 
 giving "personal representatives" 
 the right to sue (Kramer v. Market 
 St. R. Co, 2oCal. 435; Indianapolis, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Stout. 53 Ind. 143 ; 
 Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 38 
 Vt. 294 ; Whiton v. Chicago, etc. E. 
 Co., 21 Wise. 310). The " legal and 
 personal representatives," as used in 
 the Mississippi Constitution, are held 
 to mean the executors or adminis- 
 trators (Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. Hun- 
 ter, 70 Miss. 471; 12 So. 482). 
 
 2 The California Code (g 377) al- 
 lows decedent's "heirs" to recover 
 
 for an adult's death. Held, that this 
 includes all those capable of inherit- 
 ing from the deceased generally, 
 uncontrolled by limitation of stat- 
 utes relating to the distribution of 
 community property, including mi- 
 nor children of deceased (Eediield v. 
 Oakland Consol. E. Co., 110 Cal. 277; 
 42 Pac. 823) . Hence, in one action, a 
 liusband may recover, personally, 
 and as guardian ad litem of minor 
 children, for the death of their wife 
 and mother (lb.). Only one action 
 can be brought, and a recovery by 
 the executor is a bar to an action by 
 the heirs (Hartigan v. Southern 
 Pac. E. Co., 86 Cal. 142; 24 Pac. 851). 
 In Louisiana, a widow may sue for 
 the death of the husband and father 
 individually and as tutrix of her 
 minor son, both having an equal in- 
 terest in the same cause of action, 
 by inheritance (Curley v. Illinois 
 Cent. E. Co., 40 La. Ann. 810 ; 6 So. 
 103). A ruling under the former 
 Kentucky statute that "heir," used 
 therein, meant child and did not in- 
 clude parents or collateral relatives 
 (Jordan v. Cincinnati, etc. E. Co., 89 
 Ky. 40 ; 11 S. W. 1013) seems to be 
 superseded by the revision of 1894. 
 
207 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 L§i33 
 
 if he is not living,' or has deserted his family,'' or is imprisoned,^ 
 to the mother of the minor.^ In Montana, the guardian of a 
 minor may sue for the death of his ward. In Missouri and 
 Colorado, if decedent was a minor, or unmarried, the father 
 and mother may sue jointly, and each have an equal interest 
 in the judgment recovered.' In Rhode Island, in addition to 
 an action in favor of the widow and kindred of the decedent, a 
 like action may be maintained for damages for such loss of life 
 by " any person having a direct pecuniary interest in the con- 
 tinuance of the life of such deceased person." * In Florida, 
 where none of the class of decedent's relatives named in the 
 statute survived him, the action may be brought by one who 
 was dependent on him for support.' When the right of action 
 
 3 So in Alabama (Code 1887, § 
 3588), and Indiana (Rev. Stat. 1894, 
 § 267). Only one action can be 
 brought (Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 
 338 ; 3 N. E. 793). 
 
 < California Co. Civ. Pro. § 376. So, 
 too, in Pennsylvania (Kerr v. Penn- 
 sylvania B. Co., 169 Pa. St. 95; 33 
 Atl. U6). 
 
 ' Iowa Code, § 3556. 
 
 ^ So in Arkansas. If the mother 
 sues, she must generally show 
 affirmatively and positively that the 
 father is dead. It is not enough to 
 allege that she is a widow (St Louis, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Yooum, 34 Ark. 493). 
 But in Louisiana she may sue alone, 
 even if her husband is living (Civ. 
 Code, 1889, art. 3315). In Georgia, 
 a wife, living apart from her hus- 
 band, may maintain an action in 
 the husband's name for her own use, 
 for the death of their minor son, vrho 
 supported her (East Tennessee, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Maloy, 77 Ga. 337; 3 S. E 
 941). The Georgia statute gives the 
 cause of action to the mother, or, if 
 no mother, to the father. Held, that 
 where, at the time of a child's death, 
 the mother was living, but subse- 
 quently died, without suing, the 
 husband could not bring the action 
 
 (Frazier v. Georgia R. Co., 96 Ga. 785; 
 23 S. E. 936). 
 
 ' Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 4435. On 
 death of one parent pending action, 
 the parent surviving at the date of 
 judgment has the right to the full 
 amount of the forfeiture (Senn v. 
 Southern R. Co., 134 Mo. 621; 28 S. 
 W. 66). Colo. Gen. Stat. 1891, arts. 
 1508-10. See Hayes v. Williams, 17 
 Colo. 465 ; 30 Pac. 352; Brennan v. 
 Molly Gibson Co. , 44 Fed. 795; Pierce 
 V. Conners, 20 Colo. 178; 37 Pac. 731. 
 
 8R. I. Pub. Stat. 1883, § 17. See 
 Goodwin v. Nickerson, 17 R. I. 478 ; 
 23 Atl. 13. 
 
 5 See Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85 ; 
 15 So. 876. A similar statute in 
 Massachusetts ( St. 1887, c. 270, g 3) 
 provides that the next of kin, who 
 are dependent on an employee for 
 support, may maintain an action for 
 his death. Held, under it, that a 
 daughter to whom her father paid 
 over all his wages, and who managed 
 the household, and received board 
 money from her brothers, without 
 accounting to her father, could main- 
 tain an action for her father's death 
 (Houlihan v. Connecticut River R. 
 Co., 164 Mass. 555; 42 N. E. 108.) 
 
§ '33] 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 208 
 
 is given to a child, a child f« ventre sa mere can sue.'" In 
 Texas and Arizona, the action may be brought by one or more 
 members of the class named in the statute to whom the right 
 of action is given, for the benefit of all." In Maine and in 
 Massachusetts (in certain cases) the remedy is by indictment ; 
 and in Maryland, the action is to be brought in the name of 
 the state, though in every respect it is a civil action.'^ An 
 action brought in another jurisdiction than that in which the 
 fatal injury was inflicted, can only be maintained by one who 
 could maintain a similar action in the jurisdiction where the 
 injury occurred;" and, if suing as a personal representative, he 
 
 '" A child en ventre sa mere is en- 
 titled to sue under Lord Campbell's 
 act, on the death of the father by 
 negligence (The George and Rich- 
 ard, 3 L. R. Adm. 466). In Texas, 
 a child, unborn at the death of 
 its father, is a "surviving child," 
 ■within the meaning of the statute 
 allowing surviving children to bring 
 suit for damages for the death of 
 their parents (Texas, etc. R. Co v. 
 Robertson, 83 Tex. 657 ; 17 S. W. 
 1041 ; Nelson v. Galveston, etc. R. 
 Co., 78 Tex. 621 ; 14 S. W. 1021). 
 
 " Pee Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Henry, 75 Tex. 220 ; 12 S. W. 838 
 [wife sued for death of son, without 
 joining husband]; Texas, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Berry, 67 Tex. 238 ; 5 S. W. 817 ; 
 [widow having child sued for death 
 of husbandj. 
 
 " Code, 1888, art. 67, TT^ 1-4 ; see 
 Albert v. State, 66 Md. 325 ; 7 Atl. 
 697 ; State v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 69 Md. 330; 17 Atl. 88. 
 
 "Hence a widow cannot sue, as 
 such, in Pennsylvania, for the death 
 of her husband in New Jersey, 
 where the statute gives the cause of 
 action to the decedent's personal 
 representatives, though by the Penn- 
 sylvania statute the remedy is given 
 to the widow (Usher v. West Jersey 
 R. Co , 126 Pa. St. 206 ; 17 Atl. 597). 
 So the widow of one killed in Penn- 
 
 sylvania may sue as such in New 
 York, although by the statute of the 
 latter state only personal represen- 
 tatives can maintain an action for 
 death (Wooden v. Western, etc. R. 
 Co., 126 N. Y. 10; 26 N. E. 1050). 
 To same effect, Lower v. Segal, 59 N. 
 J. Law, 66; 34 Atl. 945 ; Ash v. Bal- 
 timore, etc. R. Co., 73 Md. 144; 19 
 Atl. 643; Dates v. Union Pac. E. Co., 
 104 Mo. 514 ; 16 S. W. 487 ; Hamil- 
 ton V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 39 
 Kans. 56 ; 18 Pac. 57. If the cause 
 of action does not survive in tho 
 state where the death was caused, 
 no action can be maintained in an- 
 other state, though a survival of such 
 actions is provided for in tlie latter 
 state. So held in Davis v. New 
 England R. Co. (143 Mass. 301; 9 N. 
 E. 815), before the survival of actions 
 for personal injuries was given (1888) 
 by Connecticut, where the cause of 
 action arose. Since 1888, actions for 
 death, by personal representatives 
 of a decedent injured in Connecti- 
 cut, have been maintained in Massa- 
 chusetts (Higgins V. Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 155 Mass. 176 ; 29 N. E. 534 : 
 Chandler v. New Haven, etc. R. Co , 
 159 Mass. 589 ; 35 N. E. 89). If the 
 cause of action survived in the state 
 where the death was caused, the fact 
 should be pleaded in an action in 
 another state where such a cause of 
 
209 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 [§ 135 
 
 must have been appointed or empowered to act in the state 
 where he sues." His right of action, of course, depends upon 
 the powers he was entitled to exercise in his own state.*^ 
 
 § 134. For whose benefit action may be brought.— These 
 
 statutes are not designed for the benefit of creditors of the 
 deceased. By providing, as nearly all these statutes do, for 
 a particular distribution of the recovery, creditors are ex- 
 cluded.' The persons for whose benefit the recovery is to be 
 had have a vested right in such recovery from the moment 
 of the death; and if they die before judgment is had, their 
 representatives take its benefits.' 
 
 § 135. No action without surviving statutory beneficiary.— 
 
 The action cannot be maintained at all under the statutes 
 of England, New York, Indiana or any similar ones, unless the 
 deceased left at least one surviving relative of the class specified 
 in the statute.^ Where, as in New York, Vermont, New Jersey, 
 North Carolina, Ohio, Illinois and Michigan, the statute uses 
 the conjunctive form, and allows an action for the benefit of 
 
 action does not survive (O'Reilly v. 
 New England R. Co., 16 R. I. 388; 
 17Atl. 908.) 
 
 "So held in Indiana (Memphis, 
 etc. Packet Co. v. Pikey, 143 Ind. 304; 
 
 40 N. E. 527 ; Jeffersonville, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Hendricks, 36 Ind. 228; S. c, 
 
 41 Id. 48) ; Illinois (Union R. Co. v. 
 Shaoklet, 119 111. 232 ; 10 N. E. 896 ; 
 Wabash, etc. R. Co. v. Shacklet, 105 
 111. 364); Kansas (Kansas Pac. R. Co. 
 V. Cutter, 16 Kans. 568 ; see L. 1889, 
 ch. 131 ; Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Napole, 55 Kans. 401; 40 Pac. 669) ; 
 Nebraska (Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Lewis, 24 Neb. 848 ; 40 N. W. 401); 
 Kentucky ( Bruce v'. Cincinnati, etc. 
 R. Co., 83 Ky. 174 ; Marvin v. Mays- 
 ville, etc. R. Co., 49 Fed. 436). 
 
 "Northern Pac. K. Co. v. Babcock, 
 154 U. S. 190 ; 14 S. Ct. 978 ; Lime- 
 killer V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 33 
 Kaus, 83; 5 Pac. 401 ; Hulbert v. 
 Topeka. 34 Fed. 510. 
 
 ' Chicago V. Major, 18 111. 349 ; see 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 14] 
 
 peculiar statute of Rhode Island 
 (Pub. Stat. 1882, § 17), and of Min- 
 nesota (Gen. L. 1891, c. 123, S 1; 
 State V. Dakota county, 51 Minn. 
 241; 53 N. W. 463). 
 
 'Waldo V. Goodsell, 33 Conn. 432. 
 
 > Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer, 627 ; 
 Lucas V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 21 
 Barb. 245 ; Commonwealth v. Bos- 
 ton, etc. R. Co., 121 Mass. 36; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. v. Morris, 26 III. 
 400 ; see Andrews v. Hartford, etc. 
 R. Co., 34 Conn. 57. The complaint 
 must allege the existence of such kin 
 (Stewart v. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co., 
 103 Ind. 44 ; 3 N. E. 208 ; Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Barber, 44 Kans. 612 ; 
 24 Pac. 969 : Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Pitt, 91 Tenn. 86 ; 18 S. W. 118 ; East 
 Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Lilly, 90 
 enn. 563 ; 18 S. W. 243 ; Lilly v. 
 Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 33 S. C. 142; 10 
 S. E. 933; Sorensen v. Northern Pac. 
 R. Co., 45 Fed. 407 [a Montana case]). 
 
§ 136] DECEASED PERSONS. 2IO 
 
 " a widow and next of kin," the action can be sustained where 
 there is a widow but no kindred of the deceased,^ or where he 
 leaves kindred but no widow.' In Vermont, New Jersey, Ohio, 
 IlHnois, Michigan and Indiana, the statute mentions only- 
 widows and next of kin as entitled to its benefits. A husband, 
 not being, as such, of kin to his wife, is therefore not within 
 the benefit of the statute ; if the deceased left a husband only, 
 the action cannot be maintained.* Such was the law in New 
 York until April, 1870, when an act was passed including hus- 
 bands among the beneficiaries of the statute.' It is held under 
 the Tennessee code, which provides that the right of action 
 shall pass to the decedent's widow, or to his personal repre- 
 sentatives for the benefit of his widow, or, if there is no widow, 
 for the benefit of his next of kin, that, where, pending an 
 action by an administrator for the benefit of a widow, the lat- 
 ter dies, the action cannot be revived by the administrator for 
 the benefit of surviving next of kin.' 
 
 §136. Illegitimates; when entitled to benefit of act.— 
 
 Where, as in England, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
 Maryland, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Missouri 
 and Kansas, and other states, the statute specifies the " child" 
 of the deceased, an illegitimate child is not within the descrip- 
 tion;' but in Ohio, where the statute gives the recovery to the 
 
 •' See Oldfield v. Harlem R. Co., « Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. Bean, U4 
 
 14 N. Y. 310. Tenn. 388 ; 29 S. W. 370. 
 
 5 Oldfield V. Harlem R. Co., 14 N. ' An illegitimate child is not with- 
 
 Y. 310 ; Quin v. Moore, 15 Id. 432 ; in the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, giving a 
 
 Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 Id. right of action for thebenefit of the 
 
 471 ; McMahon v. New York, 33 Id. wife, husband, parent, or child of a 
 
 642 ; Lyons v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., person whose death lias been caused 
 
 7 Ohio St. 336 ; Chicago v. Major, 18 by wrongful act, neglect, or default 
 
 111. 349. (Dickinson v. Northeastern R. Co. , 2 
 
 * Lucas V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 21 Hurlst. & C. 73.5). A bastard is not 
 Barb. 245 ; Georgia E. Co. v. Wynn, a child, within the Indiana statute 
 42 Ga. 381 ; Scott v. Central. E. Co., giving a father a right of action for 
 77 Id. 450 ; Snell v. Smith, 78 Id. 355 ; death of a child (McDonald v. Pitts- 
 see Dickins v. N. Y. Central E. Co., burgh, etc. E. Co., 144 Ind. 459; 43 
 28 N. Y. 158. N. E. 447). One wlio marries the 
 
 ' In New York, " next of kin" in- mother of a bastard child, which he 
 
 elude all those entitled to a share of receives into his home as a member of 
 
 unbequeathed assets, under the stat- his familj', cannot sue for the death 
 
 ute of distributions except a husband of the child (Thornburg v. Ameri- 
 
 or wife (Code Civ. Pro. § 1870). can. Strawboard Co., 141 Ind. 443; 
 
211 DECEASED PERSONS. [§ 137 
 
 " next of kin," and another statute makes an illegitimate child 
 heir to its mother, if the latter leaves no lawful child, an ille- 
 gitimate child so left is entitled to the benefit of the statute.^ 
 And the statute being the same in New York,' we have no 
 doubt that the same decision will be made there whenever the 
 case arises, inasmuch as the reasoning appears to us conclusive. 
 
 § 137. Pecuniary injury ; how far essential to action. — 
 
 Although the statutes of New York and of most other states, 
 upon this subject, are substantially like that of England, they 
 have not been construed with entire uniformity. In England, 
 it is held that pecuniary injury to some one of the relatives of 
 the deceased, specified in the statute, is an indispensable ele- 
 ment of the cause of action, and that, without evidence of 
 such injury, the action is not maintainable, even for nominal 
 damages; indeed, nominal damages in such an action are 
 deemed inadmissible.^ In New York, however (the words of 
 the statute upon this point being at that time exactly the 
 same as in the English statute), it was held that such evidence 
 was not at all essential to the cause of action, and that nom- 
 inal damages, at least, were recoverable in every case of death 
 by a wrongful act or default ; and this is the universal law in 
 this country.^ It follows, as a matter of course, that the action 
 
 40 N. E. 1063). Under the Missouri Tilley v. Hudson River E. Co., 34 Id. 
 
 statute, 1889, § 4435, providing that 471 ; s. C, 39 Id. 353 ; Mclntyre v. N. 
 
 if the deceased be a minor and un- Y. Central E. Co., .87 Id. 287 ; O'Mara 
 
 married, whether such deceased v. Hudson River R. Co., 38 Id. 443; 
 
 unmarried minor be a natural born Ihl v. Forty-second St. R. Co., 47 Id. 
 
 or adopted child, the father and 317; Bierbauer v. N. Y. Central R. 
 
 mother may join in the suit, and Co., 15 Hun, 559 ; 77 N. Y. 588 ; Har- 
 
 each shall have an equal interest in linger v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 93 
 
 the judgment ; only natural born Id. 661 ; Houghkirk v. Delaware, 
 
 legitimate children are intended, etc. Canal Co., 93 Id. 219. The fact 
 
 and no action can be maintained by that next of kin are not able to sho w 
 
 a mother for the death of her bas- any direct, specific, pecuniary loss 
 
 tard child (Marshall v. "Wabash R. arising from the death of a person 
 
 Co., 46 Fed. 269). by negligent act, does not affect 
 
 '' Muhl V. Soutliern, etc. R. Co., 10 their right to recover but the con- 
 Ohio St. 373. dition and circumstances both of 
 
 'N. Y. Stat. 1855, ch. 547. deceased and of the next of kin 
 
 ' Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 Hurlst. are to be considered, and the best 
 
 & N. 653. estimate possible made therefrom 
 
 ' Oldfleld V. Harlem R. Co., 14 N. (Lockwood v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 
 Y. 310; Quin v. Moore, 15 Id. 433; R.Co., 98 N. Y. 533). S.P., Pennsyl- 
 
§137] 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 212 
 
 can be sustained without showing that any of the relatives 
 for whose benefit the action is brought were dependent 
 upon the decedent for support,' and although the decedent 
 left neither widow nor children having a legal claim for 
 support. It is only necessary to show that some one of 
 such beneficiaries exist.* It is not necessary, even in Eng- 
 land, to show that the relatives have lost by the death 
 something to which they had a legal title. The action is main- 
 tainable if they had a reasonable expectation of an advantage 
 from the continuance of the life of the deceased, capable of 
 appreciation in pecuniary values.' And as the English statute 
 contemplates the injury to individuals, rather than to a class, 
 an action may be maintained where the death causes a pecu- 
 niary loss to one or more of the relatives, even though it 
 should cause a gain to the others equal to or exceeding the 
 loss of the former.* In states where the remedy is given 
 directly, e. g. to a father or mother for the death of a child. 
 
 vanla R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. St. 60 ; 
 Lyons v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 7 
 Ohio St. 338 ; Donaldson v. Missis- 
 sippi, etc. R. Co., 18 Iowa, 280 ; An- 
 drews V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 86 Id. 
 677 ; 53 N. W. 399 ; Atchison, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Weber, 33 Kans. 543 ; 6 Pac. 
 877; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Shannon, 
 43 111. 338 ; Chicago v. Keefe, 114 Id 
 223 ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 
 157 111. 354; 41 N. E. 724 ; Korrady 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 131 Ind. 
 261; 29 N. E. 1069. 
 
 ' Keller v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 3 
 Abb. Ct. App. 480 . This proposition 
 was necessarily involved in the de- 
 cision of Quin V. Moore, 15 N. Y. 433; 
 Oldfield V. Harlem R. Co., 14 Id. 310; 
 Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 
 110 Id. 504 ; 18 N. E. 108 ; Keenan v. 
 Brooklyn R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348-; 40 
 N. E. 15. The same decision has 
 been made in other states (Chicago 
 V. Major, 18 111. 349, and cases cited 
 under last note). In Michigan, 
 Wisconsin, Nebraska and Colorado, 
 whose statutes, substantially identi- 
 cal, allow damages " with reference 
 
 to the pecuniary injury," it is held 
 that pecuniary injury must be al- 
 leged and proved (Coops v. Lake 
 Shore, etc. R. Co., 66 Mich. 448; 
 Hurst V. Detroit R. Co., 84 Id. 539 ; 
 48 N. W. 44 ; Charlebois v. Gogebic, 
 etc. R. Co , 91 Mich. 59 ; 51 N. W. 812 ; 
 Topping V. St. Lawrence, 86 Wise. 
 526; Orgall V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 
 46 Neb. 4; 64 N. W. 450; Denver, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Wilson, 12 Colo. 30 ; 30 Pac. 
 340). On the question of the dam- 
 ages recoverable in an action for 
 death, see §§ 766-772, 'post. 
 
 * SaflEord v. Drew, 3 Duer, 637 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Morris, 26 111. 
 400 ; Quinoy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 Id. 
 68 ; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Hes- 
 sions, 150 Id 546; Indianapolis, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Keeley, 23 Ind. 133. 
 
 ' Franklin v. Southeastern R. Co., 
 3 Hurlst. & N. 311; Dalton v. Southl 
 eastern R. Co., 4 C. B. N. S. 296; 
 Pym V. Great Northern R. Co., 4 
 Best & S. 396. 
 
 ' Pym V. Great Northern R. Co., 4 
 Best & S. 396. 
 
213 DECEASED PERSONS. [§ 1 39 
 
 but upon condition of being dependent upon the decedent fof 
 support, proof of such dependence is necessary to maintain 
 the action.'' 
 
 § 138. Miscellaneous points. — In some of the states the 
 statute specifies the time within which an action for injuries 
 causing death should be begun. In others the statute is silent 
 on the subject. Where this is the case, the rule is that the 
 time begins to run from the date of the death.' The time is 
 governed by the law of the place where the injury occurred, 
 not by that of the state where the action is brought.^ Many 
 questions arising under the various statutes relating to the 
 measure of damages, the right to exemplary and punitive 
 damages are reserved, as more properly belonging to the 
 chapter on Damages. The subject of contributory negligence, 
 in connection with this class of actions, has already been 
 treated (§ 62). 
 
 § 139. Effect of survival statutes. — Statutes have been 
 enacted in several states, beginning with Massachusetts,' and 
 followed in New Hampshire, Connecticut, Delaware, Ken- 
 tucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana and South 
 Dakota, providing for the survival and continuance, to his 
 personal representative, of the right of action which a per- 
 son killed by an injury would have had in case he had not 
 died. In Massachusetts and Mississippi, it is held that such a 
 statute does not give to the representatives a right to sue 
 upon an injury which caused instantaneous death, upon the 
 ground that the deceased could never have had a cause of 
 
 'The Georgia Code gives the right Stat. 1887, c. 370, § 3 ; McCarthy v. 
 
 of recovery to a father or mother for Nevr England Order, etc., 153 Mass. 
 
 death of a child on whom he or she 314 ; Daly v. New Jersey Steel Co., 
 
 ■was dependent, or who contributed to 155 Id. 1; Hodnett v. Boston, etc. R. 
 
 his or her support. It is not enough Co., 156 Id. 86 ; 30 N. E. 324. 
 
 to show merely that decedent >Waldo v. Goodsell, 83 Conn. 433 ; 
 
 contributed to a parent's support, see Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 
 
 (Clay V. Central R. Co., 84 Ga. 345 ; 38 Vt. 294 ; Atlanta, etc R. Co. v. 
 
 10 S. E. 967) ; though it is not neces- Venable, 67 Ga. 697. 
 
 sary that the parent should have ' Weaver v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 
 been wholly dependent (Daniels v. 81 D. C. 499. 
 
 Savannah, etc. R. Co., 86 Ga. 236 ; 12 ' Stat. 1842, c. 89 ; Stat. 1882, c. 
 
 S. E. 365). See decisions under Mass. 165. 
 
§ 139] DECEASED PERSONS. 214 
 
 action for his own death.^ If the deceased lingered, even for 
 the shortest appreciable space of time, it is held that he had a 
 cause of action, which survives under the statute.^ But it is 
 further held that only such damages can be recovered by the 
 representative as the deceased person could have recovered on 
 account of what he suffered up to the time of his death, and 
 therefore that if he was always entirely unconscious, and 
 suffered nothing, his representatives can only recover nominal 
 damages.* In Connecticut, under a similar statute, it was held 
 that there could be no such thing as literally instantaneous 
 death, that is to say, death happening absolutely simul- 
 taneously with the injury causing it, and therefore that a 
 sufficient cause of action for substantial (though not for penal) 
 damages survived to the representative, in all cases.^ We 
 think that the latter construction of the statute is correct. 
 The interval between injury and death may be inappreciable; 
 but it is impossible that there should be none.^ A more dififi- 
 cult question arises where, as in Kentucky and South Dakota, 
 a single statute provides for two distinct actions by distinct 
 persons, in different rights, for the same injury. In those 
 states, the statute provides that the cause of action belonging 
 to the deceased person shall survive to his personal representa- 
 tive, and also that certain specified relatives of the deceased 
 may recover for the injury suffered by the family from the 
 death. In South Dakota, it is held that this clearly indicates 
 
 'Hollenbeck v. Berkshire R. Co., notarise in favor of an administra- 
 
 9 Cush. 478 ; Kearney v. Boston & tor, in Connecticut, until he is ap- 
 
 "Worc. R. Co., Id. 108 ; followed in pointed (Andrews v. Hartford, etc. 
 
 many cases, e. g., Mulcliahey v. R. Co., 34 Conn. 57). 
 
 "Washburn Car Wheel Co., 145 Mass. * On this point Comstock, J., has 
 
 281;14N.E. 106; Beckman V.Georgia well said (Whitford v. Panama R. 
 
 Pac. R. Co.. Miss. ; 12 So. 956; Co., 33 N. Y. 465, 486): " The death. 
 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Pendergrass, may be sudden ; in common lan- 
 
 69 Miss. 425 ; 12 So. 954. guage, instantaneous. But in every 
 
 2 Bancroft v. Boston, etc. R. Co., fatal casualty there must be a con- 
 
 11 Allen, 34. ceivable point of time, however 
 
 ■•Mulchahey v. Washburn Car minute, between the violence and 
 
 Wheel Co., 145 Mass. 381 ; 14 N. E. the total extinction of life. . . 
 
 106. During its continuance the right of 
 
 ^Murphy v. New Haven R. Co., 30 compensation for the wrong belongs 
 
 Conn. 184. The statute has since to the victim, and is capable of dev- 
 
 been amended so as to embody this olution. like other rights, upon his 
 
 decision. The cause of action does representative." 
 
215 DECEASED PERSONS. [§ 140 
 
 an intention on the part of the legislature to exclude from the 
 recovery of the representative all compensation for death, 
 since otherwise the party in fault would be required to pay for 
 the same injury twice overJ In Kentucky, this difficulty is 
 solved by holding that the representative can recover only 
 actual damages, while the family can recover exemplary 
 damages.' The latter reasoning would not be satisfactory 
 where, as is generally the case, exemplary damages are not 
 recoverable at all. In Iowa, where the statute provides, in the 
 simplest possible terms, for a survival of the right of action, 
 the representative is entitled to recover full (though not puni- 
 tive) damages, even in case of instantaneous death;' and such 
 also is the rule in Louisiana.^" Under any of the other 
 statutes that we have mentioned, it is of no importance 
 whether the decedent died instantly from the effect of the 
 injury or lingered for some time." 
 
 § 140. Effect of releases and settlements out of court. — 
 
 Where the right of action is given only by a survival statute 
 (that is, continuing the righfof the injured person, after his 
 death), it is too plain for argument that a release from the de- 
 ceased in his lifetime is a bar to any action.' But, further- 
 more, it has been held, under the broader statutes, that the 
 foundation of every action of this kind is in the injury which 
 caused the death, and not merely in. the fact of death itself; 
 and, therefore, that if an injured person recovers damages for 
 
 'Belding v. Black Hills, etc. E. R. Co., 37 S. C. 42; 16 S. E. 289; 
 
 Co., 3 S. Dak. 369; 53 N. W. 750. Haley v. Mobile, etc. E. Co., 7 Bax- 
 
 8 Givensv. Kentucky Cent. E. Co., ter, 239; International E. Co. v. 
 
 89 Kv. 331; 13 S. W. 357. Kindred, 57 Texas, 491 ; NashvUle, 
 
 ' Conners v. Burlington, etc. E. etc. R. Co. v. Prince, 3 Heisk. 580 ; 
 
 Co., 71 Iowa, 490 : 33 N. W. 465. overruling Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. 
 
 "> In Louisiana, vchere an infant Burke, 6 C'oldw. 45. In Maine, the 
 
 child is negligently run over by an death must be instantaneous to give 
 
 engine, and instantly killed, a cause a statutory right of action ; because, 
 
 of action accrues to the child and . if it were not instantaneous, the 
 
 survives to the parents ; but the cause of action survived, inde- 
 
 right to recover punitive damages pendent of statute (Sawyer v. Perry, 
 
 does not survive (Hamnton v. Mor- 88 Me. 43 ; 33 Atl. 660 ; State v. Grand 
 
 gan's S. S. Co., 43 La. Ann. 824; Trunk E. Co., 61 Me. 114). 
 
 8 So. 586). 'Price v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 
 " Brown v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 33 S. C. 556 ; 12 S. E. 413. 
 23 N. Y. 191 ; Reed v. Northeastern 
 
ho] 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 2l6 
 
 that injury during his lifetime,^ or releases his claim,' or (under 
 peculiar English statutes) if he had contracted with his em- 
 ployer that the benefit of the statute should not be claimed/ 
 his representatives cannot maintain any action upon his subse- 
 quent death, resulting from the injury. A release given to 
 the person liable, by all those entitled to the amount recover- 
 able for death caused by a wrongful act, has been held, in 
 Minnesota, a bar to a subsequent action brought by the per- 
 sonal representative of deceased.^ But not so in Indiana.* 
 Certainly all the parties in interest must unite in such release, 
 to make it an effectual bar.'' A release from the party having 
 the first right to sue is conclusive against others, having only 
 a subordinate right.' The effect of a recovery by one person 
 upon the right of action of another upon the same death 
 varies, under different statutes.' 
 
 'Littlewood v. New York, 89 N. 
 Y. 24 ; overruling Schlichting v. 
 Wintgen, 25 Hun, 626. 
 
 ^Read v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. 
 R. 3 Q. B. 555 ; Dibble v. N. Y. & 
 Erie R. Co. , 25 Barb. 183 ; see the re- 
 sult of the appeal in this case, 23 N. 
 Y. 484; Fowlkes v. Nashville, etc. R. 
 Co., 5 Baxt. [Tenn.] 663 ; see, how- 
 ever, Southern, etc. R. Co. v. Sulli- 
 van, 59 Ala. 272. The effect of the 
 decision in Robinson v. Canadian 
 Pac. R. Co. (1892 App. Cas. 481 ; rev'g 
 19 Can. S. C. 292) on these cases is 
 worth consideration ; for it recog- 
 nizes death as a new and separate 
 cause of action. 
 
 " Griffiths V. Earl Dudley, L. R. 9 
 Q. B. Div. 357. In Iowa, where the 
 statute gives a, remedy to railroad 
 employes for injuries caused by neg- 
 ligence of other employes, it is ex- 
 pressly provided that no agreement 
 exempting the company from liabil- 
 ity shall be binding (Iowa Stat. 1888, 
 § 1307 ; so by Wis. Rev. Stat. 1878, 
 § 1816 ; repealed in 1880). Under the 
 
 Iowa statute, a contract exempting a 
 raUroad company from liability for 
 injury to a passenger is invalid (Rose 
 V. Des Moines Valley R. Co. , 39 Iowa 
 246). 
 
 ^Sykora v. Case Mach. Co., 59 
 Minn. 130; 60 N. W. 1008. 
 
 * Yelton V. EvansvLUe, etc. R. Co., 
 134 Ind. 414; 33 N. E. 629. 
 
 ' An action by an administrator for 
 the wrongful death of his intestate 
 "for the use and benefit of the 
 widow and children," cannot be com- 
 promised by the widow without the 
 consent of the children or adminis- 
 trator (Knoxville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Acuff, 93 Tenn. 36: 20 S. W. 848). 
 
 * Holder v. NashviUe, etc. R. Co. 
 92 Tenn. 143: 30 S. W. 537. 
 
 ' Compare Legg v. Britton, 64 Vt. 
 652 ; 24 Atl. 1016 ; Hecht v. Ohio, etc. 
 R. Co., 133 Ind. 507 ; 32 N. E. 302 ; 
 Nelson v. Galveston, etc. R. Co., 78 
 Tex. 631 ; 14 S. W. 1031 ; Putnam v. 
 Southern Pac. R. Co., 31 Greg. 330 ; 
 37 Pac. 1083. 
 
PART II. 
 
 LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF PERSONAL 
 RELATIONS. 
 
 Chapter IX. Liability of Masters for Servants. 
 X. Liability of Masters to Servants. 
 XI. Liability of Servants. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 § 141. General rule of liability. § 157. 
 
 142. Principle of the rule. 
 
 143. [Omictedj. 158. 
 
 144. Agency necessary to create 
 
 responsibility. 159. 
 
 145. Master's liability for servant's 
 
 acts under implied authority. 160. 
 
 146. Master liable for acts in course 161. 
 
 of employment. 
 
 147. "What acts are within employ- 162. 
 
 ment. 163. 
 
 148. Master not liable for acts out- 
 
 side of employment. 164. 
 
 149. [Omitted]. 165. 
 
 150. Liability for servant's wiUful 
 
 acts. 166. 
 
 151. Ostensible authority for will- 
 
 ful acts. 167. 
 
 152. [Omitted]. 168. 
 
 153. Willful acts; when conse- 
 
 quence of negligence. 169. 
 
 154. Liability for negative results 
 
 of willful acts. 170. 
 
 155. Disobedience of master's 171. 
 
 orders. 
 
 156. [Omitted]. 
 
 [217] 
 
 Liability for sub-agents or 
 strangers. 
 
 Implied liability of owner of 
 vehicle. 
 
 Ownership of other property; 
 how far implies liability. 
 
 Who is to be deemed a master. 
 
 Nominal master when not 
 liable. 
 
 Liability for servant hired out. 
 
 Liability of trustees for em- 
 ployee's acts. 
 
 Who is a " contractor." 
 
 When contractor and when 
 servant. 
 
 Effect of employer's control 
 over contractor. 
 
 Effect of right of dismissal. 
 
 Employer not liable for con- 
 tractor's negligence. 
 
 Negligence of subcontractor 
 and part-contractor. 
 
 [Omitted]. 
 
 Employer liable for persons 
 selected by him. 
 
§ 142] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 2l8 
 
 g 173. Liability for servant oompul- 
 sorily employed — pilots. 
 
 173. Liability of owner for persons 
 
 employed on land. 
 
 174. Liability of employer for his 
 
 own fault. 
 
 g 175. Employer liable for act con- 
 tracted for. 
 176. Omission of duty not excused 
 by contracting to have it 
 done. 
 
 § 141. General rule of liability. — It is an old and thoroughly 
 established doctrine that, where the relation of master and ser- 
 vant exists, the master is responsible to third persons for the 
 damage caused by the wrongful acts or omissions of his servants, 
 in the course of their employment as such.' This liability is 
 not confined to the mere negligence of servants, but extends 
 also to their willful acts, though unauthorized or even forbidden 
 by the master, so far as such acts deprive third persons of a 
 benefit which the master was bound to confer upon them, or, for 
 any other reason, have occurred in the course of the servant's 
 employment. This responsibility for willful wrongs, not au- 
 thorized by the master, may still fall under the law of negli- 
 gence. The master may be considered in such case guilty, 
 not of the wrongful act itself, but only of neglect to restrain 
 his servant from committing it.^ 
 
 § 142. Principle of the rule. — The principle which hes at 
 the foundation of this rule has been differently stated in 
 several judicial opinions;' and the abstract justice of the rule 
 
 ' Whiteley v. Pepper, L. R. 2 Q. B. 
 Div. 276 ; Coughtry v. Globe Woolen 
 Co., 56 N. Y. 134 ; Kennedy v. EyaU, 
 67 Id. 379 ; Simontou v. Loring, 68 
 Me. 164; The Rheola, 33 Blatchf. 
 134; Tuel v. Weston, 47 Vt. 634; 
 Phelon V. Stiles, 43 Conn. 436; Oil 
 Creek, etc. E. Co. v. Keighron, 74 
 Pa. St. 316 [servant let oil car come 
 into collision with a locomotive, 
 which set fire to the car, burning 
 plaintiff's house] ; Andrews v. Boe- 
 decker, 136 111. 605 ; 18 N. E. 651 ; 
 and cases, infra. 
 
 2See§§ ir,;), 154,pos!:. 
 
 * "The reason of [the rule] is that 
 every act which is done by a servant 
 in the course of his duty is regarded 
 as done by his master's orders, and 
 
 consequently is the same as if it 
 were the master's own act" (per 
 Lord Chelmsford, in Bartonshill 
 Coal Co. V. McGuire, 3 Macq. H. L. 
 306). "The responsibility of the 
 master for the acts of a servant rests 
 upon the express or implied authori- 
 zation of the act by the master, who, 
 in the employment of another to act 
 for him, assumes all the risks of a 
 wrongful execution of his duties" 
 (per Allen, J., in Mott v. Consumers' 
 Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543). The master's 
 liability . " is wholly irrespective of 
 any contract, express or implied, or 
 any other relation between the 
 injured party and the master " (per 
 Grier, J., in Philadelphia, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Derby, 14 How. U. S. 468, 
 
219 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§142 
 
 itself has been occasionally questioned.^ But the soundness of 
 the principle and the necessity of the rule, which we have 
 inherited from the Roman law,^ have received new and con- 
 vincing illustrations in the immense development of modern 
 corporations. If the rule of respondeat superior were now to 
 be abrogated, it would be almost impossible to carry on the 
 present complex business of society. Every person having 
 any pecuniary responsibility would shelter himself behind the 
 forms of a corporation, which would, in such case, be free from 
 all responsibility for the negligence and violence of its agents, 
 without direct evidence of authority for their acts ; while such 
 evidence could be, in almost every instance, suppressed. In 
 short, the rule is one of those elementary ones, established so 
 
 485) . " It is this right to control the 
 conduct of the agent which is tlie 
 foundation of the doctrine that the 
 master is to be aflectied by the acts 
 of his servant " (N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. Law, 
 161). In Wilson v. Owens (16 L. R. Ir. 
 225), Dowse B., says: "There is no 
 material difference whether the 
 party committing the injury is a 
 servant or agent of the defendant. 
 A servant is an agent. The princi- 
 pal is responsible for the act of his 
 agent, and this case is only an appli- 
 fation of the doctrine of ^respondeat 
 superior.'" See Cooley on Torts, 
 539. The rule "is founded on the 
 soundest considerations of public 
 policy, and which the courts are not 
 at liberty to relax " (per Thompson, 
 J. , in Siegrist v. Arnot, 10 Mo. App. 
 197). " The rule is necessary to pre- 
 vent fraud and encourage confi- 
 dence in dealing" (per Tenney, C. 
 J., Stickney v. Munroe, 44 Me. 204). 
 ''"We never apply this rule [re- 
 spondeat superior] without a sense 
 of its hardships on the master ; but 
 it has been settled on a broad bal- 
 ancing of reason and equities, and 
 judicis est dieere, nan donare, legem " 
 (per Fenner, J., Shea v. Reems, 36 
 La. Ann. 966). "It is very im- 
 
 portant that the principle [respond- 
 eat superior} s'.iould be upheld and 
 maintained for (lis sake of the gen- 
 eral security of society, yet it is 
 often attended with much seeming 
 hardship. To visit a man with 
 heavy damages for the negligence 
 of a servant, when he is able to 
 show that he exercised all possible 
 care and precaution in the selection 
 of him, is apt to strike the common 
 mind as unjust" (perSharswood, J., 
 Hays V. Millar, 77 Pa. St. 238). In 
 Collett V. Foster (SHurlst. & N. 356), 
 where a client was made liable for 
 the tortious acts of his attorney in 
 the conduct of a suit, though he 
 was wholly ignorant of the particu- 
 lar act, Bramwell, B., expressed a 
 great desire to limit the doctrine of 
 respondeat superior, so as to make 
 the actual wrong-doer alone respon- 
 sible. See, also. Smith v. Keal, L. 
 R. 9 Q. B. Div. 340 
 
 2 " The true explanation of the 
 doctrine seems to be historical, dat- 
 ing back to the period of the Roman 
 law when servants were slaves, for 
 whom the pater familias was respon- 
 sible, as part of his general responsi- 
 bility for the family which he repre- 
 sented and governed " (2 Kent 
 Com. 12th ed. 260, n. 1). 
 
§144] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 220 
 
 early in the history of civil society that the evils which led to 
 its establishment have utterly passed away, leaving scarcely a 
 trace in history ; and it is precisely such rules and principles 
 which are most questioned in modern times, simply because 
 no human memory and no written record enables us to recall 
 the state of facts out of which reason developed them. 
 
 § 143. [Omitted.] 
 
 § 144. Agency necessary to create responsibility. — No 
 
 one is responsible for the act or omission of another, unless 
 that other is his agent.' The relation of parent or child is not 
 of itself enough to make the parent responsible for the negli- 
 gence of even a minor child ^ in his custody and care, much 
 less for that of an adult child. ^ Nor is the child responsible 
 for any act of the parent, as such.* Neither does the relation 
 of husband and wife, of itself, bring either of them within the 
 scope and meaning of this chapter. Under the rules of the 
 common law, the husband was often liable for his wife's torts ; 
 
 ' See § 65, ante. To render one 
 liable for the negligence of another, 
 the relation of master and servant, 
 or principal and agent, must exist 
 (Stevens v. Armstrong, 6 N. Y. 435 ; 
 McGuire v. Grant, 35 N. J. Law, 
 356 ; Penn. R. Co. v. Russ, 57 Id. 136 ; 
 30 Atl. 534 ; Larock v. Ogdensburgh, 
 etc. R. Co., 36 Hun, 383 ; Fisher v. 
 Metropolitan R. Co., 34 Id. 433). 
 "It is absolutely essential, in order 
 to establish a liability against a 
 party for the negligence of others, 
 that the relation of master and ser- 
 vant should exist" (Hexamer v. 
 Webb, 101 N. Y. 377 ; 4 N. E. 755). 
 s. p., MoCullough V. Shoneman, 105 
 Pa. St. 169 ; Thorp v. Minor, 109 N. 
 C. 153 ; 13 S. E. 703. The fact that 
 a railway company permitted an en- 
 gine to be run on its tracks by a con- 
 tractor in performing his contract 
 with third parties does not render it 
 liable for an injury occurring 
 through his negligent operation of 
 such engine (City, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 Moores, 80 Md. 848; 30 Atl. 643); 
 Holmes v. Union Tel. Co., 63 Hun, 
 618 ; 16 N. Y. Supp. 563 [licensor of 
 use of telegraph poles not liable for 
 licensee's negligence] ; Fluker v. 
 Georgia R. Co., 81 Ga. 461 ; 8 S. E. 
 539 [license]. Tlie superintendent 
 and an inmate of a hospital do not 
 sustain towards each other the rela- 
 tion of master and servant (Schrubbe 
 V. ConneU, 69 Wise. 476 ; 34 N. W. 
 503) . A servant may so serve two 
 independent masters that both shall 
 be liable (Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. 
 King, 69 Miss. 853 ; 13 So. 834 ; Fisher 
 V. Cook, 135 111. 380 ; 17 N. E. 763). 
 s. p., Smith V. Belshaw, 89 Cal. 437 ; 
 36 Pac. 834 [leased mine]. 
 
 = Baker v. Morris, 33 Kans. 580 ; 7 
 Pac. 367 [minor son negligently fired 
 a gun, killing plaintiff's horse ; father 
 not liable] ; Brohl v. Lingeman, 41 
 Mich. 711 ; 3 N. W. 199. 
 
 « Way V. Powers, 57 Vt. 135. 
 
 ■* See cases on Contributory Negli- 
 gence, ante, §§ 70-79. 
 
221 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 144 
 
 but that liability stands upon a different ground from the lia- 
 bility of a master for the act of his servant ; and it does not now 
 exist in most of the United States. The wife never was liable 
 for the torts of the husband; and there is no principle under 
 which she can be made so liable now. Nor is the mere fact 
 of employment always sufficient to make the employer 
 responsible for the acts of the person employed.' Every one, 
 with whom a contract is made to do or to furnish a thing, may 
 be said to be employed for this purpose by the person for 
 whom the act is to be performed ; but such a contract does 
 not necessarily create the relation of master and servant or 
 principal and agent ; and, where that relation is not created, 
 the responsibility here defined does not arise.^ It makes no 
 difference that the employer, in such a case, puts some of his 
 property, whether real or personal, into the charge or control 
 of the employed, and that the latter uses that identical prop- 
 erty in such a wrongful manner as to injure a stranger there- 
 with.' Much less can the owner of the property be made 
 responsible for injuries caused by the contact of such property 
 with the person or property of another, without proof or pre- 
 sumption of any other circumstance, and on the mere ground 
 of his ownership.^ The relation of landlord and tenant, there- 
 
 ^ King V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 66 ing no right or power to direct the 
 
 N. Y. 181, where Andrews, J., said : movements of its trains while on the 
 
 " It is not enough, in order to estab- track of tlie other company, was not 
 
 lish a liability of one person for the liable for the negligence of those in 
 
 negligence of another, to show that charge of its train while running 
 
 the person whose negligence caused over such tracks, though employed 
 
 the injury was at the time acting and paid by it (Atwood v. Chicago, 
 
 under an employment by the person etc. R. Co., 73 Fed. 447). 
 
 who is sought to be charged. It « Seeposi, §§ 164, 168. 
 
 must be shown, in addition, that the ' See post, §§ 158, 1 59, 173 ; Brohl 
 
 employment created the relation of v. Lingenian, 41 Mich. 711 ; 3 N. W. 
 
 master and servant between them." 199 ; Byrne v. Kansas City, etc. K. 
 
 The defendant company used an- Co., 61 Fed. 605 ; 9 C. C. A. 666. 
 
 other company's tracks under an « See Kelly v. New York, 11 N. Y. 
 
 agreement that the latter should 433 ; Pack v. Same, 8 Id. 223 ; Gour- 
 
 have the exclusive right to make dier v. Coraiack, 3 E. D. Smith, 254 ; 
 
 rules for the operation of that part Higgs v. Maynard, 14 Weekly Rep. 
 
 of the railroad used by the parties 610 ; 13 Jur. N. S. 705 ; Samuelson 
 
 jointly, and that all trains should v. Cleveland, etc. Mining Co., 49 
 
 move in accordance with the order Mich. 164 ; Pettigrew v. St. Louis, 
 
 of the superintendent of the latter etc. Steel Co., 14 Mo. App. 441; Cin- 
 
 company. Held, that defendant, hav- cinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Wright, 54 
 
§145] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 fore, does not impose upon the landlord any liability for the 
 negligent use of the leased premises by the tenant, to the 
 injury of a stranger.' 
 
 § 145. Master's liability for servant's acts under implied 
 authority. — A master is, of course, responsible for any act of 
 his servants committed by his express command, however un- 
 lawful it may be. He is also responsible for the acts of a 
 servant under an implied authority — that is to say, an 
 authority which he gave the servant himself, or the person 
 dealing with him, reasonable ground to believe had been given, 
 or which is usually given under similar circumstances.^ It 
 may well be that a servant can have no implied authority to 
 do that which it cannot be lawful, under any circumstances, or 
 
 Ohio St. 181 ; 43 N. E. 688. A. was 
 injured by collision with a car, 
 driven by a servant of B., the car 
 being owned by C. Held, that action 
 was properly brought against B. 
 (Weyant v. Harlem R. Co., 3 Duer, 
 360)' 
 
 'Wolf V, Kilpatrick, 101 N. Y. 
 146; 4 N. E. 188; Edwards v. Har- 
 lem E. Co., 98 N. Y. 249 ; Miller v. 
 N. Y. Lackawanna, etc. R. Co., 125 
 Id. 118 ; 26 N. E. 35 [lessor of rail- 
 road not liable for injuries to ad- 
 jacent property by embankment 
 built by lessee, though bound by 
 terms of lease to pay latter for its 
 new construction-work], s. P., Phil- 
 ips V. Northern R. Co., 63 Hun, 23H ; 
 16 N. Y. Supp. 909 [lessor of railroad]. 
 But the lessor of a railroad, in whose 
 exclusive interest it is operated by 
 the lessee, is liable for injuries re- 
 ceived through the negligent opera- 
 tion of the road (Southern R. Co. v. 
 Bouknight, 17 C. C. A. 181 ; 70 Fed. 
 443 ; see ^ 120a, ante, and § 413, 
 post). The defendant, having a 
 license to run a ferry, leased it to 
 another ; and through the negligence 
 of the lessee's servant, A. was 
 drowned. Held, that the relation of 
 
 master and servant did not exist be- 
 tween lessee and defendant, who 
 was therefore not liable (Blackwell 
 V. Wiswall, 34 Barb. 355). To same 
 effect, Felton v. Deall, 22 Vt. 171. 
 The lessor of a quarry was held not 
 liable to an eiaiployee of the lessee, 
 for the lessee's negligence ; it not 
 appearing that any duty of the lessor 
 remained unperformed, even though 
 the one injured was originally a 
 seiwant of the lessor, and supposed 
 that he was so at the time of the 
 accident (Crusselle v. Pugh, 67 Ga. 
 430 ; distinguishing Lake Superior 
 Iron Co. V. Erickson, 39 Mich. 493). 
 Compare Northeastern R. Co. v Bar- 
 nett (89 Ga. 399 ; 15 S. E. 493), where, 
 on the facts, a verdict against the 
 lessor was not disturbed. One who 
 has let out his farm and stock on 
 shares is not engaged in the joint 
 undertaking of carrying on the farm 
 with the tenant so as to render him 
 personally liable for the latter's neg- 
 ligence Marsh v. Hand, 130 N. Y., 
 315 ; 24 N. E. 463). 
 
 ' Allen V. Southwestern R. Co., L. 
 R; 6Q. B, 65, per Blackburn, J.; Bar- 
 wick V. English Joint Stock Bank, 
 L. R. 3 Ex. 259. 
 
221 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ I45 
 
 in any manner, for either him or his master to do.^ But that 
 does not justify the proposition that a master is never Hable for 
 the act of his servant, in doing that which, under the particu- 
 lar circumstances, would have been entirely unlawful for his 
 master to do, or, where the master is a corporation, an act 
 beyond its corporate power. On this point some confusion 
 has arisen. Thus it has been held that where a railway corpo- 
 ration had no power to cause the arrest of the plaintiff upon a 
 certain specified ground, it could not be held responsible for 
 the act of its agent in arresting the plaintiff on that ground, 
 although the agent acted in good faith, for the purpose of pro- 
 tecting his employer's interest.' But this decision was clearly 
 wrong. There is not, and never could have been, any doubt 
 that such a corporation had power to cause persons to be ar- 
 rested and detained for some offenses ; and, such being the 
 case, it is uniformly held that the corporation is responsible 
 for the act of an agent who, in good faith, believed that there 
 was sufficient ground for making the arrest.* For, where a 
 
 «In Mali v. Lord (39 N. Y. 381) 
 the superintendent of defendant's 
 store called in a policeman and 
 directed him to arrest aud examine 
 the person of the plaintiff, a lady, 
 suspected of stealing goods, which 
 was done, witliont defendant's ex- 
 press authority. Held, that the 
 servant was not impliedly authorized 
 by his master to do that whicli the 
 master himself, being present, would 
 not be authorized to do. See § 151, 
 post. 
 
 3 Poulton V. Southwestern E. Co. , 
 L, E. 3 Q. B. 534. 
 
 ■•Where officers of railway com- 
 panies, intrusted with the execution 
 of by-laws relating to imprisonment, 
 and intending to act in tlie course of 
 their duty, improperly imprisoned 
 persons who are supposed to oome 
 within the terms of the by-laws, the 
 companies are liable (GofiP v. Great 
 Northern E. Co., 3 El. & El. 673, ex- 
 plaining Eoe V. Birkenhead E. Co., 7 
 Ex. 36 ; and see Barry v. Midland E. 
 Co., Irish Eep. 1 C. L. 130). In 
 
 Lynch v. Metropolitan El. E. Co. 
 (90 N. Y. 77), defendant was held 
 liable for the unlawful detention of 
 a passenger by a gate-keeper, wlio 
 refused to allow him to leave tlie 
 station without proilucing his ticket 
 or paying his fare. s. P., Moore v. 
 Metropolitan E. Co., L. E. 8 Q. B. 36 
 [false imprisonment of passenger not 
 paying proper fare]; Bayley v. Man. 
 Chester, etc. E. Co., L. E. 8 C. P. 148 
 [porter pulling passenger back from 
 train in motion]; Seymour v. Green- 
 wood, 7 Hurlst. & N. 356 [assault of 
 passenger by omnibus guard]. There 
 are many similar decisions, but as 
 they mp.inly lie outside of our 
 province, we only refer to a few, 
 holding the master liable for arrest: 
 Staples V. Schmid, 18 R. I. 2i4 ; 36 
 Atl. 19.5 [salesman in charge of 
 store]; Mallach v. Eidley, 34 Abb. N. 
 C. 173; 9 N. Y. Supp. 933; qualify- 
 ing s. c. before, 43 Hun, 336 ; Clark 
 V. Starin, 47 Id. 345 ; Toomey v. 
 Delaware, etc. E. Co., 4 Misc. 393 ; 
 34 N. T. Supp. 108; Atchison, etc. 
 
§146] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 224 
 
 servant is authorized to do acts which may or may not be law- 
 ful, according to circumstances, the master may be liable for 
 such an act, although no circumstances existed to justify it.^ 
 The master is clearly liable for the servant's negligence in 
 incomplete performance of an authorized act, even though by 
 reason of such omission, the act becomes criminal.* 
 
 § 146. Master liable for acts in course of employment. — 
 
 The master is responsible for the negligent acts or omissions 
 of his servants in the course of their employment, though un- 
 authorized' or even forbidden^ by him, and although outside 
 
 R. Co. V. Henry, 55 Kans. 715 ; 41 
 Pac. 953 [train conductor]; LafHtte 
 V. New Orleans E. Co., 43 La. Ann. 
 34; 8 So. 701 [car driver] ; compare 
 Central R. Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 
 394; 28 Atl. 615 [president not au- 
 thorized ; a strange decision] ; see 
 Abrahams v. Deakin (1891), 1 Q. B. 
 516; 60 L. J. Q. B. 238. 
 
 ' See post, % 148 ; Limpus v. Lon- 
 don Omnibus Co., 1 Hurlst. & C, 
 536 [racing omnibuses] ; Regina v. 
 Stephens, L. R. 1 Q. B. 703 ; Dickson 
 V. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507; 34 N. E. 
 506 ; 35 Id. 1 [assault by special 
 policeman]. A servant employed 
 "to do genex-al farm work," negli- 
 gently driving out of the field a tres- 
 passing cow, killed it with a stone. 
 The master was held liable, though 
 he had given no orders in regard to 
 driving cattle out of the field (Evans 
 V. Davidson, 53 Md. 245). 
 
 'Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 
 108; 41 N. W. 543 [selling poison 
 without label]. 
 
 ' Limpus V. London Omnibus Co. , 
 1 Hurlst. & C. 536 ; Croft v. Ahson, 
 4 Barn. & Aid. 590 ; Page v. Defries, 
 7 Best & S. 137 ; Luttrell v. Hazen, 3 
 Sneed, 30. To same effect, South- 
 wick V. Estes, 7 Cush. 385 ; Cosgrove 
 v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 355. The test of 
 
 the liability of a master for the torts 
 of his servant is, whether the latter 
 was at the time acting within the 
 scope of his authority, and not 
 whether the act was done in accord- 
 ance with instructions (Gregory v. 
 Ohio River R. Co., 37 W. Va. 606 ; 16 
 S. E. 819 ; Clark v. Koehler, 46 Hun, 
 536 ; Tierney v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co. , 
 85 Id. 146 ; 32 N. Y. Supp. 627). The 
 fact that the engine was moved by a 
 brakeman, without authority, is im- 
 material (Houston, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Stewart [Tex. Sup.], 17 S. W. 33). 
 ' Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Derby, 
 
 14 How. U. S. 468 ; Weed v. Panama 
 R. Co., 17 N. Y. 363 ; Columbus, etc. 
 R. Co. V. PoweU, 40 Ind. 37 [conduc- 
 tor putting aged passenger off train 
 in motion] ; Houston, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Gorbett, 49 Tex. 573 [brakeman put- 
 ting passenger off train] ; Dolan v. 
 Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 71 N. Y. 
 285 [negligence of flagman at rail- 
 road crossing] Duggins v. "Watson, 
 
 15 Ark. 118; McClung v. Dearborne, 
 134 Pa. St. 396 ; 19 Atl. 698 : DriscoU 
 V. Carlin, 50 N. J. Law, 28 ; 11 Atl. 
 483 ; Mound City Paint Co. v. Con- 
 Ion, 92 Mo. 221 ; 4 S. W. 922 ; Bileu 
 V. Paisley, 18 Oreg. 47 ; 31 Pac. 934 ; 
 Gross V. Pennsylvania, etc. R. Co., 
 62 Hun, 619 ; 16 N. Y, Supp. 616. 
 
225 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§146 
 
 of their "line of duty," ^ and without regard to their motives.^ 
 He cannot limit his responsibility for any servant, by employ- 
 ing him only with reference to a single branch of the business. 
 If a servant under such limited employment nevertheless un- 
 dertakes to serve his master in any other matter connected 
 with the general business, and the limitation of his employment 
 is not clear or is not known to the persons with whom he deals, 
 the master is responsible for the acts of such a servant, in those 
 matters, as much as for those of any other servant.^ There is 
 
 " It is not correct, .and leads to an 
 erroneous result, to describe the mas- 
 ter's freedom from liability as arising 
 wheie tlie servant has departed from 
 his "line of duty in" his master's 
 business. Such a statement of the 
 law might excuse every deviation 
 from the master's orders, and substi- 
 tute a new and very dangerous test 
 of liability (Quinn v. Power, 87 N. 
 Y. 535 ; approved in Pittsburgh, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399 ; 1 N. E. 
 849). Master liable for act of fore- 
 man in stretching a guy rope across 
 a railroad to aid in taking down a 
 derrick when foreman had general 
 charge of the work, though in- 
 structed to employ a derrick special- 
 ist when moving derricks (Beinke 
 V. Bentley, 90 Wise. 457 ; 63 N. W. 
 1055 ; see Burns v. Poulsom, L. B. 8 
 C. P. 563). 
 
 ^ Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 
 90 N. Y. 588 ; Bryant v. Rich, 106 
 Mass. ISO ; Phelon v. Stiles, 43 Conn. 
 436. Yet the motive is often taken 
 into account, as an element of proof 
 on the main question (see The Polaria, 
 25 Fed. 735 ; Burns v. Poulsom, L. B. 
 8 C. P. 563; Birmingham "Water- 
 Works Co. V. Hubbard, 85 Ala. 179 ; 
 4 So. 607). A master Instructed his 
 servant to go to a certain place and 
 " kill a beef." The servant, finding 
 no animal there but the plaintiff's 
 bull, killed it, honestly attempting 
 to carry out the master's order. The 
 master was held liable (Maier v. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 1.5] 
 
 Eandolph, 33 Kans. 340 ; 6 Pac. 
 635). 
 
 * It is no defense that the servant's 
 duties were in another department 
 of the business, and that his act was 
 without the express authority of the 
 master (Hardegg v. Willards, 12 
 Misc. 17; 33 N. Y. Supp. 35). In 
 Courtney v. Baker (60 N. Y. l),the 
 master was held liable for injuries 
 caused by a clerk watching for thefts, 
 without orders. Bapallo, J., said : 
 " It may be that he was not bound 
 to watch for thieves, there being a 
 watchman charged with that duty ; 
 but if, casually, suspicious signs came 
 to his notice, we think his general 
 duty to his employers justified him 
 in endeavoring to ascertain what 
 was being done." Defendant, a 
 blacksmith, had only two men work- 
 ing, one of whom shod the horse and 
 injured him. Held, that defendant 
 was liable, though he swore that 
 the man was employed as a mere 
 helper and not to put on shoes 
 (Leviness v. Post, 6 Daly, 331). 
 Plaintiff was employed by a shipper 
 to load a car with lumber ; it was the 
 duty of defendant's yard master to 
 enter cars on his shipping book, 
 when reported ready for transporta- 
 tion, and see that they were properly 
 loaded and securely staked ; the yard 
 master inspected the car in question, 
 and required other stakes to be placed 
 thereon ; and while plaintiff was re- 
 moving a defective stake the yard 
 
§147] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 226 
 
 no difference, in this respect, between aservant who is a general 
 agent and one who is employed for a particular purpose ; al- 
 though such a distinction has been sometimes taken.* The 
 fact that the servant is employed only for a single purpose 
 maybe material in determining whether his negligence or other 
 misconduct happens in the course of his employment ; but if 
 it does, the master's liability is exactly the same as if the ser- 
 vant were a general agent.' 
 
 § 147. What acts are within employment. — In determin- 
 ing whether a particular act is done in the course of the ser- 
 vant's employment, it is proper first to inquire whether the 
 servant was at the time engaged in serving his master.^ If 
 
 master broke off another stake, caus- 
 ing the lumber to fall on plaintiff. 
 The car had been entered in the ship- 
 ping book by the yard master, who 
 understood that it was to be ready 
 to go on the morning of the accident. 
 Held, proper to refuse to instruct 
 that if, at the time of the accident, 
 the car had not been reported to de- 
 fendant as ready for shipment, but 
 was at that time under plaintiff's 
 control, then the yard master, when 
 he broke the stake, was not acting in 
 the line of his duty, and defendant 
 would not be liable (Pollard v. 
 Maine Cent. E. Co., 87 Me. 51 ; 33 
 Atl. 735). 
 
 « See Wilson v. Peverly, 3 N. H. 
 548; Oxford v. Peter, 28 lU. 434. 
 These cases have been overruled 
 (Schmidt v. Adams, 18 Mo. App. 
 432). 
 
 ' Cases cited in note 5, supra, and 
 under next section. 
 
 'A master, who permits his ser- 
 vant to go to a fair for his own 
 pleasure with the master's horse and 
 cart, is not liable for damages aris- 
 ing from the servant's negligent man- 
 agement of the horse (Bard v. Yohn, 
 26 Pa. St. 483). In Aycrigg v. N. Y. 
 &ErieR. Co. (30 N. J. Law, 460), 
 master of a ferry-boat, without au- 
 
 thority, took a burning barge in tow. 
 Held, owners not liable for injuries 
 done by the barge. The gatekeeper 
 of a toll-road company, who had 
 charge of the gate at all times, but 
 was not required to collect toll after 
 9 o'clock p. M., negligently let the 
 beam of the gate down upon a trav- 
 eler, who was attempting to pass 
 after that hour, and injured him. 
 Held, the act was in the course of 
 his employment, and the company 
 responsible (Noblesville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Gause, 76 Ind. 142). In Marrier 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co. (31 Minn. 351 ; 
 17 N. W. 952), it was sought to hold 
 a railroad company liable for the 
 destruction of the plaintiff's hay by 
 fire, communicated from afire negli- 
 gently left burning by the company's 
 section men, which fire they had 
 kindled for the purpose of warming 
 their coffee. But the court held the 
 company not liable. Where a ser- 
 vant, whose duty was to peddle 
 goods for his master, was driving to 
 the store, in a team of his own, to 
 get goods, the master was held lia- 
 ble for an injury infiicted upon a 
 third pei-son by negligent driving, 
 though no goods were then in the 
 wagon (Shea v. Reems, 36 La. Ann. 
 966). See cases under next section. 
 
V 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 147 
 
 the act is done while the servant is at liberty from service, and 
 pursuing his own ends exclusively, there can be no question of 
 the master's freedom from all responsibility,^ even though the 
 injury complained of could not have been committed without 
 the facilities afforded to the servant by his relation to his mas- 
 ter.' On the other hand, where a servant is allowed by his 
 master to combine his own business with that of the master, 
 or even to attend to both at substantially the same time, no 
 nice inquiry will be made as to which business the servant was 
 actually engaged in, when a third person was injured by his 
 
 " A servant of a railroad company where the owner of a horse and 
 
 was di'iving the company's horses wagon intrusted thera generally to 
 
 home in the usual way, when an- a driver, with authority to secure 
 
 other servant of the company, not such business as he could, and the 
 
 at the time actually engaged in its latter, after having delivered a 
 
 service, struck them, rendering them trunk, went out of his direct return 
 
 unmanageable, in consequence of route to get a load of poles for him- 
 
 which they ran over the plaintiff, self, and while taking them back, 
 
 Held, that the company was not negligently ran over plaintiff. The 
 
 responsible (Weldon v. Harlem B. owner was held liable. To same 
 
 Co., 5Bosw. 576). S. P., Dells v. Stol- effect, Venables v. Smith, L. R. 3 Q. 
 
 lenwerk, 78 Wise. 339; 47 N. W. 431. B. Div. 279. Mitchell v. Crasswel- 
 
 3 Where a carman, whose duty it ler was followed in Sheridan v. 
 
 was to attend to putting up a horse Charlick (4 Daly, 338) , where a 
 
 and cart, drove in an opposite direc- coachman, after having used his 
 
 tion without the consent of his master's team upon an errand for 
 
 employer, and, on his way back, in- his master, used it upon an errand 
 
 jured a third person, it was held of his own, without his master's 
 
 that his employer was not liable knowledge or consent, and while 
 
 (Mitchell V. Crassweller, 13 C. B. doing so, injured plaintiff's horse. 
 
 237). S. P., Storey v. Ashton, L. E. 4 Held, that the master wasnothable. 
 
 Q. B. 476. These cases were distin- To precisely same effect, Cavanagh 
 
 guished in Stevens v. Woodward (L. v. Dinsmore, 12 Hun, 465: also Ray- 
 
 R. 6Q. B. Div. 318), which was the ner v. Mitchell, L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 
 
 case of a clerk of a solicitor who, 357; Chicago Bottling Co. v. McGin- 
 
 contrary to express orders not to nis, 51 111. App. 325. To similar 
 
 enter a room, went in to wash his effect, see Way v. Powers, 57 Vt. 
 
 hands, and negligently left water 135; Stone v. Hills, 45 Conn. 44. So 
 
 turned on, so that premises under- in Cousins v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co. 
 
 neath were flooded. Held, the em- (66 Mo. 572), where the superintend- 
 
 ployer was not liable. But where a ent of defendant's round-house 
 
 servant was not forbidden to use a took a locomotive, without authority, 
 
 lavatory, the master was held liable ran it on defendant's track to get a 
 
 (Ruddiman v. Smith, 60 L. T. 708; doctor and killed plaintiff's mule on 
 
 37 W. R. 528). Mitchell v. Crass- the trip. Held, defendant not lia- 
 
 weller was further distinguished in ble. 
 Mulvehill v. Bates (31 Minn. 364), 
 
148] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 negligence ; but the master will be held responsible, unless it 
 clearly appears that the servant could not have been, directly 
 or indirectly, serving his master in the act, the negligent per- 
 formance of which caused the injury.'' And slight deviations 
 from the strict path of service will not suffice to relieve the 
 master.^ 
 
 § 148. Master not liable for acts outside of employment.— 
 
 The fact that the servant was, at the time of the injury, en- 
 gaged in the service of his master, is not conclusive of the 
 master's liability. The mere fact that one is master and the 
 other servant does not, of itself,^ make the master responsible 
 for any act or omission, which has no relation to the servant's 
 employment.^ The act complained of must be within the 
 
 " The defendant's agent was driv- 
 ing with his own horse and gig, for 
 his own pm-pose, but proposed, with 
 the knowledge of the defendant, 
 though without his express assent, to 
 stop on the way upon defendant's 
 business, aiid, before so stopping, 
 ran against plaintiff's hoi-se. Held, 
 that the defendant was liable 
 (Patten v. Rea, 3 C. B. N. S. 606). 
 
 '• In Joel T. Morison (6 Carr. & P. 
 501), a servant, driving his master's 
 cart, on his master's business, made 
 a slight detour for some purpose of 
 his own. Held, the master was lia- 
 ble for an injury done by him, on 
 the way. This case was apparently 
 approved in Burns \ . Poulsom (L. 
 R 8 C. P. 563) : and the same decision 
 was made in Ritchie v. Waller (63 
 Conn. 155; 28 Atl. •:9). Where the 
 pilot in charge of the defendants' 
 ferry-boat, diverging f ron\ his course 
 to favor a passenger, collided with 
 a canal-boat, the defendants were 
 held liable, though they neither 
 knew of nor consented to their ser- 
 vant's acts (Quinn v. Power, 87 N. 
 Y. 535; compare Brown v. Purvi- 
 ance. 3Harr. & G. 316). 
 
 ' This qualification is very material, 
 as will be seen later on. Thus, a 
 
 bailee, for hire, is responsible for 
 damage done to the chattel, through 
 negligence of the bailee's servant, 
 though not in the course of his em- 
 ployment (Coupe Co. v. Maddick, 
 1891, 3 Q. B. 413; 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 676). 
 
 2 Walton V. N. Y. Central Sleeping 
 Car Co., 139 Mass. 556 ; 3 N. E. 101 
 [car porter, throvcing out his own 
 things] ; Smith v. Spitz, 156 Massr 
 319 ; 31 N. E. 5 [billposter leaving 
 bills about] ; Driscoll v. Scanlon, 165 
 Mass. 348 ; 43 N. E. 100 [teamster's 
 invitation to ride, and to drive the 
 team] ; Searle v. Parke, N. H. ; 
 34 Atl. 744 [theft] ; Smith v. N. T. 
 Central R. Co., 78 Hun, 534; 39 
 N. Y. Supp. 540 [agent amusing 
 himself with torpedo] ; Wyllie v. 
 Palmer, 63 Hun, 8 ; 17 N. Y. Supp. 
 434 [firing rockets] ; Brunner v. 
 American Tel. Co., 151 Pa. St. 
 447 ; 25 Atl. 29 [dynamite as amuse- 
 ment] ; Shaw v. Reed, 9 Watts & S. 
 73 ; Aycrigg v. N. Y. & Erie K. Co., 
 30 N. J. Law, 460 ; Adams v. Cost, 
 63 Md. 264 ; Harris v. Mabry, 1 Ired. 
 N. C. Law, 240 ; Mayer v. Thompson, 
 etc. Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 611 ; 16 So. 620; 
 Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Carper, 112 
 Ind. 26 : 13 N. E. 122 [conductor 
 
229 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ ISO 
 
 scope of authority which the servant had from the master,^ or 
 which the master gave the servant reasonable cause to beHeve 
 that he had, or which servants employed in the same capacity 
 usually have," or which third persons have a right to infer from 
 the nature and circumstances of the .employment.^ The mere 
 fact that the injury complained of was caused by negligence 
 of the servant in the performance of an act which, taken per se, 
 was within the scope of his employment, will not impose a 
 liability upon the master, if the act was merely incidental to 
 the servant's attempt to perform an act entirely beyond the 
 scope of his authority.^ 
 
 § 149. [Omitted.] 
 
 § 150. Liability for servant's willful acts. — There is no 
 such broad rule of law as that a master is not liable for the 
 
 directing passenger where to go after 
 leaving train] ; Keating v. Michigan 
 Cent. R. Co., 97 Mich. 154 ; 56 N. W. 
 346 [advice to passenger] ; Wiltse v. 
 State Bridge Co., 63 Mich. 639 ; SO 
 N. W. 370 [horse frightened by pri- 
 vate property of servant] ; Walker 
 v. Hannibal, etc. E. Co., 121 Mo. 575 ; 
 26 S. W. 360 [freight carried without 
 authority] ; Yates v. Squires, 19 
 Iowa, 20 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
 MuUins, 44 Neb. 732 ; 62 N. W. 880 ; 
 Dawkins v. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 77 Tex. 
 233 ; 13 S. W. 984 [hand-car used for 
 private purpose] ; International, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Cooper, 88 Tex. 607; 32S.W. 
 517 [engineer's invitation to ride on 
 locomotive]. 
 
 3 Ratification of an unauthorized 
 act will make the principal liable for 
 an injury resulting from the negli- 
 gence of the agent in doing the act 
 (Nims V. Mt. Heroion School, 160 
 Mass. 177 ; 35 N. E. 776). 
 
 * It is within the scope of authority 
 of the conductor and driver of a 
 horse-car to receive and let off a pas- 
 senger without payment of fare 
 (Brennan v. Fair Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 45 Conn. 384). 
 
 'Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Casey, 9 
 
 ■lU. App. 632, 639. In that case, de- 
 fendant was charged with its engi- 
 neer's negligence in giving permis- 
 sion to a boy to get upon a train 
 while in motion. It was held not 
 liable, Bailey, J., saying: " The en- 
 gineer, then, in giving the boys per- 
 mission to ride, acted not only witli- 
 out actual authority from the com- 
 pany, but also without any authority 
 which third persons had a right to 
 infer from the nature and circum- 
 stances of his employment ; in other 
 words, without any apparent author- 
 ity." 
 
 * Coomes v. Houghton, 103 Mass. 
 311 ; Olive v. Whitney Marble Co., 
 103 N. Y. 393; affi'g s. c. 36 Hun, 
 640. In Burke v. Shaw (59 Miss. 
 443) , the owners of a foundry had for 
 years given the ashes to their engi- 
 neer, in consideration of his remov- 
 ing them after working hours ; and 
 he deposited them, to the knowledge 
 of his emploj'ers, on an uninclosed 
 lot opposite the foundry, owned by 
 third persons. Held, such employers 
 were not liable for injuries caused to 
 a young child who, running across 
 the lot, fell into a quantity of the hot 
 ashes and was burned. 
 
§iSo] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 230 
 
 unauthorized, willful and wrongful acts of his servants; and, 
 though such a doctrine has often been propounded in judicial 
 opinions/ it is now so thoroughly overruled as to need no 
 further notice. The only ground upon which a master can 
 avoid liability for unauthorized and willful acts of a servant is 
 that they are not done in the course of the servant's employ- 
 ment. When they are so done, the master is responsible for 
 them.^ When not so done, yet if they directly cause a failure 
 to perform a duty incumbent upon the master, he is responsi- 
 ble on that ground.* In other cases he is not responsible at all.* 
 
 ' See Harris v. Nicholas, 5 Munf. 
 483 ; Moore v. Sanborne, 8 Mich. 519 ; 
 Johnson v. Barber, 5 Gilm. 425, and 
 cases infra. 
 
 ' See Weed v. Panama R. Co., 17 
 N. Y. 363 ; Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Finney, 10 Wise. 388 ; Corrigan v. 
 Union Sugar Refinery, 98 Mass. 577 ; 
 Smith V. Webster, 23 Mich. 298. A 
 master was held liable, as matter of 
 law, for the reckless and disobedient 
 conduct of a servant, while in the 
 plain line of his employment and in- 
 tending to promote his master's in- 
 terest (Ochsenbein v. Shapiey, 85 N. 
 Y. 214). In Spaulding v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. (33 Wise. 582 ; s. c, on 
 former appeal, 30 Wise. 110), defend- 
 ant's fireman threw a burning stick 
 from locomotive. A refusal to charge 
 that if the act was willful the de- 
 fendant was not liable, was sus- 
 tained. A railroad servant throwing 
 water in the face of a boy trespass- 
 ing upon the cars, for the purpose of 
 removing him — held within the 
 scope of his emj)loyment (Clark v. 
 N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 40 
 Hun, 605 ; citing Higgins v. Water- 
 vhet Turnpike, etc. Co., 46 N. Y. 23 ; 
 Rounds T. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 64 
 I'J. 129 ; Cohen v. Dry Dock, etc, R. 
 Co., 69 Id. 170 ; Hoffman v. N. Y. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 87 Id. 35). 
 
 ' Cases cited under § 154, post. 
 Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 90 
 
 N. Y. 588 ; Weed v. Panama R. Co. , 
 17 N. Y. 363 [conductor willfully, 
 and contrary to orders, detained a 
 train of cars upon the road ; com- 
 pany liable to a passenger]. A pas- 
 senger may recover of a railway 
 companj' for the act of a conductor 
 in throwing him from the car, 
 though such act was willful and 
 malicious (Schultz v. Third Ave. R. 
 Co., 89 N. Y. 343, citing Jackson v. 
 Second Ave. R. Co., 47 Id. 274; 
 Rounds V. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 64 
 Id. 139 ; Day v. Brooklyn R. Co., 76 
 Id. 593 ; affi'g 13 Hun, 435). 
 
 ■* A master cannot be made liable 
 for the willful injuries or trespasses 
 of his servants, committed outside of 
 their line of employment (Snodgrass 
 V. Bradley, 2 Pa. 43 ; Little Miami R. 
 Co. v.Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 ; Mc- 
 Keon V. Citizens' R. Co., 43 Mo. 79 ; 
 Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Harris, 71 
 Miss. 74 ; 14 So. 263) ; and for personal 
 motives (Murphy v. Central Park 
 R. Co., 48 N. Y. Superior, 96). A 
 declaration setting forth an unlaw- 
 ful and malicious assault upon plain- 
 tiff by "defendant's servant," was 
 held insufficient by reason of the 
 lack of an allegation that the same 
 was committed while the servant 
 was acting within the scope of his 
 employment (McCann v. Tillinghast, 
 140 Mass. 337 ; 5 N. E. 164). In North 
 V. Smith (10 C. B. N. S. 573), defend- 
 
231 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 L§ 151 
 
 We do not undertake to define the master's liability for wrong- 
 ful acts of his servant, beyond the line of negligence, as for 
 assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution 
 and other affirmative injuries. The master's liability is not 
 confined to mere acts of negligence; but its full definition 
 belongs to a treatise on Agency. We make a brief reference 
 to such cases in the notes.' 
 
 § 151. Ostensible authority for willful acts.— Where a 
 servant has authority to commit an act of violence or other 
 aggression, under certain contingencies, the master is liable for 
 the consequences of such an act, when committed by the ser- 
 vant under the belief that such a contingency had occurred, 
 although in fact it had not.^ This authority may of course be 
 
 ant's gi-oom struck his spurs into 
 plaintiff's horse as he was passing ; 
 defendant lield jiot liable. A bank 
 receiving money on special deposit, 
 for safe keeping only, was held not 
 responsible for an embezzlement by 
 its cashier (Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 
 Mass. 479). The soundness of this 
 decision may well be questioned. 
 See United So. of Shakers v. Under- 
 wood, 9 Bush, 609 [conversion of 
 special deposit by bank officers]. 
 
 ' Master held liable for assaults 
 (Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507 ; 
 35 N. E. 1 ; affi'g 34 Id. 500 ; O'Con- 
 nell V. Samuel, 81 Hun, 357 ; 30 N. 
 y. Supp. 889 ; Canfield v. Chicago, 
 etc. E. Co. 59 Mo. App. 354 ; Ward 
 v. Young, 42 Ark. 543) ; for arrest 
 (Harris v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 35 
 Fed. 116; Palmeriv. Manhattan E. 
 Co. 60 Hun, 579, mem. ; 14 N. Y. Supp. 
 468 [arrest and abusive language]). 
 Master held not liable for an assault 
 (Cofield v. McCabe, 58 Minn. 318; 59 
 N. W. 1005 ; Meehan v. Morewood, 
 53 Hun, 566; 5 N. Y. Supp. 710 
 [foreman of store] ; Campbell v. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co., 51 Minn. 488 : 
 53 N. W. 768 [surgeon] ; Texas, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Black, 87 Tex. 160 ; 37 S. 
 W. 118[brakeman]; Candiff v. Louis- 
 
 ville, etc. R. Co. , 43 La. Ann. 477 ; 
 7 So. 601 [conductor shooting stran- 
 ger] ; Thorburn v. Smith, 10 Wash. 
 St. 479 ; 39 Pac. 134 [miners shoot- 
 ing]); nor for willfully firing building 
 to injure his master (Collins v. Ala- 
 bama, etc. E. Co., 104 Ala. 390; 16 So. 
 140) ; nor for willful murder (Fi-aser 
 V. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 566 ; Golden v. 
 Newbrand, 53 Iowa, 59 ; 3 N.W. 537) 
 Under the Georgia Code (§ 30;J3), 
 which renders railroad companies 
 liable for damages caused by their 
 employees, unless their agents have 
 exercised reasonable care and dili- 
 gence, such company is liable for 
 the homicide of a person lawfully 
 on its pi'emises, by its agent who 
 was known to be insane when em- 
 ployed (Christian v. Columbus, etc. 
 R. R. Co., 79 Ga. 460 ; 7 S. E. 316). 
 
 ' The defendants directed guards 
 to remove disorderly passengers. 
 Deeming an inoffensive person dis- 
 orderly, a guard ejected him with 
 excessive force. Held, that the 
 guard had implied authority to de- 
 termine who were disorderly, and 
 defendants were liable (Seymour v. 
 Greenwood, 7 Hurlst. & N. 355 ; 6 
 Id. 359; S. P., Passenger R. Co. v. 
 Young, 31 Ohio St. 518). In Bayley 
 
§iSi] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 232 
 
 given by implication,^ as well as by express assent ; and, where 
 an act of violence is usually authorized under particular cir- 
 cumstances, the master is liable for such an act on the part of 
 the servant, if he believes that the circumstances authorizing 
 it exist.' Where a contingency occurs which justifies the ser- 
 vant in using violence, yet if he uses unnecessary violence, or 
 resorts to it in a time or a manner which make its conse- 
 quences unnecessarily injurious, the master is liable,* notwith- 
 standing any precaution that he may have taken in his instruc- 
 tions to avoid the occurrence of such excessive or ill-timed use 
 of the power intrusted to the servant.' Thus a railroad com- 
 pany is liable for an injury suffered by a passenger who, 
 for refusing to pay fare, is put off by its servant, while the 
 cars are in motion,* or with unnecessary violence ; ''' or if the 
 
 V. Manchester, etc. R. Co. (L. E. 8 
 C. P. 148), a passenger was pulled 
 by a porter out of a carriage, after 
 the train had started, under the 
 erroneous impi-ession that the pas- 
 senger was in a wrong carriage. It 
 was his duty to prevent persons 
 from traveling in wrong carriages : 
 but he Iiad no authority to remove a 
 passenger from a carriage. Held, 
 that a jury might find that the por- 
 ter was acting within the course of 
 his employment. 
 
 'See Mali r. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381 ; 
 and § 140, ante. 
 
 3 Croft V. Alison, 4 B. & Aid. 590, 
 where plaintiff recovered ; and Mc- 
 Manus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106, where 
 plaintiff was nonsuited. McManus v. 
 Crickett is discussed in Howe v. New- 
 march, 94 Mass. 49. It really de- 
 cided only that " trespass " would not 
 lie, and that " case" was the proper 
 remedy. 
 
 ^ Master held liable in Eogahn v. 
 Moore M'fg. Co. 79 Wise. 573; 
 48 N. W. 669 [expelling with vio- 
 lence] ; Jones v. Glass, 13 Ired. N. 
 C. Law, 305 [excessive punishment]. 
 
 ^Higgins V. Watervliet Tump. Co., 
 46 N. Y. 23 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544 ; 14 N. E. 573. 
 
 sSanford v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 
 23 N. Y. 343 ; Higgins v. Watervliet 
 Turnp. Co., 46 Id. 23; Pennsylvania 
 E. Co. V. Vandiver, 42 Pa. St. 365 ; 
 Healey v. City Pass. R. Co. 28 Ohio 
 St. 23. See cases cited under last 
 section. In Harlinger v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral R. Co. (15 Week. Dig. 392 ; affi'd, 
 without opinion, 93 N. Y. 661), a 
 car porter removed a trespasser from 
 his car while the train was in 
 motion, causing his death. Held, 
 the company was liable, though the 
 porter acted with negligence, want 
 of judgment and violence of temper. 
 Contra, Williams v. Pullman Car 
 Co., 40 La. Ann. 87; 3 So. 631 ; not 
 to be followed. In ejecting a pas- 
 senger the train must be stopped 
 Gallena v. Hot Spring R. Co., 13 
 Fed. 116 ; State v. Kinney, 34 Minn. 
 311 ; 25 N. W. 705), at a regular 
 station (Hall v. Memphis, etc. R. 
 Co., 15 Fed. 57). See § 493, post. 
 
 ' Perkins V. Missouri, etc. E. Co., 
 55 Mo. 301 ; Hufford v. Grand 
 Rapids, etc. R. Co., 53 Mich. 118 ; 31 
 N. W. 544 ; Jackson v. Second Ave. 
 R. Co., 47 N. Y. 374 ; Kline v. Cen- 
 tral Pacific R. Co., 37 Cal. 400. So, 
 where the servant uses excessive 
 force and abusive language to com- 
 
233 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§153 
 
 passenger's property is seized for fare.^ It is liable for excessive 
 and wanton violence used in ejecting a trespasser," and for the 
 wrongful ejection of one whom its servant erroneously believed 
 to be a trespasser.^" 
 
 § 152. [Omitted]. 
 
 § 153. Willful acts ; when consequence of negligence.— A 
 
 servant's negligence in his master's business may involve him 
 in difiSculties, out of which he cannot escape without pur- 
 posely doing an injury to a third person. In such a case, if a 
 prudent regard to his master's interest would dictate such a 
 course, he has an implied authority from his master to com- 
 
 pel the double payment of fare, the 
 carrier is liable (Goddard v. Grand 
 Trunk R. Co., 07 Me. 202). 
 
 ^ Ramsden v. Boston & Alb. R. Co. , 
 104 Mass. 117. 
 
 ' It is part of the duty of a street- 
 car driver to keep trespassers off his 
 car, and, therefore, where he com- 
 pels a boy to jump off while the car 
 was in rapid motion, such act, 
 though wanton and reckless, is with- 
 in the scope of his employment 
 (Raber v. Broadway, etc. R. Co., 9 
 Misc. 20 ; affi'd, 149 N. Y. 584, mem., 
 43 N. E. 985; Healey v. City Passen- 
 ger R. Co., 28 Ohio St. 23 ; Haehl v. 
 Wabash R. Co., 119 Mo. 325 ; 24 S. 
 W. 737). s. P., Shea v. Sixth Av. R. 
 Co., 62 N. Y. 180 [forcing lady off]. 
 So as to conductors(North Chicago R. 
 Co. V. Gastka, 128 111. 613 ; 21 N. E. 
 522 ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Kennedy, 
 9 Tex. Civ. App. 233 ; 29 S. W. 394 
 [conductor shooting trespasser] ) ; so 
 as to an engineer (Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 V. West, 135 111. 320 ; 17 N. E. 788 
 [forcing child off]). A brakeman 
 has implied authority to remove 
 from his train, in a lawful manner, 
 a trespasser found on a car, and the 
 company is liable for his en-ors and 
 excesses in so doing (Smith v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 95 Ky." 11 ; 23 
 «. W. 652 ; Hoffman v. N. Y. Cen- 
 
 tral R. Co. 87 N. Y. 25 [brakeman, 
 kicking boy from train running ten 
 miles an hour] ; Lang v. N. Y., 
 Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 51 Hun, 603; 
 S. c, again, 80 Hun, 275 ; 30 N. Y. 
 Supp., 137 [brakeman throwing coal 
 at boy] ; Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Seaes, 
 100 Ala. 368 ; 13 So. 917 [wanton in- 
 jury]). Contra, as to brakemen, 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Latham, 72 
 Miss. 32 ; 16 So. 757 ; Georgia R. Co. 
 V. Wood, 94 Ga. 124 ; 21 S. E. 288 ; 
 Farber v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 32 
 Mo. App. 378. In Texas and ArJcan- 
 sas, some evidence of the brake- 
 man's authority is required (Texas, 
 etc. R.Co. V. Moody [Tex. Civ. App.], 
 23 S. W. 41) ; but when given, the 
 company is responsible (Texas, etc. 
 R. Co. v. Mother, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 
 87 ; 34 S. W. 79 ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Hendricks, 48 Ark. 177 ; 3 S. W. 
 783 ; Bess v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 35 W. Va. 493 ; 14 S. E. 234 [busi- 
 ness of servant "vinknown "]>. In 
 Molloy V. N. Y. Central R. Co. (10 
 Daly, 453), the rule was erroneously 
 declared not to apply to the case of 
 an employee who kicks or pushes a 
 person merely running alongside the 
 train. 
 
 '" Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Rosen- 
 zweig, 113 Pa. St. 519 ; 6 Atl. 545. 
 
§i54j 
 
 LIAJilLITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 234 
 
 mit the injury ; and the master is, of course, answerable for 
 the consequences.^ 
 
 § 154. Liability for negative result of willful acts. — Where 
 
 the servant, by his wrongful act, deprives the plaintiff of the 
 benefit of some act which it was the duty of the master to per- 
 form, and the performance of which is, in whole or in part, 
 delegated to that servant, the master is responsible for the 
 servant's act, no matter how willful, malicious and unauthorized 
 it may be.' Nor would it alter the case to prove that the 
 servant not only knew his act to be unauthorized, but was im- 
 pelled to the act by a desire to injure his master.^ This 
 doctrine is peculiarly applicable to common carriers, who are 
 bound to protect their passengers from insult and injury, so 
 far as lies reasonably within their power, and absolutely so, 
 against their own servants.^ But it applies also to every case 
 
 'Defendant's team was driven so 
 negligently by his servant as to put 
 him in danger, from which he could 
 only escape by intentionally driving 
 against plaintiff's wagon. Held, 
 that defendant was liable (Wolfe v. 
 Mersereau, 4 Duer, 470 ; see, also, 
 Croft V. Ahson, 4 B. & Aid. 590). 
 So a locomotive engineer has im- 
 plied authority to run over cattle, if 
 necessary to save the train. • See 
 § 429, post. 
 
 ' Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 
 90 N. Y. 588 ; Sohultz v. Third Ave. 
 R. Co., 89 Id. 242. A railroad pas- 
 senger was expelled by the con- 
 ductor from the car. Held, that the 
 company was liable (Milwaukee, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Finney, 10 Wise. 388). 
 
 'Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie R. 
 Co., 20 N. Y. 48. 
 
 ' Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 
 90 N. Y. 588 ; overruling Isaacs v. 
 Third Ave. R. Co., 47 Id. 122. In 
 the former case, a carrier was held 
 liable to a passenger who was, with- 
 out any cause, cruelly beaten by the 
 driver of the car. s. P., Fisher v. 
 Metropolitan R. Co., 34 Hun, 433. 
 In Schultz V. Third Ave. R. Co. (89 
 
 N. Y. 242), the carrier was held 
 liable for willful act of the conductor 
 in throwing plaintiff off the plat- 
 form into the street without asking 
 for his fare. A railroad company, 
 beiog bound to protect its passengers 
 fi'om the violence and insult of its 
 servants, is liable for an assault by 
 the conductor, though made will- 
 fully and maliciously, and in no 
 manner connected with the con- 
 ductor's duties (Dillingham v. An- 
 thony, 73 Tex. 47; 11 S. W. 139). 
 To same effect, Indianapolis Union 
 R. Co. V. Cooper, 6 Ind. App. 202; 
 33 N. E. 219 [railway gateman]; 
 Mulligan v. Rockaway Beach R. 
 Co., 14 N. Y. Supp. 456 ; 60 Hun, 579, 
 mem. [arrest of passenger for offer- 
 ing counterfeit money]. To the con- 
 trary is a palpably erroneous de- 
 cision in Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Douglass, 69 Miss. 723; 11 So. 933 
 [baggage-master forcing passenger 
 off train]. In Daniel v. Petersburg 
 R. Co. (117 N. C. 592; 23 S. E. 337), 
 a passenger, calling to receive his 
 baggage, was shot by the depot- 
 agent on account of the former's 
 abusive language to him. Carrier 
 
235 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§IS4 
 
 in which the wrongful act of the servant results in a breach of 
 any duty of the master/ These principles have been often 
 overlooked ; as where the master of a vessel wantonly ran into 
 another, without quitting his direct route,^ and where an 
 engineer purposely ran over or frightened a person or an 
 animal.^ But these decisions have been since disapproved^ 
 They overlook the duty which the owner of a dangerous instru- 
 
 held liable. But a carrier is not 
 liable for an injury to a passenger 
 by its servant under circumstances 
 which free the servant from all 
 criminal or civil responsibility (New 
 Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 
 U. S. 18 ; 12 S. Ct. 109 [shooting in 
 self-defense]). Carrier not liable 
 for assault by servant, after contract 
 for carriage fully performed (Cen- 
 tral E. Co. V. Peacock, 69 Md. 257 ; 
 14 Atl. 709 ; Dwinelle v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral, etc. E. Co., 45 Hun, 139). 
 
 * The gate-keeper of defendant's 
 fair, authorized to eject those who 
 were not rightfully on the grounds, 
 wrongfully ejected plaintiff and in- 
 flicted malicious injury on him. 
 Defendant liable (Oakland Agric. 
 Soc. V. Bingham, 4 Ind. App. 545 ; 
 31 N. E. 383). A company, keeping 
 a " union depot," for the accommo- 
 dation of passengers coming on 
 several railways, is liable for the vio- 
 lence of a brutal servant, to the 
 same extent as a carrier (Dean v. 
 St. Paul Union Depot Co., 41 Minn. 
 360; 43N. W. 54). 
 
 'Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turn- 
 pike Co., 2 N. Y. 479. 
 
 6 Cooke V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 30 
 Iowa, 202; Stephenson v. Southern 
 Pac. R. Co., 93 Cal. 558; 29 Pac. 
 234. 
 
 ' Wallace v. Merrimack, etc. Co. 
 134 Mass. 95 ; 45 Am. Rep. 301 ; Dug- 
 gins V. Watson, 15 Ark. 118. The 
 master is civilly liable for the act of 
 his servant, whether the act is one 
 of omission or commission, whether 
 
 negligent, fraudulent or deceitful, if 
 the act is done in the course of the 
 servant's employment (Hanson v. 
 European, etc. R. Co., 62 Me. 84; 
 Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 
 57 Id. 202 ; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 
 180 ; Ramsden v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 104 Id. 117 ; Craker v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 36 Wise. 657; Chicago, etc. 
 R Co. V. Flexman, 103 111. 546; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 
 Id. 151 ; Sherley v. Billings, 8 Bush, 
 147 ; Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Starnes, 
 
 9 Heisk. 52 ; Wetmore v. Little Miami 
 R. Co., 19 Ohio St. 110 ; McKinley v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 314; 
 Philadelphia E. Co. v. Derby, 14 
 How. U. S. 468 ; see 40 Am. Rep. 
 227, n. and § 150, ante, and § 513, 
 post). Railroad companies have 
 been repeatedly held responsible for 
 the act of an engineer, in maliciously 
 spurting steam (Cobb v. Columbia, 
 etc. R. Co., 37 S. C. 194 ; 15 S. E. 878 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 
 111. 151 ; Georgia R. Co. v. Newsome, 
 60 Ga. 492 ; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Brannen [Penn.], 33 Alb. L. J. 
 216) ; or blo\^ ing a whistle (Texas, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Scoville, 62 Fed. 730 ; 
 
 10 C. C. A. 479) to frighten animals, 
 etc. See § 426, post. The general 
 principle of the Vanderbilt case 
 (supra, n. 5) has, however, been 
 mentioned with approval in the 
 same court (Rounds v. Delaware, 
 etc. R. Co., 04 N. Y. 129, 135 ; Mott 
 V. Consumers' Ice Co., 73 Id. 543, 
 548). 
 
§ 155] LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 236 
 
 ment owes to the public, not to set it in motion without 
 keeping it under proper guidance. Thus a master who entrusts 
 a servant with the charge of some inherently dangerous thing 
 {e. g., an explosive) is responsible for the omission of the 
 servant to keep it safely ; and, therefore, for his malicious use 
 of it for mischievous purposes.* If an engine or a vefisel is 
 started without the permission of its owner, by a servant not 
 entrusted with its care,, a different question is presented.' 
 
 § 155. Disobedience of master's orders. — Unintentional 
 disobedience of a master's orders should always be deemed 
 mere negligence, for the consequences of which, if the master 
 would otherwise be liable, his orders should not protect him 
 from liability.^ Even the willful disobedience of a servant 
 does not necessarily exonerate his master.^ Where the master 
 is bound by law or contract to render a particular service to a 
 third person, he is liable for the non-performance of such ser- 
 vice, although arising solely from the willful refusal of a servant 
 to do his duty, whatever may be the motive. Thus, a carrier 
 is liable for a delay in the transportation of persons' or prop- 
 
 * Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Shields, a trespasser and killed him. Held, 
 
 47 Ohio St. 387 ; 24 N. E. 658. defendant was responsible (Priester 
 
 'MarsY. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., v. Augley, 5 Rich. Law, 44). 
 
 54 Hun, 625 ; 8 N. Y. Supp. 107. '' See many cases cited under § 146. 
 
 ' Armstrong v. Cooley, 5 Gilm. 509 But where defendant's employees, in 
 [prairie fire]. Defendant directed direct disobedience of his orders, pur- 
 servant to cut trees along the line of posely start a tire in clearing defend- 
 his land. The servant ignorantly ant's field, which spreads to plaintiff's 
 cut timber upon another man's land, field, defendant is not liable ( An- 
 Held, defendant was liable (Luttrell drews v. Green, 62 N. H. 436). Sed 
 V. Hazen, 3 Sneed, 20 ; see, also, Car- quczre 1 To the precise contrary, 
 man v. New York, 14 Abb. Pr. 301). see Keith v. Keir, Hay, 8. 
 Defendant's servants, employed in ^ Weed v. Panama R. Co., 17 N.Y. 
 renjoving obstructions from a stream, 362. The conductor of a passenger 
 negligently, and contrary to instruc- train willfully kept it standing all 
 tions, entered upon plaintiff's land night, from motives of his own. 
 bordering upon the stream. Held, Strong. J., said : "The obligation to 
 defendants were liable (Southwick be performed was that of the master, 
 V. Estes, 7 Cush. 385). Compare and delay in performance, from in- 
 Bolingbroke v. Swindon, L. R. 9 C. tentional violation of duty by an 
 P. 575. Defendant permitted his in- agent, is the negligence of the 
 fant son to drive slaves from cane master." s. p., Philadelphia, etc, 
 patch with a gr.n, but cautioned him R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. IJ. S. 468. 
 not to hit any one. The son fired at 
 
237 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ '57 
 
 erty,* caused by the willful act of his servants, directly contrary 
 to his orders, and even though committed for the purpose of 
 injuring him.^ And where a servant is employed to do a 
 certain act, and is specially forbidden to adopt a particular 
 method of doing it, yet willfully adopts that method, the 
 master is, nevertheless, liable for injuries thereby caused to 
 third persons, if the servant did the forbidden thing as a real 
 means for the performance of his master's work.' So, if the 
 master is bound to guard an animal from doing mischief, and 
 for this purpose employs a servant, who, by an act of willful 
 disobedience, abandons his post, the master is liable for the 
 consequences of the want of a guard.' 
 
 § 156. [Omitted.] 
 
 § 157. Liability for sub-agents or strangers.— The master 
 is, of course, liable for the negligence of one whom his servant 
 employs, by his authority, to aid such servant in the master's 
 business.^ Such authority need not be express, but may be 
 implied from the nature of the business, or the course of trade. 
 Thus, such an authority would almost necessarily be implied 
 in favor of a servant intrusted with the whole care of a farm, or 
 the construction of a building, or the transportation of a large 
 quantity of goods, or any other task which could not be per- 
 formed within a reasonable time by one man.^ But a question 
 of some difficulty may arise, where a servant, without having 
 
 ■* Blaokstock v. N. Y. & Erie R. so as to compel submission to their 
 
 Co., 30 N. Y. 48 ; Galena, etc. E. Co. demands. Held, all this made no 
 
 V. Rae, 18 111. 463. But where the difference. 
 
 carrier's servants left his service, " A railroad company may be re- 
 
 and violently prevented new serv- sponsible for the acts of its servants, 
 
 ants from acting ; held, that the though in direct violation of its rules 
 
 carrier was not liable (Geismer v. (Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Harmon, 47 
 
 Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 103 N. T. 111. 298). 
 
 563; 7 N. E. 838). ''Whatman v. Pearson, L. R. 3 
 
 5 Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie R. C. P. 423. 
 
 Co., supra. All the engineers on the 'Wanstall v. Pooley, C Clark & 
 
 road having struck, the company Fin. 910, n. 
 
 was unable to deliver plaintiff's po- '■'Bucki v. Cone, 35 Fla. 1 ; 6 So. 
 
 tatoes in time. Defendant offered 160 [logging]; Gleason v. Amsdel, 9 
 
 to prove that the engineers were en- Daly, 393 [master saw assistant at 
 
 tirely in the wrong ; it was obvious work], 
 they meant to injure the company, 
 
§ 158] LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 238 
 
 any real or ostensible authority to do so, employs an assistant, 
 by whose negligence, in the performance of work assigned to 
 the former servant, a third person is injured. The master 
 would not be bound by a contract made in his name by such a 
 sub-agent, even though it were exactly such as he had author- 
 ized his own servant to make ; and from this it might not 
 unreasonably be inferred that he could not be made liable for 
 the torts of one whose contracts would not bind him.^ On the 
 other hand, manifest inconvenience is certain to ensue to the 
 public at large from thus shifting the responsibility from mas- 
 ters, who, as a class, are able to meet it, and who receive the 
 benefit of the service, upon servants who, as a class, are entirely 
 unable to compensate for the injuries thus caused. Public 
 policy, therefore, requires that masters should be held liable 
 for the consequences in such cases; and so the courts have 
 held, although without laying down any general rule upon the 
 subject.* But the rule does not extend so far as to hold a 
 master liable where a third person is injured through the neg- 
 ligence of a stranger who intrudes into and acts in the master's 
 business, without the assent of the servant in charge, although 
 the conduct of the latter gave opportunity for the intrusion.^ 
 
 § 158. Implied liability of owner of vehicle. — When the 
 plaintiff has suffered injury from the negligent management of 
 a vehicle, such as a boat, car or carriage, it is sufficient prima 
 facie evidence that the negligence was imputable to the de- 
 fendant, to show that he was the owner of the thing, without 
 
 3 In Jewell V. Grand Trunk R. Co. gon Pac. E. Co.. 15 Greg. 220; 15 
 (55 N. H. 84), defendant was held Pac. 641). In Carson v. Leathers 
 not to be liable for the negligence of (57 Miss. 650), the owners of a steam- 
 one employed by its servant, without boat wei-e held liable to a passenger 
 authority, to assist him in moving a who disembarked at a wrong land- 
 crate of crockery. ing pursuant to the directions of 
 
 ^ Althorf V. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355 ; strangers, deputed by the clerk, 
 where defendant directed his servant 'In Edwards v. Jones (67 How. 
 to clear the snow off the roof. The Pr. 177), defendant's servant left a 
 servant employed another man to horse which he had been driving, 
 help him ; through negligence of the and was absent tenor fifteen rain- 
 latter, a mass of snow thrown into utes. During this time, a strange 
 the street killed plaintiff's intestate, man took hold of the horse, and. by 
 Held, defendant was liable. So as his negligence, plaintiff's boat was 
 to stranger left in charge of loco- damaged. Defendant was held not 
 motive by engineer (Lakin v. Ore- liable. 
 
239 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 1 59 
 
 proving affirmatively that the person in charge was the de- 
 fendants' servant. It Hes with the defendant to show that the 
 person in charge was not his servant/ leaving him to show, 
 if he can, that the property was not under his control 
 at the time, and that the accident was occasioned by the 
 fault of a stranger, an independent contractor, or other 
 person, for whose negligence the owner would not be answer- 
 able. This view is supported by decisions, in which it was 
 held sufficient evidence of the defendant's negligence to show 
 that the plaintiff was injured by something falling out of - 
 the window of the defendant's house, ^ or from hoisting appara- 
 tus belonging to the defendant.^ Acquiescence in the con- 
 stant use of a vehicle may make the owner responsible for 
 the negligence of those using it in connection with his busi- 
 ness.* And where an injury is caused by defects in a vehicle 
 or its loading, which the owner was bound to remedy, it is 
 immaterial whether the persons in charge were his servants or 
 not.^ 
 
 § 159. , Ownership of other property ; how far implies 
 liability. — It would seem to be reasonable that the same doc- 
 trine should apply to every species of property, which, in the 
 ordinary course of affairs, is managed by its owner or his ser- 
 vants, and that the mere fact of its mismanagement should 
 raise a presumption that the owner was responsible therefor.* 
 
 'Proof of defendant's ownership -iReilly v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 94 
 
 of a wagon is prima facie evidence, Mo. 600 ; 7 S. W. 407 [locomotive] ; 
 
 to charge him with responsibility for Lovingston v. Bauchens, 34 111. App. 
 
 its management (Norris v. Kohler, 544 [team]. 
 
 41 N. Y. 43 ; see Bouiface v. Eelyea, * Haugh v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 73 
 
 6 Robt. 397 ; Svensou v. Atlantic Mail Iowa, 66 ; 85 N. W. 116. 
 
 S. S. Co.,57N. Y. 108; affi'g33N. Y. 'Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 331: 
 
 Superior Ct. 277 ; McCoun v. N. Y. 29 Atl. 380. As the owner of a 
 
 Central R. Co., 66 Barb. 338 [men at building adjoining a highway is 
 
 work on locomotive] ; Smith v. bound to take reasonable care that 
 
 Bailey [1891], 2 Q. B. 403 ; 60 L, J. it is kept in proper condition, the 
 
 Q. b". 779) ; see Atchison, etc. R. mere falling of the building raises a 
 
 Co. V. Cochran. 43 Kans. 225 ; 23 presumption of negligence, and tlie 
 
 Pac. 151 [shareholder not a part burden is on the owner of showing 
 
 owner]). ordinary care (MuUen v. St. John, 
 
 « Byrne v. Boadle, 3 Hurlst. & C. 57 N. Y. 567 ; compare English v. 
 
 733 Brennan, 60 N. Y. 609\ s. p., Ste- 
 
 s Scott v. London Dock Co., 8 venson v. Joy, 152 Mass, 45; 25 N. E. 
 
 Hurlst. & C. 596. See § 59, ante. 78 [uncovered coal-hole in sidewalk 
 
§ i6oj 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 240 
 
 Of course, the circumstances may be such as to raise a pre- 
 sumption that the property was not, at the time of the acci- 
 dent, under the defendant's actual control; and in such case 
 the usual presumption of the defendant's negligence, arising 
 out of his supposed custody of the thing, is rebutted, and fur- 
 ther evidence must be adduced.^ And it has been well sug- 
 gested that, where it is the usual course of business to employ 
 a contractor to do certain work on property, no presumption 
 should arise, from the mere fact that such work was going on, 
 •that it was done by servants of the owner.' 
 
 § 160. Who is to be deemed a master. — He is to be 
 
 deemed the master, who has the supreme choice,* con- 
 
 in charge of agent of owner of abut- 
 ting building]. The falling of a 
 piece of wood from a building dur- 
 ing the repairs is prima facie evi- 
 dence of negligence in the owner 
 (Clare v. National City Bank, 1 
 Sweeney, 539). So is the fall of any- 
 thing from a window (Byrne v. 
 Boadle, 3 Hurlst. & C. 722). In Leb- 
 anon Light Co. V. Leap (139 Ind. 448 ; 
 39 N. E. 5T) , a gas company contrac- 
 ted for the construction of a gas 
 plant. The contractor sublet the con- 
 tract for boring the gas wells. The 
 sub-contractor, after boring one 
 well, laid pipe, which was furnished 
 by the contractor, to get gas from 
 the well to use in boring others. Part 
 of the pipe so laid was taken up by the 
 contractor, and the rest used in con- 
 ducting gas to a town for the use of 
 the company. Held, that, though the 
 plant had not been turned over to 
 the company, it and both contractors 
 were liable for injuries caused by 
 the negligent manner in which the 
 pipe was laid. s. p., Wichita, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Gibbs, 47 Kans. 274; 37 
 Pac. 991 [railroad in hands of con- 
 struction-company] : Chattanooga, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Whitehead, 90 Ga. 47; 
 15 S. E. 44 [same] ; Johnson v. 
 Spear, 76 Mich. 139 ; 43 N. W. 1093 
 
 [owner's hoisting apparatus used by 
 contractor]. 
 
 '' Plaintiff was injured by being 
 knocked down by a van belonging 
 to defendants, and which they lent 
 to A. , who attached his own horses 
 to the van, and provided a driver. 
 Held, as the horse was the property, 
 and the driver, strictly speaking, the 
 servant, not of defendants, but of A., 
 defendants were not liable (Shiells v. 
 Edinburgh, etc. R. Co., Hay, 254 ; 18 
 Dunlop, 1199). 
 
 " Welfare v. Brighton, etc. R. Co. , 
 L, R. 4 Q. B. 698. 
 
 ' General Steam Nav. Co. v. Brit- 
 ish, etc. Nav. Co., L. R. 3 Exch. 330; 
 Dalyell v. Tyrer, El. B. & El. 899. 
 He is the master who employs and 
 has the power to discharge. "This 
 is the only test by which to deter- 
 mine which is the master, and, as 
 such, liable to the person injured '" 
 (Michael v. Stanton, 8 Hun, 462). See 
 other illustrations, §162, posi. The 
 owners of a vessel, by employing a 
 tug to draw it, do not necessarily be- 
 come responsible for negligence of 
 the tug, " as they neither appoint 
 the master of the tug nor employ the 
 crew, nor can they displace either 
 one or the other " (The Clarita, 28 
 Wall. 1) . There, the master of a tug 
 
241 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 160 
 
 trol 2 and direction of the servant, and whose will the servant rep- 
 resents, not merely in the ultimate result of his work, but in all 
 
 having a burning feri-y-boat in tow, 
 allowed the latter to drift against li- 
 belant's vessel and set it on fire. A. 
 sold to B. a box in the loft of A.'s 
 store ; B. sent his porter to take it 
 away ; and the porter, while, with 
 the permission of A., getting the box 
 down, suffered it to fall on plaintiff. 
 Held, in letting down the box, I he 
 porter was the servant of B,, not of 
 A., and A. was not liable (Stevens 
 V. Armstrong, 6 N. Y. 435). Legal 
 competency to discharge a servant, 
 being an essential attribute of the 
 master, it has been doubted whether 
 the relation can exist between hus- 
 band and wife, in such sense as to 
 sustain an action by a. stranger 
 against one for negligently retaining 
 the other (Curtis v. Dinneen, 4 Dak. 
 245 ; 30 N. W. 148) ; where it was 
 sought to hold a woman, proprietor 
 of a tavern, liable for negligence in 
 having in her employment her fe- 
 rocious husband, who had removed 
 the eye of a guest. But a husband 
 has always been held liable for his 
 wife's acts, when employed by him. 
 And the wife could have dismissed 
 the husband from her employment, 
 although not from the house. And 
 see, as to power to discharge sub 
 modo, Zeigler v. Danbury, etc. R. 
 Co., 53 Conn. 488. 
 
 ' McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. Law, 
 356. The liability of a master for the 
 acts of his servants is precisely com- 
 mensurate with the extent of his 
 right to control them (Callahan v. 
 Burlington, etc. R. Co., 23 Iowa, 563 ; 
 see Clapp v. Kemp, 133 Mass. 481 ; 
 and § 164, post). A lessee of the 
 penitentiary placed a convict in 
 charge of his orchard, with author- 
 ity to protect it. Plaintiff, a boy, 
 entered therein with a gun, to shoot 
 [Law of Neg. Vol 1—16] 
 
 birds. The convict ordered him out 
 and struck tlie boy. It was contended 
 that the relation of master and ser- 
 vant could not exist between the 
 lessee of the penitentiary and a con- 
 vict. But the lessee was held liable 
 (Ward V. Young, 43 Ark. 543). In 
 Bradley v. N. Y. Central R. Co. (3 
 T. & C. 287 ; affl'd, 63 N. Y. 99), a 
 track master engaged plaintiff, a far- 
 mer, to aid with his team in scraping 
 snow from defendant's track, in 
 which operation he was injured 
 through the track master's negli- 
 gence. Defendant contended plain- 
 tiff was its servant, and without 
 remedy for the negligence of a co- 
 employee, butthis view was rejected. 
 "The presumption is that a minor 
 child living with his father, and using 
 his team and conveyance in and 
 about the business of such father, is 
 acting in his behalf and upon his di- 
 rection " (Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 67 
 Wise. 495 : 30 N. W. 933). The cap- 
 tain of a tug, having a canal boat in 
 tow, was held not to be master of 
 the boat, so as to make the owner 
 of the tug chargeable with negligence 
 of the boat crew in not putting out 
 lights, vrhereby a collision occurred 
 and a third vessel was sunk (Arctic 
 Ins. Co. V. Austin, 69 N. Y. 470). 
 Plaintiff, having discovered a leak- 
 age of gas, due to defendant's negli- 
 gence, called in a plumber to ascer- 
 tain the location of the leak, and the 
 latter entered with a lighted candle, 
 causing an explosion. Held, that the 
 plumber was not the plaintiff's ser- 
 vant, so as to make plaintiff answera- 
 ble for his negligence, and that both 
 defendant and the plumber were re- 
 sponsible (Schermerhorn v. Metro- 
 politan Gas Co., 5 Daly, 144). 
 
i6o] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 242 
 
 its details.^ The payment of an employe by the day,* or the 
 control and supervision of the work by the employer,^ though 
 important considerations, are not in themselves decisive of the 
 fact that the two are master and servant. It has been well 
 said by a Connecticut judge : " To get at the truth, we must 
 look further, and see if the person said to be a servant is act- 
 ing at the time for and in the place of his master, in accord 
 ance with and representing his master's will, and not his own."* 
 Where this is not the case, the employer is not a master, nor 
 the person employed his servant.' Where the relation of mas- 
 
 3 See |§ 162, 163, post ; Williamson 
 V. Wadsworth, 49 Barb. 294. In 
 Coggin V. Central R. Co. (63 Ga. 
 685), plaintiff, an employee of a tele- 
 graph company, was in j ured by the 
 carelessness of an engineer in taking 
 up the ' ' slack " of his train, engaged 
 in distributing telegraph poles along 
 the line ; all the operatives except 
 the engineer and conductor being 
 servants of the telegraph company, 
 and one of the latter being in com- 
 mand of the train. Held, the engi- 
 neer was the servant of the railroad 
 company, and plaintiff could re- 
 cover ; there being no evidence that 
 any telegraph agent interfered or 
 had a right to interfere with the ap- 
 plication of steam or with manipu- 
 lating the engine. 
 
 * Plaintiff contracted with defend- 
 ant to build a stone dam, for which 
 he was to receive a certain price per 
 day for himself and each of his men; 
 defendant furnishing the powder for 
 blasting and superintending the 
 building of the dam, but having no 
 control over the blasting. Held, the 
 relation of master and servant did 
 not exist, and defendant was not lia- 
 ble to indemnify plaintiff for dam- 
 ages recovered from him by a third 
 party, injured by the negligence of 
 men employed upon the blasting 
 (Corbin v. American Mills, 37 Conn. 
 374). The Louisiana Code (art. 163) 
 
 defines servants as those who let, 
 hire or engage their services "to 
 another in this state, to be employed 
 therein at any work, commerce or 
 occupation for the benefit of him 
 who has contracted with tbem, for 
 a certain price or retribution, or 
 upon certain conditions." Under 
 this section it has been held that 
 where a person was employed to 
 peddle goods at a fixed wage per 
 week, with certain additional • com- 
 missions, the payment of wages es- 
 tablished the relation of master and 
 servant, so as to make the hirer re- 
 sponsible for his servant's negligence 
 in the course of his employment 
 (Shea V. Reems, 36 La. Ann. 966). 
 
 = Corbin v. American Mills Co., 27 
 Conn. 374 ; Gerlach v. Edelmeyer, 
 47 N. Y. Superior, 292 ; affi'd, 88 N. 
 Y. 64.'5 ; Wray v. Evans, 80 Pa. St. 
 103 [work to be to satisfaction of de- 
 fendant's engineer]. 
 
 * Corbin v. American MiUs, 27 
 Conn. 274. 
 
 ' A railroad company is not re- 
 sponsible for Unitfd States postal 
 clerks on its trains (Poling v. Ohio 
 River R. Co., 38 W. Va. 645 ; 18 S. 
 E. 783). One riding in a friend's 
 wagon, for a specific trip, does not 
 thereby become liable for negligence 
 of the friend's driver (Muse v. Stern, 
 83 Va. 33). 
 
243 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ l6l 
 
 ter and servant exists in fact, the master cannot avoid liability 
 by any arrangement between them for concealing the fact from 
 others^ nor by an express agreement to the contrary between 
 themselves, even in good faith.^ A servant may at the same 
 time serve two or more distinct masters ; each of whom will be 
 responsible for his acts.''" 
 
 § i6i. Nominal master when not liable. — Servants who 
 are employed and paid by one person may nevertheless be, ad 
 hoc, the servants of another in a particular transaction, and 
 that, too, even where their general employer is interested in 
 the work.' Obviously they may desert the service of their 
 lawful master, and work for another; or he may lend their 
 services to another person, abandoning to the latter all control 
 over them;^ or they may, without consulting their master, but 
 in good faith, assist a person independently employed to do 
 something which will benefit their master, but with which 
 neither he nor they have any right to interfere, and in which 
 they act entirely under the control of such other person.^ In 
 these cases the nominal master is not responsible to strangers 
 
 * Singer Manuf g Co. v. Rahn, 132 employed by a contractor who hired 
 
 U. S. 518 ; 10 S. Cf. 175 [canvasser], out the driver, horse and wagon, to 
 
 ' Tiffin V. McCorinack, 34 Ohio St. a city by the day, to aid in paving 
 
 638 ; see Southern Exp. Co. v. Brown, streets, was held to continue as the 
 
 67 Miss. 360 ; 7 So. 318 ; 8 Id. 435. contractor's servant, so as to render 
 
 '"Browv. Boston, etc. R. Co., 157 his master liable for damage caused 
 
 Mass. 899 ; 32 N. E. 362 ; Union R. by the driver's negligent manage- 
 
 Co. V. Kallaher, 114 111. 325 ; 3 N. E. ment of the horse. In Denver, etc. 
 
 77 ; Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Schnei- R. Co. v. Gustafson (21 Colo. 393 ; 
 
 der, 45 Ohio St. 678 ; 17 N. E. 331 ; 41 Pac. 505) , a railroad company 
 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Jones, 75 Tex. which knowingly availed itself for a 
 
 151 ; 13 S. "W. 973. number of years of the services at a 
 
 1 Oil Creek, etc. R. Co. v. Keigh- street crossing of the flagman em- 
 
 ron, 74 Pa. St. 316; where the superin- ployed and paid by another company, 
 
 tendent of a petroleum company, in- was held liable as an employer, 
 
 trusted by the defendant, a railroad "^ Donovan v. Laing, 4 Reports, 317 ; 
 
 company, with the management of [1893] 1 Q. B. 639 ; Murray v. Currie, 
 
 cars, was held to be defendant's ser- L. R. 6 C. P. 24 ; see McGatrick v. 
 
 vant, pro hac vice, so as to render it Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566 ; § 162, post. 
 
 liable to a third person injured by ^ jyim-phey v. Caralli, 3 Hurlst. & C. 
 
 the superintendent's negligence. In 463 ; see Elder v. Bemis, 2 Mete. 
 
 Huff V. Ford (126 Mass. 24), a driver 599. 
 
§I62] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 244 
 
 for their acts or omissions,^ while the person really controlling 
 them isJ' 
 
 § 162. Liability for servant hired out. — A master who 
 hires out one of his servants to work for another person, is 
 liable to t/ie hirer for such servant's negligence in the work, 
 and this even though the particular servant was selected by 
 the hirer himself ; * and unless the master abandons the entire 
 control of his servants to the hirer, he remains liable to strang- 
 ers for their negligence.^ The hirer cannot properly be said 
 to have control of the servants, unless he has the right to dis- 
 charge them and employ others in their places in case of their 
 misconduct or incapacity ; that being the only practicable 
 means by which free servants can be controlled. If, there- 
 
 < Murray v. Currie, L. E. 6 C. P. 
 34 ; Murphey v. Caralli, 3 Hurlst. & 
 C. 403 ; Manning v. Adams, 32 "W. 
 R. 430. In the last case, plaintiff, in 
 Ihe employ of a stevedore as fore- 
 man, was injured while unloading a 
 ship with the assistance of the crew, 
 through the negligence of one of 
 these. In an action against the ship- 
 owners, held plaintiff could not re- 
 cover. 
 
 * Kimball v. Cushman, 103 Mass. 
 194. 
 
 ' Defendant's servant hired him- 
 self, on his own account, to plaintiff 
 to do thatching. The servant hav- 
 ing left his work, defendant told 
 plaintiff that if the servant did the 
 work, he, defendant, must be paid 
 for it. Afterward the servant re- 
 sumed work; defendant sent another 
 to assist him and received pay for 
 both. An injury liaving occurred, 
 the thatching being defective, it was 
 held defendant was responsible 
 (Holmes V. Onion, 3 C. B. N. S 790). 
 Cockburn, C. J., said: "Although 
 true it is that where a man employ- 
 ing a tradesman selects a particular 
 servant or workman to do the job, 
 the master may be relieved from 
 responsibility for the consequences 
 
 of the man's incompetency, it is, I 
 think, going too far to say that he is 
 relieved from all responsibility if the 
 servant is guilty of negligence." 
 Defendant hired of plaintiff a team 
 and driver, through whose negli- 
 gence the horses were drowned. 
 Held, although the horses and driver 
 were under the control and manage- 
 ment of defendant, who was respon- 
 sible for whatever was done in pur- 
 suance of his orders, plaintiff must 
 bear the results of the driver's in- 
 competency, as he was bound to fur- 
 nish a suitable servant (Ames v. Jor- 
 dan, 71 Me. 540). 
 
 » Coyle V. Pierrepont, 37 Hun, 379; 
 overruhng s. c, 33 Id. 311. Defend- 
 ants hired to H. for a day a steamer 
 and crew. The crew were hired, 
 paid and entirely controlled by de- 
 fendants, who also had ijower to sub- 
 stitute others in then- place. By the 
 negligence of the crew an injury 
 was occasioned to the plaintiff. 
 Held, defendants were liable: the 
 crew were their servants, and not 
 those of H. (Dalyell v. Tyrer, El. B. 
 <fe El. 899 ; see, also, Fenton v. Dublin 
 Steam Packet Co., 8 Adol. & El. 
 885). 
 
245 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 163 
 
 fore, the hirer has no such power, he is not responsible to any- 
 one for the faults of the servants.^ If the hirer is vested for 
 the time with exclusive control with the right to discharge the 
 servants and to employ others, he alone is responsible for their 
 defaults.* Where a person hires the personal property of an- 
 other, who supplies, under the contract, a servant charged 
 with the general management and control of the property, 
 although the hirer acquires, to a limited degree, a dominion 
 over the servant, with a right to superintend and direct his 
 conduct, the latter still continues the servant of the owner, 
 who is responsible for his negligence, though it occurs in the 
 performance of work in which the hirer alone is interested.^ 
 
 §163. Liability of trustees for employee's acts. — Trustees 
 are personally liable to third persons for the negligence of 
 persons employed in the discharge of the trust, unless they 
 are themselves acting as mere agents, with a responsible prin- 
 cipal behind them. Thus, while the directors of a railroad 
 company are not in general personally liable for the negligence 
 of its servants, trustees of bondholders, who take possession 
 of a railroad under the provisions of a mortgage, and run it for 
 the benefit of the bondholders, cannot require persons injured 
 by the negligence of servants on the road to sue the bond- 
 holders, but must personally answer for the damage.' The 
 receiver of a railroad is liable, to the extent of his trust funds 
 (but no further), for the negligence of his servants.^ Where 
 appointed in involuntary proceedings, he is not the agent or 
 
 3 Burke v. De Castro, etc. Co., 11 * Per Cooper, J., in New Orleans, 
 
 Hun, 354 ; compare Gerlaok v. Edel- etc. E. Co. v. Norwood, 63 Miss, 
 
 meyer, 88 N. Y. 645. 565. 
 
 ^ Murray v. Currie, L. R. 6 C. P. ' Ballou v. Farnum, 9 Allen, 47. 
 24 ; Rourke v. White Moss Colliery ' Meara v. Holbrook, 30 Ohio St. 
 Co. (L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 305; Quin v. 137. But he is liable only to that 
 Complete Elect. Co. 46 Fed. 506; extent ; and a judgment against him 
 Sweeney v. Murphy, 33 La. Ann. personally, for such a cause, will be 
 638. In such case, the former mas- reversed or amended (Camp v. Bar- 
 ter may pay the servants' wages, ney, 4 Hun, 373 ; see Dalton v. Re- 
 being repaid by the real master, ceivers of Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 4 
 without becoming liable as master Hughes. 180). There are now in- 
 (Cotter V. Lindgren, 108 Cal. 603; 39 numerable reported cases, in which 
 Pac. 950 ; Ditberner V. Rogers, 66 receivers have been thus held liable. 
 How. Pr. 35 ; 18 Abb. N. C. 436). 
 
i64] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 246 
 
 servant of the corporation, so as to render it liable for the 
 negligence of himself or his employes, whereby a passenger 
 is injured.' But a corporation, having public duties {e. g. a 
 railroad company), cannot get rid of its liabilities by a volun- 
 tary surrender to trustees under a mortgage.^ 
 
 § 164. Who is a "contractor." — Although, in a general 
 sense, every person who enters into a contract may be called a 
 "contractor," yet that word, for want of a better one, has 
 come to be used with special reference to a person who, in the 
 pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do a specific 
 piece of work for other persons, using his own means and 
 methods, without submitting himself to their control in respect 
 of all its details.' The true test of a "contractor" would seem 
 to be, that he renders the service in the course of an independ- 
 
 ^Metz V. Buffalo, etc. E. Co., 58 
 N. Y. 6L See § 130 a., aii^e. 
 
 ■•Naglee v. Alexandria, etc. R. Co., 
 83 Va. 707 ; 3 S. E. 869. 
 
 ' Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570 ; 
 35 N. E. 101. In Ferguson v. Hub- 
 bell (97 N. Y. 507), defendant leased 
 to H. certain land to work upon 
 shares, defendant was to pay H, ten 
 dollars per acre for clearing the lot. 
 Held, in clearing the land by fire, H. 
 was an independent contractor, and 
 not a servant. But where M. agreed 
 to clear defendant's land at a fixed 
 price, and defendant advised him to 
 fire log heaps, held, M. was a mere 
 workman, and defendant was liable 
 for plaintiff's fence which was 
 burned (Johnston v. Hastie, 30 Upper 
 Can. [Q. B.] 332). In Pierrepont 
 V. Loveless (73 N. Y. 311), defend- 
 ants contracted with third persons 
 to drive logs into a river. Held, that 
 the log drivers were contractors, 
 Rapallo J., says: "The absence of 
 control was more coraplete than in 
 any of the cases on the subject.'" So 
 in Puller v. Citizens' Nat. Bank (15 
 Fed. 875), where a land owner let 
 the whole work of excavating a 
 vault to A. reserving no control over 
 
 the manner of performance, though 
 he was tof urnish materials ; held, A. 
 was a contractor. So in Bennett v. 
 Truebody (66 Cal. 509), where the 
 owner of a building was absolved 
 from responsibility to one who fell 
 through a trap-door, left open by 
 servants of a plumber. But a master 
 cannot convert a servant into a con- 
 tractor, by agreeing to exercise no 
 control over him in the manner of 
 doing his work (Tiffin v. McCor- 
 mack, 34 Ohio St. 638). The foUowing 
 persons were held to be contractors, 
 not servants. A person employed by 
 a railroad company to clear rubbish 
 from its right of way at so much per 
 mile, who hires, pays and controls 
 his own help (St. Louis, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Yonley, 53 Ark. 503 ; 14 S. W. 800 ; 
 13 Id. 333); a railroad company, 
 building telegraph lines (Hackett v. 
 Western Union Tel. Co., 80 Wise. 
 187 ; 49 N. W. 833) ; an ore digger, 
 paid per car load (Harris v. McNa- 
 mara, 97 Ala. 181 ; 13 So. 103) ; see 
 Carlson v. Stocking, 91 Wise. 433 ; 
 65 N. W. 58 [question for jury to say 
 whether one in charge of a log drive, 
 he supplying men and supplies, was 
 an independent contractor or not]. 
 
247 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 1 65 
 
 ent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as 
 to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it 
 is accomplished.^ If he never serves more than one person, 
 there is usually a presumption that he has no independent 
 occupation ; but this presumption is not conclusive. A single 
 large railroad company, for example, might find work enough 
 for a contractor to occupy his whole lifetime, yet leave him to 
 work in perfect independence, accepting the results of his 
 labor, without ever interfering with his choice of the mode and 
 instruments of working. On the other hand, one may have 
 many employers within a short space of time, yet be a mere 
 servant to each of them in turn. The mere fact of direction 
 as to things to be done, without control over the method or 
 means of doing them, does not make a contractor a servant.' 
 
 § 165. When contractor and when servant. — One who 
 
 has an independent business, and generally serves only in the 
 capacity of a contractor, may abandon that character for a 
 time, and become a mere servant or agent, and this, too, with- 
 out doing work of a different nature from that to which he is 
 accustomed. If he submits himself to the direction of his em- 
 ployer as to the details of the work, fulfiling his wishes, not 
 merely as to the result, but also as to the means by which that 
 result is to be attained, the contractor becomes a servant in re- 
 spect to that work.^ And he may even be a contractor as to 
 part of his service, and a servant as to part. Whether he works 
 as contractor or as servant, is a question of mingled law and 
 fact, which it is scarcely possible to decide by any fixed rule 
 which will accurately govern those cases where the one occu- 
 pation borders closely upon the other. In most instances, the 
 distinction is easily observed. Thus, one who contracts to do 
 a specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistants, and exe- 
 
 ^ Thin clause was originally in- 111. App. 213, where this test is de- 
 serted without; the support of any clared to be the true one. 
 express authority.. It has now, how- » Morgan v. Smith, sttpra, note 1, 
 ever, been quoted and adopted in and §166, posf. 
 
 Hexamer v. "Webb (101 N. Y. 377, ' Savannah, etc. R. Co. v. Phillips, 
 
 885 ; 4 N. E. 755), and in Cunning- 90 Ga. 829 ; 17 S. E. 83 [contractor 
 
 ham V. International R. Co. (51 Tex. accepting control in details]. See 
 
 503) ; see Robinson v. "Webb. 11 Bush. Brackett v. Lubke, 4 Allen, 138 ; 
 
 464 ; and Andrews v. Boedecker, 17 Moir v. Hopkins, 16 111. 318. 
 
§I6S] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 248 
 
 cuting the work either entirely according to his own ideas, or 
 in accordance with a plan previously given to him by the per- 
 son for whom the work is done, without being subject to the 
 orders of the latter in respect to the details of the work, is 
 clearly a contractor, and not a servant.^ The fact that such an 
 employee is paid by the day,* or that, in all the work, he con- 
 sults and defers to the wishes of his employer, makes no 
 difference ; although an express contract to pay by the job is 
 always strong evidence that the relation of master and servant 
 does not exist.* On the other hand, one who is at all times 
 subject to the will of his employer, and who cannot properly 
 refuse to obey his directions as to the mode in which the work 
 shall be done and the persons to be employed upon it, is not a 
 contractor, but a servant;^ and this, although the employer 
 should never exercise such control,^ and the employee should 
 be paid by the job, instead of by the day.'' But the fact that 
 no price is fixed,* and no specifications are made, as to the 
 
 2 Pack V. New York, 8 N. Y. 323 ; 
 Kelly V. New York, 11 Id. 433; 
 rev'g 4 E. D. Smith, 391 ; Forsyth 
 V. Hooper, 11 Allen, 419 ; Allen 
 V. Hayward, 7 Q. B. 960 ; Painter v. 
 Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 213 ; Allen 
 V. Willard, 57 Id. 374 ; McCarthy v. 
 Portland, 71 Me. 318 (where the text 
 is quoted with approval); Hale v. 
 Johnson, 80 111. 185 (where the text 
 is cited and its doctrine applied). 
 
 3 Geer v. Oarrow, 61 Conn. 230 ; 23 
 Atl. 1087; Corbin v. American Mills, 
 37 Conn. 274. 
 
 ■•See Forsyth v. Hooper, 11 Allen, 
 419. 
 
 ^For examples of nominal "con- 
 tractors" held to be servants, see 
 Hughbanks v. Boston In v. Co., 93 
 Iowa, 267 ; 60 N. W. 640 ; Waters v. 
 Greenleaf Lumber Co., 115 N. C. 
 648 ; 20 S. E. 718 ; Jensen v. Bar- 
 bour, 15 Mont. 582 ; 39 Pac. 906 [con- 
 tract to furnish ear and driver]. 
 
 'Linnehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 
 123. 
 
 'In Sadler v. Henlock (4 El. & 
 B. 570), defendant employed P. to 
 
 clean out a drain. P. was a common 
 laborer not in defendant's service. 
 P. cleaned out the drain without the 
 further direction or inspection of 
 defendant. He received five shillings 
 for the job ; held, P. was not a con- 
 tractor, but a servant. S. p., Burgess 
 V. Gray, 1 C. B. 578. So, where 
 lessees of a building employed a car- 
 penter to repair an awning over a 
 public way, and made no special con- 
 tract. Held, they were liable to a 
 third pei'son, injured through negli- 
 gence of the carpenter (Braokett v. 
 Lubke, 4 Allen, 138). s. p., Ber- 
 nauer V. Hartman Steel Co., 33 111. 
 App. 491 [plumber]. 
 
 8 Fuller V. Citizen's Nat. Bank, 15 
 Fed. 875. One engaged in deliver- 
 ing coal at so much a load, and sub- 
 ject to control as to mode of delivery, 
 is a servant and not an independent 
 contractor (Waters v. Pioneer Fuel 
 Co., 52 Minn. 474; 55 N. W. 52). 
 s. P., Clapp V. Kemp, 122 Mass. 481. 
 Laborers grading a roadbed, subject 
 to the direction of the chief engineer, 
 are not independent contractors, but 
 
249 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§I66 
 
 work to be done, does not of itself create the relation of mas- 
 ter and servant between the parties.' 
 
 § i66. Effect of employer's control over contractor. — 
 
 It is now practically settled that the reservation, in a contract, 
 of the right to inspect the work at all times and to have it 
 done subject to the approval of the employer, without any 
 right to dictate the details of method or to interfere with ser- 
 vants, does not make the contractor a servant.' Thus, in New 
 York, Pennsylvania, and other states, it has been held that a 
 clause requiring the contractor to conform to such further 
 directions, of a specified nature, as might be given by the 
 employer,^ or requiring him to do the work " under the direc- 
 tion and to the satisfaction " of a servant of the employer,^ did 
 not make the contractor a servant of the employer. So, where 
 a contractor subcontracts a portion of the work, reserving no 
 control over the manner of performance, save generally to in- 
 sist that the work be done according to the terms of the sub- 
 
 are servants (St. Johns, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Shalley, 33 Fla. 397 ; 14 So. 890). 
 
 'InHexamerv. Webb (101 N. Y. 
 877 ; 4 N. E. 755), defendant engaged 
 B., a roofer, to prevent pigeons from 
 making nests under the eaves of his 
 roof. B. was to work in his own 
 way, the contract containing no re- 
 strictions as to time or amount or 
 specific services to be rendered. Held, 
 that defendant was not liable for 
 B.'s negligence, B. being an inde- 
 pendent contractor. 
 
 ' Casement v. Brown, 148 U. S. 615 
 13 S. Ct. 67a ; Bibb v. Norfolk, etc 
 R. Co., 87 Va. 711; 14 S. E. 163 
 Crenshaw v. UUman, 113 Mo. 633. 
 30 S. W. 1077. 
 
 2 Pack V. New York, 8 N. Y. 233. 
 Reserving the right to " vary, ex- 
 tend or diminish the quantity of 
 work during its progress," and di- 
 recting changes in grade of side- 
 walk, leaves him still an independ- 
 ent contractor (Charlock v. Freel, 
 135 N. Y. Sai : 26 N. E. 263). See, 
 also, Vincennes Water-Supply Co., 
 
 V, White, 124 Ind. 376; 24 N. E. 
 747. 
 
 3 Kelly V. New York, 11 N. Y. 433. 
 Selden, J., there said: "The object 
 of the clause relied upon was not to 
 give the right to interfere with the 
 workmen, and direct them in detail 
 how they should proceed, but to en- 
 able them to see that every portion 
 of the work was satisfactorily com- 
 pleted. It authorized them to pre- 
 scribe what was to be done, but not 
 how it was done, nor wlio should do 
 it.'' The same decision has been 
 made in Pennsylvania (Allen v. Wil- 
 lard, 57 Pa. St. 374 ; Hunt v. Penn. 
 R. Co., 51 Id. 475) ; and Massachusetts 
 (Harding v. Boston, 163 Mass. 14 ; 
 39. N. E. 411;. To the same effect is 
 Clare v. National City Bank, 40 N. y. 
 Superior, 104. The mere right of 
 "supervision" does not make the 
 employer responsible (Samuelson v. 
 Cleveland Mining Co., 49 Mich. 104). 
 To the contrary, see Schwartz v. 
 Gilmore, 45 111. 455; St. Paul v. 
 Seitz, 3 Minn. 297. 
 
§i67] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 250 
 
 contract, the subcontractor is not his servant.'' In Connecticut 
 and South Carolina, a very large measure of control is permit- 
 ted, without making the employer liable for a contractor's 
 negligence.^ But in Ohio, under a contract which provided 
 not only that the contractor should do the work " under the 
 direction " of the employer's agent, but also that such agent 
 should "have entire control over the manner of doing and 
 shaping all or any part of the same, and whose direction must 
 be strictly obeyed," it was held that the contractor was a mere 
 servant of his employer." The right to complete control 
 makes the employer liable, even though he never exercised it.'' 
 
 § 167. Effect of right of dismissal. — It is presumably in- 
 consistent with the legal character of a contractor that he 
 should be subject to dismissal by his employer at any moment, 
 at pleasure ; ^ but this presumption is not conclusive, where 
 other circumstances exist inconsistent with that idea.^ The 
 
 * Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N. Y. 138. 
 
 'Norwalk Gas Co. v. Norwalk, 63 
 Conn. 49o ; 38 AtL 33 ; Rogers v. 
 Florence R. Co., 31 S. O. 378 ; 9 S. E. 
 1059. 
 
 " Cincinnati v. Stone. 5 Ohio St. 
 38. So in Missouri (Speed v. Atlan- 
 tic, etc. R. Co., 71 Mo. 803) ; where 
 the business of loading and unload- 
 ing freight "' vras to be done in a 
 manner satisfactory to the superin- 
 tendent of defendant and subject to 
 his control." See, also, Annett v. 
 Foster, 1 Daly, 503. But not so, if 
 the contractor is employed to do the 
 work according to his own method, 
 and is subject to control only as re- 
 gards the result (Burns v. McDon- 
 ald, 57 Mo. App. 599). A written 
 contract that the " work of tlemoli- 
 tion is to be carried out according to 
 the directions of the supervising 
 architect, whose decisions on all 
 points I agree to accept as final." 
 created the relation of master and 
 servant (Faren v. Sellers, 39 La. 
 Ann. 1011 ; 3 So. 363). 
 ■" Linnehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 133; 
 
 conceded in Norwalk Gas Co. v. 
 Norwalk, supra. 
 
 ' The fact that the person em- 
 ployed is liable to dismissal at pleas- 
 ure is strong evidence that he is a 
 servant and not contractor (Blake v. 
 Thirst, 3 Hurlst. &C. 30; Morgan v. 
 Bowman, 33 Mo. 538 ; see Charles v. 
 Taylor, L. R. 3 Ex. 251). In Tifiin 
 V. McCormack (34 Ohio St. 638), 
 where the owner of a quarry hired a 
 person to quarry, break and pile up 
 stone, and had no further control over 
 the employee, who was to find pow- 
 der and tools, and receive compensa- 
 tion at piece rates : Held, defendant 
 was liable for employee's negligence 
 in blasting ; Mcllvaine, J., pointing 
 out that there was no defined quan- 
 tity of work contracted for ; the em- 
 ployee's services might be deter- 
 mined at pleasure, and the compensa- 
 tion was to be measured by the 
 amount of labor performed. 
 
 2 In Robinson v. Webb (11 Bush, 
 464) , defendant contracted with the 
 builder that the latter should con- 
 struct a building, furnishing all the 
 
251 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 1 68 
 
 owner of a house, for example, must surely have the right to 
 stop the work of a plumber at any time or to discontinue an 
 alteration which proves to be no improvement without becom- 
 ing a "master" over the contractor. As to the effect of 
 reserving a right to dismiss any of the contractor's servants, 
 authorities differ. In Illinois and Missouri ^ it is held that a 
 contractor under such a restriction is a servant. In England "* 
 and New Jersey ^ it is held that he is not. The discharge of 
 servants, who give reasonable cause of complaint to the con- 
 tractor's employer, without any general agreement to do so, 
 has certainly no effect upon the relation of the parties.^ 
 
 § i68. Employer not liable for contractor's negligence. — 
 
 It appearing, from the definition which we have given of a 
 contractor, that he is not the agent or servant of his employer 
 in relation to anything but the specific results which he under- 
 takes to produce, it follows that his employer is not responsible 
 to third persons for his negligence, nor for the negligence of 
 his servants, agents, or subcontractors, in the execution of the 
 work.' To use the language of Baron Rolfe : " The party 
 
 materials and labor. The work was killed ; held, the company was not 
 
 to be done under the supervision of liable, although it reserved to itself 
 
 an architect authorized, in case of the right of dismissing incompetent 
 
 delay, to employ another builder, workmen (Reedie v. Northwestern 
 
 and without whose consent the E. Co., 4 Exch. 244). 
 
 builder was not to sublet any of the * Cuff v. Newark, etc. R. Co., 35 
 
 work. Held, a third person dam- N. J. Law, 17. See. also, Rogers v. 
 
 aged by the falling of a wall could Florence R. Co., 31 S. C. 378 ; 9 8. E. 
 
 riot recover from defendant. 1059. 
 
 " Chicago v. Joney, 60 111. 383 ; " Harris v. McNamara, 97 Ala. 
 where the city contracted with third 181 ; 13 So. 103. 
 persons for the deepening of a canal, 'Casement v. Brown, 148 U. S. 
 retaining a supervisory control over 615 ; 1?> S. Ct. 672 ; Chicago v. Rob- 
 the work, and power finally to dis- bins. 2 Black, 418; Kelly v. New 
 miss any person employed on the York, 11 N. Y. 432 ; Hexamer v. 
 work; Larson v. Metropolitan R. "Webb, 101 Id. 377; Duncan v. Find- 
 Co., 110 Mo. 334; 19 8. W. 416 [con- later. 6 Clark & F. 894; Allen v. 
 tractor agreeing to dismiss servants Hayward, 7 Q. B. 960 ; Reedie v. 
 not obeying owner's orders]. S. P., Northwestern R. Co., 4 Exch. 244; 
 Blumb V. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 113. Eaton v. European, etc. R. Co.. 59 
 ^ Where a railroad company en- Me. 520 ; Clark v. Vermont, etc. R. 
 gaged a contractor to make a via- Co., 28 Vt. 103; Hilliard v. Richard- 
 duct, and, through the negligence son 3 Gray. 349 ; Allen v. Willard, 
 of the latter's workmen, a man was 57 Pa. St. 374 ; Smith v. Simmons, 
 
S5 169] LIABILITY OF. MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 252 
 
 employing has the selection of the agent employed ; and it is 
 reasonable that he who has made choice of an unskillful or 
 careless person to execute his orders, should be responsible for 
 any injury resulting from his want of skill or want of care. 
 But neither the principle of the rule nor the rule itself can 
 apply to a case where the party sought to be charged does not 
 stand in the character of employer to the party by whose 
 negligent act the injury has been occasioned ;" ^ though the 
 employer is liable for such consequences as naturally flow from 
 the execution of the work in a careful manner.^ The principle 
 here stated is now perfectly well settled, both in England and 
 America ; but this conclusion has been reached through a 
 series of contradictory decisions, some of which have not been 
 overruled by name, and may therefore mislead the student.* 
 The chief difficulty has arisen from an attempt to distinguish 
 between the obligations of owners of real and of personal 
 property, to which we shall presently allude ; ^ an attempt no 
 longer made by any court. To this exemption from responsi- 
 bility, there is a single important qualification — that the 
 employer must have used ordinary care to select a contractor 
 of proper skill and prudence.^ 
 
 § 169. Negligence of subcontractor and part-contractor.— 
 
 The same principle is applicable to the case of subcon- 
 
 103 Id. 3'2 ; Chartiers Gas Co. v. v. Willis (Kans.) 16 Pao. 728 ; Easter 
 
 Lynch, 118 Id. 363 ; 13 Atl. 435 [lay- v. Hall, 13 Wash. St. 160 ; 40 Pac. 738. 
 
 ing gas mains] ; Conway v. Furat, 57 ' Reedie v. Northwestern R. Co., 4 
 
 N.J. Law, 645; 33 Atl. 880; Deford v. Exch. 344; cited with approval in 
 
 State, 30 Md. 179 ; Bibb v. Norfolk, Pack v. New York, 8 N. Y. 233, 225' ; 
 
 etc. R. Co., 87 Va. 711 ;14 S. E. 163 Kelly v. New York, 11 Id. 432; 
 
 [construction of railroad] ; Hunt v. Blake v. Ferris, 5 Id. 48. 
 
 Vanderbilt, 115 N. C. 559 ; 20 S. E. ^ gge § 175. post. 
 
 168; Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. Kim- ■'The leading cases in error are 
 
 berly, 87 Ga. 161 ; 13 S. E. 277 [rail- Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & P. 404 ; 
 
 road] ; Rome, etc. R. Co. v. Chasteen, Randleson v. Murray, 8 Ad. & El. 
 
 88 Ala. .'•.91 ; 7 So. 94 [same] ; Kep- 109. They are entirely overruled, 
 
 perly v. Ramsden. 83 111. 354 ; De = See § 173, post. 
 
 Forrest v. Wright. 3 Mich. 368 ; " Norwalk Gas Co. v. Norwalk, 63 
 
 Riedel v. Moran. 103 Mich. 262; 61 N. Conn. 4fl."i ; 28 Atl. 33 ; Berg v. Par- 
 
 W. .509 ; Charlebois v. Gogebic, etc. sons, 84 Hun, 60 ; 31 N. Y. Supp. 1091 ; 
 
 R. Co.. 91 Mich. 59 ; 51 N. W. 813 ; Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55 ; 21 
 
 Barry v. St. Louis. 17 Mo. 121 ; Wood S. W. 451. This limitation has often 
 
 V. School Dist., 44 Iowa, 27; Miller been recognized (Burns v. McDon- 
 
 V. Minnesota, etc. R. Co., 76 Id. 6.55 ; aid, 57 Mo. App. 599). 
 39 N. W. 188 : St. Louis, etc. R Co. 
 
253 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 1 69 
 
 tractors. A contractor who employs another contractor to 
 execute the whole or a part of his job, leaving to the latter 
 that freedom in the choice of means heretofore described as 
 part of the attributes, of a contractor, is not liable to strangers 
 for the negligence of the subcontractor;' and the subcon- 
 tractor may again sublet all or a part of his work and thus 
 avoid liability for its details.^ Of course, the original em- 
 ployer is not liable.^ And the rule is applicable to the case of 
 a contractor who is intrusted with only part of an entire job, 
 as much as if he had charge of the whole. Thus, if the owner 
 of land makes separate contracts with a stone-mason, a brick- 
 layer, a carpenter and a plumber, each to do the work of, his 
 own trade upon a single house, each of these mechanics is a 
 contractor, within the meaning of the rule already stated, as 
 much as if he had agreed to put up the entire building.^ 
 Even if a single species of work upon a single piece of property 
 should be divided between two or more contractors, they 
 would not thereby necessarily lose the character of contractors, 
 and if their employer had no further control over them than 
 he would have over a contractor for the whole work, he would 
 not be liable for their negligence.^ 
 
 'The head contractor was held engaged B. to lay the brick, agreeing 
 
 not liable in Wray v. Evans, 80 Pa. to i3ay him a price per yard, and re- 
 
 St. 103 [trench left open by subcon- quested him to provide lamps, 
 
 tractor] ; Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N. Plaintiff, passing at night, no lamps 
 
 Y. 138 [water accumulated in eel- being visible, was injured. Held, 
 
 lar] ; Pearson v. Cox, L. R. 3 C. P. defendants were liable ; B. was only 
 
 Div. 369 [subcontract for plastering a servant (Wilson v. White, 71 Ga. 
 
 house] : Overton V. Freeman, 11 C. 506). But a decision upon this 
 
 B. 867 ; Eapson v. Cubitt, 9 Mees. & point was unnecessary. The de- 
 
 W. 710 [gas-flttings] : Boniface v. fendants were liable, because it was 
 
 Relyea, 5 Abb. N. S. 359 ; 36 How. their duty to provide lamps. See 
 
 Pr. 457 [undertaker not liable for § 176, post. 
 
 carriage at funeral] ; Powell v. Vir- ' King v. Livermore, 9 Hun, 398 ; 
 
 ginia Const. Co., 88 Tenn. 693 ; 13 affi'd, 71 N. Y. 605 ; Wray v. Evans, 
 
 S. W. G91 [railroad construction]. 80 Pa. St. 103. Knight v. Fox (5 
 
 But evidence of a subcontract must Exch. 721) is a doubtful case, 
 
 be clear, as this claim for exemption = St. Louis, etc. E. Co. v. Knott, 54 
 
 is looked upon with some suspicion Ark. 424 ; 16 S. W. 9. 
 
 (see Allen v. Willard 57 Pa. St. 374 ; "Martin v. Tribune Asso., 30 Hun, 
 
 Berberich v. Ebach, 131 Id. 165; 18 391. 
 
 Atl. 1008). Defendants contracted s-.-^vj^en we once arrive at the 
 
 to lay a pavement in the street. To principle that employment, control, 
 
 this end they piled up bricks. They and supervision, or the right to such. 
 
§ 172 J LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 254 
 
 § 170. [Omitted]. 
 
 § 171. Employer liable for servants selected by him.— 
 
 But servants appointed by the principal employer are his 
 servants even though their wages are paid by the contractor.* 
 This is not, however, to be understood as implying that the 
 mere recommendation of a new servant to a contractor, by the 
 latter's employer, is enough to make the employer responsible 
 for such servant's acts. In order to have such an effect, the 
 recommendation must be in substance a dictation of the 
 choice. Much less does the employer of a contractor assume 
 any liability for a servant of the latter, by simply expressing a 
 preference for that servant over others, and thus inducing the 
 contractor to assign to him the work. Indeed, so long as the 
 employer confines his selection to one of several servants 
 already employed by the contractor, he does not become re- 
 sponsible for such servant.^ Where, however, the servants 
 actually employed upon the work receive their wages directly 
 from the person for whose benefit the work is done, the pre- 
 sumption is that they are his servants, although they are 
 selected and superintended by another person hired by the 
 former to render that service.^ But this presumption is not at 
 all conclusive. 
 
 § 172. Liability for servant compulsorily employed — 
 pilots. — A pilot, when taken on board a vessel without any 
 
 over a person whose neglect was the have made all the difiference " (Quar- 
 
 immediate cause of the injury, is to man v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & W. 499). 
 
 test all these cases, the logical result "^ Quarraan v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & 
 
 seems inevitable, that such rule is as W. 499 [defendants hired from a 
 
 applicable to contracts for distinct livery stable a particular driver, who 
 
 portions of a building as to a con- always drove for them]; Jones v. 
 
 tract for the whole" (per Hoffman, Liverpool, L. B., 14 Q. B. Div. 890. 
 
 J., Potter V. Seymour, 4 Bosw. 140, In Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice Co. 
 
 148) . (50 Mich. 516 ; 45 Am. R. 54), Cooler. 
 
 1 Thus, it was said by Parke, B., J., says: "The case is directly 
 
 where defendants had hired a driver within Quarman v. Burnett, which, 
 
 from the keeper of a livery stable : whether correctly decided or not. 
 
 " If, indeed, the defendants had in- has been too often and too generally 
 
 sisted upon the horse being driven, recognized and followed to be ques- 
 
 not by one of the regular servants, tioned now." 
 
 but by a stranger to the job-master, » gamyn v. McClosky, 2 Ohio St. 
 
 appointed by themselves, it would 536. 
 
255 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 173 
 
 legal compulsion, is considered the servant of the owner, who 
 is responsible for the negligence of the pilot to the same ex- 
 tent as for that of any other servant ; ' but if the owner is com- 
 pelled by law to take a particular pilot, who is entitled to 
 control, he is not thus responsible.^ The owner is, however, 
 liable to third persons for the negligence of the master and 
 crew in all cases, even though a compulsory pilot is on board.^ 
 And where the owner is at liberty to make a selection among 
 pilots,* all qualified for the service, or to dispense with a pilot 
 altogether, subject to the payment of pilotage for service not 
 rendered,^ he has been held liable for the pilot's negligence. 
 There is no implied contract between the owners of a ship and 
 a pilot whom they are compelled to employ, that the latter 
 shall take upon himself the risk of injury from the negligence 
 of the ship-owner's servants.* On similar principles, owners of 
 mines have been exempted from liability to their own servants 
 for the negligence of a mining-boss, whom they are forced to 
 employ by statute.' 
 
 § 173. Liability of owner for persons employed on land. — 
 
 There is nothing in the nature of real property which requires 
 that its owner should be held to a stricter liability than the 
 owner of personal property ; and he is not, therefore, respon- 
 sible for the negligence of persons employed upon his land, 
 any further than he would be if they were employed about 
 
 'Yates V. Brown, 8 Pick. 23; 258 ; Ritchie v. Bowsfinld, Id. 309). 
 
 Bussy V. Donaldson, 4 Dallas, 206 ; If the pilot does not, as of right, 
 
 Shaw V. Reed, 9 Watts & S. ?3 ; supersede the master but is merely 
 
 Fletcher v. Braddick, 5 Bos. & P. his adviser, the owners are not ex- 
 
 183 ; The Stettin, Brow. & Lush. 199 ; empt from liability (The Augusta, 
 
 21 L. J. [P. & D.] 208 ; The Lion, L. 57 Law Times, 326 ; affi'g 56 Id. 58). 
 
 R. 2 Adm. 103. ' 1'he Queen, Law Rep. 2 Adin. 
 
 = Thus, the owner is exempt if re- 354 ; The Protector, 1 W. Rob. 45 ; 
 
 quired to employ the first pilot that The Diana, 1 W. Rob. 131 ; Smith v. 
 
 offers (National Steam Nav. Co. v. Condry, 17 Peters, 20 ; 1 How. [U. 
 
 British, etc. Nav. Co., Law Rep. 8 S.] 28. 
 
 Exch. 330 ; Story on Agency, § 456a ; ■• Martin v. Temperely, 4 Q. B. 298. 
 
 The Halley, L. R. 3 P. C. 193) . Other Is this consistent with the rule in 
 
 English decisions go farther, but Quarman v. Burnett (srtpra), query? 
 
 thev are founded on peculiar statutes * Williamson v. Price, 16 Martin, 
 
 (see Lucey v. Ingram, 6 Mees. & W. 399 ; Tates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 23. 
 
 803 : Mcintosh v. Slade, 6 Barn. & « Smith v. Steele, L. R. 10 Q. B. 125. 
 
 Or. 657 ; Bennet v. Moita, 7 Taunt. ■" See post, g 231. 
 
§ 173] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 256 
 
 his chattels.' Many attempts have been made to estabhsh 
 such a distinction, and to make the owner of land responsible 
 for the misuse of his property by contractors and their serv- 
 ants ; and for a long time the courts gave it a certain recog- 
 nition ; but, on more thorough consideration, they repudiated 
 it altogether.^ Even though the injury be caused by actual 
 contact of the soil with the person or property of the plain- 
 
 ' Eeedie v. Northwestern R. Co., 4 
 Exch. 244; Overton v. Freeman, 11 
 C. B. 867 ; Peachey v. Rowland, 13 
 Id. 183 ; Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48; 
 Pack V. New York, 8 Id. 323 ; Kel- 
 ]ey V. New York, 11 Id. 433 ; King 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 6G Id. 181; 
 Hexamer v. Webb, 101 Id. 377; Hil- 
 liard v. Richardson, 8 Gray, 349; 
 Conners v. Hennessey, 113 Mass. 96 ; 
 Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 
 213 ; Conway v. Furst, 57 N. J. Law, 
 643 ; 33 Atl. 380 ; affi'g Cuff v. New- 
 ark, etc. R. Co., 35 N. J. Law, 17; 
 Prairie, etc. Co. v. Doig, 70 lU. 53 ; 
 Du Pratt V. Lick, 38 Cal. 691; Rob- 
 inson V. Webb, 11 Bush, 464. The 
 propositions of the text were cited 
 with approval in McCafferty v. Spuy- 
 ten, etc. R. Co. (61 N. Y. 178), where 
 a railroad company was held not lia- 
 ble for damage caused by rocks cast 
 into plaintiff's grocery through an 
 overcharge of powder used by a 
 conti-actor in blasting for defend- 
 ant's road. s. P., Edniundson v. 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., Ill Pa. 
 St. 316. 
 
 ' The history of the decisions and 
 dic1:a upon this point is worth re- 
 viewing. The distinction seems to 
 have been first suggested by Eyre, 
 C. J., in Bush v. Steinman (1 Bos. & 
 P. 404). The other judges did not 
 put their decisions upon thatgi'ound. 
 In Laugher V. Pointer [1S26] (5 Barn. 
 & Cr. 547), the court was equally 
 divided upon the question whether 
 the rule in Bush v. Steinman should 
 apply to owners of movable prop- 
 
 erty, and the judges who held that 
 it should not, relied much upon this 
 distinction. In Quarman v. Bur- 
 nett [1840] (6Mees. & W. 499), the 
 court said Bush v. Steinman could 
 not be supported on any other 
 ground, but intimated it might well 
 stand upon this. The same opinion 
 was expressed in Rapson v. Cubitt 
 [1843] (9 Mees. & W. 710). In Milli- 
 gan V. Wedge [1840] (13 Ad. & El. 
 737), the validity of this distinction 
 was doubted ; and in Allen v. Hay- 
 ward [1845] (7 Q. B. 960), it was 
 practically denied ; but it was not 
 until 1849 that it was finally passed 
 upon. It was then overruled, in 
 Reedie v. N. W. R. Co. (4 Exch. 344), 
 and again, in Overton v. Fi-eeman 
 (1851, 11 C. B. 867), which was de- 
 cided in the same court which de- 
 cided Bush V. Steinman. In Gay- 
 ford V. Nichols (1854, 9 Exch. 703), 
 Bush V. Steinman was again cited 
 and overruled; and since that time 
 we cannot find that it has ever been 
 quoted as an authority in England. 
 In this country the doctrine of Bush 
 V. Steinman was approved and ap- 
 plied in Lowell v. Boston & Lowell 
 R. Co., 23 Pick. 34 ; Stone v. Che- 
 shire R. Co., 19 N. H. 427 ; Wis wall 
 V. Brinson, 10 Ired. [N. C] Law, 
 554 (RufKn, C. J., dissenting); and 
 New York v. Bailey, 3 Denio, 433 
 (per Walworth, Ch., and Hand, Sen- 
 ator) . But it has since been wholly 
 repudiated in New York (Blake v. 
 Ferris,.') N. Y. 48: Pack v. New 
 York, 8 Id. 323 ; McCafferty v. Spuy. 
 
257 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 1 74 
 
 tiff, yet if such contact arises from the act of a mere contrac- 
 tor or his servant, the owner of the soil is not liable.' 
 
 § 174. Liability of employer for his own fault.— If the in- 
 jury complained of is the consequence of the neglect of a duty 
 which was incumbent upon the employer, and not upon the 
 contractor, the existence of the contract is no defense.^ This 
 is obvious when stated as a general principle ; but in the prac- 
 tical application of the general rule exempting employers from 
 liability for contractors' negligence, this consideration is in 
 danger of being overlooked. Thus, in the leading case in the 
 courts of New York upon the general rule, the employer was 
 held not liable to third persons for the want of proper guards 
 to a sewer, which the contractor dug in a public street.^ It 
 was assumed that it was the duty of the contractor to place 
 such guards around the excavation. But in the later cases it 
 has been held that, in the absence of positive stipulations to 
 that effect, the contractor owes no such duty to his employer, 
 whatever he may owe to third persons.^ The correctness 
 of the actual decision in Blake v. Ferris has therefore been 
 justly questioned in the court which made it ; * while the cor- 
 rectness of the doctrine expressed in that case has always been 
 acknowledged. And it has been rightly held that where a 
 plaintiff has been damaged by the want of proper precautions 
 
 ten, etc. E. Co., 61 Id. 178, 185 ; King with a city for the grading of a 
 V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 66 Id. public street injured the plaintiff by 
 181, 184; and other cases); \-a. Massa- blasting rock (Pack v. New York, 8 
 chusetts (Hilliard V. Richardson, 3 N.Y. 233; Kelley v. New York, 11 Id. 
 Gray, 349); in New Jersey (CuflE v. 433 ; Blumb v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 
 Newark, etc. R. Co., 35 N. J. Law, 113); and so, under like contracts 
 17) : in Pennsylvania (Painter v. for constructing railways (Edmund- 
 Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 313; Allen son v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., Ill 
 V. Willard, 57 Id. 374 ; Reed v. AUe- Pa. St. 316 ; McCafferty v. Spuyten, 
 gheny, 79 Id. 300); in Elinois (Prai- etc., R. Co., 61 N. Y. 178). To same 
 rie, etc. Co. v. Doig, 70 111. 53) ; in effect, Gourdier v. Cormack, 3 E. D. 
 Texas (Cunningham v. International Smith, 354. 
 
 R. Co., 51 Tex. 503); and mo.st of ' Pendlebury v. Greenhalgh, L. R. 
 
 the other states. No case, which 1 Q. B. Div. 36. 
 
 was once esteemed as authority, has '■■ Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48. 
 
 been more completely overthrown ' Buffalo v. Holloway, 7 N. Y. 493. 
 
 (Cuff V. Newark, etc. R. Co., 35 N. <Per Comstock, J., Storrs v. Utica, 
 
 J. Law, 17, 33). 17 N. Y. 104. 
 ' So held, where the contractor 
 [L vw OF Nbg. Vol. 1—17] 
 
§ 174] LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 258. 
 
 against injury to the public from work done by a contractor, 
 the employer could not escape liability, without at least show- 
 ing that the contractor had neglected to perform a duty in the 
 premises which the employer had a right to enforce.' Where 
 an injury is caused by defects in the building or materials fur- 
 nished by the employer, he is responsible, even though no 
 injury would have happened, but for the use prudently made 
 thereof by a contractor." So, if the employer undertakes to 
 supply the contractor with anything necessary to enable the 
 latter to avoid injury to others from the work, the employer, 
 if he fails to supply it, cannot avoid liability for the contrac- 
 tor's neglect to avoid such injury.'^ But, as in other cases, the 
 employer is liable only for the proximate consequences of his 
 neglect ; and, therefore, where he had simply neglected to 
 furnish necessary materials as fast as the contractor was ready 
 for them, and the contractor thereupon recklessly proceeded 
 without them, the employer was held not liable for the conse- 
 quences of this recklessness.^ 
 
 * Defendants, who had contracted against accidents only while his 
 to build a house, employed a black- workmen were on the premises ; and 
 smith to put in a grating on the the responsiblity did not attach to 
 front area, the opening for which the first opening of the passage, but 
 was left without a cover or fence, to the subsequent neglect (Milne v. 
 Plaintiff fell through it. As it did Smith, 2 Dow, 290). 
 not appear that the blacksmith was * Whitney v. Clifford, 46 Wise, 
 bound to protect the opening, except 138 ; 49 N. W. 835. 
 \Thile engaged on his own work, the 'Defendant engaged contractors to 
 defendants were liable (McCleary v. erect a building. He agreed to furnish 
 Kent, 3 Duer, 27). So, where de- iron pipe necessary for it, and, in 
 fend ant, owner of a store, contracted consequence of his delay, plaintiff's 
 with a builder for a new roof, but premises were injured by water, 
 did not bind the latter to use means Held, defendant was liable, notwith- 
 to keep out the rain during the pro- standing another person had con- 
 gress of the work, defendant was traoted with him to furnish the pipe 
 held liable for damage to his tenants (Gilbert v. Beach, 5 Bosw. 445, 455). 
 by rain (Sulzbacher v. Dickie, 6 Daly, Where a mining company contracted 
 469). In an early case, A. being em- for certain work in the mine, but 
 ployed to plaster a house, caused two agreed to provide props, etc., for 
 openings to be made through the protection of the contractor's serv- 
 wall. He did not close them up ants, it was liable to them for neglect 
 when he left his work, but they con- to do so (Lake Superior Iron Co. v. 
 tinued to be used by other parties ; Erickson, 39 Mich. 492 ; KeUy v. 
 and, B., accidentally entering one Howell, 41 Ohio St. 438). 
 of them, fell through the floor and * Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N. Y. 138; 
 was injured. Held, by the House affl'g 5 Daly, 445. See ante, § 31. 
 of Lords, A. was bound to provide 
 
259 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 [§175 
 
 § 175. Employer liable for the act contracted for.— The 
 employer always remains responsible for the natural conse- 
 quences of the act which he directs or contracts to have done, 
 when it is done in the manner contemplated by the contract,' 
 or with ordinary care.^ If, therefore, a contractor is employed 
 to do an unlawful act,^ e. g., to make an excavation in a high- 
 way, without authority from the proper public officer,* or to 
 create a nuisance,' or do work, intrinsically dangerous to others, 
 as employing a contractor to blast under dangerous cir- 
 cumstances, without proper safeguards,^ a person injured by 
 
 ' Brannook v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 45 ; 
 21 S. "W. 451 ; Lancaster v. Conn. 
 Mut. L. Ins .Co., 93 Mo. 460 ; 5 S. 
 W. 33 ; Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. 
 Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495 ; 38 Atl. 33 
 [blasting] ; Koch v. Sackman-Phil- 
 lips Co., 9 Wash. St. 405 ; 37 Pao. 
 703 [piling sand against adjoining lot 
 and buildings]. 
 
 ' Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418 ; 
 see O'Eourke v. Hart, 7 Bostv. 51 ; 
 Carman v. Steubenville, etc. R. Co., 
 4 Ohio St. 399 ; Engel v. Eureka Club, 
 137 N. Y. 100 ; 33 N. E. 1053. 
 
 'Where defendant contracts for 
 the repair of its canal, with soil taken 
 from plaintiff's land, defendant is 
 liable (Williams v. Fresno Canal Co., 
 96 Cal. 14 ; 30 Pac. 961). S. p., Cren- 
 shaw V. Ullman, 113 Mo. 633 ; 30 S. 
 W. 1077 [excavating on stranger's 
 land]. Defendant employed a con- 
 tractor to shore up plaintiff's wall, 
 to prevent it from falling into an 
 excavation which defendant was 
 making on an abutting lot. In doing 
 this, plaintiff's property was injured. 
 It was not claimed that the work 
 was negligently or improperly done. 
 Held, that the work done was neces- 
 sai'ily injurious to plaintiff, and de- 
 fendant was not relieved from 
 liability by the fact that it was done 
 by an independent contractor 
 (Ketcham v. Cohn, 3N. Y. Misc. 437 ; 
 23 N. Y. Supp. 181). 
 
 * Where plaintiff was injured by a 
 pile of stones left in a public street 
 by servants working under a con- 
 tract made bj' their master with de- 
 fendants, unlawfully to excavate in 
 a public street, defendants were held 
 liable (EUis v. Sheffield Gas Co., 3 
 EUis & B. 767.) Lord Campbell, C. 
 J., said: "It would be monstrous 
 if the party causing another to do a 
 thing were exempted from liability 
 for that act, merely because there 
 was a contract between him and the 
 person immediately causing the act 
 to be done " (lb.). The same point 
 was decided in Congreve v. Morgan, 
 5 Duer. 495, affi'd, suh nom. Con- 
 greve V. Smith, 18 F. Y. 79 ; Creed 
 V. Hartmann, 29 N. Y. 591 ; Ohio So. 
 R. Co. V. Morey, 147 Ohio St. 307 ; 24 
 N. E. 269 ; and other cases cited un- 
 der 55 298, post. 
 
 'Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 
 556 ; s. c, below, 3 Abb. U. S. 361 ; 
 Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 ; 
 Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38 ; 
 Clark V. Fry, 8 Id. 358 ; Brusso v. 
 Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679; Storrs v. 
 Utica, 17 Id. 104 ; Logansport v. 
 Dick, 70 Ind. 65 ; Jones v. Chantry, 
 1 Hun, 613. See, to same effect, 
 Hundhausen v. Bond, 36 Wise. 29. 
 
 «Joliet V. Harwood, 86 111. 110; 
 Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55 ; 21 
 S. W. 451. See, also, Pye v. Faxon, 
 156 Mass. 471 ; 31 N. E. 640. But 
 
§176] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. 
 
 260 
 
 such unlawful act, or by any result of it, may recover damages 
 from either the contractor or the employer, or both. In such 
 cases, the negligence is not that of the contractor alone: it is 
 that of the employer, in directing him to do an act which in 
 its nature was wrongful. 
 
 § 176. Omission of duty not excused by contracting to 
 have it done. — Neither can any one escape from the burden 
 of an obligation imposed upon him by law, by engaging for 
 its performance by a contractor. Whatever he is bound to 
 do, must be done; and though he may have a remedy against 
 his contractor for the failure of the latter to discharge his 
 duty, strangers to the contract are still at liberty to enforce 
 the rights conferred upon them by the law, without noticing 
 the contract.^ Thus, since a municipal corporation is bound 
 
 blasting is not, per se, injurious, and 
 one contracting to liave it done is 
 not liable for injuries caused by the 
 negligence of the contractor in doing 
 the -work, as by failure to give warn- 
 ing (Herrington V. Lansingburgh, 110 
 N. Y. 145 ; McCafferty v. Spuyten 
 Duyvil R. Co., 61 Id 178). But to 
 the contrary, see Jones v. McMini- 
 my, 93 Ky. 471 ; 20 S. W. 435. 
 
 ' Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 
 H. L. 93 ; Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. 
 B. N. S. 480 ; City R. Co. v. Moores, 
 80Md. 348; 30 Atl. 643. The occupier 
 of a house is not excused from lia- 
 bility for an open coal-hole in the 
 street, by the fact that is was left 
 open by a coal-carrier, who ought to 
 have closed it (Picl^ard v. Smith, 
 supra) ; although the coal-carrier is 
 primarily liable (Whiteley v. Pepper, 
 L. R. 2 4 B. Div. 276). In Allison 
 V. Western, etc. R. Co. (64 N. C. 383), 
 the hirer of a slave was held liable 
 for an injury caused by gun-powder 
 placed by the servant of a contractor 
 in the room which the slave was di- 
 rected by the hirer to occupy. This 
 principle was applied where railroad 
 companies sought, under the plea of 
 
 "contractor," to escape liability for 
 failure to perform their duty to pas- 
 sengers (Carrico v. West Va. R. Co., 
 39 W. Va. 86; 19 S. E. 571) or the 
 public (Hole V. Sittingbourne R. Co., 
 6 Hurlst. & N. 488; Donovan v. 
 Oakland R. Co., 102 Cal. 245; 86 
 Pac. 516) . In Bower v. Peate (L. R. 
 1 Q B. Div. 321), the owner of one of 
 two adjoining houses employed a 
 contractor to pull down his house, 
 excavate and rebuild, the con- 
 tractor agreeing to support, as 
 far as might be necessary, the ad- 
 joining buildings. The adjoining 
 house, which was entitled to the sup- 
 port of the soil, was injured by the 
 excavation. Held, the owner was 
 liable. Cockburn, C. J., says: "There 
 is an obvious difference between 
 committing work to a contractor to 
 be executed, from which, if properly 
 done, no injurious consequences can 
 arise, and handing over to him 
 work to be done from which mis- 
 chievous consequences will arise un- 
 less preventive measures are adopt- 
 ed." To similar effect, Spence v. 
 Schultz, 103 Cal. 208; 37 Pac. 220. 
 A building so defectively constructed 
 
26l LIABILITY OF MASTERS FOR SERVANTS. [§ 1 76 
 
 to keep its streets in a safe condition, it is liable for an injury- 
 caused by the want of proper guards around an excavation, 
 made in the street by a contractor at its request.^ So one, 
 who is bound to keep premises in repair, cannot relieve him- 
 self by contracting for repairs;^ nor can one do so, who is 
 bound by statute to cover up or refill excavations/ So one, 
 who obtains permission to excavate in a highway, is personally 
 bound to repair it, and cannot delegate that duty by contract,'* 
 and where one obtained a license from a city to incumber its 
 street, in order to perform certain work, which he thereupon 
 let to a contractor, he could not shield himself by such con- 
 tract from liability for the abuse of the license by the contractor, 
 amounting to a nuisance.^ Much less can one relieve himself 
 from responsibility for the non-performance of his own express 
 contract, by making a contract with another person to perform 
 it. And this principle is especially to be borne in mind, when 
 considering a claim on the part of a contractor to be relieved 
 from responsibility for the defaults of a subcontractor. On 
 the other hand, it is only a person in whose favor the contract 
 creates a duty who can take advantage of this rule. 
 
 as to be dangerous is a nuisance, and 438 ; 20 N. E. 33 ; limited, Shute v. 
 
 the doctrine of . independent con- Princeton, 58 Minn. 337 ; 59 N. W. 
 
 tractors does not apply (Wilkinson 1050. 
 
 V. Detroit Steel Works, 73 Mich. 405 ; = Curtis v. Kiley, 153 Mass. 133; 26 
 
 41 N. W. 490). N. E.421 ; Brennan v. Elli?, 70 Hun, 
 
 » Storrs V. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 ; St. 472 ; 24 N. Y. Supp. 436. 
 
 Paul V. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297. To same * Gray v. PuUen, 5 Best & S. 970, 
 
 effect, Bobbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 981. 
 
 657 ; Brusso v. Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679 : > Colgrove v. Smith, 102 Cal. 220 ; 
 
 Ironton v. Kelly, 38 Ohio St. 50 ; 36 Pac. 411. 
 
 Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Id. 465 ; « Darmstaetter v. Moynahan, 37 
 
 Wilson V. Wheeling, 19 West Va. Mich. 188. 
 323; Jefferson y. Chapman, 137 111. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 § 177. 
 
 178. 
 179. 
 180. 
 181. 
 183. 
 
 183. 
 184. 
 
 185. 
 185a. 
 
 1856. 
 
 186. 
 
 186a. 
 
 187. 
 
 188. 
 189. 
 
 190. 
 
 191. 
 
 192. 
 
 193. 
 
 194. 
 
 194a. 
 195. 
 
 Limitations of master's lia- 
 bility to servant. 
 
 Reason assigned for rule. 
 
 The real reason. 
 
 The genei'al rule. 
 
 Who are servants. 
 
 Volunteer, when considered 
 servant. 
 
 Who is a volunteer assistant. 
 
 Master does not insure 
 against risks. 
 
 What risks servants assume. 
 
 What risks servants do not 
 
 assume. 
 What facts 
 
 servants 
 
 may 
 
 presume. 
 Risks assumed under special 
 
 orders. 
 Risks of service outside of 
 
 ordinary employment. 
 Master liable for his own 
 
 negligence. 
 Concurrent negligence. 
 Degree of care required of 
 
 master. 
 Duration of master's duty 
 
 and exemption. 
 Duty to select competent 
 
 fellow-servants. 
 Evidence of negligence in 
 
 employment of servant. 
 Duty to employ suiBcient 
 
 force. 
 Duty to provide proper in- 
 strumentalities. 
 Duty of inspection and repair. 
 Limits of master's liability 
 
 for instrumentalities. 
 
 § 196. 
 
 197. 
 
 198. 
 198a. 
 
 199. 
 300. 
 201. 
 302. 
 
 203. 
 
 203a. 
 204. 
 
 205. 
 
 306. 
 
 207. 
 207a. 
 
 307b. 
 
 308. 
 
 309. 
 
 309a. 
 
 310. 
 311. 
 
 [262] 
 
 Master's duty as to instru- 
 mentalities not his own 
 pi'operty. 
 
 Illustrations of master's lia- 
 bility. 
 
 Low bridges. 
 
 Low bridges ; contributory 
 fault. 
 
 Low bridge cases limited. 
 
 [Omitted.] 
 
 Other dangerous projections. 
 
 Master's duty to prescribe 
 and enforce rules. 
 
 Master's duty to guard 
 and warn against unusual 
 risks. 
 
 Duty of supervision. 
 
 Delegation of master's per- 
 sonal duties. 
 
 Illustrations of non-transfer- 
 able duties. 
 
 What is sufficient notice to 
 master. 
 
 Contributory negligence. 
 
 What is not contributory 
 negligence. 
 
 Disobedience of rules and 
 orders. 
 
 Basis of imputed assumption 
 of risks from master's neg- 
 ligence. 
 
 Servant accepting employ- 
 ment with notice of defects. 
 
 Servant continuing with 
 notice of defects. 
 
 Efifect of refusal to repair. 
 
 True rule as to effect of serv- 
 ant's knowledge. 
 
263 
 
 § 211a 
 
 313. 
 313. 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 177 
 
 314. 
 
 315. 
 
 316. 
 
 217. 
 
 318. 
 219. 
 
 2l9a, 
 220. 
 
 231. 
 
 332. 
 223. 
 334. 
 325. 
 336. 
 
 337. 
 
 338. 
 339. 
 
 . Special risks incurred under 
 coercion. 
 
 Test of servant's prudence. 
 
 Excusable omissions of usual 
 care. 
 
 Notice of defect, without 
 notice of danger, imma- 
 terial. 
 
 Effect of master's promises 
 and assurances. 
 
 Presumption as to servant's 
 knovrledge. 
 
 Means of knowledge ; duty 
 to investigate. 
 
 Application of rule to minors. 
 
 Special duties of masters to 
 minors. 
 
 Inexperienced servants. 
 
 Servant's knowledge of mas- 
 ter's personal defects. 
 
 Servant's duty to warn and 
 complain. 
 
 Burden of proof. 
 
 "What is sufficient proof. 
 
 Who are fellow-servants. 
 
 Who are not fellow-servants. 
 
 American rule ; vice-pi-inci- 
 pals not fellow-servants. 
 
 British rule ; no vice-prin- 
 cipals. 
 
 British rule criticised. 
 
 British rule condemned at 
 home. 
 
 5 330. Who are vice-principals; 
 general managers. 
 
 331. Who are vice-principals; 
 New York rule. 
 
 233. Principle of New York de- 
 cision generally accepted. 
 
 233. In what duties servants act 
 as vice-principals. 
 
 333a. Examples of who are, or are 
 not, vice-principals. 
 
 3336. Peculiar local rules. 
 
 334. Servants must be in common 
 employment. 
 
 335. Common employment ; gen- 
 eral rule. 
 
 336. Who are in common employ- 
 ment under general rule. 
 
 237. Who are not in common em- 
 ployment. 
 
 238. Common emidoyment ; asso- 
 ciation rule. 
 
 239. Illustrations of common em- 
 ployment. 
 
 240. [Omitted.] 
 
 241. Illustration of fellow-serv- 
 ant in common employ- 
 ment under all rules. 
 
 241a. Effect of statutes and codes. 
 
 241&. Statutes of general applica- 
 tion. 
 
 241c. Statutes applying to railroad 
 companies. 
 
 241d. Exemption from liability by 
 special contract. 
 
 § 177. Limitations of master's liability to servant. — We 
 
 now have to consider the limitations which have been devised 
 by judges to the general rule of a master's liability for the 
 negligence of his servants, by force of which his own servants 
 have less claim against him than any one else has. In our 
 first three editions, we acquiesced in the principal English and 
 American decisions on this question, outside of the intolerable 
 rulings of the Massachusetts courts, partly because we had 
 elsewhere criticised so many judicial opinions, that we began 
 to feel ourselves in danger of just censure for presumption. 
 But no part of this treatise has been more useful or more ap- 
 proved by the highest courts, than that in which it opposed 
 and rejected ill-considered decisions ; while most of the parts 
 
§ 177] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 264 
 
 which have been overruled are those which followed the 
 apparent drift of authority. In our fourth edition, therefore, 
 we undertook to discuss all these questions in the light of 
 reason and on some basis of principle ; and we continue to do 
 so. The general rule of limitation will not be disputed ; 
 although the reasons given, eveji for that, have been often 
 declared unsatisfactory or incomprehensible, by judges who 
 assented to the rule itself.^ But, while starting from the 
 same foundation, the English and American decisions have 
 been gradually diverging, the former in favor of the mas- 
 ter and the latter against him, until English decisions upon 
 new questions of difificulty are practically useless in most 
 American courts. Some of the principal English and Massa- 
 chusetts decisions, moreover, having been made under the in- 
 fluence of a class-interest, and looking solely to the interest 
 and convenience of a single class, have gone so far as to shock 
 the moral sense of that very class, and have compelled legisla- 
 tures, composed almost exclusively of masters, to overrule 
 these decisions by statute. Since the whole of this new law 
 consists of judicial legislation, the example of the British Par- 
 liament, composed almost in solid mass of wealthy employers, 
 in repudiating judge-made law, invented solely for the benefit 
 of that class, should have a powerful influence, in every court 
 not yet tied up by precedents, in the direction of enlarging 
 the responsibility of the employing class, rather than of 
 diminishing it. It is gratifying to observe that the judges of 
 England and Massachusetts, within the last five or six years, 
 have manifested a disposition in this direction, so far as the 
 harsh decisions of their predecessors would permit. 
 
 ' In Lovell v. Howell (L. R. 1 C P. its range. It must be conceded that 
 
 D. 161, 167), Brett, J., says: "Now, it cannot rest on reasons drawn from 
 
 I decline to say, because I feel a considerations of justice or of public 
 
 dififlculty in understanding or defin- policy" (per Carpenter, J., in Zeigler 
 
 ing it, what is the precise principle v. Danbury, etc. R. Co., 53 Conn. 543; 
 
 on which the immunity of the master and see Chicago, etc. R. Co. t. Ross, 
 
 in these cases rests. But I am bound 112 U. S. 377, 383). " The limitation 
 
 by law and by the authority of de- has no foundation in abstract or nat- 
 
 cided cases to say that such immun- ural justice ; and all attempts to 
 
 ity does exist." "The defense of place it upon any other foundation 
 
 common employment has little of than that of public policy will prove 
 
 reason or principle to support it, and unsatisfactory" (Earl, J., Crispin v. 
 
 the tendency in nearly all jurisdic- Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516, 528). 
 tions is to limit rather than enlarge 
 
265 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 178 
 
 § 178. Reason assigned for rule. — The reason usually as- 
 signed for the exemption of masters from liability to their serv- 
 ants, is that a servant, in bargaining for his wages, takes into 
 account all the ordinary risks of the business upon which he 
 enters, and obtains a compensation which, upon the average, 
 covers these risks, among which are reckoned the negligence 
 of fellow-servants.^ Dr. Wharton thinks that this principle will 
 not sustain the rule, because, he says: "no agreement that a 
 party shall be held irresponsible for his negligence * * * 
 is valid."'' That ought to be the law, if it is not;^ but it does 
 not prove that a contract against liability for an agent' s negli- 
 gence is void. And the cases cited by him only hold that a 
 principal cannot enforce an unreasonable restriction of his lia- 
 bility for his agent's negligence;* a principle which we 
 thoroughly approve. But even this principle is not universally 
 accepted. Decisions can now be found both ways.' The in- 
 
 ' "The general rule, resulting from 
 considerations as well of justice as 
 of policy, is, that he who enga^ges in 
 the employment of another for the 
 performance of specified duties and 
 services, for compensation, takes up- 
 on himself the natural and ordinary 
 risks and perils incident to the per- 
 formance of such services, and in a 
 legal presumption, the compensation 
 is adjusted accordingly. And we are 
 not aware of any principle which 
 should except the perils arising from 
 the carelessness and negligence of 
 those who are in the same employ- 
 ment ; peril, which the servant is as 
 likely to know, and against whicla 
 he can as effectually guard, as the 
 master " (Farwell v. Boston & Wor- 
 cester E. Co., 4 Mete. 49). To same 
 effect, Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. El- 
 liott, 1 Coldw. [Tenn.] 611 ; Holden 
 v. Fitchburg R. Co., 139 Mass. 268; 
 Little Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Townsend, 
 41 Ark. 383 ; Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Black, 88 111. 112 ; Harrison v. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 31 N. J. Law, 293 ; State 
 V. Malster, 57 Md. 287 ; Mad River 
 R. Co. V. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541 ; 
 
 Morgan v. Vale of Neath R. Co. , L. 
 R. 1 Q. B. 149 ; Warburton v. Great 
 Western R. Co., L. R. 3 Exch. 30. 
 See also the following, which are less 
 distinct and explicit in holding that 
 the risks included are presumed to 
 have been considered in estimating 
 the compensation : Gibson v. Erie R. 
 Co., 63 N. Y. 449 ; Sweeney v. Berlin, 
 etc. Co., 101 Id. 530 ; Bartonshill Co. 
 V. Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. 265, 266. 
 
 2 Wharton, Negligence, § 199. 
 
 ^See Harrison v. Central R. Co., 
 31 N. J. Law, 293, 298. 
 
 ^ See cases cited,Wharton on Negl., 
 § 589, and § 505, post. 
 
 ' It is not the common law of Eng- 
 land (McCawley v. Furness, etc., R. 
 Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 59); nor of New 
 Yorh (Blair v. Erie R. Co., 66 N. Y. 
 313 ; Boucher v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 49 N. Y. 263 ; Wilson v. N. Y. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 97 Id. 87); New 
 Jersey (Kinney v. Central R. Co., 33 
 N. J. Law, 407); Maryland (Balti- 
 more, etc. R. Co. V. Brady, 33 Md. 
 333) ; Illinois (lU. Central R. Co. v. 
 Read, 37 111. 484) ; Michigan (Hawkins 
 V. Great Western R. Co., 17 Mich. 
 
§178] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 266 
 
 genious invention of Chief Baron Pollock, that no member of 
 an establishment could maintain an action against its head for 
 the fault of another member, which he was never weary of re- 
 peating,* has never been accepted as a basis for this rule ; and 
 Dr. Wharton's proposed principle, that a co-adventurer assumes 
 the consequences of all risks incidental to the business, is no 
 more satisfactory.' How can one "assume," by mere force 
 of circumstances, a risk which he is not allowed to assume by 
 express contract? Chief Justice Shaw's theory, that public 
 policy requires that servants should have no remedy against 
 their masters, in such cases, because the absence of any remedy 
 will make them more careful of their own safety than they 
 would otherwise be,* reminds us of nothing so much as the 
 opinion of Chief Justice Rufifin, in the days of slavery, that the 
 law denied any remedy for any amount of torture to a slave, 
 short of murder, out of humane regard to the best interests of the 
 slaves themselves.' There is quite as much to be said on behalf 
 
 57). In Virginia, a principal, e. g., 
 a railroad company, cannot, by con- 
 tract, exempt itself from liability for 
 personal injuries to a stranger, caused 
 by the negligence of its servants 
 (Johnson v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 86 Va. 975 ; 11 S. E. 829). Contracts 
 exempting masters f rona the liability 
 to their servants, imposed by law, 
 were held valid in Griffiths v. Dudley, 
 L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 357 ; Western, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Strong, 52 Ga. 461 ; Gallo- 
 way V. Western, etc. R. Co., 57 Id. 
 512 ; see Ingersoll v. Randall, 14 
 Minn. 400. They were held void, as 
 against public policy, in Roesner v. 
 Hermann, 8 Fed. 782 : 10 Bissell, 486 ; 
 Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Spangler, 
 44 Ohio St. 471 ; 8 N. E. 467 ; Little 
 Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Eubanks, 48 
 Ark. 460 ; 3 S. W. 808. In Massa- 
 chusetts, Iowa, Kansas, and Ala- 
 bama, sonie contracts of this kind 
 are made void by statute (see Kansas, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Peavey, 29 Kans. 1G9). 
 The British Employers' Liability Bill 
 (1893) was lost, only because the 
 Lords insisted upon an amendment 
 
 allowing such contracts in certain 
 cases, while the Commons refused to 
 assent thereto. 
 
 " In Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 Hurlst. 
 & N. 143, and other cases. 
 
 ' Wharton, Negligence, § 199. 
 
 8 Farwell v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 4 
 Mete. 49, 59. With regard to the 
 "supposed public policy" at the 
 foundation of the rule. Field, J., well 
 says : " It is assumed that the ex- 
 emption operates as a stimulant to 
 diligence and caution on the part of 
 the servant for his own safety as 
 well as that of his master, 
 but it may be doubted whether the 
 exemption has the effect thus claimed 
 for it. We have never known parties 
 more willing to subject themselves to 
 danger of life or limb, because . . . 
 damages could be recovered by their 
 representatives or themselves for the 
 loss or injury" (Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Ross, 113 U. S. 377, 383 ; 5 S. Ct. 
 184). 
 
 'State V. Mann, 3 L)ev. [N. C] 
 Law, 363. 
 
267 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 1 79 
 
 of the latter proposition as of the former; perhaps more. We 
 fully agree with Mr. Horace Smith/" and with the British Par- 
 liament," that true public policy is opposed to the whole rule 
 of exemption to masters as against their servants, and that 
 accidents would be far less frequent, and the public interest 
 better served, if the rule were entirely abolished. The true 
 rule, in our opinion, would be to hold masters to the obliga- 
 tion of ordinary care in each of their agents, as well toward 
 fellow-servants as toward strangers ; but, in consideration of 
 the well-attested fact that the familiarity of servants with dan- 
 ger always makes them more careless of their own safety than 
 strangers to such work would be, there should be a presump- 
 tion of contributory negligence on their part, not to be over- 
 come without positive evidence of their due care at the time 
 of the accident, or, if that is impracticable, as in cases of death 
 or loss of reason, evidence of their constant habit of care at 
 other times. 
 
 § 179. The real reason. — If the exemption of masters from 
 liability to servants for the negligence of fellow-servants is 
 founded upon any principle whatever, it must be upon an 
 assumption that, in a majority of cases so large as to constitute 
 a rule for all others, both employer and employee tacitly 
 understand, when the employment begins, that the employee is 
 not to expect indemnity from the employer against the negli- 
 gence of other persons in the same common employment.^ If 
 it is true that such is the universal understanding between the 
 parties, though unexpressed, and that such was the case before 
 the question had ever been passed upon by the courts, there 
 is a good foundation for the rule, in all cases in which an ex- 
 press contract to the same effect would be binding. For, 
 upon a familiar principle of the law of contracts, where both 
 parties to the contract of hiring have, in fact, each understood 
 the contract in that sense,^ or where the employee entered into 
 
 '» Smith's Negligence [Whit, ed.], ' Harrison v. Central R. Co. 31 N. 
 
 138. J. Law, 293. 
 
 "A bill abolishing this exemption ' See Scrantom v. Booth, 29 Barb, 
 
 passed both houses of Parliament, in 171 ; Saltus v. Prujn, 18 How. Pr. 
 
 1893 ; yet it fell through, on account 513 ; Hartford, etc. R. Co. v. Jack- 
 
 of amendments by the Lords, which son, 24 Conn. 514 ; Hazard v. New 
 
 the Commons rejected. England Ins. Co. 1 Sumn. 218 ; Pars. 
 
 Contr. (6 ed.) 475, note (a). 
 
§ l8o] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 268 
 
 the contract of service, knowing or believing that the employer 
 understood this condition to be implied,^ the condition is 
 implied, just as effectually as if it had been put down in writing. 
 And if such a mutual understanding has always existed, in the 
 vast majority of cases, and a contrary understanding has not 
 been known to exist in any appreciable number of cases, such 
 a state of facts creates a settled usage, the terms of which are 
 implied in every contract from which they are not expressly 
 excluded,* even though one of the parties may not have known 
 of the usage or intended to assent to it, so long as the other 
 party was not aware of that circumstance. These are well 
 known principles in the law of contracts ; and they are prop- 
 erly applicable to the law of master and servant. And, 
 whatever may have been the' fact fifty years ago, when the 
 courts began to evolve this branch of the law, we think that 
 it must be conceded that their long course of decisions, whether 
 originally correct or not, have established a general and notori- 
 ous usage, which every intelligent man now takes into account, 
 when entering into a contract of service. We shall adopt this 
 principle, as the only one which can justify any limitation of 
 the master's liability to a servant, as distinguished from a 
 stranger, and shall apply this test to all questionable decisions 
 and doubtful cases. Those adjudications which can stand 
 under this test, ought to stand ; and the sooner all others are 
 overruled, the better will be the state of the law. If those 
 cases, in which it has recently been held that all express con- 
 tracts limiting the liability of masters to their servants are 
 void, as against public policy, were correctly decided, then the 
 rule of limitation is founded upon no reason whatever ; for no 
 intelligible reason, other then that of implied contract, has 
 ever been suggested by the courts ; and they have always as- 
 signed that reason, even when suggesting others. 
 
 § 180. The general rule. — Under the principles before 
 stated, it must be conceded to be settled at common law that 
 a master is not liable for injuries personally suffered by his 
 servant through the ordinary risks of the business,^ including 
 
 3 Barlow v. Scott, 34 N. Y. 40: 617; Pollock v. Stables, 12 Q. B. 765; 
 White V. Hoyt, 73 Id. 505. Dale v. Huuifrey, El., B. & El. 1004. 
 
 * Field V. Lelean, 6 Hurlst. & N. ^ See % 184, post . 
 
269 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§i8o 
 
 the negligence of a fellow-servant,^ acting as such/ while 
 engaged in the same common employment/ unless the master 
 is chargeable with negligence in the selection of the servant in 
 fault/ or in retaining him after actual or constructive notice of 
 his incompetency/ This "bad exception to a bad rule," as 
 Lord Esher called it, in his testimony before a parliamentary 
 committee, was first suggested in 1837, in an English court, in 
 Priestly v. Fowler/ where the precise point did not arise. 
 That case, however, is always spoken of as the foundation of 
 the rule. The first real decision of the question was made in 
 South Carolina in 1841/ This was cited and approved by 
 Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts, in 1842, in the Farwell 
 case/ which is the leading case on the question, and contains 
 all the reasoning in favor of the rule which is worth mention- 
 ing.^" His opinion was followed in New York in 1847." The 
 
 'Hutchinson v. York, etc. R. Co., 
 5 Exch. 343. As to who are fellow- 
 servants, see § 224, et seq., post. In 
 Wilson V. Merry (L. R,, 1 Sc. App. 
 326) , Lord Cairns objected to the use 
 of the term "fellow-servant," as in- 
 adequate to express the rule cor- 
 
 ■■3 Mees. & W. 1. "Meeson & 
 Welsby " have been often said, in 
 England, to have produced more bad 
 law than can be found in many times 
 the same number of volumes else- 
 where. Lord Abinger, who deliv- 
 ered this judgment, and who, as Sir 
 
 reotly. It certainly did not, if the James Scarlett, was esteemed as the 
 doctrines advanced by him were ablest advocate at tlie bar, was (for 
 
 sound. But, as will presently appear, 
 these doctrines are not accepted by 
 any court in the United States, and 
 have been condemned by the British 
 Parliament as contrary to natural 
 justice. 
 ^ When a, fellow-servant acts in 
 
 the same reasons) considered to be 
 one of the pooi-est judges. 
 
 * Murray v. South Carolina R. Co., 
 1 McMull. Law, 885. 
 
 ' Farwell v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 4 
 Mete. 49. 
 
 10 Perhaps we should mention the 
 
 place of the master, the rule does slashing opinion in Ryan v. Cumber- 
 
 not apply : see § 204, post. 
 
 * This is a necessary condition. 
 See § 234, post. Contributory negli- 
 gence of a fellow-servant of a plain- 
 tiff is no defense for a defendant 
 who is not the master of either 
 
 land R. Co. (23 Pa. St. 384), which, 
 however, consists mainly of ai'gu- 
 ments which have since been almost 
 universally rejected. 
 
 " The Farwell case was cited with 
 approval in New York in 1844, in 
 
 (Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Chambers, Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill, 592; and 
 
 15 CCA. 327 ; 68 Fed. 148). expressly adopted in 1847, in Coon v. 
 
 'This is conceded in all the fore- Syracuse, etc. K. Co., 6 Barb. 231; 
 
 going cases. See § \^\, post. affi'd, 1851, 5 N. Y. 492. The courts 
 
 * ^g 191, 192, post. See Weger v. assigned no reasons of their own, 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 460 ; and counsel did not even argue this 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Stafford, 16 question. See report in 6 Barb. 
 
 111. App. 84; Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. 231. 
 Collarn 73 Ind. 261. 
 
§i8o] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 270 
 
 precise point was first decided in England in 1850, and fol- 
 lowed ever since.'^ Since then the rule has been forced upon 
 Scotland, by the votes of English judges, overruling the 
 Scotch courts ; '^ and it has been accepted by all American 
 courts, both Federal and state," with only some qualifications 
 
 "' Hutchinson v. York, etc. R. Co., 
 5 Exch. 343; Wigmore v. Jay, Id. 354; 
 Tarrant v. Webb, 18 C. B. 797; Mor- 
 gan V. Vale of Neath R. Co., L. R. 1 
 Q. B. 149; Searle t. Lindsay, 11 C. 
 B. [N. S.] 429; Griffiths v. Gidlow, 3 
 Hurlst. & N. 648. 
 
 " See a review of this doctrine in 
 Dixon V. Ranken (14 Dunlop, 480), 
 where the courts of Scotland em- 
 phatically repudiated it; although 
 the House of Lords, on a subsequent 
 appeal, declared the law of Scotland 
 to be the same in this respect as that 
 of England (Bartonshill Coal Co. v. 
 Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. 366) . This was 
 a gross example of bald judicial 
 legislation : three English judges, 
 who knew nothing of Scotch law, 
 overruling fifteen Scotch judges, 
 who had made it a lifelong study. 
 
 '■' So held in the courts of the 
 United States (Randall v. Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co. 109 U. S. 478); in Canada 
 (O'SuUivan v. Victoria R. Co., 44 
 Upper Canada, 128); in Neiv York 
 (Coon v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co.. 5 N. 
 Y. 492; Keegan v. W^estern R. Co., 
 8 Id. 175 ; Russell v. Hudson Riv. R. 
 Co., 17 Id. 134 ; Crispin v. Babbitt, 
 81 Id. 51G) ; Alabama (Cook v. Par- 
 ham, 24 Ala. 21, 36 ; Mobile, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672, 682) ; Cali- 
 fomia (Yeomans v. Contra Costa S. 
 N. Co., 44 Cal. 71 ; Hogan v. Central 
 Pac. R. Co., 49 Id. 128 ; Civil Code, 
 § 1970) ; Colorado (Summerhays \-. 
 Kansas Pac. R. Co.. 2 Colo. 434; 
 Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Farrow, 6 
 Id. 498j ; Connecticut (Burke v. Nor- 
 wich, etc. R. Co., 34 Conn. 474; Dar- 
 rigan v. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 52 Id. 285); Florida (Parrish v. 
 
 Pensacola, etc. R. Co., 28 Fla. 251 ; 9 
 So. 696) ; Oeorgia{see Georgia, etc. R. 
 Co, v. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645) ; Idaho 
 (Minty v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2 Idaho, 
 437 ; 21 Pac. 660); Illinois (Honner 
 V. Illinois, etc. R Co., 15 lU. 550 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Murphy, 53 
 Id. 336; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Powers, 74 Id. 341); Indiana (Madi- 
 son R. Co. V. Bacon, 6 Ind. 205; 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Adams, 
 105 Id. 151) ; Iowa (Sullivan v. Mis- 
 sissippi, etc. R. Co., 11 Iowa, 421 ; 
 Benn v. Null, 65 Id., 407); Kansas 
 (Union Pacific R. Co. v. Young, 8 
 Kans. 638) ; Maine (Blake v. Maine 
 Cent. R. Co., 70 Me. 60) ; Maryland 
 (O'Coniiell V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 20 Md. 212; Hanrathy v. Northern 
 Cent. R. Co. 46 Id. 280) ; Massachu- 
 setts (FarweU v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 4 Mete. 49 ; Clifford v. Old Colony 
 R. Co. 141 Mass. 564; 6 N. E. 751)"; 
 Michigan (Davis v. Detroit, etc. R. 
 Co, 20 Mich. 105 ;-Michigan Cent. 
 R. Co. V. Dolan, 32 Id. 510); 3Iinne- 
 sota (Fraker v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 32 Minn. 54 ; 19 N. W. 349) ; Mis- 
 souri (Rohbach v. Pacific R. Co., 43 
 Mo. 187; Lee v. Detroit, etc.. Works, 
 63 Id. 565 ; Ryan v. McCully, 123 
 Mo. 636 ; 27 S. W. 533) ; Kew Jersey 
 (McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N. J. Law, 
 118 ; Colly er v. Penn. R. Co., 49 j; 
 J. Law, 59 ; 6 Atl. 437) ; North Caro- 
 lina (Ponton V. Wilmington, etc. 
 R. Co., 6 Jones, Law, 245; Hardy v. 
 Carolina Cent. R. Co., 76 N. C. 5 ; 
 Hagins v. Cape Fear R, Co., 106 Id. 
 537 ; 11 S. E. 5P0) ; Ohio (Mad River, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541, 
 562 ; Whaalan v. Mad River, etc. R. 
 Co., 8 Id. 349); Oregon (Willis v. 
 
2/1 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§I8I 
 
 in Kentucky " and some Western and Southern states ; 
 which, however, turn rather upon the interpretation of the 
 rule than upon the rule itself." 
 
 § i8l. [New.'] Who are servants. — The same principles 
 are applied to determining who is a servant, for the purpose of 
 settling a question as to the master's liability or non-liability 
 to him, as are applied to the question of his liability for him. 
 Persons who, in a sense, serve another person, but are not his 
 " servants," within the definition heretofore given,^ stand upon 
 the same footing as strangers.^ Thus an independent con- 
 
 Oregon R. etc. Co., n Greg. 257; 
 4 Pac. 131); Pennsylvania (Ryan v. 
 Cumberland R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 384; 
 Reeso v. Biddle, 112 Id. 72 ; 3 Atl. 
 813) ; South Carolina (Murray v. S. 
 Carolina R. Co., 1 McMull. Law, 385; 
 Boat Wright v. Northeastern R. Co., 
 258. C. 138); Tennessee (Fox v. Sand- 
 ford, 4 Sneed [Tenn.], 36); Texas 
 (Price V. Houston Nav. Co., 46 Tex. 
 535; citing numerous cases; Railroad 
 Co. V. Miller, 51 Tex. 370) ; Vermont 
 (Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59 ; Hard v. 
 Vermont, etc., R. Co., 32 Id. 473), 
 and Virginia (Norfolk, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Nuckols,91 Va. 193 ; 21 S. E. 842). 
 Wisconsin at first denied this judge- 
 made law (Chamberlain v. Milwau- 
 kee, etc. R. Co., 11 Wise. 248); but 
 the same court, solely out of defer- 
 ence to the overwhelming current of 
 authority in other states, fell into 
 line (Cooper v. Milwaukee, etc. R. 
 Co., 23 Wise. 668); and remains 
 there (Craven v. Smith, 89 Wise. 119; 
 61 N. W. 317). 
 
 '^ In Kentucky, a master is held 
 liable to his servant for the gross 
 negligence of a superior fellow-serv^ 
 ant (Louisville, etc. R. Co v. Rob- 
 inson. 4 Bush, 507 ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Filbern, 6 Id. 574), but for 
 nothing short of that (Robinson v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., Ky. ; 
 34 S. W. 635): nor even for gross 
 negligence of a fellow-servant, of 
 
 the same grade or rank, and engaged 
 in the same field of labor (Volz v. 
 Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 95 Ky. 
 188: 24 S. W. 119; Fort Hill Stone 
 Co. V. Orm, 84 Ky. 183). 
 
 '« See §§ 333&, 2Z8, post. 
 
 ' In our last edition, § 181 was de- 
 voted to the "effect of statutes." 
 The multiplication of these statutes 
 makes it necessary to devote several 
 sections to them at the end of this 
 chapter. 
 
 ' Ante, %% 160, 164. See a curious 
 question as to what constitutes a 
 servant within this rule in Fowler v. 
 Lock, L. R. 7 C. P. 273. See, also, 
 Bradley v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 3 
 T. & C. 288 ; affi'd, 62 N. Y. 99 ; 
 Kelly V. Johnson, 128 Mass. 530; 
 where A., a sei'vant of B., recovered 
 of C. for the negligence of C.'s ser- 
 vants, while A. was aiding them in 
 pursuance of their false representa- 
 tions that B. had directed him so to 
 do. A postal clerk on a train, what- 
 ever may be his precise status, is not 
 a servant of the railroad company 
 (Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Hampton, 
 64 Tex. 427). A servant cannot, by 
 neglecting to act as such, entitle him- 
 self to the rights of a stranger 
 (EvEi.ns V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 63 
 Mo. 49). 
 
 2 For some peculiar cases, in which 
 one who is not a " servant " may 
 claim the same protection from in- 
 
§ 1 82] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 2/2 
 
 tractor or the servant of such contractor is not within the rule ; 
 and he may recover against the employer of such contractor 
 in like manner with any stranger.* On the other hand, he has 
 no greater rights than any mere stranger has.' The wife, child 
 or servant of a servant is of course not a servant of his master in 
 any sense. And the legal fiction, by which a servant is held to 
 assume certain risks, does not bind him to assume any risks to 
 his family. He has, therefore, the same right to recover from 
 his master damage caused to him by injuries suffered by his 
 wife, child or servant, as any one else has.^ Prisoners, com- 
 pelled to work in or out of prison, are not servants of the 
 persons controlling them nor fellow-servants with each other.' 
 
 § 182. Volunteer, when considered servant. — One who, 
 without being requested or authorized by the master to do so, 
 assists his servants to serve him, is deemed to be so far their 
 fellow-servant as to limit the liability of the master to him, 
 even though he would not be regarded as a servant so far as to 
 make the rhaster liable to strangers for his negligence.* This 
 is so where such assistance is given at the request of the serv- 
 ants ; ^ and it can make no difference in his favor that the 
 person rendering such assistance does so unasked or even 
 
 jury that a servant can, seeHannigan ' Buckalew v. Tennessee Coal Co., 
 
 V. Union Warehouse Co., 3 N. Y. Ala. ; 30 So. 606 ; Bos well v. 
 
 App. Div. 618 ; 38 N. Y. Supp. 272 Barnhart, 96 Ga. 531 ; 28 S. E 414. 
 
 [duty to furnish safe implements] ; ' Degg v. Midland R. Co., 1 Hnrlst. 
 
 Hart wig V. Bay State Shoe Co., 43 & N. 773; Potter v. Faulkner, 1 
 
 Hun, 425 [same, in favor of convict Best& S. 800 ; Osborne v. Knox, etc. 
 
 against contractor] ; and so where no E. Co. , 68 Me. 49. 
 
 such duty can be claimed (Bibb v. 'Osborne v. Knox, etc. R. Co., 
 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 87 Va. 711 ; 14 supra ; Johnson v. Ashland Water 
 
 S. E. 163 ; Hanna v. Chattanooga, Co., 71 Wise. 553 : 37 N. W. 823 ; 
 
 etc. R. Co., 88Tenn. 310 ; 12 S. W. Bonner v. Bryant, 79 Tex. 540; 15 
 
 718). S. W. 491 ; Helm V. Louisville, etc. 
 
 "Galvin v. New York, 113 N. Y. R. Co., Ky. ; 33 S. W. 390. The 
 
 223 ; 19 N. E. 675 ; Neimeyer v. contrary decision was made in the 
 
 Weyerhaeuser, 95 Iowa, 497; 64N.W. Scotch case of Little v. Summerlee 
 
 416 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v . Clark, Iron Co. , 27 Jur. 135 ; 17 Dunlop, 
 
 26 Neb. 645 ; 42 N. W. 703. 310. In Pennsylvania Co. v. Galla- 
 
 ' Floette v. Third Av. R. Co , 10 N. her (40 Ohio St. 637). an employee of 
 
 Y. App. Div. 308 ; 41 N. Y, Supp. 793. a railroad company, while repairing 
 
 « Gannon V. HousatonicR. Co.,112 a freight car, called upon his son, 
 
 Mass. 234 : Campbell v. Harris, 4 aged eleven years, to assist him, who, 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 036 ; 33 S. W. 85. while doing so, was injured by other 
 
273 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§183 
 
 against the will of the master or of the servants, or both. In 
 such case he may be a trespasser ; and if so, he diminishes his 
 right to recover for an injury received under such circum- 
 stances by his contributory fault.^ On the other hand, if his 
 assistance is rendered at the request of the master or his 
 authorized agent, he becomes for the time a servant in every 
 legal sense, with the benefits ^ as well as the burdens of that 
 position. 
 
 § 183. Who is a volunteer assistant. — It is not every act 
 of literal assistance to a servant that makes the person doing 
 it an " assistant " within the scope of the term as we havejust 
 used it. The act must be done with the intention of rendering 
 a service to the master. If done for the benefit of himself or 
 any one else, and the person doing it does so only because he 
 cannot otherwise effect his own purpose, he may be a tres- 
 passer, but he is not in any sense a servant of that master.' 
 
 servants of the company backing a 
 train down on him. The company- 
 was held liable ; the court consider- 
 ing that the father bad an implied 
 authority to call for mechanical 
 assistance. 
 
 ' It has been held that whei'e a rail- 
 road company has not given its con- 
 ductor express or apparent author- 
 ity to employ help, and there is no 
 exigency requiring extra help, a boy 
 of 15 who willingly obeys his re- 
 quest to assist on a car, is a trespasser, 
 and, if injured, cannot recover from 
 the company in the absence of will- 
 ful or gross negligence (Hot Springs 
 R Co. V. Dial, 58 Ark. 318 ; 24 S. W. 
 500). That case is one of many, in 
 which bad la .'' was invented in order 
 to overcome a perverse verdict 
 against the obvious weight of evi- 
 dence. 
 
 * A person who without pay assists 
 as a brakeman in making up a rail- 
 road train by the direction or with 
 the express permission of a yard- 
 master, who has authority to employ 
 necessary assistants in his depart- 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 18] 
 
 ment, is not a trespasser on the train, 
 but a servant of the company, and 
 it will be liable to him for an injury 
 resulting from the use of a defective 
 brake (Central Trust Co. v. Texas, 
 etc. R. Co., 33 Fed. 448). 
 
 ' The cases of Degg v. Midland R. 
 Co. and Potter v. Faulkner were 
 distinguished in Wright v. North- 
 western R. Co., L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 
 252, where the defendant was held 
 liable to one who was assisting its 
 servants in delivering to him his own 
 goods, for an injury caused to him 
 during the process of delivery by 
 the negligence of defendant's ser- 
 vants. Coleridge, C. J., says : " It is 
 plain, therefore, that the plaintiff 
 was not acting merely as a volun- 
 teer . . . nor was it the case of 
 master and servant. . . . But 
 the defendants being bound by con- 
 tract to deliver the heifer to the 
 plaintiff, they . . . allowed the 
 plaintiff to take part in the delivery, 
 and they were, therefore, bound to 
 see that he did not get injured by the 
 negligence of their servants." This 
 
§i84] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 274 
 
 Thus, if a horse is running away and is stopped by a person 
 otherwise in danger of being run over, such person does not 
 tliereby become in any degree a servant of the owner of the 
 horse. So one, whose house is threatened by the spread of a 
 fire in his neighbor's, does not lose any rights as a stranger by 
 helping to put out the fire. 
 
 § 184. Master does not insure against risks. — The master 
 is not bound to protect his servants, at all hazards, against 
 defects in materials or instruments used in his work, nor against 
 the risks and perils of the business. The contract of employ- 
 ment does not imply an absolute warranty that the materials 
 and instruments furnished shall be sound or fit for the pur- 
 poses to which they are applied,' nor that the servant shall not 
 
 case was followed where a street 
 railway company was held liable to 
 a passenger who, at the request of 
 the driver, assisted in pushing a car, 
 for an injury suffered through neg- 
 ligence of the driver of another car 
 (Mclntire St. R. Co. v. Bolton, 43 
 Ohio St. 334 ; Stastney v. Second Ave, 
 R. Co.,18N. Y. Supp. 800). Thefol- 
 lowing hard case seems to be opposed 
 to these decisions : Defendant was 
 delivering a large fly-wheel at the 
 factory of B., plaintiff's employer, 
 and the servants of both defendant 
 and B. were jointly engaged in un- 
 loading the wheel. Defendant's 
 foreman called for help as the wheel 
 was being lowered, and B.'s foreman 
 ordered plaintiff to assist, and while 
 executing this order plaintiff was 
 caught under the wheel and injured. 
 Held, that plaintiff assumed the re- 
 lation of servant to defendant, even 
 though ordered to assist by his em- 
 ployer's foreman at the request for 
 help from defendant's foreman, and 
 that he could not recover for the 
 negligence of the other servants of 
 defendant (Wischam v. Rickards, 
 136 Pa. St. 109; 30 Atl. 533). See 
 also Billows v. Moors, 163 Mass. 43 ; 
 37 N. E. 750. 
 
 ' Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S, 313 ; 
 4 S, Ct. 483 [projecting timber giving 
 way] ; Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 
 470 ; Dillon v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 97 
 Id. 637. This is substantially the 
 form in which the doctrine is stated 
 in the following cases, where mas- 
 ters were held not liable to servants 
 for defects in materials, etc. : Or- 
 mond V. Holland, El., Bl. & El. 103 
 Hard v. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 33 Vt, 
 473 ; Columbus, etc. R. Co. v. "Webb, 
 13 Ohio St. 475 ; Mad River, etc. K 
 Co. V. Barber, 5 Id. 541 : Indian 
 apolis, etc. R. Co. v. Love, 10 Ind' 
 554 ; Murphy v. Crossan, 98 Pa. St, 
 
 495 ; Sykes v. Packer, 99 Id. 465 [in 
 construction of building, plaintiff, a 
 rigger, injured by falling rafters] ; 
 Ladd V. New Bedford, etc. R. Co., 
 119 Mass. 412 [roadmaster injured 
 by breaking of switch]; Indianapolis, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Toy, 91 111. 474 [fire- 
 man injured by explosion of boiler]; 
 Richardson v. Cooper, 88 111. 270 
 [machine which had previously been 
 abundantly sufficient, but fell out 
 of repair, unknown to master]; Bry- 
 mer v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 90 Cal. 
 
 496 ; 37 Pac. 371 ; Watts v. Hart, 7 
 Wash. St. 178 : 34 Pac. 433, 771 ; 
 Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. Askew, 90 
 
275 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§184 
 
 be exposed to extraordinary risks.^ A master is not liable to 
 his servant for any defects in the materials furnished to the 
 latter for use in the master's service, unless he, or those 
 entrusted by him with the selection or inspection of such 
 materials, had notice of such defects or could have discovered 
 them by the use of ordinary care in selection or inspection,'' 
 and negligently omitted to warn the servant of their defects. 
 A railroad company is, therefore, not prima facie liable to 
 any of its servants for defects in its rolling stock,* rails,^ ties,* 
 
 Ala. 5 ; 7 So. 833 ; St. Louis, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Jagerman, 59 Ark. 98 ; 36 S. 
 W. 591 ; Van Winkle v. Chicago, 
 etc. K. Co., 93 Iowa, 509 ; 61 N. W. 
 929. 
 
 "^ Riley v. Baxendale, 6 Hurlst. & 
 N. 446 ; Lasky v. Canadian Pac. R. 
 Co., 83 Me. 461 ; 22 Atl. 367 ; Toledo, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Conroy, 68 111. 567 ; 
 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Philips, 49 
 Id. 334 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Thompson, 56 Id. 138. Compare also, 
 Gibson V, Pacific R. Co., 46 Mo. 163 ; 
 Crown V. Orr, 140 N. Y. 450 ; 35 N. E. 
 648. The test of liability is the negli- 
 gence of the master, not the danger 
 of the employment, though the 
 danger of the employment may help 
 to determine the ordinary care re- 
 quired in the case (Knight v. Cooper, 
 36W. Va. 233; 14 S. E. 999). 
 
 ' Washington, etc. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Dade, 135 U. S. 554 ; 10 S. Ct. 1044 ; 
 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 ; De- 
 Graff V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 76 Id. 125 [defect in brake chain, not 
 discoverable by usual means] ; Han- 
 rathy v. Northern Central R. Co. , 46 
 Md. 280 [alleged defect in steam 
 hammer] ; Allerton Packing Co. v. 
 Ejan, 86 111. 253 [explosion of steam 
 tank] ; Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Jones, 9 Heisk. 373 [explosion of 
 boiler]; Jones v. N. Y. Central, etc. 
 R. Co., 33 Hun, 284 [brakeman killed 
 by breaking of a ladder on freight 
 car] ; Smoot v. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 
 
 67 Ala. 13 [brakeman injured while 
 coupling cars, by reason of a broken 
 strap which supported bumper] ; 
 Little Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Duffey, 35 
 Ark. 603 [trackman injured by a de- 
 fective spike maul] ; Lake Shore R. 
 Co. V. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440 
 [brakeman injured by catching his 
 foot in switch frog, while coupling 
 cars] ; Riley v. Baxendale, 6 Hurlst. 
 & N. 446 [porter killed at a station 
 by a i-ailway truck] ; Seaver v. Bos- 
 ton & Maine R. Co., 14 Gray, 466 
 [carpenter riding from work, injured 
 by breaking of axle, and lack of 
 safety beams] ; Gunter v. Granite- 
 ville Mfg. Co., 15 S. C. 443 [cotton 
 machinery]. So held where the 
 origin of the defect did not appear 
 (Warner v. Erie R. Co., 39 N. Y. 468; 
 Ormond v. Holland, El., Bl. & El. 
 102 ; Flynn v. Beebe, 98 Mass, 57.i ; 
 Columbus, etc. R. Co. v. Webb, 12 
 Ohio St. 475 ; Hayden v. Smithville 
 Mfg. Co., 39 Conn. 548; Buzzell v. 
 LaconiaMfg. Co., 48 Me. 113 ; Priest- 
 ley V. Fowler, 3 Mees. & W. 1). 
 
 < Hard V. Vermont, etc. R. Co., 32 
 Vt. 473 ; Mad River, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Barber, 5 Ohio St. 54*. ; De Graff v. 
 N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 
 135. 
 
 "■ Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Love, 
 10 Ind. 554 ; Colorado R. Co. v. 
 Ogden, 3 Colo. 499. 
 
 « Little Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Town- 
 send. 41 Ark. 383. 
 
§i85] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 276 
 
 or bridges,' even where such servant is not employed upon the 
 particular thing which is defective, but upon work wholly 
 unconnected therewith.* In short, the master does not insure 
 the safety of his servants.^ 
 
 § 185. What risks servants assume.— A servant is held to 
 assume the ordinary risks of the business upon which he 
 enters,* so far as those risks, at the time of his entering upon 
 
 ' Warner r. Erie R. Co., 39 N. Y. 
 468 ; rev'g s. C, 49 Barb. 558. 
 
 * "Where the plaintiff was em- 
 ployed by a raibroad company upon 
 work unconnected with its trains or 
 tracks, and daily passed over its road 
 free of charge, to and from his work, 
 and the train carrying him was 
 thrown from the track, in conse- 
 quence of some rails not being prop- 
 erly joined together, it was held that 
 the company was not liable (Sea- 
 ■ver y. Boston & Maine B. Co., 14 
 Gray, 466 ; Moss v. Johnson, 23 111. 
 633). These decisions can only be 
 supported upon the assumption that 
 no negligence in selecting or inspect- 
 ing the rails was proved (Compai'e 
 § 194). The reasoning in the latter 
 case is very feeble ; and it is practi- 
 cally overruled in Toledo, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Conroy, 68 111. 567. Where a de- 
 duction was made on account of 
 such transaction, from the wages 
 that would otherwise have been al- 
 lowed, it was held that the servant 
 had for the time all the rights of 
 other passengers (O'Donnell v. 
 Allegheny Valley R. Co., 59 Pa. 
 St. 289). The opposite ruling was 
 made in Vick v. N. T. Central R. 
 Co., 95 N. Y. 267. The question 
 on which the two courts differed 
 was whether the contract really 
 amounted to payment of fare by 
 the servant, or whether he was car- 
 ried free, as a servant, and was in 
 service, while traveling. If a ser- 
 vant is required to pay any fare 
 
 whatever, on his way to work, there 
 can be no doubt that he has all the 
 rights of a passenger. 
 
 ' Needham v. Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co., 85 Ky. 428 ; 11 S. W. 306 ; Bry- 
 mer v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 90 
 Cal. 496 ; 37 Pac. 371 ; Colorado R. 
 Co. V. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499. 
 
 ' Sweeney v. Berlin, etc. Co., 101 
 N. Y. 520 ; 5 N. E. 358, and cases 
 cited ; Dysinger v. Cincinnati, etc. 
 R. Co., 93 Mich. 646 ; 53 N. W. 825 
 [car coupling] ; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 
 Pa. St. 628 ; 11 Atl. 514 ; Lee v. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 86 Ga. 331 ; 13 S. E. 307 ; 
 Rutledge v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 110 
 Mo. 313 ; 19 S. W. 38. A servant as- 
 sumes such risks as, from the nature 
 of the business as ordinarily con- 
 ducted, he must have known, and 
 those risks which the exercise of his 
 opportunities for inspection would 
 have disclosed to him (Linton Coal 
 Mining Co. v. Persons, Ind. 
 43 N. E. 651). To similar effect, 
 Smith V. SeUars, 40 La. Ann. 537 ; 
 4 So. 333 ; Central R. Co. v. Sims, 80 
 Ga. 749 ; 7 S. E. 176 [jerk of train]. 
 An employee assumes not only the 
 risks which always attend his em- 
 ployment, but those, also, which 
 commonly do so (Gulf, etc. R. Co. v_ 
 Kizziah. 86 Tex. 81 ; 33 S. W. 578).' 
 In a cold climate, railroad em- 
 ployees assume risks incident to ac- 
 cumulation of snow and ice on the 
 tracks (Lawson v. Truesdale 60 
 Minn. 410; 63 N. W. 546). 
 
277 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 185 
 
 the business,^ are known to him, or should be readily discerni- 
 ble by a person of his age and capacity, in the exercise of 
 ordinary care,^ and whether the business is dangerous or not.* 
 Notwithstanding the general rule that the master is bound 
 to use due care to furnish safe and sound materials, machinery, 
 etc., yet the servant assumes the risk of obvious defects in 
 things which he voluntarily uses,^ if his work consists, in whole 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Leech, 41 Ohio St. 
 u88 [section hand, riding on hand- 
 car run over by delayed train] ; Do- 
 well V. Burlington, etc. R. Co., C2 
 Iowa, 639 [brakeman injured by con- 
 tact with snow bank formed b}' snow 
 plow] ; Coolbroth v. Maine Central 
 R. Co., 77 Me. 165 [plaintiff injured, 
 after three weeks' experience in 
 throwing mail bags into train in mo- 
 tion] ; Penn. R. Co. y. Wachter, 60 
 Md. 395 [trackman injured on hand- 
 car, by collision with a special train, 
 running, according to a custom 
 known to him, without notice] ; Tay- 
 lor V. Carew Mfg. Co., 140 Mass. 
 150 ; 3 N. E. 21 [employee in mill 
 going to adjust a belt, ordered by 
 foreman to hurry, fell into an un- 
 guarded elevator well] ; Walsh v. 
 St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 27 Minn. 367 
 [freight handler rolling heavy 
 grindstone over uneven fiioor]. An 
 employer is not liable for the death 
 of an employee' who was killed by 
 the igniting of the fumes of black 
 varnish with which he was painting, 
 where deceased had used black var- 
 nish for twelve years, and the torch 
 from which the fire occurred was 
 used at his suggestion, and the var- 
 nish was of the same quality as that 
 he had always used (Lyons v. Boston 
 Towage Co., 163 Mass. 158 ; 39 N. E. 
 800). 
 
 ^Kaare v. Troy Steel Co., 139 N. 
 Y. 369 ; 34 N. E. 919 [wheeling on 
 narrow incline] ; La Pierre v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R.Co., 99 Mich. 213; 58 
 N. W. 60 ; Shaffer v. Haish, 110 Pa. 
 St. 575 [loose belting slipping] ; 
 
 2 Gibson v. Erie R. Co., 63 N. Y. 
 449 ; DeForest v. Jewett, 88 Id. 264 ; 
 Shaw V. Sheldon, 103 Id. 667 ; Haas 
 V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 40 Hun, 145. 
 
 ' Servant assumes all obvious risks 
 (Crown V. Orr, 140 N. Y. 450 ; 35 N. 
 E. 648 ; Hoosier Stone Co. v. McCain, 
 138 Ind. 231 ; 31 N. E. 956 ; Berger 
 V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 39 Minn. 78 ; 
 38 N. W. 814 [roller, worked long 
 time, danger obvious] ; Burnell v. 
 West Side R. Co., 87 Wise. 387 ; 58 N. 
 W. 773 [obvious danger of cleaning 
 electric motor] ; Ohio Val. R. Co. v. 
 McKinley, Ky. ; 33 S. W. 186 ; 
 Linton Coal Co. v. Persons, Ind. 
 ; 43 N. E. 651 [coal mining]). 
 
 " Stewart v. Ohio River R. Co., 40 
 W. Va. 188 ; 20 S. E. 923 ; Southern 
 Pac. Co. V. Johnson, 16 C. C. A. 317 ; 
 69 Fed. 559 [locomotive] ; Kennedy 
 V. Manhattan R. Co., 33 Hun, 457 
 [signal-man assumes risk of want of 
 side platform to enable him to escape 
 from passing trains] ; Murphy v. N. 
 Y. Central R. Co., 11 Daly, 133 
 [laborer upon tracks in a yard as- 
 sumes risk of oar coming behind 
 him] ; Hopkins Bridge Co. v. Bur- 
 nett, 85 Tex. 16 ; 19 S. W. 886 ; and 
 Houston, etc. R. Co. v. Conrad, 63 
 Tex. 637 [injuries by clippings from 
 good tools] ; Boyle v. N. Y. & N. 
 England R. Co.," 151 Mass. 103; 23 
 N. E. 837 ; Mcintosh v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 58 Mo. App. 281 [men in- 
 jured while coupling cars from the 
 ends of which rails projected]; Lake 
 Shore etc. R. Co. v. Knittal, 33 Ohio 
 St. 468 ; [risks attending known cus- 
 tom of making " flying switches " ] ; 
 
§i8s] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 278 
 
 or in part, in dealing with dangerous,' unsafe or unsound 
 
 Davis V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 25 
 Atl. 498 ; 152 Pa. St. 314 [box car 
 used as caboose] ; Denver Tramway 
 Co. V. Nesbit, 22 Colo. 408 ; 45 Pac. 
 405 [no guard to car wheels] ; Patton 
 V. Central Iowa R. Co., 73 Iowa, 
 306 ; 35 N. W. 149 [unfenced road] ; 
 Scharenbroich v. St. Cloud Fiber 
 Co., 59 Minn. 116; 60 N. W. 1093 
 [slippery floor and unguarded pin- 
 ion] ; Graves v. Brewer, 4 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 327 ; 38 N. Y. Supp. 566 [cogs 
 of machine uncovered in violation 
 of Factory Act : danger obvious] ; 
 Boyd V. Harris, 176 Pa. St. 484 ; 35 
 Atl. 222 [projections from side tracks, 
 well know^n] ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Stutts, 22 Ala. 868 ; 17 So. 29 [ob- 
 viously defective engine]. Especially 
 is this the rule where a servant, en- 
 tirely of his own accord, goes into 
 known danger (Bunt v. Sierra, etc. 
 Co., 138 U. S. 483 ; 11 S. Ct. 464). 
 A servant who stands upon an un- 
 railed platform two feet wide and 
 attempts to pry a pulley off with a 
 piece of scantling assumes the risk 
 of the scantling breaking and caus- 
 ing him to fall (Chesapeake, etc. R. Co. 
 V. McDoweU [Ky.]; 24 S. W. 607). 
 
 ' Bormann v. Milwaukee, 03 Wise. 
 524; 67 N. W. 924 [wild animals en- 
 closed] ; Wood V. Heiges, 83 Md. 257 ; 
 34 Atl. 872 [very dangerous iron- 
 breaker in constant use] ; Burke v. 
 Parker, Mich. ; 64 N. W. 1065 
 [benzine paint, properly used in 
 business] ; Thomas v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 109 Mo. 187; 18 S. W. 980 
 [unusual couplings] ; Content v. 
 New Haven, etc. R. Co., 165 Mass. 
 367 ; 43 N. E. 94 [extra large cars, pro- 
 jecting over track] ; Bagley v. Con- 
 solidated Gas Co., 5 N. T. App. Div. 
 433 ; 39 N. Y. Supp. 303 [planks fall- 
 ing from scaffold]. An employee 
 working with and about two cylin- 
 ders in contact with each other and 
 
 revolving inwardly, and in plain 
 view, cannot recover for injuries 
 caused by her fingers being caught 
 between such cylinders (Connolly v. 
 Eldredge, 160 Mass. 566; 86 N. E. 
 469; S. P., Walsh v. Com'l. Laundry 
 Co., 11 N. Y. Misc. 3 ; 31 N. Y. 
 Supp. 833 ; Daigle v. Lawrence Mfg. 
 Co., 159 Mass. 378 ; 34 N. E. 458 [re- 
 volving cylinder] ; Arkadelphia Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Bethea, 57 Ark. 76 ; 20 S. 
 W. 808 [dangerous cylinder of knives, 
 used in dangerous position] ; Good- 
 now V. Walpole Emery Mills, 146 
 Mass. 261 ; 15 N. E. 576 [dangerous 
 revolving screw ■ obvious : extra pay 
 for special work] ; Darracott v. 
 Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 83 Va. 288 ; 
 3 S. E. 511 [dangerous couplings in 
 common use] ; Hulett v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co., 67 Mo. 239 [similar]; 
 Hatter v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 69 
 Miss. 643; 13 So. 827 [coupler not 
 defective, but dangerous]). One who 
 is employed to dig out gravel from 
 under a thin stratum of clay cannot 
 recover for injuries received from 
 the clay falling on him (Griffin v. 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co., 124 Ind. 326 ; 24 
 N. E. 888). One engaged in digging 
 and removing earth from a nearly 
 perpendicular bank assumes the 
 risk (Pederson v. Rushford, 41 Minn. 
 289 ; 42 N. W. 1063). To similar effect, 
 Swanson v. La Fayette, 134 Ind. 625 ; 
 33 N. E. 1033 ; Carlson v. Sioux FaUs 
 Water Co., 8 S. Dak. 47 ; 65 N. W. 
 419 [digging in unsafe soil] ; Evans- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. v. Henderson, 134 
 Ind. 636 ; 33 N. E. 1031 [construction 
 train on obviously unfinished road] ; 
 Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Barnes, 
 137 Ind. 306 ; 36 N. E. 1092 ; Walling 
 V. Congaree Constr. Co., 41 S. C. 
 388 ; 19 S. E. 723 ; Titus v. Bradford, 
 etc. R. Co., 136 Pa. St. 618; 20 Atl. 
 517 [transferring broad gauge cars 
 to narrow tracks]). 
 
279 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§I8S 
 
 things,' known to him to be so, or obviously so, and which, by 
 the very nature of the business, must be used while in that 
 condition, he assumes the risk of doing so. Thus, a railway 
 servant, employed to remove damaged cars to a repair shop, 
 has no right to complain of injuries suffered from the known 
 defects of such cars.^ And, where a business is obviously 
 dangerous, and is conducted in a manner which is fully known 
 to the servant at the outset, he assumes the risk of its con- 
 duct in that manner, although a safer method could have 
 been adopted.' The ordinary risks of a particular business 
 
 'Arnold V. Delaware, etc. Canal has knowledge of the nature and 
 
 Co., 135 N. Y. 13 ; 35 N. E. 1064 [mov- extent of the risk (Claybaugh v. 
 
 ing defective cars]; Anglin v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 56 Mo. App. 
 
 Texas, etc. R. Co. , 60 Fed . 553 ; 9 C. C. 630). A trackman, whose duty it is 
 
 A. 130 [moving "dead" engine]; to watch for wild trains, assumes 
 
 Dartmouth Spinning Co. v. Achord, the danger of collision between a 
 
 84 Ga. 14 ; 10 S. E. 449 [repairing wild train and a hand car which he 
 
 imperfect machinery] ; Carlson v. 
 Oregon Short-Line R. Co., 31 Oreg. 
 
 is pushing (Sullivan v. Fitchburg R. 
 Co., 161 Mass. 135; 36 N. E. 751.) 
 
 430; 28 Pac. 497 [repairing dilapidated Where it is the known and estab 
 
 track, after storms] ; Moore v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co., 107 Pa. St. 495 ; 31 
 Atl. 734 [dismantling trestle]. A ser- 
 vant, employed to watch a dilapi- 
 
 lished practice of a railway company 
 to run special trains at any time, 
 without notice, sending out such a 
 train with snow- plow, in a storm. 
 
 dated building which is apparently without such notice, was not negli- 
 liable to fall at any moment (Paland gence, but the attendant risks to 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 44 La. Ann. 
 1003; 11 So. 707). 
 
 trackmen are assumed, if they 
 knew, or ought to have known, that 
 
 ' Flannagan v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., such a train might be expected (01- 
 
 50 Wise. 463 ; 7 N. W. 337 ; s. c, on son v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 38 Minn, 
 
 former appeal, 45 Wise. 98 ; forsimi- 117; 35 N. W. 866); s. P., where 
 
 lar cases, see Watson v. Houston, about one-third of the trains were 
 
 etc. R. Co., 58 Tex. 434 ; Yeaton v. extra trains, not running on sched- 
 
 Boston, etc. R. Co., 135 Mass. 418. ule time (Larson v. St. Paul, etc. R. 
 
 'Naylorv. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 53 Co., 43 Minn. 433; 45 N. W. 733). 
 
 Wise. 661 ; 11 N. W. 34 [bank exca- A railroad hand, working where he 
 
 vation]. Cited and followed in Gal- 
 veston, etc. R. Co. V. Lempe, 59 Tex. 
 
 knows there is no one to give notice 
 of approaching trains, assumes the 
 
 19 [workman, repairing a well, in risk (Rutherford v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 
 obviously dangerous condition] ; Gal- Co., 57 Minn. 337; 59 N. W. 303). 
 
 veston, etc. R. Co. v. Arispe, 81 Tex. As it is the general usage on the 
 
 617; 17 S. W. 47 [trains constantly Mississippi to land steamboats, for 
 
 moved backwards]. A servant as- thedelivery of freight, by running the 
 
 sumes the risk of an unusually and bow into the shore, and holding 
 
 extra hazardous way of performing the vessel in position by revolutions 
 
 work in which he is experienced, of the wheel, without putting out 
 
 where the danger is obvious, and he lines, any risk attendant on this 
 
§>8SJ 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 280 
 
 are those which are part of the natural and ordinary method 
 of conducting that business, even although they might fairly 
 be called extraordinary with reference to a different busi- 
 ness, or a different department of the same business.^" While 
 a person engaged for a particular service only agrees to en- 
 counter the dangers of that service, yet if, being assigned to 
 the performance of duties not within his contract, he volun- 
 tarily," or, it has been sometimes wrongly held, even under 
 some coercion,'^ determines to perform them, he assumes the 
 necessary risks attendant thereon. But this does not apply to 
 risks, caused by the master's fault ; and doubt has been cast 
 upon the whole of these decisions. ^^ In the absence of other 
 evidence of negligence, where master and servant are equally 
 
 method is assumed by employees de- 
 livering or receiving freight (Red 
 River Line v. Cheatham, 60 Fed. 
 517; 9 C. C. A. 124). One, who 
 works on tracks for several hours at 
 a place where ties are piled near the 
 tracks, assumes the risk of their 
 preventing his getting out of the 
 way of a train (Bengtson v. Chicago, 
 etc. E. Co., 47 Minn. 486; 50 N. W. 
 531). 
 
 "•If the business is essentially 
 attended with extraordinary dan- 
 gers, these are among the risks as- 
 sumed (Joyce V. Worcester, 140 
 Mass. 245; 4 N. E. 565 [fall of der- 
 rick, while workman pulling up 
 planks from trench]; Kelley v. Silver 
 Springs, etc. Co., 12 R. L 112 [gig 
 tender injured by exposed gears]; 
 Morse v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 30 
 Minn. 465 [engineer killed while 
 "bucking" snow off track]; Derr v. 
 Lehigh V. E. Co., 158 Pa. St. 865; 27 
 Atl. 1002 [nearly the same]; see Fos- 
 ter v. Pusey, 8 Houst. [Del.] 168 ; 14 
 Atl. 545) ; South- West Imp. Co. v. 
 Andrew, 86 Va. 270; 9 S. E. 1015 
 [very dangerous work in coal mines, 
 carefully inspected]. Where plain- 
 tiff, who had been engaged as a 
 
 weaver, after being laid off till a new 
 mill, in which alterations were being 
 made, was started up, was employed 
 to assist in moving into the new mill 
 and making alterations, he assumed 
 the increased risk incident to altera- 
 tions (Eooney v. Carson, 161 Pa. St. 
 26; 28 Atl. 996). A brakeman on a 
 freight train was standing on a flat 
 car, and, while approaching a bridge, 
 the engineer signaled for brakes. 
 The brakeman sprang, caught the 
 ladder on tlie side of a box car, and, 
 swinging himself to ascend, came in 
 contact with the bridge with such 
 force that he was thrown from the 
 train, and killed. Held, that his 
 death "was one of the accidents 
 incident to his employment " (Illick 
 V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 67 Mich. 632; 85 
 N. W. 708). 
 
 " Paule V. Florence Min. Co. 80 
 Wis. 350 ; 50 N. W. 189 ; Ft. Smith 
 Oil Co. V. Slover, 58 Ark. 168 ; 24 
 S. W. 106. 
 
 "Leary V. Boston, etc. R. Co. 139 
 Mass. 580 ; 2 N. E. 115 [truckman 
 directed to act as fireman on a switch 
 engine]. 
 
 "See post, §§ 208a, 209, 210, and 
 especially 211a. 
 
28l 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 185a 
 
 acquainted with" or equally ignorant oP the dangers the 
 servant assumes, much less can the master be held liable, if the 
 servant knows of the hazardous character of the work which 
 he undertakes, and is injured by an accident which could not 
 be foreseen by his employer.^* 
 
 § 185a. What risks servants do not assume. — A servant 
 does not assume any risks which are not thus known or dis- 
 cernible,^ nor any which do not exist at the time when he 
 
 '■•Mississippi Logging Co. v. 
 Schneider, 20 C. C. A. 390; 74 Fed. 195 ; 
 [manifest risk of coupling buffer en- 
 gine with oar] ; Wormell v. Maine 
 Cent. E. Co., 79 Me. 397 ; 10 Atl. 49 ; 
 Prentice v. Wellsville, 66 Hun, 634 ; 
 31 N. Y. Supp. 820 ; Weeklund v. So. 
 Oregon Co., 30 Oreg. 591 ; 37 Pac. 260. 
 "Where a section hand, engaged at 
 night in taking up and relaying track, 
 was injured in consequence of an- 
 other workman stumbling and 
 dropping a rail, held that, in view of 
 the nature of the work, this was a 
 risk assumed by the servant, as was 
 a deficiency of light, of wliich the 
 servant must have been as well 
 aware as the master (Gulf, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Jackson, 65 Fed. 48; 13 C. C. 
 A. 507). 
 
 '^ Watts V. Hart, 7 Wash. St. 178 ; 
 34 Pac. 438. 
 
 "Baston v. Houston, etc. R. Co., 
 39 Fed. 65 ; Go wen v. Harley, 56 
 Fed. 973; 6 C. C. A. 190 ; Fisher v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 77 Mich. 546 ; 
 43 N. W. 933. Where there is an in- 
 creased hazard in the employment of 
 a fireman upon a passenger train, on 
 account of the use of switches with- 
 out lamps, and the fireman knows 
 that he is exposed to that hazard 
 every time he goes over the road 
 after dark, and makes no objection, 
 it will be presumed that he assents 
 to it, and that it is one of the risks 
 
 incident to his employment (Illinois 
 Cent. R. Co. v. Swisher, 61 111. Ai^p. 
 611). 
 
 ' Myers v. Hudson Iron Co., 150 
 Mass. 125 ; 33 N. E. 631 [bucket 
 descending mine] ; Nicholds v. Crys- 
 tal Plate Co., 136 Mo. 55 ; 38 S. W. 
 991 [latent defects] ; Kearney Elec- 
 tric Co. V. Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390; 
 63 N. W. 941 ; Nail v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co., 129 Ind. 360 ; 28 N. E. 611 ; 
 Murtaugh v, N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 49 Hun, 456 ; 3 N. Y. Supp. 483 
 [latent defects in wheel] ; Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Reagan, 96 Tenn. 138 ; 
 33 S. W. 1050 [latent defects in 
 drawbar] ; Kennedy v. Lake Supe- 
 rior R. Co., 93 Wise. 32; 66 N. W. 
 1137 [ashes covered with snow] ; 
 Fitzgei-ald v. Connecticut Paper Co., 
 155 Mass. 155 ; 39 N. E. 464 [danger 
 not obvious] ; Blanton v. Dold, 109 
 Mo. 64; 18 S. W. 1149 [concealed 
 risk of sudden starting machinery] ; 
 Clapp V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 36 Minn. 6 ; 39 N. W. 340 [rails too 
 light ; broken rail ; no notice] ; Mc- 
 Dermott v. Iowa Falls R. Co., 85 
 Iowa, 180 ; 47 N. W. 1037 [ice-coated 
 gates]. An employee does not as- 
 sume the risk of a grindstone burst- 
 ing from excessive speed, he being 
 ignorant of what was an unsafe rate 
 of speed (Helfenstein v. Medart, 
 Mo. ; 36 S. W. 863). 
 
§ 185a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 282 
 
 enters into his master's service,^ and of which he has not notice 
 in time to protect himself against them.^ He does not even 
 assume risks, which he knows to exist, if he has no notice that 
 he will be exposed to them.* He does not assume extra- 
 ordinary risks, unusual in his business, of which he has not 
 timely notice.^ These risks, moreover, must not arise from 
 defects in the master's discharge of his personal duties, as else- 
 where defined ; '^ at all events, not from such defects as the 
 
 « Libby v. Scherman, 146 111. 540 ; 
 B4N. E.801. " The servant assumes 
 no risks, except such as exist at the 
 beginning of the employment, and 
 such as are incidental to the busi- 
 ness, or which exist during the 
 course of the employment, of which 
 the employee has knowledge, or is 
 bound to have knowledge " (Sowden 
 V. Idaho, etc. Mining Co., 55 Cal. 
 4i'S) ; where defendant introduced a 
 new blasting powder. If the risk is 
 increased, the servant is entitled to 
 notice of the change (Hawkins v. 
 Johnson, 105 Ind. 29 ; 4 N. E. 172) ; 
 where a way passing under a revolv- 
 ing shaft was raised without notice. 
 A servant, by entering an employ- 
 ment necessitating use of steps, does 
 not assume the risk of their subse- 
 quent icy condition, where, when 
 the contract was made, the steps 
 were not icy, nor was there any rea- 
 son to suppose that the business in- 
 volved a risk in regard to them 
 (Fitzgerald v. Connecticut Paper 
 Co., 15.J Mass. 155; 29 N. E. 464). 
 
 2 Knowledge by servant of risk of 
 employment does not constitute an 
 assumption of such risk unless the 
 knowledge comes in time to be of 
 use ^Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. Kelly, 
 63 led. 407 ; 11 C. C. A. 260 ; Meloy 
 v. Chicago, etc. E. Co. , 77 Iowa, 743 ; 
 42 N. W. 5B.3 [civil engineer, injured 
 on new road which he was laying 
 out]). 
 
 ■•Hosic V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 75 
 Iowa, 683 ; 37 N. W. 963. 
 
 'Bergquist v. Chandler Iron Co., 
 49 Minn. 511 ; 53 N. W. 136 ; St. 
 Louis, etc. E. Co. v. Triplett, 54 Ark. 
 289 ; 15 S. W. 831 [no warning ; un- 
 usual operation] ; Fordyce v. Low- 
 man, 57 Ark. 160; 20 S. W. 1090 
 [improper custom ; needless hazard ; 
 no notice] ; Brazil Coal Co. v. Hood- 
 let, 12s Ind. 337 ; 37 N. E. 741 [black- 
 smith called into mine] ; Moynihan 
 v. Hills Co., 146 Mass. 586 : 16 N. E. 
 574 [unexplained breaking of ma- 
 chine]. 
 
 * A servant does not assume the 
 risks incident to the negligence of his 
 superior (Mattise v. Consumers' Ice 
 Co., 46 La. Ann. 1535 ; 16 So. 400 ; 
 Nicholds V. Crystal Plate Glass Co., 
 126 Mo. 55 ; 38 S. W. 991 ; [non- 
 repair of appliances] ; Houlihan v. 
 Connecticut Eiver E. Co., 164 Mass. 
 535 ; 42 N. E. 108 ; [defects in planks]; 
 Goldie V. Werner, 151 111. 551 ; 38 N. 
 E. 95 [defective plank in scaffold]; 
 Coots V. Detroit, 75 Mich. 628 ; 43 N. 
 "W. 17 [fireman: street in bad condi- 
 tion]; Kucera v. Merrill Lumber Co., 
 91 Wise. 637; 65 N. W. 374 [unguarded 
 Hines v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 78 
 wheel; boy 16; working at night]; 
 Hun, 239 ; 28 N. Y. Supp. 829 ["tell- 
 tale " out of order]). The risk conse- 
 quent upon the failure of the master 
 to properly discharge his duty to the 
 servant is not a risk incident to his 
 employment (Promer v. Milwaukee, 
 etc. E. Co., 90 Wise. 215; 63 N. W. 
 90). A servant assumes all ordinary 
 risks of his employment, but not un- 
 
283 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 185b 
 
 servant has a right to believe will be remedied within a reason- 
 able time.'^ He does not assume risks arising through the 
 consent of his master to an unlawful act of a stranger ; such 
 as the joint use of a railroad, contrary to law ; ^ and his master 
 is responsible for the consequences.' The master cannot cast 
 upon the servant any new risk, simply by giving him notice 
 that he must assume it.'" Of course he does not assume any 
 risks as to strangers. It is only his own master who can claim 
 the benefit of the limitation of liability." As to risks not 
 assumed, masters are not necessarily liable to their servants ; 
 but they are liable to the same extent as they would be to 
 strangers. Thus, with respect to such non-assumed risks, 
 masters are liable for the negligence of a fellow-servant; and 
 they are held to as high a degree of care as they would be 
 towards strangers in the same situation. 
 
 § 185b. What facts servants may presume. — A servant 
 has the right to presume, and to act upon the presumption, 
 that his master or his vice-principal has performed and will 
 continue to perform every duty incumbent upon him;' that 
 there are no risks attending the business other than such as 
 usually attend business of that general nature, and existed 
 
 known perils arising from negligent will not establish liability of master 
 
 direction of the work (Schroeder (Sweeney v. Berlin, etc. Co. 101 N. 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 108 Mo. 323 ; Y. 520 ; 5 N. E. 358). ' 
 
 18 S. W. 1094 ; Gagnon v. Sea- * A railroad company is liable for 
 
 connetMills, 165Mass.221;48N. E. 83 injury to its servant caused by the 
 
 finexperienced servant, obeying dan- negligence of another company 
 
 gerous order]) . See g§ 187, 204, while using a section of its road by 
 
 pQst^ its permission, but without legisla- 
 
 ■" Harris v. Hewitt, Minn. ; 65 tive authority (Central R. Co. v. 
 
 N. W. 1085 [promise to repair rail]; Passmore, 90 Ga. 203; 15 S. E. T60). 
 
 Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Lannigan, "Id. 
 
 58 Kan. 109 ; 43 Pac. 343 [promise to '" So held where the servant made 
 
 repair lantern] ; Homestake Min. Co. no objection (Fairbank Canning 
 
 V. Fullerton, 16 C. C..A. 545; 69 Co. v. Innes, 135 111. 410; 17 N. E. 
 
 Fed. 933 [promise to cover shaft]. 730 [elevator without proper ap- 
 
 See § 215, post. A request that the pliances]). 
 
 master procure a new appliance, not " Penn. Co. v. Backes, 133 111. 255 ; 
 
 ordinarily attached to similar ma- 34 N. E. 563. 
 
 chinery, which is not followed by a ' Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Everett, 
 
 promise to procure it, nor new in- 153 U. S. 107 ; 14 S. Ct. 474 [may 
 
 ducements to undertake the risk, assume that car is properly loaded] ; 
 
§ l8Sb] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 284 
 
 when he entered into the service,^ or such as have been 
 explained to him ^ or are known by, or perfectly obvious to 
 him;^ that it is safe to obey orders;^ that his fellow-servants 
 are competent and careful ; " that they are under such proper 
 supervision as the case may require ; ^ that they will do their 
 duty as faithfully as such men usually do;^ that the place of 
 work is safe ' and the materials and appliances reasonably good 
 and adequate;'" that dangerous things are properly secured ; " 
 that proper repairs, supports or supplies, of the need of which 
 the master has notice, will be promptly provided ; '^ that 
 
 Wallace v. Central Vt. R. Co., 138 
 N. Y. 30i ; 33 N. E. 1069 [statu- 
 tory duty] ; Western Goal Co. v. 
 Ingraham, 17 C. C. A. 71 ; 70 Fed. 
 219 ; Helm v. O'Rourke, 46 La. Ann. 
 178 ; 15 So. 400 ; Gorman v. McArdle, 
 67 Hun, 484 ; 23 N. Y. Supp. 479 
 [statutory duty] ; Eastman v. Curtis, 
 67 Vt. 432 ; 33 Atl. 383 [proper con- 
 struction of elevator] ; Lynch v. 
 Allyn, 160 Mass. 348 ; 35 N. E. 550 
 [reliance on superintendent return- 
 ing]. 
 
 2 Libby v. Schermau, 146 111. 540 ; 
 34 N. E. 801; § 185a, note 3. 
 
 ' See many examples, § 303, post. 
 
 * The doctrine that a servant has 
 a right to assume that his master 
 has furnished a safe place in which 
 to work, does not apply where dan- 
 gers are apparent (Jennings v. Ta- 
 coma R. Co., 7 Wash. St. 375 ; 34 
 Pac. 937 ; Pennsylvania Go. v. Bur- 
 gett, 7 Ind. App. 338 ; 34 N. E. 650). 
 
 5 Crowley v. Gutting, 165 Mass. 436 ; 
 43 N. E. 197. 
 
 ^ A section hand working on track, 
 did not assume risk of foreman's 
 negligence (Davis v. New Haven R. 
 Co., 159 Mass. 532 ; 34 N. E. lOTO ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Champion, 9 
 Ind. App. 510 ; 36 N. E. 331 ; Id., 37 
 N. E. 21). And see § 185a, ante. 
 
 ' See § 303a, post. 
 
 ^ Haugh v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 73 
 Iowa, 66 ; 35 N. W. 116 [car badly 
 loaded]. 
 
 'Vanesse v. Catsburg Coal Co., 
 
 159 Pa. St. 403 ; 28 Atl. 300 [en- 
 trance to mine] ; Western Coal Co. 
 V. Ingraham, 17 C. C. A. 71 ; 70 Fed. 
 319 (U. S. App.) ; Union Pacific E. 
 Co. V. Jarvi, 53 Fed. 65 ; 10 U. S. 
 App. 444 [mines] ; Consolidated Coal 
 Co. V. Bruce, 47 111. App. 444 [mine] ; 
 Taylor, etc. R. Co. v. Taylor, 79 Tex. 
 1C4; 14 S. W. 918 [unsafe railroad 
 track] ; Diamond Iron Co. v. Giles 
 (Del.), 11 Atl. 189 [defective roof]. 
 
 '" Bushby v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 R. Co., 107 N. Y. 374 ; 14 N. E. 407 
 [car]; Smith v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 
 73 Hun, 545; 35 N. Y. Supp. 638 
 [coupling] ; Ingebregtsen v. N. D. 
 Lloyd S. S. Co., 57 N. J. Law, 400 ; 31 
 Atl. 619 ; Evans v. Chamberlain, 40 
 S. C. 104 ; 18 S. E. 213 [latent defects 
 in bumpers of cars] ; Heltonville 
 Mfg. Co. V. Fields, 138 Ind. 58 ; 36 
 N. E. 529; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hines, 132 111. 161 ; 33 N. E. 1021 ; 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Nunnally, 88 
 Va. 546 ; 14 S. E. 367 ; Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Orr, 91 Ala. 548 ; 8 So. 
 360 ; Grannis v. Chicago, etc. E. Co. , 
 81 Iowa, 444 ; 46 N. W. 1067 ; Banks 
 V. Wabash R. Co., 40 Mo. App. 458. 
 
 " A servant, who is directed by 
 his superintendent to steady a stone 
 which is being hoisted, is not, as a 
 matter of law, guilty of negligence 
 in doing so, in a proper manner; 
 having the right to assume that the 
 stone is properly fastened (Crowley v. 
 Cutting, 165 Mass. 486; 43 N. E. 197). 
 
 "Delude v. St. Paul R. Co.. 55 
 
285 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ l8Sb 
 
 obstacles will be removed, within the proper time ; ^^ that warn- 
 ing of danger will be given whenever it ought to be given ; " 
 and that, if there is any defect or if any change takes place, 
 with respect to incidents of the business, increasing his perils, 
 he will receive timely notice thereof.^^ He is especially 
 entitled to rely implicitly upon the truth of his master's state- 
 ments '" and upon his master's performance of his promises." 
 But these are all mere presumptions ; and if the servant 
 becomes aware that any of them are contrary to the fact, he 
 cannot justify himself in shutting his eyes to the truth. In 
 short, he cannot be heard to say that he relied upon that which 
 he did not believe. These are familiar conditions in the law of 
 estoppel. These presumptions moreover are stated here only 
 as affording a standard by which to judge of the servant's pru- 
 dence. Masters are not bound to make all these presumptions 
 good. The extent of their duty to do so is stated elsewhere- 
 
 Minn. 63; 56 N. W. 461 [repairs coup- working on a track, was justified in 
 ling cars] ; Chicago, etc. Coal Co. v, relying on receiving from the fore- 
 Peterson, 39 111. App. 114 [props for man warning of approach of any 
 
 mine]. 
 
 ■'McChesney v. Panama R. Co., 
 74 Hun, 150; 26 N. Y. Supp. 245. 
 
 train (Davis v. New Haven R. Co., 
 159 Mass. 532; 84 N. E. 1070) ; s. P., 
 Northern Pao. R. Co. v. Amato, 144 
 
 '"Wallace v. Cent. Vt. R. Co., 138 U. S. 465; 12 S. Ct. 740; Bradley v. 
 
 N. Y. 302; 33 N. E. 1069 [low bridge; 
 "tell-tale" out of order]; Savannah, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Day, 91 Ga. 676; 17 S. 
 E. 959 [same]; Reliman v. Minne- 
 apolis, etc. R. Co., 43 Minn. 42 ; 44 
 N. W. 522 [engine backing]; Shum- 
 way V. Walworth Mfg. Co., 98 Mich. 
 
 N. Y. Central R. Co., 62 N. Y. 99. 
 
 '' Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Cham- 
 pion, 9 Ind. App. 510 ; 36 N. E. 231 ; 37 
 Id. 21 [employment of inexperienced 
 servants] ; Grannis v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 81 Iowa, 444; 46 N. W. 1067 
 [appliances] ; Donahoe v. Old Colony 
 
 411; 57N. W. 251 [machinery started '"<«. Co., 153 Mass. 356; 26 N. E. 868 
 
 without warning] ; Anderson v. 
 Northern Mill Co., 42 Minn. 424; 44 
 N. W. 315 [usual signal omitted]; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Hanning, 
 131 Ind. 538; 31 N. E. 187. When a 
 
 [defect in cars]: St. Louis, etc. E. Co. 
 v. Holman, 155 111. 21; 39 N. E. 573. 
 '* Lawrence v. Hagemeyer, 93 Ky. 
 591; 20 S. W. 701 [assurance repairs 
 done] ; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 
 sei-vant is placed in a situation of Kee, 37 Kans. 592; 15 Pac. 484 [may 
 
 danger, wliere engrossing duties are assume tnitli of statements]; S. P., 
 
 required of him, he has a right to as to condition of works, Morbach v. 
 
 assume that the master will not Home Min. Co., 53 Kans. 731 ; 37 
 
 without warning subject him to Pac. 122. 
 
 other perils unknown to him (Mich- " Floettl r. Third Av. R. Co., 10 N. 
 
 ael V. Roanoke Mach. Works, 90 Va. Y. App. Div. 308; 41 N. Y. Supp. 792. 
 493; 19 S. E. 261). A section hand, 
 
§ 1 86] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 286 
 
 § i86. Risks assumed under special orders. — Where a 
 servant, seeing a defect, and notifying his master thereof, is 
 nevertheless ordered to continue his work, without any ex- 
 press or implied promise of a remedy, it has sometimes been 
 held that he cannot recover, on the theory that from that time 
 he assumes the risk.^ But this is unsound. A master's order 
 is at least as much justification for the servant's continuance 
 as would be another's invitation ; and we have seen (§ 91) that 
 a mere invitation is, in some cases, enough to acquit the per- 
 son acting upon it from the imputation of contributory negli- 
 gence. The true rule', in this, as in all others cases, is that, if 
 the master gives the servant to understBnd that he does not 
 consider the risk one which a prudent person should refuse to 
 undertake, the servant has a right to rely upon his master's 
 judgment, unless his own is so clearly opposed thereto that, 
 in fact, he does not rely upon the master's opinion. So, if the 
 peculiar risk of the act commanded by the master is not obvi- 
 ous, the servant has a right to assume that he is not sent into 
 any unusual peril, and he is not bound to investigate into the 
 risk, before obeying his orders.^ A servant is not called upon 
 to set up his own unaided judgment against that of his 
 superiors ; and he may rely upon their advice and still more 
 upon their orders, notwithstanding many misgivings of his 
 own.^ If the master directs the servant to do some act which 
 is dangerous, but which could be made less dangerous by the 
 use of special care on the part of the master, the servant has 
 a right to assume that such special care will be taken, and 
 
 ' See Linch v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., required to make such examination 
 
 143 Mass. 206 ; 9 N. E. 728. into the danger of the operation as 
 
 ^ Stephens v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., he would have been under other cir- 
 
 96 Mo. 207 ; 9 S. W. 589. It is the cumstances " (Howard Oil Co. v. 
 
 duty of a servant to obey an order Farmer, 56 Tex. 801). Where, by 
 
 given by one in authority over him, orders of the master, the servant is 
 
 if not manifestly unreasonable ; and carried beyond his employment, he 
 
 vchere by such order he is directed is relieved from his implied under- 
 
 to work in an unsafe place, and is taking to assume risks incident to 
 
 injured, the master is liable there- the employment (Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 
 for (Illinois Steel Co. v, Schyma- Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151 [section- 
 
 nowski, 59111. App. 32). "Being di- hand ordered to couple cars]), 
 
 reoted to perform the act by an ex- ' Cited and adopted, Harrison v. 
 
 perienced man, the representative Denver, etc. R. Co., 7 Utah, 523 ; 27 
 
 of the defendant, plaintiff was not Pac. 728. 
 
287 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§i86 
 
 does not take the greater risk upon himself.* If the master 
 calls suddenly upon the servant, under circumstances which 
 give no time for consideration,' or if he asks the servant to 
 extricate him from danger," he is bound to indemnify the ser- 
 vant for injuries sustained through obedience to such a call. 
 The servant's dependent and inferior position is to be taken 
 into consideration; and, if the master gives him positive orders 
 to go on with the work, under perilous circumstances, the ser- 
 vant may recover for an injury thus incurred, if the work was 
 not obviously so dangerous that no man of ordinary prudence 
 would have obeyed.'^ More especially is this the case where 
 
 * Plaintiff was sent to repair a 
 wrecked caboose on the line of its 
 road. It was extremely cold, and a 
 village 9 miles away was the nearest 
 point at which he could get food and 
 shelter. He was not provided with 
 food ox suiflcient clothing for expos- 
 ure to such weather. The company 
 knew this, and that he relied on its 
 sending for him in the evening. It 
 did not do so, and lie walked to the 
 village. By the exposure he con- 
 tracted rheumatism, and was per- 
 manently injured. Held, that he 
 was not guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence; that the company was negli- 
 gent; and whether the injury was 
 the proximate result was for the 
 jury (Schumaker v. St. Paul, etc. 
 R. Co., 46 Minn. 39; 48 N. W. 5.59). 
 
 ' Adopted in Rush v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 36 Kans. 129 ; 13 Pac. 583 ; 
 followed in Birmingham R. Co. v. 
 Allen, 99 Ala. .359 ; 13 So. 8. 
 
 ' In Lorentz v. Robinson (61 Md. 
 64) , a master was held liable to his 
 servant for injuries sustained by the 
 fall of an elevator, on which the 
 master was ascending, when, find- 
 ing it unmanageable, he called the 
 servant to his aid, and thereby him- 
 self escaped unharmed. 
 
 ■"Hawley v. Northern Central R. 
 Co , 83 N. Y. 370 ; affl'g S. C. 17 
 Hun, 115 ; Kain v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 
 
 375 ; Patterson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 Co., 76 Pa. St. 389 ; Lebanon v. Mc- 
 Coy, 13 Ind. App. 500 ; 40 N. E. 700 ; 
 Greene v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 
 31 Minn. 248 ; Flynn v. Kansas City, 
 etc. R. Co., 78 Mo. 195 ; Kroy v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 33 Iowa, 857 ; Light 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co.^ 93 Iowa, ; 61 
 N. W. 380 ; Colorado, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Ogden, 3 Colo. 499. In an action for 
 injuries to a youthful servant from a 
 dangerous machine which he was 
 cleaning wliile in motion, there was 
 evidence that the foreman told jjlain- 
 tiff to hurry up with his machine, as 
 he would have to clean another. Held, 
 that defendant was liable if plain- 
 tiff Nvas not aware of the danger, and 
 he obeyed, because he thought the 
 foreman knew better, or because he 
 was afraid to disobey (Tagg v. Mc- 
 George, 155 Pa. St. 368 ; 36 Atl. 671, 
 following Lee v. Woolsey, 109 Pa. 
 St. 124, and Kehler v. Schwenk, 151 
 Id. 519 ; 25 Atl. 130). A laborer, 
 jumping off a train moving only four 
 miles an hour, in obedience to con- 
 ductor's orders, may be acquitted of 
 negligence by the jury (Northern 
 Pac. E. Co. V. Egeland, 163 U. S. 93; 
 16 S. Ct. 975 ; affi'g S. c, 12 U. S. 
 App. 271 ; 56 Fed. 200 ; 5 C. C. A. 
 471). Jumping off even a swiftly 
 moving train, in obedience to or- 
 ders, may be justified, especially by 
 
§i86] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 the master insists upon the servant proceeding with the work, 
 either with a promise of inspection* or repair' or with an 
 assurance that there is no danger. '•• This, we are glad to say, 
 is now settled law. In short, the law of estoppel applies to 
 such cases. The master is estopped from alleging the falsity 
 of his own representations, unless it appears clearly that the ser- 
 vant did not rely upon them.''* Yet there are extreme cases in 
 which " the danger was so glaring that no prudent man would 
 have entered into it, even under orders."'^ In such cases, ser- 
 vants cannot generally recover for risks thus assumed.'^ Yet, 
 if it is the duty of the servant to obey such an order, even in 
 the face of a known danger, as it would be in the case of a 
 seaman, he is entitled to indemnity against the risk." And 
 
 a new hand (Patton v. Western, 
 etc. R. Co., 96 N. C. 455; t S. E. 
 863). So as to a brakeman 
 coupling moving cars, in obedience 
 to conductor's order (Mason v. 
 Richmond, etc. R. Co., Ill N. C. 482 ; 
 10 S. E. 698). But a general com- 
 mand by a conductor to go between 
 cars when couplings cannot other- 
 wise be made, does not justify the 
 brakeman in so doing several months 
 later, when under the control of an- 
 other conductor (Mason v. Rich- 
 mond, etc. R. Co., 114 N. C. 718 ; 19 
 S. E. 362). 
 
 ^Schlacker V. Ashland Iron Co., 89 
 Mich. 253 ; 50 N. W. 839. 
 
 ' Patterson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 Co., 76 Pa. St. 389. 
 
 '"Keegan v. Kavanugh, 62 Mo. 
 230 ; Daley v. Schaaf, 28 Hun, 314 ; 
 Hoffman v. Dickinson, 31 W. Va. 
 142 ; 6 S. E. 53 ; Schlacker v. Ash- 
 land Iron Co., supra ; Haas v. Balch, 
 12 U. S. App. 534 ; 56 Fed. 934 ; 6 C. 
 C. A. 201. 
 
 " Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 
 37 Mich. 205 ; Schlacker v. Ashland 
 Min'g Co. 89 Mich. 2.53; 50 N. W. 
 889 ; Rettig v. Fifth Ave. Tr. Co., 6 
 N. Y. Misc. 328 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 896. 
 
 "Shortel v. St. Joseph, 104 Mo. 
 
 114; 16 S. W. 397; Miller v. Union 
 Pao. R. Co., 12 Fed. 600. 
 
 '^Kean v. Detroit, etc. Mills, 66 
 Mich. 277 ; 33 N. W. 395 ; Gavigan 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., Mich. ; 
 67 N. W. 1097 ; Drake v. Union P. 
 R. Co. , 2 Idaho, 453 ; 21 Pac. 560 ; Wil- 
 son V. Ti-emont Mills, 159 Mass. 154 ; 
 84 N. E. 90 ; Roul v. East Tennessee, 
 etc. R. Co., 85 Ga. 197 ; 11 S. E. 558 
 [getting on rapidly moving train] ; 
 see also Lake v. Mining Co., 71 Mich. 
 364 ; Bradshaw v. Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co. [Ky.]; 21 S. W. 346 [getting on 
 overcrowded hand car]. One who 
 knowingly engages in dangerous 
 work, because he is told he will lose 
 his place if he refuses to do so, as- 
 sumes the risk (Dougherty v. West 
 Superior Iron Co. 88 Wise. 343 ; 60 N. 
 W. 274). But this ruling is opposed 
 to the later and sounder decisions 
 (see § 211a, posi). 
 
 "This principle, which we ad- 
 vanced in opposition to some New 
 York decisions, has now been 
 adopted by the highest court (Eld- 
 ridge V. Atlas S. S. Co., 134 N. Y. 187; 
 32 N. E. 66 [seaman, under compul- 
 sion] ; Hosic V. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 
 75 Iowa, 683 ; 37 N. W. 963 [brake- 
 man obeying danger signal]). 
 
289 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 1 86a 
 
 a risk must be voluntarily assumed, to relieve the master from 
 liability. Risks incurred under coercion are not assumed." 
 
 § i86a. Risks of service, outside of ordinary employ- 
 ment. — In many cases it has been said, in general terms, that 
 a servant does not assume the risks attendant upon services 
 which he is called upon to render, outside of his regular em- 
 ployment, and more hazardous.^ But it has been pointed out 
 that, in all these cases, the real liability incurred by the mas- 
 ter was simply for his omission to give due warning of the 
 risks which were especially attendant upon the new and strange 
 work to which the servant was suddenly assigned.^ A servant, 
 thus directed to undertake work outside of that which he had 
 engaged to do, is not presumed to be aware of its peculiar 
 risks;' and therefore, if the master does not fully explain 
 
 " See § 211a, post. 
 ' Where a servant is ordered by 
 his master to do work outside of his 
 regular duties, and bringing him 
 into contact with a different class of 
 fellow-servants, the latent risks inci- 
 dent to the new work are, as to him, 
 extra hazardous, because additional 
 to the risks of his regular duties 
 (Consolidated Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 
 111. 614; 35 N. E. 163 ; Lehman Co. v. 
 Siggeman, 35 111. App. 161 ; East 
 Line, etc. E. Co. v. Scott, 68 Tex. 694 ; 
 5 S W. 501 ; Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Lang, 118 Ind. 579 ; 31 N. E. 317 ; 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Adams, 
 105 Ind. 151; 5 N. E. 187; Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 310 ; 
 Mann v. Oriental Works, 11 R. I. 
 158). A servant ordered to more 
 dangerous work than he was em- 
 ployed to perform, can protect him- 
 self by protest (Jones v. Lake Shore, 
 etc. R. Co., 49 Mich. 573 [brakeman 
 recovered for injuries sustained 
 while doing yard work, pursuant to 
 orders of the superintendent] ) . The 
 complaint alleged that plaintiff was 
 employed as trackman; that he was 
 ordered to assist in unloading rails 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 19] 
 
 from a train, — work which was out 
 of the line of liis duty, and much 
 naore hazardous than that which it 
 was his duty to perform ; that while 
 thus engaged he received the inju- 
 ries complained of. Held to state a 
 cause of action (Cincinnati, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Madden, 134 Ind. 463 ; 34 N. E. 
 337). 
 
 ^ The liability of a master, in cases 
 of injury to his servant, received in 
 a dangerous employment outside of 
 that for which he had engaged, 
 arises not from the direction of the 
 master to the servant to depart from 
 the one service and engage in the 
 other and more dangerous work, but 
 from failure to give proper warning 
 of the attendant danger in cases 
 where the danger is not obvious, or 
 where the servant is of immature 
 years, or unable to comprehend the 
 danger (Reed v. Stockmeyer, 30 C. C. 
 A. 381 ; 74 Fed. 186). To this should 
 be added: "Or has not ample timie 
 to become aware of the danger be- 
 fore entering upon the work." 
 
 2 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Haenni, 
 146 111. 614; 35 N. E. 163. 
 
§ 1 86a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 2go 
 
 them to the servant, before putting him at such new work, 
 the servant is entitled to assume that it has no greater risks 
 than those which attach to his regular work, either in the 
 nature of the work itself or in the habits of fellow-servants 
 with whom it brings him into contact* Nor is the servant 
 bound to make any inquiries on these subjects.' In such cases, 
 the master must indemnify the servant against injuries then 
 suffered;^ provided the master knew or ought to have known 
 of the defect causing the injury, but not otherwise.'' If, how- 
 ever, the servant knows what the new dangers are,^ or if they 
 are obvious to persons thus suddenly calledto do such work,^ 
 and he is able to appreciate the peril involved,'" and is not act- 
 ing under such coercion as would in other cases excuse him,'' 
 he assumes the risks of this new work, to the same extent as 
 he did those of his regular employment. The liability of the 
 master in such cases depends upon the principles stated here- 
 after, in section 203. 
 
 * See Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Ad- 
 ams, 105 Ind. 151; 5 N. E. 187. This 
 much, indeed, is implied in all the 
 decisions. 
 
 5 U. S. Rolling Stock Co. v. Wil- 
 der, 116 111. 100; 5 N. E. 92. 
 
 * Where an employee is ordered, 
 out of the line of his employment, to 
 work upon machinery with the man- 
 agement of whicli he is ignorant, 
 and is not warned of the danger in- 
 cident thereto, the master is liable 
 for personal injuries resulting there- 
 from (Quinn v. Johnson Forge Co., 
 9 Houst. 338; 82 Atl. 858). To same 
 effect, Linderberg v. Orescent Min. 
 Co., 9 Utah, 168 ; 38 Pao. 692 [miner] ; 
 Colorado Electric Co. v. Lubbers, 11 
 Colo. 505 ; 19 Pac. 479 [carpenter sent 
 to handle electric wires]; Cole v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co , 71 Wise. 114 ; 37 
 N. W. 84. 
 
 * Where a servant of mature years 
 deviates from the original contract 
 with a full knowledge of the new 
 risks, he is looked upon as entering 
 into a new contract (Houston, etc. R. 
 
 Co. V. Fowler, 56 Tex. 453 fyardmas- 
 ter ordered to run a relief train to a 
 wreck, after a violent storm, and 
 himself wrecked in a culvert] ; Pren- 
 tiss V. Manufacturing Co., 63 Mich. 
 478 ; 30 N. W. 109 ; Wheeler v. Berry, 
 95 Mich. 250 ; 54 N. W. 876 [circular 
 saw: plaintiff protested, but was fa- 
 miliar with its use]). 
 
 « See Alford v. Metcalf, 74 Mich. 
 369; 43 N. W. 52. But in none of 
 the cases in this and the last noje 
 was any real negligence proved 
 against the defendants. The opin- 
 ions on risks assumed are, therefore, 
 obiter. 
 
 1" Not otherwise (Railroad Co. v. 
 Fort, 17 Wall. 553 ; Consol. Coal Co. 
 V. Haenni, supra; s. p., Broderick 
 V. Detroit Depot Co., 56 Mich. 261; 
 33 N. W. 803; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Bayfield, 37 Mich. 305). 
 
 " Kehler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa. St. 
 505 ; 35 Atl. 130 ; Eldridge v. Atlas 
 S. S. Co., 134 N. Y. 187; 33 N. E. 66. 
 See further, § 311a, post. 
 
291 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§187 
 
 § 187. Master liable for his own negligence.— A master 
 is liable to his servants, as much as to any one else, for his own 
 negligence.^ Therefore, a servant can recover for any injury 
 caused by the personal negligence of the master, as, for 
 example, by a defect in a thing made under his direct super- 
 vision,^ or by the fall of a heavy substance down a pit which 
 the master was personally guarding,^ or by the fall of an 
 elevator which the master was personally operating,* or by a 
 defect in the work of a contractor, resulting from the master's 
 interference.^ The negligence of any member of a partnership, 
 in conducting the partnership business, is, of course, for the 
 purposes of a civil liability, attributed to every other partner.^ 
 As in every other case, the master is not liable, on the ground 
 
 ' Hough V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 100 
 tr. S. 313; Brydon v. Stewart, 3 
 Macq. H. L. 30 ; Johnson v. Brunei-, 
 61 Pa. St. 58 ; Leonard v. ColUns, 70 
 N. Y. 90 ; Booth v. Boston, etc. R. 
 Co., 73 Id. 38 ; and many other cases 
 cited under § 185a, note. To warrant 
 a recovery against the master for an 
 act of negligence on his part, the act 
 complained of must be pleaded as 
 the cause of action : to permit a re- 
 covery upon an act not pleaded, but 
 incidentally revealed, would be 
 obviously unfair (Georgia, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Oaks, 53 Ga. 410). A com- 
 plaint against a corporation, alleg- 
 ing "the defendant's negligence," 
 may properly be construed as charg- 
 ing defendant with personal negli- 
 gence (Fifleld V. Northern R. Co., 
 43 N. H. 335 ; Harrison v. Central 
 R. Uo. , 31 N. J. Law, 393 ; McKin- 
 ney v. Irish Northw. R. Co. Irish R. 
 3 C. L. 600). 
 
 ' Weems v. Mathieson, 4 Macq. H. 
 L. 315 ; Roberts v. Smith, 3 Hurlst. 
 & N. 313 [scaffold]. 
 
 'The plaintiff, a servant of two 
 partners, was at work at the bottom 
 of a coal shaft. The mouth of the 
 Bhaft being carelessly guarded by 
 
 one partner, a piece of iron fell 
 down the shaft and injured the 
 plaintiff. Held, that such partner 
 was liable, on the ground of his per- 
 sonal negligence, and that the other 
 partner was liable merely as such 
 (Ashworth v. Stanwix, 3 El. & El. 
 701 ; approved, Mellors v. Shaw, 1 
 Best & S. 437 ; S. p., Daley v. 
 Schaaf, 38 Hun, 314 ; Rickhoft v. 
 Heckman, 54 Hun, 637 ; 7 N. Y. 
 Supp. 471 ; Moran v. Harris, 63 
 Iowa, 390). 
 
 ■" Lorentz v. Robinson, 61 Md. 64. 
 
 ^ The building was constructed by 
 a contractor, and defendants re- 
 served no control over the erection, 
 but told the builder that they 
 guessed "single top places" would 
 do. Defendants knew the number 
 of tiebeams in the section which 
 fell. Held, that the jury were justi- 
 fied in saying that defendants were 
 responsible for any weakness result- 
 ing from the single top plate and 
 insufficient tiebeams when they 
 set plaintiff at work (Meier v. Mor- 
 gan, 83 Wis. 389 ; 53 N. W. 174). 
 
 « Ashworth v. Stanwix, 3 EL & 
 El. 701. 
 
§i88] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 292 
 
 of his personal negligence, for any injury of which his negli- 
 gence was not the proximate cause.' 
 
 § 188 [New].* Concurrent negligence. — Where an injury 
 to a servant is proximately caused ^ in part by an act or omis- 
 sion for which the master is responsible, and in part by one for 
 which he is not responsible, the master is liable for all the 
 damage, in conformity to the general rule as to several con- 
 tributory wrong-doers.^ Therefore, it is no defense for a mas- 
 ter, by whose personal negligence,' or by the negligence of 
 whose vice-principal,^ a servant has suffered damage, to prove 
 that the negligence of a fellow-servant in common employ- 
 ment,^ or the fault of a stranger," contributed to the injury. 
 
 I Evansville, etc. E. Co. v. Tohill 
 [Ind,], 41 N. E. 709. A railroad 
 company is liable for a defective 
 roadbed, only where such defect was 
 such as might have boen expected to 
 result in such an injury. (McGowan 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 91 Wise. 147 ; 
 64 N. W. 891). 
 
 *The old § 188 has been divided 
 under other sections ; to which it 
 properly belongs. 
 
 ' Not otherwise (Kevern v. Provi- 
 dence Min. Co., 70 Cal. 393 ; 11 Pac. 
 740 ; Steinke v. Diamond Match Co., 
 87 Wise. 477 ; 58 N. W. 843). 
 
 " See § 65, ante, where many cases 
 are cited. 
 
 3 Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274 ; 
 Elmer v. Locke, 135 Mass. 575 ; Boyce 
 V. Fitzpatrick, 80 Ind. 536. 
 
 "Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Cum- 
 mings, 106 U. S. 700 ; Flike v. Bos- 
 ton, etc. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 549; Booth 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 73 Id. 38 ; 
 Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. 
 Law, 151 ; Stetler v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 46 Wise. 497; s. c, again, 49 
 Wise. 009 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Henderson, 37 Ohio St. 549 [imme- 
 diate cause of injury, negligence of a 
 fellow-servant] ; Cone v. Delaware, 
 etc. R. Co., 81 N. Y. 306 [defective 
 
 engine ; fellow-servant in fault] ; 
 Towns V. EaiJi'oad Co., 37 La. Ann. 
 630 ; Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Phelps, 
 90 Va. 665; 19 8. E. 653; Norfolk, 
 etc. R. Co. v. Thomas, 90 Va. 305 ; 
 17 S. E. 884 [fellow-servants in fault]. 
 
 ^ Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Cum- 
 mings, 100 XJ. S. 700 ; Northwestern 
 Fuel Co. V. Danielson, 57 Fed. 915 ; 
 6 C. C. A. 636 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Kenley, 92 Tenn. 307 ; New Jersey, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Young, 1 U. S. App. 96 ; 
 49 Fed. 733 ; Coppins v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 123 N. Y. 557 ; 35 N. E. 915 ; 
 Lilly V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 107 N. Y. 
 566 ; 14 N. E. 503 [defective brakes] ; 
 Morrisey v. Hughes, 65 Vt. 553 ; 27 Atl. 
 305 ; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. George, 
 88 Va. 333 ; 13 S. E. 439 [broken car 
 bumper] ; Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Nuckols. 91 Va. 193; 31 S. E. 843; Bean 
 V. Western N C. R. Co., 107 N. C. 
 781 ; 13 S. E. 600 ; Louisville, etc. R 
 Co. V. Kenley, 93 Tenn. 207 ; 31 S. 
 W. 836 [defect in car ; negligent en- 
 gineer] ; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Kizziah, 
 86 Tex. 81 ; 38 S. W. 578 [machinery] ; 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. McClain, 80 
 Tex. 85; 15 S. W. 789. 
 
 * Toomey v. Donovan, 158 Mass. 
 333 ; 33 N. E. 396 [independent con- 
 tractor]. 
 
293 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§189 
 
 § 189. Degree of care required of master. — The master is 
 bound to use ordinary care, diligence and skill for the purpose 
 of protecting his servants from encountering unnecessary risks 
 in his service;^ but he is not bound to use any higher degree 
 of care.^ A railroad company, for example, although bound 
 
 Tex. 85 ; 15 S. W. 789 ; Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Berkey, 136 Ind. 181 ; 
 35 N. E. 3 [coupling] ; Island Coal 
 Co. V. Risher(Ind. App.), 40 N. E. 158 
 [roof of mine] ; Rogers v. Leyden, 
 127 Ind. 50 ; 26 N. E. 210 [same] ; 
 Pullman Car Co. v. Laack, 143 111. 
 242 ; 32 N. E. 285 [appliances] ; Town 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 84 Mich. 
 214 ; 47 N. W. 665 [open switch ; no 
 lights] ; Hunn v. Michigan Cent. R. 
 Co , 78 Mich. 513 ; 44 N. W. 502 ; 
 Sherman v. Menominee Lumber Co., 
 72 Wise. 122 ; 39 N. "W. 365 ; Craven 
 V. Smith, 89 Wise. 119 ; 61 N. W. 317 ; 
 Covran V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 80 
 Wise. 284 ; 50 N. W. 180 [brake-rod] ; 
 Delude v. St. Paul R. Co., 55 Minn. 
 63; 56 N. W. 461 ; Franklin v. Win- 
 ona, etc. R. Co., 37 Minn. 409 ; 34 N. 
 W. 898 ; Browning v. Wabash R. Co., 
 124 Mo. 55 ; 27 S. W. 644 ; Devveese 
 V. Meramec Iron Co., 128 Mo. 423; 
 81 S. W. 110. 
 
 " Hough V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 100 
 U. S. 313 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Rowan, 104 Ind. 88 ; Tissue v. Balti- 
 more, etc. R. Co., 113 Pa. St. 91; 
 Noyes v. Smith, 38 Vt. 59 ; Ryan 
 V. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410; see Paterson 
 Y. Wallace, 1 Macq. 748. A doubt 
 as to the existence of this obligation 
 was expressed in Seaver v. Boston & 
 Maine R. Co., 14 Gray, 466. But the 
 opinions of Massachusetts courts, on 
 questions like these, down to a 
 recent period, were greatly biased 
 by undue sympathy with corporate 
 interests, and should be cautiously 
 scrutinized. 
 
 ' In an action by a servant for in- 
 juries sustained by reason of dan- 
 gerous machinery furnished by the 
 
 master, an instruction that "defend- 
 ant was not a guarantor of the safety 
 of its machinery, and was only bound 
 to use ordinary care and prudence in 
 the selection and arrangement there- 
 of, and had a right to use and employ 
 such as the experience of trade and 
 manufacture sanctioned as reason- 
 ably safe," is not erroneous (Wash- 
 ington, etc. R. Co. V. McDade, 135 
 U. S. 554 ; 10 S. Ct. 1044). Such is 
 the rule in JVew York (Probst v. 
 Delamater, 100 N. Y. 366 ; Burke v. 
 Witherbee, 98 Id. 562 ; Leonard 
 v. Collins, 70 Id. 90 [excavating 
 overhanging bank of earth]; Devlin 
 V. Smith, 89 Id. 470) ; Pennsyl- 
 vania (Payne v. Reese, 100 Pa. 
 St. 301) ; Massachusetts (Ladd v. 
 New Bedford, etc. R. Co., 119 Mass. 
 413); Vermont (Hard v. Vermont, 
 etc. R Co., 33 Vt. 473; Noyes v. 
 Smith, 38 Id. 59) ; Indiana (Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Orr, 84 Ind. 50 
 [crab for hoisting timbers, which 
 had nothing to prevent it from fly- 
 ing out of gear]) ; Missouri (McMil- 
 lan V. Union Brick Co. , 6 Mo. App. 
 434; Aldridge v. Midland, etc. Fur- 
 nace Co., 78 Mo. 559 [excavating 
 overhanging earth bank]) ; Iowa 
 (Cooper V. Central R. Co. , 44 Iowa, 
 134) ; Minnesota (Gates v. Southern 
 Minn. R. Co., 38 Minn. 110) ; Kansas 
 (Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Winston, 
 56 Kans. 456 ; 43 Pac. 777) ; Cali- 
 fornia (Rodgers v. Central Pac. R. 
 Co., 67 Cal. 607; 8 Pac. 377; Civil 
 Code, § 1971); South Carolina (Ex 
 parte Johnson, 19 S. C. 493 ; Sanders 
 v. Etiwan Phosphate Co., Id. 510) ; 
 Alabama (Smoot v. Mobile, etc. R. 
 Co., 67 Ala. 13); Texas (Missouri 
 
§i89j 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 294 
 
 to use the utmost care and diligence for the protection of its 
 passengers from injury, owes no such duty to its own servants, 
 although they may be exposed to the same perils.' Ordinary 
 care, however, means such as is commensurate with the perils 
 of the situation ; ^ and it requires that, in all occupations 
 attended with great and unusual danger, all appliances readily 
 attainable, known to science, should be used for the prevention 
 of accidents.^ This rule, recently afifirmed by our highest 
 national court, has too often been practically denied. It is 
 founded upon the sound principle that " ordinary care," in 
 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Lyde, 57 Tex. 505). 
 Threats, which had 7iot been com- 
 municated to the mine owners, did 
 not require the duty of special dili- 
 gence to guard against fire ; and 
 their failure to use such diligence 
 did not render them liable for the 
 death of a miner through incendia- 
 rism (Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Davis, 
 90 Tenn. 711; 18 S. W. 387). Where 
 it was not customary for a switch 
 engine, running through the com- 
 pany's yard, to ring or whistle, 
 omission to do so is not negligence, 
 so far as employees are concerned 
 (Galvin v. Old Colony R. Co., 163 
 Mass. 533; 39 N. E. 186). 
 
 2 See railroad cases in last previous 
 note, and many cases cited under 
 §§ 194, 195. A railroad company 
 need exercise ordinary care and dili- 
 gence, and only such, in furnishing 
 its employees reasonably safe ma- 
 chinery and appliances (Atchison.etc. 
 E. Co. V. Wagner, 33 Kans. 660; 7 
 Pac. 304 ; Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Ryan, 53 Kans. 637 ; 35 Pac. 393 ; 
 Gulf, etc. R. Co. V. Wells, 81 Tex. 
 685; 17 S. W. 511; Nutt v. Southern 
 Pac. R. Co., 35 Oreg. 391 ; 35 Pac. 
 653). So as to tracks (Williams v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 119 Mo. 316 ; 
 24 S. W. 783 ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Weaver. 35 Kans. 413; 11 Pac. 408 ; 
 International, etc. R. Co. v. Bell, 75 
 Tex. 50; 13 S. W. 331). An instruc- 
 tion "that a railway company owes 
 
 the duty to its employees to do all 
 that human care, vigilance and fore- 
 ,sight can do, consistently with the 
 practical operation of its road, in 
 providing a safe road, roadbed, 
 track, ties and I'ails, and to keep the 
 same in rejaair," is erroneous (Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Kerr, 148 111. 605; 
 35 N. E. 1117). Where a railroad 
 company voluntarily employs a 
 physician for its injured employee, 
 it is only bound to exercise reason- 
 able care in selecting a competent 
 person, and is not liable for the phy- 
 sician's negligence or tortious acts 
 (Pittsburg, etc. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 
 141 Ind. 83 ; 40 N. E. 138 ; Atchison, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Zeiler, 54 Kans. 340 ; 
 38 Pac. 383 ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Howard, 45 Neb. 570 ; 63 N. W. 878 ; 
 Quinn V. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 94 Tenn. 713 ; 30 S. W. 1036). 
 
 " Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels,- 107 
 U. S. 454; 3 S. Ct. 933; Central R. Co. 
 V. Ryles. 84 Ga. 430; 11 S. E. 499. 
 In Alabama, "due" care and dili- 
 gence are required (Ala., etc. R. Co. 
 V. Waller, 48 Ala. 459). 
 
 * " In all occupations attended 
 with great and unusual danger there 
 must be used all appliances readily 
 attainable known to science for the 
 prevention of accidents," and the 
 neglect to provide such readily attain- 
 able appliances is proof of culpable 
 negligence (Mather v. Elllston, 156 
 U. S. 391 ; 15 S. Ct. 464). 
 
295 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§190 
 
 extraordinary dangers, means what would be extraordinary 
 care, in ordinary dangers.^ Ordinary care requires obedience 
 to statutes or valid ordinances, enacted for the protection of 
 servants, whether separately, as a class, or as a part of the 
 public' The master is allowed a reasonable time in which to 
 discover defects which he ought to remedy .^ 
 
 § 190. Duration of master's duty and exemption.— The 
 
 obligations of the master, as stated in this chapter, continue 
 in force, not only during all the time in which his servants are 
 actually engaged in his service,' but also during the time 
 reasonably occupied by them on his premises in going to and 
 returning from their work,^ and in intervals of rest between.^ 
 
 " A railroad company, in putting a 
 car on a repair tracis, whereon are 
 other cars, under which its em- 
 ployees are at work, should exercise 
 that degree of care which very care- 
 ful and prudent men exercise in 
 their own affairs (LouisvUle, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Davis, 91 Ala. 487; 8 So. 553). 
 ' Where a city ordinance limits 
 the speed of locomotives, within the 
 city, to five miles an hour, it is neg- 
 ligence, per se, as to employees 
 whose duty requires them to cross 
 or be on the tracks, to violate the 
 ordinance by running at a higher 
 speed (Central Railroad Co. v. Brant- 
 ley, 93 Ga. 259 ; 20 S. E. 98). 
 
 " Hansen v. Schneider, 58 Hun, 60; 
 .11 N. Y. Supp. 347 [defective eleva- 
 tor in building, newly occupied by 
 defendant]. 
 
 ' The fact that a workman was ad- 
 vised by vice-principal of defendant 
 not to work beyond a certain hour, 
 but that he worked longer, did not 
 sever the relation of master and serv- 
 ant or show contributory negligence 
 so as to prevent recovery for his 
 death resulting from defendant's 
 negligence (McElligott v. Randolph, 
 61 Conn. 157 ; 22 Atl. 1094). It is a 
 question for the jury whether de- 
 ceased was in the line of his duty 
 
 when killed by a boiler explosion 
 some minutes before working hours, 
 where it appears that he often came 
 early, using his time in oiling and 
 getting ready his machine (Walbert 
 V. Trexler, 156 Pa. St. 113 ; 27 Atl. 
 65). 
 
 ^ Brydon v. Stewart, 3 Macq. H. 
 L. 30 ; Chicago, etc. B. Co. v. Artery, 
 137 U. S. 507; 11 S. Ct. 129 [return- 
 ing on hand car] ; Ewald v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 70 Wise. 420 ; 36 N. W 
 12. 
 
 ' Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Martin, 
 13 Ind. App. 485 ; 89 N. E. 759 [escape 
 of steam in dinner-time] ; Broderick 
 V. Detroit Union Depot, 56 Mich. 361 
 [workman while eating dinner was 
 asked by foreman to open ventilator 
 and did so ; being defective, it fell 
 and crushed his liand] ; Atlanta 
 Cotton Co. V. Speer, 69 Ga. 137 [child 
 playing after work]. Servant while 
 at work at 4 a. m. obtained permis- 
 sion to go into a building to warm 
 himself, and while attempting to 
 enter, fell into an uncovered cistern 
 containing boiling water. Held, 
 jury justified in finding that " at the 
 time of his injury the employee was 
 engaged in the line of his duty " 
 (Parkinson Sugar Co. v. Riley, 50 
 Kans. 401 ; 31 Pac. 1090). 
 
§ igo] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 296 
 
 He is bound to use the same degree of care for the purpose of 
 making their access and departure safe, as for the purpose of 
 providing a safe and proper place in which the work is to be 
 done. So far, therefore, as their road to his work lies through 
 his premises, he is bound to use ordinary care to keep those 
 premises in a safe condition for their entry at all times when 
 he invites such entry ; and he is bound to use such care for the 
 purpose of enabling them to depart in safety, whether their 
 departure is rightful or wrongful.'' But he is under no obliga- 
 tion to keep in safe condition for their use any part of the 
 premises to which their duties do not call them and to which 
 he has not given them permission to go.* On the other hand, 
 the master's exemption from liability for risks which the 
 servant is held to assume, continues for the same time. So 
 long as he is required to use care for the servant's protection, 
 as a servant, he is only liable as far as a master is liable to a 
 servant.^ Outside of these limits, these respective liabilities 
 and limitations cease ; and each party has the same rights and 
 duties as any other strangers have towards each other under 
 similar circumstances. Thus, a servant of a common carrier, 
 riding in his master's vehicle on the same footing with strangers 
 
 * In Brydon v. Stewart, 3 Macq. liable (Belford v. Canada Shipping 
 H. L. 30, a miner who wished to Co , 35 Hun, 347; s. P., Wright v. 
 leave his employment, while coming Rawson, 52 Iowa, 329). Where an 
 up from, the pit for that piu-pose, was employee's work was on the ground, 
 killed by a defect due to the defend- and he climbed up an elevated rail- 
 ant's personal fault. Held, that the road structure, in building which he 
 defendant was liable ; having let the was employed, for his own purposes, 
 workman down, he was bound to before commencing work, his em- 
 bring him up in safety, even if he ployer is not liable (Cowhill v. Rob- 
 came up without lawful excuse or erts, 71 Hun, 137 ; 24 N. Y. Supp. 
 proper cause. 533). But one working in a ship, 
 
 '• Baker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., who, after the work is finished or 
 
 95 Iowa. 163: 68 N. W. 667 [walking suspended, goes into the hold to get 
 
 on track]. A carpenter, who was his coat, is lawfully there, and the 
 
 working on the upper deck of de- shipowner is liable for want of rea- 
 
 fendant's steamer, on quitting work sonable care (Boden v. Demwolf, 56 
 
 at night went to the lower deck with Fed. 846). 
 
 the engineer, who hid his tools in the ' McDonough v. Lanher, 55 Minn, 
 
 boiler, and on going to get his tools 501 ; 57 N. W. 152 [servant riding to 
 
 next morning he fell into a bunk work on elevatorj. 
 hole. Held, that defendant was not 
 
297 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§191 
 
 and not on service/ or a railroad servant crossing the track 
 when off duty, and neither going to nor returning from his 
 work,^ has as much right to recover for injuries caused by neg- 
 ligence of his fellow-servants as any stranger would have, but 
 
 no more. 
 
 § 191. Duty to select competent fellow-servants. — Among 
 the duties which the master personally owes to his servants is 
 that of using ordinary care to select competent servants,^ that 
 is, servants of sufficient care, skill, prudence and good habits 
 to make it probable that they will not cause injury to each 
 other, and to dismiss servants who show such a want of these 
 qualifications as to give reasonable ground for apprehension 
 that they will injure their fellow-servants.^ Ordinary care, 
 in such cases, implies the usual diligence, which a prudent 
 man, in the same line of business, would use in making inquiry, 
 for the purpose of protecting himself from danger.^ If he fails 
 in the performance of this duty, the master is liable to any 
 servant for the consequences of such negligence or incompe- 
 
 ' Doyle V. Fitchburg R. Co., 162 
 Mass. 66 ; 37 N. E. 770. See, also, 
 Richardson v. Coal Co., 6 Wash. 52 ; 
 Sagers v. Nuckolls, 3 Colo. App. 95 ; 
 Vormus v. Coal Co., 97 Ala. 326 ; 
 Christian v. Railway Co. , 90 Ga. 124. 
 
 ' Savannah, etc. R. Co. v. Flanna- 
 gan, 82 Ga. 579 ; 9 S. E. 471 [killed 
 at street crossing] ; Cincinnati, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Conley, Ky. ; 20 S. W. 
 816. 
 
 » Wink V. Weiler, 41 111. App. 336 
 [going home in master's wagon]. 
 
 1 Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 
 U. S. 454 ; Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 
 112, 131; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Harney, 28 Ind. 28 ; Laning v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 49 N. T. 531 ; New 
 Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Hughes, 49 
 Miss. 358 ; Porter v. Waters- Allen 
 Co., 94 Tenn. 870; 39 S. W. 237; 
 Lewis V. Emery, Mich. ; 66 
 N. W. 569. A competent man is one 
 who may be relied on to execute the 
 rules of the master, unless prevented 
 
 by causes beyond his own control. 
 Hence, incompetency exists, not 
 alone in physical or mental attri- 
 butes, but in the disposition with 
 which a servant performs his duties. 
 If he habitually neglects these duties, 
 he becomes unreliable, and although 
 he may be well able to do all that is 
 required of liim, his disposition 
 makes him an incompetent man 
 (Coppins V. N. Y. Central E. Co., 123 
 N. Y. 557 ; 25 N. E. 915). That this 
 is the master's personal duty is con- 
 ceded in every court, even by the 
 British Lords, in Wilson v. Merry, 
 L. R. 1 Scotch App. 336. 
 
 -Laning v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 49 N. Y. 521 ; Tonnesen v. Ross, 58 
 Hun, 415 ; 13 N. Y. Supp. 150 ; Gates 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 3 S. Dak. 
 433 ; 50 N. W. 907 ; Norfolk, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Nuckols, 91 Va. 1C3; 31 S. E. 
 343. 
 
 ' Jungnitschv. Michigan Iron Co., 
 105 Mich. 370; 63 N. W. 296. 
 
§i9ij 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 298 
 
 tency, on the part of a servant thus neghgently employed or 
 retained, as might reasonably be anticipated as not unlikely 
 to occur, from such information as could have been obtained 
 about such servant, by the use of ordinary care.* Much more 
 is he responsible, if he has actual notice of the negligent habits 
 or incompetency of a servant employed by him.^ But even 
 the master's knowledge of this fact is only some evidence of 
 negligence on his part; and the issue must still be left to the 
 jur>'.^ It is held, in New York, that a master is not bound to 
 use as much diligence in inquiring about a servant's habits, 
 while employed, as he is when selecting the servant.'' And 
 
 " Faulkner v. Erie E. Co., 49 Barb. 
 3M; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Swett, 
 4o 111. 197 ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Harney, 38 Ind. 28 ; see Thayer v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 22 Id. 26 ; Nor- 
 drke etc. Co. v. Van Sant, 99 Id. 
 188; Blake V. Maine Central E. Co., 
 70 Me. 60 ; Baulec v. N. Y. Central, 
 etc. E. Co., 59 N. Y. 356 ; Mann v. 
 Delaware etc. Canal Co., 91 Id. 495 
 [engineer of a train killed by col- 
 lision through inefficiency of brake- 
 man, who was a new hand without 
 proper knowledge of the signals : 
 question for the jury] ; Chicago, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Sullivan, 63 111. 293 [serv- 
 ant causing injury was in charge of 
 a gravel train, while intoxicated 
 and his character as intemperate 
 must have been known to the com- 
 pany]. But the mere fact that an 
 engineer of a locomotive is near- 
 sighted is not sufficient to establish 
 negligence in retaining him (Texas, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Harrington, 62 Tex. 
 597). 
 
 ' Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Mares, 
 123 U. S. 710 ; 8 S. Ct. 321 ; Laning 
 V. N. T. Central, etc. E. Co., 49 N. Y. 
 521 ; Gilman v. Eastern R. Co., 10 
 Allen, 333 ; Huntingdon, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Decker, 84 Penn. St. 419 [habitu- 
 ally intemperate conductor, whose 
 unfitness was known to superin- 
 tendent] ; Smith v. Backus Lumber 
 
 Co., 64 Minn. 447; 67 N. W. 358. 
 This is conceded in all the cases cited 
 under § 180. In Illinois Central R. 
 Co. V. Jewell (46 lU. 99), the fact 
 that the incompetency of an engineer 
 was known to some officers of the 
 company (not apparently directors), 
 was held sufficient to make the com- 
 pany liable to a brakeman for the 
 engineers fault. A single instance 
 of negligence in a servant does not 
 necessarily make it the duty of his 
 master to discharge him (Baulec t. 
 Harlem E. Co., 59 N. Y. 356 : Sum- 
 merhays v. Kansas Pac. E. Co., 2 
 Colo. 484). An employer is liable 
 for injury to an employee, caused by 
 the incompetency of a co-employee 
 whom the employer, with knowl 
 edge of his incompetency, retains in 
 his service, if such incompetency 
 was not known to the person injured 
 (Texas, etc. E. Co. v. Johnson, 89 
 Tex. 519; 35 S. W. 1042). Where 
 the master has been notified of the 
 incompetency of a servant, he can- 
 not defend by showing that he con- 
 sidered such servant competent (Eoss 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 2 McCrary, 
 235; affi'd, 112 U. S. 337). 
 
 " Hoey V. Dublin, etc. R. Co., Irish 
 Eep. 5 C. L. 206. 
 
 ■" Chapman v. Erie E. Co., 55 N. Y. 
 579. 
 
299 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ I92 
 
 the master does not become responsible for the incompetency 
 of a servant, of which he had originally neither actual nor con- 
 structive notice, until he has had sufficient time to inquire and 
 act upon subsequent notice.^ But he must use ordinary care 
 and diligence to keep himself informed.' He must maintain 
 watch and supervision over his servants ; ^'' and he is responsible 
 to every servant for his failure to do so. Putting a servant, 
 generally competent, to a task for which he is incompetent, 
 with notice, is as culpable as the employment of a servant 
 equally incompetent for all purposes." 
 
 § 192. Evidence ofnegligence in employment of servant. — 
 
 The burden of proving negligence in selecting or continu- 
 ing an unfit servant is upon the plaintiff.' He must prove (i) 
 the specific negligent act on which the action is founded,^ 
 which may, in some cases, but not generally,' be such as to 
 prove incompetency, but never can, of itself, prove notice 
 
 8 Louisville, etc. E. Co, v. Breed- [engineer, never before on road, sent 
 
 love, 10 Ind. App. 657 ; 38 N. E. 357 ; out after storm] ; Core v. Ohio River 
 
 Lake Shore R. Co. v. Stupak, 123 R. Co., 38 W. Va. 456 ; 18 S. E. 596 
 
 Ind. 310 ; S3 N. E. 346. Where a [inexperienced fireman in charge of 
 
 flagman's unfitness for the posi- engine] ; Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 tion was known to the defendant Guyton, 115 Ind. 450 ; 17 N. E. 101 
 
 long enough before the accident to [brakemen set to run wild train], 
 
 enable it to procure some one else, ' Cameron v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 
 the liability of defendant is a ques- 145 N. Y. 400 ; 40 N. E. 1; Mentzer 
 
 tion for the jury (Hughes v. Balti- v. Armour, 18 Fed. 373 ; and all 
 
 more, etc. R- Co., 164 Pa. St. 178; other cases cited under this section. 
 
 30 Atl. 383). ' '^ It is astonishing that any decision 
 
 ' Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Nuokols, to this effect should ever have been 
 
 91 Va. 1 93 ; 31 S. E. 343. called for ; but it seems that efforts 
 
 "> Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Hen- have been made to recover on mere 
 
 thorne, 19 C. C. A. 633 ; 73 Fed. 634. proof of previous negligence or 
 
 There was evidence that the engi- general incompetency, without prov- 
 
 neer, during two weeks, had re- ing any fault connected with the 
 
 peatedly disobeyed signals. Held, plaintiff's injury. Of course such 
 
 that it was error to grant a nonsuit attempts have always failed (Kersey 
 
 on the ground that deceased had the v. Kansas, etc. R. Co., 79 Mo. 30 ; 
 
 saiiie means of knowledge as to the Galveston, etc. R. Co. v. Faber, 77 
 
 engineer's negligence as defendant Tex. 153 ; 8 S. W. 64). 
 
 had (Daly v. Sang, 91 Wise 336; 64 ' Sullivan v. New Haven, etc. R. 
 
 N. W. 997). Co., 63 Conn. 209 ; 35 Atl. 711 ; Craig 
 
 '! Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Patton, v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 54 Mo. App. 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. ; 25 S. W. 339 533. 
 
§192] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 300 
 
 thereof to the master;^ (2) incompetency, by inherent unfit- 
 ness^ or previous specific acts of neligence, from which incom- 
 petency may be inferred;** and (3) either actual notice to the 
 master of such unfitness or bad habits/ or constructive 
 
 * Conrad v.Gray, 109 Ala. 130; 19 So. 
 898. See Murphy v. Pollock, 15 Irish 
 C. L. 224 ; Wright v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 25 N. Y. 562; Harvey v. N. 
 Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 88 Id. 481. 
 
 ^ Evans v. Chamberlain, 40 8. C. 
 104 ; 18 S. E. 213 [engineer ; no proof 
 of incompetency]. Juiy may find 
 servants given to drink incompe- 
 tent (Campbell Co. v. Roediger, 
 78 Md. 601 ; 28 Atl. 901 ; Laning 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49 N. 
 Y. 521 ; Kean v. Detroit Rolling 
 Mills, 66 Mich. 277 ; 33 N. W. 395 ; 
 Williams v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 109 
 Mo. 475; 18 S. W. 1098 [engineer]). 
 Examples of evidence insufficient to 
 prove negligence in employing: Ohio, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Dunn, 138 Ind. 18 ; 30 
 N. E. 702; Baltimore v. Warr, 77 Md. 
 TiOS ; 27 Atl. 85 [recommendation of 
 politician] ; Timm v. Michigan Cent. 
 R. Co., 98 Mich. 226 ; 57 N. W. 116 ; 
 Kansas, etc. Coal Co. v. Brownlie, 
 00 Ark. 582 ; 31 S. W. 453 [boy over 
 14, as trapper in mine] ; Smillie v. St. 
 Bernard Dollar Store, 47 Mo. App. 
 402 [boy 13, to run elevator] ; Suther- 
 land V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 
 737 ; S. C, more fully, 26 N. E. 600 
 [telegraph operator of 17] ; Cosgi-ove 
 V. Pitman, 103 Cal. 268 ; 37 Pac. 232 
 [engineer OQcasionally under the in- 
 fluence of drink]. Competency was 
 held well proved in Roblin v. Kansas 
 City, etc. R. Co., 119 Mo. 476 ; 24 S. 
 W. 1011 [engineer]. 
 
 "Baulec v. Harlem R. Co., 59 N. 
 Y. 356, 860 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Ruby, 88 Ind. 294 ; Evansville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Guyton, 115 Ind. 450 ; 17 N. 
 E. 101; Hilts V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 55 Mich. 437 ; 21 N. W. 878 ; Grube 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 98 Mo. 330 ; 
 11 S. W. 736 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. 
 
 V. Camp, 65 Fed. 952 ; 13 C. C. A. 
 233. See Coppins v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 123 N. Y. 557 ; 25 N. E. 915. To 
 the contrary, on the ground that 
 such evidence multiplied the issues, 
 were Frazier v. Penn. R. Co., 38 Pa. 
 St. 104 ; Connors v. Morton, 160 Mass. 
 333 ; 35 N. E. 860 ; Hatt v. Nay, 144 
 Mass. 186 : 10 N! E. 807 ; Robinson 
 V. Fitchburg R. Co., 7 Gray, 92. The 
 former decision was reviewed and 
 condemned in Baulec v. N. Y. & 
 Harlem R. Co., 59 N. Y. 356 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. V. Ruby, 38 Ind. 
 294. 
 
 ' Some notice is indispensable to 
 liability (Cameron v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 145 N. Y. 400 ; 40 N. E. 1 ; Burke 
 V. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 69 Hun, 21 ; 
 28 N. Y. Supp. 453 [switchman of 17]; 
 Jungnitsch v. Michigan Malleable 
 Iron Co., 105 Mich. 270; 63 N. W. 296 
 [boy of 16 ; arm broken, but this un- 
 known]. Actual notice was held 
 proved in Laning v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521 [servant 
 known to be drunk] ; McPhee v. 
 Scully, 163 Mass. 216 ; 89 N. E. 1007 
 [servant obviously drunk] ; Wabash 
 R. Co. V. Brow, 65 Fed. 941 ; 13 C. 
 C. A. 222 [servant drunk at accident, 
 drunk before at similar accident ; 
 notice]. Notice to any agent of the 
 master, entrusted with the power of 
 dismissing the servant in fault, is 
 clearly enough (Chapman v. Erie R. 
 Co., 55 N. Y. 579; Sutton v. N. Y., 
 Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 66 Hun, 632; 
 21 N. Y. Supp. 313 [conductor's neg- 
 ligence known to superintendent]). 
 Notice to an agent without authority 
 to hire or discharge such servants 
 cannot be imputed to the company 
 (Reiser v. Pennsylvania Co., 152 Pa. 
 St 38; 25 Id, 175). 
 
30I 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 192 
 
 notice,^ by showing that the master could have known the 
 facts, had he used ordinary care in " oversight and super- 
 vision," ' or by proving general reputation of the servant for in- 
 competency or negligence i^** and, (4), that the injury complained 
 of resulted from the incompetency proved." For evidence of 
 a defect or bad habit is of no effect, if the injury complained 
 of was in no way brought about by that defect or habit." 
 The mere fact of the incompetency of a servant for the work 
 upon which he was employed is not enough to warrant a jury 
 
 8 Galveston, etc. JR. Co. v. Arispe, 
 81 Tex. 517; 17 S. W. 47. 
 
 ' Whittaker v. Delaware, etc. Ca- 
 nal Co., 126 N. Y. 544 ; 27 N. E. 1042 ; 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Coll am, 73 Ind. 
 261. Continuous negligence for two 
 weeks, held sufficient to go to jury- 
 as evidence of such want of over- 
 sight (Daly V. Sang, 91 Wise. 336 ; 
 64 N. "W. 997). Proof of unfitness of 
 a servant, at the time of his employ- 
 ment, makes out a prima facie case 
 against the master, and throws upon 
 him the burden of disproving negli- 
 gence in the selection (Crandall v. 
 Mcllrath, 24 Minn. 127; Fines v. 
 Sillery, 73 Hun, 549 : 26 N. Y. Supp. 
 181 [no inquiries made on employing 
 servant]). 
 
 '" Common reputation is admissi- 
 ble to charge master with notice of 
 incompetency, without bringing no- 
 tice of such reputation home to the 
 master (Monahan v. Worcester, 150 
 Mass. 439 ; 23 N. E. 228 ; DriscoU v. 
 Fall River, 163 Mass. 105 ; 39 N. E. 
 1003 ; Lake Shore R. Co. v. Stupak, 
 123 Ind. 210 ; 23 N. E. 246 ; Davis v. 
 Detroit, etc. R. Co., 20 Mich. 105 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 63 111. 
 293; Western Stone Co. v. Whalen, 
 151 111. 473; 38 N. E. 241; Norfolk, 
 etc. R Co. V. Hoover, 79 Md. 253 ; 
 29 Atl. 994; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Johnson. 89 Tex. 519 ; 35 S. W. 1042 ; 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Hentli"rne ; 
 19 C. C. A. 623; 73 Fed. 634 ; Park 
 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 85 Hun, 184; 
 32 N. Y. Supp. 482). Evidence of 
 reputation for incompetency is no 
 proof of incompetency in fact (Gier 
 V. Los Angeles R. Co., 108 Cal. 129; 
 41 Pac. 22), except in Massachusetts 
 (Hatt V. Nay, 144 Mass. 186; 10 N. E. 
 807) ; MissQuri(Grube V.Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 98 Mo. 330 ; 11 S. W. 736), and 
 perhaps Pennsylvania. General repu- 
 tation of a servant for competency 
 and care at the time and place of 
 employment, of such character as to 
 imply information to the employer, 
 is adjnissible as tending to disprove 
 alleged negligence in employing such 
 servant (Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mor- 
 rissey, 45 111. App. 12T). 
 
 " Core V. Ohio River R. Co., 38 W. 
 Ya. 456; 18 S. E. 596 [fu-eman in 
 charge engine]. Plaintiff cannot re- 
 cover merely on proof of reputation 
 for recklessness and carelessness, 
 without also proving that the ser- 
 vant was in fact reckless and care- 
 less (Gier v. Los Angeles- R. Co. , 108 
 Cal. 129; 41 Pac. 22). 
 
 " Cosgrove v. Pitman, 103 Cal. 268; 
 37 Pac. 232 [intoxication] ; Harring- 
 ton V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 50 Hun, 
 602 ; 4 N. Y. Supp. 640 [foreman some- 
 times drunk, but sober at time ac- 
 cident] ; Engelhardt v. Delaware, 
 etc. R. Co., 78 Hun, 588; 29 N. Y. 
 Supp. 425 [short sight, not causing 
 injury]. 
 
§192] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 302 
 
 in finding the master guilty of negligence in employing him.'* 
 But the evidence by which such incompetency is proved may 
 be of such a nature as to raise a fair inference that the master 
 either had notice of the fact/* or else omitted to make such 
 inquiries as common prudence would have dictated.*' Thus, 
 proof of the employment of one, who had always been a mere 
 clerk, or a common laborer, to run a steam engine, would justify 
 a finding of negligence on the part of the master, without 
 showing that he had actual notice of the servant's antece- 
 dents;'^ for it would be improbable that the master could be 
 so grossly deceived if he had made any inquiry. Evidence 
 of only one other negligent act of the servant in fault is 
 not usually sufficient," especially if no injury resulted from 
 
 '^ The bare fact of habitual negli- 
 gence of a servant, without proof 
 that it came to the notice of the 
 master or of any agent charged 
 with the duty of reporting it, or of 
 some circumstance which should 
 have called attention to it, is not 
 enough to charge the master with 
 notice (Cameron v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 145 N. Y. 400 ; 40 N". E. 1 ; Moss 
 v. Pacific R. Co., 49 Mo. 167 ; Jor- 
 dan V. Wells, 3 Woods, 527; East 
 Tenn, etc. R. Co. v. Gurley, 13 Lea, 
 46 ; Huffman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 78 Mo. 50 [engineer alleged to have 
 I'un his train too fast, to the damage 
 of brakeman] ; Chapman v. Erie R. 
 Co., 55 N. Y., 579 [employee original- 
 ly competent, subsequently became 
 unfit] ; Harvey v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 83 N. Y. 481 [negligent but not 
 incompetent switchman] ; Pilkinton 
 V. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 70 Tex. 336 ; 7 
 S. W. 805) . Proof of incompetency 
 alone does not throw upon the mas- 
 ter the burden of showing care in 
 selection (Murphy v. St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co. , 71 Mo. 303 ; coiitra, Skerritt 
 V. Scallan, 11 Irish R. C. L. 389). 
 Master must have notice in some 
 form to be chargeable (Stevens v. 
 San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 100 Cal. 
 554 ; 35 Pac. 165 ; Reiser v. Pennsyl- 
 
 vania Co., 153 Pa. St. 38; 25 Atl. 
 175 ; MuUiern v. Lehigh Val. Coal 
 Co., 161 Pa. St. 3:0 ; 28 Atl. 1087 
 [rule not changed by statute, 1885]). 
 
 >" OXoughlin v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 87 Hun, 538; 34 N. Y. Supp. 
 397 [conductor forced to act as 
 switchman]. 
 
 " Evidence of incompetency and 
 notice held sufficient to go to jury, 
 in Coppins v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 133 N. Y. 557 ; 35 N. E. 915 [habit of 
 leaving post of duty] ; Hilts v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 55 Mich. 487; 31 
 N. W. 878 [locomotive engineer had 
 for nine months habitually been 
 noticeably drunk] ; Wall v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. R. Co., 54 Hun, 454 ; 7 N. 
 Y. Supp. 709 [frequent acts]. 
 
 " Such proof will sustain a verdict, 
 but it does not raise a legal presump- 
 tion. It is entirely for the jury 
 (Joch V. Dankwardt, 85 111. 331). 
 See Bunnell v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 
 39 Minn. 305, where one, who had 
 never learned the trade of carpenter, 
 was employed as foreman of a gang 
 of carpenters. 
 
 "Hathaway v. Illinois Cent. R. 
 Co., 93 Iowa, 337; 60 N. W. 651. 
 Proof of single act may be enough 
 with other facts (East Line, etc. R.Co. 
 V. Scott, 71 Tex. 703 ; 10 S. W. 398) 
 
303 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§193 
 
 it.^^ A jury cannot be allowed to decide, merely from the looks 
 and manner of a servant appearing before them, that he was 
 incompetent, and that the master ought to have known it.'^ 
 
 § 193. Duty to employ sufificient force. — Another duty 
 which the master owes to his servants is that of employing a 
 sufificient number to do the work, so far as may be necessary to 
 enable them to do it in safety ;' but, as in other cases, he is 
 only bound to use ordinary care for this purpose.^ It is not 
 always consistent with such care, however, to provide a force 
 just suf^cient for the regular, every-day course of business. 
 Preparation must be made for those extraordinary emergencies 
 which, although they do not frequently occur, are still known 
 in common experience to be likely to occur occasionally. 
 Thus, in case of a sudden flood, washing away a part of a rail- 
 road, the company must have men promptly stationed at 
 points of danger, to warn servants who are unconscious of it.^ 
 
 18 Holland V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 
 100 Cal. 340; 34 Pac. 666 [running 
 train too fast]. 
 
 "Corson v. Maine Central R. Co., 
 76 Me. 344. See Peaslee v. Fitch- 
 burg R. Co., 152 Mass. 155 ; 25 N. E. 
 71. Yet the court on appeal cannot 
 say, as matter of law, that the con- 
 duct of the servant, in presence of 
 the jury, in connection with other 
 testimony, will not warrant a find- 
 ing of his incompetency (Keith v. 
 New Haven, etc. R. Co., 140 Mass. 
 175; 3N. E. 38). 
 
 ■ Flike V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 53 N. 
 Y. 549 ; Booth v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 73 Id. 38 ; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Lavalley, 36 Ohio St. 231 ; Burling- 
 ton, etc. R. Co. V. Crockett, 19 Neb. 
 138 ; 26 N. W. 931 [absence of watch- 
 man] ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Taylor, 
 69 111. 461. A railroad company is 
 liable for the death of an employee, 
 caused by the absence from a train, 
 for the purpose of getting something 
 to eat, of part of a train crew, who 
 were required to remain on duty 19 
 hours without any way of getting 
 meals, though decedent was a fellow- 
 
 servant (Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaf- 
 frey, 139 Ind. 430 ; 33 N. E. 67). See 
 Thorpe v. Mo. Pacific R. Co. (89 Mo. 
 650), where it was held that if the 
 insufficiency of the staff or force em- 
 ployed to do the work is obviously so 
 great that even with use of great 
 caution there is imminent danger to 
 those actually taking part, they are 
 chargeable with contributory negli- 
 gence in uniting in it. 
 
 i'See Northern Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Herbert, 116 U. S. 643 ; 6 S. Ct. 590; 
 Saxton v. Hawksworth, 26 L. T. 8-51 ; 
 Skipp V. Eastern Counties R. Co., 9 
 Exch. 333. 
 
 ^ Hardy v. Carolina Central R. Co , 
 76 N. C. 5. In that case, a brake- 
 man in defendant's employment, was 
 killed by the wrecking of his train 
 in a washout, immediately after an 
 extraordinary storm. The corpora- 
 tion was held liable on the ground of 
 their failure to have a man at the 
 break in the road, to warn the train ; 
 Read, J., saying : "There must be a 
 man for every place, as need may 
 be "(see 74 N. C. 734). 
 
§194] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 304 
 
 If men enough are not previously engaged, new ones should 
 be instantly procured ; or, if there is not time to do this, some 
 part of the general business must be suspended, so as to 
 release a sufficient number of men to attend to the new and 
 
 more pressing duty. 
 
 § 194. Duty to provide proper instrumentalities. — The 
 
 master personally^ owes to his servants the duty of using ordi- 
 nary care and diligence ^ to provide for their use reasonably safe 
 instrumentalities of service.^ Among these are a reasonably 
 safe place in which to do their work* or to stay while waiting 
 
 ' The master is bound to uso due 
 care in furnishing safe instru- 
 mentalities for performing the work. 
 This is a personal obligation, which 
 cannot be escaped by delegating it 
 (Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
 150 U. S. 349 : 14 S. Cfc. 140 ; Northern 
 Pacific E. Co. V. Herbert. 116 U. S. 
 6-13 ; 6 S. Ct. 590 ; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 
 N. Y. 46 ; Pullman Car Co. v. Laack, 
 143 111. 343 ; 33 N. E. 385 ; Morton v. 
 Detroit, etc. E. Co., 81 Mich. 4133; 46 N. 
 W. Ill ; Bushby v. N. Y., Lake Erie, 
 etc. E. Co., 107 N. Y. 374 ; 14 N. E. 
 437; Kranz v. Long Island R. Co., 
 123 N. Y. 1 ; 25 N. E. 206, and, in 
 fact, all the cases cited under this 
 section). 
 
 ' Ordinary care is always required. 
 It is error to charge that anything 
 less will suiHce in any case (St. 
 Louis, etc. E. Co. v. Eggmann, 161 
 111. 155; 43 N. E. 620). Ordinary 
 cai-e implies such care in the matter 
 as the master would take if it were 
 possible for him to occupy at the 
 same time the position of both mas- 
 ter and servant (Morrisey v. Hughes, 
 65 Vt. 553; 27 Atl. 205). The or- 
 dinary care which a railroad com- 
 pany is bound to use to furnish safe 
 machinery and appliances is meas- 
 ured by the character and risks of 
 the business (Mather v. Eillston, 156 
 U. S. .391 ; 16 S. Ct. 464 ; Texas, etc. 
 R Co. V. Thompson, 17 C. C. A. 534; 
 
 70 Fed. 944). A. railroad company 
 owes to its servants a greater degree 
 of diligence and care, according as 
 the service in which they are en- 
 gaged is more dangerous (Central R. 
 Co. V. Ryles, 84 Ga. 420 ; 11 S. E. 499). 
 
 5 Gardner v. Mich. Central R. Co., 
 150 U. S. 349 ; 14 S. Ct. 140 ; Central 
 R. Co. V. Keegan, 160 U. S. 259; 16 
 S. Ct. 269. The rule applies to ani- 
 mals as well as inanimate appliances 
 (Hammond Co. v. Johnson, 38 Neb. 
 244 ; 56 N. W. 967 [horses] ; Wrought 
 Iron Range Co. v. Martin [Tex. Civ. 
 App.] 28 S. W. 557). 
 
 * Union Pac. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 
 161 U. S. 451; Plank v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 60 N. Y. 607 [trench in place 
 where brakemen were required to 
 stand] ; Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. 
 Y. ,547; 5 N. E. 449 [platform]; 
 Kranz v. Long Island R. Co., 123 N. 
 Y. 1 ; 25 N. E. 206 [trench] ; Wilson 
 V. Willimantio Linen Co., 50 Conn. 
 433 [defective shafting ; making 
 workshop dangerous]. Servant 
 crushed between a car and a build- 
 ing while moving the car in obedi 
 ence to orders, recovered ; space be- 
 tween track and building being too 
 narrow, and constantly narrow- 
 ing ; but plaintiff did not know, and 
 could not reasonably be expected to 
 know, this (Ferren v. Old Colony R. 
 Co. 143 Mass. 197, 9 N. E. 608). 
 Deceased v.'as digging in a deep 
 
30S 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 194 
 
 orders,^ reasonably safe ways of entrance and departure,* an 
 adequate supply' of sound and safe materials, implements and 
 accommodations,^ with such other appliances as may reason- 
 
 trench, the sides of ■which were not 
 braced, and on one side of which a 
 water pipe had been buried ; and 
 this side caved in. Held, that a 
 verdict against the master could not 
 be set aside (Van Steenburgh v. 
 Thornton [Ct. Errors], 58 N. J. Law, 
 160; 33 Atl. 380). It is the duty of a 
 master to exercise reasonable care to 
 see that the place furnished for a 
 servant to work is reasonably safe, 
 and if he leaves the performance of 
 such duty to other servants, he is 
 liable for the manner in which they 
 perform it, without regard to his 
 personal knowledge, or notice of 
 dangerous conditions (Hess v. Rosen- 
 thal, 160 111. 621 ; 43 N. E. 743). To th6 
 same effect, Phil. & Reading R. Co. 
 V. Trainor, 137 Pa. St. 148 ; 20 Atl. 
 632 ; Big Creek Stone Co. v. Wolf, 
 138 Ind. 496 ; 38 N. E. 52 ; Engstrom 
 V.Ashland Iron Co., 87 Wise. 166; 
 58 N. W. 241 ; Kelley v. Ryus, 48 
 Kans. 130 ; 29 Pac. 144 ; Hammond 
 Co. V. Mason, 12 Ind. App. 469 ; 40 
 N. E. 642 ; Gisson v. Schwabacher, 
 «9 Cal. 419 ; 34 Pac. 104 [dark room 
 with dangerous machinery] ; Akeley 
 Lumber Co. v. Rauen, 58 Fed. 668 ; 
 7 C. C. A. 424 [dangerous place, in- 
 sufficiently lighted]. A railroad 
 track is the " place of work " for 
 trainmen ; and the master is bound 
 to see to its safety (Union Pac. R. 
 Co. V. O'Brien, 161 U. S. 451; 
 Pidgeon v. Long Island E. Co., 87 
 Hun, 43 ; 33 N. Y. Supp. 870; Bessex 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 45 "Wise. 
 477 [track] ; Hulehan v. Green Bay, 
 etc. R. Co., 58 Id. 319 ; 17 N. W. 17 
 [track] ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Robbins, 57 Ark. 377 ; 21 S. W. 886 : 
 Fordyce v. Briney, 58 Ark. 206 ; 24 
 S. "W. 250 ; Davis v. Button, 78 Cal. 
 [Law of Neq. Vol. 1 — 20] 
 
 247 ; 18 Pac. 138 [bridge] ; Woods v. 
 Lindvall, 4 U. S. App. 49 ; 1 C. C. A. 
 37 ; 48 Fed. 62 [defective trestle]). 
 
 ' Peters v. Harrison Wire Co. , 14 
 Mo. App. 599 [heavy wheel, left un- 
 fastened on an inclined track over a 
 place where plaintiff, a servant, was 
 waiting to go to his ■work, and an- 
 other servant set in motion the 
 wheel, which fell upon plaintiff]. 
 So while eating meals during short 
 interval (Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Martin [Ind. App.], 39 N. E. 759). 
 
 « Brydon v. Stewart, 2 Macq. H. L. 
 30 ; s. P., BuzzeU v. Laconia Mfg. 
 Co., 48 Me. 113. 
 
 ' Supply of tools and appliances 
 must be sufficient (Cleveland, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Brown, 20 C. C. A. 147; 73 
 Fed. 970). The neglect to provide 
 readily attainable appliances for the 
 prevention of accidents, in occu- 
 pations attended with unusual dan- 
 ger, is proof of culpable negligence. 
 (Mather v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 391 ; 
 15 S. Ct. 464). 
 
 8 Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. 
 L. 748 ; Brydon v. Stewart, 2 Macq. 
 H. L. 30 ; Buzzell v. Laconia Mfg. 
 Co., 48 Me. 113; Keegan v. West- 
 ern R. Co., 8 N. Y. 175 ; Ryan v. 
 Fowler, 24 Id. 410 ; Laning v. N. .Y 
 Central R. Co., 49 Id. 521; Houston 
 V. Brush, 66 Vt. 331 ; 39 Atl. 3?0 ; 
 Fifield V. Northern R. Co., 43 N. H. 
 235 ; Hanley v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 
 63 Id. 274 ; Moynihan v. Hills Co., 
 146 Mass. 586; 16 N. E. 574 [machine]; 
 Elkins V. Penn. R. Co., 171 Pa. St. 
 121 ; 33 Atl. 74 [defect in steps of 
 freight car] ; Norfolk, etc. R. Co. t. 
 Jackson, 85 Va. 489; 6 S. E. 320 
 [cross-grained defective push-pole] ; 
 Campbell v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 109 Ala. 520; 19 So. 675 [defective car 
 
§i94j 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 306 
 
 ably be required to insure their safety/ while at their work or 
 passing over his premises to or from work.^" These things 
 must, moreover, be adapted to the work in hand. It is not 
 enough that they should be good, under ordinary conditions. 
 They must be suitable for the work to which they are applied 
 by the master, and properly adjusted to each other." If, 
 therefore, the master knows *^ or would have known if he 
 had used ordinary care to ascertain the facts,'^ that the build- 
 
 brake]; Nordyke, etc. M. Co. v. Van 
 Sant, 99 Ind. 188 ; Chicago, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Swett, 45 111. 197 [a very em- 
 phatic decision] ; Perry v. Eicketts, 
 55 Id. 234 ; Fink v. Des Moines Ice 
 Co., 84 Iowa, 331; 51 N. W. 155 [slide 
 in ice house] ; Eodney v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co., 127 Mo. 676 ; 28 S. W. 887 
 [car] ; Kelley v. Eyus, 48 Kans. 120 ; 
 29 Pac. 144 [machinery] ; Prosser v. 
 Montana E. Co., 17 Mont. 372; 43 
 Pac. 81 [bent brakestaff] ; Hallower 
 T. Henley, 6 Cal. 209 ; Johnson v. 
 Bellingham Imp. Co. ,13 Wash. St. 
 455 ; 48 Pac. 370 [rotten plank]. It is 
 the duty of an employer to exercise 
 ordinary care in providing reason- 
 ably safe and suitable machinery for 
 the use of his servant, and, in the 
 absence of notice to the contrary, 
 the servant is vrarranted in assum- 
 ing that his employer has performed 
 this duty (Eicbland's Iron Co. v. El- 
 kins, 90 Va. 249 ; 17 S. E. 890). 
 
 » Hough V. Texas, etc. E. Co., 100 
 "U. S. 213 ; Benzing v. Stein way, 101 
 N. Y. 547 ; 5 N. E. 449 ; Corcoran v. 
 Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517 [laborer in 
 cotton mill, injured through failure 
 of general agent to keep an elevator 
 in repair] ; Vosburgh v. Lake Shore, 
 etc. E. Co.,94N.Y. 374. 
 
 '" Cases cited, note 6, supra. This 
 principle applies to vehicles and 
 ways in or over which the master 
 carries the servant to or from work 
 (Conlon V. Oregon, etc. E. Co., 23 
 Greg. 499 ; 32 Pac. 397 [servant 
 riding over bridge to his work]; 
 
 San Antonio, etc. R. Co. v. Adams, 
 6 Tex. Civ. App. 103 ; 24 S. W. 839 
 [bridge] ; Pendergast v. Union E. 
 Co., 10 N. Y. App. Div. 207 ; 41 N. 
 Y. Supp. 927 [cars]). 
 
 " Where machinery was perfect, 
 of its kind, and in good repair, but 
 unsuitable for the purpose for which 
 it was used, the master was held lia- 
 ble (Geloneck v. Dean Pump Co., 
 165 Mass. 203; 43 N. E. 85). The 
 proper adjustment of brake-rods is 
 a master's duty (Woods v. Long 
 Island E. Co. 11 N. Y. App. Div. 16 ; 
 42 N. Y. Supp. 140). 
 
 '2 Eyan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y'. 410 ; 
 Keegan v. Western E. Co., 8 Id. 175; 
 Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 374; 
 Perry v. Eicketts, 55 111. 234. 
 
 '^ Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. 
 547 ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Jack- 
 son, 55 111. 493 ; Gibson v. Pacific R. 
 Co., 46 Mo. 163 ; Elliott v. St. Louis, 
 etc. E. Co., 67 Mo. 273; Spicer v. 
 South Boston Iron Co., 138 Mass. 
 426 [flaw in iron hook used to raise 
 furnace door, which a careful in- 
 spection would have revealed]; Texas, 
 etc. E. Co. V. McAtee, 61 Tex. 695 
 [defect in car-brake, of which the 
 master should have known] ; Hous- 
 ton V. Brush, 66 Vt. 331; 29 Atl. 880; 
 Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59 [defect in 
 fire-box of engine, which master 
 might have discovered by proper 
 vigilance] : Paine v. Eastern E. 
 Co., 91 Wise. 340; 64 N. W. 1005). 
 Where a piece of mechanism is mani- 
 festly incomplete, and is used in 
 
307 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 1 94 
 
 ings, ways, machinery, tools or materials which he pro- 
 vides for the use of his servants are unsafe, and a servant, 
 without contributory fault, suffers injury thereby, the master 
 is liable therefor;" although he is not thus liable, in the 
 absence of actual or constructive notice." The master is 
 not entitled to time to discover defects in things which are 
 defective when put in use. He should examine them before 
 putting them in use.^" He cannot evade his responsibility in 
 these respects, by simply giving general orders that servants 
 
 that condition, the master cannot '■* Complaint alleging that ' ' de- 
 shield himself from responsibility fendant, by the exercise of ordinary 
 by alleging ignorance of its condi- care, might have known,'' states 
 tion and of the danger thereof cause of action (Seckinger v. Phili- 
 (Broderick V. Detroit, etc. Depot Co., bert Co., 129 Mo. 590; 31 S. W. 
 56 Mich. 261 [defective ventilator in 957) . Master who himself made 
 grain elevator] ; Ogden v. Rum- ladder furnished servant, chargeable 
 mens, 3 Fost. & F. 751 [arch fell with knowledge of such defects as 
 and killed a workman ; defendant ordinary care during manufacture 
 held liable if he had reasonable would have disclosed (Standard Oil 
 cause to apprehend the fall]). Where Co. v. Bowker, 141 Ind. 12; 40 N. 
 a servant was injured by the giving E. 128). In that case, the master 
 way of wood which had been al- being a corporation, was of course 
 lowed to remain in the soil an un- held responsible for neglect of its 
 reasonable length of time, he was servants in the course of manu- 
 held entitled to recover against his facture. 
 
 master (who owned the wood and '^ Welfare v. Brighton, etc. R. 
 soU) without proof of an actual Co., L. E. 4 Q. B. 696 ; Priestly v. 
 scienter (O'Donnell v. Allegheny Fowler, 3 JI. & W. 1 ; Indianapolis, 
 Valley B. Co., 59 Pa. St. 239; Webb etc. R. Co. v. Love, 10 Ind. 554; 
 V. Rennie, 4 Fost. & F. 608). The Wright v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 25 
 plaintiff's son was at work for the N. Y. 566 ; Hayden v. Smithville 
 defendant under a cylinder sus- Mfg. Co., 29 Conn. 548; BuzzeU v, 
 pended by chains and bolts, and Laconia Mfg. Co., 48 Me. 113; Hull 
 the tackle being insufficient for the v. Hall, 78 Id. 114; 3 Atl. 38. See 
 purpose, the cylinder fell and killed § 195, note 3 ; Schulz v. Rohe, 149 
 the plaintiff's son. The manner in N. Y. 132 ; 43 N. E. 420 [no notice of 
 which the cylinder was suspended particular defect], 
 was unusual and dangerous, and '* If appliances furnished by the 
 was suggested by the defendant master "are shown to have been 
 himself. Held, that the defendant originally defective and unsafe, the 
 was liable (Weems v. Mathieson, 4 burden does not rest on an employee, 
 Macq. H. L. 215). When an eleva- when injured by such defect, to pro- 
 tor fell a second time and injured a duce further evidence that the mas- 
 servant, proof of the former fall was ter had notice thereof " (Union Pa- 
 held admissible to show the master's cific R. Co. v. James, 56 Fed. 1001 ; 
 knowledge of its defective character 6 C. C. A. 217). 
 (Malone v. Hawley, 46 Cal. 409). 
 
§ 1 94a] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 308 
 
 shall examine for themselves, before using the place, materials, 
 etc., furnished by him. The fact that a servant could, by care 
 and caution, so operate a defective and dangerous machine as 
 not to produce injury to his fellow-servants, does not exempt 
 the master from his liability for an omission to exercise rea- 
 sonable care and prudence in furnishing safe and suitable 
 appliances.^'^ The master fails to supply a "safe place" for 
 work, if he allows work to be conducted there habitually, in a 
 manner needlessly dangerous to servants.^' 
 
 § 194a. Duty of inspection and repair. — The master is also 
 personally * bound, from time to time,^ to inspect and examine 
 
 " Stringham v. Stewart, 100 N. Y. 
 516 ; 3 N. E. 575 [warehouse eleva- 
 tor which fell, in consequence of 
 lack of safety-guard]. See MoGee 
 V. Boston Cordage Co., 139 Mass. 
 445 ; 1 N. E. 745, and note. 
 
 '* Doing V. N. Y., Ontario etc. E. 
 Co., 151 N. Y. 579; 45 N. E. 1028; 
 Predenburg v. Northern Cent. E. 
 Co., 114 N. Y. 583 ; 21 N. E. 1049. 
 
 ' The duty of a railroad company 
 to exercise reasonable care in fur- 
 nishing adequately safe trains for 
 the use of its employees is not dis- 
 charged by simply using reasonable 
 care to employ and retain only 
 competent and diligent inspectors, 
 but it is liable if its inspectors, in 
 fact, fail to discover a defect which a 
 reasonable examination would have 
 disclosed (Union Pac. E. Co. v. 
 Daniels, 152 IT. S. 684 ; 14 S. Ct. 756 ; 
 affi'g Daniels v. Union Pac. E. Co., 
 € Utah, 357; 23 Pac. 762). In short, 
 their duty of inspection and repair 
 cannot be delegated (Id. ; Jaques v. 
 Great Falls Mfg. Co. , 66 N. H. 483 ; 33 
 Atl. 552 ; Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 33; 
 29 Atl. 380 ; Davis v. Central E. Co., 
 55 Vt. 84 [derrick]; Daley v. Boston 
 & A. E. Co., 147 Mass. 101; 16 N. E. 
 690 [defective rope]; Myers v. Hud- 
 son Iron Co., 150 Mass. 125 [mining 
 machinery recently inspected, but 
 
 defective] ; Elmer v. Locke, 185 
 Mass. 576 ; Ingebregtsen v. Nord 
 Deutscher S. S. Co. [Ct. Errors], 57; 
 N. J. Law, 400 ; 31 Atl. 619 ; Torians 
 V. Eichmond, etc. R. Co., 84 Va. 193 ; 
 4 S. E. 339; Carter v. Oliver Oil 
 Co., 34 S. C. 311; 13 S. E. 419; Bean 
 V. Western N. C. E. Co., 107 N. C. 731; 
 12 S. E. 600 [loose rocks falling 
 on track; track-walker employed]; 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 
 111. 458 ; 39 N. E. 324 ; Eomona Stone 
 Co. V. Phillips, 11 Ind. App. 118 ; 39 N. 
 E. 96 ; Coontz v. Missouri Pac. E. Co ., 
 121 Mo. 653 ; 26 S. W. 661). The duty 
 of keeping its track in proper repair 
 rests on the master (McClarney v. 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co., 80 "Wise. 277; 
 49 N. W. 963; Fox v. Spring Lake 
 Iron Co., 89 Mich. 387; 50 N. W. 873 
 [hoisting apparatus] ; Van Dusen v. 
 Letellier, 78 Mich. 493 ; 44 N. W. 573 
 [dock on which work was done]). 
 
 = Snow V. Housatonic E. Co., 8 Al- 
 len, 441; Toledo, etc. E. Co. v. Con- 
 roy, 68 111. 560; Quincy Coal Co. v. 
 Hood, 77 Id. 68 ; Wedgwood v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. E. Co., 44 Wise. 44 ; Hous- 
 ton, etc. E. Co. V. Dunham, 49 Tex. 
 181 ; Bridges v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 6 Mo. App. 389 ; Smith v. Peninsular 
 Car Works, 60 Mich. 501 ; 37 N. W. 
 663 [icy walk, on which workman 
 slipped while carrying melted iron] ; 
 
309 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 194a 
 
 all instrumentalities furnished by him, and to use ordinary 
 care, diligence and skill to keep them in good and safe con- 
 dition.^ " The duty of inspection is affirmative and must be 
 continuously fulfilled and positively performed." * Such duty 
 is not discharged by giving directions for its performance,' or 
 by promulgating rules requiring it to be performed,^ or by em- 
 ploying competent and careful persons for that purpose.'' The 
 master is not responsible for the want of repairs when he has 
 neither actual nor constructive notice of their need ; and this 
 notice is not presumed, but must be proved by the servant.* 
 
 Cooper V. Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co. , 24 
 W. Va. 37, 51. Strips, used to hold 
 lumber upon a flat car, are part of 
 the equipment, whicli the railroad 
 company was obliged to make rea- 
 sonably safe for the use of its em- 
 ployees (Dougherty v. Rome, etc. E. 
 Co., 64 Hun, C33 ; 18 N. Y. Supp. 841). 
 Company liable for an injury caused 
 by section boss allowing blocks of 
 wood to remain on the ti-acks (Hule- 
 han V. Green Bay, etc. R. Co., 68 
 Wise. 520 ; 32 N. W. 529). In Web- 
 ber V. Piper (109 N. Y. 496 ; 17 N. E. 
 216), it was held that mere dullness 
 of a saw, resulting from use, is not a 
 " defect " within the meaning of this 
 rule. s. P., Little Eock, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Duffey, 35 Ark. 602. But where 
 part of a machine is so worn by use 
 as to be dangerous, defendant's neg- 
 ligence was a question for the jury 
 (Sneider v. Treichler, 56 Hun, 309; 
 9 N. Y. Supp. 584 ; Myers v. Hudson 
 Iron Co., 150 Mass. 125; 22 N. E. 631 
 [worn brake on hoisting machinery]). 
 3 Goodrich v. N. Y. Central, etc. E. 
 Co. 116 N. Y. 398 ; 23 N. E. 397 [car- 
 bumper fallen out of place] ; Jaques 
 V. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 66 N. H. 482 ; 
 33 Atl. 553 [shuttle flying out of 
 loom] ; Hannah v. Connecticut River 
 R. Co., 154 Mass. 529; 38 N. E. 683 
 [switch-rod] ; Myers v. Hudson Iron 
 Co., 150 Mass. 125; 22 N. E. 631 
 [shoe-brake on mining bucket] ; Sim- 
 mons V. Peters, 85 Hun, 93 ; 32 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 680 [door to elevator shaft] ; 
 New York, etc. Min. Co. v. Rogers, 
 11 Colo. 6 ; 16 Pac. 719 [frozen rope 
 to mining bucket]. A switch must 
 be kept properly connected and a 
 new lock furnished when required 
 (Coleman V. Wilmington, etc. E. Co., 
 25 S. C. 446) 
 
 ■• Brann v. Chicago, etc. E. Co. , 53 
 Iowa, 595 ; 6 N. W. 5 ; Cooper v. 
 Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co., 24 W. Va. 
 37, 56 ; Settle v. St. Louis, etc. E. 
 Co., 127 Mo. 336 ; 30 S. W. 125 ; Hous- 
 ton V. Brush, 66 Vt. 331 ; 39 Atl. 380. 
 
 '^ Van Dusen v. Letellier, 78 Mich. 
 492 ; 41 N. W. 573 ; see, also, § 204, 
 post; and note 1, ante. 
 
 8 Bailey v. Rome, etc. R. Co., 139 
 N. Y. 303 ; 34 N. E. 918 ; Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. V. McElyea, 71 Tex. 386 ; 
 9 S. W. 313. 
 
 ' See cases cited under note 1 ; Sweat 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co. , 156 Mass. 384 ; 
 31 N. E. 296 [platform] ; Fuller v. 
 Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46. 
 
 8 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Heaton, 137 
 Ind. 1 ; 35 N. E. 087 ; Williams v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 119 Mo. 316 ; 
 24 S. W. 782 ; Colfax Coal Co. v. 
 Johnson, 53 111. App. 383 ; Illinois 
 Cent. E. Co. v. Harris, 53 Id. 592 ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Dixon, 49 Id. 
 293. The master is not liable at all 
 for want of repairs, if he is not 
 chargeable with notice of their need 
 (Howd V. Mississippi, etc. R. Co., 50 
 Miss. 178). In Ohio, by statute, a 
 
§ 194a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 31O 
 
 And it must be proved that he was chargeable with notice of 
 the particular defect complained of.' But he is chargeable 
 with constructive notice of whatever, by the use of ordinary 
 care and diligence, he might have discovered," or avoided the 
 
 railroad company is chargeable with Monmouth Min. Co. v. Erling, 148 
 
 knowledge of defects in its cars, loco- 111. 531 ; 36 N. E. 117 [nut missing 
 
 motives, and machinery (Act, April two weeks] ; Cowan v. Chicago, etc. 
 
 2, 1890, § 2), to overcome which it R. Co., 80 Wise. 284 ; 50 N. W. 180 
 
 must show that, in fact, it did not [brake-rod] ; Paine v. Eastern R. Co. , 
 
 have such knowledge, and that it 91 Wise. 340 ; 64 N. W. 1005 [appli- 
 
 used due diligence to ascertain and ance worn out] ; Kennedy v. Chicago, 
 
 remedy such defects (Columbus, etc. etc. R. Co., 57 Minn. 327 ; 58 N. W. 
 
 R. Co. V. Erick, 51 Ohio St. 146 ; 37 878 [jack-screw not inspected] ; 
 
 N. E. 128). Sheedy v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 55 
 
 9 Schulz V. Rohe, 149 N. Y. 133; 43 Minn. 357 ; 57 N. W. 60 [brake] ; 
 
 N. E. 420. Coontz v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 131 
 
 "> It is not necessary that the mas- Mo. 652 ; 26 S. W. 661 ; Gutridge v. 
 
 ter have actual knowledge of the de- Missouri Pac. R. Co., 105 Mo. 520; 
 
 feet, but it is sufficient to show that 16 S. W. 943 [defect not apparent 
 
 he could have discovered the defect to the eye] ; Southw. Tel. Co. v. 
 
 by the exercise of reasonable care Woughter, 56 Ark. 206 ; 19 S. W. 
 
 and diligence (Houston v. Brush, 66 575 [telegraph pole] ; St. Louis, etc. 
 
 Vt. 331 ; 29 Atl. 380 ; Daniels v. R. Co. v. Higgins, 58 Ark. 458 ; 14 
 
 Union Pac. E. Co., 152 U. S. 684 ; 14 S. W. 653 [caboose] ; Gulf, etc. R. 
 
 S. Ct. 756 ; affi'g 6 Utah, 357 ; 23 Co. v. Pettis, 69 Tex. 689 ; 7 S. W. 
 
 Pac. 763 ; Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v. 98 [rotten ties] ; Eddy v. Prentice 
 
 Barrett. 14 C. C. A. 373 ; 67 Fed. 214; 8 Tex. Civ. App. 58; 37 S. W. 1063 
 
 Babcock V. Old Colony R. Co., 150 [brake-rod]; Galveston, etc. R. Co. 
 
 Mass. 467 ; 33 N. E. 325 [obstructions v. Templeton, 87 Tex. 43 ; 36 S. W. 
 
 near track] ; Mooney v. Connect!- 1066 [brake out of place]). Evidence 
 
 cut Lumber Co., 154 Mass. 407 ; 38 of actual notice to officers of a cor- 
 
 N. E. 352 [machinery known to start poration of the defective condition 
 
 of itself] ; McCarragher v. Rogers, of a boiler is, of course, proper (Bal- 
 
 130 N. Y. 526 ; 24 N. E. 813 [defect lard v. Hitchcock Mfg. Co., 71 Hun, 
 
 in machine known] ; Bailey v. Rome, 583 ; 34 N. Y. Sup. 1101). For cases 
 
 etc. R. Co., 139 N. Y. 302 ; 34 N. E. of actual notice, see Glossen v. Geh- 
 
 fll8 [defect in brake visible only by man, 147 Pa. St. 619 ; 33 Atl. 843 
 
 inspection under car, question for [defendant personally knew] ; Union 
 
 jury]; Bird v. Long Is. R. Co., 11 Stock- Yards Co. v. Larson, 88 Neb. 
 
 N. Y. App. Div. 134; 42 N. Y. Supp. 492 ; 56 N. W. 1079 [superintendent 
 
 888 [defect in station platform not knew] ; Mattise v. Consumers' Ice 
 
 obvious]; Bennett v. Standard Glass Co., 46 La. Ann. 1535; 16 So. 400 
 
 Co., 158 Pa. St. 120; 27 Atl. 874; [engineer in charge knew]. The 
 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Nunnally, 88 same rule applies to the continuance 
 
 Ya. 546 ; 14 S. E. 867 [car couplings] ; of negligent and dangerous methods 
 
 Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Burnett. 88 of work for a long time (Doing v. 
 
 Va. 538 : 14 S E. 373 [brake] ; Lake N. Y., Ontario, etc. R. Co., 151 N. 
 
 Erie. etc. R. Co. v. McHenry, 10 Y. 579.) 
 Ind. App. 535 ; 37 N. E. 186 [engine] ; 
 
311 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 195 
 
 ■danger incident thereupon. He is entitled to reasonable 
 time, after notice of a defect, within which to make repairs ; " 
 and if, during that period, or while he is repairing, an injury 
 occurs to a servant, the question of a master's negligence 
 depends upon his diligence under all the circumstances.'^ A 
 distinction is sometimes made between repairs generally and 
 those ordinary repairs, which a machine rod or other imple- 
 ment requires from day to day : the latter being held to be 
 not within the master's personal duty.'' This is largely based 
 upon the superior knowledge of the servants and the impossi- 
 bility of the most careful master knowing when the repair is 
 called for. 
 
 § 195. Limits of master's liabilities for instrumentalities. — 
 
 The master is not required to use more than ordinary care and 
 diligence (as already defined) for the protection of his servants,^ 
 
 " Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Sloan, the perfection in all parts of the 
 
 11 Ind. App. 401 ; 39 N. E. 174. It machinery or apparatus provided for 
 
 has been held that a railroad com- the use of servants (Baltimore, etc. 
 
 pany is under no obligation to its E. Co. v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72 ; 15 
 
 servants to repair track which be- S. Ct. 491 ; Soderman v. Kemp, 145 
 
 comes unsafe ; but it must give them N. Y. 427 ; 40 N. E. 212 ; Fenderson 
 
 due and timely notice of the injury, v. Atlantic City E. Co. [Ct. Errors], 
 
 with warning to keep off that per- 56 N. J. Law, 708 ; 31 Atl. 767 ; Sul- 
 
 tion of the track, and then may take livau v. N. Y., IST. Haven, etc. R. 
 
 whatever time it deems proper to Co., 62 Conn. 209 ; 25 Atl. 711 ; Hart 
 
 make the repairs (Henry v. Lake v. Naumburg, 123 N. Y. 641 ; 25 N. 
 
 Shore, etc. R. Co., 49 Mich. 495 ; fol- E. 385 [elevator] ; Mancuso v. Cata- 
 
 lovved in St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. ract Construction Co., 87 Hun, 519; 
 
 Morgart, 45 Ark. 318). 34 N. Y. S. 273 [dynamite in place of 
 
 " Murphy v. Crossan, 98 Pa. St. work] ; Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Jack- 
 
 495 [question for jury]. son, 85 Va. 489 ; 8 S. E. 370 ; Annis- 
 
 '^ McGee v. Boston Cordage Co., ton Pipe "Works v. Dickey, 93 Ala. 
 
 139 Mass. 445 ; 1 N. E. 745 [hackling 418 ; 9 So. 720 ; Park Hotel Co. v. 
 
 pins supplied but not replaced] ; Lockhart, 59 Ark. 465 ; 28 S. W. 23 ; 
 
 Johnson v. Boston Towboat Co., 135 Eddy v. Adams, Tex. ; 18 S. W. 
 
 Mass. 209 [new ropes supplied but 490 ; Trinity Lumber Co. v. Denham, 
 
 not used] ; approved and followed 85 Tex. 56 ; 19 S. W. 1012 ; Chicago, 
 
 in Cregan v. Marston, 126 N. Y. etc. R. Co. v. Kerr, 148 111. 605 ; 35 
 
 568 ; 37 N. E. 953. See Webber v. N. E. 1117 ; Kansas City, etc. E. Co. 
 
 Piper, 109 N. Y. 496 ; 17 N. E. 316. v. Ryan, 52 Kans. 637 ; 35 Pac. 392 ; 
 
 ' No more than ordinary care is Williams v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 
 
 required. The master is not to be 119 Mo. .S16 ; 24 S. W. 782 ; Fosburg 
 
 held as warranting the absolute v. Phillips Fuel Co., 93 Iowa, 54; 61 N. 
 
 safety, under all circumstances, or W. 400). Only reasonable care re- 
 
ii95] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 312 
 
 even under circumstances which would entitle a passenger or 
 stranger to the use of great or extreme care.^ He is not liable 
 to a servant for defects of which he had no notice and which 
 he could not discover by the use of ordinary care.' The mas- 
 
 quired (Anderson v. Michigan Cent. 
 R. Co., Mich. : 65 N. W. •'585 ; 
 Brymer v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 90 
 Cal. 406 ; 27 Pac. 371). Therefore, it 
 is error to charge that, for the pro- 
 tection of employees in its shops, a 
 railroad company is bound to have 
 its machinery " safe so far as human 
 skill and foresight can make it" 
 (East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Aiken, 
 89 Tenn. 245 ; 14 S. W. 1082) ; or that 
 " it is the duty of the master to pro- 
 vide safe, sound and suitable appli- 
 ances and instrumentalities for the 
 use of the servant, and to provide 
 generally for his safety in the course 
 of tlie employment, and to use 
 proper diligence to avoid exposing 
 the servant to extraordinary risk." 
 (Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin, 93 Va. 
 791; 23 S. E. 869). 
 
 ^ Although a railroad company is 
 bound to use the highest degree of 
 care to keep its track and machinery 
 in safe condition for the protection 
 of its passengers, it is error to charge 
 that it is bound to use the same 
 degree of care for that purpose for 
 the protection of its servants (Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Kerr, 148 111. 605 ; 
 35 N. E. 1117). The master discharges 
 his duty by applying ordinary tests, 
 and is not bound to employ experts 
 or apply the highest tests (Clyde v. 
 Richmond, etc. R. Co., 63 Fed. 482). 
 See note 11, post. 
 
 ^ Unless the alleged defect was or 
 ought to have been known to the 
 master, no recovery can be had (De- 
 GrafE v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 76 N. Y. 125 [defective brake-chain] ; 
 Feltham v. England, L. R. 3 Q. B. 
 33 [defective tramway] ; Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Piatt, 89 111. 141 ; East 
 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Hightower, 
 92 Id. 139 ; Ballou v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 54 Wise. 257 ; Hobbs v. 
 Stauer, 63 Id. 108 ; Atchison, etc. R. 
 Co. v.Ledbetter, 84Kans.336 [switch- 
 man injured by defective draw-bar] f 
 Baldwin v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 68 
 Iowa, 37 ; 25 N. W. 918 [fall of lum- 
 ber pile, properly constructed origi- 
 nally, but weakened by the cutting 
 of cross strips] ; Johnson v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc. R. Co., 36 W. Va. 73 ; 14 
 S. E. 432 [car coupling] ; Dunlap v. 
 Richmond, etc. R. Co., 81 Ga. 136; 
 7 S. E, 283 [railroad track] ; Georgia. 
 R. Co. V. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; 9 S. E, 
 1049 [latent defect in hammer] ^ 
 Hooper v. Snead Iron Works, Ky. 
 ; 14 S. W. 542 ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Hinder, Ky. ; 30 S. 
 W. 399 [invisible defect] ; Sack v. 
 Dolese, 137 111. 129 ; 27 N. E. 63 [for- 
 eign car] ; Doyle v. St. Paul, etc. R. 
 Co., 43 Minn. 79 ; 43 N. W. 787 [rail- 
 road track] ; Allen v. Union Pac. R. 
 Co., 7 Utah, 339 ; 36 Pac. 297 [cars] ; 
 Moranv. Racine Wagon Co. , 74 Hun, 
 454 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 853 [elevator]). 
 It must be shown that the master 
 knew of the defect, or that it was of 
 such a nature or had existed for such 
 a time that defendant ought to have 
 discovered it (Carruthers v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 55Kans. 600; 40 Pac. 915). 
 The company is not chargeable with 
 negligence unless it is shown that 
 the defect in the track had existed 
 long enough to be discovered by 
 careful inspection, and had not been 
 repaired (Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Webb, 97 Ala. 157. 11 So. 888). A 
 brakeman cannot recover for injur- 
 ies caused by a pile of ashes wrong- 
 fully dumped by a fireman and 
 
313 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 195 
 
 ter is not bound to provide the very best materials, imple- 
 ments or accommodations which can be procured/ nor those 
 which are absolutely the most convenient or most safe.^ His 
 duty is sufficiently discharged by providing those which are 
 reasonably safe and fit." Still less is he bound to furnish every 
 
 negligently left there by section- 
 men, without proof of actual or 
 constructive notice to the railroad 
 company (Loranger v. Lake Shore, 
 etc. R. Co., 104 Mich. 80; 63 N. W. 
 137). 
 
 ■•Kern v. De Castro Ref'g Co., 125 
 N. Y. 50 ; 35 N. E. 1071 [elevator] ; 
 Bajus V. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 103 
 N. Y. 313 ; Burke v. Witherbee, 98 
 Id. 563 ; Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin, 
 93 Va. 791 ; 33 S. E. 869. Railroad 
 companies are not "bound to pro- 
 cure the best " machinery and ap- 
 pliances (Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. 
 McCormick, 74 Ind. 440 ; Umback 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 83 Id. 191; 
 Lyttle V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 84 
 Mich. 389 ; 47 N. W. 571 ; Smith v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 69 Mo. 33). 
 
 = Jones V. Granite Mills, 136 Mass. 
 84 [lire escape] ; Payne v. Reese, 
 100 Pa. St. 301 [question held one 
 for jury] ; Cagney v. Hannibal, 
 etc. R. Co., 69 Mo. 416 [shaping- 
 machine, without guard or fender] ; 
 Sappenfield v. Main St. R. Co., 
 91 Cal. 48; 37 Pac. 590; Pierce v. 
 Atlanta Cotton Mills, 79 Ga. 783 ; 4 
 S. E. 381; Friel v. Citizens' R. Co., 
 115 Mo. 503 ; 33 S. W. 498 ; Nutt v. 
 Southern Pac. R. Co., 35 Greg. 391; 
 35 Pac. 653 ; Missouri Pac. R. Co, v. 
 Lewis, 24 Neb. 848 ; 40 N . W. 401; 
 McGinnis v. Canada So. Bridge Co., 
 49 Mich. 466 ; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. 
 V. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440 [three 
 unblocked "frog" cases]; Phila- 
 delphia, etc. R. Co. V. Keenan, 103 
 Pa. St. 134 [pushing-pole, used for 
 shifting cars in making up trains, 
 which lacked a handle]; Western, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465; and 
 
 Burns v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 69 
 Iowa, 450 [car-coupling not of the 
 most approved kind]; "Wonder v. 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 32 Md. 411 
 [car-brake having a hook instead of 
 an eye-bolt, the point of the hook 
 turned in wrong direction]. A 
 master is not liable to a servant for 
 injuries sustained through the use of 
 machinery, merely on the ground of 
 failing to discard a machine or a 
 part of a machine, and supply its 
 place with something safer (Sweeney 
 V. Berlin, etc. Envelope Co., 101 N. 
 Y. 520; 5 N. E. 358). It is not 
 negligence per se to adopt a device 
 for coupling cars, not before in 
 use on road, without discarding 
 those already in use, although the 
 use of the two together may be 
 more hazardous than the use of 
 either alone (Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Henly, 48 Ohio St. 60S ; 29 N. E. 
 575). The use of cars of unequal 
 height and mismatched couplings 
 is not negligence per se (Norfolk, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Brown, 91 Va. 668 ; 23 
 S. E. 496). Only defect in a car 
 was a slight straightening of one 
 hook, not enough to allow the car 
 to dump when fastened. Held, that 
 a verdict for plaintiff was not justi- 
 fied (Soderman v. Kemp, 145 N. Y. 
 457; 40 N. E. 212). 
 
 * A master is not bound to furnish 
 the best known appliances for the 
 work, but only such as are reason- 
 ably fit and safe (Harley v. Buffalo 
 Car Mfg. Co., 143 N. Y. 31 ; 36 N. E. 
 813 ; Stringham v. Hilton, 111 N. Y. 
 188 ; 18 N. E. 870 [elevator] : Benfleld 
 V. Vacuum Oil Co., 75 Hun, 209 : 27 
 N. Y. Supp. 16 [no light provided 
 
§195] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 314 
 
 new improvement or invention ; '' but he may wait, even where 
 a question of safety is involved, until an alleged improvement 
 has been tested and has come into somewhat general use.* 
 Only such appliances, safeguards and tests as are usual can be 
 required.' Materials, implements and appliances, so long as 
 not dangerous generally, need not be better in quality or con- 
 dition than is required by the purpose for which they are 
 intended.'" A master who purchases materials, etc., for the 
 use of his servants is not required to apply to them such tests 
 
 near tank of explosive oil] ) . The 
 master's duty does not require him 
 to provide machinery similar to that 
 used in other establishments, though 
 less dangerous tlian that used by him, 
 but merely to furnish proper and 
 suitable machinery, vi-hich is to be 
 determined by its actual condition, 
 and not by comparing it with ma- 
 cliines used by other establishments 
 for similar work (Wood v. Heiges, 
 S3 Md. 257 ; 34 Atl. 872). 
 
 ' Fi-ance v. Home, etc. Co., 88 Hun, 
 318 ; 34 N. Y. Supp. 408 [hand-brakes 
 vrhen air-brakes were not general] ; 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Armstrong, 
 63 111. App. 228. See Steinweg v. 
 Erie E. Co., 48 N. Y. 133. In Con- 
 way V. Illinois Cent. E. Co. (50 Iowa, 
 4651, the company was held not li- 
 able to a brakeman for not using the 
 crooked link which was a better ap- 
 pliance for coupling cars of different 
 ■ heights than the one actually in use. 
 A company is not bound to change 
 machinery and appliances which are 
 safe, for a newer and yet safer ap- 
 pliance (Bradley v. Nashville, etc. E. 
 Co., 14 Lea [Tenn.], 374) ; and the 
 jury must consider that the new in- 
 vention, while guarding against one 
 danger, might introduce new ones 
 (Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Few, 15 
 Bradwell, 125). 
 
 ' Delaware Iron Works v. Nuttall, 
 119 Pa. St. 149 ; 13 Atl. 65 ; Norfolk 
 & W. R. Cc. V. Jackson's Adm'r, 80 
 Ya. 489; 8 S. E. 870. 
 
 ' Augerstein v. Jones, 139 Pa. St. 
 183 ; 21 Atl. 24 [emery stone] ; Mackin 
 V. Alaska Eefrigerator Co. , 100 Mich. 
 276 ; 58 N. W. 999 [screen over planer] ; 
 Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Davis, 90 
 Tenn. 711 ; 18 S. W. 387 [wooden 
 buildings at coal mine] ; Grant v. 
 Union Pac. E. Co., 45 Fed. 673 [lights 
 on switches]. The master has abso- 
 lute discretion to select any method 
 in general use, according to his own 
 judgment (Kehler v. Sohwenk, 144 
 Pa. St. 348; 23 Atl. 910). Even as 
 to these, there may be question 
 (Eooney v. Sewall etc. Cordage Co., 
 161 Mass. 153 ; 36 N. E. 789). Defend- 
 ant's liability could not be tested by 
 comparing its appliances with the 
 similar appliances of five other rail- 
 road companies (Eichmond, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Weems, 97 Ala. 370 ; 12 So. 
 186) . A test impracticable and never 
 employed, cannot be left to the jury 
 (Atz V. Newark Lime Co., 59 N. J. 
 Law, 41; 34 Atl. 980). 
 
 '» Hickey v. Taaffe, 105 N. Y. 26 ; 
 13 N. E. 286. Thus a freight eleva- 
 tor need not be made safe for passen- 
 gers (Kern v. De Castro Sugar Co., 
 135 N. Y. 50 ; 25 N. E. 1071). Worn 
 brakes are good enough, if they hold 
 effectively (Smith v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 118 N. Y. 645; 23 N. E. 990 ; 
 East Tennessee, etc. E. Co. v. Rey- 
 nolds, 93 Ga. 570 ; 20 S. E. 70 [cross 
 ties] ; s. P., Graham v. Chicago, St. 
 Paul, etc. R. Co., 63 Fed. 896). 
 
315 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§195 
 
 as are appropriate only to the process of manufacture." The 
 master performs his whole duty by using as much care in fur- 
 nishing instrumentalities for the use of his servants as a man 
 of ordinary prudence, in the same line of business, acting with 
 a prudent regard to his own safety, would use in supplying 
 similar things for himself, if he were doing the work.^^ He is 
 not in fault without proof of notice of the defect ; ^^ nor, as to 
 repairs and replacements, until he has had a reasonable time, 
 after actual or constructive notice, to perform his duty.^* The 
 master is not expected to stand over each servant every 
 moment, to discover instantly a defect in good materials and 
 tools, caused by their careless use.^' Nor is he bound to keep 
 such a close watch over the details of the work, as to enable 
 him to repair every deterioration in instrumentalities of work, 
 resulting from a servant's use thereof, as soon as it occurs.^* 
 
 " A master is not bound to 
 apply to iron girders, which he pur- 
 chases from others, such tests as are 
 usually applied in course of manu- 
 facture (Carlson v. Phenix Bridge 
 Co.. 133 N. Y. 373 ; 30 N. E. 750 ; 
 Roughan v. Boston, etc. Block Co., 
 161 Mass. 24 ; 36 N. E. 461 ; Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Campbell, 97 
 Ala. 147 ; 13 So. 574 [brake-rods] ; 
 Breen v. St. Louis Cooperage Co. , 50 
 Mo. App. 303 [shaft] ; Clyde v. 
 Richmond, etc. R; Co., 65 Fed. 483 ; 
 Ballard v. Hitchcock Mfg. Co., 51 
 Hun, 188 ; 4N. Y. Supp. 940 [boiler]; 
 S. P., Prentice v. Wells ville, 66 Hun, 
 634 ; 31 N. Y. Supp. 830 [explosives]; 
 Shea V. Wellington, 163 Mass. 364 ; 
 40 N. E. 173 [explosives]). 
 
 ■'■'Marsh v. Chickering, 101 N. Y. 
 396 ; 5 N. E. 56 ; Ford v. Lyons, 41 
 Hun, 513. 
 
 '^ See note 3, supra. 
 
 " Knowledge by a master of the 
 defective condition of machinery 
 does not make him liable for injuries 
 resulting therefrom to one of his 
 servants, unless he had a reasonable 
 opportunity, after acquiring such 
 knowledge, to remedy the defect 
 Seaboard M'f'g Co. v. Woodson, 94 
 
 Ala. 143 ; 10 So. 87 ; 11 So. 733). See 
 Miller v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 90 
 Mich. 330 ; 51 N. W. 370. The cases 
 in which masters have been ex- 
 empted from liability for places or 
 implements, suddenly made unsafe 
 by the fault of a co-servant, really 
 depend upon this rule. Of such are 
 Fenderson v. Atlantic City R. Co. 
 [Ct. Errors], 56 N. J. Law, 708 ; 31 
 Atl. 767; Filbert v. Delaware, etc. 
 Canal Co., 131 N. Y. 207; 33 N. E. 
 1104 ; Anthony v. Leeret, 105 N. Y. 
 591 ; 13 N. E. 561 (trapdoor left 
 open] ; Pawling v. Hoskins, 133 Pa. 
 St. 617 ; 19 AtL 301 [same]. 
 
 '^ Jennings v. Iron Bay Co., 47 
 Minn. Ill ; 49 N. W. 685 [planks out 
 of position] ; Donnelly v. Brown, 43 
 Hun, 470 [ladder not secured]. 
 
 " It is not the master's duty to re- 
 . pair defects arising in the daily use 
 of the appliance, for which proper 
 and suitable materials are supplied 
 and which may easily be remedied 
 by the workmen, and are not of a 
 permanent character or requiring 
 the help of skilled mechanics (Cre- 
 gan V. Marston, 136 N. Y. 568 ; 37 
 N. E. 952 [rope breaking] ). 
 
§195] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 316 
 
 He is not bound to keep the place of work constantly safe, 
 when the servant's work, in its very nature, renders the place 
 for the time unsafe," nor when the very work which the 
 servant is employed to do is to make a dangerous place 
 safe.^^ A master who has provided an ample supply of 
 proper appliances, ready at hand, is not necessarily respon- 
 sible to a servant for the neglect of a fellow-servant to use 
 such appliances.^' The adjustment and adaptation of imple- 
 ments to the work in hand, according to its varying needs, 
 belong to the sphere of servants, not of masters ; and, there- 
 fore, a servant's negligence in these matters to the injury of 
 a fellow-servant is not presumably imputable to the master.^* 
 
 " Gulf, etc. E. Co. V. Jackson, 13 
 C. C. A. .507 ; 65 Fed. 48. 
 
 '* Finlayson v. Utica Mining Co., 
 14 C. C. A. 492 ; 67 Fed. 507 [mining] ; 
 Grant v. Varney, 21 Colo. 329; 40Pac. 
 771 [same] ; Clark v. Liston, 54 111. 
 App. 578 [tearing down building] ; 
 Collins V. Crimmins, 11 Misc. 34; 31 
 N. Y. Supp. 860 [digging trench]. 
 
 '» Thyng v. Fitchburg E. Co., 156 
 Mass. 13 ; 30 N. E. 169 [defective 
 coupling pin used when good ones 
 at hand] ; Cregan v. Marston, 126 N. 
 Y. 568 ; 27 N. E. 952 [rope] ; Pres- 
 cott V. Ball Engine Co., 176 Pa. St. 
 459; 35 Atl. 224 [ropes] ; Webber v. 
 Piper, 109 N. Y. 496 ; 17 N. E. 216 
 [saw] ; Harley v. Buffalo Car Mfg. 
 Co., 142 N. T. 31 ; 36 N. E. 813 
 [ample supply, not enough used], 
 s. P., Kaare v. Troy Steel Co., 139 N. 
 Y. 369 ; 34 N. E. 901 [torches on 
 hand] ; Eoss v. Walker, 139 Pa. St. 
 42 ; 21 Atl. 157 [material for scaf- 
 fold] ; Kehoe v. Allen, 92 Mich. 464 ; 
 52 N. W. 740 [flasks for molds] ; Van 
 DenHeuvel V. National Furnace Co., 
 84 Wise. 636 ; 54 N. W. 1016 [planks] ; 
 Hefferen v. Northern Pacific E. Co., 
 45 Minn. 471 ; 48 N. W. 526 [tools] ; 
 Fraser v. Eed Eiver Lumber Co., 45 
 Minn. 235 ; 47 N. W. 785 [planks] ; 
 Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. Petty, 67 
 Miss. 255 ; 7 So. 351 [sand in engine] ; 
 
 Moran v. Brown, 27 Mo. App. 487 
 [axe handle]; Cleveland, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Brown, 20 C. C. A. 147; 73 Fed. 970 ; 
 and see Eailroad Co. v. Keegan, 160 
 U. S. 259 ; 16 S. Ct. 269 ; Eailroad 
 Co. V. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346; 16 
 S. Ct. 843 ; EaUroad Co. v. Charless, 
 162 U. S. 359; 16 S. Ct. 848. No 
 action against a master for in- 
 juries caused by a defective tool will 
 lie where the employee injured could 
 have obtained a proper one at any 
 time (Allen v. Smith Iron Co., 160 
 Mass. 557 ; 36 N. E. 581). But where, 
 in an action for injuries caused by 
 the falling of a scaffold from the 
 breaking of a ledger board, there is 
 evidence that the wood provided by 
 defendant for ledger boards was un- 
 suitable, the question of whether 
 defendant used due care in furnish- 
 ing materials was for the jury, 
 though there was evidence that the 
 carpenters who built the scaffold 
 were careless in selecting the piece 
 of board which broke (Twomey v. 
 Swift, 163 Mass. 273 ; 39 N. E. 1018). 
 '"Hudson V. Ocean S. S. Co., 110 
 N. Y. 625; 17 N. E. 342 [sHpping 
 skid] ; McGinty v. Athol Eeservoir 
 Co., 155 Mass. 183 ; 29 N. E. 510 [set- 
 ting up derrick] ; St. Louis, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Needham, 11 C. C. A. 56; 
 63 Fed. 107 [operating switch] . 
 
317 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§195 
 
 Thus the manner in which cars are loaded is a detail of 
 servants' work ; and the master is not held to as strict respon- 
 sibility for the condition of the car, when loaded, as when not 
 loaded.^' An important distinction is taken between instru- 
 mentalities which the master undertakes to furnish for the ser- 
 vants' use and those which he employs the servants to furnish 
 for themselves and their fellow-servants in the same work. 
 Negligence in making the former is the master's negli- 
 gence,^ but negligence about the latter is the negligence 
 of a fellow-servant.^^ This is illustrated in the well-known 
 series of " scaffold cases." If a servant is engaged to work 
 upon a scaffold or platform, ready made, the master is held 
 responsible for personal care to make it a safe place on which 
 to work.*** But if a number of associated servants are employed 
 
 Miller v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 20 
 Oreg. 285 ; 26 Pac. 70 [same] ; Kennj 
 V. Cunard Steamship Co., 55 N. Y. 
 Super. Ct. 558 [tightening chain] ; 
 Eicheler v. St. Paul Furniture Co., 
 40 Minn. 263 ; 41 N. W. 975 ; [ad- 
 justing machinery] ; Weeklund v. 
 Southern Oregon Co., 20 Oreg. 
 691 ; 27 Pac. 260 [rollers in saw-mill]. 
 
 "Ford V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 
 117 N. Y. 638 ; 22 N. E. 946 ; Byrnes 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 113 
 N. Y. 2.il ; 21 N. E. 50 ; Hanley v. 
 Grand Trunk R. Co., 62 N. H. 274 ; 
 Jarman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 98 
 Mich. 135 ; 57 N. W. 32 ; Dewey v. 
 Detroit, etc. R. Co., 97 Mich. 329; 
 56 N. W. 756. But the failure of a 
 railroad company to properly secure 
 lumber loaded on a car for trans- 
 portation, in consequence of which 
 a trainman on another train is in- 
 jured, is negligence for which the 
 company is liable to the injured em- 
 ployee (Ryan v. N. Y, Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 88 Hun, 269; 34 N. Y. Supp. 
 635). 
 
 22 Manning v. Hogan, 78 N. Y. 615 ; 
 Grant v. Varney, 21 Colo. 329 ; 40 
 Pac. 771 [mine], and cases cited in 
 note 24 ; Ingebregtsen v. Nord D. 
 Lloyd SS. Co. [Ct. Errors], 57 N. J. 
 
 Law, 400 ; 31 Atl. 619 ; Cadden v. 
 American Steel-Barge Co., 88 Wise. 
 409 ; 60 N. W. 800 [scaffold] ; Sims v. 
 Am. Steel-Barge Co., 56 Minn. 68 ; 
 57 N. W. 332. 
 
 ^* The rule that a master is bound 
 to furnish safe appliances, and can- 
 not escape liability for failure to do 
 so by intrusting the duty to a serv- 
 ant, by whose negligence a fellow- 
 servant is injured, does not apply 
 where several persons are employed 
 to do certain work, and by the con- 
 tract of employment, express or 
 implied, they are to adjust the ap- 
 pliances by which the work is to be 
 done (Burns v. Sennett, 69 Cal. 363 ; 
 33 Pac. 916 ; Lindvall v. Woods, 41 
 Minn. 212 ; 43 N. W. 1020 [trestle] ; 
 s. p., Jones V. St. Louis, etc. Packet 
 Co. , 43 Mo. App. 398 ; Weeklund v. 
 Southern Oregon Co., 20 Oreg. 591 ; 
 27 Pac. 260 [chute for saw-mill]). 
 This distinction is approved in Inge- 
 bregtsen V. Nord D. Lloyd S. S. Co., 
 supra ; citing Collyer v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co., 49 N. J. Law, 59 ; 6 
 Atl. 437. 
 
 " Manning v. Hogan, 78 N. Y. 615 ; 
 Arkerson v. Dennison, 117 Mass. 
 407 ; Sims v. Am. Steel-Barge Co., 
 56 Minn. 68 ; 57 N. W. 322 ; Cadden 
 
§195] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 318 
 
 to make the scaffold or other standing place, as well as to use 
 it when made, the master is no further responsible for negli- 
 gence in its making than he is for negligence in work done 
 upon it, when made.^^ The use of dangerous machinery is not 
 necessarily negligence ; ^^ nor is the lack of guards or covers 
 thereto, in the absence of proof that such protection was 
 reasonably practicable.^ It has already been stated (§ 185) 
 that a servant, who knows or ought to know that the very 
 things upon or with which he voluntarily agrees to work are 
 defective or dangerous, assumes the risk. The neglect of his 
 fellow-servants to use proper care in using such things, so as 
 to protect him from such risks, is not chargeable to the master.^ 
 
 V. American Steel-Barge Co., 88 
 Wise. 409 ; 60 N. "W. 800. A master 
 who employs inen to -work upon a 
 scaffold, ready-made, is responsible 
 for defects in it (McNamara v. Mac- 
 Donough, 103 Cal. 575 ; 36 Pac. 941 ; 
 Bowen v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co., 95 
 Mo. 277; 8 N. W. 330; Solarz v. 
 Manhattan R. Co., 31 Abb. N. C. 
 436 ; 8 Misc. 656 ; 29 N. Y. Supp. 
 1123 ; Rice, etc. Malting Co. v. Paul- 
 sen, 51 111. App. 123. 
 
 " Hogaa V. Smith, 135 N. Y. 774 ; 
 26 N. E. 742 [staging on -vessel] ; Jud- 
 son V. Clean, 23 N. E. 555; s. 0., 
 without opinion, 116 N. Y. 655 ; But- 
 ler V. Townsend, 126 N. Y. 105 ; 26 
 N. E. 1017 [decided by a bare major- 
 ity] ; followed in Marsh v. Herman, 47 
 Minn. 537 ; 50 N. W. 611 [scaffold] ; 
 Noyes v. Wood, 103 Cal. 380 ; 36 Pac. 
 766; Beesley v. Wheeler Co. , 103 Mich. 
 196; 61 N. W. 658; S. P., Benn v. 
 NuU, 65 Iowa, 407 ; 21 N. W. 700 ; 
 Killea v. Foxon, 125 Mass. 485 ; Hoar 
 V. Merritt, 62 Mich. 386 ; 29 N. W. 
 15 ; applied to roof of mine (Petaja 
 V. Aurora Mining Co., Mich., 64 N. 
 W. 333 ; 66 Id. 951 ; Consol. Min. Co. 
 V. Clay, 51 Ohio St. 542 ; 38 N. E. 
 610) ; to construction of frame work 
 
 of windmill, when all given out as 
 one job (Peschel v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 62 Wise. 838 ; 21 N. W. 269). 
 
 '" Lafflin v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 
 106 N. Y. 136 ; 13 N. E. 599. 
 
 " McGuerty v. Hale, 161 Mass. 51 ; 
 36 N. E. 683 ; Young v. Burlington 
 Mattress Co., 79 Iowa, 415 ; 44 N. W., 
 693 ; Carroll v. Williston, 44 Minn. 
 387 ; 46 N. W. 353 ; French v. AuUs, 
 73 Hun, 442 ; 35 N. Y. Supp. 188. 
 A mill owner is not liable for injury 
 to an employee in operating a saw, 
 because of the absence of a guard : 
 the machine, which was one of the 
 best make, and in good condition, 
 not being constructed with a view to 
 having such guard (Arizona Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Mooney, Ariz. ; 43 
 Pac. 953). 
 
 '* Where plaintiff was employed to 
 aid in taking defective cars from 
 trains, the neglect of the customary 
 precaution of chaining or propping 
 a defective draw-head in such a car, 
 whereby plaintiff was injured, if not 
 chargeable in some degree to plain- 
 tiff, was the neglect of his co-serv- 
 ants, and not that of the master 
 (Arnold v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 135 N. Y. 15 ; 35 N. E. 1064). 
 
319 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 19^ 
 
 As in all other cases, the master's negligence involves no lia- 
 bility, if it is not a proximate cause of the injury.^' 
 
 § 196. Master's duty as to instrumentalities not his own 
 
 property. — The duty of the master to inspect the materials, 
 machinery, etc., used by his servants, in the course of his busi- 
 ness, extends not only to those things which are his property 
 or are directly furnished by him, but also equally to all things 
 which it becomes the duty of his servants to use, in the course 
 of their employment. Thus, where a railroad company requires 
 its servants to handle cars not belonging to it,^ or to run trains 
 
 " Hope V. Fall Brook Coal Co., 3 
 N. Y. App. Div. 70 ; 38 N. Y. Supp. 
 1040. A brakemari having his hand 
 crushed in coupling cars, cannot re- 
 cover on the ground that the draught 
 irons on the two cars were at differ- 
 ent heights, when there is no evi- 
 dence that this fact contributed to 
 produce the accident (Kruse v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 83 Wise. 568; 53 
 N. W. 755). The fact that a stop 
 block at the end of a trestle was de- 
 fective, will not render the company- 
 liable for the death of an engineer 
 who ran his engine off the end of the 
 trestle, where the accident was 
 caused by running the engine at 
 such a speed that no block would 
 have been effective (Louisville & N. 
 E. Co. V. Stutts, 105 Ala. 368 ; 17 So. 
 39). As the injury was due pri- 
 marily to the slipping of the shipper 
 out of the servant's hand, and a catch 
 (the absence of which was alone 
 complained of) would not have pre- 
 vented this, the defendant was not 
 liable (Sullivan v. Wamsutta Mills, 
 155 Mass. 300 ; 29 N. E. 516). 
 
 ' A railroad company is under a 
 legal duty not to expose its employees 
 to dangers arising from such defects 
 in foreign cars as may be discovered 
 by reasonable inspection before such 
 cars are admitted into its train (Bal- 
 timore, etc. R. Co. V. Mackey, 157 
 U. S. 72 ; 15 S. Ct. 491 [defective 
 
 brake] ; Goodrich v. N. T. Central 
 R. Co., 116 N Y. 398 ; 23 N. E. 397 ; 
 Spaulding v. Flynt Granite Co., 159 
 Mass. 587 ; 34 N. E. 1134 ; Elkins v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 171 Pa. St. 131 ; 
 
 33 Atl. 74 ; Mason v. Richmond, etc. 
 R. Co., Ill N. C. 483 ; 16 S. E. 698 ; 
 Joliet, etc. R. Co. v. Velie, 140 111. 59 ; 
 26 N. E. 1086 ; Michigan Cent. R. Co. 
 V. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212 ; Interna- 
 tional R. Co. V. Kernan, 78 Tex. 294 ; 
 14 S. "W. 668 ; Bomar v. Louisiana, 
 etc. R Co., 42 La. Ann. 983, 1206; 
 8 So. 478 ; 9 So. 344 ; Mateer v. Mis- 
 souri Pac. R. Co., 105 Mo. 330 ; 16 
 S. W. 839 ; 15 S. W. 970 ; Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Barber, 44 Kans. 613 ; 
 
 34 Pac. 969 [foreign cars used on 
 line] ; Atchinson, etc. R. Co. v. Pen- 
 fold, 57 Kans. 148; 45 Pac. 574). See 
 also Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Avery, 
 109 111. 314. So, under Mass. Stat. 
 1887 (Bowers v. Connecticut River 
 R. Co., 163 Mass. 313 ; 38 N. E. 508). 
 The rule is the same where, by 
 statute, railroads are compelled to 
 receive and transport cars, of a con- 
 necting road, without delay or dis- 
 crimination, for they are not obliged 
 to move such cars when not provided 
 with the appliances which ordinary- 
 care requires (Dooner v. Delaware, 
 etc. Canal Co., 104 Pa. St. 17 ; 30 Atl. 
 269 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Wil- 
 liams. 9.-) Ky 199; 24S. W. 1). So 
 as to anything near enough to the 
 
§197] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 320 
 
 over a track belonging to another company,^ it is liable to them 
 for such defects in these things as could be discovered by ordi- 
 nary care in inspection. But the mere fact of such " foreign " 
 materials being different from those used by the master is not 
 necessarily a " defect," especially in the case of a railroad com- 
 pany receiving from another company cars of a pattern differ- 
 ent from its own.^ If such differences are a cause of danger, 
 servants unfamiliar with them are entitled to warning.* But 
 where a servant, without authority, uses the property of a 
 stranger, even in good faith, for thf benefit of his master, he 
 does so entirely at his own risk.^ 
 
 § 197. Illustrations of liability for instrumentalities. — 
 
 Thus, the master has been held liable for injuries suffered by 
 his servants from defects in ropes, ^ ladders,^ derricks,^ shafts of 
 
 place of work to make it dangerous 
 (Little Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Cagle, 
 53 Ark. 347 ; 14 S, W. 89). But rail- 
 road companies have a right to pre- 
 sume that cars delivered to them by 
 connecting lines are in proper condi- 
 ion (Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Dud- 
 ley, 90 Va. 304 ; 18 S. E. 274). And 
 masters are not liable for injuries 
 caused by defects in foreign cars of 
 vphich they are justifiably ignorant 
 (McMuUen v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 
 158 Pa. St. 518 ; 27 Atl. 1043). A 
 railroad company is not responsible 
 to its switchman for injuries caused 
 by defects in a foreign car, if it has 
 warned him of its defects (Atchison, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Myers, 11 C. C A. 439 ; 
 63 Fed. 793). As to defective loading 
 of foreign cars, compare Dewey v. 
 Detroit, etc. R. Co., Mich., 52 N. W. 
 942 [company liable] ; Mexican Cent. 
 E. Co. V. Shean, Tex., 18 S. W. 151 
 [not liable]. 
 
 = Stetler v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 46 
 Wise. 497 ; s. c. , again, 49 Wise. 609. 
 
 ' A railroad company is not guilty 
 of negligence in receiving into its 
 yards and passing over its lines cars 
 different from those owned by itself 
 (Kohn V. McNulta, 147 U. S. 238 ; 18 
 S. Ct. 298 [unusual "bumpers"]); 
 especially where the receipt of 
 
 freight cars is compulsory by law 
 (Thomas v. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 109 
 Mo. 187 ; 18 S. W. 980). 
 
 * Reynolds v. Boston & Me. R. Co., 
 64 Vt. 66 ; 24 Atl. 134. 
 
 ' An employee of a telegraph com- 
 pany, who, in climbing a pole belong- 
 ing to another company, to get wires 
 out of the way, was injured by rea- 
 son of defects in the pole, could not 
 recover from his employer (Dixon v. 
 Western Union Tel. Co. [C. C] 68 
 Fed. 630). 
 
 ' Baker v. Allegheny, etc. E. Co., 
 95 Pa. St. 211 [rotten, though ap- 
 parently sound, rope on derrick] ; 
 Warden v. Old Colony E. Co., 137 
 Mass. 204 [worn-out rope] ; Perry v. 
 Eicketts, 55 111. 234 [insecure rope 
 used for lowering into coal mine] ; 
 Lund V. Hersey Lumber Co., 41 Fed. 
 202. 
 
 '' Burns v. Ocean S. S. Co., 84 Ga. 
 709; 11 S. E. 493 [missing step]; 
 Denning v. Gould, 157 Mass. 563 ; 32 
 N. E. 862 [ladders tied together]; 
 Williams v. Clough, 3 Hurlst. & N. 
 258 ; Reber v. Tower, 11 Mo. App. 
 199 ; The Truro, 31 Fed. 158. 
 
 ' Houston V. Brush, 66 Vt. 381 ; 29 
 Atl. 380; Holden v. Fitchburg R. 
 Co., 128 Mass. 268 [derrick left stand- 
 ing in dangerous position]. 
 
321 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 197 
 
 a mine/ buildings,^ platforms,* locomotives,'' cars,^ car-buffers,' 
 
 « Mellors v. Shaw, 1 Best & S. 437 ; master, the master was held liable 
 
 Brydon v. Stewart, 2 Macq. H. L. (Keegan v. Western E. Co., 8 N. Y. 
 
 80. See, also, Buzzell v. Laconia 175 ; s. P., Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 
 
 Mfg. Co., 48 Me. 113 ; Pantzar v. 274 ; Bean v. Oceanic Steam Nav. 
 
 Tilly, etc. Mining Co., 99 N. Y. 368. Co., 24 Fed. 124). In a similar case, 
 
 * Thus where, in consequence of employer was not excused by the 
 
 the want of proper support to a facts that there -vras no personal neg- 
 
 privy, of which defendant was aware, ligenoe on his part, that proper in- 
 
 it gave way, defendant was held structions had been given for 
 
 liable (Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. thorough repair, and that the fault 
 
 410). See, also, Horner v. Nichol- lay with mechanics directed to make 
 
 son, 56 Mo. 230 [careless use of old the repairs (Fuller v. Jewett, 80 
 
 and defective walls in remodeling N. Y. 46). 
 
 building]. « O'Neill v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co.', 
 
 « Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. 3 McCrary, 423 [freight-car] ; Palmer 
 
 347 ; 5 N. E. 449 ; Ai-kerson v. Den- v. Denver, etc. E. Co., Id. 635 [ca- 
 
 nison, 117 Mass. 407 ; Behm v. Ar- boose car] ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. 
 
 mour, 58 Wise. 1 ; 15 N. W. 806 Jackson, 55 111. 492 ; Toledo, etc. K. 
 
 [elevated platform for shoveling coal Co. v. Ingraham, 77 Id. 309; Siela 
 
 into barge] ; Hobbs v. Stauer, 62 v. Hannibal, etc. E. Co., 83 Mo. 
 
 Wise. 108; 22 N.W. 153. A scaffold, 430 [handle of handcar]; Ander- 
 
 however, is an. appliance not a. place son v. Minnesota, etc. E. Co., 39 
 
 of work (Butler v. Townsend, 126 N. Minn. 523 ; 41 N. W. 104 [same]. The 
 
 Y. 105; 36 N. E. 1017). The master ends of freight cars should be fur- 
 
 may, therefore, have it built by a nished with such handles, ladders, 
 
 contractor of good repute, and is or safeguards as are in common, 
 
 then not bound to inspect it (Id.) ordinary use (Dooner v. Delaware, 
 
 Or if the making of the scaffold is etc. Canal Co., 164 Pa. St. 17 ; 30 
 
 part of the servant's work, jointly Atl. 269 ; Settle v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 
 with others, the master is not liable Co., 127 Mo. 336 ; 30 S. W. 125 [bent 
 
 for their negligent use of materials handle]). No sand-box on ti-olley car 
 
 furnishedby him (Kimmer V.Weber, (Van Dyke v. Atlantic Ave. E. Co., 
 
 151 N. Y. 417 ; 45 N. E. 860). 67 Fed. 296). Where a brakeman 
 
 ' Hough V. Texas, etc. E. Co., 100 was injured by falling from some 
 U. S. 313 [insecurely fastened steam machinery loaded in an open car 
 whistle on locomotive] ; Stevenson over which he had to pass, held, 
 V. Jewett, 16 Hun, 210 [broken stay- that the jury were justified in find- 
 bolts and corroded outside sheet of ing that the company was negligent 
 boiler] ; Crutchfleld v. Eichmond, in not providing foot-boards over the 
 etc. R. Co., 76 N. C. 320 [defective car(Hosicv. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 75 
 locomotive and road-bed]. Where a Iowa, 683 ; 37 N. W. 963) . 
 fireman was injured by explosion of " Cowles v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 a boiler, the dangerous condition of 84 N. C. 309 ; Ellis v. N. Y., Lake 
 which had often been reported to the Erie, etc. E. Co., 95 N. Y. 546. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 21] 
 
§197] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 322- 
 
 brakes,^" couplings," railroad tracks,*^ machinery *^ and eleva- 
 
 Ga. 749 ; 3 S. E. 631 [track] ; Brooke 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 81 Iowa, 
 504 ; 47 N. W. 74 [defective track] ; 
 Knapp V. Sioux City E. Co., 65 Iowa, 
 91 ; Meloy v. Chicago, etc. E. Co. , 
 77 Id. 743 ; 43 N. W. 563 [civil en- 
 gineer recovered for defects in new 
 track he was laying] : St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co. v. Bobbins, 57 Ark. 377 ; 31 
 S. W. 886 ; Swadley v. Missouri 
 Pac. E. Co., 118 Mo. 368 ; 34 S. W. 
 140; Burdick v. Missouri Pac, E. 
 Co., 133 Mo. 231 ; 37 S. W. 453 [road- 
 bed] ; Sadowski v . Michigan Car Co. , 
 84 Mich. 100 ; 47 N. W. 598 [ditck 
 across track] ; s. P., Gulf, etc. R 
 Co. V. Eedeker, 67 Tex. 181 ; 3 S. W, 
 513 ; Madden v. Minneapolis, etc. E 
 Co., 33 Minn. 303 ; 30 N. W. 317 
 [defective road-bed] ; Brickman v. 
 South Car. E. Co. 8 S. C. 173 [defec 
 tive trestle over culvert]. So as to 
 lack of drains to carry off water 
 (Stoher v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 105 
 Mo., 193; 16S. W. 591 [track sink- 
 ing under flood] ; Balhoffl v. Mich. 
 Cent. E. Co., 106 Mich. 606; 65 N. W. 
 593 [ice on track] ; McPherson v. St. 
 Louis, etc. E. Co., 97 Mo. 353 ; 10 S. 
 W. 846). Where a railroad com- 
 pany erects a cattle guai-d at a point 
 which its employees are constantly 
 compelled to cross in switching cars, 
 the guard must be made reasonably 
 safe for that purpose ; it is not 
 enough that it be made sufficient and 
 
 " Baltimore, etc. E. Co. v. Mackey, 
 157 U. S. 72 ; 15 S. Ct. 491 ; Lilly v. 
 N. Y. Central R. Co., 107 N. Y. 566 ; 
 14 N. E. 503 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Taylor, 69 111. 461 ; Johnson v. Rich- 
 mond, etc. R. Co., 81 N. C. 453; 
 Henry v. Wabash W. R. Co., 109 
 Mo. 488 ; 19 S. W. 339 ; Prosser v. 
 Montana Cent. R. Co., 17 Mont. 373; 
 43 Pac. 81 [brake-staff bent]. 
 
 " Gravelle v. Minneapolis, etc. R. 
 Co., 11 Fed. 509 ; Toledo, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Fredericks, 71 111. 394. Defective 
 drawheads or drawbars (Luoco v. 
 N. Y. Central R. Co., 87 Hun, 613 ; 
 34 N. Y. Supp. 277; Bowers v. 
 Connecticut River R. Co. 162 Mass. 
 313 ; 38 N. E. 508 ; Rodney v. St. 
 Louis, etc., R. Co., 137 Mo. 670; 
 28 S. W. 887). Where a railroad 
 uses cars with drawheads of differ- 
 ent heights, it is a question for the 
 jury whether, in failing to furnish 
 crooked links suitable to the coupling 
 of such cars, it was in fault (Bennett 
 V. Greenwich, etc. R. Co., 84 Hun, 
 316 ; 33 N. Y. Supp. 457 ; S. p., Den- 
 ver, etc. E. Co. V. Simpson, 16 Colo. 
 55; 36 Pac. 339). 
 
 '' Fredenburg v. Northern Central 
 R. Co., 114 N. Y. 533; 21 N. E. 1049 
 [trench in track where cars w^ere 
 coupled in dark] ; Pennsylvania Co. 
 V. McCormack, 131 Ind. 350 ; 30 N. 
 E. 27 [tracks too close to each other] ; 
 Killian v. Augusta, etc. R. Co., 78 
 
 13 Wilson V: WUlimantic Co., 50 
 Conn. 433 [shafting] ; Atchison, etc. 
 R. Co. V. McKee, 37 Kans. 592 ; 15 
 Pac. 484; O'Donnell v. East River 
 Gas Co., 91 Hun, 184 ; 36 N. Y. Supp. 
 288 [pipe not cleaned] ; Quaid v. 
 Cornwall, 13 Bush, 601 [defective 
 machinery in factory, putting out 
 employee's eye] ; McGatrick v. 
 Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566 ; Schall v. 
 Cole, 107 Pa. St. 1 [wooden rim at- 
 tached to iron pulley, in order to in- 
 
 crease velocity of planing machine]. 
 Master is not responsible for an in- 
 jury to an employee arising from' 
 defects in machinery, if the proxi- 
 mate cause of the injury is careless- 
 ness of the engineer in managing 
 the defective machine ; the engineer 
 and injured employee being fellow- 
 servants (Philadelphia Iron, etc. 
 Co. V. Davis, 111 Pa. St. 397 ; 4 AtL 
 513). 
 
323 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 197 
 
 tors," of which the master was aware or which he could have 
 ascertained by careful inspection, even though he did not 
 know of them. And the master has been absolved from lia- 
 bility, where the only ground of complaint was that appliances 
 were furnished which required special care and skill for their 
 use, as, for example, cars with "double deadwoods," though 
 
 safe to turn stock (Ford v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 91 Iowa, 179 ; 59 N. W. 5). 
 A railroad company owes no duty 
 to a brakeman to ballast storage or 
 switch tracks so as to prevent his 
 foot being caught between the ties 
 (Pinnell v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 129 N. Y. 669 ; 29 N. E. 825 ; S. P., 
 Rosenbaum v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 
 38 Minn. 173 ; 36 N. W. 447). Com- 
 panies have been held responsible to 
 servants for tracks insecurely fas- 
 tened (Suter V. Park, etc. Lumber 
 Co., 90 Wise. 118 ; 62 N. W. 927) ; rail- 
 road switches left unfastened without 
 lock (Birmingham R. Co. v. Allen, 99 
 Ala. 359 ; 13 So. 8) ; sand washed on 
 the tracks by heavy i-ain, an hour 
 before the accident (Kansas City, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Kirksey, 60 Fed. 999 ; 
 9 C. C. A. 321) ; old accumulations 
 of snow on tracks, provided injury 
 was caused thereby (see McClarney 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 80 Wise. 277 ; 
 49 N. W. 983) ; but compare, as to 
 similar accumulations of coal or 
 coke, Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Mealer, 6 U. S. App. 86 ; 50 Fed. 725 ; 
 1 C. C. A. 633. Whether a railroad 
 company, in removing snow from 
 the track, by piling it within a few 
 feet of the track, acted with ordinary 
 care for the safety of employees, is a 
 question for the jury (Lawson v. 
 Truesdale, 60 Minn. 410 ; 62 N. W. 
 546). For insufficiency of evidence, 
 in an icy track case, see Orttel v. 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 89 Wise. 127; 
 61 N. W. 289 ; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Johnson, 76 Tex. 421; 13 S. W. 463 
 [defective spring in switch]. The 
 court properly charged that, if de- 
 fendant's roadbed and track were 
 not in a reasonably safe condition 
 for the passage of trains at the place 
 of the accident on account of rotten 
 ties, or failure to properly ballast the 
 roadbed, or on account of the inside 
 rail of the curve being higher than 
 the outside rail ; and defendant 
 knew, or by the exercise of ordinary 
 care might have known, of the con- 
 dition of the ties, roadbed and track 
 before the accident ; and if defend- 
 ant provided for use in the train a 
 caboose with a defective brake, and 
 placed in the train a car so heavily 
 loaded tliat it would not adjust itself 
 to the track in passing over tlie 
 same ; and by reason of any or all of 
 these conditions, if they were found 
 to exist, plaintiff was injured with- 
 out his fault, defendant was liable 
 (Gorham v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 113 Mo. 408; 20 S. W. 1060). En- 
 gineer does not assume risks caused 
 by faulty construction and mainte- 
 nance of the roadbed and track, even 
 though liability to accidents thereby 
 was increased because the road was 
 built in proximity to mountain 
 ranges(Union Pac. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 
 4 U. S. App. 221 ; 1 C. C. A. 354 ; 49 
 Fed. 538 ; affl'd, 161 U. S. 451). 
 
 " Stringham v. Stewart, 100 N. Y. Gonigle v. Kane, 20 Colo. 292 ; 38 
 
 516 ; 3 N. E. 575 ; Corcoran v. Hoi- Pac. 367 ; Thompson v. Johnston Co., 
 
 brook, 59 N. Y. 517 ; Wise v. Acker- 86 Wise. 576 ; 57 N. W. 298. 
 man, 76 Md. 375 ; 25 Atl. 424 ; Mc- 
 
§ 198] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 324 
 
 received on a line where they were not already in use.'' Until 
 recently, the use of unblocked frogs was not regarded as 
 sufificent evidence of negligence to go to a jury without affirma- 
 tive proof that blocking was necessary to safety and had oome 
 into general use among careful employers/' and that blocking 
 would not increase the danger to servants, rather than dimin- 
 ish it." Whether this rule is fully maintained or not, in view 
 of the widely extended use of blocked frogs, yet the use of 
 such frogs cannot be required, where the evidence leaves these 
 questions in doubt.'' Masters have been held responsible for 
 allowing dangerous accumulations of ashes, snow or ice on 
 places where servants had to work.'' 
 
 § 198. Low bridges. — Owing to the hasty and careless 
 manner in which most railroads in America are originally con- 
 structed, bridges are very generally built over railroads at as 
 little height as can possibly be managed, in order to save the 
 cost of lowering the track or of gradually raising the highway 
 at each end of the bridge. Still worse, the roofs of bridges 
 are made low to save a few dollars, in timber or metal. These 
 bridges remain unaltered, while the height of freight cars is 
 steadily increased, in order to make each car available for 
 more freight. For the sake of avoiding the expense of a better 
 brake system, the old method of brakes on the top of the cars 
 is continued ; and a small number of brakemen are employed 
 upon such trains, who are necessarily required to be upon 
 
 15 Kobn V. McNulta, 147 U. S. 338 ; Central R. Co. , 67 Hun, 196 ; 32 N. Y. 
 
 13 S. Ct. 298 ; Northern Pac, R. Co. Supp. 100 ; but see contra. Lake Erie, 
 
 V. Blake, 11 C. C. A. 93 ; 63 Fed. 45 ; etc. R. Co. v. Craig, 19 C. C. A. 631 . 
 
 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Smithson, 73 Fed. 643 ; Meek v. N. Y. Central R; 
 
 45 Mich. 312; Baldwin v. Chicago, Co., 69 Hun, 488 ; 33 N. Y. Supp. 420.' 
 
 etc. R. Co., 50 Iowa, 680. " Thus servants have been allowed 
 
 "McGinnis v. Canada Br. Co., 49 to recover for corrosion of iron 
 
 Mich. 466 ; 13 N. W. 819 ; Missouri roof from accumulation of ashes 
 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Lewis, 34 Neb. 848 ; and dirt from defendant's furnace 
 
 40 N. W. 401 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. (Engstrom v. Ashland Iron Co., 87 
 
 V. Lonergan, 118 111. 41 ; 7 N. E. 55 Wise. 166 ; 58 N. W. 241) ; fall of a 
 
 [thl-ee judges dissenting]. shed, from accumulation of snow, 
 
 "McGinnis v. Canada Br. Co., etc. (Johnson v. First Nat. Bank, 79 
 
 supra. Wise. 414; 48 N. W. 713); an icy 
 
 18 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Seley, 153 path (Murray v. Knight, 156 Mass. 
 
 U. S. 145; 14S. Ct. 530; rev-g Seley 518; 31 N. E. 646); icy stairs 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 6 Utah, 319 ; (Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513; 30 
 
 23 Pac. 751 ; s. p., Spencer v. N. Y. N. E. 366). 
 
325 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§198 
 
 the roofs of the cars while in motion. Thus it has come to 
 be an ordinary occurrence, even upon some of the best rail- 
 roads, for bridges over the track, or the covers of bridges, to 
 be so low that no freight brakeman can pass under them, while 
 in the discharge of his regular duties, without imminent peril 
 to his life. He must stoop or be killed. The maintenance of 
 such bridges, or similar overhead obstructions, has been 
 repeatedly adjudged to be ample ground for a verdict of neg- 
 ligence,^ and in some cases, gross negligence,^ although in two 
 courts it has been held that their existence may be justified by 
 public convenience for highways and other excuses, which all 
 resolve themselves into one — proper bridges might cost too 
 much ! ' The maintenance of bridges or roads less than seven 
 feet clear of the cars, on railroads operated by brakemen who 
 are peremptorily required to walk along the roofs of those 
 cars, is in itself a crime, and ought to be punished as such.* 
 It is not an act of mere negligence ; it is a willful wrong. We 
 do not overlook the difificultles arising from the necessity for 
 numerous bridges and the great cost of making them as high 
 
 ' A railroad company which know- 
 ingly maintains a bridge over the 
 tracks so low that brakemen cannot, 
 with reasonable safety, perform their 
 duty on top of the cars, is liable to a 
 brakeman who, having no knowledge 
 of its dangerous character, is struck 
 by the bridge while in the perform- 
 ance of such duly (Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Rowan, 104 Ind. 88; 3N. E. 637; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Wright, 115 
 Ind. 378 ; 16 N. E. 145 ; 17 N. E. 534 ; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Sears, 13G Ind. 
 460 ; 34 N. E. 15 [passing at night] ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Johnson, 116 
 111. 206 ; 4 N. E. 381). The main- 
 tenance of a bridge over a railroad 
 ti'ack so low as to make it unsafe for 
 brakemen is prima facie negligence 
 (Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Rowan, 55 
 Kans. 270 ; 39 Pac. 1010 ; St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Irwin, 37 Kans. 701 ; 
 16 Pac. 146). The law only requires 
 that such bridges shall be of such 
 height that the employees can per- 
 form their duties with reasonable 
 
 safety (Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Walter, 147 111. 60 ; 35 N. E. 529 j 
 Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 8 Tex. 
 Civ. Ap. 339 ; 37 S. W. 962). 
 
 '' Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Samp- 
 son, 97 Ky. 65 ; 30 S. W. 13. Whether 
 a railway company which persists in 
 maintaining for many years a bridge 
 over its tracks so low as to be 
 dangerous to brakemen standing on. 
 top of cars, is guilty of grosss negli- 
 gence, is a question for the jury 
 (Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Love, 57 
 Kans. 36; 45 Pac. 59). Contra, 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Banks, 104 
 Ala. 508 ; 16 So. 547 [not willful or 
 wanton negligence] ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Hall, 87 Ala. 708 ; 6 So. 
 377. 
 
 3 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Hall, 87 
 Ala. 708 ; 6 So. 277 ; Baylor v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. R. Co., 40 N. J. Law, 20. 
 
 " In Canada, the erection or main- 
 tenance of such bridges is strictly 
 prohibited (Railway Consolidatioix 
 Act, 1879). 
 
§ 198a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 326 
 
 as they should be. But these difficulties form no excuse for 
 such reckless disregard for human life. The bridges or roofs 
 should be raised ; or the cars should be lowered ; or a new- 
 system of brakes should be introduced. Of course, these 
 criticisms apply only to cases in which railroad servants are 
 required by their duties to be on the roofs of moving cars. 
 Where no such duty exists, a railroad may, with perfect pro- 
 priety, be covered with bridges not more than a few inches 
 above the cars.' 
 
 § 198a. Low bridges; contributory fault. — The main 
 difficulty in low bridge cases arises on the question of con- 
 tributory negligence. All agree that a servant who, with full 
 knowledge of the existence of such an obstruction, refuses to 
 stoop, or who, knowing that he is so near to it that he ought 
 to look out for it, recklessly takes his chances without looking, 
 is guilty of contributory negligence, barring his recovery.* 
 But in Pennsylvania, Vermont and Iowa, the courts have held 
 that, by remaining in the service, with knowledge of the exist- 
 ence of such bridges, servants assume all the risks thereof ; ^ 
 while in Maryland, Virginia, Alabama, Missouri, and the lower 
 
 5 In Gibson v. Erie R. Co. (63 N. Y. ' This was the test applied in Cin- 
 
 449 ; rev'g s. c, 5 Hun, 31), the cinnati, etc. E. Co. v. Sampson, 65 
 
 injured party was a conductor, Ky. 97; 80 S. W. 13, where the 
 
 whose duties did not call him to ex- company was held liable ; and Derby 
 
 pose himself to such risks ; at all v. Kentucky R. Co. [Ky.], 4 S. W. 
 
 events, the court so assumed. More- 303, where it was held not liable> 
 
 over, the obstruction was not a because the bridges were high 
 
 bridge, but a station roof projecting, enough to admit all its own cars 
 
 So in Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Sent- safely, and the injured person 
 
 meyer (93 Pa. St. 376), the injui-ed knowingly took a higher foreign car 
 
 brakeman was not called by any in the train. 
 
 duty to be on the roof of the car. ^ In Carbine v. Bennington, etc. R. 
 Where the lessor railroad company Co. , 61 Vt. 348 ; 17 Atl. 491 ; Bross- 
 constructs its bridges of sufficient man v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 113 Pa. 
 height to permit the operation of St. 490 ; 6 Atl. 336 ; and Wells v. 
 ordinary cars through them, but the Burlington, etc. R. Co., 56 Iowa, 530 ; 
 lessee company receives into its 9 N. W. 364, it was held that brake- 
 train a car of unusual height, failing men, by simply continuing in ser- 
 to give notice thereof to its em- vice, with knowledge of such 
 ployees, and one of them is killed on bridges, and without complaint, 
 that account, the lessor is not liable assumed all the risks thereof. To 
 (Texas, etc. R. Co. t. Moore [Tex. same effect, Goff v. Norfolk, etc. R. 
 Civ. App.], 27 S. W. 963). Co., 36 Fed. 399. 
 
.327 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§199 
 
 courts of New Jersey, it has been held that a servant, who 
 knows in a general way of the existence of such dangerous 
 bridges, cannot recover for injuries suffered from collision 
 with them, when necessarily exposed thereto by the discharge 
 of his duties, and even when acting in such haste that he did 
 not have time to make his usual calculation of the precise 
 number of inches which- stood between him and death.'* 
 Decisions more shocking to the moral sense are scarcely con- 
 ceivable.* In other cases contributory negligence has been 
 clearly proved.' 
 
 § 199. Low bridge cases limited. — In New York, Georgia, 
 Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Kansas and some of the Federal 
 courts, it is held that a railway servant does not assume all 
 risks from low bridges, by simply continuing in service after 
 notice of their existence, but may be excused by a jury for 
 forgetting the existence or proximity of a low bridge, even in 
 the daytime and much more at night.-' It is conceded in Ala- 
 
 ^ Baylor v. Delaware, etc. R. Co. , 
 40 N. J. Law, 23 ; Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Strickler, 51 Md. 47 ; Rains v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 71 Mo. 164 ; 
 Devitt V. Pacific, etc: R. Co., 50 Id. 
 503 ; Clark v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 78 Va. 709 ; re-afflrmed in a par- 
 ticularly bad case (Chesapeake, etc. 
 R Co. V. Hafner, 90 Va. 631 ; 19 S. 
 E. 166), where the brakeman did 
 stoop, but mistakenly believed that 
 he had stooped long enough, and 
 I'aised his head too soon. 
 
 '' In Baltimore, etc R. Co. v. Rowan 
 <104 Ind. 88 ; 3 N. E. 637), the severe 
 language of Mr. Beach (Contr. Neg., 
 § 363), in condemnation of these 
 rulings, is quoted with approval. 
 
 * The center of the bridge was high 
 enough to allow deceased to stand 
 in the center o£ a car or at the 
 brakes, but it sloped on the sides, so 
 as to be but two or three feet above 
 the outer edges of the car. Deceased 
 had passed under the bridge almost 
 daily for four months, and the acci- 
 dent happened at midday. His 
 
 proper place was at the brakes or on 
 the center of the car, but at the time 
 of the accident deceased was sitting 
 on the edge of the car. Held, that 
 he was guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence (Schlaff V. Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co., 100 Ala. 877 ; 14 So. 105). 
 
 ' A brakeman on top of a moving 
 train, with his face towards the rear, 
 intent on the discharge of his duty 
 at a place where there is danger that 
 the train may break in two, is not, 
 as matter of law, chargeable with 
 contributory negligence because he 
 fails to take notice that the train is 
 approaching a low bridge (Wallace 
 V. Central Vermont R. Co., 138 N. 
 Y. 303 ; 33 N. E. 1069 ; rev'g s., c. 03 
 Hun, 633, and overruling all the 
 cases usually cited from New York) . 
 In Williams V. Delawai-e, etc. R. Co. 
 (116 N. Y. 638 ; 33 N. E. 1117), the 
 plaintiff proved his own negligence 
 and gave no excuse for it. Held, by 
 a bare majority, nonsuit proper. 
 Doubted in Wallace v. Central Vt. 
 R. Co. supra. The question of con- 
 
§199] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 328 
 
 bama that a bridge so low that brakemen could not escape dan- 
 ger by stooping, is a nuisance,^ and that different rules apply. 
 It is also conceded in New Jersey, that contributory negli- 
 gence is not to be imputed, as matter of law, where a mere 
 beam or bar of a bridge proves to be lower than a brakeman 
 has reason to expect.^ Statutes in some states {e. g., New 
 York, Massachusetts, and Georgia) require "tell-tales " to be 
 placed, as warnings of low bridges.* Brakemen have a right 
 to assume that such " tell-tales " will be placed and kept in such 
 order, as to give timely warning, and are not in fault for rely- 
 ing thereon.' But if they know that a particular tell-tale is 
 out of order, they must use due care to watch for the bridge.^ 
 
 § 200. [Omitted]. 
 
 tributory negligence is for the jury 
 (Stiik V. Central Railroad Co., 79 
 Ga. 495 ; 5 S. E. 105 ; Atchison, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Rowan, 55 Kans. 270 ; 39 
 Pac. 1010 ; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Mortenson, 63 Fed. 530 ; 11 C. C. A. 
 835 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Mat- 
 thews, 48 111. App. 361 [dark night ; 
 no warning]). The law does not re- 
 quire of a brakeman that he should 
 absolutely know all of the defects of 
 construction, and all the obstruc- 
 tions there may be along the line of 
 the railway, nor that he should neg- 
 lect the performance of his duties as a 
 brakeman to be on the constant look- 
 out for such obstructions and de- 
 fects, which may be dangerous (Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Johnson, 116 111. 
 206; 4N. E. 3S1). 
 
 2 LouisviUe, etc. R. Co. v. Hall, 87 
 Ala. 708 ; 6 So. 277. So held, Illi- 
 nois Cent. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 111. 
 183 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Gregory, 
 58 111. 272 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Russell, 91 111. 298. 
 
 ^ N. Y. Susquehanna, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Marion, 57 N. J. Law, 94 ; 30 Atl. 
 316. 
 
 ■■N. Y., Stat. 1884, ch. 439, § 2. 
 A railroad company whose tracks 
 cross those of another company by 
 a low bridge is not required to 
 maintain tell-tales to warn trainmen 
 on the under road of the danger 
 (Neff V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 80 
 Hun, 394 ; 30 N, Y. Supp. 328). 
 
 ' The fact that a tell-tale is so near 
 a bridge that a brakeman, facing the- 
 rear of the train, after passing under 
 the tell-tale without being touched 
 thereby, could not see it in time ta 
 avoid the injury, is evidence of neg- 
 ligence suflScient to go to the jury, 
 since the statute requires suitable 
 warning signals (Wallace v. Central 
 Vermont R. Co., 138 N. Y. 302 ; 83 N. 
 / E. 1060 ; Maher v. Boston & A. R. 
 Co., 158 Mass. 36; 32 N. E. 950 [tell- 
 tales missing] ; Savannah, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Day, 91 Ga. 676 ; 17 S. E. 959 
 [tell-tale out of order ; broad day- 
 light]). 
 
 6 Fitzgerald v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 59 Hun, 225; 12 N. Y.-Supp. 
 932. The principle was, however, 
 wrongly applied in that case. 
 
329 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§20I 
 
 § 201. Other dangerous projections.— The projection of 
 buildings/ posts,^ cattle-guards/ tell-tales/ and the like, over a 
 railroad track, or even near it,'^ so as to be dangerous to serv- 
 ants in the performance of their duties, is usually deemed 
 negligence; and servants are not, as matter of law, necessarily 
 charged with the assumption of all risks arising therefrom, 
 merely because they have notice thereof. The question, 
 within the usual limits, is for the jury. There is a marked 
 
 ' Flanders v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 51 Minn. 193 ; 53 N. W. 544 [section 
 house]. 
 
 ^ Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Hohn, 1 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 3G ; 31 S. W. 943 [scaf- 
 fold] ; Nance v. Newport News, etc. 
 R. Co., Ky. ; 17 S. W. 570 
 
 [projecting beam] ; Ft. "Worth, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Graves, Tex. Civ. App. 
 ; 21 S. W. 606 [supports of bridge]; 
 Johnson v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 43 
 Minn. 53 ; 44 N. W. 884 [signal post 
 four feet from cars]. Contra, Love- 
 joy V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 125 Mass. 
 79 ; wrongly decided. The distance 
 between a signal-post and the ladder 
 on the outside of a car was but one 
 foot. A brakeman on his first trip, 
 did not know that there were erec- 
 tions so near, and was not informed 
 of the danger. They were, in fact, 
 exceptional. Held, that the danger 
 was not obviously incident to the 
 employment (Scanlon v. Boston & 
 A. R. Co., 147 Mass. 484 ; 18 N. E. 
 209). In Helfrich v. Ogden R. Co. (7 
 Utah, 186 ; 26 Pao. 295), the plain- 
 tiff's intestate was clearly negligent. 
 3 Murphy v. Wabash R. Co , 115 
 Mo. Ill ; 31 S. W. 863 [danger un- 
 known]. The fact that all the com- 
 pany's cattle -guard fences are con- 
 structed in the same way will not 
 warrant the court in disturbing the 
 jury's findings (Id.) Where a 
 brake was so defective as to require 
 reaching beyond the line of the cars, 
 and a brakeman was struck, while 
 so doing, by a cattle-guard of which 
 
 he had no notice, he may recover, 
 though he had assumed the risk as 
 to the brakes (Missouri Pac. R. Co. 
 V. Somers, 78 Tex. 439 ; 14 S. W. 
 779). 
 
 ■■A "tell-tale," dangerous for brake- 
 men upon cars of a great height, 
 which have come into use for special 
 purposes, is not a risk incident to a 
 brakeman's emiDloyment (Dai-ling v. 
 N. Y., Providence, etc. R. Co., 17 R. 
 L 708; 24Atl. 462). 
 
 ' Where it is customary for brake- 
 men in the performance of their 
 duties to ascend and descend cars by 
 side-ladders, while the train is in 
 motion, the company is bound to 
 maintain its road-way free from pro- 
 jections which endanger them while 
 so doing (Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Davis, 93 Ala. 300 ; 9 So. 253). Where 
 the jury found that ' ' the shed was 
 so close to the track as to render the 
 place unnecessarily dangerous to 
 employees in performing their duties 
 at that place," company held liable 
 (Kelleher v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 80 Wise. 584 ; 50 N. W. 942). Com- 
 pany liable for a switch-stand so near 
 its track that an arm projecting 
 therefrom was only seven and one- 
 half inches from the gangway step 
 of a passing engine ; it being shown 
 that it stood considerably closer to 
 the track than other switch-stands 
 in the same yard, and was never 
 used (Coif V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 87 Wise. 373 ; 58 N. W. 408). 
 
§202] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 330 
 
 difference between obstructions not removed by the master and 
 those made by him.* And a clear distinction is to be drawn 
 between bridges and similar structures over the main track, 
 placed low for the sake of mere economy, and coverings over 
 side tracks, made low for some useful purpose, which could not 
 be answerd by any less dangerous structure. Thus the spout 
 of a grain elevator or a covering to protect grain from rain 
 while being poured into the cars, would stand on a different 
 footing, if on a side track, where the train would naturally not 
 move at full speed, and where the exceptional character of the 
 work would notify brakemen of peculiar dangers.'' And so 
 does every structure, necessarily near the track or projecting 
 over it, such as a crane.' 
 
 § 202. Master's duty to prescribe and enforce rules. — 
 
 A master who employs servants in a dangerous and compli- 
 cated business is personally bound to prescribe rules sufficient 
 for its orderly and safe management,' and to keep his serv- 
 
 ' Where a brakeman knows the 
 danger arising from a tree project- 
 ing over the track, which though 
 dangerous, can be avoided by ordi- 
 nary care, if he continues in the em- 
 ployment without protest or promise 
 of removal, he assumes the risk 
 (Woodell V. "West Va. Imp. Co., 38 
 W. Va. 23; 17 S. E. 386). 
 
 ' So held, as to a brakeman injured 
 by failing to "think" of an awning 
 used to protect grain, necessarily low, 
 and projecting from the side of an 
 elevator, over a side-track, on which 
 he was engaged (Clark v. St. Paul, 
 etc. E. Co., 28 Minn. 128). 
 
 5 Sisco V. Lehigh, etc. R. Co. , 145 
 N. Y, 29C ; 39 N. E. 958 ; "Wolf v. 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 88 Ga. 
 210; 14 S. E. 199; s. P., Fisk v. 
 Eitchburg R. Co., 108 Mass. 338 ; 33 
 N. E. 510 [awning]. In Scidmore v. 
 Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. (89 "Wise. 
 188 ; 61 N. W 765), a brakeman in- 
 jured by a post necessarily near 
 track knownto him, wasnot allowed 
 to recover. 
 
 ' Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. S". 61 ; 
 
 Besel V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 70 Id. 
 171 ; Sheehan v. Same, 91 Id. 83S ; 
 Dana v. Same, 92 Id. 639 ; Luebke 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 59 "Wise. 
 137 ; Ford v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. , 
 124 N. Y. 493 ; 36 N. E. 1101 [no rule 
 requiring lumber loaded on flat-cars 
 to be secured] ; Irvine v. Flint, etc. 
 R. Co., 89 Mich. 416 ; 50 N. W. 1008 
 [loading cars] ; Byrnes v. N. Y. Lake 
 Erie, etc. R. Co., 71 Hun, 309 ; 24 N. 
 Y. Supp. 517 [loaded cars] ; Lake 
 Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 
 50 Ohio St. 135 ; 33 N. E. 403 [signals 
 for approaching trains] ; Reagan -v. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 93 Mo. 348; 6 
 S. "W. 371 [signals for moving cars] ; 
 Redington v. N. Y. Ontario R. Co., 
 84 Hun, 231 : 33 N. Y. Supp. 535 
 [cars standing on grade] ; Eastwood 
 V. Retsof Min. Co., 86 Hun, 91 ; 34 
 N. Y. Supp. 196 [dangerous salt- bin] ; 
 Hartvig v. N. P. Lumber Co., 19 
 Oreg. 533; 35 Pac. 358 [lumber- 
 chute] ; International, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hall, 78 Tex. 657 ; 15 S. "W. 108 ; 
 Hannibal, etc. R. Co. v. Pox, HI Tex 
 586. 
 
331 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§202 
 
 ants informed of these rules, so far as may be needful for 
 their guidance.^ Thus, a railroad company is bound to regu- 
 late, by published rules, the time and manner of running its 
 trains so as to avoid collisions, and to enable all its servants to 
 know when a train may be expected, and thus to avoid danger.' 
 And a jury may find that it ought to have rules to protect 
 men working underneath cars from the starting of such cars 
 without due warning.* The master is also bound to use ordi- 
 nary care and diligence to enforce the rules which he has 
 made, and disregard of such rules, with his acquiescence or 
 neglect to enforce them, is tantamount to a suspension of the 
 rules.* A jury has no general right to find that a rule should 
 have been adopted, without sufficient evidence that such rule 
 was necessary and practicable ; * but it is not necessary that 
 other masters should have adopted it under similar circum- 
 
 ^ Abel V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 103 N. Y. 581 ; 9 N. E. 325 ; La Croy 
 V. N. Y. Lake Erie, etc E. Co., 57 
 Hun, 67 ; 10 N. Y. Supp. 383 ; Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Berkey, 136 Ind. 
 181 ; 35 N. E. 3. If a rule has been 
 prescribed, and a foreman omits to 
 warn a workman under him of 
 its existence, it is for the jury, not 
 the court, to say whether the master 
 took sufflcienc precautions (Avilla 
 V. Nash. 117 Mass. 318 [employee in- 
 jured while on goods elevator] ; 
 distinguishing Durgin v. Munson, 9 
 Allen, 396). 
 
 3 Lewis V. Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 628; 
 11 Atl. 514 ; Bradley v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral, etc. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 99 [work- 
 men removing snow from tracks] ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Taylor, 69 
 111. 461 [rules for making "flying 
 switches "] ; Cooper v. Central E. 
 Co., 44 Iowa, 134 [rules forbidding 
 excessive speed of locomotive run- 
 ning backwards] ; Haynes v. Bast 
 Tennessee E. Co., 3 Coldw. 333. See 
 Baltimore, etc. E. Co. v.Whittington 
 SO Gratt. 805. 
 
 * Abel V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 103 N. Y. 581 ; S. C, again, 128 N. Y. 
 662 ; 28 N. E. 663 ; Fordyce v. Briney, 
 58 Ark. 306 ; 34 S. W. 250. What is 
 sufficient in such cases (Corcoran v. 
 Delaware, etc. E. Co., 136 N. Y. 678 ; 
 37 N. E. 1032) . 
 
 6 Wabash E. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 
 U. S. 454 ; 3 S. Ct. 933 ; Whittaker 
 V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 126 N. T. 
 544 ; 27 N. E. 1042 ; St. Louis, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Ti-iplett, 54 Ark. 289 ; 15 S. W. 
 831 ; see Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Flynn, 
 154 111. 448 ; 40 N. E. 332 ; Strong v. 
 Iowa Cent. E. Co., 94 Iowa, 380; 63 
 N. W. 799; White v. Louisville, etc_ 
 R. Co., 72 Miss. 12; 16 So. 248. 
 
 ^ Morgan v. Hudson Riv. Ore Co. , 
 133 N. Y. 666 ; 31 N. E. 234 [ore kilns 
 and car track] ; Burke v. Syracuse, 
 etc. R. Co., 69 Hun, 31 ; 33 N. Y. 
 Supp. 458 [switch opened]. Failure 
 to make rules is not negligence, 
 where the practice actually in force 
 renders a rule unnecessary (Kudik 
 V. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 78 Hun, 493 ; 
 29 N. Y. Supp. 533). 
 
§203] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 332 
 
 Stances.'' The necessity,^ or sufficiency^ of a particular rule is 
 a mixed question of law and fact. The reasonableness of a 
 particular rule is a question of law.^" To enable a servant to 
 recover, on the ground of the absence of a rule, he must prove 
 its absence " and necessity,'^ and that its absence was proxi- 
 mate cause of his injury.'^ 
 
 § 203. Master's duty to guard and warn against unusual 
 risks. — It is also the personal^ duty of the master, so far as he 
 can by the use of ordinary care, to avoid exposing his servants 
 to extraordinary risks which they could not reasonably antici- 
 pate;^ although he is not bound to guarantee them against 
 
 ' Defendant held negligent in not 
 making a rule to govern the shunt- 
 ing of cars, although there was no 
 evidence that other companies had 
 such rules (Doing v. N. Y. , Ontario, 
 etc. E. Co., 151 N. Y. 579 ; rev'g s. c, 
 73 Hun, 270 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 405) ; 
 s. p., Abel V. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co., 128 N. Y. 663 ; 28 N. E. 663. 
 
 'Abel V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 103 N. Y. 581 ; s. C, again, 128 N. Y. 
 662 ; 28 N. E. 663 [no rule protecting 
 car repabers against motion of car]. 
 Under guidance from the court, it is 
 for the jury to decide which, of sev- 
 eral reasonable rules, should have 
 been adopted (Id.). 
 
 ' It is proper to leave to the jury 
 the question whether a rule as to 
 loading lumber on flat-cars was suffi- 
 cient, when faithfully followed, to 
 give reasonable protection to em- 
 ployees (Ford V. Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 Co., 134 N. Y. 493 ; 26 N. E. 1101); 
 
 '" Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. Hammond, 
 58 Ark. 324 ; 24 S. W. 723. 
 
 " Rose V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 58 
 N, Y. 217. 
 
 '^ See notes 6 and 7 ; Rutledge v. 
 Missouri Pao. R. Co., 123 Mo. 121 ; 
 24 S. W. 1053 ; affi'd in 27 S. W. 327. 
 
 "Berrigan v. N. Y., Lake Erie, 
 etc. R. Co., 131 N. Y. 582 ; 30 N. E. 
 57; Warn v. N. Y. Central R. R. 
 
 Co., 92 Hun, 91 ; 36 N. Y. Supp. 336 
 [defect in rules] ; Peaslee v. Fitch- 
 burg R. Co., 152 Mass. 155 ; 25 N. E. 
 71 ; Rutledge v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. , 
 110 Mo. 312 ; 19 S. W. 38 ; Gibson v. 
 Oregon Short Line, etc. R. Co., 83 
 Oreg. 493 ; 32 Pac. 295 ; Texas, etc., 
 R. Co. v. Cumpston, 4 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 25 ; 23 S. W. 47. 
 
 ' This is one of the non-transferable 
 duties. See § 204, post, and many 
 cases cited in the following notes. 
 
 'McGovernv. Central Vt. R. Co., 
 133 N. Y. 380 ; 25 N. E. 373 [grain 
 bin, entered from bottom] ; Baxter 
 V. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187 ; Fairbanks 
 V. Haentzche, 73 111. 236; Deweese 
 V. Meramec Mining Co., 128 Mo. 423; 
 31 S. W. 110 [mine dangerous from 
 falling stones] ; McGonigle v. Canty, 
 80 Hun, 301; 30 N. Y. Supp. 320 
 [tree about to fall] ; Palmer v. Michi- 
 gan Central R. Co., 87 Mich. 281 ; 49 
 N. W. 613 [dangerous method of 
 loading]. A master, who places his 
 servant in a position of unusual dan- 
 ger, must adopt every reasonable 
 precaution to avoid injury to him 
 (Claybaugh v. Kansas City, etc. R. 
 Co., 56 Mo. App. 630 ; Felice v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 14 N. Y. App. Div. 345 
 [men working in railroad tunnel] ; 
 Bernard! v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 78 
 Hun, 454 ; 29 N. Y. Supp. 230 [trans- 
 
333 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§203 
 
 such risks, ^ nor to guard against an accident which is not at all 
 likely to happen.* The master must, therefore, give warning to 
 his servants of all perils to which they will be exposed, of 
 which he is or ought to be aware, other than such as they 
 should, in the exercise of ordinary care, have foreseen as 
 necessarily incidental to the business, in the natural and ordi- 
 nary course of affairs;^ though more than this is not required 
 
 portation of dynamite]). Cases of 
 dynamite left in drill holes : Neveu 
 V. Sears, 155 Mass. 303 ; 29 N. E. 472 
 [question for jury] ; Houston v. Cul- 
 ver, 88 Ga. 34 ; 13 S. E. 953 [nonsuit] ; 
 Henderson v. Williams, 66 N. H. 405 ; 
 23 Atl. 365 [nonsuit proper]. 
 
 'Riley v. Baxendale, 6 Hurlst. & 
 N. 446; Kearney Electric Co. v. 
 Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390 ; 63 N. W. 941. 
 
 * Keats V. National Heeling Mach. 
 Co., 65 Fed. 940; 13 C. C. A. 331; 
 Sjogi-en V. Hall, 53 Mich. 274 [un- 
 covered wheel in saw mill] ; S. P., 
 McKee v. Chicago, etc. B. Co., 83 
 Iowa, 616 ; 50 N. W. 209). 
 
 ' It laborers engaged in hazardous 
 occupations are not informed of 
 the accompanying dangers by their 
 employers, and they remain in 
 ignorance of the dangers, and suffer 
 in consequence, the employers are 
 chargeable (Mather v. Eillston, 156 
 U. S. 391 ; 15 S. Ct. 464 [dynamite 
 liable to heat]). An employer is 
 bound to give notice of latent dan- 
 gers among which the employee is 
 required to work, and of which the 
 employer has knowledge (Salem 
 Stone Co. v. Griffin, 139 Ind. 141 ; 38 
 N. E. 411 ; Smith v. Peninsular Car 
 Works, 60 Mich. 501 ; 27 N. W. 662 ; 
 Augusta Factory v. Hill, 83 Ga. 709 ; 
 10 S. E. 450 ; Northwestern Fuel Co. 
 V. Danielson, 6 C. C..A. 636 ; 57 Fed. 
 ^15 [trestle weakened, without warn- 
 ing] ; Stackman v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 80 Wise. 428; 50 N. W. 404 
 [place of work too narrow ; no warn- 
 ing ; master liable] ; Lynch v. AUyn, 
 160 Mass. 248; 35 N. E. 550 [no 
 
 warning of dangerous earth bank] ; 
 Andreson v. Ogden Union R. Co., 8 
 Utah, 128 ; 30 Pac. 305 [earth banks 
 falling]). Where there are hazards 
 incident to an occupation which tlie 
 master knows, or ought to know, it 
 is his duty to warn the servant of 
 them fully, and, failing to do so, he 
 is liable to him for any injury that 
 he may sustain in consequence of 
 such neglect (Missouri Pac. R. v. 
 Callbreath, 66 Tex. 526 ; 1 S. W. 632 
 [dangerous car coupling]). It is the 
 duty of a manufacturer of Paris 
 green to inform laborers of its 
 poisonous character, and the precau- 
 tions necessary in its manufacture, 
 not of its particular ingredients (Fox 
 V. Peninsular Lead Works, 84 Mich. 
 676 ; 48N. W. 303 ; s. P., Texas Mex. 
 R. Co. V. Douglas, 73 Tex. 325 ; 11 S. 
 W. 333 [plumber should be informed 
 of dangerous railroad ties]). Where 
 the service involves peculiar, un- 
 usual perils, which the master under- 
 stands, but the servant, from youth, 
 inexperience or ignorance, may 
 naturally fail to appreciate, the mas- 
 ter may be chargeable with breach 
 of duty if he orders or urges the 
 servant to incur such dangers, even 
 though the latter, from ignorance, 
 etc., assents. The question is for the 
 jury (Atlas Engine Works v. Ran- 
 dall, 100 Ind. 293 ; Sullivan v. India 
 Manufg. Co., 113 Mass. 396 ; Western 
 Union Tel. Co. v. McMuUen, 58 N. J. 
 Law, 155 ; 33 Atl. 384 ; N. Y. Biscuit 
 Co. V. Rouss, 20 c. C. A. 555 ; 74 Fed. 
 
203] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 334 
 
 of him.' It makes no difference what is the nature of the 
 pecuhar peril, or whether it is or is not beyond the master's 
 control.' And it is not enough for the master to use care and 
 pains to give such notice. He must see that it is actually 
 given.^ If, therefore, he fails to give such warning, in terms 
 sufficiently clear to call the attention of his servants to a peril 
 of which he is or ought to be aware, he is liable to them for 
 any injury which they suffer thereby without contributory 
 negligence.' Such notice must be timely — that is, given in 
 sufficient time to enable the servant to profit by it.^" It is, 
 therefore, the duty of the master to give adequate and timely 
 warnings of changes in the situation, involving new dangers. ^"^ 
 Signals must be given of every approaching train or part of a 
 train, on a railroad ;''' or of the starting of a train, while a 
 
 " Big Creek Stone Co. v. Wolf, 138 
 Ind. 496 ; 38 N. E. 52 [servant ought 
 to have known defects] ; Illinois 
 Cent. R. Co. v. Neer, 26 111. App. 356 
 [no liability for well-known risk] ; 
 Muster v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 61 
 Wise. 325 ; 21 N. W. 223 [mail-bag 
 thrown out]. 
 
 ' Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187 
 [carpenter employed to tear down a 
 fence, and shot by squatters while 
 performing his duty]. But not so 
 where master had not such notice 
 (Kelly V. Shelby E. Co., Ky. ; 
 22 S. W. 445). 
 
 8 Wheeler v. Wason Mfg. Co., 135 
 Mass 294 [plaintiff injured while 
 operating a circular saw) . 
 
 ' O'Connor v. Adams, 120 Mass. 
 427 ; Coombs v. New Bedford Cord- 
 age Co., 102 Id. 572 [minor's arm torn 
 off by rapidly revolving cylinder] ; 
 Parkhurst v. Johnson, 50 Mich. 70 
 [inexperienced laborer fell into a 
 lime kiln, not being warned of danger 
 from removal of burned stone be- 
 low] ; Ryan v. Tarbox, 135 Mass. 207 
 [laborer tearing down an old build- 
 ing, set to work under a weak chim- 
 ney, which fell on him]. 
 
 '» Thus, timely warning must be 
 given of starting machinery at an 
 
 unusual time (Shumway v. Walworth 
 Mfg. Co., 98 Mich. 411 ; 57 N. W. 
 251 ; Huber v. Wilson, 58 Hun, 603 ; 
 11 N. Y. Supp. 377 ; see Crispin v. Bab- 
 bitt, 81 N. Y. 516). But not at the 
 usual time in the absence of special 
 reasons (Balle v. Detroit Leather Co., 
 73 Mich. 158 ; 41 N. W. 216). 
 
 " Muller V. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 
 195 [fierce dog let loose at night] ; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Kerr, 148111. 
 605; 35 N. E. 1117 [track out of 
 order] ; Cheeney v. Ocean S. S. Co., 
 92 Ga. 726 ; 19 S. E. 33 [throwing 
 cotton bales] ; Donahue v. Old Colony 
 R. Co., 153 Mass. 356 ; 26 N. E. 868 ; 
 [conductor's omission to notify 
 brakeman that draw-bar is broken is 
 negligence] ; Stevenson v. Raven- 
 Bcroft, 25 Neb. 678 ; 41 N. W. 653 
 [breaking off earth bank without 
 warning] ; MoUie Gibson Mining Co. 
 V. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321 ; 38 Pac. 
 850 [removal of earth support]. 
 
 '^ Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Barber, 
 Ky. ; 31 S. W. 482 [signals of 
 late train omitted] ; Dixon v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 109 Mo. 413 il9S. W. 
 412 [engine coming around curve] ; 
 Moran v. Eastern R. Co., 48 Minn. 
 46 ; 50 N. W. 930 ; Sobieski v. St. 
 Paul, etc. R. Co., 41 Minn. 169; 4S 
 
335 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§203 
 
 servant is coupling cars^^ or repairing a car/* although, as the 
 actual movement of trains is rarely within the possible personal 
 knowledge of the master, his duty in that and similar matters 
 may be discharged by proper rules and supervision.^'' But if 
 a servant has sufficient actual notice of the peril to put him 
 upon his guard, it is of no importance that such notice did not 
 proceed from the master.'* And the master is not required to 
 point out dangers which are readily discoverable by the ser- 
 vant himself by the use of ordinary care, with such knowledge, 
 experience and judgment as the servant actually possesses, or 
 as the master is justified in believing him to possess." No 
 
 N W. 863. Defendant owed work- 
 men duty of active vigilance in giv- 
 ing proper signals of approach of 
 trains, and they had the right to rely 
 on the continued performance of 
 this duty (Erickson v. St. Paul, etc. 
 E. Co., 41 Minn. 500 ; 43 N. W. 332 ; 
 Schulz V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 57 
 Minn. 271 ; 59 N. W. 192 ; Promer v. 
 Milwaukee, etc. B. Co., 90 Wis. 215 ; 
 63 N. W. 90 [shunted carj ; East 
 Tennessee, etc. K. Co. v. Bridges, 92 
 Ga. 399; 17 S. E. 645 [" wild " engine, 
 without warning] ; Miss. Cotton-Oil 
 Mills Co. V. Ellis, 72 Miss. 191 ; 17 So. 
 214 ; Evansville, etc. E. Co. v. Hol- 
 comb, 9 Ind. App. 198 ; 36 N. E. 39 ; 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 51 111. 
 App. 404 [insufficient signal of 
 train] ; Wild v. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 
 21 Greg. 159; 27 Pac. 954). But the 
 U. S. Supreme Court has recently 
 held (three judges dissenting) that 
 the negligence of the officer in 
 charge of a train in failing to give 
 warning as the train rapidly ap- 
 proached a hand car on the track 
 was the fault of a fellow-servant 
 and not imputable to the master, 
 where a section hand on the hand 
 car was injured (Northern Pac. E. 
 Co. V. Charless, 162 U. S. 359 ; rev'g 
 S. C, 51 Fed. 563 ; 2 C. C. A., 380 ; 7 
 U. S. App. 859). And where a 
 switching engine is constantly mov- 
 ing to and fro in a railroad yard, 
 
 there is no obligation to ring the 
 bell or sound the whistle for the 
 purpose of notifying employees who 
 are familiar with the operation of 
 the yard (Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 
 145 U. S. 418 ; 12 S. Ct. 835). 
 
 '^ Barnett V. Northeastern E. Co., 
 89 Ga. 399; l.") S. E. 492. 
 
 '■•Abel V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 103 N. Y. 581. 
 
 " See § 203, ante. 
 
 '« Foley V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 48 
 Mich. 633 [switchman killed while 
 handling nitro-glycerine, he having 
 a general acquaintance with its 
 qualities] ; Eooney v. Sewall Cordage 
 Co., 161 Mass. 153; 86 N. E. 789; 
 Downey v. Sawyer, 157 Mass. 418 ; 
 33 N. E. 654 ; Truntle v. North Star 
 Mills, 57 Minn. 52 ; 58 N. W. 832. 
 
 " It is not necessary that a servant 
 should be warned of evei-y possible 
 manner in w^hich injury may occur 
 to him, nor of risks that are as obvi- 
 ous to him as to the master ; and 
 where a mature and experienced 
 man engages in a dangerous occupa- 
 tion, with the risks of which he 
 is familiar, and is injured, not 
 through defect in the appliances, 
 but through the manner of their 
 operation, incident to the business, 
 he cannot recover against the master 
 (Mississippi Logging Co. v. Schnei- 
 der, 20 C. C. A. 390 ; 74 Fed. 195). To 
 same effect, Hazen v. West Superior 
 
§ 203a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 336 
 
 notice, therefore, is usually required of dangers obvious to 
 everyone." 
 
 § 203a. Duty of supervision. — It is a universal American 
 rule that the master is personally bound to maintain " such an 
 oversight and supervision" of his servants and business,^ as 
 will enable him to discover, within a reasonable time, the 
 incompetency or habitual negligence of any servant,* the 
 defects of any place or appliance provided for work^ or the 
 failure of his servants to conduct the business in pursuance of 
 
 Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 208; 64 N. W. 
 857 [projecting circular saws, un- 
 guarded : floor slippery : no instruc- 
 tion : dangers obvious] ; Nugent v. 
 Kaufifman Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241 ; 
 33 S. W. 428 [revolving cylinders : no 
 instructions : age 20] ; Jones v. Rob- 
 erts, 57 111. App. 56 [steam mangle : 
 girl 10 : danger obvious : no warn- 
 ing] ; Jones v. Roberts, 57 111. App. 
 56 ; Richstain v. Washington Mills 
 Co., 157 Mass. 538 ; 32 N. E. 908 ; 
 Tones v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17 [minor 
 set to operate dangerous machinery] ; 
 Arcade File Works v. Juteau, 15 
 Ind. App. 460 ; 40 N. E. 818 [no 
 notice of servant's inexperience]. A 
 raih-oad company is not negligent in 
 falling to inform one of its experi- 
 enced engineers, who has run over 
 its road for many years, and who 
 was appointed to instruct an en- 
 gineer on another engine in all the 
 peculiarities of the road, that 
 such engine Is several inches wider 
 than the one he had been accustomed 
 to handle (Bellows v. Pennsylvania, 
 etc. Canal Co., 157 Pa. St. 51 ; 27 
 At). 685; s. P., Thain v. Old Colony 
 R. Co., 101 Mass. 353; 37 N. E. 309 
 [post four feet from train]). 
 
 '*Bohn V. Havemeyer, 114 N. Y. 
 296 ; 21 N. E. 403 [sugar bin] ; Dela- 
 ware Iron Works v. Nuttall, 119 Pa. 
 St. 149 ; 13 Atl. 65 [circular saw] ; 
 ijtuart V. West End St. R. Co., 163 
 Mass. 393 ; 40 N. E. 180 [hay cutter] ; 
 
 Foley V. Pettee Machine Works, 149 
 Mass. 294 ; 21 N. E. 804 [experienced 
 servant : uncovered gearing ; no re- 
 covery] ; East Tennessee R. Co. v. 
 Turvaville, 97 Ala. 123 ; 13 So. 63 ; [car 
 couplings] ; Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Boland, 96 Ala. 626; 11 So. 667 
 [same] ; Watts v. Hart, 7 Wash. St. 
 178 ; 34 Pac. 433, 771. Where an 
 unf enced railroad runs through pas- 
 ture land, it is not the duty of the 
 company to warn employees of the 
 danger of encountering cattle (Pat- 
 ton V. Central Iowa R. Co., 73 Iowa, 
 306; 35 N. W.149). 
 
 ' Whittaker v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co., 126 N. Y. 544; 37 N. E. 1043. 
 In Cullen v. Norton (126 N. Y. 1; 
 26 N. E. 905), this point was over- 
 looked, but not overruled. The de- 
 cision was made by a divided court, 
 and reversed the decision of a large 
 number of judges below (9 N. Y. 
 Supp. 174; 29 St. Rep. 700; S. C, 
 before, 52 Hun, 9 ; reargued, 34 St. 
 Rep. 103). 
 
 '' Whittaker v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co., 136 N. Y. 544; Oilman v. East- 
 ern R. Co., 10 Allen, 333. 
 
 'See §§ 194, 194a, ante, and cases 
 cited ; also Durkin v. Sharp, 88 N. 
 Y. 335; Atchison, etc. E. Co. v. 
 M'Kee, 37 Kans. 593; 15 Pac. 484; 
 Rogers v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 144 Mass. 
 198 ; 11 N. E. 77 ; and Mass. cases 
 there cited. 
 
337 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 204 
 
 his rules.* It is difficult to perceive upon what principle any 
 distinction can be made between supervision for these purposes 
 and general supervision for all other purposes — not as to 
 minute details, but over the general work. Indeed, the 
 requirement of rules and their enforcement (§ 202) has no 
 basis, except on this assumption. Accordingly, the great 
 weight of American authority, estimated either according to 
 the number of judges or to their ability and freedom from 
 bias, is decidedly in favor of holding masters, whether present 
 or absent, to personal responsibility for such general super- 
 vision as a prudent master would give if personally present.' 
 If the master chooses to delegate this supervision to an agent, 
 or if he undertakes work on so large a scale as tp leave him no 
 choice but to so delegate it, his responsibility stands upon the 
 same footing, in this case, as in the other duties of supervision, 
 upon which all authorities agree. 
 
 § 204. Delegation of master's personal duties.— None of 
 the duties which have been previously stated as devolving 
 upon the master personally can be by him delegated to any 
 agent so as to relieve him from personal responsibility.* He 
 may and often must delegate the performance of such duties 
 
 ^ Whittaker v. Delaware, etc. Canal Burlington, etc. E. Co. v. Crockett, 
 
 Co., 126 N. Y. 544; Wabash R. Co. 19 Neb. 138; 26 N. W. 931 [con- 
 
 V. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454 ; 2 S. Ct. ductor's omission to warn of danger]; 
 
 933. Crystal Ice Co. v. Sherlock, 37 Neb. 
 
 '■ McElligott V. Randolph, 61 Conn. 19 ; 55 N. W. 394 ; Hannibal, etc. R. 
 
 157 ; 22 Atl. 1094 ; Criswell v. Pitts- Co. v. Fox, 31 Kans. 586 ; 3 Pao. 330 
 
 burgh, etc. R. Co., 80 W. Va. 798 ; 6 [foreman failing to warn of danger] ; 
 
 S. E. 31 ; Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Bloyd v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. , 58 
 
 Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201 ; Taylor v. Ark. 66 ; 22 S. W. 1089 ; per Field, 
 
 Evansville, etc. R. Co., 121 Ind. 124; J., Rogers v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 144 
 
 23N. E. 876; Engine Works v. Rand- Mass. 198; 11 N. E. 77. But the 
 
 all, 100 Ind. 293 ; Quincy Mining Co. principle is not adhered to in Massa- 
 
 V. Kitts, 42 Mich. 34 ; 3 N. W. 240 ; chusetts, except under the statute 
 
 per Cooley, C. J.; Hunn v. Mich, of 1887. The duty does not extend 
 
 Central R. Co., 78 Mich. 513 ; 44 N. so far as to require the master to 
 
 W. 502 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Bay- see that every servant always re- 
 
 fleld, 37 Mich. 205 ; Carlson v. North mains at his post (Parker v. N. Y. 
 
 West. Tel.Cc, 63 Minn. 428; 65N.W. & New England R. Co., 18 E. L 773 , 
 
 914; Miller v. Mo. Pacific R. Co., 109 30 Atl. 849). 
 
 Mo. 350 : 19 S. W. 58, and cases there ' Booth v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 73 
 
 cited ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Lund- N. Y. 38, 40. It is the duty of the 
 
 strum. 16 Neb. 254 ; 20 N. W. 1^8 employer to select and retain serv- 
 
 {conductor's orders] ; re-affirmed, ants who are fit and competent for 
 [Law of Neg. Vol 1 — 23] 
 
204] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 338 
 
 to subordinates ; but he remains responsible to all his servants 
 for the acts of these subordinates, in that particular capacity, 
 to the same extent as if those acts were literally his own.^ 
 This has been repeatedly adjudged, as to his duty in the selec- 
 tion and dismissal of servants,' in providing,* inspecting' and 
 
 the service, and to furnish suffioient 
 and safe materials, machinery or 
 otlier means by vvliich it is to be per- 
 formed, and to keep them in repair 
 and order. This duty he cannot dele- 
 gate to a servant so as to exempt 
 himself from liability for injuries 
 caused to another servant by this 
 omission. Indeed, no duty required 
 of him for the safety and protection 
 of his servants can be transferred, so 
 as to exempt him from such liability 
 (Northern Pacific E. Co. v. Herbert, 
 116 U. S. 643, 647 ; s. p., Ford -v. 
 Fitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 240; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Jackson, 55 
 111. 492). Almost the same language 
 was used by Church, C. J., Flike v. 
 Boston, etc. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549. 
 A remarkable distinction was made 
 in Malone y. Hathavray (64 N. Y. 
 5, 12), between corporations and in- 
 dividuals. It was held, that, where 
 a principal was an individual, " and 
 there is no evidence of a sui-render 
 of power and control to any subordi- 
 nate, and he is present himself, su- 
 perintending tlie establishment in 
 person," he is not responsible for the 
 negligence of a competent and pro- 
 per foreman in failing to maintain 
 the building in a secure and safe 
 condition. Church, C. J., and Ra- 
 pallo, J. , dissented ; and we enter- 
 tain no doubt that their dissent was 
 fully justified. 
 
 ' Cooper V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 24 West Va. 37. 
 
 ^ Mann v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co., 91 N. Y. 495 [incompetent flag- 
 man selected by conductor] ; Laning 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49 N. Y. 
 521 ; Walker v. Boiling, 22 Ala. 294 
 
 [ship-owner responsible for captain's 
 employment of incompetent engi- 
 neer]. To the contrary, apparently, 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Hoover, 79^ 
 Md. 253 ; 29 Atl. 994. 
 
 ■■ The obligation of the master " to 
 provide and maintain in suitable 
 condition the machinery and appa- 
 ratus to be used by its employees " 
 cannot be so delegated to an agent as. 
 to relieve the master from responsi- 
 bility therefor to his servants (Hough 
 V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 100 U. S. 213, 
 220 ; No. Pac. R. Co. v. Poirier, 67 
 Fed. 881 ; 15 C. C. A. 52 ; Pullman 
 Co. V. Laack, 143 111. 212 ; 33 N. E. 
 285 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitoomb, 
 111 ind. 212 ; 12 N. E. 380 ; Fuller v. 
 Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 ; Benzing v. 
 Steinway, 101 N. Y. 547; Collyer 
 V. Penna. R. Co., 49 N. J. Law, 59 ; 
 6 Atl. 437). The rule is the same- 
 under the California Code (Sanborn 
 v. Madera, etc. R. Co., 70 Cal. 261 ; 
 11 Pac. 710). So as to supplying 
 sufficient force of men (Flike v. Bos- 
 ton, etc. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549). 
 Agents who are charged with the 
 duty of supplying safe machinery 
 are not to be regarded as fellow- 
 servants of those who operate it. 
 They are charged with a master's- 
 duties to his servants. They are em- 
 ployed in distinct and independent 
 departments of service, and there is 
 no difficulty in distinguishing them 
 (Ford V. Fitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 
 240; S. P., Kelly v. Erie Tel. Co., 34 
 Minn. 321 ; Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. 
 McMuUen, 117 Ind. 439; 20 N. E.287). 
 
 ' The operator of a railroad, to ex- 
 empt him from liability to a servant 
 for injury arising from a defective- 
 
339 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 204 
 
 repairing" materials and appliances, in warning servants of 
 special dangers,' and in framing rules.^ Thus a builder has 
 been held liable to a hod-carrier for the negligence of a fore- 
 condition of the track, must show Co., 94 Mich. 607 ; 54 N. W. 493 ; 
 that it was, at proper intervals, care- Bessex v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 45 
 fully inspected by a competent in- Wise. 477, 481 ; "Wedgwood v. Chi- 
 spector. Proof of the competency cago, etc. E. Co., 41 Wise. 478; 
 oftheinspector, without proof of due Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Conroy, 68 111. 
 inspection, is insufficient (Durkin v. 560 ; Drymala v. Thompson, 28 Minn. 
 Sharp, 88 N. Y. 225) . S. P. , as to plat- 40; Flynn v. Kansas City, etc. R. 
 form containing a defective plank Co., 78 Mo. 195 ; Hou.ston, etc. R. 
 (Benzing V. iSteinway, 101 N. Y. 547 ; Co. v. Marcelles, 59 Tex. 334.) This 
 5 N. E. 449). To same effect. Little duty of inspection and repair cannot 
 Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Moseley, 56 Fed. be delegated so as to avoid the mas- 
 1009 ; 6 C. C. A. 235 [couplhig link] ; ter's personal liability (Bailey v. 
 Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. McMullen, Rome, etc. R. Co., 139 N. Y. 803 ; 
 inind. 439; 30 N.E. 287 [car brake]. 34 N. E. 918; Richmond, etc. R. 
 The same rule applies to the inspeo- Co. v. Elliott, 149 U. S. 366 ; Louis- 
 tion of foreign cars running on the ville, etc. R. Co. v. Ward, 61 Fed. 
 road (International, etc. R. Co. v. 937 ; 18 U. S. App. 683 ; Cooper v. 
 Kernan, 78 Tex. 394; 14 S. W. 668). Pittsburg, etc. R. Co., 24 West Va. 
 Very strangely, the Ohio courts, 37; Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co., 110 
 which were the first to establish Mass. 249 ; Moynihan v. Hills Mfg. 
 liberal rules in favor of servants, Co., 146 Mass. 585 ; 16 N. E. 574 ; 
 have greatly erred on this point, Davis v. Central Vt. R. Co. , 55 Vt. 
 holding that a railroad company is 84 [fireman killed by negligence of 
 not liable to a train-hand for the road-master] ; Cook v. St. Paul, etc. 
 failure of its car inspector to inspect R. Co., 34 Minn. 45 [negligent road- 
 (Little Miami R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, master] ; Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. 
 43 Ohio St. 318 ; citing Columbus, Moore, 31 Kans. 197 [same] ; Lawless 
 etc. R. Co. V. Webb, 13 Id. 475). v. Conn. River R. Co., 136 Mass. 1 
 This ruling is clearly wrong. [draw-bar on switch engine too low] ; 
 ' The neglect of a servant to keep Mulvey v. R. I. Locomotive Works, 
 in order miachinery, etc., is not the 14 R. I. 240 [breaking of elevator 
 neglect of a fellow-servant of the one chain]; Kirkpatrick v. N. Y. Cen- 
 employed to operate such machinery, tral, etc. R. Co., 79 N. Y. 340 [ex- 
 In the repair of naachinery, the serv- plosion of weak boiler]), 
 ant represents the master in the per- 'Smith v. Oxford Iron Co., 43 
 f ormance of his part of the contract, N. J. Law, 467 [verdict sustained 
 and his negligence in that respect is where a miner was injured by ex- 
 the negligence of the master (Shanny plosion of giant powder : defendant 
 v. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 420 ; having failed to explain its danger- 
 cited and followed in Northern ous character]. Numerous examples 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Herbert, 116 U. S. may be found in the notes to § 303, 
 643, 651). To the same effect, Sa- ante. 
 dowski V. Mich. Car. Co., 84 Mich. » See §303, ante. 
 100 ; 47 N. W. HQS ; Roux v. Blodgett 
 
§ 205] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 340 
 
 man employed to put up a scaffold,' or entrusted with the 
 construction and rigging of a derrick/" and a cotton manufac- 
 turing company for the negligence of a loom-repairer." So, 
 as to a mining company, in respect of the negligence of its 
 superintendent, who failed to adopt precautions against injury 
 to the miners by falling rock ; '^ and a factory-owner, for the 
 act of his foreman in supplying a defective platform.'' Several 
 English and American decisions are inconsistent with these 
 principles ; but they were all, or nearly all, decided without 
 considering the distinction between the responsibility of a 
 master for materials, and his responsibility for the use made of 
 materials by fellow-servants of the injured servant. All such 
 decisions are of no authority, outside of the particular courts 
 making them, and ought to be overruled, even there." We 
 hold, further, that the power of absolute command cannot be 
 delegated so as to relieve the master from liability for its 
 misuse.'^ But, in a few courts, this doctrine is not accepted. 
 
 § 205. Illustrations of non-transferable duties.— Upon 
 the principle just stated, many cases have been decided, espe- 
 cially with reference to corporations. Thus, it has been held 
 
 ' Green v. Banta, 48 N. Y. Superior Wonder v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co. , 
 Ct., 156 (affl'd, 97 N. Y. 637), where 33 Md. 411 ; Seaile v. Lindsay, 11 
 Sedgwick, C. J., says : "The master C. B. N. S. 439; Little Miami R. Co. 
 would be liable for the neglect of any v. Fitzpatrick, 43 Ohio St. 318 ; Gib- 
 workman, not called foreman, who son v. Northern Central R. Co., 33 
 was directed by the master to make Hun, 289 ; Kid well v. Houston, etc. 
 the scaffold." See Fort v. Whipple, R. Co., 3 Woods C. C. 318 [all cases 
 11 Hun, 586 [workman injured by of negligent inspection of ma- 
 defects in scaffold constructed by de- chinery] ; Collier v. Steinhardt, 51 
 fendant]. Cal. 116 [negligent selection of serv- 
 
 " Courtney v. Cornell, 49 N. Y. ant by agent delegated thereto] ; 
 
 Superior, 386. Mackin v. Boston & Alb. R. Co., 135 
 
 " Gunter v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., Mass. 201 ; Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 
 
 18 S. C. 363. 258 [neglect of car inspector to in- 
 
 " Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Mining spect defective cars received from 
 
 Co., 99 N. Y. 368 ; 2 N. E. 24. To other companies], 
 the contrary, Hall v. Johnson, 9 " ggg gg 236, 337, post. In Miller 
 
 Hurlst. & C. 589, of no authority in v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (109 Mo. 
 
 America. 350; 19 S. W. 58), this section was 
 
 '3 Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. cited as authority for holding that 
 
 547 ; 5 N. E. 449. such power could not be thus dele- 
 
 " Among the cases thus errone- gated, 
 ously decided on this point are 
 
341 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 205 
 
 that a corporation is responsible to its servants for the negU- 
 ■ gence of other servants, entrusted with the duty of providing 
 a safe place in which to work/ or of providing -suitable tools, 
 materials or other appliances ; as in the case of an agent 
 entrusted with the selection of ropes,' or of a section boss, 
 who knowingly furnished a spike-driver with a defective maul;* 
 of the foreman of a gang employed in constructing a road, 
 who was entrusted with the thawing of blasting powder, by 
 whose negligence in doing which one of the men was injured;* 
 of a car inspector, through whose neglect to cause a defective 
 ladder on a box car to be repaired, a brakeman fell from the 
 car;' of a master mechanic, having exclusive management of 
 motive power, in failing to make secure a steam whistle,^ and 
 of a general, superintendent and an overseer of repairs in a 
 factory, by whose joint neglect to complete certain machinery 
 before starting it, an employee was injured/ So railroad com- 
 panies have been held responsible to their servants for the 
 negligence of other servants entrusted with the duty of 
 inspecting materials and supplies or making repairs, as in the 
 case of a division superintendent in respect of defects in a 
 
 ' Hannibal, etc. E. Co. v. Fox, 31 '' Gilmore v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
 
 Kans. 586, where the foreman or 18 Fed. 866 ; Bertha Zinc Co. v. 
 
 boss repairer ordered the plaintiff to Martin, 93 Va. 791; 33 S. E. 869 
 
 go under a car to make repairs, [dynamite]. 
 
 While the plaintiff was under the ^ Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Her- 
 car other cars were pushed along the bert, 116 U. S. 643 ; Cooper v. Pitts- 
 track and injured the plaintiff. Held, burgh, etc. R. Co., 24 W. Va. 37 ; 
 that for the foreman's neglect to see Brann v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 53 
 that reasonable precautions were Iowa, 595 ; Condon v. Mo. Pacific R. 
 taken to protect plaintiff, the com- Co., 78 Mo. 567. 
 pany was responsible (Quincy Coal « Hough v. Railroad Company, 100 
 Co. V. Hood, 77 111. 68 [superintend- U. S. 313. 
 
 ent of mining company having ' Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co., 
 
 timely nptice of dangerous condi- 50 Conn. 433. The negligence of de- 
 
 tion of roof of mine]). fendant's foreman in failing to notice 
 
 = Galveston, etc. R. Co. v. Dela- the defect in machinery when it 
 liunty, 53 Tex. 306 [roadmaster who came from the manufacturer, or in 
 furnished a worn rope] ; Indiana Car failing afterwards to discover the de- 
 Co. V. Parker, 100 Ind. 181 [superin- feet, is the negligence of a servant 
 tendent allowed a rope used in oper- in the discharge of a duty which the 
 ating a cut-off saw to become worn master owes his other servants and 
 and unsafe from age and use]. not the negligence of a fellow-serv- 
 
 3 Guthrie v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., ant (Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 331; 39 
 
 11 Lea (Tenn.) 372. Atl. 380). 
 
§205] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 342 
 
 station house which he had discretionary power to repair;* of 
 a superintendent of repairs who failed to make proper exami- 
 nation of a locomotive boiler, by defects in which a fireman 
 was killed ; ' of its inspectors of stakes used as guards on plat- 
 form cars, by the breaking of one of which a brakeman was 
 injured;" of a car inspector, whose duty it was to inspect cars, 
 failing to mark them for repairs, for want of which a man 
 engaged in coupling cars was injured." So as to a road master, 
 whose duty it was to keep the road in good repair, and through 
 whose neglect a train was precipitated into a washout and a 
 brakeman injured;''^ and a section foreman, who, having taken 
 up a rail in repairing the track, failed to put out any signal to 
 warn approaching trains, whereby a train was thrown off and a 
 brakeman's leg broken." So as to servants entrusted with 
 the power of deciding what number of men was necessary for 
 a particular task." So with regard to servants having abso- 
 lute control over the starting or delaying of trains.'^ The 
 
 8 IlUnois Central R. Co. v. "Welch, 
 52 111. 183 ; Houston, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Oram, 49 Tex. 341 [brakeman while 
 ascending a side ladder on a oar in 
 motion, injured by projecting frame- 
 work of a water tank]. 
 
 ' Stevenson v. Jewett, 16 Hun, 
 310. 
 
 '" Bushby v. N. Y., Lake Erie R. 
 Co., 37 Hun, 104; affi'd, 107 N. Y. 
 374. 
 
 " Tierney v. Minneapolis, etc. R. 
 Co., 33 Minn. 311, where Vander- 
 burgh, J., distinguishes between 
 servants or agents whose duties re- 
 late to the maintenance of safe in- 
 strumentalities and those who super- 
 intend the use of them (comparing 
 Drymala v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 40, 
 and Brown v. Winona, etc. E. Co.. 
 27 Id. 162). The same distinction is 
 taken in Marvin v. Miller (25 Hun, 
 163). 
 
 " Atchison, etc. E. Co. v. Moore, 
 SI Kans. 197 ; Houston, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Dunham, 49 Tex. 181 ; S. P., New 
 Orleans, etc. E. Co. v. Hughes, 49 
 Miss. 258 ; and see Hall v. Paciiic E. 
 
 Co., 74 Mo. 398 ; following Lewis v. 
 St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 59 Id. 495. In 
 Bessex v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. (45 
 Wise. 477) , the neglect of yardmaster 
 to keep the track free from obstruc- 
 tions, whereby plaintiff was injured 
 through the falling of a pile of 
 boards, was held to be the negligence 
 of defendant. Followed in Hulehan 
 V. Green Bay, etc. R. Co., 58 Wise. 
 319 [loose blocks of firewood left 
 scattered along track, over which 
 brakeman stumbled while coupling 
 cars]. 
 
 '^ Drymala v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 
 40. Compare Walsh v. St. Paul, etc. 
 E. Co., 37 Minn. 367. 
 
 " Flike V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 53 
 N. Y. 549 ; Booth v. Boston, etc. E. 
 Co. , 73 Id. 38 ; in which cases de- 
 fendant's agent sent out a freight 
 train with only two brakeman aboard 
 when there should have been three, 
 which was the usual number. 
 
 ^^ Darrigan v. N. Y. & New Eng- 
 land E. Co., 52 Conn. 385 [train dis- 
 patcher, through whose negligence 
 in sending out two irregular trains 
 
343 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§206 
 
 ■decisions as to the liability of railroad companies to their 
 servants for the neglect of engineers to give the ordinary- 
 signals of approaching trains, are simply irreconcilable.** 
 
 § 206. What is sufficient notice to master. — Masters are 
 •charged with notice, not only of what they know, but also of 
 what they ought to know,* that is, of every fact which they 
 would have known had they used ordinary care and diligence 
 in performing their duties.^ And while the general rule which, 
 in favor of a stranger, holds the principal to be affected with 
 notice of any fact coming to the knowledge of any of his 
 agents, under such circumstances as to make it the duty of that 
 agent to communicate the fact to his principal, does not apply 
 to its full extent in favor of a servant,' yet, where a master has 
 
 in opposite directions a collision oc- 
 curred, which injured an engineer] ; 
 Hankins v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co., 143 N. Y. 516; 37 N. E. 466 
 [same] ; Dana v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 as N. Y. 639 ; rev'g 33 Hun, 478 [tele- 
 graph operator, through whom the 
 movements of trains were regulated, 
 by whose omission to send proper 
 dispatches, a collision occurred, in 
 which an engineer was killed]. 
 
 " In Georgia, Kentucky, Mississ- 
 ippi, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, 
 Minnesota, Oregon, the railroad com- 
 pany is held responsible . (See cases 
 cited under § 303.) In the U. S. Su- 
 preme Court, the contrary rule was 
 recently established (Northern Pac. 
 R. Co. V. Charless, 163 U. S. 359). 
 
 ' Ocean S. S. Co. v. Matthews, 86 
 Ga. 418 ; 13 S. E. 633 [defect in ap- 
 pliances] ; Standard Mfg. Co.'s ap- 
 peal, 130 Pa. St. 446 ; 18 Atl. 637. 
 
 ' Union Pao. R. Co. v. Daniels, 
 l.'iS U. S. 684 ; 14 S. Ct. 756 ; John- 
 son V. First Nat. Bank, 79 Wise. 
 414 ; 48 N. W. 713 ; St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Davis, 54 Ark. 389 ; 1.5 S 
 W. 895 [latent defect, which should 
 have been discovered] ; Moon v. 
 Northern Pac. R Co., 46 Minn. 106 ; 
 48 N. W. 679 [same]. The facts that 
 
 a defective car was attached to a 
 train, with nothing to show that it 
 differed from the other cars, and 
 that it became necessary to use it in 
 such a manner as resulted in injury, 
 are prima facie evidence of negli- 
 gence of the railroad company, 
 without proof that it had notice of 
 the defect (Guthrie v. Maine . Cent. 
 R. Co., 81 Me. 573 ; 18 Atl. 295). See 
 Griffin v. Boston & Alb. R. Co., 148 
 Mass. 143 ; 19 N. E. 166 [defective 
 couphng link], and §§ 191, 194, 194a, 
 ante, and many oases there cited. 
 
 2 Knowledge of a defect, in ma- 
 terials, etc., on the part of a fellow- 
 servant, of precisely the same grade 
 as the one who is injured by such 
 defect (e. g., a brakeman), is not im- 
 putable to the master (Smoot v. Mo- 
 bile, etc. R. Co., 67 Ala. 13 ; Union 
 Pac. R, Co. v. Springsteen, 41 Kans. 
 734 ; 21 Pac. 774 ; Indiana, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Snyder (Ind.), 33 N. E. 1129 
 [latent defect in handle, known only 
 to carpenter making it, not notice]). 
 But notice to a telegraph operator 
 of a railroad, of defect in a bridge is 
 sufficient notice to the company 
 (Hall V. Galveston, etc. R. Co., 89 
 Fed. 18). 
 
§206] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 344 
 
 delegated to any of his servants the duty of receiving notice 
 of certain facts,* or has placed in their hands the power of tak- 
 ing action with respect to such notice, or has left such matters 
 under their charge or control,^ notice of such facts to such serv- 
 ants is equivalent to notice to the master. Thus, a master is 
 charged with notice of the incompetency of a servant, when 
 received by any agent who has the power of dismissing that 
 servant,' or even of suspending him ; ' and with notice of 
 defects in instrumentalies, received by any agent charged with 
 the supply, inspection or repair of such instrumentalities. ° 
 Notice to any one who is a vice-principal (within the definition 
 hereafter given) is sufficient notice to the master.' If a master 
 
 ■* A railroad company is bound, by 
 notice of the defective condition of 
 a switch engine, given to a foreman 
 in its repair shop, to whom, by the 
 company's rules, the same should 
 have been reported (Brabbits v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 38 Wise. 287). 
 Where a railroad company makes no 
 provision for inspection of locomo- 
 tives except by engineers, it is a 
 question for the jury whether the 
 engineer does not occupy such rela- 
 tion to the company that notice to 
 him is notice to the company (Mc- 
 Donald V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
 Mich. ; 65 N. W. 597). 
 
 " Notice to head engineer, who has 
 charge of all the machinery and 
 elevators in a building, that an ele- 
 vator chain was too light for its 
 work, is notice to the owner (De- 
 laney v. Hilton, 50 N. Y. Super. 341). 
 Notice to foreman of railroad round- 
 house of the dangerous condition of 
 an engine belonging to that house, 
 held notice to the company (Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Rung, 104 111. 641). So, 
 as to notice given to a railroad super- 
 intendent of a defect in its track 
 (Patterson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 Co., 7li Pa. St. 389 ) ; or in a car-coup- 
 ler (Bowers v. Union Pac. R. Co., 4 
 Utah, 315 ; 7 Pac. 251). 
 
 * Notice to the master-mechanic 
 
 whose province it was to employ and 
 discharge engineers and firemen, of 
 the practice of engineers to violate 
 an order of the company, by placing^ 
 their engines in the hands of fire- 
 men, is notice to the company (Ohio, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Collarn, 73 Ind. 361) 
 
 ' It is sufiicient that notice of in- 
 competency should be given to offi- 
 cers who supervise such employee's 
 work, and are given authority to 
 suspend him temporarily from his 
 position, for incompetency of the 
 kind in question (Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Henthorne, 19 C. C. A. 633 ; 73 
 Fed. 634). 
 
 * Worden v. Humeston, etc. R. Co., 
 76 Iowa, 310; 41 N. W. 36 ; Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Blevins, 46 Kans. 370 ; 
 36 Pac. 687 [foreman providing de- 
 fective tool] ; Sangamon Coal Co., 
 V. Wiggerhaus, 132 111. 379; 13 N. E. 
 648. Notice of defects in appliances, 
 to one whose duty it is to have re- 
 pairs made, whatever the grade of 
 his employment, is notice to the 
 company (Chapman v. Southern 
 Pac. Co., 13 Utah, 30 ; 41 Pac 551). 
 
 " Patterson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. 
 R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 389 ; Johnson v. 
 First Nat Bank, 79 Wise. 414 ; 48 
 N. W. 713 [superintendent of build- 
 ing walk] ; Lyttle v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 84 Mich. 289; 47 N. W. 571 
 
345 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§207 
 
 does not provide any convenient means of receiving notice per- 
 sonally or through an easily accessible vice-principal, he neg- 
 lects his personal duty of supervision and inspection, and 
 notice to any agent who ought to communicate it, may be 
 sufficient. *" 
 
 § 207. Contributory negligence.— All the rules as to con- 
 tributory negligence are, of course, applicable to the claims of 
 servants against their masters ; and many cases of that kind have 
 already been cited in Chapter VI. Some further illustrations of 
 the application of these rules may be given here, as contributory 
 negligence is naturally very frequent among injured servants. 
 Constant familiarity with danger always breeds indifference and 
 often produces recklessness. The servant cannot recover if his 
 injury was proximately due to his own fault in taking unneces- 
 sary risks/ as by needlessly going or remaining in a dangerous 
 
 [notice to yardmaster of defects in 
 engine]. Those in charge of the men 
 who were using a hand car had 
 actual knowledge of defects. Held, 
 that their knowledge was notice to 
 the company (Atchison, etc. E. Co. 
 V. Napole, 55 Kans. 401 ; 40 Pac. 
 6tj9). Where notice was given to the 
 superintendent of a street railway 
 company of a defect, but the com- 
 pany neglected to remedy the defect, 
 and after a change in superintend- 
 ents, a servant was injured thereby, 
 the company could not plead want 
 of notice of the defect, though its 
 then superintendent had not been 
 notified thereof (Bland v. Shreve- 
 port R. Co., 48 La. Ann. 1057 ; 20 So. 
 284). 
 
 "• Notice to a conductor of a de- 
 fective " hand-hold "or " foot-rest " 
 was notice to defendant, and his 
 promise to have the defect repaired 
 soon was sufficient, though not him- 
 self authorized to make the repairs 
 (Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Kenley, 
 92 Tenn. 207 ; 21 S. W. 32(3). 
 
 ' Lothrop V. Fitchburg E. Co., 150 
 Mass 423 ; 23 N. E. 227 ; Piper v. 
 Cambria Iron Co., 78 Md. 2-19 ; 27 
 
 Atl. 939 ; Carroll v. East Tennessee, 
 V. & G. Ey. Co., 82 Ga. 453 ; 10 S. 
 E. 163 [fireman traveling with sleep- 
 ing engineer] ; Illinois, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Patterson. 69111. 650 ; s. C, again, 
 93 111. 290 ; Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Thomas, 51 Miss. 637 [driving train 
 too fast over track known to be dan- 
 gerous] ; Welch v. Brainard, 
 Mich. ; 65 N. W. 667 [doing work 
 in a needlessly dangerous manner] ; 
 Way V. Chicago, etc. E. Co. 76 Iowa, 
 393 ; 41 N. W. 51 [dispensing with 
 needed assistance] ; Gowen v. Har- 
 ley, 6 C. C. A. 190 ; 56 Fed. 973. 
 While the cars were still moving, 
 decedent began to climb down the 
 side of the car, and was crushed be- 
 tween the car and a post which 
 stood close to the track. Decedent 
 was an experienced railroad man, 
 and was familiar with the surround- 
 ings of defendant's tracks. It did 
 not appear that any rule of defend- 
 ant required decedent to descend 
 from a moving train at that place. 
 Held, that decedent assumed the 
 risk in descending from car, and 
 plaintiff could not recover (Penning- 
 ton V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 90 Mch^ 
 
207] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 346 
 
 place,'* needlessly or carelessly using.dangerous appliances,' need- 
 lessly using materials, implements or structures for purposes, or 
 in a manner to which they are obviously not adapted,* needlessly 
 
 505 ; 51 N. W. 634). In an action 
 against a railway company for tlie 
 death of an employee, evidence that 
 deceased was habitually careless and 
 reckless in the performance of his 
 duty is admissible (Peoria, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Puckett, .53 111. App. 223). 
 Where plaintiff was not acting 
 under the orders of his employer, 
 but on his own responsibility, know- 
 ing the danger, he could not recover 
 damages for his injuries (Taylor v. 
 Baldwin, 78Cal. 517; 31 Pac. 124). 
 
 ' Bunt V. Sierra Min. Co., 138 U. 
 S. 483 ; 11 S. Ct. 464 [miner remov- 
 ing prop and sitting under danger- 
 ous roof] ; Victor Coal Co. v. Muir, 
 20 Colo. 330 ; 38 Pac. 378 [miner con- 
 tinuing work without propping 
 mine] ; Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53 
 Ohio St. 48 ; 40 N. E. 725 [same] ; 
 Lord V. Pueblo Smelting & Eefining 
 Co., 13 Colo. 390 ; 31 Pac. 148 [pass- 
 ing between cars two feet apart] ; 
 Whitmore v. Boston & M. R. Co., 
 150 Mass. 477 ; 33 N. E. 230 [going 
 between cars] ; Columbus, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; 5 So. 
 864 [crossing dangerous trestle] ; 
 Haggerty v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 90 
 Iowa, 405 ; 57 N. W. 896 [climbing 
 down side of car] ; Southern Pac. 
 Co. T. Johnson,' 13 C. C. A. 479 ; 64 
 Ped. 951 [going outside of locomotive 
 while running fast]. A conductor 
 of a material train who, unneces- 
 sarily and contrary to custom, 
 climbed on top of a shanty car form- 
 ing part of the train, to signal the 
 engineer, and was thrown there- 
 from on account of the car being de- 
 railed through the falling of the 
 coupling apparatus, was guilty of 
 contributory negligence (Georgia, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Hallman, 97 Ga. 317; 23 
 
 S. E. 73 [conductor climbing on top 
 of car, without necessity or cus- 
 tom] ; Werk v. Hlinois Steel Co., 154 
 111. 437 ; 40 N. E. 443 [standing on 
 rail, close to wheel of car] ; Coops 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 33 N. W. 
 541 [creeping under train] ; Kinney 
 V. Corbin, 133 Pa. St. 841 ; 13 Atl. 
 141 [going under hanging stone] ; 
 Kilroy v. Foss, 161 Mass. 138 ; 36 N. 
 E. 746 [going under hanging stone ; 
 Goff v. Chippewa River, etc. R. Co., 
 86 Wise. 337 ; 56 N. W. 465 ; Years- 
 ley V. Sunset Telephone Co., 110 Cal. 
 336 ; 43 Pac. 638 [climbing tree to 
 string wires]). To stand in close prox- 
 imity to a railroad train passing at 
 the rate of thirty or forty miles an 
 hour is contributory negligence 
 (Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Stassen, 56 
 111. App. 321). 
 
 ^ Cunningham v. Merrimac Paper 
 Co., 163 Mass. 89 ; 89 N. E. 774 [lift- 
 ing heavy door] ; Diehl v. Lehigh 
 Iron Co. '(Pa.), 31 Atl. 430 [dyna- 
 mite] ; Acme Coal Min. Co. v. Mc- 
 Iver, 5 Colo. App. 367 ; 38 Pac. 596 
 [elevator liable to start] ; Massie v. 
 Peel Coal Co., 41 W. Va. 639 ; 34 S. 
 E. 644 [coal miner, who tested slate 
 roof of mine by tapping it with his 
 pick near place known to him to be 
 dangerous]. 
 
 ■* An employee cannot recover for 
 injuries from defective appliances 
 while using them, without necessity, 
 in a manner and for a purpose not 
 intended, where the defects would 
 not render such appliances unfit to 
 be used as intended (Jayne v. Sebe- 
 waing Coal Co., Mich. ; 65 N. 
 
 W. 971) ; Galvin v. Old Colony R. 
 Co.. 163 Mass 533 ; 89 N. E. 186 
 [narrow passage, not meant for 
 travel] ; Jennings v. Tacoma R. Co., 
 
347 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§207 
 
 coupling cars in motion/ or needlessly trying to step on a 
 moving railroad train.* He cannot recover for injuries caused 
 by his own negligence, in using without order to do so, appli- 
 ances which he knows to be dangerously defective or out of 
 repair,'' or using dangerous machinery in a perilous manner,^ or 
 
 7 Wash. St. 275 ; 34 Pac. 937 [same] ; 
 Cluny V. Cornell Mills, 160 Mass. 
 218 ; 85 N. E. 773 [guard to saw] ; 
 Felch V. Allen, 98 Mass. 573 ; Hous- 
 ton, etc. R. Co. V. Meyers, 55 Tex. 
 110 [brakeman using end of switch- 
 chain in place of coupling-link] ; 
 Groff vr. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., 
 58 Minn. 833 ; 59 N. W. 1049 [setting 
 ladder on lose barrels] ; Richardson 
 V. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 6 Wash. St. 
 53 ; 33 Pac. 1012 [walking in railroad 
 tunnel] ; Kauffman v, Maier, 94 Cal. 
 369 ; 39 Pac. 481. But where an ap- 
 pliance suitable for the purpose for 
 which it is designed, is used for an- 
 other for which it is unfitted, the 
 master may become liable for in- 
 juries caused by such diversion, 
 where that practice has grown into a 
 custom (Miller v. L^nion Pac. R. Co. , 
 17 Fed. 67 ; Crebarry v. National 
 Transit Co., 38 N. Y. Supp. 291 ; 77 
 Hun, 74 [leaning against lath]). 
 
 *Finnell v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 139 N. Y. 669 ; 39 N. B. 835 ; Ken- 
 nedy v. Lake Superior, etc. R. Co., 
 87 Wise. 38 ; 57 N. W. 976 ; Long v. 
 Coronado R. Co., 96 Cal. 369 ; 81 Pac. 
 170 ; Muldowney v. Illinois Central 
 R. Co., 89 Iowa, 615 [brakeman 
 warned] ; Williams v. Central R. Co., 
 48 Id. 396 ; Peoria, D, & E. R. Co. v. 
 Puckett, 53 111 App. 333 ; Towner v. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co., 53 Mo. App. 
 648 [needlessly coupling cars going 
 6 miles an hour]. 
 
 * Wilson V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
 84 Mich. 30 ; 53 N. W. 797 i Novock 
 V. Michigan Cent. R. Co.. 63 Mich. 
 131 ; 39 N. W. 535 ; Louisville, etc. N. 
 R. Co. V. Wallace, 90 Tenn. 581 ;15 S. 
 W. 931 [speed ten miles an hour ; in- 
 
 excusable] ; Richmond, etc. R. Co, 
 V. Bivins, 103 Ala. 143 ; 15 So. 515 ; 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Bloyd, 60 
 Ark. 637 ; 31 S. W. 457 ; Union Pac. 
 R. Co. V. Estes, 37 Kans. 715 ; 16 Pac. 
 131. 
 
 ' Sohulz V. Rohe, 149 N. Y. 183 ; 43 
 N. E. 430 ; rev'g 8 Misc. 683 ; 38 N. 
 Y. Supp. 1147; McQuigan v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 618 ; 26 
 N. E. 13. Where deceased was in 
 charge of defendant's coal cars, and 
 in the use of a car, the trap of which 
 had, to his knowledge, been broken 
 two weeks before he was killed by 
 falling through the trap, while cars 
 in proper condition were available to 
 him for use, and he had been directed 
 to send cars with broken traps to the 
 shop for repair, held, that it was 
 error to submit the case to the jury 
 (Shields v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 138 
 N. Y. 5.J7; 30N. E. 596). 
 
 8 0dell V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 120 
 N. Y. 323 ; 34 N. E. 478 [placing 
 hand on dangerous saw] ; GafEney v. 
 Inman Mfg. Co., 18 R. I. 781 : 31 Atl. 
 6 [putting hand in machine while in 
 motion] ; Hartwig v. Bay State Shoe 
 Co., 118 N. Y. 664 ; 33 N. E. 24 [ad- 
 justing machinery in motion] ; Lar- 
 son V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 43 Minn. 
 488; 45 N. W. 1096 [turning cog- 
 wheels by hand] ; Salem Stone Co. 
 V. O'Brien, 13 Ind. App. 217 ; 40 N. 
 E. 480 [resting foot on cogwheels] ; 
 Wilson V. Steel-Edge Stamping Co., 
 168 Mass. 815; 39 N. B. 1039 [bad 
 method using machinery] ; Mc- 
 Callum V. McCallum, 58 Minn. 388 ; 
 59 N. W. 1019 ; Jones v. Sutherland, 
 91 Wise. 587 ; 65 N. W. 496. 
 
§207] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 348 
 
 in failing to heed warnings or signals ; ' in failing to give such 
 warning to others as is necessary for his own protection ; *" in 
 failing to use the safeguards which the master has provided," 
 or to take proper precautions against known danger, ^^ or in 
 omitting to look and listen for approaching trains on a railroad,'* 
 
 'St. Louis, etc. R. Co v. Schu- 
 macher, 1.j3 U. S. 77 ; 14 S. Ct. 479 
 [several warningsj ; Southern Pac. 
 Co. V. Seley, 15i U. S. 145; 14 S. Ct. 530 
 [warned, yet persisted] ; Moeller v. 
 Brewster, 131 N. Y. 603 ; 30 N. E. 124 
 [warning against laammering radia- 
 tor] ; Ward v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 89 W. Va. 46 ; 19 S. E. 339 [failure to 
 see signal] Vreeland v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co. (Iowa), 60 N. W. 543 [heard 
 warning, but thought no danger] ; 
 Degnan v. Jordan, 164 Mass. 84 ; 41 N. 
 E. 117 ; Lendberg v. Brotherton Iron 
 Min. Co., 97 Mich. 443; 56 N. W. 
 846 ; Devine v. Savannah, etc. R. 
 Co., 89 Ga. 541 ; 15 S. E. 781 ; Camp- 
 beU, V. Lunsford, 83 Ala. 513 ; 3 So. 
 523 ; Noll v. Phil. & Reading R. Co,, 
 103 Pa. St. 504 ; 30 Atl .157 [mistaken 
 belief that danger had passed]. 
 
 '"Hoover v. Beech Creek R. Co., 
 154 Pa. St. 363 ; 36 Atl. 315 ; Thoman 
 V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., Iowa, 
 ; 60 N. W. 613 ; Richmond, etc. 
 R. Co. V. De Butts, 90 Va. 405 ; 18 S. 
 E. 837 ; St. Louis Brick Co. v. Ken- 
 yon, 57 ni. App. 640; Stevens v. 
 San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 100 Cal. 
 554 ; 3d Pac. 165 [near machinery, 
 without notifying engineer] ; Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co V. Mothershed, 97 
 Ala. 361 ; 13 So. 714 [conductor fail- 
 ing to signal]; Crane v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 93 Wise. 4y7; 67 N. W. 1133 
 [going under engine, without notify- 
 ing engineer]; Lumpkin v. Southern 
 E. Co.; 99 Ga.lll; 34 S. E. 963 [watch- 
 man climbing on oar without giving 
 notice]. A car repairer, who had 
 been engaged for three years in that 
 work, went under the last car of a 
 train, with the knowledge that a ca- 
 
 boose was to be attached to the rear 
 of the car, without putting out a 
 flag or other signal to give warning 
 of his being under the car, is guilty 
 of negligence (Southern Pac. Co. v. 
 Pool, 160 U. S. 438 ; 16 S. Ct. 338 ; 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Winslow, 56 
 lU. App. 462). 
 
 " Junior V. Missouri Electric Co., 
 137 Mo. 79 ; ^9 S. W. 988 [handling 
 wires without gloves] ; Kaare v. Troy 
 Steel Co., 139 N. Y. 369 ; 34 N. E. 901 
 [not using lights]. 
 
 '^ McQuigan v. Delaware, etc. R. 
 Co., 123 N. Y. 618 ; 26 N. E. 13, 759 
 [stepping on man-hole cover known 
 to be loose] ; Evansville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Krapf, 143 Ind. 647 ; 36 N. E. 901 ; 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bowles, 71 
 Miss. 1003 ; 15 So. 138 [going between 
 disabled cars] ; Bedford R. Co. v. 
 Brown, 142 Ind. 659 ; 43 N. E. 359 [not 
 looking to see if timbers were in 
 place.] 
 
 '' Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 145 U. 
 S. 418 ; 12 S. Ct. 835 ; EUiott v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 150 U. S. 245 ; 14 
 S. Ct. 85 [no excuse that attention 
 was suddenly called away] ; Lynch 
 v. Boston & A. R. Co., 159 Mass, 
 536 ; 34 N. E. 1072 ; Clark v. N. Y., 
 Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 80 Hun, 320 ; 
 
 30 N. Y. Supp. 126 ; Loring v. Kan- 
 sas City, etc. R. Co., 128 Mo. 349 ; 
 
 31 S. W. 6 ; Church v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 119 Mo. 303 ; 23 S. W. 1056; 
 Rawlston v. East Tennessee, etc. R. 
 Co., 94 Ga. 536 ; 20 S. E. 123 ; Keefe 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 93Iowa,182; 
 60 N. W. 503; Schaible v. Lake 
 Shore, etc. R. Co.. 97 Mich. 318 ; 56 
 N. W. 565 [shunted train] ; Wilber v. 
 Wisconsin Cent. Co., 86 Wis. 535; 
 
349 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§207 
 
 or to notice which way a train was moving," or to get out 
 of the way of a train/' or to look for defects or dangers in 
 the place of work or appliances, which were obvious or which 
 he ought to have foreseen were probable.^* A servant cannot 
 recover for an injury caused by his own needless haste ; " but 
 his error of judgment, caused by necessary haste, is not neces- 
 sarily a bar.'^ So the servant cannot recover for an injury 
 which he would not have suffered, if he had not voluntarily 
 left his post of duty to take a position of greater danger,*' 
 even though his act may be well-meant and his object to con- 
 tinue serving his master.^ We have no doubt, however, that 
 this doctrine should not be. extended so far as to cover the 
 case of a servant who, in good faith and in the exercise of 
 a reasonable discretion, leaves his regular work to protect the 
 interest of his master in another place, under circumstances 
 
 57 N W. 356 [shunted car] ; Nelling 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 95 Iowa, ; 
 
 63 N. W. 568 [extra train] ; Kenna 
 V. Central Pac. R. Co., 101 Cal. 26 ; 
 
 35 Pac. 332. 
 
 '■■Magee v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 89 Iowa, 752 ; 56 N. "W. 681. 
 
 " Cooney v. Great Northern R. 
 Co. . 9 Wash. St. 392 ; 37 Pac. 438. 
 
 " Conway v. Furst [Ct. Errors] 57 
 N. J. Law, 645; 33 Atl. 380 [unfinished 
 building] ; East St. Louis Storage Co. 
 v. Crow, 155 111. 74 ; 39 N. E. 589 
 [hole : no excuse given for not seeing 
 it]; Dieboldt v. U. S. Baking Co., 
 81 Hun, 195; 30 N. Y. Supp. 745 
 [elevator] ; Johnson v. Hovey, 98 
 Mich. 343; 57 N. W. 173 [saw]; 
 Moore v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co , 87 Va. 
 489 ; 13 S. E. 9G8 [lounging too near 
 track] ; Sexton v. Turner, 89 Va. 
 341 ; 15 S. E. 863 [failure to examine 
 hole loaded with dynamite] ; Day v. 
 Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 137 Ind. 206 ; 
 
 36 N. E. 854. 
 
 " Home V. Old Colony R. Co., 161 
 Mass. 180 ; 36 N. E. 793. 
 '^Reynolds v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 
 
 64 Vt. 66 ; 34 Atl. 134. 
 
 " Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Sent- 
 meyer, 92 Pa. St. 376 [riding on 
 
 top of car : low bridge] ; S. P., 
 Rains V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 71 
 Mo. 164 ; Wilson v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co., 85 Ala. 269 ; 4 So. 701 ; Sam- 
 mon v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 38 N. Y. Superior, 414 [barrier-man 
 at a crossing injured by going upon 
 a track, vchere he had no business to 
 go] ; affl'd on another ground, 63 N. 
 Y. 251 ; Central R. Co. v. Chapman, 
 96 Ga. 769 ; 23 S. E. 273 [dangerous 
 machine] ; Colorado Coal Co. v. 
 Carpita, 6 Colo. App. 248 ; 40 Pac. 
 248 ; Chicago, etc. Smelting Co. % . 
 Collins, 43 111. App. 478 ; Mandel v . 
 Wheeler, 59 111. App. 459 [going to 
 look at escaping steam]. We doubt 
 the soundness of this last decision. 
 
 2» Sears v. Central R. Co., 53 Ga., 
 630 [conductor coupling cars] ; 
 Brown v. Byroads, 47 Ind. 435 
 [catcher exchanging place with 
 sawyer] ; Freeberg v. St. Paul Plow 
 Works, 48 Minn. 99 ; 50 N. W. 1036 
 [meddling with belt] ; Knox v. 
 Pioneer Coal Co., 90 Tenn. 546; 18 
 S. W. 255 [propping mine at request 
 of servant not in authority] ; Mellor 
 V. Merchants' Mfg. Co., 150 Mass. 
 363 ; 33 N. E. 100 [making danger- 
 ous repairs]. 
 
§ 207a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 350 
 
 which justify him in beheving that his master would direct 
 him to . do so if personally present. Obviously, he cannot 
 recover for an injury caused by his own negligent workman- 
 ship,^* or bad judgment,^ especially where he chooses to follow 
 his own judgment, in opposition to that of the master.^* 
 Untrue statements, whether willful or not, are a bar to recov- 
 ery upon any act properly done in reliance thereon.''* Evi- 
 dence of a general habit of recklessness among servants of the 
 same master, even when known to him and unchecked, is 
 inadmissible for the purpose of relieving any of them from the 
 imputation of contributory negligence.^ 
 
 § 207a. What is not contributory negligence. — Negli- 
 gence, which is not a proximate cause of the injury, is not 
 contributory negligence.' Not every risky act is necessarily 
 negligent ; nor does the servant's assumption of a particular 
 risk, as part of his duty, make him assume, also, all increased 
 risks due to negligence, for which his master would otherwise 
 be responsible. A servant, whose duty requires him to do 
 something which necessarily involves some danger, is not 
 guilty of contributory negligence in simply performing such 
 duty, and assumes only such risks as are inherent to his own 
 
 " Coal Co. V. Estievenard, 53 Ohio [having good ladder, accepted 
 
 St. 43 ; 40 N. E. 725 [propping mine another from co-servant], 
 
 badly] ; PfefEer V. Cutler, 83 Wise. "jytorgan v. Carbon Hill Co., 6 
 
 281 ; 53 N. W. 508 [scaffold]. It Wash, St, 577 ; 34 Pao. 152, 773 
 
 makes no difference that the mas- [decedent induced opening of lamp, 
 
 ter assisted or superintended the causing explosion] ; Stanley v. Chi- 
 
 vFork, if the servant participated in cago, etc. R. Co., 101 Mich., 202 ; 59 
 
 doing it badly (Lucey v. Hannibal N. W. 393 [pretending experience to 
 
 Oil Co., 129 Mo., 32; 31 S.W. 340). get employment]; McDermott v. 
 
 "Kansas City, etc. E. Co. v. Bur- Iowa Falls, etc. R. Co. (Iowa), 47 
 
 ton, 97 Ala. 240 ; 12 So. 88. N. W. 1037 [same]. 
 
 '3 Jolly V. Detroit, etc. E. Co., 93 «= Thompson v. Boston & M. R. 
 
 Mich. 370 ; 53 N. W. 536 ; Davies v. Co., 153 Mass. 391 ; 26 N. E. 1070. 
 
 Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 76 Hun, 'Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Bur- 
 
 289 ; 27 N. Y. Supp. 709 ; Eoblin v. ton, 97 Ala. 240 ; 13 So. 88 ; Phillips 
 
 Kansas City, etc. E. Co., 119 Mo. v. Railway Co., 64 Wise. 475 ; 25 N. 
 
 476; 24 S. W. 1011 ; Judkins v. W. 544; Terre Haute, etc. E. Co. v. 
 
 Maine Cent. E. Co., 80 Me. 417 ; 14 Mansberger, 65 Fed. 196 ; 12 C. C. A. 
 
 Atl. 735 ; Bolton v. Georgia Pac. 574 ; Murray v. Gulf, etc. E. Co. , 78 
 
 E. Co., 83 Ga. 659 ; 10 S. E. 352 Tex.2 ; 11 s" W. 125 ; Magee v. North 
 
 Pac. E.Co., 78 Cal. 480 ; 21 Pac. 114. 
 
3SI 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 207a 
 
 act.^ The principle has been applied in favor of servants 
 required to work in a dangerous place,^ to jump on or off 
 moving cars,* to walk on top of cars in a moving train,^ to 
 occupy a perilous position on a moving train,^ to stand very 
 near a rapidly moving train/ to walk or stand upon a rail- 
 road track where trains are constantly running,^ to walk 
 behind' or between'" cars in a train liable to move at any 
 moment upon notice to make a "flying switch,"" to cou- 
 ple cars by going between them, even while they are mov- 
 
 '' Mather v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 391 ; 
 15 S. Ct. 464 [dynamite] ; Galvin v. 
 New York, 112 N. Y. 233 ; 19 N. E. 
 675 ; Stackmaii v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 80 Wise. 428; 50 N. W. 404 
 [ground slippery ; place narrow]. 
 The fact that an employee has per- 
 formed work, knowing it to be dan- 
 gerous, does not of itself make him 
 guilty of contributory negligence, 
 but it must appear that he per- 
 formed that which was dangerous in 
 a negligent manner (Mobile & B. R. 
 Co. V. Holborn, 84 Ala. 133 ; 4 So. 
 146). 
 
 ^ Mather v. Rillston, supra ; Ly ttle 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 84 Mich. 289 ; 
 47 N. W. 571 [standing on engine- 
 step] ; Michael v. Roanoke Mach. 
 Works, 90 Va. 492 ; 19 S. E. 261 ; 
 see Cahill v. Hilton, 106 N. Y. 512; 
 13 N. E. 339 ; Pantzar v. Mining Co. , 
 99 N.Y. 368 ; Doyle v. Baird, 15 Daly, 
 287 ; 6 N. Y. Supp. 517. 
 
 ^ Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Reed, 88 
 Tex. 439 ; 31 S. W. 1058 [duty to get 
 on moving cars] ; Lawson v. Trues 
 dale, 60 Minn. 410 ; 62 N. W. 546 
 Oregon, etc. R. Co. v. Tracy, 66 Fed 
 931 ; 14 C. C. A. 199 ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Earl, 94 Ky. 368 ; 22 S. W 
 607 [jumping on car ; caught by other 
 car left on track] ; O'Mellia v. Kansas 
 City, etc. R. Co , 115 Mo. 205 : 21 S. 
 W. 503 [no rule forbid ding it]. Where 
 common laborer returning from work 
 on a train was ordered by conductor 
 to jump off at station when train 
 
 was moving about four miles an 
 hour, held that this negligence was 
 a question for the jury, and verdict 
 being found in its favor, it was af- 
 firmed (Northern Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Egeland, 163 U. S. 93; afii'g 12 U. 
 S. App. 271). 
 
 = Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Utz, 133 
 Ind. 265 ; 32 N. E. 881 ; Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Leathers, 12 Ind. App. 
 544 ; 40 N. E. 1094 [for jury]. 
 
 * Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zink, 126 
 Pa. St. 288 ; 17 Atl. 614 : Martin v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 95 Ky. 612; 
 26 S.W. 801 ; Lockhartv. Little Rock, 
 etc. R. Co., 40 Fed. 631 [riding on 
 footboard of engine]. 
 
 ■■ Swadley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 118 Mo. 268 ; 34 S. W. 140 ; Card v. 
 Eddy, 139 Mo. 510 : 28 S. W. 753. 
 
 ^Taylor v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 93 Tenn. 305 ; 27 S. W. 663 ; O'Lough- 
 lin V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 87 Hun, 
 538 ; 34 N. Y. Supp. 297 ; Kroener, 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 88 Iowa, 16 ; 
 55 N. W. 28 [foot caught in rails] ; 
 Craft V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 62 
 Fed. 735. 
 
 'Mears V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 163 
 Mass. 150 ; 39 N. E. 997. 
 
 '"Lowe V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 89 
 Iowa, 420 ; 56 N. W. 519 [uncoup- 
 ling]; Rahman v. Minnesota, etc. 
 R. Co., 43 Minn. 42 ; 44 N. W. 532. 
 
 " Dooner v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co., 161 Pa. St. 17; 30 AtL 269 ; St- 
 Louis, etc. R. Co. \ . French, 56 
 Kans. 584 ; 44 Pac. 13. 
 
§ 207a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 352 
 
 ing,'^ or to use dangerous appliances.'^ The mere fact that a 
 servant was injured because of the way of performing a duty 
 which he selected, when, if he had selected another way, 
 injury would have been avoided, does not conclusively show 
 contributory negligence." It is not merely no negligence in a 
 servant to take the most obvious risks, in order to save human 
 life ; it is positively commendable for him to do so ; and it 
 will in no degree prejudice his right of recovery .'^ It is not 
 negligence to take some risks, in the proper course of busi- 
 ness, upon the assumption that both the master" and his 
 servants " will do their duty. Statutes, positively requiring 
 masters to take certain precautions against dangers to servants, 
 justify a servant in assuming, without special inquiry, that 
 such precautions have been taken, '^ but not so when it is obvi- 
 ous that they have not been taken ; '^ nor do they at all excuse 
 the servant's want of due care in other respects.^ Where a 
 servant is suddenly subjected to imminent peril, he cannot be 
 
 "Horan v. Chicago, etc. B. Co.. 
 89 Iowa, .828 ; 56 N. W. 507 ; Ben- 
 nett V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 3 N. 
 Dak. 91 ; 54 N. W. 314. Though 
 plaintiff was directed by the yard- 
 master not to go between the cars, 
 yet his going between them to un- 
 couple them would not make him 
 guilty of negligence, where there 
 was no rule forbidding it, and he 
 was acting under the directions of 
 the conductor (Hannah v, Connecti- 
 cut River R. Co., 154 Mass. 539 ; 28 
 N. E. G82). 
 
 '"Martin v. California Cent. R. Co. , 
 94 Cal. 320 ; 29 Pac. 615 ; Donahue 
 V. Drown, iri4 Mass. 21 ; 27 N. E. 675. 
 
 "Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Herndon, 
 100 Ala. 451 ; 14 So. 287 ; McElligott 
 V. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157; 22 Atl. 
 1094 ; Chase v. Burlington & N. R. 
 Co., 76 Iowa, 675 ; 39 N. W. 196. See 
 Murphy v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 118 
 N. Y. 527 ; 23 N. E. 812 ; McPhee v. 
 Scully, 163 Mass. 216 ; 39 N. E. 1007. 
 This is only a fair application of the 
 doctrine which holds a master free 
 
 to select any reasonable method of 
 having his work done. 
 
 " Omaha, etc. R. Co. v. Krayen- 
 buhl, 48 Neb. 553 ; 67 N. W. 447^ see 
 also Fordyce v. Edwards, 60 Ark. 
 438 ; 30 S. W. 758 [defective engine 
 may be operated to end of journey]. 
 
 '» Heltonville Manuf'g Co. v. 
 Fields, 138 Ind. 58 ; 36 N. E. 529. 
 
 " Baltzer v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 
 89 Wise. 257; 60 N. W. 716 ; Cleve- 
 land, etc. R. Co. V Brown, 18 U. S. 
 App. 10 ; 6 C. C. A. 142 ; 56 Fed. 
 804 ; West Chicago R. Co. v. Dwyer, 
 57 111. App. 440. 
 
 18 Wallace v. Central Vt. R. Co., 
 138 N. Y. 302 ; 33 N. E. 1069 ; Davis 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 159 Mass. 532 ; 34 N. E. 1070. 
 
 "See Thompson v. AlUs-Co., 89 
 Wise. 523 ; 62 N. W. 527. 
 
 '"' Davis V. N. Y. , New Haven, etc. 
 R. Co., 159 Mass. 532 ; 34 N. E. 1070 
 [must look and listen for train] ; 
 Krause v. Morgan, 52 Ohio St. 662 ; 
 40 N. E. 886 ; Linton Coal Co. v. 
 Persons, 11 Ind. App. 264 ; 39 N. E. 
 214. 
 
353 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 270b 
 
 held guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, 
 merely because he does not choose the best means of escape.^' 
 Where he is in doubt about the safety of a place where he has 
 to work, he will not be prejudiced by deferring to the opinions 
 and assurances of those who are, from their position, bound to 
 have special knowledge as to whether it is safe or not.^' 
 Obedience to the master's rules cannot be charged as contribu- 
 tory negligence. A servant cannot be required to keep watch 
 for dangers, when his duty requires him to do something incon- 
 sistent therewith.^' The negligence of one servant is not 
 imputed to another co-operating with him." 
 
 § 207b. Disobedience of rules and orders. — The disobe- 
 dience of a servant to reasonable ^ rules or orders of his master, 
 of which the servant has notice and which are then in force, is, 
 if it proximately contributes to his injury,^ evidence of his 
 
 " Neilson v. Hillside Coal Co., 168 
 Pa. St. 256 ; 31 Atl. 1091 ; Schultz v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 44 Wise. 638 ; 
 EastTenn., etc. R. Co. v. Guvley, 13 
 Lea, 46 ; Greenleaf v. 111. Central R. 
 Co., 29 Iowa, 47 ; and see Union 
 Pacific R. Go. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553 ; 
 affl'gs. c, 3 DilL 259. 
 
 ^^ Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Erick- 
 son, 39 Mich. 493. 
 
 =3 Conlon V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 74 Hun, 115 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 659. 
 20 Abbitt V. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 
 Ind. ; 40 N. E. 40. * 
 ' The rule must be reasonable (Re- 
 ceivers V. Moore, 3 Tex Civ, App. 416; 
 22 S. W. 272 ; see Overby v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc. R. Co., 37 W. Va. 524; 
 16 S. E. 813 ; Francis v. Kansas City 
 R. Co., 110 Mo. 387; 19 S. W. 985 
 [rule held reasonable]). A rule re- 
 quiring: brakemen to examine appli- 
 ances before using them, does not 
 relieve from liability for injuries 
 caused by defective appliances, un- 
 less the injured brakeman had time 
 and opportunity to make such an 
 examination as would have re- 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 33] 
 
 vealed the defect (O'Malley v. N. 
 Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 67 Hun, 
 130; 23 N. Y. Supp. 48). It is not 
 negligence for a servant to go be- 
 tween cars, contrary to rules, when 
 the duty required cannot otherwise 
 be performed (Memphis, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Graham, 94 Ala. 645 ; 10 So. 283 ; 
 Eastman v. Lake Shore R. Co., 
 101 Mich. 597 ; 60 N. W. 809 ; but 
 compare Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hissong, 97 Ala. 187; 13 So. 209). 
 To the contrary is Louisville, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Bryant (Ky.), 23 S. W. 606, a 
 very bad decision, which the court 
 itself ordered not to be reported. 
 
 ' Had he observed the rule the 
 result would have been the same ; 
 violation of the rule will not pre- 
 clude recovery (White v. Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co., 73 Miss. 12 ; 16 So. 248 : 
 Helfenstein v. Medart, 136 Mc. 595 ; 
 36 S. W. 863 ; Horan v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 89 Iowa, 328 ; 56 N. W. 507. 
 See, also, Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Brown, 89 Va. 749 ; 17 S. E. 133 ; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Pearson, 97 
 Ala. 311 ; 13 So. 176). 
 
§ 207b] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 354 
 
 contributory negligence.^ Thus, a servant has been denied the 
 right to recover when injured while violating a known rule 
 forbidding him to ride on an elevator* or tender,^ or to ride on 
 the top of a car," or not to keep on the top/ or to jump on a 
 moving train,^ or to use defective cars,^ or forbidding him to 
 
 ' A servant cannot recover for an 
 injury vehioh was the direct result 
 of his own disobedience of specific 
 orders (Knight v. Cooper, 36 W. Va. 
 232 ; 14 S. E. 999 ; Louisville, etc. E. 
 Co. v. "Woods, 105 Ala. 561 ; 17 So. 
 41 ; CuUen v. National Roofing Co., 
 114 N. y. 45 ; 20 N. E. 831), or gen- 
 eral rules (Overby v. Chesapeake, 
 etc. R. Co., 37 W. Va. 524 ; 16 S. E. 
 818; Shenandoah Val. R. Co. v. 
 Lucado, 86 Va. 390 ; 10 S. E. 432 ; 
 Drake v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 80 
 Hun, 490 ; SON. Y. Supp. 671 ; Deeds 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 74 Iowa, 154 ; 
 37 N. "W. 124 ; Savannah, etc. E. Co. 
 v. Folks, 76 Ga. 527 ; Memphis, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Graham, 94 Ala. 545 ; 10 
 So. 283 ; Murray v. Gulf, etc. R. Co., 
 73 Tex. 2 ; 11 S. W. 125 ; Fritz v. 
 Missouri, etc. E. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 
 30 S. W. 85 ; Patnode v. Harter, 20 
 Nev. 303 ; 21 Pac. 679 ; Kansas, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Dye, 16 C. C A. 604 ; 70 
 Fed. 24 [signals]). Even a reason- 
 able belief in his mind that obedi- 
 ence to such rule was unnecessary is 
 no excuse (Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Mothershed, 110 Ala. 143 ; 20 So. 67). 
 In a suit to recover for the death of 
 an employee of a company operating 
 a leased track, on account of negli- 
 gence in the construction of bridges 
 over the track, the fact that his 
 death was caused by his violation of 
 a rule of his employer will operate 
 as a defense in favor of the owner of 
 the track (Texas, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Moore, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 389 ; 27 S. 
 W. 962). An employee of a railroad 
 company, who has himself disre- 
 
 garded its rules, cannot recover dam- 
 ages for an injury resulting from a 
 disregard of the company's rules by 
 another employee, to which injury 
 his own disregard of the rules con- 
 tributed (Simpson v. Central Vt. E. 
 Co., 5 N. Y. App. Div. 614 ; 39 N. Y. 
 Supp. 464). Except in rare cases, 
 unless the act is contrary to a statute, 
 a servant's violation of a rule of the 
 master is not negligence per se 
 (Galveston, etc. E. Co. v. Sweeney, 
 Tex. Civ. App. ; 36 S. W. 800; 
 Dunlap V. Northeastern E. Co., 130 
 U. S. 649 ; 9 S. Ct. 647 [question for 
 jury]). 
 
 "Eailroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 
 439 ; O'Neill v. Keokuk, etc. R. Co., 
 45 Iowa, 546 ; Abend v. Terre Haute 
 etc. E. Co., Ill 111. 303; Louisville, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Wilson, 88 Tenn. 316 .- 
 13 S. W. 730. 
 
 ' Benage v. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co., 
 102 Mich. 72, 79 ; 60 N. W. 386. 
 
 * San Antonio, etc. R. Co. v. Wal- 
 lace, 7^ Tex. 636 ; 13 S. W. 565. 
 
 ' An employee injured by being 
 brought in contact with a coal chute 
 placed too near the track, while 
 standing on the ladder at the side of 
 the car, instead of on top thereof, 
 as the rules and custom require, 
 cannot recover damages for injuries- 
 (Central Trust Co. v. East Tennes- 
 see, etc. R. Co. [C. C.]. 69 Fed. 353). 
 
 ^ Francis v. Kansas City, etc. R. 
 Co., 110 Mo. 387; 19 S. W. 935; 
 Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Ryan, 69 Tex. 
 665 ; 7 S. W. 83. 
 
 » Shields v. N. Y. Central R. Co.,. 
 133 N. Y. 557; 80 N. E. 596. 
 
355 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 207b 
 
 couple cars in motion,'" or to couple them without a coupling 
 stick," or to go between cars to couple them,'- or even to 
 couple them at all,'^ or forbidding high speed," or forbidding 
 " flying switches." '' Nor can he recover for injuries caused by 
 his omitting to give notices,'" warnings or signals " required by 
 such rules, or to examine and inspect cars or other instrumen- 
 talities of work,'^ or to clean his tools." A servant cannot be 
 charged with negligence in disobeying orders of which he had 
 no notice,^" but he is chargeable with notice of any rules and 
 
 '" Johnson v. Chesapeake, etc. R. 
 Co., 38 W. Va. 206; 18 S. E. 573; 
 Sedgwick v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 76 
 Iowa, 340 ; 41 N. W. 35 ; Darracott 
 V. Chesapeake, etc. R., 83 Va. 388; 3 
 S. E. 511. 
 
 " Wolsey V. Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 Co., 33 Ohio St. 327; Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. Whitcomb, llf Ind. 213; 13 
 N. E." 880 ; Brennan v. Michigan Cent. 
 R. Co., 93 Mich. 156 ; 53 N. W. 358 ; 
 Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Briggs, 
 Va. ; 16 S. E. 748 ; affi'g 14 Id. 
 753; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Pan- 
 nill, 89 Va. 553 ; 16 S. E. 748 ; Rich- 
 mond, etc. R. Co. T. Free, 97 Ala. 
 231 ; 12 So. 294 ; Rome, etc. Const. Co. 
 V. Dempsey, 86 Ga. 499 ; 13 S. E. 882 ; 
 Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Thomason, 
 99 Ala. 471 ; 12 So. 373 ; Pryor v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 90 Ala. 33 ; 8 
 So. 55 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Ward, 10 C. C. A. 166 ; 61 Fed. 927 ; 
 Russell V. Richmond, etc. R. Co. (C. 
 C.) 47 Fed. 204. 
 
 " St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Rice, 51 
 Ark. 467; US. W. 699. 
 
 ■" Kane v. Savannah, etc. R. Co., 
 85 Ga. 858 ; 11 S. E. 493 [there be- 
 ing no pressing emergency]. 
 
 " Williams v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 
 89 Va. 165 ; 15 S. E. 533 ; Robinson 
 V. West Virginia, etc. R. Co., 40 
 W. Va. 583 ; 21 S. E. 737 : Sutherland 
 V. Troy, etc. R. Co., 74 Hun, 163; 36 
 N. Y. Supp. 387; Illinois Cent. R. 
 Co. V. Neer, 46 111. App. 276. Com- 
 
 pare Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Lester, 75 
 Tex. 56 ; 13 S. W. 955. 
 
 '= Pilkinton v. Gulf, etc. R. Co. , 70 
 Tex. 336 ; 7 S. W. 805 ; Sheets v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 139 Ind. 683; 
 89 N. E. 154. 
 
 " Davis V. Nuttallsburg Coal Co., 
 34 W. Va. 500 ; 13 S. E. 539. 
 
 " Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Han- 
 ning, 131 Ind. 528 ; 31 N. E. 187 ; Mc- 
 Grath v. N. Y. & New England R. 
 Co., 15 R. I. 95 ; 33 Atl. 927 ; Le 
 Bahn v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 80 
 Hun, 116; 30 N. Y. Supp. 7; Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Markee, 103 Ala. 
 160 ; 15 So. 511. 
 
 '* Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Pear- 
 son, -97 Ala. 311 ; 13 So. 176 ; Brooks 
 V. Northern Pao. R. Co., 47 Fed. 687. 
 See Beall v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 
 38 W. Va. 525 ; 18 S. E. 729. 
 
 " Johnson v. Hovey, 98 Mich. 343 ; 
 57 N. W. 172 [saw and frame]. 
 
 -" An employee is not guilty of 
 contributory negligence merely be- 
 cause an act of his violates a rule of 
 his employer, he not having notice 
 of the rule (Brown v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co., Ill Ala. 275; 19 So. 1001; 
 Mackey v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 
 157 U. S. 73; Alabama Midland R. 
 Co. V. McDonald, Ala. ; 20 
 So. 472 ; International, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hinzie, 83 Tex. 633 ; 18 S. W. 681. 
 But if he knows the tenns of a rule 
 promulgated by the company to gov- 
 ern his conduct he is bound by the 
 
§ 207b] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 35^ 
 
 orders which he ought to have known.^' It is for the master 
 to prove the existence of rules, and either actual notice or 
 publication in such manner that the servant ought to have 
 known of them ; ^ after which it is for the servant to prove 
 that he did not know of them and was not in fault for not 
 knowing.^ A rule which is constantly disobeyed, to the 
 knowledge of the master, and without remonstrance on his 
 part, may be regarded by a jury as not in force ;^ but mere 
 
 rule, though the company failed to villa etc. R. Co., 83 Ky. 589'; For- 
 give him notice of its existence, or dyce v. Briney, 58 Ark. 206 ; 24 S. 
 to afiford him a reasonable opportu- W. 250). 
 
 nity to ascertain its terms (Port ^* As to when rules are considered 
 Eoyal, etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 95 Ga. not in force, see Newport News, etc. 
 292 ; 22 S. E. 833). R. Co. v. Campbell [Ky.], 25 S. 
 
 "Seesev. Northern Pac. R. Co., W. 267; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 39 Fed. 487. Foley, 94 Ky. 330 ; 31 S. W. 866 
 
 "Notice of the rule must be [" mere form,'' and impracticable] ; 
 proved by defendant (Mackey v. East Line, etc. R. Co. v. Scott, 71 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 19 D. C. 282; Tex. 703 ; 10 S. W. 298 ; Chicago & 
 affi'd, 157 U. S. 72; Louisville, etc. W. I. R. Co. v. Flynn, 154 111. 448; 
 R. Co. v. Utz, 133 Ind. 265 ; 33 N. E. 40 N. E. 332 ; Barry v. Hannibal, etc. 
 881 ; Brunswick, etc. R. Co. v. Clem, R. Co., 98 Mo. 63; 11 S. W. 308; 
 80 Ga. 534 ; 7 S. E. 84 ; Georgia Pac. Francis v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 R. Co. V. Davis, 93 Ala. 300 ; 9 So. 127 Mo. 6.-)8 ; 28 S. W. 842 ; Id. 30 S. 
 253 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. V. Mother- W. 129; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 shed, 110 Ala. 143; 30 So. 67). A Richardson, 100 Ala. 332 ; 14 So. 309 ; 
 written contract, embodying a rule. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Nickels, 50 
 signed by the servant, is best evidence Fed. 718 ; 1 C. C. A. 635 ; Hayes v. 
 of notice (Sedgwick v. Illinois Cent. Bush & Denslow Mfg. Co., 41 Hun, 
 R. Co., 73 Iowa, 158 ; 34 N. W. 790.) 407. A rule, directing brakeman to 
 
 ^' Where a brakeman had seen a not uncouple cars while in motion, 
 book of rules, read some, and could may be waived by disregard thereof 
 have read all; held, bound by rules on the part of brakemen, for such a 
 which he did not read, though the time that the ofiBcers were charge- 
 lailroad company had not furnished able with notice (Fish v. Illinois Cent, 
 him with a book of rules, nor re- R. Co., 98 Iowa, 702; 65 N. W. 995; 
 quired him to read it (Lacroy v. Strong v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 94 Iowa, 
 N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 133 N. ; 63 N. W. 799 ; Lowe v. Chicago, 
 Y, 570 ; 30 N. E. 391). Rule exten- etc. R. Co., 89 Iowa, 420 ; 56 N. W. 
 sively distributed and posted in con- 519 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Rea- 
 spicuous places, is admissible in evi- gan, 96 Tenn. 128 ; 33 S. W. 1050). 
 dence, though it is not shown that But it must be shown that notice 
 plaintiff actually knew of its exist- of such disregard had been brought 
 ence (Alcorn v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., home to the master (Alabama, etc. 
 108 Mo. 81 ; 16 S. W. 239). s p., Wil- R. Co. v. Roach, 110 Ala. 366 ; 30 So. 
 liams V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 89 Va. 133). 
 165 ; 15 S. E. 533 ; Alexander v. Louis- 
 
357 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§208 
 
 disobedience, however frequent, is of no effect, if the master 
 was not chargeable with constructive notice or had no oppor- 
 tunity to remonstrate.^ A servant is justified in disobeying 
 general rules, when positively ordered to do so by the master 
 in person or by a vice-principal,^^ but not so as to the orders of 
 any other fellow-servant.^^ And a mere suggestion or assent 
 from a vice-principal is not equivalent to a positive order.^ 
 A servant may be barred from recovering, by acquiescence in 
 the violation of a rule by another servant,^' but such acquies- 
 cence cannot be inferred from the mere silence of a servant 
 inferior in grade to the one in fault.'*" 
 
 § 208. Basis of imputed assumption of risks from 
 master's negligence. — The exemption of masters from 
 liability to servants for the master's negligence is founded, in 
 most cases, upon the general doctrine as to contributory 
 negligence.^ But it has been held, on due consideration, that 
 
 '^^ Benage v. Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 Co., 103 Mich. 73; 60 N. W. 386; 
 Francis v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 110 Mo. 387 ; 19 S. W. 935 ; Rich- 
 mond, etc. R. Co. T. Hissong, 97 
 Ala. 187 ; 13 So. 309 ; modifying s. C, 
 91 Ala. 514 ; 8 So. 776. 
 
 "Smith V. Wabash, etc. R. Co., 
 93 Mo. 359 ; 4 S. W. 129 [train dis- 
 patcher] ; Mason v. Richmond, etc. 
 R. Co., Ill N. C. 483; 16 S. E. 698 
 [conductor] ; see, also, Fulton Bag 
 & Cotton Mills V. Wilson, 89 Ga. 
 318 ; Hurlbut v. Wabash R. Co., 130 
 Mo. 6S7 ; 31 S. W. 1051 [conductor] ; 
 especially in cases of emergency, 
 where reasonable doubt might exist 
 as to the binding force of the rule (Fox 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 86 Iowa, 368 ; 
 East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Bridges, 
 93 Ga. 399). But compare Wescott v. 
 N. Y. & New England R. Co., 153 
 Mass. 460 ; 37 N. E. 10 [obedience to 
 vice-principal, without protest] ; 
 Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Fiiiley, 63 
 Fed. 338 ; 13 C. C. A. 595 ; 35 U. S. 
 App. 16 [order of conductor not suffi- 
 cient] ; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. 
 
 Rush, 71 Miss. 987 ; 15 So. 133 [con- 
 ductor]. 
 
 " East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 89 Tenn. 114 ; 14 S. W. 1077 
 [engineer and brakeman]. 
 
 *>* Keenan v. N. Y. , Lake Erie, etc. 
 Co., 145 N. Y. 190; 39 N. E. 711 
 [boss not authorized to change regu- 
 lar rules ; no positive QvAers] ; Mason 
 V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 114 S. C. 
 718 ; 19 S. E. 363 ; Atchison, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Reesman, 60 Fed. 370 ; 9 C. C. 
 A. 30 [mere assent of conductor]. 
 
 29 Richmond, etc. R. Co v. Dudley, 
 90 Va. 304 ; 18 S. E. 374 [conductor ; 
 brakeman] ; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Knittal, 33 Ohio St. 468. 
 
 ^^ New Jersey, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Young, 1 U. S. App. 96 ; 1 C. C. A. 
 438; 49 Fed. 733 [fireman; en- 
 gineer] ; Haas v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 90 Iowa, 359; 57 N. W. 894 
 [fireman ; conductor]. 
 
 1 See Laning v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 49 N. Y. 531 ; Allerton. etc. 
 Co. V. Egan, 86 111. 353 ; Devitt 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 50 Mo. 303 [low 
 bridge] ; Crutchfield v. Richmond, 
 
§209] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 358 
 
 such a risk may be deliberately assumed without any want of 
 care, and that the maxim volenti non fit injuria governs such 
 cases, irrespective of any negligence.^ To bring a case within 
 this maxim, the assumption of risk must be really voluntary, 
 as will hereafter be shown. 
 
 § 209. Servant accepting employment with notice of 
 defects. — A marked distinction is to be made between risks, 
 of which the servant had notice when he entered into, service, 
 and risks which arose or were first brought to his notice, at 
 some subsequent period.' It is well settled that a servant 
 assumes the risk of every defect of which he had actual or 
 constructive notice when he accepted the employment,^ so far 
 as he comprehends, or ought to comprehend, the peril 
 involved,^ even though such defect was due to the master's 
 personal negligence, provided there was no express promise 
 to remove the defect,* nor any new obligation subsequently 
 
 etc. R Co., 78 N. C. 300 [coupling 
 cars] ; Mad Eiver, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Barber, ."j Ohio St. 541 [conductor 
 injured through a defect which he 
 should have discovered] ; Manu- 
 facturing Co. V. Morrissey, 40 Ohio 
 St. 148 [operator of a lathe, injured 
 by defects of vrhicli he had knowl- 
 edge]. For general discussions of 
 the subject, see Greene v. Minne- 
 apolis, etc. R. Co., 31 Minn. 248; 
 O'Rorke v. Union Pacific R. Co., 22 
 Fed. 189 ; Hough v. Texas, etc. R. 
 Co., 100 U. S. 213. 
 
 2 Miner v. Conn. R. Co., 153 Mass. 
 398 ; 26 N. E. 994 ; Mundle v. Hill 
 Mfg. Co., 86 Me. 400 ; 30 Atl. 16 ; 
 Rogers v. Leyden, 127 Ind. 50 ; 26 
 N. E. 210. 
 
 ' See §§ 185, 185a, ante ; Mahoney 
 V. Dore, 155 Mass. 513 ; 30 N. E. 366. 
 
 2 Gibson v. Erie R. Co., 63 N. Y. 
 449 [low bi-idge] ; De Forest v. 
 Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264 [ditches in 
 yard] ; Shaw v. Sheldon, 103 N Y. 
 667 ; 9 N. E. 183 [uncovered rollers] ; 
 Bancroft v. Boston & M. R. , N. H. 
 ; 30 Atl. 409 [no gates at cross- 
 ing] ; Qoodes v. Boston & A. R. Co., 
 
 162 Mass. 287 ; 38 N. E. 500 [switch 
 too near main track] ; Marean v. N. 
 Y., Susquehanna, etc. R. Co., 167 
 Pa. St. 220 ; 31 Atl. 562 [no proper 
 signals furnished] ; St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Davis, 54 Ark. 389; 15 
 S. W. 895 [unblocked frogs] ; Nor- 
 folk, etc. R. Co. V. McDonald, 88 Va. 
 352 ; 13 S. E 706 [bad couplings ; no 
 promise to change] ; Williamson v. 
 Newport News, etc. Co., 34 W. Va. 
 657 ; 12 S. E. 824 [low bridge] ; 
 Sheets v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 139 
 Ind. 682 ; 39 N. E. 154 [same] ; Lake 
 Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Stupak, 108 
 Ind. 1 ; 8 N. E. 630 ; Gleeson v. Ex- 
 celsior Mfg. Co., 94 Mo. 201 ; 7 S. W. 
 188 [unguarded hatchway] ; Man- 
 ning V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 105 
 Mich. 260 : 63 N. W. 312 [tree close to 
 track]; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Min- 
 nick, 57 Fed. 362 ; 6 C. C. A. 387 
 [defective locomotive]. 
 
 ^This limitation is recognized in 
 Shaw V. Sheldon, 103 N. Y. 667 ; 9 
 N. E. 183. 
 
 * See Sweeney v. Berlin Envelope 
 Co., 101 N. Y. 520 ; 5 N. E. 358. 
 
359 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 209a 
 
 imposed upon the master with respect thereto. In such a 
 case the master may insist that the servant go on with the 
 work, under existing conditions ; and a threat to dismiss him, 
 if he will not go on, is not coercion.^ This doctrine, however, 
 has only been applied to risks inherent in a place, tool or other 
 instrumentaHty, or in the nature of the work, or in the character 
 of a fellow servant. It is wholly inapplicable to the faults of 
 the master or vice-principal, even though such faults should 
 be so habitual as to form a part of his very nature. The care- 
 lessness, violent temper or incapacity of the master or vice- 
 principal are not risks assumed by the servant, even if he 
 knows of them from the beginning. 
 
 § 209a. Servant continuing, with notice of defects.— A 
 
 servant who, with actual or constructive notice ^ of a defect, 
 ■due to the master's fault, and of the danger to which he is 
 
 ' Sweeney v. Berlin Envelope Co., 
 101 N. Y. 520 ; 5 N. E. 358. 
 
 ' The servant must have notice of 
 ^ome kind in order to relieve the 
 master (Scanlan v. Boston & A. B. 
 Co., 147 Mass. 484; 18 N. E. 209; 
 Breen v. Field, 157 Mass. 277 ; 31 N. 
 E. 1075 ; Slater v. Chapman, 67 Mich. 
 533 ; 35 N. E. 106 ; Alabama G. S. R. 
 Co. V. Richie, 99 Ala. 346 ; 12 So. 612 
 [danger not obvious] ; Lebanon v. 
 McCoy, 13 Ind. App. 500 ; 40 N, E. 
 7J0). For instances of actual knowl- 
 edge see Appel V. Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 
 Ill N. Y. 550; 19 N. E. 93 [knew 
 frog unblocked] ; Horrigan v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 7 N. Y. App. Div. 
 377 ; 39 N. Y. Supp. 938 [defective 
 derrick] ; Schwartz v. Cornell, 59 
 Hun. 633 ; 13 N. Y. Supp. 355 [hole 
 in floor] ; Wannamaker v. Burke, 111 
 Pa. St. 433 ; 3 Atl. 500 [same] ; Mun- 
 ■dle V. Hill Mfg Co., 86 Me. 400 ; 30 
 Atl. 16 ; Baltimore, etc. B. Co. v. 
 :State, 75 Md. 152 ; 23 Atl. 810 [tunnel 
 not ventilated] ; Nelson v. Central 
 R. Co., 88 Ga. 325 : 14 S. E. 310 [de- 
 fective brake] ; East Tennessee, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Head, 93 Ga. 723 ; 18 S, E. 
 *76 [post near track] : O'Neal v. Chi- 
 cago, etc., R. Co., 133 Ind. 110; 31 
 
 N. E. 669 [track] ; Pitrowsky v. 
 Reedy Mfg. Co., 54 111. App. 353 [un- 
 protected gearing] ; Steinhauser v. 
 Spraul, 137 Mo. 541 ; 38 S. W. 620 ; 
 Id. 30 S. W. 103 [ladder in house] ; 
 Lucey v. Hannibal Oil Co., 139 Mo. 
 33 ; 31 S. W. 340 ; McLaren v. Wil- 
 liston, 48 Minn. 299 ; 51 N. W. 373 ; 
 Olson V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 38 
 Minn. 117 ; 35 N. W. 866 ; Norton v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., Ky. ; 
 30 S. W. 599 [lever on hand car] ; 
 Emma Oil Co. v. Hale, 56 Ark. 233 ; 
 19 S. W. 600 ; Crilly v. Texas, etc. R. 
 Co., 44 La. Ann. 95; 10 So. 400; 
 Brown v. Brown, 71 Tex. 355 ; 9 S. 
 W. 261 ; Texas & Pacific B. Co. v. 
 Minnick, 6 C. C. A. 387 ; 57 Fed. 363 
 [no watchman on track]). Plaintiff 
 continued in service some months 
 with knowledge of the general con- 
 dition of the track. Held, chat he 
 had assumed the risk, though he may 
 not have known of the particular 
 defects which caused the injury 
 (Green v. Cross, 79 Tex. 130 ; 15 S. 
 W. 230) . To similar effect Allen v. 
 Logan City, 10 Utah, 379 ; 37 Pac. 
 496 [earth bank]. As to what is 
 sufficient constructive notice or when 
 notice is presumed, see § 316, post. 
 
§ 209a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 360 
 
 exposed thereby/ and either fully comprehending the risk,^ or 
 by his own fault failing to do so * " voluntarily takes his chance " ' 
 and continues in work which exposes him to such danger/ 
 
 As to the servant's duty to investi- 
 gate, see § 2l7a, post. Where it ap- 
 pears that a brakeman, injured 
 through a defect in the coupling 
 machinery of a car, only discovered 
 his danger at the moment of the acci- 
 dent, the question of contributory 
 negligence is for the jury (Goodrich 
 V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 116 N. Y. 
 398 ; 22 N. E. 397). 
 
 ^ That servant must be aware of 
 the danger to charge him with neg- 
 ligence, see § 314, post; MuUin v. 
 Cal. Horseshoe Co., 105 Cal. 77 ; 38 
 Pac. 535 ; Wagner v. Jayne Co., 147 
 Pa. St. 475 ; 23 Atl. 773 ; Huhn v. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co., 93 Mo. 440; 4 
 S. W. 937. If plaintiff "without 
 any negligence on his part," by 
 reason of his youth or inexperience, 
 or reliance on the directions given 
 him, failed to appreciate the danger, 
 the defendants will be responsible for 
 their negligence in not properly 
 guarding the shaft (Dowling v. Allen, 
 103 Mo. 313 ; 14 S. W. 751). Both 
 master and servant knowing of the 
 defect, and neither regarding it as 
 dangerous, servant cannot recover on 
 account of that defect (Jenney Elec- 
 tric Co. V. Murphy, 115 Ind. 566 ; 18 
 N. E. 30). Otherwise, however, 
 where the defect oaaising the injury, 
 though in the same appliance, was 
 not the same defect thus agreed upon 
 (Dumas v. Stone, 65 Vt. 443 ; 35 Atl. 
 1097). 
 
 2 Fitzgerald v. Conn. Paper Co., 
 155 Mass. 155 ; 39 N. E. 464 ; see 
 § 214, post. The workman's knowl- 
 edge of the defects should amount 
 to thorough comprehension of the 
 risk incurred to justify the with- 
 drawal of the case from the jury 
 (Brooke v. Eamsden, 63 Law T. 287). 
 
 ^ Suter V. Park Lumber Co., 90 
 
 Wise. 118 ; 63 N. W. 937 ; Luebke v. 
 Berlin Works, 88 Wise. 443 ; 60 N. 
 W. 711. 
 
 ^ Quoted from Fitzgerald v. Conn. 
 Paper Co. (155 Mass. 155 ; 29 N. E. 
 464), where plaintffi had no way of 
 leaving the mill, except by going 
 down icy steps. Held, a question for 
 the jury. s. p. , Osborne v. London, 
 etc. R. Co., 31 Q. B. Div. 230 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. McGraw, 22 Colo. 
 363 ; 45 Pac. 383. The assumption 
 of risk must be really voluntary, 
 not "under extraneous pressure, 
 which amounts almost to compul- 
 sion " (Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 
 513 ; 30 N. E. 366 ; Smith v. Baker 
 (Ho. Lords), 1891, App. Cas. 325). 
 
 ' Lake Shore, etc. B. Co. v. Stupak, 
 108 Ind. 1 ; 8 N. E. 630 ; Spencer v.. 
 Ohio, etc. E. Co., 130 Ind. 181 ; 29 N- 
 E. 915 ; Bradshaw v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co., Ky. ; 21 S. W. 346 ; 
 Bogenschutz v. Smith, 84 Ky. 330 ; 
 3 S. W. 800. Injured servants were 
 debarred from recovery, on this 
 ground, in Clark v. Barnes, 37 Hun, 
 389 [floor slippery from drips of 
 water and oilj ; Pingree v. Leyland, 
 135 Mass. 398 [machinist used a 
 " jack-winch," knowing it to be " an 
 old rattle-trap," destitute of a guard] ;- 
 Russell V. Tillotson, 140 Mass. 201 
 [revolving shaft, plainly visible] ; 
 Assop V. Yates, 2 Hurlst. & N. 768 
 [machine in dangerous position] ; 
 Senior v. Ward, 1 El. & El. 385- 
 [miner warned to test rope, but did 
 not] ; Simmons v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co , 110 111. 340, and Easmussen v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 65 Iowa, 236 
 [employee killed by falling of a bank 
 which he was undermining] ; Sulli- 
 van V. Louisville Bridge Co., 9 Bush. 
 81 [use of narrow plank over swift 
 water, as standing place]. 
 
361 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 209a 
 
 without reasonable excuse '' and without complaint or objection,* 
 where ordinary prudence would require him to refuse the risk,* 
 is held to assume the risk. This rule has been applied to cases 
 in which a servant has suffered injuries from the employment 
 of an incompetent or habitually negligent fellow-servant,^" or 
 
 ' As to what is sufficient excuse, 
 see §§311, 313, 215, post. The mas- 
 ter is responsible for an injury 
 caused by obvious defects in the in- 
 strumentalities furnished only where 
 the danger was not fully appreciated 
 owing to the want of time for con- 
 sideration, or the increased danger, 
 by reason of the defective agencies, 
 was not so imminent and threaten- 
 ing as to require the servant to aban- 
 don the service (Reichla v. Gruens- 
 felder, 53 Mo. App. 43). 
 
 8 Kaare v. Troy Steel Co., 139 N. 
 T. 369 ; 34 N. E. 901 [platform, no 
 objection] ; Powers v. N. Y., Lake 
 Erie, etc. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 374; Mun- 
 dle V. HillManuf'g Co., 86 Me. 400 ; 
 30 Atl. 16 [splinter in floor] ; Latre- 
 mouille V. Bennington, etc. R. Co., 
 
 63 Vt. 336 ; 23 Atl. 656 [incompetent 
 co-servant] ; Feely v. Pearson Cord- 
 age Co., 161 Mass" 426 ; 37 N. E. 368 
 [ungarded well] ; Goldthwait v. 
 Haverhill R. Co., 160 Mass. 554; 36 
 N. E, 486 ; N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co. v. Lyons, 119 Pa. St. 324 ; 13 
 Atl. 205 ; Foster v. Pusey,8 Del. 168 ; 
 14 Atl. 545 ; Graver Tank Works v. 
 McGee, 58 111. App. 250; Chicago 
 Packing Co. v. Rohan, 47 Id. 640 
 [unguarded vat] ; Shackelton t. 
 Manistee, etc. R. Co., Mich. ; 
 
 64 N. "W. 738 [conductor using de- 
 fective car without objection] ; 
 Hewitt V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 67 Mich. 
 61 ; 34 N. W. 659 ; Needham v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 85 Ky. 423 ; 
 3 S. W. 797 ; 11 S. W. 306 ; Balle v. 
 Detroit Leather Co., 73 Mich. 1.58 ; 
 41 N. W. 310 ; Scott v. Darby Coal 
 Co.. 90 Iowa, 689 ; 57 N. W. 619 [de- 
 fective engine, well known, no com- 
 
 plaint] ; Beckman v. Consolidation 
 Coal Co., 90 Iowa, 352 ; 57 N. W. 
 889 [switch often left open] ; Bogen- 
 schutz v. Smith, 84 Ky. 330 ; 1 S. W. 
 578 [no complaint] ; Greenleaf v. 
 Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 33 Iowa, 52 ; 
 Hanrathy v. Northern Central R. 
 Co., 46 Md. 288 ; Galveston, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Drew, 59 Tex. 10. 
 
 » See §§211, 314, post. For a fire- 
 man, knowing of a defect in the air- 
 brake, to remain upon a locomotive 
 is not conclusive of negligence on 
 his part, and it i.9 a proper question 
 for the jury whether the defect is 
 such that a man of ordinary pru- 
 dence and intelligence would not 
 have remained (New Jersey, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Young, 1 U. S. App. 90 ; 1 C. 
 C. A. 428 ; 49 Fed. 723). Seecow^ra, 
 Worden v. Humeston, etc. R. Co., 73 
 Iowa, 201 ; 33 N. W. 039. Servant 
 assumed the risk, and was guilty of 
 contributory negligence, having con- 
 tinued the work after the danger 
 became so plain and imminent that 
 a raan of ordinary prudence would 
 not have taken the risk (Pollich v. 
 Sellers, 43 La. Ann. 623 ; 7 So. 780). 
 
 '" Frazier v. Pennsylvania R. Co , 
 38 Pa. St. 104 ; Kroy v. Chicago, etc. 
 E. Co. , 33 Iowa, 357 ; St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Morgart, 45 Ark. 318 ; Con- 
 solidated Coal Co. V. Clay, 51 Ohio 
 St. 543 ; 38 N. E. 610 ; Smith v. Sib- 
 ley Manuf'g Co., 85 Ga. 333; 11 S. 
 E. 616 ; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Worley, 93 Ga. 84 ; 18 S. E. 361 [no 
 objection made] ; Acme Coal Min. 
 Co. V. Mclver, 5 Colo. App. 267 ; 38 
 Pac. 596. By continuing to work 
 with an incompetent fellow-servant 
 without notifying the master, one 
 
§ 209a] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 362 
 
 from inadequacy in the force employed," from defects in the 
 place of work, materials or appliances,'^ from the dangerous 
 nature of the work, from unlawful speed of trains, '^ or from 
 failure to maintain safeguards required by law.''' But those 
 cases in which it has been held, regardless of these limitations, 
 that notice of defects or continuous negligence of the master 
 was a bar to the action, as matter of law, are overruled and 
 obsolete.'^ The latest and best authorities hold that the lia- 
 
 assumes the risk of injuries result- 
 ing from the incompetency (St. Louis 
 Brick Co. v. Kenyon, 57 III. App. 640 ; 
 McCharles v. Horn Silver Mining 
 Co., 10 Utah, 470; 37 Pac. 733). 
 
 " Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. State, 41 
 Md. 268 [only one brakeman to entire 
 train] ; Robinson v. Houston, etc. R. 
 Co., 46 Tex. 540 [deficiency of brake- 
 men] ; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rogers, 
 6 C. C. A.' 408 ; 57 Fed. 378 ; Long v. 
 Coronado R. Co., 96 Cal. 269 ; 31 Pac. 
 170 ; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Harriett, 80 
 Tex. 73 : 15 S. W. 556 [no conductor 
 on train] ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Lemon, 83 Tex. 143 ; 18 S. W. 331 
 l^obvious deficiency] ; Richmond, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Mitchell, C3 Ga. 77 ; 18 S. 
 E. 290 ; Eddy v. Rogers, Tex. Civ. 
 App. ; 27 S W. 295; Southern 
 Kansas R. Co. v. Drake, 53 Kans. 1 ; 
 35 Pac, 825 ; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 67 Fed. 524 ; 14 C. C. A. 509. 
 
 "^ Deceased ■was a car cleaner on 
 defendant's elevated railroad yards, 
 and VFas killed by stepping backwards 
 from a car at night, and falling 
 through an opening in the structure 
 on Vfhich the tracks were laid. It 
 ■was shown that the structure was 
 new, and not yet finished ; that de- 
 ceased had been there daily for three 
 weeks in the capacity of watchman 
 and car cleaner, saw carpenters at 
 work planking the structure, and 
 knew its condition. Held, that de- 
 fendant vras not liable. Andrews, 
 C J., and O'Brien, J., dissenting 
 (Kennedy v. Manhattan R. Co., 145 
 
 N. Y. 288 ; 39 N. E. 956). For other 
 examples, see La Pierre v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. , 99 Mich. 212 ; 58 N. W . 60 ; 
 McGlynn v. Brodie, 31 Cal. 376 ; Grif- 
 fiths V. Gidlow, 3 Hurlst. & N. 648 
 [servant injured by a defect in ma- 
 chinery, which he had used volun- 
 tarily, knovcing its defects] ; Green, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Bresmer, 97 Pa. St. 103 
 [groom kicked by mare which he 
 knew to be vicious]). An employee 
 calking pipe in a trench for water- 
 works, who is of mature years and 
 of ordinai-y intelligence, and who 
 knows the liability of such trenches 
 to cave in, and who, a few minutes 
 after seeing the trench in which 
 he is working partially cave in a 
 few feet from him, again goes to 
 work, assumes the risk (Showalter 
 T. Fairbanks, 88 Wise. 376 ; 60 N. W. 
 257 ; Secord v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 
 
 Mich. ; 65 N. W. 550 [defects in 
 coupling] ; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Kee, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 100 ; 29 S. W. 
 544). The rule that a servant is 
 deemed to assume the risks attend- 
 ant on the use of defective machin- 
 ery on his work does not extend to 
 a careless use of such machinery by 
 other servants of the master (Moran 
 V. Harris, 63 Iowa, 390). 
 
 " Bengtson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 47 Minn. 486; 50 N. W. 531. 
 
 " Victor Coal Co. v. Muir, 20 Colo. 
 320 ; 38 Pac. 378 [mine]. 
 
 '^ See Hawley v. Northern Central 
 R. Co., 82 N. Y. 370 ; Kain v. Smith, 
 89 Id. 375. 
 
363 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 2 TO 
 
 bility of the master for risks, caused by his negligence, which 
 did not exist when the servant accepted the employment, 
 depends upon the " question of fact whether a servant who 
 works on, appreciating the risk, assumes it voluntarily or 
 endures it because he feels constrained to."'' If he volun- 
 tarily continues work, with full notice of the risk, he assumes 
 it," but not so if he acts under coercion.'^ 
 
 § 210. Effect of refusal to repair. — It has been distinctly 
 held, in some cases, and plainly implied in others, that, no 
 matter how serious may be the defects in a master's selection 
 of materials or of fellow-servants, a servant who remains in his 
 employment, knowing that the master does not intend to 
 remedy these defects, assumes the risk and waives all right of 
 action against the master, in case of injury arising therefrom. 
 Such decisions are founded upon the assumption that a master 
 can change the whole rule of law governing the relation 
 between himself and his servants, by a mere notice, without 
 their assent. It must be conceded that this cannot be done 
 in any other relation of life. Whatever contract is implied by 
 law in any other case, can only be modified by mutual con- 
 sent. A notice, if assented to, may suffice for this purpose; 
 but a bare notice has no such effect.' There is no foundation 
 for a different rule in this instance. Where either party to the 
 contract of service desires to alter the contract implied by law, 
 it is not enough for him to give notice of that desire or inten- 
 tion to the other party. The legal rights of the parties can 
 only be altered by mutual assent. There can be no doubt 
 
 '« Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513 ; 19 Wend. 351 ; Camden Co. v. Bel- 
 
 30 N. E. 366 ; McCampbell v. Cunard knap, 31 Id. 354 ; KLossom v. Dodd, 
 
 Steamship Co., 69 Hun, 131 ; 33 N.Y. 43 N. Y. 364 ; Rawson v. Penn. R. 
 
 Supp. 477. Co., 48 Id. 312) ; in the United States 
 
 "Coal Co. V. Estievenard, 53 Ohio courts (Railroad Co. v. Mfg. Co., 
 
 St. 43; 40 N. E. 725; Coal Co. y. 16 Wall. 318 ; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. 
 
 Jones, 137 111. 379; 8 N. E. 865; Hoi- v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; 
 
 loran v. Union Iron Co. , 133 Mo. 470 ; Aj'res v. Western R. Co., 14 Blatebf. 
 
 35 S. W, 360. 9 ; Bank of Ky. v. Adams Exp. Co., 
 
 "Wells Co. V. Gortorski, 50 111. 93 U. S. 174) ; and in nearly or quite 
 
 445. See § 211a, post. all of the state courts. See Lawson 
 
 'Carriers of goods cannot limit Contr. Carr., 33-55; 1 Add. Contr. 
 
 their common-law liability for lo.sses, (Am. ed.) 1883, pp. 766, 768. 541, note, 
 
 by a mere notice ; this is established citing numerous cases. 
 law in New York (Cole v. Goodwin, 
 
§2IlJ LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 364 
 
 that the courts would disregard any notice served by an 
 employee upon his employer, to the effect that he should look 
 to the employer for compensation for all injuries suffered in 
 his service, unless the employer acted in such a manner as to 
 give the employee a right to believe that he accepted this 
 modification of their legal relations. But on what principle 
 can a different rule be applied, where the notice proceeds from 
 the employer? We know of none; and we are, therefore, 
 satisfied that a servant is not bound by any mere notice given 
 by his master of an intent not to perform his ordinary legal 
 duties. The master must require an assent or must dismiss 
 the servant, if he expects to avoid the usual responsibilities of 
 a master. In view of the obvious superiority of the master's 
 position, which, in the United States, is constantly increasing, 
 it should not be presumed that the servant assents to any such 
 notice, by acts which, in more equal relations of life, might 
 fairly be deemed to amount to a tacit assent. We certainly 
 think that all reasonable presumptions should be against con- 
 struing the servant's silence into such an assent. We fully 
 admit that many decisions or dicta are adverse to these views ;^ 
 but they have been practically overruled in Great Britain, in 
 our Federal courts, and even in Massachusetts;' much more 
 in other states.* 
 
 § 211. True rule as to effect of servant's knowledge. — 
 
 The true rule, as nearly as it can be stated, is that a servant 
 can recover for an injtiry suffered from defects due to the 
 master's fault, of which he had notice, if, under all the circum- 
 stances, a servant of ordinary prudence, acting with such pru- 
 dence, would, under similar conditions, have continued the 
 
 ' See Leary v. Boston, etc. R. Co., they would have to get along the 
 
 139 Mass. 580 ; East Tennessee, etc. best they could ; " and see Hough v. 
 
 E. Co. V. Duffleld. 12 Lea, 63 ; Gal- Texas, etc. B. Co., 100 U. S. 313, 225 ; 
 
 veston, etc. E. Co. v. Drew, 59 Dale v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. , 63 Mo. 
 
 Tex. 10. 455 ; Hawley v. Northern Central R. 
 
 3 See cases cited under § 209a and Co., 82 N, Y. 370 ; affl'g s. c , 17 
 
 § 215, _pos/. Hun, 115; McMahon v. Port Henry 
 
 ■* Francis t. Kansas City R. Co., Ore Co., 24 Hun, 48 ; Poirier v. Car- 
 
 127 Mo. 658 ; 28 S. W. 843 ; affl'd, roll, 35 La. Ann. 699 ; Kain v. Smith, 
 
 30 S. W. 129 ; where servants com- 89 N. Y. 375 ; Patterson v. Pittsburgh, 
 
 plained, and were " told to go on; etc. R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 889. 
 
365 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 211 
 
 same work under the same risk ; * but not otherwise. All the 
 circumstances must be taken into account, and not merely the 
 isolated fact of risk. Thus, to take a strong case, an engineer, 
 who should discover, for the first time, while midway between 
 two stations, that his engine was dangerously defective, would 
 unquestionably be justified in continuing to run it to the next 
 station,^ To take a weaker case, he would still be justified in 
 running it beyond that station, if no other engine could be 
 obtained there, unless the danger of explosion were imminent. 
 But can we stop there ? Would not an engineer, having a 
 train full of passengers, bound for a station 100 miles distant, 
 be entitled and indeed almost bound to take the train through 
 with an engine which, though defective, is probably manage- 
 able with unusual care, and which is the only engine obtainable 
 by which the train can be taken through on schedule time?^ 
 Is there any doubt that the most prudent engineer would do 
 so? But that which is true of an engineer, under such circum- 
 stances, is equally true of all classes of servants under other 
 circumstances, similar in principle. If every man should cease 
 from work upon the instant of discovering that his safety was 
 imperiled by the negligence of some other person, the business 
 world would come to a stand. If every servant on a railroad 
 or in a factory should refuse to work by the side of a negligent 
 fellow-servant or with defective materials, immediately upon 
 becoming aware of the fact, such enterprises could never be 
 carried on. Obviously, a reasonable time must be given for 
 removal of the defect ; and meantime, the business must be 
 carried on with no prejudice to the servant's rights,* unless the 
 
 ' Patterson v. Pittsburg, etc. R. « Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co., 110 
 
 Co., 76 Pa. St. 389 ; Clarke v. Holmes, Mass. 240. 
 
 7 Hurlst. & N. 937, 945 ; Hougb v. s Fordyce v. Edwards, 60 Ark. 438 ; 
 
 Texas, etc. R. Co., 100 U. S. 213; SOS. W. 758. 
 
 Greene V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., '' The entire doctrine of this section 
 
 31 Minn. 248 ; Dwyer v. St. Louis, was adopted, in effect, in cases of 
 
 etc. R. Co., 52 Fed. 87. It is gener- injury from the known incompe- 
 
 ally a question for the jury whether tency of a co-servant (Northern Pac. 
 
 the surrounding circumstances made R. Co. v. Mares, 133 U. S. 710; 
 
 it contributory negligence for the Francis v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 
 
 servant to continue using the appli- 127 Mo. 658; 28 S. W. 842; affl'd, 
 
 ance (Hamilton v. Rich Hill Coal 30 S. W. 129) ; or known defects in 
 
 Co., 108 Mo. 364; 18 S. W. 977). instrumentalities of work (Hamilton 
 
 S. P., Murtaugh v. N. Y. Central R. v. Rich Hill Coal Co., 108 Mo. 364; 
 
 Co.,49Hun, 456; 3N. Y. Supp. 483. 18 S. W. 977; O'Mellia v. Kansas 
 
§212] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 366 
 
 risk is so great that no one, acting with ordinary prudence, 
 would go on under the circumstances. 
 
 § 21 la. Special risks incurred under coercion. — As 
 
 already stated, it is now held by the most conservative authori- 
 ties, that a servant is not deprived of his right to recover for 
 defects caused by his master's negligence, arising or first com- 
 ing to the servant's notice, after he has entered into service, 
 unless he assumes the risk of his own free and unconstrained 
 will.' If, therefore, he continues to incur the risk of such 
 defects, under any kind of necessity' or coercion,' such as the 
 threat or reasonable fear of dismissal,' he does not voluntarily 
 assume the risk, and is not, necessarily, debarred from recovery 
 thereby.* It is true that many decisions can be found to the 
 contrary,^ but now that the ultra-conservative courts of Great 
 Britain and Massachusetts have overruled them, we may be 
 permitted to concur with the Virginia court in condemning 
 such decisions as founded on " a cruel and inhuman doctrine."* 
 
 § 212. Test of servant's prudence. — The test of prudence, 
 in these cases, in analogy to that applied in ordinary cases of 
 contributory fault, is that which a prudent servant, of the same 
 class,' using such prudence and judgment as such persons 
 
 City, etc. R. Co., 115 Mo. 205; 31 S. Kansas Ey. Co. v. Moore, 49 Kans. 
 
 W. 503). 616 ; 81 Pac. 138 ; Leary v. Boston, 
 
 ' §209a, ante. & A. B. Co., 139 Mass. 587; 2 N. 
 
 ' Such as there being no safe means E. 115. InAnderson v. Akeley Lum- 
 
 of access to the place of work (Fitz- ber Co., 47 Minn. 138 ; 49 N. W. 664, 
 
 gerald v. Coun. Paper Co., 155 Mass. the vice-principal refusing to repair, 
 
 155 ; 29 N. E. 464). the defect was one which the servant 
 
 * Jackson v. Georgia E. Co., 77 Ga. could easily have repaired himself. 
 
 82. « Richmond, etc. E. Co. v. Nor- 
 
 ■* Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513 ; ment, 84 Va. 167 ; 4 S. E. 311. 
 
 30 N. E. 366 ; thrussell v. Handy- ' The test is whether an ordinarily 
 
 side, 20 Q. B. Div. 359 ; Yarmouth prudent person of his age and ex- 
 
 V. France, 19 Id. 647; see Smith v. perience, under like circumstances, 
 
 Baker {Ho. Lords), 1891, App. Cas. would have appreciated the danger 
 
 325; Fitzgerald v. Conn. Paper Co., (Craven v. Smith, 89 Wise. 119; 61 
 
 155 Mass. 155 ; 39 N. E. 464. N. W. 317 ; Colorado Midland R. Co. 
 
 "■ Dougherty v West Superior Iron v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219 ; 37 Pac. 701. 
 
 Co., 88 Wise. 343; 60 N. W. 374 See Fox v. Glastonbury. 29 Conn, 
 
 [relying on cases since overruled] ; 204 ; Hassenyer v. Michigan Central 
 
 Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Schroeder, R. Co , 48 Mich. 205). 
 47 Kans. 315 ; 37 Pac. 965 ; Southern 
 
367 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§213 
 
 usually possess,' but no more,' might reasonably be expected 
 to apply to the particular case.* A conductor should be 
 required to exercise the care and judgment of an ordinarily 
 prudent conductor; an engineer, that of an ordinarily prudent 
 engineer ; a skilled mechanic, that of an ordinarily prudent 
 mechanic of the same class ; but from a brakeman or common 
 laborer, only that which can fairly be expected from a brake- 
 man or a laborer.^ This has been too often overlooked ; but it is 
 well settled in other branches of the law of contributory negli- 
 gence ; and the later cases apply this test here. 
 
 § 213. Excusable omissions of usual care. — A servant is 
 not debarred from recovery, as matter of law, by his omission 
 to exercise, under peculiar circumstances, the same kind or 
 degree of care which he should exercise under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances.^ Thus, in an emergency, to avoid a greater peril, 
 either to himself or to others to whom he owes any duty, he 
 may, with full knowledge of the peril incurred, go into a 
 dangerous place,' use a dangerous appliance,' undertake a 
 
 ^^§311, ante; National Syrup Co. ing from fire by defective fire es- 
 
 V. Carlson, 43 111. App. 178. cape]. Where an engineer fails to go 
 
 ' Brick V. Bosworth, 163 Mass. 334 ; on a siding in order to permit a train 
 
 39 N. E. 86. about due to pass, and a brakeman, 
 
 ■* Where an instruction was re- in imminent danger of a collision, 
 
 quested that deceased was bound to goes forward on top of the cars to 
 
 exercise the same care and diligence warn him to stop, and is injured, the 
 
 as would have been used by men of company is liable (Simmons v. East 
 
 ordinary care and prudence under Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 93 Ga. 658 ; 18 
 
 the same or similar circumstances, S. E. 999). So where he takes great 
 
 it was error to substitute the words risks to save a train (Omaha, etc. B. 
 
 "under ordinary circumstances" Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 48 Neb. 553;67N. 
 
 (Overman Wheel Co. v. Griffin, 67 W. 447). 
 Fed. 659 ; 14 C. C. A. 609). 'A brakeman acting under orders, 
 
 ' McGovern v. Central Vermont who attempted to couple ears with 
 R. Co., 133 N. Y., 380 ; 35 N. E. 378 ; defective tool, knowing that a pas- 
 Gill v. Homrighausen, 79 Wise. 684 ; senger train was soon due, and that 
 48 N. W. 863. unless the coupling was made 
 
 'Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Overheiser, there would be danger of collision 
 
 76 Tex. 437 ; 13 S. W. 468 [stepping may recover for injuries caused 
 
 between moving cars] . thereby (Strong v. Iowa Cent. R. 
 
 2 Johnson v. Steam Gauge Co., 73 Co., 94 Iowa, 380 ; 03 N. W. 799). 
 Hun, 535 ; 35 N. Y. Supp. 689 [escap- 
 
§213] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 368 
 
 dangerous task * or make a dangerous leap.' The mere tech- 
 nical fact of the servant's knowledge of a defect is not sufficient 
 to exonerate the master, if, for any reason, the servant forgets 
 it, and is not in fault in forgetting it, at the precise time when 
 he suffers thereby. In analogy to the principles already stated 
 under the head of contributory negligence,^ the servant's 
 rights are not prejudiced by his excusable forgetfulness of or 
 failure to observe a defect or danger, under the influence of 
 sudden alarm'' or of an urgent necessity for speed,^ or if his 
 
 ■•Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 
 139 Ind. 430 ; 38 N. E. 67 [trying to 
 leave train] ; Schroeder v. Chicago, 
 etc. E. Co., 108 Mo. 323 ; 18 S. W. 
 1094 [getting out of way of train to 
 protect passengers] ; Fox v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 86 Iowa, 368 ; 53 N. 
 W. 859 [endeavoring to catch a fast 
 moving freight car, under orders of 
 conductor, and in an emergency]. 
 
 ' Louisville, etc. E. Co. v. Rains, 
 
 Ky. ; 23 S. W. 505 [jumping 
 
 from a train to avoid a collision] ; 
 
 S. P., Haney v. Pittsburgh E. Co.,*38 
 
 W. Va. 570 ; 18 S. B. 748. 
 
 « See § 89, ante. 
 
 ' Eima v. Eossie Iron Works, 130 
 N. Y. 483 ; 34 N. E. 940 ; Haas v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 90 Iowa, 
 259; 57 N. W. 894 [fireman not 
 jumping off, in view of collision] ; 
 s. P. , Spaulding v. Flynt Granite Co. , 
 150 Mass. 587 ; 34 N. E. 1134 ; Hud- 
 son V. East Tennessee, etc. E. Co. , 93 
 Ga. 816 ; 31 S. E. 136 [attention dis- 
 tracted by noise] ; San Antonio, etc. 
 E. Co. V. McDonald, Tex. Civ. App. 
 ; 31 S. W. 73. In Columbus, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Bradford (86 Ala. 574 ; 6 
 So. 90) . the excuse for forgetfulness 
 was held insufficient. 
 
 * His duty having compelled serv- 
 ant to act at once without oppor- 
 tunity for inspection, the question of 
 contributory negligence is for the 
 jury (Doonerv. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co.", 164 Pa. St. 17 ; 30 Atl. 369) ; 
 S. P., Irvine v. Flint, etc. R. Co., 89 
 
 Mich. 416 ; 50 N. W. 1008). Servant 
 obliged to work quickly, excusable 
 (Carter v. Oliver Oil Co., 34 S. C. 311; 
 13 S. E. 419). Plaintiff, a brake- 
 man, while making a trip on a cold, 
 stormy night, discovered that a step 
 was missing from a car, between his 
 post and the caboose, and notified 
 the conductor, who promised to 
 drop the car at a certain point. 
 Before reaching that point the train 
 stopped at a station, and plaintiff 
 went back to the caboose, as was the , 
 custom, to eat and warm himself. 
 The ti'ain suddenly started, and 
 plaintiff hastily ran out over the 
 cars, to resume his post, and, for- 
 getting about the missing step, feU 
 and was injured. Held, that the 
 question of contributory negligence 
 should have been submitted to the 
 jury (Kane v. Northern Cent. E. Co., 
 138 U. 8. 91 ; 9 S. Ct. 16). Where a 
 laborer while working under the eye 
 and voice of his employer, who was 
 urging speed, and saying " all right," 
 did not think at the moment, owing 
 to this urgency, of a danger of which 
 he had some previous knowledge, 
 and in consequence was injured, held 
 that he was not deprived of his rem- 
 edy (Lee V. Woolsey, 109 Pa. St. 134 ; 
 42 Leg. Intel. 375). Brennan v. Front 
 St. E. Co., 8 Wash. St. 363 ; 36 Pac. 
 272, perhaps contra, is a very harsh 
 and oppressive decision. A com- 
 raand given by the master in a loud 
 and harsh voice to the engineer in 
 
369 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§214 
 
 duties are such as necessarily to absorb his whole attention, 
 leaving him no reasonable opportunity to look for defects,' or 
 if "the light is imperfect.^" Oaths and violent language in 
 giving orders have been held insufficient excuse for errors of 
 judgment on the part of a frightened servant." 
 
 § 214. Notice of defect, without notice of danger, imma- 
 terial. — The right of a servant to recover on account of the 
 master's negligence is not affected by notice of any defects 
 other than such as the servant foresaw, or, in the exercise of 
 ordinary prudence, ought to have foreseen, might endanger 
 his safety.^ If a servant of ordinary prudence would have 
 believed that he could not, in the regular discharge of his duties, 
 be injured by the defect, the servant may properly disregard 
 it, without losing the right to complain if, while pursuing his 
 
 charge of a derrick to " Hoist her ! 
 There is a team waiting" — is not 
 negligence entitling an employee to 
 recover for injuries caused by the 
 engineer obeying in a negligent man- 
 ner (Griffin v. Glen Mfg. Co., 67 N. 
 H. ; 30 Atl. 344). 
 
 ^ Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Everett, 
 153 U. S. 107 ; 14 S. Ct. 474 ; Wal- 
 lace V. Cent. Vt. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 
 302. In Plank v. N. Y. Central, etc. 
 R. Co. (60 N. Y. 607), where a brake- 
 man was killed while attempting to 
 couple cars, in the night, wliile snow 
 was on the ground, by stepping into 
 a sluice-way which had existed for 
 years, and of which he knew, a non- 
 suit was held error, because the act 
 in which he was engaged necessarily 
 required his whole attention and 
 thought. To similar effect. Green- 
 leaf V. 111. Central R Co., 29 Iowa, 
 47 ; Snow v. Housatonic R. Co. , 8 
 Allen, 441 ; Hannah v. Connecticut 
 River R. Co., 154 Mass. 539; 28 N. 
 E. 682 ; Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. 
 Co.. 121 Mo. 258 ; 24 S. W. 57 [switch- 
 man, failing to see coming train] ; 
 Tobey v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 94 
 Iowa. 256; 62 N. W. 761 [similar 
 case]; Fiero v. N.Y. Cent., etc. R.Co., 
 [Law op Neg. Vol. 1 — 24] 
 
 71 Hun, 213 ; 24 N. Y. Supp. 805 [con- 
 ductor busy collecting tickets]. 
 
 '" Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 131 Mo. 358; 24 8. W. 57 [confused by 
 electric lights]; McLarney v. Long 
 Island R. Co., 11 N. Y. Misc. 64 ; 31 N. 
 Y. Supp. 863 [lantern just gone out]. 
 
 " Coyne v. Union Pac. R. Co., 133 
 U. S. 370 ; 10 S. Ct. 383. 
 
 1 Dale V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. , 63 
 Mo. 455, approving the doctrine of 
 the text ; Mehan v. Syracuse, etc. R. 
 Co., 73 N. Y. 585; Worden v. 
 Humeston, etc. R. Co., 76 Iowa, 
 310 ; 41 N. W. 36 ; SulUvan v. Han- 
 nibal, etc. R. Co., 107 Mo. 66 ; 17 S. 
 W. 748 ; WuotiUa v. Duluth Lumber 
 Co., 37 Minn. 153 ; 33 N. W. 551 ; 
 Newhart v. St. Paul City R. Co., 51 
 Minn. 43 ; 53 N. W. 983 ; Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 
 61 ; 13 S. W. 838 ; Sanborn v. Ma- 
 dera Flume Co., 70 Cal. 361 ; 11 Pac. 
 710; Lee v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 
 101 Cal. 118 ; 35 Pac. 573 ; BJorman 
 V. Ft. Bragg Redwood Co., 104 Cal. 
 626 ; 38 Pac. 451. The test is 
 whether the servant ought to have 
 comprehended the danger (Craven 
 V. Smith, 89 Wis. 119 ; 61 N. W. 
 317). 
 
§214] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 37» 
 
 ordinary course, under such belief, he suffers from such defect.* 
 And so, if the danger is one which a servant of ordinary pru- 
 dence would believe could be entirely avoided by the use of cer- 
 tain additional precautions, the servant would not, by continuing 
 his service, lose his right to recover for damages suffered by 
 him, while using such precautions.^ But, on the other hand, it is 
 clearly the duty of a servant, in such a case, to use all those 
 additional precautions which ordinary prudence, in view of the 
 risk, would dictate;^ and the burden of proof would justly^ 
 
 ' Russell V. Minneapolis, etc. R. 
 Co., 33 Minn. 230 ; 30 N. W. 147 
 [brakenian crushed while coupling] ; 
 Cook V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 34 
 Minn. 45; 24 N. W. 311 ; Snow v. 
 Housatonic R. Co., 8 Allen, 441 ; 
 Britton t. Great Western Cotton 
 Co., L. R. 7 Ex. 130 ; reaffirmed in 
 Ford V. Fitchburg, etc. R. Co., 110 
 Mass. 340 ; Lawless v. Conn. River 
 R. Co., 136 Mass. 1 [low draw-bar on 
 locomotive ; Thorpe v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 89 Mo. 650 ; 3 S. W. 3. The 
 fact that a servant knows of a de- 
 fect in machinery, likely to injure 
 him, is not necessarily conclusive of 
 want of due care on his part. It is 
 for the jury to say whether the de- 
 fect was such that none but a reck- 
 less person, utterly careless of his 
 safety, would have used the machine 
 (Hough V. lexas, etc. R. Co., 100 U. 
 S. 313, 335). In Kain v. Smith (89 
 N. Y. 375), a carpenter sued to re- 
 cover for injuries received while 
 loading car wheels, under the direc- 
 tion of a foreman by means of a 
 defective "jigger." A nonsuit was 
 held error; Danforth, J., saying: 
 "It is said that the plaintiff might 
 also see the defects ; true, but he did 
 not know the effect of such defi- 
 ciencies, and was, moreover, directed 
 by his superior to get and use the 
 instrument, and whether, under 
 these circumstances, he should be 
 charged with knowledge and with 
 
 negligence by reason of it, was also 
 for the jury." 
 
 ' This was vaguely implied in the 
 opinion of Hartley, J., in Mad River, 
 etc. R. Co. v; Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541, 
 563, 565, and expressly declared in 
 Patterson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. 
 (76 Pa. St. 389), where defendant 
 was held liable to its conductor for 
 injuries sustained through defects in 
 a switch, of which he had notified- 
 the superintendent, who had pro- 
 mised to make the required repairs, 
 and requested plaintiff to continue 
 his work meanwhile, observing due 
 care; Gordon, J., saying: "Where 
 the servant, in obedience of the re- 
 quirement of the master, incui-s the 
 risk of machinery which, though 
 dangerous, is not so much so as to 
 threaten immediate injury, or wherfr 
 it is reasonably probable it may be 
 safely used by extraordinary cau- 
 tion or skill . . . the master is 
 liable for a resulting accident." See 
 Sioux City, etc. R. Co. v. Finlayson, 
 16 Neb. 578 [locomotive with weak 
 throat-sheet, which engineer used 
 with great caution]. 
 
 " Taylor v. Carew Mfg. Co., 143- 
 Mass. 470 ; 10 N. E. 308 [servant 
 walked quickly in a dark basement 
 room, where he should have groped 
 carefully, and fell into an unguarded 
 hatchway hole] ; Gates v. Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 566 ; 26 AtL 
 598 [attempting to cross at night un- 
 
371 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§215 
 
 be laid upon him to prove that he did so. The servant loses 
 no rights, unless he comprehends and appreciates the danger,^ 
 or, having the necessary capacity and information, fails to do 
 so by his own fault. ^ But one who comprehends the danger 
 is not excused by his inability to realize the full extent of the 
 injuries which may possibly result therefrom.' 
 
 §215. Effect of master's promises or assurances. — In 
 
 some old cases, the mere continuance of a servant in his work, 
 with knowledge of defects in his associates or his materials, 
 was treated as conclusive evidence of his having waived objec- 
 tions thereto.' Such rulings were unjust ; because a servant 
 has the same right that any one else has, to complete his con- 
 tract in reliance upon its original terms. And those opinions 
 have now been distinctly overruled.^ A party to any other 
 
 lighted bridge, with which servant 
 was familiar for the jury]. If a 
 servant, killed by the sudden draw- 
 ing of a coal-car out of the mine in 
 which he is working, knew that the 
 car would probably soon be drawn, 
 it is immaterial that the master 
 took no steps to notify the servant 
 of that fact (Lehigh, etc. Coal Co. 
 V. Hayes, 128 Pa. St. 294 ; 18 Atl. 
 387). 
 
 ^ Fitzgerald v. Conn. Paper Co., 
 lo5 Mass. 155 ; 29 N. E. 464 ; Prendi- 
 ble V. Connecticut River Mfg. Co., 
 
 160 Mass. 131 ; 35 N. E. 675 ; Thomas 
 V. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. Div. 685 ; 
 Yarmouth v. Fi-ance, 19 Id. 647 ; Os- 
 borne v. London, etc. R. Co., 21 Id. 
 220 ; approved, Mundle v. Hill. Mfg. 
 Co., 86 Me. 400; 30 Atl. 16. S. P., 
 Davidson v. Cornell, 133 N. Y. 228 ; 
 30 N. B. 573 ; Smith v. Peninsular 
 Car Works, 60 Mich. 501 ; 27 N. W. 
 662 ; Wuotillav. Duluth Lumber Co., 
 87 Minn. 153 ; 33 N. W. 551. 
 
 « Suter V. Park Lumber Co. , 90 
 Wise. 118; 62 N. W. 927. 
 ' Feely v. Pearson Cordage Co., 
 
 161 Mass. 436 ; 37 N. E. 368 ; Ti-un- 
 tle V. North Star Woolen-Mill Co., 
 S7 Minn. 53 ; 5'i N. W. 832. 
 
 ' See Mad River, etc. R. Co. v. But- 
 ler, 5 Ohio St. 541 ; Wright v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 25 N. Y. 562, 569. 
 
 ^ Hoey V. Dublin, etc. R. Co. , Irish 
 Rep., 5 C. L. 206 ; Laning v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521 [over- 
 ruling the dicta in Wright's case] ; 
 Hawley v. Northern Central R. Co., 
 82 N. Y. 370 ; Flynn v. Kansas City, 
 etc. R. Co., 78 Mo. 195 ; Dale v. St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co., 63 Mo. 455 [fire- 
 man injured by defective joint in 
 rails] , Francis v. Kansas City, etc. 
 R. Co., 137 Mo. 658 ; 28 S. W. 843 ; 
 30 S. W. 139 ; Graham v. Newburg 
 Coal Co., 38 W. Va. 373; 18 S. E. 
 584. Defendant held liable, where 
 superintendent promised to repair, 
 and requested plaintiff to continue 
 work until the repairs could be 
 effected (Patterson v. Pittsburgh, 
 etc. R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 389). " It 
 would seem to be unreasonable that 
 one who has undertaken a service 
 which, in itself, has some elements 
 of danger, whenever he shall see 
 that the danger has been increased 
 through some negligence of his em- 
 ployer, must either stop his employ- 
 ment or be deemed to have accepted 
 the increased risk. We do not think 
 
§215] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 372 
 
 contract having mutual obligations is allowed to perform fully 
 his part, notwithstanding the failure of the other party to ful- 
 fill a condition precedent, without necessarily waiving his right 
 to insist upon performance of such condition at a later period. 
 It is not fair to require from servants a more peremptory 
 assertion of their rights against masters than would be 
 required between parties standing upon a more equal footing. 
 Indeed, the dependent position of servants generally makes 
 it reasonable to hold any notice on their part sufficient, how- 
 ever timid and hesitating, so long as it plainly conveys to the 
 master the idea that a defect exists, and that they desire its 
 removal.' The real question to be determined in each case is 
 whether, under all the circumstances, the master believed and 
 the servant intended to make him believe, that all objections 
 to the unfitness of a fellow-servant, or to the defects in the 
 materials provided for the work, were waived,^ and that an 
 implied contract exempting the master from liability was 
 freely accepted. This is a question of fact, not of law ; and if 
 not free from doubt, it must be left to the jury.^ There is no 
 longer any doubt that where a master has expressly promised 
 
 that this is the rule ; and it seems to * This proposition cited from old 
 
 us that the plaintiff had a I'ight to section 96, with approval, and fol- 
 
 go to the jury, on the question lowed in Poirier v. Carroll, 35 La. 
 
 ■whether he was, under the circum- Ann. 699 [distinction taken in favor 
 
 stances, justified in going on with of a servant hired for a limited 
 
 his work" (McMahon v. Port Henry time]. 
 
 Ore Co., 24 Hun, 48). ' It has been expressly held that 
 ' This language, used in our old the mere continuance of a servant 
 section 96, although not quoted, is, in his work, in face of a known 
 in spirit, reproduced in Hawley v. danger, only raises a question for 
 Northern Central E. Co., 82 N. Y. the jury (McMahon v. Port Henry 
 370. It is literally quoted and adopted Iron Co., 24 Hun, 48; Hawley v. 
 in Thorpe v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 89 Northern Central R. Co., 17 Id. 115, 
 Mo. 650 ; 2 S. W. 3. When com- affi'd 82 N. Y. 370 ; see Kain. v! 
 plaining of defective machinery, it Smith, 89 Id. 375) . But perhaps 
 is not necessary that the servant Shaw v. Sheldon, 103 Id. 667, de- 
 shall state in exact words that he ap- cided by a bare majority of the 
 prehends danger to himself from the court, is to the contrary, where the 
 defects, nor need there be a formal facts are undisputed and no excuse 
 notification that he will leave the for continuance appears. The text 
 service unless the defects be re- was quoted and adopted in Stephen, 
 paired (Rothenberger v. North- son v. Duncan, 73 Wise. 404 ; 41 N. 
 western Milling Co., 57 Minn. 461 ; W. 337. 
 59 N. W. 531). 
 
373 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§215 
 
 to repair a defect/ the servant does not assume the risk of an 
 injury caused thereby within such a period of time after the 
 promise as would be reasonably allowed for its performance,^ 
 or indeed, within any period which would not preclude all 
 reasonable expectation that the promise might be kept.^ And 
 
 " For exaaiples of evasive answers 
 held not to amount to a promise, see 
 Breig v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 98 
 Mich. 233 ; 57 N. W. 118 ; Wilson v. 
 Winona, etc R. Co., 37 Minn. 326 ; 
 33 N. W. 908. It is often said to be 
 essential that the servant should be 
 •' induced to remain " by the promise 
 (Levris V. N. Y., New England, etc. 
 R. Co., 158 Mass. 73 : 26 N. E. 481 ; 
 Burlington, etc. R. Co. v. Liehe, 17 
 Colo. 380 ; 39 Pac. 175). It is of no 
 importance that the promise was not 
 made to the injured employee indi- 
 vidually (Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Sadler, 38 Kans. 128; 16 Pac. 46 ; 
 Interstate, etc. R. Co. v. Fox, 41 
 Kans. 715 ; 21 Pac. 797 [promise 
 made to contractor under whom 
 plaintiff worked]). 
 
 ■■ Hough V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 100 
 U S. 213 ; New Jersey, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Young, 49 Fed. 733 ; 1 U. 8. App. 
 96 , 1 C. C. A. 438 ; Wust v. Erie Iron 
 Works, 149 Pa. St. 263 ; 24 Atl. 391 
 [incompetent helper] ; Rogers v. 
 Leyden, 137 Ind. 50; 26 N. E. 210 ; 
 Chicago Forge Co. v. Van Dam, 149 
 111. 337 ; 36 N. E. 1034 ; St. Clair 
 Nail Co. V. Smith, 43 111. App. 105 ; 
 Lyttle V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 84 
 Mich. 339 ; 47 N. W. 571 ; Brecken- 
 ridge Co. v. Hicks, 94 Ky. 363 ; 33 
 S. W. 554 ; Weber Wagon Co. v. 
 Kehl, 139 111. 644 ; 29 N. E. 714 ; 
 Rothenberger v. Northwestern Mill- 
 ing Co., 57 Minn. 461 ; 59 N. W. 581 
 [defejctive machinery not immedi- 
 ately dangerous]. An employee who 
 is told to work with a defective tool, 
 of vyhich he had complained, until 
 a good one, promised, should arrive, 
 and relying on such promise, and 
 
 there being no immediate danger, 
 does so, and is injured by the use of 
 the defective tool, can recover for 
 the injury (Southern Kan. R. Co. 
 V. Croker, 41 Kans. 747 ; 21 Pac. 
 785 ; Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Mid- 
 gett, 1 Kans. App. 138 ; 40 Pac. 995 ; 
 Morbach v. Home Min. Co., 53 Kans. 
 731 ; 37 Pac. 133 ; Gulf, etc. R. Co 
 V. Donnelly, 70 Tex. 871 ; 8 S. W. 
 53 ; Harvey v. Alturas Gold Min. 
 Co., Idaho, ; 31 Pac. 819 ; 
 
 Anderson v. Northern Pac. Lumber 
 Co., 21 Oreg. 281 ; 28 Pac. 5 ; see 
 Counsell v. Hall, 145 Mass. 468 ; 14 
 N. E. 530). In determining what is 
 a reasonable time, the jury should 
 consider all the circumstances, such 
 as the opportunity for making re- 
 pairs, and the frequency with which 
 the engine was used (Lyttle v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 84 Mich. 289 ; 47 
 N. W. 571). When plaintiff has duly 
 reported a defect, and been twice 
 assured that it will be repaired, the 
 fact that he could have repaired it 
 himself, or dispensed with the ap- 
 pliance in which it occurred, does 
 not deprive him of his right to re- 
 cover for an injury caused by it (Gib- 
 son V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co. , 55 
 Minn. 177; 56 N. W. 686j. Much 
 more can he recover, if forbidden to 
 repair himself (Ferriss v. Berlin Ma- 
 chine Works, 90 Wise. 541 ; 63 N. W. 
 334 [several weeks allowed]). The 
 promise must come from the master 
 or his proper representative (Ehmcke 
 V. Porter, 45 Minn. 888; 47 N. W. 
 1066). 
 
 ' The whole of this sentence from 
 our old section 96 (in its original 
 form), was quoted and adopted in 
 
§2ISJ 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 374 
 
 the same principle applies to a case where the master promises 
 to a servant to discharge an incompetent fellow-servant, but 
 fails to do so, and the former servant is thereby injured,^ or 
 where a servant, apprehending a particular danger, makes it 
 known to the master, who assures him that he will provide 
 against it.'" Nor, indeed, is any express promise or assurance 
 from the master necessary. It is sufficient, if the servant 
 may reasonably infer that the matter will be attended to." 
 So a servant may rely upon the master's assurance that there 
 
 Hough V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 100 U. 
 S. 213, 225 [engineer and defective 
 engine] ; and also in Missouri Fur- 
 nace Co. V. Abend, 107 111. 44 [similar 
 facts]. So held in Conroy v. Vulcan 
 Iron "Works, 62 Mo. 35 [boards of 
 platform insecure] ; Greene v. Minne- 
 apolis, etc. R. Co., 31 Minn. 248 ; 17 
 N. W. 378 [broken "chafing irons"] ; 
 Manufacturing Co. v. Morrissey, 40 
 Ohio St. 148 [defective lathe] ; Belair 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 663 
 [defective draw bar] ; Parody v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 15 Fed. 305 
 [defective draw-bar] ; Roux v. Blod- 
 gett Lumber Co., 94 Mich. 607 ; 54 
 N. W. 493 [uncovered gearing] ; 
 Sioux City, etc. R. Co. v. Finlayson, 
 16 Neb. 578 ; 20 N. W. 860 [engine] ; 
 Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurlst. & N. 
 937; affi'gs. c, 6 Id. 349 [unfenced 
 macliinery]. Where plaintiff's in- 
 testate remonstrated with defend- 
 ant's agent in charge of the mine, on 
 account of the dangerous position of 
 a large stone, and the agent sent per- 
 sons to remove it, but, before they 
 began work, it fell upon the de- 
 ceai^ed, held, that plaintiff could re- 
 cover (Paterson V. Wallace, 1 Macq. 
 H. L, 748 [unfenced nrachinery] ) . 
 Where a servant was injured because 
 of defective lights, of which he had 
 frequently complained, and the mas- 
 ter had repeatedly promised that the 
 defect should be remedied, the serv- 
 ant did not assume the risk, in con- 
 tinuing in the employment in ex- 
 
 pectation that the lights would be 
 properly fixed (Smith v. Backus 
 Lumber Co., 64 Minn. 447; 67 N. W. 
 358). 
 
 » Laning v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 49 N. Y. 531. Where plaintiff, a 
 blacksmith was assigned an incom- 
 petent helper, and the latter was 
 changed on plaintiff's complaint, but 
 reassigned May 4th, and plaintiff 
 again complained on the 6th, and 
 was promised another helper, and 
 was injured on the 10th, a verdict 
 holding plaintiff free from negli- 
 gence sustained (Lyberg v. Northern 
 Pac. R. Co., 39 Minn. 15 ; 38 N. W. 
 633). 
 
 '" Hyatt V. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 19 Mo. App. 287 [employee, sent out 
 to shovel snow drifts, was frozen in 
 consequence of non-fulfillment of a 
 promise to provide a car in which he 
 could warm himself]. 
 
 " Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Bab- 
 cock, 151 U. S. 190; 14 S. Ct. 978 
 [justifiable impression that repair 
 would be made] So, where by the 
 master's conduct, the servant is lulled 
 into a sense of security (Graham v 
 Newburg Coal Co., 38 W. Va. 373 ; 
 18 S. E. 584). Where a driver of a 
 wagon notifies his employer pi its 
 dangerous condition, and is induced 
 to use it for a short time, the servant 
 does not assume the risk (Schlitz v. 
 Pabst Brewing Co., 57 Minn. 303 ; 59 
 N. W. 188 ; s. P., Eddy v. Bodkin, 
 Tex. Civ. App. ; 28 S, W. 54). 
 
375 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§215 
 
 is no real danger,^^ or that he will explain the points of danger," 
 or that he will see that there is no danger." Much more may 
 he rely without inquiry upon an assurance that repairs have 
 actually been made.'^ If, however, he knows that such assur- 
 ances are false," or if the danger is so palpable, immediate and 
 constant, that none but an utterly reckless person would 
 expose himself to it, even after receiving any or all of these 
 assurances," the servant may be debarred from recovery, not 
 
 '^ Where a master directs his serv- 
 ant to work in a certain dangerous 
 place, and, in reply to the servant's 
 ■expressions of fear, assures him that 
 there is no danger, the servant is not 
 guilty of negligence, in going to 
 work there, unless the danger is so 
 Imminent that no prudent person 
 would undertake to perform the ser- 
 vice (Chicago Brick Co. v. Sobko- 
 wiak, 148 111. 573 ; 36 N. E. 572). To 
 «ame effect, Wagner v. Jayne Chemi- 
 cal Co., 147 Pa. St. 475; 33 Atl. 773 
 [fumes of nitric acid assured not be 
 injurious] ; Hoffman v. Dickinson, 
 81 W. Va. 143 ; 6 S. E. 53 [chain: as- 
 surance no danger] ; Stephens v. 
 Hudson Knitting Co., 69 Hun, 375 ; 
 33 N. Y. Supp. 656 ; Schlacker v. 
 Ashland Min. Co., 89 Mich. 353; 50 
 N. W. 839 ; O'Driscoll v. Faxon, 156 
 Mass. 537 ; 31 N. E. 635 ; Burgess v. 
 Davis Sulphur Co., 165 Mass. 71 ; 43 
 N. E. 501. If the master has superior 
 knowledge, or means of knowledge, 
 and assures a servant that he can 
 safely undertake a given work, such 
 an assurance may justify the serv- 
 ant in undertaking the work, with- 
 out being liable to the charge of 
 negligence, unless the danger is 
 imniinentormanifest(Haas v. Baloh, 
 56 Fed. 984 ; 6 C. C. A. 201). 
 
 " The rule that a servant assumes 
 the risks of the business does not ap- 
 ply where the servant is required by 
 his master to enter upon a hazardous 
 task under an unfulfilled promise to 
 point out its hazards to him (McCor- 
 
 mick Mach. Co. v. Burandt, 136 111. 
 170 ; 36 N. E. 588). 
 
 '■* Defendant had told plaintiff that 
 he would see that no cartridge was 
 left in any revolver returned to plain- 
 tiff for alteration. Held, that it was 
 a question for the jury whether, by 
 continuing in defendant's employ 
 after he had once discovered a cart- 
 ridge in a revolver, plaintiff assumed 
 the risk of such an accident (Ander- 
 son V. Duckworth, 162 Mass. 351 ; 38 
 N. E. 510). 
 
 '* Lawrence v. Hagemeyer, 93 Ky. 
 591 ; 30 S. W. 704 ; Atchison, etc. R. 
 Co. V. McKee. 37 Kans. 593 ; 15 Pac. 
 484. 
 
 '* This is on the general principle 
 of estoppel. 
 
 " Dist. Columbia V. McEmgott,117 
 U. S. 633 ; 6 S. Ct. 884 ; McKelvey v. 
 Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 35 W. Va. 
 500 ; 14 S. E. 261. So held, as to 
 promises to supply a better ladder 
 (Marsh v. Chickering, 101 N. Y. 396 ; 
 5 N. E. 56 ; Corcoran v. Gas Co., 81 
 Wise. 191 ; 51 N. W. 328 ; Meador 
 V. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co.. 138 Ind. 
 390 ; 37 N. E. 721 : St. Louis, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Keltoii, 55 Ark. 483 ; 18 S. W. 
 933; Showalter v. Fairbanks, 88 Wise, 
 376 ; 60 N. W. 257 [assurances of no 
 danger] ; McAndrews v. Montana 
 Union R. Co., 15 Mont. 390 ; 39 Pac. 85 
 [orders to go on " with great care " ] ). 
 This limitation is recognized in all 
 the cases cited in the last note. The 
 servant cannot " rely" upon an as 
 surance which he does not believe. 
 
§215] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 376 
 
 because he "assumed the risk," but on the ground of his con- 
 tributory negligence. For the master's duty to repair is a 
 continuing one, and servants do not " assume the risk" of his 
 faults.*** In several cases, however, that phrase is used by the 
 courts. After the prescribed period has elapsed without 
 change, or if the master has refused to remedy the defect, the 
 servant cannot rely upon his expectation of a remedy as an 
 excuse for remaining, whatever rights he may have upon other 
 grounds; and in many cases it has been held that he ''assumed 
 the risk."*' It may seem presumptuous on our part to differ 
 from so many learned judges; but we think that all these 
 decisions are wrong. They entirely ignore the master's gross 
 breach of his express contract to repair. Why is not the serv- 
 ant entitled to recover upon that ground, entirely irrespective 
 of the ordinary issue of negligence? To an action upon breach 
 of express contract, contributory negligence is no defense. If 
 the master expressly promises to " take all the risks," the 
 servant may recover upon this promise, no matter how obvious 
 the risk may be.^ 
 
 . These decisions, however, need to be Watson, 114 Ind. 20 , 14 N. E. 731 ; 
 reviewed in the light of the more Chicago Forge Co. v. Van Dam, 149 
 modern and humane cases cited lU. 337 ; 36 N. E. 1034 ; Eothenberger 
 nnder § 311a, ante.. The night- v. Northwestern Milling Co., 57 Minn, 
 watchman of a freight-yard, after 461 ; 59 N. W. 531. 
 twice applying for a lantern as neces- '* Settle v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 
 sarytohissafety.andreceivingprom- 127 Mo. 336; SOS. W. 125; Huhn v. 
 ises of one, was told that he would Missouri Pac. R. C(J., 93 Mo. 447 ; 4 
 be lucky if he got one in a month. S. W. 937 ; Patterson v. Pittsburgh, 
 He resumed work not expecting etc. E. Co., 70 Pa. St. 389. 
 to get one within a month. Held, ^' Stephenson v. Duncan, 73 Wise, 
 that, his employment being immedi- 404 ; 41 N. W. 337 ; Counsell v. Hall, 
 ately and constantly dangerous, he 145 Mass. 468 ; 14 N. E. 530 : Mor- 
 could not recover (Indianapolis, etc. bach v. Home Min. Co., 53 Kans. 731 ; 
 E. Co. V. Watson, 114 Ind. 20 ; 14 N. 37 Pac. 123 ; Eureka Co. v. Bass, 81 
 E. 721; 15 Id. 824). " Utterly reck- Ala. 200; 8 So. 216 [defective fuse] ; 
 less" is the phrase used in Hough v. Davis v. Graham, 3 Colo. App. 310 ; 
 Texas, etc. E. Co., 100 U. S. 313 ; 29 Pac. 1007. These were all cases in 
 Chicago Brick Co. v. Sobkowiak, which so long a time had elapsed 
 148 111. 573 ; 36 N. E. 573 ; Indianap- without repair that the servant 
 olis E. Co. v. Ott, 11 Ind. App. 564 ; could not have believed that it 
 38 N. E. 843 ; Cincinnati E. Co. v. would be made. 
 Grames, 136 Ind. 39; 34 N. E. 714. '» Phillips v. Michaels, lllnd. App. 
 " No prudent person " is the Ian- 673 ; 39 N. E. 669. 
 guage of Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
m 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§2l6 
 
 § 2i6. Presumption as to servant's knowledge. — It may 
 
 fairly be presumed that a servant knows the condition of 
 materials, machinery or appliances, which he has a constant 
 opportunity to inspect, and which his regular duties bring 
 under his notice;' but no such presumption arises where he 
 has no such opportunity.^ A locomotive engineer, conductor 
 or train servant of any kind is not presumed to be familiar 
 with the condition of the track ; and therefore he does not, as 
 matter of law, assume risks arising from a defective or negli- 
 gent construction of the track,' or of ties under the track,^ even 
 though such defects existed when he entered upon his employ- 
 ment. And no servant is presumptively chargeable with 
 notice of a peculiar and unusual state of things.^ Reasonable 
 time must be allowed to a new servant to become acquainted 
 
 ' The servant is presumed to know 
 of the ordinary dangers and risks of 
 the service, and cannot recover for 
 an injury which he might have 
 avoided by using such knowledge 
 (St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Marker, 41 
 Ark. 543) ; where a. laborer had his 
 leg broken in consequence of need- 
 lessly sitting on the edge of a flat car, 
 while in motion, with his feet dang- 
 ling down. S. P. , Shaw v. Sheldon, 
 103 N. Y, 667 ; 9 N. E. 183 ; Bross- 
 man v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 113 
 Pa. St. 490 ; 6 Atl. 336. Compare 
 Hoffman v. Clough, 134 Pa. St. 505 ; 
 17 Atl. 19. Four years' service, never 
 being warned of a constant danger, 
 implied notice of master's habitual 
 failure to warn, and assumption of 
 risk (Flynn v. Campbell, 160 Mass. 
 138; 35 N. E. 453). So after one 
 year's service (Kennedy v. Pennsyl- 
 vania Co. fPa.], 17 Atl. 7). So after 
 servant had been using machine for 
 three weeks, where neither party 
 knew of the defect, and both had the 
 same opportunity of discovering it 
 (Rietman v. Stolte, 130 Ind. 314 ; 33 
 N. E. 304). 
 
 'Chicago R. Co. v. Jackson, 55 
 III. 493 ; Mickee V.Wood Mach. Co., 
 
 70 Hun, 456 ; 34 N. Y. Supp. 501 ; 
 Alexander v. Central Lumber Co., 
 104 Cal. 583 ; 38 Pac. 410 [few oppor- 
 tunities]. 
 
 'Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Miller, 
 140 Ind. 685 ; 40 N. E. 116 [conduc- 
 tor] ; Bean v. Western N. C. R. Co., 
 107 N. C. 731 ; 13 S. E. 600 ; Little 
 Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Duffey, 35 Ark. 
 603 ; Sweeney v. Central Pacific R. 
 Co., 57 Cal. 15 ; Trask v. California, 
 etc. R. Co., 63 Cal. 96. See Lovell v. 
 Howell, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 161 ; 
 Lopez V. Central Ariz. Mine Co., 1 
 Ariz. 464 ; 3 Pac. 748 ; Mich. Central 
 R. Co. V. Austin, 40 Mich. 347 [worn 
 rail], 
 
 " Houston, etc. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Naraara, 59 Tex. 355. 
 
 5 Whalen v. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 16 
 111. App. 330 [switchman's knowl- 
 edge of dangerous proximity of a 
 scale-shed to the track, question for 
 jury]. Where a brakeman was in- 
 jured by contact with a post, erected 
 near the track, by a station agent, 
 for Ms own purposes, held, that 
 plaintiff was authorized to presume 
 that no such obstruction existed 
 (Kearns v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 66 
 Iowa, 599; 24 N. W. 231). 
 
§2l6] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 378 
 
 with his surroundings,^ and to an old servant to learn of 
 changes in the situation.'^ Servants are presumed to be aware 
 
 of defects which are perfectly obvious to their sight, ^ and the 
 danger of which is obvious to any person of their mental 
 
 « Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Mares. N. J. Law, 411 ; 24 Atl. 487; Yates 
 
 133 U. S. 710 ; 8 S. Ct. 321 [one week v. McCullough Iron Co., 69 Md. 370 ; 
 
 not necessarily enough] . 16 Atl. 280 ; Richmond, etc. E. Co. 
 
 ■> Nelson v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 60 v. Eisdon, 87 Va. 335 ; 12 S. E. 786 
 
 "Wise. 320 ; 19 N. W. 52 [locomotive [unblocked frog] ; Adkins v. Atlan- 
 
 engineer not bound to understand, tic, etc. E. Co., 27 S. C. 71 ; 2 S. E. 
 
 immediately, changes in time- 849 ; Hazlehurst v. Brunswick Lum- 
 
 table]. A baggage-master is not pre- ber Co. 94 Ga. 535 ; 19 8. E. 756 [no 
 
 sumed to be aware of ambiguities in necessity for exposure to danger]; 
 
 the rules for running the trains Hoyle v. Excelsior Steam Laundry 
 
 (Georgia, E. etc. Co. v. Ehodes, 56 Co., 95 Ga. 34 ; 21 S. E. 1001 ; Smart 
 
 Ga. 645). V. Louisiana Electric Co., 47 La. 
 
 8 For instances of denial of recov- Ann. 869 ; 17 So. 346 [insulating 
 
 ery, irrespective of actual knowledge, gloves] ; Fordyce v. Edwai'ds, 60 
 
 where defects in appliances were Ark. 488 ; 30 S. W. 758 [locomotive] . 
 
 obvious, see McCampbell v. Cunard Lamotte v. Boyce, 105 Mich. 545 ; 63 
 
 Steamship Co., 144 N. Y. 553 ; 39 N. N. W, 517 [ladder and post] ; Ste- 
 
 E. 637 [truck and skid] ; Crown v. phenson v. Duncan, 73 Wise. 404 ; 41 
 
 Orr, 140 N. Y. 450 ; 35 N. E. 648 N. W. 337 [projecting saw] ; Peter- 
 
 [planing machine] ; O'Maley v. sen v. Sherry Lumber Co., 90 Wise. 
 
 South Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 83 : 62 N. W. 948 [saw mill] ; Quick 
 
 135 ; 32 N. E. 1119 [long experience ; v. Minnesota Iron Co., 47 Minn. 361 ; 
 
 " niust have known "] ; Cassady v. 50 N. W. 244 [mining elevator]; 
 
 Boston & Albany E. Co., 164 Mass. Bennett v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 2 
 
 168 ; 41 N. E. 129 [doorof grain car] ; N. Dak. 113 ; 49 N. W. 408 [insuffi- 
 
 Goodridge v. Washington Mills Co., cient space between cars] ; Olson v. 
 
 ]60Mass. 234; 35 N. E. 484 [uncov- McMurray Cedar Lumber Co, 9 
 
 ered gearing] ; Connors v. Morton, Wash. St. 500 ; 37 Pac. 679 [saw mill 
 
 160 Mass. 333 ; 35 N. E. 860 [master machinery] ; Hogele v. Wilson, 5 
 
 failed to warn, yet not. liable] ; Con- Wash. St. 160 ; 31 Pae. 469 [same] ; 
 
 nelly v. Hamilton Woolen Co., 163 Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 8 Wash. 
 
 Mass. 156 ; 39 N. E. 787 : Appel v. St. 629 ; 29 Pac. 215 [defective wire] ; 
 
 Buffalo, etc. R. Co., Ill N.Y. 550; 19 Bonnet v. Galveston, etc. E. Co., 
 
 N. E. 93 ; McNeil v. N. Y., Lake Erie, Tex. Civ. App. ; 31 S. W. 535). 
 
 etc. R. Co.,142N. Y. 631;37N. E. 566 So, where the place of work was 
 
 [unblocked guard rails]. Where a obviously dangerous (MeGrath v. 
 
 longshoreman can see that a place is Texas, etc. E. Co., 60 Fed. 555 ; 9 C. 
 
 dark, the foreman, who is loading a C. A. 133 [bridge]; Texas, etc. R. 
 
 ship, does not represent the master Co. v. French, 86 Tex. 96 ; 33 S. W. 
 
 in failing to direct the longshoreman 642 [earth bank] ; Larich v. Moies, 18 
 
 to go ashore and get a lantern (Tully R. I. 513 ; 28 Atl. 661 [same] ; Bat- 
 
 V. N. Y. & Texas S. S. Co., 10 N. Y. terson v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 53 
 
 App. Div. 463 ; 43 N. Y. Supp. 29 ; Mich. 125 [track]). 
 Foley V. Jersey City Electric Co., 54 
 
379 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§217 
 
 capacity.' But to charge them with notice on this ground, the 
 defect and danger must be unquestionably plain and clear, so 
 that, if they did not see it, they must necessarily have been in 
 fault." 
 
 § 217. Means of knowledge ; duty to investigate.— It has 
 
 been often said that the master is not liable for defects in 
 instrumentalities to a servant whose means of knowledge were 
 equal to those of the master.' But this is much too broad a 
 statement ; and in later and better considered cases, it has 
 been very properly repudiated.^ It is not the law. Such a 
 rule certainly has no application to latent defects; as to which, 
 servants are not bound to inquire or inspect.^ The true rule 
 
 'In most of the cases cited, it will 
 be found that weight was laid upon 
 the capacity of the servant to appre- 
 ciate the danger, and the rule is fully 
 stated in §«^ 203, 314, 318, 319, 319a, 
 post. 
 
 '" A master is liable for defective 
 appliances, unless the defect is so 
 glaringly obvious that there can be 
 no doubt as to whether a prudent 
 man would have assumed the risk 
 (Jones V. St. Louis Packet Co., 43 
 Mo. App. 398). So, also, as to the 
 danger of particular work (Kerns v. 
 Ctiicago, etc. R. Co. 94 Iowa, 131; 62 
 N. W. 698) . If by reason of darkness, 
 the defect could not possibly have 
 been seen, the servant is free from 
 fault (Bright v. Barnett Co., 88 Wise. 
 399 ; 60 N. W. 418). For cases in 
 which the question of notice was for 
 the jury, see Walker v. Lake Shore, 
 etc. R. Co., 104 Mich. 606; 63 N. W. 
 1033 [workman inexperienced ; no 
 warning] ; Oregon, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Tracy, 66 Fed. 931 ; 14 C C. A. 199 
 {view obscured] ; Smith v. Occidental 
 Steamship Co., 99 Cal, 463 ; U Pac. 
 84 ; Gaul v. Rochester Paper Co., 73 
 Hun, 485 ; 25 N. Y. Supp. 443 ; Coif 
 V. Chicaso. etc. R. Co., 87 Wise. 273 ; 
 58 N. W. 408 [work done at night]. 
 
 ' Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Hand- 
 man, 13 Lea, 423 ; Lumley v. Cas- 
 
 well, 47 Iowa, 159 ; Moulton v. Gage, 
 138 Mass. 390 ; Malone v. Hawley, 46 
 Cal. 409 ; Salem Stone Co. v. Hobbs, 
 11 Ind. App. 37 ; 38 N. B. .538 [no la- 
 tent defects] ; Clark v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 48 Kans. 654; 39 Pac. 1138 
 [equal knowledge a bar]. Plaintiff, 
 having better knowledge of the dan- 
 ger than defendant, not entitled to 
 recover (Fairmount Cemetery v. 
 Davis, 4 Colo. App. 570 ; 36 Pac. 911). 
 
 = Austin V. Appling, 88 Ga. 54 ; 13 
 S. E. 955 ; Williams v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 109 Mo. 475 ; 18 S. W. 1098 ; 
 Dickson v. Omaha, etc. R. Co., 124 
 Mo. 140 ; 37 S. W. 476 [fence] ; Salem 
 Stone & Lime Co. v. Tepps, 10 Ind. 
 App. 516 ; 38 N. E. 339 [latent defect 
 in machinery] ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. 
 V. Crenshaw, 71 Tex. 340 ; 9 S. W. 
 363. 
 
 ' Servants are not, as a rule, bound 
 to inspect instrumentalities or to 
 look for latent defects (Snow v. 
 Housatonic R. Co., 8 Allen, 441 ; 
 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, 156 
 111. 9; 40 N. E. 938 [machinery]; 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Hines, 132 
 111. 161 ; 33N. E. 1031 [approving our 
 text] ; Porter v. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 
 71 Mo. 66 ; Harr v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 114 N. Y 633 ; 31 N. E 435 [track 
 in large yard] ; Pennsylvania Co. v. 
 McCormack, 131 Ind. 250 ; 30 N. E. 
 
§217] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 380 
 
 as to " equal knowledge " is that, when the means of knowl- 
 edge and the duty to use those means are equal, between master 
 and servant, and neither uses those means, both are equally at 
 fault. And this is all which was really intended by the courts 
 in the loose dicta referred to.'' As the master is always bound 
 to use due care in the selection of servants and instrumentali- 
 ties,' his servants may rely upon his having done so ; and as, 
 in the ordinary course of affairs, such care would result in a 
 proper selection, servants have a right, in all cases, to assume, 
 without inspection, that instrumentalities are safe,' and, with- 
 
 27 [brakeman : roadway and 313 ; Baldwin v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 
 switches] ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Co., 73 Iowa, 45; 33 N. W. 356. A 
 
 Brush, 130 Ind. 347 ; 28 N. E. 615 servant may assume that his master's 
 
 [switchman ; broken tie in track] ; premises and appliances are safe, 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 139 and need not actively inspect them 
 
 Ind. 430; 38 N. E. 67 [section-man; ab- (Rigdon v. Allegheny Lumber Co., 
 
 senceof necessary hands from train]; 59 Hun, 637; 13 N. Y. Supp. 871; 
 
 Morton v. Detroit, etc. E. Co., 81 Lebanon v. McCoy, 13 Ind. App. 500 ; 
 
 Mich. 423 ; 46 N. W. Ill [brakeman : 40 N. E. 700 ; Banks v. Wabash W. 
 
 brake chain] ; Nicholds v. Crystal R. Co., 40 Mo. A pp. 458 ; Dillingham 
 
 Plate-Glass Co. 126 Mo. 55 ; 27 S. W. v. Harden, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 474 ; 
 
 516 [chain] ; Little Rock, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Voss (Ark.), 18 S. W. 173 [road- 
 bed] ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Cren- 
 shaw, 71 Tex. 340; 9 S. W. 262; 
 Zintek v. Stimson Mill Co., 9 Wash. 
 St. 395 ; 37 Pac. 340 [lumber pile] ; 
 Victor Coal Co. v. Muir, 30 Colo. 330 ; 
 38 Pac. 378 [mine roof] ; Little Rock, 
 etc R. Co. V. Moseley, 56 Fed. 1009 ; 
 
 36 S. W. 914 [tool] : see Powers v. N. 
 Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 
 274, 380). Brakeman not bound to 
 inspect coupling appliances of cars 
 (Goodrich v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 110 N. Y. 398 ; 32 N. E. 397 ; Louis- 
 ville & N. R. Co. V. Foley, 94 Ky. 
 320 ; 21 S. W. 866 ; Sabine, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Ewing, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 531 ; 
 
 6 C. C. A 335 [switchman : tracks in 31 S. W. 700), or brakes, nor to exam- 
 yard] ; Carpenter v. Mexican Nat. ine brakes before using them (Ohio, 
 R. Co., 39 Fed. 315 [brakes]). etc. R. Co. v. Pearcy, 138 Ind. 197 ; 
 
 «See Wells v. Coe, 9 Colo. 159 ; 11 37 N. E. 479) ; much less is a yard 
 
 Pac. 50, in which the facts were as workman bound to do so (Chicago, 
 
 above stated, but the usual broad etc. R. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 111. 458 ; 
 
 language was used. 80 in Vincen- 89 N. E. 384), nor, as a matter of law, 
 
 nes Water Supply Co. v. White, 134 the track (Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 Ind. 376 ; 34 N. E 747. Sloan, 11 Ind. App. 401 : 39 N. E. 
 
 ^ See § 194 and notes ; Marsh v. 174). A brakeman cannot, as matter 
 
 Chickering, 101 N. Y. 396 ; 5 N. E. 
 56. 
 
 ' Ante, § 1856, Chicago, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Hines, 183 lU 161 ; 33 N. E. 1021 
 
 of law, be held negligent in failing 
 to discover that bumpers on cars he 
 is about to couple were rotten, and 
 so defective as to permit the cars to 
 
 [machinery] ; Bannon v. Lutz, 158 come almost together (Chesapeake, 
 Pa. St. 166; 37 Atl. 890: Evans v. etc. R. Co. v. Lash, Va. ; 24 
 Chamberlain, 40 S. C. 104 ; 18 S. E. S. E. 385). 
 
38i 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§217 
 
 out inquiry, that their fellow-servants are competent and care- 
 fulJ In like manner, servants may assume that all instrumen- 
 talities are fit and suitable for the use to which the master 
 applies them,* and that they are properly adjusted to each 
 other.' It is only when special circumstances make it the 
 duty of the servant to inquire, that it is contributory negli- 
 gence on his part not to inquire. The duty of inspection and 
 inquiry may be cast upon the servant by special contract,*" or 
 by general rules" or special orders,'^ brought home to his 
 notice and giving him reasonable opportunity for compliance,'^ 
 and to the extent to which such investigation is within his 
 reasonable capacity." And it is cast upon him by actual knowl- 
 edge of any fact, which would suffice to put every person, in 
 his circumstances and of his capacity, using ordinary prudence, 
 upon inquiry.*' Therefore, if, in the ordinary course of his 
 service, exercising ordinary care, he would necessarily *^ become 
 
 ' ^nifi, § 1856 ; U. S. Rolling Stock "^gee O'Malley v. N. Y., Lake 
 Co. V. wilder, 116 111. 100 ; 5 N. E. Erie, etc. R. Co., 67 Hun, 130 ; 33 N. 
 93 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Beatty, Y. Supp. 48 [insufficient time]. 
 
 13 Tnd. App. 604 ; 40 N. E. 753. 
 
 ' Question of negligence properly 
 
 *This is well stated in Porter v. submitted to jury, since evidence 
 Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 71 Mo. 66 tended to show that it would have 
 
 [brakeman thrown from car by de- 
 fect in track]. See Muldowney v. 
 
 required an expert to discover the 
 defects in the brake (Pratt v. Lake 
 
 Illinois, etc. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 463 Shore, etc. R. Co., 63 Hun, 616 ; 18 
 
 [brakeman, coupling cars, injured N. Y. Supp. 683 [express contract], 
 
 through difference in height of "Servant, knowing that many 
 
 buffers]. cars had defective brakes, put upon 
 
 ' Thus, it may be assumed that a inquiry as to brakes on his car 
 
 car has been properly loaded (North- (Roddy v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 104 
 
 em Pac. R. Co. v. Everett, 153 U. S. Mo. 334; 15 S. W. 1113). He must 
 
 107 ; Haugh v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 73 Iowa, 66; 35 N. W. 116). 
 
 " See Pratt v. Lake Shore, etc. R. 
 Co., 63 Hun, 616 ; 18 N. Y. Supp. 683. 
 
 "La Croy v. N. Y., Lake Erie, 
 etc. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 570; 30 N. E. 
 891 ; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Dud- 
 ley, 90 Va. 304 ; 18 S. E. 374 ; Fort 
 
 look for obvious defects (Guinard v. 
 Knapp Co., 90 Wise. 123 ; 63 N. W. 
 635). " He must use his eyes, and 
 make such inspection as ordinary 
 care would require'" for obvious de- 
 fects (Fordyce v. Edwards, 60 Ark. 
 438 ; 30 S. W. 758). 
 '« It cannot be held that deceased 
 
 Wayne, etc. R. Co. v. Gruff, 133 was bound to know the unsafe con- 
 dition of the track, the defect not 
 being so palpable that he must neces- 
 Thus, one employed to select sarily have known of it (Pennsyl- 
 
 materials is necessarily bound to vania R. Co. v. Zink, 136 Pa. St. 288 ; 
 
 inspect them (Boettger v. Scherpe 17 Atl. 614). 
 
 Iron Co., 124 Mo. 87 ; 37 S. W. 466). 
 
 Ind. 13 ; 31 N. E. 460 ; Alexander v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 83 Ky. 589 
 
 13 
 
217] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 382 
 
 familiar with certain defects, he is charged, not only with notice 
 of them," but with the duty of making reasonable investiga- 
 tion into such further dangers as they would reasonably sug- 
 gest to him.^^ A servant is chargeable with actual notice of 
 every fact which he would have known, had he exercised 
 ordinary care to keep himself informed as to matters concern- 
 ing which it was his duty to inquire ; '' and especially should 
 this rule be applied, where the servant's action is founded 
 upon the assumption that the master ought to have known of 
 
 "Ryan v. Porter Manuf. Co., 57 
 Hun, 353 ; 10 N. Y. Supp. 774 [floor- 
 ing, used eight months] ; Goltz v. 
 Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 76 Wise. 136 ; 
 44 N. W. 752 [cracked track] : Schulz 
 Y. Johnson, 7 Wash. St. 403 ; 35 Pac. 
 130 [rope] ; Ragon v. Toledo, etc. R. 
 Co., 97 Mich. 265; 56 N. W. 613 
 [hole, readily visible]. 
 
 "Flood V. Western U. Tel. Co., 
 181 N. Y. 603; 30 N. E. 196 [cross 
 bars, notoriously not strong enough 
 to bear man's weight] ; Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co. V. Somers, 71 Tex. 700 ; 9 S. W. 
 741. A brakeman coupling a flat 
 car is entitled to assume that it is 
 properly loaded, but is nevertheless 
 bound to use proper diligence to dis- 
 cover any negligent loading which 
 renders the coupling dangerous, and 
 then to desist from the effort, or em- 
 ploy some method of avoiding the 
 danger (Northern Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Everett, 152 U. S. 107 ; 14 S. Ct. 474). 
 The omission of employer to supply 
 proper light does not excuse em- 
 ployee for exposing himself to un- 
 seen and unknown danger in the 
 dark, which he ought to have dis- 
 covered, had he made pi'oper use of 
 daylight (Stubbs v. Atlanta Oil Mills, 
 93 Ga. 495 ; 17 S. E. 746 ; Norfolk & 
 W. R. Co. v. Emmert, 83 Va. 640 ; 3 
 S. E. 145 [couplings] ; Gulf, etc. R. 
 Co. v. Kizziah, 86 Tex. 81 ; 33 S. W. 
 578 [cars and brakes]). 
 
 "Duffy V. Upton, 113 Mass. 544 
 [breaking of derrick- spar]. See De 
 Graff V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. Co., 
 76 N. Y. 135 [car-brakes of old pat- 
 tern, on wrong side of car] ; Perigo 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 53 Iowa, 276 ; 
 Mayes v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 63 
 Iowa, 563 [obvious defect]. In many 
 cases, the qualifying clause as to 
 duty to inquire is not stated (Nix v. 
 Texas, etc. R. Co., 83 Tex. 473 ; 18 S. 
 W. 571 ["knew or might have 
 known"] ; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Wil- 
 liams, 72 Tex. 159; 13 S. W. 173 
 [should have known] ; South Flor- 
 ida R. Co. V. Weese, 33 Fla. 312 ; 13 
 So. 436 ["should have known"]; 
 NeUing v. Industrial Manuf 'g Co., 
 78 Oa. 260 ["might, by ordinary 
 care "] ; Haley v. Jump River Lum- 
 ber Co., 81 Wise. 413 ; 51 N. W. 331, 
 956 [same] ; Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Monden, 50 Kans. 539 ; 31 Pac. 1003 
 [" in the performance of his duties, 
 must have known "]). But that con- 
 dition is always implied. Under 
 Code Ala. § 3590, which releases the 
 employer from liability when the 
 employee knew of the defects which 
 caused his injury, a plea is bad 
 which alleges that the employee 
 knew, "or by the exercise of due 
 care might have known," of the de- 
 fect (Louisville & N. R. Co. v. 
 Hawkins, 93 Ala. 341 ; 9 So. 271). 
 
383 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§2I8 
 
 something which he did not actually know.^ A servant is 
 certainly not chargeable with notice of that which he neither 
 knew nor was bound to know.'*' 
 
 § 2i8. Application of rule to minors. — It is now well set- 
 tled that the general rule, limiting the liability of a master to 
 his servant, applies to minor servants, as well as to others; no 
 distinction being made on account of their incapacity to con- 
 tract for the assumption of such perils.' Thus, where a serv- 
 ant is set at dangerous work, the mere fact of his minority 
 does not render the master liable for the risk, if the servant 
 has sufficient capacity to take care of himself, and knows and 
 can properly appreciate the risk.^ Therefore, if the risk is 
 obvious to him, and fully appreciated by him, and he has 
 entire liberty of action, the usual rules are held to apply.' 
 
 '" Lumley v. Caswell, 47 Iowa, 159 
 [explosion of a boiler] ; Cooper v. 
 Butler, 103 Pa. St. 412; Malone v. 
 Hawley, 46 Cal. 409 , see 111. Central 
 R. Co. V. Jewell, 46 111. 99. 
 
 '' Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Ward, 
 10 C. C. A. 166 ; 61 Fed. 037 ; Mc- 
 Namara v. Logan, 100 Ala. 187 ; 14 
 So. 175 ; Wells, etc. Co. v. Miskowicz, 
 50 111. App. 452 [no reason to suspect] ; 
 Cielfield v. Browning, 29 N. Y. Supp. 
 710 ; 9 N. Y. Misc. 98. 
 
 ■Buckley v. Gutta Percha Mfg. 
 Co., 113 N. Y. 540; 21 N. E. 717; 
 Hiokey v. Taaflfe, 105 N. Y. 26 ; 12 N. 
 E. 286 ; Crown v. Orr, 140 N. Y. 450 ; 
 35 N. E. 648; Gartland v. Toledo, 
 etc. R. Co., 67 111. 498 ; Houston, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Miller, 51 Tex. 370 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. V. Adams, 105 
 Ind. 151; 5 N. E. 187: King v. 
 Boston, etc. R. Co., 9 Cush. 113; 
 Zurn V. Tetlow, 134 Pa. St. 213 ; 19 
 Atl, 504. 
 
 "Where a minor is of sufHcient 
 age and discretion to comprehend 
 the dangers of an employment, the 
 fact that he is a minor cannot 
 exercise a controlling influence 
 (Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Hender- 
 son 184 Ind. 636 ; 33 N. E. 1031). 
 
 The fact that an employee, in- 
 jured by the alleged negligence of 
 his employer, is a minor, does not 
 require the question of his assump- 
 tion of risk to be submitted to the 
 jury, where it plainly appears from 
 undisputed evidence (Herold v. 
 Pfister, 93 Wise. 417 ; 66 N. W. 355). 
 The mother of an infant cannot re- 
 cover for injuries received by her 
 child by running a machine which 
 was safe when properly operated, in 
 the absence of evidence that the 
 employer failed to give warning of 
 the dangers of operation (Davis v. 
 Augusta Factory, 93 Ga. 713 ; 18 S. 
 E. 974). 
 
 3 Ogley V. Miles, 139 N. Y. 458 ; 34 
 N. E. 1059 [boy 16 : buzz-saw ; experi- 
 ence ; no instructions ; non-suit] ; 
 Ekendahl v. Hayes, 10 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 487 ; 43 N. Y. Supp. 236 [boy of 
 16 : disobedience of instructions ; 
 cog wheels] ; Oszkoscil v. Eagle 
 Pencil Co., 57 N. Y. Superior, 317; 
 6 N. Y. Supp. 501 ; Williamson v. 
 Sheldon Marble Co., 06 Vt. 437; 39 
 Atl. 669 [boy 16 : " danger perfectly 
 apparent "] ; Downey v. Sawyer, 157 
 Mass. 418; 32 N. E. 654 [boy 16: 
 dreaded the work ; nonsuit ; no 
 
§2l8] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 384 
 
 But, while the mere fact of minority is deemed immaterial, it 
 is also settled that any actual or presumptive incapacity of a 
 minor to understand and appreciate the perils to which he is 
 exposed is to be fully considered, and that he can recover 
 from his master for injuries suffered from any perils, the 
 nature of which he did not know, or could not properly 
 appreciate, if he did nominally know, and to which a prudent 
 and right-minded master would not have allowed him to be 
 exposed.* In effect, the weight of authority is in favor of 
 applying the same principles to the case of a young person in 
 service as to that of a child charged with contributory negli- 
 gence.^ He is held responsible for the exercise of that degree 
 
 point of coercion raised] ; Probert 
 V. Phipps, 149 Mass. 258 ; 31 N. E. 
 370 ; Curran V. Merchants' Mfg. Co., 
 130 Mass. 374 [boy over 14] ; Green- 
 way V. Conroy, 160 Pa. St. 185 ; 28 
 Atl. 692 [boy 14 : warned] ; McMelleu 
 V. Union News Co., 144 Pa. St. 333 ; 
 23 Atl. 706 [intelligent boy : jumping 
 off train ; nonsuit] ; Pennsylvania 
 Co. T. Congdon, 184 Ind. 326 • 33 N. 
 E. 795 [age 18 : 3 months' experi- 
 ence] ; Phillips V. Michael, 11 Ind. 
 App. 672 ; 39 N. E. 669 [girl nearly 
 16 presumed to appreciate extremely 
 obvious dangers] ; Casey v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 90 "Wise. 113 ; 62 N. W. 
 634 [age 18 ; assumed risk] ; Hef- 
 feren v. Northern Pao. R. Co., 45 
 Minn. 471 ; 48 N. W. 1, 526 [17 years : 
 obvious danger ; nonsuit] ; Ander- 
 son V. Morrison, 33 Minn. 274. A 
 number of similar Massachusetts de- 
 cisions are well stated in Patnode v. 
 Warren Mills, 157 Mass. 383 ; 32 N. 
 E. 161. A minor servant, old enough 
 and sensible enough to use his eyes, 
 and to take notice of the ordinary 
 operation of familiar natural laws, 
 and to govern himself accordingly, 
 acts at his own peril in failing so to 
 do (Kelly v. Barber Asphalt Co., 
 93 Ky. 363 ; 30 S. W. 271 [boy 17]). 
 
 ••Union Pacific R. Co. v. Fort, 17 
 Wall. 553 ; Coombs v. New Bedford 
 
 Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 578 ; Sullivan 
 V. India Man'f'g. Co., 113 Id. 396; 
 Hayden v. SmithviUe M'f'g. Co., 29 
 Conn. 548 ; Hickey v. Taafle, 105 N. 
 Y. 26, 36 ; 13 N. E. 286 ; Patnode v. 
 Warren Mills, 157 Mass. 283 ; 33 N. 
 E. 161 [boy of 14 : dull of inteUect] ; 
 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire, 3 
 Macq. 800 ; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 772 ; Turner 
 V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 40 W. Va. 
 675 ; 23 S. E. 8b [boy 16] ; Thompson 
 V. Johnston Co., 86 Wise. 576 ; 57 
 N. W. 398 [boy 16: little experi- 
 ence ; risk not assumed as matter of 
 law] ; Sprague v. Atlee, 81 Iowa, 1 ; 
 46 N. W. 756 [boy 13: verdict 
 stands] ; Northern Pac. Coal Co. v. 
 Richmond, 58 Fed..756; 7 C. C. A. 
 485 [for jury]. The language of 
 this paragraph was quoted, approved 
 and adopted in Hinckley v. Horaz- 
 dowsky, 188 IB. 359 ; 24 N. E. 431. 
 
 * Compare §§ 70, 73, ante. Atlas 
 Engine Works v. Randall, 100 Ind. 
 293. The negligence of the parent 
 or guardian in permitting the em- 
 ployment of a minor in the use of 
 dangerous machinery cannot be im- 
 puted to the latter (Huff v. Ames, 16 
 Neb. 139 [boy of 11]). But a father 
 who allows his boy to be employed 
 in a coal mine without stipulating 
 for such employment as will not ex- 
 pose him to danger disproportioned 
 
385 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§2I8 
 
 of care and discretion which is usual among young persons of 
 his age and circumstances, and for the use of ruch knowledge 
 as he actually has,^ but for nothing more.'' And great allow- 
 ance is made in favor of a minor rendering obedience to a 
 superior servant, where a servant of full age might have been 
 required to refuse such obedience' on account of obvious 
 danger. In general, these questions are to be left to the jury, 
 especially as to mere children.' The rule holding masters 
 responsible for risks assumed under their coercion is peculiarly 
 applicable in favor of minors, and especially young children. ■"' 
 Moreover (although we do not find that the point has been 
 judicially determined), we entertain no doubt that the coercion 
 
 to his years and discretion is negli- 
 gent, and cannot recover for injuries 
 to him ("Weaver v. Iselin, 161 Pa. St. 
 386 ; 29 Atl. 49). 
 
 8 Sullivan v. India Mfg. Co., 113 
 Mass. 396 ; Chicago R. Co. v. "Wil- 
 cox, 188 111. 370 ; 27 N. E. 899 ; 
 Evans v. Anieiican Iron Co., 42 Fed. 
 519. Minor servants are held to 
 assume those ordinary risks of their 
 service which are obvious to them, 
 or have been pointed out in a man- 
 ner suited to their youth and inex- 
 perience (Smith V. Irvrin, 51 N. J. 
 Lavsr, 507; 18 Atl. 852). 
 
 ' Hayden v. Smith ville Mfg. Co., 
 29 Conn. 548 ; Hinckley v. Horaz- 
 dowsky, 133 111. 859 ; 24 N. E. 421 ; 
 Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Gaffney, 
 119 Ind. 4.55 ; 21 N. E. 1103 [boy 10, 
 coupling coal cars] ; Luebke v. Ber- 
 lin Mach. Works, 88 Wise. 442 ; 60 
 N. W. 711 [age 16 : for jury]. A 
 boy of 14, presumed to be capable of 
 appreciating danger, yet he is not to 
 be held to the same degree of pru- 
 dence as a man of mature years 
 (Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. St. 348 ; 
 22 Atl. 910). See Texas, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Brick, 83 Tex. 598 ; 20 S. W. 511 
 [boy 19, with experience, not pre- 
 sumed to be equally responsible with 
 adult] ; Evans v. American Iron & 
 Tube Co., 42 Fed. 519 ; Norton v. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. I — 25] 
 
 Volzke, 54 111 App. 545. All cases 
 cited in note 4 are to the same effect. 
 
 8 Turner v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 
 40 W. Va. 675 ; 22 S. E. 83 [wrong- 
 ful orders of foreman : boy 16] ; 
 Hinckley v. Horazdowsky, 133 111. 
 359 ; 24 N. E. 421 [boy 12 : obvious 
 danger, ordered outside regular em- 
 ployment] ; Neilon v. Marinette, etc. 
 Paper Co., 75 Wise. 579; 44 N. W. 
 772 [ditto : boy 14] ; Jones v. Old 
 Dominion Cotton Mills, 83 Va. 140 
 [boy 13] ; Robertson v. Cornelson, 34 
 Fed. 716. See Gartside Coal Co. v. 
 Turk, 147 111. 120 ; 35 N. E. 467 [age 
 18 : only three days at work ; ex- 
 press orders]. 
 
 » McCarragher v. Rogers, 130 N. Y. 
 526 ; 24 N. E. 812 [boy 13] ; Heavey 
 V. Hudson, etc. Paper Co., 57 Hun, 
 339 ; 10 N. Y. Supp. 585 [boy 15]. 
 
 '" Mullin V. California Horseshoe 
 Co., 105 Cal. 77 ; 88 Pac. 535 [ditto : 
 boy 16, obeying unwillingly] ; Kehler 
 V. Schwenk, 151 Pa. St. 505 ; 25 Atl. 
 130 [boy 14 : unwilling ; urged ; for 
 jury]. Where a boy of 10 is under 
 control of full grown men, jury may 
 infer compulsion (Brazil Coal Co. v. 
 GaflPney, 119 Ind. 445 ; 21 N. E. 1103). 
 See, also. Ciriack v. Merchants' 
 Woolen Co., 151 Mass. 153 ; 23 N. E. 
 829 [boy 12 : dull ; ordered to be 
 quick]. 
 
§2I9l 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 386 
 
 of a parent or guardian, exercised in favor of the master, has 
 the same effect, in the case of a minor, as the coercion of the 
 master himself. The master of a minor servant is charged 
 with notice of such lack of capacity as is usual among minors of 
 the same age," so far as his age is or ought to be known by 
 the master,^^ and the burden of proving that the minor servant 
 had any greater capacity than this rests upon the master,'^ 
 while the burden of proving that he had less, and that the 
 master had notice of the fact, rests upon the servant. 
 
 § 219. Special duties of masters to minors. — It is the 
 
 duty of one who employs young persons in his service to take 
 notice of their apparent age and ability, and to use ordinary 
 care to protect them from risks which they cannot properly 
 appreciate, and to which they ought not to be exposed.' This 
 is a duty which cannot be delegated ; and any failure to per- 
 form it leaves the master subject to the same liability, with 
 respect to such risks, as if the child were not a servant.^ For 
 this purpose, the master must instruct such young servants in 
 
 " In an action by an infant for years of age is employed to do work 
 
 personal injuries received in the requiring the exercise of great care 
 
 course of an employment necessai-ily and judgment, the employer assumes 
 
 attended with danger, instructions the burden of proving that the child 
 
 should be given to find in his favor, was in fact competent, if sued for 
 
 on the ground that he had not injuries alleged to have resulted from 
 
 assumed the risks so as to require his negligence (Molaske v. Ohio Coal 
 
 him to exercise ordinary care and Co., 86 Wise. 330; 56 N. W. 475. 
 
 caution, unless his age, intelligence See Wynne v. Conklin, 86 Ga. 40 ; 
 
 and experience were such as to in- 13 S. E. 183 [boy 13 : nonsuit error]), 
 
 duce a man of ordinary care and ' Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13 ; 
 
 prudence to believe him qualified for Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage 
 
 the employment (De Lozier v. Ken- Co., 103 Mass. 573 ; Sullivan v. India 
 
 tucky Lumber Co., Ky. ; 18 Mfg. Co., 113 Id. 396 ; Nashville, etc. 
 
 S. W. 451 ; s. P., Taylor v. Wootan, R. Co. v. Elliot, 1 Coldw. 613 ; Lynch 
 
 llnd. App. 183 ; 27 N. E. 503). Sub- v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29. Where the 
 
 Btantially the same rule is stated or servant is a child of tender years, 
 
 implied in all the cases cited under the master is bound to a high degree 
 
 this section. of care (Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 
 
 '= Leistritz v. American Zylonite 72 Ga. 217). 
 
 Co., 154 Mass. 382; 28 N. E. 294; ^^ Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 
 
 GofC V. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 36 Fed. 37 Mich. 205 [minor, hired as com- 
 
 299. 
 
 13 Gulf, etc. R. Co. V. Jones, 76 
 Tex. 350; 13 S. W. 374 [boy 16: 
 brakeman]. Where a child 13 or 18 
 
 mon laborer, and ordered to act as 
 brakeman] ; followed in Jones v. 
 Lake Shore R. Co., 49 Mich. 573. 
 
387 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§219 
 
 their work ^ and warn them against the dangers to which it 
 exposes them/ and he must put this warning in such plain 
 
 3 Hill V. Gust, 55 Ind. 45 ; KeUer 
 V. Gaskill, 9 Ind. App. 670 ; 36 N. E. 
 303 ; Glover v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 148 
 Mass. 32 ; 18 N. E. 597 [girl 13, clean- 
 ing wheel] ; Sciolina v. Erie Pre- 
 serving Co., 7 N. Y. App. Div. 417 ; 
 39 N. Y. Supp. 916. Plaintiff having 
 been injured in cleaning a wheel, to 
 which, in order to clean it, it was 
 necessary to impart a peculiar mo- 
 tion, the question of her due care is 
 for the jury, she having testified that 
 she attempted to clean the wheel, 
 and give the required movement, as , 
 she had seen her fellow- servants do 
 (Glover v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 148 
 Mass. 33 ; 18 N. E. 597). The obliga- 
 tion to instruct does not necessarily 
 follow, as matter of law, from his 
 minority inexperience ; it is for the 
 jury (Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 
 94 Ga. 107; 20 S. E. 763). 
 
 * Tagg V. McGeorge, 155 Pa. St. 
 368 ; 36 Atl. 671 ; Smith v. Irwin, 51 
 N. J. Law, 507 ; 18 Atl. 853 ; Buckley 
 V. Gutta Percha Mfg. Co. , 41 Hun, 
 450 ; Gamble v. Hine, 50 Hun, 604 ; 
 3 N. Y. Supp 778 ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18 ; 9 
 N. E. 591 ; HofiEman v. Adams, 106 
 Mich. Ill ; 64 N. W. 7 [dangerous 
 horse ; no warning] ; May v. Smith, 
 93 Ga. 95; 18 S. E 360 [boy 17: 
 dangerous machinery] ; Nadau v. 
 White River Lumber Co., 76 Wise. 
 130 ; 43 N. W. 1 135 [cog-wheels : boy 
 19] ; Kaillen v. Northwestern Bed- 
 ding Co., 46 Minn. 187; 48 N. W. 
 779 [inexperienced boy 14 : rollers ; 
 spikes] ; Wallace v. Standard Oil 
 Co., 66 Fed. 360 [inflammable oils : 
 boy 17]. Persons who employ chil- 
 dren to work with or about danger- 
 ous machinery, or in dangerous 
 places, should anticipate that they 
 will exercise only such judgment 
 and discretion as is usual among 
 
 children of the same age, under 
 similar circumstances ; and are 
 bound to use due care, having re- 
 gard to their age and inexperience, 
 to protect them from dangers inci- 
 dent to the situation in which they 
 are placed ; and it is the duty of the 
 employer to so instruct such em- 
 ployees concerning the dangers 
 connected with their employment, 
 which, from their youth and inex- 
 perience, they may not appreciate 
 or comprehend, that they may, by 
 the exercise of such care as ought 
 reasonably to be expected of them, 
 avoid injuries (Cleveland Rolling- 
 Mill Co. V. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 283 ; 
 20 N. B. 466). It is proper to charge 
 that it is the duty of the employer of 
 an ignorant and inexperienced boy 
 of tender years to warn him of all 
 dangers incident to his employment 
 (Harris v. Shebek, 151 111. 287 ; 37 
 N. E. 1015). The master is not bound 
 to instruct what to do in case fellow- 
 servant is guilty of negligence (Sid- 
 dall V. Pacific Mills, 163 Mass. 378 : 
 38 N. E. 969). Compare Wilson v. 
 Steel-Edge Co. (163 Mass. 315; 39- 
 N. E. 1039), where no instructions 
 were asked by servant, nearly 31. 
 Master held not in fault. In Wolski 
 V. Knapp Co. (90 Wise. 178; 63 
 N. W. 87), there was evidence that 
 the employment was attended by 
 danger not obvious to one unac- 
 customed to the work, and that de- 
 ceased, a minor, had no experience, 
 and was not warned of the danger, 
 though testimony for defendant 
 tended to show that he had been 
 cautioned. Held, that the question 
 of defendant's liability was for the 
 jury. s. P., Armstrong v. Forg, 163 
 Mass. 544; 39 N. E. 190. In an 
 action involving the question of 
 negligence in setting an inexperi- 
 
219] 
 
 LIABILITY^ OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 388 
 
 language as to be sure that they understand it and appreciate 
 the danger.^ For it is not enough that he should do his best 
 to make children understand. They must no. be exposed to 
 dangers which they do not fully understand in fact." Bearing 
 in mind the natural forgetfulness of youth, he must renew this 
 warning from time to time, as may be reasonably necessary.' 
 And if the servant has not capacity enough to understand the 
 warning and appreciate the danger,* or for any other reason 
 does not in fact understand it,' the master will be liable for 
 any injury which such servant may suffer in consequence, if 
 continued at such work. But the master is not required to 
 point out dangers which are known or must be obvious to and 
 fully appreciated by the servant, after making due allowance 
 for his youth.*" Generally, this question is for the jury." 
 When, by statute, the employment of young persons in certain 
 
 enced person to work on a dangerous 
 machine, a witness, familiar with 
 the woi-king of the machine, may 
 describe what dangers there were 
 about it, and what precautions were 
 necessary to avoid them ; may testify 
 that the men usually employed upon 
 it were of mature age, the plaintiff 
 being a young lad ; and that, before 
 being set to work, such men were 
 carefully instructed in the use of the 
 machine (N. Y. Biscuit Co. v. Rouss, 
 SO C. C. A. 555 ; 74 Fed. 608). 
 
 * Honlahan v. New American File 
 Co., 17 R. 1. 141 ; 20 Atl. 268 ; Reisert 
 V. Williams, 51 Mo. App. 13 ; see 
 Coombs Y. New Bedford Cordage 
 Co., 103 Mass. 573 [boy, less than U, 
 set to work near unguarded cogs]. 
 SufiSciency of warning ; held, for 
 the jury to decide (Rummell v. Dil- 
 worth, 131 Pa. St. 509; 19 Atl. 346). 
 Warning held sufficient (Pratt v. 
 Prouty, 15! Mass. 333; 36 N. E. 
 1002). 
 
 * Instructions alone are not enough. 
 The child "must understand, in 
 fact " (Hickey v. Taaffe, 105 N. Y. 
 36, 36 ; 13 N. E. 286). 
 
 ' Repeated warnings held suflScient 
 (Tinkham v. Sawyer, 158 Mass. 485 ; 
 37 N. E. 6). 
 
 * Taylor v. Wootan, 1 Ind. App. 
 188 ; 37 N. E. 503. 
 
 9 Hickey v. Taaffe, 105 N. Y. 36 ; 
 13 N. E. 386 ; Chicago Brick Co. v. 
 Reinneiger, 140 lU. 384; 39 N. E. 
 1106. 
 
 "> Ogley V. Miles, 189 N. Y. 458 ; 34 
 N. E. 1059 [buzz-saw : nonsuit] ; 
 Buckley v. Gutta-Percha Mfg. Co., 
 113 N. Y. 540 ; 31 N. E. 717 [boy of 
 13] ; Gordon v. Reynolds' Card Co., 
 47 Hun, 378 [boy 18 : several months' 
 experience] ; Mackin v. Alaska Re- 
 frigerator Co., 100 Mich. 376; 58 
 N. W. 999; Prentiss v. Kent Mfg. 
 Co., 63 Mich. 478; 30 N. W. 109. 
 Master need not point out wholly 
 improbable dangers (Briggs v. New- 
 port News & M. V. Co. [Ky.], 34 
 S. W. 1069). 
 
 " The question whether, from pre- 
 vious experience, he should have 
 comprehended the danger, so that 
 neither warning nor instruction was 
 necessary, is for the jury (Chopin v. 
 Badger Paper Co., 83 Wise. 192; 58 
 N. W. 453). 
 
389 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§2193 
 
 dangerous work is prohibited, a person under the prescribed 
 age, who is thus employed, and suffers injury in consequence 
 thereof, is entitled to recover damages from the master.'^ 
 A minor must not be employed in dangerous work against the 
 will of his parent or guardian. ^^ 
 
 § 219a. Inexperienced servants, etc. — The principles gov- 
 erning the employment of minors are, to a large degree, also 
 applicable to the employment of inexperienced, ignorant, feeble 
 or incompetent servants.^ A master, having notice of any such 
 defect in a servant, no matter what his age may be, is bound 
 to use ordinary care to instruct the inexperienced^ or igno- 
 
 '^ Hickey v. Taaffe, 33 Hun, 7 ; re- determining his understanding, mat- 
 versed only on the ground that the ters of youth, intelligence, inexperi- 
 statute did not apply to that particu- 
 lar business (99 N. Y. 304). An em- 
 ployee in a factory may waive the 
 protection afforded by L. 1893, c. 673, 
 § 8, which provides that " no woman 
 under 31 years of age shall be allowed 
 to clean machinery while in motion " 
 (De Young v. Irving, 5 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 499 ; 38 N. Y. Supp. 1089). 
 
 " Hamilton v. Galveston, etc. R. 
 Co., 54 Tex. 556; Goff v. Norfolk, 
 etc. R. Co., 36 Fed. 299. Where a 
 party knowingly engages a minor in 
 a dangerous employment, against 
 the known will of the father, and 
 the minor is injured in such employ- 
 ment, such party is responsible to 
 the father for the consequent loss of 
 the services of the minor (Taylor v. 
 Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 41 W. Va. 
 
 704 ; 34 S. E. 631). Where a minor 
 
 is killed in a dangerous employment, 
 
 the mere fact that he was employed 
 
 without his father's consent does not 
 
 render the master liable to the father 
 
 for the loss of the minor's services, 
 
 but the employment must have been 
 
 against the will of the father (Toledo, 
 
 etc. R. Co. V. Trimble, 8 Ind. App. 
 
 338; 35 N. E. 716). 
 ' Where a servant is warned of the 
 
 dangerous character of nachinery, 
 
 and understands the danger, he can- 
 not recover for any injury ;^ but, in 
 
 ence, and the like, are to be consid- 
 ered (King V. Ford River Lumber Co. , 
 93 Mich. 173 ; 53 N. W. 10). 
 
 ^ Brennan v. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 
 489 ; 23 N. E. 810 [use of elevator] ; 
 Campbell v. Eveleth, 83 Me. 50 ; 21 
 Atl. 784 [lath saw] ; Cartter v. Cotter, 
 88 Ga. 386; 14 S. E. 476 [unsafe 
 machinery] ; Jones v. Florence Min- 
 ing Co., 66 Wise. 368 ; Greenberg v. 
 Whitoomb Co., 90 Wise. 325; 03 N. 
 W. 93 ; Reynolds v. Boston & M. R. 
 Co., 64 Vt. 66 ; 34 Atl. 1^4[brakeman: 
 double deadwoods] ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; 9 N. 
 E. 594 [same] ; Hungerford v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co., 41 Minn. 444; 43 
 N. W. 334 [brakeman coupling with 
 improper draft-iron] ; Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co. V. White, 76 Tex. 103 ; 13 S. 
 W. 65 [peculiar couplings] ; Texas 
 Mex. R. Co. V. Douglas, 73 Tex. 335; 
 11 S. W. 333. A railroad company 
 is bound to instruct a brakeman, 
 whose experience in the business has 
 been only five days, as to the propei- 
 mode to make the coupling of foreign 
 cars supplied with coupling appa- 
 ratus unlike its own, in using which 
 the danger is greater than in using 
 its own, and which cannot with 
 safety be coupled in the same man- 
 ner (Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Price, 
 73 Miss. 863; 18 So. 415). 
 
§ 219a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 390 
 
 rant,^ to avoid putting the feeble to work too heavy for their 
 strength,* and generally to refrain from exposing them to risks 
 which they are not fit to encounter. When the master has 
 notice of such ignorance or inexperience on the part of the 
 servant as would make the ordinary risks of the business 
 especially perilous to that servant, he must give the servant 
 explicit warning of the danger, and not allow him to undertake 
 the work without a full explanation of its perils.' Especially 
 is this duty of warning incumbent upon the master, when the 
 risks to be encountered are unusual or special.* These obliga- 
 tions are personal to the master.' On the other hand, the 
 master is not charged with these duties, without proof of 
 
 2 Kearney Electric Co. v. Laughlin, 
 45 Neb. 390 ; 63 N. W. 941 [common 
 laborer at excavation not instructed 
 to erect supports to tunnel] ; Rolh v. 
 Northern Pac. Lumber Co., 18 Oreg. 
 205 ; 33 Pac. 843 [unskilled servant] ; 
 Ingerman v. Moore, 90 Cal. 410 ; 37 
 Pac. 306 [concealed danger] ; White- 
 law v. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 16 Lea, 
 391 ; 1 S. W. 37 [young man 19]. 
 
 * Defendant guilty of negligence in 
 setting plaintiff to work at the 
 special task, knowing that he 
 lacked the strength and skill neces- 
 sary to do it safely (Yeaman v. 
 Noblesville Foundry Co., 3 Ind. App. 
 531 ; 30 N. E. 10). 
 
 5 Mather v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 391 ; 
 15 S. Ct. 464 [dynamite] ; Rummell 
 V. Dillworth, 111 Pa. St. 313 ; 3 Atl. 
 355 ; Gates v. State, 128 N. Y. 331 ; 
 28 N. E. 873 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18 ; 9 N. E. 594; 
 Davies v. England, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1335 
 [cutting diseased flesh] ; Spelman v. 
 Fisher Iron Co., 56 Barb. 151 [new 
 explosive] ; Smith v. Oxford Iron 
 Works, 43 N. J. Law, 467 ; Lofrano 
 T. N. Y. & Mt. Vernon Water Co., 
 55 Hun, 453; 8 N. Y. Supp. 717 
 [dynamite] : Evansville, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Maddux, 134 Ind. 571 ; 33 N. E. 
 345 ,■ 34 Id. 511 [unsafe condition of 
 road] ; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. 
 
 Harkins, 5 C. C. A. 336 ; 55 Fed. 
 933 ; see Gilbert v. Guild, 144 Mass. 
 601 ; 13 N. E. 368. See Ryan v. Los 
 Angeles Storage Co., 113 Cal. 344 ; 44 
 Pac. 471, for example of sufficient 
 evidence. 
 
 * A railroad company which con- 
 tinues to use a brake which is dan- 
 gerous because it is liable to throw 
 off suddenly, after a safer one is dis- 
 covered, is bound to warn an inex- 
 perienced brakeman of its danger 
 (Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Binion, 107 
 Ala 645 ; 18 So. 75). An inexperi- 
 enced brakeman will not be held 
 guilty of contributory negligence in 
 obeying an order to couple cars sup- 
 plied with coupling appliances dif- 
 ferent from those he had been in- 
 structed in regard to, on the theory 
 that he must have seen the difference, 
 and that their difference was suflfi- 
 cient warning of the increased dan- 
 ger (Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Price, 
 73 Miss. 863 ; 18 So. 415). And see 
 further, § 303, ante. 
 
 ' Master personally bound to in- 
 struct, in use of dangerous machin- 
 ery, servant known to him to be 
 unskilled ; and every one giving 
 such instruction is a vice-principal 
 (Brennan v. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 489 
 [elevator]). 
 
391 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§220 
 
 notice of the facts ;^ nor if the risks are known or perfectly- 
 obvious to the servant,' and he is capable of appreciating them ; 
 nor is he bound to give a detailed description of the risks to 
 be encountered or to anticipate every possible risk.'" The 
 master is not liable for injuries caused solely by the inexpe- 
 rience or ignorance of the servant since it is not culpable to 
 employ such a servant." 
 
 § 220. Servant's knowledge of master's personal defects. — 
 
 A servant's knowledge of his master's character and habits 
 does not protect the master from liability for the direct conse- 
 quences of his own negligence. For these he is liable, no 
 matter how well he is known by his servants to be of negli- 
 gent habits. Nor, indeed, does any knowledge of his general 
 negligence deprive his servants of remedy for the proximate, 
 though indirect, results of his negligence in particular things. 
 It is only where a servant knows that a particular duty has 
 not been performed, has no reason to expect that it will be. 
 
 8 Gorman v. Minneapolis, etc. R. 
 Co., 78 Iowa, 509; 43 N. W. 303. 
 Whether the master, at the time of 
 engaging a servant to work on dan- 
 gerous machinery, or afterwards, 
 ought to have inquired whether he 
 was experienced or not, or should 
 have taken notice, under all the 
 facts, of the probability that he was 
 not, nothing being said on the sub- 
 ject by either party, is a question for 
 the jury (May v. Smith, 92 Ga. 9) ; 
 18 S. E. 360). Ignorance by a serv- 
 ant of a malady which he had, and 
 which rendered certain labor dan- 
 gerous, and knowledge of it by his 
 master, is not sufficient to entitle 
 the servant to recover where the 
 master places him at such labor ; it 
 being necessary to show further that 
 the master did not know that the 
 servant was ignorant of it (Crowley 
 V. Appleton, 148 Mass. 98 ; 18 N. E. 
 675). 
 
 'So held where servant knew 
 (White V. Wittemann Lithographic 
 Co., 181 N. Y. 631 ; 30 N. E. 236 ; 
 
 Coullard v. Tecumseh Mills, 151 
 Mass. 85 ; 23 N. E. 731 [servant 
 familiar] ; Yeager v. Burlington, etc. 
 R. Co., 93 Iowa, 1 ; 61 N. W. 215 ; 
 McCue V. National Starch Co., 142 
 N. Y. 106 ; 30 N. E. 809 [undirected 
 use of machinery where danger 
 was obvious] ; Melzer v. Peninsular 
 Car Co., 70 Mich. 94 ; 42 N. W. 1078; 
 Crowley v. Pacific Mills, 148 Mass. 
 238 : 19 N E. 344 ; Townsend v. 
 Langles, 41 Fed. 919 ; International, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Arias, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 
 190; SOS. W. 446). 
 
 '"Thompson v. Allis Co., 89 Wise. 
 523 ; 62 N. W. 527 ; Foster v. Pusey, 
 8 Del. 168 ; 14 Atl. 545. 
 
 " Where an inexperienced man 
 enters on the duties of a conductor 
 of a railroad train, he cannot recover 
 for damages resulting vierely from 
 his inexperience, though the com- 
 pany knew of his want of skill when 
 it employed him (Alexander v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 83 Ky. 589). 
 See, also, §§ 218, 219, ante. 
 
§22lJ 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 392 
 
 and does not insist that it shall be, that he can be deprived of 
 the right to complain of its neglect ; and even this is usually a 
 question of fact, not of law.^ Therefore a servant is not 
 affected in his rights by his knowledge that his master is in 
 the habit of employing incompetent servants, or of furnishing 
 dangerous materials to his workmen, or of omitting to provide 
 adequate safeguards, or of neglecting that part of the work to 
 which he personally attends. He has, none the less, a right 
 to presume that the master will act prudently in his own case. 
 
 § 221. Servant's duty to vrarn and complain. — As a 
 
 general rule, servants owe to their masters the duty of giving 
 notice of circumstances which endanger their own safety ; and 
 they ought to complain of defects in materials and instrumen- 
 talities of their work,^ defects in their fellow-servants^ or 
 insufficiency of their numbers.^ They should ask that these 
 defects be remedied. And if they fail to do so, they are 
 usually considered to be guilty of contributory negligence.'^ 
 
 ' Lasure v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., 
 18 S. C. 275. 
 
 'Watts V. Boston Towboat Co., 
 161 Mass. 378 ; 37 N. E. 197 [grating 
 and cover badly worn] ; Keenan v. 
 Edison Electric Co., 159 Mass. 379 ; 
 34 N. E. 366 [no guard, as required 
 by statute : no complaint for two 
 months] ; N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Lyons, 119 Pa. St. 324: 13 
 Atl. 305 ; Patterson v. Pittsburgh, 
 etc. R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 389 ; Illinois 
 Central B. Co. v. Jewell, 46 lU. 99 ; 
 Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Eddy, 72 Id. 138; 
 Bogensohutz v. Smith, 84 Ky. 330 ; 1 
 S. W. 578 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. 
 Lynch, 90 III. 333 ; Consol. Mining 
 Co. V. Clay, 51 Ohio St. 542 ; 38 N. 
 E. 610 ; Chicago Coal Co. v. Norman, 
 49 Ohio St. 598 ; 33 N. E. 857 ; Hewitt 
 V. Flint, etc. R. Co., 67 Mich. 61 ; Kroy 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., ,33 Iowa, 357 ; 
 Muldowney v. 111. Central R. Co., 39 
 Id. 615 ; Youll v. Sioux, etc. R. Co., 
 66 Id. 348 ; 23 N. W. 736. 
 
 ^ Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Peavey, 29 
 Kans. 169 ; Halt v. Nay, 144 Mass. 
 
 186 ; approving Davis v. Deti'oit, 
 etc. R. Co., 20 Mich. 105 [conductor 
 injured through carelessness of en-_ 
 gineer, who became careless and in- 
 competent, and conductor knowing 
 it did not report him] ; and see other 
 cases to same effect, § 309, ante. A 
 servant assumes all dangers arising 
 from the known incompetency or 
 unskillfulness of a fellow-servant, 
 which he does not complain of or 
 make known to his master (Latre- 
 mouille v. Bennington, etc. R. Co., 
 63 Vt. 336 : 23 Atl. 656). 
 
 2 A railroad employee assumes th& 
 risk of collisions at a crossing having 
 no watchman, and knowing its dan- 
 gers, if he makes no complaint in 
 regard to its dangers and the neces- 
 sity of keeping a watchman there 
 (Rumsey v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 
 151 Pa. St. 74 ; 35 Atl. 37). 
 
 ^ Williams v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 119 Mo. 316 ; 24 S. W. 782 [spiral 
 spring, concealed in grass, grown 
 over track : no complaint]. 
 
393 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 221 
 
 This duty of warning, however, does not extend to defects and 
 dangers of which the master is already well aware,^ unless they 
 are of such a nature that, in the absence of complaint, the 
 master may reasonably assume that the servant is content to 
 take the risk of them.* They also owe a duty of warning their 
 masters of defects in themselves, which make the work danger- 
 ous to them.'' Thus, a servant who is set to do work to which 
 he is unaccustomed, and which he does not understand, ought 
 to inform his master of the fact ; ' and if, for want of such 
 warning, he is kept at work for which he is unfit, and suffers 
 injury thereby, he is himself in fault, and cannot generally 
 recover damages. Still more is this proper, where the servant 
 assures the master that he is competent, when he is not.' 
 But, in a few large establishments (it is commonly reported) it 
 is the rule to discharge forthwith any employee who makes a 
 complaint. On proof of such a practice, we cannot doubt that 
 every court would hold an injured servant relieved from the duty 
 of complaint, and, furthermore, that such employers would be 
 charged with personal notice of all defects which, but for this 
 tyrannous rule, would probably have come to their knowledge. 
 Failure to give warning of dangers unknown to the master, 
 which he could have guarded against, if warned, is contribu- 
 tory negligence.'" Warnings should be given or complaints 
 
 ' Where servants of railroad com- blasting, and was employed to use 
 
 pany superior to plaintiff knew of the same in his work at an increased 
 
 defects in the engine, it is no defense price. Held, that plaintiff from his 
 
 that plaintiff, though knowing of own negligence in undertaking to 
 
 them, failed to inform the company stir the material in the cap, without 
 
 (Seaboard Mfg. Co. v. Woodson, 98 first informing himself if it could 
 
 Ala. 878 ; 11 So. 733). safely be done, was not entitled to re- 
 
 «See § 211, ante. cover (Ray v. Jeffries, 86 Ky. 367 ; 
 
 ' It is one of the general implied 5 S. W. 867) . An untruthful state- 
 conditions of every contract for ser- ment, made by a servant when he 
 vice with an adult person that the enters upon employment, that he is 
 servant is competent to discharge accustomed to such work, relieves 
 the duties for which he is employed the master from the duty of explain- 
 (Union Pac. R. Co. v. Estes, 37 ing the dangers ordinarily incident, 
 Kans. 715 ; 16 Pac. 131). but does not qualify his obligation 
 
 ^ Whittaker v. Coombs, 14 111. App. to furnish reasonably safe appliances 
 
 498. (Steen v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 37 
 
 'Plaintiff represented to defendant Minn. 310 ; 34 N. W. 113). 
 
 that he was acquainted with and '"Harrison v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 
 
 skilled in the use of giant powder in 79 Mich. 409 ; 44 N. W. 1034. 
 
§222] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 394 
 
 made to some superior officer, and not to a mere fellow-servant 
 on an equal footing, nor to one known not to have charge of 
 such matters." But they maybe given to any superior, whose 
 duty it is to receive and forward such warnings to the master; 
 although he is not empowered to repair.'^ In cases of iextreme 
 danger, when the complaining servant knows that his com- 
 plaint has not been attended to. he should renew it to the 
 master or to the highest agent that he can conveniently 
 reach. *^ 
 
 § 222. Burden of proof. — The servant must affirmatively 
 prove the master's negligence, and that it was the proximate 
 cause of the injury.' The burden of proving that the master 
 had failed to establish or enforce proper rules, ^ or that instru- 
 mentalities were defective in quality or quantity,^ or that a 
 fellow-servant was incompetent,* or that the force of servants 
 was inadequate,^ and that the master is chargeable with notice 
 of such defects,^ rests upon the servant. In most American 
 
 " Chesapeake, etc. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Dowell, Ky. ; 24 S. W. 607. 
 
 " Pieart v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 82 Iowa, 148 ; 47 N. W. 1017 [brake- 
 man to yardmaster] ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Kenley, 93 Tenn. 307; 31 
 S. W. 326 [brakeman to conductor]. 
 
 "Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal 
 Co., 157 Pa. St. 153 ; 27 Atl. 577. 
 
 ' A master is liable for an injury 
 to his servant caused by the master's 
 negligence and the concurrent neg- 
 ligence of a fellow-servant, but the 
 burden is on the plaintiff to show 
 that the master's negligence is the 
 proximate cause of the injury (Union 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Callaghan, 56 Fed. 
 988 ; 6 C. C. A. 205). 
 
 " Potter V. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 136 N. Y. 77 ; 32 N. E. 603. 
 
 ^ So held as to defects in materials 
 (Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Howard, 45 
 Neb. 570; 63 N. W. 873; Mulligan 
 V. Crimmins, 75 Hun, 578 ; 27 N. Y. 
 Supp. 819). In an action by a serv- 
 ant for injuries caused by the break- 
 ing of a defective machine, the 
 
 refusal of the court to instruct, as 
 requested by defendant, that he was 
 not bound to explain the cause of 
 the accident, is not ground for com- 
 plaint, when it does instruct that the 
 breaking of the machine was no evi- 
 dence of neglect on the part of the 
 defendant (Ouillette v. Overman 
 Wheel Co., 163 Mass. 305 ; 38 N. E. 
 511). So as to insufflciency of sup- 
 ply (Potter V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 136 N Y. 77; 33 N. E. 603). 
 
 '' § 193, ante. A brakeman injured 
 in coupling cars has the burden of 
 proving that the person in charge of 
 the switch-engine was incompetent 
 as an engineer (Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Dunn, 138 Ind. 18 ; 36 N. E. 702 ; 37 
 Id. 546). 
 
 " Potter V. N. Y. Central E. Co., 
 136 N. Y. 77 ; 33 N. E. 603. 
 
 ' So held as to appliances (Beau- 
 lieu V. Portland, etc. Co., 48 Me. 391 ; 
 Columbus, etc. R. Co. v. Webb, 12 
 Ohio St. 475; Mansfield Coal, etc. 
 Co. V. McEnery, 91 Pa. St. 185; Allen 
 V. New Gas Co., L. R. 1 Ex. Div. 
 
395 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§ 222 
 
 courts it is held that, the plaintiff having proved the master 
 to be in fault, the burden of proving that the plaintiff also 
 had notice of such defect, and commenced oi continued his 
 service with such notice, rests upon the defendant.' This 
 fact being proved, it is then for the plaintiff to show, if he 
 can, that the defendant induced him to continue his work, 
 by promising to remedy the defect,^ or, in some other way, to 
 excuse his continuance without assuming the risk. In Eng- 
 land,' Indiana, Ohio, Maine and Texas,'" it is held that the 
 servant must affirmatively prove that he did not himself know 
 of the defect, or, if he did, that some fact existed which would 
 justify him in going on with the work, at the risk of the 
 master. In courts adhering to the general American rule, which 
 
 251 ; state v. Malster, 57 Md. 287 ; 
 East Tenn. etc. R. Co. v. Stewart, 13 
 Lea, 433 ; Nels6n v. DuBois, 11 Daly, 
 127 ; Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Duel, 
 134 Ind. 156 ; 33 N. E. 355 [defec- 
 tive engine]; Deane v. Roaring Forii 
 Light Co., 5 Colo. App. 521 ; 39 Pac. 
 346 [^vater valve]). But in Alabama, 
 the burden is not on plaintiff to 
 prove that defendant had knowledge 
 of the imperfection of brakes on a 
 train, whose defects, he alleges, 
 caused his accident (Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Coulton, 86 Ala. 129 ; 5 So. 
 458). The burden is on plaintiff of 
 showing that his employer was neg- 
 ligent in hiring a fellow-servant 
 whose incompetency caused plain- 
 tiff's injuries (Roblin v. Kansas City, 
 etc. R. Co., 119 Mo. 476; 24 S. W. 
 1011 ; St. Louis Press Brick Co. v. 
 Kenyon, 57 111. App. 640 ; Southern 
 Cotton-Oil Co. v.DeVond, Tex. 
 Civ. App. ; 25 S. W. 43; Mc- 
 Charles v. Horn Silver Co., 10 Utah, 
 470 ; 37 Pac. 733). See more fully 
 on this point g 192, ante. 
 
 ' Cowles V. Richmond & D. R. Co., 
 84 N. C. 309 [brakeman]. So in 
 Massachusetts, under "Employers' 
 Liability Act" (Connolly v. Walt- 
 ham, 156 Mass. 368 ; 31 N. E. 303). 
 So under N. Y. statute requiring 
 
 fire escapes (Gorman v. McArdle, 67 
 Hun, 484; 33 N. Y. Supp. 479). 
 
 ' This (which was part of our old 
 section 99) was accepted as sound 
 law in Greenleaf v. 111. Central R. 
 Co., 29 Iowa, 14 ; and yet, in Belair 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 43 Id. 663, 
 the court seems to have held that it 
 was incumbent on the plaintiff to 
 show by a preponderance of testi- 
 mony, his want of knowledge and 
 of means of knowledge, of the 
 defect. 
 
 ' In Griffiths v. London, etc. Docks 
 Co. (L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 493 ; affi'd, 
 13 Id. 259), the " statement of claim " 
 was held insufficient for want of an 
 allegation that the danger was 
 known to the master and unknown 
 to the servant. On this ground, 
 Seymour v. Maddox (16 Q. B. 326) 
 may be sustained in England. On 
 the merits, we think it could not be. 
 It was questioned in Ryan v. Fowler, 
 24 N. Y. 410. Neither case is good 
 law in the United States, except in 
 Indiana. 
 
 '" Chicago, etc. Coal Co. v. Nor- 
 man, 49 Ohio St. 598 ; 33 N. E. 857 ; 
 Buzzell V. Laconia Mfg. Co., 48 Me. 
 113 ; LouisviUe, etc. R. Co. v. Orr, 
 84 Ind. 50 ; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Crowder, 63 Tex. 503. 
 
§223J 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 396 
 
 puts the burden of proving contributory fault upon the defense, 
 the servant is not required to prove affirmatively his freedom 
 from fault ; but the master must prove that the servant was in 
 fault, if he relies upon this as a defense ; " and it is for the master 
 to prove, if he can, that the servant understood and appreciated 
 extraordinary risks, due to the master's negligence."* In the 
 minority of states, the burden of proof is upon the servant.** 
 But everywhere it is for the master to prove that he gave 
 such warning of danger as the law requires him to give. It • 
 will not be presumed that he did so." 
 
 §223.* What is sufficient proof. — As in other cases, it is 
 not enough for the servant to prove an accident causing him 
 injury, while in service,' unless there is something in the very 
 
 " Thus it is held in a majority of 
 the states that in an action by a 
 servant against his master, the bur- 
 den of proving contributory negli- 
 gence is on defendant (Whaley v. 
 Bartlett, 43 S. C. 454 ; 20 S. E. 745 ; 
 Johnston v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 95 Ga. 685 ; 33 S. E. 694 ; Jones v. 
 Malvern Lumber Co., 58 Ark. 125 ; 
 23 S. W. 679 ; Comer v. Consol. Min- 
 ing Co., 34 W. Va. 533 ; 12 S. E. 476 ; 
 Buokner v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 72 Miss. 873; 18 So. 449 ; Missouri, 
 etc. R. Co. v. Hogan, 88 Tex. 679 ; 33 
 S. W. 1035). 
 
 " When the servant shows that 
 his injury was in consequence of an 
 increased risk, not incident to his 
 ordinary employment, but growing 
 out of the master's negligence, the 
 burden of proof is on the master to 
 show that the servant understood 
 the increased dangers (Norfolk, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Ward, 90 Va. 687 ; 19 S. E. 
 849). 
 
 " Gayette v. Fitchburg R. Co., 163 
 Mass. 549 ; 39 N. E. 188 ; Tyndale v. 
 Old Colony R. Co., 156 Mass. 503; 31 
 N. E. 6.'55 : Reardon v. N. Y. Card 
 Co., 51 N. Y. Superior, 134; Keller 
 
 V. Gaskill, 9 Ind. App. 670 ; 36 N. E. 
 303; Baker v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 95 Iowa, 168 ; 63 N. W. 667 ; Musick 
 V. Dold Packing Co., 58 Mo. App. 
 333. 
 
 '* Grimmelman v. Union Pac. B. 
 Co., Iowa, ; 70 N. W. 90. 
 
 ' Proof that machinery fell upon 
 the servant and broke is not sufficient 
 proof of negligence, in the absence of 
 any direct evidence that the ma- 
 chinery was insecure or unsafe (Dob- 
 bins V. Brown, 119 N. Y. 188 ; 33 N. 
 E. 537). To the same effect, Cahill 
 V. Hilton, 106 N. Y. 513 ; 13 N. E. 
 339 ; LatremouiUe v. Bennington, 
 etc. R. Co., 68 Vt. 336; 22 Atl. 656; 
 Murphy v. Greeley, 146 Mass. 196 ; 
 15 N. E. 654 ; Bahr v. Lombard [Ct. 
 EiTors], 53 N. J. Law, 333 ; 21 Atl. 
 190 ; Fenderson v. Atlantic City R. 
 Co. [Ct. Errors], 56 N. J. Law, 708 ; 
 31 Atl. 767 ; Stewart v. Ohio River 
 R. Co., 38 W. Va. 438 ; 18 8. E. 604 ; 
 30 S. E. 933 ; Huff v. Austin, 46 Ohio 
 St. 386 ; 31 N. E. 864 [explosion of 
 boiler, not enough] ; Jones v. Ala- 
 bama Mineral R. Co., 107 Ala. 400 ; 18 
 So. 30 [servant thrown off hand car ; 
 not enough] ; Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 * This .section is substantially new. 
 
397 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§223 
 
 nature of the accident which affords evidence of the master's 
 fault.^ The proper evidence of a fellow-servant's incompetency 
 and notice thereof has been already sufficiently discussed.^ 
 Proof of an error of judgment on the part of a competent serv- 
 ant will not sustain a verdict for a fellow-servant.* Proof of 
 defects, without proof also of notice to the master, is, of course, 
 insufficient.' If the ground of complaint is the failure to keep 
 a path in order, it must be shown that the master had notice 
 of the servant's proper use of that path.' Proof that the place 
 
 Godfrey 155 111. 78 ; 39 N. E. 590 
 [collision] ; Wintuska v. Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co., [Ky.] ; 20 S. W. 819 
 [cause in doubt] ; Redmond v. Delta 
 Lumber Co., 96 Mich. 545 ; 55 N. W. 
 1004 ; Murray v. Denver, etc. R. Co., 
 11 Colo. 134 ; 17 Pac. 484 ; Brymer v. 
 Southern Pac. Co., 90 Cal. 496 ; 27 
 Pac. 371 ; Madden v. Occidental & 
 Oriental S. S. Co., 86 Cal. 445; 35 
 Pac. 5 ; Lindall v. Bode, 73 Cal. 245 ; 
 13 Pac. 660. The mere fact of a col- 
 lision does not establish a presump- 
 tion of negligence on the part of a 
 railway company in favor of its em- 
 ployees, such a pi'esumption existing 
 only in favor of passengers (Smith v. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co., 113 Mo. 70 ; 30 
 S. W. 896) . The mere fact that the 
 body of a track-walker was found 
 near his employer's track, in such a 
 position as to indicate that he was 
 struck by one of its trains, does not 
 impute negligence to the company 
 (Johnston v. East Tennessee, etc. R. 
 Co., [Ky.] 80 S. W. 41.5). 
 
 ^ Such is sometimes the case, as in 
 Transjwrtation Co. v. Downer, 11 
 Wall. 139 ; Wasliington v. Missouri, 
 etc. R. Co., 90 Tex. 814 ; 38 S. W. 764. 
 Where a servant is injured by the 
 defective manner in which a wheel 
 in the tackle block of a derrick was 
 held in place, and it appears that 
 the pin holding the wheel in place 
 would not have worked out if it had 
 been securely fastened into the 
 block and had been kept in that con- 
 dition, the working out of the pin is 
 
 presumptive evidence tliat the mas- 
 ter failed to exercise ordinary care 
 (Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 331 ; 39 
 Atl. 380) . A lineman was putting up 
 a telegi-aph wire, when both the wire 
 and the cross-arm broke, and the 
 lineman was thrown to the ground 
 and killed. Held, in the absence of 
 positive evidence that the materials 
 were carefully selected by the com- 
 pany, and the evidence as to tlieir 
 actual soundness being conflicting, 
 that their breaking showed tliem 
 inadequate, and a judgment against 
 the company was sustained (Clairain 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co., 40 La. 
 Ann. 178 ; 3 So. 635). 
 
 'Seeg 193, ante. 
 
 « Keith V. Walker Iron Co., 81 Ga. 
 49 ; 7 S. E. 166. 
 
 ' Proof that the brake on defend- 
 ant's car was out of order at the time 
 of the accident, and that plaintiff was 
 thereby unable to control the car, so 
 that it ran away with him, is not 
 sufficient to estabhsh the negligence 
 for which a master is responsible to 
 his servant (Mixter v. Imperial Coal 
 Co., 153 Pa. St. 395; 25 Atl. 587). 
 
 "There were three other routes 
 from deceased's work to his home, 
 some of which he sometimes took, 
 There was no evidence of defend- 
 ant's knowledge that the deceased 
 ever took this route. Held, that 
 plaintiff could not recover (O'Don- 
 nell V. Duluth, etc. R. Co., 89 Mich. 
 174; 50 N. W. 801). 
 
§223] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 398 
 
 or materials of work were defective, in such respect that, if a 
 proper inspection had been maintained, the defects would 
 probably have been ascertained in time to prevent the injury- 
 complained of, is sufficient.' But it is not enough to prove a 
 defect which may have been beyond the reach of inspection.^ 
 Evidence of long neglect to repair,' and of frequent complaints,'" 
 is entirely proper. Proof of defects in the place of work, though 
 not originally due to negligence, is proper, to show neglect to 
 put it in order, sufficient time having elapsed." Proof that a 
 machine has acted badly before is competent to prove notice 
 of the defect and negligence in failing to repair.'^ The serv- 
 
 ■" Union Pac. R. Co. v. Daniels, 153 
 U. S. 684 ; 14 S. Ct. 756 ; Bailey v. 
 Rome, etc. E. Co., 139 N. Y. 803 ; 34 
 N. E. 918 ; Babcock v. Old Colony R. 
 Co., 150 Mass. 467 ; 33 N. E. 335 ; 
 and many other cases, cited under 
 § 194a, ante. 
 
 ^ Grant v. Pennsylvania, etc. Canal 
 Co., 133 N. Y. 657 ; 31 N. E. 230. 
 
 ' Evidence that the defective con- 
 ditions existed more than a year be- 
 fore the accident, is I'elevant (Nichols 
 V. Brush, etc. Mfg. Co., 53 Hun, 137 ; 
 6 N. Y. Supp. 601). Evidence that a 
 brateman, while about to make a 
 coupling betvsreen moving bars, 
 stepped into a ditch, and was in- 
 jured ; that he was not aware of the 
 existence of said ditch ; that a rule 
 of defendant permitted couplings to 
 be made when the cars were moving 
 at a safe rate of speed ; and that de- 
 fendant's foreman, who had charge 
 of the roadbed, knew of the ditch 
 for several months before the acci- 
 dent,— established a, prima facie case 
 of negligence (HoUenbeck v. Missouri 
 Pac.R. Co., [Mo.]; 34 S. W. 494). 
 
 '"To show that the defective con- 
 dition of the still in which the em- 
 ployee was required to work was 
 known to the employer, evidence 
 that another employee had, prior to 
 the accident, repeatedly complained 
 of it to the superintendent, is ad- 
 
 missible (Nichols v. Brush, etc. Mfg. 
 Co., 53 Hun, 137 ; 6 N. Y. Supp. 601). 
 
 " Where part of the roof of a 
 mine, from which rock fell and in- 
 jured plaintiff, was known to the 
 officers to consist of treacherous rock, 
 needing constant watching, and lia- 
 ble to be loosened if wet ; and where 
 it appears that it had not been prop- 
 erly tested for weeks ; that it had 
 long been wet ; that similar rock 
 near by had been supported or re- 
 moved — it is a question for the jury 
 whether the failure to support or 
 remove such rock was a lack of or- 
 dinary care in providing a safe place 
 for the miners to work in (Union 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Jarvi, 58 Fed. 65 ; 3C. 
 C. A. 438 ; 10 U. S. App. 439). To 
 same effect, Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Wilson, 48 Fed. 57 ; 4 U. S. App. 35 ; 
 1 C. C. A. 25 [flooded track] ; Davis 
 T. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 78 
 Hun, 285 ; 28 N. Y. Supp. 819 [waUs 
 weakened by dynamite explosion] ; 
 Perry v. Rogers, 91 Hun, 343 : 86 N. 
 Y. Supp. 208 [rock loosened by 
 blasting]. 
 
 "i McCarragher v. Rogers, 120 N. Y. 
 526; 24 N. E. 812 [machinery not 
 guarded by netting]. When an 
 elevator fell a second time and in- 
 jured a servant, proof of the former 
 fall was admissible to show notice 
 to the master (Malone v. Hawley, 46 
 
399 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§223 
 
 ant is not bound to show the precise nature of a defect in 
 appliances ; '^ but he must so far prove the nature of the defect 
 as not to leave a fair mind unable to decide whether the injury- 
 was caused by it or not." Proof of a dangerous variation in 
 appliances from what is usual and s^ie, combined with due 
 proof of notice, is sufificient evidence of negligence.^'' Proof that 
 a machine acted in an unusual and dangerous manner calls for 
 explanation from the master.'^ When the absence of peculiar 
 
 Cal. 409). For drawing down to its 
 proper position a heavy spring in a 
 locomotive, a railroad company pro- 
 vided a jack-screw and chain. The 
 spring was unusually strong, and 
 the chain broke without apparent 
 cause, and an employee was injured 
 by the recoil of the spring. The 
 chain had broken before when used 
 for tlie same purpose. Held, suffi- 
 cient evidence of negligence (Krog- 
 stad V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 46 
 Minn. 18 ; 48 N. W. 409). But com- 
 pare Dingley v. Star Knitting Co., 
 134 N. Y. 553 ; 33 N. E. 35, where 
 belt shifting itself three times, held, 
 by a divided court, no evidence of 
 negligence. 
 
 '^ "Where an employee is injured 
 by defective machinery, it is not 
 necessary to his recovery therefor 
 that he should be able to show the 
 precise nature of the defect (Nelson 
 v. St. Paul Plow Works, 57 Minn. 
 48 ; 58 N. W. 868). While plaintiff 
 was engaged in changing a saw in 
 defendant's mill, a log cai-riage, 
 which had been left at rest, with the 
 steam shut off, and the lever locked, 
 suddenly started, and injured plain- 
 tiff. Held, proper to refuse instruc- 
 tions that plaintiff cannot recover if 
 it does not appear what was the real 
 cause of the starting of the machine, 
 since he was only required to furnish 
 evidence from which defendant's 
 negligence might be inferred, and 
 was not bound to point out the par- 
 ticular act or omission which caused 
 
 the accident (Mooney v. Connecticut 
 River Lumber Co., 154 Mass. 407 ; 38 
 N. E. 353). 
 
 '■■■Dingley v. Star Knitting Co., 
 134 N. Y. 553 ; 33 N. E. 35. If the 
 injury maybe inferred to have arisen 
 from either of two causes, equally 
 probable, one of whit^h is attributable 
 to the employee, a nonsuit is proper 
 (Id). 
 
 ■' Bennett v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 
 3 N. D. 113 ; 49 N. W. 408 [couphng : 
 drawbars] ; Texas, etc. R. Co. v. 
 White, 83 Tex. 543 ; 18 S. W. 478 
 [brake]. A brakeman, while coupling 
 a flat car and coach, where it ap- 
 peared that the bumpers were broken 
 from the flat car ; that the draw- 
 heads on the cars were of a different 
 make, so that they did not come to- 
 gether evenly ; that a spring on the 
 coach drawhead used to keep it in 
 position had been removed for re- 
 pairs ; and that the brakeman knew 
 of the condition of the cars, — the 
 question of whether the appliances 
 furnished by the company were suffi- 
 cient was for the jury (White v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 73 Miss. 13 ; 
 16 So. 248). 
 
 " While plaintiff failed to specifi- 
 cally assign a cause for the sudden 
 movement of the machinery, yet, 
 such movement being entirely out 
 of the usual manner of its operation, 
 it afforded prima facie evidence of 
 some want of care in its construction 
 or condition (Blanton v. Bold, 109 
 Mo. 64 ; 18 S. W. 1149). 
 
§223] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS 
 
 400 
 
 precautions is complained of, it must be shown that such are in 
 use elsewhere, or that in some other way prudence dictated 
 them." Evidence of precautions taken in other establishments 
 is competent.'^ Failure to supply an appliance, asked for on 
 the mere ground of convenience, the servant himself not think- 
 ing it needed for safety, is no evidence of negligence." Where 
 negligent omission of warning against danger is proved, it is- 
 not necessary to prove also that the master foresaw the conse- 
 quences.^" Evidence that a machine, while in the same con- 
 dition as at the time of the accident, worked well, both before 
 and after that, is competent in disproof of negligence.^' Oaths 
 and violent language, in giving orders, are held to be no evi- 
 dence of negligence by themselves.^^ Contributory negligence, 
 in courts where it is held a matter of defense, cannot be inferred 
 
 " A declaration alleging that de- 
 fendants had hired plaintiff to run a 
 lath machine, but failed to keep it 
 safe by providing a pit and carrier 
 for refuse, is fatally defective, as 
 not alleging a custom to provide 
 such pit or carrier, what means were 
 proper to guard the saw while re- 
 moving debris, that the plaintiff 
 could not stop the saw, or that it 
 was necessarily unsafe to remove 
 the debris while it was moving, or 
 that plaintiff was inexperienced, 
 how long he had been at said work, 
 or that he had ever told defendants 
 of the defect, or that they had failed 
 to instruct him (Torongo v. Salliotte, 
 99 Mich. 41 ; 57 N. W. 1043). Where 
 one oiling a machine is injured by 
 its starting up by a belt working 
 fi-om the loose pulley to the tight 
 pulley, the employer is not liable, 
 though the accident could not have 
 happened had there been something 
 with which to lock the lever used in 
 shifting the belt from the tight pul- 
 ley to the loose pulley, and back 
 again, there being no evidence that 
 the machinery was defective, or dif- 
 ferent from that in use elsewhere 
 (Ross V. Pearson Cordage Co., 164 
 Mass. 357 ; 41 N. E. 284). 
 
 ■» Bannon v. Lutz, 158 Pa. St. 166 ; 
 27 Atl. 890 [oil refinery : precautions 
 not used] 
 
 " Plaintiff had asked for and been 
 promised skids, whereon to slide the 
 box from one car to the other, but 
 he made request merely from con- 
 siderations of convenience, and not 
 because he thought any other method 
 of moving the box dangerous. 
 Held, that the failure of the master 
 to furnish skids was not negligence 
 (Gowen v. Harley, 56 Fed. 973 ; 6 C. 
 C. A. 190). 
 
 ™ Where defendant employed an 
 inexperienced man to do work which 
 was unsafe unless performed by a 
 skilled workman, without caution- 
 ing him expressly as to the danger, it 
 was not necessary to show further 
 that defendant should have fore- 
 seen that an accident would probably 
 occur, in order to hold him liable 
 (Ryan v. Los Angeles Storage Co., 
 113 Cal. 344 ; 44 Pac. 471). 
 
 " Tremblay v. Harnden, 163 Mass. 
 383 ; 38 N. E. 973. 
 
 '' Coyne v. Union Pac. R. Co., 133 
 U. S. 370 ; 10 S. Ct. 383 ; see also 
 Williams v. Churchill, 137 Mass. 
 243. 
 
40I LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 224 
 
 from the mere accident, any more than the master's neghgence 
 could be.^ 
 
 § 224. Who are fellow-servants. — We now approach a 
 line of questions, which have given rise to irreconcilable dif- 
 ferences of opinion, and upon which the cases must be mar- 
 shaled in divergent lines ; although much progress has been 
 made, in the last ten years, towards a solution upon principle. 
 The master's exemption from his ordinary liability for the 
 negligence of his servants only applies, where the servant in 
 fault is a fellow-servant, in the same common employment 
 with the injured servant. Leaving the latter point for future 
 consideration, it is needful to determine first : Who are fellow- 
 servants ? To a certain extent, all the cases agree, and all rest 
 upon an intelligible principle. Any person in the employ- 
 ment of the same master, and under his control, whether his 
 position is equal, inferior or superior to that of the injured 
 servant,' so long as he is not entrusted with a power of control 
 over that servant,^ is a fellow-servant with him. No extent of 
 difference in their wages, social position, or work, affects the 
 question.^ Thus, a merchant's clerk, although (as is frequently 
 the case) the equal of his employer in social position, is, in the 
 eye of the law, a fellow-servant with the boy who sweeps out 
 the store and lights the fiires. And a servant who was form- 
 erly employed by the same master is, with respect to his 
 negligence while so employed, to be considered the fellow- 
 servant of another, who, being subsequently engaged, is 
 injured by the after-effects of such negligence, if they would 
 have been considered fellow-servants, had the former remained 
 in the same service.* 
 
 23 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Middle- 112 U. S. 377 ; Little Miami R. Co. v. 
 
 ton [Ct. Errors], 57 N.J. Law, 154; 31 Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415; Pittsburgh, 
 
 Atl. 616. etc. R. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Ohio St. 
 
 iKumler v. Junction R. Co., 33 198). 
 Ohio St. 150 [engineer and laborer] ; = gge cases cited under § 241, post, 
 Randall v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., * Wilson v. Merry, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 
 
 109 U. S. 478 [engineer and brake- 326 [the only point rightly decided 
 
 man or switchman] ; Kimmer v. in that case] ; Butler v. Townsend, 
 
 Weber, 151 N. Y. 417 ; 45 N. E. 860. 126 N. Y. 105 ; 26 N. E. 1017 ; Haley 
 
 For illustrations, see § M\,post. v. Keim, 151 Pa. St. 117 ; 25 Atl 98 ; 
 
 •' This is the test under the Ohio Burns v. Sennett, 99 Cal. 363 ; 38 
 
 rule {Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Ross, Pac. 916. 
 [Law of Neq. Vol. 1—26] 
 
§225] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 402 
 
 § 225. Who are not fellow-servants. — Mere co-operation, 
 or community of labor and ultimate purpose, is not enough to 
 make men fellow-servants. They are not fellow-servants 
 unless they are all under the control and direction of a com- 
 mon master.' Therefore, where a servant works side by side 
 with one employed by his master as an independent contrac- 
 tor,^ or with a servant of such contractor,^ or the servant of a 
 contractor works with the servants of a subcontractor * or 
 with the servants of another independent contractor,' they are 
 not fellow-servants, even though they help to do the same 
 work, for the benefit of the same ultimate employer; and the 
 master of either servant is, therefore, responsible for an injury 
 
 ' Cited and approved (Svenson v. 
 Atlantic, etc. S. S. Co., 57 N. Y. 108); 
 whei-e a servant of owners of a barge, 
 engaged in lightening a steamship, 
 was injured by negligence of steam- 
 ship crew. To same effect, Johnson 
 V. Lindsay, 1891, Eng. App. Gas 371 ; 
 Central E. Co. v. Stoermer, 1 U. S. 
 App. 276 ; 51 Fed. 518 ; Kilroy v. 
 Delaware, etc. Canal Co. 131 N. Y. 
 22 ; 24 N. E. 192 [captain and serv- 
 ants of consignee] Louisville, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Hawthorn, 147 111. 236 ; 35 
 N. E 534 ; Union Pao. E. Co. v. 
 Billeter, 28 Neb. 433 ; 44 N. W. 483 
 [train, engineer and loaders]. To the 
 contrary was Ewan v, Lippincott, 
 47 N. J. Law, 193 ; practically over- 
 ruled in New Jersey (Hardy v. Dela- 
 ware, etc. R. Co., 57 N. J. Law, 505 ; 
 81 Atl. 281) and certainly not law. An 
 engine hostler, employed by a rail- 
 road company, taking a locomotive 
 to the yards of a terminal company, 
 and a car accountant employed by 
 the terminal company, were not 
 fellow -servants (Northern Pac. E. 
 Co. V. Craft, 16 C. C. A. 175; 69 Fed. 
 134). 
 
 - Eeagan v. Casey, 160 Mass. 371 ; 
 36 N. E. 58. Where a stevedore en- 
 gaged in discharging cargo was in- 
 jured by being struck by a sling 
 which the winchman employed by 
 
 the vessel started too rapidly, the 
 doctrine of fellow-servants did not 
 apply, and the ship was liable (Pavi 
 V. The Victoria, 69 Fed. 160. s. p., 
 Fletcher v. Peto, 3 Fost. & F. 368 ; 
 Wadsworth v. Duke, 50 Ga. 911 
 
 ^Cunard S. S. Co v. Carey,119 U. 
 S. 345 [longshoreman and boss of 
 coal-heavers] ; Goodfellow v. Bos- 
 ton, etc. E. Co., 106 Mass. 461 ; 
 Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 Hurlst. & 
 N. 143 [servant of cartman injured 
 by servants of warehouseman] ; Sey- 
 bolt V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 
 95 N. Y. 563 [mail agent and railroad 
 employee] ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Price, 96 Pa. St. 256 [same] ; Hous- 
 ton, etc. R. Co. V. Hampton, 64 
 Texas, 437 [same] ; Sanford v. 
 Standard Oil Co., 118 N. Y. 571 ; 24 
 N. E. 313 [stevedore and wliarfinger's 
 engineer] ; Kane v. Mitchell Transp. 
 Co., 90 Hun, 65 ; 35 N. Y. Supp. 581 
 [laborer and deck-hand]. 
 
 ■* Gerlach v. Edelmeyer, 88 N. Y., 
 645 ; 47 N. Y. Super. 293 ; Curley v. 
 Harris, 11 Allen, 112: Johnson v. 
 Lindsay, 1891, Eng. App. Cas. 371;. 
 overruling Wiggett v. Fox, 11 
 Exch. 833. See Necker v. Harvey, 
 49 Mich. 517. 
 
 * Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570 ; 
 35 N. E. 101 ; Burrill v. Eddy, 160^ 
 Mass. 198 ; 35 N. E. 488. 
 
403 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 L§225 
 
 caused by such servant's negligence in such work to the other 
 servant. Still more clear is it that, where two or more 
 employers use the same property for their respective pur- 
 poses, the servants of one do not become fellow-servants with 
 the servants of the other, by their concurrent use of the same 
 thing. Therefore, a servant of a railroad company, employed 
 upon a section of road used by it in common with another 
 corporation, may recover against that corporation, for the 
 negligence of its servant.^ And where one corporation hires 
 from another the use of its track, a servant of the former can 
 recover from the latter for any injury caused by defects in the 
 track,''' and a servant of the latter corporation may recover 
 fiom the former for the negligent management of its trains,^ 
 in the same manner as a stranger; the servants of neither being 
 fellow-servants with those of the other.^ It makes no differ- 
 ence that, for limited purposes, the two servants were for the 
 time under the direction of a single superintending agent/** 
 or subject to the rules of a single corporation." Nor can 
 
 6 Smith V. Harlem K. Co., 19 N. 
 Y. 127 ; Sawyer v. Rutland, etc. R. 
 Co., 37 Vt. 370'; Warburton v. Great 
 Western R. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 30 ; 4 
 Hurlst. & C. 695 ; Graham v. North 
 Eastern R. Co., 18 C. B. N. S. 339 ; 
 Phillips V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 64 
 Wise. 475 ; 35 N. W. 544. To same 
 effect, Swainson v. North Eastern R. 
 Co., L. R. 3 Ex. Div. 841 ; Zeigler v. 
 Danbury, etc. R. Co., 52 Conn. 543 ; 
 Omaha, etc. R. Co. v. Morgan, 40 
 Neb. 604; 59 N. W. 81 [joint use 
 Station grounds] ; Central R. v. 
 Stoermer, 51 Fed. 518; 3 C. C. A. 
 360; 1 U. S. App. 276 [limiting 
 Ewan V. Lippincott, 47 N. J. Law, 
 198; Johnson v. Boston, 118 Mass. 
 114]. 
 
 'Snow v.. Housatonic R. Co., 8 
 Allen, 441 ; Graham v. Northeastern 
 R. Co., 18 C. B. N. S 239 ; Philadel- 
 phia, etc. R. Co. V. State, 58 Md. 373 ; 
 Augusta, etc. R. Co. v. Killian, 79 
 Ga. 234 ; 4 S. E 165. 
 
 ^ Catawissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, 
 49 Pa. St. 186 ; Sullivan v. Tioga R. 
 Co., 112 N. Y. 613 ; 30 N. E. 569 ; 
 Texas, etc R. Co. v. Easton, 3 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 378 ; 31 S. W. 575 ; Noo- 
 nan v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 63 
 Hun, 618 ; 16 N. Y. Supp. 678 ; affi'd, 
 131 N. Y. 594. 
 
 ' Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. State, 
 58. Md. 373. 
 
 '"Johnson v. Netherlands Nav. 
 Co., 133 N. Y. 576; 30 N. E. 505 
 [stevedore and winchman] ; Tierney 
 v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 85 Hun, 
 146 ; 33 N Y Supp. 637 [common 
 superintendent] ; Noll v. Philadel- 
 phia, etc. R. Co., 163 Pa. St. 504 ; 30 
 Atl. 157. 
 
 " Jones V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 125 
 Mo. 666 ; 38 S.W. 883 [parlor car por- 
 ter] ; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Kelley, 
 4 Colo. App. 325 ; 35 Pac. 923 [express 
 agent subject to railroad rules]. 
 
§ 226] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 4O4 
 
 contracts between masters, unknown to an injured servant, 
 take away his rights in this respect.'^ 
 
 § 226.* American rule : vice-principals not fellow-serv- 
 ants. — At an early day, American judges divided sharply upon 
 the question of the liability of a master to his servants, for the 
 negligence of a servant of superior grade and in control of 
 other servants. The question was passed upon, almost at the 
 same time, in the East and the West : the Massachusetts court 
 holding strongly in favor of masters,' and the Ohio court 
 strongly against them.^ A long conflict of opinions followed ; 
 and when our last edition was prepared, in 1887, there was no 
 general settled rule. Although entire unanimity has not yet 
 been reached on some material points, several fundamental 
 principles are fully agreed upon. It is now universally held, 
 in American courts, that a master always may have, and some- 
 times must have, a servant, who acts as his representative or 
 alter ego towards other servants ; and that for the negligence 
 of such representative, while acting as such, the master is 
 responsible to the other servants, precisely as if it were his 
 own.^ By general consent such representative, while acting as 
 
 "'Robertson V. Boston, etc. R. Co., against two strongly inclined to- 
 
 160 Mass. 191 ; 35 N. E. 775 ; Strader wards the English rule ; yet, in much 
 
 V. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 86 more recent cases, it has been firmly 
 
 Hun, 613 ; 33 N. Y. Supp. 761. established in Pennsylvania that the 
 
 ' Albro V. Agawam Co. , 6 Cush. 75. chief manager of any separate de- 
 
 '^ Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens, partment of a business is not a 
 
 20 Ohio, 415. fellow-servant of those who are 
 
 ^ So held in Maine (Shanny v. under his absolute orders, with re- 
 
 Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 420); spect to those orders, and that, for 
 
 Bliode Island (Mann v. Oriental his negligence in giving such orders, 
 
 Printworks, 11 R. I. 153; Mulvey the master is responsible to a servant 
 
 V. Rhode Island Works, 14 Id. 304 ; injured in consequence of his obedi- 
 
 Brodeur v. Valley Falls Co., 16 Id. ence (Frazier v. Penn. R. Co , 38 Pa. 
 
 448); New York (Corcoran v. Hoi- St. 104; Patterson v. Pittsburgh, etc. 
 
 brook, 59 N. Y. 517 ; Pantzar v. Tilly R. Co., 76 Id. 389 ; MuUan v. Phila- 
 
 Iron Co., 99 Id. 868; 2 N. E. 24; delphia S. S. Co., 78 Id. 35 [steve- 
 
 compare Malone v. Hathaway, 64 dore]). It is unnecessary to cite cases 
 
 N. Y. 5) ; Michigan (Shumway v. from other states , as all other courts 
 
 Walworth Mfg. Co., 98 Mich. 411 ; 57 holding the American doctrine at 
 
 N. W. 251). Although in Ryan v. all, hold this and much moi-e, as will 
 
 Cumberland V. R. Co. (23 Pa. St. be seen further on. Even Mas- 
 
 384), the opinion cf three judges sachusetts is no exception ; for 
 
 * This section is entirely recast. 
 
405 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§227 
 
 such, is called a "vice-principal." And a vice-principal is not 
 a " fellow-servant." 
 
 § 227. British rule : no vice-principals.— In Great Britain, 
 where the name of "vice-principal" was invented,^ it is now 
 settled that, as the result of the obiter dicta of two superannu- 
 ated judges, in the famous case of Wilson v. Merry, the whole 
 idea of liability for vice-principals "is exploded." The com- 
 mon master is not responsible to any of his servants for the 
 negligence of any other, even though the negligent servant is 
 in supreme and exclusive control over the entire business, the 
 master being always absent or being a corporation.^ This 
 monstrous and iniquitous ruling was not essential to the 
 decision of that case. It was founded upon pretended infer- 
 ences from decisions of inferior tribunals, in "none of which 
 was any such point clearly decided, and in the latest of which 
 the whole court conceded that a master was liable for the 
 negligence of his general representative.^ As to the reasoning 
 
 although its courts persist in saying 
 that all servants of a corpoi'ation are 
 fellow-servants (Rogers v. Ludlow 
 Mfg. Co., 144 Mass. 198 ; 11 N. E. 77 ; 
 Mackin v. Boston, etc. E. Co., 135 
 Mass. 201), they no longer mean 
 anything more by that phrase than 
 is implied by the New York rule or 
 Webster's Dictionary. Mississippi 
 decisions to the contrary (Lagrone v. 
 Mobile, etc. R. Co., 67 Miss. 593 ; 7 So. 
 433; New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hughes, 49 Miss. 358 ; Howd v. Miss. 
 Central R. Co., 50 Id. 178) have been 
 abrogated by the new Constitution 
 and statutes. ( See § 341a, post.) 
 ' Murphy v. Smith, 19 C. B. N. S. 361. 
 2 Wilson V. Merry, L. R. 1 Scotch 
 App. 336 ; thus interpreted, with 
 hardly a struggle by counsel, in 
 Howells V. Landore Co., L. R. 10 
 Q. B. 68. Limited to this, in John- 
 son v. Lindsay [1891], App. Cas 371 , 
 65 Law Times, 97 ; but followed as 
 to this, in Hedley v. Pinkney S. S. 
 Co. [1894], App. Cas. 333 [shipmaster 
 fellow-servant with seamen]. 
 
 ^ The history of the cases upon 
 which the House of Lords rested 
 their dieta is briefly as follows: In 
 Wigmore v. Jay (5 Exch. 354), a 
 master builder was held not respon- 
 sible for original defects in a scaf- 
 fold, which were known to his fore- 
 man in charge, but not known to a 
 woi'kman directed to work upon it 
 nor to the master personally. It was 
 supported by no argument, but 
 simply referred to the opinion in 
 another case, decided at the same 
 time, which had no bearing on this 
 question. But it was followed, with 
 much hesitation, in Gallagher v. 
 Piper (16 C. B. N. S. 669), Byles, J., 
 dissenting, and Williams, J., doubt- 
 ing ; while the other two judges 
 simply held themselves bound by the 
 previous case. In Murphy v. Smith 
 (19 C. B. N. S. 361), the same court 
 agreed that the rule would not apply 
 to a "vice-principal." In Feltham 
 V. England (L. R. 2 Q. B. 33), it was 
 held that a "foreman or manager" 
 was not such a vice-principal, be- 
 
§ 228] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 406 
 
 of the noble lords themselves, it is entirely beneath criticism. 
 Had it been used as an argument at the bar, any court would 
 have resented it, as an insult to the human understanding. 
 
 § 228. British rule criticised. — The British rule has been 
 justly condemned everywhere. Its only excuse is founded 
 upon the assumption that a master owes to his servants no 
 duty with respect to their management and control, that he is 
 not bound to see that they receive reasonable orders, or are 
 put at proper work, or not sent into places of danger. But 
 this assumption is unfounded and unjust. No court has ever 
 doubted that a master was liable to his servants, if he personally 
 ordered his servants to encounter needless dangers, of which 
 he was aware and they were not. Indeed, what is the special 
 attribute of the master? What distinguishes him from any 
 one else ? Is it the mere fact that he provides materials for 
 the work, or that he selects the servants ? Is it not, more than 
 anything else, that in him is vested the right and duty of 
 supervision, of giving orders, of directing what work shall be 
 done, and how it shall be done?' If the master chooses to 
 delegate this authority to some one else, on what possible 
 principle can he be allowed to relieve himself from the respon- 
 sibility of having proper orders given ? We cannot find that 
 a single judge, in any part of the United States, has really 
 followed either the decision or the dicta in Wilson v. Merry. 
 Yet nothing is more common than to see that case cited in 
 some American courts as an authority ; while its very dicta 
 are occasionally quoted, as at least worthy of great considera- 
 
 cause, in that case "the master still decisions were so technical as to be 
 
 retained control of the establish- a " disgrace to jurisprudence." The 
 
 ment," and the foreman "was not opinions so often quoted were de- 
 
 . . . the representative of the livered by Lord Cairns and Lord 
 
 master." The court again simply Chelmsford, both of the most bigoted 
 
 followed Wigmore t. Jay, without and narrow type of politics ; and the 
 
 independent reasoning. These are latter, always a poor judge, all the 
 
 all the cases cited by the House of more because he was an able advo- 
 
 Lords, as conclusive of British law ; cate. 
 
 and they all rest upon qne slipshod, 'Quoted and followed, Bloyd v. 
 
 unreasoned decision of the Ex- St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 58 Ark. 66 ; 2a 
 
 chequer, in the time of Baron S. W. 1089 ; also, substantially, in 
 
 Parke: a court of which English Carlson v. Northwestern Tel. Co., 63 
 
 critics have said that many of its Minn. 428; 65 N. W. 914. 
 
407 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 229 
 
 tion.' It is time to bring tliis mistaken policy to an end. So 
 far as it is possible to ascertain the point actually decided, in 
 Wilson V. Merry, it was that the master is not bound to use 
 any further care to make or keep the place, on which his serv- 
 ants are required to do their work, safe for their use, than to 
 select a competent servant to attend to that matter. This is 
 exploded in every American court, including Massachusetts.^ 
 The dicta so often quoted from that case, as interpreted by 
 the English courts, are to the effect that no corporation, not 
 even a railway company, is ever responsible to its servants for 
 the negligence of its highest officers. This doctrine also is 
 exploded in America.* In short, the case of Wilson v. Merry 
 is one not fit to be cited in any American court, on any point 
 whatever. 
 
 § 229. British rule condemned at home. — The decision in 
 Wilson V. Merry was received with a storm of censure in Great 
 Britain. All independent legal critics condemned it ; and 
 nobody ever defended it. It is well known that the British 
 Parliament has always been composed almost exclusively of 
 wealthy employers, for whose benefit the decisions of the 
 British courts on this point were made. Yet a parliamentary 
 committee reported in 1877 that these decisions were unjust 
 and ought to be abrogated, saying, among other things: 
 " Where the actual employers cannot personally discharge the 
 duties of masters, or where they dehberately abdicate their 
 functions and delegate them to agents, the acts or defaults of 
 the agents who thus discharge the duties and fulfill the func- 
 tions of the masters should be considered as the personal acts 
 or defaults of the principals and employers, and should impose 
 the same liability on such principals and employers as they 
 would have been subject to had they been acting personally in 
 the conduct of their business, notwithstanding that such agents 
 are technically in the employment of the principals ; " ' and in 
 1880 these principles were given partial effect by the Employ- 
 'ers' Liability Act, which we quote elsewhere. In 1893, the 
 
 2 This is especially true of Massa- ^ See § 230, post. 
 chusetts, New York aud Maryland. ■ 11 Irish Law Times, 354 ; less 
 
 'Rogers v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 144 fully, 21 Solicitors' Journal, 754. 
 Mass. 198 ; 11 N. E. 77 ; where Wil- 
 son V Merry is expressly overruled. 
 
§ 230] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 408 
 
 House of Commons passed a much broader measure, substan- 
 tially abolishing the entire judge-made limitations on the lia- 
 bility of masters to servants for the negligence of fellow-serv- 
 ants, and forbidding contracts for exemption from the new 
 law. The House of Lords insisted on amendments permitting 
 such contracts for exemption ; to which the Commons refused 
 to agree ; and thus the entire bill fell through. The new 
 government, although its members defeated the last bill, have 
 pledged themselves to carry through something of the same 
 general nature, which will at the very least consign " Wilson v. 
 Merry " to that oblivion which alone it can adorn. 
 
 § 230.* Who are vice-principals : general managers. — 
 
 The master must either give a general management to his 
 work or be responsible for the negligence of those to whom he 
 delegates that management. He cannot efface himself, trans- 
 fer all his powers to a substitute and relieve himself from all 
 responsibility as to the mode in which those powers are exer- 
 cised, even as to his servants. Where the master is a corpora- 
 tion, there must of necessity be at least one vice-principal ; 
 because the corporation itself cannot perform any of the per- 
 sonal duties of a master.^ And where an individual master 
 abdicates from control and puts the whole power of super- 
 intendence into other hands, he necessarily has one or more 
 vice-principals.^ It is, therefore, universally agreed in America, 
 that any person to whom is committed, under such circum- 
 stances, the entire control of all the servants, including the 
 
 ' Duval V. Hunt, 34 Ma. 85 ; 15 So. other employers on this ground. 
 
 876, 887 ; Hunn v. Mich. Central R. This was said in order to let an 
 
 Co., 78 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. 502. individual master avoid liability. 
 
 Corporations are responsible to serv- In Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Baum 
 
 ants for the negligence of their di- (26 Ind. 74), the court said that the 
 
 rectors (Warner v. Erie R. Co., 49 mere suggestion of a distinction be- 
 
 Barb. 558 ; reversed on another tween corporations and individuals 
 
 ground. 39 N. Y. 468 ; Texas Mexican was "not fit to be made.'' But this 
 
 R. Co.v. Whitmore, 58Tex. 276),gen- was said to let a corporate master 
 
 eral managers and managers of de- avoid liability. 
 
 partments, etc. See subsequent notes; ^Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 
 
 also. Malone v. Hatliaway, 64 N. Y. 517 ; Ryan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179 ; 
 
 5, distinguishing corporations from 15 N. W. 172. 
 
 * This section is entirely recast. 
 
409 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§230 
 
 power to Jiire and discharge, is a vice-principal ; ^ for whose 
 negligence, in all management of the business, the master is 
 liable to his servants.* It is in like manner agreed that the 
 manager of any distinct department of a varied or extended 
 business, having such power in his department, is a vice- 
 principal with respect thereto.^ In some states, such as Ohio, 
 
 ^ " When the general management 
 and control of an industrial enter- 
 prise is delegated to a superintend- 
 ent, with povver to hire and dis- 
 charge servants, to direct their labors 
 and obtain and employ suitable 
 means and appliances for the con- 
 duct of the business, such super- 
 intendent stands in the place of the 
 master " (Pantzar v. Tilly Min. Co., 99 
 N. Y. 368 ; 2 N. E. 24 ; Hathaway v. 
 Des Moines, Iowa, ; C6 N. W. 
 188). So held, as to railroad super- 
 intendents (Patterson v. Pittsburgh, 
 etc. R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 389 ; Hunting- 
 ton, etc. R. Co. V. Decker, 84 Id. 419 ; 
 Laning v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 49 
 N. Y. 521 ; Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 56 Id. 44 ; Mann v. Delaware, 
 etc. Canal Co., 91 Id. 495 ; Pitts- 
 burgli, etc. R. Co. v. Henderson, 37 
 Ohio St. 549 ; Krogg v. Atlanta, etc. 
 R. Co., 77 Ga. 203 ; Kansas Pac. R. 
 Co. V. Little, 19 Kans. 267); mine 
 superintendents (Pantzar v. Tilly 
 Min. Co., supra : Chicago, etc. Brick 
 Co. V. Sobkowiak, 148 111. 573 ; 36 N. 
 E. 572 ; Ryan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 
 179; 15 N. W. 72), or "foremen" 
 of mines, having entire control 
 (Reddon v. Union Pac. R. Co., 5 
 Utah, 344; 15 Pac. 263: Trihay v 
 Brooklyn Lead Min. Co., 4 Utah, 
 468 ; 11 Pac. 612). The principle in- 
 cludes any person to whom the gen- 
 eral superintendent, with the assent 
 of the master, delegates his powers 
 (Lasky v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 83 
 Me. 461 ; 23 Atl. 367). •' The agent 
 who represents the corporation, as 
 master over other employees for the 
 time, is in the shoes of the corpora- 
 
 tion ; and whether they fit him, and 
 he wears them with propriety, or 
 not, is their concern " (Atlantic Cot- 
 ton Co. V. Speer, 69 Ga. 137). So 
 held, as to individual employers : 
 Corcoran v. Holbrook, supra ; Mitch- 
 eU V. Robinson, 80 Ind. 381 ; Fort v. 
 Whipple, 11 Hun, 586. This is 
 especially the rule where the busi- 
 ness managed is one entirely dis- 
 tinct from that which the master 
 personally supervises (Id. ; Cook v. 
 St. Paul, etc. E. Co. 34 Minn. 45; 
 34 N. W. 311 ; Whaley v. Bartlett, 
 42 S. C. 454 ; 20 S. E. 745 ; conceded 
 in Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5). 
 
 * Limited to this, in most courts. 
 See § 231, post. 
 
 5 Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Peterson, 
 162 U. S. 840 ; 16 S. Ct. 843 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Eoss, 113 U. S. 
 377, 390 [approved on this point, in 
 Baltimore, etc. E. Co. v. Baugh, 149 
 U. S. 368] ; Mullan v. Phila. S. S. 
 Co., 78 Pa. St. 2.) [stevedore] ; Mc- 
 Govern v. Central Vt. E. Co., 123 N. 
 Y. 281 ; 29 N. E. 373 [entire charge 
 of grain bin] ; Kimmer v. Weber, 81 
 Hun, 599 ; 30 N. Y. Supp. 1103 [fore- 
 man in full charge : master some- 
 times visiting] ; Davis v. Central R. 
 Co., 55 Vt. 84 ; Harrison v. Detroit, 
 etc. E. Co., 79 Mich. 409 ; 44 N. W. 
 1034 ; Eyan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 
 179 ; 15 N. W. 73 [mine boss] ; Hunn 
 V. Mich. Central E. Co., 78 Mich. 513 ; 
 44 N. W. 503 ; Baldwin v. St. Louis, 
 etc. E. Co., 75 Iowa, 397 ; 39 N. W. 
 507 ; Dayharsh v. Hannibal, etc. E. 
 Co., 103 Mo. 570 ; 15 S. W. 554 ; Gal- 
 veston, etc. R. Co. V. Drew, 59 Tex. 
 11. So held as to foreman in charge 
 
§ 230] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 410 
 
 Kentucky, Michigan, Texas, Montana, Utah, the master is 
 responsible for the negligence of such a vice-principal, in any 
 matter connected with the service of the master, whether in 
 management or not.^ But this is not the general rule.'^ In 
 most states, including Ohio, one who is a vice-principal only 
 by virtue of his power of superintendence and control is a vice- 
 principal only as to those who are under his control.' In all 
 but a very few states, such as Texas,' although power to hire 
 and discharge existed, and is referred to in most cases, yet the 
 lack of power either to hire or discharge is not material;'" and 
 
 of gang : Woods v. Lindvall, 48 Fed. 
 63 ; 4 U. S. App. 49 ; 1 C. C. A. 37 ; 
 Cleveland, etc. E. Co. v. Brown, 
 56 Fed. 804; 6 C. C. A. 143; but 
 these cases are limited, if not over- 
 ruled, in the Peterson case, below. 
 The boss of a separate "little job " is 
 not necessarily a vice-principal (.Mc- 
 Donald V. Eagle Mfg. Co., 68 Ga. 
 840 ; What Cheer Coal Co. v. John- 
 son, 56 Fed. 810; 6 C. C. A. 148 
 [foreman in part of mine, under 
 superintendent] ; see Thorn v. Pit- 
 tard, 63 Fed. 232 ; 10 C. C. A. 353 ; 8 
 U. S. App. 597). The foreman of an 
 extra gang of track repairers, whose 
 sole duty it was to supervise the 
 work of track repairing over some 
 eighteen or twenty miles of the road- 
 bed of a railroad company, to hire 
 the men necessary to do that work, 
 and to direct the operations of the 
 force so employed, is not a vice- 
 principal, and a workman in the 
 gang, injured by his fault, but not 
 as a result of his orders, cannot re- 
 cover againet the company (North- 
 ern Pac. E. Co. V. Peterson, 163 U. 
 S. 346 ; rev'g s. c, 51 Fed. 183 ; 3 C. 
 C. A. 157 ; 4 U. S. App. 574). 
 
 "This certainly seems to be the 
 rule declared in several Michigan 
 decisions, with unanimous concur- 
 rence of the court (Eyan v. Bagalev, 
 50 Mich. 179 : 15 N. W. 73 ; Slater v. 
 Chapman, 67 Mich. 523; 35 N. W. 
 106 ; Shumway v. Walworth, etc. 
 
 Mfg. Co., 98 Mich. 411 ; 57 N. W. 
 251 ; Palmer v. Mich. Cent. E. Co., 
 93 Mich. 363 ; 53 N. W. 397 [assistant 
 roadmaster] ; Schroeder v. Flint, etc. 
 E. Co., 103 Mich. 213; per Mont- 
 gomery, J., 61 N. W. 663 ; yet there 
 are intimations of doubt as to this 
 rule in the last case cited. This is 
 the undoubted rule in Montana (Berg 
 V. Boston, etc. Min. Co., 12 Mont. 
 213 ; 39 Pac. 545 ; Kelley v. Cable Co., 
 7 Mont. 70; 14 Pac. 633), and the 
 other states mentioned (see § 233a, 
 post). 
 
 ' See § 231, post 
 
 'Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co. v. De- 
 vinney, 17 Ohio St. 198. Two fore- 
 men of gangs working independently, 
 but under the same roadmaster, are 
 fellow-servants (Sherrin v. St. Jo- 
 seph, etc. E. Co., 103 Mo. 378; 15 
 S. W. 443). 
 
 « Campbell v. Cook, 86 Tex. 630; 
 26 S. W. 486. Otherwise, by statute 
 ' of 1891, as to railroads. 
 
 " A master is liable for the negli- 
 gence of a superintending employee 
 in directing his subordinates, though 
 he has no power to hire and dis- 
 charge (Foster v. Missouri Pac. E. 
 Co., 115 Mo. 165 ; 31 S. W. 916 ; Mil- 
 ler V. Mo. Pac. E. Co., 109 Mo. 350 ; 
 19 S. W. 58 ; Dayharsh v. Hannibal, 
 etc. E. Co., 103 Mo. 570; 15 S. W. 
 554 ; Mooi-e v. Wabash, etc. E. Co., 85 
 Mo. 588 ; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Id. 13 
 Madden v. Chesapeake & O. E. Co., 
 
411 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§231 
 
 the power of superintendence and control is the test." Even 
 that is not necessary to prove vice-principalship in other 
 matters than giving orders, as, for example, in providing or 
 inspecting places or appliances for work.^^ Where a general 
 manager of a department is appointed in obedience to a 
 statute, making such appointment compulsory, and making 
 such manager personally responsible and independent of his 
 employer's control, such employer is not responsible for any- 
 thing more than due care in selecting him. He is not a vice- 
 principal ; because he is not really an agent of the principal.'* 
 The rule of law as to vice-principals has apparently not yet 
 been settled in Florida. 
 
 § 231.* Who are vice-principals; New York rule.— It was 
 
 finally settled, as the law of New York, by the famous case of 
 Crispin v. Babbitt,' that " the liability of the master does not 
 
 38W. Va. 610). A conductor is, in re- 
 lation to those subject to bis orders on 
 the train, a vice-principal, whether 
 he has (Shadd v. Georgia, etc. R. 
 Co., 116 N. C. 968; 31 S. E. 554), or has 
 not (Mason v. Eichmond, etc. R. Co., 
 114 N. C. 718; 19 S. E. 363. s. c, 
 111 N. C 483; 16 S. E. 698) power 
 to hire and discharge. ' ' The power 
 to hire and discharge is ■ " • in 
 many cases, of little moment" 
 (Schroeder v. Flint, etc. R. Co., 103 
 Mich. 313 ; 61 N. W. 663). 
 
 "Miller v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.. 
 109 Mo. 350 ; 19 S. W. 58 ; Hamilton 
 t' Walla Walla, 46 Fed. 198 [second 
 mate : not having superintendence]. 
 '2 Jaques v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 
 66 N. H. 483 ; 33 Atl. 553. 
 
 " The mining boss required by the 
 act of 1885 to be employed by mine 
 owners, is a fellow-servant with the 
 miners at work in the mine ; and, if 
 the owners have exercised reason- 
 able care in tlie selection of a mining 
 boss, they are not liable for injuries 
 to workmen resulting from his negli- 
 gence (Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal 
 
 Co., 157 Pa. St. 153; 37 Atl. 577; 
 Coke Co. V. Roby, 115 Pa. St. 364 ; 6 
 Atl. 593 ; Delaware, etc. Canal Co. 
 V. Carroll, 89 Pa. St. 374). s. p., 
 Colorado Coal, etc. Co. v. Lamb, 6 
 Colo App. 255; 40 Pac 251. 
 
 ' This rule, first propounded by 
 Church, C. J. (Flike v. Boston, etc. 
 R. Co., 58 N. Y., 549), in 1873, was 
 declared to be the law in Crispin v. 
 Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 [where a gene- 
 ral manager carelessly let steam into 
 an engine while the plaintiff was 
 engaged in working upon the en- 
 gine] ; re-affirmed in McCosker v. 
 Long Island, etc. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 
 77 [yard-master at the wrong mo- 
 ment signaled to back up] ; s. P., 
 Brick V. Rochester, etc. K. Co., 93 
 N. T. 211 [general superintendent 
 aiding in repair of railroad]). In all 
 these cases the rule seems to us to 
 have been erroneously applied to 
 work of superintendence. In the 
 Crispin case it was the duty of the 
 master to see that proper warning 
 was given, before starting dangerous 
 machinery (Shumway v. Walworth 
 
 * This section is entirely new. 
 
§23l] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 412 
 
 depend upon the grade or rank of the employee whose negli- 
 gence causes the injury. * * * However low the grade or 
 rank of the employee, the master is liable for injuries caused 
 by him to another servant, if they result from the omission of 
 some duty of the master, which he had confided to such 
 inferior employee. * * * If the act is one which pertains 
 only to the duty of an operative, the employee performing it 
 is a mere servant ; and the master, although liable to strangers, 
 is not liable to a fellow-servant for its improper performance." 
 This decision has been so fully accepted in later cases as to be 
 the unquestioned law of New York.^ Under this rule, a vice- 
 principal is one to whom is deputed the discharge of some 
 duty or the exercise of some power which belongs to the master, 
 as such. And he does not act as a vice-principal, when engaged 
 in any work which does not pertain to the duty or peculiar 
 powers of the master, just as an agent does not act as an agent 
 when doing some act entirely outside of his agenc)'.^ But he 
 
 Mfg. Co., 98 Mich. 411 ; 57 N. W. 
 251; S. P., Gei-rish v. New Haven 
 Ice Co., 63 Conn. 9 ; 37 Atl. 235). 
 Crispin v. Babbitt was tried a sec- 
 ond time ; when judgment was again 
 given for the plaintiff, and finally 
 affirmed (109 N. Y. 653 ; 16 N. E. 
 683). The rule was wrongly ap- 
 plied in Loughlin v. State (105 N. Y. 
 159; 11 N. E. 371), citing Slater v. 
 Jewett (85 N. Y. 61), which bore no 
 analogy ; Wilson v. Merry, a case 
 not fit to be cited anywhere ; and 
 the opinion of Allen, J., in Wright 
 V. N. Y. Central E. Co. '(25 N. Y. 
 562), which was afterwards over- 
 ruled by all his associates in the new 
 court of appeals. This decision is 
 inconsistent even with the opinion 
 of Allen, J., in Malone v. Hatha- 
 way, 64 N. Y. 5. The captain in 
 Loughlin's case was doing every 
 thing which any master could do. 
 There was no other master, and 
 could be none, in bodily form. And 
 his negligence consisted in positi\'e 
 direction of the work ; emphatically 
 a master's province. These errone- 
 ous decisions have, of course, led to 
 
 others, e. g., Eiley v. O'Brien, 53 
 Hun, 147 ; 6 N. Y. Supp. 129 ; Cul- 
 len V. Norton, 126 N. Y. 1 ; 26 N. E. 
 905; Ruger, C. J., and O'Brien, J., 
 dissenting. In Pendergast v. Union 
 R. Co. (10 N.Y. App. Div. 307 ; 41 N. Y. 
 Supp. 937), it was the duty of a street 
 car conductor to fasten the car plat- 
 form gate, so as to prevent passengers 
 from falling off. Held, that the con- 
 ductor represented the master and 
 fellow-master of another employee 
 of the master, on the car, on his way 
 home after a day's work, and the 
 master was liable for the conductor's 
 neglect of such duty. 
 
 '■' Hankins v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. 
 R. Co., 143 N. Y. 416 ; 37 N. E. 466 ; 
 Cullen V. Norton, 136 N. Y. 1 ; 36 N. 
 E. 905 ; Hussey v. Coger, 113 N. Y. 
 614 ; 30 N. E. 556. 
 
 ^ A laborer, acting as temporary 
 foreman of a bridge gang, but at 
 the same time actually assisting in 
 the labor, is a fellow-servant of the 
 other members of the gang (Texas, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Rogers, 57 Fed. 378 ; 
 6C. C. A. 403). 
 
413 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§232 
 
 may be, at the same moment, a vice-principal as to one duty 
 and a fellow-servant as to another. He is none the less a vice- 
 principal, as to the master's duties, delegated to him, because 
 of any part which he may take in the servant's work.* 
 
 § 232.* Principle of New York decision generally 
 accepted.— The principle stated in the New York rule has 
 met with acceptance in much the greater part of the United 
 States, including the U. S. Supreme Court; » all New England, 
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware in the Northeast -^ in 
 
 ■* Thus, while working as a ser- 
 vant, he may issue orders as vice- 
 principal (Hardy V. Minneapolis, etc. 
 R. Co., 36 Fed. 657). The fact that 
 the vice-principal, after having neg- 
 ligently directed the work, assisted 
 in its performance, does not affect 
 the question of the master's liability 
 (Malcolm v. Fuller, 153 Mass. 160 ; 25 
 N. E. 83 ; Bergstrom v. Staples, 83 
 Mich. 654; 46 N. W. 1035 [engineer 
 carelessly starting machinery as part 
 of daily duty]). In an action by a 
 brakeman for personal injuries, 
 under a count alleging that defend- 
 ant failed to have sufficient compe- 
 tent inspectors of cars received by it 
 from other roads, by reason of which 
 he was injured, he cannot recover 
 on account of the neglect of an in- 
 spector, he being a fellow-servant 
 (Bowers v. Connecticut River R. Co. , 
 163 Mass. 313 ; 38 N. E. 508) ; S. P., 
 Mackin v. Boston & Alb. R. Co., 135 
 Mass. 201 ; Keith v. New Haven, etc. 
 Co., 140 Mass. 175 ; 3 N. E. 28 : Coffee 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. Co., 155 
 Mass. 31 ; 38 N. E. 1128). 
 
 ' In determining the liability of a 
 master to his servant for injuries 
 caused by the negligence of another 
 servant, the question does not tm-n 
 merely on the matter of subordina- 
 tion and control, but rather on the 
 character of the alleged negligent 
 act. If that act is done in the dis- 
 
 charge of some positive duty of the 
 master to the servant, then negli- 
 gence in the act is the negligence of 
 the master, irrespective of the grada- 
 tions of service as between the serv- 
 ants themselves. If the act is not 
 one in the discharge of such positive 
 duty, then there should be some 
 personal wrong on the part of the 
 master before he can be held liable 
 (Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 
 U. S. 368; IBS. Ct. 914). To same 
 effect, Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Ham- 
 bly, 154 U. S. 349 ; 14 S. Ct. 988. 
 
 ''Maine: Dube v. Lewiston, 83 
 Me. 211 ; 33 Atl. 112. 
 
 New Hampshire: Jaques v. Gt. 
 Falls Mfg. Co., 66 N. H. 482 ; 22 Atl. 
 552 [servant charged with inspection 
 vice-principal]. 
 
 Massachusetts: See Moynihan v. 
 Hills, 146 Mass. 586 ; 16 N. E. 674 
 [reconstructing machinery] ; Bab- 
 cock V. Old Colony R. Co. 150 Mass. 
 467 ; 33 N. E. 335 [inspecting tracks]. 
 Rhode Island : Hanna v. Granger, 
 18 R. I. 507 ; 38 Atl. 659 [foreman, 
 while in ordinary work, mere fellow- 
 servant]. 
 
 Connecticut : McElligott v. Ran- 
 dolph, 61 Conn. 157; 32 Atl. 1094 
 [but supervision held master's duty] ; 
 Sullivan v. N. Y., New Haven, etc. 
 R. Co., 63 Conn. 309 ; 25 Atl. 711 
 [foreman not vice-principal]. 
 Neiv Jersey : O'Brien v. Dredging 
 
 * This section is entirely new. 
 
§232] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 414 
 
 Maryland, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama and probably North 
 Carolina in the Southeast ; ^ in Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wis- 
 consin, Iowa, Minnesota and North Dakota in the Northwest;* 
 
 Co., 53 N. J. Law, 391 ; 31 Atl. 324 
 [captain of dredge] ; Gilmore v. Ox- 
 ford Iron Co., 55 N. J. Law, 89 ; 25 
 Atl. 707 [mining foreman]. 
 
 Pennsylvania : Lewis v. Seifert, 
 116 Pa. St. 628 ; 11 Atl. 514 ; Bridge 
 Co. V. Newberry, 9G Pa. St. 346. It 
 is not clear that the whole principle 
 has been adopted in Pennsylvania. 
 The courts refuse to treat any serv- 
 ant as a vice-principal who is not in 
 charge of an entire department 
 (Faber v. Carlisle Mfg. Co., 136 Pa. 
 St. 387 ; 17 Atl. 621 ; Kinney v. Cor- 
 bin, 133 Pa. St. 341 ; 19 Atl. 141 ; N. 
 Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. Bell, 
 113 Pa. St. 400 ; 4 Atl. 50 ; McGinley 
 v. Levering, 153 Pa. St. 366; 35 Atl. 
 834). This amounts to a rejection of 
 the principle, so far as it is advan- 
 tageous to servants. 
 
 Delaware : Foster v. Pusey, 14 
 Atl. 545. 
 
 ' Maryland adopts the New York 
 rule, with that decided leaning 
 against servants, which has always 
 marked the Maryland courts (State 
 V. Malster, 57 Md. 387). 
 
 South Carolina : Gunter v. Gran- 
 ite viUe Mfg. Co., 18 S. C. 363. 
 
 Florida . South Florida R. Co. v. 
 Weese, 33 Fla. 212 ; 13 So. 436. 
 
 Alabama : Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 59 Ala. 245 ; Tyson v. South 
 & N. Ala. R. Co., 61 Ala. 5-54. 
 
 North Carolina: See Patton v. 
 Western, etc. R. Co. (96 N. C. 455 ; 
 1 S. E. 863), applying the rule in 
 favor of a servant. 
 
 •• Indiana : New Pittsburgh Coal 
 Co. v. Peterson, 136 Ind. 398 ; 35 N. 
 E. 7 ; Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 
 Ind. 181 ; Justice v. Pennsylvania 
 Co., 130 Ind. 331 ; 30 N. E. 303 [sec- 
 tion foreman failing to apply brake, 
 master not liable]. 
 
 Illinois : Fitzgerald v. Honkomp, 
 44 111. App. 365 ; and see Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. May, 108 111. 288 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Moranda, 108 Id. 
 576. 
 
 Michigan : Beesley v. Wheeler 
 Co., 103 Mich. 196;61N. W. 658; 
 Findlay v. Russell Wheel Co., 
 Mich. ; 66 N. W. 50. 
 
 Wisconsin : Klochinski v. Shores 
 Lumber Co., 93 Wise. 417; 67 N. W. 
 934 [superintendent handling logs : 
 master not liable] ; Hartford v. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co., 91 Wise. 374 ; 
 64 N. W. 1033 [superintendent 
 turning wheels : master not liable] ; 
 Stutz V. Armour, 84 Wise. 623 ; 54 
 N. W. 1000 [foreman's negligent di- 
 rections : being such only as one 
 workman would give to another] ; 
 Dwyer v. American Exp. Co., 83 
 Wise. 807 ; 52 N. W. 804 [general 
 manager driving wagon] ; Toner v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 69 Wise. 188; 
 83 N. W. 433 [station agent : master 
 not liable to brakeman]. 
 
 Iowa : A mere ' ' foreman " is a fel- 
 low-servant with his subordinates, 
 " so far as his own mere labor is 
 concerned " (Baldwin v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co.. 68 Iowa, 37 ; 25 N. W. 
 918 ; explaining Peterson v. Coal 
 Co., 50 Iowa, 673). But any one in 
 full control of a timber yard, hiring 
 and discharging men, is a vice- 
 principal (Baldwin v. St. Louis, etc. 
 R. Co., 75 Iowa, 297 ; 39 N. W. .507), 
 and so is his substitute, in his ab- 
 sence (Id.) ; see Houser v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 230 ; 14 N. W. 
 778 ; Hathaway v. Illinois Cent. R. 
 Co., 93 Iowa, 387 ; 60 N. W. 651 ; 
 Wilson V. Dunreath Red Stone Co. 
 77 Iowa, 429 ; 43 N. W. 860 ; Fos- 
 burg V. Phillips Fuel Co., 93 Iowa, 
 54 ; 61 N. W. 400. 
 
415 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§233 
 
 in Missouri, Arkansas and Tennessee, in the Southwest ; and in 
 California, Oregon and Washington.'^ 
 
 § 233 * In what duties servants act as vice-principals.— 
 
 The value of any general principle of law depends mainly upon 
 the method of its application. And while the principle here- 
 tofore stated has met with very general acceptance, its value 
 has been greatly reduced in Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode 
 Island, New York and Maryland, by the narrow spirit in 
 which the personal duties of masters have been defined ;i 
 
 Minnesota : Carlson v. N. W. Tel. 
 Co., 63 Minn. 438 ; 65 N. W. 914 [mas- 
 ter liable for negligent orders of 
 foreman sending workmen into dan- 
 ger, without warning] ; Lindvall v. 
 Woods, 41 Minn. 313 : 43 N. W. 1020 
 [foreman negligent in joint work : 
 master not liable]. The earlier 
 Minnesota cases are conflicting and 
 not to be regarded as of weight. By 
 Stat. 1887, ch. 13, this question 
 ceases to arise in actions against 
 railroad companies, with some ex- 
 ceptions (see § 181, ante, and the 
 statute at the end of this chapter) . 
 
 North Dakota : Ell v. Northern 
 Pacific R. Co., 48N. W. 323. 
 
 ^Missouri: Miller v. Mo. Pac. R. 
 Co., 109 Mo. 350; 19 S. W. 58. 
 
 Arkansas: St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Torrey, 58 Ark. 317 ; 24 S. W. 
 244 [foreman handling rope : master 
 not liable]. 
 
 Tennessee : The master is liable for 
 the foreman's negligence only in re- 
 gard to some duty to the inferior 
 imposed by law upon the master, 
 and by him intrusted to the superior 
 servant (Allen v. Goodwin, 92 Tenn. 
 885 ; 31 S. W. 760 ; quoting Nash- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Handman, 81 
 Tenn. [1.3 Lea] 435 ; Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Lahr, 86 Tenn. 335 ; 6 S. 
 W. 668). 
 
 California: Daves v. Southern 
 Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 30; 83 Pac. 708; 
 
 Burns v. Sennett, 99 Cal. 363; 33 
 Pac. 916 ; Nixon v. Selby Lead Co., 
 103 Cal. 458 ; 36 Pac. 803. 
 
 Oregon : Miller v. So. Pac. Co. , 
 20 Oreg. 285; 26 Pac. 70 [switch- 
 tender not vice-principal] ; compare 
 Knahtla v. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 21 
 Oreg. 136 ; 27 Pac. 91 ; Anderson v. 
 Bennett, 10 Oreg. 515 ; 19 Pac. 765. 
 
 Washington : Say ward v. Carlson, 
 1 Wash. St. 29 ; 23 Pac. 830; Zintek v. 
 Stimson Mill Co., 9 Wash. St. 395; 
 37 Pac . 340. 
 
 ' In Maine, the master was held 
 not liable for the negligent orders of 
 a conductor (Lasky v. Canadian Pac. 
 R. Co., 83 Me. 461 ; 22 Atl. 367 [de- 
 nying ' ' Ross " case] ; Cassidy v. 
 Maine Central R. Co., 76 Me. 488) or 
 foreman (Doughty v. Penobscot, etc. 
 Co., Id. 143) or overseer (Conley v. 
 Portland, 78 Id. 217 ; 3 Atl. 658) . So 
 in Maryland (O'Connell v. Bait. & 
 Ohio R. Co., 20 'Md. 313). In Hhode 
 Island the court once said that 
 if a foreman were negligent in 
 ordering men to go on shoveling 
 under a bank, after Tvarning that it 
 was dangerous, such negligence was 
 that of a fellow-servant, not of a 
 vice- principal (Larich v. Moies, 18 
 R. I. 513; 23 Atl. 631). But this 
 was not the point decided. In-iVew 
 York so many decisions have been 
 made by almost equally divided 
 courts, with so many reversals, that 
 
 * This section is entirely new. 
 
§233] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 416 
 
 while in nearly all other courts its value has been greatly- 
 increased, by putting in the forefront of those duties the duty 
 of general superintendence, including direction, control, watch- 
 fulness, warning, instruction and inspection. The test to be 
 applied in each case, under this principle, is to inquire : What 
 would have been the duty of the master had he been person- 
 ally present? To whom did he delegate that duty, he being 
 absent? That delegate, whether he be high or low, should 
 be deemed, with respect to that duty, a vice-principal. Fore- 
 most among the powers of a master, as already pointed out, is 
 the power of giving orders. Foremost among his duties is 
 that of general superintendence. He is equally responsible, 
 where he deputes to another the duty of giving orders which 
 
 it is hai-dly possible to say what is 
 the law on these questions. Masters 
 were held liable for the negligence 
 of superior servants in general sup- 
 erintendence in Hankius v. N. Y., 
 Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 143 N. Y. 41G ; 
 37 N. E. 466 [train dispatcher] ; 
 Bailey v. Rome, etc. R. Co., 139 N. 
 Y. 303 ; 34 N. E. 918 [inspection of 
 machinery] ; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. 
 Y. 46 [same] ; Kranz v. Long Island 
 E. Co., 133 N. Y. 1 ; 35 N. E. 806 [in- 
 spection of place] ; Pantzar v. Tilly, 
 etc. Mining Co., 99 N. Y. 368; 3 
 N. E. 34 [general manager failing 
 to protect against dangers] ; El- 
 dridge v. Atlas Steamship Co., 
 134 N. Y. 187 ; 33 N. E. 66 [sea- 
 man injured by obedience to or- 
 ders of superior at sea] ; Soarflf v. 
 Metcalf, 107 N. T. 311 ; 13 N. E. 796 
 [seaman neglected in sickness by 
 captain] ; Conlan v. N. Y. Central, 
 E. Co., 74 Hun, 115; 36 N. Y. 
 Supp. 659 [brakeaian acting as con- 
 ductor] ; Marks v. Rochester R. Co., 
 77 Hun, 77 ; 38 N. Y. Supp. 314 [car- 
 driver and assistant] ; Rettig v. Fifth 
 Av. Tr. Co , 6 N. Y. Misc. 338 ; 36 
 N. Y. Supp. 896 [superintendent alter 
 ego of master in setting intestate at 
 dangerous work without proper in- 
 structions] ; McCampbell v. Cunard 
 
 Steamship Co., 69 Hun, 131 ; S3 N. 
 Y. Supp. 477 [superintendent giving 
 orders, not fellow-servant] ; Brennan 
 V. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 489 ; S3 N. E. 
 810 [instructions as to use of ele- 
 vator]. They were held not liable 
 under somewhat similar circum- 
 stances in Gabrielson v. Waydell, 
 135 N. Y. 1 ; 31 N. E. 969 [sea cap- 
 tain beating seaman] a very bad case; 
 vote 4 to 3 ; quite inconsistent 
 with Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N. Y. 
 311, because master owes duty of 
 keeping order on board ; Hussey v. 
 Coger, 113 N. Y. 614; 30 N. E." 556 
 [superintendent assumed to be care- 
 less in orders, but fault really in 
 workmen] ; Murphy v. Boston & Al- 
 bany E. Co., 88 N. Y. 146 [engineer 
 and mechanic in repair shop killed 
 by explosion of boiler, negligently 
 inspected] ; Beilfus v. N. Y., Lake 
 Erie, etc. R. Co., 39 Hun, 656 [sup- 
 erintendent of wrecking train and 
 employee under him killed by obey- 
 ing his order] ; Scott v. Sweeney, 
 34 Hun, 393 [foreman in charge of a 
 derrick and laborer under him] ; 
 Hart V. N. Y. etc. Dock Co., 48 
 N. Y. Superior, 460 [foreman of dry- 
 dock and laborer] ; Kenny v. Cun- 
 ard S. S.-Co., 53 Id. 434. 
 
417 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§233 
 
 he ought to give himself, if present; and if he deputes his 
 power and duty of superintendence, he is responsible for the 
 failure of his deputy to properly superintend. Under any 
 consistent application of the New York rule, therefore, the 
 master is represented, as by a vice-principal, by any one to 
 whom he deputes the power of giving orders, which must be 
 obeyed without or before appeal ; and he is responsible for 
 those orders as much as if they were his own.^ His deputy, 
 in these and all similar respects, is his vice-principal.^ The 
 
 « Carlson v. N. Western Tel. Co., 
 63 Minn. 428; 65 N. W. 914 [an ex- 
 cellent case] ; Eldridge v. Atlas S. 
 S. Co., 134 N. Y. 187 ; 33 N. E. 66 ; 
 Patton V. Western, etc. R. Co., 96 N. 
 C. 455 ; 1 S. E. 863 [briefly but well 
 reasoned]; Logan v. N. Carolina R. 
 Co , 116 N. C. 940 ; 31 S.E. 959 ; Taylor 
 V. Evansville, etc. R. Co., 131 Ind. 124; 
 32 N. E. 876 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 May, 108 111. 388 ; Smith v. Wabash, 
 etc. R. Co., 93 Mo. 366 ; 4 S. W. 129 ; 
 Schroeder v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 108 
 Mo. 322 ; 18 S. W. 1094 [section fore- 
 man] ; Orman v. Mannix, 17 Colo. 
 564 ; 30 Pac. 1037 [gang boss, giving 
 negligent orders to boy, vice-princi- 
 pal]. A superintendent who has fore- 
 men and workmen under him, whom 
 he employs and discharges at pleas- 
 ure, and who has entire control of the 
 machinery and men employed is a 
 vice-principal (Denver, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Drisooll, 13 Colo. 530 ; 31 Pac. 708, fol- 
 lowing "Ross" case). The negli- 
 gence was in directing work. Fol- 
 lowed, holding, in the absence of the 
 superintendent, general foreman a 
 vice-principal (Colorado Midland R. 
 Co. v. O'Brien. 16 Colo. 319 ; 37 Pac. 
 701). s. P., Colorado Midland R. Co. 
 V. Nay Ion, 17 Colo. 501 ; 30 Pac. 249 
 [deputy superintendent being absent: 
 deputy vice-principal ; master li- 
 able for his negligent direction of 
 work] ; Ryan v. Los Angeles Storage 
 Co.. 113Cal. 344 ; 44 Pac. 471 [master 
 liable for negligent orders of engi- 
 [Law op Neg. Vol. 1—37.] 
 
 neer in control for time being] ; 
 Bergman v. Omaha, etc. R. Co., 41 
 Fed. 667, per Shiras, J. [foreman 
 intrusted with restoring wrecked 
 trains]. Many decisions are cited 
 in a later note, holding all this and 
 
 much more. The famous "Ross 
 
 « 
 
 case" of course does so. But the 
 ' ' Baugh case " inferentially recog- 
 nizes this rule. Otherwise in Massa- 
 chusetts, at common law (Moody v. 
 Hamilton Manuf'g Co., 159 Mass. 70; 
 34 N. E. 185), and in Maine, and per- 
 haps in Michigan, where it was lately 
 held that even in giving orders to go 
 on, after warning of danger, a shift 
 boss of miners is a fellow-servant of 
 a trammer {Petaja v. Aurora Iron 
 Min. Co., 106 Mich. 463; 66 N. W. 
 951; 64 N. W. 335). This point, 
 however, does not seem to have been 
 much in the mind of the court. The 
 decision seems to us, on this point, 
 inconsistent with Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 305. 
 
 " Suppose the owner of a mill, em- 
 ploying a thousand men, should call 
 them together and say, in so many 
 words: "I have deputed the man- 
 agement of this mill to the superin- 
 tendent, who will appoint twenty 
 foremen over fifty hands each. I 
 give notice that each of you is to 
 obey, absolutely and without hesita- 
 tion, every order which is given to 
 you by your foreman, whether it 
 seems to you reasonable or not. If 
 you do not, you will be instantly 
 
§ 233] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 418 
 
 master's responsibility for the acts of his vice-principal is to be 
 determined, not merely by the character of the act which the 
 latter performs, but also by the character of that which he 
 fails to perforin. If, therefore, a vice-principal, invested with 
 the power and duty of superintendence, negligently permits 
 any act to be done which it would be the duty of the master, 
 if present, to prevent, the master is responsible to a servant 
 injured thereby, simply because of the failure of his super- 
 intending vice-principal to prevent it being done.^ And the 
 master is none the less liable, if the negligent act is done by 
 the vice-principal himself.^ So the master is responsible for 
 the failure of a superintending servant to give such due warn- 
 
 discharged. Do not appeal to me or 
 to the general superintendent; for we 
 will listen to no appeal, until after 
 you have obeyed the foreman's 
 orders." Could there be any doubt 
 that such an employer would be li- 
 able for the consequences of obedi- 
 ence to such orders, negligently 
 given ? Yet such notice is as effect- 
 ually given by the notorious invari- 
 able usage of employers to act in this 
 manner, as if it were given in express 
 words to each employee. Every 
 master, putting any of his servants 
 under the orders ol another servant, 
 by that very act leaves to him dis- 
 cx^etion to judge whether his orders 
 are wise or unwise, and denies to the 
 subordinate servants all right to dis- 
 cuss that question. He does this 
 knowingly and intentionally ; and 
 he knows that the superior servant, 
 thus entrusted with absolute control, 
 will sometimes use it negligently to 
 the injury of the other servants ; for 
 universal experience proves that 
 such will be the result. It is, of 
 course, extremely convenient for em- 
 ployers thus to relieve themselves 
 from responsibility ; but it is diffi- 
 cult to understand how any court 
 could allow them to do it. The true 
 test is, whether the inferior servant 
 is allowed any discretion as to obey- 
 
 ing the orders of the superior. If he 
 is not, but is by usage of the master 
 dismissed or suspended for disobedi- 
 ence, the master should in law, as 
 well as in common sense, be held to 
 have personally authorized in ad- 
 vance any order given by the super- 
 ior servant, however negligent or 
 reckless ; and he should be held per- 
 sonally responsible. 
 
 ■• Shumway v. Walworth Mfg. Co., 
 98 Mich. 411 ; 57 N. W. 251 ; Gerrish 
 v. New Haven Ice Co., 63 Conn. 9 ; 
 37 Atl. 235 [general manager omit- 
 ting to prevent starting machinery]. 
 To the contrary, Crispin v. Babbitt, 
 81 N. Y. 516, but without notice of 
 this distinction. 
 
 ^ Where a section foreman, under 
 whom plaintiff was employed, di- 
 rected a keg to be placed on a hand 
 car for his seat, and allowed the 
 keg to fall off, thus causing the car 
 to leave the track, defendant is 
 liable (Russ v. Wabash, etc. E. Co., 
 112 Mo. 45 ; 20 S. W. 473). "The 
 principle of liability is not confined 
 to negligent orders" (Id.). So the 
 master is liable, when a vice-princi- 
 pal personally does that which as 
 master he ought bo forbid (Day harsh 
 V. Hannibal, etc. E. Co., 108 Mo. 570; 
 15 S. W. 554). 
 
419 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 L§233 
 
 ing of dangers as the master should have given, if present.^ 
 These doctrines are fully sustained by the decisions of the 
 U. S. Supreme Court,^ and by those of the highest courts in 
 Vermont, Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia, 
 North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, 
 Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illi- 
 nois, Missouri, Minnesota, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, 
 Montana, Utah, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming.^ They 
 
 * Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Ross, 113 
 U. S. 377 ; 5 S. Ct. 184 [conductor 
 omitting signal] ; Gerrish v. New 
 Haven Ice Co. , supra ; Dayharsh v. 
 Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 103 Mo. 570 ; 15 
 S. W. 554 ; Smith v. Oxford Iron Co. , 
 43 N. J. Law, 467. Company liable 
 for section foreman's failure to notify 
 conductor of snow slide (Fisher v. 
 Oregon, etc. R. Co., 33 Or. 533 ; 80 
 Pac. 435). 
 
 ' " There is, in applying this doc- 
 trine, a clear distinction to be made 
 
 • • ■ between servants of a cor- 
 poration exercising no supervision 
 over others engaged with them in 
 the same employment, and agents of 
 the corporation clothed with the 
 control and management of a dis- 
 tinct department, in which their 
 duty is entirely that of direction and 
 superintendence " (Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Ross, 113 U. S. 377, 390). "In 
 no proper sense of the term is a con- 
 ductor a fellow-servant with the 
 foreman, the brakeman, tlie porters 
 and the engineer. Tlie latter are 
 fellow-servants in the running of the 
 train under liis direction. As to 
 them and the train he stands in tlie 
 place of and represents the corpora- 
 
 . tion" (Id.). "If such a conductor 
 does not represent the company, then 
 the train is operated without any 
 representative of its owner " (Id. 
 394). The conductor's negligence, 
 in that case, consisted in omitting to 
 give proper orders. Although that 
 decision has been limited in Balti- 
 more, etc. R. Co. V. Baugh (149 U. 
 
 S. 368) to the conductor of an entire 
 train, as distinguished from an en- 
 gineer running an engine with no 
 train, and again, in the Hambly, 
 Peterson and Charless cases, so as not 
 to cover foremen, etc., managing 
 small pieces of work, in which they 
 take part, it has never been over- 
 ruled. In Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Fort (17 Wall. 553), the defendant 
 was held liable to a boy for the loss 
 of an arm suffered while adjusting a 
 belt on rapidly moving machinery, 
 by direction of C, whose orders the 
 boy was bound to obey. s. P. , Daub 
 V. Northern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. 
 635 [deck-hand injured through neg- 
 ligence of mate, while obeying his 
 order]. See Briggs v. Titan, 33 Fed. 
 413 [pilot and deckhand] ; Gravelle 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 3 Mc- 
 Crary, 353 [yardmaster and hand 
 coupling ears under his order] ; Mil- 
 ler V. Union Pacific R. Co., 17 Fed. 
 67 [employee ordered by foreman 
 into perilous position] ; The Clatsop 
 Chief, 7 Sawyer, 375 [master and 
 foreman of steam-tug] ; Garrahy v. 
 Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 25 Fed. 358. 
 
 * Arkansas : Bloyd v. St. Louis, 
 etc. R. Co., 58 Ark. 66 ; 33 S. W. 
 1089 [foreman and laborer injured 
 through obedience to his orders], 
 expressly adopting our § 338 and the 
 Ross case : S. P. , St. Louis, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Harper, 44 Ark. 534. Earlier cases 
 were doubtful (see Fones v. Phillips, 
 89 Ark. 17 ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Shackleford, 43 Ark. 417). 
 
 Colorado : Denver, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
233] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 420 
 
 are also maintained, upon the whole, though with some vacil- 
 
 DriscoU, 12 Colo. 520 ; 21 Pac. 708 
 [adopting Boss case]. 
 
 Connecticut : Darrigan v. N. Y. & 
 New England E. Co., 52 Conn. 285 
 [rejecting the English decisions and 
 accepting the Ross case]. 
 
 Delaware : Foster v. Pusey, 14 Atl. 
 545. 
 
 In Georgia, so much of the rule 
 here stated as makes in favor of 
 servants is adopted (Cheeney v. 
 Ocean S. S. Co., 92 Ga. 726 ; 19 S. E. 
 33 [stevedore vice-principal] ; Cen- 
 tral R. Co. V. De Bray, 71 Ga. 406 
 [brakeman and conductor on same 
 train, not fellow-servants] ; Augusta 
 Factory v. Barnes, 72 Id. 217) . 
 
 Indiana : One engaged in superin- 
 tendence and command as the sole 
 present representative of the master, 
 and not manually working with and 
 as the other servants, is not a "fel- 
 low-servant ; " and for his negligence 
 in giving orders, or in making the 
 work which he orders unsafe, the 
 master is responsible (Taylor v. 
 Evansville, etc. R. Co., 121 Ind. 121; 
 22 N. E. 876 ; Spencer v. Ohio, etc., R. 
 Co., 130 Ind. 181 ; 29 N. E. 015 [negli- 
 gent orders]). Where a foreman acts 
 as a vice-principal in calling out em- 
 ployees, he does not cease to be such 
 vice-principal and become a fellow- 
 servant as soon as he has assigned 
 to the other employees a place to 
 work, but retains his original char- 
 acter while directing the details of 
 the work (Nail v. Louisville, etc. E. 
 Co., 129 Ind. 260 ; 28 N. E. 183, 611). 
 
 The court expressly overruled Col- 
 umbus, etc. R. Co. V. Arnold, 31 Ind. 
 174 ; and distinguished many cases, 
 such as Brazil, etc. Coal Co. v. Cain, 
 98 Id. 282 ; Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 
 100 Id. 181 ; Capper v. Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co., 103 Id. 305. 
 
 UKnois : Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 May, 108 111. 288, where one of a 
 gang of men was killed in conse- 
 
 quence of obedience to an order care- 
 lessly given by the foreman, the 
 court, per Mulkey, J. , saying : 
 "When the negligent act complained 
 arises out of and is the direct 
 result of the exercise of the authority 
 conferred upon him by the master 
 over his co-laborers, the master will 
 be liable. . . . When he gives 
 an order within the scope of his 
 authority, if not manifestly unrea- 
 sonable, those under his charge are 
 bound to obey, at the peril of losing 
 their situations ; and such com- 
 mands ai-e, in contemplation of law, 
 the commands of the company ; and 
 hence it is held responsible for the 
 consequences. '' This was quoted and 
 followed in several cases of foremen 
 negligent in giving orders (Wabash, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Hawk, 121 111. 259 ; 12 
 N. E. 253 ; Stearns v. Reidy, 33 111. 
 App. 246 ; affl'd in 25 N. E. 762) ; or 
 omitting to give due warning (Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Gross, 35 111. 
 App. 178; affl'd in 24 N. E. 563). 
 Any servant authorized to superin- 
 tend and command a gang of men 
 is a vice-principal as to them, in such 
 superintendence (Libby v. Scher- 
 man, 146 111. 540 ; 34 N. E. 801). The 
 master is responsible for negligence 
 "in exercise of authority " conferred 
 by him (Consolidated Coal Co. v. 
 Wombacher, 134 111. 57; 24 N. E. 
 627 [night foreman]). Whether a 
 conductor negligently starting a 
 train is fellow-servant with a laborer 
 on a work train, is for the jury (Mo- 
 bile, etc. R. Co. V. Massey, 152 111. 
 144 ; 38 N. E. 787 ; affi'g 53 111. App. 
 556). 
 
 Kansas : Hannibal, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Pox, 31 Kans. 586 ; 3 Pac. 320 ; 
 Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 29 
 Kans. 633 ; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Sal- 
 mon, 14 Id. 512 ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Weaver, 35 Kans. 413; 11 Pac 
 408. 
 
421 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 233 
 
 lation, in Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa and California.' In 
 
 Louisiana : In Van Amburg v. 
 Vicksburgh, etc. R. Co. (37 La. Ann. 
 650) a conductor was held not to be 
 a fellow-servant with the engineer 
 of his train. Manning, J., saying: 
 " The case of Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Ross, 113 U. S. 377, has made an in- 
 road on jurisprudence in the right 
 direction ; and we have applied the 
 new principle there established at 
 the present term, in Towns v. Vicks- 
 burg, etc. R. Co., 37 La. Ann. 633, re- 
 aflSrmed, Fai'en v. Sellers, 89 La. 
 Ann. 1011 ; 3 So. 363." A fireman in 
 a factory is not a fellow-servant of 
 the engineer in charge of the ma- 
 chinery (Mattise v. Consumers' Ice 
 Co., 46 La. Ann. 1535 ; 16 So. 400 
 [adopting Ross case]). 
 
 In Minnesota, after much fluctua- 
 
 tion, the correct principle has been 
 decisively adopted: Carlson v. N. W. 
 Tel. Co., 63 Minn. 438; 65 N. W. 914 
 [foreman, negligent in superinten- 
 dence] ; Blomquist v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 60 Minn. 436 ; 63 N. W. 818 
 [foreman, negligent in orders] ; dis- 
 tinguishing Lindvall v. Woods, 41 
 Minn. 313 [foreman's negligence in 
 work, not in directions] ; and practi- 
 cally overruling several earlier deci- 
 sions. 
 
 Nebraska : Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Lundstrom, 16 Neb. 354 ; 30 N. W. 
 .198 [injuries received through negli- 
 gence of the conductor, while work- 
 ing under his orders]. Cobb, C. J. , 
 says : " I think the law thus estab- 
 lished and laid down in Ohio pre- 
 vails substantially throughout the 
 
 ' The latest California decision 
 holds the master liable for orders 
 negligently given by a subordinate 
 of the superintendent, while in con- 
 trol of the injured servant (Ryan v. 
 Los Angeles Storage Co., 113 Cal. 
 344; 44Pac. 471). 
 
 In Michigan, most recent cases 
 have been in harmony with the doc- 
 trines here stated (Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 305 [con- 
 ductor not fellow-servant with 
 laborer on gravel train] ; Rodman v. 
 Mich. Cent. R. Co., 59 Mich. 395 ; 36 
 N. W. 651 ; practically overruling s. 
 C, 55 Mich. 57 ; 30 N. W. 788 [con- 
 ductor's negligence]). An assistant 
 road master in control of a gang of 
 men. and with power to direct their 
 work and discharge any of them, is 
 a superior servant for whose negli- 
 gent acts the master is liable (Harri- 
 son V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 79 Mich. 
 409 ; 44 N. W. 1034 ; Palmer v. 
 Michigan Cent. R. Co., 93 Mich 363 ; 
 53 N. W. 397). But compare Petaja 
 
 V. Aurora Min. Co., 106 Mich. 463 ; 64 
 N. W. 335. 
 
 In Wisconsin, these matters are 
 largely regulated by statute (L. 1889, 
 ch. 438 ; L 1898, ch. 330). Prior to 
 these statutes, superior servants were 
 held not to be vice-principals, in 
 Mathews v. Case, 61 Wise. 491 [mas- 
 ter and mate of vessel] ; Peschel v. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co., 63 Id. 388 [fore- 
 man, having no power to discharge, 
 and workman under foreman's di- 
 rection] ; Pease v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 61 Id. 163 [conductor and brake- 
 man, injured by former negligently 
 starting train] ; Toner v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 69 Wise. 188 ; 81 N. W. 
 104 [station agent, responsible to 
 "see everything right at station," 
 fellow-servant with brakeman]; Hoth 
 V. Peters, 55 Wise. 405 [foreman of 
 a lumber yard and laborer] ; Heine 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 58 Wise. 535 
 [laborer unloading gravel train and 
 conductor]. In none of these oases 
 was the injury the result of a direct 
 order to the plaintiff. 
 
§233] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 422 
 
 Massachusetts '" and Mississippi " adverse decisions have been 
 overruled by statutes. Any person employed by the master 
 to do work which the master is personally bound to see done, 
 for the protection of servants, is a vice-principal, alike in doing 
 or in failing to do such work;'^ and it makes no difference how 
 high or how low the position of such servant may be. With 
 
 Western states, and will ultimately 
 prevail everywhere." Re-afflrmed, 
 Burlington, etc. R. Co. v. Crockett, 
 19 Neb. 133; 26 N. W. 931; and 
 again, Crystal Ice Co. v. Sherlock, 37 
 Neb. 19 ; 55 N. W. 394. In a very 
 recent decision, the " Ross " case was 
 adhered to, and the later TJ. S. deci- 
 sions (e. g. " Peterson ") overruled in 
 Nebraska (Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Doyle, 70 N. W. 43.) 
 
 North Carolina : Dohbin v. Rich- 
 mond, etc. R. Co., 81 N. C. 446 [en- 
 gineer and laborers on gravel train] ; 
 per Ruffin, J., Cowles v. Richmond, 
 etc. R. Co., 84 N. C. 309; Shadd v. 
 Geo. etc. R. Co., 116 N. C. 968 ; 31 S, 
 E. 554 [adopting "Ross " decision]. 
 
 South Carolina ; Boatwright v. 
 No. Eastern R. Co., 35 S. C. 138 ; 
 Couch V. Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 23 
 S. C. 557 [adopting " Ross" case.] 
 
 Ohio; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Lavalley, 36 Ohio St. 221 [foreman, 
 who negligently omitted to give 
 waz'uing]. 
 
 Oregon: Anderson v. Bennett, 16 
 Greg. 515 ; 19 Pac. 765. 
 
 Tennessee : The conductor of a 
 train is a vice-principal and not a 
 fellow servant of a brakeman who 
 is injured in a collision (Illinois Cent. 
 R. Co. v. Spence, 93 Tenn. 173 : 33 S. 
 W. 2tl [adopting " Ross" case] ; s. p., 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Bowler, 9 
 Heisk. 866 [approving Cleveland, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 301] ; East 
 Tenn. R. Co. v. De Armond, 2 Pickle, 
 73 ; 5 S. "W. 600). Otherwise, how- 
 
 ever, where the one assuming to 
 give the order had no authority 
 (Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. McDaniel, 
 13 Lea, 386), or the. "order" is a 
 mere request (Bradley v. Nashville, 
 etc. R. Co., 14 Lea, 374). 
 
 Vermont : Davis v. Central R. Co. 
 55 Vt. 85. 
 
 Virginia : Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Thomas, 90 Va. 305 ; 17 S. E. 884 ; 
 Moon V. Richmond, etc.' R. Co., 78 
 Va. 745 ; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Williams, 86 Va. 165 ; 9 S. E. 990. 
 The foreman of a quarry owned by 
 a corporation, whose duties require 
 him to exercise a general superin- 
 tendence over the men, and to make 
 and abrogate rules for their guid- 
 ance, is not a fellow-servant of one 
 of such men (Richmond Granite Co. 
 V. Bailey. 93 Va. 554 ; 24 S. E. 232). 
 
 West Virginia: Criswell v. Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co., 30 W. Va. 798 ; 
 6 S. E. 31 [foreman omitting to give 
 warning] ; Madden v. Chesapeake & 
 O. R. Co., 28 W. Va. 610 [not neces- 
 sary that vice-principal should be 
 alter ego or have power to discharge]; 
 Cooper V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 24 
 W. Va. 37 ; a well-reasoned decision. 
 
 Washington : Zintek v. Stimson 
 Mill Co., 6 Wash. 178 ; 32 Pac. 997 ; 
 S3 Id. 1055, and again, 37 Id. 340 ; 9 
 Wash. 395 [yardmaster, superintend- 
 ing, hiring, etc., negligent in direc- 
 tions]. 
 
 Wyoming : McBride v. Union Pac. 
 R. Co., 8 Wy. 247 ; 21 Pac. 687. 
 
 1° Stat. 1887. ch. 270. 
 " Const., 1890. 
 
 '2 See § 204, ante, and for illustra- 
 tions, see § 233a, post. 
 
423 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 233a 
 
 respect to that particular work, he is not a fellow-servant with 
 those for whose protection it should be done. 
 
 § 233a. Examples of who are or who are not vice-prin- 
 cipals. — Under the principle stated in § 232, as now generally 
 accepted, it is held that a train dispatcher, in making up trains, 
 directing their movements, or failing to do so, is a vice-prin- 
 pal, as to conductors, engineers and their subordinates ; ^ a train 
 conductor, in starting, stopping and managing his train, is a vice- 
 principal, as to all subordinates on his train,^ though not (in 
 
 ' It is settled in New York, Pennsyl- Tennessee, Virginia axiAWest Vir- 
 vania, Virginia, Michigan, Illinois, ginia (Bloyd v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 
 Missouri and Arkansas that a train 58 Ark. 66 ; 22 S. W. 1089 ; Colorado, 
 dispatcher, who orders the move- etc. R. Co. v. Naylor, 17 Colo. 501 ; 
 ment of trains, and whose orders Denver, etc. R. Co. v. Driscoll, 13 
 conductors and engineers are bound Colo. 520 ; 2] Pac. 708 ; Darrigan v. 
 to obey, is the " alter ego" oi a rail- N. Y. & New England R. Co., 52 
 way company in giving such orders. Conn. 285 ; Newport, etc. R. Co. v. 
 notwithstanding he is subordinate Dentzel, 91 Ky. 42 ; 14 S. W. 958 ; 
 to a division superintendent, who is Central R. Co. v. De Bray, 71 Ga. 
 under a general superintendent, who 406 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 
 in turn is under the president (Lewis 83 Ky. 675 ; Van Amburg v. Vicks- 
 V. Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 628 ; 11 Atl. burgh, etc. R. Co., 87 La. Ann. 650 ; 
 514 ; Hankins v. N. Y., Lake Erie, Mattise v. Consumers' Ice Co., 46 La 
 etc. R. Co., 142 N. Y. 416 ; 37 N. E. Ann. 1535 ; 16 So. 400 ; Rodman v. 
 466 ; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61, Mich. Central R. Co., 59 Mich. 393; 
 68, 69 ; Sutherland v. Troy, etc. R. 26 N. W. 651 ; Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Co., 135 N. Y. 737 ; 36 N. E. 609 ; Doyle, Neb. . ; 70 N. W. 43 
 McChesney v. Panama R. Co., 66 [repudiating the limitations of the 
 Hun, 637 ; 21 N. Y. Supp. 207 ; Flan- " Peterson " case ] ; Shadd v. Geor- 
 negan v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 40 gia, etc. R. Co., 116 N. C. 968; 31 
 W. Va. 436 ; 31 S. E. 1038 ; Chicago, S. E. 554 ; Coleman v. Wilmington, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Young, 36 111. App. etc. R. Co., 35 S. C. 446 [leaving 
 115 ; Hunn v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 78 switch open] ; Boatwright v. North- 
 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. 503 ; Smith v. eastern R. Co., 35 Id. 138 ; Couch v. 
 "Wabash, etc. R. Co., 92 Mo. 386 ; 4 Charlotte, etc. R. Co., 33 Id. 557 ; 
 S. W. 129 ; Little Rock, etc. R. Co. lUinois Cent. R. Co. v. Spence, 93 
 v. Barry, 58 Ark. 198 ; 28 S. W. Tenn. 173 ; 23 S. W. 311 ; Richmond, 
 1097 ; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. etc. R. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 165 ; 
 Camp, 65 Fed. 952; 13 C. C. A. 233). 9 S. E. 990 [master liable for con- 
 
 ' Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 ductor negligently starting train] ; 
 
 U. S. 877 ; 5 S. Ct. 184. The " Ross Moon v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 78 
 
 case " has been expressly approved Va. 745 ; Daniel v. Chesapeake, etc. 
 
 and adopted in Arkansas, Colorado, R. Co. 30 W. Va. 397 ; 15 S. E. 162 
 
 Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, [conductor failing to notify]. It has 
 
 Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, been expressly disapproved in Maine 
 
 North Carolina, South Carolina (Lasky v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 83 
 
§ 233a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 424 
 
 most States) as to servants on other trains or on the track.* 
 So is any agent, high or low, in selecting instrumentalities, such 
 as tools and machinery,* or in inspecting them,^ or the place of 
 work." So is a servant having general authority to make 
 needed repairs;'' and so, as to repairs which the master is 
 bound to make, is any one employed by him to make them.^ 
 
 N. C. 59 ; 23 S. E. 925 [platform]. 
 Where one employed to inspect or 
 repair machinery is not engaged in 
 using it in a common employment 
 with fellow-servants, the master is 
 liable to the fellow-servants for the 
 negligence of such employee (Inge- 
 bregtsen v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd 
 Steamship Co. [Ct. Errors], 57 N. J. 
 Law, 400 ; 31 Atl. 619). A car in- 
 spector is not the fellow-servant of 
 a brakeman (Atchison, etc. R. Co v. 
 Myers, 63 Fed. 793 ; 11 C. C. A. 439 ; 
 Terre Haute, etc. R. Co v. Mans- 
 berger, 65 Fed. 196 ; 12 C. C. A. 574 ; 
 Ohio & M. R. Co. V. Pearcy, 128 Ind. 
 197; 27 N. B. 479: Morton v. Detroit, 
 etc. R. Co., 81 Mich. 423 ; 46 N. W. 
 111). 
 
 « Durkin v. Sharp, 88 N. Y. 225 
 [track] ; s. P., Dewey v. Detroit, etc. 
 R. Co. (Mich.), 53 N. W. 942; Bal- 
 hofE V. Mich. Central R. Co., 106 Mich. 
 606; 65 N. W. 592 [track]. 
 
 'Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Her- 
 bert, 116 U. S. 642 ; 6 S. Ct. 590 ; Van 
 Dusen v. Letellier, 78 Mich. 493 ; 44 
 N. W. 572. Foreman of machine 
 shop, who neglects to repair a defect 
 in an engine of which he has notice, 
 is not, as respects the duty to repair, 
 the fellow-servant of a brakeman in- 
 jured because of such defect (Ohio, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Stein, 140 Ind, 61; 39 
 N. E. 246). 
 
 ' Indiana, etc. R. Co. v. Snyder, 
 140 Ind. 647; 39 N. E. 912 [carpenter]; 
 Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. McMullen, 
 
 117 Ind. 439; 30 N. E. 287; Romona 
 Stone Co. v. Phillips, 11 Ind. App. 
 
 118 ; 39 N. E. 96 ; Atchison, etc. R. Co. 
 V. McKee, 37 Kans. 592 ; Jacques v. 
 
 Me. 461 ; 23 Atl. 367), and New York 
 (Loughlin v. State, 105 N. Y. 159; 11 
 N. E. 371). It has been reaffirmed 
 in the lower Federal courts, as un- 
 affected by the "Baugh" case 
 (Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Johnston, 
 9 C. C. A. 587 ; 61 Fed. 738 ; Union 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Callaghan, 56 Fed. 
 988 ; 6 C. C. A. 205 ; Northern Pac. 
 R. Co. V. Cavanaugh, 51 Fed. 517 ; 3 
 C. C. A. 358 ; 10 U. S. App. 197 [con- 
 ductor disobeying train dispatcher]). 
 When an officer is placed in charge 
 of the train, over the conductor, the 
 latter ceases to be a vice-principal 
 (Northern Pac. R Co. v. Smith, 59 
 Fed. 993 ; 8 C. C. A. 663). 
 
 ' Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Rey- 
 nolds, 50 Fed. 738 ; 1 C. C. A. 686 ; 
 6 XT. S. App. 75 [brakeman fellow- 
 servant with conductor of another 
 train] ; s. P., St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Needham, 63 Fed. 107 ; 11 C. C. A. 
 56 ; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mase, 
 63 Fed. 114 ; 11 C. C. A. 63 ; North- 
 ern Pac. R. Co. V. Smith, 59 Fed. 
 993 ; 8 C. C. A. 663 ; Pittsburgh, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Devinney, 17 Ohio St. 198. 
 The law is otherwise in West Vir- 
 ginia (Daniels v. Chesapeake, etc. 
 R. Co., 36 W. Va. 397 ; 15 S. E. 163), 
 and now, by statute, in Ohio (Ohio 
 Stat. April 3, 1890 ; Cincinnati, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Margi-at, 51 Ohio St. 130 ; 
 37 N. E. 11). 
 
 ■■ Ford V. Fitchburgh R. Co., 110 
 Mass. 240. 
 
 ^ Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Kneirim, 
 153 111. 458; 39 N. E. 324; Western 
 Mining Co. v. Ingraham, 17 C. C. A. 
 71 ; 70 Fed. 219 [timbering of mine] ; 
 Chesson v. Roper Lumber Co., 118 
 
425 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 233b 
 
 Any agent, empowered to select and employ servants, acts as 
 a vice-principal in so doing,' and so does anyone employed to 
 instruct new or inexperienced servants.'" But a telegraph 
 operator, transmitting orders received from others, is a mere 
 fellow-servant of those who receive orders through him," for, 
 unlike a train dispatcher, no discretionary power is delegated 
 to him. The engineer of a train, as such, is not a vice-princi- 
 pal,*^ nor is a switch-tender, either as to his management of 
 the switches or his inspection of them.'' 
 
 § 233b. Peculiar local rules. — In Ohio, at an early date, it 
 was held, and is still settled law, that any servant having con- 
 trol over another is not a " fellow-servant " of the latter, and 
 that the common master is responsible to the servant con- 
 
 Great Falls Mfg. Co., 66 N. H. 483 ; 
 33 Atl. 553 [loom-flxer] ; Scherer v. 
 Holly Mfg. Co., 86 Hun, 37; 33 N. Y. 
 Supp. 305 [grade of no importance]. 
 
 ' Mann v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co., 91 N, Y. 495. There is a curiously- 
 involved decision, perhaps to the 
 contrary, in Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Hoover, 79 Md. 353; 39 Atl. 994. 
 But if so, it is contrary to all author- 
 ity, outside of Maryland. See Yates 
 V. McCullough Iron Co., 69 Md. 370 ; 
 16 Atl. 380. 
 
 "> Brennan v. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 
 489; 33 N. E. 810. 
 
 " A telegraph operator and the 
 engineer of a train are fellovF-serv- 
 ants (Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Camp, 
 65 Fed. 953 ; 13 C. C. A. 333 ; Mon- 
 aghan v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 45 
 Hun, 113). S. p., as to fireman (Cincin- 
 nati, etc. R. Co. V. Clark, 57 Fed. 135 ; 
 6 C. C. A. 381 ; McKaig v. Northern 
 Pac. R. Co., 43 Fed. 388). 
 
 12 In Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Baugh (149 U. S. 368 ; 13 S. Ct. 914), 
 held, that an engineer, running an 
 engine by itself, was not a vice- 
 principal as to his management of 
 the engine toward a fireman injured 
 
 thereby, but not as result of engi- 
 neer's orders. An engineer is a fel- 
 low-servant with a brakeman on the 
 same train, the conductor being in 
 charge (East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Smith, 89 Tenn. 114 ; 14 S. W. 
 1077 ; Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Whe- 
 less, 68 Tenn. [10 Lea], 741 [a well- 
 reasoned opinion]; Hobbs v. Atlantic, 
 etc. R. Co., 107 N. C. 1 ; 13 S. E. 134; 
 Hagins v. Cape Fear, etc. R. Co., 
 106 N. C. 537 ; 11 S. E. 590 ; Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. Co. V. Martin, 87 Tenn. 
 [3 Pickle] 398 ; 10 S. W. 772 ; New- 
 port News, etc. Co. v. Howe, 53 Fed. 
 363; 3 C. C. A. 121 ; 6 U. S. App. 
 173). Engineer's signals are not 
 " orders,'' so as to make him a vice- 
 principal as to brakemen (Pittsburgh, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Ranney, 37 Ohio St. 
 665 ; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Lewis, 
 33 Id!. 196). Therefore.an engineer is 
 the fellow-servant of all others on 
 the train (Id). 
 
 " Randall v. Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co., 109 U. S. 483 ; Miller v. So. Pac. 
 Co., 30 Oreg. 385 ; 36 Pac. 70 ; Har- 
 vey V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 88 N. Y. 
 481. 
 
§ 233b] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 426 
 
 trolled for the negligence of the superior servant.* But this 
 rule is limited to the case of servants vested with actual con- 
 trol over injured servants. In any other case, superiority of 
 position makes no difference.^ No distinction is made between 
 the different kinds of negligence, of which such superior serv- 
 ant may be guilty. He stands in the place of the master, 
 alike when doing the work of a servant, or when doing that of 
 a master.^ The Ohio rule was at one time adopted in the courts 
 of several states ; but they have nearly all modified their position, 
 until only Virginia, Nebraska and Utah seem to be left in line 
 with Ohio;* and the decisions even there might be sustained 
 upon a somewhat different theory. Nevertheless, the Ohio 
 judges are entitled to the honor of having been the first to 
 strike out on the right path ; although they made some mis- 
 takes in details, and failed to state their ideas with accuracy. 
 In Kentucky, a master is not liable to a servant for the negli- 
 gence of a fellow-servant in the same or an inferior rank, no 
 matter how gross it may be;^ nor for anything less than gross 
 
 ' This point was first decided where 
 an. engineer was allowed to use an 
 old time-table, through the negli- 
 gence of the conductor of his train 
 or the superintendent of the road, 
 and, in consequence, a collision oc- 
 curred by which he was injured 
 (Little Miami R. Co. t. Stevens, 30 
 Ohio, 415). Afterwards, where a 
 brakeman was injured by a collision, 
 through the negligent management 
 of a conductor, whose orders he was 
 bound to obey, it was held that the 
 company was liable (Cleveland, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 301 ; see 
 Mad River, etc. R. Co. v. Barber, 5 
 Ohio St. 541, 563) . But a brakeman 
 and an engineer on the same train 
 are fellow-servants, though the 
 former is bound to observe the sig- 
 nals of the latter to apply or loosen 
 the brakes (Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Lewis, 33 Ohio St. 196 ; compare 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Ranney, 
 87 Ohio St. 665). 
 
 2 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Devin- 
 ney, 17 Ohio St. 198. 
 
 ^Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 
 Ohio St. 387. 
 
 ■* Virginia : Moon v. Richmond, 
 etc. R. Co., 78 Va. 745 [conductor of 
 gravel train and laborer] ; fully sus- 
 tained in Ayers v. Richmond, etc. R. 
 Co., 84 Va. 679; 5 S. E. 583; Rich- 
 mond, etc. R. Co. V. "Williams, 86 
 Va. 165 ; 9 S. E. 990. AU these were 
 really acts of superintendence. 
 
 Nebraska : Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Lundstrom, 16 Neb. 254 ; 30 N. W. 
 198 ; Burlington, etc. R. Co. v. Crock- 
 ett, 19 Neb. 138 ; 36 N. W. 93] . The 
 court has recently adhered to this 
 doctrine, refusing to follow the 
 Peterson case (163 U. S. 346) ; Union 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Doyle, Neb. ; 
 
 70 N. W. 43. 
 
 Utah adopts the full Ohio rule 
 (Armstrong v. Oregon, etc. R. Co., 8 
 Utah, 430; 33 Pac. 693). 
 
 ' Volz V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 95 Ky. 188 ; 34 S. W. 119 [workmen 
 driving piles] ; Casey v. Louisville, 
 etc. R. Co., 84 Ky. 79 [common 
 laborers]. 
 
427 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 233b 
 
 negligence on the part of any servant whatever;" but he is 
 liable for the gross negligence of a superior servant of any 
 kind, whether in control or notJ In an action for causing 
 death, under the statute, willful negligence must be proved.^ 
 The rule adopted in Texas is peculiar, but is at least intelli- 
 gible and easily applied. Any servant in Texas, high or low, 
 is a vice-principal as to other servants whose work he super- 
 intends, and whom he has power to hire and discharge.' All 
 these powers must co-exist in the same person ; or he is not a 
 vice-principal. 1" Such a vice-principal is not a "fellow-serv- 
 ant" with the others; and for his negligence, whether in man- 
 agement or in any other respect, the master is responsible." 
 
 * When an employee of a railroad 
 company is injured by the negli- 
 gence of another employee in a 
 higher grade of the same service, in 
 order to recover he must show that 
 such negligence was gross ; and a 
 verdict in his favor, stating that the 
 negligence was " ordinary," will be 
 set aside (Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Brantley, 96 Ky. 297 ; 29 S. W. 477 
 [engineer and porter "not fellow- 
 servants "J). A railroad porter who 
 is engaged with the engineer in 
 making up a train can recover for 
 injury received through the fault of 
 such engineer only on proof of gross 
 negligence (Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. 
 v. Palmer [Ky.], 33 S. W. 199). 
 
 ' Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Collins, 
 2 Duvall, 114 ; Louisville, etc. R. Co. 
 v. Cavens, 9 Bush, 559 [train-dis- 
 patcher, through whose negligence 
 an engineer was killed] ; Greer v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 94 Ky. 169 ; 
 21 S. W. 649 [engineer superior of 
 brakeman]. 
 
 * Chesapeake, etc R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Michael [Ky.J, 15 S. W. 878 [not 
 proved] ; Newport News, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Dentzel, 91 Ky. 43 ; 14 S. W. 958 
 [proved]. 
 
 'Nix V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 82 Tex. 
 478 ; 18 S. W. 571 ; Gulf, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Wells [Tex.] 16 S. W. 1025 ; see 
 
 s. c, 81 Tex. 685; 17 S. W. 511. 
 S. P., Ft. Worth, etc. R. Co. v. Peters, 
 87 Tex. 223 ; 27 S. W. 257 ; Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Williams, 75 Tex. 4 ; 
 12 S. W. 835 [foreman in repair de- 
 partment] ; Galveston, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 76 Tex. 611 ; 13 S. W. 563 
 [railroad superintendent] . 
 
 '"Thus a brakeman and the con- 
 ductor on the same train are fellow- 
 servants, in the absence of authority 
 by the conductor to employ and dis- 
 charge brakemen (Campbell v. Cook, 
 86 Tex. 630 ; 36 S. W. 486). And so 
 as to conductor and laborer (Corona 
 v. Galveston, etc. R. Co. [Tex.], 17 
 S. W. 384) ; and a locomotive engi- 
 neer and fireman (Gulf, etc. R. Co. 
 V. Blohn, 73 Tex. 637 ; 11 S. W. 867). 
 To justify a finding for plaintiff, the 
 evidence must show that the tempo- 
 rary foreman had full control of the 
 work, with power to employ and 
 discharge the men (St. Louis, etc. R. 
 Co. V. Lemon, 83 Tex. 143 ; 18 S. W. 
 331). But all these limitations, so 
 far as they relate to railroad serv- 
 ants, have been substantially abol- 
 ished by the statutes of March 10, 
 1891. and May 4, 1893. 
 
 " In Texas there is no distinction, 
 as regards tl}e master's liability for 
 the vice-principal's negligence, be- 
 tween the latter's acts in performing 
 
§234] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 428 
 
 § 234. Servants must be in same common employment. — 
 
 In order to constitute an exception to the general rule of the 
 master's liability for the negligence ot his servant, it is neces- 
 sary that the person suffering the injury should be not only a 
 fellow-servant, but also in the same common employment 
 with the servant whose negligence has caused the injury.^ 
 And the injury must have occurred while both servants were 
 actually serving in this employment? The opinions of the 
 courts have generally failed to distinguish between the ques- 
 tions of what constitutes a fellow-servant and what constitutes 
 a common employment ; and in many cases it has been held 
 that two servants of the same master were not fellow-servants, 
 when all that was really meant by the court was that they 
 were not in the same common employment. We shall en- 
 deavor to classify the cases according to their real meaning, 
 but may not be always able to succeed. So far as we can see, 
 the only tests as to fellow-service are the common service of 
 one master by both servants and the absence of any such 
 difference of grade between them as would put one in the 
 
 the non-assignable duties intrusted 
 to him specially and those ordinary 
 acts which he and the servants under 
 him are in the habit of indiscrimin- 
 ately performing (Sweeney v. Gulf, 
 etc. R. Co., 84 Tex. 433; 19 S. W. 
 555 [foreman throwing switch] ; 
 Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Reed, 88 Tex. 
 439 ; 31 S. W. 1058 [assisting in the 
 making up of trains]). 
 
 ' W^arburton v. Great Western R. 
 Co., L. R. 2 Exch. 30 ; Abraham v. 
 Reynolds, 5 Hurlst. & N. 143 ; Gil- 
 lenwater v. Madison, etc. R. Co., 5 
 Ind. 389 ; Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Ham- 
 mersley, 33 Ind. 371 ; Toledo etc. R. 
 Co. V. Moore, 77 111. 317; McAn- 
 drews v. Burns, 39 N. J. Law, 117 ; 
 Rogers, etc. Works v. Hand, 50 Id. 
 464 ; 14 Atl. 766 ; Baird v. Pettit, 70 
 Pa. St. 477. In Mullan v. Phila. etc. 
 S. S. Co. (78 Pa. St. 25) , it was held to 
 be a question for the jury, whether a 
 stevedore, employed by a ship-owner 
 to unload a vessel, was a fellow-ser- 
 
 vant, in a common employment, 
 with the mate, whose negligence in 
 splicing a rope occasioned an injury 
 to the former. If the stevedore was 
 a " contractor," it is clear that the 
 two men would not be fellow-ser- 
 vants (see Hass v. Philadelphia, etc. 
 S. S. Co., 88 Pa. St. 269 [question 
 for jury]). 
 
 ' As to the injured servant, all the 
 cases agree. But it is equally clear 
 as to the servant in fault. Both 
 must have actually co-operated in 
 one employment. The cases upon 
 the first question are reviewed 
 in State v. Western Maryland R. 
 Co. (63 Md. 433), where Stone, J., 
 points out that they all agree in 
 this, " that if the plaintiff is not, at 
 the time of the accident, engaged in 
 the actual service of the company, or 
 in some way connected with such 
 service, the company is liable for the 
 negligence of its employees." 
 
429 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§23S 
 
 position of a master over the other. All questions as to the 
 engagement of servants of the same master in such spheres of 
 labor as to bring the common master within the rule of ex- 
 emption, or to exclude him therefrom, belong to the realm of 
 common employment. Thus, sailors employerd upon different 
 vessels by the same owner may be fellow-servants ; but they 
 are not in the same common employment. 
 
 § 235. Common employment : general rule. — Under the 
 rule first established in England and Massachusetts,' but 
 which, upon this point, is accepted by the U. S. Supreme 
 Court,^ as well as the courts in all New England, New York, 
 
 'Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 
 Maoq. H. L. 266 ; Bartonshill Coal 
 Co. V. MoGuire, Id. 300 ; Charles v. 
 Taylor, 8 0. P. Div. 493. '■ When the 
 object to be accomplished is one and 
 the same, when the employers are 
 the same, and the several persons 
 employed derive their authority and 
 their compensation from the same 
 source, it would be extremely diffi- 
 cult to distinguish what constitutes 
 one department, and what a dis- 
 tinct department of duty " (Farwell 
 V. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 4 
 Mete. 49). 
 
 " The general rule is that those 
 entering the service of a common 
 master become thereby engaged in a 
 common service, and are fellow- 
 servants ; and, prima facie, the com- 
 mon master is not liable for the 
 negligence of one of his servants 
 which has resulted in an injury to a 
 fellow-servant (Northern Pac. R. 
 Co. V. Peterson, 163 U. S. 346 ; 16 
 S. Ct. 843). In Northern Pac. R. 
 Co. V. Hambly (154 U. S. 849), 
 Brown, J., sums up the cases very 
 fairly thus : "It may be said in 
 general that, as between laborers 
 employed upon a railroad track and 
 the conductor or other employees of 
 a moving" train, the courts of Massa- 
 chusetts, Rhode Island, New York, 
 Indiana, Iowa, Michigan North 
 
 Carolina, Minnesota, Maine, Texas, 
 California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
 Arkansas and Wisconsin hold the 
 relation of fellow-servants to exist 
 (Farwell v. Boston, etc. R., 4 Mete. 
 49 ; Clifford V. Old Colony R. Co., 141 
 Mass. 564 ; 6 N. E. 751 ; Brodeur v. 
 Valley Falls Co., 17 Atl. 54 ; 16 R. I. 
 448 ; Harvey v. N. Y. Central R., 88 
 N. Y. 481 ; Gormley v. Ohio, etc. R., 
 73 Ind. 31 ; Collins v. St. Paul, etc. R. 
 Co., 30 Minn. 81 ; Pennsylvania R. 
 R. V. Wachter, 60 Md. 395; Houston, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Rider, 63 Tex. 267 ; St. 
 Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Shackelford, 43 
 Ark. 417; Blake v. Maine Central R., 
 70 Me. 60 ; Ryan v. Cumberland 
 Valley R., 28 Pa. St. 384; Sullivan 
 V. Miss. & Mo. R., 11 Iowa, 431; 
 Fowler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 
 61 Wise. 159 ; Kirk v. Atlantic, etc. 
 R. Co., 94 N. C. 635 ; Quincy Mining 
 Co. V. Kitts, 43 Mich. 84 ; Keystone 
 Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. St. 
 346) ; while in Illinois, Missouri, 
 Virginia, Ohio and Kentucky the 
 rule is apparently the other way 
 (Chicago, etc. R. v. Moranda, 93 111. 
 303 ; Sullivan v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 97 
 Mo. 113 ; 10 S. W. 853 ; Richmond, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Norment, 84 Va. 167 ; 
 4 S. E. 311 ; Dick v. Railroad Co., 38 
 Ohio St. 389 ; Louisville, etc. R. v. 
 Caven, 9 Bush, 559 ; Madden v. 
 Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 38 W. Va. 
 
§ 236] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 430 
 
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro- 
 lina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Ohio, Indi- 
 ana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, the two Dakotas, 
 Idaho, California and other states, it is not necessary, in order 
 to establish a " common employment," that the two servants 
 should be engaged in the same kind of work, or even in the 
 same department. It is held to be enough if they are both 
 engaged in serving one master in one general business, aim- 
 ing at one general result, with such notice of risk as is 
 stated in the next section. 
 
 § 236. Who are in common employment. — Under the 
 generally prevailing rule, fellow-servants are engaged in a com- 
 mon employment when each of them is occupied in service of 
 such a kind that all the others, in the exercise of ordinary 
 sagacity, ought to be able to foresee, when accepting their 
 employment, that his negligence would probably expose them 
 to the risk of injury.' That this is the proper test is evident, 
 
 610). The cases in Tennessee seem Tenn. 711; 18 S. W. 387) which is 
 to be divided (East Tenn. etc. R. Co. V. also the case in Georgia (Ellington 
 Rush, 15 Lea, 145; Louisville, etc. v. Beaver Dam Co., 93 Ga. 53; 19 
 R. Co. V. Robertson, 9 Heisk. 376; S. E. 21). The general rule also pre- 
 Haley v. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 7 Bax- vails in New Jersey (Smith v. Ox- 
 ter, 239; Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. ford Iron Co., 43 N. J. Law, 467); 
 Jones, 9 Heisk, 27 ; East Tenn. etc. R. Idaho (Snyder v. Viola Mining Co., 
 Co. V. Gurley, 13 Lea, 46)." The list 3 Idaho, 771 ; 36 Pac. 137); and at 
 of states thus given by Judge Brown common law in Mississippi (McMas- 
 must be modified by excluding from ter v. 111. Central R. Co., 65 Miss." 
 those supposed to have adopted the 364 ; 4 So. 59) ; but changed there in 
 Illinois doctrine, Ohio, where it part by statute, 
 never was really adopted (see Con- ' McAndrews v. Burns, 89 N. J. 
 solidated Coal Co. v. Clay, 51 Ohio Law, 117 ; Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. St. 
 St. 543 ; 38 N. E. 610 ; Whaalan v. 477 ; Norfolk, etc. R.Co. v. Nuckols, 
 Mad River R. Co., 8 Ohio St. 349); 91 Va. 198 ; 31 S. E. 343. SeeLouis- 
 and Virginia, where it has since ville, etc. R. Co. v. Robinson, 4 
 been expressly repudiated (Norfolk, Bush, 507 [brakeman and conductor 
 etc. R. Co. V. Nuckols, 91 Va. 193 ; 31 on different trains] ; Baltimore Ele- 
 S. E. 343 ; overruling earlier cases) ; vator Co. v. Neal, 65 Md. 438 ; 5 Atl. 
 while the apparent conflict in Ten- 338; Barstow v. Old Colony R. Co., 
 nessee is settled by holding that the 143 Mass. 535; 10 N. E. 855. In 
 "Illinois rule" applies to railroad Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire (8 
 companies and to no other employ- Macq. H. L. 300), Lord Chelmsford 
 ers (Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll, said : " There may be sonie nicety 
 62 Tenn. [6 Heisk ] 347, as limited in and difficulty, in peculiar cases, in 
 Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Davis, 90 deciding whether a common employ- 
 
43 1 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 238 
 
 if it is true, as stated in the English cases and those follow- 
 ing them, that the reason for the exemption of masters from 
 liability to their servants is that the servant takes the risk into 
 account in fixing his wages. He cannot take into account a 
 risk which he has no reason to anticipate ; and he should take 
 into account those risks which the average experience of his 
 fellows has led them as a class to anticipate. 
 
 §237. Who are not in common employment. — On the 
 
 other hand, the mere fact that two servants of the same man 
 are both engaged in adding to his wealth or ministering to his 
 tastes or comforts, does not necessarily bring them within the 
 definition of a common employment. Thus, where a mer- 
 chant carries on a regular trade in his store, and at the same 
 time owns a ship, the clerks in his store and the sailors in his 
 ship are clearly not in a common employment. Indeed, if he 
 owns two ships, a sailor in one is not in a common employ- 
 ment with a sailor in the other.' Workmen in a quarry 
 owned by a railroad company are not in common employment 
 with the railroad hands. ^ Still less are domestic servants, 
 engaged in providing for the wants of their employer at home, 
 in a common employment with his clerks, operatives, or other 
 servants in his business. So a draftsman is not in the same 
 common employment with a man excavating a cellar below 
 the same office.^ 
 
 § 238. Common employment ; " association " rule. — In 
 
 Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, Utah and per- 
 haps elsewhere, what may be called the "association " rule is 
 established.' Under this rule, fellow-servants are not in the 
 
 ment exists ; but in general, by 327 [track repairer and stock and fuel 
 
 keeping in view what the servant agent]. 
 
 must have known or expected to ' Illinois : Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 
 have been involved in the service Moranda, 93 111. 302 ; Chicago, etc. 
 
 which he undertook, a satisfactory R. Co. v. Snyder, 117 111. 376 ; 7 N. 
 
 conclusion may be arrived at." E. 604. It is proper to charge that, 
 
 ' The Petrel (1893), Prob. & Adni. to constitute fellow-servants, the 
 
 320 ; Connolly v. Davidson, 15 Minn, servants should be actually co-ope- 
 
 519_ rating at the time of the injury in 
 
 2 Dixon v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 109 the particular business in hand, or 
 
 Mo. 413 ; 19 S. W. 412. their usual duties should bring them 
 
 'Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. St. 477; into habitual consociation with each 
 
 Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Kirk, 63 Tex. other, so that they might exercise 
 
§238] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 432 
 
 " same common employment," unless they are so engaged that 
 their duties bring them into association with each other, either 
 generally^ or at the time of the injury in question,* to such a 
 degree that they can exercise some influence upon each other, 
 in favor of care and caution for their mutual safety.* In some 
 cases this rule is stated as limiting " common employment " 
 to " the same department ; "' but the definition of a depart- 
 ment seems to be as above stated. This rule is adopted in 
 Tennessee, with respect to railroad companies, but no fur- 
 ther.' In Georgia, Mississippi and Texas, by statute, a simi- 
 lar rule is imposed upon all owners and managers of rail- 
 
 an influence upon each other promo- 
 tive of proper caution for their per- 
 sonal safety (Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 O'Brien, 155 111. 630 ; 40 N. E. 1033). ' 
 So in Missouri, although with con- 
 siderable dissent, on the part of new 
 judges (Dixon v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 109 Mo. 413 ; 19 S. W. 412 [track 
 laborer not in common employment 
 with trainmen] ; Schlereth v. Mis- 
 souri Pac. R. Co., 115 Mo. 87; 31 S. 
 W. 1110 [same]; Sullivan v. Mo. 
 Pacii]c R. Co., 97 Mo. 113 ; 10 S. W. 
 853 [same] ; but compare Parker v 
 Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 109 Mo. 363; 
 19 S. W. 1119 [where trainmen were 
 unloading with trackmen ; and the 
 court divided equally] ; and Relyea v. 
 Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 112 Mo. 86 ; 
 19 S. W. 1116 ; again. 20 S. W. 480 
 [brakeman on one train in common 
 employment with fireman on an- 
 other]). So in Kansas (Atchison, 
 etc. R. Co. V. McKee, 37 Kans. 593 ; 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Weaver, 35 
 Kans. 413 ; 11 Pac. 408 [section fore- 
 man and engineer of train, not in 
 common employment]) ; in Kentucky 
 (Kentucky, etc R Co -p Ackley, 87 
 Ky. 378; 8 S W 691) Nebraska 
 (Union Pac. R. Co. v. Erickson, 41 
 Neb. 1 ; 59 N. W. 347 ; Omaha, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Krayenbuhl, 48 Neb. 553 ; 
 67 N. W. 447 [section foreman not in 
 
 common employment with train en- 
 gineer]) ; and Utah (Armstrong v. 
 Oregon, etc., R. Co., 8 Utah, 430 ; 33 
 Pac. 693 ; Webb v. Denver, etc. E. 
 Co., 7 Utah, 363; 36 Pac. 981 [car- 
 repairer and engineer]). The Illinois 
 rule was once approved in Virginia 
 (Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Norment, 84 
 Va. 167) ; but is now expressly repu- 
 diated (Norfolk, etc. R. Co v. Nuck- 
 ols, 94 Va. 193 ; 31 8. E. 343). 
 
 * This is declai'ed in all the cases. 
 
 ' If they are thus co-operating, at 
 the time of the injury, it makes no 
 difference that their usual duties are 
 iu separate departments (Casgy v. 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 84 Ky. 79; 
 Abend v. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co., 
 Ill 111. 303). 
 
 « North Chicago Mill Co. v. John- 
 son, 114 111. 57 ; 39 N. E. 186 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. O'Brien, 155 111. 
 630 ; 40 N. E. 1033. 
 
 ^ St. Louis, etc, R. Co. v. Weaver, 
 35 Kans. 413 ; 11 Pac. 408. 
 
 * The doctrine that where em- 
 ployees are in different departments 
 of service the fellow-servant rule 
 does not apply, has no application in 
 this state except as to railroad com- 
 panies (Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Davis, 
 90 Tenn. 711 ; 18 S. W. 387 ; limiting 
 Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll, 6 
 Heisk. 347). 
 
433 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§238 
 
 roads.'' In courts adhering to this definition, the following 
 servants are held not to be usually in common employment 
 with each other, and therefore a jury may allow one to 
 recover against the common master for the negligence of the 
 other: trainmen for the fault of trackmen;' trackmen for 
 fault of trainmen ; ' trainmen for fault of telegraph operators," 
 or of foreman sending out unsafe engine or car;'^ a yard 
 switchman for fault of an engineer ; ^ a car inspector for fault 
 of engineer;^' car loaders for fault of trainmen within the 
 same yard ; '* a brakeman for fault of officers attending to 
 loading of trains.^^ As to servants on separate trains, coming 
 into collision, the decisions are conflicting.'* On the other 
 
 ' Georgia Code [1883], § 3036 ; Mis- 
 sissippi Code, § 193 ; Texas Stat. May 
 4, 1893 ; March 10, 1891. But it is not 
 the common-law rule, and therefoi'e 
 has no further application (Ellington 
 V. Beaver Dam Lumber Co., 93 Ga 53 ; 
 19 S. E. 21 ; International, etc. R. Co. 
 T. Ryan, 83 Tex. 565 ; 18 S. W. 219). 
 
 ' Toriansv. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 
 84 Va. 192 ; 4 S. E. 339 [track re- 
 pairers in fault]. 
 
 ' Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Powers, 
 74 111. 841 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Swett, 45 Id. 197'; Toledo, etc. R. 
 Co. V. O'Connor, 77 Id. 391 ; Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. Co. V. Moranda, 93 Id. 
 303 ; Peoria, etc. R. Co. v. Rice, 144 
 111. 327 ; 33 N. E. 951 [section fore- 
 man] ; Sullivan v. Missouri Pac. R. 
 Co., 97 Mo. 113 ; 10 S. W. 853 ; Schle- 
 reth V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 115 
 Mo. 87 ; 31 S. W. 1110 ; Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. V. O'Brien, 1 Wash. 
 599; 31 Pac. 33. In Texas, an em- 
 ployee of a railroad who travels in a 
 train to reach a point where he has 
 been assigned to work, but wlio takes 
 no part in the running of the train, 
 is not a fellow-servant of the engi- 
 neer (Galveston, etc. R. Co. v. Nor- 
 ris, Tex. Civ. App. ; 29 S. W. 
 950). A section man and men oper- 
 ating a train are not fellow-servants 
 (Southern Pac. Co. v. Ryan. Tex. 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 38.] 
 
 Civ. App. ; 39 S. W. 537 ; Union 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Erickson, 41 Neb. 1 ; 
 59 N. W. 347). 
 
 "> East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. De 
 Armond, 3 Pickle, 73 ; 5 S. 'W. 600. 
 
 " Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Shannon, 
 43 111. 338 ; Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Moore, 77 Id. 317 [engineer not fel- 
 low-servant with those whose duty 
 it was to inspect and keep engine in 
 order] ; S. P., Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Taylor, 69 Id. 461 ; Norway v. Jen- 
 sen, 53 Id. 373 [sailor on schooner]. 
 
 '* Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Sheets, 
 (Ky.) 13 S. W. 348. 
 
 '2 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Hoyt, 133 
 III. 369 ; 13 N. E. 335 ; Richmond, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Norment, 84 Va. 167 ; 
 4 S. E. 211 ["different depart- 
 ments"]; but compare Valtez v. 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co., 85 lU. 500 [car re- 
 pairer at station and negligent en- 
 gineer in charge of switch engine at 
 same station]. 
 
 i'' North Chicago RolHng Mill Co. 
 V. Johnson, 114 111. 57 ; 29 N. E. 186. 
 
 " Atchinson, etc. R. Co. v. Seeley, 
 54 Kans. 31 ; 37 Pac. 104. 
 
 '"Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Ackley, 
 87 Ky. 378; 8 S. W. 691 [freight 
 train and passenger train not in com- 
 mon employment]. But see contra, 
 as to locomotive engineers on the 
 same road, Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Robb, 
 
§239] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 434 
 
 hand, it is held under this rule that servants are in common 
 employment, and therefore cannot recover against the master, 
 in the following cases: laborers, carried on a train, for the 
 fault of the train engineer ; " a trackman for the omission of 
 an engineer to notify him of a defect, it being the duty and 
 habit of the engineer to do so ; " a watchman at a cable road 
 crossing, for the fault of a motorman ; " a laborer, loading a. 
 ship, for the fault of laborer above, failing to give due warn- 
 ing ; ^ and a track-layer in a mine for the fault of an engineer 
 operating the hoist.^' 
 
 § 239. Illustrations of common employment. — Except in 
 the states specified in section 238, the rule of common employ- 
 ment includes all employed in the same factory, mill, shop,^ 
 warehouse or office,' all employed in operating the same mine, 
 whether above or below,^ all persons employed upon the trains, 
 yards, stations and depots of the same railroad,^ and certainly 
 
 36 111. App. 627, and brakeman and 
 fireman of different trains, Relyea 
 V. Kansas City, etc. E. Co., 113 Mo. 
 86 ; 20 S. W. 480. 
 
 "Higgins V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 104 Mo. 413 ; 16 S. W. 409 ; Illinois 
 Central E. Co. v. Cox, 21 111. 28; 
 Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. Keefe, 47 Id. 
 108 ; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Britz, 
 72 Id. 256; Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Durkin, 76 111. 395 ; Chicago, etc. E. 
 Co. V. Eush, 84 111. 571 [all cases of 
 co-servants on same train]. 
 
 18 White Y. Kennon, 83 Ga. 343 ; 9 
 S. E. 1082. 
 
 "Murray v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 
 98 Mo. 573 ; 12 S. W. 252. 
 
 i^o Ocean S. S. Co. v. Cheeney, 86 
 Ga. 378 ; 12 S. E. 351. 
 
 " Niantic Min. Co. v. Leonard, 25 
 lU. App. 95; affl'd, 136 111. 316; 19 
 N. E. 294. 
 
 ' Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co., 78 Mich. 
 271 ; 44 N. W. 270 [furnace with 
 separate departments] ; Say ward v. 
 Carlson, 1 AVash. St. 29 ; 23 Pac. 830 
 [sawyer and carpenter]. 
 
 "Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Eeid, 3 
 Macq. n. L. 266 ; Bartonshill Coal 
 Co. V. McGuire, Id. 300 ; Coal Creek 
 Min. Co. V. Davis, 90 Tenn. 711 ; 18 
 S. W. 387. 
 
 ' The employees of an extra freight 
 train are the fellow-servants of sec- 
 tion hands going to their work upon 
 a hand car, so that the negligence of 
 the former in failing to give proper 
 signals, whereby a collision results, 
 does not render the company liable 
 for injuries to one of the section men 
 (Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Charless, 
 163 U. S. 359 ; 16 S. Ct. 848). Track- 
 men and trainmen of a railroad com- 
 pany are fellow-servants (Schaible 
 v. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co., 97 Mich. 
 318 ; 56 N. W. 565 ; St. Louis, etc. 
 E. Co. V. Welch, 73 Tex. 298 ; 10 S. 
 W. 529). So held, under a code, 
 using the words, " the same general 
 business" (Northern Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Hambly, 154 U. S. 349 ; 14 S. Ct. 
 983). Employees in a round-hous& 
 in whose charge plaintiff, an inex- 
 perienced workman, was placed, and 
 
435 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§239 
 
 all co-operating in a single piece of work* or the construction 
 of a single thing, such as a building,^ no matter how different 
 their special lines of work may be." Workmen employed by 
 a railroad company, and carried free to and from their work, 
 as part of their contract for service, upon trains in the manage- 
 ment of which they do not in the least degree participate, are 
 in a common employment with the engineer and other serv- 
 ants in charge of the train,'' and with switchmen upon the 
 track,^ and, therefore, cannot hold the company liable for the 
 negligence of the latter. But if servants thus traveling were 
 not carried in pursuance of their contract for service, even 
 though they traveled under a free pass which would not have 
 been given to them but for their service, they are not in service 
 during their journey, and therefore, are not in common employ- 
 ment with anybody.' And in Pennsylvania it is held that a 
 servant, who accepts reduced wages, in consideration of being 
 allowed to travel upon the road to and from his work, is not 
 in service while thus traveling. '" 
 
 who ordered plaintiff to clean an 
 engine, are fellow-servants of plain- 
 tiff, as is also the engineer in charge 
 of such engine (Spencer v. Ohio, etc. 
 R. Co., 130 Ind. 181 ; 29 N. E. 915). 
 
 " Morgan v. Vale of Neath R. Co., 
 5 Best & S. 570 ; affi'd, Id. 740 ; 
 L. R. 1 Q. B. 149 ; Butler v. Town- 
 send, 136 N. Y. 105 ; 26 N. E. 1017 ; 
 Fitzgerald v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 156 
 Mass. 393 ; 31 N. E. 7 [stowing hay]; 
 Bergquist v. Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 
 471 ; 44 N. W. 530 ; see Neal v. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co , 57 Minn. 363 ; 
 59 N. W. 313 [men blasting for track 
 and men laying telegraph line]). One 
 unloading coal from a car is in the 
 same common employment with one 
 employed by the same master to 
 place cars in a position for unload- 
 ing (Rehm v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 164 Pa. St. 91 ; 30 Atl. 356). 
 
 = Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313 ; 
 4 S Ct. 433. 
 
 « Butler V. Townsend, 126 N. Y. 
 105 ; 26 N. E. 1017. 
 
 ' Boldt V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 18 
 N. Y. 433 ; Ryan v. Cumberland Val- 
 
 ley R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 384 ; Gillshan- 
 non V. Stony Brook R. Co., 10 Cush. 
 328 ; Seaver v. Boston & Maine R. 
 Co., 14 Gray, 466 ; Whaalan v. Mad 
 River, etc. R. Co., 8 Ohio St. 249 ; 
 McQueen v. Central, etc. R. Co., £0 
 Kans. 689 ; Capper v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. Co., 103 Ind. 305. 
 
 * Gilman v. Eastern R. Co., 10 
 Allen, 233 ; Tunney v. Midland R. 
 Co., L. R., 1 C. P. 391 ; Vick v. N. Y. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 367. 
 
 s State V. "Western Md. R. Co., 63 
 Md. 433. A foreman of a railroad's 
 bridge carpenters, who has, by the 
 order of his superior (the superin- 
 tendent of the bridge- building de- 
 partment), gone on a train, to be 
 transported to his place of work, is 
 not, while being transported, a fel- 
 low-servant of the conductor (North- 
 ern Pac. R. Co. V. Beaton, 64 Fed. 
 563; 13 C. C. A. 301). 
 
 '" O'Donnell v. ' Allegheny Valley 
 R. Co., 59 Pa. St. 239, which case, 
 however, is declared to be " not 
 sound law," in Vick v. N. Y. Central, 
 etc. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 267. 
 
§241] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 436 
 
 § 240. [Omitted as superfluous]. 
 
 § 241. Illustrations of fellow-servants in common employ- 
 ment. — Subject to the exceptions mentioned in section 238, 
 it is everywhere held that the rule of " fellow-servants in com- 
 mon employment" applies, and the common master is not 
 liable, in the following instances : for the negligence of a loco- 
 motive engineer or electric motorman, causing injury to a 
 conductor,' brakeman,^ fireman,* or other servant,* on the same 
 train, or on any other train of the same master on the same road,' 
 or on a hand car," or employed in any capacity upon the track,'' 
 
 ' Ragsdale v. Memphis, etc. E. Co. , 
 3 Baxter (Tenn.), 426, where MoFar- 
 land, J., points out that it was a case 
 where the superior servant charged 
 negligence upon tlae inferior. See a 
 similar case, St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Morgart, 45 Ark. 318. 
 
 ° Russell Y. Hudson River R. Co., 
 17 N. Y. 134 ; Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Brown, 91 Va. 608 ; 23 S. E. 496. . 
 
 3 Bull V. Mobile, etc. R. Co., 67 
 Ala. 206 ; Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Handman, 13 Lea, 423 ; Nashville, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Wheless, 10 Id. 741 ; 
 Sumraerhays v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 
 2 Colo. 384 ; Murray v. South Caro- 
 lina R. Co., 1 McMuUan, Law, 385; 
 Henry v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 49 
 Mich. 495 ; St. Louis, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Britz, 72 111. 356. 
 
 ^ Abend v. Terre Haute, etc. R. 
 Co., Ill 111. 303 [blacksmith going to 
 repair wrecked train] ; Dallas v. 
 Oulf, etc R. Co., 61 Tex. 196 [person 
 employed to vs atch ties along road, 
 riding on train under orders] ; Smith 
 V. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 18 Fed. 304 
 rswitchman ordered to ride on en- 
 gine] ; Kumler v. Junction R. Co., 
 S3 Ohio St. 150 [car-loader on gravel 
 train] ; Ohio, etc. Co. v. Tindall, 13 
 Ind. 366 [shoveler on gravel train] ; 
 Houston V. Texas, etc. R. Co., 63 
 Tex. 267 [section hand] ; Evansville, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Henderson, 134 Ind. 
 636 ; 83 N. E. 1031. 
 
 ' So held as to injured engineer 
 (Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Donnelly, 88 
 Va. 858 ; 14 S. E. 693 ; Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977 ; Far- 
 well V. Boston & Worcester E. Co., 
 4 Meto. 49 [injured conductor] ; En- 
 right V. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 93 Mich. 
 409 ; 53 N. W. 536 [same] ; Wright v- 
 N. Y. Central R. Co., 25 N. Y. 563 
 [injured brakeman] ; Randall v. Bal- 
 timore, etc. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478 
 [same] ; East Tenn. etc. E. Co. v. 
 Rush, 15 Lea [Tenn.], 145 [same] ; 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Robinson, 4 
 Bush, 507 [same]). 
 
 * Van Wickle v. Manhattan E. Co., 
 32 Fed. 278. So held where no head- 
 light was shown (Penn. E. Co. v. 
 Waohter, 60 Md. 395 ; s. P., Collins 
 V. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 30 Minn. 31). 
 Otherwise, if the company had failed 
 to furnish a proper headlight (Id.). 
 
 ■"Gormley v. Ohio, etc. R. Co., 72 
 Ind. 31 ; Coon v. Syracuse, etc. R. 
 Co., 5 N. Y. 493; Blake v. Maine 
 Cent. R. Co., 70 Me. 60; Watts v 
 Hart, 7 Wash. St. 178; 34 Pac. 
 433, 771 [all cases of laborers] • 
 Lundquist v. Duluth R. Co., 65 
 Minn. 387 ; 67 N. W. 1006 [track re- 
 pairer injured by fault of motor- 
 man] ; Kennedy v. Manhattan R. 
 Co., 33 Hun, 457 [signalman] ; Con- 
 nelly V. Minneapolis, etc. E. Co., 38 
 Minn. 80; 35 N. W. 582 [section 
 man]. Applied even to the case of 
 
437 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§241 
 
 or to a switchtender,* a car-coupler," a car-repairer/" a sec- 
 tion-boss," a yardmaster/^ a station-agent/' or a general 
 superintendent." Nor is the common master liable for the 
 negligence of a brakeman, injuring a switchman/' a car 
 inspector or car-repairer/" a station-master," a train-loader^* 
 or any servant on his train ; '' nor for the negligence of a man 
 watching the track, injuring an engineer,^" fireman ^' or con- 
 ductor^^ of a train, a switchman ^^ or a laborer upon the 
 
 a detective, \valking on the track 
 (Pyne v. Chicago, etc. B. Co., 54 
 Iowa, 223). 
 
 ^ Randall v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co. , 
 109 U. S. 478 ; Satterly v. Morgan, 35 
 La. Ann. 1166 ; Fowler v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 61 Wise. 159; Farwell 
 ■V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 
 49 ; Rutledge v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 133 Mo. 131 ; 34 S. W. 1058 ; affi'd in 
 37 S. W. 327. 
 
 'Fowler v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 61 
 Wise. 159. 
 
 '° Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Harrington, 
 63 Tex. 597 ; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Murphy, 53 111. 336. s. p., as to an 
 engine-wiper, employed in the round- 
 house of the defendant in cleaning 
 engines (Ewald v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 70 Wise. 420 ; 36 N.-W. 12). 
 
 " Clifford V. Old Colony R. Co., 
 141 Mass. 564 ; 6 N. E. 751. 
 
 "Evans v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 
 
 62 Mo. 49. So as to a car-numberer 
 stationed in the yard to take the 
 number of each car as it arrives 
 (Beuhring v. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 
 37 W. Va. 502 ; 16 S. E. 435). 
 
 '^ Evans v. Atlantic, etc. K. Co., 
 
 63 Mo 49. 
 
 '^ Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 59 
 Ala. 845. Here, if the negligence 
 had been on the side of the superin- 
 tendent, the engineer could have re- 
 covered. 
 
 '5 Ponton V. Wilmington, etc. R. 
 Co., 6 Jones Law (N. C), 345 ; Slat- 
 
 tery v. Toledo, etc. R. Co., 23 Ind. 
 81. 
 
 " Car-repairers (Besel v. N.Y. Cen 
 tral, etc. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 171). Car 
 inspectors (Potter v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 136 N. Y. 77 ; 33 N. E. 603 ; Col- 
 umbus, etc. R. Co. V. Webb, 13 
 Ohio St. 475 ; see Manville v. Cleve- 
 land, etc. R. Co., 11 Ohio St. 417). 
 
 "Hodgkins v. Eastern R. Co., 119 
 Mass. 419. 
 
 '8 Henry v. Staten I. R. Co., 81 N. 
 Y. 373. 
 
 " The other members of a train 
 crew engaged with a brakeman in 
 making a " running switch," under 
 orders from their conductor simply 
 to side track certain cars, are his 
 fellow-servants (Sheets v. Chicago 
 Coal Ry. Co., 139 Ind. 682 ; 39 N. E. 
 154). Under the Illinois rule, brake, 
 men engaged in running the same 
 train are fellow-servants (Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Howard, 45 Neb. 570 ; 
 63N. W. 873). 
 
 ■"McEniry v. Waterford, etc. R. 
 Co., 8 Irish C. h. 313. 
 
 " Whaalan v. Mad River, etc. R. 
 Co. , 8 Ohio St. 249. 
 
 " Waller r. Southeastern R. Co., 2 
 Hurlst. & C. 102 ; see also Lovegrove 
 V. Brighton, etc. R. Co., 16 C. B. N. 
 S. 669 ; distinguished in Elmer v. 
 Locke, 139 Mass. 575. 
 
 23 Sammon v. N. Y. & Harlem R. 
 Co., 62 N. Y. 251. 
 
§241] 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 438 
 
 track ;^ nor for the negligence of a switchman, injuring an 
 engineer,^ a fireman,^^ a flagman,^ car-repairer^ or train- 
 loader;^' nor for the negligence of a fireman, on an engine, 
 injuring a brakeman ^ or track repairer ;^i nor for the negli- 
 gence of a baggage-master, injuring a conductor;^ nor for that 
 of a car-repairer (otherwise than in omission to repair), injuring 
 a yardmaster.^ Even though a train conductor be deemed a 
 vice-principal, as to servants on the same train, and under his 
 command, he is not so considered as to servants on other 
 trains or on the track ; and the common master is not liable to 
 the latter for his negligence.^ The carpenter, the porter and 
 the stewardess of a steamship are fellow-servants, in common 
 employment, for whose negligence, as to each other, the mas- 
 
 "* A laborer employed by a railroad 
 company to remove snow and other 
 obstructions is a fellow-servant, 
 within the law of negligence, with 
 the track-walker, whose duty it is to 
 see tUat the track is clear, and with 
 a conductor of a train (Fagundes v. 
 Central Pac. R. Co., 79 Cal. 97 ; 31 
 Pac. 437). 
 
 " Walker v. Boston & Maine R. 
 Co., 138 Mass. 8 ; Miller v. So. 
 Pacific E. Co., 20 Oreg. 285: 36 
 Pac. 70 
 
 « Harvey v. N. Y. Central, etc. R. 
 Co., 88 N. Y. 481 ; Galveston, etc. 
 E. Co. v. Faber, 63 Tex. 344 ; Parker 
 V. N. Y. & New England E. Co., 18 
 E. I. 773 ; 30 Atl. 849 ; s. p., Eoberts 
 V. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 33 Minn. 318 
 [baggage- master] . 
 
 " Sammon v. N. Y. Central, etc. 
 E. Co., 63 N. Y. 251. 
 
 28 Clark V. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 28 
 Minn. 128. 
 
 " Indianapolis, etc. E. Co. v. John- 
 son, 103 Ind. 353. 
 
 ™ Kersey v. Kansas City, etc. E. 
 Co , 79 Mo. 363; Greenwald v. Mar- 
 quette, etc. E. Co., 49 Mich. 197 
 [fireman only 16 years old, but com- 
 petent]. 
 
 2' Foster v. Minn. Central R. Co., 
 14 Minn. 360. 
 
 S2 Colorado Central E. Co. v. Mar- 
 tin, 7 Colo. 593, citing our old § 11, 
 now § 53 ; Manville v. Cleveland, 
 etc. E. Co., 11 Ohio St. 417 [con- 
 ductor traveling on another train to 
 place of service]. 
 
 ^' Corcoran v. Delaware, etc. E. 
 Co., 126 N, Y. 673 ; 27 N. E. 1032. 
 
 '■* Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Hambly, 
 154 U. S. 349 ; 14 S. Ct. 983 ; N. Y. 
 & New England E. Co. v. Hyde, 5 
 C. C. A. 461; 56 Fed. 188. So in 
 Indiana (Becker v. Baltimore, etc. 
 E. Co., 57 Fed. 188) ; and South Caro- 
 lina (Jenkins v. Eichmond, etc. E. 
 Co., 39 S. C. 507; 18 S. E. 183); and, 
 of course, in Massachusetts (Whit- 
 more V. Boston, etc. E. Co., 150 
 Mass. 477; 23 N. E. 220 [car inspector 
 injured]). But in West Virginia, 
 trainmen can recover for the fault of 
 the conductor of another train, as a 
 vice-principal (Madden v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc. E. Co., 28 W. Va. 610; 
 Daniel v Chesapeake, etc. E. Co., 36 
 W. Va. 397; 15 S E. 163). Conductors 
 of electric railway cars on the same 
 road are fellow-servants (Baltimore 
 Trust Co. V. Atlanta Traction Co., 
 69 Fed. 358). 
 
439 
 
 LIABILITV OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 [§241 
 
 ter is not liable.^' The same rule applies between a negligent 
 engineer of a hoisting engine at a mine and a miner excavating 
 the shaft and loading rock ; ^' a negligent roadman in a mine 
 and a miner ; ^^ a workman hauling rock and other employees 
 negligently blasting the rock ; ^ a negligent engineer in charge 
 ■of a steam shovel and a workman engaged with the machine ; '' 
 and between carpenters and bricklayers, working together in 
 the construction of a wall.** In several of these instances, a 
 superior officer cannot recover for the negligence of the 
 inferior ; " although the inferior could recover for the negli- 
 gence of the superior. For some other cases, see the notes.*^ 
 
 3* Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, the hour, was sent by his master to 
 
 133 U. S. 375; 10 S. Ct. 397. repair defendant's elevator under the 
 
 ^'Buckley v. Gould, etc. Mining" direction of defendant's superin- 
 
 €0., 14 Fed. 833; S. P., Collier v. 
 Steinhart, 51 Cal. 116. 
 
 '■■ Troughear v. Lower Vein Coal 
 Co., 62 Iowa, 576. Contra, as to a 
 laborer, not a miner, employed in a 
 mine, and the regular miners, 
 through whose negligence in re- 
 moving a supporting pillar a por- 
 tion of the mine caved in and in- 
 jured the former (James v. Emmet 
 Mining Co., 55 Mich. 335). This was 
 on the ground that the place of work 
 was thus made unsafe. 
 
 8' Bogard v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 
 100 Ind. 491. 
 
 39 Thompson v. Chicago, etc. R. 
 Co., 18 Fed. 239; though it would 
 not be so as to a general superin- 
 tendent, having power of control (Id.) 
 
 "» Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313; 
 4 S. Ct. 433; Bier v. Jefferson ville, 
 etc. R. Co . 132 Ind. 78 ; 31 N. E. 471. 
 
 ■" Ragsdale v. Memphis, etc. R. 
 Co., 3 Baxter [Tenn.], 426. 
 
 ■•^ Negligence of a competent serv- 
 ant, who, in the course of his daily 
 duty of oiling machinery, fails to re- 
 adjust the cylinders of one of them, 
 whereby the operator thereof is in- 
 jured, cannot be imputed to the 
 master (Bjbjian v. Woonsocket Rub- 
 ber Co . 164 Mass. 214; 41 N. E. S65J. 
 PlaintiflE, a carpenter employed by 
 
 tendent, and while executing the 
 repairs was injured by tlie careless- 
 ness of the elevator boy. Held, that 
 plaintiff, for the purpose of making 
 the repairs, was defendant's serv- 
 ant and in a common employment 
 with the elevator boy (Hasty v. 
 Sears, 157 Mass. 123; 31 N. E. 759). 
 A foreman, who unites with the 
 workmen in determining that a scaf- 
 folding being constructed by them is 
 safe, is a co-servant, and his deter- 
 mination, if erroneous, does not 
 render the master liable (Kimmer 
 V. Weber, 151 N. Y. 417; 45 N. E. 
 Rep. 860; rev'g 81 Hun, 599; SO N. Y. 
 Supp. 1103). One who rents a room 
 containing machinery operated by 
 men employed by the lessor, is the 
 master of the men so employed, 
 where they are engaged whoUy with 
 his work, and subject entirely to his 
 control ; and they are the fellow- 
 servants of a person employed by 
 the lessee to work under the direc- 
 tion of one of them (Rozelle v. Rose, 
 3 N. Y. App. Div. 132; 89 N. Y. Supp. 
 863). The slingman of a stevedore's 
 crew employed to load a vessel, 
 whose duty it is to stand on the 
 wharf and attach the hoisting tackle 
 to the articles to be loaded, is a fel- 
 low-servant of the riggers, whose 
 
§ 241 a] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 44O 
 
 § 241a. Effect of statutes and codes. — Mere general lan- 
 guage in statutes, especially in codes, declaring persons or 
 corporations to be liable for the negligence of themselves or 
 of their servants, in such broad terms as, if there were no rule 
 of common law exempting masters from liability to their serv- 
 ants, would undoubtedly leave no room to imply such an 
 exemption, is not to be construed as abolishing the exemption 
 of the common law, but is to be taken as simply afifirming the 
 general liability of such persons or corporations, subject to all 
 the established exceptions of the common law. Therefore, a 
 statute prescribing certain rules and declaring that a corpora- 
 tion neglecting to comply therewith "shall be liable to any 
 person injured for all damages sustained by reason of suck 
 neglect," does not alter the common-law rule so as to make a 
 corporation liable to its servants for the consequences of such 
 neglect on the part of a fellow-servant.^ Nor, on the other hand, 
 will general language in a statute, especially a code, be con- 
 strued so as to restrict the liability of masters to something less 
 than that imposed by the common-law, where the intent of the 
 legislature to produce that result does not plainly appear.^ 
 Nor will it be construed as abolishing the common-law rule as 
 to contributory negligence.^ The only attempt to codify the 
 whole law on this subject is to be found in one section of the 
 Civil Codes of Dakota and California.^ This section is a model 
 
 duty it is to set up and rig the hoist- of their agents (Carle v. Bangor, etc. 
 ing apparatus to the vessel (Burns v. R. Co., 43 Me. 269 ; Sullivan v. Mis- 
 Sennett, 99 Cal. 363; 44 Pac. 1068). sissippi, etc. R. Co., 11 Iowa, 421). 
 A complaint vehich alleges that de- s. p., Railroad Co. v. Rush, 15 Lea 
 fendant allowed a car to stand on [Tenn.], 150. But where the statute, 
 the track without having the brake taken as a whole, was evidently- 
 set, in consequence of which it ran framed for the purpose of affording 
 against plaintiff, who was wrorking increased protection to servants, the 
 at another car, shows on its face that rule is otherwise (Le May v. Can. 
 plaintiff's injuries were caused by Pac. R. Co., 18 Ontario, 314). 
 the negligence of a fellow-servant « Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Herbert, 
 (Kudik V. Lehigh VaL R. Co., 78 116 U. S. 642 ; construing Civil Code 
 Hun, 493; 29 N. Y. Supp. 583). of Dakota. 
 
 1 Randall V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., ^Lorimer v. St. Paul R. Co., 48 
 
 109 U. S. 478. So, also, in the case Minn. 391; 51 N. W. 125. 
 
 of a statute declaring that railroad « Civil Code, Dakota, § 1130; do. 
 
 companies shall be liable for all Cal., § 1970. This part of these- 
 
 damages happening to "any per- Codes was framed by the writer, 
 
 son," in consequence of the neglect nearly forty years ago, just after his- 
 
441 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§ 241b 
 
 of inaccuracy and incompleteness; which has confused every- 
 thing and explained nothing. Literally construed, it would 
 legalize the dicta in Wilson v. Merry. Fortunately, it is 
 mostly explained away.^ While it is construed as abolishing 
 all distinctions between servants of every degree,* the courts 
 of California and the Dakotas hold masters responsible under 
 the New York rule, and regard as a vice-principal every servant 
 charged with the performance of the master's duty, in the 
 discharge of that duty.^ 
 
 § 241b. Statutes of general application. — The liability of 
 masters to their servants has been regulated by statute, in sev- 
 eral states. We can only refer to these statutes and the decis- 
 ions under them, in a very general way. The first example of 
 careful general legislation was given in Great Britain, in 1880.^ 
 This statute was sound and liberal in principle, but, as usual 
 in such cases, was spoiled by the House of Lords in its details. 
 The principles of the British statute were embodied in statutes 
 of Alabama, in 1885,^ and of Massachusetts, in 1887.^ The gen- 
 
 admission to the bar, when he knew 
 no better than to quote literally from 
 the ponderous obiter dicta of learned 
 judges. The section contains at least 
 two errors in every line. 
 
 = Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Her- 
 bert, 116 U. S. 643 ; 6 S. Ct. 590. 
 
 * Congrave v. Southern Pacific R. 
 Co., 88 Cal. 360; reaffirmed, Stevens 
 V. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 100 
 Cal. 554 ; overruling Brown v. Sen- 
 nett. 68 Cal. 325 ; which overruled 
 McLean v. Blue Point Co. 51 Cal. 
 355 ; S. P., Ell V. No. Pacific K. Co., 
 1 N. Dak. 336; Elliot v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 5 Dak. 538 ; 41 N. W. 
 758 : Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Hogan, 
 63 Fed. 103 ; 11 C. C. A. 51 [brake- 
 man and conductor]. 
 
 ■■ McNamarfu v. MacDonough, 103 
 Cal. 575 ; 36 Pac. 941 : Elledge v. 
 National City, etc. R. Co., 100 Cal. 
 
 383 ; 34 Pac. 730. See Ell v. No. 
 Pacific R. Co., 1 N. Dak. 386. 
 
 1 Stat. 43 and 44 Vic. c. 43. See 
 the statute, at the end of this chap- 
 ter. 
 
 2 Alabama Code, § 2590. Under 
 Code Ala. § 2590, an employer, 
 knowing of defect or negligence, 
 cannot set up that the employee, by 
 continuing in the work, has thereby 
 waived his right to sue (Mobile, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Holborn, 84 Ala. 133 ; 4 So. 
 146). It is not necessary to show that 
 the superintendence was over the 
 person who complains of negligence 
 (Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Burton, 
 97 Ala. 340 ; 12 So. 88). V^hen an 
 engineer is not a person " who has 
 any superintendence intrusted to 
 him," under Code (Dantzler v. De 
 Bardeleben Coal Co., 101 Ala. 309 ; 
 14 So. 10). When he is (Perdue v. 
 
 3 Mass. Stat. 1887, ch. 270; amended ohinery (Bowers v. Conn. 
 1888, 1893. 1893 and 1894. Loaded Co., 163 Mass. 313; 38 N. 
 cars are part of works and ma- So by stat. 1898, eh. 359. 
 
 Riv. R. 
 
 E. 508). 
 
§ 241 b] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 442 
 
 eral effect of these statutes (apart from special rules affecting 
 railroad companies) is to make clear the liability of masters for 
 the negligence of any servants entrusted with powers of 
 superintendence or command, in the execution of such pow- 
 ers.* They also define more clearly the master's liability for 
 defects in ways, works and machinery.^ These statutes do not 
 
 Louisville, etc. R. Co., 100 Ala. 535 ; 
 14 So. 366). The fact that foreman 
 •was voluntarily assisting in manual 
 labor does not constitute him a co- 
 employee, so as to relieve defendant 
 from liability (Kansas City, etc. R. 
 Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. 240; 13 So. 
 88). Liability of municipal corpora- 
 
 tion (Sheffield v. Harris, 101 Ala. 
 564 ; 14 So. 357 ; Lewis v. Montgom- 
 ery, Ala. ; 16 So. 34). Rail- 
 road company liable for injuries to a 
 switchman caused by fireman's fail- 
 ure to transmit a signal (Richmond, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Jones, 93 Ala. 218 ; 9 
 So. 276). 
 
 ■* Who are superintendents within 
 the statute: foreman of gang (Pren- 
 dible V. Connecticut River Mfg. Co., 
 160 Mass. 131 ; 35 N. E. 675) ; fore- 
 man of five men (Mahoney v. N. Y. 
 & New England R. Co., 160 Mass. 
 573; 36 N. E. 588); foreman of a sec- 
 tion gang doing no work (Davis v. 
 N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. Co., 159 
 Mass. 532; 34 N. E. 1070); foreman, 
 doing a slight amount of work 
 (Crowley v. Cutting, 165 Mass. 436 ; 
 48 N. E. 197); section master (Bab- 
 cock V. Old Colony R. Co., 150 Mass. 
 467; 23 N. E. 325); overseer (Patnode 
 V. Warren Cotton Mills, 157 Mass. 
 283; 32 N. E. 161). In that case the 
 factory owner was represented in 
 the carding room by a card grinder, 
 who was acting as second hand, and 
 who ordered plaintifl" to leave his 
 ordinary work and assist him in his 
 work, which plaintiff did. Held, 
 plaintiff was not properly employed 
 in rendering such assistance. 
 
 What is negligence in superin- 
 tendent : McPhee v. Scully, 163 
 Mass. 210; 39 N. E. 1007; Malcolm v. 
 Fuller, 152 Mass. 160; 25 N. E. 83. 
 
 Who is not a superintendent : one 
 doing the same work and receiving 
 the same pay as those to whom he 
 gives directions (Dowd v. Boston & 
 
 A. R. Co., 163 Mass. 185; 38 N. E. 
 440; Adasken v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 
 443; 43 N. E. 199) ; or who is at work 
 " pretty much all the time " with the 
 others (O'Brien v. Rideout, 161 Mass. 
 170; 36 N. E. 793 ; and see O'NeU v. 
 O'Leary, 164 Mass. 887; 41 N. E. 662); 
 weaver operating a loom (Roseback 
 V. ^tna Mills, 158 Mass. 379; 33 N. E. 
 577). 
 
 Who is " in charge of a train : ' 
 Devine v. Boston & A. R. Co., 159 
 Mass. 348; 34 N. E. 589 [conductor] ; 
 Davis V. N. T., New Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 159 Mass. 532; 84 N. E. 1070 
 [engineer]. 
 
 Who is not in charge : LouisviUe, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Richardson, 100 Ala. 
 233; 14 So. 209 [hostler]. 
 
 * What are such defects : Toomey 
 V. Donovan, 158 Mass. 233 ; 33 N. E. 
 396; Gustafsen v. Washburn, etc. 
 Mfg. Co., 153 Mass. 468 ; 37 N. E. 
 179; Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Webb, 97 Ala. 157; 11 So. 888 [de- 
 fects in track]. 
 
 What are not " defects in the ways, 
 works, or machinery connected with 
 or used in the business of the em- 
 ployer," within the meaning of St. 
 1887, ch. 370, § 1, cl. 1: Lynch v. Al- 
 lyn, 160 Mass. 248 ; 35 N. E. 550 [earth 
 bank] ; Burns v. Washburn, 160 Mass. 
 
443 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§2410 
 
 abolish the rule as to the effect of a perfectly voluntary 
 assumption of risks by a servant.* They do not supersede 
 the common law upon the same subject ; and a servant may, 
 if he desires to do so, maintain his action at common law, 
 instead of relying upon the statute.'^ In 1893, a statute was 
 enacted in Indiana, enlarging the liability of all corporations to 
 their servants. 
 
 § 241C. Statutes applying to railroad companies. — Georgia 
 was the first state to legislate on this subject. In 1855, the 
 entire exemption of railroad companies from liability for neg- 
 ligence of fellow-servants was abolished by a statute^ which 
 was literally copied in Florida, in 1887,^ substantially enacted 
 
 457 ; 36 N. E. 199 [temporary stag- 
 ing] ; Carroll v. Willcutt, 163 Mass. 
 231; 39 N. E. 1016 [stone on a scaf- 
 fold]; Sheav. Wellington, 163 Mass. 
 364 ; 40 N. E. 173 [exploder]; May v. 
 Whittier Maoh. Co., 154 Mass. 29 ; 27 
 N. E. 768 [pile of wood on way]; 
 Fiskv. Fitchburg R. Co., 158 Mass. 
 238; 33 N. E. 510 [awning]; see 
 O'Maley v. South Boston Gaslight 
 Co., 158 Mass. 135; 83 N. E. 1119. 
 Company not liable for car (Coffee 
 V. N. Y., New Haven, etc. R. Co., 
 1.55 Mass. 21; 28 N. E. 1128) on track 
 not owned by it, though temporarily 
 used (Trask v. Old Colony R. Co. , 
 156 Mass. 398 ; 81 N. E. 6). 
 
 * Cassady v. Boston & A. R. Co., 
 164 Mass. 168 ; 41 N. E. 129. The 
 statute does not change the doctrine 
 of volenti non jit injuria (Birming- 
 ham R. Co. T. Allen, 99 Ala. 359; 13 
 So. 8 [voluntary use for year, with- 
 out objection] ; overruling Mobile, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Holborn, 84 Ala. 133; 
 4 So. 146; Highland Ave. etc. R. 
 Co. V. Walters, 91 Ala. 435; 8 So. 
 357; and approving Thomas v. Quar- 
 termain, 18 Q. B. Div. 685; Mellor 
 V. Merchants' Mfg. Co., 150 Mass. 
 303; 23 N. E. 100). 
 
 ^ Ryalls V. Mechanics' Mills, 150 
 Mass. 190; 22 N. E. 766; Clark v. 
 
 Merchants', etc. Trans. Co., 151 Mass. 
 353; 24 N. E. 49. 
 
 ' Georgia Code, § 3033. In Geor- 
 gia, a railroad company is liable for 
 injuries to an employee wholly 
 caused by the negligence of a f eUow- 
 servart, whether or not such injuries 
 are connected with the running of 
 trains (Georgia R. Co. v. Brown, 86 
 Ga. 320; 13 S. E. 812); s. p., Geor- 
 gia R. Co. v. Miller, 9 J Ga. 571 ; 16 
 S. E. 939. Under the same statute, 
 a railroad employee may recover for 
 injuries resulting from the negli- 
 gence of a co-employee where he 
 himself was free from fault (Maloy 
 V. Port Royal, etc. R. Co., 97 Ga. 
 295 ; 22 S. E. 588). For cases of 
 non -liability, see McGovern v. Col- 
 umbus Manuf'g Co., 80 Ga. 337; 5 
 S. E. 493 ; Georgia Railroad Co. v. 
 Xelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; 9 S. E. 1049 [ham- 
 mer is not machinery]. 
 
 " Florida Stat. June 7, 1887 (Gen. 
 Laws, ch. 3744) ; and by statute May 
 4, 1891, any person or property is in- 
 jured by the operation of railroad 
 trains, cars, locomotives, or machin- 
 ery, or by any person in the employ 
 of the company, the burden shall be 
 on the company to show ordinary 
 and reasonable care and diligence 
 (Laws 1890-91, ch. 4071). 
 
§ 241 c] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 444 
 
 in Kansas, in 1874,^ and followed in Iowa, also in 1874, so far as 
 relates to wrongs " connected with the use and operation of any 
 railroad,"* leaving negligence in the construction of a railroad 
 subject to common-law rules.^ A similar statute was enacted 
 in Minnesota, in 1887.^ But it is held that, under a constitu- 
 tion prohibiting class legislation, such a special burden could 
 not be imposed upon any one class of masters in that state, if 
 applicable to all the corporate business ; and therefore the effect 
 of the statute is restricted to those hazards which are peculiar 
 to the operation of railroads^ Therefore it does not apply at 
 all to street railroads in a city or town operated by cable' or 
 horse power. In Mississippi, by the constitution of 1890,' and in 
 
 ' Kansas Stat. 1874, ch. 93 ; Com- « Id. 
 piled Laws, § 5201. The Kansas 
 statute is constitutional (Atchison, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Koehler, 37 Kans. 463 ; 
 15 Pac. 567) . For cases of liability 
 under the Kansas statute, see Chi- 
 cago, etc. E. Co. V. Pontius, 157 U. 
 S. 309; 15 S. Ct. 585; affi'g s. c, 52 
 Kans. 264 ; 34 Pac. 739 ; Atchison, 
 etc. E. Co. V. Brassfleld, 51 Kans. 
 167 ; 32 Pac. 814 ; Missouri Pac. E. 
 Co, V. McCally, 41 Kans. 639; 21 
 Pac. 574 ; Chicago, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Stahley, 62 Fed. 363 ; U C. C. A. 88. 
 
 ^lowa Stat. 1874, ch. 65, Code, § 
 1307. For examples of liability 
 under the Iowa statute, see Chicago, 
 etc. E. Co. -9. McLaughlin, 119 U. S. 
 566 ; 7 S. Ct. 1366 ; Keatley v. Illi- 
 nois Cent. E. Co., 94 Iowa, 685; 63 N. 
 W. 560; Butler v. Chicago, etc. E. 
 Co., 87 Iowa, 306; 54 N. W. 208; 
 Larson v. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 91 
 Iowa, 81 ; 58 N. W. 1076 ; Haden v. 
 Sioux City, etc. E. Co. , 92 Iowa, 236 ; 
 60 N. W. 537 ; Smith v. Humeston, 
 etc. E. Co., 78 Iowa, 583 ; 43 N. W. 
 545 ; Neville v. Chicago, etc. E. Co., 
 79 Iowa, 333 ; 44 N. W. 367 ; Nelson 
 V. Chicago, M., etc. E. Co., 73 Iowa, 
 576 ; 35 N. W. 611 ; Pierce v. Central 
 Iowa E. Co., 73 Iowa, 140 ; 34 N. W. 
 783. 
 
 ' This is expressly provided by the 
 Minnesota statute (Laws 1887, ch. 13). 
 
 'Lavallee v. St. Paul, etc. E. Co., 
 40 Minn. 249 ; 41 N. W. 974 ; John- 
 son V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 43 Minn. 
 223 ; 45 N. W. 156. For cases of lia- 
 bility, see Nichols v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 60 Minn. 319 ; 63 N. W. 386 ; 
 Smith V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 44 
 Minn. 17; 46 N. W. 149; Schneider 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 43 Minn. 68 ; 
 43 N. W. 783 ; Steffenson v. Chicago, 
 etc. R. Co., 45 Minn. 355 ; 47 N. W. 
 1068. 
 
 s Funk V. St. Paul E. Co., 61 Minn. 
 435; 63 N. W. 1099. s. P., Eiley v. 
 Galveston E. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 
 35 S. W. 836. 
 
 " Const. 1890, § 193, provides that 
 employees of any railroad corpora- 
 tion shall have the same rights and 
 remedies as are allowed to persons 
 not employees, for injuries caused 
 by the negligence of a superior agent 
 or officer, or of a person having the 
 right to control or direct the services 
 of the party injured, or of a fellow- 
 servant engaged in another depart- 
 ment of labor, etc. Held, that 
 negligence will not be inferred from 
 the fact of injury to an employee, 
 but it must be shown, since the rule 
 applicable in case of injury to pas- 
 sengers does not apply to an em- 
 ployee (Short V. New Orleans, etc. 
 E. Co., 69 Miss. 848 ; 13 So. 826). 
 
445 
 
 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. [§24IC 
 
 Texas, by statutes of 1891 and 1892,^" railroad companies are 
 made liable to servants for any negligence of a superior agent or 
 of any person having the right to control or direct the injured 
 servant," or where servants are engaged in different departments 
 of labor. 1^ In Montana, since 1887, railroad companies have 
 been liable to servants for the fault of any superior.'^ In 
 Ohio, by act of April 2, 1890, " every person in the employ of 
 such company having charge or control of employees in any 
 separate branch or department, shall be held to be the superior 
 and not fellow-servant of employees in any other branch or 
 department, who have no power to direct or control in the 
 branch or department in which they are employed." ^* In Wis- 
 consin, since 1893, railroad companies have been liable to serv- 
 ants for the negligence of engineers and officers superior to 
 them, and also for that of telegraphers, signalmen and switch- 
 
 '» Texas Stat. March 10, 1891, ch. 
 34. This statute held not to apply 
 to the employees of a receiver of a 
 railway corporation (Campbell v. 
 Cook, 86 Tex. 630; 26 S. W. 486; 
 Turner v. Cross, 83 Tex. 218 ; 18 S. 
 W. 578 ; San Antonio, etc. E.' Co. v. 
 Eeynolds, Tex. Civ. App. ; 30 S. 
 W. 846). It was therefore amended 
 in 1892 so as to include receivers. 
 These statutes apply to street rail- 
 way corporations (Austin R. Co v. 
 Groethe, Tex. Civ. App. ; 31 S. 
 W. 197). 
 
 " Engineer and brakeman, held, 
 feUow-servants : Evans v. Louisville, 
 etc. K. Co., 70 Miss. 527 ; 12 So. 581. 
 To the contrary : San Antonio, etc. 
 R. Co. V. Bowles, Tex. Civ. App. ; 
 SO S. "W. 89 ; Galveston, etc. R. Co. 
 ^r. Waldo, Tex. Civ. App. ; 26 S. 
 W. 1004. 
 
 '- A fireman on an engine and a 
 telegraph operator are engaged in 
 different departments (Illinois Cent. 
 R. Co. V. Hunter, 70 Miss. 471 ; 12 
 So. 483) . Under Gen. Laws 1891, ch. 
 34, conductors of switch engines in 
 the same yard, engaged in moving 
 
 cars, etc., under a common superior, 
 but whose duties are separate and 
 distinct, are fellow-servants (Texas, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Tatmau, 10 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 434 ; 31 S. W. 333). 
 
 "Under Comp. St. Mont. 1887, ch. 
 25, § 697. Under this statute, a rail- 
 road company is liable for an injury 
 to a fireman on one train, caused by 
 the negligence of a conductor on 
 another train in leaving a switch 
 open (Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mase, 
 63 Fed. 114 ; 11 C. C. A. 63 ; approv- 
 ing Ragsdale v. Northern Pac. R. 
 Co., 42 Fed. 383). 
 
 " An engineer in charge of a loco- 
 motive, who has authority to direct 
 or control a fireman sei'ving on the 
 same locomotive, is a "superior," 
 within the meaning of Act, April 2, 
 1890, and therefore not fellow-serv- 
 ant with a brakeman on another 
 train (Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Margrat, 51 Ohio St. 130 ; 37 N. B. 
 11). A chief inspector of cars, hav- 
 ing other inspectors under him, is 
 not a fellow-servant of a brakeman 
 (Columbus, etc. R. Co. v. Brick, 51 
 Ohio St. 146 ; 87 N. E. 128). 
 
§ 241 d] LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 446 
 
 men.15 Notwithstanding decisions to the contrary in Geor- 
 gia" and Texas," it is the settled general rule that these stat- 
 utes apply to receivers or trustees operating railroads '^ belong- 
 ing to corporations. They do not apply to individuals or 
 private firms owning railroads, but not acting as common 
 carriers.*' 
 
 § 24id. Exemption from liability by special contract— In 
 
 Great Britain, and in some American courts, it is held that a 
 servant can, by express contract, release his master from all 
 liability for the ordinary negligence of the master, and for 
 any neghgence of the master's agents, either at common law 
 or under a statute.* But there must be some good considera- 
 tion for such a contract, and if made while the servant is in 
 employment, \yithout some new consideration, it is void.^ 
 Some courts hold such contracts void, as against public 
 policy.^ Several statutes expressly prohibit such contracts.* 
 
 "Stat. 1893, ch. 320; Sanb. & B. 
 Ann. St. § 1816a. See Promer v. 
 Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 90 Wis. 215 ; 
 
 63 N. W. 90 ; Albrecht v. Milwaukee, 
 etc. E. .Co., 87 Wise. 105 ; 58 N. W. 
 72. Under the previous statute of 
 1889. a foreman of a shop was not 
 a "superintendent" (Hartford t. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co., 91 Wise. 374 ; 
 
 64 N. W. 1033). 
 
 '^Thurman v. Cherokee R. Co., 56 
 Ga. 376; Henderson v. Walker, 55 
 Id. 481. 
 
 " See note 10, supra. 
 
 '8 Sloan V. Central Iowa R. Co., 63 
 Iowa, 728 ; 16 N. W. 331 ; Rouse v. 
 Harry, 55 Kans. 589 ; 40 Pac. 1007 ; 
 Hornsby v. Eddy, 56 Fed. 461 ; 5 C. 
 C. A. 560 ; 13 U. S. App. 404 ; Rouse 
 V. Hornsby, 67 Fed. 219; 14 C. C. A. 
 877. 
 
 " Beeson v. Busenbark, 44 Kans, 
 669 ; 35 Pac, 48. 
 
 ' As between master and servant. 
 
 the latter in the contract of hiring 
 may assume all risks appertaining 
 to the service, save such as arise 
 from criminal negligence (Western, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Bishop, .50 Ga. 465; 
 Western, etc. R. Co. v. Strong, 53 
 Id. 461 ; Fulton Bag Mills v. Wilson, 
 89 Ga. 318; 15 8. E. 332). A mere 
 notice will not have this effect, 
 especially if not brought clearly to 
 the servant's mind (Georgia Pac. R. 
 Co. V. Dooley, 86 Ga. 294 ; 13 S. E. 
 933). 
 
 'Purdy V. Rome, etc. R. Co., 135 
 N. Y. 209; 36 N. E. 355. 
 ^ An employer cannot provide that 
 . his employees shall look after and 
 be responsible for their own safety 
 (Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Orr, 91 
 Ala. 548 ; 8 So. 360 ; Hissongv. Rich- 
 mond, etc. R. Co. , 91 Ala. 514 ; 8 So. 
 776). An employee in a factory can- 
 not waive the protection afforded hj 
 Laws 1893, ch. 673, requiring machin- 
 
 *So in Texas (Gen. Laws 1891, ch. statutory liability of railroad com- 
 34, S 3), and Wyoming (Laws 1890-91 , panies (Code, § 1307) . 
 ch. 28), and in Iowa, as to the special 
 
447 liability of masters to servants. 
 
 English Employers' Liability Act of 1880. 
 
 43 & 44 Vict. c. 43; 
 An Act to eoctend and regulate the Liability of Employers to make Compen- 
 sation for Personal Injuries suffered by Workmen in their Service. 
 
 [7th September, 1880.] 
 Be it enacted by, &c., &c., as follows : — 
 
 1. Where after the commehceDient of this act personal injury is caused 
 to a workman — 
 
 (1.) By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machin- 
 ery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the 
 employer; or 
 
 (2.) By reason of The negligence of any person in the service of the 
 employer who has any superintendence entrusted to him whilst in 
 the exercise of such superintendence ; or 
 
 (3.) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the 
 employer to whose orders or directions the workman at the time 
 of the injury was bound to conform, and did conform, where such 
 injury resulted from his having so conformed; or 
 
 (4.) By reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the 
 employer done or made in obedience to the rules or by-laws of 
 the employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by 
 any person delegated with the authority of the employer in that 
 behalf; or 
 
 (5.) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the 
 employer who has the charge or control of any signal, points, loco- 
 motive engine or train upon a railway, the workman, or in the case 
 the injury results in death, the legal personal representatives of the 
 workman, and any persons entitled in case of death, shall have 
 the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer 
 as if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service 
 of the employer, nor engaged in his work, 
 
 2. A workman shall not be entitled under this act to any right of com- 
 pensation or remedy against the employer in any of the following cases; 
 that is to say, 
 
 (1.) Under sub-section one of section one, unless the defect therein men- 
 tioned arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing 
 to the negligence of the employer, or of some person in the serv- 
 
 ery to be properly guarded (Simp- Laws 1887, p. 235, in relation to the 
 
 son V. N. Y. Rubber Co., 80 Hun, care that the mine owner must exer- 
 
 415 ; 80 N. Y. Supp. 339). A parent cise with regard to the protection of 
 
 cannot exempt the employer from his employees from personal in- 
 
 responsibility to a minor (Interna- juries, cannot be dispensed with by 
 
 tional, etc. R. Co. v. Hinzie. 83 Tex. contract (Chicago, etc. Coal Co. v. 
 
 623; 18 S. W. 681 ; see Shepard v. Peterson, 39 III. App. 114). See also 
 
 N. Y. Central R. Co., 18 N. Y. Supp. Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 91 
 
 665). The provisions of Illinois Ala. 487. 
 
LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 44^ 
 
 ice of the employer i and entrusted by him with the duty of see- 
 ing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were in proper 
 condition. 
 <2.) Under sub-section four of section one, unless the injury resulted 
 from some impropriety or defect in the rules, by-laws, or instruc- 
 tions therein mentioned ; provided that where a rule or by-law has 
 been approved or has been accepted as a proper rule or by-law by 
 one of her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, or by the Board 
 of Trade or any other department of the Government, under or 
 by virtue of any act of parliament, it shall not be deemed for 
 the purposes of this act to be an improper or defective rule or 
 by-law. 
 (3.) In any case where the workman knew of the defect or negligence 
 which caused his injury, and failed within a reasonable time to 
 give, or cause to be given, information thereof to the employer or 
 some person superior to himself in the service of the employer, 
 unless he was aware that the employer of such superior already 
 knew of the said defect or negligence. 
 3. The amount of compensation recoverable under this act shall not 
 exceed such sum as may be found to be equivalent to the estimated earn- 
 ings, during the three years preceding the injury, of a person in the same 
 grade employed during those years in the like employment and in the dis- 
 trict in which the workman is employed at the time of the injury. 
 [Limitation of time for bringing suit, etc.] 
 
 Alabama — Code [1886], §§ 2590, 2591, 2592. 
 
 § 3590. When a personal injury is received by a servant or employee 
 in the service or business of the master or employer, the master or 
 employer is liable to answer in damages to such servant or employee, as if 
 he were a stranger, and not engaged in such service or employment, in the 
 cases following : 
 
 1. When the injui-y is caused by reason of any defect in the condition of 
 the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with, or used in the busi- 
 ness of the master or employer. 
 
 2. When the injury is caused by reason of the negligence of any 
 person in the service or employment of the master or employer, who 
 has any superintendence intrusted to him whilst in the exercise of such 
 superintendence. 
 
 3. When such injury is caused by reason of the negligence of any 
 person in the service or employment of the master or employer, to whose 
 orders or directions the servant or employee, at the time of the injury, 
 was bound to conform, and did conform, if such injuries resulted from 
 his having so conformed. 
 
 4. When such injury is caused by reason of the act or omission of any 
 person in the service or employment of the master or employer, done or 
 made in obedience to the rules and regulations or by-laws of the master 
 
449 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 or employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by any persoa 
 delegated with the authority of the master or employer in that behalf. 
 
 5. Wlien such injury is caused by reason of the negligence of any person 
 in the service or employment of the master or employer, who has the 
 charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive, engine, switch, car or 
 train upon a railway, or of any part of the track of a railway. 
 
 But the master or employer is not liable under this section, if the servant 
 or employee knew of the defect or negligence causing the injury, and 
 failed in a reasonable time to give information thereof to the master or 
 -employer, or to some person superior to himself engaged in the service 
 or employment of the master or employer, unless he was aware that the 
 master or employer, or such superior already knew of such defect or 
 negligence; nor is the master or employer liable, under sub-division one, 
 unless the defect therein mentioned arose from, or had not been discovered 
 or remedied owing to the negligence of the master or employer, or of some 
 person in the service of the master or employer, and intrusted by him with 
 the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant, were in 
 proper condition. 
 
 § 3591. If such injury results in the death of the servant or employee, 
 his personal representative is entitled to maintain an action therefor, and 
 the damages recovered are not subject to the payment of debts or lia- 
 bilities, but shall be distributed according to the statute of distributions. 
 
 § 2592. Damages recovered by the servant or employee, of and from 
 the master or euiployer, are not subject to the payment of debts or any 
 legal liabilities incurred by him. 
 
 Arkansas — Statutes — §§ 6248, 6249, 6250. 
 
 [Act February 38, 1893.] 
 
 § 6348. All persons engaged in the service of any railway corporations, 
 foreign or domestic, doing business in this state, who are entrusted by 
 such corporation with the authority of superintendence, control or com- 
 mand of other persons in the employ or service of such corporation, or with 
 the authority to direct any other employee, in the performance of any duty 
 of such employee, or vice-principals of such corporation, and are not fellow- 
 servants with such employee. 
 
 § 6349. All persons who are engaged in the common service of such rail- 
 way corporations, and who, while so engaged, are working together to a 
 common purpose, of same gi-ade, neither of such persons being entrusted 
 by such corporations with. any superintendence or control over their fellow- 
 employees, are fellow -servants with each other ; provided, nothing herein 
 contained shall be so construed as to make employees of such corporation 
 in the service of such corporation fellow-servants with other employees of 
 such corporation engaged in any other department or service of such cor- 
 poration. Employees who do not come within the provisions of this sec- 
 tion, shall not be considered fellow-servants. 
 
 § 6250. No contract made between the employer and employee based 
 upon the contingency of the injury or death of the employee limiting the 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1—29.] 
 
LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 45O- 
 
 liability of the employer under this act, or fixing damages to be recovered,, 
 shall be valid and binding. 
 
 Colorado — Laws of 1893, Ch. yy. 
 
 An Act Concerning Damages Sustained by Agents, Servants or Employees. 
 
 Section 1. Where, after the passage of this act, personal injury is caused 
 to an employee, who is himself in the exercise of due care and diligence at 
 the time : 
 
 (1.) By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, woi-ks or 
 machinery connected with or used in the business of the employer, which 
 arose from or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negli- 
 gence of the employer, or of any person in the service of the employer, 
 and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works and 
 machinery were in proper condition ; or 
 
 (2.) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the 
 employer, entrusted with exercising superintendence, whose sole or princi- 
 pal duty is that of superintendence. 
 
 (3.) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the 
 employer, who has the charge or control of any switch, signal, locomo- 
 tive, engine or train upon a railroad, the employee, or in case the injury 
 results in death, the parties entitled by law to sue and recover for such 
 damages, shall have the same right of compensation and remedy against 
 the employer, as if the employee had not been an employee of or in the 
 service of the employer or engaged in his or its works. 
 
 Florida — Laws of 1891, Ch. 4071. 
 
 An Act Defining the Liabilities of Railroad Companies in certain cases. 
 I 3. If any person is injured by a railroad company by the running of 
 the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of such company, he being at 
 the time of such injury an employee of the company, and the damage was 
 caused by negligence of another employee, and without fault or negUgencfr 
 on the part of the person injured, his employment by the company shall 
 be no bar to a recovery. No contract which restricts such liability shall be- 
 legal or binding. 
 
 Georgia — Code, § 3036. 
 
 [Act of 1855, RELATiNa to injueies by Railroad Companies.] 
 
 If the person injured is himself an employee of the company, and the 
 damage was caused by another employee, and without fault or negligence 
 on the part of the person injured, his employment by the company shall 
 be no bar to the recovery. 
 
451 liability of masters to servants. 
 
 Indiana — Statute, 1896 — § 5206^. 
 
 [Laws of 1893, Ch. 130.] 
 
 Every railroad or other corporation, except municipal, operating in this 
 State, shall be liable in daaiages for personal injury suffered by any 
 employee while in its service, the employee so injured being in the exer- 
 cise of due care and diligence, in the following cases : 
 
 First. When such injury is suffered by reason of any defect in the con- 
 dition of ways, works, plant, tools and machinery connected with or in 
 use in the business of such corporation, when such defect was the result 
 of negligence on the part of the corporation, or some person entrusted by 
 it with the duty of keeping such way, works, plant, tools or machinery in 
 proper condition. 
 
 Second. Where such injury resulted from the negligence of any. person 
 in the service of such corporation to whose order or dii-ection the injured 
 employee at the time of the injury was bound to conform, and did 
 conform. 
 
 Third. Where such injury resulted from the act or omission of any 
 person done or made in obedience to any rule, regulation or by-law of such 
 corporation, or in obedience to the particular instructions given by any 
 person delegated with the authority of the corporation in that behalf. 
 
 Fourth. Where such injury was caused by the negligence of any person 
 in the service of such corporation who has charge of any signal, telegraph 
 office, switch-yard, shop, round-house, locomotive engine or train upon a 
 railway, or where such injury was caused by the negligence of any person, 
 co-employee, or fellow-servant engaged in the same common service in 
 any of the several departments of the service of any such corporation, 
 the said person, co employee, or fellow-servant, at the time acting in 
 the place and performing the duty of the corporation in that behalf, 
 and the person so injui'ed, obeying or conforming to the order of some 
 superior at the time of such injury, having authority to direct ; but 
 nothing herein shall be construed to abridge the liability of the corpora- 
 tion under existing laws. 
 
 Iowa— Code — § 1307. 
 
 Every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all damages 
 sustained by any person, including employes of such corporation, in con- 
 sequence of the neglect of agents, or by any mismanagement of the 
 engineers or other employees of the corporation, and in consequence of 
 the wilful wrongs, whether of commission or omission of such agents, 
 engineers or other employees when such wrongs are in any manner con- 
 nected with the use and operation of any railway, on or about which they 
 shall be employed, and no contract which restricts such liability shall be 
 legal or binding. 
 
liability of masters to servants. 452 
 
 Kansas— Laws of 1874, Ch. 93. 
 
 §1. Every railroad company organized or doing business in this State 
 shall be liable for all damages done to any employee of such company in 
 consequence of any negligence of its agents or by any mismanagement of 
 its engineers or other employees to any person sustaining such damage. 
 
 Massachusetts — Acts, 1894, Ch. 499. 
 
 An Act Relating to the Liability of Employers to make compensation for 
 Personal Injuries Suffered by Employees in their Service. 
 Section 1. Where, after the passage of this act, personal injury is caused 
 to an employee, who is himself in the exercise of due care and diligence at 
 the time : (1) By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works 
 or machinery connected with or used in the business of the employer, 
 which arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the 
 negligence of the employer, or of any person in the service of the employer, 
 and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works or 
 machinery were in proper condition ; or (3), By reason of the negligence of 
 any person in the service of the employer, entrusted with and exercising 
 superintendence, whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence, 
 or, in the absence of such superintendent, of any person acting as super- 
 intendent with the authority or consent of such employer; or (3), By 
 reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who 
 has the charge or control of any signal, svritch, locomotive engine or train 
 upon a raOroad, the employee, or in case the injury results in death, the 
 legal i-epresentatives of such employee, shall have the same right of com- 
 pensation and remedies against the employer as if the employee had not 
 been an employee of, nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in 
 its work. 
 
 Mississippi — Constitution (1890), § 193. 
 
 Every employee of any railroad corporation shall have the same right 
 and remedies for any injury suffered by him from the act or omission of 
 said corporation or its employees, as are allowed by law to other persons 
 not employees, v^here the injury results from the negligence of a superior 
 agent or officer, or of a person having the right to control or direct the 
 services of the party injured, and also where the injury results from the 
 negligence of a fellow-servant engaged in another department of labor 
 from that of the party injured, or of a fellow-servant on another train of 
 cars, or one engaged about a different piece of work. Knowledge by any 
 employee injured, of the defective or unsafe character or condition of any 
 machinery, ways, or appliances, shall be no defense to an action for 
 injury caused thereby, except as to conductors or engineers in charge of 
 
453 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 dangerous or unsafe cars, or engines voluntarily operated by them. * * * 
 Any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to 
 waive the benefit of this section, shall be null and void ; and this section 
 shall not be construed to deprive any employee of a corporation, or his 
 legal or personal representative, of any right or remedy that he now has 
 by the law of the land. The legislature may extend the remedies herein 
 provided for to any other class of employees. 
 
 § 3.559 of the Annotated Code of Mississippi is substantially identical with 
 § 193 of the Constitution above quoted. 
 
 Montana — Constitution [1889], Art. XV., Sec 16. 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, company or corporation to require 
 of its servants or employees, as a condition of their employment or other- 
 wise, any contract or agreement, whereby such person, company or cor- 
 poration, shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility on 
 account of personal injuries received by such servants or employees while 
 in the service of such person, company or corporation, by reason of the 
 negligence of such person, company or corporation, or the agents or em- 
 ployees thereof; and such contracts shall be absolutely null and void. 
 
 Section 3243 of the Civil Code of Montana is substantially identical with 
 section 16 of article 15 of the Constitution above quoted. 
 
 New Mexico — Laws of 1893, Chap. 28. 
 
 An Act for the, Protection and Relief of Railroad Employees, and for 
 Other Purposes. 
 
 Sec. 1. Every corporation operating a railway in this territory shall be lia- 
 ble in a sum sufficient to compensate such employee for all damages sus- 
 tained by any employee of such corporation, the person injured or damaged 
 being without fault on his or her part, occurring or sustained in conse- 
 quence of any mismanagement, carelessness, neglect, default or wrongful 
 act of any agent or employee of sucli corporation, while in the exercise of 
 their several duties, when such mismanagement, carelessness, neglect, de- 
 fault or wrongful act of such employee or agent, could have been avoided 
 by such corporation through the exercise of reasonable care or diligence in 
 the selection of competent employees or agents, or by not overworking 
 said employees or requiring or allowing them to worli an unusual or un- 
 reasonable number of hours; and any contract restricting such liability, 
 shall be deemed to be contrary to the public policy of this territory, and 
 therefore void. 
 
LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 454 
 
 Ohio — Laws of 1890 — P. 149. 
 
 An Act for the Protection and Belief of Railroad Employees, etc. 
 Sec. 3. That in all actions against a railroad company for personal injury 
 to, or death resulting from personal injury of any person while in the 
 employ of such company, arising from the negligence of such company or 
 any of its officers or employees, it shall be held, in addition to the liability 
 now existing by law, that every person in the employ of such company, 
 actually having power or authority to direct or control any other employee 
 of such company, is not the fellow-servant, but superior of such other 
 employee; also, that every person in the employ of such company having 
 charge or control of employees in any separate branch or department, shall 
 be held to be tlie superior and not fellow-servant of employees in any other 
 branch or department who have no power to direct or control in the branch 
 or department in which they are employed. 
 
 Utah — Laws of 1896, Chap. 24. 
 
 An Act to Define Who are and Who are not Fellow-servants. 
 
 Sec. 1. That all persons engaged in the service of any person, firm or 
 corporation, foreign or domestic, doing business in this State, who are en- 
 trusted by such person, firm or corporation as employer with the authority 
 of superintendence, control or command of other persons in the employ or 
 service of such employer, or with the authority to direct any other em- 
 ployee in the performance of any duties of such employee are vice princi- 
 pals of such employer and are not fellovp-servants. 
 
 § 2. That all persons who are engaged in the service of such employer, 
 and who, while so engaged, are working together at the same time and 
 place to a common purpose, of the same grade of service, neither of such 
 persons being entrusted by such employer with any superintendence or 
 control over his fellow-employees, are fellow-servants with each other ; 
 Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to make 
 employees of such employer in the service of such employer fellow-ser- 
 vants with other employees engaged in any other department of service 
 of such employer. Employees who do not come within the provisions of 
 this section, shall not be considered fellow servants. 
 
 Wisconsin — Laws of 1893 — Chap. 220. 
 
 An Act to Define the Liahiliiy of Railroad Companies in Relation to Dam^ 
 
 ages Sustained by Their Employees. 
 
 Sec. 1. Every railroad or railway company operating any railroad or 
 
 railway, the line of which shall be in whole or in part within this state, 
 
 shall be liable for all damages sustained within this state by any employee 
 
455 LIABILITY OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS. 
 
 of such company, without contributory negligence on his part; first, when 
 such injury is caused by any defect in any locomotive, engine, car, rail, 
 track, machinery or appliance required by said company to be used by its 
 employees in and about the business of such employment, when such de- 
 fect could have been discovei-ed by such company by reasonable and proper 
 care, tests or inspection, and proof of such defect shall be presumptive 
 evidence of knowledge thereof on the part of such company; second, or 
 while any such employee is so engaged in operating, running, riding upon 
 ■or switching, passenger or freight or other trains, engines or cars, and 
 while engaged in the performance of his duty as such employee, and which 
 such injury shall have been caused by the carelessness or negligence of any 
 other employee, officer or agent of such company in the discharge of, or 
 for failure to discharge his duties as such. 
 
 § 4. No contract, receipt, rule or regulation between any employee and a 
 railroad company shall exempt such corporation from the fuU liability 
 imposed by this act. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 
 
 § 242. Servant's liability to master. 
 
 243. Servant not liable to third 
 
 person for nonfeasance. 
 
 244. Servant liable to third person 
 
 for misfeasance. 
 
 245. Servant's liabilitj' to fellow- 
 
 servants. 
 
 § 246. Liability of shipmasters. 
 
 247. Servant not liable for negli- 
 
 gence of a fellow-servant. 
 
 248. Joint liability of master and 
 
 servant. 
 
 § 242. Servant's liability to master. — A servant is liable 
 to his master for any damage, of which the servant's want of 
 ordinary care and diligence in his work, or want of such skill 
 as he had induced the master to believe that he possessed, is 
 the proximate cause.' And if the master is obliged to pay 
 damages to a stranger for negligence of the servant, in which 
 the master had no personal share, he is entitled to recover over 
 against the servant, 
 
 § 243. Servant not liable to third person for nonfeasance. — 
 
 No agent of a private individual or corporation is ever liable 
 to third persons for his failure to perform obligations of his 
 principal, and which the principal has employed him to per- 
 form, but which he has not contracted with them to perform 
 in their favor.' In other words, he is not liable to them for 
 
 ' WiUard v. Pinard, 44 Vt. 34 ; 
 Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Clanton, 59 
 Ala. 392 [railroad company could 
 recover from employee for damage 
 to its property resulting from his 
 negligence]. The fact that a train 
 was imperfectly equipped did not 
 relieve the conductor from the exer- 
 cise of due care in its management 
 Id.) The damage suffered by the 
 master need not be directly or im- 
 
 mediately caused by the servant's 
 act ; it is suflScient that it is fairly 
 attributable to an act done or omitted 
 by the latter, as a natural or a just 
 consequence (Gilson v. Collins. 66 
 111. 136 [tug-boat damaged by flre 
 while in charge of an engineer]). 
 
 ■ Shipmasters and factors are no 
 exception, because they personally" 
 contract with third persons. 
 
 [456] 
 
457 
 
 LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 
 
 [§243 
 
 his mere nonfeasance.^ He is, consequently, not responsible to 
 them for any neghgence in the performance of duties devolv- 
 ing upon him purely from his agency, since he cannot, as 
 agent, be subject to any obligations toward third persons, 
 other than those of his principal. And these duties are not 
 imposed upon him by law, nor has he agreed with any one, 
 except his principal, that he will perform therti. In failing to 
 do so, he wrongs no one except his principal, who al-one, 
 therefore, can hold him responsible for his negligence.^ For 
 the failure of the agent to perform any duty which the prin- 
 cipal owes to a third person, the remedy of such person is 
 only against the principal, even though the fault, as a matter 
 of fact, is entirely with the agent. Thus, where a banker is 
 employed to collect a note, which he puts into the hands of 
 another banker, through whose negligence the debt is lost, 
 the creditor cannot sue the latter banker, though he was the 
 one actually in fault.* So the transfer agent of a corporation 
 is not liable to a purchaser of stock for his improper refusal to 
 transfer such stock upon the books.^ So a sheriff's deputy is 
 
 ' The question of the liabiUty of 
 the negligent servant depends upon 
 whether his act was one of misfeas- 
 ance or nonfeasance. For the for- 
 mer the former the servant is, in 
 general, liable ; for the latter, not. 
 The servant, as between himself and 
 his master, is bound to serve him 
 with fidelity and to perform the du- 
 ties committed to him. An omission 
 to perform them may subject third 
 persona to harm, and the master to 
 damages. But the breach of the 
 contract of service is a matter be- 
 tween the master and servant alone, 
 and the nonfeasance of the servant 
 causing injury to third persons is 
 not, in general, at least, a ground 
 for a civil action against the servant 
 in their favor (Murray v. Usher, 117 
 N. ¥.,543; 33 N. E. 564). The agents 
 of a corporation charged with the 
 duty of erecting on its grounds 
 structures for the accommodation of 
 the public, negligently permitted a 
 defective structure to be erected. 
 
 Held guilty merely of nonfeasance, 
 and therefore were not liable to per- 
 sons injured by reason of such de- 
 fects (Van Antwerp v. Linton, 89 
 Hun, 417; 35 N. Y. Supp. 818). 
 s p., Jessup V. Sloneker, 143 Pa. St. 
 537 ; 31 Atl. 988. 
 
 ' Montgomery Bank v. Albany 
 Bank, 7 N. Y. 459 ; Colvin v. Hol- 
 brook, 2 Id. 126 ; Denny v. Manhat- 
 tan Co., 3 Denio, 115; afi&'d, 5 
 Id. 639 ; Bristol, etc. R. Co. v. Col- 
 lins, 7 H. L. Cas. 194 ; 5 Hurlst. & 
 N. [Amer. ed.] 969 ; Coxon v. Gt- 
 "Western R. Co , 5 Hurlst. & N. 374 ; 
 Mytton V. Midland R. Co., 4 Id. 615 ; 
 see Anderson v. Brownlee, 1 S. 474 ; 
 Hay, 28 ; Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie 
 R. Co., 30 N. Y. 48, 50 : Henshaw v. 
 Noble, 7 Ohio St. 236; Osborne v. 
 Morgan, 137 Mass. 1. 
 
 ■* Montgomery Bank v. Albany 
 Bank, 7 N. Y. 459 ; see Commercial 
 Bank v. Union Bank, 11 Id. 208. 
 
 * Denny v. Manhattan R. Co., 2 
 Denio, 115 : afii'd, 5 Id. 639. 
 
■§ 244] LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 458 
 
 not liable to a judgment-creditor for money collected by him 
 under an execution in favor of the creditor.^ So the agent of 
 an executor is not liable to the legatees for his mismanage- 
 ment of the estate^ So the agent of a landlord is not liable to 
 the tenant for his neglect to make repairs, which the landlord 
 was bound to make and had deputed to the agent.^ The 
 directors or other officers of a corporation cannot be held 
 liable to a stranger for any omission on the part of the cor- 
 poration to perform a duty to him, even though such omis- 
 sion is the direct result of the vote of such directors, who have 
 exclusive control of the corporate business.' 
 
 § 244. Servant liable to third person for misfeasance. — 
 
 But every one, whether he is principal or agent, is responsible 
 directly to persons injured by his own negligence in fulfilling 
 obligations resting upon him in his individual character. 
 These obligations are those which the law imposes upon 
 all persons, independent of contract. No man increases or 
 diminishes his obligations to strangers by becoming an agent ; 
 but if, in the course of his agency, he comes in contact with 
 the person or property of a stranger, he is liable for any injury 
 he may do to either, by his negligence in the performance of 
 duties imposed by law upon him, in common with all other 
 men.^ Thus, a servant is personally liable to a third person for 
 
 « Colvin V. Holbrook, 3 N. Y. 136 ; without passing on this (sub nom. 
 
 Tuttle V. Love, 7 Johns. 470. Rogers v. N. Y. & Texas Land Co.), 
 
 ■■ Phinney v. Phinney, 17 How. 134 N. Y, 197 ; 33 N. E. 27. 
 
 Pr. 197. '.Where the agent's act, which 
 
 8 Dean v. Brock, 11 Ind. App. 507; causes the injury, is a misfeasance, 
 38 N. E. 839. But where premises as distinguished from a mere omis- 
 owned by a non-resident are placed sion of duty, the agent is liable, as 
 in the hands of a resident real estate well as the principal (Harriman v. 
 agent, with authority to make re- Stowe, 57 Mo. 93 [carpenter, em- 
 pairs, lease, etc., and the agent per- ployed to build a trapdoor, did the 
 mits such premises to become danger- work so negligently that another 
 ous for want of repairs, he will be person fell down the hatchway]; 
 liable to any person who is injured Blue v. Briggs, 13 Ind. App. 105 ; 
 by such dangerous condition of the 89 N. E. 885 ). An agent is liable for 
 premises (Baird v. Shipman, 33 111. misfeasance to the owner of the prop- 
 App. 503 ; affl'd, 133 111. 16; 23 N. E. erty injured, whether he acted by 
 384. . the direction of his principal or not 
 
 3 Rogers v. Phelps, 9 N. Y. Supp. (Richardson v. Kimball. 38 Me. 4659. 
 
 S86 ; reversed on other grounds, If one commits an unlawful act 
 
459 
 
 LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 
 
 [§244 
 
 negligently driving the master's horse or carriage over him, 
 even though the master also be liable.^ So the driver of a 
 railroad engine, or the conductor of a train, is personally- 
 responsible for cattle killed on the track through his negli- 
 gence,^ or for bodily injuries suffered by a passenger from the 
 same cause;* and a servant in a stone quarry, adjacent to a 
 highway, negligently setting off a blast, is liable to a traveler 
 
 under the direction of another, that 
 fact will not shield him from respon- 
 sibility, but both are equally liable 
 to the- injured party (Johnson v. Bar- 
 ber, 5 Gilm. 435). An agent, com- 
 mitting a positive and obvious 
 wrong, cannot relieve himself from 
 liability by showing that he was act- 
 ing under the orders of another (see 
 Bennett v. Ives, 30 Conn. 339; 
 Mitchell V. Harmony, 13 How. 
 [U. S.] 115). Defendants, who had 
 been repairing a house, left a box on 
 the premises, in a pathway. Held, 
 that they were responsible to a ten- 
 ant living in the house, who, in go- 
 ing along the pathway, after dark, 
 fell over the box, and was injured 
 (Donnelly v. Hufschmidt, 79 Cal. 74; 
 21 Pac. 546). See a dictum, in affir- 
 mation of the doctrine of the text, in 
 Kirby v. Penn. E. Co. (76 Pa. St. 
 506), where Agnew, C. J., says that 
 the law leaves "each one to assert 
 his proper remedy against the per- 
 son whose act or negligence does 
 him an injury." In applying this 
 principle, it must be borne in mind 
 that a rule of law is merged in a 
 contract, express or implied, cover- 
 ing the same point. Therefore, one 
 who commits his property to the 
 care of another, for any purpose, 
 enters into an applied contract with 
 the latter for the exercise of care, 
 which supersedes the requirement of 
 the law. And the agents of the per- 
 son thus intrusted, in dealing with 
 the property as such agents, and 
 within the scope of their agency, are 
 
 not subject to the general rule of law 
 requiring care, for that has been 
 merged in the contract ; nor are they 
 subject to the contract, for they were 
 not parties to it. In an action of 
 trover, it is no defense that the de- 
 fendant acted as the agent or ser- 
 vant of another, who was himself 
 a wrong-doer (McPheters v. Page, 83 
 Me. 334 ; 33 Atl. 101). 
 
 2 Phelps V. Wait, 30 N. T. 78; 
 Montfort v. Hughes, 3 E. D. Smith, 
 591 ; Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 
 343 ; Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen, 430 ; 
 but compare Parsons v. Winchell, 5 
 Cush. 593. Where the owner of a 
 scow employed a tug to tow the 
 scow across a river, the tug-owner 
 was held liable to a third person, 
 having freight on the scow, for neg- 
 ligence, injuring the freight (Baird 
 V. Daly. 57 N. Y. 337). 
 
 3 Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358. 
 
 '' Where an engineer is employed 
 to erect a steam boiler and other 
 apparatus, and, in consequence of 
 the explosion of the boiler, while 
 under the personal supervision of the 
 engineer, although, from the insuffi- 
 ciency of the materials of which it 
 was composed, the plaintiff is in- 
 jured, the engineer is answerable. 
 But it seems that if the jury had 
 negatived the fact of the defend- 
 ant's management of the apparatus, 
 he would not have been liable (Witte 
 v. Hague, 3 Dowl. & R. 33). Cited 
 in Necker v. Harvey, 49 Mich. 517 
 [fall of elevator, while in custody of 
 manufacturer's servant]. 
 
§245] 
 
 LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 
 
 460 
 
 injured thereby.^ So a servant is liable for his negligence in 
 so constructing a building as to cause a wall to fall upon a 
 stranger.^ 
 
 § 245. Servant's liability to fellow-servants.— The authori- 
 ties are now unanimous in favor of holding a servant liable to 
 his fellow-servants for injuries suffered by them through his 
 personal negligence in the performance of those duties which 
 each man owes to his fellow-men.' Servants do not neces- 
 sarily or commonly make any bargain with each other, express 
 or imphed, for exemption from such liability ; and, if it is true 
 that they consider the risk in fixing their wages, the implied 
 contract thus entered into is not made for the benefit of the 
 other servants, nor have the latter any interest in it. The test 
 of liability is the same as in the case of strangers. A servant 
 
 6 Wright V. Compton, 53 Ind. 337. 
 
 * Mayer v. Hutchinson B'd'g Co., 
 104 Ala. 611 ; 16 So. 630. 
 
 ' Woodhead v. Gartness Mineral 
 Co., 4 Rettie, 469 ; Griffiths v. Wol- 
 fram, 23 Minn. 185 [servants negli- 
 gently constructing a center piece 
 for the support of a brick arch, liable 
 to a bricklayer, being a fellow- 
 servant], GilflUan, J., says : " This 
 liability does not rest upon any duty 
 imposed by privity of contract, for in 
 such cases there may not be, and 
 frequently is not, any such privity. 
 But the duty of each to do the work 
 with proper care grew out of the re- 
 lation which existed between them as 
 persons engaged in the same work." 
 In former editions of this work, we 
 referred to the fact that the contrary 
 doctrine was established in Massa- 
 chusetts, in Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray, 
 99, which decision we then em- 
 phatically condemned. It has since 
 been expressly overruled by the same 
 court (differently constituted) in Os- 
 borne V. Morgan, 130 Mass, 103. In 
 that case, while plaintiff was at 
 work, in the establishment of a 
 manufacturing corporation, as a car- 
 penter, the defendants, the superin- 
 tendent, and other servants of the 
 
 corporation, negligently caused a 
 tackle block and chains to be placed 
 upon an iron rail suspended from the 
 ceiling, and suffered them to remain 
 in such a condition that they fell 
 upon the plaintiff. It was held that 
 the action was maintainable. Gray, 
 C. J., says : "Upon consideration, we 
 are all of the opinion that [Albro v. 
 Jaquith] is supported by no satisfac- 
 tory reasons, and must be over- 
 ruled. . . The plaintiff's action 
 is not founded on any contract, but 
 is an action of tort for injuries 
 which, according to the common ex- 
 perience of mankind, were a natural 
 consequence of the defendant's neg- 
 ligence. . . Even the master is 
 not exempt from liability to his ser- 
 vants for his own negligence ; and 
 the servants make no contract with, 
 and receive no compensation from, 
 each other." Fellow-servants mutu- 
 ally owe to each other the duty of 
 exercising ordinary care in the per- 
 formance of their service, and one 
 who fails in that respect is liable at 
 common law for any personal injury 
 resulting therefrom to his fellow- 
 servant (Hare v. Mclntire, 83 Me. 
 340 ; 19 Atl. 453). 
 
46 1 
 
 LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 
 
 [§246 
 
 is liable to his fellows for misfeasance,^ but not for mere non- 
 feasance of a duty belonging to the master, though delegated 
 to him.^ 
 
 § 246. Liability of shipmasters.— By a rule peculiar to the 
 mercantile law, the master of a private vessel, no matter of 
 what kind,' is responsible to third persons for his own negli- 
 gence to the fullest extent,^ and for the negligence of all 
 employed on board, to the same extent as if he were the iilti- 
 mate principal.^ His liability in this last respect is defined in 
 the chapter on the liability of masters for the acts of their 
 servants. But while the master is on shore, and the vessel is 
 under the charge of a hcensed pilot, the latter is master for 
 the time being, and the former is not liable for the pilot's 
 negligence.* 
 
 ' Thus an agent, to whom the duty 
 of providing safe machinery is dele- 
 gated, is liable to a fellow-servant 
 for directing him to use defective 
 machinery, which he knew to be 
 dangerous (Greenberg v. Whitcomb 
 Lumber Co., 90 Wise. 325; 63 N. W. 
 93). Where the section crew of a 
 railroad company side track a hand 
 car with which they are working to 
 clear the main track for an approach- 
 ing train, and the foreman, who has 
 unlocked the switch, negligently 
 fails to close it, and the train enters 
 on the side track, and kills a section 
 hand, the foreman is personally liable 
 in damages for his death (Daves v. 
 Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 19; 33 Pac. 
 708). 
 
 ' A servant in charge of vi^ork, 
 who neglects to take proper precau- 
 tions for the safety of the workmen, 
 as by failing to direct them not to 
 work, is not liable to a workman in- 
 jured thereby, as a servant is not lia- 
 ble for injuries caused by nonfeas- 
 ance, but only for such as are caused 
 by misfeasance (Burns v. Pethcal, 75 
 Hun. 437: 37 N. Y. Supp. 499 ; see, 
 also, Steinhauser v. Spraul, 114 Mo. 
 
 551 ; 127 Mo. 541; 38 S. W. 620 [wife 
 not liable to servant]). 
 
 ' Not only does this rule apply to 
 master of a merchant ship, but also 
 to the master of a steamer carrying 
 passengers on inland water (Denison 
 V. Seymour, 9 Wend. 9). The rela- 
 tion of master and servant does not 
 subsist between the captain of a ship 
 of war and his officers or seamen 
 (Nicholson v. Mounsey, 15 East, 334); 
 nor between the master or owner of 
 a merchant vessel and a pilot received 
 on board under a statute giving the 
 former no choice to accept or refuse, 
 nor control over his services (see 
 Bowcher v. Noidstrom, 1 Taunt. 568). 
 
 * Denison v. Seymour, 9 Wend. 9; 
 see Foot v. Wiswall, 14 Johns. 304 ; 
 Snell V. Rich, 1 Id. 805 ; Rosiere v. 
 Sawkins, 13 Mod. 434. 
 
 ^ Id. The text is cited and applied 
 in Kennedy v. Ryall (67 N. Y. 379), 
 where the master of a steamship 
 was held liable for the negligence of 
 the chief steward in leaving poison 
 exposed in a pan, used in fumigating 
 the vessel under direction of the 
 health officer while in port, whereby 
 plaintiff's intestate was killed. 
 
 ^ Snell v. Rich, 1 Johns. 305. 
 
§248] 
 
 LIABILITY OF SERVANTS. 
 
 462 
 
 § 247. Servant not liable for negligence of a fellow-serv- 
 ant. — Except in the peculiar case mentioned in the last sec- 
 tion, a servant is never responsible to a third person for the 
 negligence or other fault of a fellow-servant, even though the 
 latter is under the control and direction of the former, as 
 the sole representative of the master, having the power to 
 select and dismiss his subordinate fellow-servants.^ It is only 
 for his own personal negligence that a servant is liable. 
 
 § 248. Joint liability of master and servant. — Wherever a 
 master can be held responsible for the tortious negligence of 
 his servant, the two are generally held jointly as well as sever- 
 ally liable ; ' and if a servant employs a sub-agent, under such 
 circumstances that both the original master and the intermedi- 
 ate employer are liable for the negligence of the sub-agent, 
 they are all jointly and severally liable.^ A different rule pre- 
 vails in Massachusetts,' and probably in Maine ; * a master, 
 who is not present when his servant commits a wrongful act, 
 being held not subject to a joint liability, even when both are 
 severally liable. 
 
 1 In Brown v. Lent (20 Vt. 539), 
 defendant was employed as the gen- 
 eral superintendent over a job of 
 quarrying and mason work, and as 
 such directed another servant of the 
 same master to take charge of the 
 blasting of certain rocks. The latter 
 servant, in the absence of the de- 
 fendant, and by his own negligence 
 alone, caused an injury to a third 
 person in the process of blasting. 
 Held, that the defendant was not li- 
 able for the injury. Davis, J., said: 
 "Neither principle nor authority 
 will warrant the holding a mere 
 middleman, an intermediate agent 
 between the master and the direct 
 agent, constructively responsible for 
 the acts of the latter." 
 
 ' Phelps V. "Wait, 30 N Y. 78 : Suy- 
 dam V. Moore, 8 Barb. 358 ; Mont- 
 fort v. Hughes, 3 E. D. Smith, 591; 
 Wright V. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343; 
 Fortv. Whipple, 11 Hun, 589 [where 
 the injury was to a servant] ; Wright 
 V. Compton, 58 Ind. 337. 
 
 2 Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358. 
 
 ' A master and servant are not lia- 
 ble jointly, in an action on the case, 
 for an injury occasioned by the neg- 
 ligence of the servant while driving 
 the carriage of the master in his ab- 
 sence (Parsons v. Winohell, 5 Cush, 
 593 ; and see Campbell v. Phelps, 1 
 Pick. 63 ; Mulchey v. Methodist, etc. 
 So., 135 Mass. 487. But compare 
 Hewett V. Swift, 8 Allen, 430). One 
 who gratuitously superintends work 
 done on the land of another, 
 and through whose negligence, as 
 well as that of such other, damage 
 is done to a third person by the 
 work, is liable jointly with the other 
 person therefor (Hawkesworth v. 
 Thompson, 98 Mass. 77). 
 
 " In Campbell v. Portland Sugar 
 Co (63 Me. 553), a wharf company 
 and its agent were held to be sevei-- 
 ally liable for a defect in the wharf. 
 Barrows, J., saying: "We think 
 there are substantial reasons assigned 
 in Parsons v. Winchell (supra), why 
 the principal and agent should not 
 be charged jointly in such a case." 
 
PART III. 
 
 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND OFFICERS. 
 
 Chapter XII. Municipal Corporations. 
 
 XIII. Public Officers. 
 
 XIV. Incorporated Public Trustees. 
 
 CHAPTER- XII. 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 349. The state cannot be coerced § 263. 
 by suit. 
 
 250. Extent of state's immunity. 
 
 251. Liability of state by its own 
 
 consent. 
 [Consolidated with § 253]. 
 Municipal corporations a s 
 
 state-agencies. 
 Statutory test of corporate 
 
 liability. 
 Public and private functions 
 
 of corporations. 
 Liability of counties, towns, 
 
 etc., generally. 
 Liability of counties in Penn- 
 sylvania, Maryland, Indiana 
 
 and Iowa. 
 Liability of New England 
 
 towns. 
 Common law liability of New 
 
 England towns. 
 [Consolidated with § 291]. 
 260a. Maintenance of jails, etc. 
 261. Statutory liability for mob 
 
 violence. 
 263. Adoption and execution of 
 
 laws and ordinances. 
 
 [463] 
 
 252. 
 233. 
 
 254. 
 
 255. 
 
 256. 
 
 257. 
 
 258. 
 
 259. 
 
 260. 
 
 264. 
 265. 
 
 366. 
 
 267. 
 368. 
 369. 
 270. 
 271. 
 
 373. 
 
 373. 
 
 374. 
 
 375. 
 
 376. 
 
 377. 
 378. 
 
 379. 
 380. 
 
 Discretionary powers — grant- 
 ing licenses. 
 
 [Omitted]. 
 
 Supplying water and appa- 
 ratus for extinguishing 
 fires. 
 
 Providing for public health. 
 
 Providing public schools. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 358]. 
 
 [Consolidated with g 362]. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 363]. 
 
 Devising plan of public im- 
 provement. 
 
 Error of judgment distin- 
 guished from negligence. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 273]. 
 
 Planning inefficient or injuri- 
 ous drainage. 
 
 Duty to remedy defects in 
 plan. 
 
 Discretion in the application 
 of limited funds. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 374]. 
 
 How far professional advice 
 will excuse defect in plan. 
 
 Statutory directions as to plan. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 381]. 
 
§2491 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 464 
 
 § 281. Liability for breach of minis- 
 terial duties. 
 
 282. [Consolidated with § 281]. 
 
 283. Damage consequent on au- 
 
 thorized act. 
 
 284. [Consolidated with §334]. 
 
 285. Municipal lands and struc- 
 
 tures. 
 
 286. Management of water and 
 
 gas service. 
 
 287. Maintenance and repair of 
 
 sewers. 
 
 288. [Consolidated with §258]. 
 
 289. Implied liability for non-re- 
 
 pair of streets. 
 
 290. [Consolidated with § 867]. 
 
 291. Implied liability for negli- 
 
 gence of agents. 
 
 292. [Consolidated with § 291]. 
 
 293. [Consolidated with § 291]. 
 
 294. [Consohdated with § 291]. 
 
 295. Departments of government, 
 
 not agents of city. 
 
 296. When departments are city's 
 
 299. 
 
 300. 
 
 801. Recovery over by corporation. 
 
 297. [Omitted]. 
 
 298. Independent contractors not 
 
 agents. 
 Liability limited to matters 
 
 within jurisdiction. 
 [Consolidated with § ! 
 
 §249. State cannot be coerced by suit— The state is a 
 corporation,^ and as such may make contracts and may suffer 
 and commit wrongs, and may enforce its rights and redress its 
 injuries by civil action.^ But as a sovereign power, it cannot 
 be compelled by the process of courts of its own creation, 
 much less by that of other courts, to defend itself from pros- 
 ecution.^ Such immunity is placed upon the ground that the 
 general welfare requires that the state should not be deprived 
 or dispossessed of its property without its consent; not on the 
 maxim of the English law that the king can do no wrong, a 
 
 ' Even the United States may be 
 said to be a corporation (United 
 States V. Hillegas, 3 Wash. C. C. 73), 
 as the king of England and Parlia- 
 ment are (10 Co. 29b: Shep. Abr. 
 431). The governor of a state, as 
 the head of the executive depart- 
 ment, is a corporation sole, and 
 bonds given to hiui may be enforced 
 for the benefit of those interested 
 {Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. 176; 
 Polk V. Plummer, 2 Id. 500). The 
 District of Columbia is a municipal 
 corporation, created by act of Con- 
 gress (see Barnes v. Dist. of Colum- 
 bia, 91 U. S. 540 ; Dist. of Columbia 
 V. Woodbury, 136 Id. 450 ; 10 S. Ct. 
 990). 
 
 5 Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill, 33 ; 
 Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Id. 159; 26 
 
 Wend. 192 ; affl'g 8 Paige, 531 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Watertown, 1 HiU, 620 ; State 
 V. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76. 
 
 ' Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 
 411 ; United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 
 436 ; Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Id. 257 
 Gary v. Curtis, 3 How. [U. S.] 236 
 United States v. McLemore, 4 Id 
 286 ; Hill v. United States, 9 Id. 386 
 Reeside v. Walker, 11 Id. 272 ; Beers 
 V. Arkansas, 20 Id. 527 ; Nations v. 
 Johnson, 24 Id. 195 ; DeGroot v. 
 United States, 5 Wall. 419 ; United 
 States V. Eckford, 6 Id. 484 ; The 
 Siren, 7 Id. 152, 154 ; The Davis, 10 
 Id, 15, 20 ; Nichols v. United States, 
 7 Id. 122 ; United States v. O'Keefe, 
 11 Id. 178 ; Case v. Terrell, 11 Id. 
 199, 201; Carr v. United States, 98 
 U. S. 433, 437; United States v. 
 
465 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§249 
 
 maxim which has no existence in American law.* Any liability 
 therefore, on the part of the state for the negligent acts or 
 omissions of its officers or agents, must be one voluntarily 
 assumed by constitutional legislative enactment,^ or it does not 
 exist." In a word, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not 
 apply to the state. '^ 
 
 ^ "We do not understand that 
 either in reference to the govern- 
 ment of the United States, or of the 
 several states, or of any of their 
 officers, the English maxim [that 
 the king can do no wrong] has an 
 existence in this country " (per Mil- 
 ler, J.; Langford v. United States, 
 101 U. S. 341). 
 
 ' No officer or body of authority, 
 except the legislature, can consent 
 that the state be sued (The Davis, 10 
 Wall. 15; United States v. Lee, 106 
 U. S. 196 ; 1 S. Ct. 240 ; Transporta- 
 tion Co. V. Chicago, 99 Id. 635). The 
 state may withdraw its consent to 
 be sued whenever the public interest 
 requires (Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 
 [U. S.] 527 ; Ex parte State, 53 Ala. 
 235). 
 
 *> The ordinary courts have no 
 jurisdiction to render an affirmative 
 judgment against the state, even by 
 way of a set-off in a suit instituted 
 by the state, unless authorized by 
 statute (People v. Dennison, 84 N. Y. 
 272 ; Commonwealth v. Matlack, 4 
 Dall. 303 ; White v. The Governor, 
 18 Ala. 767 ; State v. HiU, 54 Id. 67 ; 
 State V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 34 
 Md. 344 ; Commonwealth v. Eodes, 
 5 T. Mon. 318, and cases cited, 
 stipra). See, also, Coster v. Albany, 
 43 N. Y. 399 ; Branch v. Macon, etc. 
 R. Co., 2 Woods C. C. 385; Metz v. 
 Soule, 40 Iowa, 236 ; People v. Tal- 
 madge, 6 Cal 256). 
 
 ' The government is not liable on 
 an implied assumpsit for the torts of 
 its officer committed while in its 
 service and apparently for its benefit 
 (Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269). 
 
 Thompson, 98 Id. 486, 489 ; Railroad 
 Co. V. Tennessee, 101 Id. 337 ; Rail- 
 road Co. V. Alabama, Id. 832 ; United 
 States V. Lee, 106 Id. 196 ; 1 S. Ct. 
 240 ; Hans v. Louisiana, 24 Fed. 55 ; 
 Harvey v. Virginia, 20 Id. 411 ; 
 Lewis V. State, 96 N. Y. 71 ; Sipple 
 V. State, 99 Id. 284 ; People v. Miles, 
 56 Cal. 401; Chapman v. State, 104 
 Id. 690 ; 38 Pac. 457 ; Chicago, etc. 
 E. Co. V. State, 53 Wise. 509 ; 10 
 N. W. 560; Raymond v. State, 54 
 Miss. 563; Chevallier v. State, 10 
 Tex. 315; Tracy v. Hornbuckle, 8 
 Bush, 336 ; Tate v. Salmon, 79 Ky. 
 540 ; Ex parte State, 52 Ala. 231 ; 
 Owen V. State, 7 Neb. 108 ; Rollo v. 
 Andes Ins. Co., 33 Gratt. 515 ; Clod- 
 felter v. State, 86 N. C. 51 ; Lowry 
 V. Thompson, 25 S. C. 416 ; State v. 
 Lanier, 47 La. Ann. 110 ; 16 So. 647 ; 
 Bloxham v. Florida Central R. Co., 
 35 Fla. 635 ; 17 So. 902 ; Matter of 
 Substitute, etc., Colo. ; 39 Pac. 
 1088. Though the action is in form 
 against an officer of the state, if it is 
 in fact against the state itself, it can- 
 not be maintained. The fact that 
 the state is not a party of record is 
 immaterial (Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 
 U. S. 711 ; 2 S. Ct. 128 ; Cunning- 
 ham V. Macon, etc. R. Co., 109 Id. 
 446 ; 3 S. Ct. 292 ; Hagood v. 
 Southern, 117 Id. 52 ; 6 S. Ct. 608). 
 s. P., Paine v. Boston, 124 Mass. 486; 
 Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117 ; 
 Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 257 ; 
 Jones V. Loving, 55 Miss. 109 ; Pike 
 V. Megam, 44 Mo. 491 ; Attorney- 
 General V. Brown, 1 Wise. 532 ; 
 Wright V. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302 ; Baker 
 -V. State, 37 Id. 485. 
 
 [Law op Neg. Vol. I — 30] 
 
§251] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 4^6- 
 
 § 250. Extent of state's immunity. — The fact that the 
 state derives a profit by way of statutory tolls or otherwise,, 
 from the maintenance and operation of a public work, does 
 not deprive it of its immunity or impose a duty as to which 
 negligence is predicable in a private action.' On the other 
 hand, the fact that the state shares the profits of a private 
 enterprise, r. g., as a stockholder of a private corporation, does 
 not exempt the latter from coercion by suit. By becoming a 
 partner in such a company, the state divests itself of its sover- 
 eign character, so far as concerns the transactions of that com- 
 pany, and takes that of a private citizen ; the fact of the state's 
 ownership of a part, or even of the whole, of the capital of such 
 a corporation does not affect the rights of those dealing with it.^ 
 Hence the state's ownership of all the shares of the capital stock 
 of a railroad company will not exempt the corporation from 
 liability for the negligence of its servants.^ 
 
 § 251. Liability of state by its own consent. — The Federal 
 government, and some of the states, have provided for the 
 adjudication of many classes of private claims against them, 
 in their ordinary courts or in courts especially erected for that 
 purpose.' The rule is inflexible that, whenever the state 
 
 ' The fact that the state derives a of its sovereignty, takes possession 
 
 profit from the enforced labor of its of, and operates a railroad, it is, 
 
 prison convicts will not make it lia- by virtue of its sovereignty, ex- 
 
 ble for the negligence of its prison erapt from liability for its servants' 
 
 officers to the injury of a convict acts in operating the line. The 
 
 (Lewis V. State, 96 N. Y. 71; Ala- crown is not liable as a common 
 
 mango v. Albany County, 25 Huri, carrier (Eegina v. McLeod, 8 Duval 
 
 511; and cases cited under § 360a, [Canada], 1; Regina v. McFarlane, 
 
 post). 7 Id. 216). 
 
 ' Bank of United States v. Plant- ' Notwithstanding that in thirteen 
 ers' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904; Pennsyl- states, the legislature is authorized 
 vania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge, 13 by constitutional provision to pro- 
 How. [U. S.] 518; Curran v. Arkan- vide a method for establishing claims 
 sas, 15 Id. 304; Darrington v. State against the state by suit, this per- 
 Bank, 13 Id. 12; Bank of Kentucky mission has been availed of in only 
 V. Wister, 2 Peters, 318; Tinsman v. a few of them. The New York 
 Belvidere, etc. E. Co. 26 N. J. Law, scheme of a Court of Claims, as 
 148. originally adopted, was a statutory 
 
 ' Hutchinson v. Western, etc. R. tribunal without constitutional sane- 
 Co. 6 Heisk. 634. On the other tion. In five states the legislature 
 hand, it is held in Canada, that is forbidden to make any sueli pro- 
 where the crown, in the exercise vision. 
 
467 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§2S3 
 
 designates a particular tribunal in which it consents to be 
 prosecuted, and the class of claims which such tribunal may 
 entertain, and prescribes a particular form of procedure, the 
 statutory directions must be strictly followed. Actions can- 
 not be brought for any other cause ^ or in any other court* 
 than that thus specified. But Federal statutes, allowing the 
 United States to be sued for certain causes, without specifying 
 any particular court, are held to authorize actions to be brought 
 in state courts.* 
 
 § 252. [consolidated with § 253]. 
 
 § 253. Municipal corporations as state-agencies. — We 
 
 confine ourselves here to the consideration of the extent 
 
 " Lewis V. State, 96 N. Y. 71. Or- 
 dinary legal remedies, as in ques- 
 tions of contract between individuals 
 are not contemplated by these per- 
 missive statutes. In those cases, re- 
 liance must be had, it is said, upon 
 the good faith of the state (see Han- 
 cock V. Walsh, 3 Woods C. C. 363; 
 Dabney v. State Banlc, 3 S. C. 167; 
 .Clark V. State, 7 Coldw. 317; Dan- 
 olds v. Scate, 89 N. Y. 36). The jur- 
 isdiction of the Federal Court of 
 Claims is restricted to contracts, ex- 
 press or implied. Hence the gov- 
 ernment is not liable to suit for the 
 wrongful and unauthorized acts 
 committed by its officers, under a 
 mistaken zeal for the public good 
 (Longford v. United States, 101 U. S. 
 341). In New York (L. 1883, ch. 
 305; L. 1870, ch. 331), the state is 
 liable to all persons for damages sus- 
 tained from the canals of the state, 
 or from their use or management, or 
 from the negligence of the state offi- 
 cers in charge thereof, resulting or 
 arising from any accident or other 
 matter connected with the canals, if 
 the facts proved shall make out a 
 case which would create a legal lia- 
 bility against the state, were they 
 established in a court of justice 
 against an individual or corporation. 
 It is not necessary that the damages 
 
 should be caused by some person 
 described by law as "an officer " of 
 the state (Sipple v. State, 99 N. Y. 
 284; Eexford v. State, 105 Id. 229; 
 UN. E. 514). For other cases under 
 this statute, see Bowen v. State, 108 
 N. Y. 166 [action for death caused 
 by negligent act will lie] ; Splittorf 
 V. State, Id. 205; 15 N. E. 322 [open 
 swing bridge]. Ballon v. State, 111 
 N. Y. 496 ; 18 N. E. 627 [failure to 
 remove obstruction in drainage 
 sewer] ; Bidelman v. State, 110 N. 
 Y. 283; 18 N. E. 115.) By California 
 statute of March 12, 1885, authoriz- 
 ing recovery of damages by reason 
 of certain canal improvements made 
 by the state, provided they were 
 bccasioned "by any act for which 
 the state is legally liable," it is held 
 that no liability was admitted or de- 
 fense waived, except immunity from 
 suit; the state may still interpose the 
 defense that it was engaged in a pub- 
 lic work for the common good (Green 
 V. State, 73 Cal. 29 ; 14 Pac. 610). 
 
 3 See United States v. Clark, 8 
 Peters, 444. 
 
 ' United States v, Clark, 8 Peters, 
 444; Jones v. United States, 48 Wise. 
 385 ; 4 N. W. 519 ; Zemlock v. Uni- 
 ted States, 73 Wise. 363; 41 N. W. 
 445 ; Velte v. United States, 76 Wise. 
 278 ; 45 N. W. 119. 
 
§2S3J 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 468 
 
 of the liability to private actions of that large class of local 
 corporations, generically denominated municipal corporations, 
 such as cities, towns, counties, school districts, etc., to which, 
 for administrative purposes, the state delegates portions of its 
 sovereign powers, to be exercised within particular sections of 
 its territory, for certain public purposes.^ To the extent 
 that such local or special organizations possess and exer- 
 cise governmental powers, they are, as it were, departments 
 of state ;^ and as such, in the absence of any statute to the 
 contrary, they have the privilege and immunity of the state ; 
 they partake of the state's prerogative of sovereignty, in that 
 they are exempt from private prosecution for the conse- 
 quences of their exercising or neglecting to exercise the 
 governmental powers they possess.^ Their delegated duties 
 
 ' The term ' ' municipal corpora- 
 tion" is sometimes defined, as in 
 New York (Gen. Corp. L. of 1891, § 
 2) so as to include ' ' a county, tovs-n, 
 school district, village, city, and any 
 other territorial division of the state 
 established by law, with powers of 
 local government." In Missouri, the 
 term as tised in a statute does not 
 include an incorporated board of 
 public schools, but only organized 
 cities and towns and other like 
 organizations with political and 
 legislative powers for local civil 
 government and police regulation 
 of the inhabitants of particular dis- 
 tricts included in the boundaries of 
 the corporation (Heller v. Strem- 
 mel, 53 Mo. 309 ; State v. Leffing- 
 well, 54 Id. 458). In Wisconsin, the 
 term as used in the constitution is 
 held not to include towns, school 
 districts and such like unincorpora- 
 ted quasi corporations (Eaton v. 
 Manitowoc Co., 44 "Wise. 4S9). 
 
 ^ " A municipal corporation in the 
 exercise of all of its duties, includ- 
 ing those most strictly local or inter- 
 nal, is but a department of the state. 
 Tlie legislature may give it all the 
 powers such a being is capable of 
 
 receiving, making it a miniature 
 state within its locality. Again : it 
 may strip it of every power, leaving 
 it a corporation in name only " (per 
 Hunt, J., Barnes v. Dist. of Colum- 
 bia, 91 U. S. 540). 
 
 ' In Edgerly v. Concord (63 N. H. 
 8) , the court said : "As a part of 
 the governmental machinery of the 
 state, municipal corporations legis- 
 late and provide for the customary 
 local convenience of the people, and 
 in exercising these discretionary 
 functions the corporations are not 
 called upon to respond in damages 
 to individuals, either for omissions 
 to act or in the mode of exercising 
 the powers conferred on them for 
 public purposes and to be exercised 
 at discretion for the public good. 
 For injuries arising from the cor- 
 poration's failure to exercise its pub- 
 lic, legislative and police powers, 
 and for the manner of executing 
 those powers there is no remedy 
 against the municipality, nor can an 
 action be maintained for damages 
 resulting from the failure of its offi- 
 cers to discharge properly and 
 efficiently their official duties." To 
 the same effect, Tainter v. Worces- 
 
469 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [§ 254 
 
 are regarded as due to the public, not to individuals; their 
 officers are not agents of the corporation, but of " the 
 greater public,"^ the state. No relation of agency existing 
 between the corporation and its officers, with respect to the 
 discharge of these public, governmental duties, the corpora- 
 tion is not responsible for the acts or omissions of its officers 
 therein. This is nothing more than an application and proper 
 extension of the rule that the state is not liable for the mis- 
 feasance of its officers. On the other hand, to the extent that 
 these local organizations are invested with a corporate indi- 
 viduality, and so are to be regarded as juristic persons, they 
 are, like private corporations or individuals, subject to the 
 rule of private law that a principal is liable for the acts or 
 omissions of his agent.' 
 
 § 254. Statutory test of corporate liability. — It is impos- 
 sible to state a general rule by which the liability of every 
 municipal corporation of every class, for either the non- 
 feasance or misfeasance of its officers, may be determined. 
 The only test of liability of a particular corporation is the 
 statute under which it exists, and which confers its powers 
 and prescribes its duties. Subject to constitutional limita- 
 tions, the state may, either in the charter, as a condition of a 
 grant of powers, or subsequently by an independent act, 
 impose upon such bodies such burdens and charges as are 
 thought most likely to accomplish the object of their creation ;i • 
 
 ter, 123 Mass. 311 ; Maximilian v. isiana v. New Orleans, 109 TJ. S. 285 ; 
 
 New York, 62 N. Y. 160, per Folger, 3 S. Ct. 211). The several ' ' riot acts " 
 
 J. ; Springfield Fire Ins. Co. v. Keese- of England, and of various American 
 
 ville, 148 Id. 46; 42 N. E. 405, per states, giving a right of action against 
 
 Gray, J. And see cases cited under a city or county for damages done by 
 
 §^ 260-276, post. a mob or riot, and statutes giving a 
 
 * Per Folger J., Maximilian v. New remedy against a town or county or 
 
 York, 62 N. Y. 160 ; see § 266, post, municipal corporation at the suit of 
 
 ' See § 291, post. a citizen sustaining injuries by rea- 
 
 1 Laramie county V. Albany county, son of the defective condition of a 
 
 92 U. S. 307 ; Darlington v. New York, street or bridge within their limits 
 
 31 N. Y. 164 ; People v. Morrell, 21 are examples of the exercise of such 
 
 Weud. 563; Stone V. New York, 25 Id. power. It was once contended 
 
 181 ; Booth V. "Woodbury, 32 Conn. (Green v. New York, 5 Abb. Pr. 503; 
 
 118. A statutory right of action for People v. Haws, 37 Barb. 440), that 
 
 damages caused by a mob may be while such an exercise of legislative 
 
 given or taken away at pleasure (Lou- power over counties and other quasi 
 
§254] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 470 
 kinds of 
 
 or it may exempt them altogether from certain 
 liability.^ It is a universally recognized principle that they 
 have no powers, except those given by statute, either expressly 
 or as necessarily incident to their express powers;' and that 
 their liabilities are to be determined upon a true interpretation 
 of the statutes creating or governing them.* Where the stat- 
 
 corporations may not be open to 
 question, a different question arises 
 as to municipal corporations holding 
 property derived from other sources 
 than the legislature. But this dis- 
 tinction was long ago overruled 
 (Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y. 
 163). See g§ 261, 281. 
 
 « See Gray v. Brooklyn, 2 Abb. Ct. 
 App. 267 ; Fitzpatrick v. Slooum, 89 
 N. Y. 358 ; Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 
 Id. 435 ; Bieling v. Brooklyn, 120 Id. 
 98 ; 24 N. E. 389, on the construction 
 of L. 1873, ch. 863, tit. 19, § 27, re- 
 lieving the city of Brooklyn from 
 liability for any misfeasance or mal- 
 feasance of its common council or any 
 officer of the city or appointee of the 
 common council. The result of the 
 cases under this statute is that if the 
 duty that was neglected, e. g., the 
 guarding of a draw-bridge, did not 
 rest upon any particular officer of the 
 corporation, the corporation will be 
 liable for the consequences of its 
 neglect of the duty, under its pri- 
 mary obligation to keep its streets 
 and bridges in a safe condition. See 
 Vincent v. Brooklyn, 31 Hun, 122 ; 
 Fitzgerald v. Binghamton, 40 Hun, 
 332 ; Parsons v. San Francisco, 23 
 Cal. 462; O'Harra v. Portland, 8 
 Oreg. 525. It is competent to at- 
 tach any condition precedent or sub- 
 sequent to a right of action against 
 a municipal corporation, whether a 
 common-law action or on6 given by 
 the statute (Eeining v. Buffalo, 102 
 N. Y. 308; 6 N. E. 792; Merz v. 
 Brooklyn, 128 N. Y. 617, mem. ; 28 
 N. E. 253 ; Curry v. Buffalo, 135 N. 
 Y. 366 ; 32 N. E. 80 ; Simmons v. 
 
 Brooklyn, 1 N. Y. App. Div. 630 ; 
 36 N. Y. Supp. 1133 ; Patterson v. 
 Brooklyn, 6 N. Y. App. Div. 137; 
 40 N. Y. Supp. 581). 
 
 " Frost V. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152 ; 
 Stetson V. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 ; 
 Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 
 363 ; Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Id. 
 254; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Id. 
 118 ; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645 ; 
 Wright V. Briggs, 2 HQl, 77 ; Macon 
 v. Macon, etc. R. Co., 7 Ga. 221 ; 
 Askew V. Hall, 54 Ala. 639 ; Y^oung- 
 blood V. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406 ; Ould 
 V. Richmond, 23 Graft. 464 ; Hess v. 
 Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 ; Douglass v. Placer- 
 ville, 18 Cal. 643. Corporate powers 
 cannot be created by implication, 
 nor extended by construction (Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. V. Canal Commis- 
 sioners, 21 Pa. St. 9 ; and see Blair v. 
 Perpetual Ins, Co., 10 Mo. 559 ; Hos- 
 ack V. College of Physicians, 5 Wend. 
 547 ; Brady v. New York, 20 N. Y. 
 312). 
 
 ■* Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 
 H. L. 93. " All that can be done with 
 safety is to determine each case as it 
 arises " (per Foote, J. , Lloyd v. New 
 York, 5 N. Y. 369, 375). "The lia- 
 bility of a body created by statute 
 must be determined upon a true in- 
 terpretation of the statute under 
 which it is created" (Southampton, 
 etc. Bridge Co. v. Southampton 
 Board, 8 El. & B. 801, 812). "The 
 liability of a statutory body depends 
 wholly upon the construction of the 
 various acts of parliament under 
 which they exercise their powers. 
 If certain duties are imposed upon 
 the defendants, the circumstance of 
 
471 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [§ 255 
 
 ute is silent on the subject of their liabilities to private actions 
 for a failure to exercise delegated powers, or to perform an 
 imposed duty, the courts have confessedly found it difficult to 
 state a rule of general application by which such a liability, 
 one way or the other, may be determined. The question has 
 sometimes been determined on a consideration of the nature of 
 a particular power or duty expressed in the statute; in other 
 ■cases, it has been made to depend upon a distinction between 
 •corporations having special charters, with specific duties vol- 
 untarily assumed by the grantee, and involuntary or quasi cor- 
 porations, organized under general statutes, upon which duties 
 are arbitrarily imposed. 
 
 § 255. Public and private functions of corporations.— 
 
 There is a well-recognized distinction between powers and 
 ■duties which are granted to, or imposed upon, a public body 
 as an agency of government, to be exercised and performed 
 exclusively for public, governmental purposes, and that other 
 •class of powers and privileges which are exercised by the 
 grantee for its own private advantage, and are for public pur- 
 poses in no other sense than that the public derives a com- 
 mon benefit from a proper discharge of duties arising from the 
 grant.' In respect to special powers and privileges granted to 
 
 their being a public body, receiving tary Commissioners v. Orfila, L. R. 
 their powers for public purposes 15 App. Cas. 400. ) In that case, it 
 only, does not protect them from the ■was held that a board of officers un- 
 consequences of neglect of their der a statutory duty merely to main- 
 duties, if danger arises by the neg- tain roads, ■was not liable for the fall 
 lect " (per Cleasby, B , Winch v. of a retaining ■wall of an overhang- 
 Conservators of the Thames, L. R. ing road, due to an original defect 
 •9 C. P. 378 ; affi'g L. R. 7 C. P. 458). existing before the board ■was cre- 
 If the court can see that, by the ated, of ■which the board ■was not 
 terms of the statute creating a negligently ignorant. " Without a 
 subordinate board or corporation duty to repair [a high^way], no duty 
 with a duty to perform a particular rests on the municipality. In this 
 public service, the body thus created state, the duty is statutory, and 
 was intended to be a mere agent for therefore we must look to the stat- 
 executing the state's administrative ute for its nature and extent " (per 
 functions in that particular, subject Agnew, J., Rapho v. Moore, 68 Pa, 
 to the control of the state, it will not St. 404). See § 281, post. 
 infer an intention to impose upon it ' Fowle v. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398, 
 any liability to a private action for per Marshall, C. J. ; Maximilian v. 
 the consequences of its failure to New York, 63 N. Y. 160 ; Folger, J., 
 perform such duties (Gibraltar Sani- there said : "There are two kinds of 
 
§256] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 472 
 
 it, and the duty to the pubHc which acceptance and use of 
 such a grant involve, a municipahty is on the same footing 
 with a private grantee of a power, and is, Hke an individual, 
 liable for a negligent exercise of it.^ 
 
 § 256. Liability of counties, towns, etc, generally. — 
 
 Speaking, in the first place, of that class of quasi municipal 
 corporations, such as counties, towns, parishes, road and school 
 districts and the like, which are mere political divisions of the 
 territory of the state, like assembly and senatorial districts, 
 organized for the convenient exercise of portions of the politi- 
 cal power of the state, they are regarded as mere agencies of 
 government; they have certain limited powers and duties, 
 which may be enforced, and privileges which may be main- 
 
 duties which are imposed upon a 
 municipal corporation : One is of 
 that liind which arises from the 
 grant of a special power, in the ex- 
 ercise of which the municipality is 
 as a legal individual ; the other is of 
 that kind which arises or is implied 
 from the use of political rights under 
 the general law, in the exercise of 
 which it is as a sovereign. . . . 
 In the exercise of the former power, 
 and under the duty to the public 
 which the acceptance and use of the 
 power involves, a municipality is 
 like a private corporation, and is 
 liable for a failure to use its power 
 well or for an injury caused by 
 using it badly. But where the 
 power is conferred not for the im- 
 mediate benefit of the municipality, 
 but as a means to the exercise of the 
 sovereign power for the benefit of 
 all citizens, the corporation is not 
 liable for non-user, nor for mis-user, 
 by the public agents. 
 When the powers created and duly 
 enjoined are given and laid upon 
 officers to be named by the corpora- 
 tion, but for the public benefit and 
 as a convenient method of exercising 
 a function of general government, 
 and the corporation has no immedi- 
 
 ate control nor immediate power of 
 removal of those officers, nor of 
 their subordinates and servants, 
 then it is not liable for their negli- 
 gent omission or action." This 
 distinction determined the decision 
 of the following, among a multitude 
 of other cases : Ham v. New York, 
 70 N. Y. 459 ; N. Y. & Brooklyn 
 Sawmill, etc. Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 Id. 
 580 ; Swift v. New York, 83 Id. 528 ;. 
 Ehrgott V. New York, 96 Id. 264; 
 Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 Id. 137; 4 
 N. E. 321 ; Hunt v. New York, 109 
 N. Y. 134 ; 16 N. E. 320 ; Chapman 
 V. Rochester, 110 N. Y. 273; 18 N. 
 E. 88: Danaher v. Brooklyn, 119 N. 
 Y. 241 ; 33 N. E. 745 [quality of 
 water-supply of public well] ; Mead 
 V. New Haven, 40 Conn. 72 ; Boyd v. 
 Insurance Patrol, 113 Pa. St. 269 ; 6 
 Atl. 536 ; Richmond v. Long, 17 
 Gratt. 378; HoUenbeck v. Winne- 
 bago county, 95 111. 148 ; Brinkmeyer 
 V. Evansville 29 Ind. 187 (per Elliott 
 J.); Evansville v. Decker, 84 Id. 325; 
 Gould V. Topeka, 32 Kans. 485; Kin- 
 caid V. Hardin county, 53 Iowa, 430; 
 Ogg V. Lansing, 35 Id. 495. 
 
 ^ For illustrations of the two kinds, 
 of duties, see §§261-275, 281-389, 
 post. 
 
473 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§256 
 
 tained ; but they are invested with corporate powers sub tnodo, 
 and for a few specified purposes only.' This class of involun- 
 tary organizations have no duties, and are under no liabilities, 
 except such as are imposed by statute expressly. Hence it 
 is very generally, though not uniformly, held that where a 
 statute imposes a duty upon public corporations of this sort, 
 but is silent on the subject of their liability to a private action 
 for injuries sustained because of a breach of that duty, no 
 liability therefor will be implied,^ while in the case of a muni- 
 
 ' Commonwealth v. Green, 4 
 Whart. [Penn.J 531 ; Jackson v. 
 Hartwell, 8 Johns. 330 ; Hornbeok 
 V. Westbrook, 9 Id. 73, and cases 
 infra. 
 
 'Russell V. Men of Devon (2 Term 
 E. 667) is the leading case which has 
 been frequently referred to and fol- 
 lowed by the American courts. 
 There, the duty of the county to re- 
 pair a bridge was admitted ; but in- 
 asmuch as the county had no corpo- 
 rate fund, nor the means of obtaining 
 such a fund, out of which a judg- 
 ment could be satisfied, and because 
 each inhabitant would be hable to 
 satisfy any judgment, which might 
 be levied upon one or two inhabit- 
 ants, who would have no means of 
 reimbursing themselves, the action 
 was held not to lie. The reasons 
 given for the judgment in this case 
 are not altogether applicable to the 
 case of counties or of towns which 
 have a corporate fund, or the means 
 of obtaining one, out of which a 
 judgment might be satisfied, but the 
 reasoning of the case has been re- 
 peatedly approved. See "Weightman 
 V. Washington, 1 Black, 39 ; Riddle 
 v. Proprietors of Locks, etc., 7 Mass. 
 169 ; Mower v. Leicester, 9 Id. 247 ; 
 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375 ; 
 Jones V. New Haven, 34 Id. 1 ; Bax- 
 ter V. Winooski Turnp. Co., 22 Vt. 
 123 ; Ball v. Winchester, 32 N. H. 
 443, as explained and limited by Gil- 
 man V. Laconia, 55 Id. 130 ; Eastman 
 
 V. Meredith, 36 Id. 284 ; Hill v. Bos- 
 ton, 123 Mass. 344 ; King v. St. Lan- 
 dry, 12 La. Ann. 858. 
 
 As to coutities, the rule of non- 
 liability, at common law, has been 
 applied in the following states : 
 
 Alabama : Askew v. Hale county, 
 54 Ala. 639; Barbour county v. Horn, 
 48 Id. 566 ; Covington county v. 
 Kinney, 45 Id. 176; Sims v. Butler 
 county, 49 Id. 110 ; Barbour county 
 V. Brunson, 36 Id. 363 ; Van Epps v. 
 Commissioners, 35 Id. 460 ; Selma v. 
 Perkins, 68 Id. 145 ; Green county v. 
 Eubanks, 80 Id. 204 ; Dunn v. Wil- 
 cox county, 85 Id. 144; 4 So. 661 
 Under Ala. Code, § 1456, a county 
 which has neglected to take from a 
 road -contractor the guaranty it is 
 authorized to exact for the safe con- 
 dition of a road, is liable for injuries 
 from the unsafe condition of the 
 road contracted for (Lee county v. 
 Yarbrough, 85 Ala. 590 ; 5 So. 841 ; 
 see Williams v. Stillwell, 88 Ala. 333 j . 
 6 So. 914). 
 
 Arkansas: Granger v. Pulaski 
 county, 36 Ark. 37. 
 
 In California, "a county is not a 
 person in any sense ; it is not a cor- 
 poration," and there is no more 
 remedy, therefore, against it than 
 there is against tlie state (Hunsaker 
 V. Borden, 5 Cal. 288 ; Price v. Sac- 
 ramento, 6 Id. 254). s. P., Huffman 
 V. San Joaquin county, 21 Id. 436 ; 
 Burnett v. Contra Costa county, 67 
 Id. 78 [defective bridge] ; Crowell v. 
 
§256] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 474 
 
 cipal corporation proper, under a similar statute, such an impli- 
 cation will be made. The difficulty sometimes met with, in 
 
 Sonoma county, 25 Id. 313 [building 
 a bridge so that it obstructed water- 
 course] ; Sherbourne V.Yuba county, 
 21 Id. 113 [county physician's un- 
 skilled treatment of an indigent sick 
 person in county hospital]. 
 
 Colorado : El Paso county v. Bisli, 
 18 Colo. 474 ; 33 Pac. 184 [bridge]. 
 
 Connecticvi : Counties having no 
 organization, and no officer on whom 
 process can be served, and cannot 
 be sued at all (Ward v. Hartford 
 county, 12 Conn. 404). 
 
 Florida ; Forbes v. Escambia 
 county, 28 Fla. 26 ; 9 So. 863. 
 
 Georgia : Scales v. Chattahoochee 
 county, 41 Ga. 225 ; Haygood v. 
 Justices, etc., 20 Id. 845 [county not 
 liable to sheriff for escape of prisoner 
 on account of insufficiency of jail]. 
 s. P., Governor v. Justices, etc., 19 
 Id. 97. As to liability of counties, 
 'under Code, § 690, see Arnold v. 
 Henry county, 81 Ga. 730 ; 8 S. E. 
 606 ; Smith v. Floyd county, 85 Ga. 
 420 ; ] 1 S. E. 850 ; Monroe county 
 V. Flynt, 80 Ga. 489 ; 6 S. E. 173. 
 
 Illinois : Hollenbeck v. Winneba- 
 go county, 95 111. 148 [defective con- 
 struction of public building] ; White 
 V. Bond county, 58 Id. 297 [defective 
 bridge] ; Browning v. Springfield, 
 17 111. 143 ; Symonds v. Clay county, 
 71 Id. 355 [county employee negli- 
 gently setting fire to brush on county 
 poorhouse farm]. 
 
 Indiana : Cones v. Benton county, 
 137 Ind. 404 ; 37 N. E. 272 [highway]; 
 Vigo county v. Daily, 132 Ind. 73 ; 
 31 N. E. 531 [court-house] ; Morris 
 V. Switzerland county, 131 Ind. 285; 
 31 N. E. 77 [county jail] ; Abbett v. 
 Johnson county, 114 Ind. 61 ; 16 N. 
 E. 127. s. P., Smith v. Allen county, 
 131 Ind. 116 ; 30 N. E. 949 ; Spicer v. 
 Elkhart county, 126 Ind. 369 ; 26 N. 
 E. 58. See next section. 
 
 Iowa : Kincaid v. Hardin county, 
 53 Iowa, 430 ; 5 N. W. 589 [court- 
 house] ; Green v. Harrison county, 
 61 Iowa, 311 ; 16 N. E. 136 [ditch] ; 
 Lindley v. Polk county, 84 Iowa, 
 308 ; 50 N. W. 975 [county jail] ; 
 Packard v. Voltz, 94 Iowa, 277 : 62 
 N.W. 757 ; Dashner v. Mills county, 
 88 Iowa, 401 ; 55 N. W. 468 [ditch]. 
 See § 257, note 4. 
 
 Kansas : Marion county v. Riggs, 
 24 Kans. 255 [defective highway and 
 bridge] ; EikenbeiTy v. Bazaar, 82 
 Id. 556 [highway]. 
 
 Kentucky: Wheatly v. Mercer, 9 
 Bush, 704 [bridge] ; Hite v. Whitley 
 county, 91 Ky. 168; 15 S. W. 57 
 [jail] ; Shepard v. Pulaski county, 
 18 S. W. 15 [court-house] ; Hender- 
 son V. Covington, 14 Bush, 312. 
 
 Maine: Mitchell v. Rockland, 52 
 Me. 118. 
 
 Michigan: Larkin v. Saginaw 
 county, 11 Mich. 88 [bridge] ; Web- 
 ster V. Hillsdale county, 99 Id. 259 ; 
 58 N.W. 317 [county jail]. 
 
 Minnesota : Uosdall v. Olmsted 
 county, 30 Minn. 96 ; 14 N. W. 458 
 [county court-house and appurten- 
 'ant sidewalk]. 
 
 Mississippi: Sutton v. Police 
 Board, 41 Miss. 236 [defective con- 
 struction of bridge] ; Brabham v. 
 Hinds county, 54 Id. 363 [non-repair 
 of bridge]. 
 
 Missouri: Miller v. Iron county, 
 29 Mo. 122 ; State v. St. Louis county, 
 34 Id. 546 ; State v. Leffingwell, 54 
 Id. 458 ; Clark v. Adair county, 79 
 Id. 536; Reardon v. St. Louis county, 
 36 Id. 555 ; Reed v. Howell county, 
 125 Id. 58 ; 28 S. W. 177 ; Jefferson 
 county V. St. Louis county, 113 Mo. 
 619 ; 21 S. W. 217. 
 
 Nebraska : Wehn v. Gage county, 
 5 Neb. 494 [county jail] ; Woods v.' 
 Colfax county, 10 Id. 552 ; 7 N. W. 
 
475 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 K256 
 
 maintaining this difference, has led some courts of established 
 authority to reject it altogether, as being without foundation 
 
 269 [bridge] ; A statute (L. 1889, ch. 
 7, g 4) now declares the liability of 
 counties for injuries to a traveler 
 caused by insufBcient or unsafe 
 highways and bridges. See Hollings- 
 worth V. Saunders county, 36 Neb. 
 141. 
 
 New Jersey : Sussex v. Strader, 18 
 N. J. Law, 108 ; Cooley v. Freehold- 
 ers, etc., 27 Id. 415. In 1860, the 
 statute made the freeholders of each 
 county a corporation, and gave an 
 action against them for injuries 
 from defective condition of bridges 
 (Eipley v. Freeholders, etc., 40 N. 
 J. Law, 45 ; Pray v. Jersey City, 32 
 Id. 394 ; Livermore v. Freeholders, 
 etc., 39 Id. 245). See State v. Hud- 
 son county, 80 N. J. Law, 137 [in- 
 dictment]. 
 
 New York : Under a statute de- 
 claring that a certain bridge " shall 
 become a public bridge and may be 
 maintained by the county," an ac- 
 tion will not lie against the county 
 foi; damages from want of repair. 
 "We have not been referred to a case, 
 and we are not aware of one, in 
 which an action for injury for neg- 
 lect to properly maintain a bridge 
 has been maintained against a county 
 or town, unless the right of action 
 was expressly given by statute " (En- 
 sign V. Livingston county, 25 Hun, 
 20). S. P., Hughes v. Monroe county, 
 147 N. Y. 49 ; 41 N. E / 407 [defective 
 machine in insane asylum] ; Ala- 
 mango v. Albany county, 25 Hun, 
 551 [same, in penitentiary]. See 
 Lorillard v. Monroe county, 11 N. 
 Y. 392 [mistake in tax assessment]. 
 The statute (L. 1892, ch. 686, §§ 2, 3) 
 declaring counties to be municipal 
 corporations, does not change the 
 rule that a county is not liable for 
 negligence in failing to maintain 
 bridges in a reasonably safe condition 
 
 for public travel (Albrecht v. Queens 
 county, 84 Hun, 399 ; 33 N. Y. Supp. 
 473; Ahern v. Kings county, 89 Hun, 
 148 ; 34 N. Y. Supp. 1023) ; nor for the 
 negligence of a drawbridge tender 
 (Godfrey v. Kings county, 89 Hun, 
 18 ; 34 N. Y. Supp. 1052). 
 
 North Carolina : White v. Cho- 
 wan county, 90 N. C. 437 [defective 
 bridge] ; Jackson v. Greene county, 
 76 Id. 282 [fallen bridge] ; s. p., An- 
 derson V. Steamboat Co., 64 Id. 399 ; 
 Willey V. Gatling, 70 Id. 410. 
 
 Ohio : Hamilton county v. 
 Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 [court-house]. 
 See Dunn v. Brown county, 46 Id. 
 98 ; 18 N. E. 496). 
 
 Oregon : Templeton v. Linn coun- 
 ty, 32 Greg. 313; 29 Pac. 795; Walker 
 V. Wasco county, 19 Pac. 81 ; East- 
 man V. Clackamas county, 33 Fed. 
 24. Compare McCalla v. Multno- 
 mah county, 3 Greg. 424 [action 
 under statute] ; Rankin v. Buckmau, 
 9 Id. 253. 
 
 South Carolina: Young v. Road 
 Commis., 2 Nott & McC. 537 ; White 
 V. Charleston, 2 Hill, 571. 
 
 South Dakota : Bailey v. Law- 
 rence county, 5 S. D. 393 ; 59 N. W. 
 219 [bridge]. 
 
 Washington : Clark v. Lincoln 
 county, 1 Wash. St., 518 ; 30 Pac. 
 576 [highway]. 
 
 Towns and townships are likewise 
 exempt at common law (Morey v. 
 Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Fishkill v. 
 Fishkill Plank Road Co., 23 Id. 634 ; 
 Galen v. Clyde Plank Road Co., 27 
 Id. 543 : Gailor v. Herrick, 42 Id. 79 ; 
 North Lebanon v. Arnold, 47 Pa. St. 
 488 ; Miller v. Mc Williams, 50 Ala. 
 427 ; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 III. 346 
 [overruling South Ottawa v. Foster, 
 20 Id. 296] ; Bussell v. Steuben, 57 
 Id. 35 ; Fieri v. St. Louis. 69 Mo. 3'41 ; 
 Yeager v. Tippecanoe. 81 Ind. 46 ; 
 
§ 256] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 47^ 
 
 in sound reason. The difficulty of finding any legal basis for 
 exempting a county from liability for a breach of its duty to 
 maintain its highways in a reasonable state of repair, where it 
 has the same power that a city-corporation has of raising 
 funds to perform its duty in that regard, is not to be denied. 
 It would seem that where a county or other such pubHc cor- 
 poration is provided with a corporate fund, or the means of 
 raising it, one reason at least for the rule of exemption ceases. 
 It has been suggested that the reason may be found in the 
 difference of character between urban and suburban servitudes, 
 and the consequent limited ownership and control of their 
 roads by counties, as compared with a city's mere absolute 
 rights of ownership and control of its streets. Other plausible 
 reasons might be urged, but the fact remains that counties, 
 townships, and the like, are governmental agencies not less 
 than cities, and for that reason, where a statutory duty 
 imposed on one class — e. g. to maintain highways and bridges, 
 is essentially identical with that imposed on the other, within 
 their respective territories, and each is provided with the 
 means of performing it, it is plainly more consistent, on prin- 
 ciple, to hold both classes to the same extent of liability for 
 a breach of the duty, either by denying that either class is 
 liable, as is done in some states, or else holding both liable, as 
 in others. But with the exceptions mentioned in the next 
 
 Altnow V. Sibley, 30 Minn. 186; 14 grounds]). SeeBigelowv. Bandolph, 
 
 N. W. 877 ; Vail v. Amenia, 4 N. 14 Gray, 541. Union school districts 
 
 Dak. 339 ; 59 N. W. 1093 ; Niles v. in New York are, by statute, full 
 
 Martin, 4 Mich. 557 ; Leoni v. Tay- corporations, and responsible out of 
 
 lor, 20 Id. 148 ; Bristol v. Johnson, their corporate funds, for the negli- 
 
 34 Id. 123). As to Michigan, under gence of their trustees (L. 1864, ch. 
 
 present statutes, see Frary v, Allen, 555 ; Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303 ; 
 
 91 Mich. 666 ; 53 N. W. 78. rev'g 13 Hun, 309 [defects in floor of 
 
 So are school districts ('H.a.rns y. school-house injuring pupil]). See 
 
 School District, 8 Foster [N. H.], 58 ; § 329, post. 
 
 Giles V. School District, 11 Id. 304 ; So are Road Districts (White v. 
 
 Scales V. Chattahoochee county, 4 Road District, 9 Iowa, 203 ; McCon- 
 
 Ga. 335 ; Rogers v. People, 68 111. nell v. Dewey, 5 Neb. 385 ; Court v. 
 
 154 ; Lane v. Woodbury, 58 Iowa, Coroner, 3 Wall. 501 ; Trustees, etc., 
 
 463 [school-house]; 12 N. W. 478 ; v. Tatman, 13 111. 27). 
 
 Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kans. 23 ; Conk- Drainage Districts : Elmore v. 
 
 lin V. School District, 23 Id. 521 ; Drainage Com'rs, 135 111. 369 ; 25 N. 
 
 Bank v. Brainerd School District, 49 E. 1010. 
 • Minn. 106 ; 51 N. W. 814 [school 
 
477 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§257 
 
 two sections, all the states, while holding their cities and in- 
 corporated villages and towns liable for breaches of such a 
 duty, declare their counties, townships, etc., to be exempt, 
 although the language of the statute imposing the duty is, in 
 words, as mandatory on the one as on the other.^ 
 
 § 257. Liability of counties, towns, etc., in Pennsylvania, 
 Maryland, Indiana and Iowa. — In Pennsylvania' and Mary- 
 
 ^ Referring to this distinction, 
 Judge Dillon (Municip. Corp. g 
 1023a) says : "It may be after all 
 that there is a substantial difference 
 not readily perceived in the greater 
 efficiency with which the latter class 
 of corporations, as actually consti- 
 tuted, is able to perform the duty in 
 question. And it may be that this 
 is only another of the many ex- 
 amples with which our jurispru- 
 dence abounds — which abhors gen- 
 eralizations, disregards mere sym- 
 metry, and unconsciously and 
 silently embodies the underlying 
 notions of the local communities — 
 this may be, we suggest, after all 
 only another example of the fact 
 that logic and law are not always 
 precisely coincident or coterminous ; 
 that law is frequently logic limited 
 and circumscribed by a sense of ex- 
 pediency ; and that accordingly leg- 
 islators and courts declare and apply 
 distinctions that are oftentimes 
 easier to feel than to unfold and 
 define, and which do not obviously 
 consist with an indefinite extension 
 and inexorable application of those 
 principles of logic that are appar- 
 ently applicable to and seemingly 
 control the subject. The foregoing 
 considerations are applicable to all 
 kinds of quasi corporations. These 
 are primarily and distinctively state 
 instrumentalities, and the preroga- 
 tive of partaking of the state's ex- 
 emption from liability in respect to 
 the exercise of all their public func- 
 tions and duties without exception, 
 
 is one which naturally grows out of 
 the manner and objects of the crea- 
 tion." The reason, or want of reason, 
 for the distinction is discussed in 
 EUiott, Roads and Streets, 39-43, 333, 
 and 1 Thompson, Negligence, 618. 
 The subject need not be further 
 pursued here. As to highways, see 
 § 289, post. 
 
 ' Under the Pennsylvania Consti- 
 tution of 1873, counties are recog- 
 nized as municipal corporations 
 (Lamoreux v. Luzerne county, 116 
 Pa. St. 195; 9 Atl. 274). The 
 Pennsylvania statute provides that 
 " it shall be the duty of the county 
 commissioners " to repair all bridges, 
 etc., and pay the expenses out of the 
 county treasury (Act 1843, § 1, P. L. 
 221). " AH roads shall be kept in re- 
 pair at the expense of the respective 
 townships " (Act of 1836, § 6, P. L. 
 556). It is held that, under these 
 statutes, the liabilities of the counties 
 for the non-repair of bridges, and of 
 townships for the non-repair of roads, 
 is "legally consequent upon a 
 neglected duty to repair " (Dean v. 
 New Milford [1843] o Watts & S. 
 545 [township] ; Humphreys v. Arm- 
 strong county, 56 Pa. St. 204 [coun- 
 ty] ; Rapho v. Moore, 68 Id. 404 
 [township] ; Newlin v. Davis, 77 Id. 
 319 [township] ; Mahanoy v Scholly, 
 84 Id. 136 [township] ; Rigony v. 
 Schuylkill county, 103 Id. 382 [coun- 
 ty not liable for bridge built by it, 
 and subsequently turned over to 
 township by act of legislature] ; 
 Shadier v. Blair county, 136 Id. 488 : 
 
§257] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 478 
 
 land^ it has long been firmly held that the imposition of an 
 imperative duty by general statute, upon counties and towns, 
 or similar quasi municipal corporations, such as to maintain 
 highways, bridges, public buildings and the like, or to abate 
 nuisances, especially when coupled with a power through 
 administrative boards, to raise money for the purpose of per- 
 forming the duty, by taxation or otherwise, implies an inten- 
 tion on the part of the legislature to make them liable to a 
 private action for the consequences of a breach of such duties. 
 In Indiana' and Iowa,* early decisions, under their respective 
 
 20 Atl. 539. To the same effect, 
 Pennsylvania, etc. Canal Co. v. 
 Graham, 6B Pa. St. 290 ; Meadville v. 
 Erie Canal Co., 18 Id. 66. 
 
 'In Maryland, the statute makes 
 the county commissioners a corpora- 
 tion, and they have " power and 
 authority " to build and maintain in 
 repair all roads and bridges, with am- 
 ple powers to raise funds for that 
 purpose ; though no liability is ex- 
 pressly imposed or action given for 
 a breach of duty. It is held that 
 under this statute, a county is liable 
 for injuries sustained from the non- 
 repair of a road or bridge ; that the 
 exercise of a statutory power, 
 granted for the public good, is not 
 merely discretionary, but imperative, 
 and the words, "power and authori- 
 ty " in such case may be construed 
 "duty and obligation" (Baltimore 
 V. Marriott, 9 Md. 178 ; Anne Arun- 
 del county V. Duckett, 20 Id. 468 ; 
 Calvert county v. Gibson, 36 Id. 
 229 ; Prince George's county v. Bur- 
 gess, 61 Id. 29 ; Baltimore v. Pen- 
 nington, 15 Id. 173 ; Baltimore v. 
 Baker, 44 Id. 1 [county liable for de- 
 
 Co. V. Cassell, 66 Md. 419 ; 7 Atl. 
 805; Hartford county v. Wise, 71 
 Md. 43 : 18 Atl. 31. 
 
 ^ In Indiana, the county commis- 
 sioners "shall cause" all bridges in 
 the county to be kept in repair. 
 Held that this raises an imperative 
 duty, and an implied liability on the 
 part of the county for injuries oc- 
 casioned by the non-i-epair of a 
 bridge (Vaught v. Johnson county, 
 101 Ind. 123 ; Fulton county v. 
 Eickel, 106 Id. ■501 ; Knox county v. 
 Montgomery, 109 Id. 69 ; Patton v. 
 Montgomery county, 96 Id. 131 ; 
 Gibson v. Emmerson, 95 Id. 579 ; 
 Howard county v. Legg, 93 Id. 523 ; 
 Madison county v. Brown, 89 Id. 48 • 
 Morgan county v. Pritchett, 85 Id. 
 68 ; Pritchett v. Morgan county 62 
 Id. 210 ; Shelby county v. Duprez, 
 87 Id. 509 ; House v. Montgomery 
 county, 60 Id. 580 [negligent con- 
 struction of bridge] ; Sullivan v. Ar- 
 nett, 116 Id. 438 ; 19 IS". E. 299 ; Har- 
 ris V. Vigo county, 121 Ind. 299 ; 23 
 N. E. 92). 
 
 ■■ In loiva, the county officers have 
 power " to provide for the erection 
 
 feet of county bridges occasioned by of all bridges which may be neces. 
 
 omission to appoint officers to make 
 repairs]; Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 
 Id. 322 ; Baltimore, etc. Turnpike 
 Co. V. Crowther, 63 Id. 566 ; Hart- 
 ford county V. Hamilton, 60 Id. 340 ; 
 Prince George's county v. Burgess, 
 61 Id. 29 ; Baltimore, etc. Turnpike 
 
 sary and which the public con- 
 venience may require vs'ithin their 
 respective counties and to keep the 
 same in repair " (Code, § 303, subd. 
 18) ; and the same officers are also 
 empowered " to build and keep in 
 repair " necessary buildings for th© 
 
479 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§258 
 
 statutes, which held counties impliedly liable for non-repair of 
 bridges, continue to be followed, though confessedly without 
 any legal reason, and contrary to all the authorities in other 
 states having similar statutes ; but in both these states' the 
 courts have refused to extend the rule of liability any further 
 than the matter of bridges, though the cases so decided are 
 fully within the principle of the bridge cases.' 
 
 § 258. Liability of New England towns. — The term 
 " town " in New England is generic, and will embrace cities, 
 unless the contrary appears to have been the intent of the 
 legislature.^ The individual inhabitants of towns and cities 
 
 use of the county and the courts. 
 Under the first named statute coun- 
 ties are held impliedly liable for in- 
 juries resulting from defective 
 bridges (Wilson v. JeflEerson county, 
 13 Iowa, 181 ; Brown v. JeflEerson 
 county, 16 Id. 339; McCulIom v. 
 Blackhawk county, 21 Id. 409 ; Bar- 
 rett V. Brooks, Id. 144 ; Soper v. 
 Henry county, 36 Id. 364 ; Kendall 
 V. Council BlufEs, 33 Id. 324 ; Chand- 
 ler V. Fremont county, 42 Id. 58 ; 
 Huston V. Iowa county, 43 Id. 456 ; 
 Moreland v. Mitchell county, 40 Id. 
 394 ; Krause v. Davis county, 44 Id. 
 141 ; Huff V. Poweshiek county, 60 
 Id. 539 15 N. W. 418 ; Casey v. 
 Tama county, 75 Iowa, 655 ; 37 N. 
 W. 138 ; Morgan v. Fremont county, 
 93 Iowa, 644; 61 N. W. 331). It 
 must be shown that the county had 
 assumed control of the bridge or 
 made appropriations for building or 
 keeping it in repair (Titter v. Iowa 
 county, 48 Iowa, 90 ; S. P., Taylor v. 
 Davis county, 40 Id. 395. It is, 
 nevertheless, held that from the lan- 
 guage of the statute as to conrt- 
 houses, no such liability as to them 
 will be implied (Kincaid v.. Hardin 
 county, 53 Iowa, 430 ; see next note). 
 5 Cones V. Benton county, 137 Ind. 
 404 ; 87 N. E. 273 ; where the county 
 was held not liable for non-repair of 
 
 a highway ; the court saying 
 " While we regard the liability of 
 counties for negligence in failing to 
 keep bridges in repair as well settled, 
 we recognize the fact that the weight 
 of authority is all the other way, 
 and are not disposed to extend the 
 rule so as to embrace other cases." 
 So a county has been held not liable 
 for non-repair of its court-house 
 (Vigo county v. Daily, 133 Ind. 73 ; 
 31 N. E. 531) ; or of its jail (Morris v. 
 Switzerland county, 131 Ind. 285 ; 
 31 N. E. 77). It is also held that a 
 county is not liable for injuries to 
 a traveler on a highway by the negli- 
 gent conduct of its officers in piling 
 lumber therein while repairing a 
 bridge (Abbett v. Johnson county, 
 114 Ind. 61 ; 16 N. E. 137). The 
 same restricted interpretation of the 
 statute has been made in Iowa. 
 Thus in Kincaid v. Hardin county 
 (53 Iowa, 430), where it was sought 
 to hold a county liable for structural 
 defects in a county court-house caus- 
 ing injury to plaintiff, it was held 
 the county was not liable. "We 
 have no disposition to carry the doc- 
 trine [of the bridge cases] further 
 than is necessary to sustain the de- 
 cisions of the court " (per Eoth- 
 rock, J.). 
 ' State V. Gennon, 2 E. I. 378 ; Hill 
 
§258] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 480 
 
 and other municipal communities are liable, in their persons 
 and property, for the debts of the towns or corporations (in- 
 cluding judgments against towns for negligence), by execu- 
 tion or taxation.^ These town organizations have many, if 
 not all, the usual powers of municipal corporations, besides 
 the characteristics of the county organizations of other states. 
 They are charged, among other things, with the duty of build- 
 ing and maintaining highways, bridges, town buildings and the 
 like — a duty which, in other states, is generally imposed upon 
 independent public officers, or is voluntarily assumed by incor- 
 porated villages and cities. Nevertheless they are universally 
 declared to be quasi corporations merely, and, with perhaps a 
 single qualification, to be wholly exempt from civil liability 
 for neglect of duty, in the absence of a statute imposing such 
 liability.^ This doctrine has been applied by the courts of 
 
 V. Boston, 123 Mass. 344; Mead v. 
 Derby, 40 Conn. 205. In Connecti- 
 cut, however, this notion of identi- 
 fying incorporated cities and bor- 
 oughs with rural towns, in respect 
 to their corpora,te liabilities, seems 
 to be now repudiated (Hall v. Nor- 
 walk, 65 Conn. 310 ; 32 Atl. 400). 
 There held that a borough, whose 
 charter provided that it shall have 
 exclusive authority to repair high- 
 ways, " any general statute to the 
 conti'ary notwithstanding," was im- 
 pliedly liable for defective highways 
 within its limits. See cases cited in 
 notel, §259. 
 
 •5 In Beardsley v. Smith (16 Conn. 
 368) it was declared to be the imme- 
 morial usage, and uniformly sup- 
 ported by judicial decisions through- 
 out New England, that the inhabit- 
 ants of towns and other municipal 
 communities or corporations and 
 quasi corporations, were liable in 
 their persons and property for the 
 debts of the towns or corporations 
 by taxation or execution. And see 
 Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416 ; 
 compare Horner v. Coffey, 25 Miss. 
 434; Miller v. McWiUiams, 50 Ala. 437. 
 
 "Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; 
 Oliver v. Worcester, 103 Id. 489; 
 Sullivan v. Boston, 126 Id. 540 ; Com- 
 monwealth V. Springfield, 7 Id. 9 ; 
 Mower V. Leicester, 9 Id. 247 ; Hixon 
 V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59 ; Bigelow v. 
 Randolph, 14 Id. 541 ; Brady v. Low- 
 ell, 3 Cush. 131 ; Bacon v. Boston, 8 
 Id. 174 ; Brailey v. Southborough, 6 
 Id. 141 ; Smith v. Dedham, 8 Id. 522; 
 Gregoiy v. Adams, 14 Id. 243 ; Blod- 
 gett V. Boston, 8 Allen, 237 ; Stick- 
 ney v. Salem, 3 Id. 374 ; Pettingell 
 V. Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368 ; 37 N. E. 
 380 [breaking of pole connected with 
 fire-signal service, injuring em- 
 ployee]; Chedsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 
 475; Eeed v. Belfast, 20 Me. 248; 
 Frazer v. Lewiston, 76 Id. 531 ; San- 
 ford V. Augusta, 32 Id. 536 ; Peck v. 
 Ellsworth, 36 Id. 393 ; McCarthy v. 
 Portland, 67 Id. 167 ; Eastman v. 
 Meredith, 36 N. H. 284 [defective 
 construction of town house] ; Wake- 
 field V. Newport, 63 Id. 624 [negli- 
 gence in taking down a flag-staff so 
 that it fell on a traveler on the high- 
 way] ; Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 443 ; 
 Baxter v. Winooski Turnp. Co. 22 Id. 
 114 ; Davis v. Lamolle Turnp. Co. 
 
48 1 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§258 
 
 Massachusetts and Rhode Island to the performance of any 
 and all duties imposed by general statute upon all the towns 
 of the state, and not upon any particular town or city, by the 
 terms of its charter for its individual benefit, pecuniary or 
 otherwise.* Duties thus generally imposed are held, in those 
 states, to be owing to the public alone, and not to any indi- 
 vidual, and hence an injury sustained by a breach thereof will 
 not sustain a private action. From a duty thus generally im- 
 posed, e. g., to build and maintain school-houses, a liability for 
 a negligent performance of it will not be implied, in favor of 
 one specially damaged thereby.^ It does not matter that such 
 service is not one imperatively imposed upon the corporation ; 
 it is sufficient if the statute permits it, and the city voluntarily 
 undertook the work.^ This rule has been accepted and applied 
 
 27 Id. 602 ; State v. Burlington, 36 
 Id. 521 ; Drew v. Sutton, 55 Id. 586 
 Wixon V. Newport, 13 R. I. 453 
 Taylor y. Peckham, 8 Id. 349 
 Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. IT. S. 
 167. 
 
 ■* Hill V. Boston, supra. 
 
 ' Hill V. Boston, supra. No doubt 
 this case was rightly decided ; but 
 we cannot think the ground on 
 which the decision was put can be 
 sustained, except, perhaps, under 
 the somewhat peculiar jurisprudence 
 governing the liabilities of towns in 
 the New England states. We can 
 see no reason why a duty imposed 
 by a general law upon the 1,000 
 towns of a state should have any 
 leas force to raise an implied liability 
 for a breach of it than 1,000 special 
 statutes imposing the same duty on 
 1,000 different towns. The doctrine 
 ■was approved in Wixon v. Newport, 
 13 R. I. 454, where it was sought to 
 make a city corporation liable for 
 defects in the steam heating appa- 
 ratus of a public school building, re- 
 sulting in a pupil being scalded. 
 The non-hability of the city, how- 
 ever, was more distinctly put upon 
 the ground that the maintenance of 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1—31.] 
 
 school buildings was a public, as 
 distinguished from a private cor- 
 porate, duty. 
 
 ^ Under a general statute, provid- 
 ing that cities might appropriate 
 money for the celebration of holi- 
 days, a city undertook the celebra- 
 tion of a holiday exclusively for the 
 gratuitous amusement, entertain- 
 ment and instruction of the public. 
 Held, the city was not liable to one 
 injured through the negligence of 
 the city's servants in disohai'ging 
 fireworks for the purpose of the 
 celebration. The doctrine was there 
 stated to be that " cities or towns are 
 not liable for negligence when, act- 
 ing under general laws applicable to 
 all cities and towns alike, they have 
 undertaken a particular service or 
 work which has no direct or natural 
 tendency to injure any individual in 
 reason or property, aud no element 
 of special corporate advantage or of 
 a consideration for undertaking it, 
 or of pecuniary profit or contribution 
 from individuals especially bene- 
 fited, either by way of aid in the 
 performance of the work, or of com- 
 pensation for its use, or benefit after 
 its completion ; and where no peou- 
 
§258] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 482 
 
 in California,' Michigan,^ New Jersey,' South Carolina" and 
 
 niary penalty or liability is imposed 
 by statute in case of defective or 
 negligent performance of the under- 
 taking ; but where their action is 
 exclusively and purely as a matter of 
 public service for the general and 
 common good " (Tindley v. Salem, 
 137 Mass. 171). "The agents se- 
 lected by them to execute the duty 
 [of keeping public vpays in repair], 
 in obedience to the law of the state, 
 are to be regarded as public officers 
 rather than the servants or agents 
 of the municipal corporation by 
 which they are employed. The re- 
 lation of master and servant does 
 not exist and the maxim of respond- 
 eat superior does not apply" (Bar- 
 ney V. Lowell, 98 Mass. 570). 
 
 ' " In Calif ornia, the doctrine [that 
 municipal corporations are not liable 
 for personal injuries to individuals] 
 has been clearly and continuously 
 adopted " (Chope v. Eureka, 78 Cal. 
 588; 31 Pac. 364 [excavation for 
 sewer left without guard or light at 
 night] ; Arnold v. San Jose, 81 Cal. 
 618 ; 23 Pac. 877 [same]). The muni- 
 cipal officers are alone liable (Butler 
 V. Ash worth, 103 Cal. 663; 36 Pac. 
 923 [unskillful repair of sewer caus- 
 ing sewage to set back]). A general 
 statute of California for the organiza- 
 tion of cities provides that " the city 
 council shall have power to cause 
 the streets to_ be cleansed and re- 
 paired." Held, that this power was 
 not given to the corporation, as such, 
 and that there was no consequent 
 liability on the part of the corpora- 
 tion for the non-performance of the 
 correlative duty (Winbigler v. Los 
 Angeles [1872], 45 Cal. 36). There is 
 also a, dictum that incorporated cities 
 are, like counties, mere govern- 
 mental instruments, formed for the 
 purpose of internal administration, 
 and are not liable for the negligence 
 
 of their officers, unless made so by 
 statute. See James v. San Fran- 
 cisco, 6 Cal. 538 ; O'Hale v. Sacra- 
 mento, 48 Id. 212. 
 
 8 Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84 
 [decided in 1870]. Cooley, J., de- 
 livered a convincing dissenting 
 opinion, frequently referred to by 
 writers on this subject. The case is 
 ably reviewed and dissented from in 
 Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 847. In 
 1879, the legislature declared the 
 liability of municipal corporations 
 for negligence in the maintenance of 
 their streets, the purpose of the stat- 
 ute being to limit the responsibility 
 to want of reasonable care (McAr- 
 thur V. Saginaw, 58 Mich. 857). See 
 Burnham v. Byron, 46 Id. 555 ; Grand 
 Rapids V. Wyman, Id. 516 ; Lansing^ 
 V. Toolan, 37 Id. 153 ; Niles v. Mar- 
 tin, 4 Id. 557 [decided before 1879]. 
 
 9 Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. Law^ 
 394. This case was decided appar- 
 ently out of deference to the eminent 
 judges who decided [1840] Sussex v. 
 Strader (3 Harr. 108), the court 
 remarking, that "the legal mind 
 of the country upon this topic, is in 
 a state of dubiety ; if the matter 
 were one primce impressionis in this 
 court, a broad field for investigation 
 would be thrown open." See also 
 Callahan v. Morris, 30 N. J. Law, 
 161 ; Union v. Durkes, 88 Id. 81 p 
 Condict V. Jersey City, 46 Id. 157. 
 In the last case, it was held that the- 
 removal of ashes and garbage from 
 the streets was a public duty ; 
 and the corporation was not liable 
 for the negligence of its servant, tb& 
 driver of an ash cart owned by it, 
 while dumping ashes. See also Mar- 
 vin Safe Co. V. Ward, 46 N. J. Law, 
 19 ; Jersey City v. Kiernan, 50 Id. 
 246 ; note 5, § 287, post. 
 
 '"Young V. Charleston, 20 S. C 
 116. 
 
483 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§259 
 
 Wisconsin." It was at one time accepted," but soon rejected/* 
 in Texas. But in none of these states does the rule extend 
 to cases of a positive wrong committed by the corporation to 
 the personal damage of another, though done in the discharge 
 of a public duty, such as a trespass or the creation or main- 
 tenance of a nuisance." 
 
 § 259. Common-law liability of New England towns. — 
 
 The qualification of the general rule mentioned in the preced- 
 ing section is, with respect to liability for the neglect of obli- 
 gations which a town incurs when a special duty is imposed 
 upon it, with its consent, express or implied, or a special 
 authority is conferred on it, at its request. In such cases the 
 
 " Ward Y. Jefferson, 24 Wise. 343 ; 
 Cook V. Milwaukee, Id. 370 ; Houfe 
 V. Fulton, 29 Id. 296 ; Wheeler v. 
 Westport, 30 Id. 393 ; Burns v. Elba, 
 
 33 Id. 605 ; Perkins v. Fond du Lac, 
 
 34 Id. 435 ; Kittredge v. Milwaukee, 
 26 Id. 46 ; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 
 Id. 365. 
 
 '2 Navastota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 535. 
 
 '2 In Galveston v. Posnainsky (63 
 Id. 118), the question was examined 
 with care, in the case of a city whose 
 charter merely gave it the control of 
 its streets. It was held that a lia- 
 bility for the defective condition of 
 a street was necessarily implied from 
 such a grant of povfer ; Stay ton, J., 
 saying: "The weight of authority 
 holding that such a corporation, 
 created by special charter, is liable 
 for an injury resulting from its neg- 
 lect to keep its streets in repair, is so 
 overwhelming that we feel con- 
 strained to hold the larv so to be, and 
 that an action lies for such an injury 
 without its being expressly given by 
 statute." Followed: Galveston v. 
 Barbour. 63 Id. 173 ; Klein v. Dallas, 
 71 Id. 384 ; Baugus v. Atlanta, 74 Id. 
 629 ; 13 S. W. 750 ; Sherman v. Wil- 
 liams. 77 Tex. 310 ; 14 S. W. 130. 
 
 " "If by an excess of the powers 
 granted or negligence in the mode 
 
 of carrying out the system legally 
 adopted, or omitting to take due 
 precautions to guard against the con- 
 sequences of its operation, a nuisance 
 is created, the city may be liable to 
 indictment in behalf of the public, 
 or to suit by individuals suffering 
 special damages'' (Washburn, etc., 
 Mfg. Co. V. Worcester, 116 Mass. 
 458 ; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Id- 
 308 ; Merrifleld v. Worcester, 110 Id. 
 316). Maintaining a sewer in such a 
 manner that it carries the wash and 
 iJirt from the streets into a tide- 
 water dock, is to create a private 
 nuisance, and the dock owner may 
 recover for the consequent obstruc- 
 tion of the water near the wharf 
 preventing vessels from lying at it 
 (Brayton v. Fall Eiver, 113 Mass. 
 218). So in California, it is held, fol- 
 lowing the common-law rule, that a 
 city is liable, as for maintaining a 
 nuisance, where it knowingly per- 
 mits a sewer to become obstructed 
 or out of repair, so that sewage over- 
 flows upon adjacent land. It is no 
 defense that the flow was unusual, 
 provided the sewer would have car- 
 ried off all the water if it had been 
 kept in repair (Spangler v. San 
 Francisco, 84 Cal. 13 ; 23 Pac. 1091) ; 
 see § 387, post. 
 
§ 26oa] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 4^ 
 
 town is subject to the same liabilities, for the neglect of those 
 special duties to which a corporation proper, or a private 
 company, would be if the same duties were imposed or the 
 same authority conferred on it, including a liability for the 
 wrongful omission of its officers and agents to act, as well as 
 for their wrongful acts.^ In like manner, the common-law 
 immunity of towns does not extend to the case of a town 
 which assumes an obligation for its own advantage, as where 
 a town lets a pubHc building and receives rent for its use. In 
 such a case, the town is liable in the same manner and to the 
 same extent as a private owner for injuries caused by defects 
 in the building.^ So if a town, instead of leaving the duty of 
 keeping its highways in repair to be , performed by its officers 
 and in the methods provided by general laws, assumes to per- 
 form it by means of agents, whom it may direct and control, it 
 is, like any other employer, responsible for the acts of those 
 agents.^ 
 
 § 260 [consolidated with § 291]. 
 
 § 260a. Maintenance of jails and care of prisoners, — 
 
 As a state-agency, a municipal corporation is exempt from 
 liability for the negligence of its officers in maintaining and 
 administering its jails, workhouses, and the like, for the con- 
 
 ' Bigelow V. Eandolph, 14 Gray, alike to all cities ; but it is a special 
 541, per Metcalf, J. In Jones v. New power or privilege conferred upon 
 Haven (34 Conn. 1), defendant's the city at its request." So, in ex- 
 charter gave its common-council eroising a privilege specially granted 
 power to make by-laws for the regu- to a borough, e. ^r., the right to 
 lation and protection of trees in the remove encroachments upon its 
 public squares and streets. A dead highways, it acts for its own advant- 
 limb, which the city officers had age, and not for the benefit of the 
 negligently allowed to remain upon public at large, and hence is liable 
 a tree in a public square, fell upon for the trespass of its officer within 
 and injured the plaintiff. Held, city the scope of such power (Weed v. 
 was liable. Carpenter, J., said: Greenwich, 45 Conn. 170; Hall v. 
 " This duty [of caring for trees] is Norwalk, 65 Id. 310 ; 33 Atl. 400). 
 not, strictly speaking, a public one. '^ Worden v. New Bedford, 181 
 It is not a matter in which the pub- Mass. 23 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 103 
 lie at large, outside the immediate Id. 489 ; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick, 
 •vicinity of New Haven, have any 511. 
 
 particular interest. It is not a power ^ "Waldron v. Haverhill, 148 Mass. 
 
 or duty imposed upon the city by 583 ; 10 N. E. 481. 
 general law ; nor is it applicable 
 
485 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§261 
 
 finement of offenders.^ The fact that revenue is derived from 
 the labor of prisoners confined in a jail, or that inmates of a 
 workhouse or poor-farm are called upon to assist in the work 
 of conducting it,^ does not change the nature of the city's 
 obligation from a public to a private one, so as to make the 
 jail officers its servants, for whose negligence, in the line of 
 their duty, it is liable. 
 
 § 261. Statutory liability for mob violence. — The protec- 
 tion of persons and property from the violence of mobs and 
 riotous assemblages is essentially a governmental function, and 
 
 ' Hence a municipal corporation 
 is not liable for the death of a pris- 
 oner in the burning of its jail, 
 through the negligence of the officer 
 in charge (Brown v. Guyandotte, 34 
 W. Va. 399 ; 13 S. E. 707). s. P., 
 Symonds v. Clay county, 71 111. 355. 
 An action will not lie by a prisoner 
 for injuries resulting from his being 
 confined in a filthy and unhealthy 
 jail, without bedding, to the injury 
 of his health (New Kiowa v. Craven, 
 46 Kans. 114 ; 36 Pac. 426 ; Blake v. 
 Pontiac, 49 111. App. 543 ; La Clef 
 V. Concordia, 41 Kans. 333 ; 21 Pac. 
 272 ; Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C. 
 287; 9 S. E. 695; Davis v. Knox- 
 ville, 90 Tenn. 599 ; 18 8. W. 354) ; 
 or being detained in a lock-up all 
 night in winter without a fire (Gul- 
 likson V. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278; 
 64 N. W. 812). In Shields v. Dur- 
 ham (118 N. C. 450 ; 24 S. B. 794) 
 the authorities had known the bad 
 condition of the jail for some time 
 prior to plaintiff's arrest. Held, a 
 nonsuit was error. See Lewis v. 
 Raleigh, 77 N. C. 339. In Ulrieh v. 
 St. Louis (113 Mo. 138 ; 20 S. W. 466), 
 the plaintiff, committed to the work- 
 house, was kicked by a mule which 
 the superintendent of the workhouse 
 had ordered him to harness, know- 
 ing it to be vicious : city not lia- 
 ble. Compare NefiE v. Wellesley, 148 
 
 Mass. 487 ; 20 N. E. Ill [poorhouse 
 farm ; town liable]. In Edwards v. 
 Pocahontas (47 Fed. 268 [W. Dist. 
 Va.]), a distinction was made be- 
 tween a public county-jail (which 
 the city had a statutory right to use 
 for confining persons arrested for 
 breaches of its ordinances), and a 
 lock-up, which it set up instead ; it 
 being held that for the defective 
 condition of the latter, causing in- 
 juries to a prisoner therein confined, 
 the defendant was liable, it appear- 
 ing that the officers whose duty it 
 was to inspect it, from time to time, 
 had neglected to do so. 
 
 " In Curran v. Boston (151 Mass. 
 505 ; 24 N. E. 781), an inmate of a 
 workhouse was injured while en- 
 gaged in unloading coal, by the neg- 
 ligence of the officers and servants 
 employed in the institution. The 
 city derived some revenue from the 
 labor of the inmates. Held, that the 
 profit thus derived was purely inci- 
 dental to the object and purpose of 
 the workhouse, which was not the 
 nature of a business, and the city 
 was not liable. To same effect, 
 Alamango v. Albany county, 25 
 Hun, 551 [a penitentiary inmate in- 
 jured by defective machinery at 
 which he was put to work]. See 
 Lewis V. State, 96 N. Y. 71 ; § 250, 
 n. 1, ante. 
 
§26l] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 486 
 
 when delegated by the state to a local governing body, the 
 latter partakes of the state's prerogative of exemption from 
 private action for the consequences of its failure to exercise its 
 powers to that end. Although it may have anticipated a 
 breach of the peace and possessed means to prevent the injury 
 inflicted by the wrong-doers, it is not liable at common law for 
 the consequences of its neglect of duty in that regard.' It is 
 entirely competent, however, for the legislature to furnish such 
 a remedy, and regulate the mode of assessing the damages 
 suffered ; ^ and this has been done in England, and in several 
 of our own states, as in Alabama, California, Kansas, Ken- 
 
 ' Hart T. Bridgeport, 13 Blatchf. 
 289 ; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 
 U. S. 285. The charter of a city 
 provided that it should be its duty 
 ' ' to regulate the police, preserve the 
 peace, prevent disturbance and dis- 
 orderly assemblages." Held, that 
 the duty intended properly apper- 
 tained to an administrative and legis- 
 lative body, acting in the govern- 
 ment of a city; hence the corpora- 
 tion was not responsible for the 
 destruction of property by a riotous 
 assemblage of persons, or for the 
 neglect of the officers in not prevent- 
 ing such destruction (Western Col- 
 lege V. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375). 
 In that case Gholson, J., said : " It 
 is not the policy of governments to 
 indemnify individuals for losses sus- 
 tained, either from the want of 
 proper laws, or from the indequate 
 enforcement of laws, made to secure 
 the property of individuals." To 
 same effect, Darlington v. New York, 
 31 N. Y. 164; Solomon v. Kingston, 
 24 Hun, 563; Luke v. Brooklyn, 43 
 Barb. 54; Re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 
 Pa. St. 305 ; Allegheny county v. 
 Oibson. 90 Id. 397 ; Baltimore v. 
 Poultney, 25 Md. 107 ; Brightman v. 
 Bristol, 65 Me. 428; Underbill v. 
 Manchester. 45 N H. 314: Chad- 
 bourne V. New Castle, 48 Id. 196; 
 Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 Ala. 
 
 527 ; Clear Lake, etc. Co. v. Lake 
 County, 45 Cal. 90 ; Atchison v. 
 Twine, 9 Kans. 350 ; Prather v. Lex- 
 ington, 52 Ky. 559 ; Fauvia v. New 
 Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 410 ; Gianfor- 
 tone v. New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64; 
 New Orleans v. Abbagnato, 10 C. C. 
 A. 361 ; 62 Fed. 240 ; Respublica v. 
 Sparhawk, 1 Dallas, 357 [government 
 not liable for loss of goods stored in 
 a public storehouse during a time of 
 war, by order of Congress, and sub- 
 sequently seized by the public 
 enemy]. In Kentucky (Gen. Stat, 
 c. 1, § 5), cities are declared liable 
 for damages done to property by 
 riotous and tumultuous assem- 
 blages of people. In Jolley v. 
 Hawesville (89 Ky. 279; 12 S. W. 
 813), the city was sought to be held 
 liable for the negligence of the city 
 marshal in permitting persons to 
 congregate on the streets with guns 
 and pistols, and engage in a sham 
 battle, resulting in the death of a 
 non-participant. Held, city not lia- 
 ble. The liability cannot be founded 
 on the existence of both power and 
 means to prevent and suppress mobs, 
 and the neglect of the oflBcers to 
 exercise them (Prather v. Lexing- 
 ton, 52 Ky. 559; Ward v. Louisville, 
 16 Id. 184). 
 
 ^ Darlington v. New York, 31 N. 
 Y. 164, and cases supra. 
 
487 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§262 
 
 tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, 
 Pennsylvania, and perhaps others. Like every purely statu- 
 tory remedy, it must be strictly pursued.' 
 
 § 262. Adoption and execution of laws and ordinances. — 
 
 The common-law immunity of a municipal corporation, of 
 whatever grade, from liability to a private action for a neglect 
 of its imposed public duties has been extended to cases of 
 failure either to adopt suitable ordinances for the public 
 welfare, as authorized by its charter, or by general statute, 
 and to cases of neglect or refusal to enforce its ordinances 
 to that end. Except in Maryland,^ and perhaps Pennsyl- 
 
 ' For various defenses in actions 
 under a statute giving a remedy, see 
 Underhill v. Manchester, 45 N. H. 
 214 ; Chadbourne v. New Castle, 48 
 Id. 196; Brightman v. Bristol, 65 
 Me. 428 ; Duffy v. Baltimore, Taney 
 C. C. 200 ; Ely v. Niagara county, 36 
 N. Y. 297 [that plaintiff kept a dis- 
 orderly house is no defense] ; Hill v. 
 Rensselaer county, 53 Hun, 194 ; 6 
 N. y. Supp. 716 [contributory negli- 
 gence]. 
 
 ' It is well settled in Maryland that 
 when a statute confers a power upon 
 a corporation to be exercised for 
 the public good ("general welfare 
 clause ") its exercise is not merely 
 discretionary, but imperative ; tlie 
 words " power and authority " may 
 he construed "duty and obligation." 
 (See § 254, ante.) In Cochrane v. 
 Frostburg(81 Md. 54; 31 Atl. 703), 
 a petition was sustained, on demur- 
 rer, which alleged that large num- 
 bers of domestic animals were al- 
 lowed to run at large within the 
 streets ; that the authorities, having 
 knowledge of such fact, had ne- 
 glected and refused to pass an ordi- 
 nance abating such nuisance, al- 
 though having power under the 
 charter to pass and enforce ordi- 
 nances for the " comfort, good order, 
 health and safety of the inhabitants," 
 and to prevent and remove nui- 
 
 sances ; and that plaintiff, while 
 walking on one of the streets was 
 attacked and seriously injured by 
 one of such animals. The ground 
 of the decision was that " the de- 
 fendant could have prevented the 
 cow from running at large by the 
 use of ordinary care and diligence." 
 The court said, however, that if the 
 cow was on the street without any 
 fault of the owner, then no blame 
 could attach to the defendant, and it 
 would not be liable ; to hold other- 
 wise would im.pose a stricter liability 
 on the corporation than the owner 
 of the animal would be held to ; and 
 that it would be competent, on a 
 trial, to charge "that defendant was 
 not liable if it had made a vigorous 
 effort to enforce the ordinance, and 
 notwithstanding such effort, was 
 unable to prevent the nuisance in 
 question." In Taylor v. Cumber- 
 land (64 Md. 68), a corporation 
 which was required by its charter to 
 pass ordinances to remove all nui- 
 sances from the streets and to 
 protect persons, property, etc., 
 was held bound to prevent per- 
 sons from coasting on the streets, 
 if it could do so by ordinary and 
 reasonable care and diligence. The 
 city of Baltimore's charter con- 
 ferred power to prevent and remove 
 nuisantes. Held, that the mere pas- 
 
§262] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 488. 
 
 vania,^ it is everywhere held that a public duty to make and 
 enforce adequate laws, for the prevention or abatement of 
 nuisances injurious to the health, property or person of the 
 citizen is an imperfect obligation, and cannot be enforced against 
 the will of the state.^ The mere fact that a nuisance exists and 
 has occasioned an injury to a third person does not render the 
 corporation liable therefor,* provided the nuisance was not 
 created or maintained by the corporation itself.^ Such failure 
 
 sage of an ordinance requiring abut- 
 ters to remove ice and snow from the 
 sidewalk was not enough. It must 
 use reasonable care and diligence to 
 enforce it, and not doing so, was lia- 
 ble (Marriott v. Baltimore , 9 Md. 
 160). 
 
 '' " Whether a charter-duty to re- 
 move nuisances remains unper- 
 formed, because the city had no 
 ordinance on the subject, or because, 
 having ordinances, it neglected to 
 enforce them, is no matter. In 
 either case, the liability of the city 
 remains the same " (Pittsburgh v. 
 Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54 [wharf] ; Mc- 
 Dade v. Chester, 117 Pa. St. 414 ; 12 
 Atl. 431 [neglect to prohibit manu- 
 facture of fireworks])- 
 
 ^ See Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 
 65 Pa. St. 135, per Agnew, J. 
 
 * The duty to prevent by adequate 
 laws nuisances, injurious to health, 
 property or rights of the citizen, is 
 an imperfect obligation, and for its 
 non-performance it is not liable, un- 
 til after notice (Griffin v. New York, 
 9 N. Y. 456) The fact that a cor- 
 poration has adopted an ordinance 
 providing a method for the removal 
 of vessels sunken at any of the 
 docks on its water-front does not 
 charge it with the duty of enforcing 
 the ordinance, nor make it liable for 
 Its non-enforcement (Coonley v. Al- 
 bany, 133 N. Y. 145 ; 30 N. E. 383 ; 
 affl'g 57 Hun, 327 ; 10 N. T. Supp. 
 512). In Davis v. Montgomery (51 
 Ala. 139) plaintiff's house was de- 
 
 stroyed by fire communicated from 
 a steam engine on an adjoining lot, 
 the danger of which was known to 
 the corporation's officers ; city not 
 liable, though the engine might 
 have been abated as a nuisance. In 
 Stackhouse v. Lafayette (26 Ind.l7), a 
 railroad company having a right of 
 way through a city street, granted by 
 the city, built a culvert on the street 
 solely for its own use, but of insuffi- 
 cient capacity to carry off water, 
 so that plaintiff's land was over- 
 flowed. Held, city not liable for 
 not compelling the company to re- 
 construct the culvert. A city is not ' 
 liable as for misfeasance in extend- 
 ing the bounds of a street so as to 
 bring an existing nuisance within 
 limits of such street (McCutcheon v. 
 Homer, 43 Mich. 483). s. P., James 
 V. Harrodsburg, 85 Ky. 191 ; 3 S. W. 
 135 [neglect to stop negligent blast- 
 ing on lot abutting on highway]. 
 
 ' A city, sheltering itself under 
 authority of law from liability for 
 acts which between individuals 
 would be a nuisance, must show an 
 express or clearly implied authority 
 from the powers conferred (Hill v. 
 New York, 139 N. Y. 495 ; 34 N. E. 
 1090 ; Stoddard v. Saratoga Springs, 
 127 N. Y. 261 ; 27 N. E. 1030 ; Seif- 
 ert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136 : 4 
 N. E. 321 ; Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. 
 Y. 470 ; Bolton v. New Rochelle, 84 
 Hun, 381; 32 N. Y. Supp. 442; 
 Fort Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 
 404 ; 12 S. W. 52 [dump yard for 
 
489 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§262 
 
 to execute the law is neglect of a duty owing to the public, not 
 to individuals. A neglect or refusal to execute a power " to 
 construct and repair sidewalks " ' or " to remove all obstruc- 
 tions in a harbor," ' or to organize a fire department and fire 
 extinguishing apparatus,^ or to provide a pest-house,' or to 
 plat and establish the grade of its streets," or to provide for 
 
 city refuse]). It will not be as- 
 sumed that the legislature in- 
 tended to authorize a nuisance, 
 unless this is the necessary result 
 of the powers granted (Bacon v. 
 Boston, 154 Mass. 100 ; 28 N. E. 9, 
 and cases cited). 
 
 'Whether the corporation will 
 build or permit to be built, a side- 
 walk, is a matter of discretion. It is 
 only when the sidewalk is built, with 
 or without its authority, that any 
 responsibility with reference thereto 
 begins (Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. 
 Y. 37 ; Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, 91 
 Id. 67 ; Atwater v. Canandaigua, 
 124 Id. 602 ; 27 N. E. 385 ; Lehigh 
 county V. Hoffort, 116 Pa. St. 119 ; 9 
 Atl. 177 ; Joliet v. Verley, 35 111. 58). 
 S. P., Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 
 239 ; Hyatt v. Rondout, 44 Barb. 391 ; 
 41 N. Y. 619 ; Vogel v. New York, 
 93 N. Y. 10 ; Requa v. Rochester, 45 
 Id. 129; Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 
 218 ; Peck v. Batavia, 32 Id. 634 ; 
 Harrington v. Corning, 51 Id. 396 ; 
 Carroll v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App. 191 
 [failure to condemn land for street 
 purposes] ; Easton v. Neff, 102 Pa. 
 St. 474 [refusal to build crosswalk at 
 a particular place] ; see cases cited 
 in note 10, infra. 
 
 ' Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 111. 445. 
 In Forbes v. Lee Conservancy Board 
 (L. R. 4 Exch. Div. 116), a statute 
 under which incorporated trustees 
 were " authorized and empowered, 
 from time to time, to reaiove ob- 
 structions and impediments to the 
 navigation " of a canal, was con- 
 strued as making the duty of re- 
 
 moving obstructions discretionary 
 and not compulsory. 
 
 ' Cases cited under § 265, ante. 
 
 » Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex. 316. 
 
 '" Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 
 99 U. S. 635 ; Smith v. Washington, 
 20 How. [U. S.] 135 ; Mills v. Brook- 
 lyn, 32 N. Y. 489 ; Pontiac v. Carter, 
 32 Mich. 164 ; Wicks v. De Witt, 54 
 Iowa, 130 ; 6 N. W. 176 ; White v. 
 Yazoo City, 37 Miss. 357, and cases 
 cited under ^ 271, post. Whether a 
 municipal corporation will or will 
 not open and improve a sti-eet in its 
 remote suburbs, is a question of leg- 
 islative discretion, a decision of 
 which in the negative cannot be 
 made the basis of a civil action 
 (Hughes V. Baltimore, Taney's Dec. 
 343 ; McDonough v. Virginia City, 
 
 6 Nev. 90; Aurora v. Pulfer, 56 111. 
 370 ; Lindholm v. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 
 245 ; Henderson v. Sandefur, 11 
 Bush, 550). s. P., Smith v. Gould, 
 61 Wise. 31 ; 20 N. W. 369 ; Keating 
 V. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 415 ; Wil- 
 liams V. Grand Rapids, 59 Mich. 51 ; 
 36 N. W. 379. As to discretion in 
 vacating or discontinuing a street, so 
 as to terminate all obligation to re- 
 pair it, see Tinker v. Russell, 14 Pick. 
 379 ; Warner v. Holyoke, 113 Mass. 
 363 ; State v. Cumberland, 6 R. I. 496; 
 
 7 Id. 75 ; State v. Hampton, 3 N. H. 
 22; Page v. Weathersfield, 13 Vt. 424 ; 
 Bauman v. Campau, 58 Mich. 444 ; 
 Brewster v. Davenport, 51 Iowa, 
 427 ; see Horton v. Nashville, 4 Lea 
 [Tenn.] 47. Where the charter re- 
 quired the city council, "as soon as 
 practicable," to establish the grade 
 
§262] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 490 
 
 lighting them,** or to devise and adopt a drainage and sewerage 
 system/^ will not sustain a private action for neglect of duty. 
 In all such matters, the corporate authorities have a discretion 
 to exercise; and, however unwise their judgment may turn 
 out to have been, the corporation will not be liable in damages 
 for the consequence of their unwisdom.*' It is not action- 
 able for municipal officers to neglect to enforce an ordinance 
 or to tolerate its violation,** unless there is a clear abuse of 
 discretion.*' It is, therefore, very generally held that the cor- 
 
 of the sti'eets, the corporation is not 
 liable for delaying the undertaking ; 
 the council is the judge of when it is 
 practicable (Schattner v. Kansas 
 City, 53 Mo. 163). s. p., Evansville 
 V. Decker, 84 Ind. 325 ; Wilson v. 
 New York, 1 Denio, 595 ; Milwaukee 
 V. Davis, 6 Wise. 377. 
 
 " Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 400 ; 
 Randall v. Eastern R. Co., 106 Mass. 
 276. 
 
 '■^ Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 
 Pa. St. 334 ; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa._ St. 
 420 ; Woods v. Kansas Ciiy, 58 Mo. 
 App. 373 ; Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wise. 
 656 ; Alton v. Hope, 68 111. 167. To 
 allow an owner of property to prose- 
 cute the corporation, on the ground 
 tliat sufficient sewerage had not been 
 provided for his premises, " would 
 be to submit these questions to the 
 determination of a jury ; and thus, 
 in effect, a judicial tribunal would 
 be exercising the functions of a com- 
 mon council " (Anne Arundel coun- 
 ty V. Duckett, 30 Md. 468 ; Bennett 
 V. New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 120 
 [failure to repair a draining machine, 
 whereby plaintiff's cellar was 
 flooded] ; Steinmeyer v. St. Louis, 3 
 Mo, App. 256 [sewer formerly suffi- 
 cient to carry off water, now failed 
 to do so ; city not liable]) s. p., Ban- 
 nagan v. Dist. of Col., 2 Mackey [D. 
 C.], 385 ; see Alton v. Hope, 68 111. 
 167 ; Atchison v. Challiss, 9 Kans. 
 603 • McGregor v. Boyle, 34 Iowa, 
 268 ; Van Pelt v. Davenport, 43 Id. 
 
 308 ; Judge v. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90. 
 See § 387, post. 
 
 "In determining the place in a 
 public street where a railroad com- 
 pany may place a turntable, which 
 the company is entitled to have in 
 the locality, the city exercises a dis- 
 cretion which is not reviewable by 
 the courts (Fitch v. New York, 55 
 N. Y. Superior, 494 ; 3 N. Y. Supp. 
 700). "It may be laid down as a 
 very clear proposition, that if no 
 sewer had been constructed at the 
 locality referred to, an action would 
 not lie against the corporation, 
 though the jury should find that one 
 was necessary, and that the defend- 
 ants were guilty of a dereliction of 
 duty in not having constructed one " 
 (Mills V. Brooklyn, 82 N. Y. 489). 
 s. P., Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y. 
 60 ; Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 Id. 435 ; 
 Roeck V. Newark, 33 N. J. Law, 129 ; 
 Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 ; 
 Chase v. Oshkosh, 81 Wise. 313 ; 51 
 N. W. 560 [destruction of shade trees 
 in street, ordered removed]. 
 
 '^ See cases in note 16 et seq. 
 
 '* This qualification appears in 
 many of the decisions above cited, 
 but in Rosenbaum v. Newbern (118 
 N. C. 83 ; 24 S. E. 1), it was held that 
 a city was not liable for damages 
 caused by the enactment and en- 
 forcement of a valid ordinance, 
 though the ordinance showed an 
 abuse of its discretionary power. 
 
491 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§262 
 
 poration is not responsible for the acts of persons engaged in 
 the violation of a law or ordinance, resulting in an injury to a 
 third person, though such illegal acts might and ought to have 
 been prevented by its officers, and although the officers them- 
 selves, and even a majority of the citizens, actively participated 
 in the illegal proceeding.^^ Thus a municipal corporation is 
 not liable for injuries caused by persons unlawfully coasting 
 upon its streets," even when the authorities had tolerated the 
 sport,^^ or had publicly set apart a particular street for that 
 purpose." So where the injury was caused by a builder 
 encumbering the street with materials in violation of the 
 building laws,^" or by the fall of a partially ruined wall which 
 the city had neglected to compel the owner to remove, as 
 required by an ordinance,^^ or by swine being permitted to 
 
 i«Ball V. Woodbine, 61 Iowa, 83 ; 
 15 N. W. 846 ; Boyland v. New 
 York, 1 Sandf. 27. The non-action 
 of tlie officers must be deemed to 
 have been contrary to the will of the 
 corporation as expi-essed in its ordi- 
 nances (Peck V. Austin, 22 Tex. 261). 
 s. P., Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 
 392 ; Cole v. Nashville, 4 Sneed, 162 
 [not arresting and confining a luna- 
 tic] ; Miller v. Iron county, 29 Mo. 
 132 [same]. 
 
 " Schultz V. Milwaukee, 49 Wise. 
 254; 5 N. W. 342; Faulkner v. 
 Aurora, 85 Ind. 130 ; Lafayette v. 
 Timberlake, 88 Id. 330 ; Burford v. 
 Grand Rapids, 53 Mich . 98 ; Steele v. 
 Boston, 128 Mass. 588 ; Pierce v. New 
 Bedford, 129 Mass. 534 ; Wilmington 
 T. Vandegrift, 29 Atl. 1047. 
 
 '8 Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 Ind. 130 ; 
 Weller v. Burlington, 60 Vt. 28 ; 12 
 Atl. 215. 
 
 "Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53 
 Mich. 98. "If it were unquestion- 
 able that coasting upon a public 
 highway was always a nuisance, 
 tliere would be much plausibility in 
 the contention [that it was a nui- 
 sance jser se], and perhaps it should 
 be accepted as sound." (Id. per 
 €ooley, J.) Compare Arthur v. 
 
 Cohoes, 56 Hun, 36; 9 N. Y. Supp. 
 160 ; Toomey v. Albany, 60 Hun, 
 580, mem.; 14 N. Y. Supp. 572, where 
 the propriety of such authorization 
 and use were held questions for the 
 jury. See cases cited under next sec- 
 tion. 
 
 '''"Griffin v. New York, 9 N. Y. 
 456 [notice of obstruction not shown, 
 city not liable]. As to kind of notice 
 necessary to warrant recovery, see 
 § 367, post. A corporation which 
 permits a wooden building to be 
 erected in violation of its ordinance, 
 is not liable to the owner of an ad- 
 joining house taking fire from the 
 wooden house (Forsyth v. Atlanta, 
 45 Ga. 152 ; Hines v. Charlotte, 72 
 Mich. 278 ; 40 N. W. 333). 
 
 " Cain V. Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 88 ; 
 s. p., Connors v. New York, 11 Hun, 
 439 ; Hewison v. New Haven, 37 
 Conn. 475 ; Parker v. Macon, 89 Ga. 
 729 ; Howe v. New Orleans, 12 La. 
 Ann. 481 ; Kistner v. Indianapolis, 
 100 Ind. 210 [failure to pass ordi- 
 nance requiring railroad company to 
 erect guards at grade crossing ; city 
 not liable] ; Anderson v. East, 117 
 Id. 126; 19 N. E. 736. But see 
 Kiley v. Kansas City, 69 Mo. 102. 
 
§ 263] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 49^ 
 
 run at large in violation of an ordinance.^^ The non-enforce- 
 ment of an ordinance forbidding the firing of cannon or the 
 display of fireworks in public streets and places^ will not 
 render the city liable to a bystander injured thereby; nor to 
 one who fell into an open excavation adjacent to a highway, 
 which the abutting owner had not been compelled to fill up, 
 as required by ordinance.^ Having a discretion as to what 
 ordinances it will adopt, the corporation has a like discretion 
 and power to suspend the operation of its ordinances tempo- 
 rarily or indefinitely.^ 
 
 § 263. Discretionary powers — granting licenses. — A 
 
 municipal corporation has been held exempt from liability 
 for the negligent or fraudulent conduct of a person formally 
 licensed by it to pursue a particular calling, without exacting 
 (by misconstruing the extent of its powers) certain legal 
 formalities on the part of the licensee, as where a license was 
 issued to an auctioneer without taking the bond required by 
 law.^ But the rule has never been so far applied as to protect 
 a corporation from liability for the consequences of the unlaw- 
 ful acts of third persons, authorized by it to be done, under 
 
 ''^ Levy V. New York, 1 Sandf . 465 ; [ordinance forbidding fireworks] ; 
 
 Kelley v. Milwaukee, 18 Wise. 83. Rivers v. Augusta. 67 Ga. 376 [for- 
 
 ''^ Boyland v. New York, 1 Sandf. bidding cattle running at large] ; 
 
 27 [firing cannon in public park, at Fifield v. Phoenix, Ariz. ; 36 
 
 public meeting called together by the Pao. 916. 
 
 mayor] ; Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 ' Fowle v. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398 ; 
 
 Mass. 219 [city officers took part] ; affi'g 3 Cranch O. C. 70. But in Cole 
 
 Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 579 ; 20 v. Nashville (4 Sneed, 162) it was 
 
 N. E. 329 ; McDade v. Chester, 117 held that granting a license to a 
 
 Pa. St. 414 ; 13 Atl. 421 [same] ; Nor- known lunatic to carry on the busi- 
 
 ristownv. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St. 121 ; ness of a druggist, was a ministerial 
 
 Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. act for which the city was liable to 
 
 625 ; Ball V. Woodbine, 61 Iowa, 83 ; one injured by the lunatic's negli- 
 
 15 N. W. 846 [fireworks] ; O'Rourke genoe in his business as a druggist. 
 
 V. Sioux Falls, 4 So. Dak. 47; 54 See Hubbel v. Virogua, 67 Wise. 343 ; 
 
 N. W. 1044. As to whether the act 30 N. W. 847 [licensing shooting gal- 
 
 of discharging fireworks in a high- lery]. In Anderson v. Wilmington 
 
 way is a nuisance per se, see Jenne ( [Del ], 19 Atl. 509), a city was held 
 
 V. Sutton, 43 N. J. Law, 257 ; Conklin liable for the negligent work of a 
 
 V. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218. plumber acting under its license in 
 
 "Moran v. Pullman Car Co., 134 laying a private drain to the public 
 
 Mo. 641 ; 86 S. W. 659. main, causing flooding of plaintiff's 
 
 25 Hill V. Charlotte, 73 N. C. 55 premises. 
 
493 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§263 
 
 a mistaken notion of its corporate powers. Whatever may be 
 the extent of the right of a particular corporation to grant to 
 private persons exceptional uses of its streets, it is settled that 
 it cannot escape liability for the consequences of an unlawful 
 use of its streets by a third person, under its authority. A per- 
 mission, for example, given to a railroad company, contrary to 
 law, to use steam-motors in the streets of a city,^ or to a third 
 person to store his property in a street,^ is to authorize a 
 nuisance, and the city is liable for an injury caused to one on 
 the highway by such unlawful user. So the licensing of a dis- 
 play of fireworks and dangerous explosives in a compact 
 portion of a city, at the junction of two narrow streets, being 
 reasonably likely to result in injury to persons and property, 
 is such an unwarranted use of the streets as will render the 
 licensor liable for the consequences.* But, it not being unlaw- 
 ful to permit an abutting owner to interfere with a highway 
 so as to connect his premises with the public sewer therein, 
 the mere fact of granting such a permit does not render the 
 
 " Stanley v. Davenport, 54 Iowa, 
 463 ; and other cases cited under 
 § 358, post. 
 
 3 Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y. 
 533 ; 31 N. E. 700 ; rev'g 43 Hun, 
 345. In that case, the city, without 
 authority, granted a license to a 
 grocer, on payment of a fee, per- 
 mitting him to keep his delivery 
 wagon standing in the street in front 
 of his store night and day. Held, 
 the wagon constituted a public nui- 
 sance, and that the city was liable 
 for plaintiff's injury from collision 
 therewith. S. P., Farley v. New 
 York, 15J N. Y. 333 ; 46 N. E. 506. 
 
 « Spier V. Brooklyn, 139 N. Y. 6 ; 
 34 N. E. 737. In that case, the de- 
 fendant's contention that the lan- 
 guage of the ordinance under which 
 the permit was given implied a lim- 
 itation that the permit should extend 
 only to proper and suitable places 
 other than public streets, and, there- 
 fore, the permit was ultra vires, arid 
 the city not liable, was overruled. 
 
 In Little v. Madison (43 Wise. 643), 
 the authorities granted a license to 
 exhibit a bear within the city. Held, 
 on demurrer, that it was implied 
 that the exhibition should be in a 
 suitable place and not in the street ; 
 it was not the duty of the city to see 
 that the licensee chose a suitable 
 place, and it was not liable for the 
 fright of plaintiff's horse by the 
 bear's exhibition in the street. It 
 appeared, on the trial, that the 
 license did not specify the streets as 
 the place for the exhibition. Held, 
 it was the licensee's duty to select a 
 safe place, and city not liable for 
 not preventing his use of the street 
 (49 Wise. 6051 In Wheeler v. Ply- 
 mouth (116 Ind. 158 ; 18 N. E. 533), 
 an ordinance prohibited the firing of 
 gunpowder, except on license of the 
 mayor, on certain occasions. Held, 
 city not liable for the negligence of 
 the licensee, the authorized act not 
 being necessarily dangerous. 
 
§265] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 494 
 
 corporation responsible for the negligent conduct of the 
 licensee in leaving his excavation open and unguarded.^ It can 
 only be held liable under its general duty of keeping its 
 highways in a reasonably safe condition.^ 
 
 §264. [Omitted}. 
 
 § 265. Supplying water and apparatus for extinguishing- 
 fires. — A power conferred upon a municipal corporation to 
 provide a system of water-supply, fire-engines and other 
 apparatus for extinguishing fires, being for the common pro- 
 tection, as distinguished from any corporate benefit of its own, 
 the corporation's neglect or refusal to exercise it is not action- 
 able.' Nor do the facts that it has accepted such power, and 
 has built water-works and levied taxes or rates for their main- 
 tenance, change the nature of its duty to one of contract 
 between it and the owners of property to supply sufficient 
 water,^ or adequate means for using it, to extinguish fires. 
 
 " Masterton v. Mount Vernon, 58 
 N. Y. 391 ; distinguishing Wendell 
 T. Troy, 4 Abb. Ct. App. 563. The 
 negligence of a lot-owner while 
 making a sidewalk is imputable to 
 the city, if the jiroprietor made the 
 sidewalk in obedience to an order 
 from the city authorities, and rea- 
 sonable supervision of the work by 
 these authorities would have dis- 
 covered the defect in season to have 
 prevented the injui-y {Boucher v. 
 New Haven, 40 Conn. 457 ; Master- 
 ton V. Mount Vernon, supra; Mc- 
 Coull V. Manchester, 85 Va. 579 ; 8 
 S. E. 379). It is proper to instnict 
 that the granting of a permit to 
 make an excavation in a street is 
 notice to the corporation that the 
 work is in progress, and that there- 
 after it would be liable for injuries 
 arising from the negligence of the 
 person doing the work, which is 
 dangerous in itself (District of Co- 
 lumbia V. W^oodbury, 186 U. S. 450 ; 
 10 S. Ct. 990). 
 « See Fitch v. New York, 55 N. Y. 
 
 Superior, 494; 2 N. Y. Supp. 700 
 [lawfully permitting- a railroad turn- 
 table to be placed in street ; city not 
 liable for negligence of company in 
 operating it]. 
 
 1 Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420 ; 
 and cases cited, infra. As there is 
 no obligation on the part of the city 
 to supply water to extinguish fires, 
 a contractor with it to furnish water 
 for that purpose cannot be charged 
 with a liability which the law did 
 not impose on it (House v. Hous- 
 ton Water- works Co. , 88 Tex. 233 •. 
 31 S. W. 179 [well-considered opin- 
 ion by Brown, J.]). 
 
 ' ' ' The protection of all buildings 
 in a city or town from destruction 
 or injury by fire is for the benefit of 
 all the inhabitants and for their 
 relief from a common danger ; and 
 cities and towns are, therefore, 
 authorized by general laws to pro- 
 vide and maintain fire-engines, etc., 
 to supply water for the extinguish- 
 ment of fires. The city did not, by 
 accepting the statute and building 
 
495 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§265 
 
 upon which a private action can be maintained. The corpora- 
 tion is, therefore, not liable for the want of repair or other 
 defects of its fire-engines,^ or their appliances,^ or its fire- 
 
 ils water-works under it, enter into 
 any contract with, or assume any 
 liability to, the owners of property 
 to furnish means or water for tlie 
 extinguishment of fires upon which 
 an action can be maintained " (Tain- 
 ter y. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311 [cut- 
 ting olf water, but for which fire 
 might have been extinguished]). 
 There is no contract, express or im- 
 plied, on the part of a city to indem- 
 nify the citizen for losses by the 
 burning down of their houses ex- 
 cept in cases specially provided by 
 law " (Yule v. New Orleans, 25 La. 
 Ann. 394). A municipal corporation 
 is not Uable for the destruction of 
 property by fire becaiise of the in- 
 sufiiciency of the water supply 
 (Springfield Fire Ins. Co. v. Keese- 
 viUe, 148 N. Y. 46 ; 42 N. E. 40o ; 
 rev'g 80 Hun, 163 ; 29 N. Y. Supp. 
 1130 : and affi'g 6 N. Y. Misc. 233 ; 
 26 N. Y. Supp. 1094; Mendell v. 
 Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233 [supply 
 pipe filled with mud, stopping flow 
 of water] ; Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 
 Ohio St. 19 [insufficient cisterns, and 
 unsuitable engines ; Brinkmeyer v. 
 Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 [same] ; Black 
 V. Columbia, 19 S. C. 412 [lack of 
 water] ; Foster v. Chattanooga, 3 
 Lea [Tenn.] 42 [same] ; Vanhorn v. 
 Des Moines, 63 Iowa 447 [same]); 
 Becker v. Water -works, 79 Iowa, 419 ; 
 44 N. W. 694 ; compare, contra, Len- 
 zen V. New Braufels, Tex. Civ. 
 App. ; 35 S. W. 341. Frequent 
 
 attempts have been made to hold 
 water companies contracting with 
 municipal corporations to supply 
 them water, liable for breach of 
 contract, or in tort, at the suit of a 
 third person whose property was 
 desti'oyed by fire by reason of its 
 
 failure to supply sufiBcient water. 
 But with apparently a single excep- 
 tion (Paducah Lumber Co. v. Padu- 
 cah Water Co., 89 Ky. 340 ; 12 S. 
 W. 554 ; 13 Id. 249), all courts hold 
 that the contracting company can- 
 not be charged with a greater lia- 
 bility than the city itself was legally 
 subject to, and that there is no pri- 
 vity of contract between the water 
 company and a citizen which will 
 support an action (Nickerson v. 
 Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 46 Conn. 
 24; Stone v. Uniontown Water Co., 
 4 Pa. Dist. E. 431 ; Beck v. Kitanning 
 Water Co. [Penn.] ; 11 Atl. 300; 
 Becker v. Keokuk Water-works, 79 
 Iowa 419 ; 44 N. W. 694 ; Davis v. 
 Clinton Water-works Co., 54 Iowa, 
 59 ; 6 N. W. 126 ; Becker v. Keokuk 
 Water-works, 79 Iowa, 419 ; 44 N. W. 
 694 ; Britton v. Greenbay Water- 
 works Co., 81 Wise. 48 ; 51 N. W. 84 j 
 Eaton V. Fairbury Water-works Co., 
 37 Neb. 546 ; 56 N. W. 201 ; Mott v. 
 Cherry vale Water, etc. Co., 48 Kans. 
 12 ; 28 Pac. 989 ; Howsmon v. Tren- 
 ton Water Co., 119 Mo. 304; 24 S. 
 W. 784 ; Fowler v. Athens Water- 
 works Co., 83 Ga. 219; 9S E. 673; 
 House V. Houston Water-works Co., 
 88 Tex. 233 ; 31 S. W. 179 ; Ferris v. 
 Carson Water Co., 16 Nev. 44. 
 
 ^ McKenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. 
 App. 820. 
 
 * Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87 
 [bursting of hose] ; Robinson v. 
 Evansville, 87 Ind. 334 [insufficient 
 length of hose] : Brinkmeyer v. 
 Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 ; Edgerly v. 
 Concord, 59 N. H. 79 [fire-hydrant] ; 
 Welsh V. Rutland, .56 Vt. 228; see 
 Jenney v. Brooklyn, 120 N. Y. 164 ; 
 24 N. E. 274. 
 
§265] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 496 
 
 hydrants, rendering them ineffectual, or for the delay of its 
 firemen in reaching the fire,= or their negligent management of 
 these instrumentalities, though in the hne of duty, to the per- 
 sonal injury of third persons/ It is immaterial whether the 
 firemen were employed and paid by the city, or whether they 
 constituted themselves a voluntary association, acting gratu- 
 itously.' In neither case are they agents or servants of the 
 corporation for whose fault the latter is liable.* 
 
 ' Robinson v. Evansville, 87 Ind. 
 334. 
 
 « Smith V. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506 ; 
 O'Meai-a v. New York, 1 Daly, 425 ; 
 Clarissy v. Fire Department, 7 Abb. 
 N. S. 352 ; New York v. Workman, 
 14 C. C. A. 530 ; 67 Fed. 347 ; Haf- 
 ford V. New Bedford, 82 Mass. 297 ; 
 Burrill v. Augusta, 78 Me. 118 ; 3 Atl. 
 177 [drawing fires of a steam fire- 
 engine while standing in the street 
 and permitting escape of steam with 
 great noise, frightening horse] ; 
 Dodge V. Granger, 17 R. I. 664 ; 24 
 Atl. 100; Thomas v. Findlay, 6 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 241 ; Wilcox v. Chicago, 
 107 111. 334 ; Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 
 Wise. 314 [sparks emitted from en- 
 gine] ; Grube v. St Paul, 34 Minn. 
 402 ; 26 N. W. 228 ; Greenwood v. 
 Louisville, 13 Bush. 226 ; Patch 
 V. Covington, 17 B. Monr. 722 ; 
 Alexander v. Vicksburg, 68 Miss. 
 564 ; 10 So. 62 ; Heller v. Sedalia, 53 
 Mo. 159 ; Gillespie v. Lincoln, 35 
 Neb. 34 ; 52 N. W. 811 ; Howard v. 
 San Francisco, 51 Cal. 52 ; Lawson 
 V. Seattle, 6 Wash. St. 184; 33 Pac. 
 347. The foregoing were mostly 
 cases for negligent driving in going 
 to a fire, resulting in collisions with 
 persons on the street. In some of 
 them, the decision was put on the 
 ground that the negligent officers 
 were members of the city's fire de- 
 partment, but the doctrine of the 
 text was asserted. As to the liability 
 of a fire department for the negli- 
 gence of its employees, see Newcomb 
 
 V. Boston Protective Dept. 146 Mass. 
 596 ; 16 N. E. 555 : Clarissy v. Fire 
 Dept. 7 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 853 ; and 
 cases under §§ 295, 296, post. In 
 Smith V. Rochester, supra, fireman 
 going to a rendezvous to participate 
 in a public celebration, ordered by 
 the common council, ran dow^n 
 plaintiff. Held, that the calling out 
 of firemen for such purpose was 
 ultra vires, and the city was not lia- 
 ble. The city's ownership of the 
 horses and hose cart did not make it 
 responsible for the negligent acts of 
 its servants in a service not of a pub- 
 lic nature and not authorized by 
 law. 
 
 ' Jewett V. New Haven, 88 Conn. 
 368 ; Lawson v. Seattle, 6 Wash. St. 
 184 ; 33 Pac. 347. 
 
 8Kies V. Erie, 135 Pa. St. 144 ; 19 
 Atl. 942 [fireman opening door of 
 engine-house striking passer-by ; 
 city not liable] ; Torbush v. Nor- 
 wich, 38 Conn. 325. It follows that 
 the rule of non-liability of a master 
 to a servant for the negligence of a 
 fellow-servant is not applicable to 
 the case of a fire officer, who, while 
 driving rapidly to a fire, came in 
 contact with an obstruction in the 
 street and was thrown out and in- 
 jured. He can maintain an action 
 against the city (Turner v. Indian- 
 apolis, 96 Ind. 51 ; Lafayette v. Al- 
 len, 81 Ind. 166 [defective fire-en- 
 gine injured operator ; city liable] ; 
 Edgerly v. Concord, 59 N. H. 79 [fire- 
 man injured by defective hydrant]). 
 
497 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§266 
 
 § 266. Providing for public health. — Making provision for 
 the poor, the sick and the injured is essentially a public duty 
 with which the state is primarily charged. When such duty 
 is imposed upon, or is voluntarily assumed by, a local govern- 
 ing body, the latter is exempt at common law from private 
 prosecution, whether for an entire failure to perform it,' or for 
 the negligent manner in which it is attempted to be performed, 
 to the injury of another.^ Like police or fire officers, health 
 officers do not sustain the relation of servants or agents to the 
 corporation appointing them, so as to make the latter 
 
 Compare Wild v. Paterson, 47 N. J. 
 Law, 406 [defective brake on engine : 
 fireman injured ; city not liable]. 
 " If there are any reasons for modi- 
 fying the general rule of exemption 
 with respect to employees, they can- 
 not be considered by the courts" (Id. 
 by Magie, J.). See Coots v. Detroit, 
 75 Mich. 638 ; 43 N. W. 17. 
 
 ' Danaher v. Brooklyn, 119 N. Y. 
 241 ; 23 N. E. 745 ; affi'g 51 Hun, 563. 
 In that case, city held not liable for 
 injuries attributable to the failure of 
 its health department to watch over 
 the natural influences which might 
 render unhealthful the water of a 
 public well unconnected with the 
 city's water system. In Bryant v. 
 St. Paul (33 Minn. 289; 23 N. W. 
 220) , a privy vault was negligently 
 allowed to remain open, to plaintiff's 
 injury ; city not liable. S. P. Love 
 V. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129 ; 22 S. E. 29 
 [health officers neglect to remove 
 accumulations of filth from streets]. 
 
 '' Maximilian v. New York, 63 N. Y. 
 160 ; Haight v. New York, 24 Fed. 
 93 ; Brennan v. Limerick Union, L. 
 R. Ir., 3 C. L. 43 ; Benton v. Boston 
 Hospital, 140 Mass. 13 : 1 N. E. 836 ; 
 see McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 
 130 Mass. 433 ; Palmer v. St. Al- 
 bans, 60 Vt. 427 ; 13 Atl. 569 ; Brown 
 V. Vinal Haven, 65 Me. 402 [suffer- 
 ing a hospital nurse to depart with- 
 out being disinfected, whereby plain- 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1 — 33] 
 
 tiff caught small-pox] ; Barbour v. 
 Ellsworth, 67 Id. 294 [carrying a 
 well person to small-pox hospital] ; 
 Mitchell V. Rockland, 53 Id. 118 
 [health officer appropriated plain- 
 tiff's vessel, by consent, for a hos- 
 pital, and so negligently cared for it 
 that it caught fire and was injured]; 
 Rudolphe v. New Orleans, 11 La. 
 Ann. 243 [illegally ordering a ship to 
 leave port] ; Harrison v. Baltimore, 
 1 Gill (Md.), 364; Summers v. 
 Daviess county, 103 Ind. 363 ; 3 N. 
 E. 735 [unskillful treatment of sick 
 poor person by county physician] ; 
 Shelbourne v. Yuba county, 31 Cal. 
 113 [unskilled treatment by hospital 
 physician] ; Forbes v. Escambia 
 county, 28 Fla. 36 ; 9 So. 863 [vessel 
 wrongfully ordered into quaran- 
 tine] ; Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 
 375 [patient admitted to a small-pox 
 hospital negligently suffered, when 
 delji'ious, to escape, wander off and 
 die] ; Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 
 480 [hospital officers] ; Hughes v. 
 Monroe county, 79 Hun, 130; 39 
 N. Y. Supp. 495. In Ogg v. Lan- 
 sing (35 Iowa, 495), plaintiff sought 
 to recover for the city's neglect to 
 take proper precautions to prevent 
 the spread of small pox and for 
 failing to notify him, when requested 
 by its officers to help them remove 
 the corpse of a person who had died 
 of that disease, of the dangerous na- 
 
§26;] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 498- 
 
 liable for their misfeasances or malfeasances, in the line of 
 their public duties.^ 
 
 § 267. Providing and maintaining public schools. — The 
 
 duty of providing means of education, at the public expense, 
 by building and maintaining schools-houses, employing teach- 
 ers, etc., is a purely public duty, in the discharge of which 
 the local body, as the state's representative, is exempt from 
 corporate liability, for the faulty construction or want of repair 
 of its school buildings,^ or the torts of its servants^ employed 
 therein. In states where the liablity of towns, etc., to private 
 actions for neghgence is denied, unless imposed by statute, this 
 ground of exemption is not specially relied on, though it is 
 stated. But in other states, the exemption is distinctly based 
 upon the public nature of the duty imposed. Where, as in 
 some states, school-districts or unions are incorporated under 
 statutory authority, and are provided with the means of raising 
 funds for the repair of school buildings, a liabiHty for negligent 
 failure to repair will be implied.^ 
 
 ture of tbe service required of him. 
 Held, the city not liable. And see 
 cases cited under § 331, post. 
 
 'Maximilian v. New York, 63 N. 
 Y. 160, and cases cited in note 3. 
 
 ' Hill V. Boston, 133 Mass. 344 [pu- 
 pil fell over dangerously low railing 
 on winding stair, in school-house] ; 
 Sullivan v. Boston, 126 Id. 540 [de- 
 fective approach to school-house] ; 
 Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541 
 [dangerous excavation in school- 
 house yard] ; Wixon v. Newport, 13 
 R. 1.454 [defective heating apparatus, 
 injuring pupil]. See Howard v. Wor- 
 cester, 153 Mass. 426, 27 N. E. 11 
 [negligent blasting for erection of 
 school-house], where ground of deci- 
 sion was that the school-house con- 
 struction was for public use. 
 
 ' Donovan v. Board of Education, 
 85 N. Y. 117 [excavation in school- 
 yard left uncovered by workmen em- 
 ployed by trustees; a pupil fell into 
 it]. In Donovan v. McAlpin (85 Id. 
 185), the same plaintiff as in the 
 
 above case sued the trustees person- 
 ally for the negligence of their em- 
 ployee. Held that, acting gratuit- 
 ously for the public, they were not 
 responsible for the negligence of 
 persons employed to do what they 
 were not personally bound to do. In 
 the first case, the decision went on 
 the ground that the school-board was^ 
 organized to exercise purely public 
 functions; that it had no treasury^ 
 and received no private corporate 
 benefit from the powers conferred. 
 To the same effect, see Ham v. New- 
 York, 70 N. Y. 460 ; Terry v. New 
 York, 8 Bosw. 504 ; Diehm v. Cin- 
 cinnati, 35 Ohio St. 305 ; Finch v. 
 Board, etc., 80 Id. 37; Lane v. Wood- 
 bury, 58 Iowa, 463; 13 N. W 
 478 [lightning rod on school-house- 
 broken]; Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kans. 
 33. 
 
 ' Ford V. Kendall School District, 
 131 Pa. St. 543: 15 Atl. 813 [janitor 
 of school threw petroleum in the 
 stove, injuring pupil]. But it is na 
 
499 ' MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [§ 27 1 
 
 § 268. [consolidated with § 258. J 
 
 § 269. [consolidated with § 262. J 
 
 § 270. [consolidated with g 262.] 
 
 §271. Devising plan of public improvement.— After de- 
 ciding to undertake the construction of a public work, and 
 when and where to begin, the corporation is called upon to 
 determine the plan of the structure, e.g., the route and grade 
 of a street,^ the level and size of a sewer,^ and like details ; and 
 
 defense to an action for trespass that 
 a wall which encroached on plaintiff's 
 land was a school-house wall (Miles 
 V. Worcester, 154 Mass. 511 ; 28 N. 
 E. 676), or that it was the negligent 
 plumbing and drainage of a school 
 building that caused the flooding of 
 plaintiff's premises (Briegel v. Phila- 
 delphia, 135 Pa. St. 451 ; 19 Atl. 
 1038). See §339, post 
 
 ' In constructing a plan for a high- 
 way, the officers are called upon to 
 decide upon the safety of the route 
 adopted, and the dangers thereby to 
 be encountered. If guards are neces- 
 sary to protect travelers in passing 
 dangerous places, failure to provide 
 them is simply a defect in the plan 
 of the work, arising from an error 
 of judgment as to its necessities, for 
 which there is no liability (Monk v. 
 New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. 552 ; 11 N. 
 E. S68). In Urquhart v. Ogdens- 
 burg(91 N. Y. 67), the defect com- 
 plained of and which caused the in- 
 jury was that the slope of the side- 
 walk was too steep, so that ioe form- 
 ing on it made it dangerous for 
 travel. Held, the corporation was 
 not liable for error in the plan of the 
 sidewalk. S. p., Watson v. Kingston, 
 114 N. Y. 88 ; 21 N. E. 103 [grade 
 adopted diverted surface water on 
 abutting lot] ; Champion v. Crandon, 
 84 Wise. 405 ; 54 N. W. 775 [same] ; 
 Roach V. Ogdensburg, 80 Hun, 467 ; 
 30 N. Y. Supp. 450 [sidewalk]. See 
 
 Rehrey v. Newburgh, 78 Hun, 611 ; 28 
 N. Y. Supp. 916 ; Smith v. Pella, 86 
 Iowa, 236 ; 53 N. W. 226 ; Shippy v. 
 Au Sable, 65 Mich. 494 ; 32 N. W. 
 741. 
 
 ' In Johnson v. District of Colum- 
 bia (118 U. S. 19 ; 6 S. Ct. 923), Justice 
 Gray stated the rule thus : ' ' The 
 duties of the municipal authorities, 
 in adopting a general plan of drain- 
 age, and determining when and 
 where sewers shall be built, of what 
 size and at what level, are of a quasi- 
 judioial nature, involving the exer- 
 cise of deliberate judgment and large 
 discretion, and depending upon con- 
 siderations affecting the public 
 health and general convenience 
 throughout an extensive territory; 
 and the exercise of such judgment 
 and discretion, in the selection and 
 adoption of the general plan or sys- 
 tem of drainage, is not subject to re- 
 vision by a court or jury in a private 
 action for not sufficiently draining 
 a particular lot of land." Cooley, C. 
 J., in reversing the judgment in 
 Lansing v. Toolan (37 Mich. 152), 
 says : "In planning public works a 
 municipal corporation must deter- 
 mine for itself to what extent it will 
 guard against possible accidents, 
 courts and juries are not to say it 
 shall be punished in damages for not 
 giving the public more complete pro- 
 tection ; for that would be to take 
 the administration of municipal af- 
 
§ 272] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. SCO 
 
 also, what precautions are reasonably required to prevent 
 accidents while the work is in progress. All these matters 
 must be determined by the corporation for itself; courts 
 and juries cannot decide that the plan adopted was ill-judged, 
 and that the corporation should be punished in damages for 
 its error in judgment and for not giving the public more com- 
 plete protection.' All that can be required, where the statute 
 does not specify the plan or other particulars of construction, 
 is that such course should be adopted as is reasonably calcu- 
 lated to subserve the object of the work,"* according to the needs 
 of the present, and those of the future so far as they can be 
 reasonably anticipated. 
 
 § 272. Error of judgment distinguished from negligence. — 
 
 The foregoing principle has been accepted with entire approval 
 by all the courts, though the cases disclose some divergence of 
 opinion among them as to its proper application. Some dis- 
 tinctions are made, which it is important to note. Thus, a 
 distinction is made (justly, we think) between a mere " error of 
 judgment " in devising a plan of construction, for which, as we 
 have seen, the corporation is not liable, and such a palpable 
 lack of skill and care as amounts to negligence, in devising and 
 adopting the plan of a public work.^ It is a lack of ordinary 
 
 fairs out of the hands to -which it liable for consequent insufficiency], 
 
 has been intrusted by law." See But see Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. 
 
 Garratt v. Canandaigua, 135 N. Y. Y. 136 ; 4 N. E. 321 ; and cases cited 
 
 436 ; 33 N. E. 142 [drainage sewer] ; under § 275, post. In constructing 
 
 and cases cited under § 374, post. a market-house, the corporation is 
 
 2 Johnson V. District of Columbia, not bound to anticipate the oocur- 
 
 supra. rence of extraordinary forces of na^ 
 
 <"The degree of care and fore- ture, and, therefore, is not liable to 
 sight which it is necessary to use in one injured by the fall of the house, 
 cases of this description, must always occasioned by an unusual and extra- 
 he in proportion to the nature and ordinary wind storm (Flori v. St. 
 magnitude of the injury that will be Louis, 69 Mo. 841) ; nor from the 
 likely to result from the occurrence flooding of a water-way, caused by an 
 which is to be anticipated and extraordinary rainfall (German 
 guarded against" (New York v. Theo. School v. Dubuque, 64 Iowa, 
 Bailey, 2 Den. 433). See § 45, ante. 786 ; Allen v. Chippewa Falls, 53 
 Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 309 Wise. 430 ; Evansville v. Decker, 84 
 [sewer, when built, was large enough Ind. 335 ; Wright v. Wilmington, 92 
 to carry off all the water, but the N. 0. 156). 
 
 system of sewerage being extended, ■ This distinction is clearly made 
 
 an increased flow resulted ; city not in several cases in Indiana. In 
 
501 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§ 272 
 
 prudence, for example, amounting to culpable negligence, to 
 stop the course of a natural water-way, without providing an 
 artificial substitute to discharge the water accustomed to flow 
 through it ;2 or to plan a bridge to be built of timbers so slight 
 that they would give way beneath the tread of a child or horse,* 
 or with a span so narrow as not to allejw the free flow of 
 water in times of ordinary freshets;* or to build a road on a 
 high embankment without guard or barrier' or a sidewalk of a 
 
 North Vernon v. Voegler (103 Ind. 
 314 ; 3 N. E. 831),by an improvement 
 in a city street, surface water was 
 set back and overflowed plaintiff's 
 lots. The improvements were made 
 under an ordinance and a plan of 
 the common council. Held, that 
 the corporation was liable. Elliott, 
 J., said : " The only rule that has 
 any solid support in principle is, that 
 for errors of judgment in devising a 
 plan, there is no liability ; but there 
 is liability where the lack of care 
 and skill in devising the plan is so 
 great as to constitute negligence.'' 
 See to same effect, Eice v. Evans- 
 vUle, 108 Ind. 7; 9 N. E. 139 ; Evans- 
 ville V. Decker, 84 Ind. 325 ; Cum- 
 mins V. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 ; Sey- 
 mour V. Cummins, 119 Id. 148 ; 21 N. 
 E. 549. Substantially the same dis- 
 tinction was made in Gould v. To- 
 peka, 32 Kans. 485; 4 Pac. 822; 
 Wilson V. Atlanta, 60 Ga. 473 ; Chi- 
 cago V. Gallagher, 44 111. 295 ["bridge 
 across a canal of less width than the 
 street leading to it, and without rail- 
 ings]. See § 274, post, as to sewers. 
 'Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 
 235 ; Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 
 569. See cases under § 274. 
 
 'It is negligence to construct a 
 road or bridge of a poor kind of ma- 
 terial, not likely to endure the 
 weather (Townsend v. Susquehanna 
 Turnp. Co., 6 Johns. 90 ; People v. 
 Waterford, etc., Turnp. Co., 2Keyes, 
 327 ; Howard county v. Legg, 93 
 Ind. 528 ; 11 N. E. 612), or of a width 
 
 unsafe or inconvenient for travel 
 (Wilson V. Susquehanna Turnp. Co., 
 21 Barb. 68 ; Aldrich v. Pelham, 1 
 Gray, 510); depending upon its loca- 
 tion, and the business to which it will 
 be principally appropriated (Fowler 
 V. Mott, 19 Barb. 204). 
 
 ■•Riddle v. Delaware county, 156 
 Pa. St. 61:J ; 27 Atl. 569. In that 
 case, a mill owner had raised his dam 
 and erected a stone wall in the 
 stream. Held, the county, in erect- 
 ing a bridge across the stream, was 
 bound to provide for the then exist- 
 ing conditions ; and if a larger span 
 in the bridge would have obviated 
 the flooding of plaintiff's property, 
 he was entitled ti> recover for the 
 injury, though such flooding would 
 not have occurred if he had not 
 raised the dam or built the wall. 
 
 ' Maxim v. Champion, 50 Hun, 88 ; 
 4 N. Y. Supp. 515 ; Wood v. Gilboa, 76 
 Hun, 175 ; 27 N. Y. Supp. 586) ; dis- 
 tinguishing cases cited in note 1, 
 § 271, ante. See § 275, post. On 
 one side of a city street was a high 
 embankment, withoutrails, guards or 
 lights ; plaintiff's carriage overturn- 
 ing he was precipitated down the 
 embankment and injured. Held, 
 that where a street as planned was 
 so manifestly dangerous that a court, 
 upon the facts, could say, as matter 
 of law, it was dangerous and unsafe, 
 the city was liable ; but where it 
 would be so doubtful whether the 
 street as planned was dangerous or 
 unsafe or not, that different minds 
 
§272] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 S02 
 
 dangerously steep grade, not required by the natural lay of the 
 land.* If the work, as planned and ordered, is so manifestly 
 dangerous that a court can say, upon the facts, as matter of 
 law, that it was dangerous and. unsafe for travel or otherwise a 
 cause of injury, the city will be liable for the consequence of 
 executing it.^ This would be not an " error of judgment," but 
 neglect to use ordinary care and prudence, and the corporation 
 should not be allowed to excuse itself for the consequences of 
 its fault, on the pretense of a judicial discretion in the adoption 
 of the plan and the selection of materials. We quite agree that 
 such cases do not come within the rule stated. There is in such 
 cases no question of the breach of a purely discretionary duty ; 
 the duty neglected was executive and ministerial, and the lia- 
 bility of the corporation for the consequences of such neglect 
 rests upon the same principle as that under which individuals 
 are made liable for the acts of themselves and their servants in 
 the performance of a similar duty. 
 
 might entertain difEerent opinions 
 witli respect thereto, the benefit of 
 the doubt might properly be given 
 to the city, and it should not be held 
 liable (Gould v. Topeka, 32 Kans. 
 485 ; 4 Pac. 822 ; Blyhl v. Waterville, 
 57 Minn. 115 ;58-N. W. 817 [side- 
 walk] ; Sawyer v. Newburyport, 157 
 Mass. 430 ; 33 N. E. 653 [defect in 
 original construction, question for 
 the jury]. A charge that, if the 
 jury found that the sidewalk, as 
 originally constructed, was danger- 
 ous to persons who used it, that a 
 person of ordinary care and pru- 
 dence would not have so construc- 
 ted it, they would be justified in 
 finding the walk originally negli- 
 gently constructed. Held, correct 
 (Kendall v. Albia, 73 Iowa, 341 ; 34 
 N. "W. 883). The real ground of re- 
 covery in these cases was not so much 
 the defects in the original plan, as 
 failure to correct them after they 
 were discovered. 
 
 'Clemenoe v. Auburn, 66 N. Y. 
 334 ; Granger v. Seneca Falls, 45 
 Hun, 60. 
 
 ' In Weightman v. Washington (1 
 Black, 39) the plan for a bridge was 
 essentially and radically defective, 
 and at the time of the falling of the 
 bridge its braces were broken and 
 some of the wedges had fallen out, 
 and the bridge was loose and shook 
 greatly when carriages passed over 
 it. Held, the corporation was liable 
 for injuries sustained by the falling 
 of the bridge. A city which so con- 
 structs the doors of an engine house 
 that they open outward with springs, 
 is liable for injuries resulting, if the 
 necessary operation of the doors was 
 dangerous to persons passing on the 
 sidewalk, though ordinary care was 
 used by the employees (Kies v. Erie, 
 169 Pa. St. 598; 33 Atl. 631). It is 
 negligence to grade two streets which 
 run at right angles with each other 
 without providing for the comple- 
 tion of one before the other, if the 
 result of so doing is necessarily to 
 cause the excavation in one of them 
 to be filled with water during the 
 prosecution of the work, without 
 possibility of escape, and thereby in- 
 
.S03 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§274- 
 
 § 273. [consolidated with § 272]. 
 
 § 274. Planning inefficient or injurious drainage. — In 
 
 applying the rule of corporate non-liability for injuries caused 
 by drains or sewers, constructed on a faulty plan as to size, 
 level, location or other detail, a distinction is made between 
 sewers designed merely to collect and carry off surface water 
 from streets and public places, and artificial channels planned 
 as substitutes for natural water-courses. No duty rests upon 
 the corporation, at common law, to drain surface water from 
 its streets and public places,' much less from abutting private 
 lands ;^ but when such a duty is assumed, or is imposed, with- 
 out the plans or details of the work being prescribed, all courts 
 agree that, in deciding upon the size and other details of a 
 ■sewer, the corporation acts ^jiasz-iudiciaWy, and hence is not 
 liable, in the absence of bad faith, for an error of judgment, 
 though the work, as planned, turns out to be inefficient, under 
 
 jure adjacent property (Lacour v. 
 New York, 3 Duer, 406). S. P., Ken- 
 sington V. Wood, 10 Pa. St. 93; 
 Jlagg V. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601 ; 
 Welsh V. Rutland, 56 Vt. 228 ; 
 Hitchins v. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100 ; 
 11 Atl. 826 ; Nevins v. Peoria, 41 111. 
 503 ; Beatrice v. Leary, 45 Neb. 149 ; 
 63 N. W. 370 ; De Baker v. Southern 
 Cal. R. Co., 106 Cal. 257 ; 39 Pac. 610 ; 
 Stanford v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 
 198 ; 43 Pac. 605. 
 
 1 Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y. 60 ; 
 Gould V. Booth. 66 Id. 62 ; Acker v. 
 New Castle, 48 Hun ,312. The grad- 
 ing and paving of streets prevented 
 the absorption of rain, which was 
 consequently discharged on adjoin- 
 ing land in greater quantities than 
 it would otherwise have been. Held, 
 that as the municipality could not 
 be compelled to construct drains to 
 •dispose of surface water, it was not 
 liable (Anchor Brewing Co. v. Dobbs 
 Ferry, 84 Hun. 274 ; 32 N. Y. Supp. 
 371). See St. Paul, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Duluth, 56 Minn. 494. s. p., Byrne 
 V. Farmington, 64 Conn. 367; 30 
 
 Atl. 138 ; Waters v. Bay View, 61 
 Wise. 642 ; Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Id. 
 656 ; Champion v. Crandon, 84 Id. 
 405; Monticello v. Fox, 3 Ind. 
 App. 481 ; 28 N. E. 1025 ; Kearney v. 
 Themanson, 48 Neb. 74 ; 66 N. W. 
 996; Bush v. Portland, 19 Oreg. 
 45 ; 23 Pac. 667. " The construction 
 of -ewers and drains to carry off 
 merely surface water is purely dis- 
 cretionary with a city. It may con- 
 struct them or not at its option'' 
 (per Valentine, .)., Atchison v. Chal- 
 liss, 9 Kans. 603), or discontinue and 
 abandon them, at discretion, pro- 
 vided individuals are left thereby in 
 no worse condition than if they had 
 never been built (lb ; see Simpson 
 V. Keokuk, 34 Iowa, 568). Compare 
 Sample v. Vicksburg, 62 Miss. 63 
 [city liable for disconnecting plain- 
 tiff 's drain with public sewei-]. 
 
 2 Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489 ; 
 St. Paul. etc. R. Co. v. Duluth, 56 
 Minn. 494 ; 58 N. W. 159 ; Henderson 
 V. Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 319 ; Evans- 
 ville V. Decker, 84 Ind. S25, and cases 
 cited. 
 
§274j 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 504 
 
 circumstances which could not reasonably be anticipated.^ 
 The adoption, however, of a plan which does not provide 
 proper means of escape for the water, so that it sets back 
 upon, or overflows, adjacent lands, under ordinary conditions, 
 or one which provides for the discharge of the water directly 
 upon another's premises,* is a clear abuse of discretion, and, 
 
 ' Johnson v District of Columbia, 
 118 U. S. 19 ; 6 S. Ct. 923 [overflow 
 of sewer of inadequate size] ; Wilson 
 V. New York, 1 Denio, 595, 598; 
 Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489 
 [water set back in sewer] ; Watson 
 V. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 83 ; 21 N. E. 
 102 ; Garratt v. Canandaigua, 135 
 N. Y. 436 ; 32 N. E. 142 ; Merrifleld 
 V. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 ; Buck- 
 ley V. New Bedford, 155 Id. 64 ; 29 
 N. E. 201 ; Darling v. Bangor, 68 Me. 
 108; Attwood v. Bangor, 83 Id. 
 582 ; 22 Atl. 466 [locating sewer] ; 
 Diamond Match Co. v. New Haven, 
 55 Conn. 510 ; 13 Atl. 409 [mistake 
 of engineer] ; Collins v. Philadelphia, 
 93 Pa. St. 2:2 ; Fair v. Philadelphia, 
 88 Id. 309; Carr v. Northern Lib- 
 erties, 35 Id. 324 ; Bear v. AUentown, 
 148 Pa. St. 80 ; 23 Atl. 1062 ; Har 
 rigan v. Wilmington [Del.], 12 Atl. 
 779 [sewer not grossly inadequate] ; 
 Weis V. Madison, 75 Ind. 241 ; Eice 
 V. Evansville, 108 Id. 7 ; 9 N. E. 139 ; 
 Peru V. Brown, 10 Ind. App. 597 ; 
 38 N. E. 223 ; Dermont v. Detroit, 4 
 Mich. 435 ; Allen v. Chippewa Falls, 
 52 Wise. 430 ; 9 N. W. 284 ; Damour 
 V. Lyons, 44 Iowa, 276 ; German 
 Theo. School v. Dubuque, 64 Id. 736 ; 
 17 N. W. 153 [location of sewer 
 draining a ravine] ; Wicks v. De- 
 Witt, 54 Iowa, 130; 6 N. W. 176 
 [location of ditch] ; Thompson v. 
 Polk county. 38 Minn. 130 ; 36 N. W. 
 267 ; Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 
 572 ; Atchison y. Challiss, 9 Kans. 
 603 ; Kearney v. Thoemanson, 25 
 Neb. 147 ; 41 N. W. 115 ; Denver v. 
 Capelli, 4 Colo. 25; Los Angeles 
 
 Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 103^ 
 Cal. 461 J 37 Pac. 375. 
 
 ■* " A municipal corporation has no- 
 greater right than an individual to 
 collect the surface water of its lands 
 or streets into an artificial channel 
 and discharge it upon the lands of 
 another" (per Andrews, J., Noonan 
 V. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470). " The cases 
 to the effect that a municipal corpo- 
 ration is not liable for an omission 
 to supply drainage or sewerage do^ 
 not apply to a case where the neces- 
 sity for the drainage or outlet is 
 caused by the act of the corporation 
 itself " (Byrnes v. Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 
 204). To the same effect, Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Fifth Baptist Ch.,. 
 108 U. S. 317 ; 2 S. Ct. 719 ; Stoddard 
 V. Saratoga Springs, 127 N. Y. 261 ; 
 27 N. E. 1030 ; Chapman v. Roches- 
 ter, 110 N. Y. 273 ; 18 N. E. 88 [dis- 
 charging water and sewage into 
 stream] ; Clark v. Rochester, 43 Hun, 
 271 [diverting surface water from 
 natural channel] ; Beach v. Elmira, 
 22 Id. 158 ; Bastable v. Syracuse, 
 8 Hun, 587 ; appeal dismissed, 12 
 N. T. 64 ; GiUett v. Kinderhook, 77 
 Hun, 604; 28 N. Y. Supp. 1044;. 
 Daggett V. Cohoes, 54 Hun, 639. 
 mem.; 7 N. Y. Supp. 882 ; Hooker v. 
 Rochester, 37 Hun, 181 ; Donohue 
 V. New York, 3 Daly, 65 ; Lewen- 
 thal V. New York, 61 Barb. 511 ; 
 Kavanagh v. Brooklyn, 38 Id. 234; 
 Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 
 208 ; Manning v. Lowell, 130 Id. 21 ; 
 Collins V. Waltham, 151 Id. 196 j 
 24 N. E. 327; Bohan v. Avoca,' 
 154 Pa. St. 404 ; 26 Atl. 604 ; West 
 
SOS 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§274 
 
 under the rule already stated, the corporation is liable for 
 damages caused by a work built upon such a necessarily 
 defective plan. In diverting a natural water-course, or con- 
 
 Orange V. Field, 37 N. J. Eq. 600 ; 
 EUiott V. Oil City. 139 Pa. St. 
 570 ; 18 Atl. 553. See Fi-ostburg v. 
 Dufty, 70 Md. 47 ; 16 Atl. 643 ; Smith 
 V. Alexandria, 33 Gratt. 208 ; Bur- 
 ton V. Chattanooga, 17 Lea, 739 ; 
 Eufaula v. Simmons, 86 Ala. 515 ; 
 6 So. 47 ; Jacksonville v. Lambert, 63 
 111. 519 ; Aurora v. Reed, 57 Id. 29 ; 
 Elgin V. Kimball, 90 Id. 356 ; Craw- 
 fordsville v. Bond, 96 Ind. 336 
 Evansville v. Decker, 84 Id. 335 
 Templeton v. Voshloe, 73 Id. 134 
 Schlichter v. Phillipy, 67 Id. 301 
 Buford V. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 
 98; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Id. 
 296 ; Defer v. Detroit, 67 Id. 346 ; 34 
 N. W. 680 ; Bice v. Flint, 67 Mich. 
 401 ; 34 N. W. 719 ; Schroeder v. 
 Baraboo, 93 Wise. 95 ; 67 N. W. 27 ; 
 FoUmann v. Mankato, 45 Minn. 457 ; 
 48 N. W. 193 ; Stoehr v. St. Paul, 54 
 Minn. 549; 56 N. W. 350; Da- 
 mour V. Lyons, 44 Iowa, 276 ; 
 Foster v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 157 ; Im- 
 ler V. Springfield, 55 Id. 119 ; Schatt- 
 ner v. Kansas City, 53 Id. 163 ; Sax- 
 ton V. St. Joseph, 60 Id. 153 ; Weg- 
 mann v. Jefferson City, 61 Id. 55 ; 
 Rychlicki v. St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497 ; 
 11 S. W. 1001 ; Edmondson v. Mo- 
 berly, 98 Mo. 523; 11 S. W. 990; 
 Am V. Kansas City, 14 Fed. 236. 
 Where owing to the natural confor- 
 mation of the country, surface water 
 has formed for itself a definite chan- 
 nel, in which it is accustomed to 
 flow, a city is bound to build cul- 
 verts, sufficient to discharge the or- 
 dinary flow of water, in grading 
 streets (Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n 
 V. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461 ; 37 Pac. 
 375 ; Lehn v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 
 76). Compare Rice v. Evansville (108 
 Ind. 7 ; 9 N. E. 139), where it was 
 
 held that the court would not say, 
 as matter of law, that a sewer was 
 inadequate in size to carry off sur- 
 face water, occasionally running 
 through a ravine, not a natural water, 
 course. Thus, where a culvert, con- 
 structed for the purpose of carrying 
 off the water of a natural stream 
 which bad been the outlet of the 
 surface water of a portion of the 
 city, w^as of such insufficient capac- 
 ity and so otherwise negligently con- 
 structed that, on the occurrence of 
 a freshet, it failed to discharge the 
 waters, so that they are set back up- 
 on adjacent premises, held that the 
 city was liable for the injuries there- 
 by caused (Rochester White Lead 
 Co. V. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463). s. P., 
 Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 149 
 Mass. 44 ; 30 N. E. 330 ; Manning v. 
 Lowell, 130 Id. 31 ; Morse v. Wor- 
 cester, 139 Id. 389 ; Stanchfield v. 
 Newton, 143 Id. 110 ; Crawfordsville 
 V. Bond, 96 Ind. 236; McClure v. 
 Red Wing, 38 Minn. 186 ; Blakely v, 
 Devine, 36 Id. 53; 39 N. W. 342 
 Pye V. Mankato, 36 Id. 373 ; 31 N, 
 W. 863 ; Barnes v. Hannibal, 71 Mo, 
 449; Weis v. Madison, 75 Ind. 241 
 Gillison v. Charleston, 16 W.Va. 282 
 Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569 
 Spelman v. Portage, 41 Wise. 144 
 Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa, 308 
 Damourv. Lyons, 44 Id. 276 ; Powers 
 V. Council Bluffs, 50 Id. 201 ; Bea- 
 trice V. Leary, 45 Neb. 149 ; 63 N. W. 
 370 ; Spangler v. San Francisco, 84 
 Cal. 13, 17 ; 23 Pac. 1091 [temporary 
 dam to divert water course, while 
 building sewer, caused flooding of 
 adjoining lands during unusual 
 storm]. It has been held in Penn- 
 sylvania, however, that a munici- 
 pality's failure to construct a sewer 
 
§274] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 506 
 
 fining and carrying off its waters in an artificial channel, as a 
 substitute therefor, the corporation cannot escape liability for 
 the consequences of the work as planned on the plea that the 
 
 along the bed of a creek (under 
 statutory authority) of suflSoient 
 capacity to carry off all its waters, 
 was a mere want of judgment, and 
 hence the city was not liable for an 
 overflow of the creek, after a heavy 
 rain (Collins v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 
 272). There is some diversity of opin- 
 ion as to whether it is a justification 
 for causing surface water to be cast 
 upon an adjacent owner's land, that 
 such was the effect of an authorized 
 raising of the grade of a street, and 
 as to whether the city in such a case 
 was bound to make some provision 
 for carrying off the surface water, so 
 as to prevent the flooding of abutting 
 land, and whether, failing to do so, 
 it is liable for injuries so caused. 
 It was held so bound in Dixon v. 
 Baker, 65 111. 518 ; Nevins v. Peoria, 
 41 Id. 502 ; Elgin v. Kimball, 90 Id. 
 356 ; Crawfordsville v. Bond, 96 Ind. 
 230 ; North Vernon v. Voegler, 89 Id. 
 77 ; I^a Fayette v. Nagle, 113 Id. 435 ; 
 15 N. E. 1 ; Quincey v. Jones, 76 111. 
 231 ; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 
 331 ; Imlerv. SpringBeld, 55 Mo. 119 ; 
 Sheehy v. Kansas City R. Co., 94 Id. 
 574 ; 7 S. W. 579 ; Schattner v. Kan- 
 sas City, 53 Id. 162 ; Burton v. Chat- 
 tanooga, 7 Lea [Tenn.], 739 ; Mont- 
 gomery V. Townsend, 84 Ala. 478 ; 4 
 So. 780. For the Ohio rule, see Cin- 
 cinnati V. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499 
 Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Id. 133 
 McCombs V. Akron, 15 Ohio, 471 
 18 Id. 229; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 
 Ohio, 159 ; approved, Keating v. 
 Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 141. But the 
 great body of authority is in accord- 
 ance with the rule that the flooding 
 of the abutting land in such cases is 
 proximately owing to the owner's 
 failure to raise his land to the grade 
 
 of the street, and that, providing the 
 work of grading is doue with reason- 
 able care and skill, the owner is 
 without remedy. The city has the 
 right to presume that the abutting 
 owner will bring his premises to 
 grade, and thus protect himself from 
 overflow (West Orange v. Field, 37 
 N. J. Eq. 600 ; MUler v. Morristown, 
 47 Id. 62 ; 20 Atl. 61 ; Gardiner v. 
 Johnston, 16 R. I. 94 ; 12 Atl. 888 ; 
 GUpatrick v. Biddeford, 86 Me. 534 ; 
 30 Atl. 99 ; AUentown v. Kramer, 
 73 Pa. St. 405 ; Magarity v. Wilming- 
 ton, 5 Del. 530 ; Cumberland v. Wil- 
 lison, 50 Md. 138 ; Alden v. Minne- 
 apolis, 34 Minn. 354 ; Henderson v. 
 Minneapolis, 82 Id. 819 ; Freburg v. 
 Davenport, 63 Iowa, 119 ; Morris v. 
 Council Bluffs, 67 Id. 343 ; Stewart 
 T. Clinton, 79 Mo. 603 ; Patoka v. 
 Hopkins, 131 Ind. 143 ; 30 N. E. 890 ; 
 Kokomo V. Mahan, 100 Id. 243 ; Weis 
 V. Madison, 75 Id. 341 ; Princeton v. 
 Gieske, 93 Id. 103 ; Fuller v. Atlanta, 
 66 Ga. 80 ; White v. Yazoo City, 37 
 Miss. 357 ; Herring v. District of 
 Columbia, 3 Mackey [D, C], 573; 
 Champion v. Crandon, 84 Wise. 405; 
 54 N. W. 775; Beatrice v. Knight 
 45 Neb. 546 ; 63 N. W. 838 ; Thibo- 
 daux V. Thibodaux, 46 La. Ann. 
 1528 ; 16 So. 450.) See cases cited in 
 note 3, § 383 post. The rule of non- 
 liability is well settled in New York 
 (Watson V. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 88 ; 
 affi'g 43 Hun, 367, and cases cited.) 
 See Betts v. GloversviUe, 56 Hun, 
 639, mem.; 8 N. Y. Supp. 795. The 
 ordinance authorizing the gi-ading 
 must conform to the requirements 
 of the charter to make such grading 
 legal ; otherwise the city is liable for 
 damages caused (Meinzer v. Racine, 
 70 Wise. 561 ; 36 N. W. 360.) 
 
507 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§275 
 
 plan was faulty through an error of judgment. It is bound to 
 use reasonable care and skill in planning as well as construct- 
 ing such new channel. If it is insufficient in size or otherwise 
 faulty, so that the water is set back, or is otherwise made a 
 cause of injury to another, the corporation is liable, not for 
 diverting the course of the stream (if authorized to do so), but 
 for a failure to use ordinary care and skill in the construction 
 of the sewer.' 
 
 § 275. Duty to remedy defects in plan.— It is well settled 
 that when a public work, as planned, is found to result in 
 direct and physical injury to the property of another, which, 
 from its nature, is liable to be repeated and continuous, but is 
 remediable by the adoption of prudential measures, the cor- 
 poration is liable for such damages as occur in consequence of 
 the continuance of the original cause, after notice, and an 
 omission to remedy the evil.* The immunity from liability 
 
 * Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wise. 
 264 ; Atwater v. Canandaigua, 134 
 N. Y. 602 ; 37 N. E. 385 [dam across 
 outlet of lake] ; see Pettigrew v. 
 Evansville, 25 Wise. 323 , Pumpelly 
 V. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; 
 Barton v. Syracuse, 37 Barb. 393; 
 Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80 ; Del- 
 monico v. New York, 1 Sandf. 233 ; 
 Smith V. Milwaukee, 18 Wise. 69, 
 and cases cited under § 373, ante. 
 
 ' Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 
 136; 4 N. E. 331 (distinguishing 
 Mills V. Brooklyn, 33 N. Y. 489; Smith 
 V. New York, 66 Id. 39.5 ; Lynch v. 
 New York. 76 Id. 60 ; Wilsou v. New 
 York, 1 Den. 595). In that case, the 
 sewage commissioners adopted a sys- 
 tem of drainage over and through 
 plaintiff's land. A main sewer was 
 built and lateral sewers were con- 
 nected with it from time to time. 
 Soon after the main sewer was com- 
 pleted, it was demonstrated that it 
 was insufficient to carry off all the 
 sewage flowing into it, and at times 
 plaintiff's premises were iimndated 
 with noxious matter driven through 
 
 the manholes. As other lateral sew- 
 ers were added, these overflows in- 
 creased, and were known to the mu- 
 nicipal officers. Notwithstanding 
 which, lateral sewers -were continu- 
 ally added, and the nuisance pro- 
 duced by the defect in the original 
 plan as steadily increased. Held, 
 the city was liable for not adopting 
 measures to abate the nuisance. 
 Followed, Munk v. Watertown, 67 
 Hun, 261 : 33 N. Y. Supp. 237. In Le- 
 high county V. Hoffort (116 Pa. St. 
 119 ; 9 Atl. 177), it was held that in 
 planning a bridge, a city is not bound 
 to anticipate its own future growth, 
 and the consequent increase of ti-avel 
 on the bridge, fifty years thereafter, 
 or to anticipate that horses would be- 
 come unmanageable while crossing 
 it, and that being properly planned 
 when built and large enough for its 
 then uses, the failure to erect a guard 
 was not actionable negligence. The 
 last conclusion seems to us erroneous. 
 A more reasonable conclusion was 
 reached in Fleming v. Manchester 
 (44 Law Times [N. S.] 517), where a 
 
g 276] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 50S 
 
 for the consequences following the exercise of judicial or dis- 
 cretionary power by a municipal corporation presupposes that 
 the act performed may, in some manner, be lawfully exercised ; 
 but the legislature cannot sanction, and the statute is no pro- 
 tection for, an invasion of individual rights.^ 
 
 § 276. Discretion in the application of limited funds.— 
 
 A municipal corporation or highway officer, charged with the 
 general duty of repairing the highways within the corporation 
 limits, has a discretion as to the application of the means in 
 hand devoted to that purpose. If the funds are limited in 
 amount, and there is no way of obtaining more, there is no 
 duty to undertake more than they will complete and pay for. 
 If the means in hand or obtainable are insufficient to repair 
 all ^ the highways of the town or all parts of that particular 
 highway,^ the questions whether this or that street or bridge, or 
 this or that portion of a particular street, requires repair ; or 
 whether the funds ought to be used in the repair of one street 
 or bridge more than another, call for deliberation, judgment 
 and discretion, in the exercise of which good faith will be pre- 
 sumed. In the absence of a statute imposing an absolute lia- 
 bility, the town or officer, as the case may be, is responsible 
 for the condition of the highway, only to the extent of the 
 means possessed, or obtainable, to accomplish the task ; and 
 there is no liability for the consequences of an error of judg- 
 ment in the application of such means.^ 
 
 sewer 40 years after it had been con- ' Where the statute does not im- 
 structed, during a violent storm, pose an absolute liability upon high- 
 burst under plaintiff's cellar. The way officers, or upon a town having 
 jury found that the bui-sting of the the care and superintendence of its 
 sewer was caused by defects in its highways, the duty to maintain every 
 original construction, and by the part of a particular highway in a 
 omission of defendants to take rea- safe condition for travel is only com- 
 sonable means to discover the de- mensurate with the means provided 
 fects. Held, that the corporation for that purpose. Hence, where 
 was liable. And see § 287, posi. highway commissioners received a 
 
 ^ Seifert v. Brooklyn, nupra, per specific sum of money to spend in 
 
 Euger, C. J. See Childs v. Boston, repairing seventy-five miles of roads 
 
 86 Mass. 41. and bridges, and this sum was all 
 
 ' Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 29 N. Y. spent thereon, and they had no 
 
 297. means of obtaining more, held, that 
 
 ' Monk V. New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. the town (made liable by statute for 
 
 553 ; 11 N. E. 268, per Ruger, C. J. such injuries as the commissioners 
 
509 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§278 
 
 § 277. [consolidated with § 374.] 
 
 § 278. How far professional advice will excuse defective 
 plan. — It may become the duty of the municipal officers, in 
 •adopting a plan of construction, depending, of course, upon the 
 character of the work, to consult an architect, surveyor, or 
 other person skilled in such matters.^ As a general rule, the 
 corporation will be protected by the advice of persons pro- 
 fessionally familiar with the subject, notwithstanding the 
 structure turns out to be radically defective.^ But if an incom- 
 
 were liable for) , was not liable for 
 the want of a railing along a par- 
 ticular part of the road running on 
 an embanlinient, the commissioners 
 not having sufficient funds to build 
 it. In such a case, held error to charge 
 that if the jury found " that the great 
 necessity was to keep the actual bed 
 of the roadway safe, they were 
 right in spending the money in that 
 way; but if you say that it was of 
 more importance to guard this high- 
 way, then they were wrong. " This 
 would be leaving to the jury to find 
 defendants liable for an error of 
 judgment, where they were un- 
 able from want of means to re- 
 pair all the defective places in the 
 highway (Monk v. New Utrecht, 
 supra) . 
 
 ' See Rochester White Lead Co. v. 
 Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463. In Terre 
 Haute V. Hudnut (112 Ind. 543 ; 13 
 N. E. 686) it was held that where the 
 character of a sewer required the 
 preparation of a plan by a skilled 
 person, it was negligence for coun- 
 cilmen to act on their own judg- 
 ment ; they were bound to exercise 
 reasonable care in securing the prep- 
 aration of plans by a skilled person, 
 and to use ordinary care in seeing 
 that such person used his skill. 
 Having done so, the city was not 
 liable for a defect in the plan. 
 
 ' Thus, where road trustees ordered 
 a drain to be cut, and informed them- 
 
 selves how it could best be done, and 
 took the opinion of a competent 
 surveyor upon the subject, who said 
 that it was not likely to produce in- 
 jury to any one, it was held, in an 
 early English case, that no negli- 
 gence could be imputed to them, as 
 they did all that the statute required 
 them to do in the best manner they 
 were able, and according to the best 
 information, though it turned out 
 that they were mistaken in their 
 judgment (Sutton v. Clarke, 1 Marsh. 
 439 ; 6 Taunt. 29). See also Sherman 
 V. Kortright, 52 Barb. 267. If a city 
 chooses a competent engineer, and 
 he, by error of judgment, makes a 
 culvert too small, no negligence on 
 the part of the city is shown (Van 
 Pelt V. Davenport, 42 Iowa, 308). It 
 is quite otherwise in the case of an 
 individual who undertakes to build 
 a road or bridge for his own profit. 
 He cannot, of course, relieve him- 
 self from responsibility for defects 
 therein on the ground that he em- 
 ployed a competent engineer to build 
 it (Grote v. Chester, etc. E. Co 3 
 Exch. 251 ; Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q. 
 B. 060). In Rhinelander v. Lock- 
 port (60 Hun, 582, mem.; 14 N. Y. 
 Supp. 850) a city's street gutters were 
 all built on the same plan by advice 
 of its surveyor. Held, there being 
 no defect in the maintenance of tlie 
 gutter, city was not liable for a 
 structural defect therein. Compare 
 
§279] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 510 
 
 petent person is intrusted with the work, his advice is no justifi- 
 cation ; and although a competent person is selected, and a 
 plan is adopted on his advice, yet if it becomes apparent, dur- 
 ing the progress of the work, that the plan adopted is defec- 
 tive, the corporation is guilty of negligence if it allows the 
 work to progress to completion on that plan.^ 
 
 § 279. Statutory directions as to plan. — Where the plan 
 of construction, the materials to be used, or other particulars, 
 are expressly prescribed by statute, such directions must be 
 strictly complied with. Non-compliance with the statutory 
 requirement or departure from the plan adopted, is enough to 
 .sustain an action for injuries suffered in consequence thereof, 
 without proof of actual negligence.' It is no defense that the 
 deviation better subserves the convenience of the public than 
 the plan prescribed, or that the substituted plan has been skill- 
 f ally carried out.^ 
 
 Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80 [city 
 liable for fall of bridge through want 
 of skill of city engineer], and Harris- 
 burg V. Saylor, 87 Pa. St. 216. 
 
 ' Weightman v. Washington, 1 
 Black, 39. See § 273, ante. 
 
 ' Wilson V. Susquehanna Turnp. 
 Co., 21 Barb. 68. There, the defend- 
 ant had failed to construct its road, 
 at the place of the accident,- as wide 
 as the statute required. Held, that 
 ' ' if there was a failure on the part 
 of defendant to comply with an ex- 
 press requirement of the statute, 
 either as to the width of the road or 
 as to the mode of its construction, 
 and a person traveling over it sus- 
 tained an injury in consequence of 
 such omission, defendant is respon- 
 sible. In such case, there is no ques- 
 tion involvei of want of skill or care 
 on the part of the defendant." S. P. , 
 Harlow V. Humiston, 6 Cowen, 189 ; 
 Dygert v. Schenck, 33 Wend. 446 ; 
 Baltimore, etc. Turnp. Co. v. Bate- 
 man, 68 Md. 389 ; 13 Atl. 54. In 
 Clemence v. Auburn (66 N. Y. 334), 
 the common council had directed the 
 building of the siaewalk, and one of 
 
 its members, in constructing it, made 
 an alteration from the original plan 
 which was entirely unauthorized. 
 The slanting stone which caused the 
 injury, instead of being laid as 
 directed by the common council, 
 was laid contrary to its directions by 
 an alderman. Held, city was liable. 
 Followed, Munk v. Watertown, 67 
 Hun, 261 ; 23 N. Y. Supp. 227. In 
 Hardy v. Brooklyn (90 N. Y. 435), 
 there was a departure from the plan 
 adopted for a sewer system, in con- 
 sequence of which plaintiff's prop- 
 erty was injured. Held, city was 
 liable. " We do not think that, un- 
 der such circumstances, where there 
 was a failure to carry out the plan 
 adopted, it can be held that it was a 
 mere exercise of discretion, which 
 exempted the defendant from lia- 
 bility" (per Miller, J.), s. p., Pekin, 
 V. Newell, 26 111. 320. 
 
 ^Hughes V. Providence, etc., E. 
 Co , 3 R. I. 498. Compare Smith v. 
 Pella, 86 Iowa, 236 ; 53 N. W. 226 
 [sidewalk laid on two stringers in- 
 stead of three, as required by ordi- 
 nance]. 
 
511 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [§ 281 
 
 § 280. [consolidated with § 281.J 
 
 §281. Liability for breach of ministerial duties. —Thus 
 
 far we have dealt with cases arising out of the execution of 
 powers granted to the municipality for public governmental 
 purposes, and with the performance of discretionary quasi- 
 judicial duties incident to such powers. We come now to 
 treat of that large class of absolute ministerial duties which a 
 public corporation owes primarily to the state, but, at the 
 same time, to every individual who is interested in their per- 
 formance. As already stated,^ the statute is the sole criterion 
 and measure of duty owing by a municipal corporation, regard 
 being had not so much to the nature and character of the 
 various powers conferred as to the object and purpose of the 
 legislature in conferring them. It is not necessary, in order to 
 raise a liability for breach of duty, that the statute should 
 expressly, and in set terms, impose a liability to respond in 
 damages to any one who may suffer a special injury from it. 
 If the duty clearly appears, the liability for a breach of it will 
 be implied. The acceptance, from the sovereignty, of a valu- 
 able grant of power, implies an agreement, on the part of the 
 grantee, to execute the power granted, and to assume the 
 liability which such an agreement legally implies.^ Where a 
 
 ' See § S54, ante.. charges should repair, maintain and 
 * The leading case is Henley v. support." All the courts held that 
 Lyme Regis, which went from the the defendants, having accepted the 
 Common Pleas, through the Kings charter, became legally bound to' re- 
 Bench, to the House of Lords (5 pair the buildings, banlis, etc., and 
 Bing. 91 ; 3 Barn. & Ad. 77 ; 1 Bing. that, as this obligation was one which 
 N. C. 333) . The king, by letters- concerned the public, ah action on. 
 patent, granted " to the mayor and the case would lie against them for a 
 burgesses of Lyme Regis, the bor-' direct and particular damage sus- 
 ough or town of that name, also the tained by an individual, in conse- 
 pier, quay, or cob, with all liberties, quence of a neglect to perform it. 
 profits, etc., belonging to the same. The reasoning was that the things 
 and remitted a part of their ancient granted by the charter were the con- 
 rent, expressing his will therein that sideration for the repairs to be made ; 
 tlie said mayor and burgesses and and that the corporation, by accept- 
 their successors, all and singular, ing the letters-patent, bound them- 
 the buildings, banks, sea-shore, etc., selves to do these repairs. This is 
 within the said borough, or there- the unquestioned law of England to 
 unto belonging, or situate between the present time, and has never been 
 the same and the sea, and also the questioned in the United States. It 
 said pier, etc., at their own costs and has been claimed, however, that this 
 
§28l] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 SI2 
 
 duty imposed is, in no proper sense, for "public purposes," 
 except as the public derives a common benefit from its proper 
 discharge, and there is nothing in the statute imposing it 
 
 principle of a contractual relation 
 between the donee of beneficial 
 powers and privileges, and the sov- 
 ereign granting them, has no applica- 
 tion to municipal corporations in 
 this country, where the legislature 
 {which has exclusive power to create 
 municipal or other corporations) 
 may, and almost always does, im- 
 pose duties and powers upon muni- 
 cipal corporations, without asking 
 the consent of the inhabitants (see 
 Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 366; 
 <iorham v. Springfield, 31 Me. 58). 
 Indeed, it is held in some states that 
 the legislature cannot leave it to the 
 people of a city to decide whether 
 they will accept a charter (Paterson 
 V. Society, etc., 24 N. J. Law, 385). 
 The subject was elaborately dis- 
 cussed by Gray, C. J., in Hill v. 
 Boston (123 Mass. 344), on a review 
 of the English and many of the 
 American cases ; and although the 
 paiticular case before the court was 
 decided upon quite another principle, 
 the learned judge took occasion to 
 remark that, in the absence of such 
 binding decisions, "we find it diffi- 
 cult to reconcile the view, that the 
 mere acceptance of a municipal 
 charter is to be considered as con- 
 ferring such a benefit upon the cor- 
 poration as will render it liable to 
 private action for neglect of the 
 duties thereby imposed upon it, with 
 the doctrine that the purpose of the 
 creation of municipal corporations 
 by the state is to exercise a part of 
 its powers of government." The no- 
 tion of "a contract" between the 
 state and the municipality is de- 
 clared by Judge Dillon (Municipal 
 Corp., 3d ed. § 1033), to be " ideal." 
 The "notion of a contract" has 
 
 never been questioned in the courts 
 of New York. It was first clearly 
 stated by Selden, J., in Weet v. 
 Brockport (16 N. Y. 161, note), and 
 has been steadily approved and fol- 
 lowed ever since. He said : ' ' When- 
 ever an individual or a corporation, 
 for a consideration received from 
 the sovereign power, has become 
 bound by covenant or agreement, 
 either express or implied, to do cer- 
 tain things, such individual or cor- 
 poration is liable, in case of neglect 
 to perform such covenant, not only 
 to a public prosecution by indict- 
 ment, but to a private action at the 
 suit of any person injured by such 
 neglect. The contract made with 
 the sovereign power is deemed to 
 inure to the benefit of every indi- 
 vidual interested in its performance." 
 In Cain v. Syracuse (95 N. Y. 83), 
 Finch, J., said: "Municipal cor- 
 porations accepting chartered powers 
 from the state, and so by their own 
 consent assuming duties not previ- 
 ously imposed, become liable, in con- 
 sideration of the grant, for the due 
 exercise of the powers, and the 
 proper performance of the duties 
 thus conferred and imposed ; and 
 where a public body is clothed by 
 statute with power to do an act 
 which the public interest requires to 
 be done, and the means of perform- 
 ance are placed at its disposal, the 
 execution of the power may become 
 a duty, although the statute con- 
 ferring it be only permissive in its 
 terms." In Kunz v. Troy (104 N. Y. 
 344; 10 N. E. 442), Andrews, J., 
 stated the rule thus : " The duty to 
 keep the streets of a city in repair 
 and free from obstructions is a cor- 
 porate duty resting upon the muni- 
 
513 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§28l 
 
 which indicates a contrary intention, the true rule of con- 
 struction is, that the legislature intended that the corporation's 
 liability should be co-extensive with that imposed, by the 
 general law, on individuals negligently performing, or omitting 
 to perform, a duty owing by them.^ 
 
 -cipality, springing from the accept- 
 ance by the city of its charter, and 
 the power of the municipal legisla- 
 tive body to protect the streets 
 against nuisances to the injury of 
 the public or of individuals lawfully 
 using them." The doctrine is vari- 
 ously stated and applied in the fol- 
 lowing, among other cases : New 
 York V. Furze, 3 Hill, 612 ; Hutson 
 v. New York, 9 N. Y. 163 ; Conrad v. 
 Ithaca, 16 Id. 158 ; Hickok v. Platts- 
 burgh, Id. 161, note ; Davenport v. 
 Buckman, 37 Id. 568 ; Robinson v. 
 Chamberlain, 84 Id. 389; Requa 
 V. Rochester, 45 Id. 129 ; Barton v. 
 Syracuse, 36 Id. 54 ; Hume v. New 
 York, 74 Id. 364 ; Maximilian v. 
 New York, 63 Id. 160 ; Ehrgott v. 
 New York, 96 Id. 364; Nelson v. 
 Canisteo, 100 Id. 89 ; 3 N. E. 473 ; 
 Peck V. Batavia, 33 Barb. 643, per 
 Marvin, J. ; Champlin v. Penn Yan, 
 34 Hun, 33. In Winn v. Rutland 
 (52 Vt. 481), which was an action for 
 failure to repair a sewer, in which 
 the city was held liable, Powers, J., 
 said : " The charter was sought and 
 accepted in order to realize expected 
 benefits to the inhabitants of the vil- 
 lage, and not to discharge a public 
 governmental duty. The charter- 
 power to act is thus proprietary in 
 its character, conferring upon the 
 village a valuable privilege and fran- 
 chise. This privilege, however, is 
 not granted without consideration ; 
 it carries with it an implied obliga- 
 tion to use the power granted in 
 such a way as to work no unneces- 
 sary injury to persons or property 
 affected by its exercise." s. P., Den- 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. 1—33 .] 
 
 ver V. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 338; 3 
 Pac. 705. 
 
 " Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 
 H. L. 93 ; H. L. Cas. 686. The ac- 
 tion was brought against the Mersey 
 Docks board of trustees, a corpora- 
 tion created by act of parliament, 
 with power to build docks at Liver- 
 pool and receive dock rates, to apply 
 to the maintenance of the docks, etc. 
 The plaintiff's vessel, while entering 
 one of the docks, ran foul of a sand 
 bank, which had been suffered to ac- 
 cumulate. It was contended that 
 such a corporation was a public serv- 
 ant or trustee, not civilly liable for 
 injuries arising to private individu- 
 als from acts done by persons acting 
 under them. But this was overruled. 
 Blackburn, J. , said : "In the absence 
 of anything in the statutes which cre- 
 ate such corporations, showing a 
 contrary intention in the legislature, 
 the true rule of construction is tliat 
 the legislature intended that the lia- 
 bility of corporations thus consti- 
 tuted for individuals should, to the 
 extent of their corporate funds, be 
 co-extensive with that imposed by 
 general law on owners of similar 
 works." See Cooley's Const. Limita- 
 tions (4th ed.) 304. " When a duty is 
 imposed by statute, and no remedy 
 prescribed, the right of action accrues 
 at common law ; otherwise there 
 would be a right without a remedy '' 
 (Anne Arundel county v. Duckett, 30 
 Md. 468). In Dayton v. Pease (4 Ohio 
 St. 80), Ranney, J. , said : ' ' When a 
 municipal corporation undertakes to 
 execute its own prescribed regula- 
 tions, by constructing improvements 
 
§283] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. SH 
 
 § 282. [consolidated with § 281.] 
 
 § 283. Damage consequent on authorized act. — An act 
 
 which the legislature has authorized, if done without negli- 
 gence, although it occasions consequential damage to an indi- 
 vidual, is not actionable. The remedy of the person who suf- 
 fers loss is confined to recovering such compensation, if any, as 
 the legislature has thought fit to give him.' Municipal cor- 
 porations exercising a power, under a valid authority of the 
 state, to open, grade and close streets, public parks and other 
 public works, are not liable, at common law, for the consequen- 
 tial damages which almost inevitably ensue, to the owners of 
 adjacent property, from such undertakings ; they are only 
 responsible for a failure to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
 the execution of the powers granted.^ On this principle, if the 
 
 for the especial interest or advantage 
 of its own inhabitants, the authorities 
 are all agreed that it is to be treated 
 merely as a legal individual, and, as 
 such, owing all the duties to private 
 persons, and subject to all the lia- 
 bilities, that pertain to private cor- 
 porations or individual citizens. To 
 this class most clearly belongs the 
 construction, repair, and mainte- 
 nance of its streets." 
 
 •Per Lord Blackburn, Geddis v. 
 Bann Eeservoir, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 
 455. "The act done, being itself 
 lawful, can only become unlawful in 
 consequence of the mode in which it 
 is carried into execution " (per Hol- 
 royd, J., Boulton v. Crowther, 2 
 Barn & Or. 703). "A public body 
 acting in the discharge of a public 
 duty is not answerable for an injury 
 caused by their obeying an act of 
 parliament " (Dixon v. Board of 
 Works, L. E. 7 Q. B. Div. 418). The 
 burden lies on those who seek to es- 
 tablish that the legislature intended 
 to take away the private rights of 
 individuals, to show that, by express 
 words or by necessary implication, 
 such an intention appears" (per 
 Blackburn, J., Metropolitan Asyl. 
 
 Dist. V. Hill, L.R. 6 App. Cas. 193.) In 
 that case, it was held that to justify 
 the creation of a nuisance under the 
 authority of a statute, it must be 
 clear that the legislature intended to ■ 
 give that power, s. p. , Woodruff v. 
 North Bloomfleld Gravel Co., 16 Fed. 
 35 ; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 461 ; 
 Eiohardson v. Kier, 34 Cal. 74 ; Hill 
 V. Smith, 27 Id. 482. 
 
 'In Transportation Co. v. Chicago 
 (99 U. S. 635), Strong, J., reviewing 
 many cases, said : " It is undeniable 
 that in making the improvement 
 [tunneling the Chicago river] of 
 which the plaintiffs complain, the- 
 city was the agent of the state, and 
 performing a public duty imposed 
 upon it by the legislature ; and that 
 persons appointed or authorized by 
 law to make or improve a highway 
 are not answerable for consequential 
 damages, if they act within their 
 jurisdiction, and with care and skill, 
 is a doctrine almost univei'sally ac- 
 cepted alike in England and in this 
 country." The rule of law here 
 stated was first defined under cir- 
 cumstances which may be interest- 
 ing, as illustrating. In a striking'- 
 manner, the essential harshness, if 
 
515 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§283 
 
 grade of a street is so raised as to cut off, or render difficult, 
 the access to the adjacent property, upon which the owner had 
 erected buildings with reference to the grade before estab- 
 
 not injustice, of the rule itself. 
 The city of New York, having just 
 laid out a street on the river bank, 
 which had proved very useful in 
 every way, the village of Brook- 
 lyn, on the opposite shore, was 
 seized with the idea that it could do 
 the same thing with equal success. 
 The only difficulty in the way was 
 the existence of a magnificent bank 
 on the shore, known as the Heights, 
 one of the finest ornaments of the 
 harbor, and a natural site for a park. 
 Instead of preserving these heights 
 for a park, the authorities projected 
 a street to run through them, cut- 
 ting through sixty feet of solid earth. 
 Of course, the whole adjacent 
 heights, then cultivated as a garden, 
 fell down in a shapeless mass. The 
 assessors gravely decided that Judge 
 Radcliff, who owned one of the lots, 
 would be so mucJi benefited by the 
 opening of the street and the privil- 
 lege of erecting a warehouse on his 
 side of it, against the solid mass of 
 earth behind, that he ought to re- 
 ceive nothing for the total destruc- 
 tion of his property as it stood, and 
 ought to pay |300 for the privilege of 
 fronting on Furman street. As a 
 matter of fact, Furman street has al- 
 ways been a useless nuisance ; it 
 was a nest of cholera in 1849 ; and 
 each owner of the lots thus destroyed 
 had to spend at least $10,000 in erect- 
 ing a support for his lot, from which 
 not enough rent was ever derived to 
 pay the annual taxes. Furman 
 street did not front upon the river, 
 as it should have done to be of any 
 use ; but the shore was left in the 
 hands of private owners. Its con- 
 struction, therefore, never did the 
 least good to the city of Brooklyn ; 
 
 and it cost the adjacent land owners 
 far more than their whole land was 
 worth in the market in its original 
 form. After the lapse of sixty years, 
 during which the population has 
 multiplied more than thirty fold, 
 none of these lots could be sold for 
 half as much as it cost to erect their 
 artificial supports. Judge Radcliff 
 struggled to prevent this absurd pro- 
 ject from being carried out, but was 
 defeated (Matter of Furman St., 17 
 Wend. 667). After the work of ruin 
 had been completed, he sued the city 
 for damages, but was again defeated 
 (Radcliff V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195). 
 Judge Radcliff 's house is still standing 
 at 176 Columbia Heights, Brooklyn. 
 ' ' Re Furman Street " is the leading 
 case on this subject, and its doctrine 
 has been generally followed (Smith 
 V. Washington, 20 How. U. S. 135 ; 
 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge, 13 
 Id. 518 ; Willson v. Blackbird Creek 
 M. Co., 3 Pet. 245 ; Gozler v. George- 
 town, 6 Wheat. 593 ; Lebanon v. 01- 
 cott, 1 N. H. 389 ; Flagg v. Worces- 
 ter, 13 Gray, 601 ; Hatch v. Vermont 
 Central R. Co., 35 Vt. 49 ; Rounds v. 
 Mumford, 3 R. I. 154 ; Tinsman v. 
 Belvidere, etc. R. Co., 26 N. J. Law, 
 164 ; O'Connor v. Pittsburg, 18 Pa. 
 St. 187 : Monongahela Bridge Co. v. 
 Kirk, 46 Pa. St. 113 ; Clark v. Bing- 
 hamton, etc. Bridge Co., 41 Id. 147 ; 
 Clark v. Wilmington, 5 Harringt. 
 243 ; Slate v. Grover, 19 Md. 351 ; 
 Horn V. Baltimore, 30 Id. 218 ; Sim- 
 mons v. Camden, 26 Ark. 27G ; 
 Humes v. Knoxville, 1 Humph. 403 ; 
 Shaw V. Crocker, 43 Cal. 435 ; Cole 
 V. Muscatine, 14 Iowa, 296 ; Delphi 
 V. Evans, 36 Ind. 90 ; Murphy v. 
 Chicago, 29 111. 279 ; Dore v. Mil- 
 waukee, 43 Wise. 108 ; St. Louis v. 
 
§285] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 516 
 
 lished,' or if raising the grade enlarges the area of surface water 
 drainage cast on adjoining land/ the injury is damnum absque 
 injuria. So, where the effect of a harbor improvement, made 
 under special legislative authority, was to allow the waters of 
 the lake to be driven by the wind through the canal or chan- 
 nel, which was a part of the improvement, into and upon the 
 plaintiff's adjacent lands, washing them away and rendering 
 them insecure and unfit for use, the plaintiff was held to be 
 without remedy, there being no claim of negligence or want of 
 care and skill in constructing the work.^ But however lawful 
 the work itself, or under whatever authority it may be per- 
 formed, the party undertaking it will not be protected from 
 the consequences of his own unskillfulness or malice.* 
 
 §284. [consolidated with § 334.] 
 
 § 285. Municipallands and structures. — The rule which 
 exempts municipal corporations for negligence in the con- 
 struction and maintenance of school buildings, jails, hospitals 
 and the like on the ground that these structures, though cor- 
 porate property, are for public use, and that the corporation, 
 as such, has no interest in them, has in some states been 
 extended to court-houses, town and city halls, and similar 
 public buildings maintained and primarily designed for the use 
 of the corporation-government.^ It will be found on examin- 
 ation that most of these cases were against towns or counties, 
 and either were, or might well have been, decided on the 
 ground that such quasi-zox-^ox^Xxons were under no obligation 
 
 Gurno, 13 Mo. 414). The subject is * Watson v. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 
 
 not strictly one of negligence, and 88 ; 21 N. E. 102. 
 
 we do not pursue it further. Many = Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wise, 
 
 cases are collected by Judge Dillon 264. 
 
 (Municipal Corp. § 987). « Barton v. Syracuse, 37 Barb. 292, 
 
 ^Wrightv. Woodcock, 86 Me. 113; and cases cited in note 5, § 274, 
 
 29 Atl. 958 ; Provost v. New Chester anU. 
 
 Water Co., 162 Pa. St. 375 ; 29 Atl. ' So held in Snider v. St. Paul, 
 914 ; and cases cited in note 4, § 374, 51 Minn. 466 ; 53 N. W. 763 [negli- 
 ante. So a party who, in conse- gence of operator of elevator in city 
 quence of a highway being laid upon hall], where the court declared there 
 the line of his land, becomes was no more reason for holding a 
 obliged to maintain the whole fence, city liable for defects in its city hall 
 cannot recover his damages (Ken- than a county for defects in its court- 
 net's Petition, 24 N. H. 139). house. 
 
517 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§285 
 
 whatever in respect to such structures unless so declared by- 
 statute.^ Even ^«a.fi-corporations, such as counties and 
 towns, are responsible for the negligent management of 
 property either owned or controlled by them, if they derive 
 therefrom any profit by way of rent or otherwise.^ But accord- 
 ing to a great weight of authority, a municipal corporation 
 proper, as an owner of lands and structures, holding by the 
 same right and title, is subject to the same liabilities, as a 
 private owner;* providing it has absolute control of their 
 
 ' Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 
 384 [town hall] ; Sussex v. Strader, 
 3 Harr. [N. J.], 108, 131 [court-house 
 and jailj ; Hamilton v. Mighels, 7 
 Ohio St. 109 [court-house] ; Hollen- 
 beck V. Winnebago County, 95 111. 
 148 [court-house in course of erec- 
 tion] ; and other cases cited in note 
 3, § 256, ante. In Massachusetts, it 
 has been held that a town to which 
 land is conveyed on condition that 
 it shall " forever after be kept open 
 as a public common for the use of 
 the inhabitants of the town " is not 
 liable for its negligent management 
 (Clark V. Waltham, 128 Mass. 567; 
 compare Steele v. Boston, Id. 582). 
 In Iowa, the city's acceptance of a 
 toll-bridge ' " to be held in trust for 
 the use of the public,'' does impose 
 on it the duty of keeping the bridge 
 in repair as a free bridge (Scott v. 
 Des Moines, 34 Iowa, 552). In Bos- 
 ton V. Crowley (38 Fed. 202 [Mass. 
 Cir.], an admiralty court refused to 
 agree that gwasi-corporations, like 
 towns and cities, in Massachusetts, 
 were not liable for the negligence 
 in maintenance of corporate pro- 
 perty, e. g., a draw-bridge, and de- 
 clared that the question of liability 
 in such a case was not one of statu- 
 tory construction in which the 
 Federal courts were bound to follow 
 the decisions of the state courts, but 
 was a question of general municipal 
 or commercial law which had been 
 settled by the Federal Supreme 
 
 Court — referring to Weightman v. 
 Washington, 1 Black, 39 ; Chicago 
 V. kobbins, 2 Id. 418 ; Nebraska City 
 V. Campbell, Id. 590 ; Barnes v. 
 Dist. of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540 ; 
 Evanston v. Gunn, 99 Id. 660. A 
 town, having assumed the obliga- 
 tions of a private corporation to con- 
 struct and maintain a draw-bridge, 
 which neither it nor the town was 
 required to operate. Held, liable 
 for negligence of town's servant in 
 operating the draw (Greenwood v. 
 Westport, 60 Fed. 560). See case of 
 same title in the state court, 62 Conn. 
 575. 
 
 ^ See cases cited in note 3, § 259, 
 ante. 
 
 ■* '■ Municipal corporations in their 
 private character as owners and oc- 
 cupiers of lands and houses, are 
 regarded in the same light as indi- 
 vidual owners and occupiers, and 
 dealt with accordingly" (per Nelson, 
 C. J., Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 
 531). In that case, decided in 1843, 
 and frequently referred to, the city 
 was sued for an injury to the plain- 
 tiff's land by the breaking away of 
 a dam, the property of the corpora- 
 tion, which it had built across Cro- 
 ton river as a part of its enterprise 
 of introducing water into the city. 
 The dam was negligently and un- 
 skillfuUy built by commissioners 
 appointed by the state, not under 
 the control of the city, though at its 
 instance and expense. The trial 
 
§285] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 5x8 
 
 use.^ As a land-owner, it is liable to an adjoining owner for inter- 
 fering with his lateral support/ and, as a riparian proprietor, 
 for interfering with the flow of water to the damage of an 
 adjacent owneir." The same duty to exercise care for the 
 safety of the public rests upon those in control of public piers 
 as in the case of public streets,^ and when receiving tolls or 
 
 court granted a nonsuit, but, on ap- 
 peal, a new trial was ordered, the 
 court holding that, with respect to 
 the work, the city was to be re- 
 garded as a private proprietor, and 
 as such, responsible for the unskill- 
 ful construction of the dam. On the 
 second trial, a verdict was had for 
 the plaintiff, which was afterwards 
 sustained by the Court of Errors 
 (New York v. Bailey, 2 Den. 433), 
 not upon the ground of the distinc- 
 tion between public and private 
 functions of the city, but of the 
 agency of the officers having charge 
 of the building of the dam (see the 
 comments of Denio, C. J., on this 
 distinction, Darlington v. New York, 
 31 N. Y. 200). The doctrine of the 
 decision of the Supreme Court (3 
 Hill, 531), has, however, been re- 
 peatedly approved by courts of the 
 highest authority, and must be con- 
 sidered to be firmly established. The 
 case has been commented on by 
 Hunt, J., in Barnes v. District of 
 Columbia (91 U. S. 540) ; by Sargent, 
 J., in Wright v. Holbrook (53 N. H. 
 120): by Gray, C. J., in Hill v. Bos- 
 ton (122 Mass. 344); and by Strong, 
 J., in Western Savings Fund v. 
 Philadelphia (al Pa. St. 185). Fol- 
 lowed, Galvin v. New York, 113 
 N. Y. 233 ; 19 N. E. 675 [unfastened 
 grating over hatchway in court- 
 house] ; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 
 154 Pa St. 109 ; 26 Atl. 304 [slipping 
 of stone from wall of public 
 grounds]. " The citizens and the 
 municipal body, in respect to their 
 several possessions of real estate, 
 stand upon a footing of equality ; 
 
 neither is a privileged owner, and 
 each must fulfill the same duties in 
 respect to the other" (Brewer v. 
 New York, 3 Barb. 254 ; Barron v. 
 Detroit, 94 Mich. 601 ; 54 N. W. 273 
 [market place] ; Savannah v. Cul- 
 lens, 38 Ga. 334 [same] ; Fort Worth 
 V. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404; 12 S. W. 
 53 [garbage dump on city property]; 
 Lowe V. Salt Lake City, Utah ; 
 44 Pao. 1050 [open hatchway in un- 
 lighted city hall yard] ; Carrington 
 V. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208 [corporation 
 liable for the condition of a building 
 occupied by its board of police] ; 
 Whitfield V. CarroUton, 50 Mo. App. 
 98 [city liable for lessee's negligent 
 use of its land]; Pekin v. McMahon, 
 154 111. 141 ; 39 N. E. 484). In con- 
 tracting for laying a water pipe to a 
 county building, under the super- 
 vision of its own officer, a county is, 
 quod hoc, a private corporation, and 
 liable to contractor'sservant for cave- 
 in of ditch iHannon v. St. Louis 
 county, 62 Mo. 318). 
 
 = Ham V. New York, 70 N. Y. 459 
 [public school building under exclu- 
 sive control of independent depart- 
 ment]). See § C95, post. Compare 
 Buchanan v. Barre, 66 Vt. 129: 28 
 Atl. 878. A city's ownership of the 
 upper story of a building does not 
 render it responsible for a defect 
 in the basement steps (El Paso v. 
 Causey, 1 111. App. 581). 
 
 ^Stearns v. Richmond, 88 Va. 992; 
 14 S. E. 847. 
 
 ' Ordway v. Canisteo, 66 Hun, 569 ; 
 21 N. Y. Supp. 835. 
 
 8 Kennedy v. New York, 73 N. Y. 
 365 [string-piece wanting ; horse 
 
519 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§28S 
 
 -dockage from a vessel moored at its public piers, the corpora- 
 tion is liable, like a private wharfinger, for injuries to the vessel 
 by reason of any defect in the pier,^ except that, unlike a 
 private wharfinger, it is only liable for negligence.^" With 
 respect to the waters adjacent to the pier, no duty arises, in 
 the absence of a statutory obligation.''^ The rule of corporate 
 liability applies to every kind of property, e. g., a toll-bridge'^ 
 or canal,^' from which,a profit is derived ; and to every kind of 
 business for profit in which the corporation engages." 
 
 backed off ; city liable] ; Heissen- 
 buttel V. New York, 30 Fed. 456 ; 
 McGuiness v. New York, 53 How. 
 Pr. 450. S. P., Swords v. Edgar, 59 
 N. Y. 28 ; Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. 
 Companla Tr. Espanola, 29 Abb. N. 
 Cas. 238 ; Elting v. East Chester, 50 
 Fed. 113. 
 
 ' Garrison v. New York, 5 Bosw. 
 497 ; Moody v. New York, 43 Barb. 
 283; Allegheny City v. Campbell, 
 107 Pa. St. 530 ; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 
 23 Id. 54 ; Erie City v. Schwingle, 
 Id. 3S8 ; Jeffersonville v. Louisville, 
 etc. Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100 ; Fenni- 
 more v. New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 
 124 ; Memphis v. Kimbrough, 12 
 Heisk. 133 [steamer wrecked by 
 striking on end of iron cylinder neg- 
 ligently left on wharf] ; Shinkle v. 
 Covington, 1 Busli, 617 [not provid- 
 ing proper fastenings, so that plain- 
 tiff 's boat broke away during a 
 flood ; city liable]. 
 
 '» Jackson v. Allegheny City, 41 
 Fed. 886. There held that the ves- 
 sel was not entitled to the same 
 •degree of care as that due from a 
 private wharfinger, and it not ap- 
 pearing that the owner complained 
 of the defect or notified the city to 
 cure it, he could not recover. 
 
 " Spiles fastened to the pier by 
 bolts and chains, becoming looss, 
 fell away and were wholly sub- 
 merged, except at low tide. Held, 
 that the corporation was not liable 
 for damages sustained by a steam- 
 
 tug striking the submerged spiles, in 
 passing the pier, the river in front of 
 the pier not being a higliway which 
 the city was bound to keep clear of 
 obstructions (Seaman v. New York, 
 80 N. Y. 339;. s. P., Winpenny v. 
 Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 135 ; com- 
 pare Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 
 Graft. 321 [sunken pile negligently 
 allowed to obstruct a safe use of 
 wharf ; city liable]. 
 
 " Augusta V. Hudson, 88 Ga. 599 ; 
 15 S. E. 678 ; Fox v. New York, 5 
 App. Div. 349 ; 39 N. Y. Supp. 809 
 [N. Y. and Brooklyn bridge]. 
 
 '2 As the proprietor of a canal, a 
 public body has, at common law, a 
 duty, "not perhaps to repair the 
 canal, or absolutely to free it from 
 obstructions, but to take reasonable 
 care, so long as they keep it open for 
 the public use of all who may choose 
 to navigate it, that they may navi- 
 gate it without danger to their lives 
 or pi'operty " (Lancaster Canal Co. v. 
 Parnaby, 11 Ad. & El. 223). It must 
 appear that the city was the owner 
 of, or had an interest in, the canal ; 
 or that it was a public highway 
 (N. Y. & Brooklyn Saw MiU Co. v. 
 Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580). See g§ 401- 
 408, post. 
 
 " A city which engages in the 
 business of towing vessels for profit 
 is liable for a collision caused by the 
 fault of the tug (Philadelphia v. 
 Gavagnin, 62 Fed. 617 ; 10 C. C. A. 
 552 : Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 
 
286] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 520 
 
 § 286. Management of water and gas service, etc. — In its 
 
 proprietary or private character a municipal corporation may 
 engage in enterprises for its own immediate profit or advantage 
 as a corporation, although enuring ultimately, of course, to the 
 benefit of the public. Of this character are water-works,^ to 
 supply water to consumers ; or gas-works,^ to supply gas, on 
 payment of rates or tolls, and other similar enterprises.^ In 
 respect of its liability for negligence in the construction and 
 maintenance of such works, the corporation is on the same 
 footing with private proprietors, and is liable for the negli- 
 gence of its agents in the management of its business.^ It is 
 
 St. 492; 31 Atl. 728 [electrical 
 bureau]). A municipal corporation 
 erected wash-houses for public use 
 on payment of a small sum. Held, 
 the corporation was bound to exer- 
 cise ordinary care and diligence in 
 providing machines reasonably safe 
 for use (Cowley v. Sunderland, 6 
 Hurlst. & N. 565 ; Waldron v. Haver- 
 hill, 143 Mass. 382 ; 10 N. E. 481). 
 
 ' Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 533 
 (see note 4, last section) ; Fleming v. 
 Suspension Bridge, 92 N. Y. 368. 
 
 ^A city which engages in the busi- 
 ness of manufacturing and supplying 
 gas to its inhabitants acts as a private 
 corporation and is subject to the same 
 duties, liabilities and disabilities 
 (Western Savings Society v. Phila- 
 delphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Scott v. 
 Manchester, 1 Hurlst. & N. 59 ; affi'd, 
 2 Id. 204). In Kibele v. Philadelphia 
 (105 Pa. St. 41), gas had escaped from 
 the city's gas main into plaintiff's 
 sewer, and thence into his house, 
 where it exploded. Held, the city, as 
 a manufacturer and vender of gas, 
 was bound to know the dangerous 
 character of illuminating gas and 
 take care that through the negli- 
 gence of its officers it did harm to no 
 one, and whether if, by exercising 
 reasonable diligence, they could have 
 discovered the defect in the gas 
 main, in time to have repaired it 
 
 before the explosion, was for the 
 jury. 
 
 ' See cases cited under last section. 
 
 '' Bailey v. New York, supra ; Hand 
 V. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324 [water 
 escaping from pipes] : Wilson v. 
 New Bedford, 108 Id. 261 [water per- 
 colating through soil from reservoir] ; 
 Perkins v. Lawrence, 186 Id. 30& 
 [negligently laying water-pipes] ; 
 Aldrichv. Tripp, 11 E. 1. 141 ; Grimes 
 V. Keene, 52 N. H. 335 ; Wilkins v. 
 Rutland, 61 Vt. 336 ; 17 Atl. 735 ; Pet- 
 tengill V. Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 558 ; 22 
 N. E. 1095 ; affi'g, 1 N. Y. Supp. 805 
 [laying pipes: trench left unguarded] ; 
 Wilson v. Troy, 60 Hun, 183 ; 14 N. Y. 
 Supp. 721 [same] ; Winters v. New 
 York, 15 Daly, 102 ; 2 N. Y. Supp. 695; 
 Hazzard v. Council Bluffs, 79 Iowa, 
 106 ; 44 N. W. 219 ; Sebert v. Alpena, 
 78 Mich. 165; 43 N. W. 1098; Mc- 
 Coull V. Manchester, 85 Va. 579 ; a 
 S. E. 379 ; Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 
 W. Va. 233 ; Vicksburg v. McLain, 
 67 Miss. 4 ; 6 So. 774 ; Hannon v. St. 
 Louis, 62 Mo. 313 ; Mulcairns v. 
 Janesville, 67 Wise. 24 ; 29 N.W. 565- 
 [fall of reservoir in course of con- 
 struction, injuring workman]; 
 Boulder v. Fowler, 11 Colo. 396 ; 18 
 Pac. 337 [city undertook to supply 
 residents with water for irrigation] ; 
 Ysleta V. Babbitt, Tex. Civ. App. 
 ; 38 S. W. 703 [same] ; Levy v. 
 
521 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§287 
 
 not liable, of course, for defects in the lateral service pipes, 
 connected with its mains by users of the water.^ By permit- 
 ting a lot-owner to connect his premises with the main service 
 pipe, the city does not guarantee to supply sufficient water for 
 lot-owner's use.' 
 
 § 287. Maintenance and repair of sewers.— A municipal 
 corporation is the owner of its sewers, and, as such, is respon- 
 sible for the manner in which the work of construction is done, 
 and for its subsequent maintenance in a reasonably safe and 
 efficient condition.' It is bound to anticipate and guard 
 
 Salt Lake City, 5 Utah, 302 ; affi'g, 
 3 Id. 63 [same] ; 16 Pac. 598. 
 
 ' Terry v. New York, 8 Bosw. 504 ; 
 Treadwell v. New York, 1 Daly, 123 ; 
 Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541. 
 In Stock V. Boston (149 Mass. 410; 21 
 N. E. 871), where workmen em- 
 ployed by a city, while digging a 
 sewer, uncovered a water-pipe run- 
 ning to a greenhouse, and negligently 
 left the pipe exposed, so that the 
 water froze and deprived the owner 
 of the greenhouse of his supply, the 
 city was held liable. 
 
 6 Smith V. Philadelphia (81 Pa. St. 
 38) was an action by a lot-owner for 
 damages for a non-supply of water, 
 the water-main being frozen in con- 
 sequence of being laid too near the 
 surface. Held, plaintiff might re- 
 cover back water-rents paid, but not 
 his damages. As to non-liability of 
 city for failure to supply water suf- 
 ficient to extinguish fires, see § 264, 
 ante. 
 
 ' " Statutory power to construct 
 sewers under public streets is not a 
 power given to the city for govern- 
 ment purposes, or a public municipal 
 duty imposed on the city, like that 
 to keep its streets in repair, or the 
 like, but a special legislative grant to 
 the city for private purposes. The 
 sewers of the city, like its works for 
 supplying the city with water, are 
 
 the private property of the city ; the 
 corporation and its corporators — its 
 citizens — are alone interested in 
 them ; the outside public or people 
 of the state at large have no interest 
 in them, as they have in the streets 
 of the city, which are public high- 
 ways. The donee of such a power 
 takes with it the understanding that 
 it shall be so executed as not un- 
 necessarily to interfere with the 
 rights of the public, and that all 
 needful and proper measures will be 
 taken, in the execution of it, to guard 
 against accidents to persons lawfully 
 using the highway at the time " (per 
 Manning, J., Detroit v. Corey, 9 
 Mich. 165). " As the city assumes to 
 regulate the whole subject, and com- 
 pels all inhabitants to conform to and 
 comply with their ordinances, it re- 
 sults, by necessary implication, that 
 they make themselves liable for 
 whatever mischief or injury neces- 
 sarily results from any negligence 
 or omission of duty on their part" 
 (Child V. Boston, 4 Allen, 41). "Es- 
 tablishing rules and regulations in 
 respect to cleaning sewers is one 
 thing, and the act of cleaning them 
 is another. The power and duty to 
 perform the latter is clearly ministe- 
 rial, and falls under the class of pri- 
 vate powers. The principle of re- 
 spondeat superior consequently ap- 
 
§287] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 522 
 
 against such obstructions and dilapidations in the structure, as 
 naturally result from use, by occasional examinations and 
 cleansings. This duty is purely ministerial ; and the corpora- 
 tion is liable for a failure to perform it, without regard to 
 whether it had notice of the defect or not.^ Constructive 
 notice of a defect in a sewer, which might have been dis- 
 covered by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable diligence, 
 is implied.^ Manholes and other parts of the structure on the 
 street surface are to be looked after as parts of the highway.* 
 But a city does not insure against damage from defects in its 
 sewers, any more than from defects in its highways and other 
 public works. Its duty extends only to the exercise of reason- 
 able care and vigilance. It is necessary, for a recovery, there- 
 fore, to show that the city neglected to remove the obstruction 
 after notice, or else culpably neglected to discover it before 
 the damage was done.' The city is, of course, liable, without 
 
 plies" (Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y. 
 rJ75 [sewer trench left open, un- 
 guarded and unlighted)]. 
 
 ' The neglect of duty consists in 
 not having ascertained the fact of 
 obstruction (Barton v. Syracuse, 37 
 Barb. 292; affi'd 36 Id. 54; New York 
 v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612 [obstruction; 
 leading case] ; and cases, infra). 
 
 3 Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St. 
 41 ; Koelsch v. Philadelphia Co., 153 
 Pa. St. 355. See also Briegel v. 
 Philaadelphia, 135 Pa. St. 451 ; 
 19 Atl. 1038; Hazzard v. Coun- 
 cil Bluffs, 79 Iowa, 106; 44 N. 
 W. 219. 
 
 ■■ Cassidy v. Poughkeepsie, 71 Hun, 
 144 ; 24 N. Y. Supp. 523 [sewer-basin 
 cover in sidewalk out of order from 
 long use]. It is no defense that the 
 overflow of a sewer was unusual, if 
 the sewer's incapacity to carry off 
 all the water was due to its want of 
 repair (Spangler v. San Francisco, 84 
 Cal. 13 ; 23 Pac. 1091 ; Hunt v. New 
 York, 109 N. Y. 134; 16 N. E. 320). 
 Plaintiff's horse was injured by step- 
 ping on a brick washed into the street 
 by the overflow from a culvert. Held, 
 
 error to instruct that defendant was 
 not liable, for the reason that such an 
 injury could not have been foreseen 
 and apprehended as a result of the 
 insufiScient capacity or lack of re- 
 pair of the culvert (Hazzard v. 
 Council Bluffs, 79 Iowa, 106 ; 44 N. 
 W. 219; Barr v. Kansas, 121 Mo. 
 22; 35 S. W. 563; Lincoln v. De- 
 troit, 101 Mich. 345 ; 59 N. W. 617). 
 ' Smith V. New York, 66 N. Y. 
 295. In that case the overflow of 
 sewer was caused by its stoppage 
 with sand, etc. , washed in from the 
 streets, during or just after an un- 
 usually heavy shower. No defect 
 in the sewer's construction, or any 
 prior obstructions were shown. In 
 Seifert v. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 136 ; 
 4 N. E. 321), the injury to abutting 
 property was directly caused by an 
 original defect in the sewer, which 
 was continued in use after knowl- 
 edge, and was remediable by adopt- 
 ing a change of plan. Held, the city 
 was liable for neglect to take meas- 
 ures to remedy the defect s. p. (Jer- 
 sey City V. Kiernan, 50 N. J. Law, 
 246 ; Paine v. Delhi, 116 N. Y. 324; 
 
523 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§287 
 
 proof of negligence, for having directly caused or authorized 
 any change in its sewers,* or their use for other purposes than 
 that for which they were designed,'' so that their capacity is 
 diminished, and the sewage, in consequence, is thrown back 
 on abutting land, or other damage is done. Where it has con- 
 verted, under its statutory powers, a natural watercourse^ or a 
 
 ■23 N. E. 405 ; Ballouv. State, 111 N. Y. 
 496 ; 18 N. E. 627 ; Jenney v. Brook- 
 lyn, 130 N. Y. 164 ; 34 N. E. 274 [hy- 
 drant] ; Rowe V. Portsmouth, 56 N. 
 H. 391 ; Hession v. Wilmington 
 {Del.] 37 Atl. 830 ; Harrigan v. Wil- 
 mington [Del.] 12 Atl. 779; Fair 
 T. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 309 ; 
 Collins V. Philadelphia, 93 Id. 
 272 ; Fairlawn Coal Co v. Scran- 
 ton. 148 Id. 231; 23 Atl. 1069; 
 Baltimore v. Schnitker, 84 Md. 84 ; 
 34 Atl. 1132 ; Bannagan v. District 
 of Columbia, 3 Mackey, 285 ; Wright 
 V. Wilmington, 93 N. C. 156; Peru 
 T. Brown, lOInd. App. 597 ; 38 N. E. 
 233 ; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wise. 
 365 [overflow of water by obstruc- 
 tion of street gutter, knowingly per- 
 mitted] ; Taylor v. Austin, 33 Minn. 
 247 ; Cook v. Milwaukee, 34 Wise. 
 270 ; Netzer \. Crookston, 59 Minn. 
 244 ; 61 N. W. 21 ; Imler v. Spring- 
 field, 55 Mo. 119 I Woods v. Kansas 
 City, 58 Mo App. 272 ; Valparaiso v. 
 Cartwright, 8 Ind. App. 429 ; 35 N. E. 
 1051 ; Nashville v. Sutherland, 94 
 Tenn. 356; 29 S. W. 228; Tate 
 ■V. St. Paul, 56 Minn. 537 ; 58 N. 
 W. 158 ; Parker v. Laredo, 9 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 231; 28 S. W. 1048. See 
 Downs V. High Point, 115 N. C. 
 183; 30 S. E. 385; Fort Wayne v. 
 Coombs, 107 Ind. 75 ; Spring- 
 field V. Le Claire, 49 111. 476; O'Brien 
 V. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 333 ; Wallace 
 V. Muscatine, 4 Greene [Iowa], 
 373. 
 
 " Nims V. Troy, 59 N. Y. 500 ; 
 Evers v. Long Island City, 78 Hun 
 243 ; 28 N. Y. Supp. 825 ; McCarthy 
 
 V. Far Rockaway, 3 App. Div. 379 ; 
 88 N. Y. Supp. 989 ; Bates v. West- 
 borough, 151 Mass. 174; 28 N. E. 
 1070 ; Frederick v. Lansdale, 156 Pa. 
 St. 613 ; 27 Atl. 563 ; Chalkley v. 
 Richmond, 88 Va. 402 ; 14 S. E. 339. 
 Where the necessary result of cut- 
 ting a sewer is to flood adjacent 
 land, the city is liable (Ashley v. 
 Port Huron, 35 Mich. 396). 
 
 ' Buchanan v. Duluth, 40 Minn. 
 402; 43 N. W. 204 [gas pipe in sewer]. 
 Where a city permits the use of a 
 sewer in violation of an ordinance, 
 it is liable for injuries thereby caused 
 (Champaign v. Forrester, 39 III. App. 
 117). In Fuchs v. St. Louis (133 
 Mo. 168 ; 34 S. W. 508), petroleum 
 which had been allowed to run into 
 the sewer under tlie direction of the 
 city's fire deparment could not flow 
 out by reason of the high water in 
 the river at tlie outlet of the sewer; 
 after being in the sewer for four 
 days, it generated gases which could 
 not escape because tlie manholes 
 were closed; the gases were acci- 
 dentally ignited, causmg the explo- 
 sion. Held, question of city's negli- 
 gence was for the jury. 
 
 * Krans v. Baltimore, 64 Md. 491 ; 
 2 Atl. 908 ; Morse v. Worcester, 139 
 Mass. 389; 2 N. E. 694; Parker v. 
 Lowell, 11 Gray, 853 ; Yates v. Judd. 
 18 Wise. 118; Houfe v. Fallon, 34 
 Id. 608 ; Gillerly v. Madison, 63 Id. 
 510 ; Dallas v. Schultz, Tex. Civ. 
 App. ; 27 S. W. 292. A munici- 
 pality which adopts and uses a 
 stream as an open sewer, and fails 
 to keep its channel open and to re- 
 
§287J 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 524 
 
 cana} ' into a public sewer, its duty in respect thereto is the 
 same as if the sewer were originally artificial. As sewers are 
 constructed to effect the drainage, not only of the streets, but 
 of lands adjacent, and generally at the expense of their owners, 
 such owners have a legal right to connect their premises by 
 particular drains with the main or common sewer;'" and a par- 
 ticular duty is owing to them by the corporation to use ordi- 
 nary care to prevent injury to their property by reason of the 
 structure becoming dilapidated, obstructed or otherwise a 
 cause of damage." It is, however, no part of a city's duty to 
 
 move accumulations which obstruct 
 the flow of water and throw it out 
 of its banks upon the adjoining land, 
 is liable though the stream had been 
 used as a sewer for thirty years (Bliz- 
 zard V. Danville, 175 Pa. St. 479 ; 31 
 Atl. 846). 
 
 ' Savannah v. Spears 66 Ga. 304. 
 
 "> In Barton v. Syracuse (36 N. Y. 
 54; affi'g 37 Barb. 392). it was 
 claimed that plaintifE was a wro"ng- 
 doer in connecting his cellar and 
 premises with the sewer by a drain, 
 and that he was not, therefore, en- 
 titled to recover in the action. 
 " But,'' said the court below, " if the 
 public cannot use them for the pur- 
 pose of drainage, they will not ac- 
 complish the end for which they 
 were designed. There is something 
 very like a contract to be implied 
 fi-om the construction of a sewer, at 
 the expense of the adjacent prop- 
 erty, that it may be used to drain 
 the property thus charged with its 
 construction." The rule is very 
 clearly applicable to the case of one 
 who complies with an ordinance 
 which requires all tiie particular 
 drains from private premises to pass 
 into the main sewer of the city 
 (Child V. Boston, 4 Allen, 41 ; Bolton 
 V. New Eochelle, 84 Hun, 381; 33 
 N. Y. Supp. 443). The fact, how- 
 ever, that the connection with the 
 newer was voluntary does not pre- 
 
 vent recovery for injuries from the 
 sewer's overflow (Daggett v. Cohoes, 
 54 Hun, 639, mem.; 7 N. Y. Supp. 
 883). But where adjacent owners 
 are not required to conform their 
 drainage to that which the city has 
 provided for public purposes, and 
 have not, in fact, made use of the 
 common sewer in that way, and 
 have taken no means to prevent the 
 overflow of water from it on their 
 open land, they cannot complain of 
 the failure of the city to keep its 
 own works in repair (Barry v. Low- 
 ell, 8 Allen, 137 ; Flagg v. Worces- 
 ter, 13 Gray, 601). See Judge v. 
 Meriden, 38 Conn. 90. So where the 
 connecting drain was built on plain- 
 tiff's land by the corporation with 
 his knowledge and consent, and 
 through a defect in it, sewage mat- 
 ter came from the main sewer and 
 was thrown on plaintiff's land, the 
 corporation was held not liable. " If 
 he did not like the sewer on his land, 
 he could take it up." Searing v. 
 Saratoga, 39 Hun, 807). 
 
 " Barton v. Syracuse, supra. " Be 
 cause sewers are built and main- 
 tained partly for the private benefit 
 and advantage of the abutters, who 
 pay in part for such advantages, and 
 because the charge of sewers is not 
 an obligation imposed by law with- 
 out the assent of the municipality, 
 but voluntarily assumed, a munici- 
 
525 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§289 
 
 connect private drains with its main sewer, and the city is not 
 liable for the negligent manner in which its agents undertook 
 to do so.'^ The corporation is not responsible for defects in a 
 private sewer, though on land purchased by it, unless it has 
 adopted it as a public sewer.*' 
 
 § 288. [consolidated with § 258.] 
 
 § 289. Implied liability for non-repair of streets.— With 
 few exceptions, the courts of all the states agree that, as at 
 common law, no civil liability rests upon counties and other 
 ^z^ijjz-corporations, for neglect to keep their highways in a 
 reasonable state of repair, unless such liability is expressly 
 imposed by statute.' But in respect of cities, towns and 
 villages, incorporated either by special charter, or under a 
 general statute,^ the principle is firmly established, by the 
 decisions of the Federal courts,' and by those of all the state 
 
 pality is liable in a private action for 
 negligence in building and main- 
 taining them" (per Barker, J., Coan 
 V. Marlborough, 164 Mass. 206 : 41 
 N. E. 238). S. P., Pettingell v. City 
 of Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368 ; 37 N. E. 
 380 ; Kansas City v. Slangstrom, 53 
 Kans. 431 ; 36 Pac. 706. The fact that 
 the premises were not directly con- 
 nected with the sewer would not 
 prevent recovery (Allen v. Boston, 
 159 Mass. 324; 84 N. E 519). 
 
 '2 Streift V. Milwaukee, 89 Wise. 
 218; 6t N. W. 770. Compare Ander- 
 son V. Wilmington [Del.] 19 Atl. 509; 
 Bethlehem v. Haus [Pa.]. 19 Atl. 
 457. 
 
 '^ The acquisition of the property 
 on which the private drain was lo- 
 cated by the corporation does not 
 constitute an adoption of the drain 
 as a public sewer, nor impose the 
 duty of keeping it open (Kosmak v. 
 New York, 53 Hun, 329; 6 N. Y. 
 Supp. 453). 
 
 ' See cases cited tnder § ?56, ante. 
 
 2 Ludlow V. Fargo, 3 N. Dak. 485 : 
 57 N. W. 506. 
 
 ' In District of Columbia v. Wood- 
 bury (136 U. S. 450 ; 10 S. Ct. 990 ; 
 Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 
 U. S. 540), congress created a board 
 of public works, in the District of 
 Columbia, " who shall have entire 
 control of, and make all regu- 
 lations which they shall deem neces- 
 sary for keeping in repair, the 
 streets, etc., of the city." Held, that 
 the District was liable for injuries 
 caused by the defective condition of 
 one of its streets. " The authorities 
 establishing the doctrine that a city 
 is responsible for its mere negligence, 
 are so numerous and so well con- 
 sidered that the law must be deemed 
 to be settled in accordance with 
 them" (Id. per Hunt, J.). S. P., 
 Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 
 39 ; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 
 Id. 590 ; Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 
 658; Mayor v. Sheffield, Id. 189; 
 Delger v. St. Paul, 14 Fed. 567; 
 Brown v. District of Columbia, 127 
 U. S. 586 ; 8S. Ct. 1314 ; District of 
 Columbia v. McEUigott, 117 U. S. 
 631 ; 6 S. Ct 884. 
 
289] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 526 
 
 courts,* where the question has been properly open for discus- 
 
 '' So held in Alabama : Smoot v. 
 Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 112 : Albritton 
 V. Huntsville, 60 Id. 486 ; Campbell 
 V. Montgomery, 53 Id. 537 ; Selma v. 
 Perkins, 68 Id. 145 ; Montgomery 
 V. Wright, 72 Id. 411. 
 
 Colorado : Daniels v. Denver, 3 
 Colo. 669 ; Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 
 Id. 328 ; 3 Pac. 705 ; Boulder v. 
 Niles, 9 Colo. 415 ; 12 Pac. 633. 
 
 Dakota : Larson v. Grand Forks, 
 3 Dak. 307 ; 19 N. W. 414. 
 
 Delaware : Magarity v. Wilming- 
 ton, 5 Hous. 530 ; Anderson v. Wil- 
 mington, 19 Atl. 509. 
 
 Florida : Tallahassee v. Fortune, 
 3 Fla. 19. 
 
 Georgia : Western, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Atlanta, 74 Ga. 774 ; Rome v. Dodd, 
 58 Id. 239 ; Millidgeville v. Cooley, 
 55 Id. 17 ; Wilson v. Atlanta, 60 Id. 
 473 ; Parker v. Macon, 39 Id. 72.5 ; 
 Brunswick v. Braxton, 70 Id. 193 ; 
 Greensboro v. MoGibbony, 93 Ga. 
 672 ; 20 S. E. 37. 
 
 Illinois: Rockford v. Hildebrand, 
 61 111. 155 ; Browning v. Spring- 
 "field, 17 Id. 143 ; Springfield v. La 
 Claire, 49 Id. 476 ; Chicago v. Mar- 
 tin, Id. 341. See Nevins v. Peoria, 
 41 Id, 513. 
 
 Indiana : Centerville v. Woods, 
 57 Ind. 193 ; Grove v. Fort Wayne, 
 45 Id. 429 ; Kistner v. Indianapolis; 
 100 Id. 310 ; Knightstown v. Mus- 
 grove, 116 Id. 121; 18 N. E. 453; 
 Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196 ; 21 
 N. E. 657. 
 
 Iowa: Manderschid v. Dubuque, 
 29 Iowa, 73 ; Koester v. Ottumwa, 
 34_ Id. 41 ; Clark v. Epworth, 56 Id. 
 462; Hendershottv. Ottumwa, 46 Id. 
 658; Case v. Waverlj, 36 Id. 545; 
 Beazan v. Mason City, 58 Id, 333 ; 13 
 N. W. 379. 
 
 Kansas : Topeka v. Tuttle, 5 Kans. 
 311 ; Atchison v. King, 9 Id. 550 ; 
 Ottawa V. Washabaugh, 11 Id. 124 ; 
 
 Wyandotte v. White, 13 Id. 191 ; 
 Smith V. Leavenworth, 15 Id. 81;' 
 Jansen v. Atchison, 16 Id. 358 j 
 Kansas City v. Bermingham, 45 Id. 
 212 ; 25 Pac. 509. 
 
 Kentucky: Patch v. Covington, 
 17 B. Men. 722; Greenwood v. Louis- 
 ville, 13 Bush, 236. 
 
 Louisiana : O'Neil v. New Or- 
 leans, 30 La. Ann, 330 ; Cline v. 
 Crescent City R. Co., 41 Id. 1031 ; 6 
 So. 851. 
 
 Maryland : Baltimore v. Pendle- 
 ton, 15 Md. 12 ; Hartford county v. 
 Wise, 71 Id. 43 ; 18 Atl. 31 ; Frost- 
 bury V. Hitchins, 16 Atl. 380. See 
 § 357, ante. 
 
 Minnesota : Furnell v. St. Paul, 
 30 Minn. 117; Shartle v. Minneapo- 
 lis, 17 Id. 308 ; Bohen v. Waseca, 33 
 Id. 176 ; Kellogg v. Janesville, 34 Id. 
 132 ; 24 N. W. 359 ; Welter v. St. 
 Paul, 40 Minn. 460 ; 42 N. W. 393 ; 
 Young V. Waterville, 39 Minn. 196 . 
 39 N. W. 97 ; Nichols v. St. Paul, 44 
 Minn. 494 ; 47 N. W. 168. 
 
 Mississippi: Bell v. West Point, 
 51 Miss. 263; Vicksburg v. Hen- 
 nessy, 54 Id. 392 ; Whitfield v. Meri- 
 dian, 66 Id. 570 ; 6 So. 244. 
 
 Missouri : Bassett v. St. Joseph, 
 53 Mo. 290 ; Craig v. Sedalia, 63 Id. 
 417 ; Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Id. 569 ; 
 Halpin v. Kansas City, 76 Id. 335. 
 
 ilfo?itawas ; Sullivan V. Helena , 10 
 Mont. 134; 35 Pac. 94. 
 
 Nebraska: Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 
 Neb. 446 ; Lincoln v. Walker, 18 Id. 
 344 ; 20 N. W. 113 ; Ponca v. Craw- 
 ford, 23 Id. 662 ; 37 N. W. 609. 
 
 Nevada: McDonough v. Virginia 
 City, 5 Nev. 90. 
 
 New York : Ehrgott v. New York, 
 96 N. Y. 264 ; Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 
 N. Y. 89 ; Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 Id. 
 37 ; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 Id. 158 ; 
 Hickok V. Plattsburgh, Id. 161, note; 
 Weet V. Brockport, Id. 161, note ; 
 
527 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§ 289. 
 
 sion, except these mentioned below,^ that such corporations, 
 where the statute grants them the control of their streets. 
 
 Maximilian v. New York, 62 Id. 160; 
 Hyatt V. Rondout, 44 Barb. 885 ; 
 Wendell v. Troy, 39 Id. 339 ; affi'd, 4 
 Abb. Ct. App. .563 ; Peck v. Batavia, 
 33 Barb. 634 ; Cole v. Medina, 37 Id. 
 218 ; Clark v. Lockport, 49 Barb. 580, 
 and many other cases. 
 
 North Carolina : Meares v . Wil- 
 mington, 9 Ired. Law, 73 ; Bunch v. 
 Edenton, 90 N. C. 431. 
 
 North Dakota : Ludlow v. Fargo, 
 8 N. Dak. 485. 
 
 Ohio : Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 
 80 ; Clark v. Fry, 8 Id. 358 ; Toledo 
 V. Cone, 41 Id. 149 ; Shelby v. Cla- 
 gett, 46 Id. 549 ; 23 N. E. 407. 
 
 Oregon : Sheridan v. Salem, 14 
 Oreg. 338 ; 12 Pac. 925 ; Farquar v. 
 Eoseberg, 18 Oreg. 271 ; 23 Pac. 1103. 
 
 Pennsylvania : Erie v. Schwingle, 
 23 Pa. St. 388 ; Fritsch v. Allegheny, 
 91 Id. 326 ; Rigony v. Schuylkill, 103 
 Pa. St. 383 ; Brookville v. Arthurs, 
 130 Id. 501 ; 18 Atl. 1076 ; Ethridge 
 V. Philadelphia, 26 Fed. 43. 
 
 Tennessee : Nashville v. Brown, 9 
 Heisk. 1 ; Niblett v. Nashville, 12 Id. 
 684; Knoxville v. Bell, 12 Lea, 157. 
 
 Texas: Galveston v. Posnainsky, 
 62 Tex. 118 ; Klein v. Dallas, 71 Id. 
 280 ; 8 S. W. 90 ; Austin v. Ritz, 73 
 Tex. 391 ; 9 S. W. 884. 
 
 Utah : Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 
 Utah, 63 ; 1 Pac. 160. 
 
 Virginia : Sawyer v. Corse, 17 
 Gratt. 230 ; Noble v. Richmond, 31 
 Id. 271 ; Clark v. Richmond, 83 Id. 
 355; 5 S. E. 369 ; Moore v. Richmond, 
 85 Va. 538 ; 8 S. E. 387. 
 
 Washington: Morgan v. Morley, 
 1 Wash. St. 464 ; 25 Pac. 333 ; Hutch- 
 inson V. Olympia, 3 Wash. 314 : 5 
 Pac. 608 ; Saylor v. Moutesano, 11 
 Wash. St. 338; 39 Pac. 653 ; Sutton, 
 v. Snohomish, 11 Wash. St. 24 ; 39 
 Pac. 37:i. 
 
 West Virginia : Wilson v. Wheel- 
 
 ing, 19 W. Va. 324 ; Curry v. Man- 
 nington, 23 Id. 14 ; Moore v. Hunt- 
 ington, 31 W. Va. 843 ; 8 S. E. 513 ; 
 Biggs V. Huntington, 33 W. Va. 55 ; 
 9 S. E. 51. 
 
 ^In all the New England states 
 (see § 358, ante) and in Arkansas 
 (Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 
 139; 4 S. W. 450; Fort Smitli v, 
 York, 53 Ark. 84; Vi S. W. 157), 
 California (VVinbigler v. Los An- 
 geles, 45 Cal. 86 ; Tranter v. Sacra- 
 mento, 61 Id. 371 ; Chope v. Eureka, 
 78 Id. 588 ; 31 Pac. 304 ; Ai-nold v. 
 San Jose, 81 Cal. 618 ; 22 Pac. 877 [two 
 of three judges sitting, while agree- 
 ing to apply the rule, disapproved 
 it]), Michigan (Detroit v. Blacke- 
 by, 31 Mich. 84 [dissenting opinion 
 by Cooley, J.] ; Detroit v. Putnam,^ 
 45 Id. 303 : 7 N. W. 815 ; McKeUar 
 V. Detroit, 57 Mich. 158; 23 N. W. 
 631 ; McArthur v. Saginaw, 58 Mich. 
 357; 25 N. W. 313; Williams v. 
 Grand Rapids, 59 Mich. 51 ; 26 N. 
 W. 379 ; McCutcheon v. Homer, 4a 
 Mich. 483 ; 5 N. W. 668 ; Roberts v. 
 Detroit, 103 Mich. 64 ; 60 N. W. 450) : 
 liability for non-repair is (since 1887) 
 imposed by statute (Howell Stats., 
 §§ 1442-45; see Southwell v. De- 
 troit, 74 Mich. 438; 42 N. W. 118; 
 Joslyn V. Detroit, 74 Mich. 458 ; 43 
 N. W. 50 ; Campbell v. Kalamazoo, 
 80 Mich. 655; 45 N. W. 653), New 
 Jersey (Sussex county v. Strader, 18 
 N. J. Law, 108 ; Pray v. Jersey City, 
 32 Id . 394 ; Livermore v. Camden 
 county, 29 Id. 345 ; Condict v. Jersey 
 City, 46 Id. 157 ; Carter v. Rah way, 
 57 Id. 196 ; 30 Atl. 863), South Caro- 
 lina (Young V. Charleston, 30 S C. 
 116 ; Black v. Columbia, 19 Id. 413 ; 
 Coleman v. Chester, 14 Id. 391). and 
 Wisconsin (Burns v. Elba. 32 Wise. 
 605 ; Stilling v. Thorp. 54 Wise. 538 ; 
 11 N.W. 906 ; Spearbracker v. Larra- 
 
§291] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 528 
 
 coupled with powers to raise means to maintain them, are bound 
 to exercise ordinary care and diligence to see that they are 
 reasonably safe for travel ; that this duty is not a public duty 
 owing to the public alone, but a private, corporate duty, which 
 (when not expressly imposed) is necessarily implied from such a 
 grant of power ; and, moreover, that the legislature is deemed 
 to have intended by the grant to impose a liability, co-exten- 
 sive with the duty, in favor of any person specially injured by 
 a wrongful omission to perform, or a negligent performance 
 of, such duty. We reserve for a separate chapter the con- 
 sideration of a multitude of decided cases, in which this 
 principle has been applied.^ 
 
 § 290. [consolidated with § 367.] 
 
 §291. Implied liability for negligence of agents.— A 
 
 municipal corporation is impliedly liable, on the maxim of 
 respondeat superior, for the negligence of its servants and 
 agents in the discharge of its purely corporate powers, as dis- 
 tinguished from those of a governmental nature.^ The fact of 
 agency being established, the liability of the corporation is 
 determined by the rules, already stated, which govern the 
 relation of master and servant between private persons, unless 
 it is expressly exempted by statute from the application of the 
 rule.^ It is well settled that such relation does not exist 
 between a municipal corporation and the agents it appoints or 
 employs in the execution of its governmental powers for 
 the enforcement of the laws and its own ordinances, such as 
 police officers,^ firemen,* health officers,' and the like, who are 
 
 bee, 64 Wise. 573 ; 25 N. W. 555 ; ' Barnes v. District of Columbia, 
 
 Wiltse V. Tilden, 77 Wise. 153 ; 46 N. 91 U. S. 540 ; Clark v. Washington, 
 
 W. 234 ; Goeltz v. Ashland, 75 Wise. 13 Wheat. 40 ; McCaughey v. Provi- 
 
 643 ; 44 N. W. 770) : the statute now dence, 12 R. I. 449, and cases cited, 
 
 imposes a liability (L. 1889, ch. 471) ; infra. 
 
 see KoUock v. Madison, 84 Wise. '^ See § 354, ante. 
 
 485 ; 54 N. W. 725). ' " Police officers can, in no sense. 
 
 For the rule in Pennsylvania, be regarded as servants or agents of 
 Maryland and Indiana that hofh the city. Their duties are of a pub- 
 counties and cities are impliedly lie nature. Their appointment is de- 
 liable, see § 257, ante. volved upon cities and towns by the 
 
 ' Chapter xv, §§ 333-384, post. legislature as a convenient mode of 
 
 * See § 265, ante. ' See § 266, ante. 
 
529 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 r§29i 
 
 agents of the state and not of the corporation. The corpora- 
 tion is not liable, therefore, for the torts of these officers, 
 
 city, by a policeman specially ap- 
 pointed to enforce an ordinance 
 against animals running at large. 
 Held, city not liable. A city is not 
 liable for arresting a person without 
 a warrant, or for using unnecessary 
 violence in making an arrest (Pol- 
 lock V. Louisville, 13 Bush, 221 : 
 Cook V. Macon, 54 Ga. 4C8 ; Harris 
 V. Atlanta, 62 Id. 290 ; Attaway v. 
 Cartersville, 68 Id. 740 ; Richmond 
 V. Long, 17 Gratt. 376 ; Dargan v. 
 Mobile, 31 Ala. 469 ; Moss v. Augusta, 
 93 Ga. 797 ; 20 S. E. 658 [maliciously 
 shooting dog]. See Brown v. Guy- 
 andotte, 34 W. Va. 299 ; 12 S. E. 
 707 ; Odell v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353 
 [arrest on verbal order of magis- 
 trate]; Peters v. Lindsborg, 40 Kans. 
 654 ; 20 Pac. 490 ; GuUikson v. Mc- 
 Donald, 62 Minn. 278 ; 64 N. W. 812 
 [false imprisonment]. But see Fox 
 V. Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & S. 
 108 ; Rusher v. Dallas, 83 Tex. 151 ; 
 Blake v. Pontiac, 49 111. App. 543 
 [same] ; Kansas City v. Lemen, 57 
 Fed. 905 ; 6 C. C. A. 627 [illegally 
 closing circus exhibition] ; Cobb v. 
 Portland, 55 Me. 381 [third person 
 injured while assisting police, at 
 their request, in making an ai'rest]. 
 Enforcing ordinances is in the inter- 
 est of the public, not of the corpor- 
 ation as such (Elliott v Philadelphia, 
 75 Pa. St. 347; Calwell v. Boone, 
 51 Iowa, 687 ; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Id. 
 495; Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. 
 Mon. 559 ; Laurel v. Blue [Ind ] 27 
 N. E. 301 ; Vaughtman v. Waterloo, 
 14 Ind. App. 649 ; 43 N. E. 476 ; Mc- 
 Elroy V. Albany, 65 Ga. 387 [night- 
 vratch maliciously assaulted pris- 
 oner] ; Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 
 469 ; Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. 
 Ann. 461 [officer killed a slave in 
 suppressing an unlawful assembly 
 of slaves]. Compare Johnson v. 
 
 exercising a function of government, 
 but this does not render the cities 
 and towns liable for their unlawful 
 or negligents acts. The powers and 
 duties with which police officers and 
 constables are intrusted are derived 
 from the law, and not from the city 
 or town under which they hold their 
 appointment" (per Bigelow, C. J., 
 82 Mass. 172 [policeman made an as- 
 sault while attempting to enforce 
 ordinance against street obstruc- 
 tions]). In McKay v. Buffalo (9 
 Hun, 401 ; affi'd without opinion, 74 
 N. Y. 619), it was sought to hold a 
 city liable for a policeman's negli- 
 gently handling his pistol while 
 attempting to shoot a supposed mad 
 dog in the street, as required by 
 ordinance, so that he wounded plain- 
 tiff. Held, on demurrer, no cause 
 of action. In WoodhuU v. New 
 York (150 N. Y. 450 ; 44 N. E. 1038 ; 
 rev'g 76 Hun, 3D0 ; 28 N. Y. Supp. 
 120), a policeman, detailed to the 
 Brooklyn Bridge, also acted as train- 
 guard of the railroad operated 
 thereon, for hire, by the two cities. 
 Held, that the latter were not liable 
 for the policeman's forcible deten- 
 tion of a passenger on its train, no re- 
 lation of master and servant existing 
 between them and the policeman. 
 S. P., Burch V. Hardwicke, 30 Gratt: 
 34 ; Altvater v. Baltimore, 31 Md. 
 463 ; Elliott v. Philadelphia, 7 Phila. 
 138 [policeman not caring for horse 
 after arresting driver] ; Whitfield v. 
 Paris, 84 Tex. 431 ; 19 S. W. 566 jun- 
 skillful attempt to shoot unmuzzled 
 dog, wounding plaintiff] ; Culver v. 
 Streator, 130 111. 338; 33 N. E. 810 
 [same]. In Givens v. Paris (5 Tex.Civ. 
 App. 705 ; 34 S. W. 974), plaintiff was 
 gored by a cow which was being 
 driven to pound, instead of led by a 
 rope, thi-ough a populous part of 
 [Law op Neg. Vol. 1 — 34] 
 
§291] 
 
 nUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 53° 
 
 though committed with its knowledge or by its order, or 
 though the wrong was subsequently ratified by it.^ The mere 
 fact that an officer was appointed, and is removable, by the 
 corporation, does not establish an agency, within the rule. In 
 appointing, under statutory requirement, a person to perform 
 specific public duties, e. g., a boiler-inspector,'' or a pilot,^ the 
 city discharges a political duty only, and is not liable for the 
 appointee's misfeasance or malfeasance in office.' Its officers 
 directly elected by the people are not its agents,'" nor are per- 
 sons designated by statute to construct or maintain a public 
 work for its use and benefit," unless it accepts the statute and 
 
 New Orleans, 5 Id. 100 ; Clague v. city liable] ; Lewis v. New Orleans, 
 New Orleans, 13 Id. 275 [death of 12 Id. 190). 
 slave put to work in chain-gang; 
 
 6 Calwell V. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687 ; 
 2 N. W . 614 ; Odell v. Schroeder, 58 
 111. 353 ; Grumbine v. Washington, 
 2 McArthar, 578 ; Parks v. Green- 
 ville, 44 S. C. 168; 21 S. E. 540. 
 Compare Eosenbaum v. Newbern, 
 118 N. C. 83 ; 24 S. E. 1 ; McGraw v. 
 Marion, 98 Ky. 673 ; 34 S. W. 18. 
 
 ' Mead v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 
 72. 
 
 8 Ogilvie V. Edinburgh, Hay, 26 ; 
 F. C. 1821. 
 
 8 Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545 ; 
 Sullivan v. Holyoke, 135 Mass. 273 ; 
 Prince v. Lynn, 149 Id. 193 ; 21 N. 
 E. 296 [street superintendent] ; Jen- 
 sen V. Waltham, 166 Id. 344 ; 44 N. E. 
 339 [same] ; New Bedford v. Taun- 
 ton, 9 Allen, 207 [overseers of the 
 poor] ; Hennessey v. New Bedford, 
 153 Mass. 260 ; 26 N. E. 999 [survey- 
 ors of highways] ; Cochrane v. Mai- 
 den, 152 Mass. 365; 25 N. E. 620 
 [drainage commissioners] ; Bates v. 
 kutland, 62 Vt 178: 20 Atl. 278 
 [trustees of highway district]. 
 
 '» Terry v New York, 8 Bosw. 504 ; 
 Ti-eadwell v. New York, 1 Daly, 123 ; 
 Denver v. Williams. 13 Colo 475 ; 21 
 Pac. 617. A city corporation is not re- 
 sponsible to a lot-owner for negli- 
 
 gence of a district surveyor elected by 
 the people, under authority of stat- 
 ute, the corporation having no con- 
 trol over him, in locating the line of 
 his lots, so that, after a partial con- 
 struction of a house, he was com- 
 pelled to rebuild it (Alcorn v. Phila- 
 delphia, 44 Pa. St. 348). s. P., 
 Wood V. Watertown, 58 Hun, 298 ; 
 11 N. Y. Supp. S64 [alderman]. 
 Selectmen of a town (elected), whom 
 the statute authorized to establish 
 and maintain public drinking 
 troughs, held not agents of the town 
 in erecting a trough and painting it 
 brilliant red, causing plaintiff's horse 
 to be frightened and to run away 
 (Gushing v. Bedford, 125 Mass. 526). 
 " In N. Y. & Brooklyn Saw Mill 
 Co. V. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 580), the 
 legislature appointed commissioners 
 to build docks along a canal within 
 the city limits, but not owned or con- 
 trolled by the city, the expense to be 
 ultimately paid by an assessment 
 upon adjacent land. Held, not a 
 corporate work, and that the com- 
 missioners were not agents of the 
 corporation for whose negligence it 
 was liable. And see cases under next 
 note. 
 
531 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§291 
 
 adopts the appointment, in which case the appointees become 
 its agents, the same as if they were appointed by its own 
 authority.'^ An officer whose duties are prescribed by statute, 
 whose authority is not derived from the corporation, and who 
 is not subject to its control, is not its agent for whose negH- 
 gence it is liable.'^ Under the general principle which makes 
 a master liable for the negligence of sub-agents employed by 
 his servant, under his authority,'* municipal corporations are 
 
 '2 In Bailey v. New York (3 Hill, 
 531 ; afii'd, 3 Denio, 443), commis- 
 sioners were appointed by the state 
 to draft a plan for conveying water 
 into the city of New York, such plan 
 to be submitted to the common coun- 
 cil of the city for approval and adop- 
 tion. The plan submitted to the 
 commissioners was approved, and 
 the commissioners were instructed 
 by the common council to proceed 
 with the work, which was accord- 
 ingly done. The work was paid for 
 and accepted by the city. In the 
 course of the work, a dam was so 
 negligently built that during a 
 freshet it was carried away, causing 
 injury to the plaintiff 's property. On 
 the trial, plaintiff was nonsuited, 
 principally upon the ground that 
 the water commissioners, having 
 been appointed by the state, were 
 not subject to the control of the city, 
 and that the latter was not, there- 
 fore, liable for their negligence. 
 Held, error. In Deyoe v. Saratoga 
 Springs (1 Hun, 341), commissioners 
 appointed by the legislature had 
 charge of a village water-works. 
 The village held liable for their neg- 
 ligence S. P.. Toledo, V. Cone, 41 
 Ohio St. 149 ; Ironton v. Kelley, 38 
 Id. nO; Appleton v. Water Commrs., 
 3 Hill, 433 ; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 
 N. Y. 158 [unskillful construction of 
 bridge]. 
 
 " Highway officers whose duties 
 are prescribed by general statute, 
 whose authority is not derived from 
 
 the town, and who are not under 
 the control of the town, are not 
 agents of the town. Their powers 
 cannot be enlarged or abridged by 
 any action of the town, and what 
 they do, or omit to do, in the proper 
 exercise of their authority, is done 
 or omitted because the law enjoins 
 and prescribes their duties, inde- 
 pendent of municipal control or au- 
 thority (Ball v. Winchester, 33 N. H. 
 435 ; Hardy v. Keens, 53 Id. 370 ; 
 Pratt V. Weymouth, 147 Mass. 345 ; 
 17 N. E. 538 [highway surveyor] ; 
 Barney v. Lowell, 98 Mass. 570 ; 
 McCarthy v. Boston, 135 Id. 197 
 [street superintendent] ; Walcott v. 
 Swampscott, 1 Allen, 101 [highvray 
 surveyor] ; Bates v. Horner, 65 Vt. 
 471 ; 27 Atl. 134 ; Anne Arundel 
 county V. Duval, 54 Md. 3)0 [road 
 supervisor] ; Caspary v. Portland, 
 19 Oreg. 496 ; 24 Pac. 1036 [health 
 officer]. A town is not the superior 
 of its assessors and collectors of 
 taxes so as to be liable to a tax- 
 payer for their mistakes in assessing 
 too much taxes (Lorillard v. Monroe, 
 11 N, Y. 392 ; Rossire v. Boston, 4 
 Allen, 57 ; Dunbar v. Boston, 113 
 Mass. 75 ; Alger v. Easton, 119 Id. 
 77). Compare Commonwealth Bank 
 V. New York, 43 N. Y. 184. The 
 statute must deteimine the liability 
 of the corporation for the torts of 
 its officers (Little Rock v. Willis, 37 
 Ark. 572). 
 '0 See § 157, ante. 
 
§291] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 532 
 
 answerable for the negligence of persons lawfully '^ appointed 
 or employed by its officers to perform ministerial duties '" or 
 labor" in its service. It is, of course, not liable for the negli- 
 gence of its agents when engaged in the service of a third per- 
 son.*^ But putting an agent to work in another department of 
 
 '5 Where the general duty of 
 abating nuisances is cast upon a 
 particular department of the city 
 governiuent with which the mayor 
 has nothing to do, the latter, in em- 
 ploying a person, in an emergency, 
 to remove a nuisance, does not bind 
 the city so as to make it liable for 
 the employee's negligence in trying 
 to remove the nuisance (Hilsdorf v. 
 St. Louis, 45 Mo. 94). s. P. , Cumber- 
 land V. WiUison, 50 Md. 138. 
 
 "• An authority to do acts merely 
 ministerial or mechanical may be 
 delegated ; but not so where the act 
 involves the exercise of judgment or 
 discretion (Powell v. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 
 396 ; and cases cited). 
 
 " Thus, a municipal corporation is 
 liable for injuries caused by the care- 
 lessness of the laborers employed by 
 its street commissioner, or other 
 proper officer, in corporation work 
 (Delmonico v. New York, 1 Sandf . 
 222 ; Barney Boat Co. v. New York, 
 40 Fed. 50, and note [employees of 
 street-cleaning commissioner] ; Day- 
 ton V. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80 ; Smith 
 V. Milwaukee, 18 Wise. 69 ; see 
 Memphis v. Lasser, 9 Humph. 757 ; 
 Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Cin- 
 cinnati V. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38 ; 
 Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. Law, 
 78 ; McCaughey v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 
 449). S. P., Worden v. New Bed- 
 ford, 131 Mass. 28 [janitor of a public 
 building, let out with services of the 
 janitor] ; Vincent v. Brooklyn, 31 
 Hun, 123 [keeper of a municipal 
 building, whose negligence caused 
 an explosion of gas]. In Sullivan v. 
 Holyoke (135 Mass. 273), a city was 
 
 held liable for the negligence of an 
 agent employed to take care of 
 naphtha used in lighting street 
 lamps. 
 
 '8 The fact that a city engineer 
 plans a defective drain, to be con- 
 structed by private parties, which 
 caves in, and causes injury, does not 
 impose any liability on the city 
 (Kansas City v. Brady, 52 Kans. 297; 
 34 Pac. 884; 36 Id. 726). A city is 
 not liable for the fault of its engi- 
 neer in incorrectly reporting to a lot- 
 owner the grade of street in front of 
 owner's lot, although by an ordi- 
 nance of the city it is made the 
 engineer's duty to make such reports 
 to the lot-owner. Benefit of per- 
 formance of such duty accrues to 
 lot-owner, not to city in its corpo- 
 rate capacity (Waller v. Dubuque, 
 69 Iowa, 541 ; 29 N. W. 456). s. p., 
 Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545 
 [filing a report of assessment of 
 damage for a street opening by vil- 
 lage trustees, as required by general 
 statute, not a corporate duty] ; 
 Anne Arundel county v. Duvall, 
 54 Md. 350 [road supervisor]. 
 The mere granting of a license to a 
 plumber to connect service pipes for 
 conducting water from the distribut- 
 ing pipes of the city to private 
 houses, or the giving of a special 
 permit to him, to connect with a city 
 sewer, under the direction of the 
 city inspectors, does not not make 
 the plumber a servant of the city 
 when employed by private parties 
 (Dorlon v. Brooklyn, 46 Barb. 604). 
 See § 263, ante. In Harvey v. Hills- 
 dale (86 Mich. 330 ; 49 N. W. 141), an 
 
533 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [^295 
 
 public business than that to which he was specially assigned, 
 will not terminate his agency so as to relieve the corporation 
 from liability for his negligence in such work.'' 
 
 §§ 292, 293, 294. [consolidated with § 291.] 
 
 § 295. Departments of government, not agents of city. — 
 
 The members of an independent department of municipal 
 government created by the legislature, not for the purpose of 
 managing the corporation's property, but of providing for the 
 general welfare, are not agents of the corporation, although 
 appointed and removable by it, and under its control and pay, 
 but are officers and agents of the state, for governmental pur- 
 poses, like the corporation itself. The latter is not answerable, 
 therefore, for the conduct of such officers, in the discharge 
 of their statutory duties, nor for the negligence of their sub- 
 ordinates and servants, in the business of the department.' 
 
 employee of the city while engaged 
 in work for the city under contract, 
 was taken from that work and placed 
 upon work for a third person by the 
 mayor's direction. Held, that while 
 so engaged, he was not the city's 
 agent for whose negligence it was 
 liable. In Wilson v. Troy (135 N. 
 Y. 96 : 33 N. E. 44), the city's water 
 commissioners had prohibited any 
 person except their superintendent 
 and those employed by him, or hav- 
 ing his permission, to tap or make 
 connection with the water mains. 
 A plumber who was employed to 
 make a connection with a house, 
 knowing of this rule, applied to the 
 superintendent, who directed work- 
 men employed by the city to make 
 an excavation in the street for the 
 connection, the plumber agreeing to 
 reimburse the city for the cost of 
 the men's labor. The workmen neg- 
 ligently left the excavation un- 
 guarded, and plaintiff's horse fell 
 into it. Held (by one majority), 
 whether the workmen were at the 
 time servants of the city, was for the 
 jury. 
 
 " Stoddard v. Winchester, 157 
 Mass. 567 ; 32 N. E. 948. 
 
 ' Russell V. New York, 3 Denio, 
 461, distinguishing Bailey v. New 
 York, 2 Id. 443. In Maximilian v. 
 New York (63 N. Y. 160), the driver 
 of an ambulance wagon belonging 
 to the city ran over and caused the 
 death of plaintiff's intestate. The 
 driver was an employee of the com- 
 missioners of charities — a depart- 
 ment of the city government. 
 Held, corporation not liable. S. P., 
 Ham V. New York, 70 N. T. 460 [de- 
 partment of public instruction; de- 
 fective school-house plumbing]; 
 Donovan v. Board of Education, 85 
 N. T. 117 ; Murphy v. Commission- 
 ers of Emigration, 28 N. Y. 134 
 [board not liable for emigrant's loss 
 of baggage in its charge] ; New 
 York, etc. Lumber Co. v. Brooklyn, 
 71 Id. 580 ; Tone v. New York, 70 N. 
 Y. 157 [board of revision and correc- 
 tion of tax assessments] ; Gottsber- 
 ger V. New York, 9 N. Y. Misc. 349 ; 
 29 N. Y. Supp. 593 [dock depart- 
 ment]. In O'Meara v. New York (1 
 Daly, 435), plaintiff, while on the 
 
§2961 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 534 
 
 This principle, however, does not govern the case of a public 
 work, c. g., a bridge authorized by the legislature to be built 
 and maintained at the expense of a city, by a board of trus- 
 tees appointed by the latter, to which the structure, together 
 with its revenues, belong. There, it is held, the trustees, and 
 their servants, are agents of the city, for whose negligence in 
 the management of its property the city is liable.^ 
 
 § 296. When departments are city's agents. — The fact 
 that the legislature has imposed upon an independent depart- 
 ment of a city government, e.g., a police or street department, 
 a special duty, such as enforcing ordinances against nuisances, 
 or repairing its streets, as the case may be, will not relieve the 
 corporation from its primary obligation in regard to the 
 
 sidewalk, was knocked down and 
 run over by a fire-engine in charge 
 of firemen. Held, city was not lia- 
 ble. The mere fact that the firemen 
 had at the time an engine in their 
 possession, by the authority of the 
 common council, did not create the 
 relation of master and servant. An 
 action would lie against the fire de- 
 partment itself (Clarissy v. Fire 
 Department, 7 Abb. Pr. [N. S ] 352). 
 A city charter gave tlie board of al- 
 dermen power to elect street com- 
 missioners, but denied it tlie right 
 to superintend and direct them. 
 Held, that an assistant superin- 
 tendent of streets, acting under 
 such board of street commissioners, 
 was not, by virtue of his office, an 
 agent of the city, for whose negli- 
 gence it was liable (McCann v. Wal- 
 tham, 163 Mass. 344 ; 40 N. E. 20); 
 S. p., Gross V. Portsmouth, N. H. 
 ; 33 Atl. 256 [water-works com- 
 mission] ; Dodge v. Granger, 17 R. I. 
 664; 24 Atl. 100 [fire department]; 
 Condict V. Jersey. City, 46 N. J. 
 Law, 157 [neghgence of an employee 
 of the board of pubUc works charged 
 with the duty of cleaning streets] ; 
 Fincli V. Board of Education, 30 
 Ohio St. 37 ; Alvater v. Baltimore, 
 
 31 Md. 463 [police department]; 
 Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 Ala. 
 527 [police duties]). It has been held, 
 in admiralty, under a charter, provid- 
 ing that, " for all purposes, the local 
 administration and government of 
 the city shall continue to be in, and 
 to be performed by, the corpora- 
 tion," creating the fire depart- 
 ment, and declaring its powers and 
 duties to be " admistrative and gov- 
 ernmental," the city is liable for in- 
 juries to a vessel caused by the negli- 
 gence of the department (Workman 
 V. New York, 63 Fed. 298). In 
 Edgerton v. New York (27 Fed. 230), 
 following the rule of the state courts, 
 the city was held liable, in admiralty, 
 for the negligence of an employee of 
 the department of public parks in 
 managing the draw of a bridge un- 
 der the control of that department. 
 S. P., Allen V. Boston, 159 Mass. 324, 
 34 N. E. 519. Compare Haight v. 
 New York (24 Fed. 93) , where city 
 was declared not liable for careless 
 management of steam tug by em- 
 ployees of board of charities. 
 
 2 Walsh V. New York, 107 N. Y. 
 220 ; 13 N. E. 911 ; Toomey v. New 
 York, 13 Hun, 542. See Walsh v. 
 Trustees, etc., 96 N. Y. 437. 
 
535 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [§ 298 
 
 removal of nuisances and the repair of its streets. The fact 
 that a dangerous excavation in a street was authorized by an 
 executive board having control thereof, will not relieve the 
 city from liability for the negligence of the department's serv- 
 ants, in leaving it unguarded and unlighted at night ; ^ the 
 board's duty in the premises is merely auxiliary to the general 
 duty of the corporation, and not exclusive of it.^ The fact 
 that officers are specially charged by the law with the enforce- 
 ment of corporation ordinances, is no excuse for the neglect 
 of the corporation to enforce them, so long as it has any other 
 means of securing their observance ^ A statute which gives to 
 a particular department of a city government exclusive power 
 to lay out, and exclusive control of, certain streets within the 
 city limits, does not indicate a legislative intention to excuse 
 the corporation itself from a performance of its primary duty 
 to care for all its streets ; the exclusive control given the 
 department means exclusive of any other officers of the city, 
 not exclusive of the city itself.* 
 
 § 297. [Omitted.] 
 
 §298. Independent contractors not agents. — The rule 
 that an independent contractor is not the servant or agent of 
 his employer, except in relation to the specific results which 
 he undertakes to produce, 'applies, of course, to the case of 
 a contractor with a municipal corporation, for the execution of 
 a public work. Hence the contractor is alone responsible to 
 third persons for the negligence of himself, and for that of his 
 servants or subcontractors, in carrying out the undertaking.^ 
 
 ' Graves v. Rochester, 39 Hun, 5. ^ Eeinhard v. New York, 3 Daly, 
 
 2 Kunz V. Troy, 104 N. Y. 344 ; 10 243. 
 
 N. E. 443 ; rev'g 36 Hun, 615; Barnes * Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 
 
 V. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540. 264 [dep't of parks]. See Connors v. 
 
 It is upon this principle that a city New York, 11 Hun, 439; Richards v. 
 
 is not relieved from the duty of New York, 48 N. Y. Sup. 315 [bridge 
 
 repairing a street, on the plea that under the control of department of 
 
 the disrepair was caused by a rail- parks], 
 
 road company laying its track ' See gij 164-170 ante. 
 
 therein, the company being under ' Besides the cases cited under §S 
 
 statutory obligation to restore to 168-170, an<e, see Water Company v, 
 
 their former condition streets which Ware, 16 "Wall. 566 ; Pack v. New 
 
 it had torn up in constructing its road York, 8 N. Y. 222 [blasting in street] ; 
 
 (Tierney v. Troy, 41 Hun, 120). Kelly v. New York, 11 Id. 432 [same] ; 
 
§298J 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 536 
 
 The fact that the contract reserved superintendence by the 
 city's agents is immaterial.^ If the work contracted for is, per 
 sc, a nuisance, or is necessarily dangerous, the corporation is 
 bound not only to require the contractor to take every reason- 
 able and proper precaution to prevent any mischief ensuing, 
 but to see that such precautions are taken by the contractor,* 
 
 Brusso V. Buffalo, 90 Id. 679 [un- 
 guarded excavation in street in build- 
 ing sewer] ; Reed v. Allegheny, 79 
 Pa. St. 300 [trespass of contractor] ; 
 School District v. Fuess, 98 Id. 600 ; 
 Erie v. Caulklns, 85 Id. 247 ; Wilson 
 V. WheeUng, 19 W. Va. 323 ; Logans- 
 port V. Dick, 70 Ind. 65 ; Leeds v. 
 Richniond, 102 Id. 372 ; Fuller v. 
 Grand Rapids, 105 Mich. 529 ; 63 N. 
 W. 530 ; Wood v. School District, 44 
 Iowa, 27 ; Fink v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 
 53 ; Deford's Case, 80 Md. 179 ; Anne 
 Arundel county v. Duvall, 54 Id. 
 350; Sutton T. Board of Police, 41 
 Miss. 236). In Herrington v. Lan- 
 singburgh (110 N. Y. 145 ; 17 N. E. 
 728) plaintiff's team, standing in a 
 street, was frightened by the noise of 
 a blast fired by contractors for lay- 
 ing a sewer, and plaintiff was injured. 
 Held, the village was not liable. 
 " If it was a prudent thing to notify 
 persons in the vicinity of the blast 
 before it was fired, then the con- 
 tractors should have given the no- 
 tice ; but the duty to give it did not 
 devolve upon the village." A fire- 
 works company contracted with a 
 city to purchase and set off a display 
 of fireworks for a certain sum for 
 the entire service, and to pay all 
 claims for personal injuries resulting 
 from the fireworks, the city having 
 no control whatever over the prep- 
 aration or execution of the work. 
 Held, the city was not liable for the 
 negligence of an employee of the 
 company (Heidenwag v. Philadel- 
 phia. 168 Pa. St. 72 ; 31 Atl. 1063). 
 Property owners engaged, in obedi- 
 
 ence to an ordinance, in paving and 
 curbing the sidewalk in front of 
 their properties, are not contractors 
 so as to relieve the borough from 
 liability for the dangerous condition 
 of the street caused by them (Trego 
 V. Honeybrook, 160 Pa. St. 76; 28 
 Atl. 639). 
 
 3 Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 347 ; 
 Charlock v. Freel, 50 Hun, 895 ; 3 
 N. Y. Supp. 336 ; Detroit v. Chaffee. 
 68 Mich. 635 ; 37 N. W. 19 ; Cary v. 
 Chicago, 60 111. App. 841 ; Blumb v. 
 Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112. 
 
 ■■Storrs V. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; 
 Brusso V. Buffalo, 90 Id. 679 ; Hawx- 
 hurst V. New York, 43 Hun, 588. 
 Although the work contracted for 
 was not a nuisance ■per se, if properly 
 done, yet if it becomes so, by reason 
 of the manner in which the con- 
 tractor did it, and the city accepted 
 it in that condition, it is liable 
 (Vogel V. New York, 92 N. Y. 19). 
 In that case, the contractor after 
 making an excavation, which turned 
 surface water on adjoining land, 
 abandoned the work, and the city did 
 not avail itself of the right, under the 
 contract, to take charge of the work 
 in case of its abandonment. Earl, J. , 
 said : " The excavations were made 
 by agencies put in motion by 
 the city, in the execution of a con- 
 tract for it, upon its lands. The ex- 
 cavations were not necessarily dam- 
 aging to the plaintiff. If the work 
 had been carried to completion in a 
 reasonable time, no serious damage 
 would have been done; but the dam- 
 age came because the excavations 
 
537 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§299 
 
 especially where the contract fails to provide for the contrac- 
 tor's taking precautionary measures, e. g., to guard the street 
 excavation contracted for, as in that case a person injured by the 
 absence of a guard would have no remedy against the contractor.^ 
 Want of notice of the contractor's failure to guard or light a 
 street excavation is not a defense. It was the duty of the 
 city to see that such barriers were erected and kept up.^ It 
 cannot escape liability for the consequences of a breach of 
 duty, for example, to maintain the public streets so as to be 
 reasonably safe for travel, by the fact of having contracted 
 with another for the performance of such duty.' 
 
 § 299. Liability limited to matters within jurisdiction. — 
 
 To establish the corporation's liability for the act of its agent, 
 it is necessary, of course, to show that the act was either 
 expressly or impliedly authorized by it, or by some branch of 
 its government having jurisdiction of the subject to which the 
 act relates, or that it was done, bona fide, in pursuance of a 
 
 were needlessly, negligently and 
 heedlessly suffered to remain in the 
 street for an unreasonable length of 
 time, and for that, responsibility at- 
 tached to the city." In Circleville v. 
 Neuding (41 Ohio St. 46.5), a city con- 
 tracted for the construction of a 
 cistern 20 feet deep in a street. The 
 corporation did not reserve or exer- 
 cise any control or direction over 
 the manner of doing the work except 
 to see that it was done according to 
 the contract. The cistern was un- 
 guarded while in course of construc- 
 tion, and was only partially covered. 
 Plaintiff's horse fell through the 
 covering. Held, city liable. See 
 Bauer v. Rochester, 59 Hun, 616 ; 12 
 N. Y. Supp. 418 ; Cincinnati v. Stone, 
 5 Ohio St. 38 ; Harrisburgh v. Taylor, 
 87 Pa. St. 216 ; Harrison v. CoUins, 
 86 Id. 153 ; Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 
 Id. 221 ; Welsh v. St. Louis, 73 Mo. 
 71 ; Springfield v. Le Claire, 49 HI. 
 476 ; Scammon v. Chicago, 35 Id. 424 ; 
 Palmer v Lincoln. 5 Neb. 136 ; James 
 V. San Francisco, 6 Cal. 529 ; Brooks 
 
 V. Somerville, 106 Mass. 271. A city 
 is liable when the work is intrinsi- 
 cally dangerous, though done under 
 contract (Birmingham v. McCary, 
 84 Ala. 469 ; 4 So. 630). 
 
 * Storrs V. Utica, supra ; Cotter v. 
 Lindgren, 106 Cal. 602 ; 39 Pac. 950. 
 See Charlock v. Freel, 50 Hun, 395 ; 
 3 N. Y. Supp. 336. 
 
 ^ Omaha v. Jensen, 35 Neb. 68 ; 53 
 N. W. 833. Compare New York v. 
 Brady, 81 Hun, 440 ; 30 N. Y. Supp. 
 1121. 
 
 ' Besides cases cited under § 176, 
 ante, see Turner v. Newburgh, 109 N. 
 Y. 301 ; 16 N. E. 844 ; Dressell v. 
 Kingston, 32 Hun, 533 ; Groves v. 
 Rochester, 39 Id. 5 ; Pettengill v. 
 Yonkers, 39 Id. 449 ; afli'd, 116 N. Y. 
 558 ; 22 N. E. 1095 ; Logansport v. 
 Dick, 70 Ind. 65 ; Welsh v. St. Louis, 
 73 Mo 71 ; Broadwell v. Kansas 
 City, 75 Id. 313; Jacksonville v. 
 Drew, 19 Fla 106 ; Pearson v. Zable. 
 78 Ky. 170 ; Wilson v. Wheeling, 19 
 W. Va. 323 ; Mayor v. O'Donnell, 53 
 Md. 110. 
 
§299] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 S38 
 
 general authority to act for the corporation in the matter.^ 
 A common council's powers are limited and defined by law, 
 and it can no more transcend them than an agent in any other 
 case can, and bind his principal beyond the scope of the 
 authority conferred upon him. It is not liable, therefore, for 
 acts of its agents outside the scope of its powers.^ A common 
 council, for example, has no authority, under a general charter- 
 power to remove nuisances, to direct the removal of a person 
 sick of an infectious or contagious disease from his own house 
 without his consent, or to forcibly take and occupy another's 
 
 ' In Gilmartin v. New York (55 
 Barb. 239), the city's park-keeper, in 
 attempting to take down a liberty- 
 pole in a public park, which had 
 become dangerous, did it so negli- 
 gently that it broke a telegraph pole 
 which fell upon and killed a person 
 passing on the street. Held, that in 
 taking down the pole the park-keeper 
 was acting, though without express 
 orders, within the scope of his em- 
 ployment, and the city was liable. 
 Otherwise, where the flagstaff was 
 not owned by the town (Wakefield 
 V. Newport, 60 N. H. 874). s. p., 
 Carman v. New York, 14 Abb. Pr. 
 301 [plaintiff's trees cut down by de- 
 fendant's servants ; defendant liable 
 for not properly superintending serv- 
 ants] ; McCarthy v. Boston, 185 
 Mass. 197; Thayer v. Boston, 19 
 Pick. 516 [city liable for the acts of 
 officers having general authority 
 over its streets, in erecting fences 
 and building a passage-way leading 
 to plaintiff's premises, cutting off 
 access to it]. Compare Bryant v. 
 Westbrook, 86 Me. 450 ; 29 Atl. 1109 ; 
 Sheffield v. Harris, 101 Ala. 564 ; 14 
 So. 357. R. P., Chicago V. McGraw, 
 75 111. 566 ; Sherman v. Grenada, 51 
 Miss. 186 ; Hanvey v. Rochester, 85 
 Barb. 177 ; Orlando v. Pragg, 31 
 Fla. Ill ; 12 So. 368 [abating nui- 
 sance]. Where village trustees, by 
 a formal resolution, directed their 
 
 highway officers to enter upon plain- 
 tiflf's premises, and remove a fence 
 therefrom, the act of the officer in 
 obeying the command was held to 
 be a trespass for which the corpora- 
 tion was liable, no matter how hon- 
 estly the trustees may have believed 
 the fence to be an encroachment 
 upon the highway (Lee v. Sandy 
 HiU, 40 N. Y. 442). See Buffalo, etc. 
 Turnpike Co. v. Buffalo, 58 N. Y. 
 689 [tortiously taking possession of 
 private bridge]; Woodcock v. Calais, 
 66 Maine, 234 ; Loyd v. Columbus, 90 
 Ga. 20 ; 15 S. E. 818 [cutting ditch 
 outside city limits]. 
 
 ' Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345 ; 
 Flagg V. Worcester, 13 Id. 601 ; Don- 
 nelly V. Tripp, 12 R. I. 97 ; Danbury, 
 etc. R. Co. V. Norwalk, 37 Conn. 
 109; Tilford v. New York, 1 N Y. 
 App. Div. 199; 37 N. Y. Supp. 185; 
 Kreger v. Bismarck, 59 Minn. 3; 60 N. 
 W. 675 ; Allison v. Richmond, 51 Mo. 
 App. 183 ; Hanvey v. Rochester, 35 
 Barb. 177 ; Chicago v. Turner, 80 111. 
 419 ; Cuyler v. Rochester, 12 Wend. 
 165 [city not liable for the damages 
 caused by widening of a street, for 
 want of jurisdiction to make the 
 alteration] ; Horn v. Baltimore, 80 
 Md. 218 [same] ; Cavanagh v. Bos- 
 ton, 139 Mass. 426 [city not liable for 
 work done negligently or otherwise 
 under a supposed authority of illegal 
 and void votes of common council]. 
 
539 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§300 
 
 house as a pest-house.' So it is, strictly speaking, no part of* 
 the proper business of a municipal corporation to call meetings 
 of citizens to consider political or philanthropic matters, or to 
 inaugurate celebrations in which its officers take part. For 
 the acts of its officers in such undertakings, it is not respon- 
 sible, they being done with respect to matters unconnected 
 with the purposes of the corporation, and wholly outside the 
 course of such officers' employment.* Subject to the proviso 
 that the act complained of was in or about a subject-matter of 
 which the corporation has jurisdiction, it is liable for every 
 such act of its agents committed by its express command or 
 direct authorization, however unlawful the act itself may be.^ 
 A city cannot by subsequent ratification make good an act of 
 its agent, which legally it could not have directly empowered 
 him to do.* 
 
 § 300. [consolidated with § 299]. 
 
 ' Boom V. Utica, 3 Barb. 104. In 
 Barbour v. Ellsworth (67 Me. 294), a 
 city was held not liable for the acts 
 of its officers in their official capac- 
 ity in carrying a healthy person, 
 together with sick ones, to a small- 
 pox hospital, where he contracted 
 the disease. See ante, § 260. A town 
 will not be bound, even by the ex- 
 press vote of the majority, to the 
 performance of contracts, or other 
 legal duties, not coming within the 
 scope of the objects and purposes for 
 which it was incorporated (Stetson 
 V Kempton, 13 Mass. 273 ; Norton 
 V. Mansfield, 16 Mass. 48 ; Parsons v. 
 Goshen, 11 Pick, 396; Anthony v. 
 Adams, 1 Mete. 284). 
 
 « Smith V. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506 ; 
 Boyland v. New York, 1 Sandf . 27 ; 
 Love V. Raleigh, 116 N. C. 296 ; 21 8. 
 E. 503 [Fourth of July celebration]. 
 
 * In Leman v. New York (5 Bosw. 
 414), the common council had au- 
 thority to change the grade of cer- 
 tain streets, only on the consent of 
 two-thirds of the abutting owners. 
 Having made a change of grade 
 
 without such consent, held, the city 
 was liable to an abutting owner for 
 damage to his premises in conse- 
 quence of such change. ' ' The tres- 
 pass and damage were the acts of 
 immediate agents of the corporation 
 who acted under its direct authoriza- 
 tion." Compare Browning v. Owen 
 County, 44 Ind. 11. Where work 
 was not ordered by two-thirds vote 
 of council, as required by statute, 
 the corporation is liable for the dam- 
 ages caused (Prot. Epis. Church v. 
 Anamosa, 76 Iowa, 538; 41 N. "W. 
 313). 
 
 " Hodges V. Buffalo, 3 Denio, 110 ; 
 Mitchell V. Rockland, 53 Me. 118. 
 See Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 
 219; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; 
 Kavanagh v. Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 
 333 ; Halstead v. New York, 3 N. Y. 
 430 ; Peterson v. New York, 17 Id. 
 
 Hanvey v. Rochester, 35 Barb. 
 
 Richardson v. Crandall, 47 Id. 
 
 Boom V. Utica, 3 Id. 104 ; Mc- 
 Garry v. Lafayette, 13 Rob. (La.) 
 668 ; Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind. 381. 
 
 449 
 177 
 335 
 
§30i] 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 540 
 
 § 301. Recovery over by corporation. — Although the 
 primary liability for injuries caused by a breach of corporate 
 duty or the tortuous acts of its agents rests on the corpora- 
 tion, its agents or third persons, who proximately caused the 
 injury, are jointly liable with it, and if it is obliged to pay 
 damages for an injury so caused, it has a right of recovery 
 over against the actual wrongdoer.^ It is not necessary to 
 allege or prove, in such an action, all the facts which would 
 justify a recovery by the person injured against the city.^ 
 Likewise, where two cities or counties are equally technically 
 in fault, and jointly liable for the non-repair of a highway, the 
 one which is compelled to pay damages for the omission to 
 repair, may recover contribution from the other.^ But a 
 municipal corporation cannot recover from its contractor dam- 
 ages which it has been compelled to pay to a person injured 
 by the contractor's neglect to guard against accidents while 
 prosecuting a public work, unless the contract bound him to 
 do so.* Otherwise, where the contractor had failed to com- 
 
 ' As to a servant's liabilityto mas- 
 ter, see t^ 342, ante. As to liability 
 of strangers for unlawfully using or 
 obstructing highways to the injury 
 of travelers, see § 384, post. 
 
 ' New York v. Dimick, 49 Hun 
 341 : 3 N-. Y. Supp. 46 [demurrer]. 
 
 ^ Armstrong county v. Clarion 
 county, 66 Pa. St. 218. See Perkins 
 V. Oxford, 66 Me. 545 ; Brown v. 
 Fairhaven, 47 Vt. 386. Where the 
 expense of keeping a bridge in repair 
 is imposed by statute upon several 
 towns and a railroad company 
 jointly, with a provision that the 
 municipal authorities of one of the 
 towns shall have the care and super- 
 intendence of it, and shall employ 
 all services necessary in the care 
 thereof, no action lies against such 
 town in favor of the railroad com- 
 pany, to recover damages sustained 
 by the latter in consequence of a 
 defect in the bridge (Maiden, etc R. 
 Co. V. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 245). 
 
 ^Buflfalo V. Holloway. 7 N. Y. 
 493; affi'g, 14 Barb. 101. In that 
 case, a person was injured by falling 
 into a public sewer in course of con- 
 struction by a contractor, and by 
 him left unguarded Held, tliat un- 
 less the contract imjposed upon the 
 contractor the duty of putting up 
 barriers, etc., and protecting pas- 
 sengers against injury, no action 
 would lie. Otherwise it was the 
 duty of the city to do tliis, and it 
 was their neglect that it was not 
 done. In New York v. Brady (81 
 Hun, 440 ; 30 N. Y. Supp. 1131), a 
 contractor for constructing a sewer, 
 with the consent of the city officers, 
 placed an obstruction on the side- 
 walk, but failed to guard it so as to 
 protect the public from injuiy. 
 Held, liable to the city for damages 
 which it was compelled to pay for 
 an injury from want of guard. 
 
541 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
 
 [§30I 
 
 ply with the notice of the city to remove the obstructions in 
 the street, which subsequently caused the accident.^ 
 
 ' Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N. 
 Y. 65. In that case, the city had 
 given the contractor notice of the 
 action brought against it by the per- 
 son injured, with a claim that he 
 would be held liable to indemnify 
 against any recovery therein. Held, 
 that a judgment against the city 
 was conclusive in an action over by 
 the city, both as to the city's liability 
 
 to the person injured, and as to any 
 other matter which might have been 
 urged as a defense, including the con- 
 tributory negligence of the injured 
 person ; provided it was shown that 
 the contractor unlawfully created or 
 negligently left the obstruction, s. 
 p., Campbell v. Somerville, 114 
 Mass. 834. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 j 303. Immunity of political officers. 
 303. Immunity of judicial officers. 
 304 to 309. [Omitted.] 
 
 310. §Masi-judicial officers, how 
 
 far protected. 
 
 311. [Consolidated with g 310.] 
 
 312. Non-judicial public officers 
 
 classified. 
 '313. Negligent performance of 
 ministerial duties. 
 
 314. Liability for nonfeasance. 
 
 315. [Consolidated with § 313.] 
 
 316. [Consolidated with § 314.] 
 
 317. Presumption in favor of officer. 
 
 § 318. [Consolidated with § 313.] 
 819. Liability for negligence of 
 subordinates. 
 
 320. [Omitted.] 
 
 321. Liability of post-masters for 
 
 subordinates. 
 
 322. Liability of army and navy 
 
 officers. 
 
 323. Public- school officers and 
 
 boards. 
 [Consolidated with § 340.] 
 Liability of government-con- 
 tractors. 
 
 824. 
 325. 
 
 § 302. Immunity of political officers. — For our present 
 purpose, civil offices may be conveniently classified as political, 
 judicial, and ministerial.' The functions of the first class are 
 performed by the executive and legislative departments of 
 government, and by a variety of subordinate governmental 
 officers and administrative agents, who owe duties, in the exer- 
 cise of their trusts, to the public, and to the public alone, and 
 who, consequently, are not answerable to individuals, either for 
 a failure to perform, or for a negligent performance of, such 
 public duties, where no corruption or malice^ is imputable, 
 and they keep strictly within the limits of their powers. We 
 have already stated and illustrated the rule that such officers, 
 exercising the governmental powers of the state, and repre- 
 senting its sovereigntj', enjoy the state's immunity from pri- 
 vate prosecution for a neglect to exercise such powers, as well 
 as for the consequences of a lawful exercise of them.** 
 
 ' See Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. against a governor for maliaiously 
 569. suspending another from a civil 
 
 ' In Sutherland v. Murray, cited office, 
 in Johnston v. Sutton (1 T. E. 538), ' See § 253, ante. 
 an action on the case was held to lie 
 
 [542] 
 
543 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 [§303 
 
 § 303. Immunity of judicial officers. —Judges of courts of 
 record, of general jurisdiction, are not answerable in damages 
 for a judicial act,' within their jurisdiction,^ however corrupt 
 or oppressive^ their action. If a judge fails to do justice, in 
 a particular case, he violates a public duty, for which he is 
 answerable to the public by impeachment or otherwise; but 
 the individual suitor, who may have suffered loss by such a 
 violation of duty, has no legal remedy; his particular contro- 
 versy being only the occasion of the wrong done to the public* 
 The "jurisdiction," on which the judicial privilege is limited, 
 means jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter, 
 and "jurisdiction of the subject-matter '\means, that the gen- 
 eral or abstract question involved in the controversy is within 
 the judge's judicial power to decide. Whether it is or not, is 
 a question of law, not calling for proof of facts establishing a 
 cause of action in the particular case ; and for deciding that he 
 has jurisdiction, and the extent to which he will exercise it, he 
 
 ' " Judicial oflEicers " and "judicial 
 acts " defined (Waldo v. Wallace, 12 
 Ind. 569 ; Flournoy v. Jeflfersonville, 
 17 Id. 173 ; Matter of Cooper, 22 N. 
 Y. 83 ; People v. Faulkner, 107 Id. 
 477 [action on surrogate's bond]). 
 The action of a judge in approving 
 the certificate of physicians for the 
 confinement of a lunatic, as provided 
 by statute, is judicial, and he is not 
 liable in damages for error in judg- 
 ment, though a lack of due care and 
 prudence be alleged (Ayers v. Rus- 
 sell, 50 Hun, 282; 3 N. Y. Supp. 
 338). See Hughes v. McCoy, 11 Colo. 
 591. 
 
 ' Cases cited under notes 6 and 7 of 
 this section. 
 
 ' A declaration in an action against 
 a judge for damages for the making 
 of an order disbarring plaintiff, 
 which admits the jurisdiction of de- 
 fendant, though it avers that the 
 order was made without just or prob- 
 able cause, tyrannically, oppres- 
 sively, maliciously and corruptly, is 
 fatally defective (Bradley v. Fisher, 
 
 13 Wall. 335 ; affi'g 7 D. C. 33). See 
 Randall v. Brighani, 7 Wall. 533. S. 
 p., Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12 ; 
 Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495. 
 
 ■•This principle "has a deep root 
 in the common law," per Kent, C. J., 
 in Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395. 
 See generally Vanderheyden v. 
 Young, 11 Johns. 150 ; Moor v. Ames, 
 3 Caines, 170 ; Tompkins v. Sands, 
 8 Wend. 468 ; Pratt v. Gardner, 2 
 Cush. 68 ; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 
 Mass. 547 ; Briggs v. Wardwell, 10 
 Id. 356 ; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Id. 
 350 ; Evans v. Foster, 1 N. H. 374 ; 
 Young V. Herbert, 3 Nott. & M. 173 ; 
 Ely V. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 76; 
 Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393 
 [granting order of arrest on insuffi- 
 cient affidavit] ; Olmstead v. Brewer, 
 91 Ala. 134 ; 8 So. 345 [issuing writ 
 of restitution after notice of in- 
 tention to appeal]; Smith v. Hol- 
 land [Tex.]. 16 S. W. 434 [same]; 
 State V. Whitaker, 45 La. Ann. 
 1299 ; 14 So. 66. 
 
§303] 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 544 
 
 is not personally liable in damages, if he is in error.^ This im- 
 munity, with two qualifications, is enjoyed by judges of inferior 
 courts, whether of record or not." Being statutory courts of 
 expressly defined and limited jurisdiction, they are bound to 
 know and to keep within these limits. There is no presump- 
 tion of jurisdiction in their favor,^ and their process is no pro- 
 
 * In Lange v. Benedict, supra, the 
 judge before whom plaintiff was 
 convicted of an offense, punisliable 
 by fine or imprisonment, sentenced 
 him to fine and imprisonment. 
 Plaintiff paid the fine, and then ap- 
 plied by habeas corpus ♦for a dis- 
 charge from the imprisonment. The 
 application was heard by the same 
 judge, who vacated the entire sen- 
 tence and sentenced the accused 
 anew to imprisonment. Further 
 proceedings in behalf of the accused 
 resulted in a decision by the U. S. 
 Supreme Court that the re-sentence 
 was unauthorized ; and plaintiff was 
 discharged on habeas corpus. He 
 then brought suit to recover dam- 
 ages from the judge. Held, action 
 not maintainable. Though the re- 
 sentence was unlawful, yet the 
 judge had authority to adjudicate 
 upon the question whether it was 
 lawful or not ; and if so, an errone- 
 ous adjudication was an error to be 
 redressed by review, not a personal 
 wrong to be redressed by action. For 
 the history of this interesting case, 
 see 18 Wall. 163 [discharging plain- 
 tiff from imprisonment under the 
 second sentence] ; 8 Hun, 362 [de- 
 cision of the state court denying him 
 a right of action], and 99 TJ. S. 68 
 [dismissing a writ of error taken to 
 review the decision of state Court of 
 Appeals]. 
 
 « People V. Stocking, 50 Barb. ,"573 
 Weaver v. Davendorf, 3 Denio, 117 
 Bailey v. Wiggins, 5 Harringt. 463 
 Roderick v. Whitson, 51 Hun, 620 
 mem; 4 N. Y. Supp. 112; Burns v. 
 Norton, 59 Hun, 616, mem.; 15 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 75 ; Atwood v. Atwater, 43 
 Neb. 147 ; 61 N. W. 574. The con- 
 tinuance or postponement of a cause 
 is a judicial act (Pratt v. Gardner, 3 
 Cush. 63 ; see Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 
 24 How. U. S. 544). Though a 
 statute requires a justice, on the ser- 
 vice of a summons and verified com- 
 plaint on a defendant, to render 
 judgment, without proof, on the 
 return day, for want of an answer, 
 yet the adjournment of the action 
 over plaintiff's objection is a judicial 
 error, and plaintiff cannot recover 
 damages sustained by reason of 
 other creditors securing liens on 
 defendant's property pending the 
 adjournment, whereby plaintiff lost 
 his debt (Merwin v. Rogers, 15 Daly, 
 334 ; 6 N. Y. Supp. 883). Excluding 
 a spectator from the court-room 
 (Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80 ; 
 29 Atl. 943), and refusing to take the 
 testimony of a witness (Banister v. 
 Wakeman, 64 Vt. 203 ; 23 Atl. 585) 
 are judicial acts. In Harrison v. 
 Redden (53 Kans. 265 ; 36 Pac. 825) 
 a judge warned prospective defend- 
 ant of a threatened suit against him 
 in his court, and advised his leaving 
 the state. Held, on demurrer, no 
 cause of action. 
 
 'Houlden v. Smith, 14 Q. B. 841 
 [county court judge]. " It is clear, 
 therefore, that a judge is not liable 
 to trespass for want of jurisdiction, 
 unless he knew or ought to have 
 known of the defect ; and it lies on 
 the plaintiff in every such case to 
 prove that fact" (per Parke, B., 
 Calder v. Hacket, 3 Moore P. C. 78) . 
 Jurisdiction cannot be inferred (Her- 
 
545 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 [§303 
 
 tection to any one.* If such a judge exercises a jurisdiction 
 which he knows he does not possess,' or in the face of facts 
 which admit of no reasonable doubt of want of jurisdiction, he 
 is answerable in damages.^" Another qualification of the rule 
 of immunity of inferior judges is, that though acting within 
 their jurisdiction, yet if a judge's judicial action is prompted 
 by malicious or corrupt motives, he is liable." Proof of mere 
 
 sotn's case, 39 Me. 476 ; Matlock v. 
 Strange, 8 Ind. 57 ; Wiley v. Strick- 
 land, 8 Ind. 453 ; Williams v. Bower, 
 26 Mo. 601 ; Lane v. Crosby, 4-3 Id. 
 327; Call v. Mitchell, 39 Id. 465). 
 Compare Mooney v. Williams, 15 
 Mo. 443 ; Wright v. Hazen, 34 Vt. 
 143 ; Nichols v. Thomas, 4 Mass. 233). 
 The members of a court-martial are 
 not answerable to a party aggrieved 
 by their sentence. But their juris- 
 diction is limited, and, in a case 
 clearly without the jurisdiction of 
 the court, its sentence will be no pro- 
 tection, and the court and the officer 
 are alike trespassers (Vanderheyden 
 V. Young, 11 Johns. 150 ; Wise v. 
 Withers, 3 Cranch, 311). 
 
 ' Cable V. Cooper, 15 Johns. 157, 
 per Van Ness, J.; Blood v. Sayre, 17 
 Vt. 609 ; Savacool v. Boughton, 5 
 Wend. 170; Parker v. Walrod, 16 
 Wend. 514; Earl v. Camp, 16 Wend. 
 562; Pierson v. Gale, 8 Vt. 513; 
 Beach v. Furman, 9 Johns. 329 ; Lat- 
 tin V. Smith, Bi-eese, 361 ; Nichols v. 
 Thomas, 4 Mass. 233 ; Pratt v. Hill, 
 16 Barb. 303; Revill v. Pettit, 3 Mete. 
 [Ky.] 314. If the process is void, it 
 furnishes no protection to the person 
 at whose suit it was issued (Earl v. 
 Cauip. 16 Wend. 562), nor to the offi- 
 cer serving it, if, on its face, it ap- 
 pears to be illegal, or is known to be 
 so by the officer (Campbell v. Webb, 
 11 Md. 471 ; Kelly v. Bemis,'4 Gray, 
 83 ; Reynolds v. Orvis, 7 Cow. 269 ; 
 Evertson v. Sutton, 5 Wend. 381 ; 
 Lewis V. Palmer, 6 Id. 367 ; Merritt 
 
 [Law of Neq. Vol. I — 35] 
 
 V. Read, 5 Denio, 352; Tate v. Cham- 
 bers, 3 Nott & M. 533). 
 
 ' A justice is liable to one arrested 
 under a warrant issued under a stat- 
 ute theretofore adjudged unconsti- 
 tutional (Kelly V. Bemis, .4 Gray, 83). 
 
 '» Houlden v. Smith, 14 Q. B. 841. 
 But a justice of the peace is not civ- 
 illy liable for entering in good faith 
 a judgment void for want of juris- 
 diction (Thompson v. Jackson [Iowa] 
 61 N. W. 1004 ; Morton v. Crane, 39 
 Mich. 526 ; Anderson v. Roberts, 
 Tex. Civ. App. ; 35 S. W. 416). 
 
 " Briggs V. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 
 356 ; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Id. 350; 
 Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Id. 547 ; Col- 
 man V. Anderson, 10 Id. 105; Down- 
 ing V. Herrick, 47 Me. 463 ; Garfield 
 V. Douglass, 33 111. 100 ; Irion v. 
 Lewis, 56 Ala. 190 ; Gregory v. 
 Brown, 4 Bibb, 28 ; Morgan v. Dud- 
 ley, 18 B. Monr. 693; Bullitt v. 
 Clement, 16 Id. 193 ; Bevard v. Hoflf- 
 man, 18 Md. 479 ; Hetfield v. Tows- 
 ley, 3 Greene [Iowa], 584 ; Howe v. 
 Mason, 14 Iowa, 510. Thus malici- 
 ously refusing to grant an appeal 
 (Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. 463 ; 
 Jones V. Werden, 12 Cush. 183) or 
 granting a warrant of arrest with- 
 out information (Pratt v. Gardner, 
 3 Cush. 63 ; Wasson v. Canfield, 6 
 Blackf . 406) ; or maliciously convict- 
 ing an innocent prisoner (Burley v. 
 Bethune, 1 Marsh, 320) , are action- 
 able. See Neighbour v. Trimmer, 16 
 N. J. Law, 58 [deceitfully concealing 
 fact of decision until expiration of 
 time to appeal]. 
 
§303] 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 546 
 
 negligence or unintentional mistake in assuming jurisdiction, is 
 not enough: fraud or evil intent must be shown.^^ A judicial 
 officer upon whom the law casts purely ministerial duties, such 
 as issuing process in the first instance,'^ issuing execution after 
 judgment," and the like, is liable, like every ministerial ofiBcer, 
 for the consequences of his negligence, or that of his clerk.'^ 
 
 §§ 304-309- [Omitted.'] 
 
 " No action will lie for negligence 
 or carelessness in giving to a party 
 about to prosecute an appeal, erro- 
 neous information as to the amount 
 of a judgment rendered by him by 
 means whereof the appeal was lost 
 (Wickware V. Bryan, 11 Wend. 545), 
 or for failui-e to decide a case within 
 the statutory time (Evarts v. Kiehl, 
 103 N. Y. 396 ; 6 N. E. 593). Hon- 
 estly making a false return on appeal 
 is not actionable (Millard v. Jenkins, 
 9 Wend. 398 ; Chickering v. Eobin- 
 Bon, 3 Gush. 543; Way v. Townsend, 
 4 Allen, 114 ; Howe v. Mason, 14 
 Iowa, 510 ; see Home v. Pudil, 88 
 Iowa, 533; 55 N. W. 485) s. p., Mo- 
 Teer v. Lebow, 85 Tenn. 131 ; 3 S. 
 W. 18 [approving guardian's bond]. 
 '3 Smith V. Trawl, 1 Eoot, 165 [is- 
 suing a writ of replevin without re- 
 quiring security]. And see Rogers 
 V. MuUiner, 6 Wend. 597 ; Mayberry 
 V. Kelly, 1 Kans. 116 ; Alexander v. 
 Card, 3 R. I. 145. Justice not liable 
 for trifling errors in drawing up legal 
 process (Taylor v. Alexander, 6 Ohio, 
 144 ; Wallsworth v. McCullough, 10 
 Johns. 93). 
 
 " Percival v. Jones, 3 Johns. Gas. 
 49 ; Taylor v. Trask, 7 Gow. 349 ; 
 Voorhees v. Martin, 13 Barb. 508 ; 
 Briggs V. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 856 ; 
 Sullivan v. Jones, 3 Gray, 570; Tyler 
 V. Alvord, 38 Me. 530; Noxon v. 
 Hill. 3 Allen, 315 ; Gaylor v. Hunt, 
 33 Ohio St. 355. Compare Werthei- 
 mer v. Howard, 30 Mo. 480 [execu- 
 tion returnable in 60 instead of 30 
 
 days, as required by statute; judge 
 not liable]. 
 
 '^ In Kinnison v. Carpenter (9 
 Bush, 599), a county judge who ap- 
 proved and accepted a guardian's 
 bond, prepared by the county clerk, 
 who omitted to fill up the neces- 
 sary blanks in the form, was held 
 liable to the ward. In Wood v. 
 Farnell (50 Ala. 546), in which 
 a judge was held liable, under 
 statute, for his clerk's issuing a 
 marriage-license, though done with- 
 out his knowledge, and contrary to 
 his general instructions, the court 
 said: "The public, knowing the 
 powers of a clerk in that office, and 
 seeing some one exercising them, 
 with the evident knowledge of the 
 judge, may reasonably deal with 
 him as such, and hold the judge 
 responsible for what he does amiss." 
 The issuing of a mittimus is a min- 
 isterial act (Banister v. Wakeman, 
 64 Vt. 303 ; 33 Atl. 585 ; s. p. State 
 V. Garriok, 70 Md. 586 ; 17 Atl. 559 ; 
 Cosby V. Commonwealth, 91 Ky. 
 335; 15, S. W. 514.) 
 
 ' These sections, in the last edition, 
 being mere amplifications of the gen- 
 eral rule of judicial immunity, are 
 here omitted, not only for want of 
 space, but because the subject more 
 properly belongs to the general law 
 of torts than to that branch of it here 
 treated. Most of the cases cited un- 
 der these sections will be found in 
 the notes to § 303. 
 
547 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 [§310 
 
 § 310. Quasi-judicial officers, how far protected. — Persons 
 exercising judicial functions, by whatever name they may be 
 called, enjoy the protection of the judicial privilege. Indeed 
 any officer, sworn to act faithfully, according to the best of his 
 ability, and according as things shall appear to him, is a judicial 
 oificer within the rule.' Officers who preside at elections, 
 unless they are made the sole and final judges of the qualifi- 
 cations of persons offering to vote, do not exercise a strictly 
 judicial function in determining the qualifications of a voter.^ 
 In determining whether they will receive or reject a vote, they 
 
 ' Hannon v. Agnew, 96 N. Y. 
 439. " When the law confides a 
 discretion to its officers, it will never 
 allow their acts, done in good faith, 
 within the limits of that discretion, 
 to be questioned " (Grifiith v. FoUett, 
 20 Barb. 630 [state-canal officer]). 
 " Wlienever the law vests any per- 
 son with a power to do an act, and 
 constitutes him a judge of the evi- 
 dence on which the act may be done, 
 and at the same time contemplates 
 that the act is to be carried into 
 effect through the instrumentality of 
 agents, the person thus clothed with 
 power is invested with discretion, 
 and is, quoad hoc, a judge" (Vander- 
 heyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150, 
 158). S. P., Seaman v. Patten, 2 
 Caines, 313 [provision inspector] ; 
 Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. 178 
 [bankruptcy commissioners]). The 
 refusal of a license to keep an inn 
 has been held, in England, to be a 
 judicial act {Bassett v. Godschall, 3 
 Wils. 131). But see Grider v. Tally, 
 77 Ala. 433 ; State v. Commissioners, 
 45 Ind. 501 ; Burton v. Fulton. 47 Pa. 
 St. 151 ; Huthsing v. Bousquet, 7 Fed. 
 833 [board of supervisors] ; compare 
 Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Iowa, 153; Peo- 
 ple V. Stocking. 50 Barb. 573 ; Dow- 
 ner V. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [board of pilot 
 commissioners]. As to tax assessors, 
 see Brown v. Smith, 34 Barb. 419; 
 Perry v. Buss, 15 N. H. 233 ; Fa%vcett 
 v. Dole, N. H. ; 29 Atl. 698 ; 
 
 Wilson V. Marsh, 84 Vt. 353. Private 
 arbitrators, or persons who are called 
 in to decide disputes, without having 
 the powers of arbitrators, are not 
 liable to any action for their want of 
 skill (Pappa v. Rose, L. R. 7 C. P. 
 83, 525), or of care (Tharsis Sulphur 
 Co. V. Loftus, L. R. 8 C. P. 1), or for 
 including in an award an item of 
 demand which ought not to have 
 been allowed (Phelps v. Dolan, 75 
 111. 90). A city-attorney, who, at 
 the request of the mayor, gives an 
 official opinion that a certain build- 
 ing does not comply with the fire 
 ordinance of the city, is not, in the 
 absence of proof of malice, respon- 
 sible in damages because the build- 
 ing is afterwards torn down by the 
 marshal in accordance with his erro- 
 neous opinion (Thompson v. Evans, 
 44 111. App. 389). s. P. , as to a pity- 
 engineer, in passing on the work of 
 street improvements, and determin- 
 ing whether a contract has been 
 substantially complied with (St. 
 Joseph V. McCabe, 58 Mo. App. 542); 
 as to a mayor, conducting examina- 
 tions on criminal charges (Hommert 
 V. Gleason, 60 Hun, 579, mem.; 14 
 N. Y. Supp. 568 ; State v. Hastings, 
 37 Neb. 96; 55N. W. 774). 
 
 2 Ashby V. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 
 938 ; Harman v. Tappenden, 1 East, 
 555; Drew v Coulton, 1 Id. 563, 
 note ; State v. Deliesseline, 1 Mc- 
 Cord, 53. 
 
§310] 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 548 
 
 act ministerially ; and the qualification of a person offering to 
 vote is open to examination in subsequent proceedings upon 
 any competent evidence.^ Where the statute makes the oath 
 of the elector the test of his right to vote, and the oath is 
 taken, the inspectors of election, in refusing to receive the 
 vote, clearly act ministerially, and they are liable to an action.* 
 In some states, even where the inspectors are made judges of 
 the qualifications of a voter, they have been held liable for 
 refusing to receive the vote, though no corruption or malice 
 was charged;^ but the courts of other states have construed 
 their statutes as conferring judicial powers upon election- 
 inspectors, and have consequently extended to them the pro- 
 tection given to judicial officers, and held them to be not liable 
 to an action for refusing an elector's vote, unless in doing so 
 they acted corruptly or maliciously.* But in making a return. 
 
 3 People Y. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45 ; 
 affi'g 30 Barb. 588 ; People v. Bristol, 
 etc. Turnpike Co., 23 Wend. 228; 
 Matter of Murphy, 7 Cow. 153 ; Mat- 
 ter of Heath, 3 Hill, 42 ; People v. 
 Seaman, 5 Denio, 409 ; Sudbury v. 
 Stearns, 21 Pick. 148. 
 
 •* Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 
 N. Y. 420 ; rev'g 5 Lans. 214 ; 
 Spragins v. Houghton, 3 111. 377 ; 
 State V. Eobb, 17 Ind. 536 ; Gillespie 
 V. Palmer, 20 Wise. 573. 
 
 * Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 
 350 ; Lombard v. Oliver, 3 Allen, 1 ; 
 Gates V. Neal, 23 Pick. 308 ; Capen 
 V. Foster, 12 Id. 485 ; Bacon v. Bench- 
 ley, 3 Cush. 100. See Blunchard v. 
 Stearns, 5 Meto. 298. In Anderson 
 V. Milliken (9 Ohio St. 568), the elec- 
 tion-inspectors were held liable for 
 refusing to receive the vote of an 
 elector, whom they decided not to 
 be " white," within the meaning of 
 the constitution, as the evidence 
 showed that the elector was white, 
 though no malice was shown. S. p., 
 Monroe v. Collins, 17 Id. 665 
 
 * Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 
 114; Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 
 88 ; Weckerley v. Geyer, 11 Serg. & 
 
 R. 35 ; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. 
 [Mich.] 411 ; Rail v. Potts, 8 Humgh. 
 225; Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 
 479 ; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Id. 135 ; 
 Friend v. Hamill, 34 Id. 398 ; Pike 
 V. Megoun, 44 Mo. 493 ; Peavey v. 
 Robbins, 3 Jones Law, 339 ; Caul- 
 field V. Bullock, 18 B. Monr. 494 ; 
 Miller v. Rucker, 1 Bush, 135; 
 Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88; 
 Turnpike Co. v. Champney, 2 Id. 
 199; State v. Daniels, 44 Id. 383. 
 No action lies against the selectmen 
 of a town for i-efusing to put upon 
 the list of voters therein the 
 name, and rejecting the vote, 
 of one who was not a legal voter, 
 although the proof produced by 
 him to them was sufficient to 
 establish prima facie his right to 
 vote ; and they may prove at the 
 trial that in fact he was not a legal 
 voter (Lombard V. Oliver, 3 Allen, 1). 
 But compare Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pick. 
 338 ; Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. 244, n.; 
 Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Id. 350 ; Keith 
 V. Howard, 24 Pick. 292 ; Gates v. 
 Neal, 33 Pick. 308; and Spear v. 
 Cummings, Id. 224, 327, per Shaw, 
 C. J. ; Anderson v. Milliken, 9 Ohio 
 
549 PUBLIC OFFICERS. [§3I3 
 
 election-inspectors clearly act ministerially, and an action will 
 lie for a false return.'' 
 
 §311. [consolidated with § 310]. 
 
 § 312. Non-judicial public officers classified. — In speaking 
 of the liability of non-judicial public officers to a private 
 action, it is necessary to make a distinction between those 
 officers whose duties are of a general public nature, and who 
 act for the public at large, and that other class of officers 
 appointed to act, not for the public in general, but for such 
 individuals as may have occasion to employ them for a specific 
 fee paid. Of the latter class are such officers as sheriffs, con- 
 stables, notaries public, and the like, who do not receive com- 
 pensation from the public treasury, but from individuals who 
 compensate them for particular services rendered. There has 
 never been any question that officers belonging to this class 
 ai^ liable in damages for any act of negligence or abuse of 
 office, to any individual specially injured thereby.' 
 
 § 313- Negligent performance of ministerial duties. — As 
 
 to officers belonging to the former class, so far as their duties 
 are absolute, certain and imperative, and involve the execution 
 of a set task — in other words are merely ministerial'^ — they 
 are liable in damages to any one who can show that he has 
 
 St. 568. By malice, which will (Freidman v. Mathes, 8 Ileisk. 503 ; 
 
 render an officer liable in such a Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 498). 
 
 case, is meant the refusal of a vote, A ministerial act is one which a per- 
 
 for improper motives, and contrary son performs on a given state of facts, 
 
 to his own opinions (Weckerley v. in a prescribed manner, in obedience 
 
 Geyer, 11 Serg. & R. 35 ; Christuian to the mandate of legal authority, 
 
 V. Bruce, 1 Du^'all, 63; Drewe v. without regard to, or the exercise of , 
 
 Coulton, 1 Bast, 563, note). See his own judgment, upon the propri- 
 
 Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pick. 333. ety of the act being done (Penning- 
 
 ' Regina v. Heathcote, 10 Mod. 48. ton v. Streight, 54 Ind. 377). The 
 
 See Prideaux v. Morrice, 7 Id. 14. action of an oil inspector in testing 
 
 'See, as to clerks and recording oil to determine at what temperature 
 
 officers, §i^ 590-593, postt; as to notaries it will emit a combustible vapor, the 
 
 public, §§ 594-603, -post ; as to sheriffs manner of doing so being specifically 
 
 and constables, gS 616-635, post. prescribed by statute, compliance 
 
 'A "ministerial" act or duty is with which is certain to lead to a 
 
 one done under orders of a superior ; correct test, is ministerial (Hatcher 
 
 a simple, definite duty, with respect v. Dunn, Iowa, ; 66 N. W. 905). 
 to which nothing is left to discretion 
 
§313] 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 5 SO 
 
 suffered a special injury through their neglect in respect to 
 some right which the law assures to him.^ It is settled law that 
 a public officer who acts maliciously^ towards another, or who, 
 in abuse of his office and in violation of his duty, omits to act,'' 
 or acts negligently,^ or proceeds without or in excess of 
 
 - ' ' Whenever an action is brought 
 for a breach of duty imposed by 
 statute, the party bringing it must 
 show that he had an interest in the 
 performance of the duty, and that 
 the duty was imposed for his bene- 
 fit" (Strong V. Campbell, 11 Barb. 
 135). s. P., Harrington v. Ward, 9 
 Mass. 251 ; WooUey v. Baldwin, 101 
 N. Y. 6H8 ; 5 N. E. 573 [county treas- 
 urer] ; Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. U. 
 S. 87 ; Robinson v. Chamberlain, 84 
 N. Y. 389 ; Hover v. Barkhoof , 44 
 Id. 113 ; Clark v. Miller, 54 Id. 538 ; 
 Kennedy v. Ryall, 67 Id. 379 ; Ben- 
 nett V. Whitney, 94 Id. 302 ; Shep- 
 herd V. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250 ; Jen- 
 ner v. Joliife, 9 Johns. 381 ; Piercy t. 
 Arerill, 37 Hun, 360. Bronson, J., 
 in Adsit v. Brady (4 Hill, 630) , said : 
 " When an individual sustains an in- 
 jury by the misfeasance or nonfeas- 
 ance of a public officer, who acts or 
 omits to act contrary to his duty, 
 the law gives redress to the injured 
 party by an action adapted to the 
 nature of the case." This broad 
 statement was critised by Wright, 
 J., in Garlinghouse v. Jacobs (29 N. 
 Y. 297, 312). See McCord v. High, 
 24 Iowa, 336 (per Dillon, Ch. J.) ; 
 Moss V. Cummings, 44 Mich. 359 ; 
 Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Id. 342 ; and 
 cases cited under iJi 8, ante. 
 
 ' Members of a school board have 
 been held liable for removing a 
 teacher through malice (Burton v. 
 Fulton, 49 Pa. St. 131). See Hog- 
 gatt V. Bigley, 6 Humph. 236 ; 
 Walker v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239 ; Lili- 
 enthal v. Campbell, 22 La Ann. 600, 
 and cases cited in note 3, § 323, post. 
 
 'Amy V. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 
 136 ; Percy v. Averill, 37 Hun, 360, 
 and cases cited under next section. 
 
 » Adsit V. Brady, 4 Hill, 630 [canal 
 superintendent negligently permit- 
 ted a sunken boat to remain in canal] ; 
 approved, Hutson v. New York, 
 9 N. Y. 169 ; Robinson v. Chamber- 
 lain, 34 Id. 389 ; Hover v. Barkhoof, 
 44 Id. 113 ; Fulton Fire Ins. Co. v. 
 Baldwin, 37 Id. 648 ; Conroy v. Gale, 
 47 Id. 665 ; Johnson v. Belden, 47 Id. 
 130 ; Stack v. Bangs, 6 Lans. 262 ; 
 Kennedy v. Ryall, 67 N. Y. 379 
 [child killed by drinking from a cup 
 containing poisonous materials, neg- 
 ligently left in its way by a health 
 officer after fumigating steerage of 
 vessel at quarantine ; officer liable] ; 
 Morse v. Sweenie, 15 111. App. 486 
 [city fire marshal, driving carelessly 
 around a corner of street, ran over 
 plaintiff] ; Hayes v. Porter, 22 Me. 
 371 [negligence of inspector of 
 meats] ; Barry v. Arnould, 10 Adol. 
 & El. 646 [negligence of customs- 
 collector in appraising goods]. A 
 marshal of a county fair, wishing to 
 clear a track for a race, turned a 
 team off from the track in such a 
 manner that the horses broke loose, 
 and the driver was thrown out. 
 Held, liable, if his act was negli- 
 gent (Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt. 158). 
 s. P., Kolb V. O'Brien, 86 111. 210 ; 
 Chouteau v. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65 [tax- 
 collector who received a good check 
 for taxes, but neglected to present it 
 until the drawer had failed] ; Newell 
 v. Wright, 3 AUen, 166 [draw-bridge 
 tender]. 
 
SSI 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 f§314 
 
 authority,* is answerable in damages to any one who is specially 
 injured thereby. A de facto officer will not be allowed to urge, 
 in defense of an action against him by a third person for his 
 official acts, that he is not an officer de jure. Though his 
 office may be void as to himself, it is valid as to strangers;' 
 and if one assumes the duties of an office, his acts will operate 
 by way of admission against him, and strict proof of his elec- 
 tion or appointment will not be required.^ And generally, one 
 who assumes the duties, and is invested with the powers, of a 
 public officer, is liable for a neglect properly to perform those 
 duties.^ 
 
 § 314. Liability for nonfeasance. — An officer who is made 
 the sole judge of the necessity of official action on his part, 
 in a given case, is not liable for the consequences of his judg- 
 ing no action to be necessary, no matter how erroneous his 
 judgment may turn out to have been.^ Before he can be made 
 Itable for omitting to do something, the obligation to do it 
 
 * An officer issuing a tax warrant 
 is bound to know its contents, and 
 is responsible for any defects of 
 authority appearing on its face, and 
 for acts thereunder (Atwell v. Ze- 
 luff, 26 Mich. 118). Not being per- 
 tinent to tlie subject of negligence, 
 we omit numerous cases, cited in 
 former editions, on the liabilities of 
 tax assessors and collectors, for un- 
 authorized official acts. 
 
 'Per Duncan, J., Eiddle v. Bed- 
 ford county, 7 Serg. & R. 386 ; see 
 Dean v. Gridley, 10 "Wend. 255; 
 Green v. Burke, 23 Id. 490, 502; 
 Bently v. Phelps, 27 Barb. 5g4 ; 
 Burke V. Elliott, 4 Ired. Law, 355 ; 
 Gilliam v. Beddick, 4 Id. 368 ; 
 Schlenckner v. Risley, 3 Scam. 
 483 ; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 
 585 ; Hoagland v. Culvert, 20 N. J. 
 Law, 387 ; Farmers' Bank v. Chester, 
 6 Humph. 458. Compare Vaccari v. 
 Maxwell, 3 Blatchf . 368 ; Farman v. 
 Ellington, 46 Hun, 41. 
 
 * Where a public officer is sued for 
 neglect, his acts may be given as 
 evidence of his holding the office, 
 though there be record evidence of 
 his appointment (Dean v. Gridley 10 
 Wend. 255). Giving a bond of office 
 is an admission of appointment 
 (Barada v. Carondelet, 8 Mo. 644 ; 
 Lawrence v. Sherman, 2 McLean, 
 488). See State v. Allen, 21 Ind. 
 516 ; Satterlee v. San Francisco, 33 
 Cal. 314. An officer de facto is one 
 who executes the duties of an officer 
 under some color of right, some pre- 
 tense of title, either by selection or 
 appointment (Hooper v. Goodwin, 
 48 Me. 79). Proof that an individual 
 has acted notoriously as a public 
 officer is prima facie evidence of his 
 official character, without producing 
 his appointment fColton v. Beardsley, 
 38 Barb. 39; Allen v. State, 31 Ga. 
 2]7>. 
 
 » Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N. Y. 
 303 ; State v. Goss, 69 Me. 22. 
 
 ' Cases cited in note 1, § 310, ante. 
 
§3I7l PUBLIC OFFICERS. 552 
 
 must be absolute, specific and imperative.^ The duty must 
 also be one owing to the person injured by his nonfeasance.* 
 Hence an inferior officer, like an overseer of highways, charged 
 by law with the duty, under the general directions of a super- 
 ior officer, to repair bridges, is not liable to a third person for 
 injuries caused by his neglect to repair a particular bridge,* 
 because his official duty was due to the public, whose servant 
 he was, and not to the injured person, except as one of the 
 public. It is no excuse for a superior officer's nonfeasance of a 
 ministerial duty imposed on him individually that he intrusted 
 its performance to a subordinate officer who also neglected it.° 
 
 § 315. [consolidated with § 313] 
 
 § 316. [consolidated with § 314] 
 
 § 317. Presumption in favor of ofificer. — There is always 
 a strong presumption that a sworn public officer has per- 
 formed the duties of his office faithfully ; ' and with respect 
 to acts done in excess of authority, it is a general rule that, 
 where a public duty is assigned to an officer, the acts of the 
 officer, within the scope of that duty, 2SZ prima facie taken to 
 be within his power.^ The presumption is, that no official 
 
 '^ A town supervisor who neglected ■* Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. -139 
 
 to present to the board a property- [overseer of highways] ; see Hover 
 
 owner's claim for damages assessed v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113 ; Bennett 
 
 for land taken for highway, held v. Whitney, 94 Id. 302. 
 
 liable for consequent loss of claim ^ Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. N. S. 
 
 (Clark V. Miller, 54 N. T. 528). s. P., 480, and cases cited under § 176, anU. 
 
 Olmsted V. Dennis, 77 Id. 878 [claim > Dunlop v. Monroe, 1 Cranoh C. 
 
 against city]. The su])erintendent C. 336 ; afl&'d on other grounds, 
 
 of buildings, whose duty it was to see 7 Cranch, 242 ; People v. Auditor, 3 
 
 that all unsafe buildings were taken Scam. 567 ; Vaughn v. Biggers, 6 
 
 down or made secure, and who was Ga. 188. 
 
 furnished ample means necessary to ^ Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 410 ; 
 
 fulfill such duty, may be liable for Ross v. Reed, 1 Wheat. 482 ; United 
 
 neglecting to remove a building States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 691 ; 
 
 rendered unsafe by fire it having, Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 
 
 in consequence of such neglect, 14 Id. 448 ; Delassus v. United States, 
 
 fallen and killed plaintiff 's intestate. 9 Id. 117; Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 
 
 So held on demurrer (Connors v. How. U. S. 89 ; Minter v. Crommelin, 
 
 Adams, 13 Hun, 427) . For other 18 la. 87 ; Russell v. Beebe, Hempst. 
 
 illustrations of the rule, see g§ 269, 704 ; Den v. Hill, 1 McAll. C. C. 480. 
 
 270. ante, and §§ 590-91, post [court- Compare Ruggles v. Bucknor, 1 
 
 clerks, etc]. Paine, 358 ; Bottomley v. United 
 
 ^ See cases cited in note 2, § 313. States, 1 Story C. C. 135. 
 
553 PUBLIC OFFICERS. [§3I9 
 
 person, acting under oath of office, will do aught against his 
 official duty, or will omit to do whatever his official duty- 
 requires.^ 
 
 §318. [consolidated with § 313. J 
 
 § 319. Liability for negligence of subordinates. — The 
 
 distinction between that class of officers whose duties are of a 
 general and public nature, and the other class, like sheriffs, 
 etc., whose duties are of a more private character, depending 
 upon special employment, is to be borne in mind in determin- 
 ing the liability of public officers for the misconduct and neg- 
 ligence of their subordinates in office.^ All public officers who 
 have the power of appointing their subordinates^ are bound 
 to exercise ordinary care in selecting proper persons for the 
 position, and to superintend their conduct;^ and they are 
 bound not to assign to them tasks for which they know such 
 subordinates to be incompetent, and in the execution of which 
 it is reasonable to infer that disastrous consequences will 
 ensue.* But the first class of officers, if they are guiltless of 
 personal negligence in the selection of their subordinates, are 
 not answerable to third person for the negligence or misfeas- 
 ance of the clerks, servants or agents, necessarily and properly 
 employed by or under them' in the discharge of their official 
 
 5 Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y. assigned to an inspector over whom 
 
 528 and cases cited under § 373, ante, he had no official control, he was 
 
 ' See '^ 313, ante. • not required to look after the work 
 
 ^ In People v. Campbell (83 N. Y. himself, or to detail others for that 
 
 247) , the relator, as engineer of the purpose, and was not responsible for 
 
 department of public works, had the neglect of the inspectors ap- 
 
 supervisory charge of a street im- pointed. 
 
 provement. In the contract pro- ^ Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch, 343 
 
 vision was made for an inspector to [postmaster]. 
 
 inspect the material and work of ^ Castle v. Duryee, 32 Barb. 480 : 
 this improvement, to be appointed affi'd, 1 Abb. Ct. App. 337 [militia 
 by the head of the department, to colonel] ; see § 333, post. 
 whom he was to report. Such an ' Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646; 
 inspector was appointed; and the S. C, 11 Mod. 13; Whitfield v. De- 
 improvement fell by reason of bad spencer, 3 Cowper, 754 ; Rowning v. 
 workmanship and materials. Held, Goodchild, 3 Wilson, 443; Stock v. 
 as it was impossible for the relator Harris, 5 Burr. 3709 ; McMillan v. 
 to watch all the work in the city Eastman, 4 Mass. 378 ; Schroyer v. 
 personaUy, and as the duty of in- Lynch, 8 Watts, 4.')5 ; United States 
 spection in this case was expressly v. Collier, 3 Blatch. 835. School 
 
§321] 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 554 
 
 duties. The rule of respondeat superior does not apply to 
 them, because the sub-agents which they are allowed or re- 
 quired to appoint become, by such appointment, like them- 
 selves, agents of the government ; ^ and the liability of a serv- 
 ant of the public is no greater than the liability of the servant 
 of any other principal, though recourse against the principal, 
 the public, cannot be had by an action^ But where the ap- 
 pointment is not made pursuant to authority, the appointee is 
 a mere agent or servant for whose default or negligence the 
 appointing officer is liable.^ 
 
 §320. [Omitted]. " 
 
 § 321. Liability of postmasters for subordinates.— A post- 
 master, though answerable for his own negligence, whereby a 
 letter is lost, is not liable if the loss ensues from the negli- 
 gence of his clerks or other subordinates,* who are agents of the 
 government and not of the postmaster.^ An action has been 
 
 trustees are not liable to one injured 
 by the negligent acts or omissions of 
 workmen employed to make repairs 
 to school buildings, unless they can 
 be shown to have been knowingly or 
 acquiescently parties to the wrong 
 (Donovan v. McAlpine, 85 N. Y. 185; 
 and see Donovan v. Board of Educa- 
 tion, 85 N. Y. 117). 
 
 ' Dunlop V. Munroe, 7 Cranch, 242. 
 
 ' Per Blackburn, J., Mersey Docks 
 V. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93, 111 ; 11 
 H. L. Cas. 68(5 ; see g 299, ante, and 
 § 327, post. 
 
 8 Eaisler v. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710 ; 13 
 So. 238 [postmaster] ; see § 321, post. 
 
 ' Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts, 458 ; 
 Wiggins V. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632 ; 
 Dunlop V. Munroe, 7 Cranch, 242 ; 
 Bolan V. Williamson, 1 Brevard, 181 ; 
 See Franklin v. Low, 1 Johns. 396 ; 
 Carey v. Lawless, 13 Upper Canada, 
 Q. B. 285. Case will lie against a 
 postmaster for not delivering a let- 
 ter on request, but not if postage was 
 not paid on tender of the letter (Ed- 
 wards V, Dickinson, 12 Mod. 6\ Tro- 
 
 ver has also been held maintainable 
 (Teall V. Felton, 1 N. Y. 537). Where 
 issue is taken on the negligence of 
 the postmaster himself, it is not com- 
 petent to give in evidence the negli- 
 gence of his assistants (Dunlop v. 
 Munroe, 7 Cranch, 242). 
 
 - Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646. 
 In Whitfield v. Despencer (2 Cowp. 
 765), Lord Mansfield said: "As to 
 an action on the case lying against 
 the party really offending, there can 
 be no doubt of it ; for whoever does 
 an act by which another person re- 
 ceives an injury is liable in an action 
 for the injury sustained. If the man 
 .who receives a penny to carry the 
 letters to the post-ofiice loses any of 
 them, he is answerable ; so is the 
 sorter in the business of his depart- 
 ment ; so is the postmaster for any 
 fault of his own." In Keenan v. 
 Southworth (110 Mass. 474), Gray. J., 
 said : " It is well settled in England 
 and America that the posimaster- 
 general, the deputy postmasters, and 
 their assistants and clerks, appointed 
 
555 PUBLIC OFFICERS. [§ 322 
 
 maintained against a postmaster for the acts of one whom he 
 permitted to have the care and custody of the mail in his 
 ofifice, not having been sworn according to law;^ and for the 
 purpose of establishing negligence on the part of a post- 
 master, it is competent to prove how the ofifice was kept, its 
 exposed position and the probability arising therefrom that 
 the loss was the consequence of such exposure/ The particu- 
 lar act of negligence which caused the loss need not be 
 shown.^ 
 
 § 322. Liability of army and navy officers. — Ofificers of 
 the army and navy are within the protection of the rule, and 
 are not responsible for the misfeasances or negligence of the 
 subordinate ofificers under them. Thus it has been held that 
 the captain of a sloop of war is not answerable for damage 
 done by her running down another vessel ; the mischief 
 appearing to have been done during the watch of the lieu- 
 tenant, who was upon deck, and had the actual direction and 
 management of the steering and navigating of the .sloop at the 
 time, and when the captain was not upon deck, and was not 
 called by his duty to be there.' The rule is otherwise, of 
 
 and sworn as required by law, are carrier, and proof that letters con- 
 public officers, each of whom is re- taining money were delivered to him 
 sponsible for his own negligence or his agent, in his presence, and by 
 only, and not for that of any of the his direction for registration, and of 
 others, although selected by him and their loss, without evidence of negll- 
 subject to his orders." gence resulting in their loss, was in- 
 ^ Bishop V. Williamson, 11 Me. sufficient to authorize a recovery 
 495 ; Hutchins v. Brackett, 33 N. H. against him. 
 
 353. And of course a deputy post- ' Nicholson v. Mouncey, 15 East, 
 
 master is liable for a loss sustained 384. No action can be maintained 
 
 by his personal negligence in office against the owners of a transport 
 
 (Maxwell v. Mcllvoy, 3 Bibb. 311 ; vessel, employed by the government, 
 
 Rowning v. Goodchild, 3 "Wilson, for damages done in the execution 
 
 443). See Dox v. Postmaster-Gen- of positive orders of an officer of the 
 
 eral, 1 Pet. 318). As to the liability royal navy, under whose command 
 
 of contractors for carrying the pub- she was. " This immunity does not 
 
 lie mail, see post, § 334. depend upon martial law, but on the 
 
 * Ford V. Parker, 4 Ohio St. 576. ground that persons acting under 
 
 ' Raisler v. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710 ; 18 such orders cannot be said to be 
 
 So. 338. It was there held that a guilty of negligence " (Hodgkinson 
 
 postmaster's liability for moneys or v. Fernie, 3 C. B. N. S 415) . In 
 
 letters received by him in his official Scott v. United States (18 Ct. of CI. 
 
 capacity was not that of a common 1), a safe containing money, and be- 
 
§323] 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 556 
 
 course, where the act of the subordinate was done in obedience 
 to the direct orders of the superior officer. In such case the 
 latter is hable for the consequences of the act.^ 
 
 § 323. Public-school officers. — The various officers and 
 boards to whom are committed the care and control of public 
 schools, are public officers ; they have the power, and it is their 
 duty, to adopt appropriate rules and regulations for the govern- 
 ment of schools under their control, but such rules must be 
 
 longing to a disbursing officer, was 
 stolen from his tent in the center of 
 camp, while he was asleep. The 
 usual guard surrounded the camp. 
 Held , that the officer was not charge- 
 able with negligence. So a commis- 
 sary is not responsible for the mis- 
 feasance of his subagents, unless he 
 co-operated in or authorized them 
 (Tracy v. Cloyd, 10 W. Va. 19). 
 
 'In Castle v. Duryee (1 Abb. App. 
 Dec. 327, affi'g 32 Barb. 480), a regi- 
 ment, under the command of de- 
 fendant, its colonel, was, pursu- 
 ant to official orders, going through 
 the evolutions of drill in the presence 
 of a large number of spectators. 
 Defendant ordered his men to level 
 their m uskets and aim in the direction 
 of the crowd in front. He then gave 
 orders to _/ire; whereupon the guns, 
 supposed to be loaded only with 
 blank cartridges, were discharged, 
 and plaintiff's wife was wounded 
 by a musket ball. The court 
 charged, among other things, that 
 no action could be maintained 
 against defendant for an act done 
 by him in the execution of his office, 
 and within the scope of Ids authority, 
 if done with all reasonable care and 
 caution ; nor was he responsible for 
 the negligence of those under his 
 command, unless he made himself a 
 party to the negligence by giving an 
 improper order, or by neglecting 
 some precaution which prudence 
 required him to adopt.' Held, no 
 error, and a verdict for plaintiff was 
 
 sustained. So the commander of a 
 war-vessel who seizes a vessel on 
 the high seas, and sends her in for 
 adjudication for a breach of a par- 
 ticular law, is liable for damages, 
 unless there was reasonable ground 
 of suspicion that she was violating 
 the laws (Murray v. The Charming 
 Betsy, 2 Oranch, 64 ; Little v. Bar- 
 reme, 2 Id. 170 ; Maley v. Shattuck, 
 3 Id. 458 ; The Eleanor, 2 Wheat. 
 345 ; and see Burke v. Trevitt, 1 
 Mason, 96 ; Stoughton v. Dimick, 3 
 Blatchf. 356; s. C, 29 Vt. 53.5). In 
 Buron v. Denman (2 Exch. 167), the 
 defendant, a captain in the navy, 
 was sought to be made liable for 
 burning certain barracoons on the 
 west coast of Africa, and releasing 
 the slaves contained in them. His 
 conduct in so doing had been ap- 
 proved by a letter written by the 
 secretary of state. Held, that the 
 owner of the slaves (not a British 
 subject), could not recover for his 
 loss, as the effect of the ratification 
 of defendant's act was to con- 
 vert what he had done into an act of 
 state, for which no action would lie. 
 Referring to this case. Justice 
 Stephen (Hist, of Crim. Law, vol. II, 
 p. 64) says : "As between the sov- 
 ereign and his subjects, there can be 
 no such thing as an act of state. 
 Courts are established for the ex- 
 press purpose of limiting public 
 authority in its conduct towards in- 
 dividuals." 
 
SS7 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
 
 [§325 
 
 not only reasonable/ but their enforcement must also be rea- 
 sonable, in the light of existing circumstances.^ The recog- 
 nized rule is that a school ofificer is not personally liable for a 
 mere mistake of judgment in the government of his school; to 
 make him so, it must be shown that he acted in the matter 
 complained of wantonly, willfully and maliciously.' A mem- 
 ber of a school-board, who has not been charged by the latter 
 with a duty owing by it, e. g., keeping school-buildings in 
 repair, is not individually liable for a breach of such duty;^ 
 nor for the negligence of persons employed by them.' A 
 school superintendent whose duty it is to superintend school- 
 house repairs is not the superior of persons employed by the 
 board to make repairs.^ 
 
 § 324. [consolidated with § 340.J 
 
 § 325. Liability of government-contractors. — Independent 
 contractors with the government are not the agents of the 
 
 ' Danenhofler v. State, 69Ind. 295 ; 
 State V. Webber, 108 Id. 31 ; 
 Thompson v. Beaver, 63 111. 353 ; 
 Roberts v. Boston, 5 Gush. 198 ; 
 Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Id. 160 ; 
 Spiller V. Woburn, 12 Allen, 127; 
 Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 
 475 ; State v. Burton, 45 Wise. 150 ; 
 Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444; Peo- 
 ple V. Medical Soc. , 24 Barb. 570. As 
 to what constitutes a reasonable rule 
 for the government of a school, see 
 Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa, 562. 
 The reasonableness of a rule is for the 
 court, and not for the jury (Fertich 
 V. Michener, 111 Ind. 472 ; 11 N. E. 
 605). 
 
 ' Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 
 472 ; 11 N. E. 605. " A school regu- 
 lation must be not only reasonable 
 in itself, but its enforcement must 
 also be reasonable in the light of ex- 
 isting circumstances. The habit of 
 locking the doors of the school-room 
 during the opening exercises, ob- 
 served by the appellee's teacher, was 
 not an unreasonable enforcement of 
 
 the rule under consideration, in 
 moderate weather and under ordi- 
 nary circumstances. But to so lock 
 the doors on an extremely and un- 
 usually cold morning, without caus- 
 ing special care and attention to be 
 given to the comfort of such pupils 
 as might thereby be required to re- 
 main in some other part of the 
 building, was undoubtedly both an 
 unreasonable and a negligent, and 
 hence an improper enforcement of 
 the rule.'' 
 
 2 Cooper V. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 ; 
 Gardner v. State, Id. 633 ; Danen- 
 hoffer v. State, 79 Id. 75 ; Elmore v. 
 Overton, 104 Id. 548; Churchill v. 
 Fewkes, 13 111. A pp. 520; McCor- 
 mick, V. Burt, 95 111. 263 ; Dritt v. 
 Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 ; and cases 
 cited in note 3, § 313, ante. 
 
 ^Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303 ; see 
 § 330, posi. 
 
 5 Donovan v. McAlpin, 85 N. Y. 
 185. 
 
 ^ Donovan v. McAlpin, supra. See 
 § 367, ante. 
 
§ 325] PUBLIC OFFICEPS. 558 
 
 government, so as to exempt them from the operations of the 
 rule of respondeat superior. They are liable to the same extent 
 as other masters for the negligence or malfeasance of their 
 servants. Thus, a contractor for carrying the mail, who 
 employs either a faithless or incompetent servant, or one 
 through whose negligence a letter is lost, is liable to the sender 
 of the letter.' He is also liable, as a carrier, to the agent in 
 charge of the mail.^ So one who contracts with the state to 
 keep in repair certain sections of a state canal is liable to indi- 
 viduals for any damages sustained through his neglect to do 
 so.' It is not even necessary that he should have had notice 
 of the defect which caused the injury.^ 
 
 1 Sawyer V. Corse, 17 Gratt. 330; Gale, 47 Id. 665; affl'g 5 Lans. 344; 
 
 overruling Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Johnson v. Belden, 47 N. Y. 130 ; 
 
 Ohio, 523. See Hutohins v. Brackett, Hicks v. Dorn, 42 Id. 47 ; St. Peter 
 
 2 Foster, S53. v. Denison, 58 Id. 416 ; Stack v. 
 
 '^ Cases cited under § 492, post. Bangs, 6 Lans. 262 ; see § 298, ante. 
 
 5 Robinson V. Chamberlain, 34 N. *Conroy v. Gale, 5 Lans. 344. 
 
 Y. 389 ; Fulton Fire Ins. Co. v. Compare Phillips v. Commonwealth, 
 
 Baldwin, 37 Id. 648; Conroy v, 44Pa. St. 197. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 
 
 § 336. Former rule of liability of 
 statutory trustees. 
 
 327. Pi-esent rule of liability in 
 
 England. 
 
 328. Incorporated administrative 
 
 boards. 
 
 § 329. Voluntary corporations per- 
 forming public functions. 
 
 330. Trustees not liable when 
 
 agents only. 
 
 331. Trustees of public chari- 
 
 ties. 
 
 § 326. Former rule of liability of statutory trustees.— 
 
 In England, many works tending to the benefit and conven- 
 ience of the public, and, in that sense, public works, such as 
 docks, river and harbor improvements, light-houses and the 
 like, are vested in trustees created and incorporated by statute. 
 They are required, in substance, to apply all moneys received 
 by them by way of rates or tolls to the proper maintenance of 
 the works, and then to pay the principal and interest of the 
 debt contracted for their construction. It was for some time 
 held^ that, inasmuch as these statutory trustees did not main- 
 tain these works for profit, or receive rates or tolls therefrom 
 to their own use, that is, to be divided among themselves or 
 their shareholders, but acted gratuitously, in the administra. 
 tion of a public trust, and the application of funds appropri- 
 ated by statute to particular purposes — they were to be 
 regarded as public servants; and the funds in their hands were 
 not to be subject to the claims of individuals suffering dam- 
 ages in consequence of a negligent discharge of official duties 
 by the trustees or their agents, in the absence of a clear indi- 
 cation of the intention of the legislature that they should be 
 so subject.^ 
 
 'See Metcalfe V. Hetherington, 11 
 Exch. 257 ; S. o. , again, 5 Hurlst. & 
 N. 719; British Cast Plate Co. v. 
 Meredith, 4 T. R. 794 ; Humphreys 
 V. Mears, 1 Man. & Ryl. 187; Boul- 
 
 rev'd, L. R. 1 Q. B. 711 ; Holliday 
 V. St. Leonards, 11 C. B. N. S. 193. 
 ' Duncan v. Findlater (6 CI. & Fin. 
 894) . This was an action [a Scotch 
 appeal decided in 1839] against pub- 
 
 ton V. Crowther, 2 Barn. & C. 703 ; lie trustees of a turnpike road, for 
 Coe V. Wise, 5 Best & S. 440; injuries in consequence 01 laborers, 
 
 [559] 
 
§3^7] 
 
 INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 
 
 560 
 
 § 327. Present rule of liability in England. — But this 
 theory has been wholly rejected by the highest authority ' in 
 
 employed by them, leaving a quan- 
 tity of stones in the road, thus form- 
 ing a dangerous obstruction to trav- 
 elers at night. Held, that the funds 
 raised by the statute, which ordained 
 that they should be applied to the 
 purposes set forth, and " to no other 
 purpose whatsoever," could not be 
 charged with compensation for such 
 an injury. " It is impossible to sup- 
 pose," said Lord Chancellor Cotten- 
 ham, "that the framers of this stat- 
 ute contemplated that any part of 
 this fund would be appropriated for 
 the purposes of affording compensa- 
 tion for any act of the persons who 
 might be employed under the au- 
 thority of the trustees." Referring 
 to the overruling of this case by 
 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs {infra), an 
 eminent Scotch judge, in a recent 
 case, said : ' ' During the thirty years 
 which have elapsed since the judg- 
 ment in Duncan v. Findlater, sev- 
 eral actions have been dismissed as 
 irrelevant, which would have been 
 sustained if this court had been act- 
 ing on the principle which must now 
 guide them. But an infinitely larger 
 number of claims against statutory 
 trustees or commissioners for in- 
 juries sustained through the wrong- 
 doing or negligence of themselves or 
 their servants have never seen the 
 jight, in deference to the judgment 
 in Duncan v. Findlater. Many of 
 them must, from various accidents, 
 be now incapable of resuscitation, 
 and no one can calculate what an 
 amount of injustice has been suf- 
 fered by the suppression of these 
 claims for a long period, even where 
 they can still be brought forward " 
 (per Lord President Inglis in Virtue 
 V. Police Commissioners, 1 R. 2851. 
 ' Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. 
 
 1 H. L. 93 ; 11 H. L. Cas. 686. That 
 was the case of the Liverpool docks, 
 built and maintained by the mem- 
 bers of the town-council of Liver- 
 pool, who, with their successors, 
 were created a corporation for such 
 purpose ; all the revenues from the 
 docks to be applied, in the first in- 
 stance, to making and maintaining 
 the docks, and then to the payment 
 of interest on the debt, etc. The neg- 
 ligence complained of was in not 
 properly maintaining a dock, which 
 vessels were invited to enter, so that 
 plaintiff's ship struck a bank of mud 
 as she was endeavoring to enter the 
 dock. See note 3, § 281. In Mersey 
 Docks V. Cameron (11 H. L. Cas. 
 443), which was an action to re- 
 cover poor rates from the trustees of 
 these docks. Lord Westbury said : 
 "The Mersey Docks ai'e, in truth, 
 property used and occupied for the 
 profit and benefit of a number of 
 persons, and it is the same thing in 
 substance as if the docks had been 
 demised by the subscribers to the 
 trustees, on the terms of maintaining 
 the docks and paying to the sub- 
 scribers a rent equivalent to the inter- 
 est on their bonds. They are, there- 
 fore, occupiers, and ratable as such." 
 In Winch v. Conservators of the 
 Thames (L. R. 7 C. P. 458), defend- 
 ants were incorporated with powers 
 to maintain and repair a towing- 
 path along the upper Thames for the 
 use of wliich they were entitled to 
 take toll. Held, that having invited 
 the public to use it, they were bound 
 to take reasonable care that it was in 
 a fit condition to be used as a towing- 
 path and were liable for injuries 
 resulting from its defective condi- 
 tion. The fact that defendants did 
 not collect tolls for their own advan- 
 
56i 
 
 INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 
 
 [§ 327 
 
 Great Britain, and the rule is now fixed tliat such statutory 
 bodies are not servants of the crown, so as to be exempt from 
 liability for the negligence of their employees ; that, although 
 not organized for purposes of profit, and administering a fund 
 raised by statute, by its terms made applicable to a particular 
 purpose, they are nevertheless liable to make good out of such 
 fund, any damage which may be sustained by an individual by 
 reason of the negligence of themselves or their employees in 
 the line of their duty. The statute creating them being silent 
 on the subject of their liability, the legislature is deemed to 
 have intended that they should have the same duties, and that 
 their funds should be subject to the same liabihties, as the 
 general law casts upon private persons who maintain for profit 
 works of a similar character. It makes no difference, it is said, 
 whether they, as a corporate body, were created for a bene- 
 ficial or for a fiduciary purpose.^ Having undertaken, or being 
 bound, to perform certain duties, it is immaterial whether 
 these duties are imposed by reason of the possession of prop- 
 erty, or by the assumption of an office, or however they may 
 
 tage, but merely as trustees for the 
 public, made no difference with 
 respect to liability in such cases. 
 " The intention of the legislature in 
 such cases is that the corporation 
 shall have the same duties, and its 
 funds shall be subject to the same 
 liabilities, as the general law would 
 impose upon a private person having 
 and exercising the same rights.'' Ou 
 appeal (L. B. 9 C. P. 378) judgment 
 was affirmed, Bramwell, B., saying: 
 " Since Mersey Docks v. Gibbs 
 (supra) we must hold that tlie funds 
 of this corporation (though estab- 
 lished for public purposes) are liable 
 to make good the damages sustained 
 by a private person from any breach 
 of duty on their part, and that there 
 is nothing in these statutes to exempt 
 this corporation from the duties 
 which the common law would cast 
 upon a private person or a trading 
 [Law op Nbg. Vol. 1 — 36] 
 
 corporation who maintained a simi- 
 lar towing-path along a public navi- 
 gation and levied tolls for its use." 
 In Southampton, etc. Bridge Co. v. 
 Southampton L. Board (8 El. & Bl. 
 813) it was said : ' ' Since Mersey Docks 
 Case it is useless to contend that 
 commissioners are not liable sijnply 
 on the ground that they are trustees 
 for the public. The decision of each 
 case must turn on the construction of 
 the particular statute under which 
 the commissioners are appointed." 
 
 '^ Gibbs V. Liverpool Docks, 3 
 Hurlst. & N. 1G4, per Coleridge, J.: 
 "The fact that a public body acts 
 gratuitously for the benefit of the 
 public, is no reason for exempting it 
 from liability for damages resulting 
 from the negligent performance of 
 a duty intrusted to it" (Clothier v. 
 "Webster, 13 C. B. N. S. 790). 
 
§ 328] INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 562 
 
 arise, the trustees are held to be liable to a private action for 
 negligence.^ 
 
 § 328. Incorporated administrative boards. — We are not 
 
 aware that this system of constructing and maintaining public 
 works by statutory trustees, administering funds for particu- 
 lar purposes under statutory directions, not for profit, but for 
 the public benefit, has any precise parallel in this country. It 
 is not uncommon for statutes to endow particular administrative 
 boards, organized for public purposes, with a corporate char- 
 acter, and entrust them with funds to be apphed to particular 
 purposes, in the interest of the public. Whether, in a given 
 case, such a corporate body is a public servant, exempt from 
 liability for the negligence of its employees in the line of their 
 employment, or, on the other hand, is an independent body, 
 only auxiliary to, and not a part of, the government, and hence 
 liable, must be determined by the language of the statute 
 creating it, as indicating the intention of the legislature.^ In 
 Mississippi, the legislature created a corporation consisting of 
 two persons from each of three counties bordering on the 
 Mississippi River, and their successors, elected every two years 
 
 ' The superintendence and man- stroyed beacon, vested in the corpo- 
 
 agement of all lighthouses and ration, its servant negligently left 
 
 beacons in England are vested by standing under vpater an iron stump, 
 
 statute in the corpoi-ation of Trinity on which plaintiff's ship struck, the 
 
 House, to vrhich extensive powers corporation was liable (Gilbert v. 
 
 are given, to be exercised with the Trinity House, L. E. 17 Q. B. Div. 
 
 consent of the government Board of 795). 
 
 Trade. The light-dues levied by it ' It has been uniformly held that 
 
 are directed to be carried to the when the trustees of a village are 
 
 account of a fund, out of which are created a body corporate (and not till 
 
 to be paid the expenses of the service then), they become liable in their 
 
 of lighthouses and beacons, the cor- corporate character for the negligent 
 
 poration accounting to the Board of acts and omissions of their servants 
 
 Trade for all receipts and expendi- and agents in the line of their em- 
 
 txires, and the accounts are to be ployment (Hickok v. Plattsburgh, 16 
 
 audited by the Commissioners of N. Y. 161, note ; Conrad v. Ithaca, 
 
 Audit. Held, that this corporation Id. 158 ; Peck v. Batavia, 33 Barb, 
 
 was not, by virtue of the statute, a 634). See ante, § 356. As to the 
 
 servant of the Crown so as to be ex- liabilities of local boards in Eng- 
 
 empt from liability for negligence in land, see Smith v. West Derbj', L. 
 
 the performance of the duties with R. 3 C. P. Div. 423 ; White v. Hind- 
 
 which it was charged ; and where, ley Local Board, L. R. 10 Q. B 319 ; 
 
 therefore, in removing a partially de- Ruck v. Williams, 3 Hurlst. & N. 308. 
 
563 INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. [§ 329 
 
 by the governing boards of the three counties. It was 
 made their duty to rebuild, strengthen and elevate old levees, 
 and make new ones, and " do all acts necessary in their opinion 
 to secure the counties under their charge from overflow ; " and 
 to this end, they were empowered to raise a fund by levying 
 a tax. It was claimed that the commissioners so negligently 
 and unskillfuUy constructed a levee that it gave way before 
 the pressure of high water, whereby the plaintiff 's lands were 
 inundated, and his crops destroyed. In an action against the 
 board, it was held that the commissioners were simply public 
 officers, clothed with corporate capacity solely for the con- 
 venience of administration, and that the tax was for a special 
 purpose, and could not be appropriated to pay damages for 
 the default of the commissioners.^ This decision is in 
 harmony with the principles already stated (§ 253); the board 
 was not a voluntary corporation representing the inhabitants 
 of certain territory, but a contrivance of the state to assist in 
 its government. 
 
 § 329. Voluntary corporations performing public func- 
 tions. — The case is different from that of a corporation 
 organized voluntarily by the inhabitants of a particular terri- 
 tory, under the authority of a general statute, with powers to 
 perform certain public duties, and to that end, to raise a fund 
 by taxation. Thus, in New York, under a statute which 
 authorizes the inhabitants of two or more school districts to 
 consolidate them into a union-district, and to elect trustees, 
 who, with their successors, are created a corporation, and 
 intrusted with a fund to further the objects contemplated, it 
 has been held that such a corporation is liable for injuries 
 resulting from the negligence of the trustees in the discharge 
 of their duties, e.g., in not taking reasonable care that the floor 
 
 °- Nugent V. Mississippi Levee fund to be used in preventing the 
 Com'rs, 58 Miss. 197. In that case, recurrence of damages. "To entail 
 the Mersey Docks Case (supra) was so alarming a liability on property- 
 urged in support of the action, but holders, without their free consent, 
 was held not to apply : the court say- ought to require a very plain expres- 
 ingthat to hold the fund chargeable sion of the legislative will." s. P., 
 with such damages would make the Peart v. Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 431 ; 13 
 tax-payers liable as insurers against So. 490 [levee commissioners], 
 damages. Instead of contributors to a 
 
§ 33°] INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 564 
 
 of a school-house in their charge was in a fit state of repair.^ 
 It is obvious that the character of such an independent corpo- 
 ration differs widely from that of a board of education, 
 connected with municipal government, having no treasury, 
 and created by the sovereign authority of the state to exercise 
 a purely public function and agency. Such boards enjoy the 
 immunity of government agents.^ 
 
 § 330- Trustees not liable when agents only. — To render 
 the trustees of a public work liable as a corporate body, it must 
 appear not only that the legislature intended to constitute 
 them a corporation, but also to cast upon them the burdens 
 incident to ownership or control. Where the ownership is 
 vested in a municipal corporation, by whose appointment the 
 trustees act, they themselves owning no property, and holding 
 and managing the work solely for the benefit of the munici- 
 pality, to which they are accountable for all receipts there- 
 from, the trustees are mere representatives and agents ; conse- 
 quently they are not liable for the negligence of their employees 
 in the management of the work.^ 
 
 ' Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303 ; and not of the individuals compos- 
 
 rev'g 12 Hun, 209. The action was ing it." 
 
 against the trustees individually, and '' Donovan v. Board of Education, 
 
 judgment was had for the plaintiff ; 85 N. Y. 117 ; Finch v. Board of Edu- 
 
 but it was held, on appeal, that the cation, 30 Ohio St. 37. See ante, 
 
 action lay, if at all, against the cor- g§ 295, 296. 
 
 poration, as such; Folger, J., saying: ' On an interpretation of the stat- 
 " It may be that if one of the trus- ute providing for the appointment of 
 tees had been duly charged by the trustees of the New York and Brook- 
 corporate body, as its agent or serv- lyn bridge, it was held that they 
 ant, distinct from his relation as a were mere representatives and 
 corporator, with a duty and respon- agents of the two cities, and not the 
 sibility, the neglect of which brought legal superiors of a laborer injured 
 damage to another, he would be while working on the bridge, and 
 liable as a private person therefor, the doctrine of respondeat superior 
 But it is not seen how a member of did not apply (Walsh v. Brooklyn 
 a corporate body, upon which body Bridge Trustees, 96 N. Y. 427). In 
 aduty rests, can be held individually an action subsequently brought for 
 liable for the neglect of its duty by the same injury against the cities of 
 that body. There is no duty upon New York and Brooklyn, held, on 
 him to act individually. If there is demurrer, that plaintiff was entitled 
 neglect to exert its powers or all its to recover (Walsh v. New York, 41 
 means, it is the neglect of the body Hun, 399 ; affl'd, 96 N. Y. 426). See 
 
5,65 
 
 INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 
 
 [§331 
 
 §331. Trustees of public charities.— Corporate trustees, 
 instituted for the purpose of extending charitable relief and 
 administering funds contributed for that object from the pub- 
 lic treasury or by private bounty, without the expectation or 
 right on their part to receive compensation for their own benefit, 
 having no capital stock and no provision for making dividends 
 or profits, are public servants ; and as such, having exercised due 
 care in the selection of their agents, are not liable as a corpora- 
 tion for the negligence of such agents in the line of their 
 employment, resulting in an injury to another. Their funds 
 are not to be diminished by any such casualties, it is held, 
 unless a contrary legislative intention can be gathered from 
 the statute.^ The rule will not apply, of course, to a private 
 
 Walsh V. New York, 107 N. Y. 220 ; 
 13 N. E. 911 ; Hannon v. Agnew, 96 
 N. Y. 439 ; Reid v. New York, 139 
 Id. nU; 34 N. E. 1102. 
 
 ' McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen- 
 eral Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. In that 
 case, plaintiff was brought to de- 
 fendant's hospital with a fractured 
 limb, and he offered to prove on the 
 trial that the fractured bone was 
 not properly set, by reason either of 
 the incompetency and negligence of 
 a house pupil who attended liiiii, or 
 of the negligence of the attending 
 surgeon. The defendant was a pub- 
 lic, charitable institution, organized 
 under the statute, and deriving its 
 funds frona legislative grants, and 
 donations and bequests from private 
 persons. Held, that the offer was 
 properly refused, and a direction of a 
 verdict for defendant was not error. 
 s. P., Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 
 Mich. 555 ; 60 N. W. 42 ; William- 
 son V. Louisville Reform School, 95 
 Ky. 251 ; 34 S. W. 106"). In New York, 
 the doctrine has been applied to the 
 case of a religious corporation organ- 
 ized under a statute providing that it 
 shall not be lawful to divert the 
 property to any purpose except the 
 support of an object connected with 
 the denomination to which such 
 
 corporation shall belong. Held, it 
 was not liable for the negligence of 
 an employee, where due care 
 was used in his selection (Haas 
 V. Missionary Soc. 6 N. Y. Misc. 
 281 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 868). The 
 leading English case is Heriot's 
 Hospital V. Ross (12 01. & Fin. 
 507), where plaintiff sought to re- 
 cover damages for the refusal of the 
 trustees of the hospital (founded for 
 the maintenance and education of 
 poor, fatherless boys) to admit the 
 plaintiff to its benefits. The court 
 below held the plaintiff eligible, and 
 the action well brought. But the 
 House of Lords, on appeal, held that 
 the action would not lie. Lord Camp- 
 bell said : " It seems to be thought 
 that if charity trustees are guilty of 
 a breach of trust, the persons dam- 
 nified have a light to be indemnified 
 out of the trust funds. This is con- 
 trary to all reason, justice and com- 
 mon sense. The trustees would in 
 that case be indemnified against the 
 consequences of their own miscon- 
 duct, and the real object of the 
 charity would be defeated . If there 
 has been a wrong committed by the 
 charity trustees . . . damages 
 are to be paid from the pocket of the 
 wrongdoer, not from a trust fund." 
 
§33': 
 
 INCORPORATED PUBLIC TRUSTEES. 
 
 566 
 
 corporation exercising a public function, or cng-aged in a work 
 of charity, if its operations are carried on for the private gain 
 of its members. It is not the object alone of a corporation 
 which makes it charitable within the meaning of the rule ; it is 
 the mode in which that object is sought to be attained as well 
 as the purpose for which it is pursued.^ 
 
 The Heriot's Hospital case was relied 
 upon, however, in Boyd v. Insur- 
 ance Patrol (113 Pa. St. 269), where 
 the defendant was a corporation 
 whose object, declai-ed by its char- 
 ter, was to " protect and save life 
 and property in or contiguous to 
 burning buildings, and to remove 
 and take charge of such property or 
 any part thereof, when necessary." 
 A fire occurring, officers of the Pa- 
 trol, in order to protect the property 
 from injury by water, spread tar- 
 paulins upon the upper floor of the 
 building ; coming a few days after- 
 wards to remove the tarpaulins, one 
 of the ofiicers threw them from the 
 upper story to the sidewalk, and a 
 passer-by was struck and killed. 
 Held, that such a corporation, in 
 order to establish its exemption 
 from the general rule of a mas- 
 ter's liability for the negligence of a 
 servant, must show (the charter be- 
 ing silent on the subject) that it was. 
 
 in fact, conducted as a public char- 
 ity ; that its services were gratui- 
 tously rendered to the public for the 
 public good ; and that the charter 
 alone was inadequate for that pur- 
 pose. Having failed to do so, a dis- 
 missal of the complaint on the 
 ground of such exemption was 
 error. 
 
 ' Per Clark, J., Boyd v. Insurance 
 Patrol, supra; Newcomb v. Boston 
 Protective Dep't, 151 Mass. 215 ; 24 
 N. E. 39. But the facts that the 
 corporation, by its rules, required 
 patients to pay for their board ac- 
 cording to their circumstances and 
 the accommodation they received, 
 and that no person had, individually, 
 a right to demand admission, and 
 that the trustees were to determine 
 who were to be received, did not 
 render it the less a public charity 
 (McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 
 supra ; Gooch v. Asso. for Relief of 
 Aged Females, 109 Mass. 558). 
 
PART IV. 
 
 PUBLIC WAYS. 
 
 Chapter XV. 
 
 XVI. 
 
 XVII. 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 Highways. 
 Turnpike Roads. 
 Bridges. 
 Canals. 
 
 XIX. Construction and Maintenance of Rail- 
 roads. 
 XX. Railroad Injuries to Animals. 
 XXI. Railroad Injuries to Persons. 
 
 CHAPTEIl XV. 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 § 332. Highways are public works. 
 
 333. What are highways within the 
 rule. 
 
 834. When liability in respect to 
 highway attaches. 
 
 334a. Obligation dependent on ju- 
 risdiction of structure. 
 
 335. Liability pending construc- 
 
 tion of way. 
 
 336. When obligation ceases. 
 
 337. No common-law duty to repair 
 
 highways. 
 
 338. Statutory liability for defec- 
 
 tive ways. 
 
 339. Imphed liability. 
 
 340. Liability of road-officers. 
 
 341. Contract obligations to repair. 
 343. [Consolidated with § 359.] 
 343. Obligations of abutting own- 
 ers as to highway. 
 
 [5671 
 
 §344. 
 345. 
 
 346. 
 
 347. 
 348. 
 
 ' 349. 
 350. 
 351. 
 353. 
 
 353. 
 354. 
 
 355. 
 
 356. 
 
 [Omitted.] 
 
 Joint and several liability for 
 
 defective way. 
 Defects in way concurring 
 
 with other causes. 
 [Omitted.] 
 Duty to rebuild destroyed 
 
 highway. 
 [Consolidated with § 356.] 
 What are statutory "defects.'' 
 Defects in margins of way. 
 When whole width must be 
 
 passable. 
 Sidewalks and street-crossings. 
 Overhanging roofs, awnings, 
 
 trees, etc. 
 Objects on highway likely to 
 
 frighten horses. 
 Duty to guard and light de- 
 fective highway. 
 
568 
 
 Who may maintain action. 
 
 Damages must be special. 
 
 [Omitted.] 
 
 Notice of injury preliminary 
 to action. 
 
 Defenses. 
 
 Contributory negligence. 
 
 Traveler's knowledge of defect. 
 
 Care required in traveling at 
 night. 
 
 Defect in plaintiff's carriage, 
 harness or horses. 
 
 Unskillful or improper driving. 
 
 Negligent stowing and exces- 
 sive weight of load. 
 
 Sunday traveling. 
 
 [Consolidated.] 
 
 [Consolidated. ] 
 
 Action over against third per- 
 son. 
 
 § 332. Highways are public works. — Highways are public 
 works for the use of the public at large, not merely for the 
 residents of the particular locality in which they lie/ and hence 
 are subject to the paramount control of the state,^ which may 
 determine, by statute, subject to constitutional limitations, 
 when and where, on what plan,^ at what cost, and at whose 
 charge,* they shall be built; and the uses to which they may be 
 put.^ Their construction and subsequent maintenance in repair 
 
 332 
 
 ] HIGHWAYS. 
 
 357. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 359.] 
 
 §370. 
 
 358. 
 
 Authorized interference with 
 
 871. 
 
 
 highway. 
 
 872. 
 
 359. 
 
 Liability of licensee of use of 
 street. 
 
 878. 
 
 860. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 859.] 
 
 374. 
 
 361. 
 
 Obstructions incident to build- 
 
 375. 
 
 
 ing operations. 
 
 376. 
 
 362. 
 
 Obstructions incident to traf- 
 fic. 
 Obstructions from natural 
 
 377. 
 
 363. 
 
 378. 
 
 
 causes. 
 
 
 364. 
 
 [Consolidated with § 363.] 
 
 379. 
 
 365. 
 
 Individual liability for wrong- 
 ful obstruction. 
 
 880. 
 
 366. 
 
 [Consohdated with § 367.] 
 
 381. 
 
 367. 
 
 Ground of liability for defec- 
 
 382. 
 
 
 tive ways. 
 
 383. 
 
 368. 
 
 Actual notice of defect. 
 
 384. 
 
 369. 
 
 When notice will be implied. 
 
 
 ' streets belong to the general pub- 
 lic, not merely to the local public of 
 the city in which they lie (O'Con- 
 nor V. ipittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187 ; 
 People V. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Kane 
 V. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., 125 Id. 164 ; 
 26 N. E. 278; Egerer v. N. Y. Central 
 R. Co., 130 N. Y. 108 ; 29 N. E 95: 
 Thomas v. Brooklyn, 58 Iowa, 438). 
 
 ' Perry v. New Orleans, etc. R. 
 Co., 55 Ala. 113 ; and cases cited 
 infra. See Dillon, Municipal Corp. , 
 g 656 et seq. 
 
 3 Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 
 123 ; Matter of Sackett Street, 74 Id. 
 95; Tifft V. Buffalo, 82 Id. 204; 
 Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65 [an 
 extreme case]. 
 
 " State V. Williams, 68 Conn. 131 
 and cases in last note . 
 
 * "The streets of a city are not the 
 private property of the corporation 
 in such a sense that the legislature 
 cannot, so far as regards the cor- 
 poration, authorize the same to be 
 used for any public purpose for 
 which it may seem fit " (per Dillon, 
 C. J., Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, etc. R. 
 Co., 24 Iowa, 455). " There is no sub- 
 stantial difference between streets 
 in which the legal title is in private 
 individuals, and those in which it 
 is in the public, as to the rights of 
 the public therein " (Barney v. Keo- 
 kuk, 94 U. S. 324). S. P., Storra- 
 feltz V. Manor Turnpike Co., 18 Pa. 
 
569 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§ 332 
 
 SO as to be reasonably safe for travel are usually delegated 
 by the state to local government agencies, such as cities, 
 towns, counties, road districts, or particular municipal officers, 
 under^statutes which either impose on them mandatory duties 
 in respect thereto, or else confer powers of control from which 
 a duty to use ordinary care to make them safe for travel will be 
 implied. Any breach of such duty, express or implied, 
 whether by nonfeasance or misfeasancte, is a public offense, for 
 which the officer or corporation owing it is primarily answer- 
 able to the state by criminal indictment." It is likewise a 
 criminal offense, punishable by indictment, for a third person 
 to encumber or obstruct a highway without authority.'' The 
 extent to which such public offenses, — chargeable either to 
 municipalities, their officers, or to individuals, — will sustain a 
 private action for damages suffered thereby, forms the subject 
 of this chapter. The general rule governing the liability of 
 local government agencies for neglect of duty in the construc- 
 
 St. 555 ; Plant v. Long Island R. Co., 
 10 Barb. 26). The legislature may 
 legalize that which would otherwise 
 be a nuisance. That which the legis- 
 lature constitutionally (Leigh v. 
 Westervelt, 2 Duer, 618) authorizes, 
 as the erection of a dam on a navi- 
 gable river (Harris v. Thompson, 9 
 Barb. 350), or building a railroad 
 (People V. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188) or 
 sewer (Brooks v. Boston, 19 Pick. 
 174) in a public street, cannot be a 
 nuisance per se. 
 
 * Rex V. Stoughton, 3 Saund. 158; 
 Commonwealth v. Newburyport, 
 103 Mass. 129; Commonwealth v. 
 Deerfleld, 6 Allen, 449 ; State v. Gor- 
 ham, 37 Me. 451 ; State v. Yarrell, 12 
 Ired. 130 ; State v. Murfreesboro, 11 
 Humph. 217 ; Chattanooga v. State, 5 
 Sneed, 578 ; Commonwealth v. Hop- 
 kinsville, 7 B. Monr. 38; State v. 
 Shinkle, 40 Iowa 131. 
 
 ' It is an indictable offense for 
 a timber merchant to cut logs in the 
 street adjoining his lumber yard ; 
 though he should not be able other- 
 wise to get them into his premises, 
 
 or to carry on his business there. 
 "He is not to eke out the incon- 
 venience of his own premises by tak- 
 ing in the public highway into his 
 timber yard ; and if the street be 
 narrow, he must remove to a more 
 commodious situation to carry on 
 his business " (per Ld. Ellenboroua;h, 
 Rex V. Jones, 3 Camp. 229). Nearly 
 the same language is used in People 
 V. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 529. s. p.. 
 Commonwealth v. Milliman, 13 Serg. 
 & H. 403 [constable making sales 
 under execution in a highway] ; 
 Hart V. Albany, 9 Wend. 571 [canal- 
 boat permanently stationed in canal 
 basin] ; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. 
 Law, 201 [holding unauthorized mar 
 ket in street]. The unauthorized con- 
 struction of a railroad across a high- 
 way is an indictable ofifence (Com- 
 monwealth V. Nashua, etc. R. Co., 
 2 Gray, 54 ; Commonwealth v. Ver- 
 mont, etc. R. Co., 4 Id. 22 ; Common- 
 wealth V. Old Colony, etc. R. Co., 
 14 Id. 98 ; Commonwealth v. Erie, 
 etc. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339). s. P., 
 Washington Natural Gas Co. v. 
 
§333] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 570 
 
 tion and maintenance of their public works is stated and 
 illustrated in the chapter on Municipal Corporations.* 
 
 § 333- What are highways, within the rule. — The^term 
 " highway " is generic, inclusive of all public ways, and means 
 a public road which every person has a right to use for passage 
 and traffic' The term will, therefore, include streets in cities,^ 
 footways or sidewalks,' ' turnpikes, plank-roads and bridges. 
 These different kinds of highways are only distinguished from 
 each other by the mode of their use, the material employed in 
 
 Wilkinson [Penn.], 2 Atl. 338 ; Davis 
 V. New York, 14 N. Y. 506, 524. 
 
 » Chapter XII, ante. 
 
 ' Per Cooley, J., Macomber v. 
 Nichols, 34 Mich. 212. In Holdane 
 V. Cold Spring (23 Barb. 102 ; affi'd 
 21 N. Y. 474), held, notwithstanding 
 a dictum to the contrary in Wiggins 
 V. Tallmadge (11 Barb. 457), that it 
 was essential to a public right or 
 public use of a road that it should 
 be a thoroughfare, or open at both 
 ends. In People v. Kingman (24 
 N. Y. 559), the whole question was 
 reviewed by Denio, J., with the con- 
 clusion that it is not essential to a 
 highway, either at common law or 
 under the statute of New York, 
 that it be a thoroughfare. This 
 principle was adopted in Peckham 
 V. Lebanon (39 Conn. 235). See 
 State V. Frazer, 28 Ind. 196 ; Sohatz 
 V. Pfiel, 56 Wise. 429. This is un- 
 doubtedly the English doctrine on 
 the subject (see Bateman v. Bluck, 
 14 Eng. Law & Eq. 69 ; 21 Law 
 J. [N. S.J 406). The mode of its 
 creation, whether by prescription, 
 by dedication, or under the right 
 of eminent domain, does not, in 
 general, determine the right of 
 the public therein (People v. Loeh- 
 felm, 102 N. T. 1; 5 N. E. 783; 
 Cohoes V. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 
 134 N. T. 397 ; 31 N. E 887 ; Pitts- 
 burgh, etc. R. Co. V. Commonwealth, 
 
 104 Pa. St. 583 ; Stackpole v. Healy, 
 16 Mass. 33 ; Commonwealth v. Wil- 
 kinson, 16 Pick, 175 ; Washington 
 Ice Co. V. Lay, 103 Ind. 48 ; 2 N. E. 
 222 ; State v. Proctor, 90 Mo. 334). 
 
 ' Drake v. Hudson River R. Co., 7 
 Barb. 508 ; Brace v. N. Y. Central R. 
 Co., 27 N. Y. 269, 271 ; State v. WU- 
 kinson, 3 Vt. 480. 
 
 ^ Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. U. 
 S. 161 ; MoSherry v. Canandaigua, 
 129 N. Y. 612 ; 29 N. E. 612 ; Pom- 
 frey v. Saratoga, 104 N. Y. 459; 
 Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. U92 ; 
 Hixon V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59 ; 
 Boston, etc. R. Co. v. Boston, 140 
 Mass. 87 ; Tyler v. Sturdy, 108 Id. 
 196; Hall v. Manchester, 40 N. 
 H. 410; Manchester v. Hartford, 
 30 Conn. 118 ; Young v. Waterville, 
 39 Minn. 196 ; 39 N. W. 97 ; Houfe 
 V. Fulton, 34 Wise. 608; James v. 
 Portage, 48 Id. 375 ; 5 N. W. 31 ; 
 Cronin v. Delavan, 50 Wise. 677 ; 7 
 N. W. 249 ; Taber v. GrafmiUer, 109 
 Ind. 206; Stato v. Berdetta, 73 Id. 
 185 ; Debolt v. Carpenter, 31 Id. 355 ; 
 Bloomington v. Bay, 42 111. 503 ; 
 Himmelman v. Satterlee, 50 Cal. 
 69. A foot-path across uninclosed 
 commons, held not a sidewalk (Goo- 
 din V. Des Moines, 55 Iowa, 671). 
 Whether a sidewalk is a part of the 
 highway, repairable by the public, is 
 a question for the jury. (Weare v. 
 Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 334). 
 
571 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§333 
 
 their construction, or by the manner in which the expense of 
 their construction and maintenance is defrayed. So railroads,* 
 canals,' ferries,^ and navigable rivers '' have been declared to be 
 public highways. The public have likewise a right to travel 
 on the ice covering a public river; and one who cuts holes 
 therein, near a waterway which has been used for twenty 
 years, is liable in damages to a traveler injured thereby.'* But 
 the public have, at common law, no right of way along the 
 margin of navigable rivers, except as acquired by express 
 grant,' or prescription. Public piers,'" or landing-places," pub- 
 lic squares, parks, ■'^ etc., are within the legal definition and sub- 
 ject to the principles and rules applicable to highways. 
 
 * See Beekman v. Saratoga, etc. E. 
 Co., 3 Paige, 45, 74; Rex v. Severn, 
 etc. R. Co., 3 Barn. & Ad. 646. 
 
 ^ A canal basin, for the lading and 
 unlading of boats, is a highway 
 (Hart V. Albany, 3 Paige, 213 ; Bar- 
 nett V. Johnson, 15 N. J. Eq. 481). 
 The towing-path of a canal is a high- 
 way for the purpose for which it was 
 constructed (per Bayley, J. , Rex v. 
 Severn, etc. R. Co., 2 Barn. & Ad. 
 646,648). See § 403, posf. 
 
 6 See Peter v. Kendall, 6 Barn. & 
 Cr. 703 ; Garner v. Green, 8 Ala. 96 ; 
 Pomeroy v. Donaldson, 5 Mo. 36; 
 Cohen v. Hume, 1 McCord, 439. In 
 South Carolina, a ferry operated by 
 a county is not a highway within 
 the meaning of a statute making 
 counties liable for damages caused 
 by defects in " a highway " (Chick 
 V. Newbury county, 27 S. C. 419 ; 3 
 S. E. 787). 
 
 ' Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal 
 Co., 12 Peters, 91 ; "Wilson v. Black- 
 bird Creek Co., 3 Id. 345 ; Hart v. 
 Hill, 1 Whart. 136 ; Morgan v. King, 
 35 N. Y. 454; Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige, 
 547 ; Scoct v. Wilson, 3 N. H. 321 ; 
 Moor V. Veazie, 33 Me. 343 ; Treat v. 
 Lord, 43 Id. 553; Memphis v. Overton, 
 3 Yerg. 389; Hogg v. Zanesville Canal 
 Co., 5 Ohio, 410 ; Lorman v. Benson, 
 8 Mich. 18 ; Moore v. Sanborne, 8 
 
 Id. 519 ; McManus v. Carmichael, 3 
 Iowa, 1 ; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578 ; 
 Stuart V. Clark, 2 Swan, 9 ; Dal- 
 rymple v. Mead, 1 Grant, 197 ; Post 
 V. Munn, 4 N. J. Law, 61 . What 
 use of the stream makes it a public 
 highway is one of fact for the jury 
 (Olive V. State, 86 Ala. 88 ; 5 So. 653). 
 It does not follow, from a river being 
 a highway, that land appropriated 
 from its bed must remain a highway 
 (Wetmore v. Atl. Lead Co., 37 Barb. 
 70;. 
 
 8 French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433. The 
 doctrine that a traveler on a city 
 street may rely on the assumption 
 that the streets are kept safe, is not 
 applicable to a skater on a water- 
 highway, as against one having the 
 right to cut ice therefrom (Sickles 
 V. N. J. Ice Co., 153 N. Y. 83 : rev'g 
 80 Hun, 213). 
 
 9 Ball V. Herbert, 3 T. R. 353 ; Led- 
 yard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 103. It 
 is otherwise by the civil law (Just. 
 Inst. L. 3, tit. 1, § 4), adopted by the 
 Louisiana Code. 
 
 '0 Wendell v. Baxter, 12 Gray, 494. 
 See Radway v. Briggs, 87 N. Y. 356 : 
 People v. Lambier, 5 Denio, 9. 
 
 " Fowler v. Mott, 19 Barb. 304. 
 
 '2 Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189. 
 "If a way is used for passing and 
 repassing, and is common to all the 
 
§334] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 572 
 
 "§ 334- When liability in respect to highway attaches. — 
 
 No obligation to maintain a particular highway attaches until 
 it is shown to have been established by regular legal proceed- 
 ings,' or by user and acquiesence for a sufficient period,^ or by 
 
 people, it is a liighway, -svlielher it 
 id called a road, street or public 
 square " (per Prentiss, C. J., in State 
 T. Wilkinson, 3 Vt. 480). See State 
 V. Atkinson, 24 Id. 459 ; Common- 
 wealtli V. Fisk, 8 Mete. 238 ; Com- 
 monwealth V. Bowman, 3 Pa. St. 
 303 ; "Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 
 510. 
 
 ' Page V. Weathersfield, 13 Vt. 434 ; 
 Vermont v. Leicester, 33 Id. 653 ; 
 Todd T. Rome, 2 Me. 55 ; Haywood 
 V. Charlestown, 43 N. H. 61 ; Com- 
 monwealth V. Low, 3 Pick. 408 ; 
 Commonwealth t. Newburj^, 3 Id. 
 51 ; Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 
 1 Id. 180. A town is not liable for 
 defects in a foot- way lying out of the 
 highway limits, though used by 
 reason of its neglect to repair a 
 bridge, with the consent of the land- 
 owner, if not opened according to 
 statute, or dedicated to, and accepted 
 bj-, the town (Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 
 Vt. 143 ; Sampson v. Goochland, 5 
 Gratt. 341). Compare Potter v. 
 Castleton, 53 Vt. 435 ; Henderson v. 
 Bavis, 106 N. C. 88 ; 11 S. E. 573. 
 
 ^ As to what is a sufficient period of 
 user, the rule is not uniform in the 
 different states. Immemorial usage 
 has always been held to be proof 
 of the existence of a highway 
 (Commonwealth t. Low, 3 Pick. 
 408 ; Jones v. Andover, 9 Id. 146 ; 
 Ward V. Folly, 5 N. J. Law, 482 ; 
 Hampson v. Taylor, 15 E. I. 83; 8 
 Atl. 331 ; 23 Id. 733), and, as a 
 general rule, the use of a road 
 for twenty years or more is evi- 
 dence, in most of the states, of its 
 being a public highway (Matter of 
 Bridge, 100 N. Y. 643 ; 3 N E. 679 ; 
 Hull V. Richmond. 2 Woodb. & M. 
 337; Smith v. Northumberland, 36 
 
 N. H. 38 ; Hall v. Manchester, 39 Id. 
 295 ; Chadwick v. McCausland, 47 
 Me. 342 ; Williams v. Cuniinington, 
 18 Pick. 312). Twenty years' user is 
 conclusive in Wisconsin (Lemon v. 
 Hayden, 13 Wise- 159; Wyman v. 
 State, Id. 663) ; but it must be adverse 
 (State V. Joyce, 19 Wise. 90). In Ver- 
 mont and Illinois, a less period seems 
 sufficient (Whitney v. Essex, 43 Vt. 
 520 ; see Champaign v. Patterson, 50 
 111. 62). In New York, twelve years' 
 user has been held prima facie evi- 
 dence that the highway was open by 
 authority (Golden v. Thurber, 3 
 Johns. 424). In Maine, ten years' 
 user is not sufficient to oblige a town 
 to keep it in repair (Estes v. Troy, 5 
 Me. 368), though twenty years' user 
 is (Todd V. Rome, 2 Me. 55; Souther- 
 land V. Jackson, 30 Id. 462). In Mas- 
 sachusetts, the fact that the owner 
 of land on a highway had erected a 
 building or solid wall standing back 
 from the highway and that the strip 
 between such building or wall and 
 the highway had been used by the 
 public for more than twenty years, 
 was held not conclusive evidence 
 that the strip has become a 
 part of the highway (Fall River 
 Works V. Fall River, 110 Mass. 428). 
 As to highways becoming such by 
 prescription, see StockweU v. Fitch- 
 burg, 110 Mass. 305. In Pennsylva- 
 nia, fifteen years' acquiescence in 
 abutting owner's changing street 
 grade, will bind city (Jones v. Wes- 
 terhausen, 131 Pa. St. 63; 18 Atl. 
 1073). In Kansas, the mere use of 
 vacant land by individuals as a 
 road, for more than fifteen years 
 does not constitute a highway (State 
 V. Horn, 35 Kans. 717). 
 
573 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§334 
 
 dedication and acceptance,^ and has been actually opened for 
 public use.* Its character as a pubHc highway, when collater- 
 ally raised, as in an action for its negligent maintenance, is 
 sufficiently shown, so as to shift the burden of proof,' by the 
 
 ' As to what constitutes a valid 
 dedication, and a sufficient accept- 
 ance, see Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 
 U. S. 716 ; Cook v. Harris, 61 N. Y. 
 448 ; Spier v. New Utrecht, 121 Id. 
 420 ; 24 N. E. 692 ; Wilder v. St. 
 Paul, 13 Minn. 193 ; Downer v. St. 
 Paul, etc. R. Co., 33 Id. 271 ; Red- 
 wood Cemetery v. Bandy, 93 Ind. 
 246 ; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 
 Id. 201 ; Tucker V. Conrad, 103 Id. 349; 
 3 N. E 803 ; Fisk v. Havana, 88 111. 
 208 ; State v. Welpton, 34 Iowa, 144 ; 
 Edenville v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 77 
 Id. 69 ; 41 N. W. 568 ; Gamble v. 
 St. Louis, 12 Mo. 617; Elizabeth- 
 town, etc. R. Co. V. Combs, 10 Bush, 
 383 ; Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 
 484 ; Lamar county v. Clements, 49 
 Tex. 347 ; Indianapolis v. McClure, 
 3 Ind. 147 ; Milwaukee v. Davis, 6 
 Wise. 377. The mere removal of a 
 fence by the owner of land so as to 
 leave it open, does not operate as a 
 dedication of the land as a highway; 
 an intent so to dedicate and accept- 
 ance by the public are both essential 
 to such dedicationfRozell v. Andrews, 
 103 N. Y. 150 ; 8 N. E. 513 ; Murphy 
 V. Brooklyn, 118 N. Y. 575 ; 33 N. E. 
 887). To the same effect, Harding 
 V. Hale, 61 111. 193. In Donahue v. 
 State (113 N. Y. 143 ; 19 N. E. 419), 
 the state constructed a feeder on its 
 land for a canal, covered with tim- 
 bers and several feet of earth. Its 
 surface was used by the public as a 
 highway for more than twenty years, 
 but was never laid out as a street. 
 Held, no legal dedication to the pub- 
 lic could be inferred by prescription. 
 * Hutson V. New York, 5 Sandf . 
 389, 303. See Southerland v. Jack- 
 son, SO Me. 463, per Wells, J. Any 
 
 question as to the utility of the road 
 is not to be regarded (Washington 
 Ice Co. V. Lay, 103 Ind. 48 ; 3 N. E. 
 232) . See cases cited in note 6, infra. 
 ^ Logan V. People [Ind.] 6 N. E. 
 475. Where a town has taken charge 
 of a public way, and regulated it in 
 the same manner as other highways, 
 it cannot, when sued for defects in 
 the way, defend by alleging an 
 original want of authority to estab- 
 lish the way as a highway, or the 
 want of statutory formalities in lay- 
 ing it out (Mayor V. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 
 189 ; Houfe v. Fulton, 34 Wise. 608 
 Stark V. Lancaster, 57 N. H. 88 
 Haywood v. Charlestown, 43 Id. 61 
 State V. Raymond, 37 Id. 388 ; Aurora 
 V. Colshire, 55 Ind. 484 ; Aston v. 
 Newton, 134 Mass. 507). A failure 
 to have the road recorded, if it has 
 actually been dedicated and accepted 
 by public user, is immaterial (Driggs 
 v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77 ; 8 N. E. 
 514). The duty of keeping a public 
 street in a safe condition does not in 
 the least depend upon how the street 
 became a public highway (Phelps v. 
 Mankato, 33 Minn. 376). Where a 
 street had been open to its full width 
 for forty years, was extensively used 
 by the public; the sidewalk had been 
 laid out and used during all of that 
 time ; water-mains had been laid 
 through the street; and curb-stones 
 had been placed along the sidewalks 
 at the expense of the village; Held, the 
 jury could properly find that the 
 street, for its whole width, was le- 
 gally one of the streets of the village 
 (Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 104 
 N. Y. 459; 11 N. E. 43; Cook v. Harris, 
 61 N. Y. 448; People v. Loehfelm, 103 
 Id. 1). Adoption by ordinance is not 
 
§334] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 574 
 
 facts that it has been opened, and the public permitted or 
 invited to use it for travel,* though the work is only partially 
 finished.'' Where the facts that a town has paid for a road or 
 bridge,* or has repaired it from time to time,' are relied on to 
 
 essential (Seymour v. Salamanca, 
 137 N. Y. 364 ; 33 N. E. 304 ; Walker 
 V. Pt. Pleasant, 49 Mo. App. 244), 
 unless required by statute (Imperial 
 V. Wright, 34 Neb. 732 ; 52 N. W. 
 374). A statutory requirement that 
 every dedicated street shall be ac- 
 cepted by an ordinance passed for 
 such purpose, does not forbid the 
 assumption of control, without the 
 acceptance by ordinance (Byerly v. 
 Anamoso, 79 Iowa, 204; 44 N. W. 359). 
 ' Ivory V. Deerpark, 116 N. Y. 
 476 ; 23 N. E. 1080 ; Schafer v. New 
 York, 12 N. Y. App. Div. 384; Brad- 
 bury v. Benton, 69 Me. 194 ; Kling 
 V. Kansas City, 27 Mo. App. 231; 
 Garnett v. Slater, 56 Id. 207; Waxa- 
 hachie v. Connor, [Tex. Civ. App.J 
 35 S. W. 692. An indictment, and 
 conviction thereon, against a town for 
 the non-repair of a highway is very 
 strong, if not conclusive, evidence 
 that such a highway has been 
 adopted by the town (Blodgett v. 
 Royaltori, 14 Vt. 288). Putting a 
 highway in the rate bills, expending 
 money thereon and shutting up the 
 old road, are proofs of adoption 
 (Tower V. Rutland, 56 Vt. 28). A 
 village having permitted a sidewalk, 
 unsafe in construction and built 
 without its authority, to remain for 
 a year, Held, liable for its unsafe 
 condition (Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. 
 Y. 27). So where a city passed an 
 ordinance to construct a sidewalk, 
 where the adjacent land-owners had 
 laid a plank walk, the city is liable 
 for a defect in the plank walk 
 (Oliver v. Kansas City, 69 Mo. 79). 
 A town is liable for injuries from 
 a defect in a bridge which had 
 formerly been a toll-bridge, but had 
 
 been permitted to remain open for a 
 year as a part of the ordinary line 
 of travel (Bi-adbury v. Benton, 69 
 Me. 194). See cases cited under note 
 4, supra. 
 
 ' Seymour v. Salamanca, 137 N. Y. 
 364 ; 33 N. E. 304 ; Schafer v. New 
 York, 13 N. Y. App. Div. 384 ; and 
 cases cited under next section. 
 
 » Bliss V. Deerfield, 13 Pick. 102 ; 
 Davis V. Jackson, 61 Mich. 530; 28 
 N. W. 526. 
 
 ° Rex V. Leake, 5 Barn. & Ad. 469, 
 482 ; Triese v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526 ; 
 32 N. W. 857 ; Greenberg v. Kings- 
 ton, 67 Hun, 653 ; 23 N. Y. Supp. 
 511 ; Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196 ; 
 21 N. E. 657 ; Phillips v. Huntington, 
 35 W. Va. 406 ; 14 S. E. 17. Reso- 
 lution of common council, after the 
 accident, directing the removal of 
 the alleged defect (Sewell v. Cohoes, 
 75 N. Y. 45) or repairs, without reso- 
 lution (Clapper v. Waterford, 62 
 Hun, 170; 16 N. Y. Supp. 640), are 
 competent to show control. To 
 same effect, Brennan v. St. Louis, 93 
 Mo. 483 ; 2 S. W. 481 ; Folsom v. 
 Underbill, 36 Vt. 580 ; Whitney v. 
 Essex, 42 Id. 520 ; Hayden v. Attle- 
 borough, 7 Gray, 338 ; Kellogg v. 
 Northampton, 8 Id. 504 ; Common- 
 wealth V. Petersham, 4 Pick. 119 ; 
 Codner v. Bradford. 3 Pinney, 259 ; 
 Milwaukee v. Davis, 6 Wise. 377 ; 
 Champaign v. Patterson, 50 111. 62; 
 Springfield Milling Co. v. Lane 
 county, 5 Oreg. 265 ; Munn v. Pitts, 
 burgh, 40 Pa. St. 364 [case of a 
 sewer] ; Kennedy v. Cumberland, 
 65 Md. 514 ; 9 Atl. 234 ; Wallace v. 
 Evans, 43 Kans. 509 ; 23 Pac. 596. 
 In Maine and Massachusetts, the 
 statute provides that a town which 
 
575 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§334 
 
 show its public character and the town s responsibility there- 
 for, it is competent to show that the repairs were begun and 
 continued under a mistaken belief that it was the town's duty 
 to do so/" or that, at the time the repairs were made, the duty 
 of making them was owing exclusively by another town or a 
 private person." It is no excuse for permitting an obstruction 
 to remain in a street, that the obstruction existed before the 
 street came under the control of the defendant.^^ Whether 
 there has been a common-law dedication and adoption *^ of a 
 highway, or whether any part of it has been opened or closed ** 
 to the public are generally questions for the jury. In western 
 cities, streets are often laid out for future rather than for present 
 use ; and the courts of Missouri have held that all a city 
 is bound to do, in such cases, is to see that, as the streets are 
 
 has made repairs upon a highway at 
 any time within six years, cannot 
 be heard to deny the location thereof, 
 in an action against it for injuries 
 caused by its non-repair. 
 
 ^0 Rex V. Edmonton, 1 Mood. & 
 R. 24. 
 
 " The fact that a village has occa- 
 sionally made slight repairs upon a 
 bridge which the town is bound to 
 maintain, will not relieve the town 
 from liability (Spearbracker v. Larra- 
 bee, 64 Wise. 573 ; 35 N. W. 555). 
 As to duty of town with respect to 
 an abandoned turnpike, see Reed v. 
 Cornwall, 27 Conn. 48: Barton v. 
 Montpelier, 30 Vt. 650^ Bryant v. 
 Biddeford, 39 Me. 193. 
 
 '2 Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 89 ; 
 2 N. E. 473 [a hatchway projecting 
 over a sidewalk]. When municipal 
 boundaries are extended so as to 
 take in other territory, the corpora- 
 tion is under the same obligation 
 with respect to the streets of the an- 
 nexed district as of other parts of its 
 territory (Richards v. New York, 48 
 N. Y. Superior, 315 ; Hanley v. Hun- 
 tington, 37 W. Va. 578 ; 16 S. E. 807 ; 
 Wabasha R. Co. v. Defiance, 10 Ohio 
 
 Cir. Ct. 27). The city continued to 
 treat as a highway a county road 
 through land annexed to the city. 
 Held a public highway, although 
 never formally accepted as such 
 (Steubenville v. King, 33 Ohio St. 
 610). s. P., Scranton v. Catterson, 94 
 Pa. St. 203 [water-plug placed in a 
 street by a water company prior to 
 the city's incorporation : city liable] ; 
 Mead v. Derby, 40 Conn. 205 [town 
 liable for road, though lying within 
 a chartered borough], 
 
 13 Flack V. Green Island, 133 N. Y. 
 107 ; 25 N. E. 267 ; Eastland v. Fogo, 
 58 Wise. 274 ; 16 N. W. 633 ; Ward v. 
 Farwell, 6 Colo. 66 ; Harding v. Jas- 
 per, 14 Cal. 643. Whether a public 
 highway, which has become such by 
 user, extended outside of the traveled 
 path, is for the jury (Lawrence v. 
 Mount Vernon, 35 Me. 100) . 
 
 " Clapper v. Waterford, 63 Hun, 
 170 ; 16 N. Y. Supp. 640. See Pitten- 
 ger V. Hamilton, 85 Wise. 356 ; Det- 
 wiler V. Lansing, 95 Mich. 484 ; 55 
 N. W. 361 ; 55 Id. 433 ; Hunter v. 
 Weston, 111 Mo. 176 ; 19 S. W. 1098 ; 
 Austin V. Ritz, 73 Tex. 391; 9 S. W. 
 884. 
 
§ 334aJ 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 S76 
 
 required for use, they shall be placed in a reasonably safe 
 condition.*^ 
 
 § 334a. Obligation dependent on jurisdiction of structure. — 
 
 The fact that the technical fee of a road-bed is not 
 vested in the municipality within which it lies, in no way 
 affects the corporation's responsibility for defects therein,' 
 or its right to prosecute third persons, civilly and criminally, 
 for unlawfully obstructing the highway,^ provided it had legal 
 control and jurisdiction of the structure^ at the time of the 
 injury;* though exclusive control is not essential.^ Where a 
 town has no control of, or right to interfere with, a structure, 
 e.g., a canal-bridge belonging to and built on land of the state, 
 it is not answerable for defects therein, though used by the 
 public as a highway, in continuation of its own streets within 
 its territorial Hmits. The owner's mere acquiescence in such 
 public use of the structure imposes no duty upon the town to 
 
 IS Tritz V. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 632 ; 
 Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Id. 290; 
 Brown v. Glasgow, 57 Id. 157; Craig 
 V. Sedalia, 63 Id. 417. 
 
 ' A city which maintains a side- 
 walk partly on the highway and 
 partly on abutting land, is bound to 
 repair both parts (Jewhurst v. Syr- 
 acuse, 108 N. Y. 303; 15 N. E. 409). 
 s. P., Will V. Mendon [Mich.], 66 N. 
 W. 58 ; Roodhouse v. Christian, 55 
 111. App. 107. The fact that a town- 
 bridge over a street is on the right of 
 way of a railroad company whose 
 duty it is to keep it in repair will not 
 relieve the town (Fowler v. Straw- 
 berry Hill, 74 Iowa, 644 ; 38 N. W. 
 631). 
 
 ' A town has such an interest in 
 the maintenance of its bridges as will 
 sustain a recovery by it for their in- 
 jury or destruction (Bidelman v. 
 State, 110 N. Y. 232 ; 18 N. E. 115 ; 
 Covington v. United States, etc. R. 
 Co., 8 N. Y. App. Div. 223 ; 40 N. 
 Y. Supp.313). s. P. . People V. Van- 
 derbilt, 26 N. Y. 287 ; O'Connor v. 
 
 Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187 ; State v. 
 Atkinson, 24 Vt. 448 ; State v. Mor- 
 ris, etc. R. Co., 23 N. J. Law, 360; 
 People V. Jackson, 7 Mich. 432 ; 
 Shawbut V. St. Paul, etc. R Co., 31 
 Minn. 503 ; Columbus v. Jacques, 30 
 Ga. 506. 
 
 ' A city is not answerable for a 
 defective sidewalk, outside of the 
 limits of a street, and not built by 
 the city, nor under its control (Jew- 
 burst V. Syracuse, 108 N. Y. 303 ; 15 
 N. E. 409). See cases cited under 
 g 356, post. Compare Mansfield v. 
 Moorei 124 111. 133; 16 N. E. 246; 
 Chadron v. Glover, 43 Neb. 733 ; 62 
 N. W. 62. 
 
 ■* The fact that after defendant 
 town's commissionei's were elected, 
 but before the accident, part of the 
 town was incorporated into a city, 
 does not render the city liable for a 
 defective highway (Embler v. Wall- 
 kill, 132 N. Y. 223 ; 80 N. E. 404). 
 See Barton v. McDonald, 81 Cal. 265 ; 
 22 Pac. 855. 
 
 * Cases cited in note 3, supra. 
 
577 HIGHWAYS. [§ 335 
 
 remedy a structural defect therein.* Such a case is to be dis- 
 tinguished from one where the town itself actually appropriates 
 a strip of land belonging to the state within the municipal 
 limits, to the use of a public street, taking charge of it, regu- 
 lating and paving it. It cannot excuse itself for defects therein 
 on the plea that it had not obtained title to the land or 
 legally laid it out as a street,^ or that it did not build the way 
 originally.* 
 
 § 335- Liability pending construction of way. — Responsi- 
 bility for the condition of a highway begins the moment the 
 way is actually opened for public travel,' though the time 
 allowed by statute for its construction may not have expired.^ 
 It is the opening of the road to the public use, and not the 
 expiration of the period allowed for its completion, which 
 determines the commencement of any liability for its unsafe 
 condition. Hence a town is not liable for a defective road, 
 even after the time limited for its completion, provided the 
 public was notified, by barriers or other sufBcient means, that 
 the way was not open for public use.^ Where the making of 
 the entire road is a condition precedent to any part of it 
 
 « Carpenter v. Cohoes, 81 N. Y. 21 ; 58 Wise. 243 ; 14 N. W. 25 ; McDon- 
 
 Veeder v. Little Falls, 100 Id. 343 ; 3 aid v. Ashland, 78 Wise. 351; 47 N. 
 
 N. E. 306. W. 434 ; Kinney v. Tekemah, 30 
 
 ' Sewell V. Cohoes, 75 N. Y. 45 ; Neb. 605 ; 46 N. W. 835 ; Young v. 
 
 distinguishing Albany v. Cunliff, 3 Waterville, 39 Minn. 196 ; 39 N. W. 
 
 Id. 165. See, to the same effect, 97 ; Graham v. Albert Lea, 48 Minn. 
 
 Schemer v. Rochester, 15 Abb. N. 301 ; 50 N. W. 1108 ; Rosedale v. 
 
 Cas. 57 ; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. Golding, 55 Kans. 167 ; 40 Pac. 284 ; 
 
 189. Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kans. 690 ; 
 
 8 Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27 ; 18 Pac. 933. See § 345, post. 
 
 Law V. Kingsley, 82 Hun, 76 ; 31 N. > Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 89 ; 
 
 Y. Supp. 88 ; Lambert v. Pembroke, 2 N. E. 473 ; Seymour v. Salamanca, 
 
 66 N. H. 380; 33 Atl. 81; Flora v. 137 N. Y. 364; 33 N. E. 304. s. p., 
 
 Naney, 136 111. 45; 36 N. E. 645; SeweU v. Cohoes, 75 N. Y. 45; 
 
 Chicago V. Martin, 95 111. 341 ; Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 Id. 37 ; and 
 
 Aurora v. Bitner, 100 Ind. 396 ; Ful- cases cited in notes 4 and 6, § 334, 
 
 ler V. Jackson. 83 Mich. 480 ; 46 N. ante. 
 
 W. 721; Face V. Ionia, 90 Mich. 104 ; « Blaisdell v. Portland, 39 Me. 113 ; 
 
 51 N. W. 184 ; Weber v. Creston, 75 Bradbury v. Benton, 69 Id. 194. See 
 
 Iowa, 16; 39 N. W. 126 ; Shannon v. Bliss v. Deerfleld, 13 Pick. 102. 
 
 Tama City, 74 Iowa, 33 ; 36 N. W. ^ Drury v. Worcester, 31 Pick. 44 ; 
 
 776 ; Chapman v. Milton, 31 W. Va. Lowell v. Moscow, 13 Me. 300. 
 384 ; 7 S. E. 33 ; Hill v. Fond du Lac, 
 [Law of Nbg. Vol. II - 37] 
 
§336] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 578 
 
 becoming a highway, reparable by the public, no liability 
 attaches until the whole road is completed ; and where only a 
 part of it is completed, the district in which such completed 
 part lies is not liable for its non-repair.* 
 
 §336. When obligation ceases. — The obligation of a 
 town to maintain a highway in repair ceases on the discon- 
 tinuance of the road as a highway .^ or on the transfer of 
 the road to, and the assumption of the duty of its repair by, 
 another, under a lawful authority,^ as when a plank-road is laid 
 upon a highway by a private corporation, taking toll. The 
 
 ^ Kex V. Cumberworth, 3 Barn. & 
 Ad. 108. In Pennsylvania, one who 
 obstructs a road approved of by the 
 court, though only partially opened, 
 is liable to the penalty under the 
 statute (Calder v. Chapman, 8 Pa. 
 St. 522). In New York, a highway 
 has not been ' ' opened and worked 
 within six years from the time of its 
 being so laid out," within the mean- 
 ing (L. 1861, eh. 311) unless it has 
 been opened over its entire route, 
 and worked sufficiently to be pass- 
 able for public travel (Beckwith v. 
 Whalen, 70 N. Y. 430). But when 
 about one-half of the length of a road, 
 as laid out, was opened and worked 
 so as to be passable for teams, and 
 was placed in a road district, and 
 the adjoining owners were assessed 
 for labor thereon, held, a highway, 
 though the other half had never 
 been opened or woi-ked (Vandemark 
 V. Porter, 40 Hun, 397). Compare 
 Horey v. Haverstraw, 124 N. Y. 273 ; 
 26 N. E. 582. 
 
 ' And this, although the road, 
 after its discontinuance, was re- 
 Paired by the town surveyor (Tinker 
 V. Russell, 14 Pick. 379 ; and see 
 State v.Broyles, 1 Bailey, Law, 135). 
 Notice of discontinuing a road need 
 not be given under the Vermont 
 statute {Ex parte Bostwick, 1 Aik. 
 316) . In New York, highways dis- 
 
 used for six years cease to be high- 
 ways (L. 1861, ch. 311 ; see Amsbey 
 V. Hinds. 46 Barb. 623 ; Drake v. 
 Eogers, 3 Hill, 604). The statute 
 applies to a street in a village (Ex- 
 celsior Brick Co. v. Haverstraw, 142 
 N. Y. 146; 36 N. E. 819). It does 
 not follow that because a portion of 
 that which was originally laid out 
 as a continuous highway remains 
 such that all of it does. If a part 
 of it cease to be traveled and used 
 for a period of six years, the public 
 in the meantime using some other 
 route, such part is no longer a high- 
 way (Horey v. Haverstraw, 124 N. 
 Y. 373 ; 26 N. E. 532). 
 
 ^ A highway once established does 
 not cease to be such until it has been 
 discontinued by the proper authori- 
 ties ; tlie occupation of it by an in- 
 dividual is a nuisance, and though 
 it continues twenty years, it does 
 not give him title (Driggs v. Phillips, 
 103 N. Y. 77 ; 8 N. E. 514) ; but if 
 such occupation be acquiesced in 
 for twenty years, it will create such 
 a presumption of abandonment by 
 the public authorites as may estop 
 them from prosecuting for obstruct- 
 ing the highway (Hamilton v. State, 
 106 Ind. 364 ; 7 N. E. 9) . As to what 
 will operate as an abandonment of 
 highway, see Peoria v. Johnston, 56 
 111, 45 ; Gilbraith v. Littiech, 73 Id. 
 
579 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§337 
 
 town in which it lies then ceases to be responsible for its defects.^ 
 But in such case, the substitution must be completed before 
 the liability of the town ceases, and, in the meantime, the duty 
 of maintaining the highway rests upon the town/ It is gen- 
 erally held that the erection of a municipality within a town- 
 ship or county ousts, ipso facto, the county or township officers 
 of jurisdiction over existing highways within the corporate 
 limits, and hence terminates its responsibility therefor.^ 
 
 § 337- No common-law duty to repair highways. — At 
 
 common law, no action would lie for an injury caused by the 
 non-repair of a highway.^ The duty of constructing and main- 
 
 310 ; Jeffersonville, etc. R. Co. v. 
 O'Connor, 87 Ind. 95 ; Davies v. 
 Huebner, 45 Iowa, 574 ; Lathrop v. 
 Central, etc. R. Co., 69 Id. 105. As 
 to what will not, see Hughes v. 
 Bingham, 135 N. Y. 347 ; 33 N. E. 
 78; State v. Culver, 65 Mo. 607; 
 Watkins v. Lynch, 71 Cal. 31 ; 11 
 Pac. 808 ; McEose v. Bottyer, 81 Id. 
 133 ; 33 Pac. 393 ; Reilly v. Racine, 
 51 Wise. 536 ; 8 N. W. 417 ; Law- 
 renceburgh v. Wesler, 10 Ind. App. 
 153 ; 37 N. E. 956. A town, bound to 
 keep a road in repair, cannot escape 
 from its obligation by turning over 
 the control of the road to other local 
 authorities (Mechanicsburg v. Mere- 
 dith, 54 111. 84). 
 
 " Davis V. Lamoille Plank Road 
 Co.,37Vt. 603; but compare Reed 
 V. Cornwall, 37 Conn. 48. County 
 commissioners permitted a railroad 
 company to occupy a highway for 
 thirty years, the cuts and fills in 
 some places covering the entire way, 
 and the authorities exercised no 
 supervision over it, and the public 
 did not usually travel it. Held, that 
 a finding that it was abandoned as a 
 highway was justified, and the com- 
 pany should maintain the fences 
 (Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Shanklin, 
 98 Ind. 573). 
 
 ^ Barber v. Essex, 37 Vt. 63 ; and 
 cases cited under § 358, post. 
 
 = Ottawa V. Walker, 21 111. 605 ; 
 Knowles v. Muscatine, 30 Iowa, 248 ; 
 McCuUom V. Blackhawk county, 31 
 Id. 409 ; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 
 410 ; Pope v. Commissioners, etc. , 13 
 Rich. Law (S. C), 407; State v. 
 Jones, 18 Tex. 874 ; and cases cited 
 in note 13, § 334, ante,. Compare 
 O'Kane v. Treat, 25 lU. 458 ; State v. 
 Mainey, 65 Ind. 404 ; Sparling v. 
 Dwenger, 60 Id. 73. 
 
 ' Whitaker's Smith on Negl., 108, 
 and cases cited. More frequently in 
 England than this country, the bur- 
 den of repairing a highway is cast 
 upon a particular person or corpora- 
 tion, by prescription or immemorial 
 usage (Regina v. Birmingham, etc. 
 R. Co., 3 Q. B. 233; Rex v. Eccles- 
 field, 1 Barn. & Ad. 359 ; Rex v. 
 Hendon, 4 Barn. & Ad. 638 ; Rex 
 V. Yorkshire, 3 East, 353, note). 
 Where the lands charged are occu- 
 pied by a person not the owner, such 
 occupier is primarily responsible to 
 the public for the repairs, but may 
 demand reimbursement from the 
 owner (Baker v. Greenfield, 3 Q. B. 
 148). In Massachusetts, a town may 
 become liable by prescription for the 
 repair of a highway, and for an in- 
 
§338] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 580 
 
 taining highways is cast by the statute, either expressly or by 
 necessary implication, upon municipal or $'«««-municipal cor- 
 porations, or upon public officers, or it is assumed by private 
 parties as a condition of the grant of a franchise, such as turn- 
 pikes, plank-roads, etc. If no such duty is expressly or im- 
 pliedly imposed or assumed, there is no liability for its violation.^ 
 
 § 338. Statutory liability for defective ways. — Statutes 
 imposing upon municipal corporations an absolute liability 
 exist in Maine,^ where recovery may be had for an injury 
 through "any defect or want of repair" of any highway; in 
 New Hampshire,^ for damages by reason of " any obstruction, 
 defect, insufficiency or want of repair which renders the high. 
 way unsuitable for travel ; " in Rhode Island,' for injuries to 
 any person by reason of neglect to keep the highway " in 
 
 jury resulting to a traveler from a and oases cited under §§ 8, 256, 381, 
 
 failure to repair (Stockwell v. Fitch- ante. 
 
 burg, 110 Mass. 305). There the ' 3 Rev. Stat. 1883, ch. 18, § 80. 
 
 highway had been re-located ; held No town is liable to a person on foot, 
 
 that the time in which to create lia- for injuries on account of snow or 
 
 bility by prescription did not begin ice on any sidewalk or cross-walk, 
 
 to run until after the re-location of nor on account of its slippery con- 
 
 the highway. dition (lb. § 83). The liability of the 
 
 ^ Monk V. New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. town depends upon its officers hav- 
 
 557; UN. E. 368; People V. Supervis- ing had twenty-four hours' actual 
 
 ors, etc., 93 N. Y. 397; Hill v. Super- 
 visors, etc., 13 Id. 53 ; People v. 
 Commissioners, etc., 7 Wend. 474; 
 Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks, etc. , 
 7 Mass, 160 ; Mower v. Leicester, 9 
 Id. 247 ; Hill v. Boston, 133 Id. 344 ; 
 Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541 ; 
 
 notice of the defect or want of 
 repair causing the injury, and 
 the recovery is limited to $3,000. 
 In case of death resulting from 
 injury, " such sum as the jury 
 may deem reasonable as dam- 
 ages," may be recovered. Liability 
 
 Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475 ; under the statute will not be ex- 
 Reed V. Belfast, 30 Me. 346 ; Ball v. tended by construction (Brown v. 
 Winchester, 33 N. H 435 ; Eastman Skowhegan, 83 Me. 373 ; 19 Atl. 
 V. Meredith, 36 Id. 895 ; Noble v. 
 Richmond, 31 Gratt. 371 ; Hull v. 
 Richmond, 3 Woodb. & M. 337 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Hopkinsville, 7 
 B. Monr. 38 ; Commissioners v. Mar- 
 tin, 4 Mich. 557 ; Fort Smith v. 
 York, 53 Ark. 84; 13 S. W. 157; 
 McGrath v. Bloomer, 73 Wise 39 ; 
 40 N. W. 585; Wilson v. Jefferson 
 county, 13 Iowa, 181 ; Chops v. 
 Eureka, 78 Cal." 588; 21 Pac. 364; 
 
 'Pub. Stat. 1891, ch. 76, §§1-6 
 " The duty of towns in this state, to 
 build and keep in repair roads with- 
 in their limits has long been estab- 
 lished. The most ancient provincial 
 statutes on the subject seem rather 
 to recognize than to create the duty '' 
 (Wheeler v. Troy, 30 N. H. 78). 
 
 3 Gen. Laws, 1896, tit. 10, ch. 73, 
 § 11. See McCloskey v. Moies [R. I.] 
 33 Atl. 235. 
 
58i 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§338 
 
 good repair" and "safe and convenient;" in Connecticut,* 
 for injuries " by means of a defective road or bridge ; " in 
 Wisconsin/ for any damage " by reason of the insufficiency or 
 want of repair of any bridge, sluice-way or road." Similar 
 provisions were contained in the statute of Massachusetts* 
 until 1877, and in that of Vermont^ until 1880. In New Jer- 
 sey,* townships are made liable for " any damage " happening 
 "by means of the insufficiency or want of repairs" of their 
 respective roads and bridges. In New York, every town is 
 declared " liable for all damages to person or property sus- 
 tained by reason of any defect in its highways or bridges. 
 
 -■Gen. Stat. 1888, §267. See Hall v. 
 Norwalk, 65 Conn. 310 ; 32 Atl. 400. 
 
 * Rev Stat. 1878, § 1339, as am- 
 ended, L. 1885, ch. 454. The rem- 
 edy will not be extended by con- 
 struction (Smalley v. Appleton, 75 
 Wise. 18 ; 43 N. W. 826). 
 
 * By the statute in force in 1877, a 
 town's liability for a defect in a 
 highway was limited to cases where 
 it had notice of the particular de- 
 fect, or such defect had existed for 
 twenty-four hours previous to the 
 accident (Mass. Gen. Stat. ch. 44, 
 g 22). Under the statute, the town's 
 liability was absolute, if the de- 
 fects had existed twenty-four hours 
 (Monies v. Lynn, 124 Mass. 165). The 
 present statute gives aright of action 
 for an injury to person or property 
 " through a defect or want of repair, 
 or of sufficient railing in or upon 
 a highway, [etc.], which might have 
 been prevented hy reasonable care 
 and diligence on the part of the 
 county, town," etc., provided it had 
 "reasonable notice of the defect, or 
 might have had notice thereof by 
 the exercise of proper care and dili- 
 gence" (Gen. Stat. ch. 52, § 18 ; L. 
 1888, ch. 114; L. 1891, ch. 170). 
 Recovery cannot exceed one-fifth 
 of one per cent, of the state valua- 
 tion of the town, etc., "nor a 
 greater sum than $4,000 (§ 20). See 
 
 Bowes V. Boston, 155 Mass. 344 ; 29 
 N. E. 633; Harrigan v. Clarksburg, 
 150 Id. 218 ; 22 N. E. 897 ; Rooney v. 
 Randolph, 128 Mass. 580 ; Hayes v. 
 Cambridge, 136 Id. 402 ; s. c. 1-38 Id. 
 461 ; Hansoom v. Boston, 141 Id. 242 ; 
 5 N. E. 249 ; Post v. Boston, 141 
 Mass. 189 ; 4 N. E. 815 ; Olson v. 
 Worcester, 142 Mass. 536 ; 8 N. E. 
 441. 
 
 ■" In 1880, the statute of Vermont 
 which imposed a liability, was re- 
 pealed (L. 1880, No. 62, am'd L. 
 1882, No. 13) ; but it was provided 
 that " this act shall not release 
 towns from liability for damages 
 arising from the insufficiency of 
 any bridge, culvert, or sluice " (Stats. 
 1894, § 3490). There is, therefore, 
 now no statutory liability in Ver- 
 mont for defective highways, ex- 
 cept such parts of them as consist 
 of bridges, culverts and sluices (see 
 Wilkins v. Rutland, 61- Vt. 336; 17 
 Atl. 785 ; Willard v. Sherborne, 59 
 Vt. 361 ; 8 Atl. 735). 
 
 8 Gen. Stat. 1895, p. 2844, pars. 192, 
 194. Townships in certain named 
 counties are excepted from the 
 operation of the statute (lb.). This 
 statute does not give a right of action 
 on account of a defective municipal 
 street (Rahway v. Carter [N. J.], 26 
 Atl. 96), or sidewalk (Dupuy v. 
 Union, 46 N. J. Law, : 
 
§338] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 582 
 
 existing because of the neglect of any commissioner of high- 
 ways of such town;" the town being given a right of action 
 against any commissioner for the amount of any judgment 
 recovered against it for his neglect.^ In South Carolina/" each 
 county is declared liable for any injury or damage through "a 
 defect in the repair of a highway, causeway or bridge," and in 
 West Virginia," damages sustained " by reason of a public road 
 or bridge in a county, or of a street, sidewalk or alley in an 
 incorporated city, village or town, being out of repair," are 
 recoverable against the county, city, village or town in which 
 the road, street, etc., may be : except that incorporated cities, 
 villages and towns are not subject to such liability, unless their 
 charters require them to keep their streets, etc., in repair. In 
 
 « In New York, prior to 1881, towns 
 in their gitasi-corporate character 
 had no control over highways and 
 were not liable for defects therein 
 (People V. Little Valley, 75 N. Y. 
 316; People v. Esopus, 74 Id. 310). 
 All highways, the control of which 
 was not given to, or assumed by, in- 
 corporated cities and villages, were 
 reparable by highway commissioners, 
 who were, of course, liable for their 
 own negligence in the discharge of 
 official duty in that regard (Adsit 
 V. Brady, 4 Hill, 630 ; Garlinghouse 
 V. Jacobs, 29 N. Y. 297 ; "Warren v. 
 Clement, 24 Hun, 472). But by the 
 statute of 1881, the several towns 
 were declared to be liable for all 
 damages to person or property by 
 reason of defective highways or 
 bridges, " in cases in which the com- 
 missioner or commissioners of high- 
 ways of said towns are now liable in 
 law therefor, instead of such com- 
 missioner or commissioners of high- 
 ways" (Laws of 1881, eh. 700, § 1; Gen. 
 Highway Law, §16). This statute has 
 been held not unconstitutional (Bid- 
 well v. Murray, 40 Hun, 190). Under 
 this statute, a town is not liable 
 unless the negligence of the com- 
 missioner was such as would render 
 
 him liable, under the act, to an action 
 over by the town for a recovery had 
 against it (Lane v. Hancock, 142 
 N. Y. 510; 37 N. E. 473). s. P., Waller 
 V. Hebron, 5 N. Y. App. Div. 577 ; 39 
 N. Y. Supp. 381 ; Young v. Macomb, 
 11 N. Y. App. Div. 480; 42 N. Y. 
 Supp. 35. Hence the town is not 
 liable for its commissioner's em- 
 ployee, injured while engaged in re- 
 pairing a road (Robinson v. Fowler, 
 80 Hun, 101; 30 N. Y. Supp. 25). See 
 generally, Ivory v. Deerpark, 116 
 N. Y. 476 ; 23 N. E. 1080 ; Monk v. 
 New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. 552; 11 N. E. 
 268; Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 
 392; People v. Supervisors, 93 Id. 397; 
 Bidwell V. Murray, 40 Hun, 190 ; 
 Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645 [lead- 
 ing case]. The statute applies to ob- 
 structions placed in the highway as 
 well as to acts of physical disturbance 
 or injury to the bed of the roadway 
 (Whitney v. Ticonderoga, 127 N. Y. 
 40 ; 27 N. E. 403). 
 
 '» Rev. Stat. 1893, | 1169. 
 
 " Code, 1891, ch. 43, § 53. See 
 Biggs V. Huntington, 33 W. Va. 55 ; 
 9 S. E. 51 ; Chapman v. Milton, 31 
 W. Va. 384 ; 7 S. E. 22 ; Phillips v. 
 County Court, 31 W. Va. 477 ; 7 S. 
 E. 427. 
 
583 HIGHWAYS. [§ 339 
 
 Michigan,'^ each township, village, city or corporation, whose 
 corporate authority extends over highways, and whose duty it 
 is to keep the same in good repair, is liable for an injury " by 
 reason of the neglect to keep such public highways, etc., in 
 good repair, and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for 
 travel." It has been held in Maine,^^ New Hampshire," Massa- 
 chusetts '^ and Connecticut,*^ that under their statutes towns are 
 liable only for injuries suffered by persons using the highway, 
 and not for damages sustained in consequence of not being 
 able to use it, nor in consequence of not being able to use it 
 without additional trouble. 
 
 § 339. Implied liability for defective ways.— In states which 
 do not impose a liability by statute, the liability of municipal 
 corporations proper, for injuries from defects in their highways, 
 is held to be necessarily implied on a construction of their 
 respective charters, or some general statute, by which they are 
 either expressly required to maintain their highways in a rea- 
 sonable state of repair, or else are authorized to build and 
 maintain them, and are given exclusive control of them, to- 
 gether with power to raise money for that purpose.* In a few 
 states, ^««.y2'-corporations, like counties, townships and road- 
 districts, are likewise held impliedly liable, under similar 
 impositions of duty and grants of power, the question being, 
 in each case, determinable 'on a construction of some general 
 or particular statute. Having elsewhere considered the sub- 
 ject generally, it is unnecessary to pursue it further here.^ 
 
 '« Howell's Stats. §§ 1442-45. The " The remedy is for " travelers " 
 
 statute applies to defects in con- only (McCarthy v. Portland, 67 Me. 
 
 struction as well as neglect to repair, 167 ; Eeed v. Belfast, 20 Id. 248 ; 
 
 and requires safety by night as well Sandford v. Augusta, 33 Id. 536 ; 
 
 as by day (Sebert v. Alpena, 78 Mich. Weeks v. Shirley, 33 Id. 371). 
 
 165; 43 N. W. 1098). A city is "Ball v. Winchester, 33 N. H. 435; 
 
 liable under the statute, though its Griffen v. Sanbornton, 44 Id. 246. 
 
 charter does not impose on it the " garwood v. Lowell, 4 Gush. 310; 
 
 duty of keeping its walks in repair, Smith v. Dedham. 8 Id. 533 ; Brailey 
 
 or authorize it to levy a tax for that v. Southborough, 6 Id. 141 ; Holman 
 
 purpose (Campbell v. Kalamazoo, 80 v. Townsend, 13 Mate. 297. 
 
 Mich. 655 ; 45 N. "W. 653). See South- " Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475. 
 
 well V. Detroit, 74 Mich. 438 ; 43 N. Otherwise, under the Rhode Island 
 
 W. 118 ; Quinlan v. Manistique, 85 statute (Williams v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 
 
 Mich. 22 ; 48 N. W. 173 ; Sharp v. 447). 
 
 Evergreen, 67 Mich. 443 ; 35 N. W. ' See cases cited under § 389, anU. 
 
 67, [state road]. ' See §§ 356, 257, anU. 
 
§34o] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 584 
 
 § 340. Liability of road-officers. — The duties of road-offi- 
 cers are prescribed by statute in general but comprehensive 
 terms ; and for a breach of duty, they are usually declared to 
 be subject to indictment ^ and punishment, usually by a fine. 
 They are not bound of common right to repair the roads 
 under their charge.^ Outside of the statute, by which their 
 duties are prescribed, they have no authority, and are under 
 no obligation to the public ; ' and when a highway is out of 
 
 ' So in Tennessee (State v. Barks- 
 dale, 5 Humph. 154 ; Hill v. State, 4 
 Sneed, 443) . In South Carolina, the 
 whole board of commissioners, and 
 not one alone, should be indicted, in 
 case of neglect to repair highways 
 (State V. Chappell, 2 Hill[S. C], 391. 
 See State v. Broyles, 1 Bailey Law, 
 134). In Alabama, a remedy for in- 
 juries, sustained by reason of de- 
 fects in highways, is given on the 
 bond of the contractors, or in case 
 of no bond, against the county 
 (Code, ^ 1208). And the corporate 
 officers of incorporated towns and 
 cities are indictable for a misde- 
 meanor, if streets are out of repair 
 more than ten days (Code, § 1175). 
 In North Carolina (Code, § 1054), 
 willful neglect of duties is a mis- 
 demeanor (see State v. Miller, 100 
 N. C. 543 ; 5 S. E. 925). In Missouri, 
 overseers of highways are required 
 to spend in the repair of roads all 
 the money coming into their hands, 
 and are liable for the amount of 
 damages caused by neglect, after 
 having notice " (Gen. Stat. 296, § 4G). 
 In North Carolina, overseers, for 
 neglect to keep roads and bridges 
 clear and in repair, are subject to 
 forfeiture, and ' ' liable for such dam- 
 ages as may be sustained" (Rev. 
 Code, 537, ch. 101, ^ 21 ; see Hath- 
 away v. Hinton, 1 Jones' Law, 243 ; 
 Kinsey v. Jones, 8 Id. 186). In Ohio, 
 supervisors are liable to a fine for 
 neglect to perform the duties of 
 their office (3 Eev. Stat. 1316, § 40). 
 
 So in Mississippi (Code, § 253), and 
 in Delaware (Rev. Code, 178, § 32) . 
 In Georgia, overseers, for neglect to 
 repair roads, are subject to fine, and 
 action for damages at the suit of 
 any person injured by such neglect 
 (Cobb's Stat. 500, ^ 4 ; 504, § 6). In 
 New York, overseers of highways 
 are subject to penalties for neglect 
 of duty, recoverable by highway 
 commissioners (L. 1890, ch. 568, S;§ 
 22, 23). In Illinois, each supervisor 
 is " to cause all the public roads in 
 his district to be kept well cleared, 
 smooth, and in good repair," and, 
 for failure to do so, is liaVJe to indict- 
 ment (1 lU. Rev. Stat. 562, § 14). In 
 Indiana, nearly the same statute 
 exists (see Lynn v. Adams, 3 Ind. 
 143 ; State v. Hogg, 5 Ind. 515). In 
 Iowa, supervisors notified in writing 
 that any bridge or other portion of 
 the public road is unsafe or impass- 
 able, are liable for all damages 
 resulting after a reasonable time 
 (Iowa Laws, 144, g 902). In Mary- 
 land, supervisors are liable for ne- 
 glect or malfeasance to indictment 
 and fine (1 Rev. Code, p. 610, g§ 1, 
 15, 17). 
 
 ' State V. Halifax, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 
 Law, 345. See People v. Ulster Co. 
 93 N. Y. 397; Monk v. New Utrecht, 
 104 Id. 553 ; 11 N. E. 268. 
 
 2 Austin V. Carter, 1 Mass. 231 ; 
 Winslow V. Pleasant Prairie,16 Wise. 
 613; Worden v. Witt [Idaho] 39 Pac. 
 1114. 
 
585 HIGHWAYS. [§ 340 
 
 repair, they can take only such measures for repairing it as are 
 pointed out by the statute ;* they cannot repair a way at their 
 own expense, and then call upon the public for an indemnity ;' 
 nor, without statute authority, can they contract a debt for the 
 town to enable them to make needed repairs.^ Unless, as in 
 some states, they are expressly declared to be liable in dam- 
 ages for the unsafe condition of their roads, their liability can 
 be founded only upon some negligent act or omission." If such 
 an officer has no funds, or has inadequate funds, and no means 
 of obtaining any more, he cannot be said to be guilty of neg- 
 ligence in not doing a work which requires the expenditure of 
 money. He owes no duty to any one to undertake more than 
 the funds in his hands will pay for, and he may exercise a dis- 
 cretion as to what repairs he will undertake to make with such 
 funds as he has ; ^ he is not responsible for an error of judg- 
 ment in applying deficient funds to repairs less urgently needed 
 than others,' nor for such mistakes as selecting unsuitable tim- 
 ber for repairing a bridge.'" Under the principle already 
 stated, road officers are not the superiors of their subordinates 
 or employees, so as to be liable for their negligent acts, within 
 the scope of their employment." Like every agent, he is lia- 
 
 '■ Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343. quired by statute to maintain the 
 
 5 Jones V. Lancaster, 4 Pick. 149; roads " in as good repair as the means 
 "Wood V. Waterville, 5 Mass. 294; at his command will permit" (3 
 Winslow T. Mt. Pleasant, 16 Wise. Gen. Laws, 6535, § 15). 
 
 613. » Monk v. New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. 
 
 6 People V. Ulster Co., 93 N. Y. 557 ; 11 N. E. 268. 
 
 397 ; Van Alstyne v. Freeday 41 Id. "> Loar v. Heinz, 28 111. App. 584. 
 177 ; Barker v. Loomis, 6 Hill, 463. " Hall v. Smith, 3 Bing. 156 ; and 
 
 ' Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113 ; cases cited imder | 319, ante. The 
 
 Nowellv.Wright, 3Allen, 166; Com- relative and respective duties of 
 
 missioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; commissioners, and of overseers, of 
 
 Tearney v. Smith, 86 111. 391. An highways in New York are stated 
 
 action may be maintained against in Farman v. Ellington, 46 Hun, 41. 
 
 one of several highway commission- See also Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns, 
 
 ers for an act of negligence imput- 439 ; Smith v. Wright, 37 Barb. 621; 
 
 able to all (Babcock v. Gifford, 29 McFadden v. Kingsbury, 11 Wend. 
 
 Hun, 186). See Boots v. Washburn, 667 ; Day v. Day, 94 N. Y. 159 ; Ho- 
 
 79 N. Y. 207 [must be sued in name ver v. Berkoff, 44 Id. 113 ; Bostwick 
 
 of oflfice]. ^- Barlow, 14 Hun, 177 ; Babcock v. 
 
 8 Case? cited under § 367, post. Gifford, 29 Id. 186 ; Maxim v. Cham- 
 
 In California, the road-master is re- pion, 50 Hun, 88 ; 4 N. Y. Supp. 515. 
 
343] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 586 
 
 ble for acts outside the scope of his authority, whether done 
 by himself,'^ or by his authority." 
 
 § 341. Contract obligations to repair. — One who contracts 
 with the public authorities to keep in repair a highway, canal, 
 or other public work, is liable to any one who is especially 
 injured by his failure to perform his contract, or his negligent 
 performance thereof.' Contracting to have the work done will 
 not absolve the corporation from its primary liability.^ Both 
 the contractor and the corporation are liable for a failure to 
 repair, as contracted for, the latter only after notice of the 
 defective condition of the highway.^ 
 
 § 342. [consolidated with § 359.] 
 
 § 343- Obligations of abutting owners as to highway. — 
 
 No obligation rests upon the dedicator of a way to improve or 
 repair it. The public adopting a way dedicated to its use must 
 take it in statu quo^ and the duty of adapting it to safe public 
 
 '- The owner of tlie fee in a high- 
 way can recover damages for the re- 
 moval of soil therefrom by the road 
 officers for the purpose of mending 
 the road elsewhere, when such re- 
 moval was not required to reduce 
 the surface to the proper grade 
 (Ladd V. French, 53 Hun, 635, mem. ; 
 6 N. Y. Supp. 56). Compare Wolf V. 
 Holton, 61 Mich. 5.50 ; 28 N. W. 534 ; 
 Cockrura v. Williamson, 53 Ark. 
 131; 18 S. W. 593. 
 
 '^ Where commissioners undertake 
 (abandoning the method prescribed 
 by charter for repairs) to carry out 
 the work by means of a committee 
 and superintendent, they cease to act 
 as officers exercising judicial and 
 legislative powers, and become liable 
 individually for injuries received by 
 a workman through their negligence 
 (Robinson v. Eohr, 73 Wise. 486 ; 40 
 N. W. 668). See Parks v. Greenville, 
 44 S. C. 168 ; 21 S. E. 540; Butler v. 
 Ashworth, 102 Cal. 663; 36 Pac. 
 922. 
 
 ' Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N. 
 
 Y. 389 ; Fulton Fire Ins. Co. v. Bald- 
 win, 37 Id. 648 ; Brooklyn v. Brook- 
 lyn, etc. R. Co., 47 Id. 475; McMahon 
 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 75 Id. 231; 
 Phillips V. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 
 St. 197 ; Kollock v. Madison, 84 Wise. 
 458 ; 54 N. W. 735 ; Weymouth v. 
 New Orleans, 40 La. Ann. 844 ; 4 So. 
 318 ; and cases cited under § 335, 
 ante. 
 
 '' Cases cited under §§176, 298, 
 ante. 
 
 " Union E. Co. v. Stone, 54 Kans. 
 88 ; 37 Pac. 1012 ; Bentley v. Atlanta, 
 93 Ga. 623 ; 18 S. E. 1013 ; Byrne v. 
 Syracuse, 79 Hun, 555, 39 N. Y. Supp. 
 912 ; and cases cited under § 845, 
 post. In Georgia, if a bond is not 
 required from a bridge-contractor 
 (Code, § 691) the county is liable for 
 injuries occasioned by a defect in 
 the bridge, of which it had notice 
 (Dekalb county v. Cook, 97 Ga. 415 ; 
 34 S. E. 157). 
 
 ' Thus, where a highway was 
 raised several feet above the level as 
 it stood when the defendant's house 
 
58; 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§343 
 
 travel is upon the public, and not upon the dedicator.^ The 
 owner, much less a mere occupant,^ of land fronting on a high- 
 way owes no duty, as such, to repair any part of the highway, 
 or otherwise make it safe for travel;* and it is immaterial that 
 it was originally built by him, if subsequently adopted by the 
 municipality.^ It is not competent for a city to transfer to a 
 lot-owner, by ordinance, its own duty in regard to the safety 
 of its streets, so as to make him liable to individuals for injuries 
 caused by a defective street in front of his premises,^ or, on the 
 
 was built, and the defendant bi-idged 
 over the space between the highway 
 and the upper story with gratings, 
 which were used by the public as 
 part of the highway, held, that he 
 was not liable for the non-repair of 
 such gratings. It was the duty of 
 the parish to keep them in repair 
 (Bobbins v. Jones, ]5 C. B. N. S. 231. 
 243). s. P., Fisher v. Prowse, 2 Best 
 & S. 770 ; Mercer v. Woodgate, L. R. 
 5 Q. B. 36 ; Arnold v. Blaker, L. R. 
 (5 Q. B. 433 ; Arnold v. Holbrook, L. 
 R. 8 Q. B. 96 ; Foxworthy v. Hast- 
 ings, 25 Neb. 133; 41 N. W. 133 
 [sidewalk from street to hotel set 
 back from street-line ten feet ; city 
 liable for defects therein]. 
 
 ' State V. Society, etc., 44 N. J. 
 Law, 503. In that case, an abutting 
 owner who had dedicated a way 
 through his premises, accepted by 
 the public authorities, was indicted 
 for a dangerous excavation on his 
 land near the highway, existing be- 
 fore and continued since the dedica- 
 tion. Indictment quashed, but query, 
 whether it would not have been good 
 if the highway had not been acquired 
 by condemnation. 
 
 3 Avery v. Syracuse, 29 Hun, 537. 
 The common-law rule that an occu- 
 pant of land next adjoining to a 
 highway who encloses his land on 
 both sides, and so prevents a traveler 
 from going on it, when the highway 
 becomes impassable or even danger- 
 ous or inconvenient, was bound, so 
 
 long as his enclosure lasted, to keep 
 the highway in good order (Rex v. 
 Flecknow, 1 Burr. 461; 3 Salk. 183; 
 Regina v. Ramsden, El. B. & El. 949 ; 
 explaining Duncombe's Case, Cro. 
 Car. 366) does not prevail in this 
 country (Waller v. MoCormick, 47 
 N. J. Law, 397 ; 1 Atl. 516). 
 
 " Moore v. Gadsden, 93 N. Y. 13 ; 
 Rochester v. Campbell, 133 Id. 405 ; 
 25 N. E. 937; Fulton v. Tucker, 3 
 Hun, 539 ; Law v. Kingsley, 82 Id. 
 76 ; 81 N. Y. Supp. 88 ; Kerby v. 
 Boylston Market Asso., 14 Gray, 249 ; 
 State V. Gorham, 37 Me. 457 ; Char- 
 tiers, etc. Turnpike Co. v. Nester 
 [Penn.], 7 Atl. 163 ; Vandyke v. Cin- 
 cinnati, 1 Disney [Ohio], 533 ; Grid- 
 ley V. Bloomington, 88 111. 554 ; 
 Taylor v. Lake Shore, etc. E. Co., 
 45 Mich. 74 ; 7 N. W. 738 ; Sommers 
 V. Marshfield, 90 Wise. 59 ; 63 N. W. 
 937 ; Betz v. Limingi, 46 La. Ann. 
 1113 ; 15 So. 385 ; Jansen v. Atchison, 
 16 Kans. 358 ; Topeka v. Sherwood, 
 39 Id. 690; 18 Pac 933; Norton v. 
 St. Louis, 97 Mo. 537 ; 11 S. W. 343. 
 The fact that an abutter makes use of 
 a public pump in front of his pre- 
 mises, casts on him no liability for 
 ice formed from water dripping from 
 the pump (Eckhart v. Wickwire, 87 
 Ind. 77). 
 
 * Cases cited in note 8, § 334a, ante. 
 
 « Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 
 535 ; Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 
 456 ; Kerby V. Boylston Market Asso., 
 14 Gray, 349 ; Moore v. Gadsden, 93 
 
§343] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 588 
 
 Other hand, to make him liable over to the city for damages 
 paid by it, at the suit of the injured person.'^ Subject to con- 
 stitutional limitations, it is competent for the legislature to lay 
 upon lot-owners or occupiers the duty to keep their adjacent 
 sidewalks in repair and free from ice and snow, and to enforce 
 obedience by fines and penalties,^ and even, as in some states, 
 to impose a liability to private actions for injuries from such 
 defects, or to the city for such damages as it may have been 
 compelled to pay the injured person.' But such statutes will 
 be construed strictly in favor of the lot-owner.*" The extent 
 of his obligation, with reference to adjacent highways, is to use 
 and keep his own premises so as not to render such highways 
 unsafe for ordinary travel, culpably failing in which he is liable 
 
 N. Y. 13 [water fi'om roof froze on 
 sidewalk] ; Law v. Kingsley, 82 
 Hun, 76 ; 31 N. Y. Supp. 88 ; Flynn 
 V. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312; Norton 
 V. St. Louis, 97 Mo. 537 ; 11 S. W. 
 342 ; Eustace v. Jahns, 38 Cal. 3 ; and 
 cases cited under § 13a, ante. 
 
 ■" Keokuk V. Dist. of Keokuk, 53 
 Iowa, 353 ; 5 N. W. 589 ; Chicago v. 
 Crosby, 111 III. 538 ; Woodard v. 
 Boscobel, 84 Wise. 236; 54 N. W. 333. 
 
 " In Pennsylvania, borough au- 
 thorities have power to impose upon 
 lot-owners the duty of relaying and 
 repairing sidewalks at their own ex- 
 pense (Smith V. Kingston, 130 Pa. St. 
 357 [action for fine] ; Wilkinsburg v. 
 Home for Aged Women, 131 Pa. 109 ; 
 18 Atl. 937). On the other hand, it 
 is held in Illinois that an ordinance 
 imposing a fine upon lot-owners for 
 not removing snow from their adja- 
 cent sidewalks is invalid. (Gridley 
 V. Bloomington, 88 111. 554). Fol- 
 lowed, Cliicago V. O'Brien, 111 111. 
 533). In Minnesota, a city charter's 
 provision that lot-owners "shall be 
 liable from damages to whomsoever 
 resulting from their default or evi- 
 dent neglect in not keeping [their 
 adjacent sidewalks] in good repair," 
 etc., is not constitutional (Noonan v. 
 
 Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198 ; 33 N. W. 
 444). It is generally held that ordi- 
 nances imposing a fine or penalty 
 are within granted police powers 
 (Matter of Goddard, 16 Pick. 504 ; 
 Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456 ; 
 Rochester v. Campbell, 128 N. T. 
 405 ; 35 N. E. 937 ; Moore v. Gads- 
 den, 93 N. Y. 13; Knupfle v. Knicker- 
 bocker Ice Co., 84 Id. 488 ; Reed v. 
 New York, 31 Hun, 311 ; Paxson 
 V. Sweet, 13 N. J. Law, 196; Bonsall v. 
 Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 418 ; Mayor, etc. 
 V. Maberry, 6 Humph. 368 ; Wash- 
 ington V. Nashville, 1 Swan, 177 ; 
 Whyte V. Nashville, 3 Id. 364). 
 
 ' So in Michigan (Lynch v. Hub- 
 bard, 101 Mich. 43 ; 59 S. W. 443 ; 
 Gavitt V. Jackson, Mich. ; 67 
 N. W. 517; Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 
 Id. 80), and in Wisconsin (Hiner v. 
 Fond du Lac, 71 Wise. 74 ; 36 N. W. 
 633 ; Morton v. Smith, 48 Wise. 365 ; 
 4 N. W. 330 ; Cooper v. Waterloo, 88 
 Wise. 433 ; 60 N. W. 714 ; Fife v. 
 Oshkosh, 89 Wise. 540; 63 N. W. 
 541 ; Sommers v. Marshfield, 90 
 Wise. 59 ; 63 N. W. 937 ; Toutloff 
 V. Green Bay, 91 Wise. 490 ; 65 N. 
 W. 169). 
 
 " Cases cited in last two notes. 
 
589 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§343 
 
 to travelers thereon." One who makes, and leaves unprotected, 
 an excavation on his land near a highway, so that a passer-by, 
 using ordinary care, falls into it ; ^^ or one who permits a ruinous 
 wall or other structure to remain after the lapse of a reasonable 
 time to repair or remove it, so that it falls on a traveler in the 
 street ; '' or one who neglects to take ordinary and reasonable 
 
 " Swords V. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28 
 Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 Id. 65 
 Wenzlick v. McCotter, 87 Id. 122 
 Ahern v. Steele, 115 Id. 203 ; 23 N. 
 E. 193. A lot-owner who, with con- 
 sent of the city, constructed a vault 
 under the sidewalk in front of his 
 lot, is not answerable to travelers, ex- 
 cept for actual negligence on his part 
 (Babbage v. Powers, 130 N.Y. 281; 39 
 N. E. 132). Otherwise, if constructed 
 without authority (Barry v. Ter- 
 kildsen, 72 Gal. 254; 13 Pac. 657). 
 A complaint alleging that defendant 
 allowed snow or ice to melt on her 
 premises, the water from which 
 flowed over the adjacent sidewalk, 
 and froze, rendering the walk icy, 
 by reason of which plaintiff was 
 injured, Held, bad, on demurrer 
 (Brown v. "Wysong, 1 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 423 ; 37 N. Y. Supp. 381). In 
 Bennett v. Kelly (132 Pa. St. 218 ; 19 
 Atl. 69), plaintiff was injured by 
 slipping on the sidewalk and strik- 
 ing, in falling, his hand on a pointed 
 iron fence about four feet high, 
 erected by defendant to protect his 
 area-way and the front of his house. 
 Held, defendant was not liable. S. p. , 
 Garland v. Towne, 55 N. H. 55 [snow 
 falling from roof] ; Smethurst v. 
 Cong. Church, 148 Mass. 201 ; 19N. E. 
 387 [same]; Kerby v. Boylston Market 
 Asso. , 14 Gray, 249 ; Salisbury v. 
 Herschenroder, 106 Mass. 458 [swing- 
 ing sign over sidewalk blown down] ; 
 Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Id. 
 251 [snow falling from roof] ; Walsh 
 V. Mead, 8 Hun, 387 [snow falling 
 from roof which had no snow-guard ; 
 
 abutter liable] ; Hannem v. Pence, 40 
 Minn. 127 ; 41 N. W. 657 [snow from 
 roof]. A telegraph company sus- 
 pended wires to a chimney of a 
 house, causing it to fall into the 
 street. As the owner of the bouse 
 had allowed the wire causing danger 
 to the chimney to remain for some 
 time, he was held liable (Gray v. 
 Boston Gaslight Co., 114 Mass. 149). 
 In Tarry v. Ashton (1 Q. B. Div. 314), 
 a heavy lamp had been suspended by 
 a private owner over a highway in 
 such a way as to be dangerous to the 
 public. Held, that he was bound to 
 make the overhanging lamp abso- 
 lutely safe for travelers passing by 
 beneath it, and was liable for its 
 faU. See Durgin v. Neal, 82 Cal. 
 595 ; 33 Pac. 133 ; and cases cited 
 under §§ 703, 703, post. 
 
 '^ Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. 
 Co., 4 Hurlst. & N. 67 ; Coupland v. 
 Hardingham, 3 Camp. 398 ; Barnes 
 V. Ward, 9 C. B. 393 ; Hadley v. Tay- 
 lor, L. R. 1 C. P. 53 ; Beck v. Carter, 
 68 N. Y. 383 ; Victory v. Baker, 67 
 Id. 366 ; Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill, 200 ; 
 Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 151 ; 
 Haughey v. Hart, 63 Iowa, 96 ; 17 
 N. W. 189 [unguarded well]. S. P., 
 Young V. Harvey, 16 Ind. 314. 
 
 isRegina v. Watts, 1 Salk. 357 . 
 Cliurch of Ascension v. Buckhart, 3 
 Hill, 193 [part of wall left standing 
 after a fire] ; Mullen v. St. John, 57 
 N. Y. 569 ; Lowell v. Spaulding, 4 
 Cush. 277 ; Oakham v Holbrook, 11 
 Id. 299. In Murray v. McShane, (53 
 Md. 217), plaintiff", passing along the 
 street, stopped on the door sill of de- 
 
§345] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 590 
 
 precautions to prevent the falling into the street of a building 
 in the course of erection," is, in each case, liable for the injury 
 proximately caused to the traveler, provided negligence is 
 
 shown. '^ 
 
 §344. [omitted] 
 
 § 345- Joint and several liability for defective way. — The 
 
 obligation to repair may be, and frequently is, imposed upon 
 two or more towns or counties — as, for example, the repair of 
 a bridge which spans a stream dividing two towns. In such 
 case (depending, of course, on a true construction of the 
 statute imposing the duty ' ), the towns are severally, as well as 
 jointly, liable for its non-repair,^ whether the defect which 
 caused the injury was within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
 
 fendant's house, fronting on the 
 street, for the purpose of adjusting 
 his shoe, and while thus occupied, 
 his head being within tlie line of the 
 street, a brick fell upon his head 
 from the wall of the house, which 
 was in a ruinous condition. Held, 
 owner was liable. 
 
 '* Vincett- v. Cook, 4 Hun, 318. 
 
 15 Negligence must be shown to 
 warrant a recovery (Mahoney v. Lib- 
 bey, 123 Mass. 30: Gray v. Harris, 
 107 Id. 493; ScuUin v. Dolan, 4 Daly, 
 163 ; Cross v. Koster, 17 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 403 ; 45 N. Y. Supp. 315 ; Kirk- 
 patrick v. Knapp, 28 Mo. App. 427). 
 
 ' See Lapham v. Rice, 55 N. Y. 472, 
 478 ; Theall v. Yonkers, 31 Hun, 265 ; 
 Hawxhurst v. New York, 43 Id. 588. 
 
 ' Eeid V. New Y'ork, 139 N. Y. 534; 
 34 N. B. 1103 ; affl'g 68 Hun, 110 ; 
 23 N. Y. Supp. 633 ; Shaw t. Madrid, 
 UN. Y. App. Div. 508 ; 43 N. Y. 
 Supp. 779; Lane v. Syracuse, 13 N. Y. 
 App Div. 118; 43 N. Y. Supp. 219 
 [action against city and railroad 
 company jointly]. A railroad com- 
 pany from whose tank water drips 
 on the sidewalk and forms ice, is 
 liable to persons injured by slipping 
 thereon ; the liability is not wholly 
 
 on the city (Thuringer v. N. Y. Cen- 
 tral B. Co., 82 Hun, 33 ; 31 N. Y. 
 •Supp. 419). See cases cited in note 
 8, § 334, ante; Peoria v. Simpson, 
 110 111. 294 [city and lot-owner] ; 
 Peckham v. Burlington, Brayt. (Vt.) 
 134 [two towns]. Where the duty 
 of two towns to build a bridge is 
 joint and not several, either may re 
 build, on the refusal of the other to 
 join, and sue the other for contribu- 
 tion (Day V. Day, 94 N. Y. 153) . The 
 expense of keeping a bridge in re- 
 pair being imposed by statute upon 
 several towns and a railroad com- 
 pany jointly, with a provision that 
 one of the towns should have the 
 care and superintendence of it, 
 held, the company could not re- 
 cover against the latter town for a 
 defect in the bridge (Maiden, etc. E. 
 Co. V. (;harlestown, 8 Allen, 245). 
 The fact that a railroad company 
 has built a bridge over a public 
 crossing (as required by statute) does 
 not relieve the city from its duty to 
 keep such bridge in a safe con- 
 dition for public travel (Tierney v. 
 Troy, 41 Hun, 120 ; People v. Brook- 
 lyn, 65 N. Y. 349 ; Bryant v. Ran- 
 dolph, 133 Id. 70 ; 30 N. E. 657). 
 
591 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§346 
 
 one or the other.^ Where several persons are concerned in 
 the creation of an unauthorized obstruction in a highway, they 
 are jointly and severally liable for the entire damages proxi- 
 mately caused thereby.* 
 
 § 346. Defects in way concurring with other causes. — 
 
 It is settled in Maine,' Massachusetts,^ New Hampshire'' and 
 Rhode Island* that a person cannot be said to be injured " by 
 reason of " or " through " a defect in a highway, as those words 
 are used in their respective statutes, if any other cause contrib- 
 uted to the injury, e g. the unlawful or careless act of a 
 stranger or a culpable defect in premises adjoining the place of 
 the accident.^ The same interpretation is given to the Michi- 
 gan statute ;* and the rule appears to have been adopted in 
 
 ' Hawxhurst v. New York, 43 Hun, 
 588. There held that defendant 
 county was severally liable for the 
 failure of the joint contractor of 
 itself and adjoining county to place 
 barriers on a bridge approach in the 
 adjoining county ; the duty relating 
 to the whole structure, including 
 bridge approaches at both ends. 
 
 * Cases cited under §§ 31, 120 and 
 128, ante. 
 
 ' Moulton V. Sanford, 51 Me. 127 ; 
 Perkins v. Fayette, 68 Id. 152; 
 Farrar v. Greene, 32 Id. 574. 
 
 2 Shepherd v. Chelsea, 4 Allen, 113 
 [boys coasting on road] ; Alger v. 
 Lowell, 3 Id. 403 [plaintiff crowded 
 off unrailed sidewalk] ; Palmer v. 
 Andover, 2 Cush. 600 ; Kidder v. 
 Dunstable, 7 Gray, 104 ; Richards v. 
 Enfield, 13 Id. 344 ; Eowell v. Lowell, 
 7 Id. 100. In Flagg v.- Hudson 
 (142 Mass. 280; 8 N. E. 42), one 
 driving a buggy turned aside to 
 avoid contact with a hack, but, 
 in consequence of a defect in the 
 highway, could not turn suffi- 
 ciently, and a collision ensued. 
 Held, that in the absence of negli- 
 gence on the part of the hack- 
 driver, the defect was the sole cause 
 of the injury, and the town was 
 liable, s. P., Bourget v. Cambridge, 
 
 159 Maes. 388 ; 34 N. E. 455 ; Yeaw 
 v. Williams. 15 E. I. 20. See cases 
 cited under § 350, post. 
 
 * Lavery v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 
 444 [unfenced cellarway] ; Palmer 
 V. Portsmouth, 43 Id. 365. "It 
 makes no difference whether tl;e 
 injury was caused by the act of 
 Providence, by inevitable accident 
 or by the negligent or malicious act 
 of man, or all these combined, if the 
 town could not have had notice of 
 it, or could not have remedied it 
 before the accident " (Chamberlain 
 v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356 [pile of lum- 
 ber on adjacent premises frighten- 
 ing horse on highway]). 
 
 * Where one was compelled, in 
 consequence of B's violation of 
 the law of the road, to drive 
 upon the side of the road, and 
 was injured by colliding with a post 
 standing close to the traveled car- 
 riage-way, held, the wrongful act 
 of B. was the proximate cause of 
 the injury (Mahogany v. Ward, 16 
 E. L 479 ; 17 Atl. 860 ; S. P., Yeaw v. 
 Williams, 15 E. I. 20 ; 33 Atl. 33). 
 
 ' Lavery v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 
 444. 
 
 * Hembling v. Grand Rapids, 99 
 Mich. 392, 58 N. W. 310. 
 
§346] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 592 
 
 Iowa, though it has no similar statutes to interpret.'' In 
 Vermont* and Connecticut,' the share of a stranger in produc- 
 ing the injury, if merely negligent, is not to be considered ; 
 and this doctrine is accepted by all courts, when not embar- 
 rassed by statutory interpretation.'" The general rule in all 
 states, is, that where two causes combine to produce an 
 injury to a traveler upon a highway, both of which are in their 
 nature proximate — the one being a culpable defect in the 
 highway, and the other some occurrence for which neither 
 party is responsible — the municipality is liable, provided the 
 injury would not have been sustained but for such defect ; " 
 otherwise is it exempt." Municipalities are not bound to 
 
 ' De Camp v. Sioux City, 74 Iowa, 
 893; 37 N. W. 971 [one driving 
 along a street, attempted to turn out 
 for butcher's team approaching at 
 unlawful speed, but was unable to 
 do so on account of streetcar track 
 being out of repair, and was thrown 
 out ; city not liable]. 
 
 8 See Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411. 
 
 ' See Baldwin v. Greenwood Turn- 
 pike Co., 40 Conn. 238 ; Ward v. 
 North Haven, 43 Id. 148. 
 
 "> A city is liable for negligently 
 maintaining an obstruction in a 
 street, whether created by a public 
 or private agency (Pettengill v. 
 Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 558 ; 22 N. E. 
 1095 ; Kunz v. Troy, 104 N. Y. 344 ; 
 10 N. E. 443 ; Bullock v. New York, 
 99 N. Y. 654 ; Todd v. Troy, 61 Id. 
 506; Tiers v. New York, 74 Hun, 
 453 ; 36 N. Y. Supp. 688 ; Bunch v. 
 Edenton, 90 N. C. 431 ; Centerville 
 V. Woods, 57 Ind. 193 ; Elkhart v. 
 Ritter, 66 Id. 186 ; Senhenn v. 
 Evansville, 140 Ind. 679; 40 N. E. 69 ; 
 Caton V, Sedalia, 1 Mo. App. 528 ; 
 Galveston v. Pasnainsky, 63 Tex. 118 
 [bi'oken glass in bottom of open 
 street-excavation] ; and see Goeltz 
 V. Ashland, 75 Wise. 643 ; 44 N. W. 
 770 ; Smalley v. Appleton, 75 Wise. 
 18 ; 43 N. W. 836. 
 
 " Ivory V. Deerpark, 116 N. Y. 476; 
 
 23 N. E. 1080 ; Ring v. Cohoes, 77 N. 
 Y. 83 ; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 Id. 
 364 ; Lynch v. New Rochelle, 78 HunV 
 307 ; 38 N. Y. Supp. 963 ; Hunt v. 
 Pownal, 9 Vt. 411 ; Palmer v. Ando- 
 ver, 56 Mass. 600 ; Houfe v. Fulton, 
 29 Wise. 396, per Dixon, C. J. ; Mc- 
 Namarav. Clintonville, 63 Id. 307; 
 Chicago V. Schmidt, 107 111. 186 [de- 
 fect in sidewalk prevented plaintiff 
 avoiding approaching railroad train] ; 
 Carterville v. Cook, 139 111. 153 ; 23 
 N. E. 14 [plaintiff pushed off unrailed 
 sidewalk]. One who, in attempting 
 to extricate his horse from a hole in 
 a defective bridge, into which the 
 horse had stepped, was injured by 
 the animal, may recover against the 
 tov^n (Stickney v. Maidstone, 30 
 Vt. 738 ; Page v. Bucksport, 64 Me. 
 51 , La Duke v. Exeter, 97 Mich. 450 ; 
 56 N. W. 851). 
 
 " Kieffer v. Hummelstown, 1 51 Pa. 
 St. 304, 24 Atl. 1060; [horse frightened 
 by boy's shooting pigeons in adjoin- 
 ing field ; " no accident would have 
 happened but for the shooting "] ; 
 Schaeffer v. Jackson, 150 Pa. St. 145; 
 
 24 Atl. 629 [hole in highway ; plain- 
 tiff's horse frightened by donkey ; 
 buggy caught in hole]. In West Ma- 
 honey V. Watson (116 Pa. St. 344; 9 
 
593 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§346 
 
 furnish roads upon which it will be safe for horses to run 
 away, but they are bound to furnish reasonably safe roads ; 
 and if they do not, and a traveler is injured by culpable defects 
 in the road, it is no defense that his horse at the time was 
 running away, or was beyond his control.'* Even where this 
 doctrine is not accepted it is held that the monnentary swerv- 
 ing, shying," or stumbling,'^ or the starting into a quick trot 
 
 Atl. 430) horses driven after dark, 
 struck an ash-heap negligently left 
 in the road, whereby the vehicle was 
 overturned and the horses fright- 
 ened. They ran upon a railroad, 
 were driven from the track, then 
 ran along the track, in an opposite 
 direction, for over a mile, when they 
 were struck by an engine, and 
 killed. Held, that the ash-heap 
 in the road was the remote, not 
 proximate, cause of the injury, s. 
 p. . Childrey v. Huntington, 34 W. 
 Va. 457; 13 S. E. 536 [policeman, 
 struggling with a prisoner, caught 
 his foot in hole in sidewalk, and the 
 prisoner fell on him ; hole not proxi- 
 mate cause] ; Gonzales v. Galveston, 
 84 Tex. 3 ; 19 S. W. 284 [pile of tim- 
 ber in street knocked down by dray- 
 man, injuring child; held, his negli- 
 gence, not the city's, was proximate 
 cause]. A town is not liable to one 
 injured by falling into an excava- 
 tion when the fall was wholly occa- 
 sioned by another, who willfully 
 threw him into the pit (Alexander 
 V. New Castle, 115 Ind. 51 ; 17 N. E. 
 300). 
 
 '3 Eing V. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83 ; 
 Ivory V. Deerpark, 116 N. Y. 476 ; 23 
 N. E. 1080 ; Smith v. Clarkstown, 69 
 Hun, 155 ; 33 N. Y. Supp. 245 ; Lane 
 V. Wheeler, 35 Hun, 606 ; Houghtal- 
 ing V. Shelly, 51 Id. 598 ; 3 N. Y. 
 Supp. 904 ; Baltimore Turnpike Co. 
 V. Bateman, 68 Md. 389 ; 13 Atl. 54 ; 
 Heyv. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St. 44 
 [fright from locomotive] ; Wellman 
 [Law of Neq. Vol. 11—38.] 
 
 V. Susquehanna Depot, 167 Pa. St. 
 239 ; 31 Atl. 566 [same] ; Atlanta v. 
 Wilson, 59 Ga. 544 ; Augusta v. Hud- 
 son, 94 Ga. 135 ; 31 S. E. 289 ; Brad- 
 ford V. Anniston, 92 Ala. 349 ; 8 So. 
 683 ; Smith v. County Court, 33 W. 
 Va. 713 ; 11 S. E. 1 [illegally narrow 
 road ; horse, frightened by animals, 
 backed wagon over bank] ; Fowler v. 
 Linquist, 138 Ind. 566 ; 37 N. E. 133 ; 
 Centerville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 193 ; 
 Brooksville v. Pumphrey, 59 Id. 78 ; 
 Eoss V. Ionia, 104 Mich. 320 ; 63 N. W. 
 401 ; Hull V. Kansas City, 54 Mo. 599 
 [horse for moment beyond control] ; 
 Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Id. 550 ; 16 
 S. W. 483 ; Union St. E. Co. v. Stone, 
 54Kans. 83 ; 37 Pac. 1012 ; Baldridge 
 Bridge Co. v. Cartrett, 75 Tex. 628 ; 
 13 S. W. 8 ; Eads v. Marshiill, 
 Tex. Civ. App. ; 29 S. W. 170 ; 
 
 Campbell v. Stillwater, 32 Minn. 308 
 [frightened by moving street-car]. 
 Horses, frightened by the overturn- 
 ing of their load, caused by defect 
 in highway, escaped from driver, i-an 
 ninety rods and collided with another 
 traveler : Held, the town was liable 
 (Merrill v. Claremont, 58 N. H. 468). 
 S. P., Winship V. Enfield, 42 Id. 197; 
 Fulsome v. Concord, 46 Vt. 135. 
 
 " Aldrich v. Gorham, 77 Me. 287 ; 
 Carleton v. Caribou, 88 Id. 461 ; 34 
 Atl. 269 ; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 
 139 Pa. St. 646 ; 21 Atl. 316 ; Eohr- 
 bough V. Barbour County Court, 39 
 W. Va. 472 ; 20 S. E. 565. 
 
 '5 Willey V. Belfast, 61 Me. 569 ; 
 Clark V. Lebanon, 63 Id. 393. 
 
§ 348] HIGHWAYS. 594 
 
 or even run/* of a safe horse, by which it is brought into contact 
 with a defect in the road, is not the proximate cause of a 
 resulting injury. A defect which causes the derangement or 
 breaking of a safe and proper vehicle, so that, in consequence, 
 a reasonably well-broken horse gets beyond the control of a 
 reasonably skilful driver, is the proximate cause of an ensuing 
 injury, though happening on a part of the highway which is 
 not defective." 
 
 § 347- [omitted.] 
 
 § 348. Duty to rebuild destroyed highway. — At common 
 law, a parish is excused from rebuilding a highway which has 
 been wholly destroyed by the elements or by the operation of 
 natural causes, over which it has no control, as where the soil 
 of a road-bed has been entirely swept away by a flood, or a 
 bridge totally destroyed by fire.^ On the other hand, the duty 
 of turnpike companies and other owners of road franchises 
 being to make their roads and bridges passable, it is no excuse 
 for their failure to do so, that they were rendered impassable 
 by a sudden flood or other irresistible causes. They are bound 
 to build within a reasonable time.^ Under a statute requiring 
 the mamtenance of roads and bridges, and imposing a liability 
 for the consequences of " defects " therein, it is held immaterial 
 how the defect was produced, whether by natural causes, or by 
 
 "" Stone V, Hubbardstown, 100 Mass. Otherwise, under Massachusetts stat- 
 
 49 ; Babson v. Rockport, 101 Id. 93 ; ute (Scannal v. Cambridge, 163 
 
 Teaw V. Williams, 15 E. I. 20 [team Mass. 93 ; 39 N. E. 790. See cases 
 
 coming up behind]. Under the cited under § 378, 'post. 
 Massachusetts statute it is held that ' Regina v. Hornsea, 1 Dear. C. C. 
 
 if the driver loses control of his 391 ; 18 Jur. 315 ; 35 Eng. Law & 
 
 horse, the town is not liable for the Eq. 583. In Regina v. Paul (3 Mood, 
 
 injury occasioned by a defect in the & Rob. 307), Maule, J., said : " The 
 
 highway, though no other cause iu- interruption of the passage is not 
 
 tervened between the defect and the from the want of repair, but from 
 
 injury (Marble V. Worcester, 4 Gray, the sea having washed away the 
 
 395 ; Titus v. Northbridge, 97 Mass. wall or embankment, and there is 
 
 358 ; Fogg v. Nahant, 98 Id. 578). no longer anything for them to re- 
 
 " Goshen Turnp. Co. v. Sears, 7 pair." s. p., Rex v. Montague, 
 
 Conn. 86 ; Ward v North Haven, 43 4 Barn. & Cr. 598 ; Regina v. Bam- 
 
 Id. 148 ; Scheunke v. Pine River, 84 ber, 5 Q. B. 279 ; Rex v. Landulph, 
 
 Wise. 669 ; 54 N. W. 1007 : Sherwood 1 Mood. & Rob. 393. 
 v. Hamilton, 37 Upp. Can. [Q. B.] " People v. Hillsdale Turnp. Co., 25 
 
 410; Toms v. Whitby, 35 Id. 195. Wend. 354. 
 
595 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§ 3SO 
 
 human agency ; and the total destruction of the highway is 
 a defect which the town is bound to remedy by rebuild- 
 ing without unreasonable delay.^ It is no justification for an 
 unreasonable delay in rebuilding that there is a contiguous 
 road, in good repair, which the traveler might have taken.* 
 
 § 349. [consolidated with § 356.] 
 
 § 350- What are " defects " under statutes.— As a general 
 rule, the defects in highways, whether structural or otherwise, 
 for which towns are declared liable by statute, are those, and 
 only those, the maintenance of which, as common-law nui- 
 sances, would subject a town to indictment.^ But, on the 
 other hand, it is not every nuisance which obstructs, hinders, 
 or endangers travelers upon a highway that constitutes " a 
 defect," within the meaning of a statute.^ The question, what 
 is a " safe and convenient " road or bridge, or what is a " defect 
 or want of repair " therein, or " an insufficiency," within the 
 meaning of those terms as used in the statutes is, generally, 
 one of fact for the jury upon the circumstances of each par- 
 
 2 Palmer v. Portsmouth, 43 N. H. 
 265 ; Briggs v. Guilford, 8 Vt. 264 ; 
 Clark V. Corinth, 41 Id. 449. 
 
 * State V. Fryeburg, 15 Me. 405 ; 
 Frost V. Portland, 11 Id. 271. As to 
 what will be held an unreasonable 
 delay, see Boxford v. Essex, 7 Pick. 
 337. 
 
 ' So held in Massachusetts (Howard 
 V. North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189) 
 and in Maine (Merrill v. Hampden, 
 26 Me. 334). In Goldthwaite v. East 
 Bridgewater (5 Gray, 61), the real 
 question was said to be, not whether 
 an indictment could be maintained 
 against the town for the alleged de- 
 fect, but whether it was legally an- 
 swerable to plaintiff for the injury 
 received therefrom. 
 
 ' Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 
 136, per Carpenter, J. In Hixon v. 
 Lowell (ISGray, 59), Hoar, J., said: 
 "It is obvious that there may be 
 nuisances upon traveled ways for 
 which there is no remedy against 
 
 the town which is bound by law to 
 construct and maintain tlie way. 
 If the owner of a distillery, for ex- 
 ample, or of a manufactory adjoin- 
 ing the street of a city, should 
 discharge continuously, from a pipe 
 or orifice opening toward the street, 
 a quantity of steam or hot water, to 
 the nuisance and injury of passers- 
 by, they must certainly seek redress 
 in some other mode than by an action 
 for a defective way. If the walls of 
 a house adjoining a street in a city 
 were erected in so insecure a man- 
 ner as to be liable to fall upon per- 
 sons passing by, or if the eaves- trough 
 or water-conductor was so arranged 
 as to throw a stream from the roof 
 upon tlie sidewalk, there being in 
 either case no structure erected with- 
 in or above the traveled way, it 
 would not constitute a defect in the 
 way." Held, therefore, that a city 
 was not liable for injury to passers- 
 by on a sidewalk for the fall on him 
 
§35o] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 596 
 
 ticular case,^ such as the season of the year, the hour of the 
 day or night the accident occurred, the location of the way 
 and the use to which it is to be put,^ as well as the nature 
 of the accident itself.^ Under the Maine statute, it has been 
 held that a " defect or want of repair " is either inert matter 
 left encumbering the street, either upon or over it, or a struct- 
 ural defect endangering the public travel.* In Connecticut, a 
 defect in a highway, under the statute of that state, is " any 
 
 of an overhanging mass of snow and 
 ice from an abutting building. See 
 Barber v. Roxbury, 11 Allen, 318, 
 per Gray, J. Tlie overflow of a high- 
 way by a swollen river is not " an 
 insufficiency or want of repair" of 
 the highway under the New Hamp- 
 shire statute (Farnam v. Concord, 
 2 N. H. 392). 
 
 3 Providence v. Olapp, 17 How. 
 U. S. 161 ; Green v. Danby, 12 Vt. 338; 
 Rice V. Montpelier, 19 Id. 470 ; Cas- 
 sedy .V. Stockbridge, 21 Id. 391 ; Ses- 
 sions V. Newport, 23 Id. 9 ; Kelsey v. 
 Glover, 15 Id. 708 ; Merrill v. Hamp- 
 den, 26 Me. 234 ; Tripp v. Lyman, 
 37 Id. 250 ; Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon, 
 35 Id. 100 ; Fitz v. Boston, 4 Gush. 
 365 ; Johnson v. HaverhiU, 35 N. H. 
 74 ; Winship v. Enfield, 42 Id. 197 ; 
 Yeaw V. Williams, 15 R. I. 20 ; 23 
 Atl. 33. Whether the town had 
 done all that could be reasonably 
 required to make the road safe, and 
 whether a pile of rocks by the road- 
 side was a defect, is for the jury 
 (Lee V. Barkhampton, 46 Conn. 213). 
 So whether the condition of a rail- 
 ing erected to mark out a traveled 
 way, and which had fallen out of 
 repair, constituted a defect (Pratt v. 
 Amherst, 140 Mass. 167 ; 2 N. E. 777). 
 s p., Hickey v. Waltham, 159 Mass. 
 460 ; 34 N. E. 681 [pile of dirt from 
 street excavation] ; Farley v. Phila- 
 delphia, 15 PhUa. 290 [pile of stones 
 suffered to remain on street a week] ; 
 Jackson v. Wagner [Pa.], 17 Atl. 
 903 ; Lane v. Hancock, 67 Hun, 623 ; 
 
 22 N. Y. Supp. 470 [question of 
 proximate cause] ; Whitney v. Mil- 
 waukee, 57 Wise. 639 ; 16 N. W. 13 ; 
 Troxel v. Vinton, 77 Iowa, 90 ; 41 N. 
 W. 580. Whether the absence of a 
 hand-rail on a bridge is a defect 
 (Dale V. Webster county, 76 Iowa, 
 370 ; 41 N. W. 1), or whether a side- 
 walk should have had three stringers 
 instead of two (Smith v. Pella, 86 
 Iowa, 236 ; 53 N. W. 326), are ques- 
 tions for the jury. 
 
 '' A municipal corporation must 
 keep a street in a reasonably safe con- 
 dition, considering the use to which 
 it is to be put ; and where a street is 
 in constant use in a crowded part of 
 the city, it is for the jury to say 
 whether a considerable depression in 
 the pavement created a condition 
 from which a prudent person would 
 anticipate an injury to one using the 
 street (Smith v. New York, 17 N. T. 
 App. Div. 438). 
 
 * Hutchinson v. Concord, 41 Vt. 
 271 ; Cleveland v. Bangor, 87 Me. 
 259 ; 32 Atl. 893. 
 
 * Therefore, a team temporarily 
 stationed in the street, under the 
 charge of the owner or driver, is not 
 a defect or obstruction within the 
 meaning of the statute (Davis v. 
 Bangor, 43 Me. 533). See Bigelow 
 V. Weston, 3 Pick. 267; Snow v. 
 Adams, 1 Cush. 443 ; Frost v. Port- 
 land, 11 Me. 371; Hutchinson v. Con- 
 cord, 41 Vt. 371; Ray v. Manchester, 
 46 N. H. 59. 
 
597 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§3SO 
 
 object in, upon, or near, the traveled path, which would neces- 
 sarily obstruct or hinder one in the use of the road for the 
 purpose of traveling thereon, or which, from its nature and 
 position, would be likely to produce that result.'"' It is gen- 
 erally held that a statutory requirement to maintain roads in 
 good and sufficient repair, or safe and convenient, and the like, 
 refers to the surface of a road, and to objects within its bound- 
 ary lines, calculated to interfere with its safe and convenient 
 use, and not to objects or causes of interference outside the 
 highway on adjacent premises.^ Though such objects, if they 
 overhang the highway are nuisances, they are not defects in 
 the highway which render travel on it necessarily unsafe, 
 within the meaning of the statute.^ Hence towns are held 
 not liable to a traveler injured by ice and snow falling on him 
 from the roof of an abutting buildingj^" or by the face of a 
 
 ■■ Therefore, any object upon or 
 near the traveled path (but within 
 the highway limits) which, in its 
 nature, is calculated to frighten 
 horses of ordinary gentleness, and 
 likely to obstruct the right of way, 
 may constitute a defect in the way 
 itself (Hewison v. New Haven, 34 
 Conn. 136 ; and cases cited under 
 § 355, post). In Jones v. New Haven 
 (31 Conn. 1), a dead limb, which 
 the city officers had negligently al- 
 lowed to remain upon a tree in a 
 public square, fell upon plaintiff. 
 Held, city was liable. Under the 
 present Massachusetts statute it is 
 held that a city is liable to one in- 
 jured by the falling of a tree stand- 
 ing in a public street, when the 
 authorities knew, or might have 
 known, its dangerous condition, and 
 took no steps to remove it, or to 
 guard passers-by against it (Chase 
 V. Lowell, 151 Mass. 423 ; 34 N. E. 
 313). Under the South Carolina 
 statute; (Rev. St. 1893, § 1583), a city 
 is only liable for injuries caused by 
 " defects " in the street, or by its mis- 
 management in making repairs of 
 
 the street, and not for injuries to a 
 horse caused by its becoming fright- 
 ened at merchandise negligently al- 
 lowed to be displayed on the street 
 (Dunn V. Barnwell, 43 S. C. 398; 21 
 S. E. 815). 
 
 8 Knowlton v. Pittsfield, 63 N. H. 
 535; Hebbard v. Berlin, 66 N. H. 623; 
 32 Atl. 329 [horse, frightened by 
 noise of engine on adjoining prop- 
 erty, ran away], s. P., Farrell v. 
 Oldtown, 69 Me. 73 ; Keith v. Easton, 
 3 Allen, 553 [object outside traveled 
 path frightened horse] ; Chamberlain 
 V. Enfield, 43 N. H. 3o6 ; .Hawks v. 
 Northampton, 116 Mass. 430 [defect 
 in a highway occasioned by the care- 
 less, negligent, or unskillful conduct 
 of a street railway corporation]. A 
 town is not liable for injuries occa- 
 sioned to a traveler on the highway 
 by a locomotive engine, run by a 
 railroad corporation on their track, 
 illegally laic across the highway 
 (Vinal v. Dorchester, 7 Gray, 431). 
 
 ' Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 
 136. 
 
 '» Hixon V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59. 
 
§351] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 598 
 
 sign-board," or awning ^'^ projecting from such building over 
 the sidewalk, unless the projection was, to some extent at 
 least, supported on the sidewalk.'^ A different rule prevails 
 where the liability of municipal corporations for defective high- 
 ways is not expressly defined by statute." 
 
 § 351. Defects in margin of way. — Defects for which a stat- 
 ute imposes a liability need not be in the wrought or usually trav- 
 eled track of a rural road. While all the land over the whole 
 width of such a road, as laid out, need not furnish an equally 
 safe and free passage,^ the highway cannot be said to be free 
 from " defects or want of repair," or '' safe and convenient," 
 if anything within the limits of the highway, though outside 
 the traveled track, is calculated to interfere with or endanger 
 a traveler on the main path.^ If a travrler, in order to avoid 
 dangerous defects or obstructions in the traveled path, 
 diverges to the margin of the road, he is entitled to presume 
 it safe,' and the town is liable for injuries sustained by him 
 
 " Jones V. Boston, 104 Mass. "Ifi; 
 Salisbury v. Hershenroder, 106 Id. 
 458 [owner liable ; city not] ; Taylor 
 V. Peckham, 8 R. I. 849 [same]. 
 
 "^ Hewison v. New Haven, supra; 
 Day V. Milford, 5 Allen, 98 ; Milford 
 V. Holbrook, 9 Id. 17 ; Drake v. 
 Lowell, 13 Mete. 392. 
 
 " West V. Lynn, 110 Mass. 514; 
 Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. 392. 
 
 " See § 354, post. 
 
 ' Brown v. Skowhegan, 82 Me. 373 ; 
 19 Atl. 399; and cases in next note. 
 
 ' Stinson v. Gardner, 42 Me. 348 ; 
 Bryant v. Biddeford, 39 Id. 193 ; 
 Johnson v. Whitefield, 18 Id. 286 ; 
 Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435 ; Rice 
 V. Montpelier, 19 Id. 470 ; Dimock v. 
 Suffield, 30 Conn. 139; Howard 
 V. North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 191 ; 
 Shepardson v. Colerain, 18 Mete. 56 ; 
 Bigelow V. Weston, 3 Pick. 267; 
 Cogswell V. Lexington, 4 Cush. 307. 
 Compare Young v. Yarmouth, 9 
 Gray, 386. If an obstruction out- 
 side of the traveled part renders the 
 road unsafe, the town will be liable 
 
 unless it has made proper safeguards 
 or railings (Willey v. Portsmouth, 
 35 N. H. 303). Accumulations of 
 snow on the margin of a road, ren- 
 dering travel unsafe, may be a de- 
 fect (Barton v. Montpelier, 30 Vt. 
 650). They are not, if there is a rea- 
 sonably safe and convenient path 
 anywhere within the limits (Seeley 
 V. Litchfield, 49 Conn. 134 ; WiUey 
 V. Ellsworth, 64 Me. 57). Plaintiff's 
 horses becoming frightened, got be- 
 yond his control and collided with a 
 post several feet from the traveled 
 road. Held, that, though plaintiff 
 knew of the post, he could recover 
 (Fowler v. Linguist, 138 Ind. 566; 37 
 N. E. 133). Shade trees from twenty- 
 five to forty feet high, and twelve 
 feet in diameter, standing within a 
 sidewalk, from eight to fifteen inches 
 from the cjrb, are obstructions. 
 (Chase v. Oshkosh, 81 Wise. 313; 51 
 N. W. 560). 
 
 3 Buck V. Biddeford, 83 Me. 433 ; 
 19 Atl. 912 ; Steward v. Milford, 21 
 Wise. 491 ; Austin v. Ritz, 72 Tex. 
 
599 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§35i 
 
 from pitfalls, or other defects therein/ If such divergence is 
 unnecessary and voluntary/ as where it is merely to obtain a 
 better road at the side, or where his horse takes that direction 
 from natural instinct, or from inability to see the road on 
 account of the darkness, he cannot recover for injuries 
 received.* If the margin of a road has, by use or otherwise, 
 been made a part of the road, and suffered to be used as such 
 
 391 ; 9 S. W. 884. Where there is 
 no visible sign to indicate that any 
 portion of a road-bed is unsafe, a per- 
 son is not obliged to follow the 
 beaten track, but has a right to 
 travel over any part of the road, 
 worked and prepared as a road-bed 
 (Wakeham v. St. Clair, 91 Mich. 15 ; 
 51 N. W. 696). 
 
 * If snow obstructs the usually 
 traveled path, and the only way 
 broken out is at the side over a 
 frozen ditch, a traveler is entitled to 
 take it, and the town is liable for an 
 injury sustained (Savage v. Bangor, 
 40 Me. 176). If he is forced into a 
 ditch by accident, and injury ensues 
 by reason of an obstruction placed 
 there, the town will be liable (Cas- 
 sedy V. Stockbridge, al Vt. 391 ; 
 Chapman v. Cook, 10 R. I. 304. See 
 Stone V. Attleborough, 140 Mass. 338 ; 
 Pomeroy v. Westfleld, 154 Id. 463 ; 
 38 N. E. 899). 
 
 ' If a traveler errs in judgment in 
 taking a side track upon a highway 
 when the main track is passable and 
 safe, although the side track is gen- 
 erally used, the town is not liable 
 (Burr V. Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460 ; 
 O'Laughlin v. Dubuque, 43 Iowa, 
 539). In Smith v. Wendell (7 Cush, 
 498), a town was held not liable to a 
 traveler passing from a public high- 
 way to a railway station through a 
 road opened by the proprietors of the 
 railroad for that purpose, for an in- 
 jury occasioned by a block of stone 
 lying within the limits of the high- 
 
 way as located, and obstructing the 
 entrance to the road to the station, 
 if it did not obstruct the road-bed of 
 the highway. 
 
 « Rice V. Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470. 
 And see Dickey v. Maine Telegraph 
 Co., 46 Me. 483; and Maoomber v. 
 Taunton, 100 Mass. 355, in which a 
 town was held not liable for collision 
 with a hitching post. In Farnum v. 
 Concord (3 N. H. 393), the injury 
 was occasioned by an excavation by 
 the side of the road, although the 
 traveled way was only twelve feet 
 wide, and another excavation existed 
 on the opposite side, and the whole 
 vicinity, by the side of the river, 
 was covered by nearly two feet of 
 water. Held, town not liable, s. p., 
 Joyner v. Great Barrington, 118 
 Mass. 463 ; Marshall v. Ipswich, 110 
 Id. 533 ; Ramsey v. Eushville R. Co., 
 81 Ind. 394 ; Biggs v. Huntington, 
 33 W. Va. 55 ; 9 S. E. 51. In Moeh- 
 ler V. Shaftesbury (46 Vt. 580) it was 
 held to be the duty of. the town to 
 keep a highway in sufficient repair 
 for the passing of teams going in the 
 same direction. Thougli there was 
 no necessity for plaintiff to deviate 
 from the traveled path, to pass the 
 team in front of him, and in doing so 
 he was influenced by a desire to keep 
 in companj with the party with 
 whom he was traveling, the town was 
 liable for a defect in the margin, 
 the liability of the town not being 
 limited to cases of absolate necessity. 
 
§ 352] HIGHWAYS. 6oO 
 
 by the town authorities, the town is responsible for defects in 
 such part.' 
 
 § 352. When whole width must be passable. — It is obvi- 
 ous that what would constitute a serious defect in a highway 
 of a certain character and location, might be a very inconsid- 
 erable defect, or none at all, in another highway.^ What 
 would be a safe and convenient road in the country might be 
 a very unsafe and inconvenient street in a city. The neces- 
 sity in a city street of a smooth pavement and even grade, 
 and of a sufficient width to accommodate the exigencies of 
 increased travel, does not exist in a country road.^ Hence, 
 
 ■■ Potter V. Castleton, 53 Vt. 435 ; 
 Aston V. Newton, 134 Mass. 507. A 
 side of a street may be in such form, 
 and so used, with the knowledge and 
 acquiescence of the town, as to be a 
 portion of the traveled part of the 
 w^ay, though no work has been done 
 on it to fit it for the use of pedes- 
 trians (Moran v. Palmer, 162 Mass. 
 196 ; 38 N. E. 443). Where an open 
 and well-beaten path led from the 
 traveled path to an apparently safe 
 and convenient watering-place by 
 the side of the road, but within its 
 limits, which was, in fact, a deep 
 and miry pit covered with water, 
 into which a traveler's horse, being 
 turned there to drink, fell and was 
 drowned. Held, the town was liable 
 (Cobb V. Standish, 14 Me. 198). In that 
 case, Weston, C. J., said: "Towns 
 are not obliged to furnish watering 
 places for the public convenience, 
 but, when they are provided by 
 nature in the highway, they ought 
 not to be suffered to become pit-falls, 
 first to allure, and then to destroy 
 horses or other animals, turned aside 
 to partake the refreshment to which 
 they are thus invited." Compare 
 Hall V. Unity, 57 Me. 539. 
 
 ' "The duty of cities to keep their 
 streets and highways safe and con- 
 venient is not that all parts of all 
 
 highways shall be kept in like re- 
 pair, and alike smooth and free 
 from obstruction, but that all high- 
 ways shall be kept in such a con- 
 dition as shall be deemed reason- 
 ably safe and convenient " (per Colt, 
 J., Street v. Holyoke, 103 Mass. 82, 
 84). A refusal to charge that, " the 
 duty of a municipal corporation to 
 keep its streets in a reasonably safe 
 condition for the passage of pedes- 
 trians and vehicles extends to whole 
 width of the street," is proper, since 
 a city's duty is not to keep every 
 street safe throughout its entire 
 width, regardless of location, amount 
 of travel, and other circumstances 
 (Fulliam v. Muscatine, 70 Iowa, 436; 
 30 N. W. 861). Compare Crystal v. 
 Des Moines, 65 Iowa, 503 ; 33 N. W. 
 646. 
 
 2 Hull V. Richmond, 3 Woodb. & 
 M. 337 ; Fitz V. Boston, 4 Cush. 365. 
 In the last case, the court charged 
 that, " a different state of repair 
 would be required in a city, where 
 a large amount and variety of travel 
 was constantly passing, than in a 
 country place, where the state of 
 things was different." Held, that 
 understanding "a city" to be a 
 closely built place, with a great 
 amount of travel, as distinguished 
 from a place of opposite character. 
 
6oi 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§353 
 
 while it will not be required of a country road that its whole 
 width should be wrought so as to be everywhere passable for 
 wheeled vehicles,'' this will be required of a street in a city.* 
 It may even be doubted whether width for the passage of 
 more than one carriage will be required on a country road, 
 in places where ledges of rock or other great natural obstacles 
 interpose. The most that can be required, in a road of so 
 difficult a nature, is that the sides should be in such a state 
 as would admit, without unusual delay or trouble, of the pass- 
 ing of carriages when they meet,^ or when going in the same 
 direction.^ 
 
 § 353- Sidewalks and street-crossings. — Sidewalks ' and 
 street-crossings^ being parts of the public streets, the duty of 
 
 the charge was not open to excep- 
 tion, s. P., Providence v. Clapp, 17 
 How. U. S. 161 ; Loker v. Brookline, 
 13 Pick. 343, Drake v. Lowell, 13 
 Mete. 293 ; State v. Beeman, 35 Me. 
 243 ; Church v. Cherryfield, 33 Id. 
 460. 
 
 ' Hull V. Richmond, supra; Morse 
 V. Belfast, 77 Me. 44 ; Perkins v. 
 Fayette, 60 Id. 153 ; Blake v. New- 
 field, Id. 365 ; Keyes v. Marcellus, 
 50 Mich. 439; 15 N. W. 543 ; Scran- 
 ton V. Hill, 102 Pa. St. 378 ; Monon- 
 gahela City v. Fischer, 111 Id. 9. 
 
 * A traveler has the right to pre- 
 sume that he may drive with safety 
 over all parts of a public street, and 
 he is not required to leave his team 
 in the middle of the street while 
 stopping, but may drive to the side 
 of the street, and near the curbing 
 (Buck V. Biddeford, 83 Me. 433 ; 19 
 Atl. 913). "The street and every 
 part of it, by force of the conimon 
 law, is so far dedicated to the pub- 
 lic that any act or obstruction that 
 unnecessarily incommodes or im- 
 pedes its lawful uso by the public is a 
 nuisance'' (per Haines, J., Durant 
 V. Palmer, 29 N. J. L. 544). S. P., 
 Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524. 
 
 ^ Howard v. North Bridgewater, 
 16 Pick. 189 ; Hull v. Richmond, 2 
 Woodb. & M. 837, 343 ; Kelsey v. 
 Glover, 15 Vt. 708 ; Green v. Danby_ 
 13 Id. 388 ; Loberg v. Amherst, 87 
 Wise. 634 ; 58 N. W. 1048. 
 
 « Mochler v. Shaftesbury, 46 Vt. 
 580. 
 
 ' See cases cited in note S, § 333, 
 ante. 
 
 ^ Hines v. Lockport, 60 Barb. 378 
 "Walker v. Lockport, 43 How. Pr. 306 
 Barker v. Savage, 45 N. Y. 191 
 Brady v. Lowell, 3 Cush. 121 
 Coombs V. Purrington, 42 Me. 833 
 Robinson v. Western Pacific R. Co. , 
 48 Cal. 410 ; O'Neil v. Detroit, 50 
 Mich. 133 ; Shippy v. Au Sable, 85 
 Id. 380; 48 N. W. 584; Champaign 
 V. Patterson, 50 111. 61. Under the 
 Massachusetts statute, that part of 
 the street which lies between tlie 
 carriage-way and the sidewalk 
 should be kept in such repair tliat 
 foot-passengers may cross any part 
 thereof with a reasonable assurance 
 of safety ; and establishing raised 
 crossings at proper distances is not 
 sufflcient (Raymond v. Lowell, 6 
 Cush. 534). 
 
§353] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 602 
 
 municipal corporations in respect to their proper maintenance, 
 so as to be reasonably safe for pedestrians, is the same as the 
 duty in respect to the traveled way for the use of carriages.' 
 When devoted to the common use of vehicles and foot-pas- 
 sengers, the way must be made reasonably safe for both classes 
 of travelers.^ It is no part of the duty of a city to provide a 
 safe way, or any way, by which one may reach the sidewalk 
 from adjoining premises.' But the entire width of a sidewalk 
 must be made and kept reasonably safe,' including the curb ; ' 
 and if any part of it is taken up by an open area, or cellar- 
 way connecting adjoining premises, with or without license, it 
 is an obstruction for negligently permitting which to remain 
 open or unguarded, the city is liable.' A sidewalk must have 
 
 * As to the general duty to re- 
 pair sidewalks and the degree of 
 care required, see Bacon v. Boston, 
 3 Cush. 174 ; Lowell v. Spaulding, 4 
 Id. 377; Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. 
 293 ; Weare v. Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 
 334 ; Hall v. Manchester, 40 N. H. 
 410 ; Hubbard v. Concord, 35 Id. 54 ; 
 Stack v. Portsmouth, 53 Id. 221 ; 
 Manchester v. Hartford, 80 Conn. 
 118 ; Boucher v. New Haven, 40 Id. 
 456 ; Clemenoe v. Auburn, 66 N. Y. 
 334 ; Barker v. Savage, 45 Id. 191 ; 
 Kirk V, Homer, 77 Hun, 459 ; 28 N. 
 Y. Supp. 1009 ; Barstow v. Berlin, 84 
 Wise. 357 ; Studley v. Oshkosh, 45 
 Id. 380; Furnell v. St. Paul, 20 
 Minn. 117 ; Moore v. Minneapolis, 
 19 Id. 300; Chicago v. Crooker, 2 
 111. App. 279 ; Warren v. Wright, 3 
 Id. 603 ; Rockford v. Hildebrand, 61 
 111. 155 ; Chicago v. Herz, 87 Id. 541 ; 
 Chicago V. Langlass, 66 Id. 861 ; 
 Chicago V. McCarthy, 75 Id. 603 ; 
 Higert v. Greencastle, 43 Ind. 074 ; 
 Market v. St. Louis, 56 Mo 189 ; 
 Barnes v. Newton, 46 Iowa, 567 ; 
 Hall V. Manson, 90 Id. 585 ; 58 N. W. 
 881 ; Plattsmouth v. Mitchell, 20 
 Neb. 228 ; Lincoln v. Smith, 28 Id. 
 763 ; 45 N. W. 41 ; Atlanta v. Per- 
 due, 53 Ga. 607 ; Yearance v. Salt 
 Lake City, 6 Utah, 398 ; 34 Pac. 354. 
 
 ■■ Lacon v. Page, 48 111. 499. 
 
 'Goodin v. Des Moines, 55 Iowa, 
 67 ; 7 N. W. 411. A city is not bound 
 to lay a plank from each man's house 
 across a ditch to the street, and to 
 keep such planks in repair (McCarthy 
 V. Oshawa, 19 Upper Canada, Q. B. 
 245). 
 
 ^ Durant v. Palmer, 39 N. J. Law, 
 •544 ; Pittenger v. Hamilton, 85 Wise. 
 356 ; 55 N. W. 423 ; Springfield v. 
 Burns, 51 111. App. 595 ; Roe v. Kan- 
 sas City, 100 Mo. 190 ; 13 S. W. 404 ; 
 Goius V. Moberly, 127 Mo. 116; 29 S. 
 W. 985 : Atlanta v. Milam, 95 Ga. 
 135; 33 S. E. 43 ; and cases cited 
 under last section. 
 
 ' Bishop V. Goshen, 120 N. Y. 337 ; 
 24 N. E. 720. See Harrigan v. Brook- 
 lyn, 67 Hun, 85 ; 32 N. Y. Supp. 39. 
 
 ^McNerneyv. Reading, 150 Pa. St. 
 611 ; 25 Atl. 57 [unguarded area, ex- 
 tending into sidewalkj ; Feather v. 
 Reading, 155 Pa. St. 187 ; 26 AtL 313 ; 
 Lombard v. Chicago, 4 Biss. 460 ; 
 Evanston v. Fitzgerald, 37 111. App. 
 86. A city which permits a cellar- 
 way to be constructed in the side- 
 walk, not guarded in any manner, 
 except by a trap-door, which it per- 
 mits the persons occupying the ad- 
 joining lot to open and close at their 
 option, is liable for any injury to a 
 
6o3 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§354 
 
 a smooth and even surface to make it reasonably safe, and it 
 is no excuse for its being otherwise that its surface was, in 
 part, a natural rock which had been so used for fifty years ; it 
 must be made safe by removing its irregularities;' or if an 
 iron gutter-crossing '" or a sidewalk made of glass and iron " 
 has become dangerously smooth and slippery by long use, it is 
 negligence to permit it to remain in that condition. If the 
 sidewalk is raised above the grade of the rest of the street, or 
 of the adjoining premises, it should have guard-rails, if neces- 
 sary for the protection of travelers.*' The liability for fail- 
 ure to keep sidewalks free from snow and ice is stated in 
 
 § 354, Overhanging roofs, awnings, trees, etc. — In 
 
 some states, objects which do not encumber the surface of 
 a highway, but merely overhang, without being supported 
 by it, are held not to be "defects" under their statutes.* 
 Elsewhere the general rule is, that if such objects interfere 
 with the safe and convenient use of the way, they are nuis- 
 ances, for culpably neglecting to abate which, having power 
 
 passer-by falling into the cellar-way 
 when the trap-door is left open (Smith 
 V. Leavenworth, 15 Kans. 81). To 
 same effect, Abilene v. Cowperth- 
 waifc, 53 Kans. 324 ; 34 Pac. 795 [trap- 
 door over cellar-way defectively 
 constructed] ; Sweeney v. Butte, 15 
 Mont. 374; 39 Pac. 386 [same] ; Mc- 
 Clure V. Sparta, 84 Wise. 369; 54 N.W. 
 337 [hatchway improperly located]; 
 Bowen V. Huntington, 35 W. Va. 683; 
 14 S. E. 317 [excavation in sidewalk 
 by lot-owner to lay pavement as 
 directed by city]; Langan v. Atchi- 
 son, 35 Kans. 318 ; 11 Pac. 38 [show- 
 board partly on sidewalk]. It is for 
 the jury to say whether a town is 
 negligent in allowing, in a nine- foot 
 sidewalk, a cellar-way more than 
 four feet each way, without perma- 
 nent guards, and with a plank trap- 
 door often left open when the way is 
 not in use (Lichtenberger v. Meri- 
 den, 91 Iowa, 45; 58 N. W. 1058). 
 'Higgins V. Glens Falls, 57 Hun, 
 
 594 ; 11 N. Y.. Supp. 389 ; affi'd, 134 
 N. Y. 666 ; 37 N. E. 855. 
 
 '" Lyon V. Logansport, 9 Ind. App. 
 31; 35 N. E. 138. 
 
 " Cromarty v. Boston, 137 Mass. 
 339. s. P., Chicago v. McGiven, 78 
 111. 347 [plate glass set into sidewalk] ; 
 Quincy v. Barker, 81 Id. 300 ; Chi- 
 cago V. Bixby, 84 Id. 83; Cook v. 
 Milwaukee, 24 Wise. 370 ; Perkins 
 V. Fond du Lac, 34 Id. 435 ; Grossen- 
 back V. Milwaukee, 65 Id. 31 ; 23 N. 
 W. 86 ; Broburg v. Des Moines, 63 
 Iowa, 533 ; 19 N. W. 340 ; McKellar 
 V. Detroit, 157 Mich. 158 ; 33 N. W. 
 631 ; Eoe v. New York, 56 N. Y. 
 Superior, 298 ; 4 N. Y. Supp. 447 
 [iron gutter-plate]. 
 
 1" Smith V. Clarkstown, 69 Hun,155; 
 33 N. Y. Supp. 345 ; Mt. Vernon v. 
 Brooks, 39 111. App. 436 ; Kansas 
 City V. Manning, 50 Kans. 373 ; 31 
 Pac. 1104 ; and cases cited under 
 § 356, post. 
 
 1 See § 350, ante. 
 
§354] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 604 
 
 to do so,^ the municipality is liable to one on the highway 
 injured by their falling on him, or otherwise. It is, there- 
 fore, actionable negligence for a city to permit an obvi- 
 ously defective awning,^ cornice,* tree,^ or banner* to remain 
 overhanging a highway, or a ruinous wall' to stand on or near 
 the edge of a street, which is likely to fall into it. The question 
 in every case is, whether the city was culpably negligent in per- 
 mitting the wall or other thing to remain ; for it is not a guar- 
 antor to travelers against falling walls or other objects outside 
 the highway, not belonging to it.^ Of course, the owner, as 
 supporting a nuisance, is also liable for the damages occasioned 
 by it.' Under its general obligation to use diligence to secure 
 
 " In Grove v. Fort Wayne (45 
 Ind. 439), a cornice of a building, 
 projecting over a sidewalk, was so 
 constructed as to be dangerous to 
 passers-by on the sidewalk ; Held a 
 nuisance ; and as the city had power 
 to abate it, failure to do so rendered 
 it liable to a passenger on the side- 
 walk, injured by the fall of the cor- 
 nice. See Watkins v. County Court, 
 30 W Va. 657; 5 S. E. 654. There 
 held, defendant not liable because 
 without power to remove an over- 
 hanging tree. 
 
 ' Bieling v. Brooklyn, 120 N. Y. 98 ; 
 24 N. E. 389 [awning not securely 
 attached to the adjoining building 
 had been permitted to remain in 
 that condition for a long time under 
 a heavy accumulation of snow] ; 
 Hume V. New York, 74 N. Y. 264. 
 On the first appeal in this case (47 
 N. Y. 639 ; affi'g 9 Hun, 674), it was 
 held that as the awning fell by 
 reason of a latent defect, no negli- 
 gence was shown. On a new trial, 
 the defect was shown to be obvious, 
 and city held liable (74 N. Y. 264). 
 s. p., Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. 
 176; Duffy v. Dubuque, 68 Iowa, 
 171 ; 18 N. W. 900. 
 
 * Grove v. Fort Wayne, supra. 
 
 ^ Jones V. New Haven, 84 Conn. 1; 
 
 Chase v. Lowell, 151 Mass. 422 ; 24 
 N. E. 212. 
 
 ^Champlain v. Penn Yan, 84 Hun, 
 38. 
 
 ■■ Kiley v. Kansas City, 69 Mo. 
 102 ; Parker v. Macon, 39 Ga. 725 ; 
 Savannah v. Waldner, 49 Id. 324, and 
 Hardy v. Keene, 52 N. H. 370 [fall of 
 a derrick]. These cases are dis- 
 tinguished in Cain v. Syracuse, 95 
 N. Y. 83. See, also, Anderson v. 
 East, 117 Ind. 126. 
 
 » Cain V. Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83 : 
 Hume V. New York, 47 Id. 639 ; 74 
 Id. 264 (see note 3, supra) ; Norris- 
 town V. Moyer, 67 Pa. 355 [faU of 
 rotten liberty pole, erected by third 
 persons years before]. 
 
 s Bemis v. Temple, 162 Mass. 842 ; 
 38 N. E. 970 [flag hung over street 
 frightening horses]. Defendant neg- 
 ligently ran a guy wire from a tele- 
 graph pole across the street, and 
 plaintiff's horse, becoming fiight- 
 ened, ran into and bi-oke the wire, 
 causing it to strike and injure plain- 
 tiff. Held, defendant's negligence 
 was the proximate cause of the 
 injury (Lundeen v. Livingston 
 Electric Light Co., 17 Mont. 32 ; 41 
 Pao. 995). To same effect, Albany v. 
 Watervliet, etc. R. Co., 76 Hun, 136 ; 
 27 N. Y. Supp. 848. See other cases 
 cited in notes 11 to 15, § 843, ante. 
 
6oS HIGHWAYS. [§355 
 
 the safety of its highways, or as the owner i» of trees standing 
 within a street or public place, a town is bound to see that 
 such trees are kept trimmed," or if likely to fall from decay, 
 to remove them," and is liable to persons on the high- 
 way for injuries from overhanging or falling branches. An 
 abutting owner is certainly not responsible for the condition 
 of trees on the highway,*^ although originally planted by him." 
 
 § 355- Objects on highway likely to frighten horses. — 
 
 Whether an object in a highway which is calculated to frighten 
 horses of ordinary gentleness is a " defect " in the highway, 
 or renders it " unsafe and insufficient " within the meaning 
 of a particular statute, for which a town is liable, depends 
 upon the meaning to be given these words. The courts 
 of Vermont,' New Hampshire,^ Connecticut,^ Rhode Island,^ 
 Michigan ^ and Wisconsin ^ have held, under their respective 
 statutes, that any such object in a highway, the natural effect 
 
 '" Jones V. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1 tiff's horses]. Compare Ray v. Man- 
 
 [ownership emphasizedj. Chester, 46 Id. 59. 
 
 " It is negligence, for which a town ' Dimock v. Suffield, 30 Conn, 
 
 is liable, to allow, for a long period, 129; Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Id. 
 
 the branches of a tree at the side of 136 ; Young v. New Haven, 89 Id. 
 
 a road to overhang its traveled part 435 ; Goshen Turnpike Co. v. Sears, 
 
 BO low as to cause one driving a load 7 Conn. 86 [harness broke by reason 
 
 of hay thereunder to be pulled off of obstruction in turnpike, causing 
 
 and injured (Embler v. Wallkill, horse through fi'ight to run away 
 
 132 N. Y. 332 ; 30 N. B. 404 ; Jones with the wagon, which collided with 
 
 V. New Haven, Siipra). plaintiff's vehicle; latter may re- 
 
 '« Chase v. Lowell, 151 Mass. 422 ; cover] : Hunt v. PownaU, 9 Vt. 411. 
 
 24 N. E. 212 [fall of decayed tree] ; ^ Bennett v. Lovell, 12 E. I. 166 
 
 Vosper V. New York, 49 N. Y. Su- [machinery left on roadside] ; Ben- 
 
 perior, 296 ; Gubasco v. New York, nett v. Fifield, 13 Id. 189. 
 
 12 Daly, 183. ' See Agnew v. Corunna, 55 Mich. 
 
 " Weller v. McCormick, 52 N. J. 428 ; 21 N. W. 873 ; Beall v. Athens, 
 
 Law, 470. 81 Mich. 536 ; 45 N. W. 1014 ; Simons 
 
 '* Graves v. Shattiick, 35 N. H. v. Casco, 105 Mich. 588 ; 63 N. W. 500. 
 
 257. * Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wise. 
 
 ' Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435 288 ; Jackson v. Bellevieu, 30 Id. 
 
 [burning piles of hay]. 250 ; Hawes v. Fox Lake, 33 Id. 438 ; 
 
 " Winship v. Enfield, 43 N. H. Bloor v. Delafield, 69 Id. 273 ; 34 N. 
 
 199 ; Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 Id. W. 115 ; Cairncross v. Pewaukee, 86 
 
 358 ; Littleton v. Richardson, 33 Id. Wise. 181 ; 56 N. W. 648 ; Laird v. 
 
 59 [piles of lumber] ; Bartlett v. Otsego, 90 Wise. 25 ; 62 N. W. 1042. 
 
 Harksett, 48 Id. 18 [a pig-stye occu- For interpretation of South Carolina 
 
 pied by swine whose "starting and statute on this point, see Dunn v. 
 
 running about" frightened plain- Barnwell, 33 S. C. 398 ; 21 S. E. 315. 
 
§355] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 606 
 
 of which is to frighten horses, is an obstruction of the highway 
 which the town is bound to remove, and failing to do so, is 
 liable for the damages proximately caused thereby. Appar- 
 ently the statutes of Maine and Massachusetts have been 
 interpreted differently.' When there is no question of statu- 
 tory construction, the true rule is, in the first place, that any 
 object in a highway naturally calculated* to frighten horses is 
 a public nuisance, for negligently omitting to remove which, or 
 to prevent its doing an injury, the corporation charged with 
 
 ' See Card v. Ellsworth, 63 Me. 
 547 ; Clark v. Lebanon, 63 Id. 393 ; 
 Perkins v. Fayette, 68 Id. 152 ; 
 Anderson v. Bath, 43 Id. 346 ; Moul- 
 ton V. Sanford, 51 Id. 127 ; Keith v. 
 Easton, 2 Allen, 552 [horse fright- 
 ened by itinerant daguerrean saloon 
 standing on margin of road] ; Kings- 
 bury V. Dedham, 13 Id. 186 [pile of 
 gravel fifteen inches high] ; Cook v. 
 Charlestown, 98 Mass. 80 [carcase of 
 dead horse in highway]. See Lund 
 V. Tyngsborough, 11 Cush. 563 ; Hor- 
 ton V. Taunton, 97 Mass. 563. But 
 more recent decisions seem to ac- 
 cept the New Hampshire rule (Stone 
 V. Hubbardston, 100 Mass. 49 ; Davis 
 V. Charlton, 140 Id. 423 [horse fright- 
 ened at the flapping of a cloth which 
 had been placed over a hay-cock by 
 the side of the road, and from five 
 to eight feet from the traveled part ; 
 evidence for jury]). Compare Cole 
 V. Newburyport, 129 Id. 594 [a van 
 four feet from highway] ; Bemis v. 
 Arlington, 114 Id. 507 [large stones 
 left in highway] ; Cook v. Montague, 
 115 Id. 517 [piece of stone] ; Bowes 
 V. Boston, 155 Mass. 344 ; 29 N. E. 
 633. 
 
 ' The complaint must aver that 
 defendant's act would naturally 
 frighten a roadworthy horse (Keeley 
 Brewing Co. v. Parnin, 13 Ind. App. 
 588 ; 41 N. E. 471). A town is not lia- 
 ble for a horse's shying in conse- 
 quence of ordinary stones, such as 
 are used to build stone walls, lying 
 
 by the side of the road, outside of 
 the travel path, and with nothing 
 strange or peculiar in their appear- 
 ance (McCord V. Ossining, 45 Hun, 
 593; 10 N. Y. State 407). An in- 
 struction that, to warrant a finding 
 of negligence, the stones must have 
 been so placed as " necessarily " to 
 frighten horses, is properly refused 
 (Wilson V. Spaff ord, 57 Hun, 589 ; 
 10 N. Y. Supp. 649). Evidence that 
 other horses had been frightened by 
 the same stones at about the time of 
 the accident is admissible as bearing 
 on the question whether or not the 
 stones were calculated to frighten 
 horses (lb.). Instead of removing a 
 natuial boulder whose only pecu- 
 liarity was its large size, and which 
 was imbedded in the earth in the 
 line of a highway, the town con- 
 structed a road of sutficient width 
 around it, the road being straight on 
 each side, and the rock visible for a 
 quarter of a mile. Held, town not 
 liable to a traveler injured because 
 of his horse taking fright at the 
 boulder (Barrett v. "Walworth, 64 
 Hun, 526 ; 19 N. Y. Supp. 557). Al- 
 lowing two lumber wagons to stand 
 in front of a wagon shop, upon the 
 side of a street three rods wide, is 
 not negligence which will make vil- 
 lage liable to one whose horse is 
 frightened by coming upon the 
 wagons at night (Studeor v. Gouver- 
 neur, 15 N. Y. App. Div. 229 ; 44 
 N. Y. Supp. 123). 
 
6o7 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§355 
 
 the safe condition of the highway is responsible ; ' and, in the 
 next place, that any individual who does anything likely" to 
 frighten a traveler's horse — e. g., exploding fire-crackers in 
 the street (even on the Fourth of July") — is liable for any 
 damage which may result from the fright of the horse, either 
 to the owner of the horse,'^ or to any other person whom the 
 frightened horse may injure.'^ 
 
 ' Chicago V. Hoy, 75 111. 530 
 [dead animal left to remain in 
 street] ; McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. 
 St. 218). s. P., Baker v. North 
 East, 151 Id. 234; 24 Atl. 1079 
 [water escaping from water pipe in 
 street with hissing sound] ; North 
 Manheim v. Arnold, 119 Pa. St. 380 ; 
 13 Atl. 444 [pile of lumber on mar- 
 gin of highway] ; Topeka v. Tuttle, 
 5 Kans. 311 ; Stanley v. Davenport, 
 54 Iowa, 463 ; 2 N. W. 1064 ; 6 Id. 706 ; 
 Crawfordsvillev. Smith, 79 Ind. 308 ; 
 Rushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475 ; 8 
 N. E. 292; Campbell v. Stillwater, 
 33 Minn. 308 ; 20 N. W. 320 ; Van- 
 dalia v. Huss, 41 111. App. S17 [pile 
 of shavings, three or four feet high, 
 on the side of the road] ; Sullivan 
 county V. Sisson, 2 Ind. App. 311 ; 
 28 N. E. 374. Compare Cole v. New- 
 buryport, 129 Mass. 594 ; Little v. 
 Madison, 49 Wise. 605 [horses fright- 
 ened by animals exhibited in street 
 under license] ; and cases cited under 
 § 263, ante. The mere use of a 
 steam-roller does not render a street 
 "defective" within the meaning of 
 the statute, but it is negligence not 
 to give warning of its approach, and 
 otherwise use reasonable care in 
 operating (Mullen v. Glens Falls, 11 
 N. Y. App. Div. 275 ; 42 N. Y. Supp. 
 1129. 
 
 '" Negligence cannot be predicated 
 upon the mere fact that a person 
 engaged in making a lawful exca- 
 vation in the street shoveled dirt 
 out of the same while horses were 
 passing, and they were thereby 
 caused to shy (Nilan v. Richmond 
 
 Gas Co., 1 App. Div. 234; 37 N. Y. 
 Supp. 259). To same effect, Eowell 
 V. Stamford R. Co., 64 Conn. 376; 
 30 Atl. 131 ; Kyne v. Wilmington, 
 etc. R. Co. (Del.), 14 Atl. 922 [rail- 
 road car standing on highway at 
 night, not calculated to frighten an 
 ordinarily gentle horse]. Compare 
 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Trowbridge, 126 
 Ind. 391 ; 26 N. E. 64 [hand-car left 
 on road ; defendant liable]. 
 
 " Conklin v. Thompson, 39 Barb. 
 318; Cole v. Fisher, 11 Mass. 137 
 [discharging flre-arm] ; Hill v. Char- 
 lotte, 72 N. C. 55 [fireworks]. 
 
 " Baxter v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. , 87 
 Iowa, 488 ; 54 N. W. 350 [steer killed 
 by train, left on highway] ; Hindnian 
 V. Timme, 8 Ind. App. 416 ; 35 N. E. 
 1046 [sick cow, likely to die, left on 
 road ; horse frightened by its car- 
 case] ; Ouverson v. Grafton, 5 N. 
 Dak. 281; 65 N. W. 676 [steam 
 thrashing machine] ; Turner v. Bu- 
 chanan, 82 Ind. 147 [steam engine in 
 street]. The fact that the fright was 
 increased by the rattle of the wagon 
 and its contents will not prevent a 
 recovery (lb.). One who, driving 
 along a street beside railway tracks, 
 was injured by his horses taking 
 fright at a passing train, may re- 
 cover, if defendant could, by the ex- 
 ercise of ordinary care, have pre- 
 vented the injury (Moore v. Kansas 
 City, etc. R. Co., 126 Mo. 265: 29 S. 
 W. 9). As to liability of railroad 
 companies for frightening animals 
 on highways, see § 426, post. 
 
 i^Lowery. v. Manhattan R. Co., 99 
 N. Y. 158 ; 1 N. E. 608 ; Marble v. 
 
§356] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 608 
 
 § 356. Duty to guard and light defective way. — A town 
 is not bound to fence its highway so as to prevent travelers 
 from straying out of its limits ;' yet, where the limits of a high- 
 way are not indicated by any visible objects, and there is 
 nothing to show a traveler in the evening that the course he 
 is pursuing is not within the way intended for public travel, the 
 town is liable for injuries resulting from a defect within 
 the general course and direction of travel, although without the 
 limits of the located way, if so near the located way as to 
 render traveling there dangerous, and there is nothing to give 
 travelers notice of the defect until too late to avoid it.^ Where 
 a rail or barrier is necessary for the proper security of travelers 
 at places on the road which from their nature would be other- 
 wise unsafe,^ the maintenance of which would have prevented 
 
 Worcester, 70 Mass. 395 ; Lee v. 
 Union R. Co., 12 R. I. 383 ; PioUet 
 V. Simmers, 106 Pa. St. 95 ; and cases 
 cited under § 37, ante. A person 
 ■who drives a wagon covered with 
 flags, as an advertising medium, 
 through the principal streets of a 
 city, is liable if a horse of ordinary 
 gentleness runs away from fright 
 thereat, and injures another (Jones 
 V. Snow, 56 Minn. 214 ; 57 N. W. 478). 
 
 ' Sparhawk v. Salem, 1 Allen, 30 ; 
 Adams v. Natick, 13 Id. 429 ; War- 
 ner V. Holyoke, 113 Mass. 362 ; Ran- 
 daU V. Eastern R. Co., 106 Id. 276 ; 
 Marshall v. Ipswich, 110 Id. 523 ; 
 Dailey v. Worcester, 131 Id. 452 ; 
 Chapman v. Cook, 10 R. I. 304 ; 
 Keyes v. Marcellus, 50 Mich. 439 ; 15 
 N. W. 542. 
 
 ' Hayden v. Attleborough, 7 Gray, 
 338 ; Davis v. Hill, 41 N. H. 329 ; 
 Willey V. Portsmouth, 35 Id. 303 ; 
 Morris v. Litchfield, 35 Id. 271 ; 
 Coggswell V. Lexington, 4 Cush. 307 ; 
 see Tuttle v. Holyoke, 6 Gray, 447 ; 
 Blake v. Newfleld, 68 Me. 365 ; Willey 
 V. Ellsworth, 64 Id. 57 ; Jewhurst v. 
 Syracuse, 108 N. Y. 303 ; 15 N. E. 
 409. In Ivory v. Deerpark (116 N. 
 Y. 476 ; 22 N. E. 1080), the road on 
 which plaintiff was driving on a 
 
 dark night turned on a curve. In- 
 stead of following the curve, the 
 horses continued straight ahead, 
 falling into an excavation just off 
 the highway, within eleven feet of 
 the beaten path. Held, that the 
 absence of a ditch or barrier at the 
 curve was proof of negligence. A 
 town changed the course of a river- 
 crossing and erected a new bridge, 
 leaving the old bridge in a defective 
 condition, but failed to maintain a 
 barrier warning ti-avelers of the 
 change. Held, the town was liable 
 for a defect in the old bridge 
 (Schuenke v. Pine River, 84 Wise. 
 669 ; 54 N. W. 1007) . A city is liable 
 for a, defective bridge built by mill- 
 owners in a public highway, and by 
 the side of a public bridge, where 
 the public are allowed to use both 
 indiscriminately, without notice that 
 both are not public (Detwiler v. 
 Lansing, 95 Mich. 484 ; 55 N. W. 
 361). s. p., Ireland v. Oswego, etc. 
 Turnpike Co., 13 N. Y. 536 ; Cobb v. 
 Standish, 14 Me. 198. See the last 
 case commented on in Rice v. Mont- 
 pelier, 19 Vt. 470. 
 
 3 Kimball v. Bath, 38 Me. 219; 
 Palmer v. Andover, 2 Cush. 600; 
 Britton v. Cummington, 107 Mass. 
 
609 HIGHWAYS. [§ 356 
 
 the happening of injury/ it is negligence not to construct and 
 
 347 ; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411 ; 
 Bronson v. Southbury, 37 Conn. 199. 
 Compare Morgan v. Hallowell, 57 
 Me. 375 ; Collins v. Dorchester, 6 
 Cash. 396. It is negligence not to 
 fence a sand-pit when it is so near a 
 street, and its surroundings are such, 
 that the city authorities, in the exer- 
 cise of reasonable judgment, should 
 anticipate that children would enter 
 the pit to play, and would excavate 
 in the bank to such an extent as to 
 endanger their lives (Talty v. Atlan- 
 tic. 92 Iowa, 135 ; 60 n! W. 516 ; 
 Hawley v. Atlantic. 93 Iowa, 173; 
 60 N. W. 519 ; Denver v. Soloman, 
 a Colo. App. 534 ; 31 Pac. 507 ; Au- 
 rora V. Seidelman, 34 111. App. 385 
 [ditch in street] ; see § 370, post). 
 " The law has nowhere undertaken 
 to define at what distance in feet 
 and inches a dangerous place must 
 be from the highway in order to 
 cease to be in close proximity to it. 
 It must necessarily be a practical 
 question, to be decided on the good 
 sense and experience of the jury" 
 (Warner v. Holyoke, 113 Mass. 362). 
 Bailings are necessary only when 
 defects are in such close proximity 
 as to make it unsafe to travel 
 reasonably near the boundary of 
 the traveled-way (Stockwell v. 
 Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 305 ; Murphy 
 
 V. Gloucester, 105 Id. 470; Potter 
 V. Castleton, 53 Vt. 435 ; Scott v. 
 Montgomery, 95 Pa. St. 444 ; Pitts- 
 ton V. Harts, 89 Id. 389). It has 
 been held that a barrier was not 
 necessary when the defect was 
 thirty-four feet from the traveled 
 way (Barnes v. Chicopee, 138 Mass. 
 67); twenty-five feet (Murphy v. 
 Gloucester, 105 Id 470) ; twenty to 
 thirty feet (Puffer v. Orange, 133 Id. 
 389) ; twenty-eight feet (Daily v. 
 Worcester, 131 Id. 453); Kelly v. 
 Columbus, 41 Ohio St. 263) ; fifty to 
 100 feet (Chapman v. Cook, 10 R. I. 
 304). Held, that a barrier was neces- 
 sary when the defect was fourteen 
 inches from the traveled way (Woods 
 V. Groton, 111 Mass. 357); twenty- 
 eight inches (Halpin v. Kansas City, 
 76 Mo. 335) ; six inches (Drew v. 
 Sutton, 55 Vt. 586). See Puffer 
 V. Orange, 132 Mass. 389 ; Warner v. 
 Holyoke, 112 Id. 363. No railing is 
 necessary along a sidewalk which is 
 level with the adjacent land, and 
 the city is not liable to one injured 
 by walking off the sidewalk and 
 slipping on ice covered with snow, 
 on such land, and it is immaterial 
 that the line of the highway is not 
 marked f Damon v. Boston, 149 Mass. 
 147 ; 21 N. E. 235). Guard-rails along 
 an embankment, which is separated 
 
 * See cases cited under §§ 36, 31 and 
 33, ante; Miller v. Boone county, 
 95 Iowa, 5; 63 N. W. 3.53; plain- 
 tiff pushed from street down an un- 
 guarded and dangerous declivity by 
 a crowd]; Durgin v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 
 398. Compare Shepherd v. Chelsea, 
 4 Allen, 113 ; Richards v. Enfield, 13 
 Gray. 344 ; Rowell v. Lowell, 7 Id. 
 100 ; Hinckley v. Sumerset, 145 Mass. 
 326 ; 14 N. E. 166 ; Stacy v. Phelps, 
 47 Hun. 54 ; O'Rourke v. Monroe. 98 
 [Law op Neg. Vol. 11 — 39] 
 
 Mich. 520 ; 57 N W. 738 : Gilchrist 
 V. South Omaha, 36 Neb. 163 ; 54 N. 
 W. 358 ; Omaha v. Jenson, 35 Neb. 
 68 ; 52 N. W. 833. The mere fact 
 of an accident occurring by reason 
 of a failure to place railings on a 
 highway is not sufficient evidence of 
 negligence to go to the jury (Lane v. 
 Hancock, 143 N. Y. 510; 37 N. E. 
 473 ; and cases cited under g 316, 
 ante). 
 
§ 356] HIGHWAYS. 6io 
 
 properly maintain such a barrier.' During the progress of the 
 
 from the carriageway by a wide 
 siJe-walk, are not necessary for the 
 safety of travelers by carriage (Hub- 
 bell V. Yonkers, 104 N. Y. 434 ; 10 
 N. E. 8j8). In Glasier v. Hebron 
 (131 N. Y. 447 ; 30 N. E. 239 ; rev'g 
 63 Hun, 137), plaintiff's horse becom- 
 ing frightened, backed down an em- 
 bankment into a pond. The road 
 had been used for nearly fifty years, 
 during which time no similar acci- 
 dent had ever happened, and the 
 break in the woods skirting the 
 boundary between the pond and the 
 highway, through which the horse 
 backed, was only from eight to twelve 
 feet long. Held, that failure to guard 
 such a short distance under the cir- 
 cuihstances, was not sufficient evi- 
 dence of negligence to submit the 
 case to a jury. A road, dug out 
 upon a hillside, ascending on a 
 grade of one foot in ten, sixteen feet 
 wide, level from side to side, and 
 not shown to be dangerous, and 
 otherwise in good condition, held 
 not defective for want of a guard on 
 its outer edge (Patchen v. Walton, 
 17 N. Y. App. Div. 159 ;'45 N. Y. 
 Supp. 145). To same effect, Maxim 
 V. Champion, 50 Hiin, 88 ; 4 N. Y. 
 Supp. 515 [embankment ten feet wide 
 eleven feet high across a ravine] ; 
 
 Hyatt V. Eondout, 44 Barb. 385; 
 Logan V. New Bedford, 157 Mass, 
 534 ; 32 N. E. 910 [embankment three 
 feet high ; barrier unnecessary] ; 
 Glasier v. Hebron, 82 Hun, 311 ; 31 
 N. Y. Supp. 236 [barrier unneces- 
 sary on embankment where high- 
 way is seventeen feet wide and 
 level] ; Waller v. Hebron, 5 N. Y. 
 App. Div. 577; 39 N. Y. Supp. 
 381 [embankment nineteen inches 
 high ; guard unnecessary]. The 
 question whether a« guard- rail or 
 baxTier was necessary at any part 
 of a road is generally for the jury 
 (Drew V. Sutton, 55 Vt. 586 ; War- 
 ner V. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362; Van 
 Gaasbeck v. Saugerties, 82 Hun, 415 ; 
 31 N. Y. Supp. 354 ; Burns v. Yonk- 
 ers, 83 Hun, 211 ; 31 N. Y. Supp. 
 757 ; Plymouth v. Graver, 125 Pa. 
 St. 24 ; 17 Atl. 249 ; Wellman v. 
 Susquehanna Depot, 167 Pa. St. 239 ; 
 31 Atl. 566 ; Day v. Mt. Pleasant, 70 
 Iowa, 193 ; 30 N. W. 853 ; Atlanta v. 
 Wilson, 59 Ga. 544 ; Indianapolis v. 
 Scott, 73 Ind. 196 ; Freeport v. Isbell, 
 83 111. 440). See Roblee v. Indian 
 Lake, 11 N.Y. App. Div. 435 ; 42 N. Y. 
 Supp. 326 [sufficiency ,of complaint 
 on lack of barrier between road and 
 lake to prevent waters dashing upon 
 road]. 
 
 5 Carville v. Westford, 163 Mass. 
 544: 40 N. E. 893 [rounded road- 
 way eleven feet wide on steep slop- 
 ing embankment]; Trexler v. Green- 
 wich, 168 Pa. St. 214.; 31 Atl. 1090 
 [steep declivity at side of a narrow 
 road]; Joliet v. Verley, 35 111. 58; 
 Chicago V. Gallagher, 44 Id. 295 : 
 Chicago V. Hesing, 83 Id. 304 ; Chi- 
 cago V. Wright, 58 Id . 586 ; Danville 
 V. Makemson, '83 111. App. 113 [em- 
 bankment fourteen feet high and 
 thirty feet wide at the top, on one 
 
 side of which was a street car track, 
 with the rails projecting three inches 
 above the surface] ; Byerly v. Ana- 
 mosa, 79 Iowa, 304 ; 44 N. W. 359 ; 
 Fletcher v. Ellsworth, 53 Kans. 751; 
 37 Pac. 115 [excavation seventeen 
 feet long and nine feet deep]; South 
 Omaha v. Cunningham, 31 Neb. 316; 
 47 N. W. 980 ; Crowther v. Yonkers, 
 60 Hun, 586, mem.. 15 N. Y. Supp. 
 588 [excavation eight feet deep] ; 
 Van Vranken v. Clifton Springs, 86 
 Hun, 67; 38 N. Y. Supp. 339, [build- 
 
6ii 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§356 
 
 work of altering or repairing a highway, ordinary care ^ must 
 be used to prevent injuries to travelers thereon. If, in altering 
 the grade of a street previously passable, or otherwise working 
 upon it, the way becomes impassable or dangerous for travel, 
 it is negligence to omit to warn the public of danger by erect- 
 ing fences, barriers, lights, or the like,^ having reference to such 
 accidents as may reasonably be expected to happen from the 
 condition of the road.* If necessary, it should be effectually 
 closed to the public' Under its general duty to maintain its 
 streets so as to be reasonably safe for travel, a city is bound to 
 see that excavations and other dangerous obstructions to 
 travel in a street, whether made by its own servants or by its 
 contractor ^^ or licensees,^' or wrongfully by third persons, ^^ are 
 guarded by barriers and lights, and is liable for injuries to 
 
 ing ' material piled in roadway at 
 night without light]; Birmingham 
 V. Lewis, 93 Ala. 853; 9 So. 343 [un- 
 guarded excavation four feet across, 
 four to six feet deep]. Other cases 
 are cited in notes 5 and G, § 373, 
 ante. 
 
 * Where a street is rendered unsafe 
 during course of improving it, the 
 city is only liable for failure to ex- 
 ercise reasonable care to protect 
 the public (Lincoln v. Calvert, 39 
 Neb. 305 ; 58 N. W. 115 ; Dooley v. 
 Sullivan, 113 Ind. 451 ; 14 N. E. 
 566. In Childs v. West Troy (33 
 Hun, 68), it was held that, in digging 
 a pit in a street, the city oflBcials 
 must so guard it against passers-by 
 that no accident can happen except 
 by Such extreme negligence as may 
 almost be called willful. But this is 
 too strong a statement. See Bunch 
 V. Edenton, 90 N. C. 431 ; Spring- 
 field V. LeClare, 49 111. 476 [failure to 
 guard an open sewer in process of 
 ■ construction]; Collins v. Leafey, 134 
 Pa. St. 303 : 16 Atl. 765 (see note 4, § 
 S56, post); James V. San Francisco, 
 6 Cal. 538; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. 
 Y. 161. Allowing a boulder removed 
 from road-bed to remain there from 
 
 two to five days, held, not negligence 
 (Agnew V. Corunna, 55 Mich. 438 ; 
 31 N. W. 873 [horse frightened]). 
 
 ' Storrs V. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 ; 
 Buffalo V. HoUoway, 7 Id. 493 ; Grant 
 V. Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381; Kiernan v. 
 New York, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 156; 43 
 N. Y. Supp. 588; Silvers v. Nerdlinger, 
 30 Ind. 53 ; Chicago v. Johnson, 53 
 111. 91 ; Milwaukee v. Davis, 6 Wise. 
 377 ; Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 
 Id. 513 ; Covington v. Bryant, 7 
 Bush, 348 ; Americus v. Chapman, 
 94 Ga. 711 ; 30 8. E. 3 ; Fletcher v. 
 Ellsworth, 53 Kane. 751 ; Alexander 
 V. Big Rapids, 76 Mich. 383 ; 43 N. 
 W. 1071 ; Mt. Carmel v. Guthridge, 
 53 111. App. 633 ; Omaha v. Ran- 
 dolph, 30 Neb. 699; 46 N. W. 1013. 
 
 8 Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708 ; 
 Finnegan v. Moore, 46 N. J. Law, 
 603 ; Chicago v. McDonald, 57 111. 
 App. 350 [swing bridge temporarily 
 opened]. 
 
 9 Pettengill v. Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 
 558 ; £3 N. E. 1095. 
 
 "• Cases cited in notes 4 to 7, § 398, 
 ante. 
 " Cases cited under § 358, post. 
 '^ Cases cited under § 366, post. 
 
§ 356] HIGHWAYS. 6l2 
 
 travelers proximately caused by the lack or insufficiency '^ of 
 such protective means, where it has, or by diligence might 
 have had, knowledge of it." If the barriers or lights placed 
 by the city are subsequently wrongfully removed by third per- 
 sons, negligence will not be imputed to the city, until it has 
 had a reasonable time, after notice, to replace thera.^' A city 
 is under no obligations to light its streets ; and its mere neglect 
 to do so is not a ground of liability, unless its charter expressly 
 imposes the duty.^* But inasmuch as a street partially 
 obstructed or out of repair may be reasonably safe if lighted, 
 but dangerous if unlighted, the fact that it was or was not 
 lighted may be material on the question of negligence." 
 
 § 357- [consolidated with § 359] . 
 
 '3 A loose plank, resting at one end 
 on a barrel, and supported at the 
 other by a board fastened to a post 
 near the edge of the sidewalk. 
 Held, insuflScient (Sutton v. Snoho- 
 mish, 11 Wash. St. 24; 39 Pac. 273.) 
 Whether the stretching of a rope 
 around an open trench in the street, 
 two feet from the edge, and three 
 feet above the ground, supported by 
 iron posts driven into the ground, 
 and with lanterns on the posts suffi- 
 ciently near each other to give no- 
 tice of an obstruction, would be a 
 sufficient barrier, is for the jury 
 (Norwood V. Somerville, 159 Mass. 
 105 ; 33 N. E. 1108). 
 
 '■* Where a diligent performance of 
 the duty of supervision in the con- 
 struction of a covering over a peril- 
 ous excavation in a street would 
 bring knowledge to the officers of a 
 city of its dangerous character, a 
 want of such knowledge is negli- 
 gence (Abilene v. Cowperthwait, 
 52 Kans. 324; 34 Pac. 795). See cases 
 cited under § 369, post. 
 
 '5 Senestre v. New York, 47 N. Y. 
 Superior, 341 ; Seward v. Milford, 21 
 Wise. 485 ; Klatt v. Milwaukee, 53 
 Id. 196 ; 10 N. W. 163 ; Meyers v. 
 Kansas City, 108 Mo. 480 ; 18 S. W. 
 
 914. Under an absolute statutory lia- 
 bility, the wrongful removal of bar- 
 riers has been held not to relieve the 
 city (Prentiss v. Boston, 112 Mass. 
 43 ; see Doherty v. Waltham, 4 
 Gray, 596). 
 
 'n McNish V. Peekskill, 91 Hun, 
 324; 36 N. Y. Supp. 1033; Miller v. 
 St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134 ; 36 N. W. 271. 
 Omission to light a city street is 
 not a defect in the way for which 
 the city is liable under the Massa- 
 chusetts statute (Lyon v. Cam- 
 bridge, 136 Mass. 419 ; see Ran- 
 dall V. Eastern R. Co., 106 Id. 276) . 
 A charter requirement of a toll- 
 bridge company, that the bridge 
 should " at all times be kept in good, 
 safe and passable repair," requires 
 the company to light the bridge, if 
 such lighting is necessary to make 
 the bridge safe and convenient for 
 passage at night (Commonwealth 
 V. Central Bridge Co., 13 Cush. 243; 
 see Worcester v. Canal Bridge Co. 
 16 Pick. 541). 
 
 " Miller v. St. Paul, supra ; Jeffer- 
 son V. Chapman, 127 111. 438, 30 N. E. 
 33. A city that is under no statutory 
 obligation to light its streets but 
 does so voluntarily, is not liable be- 
 cause the lighting is insufficient to 
 
6i3 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§358 
 
 § 358- Authorized interference with highway. — A muni- 
 cipal corporation which, in the exercise of a special or general 
 statutory power, authorizes a temporary interference with its 
 highway for a legitimate use ^ by third persons, such as the 
 laying of a railroad over or upon them, or gas and water-pipes 
 beneath the surface, and like uses, is bound to see that while 
 the highway is disturbed by the construction of such works, 
 a passage is kept open, so far as practicable without interfer- 
 ing with the undertaking,^ and made reasonably safe for 
 travel, by barriers, lights, or other protective measures.^ It is 
 
 enable persons to see a hydrant in 
 the street (Columbus v. Sims, 94 
 Ga. 483 ; 20 S. E. 332 ; see Chicago 
 V. Apel, 50 III. App. 132 ; Chicago v. 
 McDonald, 57 Id. 250). 
 
 ' Under express authority over 
 streets, a municipal corporation may 
 use the streets for gas- pipes or sewers 
 (Norwich Gas Co. v. Norwich City 
 Gas Co., 35 Conn. 18 ; State v. Gas 
 Co., 18 Ohio St. 262 ; State v. Gas 
 Co., 29 Wise. 454), or water-pipes 
 and mains (Memphis v. Water-works 
 Co., 5 Heisk. [Tenn.] 495), and for 
 the running of railway trains pro- 
 pelled by steam (Railroad Co. v. 
 Richmond, 96 U. S. 521), or for use 
 of street cars (Vinal v. Dorchester, 7 
 Gray, 421 ; Railroad Co. v. Hartley, 
 67 111. 439), or placing of telegraph 
 poles (Commonwealth v. Boston, 97 
 Mass. 555 ; Young v. Yarmouth, 9 
 Gray, 386). See cases cited under 
 § 332, ante. 
 
 2 Willard v. Newbury, 22 Vt. 458 ; 
 Phillips V. Veazie, 40 Me. 96 ; Davis 
 Leominster, 1 Allen, 182. There held 
 that the town was liable for an in- 
 jury from a pile of sleepers placed 
 within that portion of the highway 
 covered by the location of the rail- 
 road by the company, upon the 
 ground that the sleepers could have 
 been removed by the town without 
 interfering with the authorized con- 
 struction and operation of the rail- 
 
 road. See Brooks v. Somerville, 106 
 Mass. 271. 
 
 ' The most that ought to be re- 
 quired of the town in such a case, 
 however, is to provide a suitable by- 
 way for the public, and warn trav- 
 elers against passing upon the high- 
 way while it remains unsafe by the 
 construction of the railroad. If the 
 town has made the crossing safe and 
 convenient, except so far as it was 
 impracticable to do so without inter- 
 fering with the railroad, it is not 
 liable (Jones v. Walthani, 4 Cush. 
 299 ; Vinal v. Dorchester, 7 Gray, 
 421 ; Batty v. Duxbury, 24 Vt. 155 ; 
 Barber v. Essex, 27 Id. 62. See Kim- 
 ball V. Bath, 38 Me. 219). Under 
 statutes imposing a liability upon 
 towns for defective highways, a 
 town is liable for an obstruction, 
 either lawfully or unlawfully placed 
 in a highway by a third person, 
 which it allows to remain and in- 
 cunaber the way (Elliott v. Concord, 
 7 Foster, 204 ; Willard v. Newbury, 
 22 Vt. 458 ; Batty v. Duxbury, 24 
 Id. 155 ; Barber v. Essex, 27 Id. 62 ; 
 Merrill v. Wilbraham, 11 Gray, 154 ; 
 Sides V. Portsmouth, 59 N. H. 24). 
 See L^e v. Bai-khampsted, 46 Conn. 
 213 ; State v. Gorham, 37 Me. 451. 
 See Fink v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 52; 
 Kansas City v. Bermingham, 45 
 Kans. 213 ; 25 Pac. 569 ; Russell v. 
 Columbia, 74 Mo. 480 [gas company's 
 
§358] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 614 
 
 bound to use the same degree of care for the protection of 
 travelers as if the work were being done by its own agents, 
 for its own benefit ; * and if the interference authorized is intrin- 
 sically dangerous, if left unguarded — c. g., an extensive street 
 excavation — it is liable, without notice, for an injury due to 
 the absence of guards.^ A city is not relieved from responsi- 
 bility for the safe condition of a street, by allowing a railroad 
 company to lay and operate a track through it.^ It is bound 
 to make it safe; and if it cannot otherwise be done, the city 
 has the right to inteiferc with the regular running of carsJ It is 
 
 negligence in laying gas-pipes] ; Brie 
 ■ V. Schwingle, 23 Pa. St. 384 ; Stuart 
 V. Havens, 17 Neb. 311 ; 23 N. W. 
 419 ; King v. Oshkosh, 75 Wise. 517; 
 44 N. W. 745 [private hydrant]. 
 A railway company, under au- 
 thority from the city, raised the 
 grade of a street so as to leave a 
 dangerous pit, which it left un- 
 guarded by fence or light. Held, 
 city was liable to a traveler injured 
 thereby (McCarroll v. Kansas City, 
 3 Mo. App. 993). s. P., McCouU v. 
 Manchester, 85 Va. 579 ; 8 S. E. 379 ; 
 Augusta V. Cone, 91 Ga. 714 ; 17 S. 
 E. 1005; McAllister v. Albany, 18 
 Oreg. 436 ; 23 Pac. 845 ; Sullivan v. 
 Helena, 10 Mont. 134 ; 25 Pac. 94 ; 
 and oases cited in note 8, § 353, ante. 
 " Wendell v. Troy 4 Abb. Ct. App. 
 351 ; Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 ; 
 Hickok V. Plattsburg, 16 Id. 161; 
 Hutson V. New York, 9 N. T. 163 ; 
 affl'g 5 Sandf. 389; Springfield v. 
 LeClare, 49 111. 476 ; Detroit v. 
 Corey, 9 Mich. 165 ; Baltimore v. 
 Pennington, 15 Md. 12. A city is 
 bound to see that a platform per- 
 mitted by it to be put up by a private 
 person in a public street, and used 
 as a part of the street, though not in 
 the usually traveled portion of the 
 street, is in a safe condition (Estelle 
 V. Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243) . In 
 Boucher v. New Haven (40 Conn. 
 457), a city ordered a lot-owner to 
 
 perform a work necessarily danger- 
 ous to travelers, upon the sidewalk 
 opposite his lot. The city being 
 charged with notice, held liable, 
 because it did not superintend the 
 work. 
 
 ' Haniford v. Kansas City, 108 
 Mo. 172 ; 15 S. W. 753 ; Abilene v. 
 Cowperthwait, 53 Kans. 324 ; 34 
 Pac. 795. Compare McDermott v. 
 Kingston, 19 Hun, 198. A city which 
 permits an open trench to be dug 
 across a street, guarding it by a 
 wooden fence and a wooden horse, 
 which has to be moved many times 
 during the hour, to permit horse-cars 
 to pass, and is so moved by employees 
 of the car company placed at the 
 crossing for that purpose, is liable 
 for their momentary negligence in 
 not replacing the guard, causing 
 injury to a traveler (Blessington v. 
 Boston, 158 Mass. 409 ; 26 N. E. 1118). 
 
 « Campbell v. Stillwater, 32 Minn. 
 308; 20 N. W. 320; Zanesville v. 
 Fannan, 53 Ohio St. 605 ; 43 N. E. 
 708. A license to a builder to de- 
 posit material upon a street does 
 not relieve the city from the duty 
 of so guarding or lighting the pile 
 as to leave the street reasonably 
 safe for the traveler by night as well 
 as by day (Magee v. Troy, 48 Hun, 
 883). See cases under last section. 
 
 ' Lawrence v. New Bedford, 160 
 Mass. 327 ; 35 N. E. 459. 
 
6i5 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§358 
 
 immaterial that the statute or ordinance granting the right to 
 occupy the highway imposed on the grantee the duty to pro- 
 tect travelers, during the time of interference,^ or that the 
 grantee was stopped in the work by injunction.' Unless the 
 particular use of a street authorized by a city is either unlaw- 
 ful ; ^^ or is a nuisance per se (in which cases the latter is liable 
 without proof of negligence"), the mere facts of permitting a 
 private user of a street and an injury therefrom, do not estab- 
 lish its liability.'^ In general, the city is not liable without 
 notice for the abuse or misuse of its license by the licensee. 
 
 . 8 Wellcome v. Leeds, 51 Me. 313. 
 In Currier v. Lowell (16 Pick. 170), 
 the statute provided that the select- 
 men of the town might require any 
 alteration or amendment which they 
 might think necessary, and if the 
 company did not comply with the 
 requirements, might make the alter- 
 ation or amendment themselves, and 
 have a remedy over against the rail- 
 road corporation for the expenses. 
 Held, the town was liable, notwith- 
 standing it had given notice to the 
 superintendent of the work that a 
 barrier must be put up for the pro- 
 tection of travelers on the highway, 
 which the latter had promised, but 
 neglected to do. See Bacon v. Bos- 
 ton, 3 Cush. 174 ; Batty v. Duxbury, 
 24 Vt. 155 ; Philadelphia v. Weller, 
 4 Brev^ster, 24 ; Eowell v. Williams, 
 29 Ipwa, 210 ; Landru v. Lund, 38 
 Minn. 538; 38 N. W. 699. In 
 Massachusetts, where a railroad 
 crosses a highway at grade, the 
 company is required by statute to 
 make the passage across its tracks 
 safe and easy, and for its neglect to 
 do so, it, and not the town, is liable 
 (Scanlan v. Boston, 140 Mass. 84 ; 3 
 N. E. 787). See Rouse v. Somerville, 
 130 Id. 361 ; Sawyer v. Northfield, 7 
 Cush. 490 [railroad bridge over 
 highway]. 
 
 ' Dale V. Syracuse, 71 Hun, 449 ; 
 34 N. Y. Supp. 968. 
 
 '" When a city, without authority 
 and in direct violation of statute, 
 grants to an individual the right to 
 obstruct the public highway while in 
 the transaction of his private busi- 
 ness, it is liable for all damages proxi- 
 mately caused by such obstruction 
 (Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y., 533 ; 
 21 N. E. 700). S. P., Farley v. New 
 York, 152 N. Y. 222; 46 N. E. 506 
 [collision with truck licensed to stand 
 in street during night-time] ; Stan 
 ley V. Davenport, 54 Iowa, 463 
 [steam- motor unlawfully licensed to 
 be run in streets]. See § 363, ante. 
 
 " See § 263, ante, and g§ 359, 361, 
 post. 
 
 " Giving permission to place in 
 the street a stepping-stone (Dubois 
 V. Kingston, 103 N. Y. 319 ; 6 N. E. 
 273), or a hitohing-post (Macomber 
 V. Taunton, 100 Mass. 355), on the 
 curb of the sidewalk, will not render 
 the corporation liable to one injured 
 thereby, s. P., Wellington v. Greg- 
 son, 21 Kans. 99 [post at street corner, 
 to protect a shade tree] ; Beetz v. 
 Brooklyn, 10 N. Y. App. Div. 383 ; 41 
 N.Y. Supp. 1009; Loberg v. Amherst, 
 87 Wise. 634: 58 N. W. 1048; Miller 
 V. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134; 36 N. W- 
 271. 
 
§359] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 6i6 
 
 nor for his negligence,*' unless the thing licensed was intrin- 
 sically dangerous." 
 
 § 359. Liability of licensee of use of street. —The fact 
 that one has lawful license to interfere with a highway only 
 relieves him from the imputation of creating a public nuisance, 
 for the consequences of which he would otherwise be liable 
 without proof of negligence.' No license will relieve him from 
 the consequences of carelessness or unskillfulness.^ It is an im- 
 plied condition of every such license that the licensee will use 
 ordinary care in prosecuting his work,^ and diligence in complet- 
 ing it.* A right given to lot-owners to encroach on the sidewalk 
 by making coal-holes therein, or cellar-ways thereto,' or to a rail- 
 
 '^ Susquehanna Depot v. Simmons, 
 112 Pa. St. 384 ; 5 Atl. 434 ; Kennedy 
 V. Lansing, 99 Mich. 518 ; 58 N. W. 
 470 [trolley-pole fixed in gutter] ; 
 Michigan City v. Boeckling, 122 Ind. 
 39 ; 38 N. E. 518 ; Warsaw v. Dun- 
 lap, 112 Ind. 576 ; 14 N. E. 568. A 
 lot-owner, notified by a city to build 
 a sidewalk in front of his premises, 
 is neither the agent nor licensee of 
 the city, and for his negligence, the 
 city is not liable (Davis v. Omaha, 47 
 Neb. 886; 66 N. W. 859). 
 
 '*A municipal corporation is not 
 liable for the acts of its licensees, un- 
 less the act authorized was danger- 
 ous in itself (Wheeler v. Plymouth, 
 116 Ind. 158 ; 18 N. E. 582 ; Dooley v. 
 Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451 ; 14 N. E. 566). 
 Compare Lincoln v. Boston (148 Mass. 
 578 ; 20 N. E. 329), where it was held 
 that a person licensed to fire cannon 
 on public grounds, was not the city's 
 agent, so as to make the city liable 
 for damages caused by a horse tak- 
 ing fright at the firing. See § 263, 
 ante. 
 
 ' Clifford V. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52 ; 
 Robinson v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 37 
 Barb. 512, and cases cited. 
 
 ° Selden v. Delaware, etc. Canal 
 Co.,39N. Y. 634; Brine v. Great 
 Western E. Co., 3 Best & S. 402; 
 
 Stevens v. Stevens, 11 Mete. 251 ; 
 Lincoln Rapid Transit Co. v. Nich- 
 ols, 37 Neb. 333; 55 N. W. 873; 
 Houston St. E. Co. v. De Lesderniei-, 
 84 Tex. 83 ; 19 S. W. 366. See Bir- 
 mingham Union R. Co. v. Alexan- 
 der, 93 Ala. 133 ; 9 So. 535. 
 
 ' In Jones v. Bird (5 B3,rn. & Aid. 
 837), held that one actually engaged 
 in laying a sewer, authorized by 
 statute, was not protected merely 
 because acting bona fide and to the 
 best of his skill and judgment. 
 See Whitehouse v. Fellows, 10 C. 
 B. N. S. 765 ; Brownlow v. Metro- 
 politan Board, 18 Id. 768; 16 Id. 
 546. 
 
 « Cushing V. Adams, 18 Pick. 110 ; 
 Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211; 23 N. 
 W. 419. 
 
 ' The license to the owner of prem- 
 ises, to put a coal-hole in the side- 
 walk, simply changes the character 
 of the act of interfering with the 
 sidewalk from an absolute nuisance 
 to one involving care In the con- 
 struction and maintenance of the 
 coal-hole ; and to avail the defend- 
 ant when sued for injuries sustained 
 by reason of it, he must justify the 
 structure by alleging and proving 
 the permit, and a compliance with 
 its terms, and that the structure was 
 
017 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§ 359 
 
 road company ^ to lay tracks and run trains upon a highway, or 
 to a telegraph company ' to place poles therein and string wires 
 along or across it, is subject to pubHc convenience, and is to 
 be exercised so as not to expose travelers on the highway to 
 
 BO made and kept as to make the 
 sidewalk as safe to the public as it 
 would have been without it (Clifford 
 V. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52). s. P., Jennings 
 V. Van Schaick, 108 N. Y. 530 ; 15 
 N. E. 424 [coal-hole in sidewalk]; 
 Potter V. Bunnell, 20 Ohio St. 150. 
 
 * The obligation of railroad com- 
 panies to use care and skill in laying 
 and maintaining their tracks upon a 
 public highway, so as to save harm- 
 less persons, animals and vehicles 
 passing along it, is treated, in con- 
 nection with the subject of railroad 
 construction, in §§ 408, 414 and 417, 
 post. As to care required of rail- 
 roads on or near highways to pre- 
 vent frightening animals, see § 426, 
 post ; and injuring persons, see § 
 461, poit. 
 
 ' Postal Te\. Co. v. Zopfl, 19 C. C. 
 A. 605 ; 73 Fed. 609 [telegraph pole 
 fell] ; "Wolfe v. Erie Tel. Co., 33 Fed. 
 320 [collision with telegraph pole] ; 
 Kyle v. Southern Electric, etc. Co. , 
 174 Pa. St. 570 ; 34 Atl. 323 [falling 
 of electric light pole] ; Quill v. Em- 
 pire State Tel. Co., 92 Hun, 539; 34 
 N. Y. Supp. 470 [unsound telegraph 
 pole in street]. The company must 
 exercise reasonable care in the loca- 
 tion of its poles, so as not to incom- 
 mode public travel, but is not re- 
 quired so to locate them an to pro- 
 vide against all possible injuries that 
 might happen under extraordinary 
 circumstances (Sheffield v. Central 
 Union Tel. Co., 36 Fed. 164). If its 
 wires hang so low as to interfere 
 with a vehicle on the highway, it is 
 liable (Dickey v. Maine Telegraph 
 Co., 46 Me. 483). The fact that such 
 a wire is found swinging across a 
 public way, so low down as to en- 
 
 danger travel, is itself, nnexplained 
 and unaccounted for, sufficient evi- 
 dence of negligence (Thomas v. 
 Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Mass. 
 156). Compare Western Union Tel. 
 Co. V. Eyser, 91 U. S. 495. In Shel- 
 don V. Western U. Tel. Co. (51 Hun, 
 591; 4N. Y. Supp. 526). a telegraph 
 company sank a stone near the trav- 
 eled part of a highway, to vphich it 
 attached a wire, which was fastened 
 to a pole to hold the pole up- 
 right. The road was narrow, the 
 wire was not easily seen. Held, com- 
 pany was liable for injuries to a 
 traveler by the wire catching on his 
 vehicle. In maintaining electric 
 wires in public streets, persons are 
 bound to exercise that care which 
 a reasonably prudent person would 
 exercise under similar circum- 
 stances, and, as the business is 
 attended with great peril to the 
 public, the care to be exercised is 
 commensurate with the increased 
 danger (Denver Consolidated Elec- 
 tric Co. V. Simpson, 21 Colo. 371 ; 41 
 Pac. 499). s. P., Cookv. Wilmington 
 Electric Co., 9 Houst. 306 ; 32 Atl. 
 643 [electric wire broke and fell into 
 street]. A telegraph company negli- 
 gently allowing its wires to fall on 
 the \\ires of an electric light com- 
 pany, and to remain there hanging 
 down, is liable to a passenger on the 
 street injured by coming in contact 
 therewith (Henning v. Western U. 
 Tel. Co., 41 Fed. 864 ; Southwestern 
 Tel. Co. V. Robinson, 1 C. C. A. 684 ; 
 50 Fed. 810; McKay v. Southern 
 Bell Tel. Co., Ill Ala. 337; 19 So. 
 695 ; Ahem v. Oregon Co., 24 Oreg. 
 276 ; 35 Pac. 549). 
 
§359] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 6i8 
 
 unnecessary hazard either from defects in, or negligent manage- 
 ment of, its property and appurtenances.' It is incompetent 
 for a city either to excuse the licensee from taking reasonable 
 precautions for the safety of travelers, while the work is in 
 progress," or to permit a permanent interference with the pub- 
 lic use of a street.^" Where the manner of interference is pre- 
 scribed by the terms of the license, interference in any other 
 mode is to create a nuisance." All excavations are to be 
 guarded for the protection of travelers; ^^ and the street should 
 be restored within a reasonable time to at least as good con- 
 
 'Veazie v. Penobscot R. Co., 49 
 Me. 119 ; Howard v. Union Freight 
 E. Co., 156 Mass. 159; 30 N. E. 479 
 [dummy-engine]; Fulton St. R. Co. 
 V. McConnell, 87 Ga. 756 ; 13 S. E. 
 828 [unnecessarily obstructing street 
 by laying loose rails on surface far 
 in advance of the work]. 
 
 'Sexton y. Zett, 44 N. Y. 430; 
 McCamus v. Citizens' Gas Co., 40 
 Barb. 880. 
 
 '" Commonwealth v. Erie, etc. E. 
 Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; Green v. Port- 
 land, 32 Me. 431 ; Milhau v. Sharp, 
 15 Barb. 193 ; affi'd, 27 N. Y. 611 ; 
 Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. Ann. 854 ; 
 State V. Mobile, 5 Porter, 279 ; Lack- 
 land V. North Missouri R. Co., 31 Mo. 
 180 ; Dubach v. Hannibal, etc. R. 
 Co., 89 Id. 483 ; 1 S. W. 86 ; Pome- 
 roy V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 16 
 Wise. 640. 
 
 " The obstruction of a highway by 
 the construction of a railroad across 
 it in a manner not authorized by law, 
 is a nuisance, and renders the cor- 
 poration liable to indictment (Com- 
 monwealth V. Nashua, etc. R. Co., 2 
 Gray, 54; Commonwealth v. Ver- 
 mont, etc. E. Co., 4 Gray, 22; Com- 
 monwealth V. Erie, etc. R. Co. 27 Pa. 
 St. 339), and to a private action for 
 injuries resulting from the violation 
 of the license (Wood v. Mears, 12 
 Ind. 515; Hundhausen v. Bond, 36 
 Wise. 29; Weick v. Lander, 75 III. 
 
 93). See Hughes v. Providence, etc. 
 R. Co., 2 R. I, 493; McLaughlin v. 
 Charlotte, etc. E. Co., 5 Rich. Law, 
 583. If there is any excess or irregu- 
 larity in tlie exercise of the power 
 conferred, it becomes a public nuis- 
 ance pro tanto (Renwick v. Morris, 
 3 Hill, 621 ; affi'd, 7 Id. 575). A 
 railroad company operating its oars 
 on a street has a right to remove 
 snow from its track to another part 
 of the street, but is bound to use 
 care to avoid interfering with trav- 
 elers on the highway by causing ac- 
 cumulations of snow (Dixon v. 
 Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 100 N. Y. 170 ; 
 3 N. E. 65 ; Short v. Railroad Co., 50 
 Md. 73; McDonald v. Toledo St. R. 
 Co. 20 C. C. A. 322; 74 Fed. 104; 
 Somerville v. City R. Co., 63 Hun, 
 628 ; 17 N. T. Supp. 719 ; Canfield v. 
 Chicago, etc. R, Co. 78 Mich. 356 ; 
 44 N. W. 385 [throwing water on 
 sidewalk where it froze.] ) It is 
 under no duty to keep the space 
 between its tracks free from ice and 
 snow, and is not liable for their exist- 
 ence to a person slipping and falling 
 thereon (Silbei-stein v. Houston, etc. 
 R. Co 117N.Y.293; 22 N. E. 951). 
 
 " Charlock v. Freel, 125 N. Y. 357 ; 
 36 N. E. 262 ; Sexton v. Zett, 44 N. Y. 
 480 ; Steivermann v. White, 48 N. Y. 
 Superior, 523 ; Pfau v. Reynolds, 53 
 111. 213. 
 
6i9 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§359 
 
 dition as it was before the interference,^' subject to necessary- 
 impairment by any permanent structure authorized by the 
 license." His liability for leaving the street in a dangerous 
 state is not conditioned on his having notice of the fact; it 
 was his duty to know it.'= If the occupation of a highway 
 renders it necessary, for the convenience or safety of the pub- 
 lic, that bridges, guards or other structures should be erected, 
 the party interfering is bound not only to provide them, but 
 to maintain them so long as rendered necessary,'" even to the 
 extent of providing, from time to time, additional facilities 
 for the necessities of an increased population or traffic," or of 
 
 " McOamus v. Citizens' Gas Co., 40 
 Barb. 380 ; Georgia, etc. E. Co. v. 
 Parks, 93 Ga. 228 ; 18 S. E. 652 ; Atchi- 
 son, etc. R. Co. V. Miller, 39 Kans. 
 419; 18 Pao. 486; Dillingham v. 
 Fields, 9 Tex. Civ. App., 1 ; 29 
 S. W. 214 ; Galveston, etc. E. Co. 
 V. White, [Tex. Giv. App.], 
 32 S. W. 186. In New York the 
 statute (L. 1884, ch. 353 § 9) re- 
 quires street car companies " to 
 have and keep " the space between 
 their tracks in "permanent repair" 
 (Snell v. Rochester R. Co., 64 Hun, 
 476 ; 19 N. Y. Supp. 496 ; Worster v. 
 Forty-second St., etc. R. Co., 50 N. 
 Y. 203 ; Masterson v. N. Y. Central 
 E. Co., 84 Id. 247; Currier v. Ogdens- 
 burg, etc. R. Co., 58 Hun. 685, mem.; 
 6 N. Y. Supp. 615.) See Citizens' E. 
 Co. V. Ketcham, 123 Pa. St. 223; 15 
 Atl. 738. When replacing the soil of 
 a highway the licensee must antici- 
 pate and provide for the natural 
 effect of rain on earth excavated 
 and replaced (Johnson v. Friel, 50 
 N. Y. 679; Southern Express Co. v. 
 Texarkana Water Co., 54 Ark. 131; 
 15 S. W. 361). If, in relaying pave- 
 ment which he has disturbed, his 
 workmen so lay the stones as to give 
 such an appearance of security as 
 would induce a careful person, using 
 reasonable caution, to tread upon 
 them as safe, when, in fact, they 
 
 are not so, he will be answerable 
 for any injury (Drew v. New 
 River Co., 6 Carr. & P. 754 ; Hyams 
 V. Webster, L. E. 3 Q. B. 264). 
 S. P., Eeeves v. Larkin, 19 Mo. 192; 
 Dillon V. Washington Gas Light Co., 
 1 McArthur, 626. One is not re- 
 quired to make a crossing where the 
 city has not made one (Thieme v. 
 Gillen, 41 Hun, 443). As to duty of 
 railroad companies to restore roads, 
 streams and bridges appropriated or 
 interfered with by them, see cases 
 cited under § 415, post. 
 
 " Kyne v. Willmington, etc. E. 
 Co., 8 Houst. 185; 14 Atl. 922. 
 
 " Southern Exp. Co. v. Texarkana 
 Water Co., 54 Ark. 131 ; 15 S. W. 
 361 ; Bradwell v. Pittsburgh, etc. E. 
 Co., 35 Atl. 623 ; 158 Pa. St. 105 ; 35 
 Atl. 633 [upturned rail]. 
 
 18 Bryant v. Eandolph, 188 N. Y. 
 70; 30 N. E. 657 [unguarded approach 
 to railroad crossing]. 
 
 " Homan v. Stanley, 66 Pa. St. 464. 
 If a bridge, or a substituted road, be 
 necessary to prevent the obstruction, 
 the railroad company must build it 
 immediately, or in a reasonable 
 time, and cannot delay it until the 
 completion of the road (Louisville, 
 etc. E. Co. V. State, 3 Head, 533). 
 Where permission to lay a railroad 
 track upon a county bridge provided 
 it should construct a convenient and 
 
§36ij 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 620 
 
 conforming its structure to changes subsequently made in the 
 highway." This duty attaches to his grantee or successor in 
 interest.^' It is no defense that another occupier of the same 
 street was equally bound to keep it in repair,** or that the work 
 was done by an independent contractor.^' 
 
 § 360. [consolidated with § 359. J 
 
 § 361. Obstructionsincidenttobuildingoperations.— It is 
 
 lawful within certain limits, not necessary to be defined here, 
 to obstruct a highway for the purpose of erecting or repair- 
 ing a building on land adjoining.* The mere fact of such 
 obstruction, therefore, is not conclusive evidence of negligence. 
 The person by whom or under whose control the work is done 
 must use ordinary diligence to complete it, so as to remove the 
 obstructions to the road as soon as is reasonably possible, and 
 is liable to all persons specially injured by his failure to do so.^ 
 While the obstruction continues, he is bound to use ordinary 
 
 substantial footway over the creek, 
 the company is bound to maintain a 
 footway (Phcenixville v. Phoenix 
 Iron Co., 45 Pa. St. 135). A company 
 lawfully cutting a canal across a 
 highway is bound to build and main- 
 tain a bridge, so as to preserve a pass- 
 age (Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 
 58) ; and a water-power company, 
 carrying a trench across a highway 
 in such a manner as renders a bridge 
 necessary for passage, may be com- 
 pelled to erect and maintain such 
 bridge (Matter of Trenton Water- 
 Power Co. , 20 N. J. Law, 659) . s. p. , 
 State V. Wilmington Bridge Co., 3 
 Harringt. 313 ; State v. St. Paul, etc. 
 R. Co., 35 Minn. 131 ; 28 N. W. 3 ; 
 Oshkosh V. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 74 Wise. 534 ; 43 N. W. 489 ; Cooke 
 V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 133 Mass. 185. 
 See English v. New Haven, etc. R. 
 Co., 33 Conn. 241. 
 
 '« Carter v. Boston, etc. R. Co. 139 
 Mass 535 ; 2 N. E. 101. 
 
 " Allen v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co. 151 
 N. Y. 434 : 45 N. E. 845. 
 
 «» Webster v. Hudson River R. Co., 
 
 83 N. Y. 260; Masterson v. N. Y. 
 Central R. Co., 84 Id. 347. 
 
 ^' Woodman v. Metropolitan R.Co. , 
 149 Mass. 335 ; 21 N. E. 482 ; Hawver 
 V. Wlialen, 49 Ohio St. 69 ; 29 N. E. 
 1049 ; Rich v. Minneapolis, 37 Minn. 
 423 ; 35 N. W. 2 ; Sterling v. Schifl- 
 macher, 47 111. App. 141 ; Benjamin 
 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 133 Mo. 274 ; 
 34 S. W. 590 ; Beatrice v. Reid, 41 
 Neb. 214 ; 59 N. W. 770 ; KoUock v. 
 Madison, 84 Wise. 458 ; 54 N. W. 725; 
 Hepburn v. Philadelphia, 149 Pa. St. 
 3.35 ; 24 Atl. 279 ; Colegrove v. Smith, 
 102 Cal. 330 ; 36 Pac. 411 ; and cases 
 cited under g§ 165, 398, ante. 
 
 ' Moving a house along a street is 
 not within the rights to which the 
 public is entitled, as to the use of the 
 public streets (Dickson v. Kewanee 
 Electric Light Co., 53 111. App. 379). 
 See note 14, § 370, post. 
 
 ^ EUis V. McNaughton, 76 Mich. 
 237; 42 N. W. 1113; Stuart v. 
 Havens, 17 Neb. 311 ; 23 N. W. 419 ; 
 Gushing v. Adams, 18 Pick. 110 ; 
 Ster V. Tuety, 45 Hun, 49 ; and cases 
 infra. 
 
621 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§361 
 
 care to warn and protect passers-by from any danger to which 
 they are exposed' by means of a formal notice, such as could 
 not escape the attention of the traveler, or by an effectual 
 barricade, or in any other manner reasonably likely to accom- 
 plish the purpose. There is no rule of law which limits the 
 builder to the use of any one or more of the modes here sug- 
 gested.* The mode adopted must, however, be sufficient for 
 that purpose, so that, if any accident happens to a traveler, he 
 shall be in fault.' One does not, by going on a street, though 
 it is little used and largely occupied with buildir.g material for a 
 building in course of construction, assume the risk of building 
 material falling on him.' If the obstruction is perfectly obvious, 
 e. g., a temporary bridge built over a vault in the course of its 
 excavation beneath the sidewalk, and necessarily above the 
 street level, a traveler is bound to observe its presence, and to 
 exercise a care and prudence which might be unnecessary upon 
 the sidewalk. The builder of such a bridge is not required to 
 make it as perfectly safe as was the sidewalk before its 
 removal.'^ 
 
 5 Vanderpool v. Husson, 28 Barb. 
 196 ; Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. 
 Ann. 818. Making repairs to a roof , 
 by a contractor, from a scaffold 
 hanging therefrom composed of a 
 ladder with planks tied to it by a 
 rope is not so intrinsically dangerous 
 as to authorize a recovery against 
 the owner for the cutting of the rope 
 by rubbing against the building, and 
 the consequent fall of a plank to the 
 street belov7 (Hexamer v. "Webb, 101 
 N. Y. 377 ; 4 N. E. 755). A builder 
 is liable for negligently stretching a 
 guy-rope across a street so low that 
 plaintiff was swept off his wagon on 
 the street (Larson v. Tobin, 43 Minn. 
 88 ; 44 N. "W. 1078). See Rosenhain 
 V. Galligan, 5 N. Y. App. Div. 49; 
 38 N. Y. Supp. 713 [duty to examine 
 derrick, cables, and erect shed over 
 sidewalk]. "Where the sidewalk was 
 not covered or in any way guarded, 
 the falling of articles from the build- 
 ing to the sidewalk raises a pre- 
 sumption of negligence (Dohn v. 
 
 Dawson, 84 Hun, 110 ; 32 N. Y. Supp. 
 59) . See Witte v. Dleff enbach , 54 N. 
 Y. Super. 508 [fall of a hammer]; 
 and cases cited under §§ 59 and 60, 
 ante,. 
 
 ■• "Vanderpool v. Husson, supra; 
 Eccles V. Darragh, 48 N. Y. Super. 
 528. 
 
 ' Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. Ann. 
 818 ; Jones v. Chantry, 4 Thomp & 
 C. 63 [piles of sand and wagons un- 
 lighted at night] . A wooden scaffold- 
 ing was being erected over the side- 
 walk on a bridge, and both ends of 
 the sidewalk were barred, but the 
 roadway was open to travel. Held, 
 not negligence in not having some 
 one at each end of the bridge to warn 
 passers-by of the danger (Heiden wag 
 V. Philadelphia, 168 Pa. St. 72 ; 31 
 Atl. 1063). 
 
 8 Bunnell V. Berlin Bridge Co., 66 
 Conn. 24 ; 33 Atl. 533 ; Dohn v. Daw- 
 son, 90 Hun, 271 ; 35 N. Y. Supp. 
 984. 
 
 ■> Nolan V. King, 97 N. Y. 565. 
 
I 362] HIGHWAYS. 622 
 
 § 362. Obstructions incident to traffic. — The temporary 
 use of a street, when reasonably necessary for the bona fide 
 carrying on of an adjoining owner's business, as by the dis- 
 charging and receiving of goods, etc., is lawful.' The neces- 
 sity required to justify such use need only be reasonable, and 
 the question of reasonable necessity is for the jury.^ The 
 right to load and unload carriages in the highway is entirely 
 subordinate to the right of passage, and must be exercised in 
 such a manner as not unreasonably to abridge or incommode 
 that right.^ When so exercised, the occupant of the premises 
 is not required to furnish passers-by with a safe passage 
 around the obstruction.* But the inconvenience to the public 
 
 1 Welsh V. Wilson, 101 N. Y. 254 ; 
 4 N. E. 633 ; Commonwealth v. Pass- 
 more, 1 Serg. & R. 319; Rex v. 
 Carlisle, 6 Carr. & P. 636, per Parke, 
 J. Streets are fairly subject to 
 many purposes to which a road in 
 the country would not be, and may 
 be used for the temporary deposit 
 of goods in their transit to its store- 
 house, or for wharfage, regard being 
 had to their evident object and pur- 
 pose (Haight V. Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199). 
 s. P., Hand v. Klinker, 54 N. Y. 
 Superior, 433; Jackson v. Kiel, 13 
 Colo. 378 ; 22 Pac. 504. 
 
 = Shook V. Cohoes, 108 N. Y. 648 ; 
 15 N. E. 531. Defendant, in unload- 
 ing sugar into his store, placed a 
 skid across the sidewalk, over which 
 plaintiff fell. There was an alley 
 leading to the rear of the store, but 
 the unloading could not have been 
 there accomplished without great 
 inconvenience, and defendant fol- 
 lowed the customary method of 
 handling such goods. Held, that 
 the question of reasonable necessity 
 was for the jury (Jochem v. Robin- 
 son, 72 Wise. 199; 39 N. W. 383). 
 To same effect, Denby v. Miller, 59 
 Wise. 240 ; 18 N. W. 169 ; Gerdes v. 
 Christopher Foundry Co. [Mo.], 25 
 S. W. 537. 
 
 3 Rex v. Russell, 6 East, 437 ; Rex 
 v. Cross, S Campb. 324. In Merritt 
 
 V. Fitzgibbons (102 N. Y. 363 ; 7 N. E. 
 179), plaintiff, while passing along 
 a street in front of defendant's store, 
 slipped uj^on the icy cover of a coal- 
 hole, slippery with snow just fallen, 
 and fell under and was injured by 
 defendant's horse, attached to his 
 truck standing upon the sidewalk, 
 near its edge. The street was nar- 
 row, in part occupied by a double- 
 ti-ack horse railroad, so that there 
 was not room for a truck to stand in 
 the roadway and allow passage of a 
 car, and, at the time, one horse was 
 standing upon the sidewalk, and the 
 other in the street, leaving just room 
 for the cars to isass ; sufficient space 
 was left on the sidewalk for way- 
 farers. Held, no negligence was 
 shown on defendant's part in occu- 
 pying the sidewalk. In Mathews v. 
 Kelsey (58 Me. 56), held, that the 
 owner of a warehouse located on a 
 street through which a railroad 
 runs, has the right to unload goods 
 from a car standing on the track, 
 by means of skids extending from 
 the car to the warehouse, providing 
 there is ample room to accommodate 
 travel ou the other side of the street, 
 and the time occupied in unloading 
 is reasonably short. 
 
 4 Welsh V. Wilson, 101 N. Y. 254 ; 
 4 N. E. 633 [slippery steps in front 
 of store, on which plaintiff stepped to 
 
623 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§362 
 
 must not be prolonged for an unreasonable time.= To use 
 a street for storing goods, for months or weeks, is unreason- 
 able and actionable, as matter of law :* the rule being general 
 that no one can legally carry on any part of his business in a 
 public street, to the annoyance ofthe public' It is likewise 
 actionable for a city to allow bulky goods deposited by the 
 owner in one of its streets, much used for travel, to remain 
 there an unreasonable time, e.g., twenty-four hou'-s.^ 
 
 get around skids placed across side- 
 walk]. Whether rolling hogsheads 
 down skids from a truck to the side- 
 walk, without using danger signals 
 or stationing any one to warn pe- 
 destrians, was negligent, is for the 
 jury (Blaustein v. Guindon, 83 
 Hun, 5; 31 N. Y. Supp. 559). It is 
 error to charge that e veryone who oc- 
 cupies the highway should do so with 
 such care that no injury can happen 
 to any one, where the legal standard 
 of negligence is nowhere clearly de- 
 fined (Collins V. Leafey, 124 Pa St. 
 203; 16 Atl. 765). Persons walking 
 'in a city are bound to take notice of 
 such obstructions as the necessities 
 of commerce and the convenient 
 occupation of adjacent premises 
 render common (Buesching v. St. 
 Louis Gas Light Co. , 6 Mo. App. 85) . 
 ' In Rex V. Jones (3 Campb. 230) , 
 the defendant, who was a lumber- 
 dealer, occupied a small yard close 
 to the street, and was in the habit, 
 owing to the small size of his yard, 
 of depositing the long pieces of 
 timber in the street, and there saw- 
 ing them up before carrying them 
 into the yard. Lord Ellenborough 
 said : "A cart or wagon may be un- 
 loaded at a gateway, but this must 
 be done with promptness. So as to 
 the repairing of a house ; the public 
 must submit to the inconvenience 
 occasioned necessarily in repairing 
 the house ; but if this inconvenience 
 be prolonged for an unreasonable 
 time, the public have a right to com- 
 plain, and the party may be indicted 
 
 for a nuisance." s p., Rex v. Ward, 
 
 4 Ad. & El. 384 ; Rex v. Russell, 6 
 Barn. & Cr. 566 ; Bradbee v. London, 
 
 5 Scott, N. R. 79. 
 
 * Gerdes v. Christopher, etc. Simp 
 son Foundry Co. [Mo.], 27 S. W. 615. 
 
 ' " If the nature of the defendant's 
 business and the condition of his 
 premises are such as to require a 
 congregation of wagons in, and an 
 obstruction of, the adjoining street, 
 he must enlarge his premises, or re- 
 move to some more convenient 
 spot " (People V. Cunningham, 1 Den. 
 524). The fi-equent and continuous 
 obstruction of a street and sidewalk 
 by unreasonably stopping wagons 
 thereon, thus inconveniencing plain- 
 tiff and others passing on the street, 
 and rendering his place of business 
 less accessible to the public, is a 
 nuisance, remediable by damages 
 (Flynn v. Taylor, 53 Hun, 167 ; 6 
 N. Y. Supp. 96). S. P., Todd v. Min- 
 neapolis, etc. R. Co., 39 Minn. 186; 
 39 N. W. 318 [loading railroad cars 
 in front of plaintiff's premises] ; 
 Marine Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, etc. R. 
 Co., 41 Fed. 643. A railroad com- 
 pany cannot, without clear necessity, 
 place its depot so that the receiving 
 and discharging of passengers in- 
 juriously interferes with the use of 
 the highway (State v. Morris, etc. 
 R. Co., 44 N. J. Law, 437 ; State v. 
 Vermont Central R. Co., 27 Vt. 103 ; 
 and see Lackland v. North Missouri 
 R. Co., 31 Mo. 180). 
 
 8 Birmingham v. Tayloe, 105 Ala. 
 170 ; 16 So. 576 [box seven feet long 
 
§363] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 624 
 
 § 363. Obstructions from natural causes. — Obstructions of 
 a highway, occasioned by some natural cause, such as a flood.^ 
 or frost, ^ or snow or ice, blocking the way or impeding travel, 
 are as much defects as any other which towns and cities are 
 bound to remove or render harmless with reasonable dili- 
 gence.^ It is generally held that such obligation does not 
 extend to the removal of ice formed in smooth surfaces, so as 
 to constitute no other defect than a slippery condition of the 
 way,* unless the formation or accumulation of ice upon it was 
 proximately caused by a structural defect in the street or 
 sidewalk,^ or by a culpable neglect by the city of its general 
 
 two and one-half feet wide, and two 
 feet high, with handles extending 
 one foot beyond its length]. The 
 piling of lumber in a public street, 
 prima facie, constitutes negligence, 
 and the owner is liable for injuries 
 caused thereby, though not knowing 
 that it was piled in a dangerous 
 manner (Senhenn v. Evansville, 140 
 Ind. 675 ; 40 N. E. 69) . Compare 
 Mattimore v. Erie, 144 Pa. St. 14 ; 
 22 Atl. 817. 
 
 ' If earth under the sidewalk had 
 for more than twenty-four hours 
 been washed away, so as to make 
 ordinary travel presently perilous, it 
 is a defect under the statute (Monies 
 V. Lynn, 131 Mass. 443). Compare 
 AUen V. Chippewa Falls, 53 Wise. 
 430 ; Wiltsie v. Tilden, 77 Id. 153 ; 
 46 N. W. 334; Bush v. Geneva, 
 3 Thomp. & C. 409 ; Seely v. Litch- 
 field, 49 Conn. 134 ; see ante, § 848. 
 
 2 Tripp V. Lyman, 87 Me. 350 [frost, 
 causing the sinking of stones below 
 the surface]. A town is not respon- 
 sible for an accident caused by the 
 miry condition of a country road, 
 where such condition is the result of 
 the weather and the nature of the 
 soil (Brendlinger v. New Hanover, 
 148 Pa, St. 98 ; 33 Atl. 1105). Com- 
 pare Atlanta v. Martin, 88 Ga. 21 ; 
 13 S. E. 805. 
 
 ^ Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. U. 
 
 S. 161 [under R. I. statute] ; Loker 
 V. Brookline, 18 Pick. 343 ; Holman 
 V. Townsend, 18 Mete. 397 ; Dutton v. 
 Weare, 17 N. H. 34, and cases cited 
 infra. 
 
 * Mere slipperiness of a highway 
 or sidewalk, caused by either ice or 
 snow, is not a defect for which towns 
 are liable (Smyth v. Bangor, 73 Me. 
 349 ; Stanton V. Springfield, 13 Allen, 
 566; Nason v. Boston, 14 Id. 508; 
 Johnson v. Lowell, 13 Id. 572, note ; 
 Stone V. Hubbardston, 100 Mass. 49 ; 
 Gilbert v. Boxbury, Id. 185 ; Landolt 
 V. Norwich, 87 Conn. 615 ; Buck v. 
 Glens Falls, 4 App. Div. 333 ; 38 N. 
 Y. Supp. 583; Mauch Chunk v. 
 Kline, 100 Pa. St. 119 ; Kannenberg 
 V. Alpena, 96 Mich. 53; 55 N. W. 
 614 ; Calder v. Walla Walla, 6 Wash. 
 377 ; 38 Pac. 1054 ; Eingland v. To- 
 ronto, 23 Upper Canada [C. P.], 93). 
 
 * Hughes V. Lawrence, 160 Mass. 
 474; 36 N. E. 485 [gutter fourteen 
 inches wide and one and one- 
 half inches deep, extending across 
 sidewalk] ; Adams v. Chicopee, 
 147 Mass. 440 ; 18 N. E. 331 ; Mc- 
 Closkey v. Moies [R. I.], 83 Atl. 335 
 [depression in bridge, from which 
 rainwater could not escape, and 
 freezing] ; Clemence v. Auburn, 66 
 N. Y. 384 [sudden slope of six inches 
 in three and a half feet in a sidewalk 
 having a grade of three-quarters of 
 
625 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§363 
 
 duty to keep its streets reasonably safe,^ in which cases the ice, 
 though smooth, is an actionable defect. The duty rest- 
 ing upon municipal corporations to remove accumulations 
 of ice and snow, as it falls from time to time, upon 
 their streets, is a qualified one, and becomes imperative 
 only when dangerous formations or obstacles have been cre- 
 ated, of whose existence actual or constructive notice has 
 been received.' This duty is not affected by the fact 
 that the ice is in part the result of artificial causes, as of 
 water escaping from hose,' or an adjacent roof,^ or other 
 
 an inch to a foot, corered with snow ; 
 city Hable]. See Taylor v. Yonkers, 
 105 N . Y. 203 ; 11 N. E. 643 ; Ayres 
 V. Hammondsport, 130 N. Y. 665 ; 39 
 N. E. ^65 ; Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, 
 91 N. Y. 67 ; McQueen v. Elkhart, 
 14 Ind. App. 671; 43 N. E. 460; 
 Chamberlain v. Oshkosh, 84 Wise. 
 289 ; 54 N. W. 618 [depression at the 
 crossing of two sidewalks ; city not 
 liable] ; McCarty v. Lockport, 13 N. 
 Y. App. Div. 494 ; 4:J N. Y. Supp. 
 693. 
 
 * The slippery condition of a side- 
 walk was due to the freezing on it 
 of melting snow overflowing from a 
 gutter known to be choked, and neg- 
 ligently allowed to remain uncleared. 
 Held, city liable (Gaylord v. New 
 Britain, 58 Conn. 898 ; 30 Atl. 365 ; 
 Bishop V. Goshen, 120 N. Y. 337 ; 34 
 N. E. 730). S. P., Gillrie v. Lock- 
 port, 133 N. Y. 403 ; 35 N. E. 357. 
 When so caused, the city cannot es- 
 cape liability on the ground that the 
 ice had not so accumulated in hills 
 and ridgea as to form an obvious 
 physical obstruction to travel (Decker 
 V. Scranton, 151 Pa. St. 341 ; 35 Atl. 
 86). When ice was formed from 
 water from the city's hydrant known 
 to be leaky, it is immaterial that it 
 had no knowledge of the ice forma- 
 tion (Corbett v. Troy, 58 Hun, 338 ; 
 fi N. Y. Supp. 381). 
 
 ' Harrington v. Buffalo, 181 N. Y. 
 147. "The rule is that where there 
 [Law of Neg. Vol. II — 40] 
 
 has accumulated a mass of rough ice 
 in some one place upon a sidewalk, 
 which has been there for a time long 
 enough to give constructive notice 
 to the city, then the city may be lia- 
 ble ; but when the ice on the si<le- 
 walk is the result of some rain or 
 snow which has made all the side- 
 walks slippeiy, then it cannot be 
 negligence for the city not to remove 
 it" (Masters v. Troy, 50 Hun, 485; 3 
 N. Y. Supp. 450). But it has been 
 held in Connecticut, that where a 
 sidewalk has become dangerous by 
 an accumulation of ice, and the city 
 has had ample notice of its condi- 
 tion, and might have rendered it 
 safe by reasonable expenditure, it is 
 liable for an injury to a traveler 
 falling thereon, although there was 
 no structural defect in the sidewalk, 
 and the ice was smooth, and the icy 
 condition extended throughout the 
 city (Cloughessey v. Waterbury, 51 
 Conn. 405). 
 
 " Henckes V. Minneapolis, 43 Minn. 
 530 ; 44 N. W. 1036. 
 
 ' Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 
 104 N. Y. 459 ; Kaveny v. Troy, 108 
 Id. 571 ; Weston v. Troy, 139 Id. 
 281 ; Gillrie v. Lockport, 122 Id. 403 ; 
 35 N. E. 357 ; Stone v. Poughkeepsie, 
 15 N. Y. App. Div. 583 ; 44 N. Y. 
 Supp. 609 ; Hausman v. Madison, 85 
 Wise. 187 ; 55 N. W. 167 ; Scoville 
 V. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 60 ; 39 
 Pac . 481. Compare Clark v. Chicago, 
 
HIGHWAYS. 
 
 626 
 
 §363] 
 
 than purely natural causes, such as the fall of rain. It 
 is the settled rule in New York that if the proximate 
 cause of the injury was slipping on ice newly formed or snow 
 recently fallen, concealing an obstruction in the way, whether 
 of old ice, stones or the like which had been negligently 
 allowed to accumulate, the concurrence of such negligence in 
 producing the injury will not warrant a recovery, unless the city 
 was negligent in failing seasonably to remove the new ice 
 or snow.^" Where the new snow concealing the defect has 
 remained long enough to apprise the city of its existence, 
 the city is liable for having neglected to remove it." In 
 other states, where the statutory liability for defective high- 
 ways is absolute, it is held that if a sidewalk was so defec- 
 tive as to render the town liable in case an accident had hap- 
 pened by reason of the defect, in the absence of ice, and if 
 plaintiff's injuries were caused by such defect, and would not 
 have happened but for it, then the town was liable, though 
 the ice contributed to causing the accident.'^ But it is every- 
 
 4 Bliss. 486 ; Baltimore v. Marriott, 
 9 Md. 160 ; Hausman v. Madison, 85 
 Wise. 187; 55 N W. 167. 
 
 '" A slight incline of sidewalk 
 towards tlie curb, one inch to the 
 foot, caused by debris negligently 
 suflfered to accumulote, on which ice 
 formed over night from rain, held 
 not proximate cause of slipping 
 thereon (Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 
 203 ; 11 N. E. 643). S. P., Kaveny v. 
 Troy, 108 N. Y. 571 ; 15 N. E. 736 [ice 
 formed over night from drippings 
 or overflow from adjacent eaves in 
 severe weather, had been so for a 
 month ; city not liable] ; Kinney v. 
 Troy, 108 N. Y. 567 ; 15 N. E. 738 ; 
 Tobey v. Hudson, 49 Hun, 318 ; 2 N. 
 Y. Supp. 180. The failure for several 
 weeks to remove snow from side- 
 walk not the proximate cause of an 
 injury from slipping on ice, formed 
 the night before out of slush from 
 warm weather prevailing for several 
 days previous (HaiTington v. Buf- 
 falo, 131 N. Y. 147; 24 N. E. 186). 
 
 " Todd V. Troy. 61 N. Y. 506 ; 
 Gillrie v. Lockport, 123 Id. 403 ; 25 
 N. E. 3')7 ; Keane v. Waterford, 130 
 N. Y. 188 [ice a week old formed 
 from snow of two snow storms un- 
 removed ; city liable]. 
 
 '2 Hampson v. Taylor, 15 E.-I. 83 ; 
 8 Atl. 331 ; 33 Id. 733. In Barton v. 
 Montpelier (30 Vt. 650) , it was held 
 that a town is liable for the accumu- 
 lation of a snow-drift on a highway, 
 if, notwithstanding the drift, the in- 
 jury would not have happened had 
 the traveled path in the highway 
 been kept sufficiently wide and in 
 proper condition ; and if it was not 
 in that condition, or of a proper 
 width, when the accident happened, 
 the fact that sufficient time had not 
 elapsed after the accumulation of 
 the drift to allow of its removal be- 
 fore the accident happened, will not 
 excuse the town from liability. See 
 Green v. Danby, 12 Vt. 338 ; State v. 
 Fryeburg, 15 Me. 405 ; Church v. 
 Cherryfield, 33 Id. 460. Under the 
 
627 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§363 
 
 where held that accumulations of ice or snow in drifts or 
 ridges in a highway, so as to obstruct a reasonably free pass- 
 age, or render it by its unevenness or roughness unsafe 
 for travelers, constitute a defect, for which the municipality 
 is responsible whether under the statute,'^ or at common law.'* 
 In regard to that part of the way traveled by vehicles, it 
 would seem that when snow has fallen in great depth, or has 
 drifted, the treading down of it, so that the way is not actually 
 blocked up, uneven, or incumbered, may, in some sense, and 
 for the time being, have the effect to remove the obstruction.^' 
 But, in the case of sidewalks, this cannot be said to be a suffi- 
 cient remedy for the evil." Whether anything less than abso- 
 solute and total removal of the snow from the sidewalk, or 
 
 Michigan statute, held that a city is 
 not liable for an obstruction formed 
 by snow thrown from the sidewalk, 
 together with that thrown from the 
 street-car tracks (McKeller v. De- 
 troit, 57 Mich. 158 ; 33 N. W. 621 ; 
 Hutchinson v. Ypsilanti, 103 Mich. 
 13 ; 61 N. W. 379), or by a ridge of 
 ice formed by the tramping, freezing, 
 and melting of snow until the sur- 
 face becomes uneven (Rolf v. Green- 
 ville, 103 Mich. 544; 61 N. W. 3). For 
 rule as to contributing causes, see 
 § 346, ante. 
 
 '2 Luther v. Worcester, 97 Mass. 368 ; 
 Stone V. Hubbardston, 100 Id. 49; 
 Street v. Holyoke, 103 Id. 83 ; Bil- 
 lings V. Worcester, 103 Id. 329 ; Pink- 
 ham V. Topsfield, 104 Id. 78 ; Morse 
 V. Boston, 109 Id. 446 ; McAuley v. 
 Boston, 113 Id. 503 ; Dooley v. Meri- 
 den, 44 Conn. 117 ; Clark v. Corinth, 
 41 Vt. 449; Cook v. Milwaukee, 34 
 Wise. 370 ; Koch v. Ashland, 88 Id. 
 603 ; 60 N. W. 990. 
 
 " Evidence that there was on the 
 sidewalk a ridge of snow and ice 
 five or six inches high, which 
 was uneven and very slippery; 
 that the ridge had been there for a 
 week before the accident, and was 
 formed in part of snow that had 
 fallen more than two weeks before ; 
 
 and that no attempt to remove the 
 ridge had been made, is sufficient 
 to justify a refusal to grant a non- 
 suit (Keane v. Waterford, 130 N. 
 Y. 188 ; 39 N. E. 13a). Snow as it fell 
 from time to time during the winter 
 had not been cleaned off, but had 
 been trodden down, and had become 
 an uneven or humpy surface, and so 
 remained for about six weeks. Held, 
 city was liable (Jones v. Troy, 53 
 Hun, 610, mem.; 4 N. Y. Supp. 793). 
 s. p. Collins V. Council Bluffs, 33 
 Iowa, 334 ; Caswell v. St. Mary's, 
 etc. Road Co. , 38 U. Can. 347. See 
 McLaughlin v. Corry, 77 Pa. St. 109; 
 Wyman v. Philadelphia [Pa.], 34 Atl. 
 631, and cases supra. 
 
 16 Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. U. 
 S. 161. See Vass v. Waukesha, 90 
 Wise. 337 ; 63 N. W. 380. 
 
 •' Providence v. Clapp, supra. The 
 full extent of the duty to remove ice 
 from sidewalks cannot be definitely 
 defined bylaw, but "must in each 
 case depend upon all the circum- 
 stances of it; the general rule being 
 that towns and cities must use rea- 
 sonable care to make their streets 
 safe for public travel, whether on 
 foot or in carriages " (Landolt v. 
 Norwich, 37 Conn. 615). 
 
§363] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 628 
 
 whether the use of adequate means to make the way safe 
 and convenient, such as the sprinkhng of ashes on a slippery- 
 sidewalk," would be a compliance with a statutory require- 
 ment, is generally a question for the jury.'^ Negligence 
 in not removing or remedying the obstruction can be 
 imputed only after the lapse of a reasonable time, after 
 its existence was known or ought to have been known," 
 and then only if such removal was reasonably practicable.^" 
 
 " Under a statute requiring ways 
 to be kept reasonably safe and con- 
 Tenient for travel, there is no specific 
 duty on the part of the city to sand 
 its sidewalks, and a refusal to charge 
 that, if sanding would have pre- 
 vented the injury, plaintiff could 
 recover was proper (McGuinness v. 
 Worcester, 160 Mass. 373 ; 35 N. E. 
 1068). The fact that sand had been 
 sprinkled on the slippery portion of 
 the walk on the day of the accident 
 is material on question of negli- 
 gence (Buck V. Glens Falls, 38 N. Y. 
 Supp. 583). 
 
 " Whether snow or ice had accu- 
 mulated to a dangerous extent is one 
 of fact, dependent upon all the cir- 
 cumstances (Congdon V. ^N^orwich, 37 
 Conn. 414). Negligence on part of 
 town is not to be inferred from the 
 fact that a highway has been impas- 
 sable from snow-drifts for three 
 months. All the circumstances of 
 the case are to be considered (Burr 
 V. Plymouth, 48 Id. 460) . 
 
 " Where a considerable quantity of 
 snow has fallen, which, from the na- 
 ture of the case, must have caused 
 some obstruction on the sidewalks, 
 the falling of snow is sufficient no- 
 notice (Foxworthy v. Hastings, 25 
 Neb. 133 ; 41 N. W. 132 ; Corts v. 
 Dist. of Columbia, 7 Mack. 277). 
 On the day of the accident about 
 one-tenth of an inch of snow had 
 fallen, and in the ten days preceding 
 not more than five-tenths of an inch 
 had fallen. It had thawed in the 
 
 first portion of this period of ten days. 
 The ice at the place of the accident 
 was rough and uneven, looked like 
 old ice, extended the width of the 
 walk, and had been so a week or ten 
 days. Held, the city had construc- 
 tive notice (Masters v. Troy, 50 Hun, 
 485; 3N. Y. Supp. 450 ; Ney v. Troy, 
 50 Hun, 604, me?«.; 3 N. Y. Supp. 
 679 [alternately thawed and fi-ozen 
 for two or three weeks ; notice pre- 
 sumed] ; Walsh v. Buffalo, 17 N. 
 Y. App. Div. 113 [four or five inches 
 of snow on sidewalk for about two 
 weeks]). A week immediately before 
 the accident the temperatui'e had re- 
 mained below the freezing point, 
 and there was snow a week before 
 the accident, but none during the in- 
 terval. Held, insufficient to charge 
 the city with constructive notice of 
 ice on sidewalk (Foley v. Troy, 45 
 Hun, 396). In following cases, held, 
 no inference of constructive notice : 
 Grimm v. Greenbush, 50 Hun, 605, 
 mem.; 3 N. Y. Supp. 76 ; Davis v. 
 Kingston, 53 Hun, 615, mem.; 5 N. Y. 
 Supp. 506 ; Betts v. Gloversville, 56 
 Hun, 639, mem.; 8 N. Y. Supp. 795 ; 
 Tracey V. Poughkeepsie, 46 Hun, 569; 
 Anthony v. Glens Falls, 38 N. Y. 
 Supp. 536 [two weeksj. See Stanton 
 V. Salem, 145 Mass. 476 ; 14 N. E. 519. 
 For general rule as to notice, actual 
 or constructive, see 5;§ 368, 369 post. 
 ™ It is not negligence in a town to 
 fail to remove from its sidewalks ice 
 formed by a sudden fall of tempera- 
 ture, and which it is practically im- 
 
629 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§363 
 
 In determining what is a reasonable time, after notice, actual 
 or constructive, local climatic conditions should be considered.^' 
 A municipal corporation may impose the duty of clearing 
 sidewalks of snow and ice upon the householders, and is not 
 guilty of negligence, if, observing that the work is being gen 
 erally done, it awaits their action for a reasonable period. 
 When, however, such reasonable time has expired, the corpo- 
 ration must either compel a householder to act, or do the work 
 itself, and if it suffers the obstruction to remain thereafter, 
 with notice, it will be responsible.^^ 
 
 § 364. [consolidated with § 363.] 
 
 possible to remove ; or to fail to 
 compel its citizens to sprinkle such 
 ice with ashes or sand to prevent it 
 from being slippery, but the city 
 may await a change of temperature, 
 which will remove the danger (Tay- 
 lor V. Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 20a ; 11 
 N. E. 642). S. P., Harrington v. 
 Buffalo, 121 N. Y. 147 ; 24 N. E. 186. 
 A city is not liable where the severity 
 of the weather, and the sudden and 
 frequent changes, rendered it practi- 
 cally impossible to remove the ice 
 (Kleng V. Buflfalo, 72 Hun, 541 ; 25 
 N. Y. Supp. 445 ; Duncan v. Buffalo, 
 50 Hun, 600, mem. ; 2 N. Y. Supp. 503 
 [heavy fall of snow ended twenty- 
 four hours before accident] ; Grimm 
 V. Greenbush, 50 Hun, 605 ; 8 N. Y. 
 Supp. 76 [had rained, snowed and 
 frozen for four or five days before 
 accident]; O'Connor v. New York, 16 
 Daly, 58 ; 9 N. Y. Supp. 492 [delay 
 of forty-eight hours after snow ceased 
 falling, no negligence] ; Peard v. Mt. 
 Vernon, 83 Hun, 250 ; 81 N. Y. Supp. 
 895 [snow fell nearly every day for 
 about two weeks before the acci- 
 dent, with occasional rains, which 
 froze as they fell, rendering the snow 
 a solid mass of ice] ; Safford v. Green 
 Island, 74 Hun, 306 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 
 669 ; Dorn v. Oyster Bay, 84 Hun, 
 
 510; 33 N. Y. Supp. 341. A 
 city is not liable, as a mat- 
 ter of law, for failing to remove 
 snow which fell during an unusual 
 storm to the depth of four feet, and 
 was piled up by street-car companies 
 in clearing their tracks, and allowed 
 to so remain for seven days (McDon- 
 ald V. Toledo, 63 Fed. 60). The neg- 
 lect of a city to remove, before one 
 o'clock in the afternoon, ice which 
 had formed on sidewalks in the pre- 
 ceding night, not actionable (Blake- 
 ley V. Troy, 18 Hun, 167). Compare 
 Darling v. New York, Id. 340 ; Smith 
 V. Brooklyn, 36 Id. 224 ; Piercy v. 
 Averill, 37 Id. 360 ; Evers v. Hudson 
 Eiver Bridge Co , 18 Id. 144 ; Bat- 
 tersby v. New York, 7 Daly, 16. A 
 refusal to instruct the jury that if 
 the film of ice was formed on the 
 afternoon or evening of the day of 
 the accident plaintiff could not re- 
 cover, and leaving it open to the 
 jury's discretion, is error (Keane v. 
 Waterford, 49 Hun, 609, mem. ; 2 
 N. Y. Supp. 182). 
 
 ^'- Lumley v. Backus Mfg. Co. 20 
 C. C. A. 1; 73 Fed. 76; Scoville v. 
 Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 60 ; 89 Pao. 
 481. 
 
 " Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 
 202; 11 N. E. 642. 
 
§365] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 630 
 
 § 365. Individual liability for wrongful obstructions. — 
 
 The rule is universal that whoever, without lawful authority, 
 obstructs a highway so as to render its use hazardous, is liable 
 to one who sustains a special damage ' thereby. It is immaterial 
 whether negligence caused the nuisance.' The unathorized 
 digging of a ditch across, or laying logs or other material upon 
 a highway though but for temporary convenience,' or doing 
 anything which renders the highway less commodious or safe 
 for the traveler, is a nuisance, the author of which is liable for 
 the consequences.* Although the owner of the soil over which 
 
 ' See % 3111, post, 
 
 ■ ' ' Any act of an individual done in 
 a highway which detracts from the 
 safety of travelers, is a nuisance" 
 (per Cowen, J., Dygert v. Schenck, 
 23 Wend. 446 [bridge over a i-ace- 
 way through highway]). S. P., 
 Congreve v. Smith. 18 N. Y. 79 [un- 
 covered excavation in street without 
 license]. '-The liability does not 
 depend upon negligence " (Congreve 
 V. Morgan, 18 Id. 84); hence it is im- 
 material that a third person removed 
 the covering without defendant's 
 knowledge ; the only material fact is 
 that defendant's interference made 
 the way unsafe (lb.), s. P. , Llnsley v. 
 Bushnell, 15 Conn. 235 [load of wood 
 left on margin of road, dragged into 
 traveled path by stranger; not re- 
 moved by defendant]; Robbins v. 
 Chicago, 4 Wall. 657; Davenport v. 
 Ruckman, 37 K Y. 574; Irvine 
 v. Wood, 51 Id. 334; CliflEord v. Dam, 
 81 Id. 53; Portland v. Richardson, 54 
 Me. 46; Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 
 453 ; Lowell v. Short, 4 Gush. 377; 
 Stoughton V. Porter, 95 Mass. 191; 
 Fisher v, Thirkell, 31 Mich. 1; Ste- 
 phani v. Brown, 40 111. 438 ; Severin 
 V. Eddy, 53 Id. 189; Gridley v. Bloom- 
 ington, 68 Id. 47. See Davis v. 
 Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 61 Mich. 
 307, 38 N. W. 108. No question 
 of negligence or unskillfulness is 
 involved in the case of a railroad 
 
 company laying its tracks in a 
 highway, when it fails to restore it 
 to its former condition as required 
 by general or special statute (Robin- 
 son V. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 37 Barb. 
 513 ; and cases cited). See other 
 cases cii/5d under §§ 338, 359, ante. 
 
 ' Dunsback v. Hollester, 49 Hun, 
 353 ; 3 N. Y. Supp. 94 [deposit of 
 sand in street] ; Sohiflfmacher v. 
 Kircher, 59 111. App. 113 [temporary 
 removal of sidewalk]. 
 
 ^ Dygert v. Schenck, supra ; Lan- 
 sing V. Smith, 8 Cow. 146 ; Clinton 
 v. Howard, 43 Conn. 394 [trespass 
 for piling stones on margin of way, 
 frightening horse ] ; Brunner v. 
 American Tel. Co., 160 Pa. St. 300 ; 
 38 Atl. 690 [testing • dynamite on 
 highway], s. p., Osage City v. Lar- 
 kins, 40 Kans. 206 ; 19 Pac. 658 ; Pas- 
 sion V. Landrey, [Ind.] 24 N. E. 96 ; 
 Milarkey v. Foster, 6 Oreg. 378 [un- 
 lawful toll-gate] ; Barton v. Mc- 
 Donald, 81 Cal. 365; 33 Pac. 855 
 [unguarded excavation]. The estab- 
 lishment of a toboggan slide across 
 one of the principal streets of a pop- 
 ulous city is of itself sufficient to 
 create liability for injuries caused 
 thereby (Hayden v. Clarke, 10 N. Y. 
 Supp. 391). As to difference between 
 an encroachment and a nuisance, 
 see Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend. 
 350 ; Peckham v. Henderson, 27 
 Barb. 207. 
 
631 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§36; 
 
 a highway is laid out may not )3e guilty of trespass in digging 
 a ditch across it and arching it with a bridge,'* he is bound to 
 see that the bridge does not become a nuisance by hazarding 
 the convenience or safety of travelers, and is responsible if it 
 does.^ And while, in the absence of any statutory inhibition, 
 the presence of an unattended domestic animal on a highway 
 may not be unlawful, yet its owner has no right to so secure it 
 as to obstruct the highway.'' 
 
 § 366. [consolidated.] 
 
 § 367. Ground of liability for defective highways. — The 
 
 extent of the duty of a municipal corporation with reference to 
 the construction and maintenance of its highways is to use ordi- 
 nary care ' to make them reasonably safe and convenient for 
 
 ' " All the land within a [rural] 
 highway fence is not subject to the 
 public right of way ; " and if not, it 
 may be occupied by the owner of 
 the fee, and he is not liable as a tres- 
 passer (Harlow v. Humiston, 6 Cow. 
 189 [depositing logs and brush in 
 highway, frightening horse]). 
 
 ^ He is bound to keep the bridge 
 in repair (Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 
 454 ; Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 
 446 ; Woodring v. Porks Township, 
 38 Pa. St. 855 ; Phoenixville v. Phoe- 
 nix Iron Co.. 45 Id. 135 ; Manley v. 
 Helen's Canal Co., 2 Hurl. & N. 840). 
 
 1 In Gulliver v. Blauvelt (14 N. Y. 
 App. Div. 523 ; 43 N. Y. Supp. 93i), 
 a cow on one side of the highway 
 was fastened to a stake on the other 
 by a chain, drawn taut by the cow 
 and thus raised from the ground, 
 over which a riding horse stumbled 
 and was injured. Held, the owner 
 of the cow was liable. The owner 
 of a horse, allowed to run at large 
 on the highway, may be liable for 
 injuries caused by it, whether vicious 
 or not (Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 
 113 ; Decker v. Gannon, 44 Me. 323 ; 
 Lyons v. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71 ; Fal- 
 lon V. O'Brien, 12 R. I. 518 ; Holden 
 
 V. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336 ; Dickson v. 
 McCoy, 39 N. Y. 400 ; Lee v. Riley, 
 18 C. B. N. S. 732). See § 6:26, post. 
 ' Lane v. Hancock, 143 N. Y. 510 ; 
 37 N. E. 473 (see note 6, § 356, 
 ante). An instruction that it was 
 the duty of the borough officers " to 
 exercise proper supervision or make 
 proper examination of this pave- 
 ment, by going upon and testing it, 
 to discover, if by the eye they could 
 do so, whether the pavement was 
 defective or not," is too strict a rule 
 of responsibility (Lohr v. Phillips- 
 burg, 156 Pa. St. 346 ; 37 Atl. 133). 
 See Shaw v. Philadelphia, 159 Pa. 
 St. 487 ; 38 Atl. 354 ; Burrell v. Un- 
 campher, 117 Pa. St. 353 ; 11 Atl. 
 619 ; Harrigan v. Wilmington, 8 
 Houst. 140 ; 13 Atl. 779 [such as a 
 good business man would use under 
 like circumstances] ; Kent v. Wil- 
 mington, 7 Houst. 397 ; 32 Atl. 464 ; 
 Moore v. Richmond, 85 Va. 538 ; 8 
 S E. 387 [" reasonable care " ] ; 
 Lafayette v. Larson, 73 Ind. 367 ; 
 Michigan City v. Boeckling, 133 Id. 
 39; 23 N. E. 518; Columbus v. 
 Strassner, 134 Ind. 483 ; 35 N. E. 65 : 
 Roodhouse v. Christian, 158 111. 137 ; 
 41 N. E. 748 [reasonable care] ; Olney 
 
§367] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 632 
 
 ordinary^ travel. It does not warrant tneir absolute or even 
 their reasonable safety.^ It is therefore not enough, in order 
 to charge it with liability for an injury, to show the existence 
 of the particular defect which caused the injury;^ it must 
 appear affirmatively either that the corporation caused it, or 
 illegally assented to its creation by another (in which cases no 
 question of notice is involved =), or that the defect in question 
 could have been prevented or cured ^ by the exercise of ordi- 
 nary care on the part of its officers or agents. Its liability to 
 
 V. Eiley, 39 111. App. 401 ; Moore v. 
 Kalamazoo, Mich. ; 66 N. W. 
 1089; Shelley v. Austin, 74 Tex. 608 ; 
 13 S. W. 753 ; Lorence v. EUensburgh, 
 18 Wash. St. 341; 43 Pac. 30. See 
 Shaw V. Sun Prairie, 74 Wise. 105 ; 43 
 N. W. 271 ; Lindsey v. Des Moines, 
 74 Iowa, 111 ; 37 N. W. 9 ; Mansfield 
 V. Moore, 134 111. 133 ; 16 N. E. 346. 
 
 ^ See cases cited under § 370, post. 
 
 ' " The duty cast upon a municipal 
 corporation to keep its streets in a 
 safe condition for travel is not abso- 
 lute, so as to impose liability upon 
 the corporation in every case where 
 a traveler, without fault on his part, 
 sustains injury from a defective 
 street. Its liability depends in all 
 cases upon negligence, that is, upon 
 the fact whether it has omitted to 
 exercise due care, under tlie circum- 
 stances, in their maintenance or 
 reparation. The mere existence of a 
 defect from whicli a traveler sus- 
 tains injury does not, independently 
 of negligence, establish a culpable 
 breach of duty on the part of a mu- 
 nicipality" (Hunt V, New York, 109 
 N. Y. 134 ; 16 N. E. 320 [gas-explo- 
 sion in manhole]). S. P., Burns v. 
 Bradford, 137 Pa. St. 361; 20 Atl. 
 997; Pool V. Jackson, 93 Tenn. 10 ; 
 23 S. W. 57 ; Duthie v. Washburn, 
 87 Wise. 231 ; 58 N. W. 380. 
 
 *' Cases in last note. 
 
 * The defect being created by the 
 city, it is liable without notice (Tur- 
 
 ner V. Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301 ; 16 
 N. E. 344 [excavation] ; Wilson v. 
 Troy, 135 N. Y. 96 ; 32 N. E. 44 ; Kil- 
 ler V. Sharon Springs, 38 Hun, 344 ; 
 Riddle v. Westfield, 65 Hun, 432 ; 20 
 N. Y. Supp. 359 [water-main]). 
 
 ^ A city which permits the occupa- 
 tion of part of a street for depositing 
 building materials, and fails to exer- 
 cise reasonable diligence to prevent 
 such obstruction from becoming dan- 
 gerous to passers-by is liable for 
 damages sustained by the obsti'uction 
 (Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 395 ; 
 10 S. Ct. 90). s. P., Wendell v. Troy, 
 39 Barb. 329 ; affi'd 4 Abb. Ct. App. 
 351 [drain built by lot owner ; lack 
 of supervision] ; Hunt v. New York, 
 109 N. Y. 134; 16 N. E. 320 : Hoyerv. 
 North Tonawanda, 79 Hun, 39; 29 
 N. Y. Supp. 650 ; Buck v. Biddeford, 
 82 Me. 433; 19 Atl. 913 [cess-pool 
 cover] ; Holmes v. Paris, 75 Me. 559 ; 
 Gay V. Cambridge, 128 Mass. 387; 
 Lee V. Buckhampton, 46 Conn. 213 ; 
 Bloomington v. Annett,'16 111. App. 
 199 ; Rockford v. Hildebrand, 61 111. 
 155 ; Claicago v. McGiven, 78 Id. 347; 
 Alexander v. Oshkosh, 33 Wise. 277; 
 Holmes v. Hamburg, 47 Iowa, 
 348 ; Doulon v. Clinton, 33 Id. 397 ; 
 Smith V. Leavenworth, 15 Kans. 81; 
 Wellington v. Gregson, 31 Id. 99 ; 
 Nesbitt V. Greenville, 69 Miss. 22 ; 
 10 So. 453 ; Farman v. Ellington, 46 
 Hun. 41 ; and other cases cited under 
 § 358, ante. 
 
^33 HIGHWAYS. [§ 367 
 
 a private action for an injury from the disrepair or obstruction 
 of a highway is not for maintaining or permitting a nuisancer 
 but for culpable neglect of a duty ; and such neglect can only 
 be predicated on the fact that its officers either knew, or by 
 ordinary diligence might have known, the existence of the 
 
 defect,' and that the character of the defect was such that in- 
 
 ' Where, after notice, a city negli- delphia, 13 Phila. 173 [escape of gas 
 gently suffers an obstruction and from a street-main] ; Burns v. Brad- 
 nuisance to remain on the street, it ford, 137 Pa. St. 361 ; 30 Atl. 997 
 is liable in damages on the tlieory of [sidewalk]; Boyle v. Hazleton, 171 
 negligence and not for maintaining Pa. St. 167 ; 33 Atl. 142 [wrongful 
 a nuisance (Hume v. New York, obstruction by third person] ; At- 
 47 N. Y. 639 ; Congreve v. Smith, 18 lanta v. Perdue, 53 Ga. 607 ; Brown 
 Id. 79; Congreve ^. Morgan, Id. v. Atlanta, 66 Id. 71 ; Lewis v. At- 
 84 ; Frankel v. New York, 3 N. Y. lanta, 77 Id. 756 ; Columbus v. Ogle- 
 Supp. 394) See Donohue v. Syracuse, tree, 96 Id. 177 ; 23 S. E. 709 ; 
 etc. R. Co., 11 N. y. App. Div. 535 ; Atchison v. King, 9 Kans. 550 ; Os- 
 43 N. y. Supp. 808 ; Nevins v. Pe- borne v. Hamilton, 29 Id. 1 ; Stafford 
 oria, 41 111. 503 ; Shawneetown v. v. Oskaloosa, 57 Iowa, 748 ; Doulon 
 Mason, 83 Id. 337 ; Whitfield v. Car- v. Clinton, 33 Id. 397 ; Rosenberg v. 
 roUton, 50 Mo. App. 98 ; and cases Des Moines, 41 Id. 415 ; Weirs v. 
 cited under § 399, ante. Jones county, 80 Id. 351 ; 45 N. W. 
 
 ^ " It is certainly true, as a general 883 ; Fort Wayne v. De Witt, 47 Ind. 
 proposition, that before the corporate 391; Chicago v. Hoy, 75 111. 530; 
 authorities can be held liable in this Fahey v. Harvard, 63 Id. 38 ; Aurora 
 class of cases, it must be shown that v. Hillman, 90 III. 61 ; Ward v. 
 they knew of the existence of the Jefferson, 34 Wise. 343 ; Blank \-. 
 cause of injury, or had been notified Livonia, 79 Mich. 1 ; 44 N. W. 157 ; 
 of it, or such a state of circumstances McKellar v. Monitor, 78 Mich. 485 ; 
 must be shown that notice would be 44 N. W. 413; Pottnerv. Minneapolis, 
 implied " (Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 41 Minn. 73 ; 43 N. W. 784 ; Cun- 
 189, per Miller, J.). S. P., District ningham v. Denver, 23 Colo. 18; 45 
 of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 Pac. 356 ; Dixon v. San Antonio 
 U. S. 450 ; 10 S. Ct. 990 ; Hart [Tex. Civ. App.], 30 S. W. 359. It is 
 T. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 239 ; Mc- not liable for the breaking of a rail- 
 Ginity v. New York, 5 Duer, 674 ; ing around an excavation which had 
 Griffin v. New York, 9 N. Y. 456 ; been made secure two days before 
 Wood v. Watertown, 58 Hun, 398 ; the accident, ih the absence of no- 
 il N. Y. Supp. 864 ; Sherman v. One- tice that the railing had again be- 
 onta, 66 Hun, 629 ; 31 N. Y. Supp. come defective (Jackson v. Boone. 
 137; Colley v. Westbrook, 57 Me. 93 Ga. 663; 30 8. E. 46; Thiessen v. 
 181 ; Hoey v. Natick, 153 Mass. 528 ; Belle Plaine, 81 Iowa, 118 ; 46 N. W. 
 27 N. E. 595 ; Bill v. Norwich, 39 854). As to necessity of notice of 
 Conn. 223 ; Boucher v. ISiew Haven, accumulations of snow or ice, see 
 40 Id. 457 ; Scranton v. Catterson, 94 cases cited in note 7, § 363, ante. 
 Pa. St. 203; Strawbridge v. Phila- 
 
§367J 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 634 
 
 juries to travelers therefrom might reasonably be anticipated.' 
 While the fact that no accident from the defect complained of 
 ever happened before is not conclusive,^" it is to be con.sidered 
 on the question of negligence in not anticipating and providing 
 against the danger of accident." A town is not liable for a 
 
 'Remote contingencies need not 
 be provided against (Loftus v. Union 
 FeiTV Co., 84 N. Y. 455; Cleveland 
 V. N. J. Steamboat Co., 68 Id. 306; 
 Dougan v. Champlain Transport. 
 Co., 56 Id. 1 ; Smith v. New York, 
 06 Id. 295 [sewer choired by extra- 
 ordinary rain] ; Wright v. Wilming- 
 ton, 93 N. C. 156 [same] ; Eowe v. 
 Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291 [same]). 
 Other sewer cases are cited under 
 § 287, ante ; but note that the liabil- 
 ity for defective sewers is placed 
 upon corporate ownership of them, 
 and the duty to anticipate their ob- 
 structions is more stringent than 
 that for the safety of streets. The 
 obstruction must be dangerous ; and 
 "the burden is on the plaintiff to 
 prove either that the thing was 
 originally dangei-ous, or had become 
 so, long enough before the accident 
 for the authorities to have known 
 it, so as to impose on them the obli- 
 gation to put it in proper condition " 
 (per Harlan, J., District of Columbia 
 V. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450 ; 10 S. 
 Ct. 990). In following cases, the 
 defendant was held not liable, the 
 defect or obstruction not being 
 dangerous ; Dubois v. Kingston, 103 
 N. Y. 219 ; 6 N. E. 373 [stepping 
 stone on edge of sidewalk] ; Ring v. 
 echoes, 77 N. Y. 83 [hydrant set in 
 curb] ; Beltz v. Yonkers, 148 Id. 67 ; 
 42 N. E. 401 [depression in center of 
 sidewalk two feet long by seven 
 inches wide, caused by the breaking 
 of adjoining flagstones, which had 
 caused no previous accident]; Wit- 
 ham V. Portland, 73 Me. 539 [slight 
 depression in sidewalk] ; Macomber 
 V, Taunton, 100 Mass. 355 [hitching 
 
 post] ; Gushing v. Boston, 138 Mass. 
 330 [door step] ; Burns v. Bradford, 
 137 Pa. St. 361 ; 30 Atl. 997 [tUting 
 of board sidewalk by action of frost]; 
 Kornetzski v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 341; 
 53 N. W. 1106 [ruts outside rails of 
 street railroad] ; Gosport v. Evans, 
 113 Ind. 133 ; 13 N. E. 356 [bricks in 
 sidewalk displaced by frost] ; Oak 
 Harbor v. Kallager, 53 Ohio St. 183 ; 
 39 N. E. 144 [bill-board on sidewalk 
 blown over by extraordinary wind]; 
 Gray v. Emporia, 43 Kans. 704 ; 33 
 Pac. 944 [falling sign]. See Shelley 
 V. Austin, 74 Tex. 608 ; 13 S. W. 753. 
 
 " Lane v. Hancock, 143 N. Y. 510 ; 
 see Lutton v. Vernon, 62 Conn. 1; 
 33 Atl. 1020 ; Birmingham v. Tayloe, 
 105 Ala. 170; 16 So. 576; Barrett v. 
 Hammond, 87 Wise. 654 ; 58 N. W. 
 1053 ; Bloomington v. Legg, 151 111. 
 9 ; 37 N. E. 696 ; Smith v. Pella, 86 
 Iowa, 336 ; 53 N. W. 336 ; Newport 
 V. Miller, 93 Ky. 23 ; 18 S. W. 835. 
 
 " "The fact that for ten years or 
 more this embankment had been in 
 the same condition, and that no 
 similar accident had occurred, is 
 most cogent evidence of the lack of 
 any negligence on the part of the 
 city in failing to guard this spot. 
 That which never happened before, 
 and which in its character is such as 
 not to naturally occur to prudent 
 men to guard against its happening 
 at all, cannot, when in the course 
 of years it does happen, furnish good 
 ground for a charge of negligence in 
 not foreseeing its possible happening, 
 and guarding against that remote 
 contingency" (per Peckham, J., 
 Hubbell V. Yonkers, 104 N. Y. 434 ; 
 10 N. E. 858). s. P., Dougan v. 
 
635 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§368 
 
 latent defect in a highway, not discoverable by ordinary care 
 and prudence, until a reasonable time after actual notice.'^ 
 Statutes which impose a liability upon towns for injuries from 
 their unsafe highways usually provide either that the town 
 shall have had " reasonable notice" of the defect causing the 
 particular injury, or that the defect shall have existed a specified 
 length of time previous to the occurrence.*^ In the absence 
 of such provision, the town's liability is absolute, and proof of 
 notice is not necessary to a recovery.** 
 
 § 368 Actual notice of defect. — Under the Maine statute, 
 notice of a defect need not be given to the town in its corpo- 
 rate capacity, nor to its ofificers; if given to two of the inhabit- 
 
 Champlain Transp. Co., 56 N. Y. 1 ; Morrill v. Deering, 3 N. H. 53; and 
 
 Beltz V. Yonkers, 148 Id. 67. The fact, cases cited under next section, 
 however, that the highway had been '* Chapman v. Milton, 31 W. Va. 
 
 substantially in the same condition 384 ; 7 S. E. 23 ; Evans v. Hunting- 
 
 for sixty-eight years, and that no ton, 37 "W. Va. 601 ; 16 S. E. 801 ; 
 
 accident had occurred before, did McNally v. Cohoes, 53 Hun, 202 ; 6 
 
 not of itself exonerate the town N. Y. Supp. 842 ; affi'd 27 N. Y. 350. 
 
 from negligence in continuing the In Nebraska, a county is liable, 
 
 highway in its then condition 
 (Maxim v. Champion, 50 Hun, 88 ; 
 4 N. Y. Supp. 515). 
 
 without notice, for a defective county 
 bridge (Raasch v. Dodge county, 43 
 Neb. 508 ; 61 N. W. 725). The statute 
 
 "Prindle v. Fletcher, 89 Vt. 235; of Wisconsin "does not make the 
 
 Hanscom v. Boston, 141 Mass. 242 ; liability depend upon the question 
 
 5 N. E. 249 ; flume v. New York, 47 of diligence or want of it on the 
 
 N. Y. 689; S. C, on second appeal, part of the town" (Ward v. Jeffer- 
 
 74 Id. 364 [see note 3, § 354] ; see son 34 Wise. 343 ; Burns v. Elba, 32 
 
 Stein V. Council Bluffs, 72 Iowa, 180; Id. 610). In Massachusetts, negli- 
 
 33 N. W. 455 [street-crossing] ; La gence is now the. gist of the action. 
 
 Salle V. Porterfield, 138 III. 114; 37 In Flanders v. Norwood (141 Mass. 17; 
 
 N. E. 937 [culvert] ; Ford v. Uma- 5 N. E. 256), a town was held not 
 
 tilla, 15 Oreg. 313 ; 16 Pac. 33 answerable for an obstruction of a 
 
 [bridge]. As to defects from natural highway by a railroad bridge, be- 
 
 decay, see cases cited in note 13, cause the selectmen had done all 
 
 § 369, post. they could legally do to have the 
 
 " See Springier v. Bowdoinham, 7 obstruction removed. Under the 
 
 Me. 443 ; Bragg v. Bangor, 51 Id. f oi-mer statute, it was only necessary 
 533 ; French v. Brunswick, 31 Id. 29 ; 
 Howe V. Plainfield, 41 N. H. 135; 
 Bardwell v. Jamaica, 15 Vt. 433 ; 
 Prindle v. Fletcher, 39 Id. 355 ; Lob- 
 
 to prove the defect, and that the in- 
 jury was occasioned thereby (Billings 
 V. Worcester, 102 Mass. 339 ; Hutch- 
 ing V. Littleton, 134 Id. 289 ; Hodg- 
 dell V. New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153; kins v. Eockport, 116Id. 575 ; Horton 
 
 V. Ipswich, 13 Cush. 488). So in 
 Maine (Merrill v. Hampden, 26 Me. 
 
 Reed v. Northfleld, 13 Pick. 94; 
 Bigelow V. Weston, 3 Id. 267 ; Man- 
 chester V. Hartford, 30 Conn. 118 ; 234 ; Tripp v. Lyman, 37 Id. 250). 
 
§368] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 636 
 
 ants of a town, capable of communicating the information, 
 tiiough such persons are not among the principal men of the 
 town, and are not assessed for public taxes, it is held suffi- 
 cient.* In most states, notice of a defect to an officer or 
 servant ^ who is charged generally or specifically with the care 
 of its highways ' is notice to tlie corporation, e. g., the mayor 
 of a city,' the president of a village,^ an individual member of 
 the common-council,^ board of trustees,'' or board of county- 
 supervisors (where such board has authority to provide a 
 remedy^), a city marshal,' street superintendent,'" chief of 
 
 'Mason v. Ellsworth, 32 Me. 271 ; ' Edwards v. Three' Elvers, 96 
 modified by later statute, Rogers v. Mich. 625 ; 55 N. W. 1003, It is im- 
 Shirley, 74 Id. 141. But notice to material whether he called the at- 
 a foreman employed by road com- tention of the chairman of the street 
 missioners of a defect in a street is committee to the defect (lb.), 
 not notice to the city, though the ' So held, where the members are, 
 .defect arose through his negligence ex officio, commissionei's of high- 
 (Rich V. Rockland, 87 Me. 188 ; 32 ways (Dundas v. Lansing, 75 Mich. 
 Atl. 872 ; Tuell v. Paris, 23 Me. 499 ; 43 N. W. 1011 ; Logansport v. 
 556). See as to Massachusetts — Justice, 74 Ind. 378; Columbus v. 
 Lobdell V. New Bedford, 1 Mass. Strassner, 124 Ind. 483 ; 35 N. E. 65 ; 
 153 ; Winn t. Lowell, 1 Allen, 177. Fife v. Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 540 ; 63 N. 
 Knowledge will be imputed to the W. 541 ; TrapneU v. Red Oak, 76 
 town from the fact that a rotten Iowa, 744 ; 39 N. W. 884 ; Owen v. 
 plank in a sidewalk on a principal Ft. Dodge, Iowa, ; 67 N. W. 
 street, much traveled, was passed 281). See Aurora v. Hellman, 90 111. 
 over daily by one of the selectmen ; 61. To the contrary, Jordan v. Peck- 
 though the defect had not been ob- ham [R. I.] 31 Atl. 305 ; Vanderslice 
 served, tlie general bad condition of v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. St. 103 ; Mc- 
 the walk being apparent (Noyes v. Dermott v. Kingston 19 Hun, 198 ; 
 Gardner, 147 Mass. 505 ; 18 N. E. Bush v. Geneva, 3 Thomp. & C. 409 ; 
 423). Same ruling under Michigan see Donaldson v. Boston, 16 Gray, 
 statute (Malloy v. Walker, 77 Mich. 508). 
 448 ; 43 N. W. 1012). ' Weed v. Ballston Spa., 76 N. Y., 
 
 ^ Smith V. Des Moines, 84 Iowa, 339 ; Whipple v. Fair Haven (Vt.), 21 
 
 685; 51 N. W. 77. Compare cases Atl. 53:3 ; Sorento v. Johnson, 53 111. 
 
 cited in note 15, i?>fra. App. 659. 
 
 'Notice to officers not so charged « Morgan v. Fremont county, 93 
 
 is not notice to city (Austin v. Col- Iowa, 644; 61 N.W. 231 [each member 
 
 gate [Tex. Civ. App.] 27 S. W. 896.) being under duty to report defective 
 
 See Kansas City v. Bradbury, 45 bridges]. 
 
 Kans. 381 ; 25 Pac. 889 ; Pool v. Jack- » Hayes v. West Bay, 91 Mich 418 ■ 
 
 son, 93 Tenn. 62 ; 23 S. W. 57. 51 N. W. 1067 ; Toledo R. Co. v.' 
 
 " Michigan City v. Ballance, 123 Sweeney, 8 Ohio C. C. 298. 
 
 Ind. 334 ; 24 N. E. 117 [defect in '» Shook v. Cohoes, 108 N. Y. 648 ; 
 
 front of mayor's house] ; Sutton v. 15 N. E. 531 ; Bly v. Whitehall 120 
 
 Snohomish,ll Wash. St. 24 ; 39 Pac. N. T. 506 ; 24 N. E. 943 ; Michels v. 
 
 ^''^' Syracuse, 92 Hun, 365 ; 36 N. Y. 
 
637 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§368 
 
 police," or a patrolman on his beat, whose duty it is to report 
 defects,'^ though he fails to report the observed defect which 
 caused the injury.^^ It is sufificient if the one receiving the 
 
 Supp. 507 ; Bradford v. Anniston, 93 
 Ala. 349 ; 8 So. 683 [street overseer] ; 
 Whitfield V. Meridian, 66 Miss. 570 ; 
 6 So. 344 ; Scranton v. Catterson, 94 
 Pa. St. 203 [road overseer] ; Osborne 
 V. Hamilton, 39 Kans. 1 ; Saylor x. 
 Montesano, 11 "Wash. St. 328 ; 39 Pac. 
 653 ; Puller v. Jackson, 82 Mich. 480 ; 
 46 N. W. 721 ; Moon v. Ionia, 81 Mich. 
 635 ; 40 N. W. 25 ; Ledgerwood v. 
 Webster City, 93 Iowa, 736; 61 N. W. 
 1089 ; Parish v. Eden, 62 Wise. 372 ; 
 23 N. W. 399 [street commissioner]. 
 
 " Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo. 375 ; 16 
 Pac, 30 ; Osborne v. Detroit, 32 Fed. 
 36 [defect in front of police station]. 
 ' ■ There can be no occasion to notify 
 defendants of their own acts" 
 (Brooks V. Somerville, 106 Mass. 271 ; 
 Monies v. Lynn, 119 Id. 273; Whit- 
 ney V. LoweU, 151 Id. 313 ; 24 N. E. 
 47). s. P. , Erie v. Schwingle, 23 Pa. 
 St. 384 ; Crawfordsville v. Bond, 96 
 Ind. 236 ; Fort Wayne v. Coombs, 107 
 Id. 75 ; 7 N. E. 743 ; Michigan City v. 
 Boeckling, 123 Ind. 39 ; 33 N. E. 518 ; 
 Jefferson v. Chapman, 137 111. 438 ; 
 20 N. E. 33 ; Mansfield v. Moore, 124 
 111. 133 ; 16 N. E. 346 ; Noble v. Rich- 
 mond, 31 Gratt. 371 ; Poole v. Jack- 
 son, 93 Tenn. 63 ; 33 S. W. 57 ; Hughes 
 V. Fond du Lac, 73 Wise. 380 ; 41 N. 
 \V. 407; Moore v. Platteville, 78 
 Wise 044 ; 47 N. W. 1055 ; Russell v. 
 Columbia, 74 Mo. 480 ; Stephens v. 
 Macon, 83 Id. 345 ; Haniford v. Kan- 
 sas City, 103 Id. 172 ; 15 S. W. 753 ; 
 Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Id. 550 ; 16 
 S. W. 483; Lincoln v. Calvert, 31 Neb. 
 305; 58N.W. 115; Houston v. Isaacks, 
 68 Tex. 116 ; 3 S. W. 693 ; Klein v. 
 Dallas, 71 Tex. 2S0 ; 8 S. W. 90 ; Aus- 
 tin V. Ritz, 73 Tex. 391 ; 9 S. W. 884. 
 See, also, Larsh v. Des Moines, 74 
 Iowa, 513; 38 N. W. 384 ; Shippy v. 
 
 Au Sable, 65 Mich. 494 ; 33 N. W. 
 741 ; Ludlow v. Fargo, 3 N. Dak. 485 ; 
 57 N. W. 506 ; and cases cited under 
 § 358, ante. 
 
 '2 Rehberg v. New York, 91 N. Y. 
 137 ; Goodfellow v. New York, 100 
 Id. 15 ; 3 N. E. 463 ; Hawley v. 
 Gloversville, 4 N. Y. App. Div. 343 ; 
 38 N. Y. Supp. 647; Columbus v. 
 Ogletree, 96 Ga. 177 ; 33 8. E. 709 ; 
 Looney v. Joliet, 49 111. App. 631; 
 Lappread v. Detroit, 95 Mich. 255. 
 A patrolman had observed the icy 
 condition of the sidewalk for eight 
 consecutive days prior to the acci- 
 dent, and had reported the condition 
 of tlie street to the inspector at the 
 station-house, the custom being for 
 such reports to be forwarded to 
 headquarters, and thence to the cor- 
 poration counsel. Held, notice to the 
 corporation (Twogood v. New York, 
 102 N. Y. 216 ; 6 N. E. 275). s. P., 
 Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208 ; 
 1 S. W. 240. 
 
 " A city cannot instruct its subor- 
 dinates to see whether any of its 
 streets ai'e in a defective condition, 
 and then shield itself from liability 
 for accidents behind the fact that 
 such subordinates failed to perceive 
 or to report the dangerous condition 
 of a certain sidewalk (Goodfellow v. 
 New York, 100 N. Y. 15 ; 2 N. E. 
 463). S. P., New York v. Furze, 3 
 Hill, 613, 618 ; Martin v. Brooklyn, 
 1 Id. 545 ; Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 
 349 ; Clark v. Epworth, 56 Iowa, 
 463. See Anne Arundel county v. 
 Duval, 54 Md. 350 ; Tice v. Bay City, 
 84 Mich. 461 : 47 N. W. 1063 ; Moore 
 v. Richmond, 85 Va. 538 ; 8 S. E. 
 387 ; Stephani v. Manitowoc, 89 
 Wise. 467 ; 63 N. W. 176. 
 
§ 368] HIGHWAYS. 638 
 
 notice was acting as street-commissioner and admitted of 
 record to be such, thougli not de jure such officer.'* But 
 notice to a subordinate of the chief officer having charge of 
 streets has been held not actual notice to the city '= though 
 knowledge of an employee sent to repair a way, known to be 
 generally defective, is notice." The knowledge of a defect 
 acquired by an officer before his election has been held not 
 imputable to the corporation, on the happening of an injury 
 from such defect, after his election." Pertinent entries in 
 books of city departments and officers may be admissible as 
 evidence of notice of a defect, though not to prove the exist- 
 ence of the defect.'^ And an order given to an abutting lot 
 owner " to repair the sidewalk in front of his premises, or to a 
 railroad company to repair street crossings,^" is an admission of 
 notice of need of repair. It should be added, that the doctrine 
 of notice does not apply to the case of a defect directly 
 created by the city itself ; and this, notwithstanding a charter 
 provision exempting it from liability except on actual notice.^' 
 Much less is the individual author of an unauthorized obstruc- 
 tion entitled to notice as a condition of liability therefor.^^ 
 
 xMcSherry v. Canandaigua, 129 bus, 168 Pa. St. 382; 31 Atl. 1076). 
 
 N. Y. 612 ; 29 N. E. 821. See Bullock It is not, as matter of law, an ad- 
 
 V. Durham, 64 Hun, 880 ; 19 N. Y. mission of notice of any other de- 
 
 Supp. 685. feet than the one stated in the notice, 
 
 " Sprague v. Rochester, 88 Hun, or of one so related to it that the 
 
 613 ; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1126. existence of the latter, according to 
 
 '* Smith V. Pella, 86 Iowa, 236 ; 53 the usual course of affairs, may be 
 
 N. "W. 226 ; Atlanta v. Buchanan, 76 reasonably inferred from the former 
 
 Ga. 585. (Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio St. 549 
 
 " Lohr V. Philipsburg, 156 Pa. St. 22 N. E. 407). 
 346 ; 27 Atl. 133. ™ Butler v. Malvern, 91 Iowa, 397 
 
 '8 Blake v. LoweU, 143 Mass. 296 ; 59 N. W. 50. 
 9 N. E. 627. Resolutions of the 2' Stedman v. Rome, 88 Hun, 279 
 
 council passed during the previous 34 N. Y. Supp. 737 ; Denver v. Aaron, 
 
 two years ordering the repair of a 6 Colo. App. 232 ; 40 Pao. 587, and 
 
 sidewalk are admissible to show cases in note 11 , supra. 
 knowledge of its defective condi- '''' Clifford v. Dam, 81 N. Y. 53 ; 
 
 tion, when connected with evidence Wells v. Sibley 56 Hun, 644 mem.; 
 
 that the repairs were not made 9 N. Y. Supp. 343 ; and cases cited 
 
 (Thompson v. Quincy, 83 Mich. 173 ; in note 3, § 365, ante. Ignorance 
 
 47 N. W. 114). that a coal-hole in sidewalk had no 
 
 " Haskell v. Penn Yan, 5 Lans. 43. fastenings, does not excuse the per- 
 
 But such an order is no evidence of son responsible for it (Irvine v. Wood, 
 
 an " express notice" (Fee v. Colum- 51 N. T. 234). 
 
639 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§369 
 
 § 369. When notice will be implied. — Unless some statute 
 requires it/ actual notice is not a necessary condition of cor- 
 porate liability for the defect which caused the injury. Under 
 its duty of active vigilance, a municipal corporation is bound to 
 know the condition of its highways, and for practical purposes, 
 the opportunity of knowing must stand for actual knowledge.^ 
 Hence, where observable defects in a highway have existed for a 
 time so long that they ought to have been observed, notice of 
 them is implied, and is imputed to those whose duty it is to re- 
 pair them ; ^ in other words, they are presumed to have notice of 
 such defects as they might have discovered by the exercise of 
 reasonable diligence.^ Such notice may be imputed also where 
 
 'See McNally v. Cohoes, 127 N. 
 Y. 350; 27 N. E. 1043; Smith v. 
 Rochester, 79 Hun, 174; 29 N. Y. 
 Supp. 539 ; Hurley v. Bowdoinham, 
 88 Me. 293 ; 34 All. 72 ; Peacock v. 
 Dallas [Tex.], 35 S. W. 8. 
 
 "Want of knowledge may be re- 
 garded as negligence (Woodbury v. 
 Owosso, 69 Mich. 479 ; 37 N. W. 547 ; 
 Central R. Co. v. State [Md.], 33 
 Atl. 265 ; and all cases cited under 
 this section). 
 
 3 " They owe to the public the duty 
 of active vigilance ; and when a 
 street or sidewalk has been out of 
 repair for any considerable length of 
 time, so that by reasonable diligence 
 they could have notice of the defect, 
 such notice may be imputed to 
 them " (Pomf rey v. Saratoga Springs, 
 104 N.Y. 459; 11 N. E. 43). S. P., 
 Turner v. Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301 ; 
 16 N. E. 344 ; Weed v. Ballston, 76 
 N. Y. 329 ; Olson v. Worcester, 142 
 Mass. 536 ; 8 N. E. 441 ; Springfield 
 V. Doyle, 76 111. 202 ; Chicago v. 
 Dalle, 115 III. 386 ; Lincoln v. Wood- 
 ward, 19 Neb. 259 ; 27 N. W. 110 ; 
 Duffy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171 ; 
 Case V. Waverly, 36 Id. 545. In- 
 dianapolis V. Scott, 72 Ind. 196 ; 
 Indianapolis v. Murphy, 91 Id. 382 ; 
 Madison v. Baker, 103 Id. 41 ; 2 N. E. 
 236 ; Hembling v. Grand Rapids, 99 
 
 Mich. 292 ; 58 N. W. 310 ; Ticev. Bay 
 City, 84 Mich. 461 ; 47 N. W. 1062 ; 
 Squires v. Chillicothe, 89 Mo. 226; 
 1 S. W. 23 ; Birmingham v. Starr 
 [Ala.], 20 So. 424 ; Poole v. Jackson, 
 93 Tenn. 62 ; 23 S. W. 57 ; Galveston 
 V. Smith, 69 Tex. 80 ; 15 S. W. 589 ; 
 and cases cited in next note. 
 
 ^Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. 
 St. 41; Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 
 103 Id. 102 ; Cusick v. Norwich, 40 
 Conn. 375 ; Boucher v. New Haven, 
 Id. 456. Notice was presumed from 
 the existence of defect for a ' ' con- 
 siderable time," in the following 
 cases : Ten hours (Parsons v. Man- 
 chester, N. H. ; 27 Atl. 88 [pile 
 of dirt in much traveled street]); 
 four days (Kunz v. Troy, 104 N. Y. 
 344; 10 N. E. 442 [heavy counter 
 standing tilted on sidewalk]): five to 
 twenty days (Griffin v. Johnson, 
 84 Ga. 279 ; 10 S. E. 719 [hole in 
 bridge] ; Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 9 
 Utah, 491; 35 Pac. 509 [pile of 
 stone three to twelve days]); nine 
 days (Fortin v. Eastharapton, 14.t 
 Mass. 196 ; 13 N. E. 599 ; [ice 
 and snow] ; see other ice and 
 snow cases cited in note, 11 § 363, 
 ante) ; ten days (Grand Rapids 
 •V. Wyman, 46 Mich. 516 [hole in 
 street]) ; two or three weeks (Porafrey 
 V. Saratoga Springs, 101 N. Y. 459 ; 
 
§369] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 640 
 
 a defect, though temporary, has been of frequent occurrence 
 during a long period, e. g., where an individual has habitually 
 
 11 N. E. 43 [ice and snow] ; Foels v. 
 Tonawanda, 75 Hun, 363 ; 37 N. Y. 
 Supp. 113 [hole in sidewalk]); two 
 weeks (Dempsey v. Rome, 94 Ga. 420 ; 
 30 S. E. 835 [same]) ; Uvo or three 
 weeks (Logansport v. Justice, 74 Ind. 
 378 [bridge]) ; three weeks (Atlanta v. 
 Champa, 66 Ga. 059 [hole in cross- 
 ing]) ; four weeks (Ronn v. Des 
 Moines, 78 Iowa, 63 ; 48 N. W. 583 
 [broken sidewalk]); four, six, and 
 eight weeks (Evansville v. Wilter, 86 
 Ind. 414 ; Indianapolis v. Murphy, 91 
 Id. 383; Porter county v. Dombke, 
 94 Id. 72 ; Washington v. Small, 
 86 Id. 463 ; Bloomington v. Annett, 
 16 111. App. 199 ; Smith v. Leaven- 
 worth, 15 Kans. 81) ; two months 
 (Sutton V. Snohomish, 11 Wash. St. 
 24 ; 39 Pac. 273 [excavation]; Robin- 
 son V. Wilmington, 8 Houst. 409 ; 33 
 Atl. 347); six months (West v. Eau 
 Claire, 89 Wise. 31; 61 N. W. 313; 
 [hole in sidewalk] ; McVee v. Water- 
 town, 93 Hun, 306 ; 36 N. Y. Supp. 
 870 [same] ; Waud v. Polk county, 
 88 Iowa, 617; 55 N. W. 538 [bridge 
 openly out of repair]; Michigan City 
 V. Boeckling, 133 Ind. 39 ; 33 N. E. 
 518 [iron rails projected four inches 
 above surface of street]) ; several 
 months (Lincoln v. Smith, 38 Neb. 
 763 ; 45 N. W. 41 ; Schuenke v. Pine 
 River, 84 Wise. 669 ; 54 N. W. 1007); 
 a year (Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 
 37 [slant of sidewalk]); one year 
 (Diamond v. Brooklyn, 36 N. Y. 
 Supp. 97 [hole in crosswalk] ; Kirk 
 V. Homer, 77 Hun, 459 ; 38 N. Y. 
 Supp. 1009 [same] ; Burrows v. Lake 
 Crystal, 61 Minn. 357 ; 63 N. W. 745 ; 
 Alberts v. Vernon, 96 Mich. 549 ; 5") 
 N. W. 1033 [sidewalk not repaired]); 
 four years (Beltz v. Yonkers, 74 
 Hun, 73 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 106 [hole in 
 sidewalk]); seven years (Lane v. Han- 
 
 cock, 67 Hun, 633 ; 33 N. Y. Supp. 
 470) ; ten years (Sebert v. Alpena, 
 78 Mich. 165 ; 43 N. W. 1093 [stump 
 cJoseto traveled path]); several years 
 (Halpin v. Kansas City, 76 Mo. 335). 
 In the following cases, held, notice 
 from existence of defect was not im- 
 plied: Stoddard v. Winchester, 154 
 Mass. 149; 37 N. E. 1014 [an hour 
 before accident] ; Sikes v. Manches- 
 ter, 59 Iowa, 65 ; 12 N. W. 755 [sleigh 
 left standing for ten or fifteen min- 
 utes]; Butler V. Oxford, 69 Miss. 618; 
 13 So. 636 [horse frightened by 
 articles deposited in street an houi 
 or two before] : Klatt v. Milwaukee, 
 53 Wise. 196 [barrier up at four p. 
 M. ; removed by stranger; accident 
 at nine P. M. same day]; Herrington 
 v. Phoenix, 41 Hun, 370; Dotton v. 
 Albion, 55 Mich. 575; 24 N. W. 786; 
 Sheelv Appleton, 49 Wise. 135; 5 N. 
 W. 27 [one day]; Dittrieh v. Detroit, 
 98 Mieh. 245; 57 N. W. 125 [day after 
 thorough repair of sidewalk]; 
 Muller V. Newburgh, 32 Hun, 34 
 [snowed on Thursday, then rained 
 and froze; plaintiff fell on ice Sun- 
 day]; Blakely v. Troy, 18 Hun, 167: 
 [fell on lee one P. M. formed night 
 before]; Dorn v. Oyster Bay, 84 
 Hun, 510; 83 N. Y. Supp. 341 [five 
 days previously a snowstorm com- 
 menced, and continued until the 
 afternoon of the day before the acci- 
 dent]; Chatsworth v. Ward, 10 111. 
 App. 75 [two days]; Chicago v. 
 McCarthy, 75 111. 603 [sidewalk laid 
 but seven days]. There being no 
 averments or proof as to the length 
 of time the excavation had been 
 opened, notice cannot be implied 
 (Fort Wayne v. DeWitt, 47 Ind. 391; 
 Madison v. Baker, 103 Id. 41; 2 N. 
 E. 336). 
 
641 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§369 
 
 used an unguarded cellar door in the sidewalk;' but, on the 
 other hand, it is not to be imputed where a lawful structure has 
 been proved to be exceptionally safe, during a long period.^ If 
 the corporation has notice (unless it is too remote '') that the 
 highway is generally defective, it is charged with notice of the 
 particular defect in question ; ^ provided it is of such a character 
 as to be usually concomitant of general disrepair.' It is only 
 reasonable that notice of /ateni defects should not be so readily 
 
 ' Chapman v. Macon, 35 Ga. 566 ; 
 Augusta V. Hafers, 61 Id. 48 ; McGaf- 
 figan V. Boston, 149 Mass. 389; 31 N. 
 E. 371 [cover of coal hole]. A manu- 
 facturei- was accustomed to deposit 
 castings on sidewalk in front of his 
 place of business ; shipments and 
 removars were frequent, and there 
 were always some castings there. 
 A passer-by fell over them, after 
 dark. Held, whether the obstruc- 
 tions had been so continuous as to be 
 unlawful, and so charge the city 
 with notice, should have been sub- 
 mitted to the jury (Davis v. Corry, 
 154 Pa. St. 598, 36 At). 631). See 
 Mattimore v. Erie, 144 Pa. St. 14; 33 
 Atl. 817. 
 
 ' In Littlefield v. Norwich (40 
 Conn. 406), a removable iron grating 
 over a basement was so fitted by 
 slots into the stone work, that it 
 could not be left insecure, except by 
 gross carelessness ; it had never been 
 known to be out of place in forty 
 years, but a stranger failed to replace 
 it, and, a few minutes after, plaintiff 
 fell in. Held, city not liable. 
 
 ' Notice a year before the injury 
 is not too remote (Brownlee v. 
 Alexis. 39 111. App. 135). 
 
 " Plaintiff need not show that de- 
 fendant had any knowledge of the 
 particular defect which caused the 
 accident, but may recover on show- 
 ing that the sidewalk had been in a 
 rotten and dangerous condition, and 
 that defendant knew, or ought to 
 h^ve known thereof, and had had 
 [Law of Neg. Vol II— 41] 
 
 sufficient time, with reasonable dili- 
 gence, to repair it (Fuller v. Jack- 
 son. 92 Mich. 197 ; 53 N. W. 1075). 
 s. P., Shaw V. Sun Prairie, 74 Wise. 
 105 ; 43 N. W. 371 ; Weisenberg v. 
 Appleton, 36 Wise. 56 ; Spearbraeker 
 V. Larrabee, 64 Wise. 573 ; 35 N. W. 
 555 ; Aurora v. Hellman, 90 111. 61 ; 
 Joliet V. Weston, 133 111. 641; 14 N. 
 E. 665 ; Galesburg v. Benedict, 33 
 111. App. Ill ; Armstrong v. Ackley, 
 71 Iowa, 76 ; 33 N. W. 180 ; Bur- 
 rows V. Lake Crystal, 61 Minn. 357 ; 
 63 N. W. 745 ; Chacey v. Fargo, 5 
 N. Dak. 173; 64 N. W. 933). The 
 condition of the sidewalk in the vi- 
 cinity is admissible to show notice 
 (Aryman v. Marshalltown, 90 Iowa, 
 350; 57 N. W. 867; Edwards v. 
 Three Rivers, 103 Mich. 153; 60 N. W. 
 454; Smallwood v. Tipton, 1 Mo. App. 
 764. Compare Tice v. Bay City, 84 
 Mich. 461 ; 47 N. W. 1063). Notice 
 of the defective condition of the 
 sidewalks generally for one or two 
 blocks each way from a street cross- 
 ing, and not as to the particular de- 
 fect in that crossing which caused 
 the injury, is not sufficient notice. 
 Dundas v. Lansing, 75 Mich. 499; 43 
 N. W. 1011). 
 
 ' Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio St. 543; 
 33 N. E. 407. The court's judicious 
 suggestion, in this case, of a qualifi- 
 cation of the text of our last edition, 
 on this point, is accepted. The quali- 
 fication is implied in other cases 
 cited in last note. 
 
§369] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 642 
 
 presumed from their continuance as open and obvious defects.'" 
 If these were so dangerous as to challenge immediate attention, 
 the jury is justified in finding a very short continuance of such 
 condition to constitute sufficient notice." Active vigilance is 
 required to detect defects from natural decay in wooden 
 structures, like bridges, plank sidewalks and the like, which will 
 necessarily become unsafe from age, but the most that ought 
 to be required is the use of ordinary diligence by making tests 
 and examinations, with reasonable frequency, to ascertain 
 whether they are safe or not.'^ It has been held that notice 
 will not be implied unless the defect was so open and notice- 
 able as to attract the attention of passers-by.'^ But travelers 
 are not charged with any duty to search for defects in a high- 
 way, as road officers are, and the better rule, in our judgment, 
 
 •» Wakeham v. St. Clair, 91 Mich. 
 15 ; 51 N. W. 696 ; and cases cited in 
 note 11 under § 367, ante. 
 
 " Harriman v. Boston, 114 Mass. 
 241 ; Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 
 486 [unfenced precipice at side of 
 road] ; Kiley v. Kansas City, 69 Mo. 
 103 [overhanging wall]. See Rug- 
 gles V. Nevada, 63 Iowa, 185; 18 N. 
 W. 866; also Bradford v. Anniston, 
 92 Ala. 349 ; 8 So. 688 [bridge ap- 
 proach washed out nine o'clock 
 A. M. ; injury at one P. M.; no warn- 
 ing posted ; city liable] ; and cases 
 cited in note 4, supra. 
 
 " Hunt V. New York, 109 N. Y. 
 134 ; 16 N. E. 330 ; Pettingill v. Clean, 
 65 Hun, 634; 30 N. Y, Supp. 367; 
 Sherwood v. District of Columbia, 3 
 Mackey, 376 [wood cover of well, 
 with brick pavement over it ; not 
 inspected for nine years] ; Rapho v. 
 Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404 [bridge] ; How- 
 ard county V. Legg, 110 Ind. 479 ; 11 
 N. E 612 [bridge]; Bonebrake v. 
 Huntington county, 141 Ind. 63 ; 40 
 N. E. 141 [same] ; Allen county v. 
 Creviston, 138 Ind. 39 ; 83 N. E. 735 
 [bridge not inspected for eight years] ; 
 Wheaton v. Hadley, 131 111. 640 ; 23 
 N. E. 433 [plank sidewalk fourteen 
 
 years old] ; Joliet v. McCraney, 49 
 111. App. 381 [same] ; Moore v. Kenoc- 
 kee, 75 Mich. 333; 42 N. W. 944 
 [bridge] ; Blank v. Livonia, 95 Mich. 
 229 ; 54 N. W. 877 [bridge] ; McKeller 
 v. Monitor, 78 Mich. 485 ; 44 N. W. 
 413 [stringer of bridge]. See Spaul- 
 ding V. Sherman, 75 Wise. 77 ; 43 X. 
 W. 558. "A city is not required to 
 take up and examine, from time to 
 time, all its plankwalks, when the 
 same are apparently in good condi- 
 tion " (Jackson v. Pool, 91 Tenn. 450 ; 
 
 19 S. W. 334). 
 
 13 Tice V. Bay City, 84 Mich. 461 ; 
 47 N. W. 1063 ; McGrail v. Kalama- 
 zoo, 94 Mich. 52 ; 53 N. W. 955 ; Lohr 
 V. Philipsburg, 165 Pa. St. 109; 30 
 Atl. 833. Witnesses may testify to 
 having frequently passed over the 
 walk, and that, if there had been a 
 defect thei-e, they would have no- 
 ticed it (McGrail v. Kalamazoo, 94 
 Mich. 53 ; 53 N. W. 955). A defect 
 discoverable by only one in a thou- 
 sand, held not notorious enough to 
 require a city to take notice of it 
 (Burns v. Bradford, 137 Pa. St. 361 ; 
 
 20 Atl. 997) See Broburg v. Des 
 Moines, 63 Iowa, 528 ; 19 N. W. 340 ; 
 Shipley v. Bolivar, 43 Mo. App. 401 . 
 
643 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§369 
 
 is that knowledge of a defect maybe inferred, notwithstanding 
 it may have escaped the attention of all travelers, or even of an 
 officer, frequently passing by. It is not a question whether all 
 passers-by actually noticed a defect, but whether it was notice- 
 able.^* Evidence of previous accidents, occurring at the same 
 place, is admissible as showing that the authorities had notice 
 of its dangerous character ; ^^ and so is evidence as to the con- 
 dition of the street and the absence of lights prior to the acci- 
 dent as tending to show knowledge of the defect, if it was 
 created by a third person, and left unguarded by the city.''' 
 Upon the circumstances of each case, it is for the jury to 
 determine whether the continuance of a defect amounted to a 
 notice of its existence ; " and in doing so it should consider 
 that municipal authorities cannot ordinarily act with the 
 promptness of individuals.*' 
 
 '* "It is the dutj of the city, and 
 not of ' passers by,' to notice defects 
 in streets and sidewalks, and repair 
 them " (Squires V. Chillicothe, 89 Mo. 
 226 ; 1 S. W. 23). " It is not a ques- 
 tion whether all passengers actually 
 noticed the defect, but whether it 
 was noticeable " (Rosevearv. Osceola 
 MiUs, 169 Pa. St. 555; 32 Atl. 548). 
 Notice of a defect in a highway is 
 notice of that condition of things 
 which constitutes a defect, although 
 the town authorities may think it 
 does not constitute a defect (Hinck- 
 ley V. Somerset, 145 Mass. 326 ; 14 
 N. E. 166). In Weber v. Creston (75 
 Iowa, 16 ; 39 N. W. 126), notice of a 
 defect in a board walk was implied, 
 though the walk appeared to the 
 ordinary observer to be safe. 
 
 '^ District of Columbia v. Armes, 
 107 U. S. 519 ; 3 S. Ct. 840 ; Quinlan 
 V. Utica, 74 N. Y. 603; Avery v. 
 Syracuse, 29 Hun, 537 ; Darling v. 
 Westmoreland, 53 N. H. 401; Marvin 
 V. New Bedford, 158 Mass. 464 ; 33 
 N. E. 605 ; Chicago v. Powers, 42 111. 
 169 ; Bloomington v. Legg, 151 111. 
 9 ; 37 N. E. 696 ; Alberts v. Vernon, 
 96 Mich. 549 ; 55 N. W. 1032 [eight 
 months before] ; O'Neil v. West 
 
 Branch, 81 Mich. 544; 45 N. W. 
 1033 [injury by other defects in 
 close proximity to one in ques- 
 tion] ; Moore v. Kalamazoo [Mich.], 
 66 N. W. 1039 [another hole in close 
 vicinity] ; Golden v. Clinton, 54 Mo. 
 App. 100 ; Grundy v. Janesville, 84 
 Wise. 574 ; 54 N. W. 1085 ; Barrett 
 V. Hammond, 87 Wise. 654 ; 58 N. \V. 
 10o3 ; Johnson v. St. Paul, 53 Minn. 
 364 ; 54 N. W. 735 ; Burrows v. Lake 
 Crystal, 61 Minn. 357 ; 63 N. W. 745 ; 
 Smith V. Des Moines, 84 Iowa, 685 ; 
 51 N. W. 77 ; Goshen v. England, 119 
 Ind. 368; 31 N. E. 977. Compare 
 Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 53 
 Hun, 111 ; 4 N. Y. Supp. 848 (note 5, 
 § 60 b, ante). 
 
 '« Pettengill v. Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 
 558 ; 23 N. E. 1095 ; Poole v. Jackson, 
 93 Tenn. 62 ; 23 S. W. 57. Compare 
 Weirs v. Jones county, 80 Iowa, 351 ; 
 45 N. W. 883. 
 
 " CoUey V. Westbrook, 57 Me. 181; 
 Sheel V. Appleton, 49 Wise. 125 ; 5 
 N. W. 27 ; Enright v. Atlanta, 78 
 Ga. 288 ; Newport v. MiUer, 93 Ky. 
 32 ; 18 S. W. 835. 
 
 '8 Turner v. Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 
 301 ; 16 N. E 344 ; Kunz v. Troy, 104 
 N. Y. 314 ; 10 N. E. 443. "The danger 
 
§37o] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 644 
 
 §370. Who may maintain action. — Where the obhgation 
 of towns is limited by the terms of the statutes imposing it, to 
 the making of their highways safe and convenient for travelers, 
 their horses, etc., towns are not liable to the owner of adjoin- 
 ing land, as such, for injuries caused by a defect in a highway;' 
 their only duty being to those who are actually traveling on 
 their highway ; ^ and, of course, if persons voluntarily leave the 
 highway they cease to be travelers upon it.^ And they are not 
 travelers upon a highway while racing horses upon it, though 
 not at the time at a high rate of speed.* In Massachusetts and 
 Maine, under peculiar statutes, a child playing upon the street" 
 
 is that courts and juries may not 
 sufficiently take into account, in de- 
 termining the question of negli- 
 gence, the extent of roadways in a 
 city, under the supervision of the 
 city authorities, the unavoidable de- 
 lay often attending the action of 
 municipal authorities, and financial 
 and other embarrassments " (lb., 
 per Andrews, J.). S. P., Eoach v. 
 Ogdensburg, 91 Hun, 9; 36 N. Y. 
 Supp. 112 ; Lambert v. Pembroke, 
 66 N. H. 280; 23 Atl. 81 ; Laue v. 
 Madison, 86 Wise. 453 ; 57 N. W. 93 ; 
 Saylor v. Montesano, 11 Wash. St. 
 338; 39 Pac. 653. 
 
 ' Ball y. Winchester, 33 N. H. 435. 
 See Stinson v. Gardiner, 42 Me. 248 ; 
 Brooks V. Boston, 19 Pick. 174 ; and 
 see Willard v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 
 574 ; Peck v. Ellsworth, 36 Me. 393 ; 
 Conway v. Jefferson, 46 N. H. 521 ; 
 Smith V. Dedham, 8 Cush. 533; Gil- 
 man V. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130 ; limit- 
 ing Ball V. Winchester, supra. 
 
 ^ Sykes v. Pawlet, 43 Vt. 446 ; and 
 cases supra. Persons in public 
 parks or commons are not " upon " 
 highways, under the Mass. statute 
 (Clark V. Waltham. 138 Mass. 567; 
 Steele v. Boston, 138 Id. 583) nor are 
 those on a vessel passing through a 
 draw-bridge (McDougall v. Salem, 
 110 Id. 21). One unloading a wagon 
 in a street is rightfully there as a 
 
 traveler (Smethurst v. Congrega- 
 tional Church, 148 Mass. 261 ; 19 N. 
 E. 387). Where a pregnant woman 
 was prematurely delivered of a child 
 by reason of falling upon a defective 
 highway, the child, though living 
 for several minutes, is not a traveler, 
 for whose death an action will lie 
 (Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 
 14). The mother had already recov- 
 ered for her own injury. Towns are 
 not bound to make their roads safe 
 for a horse escaped from adjacent 
 land (Richards v. Enfield, 13 Gray, 
 344), or fi-om his driver (Davis v. 
 Dudley, 4 Allen, 557). Compare 
 Verrill v. Minot, 31 Me. 399; and 
 cases cited under § 346, ante. 
 
 3 Brown v. Skowhegan, 82 Me. 273 ; 
 19 Atl. 399. 
 
 * McCarthy v. Portland, 67 Me. 167; 
 and cases cited in note 2, § 379, post. 
 S. P., Sindlinger v. Kansas City, 126 
 Mo. 315 ; 28 S. W. 857 [a foot-race by 
 moonlight]. 
 
 ^ Stinson v. Gardiner, 43 Me. 248 
 [railing gave wayj ; Tighe v. Lowell, 
 119 Mass. 472; Lyons v. Brookline, 
 Id. 491 [child sitting upon sidewalk, 
 injured by fall of curb-stone] ; Blod- 
 gett V. Boston, 8 Allen, 337. The 
 fact that just before the injury the 
 child had been playing on the street 
 did not divest him of the character 
 of a traveler (Graham v. Boston, 1 56 
 
645 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§370 
 
 or a person stopping by the wayside to converse^ is not making 
 such a use of the highway as entitles him to complain of its 
 defects^ In other jurisdictions, not embarrassed by statutory 
 construction, the rule is that the same duty is owing to a child 
 at play on the street^ as to one passing over it for business or 
 pleasure. A person driving on a highway may stop and alight, 
 and, for a reasonable time, employ himself in acts unconnected 
 with his journey, without losing his rights as a traveler.' Mere 
 loitering, or stopping to watch a public spectacle, is not such a 
 use of the street as will prevent a recovery.'" A policeman on 
 his beat," a fireman running to a fire'^ and a laborer working on 
 the street,'^ do not assume any risks incident to their employ- 
 ment, and are entitled, though not technically travelers, to the 
 protection afforded by safe streets. No reasonable and proper 
 use of a highway will bar a recovery for defects thferein, for 
 
 Mass. 75: 30 N. E. 170). A child 
 twenty months old, sent out for air 
 and exercise, is protected by the 
 statute (Bliss v. South Hadley, 145 
 Mass. 91; 13 N. E. 354). 
 
 6 Stickney v. Salem, 3 Allen, 374. 
 To the contrary, Langlois v. Cohoes, 
 58 Hun, 236 ; 11 N Y. Supp. 908. 
 
 ■" Railings on bridges are not de- 
 signed for persons to lean against or 
 rest upon, and one using them for 
 such purposes takes the risk (Stick- 
 ney V. Salem, 3 Allen, 374 ; Oroutt v. 
 Kittery Bridge Co., 53 Me. 500). 
 
 « McGuire v. Spence, 91 N. Y. 303 ; 
 MoUarry v. Loomis, 63 Id. 104 ; Chi- 
 cago V. Keefe, 114 111. 332 ; In- 
 dianapolis V. Etnmelman, 108 Ind. 
 530 ; DoDoho v. Vulcan Iron Works, 
 7.5 Mo. 401 ; Gibson v. Huntington, 
 38 W. Va. 177; 18 S. E. 447 ; Reed v. 
 Madison, 83 Wise. 171, 53 N. W. 547. 
 Bridges, however, are not intended 
 for playgrounds, and need not be 
 furnished with guards or mechan- 
 ical contrivances to keep children off 
 the same (Gavin v. Chicago, 97 111. 66). 
 
 ' D'lflfy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171; 
 
 18 N. W. 900 [stopping to drink at a 
 hydrant] ; Britton v. Cummington, 
 107 Mass. 347 [stopping to pick ber- 
 ries at roadside] ; Babson v. Rock- 
 port, 101 Id. 93 [stopping to fill hole 
 in road]. 
 
 i»Hunt V. Salem, 131 Mass. 394 
 [boy of eight, having carried dinner 
 to his father, stopped four or five 
 minutes to look at boys] ; GuUine v. 
 Lowell, 144 Mass. 491 ; 11 N. E. 733 
 [child of seven walking on the street 
 with his father did not ' ' cease to be 
 a traveler when he stepped aside for 
 one instant to clasp in play a post in 
 the highway " ]; Varney v. Manches- 
 ter, 58 N. H. 430 [stopping to watch 
 a procession]. 
 
 "Kimball v. Boston, 83 Mass. 417; 
 Galveston v. Hemmis, 73 Tex. 558; 
 IIS.W. 29. 
 
 "Palmer v. Portsmouth, 43 N. H. 
 265 ;• Farley v. New York, 153 N. Y. 
 333 ; 46 N. E. 506 ; Coots v. Detroit, 
 75 Mich. 628 ; 43 N. W. 17; Turner v. 
 Indianapolis, 96 Ind. 51. 
 
 '3 Rehberg v. New York, 91 N. Y. 
 137. 
 
§371] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 646 
 
 example, the moving of a house," or driving an elephant " along 
 it. In general, however, roads are made and maintained for 
 ordinary travel in ordinary vehicles, and are not required to be 
 made fit and convenient, from side to side, for riders by 
 bicycle.'^ 
 
 § 371. Damage must, be special.— He, and he only, can 
 maintain an action for a defect in a highway, who has sustained 
 some damage peculiar to himself, his trade or calling. If all other 
 persons using or entitled to use the highway suffer the same 
 kind of damage, though in a less degree, an individual sufferer 
 has no right of action,' but he has, on showing damage beyond 
 
 "Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 
 257. Compare Dickson v. Kewanee 
 Electric Light Co., 53 III. App. 379 
 (note 1, § 361, ante). 
 
 " Gregory v. Adams, 14 Gray, 243. 
 It is a question for the jury whether, 
 from the time, place, and other cir- 
 cumstances, it was reasonably proper 
 to take such an animal o^er a high- 
 way (lb.). 
 
 " Sutphen v. North Hempstead, 80 
 Hun, 409; 30 N. Y. Supp. 128. 
 
 ' The leading case is Iveson v. 
 Moore, 1 Ld, Raym. 486. The dam- 
 age must be ' ' something substan- 
 tially more injurious" to the indi- 
 vidual than to other people (Rose v. 
 Miles, 4 Maule &S. 102). Inconven- 
 ience, although great, will not 
 suffice (Oldstein v. Firemen's Bldg. 
 Ass'n, 44 La. Ann. 493; 19 So. 938). 
 Erections in a river, whereby plain- 
 tiff's docks were rendered inaccessi- 
 ble, or less easy of approach, do not 
 authorize an action (Lansing v. 
 Smith, 8 Cow. 146 ; Butler v. Kent, 
 19 Johns. 323). A decrease of rental 
 value of adjacent property by ob- 
 struction of street, being common to 
 all property in the neighborhood, is 
 not a ground of action (Dougherty 
 V. Bunting, 1 Sandf . 1). s. p. , as to a 
 consequential loss to business result- 
 ing from non-repair of the way 
 
 (Gold V. Philadelphia, 115 Pa. St. 
 184 ; 8 Atl. 386; Hale v. Weston, 40 
 W. Va. 313 ; 21 S. E. 742), and in- 
 ability to get to market by reason of 
 obstructions placed in highway (Sohn 
 V. Cambern, 106 Ind. 302; 6 N. E. 
 813 ; Holman v. Townsend, 13 Mete. 
 297 [total obstruction of way by 
 snowj , Griffin v. Sanbornton, 44 N. 
 H. 346 ; WiUard v. Cambridge, 3 
 Allen, 574 ; Harvard College v. 
 Stearns, 15 Gray, 1 ; Quincy Canal 
 V. Newcomb, 7 Mete. 376 [non-repair 
 of canal] ; Holmes v. Corthell, 80 Me. 
 31; 12 Atl. 730 [wall across road]; 
 Baxter V. Winooski Tump. Co., 32 Vt. 
 114 ; Marini v. Graham, 67 Cal. 130 ; 
 Houck V. "Wachter, 31 Md. 365 ; Bal- 
 timore v. Marriott, 9 Id. 160; Pennsyl- 
 vania Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. 
 St. 396 ; Dunsbach v. HoUister, 49 
 Hun, 353 ; 3 N. Y. Supp. 94 ; Moore 
 V. Wabash, etc. Canal, 7 Ind. 463; 
 Pekin v. Brereton, 67 111. 477 ; Clark 
 V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 70 Wise. 593; 
 36 N. W. 336 [railroad bridge ob- 
 structing navigation] ; Brant v. Plu- 
 mer, 64 Iowa, 33; 19 N. W. 843 
 [obstruction of road] ; Swanson v. 
 Mississippi, etc. Boom Co. , 43 Minn. 
 533 ; 44 N. W. 986 [obstruction of 
 river] ; Central Branch R. Co. v. 
 Andrews, 41 Kana. 370 ; 31 Pac. 276 
 [railroad in street]). 
 
^47 HIGHWAYS. [§ 373 
 
 and in excess of what others have suffered from the same 
 cause. ^ As to what damages will be considered special, it is 
 now well settled that, whether the delay be caused by the time 
 consumed in going a longer way, or in removing the obstruc- 
 tion, the action will lie.^ Where, by the blocking up of a street 
 for an unreasonable time, customers are diverted from the plain- 
 tiff's shop, his loss of business is a special damage.* 
 
 372. [omitted]. 
 
 §373- Notice of injury preliminary to action. — In order 
 to protect municipal corporations from unnecessary litigation,^ 
 it is often provided by their charters, or general statute, that 
 actions shall not be brought to enforce claims against them 
 until the expiration of a certain time after the claims shall 
 have been presented to their common council, or to some 
 specified officer. Such provisions are valid; and, though some 
 of them apply only to claims arising out of contracts,^ others 
 
 ' Iveson V. Moore, supra [highway 
 obstruction preventing customer^' 
 access to colliery] ; and cases in next 
 note. 
 
 ' It was held in an early English 
 case that being put to the necessity 
 of taking a more circuitous route 
 was not a special damage (Hubert v. 
 Groves, 1 Esp. 148) ; and this rule 
 was adopted in Kentucky (Barr v. 
 Stevens, 1 Bibb, 393) ; otherwise now 
 in England (Rose v. Miles, 4 Maule 
 & S. 101 ; Greasly v. Codling, 3 Bing. 
 263 ; Wiggins v. Boddington, 3 Carr. 
 & P. 544) and, in this country, it is 
 held that " the least injury to an in- 
 dividual, as an expense of time 
 or money [in removing the obstruc- 
 tion] entitles him to an action" 
 (Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609). Reme- 
 dy by action not barred by abating 
 the nuisance (lb.) ; Renwick v. Mor- 
 ris, 7 Hill, 575 [dam obstructed navi- 
 gation], s. P., Seymour V. Cummins, 
 119 Ind. 148 ; 31 N. E. 549 [lot-owner 
 deprived of access to dwelling by 
 street obstruction ; city liable] ; Mil- 
 a^-key v. Foster, 6 Oreg. 378 [five 
 
 days delayed by an unlawful toll- 
 gate] ; Brown v. Watson, 47 Me. 161 
 [trees felled across way] ; Stetson v. 
 Faxon, 19 Pick. 147 ; Savannah v. 
 Welson, 49 Ga. 476. 
 
 * Wilkes V. Hungerf ord Market Co., 
 3 Scott, 446 ; 3 Bing. N. C. 381 ; May- 
 nell V. Saltmarsh, 1 Keb. 847 [plain- 
 tiff's corn was corrupted and spoiled, 
 he being unable to carry it away]. 
 
 ' See Fisher v. New York, 67 N. Y. 
 73, 75. 
 
 2 Brusso v. Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679 ; 
 Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 104 
 N. Y. 459 [construing L. 1875, ch. 517, 
 § 3] ; Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 
 450; 34 S. E. 794; Sutton v. Sno 
 homish, 11 Wash. St. 34 ; 30 P.ic. 
 373. The words ' ' claim or demand " 
 in a statute, required to be presented 
 before action, apply to actions upon 
 contract only, and not to those for 
 injuries caused by defective high- 
 ways (Sommers v. Marshfield, 90 
 Wise. 59 ; 63 N. W. 937). See Van 
 Frachen v. Ft. Howard, 88 Wise. 
 570 ; 60 N. W. 1063 ; Mackie v. West 
 Bay City [Mich.], 64 N. W. 25 ; Chad- 
 
§373] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 648 
 
 are applicable to claims for injuries suffered by defective high- 
 ways. If such a preliminary demand be in the nature of a 
 condition precedent, as it ordinarily is, it cannot for any pur- 
 pose be presumed to have been made ; it is essential not only 
 that it should have been made, as required, but should be 
 affirmatively alleged and proved by plaintiff.^ A substantial 
 variance, in the preliminary statement, from the material 
 facts, e. g., a wide discrepancy as to the time,* place ^ or nature' 
 of the injury, will invalidate the statement. It is not, however, 
 essential that the cause of action should be set forth in the 
 complaint in the exact terms of the preliminary claim, and a 
 variance between them, as to the amount of damages claimed, 
 is not material if the facts are otherwise substantially the same.' 
 
 ronv. Glover, 43 Neb. 733 ; 63 N. W. 
 63 ; Jones v. Albany, 151 N. Y. 338 ; 
 45 N. E. 557. 
 
 3 Reining v. Buffalo, 103 N. Y. 308; 
 6 N. E. 793; Foley y. New York, 1 
 N. Y. App. Div. 586 ; 37 N. Y. Supp. 
 465. See Rowland v. Edmonds, 34 
 N. T. 307; Minick v. Troy, 83 N. T. 
 514 ; Dorsey v. Racine, 60 Wise. 393; 
 18 N. W. 938 ; Benware v. Pine Val- 
 ley, 53 Wise. 537; 10 N. W. 695; 
 Maddox v. Randolph county, 65 Ga. 
 316. In Massachusetts, the notice 
 being a condition precedent to the 
 right of action, cannot be waived 
 (Gay V. Cambridge, 138 Mass. 387). 
 • So, in Maine (Haines v. Lewiston, 84 
 Me. 18 ; 34 Atl. 430 ; Clark v. Tre- 
 mont, 83 Me. 436 ; 33 Atl. 378). So, 
 in Iowa (Starling v. Bedford, 94 
 Iowa, 194 ; 63 N. W. 674). In Ver- 
 mont, such notice is held to be no 
 part of the cause of action, but per- 
 tains merely to the remedy and evi- 
 dence (Kent V. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591 ; 
 Babcock v. Guilford, 47 Id. 519). 
 Under Wisconsin statute, held, the 
 city was liable for the nuisance, 
 without regard to whether notice 
 of the injury had been given as re- 
 quired by its charter (Hughes v. 
 Fond du Lac, 73 Wise. 380 ; 41 N. W. 
 407). 
 
 *Shaw V. Waterbury, 46 Conn. 
 263 ; Beisiegel v. Seymour, 58 Conn. 
 43; 19 Atl. 872; Shalley v. Dan- 
 bury, etc. R. Co., 64 Conn. 381; 30 
 Atl. 135. 
 
 * Cloughessey v. Waterbury, 51 
 Conn. 405 ; Rogers v. Shirley, 74 
 Me. 144 ; Dalton v. Salem, 139 Mass. 
 91; 38 N. E. 576. A statement of 
 the place is sufficient which enables 
 the officers, with reasonable dili- 
 gence, to find it (Carr v. Ashland, 63 
 N. H. 665 ; Laird v. Otsego, 90 Wise. 
 35; 63 N. W. 1043; Owen v. Ft. 
 Dodge, Iowa, ; 67 N. W. 381; 
 Harder V. Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446; 
 43 N. W. 350 ; Stedman v. Rome, 88 
 Hun, 379 ; 34 N. Y. Supp. 737; Cross 
 V. Elmira, 86 Hun, 467; 33 N. Y. 
 Supp. 947). A difference of sixty-five 
 feet between the place of the acci- 
 dent, as proved, and the place as 
 stated in the claim filed, is imma- 
 terial (Masters v. Troy, 50 Hun, 485; 
 8 N. Y. Supp. 450;. So is fifteen or 
 twenty feet (Coffin v. Palmer, 163 
 Mass. 192 ; 88 N. E. 509). 
 
 « Willard v. Sherburne, 59 Vt. 361 ; 
 8 Atl. 785. 
 
 'Minick v. Troy, 83 N. Y. 514. 
 A notice which specifically describes 
 the location, but designates it as a 
 bridge, is sufficient, though the evi- 
 
649 HIGHWAYS. [§ 374 
 
 The notice must be of such form and manner as to indicate 
 an intention to make a claim on account of the injury, and 
 not a mere communication of information of the accident.^ 
 Notice is sufficient, if it reaches the proper officer in due time, 
 though not handed directly to him.' 
 
 § 374. Defenses. — It is no defense to an action for injuries 
 sustained by the non-repair or obstruction of a highway, that 
 it had been in that condition for a long time,' or that a con- 
 siderable portion of the roads within the town had similar 
 imperfections from the same cause, as the freezing and thaw- 
 ing of the ground,^ or that the road, if repaired, would be of 
 no immediate practical use in consequence of the destruction 
 of a connecting bridge repairable by another.' It is no defense 
 that there were other streets by which the person injured might 
 have reached the point he was aiming at when injured, if but 
 for culpable neglect to give notice and warning, by closing the 
 street, or in some other way, the injury would not have 
 
 dence shows it to be a culvert (Wall 
 V. Highland, 73 Wise. 435 ; 39 N. W. 
 560). The rule is more rigid in 
 Massachusetts (Spooner v. Freetown, 
 139 Mass. 335 ; 29 N. E. 663). 
 
 'Harris v. Newbury, 133 Mass. 
 331; Kenady v. Lawrence, Id. 318. 
 
 ' Wormwood v. Waltham, 144 
 Mass, 184. A claim is sufficiently 
 presented to the common council if 
 presented to its clerk (Murphy v. 
 Buffalo, 38 Hun, 49 ; Walsh v. Buf- 
 falo, 93 Hun, 438 ; .36 N. Y. Supp. 
 997; Paulson v. Pelican, 79 Wise. 
 445 : 48 N. W. 715) ; not so, if pre- 
 sented to a member of it (Denver v. 
 Saulcey, 5 Colo. App. 420 ; 38 Pae. 
 1098). The notice must be in writ- 
 ing (Foley V. New York, 1 N. Y. 
 App. Div. 586 ; 37 N. Y. Supp. 465). 
 
 ' Dygert v. Schenok, 33 Wend. 
 446. s. P , Driggs v. Phillips. 103 N. 
 Y. 77 ; 8 N. E. 514. 
 
 5 Tripp V. Lyman, 37 Me. 250. De- 
 fendant cannot show that the road 
 
 in question was in the same con- 
 dition as any other road of that 
 kind (McLaughlin v. Philadelphia 
 Traction Co. [Pa.], 34 Atl. 863). Com- 
 pare Jessup V. Osceola county, 93 
 Iowa, 178 ; 60 N. W. 485 ; Shelby 
 county v. Blair, 8 Ind. App. 574. 
 The number of miles of sidewalk in 
 the city cannot be considered on the 
 question whether the walk in ques- 
 tion was safe (Wichita v. Coggshall, 
 3 Kan. App. 540 ; 43 Pae. 843 ; Barr 
 V. Kansas City, 105 Mo. 550 ; 16 S. 
 W. 483). 
 
 2 Commonwealth v. Deerfield, 6 
 Allen, 449. Compare State v. Eye, 
 35 N. H. 368. A refusal to repair, on 
 the pretense of a belief that repairs 
 were not immediately necessary, 
 is not excused, though expressed 
 in a written resolution, however 
 formally or even honestly adopted 
 (Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y, 113 : 
 Fitzgerald v. Binghamton, 40 Hun, 
 333). 
 
§375] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 650 
 
 occurred.* The want of funds, and of power to raise money, 
 or to enforce contributions of labor,' or to assess the expense 
 of repair upon abutters,* is a good defense to a charge of 
 negligence for non-repair ; provided it is shown that all the 
 funds applicable to such use, and all means of raising more, 
 have been exhausted.' But want of funds is not available as a 
 defense to a charge of negligence in not erecting barriers on a 
 dangerous street, or not closing the street altogether, when 
 necessary.' 
 
 § 375- Contributory negligence. — The application to 
 actions for defective highways of the rule as to contributory 
 negligence requires some further illustration than that given 
 in the chapter on the general subject.^ In the first place, the 
 rule does not apply to an action against one who unlawfully 
 created the defect in the highway which caused the injury, 
 such an action being founded on nuisance, not on negligence.' 
 
 *Erie v. Schwingle, 23 Pa. St. 384; 
 Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211; 23 N. 
 W. 419 ; Weathered v. Bray, 7 Ind. 
 706. Compare Cook v. Atlanta, 94 
 Ga. 613; 19 S. E. 987. 
 
 ■'Whitfield V, Meridian, 66 Miss. 
 570 ; 6 So. 244. 
 
 «New Albany v. MoCuUooh, 137 
 Ind. 500 ; 26 N. E. 1074 ; Lombar v. 
 East Tawas, 86 Mich. 14 ; 48 N. W. 
 947. 
 
 ■■ Hutson V. New York, 9 N. Y. 163 ; 
 Hines t. Lockport, 50 Id. 286 ; Hyatt 
 V. Rondout, 44 Barb. 385 ; Peach v. 
 Utica, 10 Hun 477 ; Wendell v. Troy, 
 39 Barb. 329, 33H ; Ivory v. Deerpark, 
 116 N. Y. 476 ; 23 N. E. 1080 ; Young 
 V. Macomb. 11 N. Y. App. Div. 480 ; 
 42 N. Y. Supp. 351 ; Burns v. Elba, 
 33 Wise. 605 ; Erie v. Schwingle, 22 
 Pa. St. 384 ; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 
 17 Minn. 308 ; Winship v. Enfield, 42 
 N. H. 197; Baltimore, etc. Turn- 
 pike Co. V. State, 63 Md. 573; 1 
 Atl. 885 ; Birmingham v. Lewis, 
 93 Ala. 353; 9 So. 343; Mt. Ver- 
 non V. Brooks, 39 111. App. 436. 
 The want of funds is a matter of 
 
 defense, and burden of proving it 
 is on defendant (Weed v. Ballston 
 Spa., 76 N. Y. 339 ; Hines v. Lock- 
 port, 50 Id. 338 ; Bullock v. Durham, 
 64 Hun, 380 ; Netzer v. Crookston, 
 59 Minn. 344; 61 N. W. 31). Evi- 
 dence that the road was repaired 
 several days after the accident is not 
 competent to prove possession of 
 funds at the time of the accident 
 (Clapper v. Waterford, 131 N. Y. 383 ; 
 30 N. E. 340). See Getty v. Hamlin, 
 55 Hun, 603 ; 8 N. Y. Supp. 190 ; 
 Bryant v. Randolph, 53 Id. 631 ; 6 N. 
 Y. Supp. 438 [fact of repairs day 
 after accident, admissible]. 
 
 ' Carney v. Marseilles, 136 III. 401; 
 36 N. E. 491. 
 
 ' See § 61 ei seq. , ante. 
 
 ' Clifford v. Dam, 81 N. Y. 53 ; Mc- 
 Guire v. Spence, 91 Id. 303. See 
 cases cited under § 64, ante. The 
 negligence of a driver in not having 
 his coach-lamps lighted at night, so 
 that he could see that a toll-gate was 
 closed, will not exempt a turnpike 
 company from liability for a colli- 
 sion of the coach with the gates. 
 
6s I 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§375 
 
 It is, however, applicable to actions founded on statutory, as 
 well as common-law, liability.^ In either case, the standard of 
 care required of a traveler on a highway is, in general, simply 
 such as persons of common prudence ordinarily exercise under 
 the same circumstances.* When ignorant of any defects in 
 the way, he has a right to presume, and to act upon the 
 presumption, that a highway is reasonably safe' for ordinary 
 travel.* He is not bound to have the most perfect vision, nor 
 
 which it was required by law to fas- 
 ten open at night (Danville Tnrnp. 
 Co. V. Stewart, 2 Mete. [Ky.] 119). 
 
 ' Farrer v. Green, 32 Me. 574 : Mer- 
 rill V. Hampden, 26 Id. 234 ; Gleason 
 V. Bremen, 50 Id. 222; Fallon v. 
 Boston, 3 Allen, 38 ; Lane v. Crom- 
 bie, 12 Pick. 177 ; Raymond v. Low- 
 ell, 6 Cush. 524; Kelsey v. Glover, 
 15 Vt. 7U; Laney v. Chesterfield 
 county, 29 S. C. 140 ; 7 S. E. 57; 
 Houfe V. Fulton, 29 Wise. 296. 
 
 * Morrill v. Peck, 88 N. Y. 398 
 [walking on unguarded side of 
 bridge]. Evidence that plaintiff 
 knew nothing of the defect, and 
 that the night of the accident was 
 very dark, is sufficient to show ab- 
 sence of contributory negligence 
 (Chisholm v. State, 141 N. Y. 246 ; 
 36 N. E. 184). A refusal to charge 
 that if the hole in the sidewalk might 
 have been seen and readily avoided 
 by ordinary exercise of plaintiff's 
 eyes, failure to avoid it was negli- 
 gence, held proper (Minick v. Troy, 
 83 N. Y. 514.) A charge that " plain- 
 tiff was not required to use all pos- 
 sible care to avoid danger" from an 
 excavation, held correct (Erd v. St. 
 Paul, 22 Minn. 443). S. P., St. Paul 
 V. Kuby, 8 Minn. 154; Baltimore v. 
 Brannan, 14 Md. 227; Aurora v. Pul- 
 fer, 56 111. 270; Wood v. Bridgeport, 
 143 Pa. St. 167; 22 Atl. 752; 
 Gschwend v. Millvale, 159 Pa. St. 
 257; 28 Atl. 139 ; Wall v. Highland, 
 72 Wise. 435 ; 39 N. W. 560 ; Duthie 
 V. Washburn, 87 Wise. 231; 58 N. 
 
 W. 380; Schonhoff v. Jackson R. 
 Co., 97 Mo. 151 ; 10 S. W. 618 ; Aus- 
 tin V. Ritz, 72 Tex. 391; 9 8. W. 884. 
 
 ' Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 N. 
 Y. 530 ; 15 N. E 424 ; Beltz v. Yon- 
 kers, 74 Hun, 73 ; 26 N. Y. Supp. 
 106; Lutton v. Vernon [Conn.], 
 23 Atl. 1020 ; Birmingham v. Starr, 
 -A.la. ; 20 So. 424 ; Centralia 
 
 v. Baker, 36 111. App. 46 ; Chicago 
 V. Morse, 33 111. App. 61. The 
 degree of care and caution re- 
 quired of one passing over a dan- 
 'gerous- sidewalk depends' upon his 
 knowledge or information concern- 
 ing its defective or unsafe condition 
 (Gordon v. Richmond, 83 Va. 436 ; 2 
 S. E. 727). A travelei-, while trying 
 to avoid an injury from a known 
 cause (a locomotive at a railroad 
 crossing), is not held to so high a 
 degree of watchfulness, as usual, for 
 unknown defects in the highway, 
 e. g., an unguarded embankment 
 (Gillespie v. Newburgh, 54 N. Y. 468). 
 
 " In the following cases, plaintiff 
 was held not engaged in ordinary 
 travel : Casey v. Maiden, 163 Mass. 
 507; 40 N. E. 849 [a boy of ten 
 walking backward and looking in 
 another direction] ; Gaughan v. 
 Philadelphia, 119 Pa. 503 ; 13 Atl. 
 300 [boy of seven climbing up and 
 sliding down awning-post, fell into 
 gutter] ; Clarke v. Richmond, 83 Va 
 355 ; 5 S. E. 369 [child walking on 
 adjoining coping, fell into hole in 
 sidewalk] ; Jackson v. Greenville, 72 
 Miss. 230; 16 So. 382 [adult playing 
 
§375] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 652 
 
 to look far ahead to avoid defects which ought not to exist ; '' 
 nor to keep his eyes constantly on the pavement before him.^ 
 He need have only a reasonable assurance of safety before 
 venturing upon the highway;' and whether such assurance, 
 under the circumstances, is well founded, is a question for the 
 jury to determine. The mere fact of stepping into an open 
 excavation in. a sidewalk, in the daytime, is not conclusive of 
 negligence.'" A traveler is bound to observe the presence of 
 lawful obstructions'- and notorious defects;'^ and, if there is 
 anything about them to apprise him of danger, he must exer- 
 cise greater care in passing over or by them, than if they did 
 not exist. '^ If there is nothing to indicate that the way is 
 dangerously defective, he is only bound to use ordinary care." 
 
 with dog on sidewalk]. See other 
 cases cited under g 370, ante. 
 
 'Gillespie v. Newburgh, 54 N. T. 
 468 ; Thompson v. Bridgewater, 7 
 Pick. 188. 
 
 8 Woods V. Boston, 131 Mass. 337. 
 A pedestrian must use his senses 
 and the care and precaution com- 
 mon to persons of ordinary prudence, 
 but he is not bound, at his peril, to 
 discover every defect, though it may 
 be an open one (Barnes v. Marcus, 
 93 Iowa, 075; 65 N. W. 984). Com- 
 pare Gordon v. Richmond, 83 Va. 
 436 ; 3 S. E. 737 ; Moore v. Richmond, 
 85 Va. 538 ; 8 S. E. 387 ; Le Beau v. 
 Telephone, etc. Co. , Mich. ; 67 
 N. "W. 339 [plaintiflE'S failure to look, 
 held negligence as matter of law]. 
 
 'Ren wick V. N. Y. Central R. Co., 
 36 N. Y. 133. " A person may walk 
 or drive in the darkness of the night, 
 relying upon the belief that the cor- 
 poration has performed its duty, 
 and that the street or the walk is in 
 a safe condition. He walks by a 
 faith justified by law, and if his 
 faith is unfounded, and he suffers 
 an injury, the party in fault must 
 respond in damages " (Davenport v. 
 Ruckman, 37 N. Y. 568. 
 
 '» Chicago V. Babcock, 143 111. 358 ; 
 33 N. E. 271 ; Cantwell v. Appleton, 
 
 71 Wise. 463 ; 37 N. W. 813 ; Jennings 
 V. Van Schaick, 108 N. T. 530 ; 15 N. 
 E. 434. 
 
 " Nolan V. King, 97 N. Y. 565 
 [bridge over excavation in sidewalk]; 
 Vicksburg v. Hennessy, 54 Miss. 391. 
 
 '- Hill v. Seekonk, 119 Mass. 85 ; 
 Lovenguth v. Bloomington, 71 111. 
 338 ; Wakeman v. St. Clair, 91 Mich. 
 
 15 ; 51 N. W. 696. 
 
 ■^ Travelers are not required to use 
 greater care and caution than before, 
 in crossing a street, opened to the 
 public, soon after excavations have 
 been made therein, unless there is 
 something to apprise them of danger 
 (Turner v. Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301; 
 
 16 N. E. 344). 
 
 " Creed v. Hartmann, 39 N. Y. 591 
 [walking over boards covering exca- 
 vation in sidewalk] ; Evans v. Utica, 
 69 Id. 166 [walking on ice on side- 
 walk] ; Weston V. Troy, 139 Id. 381 ; 
 34 N. E. 780 [same] ; Bly v. White- 
 hall, 130 N. Y. 506 ; 34 N. E. 943 
 [walking at night on sidewalk 
 covered with water]. A person has 
 a right to assume the safety of the 
 sidewalk on which he is walking 
 until warned of danger ; and where 
 the jury finds that a person who in 
 broad day falls into an open coal-hole 
 unguarded, is not guilty of con- 
 
653 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§375 
 
 If they were not observed because he was not looking,*^ or 
 was stepping backward," or was running too fast to notice 
 anything," or allowed his attention to be momentarily di- 
 verted," or was intoxicated,'^ it is for the jury to say whether 
 he was guilty of contributory negligence.^" If ignorant of 
 any dangerous obstructions, he may cross a street at any point 
 that suits his convenience, without imputation of negli- 
 gence.** The blind and the halt are entitled, like other trav- 
 
 tributory negligence, such finding is 
 conclusive (Jennings v. Van Schaick, 
 108 N. Y. 530 ; 15 N. E. 424). s. P., 
 Mathews v. Cedar Rapids, 80 Iowa, 
 459 ; 45 N. W. 894 [looking at an 
 attractive show-window]. The ques- 
 tion of plaintiff's contributory negli- 
 gence in attempting to drive along a 
 submerged road is for the jury (Jung 
 V. Stevens Point, 74 Wise. 547 ; 43 N. 
 W. 513). 
 
 >» Fuller v. Hyde Park, 162 Mass. 
 51; 37N.E. 782; Peetz v. St. Charles 
 R. Co., 42 La. Ann. 541 ; 7 So. 688. 
 
 "See Barnes v. Snowden, 119 Pa. 
 St. 53; 13 Atl. 804. 
 
 " Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Mo, 
 550 ; 16 S. W. 483 ; McCormick v. 
 Monroe, 2 Mo. App. 1062. 
 
 '8 Dale V. Syracuse, 71 Hun, 449; 
 34 N. Y. Supp. 968 ; West v. Eau 
 Claire, 89 Wise. 31 ; 61 N. W. 313 ; 
 Simons v. Baraboo, 93 Wise. 40 ; 67 
 N. W. 40 [temporary forgetf ulness 
 of defect] ; Barry v. Terkildsen, 72 
 Cal. .254 ; 13 Pac. 657 ; Osborne v. 
 Detroit, 82 Fed. 36 [sidewalk noto- 
 riously rotten; plaintiff paid no atten- 
 tion]. But in Stackhouse v. Vendig 
 ( 1 66 Pa. St. 583 ; 31 Atl. 849) held that 
 one who, in the daytime, stumbled 
 over a partly open cellar door in the 
 sidewalk, not seen from want of 
 attention, was negligent as matter 
 of law. To same effect. Robb v. 
 Connellsville, 137 Pa. St. 42 : 20 Atl. 
 564 ; Barnes v. Snowden, 119 Pa. 
 St. 53 ; 13 Atl. 804 ; and see Kelly v. 
 Doody, 116 N. Y. 575; 23 N. E. 
 
 1084 [mere inattention may bar re- 
 covery]. 
 
 " Lynch v. New York, 47 Hun, 
 534 ; Parris v. Green Island, 60 Id. 
 580, mem.; 14 N. Y. Supp. 703 ; and 
 cases cited under §§ 93, 110, ante. 
 
 '"> Mackie v. West Bay City, 106 
 Mich. 343 ; 64 N. W. 35. See Byrne 
 V. Syracuse, 79 Hun, 555 ; 39 N. Y. 
 Supp. 913 ; Lyon v. Logansport, 9 
 Ind. App. 31 ; Beardstown v. Smith, 
 150 111. 169; 37 N. E. 211; Cumisky 
 V. Kenosha,' 87 Wise. 386 ; 58 N. W. 
 395 ; Hazzard v. Council Bluffs, 87 
 Iowa, 51; 58 N. W. 1083; Ely v. 
 Des Moines, 86 Iowa, 55 : 52 N. W. 
 475. 
 
 ^' It has been held that a pedes- 
 trian is negligent who, without suffi- 
 cient reason, walks upon a street 
 elsewhere than on the sidewalks and 
 crosswalks (O'Laughlin v. Dubuque, 
 42 Iowa, 589). See Dubuque, etc. Ass. 
 V. Dubuque, 30 Iowa, 176 ; McClary 
 V. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 3 Neb. 44 ; 
 Houston V. Isaacks, 68 Tex. 116 ; 3 
 S- W. 693. The better rule is that 
 such an act is not at all conclusive, 
 but it is to be considered with others, 
 by the jury, in determining the 
 question of contributory negligence 
 (Gerald v. Boston, 108 Mass. 580 
 Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 534 
 Coombs V. Purrington, 42 Me. 332 
 Belton V. Baxter, 54 N. Y. 245 : Tay- 
 lor V. Mt. Vernon, 58 Hun, 384 ; 13 
 N. Y. Supp. 35 ; Forker v. Sandy 
 Lake, 130 Pa. St. 133; 18 Atl 609; 
 Atlanta v Buchanan, 76 Ga. 585 ; 
 
§376] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 654 
 
 elers, to presume that a highway in constant use is reasonably 
 safe for ordinary travel, and he is not in fault in neglecting to 
 observe and avoid a defect therein which is not so plain and 
 obvious as to be necessarily observable by one in the posses- 
 sion of ordinary faculties, traveling at an ordinary pace.^^ 
 Under the principle stated in § 93, ante, the traveler's neg- 
 ligence, in order to defeat his action, must have proximately 
 contributed to the causing of his injury .^^ 
 
 § 376. Traveler's knowledge of defect. — The rule that a 
 traveler on a highway may presume that it is safe for travel 
 
 Zettler v. Atlanta, 66 Id. 195 ; Col- 
 lins V. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503 ; 35 N. 
 W. 368 ; Crowther v. Yonkers, 60 
 Hun, 586, mem.; 15 N. Y. Supp. 588 ; 
 Olathe V. Mizee, 48 Kans. 485; 39 
 Pac. 754). SeeHarrigan v. Brooklyn, 
 67 Hun, 8.5 ; 23 N. Y. Supp. 39. 
 
 '- Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 N. Y. 
 568 ; affi'g 10 Bosw. 20. A blind man 
 walking on the street is bound to use 
 ordinary care only, considering all 
 circumstances bearing on the ques- 
 tion as to what care was reasonably 
 necessary to insure his safety (Neff 
 V, Wejlesley, 148 Mass. 487 ; 30 N. E. 
 Ill; Bobbins v. Springfleld St. B. 
 Co., 165 Mass. 30 ; 42 N. E. 334). 
 s. p., Cox V. Westchester Tump. Co., 
 33 Barb. 413 ; Frost v. Waltham, 13 
 Allen, 85 ; Gilbert v. Boston, 139 
 Mass. 313 ; 31 N. E 734 [blind in one 
 eye] ; Higgins v. Glens Falls, 57 Hun, 
 594;- 11 N. Y. Supp. 389 [infirm 
 knee] ; Franklin v. Harter, 137 Ind. 
 446 ; 36 N, E. 883 [blind man] ; Mt. 
 Vernon v. Brooks, 39 111. App. 426 
 [cripple on crutches] ; Smith v. 
 Cairo, 48 111. App. 166 [astigmatism 
 and rheumatism] ; Stewart v. Nash- 
 ville, 66 Tenn. 50; 33 S. W. 613 
 [blind and unattended] ; Sweeney v. 
 Butte, 15 Mont. 274 ; 39 Pac. 386 
 [short sightedness]. A blind man's 
 habit of going about alone, and his 
 acquaintance with the locality, must 
 
 be considered by the jury (Smith v. 
 Wildes, 143 Mass. 556 ; 10 N. E. 446) ; 
 also the increased acuteness, fidelity 
 and power of his other senses (Sleeper 
 V. Sandown, 52 N. H. 244). 
 
 '^ O'Bryanv. Amsterdam, 74 Hun, 
 136 ; 36 N. Y. Supp. 1133 [plaintiff's 
 stumbling or tripping, proximate 
 cause of fall] ; Roanoke v. Harrison, 
 Va. ; 19 S. E. 179 [jumping 
 over defective crossing ; nonsuit] ; 
 Sheats v. Rome, 92 Ga. 535 ; 17 S. E. 
 922 [same]. The court cannot say. 
 as matter of law, that one who, slip- 
 ping on an icy sidewalk, fell upon a 
 large, sharp knife which he was car- 
 rying for use in his trade, fatally 
 injuring him, was negligent in car- 
 rying the knife as he did (McGoldrick 
 V. New York Central, etc. R. Co., 
 66 Hun, 639; 20 N. Y. Supp. 914). 
 See Lund v. Tyngsborough, 11 Cush. 
 563 [passenger leaped from carriage 
 on seeing dangerous defect, though 
 carriage not in contact with it; town 
 liable] ; and cases cited under §§ 93, 
 94, ante. Where the defect which 
 caused the injury was due to plain- 
 tiff's default as a highway officer, 
 he cannot recover of the town 
 (Wood V. Waterville, 4 Mass. 422 ; 5 
 Id. 294). See Taylor V. Constable, 57 
 Hun, 371 ; 10 N. Y. Supp. 607 [high- 
 way overseer]. 
 
^55 HIGHWAYS. [§ 376 
 
 does not apply, where he approaches an obstruction with 
 knowledge of its existence and location.^ The mere fact, 
 however, that a traveler is familiar with the road, and knows 
 of the existence of a defect therein, will not impose upon him 
 the duty to use more than ordinary care in avoiding it,^ and 
 does not, per se, establish negligence.^ Such knowledge is a 
 
 ' Griffin v. New York, 9 N. Y. 456 ; [icy sidewalk]; Wilson v. Syracuse, 
 
 Scanlon v. Watertown, 14 N. Y. 21 Hun, 411 ; Reed v. Northfield, 13 
 
 App. Div. 1; 43 N. Y. Supp. 618; Pick. 94; Smith v. Lowell, 6 Allen, 
 
 Hopkins v. Rush River, 70 Wise. 10 ; 39 ; Frost v. Waltham, 13 Id. 85 ; 
 
 34 N. W. 909 ; Mullen v. Owosso, 100 Whitaker v. West Boylston, 97 Mass. 
 
 Mich. 108; 08 N.W. 663 [driving over 273; Kavanaugh v. JanesvUle, 24 
 
 a pile of sand]; Phillips v. Ritchie Wise. 618; Smith v. St. Joseph, 45 
 
 county, 31 W. Va. 477; 7 S. E. 427 Mo. 449 ; Kinsley v. Morse, 40 Kans. 
 
 [visible and dangerous landslide]; 577; 30 Pac. 217; Langan v. Atchi- 
 
 Galesburg v. Hall, 45.111. App. 290 ; son, 35 Kans. 318 ; 11 Pac. 38 [danger- 
 
 and cases infra. A bridge known ous condition of street] ; Ellis v. 
 
 to plaintiff to have been without a Peru, 23 111. App. 35 [dangerous 
 
 railing for two years, cannot be pre- sidewalk] ; Flora v. Naney, 136 111. 
 
 Bumed by him, after an absence of 45 ; 26 N. E. 645 [sidewalk]. 
 
 several months, to have been sup- 
 
 ' Weed V. Ballston Spa, 76 N. Y. 
 
 plied with them in the meantime 329 ; Wooley v. Grand St. R. Co., 83 
 
 (Dale V. Webster county, 76 Iowa, Id. 121 [ignorant of precise location 
 
 370 ; 41 N. W. 1). But a traveler of defective street-railroad switch, 
 
 has a right to presume that a wagon covered by snow] ; Bond v. Smith, 
 
 obstructing a road in the daytime 44 Hun, 219 [unprotected area] ; 
 
 would have been removed before Mahoney v. Metropolitan R. Co., Ii4 
 
 night (Fox v. Sackett, 10 Allen, 535). Mass. 73 ; Lyman v. Amherst, 107 
 
 ' The fact that plaintiff knew of Id. 339 ; Lyman v. Hampshire, 140 
 
 the dangerous condition of an icy Id. 311 ; 3 N. E. 211 ; Humphreys 
 
 pavement did not require him to ex- v. Armstrong county, 56 Pa. St. 204 ; 
 
 ercise extraordinary care, but only Corts v. District of Columbia, 7 
 
 such care as an ordinarily prudent Mackey, 277 ; Samples v. Atlanta, 
 
 man would have used under the cir- 
 cumstances (Koch V. Ashland, 88 
 Wise. 603 ; 60 N. W. 990 ; Birming- 
 ham V. Starr, 112 Ala. 98; 20 So. 
 
 95 Ga. 110 ; 22 S. E. 135 [dangerously 
 defective bridge] ; Elyton Land Co. 
 V. Mingea, 88 Ala. 434 ; 7 So. 666 ; 
 Fort Wayne v. Breese, 123 Ind. 581 ; 
 
 424). Plaintiff's knowledge enjoins a 23 N. E. 1038 ; Poseyville v. Lewis, 
 degree of care on his part commen- 136 Ind. 80 ; 25 N. E, 593 [sidewalk] ; 
 
 surate therewith (Dittrich v. Detroit, 
 98 Mich. 345 ; 57 N. W. 135 ; Ger- 
 
 Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Carvener, 
 113 Ind. 51 ; 14 N. E. 738; St. Louis 
 
 maine v. Muskegon, 105 Mich. 213 ; Bridge Co. v. Miller, 13S 111. 465 ; 28 
 63 N. W. 78 ; Bedford v. Neal, 143 N. E. 1091 [bridge known to be with- 
 
 Ind. 425; 41 N. E. 1039 ; Holloway v. 
 Lockport, 54 Hun, 153 ; 7 N. Y. 
 
 out barriers] ; Sandwich v. Dolan, 
 141 111. 430 ; 31 N. E. 416 [dangerous 
 
 Supp. 363). S. P , Bullock v. New sidewalk] ; Argus v. Sturgis, 86 
 York, 99 N. Y. 654 ; [temporarv flag- Mich. 844 ; 48 N. W. 1085 ; Troxel v. 
 stones] ; Evans v. Utica. 69 Id. 166 Vinton, 77 Iowa, 90 ; 41 N. W. 580 
 
§376] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 656 
 
 circumstance, and, perhaps, a strong circumstance ; but it 
 should be submitted, with the other facts of the case, to the 
 jury, for them to determine whether, with such knowledge, the 
 plaintiff exercised ordinary care in proceeding on a way known 
 to be dangerous, or, in proceeding, used ordinary care to avoid 
 injury.* If the defect was of such a character that men of ordi- 
 
 [sidewalk out of repair but not dan- 
 gerous] ; Larsli V. Des Moines, 74 
 Iowa, 513 ; 3B N. W. 384 ; Flynn v. 
 Neosho, 114 Mo. 567 ; 31 S. W. 903 ; 
 Denison v. Sanforil, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 
 661; 31 S. W. 784; Ouverson v. 
 Grafton, 5 N. Dak. 381 ; 65 N. W. 
 676 ; Neddo v. Ticonderoga, 77 Hun, 
 534: 38 N. Y. Supp. 887 [slippery 
 sidewalk] ; and all other cases cited 
 under tins section. 
 
 ■' Whether proceeding on a way 
 known to be defective is consistent 
 with reasonable care is generally for 
 the jury, depending upon the nature 
 of the obstruction, or insufficiency 
 of the highway, and all the surround- 
 ing circumstances (Lyman v. Am- 
 herst, 107 Mass. 339; Whitford v. 
 Southbridge, 119 Id. 564; Parker v. 
 Springfield, 147 Id. 391 ; 18 N. E. 70 ; 
 GrifHn v. Auburn, 58 N. H. 131; 
 Coates v. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131 [snow- 
 drift] ; Dooley v. Meriden, 44 Conn. 
 117 [accumulation of snow] ; Hamp- 
 son V. Taylor, 15 R. I. 83 ; 8 Atl. 331 ; 
 33 Id. 733; Pomfrey v. Saratoga 
 Springs, 104 N. Y. 459 ; 11 N. E. 48 ; 
 Niven v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 619 ; 
 Weed V. Ballston Spa, Id. 339; 
 Kelly V. Doody, 116 N. Y. 575 ; 33 N. 
 E. 1084; Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 
 X. Y. 303; 11 N. E. 043; Merri- 
 mann v. Phillipsburg, 158 Pa. St. 78 ; 
 38 Atl. 133 ; Baltimore v. Holmes, 39 
 Md. 343 [ridge of stones on the high- 
 way] ; Montgomery v. Wright, 73 
 Ala. 411 [washout in sidewalk and 
 no walk on other side of street] ; 
 Phillips V. Huntington. 3i W. Va. 
 406; 14 S. E. 17; Dempsey v. 
 
 Rome, 94 Ga. 490 ; 30 S. E. 335 ; Wil- 
 son V. Trafalgar, etc. Road, 93 Ind. 
 387 ; Turnpike Co. v. Jackson, 86 Id. 
 Ill [defective culvert ; no other safe 
 way] ; Albion v. Hetrick, 90 Id. 545 
 [gully across road ; no other way] ; 
 Richmond v. Mulholland, 116 Ind. 
 173; 18 N. E. 833; Columbus v. 
 Strassner, 134 Ind. 483 ; 35 N. E. 65 ; 
 Aurora v. Dale, 90 111. 46 [hole in 
 sidewalk] ; Clayton v. Brooks, 150 
 111. 97; 37 N. E. 574; Nichols v. 
 Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 430 ; McKenzie 
 V. Northiield, 30 Id. 456; Hart v. 
 Red Cedar, 63 Wise. 634; 24 N. W. 410; 
 Erd V. St. Paul, 33 Id. 443 [covered 
 excavation in the sidewalk] ; Wright 
 V. Kansas City, 18 Mo. App. 436 
 [loose planks in a sidewalk] ; Perkins 
 V. Fond du Lac, 34 Wise. 435 [slop- 
 ing sidewalk on a starlight night] ; 
 Cumisky v. Kenosha, 87 Wise. 386 ; 
 58 N. W. 395; Waud v. Polk 
 county, 88 Iowa, 617; 55 N. W. 
 538; FuUiam v. Muscatine, 70 
 Iowa, 436 ; 30 N. W. 861 ; Lan- 
 gan v. Atchison, 35 Kans. 818 ; 11 
 Pac. 38 ; Emporia v. Schmidling, 
 38 Id. 485 ; 6 Pac. 893 ; Plattsmouth 
 V. Mitchell, 20 Neb. 338 ; 39 N W. 
 593 ; Orleans v. Perry, 34 Neb. 831 ; 
 40 N. W. 417; Omaha v. Ayer, 33 Neb. 
 375; 49 N.W. 445; Smith v.. St. Joseph, 
 45 Mo. 449. 'in general, plaintiff's 
 knowledge will raise a presumption 
 of negligence on his part so as to re- 
 quire proof to negative the presump- 
 tion (Achtenhagan v. Watertown, 18 
 Wise. 331 ; Folsom v. UnderhiU, 36 
 Vt. 580 ; Fox v. Glastenbury, 29 
 Conn. 304; Wilson v. Charlestown. 
 
657 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§376 
 
 nary prudence, having knowledge of it, would not, under ordi- 
 nary circumstances, have attempted to pass at their own risk, 
 a traveler has no right to try the experiment at the risk of the 
 public ; the risk is his own.^ But if persons of ordinary pru- 
 dence would have believed it safe to attempt the passage in the 
 mode adopted by the plaintiff, he can recover.* The rule 
 which precludes a recovery should especially hold in a case 
 where, by taking another side of the road, the defect might 
 have been easily avoided ; ' but the mere fact that the 
 
 8 Allen, 137). See Jacobs v. Bangor, 
 16 Me. 187 ; Cornelius v. Appleton, 
 23 Wise. 635 ; Hanlon v. Keokuk, 7 
 Iowa, 488 ; Brown v. Jefferson, 16 
 id. 339. 
 
 * Whittaker v. West Boylston, 97 
 Mass. 273 [knowledge of obstruction 
 for two years] ; Casey v. Fitchburg, 
 163 Mass. 321 ; 38 N. E. 499 [open 
 unlighted trencb] ; Norwood v. Som- 
 erville, 159 Mass. 105 ; 33 N. E. 1108 ; 
 Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H. 53; 
 Fox V. Glastenbury, 39 Conn. 204 
 [driving across washout during 
 freshet] ; Whalen v. Citizens' Gas 
 Co., 151 N. Y. 70; 45 N. E. 363 [dis- 
 placed flagstone] ; Haven v. Pitts- 
 burgh Bridge Co., 151 Pa. St. 630 ; 35 
 Atl. 311 [bridge notoriously danger- 
 ous and "danger" posted]; Hill v. 
 Tionesta, 146 Pa. St. 11 ; 33 Atl. 204 ; 
 Winner v. Oakland, 158 Pa. St. 405 ; 
 27 Atl. 1110 ; Acker v. Anderson, 20 
 S. C. 495 ; Laney v. Chesterfield, 29 
 S. C. 140 ; 7 S. E. 56 ; Conneaut v. 
 Naef, 54 Ohio St. 530; 44 N. E. 236 ; 
 Morrison v. Shelby county, 116 Ind. 
 431 ; 19 N. E. 316 ; Bloomington v. 
 Rogers. 9 Ind. App. 230 ; 36 N. E. 
 439 ; Black v. Manistee, Mich. ; 
 64 N. W. 868 [icy sidewalk] ; Weirs 
 V. Jones county, 86 Iowa, 635 ; 53 N. 
 W. 321 [notice of danger posted, but 
 plaintiff could not read English ; no 
 recovery] ; Galve.ston v. Hemmis, 
 73 Tex. 558 ; 11 S. W. 39. 
 
 « Though one use a street known 
 to be defective, he is not guilty of 
 ~ [L\w OP Neg. Vol. 11 — 43] 
 
 contributory negligence if he be- 
 lieves, and as a reasonably prudent 
 man has the right to believe, that he 
 will pass in safety by the exercise of 
 ordinary care, and uses such care. 
 (Nichols V. Laurens,96Iowa, 336; 65 
 N. W. 335 ; Kendall v. Albia, 73 Iowa, 
 341 ; 34 N. W. 833). A charge that 
 "if an ordinarily careful driver would 
 reasonably infer, from the fact of 
 water being there, that it was dan- 
 gerous to go over, he w^as negligent, 
 but if there was nothing to indicate 
 that the hole was dangerous, then 
 he had the right to take chances of 
 crossing" is correct (McLaughlin v. 
 Philadelphia Traction Co., 175 Pa, St. 
 565 ; 34 Atl. 863 [hole in street cov- 
 ered by water)], s. p., Taylor v. Con- 
 stable, 131 N. Y. 597 ; 30 N. E. 63 ; 
 Thomas v. Western U. Tel. Co., 100 
 Mass. 156 ; Kenworthy v. Irontou, 41 
 Wise. 047 ; Kelley v. Fond du Lao, 
 31 ■ Id. 179 ; Chilton v. Carbondale, 
 160 Pa. St. 463 ; 38 Atl. 833 ; Finn v. 
 Adrian, 93 Mich. 504 ; 53 N. W. 814; 
 Maus V. Springfield, 101 Mo. 613 ; 14 
 S. W. 630 ; Gulf, etc. E. Co. v. Gass- 
 camp, 69 Tex. 545 ; 7 S. W. 237. 
 
 ' Whether walking on one part of 
 a sidewalk rather than another is 
 negligence is for the jury (Lincoln 
 V. Power, 151 U. S. 436 ; 14 S. Ct. 
 387). Whether plaintiff was bound 
 to go around an obstruction into a 
 muddy street is for the jury (Shook 
 V. Cohoes, 108 N, Y. 648; 15 N. E. 
 531). So is the question whether 
 
§376] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 658 
 
 obstructed street was out of the way of the point at which a 
 traveler was aiming, or that he might have taken a nearer way is 
 immaterial.* It is generally,' though not uniformly,'" held 
 that taking a highway, in ordinary use by the public, with 
 knowledge of a defect therein, instead of another route, is not 
 negligence. A traveler is not required at all times to have his 
 thoughts fixed on a defect in the way, though having had notice 
 of it ; his mere inattention or forgetfulness will not, therefore, 
 necessarily preclude his recovery." The fact, however, that 
 there was no guard or light at the place will not excuse his 
 contributory negligence.'^ 
 
 venturing upon an icy sidewalk is 
 negligence, wlien all danger could 
 have been avoided by crossing to the 
 other side of the street (Twogood v. 
 New York, 103 N. Y. 216 ; 6 N. E. 
 275 ; Todd v. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506 ; 
 Evans v. Utica, 69 Id. 166). s. p., 
 Whalen v. Citizens' Gas Co., 151 N. 
 y. 71 ; 45 N. E. 663; Bullock v. New 
 York, 99 N. Y. 651 ; 2N. E, 1 ; Kling 
 V. Buffalo, 73 Hun, 541 ; 35 N. Y. 
 Supp. 445 ; Hubbard v. Concord, 35 
 N. H. 53 ; Griffin v. Auburn, 58 Id. 
 131 ; Wilson v. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 
 137; Packard v. New Bedford, 9 
 Allen, 200 ; Horton v. Ipswich, 13 
 Cush. 488 ; Congdon v. Norwich, 37 
 Conn. 414 ; Forks v. King, 84 Pa. St. 
 230; Erie v. Magill, 101 Id. 616; 
 Lynch v. Erie, 151 Pa. St. 380 ; 25 
 Atl. 43 ; Schaefler v. Sandusky, 33 
 Ohio St. 246 ; CentraUa v. Krouse, 
 64 111. 19 ; Lovenguth v. Blooming- 
 ton, 71 Id. 238 ; Madison county v. 
 Brown, 89 Ind. 48 ; Prince George's 
 county V. Burgess, 61 Md. 29 ; Me- 
 ridian V. Hyde [Miss.], 11 So. 108 ; 
 ■Welsh V. Argyle, 89 Wise. 649; 62 N. 
 W. 517; Wright v. St. Cloud, 54 
 Minn. 94; 55 N. W. 819; Parkhill 
 V. Brighton, 61 Iowa, 103 ; 15 N. W. 
 853 ; Cosner v. Centerville, 90 Iowa, 
 33; 57 N. W. 636 ; Cohn. v. Kansas 
 City, 108 Mo. 387; 18 S. W. 973; 
 Corlett V. Leavenworth, 27 Kans. 
 
 673 ; James v. San Francisco, 6 Cal. 
 528. 
 
 8 Sandwich v. Dolan, 138 111. 177 ; 
 24 N. E. 526. See Erie v. Schwingle, 
 23 Pa. St. 384. 
 
 ' Apple v. Marion county, 137 Ind. 
 553; 37 N. E. 166; Fowler v. Lin- 
 guist, 138 Ind. 566; 37 N. E. 133 ; Gos- 
 port V. Evans, H3 Ind. 138 ; 13 N. E. 
 356 [question for jury] ; Cairncross 
 V. Pewaukee, 86 Wisc.'l81; 56 N. W. 
 648 [question not to be considered] ; 
 Ball V. El Paso, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 
 221 ; 23 S. W. 835. See Gerdes v. 
 Christopher Foundry Co., 124 Mo. 
 347 ; 35 S. W. 557. 
 
 '" See Wellman v. Susquehanna 
 Depot, 167 Pa. St. 239 ; 81 Atl. 566 ; 
 Meohesney v. Unity, 164 Pa. St. 358 ; 
 30 Atl. 263 ; Biggs v. West Newton, 
 164 Pa. St. 341 ; 30 Atl. 204 ; Barnes, 
 V. Marcus, 96 Iowa, 675; 65 N.W. 984; 
 FuUiam v. Muscatine, 70 Iowa, 436; 
 30 N. W. 861 ; Cook v. Atlanta, 94 
 Ga. 613 ; 19 S. E. 987. 
 
 " Maloy V. St. Paul, 54 Minn. 398 ; 
 56 N. W. 94 ; Simonds v. Baraboo, 93 
 Wise. 40 ; 67 N. W. 40 ; Dundas v. 
 Lansing, 75 Mich. 499; 43 N. W. 
 1011 ; Springfield v. Rosenmeyer, 52 
 111. App. 301; Gibbons v. Phoenix, 61 
 Hun, 619, mem. ; 15 N. Y. Supp. 410. 
 
 " Hesser v. Grafton, 33 W. Va. 
 548 ; 11 S. E. 211 ; Vance v. Franklin, 
 4 Ind. App. 515 ; 30 N, E. 149 ; Davis 
 
659 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§377 
 
 § 377- Care required in traveling at night. — On the other 
 hand, it is not, as matter of law, negHgence for one to travel, 
 even in a dark night, over a road with which he is wholly un- 
 acquainted, and which is without a light or guard.' In walk- 
 ing or driving at night, however, the exercise of ordinary care 
 requires greater vigilance than in the day,^ particularly in a 
 strange locality,' and the question of care in such cases is for 
 the jury.* But it has been held to be negligence, /^r jr, for 
 
 V. California St. R. Co., 10a Cal. 131 ; 
 38 Pac. 647. See Horton v. Trom- 
 peter, 53 Kans. 150 ; 35 Pac. 1106 ; 
 Goddard v. Mcintosh, 161 Mass. 353 ; 
 
 37 N. E. 169. 
 
 ■ A traveler may assume that a 
 street on a dark night is in a pass- 
 able condition, and he is not guilty 
 of contributory negligence for fail- 
 ing to search for defects (Robinson 
 V. Wilmington, 8 Houst. 409 ; 33 
 Atl. 347 ; Crowther v. Yonkers, 60 
 Hun, 586, mem.; 15 N. Y. Supp. 588). 
 S. P., BIy V. Whitehall, 130 N. Y. 
 506; 34 N. E. 943). Ordinary care is 
 all that is required (Russell v. Mon- 
 roe, 116 N. C. 720; 21 S. E. 550 ; Ott 
 V. Buffalo, 181 N. Y. 594; SON. E. 
 67; Williams v. Clinton, 38 Conn. 
 364 ; Normal v. Gresham, 49 111. 
 App. 196 ; Elgin v. Renwick, 86 111. 
 498; Jefferson v. Chapman, 137 Id. 
 488 ; 30 N. E. 33 ; Owen v. Ft. Dodge,- 
 Iowa, ; 67 N. W. 281). Con- 
 tributory negligence is not shown by 
 proof that, after knowing condition 
 of street, plaintiff traveled on it 
 after dark (Maultby v. Leavenworth, 
 
 38 Kans. 745 ; Rector v. Pierce, 8 
 Thomp. & C. 416, 430 ; Milwaukee 
 V. Davis, 6 Wise. 377 [driving in 
 violent storm]; Nobles ville Gas Co. 
 V. Loehr, 124 Ind. 79; 24 N. E. 579 
 [running to a fire] ; Sias v. Reed 
 City, 103 Mich. 312 ; 61 N. W. 503) ; 
 and therefore could not comprehend 
 the danger (McGuinness v. Worces- 
 ter, 160 Mass. 372; 35 N. E. 1068). 
 In Allegany county v. Broadwater 
 
 (69 Md. 533; 16 Alt. 233), held proper 
 tO; refuse to charge that plaintiff 
 could not recover if, knowing the 
 condition of the road, he failed to 
 carry a light. Compare Daniels v. 
 Lebanon, 58 N. H. 284. 
 
 « Splittorf V. State, 108 N. Y. 305 ; 
 15 N. E. 322 [crossing a swinging 
 bridge over dangerous stream]. A 
 charge that greater caution might 
 be required at night than in the day- 
 time, is proper (Hall v. Manson, 90 
 Iowa, 585; 58 N. W. 881). "Driving 
 in the dark without thinking of dan- 
 ger, is not ordinary care " ( Prideaux 
 V. Mineral Point, 43 Wise. 513). 
 Plaintiff knew of the existence of 
 the pit, into which he fell while walk- 
 ing along at night, absorbed in 
 thought, and not looking where he 
 was going. Held, contributory neg- 
 ligence (Walker v. Reidsville, 96 N. 
 C. 383 ; 2 S. E. 74). s. P. , Indianapolis 
 V. Cook, 99 Ind. 10 ; McLaury v. Mc- 
 Gregor, 54 Iowa, 717; 7 N. W. 91; 
 Stier V. Oskaloosa, 41 Iowa, 353. 
 
 ' Cummins v. Syracuse, 100 N. Y. 
 637; 8 N. E. 680. A stranger seeing 
 people traveling on a certain street 
 at night may assume that it is rea- 
 sonably safe for that purpose ( Vieths 
 V. Skinner, 47 111. App. 335). See 
 Parcells v. Auburn, 77 Hun, 137; 
 38 N. Y. Supp. 471 [comparative 
 stranger]. 
 
 * Daniels v. Lebanon, 58 N. H. 
 284 [traveling without a light]; Hart 
 V. Red Cedar, 63 Wise. 634 ; 24 N. 
 W. 410 [plaintiff mistook his loca- 
 
§378] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 660 
 
 one, having notice of the dangerous condition of a road on 
 an embankment, to drive over it, at a point where it was so 
 dark that he could not see where he was going.' 
 
 § 378. Defect in traveler's carriage, harness or horses.— 
 
 The traveler is not bound, before venturing on a highway, to 
 see that his carriage and harness are in perfect repair, and his 
 team perfectly trained and manageable.^ All that can be 
 required of him in this regard is the exercise of ordinary care 
 and prudence. If he did not know and was not in fault for not 
 discovering the particular defect or vice in his vehicle or team 
 which concurred with the defect in the highway in causing the 
 injury, he is not barred of his remedy against the town.^ On 
 
 tion] ; Byrne v. Syracuse, 79 Hun, 
 555 ; 29 N. Y. Supp. 912 [had not 
 been on storeet since railroad was 
 laid ; injured in crossing it]. Plain- 
 tiff proceeded cautiously because it 
 was slippery; the sidewalk was in 
 common use, and another person be- 
 sides was using it at the time. Held, 
 question for jury (CofSn v. Palmer, 
 162 Mass. 192; 38 N. E. 509). See 
 also Slee v. Lawrence, 163 Mass. 405; 
 38 N E. 708; Jefferson v. Chapman, 
 127 111. 438 ; 20 N. E. 33; Berg v. 
 Milwaukee, 83 Wis. .599 ; 53 N. W. 
 890 ; McQuillan v. Seattle, 10 Wash. 
 464 ; 38 Pac. 1119 ; Jackson v. Buena 
 Viata, 88 Ga. 466; 14 S. E. 866. s. P., 
 Totten V. Phipps, 53 N. Y. 854 [en- 
 tering premises after dark without a 
 light, knowing of a, hatchway]. 
 The defense of contributoiy negli- 
 gence for not lighting carriage-lamps 
 at night is not available by a turn- 
 pike company which neglected, as 
 required by statute, to keep its gates 
 fastened open at night so that plain- 
 tiff di-ove against, without seeing 
 them (Danville, etc.. Tump. Co. v. 
 Stewart, 3 Mete. [Ky.] 119). 
 
 ' Perry v. Cedar Falls, 87 Iowa, 
 315 ; 54 N. W". 335. s. P., MoNish v. 
 Peekskill, 91 Hun, 334; 36 N. Y. 
 Supp. 1033. But compare Titus v. 
 
 New Scotland, 11 N. Y. App. Div. 
 366 ; 43 N. Y. Supp. 153. In Reed v. 
 Deerfield (8 Allen, 533), held, not 
 negligence per se, for one to drive 
 at night ten miles an hour over a 
 road which was clear when he went 
 over it an hour before. 
 
 ' " In every case of damage occur- 
 ring on the highway, we could sup- 
 pose a state of circumstances in 
 which the injury would not have 
 occurred. If the team had not been 
 too young or restive, or too old, or 
 too headstrong, or the harness had 
 not been defective, or the carriage 
 insufficient, no loss would have in- 
 tervened. It is against these con- 
 stantly occurring accidents that 
 towns are requii'ed to guard in 
 building highways." (Per Redfield, 
 J., Hunt V. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411). It is 
 not, as matter of law, contributory 
 negligence to drive a blind horse 
 (Brackenridge v. Fitchburg, 145 
 Mass. 160; 13 N. E. 457). 
 
 ' Plaintiff may recover if he shows 
 that he did not know and had no 
 reason to suppose the existence of 
 the particular vice in question, 
 whether in the horse or the carriage, 
 and that he was in no fault for not 
 knowing (Winship v. Enfield, 43 N. 
 H. 199 [vicious habits of horse and 
 
66 1 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§378 
 
 this principle, it is generally held that the fact of losing control 
 of a reasonably manageable horse, without the driver's fault, 
 will not, as matter of law, relieve the municipality from 
 responsibility for a defect in the highway, with which the run- 
 away horse came in contact.' Otherwise, if the loss of control 
 
 defects in wagon]), s. p., Clark v. 
 Harrington, 41 N. H. 44 [carriage] ; 
 Tucker v. Henniker, Id. 819 [back- 
 ing horse] ; Tuttle v. Farmington, 58 
 Id. 13 ; Allen v. Hancock, 16 Id. 
 230 [smooth-shod horse] ; Hunt v. 
 Pownal, 9 Vt. 411 ; Fletcher v. Bar- 
 net, 43 Id. 193 [gig broke down, 
 passing depression] ; Davis v. Guil- 
 ford, 55 Conn. 351 ; 11 Atl. 350 
 [chained wheel, and wagon improp- 
 erly loaded] . ' 'There cannot be a non- 
 suit where the carriage is of a kind 
 in common use and not out of re- 
 pair " (Hammond v. Mukwa, 40 
 Wise. 35 ; Jennings v. Albion, 90 
 Wise. 22 ; 63 N. W. 926 [seat not 
 anchored to the wagon]).- See Luedke 
 V. Mukwa, 90 Wise. 57 ; 63 N. W. 
 931. It is for the jury to determine 
 whether the kind of vehicle used was 
 suitable and road- worthy (Malloy v. 
 Walker, 77 Mich. 448; 43 N. W. 
 1013). The statutes of Maine and 
 Massachusetts, though worded like 
 those of New Hampshire and Ver- 
 mont, are interpreted so as to defeat 
 a traveler's action, if any defect in 
 his carriage, horse, etc., concurred 
 in producing the injury, without re- 
 gard to his knowledge, actual or im- 
 puted. In Maine, it must be shown 
 that "the injury was entirely occa- 
 sioned through want of repair," and 
 plaintiff's not being in fault for not 
 knowing of a concurring defect in 
 his own carriage, etc., will not save 
 him (Moore v. Abbot, 32 Me. 46 
 Coombs v. Topsham, 88 Id. 204 
 Farrar v. Greene. 33 Id. 574 [wagon] 
 Anderson v. Bath, 43 Id. 346 [har- 
 ness] : see Lake v. Milliken, 63 Id. 
 240). The New Hampshire interpre- 
 
 tation was followed in Massachusetts 
 in Palmer v. Andover (2 Gush. 600) , 
 where it was held that if the injury 
 would not have been sustained but 
 for a defect in the highway, the 
 town would be liable, although the 
 primary cause of the injury was 
 the failure of some part of the car- 
 riage, without plaintiff's fault. But 
 this decision has been explained 
 away and its authority greatly 
 shaken by later cases in the same 
 court (see Rowell v. Lowell, 7 Gray, 
 100 ; Jenks v. Wilbraham, 11 Id. 142 ; 
 Davis v. Dudley, 4 Allen, 5o7 ; Titus 
 V. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 265). In 
 Murdock v. Warwick (4 Gray, 178) , 
 held, that a charge that plaintiff 
 might recover " although the action 
 of the horse, from some vicious habit, 
 occasionally, operating, might have 
 contributed to the result," was error. 
 These Massachusetts oases are not 
 authority in courts where the ques- 
 tion is determined on common-law 
 principles, except in Pennsylvania, 
 where they appear to be esteemed. 
 3 Joliet V. Shufelt, 144 111. 403 ; 32 
 N. E. 969 ; Olson v. Chippewa Falls, 
 71 Wise. 558; 37 N. W. 575 ; Stacy v. 
 Phelps, 47 Hun, 54; and cases cited in 
 note 13, § 346. An instruction that if 
 the horses drawing the vehicle were 
 balky or otherwise unmanageable it 
 was negligence to drive them, held, 
 properly refused (Chamberlain v. 
 Wheatland, 54 Hun, 635, mein.; 7 N, 
 Y. Supp. 190). An instruction that if 
 plaintiff was driving a fractious 
 horse, or was unable to control his 
 horse because of a weakness of his 
 arm, he was not entitled to recover, 
 held, properly refused (Baltimore, 
 
§379] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 662 
 
 was due to some known vice of the horse/ or defect in the 
 vehicle or harness, maddening the horse ; ^ and, in some courts, 
 the exemption of towns is extended to cases of uncontrollable 
 horses, without regard to whether that condition was or was 
 not due to a known vicious habit, or any negligence on the 
 part of the driver.* 
 
 § 379- Unskillful or improper driving.-^ A driver's unskill- , 
 fulness in managing his horse,' or his driving at high speed, ^ or 
 
 etc. Turnpike Co. v. Cassell, 66 Md. 
 418). S. P., Baldridge, etc. Bridge Co. 
 V. Cartrett, 7.5 Tex. 628 ; 13 S. W. 8 
 [team became unmanageable be- 
 cause whipped ; question for jury]. 
 
 ■* Wellman V. Susquehanna Depot, 
 167 Pa. St. 239 ; 31 Atl. 566 [horse 
 having blind staggers threw rider 
 over an unrailed embankment]; Bliss 
 V. Wilbraham, 8 Allen, 564 [horse 
 young and balky ; backed against 
 railing of bridge with such force as 
 to break it and precipitate horse and 
 driver into stream]. Whether plain- 
 tiff was in fault for driving horses 
 which to his knowledge had often 
 run away before is for the jury 
 (Centralia v. Scott, 59 111. 129). See 
 Mitchell V. Turner, 149 N. Y. 39; 43 
 N..E. 403. 
 
 * Kingsley v. Bloomingdale, 
 Mich. ; 67 N. W. 333 [tight check- 
 rein] ; Chartiers v. Phillips, 122 Pa. 
 St. 601; 16 Atl. 26 [tight collar chok- 
 ing horse]. 
 
 " In Titus V. Northbridge (97 Mass. 
 258), a horse, being taken sick, ceased 
 to obey the rein and pitched over an 
 unfenced embankment ; held, town 
 not liable, because the accident 
 would not have occurred if the horse 
 had been controllable, s. p., Higgins 
 T. Boston, 148 Mass. 484 ; 20 N. E. 
 105 ; Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wise. 296 
 [horse stopped, staggered and fell 
 off unrailed bridge; no recovery]; 
 Jackson v. Bellevipu. 30 Id. 2.50. The 
 Pennsylvania courts follow those of 
 
 Massachuseitts in this hard doctrine. 
 In Herr v. Lebanon (149 Pa. 332 ;, 24 
 Atl. 307), horse drawing an omni- 
 bus fell, and in its struggles to get / 
 up fell repeatedly, until it went over ' 
 an unrailed declivity on the side of 
 the "street, taking the omnibus and 
 plaintiff with it. Held, the fall of f 
 the horse was the proximate cause of . 
 the injury, and the city was not 
 liable. S. p., Trexler v. Greenwich, 
 168 Pa. St. 214 ; 31 Atl. 1090 ; Butler 
 V. Oxford, 69 Miss. 618 ; 13 So. 626. 
 But a horse is not to be considered 
 uncontrollable because it merely 
 shies or starts, or is momen tardy out 
 of control of the driver (Horton v. 
 Taunton, 97 Mass. 366, note ; Houfe 
 V. Fulton, 29 Wise. 296 ; see cases 
 cited in notes 14, 15, 16, § 346, ante; 
 also § 355, ante). It is a question 
 for the jury whether driver's 'loss of 
 control was more than momentary, 
 or was so complete as to relieve the 
 town from liability (Britton v. Cum- 
 mington, 107 Mass. 347). 
 
 ' For a woman to drive a horse is 
 not necessarily want of ordinary 
 care (Cobb v. Standish, 14 Me. 198 ; 
 Bigelow V. Eutland, 4 Cusb» 247 ; 
 Babson v. Rockport, 101 Mass, 93 ; 
 Blood V. Tyngsborough, 103 Id. 509 ; 
 Snow V. Provincetown, 120 Id. 580 ; 
 Hassenyer v. Railroad Co., 48 Mich. 
 305 ; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Id. 83). 
 
 2 Butterfleld v. Forrester, 11 East, 
 60 [leading case]. One who, while 
 traveling, merely speeds his horse is 
 
663 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§379 
 
 faster than allowed by ordinance,' or on the wrong side of the 
 road/ though competent and even strong, is not conclusive, 
 evidence of contributory negligence. But getting the reins 
 crossed or entangled so that the horse is guided upon an 
 obstruction, which otherwise it would not have come in 
 contact with,^ or slackening the reins and allowing the horse 
 to go at will on a dark night,^ or driving in one direction 
 and looking in another,' or so recklessly as to be indiffer- 
 ent to consequences,' has been held to be contributory 
 negligence as matter of law. The driver of a horse not entirely 
 gentle or manageable should use a degree of caution commen- 
 surate with that circumstance, in passing an object likely to 
 
 within the protection of the statute 
 (Blodgett V. Boston, 8 Allen, 237, 
 241). But persons racing horses are 
 not ; because that is a purpose for 
 which highways are not designed to 
 be used, not because horse racing is 
 unlawful (McCarthy v. Portland, 67 
 Me. 167). On the same ground, a 
 traveler who drove at a trot over a 
 bridge was held barred, the bridge 
 being good and sufficient except in 
 the matter of its springing when 
 driven upon at a trot (Abbott v. 
 Wolcott, 38 Vt. 666). See Weeks v. 
 Lyndon, 54 Id. 638 ; Reed v. Deer- 
 field, 8 Allen, 522, 
 
 3 Baker v. Portland, 58 Me. 199 ; 
 Cullman v. McMinn, 109 Ala. 614 ; 
 19 So. 981 ; Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo. 
 App. 886 ; 33 Pac. 685. Compare 
 Mullen V. Owosso, 100 Mich. 103; 58 
 N. W. 663 ; Stebbins v. Keene, 60 
 Mich. 214 ; 26 N. W. 885. The mere 
 fact that plaintiff, to reach a bridge, 
 drove over a foot-path, contrary to 
 ordinance, does not justify a non- 
 suit in an action for the fall of the 
 bridge (Fisher v. Cambridge, 133 N. 
 Y. 527 ; 30 N. E. 663). Under the 
 Massachusetts doctrine (see note 6, 
 last section), one driving faster than 
 a by-law allowed, cannot recover for 
 a defect in the road, although his fast 
 driving in no way contributed to his 
 
 injury (Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 
 470). See Hill v. Seekonk, 119 Mass. 
 85; Hall v. Ripley, Id. 135. In Arey 
 V. Newton (148 Mass. 598 ; 20 N. E. 
 327), plaintiff came into collision 
 with a hitching-post on the sidewalk 
 on which he drove (in violation of 
 ordinance) on attempting to pass a 
 team in front of him ; verdict for 
 defendant sustained. In Tuttle v. 
 Lawrence (119 Mass. 276), held, that 
 plaintiff must show that in driving 
 more than six miles an hour, he was 
 not violating a city ordinance. The 
 general rule is stated and illustrated 
 in § 104, ante. 
 
 " Damon v. Scituate, 119 Mass. 66; 
 Norris V. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271. 
 
 5 Bigelow V. Rutland, 4 Cush. 247; 
 Hull V. Kansas City, 54 Mo. 598 
 [reins under horse's tail]; Fogg v. 
 Nahant, 106 Mass. 278 [same]. 
 
 6 Mueller v. Ross, 153 Pa. St. 399 ; 
 25 Atl. 604. 
 
 ' Tuffree v. State Center, 57 Iowa, 
 538 ; 11 N. W. 1. 
 
 8 Abernethy v. Van Buren, 52 
 Mich. 383 ; 18 N. W. 116 ; Forks v. 
 King, 84 Pa. St. 330 ; Pittsburgh R. 
 Co. V. Taylor, 104 Id. 306 ; McCool v. 
 Grand Rapids, 58 Mich. 41; 24 N. W. 
 631 ; Corlett v. Leavenworth, 37 
 Kans. 678; Sowles v. Moore, 65 Vt. 
 332 ; 36 Atl. 639. 
 
§380] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 664 
 
 frighten horses.' In hitching a horse in the street, only ordi- 
 nary care is required to secure it ; and if, notwithstanding such 
 care, the horse gets loose, and, while straying on the highway, 
 is injured by a defect therein, the owner is not barred." 
 
 § 380. Negligent stowing and excessive weight of load. — 
 
 If plaintiff's negligence in stowing his load insecurely was the 
 proximate cause of its falling off, on the vehicle coming in con- 
 tact with a defect in the highway, he cannot recover, as matter 
 of law.* In paving a street, or building a bridge, municipali- 
 ties are bound to anticipate and provide for ordinary travel 
 only, and hence are not liable for the giving way of a pavement 
 or the fall of a bridge under the excessive weight of a wagon- 
 load ^ or of unusual machines, e. g., traction-engines,^ or other 
 
 » DiQiock V. Suffleld, 30 Conn. 139. 
 See Dennett v. Wellington, 15 Me. 
 27; Tutis v. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 
 258 ; Stone v. Hubbardston, 100 Id. 
 49 ; Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wise. 297 ; 
 Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Taylor, 
 104 Pa. St. 306 ; Kuhn v. Walker, 
 97 Mich. 306 ; 56 N. W. 556. 
 
 " Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 
 19 ; Cummings v. Center Harbor, 57 
 N. H. 17. It is not negligence, per se, 
 to leave a horse unfastened in the 
 street, if the driver is so near that he 
 may reasonably expect to control 
 him by his voice, or to reach him 
 before he can escape (Wasmer v. 
 Delaware, etc. R. Co., 80 N. Y. 212; 
 Southworth v. Old Colony, etc. R. 
 Co., 105 Mass. 842). In Richards v. 
 Enfield (13 Gray, 344), the horse was 
 hitched outside the highway and 
 escaped thence to the highway. 
 Held, town not liable. 
 
 ' Fisher v. Fi-anklin, 89 Wise. 42 ; 
 61 N. W. 80 [insecure load of hay]. 
 
 ' Megargee v. Philadelphia, 153 Pa. 
 St. 340 ; 25 Atl. 11?0 [plaintiflf's 
 ' • heavy hauling " displaced pave- 
 ment]. Where the weight of plain- 
 tiff's wagon-load exceeded the weight 
 prescribed by statute, he is barred of 
 an action against the town (Howe v. 
 
 Castleton, 25 Yt. 162). In determin- 
 ing what constitutes a statutory 
 "load," in Vermont, only the mate- 
 rial placed upon the carriage, and 
 not the carriage itself, or anything 
 used or employed in the transporta- 
 tion of the material is to be consid- 
 ered (lb. ) . In Maine, the weight of 
 the driver is to be taken into account 
 (Dexter v. Canton Toll-bridge Co., 
 79 Me. 563 ; 12 Atl. 547). 
 
 ^ It cannot be required or expected 
 that a town shall, construct and 
 maintain bridges which will insure 
 the safety of persons passing over 
 them in a manner involving peculiar 
 and special danger arising from un- 
 usual weight of vehicles — traction- 
 engines (Gregory v. Adams, 14 Grey, 
 242, 248 ; MoCormick v. Washington, 
 113 Pa. St., 185 ; Coulter v. Pine, 164 
 Id. 543 ; 30 Atl. 490 [steam thrasher]; 
 Clulow V. McClelland, 151 Pa. St. 
 583 ; 25 Atl. 147 ; Clapp v. Elling- 
 ton, 51 Hun, 58 ; 3 N. Y. Supp. 516 
 [traction-engine propelled by steam]; 
 Yermillion county v. Chipps, 131 Ind. 
 56 ; 29 N. E. 1606 [same] ; Laporte 
 county V. Ellsworth, 9 Ind. App. 
 ■566 ; Fulton Iron Works v. Kimball, 
 53 Mich. 146 : 17 N. W. 733 [same] ; 
 Woodbury v. Owosso, 64 Mich. 339 ; 
 
665 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§381 
 
 like uses unknown or not common when the street or bridge 
 was constructed ; otherwise when such use becomes common.* 
 
 §381. Sunday traveling. — Under the statutes of Maine, 
 Vermont, and (until 1 887 ^ ) Massachusetts, which expressly pro- 
 hibit "traveling" on Sunday, an ordinary traveler has no 
 remedy for an injury received on that day from a defective 
 highway. In states having statutes which merely prohibit 
 all manner of business or work, etc., on Sunday, all courts 
 have refused to include, by construction, ordinary traveling. 
 The fact, therefore, that the plaintiff, when injured, was trav- 
 eling on Sunday is nowhere a defense to his action for the 
 injury, except in the two first mentioned states.^ 
 
 § 382. [consolidated.* ] 
 § 383- [consolidated.f j 
 
 31 N. W. 130 [same]; Yordy v. in use in the neighborhood for many 
 Marshall county, 80 Iowa, 405 ; 45 years before the construction of a 
 N. W. 1042 ; s. C. [after new trial] 86 bridge, it will be presumed that the 
 Iowa, 340 ; 53 N. W. 298 [thrashing crossing of sucli engine was antici- 
 outfit]). The character and weight pated in the construction of the 
 of the vehicle and load, and tlie bridge (Bonebrake v. Huntington 
 manner it is moved, and the effect county, 141 Ind. 62 ; 40 N. E. 141 ; 
 of its movement, are to be taken into Wabasli v. Carver, 129 Ind. 552 ; 29 
 consideration in crossing a bridge, N. E. 25). See Allen county v. Crev- 
 and m.ay require greater or less care, iston, 133 Ind. 89 ; 32 N. E. 735. It 
 and when these facts are shown, ought to be strong enough to support 
 whether any or what additional care a drove of cattle (Richardson v. Roy- 
 is required, are properly submitted alton Turnp. Co., 6 Vt, 496). 
 to the jury (Bidwell v. Murray, 40 ' Stat. 1887, ch. 391 [word " travel " 
 Hun, 190 ; and cases supra). In New stricken from Pub. Stat. cli. 98, § 13]. 
 York, " no town shall be liable for ' Platz v. Cohoes, 89 N. Y. 319 ; 
 any damage resulting to a person or Piollet v. Simmers, 106 Pa. St. 95 ; 
 property by reason of the breaking Sharp v. Evergreen, 67 Mich. 443 ; 
 of any bridge by a traction-engine 35 N. W. 67 ; and cases cited in notes 
 in crossing the same, of the weight 3 to 10, § 104, ante. 
 of four tons or over" (L. 1887, c. * The substance of this section in 
 536). The fact that a bridge, which the last edition on burden of proof. 
 fell while plaintiff was crossing it, so far as the scope of this work per- 
 had, two hours before, stood twice mits any treatment of the law of 
 as much weight, as that under which evidence, will be found in chapter v, 
 it went down, does not conclusively ante. 
 
 show that defendant could not t Damages in highway cases, the 
 
 reasonably have known its unsafe subject of this section in the last 
 
 condition (Murray v. Usher, 46 Hun, edition, are now treated in chapter 
 
 404% xxxviii, on the general subject of 
 
 * Where traction-engines had been Damages. 
 
§ 384] HIGHWAYS. 666 
 
 §384. Action over against thir*«person. — Under the gen- 
 eral principle stated in § 301, ante, one who maintains a law- 
 ful structure in a highway, which a third person, by his interfer- 
 ence, has made dangerous, e. g., by removing guards around a 
 hatchway in a sidewalk, has a right of action against the latter 
 for the damages he has been compelled to pay a traveler falling 
 into such unguarded hatchway.' So a municipal corporation 
 has a right of action for reimbursement against the immediate 
 creator of an obstruction or other nuisance in a highway, for 
 the damages paid by it, under a legal liability, to a person 
 injured thereby;" provided always that the dangerous condition 
 of the highway which caused the injury was not due to its own 
 fault ; in which case, as being in pari delicto, it cannot recover.' 
 At common law, the third person's liability over depends upon 
 his original liability to the injured person. Hence a lot- 
 owner, inasmuch as he owes no duty to maintain the highway 
 in front of his premises,^ is under no obligation to reim- 
 burse the corporation (whose duty it was to repair) the 
 damages paid by it to a traveler injured by a defective 
 sidewalk.^ Otherwise, where the statute imposes the duty 
 
 ' Churchill v. Holt, 137 Mass. 165 ; (see note 4, §301, ante); and cases 
 
 131 Id. 67. infra. 
 
 ' Chicago V. Eobbins, 3 Black, 418; '' Cases cited under §348, ante. 
 4 Wall. 679 ; District of Columbia v. ' Rochester v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 
 
 Washington Gaslight Co., 20 D. C. 405 ; 25 N. E. 937. In that case, 
 
 39. " The liability grows out of the plaintiff's charter made it the duty of 
 
 affirmative act of defendant which lot-owners to keep the adjoining 
 
 renders him liable not only to the sidewalks in good repair and remove 
 
 party injured, but also mediately to obstructions therefrom, vrith power 
 
 any party who has been damnified to the city to repair, on adjacent 
 
 by his neglect "' (Port Jei-vis v. First owner's neglect to do so after notice, 
 
 Nat'l Bank, 96 N. Y. 550 ; New York and to collect the expense from the 
 
 V.Brady, 151 Id. 611; 45 N. E. 1132; lot-owner. Held, not to impose a 
 
 Eochester v. Montgomery, 73 N. Y. primary liability upon the lot-owner, 
 
 65; Canandaigua v. Foster, 81 Hun, and not sufficient to sustain an action 
 
 147; 30 N. Y. Supp. 686; Gridley v. to recover over by the city. s. t., 
 
 Bloomington, 68 111. 47 ; Fahey v. Fulton v. Tucker, 3 Hun, 529 ; Keo- 
 
 Harvard, 62 Id. 28 ; Centerville kuk v. District of Keokuk, 53 Iowa, 
 
 V. Woods, 57 Ind. 193 ; Wabasha v. 353 ; St. Louis v. Connecticut Mut'. 
 
 Southworth, 54 Minn. 79; 56 N. Life Ins. Co., 107 Mo. 93; 17 S. W. 
 
 W. 818 [trap-door in sidewalk] ; St. 637 [ordinance prescribed penalty on 
 
 Joseph V. Union R. Co., 116 Mo. lot-owners for not keeping sidewalks 
 
 636 : 23 S. W. 794). free from ice and snow]. Compare 
 
 3 Buffalo V. Holloway, 7 N. Y. 493 Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80 ; 37 
 
667 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 [§384 
 
 to repair upon the lot-owner, and gives, expressly or impliedly, 
 a right of action over, by the corporation, against him. In 
 such a statutory action, it is no defense that the injury would 
 not have happened but for the plaintiff's neglect of its general 
 duty to repair.* In neither class of actions is it a defense that 
 the corporation authorized the defendant's interference with the 
 the highway, e. g., making an excavation, or placing a tele- 
 graph pole therein, — if the injury was caused by the defend- 
 ant's negligent manner of using the license.''' Unless otherwise 
 provided by statute, it is not a condition of plaintiff's right of 
 recovery over, that a judgment by the injured person has been 
 recovered and satisfied ; but in case of no judgment fixing 
 plaintiff's original liability, it is for him to plead and prove his 
 legal liability for the sum paid the third person.^ A recovery 
 
 N. W. 883 i'see next note). For the 
 rule in Pennsylvania, see Reading v. 
 Reiner, 167 Pa. St, 41 ; 31 Atl. 357. 
 In Brookville v. Arthurs (130 Pa. St. 
 501 ; 18 Atl. 1076), an action over 
 was maintained against a lot-owner, 
 on an ordinance requiring adjacent 
 owners to repair their sidewalks, 
 and his promise to repair, in consid- 
 eration of an extension of time — an 
 injury occurring meanwhile. 
 
 ' Veazie v . Penobscot R. Co. , 49 Me. 
 1 19 ; Littleton v. Richardson, 33 N. H. 
 59 ; Milford v. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17 ; 
 Lowell V. Short, 4 Cush. 375 ; Low- 
 ell V. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 33 
 Pick. 24 ; Woburn v. Boston, etc. R. 
 Co. 109 Mass. 383 ; Lowell v. Glid- 
 den, 159 Id. 317 ; 34 N. E. 459 ; De- 
 troit V. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80 ; 37 >T. 
 W. 833 [lot-owner liable over to city 
 for nonrepair of sidewalk, under city 
 charter ; owner and it not joint tort- 
 feasors] ; Raymond v. Sheboygan, 
 76 Wise, 33) ; 45 N. W. 135 
 
 ' Chicago V. Robbins. 3 Black, 418 
 [excavation] ; Seneca Falls v. Zalin- 
 ski, 8 Hun, 571 ; Canandaigua v. 
 Poster, 81 Hun, 147 : 30 N. Y. Supp. 
 686 [coal-hole in sidewalk] ; Center- 
 vUle V. Woods, 57 Ind. 193 ; Wick- 
 
 wire V. Angola, 4 Ind. App. 353 ; 30 
 N. E. 917 [area opening on sidewalk] ; 
 Ottawa V. Parks, 43 Iowa, 119 [exca- 
 vation] ; Independence v. Yakel, 38 
 Id. 437. On the other hand, where 
 the jury found that a telegraph pole 
 erected in a street, under plaintiff's 
 license, was a nuisance, and a trav- 
 eler's injury was caused by its loca- 
 tion, and not its use, held, the city 
 was a joint wrong-doer, and had no 
 right of action over against the 
 licensee (Geneva v. Brush Electric 
 Co., 50 Hun, 581 ; 3N. Y. Supp. 595). 
 So of a city which, with notice, per- 
 mitted defendant for years to pile 
 lumber in a street, which fell on a 
 passer-by (Galveston v. Gonzales, 6 
 Tex. Civ. App. 538 ; 35 S. W. 978). 
 
 8 Fahey v. Harvard, 63 111. 38. In 
 New York v. Dimick (49 Hun, 341; 
 3 N. Y. Supp. 46), held, on demur- 
 rer that a complaint which stated 
 facts from which notice and conse- 
 quent, liability might be inferred, 
 was sufficient. " The only effect of 
 the city's settling the claim, without 
 judgment, is to leave open all ques- 
 tions upon which defendant's liabil- 
 ity depends " (Wabasha v. South- 
 worth, 54 Minn. 79). 
 
§384] 
 
 HIGHWAYS. 
 
 668 
 
 against the city by the injured person is conclusive in its favor 
 in an action over by it, of the existence of the defect which 
 caused the injury and its own liability therefor, as well as of 
 the injured person's freedom from negligence and the amount 
 of damages ; ' provided defendant had notice of the action in 
 which the judgment was had, and was afforded an opportunity 
 to defend .« 
 
 > New York v. Brady, 151 N. Y. 
 611 ; 45 N. E. 1122; St. Joseph v. Union 
 R. Co., 116 Mo. 636 ; 23 S. W. 794. 
 
 '" The failure of city to give ex- 
 press notice to defend the action 
 against it by tlie injured person, does 
 not affect the former's right of action 
 against the wrong-doer ; it simply 
 imposes on it the burden of estab- 
 lishing all the actionable facts (Chi- 
 cago V. Bobbins, 3 Black, 418 ; Port 
 
 Jervis v. First Nat. Bk., 96 N. Y. 
 550 ; Warner v. McGarry, 4 Vt. 507 ; 
 Chatterton v. Frankfort, 79 Ind. 
 547). Where defendant joined in the 
 defense of the suit against plaintiff, 
 aU that plaintiff is required to prove 
 is that defendant's negligence caused 
 the injury, and that it has paid the 
 judgment recovered against it (Mc- 
 Donald v. Lockport, 28 111. App. 157.)