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 HE 2757 1921.06 
 
 A plan for railroad consolidations, inci 
 
 3 1924 013 693 142 
 
A PLAN 
 
 FOR 
 
 Railroad Consolidations 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 A DISCUSSION OF THEIR PURPOSE 
 AND PRACTICABILITY 
 
 By 
 JOHN E. OLDHAM 
 
 Published by 
 
 Investment Bankers Association op America 
 november 1921 
 
Hntt O^oUege of Agricttlture 
 
 At CforneU IntnetHttH 
 
 3tljara, If. 1. 
 
 2Ithrarg 
 
A PLAN 
 
 FOR 
 
 Railroad Consolidations 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 A DISCUSSION OF THEIR PURPOSE 
 AND PRACTICABILITY 
 
 By 
 JOHN E. OLDHAM 
 
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 Published by 
 
 Investment Bankers Association of America 
 
 november 1921 
 
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 Copyright, 1921 
 By JOHN E. OLDHAM 
 
 PRINTED IN U. S. A. 
 
 THE COSMOS PRESS 
 INCORPORATED 
 CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface S 
 
 Introduction 7 
 
 Condition of Railroad Credit before Federal Control ... 9 
 
 The Basis of Rates 17 
 
 Application of " Service-at-Cost" Principle 19 
 
 Consolidations — Their purpose and practicability .... 24 
 
 Consolidation would not destroy the credit of the 
 
 "Strong" Roads 25 
 
 Consolidations Essential to Healthful Competition .... 26 
 
 Characteristics of Competing Companies 28 
 
 The Proposed Systems 33 
 
 A Brief Description of the Districts 42 
 
 Similarity of Proposed Systems 43 
 
 Competition among Systems 47 
 
 A Brief Description of Systems ... SO 
 
 Summary of Conclusions 59 
 
 TABLES 
 
 Comparison of "Strong" and "Weak" Roads 
 
 Table I Per Cent of Gross Operating Income 
 
 obtained from Different Kinds of Traffic . 1 1 
 
 " II Classification of Tonnage 11 
 
 « III Rates 11 
 
 " IV Disposition of Gross Operating Income . . 12 
 
 " V Per Cent of Gross Operating Income 
 
 Distributed to Security Holders .... 12 
 
 " VI Capitalization for each $1.00 of Gross 
 
 Operating Income 12 
 
 " VII Rate of Return on Capitalization .... 12 
 [3] 
 
PAGE 
 
 Table VIII Thirty systems with annual operating income of 
 
 $25,000,000 and upward 30 
 
 " IX Fifteen systems with annual operating income 
 
 of $10,000,000 to $25,000,000 31 
 
 " X Summary of all systems classified by amount 
 
 of annual gross earnings 31 
 
 Tables showing similarity of Proposed Systems . . 44-45-46 
 
 Table of Principal Cities in the United States showing by 
 
 which Systems each is served 48-49 
 
 Alphabetical List of all Class I Roads 61 
 
 LIST OF MAPS 
 
 Map No. 1 — New York Central System 
 
 " " 2 — Buffalo System 
 
 " "3 — Pennsylvania System 
 
 " "4 — Baltimore-Reading System 
 
 « "5 — Norfolk & Western-Chesapeake & Ohio System 
 
 " "6 — Atlantic Coast Line-Louisville & Nashville System 
 
 " "7 — Southern System 
 
 " " 8 — Great Northern-St. Paul System 
 
 " "9 — Northern Pacific-Burlington System 
 
 " " 10 — Union Pacific-Northwestern System 
 
 " "11^ Atchison System 
 
 " "12 — Southern Pacific System 
 
 " "13 — Illinois Central-Soo System 
 
 [4] 
 
PREFACE 
 
 CINCE the railroads of the country were returned to 
 private management on March 1, 1920, the attention of 
 railroad executives,f^the shipping public, and citizens in 
 general so far as it has concerned itself with railroad prob- 
 lems, has been directec to questions of immediate impor- 
 tance. Transportation rates, labor costs, and obligations 
 due to or from the Government have been the problems 
 of immediate concern. 
 
 The Transportation Act of 1920, properly called one of 
 the great constructive pieces of legislation of our national 
 existence, makes provision for the consolidation of the rail- 
 roads of the country into a limited number of systems in 
 accordance with such plans as may be adopted or approved 
 by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Little public 
 attention has as yet been given to this matter, and yet it is 
 fundamental to any final solution of the railroad problem, 
 since the financial soundness and credit position of the rail- 
 roads of the country are dependent upon the character of 
 such consolidations. 
 
 It is not an over-statement to say that consolidations have 
 an important bearing upon the future success of private 
 operation and ownership, and hence a close relationship to 
 the question of public operation and Government ownership. 
 It is inevitable that this whole matter of railroad consolida- 
 tion will soon come into general public discussion and will 
 receive the attention which its fundamental importance de- 
 serves. 
 
 The writer of this pamphlet, Mr. John E. Oldham, of the 
 firm of Merrill, Oldham & Company, Boston, a former Vice- 
 President of the Investment Bankers Association, and 
 Chairman of its Railroad Securities Committee, in February 
 1920, prepared an article entitled " A Comprehensive Plan 
 for Railroad Consolidation," which first appeared in "The 
 Nation's Business." Later this article, amplified with sup- 
 
 [5] 
 
plementary tables and maps, was published in pamphlet 
 form by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. 
 
 The present pamphlet is a further study of the same 
 subject and presents a more carefully determined conclu- 
 sion. The Investment Bankers Association has under- 
 taken its publication and presents it to the public with the 
 hope that its analyses and findings may constitute a con- 
 tribution of value in bringing about such railroad con- 
 solidations as may be desirable and necessary to carry out 
 the purposes of the Transportation Act. 
 
 November 1921. 
 
 [6] 
 
RAILROAD CONSOLIDATIONS 
 
 Introduction 
 
 At the time the railroads passed under Federal control 
 in December 1917, transportation facilities were inadequate 
 for the needs of the country, and railroad service generally 
 was unsatisfactory. Facilities were over-crowded, — termi- 
 nals especially were congested. Embargoes on freight and 
 priority orders became necessary to assure the movement of 
 the most essential traffic. 
 
 While the sudden change from a nation at peace to a 
 nation at war brought about new and unexpected condi- 
 tions and made unusual demands upon the transportation 
 facilities of the country, it nevertheless had become evident 
 long before our entrance into the war that these facilities 
 were fast becoming unequal to the needs of the country, 
 especially because of the inability of the railroads generally 
 to raise new capital. Railroad credit had become so depre- 
 ciated that investors had lost confidence in the securities 
 of even the strongest systems. Many of the weaker systems 
 were having serious financial difficulties, and not a few were 
 in receivership. Many persons believed that private man- 
 agement was a failure and that Government ownership 
 would be necessary to give the country adequate and satis- 
 factory service. Others contended that the unsatisfactory 
 financial condition of the railroads was due to the restric- 
 tions of public regulation, and that under a more liberal 
 policy the roads could be operated successfully under 
 private management. Agreement was general, however, 
 that the roads should not be returned by the Government 
 to their owners without the enactment of legislation which 
 would make substantial changes in the policy of regulation 
 theretofore in force, and especially legislation made with a 
 view to rehabilitating and maintaining credit on a perma- 
 nently sound basis. 
 
 [7] 
 
The roads were returned to their owners March 1, 1920, 
 and the success of private management under the legisla- 
 tion provided by the Transportation Act is yet to be deter- 
 mined. 
 
 It need hardly be stated that private management cannot 
 continue unless it succeeds in furnishing the country with a 
 system of transportation adequate to its needs at all times, 
 and that the failure of private management will necessitate 
 Government ownership and operation. 
 
 As sound credit is essential to adequate facilities and 
 satisfactory service, the restoration and maintenance of 
 credit are necessarily essential to assure the continuance of 
 private management and to avoid the possibility of Govern- 
 ment ownership. In order that credit may be restored and 
 transportation conducted successfully under existing laws, 
 the Transportation Act recognizes that further consolidations 
 among the railroads of the country may be necessary, and 
 provides a method by which they may be accomplished. 
 
 The relationship of consolidations to credit and the prac- 
 ticability of making consolidations necessary to establish 
 credit form the subject of this pamphlet. 
 
 Part I analyzes the causes of the depreciated credit of the 
 railroads in the decade prior to their being taken over by the 
 Government and contains a discussion of consolidations as a 
 factor in restoring and maintaining sound credit conditions. 
 
 Part II presents a concrete plan for consolidating the 
 principal railroads of the country into a limited number 
 of systems. This plan has been prepared because of the con- 
 clusions arrived at in Part I that consolidations are important 
 and necessary for the purpose stated. Accompanying the 
 plan are maps and statistical data to show that the proposed 
 systems would be strong, self-supporting, and competing, in 
 accordance with the requirements of the Transportation Act. 
 
 [8] 
 
PART I 
 
 Condition of Railroad Credit Before Federal 
 
 Control 
 
 In the discussion of the railroad problem, the . roads with 
 satisfactory dividend records have usually been referred to 
 as " strong " and those without such records as " weak." 
 Using this classification, it will be found that during the ten 
 years preceding Federal control approximately 60 per cent 
 of the traffic of the country was handled by the so-called 
 " strong " roads and the remaining 40 per cent by the so- 
 called " weak " roads. 
 
 Prior to 1910 railroad earnings generally were adequate ^l^*^'"" 
 to furnish the strong roads with income which covered not 
 only their dividend requirements but provided also a margin, 
 or surplus, sufficient to offset such shrinkage in earnings as 
 might result from a temporary change in business condi- 
 tions or from other causes which could not be foreseen. 
 Under these circumstances the strong roads found it possible 
 to finance a considerable part of their requirements by the 
 issue of capital stock, thus following a policy which is uni- 
 versally recognized as a test of sound credit. 
 
 After 1910, although the same rates of dividends were 
 generally maintained, the margin of earnings which had 
 previously served to protect dividends had become so re- 
 duced, with the exception of a brief period covered by the 
 years 1916 and 1917, that investors lost confidence in the 
 ability of these roads to continue dividend payments at 
 former rates. As further issues of capital stock were im- 
 possible under these conditions, financial requirements were 
 necessarily met largely by the issue of bonds. 
 
 That the reduced margin of earnings was the result of 
 increased cost of operation and the impossibility of secur- 
 ing rate increases necessary to offset the increased cost, is 
 shown conclusively by a comparison of the reports of the 
 
 [9] 
 
The 
 
 Weak Roads 
 
 Larger 
 WeaJc Roads 
 
 Comparison 
 of Strong and 
 Ijavger Weah 
 Roads 
 
 Interstate Commerce Commission for the years covering 
 the period 1910 to 1915. These statements show that in 
 no one of the years 1911 to 1915 inclusive, were railroad net 
 earnings as large as those of the year 1910, although in each 
 of these years gross earnings were larger and property invest- 
 ment was greater. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the 
 depreciated credit of the strong roads, which is indicated in 
 part by the discontinuance of stock financing, was largely 
 if not entirely due to inadequate rates. 
 
 In considering the causes of the depreciated credit of 
 the weak roads, which handled the remaining 40 per cent of 
 the traffic of the country, in addition to inadequate rates 
 other conditions must be taken into account. In this dis- 
 cussion the weak roads will be considered in three groups as 
 follows — 
 
 First — The larger systems which in the pre-war period handled 
 
 about 25 per cent of the country's traffic 
 Second — The smaller or short line roads scattered throughout the 
 
 country which handled approximately 10 per cent 
 Third — The New England roads which handled the remaining 
 
 5 per cent 
 
 Because the first group of weak roads — the larger sys- 
 tems — forms a large part of the country's transportation 
 system, and also because the roads comprising this group are 
 and must continue to be a factor of great importance in any 
 proposed plan of consolidation, it is desirable to ascertain 
 and clearly establish the fundamental causes of their weak- 
 ness. These causes are clearly brought out by a comparison 
 of these roads with the strong roads. 
 
 For this purpose tables are here submitted presenting a 
 comparison of the operating and financial statistics of the 
 ten largest strong roads with a like number of the largest 
 weak roads, all of which operate in the Southern and Western 
 districts. 
 
 The " strong," or dividend-paying roads, will be referred to 
 in this comparison as_the Group A roads, and the "weak," or 
 non-dividend-paying roads, as the Group B roads. The 
 tonnage statistics in the following tables cover the year 
 ended June 30, 1916; all other statements are based upon 
 figures representing an annual average covering the three- 
 
 [10] 
 
year period ended June 30, 1917, commonly known as the 
 
 "Test Period." 
 
 These tables are designed to show — 
 
 Table I The proportion of gross operating income obtained 
 from different kinds of traffic 
 
 Table II The percentage of different commodities constituting 
 the freight tonnage 
 
 Table III The uniformity of rates for both passenger and freight 
 service 
 
 Table IV The uniformity of operating results, and the disposi- 
 tion of traffic earnings 
 
 Table V The percentage of fixed charges and dividends to 
 gross operating income 
 
 Table VI The percentage to gross operating income of : total 
 capitalization; securities on which fixed charges were 
 paid, including interest and rentals; preferred and 
 common stocks 
 
 Table VII The percentage of net operating income to gross 
 operating income; the rate of return earned on the 
 total capitalization; the similarity of the return of the 
 Group A and Group B roads if similarly capitalized 
 
 TABLE I 
 Per cent of Gross Operating Income Obtained From Different Kinds 
 
 of Traffic 
 
 
 Freight 
 
 Passenger 
 
 Miscellaneous 
 
 Total 
 
 Group A 
 Group B 
 
 68.5 
 72.1 
 
 21,7 
 20.5 
 
 9.8 
 
 7.4 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 TABLE II 
 Classification of Tonnage 
 
 Per cent to total tonnage 
 
 Products of 
 
 Agricul- 
 ture 
 
 Animals 
 
 Mines 
 
 Forests 
 
 Manu- 
 factures 
 
 Miscel- 
 laneous 
 
 LCL 
 
 Goods 
 
 Total 
 
 Group A 
 Group B 
 
 19.2 
 17.2 
 
 3.8 
 4.1 
 
 42.9 
 40.9 
 
 13.7 
 13.2 
 
 13.9 
 18.2 
 
 1.6 
 
 2.2 
 
 4.9 
 4.2 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 TABLE III 
 Rates 
 
 
 Rate per Ton Mile 
 
 Rate per Passenger Mile 
 
 Group A 
 Group B 
 
 ?. 00812 
 .00819 
 
 ^ 02060 
 .02060 
 
 [11 
 
TABLE IV 
 Disposition of Gross Operating Income 
 
 Received from 
 passenger, freight, 
 and miscellaneous 
 traffic 
 
 Operating ex- 
 penses and taxes, 
 excluding main- 
 tenance 
 
 ATailable for 
 expenditure upoa 
 
 property 
 (maintenance and 
 surplus combined) 
 
 Aggregate of 
 
 fixed charges and 
 
 dividends 
 
 Group A 
 Group B 
 
 100% 
 100% 
 
 41.1% 
 43.6% 
 
 35.7% 
 33.8% 
 
 23.2% 
 
 22.6% 
 
 TABLE V 
 
 Per cent of Gross Operating Income 
 
 Distributed to Security Holders 
 
 Per cent of gross paid 
 as fixed charges, inter- 
 est, and rentals 
 
 Per cent of gross paid 
 as dividends on pre- 
 ferred and common 
 stocks 
 
 Total — 
 
 Same as last column 
 
 in Table IV 
 
 Group A 
 Group B 
 
 11.5% 
 22.2% 
 
 11.7% 
 .4% 
 
 23.2% 
 22.6% 
 
 TABLE VI 
 Capitalization for Each $1.00 of Gross Operating Income 
 
 
 Obligations — 
 
 Rentals 
 
 and Interest 
 
 capitalized at s% 
 
 Preferred stock 
 
 Common stock 
 
 Total 
 See Note A 
 
 Group A 
 Group B 
 
 ?2.31 
 4.44 
 
 $ .22 
 1.14 
 
 ^1.54 
 1.45 
 
 ^.07 
 7.03 
 
 TABLE VII 
 Rate of Return on Capitalization 
 
 Net Operating 
 Income (Per 
 
 cent to Gross) 
 See Note B 
 
 Capitalization 
 
 per $1.00 of 
 gross operating 
 
 income 
 See Table VI 
 
 Rate of return 
 
 earned on 
 capitalization 
 
 Both groups 
 
 capitalized 
 
 $4. 07 — Rate 
 
 of return 
 
 earned 
 
 Both groups 
 
 capitalized 
 
 I7.03 — Rate 
 
 of return 
 
 earned 
 
 Group A 
 Group B 
 
 30.7% 
 
 28.2% 
 
 f4.07 
 7.03 
 
 7.54% 
 4.01% 
 
 7.54% 
 6.93% 
 
 4.37% 
 4.01% 
 
 Note A . As railroad income is derived not only from traffic but also from outside invest- 
 ments, and as the proportion of income from the several^ sources varies with individual com- 
 panies, for the sake of uniformity in the above comparisons the proportionate part of the 
 capitalization which may be properly considered as representing railroad property has been 
 determined by placing the same proportion of capitahzation against the railroad property 
 that the net railway operating income is to the total net income. For example, if the total 
 net income is made up of 90 per cent of railroad earnings and 10 per cent of earnings from 
 outside investments, 90 per cent of the total capitalization is allocated to railroad property 
 and 10 per cent to outside investments. 
 
 Note B. As net earnings are affected by the amounts charged to maintenance, and as 
 there is no uniformity among railroads in the matter of maintenance accounting, it has seemed 
 desirable for the purpose of comparison to charge to operating expenses the same percentage 
 of gross operating income in both groups of roads. The figure used in this case is 28.2 per cent, 
 which is the actual average of the roads comprising group A. 
 
 [12] 
 
The conclusions which are to be drawn from these tables 
 are — 
 
 First — that the strong and weak roads handle similar traffic; 
 that the proportion of income which is obtained from different 
 classes of service — passenger,freight, and miscellaneous — to 
 the total are about the same; that passenger and freight traffic 
 are handled at substantially uniform rates; and that the reven- 
 ues received from traffic are expended by both groups of roads 
 in similar proportions for operating expenses, maintenance 
 charges, and disbursements to security holders. Tables I to IV. 
 
 Second — that Group A roads divide their disbursements to secu- 
 rity holders about equally between fixed charges and dividends, 
 while Group B roads disburse about the same proportion of 
 gross, but substantially all of it is absorbed by fixed charges; 
 consequently, the Group B roads cannot be expected to pay 
 dividends on their capital stock unless they receive a larger 
 income than the Group A roads for handling similar traffic, or 
 unless they are operated with greater efficiency. Table V. 
 
 Third — that capitalization representing the aggregate par value 
 of all obligations and stock of the Group A roads is $4.07 per 
 dollar of gross operating income, and that of the Group B 
 roads is |7.03; the capitalization of the Group B roads is thus 
 75 per cent greater than that of the Group A roads; further, 
 that the amount of securities on which interest and rentals alone 
 are paid by the Group B roads is larger than the total capital- 
 ization of the Group A roads. Table VI. 
 
 Fourth — that were both groups of roads capitalized on the basis 
 of their gross earnings, there would be but little difference 
 in the rate of return earned on the capitalization of either 
 group. Table VII. 
 
 These figures tell their own story. They offer little if 
 any evidence that the average road of either group had any 
 special advantage over the other in location, character of 
 traffic carried, operating costs, maintenance charges, or in 
 any other essential operating factor. They show also that 
 the necessary readjustment of the capitalization of the Group 
 B roads is all that is required to make their financial showing 
 similar to that of the Group A roads. 
 
 The figures given in the tables for Groups A and B are 
 averages. It is a fact that figures for individual roads in 
 each group vary from the average; such variation, however, 
 is no greater in Group B than in Group A. This indicates 
 that at least some of the Group A roads, if capitalized as 
 are the Group B roads, would be considered "weak" roads, 
 
 [13] 
 
Capitalization 
 makes them 
 Strong or 
 Weah 
 
 No uniform 
 
 financial 
 
 policy 
 
 and that some of the Group B roads, if capitalized as are 
 the Group A roads, would be considered "strong." In 
 other words, a conclusion as to the relative strength or 
 weakness would be the same whether comparisons are 
 made between the two groups as such or between the 
 individual roads in such groups. 
 
 Similar comparisons in the Eastern District show similar 
 conditions. 
 
 Thus it is evident that the difference between the financial 
 condition of the strong roads and the weak, insofar as the 
 larger systems here under consideration are concerned, is 
 accounted for by the form of their financial structures and 
 has little or nothing to do with the character or quantity of, 
 or the method of handling, their business. This is an im- 
 portant fact, for it indicates that by making over the finan- 
 cial organizations of these weak roads, and by this action 
 alone, the financial condition of roads which carry about 25 
 per cent of the country's traffic can be placed on a basis 
 of financial soundness similar to that of the so-called strong 
 roads. While these conditions are not generally appreci- 
 ated, yet the causes which have led to them are quite 
 apparent. The principal railroad systems of the country, 
 the so-called strong roads and the larger systems among 
 the so-called weak roads which together carry about 85 
 per cent of the country's business, are the result of consoli- 
 dations of separately built railroads. These consolida- 
 tions took place, substantially without public regulation, 
 previous to the year 1903, at which time the decision of the 
 United States Supreme Court in the Northern Securities 
 Case became an important factor in checking development 
 along these lines. By the consoHdations which at that time 
 had been made, roads of favorable situation and conditions 
 had been united with other roads less favorably circum- 
 stanced. In this way uneven conditions had been averaged, 
 more or less unconsciously it is true, so that in all essential 
 operating respects the resulting systems in both the " strong" 
 and the " weak " groups were similar. This is clearly shown 
 by the foregoing tables. 
 
 In this development, however, no uniform financial policy 
 was followed, and consequently no uniformity of capitaliza- 
 
 [14] 
 
tion resulted. In some cases the value of the consolidated 
 property equalled or even exceeded the total capitalization; 
 in other cases the capitalization exceeded the property value. 
 Likewise, there was wide variation in the proportion of capi- 
 talization which was represented by obligations and by 
 capital stock. The roads where capitalizations did not 
 exceed property values and where fixed charges did not 
 absorb so much of the income as to leave an amount insuffi- 
 cient to pay and to protect dividends, came to be known as 
 the " strong " roads, the roads of sound credit which found 
 it possible under adequate rates to finance by the issue of 
 capital stock. On the other hand, the roads where capital- 
 ization exceeded property values and where fixed charges 
 absorbed so large a part of their income that no balance was 
 available for dividends came to be known as the "weak" 
 roads, the roads of unsound credit which even under ade- 
 quate rates were obliged to finance almost entirely by bor- 
 rowed capital. 
 
 From the foregoing it appears that by reorganizing the Financial 
 financial structures of the roads which comprise the first nec^wy""" 
 group of weak roads which carry 25 per cent of the business 
 of the country, both they and the strong roads, which carry 
 60 per cent of the business, may be expected to operate 
 with similar success under rates which are uniform for all 
 roads in the same rate-making territory. 
 
 There remains for consideration the balance of the weak The smaii 
 roads — the small roads widely scattered over the country — *°"''' 
 which handle in the aggregate approximately 10 per cent, 
 and the New England roads which handle about 5 per cent 
 of the country's business. 
 
 These small roads have been characterized frequently 
 as "less favorably situated." Such characterization is in 
 the main accurate. Some of them probably suffer from the 
 form of their financial organization as do the so-called 
 " weak " roads which have just been described, and like 
 them, they would be benefited by a change in their financial 
 structures. But, the smaller roads generally are further 
 handicapped by the character and quantity of business 
 available for them, by higher operating costs, and by other 
 factors which make it clear that as separately owned and 
 
 [15] 
 
operated units they cannot become profitable under any 
 rate-making system which would suffice for the larger 
 and stronger roads competing with them in their respective 
 territories. For the most part, they perform a necessary 
 service; they are important lines as feeders for the larger 
 systems with which they connect; their public very prop- 
 erly demands their continuance; they cannot be aban- 
 doned. 
 i^« With the New England roads the situation is in some 
 
 New England . x -i i n 11 
 
 Roads respects similar. Like the small roads they must operate 
 
 under rates made for roads more favorably situated, since 
 their rates are and must be the same in large part as those 
 made for all roads in the Eastern territory, even though 
 statistics show that they are more costly to operate. It 
 must not be concluded, however, that these roads consti- 
 tute a problem by themselves without interest to people 
 outside of New England and unrelated to the railroad prob- 
 lem of the whole country. New England with her enormous 
 factory development is an important market for the raw 
 materials produced by other sections of the country — coal, 
 steel, cotton, wool, copper, and leather — as well as the 
 source from which the country receives many kinds and 
 large amounts of manufactured products which are its 
 necessities and comforts. The food producing sections of 
 the country also find a large market for their products in 
 the dense population of the New England district. 
 
 The extent of the commercial value of New England to 
 other sections of the country and of their dependence upon 
 her is shown by the fact that nearly 65 per cent of the freight 
 tonnage of the New England roads is interchanged with 
 railroads outside of New England. This high percentage of 
 interchanged business taken with the fact that the haul on 
 the New England roads is short shows very clearly that the 
 latter are to a large extent terminals for their connecting 
 roads and are important parts of these systems. 
 
 That the credit of the New England roads be restored and 
 maintained so that they can perform adequately the service 
 required is thus a matter of concern not only to the public of 
 New England, but to the country at large. It is obvious, 
 however, that due to high operating costs their credit can- 
 
 [16] 
 
not be maintained under rates which are sufficient for the 
 more favorable situated roads with which they connect. 
 
 A satisfactory solution of the problem of credit involves: Necessity of 
 
 . J . ,...-,,, , Credit restora- 
 
 rates adequate to msure a credit position lor all roads; such tion 
 readjustment of capitalization as may be necessary to give 
 each road a sound financial structure; and some provision 
 to overcome the handicaps of location. 
 
 Large amounts of new capital will be required by all roads 
 not only for the adequate maintenance and expansion of 
 their facilities, but also for the liquidation of vast amounts 
 due to the Government as a result of Federal control. 
 
 These enormous debts due the Government at the present 
 time are a menace to private operation; their continuance 
 will eventually lead to Government ownership. The con- 
 clusion is inevitable, if private management is to be per- 
 petuated, that the railroads of the country individually and 
 as a whole must secure for themselves a credit position 
 which will enable them to meet their capital requirements 
 from the investment markets and without dependence upon 
 the public treasury. 
 
 The Basis of Rates 
 
 From the above it is evident that the factor common to 
 all the railroads is the matter of rates, — their adequacy, 
 and the theory upon which they are to be established so as 
 to afford each railroad system a sufficient income. The 
 importance of this factor is clearly recognized by the Trans- 
 portation Act. 
 
 The provisions of the Transportation Act relating to rates 
 recognize that the cost of capital is part of the cost of service, 
 and as such must be protected by the rates charged. The 
 Act provides accordingly that rates shall be so established 
 as to provide a return on the aggregate value of all rail- 
 way property held for and used in the service of trans- 
 portation. It stipulates that for two years, beginning 
 March 1, 1920, such fair return shall be 5>^ per cent and, 
 in the discretion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 may be increased to 6 per cent; and that after the expiration 
 of two years the rate of return shall be left to the judgment 
 
 [17] 
 
of the Commission, who shall give " due consideration, 
 among other things, to the transportation needs of the 
 country and the necessity ... of enlarging such facilities in 
 order to provide the people of the United States with ad- 
 equate transportation." 
 
 This recognition by the Transportation Act of the cost of 
 capital as a factor in the cost of service is not the recognition 
 of a new principle in its application to publicly regulated 
 corporations. The decisions of our highest courts time and 
 again have held that property used in the public service is 
 entitled to a fair and just return — which, obviously, must 
 be provided by the rates charged — and less than such 
 return results in confiscation of property that is abhorrent 
 to the safeguards of the Federal constitution. 
 ■J"*® Various plans which have come to be known as " service- 
 
 prtncipie at-cost" plans, in which cost of capital has been given equal 
 
 consideration with other factors, have been adopted suc- 
 cessfully for determining the rates to be charged by public 
 utility companies, especially those furnishing local trans- 
 portation service. In such cases an agreement has been 
 reached both as to the value of the property to be used for 
 rate-making purposes as well as to the rate constituting a 
 fair return. Heretofore, however, it has been impossible to 
 make railroad rates on this basis, for opinions have differed 
 in regard to the rate constituting a fair return and to the 
 factors which should determine value for rate-making pur- 
 poses. Progress in this direction has been made, however, 
 in recent years. 
 
 The Transportation Act has fixed the rate of return, or 
 provided the basis for determining the rate of return, which 
 the railroads will be allowed to earn on their property 
 value in the future. Furthermore, in response to Act of 
 Congress passed in 1913, the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission has been engaged in preparing a valuation for each 
 railroad of the country, and these valuations are nearly com- 
 pleted. Now for the first time, with more accurate and 
 definite knowledge of these two essential factors, it is possible 
 to apply to the railroads of the country the service-at-cost 
 principle of rate-making and to include in the cost the 
 factor of fair return upon the value of railroad property. 
 
 [18] 
 
In the application of this method of rate making the public 
 in the territory served is charged rates to provide income 
 sufficient to cover the cost of all services performed, includ- 
 ing an amount equal to the agreed return upon the aggregate 
 value of the property used in the service. 
 
 Provided there is a common interest in the results of 
 operation through a common interest in the ownership of 
 all parts of the property used in the service, it is not essen- 
 tial that the income from each service performed should be 
 proportionate to its cost, nor that each individual part of 
 the property should be self-sustaining so long as the total 
 income received from all services is adequate for a fair 
 return on the aggregate value of the property. 
 
 Application of " Service-at-cost " Principle 
 
 In the case of public utility companies this method of rate Difficulties in 
 making has been applied to companies having a monopoly ^o c<^"^6° 
 and, hence, a common interest in the results obtained. In companies 
 its application to the railroads, however, the companies, 
 because of diversity of ownership of the constituent parts of 
 the property, have no common interest in the results of 
 operation, and furthermore competing for the same business 
 are obliged to operate under uniform rates. As in the case of 
 a monopoly, however, the rates cannot be made to produce 
 income in excess of the combined requirements of the roads 
 as a whole in any given territory which may be determined to 
 be a unit for rate-making purposes. While rates must be 
 established which will afford the required fair return upon 
 the aggregate value of all the railroad property in a given 
 rate-making territory — and neither more nor less than such 
 fair return — it does not follow that under competitive 
 conditions such fair return will be received by each road in 
 the territory. 
 
 If the rates were established at a figure just sufficient to 
 give a fair return to the railroad most favorably situated, 
 such rate would be insufficient to give a fair return to another 
 competing railroad in the same territory less favorably situ- 
 ated. Thus, the second railroad under such a rate would 
 be selling its service at less than cost and, under such con- 
 
 ^ -._ [19] 
 
 NOV 181J^ I 
 
ditionSj could never arrive at a position of sound credit. 
 On the other hand, if the rates were made at a figure to cover 
 the cost of service of the inferior railroad, the railroad of 
 superior position would receive more than the fair return 
 contemplated by the statute. 
 
 Since property values and operating costs of each road 
 are factors which determine the rates to be used for all roads, 
 they should also determine the amount of income to be re- 
 ceived by. each road. While a separate rate for each road 
 cannot be established, this impossibility should not operate 
 to give to any road a return larger than would be received if 
 the rates were established for it as a separate unit; nor 
 should it operate to deprive any road of the full amount of 
 income to which it is entitled on the basis of its individual 
 requirements. 
 
 The Transportation Act recognized these difficulties but 
 found no adequate way to meet them. By providing for 
 the " recapture of excess earnings " it attempts to limit the 
 income of the more favorably situated roads to the fair re- 
 turn on the value of their property; by requiring the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission, in determining the equitable 
 division of joint rates, to give weight to the circumstances of 
 each road and especially to take into account " the amount 
 of revenue necessary to pay operating expenses, taxes, and to 
 give a fair return on the value of the property" it attempts 
 to some extent to divert earnings from the more favorably 
 situated to the less favorably situated roads. 
 Requisites for Unlcss some practical way is found to give to each system 
 
 its successful . '^ . ii-i- 
 
 appUcation to mcome adequate for its needs, some roads which are im- 
 compa^ portant parts of the nation's transportation system cannot 
 be made financially sound, and the provision for rate making 
 under the Transportation Act will not fully accomplish its 
 purpose. To apply the service-at-cost method with com- 
 plete success it will be necessary either (a) to consolidate all 
 the railroads in each rate-making territory into one system, 
 thus creating a monopoly and completely eliminating compe- 
 tition; or (b) to provide a method which is practicable and 
 economically sound for equahzing the income of the various 
 roads by a redistribution of the earnings so that each road 
 will receive from the whole such amount as is necessary for 
 
 [20] 
 
its cost of operation and a fair return upon the value of its 
 property, or (c) to combine the more favorably and less 
 favorably situated roads in each rate-making district so that 
 the systems resulting from the combinations will be able to 
 obtain uniform results under uniform rates. 
 
 The solution of the problem by creating a monopoly Monopoly 
 should be considered only after failure to meet the situation considered 
 by one of the other methods. A railroad monopoly in any 
 district would eliminate competition, would offend public 
 sentiment, and would be directly contrary to the clear intent 
 of the Transportation Act. 
 
 The second suggestion, that of equalizing the income by a solution by 
 
 J. ., . r ■ 1.1- • • 1 JSQuahHtvg 
 
 redistribution or earnings, even though sound in principle, income 
 presents difficulties which appear to be conclusive against it. '•"p"'**'^'''* 
 It would require both the recapture of the excess earnings 
 of the more favorably situated roads and the allocation of 
 such earnings in varying amounts to the less favorably 
 situated in accordance with the requirements of each. To 
 take from some railroads a part of the income which they 
 have received under a given schedule of rates, because they 
 have received more than that to which they are entitled 
 under the service-at-cost principle, and to hand it over to 
 other roads which have meanwhile received less than that to 
 which they are entitled entails exact standardization of 
 operating costs and maintenance charges, and standardiza- 
 tion also of efficiency in management, for a road is entitled to 
 its fixed return only provided it is efficiently operated. Such 
 standardization is practically impossible. A given railroad 
 management knowing that any excess earnings received by 
 it are to be taken away will be constantly under temp- 
 tation to conceal its excess earnings through an increase in 
 operating expenses; it will not be under any incentive to 
 keep costs down to the lowest amount consistent with safe 
 and sound operation. Likewise, a management which 
 knows that a shortage in its income is to be made up will 
 have little incentive to keep the shortage small by econ- 
 omies in operation. Extravagances of corporate manage- 
 ment to avoid payment of taxes is a phenomenon of recent 
 development which illustrates the point. 
 
 In order to exercise all of its ingenuity in a competitive 
 
 [21] 
 
^x^TLaX- ^^^^ ^^^^ management must be assured that what it receives 
 
 *»fl» under established competitive conditions shall remain its 
 
 unsound own and shall not be handed over to a management which 
 
 may be less resourceful and less careful. To take away 
 
 rewards to efficiency and to make awards to inefficiency (and 
 
 this in the absence of exact standards of accounting and 
 
 management) would destroy the incentive for railroad 
 
 managements to take advantage of their opportunities in the 
 
 knowledge that they may not keep everything that they 
 
 receive. Under the one plan railroad management would 
 
 inevitably become shiftless and extravagant; under the 
 
 other, each management would constantly strive to conserve 
 
 its resources and to become efficient. 
 
 DifBcuities of Xhe difficulties of this method of solution are well illus- 
 
 appUcation jii i i-vtt-'iii 
 
 Illustrated trated by the controversy between the New England roads 
 and the trunk lines over the division of joint rates. Nego- 
 tiations which started to determine the equitable division 
 of such rates between these roads, because of some implied 
 authority in the Act for giving weight to the circumstances 
 of the roads concerned, developed into a contention for a 
 redistribution of earnings on the basis of the needs of 
 the roads. 
 
 In the hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion testimony was presented purporting to show that rates 
 had been established for the whole of the Eastern territory 
 higher than they would have been if New England had not 
 been included, and that because of these higher rates the 
 roads in the Eastern territory outside of New England 
 would receive approximately |25,000,000 more than if rates 
 were made with a view to their requirements alone, without 
 taking into account the cost of operation and property values 
 of the New England roads. The New England roads con- 
 tended that these excess earnings measured and established 
 the amount which they were entitled to receive from the 
 outside roads because of their inclusion in the rate group. 
 This excess would be received in varying amounts by all 
 railroads in the Eastern territory, including roads which 
 have no physical and no direct traffic connection with the 
 New England roads. In this case, if it should be determined 
 how much each road should pay into a fund equitably be- 
 
 [22] 
 
longing to the New England roads, and if such payment 
 should actually be made, there would remain the equally 
 perplexing question of the equitable division of the fund 
 among the several New England roads. The practical diffi- 
 culties of solving the problem in this way have proved so 
 great that no agreement has been reached, although negotia- 
 tions have extended over many months under repeated re- 
 quests of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
 
 This single incident well illustrates some of the practical 
 difficulties which would occur hundreds of times if the expedi- 
 ent of equalizing income by a redistribution of earnings were 
 adopted in order to apply the service-at-cost principle. 
 
 From the foregoing it is clear that the service-at-cost consolidations 
 method cannot be applied successfully to competing com- solution 
 panies unless they are uniform in essential respects. Unless 
 such uniformity can be brought about, the operation of the 
 rate-making provision of the Transportation Act will prove 
 disappointing in the results attained. The question thus 
 becomes this: Can the railroads of the country be consoli- 
 dated into a limited number of competing systems of such 
 uniform character and subject to such uniform operating 
 conditions so that each and every system in a given rate- 
 making territory will be able to earn the fair return upon the 
 value of its property? Part II of this pamphlet answers this 
 question in the affirmative by presenting such a plan of 
 consolidation. 
 
 23 
 
PART II 
 
 Consolidations — Their Purpose and Practicability 
 
 The discussion in Part I has shown that consolidations are 
 necessary in order to establish the finances of the railroads 
 as a whole upon a sound basis. The primary purpose of 
 making the railroads financially sound is to enable them to 
 obtain capital readily and economically. To accomplish 
 'his fully other requirements must be met. 
 
 It will be of no avail to consolidate the railroads in such a 
 way that each road hereafter existing will be enabled to 
 receive, under a uniform rate, its fair return in a competitive 
 field, unless each road is assured of a credit position clearly 
 recognized by the investing public. 
 Reputation -pj^g requisites of credit are not only financial soundness 
 
 necessary to ^ _ •' _ 
 
 credit but a reputation based upon conservative financial policies 
 
 and management. This reputation at present is possessed 
 only by the "strong" roads. It will not be secured readily 
 by the "weak" roads merely by their financial reorganiza- 
 tion, although, logically, this is all that is needed to insure 
 the investment integrity of their securities. 
 
 Broad market Furthermore, if capital is to be obtained upon the most 
 advantageous terms by these roads, their securities must 
 be made available for investment on the part of savings 
 banks, insurance companies, and other semi-public insti- 
 tutions. Their securities, accordingly, must confoim to the 
 requirements governing the eligibility of such investments, 
 and these requirements quite universally include, as an 
 essential factor, dividend payments at given rates extend- 
 ing over a considerable period of time. The institutional 
 markets will not be available for the securities of roads 
 which have found it necessary to readjust their capitaliza- 
 tion in order to meet sound standards of credit until these 
 roads have established for themselves the necessary record 
 
 [24] 
 
 for securities 
 important 
 
for dividend payments; nor will they be available at any 
 time for the securities of the smaller systems, for these 
 institutions, either because of legislative restrictions or of 
 investment policies, for the most part confine their invest- 
 ments to securities of the larger systems. 
 
 To establish the necessary credit position and to give access 
 to the most favorable security markets the "strong" roads 
 must be used as the backbones of the new systems. 
 
 Consolidation Would Not Destroy the Credit of the 
 "Strong" Roads 
 
 Much of the opposition to consolidations has been and 
 will continue to be based on the theory that their purpose 
 is to strengthen the "weak" by weakening the "strong" 
 roads and that the credit of the "strong" roads will thereby 
 be impaired. If this result is to follow, it goes without 
 saying that voluntary consolidations in a large way will 
 never take place. 
 
 This conception of the problem, however, proceeds largely 
 on the assumption that the "weak" roads generally are less 
 favorably situated. It does not take into account the fact 
 that approximately 25 per cent of the country's traffic is 
 handled by systems which are "weak" only in their capi- 
 talization, but are similar to the "strong" roads both in 
 operating conditions and in favorableness of location, and, 
 if similarly capitalized, would have similar financial strength. 
 (The similarity and diflFerences of these two groups of roads 
 are fully discussed in Part I, pages 10-15). 
 
 The contention that the credit of the so-called "strong" *"""* financial 
 roads will be impaired by merging with the "weak" roads, prerequisite 
 insofar as it applies to such systems as are here referred to, 
 can be upheld only on the theory that the amount of exist- 
 ing capitalization rather than property value, is to be 
 the controlling factor in determining the basis of consoli- 
 dations, and that adjustment of capitalization to conform 
 to property value is not to be made at the time or before 
 consolidations take place. Such readjustments, however, 
 are required by the provision of the Transportation Act 
 which stipulates that "the bonds at par of a corporation 
 
 [25] 
 
Difficulties 
 overestimated 
 
 which is to become the owner of the consolidated properties, 
 together with the outstanding capital stock at par of such 
 corporation, shall not exceed the value of the consolidated 
 properties as determined by the Commission." Thus in 
 the process of consolidation over-capitalization will be elimi- 
 nated wherever it is found. 
 
 The problem of consolidations, therefore, has to do 
 largely with the merging of roads whose main difference is a 
 matter of capitalization, inasmuch as the remaining roads — 
 the less favorably situated — handle not over 15 per cent 
 of the country's traffic. 
 
 Even the absorption of these roads need not prove a 
 burden, provided proper recognition is given to the property 
 values and relative earning capacity of the several com- 
 panies involved. 
 
 While the complexity of the problem of harmonizing the 
 many interests concerned is fully appreciated, it is sufficient 
 here to say that, if the public interest requires that such 
 consolidations be made, the difficulties of making them on a 
 basis which will fully recognize the rights of all parties 
 appear to be no greater than those which have been met 
 successfully many times heretofore in railroad and industrial 
 consolidations. 
 
 Consolidations Essential to Healthful Competition 
 
 Wasteful com- 
 petition should 
 be eliminated 
 
 While this discussion has concerned itself thus far prin- 
 cipally with the relation of consolidations to credit, never- 
 theless, consolidations are important to carry out other 
 essential provisions of the Transportation Act. The Act 
 specifically stipulates that transportation must be fur- 
 nished at the lowest cost consistent with adequate service. 
 
 Congress adopted the premise that private ownership 
 and operation would secure greater efficiency than Govern- 
 ment ownership and that competition would assure greater 
 economy in operation than a monopoly. 
 
 There has been much misapprehension as to the kind of 
 competition contemplated by the Act. It should be empha- 
 sized that inasmuch as the primary purpose of competition 
 
 [26] 
 
Character of 
 the competition 
 
 is to promote efficiency and economy, the competition 
 intended is only such as may be expected to serve these 
 purposes. Competition which would require duplication 
 of facilities or which in any way would increase the cost of 
 service, would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes of 
 the Act. The Act calls for a limited number of systems so 
 competing as to secure economical service through efficiency 
 of operation. 
 
 Under the poUcy of rate making established by the 
 Transportation Act the amount of income in a given terri- to be preserved 
 tory is to be limited to an amount which will equal the fair 
 return on the aggregate value of the property of the roads 
 as a whole in the territory. As railroads have no control 
 over rates to be charged for service and as they are forbidden 
 by law from discriminating in favor of either individuals or 
 communities, competition resolves itself into a contest 
 among the roads in each district for such part of the avail- 
 able income as each is able to obtain on the basis of the 
 facilities which it can furnish and the quality of service which 
 it can offer. 
 
 This is genuine competition, provided the companies are 
 similarly situated so as to create equality of opportunity, 
 for under such circumstances efficiency of operation alone 
 would determine the income which each receives. Unless 
 the companies are similarly situated, other factors, especially 
 favorableness of location, would in part determine the 
 receipt of income, and, insofar as such factors are unduly 
 rewarded, efficiency of operation will fail to receive its just 
 reward. 
 
 Congress has made competition an essential factor in the 
 railroad policy of the country on the theory that competi- 
 tion provides the means of assuring adequate service with 
 the greatest efficiency and economy. It is obvious that 
 these purposes cannot be served unless the companies 
 engaged in competition have equal operating advantages 
 and similar financial strength and credit standing; and that 
 to establish these conditions it will be necessary to make 
 further consolidations among existing systems. 
 
 [27] 
 
Characteristics of Competing Companies 
 
 The general character of the consolidations contemplated 
 by the recent legislation are clearly indicated by Section 407 
 of the Transportation Act of 1920 and may be summarized 
 briefly as follows — 
 
 To combine all the railroads of the country into a limited number 
 of self-supporting systems 
 
 To group the roads so that "competition shall be preserved as 
 fully as possible" among the systems serving the same terri- 
 tory and so that wherever practicable " the existing routes and 
 channels of trade and commerce shall be maintained" 
 
 To arrange the systems so that " the cost of transportation as be- 
 tween competitive systems" shall be substantially uniform, 
 so that " these systems can employ uniform rates in the move- 
 ment of competitive traffic and under efficient management 
 earn substantially the same rate of return upon the value of 
 their respective railway properties" 
 
 In order that the interests of all concerned may be fully 
 considered before a definite plan is adopted, the Act provides 
 that the Interstate Commerce Commission shall first prepare 
 a tentative plan, and that " when the Commission has agreed 
 upon a tentative plan, it shall give the same due publicity and 
 upon reasonable notice, including notice to the Governor of 
 each State, shall hear all persons who may file or present ob- 
 jections thereto." The Act further provides that " after the 
 hearings are at an end, the Commission shall adopt a plan 
 for such consolidation and publish the same." After the 
 adoption of the permanent plan, the consolidations which 
 are authorized and approved by the Commission " shall be 
 in harmony with such plan." 
 
 The Transportation Act does not fix the number of sys- 
 tems, as the exact number can only be determined after con- 
 sideration of the whole subject. 
 Scope of ji\ tentative plan of consolidation necessitates the con- 
 
 sideration only of combinations to be made among the 
 larger systems, for such systems, as they control a substan- 
 tial part of the mileage and traffic of the country, must 
 necessarily be the foundation of any general plan. The 
 smaller roads cannot be placed until the basic systems are 
 determined; and with these definitely fixed, the logical dis- 
 position of such roads will in most cases become apparent. 
 
 [28] 
 
 tentative plan 
 
In the preparation of a tentative plan the number of 
 roads to be considered is not large. Prior to Federal control 
 80 per cent of the mileage of the country was operated by 109 
 roads so related by stock ownership, lease or otherwise, as to 
 constitute 30 systems; and 88 per cent of the revenues was 
 obtained from traffic handled by these systems. Approxi- 
 mately 7 per cent of the mileage was operated by 17 addi- 
 tional roads so related as to constitute 15 systems; 6 per 
 cent of the revenue was obtained from their traffic. Thus, 
 as 87 per cent of the mileage and 94 per cent of the revenues 
 were within the control of 45 systems, only about 13 per cent 
 of the mileage and 6 per cent of the revenues were within the 
 control of the smaller systems. 
 
 The 30 systems referred to are listed in Table VIII below; 
 the 15 in Table IX; and a summary of all the systems and 
 roads classified on the basis of their mileage and earnings, 
 with the relative mileage and earnings of each class to the 
 total of the country, will be found in Table X. 
 
 [29] 
 
TABLE VIII 
 
 The thirty systems listed below comprise all systems which, with their controlled or affiliated 
 companies, as of June 30, 1916, had annual gross operating income of $25,000,000 or over. 
 
 The names of the affiliated companies constituting the various systems as of June 30, 1916, with 
 minor exceptions and except as noted, will be found by reference to the description of the systems on 
 pages 33-40. 
 
 Number of Class I Roads 
 in each System constitut- 
 ing roads owned and 
 controlled as of June 30, 
 1916 
 
 Average for Test Period 
 
 Mileage 
 
 Gross Operating 
 
 Operated 
 
 Income 
 
 11,476.70 
 
 ^5,623,546 
 
 13,331.22 
 
 343,785,402 
 
 4,563.50 
 
 110,216,356 
 
 1,998.88 
 
 92,680,217 
 
 2,870.15 
 
 88,621,495 
 
 2,396.15 
 
 73,197,134 
 
 2,848.95 
 
 59,077,915 
 
 2,062.11 
 
 53,800,498 
 
 2,286.36 
 
 51,913,506 
 
 956.27 
 
 48,923,528 
 
 1,443.45 
 
 47,023,053 
 
 3,031.02 
 
 42,449,571 
 
 883.41 
 
 25,411,263 
 
 12,755.01 
 
 125,895,041 
 
 9,684.36 
 
 107,892,747 
 
 8,071.04 
 
 97,818,454 
 
 3,445.88 
 
 24,926,111 
 
 18,916.06 
 
 202,039,732 
 
 10,884.31 
 
 154,162,290 
 
 11,745.52 
 
 139,897,726 
 
 9,304.28 
 
 117,691,478 
 
 9,860.63 
 
 111,048,825 
 
 10,221.52 
 
 103,164,598 
 
 8,094.45 
 
 78,548,635 
 
 8,297.79 
 
 77,988,555 
 
 7,348.14 
 
 66,076,724 
 
 6,125.10 
 
 64,635,838 
 
 4,938.10 
 
 36,843,497 
 
 3,865.04 
 
 35,340,021 
 
 3,518.64 
 
 32,221,710 
 
 **197,224.04 
 
 ***?3,018,915,466 
 
 12 
 10 
 2 
 4 
 3 
 3 
 4 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 
 8 
 8 
 4 
 5 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 2 
 3 
 3 
 3 
 2 
 
 109* 
 
 Eastern 
 
 Pennsylvania R.R 
 
 ' New York Central 
 
 Baltimore & Ohio 
 
 " Phila. & Reading 
 
 N.Y. N.H. & H. R.R 
 
 Erie Railroad 
 
 Chesapeake & Ohio 
 
 Norfolk & Western . .'. 
 
 Boston & Maine 
 
 Delaware, Lackawanna &] Western . . 
 
 Lehigh Valley 
 
 Wabash 
 
 Delaware & Hudson 
 
 Southern 
 
 Atlantic Coast Line 
 
 Southern Ry 
 
 Illinois Central 
 
 Seaboard 
 
 Western 
 ' Northern Pacific 
 
 Southern Pacific 
 
 Atchison 
 
 Union Pacific 
 
 Chicago & Northwestern 
 
 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul . . . 
 
 Great Northern 
 
 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific .... 
 
 Missouri Pacific 
 
 * St. Louis & San Francisco 
 
 Minn., St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie 
 
 Missouri, Kansas & Texas 
 
 Denver & Rio Grande 
 
 Includes New York, Chicago & St. Louis, since sold. 
 2 Includes Central of New Jersey. 
 
 ' Includes Chicago, Burlington & Quincy which is controlled jointly by the Great Northern. 
 < Includes Chicago & Eastern Illinois, since sold. 
 * Includes 109 Class I roads of a total of 169. 
 ** Represents 80.3 per cent of the mileage of all roads in the United States. 
 *** Represents 88.2 per cent of the gross operating revenue of all roads in the United States. 
 
 [30] 
 
TABLE IX 
 
 The fifteen systems listed below comprise all systems which, with their controlled or affiliated com- 
 panies, as of June 30, 1916, had annual gross operating income of $10,000,000 but less than $25,000,000. 
 
 The names of the affiliated companies constituting the various systems as of June 30, 1916, with 
 minor exceptions and except as noted, will be found by reference to the description of the systems on 
 pages 33-40. 
 
 Number of Class I Roads 
 in eacli System constitut- 
 
 
 Average for Test Period 
 
 ing roads owned and 
 
 controlled as of June 30, 
 
 igz6 
 
 Mileage 
 Operated 
 
 Gross Operating 
 Income 
 
 
 Eastern 
 Pere Marquette 
 
 2,271.73 
 
 788.78 
 1,219.73 
 586.50 
 694.50 
 204.63 
 
 $20,843,657 
 
 
 Elgin, Joliet & Eastern 
 
 12,192,426 
 
 
 
 12,328,910 
 
 
 Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg 
 
 11,667,747 
 
 
 
 10,791,912 
 
 
 
 10,362,886 
 
 
 Southern 
 
 Western 
 Texas Pacific 
 
 
 1 
 
 1,944.82 
 1,051.86 
 1,459.84 
 1,753.81 
 
 836.51 
 1,027.61 
 1,646.56 
 
 390.06 
 1,159.50 
 
 **17,036.44 
 
 19,834,671 
 16,637,024 
 15,157,101 
 12,910,439 
 11,023,296 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 Chicago & Great Western 
 
 2 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 1 
 
 El Paso & Southwestern 
 
 10,878,268 
 
 1 
 
 
 10,590,733 
 
 1 
 
 Duluth, Missabe & Northern 
 
 10,552,080 
 10,107,915 
 
 ***$195,879,065 
 
 1 
 
 
 17* 
 
 
 * Includes 17 Class I roads of a total of 169* 
 ** Represents 6.9 per cent of the mileage of all roads in the United States. 
 *♦* Represents s.7 percent of the gross operating revenue of all roads in the United States. 
 
 TABLE X 
 
 Summary showing proportionate part of the total mileage and total revenue of the country handled 
 by various classes of roads. 
 
 Roads with 
 
 Total Gross 
 
 Operating Income of 
 
 Number of 
 systems 
 
 Number of 
 controlled 
 or affiliated 
 companies 
 
 Total 
 
 roads in 
 
 the 
 
 group 
 
 Combined 
 Mileage 
 
 Per 
 Cent 
 
 to 
 Total 
 
 Combined Gross 
 Operating In- 
 come 
 
 Per 
 Cent 
 
 to 
 Total 
 
 J2S,000,000 or over 
 10,000,000 to 25,000,000 
 10,000,000 or under 
 
 30 
 IS 
 42 
 
 79 
 2 
 1 
 
 109 
 
 17 
 43 
 
 197,224.04 
 17,036.44 
 14,199.49 
 
 80.3 
 6.9 
 5.8 
 
 $3,018,915,466 
 195,879,065 
 104,974,736 
 
 88.2 
 5.7 
 3.1 
 
 Total Class I roads 
 Estimated total for 
 Class II and III roads 
 
 87 
 
 82 
 
 169* 
 
 228,459.97 
 17,321.73 
 
 93.0 
 7.0 
 
 $3,319,769,267 
 103,411,445 
 
 97.0 
 3.0 
 
 Approximate total for 
 Class I, II and III roads 
 
 245,781.70 
 
 100.0 
 
 $3,423,180,712 
 
 100.0 
 
 * The slight variation from that which appeared on page 23 in the pamphlet "A Comprehensive Plan for Railroad 
 ConsohdatK)n" is due to the omission here of the Canadian Pacific Lines in Maine; the Duluth, Winnipeg & Pacific, 
 and the Grand Trunk Lines in the United States. 
 
 [31] 
 
The concentration of ownership which is indicated by 
 these tables is significant as it shows: that substantial 
 progress has already been made in the direction of establish- 
 ing a national system of transportation along the lines called 
 for by the Transportation Act; that the suggestion for 
 further consolidation is consistent with the tendencies under 
 which the representative systems of the country have been 
 developed; and that the difficulties incident to such con- 
 solidations are not as great as they frequently have been 
 made to appear. 
 
 These tables also make it clear that a national system of 
 transportation as proposed cannot be established if consolida- 
 tions are to be voluntary except through the cooperation and 
 by the consent of the owners of the 30 systems listed in Table 
 VIII. With such cooperation, the problem of a comprehen- 
 sive plan of railroad consolidations, such as the Transporta- 
 tion Act contemplates, will be largely solved. 
 
 In the preparation of the following plan, the roads have 
 been segregated into three general groups which may be 
 described as the Eastern, Southern, and Western. The 
 systems for the most part are developed by combining the 
 various roads within each group. While it may prove to be 
 desirable to make some changes eventually ih the owner- 
 ship or control now existing, for present purposes, the rela- 
 tionships heretofore established, with few exceptions, have 
 not been disturbed. Thirteen systems in all are proposed: 
 5 for the Eastern district; 2 for the Southern; and 6 for the 
 Western. 
 
 The tables given on pages 44—46 show the similarity of the 
 proposed systems. To demonstrate the extent to which 
 competition has been preserved a list of the larger cities in 
 the United States is given on pages 48-49 designating by 
 which systems each is to be served. A brief description of 
 13 systems will be found on pages 50-60, giving some of the 
 fundamental considerations involved in this grouping of the 
 roads. The maps following the text show the proposed sys- 
 tems in colors and indicate the individual roads by number. 
 
 The roads constituting the various systems, together with 
 their mileage and earnings, are as follows — 
 
 [32] 
 
PROPOSED SYSTEMS 
 
 System 1 
 NEW YORK CENTRAL SYSTEM 
 
 Gross Gross 
 
 No. Name Mileage Earnings Per Mile 
 
 2 New York Central 6,075 . 50 ^203,060,842 ?33,423 
 
 12 Cleve. Cin. Chi. & St. Louis 2,382 .43 42,904,858 18,009 
 
 13 Michigan Central 1,854 . 87 41,756,671 22,512 
 
 13 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie 224 , 58 20,559,224 91,545 
 
 40 Toledo & Ohio Central 438 . 64 5,736,686 13,078 
 
 60 Cincinnati Northern 245 . 70 1,830,991 7,452 
 
 4G Kanawha & Michigan 176 . 60 3,297,455 18,672 
 
 37 Lake Erie & Western 900 , 01 6,859,306 7,622 
 
 15 Central of New Jersey 682.78 32,490,917 47,586 
 
 31 New York, Ontario & Western 568 , 46 8,874,397 15,61 1 
 
 70 Ulster & Delaware 128 . 88 1,023,519 7,942 
 
 13,678.45 $368,394,866 J26,932 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 56 *Lehigh & Hudson 96 . 60 $2,053,781 $21,261 
 
 59 **MonongaheIa 92.41 1,690,183 18,290 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SYSTEM 
 
 to be jointly controlled by four of the Trunk Line Systems. 
 Also shown on Maps 2, 3, 4. 
 
 44 Rutland 463.11 $3,831,743 $8,264 
 
 8 Boston & Maine 2,286.36 51,913,506 22,706 
 
 25 Maine Central 1,219.73 12,328,910 10,108 
 
 45 Bangor & Aroostook 631 . 73 3,955,357 6,261 
 
 4 New York, New Haven & Hartford 1,998.83 74,927,908 37,485 
 
 41 Central New England 302.86 4,819,190 15,912 
 
 6,902.62 $151,776,614 $21,988 
 
 * Also in Systems 2, 3, 4. 
 { Also in System 3. 
 
 33 
 
System 2 
 BUFFALO SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name 
 
 6 Erie 
 
 33 Chicago & Erie 
 
 47 New York, Susque. & Western . . 
 
 14 Wabash** 
 
 30 Wheeling & Lake Erie 
 
 19 Pere Marquette 
 
 21 New York, Chicago & St. Louis . . . . 
 
 16 Delaware & Hudson 
 
 9 Delaware, Lackawanna & Western . . 
 
 26 Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh 
 
 27 Bessemer & Lake Erie 
 
 30a Pittsburgh & West Virginia 
 
 23 Elgin, Joliet & Eastern 
 
 63 Buffalo & Susquehanna 
 
 Mileage 
 
 Gross 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 1,987.84 
 
 ^62,401,580 
 
 ?3 1,392 
 
 269.56 
 
 7,455,155 
 
 27,657 
 
 138.75 
 
 3,340,399 
 
 24,075 
 
 2,518.89 
 
 34,270,522 
 
 13,606 
 
 512.13 
 
 8,179,049 
 
 15,971 
 
 2,271.73 
 
 20,843,657 
 
 9,176 
 
 569.78 
 
 13,947,626 
 
 24,479 
 
 883.41 
 
 25,411,263 
 
 28,764 
 
 956.27 
 
 48,923,528 
 
 51,161 
 
 586.50 
 
 11,667,747 
 
 19,894 
 
 204.63 
 
 10,362,886 
 
 50,642 
 
 63.31 
 
 1,080,449 
 
 17,066 
 
 788.78 
 
 12,192,426 
 
 15,457 
 
 252.56 
 
 1,604,078 
 
 6,351 
 
 12,004.14 f 261,680,365 $20,966 
 
 Line at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 66 *Lehigh& Hudson 96.60 ?2,0S3,781 $21,261 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SYSTEM 
 
 to be jointly controlled by four of the Trunk Line Systems. 
 Also shown on Maps 1, 3, 4. 
 
 44 Rutland 463.11 $3,831,743 $8,264 
 
 8 Boston & Maine 2,286.36 51,913,506 22,706 
 
 25 Maine Central 1,219.73 12,328,910 10,108 
 
 45 Bangor & Aroostook 631 . 73 3,955,357 6,261 
 
 4 New York, New Haven & Hartford 1,998.83 74,927,908 37,485 
 
 41 Central New England 302 .86 4,819,190 15,912 
 
 6,902.62 $151,776,614 $21,988 
 
 * Also in Systems I, 3, 4. 
 
 "Lines west of St. Louis in Gr. Northem-St. Paul System. 
 
 [34: 
 
Gross 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 1215,428,766 
 
 $47,249 
 
 67,119,283 
 
 38,206 
 
 59,450,509 
 
 24,792 
 
 24,001,572 
 
 33,460 
 
 5,716,575 
 
 9,971 
 
 14,284,869 
 
 35,962 
 
 4,626,775 
 
 37,246 
 
 7,355,513 
 
 20,485 
 
 3,528,025 
 
 21,555 
 
 1,200,911 
 
 13,707 
 
 1,220,565 
 
 4,927 
 
 System 3 
 PENNSYLVANIA SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name Mileage 
 
 1 Pennsylvania Railroad 4,559.45 
 
 _ fPennsylvania Co 1,756 . 74 
 
 \Pittsburgh,Cin. Chi. & St. Louis 2,397.98 
 
 17 Phila., Bait. & Washington 717.32 
 
 39 Grand Rapids & Indiana 573.32 
 
 22 Long Island 397.22 
 
 42 New York, Phila. & Norfolk .... 124 . 22 
 
 35 West Jersey & Seashore 359 .06 
 
 48 Cumberland Valley 163 .67 
 
 68 Bait. Chesapeake & Atlantic 87 . 61 
 
 172 Toledo, Peoria & Western 247 . 70 
 
 11,384.29 ^3,933,363 |35,481 
 
 Likes at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 56 *Lehigh & Hudson 96.60 $2,053,781 $21,261 
 
 59 **Monongahela 92 .41 1,690,183 18,290 
 
 88 fRichmond, Fred. & Potomac 87,68 3,475,207 39,635 
 
 101 tfWashington Southern 35,57 1,647,852 46,327 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SYSTEM 
 
 to be jointly controlled by four of the Trunk Line Systems. 
 Also shown on Maps 1, 2, 4. 
 
 44 Rutland 463.11 
 
 8 Boston & Maine 2,286.36 
 
 25 Maine Central 1,219.73 
 
 46 Bangor & Aroostook 631 . 73 
 
 4 New York, New Haven & Hartford 1,998.83 
 
 41 Central New England 302 . 86 
 
 6,902.62 $151,776,614 $21,988 
 
 * Also in Systems i, 2, 4. t Also in Systems 4, s. 6, 7. 
 
 ♦* Also in System I. tt Also m Systems 4. 3. o, 7. 
 
 $ 3,831,743 
 
 $ 8,264 
 
 51,913,506 
 
 22,706 
 
 12,328,910 
 
 10,108 
 
 3,955,357 
 
 6,261 
 
 74,927,908 
 
 37,485 
 
 4,819,190 
 
 15,912 
 
 35 
 
System 4 
 BALTIMORE — READING SYSTEM 
 
 No, Name 
 
 3 Baltimore & Ohio 
 
 65 Staten Island Rapid Transit. . . . 
 
 7 Philadelphia & Reading 
 
 61 Port Reading 
 
 53 Atlantic City 
 
 104 Coal & Coke 
 
 51 Ann Arbor 
 
 64 Cincin. Indianapolis & Western . . . 
 
 28 Western Maryland 
 
 30b Toledo, St. Louis & Western 
 
 10 Lehigh Valley 
 
 
 Gross 
 
 Gross 
 
 Mileage 
 
 Earnings 
 
 Per Mile 
 
 4,539.96 
 
 1108,665,110 
 
 123,935 
 
 23.54 
 
 1,551,246 
 
 65,898 
 
 1,104.76 
 
 55,803,929 
 
 49,614 
 
 21.16 
 
 1,818,575 
 
 85,944 
 
 170.18 
 
 2,566,796 
 
 15,083 
 
 197.30 
 
 1,100,109 
 
 5,576 
 
 295.68 
 
 2,661,519 
 
 9,001 
 
 321.68 
 
 2,477,850 
 
 7,703 
 
 694.50 
 
 10,791,912 
 
 15,539 
 
 453.55 
 
 5,560,324 
 
 12,260 
 
 1,443.45 
 
 47,023,053 
 
 32,576 
 
 9,265.76 1240,020,423 $25,904 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 56 *Lehigh & Hudson 96.60 $2,053,781 $21,261 
 
 101 **Washington Southern 35.57 1,647,852 46,327 
 
 88 tRichmond, Fred. & Potomac 87.68 3,475,207 39,635 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SYSTEMS 
 
 to be jointly controlled by four of the Trunk Line Systems. 
 Also shown on Maps 1, 2, 3. 
 
 44 Rutland 463.11 $3,831,743 $8,264 
 
 8 Boston & Maine 2,286 . 36 51,913,506 22,706 
 
 25 Maine Central 1,219.73 12,328,910 10,108 
 
 45 Bangor & Aroostook 631 . 73 3,955,357 6,261 
 
 4 New York, New Haven & Hartford 1,998.83 74,927,908 37,485 
 
 41 Central New England 302 . 86 4,819,190 15,912 
 
 6,902.62 $151,776,614 $21,988 
 
 * Also in Systems I, 2, 3. 
 ** Also in Systems 3, 5,6, 7. 
 t Also in Systems 3, 5, 6, 7. 
 
 System 5 
 NORFOLK & WESTERN — CHESAPEAKE & OHIO 
 
 No. Name Mileage 
 
 75 Chesapeake & Ohio 2,374,98 
 
 36 Hocking Valley 350.72 
 
 74 Norfolk & Western 2,062 .11 
 
 83 Virginian 506 . 53 
 
 91 Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio 271 .44 
 
 5,565.78 
 
 Gross 
 Earnings 
 
 $46,322,284 
 
 7,632,572 
 
 53,800,498 
 
 7,570,315 
 
 2,854,624 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 $19,504 
 21,763 
 26,090 
 14,945 
 10,517 
 
 $118,180,293 $21,233 
 
 101 
 88 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 *Washington Southern 
 
 tRichmond. Fred. & Potomac . 
 
 35.57 
 87.68 
 
 * Also in Systems 3, 4, 6, 7. 
 t Also in Systems 3, 4, 6, 7. 
 
 [36: 
 
 $1,647,852 
 3,475,207 
 
 $46,327 
 39,635 
 
System 6 
 
 ATLANTIC COAST LINE — LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE 
 
 SYSTEM 
 
 Gross Gross 
 
 No. Name Mileage Earnings Per Mile 
 
 76 Adantic Coast Line 4,718 .08 ?3S,464,175 $ 7,517 
 
 73 Louisville & Nashville 5,052 . 18 60,597,491 11,994 
 
 79 Nashville, Chattanooga & 
 
 St. Louis 1,232 .68 12,613,336 10,232 
 
 96 Charleston & West Carolina 341.88 1,925,040 5,631 
 
 100 Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis 199,80 1,655,678 8,287 
 89 Georgia 329.98 3,251,141 7,853 
 
 102 Atlanta & West Point 93 . 12 1,373,126 14,746 
 
 34 *Chicago, Indianapolis & Louis- 
 ville 327.00 3,836,962 11,734 
 
 12,294.72 $120,716,949 $9,819 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 101 **Washington Southern 35 . 57 $1,647,852 $46,327. 
 
 88 fRichmond, Fred. & Potomac 87.68 3,475,207 39,635 
 
 103 tfWestern Railway of Alabama 133.30 1,341,130 10,061 
 
 ** Also in Systems 3, 4, 5, 7. 
 
 t Also in Systems 3, 4, s, 7. 
 tr Also in System 13. 
 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Atlantic Coast Line— Louisville & Nashville 
 System and the Southern System, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each system. 
 
 System 7 
 SOUTHERN SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name Mileage 
 
 71 Southern 7,018.06 
 
 81 Mobile & Ohio 1,135.09 
 
 85 Alabama Great Southern 310.53 
 
 105 Southern Railway in Mississippi . 279.84 
 
 82 Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas 
 
 Pacific 337.27 
 
 87 New Orleans & Northeastern ... 203 . 73 
 34 *Chicago, Indianapolis & Louis- 
 ville 327.00 
 
 98 Alabama & Vicksburg 142 . 74 
 
 165 Vicksburg, Shreveport& Pacific. . . 171.47 
 
 84 Florida East Coast 741.04 
 
 77 Seaboard 3,445.88 
 
 92 Georgia Southern & Florida 399 . 84 
 
 • 14,512.49 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 101 **Washington Southern 35 . 57 $1,647,852 $46,327 
 
 88 fRichmond, Fred. & Potomac 87.68 3,475,207 39,635 
 
 ** Also in Systems 3, 4. Si 6. 
 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Southern System and the Atlantic Coast 
 Line— Louisville & NashviUe System, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each 
 system. 
 
 37 
 
 Gross 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 $71,974,418 
 
 11,903,351 
 
 5,585,318 
 
 1,100,457 
 
 $10,256 
 
 10,487 
 
 17,986 
 
 3,933 
 
 10,983,183 
 3,859,772 
 
 32,565 
 18,946 
 
 3,836,962 
 1,701,714 
 1,667,937 
 7,206,392 
 24,926,111 
 
 11,734 
 
 11,924 
 
 9,729 
 
 9,725 
 
 7,234 
 
 2,486,248 
 
 6,218 
 
 $147,231,863 
 
 $10,145 
 
System 8 
 GREAT NORTHERN — ST. PAUL SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name Uileage 
 
 111 Great Northern 8,094.45 
 
 142 *Spokane, Portland & Seattle ... 277 . 36 
 
 108 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ... 10,22 1 . 52 
 
 14 tWabash 
 
 129 Duluth, Missabe & Northern 390 . 06 
 
 138 Duluth & Iron Range 278 . 54 
 
 115 St. Louis-San Francisco 4,750.92 
 
 146 St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas 239.41 
 
 125 **Chicago & Alton 525.93 
 
 Gross 
 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 $ 78,548,635 
 
 2,569,401 
 
 103,164,598 
 
 $ 9,704 
 
 9,264 
 
 10,093 
 
 10,552,080 
 6,043,443 
 
 47,113,030 
 1,165,568 
 8,318,512 
 
 27,052 
 
 21,697 
 
 9,917 
 
 4,869 
 
 15,817 
 
 ^257,475,267 
 
 $10,391 
 
 24,778.19 
 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Great Northem~St. Paul System and the North- 
 ern Pacific-Burlington System, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each system. 
 
 ** This road wiU be jointly controlled by the Gt. Northem-St. Paul System and the Union 
 Pacific- Northwestern System, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each system. 
 
 t Lines of this system west of St. Louis. Lines east of St. Louis and total figures are shown 
 in the Buffalo System. 
 
 System 9 
 
 NORTHERN PACIFIC — BURLINGTON SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name Mileage 
 
 112 Northern Pacific 6,501 .95 
 
 142 *Spokane, Portland & Seattle 277.36 
 
 135 Colorado Southern 1,099 . 76 
 
 140 Fort Worth & Denver City 454.14 
 
 109 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy . . 9,359 .90 
 
 166 Colorado Midland 337 . 64 
 
 176 Trinity & Brazos Valley 351 . 23 
 
 177 Wichita Valley 256.71 
 
 127 Chicago Great Western 1,459.84 
 
 121 Denver & Rio Grande 2,573 . 83 
 
 137 Western Pacific 944.81 
 
 133 
 
 Kansas City Southern, \ o^^ r, 
 
 Texarkana & Ft. Smith / "■^° ' ^^ 
 
 Gross 
 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 $ 74,857,779 
 
 ?11,513 
 
 2,569,401 
 
 9,264 
 
 8,810,988 
 
 8,012 
 
 5,797,831 
 
 12,767 
 
 103,814,782 
 
 11,091 
 
 1,615,559 
 
 4,875 
 
 1,002,119 
 
 2,853 
 
 1,001,872 
 
 3,903 
 
 15,157,101 
 
 10,383 
 
 24,763,649 
 
 9,621 
 
 7,458,061 
 
 7,894 
 
 11,023,296 
 
 13,185 
 
 1257,872,438 
 
 110,545 
 
 24,453.68 
 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Great Northem-St. Paul System and the Northern 
 Paciiic-Burlington System, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each system. 
 
 [38: 
 
System 10 
 UNION PACIFIC — NORTHWESTERN SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name Mileage 
 
 114 *Union Pacific 3,619 .46 
 
 120 Oregon Short Line 2,235 .06 
 
 124 Oregon-Washington & Naviga- 
 
 gation 2,031.84 
 
 130 Los Angeles & Salt Lake 1,157 . 85 
 
 168 St. Joseph & Grand Island 260 . 07 
 
 181 *Central Pacific 
 
 110 Chicago & Northwestern 8,107 . 82 
 
 122 Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis 
 
 & Omaha 1,752.81 
 
 126**Chicago & Alton 525 .93 
 
 118 Missouri, Kansas & Texas 
 
 Mo. Kans. & Tex. of Texas [ 3,865 . 04 
 
 Wichita Falls & Northwestern 
 
 23,555.88 
 
 Gross 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 #61,986,599 
 24,780,729 
 
 #17,126 
 11,087 
 
 17,939,712 
 
 11,075,453 
 
 1,908,985 
 
 8,829 
 9,566 
 7,340 
 
 91,542,024 
 
 11,291 
 
 19,506,801 
 8,318,512 
 
 11,129 
 15,817 
 
 35,340,021 
 
 9,144 
 
 #272,398,836 
 
 #11,564 
 
 ♦ The Central Pacific has been placed with the Union Pacific-Northwestern System, but the 
 figures of the Central Pacific are included with those of the Southern Pacific System. 
 
 ** This road will be jointly controlled by the Union Pacific-Northwestern System and the 
 Great Northem-St. Paul System, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each system. 
 
 System 11 
 ATCHISON SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name Mileage 
 
 107 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 8,626 . 94 
 
 145 Northwestern Pacific 471 . 86 
 
 141 Panhandle & Santa Fe 709 . 29 
 
 126 Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe 1,937 .43 
 
 20 *Chicago & Eastern Illinois 567 . 38 
 
 123 Texas & Pacific 1,944.82 
 
 123a New Orleans, Texas & Mexico .... 243 .80 
 
 123b St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico 548.18 
 
 134 International & Great Northern .. . 1,159.50 
 
 119 Missouri Pacific \ •j ^^g j^ 
 
 117 St. L. Iron Mt. & Southern / ' 
 
 23,557.34 
 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Atchison System and the Southern Pacific Sys- 
 tem, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each system. 
 
 Gross 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 #114,019,747 
 
 #13,217 
 
 4,194,169 
 
 8,889 
 
 5,387,362 
 
 7,595 
 
 16,296,448 
 
 8,411 
 
 8,178,620 
 
 14,415 
 
 19,834,671 
 
 10,199 
 
 1,503,574 
 
 6,167 
 
 3,221,309 
 
 5,876 
 
 10,107,915 
 
 8,718 
 
 66,076,724 
 
 8,992 
 
 #248,820,539 
 
 #10,562 
 
 
 39 
 
No. 
 106 
 149 
 128 
 
 139 
 144 
 167 
 152 
 143 
 171 
 147 
 113 
 150 
 132 
 136 
 174 
 20* 
 
 System 12 
 SOUTHERN PACIFIC SYSTEM 
 
 Name Mileage 
 
 ♦Southern Pacific 6,990 ,90 
 
 Arizona Eastern 374.08 
 
 Galveston, Harrisburg & San 
 
 Antonio 1,355.80 
 
 Houston & Texas Central 893 , 13 
 
 Texas & New Orleans 468 .48 
 
 Houston East & West Texas .... 190 .94 
 
 Louisiana Western 207 . 74 
 
 Morgan's Louisiana & Texas .... 403 . 24 
 
 Kansas City, Mexico & Orient 737 , 62 
 
 San Antonio & Aransas Pass 727 . 80 
 
 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 7,821 .02 
 
 Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf .... 476 . 77 
 
 El Paso & Southwestern 1,027 . 61 
 
 St. Louis Southwestern 943 .31 
 
 St. Louis Southwestern of Tex. 810.50 
 
 "Chicago & Eastern Illinois 567 .39 
 
 23,996.33 
 
 Gross 
 
 Gross 
 
 Earnings 
 
 Per Mile 
 
 $115,870,170 
 
 116,575 
 
 3,304,983 
 
 8,835 
 
 14,167,759 
 
 10,450 
 
 7,022,858 
 
 7,863 
 
 4,683,962 
 
 9,998 
 
 1,532,556 
 
 8,027 
 
 2,580,656 
 
 12,422 
 
 4,999,346 
 
 12,398 
 
 2,522,892 
 
 3,420 
 
 4,003,622 
 
 5,500 
 
 74,724,444 
 
 9,554 
 
 3,264,111 
 
 6,846 
 
 10,878,268 
 
 10,586 
 
 8,500,314 
 
 9,011 
 
 4,410,125 
 
 5,441 
 
 8,178,620 
 
 14,415 
 
 ?270,644,686 
 
 ?11,278 
 
 * The Central Pacific has been placed with the Union Pacific-Northwestern System, but the 
 figures of the Central Pacific are included with those of the Southern Pacific Sytem. 
 
 ** This road will be jointly controlled by the Atchison System and the Southern Pacific Sys- 
 tem, one-half of the mileage and figures being used in each system. 
 
 System 13 
 ILLINOIS CENTRAL — SOO SYSTEM 
 
 No. Name Mileage 
 
 72 Illinois Central 4,767.81 
 
 78 Yazoo & Mississippi 1,380 . 77 
 
 80 Central of Georgia 1,922 . 46 
 
 182 Minneapolis & St. Louis 1,646.56 
 
 116 Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. 
 
 Marie 4,207.61 
 
 148 Duluth South Shore & Atlantic. .. . 610 . 48 
 
 160 Mineral Range 120.01 
 
 14,655.70 
 
 Gross 
 Earnings 
 
 Gross 
 Per Mile 
 
 170,595,781 
 14,059,523 
 13,163,150 
 10,590,733 
 
 114,807 
 
 10,187 
 
 6,847 
 
 6,437 
 
 32,305,808 
 3,506,694 
 1,030,995 
 
 7,678 
 5,744 
 8,591 
 
 1145,252,684 
 
 ?9,911 
 
 Line at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 103 *Western Railway of Alabama 133.30 Jl,341,130 $10,061 
 
 * Also in System 6. 
 
 [4o: 
 
SUMMARY OF MILEAGE AND INCOME OF PROPOSED SYSTEMS. 
 
 
 No. of 
 
 Class I Roads 
 
 Included 
 
 Number of 
 Miles Oper- 
 ated 
 
 Earnings 
 per Mile 
 Operated 
 
 Av. Annual Rail- 
 way Operating 
 come 
 
 Per Cent Earn- 
 ings to total o£ 
 all Roads 
 
 Eastern Systems 
 New York Central 
 
 11 
 14 
 11 
 11 
 
 5 
 
 13,678.45 
 
 12,004.14 
 
 11,384.29 
 
 9,265.76 
 
 5,565.78 
 
 $26,932 
 20,966 
 35,481 
 25,904 
 21,233 
 
 J368,394,866 
 261,680,365 
 403,933,363 
 240,020,423 
 118,180,293 
 
 
 Buffalo 
 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 
 Baltimore-Reading 
 
 
 Norf. & West-Ches. & Ohio . 
 
 
 Total Eastern Systems. . . . 
 
 Southern Systems 
 Atl. Coast L.-Louis & Nash.. . 
 
 52 
 
 8 
 11 
 
 51,898.42 
 
 12,294.72 
 14,512.49 
 
 9,819 
 10,145 
 
 ?1,392,209,310 
 
 120,716,949 
 ^ 147,231,863 
 
 40.7 
 
 
 
 Total Southern Systems. . . 
 
 Western Systems 
 
 Great Northern-St. Paul 
 
 Northern Pacific-Burlington . 
 Union Pacific-Northwestern. . 
 Atchison 
 
 19 
 
 7 
 
 12 
 11 
 11 
 15 
 
 7 
 
 26,807.21 
 
 24,778.19 
 24,453.68 
 23,555.88 
 23,557.34 
 23,996.33 
 14,655.70 
 
 flO,391 
 10,545 
 11,564 
 10,562 
 11,278 
 9,911 
 
 ?267,948,812 
 
 ?257,475,267 
 257,872,438 
 272,398,836 
 248,820,539 
 270,644,686 
 145,252,684 
 
 7.8 
 
 Southern Pacific 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Western Systems 
 
 Roads to be jointly controlled. 
 
 (Mileage and gross earnings 
 not included in the above) 
 
 63 
 11 
 
 134,997.12 
 7,348.18 
 
 
 $1,452,464,450 
 161,984,767 
 
 42.5 
 4.7 
 
 Total All Systems 
 
 145 
 
 221,050.93 
 
 
 13,274,607,339 
 
 95.7 
 
 SUMMARY — ALL ROADS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 Mileage 
 
 Gross Operat- 
 ing Income 
 
 Per Cent Earnings to 
 total of all Roads 
 
 Class I Roads — Included in proposed systems, 145 
 
 Class I Roads — ^Not included in proposed systems, 24. . 
 Class II and Class III Roads — partly estimated 
 
 221,050.93 
 
 7,409.04 
 
 17,321.73 
 
 $3,274,607,339 
 
 45,161,928 
 
 103,411,445 
 
 95.7 
 1.3 
 3.0 
 
 
 245,781.70 
 
 $3,423,180,712 
 
 100.0 
 
 
 
 It will be seen from the above table that included in the 
 13 systems are 145 of the 169 roads which were designated 
 on June 30, 1916 as Class I roads; that the aggregate earn- 
 ings of these 145 roads — on the basis of statements cover- 
 ing the Test Period — were 95.7 per cent of the total of the 
 country; and that the earnings of the remaining 24 Class I 
 roads, together with the earnings of all Class II and Class 
 III roads combined, were but a little over 4 per cent of the 
 total. 
 
 [41] 
 
A Brief Description of the Districts 
 
 Eastern District 
 
 Chicago and St. Louis would be western terminals for all 
 the Eastern systems except for the Norfolk & Western-Chesa- 
 peake & Ohio System, which would reach Chicago but not 
 St. Louis. 
 
 New York and adjacent cities and all the important cities 
 in New England, through the joint control of the New Eng- 
 land roads, would be eastern terminal points for the same 
 systems. 
 
 Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington would be addi- 
 tional terminal points for two of these systems. 
 
 Most of the large cities located in the East and Central 
 West would be served by four systems, some by three, and 
 all, with minor exceptions, by at least two. 
 
 Southern District 
 
 The two systems in the Southern District would compete 
 with each other at practically all points. Each of these 
 systems would extend from all important centers in the 
 South to Chicago, St. Louis, Louisville, Cincinnati, and 
 Washington. 
 
 Western District 
 
 Chicago and St. Louis would also be eastern terminal 
 points for all six Western systems. San Francisco and 
 Portland would be the Pacific Coast terminals for four, and 
 Seattle, Tacoma, and Los Angeles for three systems. Omaha 
 would be reached by all six; Minneapolis, St. Paul, 
 Duluth, Houston, Kansas City, Des Moines, and Fort 
 Worth by five. Many of the other large cities would be 
 served by four, and all by two or more. 
 
 The three Northwestern systems would not only extend 
 from the Pacific Coast to Chicago and St. Louis, but also 
 would have lines extending to the Southwest. Five of 
 the Western systems would be competitors in the South- 
 west for business to and from Chicago and St. Louis. 
 
 The Illinois Central System would be a north and south 
 system extending from the Canadian border to the Gulf 
 
 [42] 
 
with service to the principal intervening cities. It would be 
 a competitor of the Atchison and the Southern Pacific 
 systems for business between New Orleans, St, Louis, and 
 Chicago. 
 
 As Chicago and St. Louis would be terminals for both the 
 Eastern and Western systems, traffic relations could be 
 established between systems in the two districts which would 
 give coast to coast service as completely and eff^ectively as a 
 transcontinental system. 
 
 Each of the 13 systems would be a complete unit in itself, 
 and to a large extent the business originating on the lines 
 of any system for points within the district, of which it is a 
 part, could reach its destination over the lines of the same 
 system on which it originated. 
 
 Similarity of the Proposed Systems 
 
 The following comparative tables are presented in order 
 to show clearly the similarity in traffic and operating condi- 
 tions of each proposed consolidated system competing in the 
 same territory. 
 
 [43: 
 
EASTERN SYSTEMS 
 
 Statement of Operating Income and Expenses of Proposed Consolidated Systems 
 
 Average for 3 years from June 30, 1915 to June 30, 1917 
 
 
 Number 
 
 Miles 
 Operated 
 
 Railway Oper- 
 ating Income 
 
 Operating ex- 
 penses and 
 taxes (not 
 including 
 maintenance) 
 
 Maintenance 
 
 Total operat- 
 ing expenses — 
 Taxes and 
 Maintenance 
 
 Net Railway- 
 Operating 
 Income 
 
 New York Central 
 Buffalo 
 
 13,678.45 
 
 12,004.14 
 
 11,384.29 
 
 9,265.76 
 
 5,565 . 78 
 
 $368,394,866 
 261,680,365 
 403,933,363 
 240,020,423 
 
 118,180,293 
 
 $165,251,295 
 116,445,526 
 186,448,287 
 105,619,160 
 
 43,009,453 
 
 $99,970,816 
 73,282,968 
 
 127,663,344 
 68,192,163 
 
 36,359,033 
 
 $265,222,111 
 189,728,494 
 314,111,631 
 173,811,323 
 
 79,368,486 
 
 $103,172,755 
 71,951,871 
 89,821,732 
 66,209,100 
 
 38,811,807 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Balti.-Reading .... 
 
 Norfolk & Western- 
 
 Ches. & Ohio 
 
 New York Central . . 
 Buffalo 
 
 
 100.0% 
 100.0% 
 100.0% 
 100.0% 
 
 100.0% 
 
 44.8% 
 44.4% 
 46.2% 
 44.0% 
 
 36.4% 
 
 *30.8% 
 30.8% 
 30.8% 
 30,8% 
 
 30.8% 
 
 75.6% 
 75.2% 
 77.0% 
 74.8% 
 
 67.2% 
 
 24.4% 
 24.8% 
 23.0% 
 25,2% 
 
 32.8% 
 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Balti.-Reading .... 
 
 Norfolk & Western- 
 
 Ches. & Ohio .... 
 
 
 
 
 Classification of Tonnage for Year Ended June 30, 1916 
 
 
 Percentages of tons of different kinds of products to total tonnage 
 
 
 Agricul- 
 ture 
 
 Animals 
 
 Mines 
 
 Forests 
 
 Manufac- 
 tures 
 
 Miscel- 
 laneous 
 
 LCL 
 
 Total 
 
 New York Central . . 
 Buffalo 
 
 7,9 
 8.7 
 5,6 
 6,3 
 
 4,2 
 
 2.2 
 2.1 
 1.5 
 1.4 
 
 .6 
 
 56,6 
 59,5 
 60,2 
 63.3 
 
 78.4 
 
 4.5 
 3,7 
 5,3 
 4.1 
 
 5,8 
 
 22,0 
 19,3 
 18,3 
 16,0 
 
 9,1 
 
 5,6 
 3.1 
 3,8 
 3.3 
 
 .8 
 
 1.2 
 3,6 
 5,3 
 5,6 
 
 1.1 
 
 100.0 
 100 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Balti.-Reading .... 
 
 Norfolk & Western- 
 
 Ches. &Ohio 
 
 100.0 
 100.0 
 
 100.0 
 
 Statistics of Operation for 
 
 Year Ended June 30, 1916 
 
 
 
 Gross 
 Earnings 
 per mile 
 
 road 
 operated 
 
 Percentage of gross operating income 
 
 Average 
 receipts 
 per ton 
 
 per mile 
 
 Average 
 receipts 
 per pas- 
 senger 
 per mile 
 
 Average 
 
 
 Freight 
 Income 
 
 Passenger 
 Income 
 
 Miscella- 
 neous 
 Income 
 
 Total 
 
 number of 
 tons per 
 train mile 
 
 New York Central . . 
 Buffalo 
 
 $26,932 
 20,966 
 35,481 
 25,904 
 
 21,233 
 
 67,5 
 79,0 
 69,0 
 79.5 
 
 84.1 
 
 21.0 
 13,3 
 21,6 
 12,4 
 
 10.8 
 
 11.5 
 7.7 
 9.4 
 8.1 
 
 5,1 
 
 100,0 
 100,0 
 100,0 
 100,0 
 
 100,0 
 
 .00637 
 .00613 
 .00638 
 .00602 
 
 .00400 
 
 .01920 
 .01740 
 .01930 
 .01870 
 
 .02140 
 
 693 
 656 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Balti.-Reading .... 
 
 Norfolk & Western- 
 
 Ches. &Ohio.... 
 
 682 
 719 
 
 1033 
 
 * As methods of accounting with respect to maintenance differ with different companies, for the sake 
 of uniformity and for the purpose of affording a fairer comparison between individual companies, the 
 maintenance charge in the percentage figures has been standardized for each group. For roads in the 
 Eastern District, the amount was determined by taking the same percentage of the gross operating 
 income, 30.8 per cent, that was charged to maintenance by the dividend-paying roads in the district 
 averaged for the test period. The same method was followed in determining the standard of maintenance 
 for the Western and Southern Districts, but the amount varied so little, being 28.2 for the Western roads, 
 and 28.8 for the Southern, that the same figure, 28.2 per cent, was adopted for both Districts. 
 
 [44] 
 
SOUTHERN SYSTEMS 
 Statement of Operating Income and Expenses of Proposed Consolidated Systems 
 
 Average for 3 years from June 30, 1915 to June 30, 1917 
 
 
 Number 
 
 Miles 
 Operated 
 
 Railway Oper- 
 ating Income 
 
 Operating ex- 
 penses and 
 taxes (not 
 including 
 
 maintenance) 
 
 Maintenance 
 
 Total operat- 
 ing expenses — 
 
 Taxes and 
 Maintenance 
 
 Net Railway 
 
 Operating 
 
 Income 
 
 Atlantic Coast Line- 
 Louisville & Nashville 
 
 12,294.72 
 14,512.49 
 
 $120,716,949 
 147,231,863 
 
 351,963,904 
 "65,344,830 
 
 $37,828,546 
 42,027,549 
 
 $89,792,450 
 107,372,379 
 
 $30,924,499 
 39,859,484 
 
 
 Atlantic Coast Line- 
 Louisville & Nashville 
 
 
 100.0% 
 100.0% 
 
 43.0% 
 44.4% 
 
 *28.2% 
 28.2% 
 
 71.2% 
 72.6% 
 
 28.8% 
 27.4% 
 
 
 
 
 Classification of Tonnage for Year Ended June 30, 1916 
 
 
 Percentages of tons of different kinds of products to total tonnage 
 
 
 Agricul- 
 ture 
 
 Animals 
 
 Mines 
 
 Forests 
 
 Manu- 
 factures 
 
 Miscel- 
 laneous 
 
 LCL 
 
 Total 
 
 Atlantic Coast Line- 
 Louisville & Nashville 
 
 Southern 
 
 10.3 
 11.8 
 
 2.1 
 1.8 
 
 51.1 
 35,1 
 
 14.1 
 22.6 
 
 14.7 
 18.6 
 
 1.9 
 
 4.8 
 
 5.8 
 5.3 
 
 100.0 
 100.0 
 
 
 
 Statistics of Operation for Year Ended June 30, 1916 
 
 
 Gross 
 earnings 
 per mile 
 
 road 
 operated 
 
 Percentage of gross operating income 
 
 Average 
 receipts 
 per ton 
 per mile 
 
 Average 
 receipts 
 per pas- 
 senger 
 per mile 
 
 Average 
 
 
 Freight 
 Income 
 
 Passenger 
 Income 
 
 Miscella- 
 neous 
 Income 
 
 Total 
 
 number of 
 tons per 
 train mile 
 
 Atlantic Coast Line- 
 Louisville & Nashville 
 
 Southern 
 
 $9,819 
 10,145 
 
 71.3 
 69.2 
 
 21.2 
 21.4 
 
 7.5 
 9.4 
 
 100.0 
 100.0 
 
 .00807 
 
 .00851 
 
 .02160 
 .02180 
 
 376 
 402 
 
 
 
 See note on page 44. 
 
 [45] 
 
WESTERN SYSTEMS 
 Statement of Operating Income and Expenses of Proposed Consolidated Systems 
 
 Average for 3 years from June 30, 1915 to June 30, 1917 
 
 
 Number 
 
 Miles 
 Operated 
 
 Railway Oper- 
 ating Income 
 
 Operating ex- 
 penses and 
 taxes (not 
 including 
 
 maintenance) 
 
 Maintenance 
 
 Total operat- 
 ing expenses — 
 
 Taxes and 
 Maintenance 
 
 Net Railway- 
 Operating 
 Income 
 
 Great Northern- 
 St. Paul 
 
 Northern Pacific- 
 Burlington 
 
 Union Pacific- 
 Northwestern . . . 
 
 24,778.19 
 
 24,453.68 
 
 23,555.88 
 23,557.34 
 23,996.33 
 14,655.70 
 
 ?257,475,267 
 
 257,872,438 
 
 272,398,836 
 248,820,539 
 270,644,686 
 145,252,684 
 
 ?107,936,414 
 
 104,620,295 
 
 116,534,500 
 
 102,627,403 
 
 121,412,251 
 
 62,227,733 
 
 ?68,038,226 
 
 67,929,018 
 
 75,386,468 
 76,812,422 
 75,056,461 
 45,596,306 
 
 ?175,974,640 
 
 172,549,313 
 
 191,920,968 
 179,439,825 
 196,468,712 
 107,824,039 
 
 181,500,627 
 
 85,323,125 
 
 80,477,868 
 69,380,714 
 
 Southern Pacific . . . 
 111. Central-Soo. . . . 
 
 74,175,974 
 37,428,645 
 
 Great Northern- 
 St. Paul 
 
 Northern Pacific- 
 Burlington 
 
 Union Pacific- 
 Northwestern . . . 
 
 Atchison 
 
 
 100.0% 
 
 100.0% 
 
 100.0% 
 100.0% 
 100.0% 
 100.0% 
 
 41.9% 
 
 40.5% 
 
 42.8% 
 41.2% 
 44.7%, 
 42.8% 
 
 *28.2% 
 
 28.2% 
 
 28.2% 
 28.2% 
 28.2% 
 28.2% 
 
 70.1% 
 
 68.7% 
 
 71.0% 
 69.4% 
 72.9% 
 71.0% 
 
 29.9% 
 
 31.3% 
 
 29.0% 
 30 6% 
 
 Southern Pacific. . . 
 III. Central-Soo.... 
 
 27.1% 
 29.0% 
 
 Classification of Tonnage for Year Ended June 30, 1916 
 
 
 
 Percentages of tons o£ different kinds of products to total tonnage 
 
 
 Agricul- 
 ture 
 
 Animals 
 
 Mines 
 
 Forests 
 
 Manu- 
 factures 
 
 Miscel- 
 laneous 
 
 LCL 
 
 Total 
 
 Great Northern- 
 St. Paul........ 
 
 Northern Pacific- 
 Burlington 
 
 Union Pacific- 
 Northwestern . . . 
 
 14.9 
 
 19.7 
 
 22.1 
 20.2 
 20.7 
 19.3 
 
 2.9 
 
 4.6 
 
 5.2 
 4.4 
 4.0 
 2.5 
 
 54.4 
 
 42.6 
 
 38.6 
 38.5 
 38.4 
 42.7 
 
 11.1 
 
 11.8 
 
 12.5 
 14.2 
 13.7 
 17.4 
 
 11.0 
 
 13.8 
 
 15.0 
 16.6 
 16.9 
 11.3 
 
 1.7 
 
 2.6 
 
 1.8 
 1.2 
 1.3 
 2.7 
 
 4.0 
 
 4.9 
 
 4.8 
 4.9 
 5.0 
 4.1 
 
 100.0 
 
 100.0 
 
 100.0 
 100 
 
 Southern Pacific. . . 
 111. Central-Soo — 
 
 100.0 
 100.0 
 
 Statistics of Operation for Year Ended June 30, 19U 
 
 
 
 
 Gross 
 earnings 
 per mile 
 
 road 
 operated 
 
 Percentage of gross operating income 
 
 Average 
 receipts 
 per ton 
 per mile 
 
 Average 
 receipts 
 per pas- 
 senger 
 per mile 
 
 
 
 Freight 
 Income 
 
 Passenger 
 Income 
 
 Miscella- 
 neous 
 Income 
 
 Total 
 
 number of 
 
 tons per 
 
 train mile 
 
 Great Northern- 
 St. Paul... 
 
 Northern Pacific- 
 Burlington 
 
 Union Pacific- 
 Northwestern . . . 
 
 ?10,391 
 
 10,545 
 
 11,564 
 
 10,562 
 
 11,278 
 
 9,911 
 
 73.4 
 
 71.8 
 
 68.5 
 69.9 
 63.9 
 73.0 
 
 18.0 
 
 19.8 
 
 22.4 
 22.0 
 24.4 
 19.4 
 
 8.6 
 
 8.4 
 
 9.1 
 
 8.1 
 
 11.7 
 
 7.6 
 
 100.0 
 
 100.0 
 
 100.0 
 100.0 
 100.0 
 100.0 
 
 .00779 
 
 .00778 
 
 .00861 
 .00865 
 .00921 
 .00672 
 
 .02160 
 
 .01990 
 
 .02020 
 .02060 
 .02070 
 .02020 
 
 554 
 583 
 
 464 
 
 445 
 
 Southern Pacific. . . 
 111. Central-Soo — 
 
 436 
 498 
 
 * See note on page 44. 
 
 [46] 
 
What These Tables Show 
 
 With minor exceptions the foregoing tables show: — that 
 in the proposed grouping, systems have been created of about 
 the same size and earning power; that the several systems 
 competing in the same district obtained their earnings from 
 passenger, freight, and miscellaneous traffic in similar pro- 
 portions to the total; that the character of the tonnage was 
 much the same; that the average rate per ton mile and per 
 passenger mile was substantially uniform; and that under 
 these conditions similar results from operation were obtained 
 by all systems which competed with each other. 
 
 Therefore, it appears that the systems have been arranged 
 in this grouping so as to lead to the conclusion that they 
 could "employ uniform rates in the movement of competi- 
 tive traffic and under efficient management earn substan- 
 tially the same rate of return upon the value of their re- 
 spective railway properties." 
 
 Competition Among Systems 
 
 In order to show the extent to which each system will 
 compete for traffic, the following table has been prepared 
 which gives a list of the cities in the United States having 
 in 1920 a population in excess of -75,000, designating by 
 which systems each will be served. 
 
 [47] 
 

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 [48] 
 
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 [49] 
 
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEMS 
 
 Eastern Systems 
 
 1 . New York Central System 
 
 The Central Railroad of New Jersey is the only addition of 
 importance with the exception of the joint control of the 
 New England roads which is to be shared in common with 
 three of the other Eastern systems. 
 
 This grouping would give the New York Central a share 
 of the anthracite coal business of the country and make a 
 better distribution of such business among the Eastern 
 systems. 
 
 The main line of the Central Railroad of New Jersey 
 extends from Jersey City to Tamaqua. With trackage 
 rights of about 40 miles from Tamaqua to Newberry Junction, 
 direct connection would be made with existing lines of the 
 New York Central extending from that point to Ashtabula. 
 
 With the Central Railroad of New Jersey a part of the 
 New York Central system, much of the traffic to and from 
 Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and points farther west would natur- 
 ally be diverted from the main line of the system, for this 
 line would be more direct and would pass through a less 
 congested territory. 
 
 It is probable that in the future development of the 
 New York Central system to meet the demands for in- 
 creased service, capital expended upon this property would 
 result in a greater increase of capacity than if similarly ex- 
 pended on the main lines of the system passing through New 
 York state. 
 
 2. Buffalo System 
 
 The grouping of these roads has been made with a view to 
 developing a system with advantages equal to those of the 
 New York Central and the Pennsylvania systems which 
 would be strong competitors. 
 
 The Delaware & Hudson connecting with the Northern 
 
 [50] 
 
New England lines, and the Erie with the Southern New 
 England lines, would make the system a strong competitor 
 for business to and from New England. 
 
 The Delaware, Lackawanna & Western and the New 
 York, Chicago & St. Louis, together with the main line of 
 the Erie, would provide a system with two routes from New 
 York and New England points to Chicago. 
 
 The Wabash lines East of the Mississippi River would give 
 the system an entrance into St. Louis. 
 
 The Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh, the Bessemer & 
 Lake Erie, and the Wheeling & Lake Erie would give it an 
 opportunity to obtain its fair share of the business originat- 
 ing in the Pittsburgh district. 
 
 The Pere Marquette would make it a competitor for 
 Michigan business. 
 
 3. Pennsylvania System 
 
 The Pennsylvania System remains practically intact with 
 the exception of sharing with other systems in the joint con- 
 trol of the New England roads. 
 
 4. Baltimore-Reading System 
 
 This system with its principal terminals in Philadelphia, 
 Baltimore, and Washington would be more largely a com- 
 petitor of the Pennsylvania Railroad from these points to 
 the West. 
 
 The Western Maryland would supplement the lines of the 
 Baltimore & Ohio in providing additional facilities in and 
 about Baltimore. 
 
 With a joint interest in the New England roads and with 
 terminals in New York, the system would be in position to 
 compete for western business, but less advantageously than 
 the other 3 systems because of its less direct lines and also 
 because of the topography of the country through which it 
 passes. 
 
 By the addition of the Lehigh Valley it would reach 
 Buffalo and the Lakes. An outlet to Chicago could be had 
 by traffic relations with the Grand Trunk. 
 
 The Lehigh Valley also would furnish an entrance from 
 Allentown to New York. 
 
 [51] 
 
5. Norfolk & Western-Chesapeake & Ohio System 
 The Virginian Railway is included in this system. 
 As the character of the business of these roads is so similar, 
 and as there is so little diversity in the tonnage, greater 
 economy of operation would probably be realized and dupli- 
 cation of investment avoided by a common ownership of these 
 properties. They have, therefore, been grouped together 
 in a single system and competition eliminated. 
 
 The lines already owned or controlled by the Chesapeake 
 & Ohio would provide an entrance into Chicago and Toledo 
 for the remaining roads in the group. 
 
 Joint Control of New England System 
 One of the important features of the grouping of the East- 
 ern roads is the provision for the joint control of the New 
 England railroads by the four principal Eastern systems, 
 all of which reach the New England gateways. In the 
 effort to combine the railroads of the country into a single 
 national transportation system to meet the requirements 
 of the Transportation Act, each road as a part of the system 
 must be considered in its relation to the whole. The dis- 
 position to be made of the New England roads, accordingly, 
 must be determined by the service required of them as an 
 integral part of such a system. 
 
 The Act calls for the division of the country into trans- 
 portation districts; it provides that all roads in each dis- 
 trict shall be grouped into systems in such a way as to 
 "preserve competition as fully as possible"; to "maintain 
 existing routes and channels of trade and commerce wher- 
 ever practicable," and to assure facilities adequate to meet 
 all the requirements of each district. The joint control 
 of the New England roads by the four proposed systems 
 provides the only means of serving all of these purposes. 
 
 Because of their location, the New England roads, neither 
 individually nor as a whole, can compete with any other 
 system in the district. The several New England roads 
 at the present time have practically a monopoly of trans- 
 portation in the territory which they serve, and without 
 disintegrating existing systems they cannot compete even 
 with each other to any appreciable extent. The only way 
 
 [52] 
 
that the New England roads can serve a competitive 
 purpose is through their relationship to and as parts of 
 outside systems which compete for New England business. 
 
 The division of the New England roads among the various 
 trunk lines (for example, assigning the Boston & Maine to 
 the proposed New York Central System or the Buffalo 
 System; or the New York, New Haven & Hartford to the 
 Pennsylvania System or the Baltimore-Reading System) 
 would greatly restrict if not entirely eliminate competi- 
 tion and create a monopoly in the respective parts of New 
 England. To preserve and to promote competition to the 
 fullest extent among the roads in the Eastern district west 
 of the Hudson River, with which traffic is interchanged, as 
 well as to maintain the existing routes and channels of 
 trade and commerce, which these roads offer, a common 
 use of all railroad facilities within New England must be 
 preserved for all these systems without discrimination. 
 While the joint ownership or control of the New England 
 lines is not essential in order to maintain the common use 
 of these facilities, so far as competition is concerned, it is 
 essential, nevertheless, to assure facilities adequate to 
 meet the transportation requirements of the district of 
 which they are a part, for sound credit is necessary to 
 maintain adequate facilities, and sufficiency and stability 
 of income are equally necessary to maintain sound credit. 
 
 The difficulty of obtaining the full compensation for 
 service in connection with interchanged traffic, as well as 
 the high operating costs, due to location, are both factors 
 of importance which adversely affect the income and credit 
 standing of the New England roads. Nearly 65 per cent 
 of the tonnage handled by these roads is interchanged at 
 the gateways with connecting lines, and the compensation 
 for service, both for traffic originating in New England for 
 points outside, as well as that originating outside for desti- 
 nation in New England, is to a considerable extent deter- 
 mined by negotiations with the roads which share in the 
 business. 
 
 The number of roads involved, the variety of the tonnage 
 interchanged, the differences in the length of haul, and count- 
 less other factors make a satisfactory determination of the 
 
 [53] 
 
fair division of the compensation received from this traffic 
 a problem so complex as to be impossible. To what extent 
 the income of the New England roads falls short of an 
 amount sufficient to provide a fair return on their property 
 values, because of unsatisfactory division of joint rates, 
 and to what extent this shortage is due to other factors, it 
 is impossible to say; nor would it be a matter of conse- 
 quence if there were a common ownership of these proper- 
 ties by all the remaining roads in the same rate-making 
 district, for by the provisions of the Transportation Act it 
 is not essential that all parts of each system, if commonly 
 owned, should be equally self-sustaining, for rates are 
 designed to meet the combined requirements of all systems 
 in the district considered as a whole. 
 
 As the roads comprising these four systems are to include 
 practically all the roads in the Eastern district, except those 
 in the Pocahontas district, these systems together will 
 receive income above their requirements sufficient in large 
 measure to offset the shortage of income on the part of the 
 New England roads whether it is due to unsatisfactory 
 compensation for handling joint business or higher operat- 
 ing costs due to location. With income sufficient for the 
 system as a whole, it is obvious that the deficit of one part 
 fairly measures the excess accruing to the balance of the 
 system. In a broad way, therefore, it is possible both to 
 determine the extent to which the systems in the Eastern 
 district as a whole outside of New England profit by the 
 rates made for the benefit of the New England roads, and 
 to estimate the profit accruing to each system, for it may be 
 assumed that such profit is approximately in proportion 
 to the whole as the ton miles or freight earnings of each 
 system are to the total of the district. 
 
 The ownership and control of the New England roads by 
 these systems — each participating in the ownership in 
 proportion as it benefits by including the New England 
 roads in the district for rate making purposes — would 
 prove no burden to these systems, for the dividends on the 
 additional stock, which it would be necessary to issue to 
 acquire control, would be provided by the increased income 
 received through rates, which are higher because of the 
 
 [54] 
 
inclusion of the factors of cost and property values of the 
 New England roads in the determination of the rates for 
 the whole. 
 
 Such a solution of the problem would be the most effec- 
 tive means of preserving and of promoting competition; 
 of maintaining the existing routes of commerce; of provid- 
 ing the credit necessary to assure such facilities as would 
 enable the New England roads to perform the service 
 required of them, not only for New England but for the 
 country at large. 
 
 This is not the place to discuss a detailed plan for the 
 transfer of the control of New England roads to these 
 systems. A brief statement will, however, show its prac- 
 ticability. First of all, it would be necessary to determine 
 the equitable interest of each of the New England roads 
 in a unified New England system, and to make such read- 
 justments of capitalization as are necessary to establish 
 substantial uniformity in the financial structures of each 
 of the New England roads. The next step would be to 
 form a holding company, whose stock would be used to 
 acquire the stocks of the New England roads. These 
 stocks could in turn be exchanged by the holding company 
 for stocks of the four systems which are to participate in 
 the joint ownership, the extent of participation of each 
 system being determined largely by the benefit which it 
 would receive by including the New England roads in the 
 same rate-making district. As owners of the stocks of 
 these four systems, the holding company would receive 
 income with which to pay dividends to its own stockholders, 
 the original holders of the New England railroad stocks. 
 This method of meeting the New England problem has 
 been referred to as remote, inasmuch as the systems which 
 are to purchase control exist only on paper and there is 
 no assurance that the proposed consolidations will ever take 
 place. Pending such consolidations a similar plan of own- 
 ership could become operative by dealing with the nine 
 trunk line systems with which business is interchanged. 
 The freight revenues of these nine systems are over 80 per 
 cent of the total of the district, excluding the New England 
 and Pocahontas districts. These roads are the principal 
 
 155] 
 
ones concerned in the division of joint rates, and are also 
 the largest beneficiaries of the higher rates which are made 
 to cover the requirements of .the New England roads. 
 The exchange of stocks with these roads on the basis out- 
 lined would leave less than 20 per cent of the stocks of the 
 New England roads in the treasury of the holding company 
 unexchanged; this stock could be held until such time as 
 the remaining roads in the district were absorbed by the 
 various systems and then exchanged On a similar basis. 
 
 (The New England situation has been discussed previously on page i6 and again 
 on page 22). 
 
 Southern Systems 
 
 6. Atlantic Coast Line-Louisville & Nashville System 
 The various roads in this system are already so closely 
 
 related by stock ownership or by lease as to constitute a 
 system which meets the requirements of the Transportation 
 Act. 
 
 7. Southern Railway System 
 
 The principal change in this system is the addition of the 
 Seaboard Air Line. 
 
 The Seaboard Air Line covers much the same territory 
 as the Atlantic Coast Line and would give the system access 
 to Florida and additional coast ports which it would not 
 otherwise reach. 
 
 Western Systems 
 
 8. Great Northern - St. Paul System 
 
 The St. Paul would furnish the Great Northern entrances 
 into Chicago, Omaha, and Kansas City. 
 
 The Wabash lines West of the Mississippi River would 
 give an entrance into St. Louis; the St. Louis & San Fran- 
 cisco would provide an outlet to the Southwest. 
 
 The joint control of the Chicago & Alton with the Union 
 Pacific-Northwestern system would give a line from Kansas 
 
 [56] 
 
City to St. Louis and would also provide lines between the 
 Southwest and Chicago and St. Louis. 
 
 This system would compete more especially with the 
 Northern Pacific-Burlington System for Northwestern 
 traffic, and with all systems from the Southwest to Chicago. 
 
 9. Northern Paciftc-Burlington System 
 
 The important additions are the Denver & Rio Grande, 
 Western Pacific, Kansas City Southern, and Chicago Great 
 Western. 
 
 The Denver & Rio Grande and the Western Pacific would 
 provide an entrance to San Francisco and make the system 
 a strong competitor of the Union Pacific for business to and 
 from California. 
 
 The Kansas City Southern would give an outlet from 
 Kansas City to the Gulf. 
 
 The Chicago Great Western would cover territory not 
 now occupied and would furnish more direct lines from 
 Minneapolis and St. Paul to Omaha and Kansas City, and 
 also supplementary lines from St. Paul and Kansas City to 
 Chicago. 
 
 The principal competitors of this system would be the 
 Great Northern-St. Paul and the Union Pacific-North- 
 western systems. 
 
 10. Union Pacific-Northwestern System 
 
 The Chicago & Northwestern would give the Union 
 Pacific a direct entrance from Omaha into Chicago and also 
 would make it a competitor for Minnesota and Wisconsin 
 business. 
 
 The addition of the Central Pacific would give it a direct 
 line to San Francisco. 
 
 The Chicago & Alton would connect Kansas City with 
 St. Louis and provide the system with an entrance into 
 Chicago by way of St. Louis, both for its business from the 
 West and from the Southwest, the territory which it would 
 serve by the addition of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas. 
 
 This system would compete especially with the Northern 
 Pacific-Burlington and Atchison systems. 
 
 [57] 
 
11. Atchison System 
 
 An entrance into New Orleans would be provided by the 
 addition of the Texas & Pacific and make it a strong com- 
 petitor with the Southern Pacific from New Orleans to the 
 Coast. 
 
 The addition of the Missouri Pacific System would make 
 it an important factor in southwestern territory. 
 
 The Chicago & Eastern Illinois controlled jointly with the 
 Southern Pacific System would provide a direct route from 
 St. Louis to Chicago. 
 
 12. Southern Pacific System 
 
 By the addition of the El Paso and Southwestern, the 
 present Southern Pacific and Chicago, Rock Island & 
 Pacific systems would provide a direct through system from 
 Chicago to the Coast. 
 
 By the addition of the St. Louis Southwestern and the 
 joint control of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois it would be a 
 competitor with other systems from the Southwest to St. 
 Louis and Chicago. 
 
 The principal competitor would be the Atchison. 
 
 13. Illinois Central-Soo System 
 
 This is a north and south system from the Canadian border 
 to New Orleans. 
 
 The Minneapolis & St. Louis would provide direct con- 
 nection between Minneapolis and St. Paul and Omaha. 
 
 With its line through Peoria, it would permit traffic from 
 these points to reach the Gulf without entrance into Chicago. 
 
 The discussions in this pamphlet have been concerned 
 mainly with the importance of sound credit, and the sug- 
 gested groupings of the roads have been developed among 
 other things to insure the presence of this fundamental in 
 each consolidated system. Other plans will be presented 
 which will deal with essential factors viewed more especially 
 from the standpoint of natural traffic relations and economy 
 and efficiency of operation. 
 
 The Transportation Act provides first for a tentative 
 plan of consolidations in order that all phases of the problem 
 
 [58] 
 
may be thoroughly considered as a basis for the formulation 
 of a final plan. This pamphlet, therefore, will have accom- 
 plished its purpose if it contributes to a clearer understanding 
 of the fundamental requirements of credit and if it leads to a 
 fuller appreciation of the necessity of recognizing credit as a 
 factor of first importance in the development of the plan 
 which is finally adopted. 
 
 Summary of Conclusions 
 
 The development of this plan is based upon the conviction 
 that private management will not endure unless it is suc- 
 cessful in furnishing transportation adequate to the needs 
 of the country; that this purpose will be fulfilled only pro- 
 vided each railroad system hereafter existing shall establish 
 for itself a credit position which will enable it to obtain 
 capital from the investment markets both readily and 
 economically; that with the diversity of ownership of the 
 various parts of the transportation system of the country 
 as now constituted, the remedial legislation of the Trans- 
 portation Act will provide satisfactory credit for systems 
 which control only about 60 per cent of existing railroad 
 facilities and will leave those which control the remaining 
 40 per cent in much the same position as before Federal 
 control; that with a common interest in the ownership of 
 all parts of the system the legislative provisions of the 
 Transportation Act will provide sufficient credit for the 
 entire system; that with a readjustment of ownership which 
 will make systems covering the same territory, similar in 
 essential respects, the same results will be obtained from a 
 credit standpoint as though the entire system were commonly 
 owned; that the readjustments of ownership necessary to 
 secure similar systems can be brought about without seri- 
 ously disturbing the relationships of ownership and control 
 already existing, and without loss of credit standing on the 
 part of any of the railroads involved; further, that com- 
 petition offers greater assurance of economical and efficient 
 service than a monopoly; and it is, therefore, compatible 
 with the pubUc interest that further consolidations be made 
 which will create systems in each transportation district 
 
 [59] 
 
which are competitive as well as substantially uniform in 
 their operating and financial characteristics. 
 
 The passage of the Transportation Act established pri- 
 vate operation and management under public regulation 
 as a part of the future railroad policy of the country. So 
 far as a satisfactory system of regulation can be provided 
 by legislation, it has been provided by the provisions of the 
 Transportation Act. Its successful application, however, 
 requires that uniform results be obtained, and such results 
 cannot be obtained unless application be made to roads or 
 systems operating under uniform conditions. Whether it 
 will be necessary to establish such uniform conditions by 
 compulsory consolidations, or resort to a monopoly with 
 Government ownership, is a question for the future to 
 determine. The adoption of one of these expedients appears 
 to be certain, unless the necessary co-operation can be 
 secured to bring about by voluntary action such consolida- 
 tions as are required to make effective the regulatory 
 provisions of the Transportation Act. 
 
 [60] 
 
Index to Maps 
 
 Alphabetical List of all Class I Roads 
 
 * Roads are not shown on the maps or included in the tables but they would, 
 
 of course, be included in a complete plan for consolidating all roads into a 
 limited number of strong, competing systems. 
 
 ** Are to be joint control roads shown on the maps but the figures are not included 
 in the tables. 
 
 *** Joint control roads shown on the maps and on&'half of the figures are included 
 in each system. 
 
 Name of Roads Map No. 
 
 Alabama & Vicksburg 7 
 
 Alabama Great Southern 7 
 
 Ann Arbor 4 
 
 •Arizona & New Mexico — 
 
 Arizona Eastern 12 
 
 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 11 
 
 Atlanta & West Point 6 
 
 *Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic — 
 
 Atlantic City 4 
 
 •Atlantic & St. Lawrence — 
 
 Atlantic Coast Line 6 
 
 Baltimore & Ohio 4 
 
 Baltimore, Chesapeake & Atlantic 3 
 
 **Bangor & Aroostook 1-2-3-4 
 
 Bessemer & Lake Erie 2 
 
 •Bingham & Garfield — 
 
 ••Boston & Maine 1-2-3-4 
 
 Buffalo & Susquehanna 2 
 
 Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh 2 
 
 •Canadian Pacific Lines in Maine — 
 
 Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio S 
 
 ••Central New England 1-2-3-4 
 
 Central of Georgia 13 
 
 Central of New Jersey 1 
 
 §§Central Pacific 10 
 
 •Central Vermont — 
 
 Charleston & West Carolina 6 
 
 Chesapeake & Ohio 5 
 
 •••Chicago & Alton 8-10 
 
 •••Chicago & Eastern Illinois 11-12 
 
 Chicago & Erie 2 
 
 Chicago & Northwestern 10 
 
 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 9 
 
 •Chicago, Detroit & Canada Grand Trunk Junction — 
 
 Chicago Great Western 9 
 
 •••Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville 6-7 
 
 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 8 
 
 •Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis — 
 
 Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf 12 
 
 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 12 
 
 [61] 
 
Name Map No. 
 
 Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha 10 
 
 *Chicago, Terre Haute & Southeastern — 
 
 Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western 4 
 
 Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific 7 
 
 Cincinnati Northern 1 
 
 Cleveland, Cin., Chicago & St. Louis 1 
 
 Coal & Coke 4 
 
 Colorado Southern 9 
 
 *Colorado & Wyoming — 
 
 Colorado Midland 9 
 
 *Cripple Creek & Colorado Springs — 
 
 Cumberland Valley 3 
 
 Delaware & Hudson 2 
 
 Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 2 
 
 Denver & Rio Grande 9 
 
 *Denver & Salt Lake — 
 
 *Detroit & Mackinac — 
 
 *Detroit & Toledo Shore Line — 
 
 •Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee — 
 
 *Detroit, Toledo & Ironton — 
 
 Duluth & Iron Range 8 
 
 Duluth, Missabe & Northern 8 
 
 Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic 13 
 
 *Duluth, Winnipeg & Pacific — 
 
 El Paso & Southwestern 12 
 
 Elgin, Joliet & Eastern 2 
 
 Erie , 2 
 
 Florida East Coast 7 
 
 Fort Worth & Denver City 9 
 
 Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio 12 
 
 Georgia Railroad, Lessee 6 
 
 Georgia Southern & Florida 7 
 
 Grand Rapids & Indiana 3 
 
 *Grand Trunk Western — 
 
 Great Northern 8 
 
 *Gulf & Ship Island — 
 
 Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe 11 
 
 *Gulf, Mobile & Northern — 
 
 Hocking Valley 5 
 
 Houston & Texas Central 12 
 
 Houston East & West Texas 12 
 
 Illinois Central 13 
 
 International & Great Northern 11 
 
 Kanawha & Michigan 1 
 
 Kansas City, Mexico & Orient 12 
 
 Kansas City Southern 9 
 
 Lake Erie & Western 1 
 
 **Lehigh & Hudson 1-2-3-4 
 
 *Lehigh & New England — 
 
 Lehigh Valley 4 
 
 Long Island 3 
 
 Los Angeles & Salt Lake 10 
 
 *Louisiana & Arkansas — 
 
 *Louisiana Ry. & Navigation — 
 
 Louisiana Western 12 
 
 Louisville & Nashville 6 
 
 Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis 6 
 
 [621 
 
Name Map No. 
 
 ♦♦Maine Central 1-2-3^ 
 
 Michigan Central 1 
 
 •Midland Valley — 
 
 Mineral Range 13 
 
 Minneapolis & St. Louis 13 
 
 Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste Marie 13 
 
 ♦Missouri & North Arkansas — 
 
 Missouri, Kansas & Texas 10 
 
 Missouri, Kansas & Texas of Texas (included in Missouri, Kansas & 
 
 Texas) 10 
 
 ♦Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf — 
 
 Missouri Pacific 11 
 
 Mobile & Ohio 7 
 
 ♦♦Monongahela 1-3 
 
 Morgan's Louisiana & Texas R. R. & Steamship Co 12 
 
 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis 6 
 
 ♦Nevada Northern — 
 
 New Orleans & Northeastern 7 
 
 ♦New Orleans Great Northern — 
 
 New Orleans, Texas & Mexico 11 
 
 New York Central 1 
 
 New York, Chicago & St. Louis 2 
 
 ♦♦New York, New Haven & Hartford 1-2-3-4 
 
 New York, Ontario & Western 1 
 
 New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk 3 
 
 New York, Susquehanna & Western 2 
 
 Norfolk & Western ". S 
 
 ♦Norfolk Southern — 
 
 Northern Pacific 9 
 
 Northwestern Pacific 11 
 
 Oregon Short Line 10 
 
 Oregon-Washington R. R. & Navigation 10 
 
 Panhandle & Sante Fe 11 
 
 Pennsylvania Company 3 
 
 Pennsylvania Railroad 3 
 
 Pere Marquette 2 
 
 Philadelphia & Reading 4 
 
 Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington 3 
 
 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie 1% ' 
 
 Pittsburgh & West Virginia 2 
 
 Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis 3 
 
 ♦Pittsburgh, Shawmut & Northern — 
 
 Port Reading , 4 
 
 ♦♦Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac 3-4-5-6-7 
 
 ♦♦Rutland 1-2-3-4 
 
 St. Joseph & Grand Island 10 
 
 St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico 11 
 
 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern 11 
 
 St. Louis-San Francisco 8 
 
 St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas 8 
 
 St. Louis Southwestern 12 
 
 St. Louis Southwestern of Texas 12 
 
 San Antonio & Aransas Pass 12 
 
 Seaboard 7 
 
 Southern 7 
 
 Southern Railway in Mississippi 7 
 
 §§Southern Pacific 12 
 
 ♦Spokane International — 
 
 [63] 
 
Name Map No. 
 
 •**Spokane, Portland & Seattle 8-9 
 
 Staten Island Rapid Transit 4 
 
 *Tennessee Central — 
 
 Texarkana & Fort Smith (included in Kansas City Southern) 9 
 
 Texas & New Orleans 12 
 
 Texas & Pacific 11 
 
 Toledo & Ohio Central 1 
 
 Toledo, Peoria & Western 3 
 
 Toledo, St. Louis & Western 4 
 
 Trinity & Brazos Valley 9 
 
 Ulster & Delaware 1 
 
 §§Union Pacific 10 
 
 Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific 7 
 
 Virginian 5 
 
 §Wabash 2-8 
 
 **Washington Southern 3-4-5-6-7 
 
 West Jersey & Seashore 3 
 
 Western Maryland ; 4 
 
 Western Pacific 9 
 
 **Western Railway of Alabama 6-13 
 
 Wheeling & Lake Erie 2 
 
 Wichita Falls & Northwestern (included in Missouri, Kansas & Texas) 10 
 
 Wichita Valley 9 
 
 Yazoo & Mississippi Valley 13 
 
 §§ The Central Pacific has been placed with the Union Pacific, but the figures are 
 
 included in those of the Southern Pacific. 
 § Wabash lines east of St. Louis are included in the Buffalo System; lines west of 
 
 St. Louis in Great Northern-St. Paul System. Total figures are used in the 
 
 Buffalo System. 
 
 ;64] 
 
MAP 1 
 
 New York Central System 
 
NEW YORK CENTRAL SYSTEM 
 
 COLOR 
 
 NO. NAME 
 
 — — ^— 2 New York Central 
 
 '•"■•• 12 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis 
 -^^'■^-^'—:—z- 13 Michigan Central 
 ————=—- 18 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie 
 
 40 Toledo & Ohio Central 
 
 ' ' *' * ' * 60 Cincinnati Northern 
 •♦'♦ < ♦ * ♦- 46 Kanawha & Michigan 
 -^.,_,_,_,_ 3^ Lake Erie & Western 
 
 — '■■ ■ 16 Central of New Jersey 
 
 ^» — ..^-,^.4^ 31 New York, Ontario & Western 
 
 70 Ulster & Delaware 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 ■ 66 *Lehigh & Hudson 
 »-■»■ • — ^*- 69 **Monongahela 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SYSTEM 
 
 To be jointly controlled by all four Proposed Eastern Systems 
 
 Also shown on Maps 2, 3, 4. 
 
 niiMiinin 44 Rutland 
 
 8 Boston & Maine 
 
 ■-' ^ ■■ r, r^ 26 Maine Central 
 
 46 Bangor & Aroostook 
 
 -#■>«■*»• 4 New York, New Haven & Hartford 
 ■• r» I » i« I* I ■ 41 Central New England 
 
 Mapl 
 
 Trackage riglits are shown in the same 
 color as the roads having the right, but 
 in a broken line thus:___^^__ 
 
 Scale of Statute Miles 
 
 100 150 200 2S0 
 
 THE MATTHEWS-NORTHRUP WORKS, BUFFALO, i 
 
BUFFALO SYSTEM 
 
 NAME 
 
 NO. 
 
 _ 6 Erie 
 
 ^ 33 Chicago & Erie 
 
 47 New York, Susquehanna & Western 
 
 14+*Wabash 
 
 .^ 30 Wheeling & Lake Erie 
 
 19 Pere Marquette 
 
 _^ 21 New York, Chicago & St. Louis 
 
 . . ., 16 Delaware & Hudson 
 
 — 9 Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 
 
 _^ 26 Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh 
 
 — fc- 27 Bessemer & Lake Erie 
 
 .^^ 30a Pittsburgh & West Virginia 
 
 ^_ 23 Elgin, Joliet & Eastern 
 
 _.^ 63 Buffalo & Susquehanna 
 
 Line at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 . ,1 ^ ,m n 66 *Lehigh & Hudson 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SYSTEM 
 To be jointly controlled by all four Proposed Eastern Systems 
 Also shown on Maps 1, 3, 4 
 'I. .1 44 Rutland 
 
 Tratikage rights are shown in the same 
 color as the roads having the right, but 
 in a broken line thus:^______ 
 
 Scale of Statute Miles 
 
 1 50 200 
 
 THE MATTHEW8-N0RTHRUP WORKS, BUFFALO, ■ 
 
PENNSYLVANIA SYSTEM 
 
 NO. NAME 
 
 1 Pennsylvania Railroad 
 
 ■ I Pennsylvania Co. 
 
 ( Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis 
 
 ■ 17 Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington 
 89 Grand Rapids & Indiana 
 
 ■ 22 Long Island 
 
 . 42 New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk 
 
 ■ 35 West Jersey & Seashore 
 
 ■ 48 Cumberland Valley 
 
 ■ 68 Baltimore, Chesapeake & Atlantic 
 172 Toledo, Peoria & Western 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 '" 56 *Lehigh & Hudson 
 
 ■ 59 **Monongahela 
 
 — 88 tRichmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac 
 
 — — — ' — ~ 101 ttWashington Southern 
 
 NEW ENGLAND SYSTEM 
 
 To be jointly controlled by all four Proposed Eastern Systems 
 
 Also shown on Maps 1, 2, 4. 
 
 44 Rutland 
 
 8 Boston & Maine 
 
 ^> li n 1-1 n n n 26 Maine Central 
 
 >^^ — I- 45 Bangor & Aroostook 
 
 4 New York, New Haven & Hartford 
 Central New England 
 
 * Also shown on Maps 1,2,4. t Also shown on Maps 4. 5, 6, 7. 
 ** Also shown on Map 1. ft Also shown on Maps 4, 5, 6, 7. 
 
 Map 3 
 
 Tracltago riglits are shown in the same 
 color as the roads having the right, but 
 in a broken line thus:—™ 
 
 THE WATTHEW3-N0RTHHUP WORKS, OUFFftLO, ti.t 
 
NORFOLK & WESTERN-CHESAPEAKE & OHIO 
 
 SYSTEM 
 
 COLOR NO. NAME 
 
 . 76 Chesapeake & Ohio 
 
 36 Hocking Valley 
 
 - 74 Norfolk & Western 
 
 — 83 Virginian 
 
 91 Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio 
 
 Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 u *tt H M» 101 *Washington Southern 
 
 88 fRichmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac 
 
 * Also shown on Maps 3, 4, 6, 7. 
 t Also shown on Maps 3, 4, 6, 7. 
 
 Trackage rights are shown in £he same 
 color as the roads having the right, but 
 in a broken line thus:. 
 
 Scale of Statute Miles 
 
 1Q0 150 200 ^ 
 
 THE MATTHEWS-NOHTHRUP W0PK9, BUFFftLO, N.Y 
 
Lines at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 ,i, „ „ „,„^, ,„„„ ,,,, 101 **Washington Southern 
 .^_^_____ 88 tl^if'hmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac 
 __— — ^'. 103 ttWestern Railway of Alabama 
 
 ** Also shown on Maps 3, 4, 5, 7. 
 i'Also shown on Maps 3, 4, 5, 7. 
 tt Also shown on Map 13. 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Atlantic Coast Line-Louisville & Nash- 
 ville System and the Southern System, one-half of the mileage and figures being 
 included in each system. 
 
Map 7 
 
Ituy 
 J-k.l 
 
 
 sa. 
 
 Ore 
 
 H2^ 
 
 JSJEv. 
 
 C4L 
 
 ■fP. 
 
 w 
 
 IS. 
 
 -P- 
 
 Map 8 
 
 -»,; 
 
 cat F.l,.,'"^^° 
 
 .Jll 
 
 
 Miics Cy. 
 ~ BfIIinc-3 
 
 
 r- 
 
 
 / 
 
 \ 
 
 VFau 
 air,., 
 
 '^AHo 
 
 Rapid dityC 
 
 ^■S> ^\ Hinckleiv, 
 
 
 WYO. 
 
 UTAH 
 
 COLO. 
 
 ARIZ. 
 
 N.MEX. 
 
 GREAT NORTHERN -ST. PAUL SYSTEM 
 
 NO. NAME 
 
 111 Great Northern 
 
 142 *Spokane, Portland & Seattle 
 
 108 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
 
 >j<4**i H»M ii n iiiiiit- 14 tWabash 
 
 129 Duluth, Missabe & Northern 
 
 138 Duluth & Iron Range 
 
 116 St. Louis-San Francisco 
 
 Hmn m i U ut m tk 146 St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas 
 125**Chicago & Alton 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Great Northern-St. Paul System and the 
 Northern Pacific-Burlington System, one-half of the mileage and figures being 
 used in each system. 
 ** This road will be jointly controlled by the Great Northern-St. Paul System and the 
 Union Pacific-Northwestern System, one-half of the mileage and figures being 
 included in each system, 
 t Lines of this system west of St. Louis. 
 
 Lines east of St. Louis and total figures are shown in the Buff"alo System. 
 
 "v. 
 
 L'^'*r^SCTM"-""l 
 
 ^ ai»^^^ 
 
 Mason City 
 iSiouikCity T^ l a ^%; 
 
 Ecn-Baf 
 
 ka4ne 
 
 -"^^^CCJ 
 
 L. 
 I HURON/ 
 
 cm 
 
 NEBR. 
 
 Oniahai 
 
 ^^^ock'lajand 
 
 O t^T. 
 
 >bnn- 
 
 an- 
 
 ""'i^ 
 
 
 KANS. 
 
 '116 
 
 Oy^ L A . , 
 
 Sprinj?li 
 23 
 
 :on 
 
 ti«1 j=ff,;B.,]i aty^ff 8a,„^-; 
 
 X M;.I.I/'ilM/^ 
 
 O HI O 
 
 'HJ- 
 
 MASS. 
 CONK- UO""^"^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 W.VA. 
 
 ft) 
 
 pringfic'ld 
 
 KY. 
 
 Quanah^ 
 
 Vemori' 
 
 May 
 
 : 146 f ftoS* 
 
 [146 
 
 TEN N. 
 
 146 , 
 
 ARK. 
 
 'J Hope 
 
 N.CAR- 
 
 S.CAR. 
 
 Birmfnjrtiamb 
 
 MISS. I AiA. 
 
 T E X Af s 
 
 Mtnard 
 
 i'L A. 
 
 G 17 Z F 
 
 O F 
 
 MEXICO 
 
 ■=^^^ 
 
 Em 
 
 ^, 
 
 Scale of Statute Miles 
 
 60 100 200 300 400 
 
 THE MATTHEW8-N0RTHRUP WORKS, BUFFALO, N 
 
 0> 
 
 ■"X 
 
 y 
 

 Map 9 
 
 So, 
 
 
 Winnipeg o 
 I 
 
 «(i ) 
 
 ^o, 
 
 »iaMla^ 
 
 I >p950ula 
 
 -'■=.., 
 
 °«EGow 
 
 JaUa 
 
 \HejS,,'' ^- 
 
 -Bufte^ 
 
 
 IX>AH0 
 
 '''■'/ii, 
 
 Cody^j/ 
 
 GJendive i 
 
 - -_-.,,'"'?' Bismarcl 
 
 JJ2 Miles Cily 
 
 
 nlci-national ?^5^^\^ ,^ 
 
 '"^^ERI Or' 
 
 
 lKain<./rjJ'%_-*^''''''^ 
 
 f 109 
 
 •tfdf 
 
 S.D AK. 
 
 ft'cndovcry 
 
 Miuneapoli, 
 
 Mankato c 
 
 S(.OI|o^J 
 
 Stillwati-T 
 
 WIS. 
 
 Vinona 
 
 ; La Cr.jtf .- 
 
 Oi 
 
 a'37 r'"""^ / -^Sai!, 
 
 '!!( 
 
 ,N*t 
 
 "Jortliporl 
 
 CNeini: 
 
 Fort Dodge 
 
 
 ( MICH. 
 
 S 
 
 o,2sc:^ 
 
 X/. 
 I HURON/ 
 
 HT. 
 
 a.-i- 
 
 ait- 
 
 [O Wi 
 
 
 
 ' ancisco 
 
 Gal 
 
 -^rand I3] 
 
 ME V 
 
 5' 
 
 1091 
 
 1'P,r 
 
 ^#■0^ 
 
 ,en^- 
 
 LGlen' 
 
 woldSpM."^*'. 
 
 .£ Boulder , 
 
 '-%. 
 
 109 
 
 121 
 
 'F. 
 
 I^enver 
 LO'jJ136 
 
 Colorado Spi i 
 
 109 
 
 AU-lii, 
 
 [ Sft.Joffcph_ 
 
 KANS. 
 
 133 
 
 « 
 
 
 ARIZ. 
 
 Santa Fei 
 
 N.MEX. 
 
 ^,T^injdad 
 
 Sixela> 
 
 Ml' 
 
 siis City . 
 M O. 
 
 ^ Peoria 
 ILL. 
 
 >109 
 
 SCc-ntral/a 
 K.St.>Loui? , 
 
 OHIO 
 
 ^tJ.J- 
 
 MASS, 
 
 ^ 
 
 IND 
 
 W.VA. 
 
 VA- 
 
 1 MetropolJa 
 
 l4o 
 
 Amtrilla 
 
 Dalhart 
 
 TEN N. 
 
 N.CAB. 
 
 Quanuh v>^ — . 
 Wrohita Falls>3^ 
 
 177"-^. /'m \l40 
 
 Stamford'o Ft.V/„rtl\^ 
 
 Abilene i Cleburne ^""o Waxahael 
 
 exarkanal 
 
 FortSmitli 
 ARK 
 
 NORTHERN PACIFIC -BURLINGTON SYSTEM 
 
 i-i. | . 
 
 NO. NAME 
 
 112 Northern Pacific 
 
 142 *Spokane, Portland & Seattle 
 
 liiiiii I 135 Colorado Southern 
 
 __^^_-_ 140 Port Worth & Denver City 
 
 1 109 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
 
 166 Colorado Midland 
 
 176 Trinity & Brazos Valley 
 
 177 Wichita Valley 
 
 .,,11 127 Chicago Great Western 
 
 ,1 I , , . 121 Denver & Rio Crande 
 
 _^_, ^_ ^. 137 Western Pacific 
 
 „.^__-__ 133 ) Kansas City Southern 
 
 / Texarkana & Ft. Smith 
 
 *This road will be jointly controlled by the Great Northern-St. Paul System and the 
 Northern Pacific-Burlington System, one-half of the mileage and figures being 
 included in each system. 
 
 TEXAS 
 
 o leat'ue 
 \176 
 
 S.OAR- 
 
 G A. 
 
 FLA. 
 
 O 
 O 
 
 O 
 
 s 
 -^ 
 
 MEXICO 
 
 -.^ 
 
 4 ■■:-^. 
 
 Scale of Statute Miles 
 
 60 100 200 300 400 
 
 THE MATTHEWS-NORTHRUP W0«K3, BUFFALO, N, V. 
 
 
 
 :\ 
 
 1 
 
n 
 
 Vt-/ti.ll- 
 
 t4A33. 
 
 CON^- D^-^ ==■ 
 
 ^N..1. 
 
 W.V A- 
 
 
 CAR- 
 
 S. CAR- 
 
 UNION PACIFIC— NORTHWESTERN SYSTEM 
 
 COLOR 
 
 NO. NAME 
 
 114 *Union Pacific 
 
 120 Oregon Short Line 
 
 121 Oregon- Washington R. R. & Navigation Co. 
 
 ■ n M I 111 I ■ 130 Los Angeles & Salt Lake 
 
 iiiiiii iiiiiii 158 St. Joseph & Grand Island 
 
 , . 181 *Central Pacific 
 
 110 Chicago & Northwestern 
 
 iiiiiiii III! 122 Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha 
 
 « ■ I ■ ■ ■ 12B**Chicago & Alton 
 
 118 (Missouri, Kansas & Texas 
 
 1 Missouri, Kansas & Tex. of Texas 
 
 ^^.^^^. ( Wichita Falls & Northwestern 
 
 * The Central Pacific has been placed with the Union Pacific but the figures of the 
 Central Pacific are included with those of the Southern Pacific. 
 **This road will be jointly controlled by the Union Pacific-Northwestern System 
 and the Great Northern-St. Paul System, one-half of the mileage and figures 
 being included in each system. 
 
 / 7 ^; 
 
 "8^ ^4 Waco 
 
 MISS. 
 
 ALA. 
 
 '»oSlu-ev?port 
 
 TEXAS 
 
 Austin ^ I 
 118/ \ 
 
 San - 
 Antonio'- 
 
 
 Riflhts /''^Calveston 
 
 FLA. 
 
 G jr L F OF M :e X I C O 
 
 -^ 
 
 in 
 
 Scale of Statute Miles 
 
 60 100 200 300 400 
 
 600 
 
 
 THE MATTHEWS-NORTH RUP WORKS, BUFFALO, N. Y, 
 
 7 
 
Map 11 
 
 NO. NAME 
 
 107 Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe 
 
 145 Northwestern Pacific 
 
 141 Panhandle & Santa Fe 
 
 jiltiuiinitiiiiiiii 1-2® Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe 
 
 20 ^Chicago & Eastern Illinois 
 
 ,1,.,,^,,. , 123 Texas & Pacific 
 
 123a New Orleans, Texas & Mexico 
 
 „ Hr.i f ii m; 1236 St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico 
 
 ,^_^^__^^.^^,^^ 134 International & Great Northern 
 
 __^,^^^__^ 119 Missouri Pacific 
 
 117 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern 
 
 ■ ♦♦ MM * 
 
 * This road will be jointly controlled by the Atchison System and the Southern Pacific 
 System, one-half of the mileage and figures being included in each system. 
 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC SYSTEM 
 
 Map 12 
 
 r^- 
 
 ^ 
 
 (ij 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 THE MATTHEW3-N0RTHRUP WORKS, BUFFALO, H. Y. 
 
 y 
 
i "? ''u;v^jj l) 
 
 Map 13 
 
 y^A 
 
 SH. 
 
 Whiti'Tuilo- 
 
 M o 
 
 N I 
 
 Ofifi 
 
 Got, 
 
 'Oaho 
 
 WYO, 
 
 hev 
 
 UTAH 
 
 COLO. 
 
 Cal 
 
 'F. 
 
 ARIZ 
 
 N.MEX. 
 
 '^ 
 
 ILLINOIS CENTRAL- SOO SYSTEM 
 
 COLOR NO. NAME 
 
 72 Illinois Central 
 
 78 Yazoo & Mississippi 
 
 <H 1 80 Central of Georgia 
 
 . 182 Minneapolis & St. Louis 
 
 116 Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie 
 
 ^ 148 Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic 
 
 ^^^^^^^ 160 Mineral Range 
 
 Line at Present Controlled by Two or More Systems 
 
 103 *Western Railway of Alabama 
 
 * Also shown on Map 6. 
 
 116 
 
 UuioN 
 
 Ucvils Lak 
 
 
 
 
 Bismarck 
 
 Lc Eoau c 
 
 ConOu 
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 16^ 1« 
 182 
 
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 Sioux 
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 A-hoJii^'mm'iX 
 
 '•^' 
 
 NEBR. 
 
 72 DubuSve 
 
 ?,Oska!oo* 
 
 jBNN- 
 
 Omaha V"'"''"^^l|- 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 ""uir^ 
 
 OHIO 
 
 KANS. 
 
 Sp^gfield^O*&=l'^='"' 
 
 •E-Sf, 
 
 St. Louis c 
 M 0. 
 
 IND 
 
 PlndianBpoUs 
 
 W.VA. 
 
 12 
 
 .aM\ 
 
 ft\e 
 
 ^ij 
 
 =lS> 
 
 ^ 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 OKLA. 
 
 Memphis 
 
 TEN N. 
 Cliatta 
 
 ' Aber.iot 
 
 N.CAR- 
 
 ^ ^ P' N.. S.CAB- 
 
 TEXAS 
 
 GreiinvilleVi 
 
 IZJ^/LitrainghamS 
 
 
 AmTbS. ALA 
 
 Vioksburd^ 
 
 ^ ^"^ '" 1 ruiits:<>ri<«7 
 
 /baton KougcO^ 
 
 nJt^- 
 
 gavanniah 
 
 Tifaug 
 
 FLA. 
 
 G ~U 1. F OF MEXICO 
 
 Scale of Statute Miles 
 
 60 100 200 ^300 400 500 
 
 THE MATTHEW8-N0HTHRUP WOHKa, BUFFALO, N. V. 
 
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 t4 
 
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 71 
 
m 
 
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