CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 3 1924 052 854 654 J -^n. D'J A ij\iSJ.:'.K- 7 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924052854654 The American Academy OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE Was founded at Philadelphia, December 14th, 1889. It was organized in answer to a long-felt want on the part of students of economics, politics and sociology for a society which could do in the general field of political and social science what similar associations, here and abroad, are doing for natural science. The Academy will be a medium through which investigators can get the results of their special work before the public most interested in them as soon as they are ready for publication. In this way the members of the society will be able to keep themselves in constant touch with what is doing throughout the world in this important branch of science. Any person interested in the promotion of political and social science is eligible for membership upon- being approved by the Council. The Annual Membership Fee is ;?5.oo. The Life Membership Fee (exempting from all annual assessments) is $100.00. The regular publicatiMis of the Academy will be sent gratis to all members. LIBRARY OF THE ACADEMY. NOTICE TO MEMBERS. The Academy is accumulating a special library of works pertaining to Economics, Public Law and Politics, Social Science, Statistics, etc. Presen- tation of single works or of collections is solicited. All books received will be acknowledged in the Annals under the head of "Additions to the Library." Authors, whether members of the Academy or not, are requested to con- tribute copies of their own works, as it is desired to make the library of the Academy as nearly complete as possible. The attention of foreign authors is especially called to the fact that this library is a valuable depository for their works, as they will thus be most easily brought to the attention of the American public, and made accessible to American scholars working along the same lines. All books should be sent to address below. Applications for membership, as well as all other communications, should be addressed AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Station B, Philadelphia, Pa. (See 3d cover page.) publications of The American Academy of Politicai. and Social Science. No. 30. INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR MOB INJURIES. BY E. W. HUFFCUTT,' PROFEiSOR OF LAW, INDIANA UNIVERSITY. A PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. PHILADELPHIA: AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. Fhawck : Larose et Forcel, rue Soufilot 22, Paris.— Germany : Gustav Fischer, Jena. Italy : Direzione del Giomale degli Economist!, Rome, Via Ripetta 102. Price, so Cents. INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR MOB INJURIES. It is the undeniable right of every sovereign State, and to a reasonable extent the duty as well, to protect the persons and the property of its citizens visiting or domi- ciled in a foreign country, and when they are injured in a manner not warranted by the principles of international law, to intervene in their behalf If the foreign country permits aliens thus to visit or reside in its territory, it impliedly guarantees them the same measure of safety and protection as is provided for its own citizens. Should it fail in this international duty in any respect, the govern- ment of the injured alieri has a just cause for intervention and complaint. The principle was stated concretely by Chief Justice Marshall to be that " The American citizen who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and temporary allegiance to that country, is yet, if he performs no other act changing this condition, entitled to the protec- tion of his own government ; and if, without the violation of any municipal law, he should be oppressed unjustly, he would have the right to claim that protection, and the interposition of the American government in his favor would be considered as a justifiable interpo- sition." ' This language was adopted as correct by Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State, in his report to the President on Thrasher's case,'' and has been since generally approved as embodying an accepted principle of international law and a rule for the guidance of the government of the United States. 1 Murray v. Schooner " Charming Betsy," 2 Cranoh, 120. » 6 Webster's Works, p. 523. (69) "JO Annals of the American Academy. It being conceded, then, that an alien may, under cer- tain circumstances, claim the protection and intervention of his own government, the more difficult question remains as to what offences against the alien will warrant such in- tervention and a demand for redress. An offence against an alien may be against a domiciled alien, or a visiting alien, or against an alien diplomatic or consular agent. The offence may be committed by private citizens or by the public authorities, or even by other residenjt aliens.- It is necessary, therefore, in determining the extent of responsibility which the alien's government may justly throw upon the government where the offence is com- mitted, to distinguish somewhat clearly each of these cases. In the case of a domiciled alien the duty, and even the right, of his native government to interfere in his behalf may be greatly diminished or even lost by his own act in deliberately submitting his person and property to the jurisdiction of the country of his domicile. Any other rule would lead to endless international disputes of the gravest character, and give to the alien a double status — that of a citizen of his own country for the purposes of pro- tection, yet without corresponding duties and obligations, and that of a permanent resident of his adopted country, deriving from it support and protection, yet with a reserved right of appeal to another sovereign power. Mr. Marcy, when Secretary of State, stated the rule to be observed in such cases with great clearness and force : " It is essential, he said, to the independence of nations, and to the public peace, that there should be some limit to the right and duty of a government to interfere in behalf of persons born or naturalized within its jurisdiction who, on proceeding to a foreign country, and being domiciled there, may receive injuries from the authorities thereof. By the general law, as well as by the decisions of the most enlightened judges, both in England and in this country, a neutral engaged in business in an enemy's country during war, is regarded as a citizen or subject of that country, and his property, captured on the high seas, is liable to condemnation as lawful prize. No sufficient International Liability for Mob Injuries. 71 reason is perceived why the same rule should not hold good in time of peace also, as to the protection due to the property and persons of citizens or subjects of a country domiciled abroad." ^ Sir Robert Phillimore states the rule as follows : "The distinction between domiciled persons and visitors in or pass- engers through a foreign country is never to be lost sight of, because it must affect the application of the rule of law which empowers a nation to enforce the claims of its subj ects in a foreign State. The ' foreign domicile does not indeed take away this power, but it renders the invocation of it less reasonable, and the execution of it more difacult."^ In accordance with this rule, our government has fre- quently declined to interfere for the protection of citizens who, by acts indicating an intention to subject themselves permanently to a foreign jurisdiction, have thereby lost the right to claim the protection of the home government. Thus it has been held that failure to pay the income tax, enlistment in a foreign army, permanent residence abroad, and avoidance of the ordinary duties of citizen- ship, may be sufficient to release a government from its duty of protection. In the once famous cases of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, executed by General Jackson in 1818 for complicity in the Seminole War, the government of Great Britain, to which they owed allegiance, declined to inter- fere on the ground that by inciting an attack on a friendly government they had forfeited the protection of their own government. If, however, the alien be only transiently visiting or passing through a foreign country, his -status is wholly different. In such a case he loses none of his claims on his own government, for the reason that he evades none of his duties to it. He is merely the guest of the foreign country, owing it the duty of obedience to its laws and entitled from it to protection in person and property. 1 Letter to Mr. Clay (Peru), May 24, i8ss, 2 Whart. Dig Int. L.., 447, 448. 2 2 PhiU. Int. L., 6. 72 Annals of the American Academy. Any offence against him must be treated as an offence to a friendly alien, for which reparation, in proper cases, may be demanded by his government. This distinction between domiciled and visiting aliens may be rendered unavailing by reason of treaty stipula- tions fixing the status and rights of all aliens domiciled or visiting in a country who are subjects of the other treaty- making power. In such cases the obligations of the coun- try in which the alien may reside or be temporarily visiting are fixed by the terms of the treaty, and not by the princi- ples of international law. It is now common in treaties of amity and commerce to make such stipulations, and an injured alien may now generally claim redress under the terms of such a treaty. In case the alien had a representative character, either diplomatic or consular, an injury to him is regarded as in effect an injury to his government. It is true that consular agents are not entitled to the same privileges and immu- nities as diplomatic agents, but they are, nevertheless, representatives for special purposes of their own govern- ments, and any unlawful violence offered to them is an insult to the sovereignty which they represent. As to the agents of the injury the distinction may be even broader. There is not believed to be any distinction, however, between injuries committed by citizens and by resident or visiting aliens. In either case the rights of the injured alien have been invaded while submitting himself to the protection of a foreign State, and that State owes him equal protection against the wrongful acts of its own citizens and those of other aliens whom it may have re- ceived within its territory. Such protection consists, at least in civilized States, in opening to him impartially the door to redress, usually by means of its courts, and in some cases by executive action. But if the offence be committed by the public authorities of the country the case is far different. Under such circumstances the government of the alien may insist immediately upon reparation if the International Liability for Mob Injuries. 73 injury is the result of positive violence or maltreatment. Such act of the authorities may, moreover, be either positive or negative. They may use unlawful violence; they may connive at unlawful violence ; or they may wilfully neglect to provide protection against unlawful violence. In any case, the government for which the authorities act becomes liable for the wrong-doing of its agents. The application of these principles to cases of injuries to aliens arising out of the violence of a mob is not diffi- cult. It would seem reasonable that no greater international responsibility should rest «pon a government for the unlawful action of a mob than for the unlawful action of a private individual. And in general this proposition is true. It is only when the government either, having knowledge of the intention of a mob, fails to use due diligence to prevent it from assembling and executing its design, or else, having knowledge of its actual and con- tinuing violence, fails to use due diligence to suppress it, that any responsibility can attach to the government, as such, for the injuries suffered by the aliens. This is be- lieved to be a fair statement of the rule of international law as it is applied in practice by the powers of the civilized world. In addition to this rule, however, and in many cases a corollary of it, is the further rule that the government is under an international obligation, first, to use all proper means for the punishment of the offenders, and second, to provide a legal remedy to the sufferers or their representa- tives. Upon the first point, our government has again and again enunciated the principle that a wilful neglect to bring the transgressors to justice is an implied sanction of their acts. This was so declared by Secretary of State Marcy in 1854, with regard to the outrages committed by the lawless inhabitants of Greytown upon the persons and property of American citizens engaged in inter-oceanic 74 Annals of the American Academy. transit across Nicaragua. It was so admitted to be the law of international obligations by Secretary of State Fish in 187s, in reply to the claims of Mexico based on the murder of Mexican citizens by Texan border raiders. Upon the second point there is a like uniformity of utterance by the State Department of the government of the United States. As early as 1793 Jefferson, as Secretary of State, declared the test as to the right of intervention to be, " Whether the party complaining has duly pursued the ordinary remedies provided by the laws, as was incumbent on him before he would be entitled to appeal to the nation, and if he has, whether that degree of gross and palpable negligence has been done him by the national tribunals which would render the nation itself responsible for their conduct." ' The universal rule in such cases is that the injured party is bound to exhaust the judicial remedies afforded him by the municipal laws of the place of the injury before he can appeal to the executive department of the government for redress. This principle carries with it the corollary that a State is bound to supply a judicial remedy or to be held at once responsible through its executive department. It is therefore the practice to submit claims for indemnity in such States as China directly to the executive depart- ment, while in European States they must first be adjudicated by the courts. There must be a remedy somewhere, and if the State provides no judicial remedy, another State whose citizens have been injured may demand redress of the government through diplomatic channels. The law on these two points was well stated by Mr. Fish in these words : " The rule of the law of nations is that the government which refuses to repair the damages committed by its citizens or subjects, to punish the guilty parties or to give them up for that purpose, may be regarded as virtually a sharer in the injury, and as responsible therefor."* • Letter to the Attorney-General, Mar. 13, 1793 ; 2 Whart. Dig. Int. L., 675. 2 For. Rel. of U. S., 1873, *'"« Mexico ; 2 Calvo, Int. L., 397. International Liability for Mob Injuries. . 75 Several instances have occurred in the course of Amer- ican diplomacy when it became necessary to apply these principles in disposing of the claims of other governments based on injuries to aliens. In 1850 mobs in New Orleans and Key West, influenced by the severe punishment inflicted in Cuba upon the mem- bers of a filibustering expedition from the United States, sacked the houses and shops of many resident Spaniards and in New Orleans attacked the Spanish consulate itself. In this outbreak of mob violence there were two distinct injuries, the first and most serious in the view of inter- national law being to the dignity and honor of Spain as represented in the person of her consul and the inviolability of the consular office, and the second being to the persons and property of the resident subjects of Spain. In accord- ance with the principles above set forth, Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State, drew a sharp distinction between the liability of the government of the United States for these two classes of injuries. As to the first, he apparently entertained no doubt that the government owed the amplest apologies for the affront to the sovereignty of Spain and the completest indemnity which could in justice be asked. In accordance with this view President Fillmore, in his annual message in 185 1, recommended that Congress should appropriate the necessary money to carry out this purpose, and in this recommendation Congress concurred. This indemnity was granted as a matter of right. As to the private Spanish residents who were injured by the mob, Mr. Webster emphatically denied that they had any just claims against the government for indemnity. They had come, he said, voluntarily into the jurisdiction of the United States to pursue their private business and objects, and while within that jurisdiction were entitled to the same measure of protection, and no more, as was ac- corded to our own citizens. In fact, as he pointed out, their protection in the way of remedies was even ampler than that accorded to the American citizens who had 76 Annals of the American Academy. suffered like injuries at the hands of the mob, for while the injured aliens could pursue their remedies in the Federal courts or the State courts at their election, the citizens could pursue theirs only in the State courts. This double judicial remedy being therefore opened to the injured Spaniards, the government of the United States declined to regard the claims for indemnity as resting on any accepted principle of international law or any obligation of treaty stipulations. Nevertheless, our government ex- pressed the greatest sympathy for the injured subjects of Spain, and as a mark of appreciation of the generosity of the Spanish sovereign in pardoning certain American citi- zens who had been condemned to death under the Spanish laws. Congress appropriated, in 1853, the sum necessary to indemnify the Spanish victims of these riots. The money was paid, however, upon the understanding that it should be deemed a gratuity and not a lawful indemnity. The principle was saved, and the reparation was granted as a matter of grace. ^ In subsequent diplomatic discussions arising out of mob injuries the precedent of this case has been frequently cited both for and against the United States. It has always been contended by our government, however, that there was in this case no recognition whatever of the prin- ciple of indemnity for mob injuries, but that, on the con- trary, the principle was expressly denied, and that the government refused to consider itself in any way respon- sible for injuries committed by private individuals upon aliens residing within its jurisdiction. It is certain that the earlier correspondence of the State Department strongly presses this view of the case and that there was no failure politely to emphasize it at the time of the payment of the indemnity. Any fair interpretation of the correspondence and the circumstances must lead to the conclusion that 1 House Ex. Docs., 3 and 113, 32! Cong., ist. sess. ; Resolution of Cong., March 3, 1853. International Liability for Mob Injuries. "jy there was no recognition of any binding international obli- gation growing out of the mob violence other than that to the consular representative of Spain. In 1880 a mob in Denver attacked the Chinese residents of that city, destroyed a large quantity of their property and killed one of their number. The Chinese government immediately demanded that protection be extended to Chinese subjects in Denver, that the guilty persons be punished, and that the owners of the property destroyed be compensated for their losses. The government of the United States, replying through Mr. Evarts, expressed its indignation at the wanton and lawless action of the mob, assured the Chinese government that as full protection would be accorded to the Chinese as to our own citizens, and explained that under our form of government the punishment of the offenders was solely within the jurisdic- tion of the State of Colorado, and that the Federal Gov- ernment could not interfere in that regard. As to the suggestion that indemnity should be aff9rded the sufferers, Mr. Evarts replied in these words : " Under circumstances of this nature, when the government has put forth every legitimate effort to suppress a mob that threatens or attacks the life, the safety, and security of its own citizens and the foreign residents within its borders, I know of no principle of national obligation, and there certainly is none arising from treaty stipulation, which renders it incumbent on the government of the United States to make indemnity to the Chinese residents of Denver who, in com- mon with citizens of the United States at the time residents of that city, suffered losses from the operations of the mob. Whatever reme- dies may be afforded to the citizens of Colorado, or to the citizens of the United States from other States of the Union resident in Colorado, from losses resulting from that occurrence, are equally open to the Chinese residents of Denver who may have suffered from the lawless- ness of the mob. This is all that the principles of international law and the usages of national comity demand." ' This reasoning seems not to have been satisfactory to the Chinese government, which continued to press the 1 For. Rel., 1881, title China, p. 320. 78 Annals of the American Academy. claim for indemnity. Mr. Blaine, who had in the mean- time succeeded Mr. Evarts as Secretary of State, con- tinued the diplomatic discussion along the same line, and declined to recognize any liabilities as attaching to the government of the United States in consequence of the mob violence in Denver. This position was all the more tenable in view of the later developments, by which it appeared that the authorities had at the time promptly taken measures to suppress the mob, and had since ar- rested a number of the ringleaders and indicted two of them for the murder of the Chinese subject. In fact, the Chinese government failed to show any point in which the government of the United States had in any way disre- garded the obligation of international comity or of treaty rights. No neglect was shown before or at the time of the violence, and there was apparent no subsequent indiffer- ence with regard to the punishment of the offenders. In addition to all this, the courts of the State of Colorado and of the United States were open to all Chinese subjects who had suffered losses through the violence of the mob. In view of all this, our government properly declined to entertain any claim for indemnity. In 1885 the same question was again reopened with China under the most distressing circumstances. A mob at Rock Springs, Wyoming, made an unprovoked attack upon the Chinese residents of the place, murdered twenty- eight of their number, wounded fifteen, and destroyed a large amount of property. The local authorities took no adequate measures either to prevent the outrage or to punish the perpetrators, while the local courts were notoriously not an impartial forum in which the suf- ferers could seek redress. The whole proceeding by the authorities, in the way of investigation and punishment, was characterized by President Cleveland as " a ghastly mockery of justice." ' 1 Special Message, March 2, 1886. International Liability for Mob Injuries. 79 It appeared, however, upon investigation, that the assail- ants as well as the victims were aliens, that the violence grew out of the refusal of the Chinese to join in a strike then pending in the mining regions, and that American citizens were not responsible for the outrage. But this, while it saved to some extent the national honor, did not in anywise limit the national obligations as fixed by treaty or by international law. If any liability attached to the government of the United States in consequence of the outrage, it was equally binding, notwithstanding the alien- age of the perpetrators. This was practically conceded by Mr. Bayard in his correspondence with the Chinese minister and by the President in his message to Congress. The Chinese government on this occasion pressed the claim for indemnity with more than ordinary vigor, as it was well able to do in view of its own recent course in providing redress for American citizens who had suffered from the riots in Canton and other places in 1883. The Chinese minister appealed to the practices of his own government in like cases, to the terms of treaty stipula- tions, and to the spirit of modern international delations. The position of our government was not an easy one. The outrage had been cruel in the extreme ; the prompt action of China in redressing the wrongs of Americans under like circumstances called for recognition from a republic which prided itself on its civilization and love of justice ; the dictates of humanity and the precepts of mo- rality all leaned toward a policy of full and generous reparation. But seemingly opposed to all this was an alleged principle of international law which it was deemed impolitic and, looking to the future, highly embarrassing to ignore. In this predicament the government steered a middle course, maintaining the supposed principle on the one side while recommending a voluntary indemnity on the other. Mr. Bayard, in his note to the Chinese minister, took the ground that as the offence was committed by private indi- 8o Annals of the American Academy. viduals against private individuals there could be no lia- bility on the part of the government, and that for all injuries received the sufferers had an adequate remedy in the courts of Wyoming and the United States : "The government of the United States recognizes in the fullest sense the honorable obligation of its treaty stipulations, the duties of international amity, and the potentiality of justice and equity, not trammelled by technical ruling nor limited by statute. But among such obligations are not the reparation of injuries or the satisfaction by indemnity of wrongs inflicted by individuals upon other individuals in violation of the law of the land. " Such remedies must be pursued in the proper quarter and through the avenues of justice marked out for the reparation of such wrongs. " The doctrine of the non-liability of the United States for the acts of individuals committed in violation of its laws is clear as to acts of its own citizens, and a fortiori in respect to aliens who abuse the privilege accorded them of residence in our midst by breaking the public peace and infringing upon the rights of others, and it has been correctly and authoritatively laid down by my predecessors in office, to whose declarations in that behalf your note refers. To that doctrine the course of this government furnishes no exception." After proceeding to illustrate this principle by reference to the course of the government as to the Spanish riots in New Orleans in 1850, the Secretary proceeds : " Yet I am frank to say that the circumstances of the case now under consideration contain features which I am disposed to believe may induce the President to recommend to Congress, not as under obliga- tion of treaty or principle of international law, but solely from a senti- ment of generosity and pity to an innocent and unfortunate body of men, subjects of a friendly power, who, being peaceably employed within our jurisdiction, were so shockingly outraged; that in view of the gross and shameful failure of the police authorities at Rock Springs, in Wyoming Territory, to keep the peace, or even to attempt to keep the peace, or to make proper efforts to uphold the law or punish the criminals, or make compensation for the loss of property pillaged or destroyed, it may reasonably be a subject for the benevo- lent consideration of Congress whether, with the distinct understand- ing that no precedent is thereby created, or liability for want of proper enforcement of police jurisdiction in the Territories, they will not, ex gratia, grant pecuniary relief to the sufferers in the case now International Liability for Mob Injuries. 8i ■before us to the extent of the value of the property of which they were so outrageously deprived, to the grave discredit of republican institutions." i In accordance with this correspondence, President Cleve- land, in his special message of March 2, 1885, recommended an appropriation for this purpose, " with the distinct un- derstanding that such action is in nowise to be held as a precedent, is wholly gratuitous, and is resorted to in the spirit of pure generosity toward those who are otherwise helpless." The appropriation was duly made and the claims were settled to the satisfaction of the Chinese government and the injured parties. This case comes dangerously near the line at which governmental responsibility begins, as that line is fixed by international law and by the declarations of our own government. The confession by the government that no adequate protection was afforded, that "the proceedings for the ascertainment of the crime and fixing the respon- sibility therefor were a ghastly mockery of justice," and that there existed a " palpable and discreditable failure of the authorities 'of Wyoming Territory to bring to justice the guilty parties, or to assure to the sufferers an impartial forum in which to seek and obtain compensation for the losses which those subjects [of China] have incurred by a lack of police protection," ^ is a practical admission that the United States — for China deals only with the Federal government — had failed either to punish the guilty or to offer an adequate means of redress to the innocent. On both of these points our own government has on other occasions declared : (i) That neglect to prosecute offenders would be a denial of that justice which the alien's govern- ment has a right to expect ; ^ and (2) that justice may as much be denied when it would be absurd or useless to 1 For. Rel., 1886, title China, pp. 166, 168. » President's Message, Maroli 2, 1886. s Sec. of State Fish, February 19, 1873 ; For. Rel., 1873, title Mexico. Vol. II. — 6. 82 Annals of the American Academy. seek it by judicial processes, as if it were denied after having been so sought.* Confessedly the local government of Wyoming ne- glected to prosecute in good faith the offenders in the Rock Springs riots, and that it would have been useless for the Chinese sufferers to resort to the courts for justice is expressly declared by the President. Under such circum- stances there would seem to have been a plain and palpable denial of justice, leaving to the sufferers as the only recourse an appeal to the Federal Executive through diplomatic channels. That this view largely influenced the State De- partment and the Executive in recommending an indemnity cannot be doubted. The reservation of the alleged prin- ciple may therefore justly be regarded as a piece of excessive diplomatic caution, intended mainly to protect the govern- ment from the full force of this case as a precedent. There can be no doubt that morally the United States were bound to repair, so far as possible, the injuries done to these inoffensive aliens; while there is little doubt that the accepted principles of international law laid upon the government an equally binding obligation. It is to be observed, however, that this international liability was fixed, not by the fact of the mob injury itself, nor yet by the course of China toward the United States in like cases, but by the conduct of the public authorities subsequent to the outrage. Had the proceedings for the punishment of the offenders been honestly and vigorously conducted, and had the judicial remedy of the sufferers been adequate and impartial, no responsibility could have been fastened upon the Federal government. Under such circumstances, to quote Sir Robert Phillimore, " The State must be satisfied that its citizen has exhausted the means of legal redress offered by the tribunals of the country in which he has been injured. If these tribunals are unable or unwilling to entertain and adjudicate upon his grievance, the ground for interfer- ence is fairly laid." '' 1 Sec. of State Fish., Dec. i6, 1873 : For. Rel., 1873. '- 2 Int. L., 4. International Liability for Mob Injuries. 83 But in this case there was, confessedly, no means of legal redress to exhaust, for the tribunals had plainly exhibited an unwillingness to entertain or adjudicate in an impartial manner the claims of the injured subjects of China. This being so, the ground for interference was fairly laid, and China was fully justified in demanding reparation at the hands of the government of the United States. However this fact may have been obscured by the cloud of diplo- matic verbiage and the reservation of alleged principles, it remains as the decisive test of liability in this and similar cases. Pending the judicial investigation and diplomatic discus- sion of the mob violence in New Orleans on March 14th of the present year, by which a number of Italian subjects were unlawfully put to death, it may not be proper to do more than make a general application of the above prin- ciples to this particular occurrence. It is well to point out, however, that in some features this case is sharply distinguished from those already referred to. In the first place, the victims were in the custody of the public author- ities, and therefore, being deprived of the ordinary means of retreat or self-defence, entitled to the fullest protection. In the second place, it would seem — although this may be a disputed question of fact — that the proposed attempt of the mob was known some hours in advance of the assault, and that those responsible for the safety of the prisoners took no adequate measures for their protection. If these two premises are fully established, it is difficult to see how, under the principles of international law as recognized and applied by our own government, the United States can escape from the claim of Italy for reparation ; if, added to these, there should prove to be a failure of justice in the punish- ment of the offenders, the case would become a very strong one. The fact is, there would seem to be no practical dif- ference in effect between an act of positive maltreatment of an alien prisoner by public officers and an act of culpable negligence on the part of such officers whereby such alien 84 Annals of the American Academy. prisoners are suffered to receive positive maltreatment at the hands of others. In the first case our government has emphatically asserted the right to redress from the execu- tive department of the government, and in this it is sup- ported by high authority. It is difficult to see why redress may not as justly be claimed in the case of wilful negligence resulting in injury. In the case of a riot in Brazil in 1875, by which the property of certain American citizens was destroyed, Mr. Fish, then Secretary of State, declared that " It is the duty of Brazil, when she receives the citizens of a friendly- State, to protect the property which they carry with them or may acquire there. If persons in the service of that government connive at or in- stigate a riot for the purpose of depriving a citizen of the United States of his property, the Imperial government must be held account- able therefor." ' And in a similar case occurring in Peru, Mr. Evarts declared that "A government is liable internationally for damages done to alien residents by a md& which by due diUgence it could have repressed." ' These propositions involve in all cases questions of fact and the facts must be accurately ascertained before the principles can be applied. It would therefore be premature to venture a final opinion upon the unfortunate affair at New Orleans ; but should the pending investigation establish the fact that the public authorities, having knowledge of the proposed violence, failed to exercise due diligence to pre- vent it, the declarations and practices of our own govern- ment, as well as the just principles of international law, would serve to fix upon the Federal government a direct liability for the injuries sustained by the subjects of Italy. E. W. HUFFCUT. Indiana University Law School. I 2 Whart. Dig. Int. L., 602. ' Ibid. REGULAR PUBLICATIONS OP THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. Subscription Price, to other t/ian Members, $6.00. Special Rates to Libraries, $5.00. The' regular Publications are sent free to all Members of the Academy in the form of the Annals. Annual Ketnbership fee, JSs.oo. 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' All communications, in regard to membership, papers, publications, etc., should be addressed AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, station B, PHIUDELPHIA, PA; /V/^t THE American Bar Association. THE RELATION OF THE LAW SCHOOL TO THE UNIVERSITY. A PAPEK READ BBFORB The Section of Legal Education, ERNEST W. HUFFCUT, OF CORNELL DNIVERSITY, ITHACA, NEW YORK. EIQHTEJKNTH ANNUAL IVIEETING, Detroit, August 2j, iSpj. [Reprinted from the Report of the Transactions of the Association. '\ THE RELATION OF THE LAW SCHOOL TO THE UNIVEESITY, BY ERNEST W. HUFFCUT, CORNEI-I. UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, NEW YORK. During the past year (1894-95) there were in the United States seventy-three law schools open for the reception of students. In these schools there were enrolled upwards of nine thousand students. Of these nine thousand students less than two thousand were graduates of colleges or universities ; over seven thousand were entering upon their professional studies without the previous training represented by the average college course. Seven of these schools are not connected in any way with colleges or universities. These seven schools enrolled about one thousand students, of whom about three hundred were college graduates. It follows that sixty-six law schools and law departments are connected with colleges or universities, and are educating upwards of eight thousand law students annually, of whom about sixteen hundred have had the liberal training repre- sented by a college course.* Of these sixteen hundred college graduates about one-half were in eight of the university schools which enroll nearly two thousand students, and one- fifth of the sixteen hundred Vere in a single school. Of the remaining fifty-eight university law schools only about twelve per cent, of the students begin their professional studies with the training and discipline represented by the work of the college course. *Two additional university law schools wiU open at the beginning of the next academic year. 1* These statistics serve to show that there are now pursuing law studies in the various university law schools and law departmeiits of the United States, nearly sixty-five hundred students who may fairly be presumed not to possess what we are wont to term a liberal education. I would not be under- stood to say that no one of these has in fact the equivalent of a liberal education. It is far from my thought that a college diploma is decisive proof that a student has a liberal education, or that the want of a college diploma is decisive proof that he has not ; but the law, of all sciences, deals with uniform rules and presumptions, and what I wish to invoke is the presump- tion, based on the experience of mankind, that a college educa- tion is better for the average man than a non-college education or no education at all, and that he who has it may be presumed to be better qualified for intellectual labors of a high order than he who has it not. In view of this it is certainly a seri- ous question for consideration as to what shall be done for the eighty men out of one hundred who are thus indifi'erently pre- pared for the study of the law, and especially what duty rests upon the colleges and universities which are conferring upon these students their diplomas as bachelors or masters of the laws. We may leave out of account for the present, at least, the seven independent schools not connected with colleges or universities, because it would ill become us of the universities with our less than twenty per cent, of college graduates in our schools, to venture to advise them with their upwards of thirty per cent, of college graduates, though it is but just to say, that all of these thirty per cent, are in two out of the seven inde- pendent schools. The question is not merely one for us of the law, but affects as well our colleagues of the humanities in general. With the development of the law school as a part of the university sys- tem there has come upon us and upon them the pressing ques- tion as to the relation and correlation of our work. It is hardly necessary to argue at this time that there is a real and even necessary relationship between their work and ours. We have come to realize in these latter days as never before, that law is something more than a technical art of whose mysteries only the professional craftsman may profitably have knowledge. Since Blackstone, to quote the happy phrase of his greatest and severest critic, Bentham, "made the law speak the lan- guage of the gentleman and scholar," its value to the historian and student of political institutions has been increasingly recognized. Beginning with Gibbon, the English historians have read in the statute books, the reports and the court rolls, a new and deeper meaning of the progress of civilization and government. Students of government have come to know that law is not only an important element in political institutions, but that it is the important element in them. Students of philosophy and ethics are beginning to understand that a like importance for their work and for them attaches to the study of legal conceptions and the administration of justice, though it is to be feared that it will be long before speculative philoso- phy gets its feet on the firm ground of sanctioned human conduct. If it be desirable for the student of history, political science and philosophy to acquaint himself with the import of legal conceptions, institutions and practices, it is equally desirable for the student of law not to divorce himself from history^ politics and philosophy ; and here after all is the heart of our problem. We may assume that our colleagues of the humani- ties will look after their own interests, though there can be no harm in our wishing them that fulness of light that would attend their diligent study of the law. But we must first answer for those of our own household. We must make sure, if we can, that the law schools do not give the stamp of their credit to a mintage of narrow craftsmanship which does not ring true in the marts of modern scholarship and in the stern tests of our modern complex civilization. We must be careful that we lay ourselves not open to the charge that " any man may walk in from the streets " to our schools, and fare forth again after the space of a year or may be two, with our certifi- cate that he is a graduate in law. Yet shall we say that he may walk in only from the univer- sity ? and shall we add that he may go forth with our certifi- cate only after tarrying for three years ? Shall we say to him who would go with confidence and honor into his profession, that he must spend seven years in preparation after he has done with the exactions of high schools, academies and fitting schools ? And if so, what is to become of the ambitious and struggling poor, the potential strength and glory of the profession ? I think it is just here, at this point of the problem, that we need to confer with our colleagues of the other departments of the university. We are free to confess that we need their aid. vVe venture to think that they may profit from ours. Cannot the work done by them and the work done by us be so wedded and harmonized that mutual benefit will follow to students of history and politics and philosophy on the one side, and to students of law on the other ? Let us see what are the factors in the problem. In the academic courses in the university are students who wish to take law as a branch of political science or philosophy, and students who wish to take it eventually as a professional study. In the law school are students who need to take history and political science and the humanities generally as a background for their study of the law. How great is their need in this regard we have already seen from the glance at the actual educational status of the students in American law schools. The manner in which the problem has been met, so far as it has been met at all, varies greatly. Leaving out of view the schools or departments which have only a nominal or govern- mental relation to the universities with which they are con- nected, the schools or departments which have a vital or organic relation to their universities fall into three classes : First, those which treat the law school as strictly or essentially a graduate department of the university; second, those which treat it as strictly or essentially an undergraduate department of the university ; third, those which treat it as a quasi-under- graduate department of the university so far as concerns the interests of students in the college courses, but as an inde- pendent professional school so far as concerns the interests of members of the school. The first class is represented at present by but a single school. Harvard University announces that it will admit as candidates for the degree of Bachelor of Laws only those who have the degree of Bachelor of Arts, or Science, or Philosophy from a university or college of recognized standing ; though this announcement is modified by the further provision that applicants passing a satisfactory examination in Latin, French and Blackstone's Commentaries, may be received as special students, and will be admitted to graduation if they reside three years at the school and attain a standing within five per cent, of that required for the honor degree. This step is a radical one and involves an interesting question. Four years are required for the baccalaureate degree in arts, science or philosophy. Three years are required for the baccalaureate degree in law. Law is erected into a graduate department, yet it has no necessary place in the undergraduate work. In other words, unlike any other graduate department, it requires no undergraduate work specially related to the graduate work. The graduate student in other branches of political science comes to his work with the elementary subjects all behind him ; the graduate student in law comes to his work with no knowledge of the elementary subjects and spends three graduate years, or at least two of the three graduate years, in acquiring a knowledge of the elementary branches. A student of economics in these seven years would have spent perhaps two undergraduate years in special work in the elementary branches of his subject, and would have received the degree of Bachelor of Arts ; at the end of one graduate- year in economics he would have received the degree of Master of Arts ; and at the end of three graduate years he would 1* have received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ; in all he would have had the equivalent of from four to five years of continuous work in a single field. Is the study of law less worthy of such favor than the study of economics, or politics, or sociology, or any other field of political science ? Is the dis- crimination not based on the survival of the notion that law is a technical art or craft and not a legitimate branch of history and political science? Harvard University has set a high standard of legal education and every law school in the country will feel the impulse of her example. But we may properly question whether a graduate school of law ought not to be based upon an undergraduate department of law, and whether a vital branch of political science ought thus to be cut ofi" from the main trunk. The second class, like the first, is represented by but a single institution. The Leland Stanford Junior University has placed the department of law upon exactly the same basis as any and all other departments of the University. Law is both an undergraduate and a graduate study. Under the system of electives prevailing at Stanford a student may select any department in which to pursue a continuous and connected course of study equivalent to about one hour a day for three, or possibly four years, or roughly one-third of his undergrad- uate work. He may select the department of law on the same terms as the department of economics, or history, or literature, or any branch of science. At the end of his four years of undergraduate work he receives, if successful, the degree of Bachelor of Arts in history, or economics, or law, or whatever may have been his chosen department. He may then pass into the corresponding graduate department for advanced work. The student of law comes then to the graduate law department with his elementary law studies all behind him, with a liberal culture acquired during his undergraduate years in subjects, apart from law, equal to two-thirds or more of his undergraduate course, and fitted to devote all his time and energies to the special and thorough study of the law. He ia prepared to accomplish as much in one year as the graduate who has had no law can hope to achieve in two. He passes into his professional work at least one year earlier than his less fortunate fellow, as liberally educated and as specially equipped. He and society have gained a year in the span of active ser- vice without the sacrifice of any sound principle of education. The third class presents a less perfect recognition of the principle involved in the Stanford plan. It is represented in varying degree by Cornell, Columbia, the University of the City of New York, the Indiana University, the Iowa State University ; possibly by some others. The completest devel- opment of the plan includes two ideas : First, that of permit- ting undergraduates in the college courses to elect law subjects as a part of their work required for the baccalaureate degree ; . second, that of permitting law students to pursue studies in the college courses as supplementary to their law studies. We may take Cornell University as a type. In that institution an undergraduate in the college courses may, in his junior and senior years, elect an amount of law work equivalent to one year of the required law course. Upon his graduation from the college course he may pass at once into the second year of the law school. He is thus enabled to save one full year of the time required for the two degrees. The second half of the plan contemplates that the law student who is not a college graduate shall voluntarily lengthen his law course by one or more years and elect subjects from the general courses to sup- plement the course as thus lengthened. Many students do so on the advice of the law faculty. On the other hand the larger part of the law students are neither college graduates nor do they lengthen their law course in order to pursue studies in the college courses. Under this plan, therefore, it is still pos- sible for a student to enter upon the study of the law indiffer- ently prepared and to receive his degree in law without having had any studies broader than the field of law. The merit of the plan consists in the encouragement it offers to those students who desire to broaden their course of study. We may now enquire whicli of these three methods of view- ing the relation between the law school and the university is likely to do the most for the better education of members of the bar ? Obviously, if the Harvard method was universally followed, and if every law student submitted to it, there would be a guaranty of a highly educated profession. But I appre- hend that those in charge of the Harvard Law School would be among the first to recognize that the conditions there are not what they are in most other schools, and particularly in the Western schools. To insist upon a college degree as pre- liminary to the study of the law and upon three years of such study, would be to drive the majority of the law students back into the offices for their legal education. Moreover, as I have already intimated, it is at least an open question whether such a requirement is in accordance with the soundest principles of education or gives to the subject of law iis just place in the university system. There then remains only the choice between the second and the third of the systems thus far devised of bringing the law school into connection with the university. We may safely give our assent to the plan adopted at Stanford, and say that the study of the law is to be treated like the study of any other branch of human knowledge ; that the preparation for it should be mainly the same as for the study of history and political science, and that law upon the one hand and history, political science and philosophy on the other, will profit from the closer union between the two. I confess that this plan has for me personally many attractive features. It drives out at the outset the professional or technical atmosphere which is likely to surround the study of law when disconnected from all other human interests. It brings the law school into the warmth and color and light of a general university atmosphere. It relates the subject of the law logically and consistently to the general field of political science. The student from the outset of his studies in the field of law is encouraged if not compelled, to make constant investigations in the field of 9 history, political science and government which cannot fail to give him a broader apprehension of the true meaning and import of legal institutions and the administration of justice. Supplemented by an additional year or more of strictly legal study, the course thus pursued is likely to give, in my judgment, most favorable results, and to advance in a very marked degree the ideal of legal education. The Stanford plan has, however, the faults, or the perfec- tions as you choose to call them, of its qualities. It can be successfully worked only in connection with a curriculum devised in accordance with that of the Stanford University. So long as educators in the universities are at variances as to the particular formation of the curriculum and the degree of guidance or compulsion necessary for the proper direction of the studies of undergraduates, it will be impossible to urge the introduction of the Stanford system. There, I am assured, both by members of the faculty and by students, it works with the greatest success, and has the hearty support of all who are interested. There remains, then, for the greater number of the univer- sities only the third plan. But this, in order to be wholly effective, needs to be carried to its logical conclusion. If every graduate of the law school were also a graduate of the college there would be no essential difference between the Stanford and the Cornell plan. In each the student would have mas- tered the elements of the law in his undergraduate course and would pass into the law school as into a graduate department. In each he would shorten the combined college and law school courses by at least one year. As the matter stands at present, neither the professors of the college on the one hand, nor the professors of the law school on the other, will consent to shorten the period required for the granting of their respective degrees ; but the two together will enter into a treaty that the period of study required for both degrees shall, in the aggregate, be shortened by one year. Something is thereby gained toward a speedier entrance into the profession and at the same 10 time toward an ampler preparation for it. The temptation to omit altogether the undergraduate college course is lessened ; the possibility of omitting it altogether may even be removed. There are two ways in which the universities may close the door to the ill-prepared law students under this plan. The first is to require for admission to the law school the under- graduate college course, which may include one year of law work. The second is to require for admission at least as much preparation as would admit the applicant to the junior class of the college course. There is one way in which schools may admit students on less preparation and yet insure some equivalent of under- graduate college work. This is to admit students to the law school on practically the same requirements as would admit them to the freshman class of the college course, but to require students so admitted to take at least one year longer for the law degree than students admitted upon undergraduate college work, and to spend the additional time so required in studies selected from the college courses. It is quite feasible to combine all of these features under the Cornell plan. Students may be admitted to the law school : (1), if graduates of a college, and may, if their college course included one year of law, pass into the second year of the school ; (2), if entitled to junior standing in the college, and may take the full course in law in the minimum time prescribed ; (3), if entitled to freshman standing in the college, but must take for the full course in law one year longer than the mini- mum time prescribed and pursue certain studies in the college course. Whether the third feature is desirable or practicable I do not now feel disposed to discuss. I merely indicate it as a possible alternative for schools that are not prepared to require too high a standard for admission. There are two classes of universities that might object to this plan. The first are those where the law school is sepa- rated in space from the college departments, so that it is impracticable for students to pass to and fro between the two. 11 As to these it is possible to dismiss students entitled to senior standing in the college to instruction in the law school, and upon the completion of one year in the latter, to grant the baccalaureate degree in arts. This is practically what occurs at Cornell where seniors in the college are often devoting all their time to law subjects. I am also informed that at Ha;rvard seniors are sometimes given a leave of absence from the college when they have completed as much work as is required for the degree in arts and may then enter at once upon the work of the law school ; but there the law work is not counted toward the arts degree. The second class of universities that might be unfavorably affected by this plan are those which have no departments or schools of law. It would be unwise to stimulate unduly the establishment of such schools, which repuire for successful work large and expensive libraries and trained faculties. Yet with- out some equivalent provision such institutions might find themselves deprived of all students who intend to pursue the study of the law. Is it too much to hope that we may in time reach a catholicity in education which will make it possible for such institutions to dismiss seniors to any sound law school upon whose certificate of the completion of one year of workj they may grant their degree in arts ? I have some confidence that such a hope is not beyond realization. If it is, then we may leave these institutions to guard their own exclusiveness at their own cost. The sum of the matter is this : We desire a higher stand- ard of legal education. We do not wish to achieve it at the needless expense of the time and substance of the student. Our law schools are parts of a university system. By making them organic parts of that system, asking our colleagues of the universities to recognize that our work is part and parcel of their own, and ourselves frankly recognizing that theirs is essential to the success of ours, we may yet arrive at a solution of our problem which shall advance the interests of legal education and of all sound learning. ' V It CONSTITUTIONAL ASPFXTS Federal Control of Corporations BY ERNEST W. HUFFCUT Propessob. op I■ 40 S. W. 843. * 167 Mass. 92. ' 167 Mass. 107, 108. 294 INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT RELATIONS. an investigation of the issue whether such injury or ruin was inflicted in the proper exercise of a common right or was inflicted without any justification that commends itself to existing views of public policy or social utility. Differences and fluctuations there would doubtless be as to what view of public policy ought to be taken, but better that than to ignore the existence of patent facts and fashion the law into a mould unsuited to the rapidly changing conditions of modern industrial life. IV. Summary. The i-esult of the decisions may be thus stated : I. It is unlawful for B to induce X to break an existing contract with A ; but it must be noted that,-^-^ (i) the House of Lords reserves its opinion upon the point whether it is unlawful unless unlawful means are used, and (2) some American cases have decided it not to be unlawful unless unlawful means are used (except, perhaps, in the case of enticing away servants), and (3) no attempt has yet been made to determine whether any grounds of justification may be set up. II. It is unlawful for B to induce X to terminate (without breach) an existing contract with A, or to refrain from entering into a contract with A, either (l) by the use of intrinsically unlawful means, or (2) probably, by combination or conspiracy with others unless such combination can be justified. III. Whether it is unlawful for B to induce X to terminate (without breach) an existing contract with A, or to refrain from entering into a contract with A, where no intrinsically unlawful means are used or combination or conspiracy exists, there are two views : (i) that it is not unlawful ; (2) that it is unlawful, unless B can justify his interference on some principle of industrial or social utility. IV. These questions must be regarded as open : (i) What are intrinsically unlawful means, and, particularly, what acts constitute intimidation ? (2) What constitutes justification, and, particularly, what constitutes fair competition ? Ernest Wilson Huffcut. Cornell University. CORNELI. UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW THE DEDICATION OP BOARDMAN HALL AND THE PRESENTATION OP THE MOAK LAW LIBRARY PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES FEBRUARY 14, 1893 ITHACA, N. Y. PUBWSHED POR THE UNIVERSITY THE SCHOOL OF LAW DEDICATION OF BOARDMAN HALL AND Presentation of the Moak Law Library At a meeting of the Trustees, held June i6, 1886, formal action was taken establishing a School of L,aw as a depart- ment of the University. The public were at once advised of the step, and that the School would be in readiness for the ad- mission of students at the opening of the university year in 1887. The Faculty was chosen in March, 1887, and consisted of the following members : The Honorable Douglass Board- man, Dean, Harry B. Hutchins, Charles A. Collin, Francis M. Burdick, Moses Coit Tyler and Herbert Tuttle, resident pro- fessors, and the Honorable Francis M. Finch, the Honorable Daniel H. Chamberlain, the Honorable William F. Cogswell and the Honorable Theodore Bacon, special lecturers. At the June meeting of the Trustees, in 1891, Professor Charles E. Hughes was called to the professorship made vacant by the resignation of Professor Burdick, and the resident instructing corps enlarged by the election of Associate Professor William A. Finch. A vacancy in the Deanship, caused by the death 4 of the Honorable Douglass Boardman was filled in November, 1891, by the election of the Honorable Francis M. Finch. The persontiel of the corps of special lecturers has changed some- what from time to time, and at present is as follows : The Honorable Francis M. Finch, of the New York Court of Ap- peals, the Honorable Daniel H. Chamberlain, of the New York City Bar, the Honorable Alfred C. Coxe, of the United States District Court, the Honorable Albert H. Walker, of the Hartford Bar, Professor John Ordronaux, of the New York City Bar, the Honorable Irving G. Vann, of the New York Supreme Court, the Honorable Goodwin Brown, of the Albany Bar and the Honorable Irving Browne, of the Buffalo Bar. The School opened September 23, 1887, with an attend- ance of fifty-five students. The subsequent growth has been such as to meet the expectations of the most sanguine. The enrolment of the present year is two hundred and five. It was very soon apparent that the accommodations pro- vided for the School in Morrill Hall, would not long be ade- quate, and that a separate building, to be devoted exclusively to its use, would be a necessity. In February, 1891, the Trus- tees made a liberal appropriation for this purpose. The build- ing was soon under way, and although not entirely completed, was sufi&ciently far advanced to admit of its occupancy at the opening of the present university year. It is a large three story structure, the extreme dimensions being 202 by 58 feet, is built of Cleveland sandstone, and is practically fire-proof. The interior finish is largely in oak. On the first floor are three large lecture-rooms and the necessary halls and cloak- rooms. Seminary rooms and the offices of the several resident professors occupy the second floor, while the third is devoted to library purposes. Here are three large, well lighted and ele- gantly furnished library rooms, which have accommodations for 30,000 volumes and 300 readers. The building is heated by steam and lighted by electricity, and is thoroughly well ventilated. It is now entirely finished, is complete throughout in all its appointments and furnishings, and is found to be ad- mirably adapted for law-school purposes. The cost of the building with its furnishing was $110,000. The Trustees of the University, at a meeting held Sep- tember 14, 1892, unanimously determined that, in view of the long and valuable services of the late Judge Douglass Board- man as a member of their body and of his official connection with the School of I,aw, the new home of the School should be designated as BOARDMAN HAIvL, and a committee was appointed to secure a suitable memorial tablet to be placed upon the building. At the opening of the present university year, the library of the School consisted of about ten thousand volumes. The most of these had been purchased with appropriations made from time to time by the Trustees ; but the collection contained the law library of Judge Boardman, he having generously be- queathed it to the School. In October last, the large and care- fully selected law library of the late Nathaniel C. Moak, of Albany, N. Y., was placed upon the market. It was known to be one of the most complete collections in the country. Its purchase was at once authorized for the use of the School and as a memorial to its first Dean, Judge Douglass Boardman, by his widow Mrs. A. M. Boardman and his daughter, Mrs. KUen D. Williams. This collection, added to the original one, gives to this School a library of 23,000 volumes, and one which is second to none in the country. Tuesday, the fourteenth of February, 1893, was the day fixed for the formal dedication of the new law-school build- ing and for the presentation of the library so generously donated. Invitations to the exercises had been sent to the State officers, to members of the State Judiciary, to prominent members of the bar and to the graduates of the School, and a large audience gathered to listen to the addresses. The ceremonies began at 3 o'clock P. M., the Hon. Heni-y W. Sage, of the Board of Trustees, presiding. The following was the ORDER OF EXERCISES Prayer, - - By the Rev. Mr. Synnott Music, - - The Cornei,i, Gi,se Ci