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General Infokmation Series, No. III. 
 INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 
 
 EXAMPLES, CONCLUSIONS, AND MAXIMS 
 
 MODERN NAVAL TACTICS 
 
 COMMANDER WM. BAINBEIDGE-HOFF, 
 
 rrNia?E!r) sot^^this na.-v-y. 
 
 SiPLry COLLEGE LlBKAftY 
 
 OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 
 
 BUREAU OF NAVIGATION, 
 NAVT BEPAETMCENT. 
 
 1884. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 GOVERNMENT FEINTING OFFICE. 
 1884. 
 
PRETACE. 
 
 In placing these thoughts and remarks upon Naval Tactics before 
 those who may be interested in the subject, I feel obliged to acknowl- 
 edge a certain lack of experience, in a practical way, that must neces- 
 sarily exist in a navy where an evolutionary tieet is not kept up. 
 
 Those nations which have always maintained large navies, and whose 
 history and prestige date back to glorious pasts, have ever had great 
 commanders and intelligent writers, who have made this branch of 
 naval science a life-long study, both practically and theoretically. Upon 
 the experience of these men, and from the writings of their naval editors, 
 I have endeavored to give certain examples, deduce certain conclusions, 
 and formulate certain maxims. 
 
 Naval Tactics means more than the handling of squadrons. It means 
 the whole science of the conduct of vessels, whether they act singly or 
 in concert; how to keep them together at sea ; how to operate along a 
 coast ; how to conduct them through the inland waters of an enemy's 
 country; how best to govern them in regard to any peculiar environ- 
 ment, whether of wind, weather, or adversary ; whether to attack or to 
 retreat, and, if the former, how best to employ their weapons of offense 
 and defense. 
 
 The tactical integer is at all times changing according as the mechan- 
 ical arts make prominent some one point in naval science, whether it be 
 artillery or torpedoes, or the construction of the vessel itself. With 
 wooden walls, broadside guns, and sails, it was the great fleet of many 
 vessels. To-day, with the armor-clad and its all-round fire, torpedoes, 
 and ram, it is the single ship. 
 
 Formerly the ship was a component of the fleet. To-day the fleet is 
 a combination of ships. 
 
 Our own Navy has but marked its first century, yet its past history 
 is filled with examples which teach startling and important lessons to 
 the tacticians of older organizations. 
 
 During the war of 1812 a knowledge of this branch of naval science 
 enabled us to add in nearly every equal encounter the name of the 
 enemy's ship to our list of prizes. 
 
 The war of 1861 taught the lesson how to maintain the blockade of 
 an enormous extent of coast, and the feasibility or riding out the heav- 
 iest gales of wind, anchored in the open sea, almost anywhere on avail- 
 able soundings. In this war too, was developed the tactics of the 
 
torpedo flotilla, likewise the passing of fortifications with vessels lashed 
 together ; also the carrying on of campaigns up the hardly navigable 
 rivers of the enemy, with the peculiarities incident thereto. 
 
 With all the memories of the past clustering about us, we can only 
 hojie that the nation will once more seek to rehabilitate its marine de- 
 fense. Should it do so, with our new ships there will be much for us to 
 learn, and the following pages may serve to awaken an interest in a 
 greatly neglected, yet very vital, subject. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMEXT. 
 
 I wish to acknowledge my great indebtedness to the authors and 
 naval authorities whose opinions, as set forth in the following works 
 have been largely quoted and embodied : 
 
 Naval Tactics on the Open Sea with the Existing Types of Vessels and Weapons. By 
 
 Captain the Hon. Edmund R. Feejiaxtlb, R. N. 
 The Gun, Ram, and Torpedo. By Commander Gerard H. U. Noel, R. N. 
 Essay on Naval Tactics. By Jno. Knox Laughton, M. A., naval instructor, R. N. 
 Steam Tactics in a General Action. By Lieut. Charles Campbell, R. N. 
 Etudes Comparatives de Tactique Navale. By Monsieur E. Farret, Lieutenant de 
 
 Vaisseau, M. F. 
 Problems in Naval Tactics. By Vice-Admiral Randolph, R. N. 
 filaments de Tactique Navale. By M. le Vice-Amiral Penhoat, M. F. 
 Remarks on the Maneuvers of Two Vessels in Action. By Lieut. G. R. Bethell, 
 
 R.N. 
 Maritime Power and its Probable Application in War. By Capt. R. H. Harris, R. N. 
 La Guerre Maritime et les Ports Militaires de la France. By M. le Contre-Amiral 
 
 AUBE, M. F. 
 The Maneuvering Powers of Ships. By Capt. P. H. Colomb, R. N. 
 Essai sur la Tactique de Combat, et sur I'usage k faire des moyens d'Attaque et de 
 
 Defense. By M. le CapitaineL. Rivet, M. F. 
 The British Navy, its Strength, Resources, and Administration. By Sir Thomas Bras- 
 
 SEY, K. C. B., M. P., M. A. 
 La Guerre d'Escadre et la Guerre de COtes. By Monsieur P. Dislkre. 
 Occasional Papers, Landing Parties, and Naval Brigade. By Lieut. T. B. M. Mason, 
 
 U. S. N. 
 Etude sur les Combats de Mer. By M. Besson, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, M. F. 
 Attaque par les Torpilles et Defense a Opposer (Analyst de 1' Anglais). By M. FON- 
 
 TAINEAU, M. F. 
 
 And to the many writers of articles published in home and foreign 
 professional pamphlets. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Preface S 
 
 a.ck2<0wledgmext 5 
 
 Introduction 11 
 
 r 
 
 I. — The object of Naval Tactics. II. — Its importance. — The naval necessities of a 
 nation. — Naval strength will never increase after a war once begins. — Relation 
 existing between the navy and merchant marine in time of war.— The necessity 
 of being prepared. III. — Wiat the modern ship must possess. — Its efficiency de- 
 pends upon its being properly handled. — Mutual support in battle the secret of 
 success. — The naval officer's need of a knowledge of naval tactics. 
 
 Chapter I.— DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS. 
 
 I. — Strategy. — Naval tactics. II. — Formation or order. — Evolutions. — Movement or 
 maneuver. — Change of course. — Change of direction. — Line of bearing. — Abso- 
 lute bearing. — Relative bearing. — Alternate lines. — Naval square. — Distance. — 
 Interval. III. — The turning circle. — Final circle. — Final diameter and radius. — 
 Advance. — Transfer.— Tactical diameter.^Drift angle.—Chord. — Length. — Time- 
 length: — Kick. — Heeling angle. 
 
 Chapter II.— WAR VES.SELS. 
 
 I. — Their relation to Naval Tactics.— The armor-clad. — The protected cruiser. — Cor- 
 vettes. — Gun-vessels. — Torpedo-vessels. — Qualiiications for position in the line of 
 battle. — Tactical unit. II. — Functions of the armored vessels. III. — The armor, 
 clad vs. rams and torpedo-boats. IV. — Commerce destroyers — their duties. — A 
 type. — Cruisers can be assigned positions in the line of battle. — Corvettes the 
 eyes of the armored fleet. — Speed and coal capacity a necessity in small vessels. — 
 "What can be done with merchant steamers in war. V. — Opinions as to what is 
 the most important weapon in war. — Should stern fire be equal to bow fire ? — 
 What size of artillery is the most serviceable for ships. — Ammunition supply. — 
 Ram-bowed vessels. — Rams without artillery or torpedoes. — Mechanical gun-fire 
 and musketry-fire. — Ships will fight at great speed.— Charging.— Automobile tor- 
 pedoes. — Divergent torpedoes. VI. — Classification of torpedo-steamers. — Typical 
 sea-going torpedo-vessels. — A special vessel for carrying large torpedo-boats. — 
 Torpedo-boat hunter. 
 
 Chapter III —THE SHIP AND HER CAPTAIN. 
 
 I. — What the command of the modern ship involves. — Opinions of eminent authors. 
 n. — The necessity of being versed in Tactics and the Signal Book. — The penalties 
 of ignorance in this respect. III. — General apathy of commanding officers in 
 regard to a knowledge of their ships. — Speed table. — Helm table. — Sheering.— 
 Electric light.— Section drill. IV. — Captain's duty in action. — What is the proper 
 target? — Capturing vs. sinking the enemy. — Measuring distances. — Decision be- 
 tween offering and refusing combat. V. — Protection of the captain in action. 
 
 7 
 
Chapter IV.— EVOLUTIONS OF THE SHIP. 
 
 I._Wliat must be known of tlie ship. II.— Why the ship in turning does not describe 
 a circle. — Screw-steamers turn differently under one helm from what they o 
 with the other.— State of rest from full speed ahead. III.— Pilling out the speed 
 and helm tables. — Elements of the turning circle. — Captain Colomb's experi- 
 ments.— Twin screws. IV. — Captain Colomb's analysis of the turning circle. His 
 method for determining it. V.— Mr. W. H. White's (naval constructor, K. N.) 
 method for determining elements of evolution in the ship. VI. — Lieut. A. B. 
 Wyckoff's (U. S. N.) method of determining final diameter and drift angle. 
 VII. — Evolutionary powers of the Alarm. 
 
 Chapter V.— THE SHIP IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 
 
 I._Speed in action.— Good stern fire as necessary as bow fire.— Advantages of speed.— 
 Position of advantage.— Cases where slow speed will be used. II. — Quickness of 
 fire.— No limit to its rapidity.— Ammunition service.- Necessity of precision of 
 fire.— Rules for firing.— Artillery in action.— Seed bag for stopping shot holes. 
 III. — Ram in action. — Meeting bow to bow. — Danger of keeping in an adversary's 
 wake. — Examples. IV. — Torpedoes in action. — Installation on board. — Exam- 
 ples. V. — Single combat. — Examples. — A mistake, that vessels desirous of ram- 
 ming will head for one another. — "Difference between ramming and being ram- 
 med lies in half a ship's length."— The " danger field."— The " position of greatest 
 danger." — Unequal vessels in single combat. — Twin screws in action. — Lieutenant 
 Besson's theorems. VI. — Action between the Esmeralda and Huasoar, and the 
 ludependencia and Covadonga. VII. — Two ships against one. — Mutual sup- 
 port. — Examples. VIII.— Capture of the Huascar by the Chilian iron-clads. 
 IX. — Two vessels against two. — Examples. — Three vessels against two. 
 
 Chapter VI.— THE ADMIRAL AND HIS FLEET. 
 
 I, — His complex duty. — He must be familiar with the signal book. — Principles gov- 
 erning nayal strategy — Maxims for attacking the enemy successfully. — Remarks 
 corollary to these maxims. — Considerations influencing the offering of combat. — 
 Maxim. — Necessity for some distinguishing sign in vessels in time of war. — Smoke 
 during an action. — Battle signals. — Weather gauge va. leewardly position. — Ad- 
 miral's position is on the weather end of the line. — Coaling on the open sea. — 
 Strategic value of coaling stations. II. — Fundamental principles for the prep- 
 aration of the fleet. — Classification of vessels. — Speed of the slowest ship the speed 
 of the fleet. — Reserve. — Lookouts. — Skirmishers. — Convoy. III. — Fleet drill un- 
 der way.' — Necessity for the captains to know the plans of the aduiiral. IV. — Post 
 of the admiral in action. 
 
 Chapter VII.— FORMATIONS. 
 
 I. — Tactical precepts. — Concentration. — What the order of battle must fulfill, — Con- 
 ditions for attack. — Points to be observed in dividing the fleet. — Rallying points. 
 II. — Formations, simple and compound. — Principle of the sectiou. — " Leader 
 and mate." — Fleet construction. — The group as the tactical unit. — Advantages 
 claimed. — Formations based on this system. — Group system condomne<l by tac- 
 ticians of to-day. — Drawbacks to the system. — Organization and numbering of 
 the fleet. — Natural and inverted orders. — Close and open orders. — Distance. In- 
 terval. III. — RiSsum6 of formations and systems. — Discussion. — Fighting form- 
 ations. — What each vessel must preserve. — Necessity for well adjusted compasses. 
 
 Discussion and opinions as to the best method for attack. — What a good form- 
 ation for combat demands. — Discussion of the several formations. 
 
Chapter VIII.— EVOLUTIONS OF THE FLEET. 
 
 I. — The object. — Requirements. — The performance of the ship is the basis of move- 
 ment. — Bad maneuvering ships should be rejected. — Fleet surprised at anchor. — 
 General principles. — Fleet exercise. — General principles of squadron steaming in 
 the Frencli Navy. II. — Nature of all movements before an enemy. — Simultane- 
 ous movements. — Successive movements. — Isodromes. — Direct movements. — Di- 
 rect movements vs. rectangular movements. III. — Discussion of the several sys- 
 tems proposed by tacticians. — Ideal system yet to be discovered. 
 
 Chapter IX.— THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 
 
 I. — The future naval battle. — Fundamental directions. — Captain Bridge's (R. N. ) 
 opinions. — Mr. Laughton's opinions. — Can the use of torpedo boats be depended 
 upon ? II. — Most useful formation must depend upon circumstances. — General di- 
 rections. — Each vessel must keep its bow on the enemy to prevent being rammed. — 
 Concentration. III. — Remarks applicable to combats between fleets. — Signals. — 
 Semaphore. IV. — Sphere of the several weapons of a ship in a fleet fight. — 
 Merchant ships to be fitted to carry torpedo boats of large size. — Two speeds 
 for action. — Captain Rivet's opinion of a speed to be maintained. V. — Fleet 
 organization should be kept up in a fight as long as posssible. — Reforming, the 
 secret of victory. — Reserve. — Cruisers. — Ram to be used on an anchored enemy. — 
 Retreating. — Directions in case of surprise. — Hostile fleets meeting at night. 
 VI. — How will the fight be opened ? — Opinions. 
 
 Chapier X.— OTHER DUTIES OF THE FLEET IN TIME OF WAR. 
 
 I. — Chief object of war. II. — Less risk than is imagined to run past forts. — Should 
 ships fight shore defenses anchored, or under way ? — Conclusions of Lieutenant- 
 Commander Goodrich, U. S. N., in regard to bombardment of forts by fleets. — 
 An anchored fleet never safe. — What guns can do fired inland from coasts. III. — 
 Blockaders. — What a blockade will be exposed to. — If attacked by torpedo-boats 
 what to do. — The armor-clad. — Non-seagoing armor-clads. — Telegraph flotilla. — 
 Signaling. IV. — Elements of a besieging naval force. V. — Torpedo-boat us. 
 torpedo-boat. VI. — Landing parties. — Naval brigades. — The French landing- 
 stage at Sfax. VII. — Use of the electric light for disembarking. — A German 
 writer's opinion that the electric light has a bad strategic quality.— How the light 
 is best used. 
 
 Chapter. XL— DEFENSE OF THE COAST AND TORPEDO FLOTILLA TAC- 
 TICS. 
 
 I. —What the defense of the coast demands.— Centers must be beyond the ranges of 
 the largest guns of a vessel firing inland — Two categories of defense. — Admiral 
 Penhoat's idea of best coast defense. II. — Gun-vessel fitted with torpedoes vs. 
 torpedo-boat. — What is required of a good torpedo-boat. — Defense of a vessel at- 
 tacked by torpedo-boats. III.— Towing and spar torpedoes.— Tactical qualities of 
 the torpedo-boat must be known.— Single torpedo-boat has no place in modern 
 warfare. Composition of the torpedo flotilla. — Tactics of a torpedo flotilla defend- 
 ing a ship from an attack by the enemy with torpedo-boats. — Tactics of the at- 
 tacking flotilla. — Attack on a fleet by torpedo-boats. — An incident inCallao Har- 
 bor. — Further about torpedo-boats. 
 
10 
 
 Chaptkk XII.— conclusion. 
 
 I. — Loss of the Grosser Kurfurst, owing to the want of a knowledge of fleet sail- 
 ing. — What the loss of a, mau-of-v\-ar might entail. — Necessity for a knowledge 
 of fleet tactics. — Is not to he gained in the class room. — Admiral Randolph s re- 
 marks. — Necessity for a practical course in the maneuvering ox ships and squad- 
 rons. II. — Squadron of instruction in the Russian service. — -Fleet drill hy means 
 of steam launches. — Captain Colomh's war game. III.^" Ocean greyhounds. — 
 ■ Tactical changes likely to occur from great improvement in speed. — In conclusion. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I. 
 
 Admiral Aube, in his most excellent treatise on "La Guerre Mari- 
 time et les Ports Militaires de la France," makes the following remark : 
 
 "The object of all navies is war. The fundamental problem which 
 devolves upon us, before all others, in our researches, is, " What will a 
 naval war be?" Curious idea! No one at present, not even the most 
 distinguished seaman, can answer this question." 
 
 It may seem strange that large navies are built up, and yet the re- 
 quisite knowledge as to how ships can best be combined and employed 
 together in warfare is wanting. 
 
 Nevertheless the tactician, either by studying theory or by means 
 of such experience as in time of peace can be obtained, strives to 
 answer the question, " How will modern ships fight at sea?" 
 
 II. 
 
 Naval Tactics is one of the most important branches of knowledge 
 that can engage the attention of the naval officer, since it teaches how 
 to apply in a fight the different arms which constitute the power of a 
 naval vessel. These lessons are as numerous and as varied as are the 
 ends in view to be attained in a maritime war. 
 
 Until actual experience in war decides otherwise the naval power of 
 a country shows itself in its superior squadrons, that is to say, the re- 
 union in number, more or less great, of war vessels of the most recent 
 type. 
 
 To have a share in the great dominion of the sea a nation must enter 
 the contest with a strong fleet, ready to fight ; supplied with the most 
 modern weapons, and with a well-disciplined and thoroughly intelligent 
 corps of officers. It should be borne in mind that a war once begun, the 
 naval power of a nation will hardly increase, since ships take so long 
 to build. In fact its naval strength will steadily run down through with- 
 drawal of vessels for repairs incident to service, from damage done by 
 the enemy, and from inevitable losses. 
 
 One of the maxims of war, according to Captain Harris, of the British 
 Navy, is that — 
 
 Every unit of a mercantile fleet, with the exception of its fastest steamers, is a 
 national weakness in maritime war, so also is every unfortified town on the sea- 
 board. 
 
 11 
 
12 
 
 Since this is the case, we can easily see how necessary an elficieut, it 
 not a large, navy is to a nation having a large carrying trade on the 
 seas, and a proper jealousy of her rights; how vital it is to have the 
 ships of this navy, through drill and by experience in squadron, ready 
 at all times to prevent imposition on the part of unscrupulous powers 
 who may choose to be aggressive. It is the part of Naval Tactics to 
 teach this navy how best to serve this end. 
 
 III. 
 
 The modern ship is a complex engine of war. It contains, to be 
 effective, a combination of all the offensive weapons that science can 
 devise. To be complete it must be supplied with the Ijest guns, great 
 power of engine and facility of turning; greatest strength of hull, in 
 order that its ram may be efiflcient; and in it must be installed the best 
 methodfor discharging automobile torpedoes. For a ship to possess only 
 one or two of these weapons of offense is to put herself at a decided 
 disadvantage in regard to some other vessel, otherwise less commenda- 
 ble, possessed of all three. Perhaps, in order to equip ourselves with 
 these weapons, we may have to buy in a foreign market, but to have 
 complete ships we must have the best weapons. To use domestic 
 inventions of less warlike value is to handicap ourselves in a fatally 
 stupid manner. 
 
 In regard to the knowledge required for the management of these 
 new vessels we can do best by quoting the words of Vice-Admiral Ran- 
 dolph, R. N. : 
 
 The first step towards discovering a means to an end must be to define clearly what 
 that end is, and the following is submitted aa the desideratum in naval tactics : 
 
 It will be considered that the vastly increased cost, size, power, and capabilities of 
 the modern ship of war increases also the importance of its being ably and carefully 
 handled. 
 
 We may assume that the one supreme object of a ship of war, though not its only 
 raison d'etre, ,is to beat the enemy at sea. Superior seamanship, combined with 
 superior gunnery, are the means. 
 
 From the words of a French writer we can gather when and how this 
 knowledge is to be applied : 
 
 A fight between ships of similar or different caliber or class, an engagement be- 
 tween squadrons, the pursuit of a weaker opponent, the retreat from a stronger foe, 
 engagements against fortifications, such are at a glance the operations that a fleet 
 may have to perform, and upon which Naval Tactics must enlighten us, not only by 
 mathematical precepts, but by general information. 
 
 In order to combine the evolutions of ships in such a manner as to draw out of 
 these engines of war the greatest usefulness — -that is to say, to cause the greatest in- 
 jury to the enemy — it is necessary to establish certain rules. These measures in- 
 tended to preserve the singleness of design, always different and often numerous 
 have in themselves but one end — they constitute eroluHons. 
 
 Evolutions are the means employed to move squadrons under ordinary circum- 
 stances at sea and to take fleets into action in'the most advantageous manu(-r. They 
 form an important part of naval tactics, but do not constitute it entirely. Two 
 nations may have the generalprinciples of tactics in common, and the means of apply 
 ing them, that is to say, the system of evolutions, different. 
 
13 
 
 From the following, we see that Naval Tactics has to deal with a num- 
 ber of recognized conditions, from which may be derived certain postu- 
 lates. These have been framed in the following language by Admiral 
 Eandolph : 
 
 let. The maximum power of attack requires the freest possible use by each ship of its 
 ram and artillery (torpedo included) without injury to friends. 
 
 2d. The utmost mutual support should be given by friends, and protection from hoa- 
 ^\e rams. 
 
 3d. The closest order consistent with due regard to safety to each other should be 
 maintained in order to meet the preceding demand, and to avoid the danger of one 
 ship being unnecessarily exposed to the fire of two or more of the enemy. 
 
 4th. Utmost freedom to each ship of increasing or reducing speed, as well as alter- 
 ing course, or hauling out of action, or for other sufficient cause, is highly desirable. 
 
 5th. Facility of passing quickly from one enemy to another, either after partial or 
 effectual collision or unavoidable separation, is important. 
 
 6th. Facility for the reforming of separated ships for renewed attack, or mutual 
 support after the first shock of battle, is of high value. 
 
 7th. When possible, two ships, or at least a decisive superiority of force, should be 
 throwu upon one. 
 
 8th. A reserve should, when possible, be retained to consummate and secure the 
 fruits of victory. 
 
 I cannot more fitly close this introduction than by quoting the lan- 
 guage of Lieutenant Campbell, R. N., in his admirable paper on " Steam 
 tactics in a general action." 
 
 I would urge in conclusion what an important place tactical maneuvers should take 
 in our naval education. From the earliest period of his career, no officer can study 
 too carefully the signal books and the system of large fleets and squadrons acting in 
 unison. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 DEFIXITIOXS AND EXPLANATIONS. 
 
 lu regard to the value of certain terms used iu connection with this 
 work so much diversity of opinion exists, that it will be as well to de- 
 fine, as nearly as possible, the meaning intended to be conveyed. 
 
 Strategy. — Combinations made by the commander-in-chief of a force 
 acting on different points over a large area, to compel or annul certain 
 movements of the enemy, or to unite or separate portions of a large sea 
 force. Strategy refers not to the conduct of a battle but of a campaign, 
 and orders the locality in- which the fleet is to cruise and the object 
 which it is to have specially in view, such as the blockade of a port, 
 raising a blockade, or simply the meeting with and engaging the enemy. 
 It is the greater science, as including all those vast combinations which 
 lead to the subsequent available displays of naval tactics. 
 
 Naval tactics has sometimes been misused in the sense of strategy, 
 whereas in fact it is a subordinate division of this science, since it re- 
 fers to the execution of the detailed plans of strategical objects. It is 
 the art of disposing naval forces in order of battle, and performing evo- 
 lutions in the face or vicinity of the enemy ; also, of performing all the 
 possible evolutions with ships, sections, groups, divisions, squadrons, 
 or fleets when acting together ; i. e., in such order that they are con- 
 trolled by general signal — the employment of all the offensive powers 
 of a ship, artillery, rams, torpedoes, or any naval weapons. Naval 
 tactics is sometimes improperly restricted to the absolute performance 
 of evolutions and forming of orders. 
 
 II. 
 
 Formation or Order. — Any arrangement or combination of vessels, on 
 a line of bearing, or on lines of bearing, designed for cruising, for at- 
 tacking, or for retreat. 
 
 Evolutions. — The necessary movement or combination of movements 
 
 by which a fleet, or lesser number of ships acting together, proceed 
 
 from one formation to another. Evolutions in the case of a single ship 
 
 are when she proceeds from one point to another to gain some tactical 
 
 advantage. 
 
 15 
 
16 
 
 Movement or Maneuver. ^Action of the whole force, or any detached 
 portion of it, moving in the presence of the main body by which a 
 position of advantage is sought to be gained. A component part of 
 an evolution. 
 
 Change of Course. — Bringing the ship's head in some other direction. 
 
 Change of Direction. — Altering the compass bearing of the line of 
 bearing that the formation is already on. 
 
 Line of Bearing. — An imaginary straight line passing through the 
 same point of all the ships in some formation. It is designated by its 
 direction in regard to the points of the compass as, "On a line of bear- 
 ing SE. - NW." Or if the signal came from the Admiral, he would 
 d( signate the line by its bearing from the flag-ship; as, "Form on line 
 ol bearing SB." 
 
 Absolute Bearing. — The compass bearing of one ship from another; 
 as, "Bearing of A from B, NW. by N." 
 
 Relative Bearing. — The bearing of one ship from another, expressed 
 in regard to the ship itself; as, "A bears from B two points abaft the 
 beam." 
 
 A ship can change her course, which for her is a change of direction, or 
 can move or maneuver in such a manner as ta perform an evolution. 
 
 A section, group, division, squadron, or fleet can change course, by each 
 ship's head coming to some other common compass bearing ; or by a 
 movement, which is a maneuver, can change direction or the bearing of 
 its line of bearing, which will produce the same or another formation on 
 another line of bearing. Or when, in any formation, this assemblage of 
 vessels, either by a simultaneous, successive, or direct movement, or by a 
 conversion, or by a wheel in concentric circles, or by a combination of two 
 or more of these, or by performing the same movement more than once, 
 can execute evolutions, and so pass to some other formation. 
 
 If ships bear relatively right ahead and right astern of one another, 
 they are in " line ahead." If they bear right abeam of one another, they 
 are in " line abreast." If they bear bow and quartering from each other, 
 they are " in echelon." (See Plate I, Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.) These formations 
 are termed simple. 
 
 If any combination of viessels divide and form on more than one line 
 of bearing, it assumes a compound or complex formation, and is then said 
 to be in " Jine ahead in two columns" or 'Hn double line ahead;" "in 
 alternate line ahead ;" " in line ahead in groups ;" " in double line abreast;" 
 " in alternate line abreast ;" in groups in line abreast ;" '■Hn naval square ;" 
 ^Hn double Echelon ;" or " in groups in double echelon." If when in double 
 Echelon the angle and the ships' heads lie in the same general direc- 
 tion, the fleet is in ^'^ chase formation;" when the angle and the ships' 
 heads are in opposite directions, it is in " retreat formation." (See Plates 
 II & III.) 
 
 Alternate Lines are those where the ships in one line are opposite the 
 
17 
 
 spaces in the other. This formation is also kuown by the names of 
 '■'■checkered lines" and '^ supplementary linesP 
 
 Naval Square is a formation of equal front and depth. The ships are 
 so disposed that the distances and intervals are equal and the same in 
 number. 
 
 Distance is the space between ships on the same line of bearing. 
 
 Interval is the perpendicular distance between two lines of bearing. 
 
 III. 
 
 THE TURNING CIRCLE. 
 (See Plate IV, Fig. I.) 
 
 Octant. — A turn of 4 points, Pcl\ d'-, #, &c. 
 
 Final Circle. — The path a ship ultimately takes, assumed to be the 
 circumference of a circle through the points reached at the end of the 
 second, third, and fourth octants, as the arc d^, d.^, d", of which is the 
 center. 
 
 Final Diameter and Radius. — The diameter and radius of the final 
 circle. 
 
 Advance. — The distance traveled over at any point of the turn meas- 
 ured in a line parallel to the original course. Thus/' d'- is the advance 
 at 4 points ; f d'^ the advance at 8 points, and so on. 
 
 Transfer. — The distance traveled over at any point of the turn to the 
 right or left of the prolongation of the original course, measured in a 
 line at right angles to it. Thus, e^ # is the transfer at 12 points, and 
 e* a* is the transfer at 16 points. 
 
 ]S"oTE. — The advance is the ordinate., and the transfer the abscissa of 
 the curve at any point. 
 
 Tactical Diameter is the transfer at 10 points, as e* fZ*, or the distance 
 between the two courses when the original coarse is reversed. 
 
 Drift Angleis the angle included between the keel line of the ship and 
 the tangent to the turning circle passing through the pivoting point of 
 the ship. This drift angle is said to be the principal cause of the de- 
 crease of speed in turning, and the rudder pressure has little to do with 
 it. Osving to the drift angle it is incorrect to assume that the ship has 
 passed through a quarter, half, or whole circle when the ship's head 
 has turned through 9()o, 180°, or 360°, respectively. 
 
 Chord of so many points is the distance between the center of the 
 middle line at the moment of moving the helm and its position when so 
 many points have been turned. Thus, Pd^ is the chord of 12 points. It 
 is a convenient measure of turning powers so far as space is concerned. 
 
 Length is the length of the ship between perpendiculars. It is some- 
 times used to compare the space-measures of different ships' turaing 
 powers. Thus, the advance is so many lengths; the transfer so many; 
 the chord so many, and so on. When one ship shows a greater num- 
 482 2 
 
18 
 
 ber of lengths tbaii another in any of these magnitudes, she bns so much 
 ■worse turning- powers, so far as space is concerned. 
 
 Time-Length is the time it takes a ship to pass over her own length. 
 It is necessarily varied with the speed, but it is a useful time measure 
 for comparing the turning powers of any two ships. Thus, a ship is 
 said to turn 4, 8, 12, or 16 points in so many time-lengths, and if another 
 ship is shown to take more time-lengths to make the same turn, she has 
 worse maneuvering power, so far as time is concerned. 
 
 Kich is the irregularity of the path of the ship observable when the 
 helm is put down in turning. It is caused by the stern tending to. 
 swing out at right angles with the course when the rudder force begins 
 to act. (See Plate IV, Fig. 2.) 
 
 Heeling Angle is due chieiiy to centrifugal force, and varies — 
 
 1. Directly as the square of the speed of the ship. 
 
 2. Inversely with the metacentric height. 
 
 3. Inversely with the radius of the circle. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 rVAE VESSELS. 
 
 It comes within our province to consider only the war vessel in its 
 connection with naval tactics. That is to say, to meet the enemy on 
 the open sea we must oppose him with a fleet at least equal to his own 
 in number, construction, speed, and offensive power. To protect our 
 coasts we must be supplied with proper vessels, which can keep the 
 sea, yet be of sufficiently light draft to enter most of our harbors. 
 They must be protected in their construction against the projectiles of 
 the armored fleet of the enemy, and they must possess weapons of 
 offense and defense of the most commendable pattern. 
 
 To assist these iieets we need protected vessels of large size, termed 
 cruisers; also a smaller class of the same name, corvettes, and gun. 
 vessels. These should all be of great speed, have batteries of great 
 penetration, and be fitted with automobile torpedoes. They should 
 be of such heavy construction and possess such facility of turning as 
 to be efficient rams against unarmored vessels. 
 
 Torpedo vessels of different sizes, armed with automobile torpedoes, 
 machine guns, and possessed of great speed, are pre-eminently war 
 vessels, but not of the line of battle. 
 
 A great diversity of opinion exists as to what kind of a vessel shall 
 be entitled to this place in an engagement, but we think that a list of 
 standard qualifications would be something like the following, sug- 
 gested by Mr. Campbell : 
 
 1st. Great speed and coal-carrying power. 
 
 2d. Armor protection ; unaiukability. 
 
 3d. Quickness in turning. 
 
 4th. Ability to keep the sea in all weathers. 
 
 frth. Capacity for stowing a large supply of provisions. 
 
 6th. A heavy armame'nt of guns of the greatest penetrating power. 
 
 To these should be added a — 
 
 7th. Installation of the automobile torpedo. 
 
 Each ship of the line is a unit. She should therefore conrbine in 
 herself all the elements of offense and defense. Her speed should be 
 great, her turning power good, and in order to possess this quality, her 
 helm should be moved by steam or by hydraulic power. She should 
 
 19 
 
20 
 
 be protected by sufflcieut aud properlj'-distributed armor. Sbe sbould 
 be built with a ram bow, aud be divided into numerous water-tight 
 compartments. Her battery should consist of u few hoavy guns, sev- 
 eral lighter ones, a number of mechanical guns, also automobile torpe- 
 does. As spar aud divergeut torpedoes are necetisary at times, she 
 should be fitted for them. Among her boats should be two torpedo 
 launches, handy and of high speed. They should be as uusiukable as 
 possible, and be well armed with torpedoes and machine guns. 
 
 It is not to be supposed that each bne-of-battle ship will combine all 
 these qualities, but the most eminent will decide her tactical value and 
 will assign to her a proper place in the line. In fact we know, nowa- 
 days, that a fleet of vessels of the same size, build, and battery would 
 be hardly possible, but each ship will have her value either for ram, 
 artillery, or torpedo. 
 
 II. 
 
 Probably the most formidable line-of-battle ship is the sea-going 
 armor-clad. She should combiue the maximum of aggressive power 
 with the maximum of resisting qualities. 
 
 The functions of the sea-going armored fleet would be to attack in 
 line of battle the enemy's fleet wherever found ; to drive it from our 
 shores ; to follow it, and confine it to its own harbors ; to maintain an 
 unchallenged command of the sea routes leading to our coasts ; to pro- 
 tect our harbors against the enemy's fleet, and to oppose all attempts 
 under cover of the enemy's fleet of the landing of troops for invasion 
 at any point of the coast. 
 
 III'. 
 
 Comparing the merits of the armor-clad with the merits of the pro- 
 tected or uuarmored vessel for position in the line of battle. Admiral Sir 
 Geofl'rey Hornby, K. 0. B., uses the following argument in favor of the 
 armored vessel : 
 
 You may put au irou-clad iu auy position you please, and if she is attacked by 
 three of these uuarmored vessels she will make a run at one vessel or the other, at- 
 tack her with her guus, and threaten her with her ram, and it must be death to that 
 vessel if she touches her any way. The two other vessels, you say, will follow and 
 disturb the action of the irou-clad; but it must be recollected that the iron-clail will 
 always be firing at them, one gun at least, and with shells, the bursting power of 
 which mast neoeshurily, as far as we know, destroy the fighting power of the cruiser. 
 If any oue contemplates what the bursting of a shell tilled with 37 pouuds of powder 
 in the center of auy unarmored vessel would be, I think he wjll agree there would be 
 no more tight left iu the ship. It is no answer to say that the sliip is armed with a 
 gun as heavy as the irou-clad has; the morale of the people will be destroyed, and 
 they will be unable to continue the action against the concentrated force to which 
 they are opposed. For that reason I hold that the unarmored ship cannot contend 
 against the armored. 
 
 To cite a contrary oiJinion, we give that of Sir William G. Armstrong, 
 C. B., P. K. S., expressed in these words: 
 Xot only did we see that armor was unavailing against torpedo attack and ram- 
 
21 
 
 ming, but Tre Trere justifiecl in conclutling that every attempt to increase resistance 
 to projectiles would be quickly followed by a corresponding increase in the power of 
 artillery. 
 
 As to the comparative liability of an iron-clad and an unarmored ship to be sunk 
 I'y pi'ojectiles, there was much less difference between them than was generally sup- 
 posed ; because the unarmored ship, though freely penetrable, might l)e so constructed 
 that the entrance of water by perforation would not extensively flood the ship, unless 
 it took place at a great number of critical places. Indeed, by introducing an under- 
 water deck with divisional spaces, and by the partial application of cork, as in the 
 Inflexible, for displacing influent water and thereby preserving stability, and also by 
 a proper distribution of coal for the same purpose, an unarmored ship might be ren- 
 dered almost incapable of being sunk; and it was rather surprising that so little at- 
 tention had been directed to the attainment of that object. It was not too much to 
 say that for the cost of one iron-clad we could have three unarmored ships of far 
 higher speed and carrying collectively three armaments, each equal to that of the 
 armored vessel. 
 
 It might be asked, which would be the better investment ? If it were imagined that 
 the three were matched in combat against the one, it would be perceived that, in ad- 
 dition to their numerical superiority, the former would possess many advantages. 
 Being smaller, they would be more difficult to hit. Being swifter, they could choose 
 their positions, and be free to attack or retreat at pleasure. Being more nimble in 
 turning, they would be better adapted both for ramming and for evading the ram of 
 their adversary. Finally, the conditions of superior speed and agility would favor 
 their use of torpedoes and submarine projectiles. 
 
 It might, perhaps, be rash entirely to abandon armor so long as other nations con- 
 tinued to use it, because nothing but the experience of an actual war would remove 
 all question as to its possible utility ; but considering the indisputable value of a 
 numerous fleet of '.swift and powerfully-armed ships, built with a view of obtaining 
 the maximum fimount of unarmored defense, and considering that such vessels, un- 
 like armor-clads, could never grow much out of date, it did seem to be expedient that 
 the chief expenditure should be upon ships of that description. Lightness should be 
 the special aim in the construction of such vessels. Steel plates should be used for 
 the hulls, and guns and engines should be of the least possible weight consistent with 
 the necessary power. Every ton of weight saved would enable higher speed to he at- 
 tained, and there was probably no quality in a fighting ship which would so much 
 develop in importance as that of swiftness. 
 
 The question, notwithstanding the opinions of these eminent men, 
 may still be considered as open. It cannot yet be said that it is decided 
 whether an armor-clad, fit for the line of battle, is able to cope with a 
 ram, armed with one gun of great ijower and caliber, and, say, four tor- 
 pedo-vessels attacking simultaneously; all these vessels being supposed 
 to have greater speed than the armor-clad. Experience alone will teach 
 this lesson, bat the maxim can be set down that if the question of 
 money is put aside, in a contest between two vessels equal in offensive 
 equipment and tactical qualities, the one with the strongest, most in- 
 vulnerable hull will be the victor. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Cruising will be the most efficient way to ruin the enemy's commerce. 
 It is therefore necessary to build a number of special cruisers. These 
 vessels must have great speed and great coal-carrying capacity. Mr. 
 
22 
 
 J. D'A. Samuda, at a meeting- of the Institution of Niival Architects, 
 had the fonowing to say in reference to this class of vessel : 
 
 Cruisers will be specially adapted aud properly employed in protecting aud con- 
 voying commerce, keeping open the seas to enable merchantmen to trade without 
 interruption between the principal ports, lending naval assistance when needed, and 
 performing many similar secondary services; and it may be freely admitted a very 
 large number of them are required for such .services, but they will be wholly unfitted 
 to fight in line of battle and stand np against an armor-clad fleet, where endurance 
 alone will determine the result of the encounter, and where the endurance of the 
 iron-clad fleet may be reckoned by hours against minutes on the part of the nnarm- 
 ored cruisers, even if they elected to oppose the fighting fleet at all, for really, beyond 
 possessing great value for guerrilla warfare, no decisive victory could be obtained or 
 even hoped for against an iron-clad fleet by vessels whose safety, when hard pressed, 
 would only be secured by their running away. 
 
 For a description of an efficient class of vessel of the type under 
 consideration we read that — 
 
 Light unarmored ships, designed by Mr. George Rendel, have lately been built in 
 this country for foreign powers which with a displacement of only 1,300 tons had 
 attained a speed of 16 knots an hour. They carried coal for steaming 4,000 miles 
 and have already actually steamed 3,500 miles without re]ilenishing. They were 
 each armed with two 10-iuch new-type guns, which had nearly an all-round fire, and 
 were capable of piercing 18 inches of iron armor ; and with four 40-pouuder8 on the 
 broadsides. 
 
 We will notice that Mr. Samuda does not contemplate putting cruisers 
 in the line of battle, but bis opinion is not sustained by that of Vice- 
 Admiral Penhoat, of the French Navy, who thinks that these vessels 
 should be built so staunchly, and be so well armed, as to qualify for this 
 position in action. The Admiral believes that they could serve the fleet 
 better by being placed in the line than by coniining their operations to 
 acting together as a lookout squadron, or as a reserve to tow disabled 
 vessels out of action. 
 
 Of the smaller war vessels it will hardly be possible to enumerate all 
 their duties. Corvettes must be the eyes of the armored fleet; they 
 must drive off the cruisers of the enemy ; they must unceasingly pur- 
 sue and capture the merchant marine of the opposing nation. Where 
 the lines of ocean commerce come together there must be the corvette 
 to protect and to destroy. 
 
 To be worth anything small vessels should have good speed aud 
 coal-carrying power. If they are without these qualities, they should 
 act with the coastwise fleet, or as tenders, or as flag-ships for the torpedo 
 flotillas. 
 
 Altered merchant steamers become a class of coal and ammunition 
 supply vessels, large torpedo-boat carriers, and commerce destroyers. 
 
 Captain Xoel, R. X., in common with a good many others, docs not 
 believe that the gun is the most important weapon of the fleet while 
 
23 
 
 quite a uumber of writers agree with Mr. Laugiiton, who is of a con- 
 trary opinion, and says : 
 
 The gun must still be held, to be primarily the armament of ships, though sec- 
 ondarily the ram must euter largely into any scheme of battle. 
 
 All vessels, with perhaps the exception of the " Boston " class, are 
 so designed that their bow-fire is stronger than their stern-flre. If 
 the vessels of this class turn out to be all that is promised for them, we 
 will perhaps be able to come nearer a solution of some of the vexed 
 problems as regards defense of single vessels in action. It may be, 
 though, that this class of vessel has a large gun installed in a position 
 of least efficiency. 
 
 As regards the sizes of guns to be carried by vessels, whose calling 
 is on the open sea. Admiral Penhoat does not believe that their artillery 
 should be of large caliber, as the weight of the projectiles to be carried 
 reduces their number in a great degree. Vessels will naturally come 
 together in a fight, and artillery practice will be at short range. Large 
 guns will come.in for bombardments where the supply of ammunition 
 can be kept up. 
 
 This question of ammunition supply is a ver^^ burning one, and has 
 become a prominent problem in naval strategy and bears strongly upon 
 tactics. 
 
 The weight of opinion is that the ram is the most formidable of a 
 ship's offensive powers. Many authorities believe that it will be used 
 as the ordinary fighting weapon, and that all methods and plans of 
 attack should be based upon its employment ; others think that it will 
 probably only be used like the bayonet of the infantry soldier to give 
 the coup de grace. The reason for this being that it is so hard to ma- 
 neuver a vessel to ram effectively where the target is animated by a 
 spirit as active and as intelligent as your own. Official records of 
 trials in Germany show this ; and more than one writer is of the opinion 
 that there must be some accidental disadvantage to allow a vessel to be 
 rammed. 
 
 A vessel built for a ram pur et simple, to be unarmed in regard to 
 battery, once so favorably looked upon by naval economists, seems to 
 be losing its prestige as a fighting factor, since you pin your faith on 
 one weapon. If your engines happen to break down you are at the 
 mercy of the enemy. 
 
 Vessels designed to act as rams should be very handy, and therefore 
 not large. Since they are pre-eminently of the line of battle, they 
 should be armored or at least well protected. 
 
 It may be set down as a maxim that machine guns will play a prom- 
 inent part in future naval combats. Every ship should have machine 
 guns for the destruction of torpedo-boats close alongside. 
 
 Musketry and mechanical gun fire from on deck and aloft will be most 
 useful. Xot only do the decks offer a field for destruction, but the open 
 
24 
 
 gun-ports give entrance to the batteiy, into wbich your heavier pro- 
 jectiles may fail to penetrate. 
 
 All authorities are agreed that ships will fight at great speed ; they 
 ■will come close to oue another on a charge and then separate, turn and 
 charge again ; therefore, the time through which small-arm fire .can 
 act and be useful is very short. The crew should be trained sharp- 
 shooters, being armed with rifles distinguished for rapidity and accuracy 
 of fire rather than for length of range. Boarding will seldom or never 
 be resorted to. 
 
 In an action the smaller guns of the battery, as well as the machine- 
 guns, should fire at the enemy's upper deck and lightly-protected por- 
 tions. 
 
 So much progress has been made in foreign navies with the automo- 
 bile torpedo, that it is considered a perfectly reliable weapon within 400 
 yards, and that any nearer approach than this of the enemy makes it 
 an extremely hazardous undertaking for him. In fact, the risk is so 
 very great that, in the opinion of a G-erman writer, ramming will hardly 
 be attempted against any but defenseless ships. It mary be mentioned 
 here that the French, in addition to the automobile torpedo, are now 
 using divcnjent torpedoes, which ai-e towing-torpedoes, with a short scope 
 of line. 
 
 VI. 
 
 It has been proposed to classify torpedo-steamers as follows : 
 
 To a class capable of operating outside of harbors, and of keeping 
 the sea in bad weather, but generally to be carried by a sjiecial vessel, 
 the name of torpedo-vessels. 
 
 The next smaller size to be used in harbor defense, and which will 
 not accompany the fleet, the name of torpedo boat. 
 
 And, for the smallest class, such as are fitted to be carried by cruis- 
 ing vessels, the name of torpedo-launches or torpedo-pinnaces. 
 
 Lieutenant Campbell does not believe that line-of-battle ships should 
 be fitted to carry torpedoes ; but that they should have two " torpedo 
 cutters," that they can always lower and use either aggressively or for 
 defense. They should be capable of good speed, and be lowered ready 
 foi' action when up with the enemy. 
 
 However, with all the varying phases of wind and weather on the 
 open sea, it is hard to conceive how a line-of-battle ship can carry tor- 
 pedo-boats large enough to be of service in an engagement. It will be 
 difiicult to lower them, and, if they have to be towed, it will interfere 
 with the movements of the fleet, and they will at all times be liable to 
 be swa!iiped. They carry so little coal and provisions that they will 
 need filling up very often, which will be difficult to do. Torpedo-boats 
 of this kind are veritable impedimenta to the fleet, especially when, hav- 
 ing lowered them, the fleet is obliged to defend tliem in retreat. 
 
 But, if they have these drawbacks, they should still be carried by 
 
25 
 
 ships of the line, as their utility iu fleets will not be the less for defending 
 ships at anchor, in acting as " lookouts," and to fight, if necessary. 
 
 The typical sea torpedo boat is a seagoing cruiser, able to carry its 
 own crew, provisions, and coals. She shouLI be a vessel of from 200 to 
 400 tons displacement, and should have immense speed and great turn- 
 ing power. There should be two to each ship of the line of battle, and 
 they should cruise close to them. They should render offensive and 
 defensive succor at all times, and might be used to tow out of action 
 any disabled vessel. They should also k'cp an eye on the smaller tor- 
 pedo-boats. 
 
 The most modern idea is that there should be a special vessel not of 
 the line of battle, which should accompany a fleet, and which should be 
 fitted to carry as many as possible of the largest-sized torpedo-vessels. 
 She should be able to get her boats out and lower them, or pick them 
 up, in the open sea. 
 
 The Italians have lately brought to notice a vessel of war, about 150 
 feet long, displacing 600 tons, and capable of making 25 knots. She is 
 protected ; almost, if not quite, unsinkable, and has excellent turning 
 power, being fitted with two screws. Her weapons are the ram, two 
 light guns forward, a heavy gun aft with great sweep of fire, and three 
 decks of machine guns, about forty-five in all, which admit of fire in all 
 necessary directions. There are two or more tubes for discharging auto- 
 mobile torpedoes. She is designed as a torpedo-boat destroyer, and is 
 probably intended to accompany and act with the fleet. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 TEE SHIP AND HEB CAPTAIN. 
 
 I. 
 
 To comiuaud a modern vessel of war, the captain is called upon to 
 post himself on points that formerly could, very properly, be left' to his 
 subordinates. Now he commands more than a ship ; he is in supreme 
 charge of a missile, which is projected by power within itself. This mis- 
 sile, instead of moving in the medium of air, moves in air and water, 
 both elements influencing its trajectory. It acts either as a shot, and 
 rams an opponent, or like a shell, extending its destructive influence 
 outside the confines of figure by means of guns or torpedoes. 
 
 The commander should thoroughly understand that he must, as the 
 soul of this huge machine, comprehend fully all the complex results of 
 invention which science, working through the mechanical arts, has 
 accomplished, enabling him to transmit his scheme of action to the pon- 
 derous mass beneath him. His ship has her strong points and her weak 
 ones. How to keep his mail between himself and the enemy, how, in 
 case of extensive penetration, to save his ship, are points demanding 
 his constant study. 
 
 ^\ hat does the command of the modern ship in action require further, 
 for the proi)er employment of the ram and torpedo? Let three eminent 
 authorities speak. 
 
 Admiral the Count de G-ueydou says : 
 
 Above all, steady nerves, an accurate eye, and a sure hand. Science cannot develop 
 these qualities ; practice alone can. 
 
 Adoiiral Bourgois remarks : 
 
 There is nothing like quick judgment and sangfroid. In action, captains must ex- 
 pect to have their designs frustrated by smoke from funnels and guns. Tlic ordinary 
 fleet maneuvers are in no way capable of teaching a captain liis duty ; tliis must come 
 from drill against propurly-coustructed targets. 
 
 Admiral Jurien de la Graviere has described in graphic language the 
 sort of training which is necessary in order to prepare officers for the 
 rapid and desperate maneuvers of a battle with the ram. He remarks 
 that after the first charge has taken place on both sides, the fight can 
 only be renewed by the fleets turning and charging again. This turn- 
 ing wUl be the cause of innumerable fatal collisions between .ships of 
 the same side, unless the captains are thoroughly drilled. They must 
 
 20 
 
27 
 
 not ouly know tactics theoretically, bnt tliey must be perfectly certain 
 of their ships, know what they are capable of, and, in case of breaking 
 down or other accident, how to act to keep them out of the way of 
 friendly vessels, and how best to present them to the enemy to offset 
 their crippled condition. This experience cannot be obtained in the 
 class-room or in small vessels. To be successful, the nerve of the captain 
 must grow with his experience, and this condition of affairs can only be 
 brought about by drilling in fleet tactics in line-ot-battle ships, where 
 collision means fatal damage, or by exercising at night in close order. 
 Unquestionably nerve is to be obtained only by actual experience, and 
 unfortunately the use of large vessels for purposes of drill is expensive. 
 If, however, this quality is necessary, our officers must be given the 
 chance of actual practice, or they will fall behind those of other navies 
 who have had it. Without preliminary exercise it is impossible to ac- 
 quire that skill and precision in maneuvering which will be necessary 
 for the conduct and safety of the ship or the fleet in the day of battle. 
 
 II. 
 
 The duty of the captain does not end with his ow.n vessel ; each cap- 
 tain, to be successful, must be thoroughlj- versed in naval tactics, 
 which is now of more importance than ever before. 
 
 The Signal Book must be his constant study. Plans of actions must 
 therein be laid down, and their minutest details committed to memory. 
 A wrong turn, a slacking of the speed in time of battle, may mean con- 
 fusion, it not destruction, to the fleet, as may also the rendering of in- 
 eificient support, through ignorance or inexperience, to one's neighbor. 
 
 III. 
 
 Captain the honorable Edmund E. Premantle, R. if., asks the ques- 
 tion : 
 
 How many naval officers care to know the number of degrees of helm that can be 
 given to their ships; the tending of the screw to turn the ship unassisted by the rud- 
 der; the effect of turning the engines astern when the ship has head or stern way; 
 the result of increasing or reducing speed on the circle described in tiurning ; 
 what the nature of the so-called circle is ; what the reduction of speed by putting the 
 helm hard over; what heel a helm hard over may be expected to give the ship; 
 what the drift angle means ; what is the time of completing a circle at different 
 speeds and its diameter ? 
 
 Yet all these things must be known and more too. When the vessel 
 leaves the dockyard she develops a strategical and tactical character 
 requiring perhaps unlooked-for care, study, and watchfulness on the 
 part of the captain. He must know how much coal is used at the dif- 
 ferent speeds and under different conditions of environment; what is 
 the most economical expenditure of coal for speed developed. The 
 working of the helm; can it be moved from side to side as rapidly as it 
 should be to obtain the best results ? Her easiness at sea ; to what ex- 
 
28 
 
 teut is she influenced by it in lier rolling- and pitching? Are her guns 
 capable of use at all times, and can concentration of fire be quickly ef- 
 fected, &c.'? 
 
 It would take too much space and be unnecessary, we think, to enter 
 into details concerning the internal offensive aud defensive economy of 
 the ship, but it all bears upon naval tactics, and demands deep thought 
 on the part of the commander. 
 
 After her speed has been established, and after the "Speed Table" 
 has been filled out, comes in the determination of the ship's turning 
 qualities. Experiments must be made under all circumstances called 
 for in the "Helm Table," in which should be" all the points bearing on 
 fleet evolutions. Captain Noel, R. N., sums up these requirements, as 
 follows: 
 
 Isti Speed at various revolutions of the engines. 
 
 ■2(1. Evor.^ thing in connection with the ship's turning qualities, iiicludiug backing 
 with and without the helm. 
 
 3d. Time required to bring the vessel to a stnte of rest by stopping aud reversing 
 the engines. Tliia to be tiiown for different sjieeds. 
 
 4th. The amount ot helm required to turn at a certain standard speed on a certain 
 standard arc. 
 
 Then as to the sheering of the ship (it is most important to be posted 
 on this point) ; with a certain helm-angle aud a certain speed, to find 
 out the exact instant wlieu to use the wheel in order to pass over a cer- 
 tain spot. Then again, as regards the engines, the captain must know 
 what they are capable of doing under great stress; the amount of 
 power that can be developed in going ahead or astern, and the length 
 of time that it can be kept up. 
 
 The captain should see that his subordinates likely to succeed him in 
 a fight are also fully informed on all these points. 
 
 A new element is the electric light. The best place for its installa- 
 tion on board ship is a question ; where to put it so that the glare will 
 least interfere with the observer. Oflicers will have much to learn con- 
 cerning the judging of distances and the recognition of objects when 
 this light furnishes the means of illumination. 
 
 After the captain has become familiar with his ship, his command 
 must be associated with another vessel, and the two captains must be 
 thoroughly drilled in their duties of mutual support. Upon the inter- 
 dependence of vessels hangs the chances of victory. This section- 
 drill should be had under all conditions of wind, weather, and speed. 
 By it alone can the captain hope to take his place in the line of battle 
 with any feeling of security. 
 
 IV. 
 
 We come now to consider the commanding officer's duty in action. 
 The most eminent question is, what is the proper target for the ship ? 
 Is it the enemy's armor or the boilers and engines or the peoj^le on 
 board ? We should strive to deprive the enemy of his most important 
 
29 
 
 war factor, aud we believe this to be the crew aud officers. Knowing 
 the ship, we should fire into the least protected part where the men are 
 congregated, concentrating, of course, as many guns as possible upon 
 her. We should remember that a ship lying still is not necessarily de- 
 prived of the use of all her weapons, so that disabling the machinery is 
 of less value than killing the crew. The general rule to fire at the fun- 
 nels is worthless. Not only should the captain and his officers be thor- 
 oughly conversant with the construction, as regards vulnerability, of 
 the enemy's vessels, but this knowledge should extend to the leading 
 seamen of the ship's company. 
 
 Another question arises: Is the capture o( the vessel the principal ob- 
 ject of the fight? From the opinions advanced by the leading naval 
 minds we answer in the negative. Earns aud torpedoes are used with 
 but one view — the total destruction of the ship. If by killing the ship's 
 company we reduce the enemy to a harmless state, we should, of coarse, 
 take him as a prize ; but the rule is to sink aud destroy. 
 
 In order to use fore-and-aft fire in chase or retreat, or to know at any 
 time the distance of the enemy, some quick method must be used to 
 measure the interval separating ships, as nowadays such great speed 
 is kept up, and a table of mast-head angles is too slow aud too uncertain 
 a method to furnish the necessary information. Too uncertain from the 
 fact that some vessels are not sparred, aud if they are sparred, the 
 housing of light masts destroys the efQciency of the tables. Buckner's 
 method is probably the best, or the distance should be determined by 
 some kind of telemeter. 
 
 It may sometimes come within the experience of a captain to deter- 
 mine whether or not he should refuse combat. His action will be more 
 or less governed by the following considerations, esj)ecially if the ves- 
 sel is a great distance from home : 
 
 1st. Are the meaus at hand for repairing and for refitting safe and 
 sufficient ? 
 
 2d. Do not the interests of our specific work demand our not running 
 the risk of getting crippled, and thus hinder us from keeping the sea 1 
 
 There are two opinions, each directly opposed to the other and each 
 covering the ground ijretty well, bearing on the subject of the protection 
 of the captain in action. 
 
 One side is represented by the writer of an article in the German 
 Naval Official Publication. His opinion seems to be based on the re- 
 sults obtained lately in the German evolutionary squadron. The author 
 is strongly opposed to proof-protections for the commanding officer. 
 The cai)tain is, in his opinion, in no greater danger noti) than he was a 
 hundred years ago ; but the fighting is livelier, and the methods of con- 
 ducting a battle are more varied. If the captain is hidden he cannot 
 see and control his ship. With smoke obscuring the fight, with guns 
 
30 
 
 above and rams aud torpedoes below the water-line, be must be every- 
 where at the same time, otherwise iu the coufusiou of battle he cauuot 
 be properly iirejtared to meet the dangers which beset him. To confine 
 him at this time to a shelter is to circumscribe his view, as upon his 
 sight, his actions depend and his Judgment is governed. 
 
 On the other hand, M. Disl^re in his work entitled "La Guerre 
 d'Escadre et la Guerre de C6tes," takes exactly the opposite stand. 
 He urges most strongly protection for the captain. It maybe observed 
 that jMr. Disl^re represents the opinion of the larger number of writers 
 upon this subject when he says: 
 
 The captain must be protected against small-arm and shell fire for two reasons : 
 First. Because it is necessary to put into the hands of the captain the steering of 
 the ship, or at least under his direct supervision should be the 'person stationed to 
 steer the ship. It is necessary then to have a fighting wheel on the bridge; and, if 
 so, it must be protected. 
 Secondly. It is difficult to replace the commanding officer during a fight. 
 
 There is still another reason for protecting the captain. If he falls 
 during the performance of an evolution, no one, not even the officer by 
 his side, can continue the train of thought and action to any profitable 
 conclusion, or follow the first impulse of this instant, aud upon which 
 may depend the success of the fight. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EVOLUTIONS OF THE SHIP. 
 
 I. 
 
 In the last chapter we said that the following must be known of the 
 ship: 
 
 1. Speed at different number of revolutions of the engines. 
 
 2. Turning power at different speeds. 
 
 3. Helm angle required to turn on a certain arc at a certain speed. 
 We will proceed now to discuss in detail the methods by which all 
 
 these data may be obtained. 
 
 To use the different arms effectively requires one of these qualities to 
 be more prominent than the others ; for instance, in the opinion of 
 many, turning power may be looked upon as the most important for a 
 ship when used as a ram or to discharge torpedoes ; whereas, for gen- 
 eral work, speed is the most desirable quality. 
 
 For the use of artillery we need steadiness of platform, besides the 
 evolutionary qualities under consideration. I>ut this hardly comes 
 within the province of tactics, belonging more properly to the naval 
 architect. 
 
 II. 
 
 The reason that a ship in turning does not describe a circle is due to 
 the fact that when the helm is put over she is moving in a straight line, 
 which her momentum seeks to continue. It is only by degrees that she 
 yields to the rudder, and then she is always some time behind it. The 
 quicker that the helm can be put over the quicker will the vessel re- 
 spond, and also more rapidly will the diameter of the turning circle 
 decrease, and the time, if the helm angle can be increased up to 40° or 
 more. We must have great angular movement for rudders and their 
 connections, and quick-acting power immediately available to move the 
 helm. 
 
 The radius of the turning circle for ordinarily large vessels is about 
 300 yards with a working speed of 8 knots. 
 
 Seamen generally agree that all single-screw steamers turn more 
 quickly to one side than to the other under similar helm angles, and it 
 is important to the naval officer to ascertain his ship's qualities in this 
 
 31 
 
32 
 
 respect. The rule is that the bow turus towards that side to which the 
 desceudiug Wade of the screw falls. Thus a ship with a left-handed 
 screw turns to port, or must be steered with port helm to keep her on 
 her course. With ships of light draught it is said the contrary Is the 
 case. 
 
 Prof. Osborne Keyuolds states that the distance required to bring a 
 screw steamer to rest from fnll speed ahead, by the reversal of her 
 engines, is independent, or nearly so, of the power of the engine^, but 
 depends on the size and build of the ship, and is generally between 
 four and six times the ship's length. 
 
 III. 
 
 The two subjoined tables must now be filled out by every ship which 
 expects to drill with the fleet, or to take her place in the line of battle. 
 The "speed-table" takes cognizance of the speed of the ship for the 
 different number of revolutions, and under different circumstances of 
 wind and sea. The "helm-table" is a record of the ship's advance and 
 transfer, also the time it takes the ship to turn through 45°, 90°, 135°, 
 and 180°, under all conditions of wind and sea, and whether the turn 
 is made toward or away from the wind. There must be a helm-table 
 made out for each speed, say three speeds, which may be denominated 
 •'full," "fa.st,"' and "slow." 
 
 The speed-table is intended for ships steaming in squadron. To use 
 it, we must have one filled out for every vessel associated with us. 
 Su])pose the leader of a line ahead makes a certain speed with 70 rev- 
 olutions with sea rough, wind abeam, with a force of 4. Some other ship, 
 in order to keep her place in the formation, in other words to make the 
 leader's speed, can by reference to the leader's and her own table, having 
 received the leader's signal as to the number of revolutions he is making, 
 see that she need, under these circumstances, make only 60 revolutions. 
 
 So with the helm-table, every ship must have her own and her asso- 
 ciates' for each speed. We are steaming in line ahead, and the signal 
 is made to change direction 8 points to port, the sea being rough, the 
 turn being made towards the wind, its Jbrce being 6. Turning to the 
 table for this particular speed of the ship with the largest tactical 
 diameter, and knowing that she will use 40° helm angle, we find a cer- 
 tain number of yards "advance," a certain number of yards "transfer," 
 and a certain number of minutes for "time." Turning now to our own 
 table for this same speed we see that the nearest figures under the 
 same circumstances give us a helm angle of 35°. We therefore use 
 this and find we keep our station and fulfill the required conditions. 
 
33 
 
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 Wind. 
 
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 Ahead. 
 
 Abeam. 
 
 Aft. 
 
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 Force. 
 
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36 
 
 It is of the utmost importance that all the elements of the turning, 
 circle should be known. There are many methods of finding them, but 
 we will confine ourselves to those of Captain Colomb and of Mr. White, 
 E. IST. 
 
 In Captain Oolomb's experiments with the Thunderer all the ele- 
 ments can be derived if the discussion is carried through a whole turn, 
 or 32 points. 
 
 Some of the qualities of the turning circle bear more on naval tactics 
 than do others, for instance, the advance and transfer are of the Ijighest 
 importance, especially to a ram ; they should be known, however, for 
 every ship. The determination of tactical diameter is also imperative. 
 
 The loss of speed in turning through a whole circle may be assumed 
 at three times the length of the vessel. 
 
 A A^essel with two screws, if she goes ahead on one and backs on the 
 other, describes a spiral which constantly diminishes untU its diameter 
 becomes nothing, when its motion of translation ceases. If this vessel 
 went ahead on one screw and stopped the other she would describe a 
 turn of less diameter than if she went ahead on both screws and used 
 her helm hard over. 
 
 The curve, which a ship with a single screw makes in turning, has 
 generally been set down as a circle, and when the helm is righted she 
 is supposed to start off on a tangent to this circle. As we have before 
 stated, this is not so. Although the assumption may answer for the 
 ordinary purposes of fleet drill, it would prove wofully inaccurate in 
 fighting with the ram. The question then is, what curve does the 
 ship make? On this point we trust the authorities we quote will 
 enlighten us. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Captain Colomb, E. N., in discussing the turning-circles of vessels 
 expresses substantially the following ideas as the result of his ex- 
 X)erience : 
 
 The maneuvering powers of ships comprise their powers of turning 
 and of losing and gathering way. The measures of these powers are 
 always twofold, time and space. 
 
 The time' and space measurements of turning powers are much more 
 numerous than those of losing and gathering way; but we are not masters 
 of the maneuvering power of any ship until we know both and the prin- 
 ciples which govern them. 
 
 .We now take up the analysis of a single turning experiment to see 
 what principles govern it. 
 
 Plate IV, Fig. 1, shows the trace of the curve made by a vessel in turn- 
 ing. The curve is drawn differently from what has been usual in the 
 first part of the turn. When the trace is assumed to be that of the 
 center of gravity, near the middle point of the ship, it has been usual 
 to show the arc it describes at the beginning of the turn as tangential 
 
37 
 
 to the original course. There are, however, good reasons for believing 
 that the curve described is more truly represented in the iigure. It is 
 certain that the stern of the vessel does not describe a curve to which 
 the original course is a tangent, and of this we will be given one con- 
 clusive proof. If two ships are steaming in line ahead in smooth water, 
 and the order is given to alter course in succession, say to starboard, the 
 sternmost ship will see that the foremast of the headmost ship does not 
 alter its bearing for some time after the stern has swung to port, and the 
 wake of the leading ship will have a bend in it to port, which becomes 
 an excellent mark for the sternmost ship to go by for putting over her 
 own helm when she comes to this point. It is called the " kick." (See 
 Plate IV, Fig. 2.) 
 
 The two things which oppose a ship's turning when the helm is put 
 down, the ship steaming ahead, are inertia and icater-resistance. They 
 are jemarkably different in eflfects, inasmuch as inertia, as an opposing 
 element, is at its maximum when motion begins, and when water- resist- 
 ance is at its minimum. Then, as we go on applying the accelerating 
 force of rudder-power, or other force which has a moment about the 
 pivoting point of the ship, we generate angular momentum, and then 
 water-resistance. When we have once started the ship, so that every 
 point in the middle line begins to revolve around the pivoting point, we 
 get momentum of all the particles in the ship aroand this point. There 
 are in fact moments of momentum set up by the first action of the 
 rudder, which are added to the moment of rudder-power and in- 
 crease as the angular velocity increases. But a check to this growing 
 angular velocity is developed by the increasing resistance of the water. 
 Then we have tending to turn the ship round on the pivoting point mo- 
 ments of momentum and moments of rudder-power, which are opposed 
 by moments of water-resistance. It is evident that ultimately moments 
 of momentum must be equal to moments of water-resistance, and that 
 there will remain the constant force of the moments of rudder-power op- 
 posed also by equal moments of water-resistance, leaving no unbal- 
 anced forces, and so giving a uniform angular velocity to the middle 
 fore-and-aft line of the ship, and sbe turns in a circle. This circle is 
 spoken of as the final circle. 
 
 By absolute experiment it has been determined that the first quad- 
 rant of the circle is passed through in the quickest time, although the 
 distance traversed is greater than in any subsequent quadrant. Until 
 the final circle is entered upon, these three phenomena present them- 
 selves for every successive quadrant, less speed, shorter pathsto traverse, 
 and a longer time to perform that part of the turn. 
 
 Captain Oolomb gives us a method for measuring the turning powers 
 of the ship, which is as follows (some slight modifications have been 
 made in the instruments used^^ others having been suggested, but the 
 plan of the experiment has not been interfered with) : 
 
 Choose a calm, still day in the open sea, but in view of a distant point 
 
38 
 
 of land or object sufficiently conspicuous for observation. Prepare two 
 casks with flags or staffs, each flag to be of a different color. Care must 
 be taken to weight the casks, so that a very few inches remain above 
 water ; this in order to prevent wind-drift, an element calculated to mar 
 the accuracy of the experiment. 
 
 Alidades with dumb compasses or plane-tables, and sight- vanes or 
 gun-directors, are to be placed one forward and one aft on the side 
 towards which the turn is to be made. These sighting instruments are 
 to be put the same distance from the fore-and-aft middle line of the 
 ship. The distance between them to be as great as the length of the 
 ship will allow. All angles observed will be reckoned from Si zero point, 
 which is right abeam. The distance between the sighting instruments 
 is the base line of the triangle. The graduated ring of the standard 
 compass and the alidade mounted thereon will be used for observing 
 the distant point of land. Four observers are necessary ; one to note 
 the successive bearings of the distant point and change of direction of 
 the ship's head for every 4 points, one to note the times, and one at 
 each alidade to note the angles between the perpendicular to the base 
 line and the bearing of the buoy about which the ship is turning. 
 
 All being in readiness, the two buoys are to be dropped about 1,500 
 yards apart, on a bearing convenient for observing the distant object 
 at each point in the turn around either of them. A hand is stationed 
 to sound the engine-room gong and another hand is stationed at the 
 steam whistle or steam siren, if the ship is fitted with one. The engi- 
 neers are ordered to note the engine counter at each sound of the gong, 
 and the man at the whistle is directed to sound it at the orders, " Stand- 
 by ! " and " Stop ! " the gong to the engine-room being struck at the 
 order " Stop!" 
 
 The ship is now put on a course nearly parallel to the line of the 
 buoys and at the speed desired. (See Plate V, Fig. 1.) One buoy is 
 passed in this manner, but when the second buoy comes about 4 
 points on the bow, the observer, noting the time, gives the words, 
 " Stand by ! " and " Stop ! " The siren sounds for each, and at the 
 second, the helm is moved to the determined angle, the observer at the 
 compass notes the position of the ship's head both by the compass and 
 the bearing of the distant point of land, and the engineers note the 
 engine counter, while the observers at the bow and stern note the bear- 
 ing of the buoy. As the ship arrives at 4, 8, 12, and 16 points change 
 of course, the observer at the compass in like manner gives the words, 
 " Stand-by ! " and " Stop! " when the siren or whistle sounds and the 
 time, bearings, angles, and revolutions are taken. 
 
 When a series of observations completing the turn of 16 points is 
 thus taken, the ship proceeds on a course nearly parallel to the line of 
 buoys, and a turn of 16 jjointsis made around the other buoy, either at the 
 same speed and helm angle or with any desired variations of either or 
 both. The experiment may, of covirse, be varied by stopping or revers- 
 
39 
 
 ing one or both engines in a vessel with twin screws at any point in the 
 turn ; and in all cases the exact position of the ship, when she has 
 turned through 4, 8, 12, and 16 points, respectively, can be laid down 
 from the observations. The method, Captain Colomb says, works ex- 
 ceedingly well and speedily, and is remarkably accurate. 
 
 The plan will be understood from Plate lY, Fig. 1, which represents 
 an actual complete experiment. Here the ship has arrived on a straight 
 course at the point P, then going 5 to 5J knots with 35 revolutions. At 
 this moment the helm is ordered 34° a port ; the angles abh and bah are 
 observed, the engine counter noted and the time taken. At d^ the ship 
 has turned by compass and bearing 4 points. At d'^ she has turned 8 
 points, and so on, and at each position the observations are repeated, 
 the experiment being complete when the middle point of the ship is at 
 d^. The res]iective positions can easily be laid down to scale by a 
 protractor with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes. The object 
 of having two buoys is to save time and to allow the ship to recover 
 herself on a straight cause before repeating the experiment. 
 
 It will be noted that this plan of measuring the turning-circle of a 
 ship is only very good where the length of the ship is great, on account 
 of the shortness of the base line. 
 
 Mr. W. H. White, naval constructor, E. N., goes very thoroughly into 
 the subject which we are considering, as may be seen by reading his 
 lecture delivered before the Eoyal United Service Institute, a report 
 of a portion of which is as follows : 
 
 It is worth notice that when a, ship is moving ahead under the assumed conditions 
 in smooth water and a dead calm she is in unstable equiJibrium so far as the mainte- 
 nance of the straight course is concerned. That is to say, the action of a very small 
 disturbing force will suffiee to deflect her from that course. Directly the helm is 
 put over, and an unbalanced pressure is developed on the rudder, that pressure con- 
 stitutes a disturbing force, and the vessel begins to turn. Her angular motion is 
 gradually accelerated as the helm angle is increased, and after the helm is " hard 
 over." After reaching its maximum rate the angular motion of the vessel becomes 
 uniform ; and thenceforward if the helm angle and revolutions of the engines remain 
 unaltered the vessel continues to swing round through equal angles in equal times, 
 her center of gravity describing a circular path, and all other points moving in con- 
 centric circles. When there is powerful mechanical steering gear, capable of put- 
 ting rudders of large area over to good angles in very small times, this condition of 
 uniform angular motion is quickly reached, probably by the time the head of the 
 ship has swung through 360° or even a less angle from the original course. With 
 manual power at the helm, it is stated on good authority that similar uniformity of 
 angular motion is not obtained until the ship has completed two circuits or even 
 more. The longer time occupied in putting the helm over with manual power 
 accounts for this difference. 
 
 In order to determine the motion of the ship in turning it is convenient to take the 
 following : 
 
 (1.) The original straight course, as line of reference, from which to measure the 
 angles turned through by the keel line of the ship in specified times. 
 
40 
 
 (2.) The position of the center of the ship on the straight course at the instant 
 when the helm begins to move over, as an origin of co-ordinates. 
 
 (3.) The path which the center of gravity describes while the ship turns, as that 
 to be determined by observation. This will practically agree with the middle of the 
 length in most ships. 
 
 It will be obvious that if by observation we can determine the place of the center 
 of gravity at any instant with respect to the original course and the selected origin 
 of co-ordinates, the path can be constructed. Also, that if the angles through which 
 the head of the ship has turned are noted at the same times as the positions of the 
 center of gravity are observed, the instantaneous positions of the keel line are found, 
 and the instantaneous inclinations of the keel line to the corresponding tangents to 
 the path of the center of gravity can be ascertained. 
 
 When the motion of rotation has become uniform, and the center of gravity is 
 moving in a circle, the keel line of the ship makes a constant angle with the tangent 
 to the circular path of the center of gravity. Plate IV, Fig. 3, illustrates this case. 
 A represents the bow and B the stern of a ship. G shows the position of the center 
 of gravity on the keel line AB. O is the center of the circular paths in which G, A, 
 and B are moving. TGTi is the tangent to the path (G, Gi, Gj) of the center of 
 gravity ; and the angle (AGT) made by the keel line with the tangent is termed by 
 the French angle de derive, or " drift angle.'' The value of this drift angle varies con- 
 siderably in different vessels, and in the same vessel under different conditions of 
 speed and helm angle. In the Thunderer, for example, with a constant helm angle, 
 but with variations in the speed, the following results were obtained : 
 
 Speed on straight. 
 
 Drift angle. 
 
 Diameters of 
 circles (feet). 
 
 Bow. 
 
 Stern. 
 
 Knots. 
 8.2.. 
 
 o 
 H 
 
 9i 
 9i 
 
 1,350 
 1,255 
 1,240 
 1,240 
 
 1,410 
 1,345 
 1,340 
 1,340 
 
 9.4 
 
 10.4 
 
 11.14 
 
 
 Other cases are on record where the drift angle has been 16" or 18°. No general 
 law has yet been formulated for the magnitude of the drift angle, but it is generally 
 agreed that it increases (a) with increase in speed, when helm angle and rudder area 
 are constant; (6) also with increase in rudder area and helm angle, speed being con- 
 stant. As a consequence of the drift angle, the bow and stern of the ship revolve in 
 circles of different diameters, and in the above table the results' for the Thunderer 
 furnish an illustration of the fact. Furthermore, in any given time the head of the 
 ship must have turned through an angle from the original course which exceeds the 
 angle turned through by the center of gravity by a quantity equal to the drift angle. 
 
 Turning again to Plate IV, Fig. 3, let P be the foot of a perpendicular let fall from 
 the center upon the middle line of the ship (AB). Then to an observer on board 
 the ship, P will appear to be the " pivot point" about which the angular motion of 
 the ship is being performed at each instant ; for it will be seen that the keel line AB 
 coincides with the tangent to the path of the point P, which is not true of any other 
 point on the keel-line. In other words, at P there is no drift angle ; whereas for 
 every other point in the keel line there is a drift angle, the value of which i.s easily 
 determined when that for the center of gravity, G, and the radius, OG, have been de- 
 termined. In the case of the Thunderer the pivot point, P, variod from 67 to 103 
 feet before the center of gravity, or from about 80 to 40 feet from the stem. As the 
 
41 
 
 speed and drift angle increased, so tlie pivot point moved forward. It need hardly 
 be added that the point G is the true center of the motion of the ship in turning, 
 although P appears to an observer on board to be the pivot on which the ship turns 
 during the time she has uniform angular velocity. 
 
 Another circumstance requiring notice in connection with the uniform turning mo- 
 tion now under consideration is the loss of speed sustained by the ship when turning, 
 as compared with her speed on the straight course from which she began to turn. 
 Taking several cases where this loss has been carefully measured, X find that the speed 
 of advance on the circular path has only been seven-tenlJis or eight-tenths of the speed 
 on the straight. It is often supposed that this loss of speed is chiefly due to the 
 ".drag'' of the rudder. Any one who investigates the matter will become convinced 
 that the rudder pressure has little to do with this considerable decrease in speed ; 
 the real cause is to be found in the drift angle. Glancing once more at Plate IV, 
 Fig. 3, it will be evident that, at each instant, wLile the propelling force is delivered 
 along or parallel to the keel line, the actual motion of the vessel in turning is not 
 directly ahead, but sideways. In fact, the motion bears a considerable resemblance 
 to the motion of a ship sailing on a wind ; and there is a considerable pressure de- 
 veloped on the side of the bow most distant from the center, 0. This pressure not 
 merely checks the speed of the ship, but exercises a considerable turning effect, assist- 
 ing the pressure on the rudder. The importance of this assistance will appear more 
 clearly when it is considered that owing to the rotary motion of the vessel while turn- 
 ing, the flow of water at the stern is different, even in screw steamers, from that which 
 would take place before the angular motion became considerable. In fact, the effective 
 helm angle becomes considerably reduced from the angle EBD, Plate IV, Fig. 3, 
 which the rudder makes with the keel line AB, produced. So far as I am aware, we 
 have no exact data for estimating the amount of this reduction ; but French experi- 
 mentalists assert that it approaches to equality with the drift angle for the rudder 
 axis B. If OB is joined, and BQ drawn perpendicular to it, then the effective helm 
 angle, according to the French rule, should be taken as approximately equal to EBQ, 
 and not to DBR, or a reduction of at least one-half ftom the angle made with the keel 
 line, even in single-screw ships. Approximately the pressure on the rudder may be 
 expressed as a function of the speed of the ship, and the sine of the effective angle of 
 helm ; so that the loss of rudder pressure consequent upon such a reduction in the ef- 
 fective angle as is asserted to take place will be very considerable. Apart from exact 
 measures of the reduction, there can be no question as to the fact ; and it is one of the 
 matters upon which further experiments might well be made in English ships. With 
 the assistance of a dynamometer to register the strains on the tiller end when the 
 helm is first put over, and after the turning motion has become uniform, it would be 
 an easy matter to discover the variations in the effective helm angle if the revolutions 
 of the engines and speed of the ship were also observed. 
 
 In concluding these remarks on uniform angular motion, it may be well to refer to 
 the heeling which accompanies turning. The forces which tend to produce heeling 
 are as follows : 
 
 1. The centrifugal force acting outwards through the center of gravity of the ship 
 and tending to make her heel away from the center of the circle. 
 
 2. The lateral component of the rudder pressure, acting through the center of 
 pressure of the rudder at some depth below the center of gravity of the ship, and 
 tending to make her heel inwards towards the center of the circle. 
 
 3. The lateral component of the fluid resistance on the outer side of the ship, which 
 equals in magnitude the resultant of the centrifugal force and the rudder pressure, 
 and acts through the center of lateral resistance, 
 
 Plate V, Fig. 2, shows the distribution of these forces in the Thunderer, deter- 
 mined from the turning trials made at Portland. Here again it is common to find the 
 rudder pressure credited with the heeling effect ; whereas it may, in most cases, be 
 
42 
 
 neglected in oomparisou with the centrifugal force. A fair approximation to the 
 angle of heel for a ship in turning is given by the following equation : 
 
 sin e = 4x-Xi5' 
 where 6= angle of heel, 
 
 V = speed of ship in feet per second, 
 R = radius of circle turned (in feet), 
 m = "metacentric height" — height of transverse metacentric above 
 
 center of gravity, 
 d = distance of center of gravity above center of lateral resistance. 
 
 In the Thunderer, the center of lateral resistance was found to be from .43 to .49 of 
 the mean draft below the water line; probably a fair approximation for war ships 
 or ordinary form would be from .4.5 to .5 of the mean draft. From the foregoing 
 equation it will he seen that — 
 
 The angle of heel varies (1) Directly as the square of the speed of ship ; 
 
 (2) Inversely with the metacentrio height; 
 
 (3) Inversely with the radius of the circle. 
 
 Hence it is obvious that ships of high speed, fitted with steam-steering gear, capable 
 of turning on circles of comparatively small diameter, are those in which heeling may 
 be expected to be greatest. Moderate values of the metacentrio height further tend 
 to increase the heeling. If the speed be doubled, the angle of heel will be about 
 quadrupled, if the radius of the circle turned and the metacentric height remain con- 
 stant. In order to maintain a certain angle of heel under these altered conditions of 
 speed, the metacentric height would also have to be quadrupled ; but such an increase 
 in stiffness is clearly undesirable even if it were practicable. The following figures 
 may be interesting : 
 
 Thunderer ] 
 
 1 
 
 Tourville (French) 
 
 Yictoriease (French) 
 
 Speed on 
 straight. 
 
 Knots. 
 8.2 
 9.4 
 
 10.4 
 
 15 
 
 10 
 
 Diameter 
 of circle. 
 
 Feet. 
 1,340 
 1,250 
 1,240 
 2,030 
 1,290 
 
 Draft. 
 
 n. in. 
 26 3 
 26 1 
 26 1 
 
 Metacentric 
 height. 
 
 Feet. 
 3.12 
 
 Angle of 
 heel. 
 
 It is important to notice that in taking observations of the angle of heel for a ship 
 in turning, allowance must be made for the effect of the centrifugal force upon the 
 indications of jjendulums or clinometers. The error of indication is always in excess, 
 and the correction is very easily made when the diameter of the circle and time of 
 turning have been ascertained. 
 
 In treating at some length the case of a ship turning uniformly in a circular path, 
 I have endeavored to clear the ground somewhat for the discussion of the more diffi- 
 cult case, which has far more practical importance, where the angular motion of the 
 ship is not uniform and the path of her center of gravity is not circular. When the 
 helm of a ship is put down, and she begins to turn away from a straight course, it is 
 interesting to know (1) whether she will readily answer her helm; CS) what will be 
 the path traversed by her center of gravity; (3) what will be the rate of growth of 
 her drift angle; (4) what will bo her gradual loss of speed as compared with her 
 speed on the straight course. Probably the most important pieces of information in 
 relation to naval tactics will be as follows: 1. The place of the center of gravity of 
 the ship when her head has swung through 90° from her original course ; that place 
 being fixed (in the manner previously described) with reference to the original course 
 
43 
 
 and the position of the center of gravity thereon at the instant the holm begins to 
 move over. a. The speed of the ship when she has turned throngh the first 90°. 
 3. The time occupied in turning 90°. 4. The time and space required to reverse the 
 ■course, turning through 180°. 
 
 It is singular to find on inquiry how meager is the information recorded on the first 
 three of these points. I can discover no case except that of the Thunderer in which 
 the actual path traversed by the center of gravity of the ship has been determined 
 from the instant the helm was put down to the time when the turning motion had 
 become uniform. All the facte as to these trials have been published in the report of 
 the Inflexible committee, and they deserve the careful study of all naval officers. I 
 Kio not propose to reproduce them there, but to use a few of the results only for pur. 
 poses of illustration. Plate IV, Fig. 4, shows the course traversed by that ship, when 
 turning from a straight path on which her speed has been 10.44 knots. On analyzing 
 the companion diagrams for this speed, I find the following results, reckoning times 
 from the instant when the helm was begun to be put over : 
 
 
 Time. 
 
 At end of time. 
 
 Speed of 
 ship. 
 
 Angular 
 
 velocity per 
 
 second. 
 
 ■ To put lielm over 31° 
 
 Seconds. 
 19 
 
 56 
 
 89 
 123 
 159 
 320 
 
 Knots. 
 10.4 
 
 9.25 
 
 8.3 
 
 7.75 
 
 7.5 
 
 7.U 
 
 o / 
 
 20 
 
 1 IB 
 1 18 
 1 15 
 1 12 
 1 6i 
 
 
 To turn ship's head 90° 
 
 To turn ship's head 135° 
 
 
 To turn ship's head 360° 
 
 
 At 360° the turning motion had become practically uniform. The conditions here 
 traced for the Thunderer are representative for all steamships when turning under 
 the action of their rudders from a straight course on which they were originally mov- 
 ing ahead. There will, of course, be differences in different ships as regards the times 
 ■occupied in putting the helm down, or in passing through the various changes which 
 precede the attainment of uniform angular velocity, as well as in the value of that 
 velocity. But in all cases as a ship turns from her straight course she will be sub- 
 jected to angular acceleration, her drift angle will gradually increase, she will heel 
 more and more, and her speed will decrease. But by degrees these transitory condi- 
 tions will pass away, if the helm is kept at a constant angle, and the engines at a 
 nearly constant speed, and ultimately a state of uniform motion and steady heel will 
 be reached such as I have previously attempted to describe. 
 
 Purely theoretical investigation does not enable one to lay down the path of the 
 ■center of gravity of a ship from her straight course to the position occupied when the 
 head has turned through 90° ; nor are we much better off for the remaining part of 
 her path until the turning becomes uniform. The greatest difficulty in framing the 
 equations of motion arises from the uncertain state of our knowledge respecting the 
 resistance offered by the water to the motion of the ship in turning. Hence it be- 
 •comes necessary that the problem should be attacked by actual experiment, and 
 careful observations made, which would enable the path traversed to be subsequently 
 plotted. French writers assert that the curve traversed by a ship from the place 
 where her helm is put over to her place when she has turned through 180°, can be 
 treated without serious error as a circle touching the original course. The perpen- 
 dicular distance from the place of the center of gravity when the head has turned 
 through 180°, to the original course, is termed by the French the "diameter of evolu- 
 -tion." Captain Colomb has proposed to call it the " tactical diameter.'' Unfortu- 
 
44 
 
 nately tlie Thunderer experiment shows that the Frerich assumption as to the char- 
 acter of the curve is only a rough approximation; and apart from those experiments 
 it is obvious that for different ships the character of the curve is likely to vary. 
 Among the controlling circumstances which chiefly need attention are : 
 
 1. The area of the rudder, the maximum angle to which the helm can be put over, 
 the rapidity with which it can be put hard over. 
 
 2. The speed of the ship or that of her propeller, as well as other causes influencing 
 the flow of water relatively to the rudder, and the consequent development of an un- 
 balanced pressure on the rudder, which exercises a turning effect on the ship. 
 
 3. The moment of inertia of the ship taken about a vertical axis passing through 
 the center of gravity of the ship. 
 
 4. The moment of the resistance offered by (he water to the lateral, rotary, and 
 endwise motions of the ship. 
 
 It would be out of place for me to give any explanation of the causes which pro- 
 duce and deterniiue the magnitude of the pressure on the rudder, since the matter is 
 fully discussed in text books of naval architecture. Moreover, the ship comes into 
 the hands of her commanding officer furnished with her rudder and steering gear, 
 which have been tested in the constructor's trials. Experience may suggest improve- 
 ments, of course; but, as a rule, the changes made are not great, and consequently 
 in the management of the ship an officer can take advantage only of variations in the 
 helm angle below a certain fixed maximum, and of variations in speed or direction of 
 motion. It is generally agreed that — 
 
 1. Other things being equal, the turning effect of a rudder increases with aii increase 
 in the helm angle up to 40° or 45° with the keel line. 
 
 2. Other things being equal, the rate of acquisition of angular velocity, or the 
 rapidity with which a ship turns, increases as the time occupied in putting the helm 
 hard over is diminished. 
 
 Hereafter I shall mention a case or two illustrating the effect of putting the helm 
 over more quickly upon the turning of ships ; but as illustrations of the advantages 
 of large helm angles, I may quote at once a few figures from actual trials. Admiral 
 Sir Cooper Key found that the Delight gunboat behaved as under, when the helm 
 angle alone was varied : 
 
 Helm angle. 
 
 Time of turning 
 ftiU circle. 
 
 Diameter of 
 circle. 
 
 o 
 
 10 
 
 Mill. Sec. 
 3 52 
 
 3 18 
 
 2 57 
 
 2 47 
 
 Feet. 
 615 
 
 405 
 
 275 
 
 205 
 
 20 
 
 30 
 
 40 
 
 
 Admiral Halstead, in the trials conducted with the floating battery Terror, ob- 
 tained the following results : 
 
 Helm angle. 
 
 Tirue of turning 
 full circle. 
 
 o 
 10 
 
 Min. Sec. 
 6 19 
 5 23 
 5 1 
 
 20 . . 
 
 30 
 
 40 . . 
 
 4 42 
 
 
 
45 
 
 Lieutenant Coumes, of the Frencli Navy, gives the following results for the iron- 
 clad corvette Victorieuse, for an initial speed of about 12i knots : 
 
 Helm angle. 
 
 Time of turning 
 full circle. 
 
 Diameter of 
 circle. 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 Jfm. Sec. 
 
 a 48 
 
 6 50 
 5 50 
 5 20 
 5 20 
 
 Meters. 
 1,060 
 933 
 750 
 572 
 475 
 
 M 
 
 21 
 
 27 
 
 32i 
 
 
 Eespecting the remaining circumstances enumerated above as affecting the turning 
 motion, a very few remarks will suffice. In arranging the. longitudinal distribution 
 of the weights in a new ship, the naval architect cannot be governed by considera- 
 tion of the effect which the moment of inertia has upon the turning ciuaUties. But it 
 is well known that if the weights are carried far away towards the ends of a ship, 
 and her moment of inertia is great, she will be sloto to answer Tien- lielm, as compared 
 with a ship of similar form and equal displacement having the weights more con- 
 centrated towards the middle of the length. 
 
 Although the true character of the path traversed by a ship in turning has been 
 determined in very few cases, it is known that it is more or less spiral up to the time 
 that uniform angular velocity is reached. This departure from a true circle is of the 
 character indicated in Plate IV, Fig. 4, and it places the ship, when she has turned 
 through 360° and is again pointing in the original direction, somewhat to port or star- 
 board of the original coarse, according as the ship is turning to port or starboard. The 
 space occupied in turning through 180° and reversing the course has been termed the 
 tactical diameter {diamMre d' 4volution) ; it considerably exceeds the diameter of the 
 circular orbit in which the ship turns after her motion has become uniform, or "final 
 diameter " (diamHre de gyration). The reason is obvious ; in the earlier part of the 
 turning motion of the ship she is acquiring angular motion, that is to say, is subject 
 to angular acceleration, and the curvature of her path is less pronounced than it is 
 in the subsequent stages. It may be interesting to illustrate the ratio of the tactical 
 and final diameters by a few figures drawn from actual trials : 
 
 Helm 
 angle. 
 
 Speed on 
 straight. 
 
 Diameters. 
 
 Tactical. Final, 
 
 Thunderer (English) 
 
 Victorieuse (French) . 
 
 Knots. 
 8.2 
 
 9.4 
 
 10.4 
 
 10.0 
 
 Feet. 
 1,405 
 
 1,320 
 
 1,320 
 
 1,440 
 
 Feet. 
 1,340 
 
 1,250 
 
 1,240 
 
 1,230 
 
 At present the published information on the ratio of tactical to final diameters is 
 very limited; it is a subject to which further experiments may well be devoted. But 
 for all practical purposes the determination of the tactical diameters is the more 
 important. In the constructors' turning trials the diameter of the circle, as usually 
 determined, is practically the tactical diameter, as will appear from the description 
 given hereafter. With manual power and ordinary rudders the diameter of the 
 circle for large ships has been found to vary between six and eight times the length 
 of the ships ; for small ships, wherein manual power suffices to put the helm over rap- 
 idly and the speed is low, the diameter falls to three or five times the length. For 
 
46 
 
 swift torpedo-boats, witli manual power only at the helm and very small angles of 
 helm, the diameter of the circle for full speed has reached about twelve times the 
 length, and for half speed about four or sis times the length. With manual power 
 and balanced rudders the diameter for large ships has been reduced to four or five 
 times the length; and nearly equal results have been obtained with ordinary rud- 
 ders worked by steam or hydraulic steering gear. About three times the length is the 
 minimum diameter yet obtained in large ships turning under the action of their rud- 
 ders. These figures apply chiefly to full-speed trials ; but it appears that diifereuces 
 of speed do not greatly affect the diameter of the circles, although they do affect the 
 time of turning, so long as the time occupied in putting the helm hard over is nearly 
 constant. For the same ship with the same angle of helm, and about the same time 
 occupied in putting the helm over, the time occupied in turning the circle appears to 
 vary nearly inversely as the speed. The time occupied in putting the helm hard over 
 considerably affects the time of turning, and also influences the diameter of the circle. 
 In the case of one of Her Majesty's ships, where the conditions remained almost 
 unchanged, except that a steam steering engine was fitted, and the time occupied in 
 putting the helm hard over was reduced from 90 seconds to 20 seconds, the time oc- 
 cupied in turning the circle was reduced from 81 minutes to a little over 7 minutes, 
 and the diameter of the circle was reduced from 970 yards to 885 yards. Before steam 
 steering engines became common in the Eoyal Navy balanced rudders furnished the 
 best means of putting a large rudder area over quickly to a large angle, and the 
 Bellerophon, Hercules, Monarch, and other vessels so fitted performed admirably in 
 turning under steam. But now that mechanical steering appliances are available, 
 ordinary rudders, hinged at their fore edge, are once more preferred, because they 
 are simpler and less liable to derangement than balanced rudders, besides being more 
 suitable for use in ships having sail as well as steam power. 
 
 The determination of the tactical diameter is an important matter, i)ut it does not 
 furnish a complete or sufficient account of the space necessary for a ship to reverse 
 her course ; for it gives only a measurement at right angles to the original course — 
 which may be termed the " transfer " of the ship — and affords no measure of her 
 " advance" in the direction of her original course. Taking the case of the Thun- 
 derer (Plate IV, Fig. 4), it appears that, reckoning from the instant when the helm 
 began to move over, the ship advanced about 1,000 feet in the direction of her 
 straight course before her head had swung through 90°, and was transferred (at 
 right angles to her course) about 700 feet. When her head had turned through 180° 
 and the course was reversed, the advance had been reduced to 520 feet, while the 
 transfer (or tactical diameter) had increased to 1,320 feet. It is most important to 
 ascertain the advance and transfer for the 90° position ; the necessary observations 
 are easily made, and I shall not occupy space with a description of any one among the 
 many methods that might be used. 
 
 Passing from these general considerations, I will now endeavor to sketch briefly the 
 methods adopted for measuring the diameters of the circles turned by ships on their 
 constructors' trials. 
 
 The first is that commonly used in trials of Her Majesty's ships ; it was introduced 
 about fifteen years ago by Mr. Martin, chief constructor of Pembroke dock-yard, and 
 is illustrated by Plate V, Fig. 3. 
 
 At any assigned place in the length of the ship two vertical battens, b, b, are fixed 
 in the same transverse plane, and an observer is stationed at the position fixed by one 
 of these battens. A second observer is stationed at B, at a certain longitudinal dis- 
 tance, I, from the first observer, and this second observer has to operate a very simple 
 instrument for measuring angles, which is shown on a larger scale in Plate V Fig. 
 5. The zero line of this measuring instrument is made to coincide with, or be par- 
 allel to, the middle line of the ship. When the helm begins to move over a box C 
 is thrown overboard from the station b, at which the fixed battens are placed. After 
 the ship has turned through such an angle that the line joining the two fixed battens 
 
47 
 
 again bears upon the box C, a signal is made to tlie second observer, who instantly 
 notes the angle (ABC) which the line of sight to the box C makes with the zero 
 line of his measuring instrument ; let this angle be termed a. Then a simple trigo- 
 nometrical ratio gives — 
 
 Diameter of circle = I tau a, 
 
 if the semicircle is supposed to be completed when the angle a is measured. This 
 is a good practical method for smooth water and a calm. Obviously it takes no 
 account of a possible drift of the box, and it assumes the omission of the " drift 
 angle " for the ship, on the supposition that the semicircle of rotation is not completed 
 until the line joining CD is a diameter of the circle. As a matter of fact, owing to 
 the creation of the drift angle, the head of the ship will have turned through 180° 
 Tiefore her center of gravity has traversed so large an arc in its path. The amount 
 of this possible error in most large ships is not great, and for ascertaining the diame- 
 ter of the circle simply the plan is a good one. It may be added that since the diam- 
 eter determined is for the points in the ship at which the fixed battens are placed, by 
 fixing them first at the bow and next transposing them to the stern it would be pos- 
 sible to ascertain the diameters of the respective circles for the bow and stern, and 
 thence to determine the drift angle approximately. 
 
 Lieutenant Coumes, of the French Navy, has recently published an extension of the 
 English method, which deserves to be widely known. It is illustrated in Plate V, 
 Fig. 4. He assumes the path of the ship from the straight course to a little be- 
 yond the place where she has turned through 180° to be an arc of a circle. At the 
 position C, a buoy is dropped overboard abreast the fixed battens, just as is done in 
 the English plan. At the position marked D the head of the ship has swung through 
 180° and the line joining the two fixed battens bears upon the box at C. An ob- 
 server stationed at B, at a known distance from the fixed battens, notes the value of 
 the angle ABC (a) at that instant, and simultaneously a second box, D, is dropped 
 overboard. The ship moves on to a, position, E, a little beyond D, and the observer 
 stationed at the fixed battens notes the angle EDC (/i), which the two boxes, C 
 and D, then subtend. These are all the observations needed. Suppose O to be the 
 center of the circular path, join CO and produce it to meet the circle at F, also 
 join DF. Then the angle, DFC, is equal to IS, being in the same segment, and the 
 angle, CDF, being in a semicircle, is a right angle. Hence— 
 
 Diameter of circle = CD X cosec 0. 
 Diameter of circle = I tan. a cosec i3. 
 
 Further, it will be seen that the drift angle {6) equals the angle CDO, which is 
 equal to DCO, and is therefore the complement of ^. 
 
 The maximum correction produced by substituting Lieutenant Coumes's method for 
 Mr. Martin's in estimating the " tactical diameter " is expressed by the product of 
 the radius into the versed sine of the angle of drift, or algebraically— 
 
 Error ^radius X versine (S, 
 
 where S varies between 10° and 20° and versine i varies between .015 and .06. This 
 correction is evidently of little importance in most cases. 
 
 Another plan, which has been extensively used in estimating the diameter of the cir. 
 cles turned, is to tow a patent log astern and note the distance it registers while the 
 ship turns through 360°. This registered distance is afterwards treated as the cir- 
 cumference of a circle, and the diameter is obtained by a simple calculation. Opin- 
 ions are divided as to the trustworthiness of this plan. I do not pretend to be in a 
 position to decide the matter, but feel confident that the chances of error must be 
 greater than in the geometrical methods above described. Even with the best logs 
 available towed behind a vessel moving at a varying speed and turning, there must 
 be great danger that their indications will vary with differences of speed or will be 
 
48 
 
 affected with the wake of the vessel. The French have made comparative trials of 
 the geometrical method and of log-measurement, the result being unfavorable to the 
 latter. 
 
 Still another plan, -srell adapted for small vessels, is that devised by Sir Cooper 
 Key and used in the tiiruing trials of Her Majesty's gunboat Delight, conducted at 
 Devonport in 1863. The register of a Massey's patent sounding machine was re- 
 moved from the lead and attached to a long staif. At the commencement of a circle 
 the register was immersed, when the circle was completed it was immediately raised. 
 The distance registered was read off, and this was treated as the circumference of the 
 circle traversed. 
 
 In the French squadrons of 1864-'66 the turning trials were conducted differently 
 from any of the foregoing methods. Captain Bourgois gives the particulars in his 
 pamphlet previously noticed; it may be briefly described as follows : One ship of the 
 squadron was anchored, and the vessel whose movements were to be recorded turned 
 about the stationary vessel. Two observers were stationed at a known distance apart 
 on board the moving vessel. At frequent and regular intervals of time these observ- 
 ers noted simultani^ously and recorded the angular elevation of a mast head in the 
 anchored vessel. The height of this mast head above the water being known, this 
 Series of observations gave the distances of the anchored ship from each observer at 
 each time of observation. Meanwhile observers stationed on board the anchored ves- 
 sel took frequent and simultaneous observations of the angular elevations and bear- 
 iijgs of a mast head in the ship that was turning. And further, other observers on 
 hoard the moving ship noted at frequent intervals the angles subtended by a mast in 
 the anchored ship with some fixed and distant object. These observations would have 
 sufSced to determine the path traversed by the ship from the time her helm was put 
 down ; but it is a remarkable fact that the important motions of the ships through 
 the first 90° of rotation were designedly neglected, and the observations were begun 
 only when approximately uniform circular motion had been attained. On the other 
 hand, it is in these records one finds attention first given to the importance of deter- 
 mining the drift angle. 
 
 The French appear to attach great importance to the determination of the tactical 
 diameter corresponding to various revolutions of the screw and various helm angles 
 for individual ships. I leave naval officers to say what this knowledge may be worth 
 in its bearing upon the movements of the ships composing a squadron ; but it is obvi- 
 ous that if the ships are of various sizes and types, combined movements under steam 
 can be performed with greater uniformity if the admiral has this kind of information 
 for all the ships under his command. Perhaps it may be as well to add that the plan 
 which has been sometimes adopted for estimating the diameter of the circle turned 
 by counting the revolutions of the engines, and thence deducing the speed, is liable 
 to lead into serious error. Owing to the drift angle the speed corresponding to a 
 given number of revolutions is much less when a ship is turning than it is when she 
 is on a straight course. In the Thunderer, for example, a speed of 10.4 knots was ob- 
 tained with 65 revolutions, whereas on the circle 59 revolutions only gave a speed of 
 7.14 knots. 
 
 In concluding these remarks on methods of recording the behavior of ships when 
 turning, I may be permitted to add that in the trials with the Thunderer the method 
 of procedure embraced many of the foregoing principles, and enabled a most search- 
 ing check and counter-check to be put upon the observations. Any ofiBcer familiar 
 with nautical observations will find no difficulty in arranging his own programme 
 should he decide to accurately determine the path of his ship in turning under cer- 
 tain assumed conditions. But he can only derive benefit from a, study of what was 
 done in the Thunderer, the report of the trials of that ship containing the most 
 thorough information yet published on this subject. 
 
 It is impossible to discuss the "Turning Powers of Ships," even in the outline to 
 which 1 am compelled to confine myself in the present paper, without referring to the 
 
49 
 
 maneuvering power given to a sliip by duplicate propellers, and more especially by twin 
 screws. Twiu screws are now almost universally adopted in the most powerful war 
 ships, and their efficiency as propellers is well established. But they have the farther 
 advantage of enabling a vessel, by reversing one of her screws while the other drives 
 her ahead, to turn in a very small circle — almost in her own length. The rate of 
 turning under these circumstances is often slow, but the power of giving rotation to 
 a ship practically destitute of headway and independently of the rudder is of great 
 value. Twin screws are, of course, associated with rudders, and no one at all con- 
 versant with the subject would propose to trust to twin screws alone for maneuver- 
 ing purposes. They are really only valuable auxiliaries to the rudder, and in no 
 sense rivals to it. 
 
 It may be interesting to add, with regard to the turning effect of twin screws when 
 working in opposite directions, that in deep-draft ships the time occupied in turning 
 is usually greater than the time for turning the circle with both screws working 
 ahead at full speed; whereas for shallow-draft ships the corresponding difference in 
 time is small. For example, in the Captain, the time for circle at full speed ahead 
 was 5 minutes 24 seconds ; that for circle with screws working in opposite directions, 
 6 minutes 52 seconds. In the shallow-draft gunboats of the Medina class, on the other 
 hand, the full-speed turning trial gave about 3 minutes 6 seconds for the circle, and 
 with screws working in opposite directions the time was only 3 minutes 13 seconds. 
 It will be obvious that in the shallow-draft ships the ratio of the moment of resist- 
 ance to rotation to the turning moment of the screws is much less than the corre- 
 sponding ratio for deep-draft ships. 
 
 Trustworthy data are much needed respecting one feature in the steerage of twin- 
 screw ships. It is well known that with one screw only at work a, small angle of 
 helm will keep a twin-screw ship on a straight course ; and this is a proof of the mod- 
 erate turning moment obtained with twin screws working in opposite directions. 
 But I have searched unsuccessfully for records of exact experiments determining what 
 angle of helm suffices to balance one of twin screws working alone; and I shall be 
 much indebted to gentlemen who may be good enough to give me the needed infor- 
 mation. The facts to be noted are very few and simple, viz : (1) the revolutions of 
 the screw ; (2) the speed of the ship ; (3) the angle of helm required to keep the vessel 
 straight. 
 
 When I speak of the moderate turning effect of twin screws, it will be understood 
 that I have in mind the corresponding effect of even a small rudder at a small angle, 
 in a ship steaming at full speed ahead. The normal pressure on such a rudder will be 
 considerable when compared with the thrust of a screw ; but the greatest gain for 
 the rndder pressure is the leverage with which it acts. Eoughly speaking, this lever- 
 age is equal to the product — half length of ship x cosine of helm angle; whereas for the 
 twin screws the corresponding leverage is only about equal to the tranverse distance 
 between the screw shafts, or less than one-half the extreme breadth of the ship. It 
 must not be forgotten, however, that for the rudder to act most efficiently, a ship 
 must have good headway ; whereas in the twin-screw ship there is a possibility of 
 turning with very little motion ahead. 
 
 The steering effect of a single screw, which has the greatest practical interest, is 
 that in ships where the rudder is placed abaft the screw. It is well known that, in 
 such cases, if the screw be turned ahead or astern when a vessel is at rest, the impact 
 of the screw-race upon the rudder will give steerage power before the vessel has ac- 
 quired sensible headway. By this means it is possible to slew a single-screw ship 
 round in a very limited space in calm weather, although the operation is a very 
 tedious one. But there is another steering effect of a single screw independent of the 
 rudder, with which sailors are familiar ; I mean the effect which pr(»duces a turning 
 motion in a ship of which the helm is kept amidships while the screw revolves. The 
 principal causes of this turning motion are (1) the difference of the transverse thrust 
 on the blades of the screw in the upper and lower halves of their orbit; (2)thediffer- 
 482 4 
 
50 
 
 enoe in the lateral pressures, due to the momentum of the streams delivered '^^ *^« 
 upper and lower blades of the screw upon the stern-post and body of the ship. 1 he 
 ordinary result in ships of the royal navy is that with well-imviersed screws, the head 
 of the ship turns in the same direction as the upper blades of the screws move; but 
 that with screws which are near the surface, or which sweep above the surface, the 
 contrary holds good, and the head of the ship turns in the direction in which the 
 lower blades are moving. I am aware that there are exceptions to these rules, but 
 think they generally hold good for ships moving ahead. When the screws are turning 
 astern, the conditions are altered materially. 
 
 Auxiliary rudders of many kinds have been proposed and tried. In the museum 
 ofnavkl models at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, a good collection of these 
 plans may be seen, and it shows how frequently an invention is reinvented by per- 
 sons who have the same object in view, but are working in ignorance of what has 
 been done by their predecessors. I have only space to allude to the most recent and 
 most successful trials of auxiliary rudders made in the Comus class of the royal navy. 
 These vessels have an ordinary rudder at the stern, and an auxiliary rudder fitted in 
 a recess in the after part of tlie hull below the screw shaft. This auxiliary rudder 
 has side plates fitted at some distance from the body, on the plan proposed by M. 
 Joessel, of the French Navy. On trial it was found to answer fairly, keeping the ves- 
 sel under control, although its effect did not compare favorably with that of the 
 main rudder ; nor was this anticipated, since the rud'der is fitted as an auxiliary only 
 for use when the main rudder is disabled in action. 
 
 The steerage of a screw steamship having engines reversed, while she has either 
 headtvay or'sternway, supposing her to be fitted only with an ordinary rudder at the 
 stern, is a subject for experimental inquiry rather than for mathematical investiga- 
 tion. It is easy to see what causes are in operation tending to control the behavior 
 of the vessel ; but these causes are so confiicting and variable as to make any general 
 statement of little value. The following extract from the report of the committee 
 appointed by the British Association "to investigate the effect of jiropellers on the 
 steering of vessels," may be read with interest, as it represents the conclusions reached 
 after a considerable number of experiments had been made by Prof. Osborne Eeynolds 
 and other members of the committee : 
 
 " It appears both from the experiments made by the committee, and from other evi- 
 dence, that the distance required by a screw steamer to bring herself to rest from full 
 speed by the reversal of her screw is independent, or nearly so, of the power of her 
 engines, but depends upon the size and build of the ship, and generally lies betwetn 
 ioLir and six times the ship's length. It is to be borne in mind that it is to the be- 
 havior of tbe ship during this interval that the following remarks apply. 
 
 '• The main point the committee have had in view has been to ascertain how far the 
 reversing of the screw in order to stop a ship did, or did not, interfere with the action 
 of the rudder during the interval of stopping ; and it is as regards this point that the 
 most important light has been thrown on the question of haudling ships. It is found 
 an invariable rule that, during the interval in which a ship is stopping herself by the 
 reversal of her screw, the rudder produces none of its usual effects to turn the ship; 
 but that under these circumstances the effect of the rudder, such as it is, iS to tnru the 
 ship in the opposite direction from that in which she would turn if the screw were 
 going ahead. The magnitude of this reverse effect of the rudder is always feeble ami 
 is different for different ships, and even for the same ship under different couditious 
 of lading. 
 
 "It also appears from the trials that, owing to the feeble influence of the rudder over 
 ^he ship during the interval in which she is stopping, she is then at the mercy of any 
 other influences that, may act upon her. Thus the wind, which always exerts an in- 
 fluence to turn the stem (or forward end) of the ship into the wind, but which influ- 
 ence is usually well under control of the rudder, may, when the screw is reversed 
 become pai amount, and cause the ship to turn in a direction the very'opposite of that 
 which is desired. Also the reversed screw will exercise an influence which increases 
 
51 
 
 as tlie ship's way is diminislied to turn the ship to starboard or port, aooording as it 
 is right or left handed ; this being particularly the case when the ships are in light 
 draft. 
 
 " These several influences, the reversed effect of the rudder, the effect of the wind, 
 and the action of the screw, will determine the course the ship takes during the in- 
 terval of stopping. They may balance, in which case the ship will go straight on ; or 
 any one of three may predominate and determine the course of the ship. The utmost 
 effect of these influences when they all act in conjunction, as when the screw is right 
 handed, the [helm starboarded, and the wind on the starboard side, is small as com- 
 pared with the influence of the rudder as it acts when the ship is steaming ahead. In 
 no instance has a ship tried by the committee been able to turn with the screw re- 
 versed on a circle of less than double the radius of that on which she would turn when 
 steaming ahead. So that even if those in charge could govern the direction in which 
 the ship will turn while stopping, she turns but slowly, whereas in point of fact those 
 in charge have little or no control over this direction, and unless they are exception- 
 ally well acquainted with their ship they will be unable even to predict the direc- 
 tioh." 
 
 There is much in these conclusions which has been well known for many years to 
 men engaged in handling screw steamers; and trials were made in the Great Britain 
 to determine the effect of the screw race upon the steerage. But no one can look 
 through "the reports of the committee from which the above quotation is made without 
 feeling that their experiments are very valuable and deserving of being carefully 
 studied by all officers in command of screw steamships. Differences of opinion which 
 exist as to the wisdom of some of the recommendations for avoiding collisions made 
 by the committee will not prevent any one interested in the subject from acknowl- 
 edging the great merits of the work done by the committee, or at its request. 
 
 Throughout this paper it has been assumed that the ship's maneuvering capabilities 
 are ascertained in smooth water and in a calm or light breeze. These are the condi- 
 tions most suitable for exact experiments and comparison ; but I need hardly say that 
 such trials do not represent the conditions of actual service. It would be idle to at- 
 tempt any discussion of the influence which the wind and sea have upon the turning 
 powers of ships, since that influence is so variable. But, on the other hand, it must 
 be remembered that the principles previously laid down for turning in smooth water 
 hold good also in a seaway ; only the effects of the rudder, of the inertia, and rcsist- 
 anie ure then supplemented by the effects of wind and sea. This branch of the sub- 
 ject i.-<, in fact, one of seamanship, and not one to be discussed by the naval arcliitcct. 
 
 •The general conclusions to which my study of the subject of this paper has led me 
 may le briefly .summarized as follows : 
 
 (1.) Ou the whole, the ordinary rudder hung at the stern of a ship has not been 
 equaled for maneuvering purposes when a ship has headway. 
 
 (2.) When associated with steam or hydraulic steering gear the ordinary rudder 
 hinged at its forward edge to the stern-post is to be preferred to all other kinds of 
 rndders. Balanced rudders are chiefly useful, if mechanical steering gear is not avail- 
 able, in large ships. 
 
 (3.) Twin screws furnish the best combination of economical propulsion with ma- 
 neuvering power which has yet been produced. 
 
 (4.) The various inventions hitherto tried for rendering the trust of a single pro_ 
 poller available for maneuvering purposes involve risks and drawbacks too serious to 
 he encountered in large ships, although the contrary may be true in small crafts. 
 
 (5.) Bow rudders are chiefly useful to assist steerage in ships moving astern 
 Balanced or " drop " bow rudders are to be preferred for use when ships are moving 
 
 ahead. 
 
 (6.) It is desirable that further and careful observations should be made of the ac- 
 tual behavior of ships when turning at various speeds and with different helm angles. 
 Accurate plottings of the path traversed while the head of the ship swings through 
 he first 90° from her original course are especially needed. 
 
62 
 
 Turning experiments with the steamship Hankow, copied from the report of the Brms i 
 cialion Committee for Inquiri/ info the steering of steamships, 1877. 
 
 The Hankow is a single-screw steamship, of 3,594.12 gross tonnage ; net, 2,331.75 
 tons ; length, 389 feet ; breadth, 42 feet 1 inch ; depth, 28 feet 8 inches. 
 
 Her propeller is four-bladed, right-handed, with a, diameter of 20 feet, and a pitch 
 from 24 to 26 feet. The mean angle of its surface with a vertical athwartship plane 
 would be 21°, hence the streams would be delivered on an average at an angle of 21° 
 from the vertical fore and aft plane. ^ 
 
 Experiments were conducted on March S, 1877, in lat. 8° 50' S., long. 153° 58 E., 
 between 9.20 and 11.30 a. m., as follows : 
 
 Sea smooth, or between 1 and 2 of Beaufort scale ; ship drawing probably 24 feet 8 
 inches forward and 23 feet 8 inshes aft. 
 
 riKST EXPERIMENT. 
 
 Ship going ahead full speed (say 10 knots), engines were suddenly reversed, helm 
 put hard aport ; immediately the engines started, time noted, and bearing of ship's 
 head by standard Admiralty compass noted, and the bearing of the ship's head also 
 noted at every 15 seconds, until the ship came to a dead stop. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Interval. 
 
 Ship's head by 
 compass. 
 
 Head turned to- 
 
 
 Port. 
 
 Starboard. 
 
 
 h, min. sees. 
 9 20 7 
 
 9 20 22 
 
 9 20 37 
 
 9 20 62 
 
 9 21 7 
 
 9 21 22 
 
 9 21 37 
 
 9 21 52 
 
 9 22 7 
 
 9 22 22 
 
 9 22 37 
 
 9 22 52 
 
 9 23 7 
 
 9 23 22 
 
 9 23 37 
 
 m. sees. 
 
 IT. 62 W. 
 N. 62J W. 
 N.66 "W. 
 N.69 W. 
 N.78i W. 
 lf.77 W. 
 N.80 W. 
 N. 8it Vf. 
 N.88 W. 
 N.88 W. 
 N.87 W. 
 N. 85i W. 
 N.84 W. 
 N..82J W. 
 N. 79i "W. 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 
 04 
 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 44 
 
 34 
 
 34 
 
 4 
 
 34 
 stationary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 14 
 14 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 30 
 
 3 30 
 
 
 26 
 
 84 
 
 
 
 
 Ship came to a dead stop in 3 m. 30 sees., and turned to port 26° in 2 m., and then 
 to starboard 8i° for li m. 
 
53 
 
 SECOND EXPBEIMENT. 
 
 Ship going ahead full speed, say 10 knots. Engines suddenly reversed to full speed 
 astern ; helm put hard astarboard, bearing on ship's head taken, and time as before. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Interval. 
 
 Ship's head by 
 compass. 
 
 Head turned to — 
 
 Port. 
 
 Starboard. 
 
 A. Tnin. sees, 
 9 45 30 
 9 46 45 
 9 46 
 9 46 15 
 9 46 30 
 9 46 45 
 9 47 
 9 47 15 
 9 47 30 
 9 47 45 
 9 48 
 9 48 15 
 9 48 30 
 9 48 45 
 9 48 53 
 
 m. sees. 
 
 K". 3 W. 
 N.21 W. 
 N.41 W. 
 N . 494 W. 
 N. 374 W. 
 N. 324 W. 
 N.38 W. 
 N. 244 W. 
 N. 214 W. 
 N.28 W. 
 
 K.ia W. 
 
 N.19 W. 
 N. 5 W. 
 H". 24 W. 
 N. 2 W. 
 
 
 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 8 
 
 2 
 Stationary. 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 44 
 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 34 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 24 
 
 04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 23 
 
 3 23 
 
 
 2 
 
 39 
 
 
 Ship came to a dead stop in 3 m. 23 sees. Her head payed off to port 2° during the 
 first 15 sees., and afterwards turned to starboard 39° before coming to rest. 
 
 THIRD EXPERIMENT. 
 
 Ship going full speed ahead, say 10 knots, the engines suddenly reversed to full speed 
 astern the helm put amidships, the bearing of ship's head noted by azimuth compass 
 as before. Sea, wind, and weather as before. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Interval. 
 
 Ship's head by 
 compass. 
 
 Head tnrned to— 
 
 Port. 
 
 Starboard. 
 
 h. min. sees. 
 10 34 16 
 
 10 38 31 
 
 m. sees. 
 
 N. 294 E. 
 N.29 E. 
 N. 294 E. 
 1T.304 E. 
 K".32 B. 
 If.36 E. 
 lf.39 E. 
 N.44 E. 
 N. 464 E. 
 ir.48 B. 
 _ If. 504 E. 
 If. 514 E. 
 N.52 E.- 
 If. 534 B. 
 N.54 E. 
 N. 544 E. 
 If. 55' E. 
 ir.56 E. 
 
 
 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 
 04 
 
 
 04 
 
 1 
 
 li 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 24 
 
 14 
 
 24 
 
 1 
 
 04 
 
 14 
 
 Oi 
 
 04 
 
 04 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 15 
 
 4 15 
 
 
 04 
 
 27 
 
 
 Ship came to absolute rest in 4 m. 15 sees. 
 270 to starboard, before coming to rest. 
 
 her head turned to port 0|°, and then 
 
f)4 
 
 FOURTH EXPERIMENT. 
 
 In this case ship \y;is goiug full speed astern, say about 9 knots, when the engines 
 •were suddenly reversed to full speed ahead; helm put hard to port ; time and azimuth 
 of ship's head noted as before. Sea, wind, and weather as before. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Interval. 
 
 Sliip's head by 
 compass. 
 
 Head turned to — 
 
 Port. 
 
 Starboard. 
 
 h. min. sees. 
 11 3 11 
 
 11 5 56 
 
 m. sees. 
 
 S. 05i E. 
 S.66 E. 
 S. 07 E. 
 S. 67i E. 
 S. 67J E. 
 S. 66i E. 
 S. 65J E. 
 S. 63i E. 
 S. 60i E. 
 S. 57J E. 
 S. 53i E. 
 
 
 
 16 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 
 I5 
 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 
 Oi 
 1 
 
 Oi 
 stationary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 3 
 4 
 5i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 45 
 
 2 45 
 
 
 2 
 
 19i 
 
 
 Ship came to dead stop in 2 m. 45 sees., and her head turned 2° to port in the first 
 45 sees. , and 19^° to starboard in the next 2 minutes. 
 
 FIFTH EXPERIMENT 
 
 Making the circle from rest; hard to port; full speed ahead. Wind and sea as be 
 fore. 
 
 Ship started at full speed from absolute rest, with the helm hard aport, and at the 
 instant of starting an empty flour barrel was dropped from the stern, to mark the 
 point started from. 
 
 
 Time. 
 
 Interval. 
 
 Ship's head by 
 compass. 
 
 Arc turned. 
 
 
 h. min. 
 
 sees. 
 
 in. sees. 
 
 
 
 
 9 27 
 
 54 
 
 
 N. 56iW. 
 IT. 54 W. 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 24 
 
 1 30 
 
 2i 
 
 
 28 
 
 54 
 
 0. 30 
 
 N. 49 W. 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 K. 38 W. 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 28 W. 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 18 W. 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 5 W. 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 6 E. 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 19 E. 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 30 E. 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 43iE. 
 
 13i 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. .58 E. 
 
 I4i 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 N. 74 E. 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 U. 89 E. 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 75 E. 
 
 16 
 
55 
 
 Time. 
 
 luterval. 
 
 Ship'sbeadby 
 compass. 
 
 Arc turned. 
 
 h. min. 
 
 sees. 
 
 m. sees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 61 E. 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 46iE. 
 
 14i 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 83 B. 
 
 ]3i 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 20 E. 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 7i E. 
 
 12J 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 4J "W. 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 16i"W.' 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 30 W. 
 
 13i 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 45iW. 
 
 15i 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 61 W. 
 
 16i 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 S. 78JW. 
 
 17J 
 
 9 40 
 
 '54 
 
 30 
 
 N. 84 W. 
 
 17i 
 
 9 41 
 
 24 
 
 30 
 
 N. 07 W. 
 
 17 
 
 9 41 
 
 40 
 
 16 
 
 IS. 67 W. 
 
 10 
 
 13 
 
 46 
 
 13 46 
 
 
 Mean angular 
 velocity, 27' 
 per second. 
 
 
 Ship came outside barrel about 150 feet, wben it was abreast taffrail, t. e., 
 our starboard side at conclusion. 
 
 s VI. 
 
 it was on 
 
 Among the methods suggested to find the qualities of the turning 
 circle is one by Lieut. A. B. Wyckoff, U. S. I^., for determining the 
 drift angle and final diameter, which is as follows : 
 
 Have two cross-battens erected on tbe topgallant forecastle, and two observers — 
 one at the cross-battens and the other at the after end of base-line on the poop-deck. 
 At instant of putting helm over drop a buoy abreast cross-battens and note the time. 
 (See Plate V, Fig. 6.) When the vessel has turned through 90° drop a second buoy- 
 abreast cross-battens, and take the angles a and b subtended by the first buoy and 
 the opposite end of the base-line. Note the time when the second buoy comes abeam 
 (position 3) by the cross-battens, take angle z, subtended by the second buoy and the 
 forward end of base-line. Note time when ship has turned through 32 points. 
 
 PP 
 
 I = length of base line P' B 
 I sin J 
 
 sin n 
 pi ps =1 tang z 
 T Pi = P pi cos a 
 
 P^P-^ IT p.; 
 
 2 ^ 
 P^H' 
 
 E 
 P'P' 
 
 2 
 
 TT' = 
 
 Tang c = 
 
 E = 
 
 = drift angle 
 half final diameter. 
 
 VII. 
 
 In regard to the evolutionary powers of a vessel fitted with a steer- 
 ing propeller we propose to look a little into a type of vessel possessed 
 
56 
 
 by our JTavy— we mean the Alarm, Without discussing her con- 
 struction or engining, we will merely say that she has much to recom- 
 mend hef tactically: for instance, her great facility of turning; but 
 this quality, with any sort of steering propeller, must be at the expense 
 of speed. The action of the screw can be referred to any radius of a 
 circle, and therefore the vessel can be pushed or pulled in any direction. 
 Her motion indeed may he compared to a man standing between the 
 handles of a wheelbarrow, sinc§ her pivoting point is in the bow. 
 She will be comparatively safe from ramming in a single combat, since 
 she can keep her bow constantly on the enemy. She will be able to 
 ram an antagonist of greater speed, if he be fitted with a single screw, 
 as she can make the chord of the segment of a circle in turning, where 
 her adversary must run on the circumference. On a straight course, 
 however, a vessel of less speed can overtake the Alarm, from the • 
 fact that her speed is reduced by the eagerness with which she answers 
 her propeller, and the consequent reduction in the length of her for- 
 ward moment due to the screw not always acting in the direction of 
 her keel. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE SHIP IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 
 
 Most authorities agree that during au action the highest speed should 
 be maintained by the ship ; that speed is of even greater moment to a 
 ram than handiness or turning power, and that a powerful stern fire is 
 at least as important as a powerful bow fire. 
 
 It is a fundamental principle of warfare that in single combat a fast 
 ship need never be rammed by a slower one ; indeed, if the turning 
 powers are equal, the faster ship can always ram the slower one; and, 
 also, the enemy should always, if possible, be put in a position to lee- 
 ward of the attacking ship, so that the smoke from the guns and funnels 
 combined will blind him. It follows as a postulate that should a vessel 
 unfortunately be placed in this position, befogged with smoke, she should 
 stop firing, so as not to add to her difflculties. It may be observed, 
 however, that some of the best tacticians do not see in this leewardly 
 position all the disadvantages charged against it. 
 
 Lieut. G. E. Bethell, E. N., says, in regard to the speed to be main- 
 tained in action, that unquestionably vessels should be capable of the 
 very highest speed. There are cases, though, where slow speed will be 
 used ; as, for instance, two vessels running side by side, each would nat- 
 urally tend to slow and turn toward her adversary, as neither could 
 advisedly permit the other to enter her wake close astern. 
 
 II. 
 
 The increase in speed of ships, and the rapidity with which they will 
 move in future fights, obliges us to look to every means of increase in 
 the quickness of fire, so that we may hit the enemy as many times as 
 possible in a given time. Actually, a 27-centimeter gun can fire once in 
 three minutes under favorable circumstances, but in battle it will only 
 be fired probably once in four minutes. The limited amount of ammu- 
 nition that can now be carried raises the question whether very quick 
 fire will be resorted to and maintained. A sea-fight will probably last 
 such a short time and be so decisive that we think there should be no 
 limit to this rapidity. During a bombardment the vessels of a squadron 
 will have to be supplied by a regular ammunition supply-service from 
 
 57 
 
58 
 
 ammunition vessels. Some vessels have guns of such size that only 
 fifty rounds can be carried for each. A German authority believes that 
 ships of this kind are not fitted for the line of battle, and it may be added, 
 that the majority of professional writers agree with him on this point. 
 The precision of fire is of no less importance than the rapidity, the ne- 
 cessity of seizing the instant, generally very short, when you can get 
 your enemy in a position to strike him hard and with certainty must 
 not be lost, as projectiles are provided too few in number and are too 
 costly to be thrown away. 
 
 The probabilities in favor of striking the side of an ordinary armor- 
 clad of the first-class with a large calibered gun are about 95 in 100 for 
 2,200 yards ; 40 in 100" for 4,400 yards, and 15 in 100 for 6,500 yards, 
 supposing the pointing to be perfect and the only marring element to 
 be the motion of the ship. 
 
 Captain Eivet, of the French ISTa.vy, says that the precision of fire de- 
 pends upon the following : 
 
 1. Eelative movements of the two ships. 
 
 2. The smoke from the guns and funnels of your own and the enemy's 
 ships. 
 
 3. The pitching and rolling of the ship firing. 
 
 4. The uncertainty of the intervening distance. 
 
 5. The action of the wind. 
 
 6. The. state of the nerves of the firer, from his knowing that the in- 
 stant he discharges his battery the enemy will do the same. 
 
 The methods in use to measure distances are very imperfect, and the 
 variations of distances are very rapid, owing to the high speed of the 
 combatants. Rolling exercises its worst influence on covered-in guns. 
 It is recommended, in effect, as a general rule, not to fire a gun when 
 the ship is half way on a roll. Now, it may happen that the battery 
 may be concentrated beforehand on a point on a certain bearing, and 
 with a certain elevation, and when the enemy is at this spot the broad- 
 side should be fired ; but if at this instant the ship was at such a part 
 of her roll as to change the elevation the whole effect of the broadside 
 would be lost. 
 
 According to Captain Rivet the use of artillery in a naval fight can 
 be reduced to the following rules : 
 
 1. The fire of pieces from uncovered decks, or guns in barbette, should 
 be independent. Guns on covered decks should be fired by broadside 
 and concentrated tire used. 
 
 2. Barbette fire of the lighter guns should be directed by preference 
 at the decks, and at the non-protected parts of the ship. The battery 
 and heavy guns should be directed at the water line. 
 
 3. If the sea is heavy and the vessels are rolling deeply, the firing- 
 oflicer should carefully watch the motion when the enemy is on the brink 
 of arriving at the focus of concentration. 
 
69 
 
 4. As soon as tbe gun is laid the crew should cover. As soon as the 
 gun is fired it should be loaded, laid, and the crew should cover. 
 
 5. If the broadside battery has great power of penetration it is best 
 to fire each gun in succession. If the wind is ahead, commence aft. If 
 the wind is aft, commence forward. Keep, if possible, between the sun 
 and your adversary. 
 
 6. Guns should only be used when there is a probability of their pro- 
 ducing a serious effect on the enemy. 
 
 7. Machine guns and small arms on deck and aloft should fire on 
 those parts of the enemy where it is suspected the captain and controll- 
 ing officers are located, at semaphore stations on the deck, and at the 
 points where the electric lights are installed. 
 
 Besides heavy artillery, ships are furnished with lighter guns that at 
 most weigh four tons. In a fight the larger of the lighter guns will 
 aim at the non-protected parts of the ship and the screw. The smaller 
 of the lighter guns and the niachine guns will keep up a shower of pro- 
 jectiles, when near the enemy, on her decks ; or, if there is an attack 
 from the enemy's torpedo boats, these guns should drive them off. Ma- 
 chine guns and small-arms should be used from aloft. As a quantity 
 of small-arm ammunition will be used, there must be a regular force of 
 supply-men, who shall serve ammunition to the machine guns and 
 small-arm men from the small-arm magazine. 
 
 It may be suggested that the expanding quality of seed when wet 
 might be taken advantage of to stop shot-holes. A long canvas cylin- 
 drical bag might be made and used like a jackass, partially filled with 
 seed or grain. Until the seed has swelled a safety mat must be kept 
 over the aperture. It may here be mentioned that all vessels, at all 
 times, should keep one or more small hogging lines rove. 
 
 Ill . 
 
 The ram is the most formidable of all the weapons of the ship, and 
 its use re(iuires severe and prolonged practical study. The time has 
 come when a commanding officer must be as dexterous in the handling 
 of his ship as is a fencing-master in the use of his foil. 
 
 Lord Nelson said that there was only five minutes difference in time 
 between victory and defeat. Captain Rivet says with fast ships, such 
 as are used nowadays, for " five minutes " read " five seconds." 
 
 A great variety of opinion exists on the question whether vessels will 
 ram each other head on. Many good commanding officers say tliat they 
 would not hesitate to meet their antagonists in this way ; in fact their 
 decision is supported by the latest writers. As far back as ten years, 
 Captain Noel said : 
 
 If an enemy is observed to be approaching from ahead it seems to me that the only 
 chance of frustrating his attack is to keep your bow exactly on his, and so meet him. 
 
 There are, however, many others who say that such an action could 
 only result in mutual disaster, and that it should never be resorted to. 
 
60 
 
 In ramming, mechanical handling of the rudder, either by steam or 
 hydraulic power, is an absolute necessity. The engines should be 
 stopped before actual contact is made, and therefore the ship should be 
 fitted with engines, boilers, and pipe connections properly stayed and 
 arranged to ram an enemy, or to withstand a, ramming, without giving 
 way. 
 
 If your ship is a ram, and you are chasing an enemy, and you have 
 superior speed, do not keep iu his wake, as you might run on top of a tor- 
 pedo which he has thrown overboard. Keep a little on his quarter, and 
 as you draw well up on his broadside sheer iu to him as normally as 
 yon can, trying to destroy his screw and rudder. This is a good maxim. 
 (See Plate VI, Fig. 1.) 
 
 Since an engagement between two vessels is very likely to degenerate 
 into an artillery duel, each moving in the same direction around the 
 circumference of a common circle, each vessel should look out for tor- 
 pedoes dropped in the wake by the other. 
 
 If two ships intend to ram, and collide broadside to broadside at G (see 
 Plate VI, Fig. 2), and the A puts his helm hard aport and B his hard 
 astarboard, the ships will meet again at C and again at C. If, how- 
 ever, B's turning circle is smaller than A's in diameter, at O', B will be 
 inside of A's circle and safe from ramming at C". If the two vessels 
 put their helms each the same way when they collide, they will each 
 describe a circle and meet again at 0. 
 
 If the two vessels are steering around the same circle the faster ves- 
 sel may ram the slower in the stern. (See Plate VI, Fig. 3.) Or if one 
 vessel has greater facility of maneuvering, as, for, instance, a smaller 
 turning circle, she can ram the other on the quarter by steering a course 
 within the other's circle. (See Plate VI, Fig. 4.) 
 
 When one vessel is attacked by two she should never enter upon 
 circling, as one of the vessels could enter the lists with her and the 
 other could stand aloof and ram when an opportunity offered. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Automobile torpedoes can be installed so as to sweep from right 
 ahead to right astern, according as they are put in the bow, broadside, or 
 stern. A broadside installation, however, alone permits of any horizon- 
 tal train. At present, in the French service, the torpedo is discharged 
 above water. If they are discharged ahead, the pitching of the ship 
 disturbs the depth of immersion for some time in their flight. 
 
 Discharged from the side in even a moderately heavy sea, if the bow 
 of the torpedo strikes a wave, the torpedo will probably be altered in its 
 flight laterally. Discharged from the stern, the torpedo is acted upon 
 by the water stirred up by the screw. It is believed that an installa- 
 tion right ahead is the best for torpedoes, as it takes up less of the at- 
 tention of the captain in using them. The captain already has too much 
 to look out for in battle. 
 
61 
 
 In discharging automobile torpedoes from the bow, we will consider 
 the tube as being fixed in a fore-and aft line. Launching in this direc- 
 tion can be considered as extending the ram of the vessel some hundred 
 yards, as the torpedo during its flight can be counted upon to go in the 
 direction of the ship's head. There are no doubt times during an en- 
 gagement when a torpedo can be fired from this position with great suc- 
 cess. It has this drawback, however, in a stern chase a slight error in 
 the pointing of the head of the ship will make the torpedo miss the ob. 
 ject fired at. Added to this there is the possibility of running over 
 your own torpedo. This latter danger can of course be avoided by 
 having the torpedo sink at the end of its flight. 
 
 The best way to show the relation that should exist between the 
 attempt to use the torpedo and how to avoid it, is by tracing the move- 
 ments of the two ships. The question will be considered in three cate- 
 gories. 
 
 1. The course of A crosses the course of B, who for some reason does 
 not change it, but continues on. 
 
 2. The courses of the two ships are parallel and opposite. The attack 
 is made by a rapid sheer of one of the ships towards the other. 
 
 3. The enemy strives to avoid the attack by turning with his helm 
 hard over. 
 
 First Case. When the two paths cross. (See Plate VI, Fig. 5.) — A 
 has the greatest speed and intends to attack. If A is at JL and B at B, 
 A should ram B at A' (B then being at £')■ Since the torpedo is in the 
 fore-and-aft line of the ship, A would have to turn towards B to discharge 
 it. This A could not do and be certain to ram B at £'. The torpedo then 
 could not be used except just before contact. It may be well to state 
 here how A should steer with reference to B in order to ram him. A 
 knowing both ship's speeds, should keep a bearing on B.'s stern and not 
 change it. If A's speed is half again as great as B's, he should keep B 
 four points on his bow ; but as it is likely to be only one-tenth more, 
 he should then keep B about a point or a point and a half forward of 
 his (A's) beam. (See Plate VI, Fig. 5.) 
 
 Suppose, however, that A wishes to torpedo B. Since his torpedo 
 travels at a speed of 20 knots, and is available within 350 yards, he can, 
 when at a determinate point, A' (see Plate VII, Fig. 1), swing through 
 the calculated angle and discharge his torpedo; then he could swing 
 back again and head for the point where he knows that he can ram B, 
 or if he fails in reaching B can pass under his stern and give him a 
 broadside. In the figure, A at J. gets a line of bearing AB on B at £ 
 At A' A swings through the proper arc and discharges his torpedo, B 
 being at B', the torpedo and B should meet at x. B, if he escapes the 
 torpedo, might be rammed by A at B", A being then at A". If, how- 
 ever, B has arrived at B'", A cannot ram him, but must pass under 
 B's stern. 
 
62 
 
 Second Case. Courses parallel and opposite.— A and B are passing 
 on parallel courses 350 yards apart. (See Plate VII, Fig. 2.) A, wishing 
 to ram B, puts his helm hard a starboard and sheers to port. He will 
 ram B at x, but A cannot use his torpedo. B at B', however, bears slightly 
 to port and can use his torpedo on A, who will be at A', hitting A at y. 
 
 Third Case. Two vessels maneuver each to ram the other. — A, having 
 greater speed than B, could get within B's turning circle, and so have 
 him at a disadvantage. (See Plate VII, Fig. 3.) A could use his torpedo 
 at A', B being at B', which would strike B at .r. A can continue ou 
 and ram B at B" or can pass astern of B, and give him a broadside. 
 This case is an illustration of the maxim that, all else being equal, the 
 advantage remains with the ship having the greatest speed. 
 
 In case the torpedo is installed astern the best time to use it is when 
 the vessel, having missed ramming you, passes under your stern. Or 
 should two vessels be passing on opposite courses, B turns across A's 
 stern. A would stop and fire his torpedo with his head pointing iu 
 such a direction that it will reach B at B'. (See Plate VIII, Pig. 1.) 
 Then shifting his helm in the same direction as B, he starts ahead at 
 full speed and continues his circle. There is really no good reason why 
 he should continue to turn beyond a, unless he has greater speed than 
 B, as when he is at a B is at b, and any further turn brings A within 
 B's turning circle and puts him at a disadvantage as regards B. 
 
 Should the torpedo be installed in the side, the instant of discharge 
 will depend upon the speed of the two ships. It is of great importance to 
 discharge your torpedo so as to strike your adversary before he can fire 
 his concentrated broadside. The exact place of installation is really of 
 great moment, especially for distances close aboard. Probably the best 
 in broadside is as far aft as possible, as the great point is to have a tor- 
 pedo ready to prevent the enemy ramming you, which he will try to do 
 on the quarter. The discharging tube should admit of a train three 
 points forward of the been. 
 
 As an example of when the broadside installation is of greatest use, wo 
 suppose two vessels to steer courses that intersect, the slower one can 
 use his torpedoes on the faster at any time that the ships are within 
 350 yards of each other. In this case, also, tlie best point of installa- 
 tion would be as far aft as possible, as the slower vessel could always 
 turn from the faster vessel and have him in range as regards his tor- 
 pedo. (See Plate VII, Fig. 4.) 
 
 V. 
 
 Single combat. — The broadside fire is no longer the principal and 
 only power of attack ; still a fight will be opened by artillery, although 
 the ultimate design will unquestionably be to ram. The whole jtoiut 
 
 to strive for will be a commanding position — a position of advantage 
 
 using the guns to overcome the enemy, or torpedo if possible, and the 
 ram to give the coup de grace. 
 
63 
 
 We will suppose two rams identical in qualiiications are pitted against 
 one another. There will be some evolutionary sparring, a feeling of 
 one another, and then an arrival at one of the following positions referred 
 to shortly. 
 
 Admiral Eandolph, from whose work on Naval Tactics the following 
 cases are taken, does not believe that rams will meet each other .head 
 on. He thinks that they will pass in opposite directions close aboard, 
 exchanging broadsides. (See Plate VIII, Fig. 2.) 
 
 As they pass, A might turn with the utmost rapidity with his helm 
 hard aport across B's stern. If B at the same instant puts his helm 
 hard a-starboard, A at A<i, would have the power of passing ahead of 
 B, who would then be at Bi. A might then stoj) inside of B's circle ; or, 
 if B continued to circle, A might ram B at x. 
 
 All else being equal, the one which uses her helm quickest would get 
 to a safety point inside the other's turning circle. If B, however, after 
 passing astern of A at A^ [B^) were to slow also, and they were to be in the 
 position shown in Plate VIII, Pig. 3, then each could be said to be inside 
 the circle of the other, and the one which can by means of fore-and-aft 
 . sails, drags, or sternway get its head pointed fair at its opponent, has 
 the position of advantage and can ram. It follows then as a maxim 
 that the ship which first passes into the circle of the other has the 
 advantage. 
 
 Having examined the engagement from a ramming stand-point, we 
 will now consider it from an artillery view. 
 
 Broadsides have been fired when the vessels were abreast one another 
 on opposite parallel courses. At J.2, A fires his other broadside, B 
 being at B^, the ships being at close quarters. Instead of crossing B's 
 bows, A might be able to go astero of B. He might or might not be 
 able to give B a broadside, as that would depend upon whether he had 
 had time to reload his battery. 
 
 If, after the exchauge of the first broadsides, each ship turned across 
 the other's stern the result would be separation for more than two 
 diameters of their circles, and a renewed meeting end on. 
 
 If, instead of commencing the duel by exchanging broadsides, sup- 
 pose one of the ships endeavors to obtain by maneuvering some opening 
 advantage, and for this purpose when 1,000 yards off turns quickly in one 
 direction in the hope that the enemy will turn towards him in the same 
 direction, and instantly, after he has turned through i points, rights 
 and sbilts his helm, and, supposing his maneuver has induced the enemy 
 to circle, runs astern of his opponent, giving him a broadside in passing, 
 and immediately slows, he will then have the advantage of having 
 made the enemy feel his metal and will be inside his enemy's circle, 
 comparatively safe, and ready to ram. (See Plate VIII, Fig. 4.) A 
 yaws, and straightens up at ^b- B, misled, turns and receives a broad 
 side from A, when A is at A2 and B is at B^. Finally A, at A3, is 
 slowed and inside of B's turning circle. 
 
64 
 
 If B does uot change his course at B, but stands on, he will gi^e A 
 a broadside at B^, A being then at A^; then, if A turns astern of B, 
 he can finally get inside of B's turning circle at A^, but he will have 
 received B's other broadside when he is at B^ and A at Ac, but the 
 distance will be comparatively great. (See same plate and figure.) If 
 the ships have strong bow-fire this must be taken into consideration. 
 
 Still other tactics. (See Plate IX, Fig. 1.)— B may wish to try his 
 artillery first, and so alters course 5J points to port. A steers toward 
 him, and, if speeds were equal, there would be a collision at x. After 
 exchanging fire for some time, one or the other wishing to continue to 
 use artillery must keep away, which would finally end in a stern chase, 
 either straight away or both ships steering around a circle If this is 
 not the case, and they both steer to meet until their tactical circles 
 intersect, and both put their helms over simultaneously so as to turn 
 towards one another, they would meet bow and bow, without advantage 
 being to either. Here the faster ship might by a sheer pass astern of 
 the other, say A astern of B, and getting inside the other's circle have 
 the advantage; or, again, if they were very near and both had the 
 same speed one might slow for an instant and be able to ram the other. 
 Say B to ram A. (See Plate IX, Fig. 2.) 
 
 Captain Colomb, E. IST., in his work " On the attack and defense of 
 fleets," says it is a mistake generally made that vessels desirous of 
 ramming one another will head directly for one another. On the con- 
 trary, a vessel should keep the enemy on his bow, and put his helm 
 over to ram when the opposing vessel is a little less than 4 points on 
 his bow and 200 yards away. If he does so he will strike the other 
 vessel at right angles to his course. This supposes a speed of about 
 10 knots. 
 
 Vice-Admiral Bourgois, M. F., says, in speaking of single combats 
 between armored vessels, suppose two adversaries, steering straight 
 courses that intersect, are led to fall foul of one another. The proba- 
 bilities are that they will come together, scraping broadside to broad- 
 side, end for end. If they are equal in speed and tactical qualities 
 each vessel should come around under the stern of the other. If they 
 are unequal the vessel that has the greater speed should put her helm 
 over the same way as her adversary. Again,. the vessel that turns in 
 the smaller circle should put her helm the opposite way from her adver- 
 sary. To illustrate : If B has greater speed than A (see Plate IX, 
 Fig. 3), when A is at A', B will be at B', and in a better position to 
 ram than would A; or B can run inside of A's circle and be on a safety 
 point at B". But if A's turning circle is smaller than B's, by A putting 
 his helm as directed he has the advantage at A' over B at B'. (See 
 Plate IX, Fig. 4.) 
 
 Captain Fremantle, E. N., discussing the subject of single combat, 
 supposes the antagonists to be equal in power and in all tactical quali- 
 
66 
 
 ties. He says: "Our tactics are ramming tactics, and the enemy is 
 ready to meet us on our own ground." (See Plate IX, Pig. 6.) 
 
 A steers for the enemy B, keeping him a couple of points on the bow. 
 They are 2,000 yards apart. A intends to ram from the first, while B's 
 plan is not yet matured, but intends to use his guns and to ram A the 
 first time he makes a broad sheer. *B is willing to keep A on his bow 
 for this reason. They near one another, steering opposite and parallel 
 courses. Both going at full speed, they should meet in three miuutes. 
 Each keeps the other from 1^ to 2 points open on the bow. A intends 
 to fire one round from his bow gun and then ram. The gun is kept on 
 the enemy and laid for 900 yards. The instant B's masthead angle 
 shows that the vessels are separated that distance, A tires and puts 
 his helm hard aport. The smoke hides A for half a minute. If B 
 stands on for that length of time A will ram B probably effectually. If, 
 when A fires his gun, B shows for an instant and starts ahead again, B 
 would probably ram A. 
 
 Captain Colomb says, very truly, that the difference between ram- 
 ming and being raiumed lies in "half a ship's length." 
 
 Should B be wary and keep always head on to A they would of course 
 meet, but Captain Fremantle, although not believing that vessels will in- 
 tentionally ram one another head on, thinks that vessels will go so close 
 as to collide broadside to broadside, thus agreeing with Vice^Admiral 
 Bourgois : " Here would be a chance for a skillful captain to injure the 
 enemy's steering-gear and screw by a double movement of the helm." 
 
 Supposing A and B to be broadside and broadside, and each ship' 
 going at full speed, with A's helm hard astarboard and B's helm hard 
 aport, each would describe a circle, with the chances in favor of A 
 since A would be inside of B's circle and would have another chance to 
 ram. 
 
 If from the position of broadside to broadside each ship went ahead 
 at full speed, with helms hard astarboard, then the conditions would be 
 the same as when they bore down for each other at the first. 
 
 Should they agree to fight an artillery and torpedo duel after inef- 
 fectual ramming they would probably ultimately find themselves mov- 
 ing about each other around the circumference of a circle of 400 or 500 
 yards in diameter. Once in this position neither could use his ram ex- 
 cept by stopping or going astern, which would be extremely daugerous. 
 In these duels of the ram, gun, or torpedo, success should lie with the 
 fastest ship, other things being equal. 
 
 Lieutenant Bethell, in his work on two vessels in action, discusses the 
 most advantageous maneuvers that can take take place between two 
 adversaries in single combat. He draws attention to the environment 
 of one position, which he calls the " position of greatest danger," and 
 gives rules to follow to avoid it, and he further shows the importance 
 of turning power in a vessel. We propose now to take up the different 
 482 5 
 
66 
 
 cases which present themselves, and to examine into the position ot 
 greatest danger. 
 
 We consider two vessels, A and B, of equal tactical value, and it is 
 to be shown that one of them can, to a greater degree or lesser degree, 
 force the other to assume a disadvantageous position, and that this 
 locality may be termed the " danger-field." To escape from this en- 
 vironment requires certain tactics, which if not adopted, put the threat- 
 ened vessel in a constantly increasing position of danger, until she 
 arrives at a point called the " position of greatest danger," where her 
 destruction is imminent. (See Plate IX, Fig. 5.) 
 
 A is in this position as regards B: If A attempts to turn in order 
 to put himself on equal terms with B, B will ram him. A can only 
 use a weak stern fire ou B. B can keep up a powerful bow fire on A. 
 A has one advantage alone over B ; he can use his torpedoes better. 
 
 The danger field is the forward half of A's turning circle on either 
 side if A and B bear relatively as in the diagram. In order that A 
 shall clear the danger field and meet B on equal terms, the time that 
 it takes him to turn through the first two quadrants must be less than 
 the time it would take for B to get to him. The necessary distance can 
 be determined by A measuring B's masthead angle. 
 
 A can hardly escape, when having swung through, say, the first 
 quadrant, he runs off at right angles to his first course, for his pursuer 
 having only to move on the circumference of a larger circle has had 
 his speed but little reduced, and therefore arrives in A's wake nearer 
 to him than on the last course. In other words, unless A can shake 
 B off by superior speed, he only ^eZ;»s him by turning. (See Plate X, 
 Fig. 1.) 
 
 In a ramming duel, then, one vessel will try to force the other into 
 the danger field, and to the position of greatest danger in that field; 
 and the question arises how to avoid it for one, and how to force it on 
 the other. If two vessels are maneuvering, and one is unable to ap- 
 proach the other, the one has the advantage if he can get in the "wake 
 of the other within 400 yards. The pursued is, of course, safe as long 
 as he steers a direct course, but if he attempts to maneuver, he shortens 
 the distance between himself and the pursuer. By the pursued having 
 the advantage, is meant that the natural impulse of the pursued is to 
 fight, and the instant he turns he comes in the danger field. (See Plate 
 X,Fig.2.) 
 
 Another phase of this example : Suppose A wishes to close with B. 
 If he can force B into his wake at a distance that would take B longer 
 to traverse than it would A to turn her bow to B, then A could effect 
 his object, or if B continued to stand on and not turn A would have B 
 in her danger field. (See Plate X, Fig. 3.) 
 
 We will now consider an engagement between two vessels equal in 
 all respects, and steaming at a rate of 12 knots. Each vessel has a 
 diameter of turning circle of 500 yards which she executes in five min- 
 utes. 
 
67 
 
 The following formula seems to express what is incontrovertibly a 
 fact: 
 
 If one vessel is turning, and anotlier enters liis circle, then, if tlie latter vessel enters 
 on an opposite course to that of the turning vessel at the moment of entry, or is per- 
 mitted to come to an opposite course while inside the circle, the turning vessel is 
 momentarily on equal terms -with the other, and has the power of retaining that 
 equality by a proper use of the helm. 
 
 Case I. — A and B are passing 150 yards apart, steering opposite and 
 parallel courses. Each pats its helm over the same way, at the same 
 instant, so as to cross the other's wake. Result: They will come 
 around and be on equal terms. (See Plate X, Fig. 4.) 
 
 Oase II. — But if the helms are put different ways, say, A's to port, 
 and B's to starboard (see Plate X, Pig. 5), B will enter A's circle 
 at B' while A is at A'. B will have the advantage, being inside of A's 
 circle, and safe from A's ram, while B can use his. A should not at- 
 tempt to turn this way unless the perpendicular distaace A B, was so 
 great as to permit A to turn more than 16 points'Jbefore B can enter 
 his circle. In this case he would be on equal terms with B.- 
 
 Case III. — Suppose A, instead of putting'his helm either way, when 
 B began his circle, continued to stand on for^^one minute, and then piit 
 his helm over, he would flud that no matter which way he turned, he 
 could turn through more than 16 poiuts, and could therefore meet B 
 on equal terms ; for when he arrived at j/ or y' B would be at x or x'. 
 (See Plate XI, Fig. 1.) 
 
 It follows from these considerations that if two equal vessels are 
 passing one another close to, and maintaining the same speed it is im- 
 material, so far as gaining tactical] advantage is concerned, when they 
 elect to turn, with the exception of Case II, already discussed. 
 
 Now, as regards artillery, the two' vessels will exchange broadsides 
 in passing, but if A stands on, B has the advantage, as he can give A a 
 broadside at b or V, when A ,can only reply with a weak stern fire, 
 being then at A' or A" or A'". 
 
 Taking everything into consideration, however, we may lay down the 
 rule that two vessels passing, apart from unforeseen circumstances, it is 
 best for them not to delay turning. 
 
 If two vessels are separated in passing the diameter of a turning 
 circle no tactical advantage can be gained by either turning. This is 
 equally true if either stand on and elect to turn at a later time. It will 
 be seen, then, that although it is better to turn immediately on passing 
 your opponent, so as to get the advantage of fire, it is not vitally bad 
 tactics to delay doing so. 
 
 We come now to consider two vessels that are unequal either in speed 
 
 or turning power. 
 
 I. If two vessels engage,^andjinstead of being equal in all respects, 
 have unequal speeds, then' the slower of the two could not delay her 
 
68 
 
 turn, after her adversary had beguu to turn, without losing her x>osition 
 of equality. Conversely the faster of the two can turn when she wishes 
 -without sacrificing her advantage. 
 
 II. If two vessels engage, and instead of being equal in all respects 
 one has greater facility of turning than the other, the one which has 
 the smaller diameter of circle should turn immediately, as in one min- 
 ute, with a speed even of 12 knots, her advantage has disappeared, if 
 we suppose that her adversary had turned when she did and across 
 her stern. 
 
 III. But if this latter vessel, with the larger turning circle, does not 
 turn until later, and the one with the smaller circle turns immediately, 
 there will be no advantage of position for either vessel. 
 
 IV. If two vessels engage, and one turns quicker than the other, 
 then the one with the smaller circle increases her advantage for every 
 increase of distance from her adversary, when abreast one another, 
 untU such distance is equal to the diameter of the smaller turning 
 circle, when the quicker turning ship is at the position of greatest ad- 
 vantage, provided that her adversary crosses her wake in turning. If, 
 however, her opponent turns from her she loses part of her advantage 
 of position. (See Plate XI, Fig. 2.) 
 
 Therefore, not knowing which way the adversary will turn, the 
 quicker turning vessel should seek to pass close to the other, so as not 
 to risk losing any advantage. To illustrate : Let A in the diagram be 
 the vessel with the smaller circle. If A and B cross each other's wake, 
 A will enter B's circle at about a, and have the advantage, B being 
 then at b. If we suppose A and B to be apart a distance equal to A's 
 diameter of circle, that is, for A to be at A', we will see that the posi- 
 tion is still more advantageous for A, since when B is at 6 A will be at 
 a'. If, however, B turns the other way he will be at b' when A is at 
 a" or a'", and A will therefore have less advantage if he started from 
 A' than if he started from A. It will be noticed that the quicker turn- 
 ing vessel has the advantage, from an artillery stand-point, all through. 
 
 We come now to consider slower speed balanced by greater turning 
 potver. 
 
 A has 12 knots speed ; large turning circle, taking five minutes to 
 complete. 
 
 B has 10 knots speed ; small turning circle, taking three minutes to 
 complete. (See Plate XI, Fig. 3.) 
 
 I. If both ships are in the usual position of iiassing close to on op- 
 posite and parallel courses, and both turn with the helm the same way 
 and at the same instant, B will be able to get A in the danger-field ; 
 but probably before B can traverse the distance between them A will 
 have turned through enough points to be on an equality with B as 
 regards tactical position. B, however, will give A two broadsides for 
 one that he receives. 
 
 II. If B stands on, even for one minute, he loses any possible advan- 
 
69 
 
 tag© he might have reaped by an immediate turn. Conversely, if A 
 stands on for one minute or longer he will be clear of any possible dan- 
 ger from B's ram. Here, if B turns at B he will be at b when A is at 
 a, but A, being faster, might put himself on an equality before B trav- 
 erses the intervening distance. 
 
 If B stands on to B' before he tarns, he will be at h', when A is at a. 
 
 If A stands on to A' before turning, neither will have an advantage. 
 
 III. If B is pursued on a straight line by A, A having the speed 
 can in time overtake him. B turns to put himself on an equality with 
 A. If A can traverse the distance before B can turn through 16 
 points, he can ram B, so that B notwithstanding his turning power 
 must succumb to A, or turn before A gets within 600 yards of him. 
 
 IV. B must at all times endeavor to turn with his helm the opposite 
 way from A, when both turn on passing ; for the reason, by so doing 
 he gets inside of A's turning circle, where the poor quality of his speed 
 is least felt. 
 
 V. Should A pass B going in the same direction, B should try and 
 force him to turn, by feinting a ramming attack, aud thereby put A in 
 the danger-field by entering his turning circle. (See Plate XI, Fig. 4.) 
 
 For an actual fact, it would be very bad tactics for A. to take any 
 position forward of four points on B's quarter. His best position 
 would be astern of B, and out of B's wake. 
 
 Slow ships therefore should have heavy stern fire. 
 
 With ticin screws the turning circle btecomes smaller, and therefore 
 the advantage for B greater. A, the faster, should avoid turning until 
 two or three minutes after B, and should always put his helm the same 
 way that B has his. 
 
 Lieutenant Bethell is of the opinion, since rank turning with twin 
 screws represents a position of almost absolute rest, vessels should avoid 
 the excessive use of the maneuvering quality of their screws, as the 
 destruction of momentum is an advantage thrown away. 
 
 Lieutenant de Yaisseau Besson, of the French Navy, in discussing 
 the subject of an engagement between two vessels, equal in all tactical 
 respects, formulates the conditions in thirteen theorems. Some of these 
 have already been considered and some are suflftciently evident from an 
 inspection of the diagrams. Others will be explained. 
 
 Theorem 1. When two rams are in action, the first that enters the 
 turning circle of the other has the advantage. He can ram the other 
 or force him to run. (See Plate XI, Fig. 5.) A entering B's circle can 
 ram B. B cannot ram A at any point, as A is always in B's circle. B 
 to avoid being rammed must run. 
 
 Theorem 2. When a vessel enters the turning circle of another, in 
 order to ram, it is necessary that the assailant shall head within an 
 angle formed by a line which joins the two ships, and a tangent to the 
 turning circle of the adversary at the point of entrance. (See Plate 
 XII, Fig. 1) 
 
70 
 
 It will be seen that B enters A's circle at B. The distance GB is 
 equal AC, and from the fact that the ngnreoCo'B is a lozenge, the angles 
 o and o' are equal ; more than that, oG being parallel to o'B, is perpen- 
 dicular to AB, tangent to B for the circle o'. From these facts we con- 
 clude that the arcs A G and GnB are each equal to arc GmB, and are con- 
 sequently equal to each other. The two ships describing routes of equal 
 length, the collision will take place at C, to the advantage of B, he 
 slightly diminishing his speed to let A reach A slightly ahead. 
 
 To the extent that B has his head to the right of the line AB, just so 
 much smaller will be the arc that he ^ill have to traverse to ram A; of 
 course diminishing his speed to do this. He cannot be rammed by A, 
 since he is in A's circle. The limit of B's advantage is when his head 
 is in the line BD, when the two ships, turning in opposite directions ou 
 the same circle, and will meet head on at C. Should B's head lie to the 
 left of the liue A B, she will be inside A's turning circle and safe from 
 A's ram, but he cannot ram A, iis he will have to traverse a longer path 
 than A to meet on A's turning circle, which he cannot do, since their 
 speeds are taken as equal. If B's head lies to the right of the liue B D 
 he will have A in his turning circle and the case is reversed. 
 
 Theorem 3. — When a vessel, entering the turning circle of another, 
 has her head towards her adversary, and succeeds in ramming Mm, the 
 angle of contact is equal to the angle of the initial routes. (See Plate 
 XII, Fig. 2.) ' 
 
 The initial route is the relative bearing of B from A, or the angle in- 
 cluded between their courses, or the angle BAJBin the figure. To show 
 thtitBAU = HGK. 
 
 The initial route BAE — 900 — oAG 
 The angle of contact EC K=90° - o Gff. 
 
 The triangles o B G, o A G, o E G, are equal; so also the angles o A 
 G and o G E, consequently G A E = E G K. The best way therefore to 
 enter your adversary's circle is to have your bow on his middle point, 
 and at the same time on the center of his circle. The adversary then is 
 crossing your bows, and the angle of contact will be a right-angle. 
 
 Theoeem 4.— If two ships are too near to run directly at one another, 
 and are steering convergent courses, the advantage, at any instant, is 
 with the one which has the other bearing more on its bow. (See Plate 
 XII, Fig. 3.) 
 
 In the figure, A having B bearing more on its bow, has the advantage 
 from a ramming point of view. They are too near to suppose that B, 
 having a shorter distance to traverse to reach the intersection, will at- 
 tempt to run ahead of A. 
 
 Theorem 5. — The advantage of bearing is greater, the nearer two 
 vessels are together ; it ceases when their distance is greater thau five 
 times the radius of their turning circles. (See Plate XII, Fig. 4.) 
 
 The demonstration of the part of this theorem is evident. B has the 
 
71 
 
 best chauce to ram A at B, and less chance to ram A as he recedes 
 towards B', B", since B has a longer distance to go over. It will be 
 seen by Plate XII, Pig. 5, that A and B are six radii apart. B is in a 
 position most favorable to ram, and A is in the most unfavorable posi- 
 tion for being rammed. But A can turn through sixteen points and be 
 in a position of equality with B before B can reach her. 
 
 Thboeem 6. (This theorem refers only to the rules of the road and 
 has DO war value.) 
 
 Theorem 7. — When two rams pass broadside to broadside each 
 should turn towards the other in describing their circles [i. e., cross each 
 other's wake) when they will meet again under the same circumstances. 
 If they each turn with their helms the same way the one that is turned 
 toicards is at a disadvantage. 
 
 Theokem 8. — In passing broadside to broadside the maneuver to 
 turn under the stein of the other, should be commenced, as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 Theorem 9. — When two ships are together broadside and broad side, if 
 they have the same diameter of turning circle, tlie advantage will belong 
 to the one who is the fastest, that is to say, to the one who describes his 
 circle in the least time. 
 
 Theorem 10. — Two vessels close to, and broadside to broadside, 
 having turning-circles of different diameters, but whose circles are made 
 in the same time, the advantage will belong to the one that has the 
 smaller circle. 
 
 Theorem 11. — When two rams are close to, and broadside to broad- 
 side, and on opposite courses ; one turning quicker from greater speed, 
 and the other having a smaller diameter of circle, the advantage will 
 belong to the one with the greater speed, if each turns under the stern 
 of the other, and to the one with the smaller circle if they turn with their 
 helms different ways. 
 
 Theorem 12. — Two ships passing broadside to broadside, on opposite 
 and parallel courses, and close to, describing with helms in the same 
 direction like turns, there exists a point which does not change, and 
 which is the only point where they can meet. (This point is hard to 
 determine, and the demonstration is not here entered into.) 
 
 Theorem 13. — The quickest method of approaching another ship is 
 to keep your bow pointed towards him. 
 
 VI. 
 
 In the action between the Esmeralda and the Huascar, and the Inde- 
 pendencia and the Covadonga, in the Chile-Peruvian war, although 
 nothing new in the way of naval tactics was developed, still the weaker 
 vessels were handled with great strategical skill by their captains, who 
 no doubt would have shown, had their commands been equal in any 
 way to those of their antagonists, an intimate knowledge of the maneu- 
 vering of vessels, and the employment of their tactical qualities in an 
 
72 
 
 engagement, which indeed might have taught us some new lessons in 
 this science, as brilliant perhaps as were the records of these officers 
 for nerve, daring, and pluck. Lieut. T. B. M. Mason, United States 
 Xavy, tells the story as follows: 
 
 During the niglit of May 20-21 the Huascar," Captain Gran, senior officer, and the 
 Indepeiidencia.t Capt. J. G. Moore, touched at Pisaguato make sure of the absence of 
 the Chilian iron-clads. Being reassured, they continued on, and at daylight on the 
 morning of the 21st, were seen approaching Iquiqui. 
 
 As soon as Commander Arturo Prat, senior officer, commanding the Esmeralda, f 
 made out the enemy, he signaled to Commander Carlos Condell, commanding the Cova- 
 donga, to take position in his wake, and these two small vessels prepared for action. 
 It was doubtless the purpose of Prat, from the first, to tight, though the disparity 
 of force was so great. He could not escape on account of his low speed, but he would 
 not have been much blamed by the world at large if he had destroyed his ships, sur- 
 rendering himself and his crews, or if after a few shots he had surrendered all. But 
 Prat was not the man to take advantage of either of these methods of saving life. 
 
 "The iron-clad single- turret ram Huascar: length, 196 feet; beam, 35 feet 6 inches; 
 depth of hold, 21 feet; free-board, 4 feet 6 inches; draught forward, 15 feet — aft, 16 
 feet; displacement, 1,130 tons; indicated horse-power, 1,200; coal capacity, 300 tons; 
 turning capacity, through 180°, 2 minutes 0.3 seconds; maximum speed, 11 knots. 
 Armament : Two 10-inch Vii ton 300-pounder muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, mounted 
 in a revolving turret, placed forward. This turret is on Captain Coles's plan, being 
 supported on rollers, and revolved by hand-gearing. The exterior diameter is 22 feet. 
 Owing to a top-gallant forecastle forward, and the conning tower and stationary bul- 
 warks aft, the turret guns command onJy 138'- of the horizon; that is, from 10° on 
 either side of the bow-line to 32° on either side of the stern line. Two 40-pounder 
 muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, one on the starboard quarter-deck and one in the 
 stern; one 12-pounder muzzle loading Armstrong on the port quarter deck. These 
 light guns are all mounted on wooden Marsilly carriages. Armor: The side arniur, 
 extending 3 feet 6 inches below the load-water line, has a thickness of 4-J- inches 
 abreast the turret chamber, fire and engine rooms, diminishing to 2^ inches at the 
 bow and stern. This is backed by 10 inches of teak and an inner iron skin -i-ineh 
 thick. The bow is re-enforced and shaped for ramming. The decks are protected by 
 2-inch plates. The spar-deck terminates forward in a small top-gallant forecastle, 
 about 6 feet high, on which the anchors are secured, and in an open poop aft. 
 
 tThe iron-clad ram frigate Independencia, built by Samuda, at Poplar on Thames, 
 England, in 1864. Hull, iron; displacement, 2,004 tons; machinery by John Penn & 
 Sons, old type; indicated horse-power, 1,500; maximum speed' on trial, April 27, 
 1879, 12 knots ; coal capacity, 400 tons ; armament, two 150-pounder muzzle-loading 
 Armstrong rifles on spar-deck pivots ; twelve 70-pounder uiuzzle-loading Armstrong 
 rifles in broadside, on a clear gnn-deck. To this, at the outbreak of the war, were 
 added one 250-pounder muzzle-loading Vavasseur rifle on pivot in bows; one 150- 
 pounder muzzle-loading Parrott rifle on pivot in stern. Armor, 4^ inches thick at 
 water-line, and about central part of battery, backed by 10 inches of teak. Bow 
 strengthened and shaped for ramming. Condition: hull good; boilers new. Rig, 
 ship. 
 
 tThe sloop of war Esmeralda, built in England in 1854. Hull, wood; length 
 between perpendiculars, 200 feet; beam, 35 feet; draught, 14 feet; tonnage, old meas- 
 urement, 850 tons; engines, simple, old type; nominal horse-power, 200; screw, 
 single and lifting; speed, 3 knots; rig, ship; armament: original, eight 40-pouuder 
 muzzle-loading Armstrong rifl&s, in broadside, increased to fourteen 40-ponnder muz- 
 zle-loading Armstrong rifles, broadside ; crew, 160 men ; condition of hull, old and 
 rotten ; lAjilera, very old and almost unserviceable. 
 
73 
 
 Born April 3, 1848, lie was still a very young commander. He had been a marked m.iu 
 in his service, having held positions of the greatest trust; by his conduct in the cap- 
 ture of the Covadouga and in quelling a serious mutiny on board the Peruvian corvette 
 Union he had gained a reputation for gallantry; by being selected more than once as 
 an iustnictor in guunery at the naval school he had proved his theoretical proficiency 
 in that all-important branch of study. Was this young senior ofScer fitted by his ante- 
 cedents to surrender ? The answer to this question is his conduct in the engagement 
 which was about to take place — a light that astonished the naval world; which estab- 
 lished the preci?dent tliat, no matter what the odds be, vessels must be fought to the 
 last, and which, on account of the intelligence and intrepidity that characterized it, 
 and on accouut of the harm that was actually done to the powerful opponent, de- 
 serves a whole page in the records of fame. 
 
 It was a curious combination of circumstances that brought Grau and Prat together 
 in deadly combat, both to die, sword in band, in the heat of combat, within a few feet 
 of the same spot on the deck of the Huascar, each being at the time of his death the 
 senior ofiScer of an immensely inferior force contending nobly against great odds. 
 
 At 8 a. m. the Huascar tired a shot that struck between the two Chilian vessels, and 
 the action immediately became general ; the Huascar singling out the Esmeralda, and 
 the Independencia the Covadonga. The Chilian transport Lamar, which was also in 
 port when the enemy was sighted, was sent off to the southward and took no part in 
 the fight. After the firing had been going on for an hour, at distances varying from 
 2,000 yards to, perhaps, 1,000, the Covadonga steered to the south, the ludejiendencia 
 following her closely. 
 
 The Esmeralda remained in Iquiqui Harbor, fighting the Huascar. By this time the 
 Peruvian soldiers had dragged a field battery to the beach, and opened fire at dis- 
 tances not exceeding 400 or 500 yards. Thus, with the 300-pounders of the Huascar 
 on one side, and a field battery ou the other, the Esmeralda was forced to abandon 
 her position near the shore, which she had taken to avoid a ram attack from the 
 enemy, and go farther out in the bay. The time when this occurred, and that at 
 which the Huascar first rammed, has not been fixed satisfactorily; but it could not 
 have been far from half "past ten, two hours and a half after the beginning of the 
 fight. It appears that Captain Grau was deterred from ramming by the fear of torpe- 
 does, which he supposed were placed around the Esmeralda; and he rammed only 
 when the latter vessel was driven from the p'ace which she had first occupied, by the 
 fire of the field battery on shore. The defense of the Chilian vessel would have lasted 
 a much longer time if the fight had been decided entirely by the guns. The Huascar 
 kept up a fire from all her guns for four hours, and during this time must have fired 
 at least forty shots from her two 300-pouuders ; yet it is recorded that only one of 
 these shots struck the enemy. This shot passed through the side, hurst in the engine- 
 room, and killed every one of the engineers, besides disabling the engine. The reply 
 of the Esmeralda was most effective, as is testified by Captain Grau; hut musketry 
 and 40-ponnd shot are no match for 7-inch armor. Captain Grau is in error when he 
 speaks of the mitrailleuse fire of the Chilians, in his report; neither the Esmeralda 
 nor the Covadonga had machine guns of any kind. The Huascar had one long Gat- 
 ling. 
 
 When the Esmeralda came out in the bay Captain Grau determined to ram her. 
 In the first attempt, the Huascar, steaming about 8 knots and steering NE., struck 
 the Esmeralda, nearly motionless and heading N., on the port quarter. The Huas- 
 car's engine was stopped when she was about one ship's length from her adversary. 
 The blow was harmless. Captain Prat, followed by one man only, gallantly sprang 
 on the forcastle, and, sword in hand, rushed aft on the port side of the deck, and was 
 tilled by a musket-ball at the foot of the turret. The command now devolved on 
 Lieutenant Serrano. The Huascar backed off and made at the Esmeralda again, 
 this time heading S. ; the Chilian vessel presented her bow : the Huascar's engines 
 were stopped too soon, and she struck the starboard bow of the enemy, doing little 
 
74 
 
 or no damage. Again a boarding party, headed by the commanding officer, Lieuten- 
 ant Serrano, leaped on the Huascar's deck, but only to be shot down. The third at- 
 tempt of the Huascar was better conducted. The head of the Chilian vessel had 
 fallen off to W., and Capt;iin Grau, steering S., going full speed, and stopping his en- 
 gines when 20 feet from the Esmeralda, struck his adversary squarely on the star- 
 board beam. The Esmeralda sank with her colors flying and guns firing. 
 
 The Covadonga,* meanwhile, was doing all that seamanship and courage could dic- 
 tate to get away from her huge pursuer. She led along close to the shore, crossing 
 shofll places, and actually, at times, almost in the breakers. The -Independencia, 
 with her raw, unskilled gunners, conld not hit the little craft, though the vessels 
 must have been within 200 yards of each other several times. Captain Moore, fear- 
 ing that he could never end the affair with his guns, determined to ram ; this he tried 
 three times, and failed to accomplish. The third attempt was made at Punta Grueso, 
 at a time when the Covadonga was not 100 yards from the beach and had actually 
 touched on the reef. Steering about S.SE., the Independencia aimed an oblique blow 
 at the C'ovadonga's starboard quarter, and, missing her enemy, struck a rock and 
 stuck fast. It appears from the reports of both captains, Moore and Condell, that 
 the helm of the Peruvian .ship was not ported early enough to prevent her going 
 ashore, because a .shot from one of the Covadonga's 70-pound6rs killed her helmsman. 
 The only steering-wheel of the Independencia was the ordinary one on deck. 
 
 It must have been 11.45 a. m. when the Independencia t struck. Captain Con- 
 del), seeing at once the state of affairs, turned his vessel, and, passing along the 
 starboard side of the enemy, coolly took his position astern of him and began to fire. 
 It has been asserted that the Independencia's ensign was hauled down aud a flag 
 of truce hoisted, on account of the deliberate fire of the enemy aud her inability to 
 return it, having fallen over on her starboard si<le, iind her lower part having filled 
 with water. To add to the discomfiture of those on board, a shell from the Cova- 
 donga, or an accident, set fire to the after part of the vessel. 
 
 Immediately after the surrender of the Independencia, and before she was taken 
 possession of, the Huascar, which, having sunk the Esmeralda at 12.10 p. m., had re- 
 mained to pick up the survivors of her crew, came around the western end of the 
 island which forms the south side of Iquiqui Bay. She was about 10 miles off. aud 
 the Covadonga, having evidently disposed of the Independencia, was steaming rap- 
 idly away. The Huascar, after speaking her stranded consort to .ascertain whether 
 there was any immediate danger to the life of the crew, resumed her pursuit of the 
 Covadonga. This pursuit lasted until dark, when Captain Grau, seeing that there 
 were still 10 miles between him and the chase, and probably uneasy about the 
 enemy's iron-clad's, whose position was imknowu to him, gave up the pursuit and 
 returned to the Independencia. This vessel it was clearly impossible to save, and 
 she was set on fire and burned. 
 
 Nothing could have been better than Prat's plan of action. First remaining sta- 
 tionary in a corner between the island aud the shore, he limited the field of his 
 adversary's maneuvers to ram, conveying also the idea that he was protected by those 
 terrors of modern naval warfare, torpedoes. This impression was rendered doubly 
 certain in Captain Grau's mind by the report of the Peruvian captain of the port of 
 Iquiqui, who managed to get aboard the Huascar in his boat. Again, by assuming 
 this position, he reduced Grau to the painful necessity of sending his shell, at moder- 
 ately short range, directly towards the town which was occupied by his own country- 
 
 *The gunboat Covadonga, captured from the Spaniards in 1866 by the Esmeralda. 
 Tonnage, old measurement, 412; engines, old style, 140 horse-power; .single screw; 
 maximum speed, ?> knots; rig, three-masted topsail schooner; condition, hull poor; 
 engines and boilers poor; armament, two 70-pounder muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, 
 on pivot carriages. 
 
 t See note on page 72. 
 
75 
 
 men. When forced by the fire of the shore guns, more dangerous, at that short range, 
 against his wooden walls than the 300-pouuders of theiron-(;lad, he hugged the shore 
 as closely as possible, keeping up a heavy, -well-directed fire from his guns of all 
 kinds, how well directed the condition of the Huascar after the fight clearly showed. 
 One shot entered the turret through one of its ports, and alter balloting about con- 
 siderably, came to rest without injuring any one. Had this been a shell it migt-t 
 have entailed considerable loss. Other shots cut the tripod foremast nearly away; 
 so insecure did it become that Captain Grau feared that it would fall, iu which case it 
 would probably jam the turret. When the ramming began Prat called away his 
 boarders, and, as already stated, actually succeeded, with one sergeant of marines, in 
 reaching the enemy's deck. Had the contact been of longer duration he would have 
 succeeded, probably, in transferring his crew to the decks of the Huascar with a very 
 fair chance, according to Capiaiu Grau himself, of capturing the vessel, as the crew 
 was, with very few exceptions, very much demoralized. Serrano's attempt failed 
 from the same cause. When the Huascar did finally succeed in sinking the Esmeralda, 
 which was then little more than a stationary target, she injured her own bow so se- 
 verely that extensive repairs were necessary. The musketry fire of the Esmeralda 
 was so well sustained that it was thought that she was provided with machine guns. 
 
 Condell could not have done better with his little ship. That he followed the cor- 
 rect tactics iu keepiug close to the shore was proved by the results. His artillery 
 fire, which was continued throughout the chase, was so excellent that he dismounted 
 the heavy bOw pivot of the Independencia before it had succeeded in sending more 
 than one shot into him. What the eifect would have been if this had not occurred 
 may be imagined from the fact that this shot entered the starboard quarter, raked the 
 whole length of the ship, and passed out on the port bow. The other two guns, 
 being protected by iron plating, continued to fire, with but moderate results, owing 
 to the want of training of the guns' crews. The small-arm fire of the Covadonga 
 kept the enemy's crew below and killed the three helmsmen at the critical moment, 
 according to Captain Mooie, who, like Captain Grau, mistook it for machine-gun fire. 
 
 It was thus that Captain Prat's speech made to his offlcers and crew before the 
 fight was carried out in its fullest details. Had the results of the action been dift'er- 
 ent it might have passed for bombast ; as it is, it becomes a fitting text for the naval 
 students of the future : 
 
 " Children, the odds are against us. Our flag has never been lowered in the pres- 
 ence of the enemy ; I hope that it will not be to-day. As long as I live that flag 
 shall fly in its place, and if I die my ofHcers will know how to do their duty." 
 
 Captain Moore was placed under arrest and kept a close prisoner on the Moro at 
 Aiica. The two 150-pounders of the Independencia were afterwards raised by th& 
 Peruvians and taken to Iqaiqui. 
 
 This action, of course, raised the blockade of Iquiqui,and about 4,000 troops, Bo- 
 livians and Peruviaus, were thrown into the place, which was visited also by Gen- 
 eral Prado. 
 
 The Huascar was considerably injured in the action, her tripod mast was so much 
 damaged that it had to be removed on her return to Callao, her bow leaked from 
 broken plates, and her turret was slightly out of line. She continued her cruise^ 
 however, to the southward. At Antofagasta she exchanged shots with the Cova- 
 donga, that lay inside of the reef, and was supported by three ISO-pounders mounted 
 in sand batteries along the face of the town. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Two SHIPS AGAINST ONE. — It may seem strange at first sight to 
 suppose that now-a-days one vessel would attempt to cope with two- 
 nearly her size, but in reality the two ships must work together, and 
 be at all times alive to succor one another to compel victory to rest 
 
76 
 
 with them ; for the siugle ship iniglit steer down on one of the two 
 advancing against h%r, close together and in line abreast, and when at 
 the proper distance put her helm over and ram one, giving the other a 
 broadside. Now, if the one first headed for and to whom she gave her 
 first broadside was to attempt to ram her assailant the chances are 
 that she would run foul of her consort. 
 
 Admiral Kandolph says the proper course for the two ships to pur- 
 sue when the enemy's single ship is bearing down on them is to form 
 on a line abreast, with one ship's stern in a line with the other ship's 
 bow and two cables apart. They should endeavor to keep the single 
 ship between them. The idea of the line of bearing is, not only are 
 the two ships' gun-fire more eflectively arranged, but in case the single 
 ship essays to ram one of the two ships the other ship can put her helm 
 ■over to ram the rammer, without anything like the same danger there 
 would be in an exact line abreast of running into her consort. At least 
 this is Admiral Eandolph's opinion. 
 
 There are several other ways that the consorts might arrange them- 
 selves, as in line ahead, or one might keep out of the fight until the 
 other two were engaged, either in an artillery duel or in a ramming 
 contest, and then could enter the fight and liolp her friend. 
 
 If circumstances should serve, that is, if there was plenty of smoke, 
 which interfered more with the two than it did with the single ship, it 
 would be good tactics for the single ship if she could keep outside of 
 the two — outflank them in other words — to give one a broadside in 
 passing and sweeping up under the stern of the other enter her turning 
 «ircle. 
 
 We will consider A the single ship, and Bi and Bj the consorts. 
 
 Plate XIII, Fig. 1, shows how A should act. 
 
 Plate XIII, Fig. 2, shows how Bi should run for A if he attempts to 
 ram B2, and, in case B2 escapes ramming, how Bi and Bj must take 
 «are not to collide. 
 
 Plate Xlil, Fig. 3, how Bi and B2 should act in case A acts as before. 
 As soon as A's ramming maneuver is detected, B2 should put his head 
 on A and slow, Bi should ram A, and B2 should turn astern of the 
 contestants after the collision had occurred. 
 
 Plate XIII, Fig. 4, shows the danger, according to Admiral Eandolph, 
 of line abreast and being close together. Either all three will meet at 
 one point, or else Bj and B2 will collide. 
 
 Plate XIII, Fig. 5, shows how, in case A can outflank the consorts, 
 he may force them into danger of collision. 
 
 Captain Fremantle says that the best way for one vessel to fight two, 
 is to try and get them in line ahead, and that the best way for two 
 vessels to engage one is to keep generally abreast and far enough sepa- 
 rated to prevent the movements of one from interfering with the other. 
 The two vessels should strive to keep the single vessel between them, 
 and on their bows. 
 
77 
 
 VIII. 
 
 To illustrate an engagement of one vessel with two others, we cite 
 the combat between the Peruvian monitor Huascar and the Chilian 
 iron-clads Blanco-Encalada and Almirante Cochrane. The account is 
 taken from Lieut. T, B. M. Mason's work on the operations of the war 
 between Chili and Peru : 
 
 The Chilian squadron at Mejillones having coaled, put to sea during the night of 
 the 7tli in two divisions ; the first, uuder Commodore Eiveros, consisted of the 
 slower vessels, Blanco, Covadonga, and Mathias Cousino, left at about 10 p. m., and 
 steered down the coast towards Antofagasta ; the secoud, uuder Commander Latorro, 
 consisted of the Cochrane, O'Higgins,* and Loa,left at about 1 a. m. of the 8th, with 
 orders to cruise 25 miles on and off Point Angamos. This was done in* accordance 
 ■with telegraphic instructions from the director of the war, and differed slightly from 
 the original plan of the commodore, who intended to have moved south along the 
 coast in similar divisions, the first division skirting the coast and looking in at the 
 bays, while the second stood in the same direction but farther off shore, and about 40 
 miles on the starboard quarter of the first. Either of these plans would probably 
 have entailed the same results. Thus it was that, at 3.30 on the morning of October 
 8, the weather being fine and clear, the lookout in the Blanco's top reported the 
 smoke of two Vessels approaching from under Point Tetas, distant about 6 miles. 
 At daylight the enemies recognized each other. The Huascar ran for an hour to the 
 southwest at full speed, making about lOf knots with sixty revolutions and an aver- 
 age pressure of 25.5 pounds of steam, the Blanco and Covadonga following, making 
 about 7^ knots. The Mathias Cousino was sent in towards Antofagasta, but later 
 turned to the northward and followed her consorts. Commodore Eiveros saw imme- 
 diately that the chase was hopeless ; still, on the chance of an accident to the ma- 
 chinery of the Huascar or her consort, or of their turning to the northward and 
 being cut off by the second division, he determined to continue it. 
 
 It has been asked, and with good Reason, whether the results of the battle might 
 not have been different had the Peruvian ships engaged the Chilians at this time. It 
 Is true that the Union was a much more powerful vessel than the Covadonga, and 
 that both she and the Huascar had a great advantage in speed. When, however, 
 we consider that the Admiral's orders were very explicit, and wisely so, that he should 
 run no risks with his ships, as the loss of the Huascar would give the Chilians the 
 command of the sea, it does not seem strange that he should have attempted to escape. 
 Admiral Grau, finding that he was rapidly distancing his pursuers, turned to the 
 northward at about 5.40, and eased his engines by reducing the revolutions to fifty- 
 three. Having been on deck all night, he now lay down for some much needed rest. 
 At about 7.15 smoke was seen, from the Huascar, on the horizon to the northwest, 
 and at 7.30 she having stood slightly to the westward to reconuoiter, the Cochrane t 
 
 * The corvette O'Higgins, wooden hull, built in England in 1867. Length between 
 perpendiculars, 217 feet ; beam, 35 feet ; mean draft, 15 feet 9 inches ; displace- 
 ment, 1,670 tons ; engine.s, simple, old type ; screw, single and liftin'g ; speed, 8 to 10 
 knots- rig, ship; armament, three 7-ton muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, on pivot 
 carriages- two 70-pounder muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, in broadside; four 40- 
 pounder muzzle loading Armstrong rifles, broadside ; number of crew, 160 men ; con- 
 dition, hull fair ; boilers very old and poor. 
 
 tThe armored box-casemated, sea-going rams Almirante Cochrane and Blanco En- 
 calada. Leu o-th between perpendiculars was 210 feet ; beam, 45 feet 9 inches ; draught, 
 forward, 18 feet 8 inches— aft, 19 feet 8 inches ; height of battery above water-line, 5 
 feeteinches; displacement, 3,560 tons; engines, two pair, compound, horizontal trunk ; 
 horse-power, 2,960; screw-propellers, 2; speed, measured mile, 12.8 knots. 
 
 The armament consists of six 9-inch 12-ton muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, mounted 
 
78 
 
 and her consorts were recognized. The Huasoar was seou at about the same time 
 from the Cochrane's top, and the Loa was sent to reconnoiter. Admiral Grau, -who had 
 now come on deck, probably felt confident that he could elude the Cochrane, as her 
 speed, according to the latest information in his possession, was only 8 knots, and 
 stood for a short time towards the Loa. Finding, however, that the Cochrane was 
 changing her beariuus more rapidly than he had anticipated, he stood more to the 
 east, and ordered full speed. The Union, which had remained on the Huascar's port 
 quarter, now, at about 7.45, crossed her stern and passed to starboard of her at full 
 speed. From this moment this vessel, itis alleged, by order of the Admiral, made the 
 best of her way to Arica, followed until dark by the O'Higgins and Loa. The con- 
 duct of these three ccramianding officers has been much commented upon; the first 
 for not engaging, the others for not continuing the pursuit. The three iron-clads 
 were now aljout 8,000 yards distant from each other. Grau saw that his only chance 
 of escape lay in his speed. At 9.10, as the Cochrane had approached to within less 
 than 4,000 yards, and it was evident that she could cross his bows, he ordered the 
 crew to quarters, and shortly afterward entered his couning-tower alone. In going 
 to quarters an accident occurred in shifting the lead from the ordinary steering-wheel 
 
 on Scott muzzle-pivoting carriages, in a central-box battery, with double re-entering 
 forward and after jiorts, this arrangement permitting the forward gun on each side a 
 train from right ahead to abeam, the central gun from 70° forward of the beam to 35° 
 abaft the beam, and the after one from abeam to right astern. Each ship carried, 
 besides, one '.30-pounder, one 9-pounder, and one 7-pounder. The Blanco Encalada 
 carries two 1-inch ^-pounder Nordenfelt machine guns, one on each end of the bridge, 
 and the Almirante Cochrane one mounted on the knight-heads forward. After the 
 battle of Angamos several Hotchkiss revolving guns were added to the armaments for 
 use against torpedoes. 
 
 In addition to these light guns 12 picked riflemen in action are stationed in the fore 
 and main tops, protected from observation by screens. The battery is 7^ feet high, 
 the armor is in two strakes, the lower of which is 8 inches and the upper 6 inches 
 thick on the sides and forward part, while on the after part both have a uniform 
 thickness of 4^ inches. The armor is backed by about 14 inches of teak, inside of 
 which is a thin iron skin. The armored transverse bulkheads forming the forward 
 and after ends of the casemate extend below the water-line. The iron double- 
 bottomed hull is divided by seven water-tight transverse bulkheads, and is protected 
 around the water line by an armor-belt 9 feet wide in three strakes. The middle 
 strake is 9 inches thick amidships, while the other two are 6 inches, all of them taper- 
 in"' to a uniform thickness of 4^ inches at bow and stern. The teak backing behind 
 the armor-belt has an average thickness of 10 inches, and the whole of the armor and 
 backing is fastened to a double thickness of skin plating, supported by massive angle- 
 iron frames on the inside and longitudinal angle-iron guides on the outside. The upper 
 deck, which is flush with the upper edge of the armor-belt, is protected by 3 inches 
 of armor near the casemate and 2 inches at the bow and stern. The casemate over- 
 hangs the side about 3 feet. » 
 
 It is reported tl^at these vessels when in good condition make 10 knots per hour on 
 a coal consumption of from 30 to 35 tons per day. Their coal-bunker capacity is 254 
 tons. They are bark-rigged and have a complement of 300 men. They can fire their 
 n-uns by electricity, and their steam laxinches, of ordinary type, are fitted to carry 
 spar torpedoes. Beside its regular armament each carries a rocket tube and rockets. 
 Nei ther is fitted for torpedoes. 
 
 The stem is a solid casting, ram-shaped, and strengthened by backing and bracing. 
 The ram extends 7 feet 6 inches beyond the bow, and the point is 6 feet 9 inches below 
 the water-line. Condition of the hulls, good; Blanco's bottom very foul ; Cochrane's 
 better, as she had been taken to England to be docked and cleaned. The Blanco's 
 bottom is sheathed with wood and ziuc. 
 
79 
 
 under the poop to the fighting one in the turret-chamber under the conning-tower. 
 This caused the Huascar to yaw considerably whilst a makeshift tackle was being 
 rigged. At 9.25 the Cochrane, being about 3,000 yards distant, the Huascar opened 
 fire with her turret-guns. The second shot, ricocheting ahead of the Cochrane, en- 
 tered her uuarmored bows, and after smashing the galley and causing some slight 
 damage fell on deck without exploding. At this time the Blanco was about 6 miles 
 astern. The Cochrane did not answer these shots, but stood on until within :^,000 
 yards, when she opened fire. One of her first shots penetrated the Huascar's armor 
 on the port side and, exploding, entered the turret-chamber, where it set fire to the 
 light wood-work, killed and wounded twelve men, some of whom were at the winches 
 used to revolve the turret, and drove its own fragments and debris of all kinds under 
 the turret-trucks, which it jammed for the time being. A 10-iuch 300-pounder Pal- 
 liser chilled shell from the Huascar, fired at a range of 600 yards, struck the Coch- 
 rane's starboard side-armor at an angle of 30°. The plate, ^^hich was 6 inches thick, 
 was indented or scored out to a depth of 3 inches, the holts were moved, and the back- 
 ing was forced in; a beam was also broken. The shell probably broke up. 
 
 At 9.40 the Huascar stood a little to port with the intention of ramming the Coch- 
 rane, but the latter prevented this by turuiug an equal amount to port and steering 
 a parallel course. At 9.45 the conning-tower was struck by a shell, which exploded 
 in it, shattering it very much and blowing Admiral Gran to pieces — only one foot and 
 a few fragments being found. Admiral Grau usually directed the movements of his 
 vessel with his head and shoulders out of the top of the tower; the shell, therefore, 
 nmst have hit him at about the waist. The concussion from this shot caused the 
 death of Lieut. Diego Ferr6, the admiral's aide, who was at the fighting- wheel, sepa- 
 rated from the conning-tower by a light wooden grating only. This oflicer's body 
 was mistaken for that of his commander, and caused the erroneous statements which 
 appeared at the time of the combat. No wounds were found on Lieutenant Ferry's 
 body. Part of this shot also disabled the fighting-wheel, and the vessel turned to 
 starboard and ran to the eastward until, the damage having been repaired, she was 
 again headed north. About this time a shell penetrated the armor of the turret (now 
 trained on the port quarter) in its thickest part to the left of the port of the right 
 gun, killing and disabling most of the guns' crews. Among the former were the two 
 gun-captains, and among the latter Commander Meliton Carbajal, chief of staff, who 
 had come to inform the second in command, Commander Elias Aguirre, that he was 
 now in command. This shot furnishes the data for the killing effect of the projectile 
 fired experimentally at the Glatton some years ago, which by a curious coincidence 
 struck exactly the same part of the turret. Relief crews were sent to the guns, but 
 the firing became very wild, as the men were comparatively inexperienced. The right 
 gun had been disabled by the shot above mentioned, wl;iich beat the right compressor 
 and cap-square. Lieutenant Rodriguez, while looking out of one of the gun-ports, 
 had his head taken off. An eye-witness reports that the native part of the crew was 
 much demoralized by the loss of their commander. The cabin and wardroom were 
 full of men and officers, some wounded and many refugees from the upper deck, from 
 which every one had been driven by the Nordenfelt and small-arm fire of the enemy. 
 
 The Cochrane now attempted to ram, coming at right angles to her adversary 
 firing her starboard bow gun at 200 yards ; the center gun missed fire. .She missed 
 the Huascar and passed about five yards astern of her._ A shot from one of the Coch- 
 rane's port guns pierced the armor of her opponent on the starboard quarter, explod- 
 ing and doing much damage, including carrying away the iron tiller-block, which 
 served as a lead for both ordinary and fighting wheel ropes. The Huascar now again 
 headed to the eastward. A shell pierced the armor abreast the engine-room, cover- 
 ing the engines with debris, and killing and wounding several persons in the engine- 
 room o-allery. Among the latter were Surgeon Tavara and Mr. GritHths, the master 
 of the schooner Coquimbo, captured a few days before, and whose crew were forced 
 to render service during the action. The relieving-tackles, which had a very bad 
 
80 
 
 lead behind the transoms in the admiral's cabin, were now manned. The steeriiiff 
 was very uncertain, as Commander Aguirre had to conn the vessel from one of tho 
 lookout hoods of the tnrret, and the word had to be passed clear aft on the lower 
 deck to the men at the relieving tackles. The Cochrane again attempted to ram the 
 Huascar, tiring her starboard bow gun as before at 200 yards, and coming on at right 
 angles with the center guns trained abeam with three degrees depression. She again 
 missed her blow, and passed astern. The center gun was being loaded at this time. 
 It was now about 10.10, and the Blanco arrived on the scene of action, passing be. 
 tween the Hiiascar and the Cochrane just as the latter was preparing to ram a third 
 time. The Cochrane, to avoid the imminent danger in which she w.as placed by her 
 consort's ram, was forced to turn to port and then to the northward, increasing her 
 distance to 1,200 yards. The Huascar turned to starboard and headed for the 
 Blanco with the intention of ramming her, at the same time firing some ineffectual 
 shots in her direction. The Blanco sheered to starboard also, and passing at about 
 25 yards' distance, poured a broadside into her stern, which killed or wounded all of 
 the men at the relieving-tackles, and also many of the wounded and others assembled 
 in the ofiScers' quarters. The wounded were now removed to the coal-bunkers and 
 store-rooms. The Huascar now stood to the westward. 
 
 On account of the number of shots which had traversed the smokestack, driving 
 down soot, debris, and smoke into the fire-room, it was impossible to see the gauges. 
 The water fell too low in one of the boilers, which allowed the tubes to be burned 
 through, and caused a great escape of steam. This led the Chilians to believe that 
 they had struck one of the boilers. The small-arm fire at some previous tiine killed 
 and disabled three out of the four men stationed at the Catling gun in the Huascar's 
 top, although protected by a boiler-iron screen. The fourth man went below. This 
 must have been done by the small-arm men in the Chilian tops; the latter were 
 higher than that of the Huascar, which had no top covering or hood. The breast- 
 high shield bore no evidence of having been penetrated from below. At 10.25 the 
 Huascar's colors were shot away at the flag-staff, and for some moments she was sup- 
 posed to have surrendered, and all firing ceased. A loader at one of the guns went 
 aft and hoisted another flag at the gaff. A shot about this time penetrated the tur- 
 ret of the Huascar, killing or mortally wounding every man in it, including Com- 
 mander Aguirre. Some idea of the terrible effects of this .shot may be drawn from the 
 fact that when this officer's body was found and identified, all the upper part of the 
 head was gone, the lower jaw only remaining, four wounds on the right leg, a out 
 across the stomach, and six body wounds ; the right shoulder and arm had disap- 
 peared entirely. He was standing at the time to the left ^nd rear of the left gun, 
 with his head in the sighting-hood. Lieutenant Palacios was terribly wounded by 
 this shcit. At Commander Latorre's urgent request Palacios was sent on board the 
 next northern-bound mail steamer, but died before reaching Lima. 
 
 The command had devolved upon the fourth officer. Lieutenant Pedro Garezon. 
 The vessel was almost unmanageable and on fire in several places; still the eu"inc8 
 were kept going, and the left turret gun was fired occasionally. The Cochrane now 
 returned and again tried to ram ; she was only prevented fiom doing so by the chance 
 movements of the Huascar. Both Chilian ships now followed the Huascar usimi- the 
 bow and center guns, accompanied by an unceasing shower of snjall-arm and ma- 
 chine-gun projectiles. The Cochrane was stiTick during the action, probably when 
 she turned off to give place to the Blanco, by a shell which entered her uuarmored 
 stern and caused considerable damage, wounding ten men, of whom two afterwards 
 died. The Covadonga now came up and succeeded in putting herself on record bv 
 firing one gun. Lieutenant Garezon, after calling a council of surviving officers sent 
 Sub-Lieutenant Ricardo Herrera to the chief engineer with orders to attempt to sink 
 the vessel by opening her valves. Chief Engineer ilacMahon and his assistants suc- 
 ceeded in partially accomplishing this by opening the circulating-valves of the con- 
 densers, to do which they had to stop the engines. They were at work on tho bonnet 
 
81 
 
 of the main injection-valve wlien Lieutenant Kimpson of the Cochrane interfered, re- 
 volver in hand. While this was going on helow some of the men forward crawled up 
 through tlie fore-hatch and waved towels and handkerchiefs, seeing which the Chilians 
 ceased firing. The flag was then hauled down. As the Hnascar's engines did not 
 stop at first, they were going to reopen fire when she became motionless, probably for 
 the reason already stated. She was immediately boarded by boats from the Cochrane, 
 under Lieutenant Simpson, and from the Blanco, under Lieutenant-Commander Cas- 
 tillo, chief of stall' to the conmiodore ; with them came surgeons aud engineers. 
 
 It has been asked, of what use would the Whitehead system of torpedoes have been 
 in suoh an action? The answer would seem to be that the Whitehead or any of the 
 diverging systems would have proved to be dangerous and suicidal. The spar type 
 alone might have been used. It is worthy of note that, while the Chilian vessels could 
 always bring some of their guns to bear on the Huascar, the Huascar found herself in 
 many positions where only sheering would bring her guns to bear on them. In fact, 
 this action tends to prove that an all-round fire, even inferior in siugle guns, will have 
 a great advantage over a preponderance of fire within only given limits. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Two VESSELS AGAINST TWO. — In two vessels against two we can- 
 not follow the tactics of two against one. The ships must work together 
 or there is danger of two combining on one. The two vessels should 
 keep within one cable of one another, and, according to Captain Pre- 
 mantle, in line abreast, and according to Admiral Randolph in his modi- 
 fication of line abreast. Both authorities agree that they must act to- 
 gether and try to isolate one of the enemy aud combine on him. 
 
 It may be laid down as a maxim that vessels engaging two and two, 
 the advantage is with that side whose ships are close together. 
 
 Plate XIII, Fig. C, exemplifies this, the ships being in Admiral Ean- 
 dolph's formation. Ai and Aj are nearest together. Bj in order to ram 
 A, at X must put his helm down the same instant that Ai does, and 
 therefore must have anticipated Aj's move, which is not likely. 
 
 Plate XIII, Fig. 7, shows when Bi and B2 choose to attack. Ai and A2 
 are in closer formation. Aj can see B^'s move to ram Aj well marked 
 before he need put his helm down to ram B2 at x. 
 
 Three ships against two.— The general rule is for each side to 
 strive and ram the enemy's ships furthest off. The two ships, keeping 
 well together, should try and ram the two ships furthest off of the line. 
 Other than this rule there is no special tactics for the two ships to use. 
 The poiut to strive for is to use both of your ships on one of the enemy 
 if you can. 
 
 For the three ships, a formation is best where two of the ships are in 
 line abreast, or in a modification of it, aud the third ship is kept in the 
 rear, ready to assist either of her consorts which may be attacked. 
 482 6 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE ADMIRAL AND HIS FLEET. 
 I. 
 
 The commander-iu-cliief of a fleet in time of war has from the outset 
 a very complex duty to perform, viewed from a tactical standpoiut. Not 
 only must he be able to exercise his fleet in the various evolutions, and 
 to classify and to arrange his ships in line-of-battle according to their 
 values as regards speed, armament, and turning ijualities, but he must 
 know just what types of vessels are suited to compose his squadrons, 
 iu order that he may undertake the work cut out for him. 
 
 To discuss only that part of the Admiral's duty which relates to fight- 
 ing his fleet on the open sea or on the enemy's coasts, or to defending 
 his home ports, comes more within the province of these pages. 
 
 He must have an intimate acquaintance with the signal book, and iu 
 it should be laid down his plans of battle and the lines of action that 
 will be followed in an engagement. These, in common with all other 
 tactical maneuvers, should be thoroughlj' discovered to his captains. 
 
 The Admiral must be versed in naval strategy, and ther(^ are cer- 
 tain rules governing its general principles which he must ever keep in 
 mind. Captain Fremantle formulates them as follows : 
 
 l8t. In any fleet intended for action on the open sea the ships ninst be so far alike as 
 to be able to act together against the enemy in any tactical evolution which the Ad- 
 miral may require to be performed. 
 
 2d. If special ships, such as rams, gunboats, or torpedo vessels, are attached to a 
 fleet, they must act independently of other ships, according to a prearranged plan, 
 in which all their peculiar qualities may be best developed. 
 
 Since the problem to be solved is how one squadron is to gain an ad- 
 vantage over another of equal force, we think that the solution, may be 
 summed up in the following maxims : 
 
 1st. Surprise an enemy and attack him when he is unprepared. 
 
 2d. Overwhelm'a portion of his firce with the whole of yours. 
 
 There are certain main objects to be clearly borne in mind which fol- 
 low from these maxims. These are, primarily, so to form the fleet that 
 it may notofter any isolated portion to the enemy's attack, and that the 
 whole fleet may readily be brought into action to repel attack ; secondly, 
 so to maneuver as to be able to concentrate your force on a point of the 
 enemy's formation. 
 
 To carry out these objects certain tactical action must be resorted 
 to; for instance, disguising to the last moment from the eiieniv vour 
 
 8-2 
 
as 
 
 plan of action, so that it may come to him in an unexpected way or from 
 an unexpected quarter, such as getting him between two fires or mass- 
 ing on one of his flanks. To do this will require thorough drill, the 
 most perfect discipline, and a complete knowledge of naval tactics. 
 
 According to Captain Eivet, certain strategical considerations will in- 
 fluence the determination of the commander-in-chief as to whether h« 
 should force an action or avoid it if he can. Among them will be found 
 the following : 
 
 Are the nearest coast ports friendly, neutral, or inimical"? 
 
 What are their distances, and how do they bear ? 
 
 Can re-enforcements be depended upon during the action ? 
 
 In what direction can it be reasonably hoped that these re-enforce- 
 meuts will appear ? 
 
 It may be set down as a maxim that a fleet, in a»y formation, if it dis- 
 covers the enemy near at at hand, as, for instance, through the lighting 
 up of a fog or coming around a point of land, and this enemy in the midst 
 of performing an evolution, it is the duty of the commander-in-chief oi 
 the formed fleet to charge the other, even if the formation then in is 
 not a good one for attack, and the formation the maneuvering fleet io 
 striving for is better than his own. 
 
 In modern warfare, with great clouds of suioke and rapidly moving 
 vessels, it will be with great difficulty that friend can be distinguished 
 in action from foe. To prevent accident, it is possible that nations will 
 assume some color or some distinguishing mark for their fleets, as they 
 have color and cut for their army and navy uniforms. We can con- 
 ceive of a weak fleet, as a piece of strategy, assuming the enemy's liv- 
 ery, and adopting some other means of distinction, for the time being, 
 which will permit them to be recognized by their friends. 
 
 Lieutenant Campbe 1 says : 
 
 I look upon the system of communication between the Admiral and his fleet as vi- 
 tally important to the success of an action in the present time and in the future, even 
 more than in days gone by. 
 
 Eeferring to his own Navy, Mr. Campbell says : 
 
 With soft coal, as now carried, it is literally impossible to make out the Admiral'i 
 signals, and this is still more palpable when topgallant masts are down and the ship 
 is clear for action. 
 
 Coal, therefore, for purposes of fighting at sea, must be smokeless. 
 Since we, in our Navy, burn generally anthracite coal, we are to a great 
 degree spared the annoyance of smoke, but whether we can develop the 
 same high engine-power with this fuel which can be done with the softer 
 coals we leave to others to decide. In a pitched battle, though, the 
 enemy's smoke puts us all in the same category. 
 
 As this will be the case, battle signals must be very simple. Thew 
 
 should never be a hoist of more than three flags, and shapes should be 
 
 . substituted for colors, if possible, such as is u.sed in Distant Signaling 
 
84 
 
 according to the luternatioiial Code. Still better, signals made up of 
 cones, double cones, cylinders, and balls should be employed. 
 
 Most authorities agree that in action, on acco nut of smoke, the weather- 
 gauge is almost as necessary now as it was con sidered to be in the days 
 of Rodney and Nelson. There are tacticians, however, who believe that 
 this position does not possess the merit claimed for it, and prefer to 
 have the wind set in a direction that will bring it abeam for each vessel 
 when attacking. Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich, U. S. N., says that 
 the weather-gauge prevents you from seeing where your missiles strike, 
 a very necessary point to be sure of. Under all circumstances, we be- 
 lieve that the Admiral should so maneuver his command as to be on the 
 weather end of his line. 
 
 Ships, in all probability, will have to coal on the open sea, as, for in- 
 stance, when maintaining a blockade or in long voyages, especially if 
 sail power is still further reduced. Probably no nation has had greater 
 experience in this respect than our own, and in the eA^ent of war now, 
 unquestionably our experience will be still further enlarged, as we have 
 no colonies upon which we can rely, and coal undoubtedly will be con- 
 sidered contraband of war. Several methods for coaling on the open sea 
 have been proposed, and one suggested by Lieut. R. S. Lowry, of the 
 British Navy, seems to possess, at least, the claim of novelty. His plan 
 is substantially as follows : 
 
 In coaling at sea the coals should be taken on board with the vessel 
 steaming ahead, especially if there is any sea on, as will likely be the 
 case nine days out of ten. A steamer should be fitted to carry a cargo 
 of coal already put up in " carriers," which resemble somewhat the life- 
 cars now used on sea-coasts to save life. Each carrier holds one ton or 
 less. The collier is towed on the quarter of the shii), and, besides the 
 towing hawser, there is a jack-stay from the quarter of the collier to the 
 bow of the ship. The carrier is hauled along this last line in the water, 
 and taken on board the shij) by a yard and stay, if coaling over all, or 
 by yard-arm purchase and gurnet if coaled through a port. The empty 
 carriers are sent back the way they came. 
 
 The strategic value of coaling points is apparent. Nations with navies 
 must make sure in time of peace that their vessels will not be rendered 
 useless in time of war through a lack of fuel-supply. This supply may 
 be divided into two classes, fixed, or coal stations, and movable, or by 
 steamers using a temporary base. Probably the carrying on of a war. 
 will exact both systems being in a degree maintained. Each has its 
 advantages, but undoubtedly the last category presents the greatest 
 number. 
 
 We have said that a necessity for coal supply must be met in a time 
 of peace ; that is, either the coaling station must be protected by dip- 
 lomatic methods, or else by regular fortifications and marine defenses. 
 In most cases this last condition would necessitate purchase of the ter 
 ritory, and the coal station immediately partakes, more or less, of the 
 
85 
 
 nature of a colony. In time of war this station will have to be guarded 
 by vessels, which could be otherwise employed, aud therefore develops 
 at once a disadvantageous aspect. Again, it may be a long distance 
 from the theater of war, in which case no small percentage of fuel will 
 be burned by a vessel going to this station and returning to her duties 
 with the fleet. Another point: the enemy will do his best to capture it, 
 and ^ince ships will probably have to keep up the supply at this depot, 
 he will try to seize the colliers en route. One of the few advantages of 
 this means of coal supply is that at the outbreak of hostilities coal can 
 be obtained whereas otherwise the necessity would have to be foreseen, 
 and vessels with fuel-cargoes be dispatched in time to supply the fleet. 
 To insure a coal supply under the second category, in time of peace, 
 the Government must encourage a large proportion of the fast merchant 
 steamers to be so built that they can carry cargoes of this commodity 
 to such rendezvous as the nature of the war shall decide. These rendez- 
 vous, from a strategic point of view, should be as varied as possible in 
 location, so as to mislead the enemy. The advantages of a movable 
 coal supply here become apparent. The location of the depots not be- 
 ing known to the enemy, the capture of the supply vessels is much less 
 likely. Then, the points of supply being near the base of operations, 
 little or no coal will be consumed uselessly. The drawbacks to this 
 method of supply are that a rendezvous where the fleet could coal, hav- 
 ing a hostile environment, would be harder to establish, and, if estab- 
 lished, would be more likely to be attacked in force. Then, again, steam- 
 ers at the outbreak of a war may be hard to obtain, the distances that 
 they have to be sent may be very great, and the fleet might suft'er in 
 consequence. 
 
 II. 
 
 Admiral Aube remarks, "A fleet superior in numbers will be, from 
 the commencement of a naval war, the mistress of the seas, other things 
 being equal." 
 
 According to Captain Noel, there are two fundamental principles to 
 be observed in preparing a fleet to operate in time of war : 
 
 1st. In selecting weapons for service with a fleet, choose those that are capable of 
 inflicting the greatest possible injury on the enemy with the least possible danger to 
 yourself. 
 
 2d. In the organization, maneuvering, and formations of a fleet, and in the use of 
 signals, study the utmost simplicity, arranging everything with a view to efficiency 
 combined with the fewest prospects of damaging friendly ships. 
 
 Ships may be classified under the following heads, and may be com- 
 bined to compose a fleet of armor-clad line-of-battle ships : A reserve of 
 armor clads, observation squadrons, cruisers (preferably of steel), com- 
 merce destroyers, and dispatch vessels. Ships from these classes, either 
 combined or single, will operate especially on the high seas. Coastwise 
 squaidrons will be composed of armor-clads, gun-vessels, tenders, har- 
 bor flotillas of gunboats, torpedo-vessels, torpedo-boats, and their tend- 
 
86 
 
 ers. There are other vessels that must be used with the fleet which may 
 not be considered of the fleet, and which are only furnished when re- 
 quired to fulfill some special duty. 
 
 Captain Xoel, for warlike purposes, would have his navy divided as 
 follows : 
 
 1st. A fleet of heavy ships of the line. These vessels, by reducing 
 their top-hamper, and having only topsails, courses, and fore-and-aft 
 sails bent, would save enough weight to permit stowage of extra coal. 
 They should be provided with heavy towing hawsers. 
 
 2d. A squadron of cruisers attached to this fleet, all of great speed 
 and fully rigged. Their duty is to reconnoiter, make prizes of hostile 
 cruisers, and to obtain information from shipping. 
 
 3d. Dispatch vessels. 
 
 .4th. Torpedo-boats of a size large enough to keep the sea on their 
 own account. In cruising they should keep with the ships whose tend- 
 ers they are. 
 
 Captain Harris says: 
 
 As thejspeed of the slowest ship is the speed of the iieet, uo vessel should be as- 
 signed to the line of battle of less speed than 12 knots. With the swiftest fleet lies 
 the option of giving or declining battle, and also whether or not the battle will be 
 limited to artillery alone. 
 
 Lieutenant Besson, M. F., asks the following question concerning a 
 reserve squadron : Should the fleet be divided and fight with a certain 
 number of ships, letting the others keep out of the battle until the for- 
 mations are broken up, or ought the fleet to be kept together and should 
 there be no reserve ? This query he answers by saying that every 
 fighting formation presents two feeble points. These are the ships fur- 
 thest off; that is, the outside or flank vessels. Divide your fleet into 
 detached squadrons and you increase these feeble positions, and there- 
 fore diminish its power. If your fleet is much larger than that of the 
 enemy it might be done; otherwise not. Is it not more rational to put 
 the reserve on the field of battle to strengthen some part of your linet 
 
 There are three places to put the reserve ; they can either be put be- 
 tween the line-of-battle ships, in line abreast, so as to diminish the dis- 
 tances without adding to the length of the line, or they can be put be- 
 hind the center or wings of this same line abreast. 
 
 In the first case they interfere with the free movements of the ships, 
 which is a bad feature, but there. seems to be no fault to find with the 
 other two positions in wliich we consider they can be placed. 
 
 The latest authorities combine in the opinion that there should be no 
 regular reserve s(iuadron, believing that all vessels of any size and 
 strength should be in the line-of-battle. i 
 
 We would call attention to the necessity of having an efficient squad- 
 ron of "lookout" vessels. Two squadrons bearing down on one another, 
 and steaming at the rate of 10 knots, pass over three cables' length in 
 one minute. Hence the necessity of great speed in these vidette vessels. 
 
87 
 
 These vessels will probably be unarraored cruisers, but there are many 
 tacticians who are of the opinion that, besides their lookout work, they 
 should be placed in the line of battle. Admiral Penhoat says, decidedly : 
 Large cruisers of great speed and fe\r guns, or of feeble battery power, should be 
 litted witli torpedoes aud be put in the line of battle. Such vessels will increase their 
 value if to these qualifications is added turning power. 
 
 A fleet should have its videttes stretched over a distance of 20 miles 
 ahead and 10 miles on each flank. 
 
 It must be remembered that this vidette or lookout squadron is a 
 regularly organized body, and differs entirely from single vessels sent 
 out from any squadron of the fleet to observe the enemy or to draw his 
 fire. These last may be termed skirmishers. 
 
 In that part of the fleet termed "the convoy" must be vessels fitted to 
 carry ammunition. As they will have to supply the fleet under all con- 
 ditions of environment, their fittings as regards protection from pro- 
 jectiles of the enemy, defense from any attack, and ability to supply 
 their cargo becomes a serious war problem. They should be supported 
 by rams and torpedo-vessels (these last they should carry), and by one 
 or two powerful corvettes. These corvettes should be furnished with 
 good towing hawsers. The armament of the ammunition ship should be 
 a large number of machine guns. The enemy will do their utmost to 
 destroy or capture such a vessel. 
 
 Large, clumsy ships, with inferior speed and large evolutionary circles, 
 should never be permitted to cruise alone, no matter if they have heavy 
 batteries and are well protected by armor. 
 
 III. 
 
 The Admiral should sujjply to each captain commanding a vessel un- 
 der him, copies of the " helm table" and speed table" of each vessel of 
 his fleet, so that it can readily be found, on the commander-in chief 
 signaling the number of revolutions of the screw of his flagship, how 
 many revolutions are necessary for each shij) to make in order to pre- 
 serve the formation. Then, again, each captain, knowing which ship has 
 fhe largest turning circle can, when this vessel signals her evolutionary 
 helm angle, judge what amount of helm to give his ship. Mast-head 
 angle tables, for open and closed order, must be prepared for each ship 
 both when in cruising and in fighting trim. Each captain must have 
 these data. 
 
 All professional writers call attention to the necessity of the captain 
 being thoroughly informed as to the Admiral's plans, and agree that 
 bhey should be strictly conformed with, especially in respect to the speed 
 5f the ship and the intervals and distances to be maintained. If the 
 jommanding officers of ships are not thoroughly imbued with the spirit 
 jf the commander-in-chief, and are not conversant with his tactical plan 
 )f action, there can not only be no success, but only disaster and defeat 
 3an be looked for. 
 
88 
 IV. 
 
 A great diversity of opiuion exists as to tbe post the Admiral should 
 occupy in an eugagement. No doubt he should be in a position where he 
 can see and where he can be seen of all, so that the simple signals with 
 which he must content himself can be easily observed. Personal ex- 
 ample, however, will weigh morein the scale of victory than signals, and 
 therefore we find that since all actions now are based on the ram, the 
 Admiral's post is in the place of danger; he must lead into battle. Ad- 
 miral Peuhoat says: "He should lead in in line ahead. He can then 
 change direction of the fleet without using signals." 
 
 By some authorities the Admiral is placed in the center of the line ; 
 this is an excellent post should he elect to fight in two lines ahead or 
 even in line abreast. The only point to be made against this position 
 in this latter formation, is that the commander-in-chief's movements 
 and signals will be more obscured with smoke than if he was in some 
 vessel large enough to lead into action, but which, not having been 
 given a number in the line, can shift to the weather flank. As the 
 flanks will be the points most likely to be attacked, we conceive it to be 
 the place of the Admiral to make his presence felt on either one or the 
 other of them. 
 
 There are writers who believe that the post of the Admiral should be 
 with the reserve, either in a special ship or in one of the armor-clads 
 We hardly see the philosophy of this in a pitched battle, as the flag- 
 ship would probably be inferior to the armor-clads of the line-of-battle 
 in one or more respects. 
 
 A German writer has the following remark on the post of the com- 
 mander-in-chief during an engagement : 
 
 The Admiral's flag belongs on the largest and most powerful vessel, which should 
 outshine all others as a brilliant example in the heat of battle. History shows that 
 the Admiral must himself be in the midst of the fight. If he wishes to be the vital 
 element in his ship, and to make the best use of all the components of his command, 
 then he must put himself in a position to see everything and to be seen of all. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 IVBilJTfOXS. 
 
 There are tactical precepts which are commou to armies fij^liting on 
 shore ami to fleets engaging at sea. Xapoleon says: ''Coucentraie your 
 forces; do not have a weak point. To move en manse and with rapid- 
 ity on the enemy, and to attack him where he is weakest, is the secret 
 of victory.'' 
 
 The principle which answers to this is concentratian. This precept of 
 war, which is nniversally admitted to be excellent, is especially appli- 
 cable to fighting with rams. To weaken or to destroy by greater num- 
 bers a part of the enemy's fleet, then to be able to bear down afresh on 
 some other part of his formation with a superior force, is the special ob- 
 ject of all attacking maneuvers. 
 
 A fleet is in order of battle when all the vessels composing it can use 
 perfectly all the means of offense and defense that they are provided 
 with, without interfering with cue another or detracting from their 
 mutnal support. The offensive weapons of the line of battle are guns, 
 rams, and torpedoes. 
 
 The principal conditions which a formation of a fleet for attack should 
 fulfill are: 
 
 1st. The largest amount of liberty of evolution for each vessel, and at 
 the same time the best employment of the peculiar fittings of each ship 
 for attack. 
 
 2d. It should permit the execution of every maneuver in the least time, 
 with the greatest speed. 
 
 ;M. It should be simple, flexible, and easy to keep, under all condi- 
 tions of sea and weather, without exposing the ships to collision. 
 
 4tb. Unity of direction of each vessel's course must be preser^'ed. 
 The vessels must maintain their stations, and they must be able to 
 change rapidly to the direction of the enemy's attack. 
 
 5th. It should be such as to permit the fleet to be able to cope with 
 any particular necessity for preservation imposed on them by the enemy. 
 
 6th. Between vessels of the fleet there must be mutual support either 
 for attack or defense. 
 
 7th. It should permit the fleet to be kept well together under the eye 
 of the Admiral, so that each vessel can see his signals. 
 
 In dividing the fleet, should the basis of division be either the group 
 
 89 
 
90 
 
 or section, attention should be paid to the equality of the ships which 
 are to act together, more especially to their maneuvering capabilities. 
 These vessels should exercise together, should learn to move as one, 
 and should only be changed under circumstances of necessity. 
 
 In old days the signal-book was shut when the fleet bore down upon 
 the enemy. Now it may be required to maneuver as a fleet until act- 
 ually engaged. For this reason Captain Fremantle thinks that a long 
 line of ships, either ahead or abreast, will be impracticable. 
 
 Any attacking formation will finally disappear during an engagement, 
 and the fight will, in all probability, settle down to actions between ves- 
 sels. The Admiral must be careful to designate certain vessels to act as 
 rallying jjoints, or as Jindei for the re formation of his fleet, either for 
 purposes of concentrating for renewed attack, or to combine for mutual 
 support to fight in retreat. 
 
 II. 
 
 A fleet or squadron can be formed as follows : 
 
 1. In line ahead. 
 
 2. In line abreast. 
 
 3. In bow and quarter lines. 
 
 4. In triangles or quadrilaterals of difl'erent shapes. 
 
 The first three formations which are simple,]can be made compound or 
 complex by doubling or repeating the formation in some peculiar man- 
 ner, as, for instance, forming in two lines ahead, alternate line abreast, 
 in naval square, in double echelon, &c. The fourth formation is always 
 compound 
 
 The basis of fleet division is either the ship, section, or group. The 
 most modern idea is probably that each line-of-battle ship is a unit in 
 itself, and in order that it may be thoroughly effective it must not be 
 hampered in the use of any of its weapons by having to act as part of a 
 formation with any other vessel or vessels. Mr Besson says, although 
 the tactical unit is the single ship, and while her first duty is to act for 
 herself, still a designated vessel next to her in line should be combined 
 with her to develop the best results to be obtained with the ram for 
 each vessel. 
 
 Captain Courbet, M. P., in 1872, in order to apply in the best manner 
 the principle of concentration of a larger portion of his force on a smaller 
 portion of the enemy, took as the tactical unit two vessels, which he 
 called a section. One of the vessels was termed the leader, and had the 
 other vessel under his control. These two vessels, in Englisli, may be 
 designated as the " leader" and his "mate." They must combine their 
 energies in attack and give mutual support. 
 
 Admiral Penhoat also favors the interdependence of two shi]is, and 
 in all the formations and movements discussed by him and by the 
 writers who assume this tactical unit tiie two vessels act togetlier. 
 As a general thing it was contemplated that the best position for the 
 
91 
 
 subordinate vessel M'as on the quarter of the leader, so that all lines 
 ahead were alternate lines ahead, and all lines abreast were alternate 
 lines abreast. We have said that Mr. Besson believes in the necessity 
 of two vessels acting together, but he differs from all other tacticians as 
 regards the relative position of the two in attack. Believing that the 
 plan of attack should be based upon the use of the ram, he shows that 
 the ships should be abreast of one another in order to develop this weapon 
 to its fullest extent, and that therefore the line of iSattle should be a line 
 abreast. He also goes onto show that any other relative bearing between 
 the two vessels puts one or the other of them at some disadvantage as 
 regards helping its consort. 
 
 Admiral Penhoat, in common with most writers now, believes that the 
 fleet should be made up as follows : Two vessels should compose a sec- 
 tion ; two sections a division ; two divisions should form a squadron, 
 and two squadrons a fleet. This would make the fleet composed of six- 
 teen vessels. If there is a less number than sixteen, the squadron must 
 still be composed of eight, and the rest must be over, and be exercised 
 as another division or squadron. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of the group as a tactical unit. 
 During many years the students of this science were struck with the 
 necessity of so dividing the fleet that the particular qualities of each 
 ship could be given its proper value, and the divisions of the fleet into 
 groups found numerous defenders. Until lately this has beeu a favorite 
 system, since it was considered to develop in the greatest degree the 
 following points : 
 
 1. Each ship's battery was clear. 
 
 2. Each ship was considered to be entirely unhampered in its move- 
 ments as regards ramming. 
 
 3. There was the greatest mutual support between ships. 
 
 Although the peloton or group was originally intended as a forma- 
 tion to cruise in solely, and ships moving in this order were without any 
 arrangement, save that one was designated as the leader, still it soon 
 camein to prominence as a fighting formation, and was especially favored 
 by the English. In 1868 Captain Semetchkin, of the Eussian Navy, was 
 entirely impressed with its usefulness, and in his work on " Naval Tac- 
 tics" divided the squadron into two divisions, and each division into, 
 two groups, composed of three ships each. These groups were either 
 equilateral-triangular or rectangular-triangular, with equal sides, the 
 hypothenuse forming the rear face of the group. 
 
 Captain Lewal, of the French Navj", divided the squadron into three 
 groups, each group containing three ships, one being designated as 
 " group leader." Mr. Laughton's plan is nearly identical with this. He 
 makes the basis of fleet division as2w*^''owof three vessels, each squad- 
 ron to have its admiral. He gives as a reason, that each vessel is along- 
 side of his admiral, and therefore in the handiest position to, send or 
 
92 
 
 receive signals. Besides this the admiral is immediately supported by 
 the ships of his command. 
 
 Lieutenant dePenfentenyo, of the French Navy, in his work on " Earns 
 in Battle," says that the tactical unit is a group of three or four armor- 
 clads arranged iu a triangle or square. He further says that a squad- 
 ron should contain at least two divisions, and a fleet two squadrons and 
 at least twelve armored ships. 
 
 Lientenant Campbell, speaking upon this point, says that the " evolu- 
 tionary unit" seems to rest between a group composed of two, three, or 
 four ships. With two ships, one ship should befourpoints on the quar- 
 ter of the other, and two cables from it ; with three ships, the third 
 ship should be three cables from the second ship and four points ouliei 
 quarter. (See Plate XIII, Fig. 8.) With four ships, the fourth is placed 
 as iu the figure. 
 
 According to Captain Fremantle, the subordinate vessels of a group 
 should be the handiest and fastest. 
 
 Mr. Campbell says, that in a fleet actually organized for war, a group 
 should consist (if the fleet be sufBciently large) of three line-of-battle 
 ships, three tenders, and six torpedo quarter-boats. 
 
 Commander Noel also divides the squadron into groups. He adopts 
 the triangular group, which he forms in different ways. (See Plate XIV, 
 Figs. 1, 2, 3 & 4.) He says : " Since, nowadays, fleets are and must be 
 made up of ^'essels of different powers, and whose parts to play in a fight 
 are essentially different, the group-leader can, being the staunchest, 
 call his consorts under cover.!' Parthermore, he takes issue with Cap- 
 tain Colomb on the point of the hitter's condemnation of the group sys- 
 tem for either attack or defense, and gives cases to show that groups 
 can maneuver to i)ass down the line of an enemy with a narrow front 
 if reijuired, and that they are most mobile for change of formation to 
 ram, and, that iu case of collision with the enemy, they will not pile upon 
 one another as they would do if they were in line ahead; also, that if 
 the line was broken, re-formatiou is more feasible with this system. 
 
 We may observe right here what may be set down as a maxim : The 
 victory will probably lie with that fleet whose formation will permit it 
 to keep its integrity the longest. 
 
 In regard to the number of vessels comprising a group. Captain Fre- 
 mantle says, " There is no special virtue in the number three, and there 
 is no extraordinary strength of formation in the scalene triangle." This 
 most favored grouping in the English service consisted, perhaps con- 
 sists, of oae vessel leading, termed as, by Captain Lewal, the group- 
 leader ; a second vessel two points abaft the beam of the first and one 
 cable otf, and a third vessel on the other quarter of the first and two 
 cables off. We believe that the English signal-book now permits of 
 great latitude iu the use of this system. 
 
 Lieutenant Campbell is one of the greatest champions for the group 
 formation, and does not hesitate to say, " I believe that no formation is 
 
93 
 
 better adapted to the development of tbe torpedo, the ram, and the 
 heavy artillery of the present and the future." 
 
 Lieutenant Cattori, of the Italian Navy, believes in equilateral-tri- 
 angular groups, with the groups revolved through 30° about the center 
 of figure. Several of tliese groups in line abreast have the advantage of 
 the group system and that of lin-e abreast in three lines. (See Plate 
 XIV, Fig. 5.) 
 
 We can hardly look npou this formation as anything but pretty the- 
 oretically, as the formation being so hard to keep would be certain to 
 degenerate either into isolated groups or into a formation in three lines. 
 It is unquestionably clumsy to maneuver in. 
 
 Lieutenant Besson says that the result of the drill in the French squad- 
 ron of evolutions was such as to condemn the group system in toto. In 
 speaking of a formation for attack, he remarks that all orders on lines 
 of bearing, and particularly the group formation, must be abandoned. 
 " The group formation is the worst of all " are his words. He goes oii 
 to say that in the group formation the vessels do n ot give each other 
 such eflQcient support as to make up for the clumsiness of their ar- 
 rangement. Line ahead in groups is a bad cruising order, as the slight- 
 est movement of the helm or change of speed may cause a collision. 
 In every case it is difficult to imagine a fleet going into action formed 
 in this way. 
 
 At first glance it is very different with line abreast in groups. We see 
 here, in each group vessels can easily change speed ; t^e wing vessels 
 especially can do so without danger of collision. Although the forma- 
 tion may be said to possess all the merits of supplementary lines, still 
 the difficulty is that changes of direction, maintaining the group forma- 
 tion, are well-nigh impossible. This, and from the fact that this arrange- 
 ment exacts an unanimity of action between ships which is hardly to 
 be brought about, would seem to call for an absolute rejection of the 
 system. 
 
 Lieutenant Eivet, M. F., calls attention to the following defects in this 
 system. He says : 
 
 At first glance, the thiee triangles that can he formed from a group of three vessels 
 seem to fulfill all the requirements of a perfect formation, hut -when we come to ana- 
 lyze it, we find the length of time that it will tate these ships to cliange the form of 
 their triangles or direction is too long to recommend the group system as a fighting 
 formation. 
 
 The most competent authorities are unanimous iu condemning it. 
 Each group presents two weak points, one on each flank, where two of 
 the enemy can easily conceJitrate, as shown in Plate XIV, Fig. li. 
 
 In regard to the fundamental organization and numbering of the fleet 
 in line-of-battle, Ave lean towards the method given by Admiral Pen- 
 hoiit. The fleet should be considered to be in line abreast, arranged 
 as iu Plate XV. The first guide on the right of the line, the second 
 on the left. These act as general guides. There is also a right and 
 
94 
 
 left guide to each squadron. These guides will be most particular in 
 regard to speed, course, and mutual bearing. It will be seen that the 
 guides keep half a ship's length ahead of the line ; Admiral Peuhoat 
 and Admiral Eandolph both say that this is as easily done as to keep 
 exactly abreast. When the fleet is in line, the Admiral should signal 
 the direction of the dress. 
 
 We favor this method of assigning numbers to the fleet, since it will 
 cover any system of tactical division. (See Plate XV.) 
 
 The numbers for the line of-battle are sixteen, or as many more as 
 needed, up to thirty-six. If the group or division system was used with 
 four to the group, the numbers would run as in the figure. If there were 
 three vessels to the group the numbers would be in the following order: 1, 
 12, 13, 2, 22, 23, etc. If the section system or combination of two vessels 
 is used, the numbers would run : 1, 12, 2, 22, 3, 32, etc. If the tactical 
 unit was the single vessel, we would still have to use the method of 
 numbering used in the section system, so as to have numbers enough 
 for 16 vessels. It will be seen that the leader has always a single number, 
 and that the subordinate vessels have a two-figure number ; the fews fig- 
 ure telling the number of its section or group, and its tinits figure the 
 number in the section or group. The line-of-battle should first be fur- 
 nished with numbers, then the reserve, then the look-out squadron, and 
 finally the convoy. 
 
 The probabilities are that this system does not furnish numbers enough 
 for all the squadrons of a large fleet unless the group systeni of assign- 
 ing numbers is used. The only point to be looked out for is, to have 
 each distinctive squadron numbered on some system. These numbers 
 need not necessarily run from right to left ; in fact, the left group or sec- 
 tion, most likely, will have the leader on the flank, and it is this vessel 
 which should receive the single number. 
 
 Formatipns may be either natujal or inverted. They are natural when 
 the numbers run in order from an assumed right towards the left (the fleet 
 or squadron being in line abreast), and inverted when the squadron has 
 changed course simultaneously sixteen points. The natural order should 
 always be maintained except when forced by circumstances to form in 
 an inverted formation, which should be only as temporary as possible. 
 
 It will be understood that each ship has an invariable or distinguish- 
 ing number, as explained above, and a number in line, which is her num- 
 ber from the ship on the right, the squadrons being in natural order. 
 The ship on the right should be No. 1. 
 
 The Admiral should assign himself a number in the line, leaving a 
 tender or some small vessel to take his place, should he see fit not to 
 occupy his billet. 
 
 lu regard to open and close order, Captain Fremautle says: 
 
 Wc may remark on the much greater difficulty of keeping auythiug like a good 
 station when in "oiieu" than in "close order"; and i ow that "close order" is spec- 
 ially ordered in a fog, it is abundantly clear that it might and should be maintained 
 under all circumstances by night and by day, except in very bad weather. 
 
95 
 
 Mr. Laugjitoii defiaes " close order" as 150 yards and "very close 
 order" as 100 yards. Tbo general rule, however, in tactics is, that no 
 interval or distance should be made small enough to admit of two ves- 
 sels fouling in any manner. Admiral Penhoat is of the opinion that 
 the distances and intervals should not be arbitrary, but be laid down 
 with great rigor, and Captain Rivet says that the distances between 
 ships should be two cables, or two-thirds of the diameter of the evolu- 
 tionary circle. 
 
 The distances between vessels in double line abreast should be a lit- 
 tle more than in simi^le line abreast, but should not exceed four cables, 
 or once and one-third the diameter of the evolutionary circle. 
 
 The intervals between two lines should be about six cables for a speed 
 of ten knots. Supposing each fleet charges at ten knot's speed, the two 
 will come together at a rate of twenty knots. This rate makes the sec- 
 ond line engage the enemy two minutes after the first. This interval 
 ought not to be made smaller. 
 
 III. 
 
 It is hardly necessary, we take it, to go over the thousand and one 
 modifications of the three or at most four simple formations in which 
 a fleet can be arranged. Nearly every tactician has his favorite methods, 
 differing somewhat from those of other tacticians, to which formations 
 he gives special names, and special rules are laid down to preserve their 
 integrity. 
 
 It will perhaps be well, however, to look back twenty years, when 
 broadside fire was the basis of attack, and ships had only moderate 
 speed, and see the multiplicity of formations that were considered to be 
 necessary, then glance at the situation to-day, and observe what sim- 
 plicity of order is forced upon us by the ram, and by the enormous en- 
 gine power of ships. 
 
 In 1866 there were fifteen simple and compound formations. These 
 were drilled in, and undoubtedly were found to be not only satisfactory 
 but.imperatively necessary. To-day, according to Lieutenant Besson, 
 only two simple formations are retained, line ahead and line abreast ; 
 and two compound formations, two lines ahead and two lines abreast. 
 
 Formations are either simple or compound. Simple formations are 
 line ahead, line abreast, and line of bearing. This last is sometimes 
 termed echelon, and when ships are in this formation they bear from 
 one another all the way from two points forward and abaft the beam, 
 relatively, to four points. 
 
 Compound formations (see Plates II & III) are those where the simple 
 formation is repeated, as two or more lines ahead, two or more lines 
 abreast. On two lines of bearing making different angles with each 
 other, and known as chase and retreat formations; squares, which are 
 either lines ahead, lines abreast, or lines of bearing of unequal length, 
 but where the distances and intervals are equal in size and number; 
 
96 
 
 modiacations of the square, atid the uumerous group forms. By .some 
 writers, compouud formations are confined to designate the group ; by 
 others, the group formation is called " special." All this is a mere ques- 
 tion in terminology, and we prefer to class as compound all those for- 
 mations which are not single lines ahead, single lines abreast, and single 
 lines of bearing. 
 
 According to some authors, line ahead is too extended for an attack- 
 ing formation, but it is very useful in going through a narrow channel. 
 The line abreast and the line of bearing take up too much sea in width, 
 and they necessitate changes of direction that are very difttcult to make 
 when the enemy is sighted. 
 
 These writers either depend on compound formations for combat, or 
 else believe in no regular attacking formation at all. 
 
 According to Lieutenant Gattori, of the Italian Navy, the line ahead 
 is only useful in tortuous channels, but in other cruising it is of little 
 or no account. As a fighting formation at sea he says it has no place. 
 Compound linos ahead may answer in cruising in special cases, and it 
 is useful in time of war to force a passage and to enter a harbor under 
 tire. In effect, it is sufficiently concentrated, yet simple to permit change 
 of direction without change of formation. The nature of the defense 
 from the shore would have to determine wliether the ships would have 
 to be lashed together or whether the compound lines ahead would be 
 two lines ahead or alternate line ahead. The commander-in-chief, in 
 this case, most authorities agree, should not be in the line. A French 
 tactician says : 
 
 Line ahead is jirobably the liest formation for eiiteriug a harbor, eveu where mines 
 are suspected. If the torpedoes .ire in a line perpeudicnhir In the line ahead, only 
 one ship would be blown up. If they were more scattered, going in this formation 
 will increase the chances of some of the vessels getting through. Of course a sus- 
 pected locality should be thoroughly oounterrainod. 
 
 Leading into a fight or bearing down on an enemy's position in line 
 ahead has its advantage ; it does away in a great measure with the ne- 
 cessity of signaling. Then, it is easier for the captains of the vessels, 
 as they have no dress to keep, but only to maintain their position iiitlie 
 wake of the next aliead. According to Admiral Penhoat, with a small 
 fleet, say of six or eight vessels, the best arrangement is in line ahead 
 in single column, with a distance of two cables bet ween ships. If a vessel 
 must slow for some cause, she should steer out of line. Theline-of-battle 
 is most easily formed from this formation by changing direction eight 
 points and then coming into line abreast. (See Plate XVI, Fig. 1.) If 
 the fleet is large, the Admiral recommends bearing down in two parallel 
 lines, which is double line ahead, for the reason that if all the vessels 
 were in one line they could not see the Admiral's signals, and also they 
 would take too long to get into line abreast, which seems to be the favor- 
 ite formation for attack. Double line ahead can be formed in two ways : 
 the even number may form the second line by falling out to starboard 
 
97 
 
 or to port when formed in one single line ahead, or it can be formed 
 from the last half of the fleet. (See Plate XVI, Figs. 2 & 3.) 
 
 "When the lines are formed in the first manner, and the odd number 
 are in the right-hand line, and the two lines have an interval of about 
 five cables, the formation is an order of battle in two lines abreast, mov- 
 ing by the flank. It is easy to see that a fleet established in this forma- 
 tion can come quickly into the order of battle in two lines perpendicular 
 to the bearing of the enemy. 
 
 Admiral Penhoat's advice, then, is that, as a general rule, it is better 
 to have one line even if it is a little long than to have two or more, 
 especially when in the same waters with an enemy. The limit of one 
 line is eight vessels. If there are more than eight, two lines ahead must be 
 formed. Change of direction is made without dififlculty. In each line 
 ships can drop off on the off side without interfering with each other. 
 The smallest interval between the lines should be greater than the di- 
 ameter of the evolntionarj' circle, so that in case a vessel had to drop 
 out on the side nearest the other line, she could turn without danger 
 of collision. Thisinterval should be from four to six cables. The maxi- 
 mum interval between the lines need only be sufBcient to let the fleet 
 form line abreast on a line of bearing eight points from the old course. 
 
 It is diflicult to bear down on the enemy in any spread-out formation, 
 and preserve the stations of the vessels. If in bearing down, the enemy 
 shifted his bearing to the right or left, he can often be kept in front by 
 changing the course without changing the formation or the absolute 
 bearing of the lines. In steaming in line abreast, the captains of each 
 ship must preserve for their vessels — 
 
 1. The course. 
 
 2. The bearing. 
 
 3. Their station in the line. 
 
 Each ship's compass should be perfectly adjusted, or its errors must 
 be exactly known. This is most important. Chiefs of divisions are 
 guides for their divisions, and they should keep themselves just a little 
 ahead of the alignment when the fleet is in line abreast. 
 
 From Lieutenant Farret we learn that simple line abreast only an- 
 swers as a cruising formation for a limited number of ships; as an at- 
 tacking formation in the opinion of some it is too extended even with a 
 fleet of ten ships, and the flanks are without protection. This bad 
 quality does not apply, however, to line abreast in two or more lines, 
 and although this is not properly a good cruising order, it is, according 
 to Lieutenant Cattori, an excellent formation when advancing upon or 
 when feeling an enemy. It also answers in many cases as a fighting 
 formation. 
 
 Captain Rivet has the following to say about simple line abreast: 
 
 As a cruising formation it is not good; especially is it bad at night. As a forma- 
 tion for attack with rams it is good ; for artillery fire it is had. Any compound line 
 abreast is better than the simple formation. Alternate line abreast, with the distance 
 and intervals as small as possible, is the best arrangement of this formation. 
 
 482 7 
 
98 
 
 Admiral Eandolph has the followiug remarks to make on tlic bow Jinil 
 quaterline, or a formation in the ordinary echdon. " It i.s,"lie sa> m, " liard 
 to preserve; the opportunities, liowever, for usiug the battery are very 
 good. It is not the most efficient for mutual protection from ramming, 
 as the sternmost of two ships receives none from her bow neighbor, and 
 the leader of two not the utmost possible from her quarter neighbor. 
 Furthermore, it is not a good formation for ordinary steaming as it is 
 hard to maintain your station, and is difficult to change direction in, 
 although it permits great liberty of movement of the vessels themselves." 
 
 We now present the views of Mr. Laughton in regard to fleet forma- 
 tion for attack. lie is of the opinion that the fleet could best be formed 
 on a modiflcatiou of the ''naval square" (carre naval) of Admiial Count 
 Bouet-Willaumez. The Frencli formation is limited to nine vessels. If 
 this number is maintained, it will be seen that the formation is not only 
 strong, but presents the same shape, no jiiatter how the vessels liead- 
 Of his special formation (see Plate XVI, Fig. 4) he says he believes that 
 there would be all the necessary advantages of the square in the forma- 
 tion he suggests, and that every movement could be performed under one 
 general signal, "change front (so many) points to starboard (or port)." 
 
 Groups are not necessarily triaugular. Some writers believe that 
 each group should be exercised as a squadron, but that the leaders 
 should always be in one of the simple formations; the distance to be 
 suflficieutly great iietween the leaders as to prevent any interfering be- 
 tween the groups. Although this system certainly aims at keeping up 
 a squadron integrity for a longer tiuie^than any other, still the maneuv- 
 ering of even two groups together will be found to be very awkward, 
 take up too much time, and the vessels, during the evolutions, could 
 not give one another sufficient support if attacked at this time. 
 
 In Plate XVII, Fig. 1, we give several forms in which groups can be, 
 and the tactician, who recommends them, explains their uses as follows: 
 
 1. The equilateral triangle, for ramming or as a cruising formation. 
 
 2. The group on a line of bearing. For flanking an enemy; for de- 
 fense against an attack by ramming, and sometimes as a formation for 
 attack. 
 
 3. The group for evolution or for using the battery. 
 
 4. Group in line ahead. 
 •J. Group in line abreast. 
 
 In regard to special formations, Admiral Eaudolph favors a line of 
 bearing in which the ships are in ichelon of not more than a point for- 
 ward and abaft the beam. (See Plate XVII, Fig. 2.) Such a formation, 
 he says, is as easy to maintain as line abreast. In this formation Admiral 
 Randolph claims: 
 
 1. The lire is left clear. 
 
 2. The closest order is maintained. 
 
 3. It gives the maximum of mutual protection. 
 
 4. It is a rapidly formed formation and can be deferred to the last 
 moment, and thus ma sk the, intent ion from the enemy. 
 
99 
 
 The distance between the ships is set down as one and one half to one 
 and three-quarter cables. 
 
 Some tacticians divide formations for cruising into those to be followed 
 in time of peace and to those applicable to a period of hostilities. Cap- 
 taiu Attylmayr, of the Austrian Navy, believes that in time of war the 
 best cruising formation is in line ahead in groups, and in time of peace 
 line ahead, either single or double, chase formation, or the square. Mr. 
 Besson, however, is of the opinion that for all purposes of cruising, line 
 ahead in divisions is the very best for squadrons; that is, the squadron is 
 in two lines ahead. From it the lineof battle can be most easily formed. 
 The Admiral can see all his ships and be seen of all ; the squadron is 
 compact, and the tenders on the wings can easily keep it advised of the 
 approach of the enemy. When cruising the place of the Admiral is 
 leading one of the lines. 
 
 Cruising in route formation consists in dividing the fleet into sections 
 of two vessels, or groups of three \essels, and each section or group 
 governing itself as a little squadron, all steering the same course, set by 
 the commander-in-chief, and each section or group maintaining proper 
 signal distance with him. This system is excellent for a long run, as, 
 for instance, crossing the Atlantic. The Admiral should furnish his 
 captains with a list of several rendezvous, and assign certain dates 
 when these rendezvous would expire. 
 
 Lieutenant Parret says that the groups first used in the French Navy 
 were in the form of an equilateral triangle. This formation was : 
 
 Not for figlitirg purposes, but as an habitual order of navigation, so as to take the 
 place of lines of ships in each other's wake ; an order compromising for steamships, 
 especially at night. 
 
 The equilateral-triangular group became usual later as a '■'■peloton de 
 combat." For a strange fact, Commander Noel puts Ms groups in such 
 a position during the night that the squadron is virtually in line ahead. 
 
 It would seem that a good night formation would be line ahead in 
 two columns or lines. Each column should not contain more than six 
 vessels, better still if there were only four. In time of peace, or away 
 from the enemy, the leader of each line should use the forward electric 
 light to illuminate the fore part of the leader of the other line, and the 
 after electric light to illuminate the fore part of the rear ship in the other 
 line. (See Plate XVII, Fig. 3.) If the officer of the deck of either of the 
 leaders, or of the rear ships, draws into the glare of the lights of the 
 leader of the other line, he will know that he is drawing ahead of his 
 station. 
 
 When convoying, the convoy squadron should be so distributed that 
 the heavier ships during the day should cruise in chase formation with 
 the lighter vessels, acting as " whippers-in," keeping the convoy well 
 within the angle. There should be tenders to act as skirmishers ahead, 
 on the flanks, and a swift one to cruise astern. During the night the 
 convoy squadron should separate and cruise on the flanks. If the con- 
 voy is large it should be divided. 
 
ino 
 
 Although massed or in square is not in good formation for lighting 
 it is a most excellent one for reconnaissance ; probably the very best 
 for a small number of ships. 
 
 Fighting formations all come within one of the four following cate- 
 gories : 
 
 1. Narrow front — great depth. 
 
 2. Extended front — slight depth. 
 
 3. Front and depth equal. 
 
 4. Groups. 
 
 The first category is represented by line ahead ; the second, by lines 
 abreast, chase and retreat formations ; the third, by the square, and the 
 fourth, by every formation that may be included in the group system. 
 
 A good order of combat demands the arrival of all the vessels as near 
 together as possible on that point of the enemy's formation where the 
 attack is made. It also must possess the following qualities : 
 
 1. It must be easy to keep. 
 
 2. It must be easy to re-form in. 
 
 3. It must lend itself, by its flexibility, to all the combinations re- 
 quired by the Admiral. 
 
 4. The vessels composing it must be so disposed as to give one an- 
 other the maximum of mutual support. 
 
 5. The vessels must be able to use all their warlike outfit, which in- 
 cludes helm and speed power ; the use of their rams, guns, and torpedoes. 
 
 Some authors do not believe in a fundamental formation for battle, but 
 think that any formation in which the fleet presents the bow to the enemy 
 may be taken as an order of attack. 
 
 Admiral Penhoat says that vessels composing the lineof-battle must 
 steer the same course, or they will run the risk of collision. In his 
 opinion, if the plan of action is based upon artillery, the best formation 
 is simple line ahead, steering a course as nearly as possible a right an- 
 gles to the direction in which the enemy bears ; otherwise the broadside 
 guns could not be used. 
 
 Even with the ram as a basis of attack, some authors jirefer a line 
 ahead on a course perpendicular to the line of formation of the enemy. 
 Their reasons being : first, that each ship in line ahead can as it cuts the 
 enemy's line use both broadsides ; and, secondly, the rear vessel of the 
 line can, without interfering with the other vessels, take advantage of the 
 melee by the time it reaches the enemy's line, and use its ram to advan- 
 tage. They consider, in making this departure from rather well-estab- 
 lished ideas, that vessels nowadays have such great speed, and that 
 artillery, from its size, must be so slowly served, the leader of the line 
 ahead will not be punished so badly as formerly. Another advantage 
 of this formation for attack is, that the rear vessels are protected, the 
 strongest and most formidable ships leading into action. 
 
 Mr. Besson says that line ahead is the easiest to keep or to reassem- 
 ble in. It is perfectly flexible, and can in a few minutes change to any 
 direction. Each vessel is flanked by the next astern which can come 
 
101 
 
 up ou either side. The vessels beiug in the wake of one another must 
 maintain the same speed, it is true, but by sheering to either side 
 any vessel can take up any speed, or use its turning power in any way. 
 The artillery lire, for the broadside, is entirely unobstructed, but the 
 ram, the bow and stern fire, and the torpedoes are certainly put out of 
 action, but by a slight sheer out of the line any or all of these weapons 
 are called into play. 
 
 This formation fulfills all the requirements of a good fighting order. 
 
 lu liue ahead, in close order, the vessels flanking each other mutnally, and their 
 hroadsides protected hy auto-mobile torpedoes, the formation should be nearly ini- 
 peuetrable. The last ship in the line is the only exposed one, and she should be en- 
 dowed with excellent turning qualities. 
 
 The line ahead presents, according to circumstances, either the bow 
 or the broadside to the enemy. At a distance, using artillery, this 
 formation is most efi&cient with a broadside presentation. It would be 
 foolish to engage the enemy broadside to, near at hand, as the fleet 
 would be too much exposed to the enemy's rams and torpedoes. 
 
 Captain Grillo, of the Italian Kavy, adopts, as an order of battle, the 
 line ahead steaming at right angles to the enemy's front. The forma- 
 tion should be kept up as long as possible. He re-enforces the head of 
 the line with the reserve division, and the rear of his line with rams or 
 ram-bowed cruisers. (See Plate XVII, Fig. 4.) 
 
 On the other hand, A dmiral Randolph expresses the opinion that the 
 line ahead is a bad attacking formation, for the reason that only the 
 leader can ram, all the guns of the fleet are not used, and because the 
 ships do not mutually support one another to any degree. He says, " It 
 is fraught M'ith the maximum of danger.'' 
 
 Mr. Laughton remarks, "The best professional opinion refuses to ad- 
 mit the line ahead as an attacking formation." 
 
 The formation in alternate lines ahead, according to this writer, is free 
 from the defects of the single line, but it is still too extended. A concen- 
 trated attack on the rear might inflict fatal damage on one or two ships, 
 before the van could come round to their assistance, supposing that 
 the enemy's formation had been penetrated by a portion of your line. 
 
 The alternate line ahead, however, has certain advantages. It is 
 powerful as regards fighting the battery, and permits vessels of the 
 second line to ram vessels of the enemy penetrating the first. Another 
 author says that a formation in alternate line ahead permits a squadron 
 to preserve a good battery front. It is a formation hard'to break through 
 and has little to fear from rams. It has the drawback of not being 
 flexible. 
 
 The majority of tacticians are of the opinion that the most reliable 
 formation for attack based upon the ram is founded on the line abreast ; 
 still it has several alleged disadvantages, which are as follows : 
 
 1. It is hard to preserve the dress of the vessels. 
 
 2. It is so extended as to favor concentrated attacks of the enemy 
 anywhere on the line. 
 
102 
 
 3. The Admiral's signals will be hard to make out by vessels on the 
 flank. 
 
 4. The flanks are unprotected. 
 
 5. It precludes broadside fire, except from the wing ships, which are 
 unsupported. 
 
 6. It is not flexible. Changes of direction require long and diflflcnlt 
 conversions. 
 
 7. It is the easiest formation to break through and to break up, if 
 the enemy, in one or two columns, concentrates every effort on one point. 
 
 These disadvantages are discussed by Mr. Besson, and some disap- 
 pear under the light he throws upon them ; for instance, it will be shown 
 later, in discussing the " Fleet in action on the open sea," that the broad- 
 side fire can be used, without endangering the other vessels of the fleet, 
 at least at any period subsequent to the first charge. 
 
 In regard to this formation not being flexible, it is thought that if 
 this order was formed just a little while before it was needed this in- 
 convenience would disappear. 
 
 Mr. Besson calls into question some of the charges made against it, 
 and says that if there are no more than eight ships in line, the formation, 
 being simple, is consequently easy to maintain and to retake, and, further- 
 more, in it, the vessels mutually give one another the maximum of sup- 
 port. It is considered at the present day the best attacking formation 
 for rams by the French writers, and by many foreign ones. 
 
 la regard to exercising in this formation, the rule is laid down that 
 the vessels should be the radius of a turning cricle apart. Each vessel 
 then has control of its engine and helm, and may be said to be unob- 
 structed in its movements. The torpedo and ram can be perfectly used, 
 likewise the bow and stern fire. 
 
 Vice-Admiral Bourgois and Lieutenant de Penfentenyo believe that 
 the attack should be made in line abreast, but that after the first charge 
 the formation will disappear ; Admiral Bourgois believing after that 
 instant each vessel will act for itself, while Mr. de Penfentenyo ad- 
 vances the opinion that the fleet should form groups, and lays down 
 rules for so doing. 
 
 Mr. Besson says that two lines abreast, either double or alternate line 
 abreast, is preferable to single line abreast. It has the merit of concen- 
 tration and mutual support. The heaviest ships should be placed in the 
 frontline, although they may be hampered in the use of their rams and 
 torpedoes, to some extent. In this formation there is this drawback, 
 that it is hard to change the vessel's course sixteen points, which must 
 be done after passing through the enemy's line, to charge him again on 
 account of possible collisions with vessels in the second line. 
 
 Admiral Penhoat acknowledges that this is a hard 1'ormation to keep 
 in, but he says that its disadvantages are few, and that any error in 
 dress is easily rectified, agreeing, as we see, with Mr. Besson on tliis 
 point. 
 
103 
 
 Captain Fremantle is of the opiuion that if there are many ships, the 
 fleet should be divided into independent squadrons, but preserving for 
 each squadron the formation of alternate line abreast. On the other 
 hand, when your fleet is so small as to allow the enemy's line to over- 
 lap your flanks, when formed in this manner, Mr. Bessou says that 
 yon must not fight in this formation, but in ningle line abreast. 
 
 Captain Attylmayr does not believe in the double or alternate lines 
 abreast, and says that it should be entirely discarded as an attacking 
 formation. 
 
 According to Captain Grillo, in attacking this formation with a fleet 
 formed in line ahead, the rear vessels of your line ahead should be or- 
 dered to reserve their fire for the rear line of the enemy's two lines 
 abreast. 
 
 The great drawback to the formation in square is that stations can- 
 not be maintained at good speed. 
 
 Formations in echelon present to the enemy a line of rams and a line 
 of fire. Yet it is a dangerously bad formation if it is attacked in direc- 
 tion of its line of bearing, as it is not flexible. An angular formation, 
 such as a chase formation, permits the use of only one broadside on the 
 enemy; moreover, it is a hard foimation to maintain, and an attack 
 from rams is liable to get it into confusion. Although a formation in 
 chase-angle gained for the Austrians the battle of Lissa, its disadvan- 
 tage is in changing direction. The point of the angle must be kept 
 towards the enemy, otherwise the enemy will concentrate on one of the 
 flanks. Owing to its unhandiness as a general formation for attack, it 
 is not to be recommended. In fact the most modern tacticians condemn 
 it entirely as too clumsy. Unless the enemy, in some simple formation, 
 was very badly managed he could turn so that he con Id always avoid 
 the point, and could thereby flank the fleet. 
 
 Captain Werner, of the German Navy, in 1873 said, that "all modern 
 systems must look to the ram as the main weapon, and all formations 
 should have this end in view, and should try and combine as many rams 
 as possible on the enemy at the point attacked. To do this the fighting 
 formation should be such a one as to remain intact and be compact as 
 long as possible, and at the same time to permit of great mobility. The 
 group system of three vessels is the only one which satisfies these con- 
 ditions. It is easily managed and can be rapidly formed again on dis- 
 persion." ■ Captain Werner believes in the right-angled triangular group, 
 hypothenuse to the rear. Other friends of this system argue for the sca- 
 lene triangle, since the rear vessel has an excellent chance to ram. They 
 all believe that after the fight commences every group should be under 
 the sole control of its leader. 
 
 Lieutenant Campbell arranges his groups in a manner that has the 
 advantages of the unity of the group system, and the defense and sup- 
 port accredited to the double or treble line abreast. (See Plate XVII^ 
 Fig. 5.) 
 
104 
 
 Line ahead by groups, in one or two lines, appears to Lieutenant Al- 
 granati to fill all the condition s of an excellent order of attack. The 
 first or second charge will break up any elaborate formation, and the 
 groups will probably hold on longer to their identity than ships in any 
 other formation. The leading groups should be formed with the most 
 formidable anuor-clads. The rear group, which has the best chance to 
 ram, should be composed of those vessels best qualified for this work. 
 
 Vice- Admiral Eandolph examines, in his work on tactics, the differ- 
 ent formations that a squadron can take to attack, and he proposes au 
 order in echelon on a line of bearing not greater than one and a half 
 points forward or abaft the beam. He applies this formation to eight 
 armor-clads divided into divisions, and he places them on two lines of 
 bearing, but one line is the inverse of the bearing of the other. They 
 are formed something like a retreat formation. (See Plate XVII, Fig. 6.) 
 After the first penetration of the enemy's line, the order of cohesion 
 ought to be kept up until the squadron has executed the plan of battle 
 of the admiral. After this the greatest liberty of action is left to the 
 captains. 
 
 An authority who favors this system of Admiral Randolph says — 
 
 We think that it will be always wiser and more advantageous to keep together all 
 the forces in a compact mass than to divide them into isolated groups. If the aim of 
 strategy is to deceive the enemy to the last moment, to hide from him the method of 
 attack, we believe that this result can only be brought about by rapidly moving the 
 squadron en masse. We conceive this can best be done by using some flexible prepar- 
 atory formation, and then moving in some preconcerted manner, as contemplated by 
 Admiral Randolph. 
 
 The retreat formation as a formation for retreat or otherwise has few 
 friends, and may now be considered obsolete. Any spread-out formation, 
 such as this is, is bad. In retreating the best formation is probably in 
 lines ahead, with the least-injured ships nearest the enemy. Authors 
 who recommend spread-out formations to serve this purpose forget the 
 following considerations : A spread-out order supposes that all the ves- 
 sels can steam without assistance, and are still in a condition to fight. 
 This hypothesis is not tenable, for a fleet would retreat fighting, and 
 only after a reverse or failure. On its face a spread-out order permits 
 an enemy with superior speed to concentrate its force on some point of 
 the fleet in retreat, and destroy it. 
 
 In alternate lines ahead the formation is more concentrated and cohe- 
 sive. Every gun is capable of being used against the enemy. Stations 
 are easily kept, and the towed vessels are well protected. Finally, there 
 are no complicated maneuvers. So this formation is the best for dis- 
 abled vessels in retreat, as they can be taken in under the guns of their 
 own fortifications, or can enter their ports without any evolution, save 
 changing direction. 
 
 Possibly there is one condition where retreat formation may be avail- 
 able; that is, when fighting in a comparatively narrow channel, there 
 is danger of being attacked by the enemy's fleet. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 in'O/A'TIOXS Of THE FLEET. 
 
 ]0\ olutions in uaval tactics have for their object the asHeiiibliiig of 
 formations and the passing from one formation to another. They must 
 sati.sfy the following requirements : 
 
 J. They should be done in the least possible time. 
 
 2. Tliey should be spread out as little as possible. 
 
 There are thre.i' methods of evolution ; those controlled by — 
 1. Simultaneous movements. 
 'J. Successive movements. 
 
 3. Direct or oblique movements. 
 
 It will be seen further on that some tacticians draw a line between 
 direct and obliqtie movements ; others, consider this extreme delicacy of 
 division to be unnecessary. 
 
 The tactician should study these fundamental movements thoroughly, 
 so as to decide without liedl at ion whicli metliod fits the case best. It 
 will be seen that some evolutions require a combination of all three of 
 these methods. 
 
 Evolutions are not tactics, although they form the basis on which 
 tactics are founded. Captain Fremaiitle says, " they are simply tieet 
 drill, and the signal-book is the drill-book." 
 
 In all evolutions performed by a fleet at sea in the presence of an en- 
 emy, the one important point is that they should be quickly understood 
 by the commanding officers of the ships composing the fleet. To attain 
 this very desirable result, it is necessary, accordingto Lieutenant Camp- 
 bell— 
 
 1. That the signals should be as few in number as possible. 
 
 2. That the explanation attached to each signal should be as explicit 
 and concise as possible. 
 
 3. That the officers of the Navy should be instructed in the manner of 
 performing the maneuvers as early in their career as possible. 
 
 Since changes in naval warfare are constantly rendering changes in 
 ships necessary, changes in ships bring about changes in evolutions 
 and also in the manner of performing them. These changes necessitate 
 changes iu the signal-book. 
 
 The knowledge of the helm, the speed of the ship, and the elements 
 of the turning circle, certainly furnish thebasis for all evolutions. There 
 
 105 
 
10« 
 
 will be some dififlculty iu maneuvering a fleet composed of vessels vary, 
 ing greatly in speed, turning power, and armament, so as to develop the 
 special qualities of each ship ; therefore it may be set down as a maxim 
 that the actual capabilities of the worst of the vessels comprising a fleet 
 must be taken as the representative capability of such fleet. So that the 
 maximum speed of the slowest ship is effectively the maximum speed of 
 the fleet, and the circle of the ship which describes the largest, is, effect- 
 ively, the circle on which every vessel in the fleet has to maneuver. 
 
 It seems, therefore, to follow that the power of a fleet as a flghtiug 
 unit may be improved by the rejection of those vessels whose power of 
 maneuvering is bad. Mr. Laughton says : " Ships so ejected might form 
 a reserve to act in time of battle, independent of the formation of the 
 main body." 
 
 It must be borne in mind that a surprise to a fleet by an enemy lias 
 ever been dangerous; but with our mo<lern means of warfare it will 
 certainly prove disastrous. This being the' case, it will require great 
 foresight on the part of a commander-in-chief to have hjs fleet in such 
 a condition, as regards formation, that it will not be lu'cessary to per- 
 form any evolution of moment in the presence of the enemy. Should 
 it become necessary, however, under these circumstances, to maneuver 
 the fleet in order to form to resist attack, stich an evolution must be 
 performed by ships, according to Admiral Penhoat, and not by groups; 
 as by this latter system the fleet will be spread out, and a concent ratiou 
 on a portion of it by the enemy will be easier. Tlie Admiral goes on 
 to say that — 
 
 If the form and orgauizatioii of tlio liue-of-battlo tire well detcruiiiietl, it will be i-;isy 
 to deduce the proper formation for steaming aud to establish in nouic way a proper 
 system of evolutions. These tvolutions, above all, must be simple. 
 
 It may be laid down as a general principle that no evolution is of 
 merit which employs such a method, to pass from one formation to an- 
 other, as breaks up the mutual support whicli should exist, in all good 
 tactics, between the ships of the fleet. 
 
 After preparatory exercise, so as to permit the captains to familiar- 
 ize themselves with the handling of their ships, the fleet should be 
 formed in line and exercises should begin. We have before discussed 
 the principles by which the speed and position are maintained, and have 
 given forms of the tables to be used. 
 
 The fleet must drill at making together two turns of 90° each ; one 
 turn with the helm one way, and the other with the hebn over the 
 other way. The turns to be made at full speed anil to 1k' continuous. 
 (See Plate XVIII, Fig. 1.) 
 
 Drill in change of speed can be done as follows: The fleet being on 
 a line of bearing four points on the Admnal'.s quarter, for examiile, 
 and on the same course as the flagship, will, at the signal, come into 
 line abreast, dressing on the flagship. Then the moving flank will be 
 changed, and the same movements will be repeated, pivoting on the 
 
107 
 
 ship on the other extremity of the line. The ships always steering 
 parallel courses. 
 
 Night drill is siniplitied by the improved methods of electric lighting. 
 It certainly takes more nerve to drill in darkness, but it is most neces- 
 sary, and the Admiral should constantly exercise his fleet at this time. 
 
 In regard to intervals, the general rule is to close them when the for- 
 mation is accomplished, and to open them out before beginning to form 
 a nevp one. 
 
 Owing to the reduction in speed caused by turning, vessels changing 
 direction in line ahead in close order will be likely to collide with the 
 next ahead. Distances then must be great enough to permit vessels 
 to turn without being run into. 
 
 The following instructions taken from the " Manuel du Matelot Tim- 
 onier (Paris, 1882)" are extracted from the first volume of the Naval Tac- 
 tics of the French Navy : 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR SQUADRON STEAMING. 
 
 Every vessel ■whicli increases or diminishes its speed must communicate the fact to 
 the next ahead and the next astern. 
 
 This rule not only applies to formations and to evolutions, hut to every circumstance 
 where vessels maneuver in proximity to any others. It is shown hy hoisting the 
 speed pendant higher when the speed is increased, and lowering it when the speed is 
 diminished. At night a lantern is waved over the bow, to be answered by the next 
 ahead, when the speed is increased, and if the speed ia diminished, the lantern is 
 waved over the stern, to be answered by the next astern. 
 
 The only circumstances under which a vessel is authorized to stop, 
 when steaming in squadron, are the following: 
 
 1. To save a man overboard. 
 
 2. In case of an accident to the engine, screw, or rudder. 
 
 3. To avoid a collision. 
 
 In almost every case the vessel which stops should drop out of line, 
 by sheering to that side which interferes with the other vessels the least. 
 
 II. 
 
 In any movement made by a fleet in performing an evolution, there 
 are the following requirements to be fulfilled: 
 
 1. To lose as little distance as possible in passing from one point to 
 another. 
 
 2. To avoid any possibility of collision between two or more ships of 
 the fleet. 
 
 3. To keep the fleet in such a condition as to form order-of- battle easily 
 and quickly. 
 
 We may also state that the nature of all movements of a liiie-of- 
 battle presents three phases : 
 
 1. To approach the ehemy^-bow towards him. 
 
 2. To keep at a certain distance from the enemy — broadside towards 
 him. 
 
108 
 
 3. To retreat, or increase the distance from the euemy — stern towards 
 him. 
 
 We have raid in the first part of this chapter that movements may 
 be classed under the head of simultaneous, successive, and direct. 
 
 Simultaneous movements are those performed by all the ships of 
 the fleet, which are steering the same course, coming together on some 
 other common course. 
 
 Successive movements are those which are performed by means 
 of the countermarch. This method consists in patting the ileet into line 
 ahead. The leader steams in the new direction, followed by the other 
 vessels. The advantage is thatit requires no signals, the quickest speed 
 is maintained, and there is little or no danger of collision. Furthermore, 
 a countermarch is applicable to any number of vessels, whereas, a wheel 
 in a concentric circle, which is intended to accomplish the same object 
 as a countermarch, can be undertaken by only a very small number of 
 ships, since the greater the radius of turn for the fleet or squadron in 
 line abreast, the greater the speed to be made by the moving flank ship. 
 \Vith more than five ships in line, the flank ship would have to make 
 greater speed than vessels are generally capable of doing. There is 
 a method called by the French conversion, which is intended to accomr 
 plish the same object as the wheel or countermarch, and which is a com- 
 bination of the simultaneous movement and the direct movement. This 
 method will be further discussed at another point in this chapter. 
 
 When the movements refer to changes of direction of eight points 
 by means of a successive movement, they are termed " rectangular 
 movements," and evolutions performed by this method furnish the basis 
 of a regular school of tactics. There is another method of performing 
 rectangular movements, now practiced in the French evolutionary squad- 
 ron, we believe, which resembles the isodromic method of Captain Lewal, 
 which will be touched upon later. 
 
 Without discussing all the plans, methods, and means of evolution 
 suggested in the last twenty years, we will say the great speed that 
 ships are now capable of, and at which all evolutions must be performed, 
 entail upon these evolutions the greatest possible simplicity. Therefore 
 it may be laid down as a general rule, that where direction is to be 
 changed without changing the formation, if the angular difference be- 
 tween the new and old line of bearing is less than four points, and if 
 the fleet is in line abreast and not very large as regards numbers, then 
 wheeling in concentric circle or conversion should be resorted to. If, 
 however, the change is greater than four points, then the evolution 
 will be performed either by a simultaneous movement into line ahead; 
 followed by a countermarch, and then again swinging simultaneously 
 to some common course, or the evolution will be performed by a direct 
 MOVEMENT. A direct movement is where each vessel proceeds from 
 her place in the old formation to her place in the new, at the quickest 
 speed, by the shortest route, without reference to the other vessels of 
 
109 
 
 the fleet. Since one of the vessels of the fleet is formed upon in all di- 
 rect movements, and since vessels arrive in their new positions at dif- 
 ferent times, changes of speed are necessitated. Simultaneous and 
 successive movements, then, have this advantage over direct movements: 
 full speed can be maintained at all times. 
 
 Although at first glance the direct method may seem to be the easiest 
 to maneuver in, it is not so. Unless the fleet is very well drilled, there 
 is great danger of collision ; and, moreover, the vessels in passing from 
 one point to the other are in no formation and are tlieiefore at a disad- 
 vantage in case of attack. 
 
 Captain Fremantle thinks that it is "wise to prescribe as closely as 
 possible to each captain the course to be followed." He also thinks 
 that there will never be an attempt made to change a formation when 
 in action, since such change will act too disadvantageously for the 
 fleet in the manner we have spoken of. Furthermore, he says : " Rec- 
 tangular movements, which allow changes of formation to be made 
 without variation of speed, are correct." 
 
 Many authors, however, do not believe that rectangular movements 
 are applicable to a fleet of armored vessels, into which fighting by means 
 of the ram enters. They believe in direct movements, which, as we 
 have before said, contemplate a vessel proceeding from one position in 
 a formation to some other position in some other formation by any route 
 her captain may chose, observing the usual rules of the road. 
 
 Some writers favor the use of both systems, the admiral to be gov- 
 erned by the environment as to which method he will use. Bach of 
 them, however, have their drawbacks. With rectangular movements, if 
 we are maneuvering in the presence of the enemy, our broadsides are 
 exposed to his line of rams ; with direct movements collisions are lia- 
 ble to occur, and the fleet is without order until the new formation is 
 complete. 
 
 An advantage with rectangular movements is that it takes less time 
 to perform the evolution, and the location of the new formation is ex- 
 actly known; that is to say, the commander-in-chief, supposing him to 
 be in the leading ship, passes exactly over the spot of the new line of 
 bearing ; whereas with direct movements it is not so. For instance, 
 the fleet are in line ahead, and they wish to form line abreast on the 
 leader, on a line, of bearing eight points from their present line. As 
 the leader must keep up his steerage way, although at a reduced speed, 
 say four knots, the consequence is that by the time the fleet are in line 
 abreast the formation is accomplished two or three miles ahead of where 
 the leader was when the evolution commenced. 
 
 With the great speed that vess'els will maneuver at nowadays, it may 
 be set down as a maxim, that, if an enemy's fleet should be discovered 
 less than four miles off', and your formation was in line ahead in direc- 
 tion of the enemy's bearing, and you wished to form line abreast, or 
 some modification of it, you must use a rectangular, and not a direct 
 
no 
 
 luovemeut; otherwise tbe euemy will be upon you before your formation 
 is complete. 
 
 A poiut in favor of direct movements is, that ships performing this 
 evolution always present their bows to the enemy, which, in this age of 
 ram warfare, is of great moment. 
 
 III. 
 
 It is our intention now to consider several systems proposed by tac- 
 ticians for the performance of evolutions. Many of the methods pre- 
 sented are perhaps antiquated, still they are so often referred to by later 
 writers that it will be as well for us to make some little examination 
 into them. 
 
 We have seen that Mr. Laughtou divides his fleet into groups of 
 three ; each group he terms a squadron, and each leader is the flagship 
 of a rear-admiral. . His method of evolutions consists in putting his 
 squadron into line ahead, and using a successive movement, or in put- 
 ting each .squadron into line abreast, and making a wheel in a "con- 
 centric circle "through eight or sixteen points. To these are added si- 
 multaneous movements, which may be considered as entering into the 
 scheme of evolutions of every tactican. Mr. Laughton also bases his 
 evolutions upon a time element so that a shij), for instance, in a forma- 
 tion in line ahead in close order puts over her helm at a certain time-iu- 
 terval after she has received a signal from her next ahead. When this 
 last ship puts over her helm she signals the fact to her uext astern, &c. 
 
 The author describes his method of performing concentric circles, as 
 follows : 
 
 At a reduced speed of three knots, the pivot ship describes the arc of her circle 
 through the required change of bearing ; the center ship describes the same arc witli 
 a double radius, at a speed of six Ituots, and the third ship with a treble radius, 
 and it speed of nine knots, thus " wheeling " into line on the required bearing. 
 
 We have here a simultaneous-direct movement, but with two new ele- 
 ments; helm angle different for each ship and dift'erent speeds. 
 
 Commander Noel adopts groups, as units, performing rectangular move- 
 ments. That is to say, all movements made by groups are to be con- 
 sidered, when maneuvering in fleet formation, as if the groups were each 
 a single vessel. Among the vessels of the groups themselves the 
 movements are not rectangular, and are made at different speeds. The 
 speed of the group-leader, however, is never changed; always being the 
 highest adopted speed of the fleet. The movements of the fleet are, 
 nevertheless, rectangular when passing from one distinct formation to 
 another. 
 
 Captain Fremantle remarks substantially as follows, on this point: 
 The difiHculty of evolutions in groups consists in this: The ships of a 
 
 grou]) must maintain both their relative and absolute bearings that is 
 
 when the course is changed, the whole group have to swing into their 
 
HI 
 
 new positions as sliiiis forming on tlicir group leaders in order to keep 
 up the fornuition. Tliis involves so Tnany difficulties, as cliange of 
 speed, &c., tbat all advantage of the group oi' three sl)ii)s is lost by its 
 unhandiness. 
 
 Vice-Admlral Jurieu de la Gravifere, who commanded the French 
 fleet of evolutions in 1868-'70, chose the division as the tactical unit, 
 and had the following ideas upon some tactical questions. He did not 
 believe in any fundamental formation for attack. The battle having 
 once begun, the captains must fight the ships without any special di- 
 rection from the Admiral. Furthermore he did not believe that rectan- 
 gular movements were suitable for arnior-clads, and therefore he sub- 
 stituted those which were direct. Every vessel proceeded to her station 
 as we have before described, and for which maneuver an expression was 
 invented, or at least a phrase was applied, namely, that each vessel 
 should '■'■chasser son posteJ^ 
 
 Admiral Boutakov takes as a point of departure for his evolutionary 
 system, the idea that every evolution of a vessel is formulated upon two 
 geometrical lines: the circle, and a line tangent to it. Considering the 
 vessel to be moving, if the helm is put over she describes a curve, which 
 may be taken as a circle, and if the helm is riglited she describes a line 
 which is taTigeut to this circle. 
 
 The radius of the turning circle used by the squadron is the basis of 
 all measurements, and everything is laid down with the greatest precision. 
 He contrived a series of co-ordinates, so that the ship at any movement 
 of its evolution could be plotted mathematically. Probably it is more 
 theoretical than practical, for although each captain is furnished with 
 minute data as regards engine and helm, still the author supplements 
 these instructions by advising the commanding officers that they must 
 be governed also by surrounding circumstances, and that they should 
 preserve their stations by viewing the situation rather than by a blind 
 following of theory. 
 
 The Admiral indicates several methods of changing the direction of a 
 line ahead. Some are made by countermarching and some are made by 
 conversion. This last evolution is made in three movements. 
 
 Wishing to change direction eight points, being in line ahead — 
 
 1. All the ships together put over their helms and swing to a line-of- 
 bearing parallel to the course in line ahead. The angle which the head 
 of each ship swings through is always once and a half, the change of 
 direction of the lines of bearing. (See A., Plate XVIII, Fig. 2.) In this 
 case the ship's head has changed course through twelve points. 
 
 2. Each vessel proceeds at different speeds, the pivot vessel just turn- 
 ing over, the flank vessel moving at full speed, dressing on the pivot 
 shiji, until the line of bearing is changed eight points. (See B, same 
 plate and figure), when ; 
 
 3. Each vessel puts its helm over simultaneously, and swings into 
 line ahead. (See C, same plate and figure.) 
 
112 
 
 Of course, the new direction MC may make any otlier angle tlian a 
 right angle with the old line ahead NM. It will be noticed that by this 
 method the rear ship is foriaed upon. 
 
 To change direction in line abreast (see Plate XVIII, Pig. 3), either 
 pass to the formation of line ahead by simultaneously putting over 
 the helm, then letting the leader steam in the new direction, the rest 
 of the fleet following, the one in the wake of the other, and when the 
 last ship has gained the new direction, having the tleet swing into line 
 abreast simultaneously ; or else, the fleet can proceed as follows (see 
 Plate XVIII, Fig. 4): The vessels together swing through half the 
 angle between the old direction and the new, the pivot vessel barely 
 turning over, the flank vessel at full speed. When the line-of-bearing 
 at right angles to new direction is reached, the fleet comes simultane- 
 ously to the new course and renews the normal speed. .This second 
 method is only to be used when the change of direction is less than five 
 points. 
 
 When the fleet is in bow and quarter line and wishes to change.direc- 
 tion it must first come into line abreast or into line ahead, and then pro- 
 ceed by the rules given above. 
 
 The author has a method of opening order and increasing distance 
 by means of sheering. This plan is hardly feasible at night, and has 
 given way to other and simpler methods. 
 
 Captain Colomb's method of evolutions as set forth in his work in 
 1865, resembles somewhat that of Admiral Boutakov. He assumes 
 that the vessel describes a circle in turning and a tangent to this 
 circle when the helm is righted. He calls " simple evolutions" those 
 performed by either change of speed or use of helm ; and, " compound 
 evolutions" those in which both ch^iuge of speed and use of helm enter. 
 He only allows change of speed when he prescribes the direct method of 
 movement. A compound movement is a combination of several sim- 
 ple ones. At the end of each simple movement, the alignment is rec- 
 tified. The author discusses several methods of changing the direction 
 of a line ahead, one of which is by wheelinc/ in concentric circles. All 
 the vessels swing through eight points together, coming into line 
 abreast. The pivot vessel then puts its helm at such an angle as to 
 describe the arc of a circle with a radius of two cables ; the vessel next 
 to the pivot puts its helm at such an angle as to make the radius of 
 the arc of its circle four cables and so on, increasing the diameter of the 
 turning circles two cables for each ship towards the moving Hank. 
 The pivot barely keeps steerage way. The wing shij) goes at full speed, 
 the fleet keep their alignment. When they come into line abreast on 
 the new line of bearing, the vessels' helms are put over the same waj^ 
 together, and the fleet comes into line ahead, resuming full speed when 
 the helms are put over. (See Plate XIX, Fig. 3.) 
 
 The two methods by which the bearing of a line can be changed, but 
 
113 
 
 ■where the course still remains the same, are formulated by the author 
 as follows : 
 
 1. By using the system of co-ordinates proposed by Admiral Bouta- 
 kov, or — 
 
 2. By using the method of wheeling in concentric circles, or the 
 countermarch to get on to the new line- of- training, and then coming 
 to the old course by a simultaneous movement. 
 
 We will now considera lastexample to show Captain Colomb's meth- 
 ods. Being in dovible line ahead, by divisions and wishing to change 
 both course and line-of-beariug (see Plate XIX, Fig. 1), he proceeds as 
 follows : If the change is less than eight points, the outside division 
 continues its course, and keeps its speed. The inside division (the pivot 
 division) continues its course and diminishes its speed. The file leader 
 of this pivot division lets the file leader of the other division pass him 
 by a bearing equal to half the angle of the change of direction. At this 
 instant both leaders come on the new line of bearing, followed by the 
 ships of their line. The pivot division continuing at reduced speed un- 
 til the other division bears perpendicular to the course steered. If the 
 change is greater than eight points, then the division towards which 
 the turn is made (see Plate XIX, Fig. 2) stands on the same course at 
 full speed; the other division stands on the same course with reduced 
 speed, until the tile leader of the quick steaming division bears from 
 the leader of the slow steaming division, half the angular difference 
 between the old and new directions, when each leader maneuvers, as 
 in the former case, followed by the ships of their lines. It will be ob- 
 served that the left division has become the right one and vice versa. 
 
 We make our next note upon a system of evolutions proposed by 
 Captain Lewal. It consists in moving the fleet from one formation to 
 another by means of isodromy, or " paths of equal length." The method 
 is easy to be seen by reference to Plate XX, Fig. 1. It has the disad- 
 vantage of there being practically a great liability of collisions occur- 
 ring. It will be observed that each ship has passed over a course of 
 the same length, and that the same speed is maintained by each ship. 
 This evolutionary system, or something nearly akin to it, is recommended 
 by Mr. Besson. We are led to infer that this method is now being used, 
 or has been used until lately, by the French squadron of evolutions. 
 
 M. de Penfentenyo discusses the movements between the vessels com- 
 posing groups, so that the leaders can maneuver either by rectangular 
 or direct methods, whilst the duration of the evolution is shortened by 
 the vessels of each group moving among themselves. This author used 
 a line abreast as the basis of formation, the group of three being the unit 
 of division. When the fleet maneuvers, the groups arrange themselves 
 in scalene-triangular form; but the leaders of the groups are always in 
 some simple formation. He maneuvers the vessels of his groups as fol- 
 lows; in changing direction two methods are used: 
 
 1. When the change is less than (50°. 
 482 8 
 
114 
 
 2. When the change is greater than 60°. 
 
 In the first category the positions of the ships do not change; the 
 leader remains ahead. The vessels on his quarters move in such a man- 
 ner that each ship brings itself to bear half the angular change with the 
 new course, the ship on the starboard quarter slacking speed if chang- 
 ing course to starboard, the vessel on the port quarter increasing hers. 
 (See Plate XX, Fig. 2.) 
 
 If the change of direction is more than 60°, the three vessels come to- 
 gether on the new course at the same time. The vessel that finds itself 
 leading in the new direction becomes the leader ; the two other ships so 
 use their speed and helm as to group themselves as shown in Plate XX, 
 Figs. 3 & 4. 
 
 When a change of 16 points is made, the triangle is reversed by the 
 method shown in Plate XX, Fig. 5. 
 
 We now come to consider the evolutionary system of Admiral Pen- 
 hoat. He is very minute in his discussion of evolutionary points, and it 
 is to be regretted that his most interesting instruction cannot be more 
 fully entered into in these pages. Both the successive and direct sys- 
 tems are used by him. As regards simultaneous movements, he says: 
 
 Theoretically, in these movements every ship puts its lielm over in the same direc- 
 tion at the same time; practically, the ship that has no vessel on the side towards 
 which she turns should commence— as, for instance, the rear ship in line ahead; as 
 Boon as the maneuver is marked, then the next ship to her, and so on. 
 
 The signal for the execution of any evolution may be given by the 
 steam-whistle of the flagship, as well as by hauling down the hoist of 
 flags. 
 
 Simultaneous movement is the only method which can be used in 
 action. 
 
 Successive movements relate to the maneuvers of a line ahead, when 
 one vessel keeps its station at all times in the wake of another, its next 
 ahead, no matter what change of direction is made. In changing direc- 
 tion, which in successive movement is for each ship only a change of 
 course, each ship moves her helm over easily. (See Plate XX, Fig. 6.) 
 
 In regard to direct movements, this expression designates, as we have 
 said, a maneuver of a line which passes from one formation to another by 
 each vessel steering directly for its new position; for example, being in 
 line ahead, to form line abreast. (See Plate XXI, Fig. 1.) The pivot 
 vessel reduces speed to steerage way and continues on its course. The 
 other vessels steer sufflc'ently to port to gain their stations at full speed 
 first; then, moderating their speeds and keeping their dress, on bringing 
 the pivot guide on a proper bearing, they will steer his course. Suppose 
 the pivot's speed is five knots, and that the rear vessel gains its position 
 at the rate of 11 knots, it would take a fleet of eight ships twenty minutes 
 to perform this evolution, and the formation would be completed 2 mile* 
 from where the evolution commenced. 
 If two opposing fleets have each a tactical speed of II knots, it will be 
 
115 
 
 necessary to begin the formation for attack 6 miles about from where 
 the enemy is, in order that it may be accomplished by the time you 
 must engage. 
 
 We will compare this with an example of an evolution composed of a 
 successive movement succeeded by a simultaneous movement, being in 
 line ahead, to form line abreast, changing direction eight points to star- 
 board. A successive movement is made eight points to starboard, and 
 when the new line of bearing is reached by all the vessels of the fleet, 
 a simultaneous movement is performed eight points to port. It will take 
 eight vessels, 300 yards apart, steaming at a rate of 11 knots, ten to 
 thirteen minutes to perform this evolution. Advance, say, 200 yards. 
 
 In the first part of this chapter we said that some tacticians discrimi- 
 nate between direct and oblique movements. Admiral Penhoat, as we 
 will see, makes an oblique maneuver a subordinate division of direct 
 movements. He says, "That category of direct movements which is 
 the most unfavorable is where the line abreast to be formed is at right 
 angles to the line ahead you are in, and which we have discussed. If this 
 liue abreast is 'oblique to the line ahead, the consequences of the move- 
 ment are not the same." Let us suppose a line ahead of eight ships, dis- 
 tance 2 cables, speed 10 knots, are maneuvering to form by a direct 
 movement a line abreast, where the line of bearing is at an angle of 45° 
 with the old line. This is termed an oblique movement. (See Plate XXI, 
 Fig. 2.) It is done as follows : Simultaneous movement to starboard from 
 liue ahead, through the angle which is the complement of the angle which 
 the new line of bearing makes with the old. Each ship then steers for 
 its new station in line, regulating speed as in former cases. If we sup- 
 pose the speed to be the same as in the examj)le of direct movements, 
 it will take fifteen minutes to complete the evolution, and the fleet will 
 have run 2,000 yards on its course. It would take a little less time to 
 make this same evolution by countermarch. The rule is, if the change 
 of the new line of bearing is more than an angle of 45°, use successive 
 movement ; if the angle is less than 45°, use direct movement. 
 
 Direct movements, when the fleet is formed in double line ahead, with 
 an interval equal to a divisional front plus one distance (see Plate XXI, 
 Fig. 3), present some advantages over successive movements, if the 
 fleet wish to form line abreast. With eight vessels steaming 10 knots, 
 and preserving the usual distance, the duration of the evolution will be 
 eight minutes and the gain ahead three-quarters of a mile. With a suc- 
 cessive movemen t the d uration would be nine minutes. If the line abreast 
 to be formed is not at right angles to the double line ahead, the move- 
 ment is not so simple, but it can be done in two ways. 
 
 The first method (see Plate XXII, Fig. 1) is to form line abreast by a 
 direct movement, then change course eight points, coming into line 
 ahead. Enter on the new line of bearing by a successive movement, 
 and then, when the fleet is on this Ijne, all come into line abreast. 
 
 The second method (see Plate XXII, Fig. 2) is to form the fleet into 
 
116 
 
 line ahead by a successive movement on a line eight points from the old 
 direction, then steer in the new direction, and Avhen the fleet is on this 
 bearing' come into line abreast simultaneously. 
 
 We now come to consider change of direction of vessels iu line abreast 
 or on aline of bearing by certain direct movements generally called conver- 
 sions. Circular conversions, or icheeliiuj in concentric circles, is, as we have 
 seen, impractit-able for a large fleet, on account of the speed demanded 
 from the vessel on the moving flank. The author explains the following 
 system as an efficient substitute or modification. A conversion becomes 
 constantly necessary as the bearing of the enemy changes You desire 
 to keep your line parallel with and opposed to his. (See Plate XXII, Fig. 
 3.) The fleet is on line A, and you must change to line B, as the enemy 
 has changed his position from to D. To do this the vessels come 
 simultaneously to a course perpendicular to the new line. The pivot 
 stands on with barely steerage way; the flank ship stands on with the 
 fastest speed. The rest of the vessels vary their speed to keep their 
 dress. When they arrive on the new line B, speed is resumed. This is 
 not strictly a good method, since it brings the ships closer together on 
 the new line. It, however, answers very well for small changes of di- 
 rection, as it takes the least possible time to loerform such change. If 
 time offers after this evolution has been performed, the fleet should open 
 out to their proper distances. 
 
 In order that ships should be at a proper distance from one another 
 when they arrive on the new line, they should steer such a course from 
 the old line A (see Plate XXII, Fig. 4) as to be perpendicular to a line 
 bisecting the angle between the old and the new lines of bearing. 
 
 The Admiral has the following to say on formations, and the pecul- 
 iarities of naval war that are now forced upon us by the enormous speed 
 made by ships. Even with a small number of vessels, no movement 
 can be made with the enemy bearing down upon you, inside of four miles 
 separation. If an evolution must be performed, it would be better to 
 charge through the enemy's line, in the formation in which you happen 
 to be, and form on the other side. You have been caught at a disad- 
 vantage, and you must make a run for it, and this is the safest way to 
 gain time to perfect a formation. 
 
 We have now presented about all the principles involved in the evo- 
 lutionary systems of the last twenty years ; only those in future will 
 remain which fulfill the following conditions :* 
 
 1. The ships must cover the least space at full speed without danger 
 of collision. 
 
 2. The evolution must be feasible at night as well as by day. 
 
 3. During the evolution the ships must be formed, and be able to give 
 each other mutual support. 
 
 4. If possible, the broadside must not be presented to the enemy's line 
 of rams. 
 
 It may be judged from our previous remarks on formations that only 
 
117 
 
 lines ahead aud lines abreast have survived the necessities exacted of 
 tactics by the modern ship. The only question, then, is, what evolutions 
 permit these formations to be accomplished under circumstances of or- 
 dinary steaming or in the face of the enemy ? The fulfillment of the first 
 three of these conditions imposes simultaneous and successive move- 
 ments ; the fourth category renders, under some, we may say most, cir- 
 cumstances, direct movements necessary. 
 
 The ideal system of evolution has yet to be perfected, but we are in- 
 clined to believe that it will be founded upon the isodromic method. It 
 may be said for this system that when a fleet is maneuvering in the 
 presence of the enemy, each vessel is pretty well covered by the remain- 
 ing ships from any onset of the enemy for purposes of ramming. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 TBE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 
 I. 
 
 In the opinion of a German tactician, the naval battle of the future 
 will bear some resemblance to a combat on shore. In the army long 
 lines of skirmishers are pushed forward, followed in quick succession by- 
 other lines, until the whole force is deployed, when the whole body ad- 
 vances, and in a few minutes the battle is decided. His idea is that the 
 torpedo vessels represent the lines of skirmishers, and the line-of-battle 
 ships the columns. 
 
 Captain Rivet says : 
 
 The following tactical directions may be considered fundamental : 
 
 Ist. During the execution of a maneuver determined on beforehand or ordered by 
 signal, and which has for its object the bringing of the fleet into action, no vessel 
 must change course except to avoid being rammed. 
 
 2d. From the moment that the fighting formation is broken up the combined action 
 of the vessels as a fleet will cease. E3,ch ship must act by herself, and she should try 
 and avail herself of every chance of ramming the enemy which presents itself, and 
 should assist any friendly vessel in need. 
 
 3d. Mutual support would point out the necessity of not separating. The grand 
 object will be to keep together, and prevent the enemy from concentrating on any 
 point. 
 
 4th. When once the ranks are broken it is imperative to keep a lookout on the flag- 
 ship for signals, although the fighting of each ship as an individual must not be re- 
 laxed. 
 
 Captain Bridge, E. N., remarks as follows : 
 
 Fleets will approach one another at a greater or less speed ; that of about 8 knots, 
 I am inclined to believe, will be the most usual. As they approach, every gun will 
 be, most likely, fired. Ae they arrive in close proximity, the bow-gun fire will become 
 at length ineffectual, and the respective captains will be disinclined to keep the fore 
 parts of their vessels enveloped in clouds of smoke ; so it will cease. Now will come 
 the doubly-anxious moment of seeking to ram one's antagonist and to avoid being 
 rammed by her, to steer clear of towed torpedoes aud to plant one's own torpedo 
 conveniently under her water-line. In the early stage of an action I venture to think 
 no great damage will be done on either side. The two, I expect, will pass through 
 one another to a great extent intact, till there shall arrive the time which shall be the 
 crucial test of the value of the evolutionary practice in peaceful times. The two 
 fleets will have to re-form! Picture to yourself the effect, moral as well as material, 
 of a well-ordered column of fresh ships bearing down at superior speed upon a group 
 of vessels endeavoring to re-form. This strictly tactical movement (that of bringing 
 an overwhelming force upon some portion of the enemy's fleet) should not be left to 
 chance or signal. 
 118 
 
119 
 
 Mr. Laughton, in his "Essay on Naval Tactics," expresses the opin- 
 ion that firing between vessels and fleets on the open sea should only 
 be at very close quarters, and says : 
 
 Men at all times are too ready to throw away their ammunition at extreme ranges. 
 In naval action premature firing can have no other effect than to raise a cloud of dense 
 smoke, through which signals cannot he seen, to put an early end to all precise ma- 
 neuvering, and to let the ensuing fight become a mere scrambling rally, decided, as at 
 Lissa, by individual dash, backed up by good luck. 
 
 Although individual dash is not only a valuable but a necessary qual- 
 ity for an officer to possess, still method is of more moment. An emi- 
 nent tactician says: 
 
 A squadron moving on an enemy must do so in some order ; an advance as a mob 
 means defeat. Individual dash is inferior to system, even should that system not 
 'be the best. 
 
 The following conclusions may be drawn from the expressions of opin- 
 ion of many writers on this science : 
 
 Plans of battles should be prearranged, so that when the enemy 
 heaves in sight he can be attacked without numerous signals being 
 made. 
 
 The enemy should be attacked, if possible, if he attempts to pass 
 from one formation to another. 
 
 Gnus should be fought trained nearly abeam and concentrated fire 
 used. The guns should be fired generally by broadsides, and at a 
 range of about 500 yards. 
 
 The ram should be freely made use of. It should be considered the 
 principal weapon of the ship. 
 
 Torpedoes should be used preferably by special steamers, but all ves- 
 . sels must be fitted to use some type of this weapon. 
 
 We have seen it is the intention of the writers upon this science, 
 whom we have quoted, to use the torpedo-launch or the torpedo-boat, 
 which may be carried by the ships of the Hue on the high seas, to do 
 their torpedo work during an engagement. It occurs to us that tac- 
 ticians may well pause and consider the possibilities which surround 
 the plans which they advocate. Will not the lowering of torpedo- 
 boats just previous to an engagement be fraught with danger, by giving 
 the enemy a chance to concentrate and ram you ? To get the boats into 
 the water, speed must be reduced, your line will get out of dress, your 
 attention will be distracted from the main object — the attack — and the 
 probability will be that all the torpedo-boats will not have sufficient 
 steam, cannot organize, and will fall an easy prey to an alert enemy. 
 Perhaps, to gain your stations and to make your attack in a proper 
 formation, you will have to leave your boats bobbing about a mile 
 astern — of less than no use. If the enemy is sighted, and you have 
 your boats on board and you intend to use them, it would be better to 
 form in retreat, take your time to get your boats overboard, and when 
 all is ready, and your boats have formed between you and the enemy, 
 <jhange course sixteen points upon signal and stand into action. 
 
120 
 II. 
 
 Regarding the most useful formation for fleet combat, circumstances 
 can alone decide whether it is better to form the fleet in one body with 
 detachments acting by themselves, or whether it is best to divide the 
 fleet into two main divisions acting independently, and attacking the 
 enemy in two difi'erent directions at once. It will depend upon the rela- 
 tive numerical strength of the two fleets, as well as on the nature and 
 the power of the vessels comprising them. 
 
 The following remarks are made by Captain Rivet in his discussion 
 of attack formations : 
 
 It would be well for the inost numerous fleet to divide into two main 
 bodies, and one should act to cut off the retreat of the enemy. This por- 
 tion should be strong enough to stand the brunt of an attack from the 
 hostile fleet should the enemy succeed in outmaneuvering the other 
 portion of the fleet. If the two fleets are numerically equal, the fleet 
 should act together as a unit. 
 
 Rear- Admiral Aube, in his essay, further says : 
 
 It seems to be admitted tbat an action ■will commence by a primary general at- 
 tack, a collision between opponents, ship to ship ; the fleet being formed in an order 
 for Tvhich can be laid down no absolute rule. 
 
 Each vessel must keep its bow to the enemy to prevent ramming. 
 The formation will be then one of two classes — great width with little 
 depth, or narrow front with great depth. In other words, the only for- 
 mations for modern fighting are the line ahead and the line abreast, and 
 their derivatives. 
 
 In regard to concentration, we draw the following ideas from Admiral 
 Penh oat's work: 
 
 The mode of concentration differs for whichever arm of warfare is put 
 into action. There are three methods for concentrating in artillery 
 engagements the batteries of a certain number of your vessels on a 
 smaller number of the enemy: 
 
 1. By oblique pointing. 
 
 2. By the passing of the fleet before the one point assailed iu the 
 enemy's line in line ahead. 
 
 3. By catching apy ship or ships of the enemy between two fires. 
 This last method of concentration consists in penetrating the enemy's 
 
 line, to take between two fires each of the vessels of that portion attacked. 
 The fight should take place at close quarters. This system of warfare 
 leaves a portion of the enemy's fleet out of the fight, which will seek to 
 enter the melee; but if the concentrating movement has been quickly ex- 
 ecuted before the unattacked portion of the enemy has had time to get 
 into action, a decisive result should have been attained. 
 
 Considering the question of concentration in regard to rams, two i-ams 
 cannot well attack the same vessel at the same instant ; still, the twO' 
 can act in concert, either on the same broadside of the enemy's ship or 
 
121 
 
 one on each side. In eacb case the attacked ship should endeavor to 
 bring about a collision between its assailants. 
 
 The attacking vessels should ram the enemy's ship one after the other;, 
 therefore, any number of vessels can be concentrated for ramming on 
 one of the enemy. In artillery concentration, however, only two, or at 
 most three, ships can be used against one of the enemy. 
 
 Concentration for torpedo attack resembles somewhat the method 
 used for ramming. If the torpedo is carried ahead on a spar or installed 
 to act right ahead (if of the automobile type), the methods are identi- 
 cal. 
 
 Mr. Campbell has to say, in regard to this most important factor of 
 success — concentration : 
 
 Had I a fleet of twelve ships in action against a fleet of twelve ships of the enemy, 
 I would do my best to maneuver so as to fight them one at a time, or "twelve to one,"" 
 and failing this, two together, and so on ; last of all would I fight the twelve at the 
 same time — that indeed would be a dernier resort. 
 
 III. 
 
 The following remarks and general rules applicable to actions between 
 fleets are drawn from various sources, and may be considered as con- 
 clusions formed by the best tactical writers. 
 
 An attack upon one fleet by another, in fact the whole combat, will 
 consist of a series of rapid penetrations of the enemy's line. Each side 
 will be equally an attacking party. After the first charge all fleet com- 
 bination will cease, and vessels must act for themselves. The ship then 
 becomes the tactical unit. In all charges, having once passed through 
 the enemy's line, it must be well understood beforehand how the vessels 
 are to turn, whether to starboard or to port. This should be governed 
 by an inflexible rule. If it was arbitrary, confusion and disaster would 
 certainly follow. 
 
 In opposition to those who think it better for a fleet approaching an 
 enemy to have the wind aft, so as to drive the smoke in the enemy's 
 faces, by which the approaching* fleet's movements are masked, Mr., 
 Campbell says : 
 
 As far as my experience teaches me, I have always found it as hard or harder to see- 
 through smoke driving before you as it is to see through it coming towards you ; 
 and I believe the ships coming up against the wind would be the first to see what 
 formation the others were in. 
 
 For a fact, at Alexandria the English sufi'ered from obscuration of 
 their target by smoke, and since they were to windward Mr. Campbell's 
 idea would seem to be borne out. 
 
 Captain Noel says : 
 
 As it will be impossible to understand complicated signals in action, the only sig- 
 nals made should be very simple, need hardly be more than compass signals, and may- 
 be termed " action signals.'' 
 
122 
 
 If possible, a semaphore should be used, worked from some protected 
 tower, in place of the Army Code signal flag. 
 
 Captain Eivet is of the opinion that after an engagement has once 
 commenced only those signals should be used which would give an 
 order for retreat, or which would be needed to arrange the fleet in 
 such a manner as to consummate the ruin and rout of the enemy. 
 
 IV. 
 
 We will now consider the sphere of the several weapons of a ship in 
 a fight between fleets. Most authorities are of the opinion that the fire 
 of the artillery should be by broadsides, and concentrated either abeam 
 or slightly forward of the beam. Short range, say 600 yards, will be 
 the ordinary fighting distance of ships. Commander Noel, in his work 
 on the " Gun, Eam, and Torpedo," summarizes the duty of the artillery 
 in action in the following words : 
 
 Speaking generally of the use of guns in a fleet action, I am much of Captain Co- 
 lomb's opinion, viz, that they should be previously laid right abeam and horizontal 
 and then fired at the instant of passing an enemy's ship. I would lay down six rules 
 for the use of guns in a general action : 
 
 1. Guns are on no account to be tired unless there is every probability of their tak- 
 ing effect. 
 
 2. The broadside guns will always be trained on some prearranged bearing, from 
 abeam to 15° before the beam, so that the captain shall at all times, and without 
 giving a, second thought, be certain of the exact direction in which his guns are 
 pointing. 
 
 3. Guns as a rule will be fired by broadsides. 
 
 4. A disabled ship, with rudder or engines broken down, will use her guns to the 
 utmost of her power. 
 
 5. A ship pairing off with an enemy to ' single combat,' movingaround on the same 
 circle, or finding herself on the same course as the enemy, will use independent firing. 
 
 6. As far as possible the aim is to be directed at the weakest points of the enemy. 
 
 The arraor-clads of every nation should be a study, so that their vital 
 points and weaknesses may be known. Large diagrams showing 
 these should be accessible to all ofiS^ers and gun-captains. Captain 
 Noel further remarks that a turret ship, with all-round fire, should, when 
 in line-of-battle, have her arc of fire curtailed so as to be available only 
 between abeam and 15° before it, the same as any other vessel. 
 
 Mr. Besson says : 
 
 The ram is the hardest weapon to employ, but it is the most terrible. Ramming, so 
 difficult in a duel between ships, becomes more practicable in an action between fleets, 
 as during a meUe vessels, from the fact of being befogged by smoke, or through some 
 accident, may find themselves in unexpected positions either of advantage or disad- 
 vantage. 
 
 Commander Noel is of the opinion that ships of the line maneuver- 
 ing as a fleet cannot alter course and turn in any direction with the 
 sole intention of ramming an antagonist. Whenever ramming is re- 
 sorted to, it should, in his opinion, be done in this wise : Should the en- 
 
123 
 
 emy be oft' his guard, -liis vessels should be attacked by the rams on their 
 beam. These should maneuver to strike the enemy's vessels amidships 
 when on a course making an acute angle with that on which the enemy 
 is steering, instead of a right angle. By thus turning slightly towards 
 the enemy's course, the rams would come in contact with less although 
 sufficient force, and would by ranging up into the enemy's course avoid 
 the ram bows of the next astern, instead of running through the lines 
 and exposing their broadsides to the ships coming up. 
 
 Captain Eivet says that all armor-clads must carry torpedo-boats 
 of great speed, which can be lowered during an engagement, with steam 
 up, and ready for immediate action. A rapid merchant steamer can be 
 fitted to carry four large-size boats. She should accompany the fleet. 
 Yessels must carry torpedo-boats to satisfy the following conditions: 
 
 1. She must be able to lower and hoist them with facility. 
 
 2. The torpedo-boats must be of the largest size possible, considering 
 the size of the ship. 
 
 3. The torpedo-boats should have the highest speed attainable. 
 
 4. These torpedo-boats should be possessed of the best nautical qual- 
 ities. Especially should they have excellent turning power. 
 
 5. The torpedo-boats, boilers, and engines should be noiseless, and 
 their coals should be as smokeless as possible. 
 
 6. The torpedo-boats' armament should combine efficacy and handi- 
 ness. 
 
 7. The torpedo-boats should be able to obtain their steam pressure 
 very easily. 
 
 This steam pressure may either come by temporarily connecting the 
 boiler of the torpedo-boat with the ship's boilers, or by having the boat 
 fitted with a boiler especially constructed for rapid steam-making. 
 
 In the first part of this chapter we said that lowering torpedo-boats 
 preparatory to an action presents more difficulties than appear at first 
 sight, and we propose to discuss the subject further. Two fleets make 
 out one another 10 miles apart. If we give each fleet a speed of 10 
 knots, they will be together in half an hour. Nine times in ten, when 
 the mutual sighting takes place, neither will be in formation for attack. 
 By the time they have gotten into this order, which will take fifteen 
 minutes, say, they will have lessened the distance between them to about 
 5 miles. Now, if at this stage either fleet attempts to get the torpedo- 
 boats into the water, the other fleet would have a great advantage if 
 they bore down upon them at full speed and engaged them. This sep- 
 arating sea could be covered in twenty minutes, and it is doubtful if 
 this length of time will suffice to organize their torpedo flotilla and 
 straighten up the line for battle. 
 
 It would seem, then, that the principal dependence for carrying the 
 torpedo boat must be upon those vessels specially fitted for the purpose. 
 Too much distraction to the line-of-battle will take place, as a general 
 thing, if they are carriedfor sea use by those vessels composing this force. 
 
124 
 
 Torpedo-boats are of course most necessary and must be provided, but 
 it will be remembered we are discussing actions on the open sea. We 
 can see most easily the advantage of a torpedo flotilla steaming in groups 
 among the ships of the line of battle, moving in and out aniong the enemy, 
 the boats picking up their work as it comes to them. We are rather of 
 the opinion, though, that instead of forming an advance line and enter- 
 ing the action before the field of operations is obscured by smoke, and 
 when they can be the more easily driven off by machiue-gun fire, their 
 time for gathering the best fruits of the contest will be later, during 
 the melee. Indeed, it would seem to be a maxim that victory will lie with 
 that fleet whose torpedo flotilla is first in action after the first charge, 
 the state of the sea permitting torpedo-boats to be used. 
 
 Admiral Penhoat says that in battle all fires will be started ; there- 
 fore, there must be two speeds taken as necessary during an engage- 
 ment: 
 
 1. The maximum maneuvering speed, which is about 3 knots slower 
 than the maximum fighting speed. 
 
 2. The maximum fighting speed, which is, when the formation is in- 
 tact, the fastest speed of the slowest ship, and when the formation is 
 broken up the fastest speed of the individual ship. 
 
 Captain Eivet is of the opinion that no faster speed than 8 or 10 
 knots will be maintained during an action. He says : 
 
 To exceed this would make the iiring very wild, and ramming dangerous for the at- 
 tacking vessel. The engine, though, should at all times be ready to go ahead at full 
 speed. 
 
 V. 
 
 It is not probable that a fleet will charge more than twice without 
 losing its formation. The commanding officer of a section of two should 
 strive, for mutual safety, to keep up the fleet organization as long as 
 possible, but if it is broken, the section should act as a unit independ- 
 ently of the fleet, keeping a lookout for signals from the commander-in- 
 chief. Sections of two ships should keep together as long as possible* 
 the junior being under the immediate control of the senior captain, 
 whose vessel will be in the leader. There is one exception to this 
 general rule ; the junior when he encounters an enemy's ship in his path 
 should immediately ram her. 
 
 Commander ISoel says that the secret of success in an action lies in 
 the re-forming of the fleet after tlie order of attack has been broken up. 
 The chance of victory lies with that fleet which can re-form first. If, in 
 themidstof an engagement, the Admiral considers it necessary to re-form 
 the line of battle, he should signal his fleet to draw out of action and 
 to form on him, either in the formation in which the attack was made 
 or in some other as signaled. 
 
 In regard to the question of maintaining a regular reserve squadron, 
 there are two absolutely different opinions ; for instance. Captain Harris 
 
125 
 
 not only believes iu a reserve, but says that the arrival of the reserve 
 on either side will decide the battle iu favor of the side to which there- 
 serve belongs. His idea, farther expressed, is that the reserve sliould 
 be composed of those armor-clads which make less than twelve knots. 
 Other tacticians believe that there should be no reserve, and that every 
 lighting vessel should be in the line of battle to engage the enemy. 
 
 Probably the most advanced idea is th at certain vessels of widely 
 ■diflerent qualities from the majority of vessels employed should not be 
 associated with them in the lino of battle. These may form what may 
 be termed a reserve division. They may be used to reenforce the head 
 or rear of the line of battle, or they may be employed to prevent a flank 
 attack. 
 
 During a fight the duty of the squadron of cruisers, if it is seen fit 
 not to employ them in the line of battle, would be to keep well clear of 
 the ships-of-the-line, and be ready to assist damaged ships, cut off tor- 
 pedo-boats, and to harass the enemy's smaller vessels. 
 
 To attack a fleet at anchor use the ram ; each vessel choosing a ship 
 of the enemy to attack. A fleet at anchor must depend for its defense 
 on torpedoes and booms, together with its flotilla of torpedo-boats. A 
 fleet surprised at anchor is a contingency of war hard to realize. A fleet, 
 however, caught in this manner would undoubtedly be destroyed. 
 
 During an engagement, if the Admiral wishes to retreat, the line-of- 
 battle, by a simultaneous movement or otherwise, as soon as possible 
 should come into some retreat formation. Strong stern fire now be- 
 comes a necessity. The wake of each ship should be thickly strewn with 
 torpedoes. Most Admirals will prefer to retreat in lines ahead; if this 
 is the case, the best ships should be kept in the rear nearest the enemy, 
 the lighter vessels towing the disabled ones. 
 
 Should a fleet be surprised by an enemy when it is in no formation, 
 each ship's bow should be turned towards the enemy, and a charge made 
 through the enemy's line. When the other side is reached, they should 
 form in the chosen way for retreat and fight the now turned and attack- 
 ing enemy, or, if the occasion presented itself, they should turn simul- 
 taneouslj' and attack their pursuers. 
 
 Two fleets meeting at night, how will they fight? The two fleets 
 will probably not discover one another until they have approached 
 «ach other to within three miles. Each fleet will probably be cruising 
 in an irregular group formation, or else in two lines ahead. The elec- 
 tric light cannot be used indiscriminately, as you may blind your friend 
 and perhaps have him into you. Your torpedo-boats cannot be gotten 
 into the water, and no elaborate formation can be attempted. We will 
 consider each fleet to have been well exercised by her Admiral in night 
 drill, and that they stand on an equality here. It is thought that the fleet 
 which is formed in line ahead in two columns will have the advantage 
 over the fleet formed in any other way. In this case the leaders of the 
 lines alone should use their electric lights. The leader of the column 
 
126 
 
 nearest the enemy should charjre the enemy's line, followed by all the 
 ships of his column, maintaining their formation in line ahead. As soon 
 as the last ship in this colnmn has her new direction, the leader of the 
 second column, followed by his command in the line ahead, should 
 charge some other point of the enemy's line. Each column should strive 
 during the action to preserve the formation, and should pass and repass 
 through the enemy's line, using artillery alone with concentrated &Te. 
 Small arms and machine guns should be rapidly fired at the moment of 
 passing and at no other time. The leaders of the columns must under- 
 stand that they mnst turn the one and the same way in reversing their di- 
 rection to charge the enemy again. All movements made should be suc- 
 cessive. Although some tacticians, as is stated somewhere in this work, 
 say that the ram is the weapon of the night, it is believed that the most 
 modern thinkers are of the other opinion. From these last we gather 
 that ramming should only be incidental to the attack, and then only 
 when the formation gets opened out, as it will. Should the smoke grow 
 so dense as to obscure the field of battle, each ship in each column 
 should sound its fog distinguishing signal, slow to quick speed, and the 
 column leader should draw his column out of action in the direction then 
 steered, and when the smoke lifts should charge the enemy's line again, 
 with his column always following, 
 
 VI. 
 
 Different tacticians have different ideas as to the probable conduct of 
 battles on the open sea between fleets. Captain Colomb believes that 
 an engagement will be opened by a charge on both sides, followed by 
 ramming and a breaking up of the formation. He is partial to a for- 
 mation for attack of great depth and narrow front; that is, a line ahead, 
 or some modification of it, standing down on the enemy in a direction 
 perpendicular to his line of battle. His idea being to concentrate by 
 piling his ships on some point of the enemy's line. 
 
 We have before observed that Captain Colomb is not partial to the 
 group. We will now consider the plan of action of an author who is. 
 
 Commander Noel would have the enemy attacked in this manner: 
 (See Plate XXIII, Fig. 1.) Approaching in column of two divisions, the 
 enemy's fleet exposing a narrow front, the object will be to make it pass 
 outside your nearest line; that division exchanging broadsides and mov- 
 ing directly ahead, keeping all the enemy's ships enveloped in smoke, 
 and doing all the damage it can with its guns. In the meantime (or 
 directly the leading ships meet), the other division, having been previ- 
 ously instructed, will turn eight points towards the first division, and, 
 in a line abreast in groups, will pass astern of the first division and will 
 charge the enemy along its line. 
 
 Admiral Kandolph, in discussing an engagement between two squad- 
 rons, assumes that the enemy's plan of attack will be a charge in simple 
 line abreast. He assumes also that the enemy's line will contain eight 
 
127 
 
 ships. Before unfolding his scheme for his special method of forming, 
 he says that the Admiral should draw up several plans of battle, and 
 they should be rehearsed before any chance of meeting the enemy oc- 
 curs, so that when signal is made on sighting the enemy, "Use plan A 
 (or B, or 0)," each captain will know what to do. 
 
 For fighting the enemy in the formation stated above, the author 
 places his fleet of eight ships on two of his lines of bearing, A and B 
 (see Plate XXIII, Fig. 2), the Admiral on the left of the first division, the 
 second in command on the right of the second division. These two com- 
 manders are separated, and therefore the two divisions, so that the wings 
 of the fleet outflank the wings of the enemy a distance, say, of 1,200 yards. 
 The second in command drops back his division, say, 600 yards, so that 
 the fleets are formed as shown in the figure. The Admiral puts himself 
 opposite to the third shij) of the enemy, counting from the wing near- 
 est to him. The second in command opposite the third ship of the enemy 
 from the wing nearest h im. The author chooses eight knots as the best 
 lighting speed. 
 
 The fleets steer for one another, the ships of the author's fleet care- 
 fully keeping their stations. The Admiral and second in Command, act- 
 ing as guides, steer for the vessels opposite to which they have formed. 
 When the Admiral gets at the point X, he dips his signal and each ship 
 circles simultaneously, and tries to ram the ship toward which he turns. 
 If they miss ramming their opponents, then the first division steer over 
 to assist the second, ISTo. 4 going to assist ^o. and No. 3 to No. 7, &c. 
 
 About this time each captain must take care of himself, but it will be 
 seen that each division can steer down separately and attack the rear 
 of the enemy. 
 
 If the enemy, instead of being in line abreast, were also in an echelon 
 formation, the port division should not drop astern so much from the 
 beam line of the starboard division. 
 
 Suppose, now, the squadron find themselves in the presence of each 
 other under different circumstances, either somewhat suddenly, or one 
 of them, standing in for the land in the morning, observes the other 
 coming out of the port they have been watching. 
 
 The outside squadron {A) are in two lines (see Plate XXIV, Fig. 1) ; 
 the other {B) has also been enabled to form in two lines, but has not had 
 room enough to form abreast. A may be supposed to have what room 
 he wants, and forms line abreast on a line of bearing by divisions, one 
 division dropped to the rear, as shown in the figure. 
 
 As B will not have time and roo m to form, he will probably elect to 
 cut through A in the 1,200 yards interval. With A formed as he is, B 
 will run the risk of being pretty well used up by A's rams and bow fire, 
 although B can get in a good broadside fire on A. As B goes through, 
 each division of A turns towards the two columns of B. A can 
 strengthen his formation by stationing 4 and 8 nearer the scene of the 
 melee, say on the outer quarter of the Admiral and of the second in com- 
 mand. 
 
128 
 
 Admiral Penhoat gives the following advice concerning the different 
 formations for fighting with rams in squadron : 
 
 If we should elect to attack the enemy iii line abreast, we should charge him aa 
 normally as possible at good speed, and as wc approach him each ship should try aud 
 pick out its opposite in the enemy's formation. To do this, each ship may have to 
 maneuver either to one side or the other. This change of direction would be danger- 
 ous to make at a less distance than six cables from the enemy. 
 
 The Admiral thinks in the majority of cases that ramming will not be 
 undertaken at the outset, but only after the guns have inflicted sufiScieut 
 damage to prevent an enemy's maneuvering to evade an attack with the 
 ram. If, however, at the outset, ramming the enemy is engaged in, the 
 enemy may probably evade the shock; each ship, then, will pass close 
 aboard the other, and they will exchange broadsides at close quarters, 
 which should be very destructive. After the fleet have charged through 
 the enemy's line, they should turn through 16 points, with helms all the 
 same way, and return to the attack. The same general directions apply 
 to the attack when formed in double line abreast. 
 
 This author has the following to say about concentration, and gives an 
 ■example of a ramming attack : In regard to concentration it will be of 
 little or no use between equal forces, except in the case where the fleets 
 are very large. A concentration may be either total or partial. If a 
 fleet is arranged for a ramming encounter, and its number of rams is 
 double the number possessed by the enemy, the formation for attack in 
 two lines abreast of equal length is naturally indicated. This is a total 
 concentration. If the number of rams of the two fleets are equal, this 
 method will not do, and a partial concentration must be made on some 
 weak point in the enemy's line. In a concentrated attack the first line 
 should be comx^osed of the heaviest armored vessels, the second line 
 preferably of rams. The first line is to use its artillery only. Hamming 
 attacks on the broadside of a vessel, the' rammer describing a quarter of 
 a circle, are based upon an appreciation of the speed, essentially vari- 
 able, of the adversary. This maneuver presents only a very few chances 
 of success, if we reflect that with a speed of ten knots a vessel passes 
 over her length in fifteen seconds. 
 
 In lines abreast, the flanks should be protected by other vessels, not 
 belonging to the formation, but which act as a re-enforcement. 
 
 According to Mr. de Penfentenyo, the following plan of battle is the 
 best to follow out. The proper formation for attack is the simple line 
 abreast. After the first charge, vessels ought always to immediately 
 reverse their courses, all heaving over their helms in apreordered direc- 
 tion, and form groups without further signal. (See Plate XXV, Pig. 1.) 
 The group-leaders should become commanders-in-chief of their groups, 
 and should maneuver them independently. 
 
 Should charging through the enemy's line be the scheme of attack, as 
 nine times out of ten it will be, it may be laid down as a rule, that 
 after having passed through the enemy's formation, vessels should re- 
 
129 
 
 turn to the charge. If the formation is a line or lines ahead, the 
 leader returns to the attack followed in succession by his line. The 
 rearmost vessel alone may try ramming tactics, the others must not ex- 
 cept for self preservation. 
 
 A German tactician in answer to the question as to how the fleet 
 should engage the enemy, says, that if it advances in a formation of line 
 abreast, it can use its rams better, but that its artillery is of nearly no 
 avail, as it could hardly be used lest the fleet should fire into one an- 
 other. The author suggests that, with the Admiral leading, the fleet 
 should advance in line ahead steering for the nearest ship of the enemy. 
 When within two miles, change course four points with the enemy's front 
 by a successive movement, and when on this line, swing together on a 
 course heading for the enemy. This brings your fleet into a bow and 
 quarter line. (See Plate XXIV, Fig. 2.) 
 
 Mr. Besson says: 
 
 The enemy being signaled, the squadron should form in line ahead and then steer 
 for the enemy at full speed. If the enemy is in line abreast, it should try and isolate 
 one of his wings and destroy it. 
 
 Or, to discuss the subject further, let us suppose one squadron to be 
 in line ahead and the enemy in line abreast as has just been stated. 
 Oar squadron we will call A, the enemy B. (See Plate XXV, Fig. 2.) 
 The leading ship of the A squadron receives the fire from all the ships of 
 the B squadron as he approaches. If he is not stopped dead, which is 
 unlikely, he will pierce the B squadron between Bi and Bt, giving the 
 enemy both broadsides. All the A squadron follows in line, and it is 
 easy to see that iJi and Bi receives it hot and heavy. If it is supposed 
 that the two squadrons steam at the rate of 11 knots, and are composed 
 of six ships each, A squadron will pass through B^s line in two and a half 
 minutes. Consequently, the wing ships of B will not h^ave time proba- 
 bly to give Ae the benefit of their fire. The advantage belongs to A 
 squadron all through from an artillery point of view. This advantage 
 is as great, if not greater, from the standpoint of the auto-mobile tor- 
 pedo, since Bi and Bi alone can use theirs, and yet they will receive the 
 whole outfit of the A squadron. 
 
 If divergent torpedoes are used by the B squadron, Ai and perhaps A^ 
 will be sunk by Bi and Bi. But if both squadrons use them, they are 
 on an equal footing, and Bi and Bi will have the same chances against 
 them as Ai and A2. 
 
 From the standpoint of the ram, all the vessels of A except Ae are 
 flanked by their next astern, whilst as regards B squadron, ^i and Bi 
 are not as well protected by their neighbors -B3 and B5, placed on either 
 side of them. B^ and B5 can both be rammed by any vessel in A squadron, 
 but they in return can only ram one, and the next astern, as Ai, A5, or 
 Ae will certainly sink B2 and B5 if they attempt to ram A^ or A3. From 
 every point of view, then, the advantage remains with the A squadron. 
 
 The wing ships of B squadron not being able to use either guns or 
 torpedoes, will seek to enter the tight by falling in rear of Bi and Bi, 
 482 9 
 
130 
 
 aud the formation of J5 will then be in two columns formed on the center, 
 one column on each side of the A squadron. (See Plate XXV, Fig. 3.) 
 Even then A squadron will have the advantage in gun-iire, since it can 
 use both broadsides ; still, since the leading ships of A catch it so hotly 
 they may be so injured as to throw their line into confusion. The ad- 
 vantage, on the whole, if B's wing ships act as in dicated iu tbis last cat- 
 egory, will belong to the B squadron, and A should never suffer itself to 
 be entrapped into any such position. It would follow then as a maxim, 
 that since a squadron in line ahead can change direction more easily than 
 a squadron in line abreast, it should never attack a squadron in this 
 last formation in the center, but nearer one of the flanks, preferably the 
 weather one. To make this movement, A squadron should, when at 
 some short distance from the enemy, change course eight points (see 
 Plate XXVI, Fig. 2) by a simultaneous movement, and when abreast 
 one of £'s flanks form line ahead and change. 
 
 Suppose that each fleet were in line ahead. The two lines pass close 
 to one another, concentrating their fire on the head vessel of the oppos- 
 ing force. Each leader will probably succumb, and be rendered Jiors du 
 combat. The only i^recaution against this which can be taken is to lead 
 in with the vessel furnished with the heaviest protection. Whether we 
 admit that the damage done to the leaders will be grave or light, the 
 two lines will finally find themselves abreast one another. Each fleet 
 will turn to ram the other and will collide or go through. The forma- 
 tion after this turn will be a line abreast for each fleet. After a mutual 
 penetration of the formations, the fleets will turn about and again charge. 
 (See Plate XXIII, Fig. 3.) 
 
 It will be seen from the figure, that vessels charging past the enemy 
 do not do so, at the instant of passing, on a line abreast, but on a bow- 
 and quarter-line.^ This being the case, it will be observed that the gun 
 fire is unobstructed, and that therefore char ging and recharging in 
 this formation is good tactics, since there is little or no likelihood of fir- 
 ing into your friends. 
 
 Two fleets are in line abreast and have charged, and each fleet has 
 turned, all the vessels with their helms the same way. It is apparent 
 that each fleet has gained a diameter on the flank of the other, and that 
 the next charge will be with vessels in echelon. (See Plate XXVI, Pig. 
 1.) This figure, by following out two or more charges, would go to prove 
 that the formation would soon disappear as the flanks would be thrown 
 out of action. 
 
 We have now examined into most of the theories of engagements be- 
 tween fleets which have been set forth and discussed by various tacti. 
 cians. All of them are more or less unsatisfactory, from the fact that 
 the premises of the authors are more or less biased in favor of their 
 methods, and the enemy's fleet is generally considered to do the most 
 unlikely thing. There is, however, much to be gained by studying these 
 systems, but until the modem fleet meets its match on the high seas 
 we will have to content ourselves by dealing with hypotheses. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 OTHER DUTIES OF TBE FLEET IN TIME OF WAE. 
 
 I. 
 
 In answer to the question "What is the chief object of war?" Ad- 
 miral Aube discourses as follows : 
 
 To inflict the greatest possible harm ujion the enemy! "We must expect then to see 
 the iron-clad fleets, mistresses of the sea, turn their powers of attack and destruction, 
 in default of adversaries, against all coast towns, fortified or not, pacific or warlike, 
 hurn, ruin, and at least raze them to the ground without mercy. This has been done 
 at other times ; it is done now ; it will be done in future. 
 
 Captain Maubenge, of the Belgian artillery, in his paper on " The use 
 of Artillery in Coast Defense," expresses the following opinion as to 
 the motive in war, bearing out the views of the distinguished writer 
 above quoted, but in language rather more mild : 
 
 In war, the main object of ships is not to destroy the elements of defense, but rather 
 to approach naval and military establishments so as to carry disorder and devasta- 
 tion into the jiorts, dock-yards, and arsenals, and to diminish the morale of the gar- 
 rison and inhabitants. Often the fate of an invested place will be decided by the 
 presence alone of one or two armored ships in its roadstead. 
 
 Seamen can operate oiifensively in three ways : 
 
 1st. By remaining outside of the effective range of the coast guns and at a distance 
 from the place equal to or less than the longest range of their own artillery. la such ■ 
 a position, by correct firing — which would be facilitated by the great size of the tar- 
 get — they would throw their projectiles into the place, whilst the defensive artillery, 
 having a much smaller object to aim at, would have less chance of hitting it ; and 
 even successful shots, striking an armored vessel with a great angle of fall and with 
 little remaining velocity, would produce very small results. 
 
 lu winding rivers, with high banks, floating batteries, or ships not heavily armored,, 
 will conceal themselves behind the banks, and only the smoke of their guns will in- 
 dicate their position. 
 
 2d. The second method consists in forcing a passage without engaging the guns on 
 shore. This plan will certainly be adopted by seamen, if the means of defense ap- 
 pear insufficient or badly utilized, or if they have some chance of succeeding by 
 strategy. It will be resorted to if, after having crossed the dangerous belt, the ships^ 
 can bring their broadsides to bear on the place, especially so if they have to fear only 
 the fire of l-2cm or 15cm guns. The intelligeui seaman will not fail to attempt a. 
 measure, the success of which would be attended with such great results. This; 
 method would be used sometimes even when the roadstead was commanded by guns 
 of great caliber, if the river or channel above the place was navigable and was not 
 protected by coast artillery. After having passed the enemy's defenses, the ships 
 would ascend the river until beyond his effective range, stopping at a good distance 
 for bombarding. 
 
 3d. In the third place, ships can engage coast artillery. It is the middle course ; 
 seamen will resort to it only when the first two are impracticable, or are too danger- 
 
 131 
 
132 
 
 ous. They -will, perhaps, be led to attempt it when they have discovered defects in 
 the defense, and have confidence in the impenetrability of their ship's sides, or in the 
 great superiority of their ordnance. 
 
 If navigable rivers give access to the seaport on all sides, the u]ission of the attack- 
 ing seaman is easier. If he be exposed only to the .fire of iised batteries, he can, by 
 constant change of position, avoid their shots while bombarding at a good range. 
 Naval establishments thus exposed can only be defended effectively with the co-op- 
 eration of a fleet of coast-guard ships, and of floating batteries. 
 
 II. 
 
 Admiral Aube in his essay says further: 
 
 The depreciation of the power of artillery against a movable iron-clad target has 
 been verified by experience. It sensibly lessens the ri,sks which an iron-clad fleet 
 runs, covered with smoke and defiling at high speed before the most powerfully armed 
 coast batteries. 
 
 This remark is borne out by facts. The experience being still more 
 derogatory to artillery for the reason that the ships in the case in point 
 ■were nearlj' if not quite stationary. At the bombardment of Alexandria 
 some of the guns in the forts, constructed to penetrate armor of a cer- 
 tain thickness, although fired with approved charges and proper pro- 
 jectiles, failed to more than dent the comparatively light sides of the 
 attacking vessels. 
 
 Some tacticians, in fact most of them, set it down as a maxim, that in 
 attacking fortifications, fleets should engage at close quarters and fight 
 under way. If the environment prevents this, then the fleet should fight 
 bows on if possible. This, however, was not the tactics pursued by. 
 the English in the bombardment of Alexand ria. The result of their ex 
 perience was that there existed no greater danger in being anchored, and 
 that their artillery practice was much more accurate whpn the ships were 
 stationary. It must be remembered, though, that the fleet was not op- 
 posed by its equal in the art of war. During our own late war both 
 methods were tried, and both satisfied the requirements of the circum- 
 stances of the occasion. 
 
 There were certain tactical experiences undergone by the combatants 
 at Alexandria concerning which Lieutenant-Commander C. F. Goodrich, 
 United States Navy, has come to the following conclusions : 
 
 1. Although vessels engaging forts will never be able to fight on equal 
 terms with them, still forts will offer but little resistance to vessels 
 attempting to run by them. 
 
 2. Under all circumstances the fleet should keep away from forts 
 whose guns are mounted high above the sea-level on account of the 
 danger to be incurred from a plunging fire, 
 
 3. Any projection appearing above the crest of the parapet of a fort 
 furnishes an excellent target for the attacking fleet. It is a means by 
 which the position of the guns is readily indicated and located, and which 
 advantage the shii)s should be quick to seize. 
 
133 
 
 4. Eecent high-powered guns are not adapted to bombarding earth- 
 works. Ships for geuetal service should have a composite battery. 
 
 5. Ships should engage forts at moderate distances. With close 
 range and a stable platform great damage can be done by shrapnel 
 and machine-gun fire. 
 
 6. In all bombardments the target for the fleet should be : 
 (a.) The guns of the enemy actually firing. 
 
 (6.) Any building believed to be a store-house or magazine. 
 
 7. An advantage possessed by a vessel with a heavy fore and aft fire 
 lies in its ability to anchor head to sea and engage a fort either ahead 
 or astern from a comparatively steady ijlatform. 
 
 7. If the ships and forts are about equal as regards artillery, the ships 
 had better anchor. If the forts are the heavier the fleet should fight 
 under way. 
 
 Every fleet surprised at anchor is a fleet destroyed ; the ram, which 
 the assailant alone should avail himself of, then becomes an arm as safe 
 to him as it is destructive to his victim. 
 
 Every fleet at anchor, if the access to the anchorage is possible, can 
 be surprised by night, or even attacked by day, by a fleet of torpedo- 
 boats. 
 
 With the present defenseless state of our coasts, it becomes of vital 
 interest to know that the range of guns of 27°™ is 12,500 yards, and that 
 of a 14™ gun is 10,000 yards, with an elevation of 35o. It is , in fact, even 
 greater with the enormous muzzle-speeds now obtained, so that these 
 guns can bombard every town, every settlement occupying a large ex- 
 tent of ground, and which any ship thus armed can approach within 
 these distances. These towns will not only be bombarded, but they 
 will be burnt or laid under contribution without the assailants running 
 any serious risks from the coast batteries, or other shore or submarine 
 defenses. The attacking vessels can only be successfully opposed and 
 their progress barred by a fleet designed for coastwise defense. 
 
 Admiral Peuhoat says that an attack upon a harbor or position on the 
 coast involves three distinct operations : 
 
 1. The penetration of the port, or getting into a commanding or dom- 
 inating position. 
 
 2. The bombardment or landing. 
 
 3. The disembarkation of troops and the occupation of the position. 
 The speed of a fleet is now so great that it can appear off' a harbor, 
 
 without notice, with means for destroying a fleet at anchor not well de- 
 fended. To defend these vessels the author believes in a fortified break- 
 water or mole with narrow entrances. He does not pin his faith on either 
 mines or booms, as he believes such methods will prove as great ob- 
 structions to the defenders as to the assailants. Nets are only service- 
 able under circumstances which are not likely to occur. A net caught 
 in the screw would be worse than a shot lodging there. ' 
 
134 
 III. 
 
 The blockade of the whole coast of a country possessing a navy is 
 impossible ; even that of a single port is difficult. Under any circum- 
 stances it can only be rendered effective by the concentration of nu- 
 merous squadrons Echeloned, as it were, on several concentric circles 
 whose center is the port to be blockaded. 
 
 It is not likely, in the opinion of Captain Harris, E. K., that armor- 
 clads will be employed as blockaders, especially at night, in the vicinity 
 of ports known to contain torpedo vessels. Blockade should be main- 
 tained by light and swifter vessels, which, being cognizant of the posi- 
 tions of the armor-clads, will repeatedly communicate with them. In 
 some blockades an opportunity may be afforded the blockaders to estab- 
 lish themselves in an adjacent harbor, and to use it as a base for their 
 operations. 
 
 A vessel occupying the position of a blockader will be exposed to an 
 attack from : 
 
 1. Auto-mobile torpedoes from a gunboat or torpedo-boat. 
 
 2. A spar or divergent torpedo from a cruiser, gunboat, or torpedo-boat. 
 Gunboats and torpedo-boats of the most recent pattern are able to 
 
 use their torpedoes right ahead without stopping or changing course ; 
 therefore, if a blockading vessel is exposed to an attack from vessels 
 furnished in this way with these weapons she can defend herself by — 
 
 1. Eunniug away. 
 
 2. Sinking the attacking vessel before she has time to use her tor- 
 pe<lo. 
 
 3. Fighting the approaching vessel with guns and her own torpedo- 
 launches. 
 
 4. Using nets, booms, &c. 
 
 The first method is hardly to be thought of. If it was used, the enemy 
 could keep the fleet constantly driven off. 
 
 The second method is more practicable. The attacking vessel must, 
 however, be destroyed before she can approach within 600 yards. A 
 heavy fire of manageable guns should be kept upon her. The only 
 drawback is, that if the guns do not sink her, they will give her the 
 chance she wishes to have, that is, an abundance of smoke to work in. 
 
 The third method is not to be entirely depended upon, because the 
 enemy may glide between your launches; injured perhaps by your at- 
 tack but not disabled. 
 
 The fourth method is hardly satisfactory, but when combined with the 
 second and third, it seems all that is left to us. The moving torpedo- 
 boat is a small object and moves rapidly, and consequently is hard to 
 hit, but on the other hand it is easy to sink if your shot strikes it. 
 
 The above views are taken from a paper analyzed by a French writer 
 from an English work on torpedo defenses. Today the bulk of profes- 
 si'^tnal opinion is against the use of nets, &c., except in the case of 
 anchored vessels which are disabled. In any technical sense, the best 
 
135 
 
 method is to use torpedo-launches combined with mechaflical gun fire 
 from both ship and boats. In time perhaps torpedo warfare will become 
 very much modified through the improved construction of war vessels. 
 
 Armored vessels built for coast and harbor defense, but which can 
 be taken to sea, may be of great use in an enemy's harbor where tor- 
 pedoes are feared, to be pushed forward iu the van in place of the more 
 valuable armor clads of the fleet, since they have, as a general thing, 
 great artillery power and good resisting qualities for their size. 
 
 Among the most useful elements of the besieging fleetis the telegraph- 
 cable vessel. The cable-laying flotilla should consist of the tank vessel, 
 •containing the cable, small vessels to be used as receiving stations, and 
 tugs for the heavy weighing and handling of buoys. The tank vessel 
 should be capable of laying out and picking up the cable and should in 
 every way be fitted for electrical work. The tugs will be used to run 
 lines on shore. The cable should be a compromise between the shore- 
 -end and deep-sea cables, so as to stand well iu shoal water and to per- 
 mit of its being picked up and laid down many times. 
 
 Speaking of instruments and methods for signaling messages, out- 
 side of the electric telegraph, probably the best system, for day work, 
 is with the heliograph, in any country with a good bright sun and a 
 moderately clear sky. The advantage, where this instrument is used, 
 is that the enemy is absolutely unaware of your action, unless he be 
 absolutely located in the path of the reflected ray ; that is, in a line be- 
 tween your two stations. During the night the heliograph is accept- 
 ably used with artificial light. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Should a fleet regularly besiege a port, the nature of the work to be 
 done will, in a great degree, decide the class and number of tactical ele- 
 ments which will enter into it. Besides the fleet of line-of-battle shijis, 
 and the squadron of vessels composed of cruisers, corvettes, gun-vessels, 
 tenders, and torpedo-vessels, there will be heavy wrecking tugs, surveying 
 vessels to establish lights and buoys, a flotilla of smaller tugs and funi- 
 mobile launches (or those steered and governed through a cable, by the 
 system contrived by Lieut. T. C. McLean, Uniited States Navy), a sub- 
 marine brigade for mining and countermining, telegraph vessels for laying 
 cables, search vessels furnished with a powerful electric lighting in- 
 stallation, coal and ammunition vessels, commissariat and naval stores 
 vessels, hospital ships, and floating repair shops. All these various 
 elements, with their multitude of experts and attaches, must be protected 
 by a convoy guard, the whole to be under command of a flag ofiicer, 
 who will need a powerful and efficient staff under him. He must have 
 these vessels ready at all times to perform their individual functions 
 and ready to get under way and make passages without going adrift. 
 If the convoy is very large it should be divided into squads of not 
 more than six vessels, and the convoy guard for each squad should be 
 a section of two vessels at least. 
 
136 
 
 In entering an enemy's inclosed waters it will be necessary to have a 
 countermining flotilla precede the fleet where planted mines are sus- 
 pected. 
 
 V. 
 
 A German tactical writer, as recently as this year, remarks that a 
 shot entering a torpedo-boat will probably place it liors du combat, but a 
 moving ship makes it very uncertain as regards striking such a small and 
 fleet target even with mechanical gun fire. This authorjsays that there 
 is only one certain means for driving oft' the enemy's torpedo-boats, and 
 that is to fight them with your own. The question then immediately 
 arises, how does this class of vessels fight ? Not with auto-mobile tor- 
 pedoes, because the target is too small and too changeable for a torpedo; 
 besides, the boats are not deep enough in the water. Two torpedo-boats 
 could not ram one another without both being used up. The way will 
 probably be, each boat will attempt to destroy the other by means of 
 small gun-cotton spar torpedoes, by mechanical gun fire, or by the use 
 of hand grenades. It should be the aim of a combatant to try and kill 
 the crew of its adversary, as it is to be supposed that it^is composed of 
 skillful and daring men, and that their loss will be felt. 
 
 VI. 
 
 The following notes upon landing parties and the naval brigade are 
 by Lieut. T. B. M. Mason, United States Navy, published in "Hamers- 
 ley's Naval Encyclopedia " : 
 
 When everything is ready for leaving the ship, line ahead is formed, the steam- 
 launch towing the column. A few oars in each boat are kept going, and if the wind 
 is favorable, sails are set. In moving up a river care is to be taken not to be am- 
 bushed. Scouting parties may be landed if favorable eminences are near at hand, 
 from which the banks may be viewed ahead. If attacked in a narrow river, in force, 
 a fight should be made, and the advance continued after the enemy is repulsed. In a 
 broad river, it may be safe to run by the enemy, if he is unprovided with boats. Care 
 must be taken to destroy all boats which may be discovered on the way, as they might 
 be used to cut off retreat. If it is found necessary to land to make coffee, one boat 
 only should be detailed for the work, the others lying off ready for a surprise. 
 
 Haviug arrived within shelling distance of the place to be attacked, a well-directed 
 slow fire should be opened upon it. The boats furnished with guus should take up a 
 commanding position ; the lighter boats, after the landing or beach has been cleared, 
 should move in and land their men, with the exception of those detailed as boat-keep- 
 ers ; the steam launch with a machine-gun moving in to cover the landing. If pos- 
 sible, the work of destruction should be carried out by this party. 
 
 In regard to a naval brigade : 
 
 The circumstances under which a landing has to be made are so variable that no 
 general rule can be laid down. The question, however, can best be discussed from 
 two standpoiuts : 
 
 1. Landing on the water-front of a town. 
 
 2. Landing on a beach (the enemy opposing the landing in each case). 
 
 On approaching the town, the covering vessels will take up such a position that 
 they can shell the lauding, and at the same time cover the land approaches to pre- 
 vent the enemy receiving re-enforcements. The artillery boats will then advance and 
 
137 
 
 tate up positions to clear tlie landing and command the principal streets and build- 
 ings likely to shelter the enemy's riflemen. 
 
 The sea-face having been well shelled, the first line of infantry will pull in to the 
 best landing-places. Once ashore, the first line of buildings will be occupied and 
 manned on the land side. The second line now land, then the artillery, then the re- 
 serve. 
 
 On approaching a beach, the covering vessels must take up a position so as to en- 
 filade any work that the enemy has erected, and to command the approaches. The 
 artillery boats must clear the sand-hills and bushes back of them. The first line now 
 land and advance as skirmishers, and, under the fire of the boats, must throw up 
 light protections and occupy the line. Once established, they must open fire, and the 
 second line will land with the artillery. The second line on shore, they will occupy 
 the position of the first line, which will advance. The artillery will occupy any little 
 knoll, cover itself, and open fire. The reserves, in the mean time, will have landed, 
 and the whole body will advance. The reserves must intrench themselves, and keep 
 the communication with the boats open. As soon as their guard is left by the advanc- 
 ing troops, the boats should he gotten ready for the re-embarkation of the party. In all 
 cases the boats must be hauled off a little way and anchored with a hauling line on 
 shore from the stern, the cable being long enough to veer in. 
 
 The boat guard should intrench themselves as soon as they land. In case of re- 
 treat, the first troops at the landing will relieve the boat guard, which will proceed 
 to its boats. 
 
 In case of disaster, boat-keepers must be ready to sink such boats as 
 are not needed by the fugitives. 
 
 Sometimes the shallowness of the water will not permit boats to land, 
 or the only regalar point of debarkation may be covered by the enemy's 
 artillery, and the landing must be made elsewhere under circumstances 
 which necessitate the use of a stage or float. Such a condition of affairs 
 existed in the French operations before Sfax in Tunis, where the stage 
 was made out of the topsail-yards of the line-of-battle ships, which were 
 gotten into the water alongside, constructed into rafts, then towed sep- 
 arately near the shore, assembled together, and taken in under the 
 direction of Captain Juge, whose report of this well-executed, delicate 
 
 piece of work is as follows : 
 
 On Board the Marengo, 
 
 At Anchor off Sfax, July 18, 1881. 
 
 Admiral : I have the honor, in obedience to your orders, to report to you concerning 
 the duty which was assigned me relative to the assembling of the floating bridge made 
 in sections by the iron-clada of the squadron, and taking it ashore to assist in landing 
 our men. 
 
 At 3 a. m. Saturday, July 16, the steam-launch of the lutr^pide shoved off from the 
 Marengo, towing the whale-boats placed at my disposition, each boat having an officer 
 in charge. We steered for the gun-boats to whose care the different rafts had been con- 
 fided the evening before. As soon as we arrived, the steam-launch took in tow the 
 raft of the Marengo, which was to be the head of the bridge, and the others conducted 
 by the whale-boats followed on behind, end to end. Under the supervision of the 
 officers the lashings were promptly and securely made. The bridge being thus com- 
 pleted the whale-boats made fast along each side, and the steam-launch steering by 
 the alignment of the two towers took us in to about 400 meters from the mole. At that 
 distance I stopped and dropped a grapnel from the rear end, so that the steam-launch 
 had only to tauten the tow-line to keep us on a line perpendicular to the beach; we 
 thus offered the smallest target to the enemy, and at the same time we were in the 
 best position to work rapidly. It was then 4.20 a. m., and we remained in that 
 position during the bombardment. 
 
138 
 
 When the launches and native boats were almost abreast of us, by order of Captain 
 de Marquessac, I sent the whale-boats to tow the native boats, keeping one man of 
 «ach boat's crew for the oars of the bridge. The grapnel was weighed, the steam- 
 launch went ahead, and the men pulled at the oars, trying to maintain the alignment 
 of the bridge. We were soon obliged to cast off the tow, and we hauled ourselves in 
 by means of a grapnel carried out by the Trident's dinghy, and a small anchor which 
 I had sent ashore by the whale-boat of the Marengo. The boats which landed first 
 interfered with our movements somewhat. We finally, however, made our bridge 
 fast after the Trident's boat had landed, and our bridge served for the rest of the ex- 
 peditionary force. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 JUGE. 
 
 The naval brigade should be a fleet affair ; every vessel should fur- 
 nish a factor of the whole, but there should be no such organization as 
 is now generally furnished by our ships of war, where all the elements 
 are more or less those of a parade on shore, and are not such as the best 
 offensive use of a body of men would call for. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Mr. Crompton has the following novelty to offer in the use of the elec- 
 tric light for the debarkation of an army at night. He says : 
 
 It may be often necessary, on accouutof a dangerous coast, or signs of approaching 
 bad weather, that this operation should be carried on at the utmost speed by night as 
 by day. All the apparatus for producing the current would be retained aboard the 
 steamships. The conducting cable need only be passed on shore. Tripod stands, to 
 carry the lamps, would be placed at convenient intervals along the beach. The whole 
 arrangement for lighting a mile of fore-shore could be got into position, and the lights 
 showninlessthan an hour's work by squads of men properly trained with the apparatus. 
 The most difficult operations, such as landing guns and horses, will be carried on as 
 easily by night as by day. If extreme celerity were needed, it is not absolutely neces- 
 sary even to land the lights, the lanterns may be hung in such urgent cases from 
 spars rigged out on the steam tenders or launches; the dynamo-machines being 
 worked as before on board the ships. A distance between the machines and the lights 
 may be as great as a mile without causing the cable to be unnecessarily heavy. I 
 have not dwelt on the advantages which the light gives for uight signaling, for they 
 are suiHciently obvious. 
 
 The German authority, whom we have quoted a few pages back, is 
 not in favor of the electric light being used on board ship for the gen- 
 eral illumination of the situation, since he believes that its glare hin- 
 ders, rather than helps, the vision, and by this means the torpedo-boat 
 of the enemy obtains an excellent target. 
 
 To be used at its best, the electric lights of the vessels of the fleet 
 should fulfill the following conditions: 
 
 1. They should be grouped at some one point, as, for instance, by in- 
 stalling a number of lanterns in some vessel or vessels, or on some point of 
 land, connected by means of cables with a suflScient number of ships 
 to afford a current, which ships shall, if possible, be masked from fire. 
 
 2. The beam from the concentrated light should fall on the object to 
 be illuminated, so as to make as nearly as possible a horizontal right 
 angle with the line of vision of the observer stationed elsewhere. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 DEFENSE OF THE COAST AND TORPEDO FLOTILLA TACTICS. 
 
 I. 
 
 Siuce every point on the coast can become a place of debarkation f 
 an enemy's army ; every town on the coast can be burnt and pillaged 
 by the hostile fleet, or even by simple cruisers, it is necessary to distrib- 
 ute over several centers of action the different constitutent naval ele- 
 ments for the defense of this coast. These comprise rams, floating bat- 
 teries, corvettes, gun vessels of different sizes, and the various classes of 
 torpedo steamers. 
 
 These, in connection with shore defenses, must guard and protect 
 those points from which our squadrons and cruisers can escape into the 
 open sea, and to which they may retreat for asylum in case the enemy 
 be too formidable. 
 
 These centers must be beyond the range of guns of greatest caliber, 
 and should prevent, by their number and their distance inland, the en- 
 emy knowing what is going on. 
 
 The defenseofacoast comes within two categories, astationary defense 
 and a movable defense. The first comprises submarine mines, booms, 
 fortifications of every kind, placed beforehand or extemporized on the 
 coast; the second relies on the action, isolated or combined, of rams, float- 
 ing batteries, gunboats, torpedo-vessels, &c., supported, according to cir- 
 cumstances, by armored ships, or even the sea-going squadrons, should 
 circumstances so conspire as to render necessary this combination for 
 war remaining in its own waters. 
 
 Admiral Penhoat says that the best coast defense is a fleet of specially 
 constructed armor-Slads, capable of going to sea in any weather along 
 a coast. Then each harbor should have its flotilla of tori3edo-boats. 
 These coast-defense vessels should have great battery power, draw little 
 water, have good speed, and be nearly unsinkable. They will require 
 buta small amount of provisions, rather small crews, little coal on board, 
 and large amounts of ammunition. They should be accompanied by 
 lookout vessels. 
 
 These opinions of the Admiral are also formulated in the marine policy 
 of his Government, so that it, in common with many other European 
 nations, has organized fleets to fulfill this purpose. This system of de- 
 fense should especially appeal to a country which is self-supporting, has 
 
 139 
 
140 
 
 no food routes to keep open, is concrete, and which has a large extent 
 of coastline requiring protection, such as is our own. 
 
 Captain Harris says that gun-vessels and gunboats, small steamers, 
 and tenders, are especially useful for coastwise employment. They 
 should be under the protection of larger vessels, and should not be 
 trusted far from their bases. They, and the coastwise armored fleet, 
 and the torpedo flotillas should do their utmost to annoy a menacing 
 fleet, and prevent its anchoring and blockading any port. They must be 
 careful, however, not to bring about a general engagement, or to be 
 caught at sea and cut off. Kon-seagoing armor-clads are, as a general 
 thing, of more' value than tixed forts for the protection of harbors. 
 
 Coast batteries cannot alone prevent an armored squadron from 
 forcing a passage; they must supplement their guns by mines. Con- 
 versely, any mine which is not protected by a gun is harmless, as it 
 can be raised or destroyed. 
 
 Captain Maubeuge expresses the following opinion in regard to tor- 
 pedoes : 
 
 It would be hazardous to place too much confidence in torpedoes, notwithstanding 
 the perfection they have recently attained, for seamen will often succeed in raising 
 them, in cutting their wires, in exploding them at a safe distance from their ships, or, 
 stiU better, will build the latter to be almost, or quite, indestructible by torpedoes. 
 This method of construction is that of water-tight compartments, whose partial de- 
 struction does not endanger the existence of the vessel. 
 
 II. 
 
 In regard to the question, which is the best to employ, a gun-vessel 
 fitted with torpedoes, or a torpedo boat to use to make an attack with 
 auto-mobile torpedoes, it is conceived that the gun-vessel has the follow- 
 ing advantages : 
 
 1. It is harder to disable. 
 
 2. It can be used in heavier weather. 
 
 3. It is not obliged to stop to discharge its torpedoes. 
 
 As far as the torpedo-boat is concerned, Mr. Fontaineau lays down 
 the following points in its favor : 
 
 1. Probably great speed. "* 
 
 2. Smaller target than a gun-vessel. 
 
 3. Great handiness, little momentum. 
 
 4. In case of accident fewer people lost. 
 
 Should practice prove to be true, the common report that torpedo 
 boats will not have to stop to fire their auto-mobile torpedoes, the ad- 
 vantage will, however, lie strongly with this class of vessel. 
 
 If obstructions are placed about a ship, they must be strong enough 
 to resist the onset of a vessel of fair size. A shii> constrained to remain 
 anchored must thoroughly mine her anchorage ground with a regular 
 system of submarine defense. The cables for electrical connections can 
 be stopped to the chain and come in through the hawse-holes. 
 
141 
 
 To render the attack as irresistible as possible the torpedo-vessels 
 must possess the following qualities : 
 
 1. Great speed, so as to enable the boat to be in the field of fire as 
 short a time as possible, and so diminish the risk of being destroyed. 
 
 2. Show as little surface as possible, so as to reduce to a minimum the 
 size of the target for the enemy's guns. 
 
 3. Be divided into as many watertight compartments as possible to 
 prevent being easily sunk. 
 
 4. Have the vital parts as well protected as possible. 
 
 5. A. possibility of using auto-mobile torpedoes without reducing 
 speed. 
 
 6. Protection for the crew against small-arm and machine-gun fire. 
 
 7. Noiseless engines, so as to put off discovery as loiig a time as pos- 
 sible, and so be enabled to approach the enemy. 
 
 8. Great handiness. 
 
 9. Armament with machine guns, to allow fighting a vessel of the same 
 size interfering with its designs. 
 
 10. Facility of being handled out of the water and transported. 
 
 11. The most unobtrusive painting and disguise, to prevent being 
 seen by the enemy's search lights. 
 
 The best torpedo-boats nowpossess most of these desiderata. There are 
 some officers who pretend that this stopping to discharge a torpedo is 
 no defect, for it lasts for only a minute, and the torpedo is ejected be- 
 fore the battery can be concentrated. Possibly this is so, still the fact 
 that it need not be done certainly adds greatly to the tactical worth of 
 the vessel. 
 
 In considering the defense of the vessel from an attack by torpedo- 
 boats, the details of the fitting of the multitude of ingenious inventions 
 devised to meet this end are not entered into by Mr. Fontaineau. In re- 
 gard to the artillery, however, he says that it must fulfill the following 
 conditions. Bach gun must — 
 
 1. Be easily trained, permitting it to follow all the movements of the 
 enemy. 
 
 2. Be capable of rapid loading, so as to fire the instant the aggressor 
 comes in sight, and to keep it up. 
 
 3. Have the projectile heavy enough to injure seriously a gunboat 
 or sink a torpedo-boat. 
 
 III. 
 
 Towing and spar torpedoes, owing to the improvement in machine 
 guns, are now rarely fitted except as an alternative armament, as only 
 under the most favorable conditions will it be possible to approach suffi- 
 ciently near to a vessel to use them under the terrible hail of missiles 
 which could be kept up by her machine guns. The result is that, at 
 present, all the torpedo-boats under construction are armed with the auto- 
 mobile torpedo, and nearly, if not all, of them are armed with machine 
 
142 
 
 guns, to enable them to figbt other boats, and to distract the guns' crews 
 ship thej' are attacking. 
 
 The tactical qualities of the torpedo-boat must be as well known as 
 are those of the ship. They must have their turning circles and helm- 
 angles determined, and their commanding officers must be perfectly 
 familiar with them. Their turning circles will be very large for their 
 length, owing to their shoal draught of water and lightness. For this 
 reason to insure quickness of evolution, drop-rudders have been invented 
 and fitted. 
 
 That these points must be well known is patent from the fact that 
 torpedo-boats must always attack in flotilla. The torpedo-boat acting 
 singly has no place in modern warfare. No success can be derived from 
 independent action, as the assailed vessel will always be more than a 
 match for each individual boat. 
 
 Admiral Peuhoat, in discussing this subject, says that the torpedo 
 flotilla should be composed of boats representing two classes ; one 
 class capable of going outside the harbor, and the other intended to act 
 in smoother water. The flotilla should be ready to attack at all times, 
 being moored in ambuscades"; natural features of a harbor being taken 
 advantage of, if possible, to effect this object. They should be organ- 
 ized on a section or group basis, and they should be accompanied by 
 swift tenders armed with a heavy mechanical battery. 
 
 A large number of tacticians believe that the best formation for tor- 
 pedo-boats to resist an attack on a friendly ship by torpedo-boats is 
 probably in double line abreast or in alternate lines abreast. The first 
 line to charge the enemy's line and come around quickly, all boats turn- 
 ing the same way. The second line to keep between the attacking 
 boats and the benet ship. The vessel should keep up a fire over the 
 line of her own boats nearest to her. The ship should be underway 
 and perhaps stopped ; the line of boats nearest her would soon resemble 
 a cordon, and the outer line should coucentrate on the most dangerous 
 point of the enemy's attack. The ship should retreat as soon as she 
 sees her way out of the danger. 
 
 An attack on a vessel by torpedo-boats should be made with the flotilla 
 divided into two or three divisions; one of these should act as a reserve. 
 This last should either dash at the ship when the other divisions are en- 
 gaging her torpedo-boats, or they should follow the ship when she seeks 
 to retreat. If the ship must retreat through a channel, it would be a 
 piece of strategy to have her attacked at one or two points in her pas- 
 sage out ; the first attack being intended to engage her torpedo-boats, 
 and not to destroy the ship. 
 
 Let us consider an attack on a fleet lying off and on the mouth of a 
 harbor, by a flotilla of torpedo-boats at night. The boats should be di- 
 vided into two or more divisions. Each division will tow astern of a 
 corvette or tender. The slowest boat of each division will be nearest 
 the towing vessel, and will, in the attack; act as the reserve boat. The 
 
143 
 
 towing corvettes and the reserve boats sliould be supplied with rockets 
 and signal lights. The lines should tow out the harbor, each line sepa- 
 rating as soon as possible from the others and towing each to some spot 
 at about equally estimated distances from the fleet to be attacked. One 
 or two heavy vessels should move out to the mouth of the harbor. 
 When the corvettes and the heavy vessels have reached their assigned 
 positions, they should drop an anchor under foot and stand by to slip. 
 These positions should be so chosen by the Admiral that the torpedo 
 flotilla shall be giveu every advantage of shelter and cover. At a cer- 
 tain set time, the torpedo flotilla will cast off from the towing vessels 
 and be towed by the reserve boat directly towards the enemy. As soon 
 as he is discovered each boat will separate from the reserve and dash 
 for him. The painters connecting the boats had better be of chain, and 
 each end should be slipped and the chain permitted to sink, otherwise 
 the whole exploit might miscarry through a fouled screw. 
 
 No special rule can be given for attack, other than that the lines 
 should mutually support one another. Each commanding officer of a 
 torpedo-boat should be thoroughly informed of the appearance of each 
 ship of the enemy, and the disposition of her vulnerable points. When 
 the attack becomes general, the reserve boats should dash in. If the 
 enemy is worsted the corvettes and heavy vessels should approach the 
 scene and help the torpedo flotilla with .their search-lights and weapons 
 of ofiense. 
 
 If the torpedo-boats are obliged to retreat, they will fall back on the 
 corvettes, and since these are separated, the boats will stand a good 
 chance of picking up one of them, which wiU afford them shelter. Their 
 chances, indeed, would be greater of their doing this than if the cor- 
 vettes were all at one rendezvous. The anchorages of the corvettes 
 should not be farther apart than a quarter of a mile. 
 
 An engagement between small vessels, bringing out several tactical 
 situations, occurred in Oallao Harbor during the Ohili-Peruvian war, 
 an account of which is as follows : 
 
 At 2.30 a. lu., May 25, a Peruvian old-type steara-lauQcli, that formerly belonged to 
 the ill-fated Independenoia, commanded by Lieutenant Galvez, with a crew of six- 
 teen men, and armed with a Gardner gun in the bow and a 2-inoh breech-loading rifle 
 in the stern, came suddenly upon the Chilian steel Thornycroft torpedo-launch Gua- 
 colda, which had a speed of 11 knots and was fitted with three spar-torpedoes, oue 
 right ahead and one on each bow. The Peravian started at full speed for the mole as 
 soon as he made oiit his enemy. The Janequeo, a steel Yarrow torpedo-launch, with 
 a speed of 18 knots, now appeared on the scene, and passing ahead of her sister boat 
 exploded her bow torpedo under the Peruvian's counter ; at the same moment Lieuten- 
 ant Galves and Surgeon Ugarte exploded a torpedo on the Janequeo's bow, which 
 opened a large leak and killed two men. Her commander. Lieutenant Senoret, man- 
 aged to get her alongside of a lighter, where she sank. Lieutenant Goni, in the Gua- 
 colda, continued to chase the Independenoia, which kept up a, heavy fire from her 
 small-arms and stem gun. At last the Peruvians, finding their launch sinking, ceased 
 firing and surrendered. Goni sent his dingey to her rescue and succeeded in saving 
 Lieutenant Galves, seriously wounded, and seven of the crew. It was not till this 
 
144 
 
 time that Goni missed his consort ; hut thinking that she had returned to the fleet, he 
 ■went back to the flagship, put the wounded and prisoners on board, and finding that 
 the Janequeo had not returned iveut in search of her. As he approached the floating 
 dock he met Lieutenant Senoret and his crew coming out in two small boats which 
 they had picked up alongside of the hulk Callao. 
 
 Besides doing their legitimate work, torpedo-vessels will have to fight 
 small adversaries barring their passage. As we have before observed, 
 they may be the enemy's torpedo-boats, but again they may be picket 
 launches, tugs, or even booms and other obstructions. These will have 
 to be overcome by machine-gun fire, hand grenades, spar torpedoes, 
 and necklaces, or mines of gun-cotton or some other high explosive. 
 For this purpose torpedo-boats should be fitted with the necessary 
 weapons, leading wires, and batteries. 
 
 The attack on a fleet at anchor will rarely occur. However, should 
 such a condition of affairs happen, the boats should separate, and, act- 
 ing in pairs or groups of three, take as many vessels as possible at the 
 same moment, and make as many victims as they can in the least time. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE CONCLUSION. 
 I. 
 
 Sir Thomas Brassey, K. C. B., says: 
 
 The loss of the Grosser Kurfiirst occurred undoubtedly from the want of practice 
 in fleet-sailing among the officers of the German Navy. On the last-named occasion 
 the squadron of four ships was reduced to one in forty-eight hours after leaving Wil- 
 helmshaven. On the first night one of the ships grounded on a sand-bauli. On the 
 following day the collision occurred between the Konig Wilhelm and the Grosser 
 Kurfiirst. 
 
 The destruction of a large vessel represents the direct loss of about 
 $3,000,000. Then there are incidental losses of officers, men, and ma- 
 terial of war. To these may be added the capture of a tactical center 
 or the laying under bonds of a large business capital through the fail- 
 ure of this vessel to appear and defend it, making the amount of money 
 involved, rise to such a sum that the imagination fails to follow. 
 
 With the certain knowledge that ships of such size are, and will be, 
 needed; with the certain knowledge that just such ships, when we 
 have them, will be lost through collision and bad handling, is it not the 
 bounden duty of the nation to prepare for this condition of things, and 
 in the interests of economy to see that its naval officers are well in- 
 structed in practical tactics and the handling of ships'? 
 
 To again quote Sir Thomas Brassey, we read : 
 
 The history of not only our own Navy, but that of all other navies which have at- 
 tained any importance in the world, from the most ancient times downwards, has 
 shown that tactical efficiency and naval success went hand in hand, and that the ab- 
 sence of the former assuredly led to the want of the latter. 
 
 This knowledge can never be gained in the class-room, since theory 
 will not make a seaman, even in the case of men who have an intuitive 
 faculty for seamanship. 
 
 Admiral Eandolph, writing a few years ago, asks the question in re- 
 gard to his own service : 
 
 Are we taking every pains, not merely to perfect our few employed captains in 
 their art but to train and habituate all ranks of executives in the practical manage- 
 ment of ships? We eannot think that an affirmative reply can be accepted as satis- 
 factory until a system is established under which, at least, every second in command, 
 and every lieutenant of a certain standing (who may of course at any moment become 
 go or even in charge of the ship), is made fully competent to do so by experience in 
 handling one, not only in ordinary navigation, but in narrow waters, and all fleet 
 
 evolutions. 
 
 145 
 
 482 10 
 
146 
 
 Why should there not be a systematic course of practical maneuvers, including ex- 
 periments in turning under difficulties in tbo shorti-st time and smallest space; in 
 stopping dead from diifereut speeds, and going astern, &c., through which every 
 executive should pass, in vessels of any available size, from steam pinnaces to big 
 armored ships (the larger the better, of course, but nothing is too small to be of 
 great value), to be carried out abroad and at home, whenever opportunities occurred ? 
 If economists are alarmed letthem soothe themselves! * * » At the worst, it would 
 amount to little more than the necessary coal, the s aving of which cannot be justified 
 and might easily turn out not only a pernicious but a disastrous economy. Let the 
 financier who considers this a wicked waste of money put his price on these two qual- 
 ities, viz, skill and nerve, but don't lot him expect to get them for nothing j « » » 
 they require careful and constant cultivation, and if desired of the best quality, must 
 be paid for at the highest price, like all other commodities. 
 
 What is true of the British Navy is true of our own. If we have 
 fewer ships, a more dishearleniDg system governing promotion, and uo 
 punishment for mental laziness, our duty is still jilaiu ! Harder, more 
 precise work, a devotion to a specialty, is what is required ! 
 
 Since the necessity for a navy will arise, if it has not already arisen, 
 it is but fair to conclude that one will be set afloat. It will be the prac- 
 tically instructed ofticer in the science under consideration who will 
 proudly lead our new fleet into action and to victory. 
 
 If this work is demanded of the officer, what duty devolves upon the 
 nation ? Primarily, to establish a graded course for practical drill. 
 Secondly, to maintain a squadron of evolutions. 
 
 It is not proposed here to draw up a course of instruction. Such a 
 course will be the result ot great thought, consultation, a utilization of 
 the means at hand and available, and a giadual elaboration from time 
 to time. 
 
 Every officer must be given a chance to serve in the squadron after 
 passing through the school ot practical tactics. 
 
 On this subject Captain Colomb says : 
 
 I therefore feel the greatest possible anxiety that further steps should be taken 
 towards the establishment of a systematic method of training our younger officers 
 in the practical work of handling our ships at sea. The gunboat trials in the Russian 
 squadron are full of information ; a vast deal of information is got out of very little 
 experience in that way, and it could be very easily carried out n little further than 
 Meam-launches and gunboats by larger vessels, which need not ram each other, but 
 apara or rafts towed astern. 
 
 II. 
 
 Several years ago a squadron of instruction was organized in Eussia. 
 Several gunboats are fitted with fascines as buffers to prevent injury 
 from ramming, and tournaments are repeatedly held in the presence of 
 the superior offtcers of the fleet. Each gunboat is maneuvered by the 
 captain of an armor-clad assisted by one of his officers and his chief 
 engineer. In this way every captain, in his turn, has a practical lesson 
 in ramming and being rammed or avoiding it, which they could not 
 with safety attempt iu their large commands. "All day long, and cvei v 
 day, one or other of the armor-dads, taking it in turn, is underway 
 
147 
 
 threading her way backward and forward through the anchored fleet. 
 The captain who makes the closest shave, without touching, is highly 
 commended." 
 
 Naval tournaments should take place at sea between protected gun- 
 boats. 'These sea sham-fights would throw much light on disputed points 
 in the rule of the road, and settle in a week what the most experienced 
 and practical seamen may go on disputing about for years. 
 
 Much, too, can be learned in the way of fleet tactics from exercise in 
 steam-launches. The launches should be organized as a fleet, and the 
 movements, after determining the evolutionary circle of each launch, be 
 gone through with. After the captains are thoroughly conversant with 
 the drill, then astern of each launch should be towed a cutter. The helm- 
 angle of the launch should be made smaller, and the launch and its tow 
 should be considered as one vessel. Distances and intervals should be 
 made greater to correspond with the new length, and the flotilla, under 
 the new circumstances, should be again drilled in evolutions. By veer- 
 ing the boats farther astern of the launches, decreasing the helm-angles, 
 and increasing the distances and intervals, the system of tactics resem- 
 bles that of the movements of large vessels in its application. 
 
 By this means commanding olflcers can be brought to know fully the 
 amount of room required in which they can mnneuver their ships. Of 
 course this method of drill is at best a makeshift, and that amount of 
 nerve required in the commanding officer, nowadays, is in no way de- 
 veloped. 
 
 No course of instruction in tactics will be complete without a thorough 
 discussion in some graphic manner of the relation existing between op- 
 posing ships and fleets. We think this end will be best served by a 
 study of "The Duel: A Naval War Game, invented and arranged by 
 Captain P. H. Oolomb, E. N." Without entering into the rules govern- 
 ing it, it may be said that the game is based upon two ships carrying 
 guns the same in number, but differently distributed, according to the 
 choice of the players. The ships make the same or ditterent speeds, ac- 
 cording to lot. All during the combat, founded either on artillery or 
 the ram, both ships must keep up their speeds; that is, they can neither 
 slow, stop, nor back, and they must always use the same amount of helm 
 in turning, so that each ship's turning-circle has an invariable diameter. 
 There are different values for each gun when fired, and the bat:le is de- 
 cided when one of the ships is rammed, kept under artillery fire, which 
 she cannot adequately return, or when she is driven on shore or into 
 neutral waters. We see here different speeds and varying helm-angles) 
 for each ship is excluded from the game. The distinguished inventor, 
 however, promises that they will be introduced as soon as sufficient 
 authentic data is obtained bearing on these points. We can easily see 
 that the sphere of this game, between experienced players, could be so 
 enlarged as to include combats between fleets. Uuder all circumstances, 
 whether played in its present simple state or whether elaborated into 
 
148 
 
 something very much greater, it should be found in the hands of every 
 naval oflScer, who is interested in the highest and most conspicuou s branch 
 of his profession — the meeting and vanquishing of an enemy in a fair 
 fight on the open sea. 
 
 Whilst this book is in preparation, the English are considering the 
 necessity of following out the Russian system of drill. A class of gun- 
 boats is proposed, protected where necessary with buffers, going at a 
 slow rate with low steam pressure, and using a small helm-angle. The 
 idea is to make them unhandy in their movements, so as to resemble 
 somewhat larger ships in their evolutions. 
 
 III. 
 
 The run across the Atlantic from New York to Queenstown is now 
 made in a little more than six days. Nearly every week some new ves- 
 sel distinguishes herself by her quick trip. Comparing the one which 
 first made this great speed with the last one, we see a great gain in the 
 expenditure of coal ; so much less being burnt per ton of displacement, 
 and larger runs being made on individual days. 
 
 In the near future we shall see an ordinary sea-speed of 20 knots main- 
 tained. If, now, this will be the speed of merchant steamers, there must 
 be a cruiser class put afloat which will at least be their equals in si)eed, 
 and their superiors in length of time in which they can keep the sea. 
 
 The tactician may well stand appalled at these immense speeds. 
 What formations can be used for the ordinary purposes of navigation 1 
 In what order will the attack be made"? What system of evolutions 
 will be followed ? And so on through the whole list of tactical require- 
 ments. 
 
 We fancy these questions can only be answered in a very general 
 way. Any improvement in speed or turning power, or means of war- 
 fare, simplifies formations and evolutions, but enjoins greater complica- 
 tion upon the mutual duties of ships. It also causes a decrease in the 
 number of ships which can with safety be set to act together. It may 
 be that the number of vessels which can be combined will be only four, 
 if, indeed, it is not two. Distances and intervals will perhaps be greater. 
 The time during which a fire will be effective will last for only a few 
 seconds. Then, again, the amount of sea traversed, after a charge, before 
 a turn can be made, will be so great that a fight will only be possible 
 on the open sea or in wide estuaries, between other than single ships. 
 
 The question now arises, since ships will be in a fight such a short 
 time near together, what kind of guns will be used, and what will char- 
 acterize the modern ship of war fitted for the line-of-battle ? To us it 
 looks as if the coming ship would be, as regards her hull, nearly, if not 
 quite, torpedo-proof through numerous water-tight compartments com- 
 ing up to the spar-deck; have her engines, boilers, and controlling of- 
 ficers protected ; a large number of guns of moderate or even small 
 caliber; labor-saving machioery everywhere, and therefore a small 
 
149 
 
 crew; no torpedoes; auxiliary rudder; and guns or tubes for firing 
 some sort of high-powered explosive. She should also have a capacity 
 for full sail-power; ordinarily to be barquetine rigged, with generous 
 fore-and-aft " schooner" sails (lashed on the foot to booms, and not try- 
 sails), with yards ready to go aloft and square sails to bend and set. 
 
 In conclusion, it may be mentioned that the foregoing pages have not 
 been written with any idea of exciting controversy, but to refreshen 
 the line of thought upon a subject which is at present engaging the 
 minds of the offtcers of the navies of most foreign Governments. It 
 may be, that enough has been drawn from the works of others to stim- 
 ulate an endeavor to develop scientific research in a direction at once 
 very interesting and vitally important. 
 
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