36
ARISTOTLE
says of contradictory opposition ' do we find the kernel of
the late doctrine of disjunctive judgments. On the
other hand, he is copious in his treatment of the Con-
version of Propositions, 2 laying down the well-known
rules, 3 but he treats it solely in connection with his
theory of the Syllogism.
This theory of the Syllogism was expounded by
Aristotle at full length, and it may truly be called his
most original discovery. 4 As he was the first to intro-
duce the name of the Syllogism into the scientific
vocabulary, 5 so he was also the first to remark that all
connections and all advances in our thought depend
upon the syllogistic combination of judgments. A
' Syllogism ' is a chain of thoughts, in which, from certain
matters assumed, and by virtue of these alone, there issues
of necessity some further matter different from them. 6
thing contained in B and A, by
the same necessity, there is,, or
is not, a connection (if all living
beings, by reason of a necessity
of nature, are mortal, the same
is also true of every kind of
living beings, e.g. of men), as
Aristotle, loo. tit. 30, a, 21 sqq.
shows quite clearly. If, on the
other hand, these propositions
are meant to state that we are
obliged to think A connected or
not connected with B, the pro-
position, ' C must (or cannot) be
A ' can only be deduced from
the proposition ' B must (or
cannot) be A,' when we are
obliged to consider C implied in
B. If, however, we only know
as a fact (assertorially) that
C is B, then we only know as a
fact, likewise, that C is or is not
that which we are obliged to
think connected or not connected
with B.
1 Vid. supr. p. 230.
' Anal. Pr. i. 2, 3, cf. c. 13,
32, a, 29 sqq. c. 17, 36, b, 15
sqq. ii. 1, 53, a, 3 sqq.
3 Simple conversion of uni-
versal negative and particular
affirmative judgments, particular
conversion (later so-called con-
rersio per aecidens) of universal
affirmative, and no conversion at
all of particular negative judg-
ments — for the nonversio per
oontrapontionem was not as yet
known to him.
4 As he himself says, Soph. M.
c. 34, 183, b, 34, 184, b, 1.
6 Cf. Pbantl, Gescli. d.
Log. i. 264.
6 Anal. Pr. i. 24. b, 18 :
o-vWoyi&fibs 8e eori \6yos iv §
Ts84vTQ)V TLVWV fET€p6v Tl TUV KCl-
LOGIC
237
The principle that this process in its simplest form in-
volves no more than two assumptions; or more accurately
two judgments, from which a third is derived, and that
therefore no syllogistic conclusion can have more than
two premisses, is nowhere expressly proved by Aristotle
in the beginning of his treatise, though he refers to it
later. 1 Now the deduction of a third judgment from two"
given judgments can only arise out of some bringing
into connection of the concepts, which in these given
judgments were as yet unconnected. 2 This is impossi-_
ble, except a mediation be effected between them by
another concept connected with both of them. 3 Every
syllogism must therefore necessarily contain three con-
cepts, no more and no less, 4 and of these the intermediate
is connected in the one premiss with the first and in
the other with the third, in such a way as to bring out
the connection between the first and third in the con-
fxevaiv Q avdyfcrjs trvfifiaivet Tip
tclvtcl eivtu. (Likewise Top. i. 1,
100, a, 25, cf. Soph. El. c. 1, 165,
a, 1.) \eyco 8e l T0ej/
opov irpoffSely irpbs rb yev4(T0ai rb
avayndiov.
1 Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, a, 32.
As regards terminology, the pre-
misses are generally called irpo-
i-io-cu (Metaph. v. 2, 1013, b, 20 :
viroBeireis tov ffvfjLTrepda'fj.a.Tos') ; the
minor proposition in Eth. ]V. vi.
12, 1143, b, 3, vii. 5, 1147, b, 9 =
i] Irepa (or reKevrala) Trp6ra
the Scholastic designations) the (rvMoyuriibi/ rbv firiSzvbs &\\ov
moods: Barbara, Da/rii, Cclare/it, irpoavrjvcu rb avaynaiov, ars\ri
second: Cesare, Oamestres, Fes- Sf -rbv Ttpo(r8s6fi.zvov ?) kvbs ?)
bino, Baroco (ibid. c. 5) ; for the irKzidvwv, & tart piv avayicaia 5m
third : Darapti, Felapton, Disa- twv inroK€ifi4voitt 8pav «u pd)v
mis, Datisi, Bocardo, Fresison flAriTrrai 5m irpoTdv. It is not
(c. 6). necessary here to defend Ari-
3 Anal. Pr. i. c. 8-23 ; cf . the stotle's view.
discussion in n. 1 to p. 234, swpra. 5 Ibid. c. 23, 41, a, 21 sqq. ;
4 See the sections cited, espe- cf. supra, p. 238, n. 1.
ciallyc. ifin.,o. 5fin.,c. 6Jin.,u.
LOGIC 241
•
With equal fulness does Aristotle set forth rules
for the proper treatment of these forms in scientific
use, and the errors to be avoided. He shows in the
first instance what kind of propositions are more
difficult to prove but more easy to confute, and vice
versa. 1 Next he provides rules for the discovery of the
fitting premisses, having regard to the quality and
quantity of the conclusion to be proved, 2 and in doing
so he takes occasion to censure 3 in passing the Platonic
method of division. 4 On this head he treats minutely
of the rules and methods which must be observed in
order to reduce the materials of proof so discovered to
the exact syllogistic form. 5 Furthermore he discusses
the capacity of syllogisms in relation to the compre-
hension of their contents ; 6 the syllogisms giving true
conclusions from false premisses ; 7 the circulus in a/rgu-
1 Ibid. o. 26. the Platonic method is blamed
2 Ibid. o. 27-29, here also because (contrary to the rule
(c. 29) with express application given at p. 216, n. 1) it multiplies
to apagogic and supposition- unnecessarily the intermediate
syllogisms. divisions, introduces the same
3 To seek to define concepts thing under different genera,
by means of continuous divisions, gives negative qualities, divides
he says (c. 31), is of no use ; from all kinds of opposite points
we have then to suppose the of view, &c. Cf. Mbyeb, Arist.
chief point that is to be proved. Thierltunde, 71 sqq.
When it is a question of the * See Zell. Ph. d. Or. pt. i.
concept of man as a (tpov Bvnrbv, 523 sqq.
then, he says, from the proposi- 5 Loc. cit. c. 32-46.
tions ' All living beings are 6 Anal. Pr. ii. 1.
either mortal or immortal ; man ' Ibid. t. 2 init. (cf. Top. viii.
is a living being,' it would only 11 sq., 162, a, 9, b, 13) : e| aKyBiiv
follow that man is either mortal niv oiv ovk %gti tf^SSos crvWoyitr-
or immortal: that he is a £ij3oc aa0a.i, ex tyevti&v S' ianv aAyBes,
Bvnrbv is a mere postulate. Hence irAV ov 5i6ti &W' '6ti • tov ykp Sio'ti
Aristotle says of division, that ovk etrrtv e/c tyevBav trvWoyMTfids
it is oTov aa6eir))s [not valid] (because false premisses give the
. 173,n.2). Underwhat
VOL. I. K
242
ARISTOTLE
endo ; ' the ' conversion ' of the syllogism ; 2 the Eeduotio
ad absurdum ; 3 syllogisms which result from the
conversion of premisses into their opposites, 4 together
with the various syllogistic fallacies and the means of
meeting them. 5 Lastly he inquires into those kinds of
proof which do not arise by demonstration, in the strict
sense of the word, 6 and establishes the method of argu-
ment peculiar to each. 7 We cannot at this point
conditions this is possible in the
different figures, is discussed in c.
2-4.
1 Ti) KvK\a< Ka\ €| ahXijKav
SetKvvffSai. This consists in the
conclusion of a syllogism (which,
however, must of course be shown
to be true from other sources)
being used in conjunction with
the converse of one premiss to
prove the other. For the cases
where this is possible, see loc. cit.
c. 5-7. Against ' the vicious
circle ' in argument, see Anal.
Post. i. 3, 72, b, 25.
2 The destruction of one pre-
miss by the other in conjunction
with the contradictory or contrary
of the conclusion ; loc. tit. c. 8-10.
3 The Iieduetio ad aosurdxwi,
& 8ia tov afivj/drov (rvWoyifffiSs, c.
11-1 4, cf.To^. viii. 2,157, b, 34, c.
12, lG2,b,B,a.ud Anal. Post. i. 26,
where it is remarked that direct
proof is of greater scientific value.
4 Loc. cit. c. xv.
5 The petitio principii (rd iv
dpXP aiTEiVflai), c. 16, cf. Top. viii.
13 ; the [ify irapa rodro trv/j.fialveu'
t6 tyevbos, c. 17 ; the TrpwTov
iJzeOSoj, c. 18, cf. Top. viii. 10;
rules for disputation deduced
from this, c. 19, sq. ; on decep-
tion by too hasty suppositions, c.
21 ; on proving certain supposi-
tions by the transposition of the
propositions in a syllogism, c. 22.
6 Induction, c. 23 ; example,
c. 24 (cf. Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a,
9 ; JfUiet. i. 2, 1356, b, 2, 1357, b,
25, ii. 20) ; airajay 1 )) (reduction
of one problem to another more
easy to solve), c. 25 ; objection
(tvarairis), u. 26 ; the syllogism
from the probable (eucbs) or cer-
tain marks (oTj/iteTa), which Ari-
stotle calls the ' Enthymeme,'
c. 27. The most important of
these is ' Induction,' which we
shall discuss later on. It consists
in the major proposition being
proved by the minor and the
conclusion. E.g., we may prove
apodictically ' All animals which
have little gall are long-lived ;
man, the horse &c. have little gall,
and are therefore long-lived ; ' but
the inductive proof will go thus :
' Man, the horse &c.,- are long-
lived ; man &c. have little gall ;
therefore animals which have
little gall are long-lived.' This,
however, only applies when the
minor concept (' animals which
have little gall ') has an equal ex-
tension with the middle concept
(' manic.'), and when the minor
proposition (' man &c. have little
gall') can be simply transposed,
so that in its place ' the animals
which have little gall are man
&c.' can be put (loc. cit. c. 23).
' See for a fuller discussion
of these points, Peantl, p. 299-
LOGIC m 243
follow him into these researches, although we un-
doubtedly owe much to them in the application of the
syllogistic method, and though they prove most clearly
the care with which the great logician worked out
its many-sided detail.
The syllogistic system forms the foundation upon
which Aristotle built the theory of Scientific Proof,
which he set out in the second Analytics. All proof
is syllogistic, but not every syllogism is proof. It is
only the Scientific Syllogism which deserves this name. 1
Science consists in the cognition of causes, and the
cause of a phenomenon is that from which it of necessity
arises. 2 Proof, therefore, and apprehension by means of
proof are only possible when something is explained
from its original causes. 3 Nothing can be the subject
of proof except that which is necessary. Proof is a
conclusion from necessary premisses. 4 That which is
ordinarily (though not without exception) true can be
321. — In the selection and se- aWta icrl, /tal p)i evSexeo-Bai tout'
quence of the different sections no S\X«s exeiv. Further references in
strict order is observed, although support of this, mipra,T>. 163, n. 3.
related subjects are put together. 3 Ibid. 71, b, 19 : el toIvw
On the division of the Prior Ana- iffrl rb brlaraaBai olov ede/iev,
lytics as a whole, see Beandis, p. av&yici) Kal tV airoSeiKTM^v eVi-
204 sq., 219 sq. ffT4ip.i\v QaKrtB&VT'etvaiKalTrptbTav
1 Anal. Post. i. 2, 71, b, 18 : Kal apeouv [about this below] Kal
air6Sei^tv Se Xeyu ffvKXoyifffjhv yvwplv.tiiTepwv Kal TtpoTepwv tov
eTTtffTTj/wviKdv. And after giving irvfj.-nepdffp.aTOS' ovtu yap taovrai
the requisites for such an argu- «al at apxal olxeuu tov SeMvv/j.ivov.
ment, he adds : ffvWoyur/ibs fnev Ibid, line 29 : afrid re . . . Set elvai
yap €s eirl rb iro\b, rb Se vir&px*i irepl eKaarov yivos Sera Ka9'
cri/^/3i-/37)it!)y iv ovSereptp roirav aira virdpxei Kal p tKairrov, (pavepbv
iariv. Anal. Post. i. 30 : ttSs yap tin ireol rav Kad' auTck inrapx^yrav
trvWoyur/ibs t) St' avayxalvv % Bia ai hnari]novma\ airo5e£|eiy «al eVc
ruv &>s eiri rb iroKb irpordffewv ' ratv roiovrwv sltrlv. ra fikv yap
Kal ei /uey at irpordaeis avayKalai, o-i//t/3e/97)KoVa ovk ai/ay/caia, SoV
Kal to crvnirepafffna avayxatov, ei S' ovk hvdyKi) rb o-ipirepacriUL eiiivai
us iirl rb TTo\i), ko! to irviimipaaiia 810V1 inrdpxe', ovb" ei ael efrf, p})
rotovrov. Cf. p 168, n. 1/ Kaff avrb 8e, olov ol ftia a"t]fielcov
2 Altai. Post. i. 6, 75, a, 18, avKKoyia/jLol. rb yap /cafl' airb ob
c. 30 ; of. c. 8, c. 33, &c. ; via", mff airb eVio-T^avepfo> 8ti %xaffTov diro- supposes a limit to the number of
5e?|ai oIk tffTiv «U' 3) ix t&v concepts above as well as below.
eKaarov apx&v, &c. We return 3 Ch. 22, 84, a, 30; andsoJ/e-
to this later on. tapli. iii. 2, 997, a, 7 : irepl Trdvrav
1 For he says at 83, b, 6,84, yap aSivarov ht6Sei^o' ehai- ai/dyicri
a, 3 : ret &TT€ipa ovk %v fffi effri irp&ra, opOws
\4yovres, oZvvarov yap ra aireipa
SieAdeiv. eX Te Xaravrai Kal eifflv
apxal, ravras ayv&orovs elvai cwro-
fieli-eu's ye fit] otfaTjs avrccv, 'direp
ipatrlv elvai rb eiriaraaQai \l6vov ei
Se /J.}} eari ret irpSna eiSevai, oiibe ra
£k rovrccv elvai eTr'iGraaQai cmKws
ouSe KvpUos, aA.\' e£ inroOtceus, ei
eKelva ionv. He admits that
what is deduced would not be
lmown if the principles (a/>x«l)
are not known, and that if me-
diate knowledge, by way of proof,
is the only knowledge, then there
can be no knowledge of apxal.
Yet he himself in the same trea-
tise denies this very thing at p.
72, b, 18 ; cf. MetapJi. iv. 4, 1006,
a, 6 : effri yap cnraiSevo-ia rb /x^
yiyv&GKeiv, rivuv Be? £rjre?v atr6-
Sei^iv Kal rivwv ov Se?" SXtcs fiev
yap avavrtov ab'o'varov air68ei£tv
elvai ■ eis aveipov yap av /SotSffoi,
ware [17]$' oSrats eival airdBei^iv. .is
to the second of the above pro-
positions, Aristotle states it at
p. 72, b, 16, in other words —
w&vrw elvai a7ro5a£tf ovBev
KwAveiv ' ej/8ex_ev t' elvai Kal
irpioriov Kal afietrtav Kal yvupifjiwre-
pwv Kal irporepaiv Kal airlcov rod
ffvirfiepdcrfj.aros. . . . e/c Trpdrav b'
avaTToBelKrwi/, Hri ovk diriffTfoerat
/xi; exa>" aw68ei£iv airav [because
otherwise if they were not avair6-
SetKroi we could, likewise, only
know them by proof] ; rh yap
eirio'TaffQat av airdBeigis etrri ^tj
Kara a-VfJL/SeBTJKOS, rb exeiv air6-
Seitfv eariv. c. 3, 72, b, 18 : fouls
Se (pafiev otire iraffav eiriffrf]fit]v
airoSeiKriK^jV elvai, a\\a rf\v rwv
apeaiav avair68eiKrov. . . . Kal ov
Il6vov etTLO'r'fiflTjv aWa Kal apjtfiv
e'TTLtrr-fi/J.Tls elvai rivd afj.ev, $ robs
Spovs yvupifynev. Of. swpra,p. 197,
n. 6, and 210, n. 2, 179, n. 4, and
210, n.2fin. On the other hand,
the circumstance that a thing is
always so is no reason for reject-
ing proof by causes, for even the
eternal may have its causes on
which it is conditional ; see Gen.
An. ii. 6, 742, b, 17 sqq.
2 'Apxal, apxal airo$el£ews, apxai
ffvKKoyiffriKal, a. BLixeo'oi, irporaffeis
a/ieaoi, Anal.. Post. 72, a, 7, 14,
c. 10 init. (Aiyo> V apyhs ev eK&ara
yevet raiiras, as 6rt effrt /.lt] ev-
Se X erai Se7£ai) ; ii. 19, 99, b, 21, cf.
p. 197, n. i ; Gen. An. ii. 6, 742,
b, 29 sqq.; Metaph. v. 1, 1013,
a, 14, Hi. 1, 2, 995, b, 28, 996,
b, 27, iv. 3, and also cf. Ind,
248 ARISTOTLE
even a higher certainty than anything deduced from
them. 1 Consequently, the soul must contain a faculty
of immediate knowledge higher and more sure than
any mediate cognition. And, in fact, Aristotle finds in
the Nous — the pure reason — just such a faculty; and
he maintains that it never deceives itself, that in every
case it either has its object or has it not, but never has
it in a false or illusive way. 2
Yet it must be admitted that he has neither proved
the possibility nor the infallibility of any such know-
ledge. This immediate certainty, he says, is of two
kinds. There are three elements in every process of
demonstration : that which is proved, the principles
from which it is proved, 3 and the object of which it is
proved. The first of these is not matter of immediate
knowledge, for it is deduced from the other two.
These, again, are themselves distinguished in this way,
that the axioms are common to different fields of
knowledge, but the postulates relating to the special
Arist. Ill, b, 58 sqq. In Anal, also used in a wider sense, see
Post. i. 2, 72, a, 14, Aristotle Anal. Post. i. 7, 75, a, 41, c. 10,
proposes to call the unproved 76, b, 14, and Metaph. iii. 2, 997,
premiss of a syllogism Bias, if a, 5, 12. — Airy/ia. is distinguished
it refers to a particular fact, from Air69e»<2. ch.10,
66, a, 2, and Anal. Post. i. 3, 73, 76, b, 10: iriwa yhp a7roSeiKTiK^ iwi-
a, 9 ; in a narrower one in Top. i. «"rtj|inj irepl rpta iarlv, 8 iri(rrT)iL7i
r) eKeivav Kvpla irdvrav. Gf. ch. 10,
cited p. 248, n. 3 supra.
4 Anal. Pr. i. 30, 46, a, 17 :
iStat Se Kaff eKdffrijv \_iirto'r , fifii]v']
at ir\ettrrat [dpxal rav trvWo-
yttTfiuv]. Sib rets fiev apxas rds
irepl eKatrrov ifiiretpias eo-rl irapa-
Sovvat. \4yte 5' olov rfyv dffrpoKo-
ytK7}V fj.ev ep/ireiplav rr)s ao'TpoAo-
ytlcijs eirtffTr)firis. KycpdivTav yap
tKavas tuv (patvofievwv ov'tws evpe-
Bfitrav at atrTpoAo7treal a-jroSei^ets.
So in Hist. An. i. 7 init. : we have
first to describe, the peculiar pro-
perties of animals, and then to
discuss their causes : oSrw yap
koto tpvtrtv earl irot^trBat ttiv fi48-
olSov, iirapxov'o'ris tt)s Itnoplas ttjs
irepl ereaiTToy irepl Srv re yap real
e| &v elvat Set ri\v air6Setl-iv, in
rovrav ylverat (pavepdv.
5 Cf . preceding note, and the
remark in Mil. vi. 9, 1142, a, 11
sqq., that young people can make
advances in the knowledge of
Mathematics, but not in Natural
History or the wisdom of life,
'6rt rd jiev [Mathematics] 8«' cupai-
pecreds eertv [is an abstract
250
ARISTOTLE
pass, he does not further inquire. Sense-perception he
treats as a simple datum, whose elements he does not
try to analyse. He even includes cases which are to
us merely judgments upon given materials, among what
he calls immediate certainties. 1 It is therefore im-
possible to give a clear and sufficient account of the
faculties to which, according to him, we are indebted
for the immediate truths in question. 2
To enumerate the special presuppositions of all the
various sciences is also obviously impossible. Even a
general view of the universal axioms is not to be found
science], t&v b" at opx a ' ^1 ^ur«-
pias.
1 It is said in Eth. iii. 5, 1112,
b, 33, that practical reflection
(/SouAeuffir) is concerned with ra
Ka6' eKotTTa, oXov ei &pros tovto
•/) 7re7re7prai 5>s Set • aitr^cews
jkp ravra. Ibid. vi. 9, 1142, a,
23 sqq., Aristotle explains that,
in contradiction to hrurHuai,
s,
(pavepbv '6ti otivvo/rov o.jj.0. imoKo.iJ.fid-
veiv tov aiiTOV elvat Kal ju^ eivat to
avrd • ap.a yhp av %x 0L ™ s ^vavTias
86%as 6 8t6i|/€!/(r/ieyos irepl to'utov.
Ibid. u. 6, 1011, b, 15: &rel S'
aSiivaTOV t$\v avTtyaffiv a\7idei/eff9ai
djxa KaTa tov avrov [for which at
line 20 he substitutes afia KaTcupd-
vai Kal airow, % daTepov [lev irrj Bdrepov Se
aTr\5)S.
3 ' In this sense Aristotle in
Metaph. iv. i sq. confutes the
statement (which, however, he
only ascribes to certain of the
older schools as being in his view
an inference from their tenets ;
cf. Zei/leb, Ph. d. Gr. part i.
600 sq., 910, 4), that ' an object
can both be and not be the same
thing at the same time,' by
proving that in every statement
the principle of non-contradic-
252 ARISTOTLE
sophistical misuse .of it to deny the connection of
different properties in one subject, or the possibility of
becoming and of change, by that detailed exposition of it
in which he shows that it is not absolutely impossible
that contradictions should be predicated of the same
subject, but only that they should be so predicated
together and in the same relation. 1
By similar arguments to these with which he esta-
blished the Law of Contradiction, he lays down that of
the Excluded Middle z as an incontestable Axiom . 3
But he does not expressly deduce the one from the
other.
Though Aristotle maintains so decidedly that every
kind of knowledge brought about by demonstration is
doubly conditioned by an immediate and undemon-
strable conviction of the mind, yet he is far from repre-
senting this conviction as itself incapable of scientific
verification. The starting-point of all demonstration is
undemonsfrable — it is incapable of being deduced from
any other principle as from its cause. Yet it can be
shown from the given facts to be the condition which
underlies them, and which their existence presup-
tion is presupposed. In c. 5 aiv6iisvov, the dictum would
init., c. 6 (cf. c. 4, 1007, b, 22, make everything a vp6s ti,
xi. 6 init.'), he reduces to the ' See preceding note,
same principle the dictum (de 2 OuSe /teralii avriQAveas cvSe-
quo v. ZELLEB, PA. d. Or. part i. x eTC " e ^"" o«S«' ; cf . p. 230, supra.
982, 1, 988, 2) that ' that is true 3 Metaph. iv. 7 ; in applying
for each one which appears so to his argument, Aristotle has
him ' ; and to this, amongst other adopted here those reasons
arguments — coinciding broadly which are borrowed from the con-
with the Platonic Tlieretetus — he sideration of Change in Nature,
especially opposes the objection evidently wishing to prove his
(1011, a, 17 sqq. b, 4) that since theory not only as a logical, but
every tpawifievov must be a tiv\ also as a metaphysical principle.
LOGIC
253
poses. So in the place of Demonstration, comes in
Induction. 1 There are thus two lines of scientific
thinking which require to be distinguished : the one
which leads up to principles, the other which leads
down from principles 2 — the movement from the uni-
versal to the particular, from that which is in itself the
more certain to that which is so for us ; and the reverse
movement from the individual, as that which is best
known to us, to the universal, which is in its own
nature the more sure. In the former direction goes
syllogism and scientific demonstration : in the latter
goes induction. 3 And by one or other of these ways
all knowledge comes to be. That which by virtue of its
1 Of. with what follows the
references on p. 242, n. 6 supra.
The name ' inayaiyh ' refers either
to the adducing of particular
instances, from which a universal
proposition or concept is ab-
stracted (Tkbndelbnbueg,^otj.
Log. Arist. 84 : Hbydee, Vergl.
d. arist. und hegel. Dialelctilt,
p. 212 sq.), or to the introduction
to these instances of the person
to be instructed (Waitz, Arist.
Org. ii. 300). In favour of the
latter explanation there are cer-
tain passages, in which ' iirdyeiv '
has as its object the person
knowing ; as Top. viii. 1, 156,
a, 4 : entbyovTa fiky curb rStv Kad-
ixaarov eV! to ko.06\ov, but espe-
cially Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, », 19 :
Sti fiev y&p irav Tpiywvoy %%ei Svtrlv
opdats ftras, irpoffiei, Sti 5e rcJSe . . .
rpiyavdv co'tip, oifia ivayofievos
eyvcbpLirev . . . irpiv 8' Vax^Tjvai ^
\a&eiv {rvWoyLff/xbv, TphirQV fiev
riva Xfftos tpareov etriffrafrBat, &c;
c. 18, 81, b, 5 : v 6 ffv\Aoyiff/j.bs, &v
ovk zffri (fv\\oyifffi6s ' eiraywyij
&pa. (Tbendelbnbueg, Hist.
Beitr. ii. 366 sq., and Beandis, ii.
b, 2, 1443, would like to cut out
the last two words, on the ground
that all unproved knowledge does
not rest on induction; but the
form of statement is not more
universal than in the other parts
of this passage, and the explana-
tion of the whole will be gathered
from what is said in the text.)
Similarly Anal. Post. i. 1 init.
Anal. Post. i. 18: /navBdvofi.ev ?)
iirayaiyfj % airo8e/£ei. eirri 8' r/
lih cWSeiJir 4k tuv Ka86\ov, ^ 8'
iTrayuyi] 4k 7w /caret fxspos ' &8tW-
rov 8e ra KaOoAou Bettiprjffai fi^j Si'
tirayayrjs. Hid. ii. 19, 100, b, 3 :
8t}\ov Si] Sri yfuv ra irpSna
iitayayri yvapifriy avayxaiov. Top.
i. 12 : Ioti Se rb p.iv [cfSoj \6yaiv
Sm\€KTiKwy] ^07107^), rb Se eruA-
\oyur/i6s . . . 4irayuyii Se n curb
tuv KaBzKaa-rov 4tt\ rb, koB6\ov
etpotios . . . igri 8' ri fiey ewayaiyii
iriBavdmpop ko! aatyimepov Ka\
Kara tV at TrapdSeiy/xa] Siaipepei ttjs era- still we could never know that
yuyrjs, 8ti y n'ev e{ hmainuv tuv the future would not bring other
aT6fiwv rb aicpov iSeiKw^v virdpxeu' experiences differing from them.
Tip /i.4v of the ' dialectical ' in Aristotle,
Ka.9iKa.arov ffvyicelfievov • y yap see WAITZ, Arist. Org. ii. 435
iTmyaiyii Sia irdyrinv. sqq. ; cf . following note.
3 Even if we supposed we
256
ARISTOTLE
aspects under which an object can be contemplated. It
is specially useful in establishing the scientific prin-
ciples ; for as these cannot be deduced by demonstration
from anything more certain than themselves, there is
nothing left for us but to get at them from the side of
probability. 1 Such an attempt must start from the
prevailing tenets of humanity. What all the world, or
at least the experienced and intelligent part of it,
believes, is always worthy of consideration, since it
carries with it a presumption that it rests upon a real
experience/
1 Top. i. 1 : 'H (lev irp60eV) 8' o« t( ye
irdp.irav air6\\vrai, H\v two. Aool
toWo! . . . and Synes. Calv. Enc.
c. 22 (Ar. Ft. No. 2) quotes as
Aristotelian : oVi [sc. al irapoi/ilai.']
ira\aias elo-i 5ei«-
Polit. ii. 5, 1264, a, 1 ; Eth. End. vvvcu p&Kurra iiiv irdvTa ret ey5o{a
i.6imi£.,and,as to the belief in the irepl ravra t& vd6i), ei 5e /lb, rk
ai8)ip,De Cwlo,270,b, 19, Metaph. ir\e<as, Cf. De Ccelo, i. 10 into.
' gnomes,' about which cf. p. 104, Anal. Post. ii. 3 init., and Waitz
n. 1 (on the napoifaiat). on this passage ; also Phys. iv. 10
1 Metaph. iii. 1 init. . eon Se init.,Meteorol. i. 13 init., DeAn.i.
rots eiiropTJ(rai f}ovKop.4yots irpoSp- 2 init., Longit. Vit. c. 1, 464, b, 21,
70U rb Sia-Kopfitrat Ka\ws' % yhp &c. InTop. viii. 11, 162, a, 17, the
iffrepov eliiropla \iats riiv irpfaipov anip^fia is denned as v . nal Si' Smotieii-eais • Siar'
general is of such and such a kind, oifa' &vev airotiei^eas ei> rpiav Set o-TOx<££«r0ai,
cf. 97, a, 23 sqq. rod Aa/3eu> ra KariiyopoAueira cv
4 Ti if r$ rt io-ri Karriyop- r$ rl iari, Ka\ radra Tcijot ri
otifiwa, at tov yevovs Statpopal. It vp&rov ^ Stiirepov, koI St* Taura
Is obvious that only such things Trdvra.
LOGIC 271
•
progressive division is our surest method, while a corre-
spondingly gradual building up of concepts is equally-
proper to the upward process towards the universal. 1
And thus Plato's method, though Aristotle could not
accept it as a satisfactory process for deducing definitions,
was yet recognised and further worked out by him as a
means to their discovery. 2
Supposing, then, that we have defined and surveyed
the whole field of the knowledge of concepts on this
method, we shall obtain a system of ideas such as Plato
looked for, 3 carrying us in an unbroken line from the
Summa Genera through all the intermediate members
down to the lowest species. And since scientific
deduction must consist in the specification of causes,
and since each specific difference in the upward scale
implies the introduction of a new cause, and every
added cause creates a corresponding differentia, it
results that our logical structure must exactly corre-
spond with the actual sequence and concatenation of
causes. Plato never undertook actually to set forth that
derivation of everything knowable out of unity, which
he saw ahead as the end and goal of science. Aristotle
1 Aristotle includes both, with- the object to be divided; and
out further separating them, in lastly (to which Plato devoted
the concept of Division. For less attention), that it should
this he gives full rules in Anal, not proceed by means of deduced
Pott. ii. 13, 96, b, 15-97, b, or contingent differences, but by
25 ; Top. vi. 5, 6 ; Part. Anvm. the essential ones. Cf. preceding
i. 2, 3. Like Plato (Zellbb, note.
Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 524 sq.), 2 Two further rules, contained
he also considers that the most especially in the sixth book of
important thing is that the di- the Topic) — wherehe enumerates
vision should be continuous, at length the mistakes made in
should omit no intermediate denning — are omitted here,
grade, and should totally exhaust 3 See Zell. ibid. p. 525, 588.
272
ARISTOTLE
considers such a demonstration to be quite impracticable.
The highest genera, according to him, are no more
capable of being derived from any one higher principle
than are the special postulates of each science, 1 They
are connected, not by any complete community of
nature, but only by a kind of analogy, 2 and the reason
1 Anal. Post. i. 32, 88, a, 31
sqq., &c. ; vid. supra p. 246. sqq.
Aristotle says, in Metaph. xii. 4,
1070, b, 1 {irapa yap t)\v ovtrlav Kal
TaAAa refc Karyyopovfieva ovBev %trri
koiv&v), that the categories especi-
ally can be deduced neither from
one another nor from a higher
common genus: v. 28, 1024, b,
9 (where the same is said of
Form and Matter) ; xi. 9, 1065,
b, 8 ; Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 34 ; De
An. i. 6, 410, a, 13 ; Mh. N. i. 4,
1096, a, 19, 23 sqq. ; of. TRENDE-
LENBURG, Hist. Beitr. i. 149 sq.
The concepts, which one would
be most inclined to consider the
highest genera, ' Being ' and
' One,' are no ydvri : Metaph. iii.
3, 998, b, 22 ; viii. 6, 1045, b, 5 ;
x. 2, 1053, b, 21 ; xi. 1, 1059, b,
27 sq. ; xii. 4, 1070, b. 7 ; Eth. JST.
ibid. ; Anal. Post. ii. 7, 92, b, 14 ;
Top. iv. 1, 121, a, 16, c. 6, 127,
a, 26 sqq. Cf. Trendelenburg,
loo. cit. 67 ; Bonitz and Schweg-
ler on Metaph. iii. 3 (more
on p. 276 infra'). Therefore the
principle ' that eventually every-
thing is contained in a single
highest concept as in a common
genus,' which Strumpell, Gesch.
d. theor. Phil. d. Gr. p. 193,
gives as an assertion of Aristotle,
is not really Aristotelian.
2 In Metaph. v. 6, 1016, b,
31, four kinds of Unity are dis-
tinguished (somewhat different
is the other fourfold enumera-
tion in Metaph. x. 1, in which
the unity of analogy does not
occur) : the unity of number, of
species, of genus, and of analogy.
Each of these unities includes in
it the subsequent unities (i.e.
that which in number is one is
also one in species, &c.) ; but not
vive versa. Hence the unity of
Analogy can occur even in those
things which belong to no
common genus (cf. Part. An. i.
5, 645, b, 26 : t& ficv yap ex avat
to Kotvbv Kar avahoylav, ra Se
Kara yevos, Ta Sh /car' elSos). It
occurs in everything Sera £%« us
fiAAo vpbs SAAo. It consists in
identity of relation (io-oV»js \6yav~),
and hence supposes at least four
members {Eth. N. v. 6, 1131, a,
31). Its formula is : &s touto iv
tovtu % irpbs touto, to*8' ev T<£8e ^
irpds TiiSe {Metaph. ix. 6, 1048, b,
7 ; cf. Poet. 21, 1457, b, 16). It
is found not only in quantitative
identity, such as arithmetical
and geometrical {Eth. N. v. 7,
1131, b, 12, 1132, a, 1), but also
in qualitative identity, such as
similarity {Gen. et Corr. ii. 6,
333, a, 26 sqq.), or in identity of
operation (cf . Part. An. i. 5, 645,
b, 9 : to avd\oyoi> tV abri]v %x ov
5vvaii.iv, ibid. i. 4, 644, b, 11 ;
ii. 6, 652, a, 3), and in fact in all
categories {Metaph. xiv. 6, 1093,
b, 18). Besi8es those in the
passages just mentioned, other
instances are given in De Part.
LOGIC
273
why the sciences are not all one, is just because each
class of actual existences has its own peculiar sort of
knowledge which applies to it. 1 If it be true that
among the sciences we find one which is a science of
first principles — the ' First Philosophy ' — we must not
expect it to develop its subject-matter out of any single
principle of being. On the contrary, we shall find it
necessary, before proceeding to any further researches,
that we should inquire into all the most general points
of view from which the world of actual existence can
be considered, or, in other words, enumerate the highest
generic concepts themselves.
This it is with which the doctrine of the Categories
is concerned, and these form accordingly the true con-
necting link, in Aristotle's philosophic system, between
Logic and Metaphysics.
Anvrn., Anal. Pri. i. 46, 61, b, 22,
and Bliet. iii. 6 fin. That which
cannot be deduced from any
other thing (the highest prin-
ciples), must be explained by ana-
logy, as, for example, the concepts
of Matter, of T?orm, &c. ; cf . Me-
taph. ix. 6 (vid. sup. p. 269, n. 1);
xii. 4, 1070, b, 16 sqq., and Phys.
i. 7, 1 91 , a, 7. This is the account
given by Trendelenburg in
his Hist, lieitr. i. 151 sqq. ' Ana-
logy ' is of special importance to
Aristotle in his study of Natural
History; see thereon infra, and
cf. Meter, Arist. Thierhunde,
334 sqq.
1 Anal. Post. i. 28 init. : p-la
ft eiriar'tjfjir] effrlv t) lv6s yevovs . . .
eTe'pct 8' imffT^liri tffr\v irepas,
'iff tap at apxal fifo' e/c ruf aiiruv
pA\& erepai etc tuv erepav. Metaph.
iii. 2, 997, a, 21 : irep* oSv t v '
3lu Kal at fwiffrrifiai 6.ko\ovQt\, tcoiov, vp6s ti
Gleimitz, 1866) ; cf . BRENTANO's ttoS, mire, Kuaiai, ix* lv < voith
essay Von der mannigfachen vda-x^v.
Bedeutung des Seienderi nach * Aristotle uses various ex
Ar., published in 1862. pressions to designate them (cf
2 Categ. o.2 init.'.ruv Tieyo- Trendelenburg, loc. cit. at p
liivav t& /tec kotA avfutXoK^v 6 sqq., and Bonitz, ut supra, a
hiyerai, t& 8' S«u o-u/inAo/rijj. p. 23 sqq., and in the Ind. Arisl
METAPHYSICS
275
press is rather the different forms of the Actual. 1 Not
all forms of the Actual, however, are categories or divi-
sions of categories ; but only those which represent the
different formal points of view under which the Actual
may be treated. Therefore he does not reckon among the
378, a, 5 sqq.)- He calls them
rcb. yhr\ (scilicet, toS Svtos, cf.
Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 22), toi irpara
Metaph. vii. 9, 1034, b, 7), also
Staipeffets (Top. iv. 1, 120, b, 36,
121, a, 6), and irrdaeis (Metaph.
xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, with which
cf. Eth. Hud. i. 8, 1217, b, 29), rh
noma irpara (Anal. Post. ii. 13,
96, b, 20, and Metaph. vii. 9,
1034, b, 9) ; but most frequently
K %v Kal rh iv (Metaph. x. 2,
1054, a, 9 sqq.), the -rb %v Kal rb
%v rairrbv Kal fiia tptiffis tQ clko\-
ovdetv a\\4}\ois . . . a\\' ob% ® s
kvl \6y that
the categories are 'real concepts,'
if by this we are to understand
such concepts as designate the
common object-matter of a series
of experiences, such as are the
concepts of weight, extension,
thought, &c. For those very
categories which are most fre-
quently and universally applied —
substance, quantity, quality, re-
lation, action, and passion-
designate merelyformal relations,
and hence are adapted to cover
and apply to a content of the
most diverse character ; and
though this is not so absolutely
true of others — such as ttoE, irore ,
or Kei),
TTOibv, iroffbv, iroiovVy irdffxov, Sta-
nei^evov (really only a kind of
iroiic, the $td6etrts : see Categ. c.
8, 10, a, 35 sqq. Metaph. v. 20),
he refers back with the words :
ical rS,\\a 5' ois SiTJprjrai lrpirepor.
De An. i. 1, 402, a, 24: irArtpov
r6Se ri Kal ovcria fy irotbv fj iroffbv ^
Kai ris &\\t] ruv StaipeBeiffuv
Koriiyopiav. Ibid. c. 5, 410, a, 14:
ffij/iaivei yap to fi^v r6Se rt rb Be
iroffbv $} irotbv 4} Kai riva &Wi]v ruv
StatpeOeiffuv Kariyyoptuv. Anal.
PH. i. 37 : rb S' {nripxetv r6Se
T$5e . . . Toffavrax&s \ijirr4ov
dffax&s 01 tcarriyopiai Strfpijvrai.
Metaph. xii. 1 , 1069, a, 20 : irpurov
7j oitffla, e?ro rb irotbv, etrd. rb
nooiv; vi. 2, 1026, a, 36: ra
trx'hpwB' T ? s Karriyoplas, otoy rb
fthv rl, rb 8e irotbv, rb Be voffbu, rb
Be irov, rb Be irore, Kal e¥ rt &K\o
ffijfiaivet rbv rp6irov rovrov j vii. 4,
1030, a, 18: «al yap rb rl itrrtv
eva /iev rp6irov ffrifiaivei rfyv ovaiav ,
Kal rb r6Se ti, &\\ov Be eKaffrov
ruv Kariiyopovfievuv, iroffbv, irotbv
Kal Sera &\\a rotavra ; xii. 4, 1070,
a, 33 : it is a question of, irdVepon
erepat % at avral apxal ffrotx^a
ruv ohatuv Kal ruv irpis rt, Kal Kuff
eK&ffrnv Be ruv Kariyyoptuv ifioius.
Likewise in Metaph. vii. 9, 1034,
b, 9, xiv. 2, 1089, a, 7; Phys. iii.
1, 200, b, 26, after mentioning
some of the categories, he refers
to the rest with a mere ' eu
aAAat Karrryopiai,' as to something
well known, and in Anal. Post.
i. 22, 83, b, 12, a, 21, the impossi-
bility of an infinitely extended
argument is proved by the asser-
tion that the number of categories
is limited to those there named.
The completeness of Aristotle's
list of categories is also sup-
posed by the proof referred to
at the end of p. 276, n. 2, that :
280
ARISTOTLE
put. these categories and no others; 1 and among the
categories themselves there is so little indication of
any fixed principles for their evolution 2 that we are
there are only three kinds of
motion (in the narrower sense),
qualitative, quantitative, and
local (Pkys. v. 1 sq.), inasmuch
as that theorem is proved hy the
process of exclusion. ' Motion,'
Aristotle argues, ' does not occur
in the categories of substance,
&c. . therefore only those three
categories remain.'
1 Even in the lost writings no
such demonstration seems to
have occurred; otherwise the
early commentators would have
appealed to it. Whereas, on the
contrary, Simpl. ScJiol. in Ar.
79, a, 44, says : 'A\us oiSa/iov irepl
Tjjs *Tc££ews tuv yevuv ovSefilay
alriav b 'ApiffToreXys awetp-fjvaTO.
2 To Trendelenburg (in his
dissertation Be Arist. Categoriis
[Berl. 1833] and the EUmenta
Logiees Arvstotellcce, p. 54) be-
longs the credit of having first
endeavoured to find one. But
even his repeated explanation in
Hist. Beitr. i. 23 sqq.,194 sq. has
not persuaded us that he has
really succeeded in doing so. It
seems rather that the objections
which Ritter, iii. 80, and still
more exhaustively Bonitz, loo.
eit. 35 sqq., have brought against
his opinion, are well justified.
Trendelenburg (and after him
BlESE, Phil, d, Arist. i. 54 sq.)
believes that in setting out these
ten genera Aristotle was proxi-
mately influenced by gramma-
tical distinctions He suggests
that ovaia corresponds to the
substantive, troabv and irotbv, to
the adjective ; with vp6s ti cor-
respond such forms of expres-
sion as those referred to in
Categ. c. 7 ; ir«5 and wore are re-
presented by the adverbs of place
and time; the last four cate-
gories are to be looked for in the
verb, for iroieiv and Traax* 1 * trans-
late into a general concept the
force of the active and passive
voices, as ttuodcu renders one side
of the intransitive, and ex e " / * ne
special force of the Greek per-
fect. — But, in the first place, as
Bonitz, p. 41 sqq., fully proves,
Aristotle himself nowhere gives
any indication of his having
arrived at his categories in this
way. On the contrary, he does
not distinguish the parts of
speech on any such method as
that which Trendelenburg's
theory of the categories would
presuppose, for he nowhere ex-
pressly distinguishes the adverbs,
he treats the adjective (as prjua)
along with the verb, and in fact
the only ' parts of speech ' which
he names (apart from the article
and conjunction) are the uvofia
and the /5il,ua. It is therefore
not probable that grammatical
forms to which, as ' parts of
speech' he paid no attention,
should nevertheless have guided
him in distinguishing the classes
of concepts. And, again, the
two series do not in .fact corre-
spond to any such extent as we
should have expected if Trende-
lenburg's supposition were
correct. For 'quantity' and
' quality ' may just as well be ex-
pressed by substantives (e.g. Kev-
Kiriris, Bepfiirns, &c, Categ. c. 8,
9, a, 29) or verbs (\e\tAKarrai,
METAPHYSICS 281
reduced to supposing that he obtained them empirically,
by putting together the main points of view from which
the data of experience can be practically treated. It is
true that a certain logical progress is to be found
among them. We begin with the Substantial — the
Thing. Next in order to this, he deals with Quali-
&c.) as by adjectives; 'action
and passion ' as well by substan-
tives (irp£|is, viSoi, &c.) as by
verbs ; ' time ' not only by adverbs
but also by adjectives (x0i$s,
8euTepai') ; (3) external circumstances
(iroS and iroi-e, and, for a time,
xeiaBai). The question is not,
however, whether it is possible to
bring the ten categories into
some logical scheme (for that
could be done with any series,
unless it were merely put to-
gether at haphazard), but whe-
ther Aristotle arrived at them by
means of a logical deduction.
And against any such supposition
there are two facts : first, that
Aristotle in speaking of the cate-
gories, never indicates such a
deduction, and next, that none
can be found into which they
naturally fit. Even in Bren-
tano's ingenious scheme, this is
not the case. If the ten cate-
gories ' had come about in the
way he suggests, they would
have been enumerated by Ari-
stotle in. a corresponding order.
Instead of that, the itp6s ti,
which, according to Brentano,
should come last, stands in the
middle in every enumeration (see
p.274, n. 1 and p. 282, n.3),andits
regular place (the only exception
being Phys. v. 1) is immediately
after the 'inherences.' After
it, again, .the ' affections ' do not
follow (as they should according
to Brentano's order), but the
' external circumstances' Nor is
the distinction of inherences and
affections itself Aristotelian.— So
far as a logical disposition of the
categories ex post facto is con-
cerned, Zbllbe gives on p. 288
infra, that which he prefers,
although he does not believe that
Aristotle arrived at his list of
categories by any method in
which he had in his mind before-
hand either that or any other
logical scheme into which they
were to fit.
282 ARISTOTLE
ties : first (in the troaov and iroiov), those qualities
which belong to a thing in itself, and then (in the irpos
ti), those which belong to a thing in its delation to
other things. From these he passes to the external
conditions of sensible existence — Space, and Time..
And he ends the list with the concepts which express
changes and the conditions thereby produced. This
cannot be called a deduction in the strict sense ; for that,
according to Aristotelian principles, was not possible
in the case of the highest general conceptions at all. 1
In fact, the order of the categories is not always
the same. 2 It even seems that ten is somewhat ar-
bitrarily fixed as their number. Aristotle himself so
far recognises this, that in his later writings he passes
over the categories of Possession and Situation, in
places where he apparently intends to give a complete
enumeration. 3 It is possible that it may have been the
example of the Pythagoreans, 4 and the predilection
1 Vide supra, pp. 246 and 272. fj 8ti iroibv tj iroabv fi np6s ti tj iroi-
1 Examples will be found in ovy fj irdirxov ^ irov % ttote, Srav ev
what follows, and also at p. 279, naff evbs KarrtyopriSp. Ibid, b, 15 :
n. 1. The most striking thing rhyivi] rav Karrtyopiuv Tten4pavTar
with regard to this is that in 1) yi.p irotbv % iroabv ti 'irp6s ti ^
Cat. a. 7, contrary to the other- noiovv % iriaxov 1) irov % iroTe (the
wise constant rule, and even to oltria to which the latter are op-
the order given in c. 4, irp6s ti posed as aviifiefi^To. has been
precedes ttoi6v. No satisfactory already mentioned). Phys. v. 1
reason can be found for this, but fin. : ei oZv ai Karrjyopiat Si^o^i/rai
it would be rash to conclude any- oixria ku) ttoi6ttiti «al t£ irov koX
thing from it against the genuine- t$ trork not t$ Trpds ti Kal r$ iroan
ness of the work, since a later koX t$ irote7v ft irdtrxew, avdymt
writer would probably be less rptis ilvai Kii/^o-eis (cf . p. 279, u. 1
likely to permit a divergence fin.). Metaph. v. 8, 1017, », 24 :
from the order given than would tSui KaTtiyopou/iivoiv t& fiiv t\ lari
Aristotle himself, for whom it aimalvei, rk Se irotbv, t& Si iroabv,
was not firmly established. Tct Se rp6s ti, t& Sh vov t& SJ itot4.
5 Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, a, 21 : * See Zkll. Ph. d. Gr. pt. lj
Sore ^ Iv Ty tI iffTiv \Kwnfyoptircu] 325,
METAPHYSIQS
283
for a decimal system inherited from them by the
Platonists, 1 which made it at first seem to Aristotle
natural that he should find a round number of cate-
gories. But we cannot well suppose any further con-
nection between his doctrine and the Pythagorean ; a
nor iS the conjecture 3 much more probable, that he
borrowed his categories from the school of Plato. 4 It is
true that almost all of them appear in' Plato's writ-
ings; 5 but we cannot attribute any great weight to this
coincidence, for the reason that in Plato they are merely
used as occasion arises, without any attempt to arrive
at a full enumeration of all the categories in one scheme.
Among the categories themselves, much the most
1 ZELLER, ibid. p. 857 sqq.
2 As Petersen supposed in
PMlos. Chrygipp. Fundamenta,
p. 12.
s Eose, Arigt. Libr. Ord. 238
sqq.
* In the first place, there is
no trace whatever of the ten
categories among the Platonists ;
and it is not likely that informa-
tion about so notable a. point
would neither have been trans-
mitted through their writings nor
through Chrysippns and other
scholars of the Alexandrian pe-
riod to the later Peripatetics,
and through them to us. And
again, the theory of the catego-
ries is so closely connected with
the other opinions of Aristotle
that it is not likely to have
sprung up on other ground.
Take, for example, merely the
fundamental statements as to
the oitr'a and its relation to pro-
perties, on which the whole
division of the categories in
Aristotle is based. These are
certainly not Platonic ; in fact it
is one chief point of dispute be-
tween Aristotle and his master
that the latter conceded to ideas
of quality the position of sub-
stances and made the iroibv an
oh Staipe7rai
[sc. t1] ivvwdpxov [Ace] us Batji/.
Similarly in viii. 2, 1043, a, 19, cf.
Gen. An. i. 21,729,b. 3 : ushwrdp-
X°v kcl\ fidptou'hf evBvs Tovyivofievov
ffufiaros fiiyvtifievov tt) #Ap. Tbid.
c. 18, 724, a, 24 : S) belongs to the iroibv
(Cat. c. 8, 11, a, 20 ; Top. iv. 124,
b, 18 ; whereas in Metaph. v. 15,
1021, b, 3, iarpuri; is counted
under irp6s ti, that it may follow
its generic concept, kitusTi\ja\).
* That the category of Rela-
tivity, in Cat. c. 7, precedes
that of Quality (vide supra) is
contrary to the natural relation
of both, as is clear, not only in
all other enumerations and in the
express explanation in Metaph.
xiv. 1, 1088, a, 22, but indirectly
also (in Cat. c. 7 itself) from the
fact that the 8/j.oiov and laov
(qualitative and quantitative
equality) is in 6, b, 21 counted
as Ttp&s ti ; cf. Top. i. 17 ; Tren-
delenburg, ibid. p. 117.
5 Thus Cat. c. 7, 8, a, 31 :
£<7Ti t« irp6s ti ols rh etvai ravrdv
4, according to Metaph. v. terms, and we shall have to men-
15, 1020, b, 28, 1021, », 21, are tion it later on. "E|is is discussed
relative concepts; the parts of etymologically in Metaph. v. 15,
a whole (ir^BiiXiov, Kev eiprifieuwu eVi t^v
ence to prevailing news as to aurV cTrtaTJiprii' viitrn rb £titov-
wisdom, it is shown (981, b, 30) nevov ivojm [aoe$- BeapTyrucliv. Cf. iii. 2, 996, b, 8
rcpos, i Se rexvirris rwv ipnreipwv, sqq. Mh. N. vi. 7. Metapli. vi. 1,
Xeiporexvov 8k &pxiTeKTo»>,jit 5e 1026, a, 21 : t^v tiiuoto.ti\v
Bewprirucal twv ir(H7)TUCuv piaWov. [&n)TeiTOi tZv Svtuv,
Si\Xov Se Sti y ovra. Every science
has to do wi". h certain principles
and causes. aWa iroffoi avrai
[iarpuch, ^oflrj^oTDfJj, &c] irepl 'iv
ti Kal yivos ti Trepiypaif/d/ievai irepl
tovtov irpaytiareiovTai, o\V ofcx*
irepl Svtos airAwi oASe $ iv, oASe too
tI iat*v—mSiva klr/ov iroiowrai-
a\\' 4k Tdyrov at pev aiaB4\ to KaB'
a'jra VKapxoVTQ. t<£ 7eVei irepl '6 elatv
airoSetKvvQvffiv % avayKaidTepov <)
HaKaKt&Tepov. , . , dfiolus 5e oi/b"
el iGTiv ty \vi\ effTt to yevos irepl o
Trpayfj.aTevovTai ovSey Xeyovffi Sta
to Trjs aitTrjs elvai Siavolas t6 tc ti
lo-rt SrjKov iroielv Kal el eortv. So
it is with Physics and Mathe-
matics, the former being con-
cerned with that which is moved
and in which the Form is not
separated from the Matter, the
latter being at the best concerned
with that which is abstracted
from Matter and Movement, but
which does not exist of itself as
immaterial and unmoved (cF. p.
183, n. 3) : el Se ti itrrw atSiov Kal
okIvi\tov Kal x ca P t0 '' rov , tpavepbv on
OecoprjTtKrjs to yvavai . o\t fiej/Tot
v
wpbs T^jvoi/fflav Keyofi4vwv,tiTovTwv
Ttvbs K7ro(/>aVeis % ovoias • Sib Kal to
iiH/u" thai fj.T)"ov %Kaarov vpStrov (xi. 1, 1059,
METAPHYSICS 299
On the like considerations rests the other difficulty, to
which Aristotle rightly gives special prominence 1 — the
question whether it is only individual things that are ac-
tual, or whether the universal of thegenera be actual also. 2
The former theory seems untenable because the sphere
of individual existences is unlimited and of that which
is unlimited no knowledge is possible, and since all
knowledge in any case is of universals. The latter is
operi to all the objections which lie against tbe theory
of a universal existing independently, or the Ideal
Theory of Plato. 3 An application of this question to a
particular case is contained in the further inquiry,
whether the conceptions of the One and of Being denote
anything substantial or are only predicates for some
subject of a different nature. Those who accept
universals at' all (e.g. Number) as in any way sub-
stantial, must affirm the first proposition ; but the
opposite opinion is not only supported by the analogy
of the whole world of concrete things, but also by the
argument that you cannot treat the One as substance
without denying, as did Parmenides, the existence of
1 Metajj/i. iii. 4 init. o. 6 fin. Metapli. iii. 4, 999, b, 1 : «' /xiv
(cf. vii. 13 sq.), xiii. 6, xi. 2 init., odv f*.T]dev £otl irapa ra icad' eKaora,
ibid. 1060, b, 19. In the first obdev ttv eirj vot\tov bXKb. tt6.vto.
passage this Apory is called the 'xoA€7ro)T(iTr)/fald>'a7KaioToTij adduces the reasons, which were
6eafnjx a - » r e doei
diction involved in the founda- %v or apiBnQ £j/ : to yip apiBp.-f %y
tions of his own system. % to KaSixaoTov \iysw $ia4pzi
2 That this Apory coincides oWiv (999, b, 33 cf. c. 6, 1002, b,
with that adduced on p. 298, 30).
Aristotle himself asserts in
300 ARISTOTLE
the Many, as such. 1 To the same head belongs the
question whether Numbers and Figures are Substances
or no, and to this also opposite answers are possible.
For as the qualities of bodies are mere predicates from
which we distinguish the bodies themselves as their
substrata, and as these bodies presuppose, as their
elements, the surface, the line, the point, and unity, it
would seem that surface and unity must be as sub-
stantial as body is ; while on the other hand these have
not any existence for themselves but only in corporeal
things, and they do not come to be and cease to be, as
Substances do. 2 Yet auother difficulty which leads back
to the relation of the individual to the Universal is this.
The principia must on the one hand, as it seems, be of
a potential character, since possibility precedes actuality :
on the other hand, they must be actual, since otherwise
Being would be merely accidental. 3 Individual things,
indeed, do actually exist : whereas the universal concept,
except in so far as it has found for itself a place in
individual entities, exists only potentially. And finally,
if there be besides the corporeal, an uncorporeal, and
beside the changing, an eternal, the final question must
be whether both ot these have the same principia* or
not. If we say Yes, it seems impossible to explain the
difference between them. If we say No, then we must
1 Hfetaph. iii. 4, 1001, a, 3 of the Pythagorean and Platonic
sqq., and, referring to this, x. 2, doctrines.
xi 1, 1059, b, 27, c. 2, 1060, s Ibid. iii. 6, 1002, b, 32 cf.
a, 36. Bonitz and Schwegleb on this
2 Metaph. iii. 5 (cf . xi. 2, 1060, passage.
b, 12 sqq., and on p. 1002, b, 32 : * As Plato supposed, in full
viii. 6 init. c. 3, 1043, b, 15). We accordance with Aristotle's view,
shall meet with further objec- Cf . Zhller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 628
tions to this view in the criticism sq. 805 sq.
METAPHYSICS 301
decide whether the priTicipid of the changeable are
themselves changeable or unchangeable. If they be
changing, then we must go back to deeper principia,
with which the same dilemma will recur. If they be
unchangeable, then we have to explain how it can be
that out of the unchanging, in one case the changeable,
in another the unchangeable, arises. 1 The like dif-
ficulty, in truth, applies to all the different classes of
Being. How, for example, is it possible that things
which fall under wholly different categories, such as
those of Substance and Relation, can lead back to
principles that are one and the same ? 2
The other questions stated above— those relating to
the unity of the manifold, and the possibility of change —
were clearly present to Aristotle's mind, and he sought
in the first principles of his Metaphysics to find a solu-
tion for them. The combination of the manifold into
unity, concerns him chiefly as leading up to the inquiry
how the genus and the differentia can be one in con-
ception ; 3 though he recognises that the same question
may be raised in all cases where things of a different
nature are combined. 4 Aristotle's answer, in all such
1 Metaph. iii. 4, 1000, a, 5 1044, a, 5, and settled in the
sqq. (xi. 2, 1060, a, 27). manner stated in the text by viii.
i Ibid. xii. 4. Aristotle 6.
answers (ibid. 1070, b, 17) that 4 Thus with regard to num- '
the final grounds of things are bers (Metaph. viii. 3, 1044, a, 2,
only analogically the same for c. 6 init.), and to the relation
all. between soul and body (c. G,
3 This question also occurs in 1045, b, 11 ; Be An. ii. 1, 412, b,
Anal. Post. ii. 6, 92, a, 29. In 6 sqq.) ; but also in many other
Be Interpr. u. 5, 17, », 13, it is cases: cf. Metaph. viii. 6, 1045,
proposed, discussed more fully b, 12 : kuWoi 6 airbs \iyos «r!
in Metaph. vii. 12, again touched ■mhrruy, &c.
upon in viii. 3, 1043, b, 4 sqq.,
302 ARISTOTLE
cases, as will be seen, is in its essence one and the
same. It is based upon the 'relation of the possible
and the actual — of Matter and Form. 1 The problems
of Becoming and Change are of still greater importance
for the Aristotelian system. If a thing comes to be,
does it arise out of being or out of not-being ? If a
thing ceases to be, does it become something, or nothing ?
Does change mean the becoming of opposite out of
opposite, or of the same out of the same ? The one
seems to be impossible — because nothing can come out
of nothing, nor can anything return to nothing, nor
take on it the qualities of its opposite (e.g. warmth the
qualities of cold). The other alternative is equally
impossible, because it is absurd that anything should at
a definite time come to be that which it already is. 2 A
similar case is the analogous problem whether those
things which act upon each other are likes or opposites. 3
In all these questions, difficulties are brought to light
which are soluble only by a careful inquiry into the
first principles of philosophy.
1 Cf. Phys. i. 2 fin, where this question coincides with the
Lycophron and others are blamed other, as to Change, since that
for running into difficulties by which acts rnirrr-nnTnli will! •*
the inference that one must at that which suffers : Sxrr' avaynrfb.
the same time be many: Sxnrep rb irda-xoi' fh rb iroiovi/fierafidWeiv
ovk hSexif-fvov ravrbv 'iv re Kal ((fen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a P 9).
7roAA.a ilvai, p.^ ravTiKelfieya 8e ■ Hence it is true that, on the one
ecri-i yap rb tv Kal Swdfiei ical hand, things which are not op-
ivT€\ex^f- posed cannot act upon one
2 CI Phys. i. 6, 189, a, 22, c. another: o'jk ££i52 sq.), and in Eth. Sic. x. 1,
17 sqq. 1 172, a, 27 sqq. Aristotle attacks
s Metaph, ix. 3 (cf. Zelleb, the exaggerations of the moral
ibid. 220, 1). Aristotle here con- doctrine of the Cynics,
f utes the Megarian principle, that i Supra, pp. 14, 56 sq., 162,
the merely possible is actual, by &c.
314 ARISTOTLE
in no spirit of jealousy or detraction that Aristotle
comes back again and again to discuss the Platonic
doctrines, and to set out their defects from all points of
view with untiring patience; for such a criticism of his
master was unavoidable if he was to defend his own
philosophic individuality, and his right to found a new
school, against the fame of his predecessor and the
prestige of the nourishing Academy. His main cri-
ticism, leaving out of account incidental objections, is
directed against three leading points : first, against the
Ideal Theory, as such; secondly, against the later
' Pythagorising statement of the Theory;' and, thirdly,
against the principles laid down concerning the ulti-
mate basis of things, Matter and the One. 1
The Ideal Theory of Plato rested upon his convic-
tion that it is only the universal essence of things that
can be an object of knowledge. This conviction was
shared by Aristotle. 2 So likewise did Aristotle accept
without criticism Plato's doctrine as to the mutability of
all sensible . things (which for Plato was the second
buttress of the Ideal Theory), and the necessity to
pass beyond these to something stable and essential. 3
But when Plato draws from this the conclusion that it
• is only the Universal, as such, which can be actual, and
that it must exist for itself as something substantial
beyond phenomena, Aristotle parts company with him.
This, therefore, is the central point about which revolves
"the whole Aristotelian attack on Plato's Metaphysics.
For Aristotle holds as to this assumption that it is
1 Of. Zbllbe, Platon. Studien, 2 Vide supra, pp. 163,300, &c.
p. 197 sqq. 3 Vide tujpra, p. 300 sqq.
METAPHYSICS 315
devoid of all scientific basis in itself ; that it leads in its
results to difficulties and contradictions absolutely in-
soluble, and that instead of explaining the world of
phenomena, it makes them impossible.
He holds that the hypothesis of the Ideas is not
established ; of the Platonic arguments for it, there is
not one that is not open to decisive objections. 1 The
ends that Plato sought thereby to attain are and must
be attainable otherwise. The content of each of these
Ideas is, indeed, exactly the same as the corresponding
thing of which it is said to be ' the Idea ; ' for in the
conception of the ideal man, of man as such, exactly the
same marks are included as in the conception of man in
the ordinary sense, there being no difference between
the two beyond the addition of the word ' ideal ' (to
avro). 2 In this view, the Ideas appear as nothing more
than a needless reduplication of the world of things,
and the introduction of the Ideas to explain things is
to Aristotle as if a man who could not count in small
numbers should attempt to count in large ones. 3 But
even apart from the failure of proof, the Ideal Theory
is in his view in itself untenable ; for Substance cannot
1 Cf. Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 8 yap eKeivoi ovdev &\\o ino'ovv, %
sqq. xiii. 4, 1079, a. avBpdirovs aibiovs, oS6' ovroi to tlSii
2 Metaph. iii. 2, 997, b, 5 : a.x\' % aitrdirra aiSia. Similarly
iroWaxv s ' 1x6''™'-' Sv(TKo\lav, Metapli. vii. 16, 1040, b, 32:
ovBevbs ?ittov &tottov rb tpdvat fiev ttoiovo'li' oZv [ras ideas] txs avras
eival Ttvas (pfoeis irapa ras eV tm t$ eXSei tois (pdapro'is, a : jTodv8punrov
oupavu>, Tavras 5e ras auras (pdi/aL Kal aiirdiinrov, irpocrrtdevrts to?s
Tins alffBijTo'is irXfy in to. fiev aicrdTjTo7s rb pf/^ta rb avrb. Ibid.
aiSia. to 5i (pBaprd • abrb yap av- xiii. 9, 1086, b, 10 of. Eth. N. i.
8p i. 587, 2.
obo-lav koI ot i\ oio-ia; xiii. 9, 1085, 3 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 29, xiii.
a, 23, cf . vii. 6, 1031, a, 31, c. 14, 5, 1079, b, 34. In the first of
1039, b, 15. these passages we should read :
2 Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 11 sqq. oTov t6 yivos, Sis yzyos, dSSiv (so.
22, 991, b, 6, xiii. 4, 1079, a, 19, vapAteiyiia e'ffTcu).
c. 8, 1084, a, 27 ; Anal. Post. i. * Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 26.
METAPHYSICS 317
and these sometimes of opposite kinds. 1 Or again, if
the Idea is to be Substance, it cannot at the same time
be a general concept ; 2 for it is not the unity of many
individual things, but an individual itself among other
individuals. 3 Conversely, the things of which it is
predicated could not be true subjects. 4 Of Ideas of
this kind any defiuition would be as impossible as it is
of other individuals, 5 and since the Idea, like the
individual, is numerically one, it follows that one or
other of the contradictory predicates by which we sub-
divide the genus must always be predicable of it, in
which case it clearly cannot be itself the genus also.
Aristotle considers the assertion that the Ideas con-
tain the essence of things to be inconsistent with the
view that they are at the same time incorporeal. He
represents Plato as speaking sometimes of a ' matter of
the Ideas ' (that being inconsistent with the notion that
they are not in space 7 ), and as holding at other times
that in the case of all natural objects matter and the
process of becoming belongs to the essence and concep-
tion of them, in which case the conception of them
cannot exist by itself separately. 8 Similarly, he argues
that the ethical conceptions cannot be separated from
1 Metaph. vii. 13, 103!), a, 3, p. 215, svpra, from Categ. c. 2.
c. 14; cf. c. 8, 1033, b, 19, i. 9, 5 Metaph. vii. 15, 1040, a, 8-
991, a, 29, xiii. 9, 1085 a, 23. 27.
•' Metaph. xiii. 9, 108G, a, 32, ' Top. vi. 6, 143, b, 23. Length
vii. 16, 1040, a, 26 sqq. cf. iii. 6, in itself must be either airfares
1003, a, 5. or irhdros Ix ", and then thagenus
3 Metapli. i. P, 992, b, 9, xiii. must be at once a species also.
$,nt supra. ' Phys. iv. 1, 209, b, 33; cf
* Metaph. vii. 6, 103l,b,15 ;cf. Zell. ibid. 556 sq., 628 sq.
Eonitz and Schweglbb on th*s " Pfffs. ii. 2, 193 b, 35 i
passage, and the citation at
«qq.
318 ARISTOTLE
their objects. There can be no ' Idea of the Good '
standing by itself, for the conception of the Good appears
under all possible categories, and determines itself dif-
ferently according to the different circumstances ; aad as
there are different sciences that deal with the Good, so
there are different kinds of good, among which there is,
in fact, an ascending scale — a fact which of itself ex-
cludes the possibility of a commonldea existing by itself. 1
A further objection is that the theory of Ideas logically
carried out would be a process ad infinitum : for if an
Idea is always to be posited in every case where more
things than one meet in a common definition, the
common essence of the Idea and its phenomenon must
always come in as a third term different from either of
them. 2
Even if the Ideal Theory were better founded and
1 Eth. N. i. 4 (Eud. i. 8) ; of. pre- in a relation of Before and After,
ceding notes. As to the principle and can consequently be included
that what is Trp6repov and vtrrepon in no common generic concept,
cannot be reduced to a common and therefore in no idea, but
generic concept, see Polit. iii. 1, (1096, b, 25 sqq.) only in a rela-
1 275, a, 34 sqq. (Zell., i bid, 571 tion of analogy. (Vide supra, p.
sq.). On the same principle in 276 sqq.)
Eth. Nie. he. ait. Aristotle remarks ''MetaphA. 9, 991, a, 2, vii.
in criticising the 'Idea of the 13,1039, a, cf. vii. 6, 2, 1031, b, 28.
Good,' that the upholders of the Aristotle expresses this objection
doctrine of Ideas themselves say here by sayingthat the doctrine of
that there is no Idea of that Ideas leads to the rplros ii/Spawos.
which stands in the relation of Cf. Zell., Plat. Stud. p. 257, and
Before and After; but this is Ph. d. Gr.pt. i. p. 623, 5. He
actually the case with the Good, finds the parallel of the ' rp'ros
for it is found in all the cate- &vBpanros (which, however, is
gories: e.g., a substantial good equally true of the ideas them-
is the Divinity and Reason, a selves, cf. Soph. El,, c. 22, 178, b,
qualitative good is Virtue, a 36) in the change of the uni-
quantitive good is Measure, a versal into an individual of the
relative good is the Useful, &c. same name.
Thus, these different Goods stand
METAPHYSICS 319
•
less untenable, Aristotle would still say that it could by
no means fulfil the task of a true Philosophy, which is
to exhibit the basis and principles of the world of
appearances. As the Ideas are not in things, they
cannot make up the essence of things, and they cannot
contribute anything to the being of things. 1 Even the
relation of the one to the other cannot be stated clearly,
for Plato's own references to some kind of copying and
participation are always unintelligible metaphors. 2 The
principle of motive power, without which no process of
becoming and no explanation of nature is conceivable,
is wholly wanting. 3 So also is the principle of final
cause. 4 Even in regard to the theory of Knowledge,
the Ideas cannot render us that service which Plato
expected from them, for if they are outside of things,
then they are not truly the essence of things, and there-
fore the knowledge of the Idea leads to no sure con-
clusion as to the thing itself. 5 And how, on the other
hand, could we arrive, asks Aristotle, at any know-
ledge of the Ideal, since innate Ideas are not to be
assumed ? s All these difficulties will be vastly in-
creased if we are to follow Plato and his school in
translating the Ideas into Numbers, and so interposing
1 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 12 (xiii. 335, b, 7 sqq. of. Eth. End. i 8,
5, init.). 1217, b, 23.
2 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 20, 992, 4 Metaph. i. 7, 988, b, 6, o. 9,
a, 28 (xiii. 5, 1079, b. 24), i. 6, 992, a, 29 (where, instead of 5A,
987, b, 13, viii. 6, 1045, b. 7, xii. Si' 8 should be read).
10, 1075, b, 34. 5 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 12 (xiii.
3 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 8. 19 sqq. 5, 10 79, b, 15), vii. 6, 1031, a, 30
b, 3 sqq. (xiii. 5) 992, a, 24 sqq. sqq. cf. Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, a,
b, 7, O. 7, 988, b, 3, vii. 8, 1033, 32: -ret yap etSri x^pera- reperl-
b, 26, xii. 6, 1071, b, 14, u. 10, opivrA. re yap eVti, ice. :
1075, b, 16, 27 ; Gen. et Curr. ii. 9, ■ Vide supra, p. 202, &c.
320 ARISTOTLE
between the Ideas and the things of sense the whole
science of Mathematics. The difficulties which would
thus arise were set out by Aristotle with a painstaking
thoroughness most tiresome to the modern mind, though
in his day it may possibly have been needful in order
to cut off all ways of escape for the Pythagorising
school, led by such men as Xenocrates and Speusippus.
He asks how we are to think to ourselves the causality
of numbers, 1 or how they can contribute to the existence
of things. 2 He shows how capricious and contra-
dictory is the application of these numbers to natural
objects. 3 He points out the difference in character
between conceptual determinations, which are quali-
tative, and numerical determinations, which are quanti-
tative, remarking that two numbers make up one
number, but two Ideas do not make one Idea, and that
among the numbers which make up numbers no quali-
tative differences can be posited, whereas there must
be units qualitatively different if there were Ideal
Numbers. 4 With minute and careful thoroughness, 5
he controverts the various suggestions as to the relations
of mathematics to the Ideal Numbers which were
thrown out by Plato and his school and the devices they
resorted to in order to maintain a conceivable difference
1 Metaph. i. 9, 991, b, 9, with apii/iois nyiv (tiiroiceifi.ciiziv).
the answer : if things are likewise 2 Metaph. xiv. 6 init., ibid.
numbers, one does not see of what 1093, b, 21 cf. c. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq
use the ideal numbers are to them; 3 Loo. cit. from 1092, b, 29; cf
if, on the other hand, things are the commentaries on this passage
only arranged according to num- * Cf. Zbll. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p.
ber, the same would be true of 568 sq. 854, 867 sq. 884.
the ideas of them, which would 5 Loc. cit. i. 9, 991, b, 21 sqq.
not be numbers, but \6~)Oi iv 992, a, 2.
METAPHYSICS 321
between the Numbers and the units which compose
them: 1 But in this, as in other branches of the argu-
ment, his main point is always that there is a funda-
mental contradiction between the notion of a unit of
number and the fact of differences of kind. It is not,
of course, necessary here to recapitulate those of his
objections to Ideal Numbers which apply also to the
Ideal Theory in general. 2 But it is to be noticed that,
in Aristotle's view, if once we assumed the existence of
Ideas and Ideal Numbers, the ordinary mathematical
numbers would lose their status, for they could only
have the same component parts and therefore the same
nature as the Ideal Numbers themselves. 3 The position
of magnitudes would be equally dubious ; for qud
ideal they must go by ideal numbers, and qud mathe-
matical they must go by mathematical number ; 4 and
from the way in which the theory of magnitudes is
deduced, be considers that the further dilemma arises
that either it must be possible for a surface to exist
without line, and a solid without surface, or else all
three must be one and the same. 5
Finally, as concerns the ultimate principles of things,
in which Plato and the Platonists had sought to find
the ultimate basis and constituents of their Numbers
and Ideas, 6 Aristotle asserts that it is impossible to
know the constituent parts of all being, since that
1 MetajfJi. xiii. 6-8. * Mctaph. i. 9, 992, b, 13 ; xiv.
■' As in Metaplh. xiii. 9, 1085, a, 3, 1C90, b, 20.
23, and in xiv. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq. 5 Ibid, i, 9, 992, a, 10 ; xiii. 9,
c. 3, 1090, a,25-b, 5, they are used 1085, a, 7, 31.
against Speusippns. 6 Cf. Zelleb,PA. d, Gr. pi. i.
3 Metajjli. i. 9, 991, b, 27 ; xiv, 628 sq., 805.
3, 1090, b, 32 sqq.
VOL. I. y
322 ARISTOTLE
knowledge cannot be derived from any prior knowledge. 1
He doubts whether all being can have the same con-
stituent parts, 2 or whether out of the combination of the
same elements, at one time a number and at another
time a magnitude could arise. 3 He remarks that such
constituent parts can only be ascribed to substances, and
only to those substances which have some admixture of
materiality. 4 He further demonstrates that such con-
stituent parts could neither be thought as individual
nor as universal : not as individual, because they would
not then be cognisable and could not be the con-
stituents of more things or Ideas than one ; not as
universal, because in that case they would not be of the
nature of substance. 5 In another connection, he takes
exception to the variance of the Platonic suggestions as
to the 'material element,' 6 and rejects altogether the
assumption of Speusippus that there are more than one
original but different frindfia? A closer inquiry into
the two Platonic ultimate principles, ' the One,' and
' the Great and Little,' leads Aristotle to declare that
they are both misconceived. He asks how the One can
be a thing existing by itself, when no universal is a
substance. The notion of unity expresses only a
1 Metwph. i. 9, 992, b, 24 ; 5 Metajih. xiii. 10, 1086, b, 19,
against which, indeed, his own 1087, a. 4.
distinction of demonstrative and 6 Metapli. xiv. 1, 1087, b, 4,
inductive knowledge might be 12,26, c. 2,1089,b,ll; cIZellee,
used. Ph.. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 628, 3.
2 This is suggested, without ' Of it the remark in Metapli.
mention of Plato,in Metapli. xii. 4, xiv. 3, 1090, b, 13 sqq. is true, that
1070, a, 33 sqq. ; cf. what was ad- Nature is not Eireis a, 24 : cfAws 8e faroiKnris rijs ipiKo-
oijre fieTafiuKrjs ouSejums 4(mv atrta ffoiplas wepl twv tyavepoiv rd alrtov
auToIs; and at 1. 20: rb Se \eyety tovto /iev eXaKafJLey (ouSev yap
•KapaSeiy/jLara aiira. eivat Kal jU€T- Keyofiev trepl tt)s airlas '66iu i) apxh
c^eic avTuv T&Wa Kei/oKoyeiv iarri tt)s fieTa/3o\v)s'), &c.
328 ARISTOTLE
-£
CHAPTER VII.
CONTINUATION.
The Main Inquiry of Metaphysics.
There are three main questions which now fall to be
discussed. In so far as the First Philosophy has to do
with Actuality in general, with Being as such, it follows
that the question of the original essence of the actual,
which is the inquiry into the conception of Substance,
must precede all other investigations. To this question
Plato in his Ideal Theory had answered that that which
in a true and original sense is actual was to be sought
for only in the common essence of things or iu their
classes, which are expressed by general conceptions.
Aristotle, as has been seen, was not content with the
answer : but for that very reason he attributed the more
importance to the relation between the individual and
the universal. It was in the inaccurate statement of
this relation that he found the fundamental error of
Plato's view, and he felt that it was from the true con-
ception of the same relation that any revision of
Platonism must start. The first question for Philcr-
sophy, therefore, must be an inquiry into the conception
of ' substance,' which is an inquiry into the relation of
the individual to the universal. But inasmuch as
Aristotle defines that relation in such a way as to throw
1 See p. 290 sqq. supra.
METAPHYSICS 329
essential actuality to tbe side of the individual, it
follows that the Form, or the ethos, which Plato had
made identical with the universal, becomes detached
from the universal in Aristotle and takes on an altered
meaning. To him Form is essence determinate and
developed into full actuality : undetermined universality,
which is the possibility of Being, not yet determined
this way or that, is considered as Matber in opposition
to Form. The relation of Form and Matter accord- — y-i
ingly furnishes the second main object of Metaphysics.
Form, in fine, is essentially related to Matter, and
Matter to Form ; and this relation consists in the fact
that Matter becomes definite through Form. This process
is Movement. All movement, however, presupposes a
first cause of movement, and in this way movement and '/T
the first motor constitute the third pair of concepts
with which Metaphysics is concerned. In the following
pages Aristotle's theory will be set forth under these
Jhree heads. £ ^ ; ^ f.^UH ^ T" P*§0
(1) The Individual and the Universal.
Plato had taken as the essential element in things
' the universal as it is thought in conception,' and had
ascribed Being, in its fullest and original sense, to that
only. It was by a limitation of this Being, by a com-
bination of Being with Not-Being, that individual
entities could arise. These, therefore, had, outside and
above them, as something other than themselves, the
universal essences, which were the Ideas. Aristotle
denies this, for he finds the fundamental error of the Ideal
Theory in this separation of the conceptual essence from
330
ARISTOTLE
the thing itself. 1 A universal is that which belongs to
many things in common, 2 or, more accurately, that
which belongs to them by reason of their nature, and
therefore, necessarily and always. 3 It follows that all
universal concepts denote only certain of the properties
of things ; or, in other words, are predicates and not
subjects. Even when a number of these properties are
combined to make the conception of a genus, we get
thereby something which belongs to all the things
pertaining to the genus in question, but by no means
a universal subsisting beside them as distinct. For
Plato's %v Trapa to. voXXa is substituted Aristotle's
%v tcara, ttoWwv.* If, then, the universal is not any-
thing subsisting by itself, it cannot be Substance. It
is true that the name of Substance 6 is used in various
1 Seep.316,n.l,s«y;ra. Mislaph.
xiii. 9, 1086, b, 2 : rovro 8' [the
doctrine of Ideas] . . . fic'ivr/cre
/jt,kv 2w/cpanjs 5m tovs dpifffzobs, oil
fifyv eX^/Htre ye twv «a0' etcaffTov '
KoX tovto 6p9ais lv6t\dev oil xapiffas
. . avev fiev yap rod tca96\ov ovic
effTtv eirlffT'fjfiTjy \afietv, to Sk X a P~
l£eiv oXtiov tw Gvn$aiv6vT03v hva-
X^piv irepl ras ideas eGTiv . Cf. C.
4, 1073, b, 30 sq.
2 Metaph. vii. 13, 1038, b, 11 ;
to 8e Ka96\ov icoivSv • tovto yap
Aeyerai Ka96\ov o irXeioo'lv inrdpxelv
iritpiiKtv ; iii. 4, 909, b, 34 : ovtu
yap Xt'yoy.ev to Ka9eicaffTOv to
api8fA$ %v, Ka66\ov Se to iirl tovtwv.
De Interpr. 7, 17, a, 89 ; Part.
An. i. 4, 644, a 27, and supra.
3 Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 26 :
Ka86\ov 5e Keyw o av _ Kara iravT6s
Te iirdpxy «al Ko8' avrb Kal $ ouni,
(pavepbv apa oti oaa aalhjAov ^|
aviyKris vrdpxei tois Ttp6.yji.aaai ;
c. 31, 87, b, 32: rb yap ae\ /col
•wavTaxov Ka96\ov tpafieu elvai.
Metaph. v. 9, 1017, b, 35 : ret yap
Ka96\ov Kaff aiira inrdpxei. See also
BONITZ, Ind. Arist. 356, b, 4 sqq.
Kampe, Erkeimtnissth. d. Aritt.
160 sq.
■' Anal. Post.i. 11 init. : eiSr)
p-ey otv elyat '/) ev ti Trapa to.
TvoWa oiiK avdynri, el an65ei^LS
ecrrai " elvai p.ivTOi ev KaTa iroAAwf
a\y)9es elireiv avayKT}. JJe All. iii.
8 (see p. 195, n. J, snpra).
5 Aristotle's oio-'a is of course
here and elsewhere translated
by ' substance.' It is strange
to find this translation attacked
(by Strtjmpell, Gesch.d.theor.
Phil. b. d. Gr. 213 sq. ; cf.
Zbllee, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 555,
1) on the ground that Aristotle
nowhere understands by -oiov\4yeTai, else; cf. Anal. Post. i. 4, and
aAAa /caret, tovtuv ra &AAa ; vii. 3, the remarks which follow] aAA'
1028, b, 36 : rb 5' {nronelfievdv ov anXais t\ ovtriu av etri ; o. 7,
eVti ko8' ov ra aXXa Xeyerai, 1030, a, 22 : Ti ri Ictiv airXus ttj
iKttvo Sk avrb /cmjke'ti kot' SaAou. oualq birdpxei. See further on
Bid Ttpwrov irep\ roirov fiiopiffTtov • p. 289.
332
ARISTOTLE
other being. 1 Only in a derivative sense can the
genera be called substances : in so far, that is to say,
as they set forth the common essence of a certain
number of substances ; 2 and they claim a kind of
koX 8ia tovto wavTuv airia ravra ;
iii. 6, 1003, a, 8 : oZQiv yap tiros Ka\ airav rd
Kotvbv ov tcSSe ti, a\\b, toi:Ji/8e ti
t) irp6s ti r) ttc3s* t) tojj/ toiovtwv ti
o-t)y.ati>ei. (This holds even of
the sensible qualities of things ;
see p. 206, supra.) Gen. An. iv.
3, 767, b, 33: to Ka9iKatrTov
tovto yap r) ovtria. All other
categories indicate mere acci-
dents (o-v/ifiefiriKiTa') of sub-
stance ; cf . p. 289 supra. Aristotle
finds it therefore quite natural
{Metaph. vii. 16, 1040, b, 26 sq.)
that the ideas should be made
into a ^aipim-oV if they iire taken
for substances. The error of the
doctrine of ideas consisted only
in regarding the universal as
such a substantial idea. (Hert-
ling, Mat. und Form, 44, 1, has
misunderstood this statement.)
2 Cat . c. 5, 2, a, 15: Seirepai
5c ovtriat \iyovTai cV oTs ttb'ttru/ at
irpdjTws ovtriat \eydfisyat virdpxovtrt,
Tavrd T€ Ka\ Ta tuv eiSwv tovtoiv
yivi\ . . . olov '6 te aVflpwTros Kai
to (yon. And so further on.
Otherwise the expression Seute'^o
ovo-ia does not occur in Aristotle.
As, however, he elsewhere uses
irp'im) ovo-ia for ' substance in the
primary sense,' and tp'.tt) ovo-ia
for 'third class of substances,'
no objection can be taken, as we
have already remarked (in n. 1
to p. 64).
1 Oat. c. 5, 2, a, 34 : to. 5' tiAAa
irdi/Ta iJTOl Kad' viroKGifievwy \4yerai
TWV TvpiiTttiir OVffttVV r) eV VKQKElfJ.4va'.S
a°/Ta?s itrriv . . . [i$i ovtruy ovy
txv rtp-jirtav ovtrmv aZvyarov tQv
dWwv Ti elj/ai. Anal. Post. i. 4,
73, b, 5, where Aristotle calls k»9'
a'no that t fi)) leaf inroKSLfiivov
\4yerat &K\ov Tivhs, oTov to PaV^ov
e 4rep6v TiOv j8a5'£by earl koX Ksvkov,
7} 5 ovtr'.a, Kal oo~a t6Ss ti, ojx
erep6v ti uyra cVtIi/ owep itrriv '
Ta fiev Sri fi$i «a9' {nroKeifizvov
[sc. KeySpGva] Kal?' a'jra Keyw, Ta
oe Ka0' vTroKEitieyov 0*uuj9e#7jk JTa.
Metaph. vii. 1, 1028, a, 27: that
which supports all qualities is
said to be r) obtria Kal to Ka9'
eKaa-Toy . . . twit fj.hv yz.p aWwv
KaTrjyop-qfjtdTwv o : j$ev ^woio'toz',
a'irr\ 8e ,udVij; c. 3, 1029, a, 27:
to xtopiffTtiv Kal t6 T(S5e ti vwdpxeu/
Soke? p.d\LffTa t|) ovaia ; c. 4, 1030,
a, 1 9 : t)]v ovtriav /cat t^ tiJSe ti ;
c. 10, 1035, b, 28 : KaWAou S' ouk
iajui ovtria; c. 12, 1037, a, 27:
r) ovtria eV ti /cat to'Se ti trrifiaivet
&s v T(J5e ti, aWa
ToidvSe ; c. 16, 1040, b, 23 : Kotvbv
fj.7]6*i/ ovff a ' obtievl yap im&pxti r)
oi/trla a\y j) o6t^ te Kal tQ %x 0VTl
avri\v o% c'oriy ova' a. Ibid. fin. :
t&v Ka66Aov \eyo/ji{va)v ovBeu ovtria ;
xii. 5 init. : ^irel S' ^crrl ret iiiv x a 'P-
icrra.Ta 8e ou xcpiora, oitriat iKeTva,
METAPHYSICS
333
substantial character with, the more right the nearer
they approach to individual substances, so that the
species deserves to be called substantial in a higher
degree than the genus.' According to the strict con-
ception of substance, however, that term cannot be
applied to them at all, because they are predicated
of individuals, 2 and because it is true of them, as of
every universal, that they are not a ' This,' but a ' Such '
— not substantive, but adjective — and that they express,
not substance, but a condition of substance. 3
The further marks of substance which Aristotle
gives us, likewise refer, in so far as they are really
characteristic of that conception, to individual sub-
stances only. 4 The so-called secondary substance of
1 Cat. c. 5,2,b, 7sq. Aristotle,
indeed, stems to say the opposite
in JUetaph. viii. ], 1042, a, 13:
en &\Aus [5e
ti ffTifiziveu/. Of. irpwTat ovtrtcu
this holds unconditionally : lirl
5e twv SeuTe'pri/ ovtriatv (paiverai
jttev dfioicas T§ o*x^M aTl T ^ s npoff-
Tiyopias To5e ti ffiyLalveiv . . ov
fi},v a\7j0ds ye, dAAa /j.aX\ov iroi6v
ti arifj.aiv€t ■ oit yap hv irrri to"
inrotceifjLtvov tlxrirep tj irpiT?; olkticc,
aXha. Kara iroWuv o avBpotiros
\eyerai Kal to £i$ov.
4 The first characteristic of
substance was rd jiir) /caff irnoicei-
fiii'au \4yetrSai. That this is true
only of individual substance has
been shown. A second [Cat. 5,
3, a, 6 sq., and p. 331 , u. 2, supra)
is to fx^i €i/ uTroKiifievtp e7vai. But
this characteristic belongs also
to the class, and not to it alone,
but likewise [Cat. c. 5, 3, a,
21 &c.) to the specific differ-
ence, since this is likewise
contained in the conception of
the thing to which it applies ;
while (according to Aristotle,
ibid.) only that is £v vtroKeifiGt/tp
which does not belong to the
conception of that of which it
is predicated, but which is a
quality in a substance quite in-
dependent of it : e.g. in the
sentence ' the body is white,'
AevKov is eV viro/ceijUeVgj ; on the
other hand, in the sentence
' man is two-legged,' Siiroup is
not iv xnroKiiiicvif. A further
peculiarity of substance is [Cat.
c. 5, 3, b, 24) t<) fir)$fv avTtus
ivawr'av elj/ai. And yet Aristotle
himself remarks that the same
331 ARISTOTLE
Aristotle cannot be treated as exactly identical with
quality, but neither can it properly be considered sub-
stance. It denotes substance on the side of its qualities
only. For it is the combination of the essential pro-
perties of a definite class of substances. 1 In contrast
with it, it is the individual substances alone which
are of that self-sufficient and independently subsisting
nature to which the name of substance, in its original
sense, belongs.
This view, however, is not without its difficulties.
If all knowledge is concerned with the actual, 2 then it
is only the actual, in the highest and truly original
sense of the word, which can furnish the original and
ultimate object of knowledge. If knowledge is the
recognition of reality, 3 it must relate, in the first place,
to real Being, which is the substance of things. 4 If
this substance is individual substance, it follows that,
ia the case with determinations ble. The statement, moreover,
of quantity and many other con- contains a questionable identirt-
ceptions. And the same reply cation of substance with matter,
may be made if {ibid. 1. 33) it to which we shall have again to
be said that substance is sus- refer.
ceptible of no difference of ' Cat. u. 5, 3, b, 18 : (after the
degree, no greater or less. For passage quoted inn. 3 on p. 333) :
while, perhaps, we might say ow inrX&s Be iroi6v ti (ritnaivei, Sirirep
that one is more or less of a rh \evn6v. oiiBev yap &\\o e?5os
eii) vonirhv aAAi irivra oiV8i)Ta Ka.1 airavrx yiyvatrico/iLei/,
METAPHYSICS
341
of Becoming as the aim and end thereof; and even
supposing that in any particular case the Form could
itself originate in the process of Becoming, yet in any
case such a supposition could not be carried ad
infinitum, for if it could, we should never arrive at a
true instance of actual Becoming. The fact of Becom-
ing, in other words, is inexplicable unless it be true
that before anything came to be ! there was a Form 3
which itself had not come to be.
For the same reason there must also be Matter as
the correlative of Form. The relation of these two
should not be defined, as Plato defined it, merely as one
1 El$os,/J.op. The form, again,
could only come from another
form, and so on ad infinitum,
since all coming to be is the em-
bodiment of form in matter,
tpavepbv Spa ort ouSe t6 elfios . . .
ov yiyperat . . . ou5e rd ri r)p elvat
. . . St i rb fi£v ws eldos t) ovata
\ey6fievov ou yiyveTat, r) he (Tvvo^os
ayepvTjTou etirep 'iffTarai Te Kal 4k tj koto), TavTt\v \eyofievrj yiyveTat,
fify uvtos yeveffdat aSvvarov
en 5' etirep i] ifA.^ iffrl Sid rb
ayevvf]TOS elvat, Tro\b in fiaXKov
elXoyov elvat t\v obclav o irore
iKeivri yiyveTat. [oyV TTp&TttiV KOll'bs S
tovto effTcu fxi\Te eKeivy, ovQep \6yos, oJov iroaov ttoiov, &c. It is
IffTat Tb irapairav. ei de tovto
aHvporov, avdyKt) Tt elvat irapa Tb
avvo\ov tV fJ>op yap yiveaBai ££ &\Xov &\Xo say ' the uncultured man becomes
K«l e£ Irrpou crepoy ^ t« onrAS a cultured man ']. t«c Be yivoji-
METAPHYSICS
343
becomes that which it comes to be out of its opposite-
What becomes warm must before have been cold. He
who becomes a man of knowledge must before have been
without knowledge. 1 Opposites as such, however, can-
evwv &s ra ajrA.ii Xeyopev ylveadai,
rk fiev virofievov Keyofxev yiveffOat,
rb 5' ovx vtrofievov. b /j.hv yap
&udpwiros virofievei fiovs
ovre ffvvriQifievov virofj.4vet. Sioipiff-
jxivtav 5e to6to>v e£ airdvTivv twv
ytyvofievav tovto €0~ti \afiew 4dv
tis eTri/3\e'^j;, &ffirzp \4yofxev, fin
Se? rt aei viroKtlaQai t6 ytv6fievov,
Ka\ tovto el Kal aptdfirp io~Tiv ev,
aAA.' etSei 76 ovx '4v . . . O'j yap
tovtov rd avdp&TCtp koX to dfxovaw
etvai. ical t6 fiev viro/x4v€t, Tb 8'
ovx vTrofttvei " t6 ftev fj.fy afTi/eefyte-
vov vvofidvei (o yap a\v6pwiros inro-
fxevei) t6 fiovffiitdv 5e icaX t6 S/toutroy
ovx virofievei. Ibid. 190, a, 31 :
in the case of all else that be-
comes the oiiffla is the substratum
of the change ; fin 8e teal ai ovcriat
koI oo~a aAAa airXas oura e*£ vko-
Ktifxivov Ttvbs yivtTai, (tcivkqitovvti
y4voiT t av tfiavepdv. This hegoeson
to prove by the examples of plants,
animals, products of art and
chemical changes(aAAo/ Be
avTLKe7adj.i fihu tJ> &fiovo~ov, vttokgl-
adai 8e t6v frvOpaiTov, Kal rfyv /j.ev
ao-xn^oo-vvriv Kal ti\v afioptpiav 7)
t^\v h.Ta\iav to dvTtKe{/j.evov } t6v 8£
XaXttdv $) fbv \itiov t) t6v X9 vff ^ v
tA viroK€tfxevou. s £k /J.ty
tvTOSy ojliws fx4vToi ytyv€0~6ai Ik
jU$j &VTOS, o!ov Kara
airXas ytveTat, Tpoirov 5e &\\ov 4£
ovtos dei. t<5 yap Svvdfiet av 4vtz-
Ae^ei'tj 5e ^u^ %v dvdyKt] irpovTrdpx^iv
\ey6fievov d/j. : Plato errs
/lovtrucbv kc\ t!i aiiovaov ■!) t<5 Btpfidy in identifyingthe material simply
koI t6 iJ/uxP^" ^ ^ r\pi">
vt]TOP avdyKTi avrfyv elvai. etre yap
iyiyvero, vir6K€tadai t( Sei irpwrov,
rd e| ol> ipvirdpxovTOs . . . etre
rpOeiperat, els rovro hfp't^erai ?tr^;o-
rov.
- T6 VTTOKti/XevOV, TO SeKTiKOJ/, p.
342, n. 2, besides followirg rotes
and Gen. et Con: i. 10, 328, b, 1 :
ddrcpw fiev Scktikov Qdrepov 5' elSos.
Be An. ii. 2, 414, a, 9: fioptyfy Kal
el56s rt Kal \6yos Kal olov evipyeta
rod Sgktikov. Ibid. 1. 13 : 3>ffre
\6yos tis av eit\ \j\ i^ux^] Ka * e *8oy,
aAA' oi>x vKt] Kal to inroKeltieyov.
3 Phys. ibid. 1. 31 : Xeyw yap
&\r)v to" irpwTOv vwoKeifievov eKdiTTcp,
e£ oZ yiverai rt ivvirdpxovTOS ft'i)
Kara (rvftfiefiyKos. Gen. ei Covr. i.
4 fin. : tffri 8e vKtj fiaAiara fxh
Kal Kvpius rd vtroKeifievov yev4o~ews
Kal )]V Kal elftos, «a9' Sji/
iJ5t? Keyerai r6de ri ical rpirov to
4k rovrwv. eari S' f) fiev vKtj
Bvva/xis, rb S' dBos evreKexeia. So
c. 2, 414, a, 14 sq. ; Gen. et Covr.
ii. 9, 335, a, 32 : us- fiev odv S\t)
rols yevvtirois so~tw a'faiov to fivva-
346
ARISTOTLE
conceptions have been obtained entirely out of the con-
sideration of the distinction between the two poles
rbv elvai Kal ^ elvai. Metapk.
vii. 7, 1032, a, 20 : airavra Se to.
yiyvdfjieva $ ), eg, of the statue is the
stone or brass; the tVxaTrj iiAri of
man is to Kara/ifo"*- Metaj/Ji. v.
4, 1015, a, 7, c. 24 hut., viii. 6,
1045, b, 17, c. 4, 1044, a, 15, 34,
b, 1, ix. 7, 1049, a, 24. Some
verbal confusion is caused by
the fact that the expression
TrptiSTT) u'Ai) is applied equally to
matter which is absolutely, and
to matter which is only rela-
tivelj', first (to the oAws Ttp&rq
and to the irp&s avTd irpi&rti SA77) ;
see Metapli. v. 4, viii. 4, 1044,
a, 18, 23; Pliys. ii. 1, 193, a, 28,
and cf. Metajj/i. \. 4, 1014, b, 26.
Cf. Bonitz, Irul. Arist., 786,
b, 10.
2 'Evepyeia or fVreAe'xe'a (in
the concrete rb ivepyeiq ov, rb
ej/TcAEx*'? "i"), expressions which
properly differ as activity or
actualisation differs from com-
pleteness or actuality, but which
are commonly used by Aristolle
without distinction. Cf. infia,
p. 379 sq.
METAPHYSICS .349
stands by Potentiality in general Being as mere sus-
ceptibility — indeterminate, undeveloped self-existence,
capable, indeed, of becoming a definite reality, but not
yet made into one. By Actuality, on the other hand,
he means the same being considered as a developed
totality or Being which has wrought out all that it
contains into full existence. When accordingly he
identifies Form with actual, Matter with potential,
being, he means to say that the former is the totality
of the qualities which the latter does not possess but
is capable of acquiring. 1 Matter as such, the so-called
wpmrr) #A.?7, 2 is without form or definite character, being
j ust that which precedes all Becoming and all formation ;
the centre of indifference to all opposites and defi-
nite qualities ; the substratum which as yet possesses
none of the qualities that make the Form of things. 3
' Metapk. is. G, 1048, a. 30 : &>i yap irpbs aySpiayra xoAkjs ?)
eari 8' rj tvepyeia rb virapxeiv rb irpbs KX'wt\y £iAov % irpbs ray &XXa>v
TTpayfjia fxi] o'jrws ftffirep Xeyop.tv n rav ^x^vruy fiopip^v i) 8Xr] Kal
oovtip.ei. Xlyop.zv 5e Suydpei oXoy rb ttpoptpov e^ei irply XafStiv rijv
kv rtp \\iXy 'EpfiTJv Kal 4v Tjj oXrf fj.opv, ical forty [Adyos], aoptrrrov ydp; ix. 7,
rb dpav irpbs rb p.iov pXv tyiv Se 104'.), a, 24 : ci 8e ri icrri irpa,rov,
iX "* Ka ^ T0 atrOKeKpifievov 4k rrjs o puiKert Kar 1 &X\ou Aeyerat 4k*1-
v\i)s irpbs tV iXt]v, kA rb airetp- vivov [of such and such a nature],
yaap.ivov irpbs rb avepyarrrov. rxii- rovroTrpc&Tiiv'Xii ; viii. l,see p. 315,
this 8e rrjs Suupopas Bdrepoy p.6ptov n. 5, supra, iv. 4, 1007, b, 28 :
eoTto T) ivzpyeta a etrrl, tout'
OTmpdV lanv . . . izTreLpov [lev oZv
&
Hirtipoy rfjs tov fieycQovs TeXe ot-
tos li\ri Kal to hvvap.ii o\o
eVTeAe^e'a 5' oii , . . Kal ov trepiex
aKXct 7repte'xeTat, rj &TT£ipov . Sid k
ixyvoxTTOv fj airetpoy ' eiSos yap o\
e^ei tj Shrj . . . &Toirov Se K
aSiivaTOv, rd bvyvwo'TOV Kal •
a6piaTov TC£pUx* lv Ka ^ bp'ifcw, c.
207, b, 35: (pavepby 'oti us S\tj •
iireipdv iaTiy alriov, Kal Sti •
juej/ elvai avTu o-Tepyo'ts, rb Se ko
outo inroKtlpevov to* (rui/e^es K
alo-6r)T6v. iv. 2, see previous not
2 Phys. iii. 6 ; see previoi
note ; ibid. i. 7, AfetapA. ix. 6 ; si
p. 349, n. 1, supra, Metaph. vii. 1
1036, a, 8 : tj 8' iiXri &yvw(TTOs kd
atijiy. Cf. also p. 220, n. 2, tupn
for parallels from Plato, cf . Z k:
leu, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 621, 2.
METAPHYSICS 351
•
and Matter, therefore, require nothing further to medi-
ate between them in order to produce a whole, but are
immediately united : Form is the definiteness of
Matter in itself indefinite ; Matter receives into itself
directly tl , lacking definiteness of Form. When the
Potential passes into the Actual, these elements do not
stand opposed to one another as two separate things,
but one and the same thing looked at as Matter is
the Potentiality of that of which the Actuality is its
Form. 1
But just as we may not regard Form and Matter in
their mutual relation as two heterogeneous substances,
so neither may we regard either of them in any case as
a single substance, so as to imply that one Matter and
one Form constitute the fundamental elements which in
various combinations produce the aggregate of things.
Aristotle recognises, indeed, in the Divine Spirit a
being which is pure Form without Matter. Yet he
does not treat this as the intelligible idea of all Forms,
the universal, spiritual substance of all things, but as
an individual being, beside which all other individual
beings exist as so many substances. In like manner
Aristotle recognises a fundamental matter, which, while
in the elements and generally in all particular kinds of
matter it assumes different forms and qualities, yet is in
itself one and the same in all bodies. Yet this primitive
, ' Metaph. viii. 6, 1045, b, 17: elfpijTai koX % io-xarn KAtj [of. p.
to the question how the elements 348, n. 1] ho! t\ /j.op/"OT jji/, a\\' ae! ,uei-' remarks also in Gen. et Corr. i. 4,
ivavTubatus. 41; r)s ytverai to 320, a, 2,thatweareto understand
Ka\oip,ei/a aToix*ia. Ibid. i. 5, by it inihuna Kal xvpias rb iroicei-
320, b, 12 sq. fievov yeveaeas Kal (pBopas ScktikSv.
2 Metaph. viii. 6, 1046, a, 33 : 4 Metaph. xii. 4 : to 8' ofrio
eon Se tt)s S\r)S t) fiXv voifTr] r) 8' Kal at apxal &A\a aWaiv co-tip as,
aiV0r)T^, Kal aelrov \6yov -rb p.evS\n %ffri 8' as av Ka66\ov \4yy tis Kal
rb 8' ivepyita ianv ; vii. 11, 1036, kot' ava\oyiav, touto irdvTwv . . .
b, 35 : lEffTat yap ii\tj 4viav Kal pA] olov Xaas ruv alo-QriTav cafidrav
ala6r\TUV Kal iravrbs yap SAt; tIs as p.ev elSos rb Bepfibv Kal &\\ov
4<
METAPHYSICS 353
two elements, Aristotle attributes to the genus tlie
same significance as Matter, while he identifies the
specific difference with the Form. 1 Similarly in the
scheme of the universe, in physiology, in zoology, in
psychology, the upper and the lower spheres and ele-
ments, 2 the soul and the body, 3 the male and the female, 4
the Active and the Passive Reason, 5 stand to one another
in the same relation as the Form and the Matter. The
same is true, it need hardly be remarked, of Potentiality
and Actuality. These also express a definite relation
which may subsist between all possible kinds of objects,
and which can best be explained by analogy. 6 Aristotle
applies them in precisely the same way as Matter and
Form. He uses them, for instance, to elucidate the con-
nection between the genus and the specific differences,
and in general to show the possibility of several proper-
ties belonging to one and the same thing. 7 By them he
explains the relation between the passive and the active
ovk %vtw, tQ av&Xoyov Se, uerirep 312, a, 12, Gen. et Curr. i. 3, 318,
et Tts eiicot otl apxai ettri Tpus, t5 b, 32, ii. 8, 335, a, 18.
elSos teal t\ (TTepycris Kaif]fi\n. aXX' 3 De An. ii. 1, 412, b, 9 sq c.
e/catrTov tovtuv ertpov irspl e/eaoTop 2, 414, a, 13 sq. and often.
yivos iarlv ; c. 5, 1071, a, 3 : «ti * Gen. An. i. 2 init., ii. 1, 732,
5' aXXov rpiirov t s T0 " avtipiivTos, &c. aWov
i. 5, 188, a, 27, viii. 1 fin., Gen. An. tie rb ettos Kal rb irapitieiyfia • tovto
V. 7, 788, a, 14; also Poet. 0. 7,1450, ti' iarlv d \6yos 6 rov ri i/v ehai
b,27; Waitz, Arist. Org i.457 sq., Kal ra toiitou ylvi\ [i.e. the classes
the Ind. Arist. under apxb, and above it] ... m oBev ri apxh ttjs
p. 247, n, 2, svpra. 'Apxh indicates neTaf3o\rjs v irpiuTjj % rrjs ^pe^aeas
the iirst in every series, and in ... en dts rb re\os • tovto 5' iorl
this sense it is used for all kinds t6 ov evexa (= Metaph. v. 2);
of causes, but more especially of 195, a, 15 : one class of causes is
first causes, i.e. such as are de- as rb i£ ov afr-m, and of these ri.
ducible from no higher. Cf. p.ev as rb xnroKeipevov, ra 5c us t6
AA 2
856
ARISTOTLE
inspection, are found to be resolvable into the two first
mentioned. The concept of a thing is not different
from its end, since to realise an end is to actualise a
concept. But it is likewise possible to identify the
concept with the efficient cause, whether it sets the
thing in motion from within as its soul, or whether the
motion comes from without. Even in the latter case it
is the conception of the thing which produces motion,
alike in works of nature and of art. Only man can
beget man. Only the conception of health can determine
tbe physician to labour in producing health. 1 In like
ri i)v elvui; next we have causes
o9ev r) &pxb T ?) s fiera$o\TJs %
(Trdfreus Kal Kivi)o-ews ; lastly rb
re\os KaX raya86v. Metaph. i. 3
init. : rb. 8' aXrta Xeyerai rerpax<*>s,
ay fi ! av fiev airiav (pa/l€v elyai ri]V
outrlay Kal rb ri y)v elvai . . . irepav
5e ry\v v\t\v Kal rb inroKeifie/jiov,
rptrrjv 5e o'9ey 7) apxi) Tr ) s Kivrifftws,
rerdprrji/ 8e avriKeifievrjy airiav
ravrri, rb oZ eveKa Kal raya$6v.
Ibid, viii. 4, 1044, a, 32, Anal.
Post. ii. 11 init., De Somno, 2, 455,
b, 14, Gen. An. i. 1 init , v. 1, 778,
b, 7, and elsewhere ; cf. 2nd.
Arist. 22, b, 29. On the different
terms used for the four causes,
i bid. and Waitz, Arist. Org. ii.
407; on what follows, Eittee, iii.
1G6 sqq. The further modifica-
tions of the doctrine of the four
causes in Phys. ii. 3, 195, a, 26
sq. (cf. Metaph. v. 2, 1013, b, 2S),
are unimportant, as is also the
distinction of the ou eVe/cn into
person and thing, on which cf . De
An. ii. 4, 415, b, 2 : rb 8' ov eVe/ca
Strrbv, rb flee ou rb Se . See also
Phys. ii. 2, 194, a, 35, and Metaph.
xii. 7, 1072, b, 2 (where we must
read SVti yap rivl rb 08 cVekci koI
nv6s — the end is in the one
case to heal the sicli, and in the
other to establish health").
1 Phys. ii. 7, 198, a, 24 :
%PX*rai 8e tb rpia eis rb %v
lreWaKis ■ rb fiiy yap ri iffrt Kal
rb ov iv&Ka 'iv eVti [cf. 198, b, 3],
rb 8' '68ey t\ kivthtis irpurov t$
eXSei ravrb rovrois ' afdpunros yap
&pBpanrov yivya. Cf. i. 7, 190, b,
17 sq. I)e An. ii. 4, 415, b, 7 :
etrri 8e r) tyvx^l T °v C® VT0S o-up.aros
alria Kal apx'h- ravra 8e TroWax&s
\4yerat. 6/jlo'iojs 5' ?; tyuxb Kara
robs StajpLCfievous rpoirous rpets
atria ' Kal yap oBev r) kIvtjo-is airri,
Kal ou eVe/ca, Kal us 7) ovffia rav
efi\f/ix rd avrd. Gen. An. i.
1 init. : vn&Kilvrai yap atrial
rerrapes, ri te o5 tVe«n is r4\os,
Kal 6 \6yos rr)s ovffias ■ touto pilv
METAPHYSICS
357
manner we shall in the highest cause, which is God,
find the pure Form, the ultimate end_of the world and
the source of its movement united in one. Nor does
Aristotle in his physics distinguish more than two kinds
ovv us eV ti irxeSAr inroKafietv Set,
Tp'.Tov Se Kal riraprov 7) v\tj Kal
'69ev 7} apx^l ttjs Kiv7)ffeus. Hid.
ii. 1, 732, a 3, where the female
is called the fiAjj, the male the
atria Kivovtra TrpuTT], $ 6 \6yos
virdpx^i ical t6 elSos, and c. 6,
742, a, 28 ; where, as in i. 1 , the
formal and the final cause are
identified, and only three prin-
ciples are enumerated : the reKos
or ou eVe/co, the apxTi kivt\tikti Kal
ycvirrrriKri and the XP^'M " $
Xpyrai to reAos. Part. A%. i. 1,
641, a, 25 : ttjs afreTat Se
TrpuTT] [alrta] t)v \eyap.ev eVeKa
rivos ' \6yos yap oZtos. De An.
i. 1, 403, b, 6: tos Kal ti. Of the
■itp' ov it is said farther on : Kal
v(p' oS, r) Kara to elSos \tyop.evn
7j tuv yivop.ivuv if
a\tep. Part. An. i. 1, 6i0, a, 31:
7) Se t^xvti Kdyos tov tpyov & &vev
ttjs Sxtis io-Tlv; so in Gen. et
Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 33, 35, p-oprpi)
corresponds to Te'x»"i; the art,
however, is elsewhere treated as
the true efficient cause, the
artist only as a secondary cause ;
e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 34.)
Metaph. xii. 4 fin. : eVe! 8e to
Ktvovv 4y [lev toIs fyvffiKots
avSpuwois (read avQpdmu, approved
by ScHWBttLEK and Bonitz)
avOpuTros, eV Se Tots a7rb fiiavolas
to eJSos 7) to ivavTlov, Tp&Trov Tiva
Tpia aXrta av eftj, uSl 8e TeVTapa •
vyUia ydp nus 7) ImpiKT), Kal oltttas
elSos 7] oikoSojuik'/j, Kal HvBpuiros
ivipuirov 7ecj'a ; c. 3 fin. : 7) yap
UtTptKTi t^xvti S \6yos ttjs vyielas
io-riv. Speaking of health again,
358
ARISTOTLE
)
I
of Cause, necessary and final,! in the operation of Matter
and that of Form o r co neept. 2 This is the only dis-
must regard as funda-
tinction, therefore, which w2
mental ; that between formal, efficient and final causes
is merely a secondary subdivision. For though the
three are not "always combined in the individual, 3 yet
in themselves and in their essence they are one, and jt
is only in the phenomena of sense that, they are found
separate. 4 The created universe has several causes £
the eternal has only one — the essential concept itself, 5
Again, as the Form is at once the efficient and
the final force, so Matter as formless and indeterminate
it is said in Gen. et Corr. i. 7,
324, b, 1 5, that as the ou % « kci
it is not iroitiTiKdj/.
1 For a fuller discussion on
this, see pp. 349, &c. supra. At this
point, it will be enough to refer the
reader to Part. An. i. 1. Cf.
p. 642, a, 1 : eifflv &pa Svo atrial
aZrai, r6 & 1 oZ eVeva Kal rb £1-
aviyxris. The opposition is indi-
cated in 1. 17 in the words : apxh
yap rj tpvffis fiaWov ryjs #Atjs, with
which cf. further the passages
quoted in the foregoing note from
Phys. ii. 8, and Part. An. i. 1.
- For although in Gen. An. v.
1, 778, a, 34, the moving cause is
classed along with the necessary
and efficient, yet as Ritteb,
appealing to Phys. ii. 9, 200,
a, 30, rightly remarks, the
moving cause is not here con-
sidered by itself, but only as
united with matter. Cf. also
ihid. 1. 14 : iv yap rij V\rj rb
avayKaiov, rb 5' oZ 4veKa Iv rtp \6ytp.
3 So that, as is remarked
Phys. ii. 3, 195, », 8, of two
things each may be the cause of
the other, but in a different
sense ; physical exercise, e.g., may
be the efficient cause of health,
health the final cause of exercise.
This is the meaning of iroWaKts
in Phys. ii. 7 (p. 356, n. 1).
4 Cf. Metaph. ix. 8, 1049, b,
17 : T Sk XP^"¥ tpirepov [sc. 4v4p-
yeta Bvi/dpeus'] $8e • rb rQ elbzi rb
aiirb frepyovv irp6repov [i.e. every
potentiality presupposes a similar
actuality], apiBuy 5' oti— for, as
this is explained, the seed indeed
precedes the plant which springs
from it, but this seed itself comes
from another plant, so that it is
still the plant that produces the
plant. Ibid. vii. 9, 1034, b, 16 :
XZiov rrjs oucr/os . . . 8ti avdyxri
Trpovirtipxeur erepav overlay ivre-
Xe^efqt ovffav fy irotei, oXov ££op, el
ylyverai ffiov.
5 Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, b, 33:
fyxb '' *" P* v T0 ' s aKivifrois rb rl
iariv, iv Se roh yivofiivois ^Sr)
irXelovs, rpiirov 5' aAAoi' Kal ob
7rSffot rbv avr6v • utv /xia rbv
apiB/xbv, '66ev r, Klvrjirls iirriv.
See p. 318 sg. mj)ra.
METAPHYSICS 359
•
is at once the passive subject of all impressions and the
cause of all blind operations unregulated by any purpose.
Matter alone can receive impressions, for all irdOos is a
process of determination, and nothing is susceptible of
such a process but that which is not yet determined :
nothing, that is, but the indeterminate and therefore
determinable — in other words, nothing but Matter,
which can exhibit every activity and every quality,
for the simple reason that, taken in itself, it has no
quality or operative force. 1 But though Matter is
wholly devoid of any such active and positive force,
Aristotle nevertheless attributes to it every obstruction
to the plastic energy exercised by Form. To what,
other source, indeed, could this be traced ? And so,
since Form always works with a purpose, it is in Matter
that we must seek the ground of all phenomena that
are independent of this final purpose and antagonistic to
it, the principle of blind natural necessity and chance.
C The first of these obstructive forces is to be explained by
Nature's need of certain materials and the consequent de-
pendence of her creatures upon the same. Though this
material element is in no sense efficient cause, yet it is
an indispensable condition of the realisation of Nature's
ends. Though it is not necessary in itself, it is so con-
ditionally : for if a certain particular being has to be pro-
1 Gen., et Corr. i. 7, 324, b, 4 : to TrA.ax* iv *< rT ' Ka ' T0 KiviTirBai, to
iffa fiev odv jtt^ 4v 0A.7? e^ei t))V 5e KLvelu /cat Troietv eTepas Suj/a/iews.
jUop^Vj touto fniv cWaflij tojj/ toitj- Of Matter as moved and Form as
Tutuf, iaa 8' iv v\tj, TraBniTiicd. tV mover we shall have more to say
liiv yctp t/AJ!» Kiyoptv dfioiws us immediately. How exclusively
eltreiv tV avr^v elvcu t&v avTixei- passivity was limited by Aristotle
fievav Sirorepovovy, Scrircp yevos oV. to Matter, appears especially in
ibid. 1. 18: riS'Vkri fj Stoj iraflrjri- his anthropology.
ttiv ; ii. 9, 335, b, 29 : t5j s fihyltp vAiis
360
ARISTOTLE
duced certain particular materials must be ready to
hand. 1 For the same reason, the extent to which Nature
1 Plato had already sharply
distinguished the atria from the
avvahia, the efficient causes (81'
Si/ ytyverai ti) from the indis-
pensable conditions (&Veu Sv ov
yiyveTai) ; cf. Div. i. 642 sqq.
Aristotle also adopts this dis-
tinction. His whole view of
nature turns on the opposition
between design and natural ne-
cessity, between what is required
by the conception or form of a
thing and what proceeds from
the nature of its material : the
former is the Si' o, the latter the
oZ ovk avev ; the former is indepen-
dent and unconditioned, the
latter is for a purpose and con-
ditionally necessary. To these
two there is added a third kind
of necessity, viz. compulsion,
which, however, does not further
concern us here (upon this as
distinguished from the necessity
of the conception, cf. Phi/s. viii. 4,
254, b, 13; An. Post.ii.' \\M, b,
37; Metapk. v. 5, 1015, a, 26
sqq., vi. 2, 1026, b, 27, xi. 8, 1064,
b, 33). Cf. Mtstaph. xii. 7, 1072, b,
11: to yap avayKaiov Too'avTax&s ,
to jxev fiia tin irapa t^v bp[x))V, to
Se ov ovk dvev to ei5, to Se p.^ eVBe-
xtipevov aAAws dAA' curKios. Part.
An. i. 1, 639, b, 21 : rb 8' e£ avdy-
ktjs ov Traffic virdpxet tois Kara
(pvo'iv u/xolws .... vndpxei 8e to
fi'ev airAtSs to?s di'Sfois, to 8' e'|
virodeev ovk
cVSexetoi (rjv, Sec. ; as avvairiov,
to that which is f}iaiov and to that
which is avayKaiov in the proper
sense to awKovv ( = cltt\us avay-
koIov') viz. the fiii hSexipevov &K\as
%X* lv - Quite in conformity with
this is the statement of Eudemus
ajivd Sim pl. Phys. 63, a, that
matter and aim are the two
causes of motion. Within the
sphere of conditional necessity
there is again ((?6'«. An. ii. 6, 742,
a, ] 9 sq. ; where, however, 1. 22,
we must read, not ov evena but
with Cod. PS. and Wimmer
toItov 6c) a twofold distinction
made between that which as
efficient cause conditions the
production of anything and
that which is necessary to it as
the instrument of its activity :
the former must precede in origin
the thing which it aims at pro-
ducing ; the latter must follow it.
Cf. on the whole subject Waitz,
Arist. Org. ii. 409 sq.
1 Part. An. iv. 2, 677, -a, 15 :
KaraxprJTai fiev oZv iyioTe 7] tpvo~Ls
els to w(f)e\ifloy tois irtpiTTtlifjLao'iv,
OV flfy 5itt TOVTO S€i (tfTZLV TTOLVTa
evena t(vos, dWd tivwv uvtmv
Totovroiv erepa e£ avdyKTjs ffvfifialvei
Sia toSto iroAAo. So according to
Gen. An. v. 1, 778, a, 30, only
that has an end to serve which
appears universally in all nature's
productions or in certain classes
of them ; individual varieties on
the other hand have none : the
eye has an end to serve ; the fact
that it is blue has none : ibid.
c. 8 Jin., mention is made of
phenomena baa yiveaBai avfifiaivEi
fill eveicd tov aAA' eg avdyicris Kal Sta
t)\v aiTiav tV kivt\tikj\v. Accord-
ing to Metwph. viii. 4, 1044,
b, 12, the eclipses of the moon
appear to serve no end; Set 6
Zevs oix birws tov uItov av^ari,
aAA* e£ dvdyKrjs ' to yap avax^ev
^vx^vat Set Kal to i^u^flej/ SSwp
362
ARISTOTLE
We shall hereafter have occasion to observe how deeply
this view is rooted in Aristotle's whole theory of Nature,
and how many phenomena he accounts for by the resis-
tance of Matter to Form. Again the same property
of Matter is also the source of all contingency in
Nature. 1 By ' the contingent,' 2 Aristotle, who was the
first carefully to examine this conception, 3 under-
stands in general all that can equally well belong or
not belong to a thing : that which is neither contained
in its essence nor supported by the necessity of its
being, 4 and which accordingly is neither necessary nor
normal. 8 That we must assume the existence of
yevd/ievoy KariKBuv rb $' nu|<£-
viffdat tovtov ysvojxeyov rbv ffiTov
aufifiaive t. dpolas 5e koL elf rtp
&7T<$AAl/Tai 6 (TITOS iv T7? a/W, OV
tovtov eveica 3ei itirus airSkriTai,
aWarovro o~vfifie07iKey(Phys. ii.
8, 198, b, 18) ; individual organs
of animals are without purpose :
the bile is a irrplrTtafia kclI oi>x
tvexd vivos (Part. An. ibid. 1. 13),
the stag has no use for its antlers
(ibid, iii. 2, 663, a, 6, 664, a, 7).
The same is true of all super-
fluous materials which are un-
employed ; such materials are
&XPVo-tov or even tSsv irapci (piaiv
ti (Gen. An. i. 18, 725, a, 1, 4) ;
we must therefore decide even in
reference to one and the same
material whether it serves a pur-
pose or not: lymph (i'x^p), eg.,
which consists partly of half-as-
similated and partly of corrupted
blood, is in the former aspect
a'lfiaTos xfyw, in the latter *■{
avdyxris (Part. An. ii. 4 fin.").
Necessity of this latter kind, as
is indicated in the passage quoted
above from Phys. ii. 8, coincides
with contingency.
1 Whether also of all freedom
of choice in man, from which
alone contingent effects really
spring (to it alone at least these
are referred in Be Interpr. c. 9,
18, b, 31, 19, a, 7), Aristotle does
nottellus. InP/iys.i.5,196,b,17,
sq., he expressly excludes free
purpose, as such, from the domain
of tvxv-
'* 'Sv/j.$i$iiKbs in the narrower
sense, rb arrb tvxt\s.
3 As he says himself, Pliys. ii. 4.
1 An. Post. i. 4, 73, a, 34, b,
10 : Arist otle calls /cofl' aui-cfc, 8 yevtmis ras Kara.
1 Phys. ibid. 196, b, 13. tpvoiv Kal to? tpOopas ip.Troh't&vo-ai
2 Be Interpr. c. 9, 18, b, 31, ttoXX&'kis atrial tuv irapa tpvaiv
19, a, 7. avp.Ttnrr6vro>v elfflv. See further
3 Be Interpr. c. 9, 19, a, 9 : p. 341 sqq.
there must be contingency, 8ti s See n. 3, supra. Phys. ii.
364
ARISTOTLE
" caused by the diversion of free or compulsory purposeful
action to results alien from its purpose through the in-
fluence of external circumstances. 1 Now, since these
disturbing circumstances are always found in the nature
of the material means by which ends are realised, and
in the system of nature to which these means belong,
Contingency, in Aristotle's sense of the word, may
be defined as the^istu-rbaoee-by intermediate causes
of an activity directed to a purpose. 2 But activity in
obedience to a purpose is that by which the essence
or conception of an object is realised. 3 That which
does not proceed from it is unessential ; and there-
5, 196, b, 17 : tuv 5e yivofiemv to
juev wettd tov yiyveTat, to 5' otf . . .
KtrTi 5' eveicd tov 8tra re a-nb
titxvo'as av TTpaydeiti Kal '6(ra avb
(pvtreats. to 5J) roiavra '6rav Kara
0"U/xj3ej3ij/cbs yeviyral, ctirb ri^ys
tpafiev elvai . . . ru fiev oZv read'
ajrb aX.ri.av wpiap.ivov y to 5e Ka/ra
iKbs adptffTOV ' affetpa yap
av t$ kv\ trvfiflalii. It is chance,
for instance, if one comes to a
place, for another purpose and is
rewarded in a way he had not
thought of ; or if he (ifetaplt. v.
30) digs a hole and finds a trea-
sure ; or if he desires to sail to
one place and is carried to
another ; or, generally, if from
action directed to a definite end
something else results, by reason
of the intervention of external
circumstances, than that which
was intended (oVa? /lit toD
(rvfi^avTOs eVe/ca yevriTai, ov e£«
to alrtov, Phys. ii. 6, 197, b, 19).
If the action is one of voluntary
choice (irpooiperdv) such a chance
(according to the passage just
quoted from Phys. ii.) must be
called Tiixi, otherwise avri/iaTov,
so that the latter is the wider
conception. Both, however, stand
equally opposed to purposed ac-
tion"; #(Tt' ^Jrel53) aopicTTa TO. ovtws
cfiTia, Kal 7) Thyy\ a.6piffT0v (Phys. ii.
5, 197, a, 20).
' Akin to this, but unimpor-
tant for our present investigation,
is the coincidence in time of two
circumstances between which no
causal relation of any kind ex-
ists, e.g. a walk and an eclipse of
the moon. Such a coincidence
(which is the purest and simplest
case of contingency) Aristotle
calls ffvfnrTwfm, Divin. p. S. i.
462, b, 26 sqq.
2 See p. 356 sqq. snpra.
3 Metaph. vi. 2, 1026, b, 13 :
Sxrnep yap 6v6/j.aTi y.6vav t» avp.^t-
0tik6s 4oti. 5ib TlKdruv Tpdirov Tiva
oi/ KO.KWS t))V ffOtplffTlKty Trepl to fib
ov <:Ta£ev. eitrl yap of ratv (roii avSpbs ovk £?5ei Siatpepa ... in Metaph. X. 9, was rightly
ovtie (<}oi> BrjKv nal appiv frepoit r\t\ Arist., Rhein.
aurq ri Siatpopa koX 011% us Acwcottjs Mus. N.F. vii. 410.
ko! fieAavia, aAA' fi (v con-
tains the possibility alike of
being and not-being {Gen. et
Corr. ii. 9 ; Metaph. vii. 7, and
other passages. Cf. p. 345, n. 5),
as Aristotle himself distinctly
says. Cf. Metaph. vii. 15 (see
p. 220, n. 2, supra), ix. 8, 1050,
b, 7 : effrt 5' ovfiev Sui'auei aiStov.
[Or as this is expressed Phys. iii.
4, 203, b, 30: 4vB4xev 2 On this, more infra,
(pwitcwv fj.ev aiSlcay Se ovcriuv aWos 3 The solution which the
\6yos. Xatas yap evia ovk e^et fi\t\v. Schoolmen in their doctrine of
1) oil roiairriv (as the (pvaiKaX ko1 angels devised, to the effect that
■yevvt\Tal oiffiat) a.\\a pSvov Kara, each of these pure spirits, as
t6ttov Kwnriv. Similarly xii. 2, specilically different from every
1069, b, 24. The ether, for in- other and itself the only member
stance, of which the heavens and of the species, is therefore at
the heavenly bodies consist, is once specifically and numerically
said to have no ivuvTiwais and single, is nowhere suggested by
therefore to be subject to no Aristotle,
change in its substance. It has
METAPHYSICS
369
Form is never present in it except under certain limiting
conditions and with certain definite properties, which are
not contained in the Form as such — that is, in the pure
Concept of the thing. The Form or Concept is always a
Universal, 1 denoting not a thing but a kind, 2 - and capable
of being thought, but not of existing, by itself apart from
things. 3 Between the Individualsifito which the infimce
species resolve themselves no difference of kind or Form
any longer exists, 4 arid consequently they must be distin-
guished from one another by their Matter. 5 Aristotle is
unable to apply this principle unwaveringly 6 through -
1 See p. 219, n. 4, and p. 221,
supra ; and upon eTBoj as the ob-
ject of the conception see notes on
pp. 216 and 341, &c, and cf. p.
173, n. 2.
2 Metaph. viii. 8, 1033, b, 21 :
the form is not something apart
from definite material things,
h\hh rb roibvtie tnytafa'ti, r6Se Kal
upifffJLtvov ovk %ffriv, aAAa irute? Kal
yevvoi e« rovde rot6vde. But this
is itself the distinctive mark of
uni versalit y ; see pp. 333, kcsupra.
' Phys. ii. 1, 193, b, 1 : v p.opJ) here
to the form of the individual
thing qua individual. But from
the further explanation, c. 8, it
appears that this /j-optph iv t$
al(T0riT$ (1033, b, 5), this is e?Sos
t) obtrla \ey6pevov, is only the un-
realised form which first makes
this definite thing into a thing
which is defined in this or that
way (r65e into a roidvfie, 1. 23) in
the actual Ihing, i.e. in the
matter, but which on the other
hand itself stands related to
individual things as man is to
Callias or Socrates. The only
ground of individuality lies in
the matter : iv iravrl r$ yevofievcp
S\ri iveari, Kal eari [and there-
fore is] rb fiev r6fie rb fie r6fie
(1. 18). Exactly the same is true
of Metaph. viii. 1, 1042, a, 26
(eart 5' ovffiarb {iiroKeifievov, &\\ws
/xev 7} v\tj . . . aWtos 5' & \6yos Kal
i) fiopipv, & r6fie n iv r$ \6ytp
Xl
yap rb ica8' 'iKaarov tuv Kaff eicaff-
tov * ayQpanros yap hv&p&irov Ka66-
Aoy aAV tiffTiv oi/Sels, a.X\a Tlti\ebs
'Ax'AAe'ojs, &c.) itis(asHERTLlNG
says at p. 57), stated 'in plain
words that the form, like all first
principles, must be individual.'
Peleus, however, is not the mere
form of an individual but a real
individual ; and he has become
so by the union of the form man
with this particular human body.
Moreover, ISiov elSos (Meta/ph. xii.
5, 1071, a, 14) refers, not to the
individual form of this or that
man, but to the form man in
general. So also the remark (JDe
An. i. 3, 407, b, 23) that any soul
may not enter any body, since all
have their IStov e/Bos ko.1 noptfiiv,
must be taken to refer to bodies
and souls of different kinds, and
to mean that the soul of a
man may not wander into the
body of a beast. And when Gen.
An. iv. 1, 766, a, G6 sqq. explains
the origin of the female sex on
the ground that the male prin-
ciple cannot transform the
material into its ISiov eTSos, it is
not dealing with the individual
type, butwith the form of the male
sex. It does not alter the case
here that difference of sex accord-
ing to Metapli. x. 9 (see p. 365, n. 2,
supra) resides not in the ovtrla
( = e?8os) of the (fiov but only in
the CArj and the aufia : for even
although it be true that to Aris-
totle this difference concerns, not
the essence of man or animal as
such, but only the form of the
body, yet it is not on that account.
a mere question of individuality.
1 Hbrtling (Form u. Mat. 48
sq.) believes that the form in
Aristotle mui-t necessarily be an
individual thing, since it gives to
the individual its peculiar na-
ture, and is thus distinguished
from the essence (jb r\ fjv efoai),
which is always, at least in sen-
sible things, a universal. He ad-
mits, however, that these two
conceptions, which in certain
passages Aristotle undoubtedly
recognises as distinct, are as a rule
usedinterchangeablybyhim. It
seems more correct to say, on the
contrary, that it was Aristotle's
conscious intention to identify the
two, and to treat the form as well
as the essence as a universal.
If we rind individual expressions
in him which do not wholly har-
monise with this view, this is an
inconsistency which the actual
facts of the case forced upon
him. It is not the expression of
the view with which he started
and which was only afterwards
obscured. That the essence of
each thing lies in its form is to
Aristotle an incontrovertible po-
sition, and is stated by him with
the greatest definiteness. The
opposite he never stated in ex-
press words ; it can only be
deduced from casual expressions
to which we cannot certainly
prove that Aristotle himself con-
sciously attached this signifi-
cance. As a matter of fact the
boundary line between the essen-
tial marks which constitute the
class conception, and the unes-
sential which constitute mere
individual difference, is very im-
palpable. In every attempt to
define it and to explain certain
differences among things as class
differences, others as individual
varieties within the same class,
we shall come upon cases in
which a certain indefiniteness is
is 2
872
ARISTOTLE
therefore implies a material element, 1 and everything
that has a body is an Individual. 2 Aristotle uses the
two terms ' object of sense ' and ' individual ' indiffer-
ently . 3 If Matter is the cause of all this, it is impos-
sible to suppose that it is distinguished from Form only
by privation and non-existence : rather must it contri-
bute something of its own to Form.
Matter, viewed in this light, must be rated at even
inevitable. That Aristotle ex-
perienced this difficulty is unde-
niable : but it does not therefore
follow that he did not make the
attempt, and that he intended
from those elSri which coincide
with class conceptions 1o distin-
guish a second kind of eYS?j which
represent, not what is common
to the class, but what is peculiar
to the individual. The truth is
that there is no place in his
scheme for such individual forms.
For since according to the well-
known view that the form has
neither origin nor end (see p. 342
—and this must hold also of
the form which as r65e ti is in an
individual existence — see preced-
ing note) the individual forms of
sensible things, if there are such,
must be in aclual fact separable
from the things whose form they
are ; but this in Aristotle's view
is wholly inadmissible.
1 Metaph. vii. 11, 1037, n, 1:
Kal iravrbs yap #A.7j rls itrriv t fi-fj
ItrrL ri fy sIvcll icul e?5os aino Ka&
avrb &Wa TP" rT '»' $ " [where, however, as
a, 1, cf. viii. 3, 1043, b, 2) the Schweglek and Bonitz rightly
niic\, Kal toD e£ a/itpoiv b, 2, ii. 1, 412, b, 11. iletaph.
j,p6repov iffTai ; line 29 : rb elSos vii. 5, c. 10, 1035, a, 1 sqq. b,
&vev tov
ffomc. lOcitedatp. 366,n.l; ibid. 0panr6s u. 5 init. : «te! 8' ivia &i/eu
effri to Cv oy K *d tiitrovv, a\\6. ti yeyetreots Kal Kcvk6i>. Cf, pp. 341 sqq.,
[so Bonitz], toCto outV av t)\v and notes there.
378 ARISTOTLE
certainty goes on, until we cease to wonder that Aristotle's
doctrine of Matter and Form, Particular and Universal,
received the most various interpretations and supported
the most contradictory assertions not only among the
Greek Peripatetics but also and to a far greater extent
among the logicians of the Middle Ages.
. Yet the doctrine is of vital importance to the System.
Aristotle finds the best solution of the difficulties which
perplexed earlier philosophers in his distinction between
Form and Matter, Potential and Actual. By means of this
distinction he explains how Unity can also be Multiplicity ;
how the Genus and Differences form one Concept; how the
many Individuals constitute one Species ; how Soul and
Body make one Being. 1 It is this alone which enables
him to solve the problem of Becoming, over which Pla£o
as well as all others had stumbled. Indeed, the dis-
tinction of which we are speaking serves especially, as
has been seen, for the elucidation of this problem.
Form and Matter being related to each other as Actual
and Potential, they are in a position of essential correla-
tion ; tbe notion of the Potential implies the possibility
of its becoming Actual ; the notion of the Actual implies
that it is the Actuality of the Potential. Everything
that is to become actual must be potential ; and con-
versely everything that is potential must at some time
or other become actual, since what is never to be actual
cannot be called potential. 2 Nor does Aristotle mean
1 Of. pp.219, n. 2, 351, n. 1, assertion that a thing is potential
and 369, n. 5. De An. ii. 1, 412, only so long as it is actual ; but
b, 6, c. 2, 414, a, 19 sqq. he forbids us also to say (ibid.
1 Aristotle, indeed (Metaph. c. 4 init.) 8ti Swarbv /xlv toSI
ix. 3) controverts the Megarian ouk iarai Se, since this could only
METAPHYSIQS
379
by Potentiality any mere logical or formal but also real
Potentiality. Matter is in itself or in its capacity
that whereof the Actuality is Form ; and consequently
Matter of itself implies Form, requires Form, owns a
natural inclination or longing (as Aristotle expresses it)
for it, is provoked by it to move and develop itself. 1
On the other hand Form is that which gives complete-
ness to Matter by realising its potential capacities ; it
is the Energy or Entelechy of Matter. 2 But the
be said of that which by its very
nature could not be ; but this
could not be potential, and he
therefore denies (as was pointed
outatp. 366,n. 1-) that in things of
eternal duration there can be any
potentiality without actuality.
1 Cf. the passage, Phys. 1, 9,
quoted p. 344, n. 1. Matter is
said by nature ti/u'eo-flai na\
opeyetrOal tov Oelov Kal ayadou
koI ifiTov, and this is the prin-
ciple upon which we must explain
the movement of the world by
God and of the body by the soul.
Cf. such expressions as Metaph.
xii. 7, 1072, b, 3: ki><€» lis ipd-
ixivov ; ibid, a, 26 : -ri opexrhr
Kal rb voTyrhv Kivei ou Kivoi^ievov.
The longing referred to is no
cjnscious desire, but a mere
natural impulse, and is frequenl ly
referred to by Aristotle as the
cause of the natural movements
of bodies. Thus (Phys. ii. 1,
192, b, 18) we are told: a work
of art ouSe/aiav Spufy ?xfi ficra-
$o\tjs efiv
uvtcov o&re els ivepyetav tffTi Betvai
avTTjp atrXass " otfre yap rd Svvarbv
iroabv drat Kiveerat e£ avdyicys
ovre t& evepyeia iroffhjr, t) re K^yrjo'ts
evepyeia jxev tis. elvat done?, areX7)s
5e- aXriov 8' 2ti arehes rb Svvarbv t
oh early t) ivepyeta. It is there-
fore neither a ffrepTfo-ts, nor a
Svvafxts. nor an ivepyeia ottXt). (So
Metaph. xi. 9, 10K6, a, 17.) VIII.
5, 257, b, 6: Ktveirai rb kivt)t6v
rovro 8' itrrl Suvdfiet Ktvovfievov
ovk ivre\ex^ia • rb Se Svvdfxet ets
iyreXexeiav fiah't^et. effrt 5' t)
kIvijo'is ivreXex^ta kivtjtov areXi]s'
rb Se Ktpovv fjtiii evepyeia icr'v.
Metaoh. ix. 6, 1048, b, 17 : eW
Se rwv vpd^eav fi>v icrl irepas
ovSe/xia reXos aA\a rS>y irepl to
reXos, oToy rov laxvaiveiv t)
io-Xvaffia 3 avra Se Srav io-xvalvy
auras iffrly iv KtVT]0'€i J fii) inrdpxovra
WV %VeKO. 7} KlvTJfftS, OVK €/ai,
&\\o Sel etval ael evepyovv aWws
Kal &\\ais. Gen. An. ii. 1, 734, b,
21 : $s
Svvavrat iroielv Kal irdffxeiv ; and
the general reasons of this have
already been stated at p. 378-9.
C
38G
ARISTOTLE
opposite directions in each : ' the motive power excites
the latent activity in the thing moved, while the thing
moved realises it for itself. 2 Aristotle conceives of th<
operation of the motive principle upon the thing movec
as conditioned by continuous contact between them.
1 Phys. iii. 3, where this is
discussed at length. V. 1.224, b,
4, ibid. 1. 25 : i) Kivr) yap iviore
29 sqq. top Xvwovvra cMrreo*0ai v/jlwv, a\\'
3 Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 322, b, 21 : oxik airol e/celvov. That this,
nothing can affect another with- however, is no more than a play
out being in contact with it, and upon words is obvious.
in the case of things which at ' See p. 341, n. 2, 345, n. 1.
the same time move and are 5 With what follows, cf. Sib-
moved, this contact must be BECK, Die Ze Jure d.Ar. v. d. Ewig^
mutual (323. a, 20 sqq.); eori 5' keit d. Welt (Untersueh z. Phil.
ms iviore (pa/iev Tti k vobv awrecrOat d. Griechetl Halle, 1873, pp
fj.6vov tov Ktvoufiivou, to 5' awrSut- 137 18'J).
vov /i^ anTeo"0ai airro/Aeifou [that
CC 2
388 ARISTOTLE
with the property of motion, and thus we should in thii
case also arrive at a movement before motion. It ii
equally impossible to conceive of motion as destructible
The cessation of a movement is always conditioned bj
another movement which puts an end to the first. Ai
in the former argument we were forced to admit t
process of change antecedent to the first, so here w(
cannot escape one subsequent to the last. 1 Motion is
therefore without beginning or end; the world was
never created and it will never perish. 2
Yet, although Motion from this point of view is in-
finite, there is another aspect in which it has its limita-
tion. Since every motion presupposes a motive principle
it follows that the idea of motion in general involves
the assumption of a first motive force which is nol
moved by anything else. Without this assumption we
should be involved in an infinite series of moving causes,
which could never produce actual motion, because
they would never bring us to a first cause — and without
1 The above account contains on avdyKi) ehai ical k\vt\o~iv, €?irep t
the essence of the discussion in xP^ vm t&Bos tl Kiviio-eais. With
Phys. viii. 1. That motion must reference apparently to this pas-
be eternal is also asserted in Me- sage, Metaph. xii. 6 proceeds: oiSi
taph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 6: aK\' xp6i'ov ou yap oT6v re rh itpi-npov
ab'&vaTOV KivT\8aprjvat • ad yap
ii. (a), 2, where it is agreed that fiv. c. 7, 1072, a, 21 : eori ti del
neither efficient nor formal nor nivovp.evov Kivqaiv &wavi\o(ToB6Kovyap iv oTs icrrl ri v6i)ffav ot &vBpairoi elvai ti Bebv rb
$4\rtov, iv rovrots iirrt ti Kal api- kuB' iavrbv [-b] iombs rij i//«x5 ««'
arov. eirel oiv iv tois ovaiv iarlv irdvruv iirumnfiOviKararov. aWa
&\\o &\\ov fiiKriov, iativ &pa ri Kal 8!) Kal airb rav fieredpuv • Securd-
aoioToi/, SVep ejjj av rb Bttov." /jlsvoi yap fiefl' Tipipav piv fjAtoj-
s Fr. 13, b, SBXT. Math. ix. irepnroA.oB»'Ta, vixrup Be tV « Urate-
2Q:'ApurTore\risSeaTrbSvo7vapx£iv rov rav &\\wv aaripuv Kivriv Kal a?ro rav utriov.
Itertt&pav. a\\' otto /t'ev rav vepl * In the brilliant Fr. 14 (prob.
tV tyvx*)v irvuPaivivTuv dia robs iv also from the n. las in
METAPHYSICS 891:
•
cation in his system, although there are, no doubt,
certain points of them which must be interpreted in
the light of a less rigid logic, or perhaps referred to an
earlier form of his teaching more akin to Platonism.
Presentiments which exhibit themselves in prophetic
dreams and inspired states of feeling are only an obscure
manifestation of the force which under the form of the
Active Understanding unites the human and the divine
intelligence. 1 The beauty of the world, the harmonious
connection of its parts, the purpose observable in their
arrangement, the splendour of the stars, and the
inviolable order of their motions, point not only to
astral spirits (in whom we shall have hereafter to recog-
nise the guiding forces of the heavenly spheres), but
also to a Being placed far above them, from whom alone
the simple movement of the universe and the harmony
between the whole and all the parts proceed. 2 Conse-
Cic. N. D. ii. 37, 95, which re- cum autem terras nox opacasset,
minds us at the beginning, of turn ccelum totum cernerent
Plato's picture of the dwellers in astiis distinctum et ornatum
the cave (Hep. vii. init.') : ' si lunaeque luminum varietatem
essent, qui sub terra semper turn cresoentis turn senescentis
habitavissent . . . accepissent eorumque omnium ortus et
autem fama et auditione, esse occasus atque inomni seternitate
quoddam numen et vim Deorum : ratos immutabilesque cursus :
deinde aliquo tempore, patefactis haec cum viderent proTecto et
terrse faucibus, ex illis abditis esse Deos et haec tanta opera
sedibus evadere in hajc loca, quaa Deorum esse arbitrarentur.' Ac-
nosincolimus, atque exirepotuis- cording to ClC. A r . D. ii. 49, 1L'5,
sent : cum repente terrain et Aristotle seems to have pointed
maria coelumque vidissent, nu- to the instinct of animals as a
bium magnitudinem ventorum- teleological argument for the
que vim cognovissent adspexis- being of God.
sentque solem ejusque turn ' For the fuller discussion of
magnitudinem pulchritudinem- this see infra.
que turn etiam efficientiam 2 Besides the passage from Be
cognovissent, quod is diem Ccelu, i. 9 quoted ra/ra, inn..6at p.
efficeret toto ccelo luce diffusa : 395, cf, Metajili, xii. 7, 10(2, a,
392
ARISTOTLB
quently the arguments which Aristotle puts forward,
in the passages indicated, to prove the existence of
God, though based, like those of Socrates and Plato, 1
upon teleological principles — as well as the identification
which he elsewhere establishes between the force of
nature working to fixed ends and God 2 — are not a mere
adaptation of his views to unscientific notions, but are
in harmony with the spirit of his whole system. The
35 sqq., where God is described as
the apiarov or ov evcua, and as thus
the efficient cause of motion in
the world ; but especially c. 10,
where the question is discussed :
TTOTeptOS «?X ei ^ T0 " #Aou (pVffiS t2>
ayaBbv Kal rb frpurrov, .Trorepov
Kex^ptff^evoy ti Kal avrb lead' avrb,
% t))V Tt££ip, t) afjuporepais, Sitrirep
ffTpdrevfia. In the case of an
army the good resides as well in
the general as in the order of the
whole : in the former, however, in
a still more primary sense than in
the latter. The universe is com-
pared to an army : Ttavra. Se Stcrre fi7j eTvai Barepcp
irpbs Bdrepov fiilBej/, aAA' ia-rC ti.
trpbs p-ev yap ey airavra avvTeraKrat,
except that each creature is more
fully subject to this order just in
proportion to the nobility of its
nature, even as in a. household
the freeborn are subjected to
a stricter discipline than the
slaves. roiavTT] yap eKdffTov apxh
avruv 7] (pilaris eo-riv. A67W 5' oTov
els ye rb StaKptOTJvai avayKT) airaow
eKBetv, Kal aAAa oiirus einlv av
KotvaveT airavra els rb &'Aov. All
other systems are founded of
necessity upon the opposite prin-
ciple : Aristotle's is the only ex-
ception, ov ydp iffTty kvavriov Tip
vpfay obBev (1075, b, 21, 24). If,
like Speusippus, we accept a
whole series of primary principles
we destroy the unity of all being
(see the passage, Div. I. p. 854,
1) ; ra Se tfvTa ov fSo&Xerai iroXi-
reveffBai KaKus. " ovk ayaBbv iro-
\vK01pavi7] ' els Kolpavos etrTcu."
Cf. xiv. 3, 1090, b, 19, where he is
again attacking Speusippus : ovk
eoiKe 8' 7] aris 47reiBev rivbs alrias ; but
even in the former case exovai TI
Kotvbv rb ffwdirrov aitras KaKeTvo r)
apxt. The comparison of the
order of the world with that of
an army is further developed in
Sext. Math. ix. 26 sq., which
perhaps follows Aristotle riepl
(piAoiroipias.
1 See Div. i. p. 143 sq. 786
(Zbllee's Plato, Eng. Tr. p. 281
sqq. 485)."
2 De Ccelo, i. ifin. : & Bebs Kal
r) (piffis ovSev fidTTjv •koiovo'iv.
METAPHYSICS 393
•
unity of the world and its adaptation to fixed ends can
only be explained by the unity of the Supreme Cause.
It is not without good reason, also, that Aristotle
in his most important treatises connected the proof
of the reality of the Supreme Being with his theory of
motion : for this is the point at which the Changeable
is seen most directly to lean upon an Unchangeable, as
itself the condition of all change.
The further characteristics of the Supreme Being
may be determined from what has gone before. Motion
being eternal, it must be continuous (crvvexrjs), and"so
it must be one and the same throughout. But such a
single motion is the product of a single mobile and a
single motum. Hence the primum mobile is single and
is as eternal as motion itself. 1 In the next place what
has been said about the continuity and uniformity of
motion implies that this motive principle is absolutely
unmoved ; since that which is moved, being itself
subject to change, cannot impart an unbroken and
uniform movement, 2 and consequently it is of the
essence of the primum mobile to exclude the possibility
of change. 3 It is unchangeable and absolutely neces-
sary ; and this unconditional necessity is the law by
1 Phys. viii. 6, 259, a, 13 ; 3 In Fr. 15 (preserved to us by
Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, a, 23 sqq., SlMPL. Be. Cceh, 130, 45, K.,
where in connection with the Schol. in Ar. 487, a, 6), from
nptUrn atStos /to! pla Kiry/ris, that of the treatise n. s
[i.e. in so far as it is necessary it
is good, since, as is immediately
explained, its necessity is neither
external nor merely relative, but
absolute — /ify ivSex^^ov &\\ais,
oAA 1 airKws a.va,yKa2ov~\ , . . 4k
roiavTTjs dpa apxv s ^pnjTat 6
ovpavos Kal t\ tpilffis.
2 After showing that the
luipyeia precedes the 5iW/«r in
all the three respects of \6ytp,
Xpfof and ova-la, Aristotle goes on,
Metaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 6 (follow-
ing immediately on the passage
quoted at p. 385, n. 1) : ctAA.a jity
icaX Kvpuorepas [actuality has a
higher reality than the Sim/us].
Tci fixv yap ai'5ia irpWcpa rij oiiffio
rS)V (pQaprSov, etrri 5' oiidev Swdpei
di'Sioi/. This he then goes on to
prove. That which is merely
potential can both be and not be.
to 8' iv^ex^^voy/j.}} elvai tpBaprbv, -7)
atrXcos, fy tovto o,vt6 [relatively to
that], b \iycTat 4vS4x e °"^ al M e ^""
[the former, if I say, ' it is possible
for A not to be ; ' the latter, if I
say, ' it is possible for A not to be
in this place, or not to be so great,
or not to have this quality '] . . .
an\us 8e to kot' obfflav [but that
is absolutely perishable whose
substance can cease to be], olden
a\pa twv cupddprwv air\as Svvd/j.eL
4ot\v ov a.Tr\ias . . . ouSe tw e£
avdyKr\s tiiiriav.
3 Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 12 :
if there were a kiv^tikov which
did not realise itself in action
there would be no eternal unin-
terrupted motion ; di/Scxerat ya.p
to Svi/apLiv %xov fify ivepyew. But
this would be equally true, ei
evepyhffti t] 5' ovtria aiiTTJs ovva/j.is'
ob ya.p IffTOi kIvtjo'is d'/'Sios ■ ivde-
X*t at y ap rb Svvdfj.e iov fiA dvai. Sei
dpa elvai apx^v ToiavTTjv ris y\ ovffia
ivtpyeta. The leading thought of
this proof (eVSe'xeo-flai J) e?i9ev '
Si6nep o&t' eV rdirp Tcwce? lriv, Aristotle
proceeds : rb tov iravrbs ovpavov
re\os Kal rb rbv 7raWa y_p6vov Kal
t^v airsipiav irepU-xpi 1 tcAos aldtv
itTTtv, airb rod del elvai ei\TjS SpiCTTB rarov voei zeal oi nera/ldWei ■
b, 28 : we cannot think of the els x^P " 7"P V p-eraPohT) real
divine thought either as resting xlvriois ris ^897 rb roiovrov.
or as in a state of mere poten- 3 Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 28 :
tiality, for e< /tj) vivais [actual TGpov r) 6 vovs, rb voovfievov '
teal yap rb voetv Kal t) v6tjo~is inrdpl-ei
Kal rb x^P lffrov voovvtl ' uitrr' el
P ia ' T0 ' v '
3 See preceding note and Me-
taplb. xii. 9 : (paiverai b" ael aAAou
r) i7riffT7)firi, . . . t) eV e'nW r)
eirlo'Tt)fJ.ri rb irpayfia ; eirl fiev Twv
■jruirtTiKwv avev $Kt\s t) ovffia «ai rb
ti i)v eTvai, eirl 8e tG>v deuprjTLKuiv
6 \6yos rb irpayfia Kal i] v6i}o~is.
obx erepov oZv ovtos tov voovfievov
Kal tov vov, offa fi7) v"\t\v ex el T0
aitrb eVrai, Kal t) v6t\o'is tov
voov/ievov /j.la. De An. iii. 4 Jin.
(cf. c. 5 and c. 7 init.) : eirl pey
yap tuv &vev H\riS rb avr6 etrri rb
voovv Kal Tb voovfievov.
1 Metaph. xii. 9: 1075, b, 7:
aSialperov Trav rb [ify exov S\riP t
&c, see p. 397, n. 1, supra.
5 This view is set forth in
the passage immediately follow-
ing that quoted p. 394, n. 1 : Sia-
7u>y!) 8' e&Tlv [sc. t$ irpiircp
klvovvtC\ o'la r) aplo-TTj fiiKpbv XP^ V0V
ri/iir. oStio yap ael exewo ^stoi •
rifuy fiev yap aZivaTOV. tlrel Kal
■qiovT] i) evepyeia [so BONITZ,
rightly following Alexander,
instead of r) r)5. evepy.'] tovtov Kal
8m tovto [i.e. because not God's
activity alone, but activity in
general, is pleasant, for in this
passage, as often in this book,
lucidity is sacrificed to an exces-
sive brevity of style] iypi\yoptris
alo-flrjo-is v6t)Bis fySurrov 4\irloes Se
Kal j.tv?i/iai 8ia ravTa. i] Ser6ricns r)
METAPHYSICS 399
•
These propositions of Aristotle concerning the
Divine Spirit contain the first attempt to find a
scientific basis for Theism. Here first the idea of God
as self-conscious intelligence was logically deduced
from the principles of a philosophical system instead ox
being borrowed from religious notions. And on the
very threshold we are confronted with the difficulty the
solution of which is the final problem of all systems of
theistic speculation : how are we to define the idea of
God so that while maintaining his essential difference
from all finite reality, we may yet preserve his per-
sonality, and vice versa ? Aristotle represents God as
self-conscious Spirit ; on the other hand, he deprives
Him of body and senses, and, not content with this,
declares not only action and creation, but the direction
of the will itself towards an object, to be incompatible
kh&' avr^v rov ko.9' aurb apitrrov passage is quite general, referring
koI i) /udAioTa toS p.a\i & s w«is tote, S 6ehs ael,
abrbv Se voei 6 vovs Kara. fieraXr$iv Bavjiao-r6v ' el Se fiaWov erl
rov vorjrov • votjtos yap yiyverat BavfiaindtTepov. exei Se wSi, Kal
Btyy&voiv Kal voaiv, oStrre ravrbv £(ti$\ Se ye virdpxet. tj ytip vov
vovs Kal vot\t6v. rb yap SeKrtKbv evepyeta fa}}, 4Ke?vos Se 7] ivepyeia '
rov vorjTOv Kal ttjs ovffias vovs, 4vepyeia Se tj KaB' avrijv ine'ivov fai]
evepyel Se e^aiv. iliffr* eKeivo apitrrf] Kal alSios. Tepuca\, actions which
elsewhere are called simply
irpSJis in the narrower sense of
the word— from tos airoTeAeTr,
Kal t&? airrwv eyeKa Becapias Kal
titavofoeis, and attributes only
the latter to God, in opposing the
view that the practical life is
superior to the theoretic ; ffx»\f
•yap av d Bebs ?x oi koKus Kal iras 6
kut[ios, cits oiiK elalv QurepiKal
irpd£eis irapi ras oiKelas ras avratv.
Still less is jt a pertinent objec-
tion that . in using popular lan-
guage Aristotle ascribes iroieiv
to God, as in De Ccelo, i. 4 fin.
(o Bebs Kal 7j (puiris ou8ei> fi&Trjv
iroiovtrtv'), Gen. et Corr. ii. 10,
336, b, 31 (oweirA^pmh.), 8 :
et 5J? etyeais, aWws re teat rod
aplffrov, jUetce tyvxys, . . . %P$VX
av elrj rck Ktvoiftcva. Similarly
l J BOCLTJS, in Tim. 82, A (of.
Scheader, Arist. de Volunt.
Doctr. Brandenh. 1847, p. IS, A,
42) asks : ei yhp Ipif 6 niaixos,
&S tpTJfft Kal 'ApitTTOTeKTJS, TOV VOV
kjX Ktvelrat irpbs avrhv, ir68ep e\ei
T&{yrn\v t%v etpeffiv ;
3 We are not, of course, there-
fore justified in denying that
Aristotle held this notion in the
face of his own plain and re-
peated statements and the inter-
pretations of them in this sense
by the most faithful of his disci-
ples ; all the less as it is hard
indeed (as the discussion in
Theophrastus, -fV. 12, 5, clearly
proves) to say in what other way
motion can, on Aristotle's prin-
ciples, be conceived of as proceed-
ing from the absolutely Unmoved.
Beentano (as above, 239 sq.)
thinks, indeed, that there is no-
thing so totally in contradiction to
the Aristotelian doctrine as the
view that ' matter is the efficient
principle because it moves of
itself to meet God, who is its
end.' As little, he says, can ' the
end produce anything of itself
without an efficient principle.'
But nobody has asserted either
the one or the other. When
it is said that God causes
motion by causing the desire
for his own perfection, it is
not meant that the matter in
which this desire is produced
causes the motion ; as little can
it mean that the end produces
it by itself alone, apart from any
efficient principle. The fact is that
the efficient cause is not here re-
garded as different from the
final. Though mis should perhaps
in such a case conceive of two
independent causes at work,
the attractive force and the
thing that permits itself to be
attracted, Aristotle represents
the relationship otherwise. He
ascribes to the mover a $bvap.is
Troirjri/cj), to the motion merely a
Simpis iraflrjTiK^ (MetapJi. v. 15,
1021, a, 15, ix. 1, 1046, a, 16
sqq.). It is impossible, therefore,
for him to attribute to that which
owesits motion to something else,
any independent efficiency of its
own. On the contrary, the
efficient and the final cause, as
has been shown at p. 356 sq., he
conceives of as in essence one.
Their apparent severance under
certain circumstances is only a
phenomenon of the sensible
world, where form realises itself
in matter, and therefore (cf . pp,
368 sq.) in a plurality of indi-
viduals. In the intelligible world,
however, efficient and final cause
are always one and the same,
and accordingly it is impossible
to speak of an end producing
anything apart from a principle
408
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle supposes, the motum must be in contact 1 with
the mobile, it follows that the Universe must be in
contact with the prim-urn mobile, as, indeed, Aristotle
explicitly states. 2 It is true that he endeavours to
exclude the notion of contiguity in space from this
idea ; for he often employs the expression ' contact '
when the context clearly proves that he does not allude
to juxtaposition in space, but only to an immediate
connection between two things. 3 Moreover, he asserts 4
that the motum is in contact with the pimum mobile,
but not vice versa. But even though we overlook the
contradiction that is here involved, we find the notion
of efficiency.— Similar to the
action of God Himself is that of
the spheral spirits, which produce
motion in their respective spheres
as being themselves the end of
the motion ; cf . p. 405, n. 3. — It is
still more strange that BeentaNo
goes beyond the view which he
combats, in saying, p. 210, that
according to Metaph. xii. 7, 1072,
a, 26: 'God moves as known;'
for since matter, as he himself
adds, cannot know God, it would
follow from this that God does
not move matter at all. The-
assertion, however, rests upon
a misunderstanding. Aristotle
says (cf . p. 404) : rb opem-bv icai rb
voTjrbv Kivei ov Ktvovtxtvov . . .
vovs Se virb rod j/otjtov KiveiTat
Kivei 8e &s 4pdifievov. As
votfrbv God moves only Nous (to
which, however, motion can he as-
cribed only in an improper sense ;
cf. Ch. XI. at the commencement
and at the end,i»/ra); the world, on
the other hand, He moves as epeSjUe-
vov by means of the Spejtr which
He causes. We, indeed, should
not think of ascribing any such
quality to matter, and we should
hesitate scarcely less to attribute
to plants and animals a ' longing
after the divine ' as Aristotle does
in De An. ii. 4, 416, a, 26 sqq. (see
Ch. X. pt. 2, infra). Even the
doctrine of a plant and animal
soul would scarcely justify such a
view in our eyes, as from such a
soul the thought of God is neces-
sarily excluded. But just as
Aristotle here attributes to non-
rational existence an unconscious
yearning after rd Beiov, so the
conception of a world animate
throughout, so natural to the
Greek and yet resting ultimately
on an untenable anthropological
analogy, enables him to view the
astral spheres, which he holds
to be of a far higher nature than
any earthly existence (see Ch. IX.
on the Universe), in the same light.
1 Cf. supra, p. 386.
2 Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, 20.
3 Cf. supra, p. 203, n. 3.
4 Gen. et Corr. ibid. ; see p.
387, n. 3, bvpra.
METAPHYSICS 409
•
of existence in space forced upon us still more remark-
ably by the further assertion that God in setting the
world in motion starts from its circumference. For since
generally the primordial motion is taken to be motion
in space, 1 and of the original motions in space none is
absolutely continuous and uniform except circular
motion, 2 the operation of the first mover upon the
world must consist in the production of circular motion. 3
According to Aristotle, this might be effected either
from the centre or the circumference of the world, for
both of these places are apyal, and command the whole
movement. He prefers the latter, however, because it
is clear that the circumference moves faster than the
centre, and that which is nearest to the cause of
motion ought to move at the quickest rate. 4 In defending
this position he might hope to evade the objection that
he places God in a particular locality by his peculiar
theory of space, which excluded from the notion every-
thing that lay beyond the limits of the world. 5 It is
obvious, however, that we cannot accept this defence.
Again as the Deity, relatively to Himself, is confined to
the unvarying exercise of uniform self-contemplation,
so, in his relation to the world, He has no other func-
tion but that of monotonously causing circular motion.
To explain the rich variety of finite existence with the
1 Phys., viii. 7, 9 ; see p. 421 Ccelo, i. 9, 279, a,, 16 sqq. (see p.
sq. 395, n. 6, supra). Hence the
" Ibid. c. 8 sq. ; Be Ccelo, i. 2 ; assertion (Sext. Math. x. 23 ;
Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 10. Sypotyp. iii. 218) that God is
3 Phys. viii. 6 Jin., c. 8fin.; to Aristotle rb irepas toS oipavov.
Metaph. xii. 6 pi.; c. 8, ]073, a, 5 CI. De Ccelo, i. 9 (cited as
23 sqq. above, at p. 395, n. 6) and p. 432,
* Phys. viii. 10, 267, b, 6 ; Be n. 5.
410 ARISTOTLE
infinite diversities and subdivisions of its motion, by
means of this simple and uniform activity, would be im-
possible. Aristotle himself admits as much with refer-
ence to the heavenly bodies ; and accordingly he adds
to the first mover a number of subordinate but equally
eternal substances, whose business it is to cause the
special motions of the planets. 1 The same provision
must, however, be made to account for special motion
of all kinds and for every separate property of things.
As the First Cause of motion cannot have produced
them, seeing that it exercises one general function in
the world and nothing more, we are driven to assume
some special cause for them. 2 Only it will not do to
point merely to something which is equally general in
its operation : for example, to the inclination of the
orbit of the sun and planets, from which Aristotle
deduces the phenomena of growth and destruction. 3
The special character of everything must be ascribed
to its own particular nature and Form. 4 Here a new
question rises : what position do these particular Forms,
which operate as creative forces in finite things and
constitute their peculiar essence, occupy with respect to
the highest form, the primordial motive force, or God ?
Or what are we to say of those beings which, belonging
as they do to the supernatural world, are unaffected by
1 Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, a, 26. pc'Wei yevetris ical tpdopa elvcu, &\\o
For fuller explanation see Ch. Set flvai evepyovv &\Aois ko! iiUw.
IX. infra. ' Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, a,
* Metajjh. xii. C, 1072, a, 9 : 23 ; see the section of Ch. IX.
to secure the uniformity of the infra, which deals with the
motion of the world (ireptSStp earthly world.
1. 10 isprob. corrupt), SeT ti dtl « Cf., besides p. 350 sq., the
Htveiv iiaavTcos ivepyoiv. si Se passagesquoted i?ifra,y. 432,n. 5.
METAPHYSICS
411
the changes of birth and destruction — the heavenly
spheres with the spirits that move and animate them,
and the immortal part of the human soul P 1 What
explanation does Aristotle offer us of the existence and
peculiar nature of these beings ? We cannot suppose
them to be God's creatures ; 2 for not only does such a
notion obtain no support from his system and writings, 3
1 That these three classes of
being are uncreated and inde-
structible not only follows from
the eternity of the world and its
motion, but is also expressly
stated by Aristotle ; cf. p. 474 sq.
and Ch. IX. infra.
2 As Bkentano holds them to
be, Psych, d. Arist. 198, 234 sqq.
Bullingbr goes even further,
Des Arist. Erhabenheit iiber alien,
Dualismus etc. (1878), p. 2 sq.
According to his view, Aristotle
supposed not only the whole
world, but even the material of
which it is made, to originate in a
divine act of creation. Thus 'the
material out of which God
creates the world ' would, accord-
ing to Aristotle, be nothing else
' than the power and might etern-
ally actual in God, whereby the
world is actualised,' &c. (p. 15).
It will be sufficiently evident from
the account already given in the
text that speculations are here
attributed to Aristotle which
are as foreign to the range of his
thought as they are in conflict
with his definite declarations.
3 That God is called irpiirr\
dpxh (see p. 403, svpra), proves
nothing ; for this may mean, not
only that He has produced every -
thins 1 , but also that He is the
condition of the eternal order
and activity of the world : dpxh,
indeed (Mtitaph. v. I, 1013, a, 16,
20 sq.), is used in as many senses
as oXtiov, and includes especially
the conception of final cause.
Since it is God who, as the most-
perfect being in the universe,
gives unity of aim to the whole,
and who causes the all-governing
motion of the first sphere, He is
also the irpdrTj Kal KupiwrdrTj dpx^i,
on Him the whole order of the
universe may be said to depend
(p. 394, n. 1, and 395, n. 6), and
to Him we are justified in apply-
ing " eh Kolpavos eVrw " (p. 391, n.
2). The commander, however, is
not therefore the creator of his
subordinates. And as little does
it follow from Metaplh. ix. 8, 1050,
b,3 (seep. 385,n.l,»?y?ra)that the
creative activity of God precedes
all being in time; for the del
kivovv irptiiTus does not (as ,Ps.
Alex, in loc. certainly thought)
refer to God as the first cause of
motion in the universe. On the
contrary (as is obvious from the
explanation upon p. 1049, b,
17 sqq. which the &tnrep eiirofiey
recalls), the reference is here to
the fact that every individual
thing presupposes as the condi-
tion of its production another
similar already existing thing,
and this likewise another, ewj toO
del KtvovvTos irpt&Tcos : i.e. until we
come to the first member of the
412
ARISTOTLE
but it would involve us in the contradiction of sup-
posing the uncreated to be at the same time created,
that which has been declared to be eternal to have had
a beginning in time. 1 The same question arises with
series in question which has
given the first impulse to the
whole series, the pri/mum movens
in each case (not the irparov
wi/oBy); and this is the reason why
the ael kiv. irp. is repeated from
p. 1049, b, 26, where (as Phys.
viii. 10, 267, a, 1, 3) this is un-
doubtedly its meaning. Ari-
stotle was precluded from hold-
ing any theory of creation by his
view of the eternity of the
world. Such a theory, moreover,
is incompatible, not only with the
assertion that to God belongs
neither trp&TTtiv nor itoieiv (see
p. 400, n. 1), but also with the
principle ex nihilo nihil Jit
{Phys. i. 4, 187. a, 34, c. 7, 190, a,
14;' Gen. An. ii. 1, 733, b, 24 ;
Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 6, vii. 7,
1032, a, J 3, 20, b, 30, c. 8 init.,
ix. 8, 1049, b, 28, xi. 6, 1062, b,
24), from which we have not the
smallest right to make an excep-
tion in favour of the Deity, as
Brentano, 249, does.
1 Bkentano, p. 210, indeed,
believes that the eternity in time
of immaterial substances as little
dispenses with the necessity of
an efficient principle for them as
the eternity of motion dispenses
with the necessity of a, mover ;
in other words, he endeavours to
reconcile the eternity of the
world with the theory of its
creation by means of the con-
ception of an eternal creative
activity in God. But upon the
principles of the Aristotelian as
of every subsequent theism this
is impossible. One who con-
ceives of God as the substance
of the world, and of finite things
as mere manifestations of the
divine force immanent in them,
may, and even must, in conse-
quence, declare that the one is as
eternal as the other. One, on
the other hand, who treats God
as a personal being outside the
world, distinguishing other be-
ings from Him as so many inde-
pendent substances, would in-
volve himself in a palpable con-
tradiction were he to hold that
the latter are eternally created
by the former. Creation as an
act proceeding from a personal
will must necessarily be in time,
and an individual being in order
to produce other beings must
necessarily exist before them.
For only eansce irnmanentes have
contemporaneous effects ; eausce
trameuntes always precede their
effects : the father precedes the
son, the artist the work of art,
the creator the creature. Such a
contradiction we should be justi-
fied in attributing to Aristotle,
only if we could show that he
held alike to the eternity of the
world and to a creative activity
of God. The opposite, however,
is the case. Aristotle holds, in-
deed, quite definitely the doctrine
of the eternity of the world, but
of a creative activity in God we
not only find no word in his
writings, but he expressly de-
METAPHYSICS 413
•
respect to the Forms of sensible things, and to the order
of nature which results from their union with Matter :
they also are uncreated. 1 It is equally impossible upon
Aristotle's showing to explain the adaptations of nature
as the result of any personal interference on the part of
God. 2 If, finally, the ancient Greek view of the
universe as interpenetrated by divine forces is in open
disagreement with Aristotle's dualistic theism, 3 this
does not, where the question is one of his scientific
views, justify us in setting aside or explaining away his
own definite and well-considered statements, on the
ground that he has neglected to bring them into har-
mony with views that were pressed upon him from
another side.
Brandis adopts another method of solving the above
difficulties. He believes that Aristotle ' regarded the
Forms as the eternal thoughts of God, whose self-
development produces alteration in individual things,
and the harmony of whose transmutations is guaranteed
by the fundamental unity which underlies them. 4 But,
clares that no Troieiv belongs to physics, we must supply certain
Him at all. Cf. also infra, Ch. important conceptions, and goes
XI. near the end. on : ' Indeed, that all existences
1 As is shown in reference to must be traced back to, referred
the forms p. 341, n. 2 ; in reference ultimat ely to, living thoughts of
to the universe as a whole, p. 387. God, and that these must be
8 Such interference is ex- treated as the simple substrata
pressly denied of God (see p. upon which concrete existences
i(68, n. 1), nor on the theory that and their mutations ultimately
the world is eternal can we rest, hardly requires to be ex-
understand when it could have pressly stated, and is indicated
taken place ; cf. p. 412. by the question (Metaph. xii. 9,
> Cf. infra, p. 420 sq. see p. 298, n. 2, supra) : If nothing
4 Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 575, is attained by the thought of the
where he says that in order to divine spirit, wherein consists its
i ully understand Aristotle's meta- worth? We may, moreover, as-
414
AR1ST0 TLB
in the first place, this statement can apply only to the
Forms as such, and leaves the existence of the eternal
substances (the spheral spirits, &c.) wholly unex-
plained. In the second place, it is untenable even
with respect to the Forms. It finds no support in
Aristotle's own utterances, 1 and in more than one point
it contradicts what he indisputably taught. The object
of Divine Thought, according to Aristotle's definite
statement, cannot be other than God Himself: not only
are finite existences, as these particular things, ex-
cluded, but even the specific concepts or forms, which
constitute their internal essence, must remain remote
from Him, since they are always something different
from Himself, and stand far below that which alone
can be matter of his thought — viz. divine and perfect
sume that Aristotle— anticipating
Leibnitz's doctrine of monads —
more or less consciously intended
to refer the changes in the quali-
ties or essence of individual ex-
istences to the self-development
of the divine thought on which
they rest, and the obstructions
and disturbances in this. self-
development to its connection with
matter or potentiality ; and the
harmonious variations in the de-
velopments of different individual
existences, by an anticipation of
the conception of a Itarmonia
prrpstahilit"; to the unity and
perfection of the ultimate reality,
the unconditioned spirit of God,
which is their common substra-
tum.' Cf. further his p. 578, where
the central point of the Aristote-
lian theology is sought for in the
doctrine ' that all determination
in the world is referable to dy-
namic activities, and these again
to the eternal thought of God : '
and p. 577 n. : ' That dynamic ac-
tivities which have gone out from
God, and therefore also finite
being which is animated by these,
should seek to return to Him, is
quite comprehensible.' So also
Hid. iii. a, 113 sq.
1 Even Metaph. xii. 9 contains
nothing to support Brandis's
view (cf. also Kyji, Metaph.
Uhters. 258). Aristotle there
asks how we are to conceive of
the thought of the divine spirit :
if nothing is thought of by him
(not : if ' nothing is attained by
his thought ') his power of thought
must be as worthless as that ex-
ercised in sleep ; if something
other than Himself is thought of,
then is the worth of his thought
to be measured by the worthiness
of its objecfj But this does not
mean that the Divine thoughts
constitute the essence of things.
METAPHYSICS 415
•
being. 1 nnrryftrsely ; the .Forms of t hin gs onnnnt h e
thougQta^fjhe^DeJi^sijnc^^cording to Aristotle, the
Form is the substa nce of the th ings andSubstance can
neith er be predicated of n or.JielQng to anvthjng. 2
Thoughts cannot be substances, since they exist in the
soul as their substratum. 3 Again, we find no analogy
in Aristotle for the notion of a self-development of the
divine thoughts : indeed, it is directly contradicted by
the proposition 4 that there is no change in the thought
of God, no transition from one thing to another. Finally,
while Brandis maintains that all things strive towards
Deity, because the active forces which emanate from
Him struggle to return to Him again, Aristotle him-
self rather ascribes this striving, like all motion, to
Matter, which desires to complement and complete it-
self by means of the foraes. 5 Nor is it the least im-
portant- objection to this view that it clashes with the
whole character of Aristotle's system. For supposing
the thoughts of Deity to be the supporters of concrete
existences and of their mutations, the relation of finite
reality to God would be one of immanence : the Deity
would by virtue of his thoughts be inherent in things,
and the latter would have in. God the permanent ground
of their shifting properties. Instead of Aristotle's
dualistic theism, we should arrive at a system of
dynamic pantheism. 6 But not only is it impossible to
1 See p. 398, n. 1, and p. £97, stratum; seep. 214, nAfin. supra.
n. 2, supra. * P. 397, D. 2, supra.
■' See p. 330 sq., and p. 373 sq. s Uf. p. 404 sq., p. 344, n. 1,
supra. and p. 379, n. J, and on the
s 'Eirurr^/Mj is the very ex- doctrine that motion resides in
ample which Aristotle mentions the motum and therefore in the
ot that which is at once predicate material, 386, n. 1.
and inherent attribute of a sub- « This is made still more
41 C ARISTOTLE
discover such a system in the works of the Philosopher,
but even his school were unacquainted with anything
of the sort, until the influence of Stoic opinions intro-
duced that fusion of things diverse and fundamentally
distinct which meets us in the spurious book upon the
World and still more in Neoplatonism. Aristotle leaves
it quite uncertain how we are to define the relation of
the particular and individual Forms to the Deity.
From his utterances upon the subject we can only say
that he placed them side by side, without explaining
satisfactorily the existence and the special motions of
finite things by the operation of the Deity, or even
attempting such an explanation. They are given
factors, just as Matter is a given factor which he does
not attempt to deduce from Form or Deity. It is true
that the unity of his system, the ovk ayaObv vroXv-
Koopavit), is thus rendered more than doubtful. 1
This brings us to the conclusion of the Metaphysics.
God being defined as the First Cause of Motion, phi-
losophy passes from the Unmoved to the Moved — or, in
other words, to Nature.
obvious by Kym ; cf. ibid. p. 242 tajrii.), 7 : rb tie ^rh tout' fjS-n
246sq.,256,258sq.,andp.402,n.l, Xdyov Se7rai irKeiovos irepl rrjs
fin. supra. According to Kym, e^eVecus, iroia xal rivav, eVeiS^
God is said to be, not only the irKelu to Kvit\Ma [the heaveDly
creative conception, but also the spheres] k«! at avep6i>.
Pir¥sics ill
CHAPTER VIII
i
PHYSICS
A. — The Idea of Nature and the most General Conditions
of Natural Existence
First Philosophy, according to the view of Aristotle,
has to deal, as we have seen, with unmoved and in-
corporeal reality : though, in treating of this its
proper subject, we were in fact obliged to include some
notice of the opposite principle. Natural Philosophy
is occupied with the aggregate of corporeal existence
which is subject to Motion. 1 All natural substances
are bodies, or united to bodies ; and under the name
of natural existence we include bodies and masses —
everything, in fact, which possesses them or is related
to them. Hence the whole domain of corporeal existence
belongs to Natural Science. 2 But it regards form only
in its connection with matter, 3 and the soul in its con-
1 Cf. p. 183, n. 3. 1, 298, b, 27 • eVel Sf rav (piaei
2 De Casio, i. 1 init. : r/ irepi \eyon4vav t& pev ia-ra ovaicu to
rpvaews eirio-Tf)fJi.ri ff\^ov T) 7rAe»TT7| 5' epya Kal traBri roirwv [by outn'at,
ipaiVerai irepi re ad/iara Kal peycBr) however, he here means both
Kai to ToiiTtav elvat 1:6.671 Ka ^ Ta * simple and composite bodies] . . .
Kivf)ffeis, ct( 5e Trepl ras apx&s, tpavepbv 'on rr/tf irXeiariiv ffvfifialpei
otrai ttjs rota{ni}S ovtrias elffiv ' tt}s irepl (pvatus iffroplas irepi
Ttav yap tpvffei o-vvcirr&rajv to fiev fftop.&Tuiv elvai • vaffai yap at
iffTl aci/iara Kal fieyedri [as the QvaiKal ovtriai tl (niftara % jii-ra
human body], Ttt 8' e^" <™m" Ka ' ow/iaVav ytyvomai ko! fieyeBwv.
fieyeSos [as man], to 8' apxal tuv 3 Mttaph. vi. 1, 1025, b, 26 sq.
Ixivruv t'ur'.v [as the soul] ; iii. (xi, 7) and elsewhere ; see infra.
VOL. I. .E E
ii8 AnistbtLS
nection with the body. 1 It must, however, be remem-
bered that material existence pertains to Nature and to
Natural Philosophy only in so far as it is subject to
motion and repose. Mathematical bodies are not
natural bodies ; indeed, Mathematics may be distin-
guished from Physics by the fact that the former deals
with immovable, the latter with movable, substances. 2
Furthermore, movable existence can only be regarded
as ' natural ' when it contains within itself the principle
of motion ; and this is the point of difference between
natural things and the productions of art. 3 The dis-
tinction, on the other haDd, which is drawn between
rational and irrational forces, on the ground that the
former may act in either of two opposite directions, the
latter only in one, and that the former, therefore, are free,
the latter necessary — is only a subdivision within the
realm of Nature. 4 Yet since in all substance Form and
Matter are distinguishable, we are met by this question :
Does the essential reality of nature consist in the Form
1 Metaph. vi. 1, 1026, a, 5 : * Pliys. ii. 1, 192, b, 13 : to
irepl tyvxrjs 4vtas OeuprJGcu rov tiev yap tpvffei tjyra irdyra uix$i$i)K.tv . Tex"V opx^ e ' y 8**9> [similarly ix.
Sib koI x w pK ii ' X a P l " T ^ 7ty T V 2, 1046, b, 4] t\ Se tpitris apxh lv
vofati Kivtitreds iart . . . . rb pev auTc±>.
yap Trepirrbti Io-toi i«xl rb apriov, * Metaph. ix. 2 init. c. 6, c.
etc. &vev Kivii(reus, cropf Sk Ka\ 8, 1060, a, 30 sqq. De Inierpr,
harovv ko\ Mpwiros oviceri. Cf. c. 13, 22, b, 39.
what follows and 183, u. 3, supra.
PHYSICS 419
•
or in the Matter ? In support of the second alternative
it might be asserted that everything requires some
material in order to be what it is. 1 Yet Aristotle is
forced to maintain the first alternative. The essence of
things invariably resides in the Form ; it is only by its
Form and purpose that a natural object becomes what it
is. 2 The true causes are the final causes ; the material
causes are only the indispensable conditions of natural
existence. 3 If, therefore, we wish to determine the ge-
neral definition of Nature, we must not consider what
in it is material, so much as the moving and informing '
force. 4 Nature is the cause of motion and rest in every-
thing which possesses these conditions of being originally
and not merely in some derivative fashion. A natural
thing is one that has such a motive force within itself. 5
But Aristotle does not help . us greatly in defining
1 Pliys. ii. 1, 193, a, 9-30. v.ifoi.: T\irpim\ ipvais Kal Kvpias
Metaph. v. 4, 1014, b, 26. Xeyopivt) icrrlv r) ovaia f) took
2 Phys. ii. 1, 193, a, 28 sqq. o. ixivruv "PXV "iviifftas iv avrois fj
2, 194, a, 12. Metaph. as above, airi. vi. 1, 1025, b, 19 [xi. 7,
1. 35 sqq. Part. An. i. 1, 640, b, 1064, a, 16, 30] : irepl yip tt)x
28, 641, a, 29, b, 23 sqq. roiairnv iarlv qialav [ij 4>u(n/ri)]
3 For a fuller discussion of iv ri ij apxh T vs Kivfiacws ical
this point see infra and p. 357-8. ariireas iv airy (or 1. 26 : irepl
4 Part. An. i. 640, b, 28 : t\ toioutoj/ tv 8 itrri Svrarbv Kivei-
yapKarariiviioptpiivQiirtsKvpLaTepa. irfloi). It is indifferent whether
■7-7JJ 6\iktjs ipiaeus. 641, a, 30 : the nature is described as the sub-
scientific investigator has to deal stratum of motion merely, or of
with the soul still more than with rest as well, since, accord-
the body, '6aif paWov t\ 'i\i\ SC ing to Aristotle, rest (^pe/tfe,
ixiivriv i\4o~TaTOS apa. It is obvious
8e£w yiverai, ti>a*ep Sofcei, Kal eifij av that Aristotle is here arguing
t&Koyov xalpstv re aiiToiis t§ apiffrtp from popular conceptions ; he
«al t$ avyyevetrr&Ttp (toDto 5' av himself ascribes to God no ex-
€?7) i vovs) Kal robs ayair&vras ternal operation. Cf. pp. 389 sqq.
/tuUirrra rovro Kal rk/iavras co/Te«- supra.
PHYSICS
423
guishes three kinds : quantitative motion, or increase
and decrease; qualitative motion, or alteration; and
motion in space, or locomotion — to which may be added
as a fourth kind, birth and destruction. 1 Now all these
kinds of movement may be ultimately resolved into the
third kind — Motion in Space. For, if we examine
them more closely, we find that increase or growth, to
begin with, consists in the addition of fresh material to
matter which has already received a certain form : the
increment is potentially but not actually identical with
that which it augments, and assumes its form ; in other
1 Phys. v. 1, 225, a, o. 2, 226,
a, 23 (Metaph. xi. 11, 12), cf.
Metaph. viii. 1, 1042, a,. 32, xii. 2
imit.. Phys. viii. 7, 260, a, 26, 261 ,
a, 32 sqq., vii. 2 i/nit. Gen. et
Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31; Be An. i.
3. 406, a, 12, ; Long. v. 3, 465, b,
30; Be Coelo, iv. 3, 310, a, 25.
Cat. u. 14 init. Aristotle here
distinguishes generally three
kinds of change (/lerajBoAifr) :
transition from being to being,
from being to not-being, and from
not-being to being. The first is
motion in the stricter sense, the
second destruction,, the third
origination. Motion he then
divides into the kinds mentioned
in the text (/cfvjjim Karh /leytBos,
icara irdOos and Kara rbtov, as he
calls them Phys. viii. 7, 260, b,
26) , and, taking birth and destruc-
tion again together, thus enume-
rates four kinds of i^ra^oKr) :
r) Kara rb ri (yevetris Kal (pOopa), r]
Kurd, rb noaov (atityiffis teal - and condensation, which involve
ens fiev yty r\ rod aWoioirov, fj change of place. Gen. et Corr.
aWoiuiTbv, £vTt\4x ela ' ""' '^ 7*»- i- "> 322, b, 21 sqq. c. 9, 327, a,
ptp.vb'iaTOVTO,o'Tiy€v4(r8ai b, 10: aWoiaxris fi4v iffTtv, Hrav
5e? to irpa.yp.a irpurov. rb 5 1 4 "M-' erepov avayKcuov Tra&effiv .... hrav 5' 8\ov fiera-
■jrpdrepSv ri Kiveitr8ai twc yivofievav fiaWri fiij iiirofievovros aia^Tyrov
ov avrb teal ^ yivdfievov, zeal tov- tivos as vwoK€ifj.4vov tov avTov . . .
tov eTepov irp6repov. Cf . p. 38 1-7. yeveffis ^877 to toiovtov, tov Be
* Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318, a, QBopa..
23 : Sia to t^v roSSe (pBopav &\\ov 4 Cf. Meteor, iv. 1, 378, b, 31
Aval y4veaiv. /col tV toBSe yivzaiv sqq., where he argues that ge-
aWov elvai o-is is produced by change 5 Cf . Phys. viii. 7, 260, b, 8 :
426 ARISTOTLE
produced. Since this, as we saw in tbe case of altera-
tion, cannot operate without movement in space, such
movement must precede all generation. 1 Again, if
movement in space precedes generation, it must of ne-
cessity precede growth, change, decrease, and destruc-
tion ; since these processes can only be carried on in that
which has previously been generated. 2 Therefore this
species of motion is the first in the order of causality, as
well as in the order of time and in the logical order also. 3
Notwithstanding what has just been said, Aristotle
is far from explaining natural phenomena by the merely
mechanical principle of motion in space, as the Atomists
had done. Even purely physical occurrences cannot, in
his opinion, be satisfactorily accounted for by this
method, seeing that many of them are only to be
conceived as modes of qualitative alteration, or the
transmutation of materials. 4 Physics do not by any
means exhaust the conception of Nature. Final Causes
Trdvrav tZv itaii\j>ATav apxri Trite- dent of these conceptions, and
vwtris leal fidvaxrts . . TvKvaicris 5e none of them are applicable to the
/col fidvcocrts criyKpicns /col Stdnpurts, heavens (260, b, 19 sqq. Gen. et
Ha8' as yevecris Kal a dvdyKi) Kara -rivov these conceptions which has to do
pcrqS&Aeu'. with the eternal, and is of infinite
1 Phys. ibid. 261, a, 1 sqq. duration (260, b, 29, 261, a, 27
Gen. et Corr. ii. 10 init. sqq.). Aristotle also argues that
2 Phys. ibid, b, 7. It is here because it is the last in time in re-
further pointed out in proof of the spect to individual existences, it
priority of ' movement in space,' must be the first in nature (260,
that, while it is presupposed by b,30,261,a, 13);andheholdsthat
the others, it does not presup- it causes the least change in the
pose them. Without the move- nature of the thing moved, and is
ment of the heavens, neither the motion which the self-moving
generation nor destruction, nei- produces in preference to every
ther growth normaterial change, other (261, a, 20).
could take place. Movement it- 3 Ibid. 260, b, 16 sqq.
self, on the other hand, is indepen- 4 Seep. 304,n.3,andp.306,n.5.
PHYSICS 427
•
rise above the material causes which, subserve them ;
and these are not provided for in the philosophy of a
Democritus. 1 Lastly, if it be true that ' becoming' is a
transition from potentiality to actuality, or a process of
development, and that the importance of Aristotle's na-
tural philosophy consists, to a great extent, in having
first made this notion of development possible and
consciously given it the foremost place, it is clear that
Aristotle could not favour opinions which started with
an express denial of any ' becoming ' or qualitative alter-
ation, and left us nothing but a movement in space of un-
alterable materials. Therefore qualitative alterationmust
be added to locomotion, even in the domain of matter, as a
second source of natural occurrences : but over against
both, Aristotle sets the teleology of nature, which uses as
means to its end all that is corporeal and determined
by natural necessity.
Next to Motion in Space, and not without direct
relation to it, come investigations by which Aristotle
further illustrates the idea of motion in his Physics :
and these include discussions upon the Infinite, Space,
Time, the Unity and Continuity of Motion, 2 &c.
The Infinite 3 had played an important part in pre-
1 See p. 307, n. 4, and cf. p. 3 The discussion of thisconcep-
359, sq. supra. tion Aristotle introduces vaPhyt.
- He describes those concep- iii. 1, 200, b, 15, -with the words :
tions, indeed, generally, iii. 1, Soxet 8' r> itfojjo-is eivai rav avv^xav,
200, b, 15 sqq. c. 4 vnit., as be- rb 5 1 Jxtrfipov ifitfta'tverai irpwrov iu
longing to the discussion upon raj auvex**; c. 4 init. be remarks
motion, and deals with the first that natural science deals with
three in bks. iii. and iv. before the masses, motion, and time, each ■*»-• ■, i-«^UvX<
section upon the kinds of motion ; of which is either finite or infinite,
but the way in which he treats On what follows see Zbllee,P/<.
them shows that he is thinking d. Gr. pt. i. 186.
chiefly of locomotion.
428 ARISTOTLE
Aristotelian philosophy . Plato and the Pythagoreans
went so far as to make it an element of all things, and
therefore a substance. Aristotle begins by proving this
to be impossible : ' infinity ' does not belong to the
order of substances but of qualities. 1 Then he shows
that an 'infinite magnitude* is inconceivable. For sup-
pose it to be a body, body is • that which is limited by
superficies ; or if it be a number, numbers are capable
of being counted, and that which can be counted is not -
infinite. 2 Lastly, and more especially, an infinite body
could neither be composite nor simple. It could not
be composite, since, the elements being limited in
number, an infinite body could not be made up of
them unless one of them were infinite in magnitude, and
such an element would leave no room for the rest. 3
And to think of it as simple is equally impossible.
In the first place, as far as this world is concerned, no
bodies exist except the four elementary ones, nor can
there be any out of which alone everything could come,
since all becoming moves between two opposites ; and
if there be several primitive bodies, it is quite impossible
that one should be infinite. 4 Again, every body has its
natural place, in which it abid? , and to which it tends ;
and this law determines the difference in weight be-
tween bodies ; every body without exception must exist
in a definite space, in a locality; but in the infinite
there is no definite locality, no distinction of up and
down, centre and circumference, before and after, right -8*£~~^
and left. 5 Moreover, whereas it is manifest that bodies
1 Phys. iii. 5, 204, a ; see p. 312, i. 7 init.
n. 2, and p. 325, n. 2, supra. * Phys. ibid. 204, b, 22.
2 Phys. ibi.d. 204, b, 4. 5 Ibid. 205, a, 8 to end of chap.,
3 Ibid. 204, b, 11, of. Be Casio, iv. 8, 215, a, 8. Be Casio, i. 6
PHYSICS
429
either move in a circle like the celestial spheres or in
straight lines up and down like the elemental bodies,
infinity admits of neither of these movements. The
former is impossible, because circles are by their nature
circumscribed, and circular movement is rotation round
a centre, whereas in the infinite there is no centre ; ' the
latter, because lineal motion has a starting point and
end. 2 Indeed, ' infinity ' could not move at all, since it
would take infinite time to traverse the smallest con-
ceivable space. 3 Finally, Aristotle uses an argument
conclusive with Greeks, who could not imagine formless
being : the infinite, as such, is incomplete and without
shape — we call that infinite the magnitude of which is
indeterminable, which is never finished and complete,
which cannot be limited in such a way as not to leave
some portion of it outside. 4 The infinite first becomes
a whole and complete when it is enclosed by means of
form. But the world cannot be conceived except as
complete and a whole. 5 It is therefore impossible that
init. u. 7, 274, b, 8, 29. 276, b, 6
sqq. In c. 6, 273, a, 21 sqq., the
same conclusion is reached by
showing that infinite bodif "tup t
be infinitely heavy or light," *>ut
an infinitely heavy or an infi-
nitely light body is an impossi-
bility, since it must either ex-
hibit infinite speed or be abso-
lutely immovable.
1 As is shown, at unnecessary
length, De Coelo, i. 5, 271, b, 2ri
sqq. 272, b, 17 sqq. c. 7, 275, b,
12.
2 De Coelo, i. 6 mit. Also c. 7,
275, b, 15 sqq.
3 Tbid. c. 6, 272, », 21 sqq.
Phyt. vi. 7, 238, a, 36.
4 Aristotle's words are : oi
yap o5 juTjSez/ c|w, a\?C ot aei rt
e£« cotI, tout' foreipoV iaTtv,
where, however, the antithesis is
merely verbal, uv liriSiv e|to
meaning ' that beyond which
nothing exists,' ov ael ri e£u, on
the other hand, 'that of which a
part always remains beyond.'
5 P/iys.iii. 6 : see at p. 350, sup.
Gen. An. i. 715, b, 14 : ri Si i ■ . .
8) that the river is stationary, Siaipet tie Bvvdncf xal rj /ikv rotovro,
ad that only the individual ie! ertpov rb vvv, y Se avvtiei, del rb
'aves move. avr6 . . eon Se ravrb Kal Kara
1 Phys. iv. 10, 11. touto % Sialpeais Kal ri evutris, t4 5'
2 'AptO/ibs Kivfiffeus Kara to ttvai ov tovt6.
pdrepov Kal Sarepov, c. 11/*. ; De 4 Cf. p. 428 sqq., and 387,
Iwlo, i. 9, 279, a, 14. supra. Aristotle, however, here
VOL. I. F R
14 ARISTOTLE
on of Space implies the impossibility of a vacuum. If
pace is the limit of the enclosing body in relation to
ie enclosed, we cannot but conclude that there is no
>ace where there is no body : empty space would be
1 enclosure that encloses nothing. Aristotle tries on
lis point, with minute and patient arguments, to con-
ic the widely-received assumption of a vacuum, which,
ving mainly to the teaching of the Atomists, had
icome part of the current Natural Philosophy.
The reasons with which they had supported it appear
i him inconclusive. Movement does not need to be ex-
lained by such an hypothesis, since we can imagine that
lother body quits the space which the object in motion
iters. Condensation may be referred to the exit of
r or other matter from the bodies in question ; rare-
ction to its entrance into them. The expansion which
ater, for example, experiences when passing into air
hat is, into steam) may be explained by the alteration
' materials, which necessitates another degree of rarity :
■ the phenomena of gravity by the tendency of the
ements to reach their natural place. 1 The vacuum
ould rather put a stop to the possibility of motion,
nee emptiness yields equally on all sides, one cannot
lagine anything capable of determining a body to
How one direction rather than another. It would
ford no distinction of natural localities. No special
otion could take place in it. On the other hand, it
stinguishes, as Plato bad done the immutable. Pliys. iv. 12,
Hm. 37, D, 38, b), between the 221, b, 3. De Coilo, i. 9, 279, b^
dless time in which mutable 11-28; seep. 395, n. 6, supra.
istenoe moves, and eternity " Phys. iv. 7, 214, a, 24 sqq.,
\hv) or the timeless being of c. 8 init. c. 9,
WYSICS 435
would be equally impossible, on the hypothesis of
infinite vacuity, to assign any reason for rest in
Nature. Again, if bodies fall or rise with a rapidity
proportioned to the rarity of the medium through
which they are moving, everything would have to fall
or rise with infinite rapidity through the infinite rarity. -
of the void. On the other hand, if, ceteris paribus,
greater masses fall or rise quicker than smaller ones
because they more easily overcome the withstanding
medium, then in the void, where there is no resistance to
overcome, the smallest would move as quickly as the
greatest. Lastly, how are we to conceive that an
empty space exists beyond the space occupied by bodies,
since, if a body entered that space, there would then be
two spaces, an empty and a full, the one within the
other ? And what is the use of such a void space,
since every body has its own extension ? l Besides, by
maintaining that there is empty space or any space at all
beyond the world, one would end in the contradiction
of asserting that a body could be where no body can. 2
If empty Space is impossible, empty Time, filled with
no movement, is equally inconceivable, since Time is
nothing but the number of motion. 3 Aristotle, in fact,
maintains the eternity of motion as having neither be-
1 Phys. iv. 8 ; cf . De CceVi, iv. icevbv ovSe xp6vos zotIv £|o) tou
2. In estimating the force of ovpavov' iv airavrtykp rfatp Svva-
these arguments we must, of t6v virdp^at au/ia- icsvbv $' ehai
course, take account of the state (paaiv iv $ f.^1 ivvwdpx^ (ra>fia,
of scientific knowledge at the tiwarbv 5' ian\ yevfodai ££«
time, and of the presuppositions Be tou oipavov Sc'Seiktou oti o6t'
which were shared by Aristotle iarui oSt' iviix*™ yevctrBai trafia.
and the Atomists alike. 8ee 3 Phys. viii. 1, 251, b, 10: rb
p. 442, infra. irp6Tepov leal 'ia-rtpov iris IVtoi
2 De Ccelo, i. 9, 279, a, 11 : XP^ V0V M Hvtos; f) i xp^vos fi.ii
SjUa Se BtjKov 8ti oitSe r6iros oi/de o$ffi\s Ktvfoetos; ei S-fj itrriv 6
FF 2
43C ARISTOTLE
ginning nor end. 1 On this point he suggests the remark-
able question : whether there could be Time without a
soul ? And ho answers it by saying that Time in its essence
is implicit in motion, but that in reality it cannot be
without the soul, because number does not exist without
a calculator, and reason is the only calculator. 2 But we
should make a mistake if we sought to discover in this
remark any inclination to the idealist theory of Time
which has obtained so vast a.n importance in modern
philosophy. Its apparent bias towards Idealism pro-
ceeds from Aristotle's not conceiving the ideas of Time
and Space in as pure and abstract a sense as is familiar
to us. Although he does not go so far as Plato, who
identified Space with extended substance, and Time
with the motion of the stars, 3 yet he never attempts to
make an accurate distinction between Space and Time
Xpivos Kiv},treus apiS/ibs % nirnir's of its existence; v. TOBSTKIK in
•ns, elnep del xP^ vos ^tIi/, avar/Ki] S,h. Mm. xii. 1857, p. ltil sqq.],
Kal KivTjfftv a'tbuv elva.1. Ibid. 1. olotf ei evSexercu KlvTjffiv eli/at &vev
26 : avir/Ki] . . eivat oe! xP& vov - ^ V X^ S - Aristotle is not quite
a\\a fity elye xp^ vov i avepbv Sri consistent in his answers to the
avdyxri etvai Kal Kirqaiv, eiirep & question, what faculty of the soul
Xpivos irddos ti Kivfoeus. De Ccolo, it is that perceives time. Accord-
i. 9. 279, a, 14 : outside the ing to the above passage and Dr.
world there is no lime, for XP^ V0S An.iii. 10, 433, b, 5 sqq., we must
apiS/ibs Kii/^o-eais- Kivqcrts 5' avtv suppose that it is the reason, and
(pviriKov ffdtfiaros ovk %ffnv. Cf. p. that the sense of time is limited
395, n. fi, supra. to rational beings. In the De
1 See p. 387, swprn. Mem. i. 450, a. 9-23, on the other
2 Pliys. iv. 14, 223, a, lfi sqq. hand, he assigns it to the TpuTow
esp.l. 25: « Si ,u?j5ej/ &\\o mtyvxev aiVflTjTiKiv.andattributes memory,
apidfuXv ti world as a whole is not in space, but only its
arts. 3 In the same way the homogeneous parts
b.erent body, as parts of the whole, are only
lly in space ; they are not actually so until
d from the whole. 4 It is the same with Time,
eing the number of motion, presupposes an
noved on the one hand, and on the other a
I subject. He remarks expressly, however, that
me is called the number of motion, we must not
md by the word number that by which one counts,
t is counted. 5 Number, that is, must be taken
is subjective but its objective sense. Par from
ing Time as a mere form of our perception, he
it rather as something pertaining to motion,
leed, to the body moved. Outside the world,
}dies cease, Time also ceases to exist. 6
le further discussion of Motion which is found
otle's Physics, our attention is chiefly drawn to
ts which bear more directly upon his doctrine of
vim movens and the structure of the universe. He
8, swpra. real significance).
lys, therefore, Phys. iv. 8 ^ee p. 429, n. 5, supra.
8 : the movements of 4 Phys. iv. 5, 212, b, 4.
dies (fire, earth, &c.) 5 Phys. iv. 11, 219, b, 5.
ivov on itrri ti i t6tos, ° De Ccelo, i. 9 ; see p. 436,
il ex ei T '"" : Sii/cfuv (a ri. 3, nvjird, and p. 3&.", u. 6.
438
ARISTOTLE
defines the meaning of coexistence in space, of contact,
of intermediate space, of succession, of continuity, &c.'
He distinguishes the different relations in which the
unity of motion can be spoken of, 2 finding the absolute
unity of motion in continuous or unbroken movement —
that is, in such as belongs to one and the same object
in the same relation at one and the same time. 3 He
asks what constitutes uniformity of motion and its
opposite : 4 in what cases two movements, or movement
and repose, may be said to be opposed to each other ;
how far the natural or unnatural character of a move-
ment has to be considered in either instance. 5 After
proving further that all continuous magnitudes are
divisible ad infinitum? that time and space in this
respect correspond, and that in reality it is only with
1 Phys. v. 3 : S,uo ixkv olv
\4yerai tout' eivtu Hark t6ttov, bffa
eV epl r6irtp tffTi irp&T(p, x u P^ s Be
off a 4v erepy, airreffQat Se 6tv Ta
afcpa aua, fl€Ta£b 0€ ei's a iretpvKe
Trpurov oupiKUe'iffdat ro fiera[3d\\ov
. . £(pe£TJs 8e oZ jUetcc rfy apxfa
fi6vov 6vros . . . fjiTiSky fiera£6 iffri
tuv iv TauT^J yevet ical [join with
TauT^J] ou itpe^rjs iffriv. . . .
4xA/>-cvov Be [immediately suc-
cessive] t> av £ lt
only as contained potentially in
the divisible, and not ever known
except as a negation.
PHYSICS 439
inite spaces traversed in a finite time that motion has
do — whereas infinite spaces are only said to be
raversed in the same sense in which the time of motion
3 infinite ' — he establishes the indivisibility of the
iresent moment, and concludes that in this unit neither
lotion nor rest are possible. 2 He discusses the divisi-
ility of motion and of the body moved, 3 remarking that
very alteration attains completion in an indivisible
loment, but that the moment of its beginning is never
apable of being accurately determined. 4 He shows that
; is equally impossible to measure a merely finite space
1 infinite time or an infinite space in finite time, and
ansequently that an infinite magnitude cannot move
ay distance at all in a finite time. 5 These conclusions
ipply him with the means of refuting Zeno's argu-
lents against motion, 6 and enable him to prove that
le indivisible can neither move nor change in any way. 7
inally, he prepares the way for investigating tho
lovement of the universe and its cause, by asking 8
hether there can be a single movement of infinite
iration. After establishing the eternity of motion and
1 Phys. vi. 2, 233, a, 13 sqq. m. and Thehlst. Phys. 55, a, m.,
2 Ibid. c. 3, and again c. 8, that difficulties had already sug-
lere he adds : in the transition gested themselves to Theophras-
jm motion to rest, the motion tus and Eudemus in connection
its as long as the transition with this view.
its j while, therefore, a thing is 5 Phys. vi. 7 ; cf . p. 429, n. 3,
ming to rest, it is moving still, supra. Aristotle shows, PhysMii.
3 Ibid. c. 4 (cf. also p. 430,n. 2). 9, 265, b, in, that his predecessors
rtion according to this passage also treated motion in space as
divisible in a double sense : the most primary,
st in respect of the time occu- 6 Phys. vi. 9, cf. c. 2, 233, a,
id, and secondly in respect of 21, viii. 8, 263, a, 4, and p. 311,
i object moved. supra.
* Ibid. c. 5, 6. We see from 7 Phys. viii. 10.
mpl. Phys. 230, a, m. 231, b, " At the end of this chapter.
ARISTOTLE
e necessity of a primum movens, he gives this answer : '
there is a continuous and single movement without
iginning or end, it must be movement in space, for
)t only does this precede every other, 2 but every other
a transition between opposites ; 3 and where this is the
se the first motion ceases at a certain point, at which
new movement may begin in another direction, but
te and the same cannot continue without a break. 4
le same argument proves that only circular motion
iswers all the necessary requirements. If all move-
ent in space must be either in a straight line, or
rcular, or mixed, 5 a mixed movement could only be of
Ldless duration and continuous if both the others
uld. Movement in a straight line cannot have
is character, since every finite rectilinear movement G
ts terminal points at which it ceases, and though
>tween these terminal points it may be infinitely often
peated, yet these repeated movements do not con-
itute one continuous motion. Circular motion is,
erefore, the only kind of movement which, continuing
te and the same in unbroken sequence, can be without
jginning and end. 7 It unites the repose of the uni-
srse with unceasing motion, since it enables it to move
1 Phjs. viii. 1-6 ; see p. 387 ' IMd. 261, a, 31 sqq.
, supra. 5 Among mixed forms of mo-
2 Phys. viii. 7 ; see p. 423 sq. tion we must in this division
!»'«. reckon all curvesexceptthecircle.
3 Generation from not-being e An infinite one is impossible,
being ; destruction from being not only in itself (see p. 430, n. 2,
not-being ; increase from less supra) but also because the world
greater ; decrease from greater is not infinite.
less ; alteration from one state ' All this is explained at
another, e.g. from water to length, Phys. viii. 8, 261, a, 27-
>am. 263. b, 3, 264, a, 7 sqq. c. 9 init.
PHYSICS
441
without changing its place as a whole. 1 It is the mea-
sure for all other movement. It alone is entirely uniform,
whereas in rectilinear 2 movement rapidity increases in
proportion to the distance from the starting-point. 3 How
this eternal rotation is brought about by the operation
of the primum mouens 4 we have already shown.
Important though movement in space is, as the
most primitive kind of change on which all others are
dependent, Aristotle cannot agree with the mechanical
theory of physics in merging all forms of change in this
one,andiu assuming only the combination and separation,
while rejecting the transmutation, of materials. Three
questions arise upon this point. Is there a qualitative
distinction between sorts of matter ? Is there a quali-
tative alteration of materials ? Is there such a com-
bination of materials as to cause the change of their
1 Phys. viii. 9, 265, b, 1 ; of.
p. 398, i.
- Those, namely, which Aris-
totle treats as the natural motions
of elementary bodies: in other
words, the downward motion of
heavy, and the upward motion, of
light bodies. With forcible move-
ments the opposite is the case.
3 Physs. viii. 9, 265, b, 8 sqq.
* The seventh book of the
Physics is passed over in the
above account, because it was not
originally a part of the work (see
p. 8 L, n. 2, mprd). Its contents are
as follows. After it has been
explained in c. 1 that every move-
ment must have its source in a
primum mm;ens, and in c. 2 (see
p. 386, n. 3, and p. 423, n.\,adfin.)
that the latter must move along
with the motion, c. 3 goes on to
show that dWoiwtris concerns only
the sensible qualities of things;
c. i inquires in what case two
movements are commensurable,
and c. 5 finally proves that the
same force moves half the mass in
the same time twice as far, in half
the time the same distance as the
whole ; likewise that the same
mass is moved, by the same force,
in the same time, the same dis-
tance, in half the time half the
distance, while half the mass is
moved by half the force the same
distance ; on the other hand, it
does not follow that twice the
mass is moved by the same force
half as far as half the mass, or
the same mass by half the force
half as far as by the whole force ;
for the force may not perhaps be
able to move it at all. The same
is true of the other kinds of
change.
ARISTOTLE
ties ? The Atomists answered all three of these
bions, Anaxagoras and Empedocles at least the
id and the third, in the negative. Aristotle feels
elf obliged to answer all affirmatively, combating
nechanical theory of his predecessors, and seeking
olution of their difficulties in the peculiar tenets of
>wn system. That he wholly succeeded in this
lpt the natural science of our day will certainly
e to admit, and will even be frequently inclined,
Bacon, 1 to take the part of Democritus against
Yet this is just a case in which we have to guard
LSt a too hasty criticism of a man who occupies one
e first places among the scientific investigators as
is the philosophers of antiquity. In order to form
ripartial judgment of Aristotle in his contest with
lechanical theory of physics, and to appreciate his
riews, we must never forget that we have not here
' with the atomistic philosophy of our days, but
that of Democritus, which differed from it tota
Aristotle, like his opponents, possessed nothing
be scantiest rudiments of the methods and pro-
i of observation which we have to so boundless
:tent at our command. He had to define the
ntary physical conceptions of an age whose obser-
is did not extend beyond the reach of the naked
tnd whose experiments were confined to a few
3 and for the most part very unreliable empirical
ises. Of all 2 our mathematical, optical, and
:. Kuno Fischbe, Franz ences (Arist. ThierJtunde, 410
262 sqq. (Eng. tr.). sq.) to Aristotle's method in test-
'. also JBeandis, ii. b, 1213 ing heat.
sq., and Meyer's refer-
EHFSICS 443
•
physical instruments, he possessed only the rule and
compasses, together with the most imperfect substitutes
for some few others. Chemical analysis, correct mea-
surements and weights, and a thorough application of
mathematics to physics, were unknown. The attractive
force of matter, the law of gravitation, electrical phe-
nomena, the conditions of chemical combination, pres-
sure of air and its effects, the nature of light, heat,
combustion, &c. — in short, all the facts on which the
physical theories of modern science are based, were
wholly, or almost wholly, undiscovered. It would have
been more than a miracle, if under such circumstances
Aristotle had developed views in natural philosophy of
which we could have availed ourselves without altera-
tion at the present time. It is the business of a history
to show how he explained phenomena consistently with
the position of knowledge in his own day. 1
None of the ancient systems presents so pure a form
of mechanical physics as the atomic, to which the theory
of the elements adopted by Plato from Philolaus is
closely allied. Both deny qualitative variety in matter,
and consider differences of shape and magnitude as the
only original and real distinction. Aristotle opposes
this view, not merely because it maintains the existence
of infinitely small bodies or superficies, but also because
it denies specific difference in matter. In both re-
spects, according to his judgment, the weaknesses of
the Platonic theory are most striking. 2 It contradicts
mathematics, because it regards bodies as composed of
superficies, which brings us logically to the assumption
1 Cf. supra, p. 262 sq. 2 Cf. ZelleS, Platon. Stud. . 270 sq.
i ARISTOTLE
' indivisible lines , ' nay, further, to the resolution of
agnitudes into points. 2 Again it destroys the divisi-
lity of bodies. 3 Moreover, the figures of the elements
isumed by Plato do not fill the space within the world,
id yet he allows no vacuum. 4 Lastly, it is impossible
form any coherent bodies out of them. 6 Nor are the
fficulties which beset this theory from the point of
ew of physics less important. For how can bodies
hich have weight consist of surfaces which have
me ? 6 And how, according to this hypothesis, could
Le specific gravity or levity of the single elements be
■oduced ? Fire would have to become heavier and
cend more slowly in proportion to its bulk ; much
r would be heavier than a little water. 7 Again, while
jperience shows that all the elements are mutually
ansmutable, Plato only admits this with respect to
.e three just mentioned; 8 even in their case diffi-
ilties arise from the circumstance that superfluous
1 Plato, indeed, and Xenocra- are not balls or pyramids.
5 actually adopted this assump- l Ibid. c. 8 init. ; cf . Zell.
in ; cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 679, 3.
i. 807, 2 ad fin. 868. 5 Ibid. 306, b, 22 sqq.
2 Be Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 6, 300, 6 Be Casio, iii. 1, 299, a, 25 sqq.
7, c. 7, 306, a, 23. Cf. Gen. et b, 31 sqq. (where, however, we
water, steam might be extruded
sqq. from water, but water could not
- Be Ccelo, iii. 6. be wholly resolved into steam.
3 This objection is first brought 4 Be Ccelo, iii. 4, 303, a 24,
against Anaxagoras in the Phyg, where the words vvo\ei\fiet y&p
i. 4, 187, b, 22 sqq. : iaBe Ccelo,iii. ciei, Sec, must mean 'since the
7, 305, b, 20 sqq. it is used against larger atoms would fail to obtain
all who explain material change as release,' so that in water, for ex-
an extrusion — in the latter case ample, a residuum would be left
with justice, since if steam, for which could not be turned into air.
ARISTOTLE
3d with, since bodies only require to be divisible,
aeed not be actually divided in order to experience
rocal influences ; but it really serves no purpose, for,
o bodies cannot affect each other by contact, those
i of them which interpenetrate by means of pores
not do so either. 1 Therefore while the mechanical
•y of nature confined itself to a movement of the
entary ingredients in space, Aristotle maintained
qualitative alteration. Where the former had
lined apparent metamorphosis as a mere process of
»sion, Aristotle assumed the operation of real
ges under certain conditions. His predecessors re-
;ed the reciprocal operation of bodies to pressure and
ilse : he extended it to the internal nature of bodies,
eby they transform their primitive qualities,
t is precisely this process which he understands
action and passion ' in their stricter sense. 2 The
itions of such transformation, as of all movement,
contained in the correlation of potentiality and
ility. When two things meet, of which one is
illy what the other is potentially, then, so far as
is the case, the latter is patient, the former agent : 3
i change is produced in the one, which proceeds from
Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 326, b, 6- rat {l6vov, oFo^ rb Aevicbv Kal rb 9ep-
9, 327, a, 7 sqq. /i.6v • aWb. rb Kiveiv «rl irKeov rod
Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, voie'iv iariv.
£ the movens is likewise s Tbid. c. 9 init. : riva 8e rp6irov
7 motum, partly iijwnobile, inrdpxet rots ouo~t yevvyv Kal iroietv
must be true also of the /col irlaxeiv, Xeyw)j.ev \a06vres
> : Kal yap rb kivovv iroietv ri apxh" r)]V iroWdtcis i\fr\jxhi\v . ei
Kal rb iroiovv Kivetv. oil pAjv ydp eon rb /lev Suva/let t(pu ye Kal Set Siopifeiv ■ \exea TomuToy, iretpvKev oil ry fiiv
i otiv re itav rb klvovv iroietv, rrj b" oil irdaxeiv, iA\i navrji Ka8'
rb iroiovv avri&ifffofiev rep 'oaov itrrl roiovrov, ijrrov 5e Kal
wri. rovro 8' oh j) KiVrjtris /iaWov $ roiovrov p.a\\6i> iari ical
, irdQos Se Kaff 8s el-new tJ;x n. 454, n. 3, suj)ra). Ibid. 327,
r $iv eivai twv favTiKeifievav dtrore- a, 6 sqq.
iovv, &airep y4vos iv. The yevos 5 According to Gen. et Corr.
nds to the eitios generally in i. 10.
; relation of matter; see p. 219, e Aristotle shows, ibid. 327, b,
PHYSICS
457
either the one is merged in the other, 1 nor both exist
)gether unchanged, but a third is formed which is
self ofjLooo/jjSpss. 2 In other words, it consists neither
1 the absorption of one sort of matter into another, nor
1 a merely mechanical junction or interminglement of
oth, 3 but in a chemical combination. When two
laterials are mixed, neither of them remains the same,
reserving its original qualities. They are not merely
[ended in invisibly minute particles, 4 but both have
holly passed into a new material, wherein they
;main only potentially, inasmuch as they can be again
ctracted from it. 5 Such a relation, however, only
! sqq. 328, a, 19 sqq., that only
le union of substances(x<<'pia'Ta),
)t that of qualities or of the
rm with the matter or of the
imaterial efficient cause with
3 passive object, can be called a
ixture (pi£is). To us this seems
iperiiuous ; but according to
'etaph. i. 9, 991, a, 14 (cf.
ELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 890, n. 4,
id ibid. i. 881 sqq.) he had
me occasion to make this re-
rvation. That the substances,
oreover, which are mixed can
ily be of a material nature is
If -evident : for the incorporeal
airafles.
1 As happens in the case
burning (Gen. et Corr. i. 9,
7, b, 10), where it is not a
ixture that takes place, but the
odaction of fire and the de-
ruction of wood, or, in other
>rds, the change of wood into
e. The same is true of nutri-
>n, and generally of all cases in
lich one material is transformed
to another (ibid. 1. 13, 328, a,
sqq.). This is not a case of
;« but a\\olam toiouto oTa ruv fiiKTWv aWoiwOh'Tuv evaxris.
PHYSICS 459
•
above material necessity, the design of the universe ;
above the physical explanations of nature, the teleological.
Our researches up to this point have already led to
the conclusion that everything in nature has its End.
If Nature is the inner cause of motion, every motion
has its goal by which its measure and direction are
determined.' If the essence of things consists in their
form, the form is not to be distinguished from their
End. 2 If everything which moves must of necessity be
moved by something else, it follows that the ultimate
cause of movement resides in that which moves the
universe as its Final Cause, 3 and movement in general
can only be conceived as the action of form upon
matter, in which the former is the ' object of desire,' and
so the goal towards which the latter strives. 4 Ari-
stotle cannot conceive of regulated and orderly events
except under the analogy of human action directed
towards an end. Hence while combating the theory
of an anima mundi in the form in which it had been
held by Plato, he adopts himself a similar view. 5 He
1 See p. 341, n. 2, supra. consists of circular motion, or of
2 See p. 356 sqq., p. 418, and any motion at all. It would be
p. 462, n. 2. inconsistent with its perfect
3 See p. 404, and p. 396, n. 3. happiness that it should be inter-
4 See p. 383, and p. 379, n. 1. mixed with the body of the
5 Be An. i. 3, 406, b, 25 world and, burdened with the
sqq. ; Be Ccclo, ii. 1, 284, a, 27 latter, should have unintermit-
sqq. ; Metapk. xii. 6, 1071, b, 37. tently to produce, like an Ixion
Aristotle rejects this theory in with bis wheel, a, motion which
the first place because he cannot had no affinity with its nature
regard the soul as in any sense a and which therefore involved
iiigtum and therefore not even as exertion. Nor, indeed, is it shown
tavrb kuiovv (see the beginning of bow it produces it. Lastly, the
Ch. X. infra). He further objects soul cannot be apxh as asserted
that Plato conceives of the soul of in the Pluedrus, if, according to
the world as something extended the Timieus, it comes into exist-
in space. But it would be impos- ence only with the world.
sible to suppose that its thought
460
ARISTOTLE
refers not only the movement of the outermost sphere,
which communicates itself to all others, but also that of
the stars, like Plato, to the action of spirits, which are
related to the spheres moved by them as the human
soul is to the body. 1 He even treats the forces of
nature in general, to a certain extent, from the same
point of view : in the eternity of motion he recognises
the immortal life of nature, 2 and he even ascribes a sort
of animation to the elements. 3 Every vital activity is
also, as we shall see, 4 an activity guided by a purpose,
for everything in living beings is related to the soul as
the incorporeal unity of the corporeal existence. Hence
it follows that by regarding nature as a living whole,
1 Cf. p. 373 sq. and see the sec-
tion in tlie next chapter concern-
ing the Spheres. Aristotle is so
far justified from his own point
of view in treating both the world
as a whole, and its individual
parts as animated with life, as he
does also Be Cmlo, ii. 12 followed
by Eudemus (Fr. 76 b, Simpl.
Phys. 283 m. : cf. Siebeck, D.
Lelne d Ar. v. d. Leben d. Unirer-
mtm, in Fiehte s Ztschr f. Phil. lx.
3 1 ). God is a part of the universe
in the same sense in which reason
is a part of the man ; and of the
same nature is the relation of the
spheral spirits to their spheres.
Each of these spirits, however,
animates only the sphere which
it moves and the primvm movens
only the irparos oipav6s. While
the movement of the latter, in-
deed, extends to all the other
spheres, yet in their case it is
something 1 communicated from
without like the motion of the
driver on a carriage ; their own
proper motion, on the other hand,
is due, not to-the pnmu?n inovens,
but to particular motors. Al-
though the whole world is thus
animated, yet Aristotle refuses to.
call it with Plato i'lpoy, because
its life springs from nn single
principle of motion.
/ z Phys. viii. 1 init. : ridVepoi'
5e yeyoj/e irore kIvtj(Tis ouk nficru
Trp6repov, Kal s %rv\*v
.... oifdep &s cru^e iroiei rj dpufiey 4v iraffiv
4k ruv Suvaruv trotovaav rb KahKt-
o-rov. Gen. An. ii. 6, 744, b, 36 :
ovBev Troiet ireptepyov ovSe pArt\v r)
tpiai-s. Likewise o. 4, 739, b, 19.
Ingr. An. c. 2, 704. b, 15 : r) tyiais
ovBev iroiet \i.6.rt\v aAA.' ael 4k ruv
ej/Sexop.ei/wi' rfj oiiaio. irepl eKaffrov
yevos £<$ov rb fapurrov * SioVep ei
f}4\rtov w5I, ourws Kal e^ei Kara
tphaiv. Even in the most insigni-
ficant prod acts of nature we may
perceive the effort after perfec-
tion ; of. foil. n. and Mh. JV. x.
2, 1173, a, i : taws Se Kal 4v rots
s iv tkiraaiv
os Tivbs (pvffiKov Kal Ka\ov. rd
i [it) tvx^vtus &AA' eVe/ca rivos
rots tt}s (ptiffeas epyois icrl Kal
iiffTa • o5 5' eVe/ca o-vveffTTjKev
yiyove TeAous t^v tov KaKov
lav elK-qcpcv. (Of. 0. 1, cited
previous- n.)
1 Cf . also Meteor, iv. 12, 300,
10 : $.Travra 5' itnlv upto'fj.iva
epytp ■ to p.\v yap bvvafxtva
uv tT7]v alriav ft-aWov t)
ra ftpa to Qvyrd ' rb yovv reray-
fxevov Kal rb foptajievov tro\v fiaWov
(paiverai if rots ovpaviots ^ wepl
yfias, rb 5' a\\or' &Wus Kal ws
6TUX e T*?^ T ^ ^vt]ra fiaWov. ol 5e
ruv [lev C4 av tKaffrov (pvtret (patrlv
eivai Kal yeveffBat, rbv 5' ovpavbv
airb riffls Kal rov avrofidrov roiov-
rov ffvffrrivai, ev § airb rv%Ti5 Kal
ara£tas ov5' drtovv. (palverat. Cf .
also Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 650,
579, 1.
3 Phys. ii. 9, 200, a, 32 (after
the passage quoted p. 360, n. 1) :
Kal &/itpw fiev Tcp tpvotKqi KeKreai at
atrial, /*a\Kov Se T) rivos eveKa'
atriov yap rovro rrjs HKtjs [inas-
much as Nature chooses her
materials with a view to the
thing that is to be produced]
dAA' ovx aSrri rov re\ovs. Gen.
et Con: ii. 9, 335, b, 29 : it is not
sufficient to give the material
causes of a thing. Matter is
merely the motum, the rnovens
in the province both of nature
and art is something quite
different ; the Kvpioirepa airia is
the form. Materialistic physics,
instead of giving us the real
causes, can tell us only of imple-
ments of production : as if one
in answer to the question ' ,Who
saws the wood 1 ' were to reply,
464
ARISTOTLE
order to pursue definite ends, Nature must be capable
of conscious deliberation, Aristotle considers this un-
reasonable Even Art, he remarks, does not reflect,
but works in the artist unconsciously. 1 Moreover, it is
just this which, as we already know, forms to Aristotle's
mind the distinction between Art and Nature, that the
productions of the former have their motive principle
outside themselves, and those of the latter within. 2 We
thus arrive for the first time at the important concep-
tion of immanent design, a point so essential to
Aristotle's system that we might define Nature, accord-
ing to his view, as the realm of internal activity toward
a fixed end.
' The saw.' Cf. p. 360, n. 1, and
the passages quoted p. 303, n. 3,
and p. 307, n. 4, and Zbll. Ph.
d. Gr. pt. i. 788, 1, 3, 893,
2, on the neglect of final causes
in ancient physics. Part. An. i.
1, 039, b, 14 : tpaiverai Se Trpdrrj
[sc. airia] %\v Kiyofiev iveicd twos '
\6yos yap oZtos, apxb 5' b \6yos
dfio'us iv Te rots /caret t4xvv v
teal iv rots "j itself ; cf. the passages
quoted from Metaph. vii. 7, Gen.
An. ii. 4, Part. An. i. 1, in n. 1,
p. 356, and Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324,
a, 34 : oca yap /ii) %xa t)]v airiiv
ii\T)V, 7roie? airadrj tivTa, olov tj
laTptlcl] ' avT^j yap iroiovca vyieiav
oi/Sev irdo~xei virb tov vyta£ofievou.
- See p. 418, n. 3, svpra. In
this sense Nature, as the internal
operative principle in living
things, is also expressly opposed
to the human understanding,
which operates upon them /rem
without (8ipaBev vovs) ; cf. Gen.
An. ii. G, 744, b, 21.
PHYSICS 465
lis action in obedience to purpose cannot obtain
e mastery in nature : for, along with the free
of form, we have the necessary element of matter
mot be entirely overcome by form. We have al-
vn (p. 359 sqq.) that Aristotle finds in matter the
rk of chance and blind natural necessity. Both ,
timately coincide, since chance is precisely that
es not happen as the fulfiment of some design,
raduced by the way, in consequence of the
of intervening causes which are indispensable
ainment of a further end. This characteristic
existence renders it impossible to assign a pur-
rerything in the world. Nature, indeed, works
lefinite ends, but, in the realisation of her
produces many things parenthetically, by the
l mere necessity ; ' yet she still endeavours as
rible to make use of such chance products, em-
ier superfluities for purposes of her own, and,
)d housewife, taking care that nothing be lost. 2
that natural science, in like manner, cannot
:oceed with the same rigour, but must take
)unt the disturbances 'introduced into the
F nature by necessity and chance, admitting
s to rules, and feeling satisfied when her
itions hold in the majority of instances. 3
361, n. 1, supra. and nutrition of animal orgar-
An. ii. 6, 744, b, 16 : isms ; Gen. An. ii. 4, 738, a, 3r
i/ios aya8bs, xa\ f) itrts ri
roiavrij (i.e. to &vb*ex^f l * vov Ka ^
fiAAws as i s clear from the
context) is taken as =t\ (piais
roia&ri) — and Nature is so also
(i.e. o/3e/3aios).
1 Gen. An. iv. 3, 759, b,\Q sqq.
Aristotle is here speaking of abor-
tions which want essential parts
of the human body as well as
those which have more than the
proper number, and applies the
above explanation to both : r4\os
yap ra>v fiiv Kivhatav (form-giving
motion) \vofi4viap, rris 8' tSktis ov
Kparovueviis, /uevei to icaBoKov
li&XuTTa • touto 8' eor! fJMw . . .
to repas apamjpia ris 4aTty. Cf.
also 767, b, 13 : to Sh ripas ovk
apayKa'op irpbs tV tutna rov ko!
rty rov re\ovs alriav, aAAa koto
trvn&cliriKbs i.payKaiop.
2 Phys. ii. 8, 199, b, 1 : ei 5))
tirriv %via Kara rexPVP 4p ots to
opBtos eveicd too, 4p Se rots ctfiap-
ravo/j.4pots eVe/ca fl4p rivos iirix^l-
pe'irat aAA' airoTU-yxaVeTai, dfio'us
av %x ot Ka ^ ^ v T0 * s 5 4-irl to iroAu • irepi yap r^p
ael Kal r^jp 41; apdyKTjs oiiQep ytperat
iraph Qio-tp (a proposition which
was afterwards applied by theo-
logians to the miracles, and in
this application has become
famous, although it is not gener-
ally known that it comes from
Aristotle). Even a Te'pos, there-
fore, is' in a certain sense koto
(piaiv, irav /x^i Kpar^ffr) r}]V Kara
tV v\iip % koto to e?Bos wris 0ov\erai pev toOto « Gen. An. ii. 1, 732, a, 16.
7roi6ij/ iroAAetais, oi iievroi Sivarai. ' Polit. i. 5, 1254, b, 10 : tS
1 Polit. i. 5, 1254, b, 27 : jSoii- /j.h %/i.epa [&>a] tup aypiav fe\-riu
Aerai p.ev olv r) . . tu /xev oiv 'xpivf
nature, like art, is only able to irpojipav tV SAtjv avayncuov elvat
create the better after long prac- ko.1 tV yAvtaiv, t$ \6ytp tie tV
tioe. This, however, is an ex- ittio-Tov ixoptp4\v. Metapli. ix. 8,
aggeration of the Aristotelian 1 050, a, 7 : airav eV apxbv jSaBi'fei
doctrine of nature's weakness. rb yiyv6^vov kxI t4\os • aox^l y&P
1 Cf. Gen. An. iii, 7, 767, b, ™.
2 Phys. ii. 8, 199, b, 9 : na\ h 5 Part. An. 646, b, 4. Meteor.
toTv (pvTots ivtari rh.fveKi tov, iv. 12, 389, b, 29 : oel Se, n&Moir
fjTrov Si Si^pSparai. SrjKov [ri e/caoToc] eV! -rSav iaripav
3 See p. 460, n. 3, supra ; and «a! S\a>s $aa ofoi; opyava ki\ %v(kS.
PHYSICS
469
R IX
W. — ThAMi'' Elements
TruxiNG now fro^M ^^fcviierii.i inquiries into
nature to the consic^H^Hmthe actual constitution of
the world, AristotlerojPK upon a question which had
occupied a leading place in previous metaphysical dis-
cussions—the question, namely, of Creation. His pre-
decessors had without exception assigned to the world
in which we live a definite beginning in time — some,
such as Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Pythagoreans, 1
holding that this world is the only one ; others that the
world we see is only one among an infinite series of
other worlds both past and present. 2 Aristotle was the
first to declare that our world is eternal and un-
begotten. 3 This conviction seems to have early forced
itself upon him. 4 Although in his system it is not
tov. "We have a clearer idea of the
true nature of man than of flesh,
bones, &c, and a better idea of the
nature of the latter than of the
elements. T6 yap ov cVekh jjkktto
4vrav8a SrjXov bnov irKiiarov tt)s
vKr\s ' Sitrirep yap €i tci %tas (see p.
56 sq. supra), at any rate from
one of the dialogues, as Aristotle's
view : ' Neque enim ortum esse
unquam mundum, quod nulla
fuerit novo consilio inito tam
praeclari operis inceptio, et ita
esse eum undique aptum ut nulla
vis tantos queat motus mutation-
emque moliri, nulla seneotus
diuturnitate temporum existere
ut hie ornatus unquarn dilapsus
occidat.' (Cf. Plato, Tim. 34, B,
68, E, and elsewhere.) So Ps.
Philo, JEtem. M. ii. 489 (Ar.
Fr. 17), where it is declared to
be Seicr; aBedrris to regard the
6parbs Bebs as no better than any
human product.
1 See p. 387, supra. The
latter is even quite compatible
with the doctrine of the birth
and destruction of the world.
" On this, cf. p. 468, n. 3.
3 Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 20 sqq.
where, in opposing the view that
motion had ever a beginning, he
says : had the movent and the
mobile existed without producing
any motion, the transition from
rest to motion could only have
been effected by a previous change
eitBlr in one or both of them,
and we should have to suppose
a irporepa /xera^o\i] TTfS irpciiTTrjs.
Similarly we should have to con-
clude that as a preliminary to
the transition from creation to
destruction of the world or rice
rersa a change must take place
in the creative force or in the
material upon which it works.
If both remain unchanged their
mutual relation must also re-
main unchanged, and therefore
also the resultant effect. But
according to Aristotle, God is
eternal, and unchangeable ;
matter, on the other hand (set-
ting aside the doctrine of the
immutability of the material of
which the heavens are made), we
know can only suffer change
through the operation of the
moving cause. If, therefore, the
latter is unchangeable, its rela-
tion to the matter and the uni-
verse which is its product must
be unchangeable. This is the
argument indicated by Cicero
in the passage quoted above,
where Aristotle declares it to
be inconceivable that so perfect
a product as the world could
PHYSICS
471
his investigations into the origin of the world, with
proving that motion is eternal, and refuting the doctrine
that the world has a beginning but no end. 1 The doc-
trine, however, is
For if the prim,
which it produ
same. It cannot'
as a destructive
from Aristotle's s'
of the material of
stars are made. Notre
^involved in his metaphysics.
unchangeable, the effect
vsprld must always be the
,as a creative, at another
conclusion follows also
of the immutability
eavenly spheres and the
therefore, does the doctrine
of a beginning; and end of the world in the sense of an
absolute birth and destruction find no place in Ari-
have had a beginning novo
consilio inito ; whence it may
be concluded that the creative
force must have produced the
best from all eternity in virtue
of its own unchangeable perfec-
tion.
1 Aristotle devotes De C/rlo,
i. 10-12, to the proof that the
heavens are without beginning
and end, confining himself, how-
ever, almost exclusively to the at-
tack on the Platonic view, that,
while they will endure forever,
ihey yet had a beginning in time.
His chief argument against it is
that beginning and endlessness,
end and beginninglessness, are
mutually exclusive. That which
exists for an endless period can
neither begin nor cease to be ;
in either case there must be a
time in which it is not (see c, 12,
281, b, 18 sqq. where, however,
it is proved in too formal a way).
Why, moreover, should that
which has not existed for all
3ternity begin to be at this par-
ticular moment? or why should
that which has been from all
eternity cease at this particular
moment to exist? (283, a, 11)
It is its own nature which con-
stitutes athing without beginning
or end, and this in such a case
excludes the possibility of not-
being ; the nature of that which
has had a beginning and is liable
to perish must, on the other hand,
include it. The latter, therefore,
cannot last for ever any more
than the former can begin or
end(l. 29sqq.;Cf. p. 366, n. 1,/w.
and the passage quoted, ibid,
init. from Metaph. ix. 8). The
views, on the other hand, of those
who hold that the world has
both beginning and end are
here only lightly touched upon.
The atomic view Aristotle con-
sidered that he had disposed of
by his doctrine of the unity of
the world, while in reference to
the view of Heraclitus and Em-
pedocles he contents himself
with remarking (c. 10, 280, a,
472 ARISTOTLE
stotle's system, but even such a fundamental change in
the constitution of the world as is presupposed by
Heraclitus and Empedocles is wholly inconsistent both
with his cosmology and his metaphysics. The question
arjnysics
ill <*£lhe
for Aristotle is not of any origin The world in time,
but only of its actual characAeMjttd constitution.
The universe is dividedJJtpcdaljfag to Aristotle, into
two halves of opposite chara^jfc*Jhtfie one terrestrial , and
the other celestial. This op^feition is at once revealed
by the testimony of our senses : and Aristotle can
hardly have come to it in any other way. The un-
alterable nature of the stars and the changeless regu-
larity of their movements form, in his opinion, so strong
a contrast ' to terrestrial corruptibility and change, that
we #re forced to recognise two essentially different
realms, subject to different laws. The more im-
portant this opposition seems to him to be, the more he
strives to demonstrate its necessity. All natural bodies,
he argues, are capable of movement in space. But
movement in space is either rectilineal or circular or a
compound of both. The third of these being derived
from the first two, it follows that the latter alone are
simple and original — rectilineal motion proceeding from
the centre to the circumference, or vice versa, and
circular motion revolving round the centre. If these
are the first natural motions, there must be certain
bodies which by reason of their nature are the subjects
of such movement, and which are consequently the
] 1 sqq. ; cf. Zbll. Ph. d. Or. pt. and destruction,
i. (529, 1 ad fin.) that it attributes ' That it was the observation
to the world a mere change of of this which led Aristotle in
form and not a veritable birth the first instance to make his
PHYSICS 473
*
most primitive and ancient bodies. Those, on the
contrary, which exhibit a composite movement, must be
formed by combination from them, and receive their
particular bias from the constituent which prepon-
derates in their composition. That which is natural is
always earlier than that which is opposed to nature and
violent. It follows that circular, and also rectilineal,
movement must be naturally fitted for some body or
other, the more so that rotation is the only unbroken and
interminable movement, and nothing that is contrary
to nature fulfils these conditions. Accordingly there
must exist two sorts of simple bodies — the one origin-
ally destined for rectilineal, the other for circular, move-
ment. 1 Eectilineal movement has opposite directions :
it is either upwards or downwards, passing from centre
to circumference, or «ice versa. Consequent!}', the bodies
which exhibit it must be of opposite natures, destined
for the one or the other kind of motion : that is, they must
be either light or heavy. Circular motion, on the other
hand, exhibits no such contraries. It starts from any point
towards any point in the circumference. So the body
which is naturally qualified for it must likewise be with-
out contrariety. It can neither be heavy nor light, since
it does not rise or fall, and in fact it cannot exhibit any
kind of rectilineal motion. It is even impossible to com-
municate either upward or downward motion to it by force,
since if the one were unnatural to it the other must 2 be
distinction between two realms already laid down (c. 2, 269, a,
of being is obvious from his 10, 14) as the basis of the dis-
whole treatment of the subject, cussion (see p. 224, n. 3), %v hi
Cf. also p. 366, n. 1. ivarriov, which, when thus uni-
1 Be Calo, i. 2, 268, b, 14 sqq. versally expressed, is certainly
' According to the principle open to dispute.
474
ARISTOTLE
its natural motion. 1 The body that is destined for circular
motion is also without beginning or ending, subject to
neither increase nor diminution, neither impression nor
change. 2 His argument for this is that everything that
comes into being springs from its opposite, and every-
thing that perishes is resolved into the same ; 3 all in-
crease and decrease depend upon addition or subtraction
of the matter out of which a thing has grown, and there-
fore that which, being without beginning, possesses no
such matter, cannot increase or decrease ; all bodies,
finally, which alter, either increase or decrease, and where
there is no such process neither is there any alteration. 4
1 Ibid. c. 3, 269, b, 18-270, a,
] 2 ; nor can the position $(a /j.iv
yap ev84x*Tat ttjv &Wov ko! irepov
I sc. Kti'rjtriif KivuixOai] (c. 2, 269, a,
7) be accepted except provision-
ally as of universal validity.
As is shown in the sequel, it is
inapplicable to the SEther. The
position upon which the latter
conclusion rests, (viz. that move-
ment in a circle has no opposite).
Aristotle, indeed, endeavours
(c. 4) further to establish by
special proofs. But he cannot
prove that the motion may not
be crooked or oblique ; for if we
have two opposite motions on
the same or on parallel lines
which deviate in opposite direc-
tions, it does not make the
slightest difference whether the
lines are straight or circular.
Moreover, the courses of the
fixed stars and of the planets
are actually in opposite direc-
tions ; why may these bodies
not, then, consist of different
jetherial substance ? We are not
warranted, however, with Meyer
(Aristot. Thierhtnde, 393) in
casting a doubt upon Aristotle's
clearly expressed meaning, mere-
ly on the ground of the actual
difficulties that beset the theory.
2 He says, De Orlo, i. 3, 270,
a, 13, b, 1 : ayevTjTOf teal citpQaprov
Kal avavl-es real ai/aKKoiayroi/, aiSioy
teal out' avfy}aiv %x ov °^ Te fpOlfTtv,
d\A' ayhparov «al dvaXkoianov teal
awaBis. Cf. Metaph. viii. 4, 1044,
b, 7, xii. 1, 2, 1069, a, 30, b, 25.
3 On this point, cf. also p.
341 sq.
4 Be Ccelo, i. 3, 270, a, 13-35.
The immutability of the body
which has no opposite might have
been proved more simply and
conclusively from the proposi-
tion (p. 341, and p. 353 sq. above)
that all change means transition
from one state into its opposite,
and that a thing can only be
operated upon by its opposite.
Aristotle, however, does not here
adopt this method, as his investi-
gation into the conception of
change and affection was not
published until later — in his
PHYSICS 475
This position draws further support from experience.
For he contends that if the spaces of the heavens, as well
as the intermediate space between heaven and earth,
were full of air or fire, then the bulk of these elements,
considering the magnitude of the stars and their distance
from each other, would be so hugely disproportioned to
that of the remaining elements that the latter could not
preserve their equilibrium, but would be swallowed up
by them. A proper proportion between the elements '
can therefore only be maintained on the hypothesis that
the celestial space is filled with a body different from the
matter of the elements. 2 We are also led to believe that
this body is superior to all change, by the fact that
antiquity, so far as tradition reaches, furnishes us with
no evidence of the least alteration in the fabric of the
heaven or its parts. 3 Finally, the unthinking belief of
humanity harmonises with this conviction, and such a
belief deserves respect as the inheritance of unnumbered
generations. 4 All nations have placed the residence of
the gods in heaven, because they were convinced of its
immortal and divine nature. The name ' aether ' may
be traced to the same source, for Aristotle, like Plato, 5
derives it from del dsiv, from the restless rotation of
treatise on birth and destruc- 3 De Ccelo, i. 3, 270, b, 11.
tion. 4 ov yap aira| ou5e Sis a\A*
1 Such a proportion involves airetpdicis Se? voiiifeiv t&s uvtzs
that there is as much air and as atpiKveiaBai S6^as els ri/ias. De,
much fire as will be produced by Ccelo, 270, b, 19. See Meteor.
the transformation of all water 339, b, 27, where the same reason
into air and all air into fire on is given in almost the same
the basis of the existing quanti- words, and Metapli. xii. 8 ad fin.
tative extent of these bodies. See infra, the section of Ch. IX.
2 Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 13-340, on the Heavens, and Ch.XII.pt. 2.
a, 18. s Plato, Crat. 410, b.
470
ARISTOTLE
the celestial globes, and not from aWsiv. 1 The conclu-
sion is that the asther must be distinguished from all
elementary matter. 2 Without opposition and without
1 De Casio, i. 3, 270, b, 4-25 ;
Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 19 sqq. ;
and following these passages
De Mundo, c. 2, 392, a, 5. On
the name ' aether,' cf. Zell. Ph.
d. Or. i. 897, 4 ad fin.
2 Although it is called mparov
ittoix«ov, Dp Cado, iii. 1, 298, b,
6 ; Meteor, i. 1, 338, b, 21 ; c. 3,
339, b, 16, 340, b, 11, rb ruv
acrrptav (TTOix^ov; Gen. An. iii.
3, 737, a, 1, it is yet expressly
distinguished in these passages
from the four o-TDixeta. Gen. An.
ii. 3, 736, b, 29, it is called Urepov
(Tu/xa Kal 8et6repov t£>v Ka\ovfi4vtav
o-toix*'""' ; Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 7
(cf . p. 488, n. 3, infra), erepov o-Sjua
irvpds T€ Kal aepos ; and De Cosh,
i. 2, 269, a, 30 : oiicia ctefiaros
&\hri irapa ras ivravda ffvffra'fftis
6etor4pa Kal Trporepa rofrruv andv-
tuv ; cf. ibid. o. 3 (following n.).
If, therefore, we understand by
oToixeia only such simple bodies
as stand to one another in the
relation of opposites, and pass
into one another, we cannot
reckon the aather among these.
Only when we extend the mean-
ing of the word to embrace all
simple bodies can we call it a
aroix&ov. On the other hand, it
is, to say the least of it, in-
accurate and misleading to say
that according to Aristotle the
celestial spheres have ' no ma-
terial substratum ' (Bbkntano,
Psyclwl. d. Arist. 198 ; Hebtling,
Mat. und Form, 22), that 'the
a3th er consists of a material which
is 'no material, of an immaterial
material ' (Kampe, Erliennt-
nissth. d. Arist. 30 sq.) that all
that is meant by the BAij of the
stars is the potentiality they
possess of motion and change
in space, and that in this sense
we might even attribute SAtj to
vovs (Heetling, Hid. 23). Ari-
stotle certainly says, Metaph. viii.
4, 1044, b, 7 : in the case of
ytwtrral ovaiai, we have to deal
both with their matter and form ;
it is otherwise with (pvaucaX piv
atbioL 8e ovaiai. ( iaws yap tvta
ovk 6X €I faviv, ff oil roiavTfjv aWa.
fx6vov KaTard-rrov K<.VT\rl\v? Matter,
however, is denied of the hea-
venly bodies only in the sense in
which it belongs to temporal
things. Aristotle means that if
we understand by S\ri that of
which a thing is made, the
inroKetfievov ■yeveVecos Kal / l^ei
tOttik^v, toZto Kal ■ yevvvr^v Kal
(pedpriiv lx e '"; u. 8, 1050, b, 20:
ouS' elf ti KLva6fievov aifiiov, ovk tan
Kara Zvva.fi.tv Kivoi/ievov a\\' ?)
■n68iv ttoi ■ [only in respect of
PHYSICS 477
mutation, it stands above the strife of the elements:
these belong to the terrestrial, it to the celestial, world :
of it are formed the heavenly spheres and stars ; it is
the god-like in the realm of matter. 1
The four elements are different in all respects. If
circular movement is peculiar to the ffither, their move-
ment is rectilineal. But, as we have remarked, recti-
lineal motionfollows two opposite directions, upand down,
toward the circumference and toward the centre. That
which tends naturally downwards is heavy ; that which
rises is light. Accordingly the elements exhibit the
opposites of heavy and light. 2 This opposition cannot,
he holds, be reduced to quantitative differences of magni-
tude, of mathematical figure, or density ; it is original
and qualitative. The peculiarities of the elementary
materials we cannot explain either, with Plato and Demo-
critus, by the mathematical qualities of atoms, or, with
the elder physicists, by the rarefaction and condensation
locality can it be said to move i!a.ij is denied of them in the
merely Suvi/iet and not ivepyelq, same sense as it is denied of the
inasmuch as it is not yet in the immaterial Nous, or that it can
place to which it is moving] be attributed to the latter in the
toutou S' [i.b. toS irSBev iroi /civet- same sense as to the former.
aSai] S\riv aiiSh KoiXiet virapx^tv. ' It is called Beibs, Meteor, i.
Be Cmlo, i. 9, 278, a, 10 sqq. 3, 339, b, 25 ; also, similarly, Be
Aristotle expressly says : 6 oipavbs Cmlo, i. 3, 270, b, 11, 20 : f) vptirri
as a universal conception is ovata ray crati&Twv, rb irpdrov
different from 85e 6 ovpa.v6s ; the /ia, 'irepdy rihv irapa. yyv Kal irvp
former is elSos Kal popQii, the ku\ aipa Kal SSap. Ibid. ii. 1, 284,
latter rij SAp ^fuy^vov. Still a, 4 Later philosophers, such as
less can we 'infer from Metajrfi. Cicero's Epicurean (TV. Be. i. 13,
viii 4, that the 'celestial globes 33, cf. Krische, Ibrsch., 306
are incorporeal beings (like the sqq.) and the pseudo-Justin
sether, they are frequently called Cohort, c. 5, 36, identify on this
Beta, a-diiara, &c. : see Ind. Ar. ground God and the jether.
742, a, 43-60) ; we cannot, there- 2 See p. 473 sq.
fore, suppose for a moment that
478 ARISTOTLE
of one and the same primitive material. We have
already proved this point with regard to the first
hypothesis. 1 But those who deduce the differences of
matter from a condensation and rarefaction of some one
original element are, besides other arguments, met by
the objection that they do not explain the distinction
between light and heavy substance. They confine
the difference between the elements to a mere relation
of magnitudes, and accordingly represent it as some-
thing merely relative. 2 To Aristotle's mind, the oppo-
sition of rectilineal movements and natural localities at
once demands a qualitative difference between the ele-
ments. Eectilineal motion being just as primitive as
circular motion, there must be certain bodies which are
especially designed for it. 3 Again, since it includes
two tendencies, upward and downward, we must in the
first place assume two bodies, of which one naturally
sinks, the other rises, the one tending to the centre, the
other to the circumference of the world. In the second
place, we must imagine an intermediate element, or
rather a pair of elements, the one approximating to
the former, and the other to the latter. Of these four
bodies, the first two are earth and fire, the other two
water and air. Earth is absolutely heavy and entirely
devoid of lightness ; fire is absolutely light and entirely
devoid of heaviness. The one moves straight to the
centre, and therefore sinks below all other bodies ; the
other moves straight to the circumference, and therefore
1 See p. 443 sqq. 20 ; Metaph. i. 8, 988, b, 29 sqq.
2 Aristotle discusses this view s See p. 473.
De Ceelo, iii. 5, of. iv. 5, 312, b,
PHYSICS 479
rises above all other bodies. Water and air, on the
other hand, are only relatively heavy, and therefore also
relatively light. Water is heavier than air and fire,
but lighter than earth ; air heavier than fire, but lighter
than water and earth. Under no possible circumstances,
unless compelled by forcible movement, does fire sink of
itself into the place of air ; nor, again, does earth rise
into that of water. Air and water, on the contrary,
sink into the lower regions when the matter which fills
them is withdrawn. 1 Earth is everywhere heavy; water,
everywhere except in earth ; air, everywhere except in
earth and water ; 2 fire, nowhere. 3 Therefore of two
bodies the one which holds the more air may be heavier
in air but lighter in water than the other — a hundred-
weight of wood, for instance, than a pound of lead. 4
We may arrive at these four elements even more
definitely by another process of reasoning. 5 All
1 Properly, indeed, they ought world cannot consist of sether
to rise into the higher ; Aristotle alone, for it must have an immov-
admits himself, Be CceU, iv. 5, able centre. There must there-
312, b, sqq., that this does happen fore be a body whose nature it is
unless external force be applied, to rest at the centre and move
— without, however, explaining a towards it, and therefore also one
circumstance which has so im- of an opposite nature. We thus
portant a bearing upon his have earth and fire, which in
theory. turn require water and air as
2 That even air has weight is intermediate elements,
obvious from the fact that a 5 For what follows, see Gen.
bladder full of airis heavierthan et Corr. ii. 2, 3. The true author
an empty one ; ibid. c. 4, 311, b, 9. of this theory of the elements is
3 Aristotle, in the passage said to be Hippocrates (according
just referred to, finds in this to IDELEK, Arist. Meteor, ii. 389,
theory an explanation of the who appeals to Galen, De Mem.
difference between absolute and sec. Sippocr. i. 9, Opp. ed. Kiihn,
specific gravity. i. 481 sq.). This, however, is un-
4 Be Ccelo, iv. 3-5. The same certain for several reasons. In
ideas occur, in a somewhat the first place, neither of the
different application, ii. 3, 286, a, works here referred to, n. Qicrios
12 sqq. It is there said that the hpBp&irov and n. aapicuv, can be
480
ARISTOTLE
bodies capable of being perceived by the senses are
prehensible ; but all qualities perceptible by the sense of
touch, with the exception of gravity and levity, 1 are
reducible to four — warmth, cold, dryness, moisture. 2
Aristotle regards the first two of these properties as
active, the others as passive. 3 Now, by joining these
attributed to Hippocrates. The
former is without doubt the
work, or an extract from a work,
of Polybus, his son-in-law : the
latter is of post-Aristotelian
origin, cf . Kuhn, Hippoer. Opp. I.
cxlvii., olv. ; Littre, (Euwes d'
Hippocrate, i. 345 sqq. 384.
Again, while the treatise n. Kal rb iyp6v • 7j
Be irtffris rofrruv ex rijs eVaywy^s.
a!i/6Tai yap iv irSs iv
vXqs eiSei Key6p.eva atoixela],
Part. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 13 even
to Ka\o6fieya vir6 Tivtav v yiyyerat
Kai oi rpecperai [with which that
which is improperly called rpotpii.
Long. Tit. 3, 465, b, 24, Vita et
M. c. 5, 470, a, 2, does not con-
flict] ' oh yhp 7} alrij odea Biapevei
ovBeva xpdpov &s eltretv. Ibid. c.
3, 357, b, 31 : KaBdirep to tuv
pt6vTav vSdrtov Kal to ttjs (pKoybs
peB/ia. Vita et M. c. 5, 470, a, 2.
2 Gen. et Corr. ii. 3, 331, a-,
3 : ov fi^jv oAV ottAcSs 76 TeTTopo
01/ra [t& (TToix^ta] epos e'/caoTfJy
eoTi, yri juec \i\pov fiaWov $1
tyvypov, iiSaip Se tyv%pov fj.a\\ov
if vypov, oAfp S' vypov fiaWov ^
Bepfiov, irvp Se Bepfiov fiaWoy ^
|7)po5. Meteor, iv. 4, 382, a, 3.
In the latter passage Aristotle
says, among other things, that
earth and water alone are in-
habited by living beings (on which
vide below), because they alone
are Sxrj tuv tro>fi.6.Tu>v. For
although cold is held by Aristotle
1 1 2
484 ARISTOTLE
opposite to opposite ; but the elements are all opposed
to eacli other just in the same way as their distinctive
properties (warmth, cold, dryness, and moisture) are
opposed. The more complete this opposition is, the
more difficult and the slower is the process of transition
from one to the other ; the less complete, the easier.
Therefore, when two elements exhibit respectively a
conflict of both their essential properties, the process is
slower and more difficult than when they have one
property in common and conflict only in respect of the
other. In the latter case the alteration of one property
in one of them occasions a complete transmutation into
the other ; while in the former case we only gain one
step by such a change — for only the element interme-
diate between the two that are opposed is produced, and
it requires a second transmutation before the meta-
morphosis is complete. For instance, by removing the
cold of water, we obtain air ; but it is only when the
humidity common to water and air has been removed
that we obtain fire. If the humidity of water dis-
appears, earth is produced; but in order to generate
fire, the coldness common to earth and water must be
withdrawn. Hence it follows that the elements which
are wholly opposed to one another are metamorphosed
by an indirect process ; those which are but partially
opposed are transformed directly. Fire passes directly
into air or earth, indirectly into water ; air directly into
fire or water, indirectly into earth; water directly
into air or earth, indirectly into fire ; earth directly
into water or fire, indirectly into air. 1 Thus all the
1 Gen. et Corr. ii. 4.
PHYSICS 485
elements, as Heraclitus and Plato had already demon-
strated, 1 form together one complete whole, a self-
contained circle of generation and destruction, 2 the parts
of which are incessantly undergoing transformation, but
steadfastly maintaining the law of their metamorphosis,
preserving the same forms and proportions in the midst
of the ceaseless transmutation of their matter. 3
These propositions concerning the nature of the
elementary bodies are enough to prove that there is
only one world. For if each body has its natural place,
and if its very essence consists in its having it, then all
bodies, unless hindered by force, must move to these
their natural localities — earth to the centre, aether to
circumference, and the other elements to the inter-
mediate spaces. Hence it is impossible that there
should be more than one region of earth, water, air,
fire, and eether, and consequently that there should be
another world besides the one in which we live. We
cannot suppose that a body is forcibly retained in a
locality beyond the world, since such a locality must be
1 Cf. ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. tovto Kal iriGaybv, is aSitvaroi/ fiij
619, and ibid. ii. 680. rbv ainbv elvat irepl irdvTwv tovtuv
2 Gen. et Corr. ibid. 331, b, 2: \6yov, Kal 5iav re Kal tpSopav elvai Kal yiveaiv,
3 Meteor, ii. 3, 357, b, 27 : it toutjjj/ p.4vtoi rerayp-evcos trvuPa'-
is asked, irorepov Kal t\ BdAarra yeip irainv avTOts. 358, b, 29 :
ael Stap.di'zi twv alr&v oicra p.opiai> oUre ael tJ aura pepy Siap.4vet, aire
a.pi9p.evp.a. (pavepbv 5J) Ph. d. Gr. i. 2, 576, 620.
486 ARISTOTLE
the natural place of some other body ; and if all bodies
in this one world have their place, there can be no body
outside it, and consequently no space, since space is
only that in which a body is or can be. 1 The same
conclusion is arrived at also from another side. Several
worlds would presuppose several first causes of motion,
which would be specifically similar, and consequently
only different in their matter. But the primum movens
has no matter : it is single and complete in itself. It
follows that the world which derives its continuous and
eternal motion from the first cause must be so too. 2
If, however, we are told that the concept of the world,
like all concepts, must manifest itself in several indivi-
duals, Aristotle bids us answer that this argument
would be only conclusive if there were an extra-mundane
matter in which this concept could incorporate itself,
but since our world embraces the whole of matter, it is
of necessity single in its kind, although we ought
always to distinguish between its concept and the
phenomenal manifestation of the same which is present
to our senses. 3 If there are not several worlds now in
existence, no more can there be such in the future, or
have been at any past period. This world of ours is
one, and single, and complete. 4
1 De Ccelo, i. 8, C. 9, 278, b, eiirl irAefouj obpavol oSt' iyivovro
21 sqq. 279, a, 11. o8t' eVSe'xerai yevtodai irXtiovs '
2 This metaphysical proof, oX\' eh ko.1 fidvos ndi TeAeios oStos
held in prospect De Ccelo, i. 8, ovpavSs iariv. Ibid. i. 1 fin. :
277, b, 9, is given Metaph. xii. 8, particular bodies are infinite in
1074, a, 31 sqq. ; cf. also p. 388 number ; to Si iroc ov toSto p6pui
sq., and on matter as the source Te'Aeiov avayxatov elvcu koi KaBdiref
of multiplicity, p. 368 sq. ToSvofia (rrinalvfi, irdvry, real /u}j tj
3 Be Casio, i. 9 ; cf. p. 222. ph tj7 5' oS.
'' Ibid. 279, a, 9 : Sot' o«tc vvv
PHYSICS 487
•
Furthermore, the shape of the universe is deter-
mined by the nature of the five simple bodies. Since
circular motion is proper to one of them, and rectilinear
motion to the rest, we obtain in the first place the
distinction, touched upon above, between the two chief
regions of the world — that in which circular motion
rules, and that in which the opposite movements up
and down hold sway : i.e. that which is full of asther, and
that which contains the four elements. In both of
them the materials lie in spherical layers one above
the other. For since similar materials uniformly strive
to reach their natural localities, which in turn are deter-
mined by their distance from the centre of the world,
it follows that the materials of each sort are conglobated
in spheres which are at all points equidistant from the
centre. In the middle of the whole lies the earth — a
solid sphere, 1 but in extent a relatively small portion of
the world. 2 Its fixture in this locality proceeds partly
1 Besides theargumentquoted 2 In proof of this statement
in the text, Aristotle proves the Aristotle, Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 6,
rotundity of the earth (De Casio, 340, a, 6, refers generally to the
ii. 14, 297, a, 6 sqq.) from the a.a